THE PITT-NEWCASTLE COALITION AND THE CONDUCT OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 1757-1760

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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

I am very grateful for all the help given in the preparation of this thesis by Dr J.B. Owen, Mr C.H. Stuart and Dr P.G. Mackesy, all of whom supervised my efforts at various stages. My sincere thanks are also due to the Governing Body of Christ Church for awarding me a Senior Scholarship; to my cousin the late Dr E.F. Jacob for all his encouragement; and to my wife for typing this thesis and for all her other help and support.

ABSTRACT

The Pitt-Newcastle Coalition and the Conduct of the Seven Years' War, 1757-1760

The purpose of this thesis is to study the interaction of politics and the formation of war policy in the three years between the beginning of the Pitt-Newcastle coalition in June 1757 and the death of George II in October 1760. These limits are prescribed partly by the fact that this period, preceded and followed by political turmoil, has a unity of its own as a period of political quiescence; and partly by Sir Lewis Namier's work on the years 1760-1762 and the work at the moment being done by Dr J.B. Owen on the politics of 1754-1757.

But this thesis is not primarily a study of political relationships. Nor, on the other hand, is it a comprehensive survey of the formation of war policy. Rather, it is an attempt to examine how the one influenced the other: of the extent to which strategy might be shaped by political pressures, of the efforts of politicians to overcome this, and, conversely, of the way in which war developments might affect the political balance at home. Those areas of the war about which there was no political controversy are not examined: there was, for instance, no disagreement about the way Pitt conducted the war in America; this came within the Southern Department and both the King and Newcastle were happy to leave it to Pitt to decide how the American campaigns should be fought. And Pitt was in general content to leave the raising of finance entirely to Newcastle.

The conduct of the war in Europe was a much more controversial matter. The most significant political disputes of the mid-eighteenth century were about whether and how a government should support continental powers in the land war, and particularly about the respect that should be paid to the Hanoverian connection. These questions occupy a central place in the thesis.

In this way, it is intended to cover ground which has generally been neglected. On the one hand, most of the modern studies of limited periods of the eighteenth century, such as those by Dr Owen on 1742-7, Sir Lewis Namier on 1760-2, Mr Brooke on 1766-8 and Professor Christie on 1780-2, have been primarily about changes in political relationships in periods of unrest, and discussion about the evolution of policy has been incidental to the political narrative. On the other hand, the major surveys of the two great wars of the mid-eighteenth century, Admiral Richmond's The Navy in the War of 1739-1748, Sir Richard Lodge's Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748, M. Waddington's La Guerre de Sept Ans and Sir Julian Corbett's England in the Seven Years' War, are military, naval and diplomatic histories, more concerned to describe the effects of English policies on the course of war than the political developments influencing their formation. Mr Mackesy's The War for America, 1775-1783 gives more attention to the relationship between politics and strategy, but it does not of course deal with the European theatre on which the controversies of the two earlier wars were centred. The only recent work in which the main theme has been the interaction between politics and the evolution of policy has been the discussion by Dr Donoughue in

British Politics and the American Revolution of the factors affecting the formation of English policy towards America in the eighteen months before the outbreak of war.

The same general questions are asked in this thesis. First, it is necessary to examine the range of possibilities open to Pitt and Newcastle when they took office in June 1757. Part I attempts to do this. It begins with a description of the way in which the coalition came to be formed and an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the parties of which it consisted. This is followed by an examination of how Newcastle and Pitt saw their own roles in the coalition and of the restrictions imposed on these roles by the departmental system and by the nature of cabinet government. It is shown that Pitt, despite his political defeat by Newcastle in June 1757, was determined to exercise the maximum degree of control over the making of policy that the circumstances allowed, and that Newcastle, seeing his position largely in political terms, was prepared to acquiesce in this.

The limitations imposed on Pitt's field of action came not only from the way in which administration was carried on and from the fact that he was in coalition with Newcastle: he had also to ensure that his policies were acceptable to the House of Commons. Newcastle's supporters ensured him a majority, but to keep his own supporters in line was equally necessary if he was to maintain his weight and bargaining strength in the coalition. The extent to which Pitt was restricted in his policy-making by the views of his Tory and City supporters in the House of Commons is next examined. The main areas of agreement and disagreement over how war should

be conducted are identified and the range of opinion both within the Cabinet and within the House of Commons is evaluated. Pitt made use of the common ground among politicians on the controversial questions of where and how the war should be conducted, the support that should be given to Hanover and other continental allies, the use of British troops on the continent and the militia at home, and the scope for finding this common ground on these questions is explained. The areas of agreement and dispute within the ministry itself, particularly between the two leading ministers, are also reviewed: so too are the views of Leicester House and the impact they might have on Pitt and the government as a whole.

Part I therefore aims to answer the question: to what extent and in what ways was Pitt liable to face opposition in making his attempt to control war policy? Part II shows chronologically how Pitt's attempt worked out in practice. Its central theme is that, though starting from a weak political position, Pitt succeeded both in his aim of taking upon himself the direction of war policy and in his determination that this policy should be circumscribed as little as possible by political considerations. It is maintained that Pitt achieved these aims by an acute sensitivity to the nature of these considerations and by extreme care in his attention to the problem of neutralising them. In this task, it is argued that Pitt displayed a political skill of the highest order, of which only Hardwicke, among politicians active at the time, even began to form a true judgement. This is the main motif of Part II: Pitt's outstanding ability as a politician and his use of this ability to ensure that political factors deflected

to the minimum extent the course of war policy he wanted to pursue. He cleverly exploited the weakness of his own position in the government; took advantage of Newcastle's majority in the House of Commons while retaining Tory support by disclaiming any responsibility for the control of the Commons and retaining an apparently independent attitude; took advantage also of Newcastle's favour in the closet as a means of enforcing disagreeable policies on the King; and frequently contrived to put the blame on Newcastle for decisions unpopular with his own supporters but which were in reality of his own devising, while his enthusiasm for popular causes was generally related not to the merits of the question at issue, but to the political advantages for the putting over of his policies which might accrue.

It is not surprising that Pitt soon realised that the coalition was the best political framework in which he could hope to operate. Newcastle thought the same. He might disapprove of Pitt's stand on popular issues, of his raids on the French coast, his refusal to prepare seriously for invasion, his lack of enthusiasm for a Dutch alliance or for transferring the war to Flanders, his insistence on the execution of the Militia Act; but he was surprised and delighted by the measure of Pitt's support for the war in Germany and by the decision, first made in 1758, to send British troops to Ferdinand's army. Increasingly, too, Pitt's popularity would be necessary to secure the quick peace that Newcastle, as First Lord of the Treasury, consistently wanted - and which, after Minden, Pitt was also seriously considering, and on terms far short of those on which he later insisted. Pitt was

useful, moreover, in helping Newcastle to resist the King's partiality for Hanover and his wish for Hanoverian acquisitions at the peace. These demands, and his resentment against Newcastle for his constant pressure on Pitt's behalf, produced increasing tension between Newcastle and the King - until late in 1759 the King finally accepted the hopelessness of his Hanoverian requests - and also cemented the alliance between the two ministers. And just as Newcastle's alienation from the present King strengthened the bonds between himself and Pitt, so equally did Pitt's alienation from the future King. This breach was not sought by Pitt and he did what he could to prevent it from becoming irreparable. The result of this breach, and of the growing identity of interest between Pitt and Newcastle, was that before the death of George II, the parties of Fox and Bute, whose irreconcilability had been the only constant feature of the negotiations three years earlier, were looking to each other for support.

In explaining these changes in the balance of the coalition, it is sometimes necessary to narrate political developments which are unrelated to the central theme of the interaction of politics and war policy. Henry Legge's split with Bute, for instance, had nothing to do with the conduct of the war, but it has to be explained in order that the political pressures on Pitt and Newcastle, and the political opportunities open to them, can be adequately understood. In such cases, the purely political narrative, serving as it does only as a background to the main theme, is kept as brief as can reasonably be done. Above all, this is a study of politics as 'the art of the possible' - both

of how politicians saw the possibilities open to them, and of how decisions and events were shaped by these views.

C O N T E N T S

ABBREVIATIONS

PART I

1	THE FORMATION OF THE COALITION	1
2	PITT AND NEWCASTLE	33
3	MEN AND MEASURES (1) WHIGS AND TORIES	66
4	MEN AND MEASURES (2) THE MINISTERS	109

PART II

5	HASTENBECK AND ROCHEFORT	143
6	CLOSTERSEVEN	162
7	PARLIAMENT AND 'CONTINENT MEASURES'	178
8	EMDEN	195
9	ST MALO AND CHERBOURG	213
10	LOUISBOURG AND ST CAST	228
11	REALIGNMENT	244
12	INVASION	264
13	MINDEN	282
14	ATTITUDES TO PEACE	306
15	FURTHER REINFORCEMENTS	320
16	BELLEISLE	334

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS

In a few instances where there is no risk of ambiguity, titles to which frequent reference has been made in the text have been abbreviated after the first reference. The list of these abbreviations is as follows:

Almon, *Anecdotes*	(Almon, J.), *Anecdotes of the Rt Hon William Pitt, Earl Chatham, and of the Principal Events of His Time, with his Speeches in Parliament from the year 1736 to the year 1778*, London 1792
Bed. Corr.	Russell, Lord John, ed., *Correspondence of John Russell, Duke of Bedford*, ii, London 1843
Bisset, *Mitchell*	Bisset, A., *Memoirs and Papers of Sir Andrew Mitchell*, 2 vols., London 1850
Charteris, *Cumberland*	Charteris, Sir E., *William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland and the Seven Years' War*, London 1925
Chatham Corr.,	Taylor, W.S. and Pringle, J.H., eds., *Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*, i, ii, London 1838
Dodington, *Journal*	Carswell, J. and Dralle, L.A., eds., *The Political Journal of George Bubb Dodington*, Oxford 1965
Eng. Hist. Rev.	English Historical Review
Fitzmaurice, *Shelburne*	Fitzmaurice, E., *Life of William, Earl of Shelburne*, i, 2nd ed., London 1912
Glover, *Memoirs*	(Glover, R.), *Memoirs of a Celebrated Literary and Political Character from the Resignation of Sir Robert Walpole in 1742, to the Establishment of Lord Chatham's Second Administration in 1757*, London 1813

Hartshorne, Memoirs of a Royal Chaplain	Hartshorne, A., Memoirs of a Royal Chaplain, 1729-1763: The Correspondence of Edmund Pyle, D.D., Chaplain in Ordinary to George II, with Samuel Kerrich, D.D., Vicar of Dersingham, Rector of Wolferton, and Rector of West Newton, London 1905
Hervey, Memoirs	Sedgwick, R., ed., Some Materials Towards Memoirs of the Reign of King George II by John, Lord Hervey, 3 vols., London 1931
Hist. MSS. Comm.	Historical Manuscripts Commission
Ilchester, Henry Fox	Ilchester, Lord, Henry Fox, First Lord Holland, 2 vols., London 1920
Letters of Chesterfield	Dobree, B., ed., Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, Fourth Earl of Chesterfield, v, London and New York 1932
Letters to Lord Holland	Ilchester, Lord, ed., Letters to Henry Fox, First Lord Holland, London 1915
Namier, Structure of Politics	Namier, Sir L.B., The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III, 2nd ed., London 1957
Pares, War and Trade	Pares, R., War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763, Oxford 1936
Parl. Hist.	Cobbett, W., ed., The Parliamentary History of England, xv, London 1813
Phillimore, Lyttelton	Phillimore, R.J., Memoirs and Correspondence of George, Lord Lyttelton from 1734 to 1773, ii, London 1845
Pol. Corr.	Droysen, J.G., Duncker, M.W. and Volz, G.B., eds., Politische Correspondenz Friedrich's des Grossen, xiv-xx, Berlin, 1886 etc.
Smith, The Grenville Papers	Smith, W.J., ed., The Grenville Papers: Being the Correspondence of Richard Grenville Earl Temple, KG, and the Right Hon George Grenville, Their Friends and Contemporaries, i, London 1852

Torrens, History of Cabinets	Torrens, W.M., History of Cabinets: from the Union with Scotland to the Acquisition of Canada and Bengal, 2 vols., London 1894
Trans.Royal Hist. Soc.	Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
Waldegrave, Memoirs	Memoirs of James, Earl Waldegrave, 1754-1758, London 1821
Walpole, Correspondence	Lewis, W.S., ed., Horace Walpole's Correspondence, 30 vols., New Haven and London, 1937-67
Walpole, Memoirs	Holland, Lord, ed., Horace Walpole: Memoirs of the Reign of King George II, 3 vols., London 1846-7
Western, English Militia	Western, J.R., The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: the Story of a Political Issue, 1660-1802, London 1965
Whitworth, Ligonier	Whitworth, R., Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: a Study of the British Army, 1702-1770, Oxford 1958
Yorke, Hardwicke	Yorke, P.C., The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 3 vols., Cambridge 1913

P A R T I

CHAPTER I

THE FORMATION OF THE COALITION

(i) The Balance of Forces

The coalition between Newcastle and Pitt, formed in June 1957, ended a period of political instability that had lasted since the death of Henry Pelham, Newcastle's brother, in March 1754. On the formation of this administration the Earl of Hardwicke, Newcastle's closest friend and adviser, told his son-in-law Anson that 'all our friends are in raptures with it'.[1] Pitt, on the other hand, set out with 'a very bad opinion of the Union'.[2] Once Newcastle had come to accept the necessity of coming to terms with an effective figure in the House of Commons, he had brought into being a coalition containing virtually every element he wanted.

Sir Keith Feiling writes of the strength of eighteenth-century governments:

> Cabinets clearly did not depend on popular mandate, but poised and turned ... on a balance, between a royal executive, groups maintained by ministerial influence, and a public opinion not yet drawn up through party systems but scattered, formless, and difficult of expression.[3]

In this trio of forces, each of the 'Triumvirate', the three men who now dominated political life had one major advantage. Pitt's greatest asset was his support, real or contrived, outside Parliament. Within a few days of Pelham's death

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1 P.C. Yorke, The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke Earl of Hardwicke (Cambridge, 1913), ii, 405.
2 Memorials of the public Life and Character of the Rt. Hon. James Oswald of Dunnikier (Edinburgh, 1825), p. 430.
3 K.G. Feiling, The Second Tory Party, 1714-1832 (London, 1938), p. 143.

he had determined that since there was no chance of royal favour he must try to attain 'weight in the House of Commons ... from weight in the country'.[1] Henry Fox, on the other hand, was from the evidence of prints and caricatures the most unpopular of all leading politicians:[2] but as the friend and confidant of the King's son the duke of Cumberland he was the first favourite in the closet. The strength of the duke of Newcastle derived from his long experience of electoral management and his influence in the House of Commons; a list of M.Ps. on whom he could depend, drawn up for his benefit in February 1757, contains 399 names, of whom 282 were reckoned as completely reliable.[3] The events of the three years after Pelham's death showed that without control of this majority in the Commons neither Pitt's support 'out of doors' nor Fox's royal favour was enough to sustain a stable administration: but though command of this majority was essential to a soundly based government, this was not necessarily adequate on its own. The balance described by Feiling was a delicate one. Newcastle's adviser Andrew Stone recognised in October 1756 that no lasting administration would be possible unless two of the three leading contenders joined together.[4] Even when this had been accepted, it left wide room for manoeuvre. Pitt did not at first accept

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1 R.J. Phillimore, Memoirs and Correspondence of George, Lord Lyttelton, from 1734 to 1773 (London, 1845), ii, 454.
2 D. George, English Political Caricature to 1792: A Study of Opinion and Propaganda (Oxford, 1959), p. 105
3 Brit. Mus., Addit. MSS 32997 (Newcastle Papers), f. 113.
4 Brit. Mus., Addit. MSS 51379 (Holland House Papers): Stone to Fox, 28 Oct. 1756.

it; but once he did, he had no hesitation in preferring Newcastle as a partner to Fox. Fox throughout realised that some form of coalition was essential. His views on the respective merits of Newcastle and Pitt as potential partners varied with the circumstances. Newcastle was both realistic and decided, working continually for an agreement with Pitt. Newcastle alone adopted a consistent attitude, and it was he who got his way.

(ii) The Lead of the House of Commons

In March 1754 Newcastle 'had the ball at his foot'.[1] Within a week of Pelham's death, the King was suggesting that Newcastle should succeed Pelham as First Lord of the Treasury and that Fox should take the vacant Secretaryship of State.[2] But Newcastle had no intention of surrendering the control of the Commons to Fox. He at once made it clear that he would allow Fox no control over elections, patronage or secret service expenditure. Fox refused to accept on these terms, and Newcastle secured the appointment of Sir Thomas Robinson as Secretary, a loyal supporter but an inexperienced and unskilled parliamentarian.

The attempt to do something for Pitt failed. He had been made Paymaster-General in 1746 when the Pelhams, following

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1 The Political Journal of George Bubb Dodington, ed. J. Carswell and L.A. Dralle (Oxford, 1965), p. 300.
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 192.

their collective resignation and return, had imposed him on the reluctant King, who was deeply resentful of his denigration of Hanover. On Pelham's death Hardwicke, whom the King was using as an intermediary, tried to persuade the King of the importance of promoting Pitt from the Paymastership and of the fact that Fox's support rested on 'a very narrow clique, and many of them of the worst sort.'[1] But the King was adamant. Pitt abandoned all hope of achieving anything through Hardwicke.

Pitt remained as Paymaster, Fox as Secretary at War. But though they both remained within the ministry, their common exclusion from real power drew them together in opposition to the government of which they were a part.[2] In November, Pitt used the discussion of election petitions to launch a series of bitter attacks and made it clear to Newcastle that there was no chance of a reconciliation.[3] Since Pitt could not be won over, Newcastle started to look back to Fox, to whom he made overtures early in December through Lord Waldegrave. Fox's position was less strong than it had been in March. His unofficial alliance with Pitt annoyed the King.[4] He now aimed simply for a seat in the Cabinet while remaining in his present office, and agreement on these terms was soon reached.

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 206.
2 Cf. The Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ed. W.S. Taylor and J.H. Pringle (London, 1838), i, 125, 131.
3 H. Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George II, ed. Lord Holland (London, 1846), i, 407-9.
4 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 222.

The winning over of Fox gave some grounds for hope that Pitt might now become more conciliatory and an approach to him was made by 'old' Horace Walpole and by Hardwicke's son Charles Yorke.[1] As a result, Pitt spelled out his terms to Newcastle: he must have a say in the disposal of patronage and an office 'of advice as well as of execution'.[2] Newcastle was not likely to accept these conditions. At the same time, Pitt was also depriving himself of the option of an alliance with Fox. This intransigent line is explained by Pitt's connection with the Princess of Wales. Her anxiety over the ascendancy that her brother-in-law Cumberland was gaining had been increased by Cumberland's presidency of the Council of Regency during the King's absence in Hanover in the spring of 1755. Her friend Lord Bute discovered by chance that Pitt's relations with Cumberland were strained. Bute was keen to gain Pitt's support and a meeting with the Princess was arranged. Pitt agreed to enter into the 'closest engagement' with Leicester House, on the understanding that he would be made head of the government in the next reign.[3] According to Gilbert Elliot, a close friend of Bute's, Pitt had from the start agreed to oppose the subsidy treaties being negotiated with Russia and Hesse-Cassel. This would give the young court an opportunity to attach the alleged Hanoverianism of the ministry and thereby

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1 Dodington, Journal, p. 309. Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 229-231. 'Old' Horace Walpole (1678-1757) of Wolterton, Norfolk.

2 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 238.

3 R. Sedgwick, 'William Pitt and Lord Bute, 1755-58', History Today, vi, 10 (1956), 647. G.F.S. Elliot, The Border Elliots and the Family of Minto (Edinburgh, 1897), p. 341-2. cf. Sedgwick's introduction to Letters from George III to Lord Bute (London, 1939), pp. xliii-lvii, for the development of Bute's relations with the Prince and Dowager Princess of Wales.

to gain support among independent M.Ps.[1] Throughout the summer, Pitt busied himself with the recruitment of a new opposition, committing himself more and more to Leicester House.[2] Fox was as keen as Newcastle for a reconciliation, but his attempt to 'unite the Duke and the Princess' was snubbed.[3] Pitt told him that 'all connection ... was over' and no subsequent efforts by Fox could persuade him to depart from this intractable attitude.[4]

Newcastle and Fox would both have preferred an agreement with Pitt to one with each other, but Pitt made this impossible and again they consequently drew together. Once he was convinced that 'the King will not suffer Mr Fox to do anything, even in the House of Commons' without first consulting him, Newcastle was willing to allow Fox to be made Secretary of State.[5] Robinson was pensioned off, and it was agreed that Fox should take the seals shortly after the start of the session. At last Newcastle had come to realise the importance of having a proper leader of the House of Commons.

(iii) The Triumph of Public Opinion

When the session began in November, Pitt's opposition was unrestrained. In a celebrated speech, he compared Fox and Newcastle to the Rhone and the Saone: 'this, a gentle, feeble, languid stream, and though languid, of no depth - the

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1 Elliot, The Border Elliots and the Family of Minto, p. 342.
2 Sedgwick, 'William Pitt and Lord Bute, 1755-58', History Today, vi, 10 (1956), 648-9.
3 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 37-8. Dodington, Journal, pp. 305-6.
4 Dodington, Journal, p. 296.
5 Lord Ilchester, Henry Fox, First Lord Holland, (London, 1920), i, 268-9.

other, a boisterous and impetuous torrent - but they meet at last'.[1] He attacked the subsidy treaties as 'incoherent un-British measures', designed to lead to a war which could only be fought in Hanover. Within a week, he was dismissed from his post. He now did everything possible to embarrass the ministry. He opposed the budget; produced a scheme for a militia bill; violently attacked the decision to bring over 8000 Hanoverian troops to defend England against the threatened French invasion. Above all, these efforts were helped by the lack of success of the war. Dissatisfaction with the way in which a ministry, even if it had a good majority, was conducting a war invariably had a sapping effect on the government's strength and this resulted in 1742 and 1782 in the erosion and eventual destruction of that majority.

On 28 June the garrison of Fort St Philip on Minorca fell to the French after the failure of Admiral Byng to relieve it. On 9 July, the French formally declared war. The full force of public opinion at once made itself felt. Fox wrote to Devonshire on 31 July: 'the rage of people, and of considerate people, for the loss of Minorca increases hourly'.[2] Addresses demanding an inquiry poured in. The press was especially violent. This outburst of feeling was genuine and largely spontaneous; but it was also exploited and encouraged by the opponents of the ministers.[3] It was fatal to the Fox-Newcastle

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 58.
2 Ilchester, Henry Fox, i, 335.
3 L.S. Sutherland, 'The City of London and the Devonshire-Pitt Administration, 1756-7', Proceedings of the British Academy, xlvi (1960), pp. 152-9.
P. Langford, 'William Pitt and Public Opinion, 1757', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxxxviii (1973), p. 71.

coalition. On 7 August, Fox wrote to Sir Charles Hanbury Williams:

> You will be surprised to hear that I am more alarmed than either the D. of Newcastle or Ld. Chancellor. They have indeed much more courage than I have; and as yet show no other sign of fear than making up to me with the strongest professions of sincere and cordial union. But if they see things truly, they would see that I can neither leave nor save them. And therefore, for all our sakes I will make them look out for other and more help.[1]

Fox was frightened of being used as a scapegoat by Newcastle when Parliament met.[2] He attempted to insure against this by adopting as independent a line as possible. He suggested, for instance, the exchange of Gibraltar for Minorca, without consulting the other ministers.[3] His fears of being left alone in the Commons to defend the ministry were increased by the imminence of the departure of William Murray, the only other effective speaker on the government side, whose case for the vacant post of Lord Chief Justice Newcastle most reluctantly felt obliged to press. On 13 October, Fox made known to Newcastle his intention to resign.

Newcastle was 'thunderstruck' to receive Fox's letter.[4] But his policy was obvious: to try to detach Pitt as quickly as possible. Even before Fox's resignation, he had wanted to try to make Pitt Secretary of State, if this could be done without offending Fox.[5] Now he was 'hand and heart for Pitt'

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1 E. Charteris, William Augustus Duke of Cumberland and the Seven Years' War (London, 1925), p. 233.
2 Ilchester, Henry Fox, i, 335. Dodington, Journal, p. 341.
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 305.
4 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 252.
5 The Grenville Papers, ed. W.J. Smith (London, 1852), i, 174.

and he obtained the King's promise to give him a good reception if he agreed to take the Secretaryship.[1] But Pitt gave an 'absolute final negative'.[2] Late in October Newcastle made it clear that he too was going to resign.

The King called on Fox to form an administration. He was less high in the King's favour than he had formerly been. The King had been offended by an attack made by Fox on Sir Joseph Yorke, Hardwicke's son, Ambassador at the Hague, and by his support of all the demands of Leicester House on the occasion of the regulation of the Prince's establishment on his coming-of-age in June. Fox took this line in the hope of depriving Pitt of a major source of strength. Newcastle exploited Fox's defence of the Prince in order to widen the breach with the King, and the King took seriously Newcastle's allegations that Fox's conduct was dictated by a private compact with Bute.[3] Newcastle's favour in the closet correspondingly improved: Fox described him as 'intoxicated with his power' there.[4] But after Newcastle's resignation, the King had little option but to appeal again to Fox. Pitt was still out of the question, except in the very last resort; the King's overriding objection to him was that he would not 'do my German business'.[5]

There was no chance that Fox would undertake to form an administration unless he had Pitt's support, and he realised

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 322-3
2 ibid., p 326
3 Ilchester, Henry Fox, i, 348. Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 256
4 Hist. MSS. Comm. Ninth Report, Appendix, Part II (A. Morison), p 478
5 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 321

there was little chance of this, though he would 'do anything' to gain it.[1] Predictably, Pitt's reply to Fox was as negative as to Newcastle. He was projecting an administration nominally headed by the duke of Devonshire at the Treasury, with himself as Secretary of State. On 3 November Devonshire caused general surprise by accepting. Fox, a friend of Devonshire, was not consulted and blamed Devonshire's 'weakness and irresolution'.[2] Pitt was Secretary, Henry Legge (who had been dismissed with Pitt and shared his popularity) Chancellor of the Exchequer and Lord Temple First Lord of the Admiralty. Fox declined the Paymastership, a lucrative sinecure: he had not given up hope of a return to political power. But for the moment, the force of public opinion had proved too strong for the politicians.

(iv) The Limitations of 'Popular' Government

The King was no better disposed to Pitt than he had been before. He was annoyed with Devonshire for accepting office and treated Newcastle with special graciousness.[3] The precarious foundation of popularity on which Pitt's experiment rested might prove, now he was in government, a source of weakness as well as strength. As Horace Walpole put it:

> If he Hanoverizes, or checks any inquiries, he loses his popularity, and falls that way: if he humours the present rage of the people, he provokes two powerful factions. His only chance seems to depend on joining with the D(uke) of N(ewcastle) who is most offended with Fox.[4]

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1 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on the MSS. of Mrs Stopford-Sackville, i, 50. Addit. MSS. 51416: Fox to Lady Caroline Fox, 16 Dec. 1756.
2 Addit. MSS 51341: H. Digby to Ilchester, 6 Nov. 1756.
3 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on the MSS of Lord Polwarth, v, 330.
4 Horace Walpole's Correspondence, ed. W.S. Lewis (London and New Haven, 1937-67, xxi, 17. Cf. Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS, 6839, Mitchell Papers, f. 29: Symmer to Mitchell, 17 Dec. 1756.

Pitt's popularity depended on his commitments when in opposition. During the discussions as to whether he should take office one of his City supporters, Richard Glover, drew up a list of terms for Pitt's acceptance: dismissal of all Newcastle's efficient ministers, return of the foreign troops, a Militia Bill, an inquiry into the misconduct of the last administration, a stipulation not to involve the nation in any way with the continent. Pitt's own pronouncements in opposition made it impossible for him not to accept these terms.[1] In the first of these respects, Pitt broke faith the day he took office. Holdernesse and Barrington, both adherents of Newcastle, retained office as Secretary of State for the Northern Department and Secretary at War respectively. Two of the pledges it was possible to redeem. The return of the troops was announced in December, and in the same month George Townshend introduced a militia bill. This left the two items singled out by Walpole - the inquiry and the stipulation about the continent.

These two points were much more difficult. Both were Tory points and a group of leading Tories in the Lords and Commons had produced a letter inviting their Tory colleagues to support the new administration.[2] But this Tory support was by no means full-hearted: and in any case, it was recognised that whatever support Pitt derived from the Tories, Newcastle

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1 (R. Glover), Memoirs of a Celebrated Literary and Political Character, (London, 1813), p. 66-7.
2 Addit. MSS. 51416: Fox to Lady Caroline Fox, 14 Dec. 1756.

would be able, if he chose to do so, at any time to secure a majority against Pitt.[1] If Pitt's Tory backing faltered, Newcastle would have clear inducement to mobilise this majority. It was therefore all the more important that Pitt should not antagonise the Tories over the inquiry or the continental war. The nature of the controversy over the war will be examined later: it is enough at the moment to say that the only dogmatic opposition to the idea of any British involvement in Europe came from among the Tory ranks. And it was the Tories who were foremost in promoting the inquiry into the loss of Minorca. At a meeting called by George Townshend on 14 January to discuss preparations for the inquiry, fourteen of the twenty M.Ps. present were indisputably Tories, and Pitt asked this group to draw up a list of questions.[2]

But on 17 February, the first day Pitt appeared in the House after a long illness, he asked for a grant for Hanover and the next day £200,000 was requested for an army of observation in Germany. It will later be shown that Pitt's request was in no sense surprising: besides, he was only carrying out a treaty engagement entered into by the previous administration. He could also help his case by presenting these demands as assistance not for the small German princes, whose subsidies he had previously attacked, but as assistance for Prussia.[3] But though there was no opposition in Parliament, it was easy for Pitt's opponents to attack his inconsistency.[4]

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1 Addit. MSS. 6839, f. 29: Symmer to Mitchell, 17 Dec. 1756. Hist. MSS. Comm., Eighth Report, Appendix, Part I (Wingfield Digby), p. 221 (misdated 14 Dec. 1754)

2 Warwicks. Record Office, Newdigate MSS.: diary, 14 Jan., 1 Feb. 1757.

3 R. Pares, 'American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-63', Eng. Hist. Rev., li (1936),460.

4 E.g. Memoirs of a Royal Chaplain, 1729-1763, ed. A. Hartshorne (London and New York, 1821), p. 287.

Pitt's other embarrassment was the inquiry. Even Thomas Potter, one of his few close political associates, who unofficially acted as an intermediary with some of the Tory leaders, recognised the dangers of pushing this too hard, despite Tory views.[1] First, it had to be decided how to deal with Byng. His court-martial found him guilty under the twelfth article of war of not having done all he could to relieve Minorca, but it concluded that his conduct arose from misjudgement rather than cowardice and recommended mercy. Some of the members of the court-martial were uneasy that the twelfth article had left them with no choice but to impose the death sentence. A bill to absolve them from their oath of secrecy, enabling them to express their doubts on the justice of the sentence, was passed through the Commons. Hardwicke now took a hand. He saw to it that two questions were put to the members of the court-martial in the Lords: had anything happened before sentence was passed to show it was unjust?; might any undue practice have influenced the sentence? A positive answer was impossible and the bill failed to pass its second reading in the Lords. On 14 March, Byng was shot.

Newcastle and Fox both wanted Byng to be used as a scapegoat and thereby to deprive the forthcoming inquiry of material to use against them. The matter was generally looked on as a 'Tyral (sic) of the Strength of the Old and New Ministry'.[2] Pitt was therefore compelled to take a part

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1 Public Record Office, Chatham MSS. 30/8/53, f. 92: Potter to Pitt, n.d.

2 Hist. MSS. Comm., Tenth Report, Appendix, Part I (C.F. Weston Underwood), p. 312.

in deciding Byng's fate. Waldegrave accurately explained his outlook:

> The popular cry was violent against the admiral; but Pitt and Lord Temple were desirous to save him: partly to please Leicester House, and partly because making him less criminal, would throw greater blame on the late administration.
>
> But, to avoid the odium of protecting a man who had been hanged in effigy in every town in England, they wanted the king to pardon him without their seeming to interfere.[1]

Pitt stressed that the Commons was not concerned in the case, but admitted he thought mercy would do more good for naval discipline than the execution of the sentence. This line seriously imperilled Pitt's popularity; one observer claimed it was 'ruined totally'.[2] But any other attitude would have appeared to condone the actions of the late ministry, which the Tories were so keen to attack.

Both the King and Fox were encouraged by Pitt's dilemma to step up their opposition to him. The King wanted Byng's execution. He was 'quite outrageous' with Pitt and even more so with Temple.[3] Sir Henry Erskine told Bute that as a result of their conduct over Byng, 'our friends are infinitely worse in the Closet than they were some weeks ago.'[4] It was only after Byng's death that the King started to take positive steps for their removal, and through Waldegrave he ordered Newcastle to see Fox and discuss the possibility of forming an administration

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1 Waldegrave, Memoirs, 1754-1758, p. 91.
2 Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 17493 (Calcraft Papers), f. 52: Calcraft to Abercromby, 5 March 1757. Addit. MSS. 6839, ff. 41, 43: Symmer to Mitchell, 4, 11 March 1757.
3 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 95. Addit. MSS 32870, f. 221: Robinson to Newcastle, 26 Feb. 1757.
4 Mount Stuart, Bute MSS: Erskine to Bute, 7 March 1757.

with him.[1] Fox, like the King, was 'quite changed, and zealously for pushing these people now, when, by their late behaviour, they had lost their popularity'.[2] But his ambition was limited. Ideally, he wanted Newcastle as 'Minister for England', with himself as Paymaster with a security against the next reign: 'the management of the Members of the House of Commons, and the distribution of favours, shall be entirely in the D. of Newcastle; the management of debates in me'.[3] If Newcastle would not come in, Fox did not really care who occupied the Treasury: Devonshire, Waldegrave, Gower, Egremont, Northumberland, Powis, or any other 'great and opulent peer'.[4] Whatever happened, Fox was to be Paymaster with his security. Even this he would only take after the end of the session. Fear had triumphed over ambition. His return, he realised, 'would not fail of reviving the old clamour'.[5] And the Paymastership was a very attractive proposition. There was no limit to the use of the balances held by the office for private enrichment; Fox's average 'unofficial' profit from this source was to be nearly £24,000 a year.[6]

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1 Addit. MSS. 32870, f. 237: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 March 1757; ibid., f. 23, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 January 1757, shows that before the Byng episode Newcastle at least thought that the King's plan was to continue with his present ministers 'if they will come up to his terms'.

2 Addit. MSS. 32870, f. 237: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 March 1757.

3 Letters to Henry Fox, First Lord Holland, ed. Lord Ilchester (London, 1915), p. 102-3.

4 Addit. MSS. 51430, 'Schemes' marked 'c. 19 March' and 'March (19-31?) 1757'.

5 Ibid., 'Scheme' marked 'before 19 March'.

6 L.S. Sutherland and J. Binney, 'Henry Fox as Paymaster-general of the Forces', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxx (1955), 254. For Fox's balances, see Addit. MSS. 51413.

Newcastle's attitude, always more consistent, was less affected by the Byng affair than the King's or Fox's. A large majority of M.Ps. and peers still adhered to him. His success in a debate on a disputed contract showed this - hoping that he would 'soon be in a condition to reward their services'.[1] As before, he wanted an alliance with Pitt and was determined not to give in to the King's scheme: 'I will not be cudgel'd into an alliance with any body, and particularly not with Mr Fox'.[2] Hardwicke attempted in vain to persuade Bute through Chesterfield to tell Pitt that the only solution was a junction with Newcastle.[3]

Newcastle rightly calculated that Pitt's early dismissal would only strengthen the latter's position and he advised strongly against it.[4] But 'some sort of smash' was widely predicted.[5] The King's patience was exhausted. He turned in new directions, thinking of Winchilsea to replace Temple and Egremont Pitt.[6] On 4 April Temple was dismissed, and Pitt two days later. What precipitated these removals was Cumberland's imminent departure for Germany to command the observation army. It was generally thought that Cumberland would refuse to take on the command so long as Pitt remained in office and that he had delivered an ultimatum to this effect.[7] Fox was at the same time granted a valuable reversion for the lives of his two eldest sons.

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1 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 96.
2 Addit. MSS. 32870, f. 72: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 Jan. 1757.
3 ibid., f. 148: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 5 Feb. 1757.
4 ibid., f. 339-40: 26 March 1757.
5 Addit. MSS. 6832, f. 124: Holdernesse to Mitchell, 1 Apr. 1757
6 Addit. MSS. 32870, f. 358: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 3 Apr. 1757 ibid., f. 362: Pitt to Newcastle, 4 Apr. 1757. ibid.,f. 368: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 6 Apr. 1757.
7 ibid., f. 395: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 Apr. 1757. Glover, Memoirs, p. 82. Politische Correspondenz Friedrich's des Grossen (Berlin, 1886), xiv, 502, Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, Fourth Earl of Chesterfield, ed. B. Dobree, (London and New York, 1932), v, 2224

Pitt had manifestly failed to live up to his pledges made in opposition. The Militia Bill had not yet been discussed in the Lords though it had passed the Commons. Substantial help had been given to the continent. The inquiry into the loss of Minorca, which would have to be over by the end of the session, had not even begun: George Welwyn suggested Newcastle should send the ministers a card 'to thank them for their obliging enquiries.'[1] The strongly anti-government newspaper The Test lampooned the inactivity of Pitt's administration in a mock diary: 'Thursday. Vigorous measures. He put on his shoes'. The Test was right in accusing Pitt of 'governing by words'.[2] Pitt's short ministry had made all too clear the difficulties of popular government when it lacked support in the closet and in the Commons.

(v) The Defeat of the King

Despite the paucity of Pitt's achievement, when he fell there was a strong upsurge of popular feeling. Glover says that the instant Pitt was removed, his support for Byng was forgotten and he became more popular than ever before.[3] The City of London and many other towns voted their freedom to Pitt and Legge, who had resigned as Chancellor. As Pitt's popularity

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1 Sheffield Central Library, Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, R1-87: Newcastle to Rockingham, 8 Feb. 1757.
2 The Test, no. 6 p. 29, and no. 8, p. 42.
3 Glover, Memoirs, p. 83. Cf. An Eighteenth Century Correspondence, (London, 1910), p. 365: Jenkinson to Miller, 21 Apr. 1757.
4 'The City of London and the Devonshire-Pitt Administration, 1756-57', pp. 161-70. Dame Lucy Sutherland analyses the reasons for Pitt's continued popularity despite his lack of achievement: his precipitate dismissal, his ill health, the rebounding of Fox's press campaign, the blaming of selfish vested interests in the City.

revived, contemporaries noted that Fox's was declining still further.[1] There was a quite unjustified but widespread fear that he intended, with Cumberland, to introduce military rule to England.[2] Newcastle, far from being coupled with Fox, was rather coupled with Pitt. His refusal to take place or pension had done much for his popularity and it was the view both of the City and the Tories that Pitt's only chance of returning to office was in conjunction with Newcastle.[3] Halifax explained Newcastle's strength:

> My opinion is, that he should step forward and take the lead now, to prevent confusion: that he will do it the more safely, as all the world will be with him, and the other two parties, neither of which can support themselves without him, and who can never unite together, will be striving which shall stand best in his good graces.[4]

The King also recognised where Newcastle's power lay. He asked Mansfield:

> Will he go into opposition?
> - He will do nothing to impede your Majesty's service.
> If he did go into opposition, would the Whigs in the House of Commons follow him?
> - There can be no doubt they would, your Majesty.[5]

He could not even detach Newcastle's supporters. An attempt

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 4-5. Addit. MSS.6839, f.47: Symmer to Mitchell, 5 Apr 1757. Dr Langford, 'William Pitt and Public Opinion, 1757', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxxxviii (1973), pp 59-60, points out that the number of 'gold boxes' was in fact only twelve, and even in these cases there was normally some manipulation by Pitt's Tory supporters. The scale and significance of the campaign was deliberately exaggerated. But this was extremely effective.

2 Letters of Chesterfield, ed. Dobree, v. 2207. Addit. MSS. 32870, f.372: Halifax to Newcastle, enclosure, 7 Apr 1757; ff.395, 401. Cf. ibid., f.401: Newcastle to Halifax, 9 Apr 1757

3 Hist. MSS. Comm., Polwarth, v, 331. Glover, Memoirs, pp 83-4. Addit. MSS.32870, f.409: Watkins to Newcastle, 12 Apr 1757. Addit. MSS.17493, f.69-71: Calcraft to Loudoun, 10 June 1757

4 Memorials of the Public Life and Character of the Rt Hon James Oswald of Dunnikier (Edinburgh 1825), p 425

5 Addit. MSS.32870, f.419: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 8 Apr 1757

to persuade Robinson to take the Secretaryship of State and Dupplin the Exchequer met with an unqualified refusal from both.[1]

As Halifax predicted, Fox and Leicester House also recognised Newcastle's strength. Fox, realising that Newcastle was not taking seriously his offer of carte blanche as a basis for discussions, asked one of his supporters to write to Newcastle stressing that the idea was genuine and suggesting a meeting between the two.[2] Bute, too, saw Newcastle's power. He was above all keen to prevent a 'fatal alliance' with Fox. James Oswald found him 'so much frightened with Mr Fox's Administration, and a greater person at the head of it, that they will be willing to come to us, even without any conditions for their people'.[3] Temple was even ready to waive his own claims to an employment if they stood in the way of an alliance with Newcastle.[4] Pitt alone was intractable, despite Bute's pressure.[5] He told Glover that he would not unite with Newcastle unless he was sure of power.[6]

But though Newcastle was clearly the key to the solution, constitutional theory dictated certain restraints. First, it was accepted that the King, as head of the executive, had the right to choose his own instruments. The Pelhams' forcing of the closet in 1746 had never been forgotten by their enemies. Second, opposition was only respectable if it could shelter behind some member of the royal family, usually the Prince of Wales. Newcastle made use of the corollary of this: a loyal

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1 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 108.
2 Addit. MSS. 32870, f. 467-8: Campbell to Newcastle, n.d.
3 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 6. Addit. MSS. 32870, f. 420: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Apr 1757.
4 The Grenville Papers, i, 192. Addit. MSS. 32870, f. 443: Robinson's note, 22 Apr. 1757.
5 Glover, Memoirs, p. 94-5.
6 Glover, Memoirs, p. 86. Addit. MSS. 32870, f. 469: memorandum, n.d.

minister must try to 'unite the whole Royal Family and bring the succession to and give quiet support to the possession'.[1] This was the theoretical justification for Newcastle's attempt to foist Pitt on the King.

His hope was that this might be facilitated by Pitt's acceptance of an office involving infrequent contact with the King. There was some chance that this might happen. Everything depended on the activities of Henry Legge. Most contemporaries were agreed in their estimate of Legge: to him, says Walpole, 'nothing came amiss that might raise him on the ruins of either friends or enemies; indeed, neither were so to him, but by the proportion of their power'.[2] Legge's behaviour gives credence to this picture. Immediately after his resignation, Legge suggested through Anson and Halifax a secret meeting with Newcastle, implying that he thought Pitt's notion of standing alone was 'visionary' and that he had 'more credit at Leicester House than Mr Pitt'.[3] Whether this was true or not - there is some evidence for it - Newcastle welcomed the overture:

> It looks by Mr Legge's offer to see me in private, as if he thought, something could be done, and that, without making Mr Pitt the principal figure in it. Which, if so, might render it more palatable at St James's, especially after a certain great person is gone from thence.[5]

They duly met on 18 April in the greatest secrecy. There were assurances of friendship on both sides, but nothing more.[6]

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 392
2 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 190. The Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox (London 1902), Lady Ilchester and Lord Stavordale, i,39. Addit. MSS.51420: Rigby to Ilchester, 26 Nov 1757
3 Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS.15956,(Anson Papers), f.32: Hardwicke to Anson, 9 Apr 1757. Addit. MSS.32870, f.397: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 Apr 1757
4 Phillimore, Lyttelton, ii, 528
5 Addit. MSS.32870, f.383: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 8 Apr 1757
6 Dodington, Journal, p 364

Why the outcome was not more positive when both sides were so keen to agree remains obscure.

The main elements in the situation are clear. Newcastle was trying to press Pitt on the King; Bute was urging a coalition between Newcastle and Pitt; the King was willing to admit Fox but not Pitt. Two problems had to be solved before any alliance between Newcastle and Pitt could be achieved. Pitt must be brought to agree to the terms Bute wanted, and the King must be persuaded to drop his insistence on Pitt's exclusion and to compromise over Fox.

The first problem was easier to solve than the second. A coalition was in Pitt's interests, but his pride and the pressure of some of his supporters pulled him the other way.[1] He laid down the impossible condition that Newcastle should accept George Grenville at his own board as Chancellor of the Exchequer.[2] This stipulation is again explained by Legge's behaviour. In negotiations with Bute early in May, carried on through the Primate of Ireland, Newcastle, despite a promise of secrecy, leaked the news of his interview with Legge. Apparently Newcastle specifically instructed the Primate to inform Pitt of this.[3] Only six weeks later did Legge discover that Newcastle had broken his promise and attempted to come to an explanation with Bute, denying that he had ever intended to come to a

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1 Glover, Memoirs, pp. 87-8, 94-5.
2 Addit. MSS. 32871, f. 39: Newcastle to Chesterfield, 7 May 1757.
3 John Rylands Library, Legge MSS., Eng. MSS. 668 (18), undated: Glover, Memoirs, p. 101-2: Dodington, Journal, p. 365.

separate agreement.[1] It was Pitt's discovery that Legge had been negotiating behind his back, made all the more sinister by Legge's failure to give him any indication of these talks, that made him insist on Grenville as Chancellor.

Pitt seems to have resented the pressure Bute was exerting on him to abandon this demand.[2] But by 2 June he had decided no longer to press his claim for Grenville. This arose from a new danger of Newcastle taking office alone. On 27 May the King asked Newcastle to return to his service. Newcastle, as anxious as ever for a coalition, stated the difficulties of coming in alone.[3] He then left for Claremont for a week, until 3 June. On 29 May, Stone told Pitt that Newcastle had 'virtually, though not actually, accepted', and this was the version that was current.[4] Pitt probably feared Newcastle would bring Legge with him, and to avoid being isolated he gave up his claims for Grenville.

The problem of the King was more difficult. He insisted on having Fox as Paymaster, though he accepted that he could

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1 Legge wrote to Bute on 17 June saying he was sure something was wrong and that he wished to clear up any misunderstanding there might be. (Bute MSS.) Legge had earlier told Samuel Martin of the transaction. Martin advised Legge to tell Pitt at once, but Legge refused because of his promise to Newcastle. (Glover, Memoirs, p. 101) An undated letter marked Saturday 4 o'clock' in the Bute Papers from Martin refers to the conversation that morning between Martin and Legge, making clear to the latter the extent of Bute's suspicions of him. Legge, agitated, denied any intention of a separate agreement. The undated letter is clearly 18 June.

2 Addit. MSS. 51386: Hillsborough to Fox, 21 June 1757.

3 Addit. MSS. 32781, f. 155-6: Newcastle to Devonshire, 28 May 1757.

4 Chatham Corr., i. 229. Cf. Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 22; Addit. MSS 51382, Devonshire to Fox, 28 May 1757; Addit. MSS. 51398, Calcraft to Fox, 28 May 1757.

have no power or influence over recommendations and even promised to dismiss him if he tried to interfere.[1] Newcastle was ready to accept Fox on these terms in a coalition ministry with Pitt, but Leicester House was not.[2] Newcastle therefore aimed to persuade the King to accept a compromise solution for Fox, perhaps involving a peerage and a pension.[3] On 6 June he put his double demand for Pitt's acceptance and Fox's exclusion to the King:

> That it is impossible for me to serve your Majesty when it either is, or can be suppos'd, by my friends, to be in conjunction with Fox.
> - I can't come in, without bringing in my enemy, Mr Pitt. He turn'd me out. But I can't serve, without my enemy.
> - He will be unreasonable.
> - He is, Sir.
> - Beat him as low, as I can.
> - If your Majusty won't approve it, I can't come in alone.[4]

This was too much for the King. Next day he sent for Waldegrave, complained bitterly of Newcastle's 'scandalous treatment' and offered him the Treasury. Waldegrave reluctantly, out of a sense of duty, accepted. The King also made a special appeal to Fox, whom he wanted, under this new arrangement, as Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the Commons.[5] A final attempt, doomed to failure, was even made to persuade Newcastle to abandon his Leicester House allies and to join Fox.[6]

Fox was very pessimistic: Cumberland and he had long decided that the Paymastership, without any effective power, was the most that he should aim for, and he was advocating an

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1 Addit. MSS. 32871, f. 201: Newcastle to Chesterfield, 3 June 1757.
2 ibid., f. 216-8: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 June 1757.
3 Nottingham University Library, NeC 3158 (Newcastle (Clumber) MSS.): memorandum, 4 June 1757.
4 Addit. MSS. 32871, f. 224: memds. for the King, 6 June 1757.
5 Addit. MSS. 51430: Fox to Strange, 10 June 1757.
6 Addit. MSS 32871, f. 240: Newcastle to Chesterfield, 8 June 1757.

alliance between Pitt and Newcastle as a means of achieving this.[1] Fox was right. The story of 1746 was repeated. Holdernesse immediately resigned and it was rumoured that Rutland, Rockingham, Hertford, Leeds and Coventry were preparing to do so.[2] Newcastle denied any responsibility. He had urged Holdernesse that if he was going to resign he should do so quickly, but it is impossible to know if he went beyond this.[3] Holdernesse himself stressed that his action had been his own.[4] But Newcastle's opponents naturally assumed that he had as in 1746, engineered the resignation and encouraged the rumours: even some of his friends were uneasy at the part he had seemingly taken.[5] Whatever the truth, Holdernesse's action ensured the failure of this 'work of an Easter holidays'.[6] Collective resignation was the clearest indication of a minister's power: it was not a device which could be resorted to if that power was in doubt, as Newcastle was to find in 1762 and Rockingham in 1766. In a division in the Commons on 8 June, Fox mustered only eleven votes.[7] The King could hardly continue with the experiment. On 11 June Mansfield went to deliver the Exchequer seals to the King, so that he could give them to Fox. He represented to the King the impossibility of his plan, saying

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1 Devonshire MSS., Chatsworth, 260. 224: Devonshire to Cumberland, 13 May 1757.
2 Brit. Mus., Egerton MSS. 1719 (Bentinck Papers), f. 18: Lady Sophie Egerton to Bentinck, 10 June 1757.
3 Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS 35416 (Hardwicke Papers), f. 236: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 'Wednesday morning'(15 June 1757); Addit. MSS. 32871, f. 242: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 8 June 1757.
4 Brit. Mus., Egerton MSS. 3425 (Leeds Papers): Holdernesse to Lady Yarmouth, 11 June 1757.
5 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 27. Addit. MSS. 51430: Fox to Strange, 10 June 1757. Addit. MSS. 51387: Ellis to Fox, June 1757.
6 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 458.
7 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 27.

that he would even tell the projected ministers, before they kissed hands, what he thought.[1] Probably the King had already realised that the scheme could not succeed.[2] Through Mansfield, he ordered Newcastle and Hardwicke to hold further discussions with Pitt, in order to prepare 'such a plan of a ministry as you can all agree on and think, will be able to carry on (the King's) affairs'.[3] The King had surrendered. He told Devonshire he was 'going to be a Prisoner and should be undone both at home and abroad'.[4] As Bedford wrote to Fox, 'I think nothing now remains but to make (The King's) captivity as easy as possible'.[5]

(vi) The Triumph of Newcastle

The King no longer stood as an obstacle to the coalition. He now gave in to Newcastle's insistence that Pitt should be Secretary of State. But his surrender was not total. There were three points from which he would not depart. Fox must be Paymaster; he must have Anson as First Lord of the Admiralty; and Barrington must remain Secretary at War, or be replaced by someone to the King's liking.[6]

The first problem, that of Fox, was easily solved. Fox had abandoned all hopes of effective power: he 'only wanted now', he told Egmont, 'some lucrative office to support his present expences', and 'would act, just as much, and as little,

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1 G. Harris, Life of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke (London, 1847) iii, 131.
2 Waldegrave, Memoirs, pp. 128-9.
3 Addit. MSS. 32871, f.300: Devonshire to Newcastle, 14 June 1757
4 Devonshire MSS. 260. 229: Devonshire to Cumberland, 10 June 1757
5 Addit. MSS. 51385: Bedford to Fox, 16 June 1757.
6 Addit. MSS. 3595, f. 43: Devonshire to Hardwicke, 15 June 1757. But in document of 13 June in the Devonshire Papers, containing the King's message through Mansfield to Newcastle, there is no stipulation about the Secretaryship of War, and that about the Admiralty simply states that regard must be paid to Winchilsea. Devonshire MSS. 260. 232.

as the Duke of Newcastle would have him'.[1] Even after the coalition was settled, there were Leicester House fears that he would still try to interfere in recommendations.[2] But Pitt and Bute were now agreed that if the King insisted on Fox's appointment as Paymaster they would not oppose it.[3] It had become clear that the appointment would not be the King's but Newcastle's: the King was doubtful whether he would even be successful in his insistence on Fox.[4] Fox had always claimed that he would only take the Paymastership if it was apparent that it was the King and not Newcastle who was giving it,[5] and Leicester House's opposition had rested on the assumption that Fox would only accept the position on these terms. After the recent fiasco, it was all too clear that Fox owed his position to Newcastle. He implicitly admitted this when he wrote to Devonshire:

> The instant the Duke of Newcastle can deliberate about the day I am to kiss hands, the employment of Paymaster is an affront and not a favour. I will take the Pay Office from His Majesty most gratefully. I will not take it from the D(uke) of N(ewcastle). Taking it from His Majesty, I will support the D(uke) of N(ewcastle) earnestly and constantly, without interfering in any species of Administration. But I will not take that place from a minister, My being in an employment lower than Sir T. Robinson or Sir G. Lee must be my own, it shall be no other man's arrangement.[6]

As Horace Walpole wrote, the most astonishing part of the coalition was that Fox would submit to be Paymaster under

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1 Addit. MSS. 32997, f. 136: note, 19 April 1757.
2 Addit. MSS. 35351, F. 378: Royston to Hardwicke, 6 July 1757
3 Newcastle (Clumber) MSS., NeC 3667: Lincoln to Dupplin, 16 June 1757.
4 Hist. MSS. Comm., Eighth Report, Appendix, Part I (G. Wingfield Digby), p. 224.
5 Ilchester, Henry Fox, ii, 51.
6 T.W. Riker, Henry Fox, First Lord Holland, (Oxford, 1911), ii, 131-2.

these circumstances.[1]

The second problem was the Admiralty. Anson was the obvious candidate from among Newcastle's supporters, but after the loss of Minorca he was exceptionally unpopular. Hardwicke at first thought only of the Treasurership of the Navy for his son-in-law, and Newcastle was far from enthusiastic about even this, fearing it might revive the inquiry.[2] Before the Fox-Waldegrave administration, Newcastle was quite happy that Winchilsea should continue at the head of the Admiralty Board.[3] Afterwards, when Winchilsea offered to retire rather than impede the formation of a new administration, Hardwicke first suggested Anson to the King, who, wanting above all to avoid Legge, made this one of his three sine qua nons.[4] Pitt readily agreed to this. A number of observers, indeed, thought that it was only on Pitt's initiative that Anson was restored, though in view of Anson's extreme unpopularity with the Tories he attempted to conceal this initiative and to attribute it instead to the King or Hardwicke.[5] There may very well be some truth in this version. It is in keeping with Pitt's favourite political devices for evading the unpopular consequences of his actions. His only possible alternative candidates were Legge, who wanted

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1 Walpole, Correspondence, xxi, 103: Walpole to Mann, 20 June 1757
2 Addit. MSS. 32871, f. 155: Newcastle to Devonshire, 28 May 1757
3 Newcastle (Clumber) MSS., NeC 3158: memorandum, 4 June 1757.
4 Addit. MSS. 15956, f. 36: Hardwicke to Anson, 18 June 1757
5 Egerton MSS. 1719, f. 24: Lady Egerton to Bentinck, 20 June 1757. Addit. MSS. 17493, f. 78: Calcraft to Hay, 9 July 1759. Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 32. Pitt was not completely successful. Devonshire told Cumberland that his appointment had ruined Pitt's popularity. Devonshire MSS. 260. 239: Devonshire to Cumberland, 28 June 1757.

the position but to whom Pitt had no reason for gratitude, and Temple, a previous occupant, who in any case was destined to become Lord Privy Seal, a Cabinet post but one which involved little contact with the King. Pitt may have made a half-hearted effort to put Legge's name forward.[1] But he wanted neither Legge nor Temple. Professional skill was particularly important at the Admiralty: 'capacity is so little necessary for most employments', Fox wrote to Dodington, 'that you seem to forget that there is one where it is absolutely so, viz. the Admiralty'.[2] Pitt always recognised the value of having a seaman at the head of the Admiralty;[3] and even two of his own adherents were soon admitting that Anson ran the Board much better than Temple had done.[4] Almon claims that Pitt intended to control the Admiralty Board through Anson and that he successfully insisted on being allowed to conduct correspondence with the naval commanders himself.[5] Dr Middleton has shown how fictitious this story is. The voice of the First Lord was decisive and Anson only accepted office on condition that his colleagues at the Board would do as he wished.[6]

The King's third demand was over the Secretaryship at War. Barrington, the present occupant, was an adherent of Newcastle,

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1 Addit. MSS. 17493, f. 73: Calcraft to Loudoun, 8 July 1757.
2 Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 38091, f. 76: Fox to Dodington, 16 March 1757,
3 Cf. The Correspondence of King George III: From 1760 to December 1783, ed. Sir J.W. Fortescue (London, 1927), i, 390.
4 Addit. MSS. 32872, f. 285: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 July 1757.
5 (J. Almon), Anecdotes of the Rt. Hon William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (London, 1792), I, 251, 253-4.
6 C.R. Middleton, 'Pitt, Anson and the Admiralty, 1756-61', History, 55 (1970), p. 189, sqq. Staffs. Record Office, Anson MSS., D 615/HMC/Box E: Lady Anson to Anson, 18 June 1757.

'the only subject, to whom I have a real obligation'.[1] After Fox's failure, Bute for a time pressed the claims of Lord George Sackville, who had been moving towards Pitt and had for some time had his eyes on the position.[2] Bute refused at first to give any ground on this point,[3] but on 17 June he eventually gave way and persuaded Pitt also to do so.[4] Barrington could therefore be continued at the War Office.

The King made no other stipulations, but there were other posts to be filled and these created further problems. The most important of these was the Exchequer. Newcastle did not greatly mind whether Legge or Dupplin had the job, and for a while he even considered Sir George Lee. Dupplin was completely attached to Newcastle but disqualified himself on health grounds.[5] In any case, there were good reasons for having Legge: it is clear that Newcastle would have preferred him even if Dupplin had been fit.[6] He was thought to be independent of Newcastle and would carry the blame himself in the Commons for unpopular financial measures. Legge was of course furious with Newcastle for revealing details of his secret interview to Pitt and for a time after this 'black treachery' it was doubtful if he would accept office.[7] But Pitt and Bute were keen that Legge should

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1 S Barrington, The Political Life of William Wildman, Viscount Barrington (London, 1814), p. 48, 49.
2 Addit. MSS. 17493, f. 25: Calcraft to Loudoun, 7 January 1757
3 Newcastle (Clumber) MSS., NeC. 3667: Lincoln to Dupplin, 16 June 1757.
4 Addit. MSS. 32873, f. 181: Newcastle to G. Stone, 20 Aug. 1757
5 Addit. MSS. 32873, f. 391-2: Dupplin to Newcastle, 31 Aug.1757
6 Addit. MSS. 35416, f. 234-5: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 June (?) 1757. Fox realised this. Cf. Addit. MSS. 51375: Fox to Cumberland, 10 June 1757.
7 Bute MSS.: Martin to Bute, n.d. (June 1757).

accept.[1] They presumably thought that Legge's imprudence had given them a strong hold over him. Pitt apparently brought Newcastle and Legge together to find out the truth about the disclosure of the interview and Newcastle eventually admitted that the mistake had been his.[2] Perhaps it was this that induced Legge to accept. But he did so with the greatest reluctance:

> For many mornings successively, he would come into Martin's bedchamber before he was up, and roll upon the floor like a man tortured with bodily pain, and vent expressions of compunction little short of phrensy.

Martin's view was that Legge only accepted because Leicester House was attributing to him the high terms Newcastle was demanding and Legge, thinking there was truth in this, saw it as incumbent on him 'not to disorder their system by withdrawing himself from it; which otherwise he had certainly done'. Newcastle was delighted to gain Legge on the terms he did. Also at the Treasury Board were Nugent and Duncannon for Newcastle, James Grenville for Pitt, and Oswald, a friend of Halifax.

Halifax himself was presenting a further problem. Loyal to Newcastle, he had twice refused, against his own inclination, to join Fox.[4] Newcastle had promised him that he should be made a third Secretary of State for the Colonies and Halifax, when the final negotiations were concluded, talked openly of this.

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1 R. Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier, ed. R. Pares and A.J.P. Taylor (London, 1956), p. 124.
2 Correspondence of John Russell, Duke of Bedford, ed. Lord John Russell (London, 1843), ii, 256.
3 Glover, Memoirs, pp. 103-4.
4 Addit. MSS. 51430: Halifax to Fox, 24 March, 10 June 1757. Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 123.

Pitt said he had heard nothing of Halifax's proposed Secretaryship: nor could he agree to it, since it would seriously curtail the activities of his own Southern Department. This dispute, virtually identical to that subsequently between Shelburne and Egremont and ending with the same compromise formula of calling Halifax and Shelburne to Cabinet, was inherent in the division of responsibilities between the Southern Department and the Board of Trade until the creation of a third Secretaryship in 1768. Pitt in fact would probably have welcomed Halifax's appointment as Secretary of State if it had been to the Northern Department. But Holdernesse was too valuable to lose: he was as 'entirely dependent' on Newcastle as when first appointed.[1] It was quite natural, however, that Pitt should object to Halifax's appointment as Secretary for the Colonies. Newcastle was forced to admit to a furious Halifax that he had not spoken to Pitt at all about him because Pitt 'look'd so much out of humour that he durst not'.[2]

The disposition of the Great Seal was a further problem. Hardwicke, old and tired, declined to take it. Newcastle's second choice was Lord Chief Justice Willes, but the King absolutely refused to grant the peerage he demanded.[3] Instead, the Attorney-General Sir Robert Henley, who wanted only the reversion of an office, was appointed as Lord Keeper. Pitt insisted on his supporter Pratt as Attorney-General and may have made use of his apparent 'giving way' over Anson to enforce this demand.[4] The only other candidate, Hardwicke's son Charles Yorke, became Solicitor-General.

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 103
2 Dodington, Journal, p 360
3 Addit. MSS.32871, f.389-391: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 25 June 1757
4 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 32

With these minor exceptions, the settlement was a triumph for Newcastle. Even Bute, who had consistently worked hard for a coalition with Newcastle, realised this:

> I say these gentlemen are reinstated, but how! Not as the ministers of this country but under the avow'd administration of a Duke of Newcastle who ... makes the very corner stone of his system[1] to be the leaving of every man in office untouched.

Newcastle alone had hoped throughout for the eventual solution - a coalition with Pitt. Royston, in an undated paper, had listed two 'weak points of Conduct in the Duke of Newcastle's Administration since Mr Pelham's death':

> The not settling the management of the House of Commons in able hands, but having a notion, that it could be conducted without a Minister at the head of it. The not taking in Mr P(itt) by insisting[2] in the Closet, upon his being made Secretary of State.

Newcastle had realised the importance of the first of these points in the autumn of 1755 and he had been able to enforce the second after the failure of Waldegrave's attempt early in June 1757. He had got his way against both the King and his fellow-politicians. But all those involved, however dissatisfied, were prepared to give the experiment a fair trial. Pitt described the settlement as a 'bitter, but necessary cup'.[3] Fox simply wanted to 'live and dye Paymaster'.[4] And Newcastle reported that 'the Closet mends visibly'.[5] The prospect for the coalition looked bright.

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1 Bute MSS., Bute to Mackenzie, n.d.
2 Addit. MSS. 35595, f. 4.
3 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p. 124. Pitt was severely criticised by some of his more independently-minded supporters for agreeing to serve with Newcastle. Cf. P. Langford, William Pitt and Public Opinion, 1757', Eng. His. Rev., lxxxviii (1973), p. 74 s.q.q
4 Addit. MSS. 32872, f. 127: West to Newcastle, 7 July 1757.
5 Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, R1-90: Newcastle to Rockingham, 25 June 1757.

PITT AND NEWCASTLE

(i) The Two Ministers

The two leading ministers were complicated but contrasting characters. It is worth analysing in some detail their formidable combination of qualities, which made them, so long as they were acting together, so unusually difficult to beat.

Contemporaries were more accurate and more in agreement with each other in their assessment of Newcastle than of Pitt: but in neither case does a rounded picture readily emerge. They tended too easily to select certain characteristics and to deal with them not as parts of a whole, but in a self-contained, mutually independent way.[1] Those who knew Newcastle most commonly singled out four such qualities: ambition, fear, jealousy, timidity.[2] Yet these present no more than a skeleton on which to try to build up a picture of what the man was like. Even contemporaries admitted that this was a difficult task. They constantly made reference to the apparent inconsistency of Newcastle's character. Walpole described him as 'busy and inactive, fond of plotting but impossible to be put in motion'; The Test called him 'lazy, busy, quick, slow, and in short a jumble of inconsistencies'; while Waldegrave said that 'his character is full of inconsistencies;

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1 Cf. R. Sedgwick, introduction to Some Materials Towards Memoirs of the Reign of King George II by John, Lord Hervey (London, 1931), i. lix: 'common form of the period ... built "characters" out of little blocks of qualities'.

2 E.g. Glover, Memoirs, p. 60; Walpole, Memoirs, i. 119; Hervey, Memoirs, p. 345. A character sketch by Devonshire contains only three words: 'ambition, fear and jealousy'. (Devonshire MSS. 260. 251); and Waldegrave wrote 'Ambition, fear and jealousy are his prevailing passions'. (Memoirs, p. 11.

the man would be thought very singular who differed as much from the rest of the world as he differs from himself'.[1]

Paramount in Newcastle, and satisfying a deep psychological need, was the love of activity and business. 'I once imagined', wrote Lord George Germain, 'that I could not have lived without Constant Business'.[2] Newcastle indeed found it difficult to do so. His brother complained that 'he wants to be doing', and Chesterfield wrote that 'his ruling, or rather his only, passion was the agitation, the bustle, and the hurry of business'.[3] Horace Walpole wrote amusingly of the period following his resignation in 1756:

> ... his Grace retired to Claremont, where for about a fortnight, he played at being a country gentleman. Guns and green frocks were bought, and at past sixty, he affected to turn sportsman; but getting wet in his feet, he hurried back to London in a fright, and his country was once more blessed with his assistance.[4]

In 1762, while in reality again hating his isolation, he painted his retirement to Claremont as a relief: 'our crowds, thank God, begin to abate', he wrote to Lincoln.[5] Sir Lewis Namier is certainly right in saying that Newcastle did not consciously know, or dare to admit to himself, what his most fundamental cravings really were.[6] He no doubt persuaded himself in both 1756 and 1762 that he did want to retire from active office: Namier, Pares and Lodge have all shown how easily he could persuade himself to believe what he wanted to believe, and in both cases Newcastle,

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1 H. Walpole: Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, ed. G.F. Russell Barker (London and New York, 1894), i, 327. The Test, no. 4, p. 15. Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 12.
2 A. Valentine, Lord George Germain, (Oxford, 1962), p. 481.
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 12.
4 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 272-3.
5 Sir L.B. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution (2nd edn., London, 1961), pp. 327-8.
6 ibid., pp. 82-3.

with overwhelming political difficulties in the way of continuing in office, wanted to believe that he would prefer the quiet of Claremont.[1]

This need for business and agitation went hand in hand with a compulsive, though again unconscious, urge to live on his nerve. Waldegrave recognised this:

> In the midst of prosperity and apparent happiness, the slightest disappointment, or any imaginary evil, will, in a moment, make him miserable: his mind can never be composed; his spirits are always agitated. Yet this constant ferment, which would wear out and destroy any other man, is perfectly agreeable to his constitution: he is at the very perfection of health, when his fever is at the greatest height.[2]

He would 'venture the overthrow of the Government, and hazard his life and fortunes rather than dare to open a letter that might discover a plot'.[3] If there were no real problems, he would create them in his own mind:[4] Hardwicke said that he was 'afraid of his own shadow'.[5] He continually dreaded invasion. He could not believe the Tories were being as inactive as they appeared before the election in 1760.[6] He kept himself highly strung, even when there was no reason to be so.

This state of nerves and of fear put him constantly on the defensive. He wanted to share his self-imposed burden, and was always asking for the advice of friends, always trying to persuade them to approach the King or his fellow-ministers if any unpleasant

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1 Sir L.B. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 364. R. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763, (Oxford, 1936), pp. 45, 159; Sir R. Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748 (London, 1930), pp.294, 382, n.1.
2 Waldegrave, Memoirs, pp. 11-12.
3 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 166.
4 Cf. J.B. Owen, Rise of the Pelhams (London, 1957), pp. 139-41, for a good example of this.
5 Addit. MSS. 35360, f. 296: Royston to C. Yorke, 6 Dec. 1759.
6 Addit. MSS. 32910, f. 121: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 Aug. 1760.

task had to be performed. His mind gravitated naturally to compromise 'mezzo termino' solutions. The difficulties which arose from this timidity were made worse by his desire to please. This produced an 'undistinguishing and illiberal familiarity', continual 'caressing of his enemies'.[1] Patronage was not a suitable field for the timid;[2] but Newcastle hated to refuse a request. 'The duke was a good-natured man;' commented Dr Newton, bishop of Bristol, 'and consequently promised more than he was ever able to perform'.[3] This earned him accusations of treachery, of bad faith, and threats and bitter reproaches even from the obscure and insignificant: of 'doing everything by halves, and nothing well, nor soon'.[4] Only the more perceptive saw that his broken promises were the result of his wish to please and not of dishonesty or treachery.[5]

In a different sense, patronage was an ideal field for Newcastle's attention. It provided him with the endless activity and business that he needed. His mind was unselective but with an inexhaustible capacity for detail. He had acquired an incomparable mastery of the whole patronage system. He could use it to distract him when graver matters were creating difficult problems. Hume Campbell said of him: 'we leave undone those things which we ought to do and we do those things which we ought not to do'.[6] But all his activity in issues of patronage was far

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1 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 13. Walpole, Memoirs, i, 165.
2 Even the Tories were by no means averse to making applications to Newcastle as soon as they reasonably thought they could do so. See below, pp 68-9.
3 N. Sykes, 'The Duke of Newcastle as an Ecclesiastical Minister', Eng. Hist. Rev., lvii (1942), 60.
4 Letters of Chesterfield, v, 2243.
5 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 13. Lord Fitzmaurice, Life of William, Earl of Shelburne (London, 1912), i, 65. But cf. Walpole, Memoirs, i, 119.
6 Hist. MSS. Comm., Polwarth, v, 346.

from being a waste of time. Dr Plumb has shown that at every level 'it was patronage that cemented the political system'.[1] Newcastle was obsessively concerned to keep control, complete, personal control, of this complicated, ever-changing network.

A number of contemporaries gained the impression that amidst the endless activity that the operation of this network entailed, Newcastle was in reality easily manipulated: that while he thought he was doing business, the decisions were in reality being taken by subordinates.[2] In view of Newcastle's constant recourse to the advice and support of his friends, this conclusion was understandable; but it was by no means accurate. Professor Sykes' thorough study of his control of ecclesiastical patronage shows that he was both timid, hating to disappoint, and also obstinate, sticking to a decision once he had made it and generally getting his way.[3] Outside the field of patronage, the same applied. Having evolved a policy, he displayed the sort of persistence that often produces dividends in politics. Dr Owen has demonstrated that it is to Newcastle that the credit is due for the shape of English foreign policy after 1741, actively supporting Austria, doing everything possible to stimulate the United Provinces and working for an agreement with Prussia over Hanover.[4] It was he alone who prevented peace being signed in 1747.[5] Sir Richard Lodge concludes that by 1748 Newcastle was 'almost a

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1 J.H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725 (London, 1967), p. 189.
2 E.g. the selection of quotations from Fitzmaurice, op. cit. in L.B. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 68; Hervey, Memoirs, p. 732-3; Walpole, Memoirs, i, 166.
3 J.B. Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, pp. 130-1.
4 N. Sykes, Eng. Hist. Rev., lvii (1942), 59-84.
5 R. Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748, pp. 269-272.

dictator of our foreign policy':

> Newcastle was obviously his (Chesterfield's) inferior in intellectual power, but he had far more persistence. Timidity at times made him appear to vacillate, but he rarely made any substantial change in his aims. When he had decided on a particular course of action, he sought by all possible means to follow it, and, as the querulous member of a family so often does, he got his way.[1]

It is true that, as in matters of patronage, Newcastle's policies were often dictated by a 'fear of criticism and unpopularity'.[2] In July 1756, for instance, he asked Hardwicke whether he thought 'any object of attack, either in the Mediterranean, the West Indies or North America (could) be agreed upon, that would keep up people's spirits and divert their resentment ?'[3] But though often influenced by domestic considerations, the fact remains that Newcastle was the frequent initiator of major policy decisions and was remarkably successful in ensuring that his policies were carried into practice. It was this untiring persistence, springing from his compulsive need for continual activity and business, that was his most valuable political asset.

In contrast to Newcastle, Pitt appeared to his contemporaries to be unconcerned with minutiae or with domestic considerations:

> Pitt's was an unfinished greatness: considering how much of it depended on his words, one may almost call his an artificial greatness; but his passion for fame and the grandeur of his ideas compensated for his defects. He aspired to redeem the honour of his country, and to

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1 Sir R. Lodge, introduction to Private Correspondence of Chesterfield and Newcastle, 1744-46 (Camden Soc., Royal Hist. Soc., xliv, 1930), pp. xxxvi, xliv.

2 N. Sykes, Eng. Hist. Rev., lvii, 84.

3 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 307. For other illustrations of Newcastle taking a policy initiative in wartime because of purely domestic considerations, see Pares, War and Trade, pp. 44, 85-6; Sir H.W. Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-1748 (Cambridge, 1920), i, 91 and iii, 49; Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, p. 186; Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748, p. 365.

> place it in a point of giving law to nations. His ambition was to be the most illustrious man of the first country in Europe; and he thought the eminence could not be sullied by the steps to it being passed irregularly. He wished to aggrandize Britain in general but thought not of obliging or benefiting individuals.[1]

Equally in contrast to Newcastle, contemporaries spoke of Pitt's 'single, imperious, proud' nature, his 'insolent and overbearing' manner, his refusal to cultivate other politicians, his aloof uncommunicativeness, his disdain for the use of 'any instrument for acquiring popularity'.[2] The immediate impression is that no two men could easily have been more different.

Whereas Newcastle surrounded himself with a horde of friends, dependants and advisers, Pitt confined himself to a very small circle. This may have been from deliberate choice, as Glover implies it was; though constant ill health, as Waldegrave recognised, was also a factor in explaining his 'separation from the world'.[3] Pitt himself suggested that it was from choice and that quite apart from his health, he would have preferred to live out of town.[4] But a number of those who knew him thought that Pitt was incapable of a normal friendship. Chesterfield, Royston, Shelburne and Warburton all took this view, and Sir Lewis Namier attributes his failure to build up an electoral interest to the fact that he simply did not know how to work with other men.[5] Whatever the explanation, his isolation served only to emphasise

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 86-7.
2 Charteris, Cumberland, p. 236. Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 60. Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 177. Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, 173.
3 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 16.
4 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 77.
5 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 60; Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 364; Private Corr. of Chesterfield and Newcastle, 1744-46, ed. Lodge, p. 100. L.B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (2nd. edn., London, 1957) p. 10.

the elements in the picture painted by Walpole.

The same effect was also achieved by the formal, even cold, correctness with which he invariably behaved. Shelburne commented:

> I was in the most intimate political habits with him for ten years, the time that I was Secretary of State included, he Minister, and necessarily was with him at all hours in town and country, without drinking a glass of water in his house or company, or five minutes' conversation out of the way of business .... I never found him when I have gone to him, which was always by appointment, with so much as a book before him, but always sitting alone in a drawing-room waiting the hour of appointment ...[1]

He behaved in his day-to-day dealings with an impeccable propriety. Waldegrave said of him:

> ... his private character is irreproachable; he is incapable of a treacherous or ungenerous action; and in the common offices of life is justly esteemed a man of veracity and a man of honour.[2]

The same formality and correctness was shown even in his oratory in the House of Commons. He alone made a particular study of the art of eloquence and 'all the ornamental part of classical learning'.[3]

This way of presenting himself in public or in private was not entirely natural. He was very much aware of the sort of figure he was making and prepared with elaborate care for his part. He was 'affected and unnatural', mixing the solemn with the theatrical, 'always acting, always made up'.[4] This made him seem all the more isolated, aloof and proud. It created something of a sense of occasion in those who met him or heard him speak.

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1 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 60-1.
2 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 16.
3 ibid., p. 15. Walpole, Memoirs, i, 92.
4 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 60. Walpole, Memoirs, i, 93. Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, 177.

In their delineation of all these characteristics, contemporaries were in broad agreement. But one of them, Shelburne, pointed to a significance in this theatrical side of Pitt's nature, and to a gap between the image and the reality, that was not remarked upon by others, except on occasions by Hardwicke. He thought that the majority of politicians were entirely taken in by the picture that Pitt presented of himself that that this picture was very far from the truth:

> It was the fashion to say that Mr. Pitt was violent, impetuous, romantick, a despiser of money, intrigue, and patronage, ignorant of the characters of men, and one who disregarded consequences. Nothing could be less just than the whole of this, which may be judged by the leading features of his life, without relying on any private testimony. He certainly was above avarice, but as to everything else, he only repressed his desires and acted ... He did not cultivate men because he felt it an incumbrance, and thought that he could act to more advantage without the incumbrance of a party. He told me himself in 1767, that the world were much mistaken in thinking that he did not like patronage, for he was but a little man in 1755, and was obliged to act the part he did, and he proved very sufficiently that he did, by catching at everything that dropped in almost every department, and as to caution, there is no describing the pains and consideration which he gave to the minutest action. It would not be believed how much time he took to compose the most trifling note ... He passed his time studying words and expressions, always with a view to throw the responsibility of every measure upon some other, while he held a high pompous unmeaning language.
> ... Lord Bute with the mass of the people were dupes to the imposture of Mr. Pitt's character. There was nothing to which he would not stoop to gain his point. He knew the value of condescension, and reserved himself for the moment when he was almost certain of gaining his point by it: till then he pranced and vapoured. He likewise mixed into his conduct strict honour in details, which I have often observed deceive many men in great affairs ...[1]

Just as Shelburne was alone among contemporaries in giving this sort of view of Pitt, so Professor Pares has been alone among

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1 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 58-60, 65.

modern historians in coming to a conclusion broadly similar to Shelburne's:

> ... I am inclined to believe, from many instances, that Pitt was an exceedingly artful demagogue, who took the credit for anything popular and often - but not always - shirked the responsibility for things that would not go down.[1]

In another work, Pares provides the clue to the divergence of opinion about Pitt: 'patriotism and demagogy were curiously jumbled in his mind, and one could never tell which would be uppermost'.[2] It is in this sense that Mr Brown is right when he says that Pitt's character 'can never be rationalised too far'.[3] Pitt was a patriot of a high order: Professor Pares admits that his is the only opposition to the Peace of Paris that can be justified, since it rested not on political considerations but on a view of England's strategic and economic interest.[4] It will be shown that Pitt, while trying to ensure that the national interest was deflected as little as possible by internal political factors, nevertheless took a far closer interest in these political developments than his haughty, isolated reserve suggested to his fellow politicians. The devices mentioned by Shelburne and Pares were used with such skill that neither at the time nor subsequently have they generally been appreciated: but they were used as a means to a national and patriotic end, not as an end in themselves.

(ii) The Cabinet

Before examining how Newcastle and Pitt saw their roles at the start of the coalition, it is necessary to look at the

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1 Pares, War and Trade, p 570, n.2
2 R. Pares, King George III and the Politicians (Oxford, 1953), p 54
3 P. Brown, The Chathamites (London, 1967), p 27
4 Pares, War and Trade, p 609

restraints imposed and the opportunities created by the way in which governments made their decisions and had them carried out.

In wartime especially, a small body of ministers was needed to take the required decisions with speed and secrecy. The events of 1702-3 and 1739-41 had produced 'inner' cabinets of only four and five members respectively.[1] The full or 'nominal' cabinet, in contrast, had about twenty members. This large group, including for instance the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Lord Chamberlain, fell into disuse in the years 1757-60 and subsequently its functions were confined to hearing the King's speech and advising the King on death sentences.[2] Before the formation of the coalition, it had occasionally met on matters concerned with the running of the war: it had in March 1756, for example, sanctioned the sending of a fleet to the Mediterranean.[3] But its ineffectiveness was generally recognised; Newcastle stated that 'a supernumerary place in the Cabinet for my Lord Hardwicke would be a jest to think of'.[4] Mansfield thought that, at most, this large Cabinet 'should be only kept for sanction to the efficient Ministers on great occasions'.[5] It never met even for this purpose between the formation of the coalition and the death of the King, though on one occasion Newcastle did think of summoning it to decide on peace plenipotentiaries.[6]

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1 H. Temperley, 'A Note on Inner and Outer Cabinets; their Development and Relations in the Eighteenth Century', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxi (1916), 294. R.R. Sedgwick, 'The Inner Cabinet from 1739 to 1741', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxiv (1919), 291.

2 L.B. Namier, 'The End of the Nominal Cabinet', Crossroads of Power (London, 1962), p. 119-20.

3 For this and other occasions, see Egerton MSS. 3426 and Addit. MSS. 51376.

4 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 395

5 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 212.

6 Addit. MSS. 35417, f. 196: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Apr. 1758.

Before the start of the coalition, it was easy to say who the 'efficient' ministers were. Cabinets were of two types: the nominal cabinet, and a gathering of six or seven ministers - the two Secretaries of State, the First Lord of the Treasury, the Lord President, Lord Chancellor and First Lord of the Admiralty, plus, for a time after his retirement as Secretary of State, Sir Thomas Robinson, with Halifax attending when the business was concerned with the colonies.[1] During the coalition, the picture was much more complicated. There are examples of meetings covering almost the entire spectrum between the three leading ministers and something not far short of the full nominal cabinet. Even contemporaries close to the centre of politics could not agree as to who was in the inner cabinet. Barrington wrote: 'the Duke of Newcastle, Lord President, Lord Hardwicke, Lord Mansfield, the two Secretaries of State and Lord Anson, form what Lord Granville calls the conciliabulum'.[2] But Shelburne added to this list Henley and Ligonier, Commander-in-Chief after Cumberland's resignation.[3] Neither of these appears to be accurate: it is difficult to see why Legge is excluded from both lists. He attended inner cabinet meetings from the start, even if the business was not financial;[4] and Newcastle appears to have thought that he had a better claim to attend than Anson, whom both Barrington and Shelburne include.[5] Certainly he attended

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1 Evidence for this can be found in Addit. MSS. 51376. Cf. W.R. Anson, 'The Cabinet in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,' Eng. Hist. Rev., xxix (1914), 73, for the development of these two kinds of cabinet.

2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 125.

3 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 66.

4 For instance, the first cabinet meeting of the new administration, which decided not to send a Baltic squadron to help Frederick, was attended by Pitt, Newcastle, Hardwicke, Holdernesse, Anson, Granville and Legge. Egerton MSS. 3426.

5 For the meeting on 25 July 1757 to discuss Mitchell's letters, he thought Legge should certainly attend, but was doubtful about Anson. Egerton MSS. 3430: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 24 July 1757.

far more often than Henley or Ligonier.

Even within the 'conciliabulum', or 'essence of the council' as Horace Walpole described it, there were complicated gradations and subdivisions, instinctive rather than openly expressed. The smallest group, like that of Grenville's administration at the end of the war, was only three strong: the two Secretaries and the First Lord of the Treasury.[1] These three, for instance, negotiated the Hessian treaty in December 1758; dealt with the Prussian envoys over the peace declaration the following year; and in October 1759 drew up the answer to the Danish request for the confidential communication of English peace aims.[2] These were all matters coming within Holdernesse's Northern Department, but with wide implications for the future of the war and liable to arouse some controversy. In none of these cases was policy being initiated: rather, difficulties which had arisen were being ironed out in the light of overall war policy. Most of the matters of this kind came naturally within the ambit of the Northern Department; but where such a matter concerned the Southern Department, it was not expected that the ineffective Holdernesse, increasingly isolated from both Pitt and Newcastle, should be consulted. In the case of the disputes with Spain over logwood and the Newfoundland fishery in the summer of 1760, Pitt stated that the final decision would be made by Newcastle and himself,

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1 Cf. I.R. Christie, 'The Cabinet in the Reign of George III, to 1790', Myth and Reality in Late-Eighteenth Century British Politics and Other Papers (London, 1970), p 62

2 Addit. MSS.32886, f.283: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 12 Dec 1758 Addit. MSS.32896, f.94: protocolle, 26 Sept 1759; Addit. MSS. 32897, f.458: protocolle, 29 Oct 1759

advised by Hardwicke.[1]

Even within the 'conciliabulum' proper, there were a number of different levels. Pitt, Newcastle and Holdernesse would occasionally meet with Hardwicke alone. In March 1758 they met to discuss the disputed points in the convention with Prussia, when Pitt took the initiative in inviting Hardwicke.[2] This group, along with Anson, who was probably called because of the importance of the projected coastal diversion, had also met in July 1757 to produce a reply to the Prussian requests.[3] Granville, the Lord President, usually attended any meeting more extensive than this, though for the meetings over the coastal operations his name, significantly, was only added when the King ordered it.[4] He was not necessarily expected to attend regularly: he missed all the meetings on the Belleisle expedition in October 1760 because he chose to remain out of town.[5] Mansfield, too, was added to the 'conciliabulum' early in the life of the coalition by the King's command, though here the command followed an agreement between Newcastle and Pitt that Mansfield should be summoned.[6] There was also an early agreement between the two ministers that Halifax should be called to cabinet, but this clearly meant not the 'conciliabulum' but only the more extensive meetings than this.[7] In the case of Devonshire, however, Newcastle made a special effort to secure his attendance on the same basis of agreement as applied

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1 Addit. MSS. 32908, f. 80: memorandum, 4 July 1760.
2 Addit. MSS. 32878, f. 380: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 27 March 1758.
3 Addit. MSS. 32872, f. 204: memorandum, 15 July 1757.
4 ibid., f. 429: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 August 1757.
5 Cf. Bodleian Library, MSS. Lyell empt. 35, f. 89: Granville to Lady Sophia Carteret, 30 Oct. 1760.
6 Addit. MSS. 32874, f. 24: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 13 Sept. 1757. Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, R1-106: Dupplin to Rockingham, 1 Oct. 1757.
7 E.g. the meeting of thirteen members on 22 June 1759. Egerton MSS. 3426. For the agreement, see Addit. MSS. 32874, f. 325: Newcastle to Legge, 27 Sept. 1757.

to Hardwicke and Mansfield. This was in 1759, when he came to realise the value of Devonshire in holding together the old Whigs and as an intermediary with the King. Devonshire had sometimes attended since the start of the coalition larger meetings than those of a 'conciliabulum' proper, and he now declined to attend meetings on a more regular basis, though he was prepared to do so on special occasions.[1] Another politician whose attendance Newcastle was often keen to secure at larger meetings was Bedford, the lord-lieutenant of Ireland, 'whom the rest', says Walpole of the other members of the coalition, 'always summoned when they wanted to combat Pitt and did not dare'.[2] But Bedford's presence was naturally ruled out for much of the year, during his residence in Ireland. A further minister whom Newcastle suggested should be called to these larger meetings, though this time to please Pitt rather than to combat him, was Temple, after the dispute over his claim to one of the vacant Garters was satisfactorily settled in December 1759.[3]

These larger meetings were the type of gathering of which Hardwicke was thinking when he wrote to Newcastle on 24 October 1759:

> In what I said about English Ministers settling their own ideas and opinions about the terms of peace, I did by no means intend that your Grace should do it with the two Secretaries of State only. Neither can it be the work of a full Council; but must properly be so of a meeting, perhaps a little more extended than the usual ones, and yet not much extended neither.[4]

Such meetings were of two sorts. One was to discuss in general

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1 Addit. MSS. 32892, f. 500: Devonshire to Newcastle, 10 Jul.1757
2 Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i. 54.
3 Addit. MSS. 32899, f. 362: Newcastle to Pitt, 7 Dec. 1759. Cf. ibid., f. 401: memorandums for the King, 10 Dec. 1759.
4 Addit. MSS. 32897, f. 350: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 24 Oct 1759.

terms, as Hardwicke intended in this case, the broad outline of major areas of policy. The other was to take over a function of the old nominal cabinet and to give formal assent to important decisions: for example, to put the commission of array into execution in May 1759 when faced with the French invasion threat.[1]

These meetings were also attended by the Lord Keeper and the Commander-in-Chief, who only attended meetings of the 'conciliabulum' when legal or military questions respectively were under discussion. Ligonier no longer attended after the end of the war.[2] This explains why Shelburne mistakenly thought they formed part of the 'conciliabulum'. Other politicians might attend meetings from time to time, whether of the 'conciliabulum' or larger gatherings, when their own subjects were under discussion: Barrington, for instance, when the work of the War Office was to come under discussion, or Argyll for Scotland, or the naval and military commanders before the Rochefort expedition in 1757.[3] The system was above all an elastic one: here was its main strength.

(iii) The Departments

It was the cabinet that decided on or sanctioned policy. The Secretaries of State carried it out. Sir Charles Middleton later defined their respective roles as follows:

> Cabinet: To consider and determine what expeditions are to take place, and at what periods; what troops are likely to be sent abroad, when, where, how, and the number. What services are to have preference.
>
> Secretary of State: To issue timely orders, to the Treasury, Admiralty, Ordnance and Commander-in-Chief of the Army on these heads, so that every necessary preparation can be made, and no delay nor disappointment happen when the services take place.[4]

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1 Egerton MSS. 3426.
2 Christie, 'The Cabinet in the Reign of George III, to 1790', p.61
3 Cf. Addit. MSS. 32997, f. 241: 4 Aug. 1757; Egerton MSS. 3426, 22 June 1759; Egerton MSS. 3432, 10 Dec. 1759.
4 P.G. Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (Longmans, 1964) p. 12, quotes this passage.

The Secretary for the Northern Department dealt with Holland, Germany, Russia and the Scandinavian countries; for the Southern, with France, Spain, Turkey, Ireland and the colonies. In 1752 the Southern Department had lost control of the internal administration of the colonies, which was shared between the Board of Trade and a special Privy Council committee; but it continued to be responsible for colonial defence and as fighting spread the scope of the department widened.

It was the Secretaries who were responsible for communicating cabinet decisions to the different departments, so that they could carry them into effect. For example, the Treasury was responsible for the contracts for army supplies and for the delivery of these supplies; the Admiralty decided, on the advice of the Navy Board, how best the cabinet's requirements for certain numbers of ships to serve in the different theatres of operations could be met, and was also responsible, through its subordinate Victualling Board, for navy supplies; the Commander-in-Chief performed a similar function in organising the units to meet the cabinet's needs, while the War Office's functions 'extend only to regiments brought into actual service'[1]; the Ordnance Board provided engineers, field trains and munitions.[2] The Secretaries of State left it almost entirely to the departments to carry into execution what was decided by the cabinet. The most detailed illustration of the war machine at work during the early years of the war shows to

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1 Chatham MSS. 30/8/18: Barrington to Pitt, 12 July 1759.

2 For a detailed description of these functions, with the exception of those of the Treasury, see C.R. Middleton, 'The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt: the Departments of State and the Conduct of the War, 1754-1760, with particular reference to the campaigns in North America' (Exeter Univ. PhD. thesis, 1968)

how small an extent the Secretaries could expedite military and naval preparations. Such preparations were always at the mercy of the weather, the inadequate machinery for putting them into effect and, above all, the rigid departmental system which insisted that the departments could not officially transact business with one another. This could only be done through the Secretaries of State. It is not surprising that, for example, the reinforcement of 3000 troops for America decided upon in July 1757, which were intended to arrive by October, eventually arrived in poor condition in March of the following year.[1] Any attempts at interference in the internal affairs of other departments was deeply resented: Newcastle constantly complained of his complete ignorance of the transactions of the Admiralty when Cleveland, Secretary to the Admiralty, was absent, and when on one occasion he tried to extract information from a junior lord, Anson found out and compelled him to apologise.[2] Pitt and Holdernesse accepted this situation as they found it. They left the departments largely to themselves and made almost no effort to improve coordination between them.[3] As an illustration, there are only thirty-five letters between Pitt and the Admiralty Board for his first four months of office, and he never corresponded at all with the Navy or Victualling Boards.[4] Theory and practice indicated that within his own department each minister was supreme.

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1 C.R. Middleton, 'A Reinforcement for North America, Summer 1757' Bulletin of the Inst. of Hist. Research, xli (1968), 58-72.
2 C.R. Middleton, 'Pitt, Anson and the Admiralty, 1756-61', History, 55 (1970), 192.
3 Middleton, 'The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt', cites one exception only.
4 Middleton, History, 55 (1970), 195.

(iv) A First Minister: Theory and Practice

The departmental system militated against the emergence of any one leading minister. Such a position could not be attained by interference in the affairs of the departments. It was only through domination of the cabinet - in the making of policy rather than in its implementation - that any minister could impose his own views and personality on the conduct of the war. And of course domination of the cabinet was of little use without the support of the King and a majority in Parliament.

The obvious desirability of a leading minister in wartime was at odds with a confused, changing but largely hostile tradition. To accuse a minister of trying to take upon himself all effective power was a usual device of politicians in opposition. This rested on sound constitutional theory; theoretically all ministers were equal because all were servants of the King, and there was good reason to ensure that they did not usurp their master's role:

> Can one wonder at people not having guessed the future of the institution of Prime Minister? - who, with the patronage of the Crown at his disposal, was almost as permanent as the King, but, having connexions of his own and being partly dependent on them, tended to exclude a large, perhaps the larger, part of the political nation from a constructive share in national politics. This seemed a travesty of both Royal and Parliamentary government, combining the disadvantages of both; and men naturally asked themselves whether 'the management of one man in the character of Prime Minister' was not in the end 'more prejudicial to a country than that of the sovereign himself ...'[1]

Walpole had been accused of trying to become Prime Minister. The King himself told Newcastle in 1754 that 'there is no such thing

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1 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 58.

as first minister'.[1] Fox, in a speech in May 1757, 'took up some of Pitt's expressions: if a conciliabulum might not decide our measures, he hoped at least one man should not dictate them'.[2]

In practice, of course, one minister usually took the lead. By the time of the American War, the demand for 'one great director' was widespread. North, recognising his own unsuitability for the task, felt the nation needed 'a person in the Cabinet capable of leading, of discerning between opinions, of deciding quickly and confidently'.[3] The younger Pitt was even more positive, saying that such a minister should ideally be the First Lord of the Treasury. But the Seven Years' War was nearer the time when Walpole had only narrowly been acquitted by the Commons after being faced with the accusation of being Prime Minister, a position unrecognised by and alien to the constitution. Practical needs were recognised, but they had not yet outstripped constitutional theory. Pitt well reflected this state of opinion when he attacked the Newcastle-Fox ministry in 1756:

> I don't call this an Administration, it is so unsteady. One is at the head of the Treasury; one, Chancellor; one, head of the Navy; one great person, of the Army - yet, is that an Administration? They shift and shuffle the charge from one to another: says one, I am not General; the Treasury says, I am not Admiral; the Admiralty says, I am not Minister. From such an unaccording assemblage of separate and distinct powers with no system, a nullity results ... he did not wish to see a single Minister, but a system and decision ...[4]

Yet contemporaries, who saw Pitt as the single effective minister in the coalition, raised no objections. Even Joseph Yorke admitted to Andrew Mitchell that 'Pitt was now everything in

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1 Feiling, The Second Tory Party, p. 60.
2 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 18.
3 Mackesy, The War for America, p. 20.
4 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 189-90.

England'.[1] His political opponents took the same line. 'Pitt is sole minister (and I am glad of it)', wrote Fox to Bedford; and Egmont, in a tirade against the 'mad measures' of the administration, attributed them all to Pitt.[2] Pitt himself made a similar claim at the time of his resignation:

> that he was loaded with the imputation of this war being solely his; that it was called his war; that it had been a successful one, and more than hinted that the success was singly owing to him.[3]

But however much Pitt's opponents criticised his measures, they did not attack him on constitutional grounds for trying to become Prime Minister.

How was Pitt able to escape the sort of accusations that had been levelled against Walpole? Sir Lewis Namier pointed out that what was meant by 'Prime Minister' depended on the time and circumstances.[4]

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1 A. Bisset, Memoirs and Papers of Sir Andrew Mitchell (London, 1850), ii, 5. This reflected the general view. It would be unnecessary to expand on this point were it not for Middleton's misleading statement that only Almon among contemporary writers made extravagant claims for Pitt and that the myth of Pitt as the sole directing minister only grew up among later historians. ('The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt', p. 193) Middleton is of course right that Pitt did not interfere in the detailed work of the departments but he ignores Pitt's domination of the cabinet. For examples of the contemporary view that Pitt was the sole effective minister, see Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 69-70; Pol. Corr. xvi, 252; Letters to Lord Holland, p. 126; An Eighteenth-Century Corr., p. 375; M. Wyndham, Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1924), ii, 255; K. Hotblack, Chatham's Colonial Policy (London, 1917), p. 64 ; Walpole, Memoirs, 173-4; Walpole, Letters, ix (1), 251; ibid., xxi (5), 257, 277, 347; Hist. MSS. Comm.: Tenth Report, Appendix, Part I, (Weston Underwood), p. 318; Hist. MSS. Comm., Fourteenth Report, Appendix IV (Lord Kenyon), p. 496; Addit. MSS. 17493, f. 147 (Calcraft to Home, 26 Feb. 1758); Addit. MSS. 51406 (Campbell to Fox); Egerton MSS. 1719, f. 34 (Lady Egerton to Bentinck, 23 March 1759)

2 Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 47093, f. 2 (Egmont Papers. Bed. Corr., ii, 280.

3 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 279.

4 Namier, 'King, Cabinet and Parliament in the early years of George III' (Ford Lectures, 1934); Crossroads of Power, London, 1962), p. 111.

Professor Pares vividly makes the same point:

> The history of the Prime Minister before 1832 - and perhaps after it - is more like that of the Cheshire Cat: sometimes there is almost a whole cat, sometimes no more than a grin,[1] and it is not always the same end that appears first.

Dr Owen has shown that the confidence of the King and of a majority in the House of Commons were essential elements, and the experience of 1754-57 bore this out. But though they were necessary preconditions, they were not always enough on their own. Miss Kemp makes the point that neither North nor the younger Pitt spoke of the Premiership in terms of relations with the King or the House of Commons, but in terms of relations with other ministers in the cabinet.[2]

This was where Pitt could claim the lead. He denied, on the other hand, that he had the essential preconditions for leadership. He stated in June 1760:

> The Duke of Newcastle is the person, who has the confidence of the King. The Duke of Newcastle has the support of the Parliament; and a power which may enable him to stand the one, or the other. That his situation was very different.[3]

This in no sense prevented him from claiming de facto supremacy in the cabinet, as he did when he resigned. He used Newcastle's strength - the confidence of the King and of the Commons - as a backcloth for his own power in the cabinet: his administration with Devonshire had convinced him of the importance of this. He admitted that he 'borrowed' Newcastle's majority;[4] by disclaiming responsibility himself in the Commons and in the closet he could leave it to Newcastle to deal with the difficulties

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1 R. Pares, King George III and the Politicians, p. 176.
2 B. Kemp, King and Commons, 1660-1832 (London, 1957), p. 127.
3 Addit. MSS. 32908, f. 81: memorandum, 4 July 1760.
4 Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, 82.

that arose there. This combination of a willingness to avow leadership in the cabinet with a disclaimer of royal confidence or control of Parliament explains Professor Pares' puzzlement over how Pitt saw his role:

> The elder Pitt's ideas on Prime Ministership, as on other subjects, are confused and hard to interpret. He seems to have been just as uncertain as the historians whether he was Prime Minister in the coalition of 1757 - indeed, whether there was one at all. On the one hand he treated Newcastle, rightly I think, as having the chief interest in the closet; but he also said that he would not defer to the opinions of any colleague, but the sovereign must decide between them. He went on to say, in the next breath, 'The rights of my office are not enough for me', and he declared in public, after it was all over, that he had resigned 'in order not to remain responsible for measures which I was not allowed to guide'.[1]

Pitt exploited these very weaknesses in the coalition to the full and used them as a source of strength. There was a widespread feeling that the cabinet should be something of a compromise between the crown and the leading parliamentary group. J.L. Nicholl recognised that it was because Pitt was closely identified with neither that he was able to do so much.[2] It was to point to this lack of identification that Pitt claimed that he 'would oppose power in any minister, did not wish to have any himself, for he was afraid he **should not** make a right use of it'.[3] He left it to Newcastle to press his demands on the King, who - however reluctantly - almost invariably consented. Even in 1760, he said that without Newcastle's majority he would be unable to continue for more than a fortnight. He was free, at the same time, to act in a private capacity rather than as the leader of the government in the House of Commons - criticising the budget,

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1 Pares, King George III and the Politicians, p. 177.
2 Namier, 'King, Cabinet and Parliament in the early years of George III' (Ford Lectures, 1934), Crossroads of Power, p. 91.
3 Addit. MSS.32871, f.3 : Newcastle to Hardwicke, 1 May 1757

blaming others for unpopular measures and supporting popular ones even when Newcastle disapproved of them. Temple later blamed Shelburne for 'the affectation of holding the ostensible language of Mr Pitt in 1759', professing to 'know nothing of the management of the House of Commons and to throw himself upon the people alone for support'.[1] This attitude was instrumental in Pitt's retention of his Tory backing. The Tories hated to feel that they or he were bound to the Whig majority in the Commons: Fox told Newcastle on 26 April 1757 that 'every time he (Pitt) spoke of going and leaving the majority to themselves, the Tories called out with the loudest applause'.[2]

Newcastle recognised the advantages which Pitt derived from his denial of responsibility in the Commons and in the closet. He complained to Hardwicke in March 1760:

> The King said a thing to me, which had weight in it. That Pitt was supporting these points laying me under difficulties, dividing my friends, in order to destroy my influence and credit, and to enable himself, with his Tories, to carry every thing he pleased. It is to be sure a most ridiculous situation. Mr Pitt, by his situation and consequence, is at the head of the House of Commons, of which the Tories scarce make a sixth part; and all extrajudicial business, is to be agreed, and concerted with them, without any notice taken of our friends,[3] who compose the majority of the House of Commons.

And he was constantly complaining of being 'cut to pieces between the King and Mr Pitt', having 'equally to combat both my master and Mr Pitt'.[4] At times, Pitt's disclaimers of responsibility drove Newcastle to think of resignation:

> For my own part, I am determined not to continue in business, upon the present foot; obliged, every day, to be teazing,

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1 J. Norris, Shelburne and Reform (London, 1963), p. 264.
2 W.M. Torrens, History of Cabinets (London, 1894), ii, 375.
3 Addit. MSS. 32903, f. 297: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 March 1760
4 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 40-41. Addit. MSS. 32884, f. 79: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 Dept. 1758.

> and proposing disagreable things to the King; and, instead of being thank'd for it, to meet with constant reproaches, jealousies, and an overbearing superiority; and, (what is still worse) laid under the greatest difficulties every day, from proceedings in Parliament, without concert, or the least regard to consequences, or any management whatever, for myself, or my friends; with whom no measures are kept, or of whom no <u>good</u> notice is ever taken.[1]

Despite these complaints and even the talk of resignation, the coalition had been Newcastle's work, the best solution that he could devise, and he was 'unable voluntarily to leave his treadmill'.[2] Pitt increasingly supplied the administration with success and popularity; and this gave Newcastle, in compensation, a secure background against which he could devote his tireless energy to the work of the Treasury and, above all, to the disposal of patronage. He was as jealous as ever of this role. When the King in March 1758 asked Holdernesse to give him a paper of ecclesiastical recommendations, Newcastle was furious:

> This can be wanted by the King for nothing, but to have a parcel of names, suggested to be sure by that light idle man, Dr Thos. Green, Dean of Salisbury, to oppose to my future recommendations.[3]

There was no formal agreement, as many historians appear to have assumed, that Newcastle should have sole control of patronage: much less that Pitt should have sole control of policy. Newcastle wrote to Hardwicke in August 1757:

> ... I must say, that if it is expected, that I shall never talk to any body upon an employment, or even mention a <u>measure</u> to the King, without having previously concerted it with Mr Pitt - it is in such a situation, and such a dependancy, as I can by no means submit to.[4]

The following month, referring to 'seeds of jealousy' in Pitt

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1 Addit. MSS. 32879, f. 311: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Apr. 1758
2 Namier, <u>England in the Age of the American Revolution</u>, p. 83.
3 Addit. MSS. 32878, f. 352: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 Mar. 1758
4 Addit. MSS. 32873, f. 240: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 Aug. 1757.

over a minor patronage matter, he wrote:

> I doubt we shall have this (jealousy) often, if there is not some rule laid down for our conduct in these things. ? What that should be.[1]

No such agreement was arrived at. But it seems to have been accepted from the start that Newcastle should dispense patronage: in March 1758 Pitt denied that he had ever 'had one word to say concerning Hierarchys and Powers'.[2]

Newcastle himself drew a clear distinction between the functions of a 'minister of men' and a 'minister of measures'.[3] So long as Pitt allowed Newcastle to act as 'disposing minister' he would not resign, despite his occasional threats. Pitt recognised that he had 'two points only in view, viz. the disposal of employments and the confidence of the King' and that provided he did not disturb Newcastle in these, he would not retire.[4] This explains why Newcastle, however unwillingly, was prepared to allow Pitt to use Newcastle's own power, while he himself retained the responsibility for the use of this power. It is ironical that the leader of the Whigs, whose defeat of the Tories half a century ago had owed much to their usurpation of powers formerly exercised by the King, now had his own powers used in a similar way by the ally of the Tories. This also explains why contemporaries, while accepting that Pitt controlled policy, did not accuse him of trying to subvert the constitution by attempting to become Prime Minister; for it was Newcastle's power, not his own, that he was using for this purpose. Calcraft reflected the

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1 Addit. MSS. 32997, f. 271: Memorandums, 13 Sept. 1757.
2 Addit. MSS. 32878, f. 240: Pitt to Newcastle, 29 March 1758.
3 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 145.
4 ibid., p. 65.

general view when he told Home that 'Pitt is absolute minister as to measures, and the Duke of Newcastle the giver of all places'.[1] This view contained within it a recognition that Pitt's very strength, far from arising from his being sole minister, rested on the fact that he was in coalition. One of Pitt's recent biographers, O.A. Sherrard, could not be further from the truth in claiming that 'entering the coalition stands out as Pitt's one great mistake. It gave him nothing worth while, and took from him everything that mattered'.[2]

Pitt realised that he could use his apparent weakness as a source of strength not only in relation to the King and Commons, but also to the cabinet and the departments. Professor Pares sees an element of the 'consummate hypocrite' in Pitt's character:[3] and it is here that this element is most clear. In cabinet, though Pitt could and often did claim supremacy, he also - quite inconsistently - made political capital at times by lamenting his inability to secure the support of his ministerial colleagues. These complaints were unjustified: in no important matter did Pitt fail in cabinet to get his way. He was right when he claimed that he dominated the cabinet. Partly this was a matter of personality, for which, as Ehrman recognises, there was ample scope:

> The relative importance of these Ministers was in fact a matter of personality and political fortune, shaping rather than being shaped by the system itself. A weak First Lord of the Treasury might depend on the Secretaries,

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1 Chatham MSS. 30/8/86: Calcraft to Home, 10 Nov. 1758. Many of the references quoted above, p. 53, n. 3, say the same thing.

2 C.A. Sherrard, Lord Chatham: Pitt and the Seven Years' War (London, 1955), p. 6.

3 Pares, King George III and the Politicians, p. 99.

> a strong First Lord might control or ignore them, there might be an uneasy close combination, whether or not the King intervened.[1]

The opportunities for Pitt's personality to exert itself were the greater because Newcastle's cabinet majority was by no means as secure as it seemed. Newcastle himself was always complaining of this: ''I shall be entirely alone, if in any case I should be of a different opinion from Mr Pitt'; 'the thing is now over, and so is every thing that in the least interferes with the plan of one man'.[2] Hardwicke was often absent in the country and Mansfield - who apparently spoke little if at all in the cabinet - away on circuit.[3] Granville was completely independent: he alone, for instance, opposed Pitt's reply to Spain in December 1759, after Spain had expressed anxiety about the equilibrium in America being upset.[4] Holdernesse became increasingly unreliable as he switched his allegiance from Newcastle to Bute, moving from 'culpable taciturnity' to outright opposition.[5] Anson saw his role in the cabinet as a limited one. He would interfere in questions of tactics or minor strategy, but major strategic decisions he was prepared to accept, whether he approved of them or not.[6]

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1 J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: The Years of Acclaim (London 1969) p 310

2 Addit. MSS.32873, f.239: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 Aug 1757
Addit. MSS.32882, f.203: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Aug 1758

3 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 67

4 Addit. MSS.32900, f.14: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 12 Dec 1759

5 Addit. MSS.32885, f.146: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 31 Oct 1759

6 For evidence of Anson taking the initiative in tactical or minor strategic decisions, see Addit. MSS.32885, f.170: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 1 Nov 1758. But though he disliked the idea of the Martinique expedition, one of major strategic importance, he accepted that it was reasonable that it should be decided on without his participation. Addit. MSS.32884, f.81: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 Sept 1758.

The opportunities for Pitt were therefore much greater than they at first sight appeared. But Pitt could at the same time make use of his seemingly weak position in the cabinet. It was a favourite device of his, to escape responsibility for anything unpopular - however much he wanted it - to make an appearance of agreeing only reluctantly and in the face of a cabinet majority. He would justify this acquiescence by gaining simultaneous cabinet support for some more popular project with which he was identified and which, so it would seem, owed its acceptance entirely to his presence in the cabinet. In other words, he created an impression of often being overruled, but of achieving enough in cabinet of his own accord to make his continuance in the administration seem worth while. In 1758 Pitt wanted both to send troops to Europe and to send an expedition to the French coast; he wanted to escape responsibility for the former and to claim it for the latter, though both were in reality his own policies. Newcastle, pleased about the troops but unenthusiastic about the expedition, admitted to Anson, referring to the reinforcement for Germany: 'we must play a little with expeditions, to make <u>that</u> go down'.[1] Similarly, in the spring of 1760 Pitt made great play of his support for a militia bill introduced by his cousin, and Barrington commented to Newcastle: 'in short, it was plain that his consent to a greater <u>British</u> force in Germany must be purchased by that bill'.[2]

Pitt showed the same sort of hypocrisy in his attitude to the departments. In cabinet, he liked to claim supremacy except

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1 Addit. MSS. 32881, f. 190: Newcastle to Anson, 7 July 1758
2 Addit. MSS. 32904, f. 424-5: Barrington to Newcastle, 18 April 1760.

when it suited him to do otherwise: in the departments, on the other hand, he was keen to disclaim any interference except when he could derive political advantage from interfering. The theory of departmental autonomy was responsible for this attitude. It was, in any case, how Pitt expected his colleagues to behave towards him. He could have few complaints about Newcastle's behaviour in this respect. All that Newcastle asked was that 'I may have the pleasure of seeing them (Pitt's letters) and knowing the orders, the Governors and Admirals are under', and he added, 'I am sure I shall most extremely approve them'.[1] Pitt resented any suggestion of interference. In July 1760 Newcastle attributed a sudden burst of 'ill humour' from Pitt to 'the Spanish Ambassador having talk'd so fully to me, upon a point in his department'.[2] Equally, Pitt derived political benefit from leaving the affairs of the Treasury entirely in Newcastle's hands, enabling him to escape any responsibility for the huge sums which had to be raised to finance the war. Horace Walpole wrote:

> ...he kept aloof from all details, drew magnificent plans, and left others to find the magnificent means. Disdaining, too, to descend into the operations of an office which he did not fill, he affected to throw on the Treasury the execution of measures which he dictated, but for which he thus held himself not responsible. The conduct was artful, new, and grand; and to him proved most advantageous.[3]

He told Newcastle, for instance, of the high army estimates in the spring of 1758: 'I must beg to <u>disclaim</u> any part in the controlling and reducing this expence'.[4] And in the financial

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1. Addit. MSS. 32872, f. 167: Newcastle to Pitt, 11 July 1758.
2. Addit. MSS. 32908, f. 81: memorandum, 4 July 1760.
3. Walpole, <u>Memoirs</u>, iii, 173-4.

crisis of 1759 he said that

> it was not his department; and therefore he could not be looked upon as responsible. But that he hoped those whose particular province it was would take this very interesting affair into their most serious consideration, and think of applying some remedy before it was too late.[1]

Newcastle realised that this put the responsibility entirely on his shoulders. In May 1760 he complained, in relation to some demands from Prince Ferdinand which might cause parliamentary trouble: 'Mr Pitt will not say one word upon it; it is not in his department'.[2] The clearest indication of Pitt's realisation of the advantages of his non-interference in Treasury affairs is to be found in the fact that in 1766 he wanted Lord Temple to occupy the same position as that filled by Newcastle in the coalition - as First Lord of the Treasury, dealing with patronage, but with no influence over wider policy-making.[3]

But Pitt was far from consistent in maintaining this attitude.[4] At times it was politically advantageous both to share the responsibility for the work of the Southern Department and to try to influence the operations of the Treasury. In these circumstances he did not hesitate to depart from his usual professions. In December 1757, after Newcastle had said that he would approve of whatever plans for America Pitt had drawn up, Pitt replied:

> I hope your Grace will not think me unreasonable or improper, in wishing to have the sanction of a meeting of the Cabinet and particularly of your Grace present there, concerning so important and extensive a scene as

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1 Addit. MSS. 32890, f. 130: 18 April 1759.
2 Addit. MSS. 32906, f. 13: Newcastle to Granby, 12 May 1760.
3 J. Brooke, The Chatham Administration, 1766-1768 (London, 1956), pp. 7-8.
4 For some examples of this inconsistency, see B. Williams, The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (London, 1913), ii, 50-1.

> the campaign in America, where England and Europe are to be fought for, and where all the data on which we are to ground any plan are so loose and precarious, that, I confess, I do not see my way as clearly as I wish[1] to do in matters where I make myself responsible.

On occasion, also, Pitt derived benefit from the abandonment of his detachment from the affairs of the Treasury. Early in 1759, to satisfy Alderman Beckford and the West Indian interest, he made public his opposition to a tax on sugar and secured as a compromise solution a tax on all dry goods. Shortly afterwards, Newcastle protested to the King:

> There is no bearing this usage. One is not safe, whenever he (Pitt) thinks his own measures occasion any discontent. He invents reasons to fling them upon others. Sometimes the Admiralty, sometimes the Treasury, and[2] that is the true reason of his attacking Mr Legge.

But at other times his attitude was the exact reverse, and Newcastle complained: 'he will be Treasurer, Secretary, General and Admiral'.[3] Even before the kissing of hands, Lord Hillsborough saw that Pitt would be able to make use of the departmental system and of his position in cabinet by claiming credit for success without having to carry the onus of failure:

> I think the Man Mountain has so contrived that he may keep his popularity; if the revenue is well conducted, it is from the great ability of Mr L---: if well, the D. of Newcastle overrules him, and is so ignorant, etc. etc. If you have any naval successes, it is owing to the diligence, parts and wisdom of Mr Pitt's friends at that Board, if the reverse, what else could be expected from Anson? If things in general go well, Mr Pitt is all powerfull; if ill, the[4] D. of Newcastle thwarts and opposes him in every thing.

Hillsborough was right: Pitt's apparent weakness was his greatest

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1 Addit. MSS. 32876, f. 455: Pitt to Newcastle, 27 Dec. 1757.
2 Addit. MSS. 32891, f. 86: memorandums for the King, 11 May 1759.
3 Addit. MSS. 35417, f. 196: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 April 1758.
4 Addit. MSS. 51386: Hillsborough to Fox, 23 June 1757.

source of strength. He left entirely to Newcastle the tasks of keeping the King and the Commons in order. He claimed strength or weakness in the cabinet, and interfered or not in the work of the other departments, in accordance with where the political gain rested. It was on the very fact that Newcastle had triumphed in the arrangement of the coalition that Pitt was able to build his power.

MEN AND MEASURES: WHIGS AND TORIES

In the negotiations which led up to the formation of the coalition, all the discussion was about who should fill what place: measures were hardly mentioned. 'We are not squabbling about measures but about men', Holdernesse told Mitchell in November 1756.[1] Pitt of course could not admit this. When he rejected the overtures made by Hardwicke the previous month, he stressed that 'the great obstacles are the D. of N. and measures, and without a change of both, 'tis impossible for him to come'.[2] But he was hardly specific: when Hardwicke asked him what measures he would propose, he simply replied, 'I will tell your Lordship in two words, Whig and English'.[3] Subsequently, as Newcastle tightened his grip, there is almost no mention of policy in the correspondence on the negotiations. After the final settlement had been agreed, Newcastle wrote: 'Mr P. must seriously think of foreign affairs, in a different manner, from what he has hitherto done'.[4] Those who were disappointed by the agreement were naturally fiercely critical of Pitt, 'not the least adoption of any Publick System of Measures being declared or even hinted at by him'.[5]

Despite this, Pitt and Newcastle were obviously restricted in their potential scope for policy-making by their own views and those of their respective supporters. It is now necessary to

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1 Sir H. Ellis, Original Letters, Illustrative of English History, (3rd. ser., London 1846), iv, 117
2 Addit. MSS. 35351, f. 351: Hardwicke to Royston, 21 Oct. 1756.
3 Brit. Mus. Addit. MSS. 41356 (Martin Papers), f. 4.
4 Addit. MSS. 32871, f. 407: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 June 1757.
5 Hist. MSS. Comm., Eleventh Report, Appendix IV (Marquess Townshend), p. 393.

examine the limitations that this imposed.

(i) Tories and Whigs

The importance of the Tories sprang not from their abilities or numbers. Shelburne said of them that 'it is wonderful how those that are long out of employment or business of any kind, fall off in talent and knowledge of mankind', and Dupplin's list of 1754 contains only 106 Tory names.[1] But it was the very fact that they were a counterweight to Newcastle's majority in the Commons that made them so useful to Pitt. Their significance came from their support of him and from the fact that in return he took their views into account.

From the start, the question of how to treat the Tories posed a problem for Pitt. One of Newcastle's advisers wrote: 'if he admitts the Tories into office, he will lose himself entirely with the Whigs, if he excludes them, they will cool very fast towards him'.[2] Since the Hanoverian succession the Tories had as a group been excluded from office, court and consideration in the running of the House of Commons. But for a long time there had been talk of ending the proscription. The King himself, usually when wanting to frighten his Whig ministers, had occasionally talked of bringing in the Tories.[3] The Duke of Argyll resigned in February 1742 because the King rejected Sir John Hynde Cotton, a Tory, for the Admiralty Board. Egmont in 1749 planned on the accession of Frederick, Prince of Wales to take in a number of Tories. Even Orford in 1743 proposed to introduce into the administration a few Tory MPs. But he realised

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1 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 70.
2 Addit. MSS. 32871, f. 58: memorandum, 12 May 1757.
3 See Hervey, Memoirs, pp. 170, 680.

that this would not bring over the Tories in the Commons as a whole; and when the Pelhams tried to do so in the following year, they failed.[1] By 1760, this situation was changing. Talbot could confidently predict that the Tory country gentlemen would on the death of George II come in large numbers to St James's, and Douglas was able to point out that there was now no reason why the Tories should not be admitted, not singly, but as a group.[2] Pitt had been 'leading them towards the court': five months before the death of the old King, Walpole told Mann that 'Jacobites have found the way to St James's'.[3] The old proscription was already ending.

Not only were the Tories now acceptable at court and taken into account in the Commons: they also came to regard it as legitimate, since they were supporting the government, to ask for a share of its spoils. Lord Talbot wrote in January 1758 that he wished

> that during the time whilst the constellation is in the ascendant under the influence of which the Members of Tory counties may dare to receive marks of ministerial regard ... Mr William Harvey might receive a favour and the Duke of Newcastle bestow it.[4]

The fact that the Tories were supporting the administration strengthened their case for consideration in the distribution of patronage. One of those asking for an appointment from

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1 Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, pp. 257 sqq.
2 Bute MSS.: Talbot to Bute, Nov. 1760. J. Douglas, Seasonable Hints from an Honest Man on the Important Crisis of a New Reign, and a New Parliament (London, 1761), pp. 3204.
3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 179: Correspondence, xxi, 409.
4 The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1754-90, ed. Sir L.B. Namier and J. Brooke (London, 1964), i, 186. West lists Harvey as a Whig (J.R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century: the Story of a Political Issue, 1660-1802 (London, 1965). Dupplin calls him a Tory. (Addit. MSS. 33034, f. 177.

Newcastle wrote to him:

> ...tho' I am a young man I know sufficient of the world to acquaint your Grace that no man in these days should ask a favour without being conscious that they can in some measure return it.[1]

Dodington put it more succinctly: 'service is obligation, obligation implies return'.[2] It is no coincidence that it was at the height of the dispute over the Qualification Bill in February 1760, when Newcastle was very anxious to obtain a compromise with the Tories, that one of their most prominent figures, Sir John Philipps, chose to apply to Newcastle for a Surveyorship of the Window Office for a friend.[3] But there are no instances in the Newcastle or Pitt papers between June 1757 and October 1760 of a Tory MP making a direct application to either minister for an appointment for himself.

More significant than this, however, was the fact that the Tories had as a group, for the first time, lost the will to remain in permanent opposition. The events of 1744 had shown that whatever line the leading Tories might take, many Tory MPs could not bring themselves to support the administration over a period of time. The explanation for this change of attitude is that during the 1750s Jacobitism - and with it the Tory Party - ceased to be an effective political force.[4] By the time of the coalition, Jacobitism was 'now breathing its last gasp'.[5] Argyll said that it was practically extinct even in Scotland,[6] and Granville told

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1 Addit. MSS.32902, f.372: W. Emerson to Newcastle, 24 Feb. 1760
2 Dodington, Journal, p. 281.
3 Addit. MSS.32092, f.116: Newcastle to Philipps, 10 Feb. 1760.
4 R.R. Sedgwick in his introduction to The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1715-1754 (London, 1970), i, pp. 75-77, traces the decline of Jacobite Toryism after 1745.
5 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 70.
6 Addit. MSS. 32883, f.84: Argyll to Newcastle, 24 Aug 1758

his daughter in September 1759 that 'all people of what denomination 'soever pray most heartily for the King's long life and prosperity'.[1] There was now no obstacle to the Tories as a body supporting the administration: they were reconciled to the government in a way they had never been since the Hanoverian dynasty had been on the throne. Though there were few Tory applications for favours - and those always indirect ones - in the years of the coalition up to the King's death, a new attitude of mind had arisen. The general feeling was that the new reign would see a total ending of the Tory exclusion: all the essential conditions for this already existed and all that was needed was the catalyst of the accession of a new King. In November 1758 Fox told his wife that the House of Commons was completely unanimous, Newcastle's friends being kept in order by the grant of places, the Tories by 'hopes in a promis'd Land'.[2]

What, then, remained to distinguish the Tories as a separate entity? Since late in the seventeenth century the country or opposition party, whether Whig or Tory, had put forward a series of measures designed to weaken the influence of the executive. Once the Whig leaders had appropriated much of the royal influence for themselves, they naturally fought against such remedies. This programme was not so much Tory as oppositional or anti-court: Pulteney, for instance, had made use of it in his campaign against Walpole, but found it an embarrassment when in government. This was all now that the Tory programme amounted to. Charles Townshend,

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1 Bodleian Lib., MSS. Lyell empt. 35, f.33: Granville to Lady Sophia Carteret, 17 Sept. 1759.
2 Addit. MSS. 51416: Fox to Lady Caroline Fox, 25 Nov. 1758.

before he realised the extent of Tory support for the coalition, wrongly but understandably thought that this would cause difficulties for Pitt:

> ... The Tories, who gave him (Mr Pitt) popularity for their own purposes, are secretly happy to find, I hope, talents which were so irresistible in opposition, which is their own point, so ineffectual in Administration, which it is presumed is Mr Pitt's point more than their's.[1]

Thomas Potter, who acted as Pitt's agent with the Tories, recognised the lineage of their programme by calling them simply 'the country party'[2]: with Jacobitism almost dead, this indeed is what they were.

During the life of the coalition, these traditional oppositional assaults on the power of the executive were still occasionally put forward. Heredity was the main element in the Tory tradition and it is not surprising that Tory MPs advocated the same solutions as their fathers, even though the party was no longer in opposition.[3] In 1758 an attempt was made by two Tory MPs to introduce a bill for shorter Parliaments. Similar attempts to repeal the 1716 Septennial Act had been made in 1734, 1742 and 1745. John Yorke was justified in calling the Tory arguments 'trite and threadbare stuff which Tories and men in opposition have talked for these twenty years'.[4] In 1760 the Tories brought in another of their old remedies - a bill to ensure that MPs would in future be unable to hold fictitious qualifications to comply with the landed requirements in the Tory Act of 1710. Between 1721 and 1739, six similar efforts had been made by Tories and

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1 Sir L.B. Namier and J. Brooke, Charles Townshend (London, 1964) p. 56.
2 Chatham MSS. 30/8/53: Potter to Temple, n.d. (Dec. 1756)
3 Cf. Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, p. 69.
4 Addit. MSS. 35374, f. 144: Yorke to Royston, n.d. (20 Feb 1758)

opposition Whigs but for the last twenty years the subject had never even been discussed in Parliament.[1]

Another traditional and much more important element in the country programme was opposition to the idea of a standing army and support for a militia. A standing army, 'the thing in the world that was most disliked in this country',[2] was widely seen as a means by which an administration might extend its influence and even overturn the constitution. These fears were not confined to Tories; they find expression, for instance, in Douglas' 'Letter to Two Great Men', which pointed with concern to the growth of military influence during the war.[3] In contrast, Pitt's supporters were eager to claim for him that 'he harrasses the army beyond all example'.[4]

The alternative was a militia, originally seen as a possible replacement for standing armies, and now seen more realistically as a constitutional counterweight. The invasion scare of 1756 brought the question again into the forefront of politics: opponents of the ministry claimed that the Hanoverians and Hessians were raised as a 'standing army' to protect not the country against the French, but the ministers themselves against the national indignation.[5] The militia issue had always been treated in these sort of terms. Even before 1660 it was above all a 'court' versus

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1 H.E. Witmer, The Property Qualifications of Members of Parliament (New York, 1943), pp. 59-75.
2 Hervey, Memoirs, p. 525.
3 (J. Douglas), A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men on the Prospect of Peace (London, 1760), p. 46.
4 C.M. Haberdasher, Plain Reasons for Removing a Certain Great Man from His M------y's Presence and Councils for Ever (London, 1759), p. 14.
5 George, English Political Caricature, p. 103.

'country' question and it had historically been the court party, whether Whig or Tory, that had frustrated reform.[1] At the same time, it was a matter which the Tories had to approach with greater caution than the other elements in the stock opposition programme. As in the case of a standing army, constitutional objections could be levelled against a militia. The author of the pamphlet 'A Word in Time to Both Houses of Parliament' pointed out that standing armies were largely broken up at the end of wars: a standing army was in reality nothing more than a regular militia, but much less dangerous to the national security - what might have happened in the 1756 corn riots if men had been armed?[2] Lord Talbot recognised that 'till imminent danger of invasion, our continuance unembodied is most agreeable to my sense of the true nature of a British militia'.[3] And Gibbon says of the Hampshire militia in 1759:

> ... nor is it surprizing that some regiments should have assumed the discipline and appearance of veteran troops. With the skill they soon imbibed the spirit of mercenaries, the character of a militia was lost; and, under that spacious name, the crown had acquired a second army more costly and less useful than the first.[4]

The militia was therefore far from ideal as an object for the Tories to champion. They looked on the militia more in personal and pragmatic than in ideological terms. They were mainly

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1 Western, English Militia, p. 7.

2 A Word in Time to Both Houses of Parliament; recommended to the perusal of each member of Parliament before he either speaks, or votes, for or against a Militia Bill (London, 1756), p. 24 . These arguments were not easy to answer: see the review in the Monitor, 8 Jan. 1757, which simply attacks the Whig leaders for their reliance on a standing army.

3 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. in Various Collections (Eyre Matcham), vi, 47.

4 Edward Gibbon: Memoirs of My Life, ed. G.A. Bonnard (London, 1966), p. 111.

concerned with its effect on their local standing. In the summer of 1757 they were far from enthusiastic about the bill, fearing that the Whigs would 'acquire influence in their counties by the articles of clothing, etc.'[1] The militia riots in the autumn of the same year discouraged the Tories from volunteering for commissions. But they also discouraged the Whigs, and in some counties the Tories saw their opportunity in the following year. Newcastle complained:

> The Whigs don't like the Bill; nor do the Tories. But the latter finding the Whigs don't offer, have in many counties ... all offer'd, and so they must be appointed if the Crown does not reject them within a month.[2]

In other counties, the Tories were still not convinced that they would derive benefit from supporting the militia. In Somerset, for example, the Whigs held back, but the Tory MPs for the county, Sir Charles Kemys Tynte and Thomas Prowse, withdrew from the militia meeting at the last moment, no doubt influenced by the prevailing fear among the lower classes that they might be sent abroad; the Tories in the county were divided as to whether the act should be put into execution, Prowse being 'not much inclined for it' and Tynte 'but half for it'.[3] Predictably, this cautious attitude changed in the following year, when the militia, with the renewed invasion threat, became much more popular. It is apparent from the diaries of Sir Roger Newdigate that it was only in the summer of 1759 that he became enthusiastic about the Warwickshire militia. The Tories came to see commissions in the

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 40.
2 Addit. MSS. 32882, f. 398: Newcastle to White, 17 Aug. 1758.
3 Chatham MSS. 30/8/73: Poulett to Pitt, 19 Aug. 1758
4 Warwicks. R.O.

militia as a 'more decent mode of accepting emoluments' - and this without the need for a 'sudden transition to ministerial employment'.[1] Further, as the general election drew nearer, they began to see the value of exploiting the militia issue, something which Newcastle had characteristically feared almost from the moment that the militia started gaining in popularity.[2] In both Lincolnshire and Essex in 1760 the Tories set about raising an opposition on a 'militia interest'.

In their attitude to the most important question of all - where and how the war against the French should be fought - the Tory attitude again looked far back into the past. Two main factors conditioned their outlook: traditional xenophobia and resentment at high levels of land tax. The latter is easily explicable. As Newdigate wrote: 'landed men must love peace'.[3] The xenophobic streak which was 'a very strong concomitant of Toryism' had in Anne's reign been particularly identified with the country Tories.[4] Then, Holland had been the main object of Tory hatred: now it was France and Hanover. Anything which might have the appearance of being done in order to help Hanover at England's expense was looked on with extreme suspicion. On 19 April 1758 the Prussian subsidy of £670,000 and the taking of 50,000 continental troops (mostly Hanoverians) into British pay were debated in the Commons; Sir Roger Newdigate records in his diary: 'gave my negative to every proposition - no British measure'.[5]

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 281.
2 Addit. MSS. 32893, f. 129: Newcastle to Watson, 19 July 1759.
3 Sir L.B. Namier, 'Country Gentlemen in Parliament, 1750-84', Crossroads of Power, p. 41.
4 Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725, p. 153.
5 Newdigate diary, 19 April 1758.

The obvious argument against this attitude was that Hanover was not being helped for its own sake, but to preserve the balance of power; and the reply to this was to deny the validity of such a concept. All these elements are brought together in a letter from Lord Tyrconnel to his nephew:

> Lett those who have been so mean and servile to load their country so exorbitantly, be but half as Dilligent in Takeing of ye Burden, and bad as things are, if a Nation can ever Learn Wisdome by Past Suffering's, we shall never more enter into a consumeing Land Warr, we shall Leave ye Ballence of Power upon ye Continent, and ye Libertyes of Europe, a couple of Cant words, Anglice ye Austrian Pride, Insolence, and Greediness, as well as all ye Powers of ye Continent to whom we have been Bubles for above half a Century, and who allwayes think they have a right to Riot and Revel in our Blood and Treasure, to their own Inventions and to fight their own Quarells themselves ...[1]

Tyrconnel was not a Tory but an independent Whig - the best indication that the Tory outlook was in essence simply another part of the old country programme.

This allowed scope for common ground with the administration. The Tory attitude was not one of complete opposition to any involvement on the continent: after all, the Tories had supported the government's continental policy in 1742. But they had to be convinced that Hanover was not being helped for its own sake, that the maintenance of some sort of balance in Europe was necessary and that the large expenditure involved was worth while. Pitt met the first of these points by arguing in historical terms. Long before the Hanoverian connection - he singled out the reign of Henry VII as an example - England had been deeply involved in the continent. Queen Elizabeth had sent more money and troops to

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1 Records of the Cust Family, ed. Sir L. Cust (3rd ser., London, 1927), p. 129.

Europe in proportion.[1] The second and third points were dealt with by emphasising the difference between Pitt's own system and the indiscriminate granting of subsidies to the minor German powers. The Contest put the argument clearly:

> I do not think that the Balance of Power is a thing merely ideal, which mocks our attention. I believe it may be necessary to enter into foreign connections: but I fear that most of our engagements on the continent, of late years, have too civilly been called alliances. The entering into useless subsidiary treaties appears to me to be nothing more than a genteel way of settling annuities on foreign potentates for their more honourable subsistence. Indeed where petty princes appear to be in present danger, from the ambitious views of over-powerful neighbours, in that case, our regard to the Balance of Power will require us to afford them aid; and if they want money more than men, a subsidy may well be applied. But to hire eight or ten thousand of their forces, upon a long lease for years, and pay them a yearly rent, perhaps adequate to a fourth part of their dominions, is an unaccountable phrenzy ....[2]

These arguments had their effect. Pitt's historical comparisons were deliberately aimed at the Tories. After a meeting between Potter and a number of senior Tories who had formed a group fourteen strong in support of Pitt, it had been agreed on both sides that Potter should ask Pitt to talk of the question of sending troops to the continent 'historically as a fact rather than a Doctrine'.[3] Pitt was equally successful in persuading the Tories that the large supplies raised for the war were not being wasted. In the debate on the Address on 23 November 1758 Sir Richard Grosvenor spoke of the wise application of the supplies and Gabriel Hanger, another Tory, said that 'the whole nation confided in the government,.... and he was against stinting them'.[4] And the Tories also became convinced that, like it or not, the balance of power in Europe was a reality they could not ignore.

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1 Berkshire R.O., D/EN O 34/15 and D/EN O 34/16 (Neville Papers): parliamentary diaries, 18 Feb. 1757 and 19 April 1758.
2 Contest, no. 33.
3 Chatham MSS. 30/8/53: Potter to Pitt, Friday night.
4 Addit. MSS. 32885, f.524: West's report, 23 Nov. 1758.

In May Newdigate recorded in his diary:

> Robertson, P. 74 B. Age of Charles V and Francis 1st - ye policy of preservg. ye Ballce. of Power began - confederacies were formed to humble any power wh. rose aobve its due proportion. Revenge or self defence were no longer the only causes of hostility, it became common to take arms out of policy and war both in its commencement and in its operations was more an exercise of Judgement than of the Passions of Men.[1] Almost every war in Europe became general &c.

There was, then, no overriding reason why the Tories should not be able to support an administration that took care to cultivate them. With Jacobitism almost dead and their exile from court and office ending, all that remained was the old country programme. In so far as this affected the running of the war, Tory views on the militia were far from dogmatic and their views on the continent not so much so that they could not be brought to support a large measure of British involvement. There was nothing distinctively Tory about the Tory party which Pitt found so valuable.

It is impossible to generalise in this way about the Whigs. Long since, as Hervey had recognised, the real struggle had been not between Whigs and Tories but between Whigs 'in' and Whigs 'out'.[2] Sir Lewis Namier summarises the state of the Whigs on the death of George II:

> There were still in 1760 a few Whigs with a distinctively party outlook - elderly men born round 1700 and about to withdraw from politics, and country gentlemen with Whig traditions, sometimes described as 'country Whigs'; and there were young men of about twenty-five to thirty, with the spirit of enterprise not yet destroyed in them, the Parliamentary boy-scouts of the new Whig party. But the generation now between forty and fifty, who had entered Parliament about 1745 and had been nurtured in it by the

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1 Newdigate diary, 18 May 1759.
2 Hervey, Memoirs, p. 4.

> Pelhams, knew no politics except in terms of office; men such as Charles Yorke, Charles Townshend, Granby, or Barrington, though each of them representing a different type,[1] were all alike unfitted for the work of opposition.

The old Whigs were almost extinct by 1760. Like the Tories, they beloned to an earlier age, but part of their importance derived from this very fact; they represented Whig traditions in their most pure form. Independent, asking no favours for themselves, owing their seats to their own interest, they were more important to Newcastle than he was to them - especially as three of these members, John Page in Sussex and John Hewett and John White in Nottinghamshire, came from counties in which Newcastle had a strong influence. To these men, the Whigs were those who had fought for Parliament against Charles I, for independence against the influence of the executive, which in their eyes was still associated with the Crown. Robert More, MP for Shrewsbury, explained this thinking in a letter to Lord Bath in 1759:

> As the civil and religious liberties have been driven to a party for their support in the Parliament of 1641, when the great conflict began (and when the Newport family supplied the TYRANT with money for a title) my ancestor, a Member, then had and all his posterity to this day have, uniformly and very zealously attached themselves to that party in the cause of liberty; with them I have always voted in elections and will vote, - with them I live and dye; they chose me into the present Parliament without any interest of my own, without solicitation, without influence of Minister of State or Lord, indeed, I believe, they chose the meanest among themselves to show their contempt for the influence of the greatest, and one least capable of corrupting to show how much they scorned corruption.[2]

Perhaps the best example of this type was John White, born in 1699 and MP for East Retford since 1733, in whom the old

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1 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 189.
2 Namier, Structure of Politics, pp. 258-259.

Whiggism was at its most undiluted. Burke in 1769 said that White had preserved 'all his old principles and regards still fresh and alive'.[1] A close friend and entirely loyal supporter of Newcastle's, he was suspicious of Pitt and of the concessions to the Tories that this sometimes entailed: 'I have always thought a compliance with the least thing demanded a giveing up the whole.'[2] He held his seat on a family interest. He would occasionally ask for favours for friends or relations, but never for himself.[3] Himself a Dissenter, he was always keen to preserve the traditional Whig link with the nonconformists; Newcastle had to assure him in April 1758 that the new Archbishop of Canterbury had 'explained himself fully to my satisfaction with relation to his conduct towards the Dissenters'.[4] He saw the Whigs as the party historically opposed to executive influence, and approved of the Lockeian theory of checks and balances.[5] Though this influence was now largely in Whig hands, he still saw it as royal influence: Walpole called him an 'old republican'.[6] It was this that made him favourable to genuine landed qualifications for MPs and to the Tory move in 1758 for shorter Parliaments.[7] He saw opposition to the militia as a cardinal Whig principle. When Newcastle asked for his attendance in order to throw out the Scottish militia bill in April 1760, he

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1 Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, iii, 630-1.
2 Addit. MSS. 32902, f. 61: White to Newcastle, 4 Feb. 1760.
3 E.g. ibid., f. 20: White to Newcastle, 1 Feb. 1760.
4 Addit. MSS. 32879, f. 5: Newcastle to White, 1 April 1758.
5 Cf. G.H. Guttridge, English Whiggism and the American Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), pp 10-12
6 Cf. Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, i, 189.
7 Addit. MSS. 32904, f. 219: White to Newcastle, 5 April 1760.

replied:

> Though for some time I have chose to acquiesce at a distance, your Grace may be assured that I shall not be absent when you chuse to exert those principles for which I have always honour'd and permit me to add loved your Grace.[1]

He disapproved of Newcastle's efforts to carry out the 1757 Act in Nottinghamshire, despite Newcastle's assurance that 'I care no more for the militia than you do'.[2] He was equally opposed to the Tory belief in colonial warfare. He described 'peace and two shillings (land tax) till we must have four' as 'my whole system of politics'.[3] He wrote to Newcastle on 7 August 1758:

> Peace is necessary, and the support of the common cause on the Continent by every effort in our power is the only means to procure a lasting one. Your sending troops to Germany is by no means unpopular but even if it was the idle pursuit of popularity has had influence enough in the Councils of Great Britain.[4]

It is understandable that this brand of Whiggism was confined to men old enough to remember the Hanoverian succession. Namier is right in saying that the only other distinctive group of Whigs was that of the young men entering politics for the first time. There is no evidence that this group existed as a discernible entity until the spring of 1760. It was Newcastle's apparent willingness to compromise over the Scottish Militia Bill that first persuaded these 'warm young friends' to form a 'flying squadron' in the House of Commons.[5] And the question for commitment of the compromise Qualification Bill was only carried by 121 to 76 votes, this group forming the nucleus of the minority, in opposition to Newcastle, Pitt and the Tories.[6] Unhappily

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1 Addit. MSS. 32904, f. 219: White to Newcastle, 5 April 1760.
2 Addit. MSS. 32882, f. 289: Newcastle to White, 11 Aug. 1758.
3 Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, iii, 630.
4 Addit. MSS. 32882, f. 237: White to Newcastle, 7 Aug. 1758.
5 Addit. MSS. 32903, f. 297: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Mar. 1760
6 Addit. MSS. 32905, f. 16: West's report, 21 April 1760.

there is no indication at all as to who comprised this group. It is reasonable to assume that they were those who took the initiative in forming the opposition after 1762: Lord John and Lord George Cavendish, Lord Villiers, Lord Midleton, the younger Thomas Townshend, Charles Townshend 'the Spaniard', George Onslow.[1] All these were in their late twenties or early thirties, of immaculate Whig ancestry, in most cases related to Newcastle. The episode over the Scottish Militia and Qualification Bills was the only time in the old reign that these 'zealous young men' acted together as a distinct group.

Among those of middle age there is only one exception to Namier's picture: the Duke of Devonshire, born in 1720. His Whiggism was more rigid, less compromising than that of Newcastle and his government colleagues. The brother of the Cavendishes, he may have encouraged the 'flying squadron' in their opposition to the Qualification Bill; from the start, he made it clear that he was not prepared, in contrast to Newcastle, to make any concessions to the Tories over the bill.[2] He was concerned to preserve the purity and integrity of the Whig party as the sole governing party of England. When five Tories were appointed Lords and Grooms of the Bedchamber in December 1760, Fox reported

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1 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 392. Family connections might be expected to have made the Townshends and Onslow favourable to the militia. But perhaps it was simply its extension to Scotland that they objected to. This was certainly the line taken by T. Townshend jun. in the debate on 15 April, when he stated there was 'no occasion to enter into the question of militia in general'. His opposition was because it was 'very unsafe to trust Scotland'. Add. MSS. 32904, f. 392: West's report, 15 April 1760.

2 Addit. MSS. 32902, f. 194: Newcastle to Kinnoull, 15 Feb 1760.

that Devonshire 'sees confusion again, is frightened about Torys: I laugh'.[1] He was strong in his condemnation of the militia. Professor Western has shown that Devonshire, with the 'young men', was among its fiercest opponents.[2] As lord lieutenant of Derbyshire he was prepared to comply with the terms of the act, but in the hope that it would be found impossible to put it into practice.[3] He made equally clear his opposition to dependence on colonial warfare, writing to Newcastle on 20 July 1757: 'surely this war must have convinc'd every thinking man of the folly and absurdity of a maritime war'.[4] He was even critical of Pitt's amphibious operations: 'I cannot think it is advisable to trust the flower of our army and navy on the coasts of France'.[5] His grounds were political as well as practical. He described it as a 'Tory measure to abandon the Continent', to which Fox simply commented: 'for my part, I do not know who are Whigs'.[6]

In contrast to the doctrinaire Whiggism of White, Devonshire and the young men were a number of peers and MPs who are best described as independents. These naturally covered a wide range of opinion, from those who were emphatic in their Whiggism and generally loyal government supporters to those who were Whigs simply because they were not Tories, from whom their views were almost indistinguishable. One example, of whom it could be said that he was more Tory than the Tories themselves, is unique -

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1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i, 20.
2 Western, English Militia, p. 183.
3 Addit. MSS. 32880, f. 410: Devonshire to Newcastle, 12 June 1758.
4 Addit. MSS. 32872, f. 270: Devonshire to Newcastle, 20 Jul.1757
5 Devonshire MSS. 260. 245: Devonshire to Cumberland, 30 Sept 1757
6 Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, 123.

Robert Vyner, MP for Lincolnshire, who first entered Parliament in 1710. He was an independent Whig, and is one of 42 'Whigs - Against' in Dupplin's list of 1754.[1] But Egmont said of him in 1730 that he 'always divides with the Tories' and a number of contemporary observers labelled him as such.[2] Although the Tories supported the coalition, Vyner could not break the habits of a lifetime. He and his son were supported by only three other independent Whigs in voting against the increase in judges' salaries in June 1758, the Tories supporting the increase.[3] In April of the same year he was one of only two MPs to speak against the Prussian subsidy and the Hanoverian army.[4] In January of the following year, he alone voted against the 'monstrous expence' of the subsidy to Frederick. A few months later, when his son tried to bring in a bill to alter the existing Militia Act, no one would even second him.[6] He had close links with the Tories. He was apparently a friend of Sir Roger Newdigate, attended the meeting of Tories on 14 January 1757 to discuss the Minorca

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1 Addit. MSS. 33034, f. 177.
2 Sedgwick, History of Parliament, ii, 501. Vyner was described as a Tory by Jenkinson, An Eighteenth-Century Corr., p. 354 (19 Feb. 1757); in an undated list in the Newcastle Papers (attributed to H. Fox, Feb-March 1755), in Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, iii, 607, under Waring: cf. Owen, Rise of the Pelhams, 71; Addit. MSS. 3302, f. 438; and by implication in Addit. MSS. 33034, f. 208 (37 Whigs who voted against the Address, 13 Nov. 1755. Tories are omitted because they were expected to vote against, as Vyner did.)
3 Addit. MSS. 32880, f. 470: West to Newcastle, 16 June 1758.
4 Newdigate diary, 19 April 1758.
5 Addit. MSS. 32887, f. 355: Stone's report, 26 Jan. 1759.
6 Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, iii, 589.

inquiry, and even thought for a time in 1760 of accepting the invitation of the Lincolnshire Tories to stand on their interest in 1760.[1] Contemporaries did not know where he stood: by 1760, he hardly seems to have known himself.

Vyner was on his own. But almost all the independent Whigs, whatever the extent of their support for the administration, had certain tenets in common. Their independence of executive influence left them free to vote as they pleased without risking the loss of their seats. In Dupplin's survey of 1754, there are 42 MPs who are marked as 'Whigs - Against'.[2] Of these, ten are attributed to Bedford and three each to Gower and Sandwich. Of the remaining 26, twelve were returned for constituencies with small electorates in which theirs was the controlling or prevailing interest, and two as representatives of the interest of another family. Eleven were successful in larger constituencies, either unopposed or in opposition to a candidate with government support; in some cases these were also helped by their family interest. Only one, Robert Colebrooke, owed anything to government support; and that support was of very limited value since the government candidate for the other Maldon seat, with an electorate of 800, was defeated. Newcastle would

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1 Newdigate diary, 14 Jan. 1757, 17 Feb. 1759, 28 March 1759. Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, iii, 589.

2 Addit. MSS. 33034, f. 178. The 12 MPs for small electorates (under 400) were: G. Colebrooke, J. Colebrooke, Sir F. Dashwood, F.B. Delaval, J. Delaval, Lord Egmont, Treby, J. Waller, Sir W. Webster, Willy, E. Wortley Montagu (Bossiney), E. Wortley Montagu (Peterborough). The two MPs for Wootton Bassett, Probyn and Cresswell, were returned on the St John interest. The other 11, in constituencies of 700 or more voters, were Belchier, Bethell, Bowes, Bullock, Sir W. Codrington, Crowle, Fellowes, Robinson Morris, Thistlethwayte, E. Vernon, R. Vyner (Lincs.)

probably have found another candidate to oppose Colebrooke if he had felt that anyone else would have had a fair chance of success.

These independent MPs owed nothing to the administration for their seats and, like the Tories, they were unwilling to make any application for government favours on their own behalf, though prepared to do so for others. To judge how far a man might go in asking for favours while remaining independent of excessive executive influence was a difficult decision, varying from one case to another, and sometimes gave rise to misunderstandings. Lord Talbot, for instance, thought it legitimate to make an application on behalf of the Tory MP for Essex.[1] But when in the following year Newcastle told him that he had been glad to 'obey your commands' and make Dr Atwell a canon of Westminster, Talbot replied:

> This moment has honor'd me with a letter from your Grace extremely obliging, but highly embarrassing, for however deserving I think my friend Dr Atwell of preferment, I do not consider myself, at present, as entitled to be the means of any man's promition, and yet I fear, by bestowing this favour, in a manner so inhancing the obligation, your Grace has not left me at liberty to decline the acceptance of it.[2]

And he said of his colonelcy of the Glamorgan militia:

> I shall not compliment power by an offer of my service. I accepted the command because my countrymen desired me, and I thought I could not consistently with my principles of government refuse their request.[3]

At all costs, he must avoid giving the impression of owing anything to the patronage of the government.

Within this framework of independence of the executive, a wide range of views was possible. Two examples from different

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1 Above, p. 69.
2 Addit. MSS. 32894, f. 303: Talbot to Newcastle, 19 Aug. 1759. Cf. ibid., f. 426: Newcastle to Talbot, 16 Aug. 1759.
3 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. in Various Collections (Eyre Matcham), vi, 47.

extremes will show the very different ways in which this independence could manifest itself - Rose Fuller and Sir Francis Dashwood, both, by coincidence, MPs for the constituency of New Romney. Dashwood's was the independence of the country gentleman and tradition: Fuller's, that of newly-acquired wealth. Dashwood was as critical of the coalition as any MP, Vyner apart: Fuller was a reliable supporter and valuable speaker, and a friend of Newcastle's.

A rich West Indian planter, Fuller had returned to England from Jamaica in 1755 and had immediately set about trying to find a seat in Parliament. His estates and ironfounding business were in Newcastle's county of Sussex, but Fuller could afford to consider any seat which his wealth might enable him to win. The first possibility to offer itself was Great Yarmouth, but this would have involved opposing the Townshend interest, supported by the administration:

> I am very grateful to you and the other gentlemen at Yarmouth for thinking of me to represent them, but the only vacancy likely to happen is if one of the members should be preferred. In that case, I would have to face the whole weight of the administration against me, and I would not want to oppose the administration in this way.[1]

On the death of Henry Furnese in August 1756, Fuller decided to stand at New Romney, though he had no previous connection with the place. Col. William Sotheby, a relation by marriage of Fuller's, wrote to Hardwicke in September:

> Mr Fuller is a real friend to our constitution and wishes very well to the present Administration, and if in Parliament will always vote with them in any measures that ought to be supported, but is of too much property to desire to be brought in by any interest that should entirely restrain the freedom of his vote.[2]

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1 East Sussex R.O., Lewes, Rose Fuller Papers, RF/17/XII: Fuller to Preston, 3 Dec. 1755.

2 Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, ii, 478.

Once in Parliament, he showed the same sort of independence. He did not ask for favours for himself from Newcastle, but he was prepared to do so for his supporters among the New Romney corporation:[1] and in 1761 he would not accept even indirect favours from Bute.[2] He held contracts with the Ordnance Board for guns, but was determined that this should not make him in any way dependent on the administration nor that it should appear to do so.[3] In August 1760 he added his signature to a petition by a group of gunfounders, but wrote to Newcastle:

> I begg your Grace, in forming your judgement upon the memorial of the gunfounders, will have no consideration, that it was signed by me, for I should be extremely hurt and ashamed that you should doe any official act in the Administration ... out of friendship to me, which should not be attended with so evident marks of rectitude and justice, that you would doe it for the worst enemy you had in the world.[4]

Fuller was rich enough to be able to take this line and to act, when he felt it right, against his best interests. He did this, when he recommended to Newcastle in November 1759 that the prohibition on the export of grain should be lifted, a recommendation which had every justification but which was strongly opposed by the West Indian planting interest as a whole.[5] This was what Fuller meant by independence. While he wished to be free to arrive at his own opinions uninfluenced by any obligations to the administration, he had no fears about the extent of influence which the administration was able to exert. He opposed any

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1 E.g. Addit. MSS.32895, f.377: Fuller to Newcastle, 13 Sept. 1759. Cf. Addit. MSS. 32908, f. 31.
2 Bute MSS., Boston to Bute, 14 Aug. 1761, and Fuller to Bute, Aug. 1761.
3 For details, see RF/16/V, 9, 14, 15 etc.
4 Addit. MSS.32910, f.60: Fuller to Newcastle, 16 Aug. 1760
5 Addit. MSS.32898, f.372: Fuller to Newcastle, 19 Nov. 1759. Cf. Pares, War and Trade, p. 486.

measure designed to limit this influence, such as the attempt to introduce a bill for shorter Parliaments or the Qualification Bill of 1760. In the latter instance, he refused even to accept the compromise worked out by Newcastle; he was 'against any landed qualification, as at all times absurd' and was one of the tellers for the minority in opposition to the commitment of the bill.

Fuller's views on the conduct of the war were marked by the same type of independence. He consistently believed in the value of the militia. When most of the Whig leaders hoped in the autumn of 1757 that the riots would provide an excuse for not putting the bill into effect, Fuller wrote:

> I am more strongly than ever of opinion that a militia formidable enough to discourage any foreign enemy from making an attempt at invasion might be raised at any inconsiderable expense, if the government would enter into it heartily and with a becoming spirit. The design (if there is such) of laying aside a measure designed by Act of Parliament for the defence of the kingdom because a rabble in some counties are displeased with it and use violence will be an example of such pernicious consequence that our government cannot subsist under it.[2]

In the summer of 1759, Newcastle described the attempt to execute the Act in Sussex as 'contrary to the sense of the county': 'no persons of distinction except Rose Fuller and Medley have offer'd'. The previous year, Fuller had been the sole volunteer, saying he would serve in any capacity at all.[4] On the objects of the war as a whole, he had equally strong and independent views. At a

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1 Addit. MSS.32905, f.14: West's report, 21 April 1760. The Journals of the House of Commons, xxviii, 874. There is no direct evidence for his vote on shorter Parliaments on 20 Feb. 1758, but if he had voted in the minority he would almost certainly have been included on John Yorke's list in Addit. MSS. 35,374, f. 145.

2 RF 17/XIII/D: draft, 18 Oct. 1757.

3 Addit. MSS. 32893, f.406: Newcastle to A. Stone, 1 Aug. 1759.

4 Addit. MSS. 32882, f.81: Shelley to Newcastle, 27 July 1758. Cf. ibid., f.344: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 Aug. 1758.

time when Newcastle was still hoping to be able to obtain peace by making major concessions in Canada, Fuller wrote to him:

> There is now a fair prospect, that we may be able to drive the enemy out of Canada; I hope, if we doe, we shall keep them out for ever; which ... could add more to the weight and authority of the British ... than any other acquisition ... I would sacrifice all our conquests, and Minorca, and, rather than not have it, would give them a right to fish upon the Banks of Newfoundland, and to dry their fish on shoar, provided they build no forts or habitations.[1]

Fuller's fellow-MP for New Romney, Sir Francis Dashwood, was an independent Whig at the other extreme of the scale. Dashwood was often wrongly called a Tory: though he frequently voted with the Tories, his votes were based on different sentiments. The Tories had simply appropriated the old country programme. Dashwood's views were founded on a contractual theory of government looking back to 1689 and requiring an independently elected House of Commons, uninfluenced by places or pensions, to maintain a proper balance between King and Parliament.[2] In the interests of preventing executive encroachments on this balance, he supported moves to exclude placemen from the Commons and to tax places and pensions. He spoke in favour of the motion for leave to bring in a bill for shorter Parliaments in February 1758.[3] He supported the Qualification bill and at the same time moved that every MP should have to swear, when giving in his qualification, that between offering himself as a candidate and being elected he had offered no bribe or reward to any of his voters.[4]

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1 Addit. MSS.32907, f.423: Fuller to Newcastle, 28 June 1760.
2 Cf. B. Kemp, Sir Francis Dashwood: an Eighteenth-Century Independent (London, 1967), pp. 18, 21-22.
3 Addit. MSS.35374, f.145: J. Yorke to Royston,(20 Feb. 1758).
4 Addit. MSS.32905, f.16: West's report, 21 April 1760.

This brought out the double aspect of Dashwood's independence. One facet of it was common ground with Fuller - the belief that as an MP he should remain uninfluenced by any executive offers or pressures, which might restrict his independence of opinion or freedom of expression. In 1755 he was offered office by Fox but declined:

> It has allwayes been my express opinion, that those would be unworthy of, and useless to, an administration who should occasionally alter their opinions of any before adopted constitutional and great national points. With these my constant declarations, I am particularly assured the Duke of Newcastle has been acquainted ... Therefore I must entreat you (Sir) to be fully assured, and convinced, that neither the Admiralty, nor the Comptroller's Staff, nor anything better, were ever of primary consideration with me.[1]

Like Fuller, he never applied for favours for himself: nor even did he apply on behalf of friends or constituents.

The other facet of Dashwood's independence was one which he did not share with Fuller and which involved him in something of a contradiction. In the interests of the weight of the people in the constitutional balance, the electors must also be free of influence, whether at the hands of their candidates or of the executive, in their choice of MPs; and once that choice had been made, they must continue through their MP to exercise their weight. This was the thinking behind Dashwood's motion about the bribery of electors. It was an attack on the methods which men like Fuller, with money but no local interest, were bound to employ.[2] Dashwood himself, in fact, did not entirely live up to his professions. He gave several pensions to voters and in one case

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1 Kemp, Sir Francis Dashwood, p. 45.

2 For examples of Fuller's use of these methods, see RF/16/III: Langdon to Fuller, 12 Mar. 1757, S. Fuller to Fuller, 5 Jan. 1758, Fuller to Langdon, 28 Dec. 1758 and 20 Jan. 1759, Carter to Fuller, n.d. ('Tuesday 7 o'clock') and 7 April 1760. Dashwood Papers, B9/1/25: Walter to Dashwood, 25 Dec. 1758.

paid for the schooling of an elector's child.[1] This was designed to secure their support at the election, but not to restrict their independence after that. Westmorland

> ... imagined, the obligation of those pensions stood limited to the single point of your own election; and that in all other respects you are to fall in with their measures, so far as is reasonable, and without doing injury or offence elsewhere.[2]

Dashwood agreed with this. Nor was it the function of an MP to 'guide the interior policy of the corporation which should be managed wholly amongst themselves'.[3] This led Dashwood to support the idea, in an Address to his electors in 1747, of pledges given by candidates to their electors, to preserve the underlying independence of the House of Commons on the people. Here Dashwood was on difficult ground, since such pledges would seriously curtail the independence of MPs themselves.[4] Ironically, it was for this reason that Dashwood lost all hope of re-election at New Romney. His non-interference in corporation affairs and his constant position that 'I shall be guided by the majority of my friends' gave his rival candidates, Fuller and Sir Edward Dering, an admirably clear field for their own manoeuvres.[5]

The same principles shaped Dashwood's outlook on the war. A large standing army, such as might be effective against invasion, would endanger the balance of the constitution and occasion 'risque or chance of danger to our libertys'.[6] The answer was a 'numerous, effectual and well established militia', which 'has ever been

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1 Dashwood Papers, B9/1/25: Walter to Dashwood, 25 Dec. 1758.
2 B11/1/15: Westmorland to Dashwood, 29 Nov. 1758.
3 ibid.
4 Cf. Kemp, Sir Francis Dashwood, pp. 27-9.
5 B9/1/14: Dashwood to Mascall, 22 Sept. 1756.
6 B8/2/9: a sketch for national militia, 29 Dec. 1755.

deemed by all thinking men, lovers of liberty and the constitution, to be the most rational, and most natural security for the preservation of both'.[1] The militia bill introduced into the Commons in February 1746 had almost certainly been Dashwood's work.[2] He was one of 45 MPs at a meeting of militia enthusiasts in April 1759.[3] His main concern was to ensure that the opportunity of the war was taken to put the militia on a sound and permanent footing, fearing the militia was simply being used 'to protect the continent, and support German measures, and then they will be sent adrift'.[4] This would once and for all secure the constitution against the threat of an over-powerful standing army.

Dashwood was resolute in his opposition to 'German measures', It has already been shown that criticism of British involvement in the continent could be a Whig as well as a Tory doctrine. In the previous war he had been hostile to Pitt's change of front on this issue and in April 1758, with the Tories supporting Pitt's continental policy, Dashwood alone with Vyner spoke against the Prussian subsidy, apprehending that 'this means bringing you into a Continental war'.[5] But by the following year he had abandoned his opposition.

These examples show the range of opinion among the Whigs and Tories in the House of Commons. It is clear that the real divisions were not on party lines and by 1760 this fact was generally recognised. It was from among the Whigs that many of the MPs most unwilling to apply for favours, most enthusiastic about the militia and most consistently opposed to the continental war

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1 B8/2/9: sketch for national militia, 29 Dec. 1755.
2 Kemp, Sir Francis Dashwood, p. 27.
3 Western, English Militia, p. 452.
4 Addit. MSS.32904, f.161: memorandums for the King, 2 Apr 1760.
5 Neville MSS, D/EN 034/16, 19 April 1758.

were to be found. Walpole wrote: 'the moment of (George III's) accession we fortunate beyond example. The extinction of parties had not waited for, but preceded, the dawn of his reign'.[1] Dodington's project of 1751 for a union of independent Whigs and Tories, by renouncing Jacobitism, was based on a more realistic appreciation of the nature of political conflict than that of those who still thought in strict party terms. There was a widespread feeling that the names Whig and Tory should no longer be used. These names, said the Test at the outset of the coalition, 'will now, in all probability, sink into silence and oblivion'.[2] The rival Contest shared this hope:

> We think it is much to be wished, that the odious distinction of whig and tory was entirely abolished. We know that they were coalized for some time under the administration of Lord Godolphin and the Duke of Marlborough ... If a minister should ever be catched drinking a dish of chocolate with a Tory, we shall not entertain the least suspicion of his measures on that account.[3]

Even those who disagreed with this view admitted that appearances were against them. Hans Stanley wrote of the contested Hampshire election of 1759:

> This very foolish and preposterous attempt has been owing to ... the false tho' popular doctrines so often repeated in Parliament, that there no longer remains any difference of politicall opinion among his Majesty's subjects.[4]

And Edmund Pyle wrote:

> This has always been the Tory method of getting into influence; to seem to wish for the extinction of parties. But what they really mean is, to lull the Whigs into repose, whilst they are using incessant means to extinguish them.[5]

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1 Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, 4.
2 Test, no. 34, p. 193.
3 Contest, no. 6.
4 Addit. MSS. 32899, f.83: Stanley to Newcastle, 24 Nov. 1759.
5 Memoirs of a Royal Chaplain, 1729-63, ed. A. Hartshorne (London, 1905), p. 334.

Talk of party was generated more easily in the constituencies than at the centre. Bath and Powis were both Whigs, but their struggle for control of Shropshire was locally discussed in Whig versus Tory terms. Three by-elections during the first three years of the coalition show how a situation like this developed. At Windsor in 1757 the opposition to Fox sprang chiefly from the interest headed by the Recorder, Brookland, who, Fox reported to Newcastle, 'has always professed himself a Whig (the Duke of Marlbro' the other day was not Whig enough for him)'.[1] But frequently Whigs would call other Whigs whom they wished to denigrate Tories, and a few days later Lord Digby wrote to Newcastle: 'Mr Fox finds a strong opposition from the Torys at Windsor'.[2] A second illustration is the 1758 by-election at York. One of the town's members, Sir John Armytage, was killed in action in September and Robert Lane, the son of the other MP, who was returned on the corporation interest, offered himself as a candidate against the new Whig candidate Thornton. Lane was always described as a Tory, but the struggle at first was largely one between the Whig interest and the corporation. But Rockingham reported to Savile: 'you understand, that the battle we fought became merely Whig and Tory'.[3] The third example is the Hampshire contest of 1759. This was in essence a quarrel between Legge and Bute, but was soon being represented as 'the tryal whether we are to be a Whig or a Tory county'.[4] All too easily, local disputes

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1 Addit. MSS. 32872, F.7: Fox to Newcastle, 1 July 1757. Cf. Addit. MSS. 51406: Fox to Campbell, (9 July 1757).
2 Addit. MSS. 32872, f.29: Digby to Newcastle, 2 July 1757. Cf. Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 365, n. 1.
3 Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, R1-131: Rockingham to Savile, 11 Dec. 1758.
4 Addit. MSS. 32898, f.235: Clanricarde to Newcastle, 13 Nov 1759.

were rapidly translated into party terms.

But even locally, the old slogans were losing credibility. The famous Oxfordshire election of 1754 had been fought on strict party lines: only six years later Marlborough, the Whig leader, concluded a compromise with the Tories without consulting his party.[1] Even at or before the 1754 election, some observers had pointed to the unreality of the ostensible Whig-Tory conflict.[2] A better instance of the recognition of the meaninglessness of party labels is the acceptance by the Essex Whigs of Sir William Maynard, a Tory, in 1759. No Whig could be found to stand, unless the government paid the expenses, estimated at £10,000 - understandable, since the Parliament was already five years old and its maximum life of two more years depended on the health of the old King.[3] Maynard was quite willing to stand on the Whig interest. This divided the Tories, and the Whigs were entirely satisfied with the result.[4] Even the use of the expressions Whig and Tory is not proof that people were necessarily thinking along party lines. Lord Ducie wrote to Newcastle:

> Tho' all party is now happily at an end, I still think it my duty ... to inform you of the state of (this county); but, that I may be intelligible, must make use of the old terms of distinction.[5]

Lord Kinnoull advised Newcastle in 1760 that in making arrangements in the constituencies for the general election he should pay no

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1 Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 315.
2 Cf. George, Eng. Pol. Caricature to 1792, p. 115. L. Scott, 'Under-Secretaries of State, 1755-75' (Manchester Univ. M.A. thesis, 1950), p. 13. Weston's pamphlet after the 1754 election criticised the use of the 'antiquated names of Whig and Tory'.
3 Addit. MSS. 32889, f.394: West to Newcastle, 7 April 1759.
4 Addit. MSS. 32890, f.23: Rochford to Newcastle, 11 April 1759. Ibid., f.25: Newcastle to Rochford, 11 April 1759.
5 Addit. MSS. 32883, f.442: Ducie to Newcastle, 13 Sept. 1758.

attention to whether the sitting members were called Whigs or Tories; if they supported the administration, even if they were Tories, they should not be opposed.[1] Newcastle could not quite bring himself to accept this: it showed 'too much management for the Tories'. But even he admitted that local disputes between the Whigs themselves would be more likely than anything else to cause trouble at the election.[2] In the constituencies as well as nationally, there was a wide realisation that the old terms had lost much of their meaning.

(ii) The City

To preserve his weight in the coalition and his consequent bargaining power, it was important for Pitt to keep the support of the City as well as that of the Tories. This support came not from the large financiers or the three great monied companies, but from the 'middling' men, the small merchants and traders who controlled the Common Council and the elections of the four City MPs. This class, usually in opposition to the alliance between government and the richest financiers, had been the intended beneficiaries of the policy of 'open' subscriptions introduced by Legge during the Pitt-Devonshire administration. In practice, the subscription had flopped disastrously, only £313,000 of the intended £2,500,000 being raised. Despite this failure and the lack of popular achievement of the first Pitt administration, this element in the City had remained faithful to Pitt.[3]

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1 Addit. MSS. 32908, f. 166: Kinnoull to Newcastle, 10 July 1760.
2 Addit. MSS. 32910, f. 195: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 Aug 1760.
Addit. MSS. 32912, f. 209-11: Newcastle to Bishop of Durham, 29 Sept. 1760.
3 Sutherland, 'The City of London and the Devonshire-Pitt Administration, 1756-7', p. 170.

To keep the support of this class and of the MPs to whom they looked to uphold their cause, and at the same time to retain the allegiance of the Tory country gentlemen, was by no means an easy task. On some issues, of course, there was common ground. Both were opposed to the monopolies of the great companies. In 1758 Alderman Blakiston led an attack on the East India Company's tea monopoly. A compromise was reached but Blakiston renewed the attack in the following year and gained the support of William Beckford and Sir John Barnard, two of the London MPs. Sir John Philipps, the most active of the Tory country gentlemen, joined them in their fight.[1] The two groups were also in alliance in supporting the traditional anti-executive policies of the standard opposition programme. These policies had never been so much in the forefront of the City's aims as the Tories', and this produced a certain lack of enthusiasm in the City now that the coalition commanded general support. Beckford, for instance, spoke in favour of the bill for shorter Parliaments introduced by Philipps and Sir John Glynne, but did so without enthusiasm, saying he would have preferred a bill to reduce the numbers of placemen and pensioners.[2] The Qualification Bill of 1760 was the joint work of Beckford and Philipps, who applied to Pitt 'in the name of the Tories', but to many Tory country gentlemen its main attraction would have been less the attack on executive influence than the fact that it would make it more difficult for moneyed men to find seats in the House of Commons. By the 1770s the

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1 L.S. Sutherland, The East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Politics (Oxford, 1952), pp. 30-1.

2 Addit. MSS. 35374, f. 144: J. Yorke to Royston (20 Feb. 1758).

landed interest did not conceal the fact that this was the main aim of measures of this kind.[1]

This fundamental rivalry between those who owed their positions to land and those who owed them to money was the main difficulty in the way of keeping City and Tory M.P.s in working alliance. Lord Hervey, writing of the events of 1733, said that merchants and traders were no longer listened to with respect in the Commons:

> The Commons, and the country gentlemen in particular, grew jealous of their own power, were afraid of the ill effects that might attend the letting any class of men into share it, and began to think it was high time to curb that spirit which they had contributed to raise.[2]

Douglas called on the country gentlemen to 'exert their natural interest in their respective neighbourhoods, and not allow their boroughs to be stolen from them, by mean, low people, who come down to them, at the time of election, with hands full of money'.[3] Newcastle shared the same prejudice, fearing that the high cost of seats 'will fling the borcughs into East Indians, West Indians, citizens and brokers, who are not very reputable, and yet very troublesome members.[4]

Early in 1759 this jealcusy showed itself in its most acute form. It was occasioned by Legge's projected sugar duty - the same issue that, in the last war, had given rise to a major political controversy in which much had been made of the antagonism between

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1 Cf. Witmer, The Property Qualifications of Members of Parliament, p. 83 sqq. Devonshire MSS. 260.265: memoranda, 29 Jan. 1760.
2 Hervey, Memoirs, 167.
3 J. Douglas, Seasonable Hints from an Honest Man on the Important Crisis of a New Reign, and a New Parliament, p. 45.
4 Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 210.

the landed and planting interests. The country gentlemen, feeling that the land already carried a disproportionately large share of the war burden which the proposed duty would do something to rectify, bitterly opposed the efforts of Beckford and the West Indian interest to have the tax reconsidered. Joseph Watkins, a City correspondent of Newcastle, put their argument:

> ... This country ... ought to be exempted from all further taxes during the war, for the sugar islands alone can furnish you with taxes to the amount of £400,000 yearly, and produce great good to their mother country by forcing them to send part of their produce here at what price they will and no further duty be laid on it, but that all the weight must fall on this allready overburthen'd country, the consequence must be that English country gentlemen must soon resign their places in Parliament to sugar planters.[1]

The Tories thought of making some kind of demonstration of their disapproval of Beckford and Pitt, who was supporting him, and Philipps widened the scope of his attack to 'reproach Pitt with Hanoverizing'.[2] The following year the Tory country gentlemen showed the same sort of discontent when Pitt and Beckford opposed the lifting of the prohibition on the export and distilling of corn. The prohibition encouraged distilling from molasses at the expense of corn: the interests of planters and landowners were therefore in opposition. The prohibition had been introduced in 1756, caused by the serious grain shortage of that year. By the end of 1758, corn was no longer in short supply, and a battle between the country gentlemen and the West India merchants was generally expected, but the country gentlemen agreed unanimously

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1 Addit. MSS. 32888, f. 214: Watkins to Newcastle, 21 Feb. 1759.
2 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 179. Addit. MSS. 32889, f.16: memorandums for the King, 12 March 1759.

to the continuation of the prohibition for another year.[1] The next year, with the scarcity of corn long over, the expected battle took place. Beckford could not deny that there was now a corn surplus, but rested his argument on the alleged bias inherent in the taxation system against molasses and in favour of corn:[2] planters always argued that the land tax was under-assessed. The West Indian interest 'moved heaven and earth' and secured Pitt's support, but after a narrow vote of 58-55 the bill to end the prohibition was passed.[3]

It was not only West Indian issues that involved a clash of financial interests between the country gentlemen and the City and its MPs. The Privateer Act of 1759, welcomed by the Tories, was opposed by Beckford on behalf of the City. Its effectiveness checked City enthusiasm to take advantage of the war, and after it had been passed the number of new commissions taken out underwent a sharp decline.[4] There was also a conflict of interest over payment for the militia. As it expanded and became more costly, complaints arose from country gentlemen, Whig and Tory, that the expense fell entirely on the land. Vyner wanted a Scottish militia, but not if England would have to pay for it.[5] The Tory George Cooke demanded a more equitable system of financing, by which the expense 'now going to be laid on the lands of England ... ought to fall universally.'[6] But the most

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1 Addit. MSS. 35595, f.295: West to Hardwicke, 9 Nov 1758.
Addit. MSS. 35418, f.61: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 5 Dec 1758.
2 Chatham MSS., 30/8/19: Beckford to Pitt, 26 Feb. 1760.
Pares, War and Trade, 484-6, 511.
3 Addit. MSS. 32903, f.338: Watkins to Newcastle, 17 March 1760.
4 R. Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763, (Oxford, 1938), p. 276.
5 Addit. MSS. 32904, f.392: West's report, 15 April 1760.
6 Addit. MSS. 32906, f.339: West's report, 8 May 1760.

fundamental conflict of interest never came to the surface in the period between the formation of the coalition and the death of George II. War, with the high land tax it entailed, was never in the interests of the country gentlemen: but trade might thrive on it. Edmund Burke told Rockingham in 1775: 'War indeed is become a sort of substitute for Commerce'.[1] Exports to America rose sharply during the Seven Years' War, especially in those colonies where fighting was at its most intense.[2] Rockingham told Newcastle: 'in the West Riding of Yorkshire we look upon the war in North America as merely carried on for the benefit of our cloth trade'.[3] In the next war, Camden even described the struggle for America as 'a war between the Land and Trade of this kingdom'.[4] Before 1760, this conflict remained latent and unexpressed.

Pitt's task of trying to keep the support of both the City and the country gentlemen called for political skill of a high order. Two main tactics were used. First, predictably, Pitt exploited his apparent weakness in the administration. In March 1759 his supporters in the City were claiming that

> the whole dispute is between the old, and the new, administration; and the old administration cramp Mr Pitt in his measures, and prevent him from doing, or succeeding, as he otherwise would do.[5]

Pitt also benefitted from Legge's unhappy position as Chancellor. The experiment with open subscriptions had been a serious embarrassment and Pitt was no doubt relieved that Newcastle's

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1 The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, ed. W. Copeland, L.S. Sutherland and G.H. Guttridge (Cambridge, 1961), iii, 191.
2 R. Davis, 'English Foreign Trade, 1700-1774', Econ. Hist. Rev., xv, (1962), p. 296.
3 Addit. MSS. 32913, f.85: Rockingham to Newcastle, 12 Oct 1760.
4 Norris, Shelburne and Reform, p 221
5 Addit. MSS. 32889, f.156: memorandums for the King, 20 March 1759.

domination of the Treasury Board was such that Legge and he were provided with an excuse for not attempting to continue it. Legge still felt obliged to protest his faith in open subscriptions, but even he admitted that there might be times when closed subscriptions had to be used.[1]

This evasion of responsibility was generally successful. But there were times when both the Tories and the City saw what Pitt was trying to do. Some of the Tories complained in April 1759 that 'if there is no blood drawn, it is a sham battle; whenever there is an odd thing done, ... it is presently covered with a pretended quarrel'.[2] Horace Walpole wrote of the beginning of the new reign:

> ... this seeming union of Mr Pitt and the Duke of Newcastle, on which the influence of the former in some measure depended, disgusted the city. They said that Mr Pitt had temporised with the Duke of Newcastle before from necessity, but now it was a matter of election.[3]

Hardwicke also realised that Pitt made political use of his apparently weak position with both the City and the Tories. When it looked as though Pitt might object to a vote of credit projected by Newcastle, Hardwicke wrote:

> ... I think it is most desirable to take Mr P(itt) along with you in it, and strip him of any handle to tell Sir John (Philipps), the Alderman (Beckford), or any of his Tory friends <u>that he was against it</u>.[4]

Pitt's second tactic in his attempt to keep both the City and the Tory country gentlemen together in his support was to pay what seemed to be excessive deference to the views of William Beckford. He told the Commons that 'he looked upon the honour of his

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1 Addit. MSS. 32896, f.242: Legge to Newcastle, 3 Oct. 1759.
2 Addit. MSS. 51407: Campbell to Fox, 6 April 1759.
3 Walpole, <u>Memoirs of the Reign of King George III</u>, i, 11.
4 Addit. MSS. 32880, f. 303: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 June 1758.

acquaintance as one of the glories of his life': 'there was not a servant of the Crown that had deserved better of his country'.[1] Mauduit wrote:

> During the whole of Mr Pitt's administration, no one had so much of his confidence as Mr Beckford. He ... gave free admission to him, while he kept himself inaccessible to ev'ry one else. The revealer of his will in the House of Commons was Mr Beckford, for Mr Pitt himself seldom went thither. I heard him making a most fulsome panegyric on Mr Beckford's abilities; and three times following insult the whole House for presuming to laugh at Mr Beckford's professing disinterestedness.[2]

Beckford's chief value to Pitt was that he could claim to be a leader both of the City and of the Tories. Until 1756 he had supported Fox, and in 1754 had even claimed derisively that the ministry were Tories and the opposition the only true Whigs.[3] But early in 1756 he started to act with Pitt and by December was acting as self-appointed spokesman of the Tories in assuring Pitt of their cordial support. It was realised that he was acting without authority, but he was able to claim to act on behalf of the Tories because there was no one else who could make the same claim.[4] The Tories had 'not one man amongst them at present capable to be put at their head'.[5] The most active of the country gentlemen was Sir John Philipps and his credit had seriously declined among his Tory colleagues. A number of leading Tories early in 1758 thought Philipps' initiative over shorter Parliaments was ill-timed and feared that he would oppose Pitt's continental policy. To demonstrate that Philipps was not acting on their

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1 Addit. MSS. 32888, f.428: West's report, 9 March 1759.
2 MS. note to 4th edition of Considerations on the Present German War, printed by W.I. Grant, 'Canada versus Guadeloupe, an episode of the Seven Years' War', Am. Hist. Rev., xvii (1912), p. 742.
3 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 412.
4 Phillimore, Lyttelton, ii, 541.
5 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 192, quoting General Clark to Fitzmaurice, 15 Sept. 1759 (Shelburne MSS.)

behalf, they formed themselves into a group to declare their united support for the Prussian subsidy and the conduct of the war.[1] Ironically, it was the respect that Pitt was paying to both Beckford and Philipps that this group, wishing to be represented by neither, most resented: but Beckford himself was a member of the group.[2] Philipps' unpopularity with his fellow-Tories supplied a vacuum into which Beckford could try to step.

Beckford's aspirations towards Tory leadership were given some plausibility by the fact that he 'had much in common with the landed classes'.[3] He had been MP for Shaftesbury before he had started to cultivate an interest in the City. He had brought Sir John Philipps into Parliament for Petersfield in 1754.[4] In 1760 he was jointly responsible with Philipps for the introduction of the bill to prevent MPs from claiming fictitious landed qualifications. At times, keen to be looked on as a Tory leader, he seems to have pictured himself more as a country gentleman than as a West India merchant.

The corollary was that he was by no means an ideal leader of the City. This would in any case have been a virtually impossible task. There were always jealousies between the Court of Aldermen and the Court of Common Council; often they found themselves on opposing sides. The Common Council, for example, was strongly in favour of Pitt's bill, warmly espoused by Beckford, to amend the

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1 Chatham MSS. 30/8/53: Potter to Pitt, 'Friday night'. The group consisted of Affleck, Bagot, Bankes, Beckford, A. Curzon, N. Curzon, R. Grosvenor, T. Grosvenor, Sir C. Mordaunt, Northey, Pophal, Prowse, Sir C. Tynte and Ward.

2 Addit. MSS. 32998, f.25: memorandums, c. 27 April 1758.

3 L.S. Sutherland, 'The City of London in Eighteenth-Century Politics', Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier, ed. R. Pares and A.J.P. Taylor (London, 1956), p. 65.

4 But cf. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 110.

Habeas Corpus Act: the attraction was much the same as that of 'Wilkes and liberty' ten years later. The Aldermen, on the other hand, were far from enthusiastic.[1] Not that Beckford could even satisfactorily represent the opinion of the Common Council. Its main concern was local issues and it distrusted professional politicians. Wilkes did not find it difficult to take over the leadership from Beckford.[2] Beckford's financial as well as his political interests were not necessarily those of the lesser merchants and traders. In January 1760, after being allocated £100,000 in the subscription for that year, he declared in the House of Commons that 'nothing was ever more just and right for the government and the people'; and as West commented to Newcastle, 'this in the presence of Sir John Philips Mr Cartwright etc.'[3] It is not surprising that the City, like the group of Tories resentful of Pitt's attention to Philipps and Beckford in April 1758, occasionally wished to dissociate itself from the full extent of the praise heaped by Pitt on Beckford. To say that Beckford should be prouder of being an alderman than if he were a peer was 'too gross'.[4] The City was equally displeased with Pitt's support of Beckford's taxation proposals in 1758.[5] But there was no one of Wilkes' type to challenge Beckford in 1757-1760; nor would the conditions have been right for such an attempt. Beckford was the best leader the City had got.

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1 Addit. MSS. 35595, f.169: Ald. Dickinson to Hardwicke, 14 April 1758.
2 Cf. Norris, Shelburne and Reform, pp. 59-60.
3 Addit. MSS. 32901, f.305: West to Newcastle, 15 Jan. 1760.
4 Elizabeth Montagu, The Queen of the Blue Stockings: her Correspondence from 1720 to 1761, ed. E.J. Climenson (London, 1906), ii, 128.
5 M. Wyndham, Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1927) ii, 258.

This was the source of his great value to Pitt. Only the very fact that he was so far from perfect as a leader of the City and the Tories enabled him to try to fill both roles: and neither could offer anyone more effective. Where the roles clashed, that of the City leader naturally tended to predominate, and this posed the problem for Pitt of how far he could afford to go along with this without risking the loss of the support of the Tory country gentlemen. His solution was to back Beckford on the specifically West Indian matters which 'touched his vitals'.[1] He took up Beckford's suggestion of a Martinique expedition, opposed the re-opening of the distillery in 1760, fought against the sugar tax in the previous year, telling the House

> that it was a very great concern to him that the very name of sugar had caused a Horselaugh, very indecently; that if land or corn had been mentioned, they would not have done the same.[2]

On questions with which Beckford was less immediately concerned, Pitt was less enthusiastic in his support of him. He came down on Beckford's side over militia costs, but very equivocally;[3] was absent and expressed no view when Beckford, in opposition to the Tories, wanted the increase in judges' salaries discontinued;[4] and spoke against Beckford in favour of the Prize Bill.[5] Describing himself as 'equally a friend to the land and moneyed interest', he was able to steer a course between the two and to avoid losing the support of either.

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 177.
2 Addit. MSS. 32888, f.428: West's report, 9 March 1759.
3 Addit. MSS. 32905, f.339: West's report, 8 May 1760.
4 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 183.
5 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. of Mrs Stopford-Sackville (London, 1904), i, 55.
6 Addit. MSS. 32905, f.14: West's report, 21 April 1760.

Pitt's discrimination between West Indian and other issues may have been simply because he felt that so long as Beckford could appeal to him where his own interests were most directly concerned, he would never lose his support. It may have been an aspect of the predilection for the West Indies which ran through his whole career; Pares calls him 'that unfailing champion of West India causes right or wrong.[1] It may have been because the West Indian interest was much the most influential of all trading interests, and was now extending the scope of its political activities. The first reference to any political action by the Society of West India Merchants dates from February 1960, when this body lobbied Newcastle on behalf of the traders to the sugar colonies against the proposed duty on spirits.[2] The year before, Beckford had led a deputation of 50 West India merchants on a similar errand.[3] Whatever the explanation, Pitt's backing of Beckford's West Indian demands occasioned temporary discontent among the Tory gentlemen, but in view of his more restrained line on other issues no permanent harm was done.

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1 Pares, War and Trade, p. 486.
2 L.M. Penson, 'The London West India interest in the Eighteenth Century', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxvi (1921), p. 382.
Addit. MSS. 32902, f.458: Long to Newcastle, 28 Feb. 1760.
ibid., ff.460-3.
3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 177.

MEN AND MEASURES (2) - THE MINISTERS

(i) Pitt and Newcastle

Newcastle and Pitt were in substantial agreement as to how the war should be carried on. Pitt admitted this when he claimed that he had borrowed Newcastle's majority to carry out Newcastle's own policy.[1] Newcastle made almost the same point when he wrote to Hardwicke after Pitt's resignation in October 1761:

> I suppose I am to be made the author of Mr Pitt's resignation, and the adviser of all the former pusillanimous measures. We can, I can, show that before we went out, our views of attack both at home and abroad, were as active, as vigorous, and upon the same principle with Mr Pitt's, of annoying France in all parts; but we had not such good instruments as Mr Pitt had, or indeed (and that was our only fault) not the courage to insist on them.[2]

But the area of agreement was obscured by the fact that both ministers had to try to appeal to their own supporters. In making this appeal, past commitments were important; as Pares puts it, 'this was the way policy was made in those days: men did not usually think it out for the future, but they defended very tenaciously the commitments, even the mistakes, of the past'.[3] Both ministers played up the aspects of the war with which they were associated. Newcastle emphasised that 'continent measures ... are the only true solid ones':[4] yet earlier he had wanted a war fought entirely in America with a neutrality in Europe. Pitt's position, in view of the scale of 'continent measures' adopted, was more difficult and his past pronouncements a more serious handicap. His volte-face of 1746 had been widely satirised. His

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1 Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, 82.
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 334.
3 Pares, King George III and the Politicians, p. 91.
4 Addit. MSS. 32881, f.189: Newcastle to Anson, 7 July 1758.

support of the £200,000 grant for the observation army in February 1757 provided his enemies with further political capital to use against him. His popularity rested above all on his 'being thought an enemy to Hanover'.[1] He told Newcastle in October 1759, speaking of the generous help for the Electorate,

> that he thought it right, and so far he risked his popularity, but then he had the comfort to think that people would see that that was done for the sake of the whole, and not to aggrandize or promote any acquisition for Hanover; that there he stood, and so far he would maintain his popularity.[2]

He told Hardwicke in August 1755 'that if his own inclination should be to support the defence of Hanover ... (which he was far from saying it would), yet he must have the concurrence of his friends'.[3]

To make the £200,000 grant more palatable, he had in February 1757 seriously restricted his field of action by emphasising that no British troops were to be sent to Europe and the following month, when Fox tried to embarrass him by calling on him to deny a prevailing rumour that troops might be sent, he did so unequivocally.[4] To what extent he gave his supporters an undertaking that troops would never be sent is not entirely clear. Glover thought that he had done so and Hardwicke assumed that a promise of this kind had been made to the Tories in return for their support of financial help for the continent.[5] But an escape clause appears to have been left. Temple wrote to Pitt in June 1758: 'undoubtedly we have never sworn by Styx or Toryism or

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1 Waldegrave, Memoirs, p. 130.
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 241-2.
3 ibid., ii, 232
4 Dodington, Journal, p. 359.
5 Glover, Memoirs, p. 90. Addit. MSS. 32877, f.276: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 29 Jan. 1758.

Patriotism, never, in no case whatever, to send a man to the Continent'.[1] Two newspapers favourable to Pitt made the point that it would be foolish to give any such promise. An article in the Monitor said on 30 July 1757:

> I believe no reasonable man in this nation will plead for any other than a pecuniary assistance (to the continent). I am ready, indeed, to admit, that if it were absolutely necessary for us to engage in a continental war: if arms were on one side and chains on the other, I should recommend the taking up of arms.[2]

And the Con-Test observed that wartime emergencies might provide reasons for going against past commitments even where they had been definitely made.[3]

But some of Pitt's supporters, taking a less pragmatic line, thought that no military necessity could justify the sending of British troops. Almon, in retrospect, took this line, defending the decision to send British troops to Germany in the summer of 1758 on two different grounds: that acquiescence was necessary if other parts of the world were not to be sacrificed and that it was 'greater patriotism' in Pitt to agree, rather than 'to be continually opposing an aged monarch, in some alien, but favourite measures'.[4] The fact that some of his supporters thought in these ideological terms imposed great caution on Pitt in his gradual move towards extensive continental measures. This was generally recognised at the start of the coalition. Newcastle thought Pitt would 'do what is right', but he must be handled 'delicately, and by degrees'.[5] Devonshire argued:

> Mr Pitt knows and feels the necessity we are under to assist the King of Prussia and, it always was my opinion

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1 von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 196.
2 Monitor, cvi, p. 636.
3 Contest, no. 10.
4 (J. Almon), A Review of Mr Pitt's Administration (5th ed., London, 1766), p. 60 sqq.
5 Addit. MSS. 32872, f.85: Newcastle to Bentinck, 5 July 1757.

> that if he saw his way he wou'd go as far as another man ... My only apprehensions are that either the love of gaining or the fear of losing, Popularity may deter some people[1] from entering far enough into continent measures.

Waldegrave thought that everything would depend on Newcastle's success in persuading the King to accept Pitt:

> As to Pitt, it seems still doubtful what part he will act, whether he will dare to resist fashion, by doing what in his own judgment he must know to be right, or whether he will court false popularity by pursuing such measures as must in the end destroy the country. This will greatly depend on the treatment he meets with. Should the popular clamor and his Tory friends turn against him, he would certainly abuse them in his turn, and would probably do well. But, on the other hand, should he find himself quite desperate in the closet, his pride and resentment would make him do everything in his power to regain popularity by starving the war in Germany[2] and throwing affairs into confusion at home.

All these senior Whigs recognised that Pitt's commitments would be a major obstacle in the way of carrying out the continental policy which he would otherwise have adopted.

The fact that Pitt and Newcastle had to slant their public pronouncements towards their own supporters led naturally to claims being made on both sides which made the differences between the two men seem greater than they really were. Both ministers, when it suited them, would employ general arguments about the entire scope and nature of the war which served to emphasise these apparent differences. These arguments were in reality used for political reasons by both Pitt and Newcastle, in similar and equally inconsistent ways. Both ministers, for example, would claim to see the war as a total entity and to act according to a

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1 Addit. MSS. 32872, f. 269-70: Devonshire to Newcastle, 20 July 1757. Devonshire MSS. 260,236: Devonshire to Cumberland, 21 June 1757.

2 Ilchester, Henry Fox, ii, 364.

general system when they felt that their colleague was aiming to give too much help to the area of the war effort with which he was particularly identified. When Newcastle was worried about Pitt's concentration on America, he complained to Holdernesse: 'Mr Pitt looks too much to one part of the world only ... Ministers in this country, where every part of the world affects us, some way or other, should consider the whole globe'.[1] He criticised Pitt's policy of raids on the French coast as 'depending singly upon such a kind of war'.[2] Similarly, when Newcastle wanted more troops to be sent to Europe in August 1758 Pitt refused to consider the request on the ground that he 'acted upon system; that if more could have been sent, he would have sent them at first'.[3] Equally, he had to defend his acquiescence in measures likely to be unpopular with his own supporters. In November 1759 Pitt, expecting to be attacked for the extent of his support of the continent, told the House of Commons that 'he laid his strength on the totality of carrying on the war, for the least omission in any part might be fatal to the whole'.[4] Newcastle himself defended Pitt's continental policy on the same grounds when he told Joseph Yorke in 1762: 'though he had all that popular nonsense about him, he mixed it with real system and backed it with a continental support which had sense in it'.[5]

In contrast, each minister would accuse the other of acting 'on system', rigidly rather than flexibly, when he wished not to defend but to try to make more sinister or unpopular the policies favoured by his partner. Pitt objected to the Russian and Hessian

1 Addit. MSS. 32882, f.65: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 25 Jul 1758.
2 Addit. MSS. 32875, f.125: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Oct 1757.
3 Addit. MSS. 32882, f.201: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Aug 1758.
4 Addit. MSS. 32898, f.223: West's report, 13 Nov. 1759.
5 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 357.

treaties as part of an intended 'chain and connection', a 'vast comprehensive system' designed purely to defend Hanover.[1] Newcastle criticised Pitt for claiming to act according to a system in the summer of 1758, when all that mattered was immediate and substantial help for Hanover: 'we ought always to act according to exigencies; and if the King's German dominions, were again possessed by the French, I would foretell, there would then be an end of Ferdinand's army'.[2] Similarly, too, both ministers when faced with accusations of this kind would answer them by denying that they were acting in relation to any such system. Newcastle told Pitt that the Russian and Hessian treaties were not intended to be part of any kind of continental system.[3] And Pitt, when himself under fire for concluding the Prussian treaty in April 1758, argued that he had done so simply because the events of the war had made it necessary: 'I wish things may speak for themselves if they dont I cant'.[4] Many historians have taken too seriously these claims and counter-claims about acting or not acting to a general system.[5] They had no significance beyond the immediate political needs which they were designed to serve. Henry Legge was aware of this, recognising that politicians, whatever their pronouncements, simply acted in accordance with what the circumstances demanded. He wrote to Newcastle:

> I fancy you and I are better agreed on the affairs of the continent than either of us is aware of. I hold no speculative views on continent or no continent at all adventures. War always finds or makes its own theatre, and the enemy must be annoyed where he can be met with.[6]

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 231. (J. Almon), Anecdotes, i, 219.
2 Addit. MSS. 32882, f.201: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Aug 1758.
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 234.
4 Neville MSS., D/EN 034/16: 19 April 1758.
5 E.g. Sir J.S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War: a Study in Combined Strategy (London, 1907), i, 189.
6 Torrens, History of Cabinets, ii, 471.

Neither Pitt nor Newcastle would have disagreed; but the views of their respective supporters meant that they could not say so.

The ministers were also in more substantial agreement over the use of the militia than they were able to make clear. The line taken by Pitt was largely governed by two factors - the militia's popularity and its value as a bargaining counter for pressing other demands. The former, reflecting the attitude of his Tory supporters, was mirrored in the degree of enthusiasm Pitt displayed. But in practice, both popularity and unpopularity could provide reasons for restricting the use of the militia. During the militia riots of 1757, Pitt clearly left himself the chance to abandon the experiment if his punitive measures against the ringleaders failed to have an effect. Two years later, when the invasion threat produced an upsurge of feeling in favour of the militia, he wished to delay its use and limit its activity lest, as Devonshire told Newcastle, ' an engine of popularity might be lost'.[1] On occasions like this, Pitt's public enthusiasm for the militia masked his practical intentions. What further obscured the extent of this practical agreement with Newcastle was Pitt's frequent use of the militia issue either as an excuse for his 'concessions' on continental policies or to give him a lever with which to press for other demands. When George Townshend introduced a bill late in 1757 to amend various detailed provisions of the existing act, he stressed that no issue of principle was involved. This was not convenient for Pitt, who embarrassed Townshend by doing everything possible to play up the importance of the bill and his own role in championing it, in order, as

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1 Addit. MSS. 32892, f.106: Devonshire to Newcastle, 16 June 1759

Western puts it, 'to atone in the eyes of the country gentlemen for his espousal of the continental policy he had so long opposed'.[1] In the same way, he would use his European measures as a means of gaining further support for the militia and thereby of emphasising his own identification with it. He told the Commons in April 1760 that without the militia

> we could not have sent troops to America Africa or Germany and if any frowns should be give to it by men in power, he could never agree to sending more men of the regular forces abroad.[2]

Alternatively, five months earlier: 'if it had not been for that strength, he should have been for recalling the British troops from Germany'.[3] Threats and bribes of this kind conveniently concealed the measure of real agreement with Newcastle over the militia's use.

At times, ironically, Newcastle was keener than Pitt that the Militia Act should be put into practice. This was largely for local reasons. He was always apprehensive of accusations that as lord lieutenant of Nottinghamshire and Middlesex he was not doing his best to carry out the terms of an act of Parliament. In Nottinghamshire there was no enthusiasm from either Whigs or Tories. In Middlesex the change of public sentiment in 1759 persuaded both the MPs for the county to go back on their past advice and to press Newcastle to take action. Newcastle was far from pleased that the Whig member, Sir William Beauchamp Proctor, 'most ignorantly' took the lead in exerting this pressure, but the other member, George Cooke, was a Tory and there was a serious risk

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1 Western, English Militia, p. 144.
2 Addit. MSS. 32904, f.394: West's report, 15 April 1760
3 Addit. MSS. 32898, f.224: West's report, 13 Nov. 1759

that the Tories might use any inaction to build up their own position in the county.[1] In Sussex, though not lord lieutenant, Newcastle's influence was much greater, and here there were strategic as well as political reasons for the raising of the militia. In July 1759 Newcastle himself took the initiative in trying to shake the country gentlemen out of their former recalcitrance. He suggested that another meeting should be held, and wrote to one of them:

> I think the case extremely alter'd from what it was, at the time of the last meeting. The French are preparing to invade these kingdoms ... by their own confession and publick declaration; these preparations they are making on that part of their coast which is opposite to ours, and perhaps an attempt on the coast of Sussex is as likely, or more so, than any other in this situation, no means should be neglected, that may at least tend to our defence.[2]

But Sussex was a stronghold of the Whigs of the old school, and Newcastle's plea resulted in an attendance barely large enough to make it worth while to try to raise even one battalion. One of those whom Newcastle had asked to volunteer replied:

> ... as I always had a bad opinion of Cocoa Tree scheems I hope your Grace will be so good as to excuse my not offering myself for any command in that corps, since I am humbly of opinion that it is laying a strong foundation for a Civill Warr; and I cannot but remarke that those gentlemen that did offer were generally of the old leaven.[3]

Such attitudes from his most faithful supporters put Newcastle in a difficult position, reflected in his reply to another old Whig who had refused to volunteer: 'I ... don't like you a bit the worse, for not liking the militia, but that must be a secret'.[4]

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1 Addit. MSS.32895, f.78: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 31 Aug. 1759 Cf. Western, English Militia, p. 160.
2 Addit. MSS.32892, f.357-8: Newcastle to Campion, 2 July 1759.
3 Addit. MSS.32893, f.68: Nicoll to Newcastle, 15 July 1759.
4 ibid., f. 340: Newcastle to Butler, 28 July 1759.

Newcastle, as much as Pitt, was obliged to adopt attitudes to the militia which made the apparent difference between the two men greater than the real.

It is now important to examine how far the common ground between the two ministers actually extended and where the genuine disagreement over the conduct of the war existed.

Most important, they both accepted that the war in America was the main object and that the war in Germany helped this by diverting French efforts. Sir Joseph Yorke put the position clearly:

> The great object of the nation is the American war, which may be said to be thoroughly attended to, if we have sent thither a body of troops superior in number to the regulars which the French have in those parts, and secondly if we have a marine force there able to protect their operations ...
> The probability of succeeding in our main point is however much increased, by the part the French take in the affairs of Germany, which turns their attention as well as their money, from their marine, and ... making expeditions to our Colonies. The diversion is at the same time only temporary, and if they can carry their point in Germany, they will return with double vigour to fall upon us both by land and sea. It seems therefore necessary for us to try some means to stop the progress of the French arms against the King of Prussia ... tho' this engages us in some continent measures, yet they are only such as tend evidently to give us fair play in North America; we come in ... not as principals, but as auxiliaries, and yet such auxiliaries as by our weight must have a principal share in directing both the operations and the conclusion of the war.[1]

Newcastle might at times object that there were other objects than America: but he never denied that America was '... a great object'; merely insisting that it was 'not the only one, even for the sake of that object itself'.[2] Pitt himself admitted in the Commons that he 'found America the first object' of the ministers when he came to power;[3] and he told the House in November 1758:

American operations were the primary consideration of

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1 Addit. MSS. 32872, f.200: Yorke to Newcastle, 15 July 1757
2 Addit. MSS. 32882, f.65: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 25 July 1758
3 Addit. MSS. 32898, f.223: West's report, 13 Nov. 1759.

> every man in His Majesty's Counsels and equally so of the King himself: that in point of expence the dearness of provisions and other incidents might make the war in Germany the primary consideration and that he was afraid in that respect it came too near the American expence, but what could be done if necessity made it so.[1]

Newcastle was delighted by this and subsequent performances by Pitt on the same theme.[2]

But the agreement that America was the main object did not necessarily imply any agreement as to how much should be retained at the peace. It was sometimes argued that simply because it was the main object, nothing in America that had been captured should be surrendered, but this line of reasoning appealed neither to Pitt nor Newcastle.[3] In his first detailed discussion on the conditions of a future peace, Newcastle wrote:

> We want the Bay of Fundy, and other American points settled to our satisfaction; Minorca restored; we want Flanders put at least upon the foot it was, before the war; and lastly, we want a peace in Germany, and every thing restored there at least; and how shall we get a half of these things without Cape Breton in statu quo?[4]

He was arguing, in other words, for the restituion of Louisbourg with its fortifications intact. Pitt, too, was at first prepared to give up Louisbourg. In December 1758 he deliberately refused to commit himself in the House of Commons when he was asked to give an undertaking that Louisbourg would never be restored.[5] Even in October 1759 he told the Prussian minister Knyphausen that he wanted to retain the Lakes, Crown Point and Niagara, but not Louisbourg or Quebec.[6] It was only in March 1760 that his

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1 Addit. MSS.32885, f.525: West's report, 23 Nov 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32886, f.191: Newcastle to Rockingham, 7 Dec 1758
3 Douglas, A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men on the Prospect of Peace, pp. 28-33
4 Addit. MSS.32883, f.115: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Aug 1758
5 Pol.Corr., xvii, 436-7.
6 Addit. MSS.32897, f.32-3: memorandums, 12 Oct 1759

view started seriously to diverge from that of Newcastle. With further success, Pitt came to think it might be possible to retain all the British acquisitions in America; while Newcastle, with the financial burden of the war increasing every year, strongly adhered to his earlier view as a means of bringing about a quick peace. The difference was not in any sense ideological: it simply developed with the course of events.

America was the main object, and the war in Europe was presented as a diversion of French effort from the primary colonial struggle. Newcastle described continental operations as diversionary even to his old Whig supporters. He wrote to John White:

> except we can divert the power and force of France, by measures on the continent, all our other attempts by expeditions on their coasts, and most expensive operations in both Indies, and in North America, will turn upon us.[1]

Even after the conquest of Canada, both ministers presented the German war not as an end in itself, but as the only means by which France could be prevented from attempting to regain her American possessions.[2] Pitt was also keen, as an extension of this argument, to emphasise that the American part of the war was the real offensive, and that England's concern on the continent was merely to 'keep the war alive there in a defensive manner'.[3] He had used the same reasoning in the last war, when he strongly supported the Pelhams' line in the negotiations with the Cobham group - that a defensive war on the continent and an offensive war at sea was a better policy than an offensive war at sea alone. Such arguments, though politically useful, lost some of their validity when for the first time in the Seven Years' War a strong

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1 Addit. MSS.32882, f.95: Newcastle to White, 29 July 1758
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 339
3 Glover, Memoirs, p. 98

and effective Western squadron was constantly employed. The principal lesson of the last war had been to demonstrate the value of such a fleet. The Western squadron, based off the south-west coast of England or close in to the French ports, was used for both colonial and European defence at the same time and showed the interdependence of the two types of war. The purpose of the squadron was mainly defensive - to 'neutralise an offensive weapon in the enemy's hands' by making it impossible for the French to conquer America except in the Channel.[1] The double purpose of the squadron made it easier for the ministers to claim, once the land war for America was over, that although operations were now centred on Europe, it was still America that was being principally fought for.

This diversionary thesis made it possible to argue that the Hanoverian and Hessian troops hired by England were in reality fighting against France in America, Africa and overseas.[2] Beckford could claim that the Prussian subsidy was simply a way of giving money to America.[3] This made the emphasis on diversion of political value to the ministers. When it was decided to send British troops to Emden, Hardwicke advised Newcastle how to present the decision:

> ... shew that this is a right way of creating a diversion for the forces of France, and that effect has already appear'd. An use of measures upon the Continent, founded on true policy, in which every body must agree.[4]

Later, when Newcastle for a time thought of trying to reach a

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1 G.S. Graham, 'The Naval Defence of British North America, 1739-63', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., xxx (1948), 104-110
2 Almon, Anecdotes, i, 269
3 Addit. MSS.32887, f.355: West's report, 26 Jan 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32879, f.151: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 13 Apr 1758

separate peace with France comprising only the colonial war, Hardwicke had to remind him that any agreement must include Germany, or 'you would be entirely stript of the argumt. drawn from a diversion, and taking off the forces and impression of France from America'.[1] Opponents of the administration's German policy, on the other hand, denied that European operations were having the diversionary effect claimed for them. Mauduit said that if there was any diversion at all, it was England that was being diverted.[2] Significantly, the pamphlets which aimed to answer his Considerations concentrated especially on this point: weakening France in Europe was also a means of weakening her in America.[3] George Grenville in 1761 also denied the force of the theory that it was only the German war that prevented France from rebuilding its navy and attempting to reconquer America; he put forward the view that whether or not there was fighting in Germany, the French shortage of seamen would prevent any such attempt.[4] The government's diversionary argument dictated its attitude to Hanover. Hanover had to be seen not as an end in itself, but as a factor in the English struggle with France for America in Germany. If Hanover were to suffer in this conflict purely because to attack her was a means of striking a blow against England in the colonial war, there was a clear moral obligation to do something to help her. As Hervey put it:

> though nobody would wish England engaged in a war for the sake of Hanover, yet if Hanover was attacked for the

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1 Addit. MSS.32901, f.49: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 3 Jan 1760
2 Mauduit, Considerations on the Present German War (London,1760) p. 47 sqq.
3 M. Schlenke, England und das Friderizianische Preussen, 1740-1763 (Freiburg, 1963), p. 262.
4 Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, 81.

> sake of England, no Englishman with honour or common justice would desire to see Hanover in that case abandoned, and unsuccoured by those on whose account it was attacked.[1]

This was the purpose of Newcastle's 'Hanover policy' at the start of the war. It was designed to retain Hanover while involving England as little as possible on the continent, and was based on the theory that if Hanover fell it would be necessary to make sacrifices in America to recover it. Pitt in opposition argued that Hanover should be helped after rather than during the war, and Temple took the view that for England to give direct military assistance to Hanover was a waste of effort, since the German princes would come to her aid even if England did not.[2] Mauduit in 1760 came to the same conclusion as Pitt in 1755, adding that the devastation suffered by Hanover when England tried to defend it was far greater than if England had allowed it to be conquered and bought it back at the peace.[3] But Newcastle, Pitt, Temple and Mauduit were all in agreement that if Hanover was attacked purely because of the English connection, there was an 'obligation of honour and justice'[4] during the war or at the peace, to help her. Pitt and Newcastle both abandoned their earlier views as to how Hanover could be helped. In the negotiations leading up to his taking office with Devonshire, Pitt 'gave some civil, though obscure hints, as if, in losing his Grace, Hanover might not lose all its friends' and the grant of February 1757 to the observation army showed that he had come round to a policy of direct assistance.[5]

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1 Hervey, Memoirs, p. 114-5.
2 R. Pares, 'American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-63', Eng. Hist. Rev., li (1936), 437
3 Mauduit, Considerations on the Present German War, p. 24-6.
4 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 231.
5 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 259.

Newcastle had at the same time moved away from his 'Hanover policy' and especially after Frederick's victory against the Austrians at Lobositz in October 1756 started to see the advantages of a widespread subsidy system against France, Austria and Russia.[1] It was in pointing to this change that those who criticised Pitt's consistency were right to do so; Pitt was equally entitled to claim that he had acted consistently in essentials if not in details.[2] Both ministers therefore agreed from the start of the coalition that Hanover must be given active assistance, since there could be no dispute that Hanover was being attacked purely because of her connection with England.[3] The personal union and the obligations that this entailed at such times were a source of regret. Even Barrington admitted that Hanover 'does take off from our insularity' and Walpole lamented: 'nor is it a question any longer what nations can cope with Great Britain, but what little Landgrave is too formidable to the Electorate'.[4] Pitt and Newcastle both supported in principle the idea of ending the personal union by making over Hanover to a younger branch of the royal family - but the consent of the Empire would be necessary and the practical difficulties were thought to be too great.[5] However

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1 Newcastle's change of opinion is traced by C.W. Eldon, England's Subsidy Policy Towards the Continent During the Seven Years' War (Philadelphia, 1938) [illegible].

2 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 313. Cf. Addit. MSS. 51406: Campbell to Fox, 13 Nov 1757: 'how come they to think these things of so much consequence to us, who two years ago, though wee ought not to concern ourselves in the least with the Continent; nor make the least attempt to prevent the ffrench taking possession of our German dominions'.

3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 37. Addit. MSS.32877, f.436: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 Feb 1758.

4 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 119.

5 Addit. MSS.32889, f.6-7: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 Nov 1759. Cf. Sir A.W. Ward, Great Britain and Hanover: some Aspects of the Personal Union (Oxford, 1899), p. 63 sqq. for the earlier history of this project.

disadvantageous the union, nothing could be done about it or the consequences it might entail: even Beckford admitted, however regretfully, that 'if Hanover were lost, he would vote one hundred millions sooner than not recover it'.[1]

But this recovery, if it were necessary, might not be possible by money alone. It was more difficult to find mercenaries than to raise the supplies with which to pay for them. There might be no alternative but to send British troops; and it was clearly better to send British troops to prevent Hanover being lost than to recover it afterwards. It was on these grounds that the Duke of Richmond in September 1757 recognised the strength of the case for the dispatch of a British contingent:

> Who could suppose that the troops of Hanover, Hesse Cassel and Wolfembuttel with some few Prussians could resist the whole force of France? ... It was madness to attempt the defence of the Electorate with your force against such numbers. The difference was too great. If you could have had fifteen battalions of English with ten squadrons of dragoons and as many Prussians, you might I suppose have had some chance of success, and England could and ought to have spared them. They promised the King in the very beginning of this war that as it was began merely on account of England they would assist him in the defence of Hanover if it should be attacked by the French. Hanover was attacked and the only assistance given was 200,0001. This I call infamous behaviour in a nation, and an absolute breach of promise ... I suppose fifteen battalions and ten squadrons might have saved Hanover last campaign. Now we repent not having sent, and I should not be surprised if in a summer of two (sic) at farthest we should see double that number sent to retake it, which may then not be sufficient.[2]

The task of any reinforcement of this kind was recognised to be the maintenance or recovery of Hanoverian territorial integrity. It could not be expected to help in making acquisitions which might be made over to Hanover at the peace to compensate for the sufferings and reduced revenues resulting from the war. But this

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1 Addit. MSS.32887, f.355: West's report, 26 Jan 1759
2 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. of Earl Bathurst (London, 1923) pp. 679-80.

was exactly what the King wanted. His aim was to acquire at the peace the duchies of Osnabruck, Hildesheim and Paderborn.[1] In the negotiations at the close of the last war he had attempted to gain Osnabruck as an hereditary principality, and Frederick knew of these aims and was prepared to encourage him to hope for Osnabruck and the secularisation of Paderborn.[2] This made the King all the more keen to try to persuade his English ministers to support these claims at any future peace congress. When the ministers were pressing for a Garter for Lord Temple he told them that he would agree to this, provided England would support the Hanoverian minister at the peace negotiations.[3] Newcastle and Pitt refused even to consider the bribe. Newcastle especially was terrified by the prospect of accusations of Hanoverianism. In the Austrian Succession war, he had looked with extreme suspicion at the treaty of Hanau, opposed the King's inclusion as Elector in the Supplementary Convention, pressed for the return of the Hanoverian troops in 1743 and looked with horror on the Osnabruck scheme - attitudes which were all inspired by his dread of becoming the target of charges that he was 'doing the King's German business'. Both ministers consistently made clear to the King their total opposition to the possibility of even the smallest Hanoverian gain at the peace.

Hanover was therefore no exception to the rule that on all major matters of principle, Pitt and Newcastle were in agreement. The only scope for genuine dispute was over matters of degree and application, not of principle. This fact was widely recognised.

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1 Addit. MSS.32899, f. 35: memorandums (Count Viry), 22 Nov 1759
2 Pol. Corr., xiv, 168. Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748, p. 370.
3 Addit. MSS.32898, f.285-6: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 Nov 1759

Dodington said that the only question was not whether Hanover should be helped but how and to what extent.[1] Dupplin made exactly the same point.[2] Royston told the House of Commons that 'no reasonable man can dispute the principle' of involvement on the continent based on diverting the French effort: the legitimate scope for difference of opinion was simply 'whether the plans of a confederate war may, or may not, have been carried to excess'.[3] Even the potential or actual critics of the administration's continental policy accepted these claims. Beckford said in November 1758 that he was prepared to give two millions to the continent but not three.[4] The Prince of Wales complained to Bute of 'the great Sec. of St. who at the beginning of one session thinks £700.000, the most that can be spared for the Continent, and at the opening of the next, talks of £3,000,000 as a moderate sum from the same service'[5] - reflecting the view of Bute himself, who carried his objections no further than that Pitt 'might have gone too far, in supporting the Continent measures; that the expense was too heavy; and that inconveniencies might arise from it'.[6] None of these were ever sufficiently forthright in their opposition to wish to present the question as one of principle: for Professor Pares is right in calling this question of continental intervention one 'not so much between parties as between governments as such and oppositions as such'.[7] Pitt himself in the past had tried to present issues of detail as issues of principle while in opposition. He had done so in 1751 when advocating a navy of

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1 Dodington, Journal, p. 321.
2 Addit. MSS.32872, f.454: Dupplin to Newcastle, 5 Aug 1757
3 The Parliamentary History of England (ed. W. Cobbett, London 1813), xv, 835.
4 Addit. MSS.32885, f.524: West's report, 23 Nov 1758
5 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, p. 19.
6 Addit. MSS.32884, f.312: memorandums (Count Viry), 10 Oct 1758
7 Pares, King George III and the Politicians, p. 5.

10,000 rather than 8,000 men; and Murray, defending the government had remarked: 'how great the power of eloquence that could dress up the want of 2000 men, in 1751, into the source of the war'.[1] In November 1754, Julines Beckford, moving for an army of 15,000 rather than 18,800 used the occasion for a tirade against standing armies. Barrington, in reply, brought the matter into perspective: 'if eighteen thousand intended to overturn (the constitution), fifteen might'.[2] In September 1755, Hardwicke was keen to stress the real agreement with Pitt, Pitt anxious to conceal this.[3] In each case, the point at dispute was a question of degree: the government wished to keep it as such, the opposition to make it a matter of principle. But during the period between the formation of the coalition and the death of the King, there was no effective figure to assume this normal opposition role

The agreement within the administration on the principles of conducting the war did not extend to agreement as to the way in which the French should be diverted in Europe. At the close of the Austrian war, Newcastle had rejected Frederick's proposal that he should assume Austria's place in alliance with England and Holland against France, and he deliberately set about trying to restore the 'old system'. Even in July 1757 he wrote to Bentinck: 'the system of Europe is completely deranged by the unnatural alliance between France and Austria'.[4] But he accepted that after the war Prussia would have to take Austria's place in the alliance of the maritime powers against France. He wrote to Mitchell in September

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, i, 12; ii, 75.
2 Ibid., i, 410-11.
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, ii, 232. Dodington, Journal, p. 323.
4 Addit. MSS.32872, f.85: Newcastle to Bentinck, 5 July 1757

> Now is our time to push in order to make a safe and honorable end, in conjunction with the King of Prussia. Holland we must have, some way, or other, if not during the war, at least upon the conclusion of a peace; so as to form such an alliance, as that that peace may not depend upon either of the Houses of Bourbon, or Austria.[1]

It was not entirely devotion to tradition that induced Newcastle to place such emphasis on Dutch support. There were also political and strategic reasons. The political reasons were twofold. First, it was clear that if the Dutch could be relied upon for help in an emergency, one of the main arguments in favour of a militia would be much weakened.[2] Second, Newcastle realised that previous Dutch weakness had been one of the arguments used in favour of a purely naval war, and this made him keen for active Dutch participation.[3] There were also strategic considerations. Newcastle always dreaded the prospect of invasion, and the stronger the French position in Flanders, the easier it would be for them to invade England.[4] More important, however, was the significance of finance as an aspect of strategy. The Dutch, with interest rates at only $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3% and with the decline of the Dutch intermediary trade causing a gradual movement of the business community from trade to finance, had large sums available for investment at higher rates in the funds of other countries. The attraction of those funds acted as a disincentive to re-investment in commerce, and this further expedited the trading decline: it was a vicious circle. England provided the new Dutch financiers with irresistible opportunities. Annuities had a speculative appeal, while the stocks of the Bank of England, the East India Company and the South Sea Company provided a more solid income. By half way

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1 Addit. MSS.32883, f.421: Newcastle to Mitchell, 12 Sept 1758
2 Dashwood MSS., B8/2/10.
3 Addit. MSS.32873, f.174-5: Newcastle to Yorke, 19 Aug 1757
4 Addit. MSS.32872, f.340: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 July 1757

through the century, about 1000 out of 3300 voting proprietors of Bank of England stock were Dutchmen or Flemings.[1] Rather over £6¾ million of Bank and East India stock and South Sea annuities was foreign owned; this, with £3¾ million from other sources, comprised about 15% of the national debt, Dutch accounts being responsible for over three-quarters of the total number of foreign holdings.[2] The Dutch were also a major source of supply in the raising of loans, and the percentage of government expenditure financed from public borrowing had increased from 31 to 37 between the Austrian War and the Seven Years' War.[3] In the loan of 1759-60, four firms which engaged in business for Dutch investors - van Neck, Amyand, Muilman and Fonnereau - took £2.7 out of eight millions.[4] Some of this was on account of English investors included in the lists of these firms, but a high proportion was disposed of in Holland by brokers acting in conjunction with these underwriting firms.[5] It is not surprising that this dependence on the Dutch was a subject for widespread comment and regret. John Page, MP, who advised Newcastle on financial matters, commented in April 1759 that the Dutch had England 'almost at their mercy at a time when they seem more inclin'd to humble, than to assist us'.[6] Closer relations with Holland, it was generally recognised, were the key to greater Dutch investment.[7] Newcastle knew that men like van Neck could and sometimes did invest in French funds.[8]

1 Sir J.H. Clapham, The Bank of England: A History ((Cambridge, 1958), i, p. 284.
2 P.G.M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit, 1688-1756 (London 1967) p. 321-3.
3 ibid., p. 9.
4 Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 55.
5 It appears, for instance, that of the £1.2 million allocated to van Neck only £200,000 was for English investors, and only £254,000 out of £924,000 on Amyand's list. Addit. MSS.32901, ff. 240, 242.
6 Addit. MSS. 32890, f.217: Page to Newcastle, 20 April 1759
7 Addit. MSS. 32889, f.197: Watkins to Newcastle, 22 March 1759; Addit. MSS.32890, f.340: Magens' note, 25 April 1759.
8 K. Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century: a Study in Administrative History (Oxford, 1958), p. 72.

In 1760 the French consul at Amsterdam remarked that with sums of forty million livres expected to be invested by Dutch finance houses in the £25 million English loan, it was not difficult to explain why England had in recent years shown greater respect for Dutch shipping rights.[1] The scale of Dutch investment gave Newcastle as First Lord of the Treasury a powerful incentive to press for a policy more clearly orientated towards Holland.

No such reasons influenced Pitt. He had entered the administration in 1746 on condition that only limited support was to be given to the Dutch, and he had come to realise that it had been unwise to have involved them in the war at all.[2] But at least it had been possible in the last war to argue, however fallaciously, that it was the common interest of England, Holland and Austria to maintain the Barrier against French aggression. This clearly no longer applied. The Barrier Fortresses were in the Austrian Netherlands, not Holland, and as Stanhope pointed out in 1743, once Austria and France came to terms the Barrier became an irrelevance to the Dutch and 'their ancient and wise maxims for the gain of wealth, and the preservation of their own quiet, were revived in their full force'.[3] In practice, England had always placed greater emphasis than Austria on the maintenance of the Barrier, as Douglas put it:

> wasting its Millions, and lavishing its blood, to obtain a Barrier in Flanders, which those for whom we conquered it could not defend, or rather did not think it worth while to keep.[4]

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1 C.H. Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1941), p. 70.

2 Pares, 'American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-63', Eng. Hist. Rev., li (1936) p. 444-5.

3 The Case of the Hanover Forces in the Pay of Great Britain Impartially and Freely Examined: with some seasonable reflections on the present conjuncture of affairs (3rd ed., London, 1743), p. 49.

4 A letter Addressed to Two Great Man on the Prospect of Peace, Douglas, p. 17.

Austria had always resented the conditions on which she held Belgium. Now that she was in alliance with France, it was not only possible but likely that she would make concessions in the Netherlands in return for help elsewhere, and in 1757 she promised Ostend and Nieuport to France in order to gain French help in recovering Silesia.

Pitt realised, along with Stanhope, that with Austria in alliance with France, the Barrier argument was an irrelevance to the Dutch. A war in Flanders would serve no purpose. Austria and France could dispose of the Barrier fortresses as they liked and the Dutch would not be persuaded to participate by arguments that the Barrier was threatened by their unnatural alliance. Pitt told the Commons that he 'dreaded the war being transferred to Flanders - he had rather feed it in Germany'.[1] Early in the next reign, he gave as a reason for continuing the German war the fact that, if it were abandoned, 140,000 French troops would be free to invade the Low Countries and Portugal.[2]

The other point of view - that the Barrier argument might still effectively be used with the Dutch to induce them to take part in the war - was most clearly expressed by the Prussian King. In January 1759 he wrote to George II to advise that England should bring home to the Dutch the fact that the alliance between France and Austria was only founded on cessions in Flanders and that it was only by sacrificing the Barrier that these two powers had been able to join together.[3] He appears to

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 147
2 Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, 130
3 Pol. Corr., xviii, 34

have thought that since the old Barrier garrisons were now in enemy hands, a new Barrier might be stipulated in any future treaty between England and Holland.[1] Newcastle was less hopeful than Frederick that appeals to the Dutch based on the maintenance of the Barrier would have any effect. In August 1757 he thought, against the view held by Pitt, that a memorial complaining of the introduction of French garrisons into Ostend and Nieuport 'might have a good effect, rouse a spirit in Holland', but he admitted that he 'could not answer for the effect of such a measure', and unless Joseph Yorke could show that it 'would have any good effect, or at least, that it could not have a bad one', he was prepared to drop the matter.[2] He put his faith less in words than in a demonstration of military strength in Flanders, which might reassure the Dutch as to the vigour and success of the English cause and enable the Anglophile party in Holland to bring effective pressure to bear for joining in the war. Unlike Pitt, therefore, Newcastle was keen for military activity in Flanders. In March 1758 he regretted to Hardwicke the fact that 'His Majesty doubted the prudence, or possibility, of following the French army to Flanders (without the Dutch), or to the frontiers of France'.[3] Three months later, he suggested: 'might not we order our whole force to appear upon the coasts of Flanders'?[4] This was the main divergence of opinion on the conduct of the war between Newcastle and Pitt.

Their views on the desirability of war in Flanders were at the root of a second major difference on the question of how the

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1 Pol. Corr. xiv, 59
2 Addit. MSS. 32873, f.173-4: Newcastle to Yorke, 19 Aug 1757
3 Addit. MSS. 32878, f.328: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 24 March 1758
4 Addit. MSS. 32880, f.474: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 June 1758

continental diversion should best be conducted. Pitt's policy of raids on the French coast was based on the theory that while French forces were diverted from Germany to counter these attacks, no British troops were diverted from any other service, since the troops used on these expeditions were those required for the defence of England; he 'looked on the troops sent on the expedition as at home, or otherwise, nobody could sleep quietly, for fear of an invasion'.[1] The French effort in Europe was being divided while the English was not; this made 'keeping France in alarms upon the coast ... the most effectual way to distress her'.[2] There was the further advantage that the channel fleet could give cover to amphibious operations of this kind without in any way being diverted from its function.[3] Political considerations also favoured Pitt. Coastal operations were a way of helping the continent without incurring accusations of Hanoverianism, and Leicester House rapidly saw that it could safely identify itself with this form of warfare.

Newcastle had no objection in principle to expeditions of this type. He told Anson: 'I have always been of the opinion, that the enemy should ... be entertain'd with expeditions, if a diversion could be procured by it.'[4] In 1746 he had championed the expedition to the French coast in opposition to his brother, though his reason was not to provide a diversion - it was too late in the year to produce any diversionary effect - but to justify expenditure already incurred on the abandoned Canada expedition.[5]

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1 Addit. MSS.32882, f.203: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Aug 1758
2 Dodington, Journal, p 372
3 Cf. Addit. MSS.6815, f.3: Holdernesse to Mitchell, 5 July 1757
4 Addit. MSS.32881, f.189: Newcastle to Anson, 7 July 1758
5 Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-48, iii, 25, 37

In 1756, again eager to justify himself at home, he considered the possibility of a raid on the French coast.[1] But he was by no means so enthusiastic as Pitt. He could never accept Pitt's argument that these expeditions involved no greater risk of a successful invasion attempt by the French. In August 1758 Pitt told him that the expedition troops

> would always be at hand for home defence. I answer'd yes, if they did not go too far from the coast, and subject themselves to be demolish'd by a superior force.[2]

In April 1759 he became worried that Pitt was planning another expedition and determined to oppose it as strongly as he could on the ground that there were far too few troops at home.[3] Similarly, he considered that the use of the troops designed for home defence for raids on the French coast gave an extra weapon to the advocates of the militia. Hardwicke said of Pitt's plan for an operation against Belleisle in the summer of 1760:

> I entirely agree with your Grace that the shewing that this country may be, for the greatest part, trusted to the defence of the militia, has some influence in the way of thinking of a certain Person. If any good should follow from this expedition, or if no harm should follow from it, it will be argued next session that the utility of this militia is not only demonstrable, but actually demonstrated. (Yet, in truth, if no attempt should be made, it will prove nothing).[4]

Not only was Newcastle more cautious than Pitt : he also saw the diversionary value of these expeditions in a different light. Pitt's idea was simply to divert French troops from Germany. Newcastle wished also to divert them towards Flanders. In 1758 he thought first of Ostend and Dunkirk and then of Nieuport as possible targets for the expeditionary force.[5] Pitt,

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1 Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, i, 144.
2 Addit. MSS.32882, f.350: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 Aug 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32890, f.114: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 April 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32913, f.69: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 12 Oct 1760
5 Addit. MSS.32880, f.474: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 June 1758;
Addit. MSS.32881, f.329: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 July 1758.

of course, was opposed to any idea of transferring the European centre of gravity to Flanders.

This was the main difference between the two ministers on the question of how the war in Europe should be conducted. It remains in treating the areas of genuine agreement and disagreement between Newcastle and Pitt to examine the extent of common ground and of divergence in their attitudes to the militia. It has already been shown that there were political reasons why Pitt should appear to be more enthusiastic, and Newcastle less, than he really was.[1] But there were also political factors working in the opposite direction, that of unity and compromise. Professor Western, from a study of militia schemes put forward in the mid-eighteenth century by supporters of both government and opposition, has concluded that there was often little difference between the two, though government schemes always envisaged a force of only secondary importance, with crown control over the force and its officers.[2] Further, the main advocates of the militia, notably in 1756-7, showed themselves more interested in the military than in the political aspects of their scheme, and were prepared to make political concessions so long as the military feasibility was not impaired.[3] This produced a widespread impression that so far from being a political issue, the militia had contributed significantly to the extinction of party. Hardwicke warned Newcastle, referring to the prolongation of the militia in 1760, that 'more Whigs have appeared for this measure in the House of

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1 Above, pp. 114-119.
2 Western, English Militia, pp.114-116
3 ibid., p. 140.

Commons than Tories'.[1] Locally, in contrast to the political use made of the militia by the Tories in Essex and Lincolnshire, Gibbon wrote of the Hampshire militia: 'the most beneficial effect of this institution was to eradicate among the Country gentlemen the relicks of Tory or rather of Jacobite prejudice'.[2] Poulett made the same point of the Somersetshire militia: it had 'destroyed all distinction of parties in this county ... Gentlemen now associate and act together who were very shy lately and scarce knew one another.'[3]

The fact that political considerations pulled in both directions was reflected in the somewhat confused and inconsistent views of both Newcastle and Pitt. Only once did Newcastle use his majority in the Commons to reject a militia bill - and that was the Scottish militia bill of 1760, to which even some of the most enthusiastic supporters of the English militia were opposed. He was not even consistent about this: in October 1756 he had before he resigned been prepared if necessary to accept a Scottish militia bill.[4] Yet he claimed to consider the militia 'the ruin of our constitution, and the immediate destruction of the Whig Party', and in August 1762, when considering whether to resign, he made only one stipulation about domestic politics: 'I shall certainly in and out of office oppose the continuance of the Militia, in any shape, at least after the war is ended'.[5] Even Hardwicke seems scarcely to have known where he stood. In May 1756 he told the

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1 Addit. MSS.32913, f.254: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 21 Oct 1760
2 Memoirs of My Life, p. 11
3 D. Williams, The Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (London, 1913), i, 406.
4 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. of Lord Polwarth, v, 326
5 Addit. MSS. 32913, f.226: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 20 Oct 1760

Lords that far from being against a militia he was for one in principle, though he thought the numbers projected in Townshend's bill should be halved.[1] But in October 1760 he wrote to Newcastle: 'I would not be understood to be an advocate for the militia. Nobody is more strongly against it in principle than I am'.[2] Thinking of the militia in political terms, Newcastle and Hardwicke raised objections of principle only when political dangers threatened. Newcastle wrote in July 1759: 'every day convinces me of the destruction, that this militia will, sooner or later, bring upon this countrey. It will, one day or other, prove fatal to the constitution, and will be a handle against us at the next election'.[3] It is not difficult to see which of these dangers was Newcastle's real anxiety.

In the case of Pitt, it is even more difficult to disentangle his real views from his political use of the militia. Professor Western has recognised the problem and it is right to state his conclusion in full:

> The support which Pitt gave to the militia cause was of the greatest value but the reasons which prompted him to give it are obscure. It must at once be said that the militia was of the greatest use to him politically. Repeatedly he used its progress to justify his change of front on the question of sending troops to Germany. It was a means of reconciling his friends among the country gentlemen to the expense of the war effort, both by satisfying an old political demand of theirs and by giving them a part to play in the war that some of them, such as Lord Denbigh, did not find too distasteful. For all that, there are pointers to the conclusion that Pitt's enthusiasm for the militia was sincere. In the first place, he associated himself not with an empty slogan but with a practical scheme. Horace Walpole (who thought his enthusiasm feigned) remarked that the speech in which he seconded the motion for enquiry and reform in 1755 showed him to have a great memory for detail and capacity for business, adding 'he had never shone in this light before'. Pitt used the

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1 The History, Debates and Proceedings of Both Houses of Parliament of Great Britain, from the year 1743 to the year 1774 (London, 1792), iii, 245.
2 Western, English Militia, p. 178
3 Addit. MSS. 32893, f.192: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 July 1759

> opportunity afforded by the militia bill to escape from sterile opposition and show what he could do as an architect of national defence. This is a sign of merit in an opposition leader, whatever his motive, and was unprecedented in a leading politician interesting himself in the militia. No less striking is the situation in the spring of 1758 when he was apparently more determined than the leading militia enthusiasts to press forward with implementing the new scheme - militia riots notwithstanding. In 1759 - partly, it may be, to spite his colleagues - he called the militia into service; this done, he made use of them in his own way, which was agreeable to some country gentlemen but highly disagreeable to a great many and to all old-fashioned militia doctrinaires. It seems fair to conclude that he saw the soundness of the strategic case for a militia and was unable to appreciate the really valid arguments on the other side because they were financial and finance was a subject to which he paid little heed. Perhaps too, like Sir Winston Churchill, he enjoyed seasoning his lofty strategic ideas with a few 'gimmicks'.[1]

The evidence for the period of the coalition suggests that the element of gimmick was the main one: Pitt's sincerity is very much open to question. His enthusiasm in 1758, as Professor Western himself observes,[2] was attributable not to the merits of Townshend's bill but to his eagerness to show that despite his support of 'continent measures' he had not abandoned his old views. He therefore eagerly took up a number of 'popular' bills designed to identify him once more with his usual supporters. Both the Habeas Corpus amendment bill and Grenville's Navy bill hindered rather than helped the prosecution of the war. The former, Dr Middleton has shown, would only have increased the problem of manning the fleet if it had been passed;[3] while the latter, by providing for quicker payment of seamen, encouraged desertion, was resented by the Royal Navy, and did little to encourage volunteers to come forward.[4] In view of his championship of these two bills,

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1 Western, English Militia, pp 180-1
2 Ibid., p 104
3 Middleton, 'The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt', (PhD. thesis), p 104
4 R. Pares, 'The Manning of the Navy in the West Indies, 1702-1763, Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., xx, iv (1937), 37-40

it is by no means certain that military considerations played any part in determining his support for Townshend's bill.

In 1759 he called the militia into service, but was far from enthusiastic about this, though he concealed the fact for political reasons. On 12 June he told Newcastle that with 40,000 regulars in the country, he was reluctant to draw out the militia for the moment, though twelve battalions had already offered to be drawn out.[1] By the end of July he was suggesting that the militia might be discharged.[2] Further, while it is true that he used the militia at this period in a way of which the purists did not approve, this was equally not a matter of choice on Pitt's part. The old militia enthusiasts were above all keen that the militia should not simply be used as a force which might free regular troops for other duties. Pitt used it in this way, both in releasing the regular army from the duty of guarding French prisoners and in continuing the embodiment of the militia after the invasion scare was over. On both occasions, however, these were policies which only developed with the circumstances and which, recognising the political dangers, he was at first anxious to avoid. On 12 June 1759 Newcastle reported to Hardwicke after a conversation with Pitt:

> I have learnt one circumstance this morning, which is curious ... I found, he had alter'd his measure and that they (the militia battalions) are not yet to be drawn out, for the guard of the prisoners; but the regular troops, to a certain number, are to be kept where they are, for that purpose.[3]

It was also certainly his original intention that the militia should be discharged before the winter.[4] In both instances, in creditably reversing his original aims when the invasion threat

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1 Addit. MSS.32892, f.27: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 June 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32893, f.283: memorandums for the King, 26 July 1759
3 Addit. MSS.32892, f.27: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 June 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32893, f.392: memorandums for the King, 31 July 1759

dragged on, he creditably found a strategic role for the militia; but this does not suggest that at the time he called it out he had any serious or carefully thought out strategic purpose in mind. Until then, it seems that he saw the militia as little more than a gimmick. Before the invasion faced Pitt with the need to think of the militia in practical terms, he tailored his enthusiasm and his policy towards it, like the Tory country gentlemen, to its popularity and to his own immediate political needs. Bute may have exaggerated and been a little out of date when he told Viry in October 1759 that he 'was sure, that Mr Pitt was more against the militia, than the Duke of Newcastle. But that Pitt appear'd otherwise, par politique';[1] but Bute, who was in a good position to judge, was probably not far from the truth.

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1 Addit. MSS.32896, f.303: secret memorandums (Count Viry), 5 Oct 1759.

PART II

HASTENBECK AND ROCHEFORT

(i)

The foreign situation could hardly have been more serious when the coalition took office. On the day after the kissing of hands came the news of Frederick's defeat at Kolin - a victory for the Austrian army so crushing that one well-informed observer thought that, had the news of the battle arrived a day or two earlier, no administration could have been formed.[1]

The battle of Kolin put a final and decisive end to Frederick's hopes of an offensive campaign. This had begun promisingly in March. Both armies had approximately 120,000 men. By the start of May the Austrians, after little serious fighting, had abandoned half of Bohemia. On 6 May, the first major battle of the campaign had been fought outside Prague. The Prussians lost 13,000 men, the Austrians 18,000. Vienna ordered that Prague should be defended to the last man and sent Marshall Daun with a force of 54,000 troops to relieve the town. Frederick seriously underestimated Daun's strength and moved to push him back. The two armies met at Kolin on 18 June. Frederick was totally defeated, losing over a third of his army, and the Prussian siege of Prague was lifted.[2]

The diplomatic consequences of the battle were as serious as the military ones. In the winter of 1756-7, the position of Hanover had caused tension in both the Franco-Austrian and the Anglo-Prussian alliances. To France, the enemy was England: to Austria, it was Prussia. After Frederick's invasion of Saxony, the

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1 Bed. Corr., ii, 261.

2 For the figures in this paragraph, see R. Waddington, La Guerre de Sept Ans (Paris, 1899), pp. 305, 334. Waddington's account of the various campaigns has consistently been followed.

French wanted to invade Hanover, while Kaunitz aimed for a march on Saxony. The renewal in February 1757 of the pact of 1746 between Austria and Russia aroused French suspicions that Austria would try to recover Silesia with Russian help, and leave France uncompensated. But in May, Kaunitz engineered the treaty which committed France to provide 10,000 German soldiers and a twelve million florin subsidy each year for Austria, in return for the promise of Ostend, Nieuport and other towns at the peace. News of the battle of Prague imposed a serious strain on this alliance: so one-sided a treaty could not readily endure a major defeat in the field. But a palace revolution in France replaced the suspicious Rouillé by Bernis, the architect of the alliance, and the news of Kolin set the seal on the rapprochement.

Hanover had also been a source of trouble to the Anglo-Prussian alliance. In September 1756 the English cabinet decided to form an army of 30,000 Hanoverian, Hessian, and Brunswicker troops, with 11,000 Prussians promised by Frederick; but it was only to assemble if French movements made it necessary. The same month the Hanoverian ministers decided to support the Prussian alliance. But early in the New Year, Kaunitz proposed a formal convention of neutrality. The negotiations resulting from this offer eventually broke down in April, when the French refused to depart from their insistence on the right of passage for troops. Frederick, who had looked on Hanoverian participation in these negotiations as a 'secret declaration of Hanover against England', was delighted by the breakdown.[1] But his suspicion of the Hanoverian ministers was as deep as ever and the English minister,

1 Bisset, Mitchell, i, 233.

Mitchell, sharing this, asked in July for his recall.[1] Frederick was at the same time complaining bitterly of English weakness towards Russia and of her failure to supply a fleet for the Baltic.[2] Cumberland's arrival on 16 April - Frederick had consistently been pressing for his appointment as commander of the army of observation - did something to improve relations, but any reverse would be likely to produce further recriminations.[3]

(ii)

Frederick's defeat by the Austrians made it all the more essential that Cumberland should maintain his position against the French. Here the situation was threatening, if not critical. D'Estrées, in command of the French army, had over 60,000 troops, far outnumbering Cumberland, and was carrying out a slow, methodical offensive. The French advance forced Cumberland to retreat across the Weser from the strong defensive post at Bielefeld where he had intended to maintain himself, and urgent orders were sent from Paris on 25 June instructing D'Estrées to advance across the Weser in pursuit.

This was the unhappy position confronting the English cabinet when Pitt took office. The first task was to produce a reply to the repeated requests for help which Frederick had been making and which had so far gone unanswered. Time and again, he had asked the English cabinet to send a small squadron to the Baltic as a deterrent to the Russians, and during Pitt's first administration

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1 Bisset, Mitchell, i, 144, 148. Pol. Corr., xiv, 363, 380, 436; xv, 230, 215-6.
2 Pol. Corr., xv, 154-5, 193-4.
3 ibid., xiv, 363, 380, 397, 403.

hopes had been given that this might be done.[1] But the first decision of the new cabinet was that this request should not be granted; Mitchell was told of the decision on 5 July.[2] Instead, it was decided to explore a possibility which Frederick had suggested at the time Pitt had taken office the previous December, an amphibious operation on the French coast to draw their troops from Germany.[3] Frederick had never subsequently reverted to this idea, but on hearing that Pitt and Newcastle were likely to take office, he now did so again, perhaps in the realisation that Pitt would be attracted to this form of warfare. Frederick accepted that this would not be in addition to a Baltic squadron, but an alternative to one.[4] On 2 July, he made this suggestion to Mitchell, who at once transmitted it to Holdernesse. This was before the English cabinet had made its decision to reject a Baltic fleet in favour of an expedition to the French coast, though Mitchell's letter only arrived after the decision had been taken. In other words, the English cabinet was complying with Frederick's request, without yet realising the fact.

Though the cabinet had committed itself to no more than to look into the possibilities of a raid on the French coast, Pitt was anxious to push preparations ahead and to decide quickly on a definite objective. As soon as he took office, perhaps even before, he asked Sir Henry Erskine, who had acted as Bute's

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1 Pol. Corr., xiv, 297, 331, 344, 426, 446, 502; xv, 95, 143, 162, 193. Addit. MSS. 6814, f.81: Holdernesse to Mitchell, 11 March 1757.

2 Hist. MSS. Comm., Third Report, Appendix, Report on MSS of Marquess of Lansdowne (1872), p. 128.

3 Pol. Corr., xiv, 121.

4 He did not say this explicitly, but on both occasions when he suggested coastal expeditions, in Dec. 1756 and July 1757, he dropped the request for a Baltic fleet at the same time.

5 Pol. Corr., xv, 199.

representative in the negotiations over the formation of the administration, to enquire into the prospects of success of a raid on Rochefort. Erskine reported favourably.[1] The idea of Rochefort came from an engineer named Clarke, who had surveyed the place in 1754 and who recommended it to Pitt as a practicable objective for an attack.[2] On 7 July he ordered the Admiralty to make available transports for ten battalions of troops.[3] Two days later, Ligonier sounded out the King about the Rochefort project at Pitt's request and found him 'extremely pleased' by it.[4] All this was done on Pitt's initiative and without cabinet approval.

This approval was given on 14 July, at a meeting of Pitt, Newcastle, Hardwicke, Holdernesse and Anson. The meeting had been called to decide on a reply to a letter of 29 June from Mitchell which had arrived two days before. Frederick was still asking for a squadron for the Baltic: it was only four days later that he brought up the suggestion of a coastal expedition, and Mitchell's letter containing this new request had not arrived by 14 July. The cabinet decided

> to acquaint(Mitchell), under the greatest secrecy, with the intended expedition to the coasts of France (as formerly proposed by the King of Prussia) wherein near 8,000 land forces, besides marines and almost the whole fleet at home, will be employed, and, thereby, a powerful diversion may be reasonably expected.
>
> That nothing but an absolute impossibility (which must be submitted to, on all sides) would have prevented the King from sending a squadron to the Baltick, which impossibility appears, from the whole fleet being to be employed upon this expedition to the coasts of France.[5]

No definite objective for the expedition was decided upon. The decision was taken unanimously; Newcastle even claimed to Mitchell

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1 Chatham MSS. 30/8/31: Erskine to Pitt, 5 July 1757
2 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 43.
3 Williams, Life of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, i, 340
4 Chatham MSS. 30/8/48: Ligonier to Pitt, 9 July 1757. Walpole suggests that the King was far from enthusiastic. Memoirs, ii, 261.
5 Addit. MSS.32872, f.204: memorandum, 15 July 1757.

that the plan 'was imagined and prepared entre nous by me alone'.[1] This claim was quite unjustified: but Newcastle was eager to ingratiate himself with the King of Prussia, whom he felt distrusted him.

Within a fortnight, both ministers had decided to abandon the scheme on which they had agreed on 14 July. This was a direct result of the arrival on 24 July of a letter from Mitchell containing a new request from Frederick - that 6000 foot and 3000 horse should be sent from England to reinforce Cumberland. It was also made clear that Frederick would be unable to send the help to the observation army that he had promised. Frederick was keen for an early peace, and Mitchell thought that if England did not take vigorous measures in his support he might take action on his own to try to secure it.[2] Cumberland, on hearing that he would not have the expected help from Frederick, added his voice to that of the Prussian King in making a similar request, something he had hitherto refrained from doing because of the political embarrassment such a demand would cause to his supporters at home.[3]

Newcastle, so far, had also in the interests of political harmony held back from suggesting that British troops might be sent to Germany. He had told Joseph Yorke on 8 July: 'the season is far advanced; the two parties have their armies form'd; and I am afraid, it is too late, to think of strengthening our armies this campaign'.[4] But on 25 July, the day after the arrival of the joint request of Frederick and Cumberland, he wrote to Hardwicke:

> I found the Closet as much for sending troops as it has ever been against it. (The measure I always thought right).

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1 Addit. MSS.32872, f.214: Newcastle to Mitchell, 16 July 1757.
2 Pol. Corr., xv, 229-31. Addit. MSS. 32872, f.322 gives the date of arrival.
3 Addit. MSS.32872, f.342: Munchhausen to Newcastle, 26 July 1757.
4 ibid., f. 136: Newcastle to Yorke, 8 July 1757

> The possibility of doing, I still doubt. To be sure it comes recommended from the best quarter; and that without any suspicion of coming from hence. Such a reinforcement might certainly enable the Duke to do more than I am afraid, we should do, by any attempt on the French coasts. It would give spirit to the Protestant cause, to the Princes of the Empire and to the Dutch ... If this expedition is thought practicable, by the officers, who are to command it, it will be difficult to lay it aside in order to send the troops to the Duke's army; but if the intended expedition on the coast of France is thought hazardous, and almost impracticable, by the generals (as it certainly is, and as I am informed, by my Lord Anson, both Hawke and Knowles think it is) then (as I told the King) this measure may be more favourable.[1]

Newcastle had only one reservation. He feared that if 9000 troops were sent to Cumberland, the French might make an attempt on the English coast; and if this risk was thought too great, he wanted to send a squadron to the Baltic and financial help with which troops might be obtained. But he admitted to Hardwicke that in the interests of unity 'perhaps, prudence may make it adviseable to give up that opinion'.[2] Alternatively, horse alone might be sent from England, leaving the regular infantry free to combat any attempt on England that the French might make from Ostend or Nieuport.[3]

Almost certainly, the arrival of Mitchell's letter on 24 July persuaded Pitt, as well as Newcastle, to change his mind about the destination of the expedition. The evidence is incomplete, but Pitt behaved exactly as he was to do on subsequent occasions, appearing to concur with Newcastle's opinion only reluctantly and exerting pressure on Newcastle in order to make his own position seem distinctive. At the meeting on 14 July, it had been decided or understood that 'men are not to be furnished from hence'.[4] But

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1 Addit. MSS.32872, f.320: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 July 1757
2 ibid., f. 340-1: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 July 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32997, f.233-4: considerations, 24 July 1757
4 Bisset, Mitchell, i, 254.

on 27 July Newcastle wrote to Ashburnham:

> We had last night some little difference of opinion whether we should send 9000 men to reinforce the Duke upon a demand from the King of Prussia for that purpose. My Lord Hardwicke and I were strongly for it. Mr Pitt was against it, but in the most decent and friendly manner possible; and desires that opinion may not be followed if we don't think it right. I rather think that we shall send the troops, but whether we do or not, it will make no sort of uneasiness amongst us, and that is a great point.[1] In that case our expedition must be laid aside.

Pitt clearly left Newcastle with the impression that he would be prepared to send troops to Germany; and he did nothing to deny the rumours that were current that Germany was to be their destination.

On later occasions when he wanted to send a British force to Germany, Pitt behaved in the same way. His aim was to make Newcastle appear responsible, and Newcastle alone. Chesterfield warned him on 4 August that 'even should Mr Pitt be prevailed with to acquiesce in it ... he will justify himself to the public of the absurdity and unpopularity of the measure, and the Duke of Newcastle will groan single under the load of both'.[2] Calcraft thought on the other hand that Pitt's credit with his supporters was already so low that the sending of troops would hardly further impair it:

> There was last night a strong report of 10,000 men being rais'd and transports taking up. Some say for to carry troops to Germany, others for an expedition ... The Tory's have all declar'd off with Pitt, so now we'll send troops to the Duke or do anything. How ridiculous these gentlemen are. The body corporate of Chester have sent an express to Sir Richard Grosvenor not to give their gold box and freedom to Pitt and Legge, as they began to suspect them,[3] many other corporations talk of recalling theirs too.

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1 Addit. MSS.32872, f.358: Newcastle to Ashburnham, 27 July 1757
2 Letters of Chesterfield, v, 2236
3 Addit. MSS. 17493, f.80: Calcraft to Loudoun, 10 July 1757.

There is some evidence for Calcraft's view. The Contest felt obliged to devote an article to defending Pitt against accusations that in joining with Newcastle 'he who was adored for his upright professions, had veered about; deserted the cause of his country and adopted German measures'.[1] But Calcraft was resentful of Fox's political defeat at the hands of Pitt and Newcastle, and Hardwicke more accurately recognised the political dangers in agreeing to send troops when he told Royston that, in view of Pitt's previous commitments and pronouncements on the subject in the House of Commons, he thought it inconceivable that Pitt would support such a move.[2]

Having made it clear to Newcastle that he would not oppose the sending of troops, Pitt - as he regularly did when he wished to avoid responsibility for a decision he nevertheless favoured - increased his pressure on Newcastle in order to improve his bargaining position and to make his protestations of being overruled appear more plausible. Newcastle complained of a 'great alteration' in Pitt's behaviour; where he had formerly been cooperative and conciliatory over the question of help for Hanover, he was now 'very unreasonable and untoward.'[3] Newcastle lamented to George Stone:

> We had some difference of opinion as to the remedy amongst ourselves which passed the first night and the next morning with as much decency and apparent friendship as possible; but in the meeting after, sans rhyme et raison Pitt was in great emotion and complained of me extremely.[4]

Newcastle could never fathom Pitt's sudden changes of mood on these occasions.

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1 Contest, no. 34
2 Addit. MSS.35351, f.382: Hardwicke to Royston, 14 July 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32872, f.397: Newcastle to Ashburnham, 30 July 1757
4 Addit. MSS.32873, f.181: Newcastle to Stone, 20 Aug. 1757

As it was, Pitt's preparations were unnecessary. A sudden change in the European situation meant that the troops were never sent. On 2 August came the news that D'Estrées had defeated Cumberland in a three-day skirmish at Hastenbeck. The losses were small, but Cumberland had lost his chance of halting his retreat to the coast and he abandoned Hameln, Minden and the city of Hanover. Hastenbeck made it pointless to think of reinforcing Cumberland from England: the King, Newcastle, Pitt and Hardwicke were all agreed that Cumberland's fate would be decided before any troops could reach him.[1]

Pitt no longer had to justify a British reinforcement for Cumberland. But the news of Hastenbeck, in removing this problem, created another. The danger to the Electorate was greatly increased. Already before the outcome of the battle was known Newcastle reported to Dupplin that 'the King complains very heavily of being abandon'd by us'.[2] On 5 August the King told Newcastle that he was determined to try to obtain a separate peace for Hanover. Both ministers, alarmed that such a step might lead to the loss of the Prussian alliance for England, were determined to do everything possible to deter the King, though they would not advise him in his electoral capacity. Newcastle warned him that he should expect no help from England in procuring any indemnity for Hanover after a separate peace and Pitt admitted that he would 'do anything, that was practicable to assist the King, and divert this stroke'.[3] Immediate help for Hanover was essential if a Hanoverian peace was to be averted. The day after the news of Hastenbeck arrived, Pitt agreed to give £400,000 when Parliament

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1 Addit. MSS.32872, f.478-81: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 7 Aug 1757
2 Addit. MSS.32872, f.415: Newcastle to Dupplin, 2 Aug 1757
3 ibid., f.467: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 6 Aug 1757

met to the King as Elector, in addition to subsidies of £300,000 to Hesse-Cassel and £500,000 to Prussia.[1] A week later, in an attempt to avoid a separate peace, he agreed that £100,000 should be given at once to Hanover from the vote of credit, and he also took the initiative in proposing that a present should be made to the Landgrave.[2]

Pitt recognised that these measures put at risk his popularity and consistency, already seriously imperilled by his coalition with Newcastle.[3] He told Legge, after being feted in the City:

> that that was great honour to us, but that we must do what was right and I began to see the situation of affairs was such, that the King would stand in need of some immediate assistance, and that therefore we must depart from the rigidness of our declarations.[4]

He was therefore careful to explain his support for Hanover to his political allies. He told Bute that though Newcastle, Hardwicke and Holdernesse had advocated the sending of troops to Cumberland, only his negative had prevented it;[5] and the support for Hanover and Hesse was 'a concession I have judged advisable to make upon the grounds of a fatal necessity, to the best of my understanding quite irresistible'.[6] This attitude gained Pitt the support for which he hoped. Grenville accepted the plea of absolute necessity and Temple replied in the same terms:[7]

> As to the pecuniary part of your epistle to me, you who are on the spot are certainly the best judge of the reasons and necessities which call for such a deviation of plan: a battle lost and a whole electorate lost is no doubt new matter.[8]

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1 Addit. MSS.32872, f.428: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Aug 1757
2 ibid., f.492: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 Aug 1757
3 P. Langford, 'William Pitt and public opinion, 1757', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxxxviii (1973), pp.74-5.
4 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 166.
5 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p. 128.
6 The Grenville Papers, i, 206.
7 Chatham Corr., i, 243-5.
8 Chatham MSS., 30/8/61: Temple to Pitt, 14 Aug 1757

Only Bute issued a warning. He rejoiced in Pitt's refusal to give way over the troops, but added:

> I am not quite so satisfied with the Duke of Newcastle as you seem to be; his declarations about avoiding any further continental operations were formerly very strong, and he knows the idea of sending troops abroad is totally inconsistent with the being of this administration... One improper concession may prove fatal to us all.[1]

Without responsibility for the war, Bute could still afford to express the dogmatic views characteristic of opposition.

Had Pitt adhered to his view of 24 July to 2 August, he would clearly have had very considerable difficulty in retaining the support of Leicester House. But the news of Hastenbeck enabled him to return to his original plan of an expedition to Rochefort. On 2 August, after the news of Cumberland's defeat had arrived, Captain Clarke and a French pilot were examined about the practicability of Rochefort and their answers confirmed the suitability of the target.[2] Two days later the cabinet, after listening to the views of Ligonier and the military and naval commanders, decided to go ahead with the expedition.[3] Newcastle was quite happy with the decision, especially as it was agreed that the expedition should return by the end of September, a point about which Hardwicke, fearing the French would try to invade if they saw an opportunity, was particularly insistent.[4]

Newcastle's main concern was that the expedition should leave and return as quickly as possible. On 13 August, he expressed his concern to Pitt that the transports were taking so long to prepare.[5] As time elapsed, Newcastle's worries grew. By 20 August he had

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1 Chatham Corr., i, 301: 6 Aug 1757 (misdated 11 March 1758)
2 Gentleman's Magazine (1757), xxvii, 441. Addit. MSS.32872, f.413: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 2 Aug 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32997, f.241: 4 Aug 1757
4 Addit. MSS.32872, f.249: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Aug 1757
ibid., f.442: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 Aug 1757
5 Chatham Corr., i, 241-2

received intelligence that the French were already assembling 25,000 troops from Germany at Cleves, in order to be closer to Normandy or Brittany, where the English landing was expected to take place.[1] This news was by no means reassuring: the French troops would even more easily be able to march to Ostend or Nieuport from Cleves, and from there they might make an attempt on the English coast. As the risk of invasion appeared to increase, Newcastle came to hope that it might be possible either to cancel the ecpedition or to divert it to Ostend. He wrote in his 'memorandums' on 29 August:

> To consider whether the expedition should proceed in this advanced season, and stormy weather ....
> ? Send expedition to Ostend. Open the sluices and keep it that way.[2]

Ostend would serve a double purpose. It would be a direct stroke against any invasion preparations the French might be making, and it might also persuade the Dutch to lend some support to the English cause. The most reliable intelligence from France said that what was dreaded most was that Holland would join with England in order to prevent the cession of Ostend and Nieuport to France.[3] Newcastle wanted to exploit this discontent by making a formal protest in Holland about the French occupation of the garrisons of Ostend and Nieuport, though Joseph Yorke warned him that such a protest would not be enough to induce the Dutch to take a part in the war: its value would be 'rather ... to keep the cause alive, ... than to bring on an immediate step'.[4]

Pitt rejected Newcastle's idea of diverting the expedition

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1 Addit. MSS.32873, f.115: Grimaldi to D'Abreu (translation), recd. 20 Aug 1757
2 Addit. MSS.32997, f.248: memorandums, 29 Aug 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32872, f.422: intelligence, 3 Aug 1757
4 Addit. MSS.32873, f.237: Yorke to Newcastle, 23 Aug 1757

to Ostend and of trying to involve the Dutch. He agreed to the making of the protest, but only after Yorke had made it clear that he expected no results. His attitude was

> that if it were their inclination, it is not in their power, to be of the least use to the common cause, and that any attempt by us[1] to rouse Holland would bring immediate ruin on her.

This would involve the transfer of the European diversion to Flanders, which he was above all keen to avoid. He also rejected Newcastle's alternative policy of cancelling the expedition. Newcastle's efforts were notably irresolute. He suggested on 5 September that Winchilsea's view - that he did not regret that the weather had delayed the transports - 'might not have been much in the wrong'. Pitt replied that he would defend the measure of the expedition, at the hazard of his life'. 'Whoever stopt it, should answer for it'.[2] Three days later, the squadron left Spithead for Rochefort.

Newcastle's task in trying to divert or cancel the expedition was made the more difficult by Pitt's skilful political use of the episode. A rumour was current that Pitt alone had prevailed against the rest of the cabinet, all of whom had favoured sending the expedition not to Rochefort but to Germany, to help Cumberland.[3] Newcastle complained to Hardwicke on 3 September:

> Many sensible people begin to be uneasy about our expedition ... But Pitt is deaf; and in our present circumstance, especially after what has been insinuated with relation to Hanover, I[4] don't know, who dares take upon him, to stop its going.

Neither Newcastle nor Hardwicke at any stage even suggested that

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1 Addit. MSS.32873, f.173: Newcastle to Yorke, 19 Aug 1757
2 Addit. MSS.35417, f.45: Jones to Hardwicke, 5 Sept 1757
Addit. MSS.32997, f.257: business with Mansfield, 7 Sept 1757
3 Dodington, Journal, p. 368. Almon, Anecdotes, i, 264. Almon says this happened after the expedition had returned from Rochefort, Dodington before.
4 Addit. MSS.32873, f.434: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Sept 1757

the expedition should be sent to Germany; but in view of Pitt's earlier and equally inaccurate claim to Bute that in the period before Hastenbeck only he had prevented the sending of troops to Cumberland, it is hard to believe that these new rumours were not deliberately floated by Pitt. They served him well with his own supporters and removed any anxieties that in joining with Newcastle he had agreed to support 'German measures'.

Pitt took the same care to insure himself politically in his treatment of the militia. The attempt to compile lists of men liable for service in accordance with the act had given rise to serious rioting in several counties, based largely on the misunderstanding that some form of conscription was intended. The embarrassment that this caused Pitt was well put by Hardwicke:

> Some people are in danger of being thought as bad Judges of what is popular, as of what is right; for this very popular bill turns out to be the most unpopular measure, that I ever knew ... This is a law, which it is impossible to cram down the People's throats by force. You can never raise a militia by the compulsion of a standing army; in order to it you may raise a Rebellion, in the view of raising a militia to suppress a Rebellion.[1]

If the discontent was only local, Pitt wanted further attempts to be made to try to put the act into effect: but if it was national, he was quite prepared to give it up.[2] At the same time, he blamed the riots on the lords lieutenant and the justices of the peace for their failure to explain the purpose of the act.[3] Whenever something with which he was identified went wrong, he invariably threw out accusations of secret attempts at subversion, and he claimed now that 'the people had been inflamed by art and

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1 Addit. MSS.35353, f.222-3: Hardwicke to C. Yorke, 8 Sept 1757
2 Addit. MSS.32997, f.257: business with Mansfield, 7 Sept 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32873, f.547: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 10 Sept 1757

management'.[1]

In the event of having to confess defeat, this would give Pitt an excuse for placing the responsibility on the shoulders of those who disliked the act. Newcastle realised this, and to escape this responsibility was his main concern. He wrote to Hardwicke: 'Lord Granville says, this Bill cannot be forced down. It must be given up. That may be so, but I would not have it imputed to us'.[2] Ths position was almost as embarrassing for Newcastle as it was for Pitt; Barrington spoke of the 'dilemma in the minds of those who do not approve the militia on the one hand, or a Victory of the mob over the Legislature on the other'.[3] Newcastle insisted that his friends in Middlesex and Nottinghamshire should hold meetings in accordance with the act, while telling them that he liked the militia no more than he ever had done.[4] Both Newcastle and Pitt had their different reasons for supporting a policy of punishing the ringleaders of the riots and showing leniency to the others.[5] The entire episode was one which they would both have gladly avoided.

All the elements which were characteristic of Pitt's subsequent conduct of the war were in evidence during these first two months in the life of the coalition. Right from the start, Pitt was prepared to take decisions fundamentally opposed to his earlier commitments, but in doing so he took every precaution to avoid endangering his principal sources of support. Most significant is the crucial fact - and the evidence for this has

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1 Addit. MSS.35353, f.227: C. Yorke to Hardwicke, 15 Sept 1757
2 Addit. MSS.32873, f.434: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Sept 1757
3 Addit. MSS.35606, f.235: Barrington to Royston, 6 Sept 1757
4 Addit. MSS.32997, f.321: memorandum, 3 July 1757. Addit. MSS. 32872, ff.19-25.
5 Addit. MSS.32874, f. 84: Newcastle to Sutton, 16 Sept 1757

escaped students of the period - that Pitt was ready to accept, and was indeed taking active though concealed steps to promote, the sending of British troops to Germany almost from the outset of the coalition: only the news of Hastenbeck delayed the volte-face which eventually occurred in the following year. But for this news, Pitt would doubtless have shown further evidence of the political skill he displayed so often on future occasions, presenting what was in fact the formulation and execution of his own policies as the reluctant and inevitable acceptance of those of his partners in the coalition. In a similar way, the assistance to Hanover and Hesse was traded off against the decision to send an expedition to the French coast, and the application of the militia laws was deliberately left in question, with public unpopularity to be weighed against parliamentary pressures. In reconciling his political needs with the policies he wished to follow, Pitt was already demonstrating how far the art of the possible could be carried.

(iii)

Newcastle had left these strategic decisions almost entirely in Pitt's hands. Late in July, he had wished troops to be sent to Cumberland, but had not been prepared to endanger the unity of the coalition by pressing this point. A month later, he had easily allowed himself to be overruled when he timidly suggested the diversion or cancellation of the expedition. He would have even dropped his suggestion of a protest to Holland if Pitt had opposed it. He was ready to agree to any reasonable proposal of Pitt's over the militia, provided there was no risk of blame attaching to him. It is clear that he was concerned above all not with the conduct of the war, but with the task of holding the coalition together by ironing out any early difficulties which might arise.

In carrying out this task, the two main elements, apart from Pitt, were the King and Leicester House. With the former, there were few problems. As in 1746, the King accepted his defeat and was prepared to give the administration a fair trial. Waldegrave told Devonshire that his mind 'seems tolerably easy'. His 'bitter invectives' about the lack of help for Hanover were directed at English ministers in general rather than Pitt and Newcastle in particular.[1] From the start, he was 'extremely civil' to Pitt.[2] He was even reconciled with Holdernesse.[3] With Leicester House, Newcastle's difficulties were greater. Henry Legge, unhappy at the way in which he had come into the administration, aimed to substitute himself for Pitt as the leading Leicester House politician. After Pitt's decision to help Hanover, Legge appears to have thought of trying to form some sort of an opposition round Bute and his friend Halifax, Newcastle's efforts to satisfy Halifax having met with a discouraging response from Pitt.[4] This came to nothing, and he now concentrated on trying to persuade Newcastle that he was more highly regarded at Leicester House than Pitt. In this he had more success.[5] This plan involved taking Newcastle into his confidence: there would be no problems from Legge. Bute himself was a different matter. His efforts had been instrumental in the formation of the coalition, and he expected to have his views on both policy and patronage taken seriously into account. He was suspicious at the extent of help for Hanover and resentful of Newcastle's refusal to antagonise the King by attempting to

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1 Devonshire MSS.393.1: Waldegrave to Devonshire, 19 July 1757
Addit. MSS.32997, f.263-5: memorandums, 13 Sept 1757
2 Addit. MSS.32872, f.116: Newcastle to Devonshire, 7 July 1757
3 ibid., f.222: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 16 July 1757
4 Addit. MSS.36793 (Register of Bute Correspondence), f.20: Legge to Bute, 17 Aug 1757
5 Addit. MSS.32873, f.187: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 Oct 1757

replace two of the Prince's household with two of Bute's own friends.[1] But for the moment, Bute was prepared to reserve his position and to raise no unnecessary difficulties. Newcastle was successfully keeping the coalition united, leaving to Pitt the task of conducting the war.

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1 Addit. MSS.32873, f.187: Newcastle to Stone, 20 Aug 1757

CLOSTERSEVEN

(i)

The promising start to the coalition, threatened first by Kolin, was imperilled a second time by news which arrived in England on 17 September.

On 11 August, despairing of the prospect for the army of observation after Hastenbeck, the King ordered Cumberland to try, if at all possible, to make a separate peace for Hanover, and gave him full powers to conclude an agreement with the French commander.[1] This was a definite extension of the orders of 30 March, which had envisaged the possibility of a retreat to Stade 'in case of the utmost extremity', but had not raised the question of a separate peace for Hanover.[2] On 21 August Richelieu, who had assumed command of the French army, rejected an overture from Cumberland for a neutrality for Hanover and a suspension of arms. Cumberland remained determined to obtain terms, and told his father the next day that he would get the most advantageous conditions he could.[3] Meanwhile his retreat continued. He abandoned Verden, which Richelieu reached on the 29th, and six days later the French established their headquarters at Closterseven. Here on 11 September Cumberland signed a convention for the suspension of arms, negotiated at the King's request through Lynar, the Danish envoy. Half the Hanoverians were to be quartered round Stade, the rest were to cross the Elbe. The troops of Hesse, Gotha and Brunswick were to return to their own states where they were to be disbanded.

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1 Charteris, Cumberland, pp.289-90.
2 ibid., pp. 252-4, 322-7.
3 Addit. MSS.32873, f.206: Cumberland to the King (extrait), 22 Aug 1757

Before hearing of this agreement, the King had changed his mind. On 13 September he told Cumberland that nothing must be concluded without his express orders and on the 16th he for the first time called on Cumberland to consider how a march on Magdeburg, for which the King of Prussia was pressing, might be effected.[1] Next day, when the news of the convention arrived, the King 'acted surprise' and immediately claimed it was against his orders - which would have been true if Cumberland had received the instructions of 13 and 16 September before he had signed the convention.[2]

(ii)

Cumberland's action was on behalf of the King as Elector only. He told Mitchell that 'with infinite concern, the King found himself as Elector, obliged to endeavour to extricate himself, as such' from the unequal struggle against the French army.[3] The English ministers had a very imperfect knowledge of what was going on. They knew that it was the King's intention to try to make a separate peace in his electoral capacity, and that he would try three channels - through Copenhagen, Vienna and a direct approach to the French commander - to achieve this.[4] However much they disapproved of this aim, they could not openly interfere in the affairs of Hanover and their main concern at first was to ensure that the King of Prussia was not left in ignorance of the transactions.[5] It was only just before the convention was signed that they discovered that negotiations were in an advanced stage;

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1 Charteris, Cumberland, pp.302-3
2 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 59.
3 Ellis, Original Letters illustrative of English History, iv, 363
4 Addit. MSS.32872, f.465: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 6 Aug 1757
5 Addit. MSS.32873, f.52-3: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 13 Aug 1757

Pitt had his information from Newcastle, and Waddington has pointed out that there is no mention of the affairs of Hanover in Newcastle's correspondence until 6 September.[1] They at once assured the King that they would do whatever they could for him.[2]

It was again Pitt who decided the policy of the English administration. It was only on 10 September that he heard from Newcastle that Cumberland's negotiations were likely soon to be concluded.[3] He realised that all England could do was to dissociate herself at once from 'this perfidy'; only by this means might English influence be able to put a stop to the proposed convention. The blame for the project he attached entirely to the 'black machinations of His Majesty's ministers' and to the 'extreme tenderness of their master for that country'.[4] He told Newcastle he was 'convinced that the King's inclination was with his Hanover ministers', though he admitted that 'his intention was not'.[5]

Pitt took immediate action. He insisted that Holdernesse should write to the King of Prussia assuring him of full English support.[6] He told the King that any separate negotiation, far from helping the Electorate, would be fatal for it - a clear indication that no help in securing an indemnity would be forthcoming from England.[7] A declaration was drawn up on 14 September assuring Frederick that no convention might be signed would have

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1 Waddington, La Guerre de Sept Ans, i, 491.
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 180.
3 ibid., 172-3.
4 Egerton MSS.3432: Pitt to Holdernesse, 10 Sept 1757
5 Addit. MSS.32997, f.343: leads for Hardwicke, 16 Feb 1758
6 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 173.
7 Addit. MSS.32997, f.263: memorandums, 13 Sept 1757

the approval of England and that England's policy would in no way be influenced by any such convention.[1] When the news arrived on 17 September, he maintained a distinct English policy by refusing to acquiesce in the King's use of his son as a scapegoat. The King ordered Holdernesse to acquaint Cumberland with his disapproval of the convention on the grounds that he had not been authorised to conclude it. The draft of this message in the Newcastle papers contains a marginal note by Pitt: 'he had a full power, and this part must be alter'd'.[2] Even Cumberland and his friends were obliged to admit, with some reluctance, that Pitt was behaving entirely honourably.[3] By this means he left it open for the administration to continue to exert an influence on the King and the Hanoverian ministry.

Newcastle, in contrast, was compromising and negative in his approach. He took the line after Hastenbeck that Hanover had been 'brought into this danger, in this instance, singly on account of our English quarrel'; if the King was determined to make his separate peace, 'who can blame him?'[4] This was the line of least resistance, avoiding either a clash with the King or a dispute with Pitt over how Hanover might be helped by the English ministry. Compared with this, the risk to the Prussian alliance was seen only as a minor obstacle. On 3 August Newcastle reported to Hardwicke a conversation with the King:

> His Majesty was calm, said, 'He must do the best he could: he had stood it as long as he could and he must get out of it as well as he could, that he had taken his part' -

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1 Addit. MSS.35417, f.61: Jones to Hardwicke, 15 Sept 1757
2 Addit. MSS.32874, f.163.
3 Bed. Corr., ii, 277. Addit. MSS.51382: Devonshire to Fox, (2 Oct 1757)
4 Addit. MSS.32872, f.443: Newcastle to Ashburnham, 4 Aug 1757; ibid., f.445: Newcastle to Campion, 4 Aug 1757

> which I found was to make his peace, - 'that he would take the best care he could of the Landgrave of Hesse, The Dukes of Wolfenbuttel and Botha'. I just mentioned the King of Prussia; the King said, 'He could do nothing more for him; that he would acquaint His Prussian Majesty with what he should be necessitated to do, and that, if we here would do anything further for the King of Prussia, he should have no objection to it'. I thought when I could offer nothing for the King's support it would be very improper for me to say anything against any measures His Majesty should take for his own security.[1]

On Cumberland's return, Newcastle's position was again dictated by his wish to avoid a split between Pitt and the King. The King hoped that by censuring his son he would be able to escape responsibility for the treaty. He received him with extreme coldness, and Cumberland resigned his regiment and all his appointments. Newcastle initially hoped to use Cumberland as a scapegoat: he had been 'most notoriously to blame, and that from the beginning'.[2] Hardwicke warned him, 'don't take things too strongly against the Duke', and Pitt soon made it clear that he would not identify himself with any scheme to place the responsibility on Cumberland. Newcastle therefore abandoned his earlier line and tried instead to avoid any discussion of the awkward question of Cumberland's authorisation. On his suggestion, no mention was made of the matter in Holdernesse's dispatch to Cumberland, which confined itself to expressing surprise that he had failed to wait for ratification.[3] When the subject was discussed in cabinet, he treated it in a way designed to give the minimum of offence either to the King or to Pitt:

> The Duke had ... certainly a full power; and there certainly did appear a very strong disposition to conclude a separate treaty; but it is as certain that the King never meant, or

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 161
2 ibid., 181
3 Addit. MSS.32874, f.165: Holdernesse to Cumberland, 20 Sept 1757

> intended, to conclude such a convention as this; wherein neither his troops, nor his country, have that relief, which was proposed by this negotiation.[1]

Cumberland's return and resignation did not see the end of Newcastle's difficulties in trying to steer a middle course between the King and Pitt. The situation was complicated by the fact that though the King claimed that Cumberland had acted without authority and Pitt that he had had full powers, it was the former who wished to adhere to the convention while the latter was 'very violent' for breaking it.[2] As Frederick pointed out to the King, there was a ready-made excuse for this, provided by the French disarmament of the Hessian contingent in contravention of the terms of the treaty.[3] The King was determined not to ratify the convention, but wished to use it as a basis for the negotiation of better terms. There was soon a prospect that this might be possible. The position in Europe rapidly took a more favourable turn. Richelieu, despite pressure from both Versailles and Vienna, refused to move on to the offensive. Bevern, commanding the main Prussian force in defence of Silesia, forced the Austrians to abandon their operations against him. The Russians retreated to Courland after an indecisive battle with Lehwaldt's Prussian force, and the Swedish army refused to advance on Berlin without French help. On 10 October, the King told his Hanoverian ministers that he was prepared to renew negotiations with France through Austria for a separate peace or agreement, provided that France would make no further demands or exactions in Hanover and would not insist that Hanover or any of her allies should take any part in the war against

1 Addit. MSS.32874, f.323: Newcastle to Mansfield, 27 Sept 1757
2 Torrens, History of Cabinets, ii, 422.
3 Pol. Corr., xv, 424.

Prussia.[1] At the same time, in case these negotiations failed, the Hanoverian ministry should consider whether the army might be put into operation again in order to fall on the French quarters and magazines.

These preparations were to be carried out secretly. What the King most dreaded was that the French, suspecting that the convention would not be ratified, might without warning renew hostilities against the Hanoverian army.[2] Hardwicke realised that this was the King's main concern and thought that the orders for secret preparations were a smokescreen to cover the attempt to obtain better terms; the King knew perfectly well that the Hanoverian ministers would never advise breaking the convention or putting the preparations into effect.[3] Hardwicke was right in thinking that a separate peace was still the King's first aim: wrong that he did not see military preparations as a genuine alternative. On 5 October orders were sent to the Hanoverian ministers to attack the French winter quarters in Hanover without waiting for further instructions or authorisation from England, if they thought that the scheme was practicable and if any Prussian help might be forthcoming.[4] The tenor of these instructions suggests strongly that the King was sincere in putting forward this idea, and his subsequent conduct confirms this impression.

This conduct was largely the result of the pressure exerted by Pitt. Pitt wanted orders to be sent to General Sporcken, who, following Cumberland's recall, was in command of the army, to fall

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1 Addit. MSS.32875, f.7: King to Ministry at Stade (10 Oct 1757)
2 ibid., ff.1-6: King to Ministry at Stade, 10 Oct 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32874, ff.487-9: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 Oct 1757
4 ibid., f.450-1: King to Ministry at Stade, 5 Oct 1757

on the French at once and without any warning that the convention was to be broken. He treated it 'as a jest to doubt whether the King has a right to do it; and as much so whether it should be done or not', while the King kept his options open by claiming he would order Sporcken's army into operation 'if I can'. Devonshire recognised that he was in a genuine dilemma, torn between risking the destruction of his troops if the convention was broken, and the discontinuance of financial support for the troops if it was not.[1] Predictably, Newcastle took a middle line between the King's caution (there is no means of knowing whether, like Hardwicke, he thought the King was insincere) and Pitt's wish for immediate action. He said of Pitt's view that the convention should be broken at once and without warning: 'that is going fast. But ... a spirit shew'd now, might have a good effect'.[2] He wanted to break the convention, but also to make an advance declaration to Richelieu of the intention to do so.[3]

The difficulty of occupying this middle ground increased as Pitt put more and more pressure on the King for positive orders to his Hanoverian ministers. He objected to the instructions of 5 October, which made action against France conditional on Prussian success.[4] He stressed the parliamentary advantages of being able to say in the King's Speech that the convention had been broken.[5] At a cabinet meeting on 7 October, he successfully advocated that no financial help should be given to the Hanoverian army until it was actually in motion against the French; but once it was, a

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1 Devonshire MSS. 260.247: 11 Oct 1757
2 Addit. MSS.35417, f.83: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Oct 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32875, f.36: Newcastle to Mansfield, 11 Oct 1757
4 ibid., f.40: Pitt to Newcastle, 11 Oct 1757
5 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 194.

definite promise of help was made.[1] This was exactly what he had wanted, and the consequent minute of the meeting was composed by Pitt himself rather than Holdernesse.[2] The King, still undecided, was annoyed by this use of the cabinet to give weight and sanction to Pitt's own policy. He had hoped that the English ministers could be persuaded to pay the Hanoverian troops even while they remained inactive.[3] But Pitt refused to give ground on this issue. Newcastle had raised no objections to the original minute, but when the King pleaded with him the desperate state of the Hanoverian finances he approached Pitt, who would not even consider departing from the decision of 7 October, and Newcastle was obliged to admit unhappily, 'I own I think there is a great deal in what he says'.[4]

But, to Newcastle's relief, the King moved rapidly towards Pitt's view. He was alarmed by reports that Frederick was negotiating a separate peace with the French, and thought it necessary to insist on an assurance from Frederick that if the convention were broken he would listen to no peace overtures. By 12 October Newcastle thought that provided he was satisfied on this point, the King would be prepared to order the resumption of hostilities.[6] The following day he told Newcastle that 'if he thought his Hanover ministers, would have the courage to act, he should be easier'- a clear indication that when he had earlier consulted them, to produce action had not been his expectation or intention.[7] He now sent Munchhausen (from London), the brother

1 Addit. MSS.32874, f.475: cabinet minute, 7 Oct 1757. Cf. Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 65
2 Addit. MSS.35870, f.284: cabinet minute, 7 Oct 1757
3 Newcastle (Clumber) MSS., NeC.3156: Duchess of Newcastle to Lincoln, 24 Sept 1757
4 Addit. MSS.32875, f.230: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 Oct 1757
5 Addit. MSS.6815: Holdernesse to Mitchell, 14 Oct 1757
6 Addit. MSS.32875, f.57: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 Oct 1757
7 ibid., f.125: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Oct 1757

of the Hanoverian President of Finances, to Stade to press the case for a renewed offensive. Munchhausen had consistently been extremely critical of the convention and his task was to persuade the ministry of the advantages of breaking it.[1] Any remaining difficulties were renewed when Frederick overwhelmingly defeated the French on 5 November at Rossbach, and assuming that the convention would immediately be broken turned to give help to Silesia. There was no longer any chance that the French might be able to detach the Hessian and Brunswicker troops to their cause. The Hanoverian force concentrated and on 16 November the Council of Regency urged the new commander, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, to take up his position as soon as possible. Looking back on the decision the following year, the King characteristically blamed not himself but his Hanoverian ministers and their readiness to be influenced by French counsels for the long delay in resuming operations.[2] In reality, had it not been for Pitt's decisive attitude both before and after the convention was signed, Hanover might well have been at peace with France.

(iii)

Cumberland's disgrace increased Newcastle's difficulties by altering the balance of the coalition in Pitt's favour and against that of the King. Hardwicke warned Newcastle:

> I have no scruple to declare that I think him (Pitt) extremely ambitious and that his aim is supreme ministerial power, whereof he may possibly fancy that he sees a nearer prospect from what has unfortunately happened with regard to the Duke of Cumberland. 3

Cumberland's resignation provided Pitt with an opportunity to secure a more congenial commander of the army and at the same time

1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 60.
2 Ward, Great Britain and Hanover, p. 62.
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 38.

to strengthen his links with Leicester House. Bute wanted Ligonier appointed to the command of the army and the First Regiment of Guards, with Lord George Sackville succeeding him as Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance.[1] Sackville's appointment would enable Leicester House to be 'in on the war policy'.[2]

Pitt immediately took up Bute's request. This set the seal on the renewal of their friendship. There was now no risk of Pitt being supplanted by Legge as the chief politician of Leicester House. Any real chance of this had disappeared when Pitt agreed that Halifax should be called to the cabinet, an arrangement for which Bute had been working and which Legge, as a friend of Halifax, had no choice but to try to facilitate.[3] This agreement deprived Legge of any opportunity of building up a Leicester House faction based on himself and Halifax rather than Pitt. Newcastle could now afford to treat him with less respect and to use him in the role he had originally envisaged, to incur the unpopularity of drawing up the plan for raising the supplies and explaining it to the House of Commons.[4] Legge's dejection of the early days of the administration returned, and Newcastle's satisfaction with his position grew proportionately.[5] Determined not to be used by Newcastle as a scapegoat, Legge declared publicy that Newcastle was

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1 Addit. MSS.32875, f.226: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 Oct 1757

2 R. Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: a Story of the British Army, 1702-1770 (Oxford, 1958), p. 235.

3 Addit. MSS.32874, f.262: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 24 Sept 1757

ibid, f.325: Newcastle to Legge, 27 Sept 1757. Bute MSS., Legge to Bute, 17 Aug 1757

4 Addit. MSS.32874, f.480: Dupplin to Newcastle, 8 Oct 1757. White advised Newcastle that 'considering the temper of the people your Grace should throw it upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer to propose a tax plan, subject to your Grace's controul; that ... it may rather seem to be with your concurrence than to have arisen originally your own motion'.

5 Bute MSS., Ralph to Bute, 30 Sept 1757; Newcastle to Dupplin, 28 Sept 1757

proposing to misuse the vote of credit to pay for provisions required by the army after the signing of the convention; but his plans to make himself the lynch-pin at Leicester House had collapsed, and he 'very handsomely' signed the 'necessary warrant'.[1]

If Newcastle could pay less attention to Legge, he had to pay correspondingly more to the combined requests of Pitt and Bute. His first hope was to use Cumberland's disgrace as the occasion for a reconciliation between the King and Leicester House. He suggested to Hardwicke: 'why should not the King take this opportunity to send himself for the Prince of Wales and make a strong union there?'[2] For a time, relations between the two courts did improve: Chesterfield said in November that they had been much better since Cumberland's retirement.[3] The King's resentment against his son, inflamed by Munchhausen and the Hanoverian advisers, was slow to abate.[4] But the King's severity to his son sprang from his concern to justify his own position rather than from any genuine surprise at his son's action.[5] Hardwicke was confident that 'the Resentment against the Duke ... will alter pretty soon afterH.R.H.'s return'.[5] It was not a sound basis on which to build hopes that the King, having abandoned his son, would adopt a new and lasting attitude towards his grandson. Lord Hervey had always spoken favourably to Queen Caroline of her son, whom she professed to despise, knowing 'in family quarrels how natural it was for a suspended affection to revive';[6] and the same sort of policy was the only realistic one for Newcastle to follow.

1 Addit. MSS.32874, f.397: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 1 Oct 1757
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 181.
3 Letters of Chesterfield, v, 2264.
4 Bisset, Mitchell, ii, 5. Addit. MSS.17493, f.147: Calcraft to Home, 26 Feb 1758.
5 Addit. MSS.32874, f.410: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 Oct 1757
6 Hervey, Memoirs, p. 307.

To provide an opportunity of satisfying Leicester House and to try to exploit the common ground between Pitt, Bute and the King, Newcastle had to ensure that Cumberland's resignation was accepted without appearing to do so. As Hardwicke pointed out, if he supported the resignation, he would be represented as obstructing a reconciliation between the King and his son; if he tried to prevent it, Leicester House and 'your new friends in the ministry' would be offended.[1] His position was made no easier by the fact that the King, while outwardly as cold as ever towards his son, soon made it clear to him that he 'could not do without him' and that he wanted him to withdraw his resignation from all his appointments.[2] Newcastle therefore tackled the King on 19 October, urging him to make an immediate appointment of a Commander-in-Chief:

> I hope his Majesty would forgive me, for presuming to say a little upon a subject, just touch'd upon yesterday.
> The Duke - The necessity of having a Commander-in-Chief, in time of war, and danger.
> That the Duke can't be. H.R.H. would not come back at present; neither would his Majesty think of calling him back ... God forbid, that anybody should wish ever to prevent a reconciliation between the King and the Duke. We should always see it with pleasure. It would not be the further off for that ... Nobody ever could entertain a thought of desiring that the Duke should be removed.
> But this is H.R.H.'s own act; Discourag'd by the King; but the appointing a Commander is the necessary Consequence of his own act.
> Things ought not to be so managed, as to cover H.R.H. at the King's expence, if he has done wrong.
> The King must support his dignity and authority as King and father.[3]

The King realised that Newcastle's claim to want nothing more than a reconciliation was insincere. He was at first 'very negative and

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1 Addit. MSS.32875, ff.65-6: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 13 Oct 1757
2 Addit. MSS.34713 (Astle Historical Collections), f.89: A Justification of HRH the Duke's Conduct. Cf. Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 250-1.
3 Addit. MSS.32875, f.191: memorandums for the King, 19 Oct 1757

said many disagreeable things': 'that if he had a mind to be reconciled to his son, nobody had anything to do with it'. But he soon consented to the appointments of Ligonier and Sackville. Newcastle was greatly relieved: Pitt was 'most violent, and would certainly have gone to extremities' if the Command-in-Chief had been kept open for much longer.[1]

Though the immediate danger had been averted, Newcastle's efforts to bring the two courts closer together earned the gratitude of neither side. The King complained of Pitt's influence in the administration and Newcastle had to assure him:

> My connection with Mr Pitt, necessary for the King's service.
> Mr Pitt greatly well disposed.[2]
> Preserve his confidence in me.

Bute was also complaining. A few days after his success over Ligonier and Sackville, Newcastle wrote after a cold reception at Leicester House:

> It is too much to be the first object of the resentment of the Duke, etc., because I have been able to establish a ministry he does not like and that he thinks Leicester House does, and to be treated there in this impertinent manner.[3]

But Pitt himself had no such criticisms of his colleague. He recognised both the importance and the difficulty of Newcastle's role with the King, encouraging him by thanking him profusely for his part in securing the appointment of Ligonier and Sackville, assuring Hardwicke of his satisfaction 'in the highest degree' of his fellow-minister.[4] He readily agreed that Mansfield should be called to cabinet meetings, a point to which Newcastle attached

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1 Addit. MSS.32875, f.197: Newcastle to Ashburnham, 20 Oct 1757
2 Addit. MSS.32876, f.379: memorandums for the King, 22 Dec 1757
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 193
4 Addit. MSS.32876, f.406: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 23 Dec 1757

particular value, and Newcastle admitted that 'we agree prodigiously well'.[1] He even went out of his way to smooth over some of Newcastle's difficulties. He interceded with Bute, who was pressing Newcastle over the vacancies in the Prince's Bedchamber, explaining that time would be needed before this problem could be resolved.[2] Despite this cooperation, Newcastle was not blind to the extent to which Closterseven had strengthened Pitt's hand. He complained that 'Mr Pitt, I suppose, will have no sharer with him anywhere if he can help it'. He was determined not to allow 'a total submission of men and measures to him ... My pride will not suffer me to act a subordinate part'.[3] Others were less confident of Newcastle's ability to resist. Fox wrote: 'Pitt is sole minister (and I am glad of it), not by having gained the King, but by the entire submission of Lord Hardwicke and the Duke of Newcastle to him'.[4] Even Hardwicke's son, Joseph Yorke, admitted: 'Pitt was now everything in England': he was 'the sole man'.[5]

Fox and Yorke had grasped the main lesson of the Closterseven affair. This lesson - and it was one which made itself felt time and again during the ensuing three years - was that, given Newcastle's view of his own role as one of above all holding the coalition together, any difference of aim or policy between the King and Pitt reflected adversely on Newcastle's own political position, and therefore on his ability to fulfil this role.

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1 Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, R1-106: Dupplin to Rockingham, 1 Oct 1757
2 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p. 139
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 193. Addit. MSS.32875, f.289: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 Oct 1757
4 Bed. Corr., ii, 280
5 Bisset, Mitchell, ii, 5.

Provided that Pitt kept within the bounds of what his colleague (however great his reluctance) could accept politically, Newcastle inevitably found himself interceding with the King on Pitt's behalf, rather than playing the anchor part for which his political strength at the outset of the coalition seemed to make possible. Pitt recognised from the start that Newcastle's apparent advantages could be turned to his own benefit: he consistently put pressure on Newcastle to force his objectives on the King, but at the same time was always ready to smooth over any minor difficulties. The result was that the King became increasingly resentful of Newcastle's attempts to argue the case for Pitt, and the intermediary role became correspondingly difficult to sustain. When he decided in principle, late in July, that British troops should be sent to Europe, Pitt had been preparing to put the responsibility, in the eyes of his supporters, on to his fellow-minister; the Closterseven affair, in a similar way, ensured that much of the blame, in the eyes of the King, attached to Newcastle rather than Pitt. Both over men and over measures, Pitt was turning his own initial weakness, and Newcastle's strength, to good account.

PARLIAMENT AND 'CONTINENT MEASURES'

(i)

The meeting of Parliament on 1 December imposed a new limitation on Pitt's freedom of manoeuvre in the taking of strategic decisions. He was determined that the formation of war policy should not be deflected by parliamentary considerations; at the same time, he had to retain the full support of the Tories and the City. Only by preserving his strength in the Commons could he preserve his strength in the coalition, which enabled him to put his own policy into effect. There was ample scope for criticism of that policy. Pitt was committed to asking for the army of observation to be taken entirely into British pay. A draft of a convention with Prussia, involving a subsidy of £670,000, had been drawn up in response to the King's wish for a positive assurance from Frederick that he would seek no separate peace.[1] Both these items would before the end of the session have to come before the Commons.

Pitt prepared the House for the acceptance of these measures with characteristic skill and thoroughness. He did everything possible to avoid personal identification with continental measures. This was most clearly shown in the aftermath of the Rochefort episode. The expedition had started well with the taking of Aix, but the generals at a council of war had then decided not to attempt Rochefort. Hawke was furious at this decision and refused to participate in a joint council of war between the land and naval

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1 Addit. MSS.6815, f.82: Holdernesse to Mitchell, 24 Sept 1757. Cf. Addit MSS.32876, f.363: memorandums for the King, 21 Dec 1757.

officers, whereupon the generals decided to return home after destroying the works at Aix. The whole affair demonstrated the unpopularity of joint operations with both forces. Pitt was much disturbed by the failure. He realised that, as one of Mrs Montagu's correspondents put it, he would 'either have the glory or disgrace of it, for every one calls it his scheme'.[1] He therefore set about trying to neutralise the ill effect that the failure would have on his reputation with his supporters. The return of the fleet occasioned 'great grumbling among the Coffee-house, tavern and Punch house politicians':[2] in order not to fan the flames, it was important both to prevent the City from petitioning and to keep the affair out of the House of Commons. But some sort of inquiry was unavoidable: Mordaunt himself, distressed at his cold reception by the King, asked Pitt for one.[3] Pitt's solution was to set up on 1 November a commission of inquiry consisting of the Duke of Marlborough, General Waldegrave and Lord George Sackville. Walpole explained Pitt's motives:

> The ... Board was indeed artfully constituted. Two of the Commissioners were attached to Fox; if their majority acquitted, the odium would fall on Mr Pitt's antagonist - and to them he had joined Lord George Sackville, as much devoted to himself, and more than a balance to the other two in abilities.[4]

Pitt meanwhile set to work in the City. He apparently tried to prevent the Common Council from holding a special meeting to discuss the expedition; 'but a Secretary of State', Royston reported to his father, 'has less interest than a Commoner in

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1 Elizabeth Montagu... Her Corr. from 1720 to 1761, ed. Climenson ii, 116.
2 Bodleian Library, North MSS., c.11, f.161: Cheslyn to Johnson, 25 Oct 1757
3 Chatham MSS., 30/8/6:
4 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 76.

opposition with those gentlemen'.[1] When the inquiry was set up, he sent a message to the Lord Mayor to acquaint the City with its appointment: 'more absolute submission than ever of the Cabinet to the Common Council', Fox commented.[2] He took equal care with the Tories. On 21 November, the commission of inquiry reported to the King. Its findings were inconclusive, though it was suggested that no adequate reason for the failure to make an attempt on Rochefort had been given. Pitt realised that this would not satisfy the House of Commons and a week later, with Parliament due to meet in three days' time, he told Newcastle in alarm that if nothing was done, 'it will be taken up. It is a skreen. He can't deny it'.[3] The day before the session started, the King duly ordered a court-martial on Sir John Mordaunt. When this announced his acquittal, there was a renewed danger of parliamentary action; the City saw an inquiry by the House of Commons as the only remaining resort.[4] Pitt briefly used this threat to disturb Newcastle; but it was rapidly dropped.[5] Sackville and Bute, in any case, were strongly opposed to the idea of a parliamentary inquiry.[6]

To extract the maximum political capital from the Rochefort episode, Pitt had not only to play down the failure by depriving the City and the Tories of the opportunity to discuss it; he also had to show that the expedition had been practicable and to place the blame for its failure in other hands than his own. Newcastle

1 Addit. MSS.35351, f.430: Royston to Hardwicke, 1 Nov 1757
2 Addit. MSS.51420 : Fox to Ilchester, 10 Nov 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32997, f.297: memorandums for Hardwicke, 28 Nov 1757
4 Addit. MSS.6839, f.91: Symmer to Mitchell, 24 Jan 1758
5 Addit. MSS.32877, f.9: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Jan 1758
6 Addit. MSS.32870, f.31: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 4 Jan 1758

thought that his aim in setting up the board of inquiry was 'to vindicate and establish the practicability and great advantage of his project, and, in order thereto to lay before the officers, the grounds and evidence upon which it went'.[1] At Mordaunt's court-martial, where he appeared to give evidence about his orders, he took the chance to defend Thierry, the French pilot, and Clarke, who had given evidence to the cabinet when the expedition was being planned.[2] He blamed not only the officers: he included also his colleagues. He told the House of Commons, in a clear appeal to the country gentlemen, that 'nothing could be well till the Army was subjected to the civil power: they were to obey, not to reason. Those sent on the late expedition had laughed at it even at table - nay, so had some of the Cabinet'.[3] Yet Pitt was at the same time accusing the officers of 'not sufficiently remonstrating against a plan they did not approve'. As General Conway suggested, they were being blamed for accepting their commands; but if they had declined them they would equally have been censured.[4]

In his attempt to case the blame on others, Pitt was able at the same time to reassure his supporters that only his continued presence in the administration could prevent measures that were guided by Hanoverian interests. He exploited a rumour that the expedition had been recalled in order to avoid providing the French with an excuse for the further devastation of Hanoverian territory, and that the recall had therefore been a direct consequence of the

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1 Addit. MSS.32875, f.228: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 Oct 1757
2 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 78.
3 ibid., iii, 89.
4 (H.S. Conway), The Military Arguments in the Letter to a Rt. Hon. Author Fully Considered (London, 1758, pp. 71, 75.

convention of Closterseven.[1] First, Pitt dissociated himself from any suspicion of having connived at such behaviour by publishing his orders to Hawke and Mordaunt.[2] Next, he used these rumours in a more positive way, to implicate the King and Cumberland. He attributed the conduct of the officers

> to a prevailing opinion that neither the King nor the Duke wished success to this expedition, treated it as a chimera of Mr Pitt's, which must miscarry, in order to show that the only practicable thing to be done was to employ our whole force in a German war, and this he combines with Lord Loudoun's late conduct in North America.[3]

Pitt's friend Thomas Potter took up the same strain in a pamphlet criticising the conduct of the officers, whom he claimed no doubt realised that because of the King's anxiety to protect his Hanoverian territories 'nothing being done would not be the most displeasing thing imaginable'.[4] With Parliament about to meet, Pitt renewed these complaints. Newcastle noted what he said to him:

> All equally guilty. All should be punished. A court-martial for all. Some secret reason. Some connection with the neutrality ... These gentlemen about. Behind the King's chair at opera. Sees everything look ill. Suspicions.[5]

Earlier, Pitt had been 'not angry with the officers', not blaming them for carrying out what he claimed they thought to be the King's real wishes;[6] now, he realised that he could join the officers with the King in his condemnation of their 'conspiracy'. Hardwicke

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1 Historical Memoirs of His Late Royal Highness William-Augustus, Duke of Cumberland (London, 1767), p. 504

2 Addit. MSS.32875, f.124: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Oct 1757

3 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 187. Loudoun was supported by Cumberland, who wished for his reappointment. Pargellis, Military Affairs in North America, 1748-65 (New York, 1936) p. 416.

4 (T. Potter), The Expedition Against Rochefort Fully Stated and Considered (London, 1758), p. 7.

5 Addit. MSS. 32997, f.297-8: memorandums for Hardwicke, 28 Nov 1757

6 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 187

may have been right in saying that Pitt's original purpose in not criticising the officers had been to prevent them from making reflections on the feasibility of the plan.[1] After the inquiry, they no longer had this chance, and Pitt could afford to include them in his censure of the King and Cumberland. There was no justification whatever for his accusation that the King was shielding the officers. The King had received Mordaunt coldly, been dissatisfied with the inquiry, was annoyed by the verdict of the court-martial, and Newcastle reported that 'nothing can be so strong, as the discourses which His Majesty holds every day at his little levée, in the presence of the very persons concerned'.[2] But Pitt's accusations were useful to him in his attempt to disculpate himself by spreading the guilt as widely as possible. His tactics worked. One of the pamphlets in his favour could claim: 'if there was any design to hurt Mr Pitt by the failure of the expedition, it has not succeeded. The people of Britain see that the purpose was of the true patriot stamp'.[3]

Pitt had not only averted any political difficulties for himself from the Rochefort affair: he had used it to show his supporters his importance as a defender of British against Hanoverian interests. There was no danger that his opponents would be able to exploit the failure against him in Parliament. Once the session started, he demonstrated the same skill in escaping identification with continental measures. On 31 December the King asked Holdernesse for the immediate payment of £100,000 to replace

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1 Addit. MSS.32874, f.489: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 Oct 1757
2 Addit. MSS.35417, f.171: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Jan 1758
3 A Vindication of Mr Pitt, wherein all the aspersions thrown out against that gentleman, relative to the Affair at Rochefort, are unanswerably confuted (London, 1758), p. 47

the sum paid from the electoral coffers for the supply of forage to the Hessian troops with the army of observation.[1] Both Newcastle and Legge thought that this unexpected demand was exorbitant, but Munchhausen continued to press for its payment.[2] There was no choice but to agree: Ferdinand had resumed operations against Richelieu, and unless the Hessians were paid there was every chance that they might be lost. Only later could the justice of the demand be examined. The expedient of supplying the sum from the vote of credit obviated the need for a fresh demand; but Pitt was determined not to have to support another such request. The inquiry into the supply of forage brought to light a disadvantageous contract made by Colonel Amherst, Commissiary to the Hessians. Newcastle would have paid this, but Pitt absolutely refused.[3] He soon extended his complaints beyond the 'preposterous' Hessian demands to the estimates for the entire army for the forthcoming year, asking Newcastle to 'reduce things to a reasonable bulk, and to so much precision at least, as would enable me to deal openly and fairly with the House and with the nation'.[4] It was convenient to leave this task entirely in the hands of the Treasury.

It was convenient also to disclaim responsibility for the management and control of the House of Commons. Hardwicke recognised the value to Pitt of these disclaimers and warned Newcastle not to aim for 'the avowal and appearance of ... sole power in your Grace in the House of Commons.'[5] From the start of

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1 Addit. MSS.32876, f.499: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 31 Dec 1757
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 40. Addit. MSS.32877, f.15: Legge to Newcastle, 4 Jan 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32878, f.108: Newcastle to Stone, 4 March 1758
4 Chatham Corr., i, 305 (here wrongly dated 4 April: the correct date is 6 March. Addit. MSS.32878, f.130)
5 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 38.

the session, Pitt made it clear that the majority was not his but Newcastle's. To Newcastle's delight, he asked Hardwicke to draw up the King's Speech;[1] and he was happy that Lord Royston, Hardwicke's eldest son, should move the Address in reply.[2] He also refused to undertake the responsibility of summoning government supporters at the beginning of the session. Under Walpole, the custom had arisen of inviting MPs favourable to the administration to the Cockpit on the eve of the session, to meet the leader of the House of Commons. Henry Pelham continued this. In 1754 Legge, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the First Lord of the Treasury in the House of Lords, sent the circular letters inviting MPs to attend. The following year Fox, about to come in as Secretary of State, sent the letters; and in 1756 it was Pitt, as leader of the Commons.[3] He no longer wanted to do this. He suggested to James West, Secretary to the Treasury, who with Newcastle's permission approached him about the subject, that an anonymous letter dated from the Treasury Chambers might be sent.[4] When West pointed out that this might be considered a slight, Pitt

> laughed and said jocularly, if I would write Secret Service it might be understood; that when those letters were wrote they were wrote by those who had the parliament; that this was not His Parliament, but the D. of N-------- Parliament.[5]

If Pitt had sent the letters, he might have been open to the accusation from the country gentlemen of encroaching on the independence of Parliament.[6] Eventually, letters were sent

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1 Addit. MSS.32876, f.60: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 22 Nov 1757
2 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p. 136
3 L.B. Namier, 'The Circular Letters: an Eighteenth-Century Whip to Members of Parliament', Eng. Hist. Rev., xliv (1929)pp 589-97. Cf. P.D.G. Thomas, The House of Commons in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1971), pp. 111 sqq.
4 Cf. Chatham Corr., i, 196-8 for the significance of the Secretary to the Treasury in the sending of these letters.
5 Addit. MSS.32875, f.376: West to Newcastle, 2 Nov 1757
6 Cf. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725, p. 49.

unsigned and with no reference to 'Treasury Chambers'.[1]

This enabled Pitt to act in a private capacity rather than as leader of the House of Commons. He could lend his weight to any 'popular' measures that would appeal to his own supporters, regardless of the attitude to them of Newcastle and the main body of the Whigs in Parliament. He patronised George Grenville's Navy Bill, which Newcastle opposed. This was a move designed to secure the more regular payment of seamens' wages. Pitt clearly supported this for political rather than administrative reasons: the Act did nothing to alleviate the manning problem;[2] and in 1741 Pitt had opposed a bill to compel seamen to serve in the navy if called upon, on the grounds that though this might help in the manning of the fleet it involved discrimination against one class of men.[3] Royston was right when he said that Pitt cared little for the practical consequences of the bill: it was 'a Maggot of Grenville's. Pitt was indifferent, but supported it'.[4] A 'popular' move which would have been more embarrassing for Pitt was the attempt by Phillips and Glynne to introduce a bill for shorter Parliaments. Pitt was absent with gout when this was discussed.[5] On 21 March, Walpole told Mann that Pitt had only been in the Commons twice since the start of the session:[6] his illness was of service to him in enabling him to sustain the plausibility

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1 Addit. MSS.32875, f.390-1: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Nov 1757
2 D.A. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton, 1965), p. 229. Cf. Parl.Hist., xv, 839 for an account of the debates.
3 Richmond, The Navy in the War of 1739-1748, i, 142
4 Addit. MSS.35418, f.85: note by Royston on Newcastle's letter to Hardwicke, 27 Feb (?) 1759
5 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. of Lord Kenyon, p. 495
6 Walpole, Correspondence, ed. Lewis, xxi, 182

of his disclaimers of responsibility for the Parliament or for the actions of his cabinet colleagues.[1]

More important than these two issues was a third, which arose by chance and of which Pitt took full advantage. Lord Mansfield, judging a case of wrongful impressment, ruled that the writ of Habeas Corpus in such cases was not automatically to be granted, but was at the discretion of the judges. A bill was introduced into the Commons to ensure that the writ should always be of right. Pitt argued that Mansfield had broken the law: that no judge should consider reasons of state or public inconvenience in granting a writ and that 'it became absolutely necessary to have the Bill, if they did not mean to leave every Englishman's birthright to the discretion of a judge'.[2] This was a straightforward popular issue. Pitt's supporters in the City apparently made an attempt to 'raise a popular storm on him there', and there was a good attendance of country gentlemen when the bill was debated in the Commons.[3] Newcastle and Hardwicke greatly resented the attack on Mansfield, but made no attempt to organise opposition to the bill until it came to the Lords.

Pitt's policy had the effect it was designed to achieve. Dean Lyttelton commented with surprise that despite the lack of success in the war, Pitt had succeeded in retaining his popularity.[4] With the Tories in the House of Commons, there were no difficulties. They decided, says Chesterfield, to give Pitt 'unlimited credit for this session'.[5] They even regretted the initiative

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1 Cf. Sutherland, 'The City of London and the Devonshire-Pitt Administration, 1756-57', p. 162
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 5.
3 Phillimore, Lyttelton, ii, 609. Newdigate diary, 17 March 1758
4 Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century, ed. Wyndham, ii, 256
5 Letters of Chesterfield, v, 2285.

of Sir John Philipps in bringing forward the bill for more frequent Parliaments.[1] Beckford was also blamed, though wrongly, for taking a lead in advocating this 'little popular squib'.[2] Fearing that Beckford and Philipps might create unnecessary difficulties for Pitt, a group of about fifteen of the more prominent Tories in the Commons banded together to declare in advance their support for the grants to the King of Prussia and the army under Ferdinand. Potter reported to Pitt:

> These if they have no followers will tis hoped support each other, but the better hope is they will prevent a division. These are very concerned that to divide <u>against</u> you will destroy their idea they wish to inculcate that the <u>body</u> of the country party is hearty in confidence: to divide <u>with</u> you and to be left without followers would be most distressful. They will therefore previously band together to declare they are for the question.[3]

Their only suspicions were of Hanover, not of the English administration: 'the bitter part of the pill is Hanover, the sugar plumb, the King of Prussia'. Beckford, in line on this occasion with the feelings of the country gentlemen, explained what Almon called the 'new principle of politics':

> If the Hanoverians and Hessians were to be entirely under the direction of British Councils, the larger the sum that was granted, in order to render that army effectual, the more likely it would be to answer the end for which it was given; that is, to try the issue of the war with France; than which, in his judgment, there never was so favourable an opportunity as the present. But if the <u>Regency of Hanover</u> were to have the disposal of the money, and the disposition of the army, he would not give a shilling towards its subsistence.[4]

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1 Chatham MSS., 30/8/73: Potter to Pitt, 'Friday night'. This important letter clearly belongs to the period between 20 February (the day of Philipps' and Glynne's motion) and 19 April (when the Prussian subsidy was granted). It is wrongly attributed to the previous year by B. Williams. (Life of William Pitt, i, 306)

2 <u>Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. of Lord Kenyon</u>, p. 495. <u>Letters of Chesterfield</u>, ed. Dobree, 2288. See also above, p. 105

3 Chatham MSS., 30/8/53: Potter to Pitt, 'Friday night'

4 Almon, <u>Anecdotes</u>, i, 276.

Pitt took this as the key to his method of presentation. He told the Commons that expense on the Continent

> would not hinder in the least the vigour to be exerted in America. That it was vast expense, but less would not do ... That he was now for exerting the whole force of this country to come to a fair decision with France. That not to make use of the unparrelled (sic) success of the King of Prussia, this army of 50,000 Protestants, joined to the sickness at Brest and the losses of the French in Germany and in their trade would be the greatest folly. That the resources of this country were great and great expenses are now the best economy.[1]

Pitt was at the same time severely critical of the Hanoverian ministry for the 'ignominious padlock' they had put upon themselves in signing the convention.[2] He insisted that Ferdinand's army should have English contractors, that the King should talk openly and freely to him about the affairs of the army and that the correspondence should be carried on by the English Secretaries of State.[3] Before the army estimates and the Prussian subsidy came before the House of Commons, Pitt's careful groundwork had ensured both that they could be presented in a way acceptable to the Tories and that his own credibility as a defender of English against Hanoverian interests had not been damaged. His success in avoiding the potential dangers of the Rochefort failure and of his support of the German war convincingly marked the extension of the use of his political skills from dealings with his fellow-ministers to dealings with the House of Commons.

(ii)

The methods used by Pitt to reconcile his supporters to 'continent measures' - his support of popular legislation, his suspicions of Hanoverian influence at Rochefort and in the army -

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1 Addit. MSS.32877, f.183: West's report, 20 Jan 1758
2 Newdigate diary, 1 December 1757
3 Addit. MSS.32878, f.330: Newcastle to Pitt, 24 March 1758

increased the tension between himself and the King. Even after the King had agreed to his demands for English contractors and correspondence, Pitt threw out accusations that the Hanoverian ministers were trying to overturn the arrangement, 'which ... they would not venture upon, unless they were convinc'd they would be agreeable'.[1] The King's refusal to grant Ligonier an English peerage was a further grievance.[2] For his part, the King was infuriated by Pitt's treatment of the Hessian forage demands and by his complaints over the army estimates. He spoke openly at his levées against the Habeas Corpus bill.[3] He tried in vain to persuade Newcastle to give more extensive support to continental operations.[4]

This made Newcastle's role more difficult than ever. He continued to do what he could to draw Pitt and the King together, to exploit any common ground between them. When Pitt complained that the King had not consulted him over the Speech, Newcastle told Pitt that he had acquainted him with all the King had said on the subject - 'which is true', he added to Hardwicke, 'except that the King shew'd an inclination that Mr P. should not be the drawer'.[5] When both the King and Pitt expressed their annoyance at the leniency of the inquiry into the Rochefort expedition, Newcastle tried to bring about a reconciliation on the basis of their agreement; but Pitt's only comment was, 'What signified talking, if nothing was done?'[6] Newcastle started to think of retirement

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1 Addit. MSS.32877, f.498: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 19 Feb 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32876, f.197-8: Pitt to Newcastle, 1 Dec. 1757
3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 113.
4 Addit. MSS. 32876, f.379: memorandums for the King, 22 Dec 1757
5 Addit. MSS.32875, f.393: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Nov 1757
6 Addit. MSS.32877, f.11: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Jan 1758

at the end of the session: 'I see I shall be able to do little or no good, and I am cut to pieces between the King and Mr Pitt'.[1]

Pitt recognised both Newcastle's difficulties and his importance in his intermediary position. He continued to express his gratitude to Newcastle for his efforts in the closet on his behalf.[2] Even at the height of the Habeas Corpus dispute, he went out of his way to commend the love of liberty of Hardwicke and his son Charles Yorke, who were leading the attack on the bill in the Lords and the Commons respectively.[3] Pitt's desire to keep Newcastle content is understandable. More and more, Newcastle felt obliged to take Pitt's side with the King: Pitt, after all, was both promising substantial help for the continent and at the same time ensuring that there would be no opposition to this in the House of Commons. The sitting of Parliament was a source of strength, not of weakness; it made clear the fact that, if he were to leave the administration, Pitt would be more formidable than ever.

Newcastle therefore defended the extent of Pitt's support of the continental war in his audiences with the King: 'no plan can be made', he told him, 'where the King could get near what Mr Pitt offers'.[4] He refused, along with Pitt, to pay the Hessian forage demand except through Amherst, the commissary: Newcastle 'never saw, or left, the King more dissatisfied'.[5] He secured the King's consent to Pitt's requests over the contractors and correspondence, making his representations 'as palatable for the King, as the truth

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 40-1.
2 Addit. MSS.32878, f.224: Pitt to Newcastle, 16 March 1758
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 5. Addit. MSS.35353, f.241: C. Yorke to Hardwicke, 11 March 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32878, f.304: memorandums for the King, 23 March 1757
5 Addit. MSS.32877, f.7: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Jan 1758

would admit'.[1] He successfully pressed Pitt's case for the appointment of Amherst in place of Loudoun on the unwilling King.[2] He told the King that his treatment of Pitt was arousing suspicions in the latter of Newcastle's own attitude, and that this was particularly unfortunate when Pitt was 'disposed to do everything that could, in reason, be expected', assuring Pitt that he had spoken his mind 'very plainly, and without the least reserve' to the King.[3] On all these points, Newcastle was seriously straining the King's goodwill.

The continued good relations of Pitt with Leicester House provided a further reason for Newcastle to urge Pitt's demands on the King. Legge's attempt to replace Pitt in Bute's favour had clearly failed. The death of Sir Benjamin Keene on 15 December left Legge with a reversion which he was anxious to take up and he hoped, to go to the House of Lords. But he eventually yielded to the pressure put on him by Newcastle, who was anxious that Legge should remain as Chancellor and afraid that if he were to retire Pitt might aim to secure the appointment of George Grenville as his successor.[4] The reversion was made over to Legge's brother, who needed it to pay his debts, and was to pass to Legge himself on his brother's death. Legge was disappointed that Bute had not pressed him to remain in office.[5] He had overestimated the strength of his position at Leicester House. Bute was still looking primarily to Pitt, who continued to keep him informed of war news and to consult him where he could.[6] It was therefore important for

1 Addit. MSS.32878, f.332: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 24 March 1758
2 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p. 140. Torrens, History of Cabinets, ii, 436.
3 Addit. MSS.32878, f.210: memorandums for the King, 14 March 1758. Chatham Corr., i, 302.
4 Addit. MSS.32877, f.122: Legge to Newcastle, 14 Jan 1758. Addit. MSS.32997, f.322: business with Newcastle, 8 Jan 1758
5 Addit. MSS.32877, f.64: Newcastle to A.Stone, 8 Jan 1758; ibid., f.194: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 Jan 1758
6 Cf. Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-58', p.147

Newcastle to support Bute's requests as well as Pitt's, and this involved considerable difficulty with the King.[1] Another minor patronage question annoyed the King even more. Newcastle had obtained a post at the Excise Board for a Pelham relation, but hearing that Bute had a candidate for the office he was quite prepared to withdraw his own claim in Bute's favour. But when Newcastle suggested this, the King 'took fire immediately ... I am sorry to say, I heard a language, which I have not heard before, since I came in last'.[2] What made this worse was that Pitt himself had started to make requests of his own for government patronage. He made his first suggestion of an ecclesiastical preferment and he wanted to show his regard for the Tories in the appointment of the new King's Counsel.[3] Newcastle complained strongly to Hardwicke of Pitt's new departure in interfering in patronage matters, but he nevertheless felt bound to recommend the candidates advocated by Pitt. The King gave way on all major points of policy but could afford to take a stand on patronage questions, and asked Holdernesse to produce a list of ecclesiastical recommendations with which he might oppose those made by Newcastle.[4] Newcastle, also more obstinate over small matters than great, complained bitterly and once again started to talk of resignation if he did not succeed with his own candidates.[5]

There was a further reason for Newcastle to try to cultivate Bute. His task of trying to hold together the coalition was

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1 Addit. MSS.32877, ff.97-8: Newcastle to Lady Yarmouth, 12 Jan 1758. Ibid., f.148: Lady Yarmouth to Newcastle, 13 Jan 1758.
2 Addit. MSS.32877, f.350: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 Feb 1758
3 Chatham MSS., 30/8/51: Newcastle to Pitt, 30 March 1758
Addit. MSS.32877, f.202: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 22 Jan 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32878, f.352: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 March 1757
5 ibid., f.328-9: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 24 March 1758

becoming more and more burdensome. With Parliament sitting, Pitt was imposing increasing strain on the fabric of the coalition as the price of his support for the war on the continent. Newcastle even thought of attempting to find 'a figure in the House of Commons' who could 'beat Mr Pitt with the considerable Tories viz. Sir Charles Mordaunt, Mr Prowse, Mr Baggot, the Grosvenors, the Curzons', who were dissatisfied with the leadership of Philipps and Beckford.[1] Nothing came of this suggestion: nor, indeed, was any such candidate available. But the very fact that it was made shows the extent of Newcastle's frustration with his position. It is not surprising that, for the first time, he began to see in the possibility of peace a way out of his difficulties. Lady Yarmouth was putting forward the view that he should 'keep Mr Pitt 'till we have a peace, and then do, what you will with him'.[2] Newcastle took seriously Mitchell's view that peace was by no means out of the question. He knew that Pitt would pay little attention to Mitchell's letter, but he thought of approaching Bute to try to reach some initial agreement with him on the terms of peace, as a 'great national, and permanent object'.[3] His task of preserving the structure of the coalition was proving far more troublesome than he had envisaged: once peace was signed, the burden might be considerably lightened.

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1 Addit. MSS.32998, f.25: memorandums, c.27 April 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32877, f.436: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 Feb 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32880, f.102: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 May 1758

EMDEN

(i)

It is ironical that the more Pitt put into effect war policies that were agreeable to Newcastle and the Whigs, the more difficult Newcastle's position became: Pitt needed Newcastle to shield him from the political consequences of his own actions. Shortly, Pitt was to take the most politically dangerous of all decisions - to send British troops to the continent; and Newcastle's difficulties increased correspondingly.

Evidence has been adduced to suggest that in July 1757 Pitt had determined to send troops, but that he had not openly avowed this before the news of Hastenbeck made it no longer desirable. after this, he had reverted to his old attitude of opposition to any measure of this kind: Joseph Yorke recognised that he 'thought as we did, but that he was fettered by his connexions and former declarations'.[1] The question lay dormant until October, when Frederick asked the administration to consider sending the troops used on the Rochefort expedition to the Elbe and joining to them some cavalry from England.[2] Mitchell passed on this request and gave his own support to it.[3] On 12 December Holdernesse told him that the sending of any British reinforcement was out of the question, but Frederick continued to press for one and Mitchell continued to acquaint Holdernesse with these requests.[4] On 28 January, in an extraordinary letter to Newcastle, Pitt accused

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1 Bisset, Mitchell, ii, 5.
2 Pol. Corr., xv, 456, 466.
3 Addit. MSS.6807, f.12: Mitchell to Holdernesse, 28 Nov 1757
4 Addit. MSS.6815, f.129: Holdernesse to Mitchell, 12 Dec 1757; Pol. Corr., xvi, 108, 162, 175. Addit. MSS.6807, f.436: Mitchell to Holdernesse, 11 Jan 1758

Mitchell of putting the idea into the King of Prussia's mind:

> I see his aim is ... to get the King of Prussia to propose British troops as a part of the plan for the next campaign in Germany. As I cannot suffer myself to suppose that ignorance of all that passed last year and is passing this, can have any share in Dr Mitchell's conduct, it is evident to whom he belongs and whose work he is doing. Thus it is, my Lord, in every part of government, the tools of another system are perpetually marring every hopeful measure of the present administration.[1]

These accusations were wholly without foundation. On the news that British troops would not be forthcoming, Frederick refused to sign the proposed subsidy treaty with England, and Mitchell considered he was acting quite unreasonably.[2] But after Pitt's outburst it was decided to recall Mitchell and to send Joseph Yorke to Prussia to negotiate the convention.[3] On 17 February, Mitchell was ordered to prepare for his return to England.[4]

This was entirely at Pitt's initiative. Both Newcastle and the King disapproved of Mitchell's recall, but neither of them raised any objections.[5] Newcastle thought that Frederick's request for troops was both understandable and obvious, and he talked of the 'absurdity (of the) principle adopted, of supporting the Continent with two millions of money but no troops.'[6] He regretted that 'the principal person will not suffer the point to be debated, but will go immediately to a resolution'.[7] He strongly disapproved of Pitt's instructions for Joseph Yorke.[8] At the same

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1 Torrens, History of Cabinets, ii, 441.
2 Bisset, Mitchell, i, 398.
3 ibid., 403.
4 Addit. MSS.6816, f.45: Holdernesse to Mitchell, 17 Feb 1758
5 Bisset, Mitchell, ii, 18. Addit. MSS.32997, f.341-3: heads for Hardwicke, 16 Feb 1758
6 Addit. MSS.32877, f.271: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 29 Jan 1758
7 ibid., f.436: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 Feb 1758
8 Addit. MSS.32997, f.383: business for Mansfield, 5 March 1758

time, he deliberately adopted a policy of making no proposals or commitments. He took the view that 'a breach in this administration ... would do more hurt to the King of Prussia, than 10,000 men may do it good. The whole supply for Germany may possibly depend on it'.[1] He confined himself to regretting that 'people in opposition made declarations which tied them up, when they came into administration'.[2] Whatever his private feelings, he would do nothing to risk alienating Pitt. He readily accepted that it was politically impracticable to think of sending troops to Germany.[3] When Pitt rewrote Mitchell's instructions so as to provide a justification for not complying with Frederick's wishes, he did not object.[4]

Meanwhile, events in Europe were moving Pitt away from his intransigeant attitude. By early March, the French army was occupying a position stretching from Osnabruck eastwards to Minden and thence southwards to Hameln along the line of the Weser. Detached from this main force was that part of the left wing that was still holding East Friesland, some hundred miles to the north. Ferdinand was pressing hard: on 14 March Minden capitulated and Ferdinand immediately pushed on towards Osnabruck. In this situation, the French derived two major advantages from their occupation of East Friesland. So long as they held Emden, the garrison town at the mouth of the Ems, they could prevent the English from sending a force down the Ems, which might in conjunction with Ferdinand trap the French in a position between the Weser and the Ems and cut them off from their base at Wesel on

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1 Addit. MSS.32877, f.276: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 29 Jan 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32997, f.359: note, 22 Feb 1758
3 Egerton MSS.3430, f.91: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 24 Feb 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32878, f.40: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Feb 1758. Cf. Addit. MSS.6816, f.49 for these instructions.

the Rhine.[1] Secondly, even if the French did have to retreat towards the Rhine, the occupation of East Friesland would make a return to the offensive a much less dangerous operation, since if Emden were to fall into British hands there would be the constant risk that whenever the French started to advance from the Rhine, the English might send a force to the Ems.[2] The strategic advantages of an English threat to Emden and East Friesland were so apparent that during the winter both Newcastle and Frederick saw that there would be considerable benefit in simply spreading the rumour that English troops were to be sent to the Ems:[3] and indeed Cremilles, Belleisle's military agent with the army, thought that even the prospect of such a force being sent was a powerful enough reason for the French not to attempt to remain in a position where they might be hemmed in by Ferdinand, an English force, and possibly Lehwaldt's force as well.[4]

The strategic case for threatening the French position in East Friesland was recognised by the cabinet when in February they ordered Commodore Charles Holmes to cruise off the mouths of the Ems, the Weser and the Elbe and to communicate with Ferdinand. Holmes' squadron consisted of a mere two frigates, a bomb ketch and a cutter. By 12 March, at Ferdinand's urgent request, he reached Ems and a week later, after he had taken up a position near Emden which made it impossible to supply the garrison, the French and Austrian troops evacuated the town.[5] Any chance that the

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1 G. Waddington, La Guerre de Sept Ans, ii, 33-4.
2 Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, i, 247, 251.
3 Addit. MSS.32876, f.347: intelligence, 21 Feb 1758
4 Waddington, La Guerre de Sept Ans, ii, 11.
5 Corbett, England in the Sever Years' War, i, 241-9.

French might be able to maintain a position on the Weser had finally disappeared.

The news of the French evacuation of Emden arrived on the same day as the news of a breakthrough in the negotiations over the treaty with Prussia.[1] On 25 January Frederick had instructed Michel, his minister in London, not to sign the convention unless a promise was made of troops for the continent or a fleet for the Baltic.[2] Now, coinciding with news of the French abandonment of Emden, Michel gave Holdernesse to understand that Prussia would after all agree to the treaty without requiring assurances on either point.[3] A despatch from Mitchell confirmed this good news.[4] This represented something of a victory for Pitt. Holdernesse naturally expected him to be delighted. But the following day he replied:

> I cannot say, as yet, that I am greatly edified by the nature and tone of (Michel's instructions): or that I perceive anything in them that may not very well stay 'till the ordinary round of weekly labours begins again. I will appoint Michell[5] on Monday morning, and hear as patiently as I can.

This attitude was quite unexpected. Newcastle wrote:

> I am amazed at the manner of Mr Pitt's treating this affair; the putting off Michel, 'till the ordinary round of weekly labours begins; and then, to promise, to hear as patiently as he could, is a new way of[6] acting with a favorite minister, from a favorite court.

Neither Newcastle nor any of the other ministers fathomed the true explanation for Pitt's behaviour. With hindsight, however, it is clear. As soon as Ferdinand knew of the evacuation of Emden,

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1 Addit. MSS.32878, f.344: Anson to Newcastle, 25 March 1758
2 Pol. Corr., xvi, 199-200.
3 Addit. MSS.32878, f.340: Holdernesse to Pitt, 25 March 1758
4 Bisset, Mitchell, i, 406
5 Egerton MSS.3432, f.174: Pitt to Holdernesse, 26 March 1758
6 Addit. MSS.32878, f.388: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 March 1758

he urgently requested that a small British force might be sent 'to shut the Emden door'.[1] When Michel saw Pitt, he took up this request, which in view of the strategic importance of the town and the small number of troops needed (the French and Austrians had had well under 4000 between them) was a natural and predictable one to make. As recently as 9 March, the cabinet had decided that no British troops should be sent to the continent, Pitt threatening resignation if he was overruled.[2] But when Michel made his suggestion, Pitt gave no direct answer. At the same time, he told Holdernesse that it was essential to do anything that might persuade Michel to sign the convention at once, and that in this context he saw the value of the idea of sending a force to garrison Emden. But he expressed concern at the emphasis laid by the King on the point. If he were to comply with it, proper assurances would have to be given that no future demands for troops for the continent would be founded on his compliance on this occasion: Newcastle would have to see the King about this.[3]

Pitt's performance was a triumph of dissimulation. Twice, he had taken a completely unexpected line - in expressing his disappointment at Michel's instructions and in telling Michel and Holdernesse that he might be prepared to consider the sending of troops to Emden. These attitudes are, however, explicable on the hypothesis that on the news of the French evacuation of Emden he decided that an English force should be sent there. The strategic case was clear, but it was a creditable decision in view of the political risks involved. He had frequently had to assure the

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1 Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, i, 251
2 Chatham Corr., i, 298. Cf. von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 183
3 Egerton MSS.3432, f.176: substance of Pitt's conversation, 27 March 1758.

Tories in the House of Commons in recent weeks that there was no intention of sending any British troops to Germany.[1] When he decided to go back on his previous professions, Pitt as before took the greatest care to avoid any unfortunate political consequences, by representing himself not as instigating the decision but as agreeing to it reluctantly and with serious reservations. He made it appear that his concurrence was based only upon absolute necessity and the overriding need that despite Michel's unreasonable instructions and demands the convention should be signed at once. If Pitt's excuse were to retain any measure of plausibility, it was essential to act fast. As early as 29 January Mitchell had written reassuringly that it was likely that Frederick would soften Michel's instructions.[2] He had decided to send an extraordinary envoy, Knyphausen, and it was expected that he would shortly arrive with full powers to sign the convention.[3] This would deprive Pitt of the argument that troops for Emden were essential to persuade Prussia to accede to the treaty.

Pitt wanted to appear to be consenting to the Emden troops only because he had no choice. It is almost certainly no coincidence that at the very time he told Holdernesse he might be prepared to agree to the troops, he suggested that transports should also be prepared for another attempt on the French coast.[4] This was an idea that Frederick had thrown out to Mitchell six or seven weeks ago, but it was only now that Pitt raised the question.[5]

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1 Chatham MSS., 30/8/86: Calcraft to Home, 26 Feb 1758
2 Addit. MSS.6807, f.50b: Mitchell to Holdernesse, 29 Jan 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32897, f.27: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 April 1758
4 Egerton MSS.3432, f.176: substance of Pitt's conversation, 27 March 1758
5 Pol. Corr., xvi, 230

He could by this means seem to be gaining cabinet approval for a coastal raid in return for his concession over the Emden garrison. He could also reconcile Leicester House to the measure. Amphibious operations on the French coast were looked on with some suspicion by the King and Newcastle and were a way of carrying on the continental war without involving Hanover. They were therefore peculiarly appropriate for the patronage of Leicester House. By ensuring that Lord George Sackville was appointed second-in-command on the coastal expedition, Pitt was able to identify Leicester House with this form of warfare.

The task of securing his position in the House of Commons after the Emden decision was a more difficult one. To appeal to the country gentlemen by emphasising his own independence, he took up with renewed vigour the 'popular' issues before the House. He resumed his 'rhapsody of violence and virulence' on the Habeas Corpus bill, telling the Commons that he would fight against 'all arbitrary discretionary governments, whether in black gowns or red coats'.[1] In the debates on a bill introduced by George Townshend to amend the militia act, he had a further chance to play on the country gentlemens' dislike of standing armies. Horace Walpole says of Pitt's performance in the debates of 1756-7 over the act itself that Pitt 'by no means thought the militia feasible' but that he used it purely as an opportunity of gaining favour with the country gentlemen.[2] Whether Walpole was right or not, there can be no doubt that Pitt used Townshend's bill entirely for this purpose. The issues involved were matters of detail,

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 45. Addit. MSS.32879, f.276: West to Newcastle, 24 April 1758

2 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 98.

primarily designed to answer some of the grievances that the riots had brought to light and to make it more difficult for unfavourable lords-lieutenant to evade the provisions of the act. Shaftesbury, appealing for Newcastle's support, pointed out that the bill was merely designed to correct errors or omissions in the existing act and that it did not involve a question of principle:[1] and Newcastle himself admitted that the bill was 'of no consequence'.[2] George Townshend told Pitt that the main friends of the militia bill

> have endeavoured in their amendments to it this year to avoid as much as possible the giving either ill declared enemies or secret adversaries all occasion of opposing it, either in the House of Lords or in ill execution in the country: and therefore the chief alterations and additions to it consist mostly of clauses to explain the meaning of former parts of the late bill, or necessary extensions of provisions for it.[3]

This by no means suited Pitt's purpose. He outstripped even Townshend in his enthusiasm for the bill. Where Townshend wanted annual meetings in cases where too few officers volunteered, Pitt wanted only a three-month adjournment and accused Townshend of putting it in the power of the lords-lieutenant to defeat the act. Royston commented:

> It is something singular, that our Great Man should be more enteté with his militia than the very framers of it. I imagined, he only attended out of complaisance to Mr Townshend, and was very indifferent as to particular amendments, and meant to leave the bill very much to its fate in the country, and would only have it to say, that he still wished well to it.[4]

Professor Western has rightly concluded that the explanation for Pitt's enthusiasm is that here and with the Habeas Corpus bill,

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1 Addit. MSS.32879, f.121: Shaftesbury to Newcastle, 27 Apr 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32998, f.33: memorandums for Mansfield, 2 May 1758
3 Chatham MSS., 30/8/64: Townshend to Pitt, 28 Feb 1758
4 Addit. MSS.35352, f.6: Royston to Hardwicke, 10 April 1758

Pitt was trying to make up for his support of a continental policy.[1]

Pitt also looked to his position in Parliament in his treatment of the estimates. He said he would agree to anything reasonable rather than vote a general sum for the Hanoverian troops: 'if you voted £800,000, £200,000 of it would be pocketed'.[2] In view of Pitt's earlier complaints about their exorbitance, Newcastle had hopefully revised the estimates, but Pitt claimed to be 'astonished and overwhelmed' by the new and reduced figures and added 'I must beg to disclaim any part in the controlling and reducing this expense'.[3] Newcastle reluctantly put pressure on Munchhausen to reduce the Hanoverian demands and he countered Pitt's claim that 'the work ... must stand upon the authority of the Treasury' with the view that the fixing of the estimates was not the task of his department alone but of the cabinet as a whole.[4]

Pitt's care in trying to retain the allegiance of the country gentlemen had the results for which he hoped. On 19 April, in the debate towards which all Pitt's efforts had been directed, the House voted without a division to give a £670,000 subsidy to the King of Prussia and to pay 50,000 men in Ferdinand's army. Pitt spoke twice. He claimed inconsistently both that British involvement on the continent was inevitable - in every reign and in all great wars it had taken place - and that the Prussian treaty, far from drawing England into the continental war, had the reverse

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1 Western, English Militia, p. 144.
2 Addit. MSS.32879, f.1: West to Newcastle, 1 April 1758
3 Torrens, History of Cabinets, ii, 449
4 Chatham Corr., i, 306-8.

effect, by removing the danger that England might be weakened through the defeat of her allies in Europe. The Emden expedition was not a continental measure, simply a logical way to exploit success, diverting no troops that might be needed in America or elsewhere: he 'knew of no intention of going on the continent' by sending troops to Germany, which would be a different matter.[1] Several Tories spoke in Pitt's favour. Only Sir Francis Dashwood 'stuck to his text of no continent war', though Robert Wyner also made a speech which on balance was opposed to the treaty.[2] No Tory MP spoke against the convention, though Sir Roger Newdigate privately disapproved of it as 'no British measure':[3] it is impossible to judge whether this feeling was widespread amongst those of the Tories who were not in the group which had formed itself to declare in advance its support for Pitt's policies. But even for those who opposed the treaty on principle, another line of defence of Pitt was possible: that he was in reality himself against the convention, but had only agreed to it because it was politically necessary to do so.[4] This may have been why no MP was prepared to divide the House.

Having secured the support of the Commons for the Prussian subsidy, the Emden troops and the army under Ferdinand, Pitt could afford to abandon the uncompromising line that he had taken on popular and financial questions in order to appeal to the country gentlemen. This was in keeping with his policy of lightening

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1 Neville MSS., D/EN 034/16, 19 April 1758
2 Addit. MSS.17493, f.153: Calcraft to Rigby, 20 April 1758. Presumably the Tories who spoke in favour were those who had grouped together in support of Pitt. See above, pp.
3 Newdigate diary, 19 April 1758
4 (J. Almon), Review of Mr Pitt's Administration, p. 64

Newcastle's burden whenever he could easily do so. Even before the Habeas Corpus bill was rejected in the Lords, Pitt had lost his use for the issue. On 9 May, Hardwicke took the lead in proposing the bill's defeat and in referring to the twelve judges the question of whether the writs should be issued automatically.[1] Temple at first opposed the reference but soon changed his mind.[2] The judges all agreed that the writs should not issue of right, and although Temple entered a Protest, the bill was defeated on 2 June without a division.[3] Pitt had already drawn from the affair all the political capital he wanted; the day before the bill was rejected by the Lords, Newcastle found him 'quite changed, plaintiff but civil, some very unreasonable expressions, but at last rather good hunour and joking than otherwise'.[4] Had Pitt wished to revive the issue, he could readily have done so. By coincidence, the question of increasing the salaries of the judges came on shortly after the Habeas Corpus affair. Pitt could not resist making the accusation that the increase was to 'reward the complaisance of the Judges' over their Habeas Corpus verdict;[5] but neither he nor any of his associates spoke or voted against the measure and it was left only to the inevitable Vyner and a handful of others to oppose it.[6] The Habeas Corpus dispute - like the affair of Yorke's correspondence eighteen months later, which Pitt used in a similar way - died down as suddenly as it had arisen, and

1 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 13.
2 Parl. Hist., xv, 902
3 ibid., 920-5
4 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 52
5 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 182
6 Addit. MSS.32880, f.470: West to Newcastle, 16 June 1758

Newcastle was already by 27 May writing to Pitt 'as I should have done, if the late most unheard of scene had not happen'd'.[1]

Pitt could also afford to moderate his objections to the extent of financial support for the continent. He constantly used the making or withholding of grants to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel as a method of political bribery, and he had straightforwardly told Newcastle that if he would let the Habeas Corpus bill pass the Lords, he would give the Landgrave £30,000, which was more even than was being requested.[2] Newcastle expected this approach would be carried further. He commented:

> It is not a pleasant thing to have the King told that every measure, that His Majesty can wish (and it will certainly go to further offers for the support of Prince Ferdinand's army and perhaps future dédommagement), shall be granted, if a bill, disliked and opposed by particular persons in the King's service, could be let pass.[3]

A similar issue was that of the vote of credit. Newcastle and Legge were convinced that with expenses of £700,000 already incurred, £800,000 was the minimum practicable figure.[4] Pitt wished the sum to be restricted to a maximum of £600,000: he told West it was an 'unfavourable time for votes of credit, when it should be wished that the House should be in good humour'.[5] Hardwicke recognised that the higher figure might induce Philipps and Beckford to renew their campaign over the Habeas Corpus bill, 'however impertinent to the point of the vote of credit'. But with the ending of the Habeas Corpus dispute after the bill's defeat in the Lords, Pitt quickly agreed to the sum of £800,000.[7]

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1 Addit. MSS.32880, f.244: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 May 1758. Cf. ibid., f.248: Newcastle to Pitt, 27 May 1758
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 49.
3 ibid., 50.
4 ibid., 52-3.
5 Addit. MSS.32880, f.285: West to Newcastle, 1 June 1758
6 ibid., f.303: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 June 1758
7 Parl. Hist., xv, 926

No previous event in the life of the coalition had tested Pitt's political expertise more severely than the Emden decision. The techniques he adopted in steering a path through the potential minefield of parliamentary opposition were characteristic ones. He successfully contrived, as he had been preparing to do in June 1757, both to initiate the policy and to attach on to the shoulders of his colleagues the responsibility for its instigation and execution. He used the same trade-off with the projected coastal expedition as he had prepared to employ, if it had proved necessary, in the previous year. The vehement support of the Habeas Corpus Amendment bill and of Townshend's militia bill (the latter too dangerous a subject with which to identify himself a year ago) had a similar purpose, and enabled him to demonstrate to his supporters his apparent independence of his colleagues in the administration. In the exercise of his power, Pitt took the responsibility only when it suited him to do so.

(ii)

It was Hardwicke who saw the situation most clearly. Before the debate on the Prussian subsidy, he predicted that Pitt would be more concerned by the reaction in Parliament than in the closet. He would

> accompany the shining parts with such limitations and saving clauses, and with such strong declarations against going further, in order to make what he says palatable to the countrey-gentlemen, that the favour, he may gain by it in a certain place, will not be to be envied.[1]

Hardwicke also recognised that there was no way out of the difficulties this imposed on Newcastle:

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1 Addit. MSS.32879, f.151: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 13 April 1758

> I do not at present know any other connection, to which resort can be hand. The money must be got in Parliam..., or the nation is undone. I cannot blame your Grace's thought of retiring after the session is over. It will be very unfortunate for the public, but I think the happiest thing in the world for your self; for there can be no comfort in going on thus.[1]

Pitt realised as well as Hardwicke the problems which he was creating for his colleague. With Newcastle doing such valuable work with the King, he had no intention of risking his retirement and continued to take what opportunities he could to show his satisfaction with him. When Newcastle complained of his treatment of Michel, he went out of his way to ensure that Hardwicke was summoned to a special meeting.[2] Even in the middle of the Habeas Corpus dispute, Newcastle found him on all other points 'very reasonable and well'.[3]

But these attentions were not enough. In his attempt to avoid a breach between Pitt and the King, Newcastle increasingly took refuge in misrepresentation and in the avoidance of any semblance of responsibility. He deliberately concealed from Pitt the disturbing reports that the King had received on the state of Ferdinand's army, lest these reports might lead to a withdrawal of support for the continental war.[4] He refused even to suggest a name for a possible successor to Mitchell: 'I have no comfort in thinking of <u>persons</u>, or these sort of <u>things</u>, when no judgment can be made how one <u>material</u> person will think or act'. He complained bitterly to Hardwicke that Pitt was creating intolerable

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1 Addit. MSS.32879, f.76: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 6 April 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32878, f.380: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 27 March 1758
3 Yorke, <u>Hardwicke</u>, iii, 44.
4 Addit. MSS.32879, f.128: memorandums for the King, 11 April 1758
5 <u>ibid</u>., f.265: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 April 1758

difficulties for him, both in Parliament and in the closet, where he was constantly forced to press Pitt's views on the King.[1]

The King was as dissatisfied as Newcastle. He refused even to speak to Pitt at his levees.[2] He thought that a quite unreasonable number of concessions was being made for Pitt's benefit, and for the first time in the life of the coalition he thought seriously of replacing him. His first suggestion was to substitute Hardwicke and Charles Yorke for Granville and Pratt, who were enthusiastic supporters of the Habeas Corpus bill. Newcastle 'put off' this opening and the King tried a new one, suggesting that if Fox were to replace Pitt, Newcastle would be able to 'manage' him. The King automatically assumed that this arrangement would be acceptable to Newcastle.[3] But this was far from the case, as the King should have known. In March, two months before he made these proposals, Newcastle, suspecting that 'His Majesty has some scheme in his head', had written in his notes for an audience:

> To beg His Majesty the danger of forcing out Mr Pitt out of his service. The difficulty of forming any other plan of administration ... Mr Pitt desires the King would ask Mr Fox whether he would undertake to pay 50,000 men.[4]

This was the key to Newcastle's attitude. Pitt might create problems with the King, but at least he was giving a generous measure of support to the war in Europe and in such a way as to avoid any parliamentary difficulties. Nor was there any alternative; as Hardwicke wrote, 'advantage has been taken from the low and desperate state, to which <u>other persons</u> have reduc'd

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1 Addit. MSS.32879, f.310: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 April 1758
2 Addit. MSS.35417, f.227: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 June 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32880, f.99-100: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 May 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32997, f.402: business with Hardwicke, 22 March 1758
<u>ibid</u>., f.403: memorandums, 23 March 1758

themselves since the coalition was made'.[1] Since Closterseven, Fox's position had been weaker than ever; and any attempt to restore him to effective power would have been seen as a means of enabling Cumberland to exercise his former influence. Cumberland had promised at the King's request to attend court as before and to show 'all the duty and affection of the best son to his father'.[2] Newcastle had no wish to be associated with Cumberland's further rehabilitation.

The episode brought home to Newcastle his fundamental identity of interest with Pitt, despite the difficulties which this entailed. Whatever the King might think, the two ministers were at least united in thinking the existing administration the best that could be devised. Following the King's moves to get rid of Pitt, Newcastle's complaints about his colleague did not dry up completely, but they did diminish significantly in volume. A further factor emphasised the importance of cooperation. Holdernesse, whom Newcastle saw primarily as an intermediary with Pitt and as a means of proposing disagreeable policies to him, had started to rebel. He refused to approach Pitt with Newcastle's request that Legge should be considered as a plenipotentiary for the Prussian convention.[3] He began to approach Pitt directly about decisions upon which he would previously have consulted Newcastle.[4] Like Pitt, he raised difficulties over the Hessian demands.[5] On 19 May, he wrote to Newcastle after a long conversation with Pitt,'I wish you had staid to talk with him yourself'.[6] He failed to summon

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1 Addit. MSS.32879, f.76: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 6 April 1758
2 Addit. MSS.51420: Fox to Ilchester, n.d. (17-22 Oct 1757)
3 Addit. MSS.32879, f.94: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 8 April 1758
4 Cf. Chatham Corr., i, 312-15.
5 Addit. MSS.32880, f.154: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 20 May 1758
6 ibid., f.148: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 20 May 1758

Legge and Mansfield to a meeting to discuss the expedition to the French coast, forcing Newcastle to take the responsibility for summoning them himself.[1] Holdernesse's recalcitrance had its effect: Newcastle started to think twice before employing him with Pitt.[2] Newcastle complained: 'I feel every day my ticklish situation, not only unassisted by Lord Holdernesse, but with difficulties constantly thrown in my way by him, to expose me to unnecessary altercations with Mr Pitt'.[3] Holdernesse's withdrawal from his intermediary role made a good working relationship between the two leading ministers all the more essential.

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1 Addit. MSS.32880, f.474: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 June 1758
2 Cf. ibid., f.216: memorandums for the King, 24 May 1758

ST. MALO AND CHERBOURG

(i)

At the time he signified his agreement to the sending of troops to Emden, Pitt proposed that another expedition should be sent as a diversion to the French coast.[1] This was to involve 14,000 men and fifteen warships - a far more formidable force than that which had been employed at Rochefort.[2] As with the previous expedition, Pitt took the initiative from the start in the drawing up of the plans. It was he who summoned a meeting of the cabinet for 19 May to discuss the orders for the commanders.[3] Marlborough and Sackville, the commander and second-in-command of the land forces, joined Ligonier in recommending St Malo as the objective; after embarking there, they advised that the force should continue its diversionary work by ranging along the coast as far as Boulogne, making real or threatened landings.[4] There may well have been pressure on the generals to arrive at these conclusions. After the failure of the enterprise, Newcastle wrote to Hardwicke:

> Yr Lp will be surprized when you hear, that he said, this was not his project - it was the Generals, and you know what pains he took to work up the Generals, to that very low recommendation of it, viz. a degree of probability.[5]

Almost certainly this was simply an attempt to dissociate himself from the failure of a project of his own, exactly as he had tried to do after the return of the Rochefort expedition.[6]

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1 Above, p. 201
2 von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 186
3 Addit. MSS.32880, f.120: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 17(?) May 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32998, f.39-41: c. 11 May 1758, paper signed by the General officers.
5 Addit. MSS.32880, f.492: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 June 1758
6 Above, p. 178-181

No other minister put forward any alternative suggestion at the cabinet meeting on 19 May. Anson was never enthusiastic about Pitt's coastal raids, unless they were to aim to force the French fleet to sea to risk a battle, something which it was a cardinal point in French strategy to try to avoid.[1] Newcastle simply recorded that there was 'no difference of opinion' at the meeting.[2] He contented himself with the thought that a diversion, of whatever kind, would be of some use, and with Ligonier's opinion that in case of retreat there would be no great loss.[3] He may still have felt that there was a risk of invasion - late in March he saw this as the main reason for avoiding further coastal operations - and events were soon to show that even if such operations were to take place, he would have preferred that they should be directed against the Flanders coast.[4] But he accepted St Malo without comment.

The expedition sailed on 1 June. A week later, after destroying much of the shipping in Cancale Bay, the attack on St Malo was abandoned on the arrival of reports of a concentration of French troops. The rest of the month was spent to little purpose in demonstrations against Havre, Caen, Honfleur and Cherbourg. Even Bute made no attempt to present the results as anything other than a disappointment.[5] Pitt characteristically both disclaimed responsibility for the project so that its disappointing results should not be imputed to him and at the same time, to obtain cabinet support for a renewed attempt off the French coast, tried to paint it as a success: 'expeditions had always succeeded ...

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1 Addit. MSS.35376: Lady Anson to Royston, 25 May 1758
Cf. Mackesy, The War for America, p 423.
2 Addit. MSS.32880, f.156: Newcastle to Legge, 20 May 1758
3 ibid., f.171: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 May 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32997, f.407: points of business, 28 March 1758
5 Chatham Corr., i, 318-9

Did you not take Rochefort last year - it was entirely at your disposition? Have you not taken St Malo?'[1] Pitt had no strong views on the new objective, provided that it significantly diverted French troops: Brest or Rochefort, he thought, would clearly serve this purpose.

Newcastle now ventured to put forward a suggestion of his own. He proposed that the expedition should return to Dunkirk or Ostend.[2] There was much to be said in favour of this idea. The Prussian King, for the first time since he had raised the matter in February, asked Knyphausen on 12 April to try to persuade the English government of the advantages of occasional demonstrations against Dunkirk or the Netherlands ports.[3] Ferdinand had passed on this suggestion as well, specifically suggesting Dunkirk, Ostend or Nieuport.[4] Ferdinand had been forced to retreat to Cologne, but this meant that the Austrian Netherlands were now open to him, and the French had to send troops for their defence. This made it all the more necessary to reassure the Dutch, and it also meant that the French would be less likely to spare troops for a distant diversion, such as that proposed by Pitt, than for a closer one in the Low Countries.[5] On 4 April Newcastle wrote to the Princess Royal of Holland, the daughter of George II, saying that the French army would almost certainly enter the Netherlands:

> They would then have a force, which ... must be formidable to the Republick, and consequently to this country; whereas if yr. R.H. should think it proper to advise and carry out the augmentation; and the Republick should act a vigorous part, ... this dispirited, flying French army ... might not

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1 Dodington, Journal, p.372.
2 Addit. MSS.32880, f.474: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 June 1758
3 Pol. Corr., xvi, 378.
4 Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, i, 226 n.1.
5 Cf. ibid., p.285. Corbett thinks Newcastle was strategically right.

> be in a condition to be recruited and reinforced, and consequently a fair opportunity ... might offer of defeating, at once, the dangerous measures of France, and the Court of Vienna for the future disposition of the Low Countries: and I may in confidence acquaint yr. R.H. that we shall have a considerable army at home, always ready, to make any diversion on the coast of France,[1] which circumstances, or situation, may make advisable.

Naturally, then, he was delighted when Frederick's suggestion to Knyphausen arrived three weeks later:

> For my own part, I am, and have long been, ready to subscribe to what is now the King of Prussia's system; vizt. to work heartily in Holland; and see, whether by threats, or offers, we can get them to take a part.[2]

It was not until after the news of the St Malo failure had arrived that Newcastle dared to put forward these ideas to Pitt and the rest of the cabinet. The Habeas Corpus dispute was over and Parliament was to rise in a few days' time. The King had been unenthusiastic about St Malo, and was now strongly on Newcastle's side.[3] But Newcastle was unsuccessful. Pitt had no wish to transfer the war from Germany to Flanders. He was 'violently against' a scheme for an attack on Nieuport which appealed to Newcastle and the King.[4] The cabinet decided simply to order that the original instructions should remain.

Newcastle was perfectly willing to accept this. One of his reasons for his advocacy of the Flanders coast was that 'if nothing can be done there, (might not we) land afterwards our light horse and 4000, or 5000 men, at Embden, to join Ferdinand's army?'[5] At

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1 Addit. MSS.32879, f.44: Newcastle to Princess Royal, 4 April 1758
2 ibid., f.310: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 April 1758
3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 125 n.1.
4 Addit. MSS.32881, f.329: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 July 1758
5 Addit. MSS.32880, f.474: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 June 1758

the same time as the instructions for the return of the expedition were drawn up, Pitt made a proposal which more than met this suggestion. He decided that when the expedition was over, 6000 troops should be sent to join Ferdinand's army. The following day he went even further, wanting four regiments of cavalry to be sent immediately.[1] Newcastle was understandably delighted: 'we go fast', he told Hardwicke, but I rejoice at it'.[2]

The case for sending the troops was clear. Clermont, the new French commander, was carrying out a steady offensive which was forcing Ferdinand back on Cologne: any sudden advance might well have forced Ferdinand over the Rhine, until Ferdinand on 23 June, the day after Pitt made his decision to send the troops, inflicted a crushing defeat on the French army at Crefelt. After their return, the forces on the expedition would be wasted in England. Anson's blockade of the epidemic-ridden Brest fleet secured the country against any risk of invasion. Coastal operations, because of the weather, would have to end well before the end of the campaigning season in Germany. The decision to send the cavalry was an even more obvious one. All present operations were infantry ones; the cavalry's reputation was exceptionally high; and the four regiments could be sent at once.

But even if the decision was a clear one, Pitt deserves credit for taking it, as Barrington put it, 'at the risk (and certainly there is some risk) of popularity'.[3] There were four areas of support which Pitt had to reconcile to his decision - the Tories in Parliament, Leicester House, the City and his own few

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1 Addit. MSS.32881, f.37-8: Newcastle to Rockingham, 24 June 1758
2 Addit. MSS.35417, f.238: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 June 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32881, f.35: Barrington to Newcastle, 24 June 1758

personal followers. With each of these groups, he took the greatest care to limit the scope for dissatisfaction.

In the case of Parliament, the timing of Pitt's decision is almost certainly significant. It was first suggested by him on 22 June, two days after the beginning of the summer recess. Yet there is strong evidence that Pitt had made up his mind well in advance. In December, he had told the House that he would 'not now send a drop of our blood to the Elbe, to be lost in that ocean of gore'.[1] But in the debate on 19 April, he admitted that circumstances might arise in which he would be prepared to send some British troops if they could be useful to Ferdinand, 'provided that they could be recalled at any moment, and were despatched not merely for the purpose of protecting petty states, but for the promotion of common interests, and for the decision of the war as a whole'.[2] The following month, he had even agreed that troops might be sent, though only on the improbable condition that Frederick should join the Prussian army to that of Ferdinand and take command of the united force.[3] At the very least, Pitt was opening up for himself the option of sending troops. As early as March, the Spanish Ambassador thought that Pitt would do so and that 'in order to screen himself with the Parliament, he will get the motion made by a member of the House of Commons, in order to discover their way of thinking, without forcing the business by a majority'.[4]

More concrete evidence of the fact that Pitt had decided on the dispatch of a British reinforcement by May at the latest is

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 88.
2 Addit. MSS.17493, f.153-4: Calcraft to Rigby, 20 April 1758
3 Pol. Corr., xvii, 24.
4 Chatham Corr., i, 297

provided by his treatment of Leicester House. Careful preparation was necessary in view of Bute's statement of the previous year that 'the idea of sending troops abroad is totally inconsistent with the being of this administration'.[1] In trying to bring Bute round, Pitt played on a weakness of character recognised by his daughter:

> It was my father's foible, I must confess, to be too open to flattery, especially that kind of it which consists in professions of devoted attachment, and my mother constantly said that Mr Pitt and Lord Temple poured it upon him with a profusion which sometimes excited in her doubt of[2] their sincerity, on his part indignantly repelled.

From the end of May onwards, Pitt's letters to Bute were far more frequent in number and flattering in tone. He promised to do all he could to secure the appointment of James Stuart-Mackenzie as minister to Turin.[3] In a flurry of notes, couched in extravagant and effusive language, he kept him informed about the progress of the war. Three days before he announced his conversion to the idea of sending troops, Pitt wrote to Bute:

> May my noble friend's honest labours in planting the seeds of moral virtue never be frustrated: and may the reviving country reap the happy fruits of a Prince train'd to love his[4] people enough to wish generously to reform them!

Pitt's tactics worked. Bute gave his approbation against his real wishes. On 23 June, Pitt told Bute of his decision and showed that he had for some time been preparing Bute for it:

> As we have had more conversations than one on the subjects of some troops joining for an offensive operation, on the Rhine, I have the satisfaction to understand your[5] Lordship's ideas favour mine on this important question.

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1 Above, p 180
2 R. Sedgwick, 'William Pitt and Lord Bute, 1755-1758', History Today, vi (10) 1956
3 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p 148
4 ibid., p 152
5 ibid., p 153

Bute replied the same evening:

> You judge truly of me when you suppose my opinion will go along with the measure you have suggested. I ever thought that when any small body of men could be spared conveniently from hence, nothing would help the army more. Suffer me to suggest caution: but why do I mention this to you who know so well the people you have to do with. I retract that word, and am persuaded you have already been most explicit in your declarations that a small body shall not lead to a large one, which would be ruin.[1]

Pitt in reply assured Bute that he would go no further than his conviction allowed, 'authorised and confirmed by your concurrence ... A thousand real thanks for my noble friend's salutary caution'.[2] This prompted Bute to go even further in his approbation than before, and he assured Pitt: 'the number of men you propose sending is in truth neither more nor less than what I had in secret wished to go'.[3]

Bute's secret views were in reality very different. Michel recognised that Leicester House was 'tout à fait contre l'envoy des troupes anglaises sur le continent'.[4] The Prince of Wales invariably reflected what Bute had said to him, and when the expedition returned on 1 July after its abortive cruising off the French coast, he wrote in alarm to Bute:

> I suppose they will have orders to go on some other expedition, or else I am certain the K(ing) will make a push to have them sent to G(erman)y; and I can't help fearing your wavering friend would not be against it.[5]

- an indication that Bute had been far less complimentary about Pitt to the Prince than he had been to Pitt's face. He was at the same time severely critical of Newcastle to Pitt, as an outlet for his real feelings about the sending of troops.[6]

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1 Chatham MSS., 30/8/24: Bute to Pitt, 'Friday past 7' (23 June)
2 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p.155
3 Chatham Corr., i, 320
4 von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 183 n.3.
5 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 11.
6 Chatham MSS., 30/8/24: Bute to Pitt, n.d.

The same reason that made Bute privately regret the sending of troops also made it important for him to continue to place his faith in Pitt. Pitt was the one champion of the policy of French coastal raids with which Leicester House had become associated: the sending of troops to Germany both appeared to detract from the importance of littoral warfare as a means of carrying out the continental diversion, and made it all the more easy and desirable to identify Leicester House clearly with this type of strategy; in doing this, Pitt's help was essential. It was this consideration that persuaded Bute early in May to reject a new attempt by Legge to supplant Pitt at Leicester House. Bute refused to agree to his suggestion that 'there might be a third party, of which he would be one if they would give him leave'.[1] Before the St Malo expedition was planned, there were strong indications that Bute was dissatisfied with the methods used by Pitt to reconcile the country gentlemen to his continental measures, and particularly with his enthusiasm over the Habeas Corpus issue.[2] But by 22 May, three days after the cabinet meeting to make the arrangements for the expedition, Pitt felt able to ask Bute for his support on this question; and the following day the Duchess of Newcastle told Lincoln, that Bute, whom Newcastle had seen that morning, had been 'very civil and kind to him in the conversation, but ... full as much sett upon the particular point, that is to come on, on

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1 Torrens, History of Cabinets, ii, 454. Exactly what Legge meant is unclear - Hardwicke himself could not judge - but cf. Dodington, Journal, p. 201 for a similar suggestion in similar circumstances.

2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 50. Addit. MSS.32880, f.101: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 May 1758. Addit. MSS.35352, f.1: Royston to Hardwicke, 18 March 1758

Thursday, as Mr Pitt'.[1] And after the Lords had rejected the bill, Bute's language was as extravagant as any that Pitt had used.[2]

The Leicester House policy soon faced two major setbacks. First, the amphibious operations of June failed all too obviously to live up to the hopes that had been placed in them. Second, Lord George Sackville caused major embarrassment by his defection. He had never been enthusiastic about the strategy of coastal raids. The previous year, he had declined to take part in the Rochefort expedition.[3] Before the St Malo expedition, he apparently wrote to Pitt to ridicule operations against the French ports.[4] General Mostyn expressed the view characteristic of the army officers when he wrote to Newcastle: '(I am not) insensible of the difference, between a campaign in Germany, under Prince Ferdinand, ... and cruising like a marine with the fleet'.[5] Sackville too was 'sick of coasting',[6] and he asked Pitt to be transferred to Germany.[7] Even in action he had failed to distinguish himself: there had been rumours at St Malo that he 'was not among the first to court danger'.[8] Bute was understandably annoyed by Sackville's behaviour;[9] but he could not easily drop him for taking a line shared by most soldiers, and Newcastle, at Pitt's request, persuaded the King to appoint him second-in-command, again to Marlborough, in Germany.[10]

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1 Newcastle (Clumber) MSS., NeC 3154: Duchess of Newcastle to Lincoln, 23 May 1758.
2 Chatham Corr., i, 316-7.
3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 45.
4 Egerton MSS.1719, f.96: Lady Sophia Egerton to Bentinck, 4 March 1760
5 Addit. MSS.32881, f.238: Mostyn to Newcastle, 10 July 1758
6 Devonshire MSS. 416.53: Conway to Devonshire, 7 July 1758
7 Chatham Corr., i,326-7.
8 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 125.
9 Addit. MSS.32884, f.261: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Oct 1758
10 Addit. MSS.32881, f.412: Newcastle to Bedford, 20 July 1758

The disappointing result at St Malo, the defection of Sackville and the decision to send troops for Europe made it urgent for Bute to take action to enhance the damaged prestige of the policy of coastal raids; this could only be done in collaboration with Pitt. Bute did all he could. He objected strongly to the idea of General Dury to succeed Marlborough, who was to take the German command: he appeared to be the only available commander, but even Newcastle admitted that he would be 'not much for the hono'r of our expedition'. He pressed for the sending of troops from Scotland rather than from those destined for Germany, so as not to prejudice the chance of success.[1] After the return of the fleet on 1 July, he urged that it should be sent back to the French coast as soon as possible.[2] For the failure of the attempt, he blamed not the plan itself, but cabals at home.[3] Happily for Bute, he successfully arranged for Prince Edward, the Prince of Wales' younger brother, to serve with Howe and Cherbourg.[4] This did something to make up for the loss of Sackville, but Pitt's help was as necessary as ever in re-establishing the reputation of the coastal strategy.

Pitt, indeed, was anxious to help. He even made some attempt to present the St Malo episode as a success. He played up the first promising news from Cherbourg. By 15 August Bligh and Howe, the new commanders, had destroyed the fortifications and harbour

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1 Addit. MSS.32881, f.329: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 July 1758. Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p. 157

2 Chatham Corr., i, 323-4.

3 ibid., 318-9.

4 R. Sedgwick, 'William Pitt and Lord Bute, 1755-8', History Today, vi, 10(1956), 652.

works at Cherbourg, burnt or captured twenty small vessels in the harbour and carried off some of the cannon, guns and ammunition. Pitt ensured that these were put on public display in Hyde Park, after which they were ceremoniously taken to be deposited in the Tower.[1] So successful were Pitt's efforts that Newcastle, according to Fox, was 'vastly hurt that he can get nobody to allow him any share in the honour of our late good news'.[2] Pitt also took up Bute's complaint of the activities of Newcastle and his supporters in aiming to sabotage the expedition. When it became clear that Anson, whose command had only been a temporary expedient, wished to return to the head of the Admiralty once it was certain the French would not leave Brest, Pitt wrote to Bute:

> I am more than ever impatient to get it (the expedition) away, finding by a letter from Lord Anson that his Lordship is laying in for a reason to come into port, before it is long. Whether this be all from his own movement, or by concert, to embarrass and render impracticable farther operations on the coasts of France, I will not venture to decide.[3]

Pitt in fact was very uneasy at Anson's continued absence.[4] He told Newcastle's secretary that he thought Anson's presence was essential for consultation, but that he could not order him back since his assumption of the command had been his own decision.[5] But so long as Anson was absent, Pitt had useful evidence with which to support Bute's conspiracy theory.

The fact that the expedition to the French coast coincided with the decision to send troops to Europe ensured for Pitt the continued support of the City as well as Leicester House. The

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 133.
2 Addit. MSS.51420: Fox to Ilchester, n.d. (24-30 Aug 1758)
3 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p.157.
4 R. Middleton, 'Pitt, Anson and the Admiralty; 1756-1761', History, 55 (1970), 192-3.
5 Addit. MSS.35417, f.275-6: Jones to Hardwicke, 29 Aug 1758

City was thoroughly satisfied with the result of the St Malo expedition and was 'in a perfect state of tranquility'.[1] Beckford urged Pitt to continue the experiment of coastal raids. The infantry should be used only for this purpose: but there was no reason why as much of the cavalry as could be spared should not be sent to Ferdinand. Beckford saw it as a straight competition between Germany and the French coast for the employment of the infantry:[2] Pitt's scheme, of course, provided for both. If there was any opposition in the City to the decision to send troops, it quickly evaporated. Symmer reported to Mitchell on 20 July:

> The sending of troops to Germany, at first gave some disgust to the City, and to that it was imputed that our stocks fell a little. But such is still the popularity of this ministry, that they now seem to be satisfied with it; and the more sensible men among them come now to be of opinion it had been a right measure to have sent them last spring.[3]

After the St Malo failure, Newcastle would have much preferred to send the troops on the expedition direct to Ferdinand.[4] He went so far as to propose in cabinet that 2000 troops should be taken from the expeditionary force and sent to Stade to help guard the 7000 French prisoners.[5] But he recognised that it was politically useful to Pitt that the expedition should continue; and if Pitt could by this means keep his supporters quiet, Newcastle was quite willing to allow it to continue.[6] As Dupplin put it:

> It is a great satisfaction to me to hear that the two capital points are settled with mutuall agreement. If an acquiescence in one, will make the other go down with ease and popularity, surely it is a great point gained.[7]

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1 Addit. MSS.32880, f.499: Watkins to Newcastle, 19 June 1758
Walpole, Correspondence, 213.
2 Chatham Corr., i, 327-30
3 Addit. MSS.6839, f.100: Symmer to Mitchell, 20 July 1758
4 Addit. MSS.35417, f.242-3: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 July 1758
5 Addit. MSS.37232 (Misc. Letters), f.148: Pitt to Temple (?), 3 Aug 1758
6 Above, p. 47.
7 Addit. MSS.32881, f.424: Dupplin to Newcastle, 20 July 1758

With his closest political associates, Pitt had even less trouble. To George Grenville, he did not even provide a justification for his decision to send troops; and Grenville approved without reservation.[1] Temple also raised no objection, though he thought that the extra troops for the army ought to have been provided by Hanover:

> Undoubtedly we have never sworn by Styx or Toryism or Patriotism, never, in no case whatever, to send a man to the Continent, and the Emden regiment is a proof of it, but that of sending these squadrons to reinforce the Hanoverian army at this time must wholly depend upon circumstances and objects of which you are the judge, and of which success will be the best vindication. I will not ask you what additional force his Majesty sends in consequence of the great contributions he raises and the cheap subsistence of his army,[2] but I will wish you every kind of good fortune.

He admitted that 'much, very much' could be said in favour of Pitt's decision, 'though as one step necessarily draws on many more, in any hands but yours, ... my reluctance would be extreme'.[3] For the moment, however, the goodwill of his closest supporters was scarcely damaged. The lack of opposition to the measure from all the areas from which it might have been expected was a tribute to the effectiveness and thoroughness of Pitt's preparations.

(ii)

The rising of Parliament and Pitt's decision to send the troops temporarily eased Newcastle's task. Relations between Pitt and the King naturally improved. The King was delighted by Pitt's acceptance of the Hessian demands and of the £800,000 vote of credit: even more so by the decision to send the troops.[4]

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1 The Grenville Papers, i, 244. Chatham MSS.30/8/34: Grenville to Pitt, 28 June 1758

2 Chatham MSS., 30/8/61: Temple to Pitt, 29 June 1758

3 Chatham Corr., i, 324-5.

4 Addit. MSS.32881, f.37-8: Newcastle to Rockingham, 24 June 1758. ibid., f.190: Newcastle to Anson, 7 July 1758

Newcastle was keen to show his satisfaction with Pitt. Having had the Militia bill postponed in the Lords with the intention of organising opposition to it, he now simply introduced an amendment to increase the Crown's power of vetoing officers and allowed the bill to pass, securing a two to one majority.[1] He was determined to give no offence in the counties of which he was lord-lieutenant. When his Nottinghamshire friends failed to attend the meeting fixed to receive the names of potential officers, he appointed a second meeting and emphasised that the same thing must not happen again.[2] In Middlesex, anticipating difficulties, he thought of resigning the lieutenancy to escape responsibility.[3] Newcastle also took up a number of patronage requests by Bute and Temple, though he knew that this would annoy the King.[4] He knew too that the King was reluctant to appoint Sackville second-in-command in Germany, but was quite willing to press his case.[5] He even thought of inviting Bute to Claremont to signalise the happy state of relationships: but 'Claremont peaches are not yet ripe enough'.[6] So long as Pitt and the King remained on reasonable terms Newcastle's position was tolerable; but if their relations were again to deteriorate, Newcastle, more valuable to Pitt than ever, might find himself more unpopular with the King than he had been since before the start of the administration.

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1 Addit. MSS.32880, f.377: Newcastle to Devonshire, 9 June 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32882, f.263: Newcastle to Charlton, 10 Aug 1758
3 ibid., f.399: Newcastle to White, 17 Aug 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32880, f.301: memorandums for the King, 2 June 1758. ibid., f.375: Newcastle to Legge, 9 June 1758. Addit.MSS.32882, f.13: Newcastle to Bedford, 21 July 1758. ibid., f.389: Temple to Newcastle, 16 Aug 1758. ibid.,f.461: Newcastle to Temple, 19 Aug 1758
5 Newcastle (Clumber) MSS., NeC 3153: Newcastle to Lincoln, 9 July 1758
6 Addit. MSS.32882, f.383: Newcastle to Legge, 16 Aug 1758
Addit. MSS.32883, f.38: Newcastle to Legge, 22 Aug 1758

LOUISBOURG AND ST. CAST

(i)

Events in Europe and America during the summer recess imposed a major strain on relations between the ministers and the King. After Ferdinand's success at Crefelt, Ruremonde and Dusseldorf rapidly fell to his advance. But Contades quickly returned to the offensive, and the presence of Soubise at Cassel forced Ferdinand to cross the Rhine on 10 August. Divisions ensued between Contades and Soubise; and Contades' effectiveness was much reduced by the need to make a considerable detachment to the French coast. But he was able to reinforce Soubise at Cassel, where the French won a significant success against a body of Ferdinand's troops. On the news of this defeat, Ferdinand retired to the Lippe.

With the exception, therefore, of a brief interval between Contades' detachment to the French coast and Ferdinand's passage of the Lippe, Hanover lay open to the French. On 23 July the Hanoverian ministers again retired to Stade. After the generous reinforcement recently decided upon, further substantial help for the continent could not be expected: Pitt made it clear that he would not consider giving more for the Electoral troops than had been given last year.[1] He had recently refused even to take into British pay two regiments of Hanoverian troops because of the political consequences, though even Newcastle admitted the expense was 'trifling'.[2] The King inevitably started to think seriously of what might happen to Hanover at a future peace if the French were to occupy it. He began to press his ministers to promise that, as

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1 Addit. MSS.32884, f.437: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Oct 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32998, f.137: additional memorandums, 10 Aug 1758

an alternative to immediate help for Hanover, they would support him in gaining new territory at the peace.[1] Neither minister could agree to this. It was above all important to avoid accusations that British interests were being sacrificed to Hanover: Newcastle was even afraid that Ferdinand's passage of the Rhine in August might give rise to objections 'that it was done voluntarily for the sake of going to the defence of Hanover'.[2] This attitude naturally led to a sharp deterioration in relations with the King. On 5 October Newcastle wrote to Hardwicke:

> I never found His Majesty in such ill humour as he was this day; hardly civil, and that is what I can scarce say has happened, especially of late. He began by telling me - that the French had ruined his country before they left it, that he was ruined for us, who had used him very ill; that at the end of the war he, who was a <u>great Elector</u>, should now be only <u>a little Prince</u>; that in short, "My Lord you won't give me money, and therefore you must increase my dominions by acquisitions from my enemies".[3]

All that Newcastle could do was to point out to the King that it was unreasonable to expect Pitt to go further: his opponents were even trying to accuse him of being '<u>Hanoverian</u>, under the name of <u>Prussian</u>'.[4]

The ministers had every reason for caution and suspicion of Hanoverian intentions. In June, the Hanoverian ministers approached the King of Prussia and tried to obtain a guarantee that Osnabruck, Hildesheim and Paderborn should be made over to the King in his electoral capacity at the peace. They were particularly anxious that this proposal should be concealed from the English ministers; but Frederick told Mitchell and insisted that any

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1 Addit. MSS.32884, f.32: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Sept 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32882, f.446: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 19 Aug 1758
3 Yorke, <u>Hardwicke</u>, iii, 230
4 Addit. MSS.32884, f.323: memorandums (Count Viry), 10 Oct 1758; ibid., f.308: memorandums for the King, 10 Oct 1758

negotiations with Hanover should be carried out through England.[1] Three months later, the King attempted to conceal from Pitt an intercepted dispatch from Bernis, containing a strong wish for a separate neutrality for Hanover.[2] Despite this concealment, Pitt was deeply suspicious of the Hanoverian ministry. He rightly thought that they were badly divided and that 'that (party) will be taken, which according to future events shall happen to be most convenient'.[3]

The conflict between the King and his ministers had been sharpened by the news that arrived on 17 August of the capture of Louisbourg. This made it likely that the French would now concentrate their efforts on Europe, and the most reliable source of intelligence from Versailles confirmed this view.[4] Newcastle regretted that after 'the success in America, et ailleurs, ... France will revenge itself on Hanover'.[5] This fear emphasised not only the difference between the King and his ministers, but also a difference with Pitt that had lasted since the threat to Hanover had appeared; and it brought to light a new disagreement of more fundamental importance, with Newcastle ranged against both Pitt and the King.

Until the danger to Hanover had arisen, Newcastle had been more than content with the reinforcement for Ferdinand that had already been decided upon.[6] When the danger became apparent, Newcastle for the first time, though with extreme timidity and reluctance, took an initiative in the formulation of policy. It

1 Bisset, Mitchell, ii, 33.
2 Addit. MSS.32884, f.263: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Oct 1758
Cf. ibid., f.124 for Bernis' letter.
3 Addit. MSS.32884, f.266: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Oct 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32883, f.380: intelligence, 9 Sept 1758
5 Addit. MSS.32883, f.116: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Aug 1758
6 Addit. MSS.32881,f.329: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 July 1758

was the fear of accusations of pandering to the King's electoral interests that gave rise to this initiative. He wrote to Hardwicke on 23 July:

> I fear everything from ... the march of P. Soubise, to get again into the King's countrey; such a step ... would necessarily lay the King's army under the greatest difficulties ... The King will undoubtedly insist, that Prince Ferdinand should return with his army to protect his countrey; Mr P. will certainly grumble at it, if not openly oppose it, the English troops may possibly be recalled, and we shall have all the disagreeable altercations about Hanover aims and Hanover measures.[1]

A further reinforcement for Ferdinand might enable him to take action which would avert this danger to Hanover, and news that Frederick had recalled his cavalry from Ferdinand to serve against the Russians strengthened the case for sending more troops.[2] Newcastle went about making this suggestion with the greatest care: 'I am very cautious of making any proposal, that would not go down; there can be no good in that, nothing but altercation and ill humour, which must ruin everything'.[3] He tried in vain to persuade Holdernesse to make the proposal in his own name and was forced to do so himself, 'gently' suggesting that two battalions should be taken from the expedition.[4]

Pitt recognised the importance of increasing Ferdinand's army, but was determined not to do it in the way Newcastle suggested. He could not afford further to test the goodwill of his supporters. When six months later, in February 1759, Lord George

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1 Addit. MSS.32882, f.45: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 July 1758
2 ibid., f.393-4: Newcastle to Yorke, 17 Aug 1758. This letter shows that Newcastle's motive for suggesting a further reinforcement was to enable Ferdinand to make a detachment to obstruct Soubise's progress to Hanover.
3 Addit. MSS.32882, f.38: Newcastle to Holdernesse, 22 July 1758
4 ibid., f.63: Holdernesse to Newcastle, 25 July 1758. ibid., f.200-201: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Aug 1758

Sackville pressed him for more British troops for Ferdinand, he

> replied that if it could be done, he would be the first to put a hand to it, but that it would be dangerous in a country such as this to stretch the cord too much; the public must be humoured.[1]

It was all the more important in August 1758 to decline further help. Pitt had only secured the acquiescence of his supporters to his decision to reinforce Ferdinand by his championship of the expedition to the French coast; he could hardly agree to Newcastle's proposal to divert troops intended for the expedition to Germany. He even claimed that he wanted to send two more battalions to Bligh and Howe rather than, as Newcastle wanted, to remove them. It is very doubtful if Pitt was serious about this proposal. Newcastle himself realised that there might be another intention:

> I thought one of his great objects was to make it impracticable to send any thing more to Ferdinand. He talk'd of the diminution, which had been made of the three regiments from the expedition, to send to Prince Ferdinand, and that we should hear that complain'd of. That was his own doing; and probably he now wants to make amends for it. He determines to send for Ligonier, tomorrow, tho' he knows I shall not be here, and he will either have them sent, or lay upon me the stopping them.[2]

It was probably this second course that Pitt had in mind. It would have clear advantages with his supporters. Whatever the explanation, nothing more was heard of the suggestion.

At the same time that he proposed the reinforcement, and for the same reasons, Newcastle took a second and equally irresolute initiative. Ferdinand himself saw his only chance in Dutch participation. This might enable him to take measures which would avoid a long and politically damaging struggle for Hanover.

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1 Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. of Mrs Stopford-Sackville, i, 303-4.

2 Addit. MSS.32882, f.349-50: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 Aug 1758

Newcastle claimed that he would do all he could to bring in the Dutch 'if I am the single man, which I think I am'.[1] But he was anxious to avoid the responsibility for making any proposals, and just as he had tried to use Holdernesse to suggest the reinforcement, he attempted now to persuade Joseph Yorke at the Hague to advocate on his own initiative any measures which might help an accommodation. He covered himself by emphasising that he was only sending hints to Yorke, not orders: it was the same tactic that he had used with Sandwich at Breda and the Hague at the close of the last war.[2] Hardwicke, always suspicious of Newcastle's efforts to unload responsibility on to his son, saw his intention and asked him: 'what is it possible for Joe to do without orders?... How can a minister employ'd abroad venture to form and transmit a plan of his own head, ... wherein some things must be propos'd to be given up on our part?'[3] For a time, Newcastle hoped that the capture of Cape Breton might persuade the Dutch to take part,[4] a view which ran directly counter to the lessons of the two closing years of the previous war. But having failed to pass the responsibility of making proposals on to Yorke, he was determined not to assume it himself.

The capture of Cape Breton, in addition to the fact that by increasing the French threat to Hanover it brought out more clearly the respective positions of the King and his ministers on the question of how it might be helped, also revealed a new and more lasting source of division within the ministry itself, Before the

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1 Addit. MSS.32882, f.347: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 Aug 1758
2 Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748, p. 185 sqq.
3 Addit. MSS.32882, f.373: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 Aug 1758
4 ibid., f.396: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 17 Aug 1758

news from America arrived, Newcastle had envisaged another campaign.[1] When it came he saw it as 'the greatest and most glorious event, that ever was, (which), if proper use be made of it, must do our business'.[2] He wanted to keep the fortifications intact rather than destroy them, to increase the value of Cape Breton as a bargaining counter which would be handed back to the French at the peace.[3] In the last war, his obstinacy over the retention of Cape Breton had been a means of avoiding peace: now, his willingness to surrender it intact was to be a means of trying to bring an early end to the war.

There was good reason to hope that this might be possible. The French finances were known to be in a desperate state, and an approach through Denmark to the King as Elector, firmly rejected, showed that the French ministry was thinking seriously of an early peace.[4] Cressener's intelligence from Versailles, dating from before the news of Louisbourg arrived in France, took the view that if it fell, Belleisle would try to use it to bring about a peace - even a separate peace, if Austria were to prove uncooperative.[5] Newcastle had a number of powerful political reasons for wishing to exploit this possibility. It would remove the source of many of his difficulties with the King and Pitt. He rightly predicted that if the war were to continue, 'the disputes ... which will arise will lay us under the greatest difficulties,

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1 Addit. MSS.32882, f.396: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 17 Aug 1758. It is clear from the postscript that the news of Louisbourg only reached Newcastle after this letter had been written.
2 ibid., f.413: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 Aug 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32883, f.114-5: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Aug 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32880, f.33: Havrincour to Bernis, 12 May 1758. ibid., f.40: Steinberg to the King, 2 May 1758. ibid., f.94: the King to Steinberg, 16 May 1758
5 Addit. MSS.32882, f.438-41: intelligence, 19 Aug 1758

to find the means of supporting the expence; and what may be even worse, to agree amongst ourselves, as to the quality and quantity of that expence'. The City was worried about the sluggishness of the circulation, and Henry Legge as Chancellor was as enthusiastic as Newcastle about the idea of peace.[2] Hardwicke was equally keen, and there was the further advantage that Bute, with Leicester House's patronage of the strategy of coastal operations threatened by Sackville's behaviour and by Pitt's decision to send troops to Ferdinand, had also started to think in terms of an early peace.[3] Ferdinand, from the opposite angle, saw peace as the only alternative to a further reinforcement.[4] Mitchell reported that Frederick was also thinking increasingly of peace.[5] Perhaps most important of all, peace would remove the danger of a campaign based on a struggle for Hanover, with all the political difficulties this might entail. Nor would it be possible, if Cape Breton were to be given up, for the King to hold out for any territorial acquisitions for Hanover.

This was why the King was strongly opposed to the idea of peace. When Newcastle discussed the prospect with him, he found him 'impetuous, impracticable, not to be controll'd or advised'.[6] He talked 'like some other of his ministers upon American points ... His Majesty says, we must keep Cape Breton, take Canada, drive the French out of America, have two armies consisting together of 80,000 men in Germany'.[7] Pitt's reasons for wishing the war to

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1 Addit. MSS.32884, f.437: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Oct 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32883, f.450: Watkins to Newcastle, 14 Sept 1758
Addit. MSS.32882, f.448: Legge to Newcastle, 19 Aug 1758
3 ibid., f.373: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 Aug 1758
Chatham Corr., i, 320-1
4 Addit. MSS.32882, f.269-71: Ferdinand to Holdernesse, 11 Aug 1758
5 Bisset, Mitchell, i, 419
6 Addit. MSS.32998, f.148: business with Mansfield, 23 Aug 1758
7 Addit. MSS.32883, f.115: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Aug 1758

continue were of course quite different from those of the King. He simply wanted to derive the full benefit from the French disorganisation and division.[1] The opinion was widespread that the ceremonies at St Paul's to celebrate the capture of Louisbourg were deliberately devised by Pitt to make its restitution more difficult.[2] Hardwicke attempted to exploit these different motives with the King, telling Newcastle:

> I fear His Majesty's way of talking to Mr Pitt is one reason of his silence, because he thinks the war will go on witht. his appearing to press for it. It is a way of talking, that, in my opinion, will do a great deal of harm; and is I think destructive of His Majesty's views, for the more Great Britain insists to keep the less will be yielded to the Elector of Hanover.[3]

For the moment, the division between Newcastle on the one hand and Pitt and the King on the other was of little practical importance. Newcastle accepted that a vigorous campaign was the best way to bring about a quick peace: 'I am now for <u>pushing</u> every where. But I should rejoice to see a good peace this winter ... whilst we are in a condition to do so, I am for making peace'.[4] Newcastle therefore supported the two major decisions taken by Pitt between the news of Cape Breton and the start of the new session of Parliament. The first was to send 3000 troops to America.[5] The second was to send an expedition of about 6000 troops to the West Indies, to try to capture Martinique. This was suggested by Beckford to Pitt on 26 August. Pitt had attempted no enterprise in the West Indies until he was sure of Cape Breton

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1 Cf. Pares, 'American versus Continental Warfare', <u>Eng. Hist. Rev.</u>, li (1936), - 449
2 Addit. MSS.35352, f.45: Hardwicke to Royston, 11 Sept 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32885, f.38: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 22 Oct 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32883, f.418: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 12 Sept 1758
5 <u>ibid.</u>, f.38: Newcastle to Legge, 22 Aug 1758

and the mouth of the St Lawrence.[1] The purpose of Beckford's suggestion, he emphasised, was not to take Martinique and keep it as a permanent acquisition, but to use it to buy back Minorca at the peace and thereby incur no risk of having to surrender Cape Breton.[2] Newcastle accepted the idea readily enough.[3] His only fear was that it might involve a dangerous drain on resources, since if the French were to land in the south of England in the autumn or winter it would be difficult to march much more than 5000 troops against them - a very similar argument to that used by Amherst and Sandwich against Germain and the King in 1779, when an identical project was under discussion.[4]

Thus the news of Louisbourg had a divisive effect on the English administration. It clarified the differences between the King and his ministers on the question of how Hanover might be assisted. It led Newcastle for the first time to give serious thought to the possibility of an early peace; and it led him, also for the first time, to try to play a part in the determination of war policy. Fear - political, not strategic - was at the root of this apparent sign of independence: fear of accusations of Hanoverianism and fear of how he could carry on his departmental work and his intermediary role between Pitt and the King if the war were to continue. His attempt to take an initiative had no effect whatever on the making of policy: Pitt's control was as complete as ever.

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1 Cf. Pares, War and Trade, p. 165 sqq.
2 Chatham MSS., 30/8/19: Beckford to Pitt, 26 Aug 1758. Cf. Chatham Corr., i, 352-4.
3 Torrens, History of Cabinets, ii, 473.
4 Addit. MSS.32884, f.64: memorandums for the King, 20 Sept 1758 ibid., f.175: Barrington to Newcastle, 27 Sept 1758. Cf. Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 307-9.

(ii)

After their modest success at Cherbourg, Bligh and Howe returned to England on 19 August. On the last day of the month they again sailed for the French coast and four days later started to land the troops to the westward of St Malo. During the course of the operation the fleet, with the artillery still on board, was forced by a change in the weather to take shelter in the bay of St Cast. Bligh, cut off from his fleet, abandoned his intention of making for St Malo and marched inland towards Matignon, which he could use as a base for a move against St Brieuc. But Bligh did not even reach Matignon. The French had collected a force reputed to be much superior, and Bligh ordered a retreat to St Cast, where the re-embarkation was so clumsily managed that the English lost some 700 troops.

When Bligh returned to England he was advised not to present himself at court; and when he eventually appeared, the King said not a word to him.[1] Bute, refusing to admit that Bligh had failed, was 'highly offended' at this treatment. The reason is clear. Bligh's official instructions virtually gave him a free hand on the northern coast, stipulating that after Cherbourg he should attack anywhere he thought suitable between Morlaix and the easternmost part of Normandy.[2] The idea that a second attack should be made on St Malo had been decided upon when the expedition had returned to Portsmouth after its first abortive attempt. Neither Pitt nor Newcastle knew anything of this secret decision.[3]

1 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p.163. Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, p. 16.
2 Chatham MSS. 30/8/85: instructions, 18 July 1758.
3 Addit. MSS.32884, f.261: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Oct 1758

It appears to have been taken by Gilbert Elliot and Fitzmaurice, two of the principal figures at Leicester House, in collaboration with Colonel Clark, the Quartermaster-General on the expedition. Howe also accepted the plan.[1] Prince Edward was also informed of the scheme.[2]

Clark was strongly critical of Bligh's performance. He accused him of 'zig zagging in his own way', of not consulting his officers, of doing everything 'diametrically opposite to my way of thinking'.[3] But both Clark and Bligh were equally blamed for the failure. They incurred the 'universal contempt, hatred, and disapprobation of the whole army'.[4] And this attitude was shared by the public. 'The clamour against Blythe is prodigious', Calcraft reported to Fox; and Clark was said, if possible, to be even more unpopular.[5] Just as they were both censured for the failure, Bute felt obliged to defend them both. He appealed on their behalf to Pitt, asking him to try to secure Clark's appointment as a full Colonel and to remonstrate with the King about his treatment of Bligh, 'the only man that has been victorious in France'.[6] He attempted to enlist Pitt's support in common opposition to Newcastle, to whom he attributed the King's reception of Bligh: 'nothing has ever happened since we put the Crown on that little Pelham's head that so thoroughly opened my eyes'.[7]

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1 Perhaps for the reason suggested by Whitworth, Ligonier, p 265
2 Bute MSS: Clark to Bute, 13 Sept 1758. This shows that the St Malo plan was primarily Clark's.
3 ibid., Clark to Bute, 17 Aug and 13 Sept 1758
4 Hist. MSS. Comm., Stopford-Sackville, i, 296
5 Letters to Lord Holland, p 133
6 Sedgwick, 'Letters from William Pitt to Lord Bute, 1755-1758', p 163-4
7 ibid.

But Pitt would not cooperate. He was understandably annoyed by the effort of Leicester House to go behind his back and to reap all the credit in the event of success and he determined that Bligh and Clark should carry all the unpopularity for their failure. He created some surprise by criticising the descent as one which 'cou'd answer no purpose'.[1] He denied that Newcastle had been responsible for Bligh's reception, claiming that his colleague had acted honourably throughout, and he refused to help in obtaining Clark's promotion.[2] As John Campbell observed, the way in which the Cherbourg success had been exaggerated by the 'most childish cannon triumph' made the St Cast failure seem all the more embarrassing: having done all he could to identify himself with the former, Pitt was now taking equal care to dissociate himself from the latter.[3]

Pitt's support of Bute's patronage of the expedition had clearly come to an end. Bute now expressed his real views on Pitt's decision to send troops to Ferdinand, which he had so far concealed. He told Viry that Pitt

> was a very good and a very able man; but that he had not the fermété that he imagined he had had ... that a person the least concern'd in affairs might embarrass Mr Pitt extremely in the House of Commons, if he ask'd whether any account had been taken, or any review made, of the real number of the King's army in Germany, which he believed Mr P was quite ignorant of: that as to Mr P. il se laisse mener trop: il se perdra: that his real objection to P. was, he thought Mr P had too much regard, or management, for the Duke of Newcastle. That Lord B wish'd only such a conduct towards (Newcastle), as might faire aller la machine.[4]

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1 Letters to Lord Holland, p. 132.
2 Addit. MSS.32884, f.412: memorandums (Count Viry) 17 Oct 1758
3 Addit. MSS.51406: Campbell to Fox, 26 Sept 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32884, f.262, 265: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Oct 1758

Dodington was encouraging Bute in this sort of language by promising to inflame the Tories against the decision to send troops to Europe.

Neither Pitt nor Bute had sought the breach and both made efforts to heal it. Pitt tried to show Bute that the coalition was an arrangement in his interests: only Newcastle could prevent the restoration of Cumberland, and if he were to retire, Pitt would have to do so as well. Dodington was deceiving Bute: he was in reality 'entirely a friend to the Duke of Cumberland, and Mr Fox'.[1] Bute reciprocated this friendly approach. He admitted to Pitt that Dodington was of no consequence and that in the present circumstances support of the continent was not necessarily wrong.[2] But Pitt's failure to inform him of an application for the Garter by Temple produced another outburst.[3] Pitt assured him, quite truthfully, that he had had no advance warning of Temple's application.[4] Bute determined to put Pitt's goodwill to the test by discussing with him the ministerial arrangements for the new reign. A recent illness of the King, when for a time Leicester House had been 'sure ... that all was over', gave the question a new urgency in Bute's mind.[5] Viry reported this interview to Newcastle:

> Mr Pitt said that he thought, in such case, everything should be done in concert with the Duke of Newcastle considering his long experience in business, his credit, his reputation abroad, and his constant zeal for the present Royal Family. To which Lord Bute replied, What! The Duke of Newcastle to continue Minister, as he is, and (I think) in the office he is in? That can't be. All sorts of regard

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1 Addit. MSS.32884, f.313: memorandums (Count Viry), 10 Oct 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32885, f.153: memorandums (Count Viry), 31 Oct 1758
3 Chatham Corr., i, 362.
4 Addit. MSS.32898, f.204: memorandums (Count Viry), 10 Nov 1759
5 Letters to Lord Holland, p. 140

should be paid to the Duke of Newcastle, his friends should be consider'd and supported; and proper management should be had for him; but he was not to continue to be what he is now.

Mr Pitt replied that he did not mean to mark out any particular station, but that in general there should be a concert with the Duke of Newcastle; that, very probably, the Duke of Newcastle might himself not desire to continue in the hurry of business, etc. My Lord Bute said the Prince of Wales would be very glad of Mr Pitt's service; but he must not expect to assign this man this employment, and another another. Mr Pitt said that was far from his thoughts - he should be very ready to do the best service he could - that what he had said about the Duke of Newcastle was not at all with any such view.

This interview produced some improvement in the personal relations of the two men; 'not', Pitt told Viry, 'that I say, que nous sommes d'accord en tout'.[2] But it also produced a new grievance on Bute's part. He had previously intended to take the Treasury in the new reign, but he now decided that he would be unable to do so. After Pitt's remarks, he plainly thought that it would be impossible to remove Newcastle from the Treasury; but he could not without loss of face admit this to the Prince, to whom he simply said that the Grenvilles would be necessary at the Treasury Board and that he would not wish to serve with them.[3]

Despite the attempts on both sides to come to a better understanding, Pitt and Bute were never again to be in close alliance, though there were further intermittent initiatives by both men. This failure was less a matter of calculation or of inevitability than one of personality. Gilbert Elliot, who was in a better position than anyone to judge, thought that Pitt and Bute were 'incompatible from their natures'.[4] Pride was singled out

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1 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p.99.
2 Addit. MSS.32886, f.411: memorandums (Count Viry), 20 Dec 1758
3 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, p. 19.
4 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i, 51.

by those who knew them as a characteristic common to both. Shelburne described Bute as 'proud, aristocratical, pompous, imposing'.[1] Newcastle was certain that Viry's communication of the news of their quarrel was made without Pitt's consent: 'his pride is too great, to suffer me to be master of those facts, if he could have prevented it'.[2] But this quality took a different form in the two men. Bute's self-esteem could readily be satisfied by constant attentions, communications and consultations - the shadow, the outward form, would often suffice even where the real substance was lacking. No one saw this more clearly than Pitt or was more adept at exploiting it. But there was a limit beyond which he could not go. Where his authority was challenged or his orders not carried out, as in the case of the intrigues between Leicester House and the commanders at St Cast, he could not dissemble his real views. Bute might complain of Pitt that 'he let himself be govern'd by others':[3] but it was for the very opposite reason that his split with Leicester House took place.

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1 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, i, 110.
2 Addit. MSS. 32884, f.436: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Oct 1758
3 ibid., f.412: memorandums (Count Viry), 17 Oct 1758

REALIGNMENT

(i)

Parliament met on 23 November, for the first time since Pitt had sent British troops to Ferdinand's army. A difficult session was predicted. Chesterfield expected 'warm work ... this session of Parliament about Continent and no Continent; some think Mr Pitt too Continent, others too little so'.[1] The St Cast failure was another embarrassment. Walpole told Mann that 'the disgust in the army on the late frantic measures will furnish some warmth probably to Parliament'.[2]

Pitt was also apprehensive. He told Newcastle that there would be opposition to the sending of troops 'from others besides Mr Doddington, who have their uneasinesses, and who were not à négliger'.[3] Dodington was hoping to appeal to the Tories, and Pitt took care in advance to counteract the effects of such an appeal. As in the previous year, he expressed considerable alarm at the Hanoverian estimates, which were presented to Newcastle by Munchhausen three days before the start of the session. These estimates involved the bringing of an extra 4,500 Hanoverian troops into British pay.[4] Munchhausen realised that he had little hope of obtaining this demand, and there is no sign that Newcastle ever thought seriously of agreeing to it: it was deliberately put forward as a basis for bargaining, in excess of what might reasonably be granted, and it was treated by both Newcastle and Munchhausen as such.[5] But Pitt, with Parliament to meet the next

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1 Letters of Chesterfield, v, 2332.
2 Walpole, Correspondence, xxi, 252.
3 Addit. MSS.32884, f.453: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 20 Oct 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32885, f.439-40.
5 ibid., f.490-1: Newcastle to Pitt, 22 Nov 1758

day, would not even consider negotiating about the demands. He wrote to Newcastle:

> (I) beg leave to express my wonder and concern that your Grace has now, the very eve of the Parliament, only to tell me that a plan of expence, just double that of last year, new in the mode (and one part, quite additional) of which addition I had never received either from your Grace or Person that lives, the most remote intimation whatever, I say that I should only have the honour of learning this night that things are open to deliberation. [1]

Lest this appeal should fail to result in a substantial reduction, Pitt sent out circular letters to the Tories to 'tie up their civil gratitude from exercising any rigour on the Hanoverian accounts'.[2]

The debate on the Address on the first day of the new session showed that the threatened Tory revolt would not materialise. Pitt levelled some of his early remarks against Dodington as a 'secret Austrian', but Dodington himself did not even speak.[3] Two Tory country gentlemen spoke, Richard Grosvenor and Gabriel Hanger, and both were strong in Pitt's praise. Grosvenor, calling Pitt 'the blazing star of this country', congratulated the administration for steadily pursuing the main object, the war in America; it was fortunate that the French had decided to concentrate on the campaign in Europe and to neglect the colonies. Hanger claimed that the whole nation was behind the administration and that

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1 Addit. MSS.32885, f.492-3: Pitt to Newcastle, 22 Nov 1758

2 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 156. Namier, quoting a letter of Calcraft's of 16 Nov., says no circular letters were sent this session. He does not mention Walpole's statement that letters were sent to the Tories. Probably Pitt only sent them out on or after 20 Nov., after he had seen the Hanoverian estimates. ('The Circular Letters', Eng. Hist. Rev., xliv (1929), p. 599).

3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 150.

generous supplies were necessary. The only note of caution was struck by Beckford, who

> rejoiced in the unanimity of the House and nation, but must tell his politicks wch were that American operations were the primary object, Germany, his secondary; that if the latter absorbed the former he would be against it, tho' he was for a war on the Continent and would give two millions but he would not give three.[1]

The estimates came in fact to £3 million. Pitt realised that he would have nothing to fear from the Tory country gentlemen but that Beckford might be a source of trouble. Newcastle also recognised that if there were to be any difficulty, Beckford would be most likely to create it.[2] Speaking after Beckford, Pitt devoted almost all that he said to Beckford's remarks, since 'so much weight was to be given to everything that fell from a gentleman who represented the greatest City in the world'. He assured him of the primacy of the American war, regretting the size of the estimates for Germany which 'were properly cognisable where it was not his department, to look into them, nor had he ever seen any'.[3] As Walpole put it, he 'seemed to avoid all ostentation of power, while he assumed everything to himself but the disposition of the money'.[4]

Yet while claiming that the Treasury alone was responsible for the raising of supplies, that he was 'a taxee, not a taxer', Pitt exerted considerable pressure on the Treasury in an attempt to retain Beckford's support.[5] A tax on sugar was being proposed, and Beckford was organising the presentation of the planters' case. Sugar was an obvious commodity for taxation. During the summer,

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1 Addit. MSS.32885, f.524: West's report, 23 Nov 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32888, f.452: West to Newcastle, 10 March 1759
3 Addit. MSS.32885, f.524: West's report, 23 Nov 1758
4 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 149
5 Addit. MSS.32998, f.254: business with Hardwicke, 20 Feb 1759

the navy had seized several Dutch ships carrying home sugars from the French West Indies. This meant that large quantities were needed for re-export and that the price of sugar was kept up, to the benefit of the West Indian interest.[1] Feeling in the City was strongly in favour of the proposed tax.[2] Newcastle's main correspondent there wrote to him:

> This you may depend on that whatever duty or tax you substitute in the form of sugar it will occasion a general discontent, as every one sees the equity of the addition on sugar, and no shadow of reason that regards the publick, can be produced why it should not take effect.[3]

But Pitt took up Beckford's cause with enthusiasm, and in a speech difficult to reconcile with his continual assertions that taxation was the preserve of the Treasury alone, he advocated a shop tax or an excise as alternatives to sugar. He praised Beckford in extravagant terms: 'the great authority Sir Josiah Child ... could not have spoke with greater weight'.[4] Pitt's support of Beckford resulted in a compromise solution, a tax of 5% on all imported dry goods, including sugar.[5] Pitt accepted even this with an ill grace: 'tho' he did not approve, he acquiesced in the measure'. Beckford had asked him to oppose it outright, but he could hardly do so consistently with his statements of Treasury responsibility and his wish to retain the support of the Tory country gentlemen.[6]

This support, indeed, had been strained as far as Pitt dared. The country gentlemen were much in favour of the sugar tax, while the planters always claimed that the land tax was under-assessed

1 R. Pares, 'The London Sugar Market, 1740-1769', Econ. Hist. Rev. ix, 2nd ser. (1956), p. 269.
2 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 177
3 Addit. MSS.32888, f.256: Watkins to Newcastle, 26 Feb 1759
4 ibid., f.428: West's report, 9 March 1759
5 This was very like the compromise adopted by Pelham in 1747 after his defeat by the sugar interest in 1743-4.
6 Chatham MSS., 30/8/19: Beckford to Pitt, 'Thursday 5 o'clock'

and that a four shilling tax was in reality only three shillings.[1] There were two other areas in which, in the interests of overall strategy, Pitt risked offending the Tory country gentlemen. The first was over the Prize Bill. This measure was designed to allay some of the main grievances of the Dutch. Pitt's aim in paying more attention to relations with Holland was not, as Newcastle wanted, to try to bring about active Dutch participation in the war, but to avert the possibility of a French takeover in Holland. The serious illness of the Princess Royal, the leader of the English party, persuaded him to take the initiative in devising a scheme to secure the restitution of Dutch ships wrongly taken by British privateers.[2] After her death on 12 January, Yorke reported that 'the French expect a great change in their favor'.[3] Pitt had been using his influence to secure the release of four Dutch ships wrongly detained, and he now prepared a bill to curb the activities of the English privateers.[4] The Tories were divided, torn between the fact that privateering represented a part of the maritime war and their dislike of the commercial interests which would benefit from the rejection of the bill. Sir John Philipps supported the bill, but Beckford, who opposed it, carried most of the Tories with him.[5] Pitt was 'very earnest, and properly warm in support of the Bill, tho' in terms full of personal civility, and regard to Mr Beckford' and on the last day

1 Pares, War and Trade, p.508
2 Addit. MSS.32886, f.429: Newcastle to Yorke, 22 Dec 1758. ibid., f.431: memorandums for the King. Cf. Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, p.256 sqq.
3 Addit. MSS.32887, f.183: Yorke to Newcastle, 16 Jan 1759
4 ibid., f.34: Newcastle to Yorke, 5 Jan 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32890, f.401-2: West's report, 30 April 1759

of the committee stage, though Beckford still wanted to introduce amendments, he gained no support from the Tories.[1]

A second issue tested more severely the loyalty of the Tories to Pitt. Early in August, when Newcastle had proposed the sending of two battalions from the expedition to Germany 'to prevent, or at least suspend, (Ferdinand's) going with the whole army to the relief of Hanover', Pitt had also recognised the desirability of a further reinforcement for the continent. For political reasons, it was essential for him to defend the worth of the expeditionary force, but there is an indication that he would have been prepared even then, if he could place the entire responsibility on Newcastle's shoulders, to send some of the troops on the expedition to Ferdinand. Newcastle reported to Hardwicke:

> Mr Pitt asked me ... at my Lady Yarmouth's whether I would avow the measure of sending two battalions? I said yes, if he would agree to it; but he said, suppose he protested against it, as he did; I said, that was another case.[2]

Pitt proposed, instead, to offer a subsidy to the Elector of Bavaria in return for four to six thousand troops. Newcastle thought that Pitt only made this proposal because he knew Bavaria would reject it, but Hardwicke realised that it was genuine.[3]

The difficulties, however, were very considerable. France had signed a six year subsidy treaty with Bavaria, by which Bavaria was to place her troops at the disposal of the coalition. It was known that relations between the two countries were far from cordial, and early in December Pitt approached the Bavarian envoy Haslang in an attempt to bring Bavaria to change sides. He

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1 Addit. MSS.32890, f.488: Jones to Newcastle, 4 May 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32882, f.202: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Aug 1758
3 ibid., f.214: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 4 Aug 1758

offered him a subsidy, indicated that England would act in favour of Bavaria if the crown of the Roman Empire became vacant, and hinted that England might also be prepared to support an acquisition of territory for Bavaria at the close of the war.[1] On 6 December, an opportunity presented itself in the House of Commons to underline the sincerity of this offer. Sir John Philipps said that he hoped no ministry would ever surrender Cape Breton, and Beckford reiterated this remark: England had attained a superiority which all the Duke of Marlborough's battles had never obtained. Pitt took this up: 'the Duke of Marlborough had acquired superiority; the peace of Utrecht gave it away'. It was too early to say what would be retained at the peace; but whatever conquests had been made or might be made in America, England would surrender them all rather than give any of her continental allies the least cause for dissatisfaction.[2] The Bavarian ambassador duly reported this speech, displaying a greater confidence in the intentions of England.[3] The present continental allies were equally impressed. Frederick wrote to Pitt to thank him for his speech.[4] The other main target of the speech - Walpole saw it as the principal one - was Hesse-Cassel.[5] Soubise's presence at Cassel greatly increased the distress of that country, and in a letter which arrived the day before Pitt made his speech Ferdinand told the King that the chief lesson of the campaign had been that it was essential to have in future a

1 von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 218-9.
2 Pol. Corr., xvii, 436.
3 von Ruville, ii, 220
4 Pol. Corr., xviii, 9.
5 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 150.

corps to cover Hesse, if Hanover were to be protected and the alliance of the Landgrave retained.[1] By September Pitt had already come to accept that it would be necessary to renew the Hessian treaty on terms less favourable for England.[2] On 1 December Hardenburg, sent over by the Landgrave to negotiate the treaty, produced a draft which stipulated that the King should not lay down arms until the Landgrave was in possession of all his territory ahd had a full security and indemnification. The ministers could not accept this: the King was arguing that 'if we stipulate a dédommagement for the Landgrave of Hesse; á fortiori, we could not refuse a dédommagement for His Majesty, as Elector'.[3] When he made his speech on 6 December, the difficulties raised by Hardenburg had still not been resolved. But Pitt's proposal that the Landgrave should be given a £50,000 grant in addition to a subsidy of £150,000 soon settled the matter;[4] and on 14 December Pitt took another opportunity, created by a hostile speech by Vyner, to spell out to the House of Commons the indispensability of the Hessian alliance and the importance of acquiring Bavarian help: 'if I saw a Power that would turn the scale, at the Hazard of my Head I would be for it tomorrow'.[5]

This use of Parliament as a diplomatic weapon was greatly to Pitt's credit, since it was inevitably provocative to his Tory supporters. The point that he was trying to make to the European envoys was that he would not allow himself to be swayed by

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1 Addit. MSS.32886, ff.43-46: Ferdinand to the King, 28 Nov 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32884, f.31: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Sept 1758
3 ibid., f.32
4 Addit. MSS.32886, f.323: note to the King, 15 Dec 1758. The sum was later increased to £60,000.
5 Neville MSS., D/EN/ o34/17: 14 Dec 1758

doctrinaire Tory views in regulating the terms of the peace. Many of the Tory country gentlemen were also offended at the regard shown by Pitt to Beckford.[1] Sir John Philipps accused Pitt in the Commons of bowing to Hanoverian interests, and Newcastle recorded in his notes for an audience of the King on 12 March: 'the Tories wanted to show themselves against Beckford, and P.'[2]

Pitt was himself well aware of the danger. He was anxious to avoid any unnecessary provocation; when Soame Jenyns, the 'poet laureate of the Yorkes', produced a pamphlet satirising the Tories, Pitt was much concerned by the effect it would have on them, and Hardwicke had to intervene to preserve for Jenyns his place in the Board of Trade.[3] Pitt calculated correctly. Despite their misgivings, the Tories accepted his continental subsidies without demur, and Beckford, who had been cultivated so carefully, dropped his objections to the scale of support for the war in Europe. Chesterfield, who had expected difficulties, was soon writing: 'the proper officers bring in the estimates; it is taken for granted that they are necessary and frugal; the members go to dinner, and leave Mr West and Mr Martin to do the rest'[4] The Hessian treaty was voted after a debate - 'though', Stone reported, 'it can hardly be call'd a debate'-in which only the independent Whig Lord Strange raised any objections, taking the

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1 A further issue on which Beckford and the Tory country gentlemen were on different sides was that of the increase in the salaries of the Judges, which the country gentlemen did not oppose and Beckford did. Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 182-3.

2 ibid., iii, 179. Addit. MSS.32889, f.16: memorandums for the King, 12 March 1759

3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 179. Addit. MSS.35418; f.81: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Feb 1759

4 Letters of Chesterfield, v. 2342

line that if the grant to the Landgrave 'was to be understood to be given, in place of dédommagement, there should be some words in the motion, to declare it so'. Pitt argued that this would be 'a poor return for the facility of the Hessian ministers', but he was also keen to disclaim responsibility for the drawing up of the details of the treaty: it was in Holdernesse's department and 'would have been finish'd by (Lord Holdernesse), had it not been for his short and accidental absence'. The only Tory to speak was William Northey, one of the group of leading country gentlemen who in the last session had joined together to declare their support for Pitt. He stated that he had no objection to the grant, asking only for an assurance, which Pitt readily gave, that it should not be thought to create a precedent. Only Strange indicated dissent when the question was put.[1] The Prussian subsidy of £670,000 passed equally easily: this time the single opponent was Robert Vyner, and his opposition was based on the expense rather than on any ideological grounds. Pitt spoke very briefly, claiming the support of 'that Vox Dei, the universe vox populi', and there were only two other speeches, by the Tories Cooke and Beckford. Both were in defence of the treaty, and Beckford's showed the success of Pitt's tactics with him. He had said at the start of the session that he would give two millions to the continent but not three: now he said that if Hanover were lost, he would vote a hundred millions rather than not recover it.[2] By steering a course between Beckford and the country gentlemen over the sugar tax and the Prize Bill, and by sheltering behind the

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1 Addit. MSS.32867, f.351;3: Stone's report, 26 Jan 1759
2 ibid., f.355-6: West's report, 26 Jan 1759.

theory of departmental responsibility over the Hanoverian estimates and the Hessian treaty, Pitt had averted all serious opposition while extracting from the House of Commons the full value as an instrument of strategy.

(ii)

The events of the previous session, when Pitt had used Newcastle as a scapegoat for his support of the war on the continent, had increased the existing tension between the two ministers. The events of the session of 1758-9, on the other hand, drew Pitt and Newcastle into closer alliance than they had ever yet been. Pitt's pronouncements in the House of Commons were partly responsible for this. Newcastle was naturally delighted by his praise of Marlborough and his condemnation of Utrecht. He told Rockingham: 'Mr Pitt spoke most admirably ... more to the satisfaction of our friends, and the Whigs, than he has ever yet done'.[1] Perhaps more important than this was the fact that Newcastle had much less reason than in the past to try to satisfy the King, and Pitt the reversionary interest. Less favoured by their respective courts, it was natural that the two ministers should look increasingly to each other.

The King's Hanoverian ambitions, revealed to their full extent during the summer, were the reason for Newcastle's new willingness to take Pitt's side against the King. He had done this throughout the life of the administration, but always under pressure and complaint. Now he no longer complained about his role in trying to persuade the King to accept Pitt's requests and

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1 Addit. MSS.32886, f.215: Newcastle to Rockingham, 8 Dec 1758

policies. Frightened above all by the prospect of accusations of Hanoverianism and suspicious of the King's intentions, he recognised that he had a greater community of interest with his fellow-minister than with the King. He supported Pitt in his opposition to Munchhausen's demand that an extra 4500 Hanoverian troops should be supplied by England, writing in his 'memorandums' for 8 December:

> If the King will leave it to me, I will take care of his service.
> To beg nothing more may be said, at present, upon the furnishing forage for the 5,000 men. And that Mr Pitt may have authority to say, that these additional 5,000 men are absolutely furnished, paid, and supplied by the King, as Elector.
> Mr Pitt talk'd as well, and as reasonably as any man could do so.
> Ld. Hardwicke thought so.[1]

He opposed Munchhausen's suggestion that the contributions raised in Hildesheim, Paderborn, Ruremonde and Osnabrück - the very areas in which Hanover hoped to expand at the peace - should be reserved for the King as Elector.[2] He agreed entirely with Pitt in refusing to promise any indemnity for Hesse-Cassel at the end of the war, realising that any such promise would strengthen the King's case for a similar stipulation in favour of Hanover.[3] He also refused even to consider a request that more hussars should be raised in Hanover and complained to the King: 'these little demands affect, and indispose, and there must be an end of these applications from M. Munchhausen, or we shall undo the whole'.[4]

Even before Parliament met, suspicion of the King's

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1 Addit. MSS.32886, f.213: memorandums for the King, 8 Dec 1758
2 ibid., f.291: Munchhausen's memoire, 13 Dec 1758
3 ibid., f.283: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 12 Dec 1758
4 ibid., f.305: memorandums for the King, 14/15 Dec 1758.
ibid., f.407-8: memorandums for the King and Pitt, 20 Dec 1758

Hanoverian aims was producing close cooperation between the two ministers. The previous year, Newcastle had discussed the Speech with the King and only then mentioned the subject to Pitt.[1] This year, he sent a draft drawn up by Hardwicke to Pitt and accepted Pitt's suggestions on how it might be amended: 'as the King does not know one word of it, the whole is open to deliberation'.[2] Last year, again, Pitt had treated the matter of when Parliament should meet as one for the King and Newcastle alone.[3] This year Newcastle and he, anxious that the Hanoverian demands should be settled before Parliament met, successfully joined together in opposition to the King to obtain a postponement.[4]

Newcastle tried to reconcile the King to this new state of affairs. He continually assured the King that Pitt was 'very well disposed'.[5] But it was not an easy task. The King was deeply resentful of the pressure exerted on him on Pitt's behalf. Lord Temple was appointed lord-lieutenant of Buckinghamshire only after 'the greatest difficulty and under the strongest declarations and invectives from the Closet'.[6] The Lieutenancy was vacated by the death of Marlborough, the British commander in Germany, on 28 October. The King was equally reluctant to agree to Newcastle's request that Sackville should succeed to Marlborough's command; despite Newcastle's efforts, he refused to allow Sackville the powers of posting officers that had been granted to Marlborough.[7]

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1 Addit. MSS.32875, f.391-2: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Nov 1757
2 Addit. MSS.32885, f.342: draft to Pitt, 15 Nov 1758. ibid., f.423: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 19 Nov 1758
3 Addit. MSS.32875, f.376-7: West to Newcastle, 2 Nov 1757
4 Addit. MSS.32885, f.223: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 Nov 1758
5 Addit. MSS.32886, f.382: memorandums for the King, 19 Dec 1758. ibid., f.283: Barrington to Newcastle, 9 Dec 1758. ibid.,f.323-5: note to the King, 15 Dec 1758
6 Newcastle(Clumber) MSS.,NeC 3152: Newcastle to Lincoln, 21 Dec 1758
7 Hist. MSS. Comm., Stopford-Sackville, i, 53.

That Newcastle now put forward these demands without regret or apology made them no easier for the King to accept.

The partnership between Pitt and Bute was under even greater stress than that between Newcastle and the King. Bute complained of Pitt's interference in Treasury affairs over the raising of the taxes, and Pitt now defended his conduct, exonerating both Newcastle and himself from any share of the blame for the delay and confusion, which he attributed entirely to Legge.[1] Relations between Pitt and Legge were so strained that Pitt's close ally Pratt refused even to meet Legge to discuss business.[2] Newcastle realised that Pitt's intention was to 'fling the blame' for the low state of credit, the fall in the stocks and the dispute over the taxes on the 'negligence, ignorance, or ill-management of the Treasury';[3] and in doing this, Legge was a more convenient scapegoat than Newcastle. Significantly, Thomas Potter took the view that if Legge were to retire to the House of Lords, Pitt would welcome the promotion of Charles Yorke as his successor.[4]

Pitt's censure of Legge was unmerited. The tax advocated by Legge was a duty or excise on tobacco, and he at first presented this as a straight choice with sugar.[5] If Pitt agreed to this scheme - and Legge thought that, if proposed in this way, he might - the credit for the abandonment of sugar would accrue partly to Legge himself.[6] But if Pitt was not prepared to accept tobacco, Legge had no intention of trying to persevere with his suggestion.[7] This weak and pliant attitude did little to commend

1 Addit. MSS.32889, f.100-5: memorandums (Count Viry), 16 Mar 1759
2 Addit. MSS.41354, f.34: Newcastle to Martin (28 April 1759)
3 Addit. MSS.32890, f.138: considerations, 18 April 1759
4 Addit. MSS.35635, f.237: Morris to C. Yorke, 17 March 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32888, f.17: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 7 Feb 1759
6 Addit. MSS.32887, f.333: Legge to Newcastle, 25 Jan 1759
7 Addit. MSS.32888, f.173: memorandums for the King, 19/20 Feb 1759

him to Bute. He told Lord Lincoln that though Legge had not deserved the harsh treatment which Pitt had given him in the Commons, he did not approve of the way in which Legge had behaved over the taxes.[1] But Hardwicke was right when he told his son Charles that there was little prospect of his succession to Legge's post: Leicester House would not allow him to retire.[2] Anson had been ill, and if he were to die Bute was determined that Legge should replace him.[3] Legge's growing favour at Leicester House was not the result of anything that he had done: it was simply the result of Bute's alienation from Pitt. As Viry told Newcastle, 'the more Mr Pitt ran at Mr Legge for his behaviour, the more he recommended Legge to the Prince of Wales'.[4]

It was against this background that Pitt, after the failure of his first attempt at reconciliation with Bute, tried a second time. He told Viry

> that, if they (Leicester House), would let him know their sentiments, there was nothing he (Pitt) would not do, to please them; but that they were reserv'd towards him, and did not speak to him. And ... that, if they desir'd that he should be absolutely reconcil'd to Mr Legge, he was ready to agree to it.

But Pitt could not appear as a supplicant: Legge should 'make some advances, (take the first step,) towards him; and, then, all would be over'.[5] Bute responded coldly to this overture. Legge's supine behaviour over the taxes suggested that he would all too readily become Pitt's cypher in the Commons. Bute therefore wanted to bring the two together 'so as business might go on; but not to put them upon the foot of intimacy and connection, which

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1 Addit. MSS.32889, f.186: substance of Lincoln's conversation with Bute, 22 March 1759
2 Addit. MSS.35353, f.250: Hardwicke to C. Yorke, 18 March 1759
3 Addit. MSS.32888, f.316: memorandums (Count Viry) 3 March 1759
4 ibid., f.204: memorandums (Count Viry), 21 Feb 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32889, f.65: memorandums (Count Viry), 14 March 1759

they were before'.[1] When James Grenville made another approach, with proposals for a 'thorough union' with Legge, Bute evaded a direct reply.[2]

The same reason was also responsible for the lack of enthusiasm with which Bute looked on approaches from two other quarters. Both Holdernesse and Fox hoped to take advantage of disfavour with Bute, but at the same time they were trying to substitute themselves for Bute as Pitt's most valuable political associate, in much the same way as Legge was bowing to Pitt's wishes while appealing to Leicester House. Holdernesse's attempts were a consequence of his split with Newcastle.[3] Hardwicke wrote:

> I have always been of opinion that jealousies and distrusts would arise between Lord B. and Mr Secretary ... I should guess that it proceeds very much from want of communication on the part of the latter, to which his reserve, and being so much shut up, together with some contempt of other peoples' understandings,[4] greatly disposes him.

Holdernesse was able to supply the need, and he sent Bute accounts of every post which were far more detailed than those sent by Pitt.[5] But he also tried to ingratiate himself with Pitt, complaining to Mitchell of 'dirty court intrigues to lower Mr Secretary Pitt in the opinion of both the King and the public'.[6] While he was 'charmed' with Pitt, he was bitterly critical of his former patron Newcastle, who 'has used me shamefully ill'.[7]

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1 Addit. MSS.32889, f.122: memorandums (Count Viry), 14 Mar 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32890, f.7-9: memorandums (Count Viry), 11 April 1759
3 Newcastle's relations with 'that chitt, my Lord Holdernesse' further deteriorated when Holdernesse refused to cooperate with Newcastle over relations with the Dutch. Addit. MSS.32891, f.496: Newcastle to Mansfield, 8 June 1759. Cf. Addit. MSS. 32886, f.98: Newcastle to Yorke, 1 Dec 1758
4 Addit. MSS.32884, f.290: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 7 Oct 1758
5 Addit. MSS.32886, f.384: memorandums (Count Viry) 19 Dec 1758
6 Addit. MSS.6832, f.198 : Holdernesse to Mitchell, 28 May 1759
7 The Grenville Papers, i, 291. Addit. MSS.32890, f.484: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 May 1759

an opportunity to improve his standing with each of the major figures, while leaving his future field of action as open as possible.

Legge, Holdernesse and Fox were all, in Bute's eyes, showing excessive deference to Pitt. Bute was lukewarm or hostile to the efforts of all three to insinuate themselves into the favour of Leicester House. It was increasingly in Newcastle's direction that Bute started to look. There were both personal and political reasons for this. First, he suspected Pitt of supporting a project for the marriage of the Prince of Wales to the daughter of the Duke of Wolfenbuttel, in order to strengthen his hand with the prospective wife. The Duke had demanded a definite reply to the proposal; the Prince, under strong pressure from his mother, had assured Bute that he would never marry a Princess from that House.[1] Bute gave credit to Newcastle for having done nothing to encourage the marriage.[2] More important, Bute thought that Pitt was trying to ensure that the war would continue until after the death of the present King, so that the new court would find him all the more necessary. Bute on the other hand wanted an early peace, hoping that if the terms were reasonable Pitt would not dare to oppose it.[3] Having failed to associate Leicester House successfully with any part of the war, he now 'wished for nothing so much as a peace', and this gave him a community of interest with Newcastle.[4]

Half way through March, Bute approached Lincoln, Newcastle's

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1 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, p.23
2 Addit. MSS.32889, f.124: memorandums (Count Viry), 17 March 1759
3 ibid., f.104: memorandums (Count Viry), 16 March 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32890, f.516: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 5 May 1759

nephew, to try to find out Newcastle's plans in the event of the King's death. He showed

> a great inclination to have a connection, and assurance from (Newcastle and his friends); when great applications were making to them from certain quarters; which would be immediately rejected if they were sure of the D. of N's concurrence and assistance; he, L.B., did not know whether the D. of N. had any thoughts of continuing minister; that if he had not, the D. of N. might be assured of having the P. of Wales' confidence, and all possible regard for himself, and his friends.[1]

Newcastle replied that he did not intend to remain a minister in the new reign, but that this would not influence his support for the administration. Bute took Newcastle's remarks at their face value and was reassured.[2] He might now think once again of taking the Treasury himself. Until then, he would avoid giving Newcastle cause for dissatisfaction. He told him of his dissatisfaction with Pitt and criticised Legge's 'insubordination' over the taxes.[3] When James Grenville attacked Newcastle's conduct at the Treasury Board, he reacted sharply: 'what do you mean, Mr Grenville? Do you mean a breach? If you do, say so'.[3] It was a far cry from the language of two years ago.

The whole structure of the coalition, indeed, had undergone a radical change. Newcastle was no longer unwilling to support Pitt in the closet. Bute was on more friendly terms with Newcastle than with Pitt. Legge, whose efforts to supplant Pitt at Leicester House had so easily been defeated in 1757, was now higher in Bute's favour than Pitt. Holdernesse, brought in by Newcastle, was looking to Pitt and Bute in an attempt to find support against his former patron. Most unpredictable of all, Fox was hoping to

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1 Addit. MSS.32889, f.136: memorandums for Lincoln, 18 March 1759
2 Cf. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p.101
3 Addit. MSS.32890, f.13: substance of conversation with Bute, 11 April 1759.
4 ibid., f.8: memorandums (Count Viry), 11 April 1759

arrive at a working arrangement with Pitt or Leicester House. The reversal of roles was almost complete.

INVASION

(i)

Throughout the year 1759, English strategy was shaped and restricted by reports and rumours that the French were planning to invade England. The attempt, when eventually made early in the following year, was a desperate affair destined from the start to almost certain failure and encountered without any difficulty, except for a temporary panic in Ireland. But the episode is of considerable interest in illuminating the different attitudes and roles of the leading ministers in the making of preparations to counteract the threat.

Pitt made provision against the French danger long before he admitted that any real risk of invasion existed. In December 1758 he developed the fear that if the Princess Royal died and the English party in Holland lost ground, the French might, with the aid of Dutch ships, be able to make an attempt in the Channel during the winter, in the absence of the blockading fleet. He therefore took steps to ensure that an adequate fleet, properly manned, was built up at home:[1] and by the end of May, forty ships of the line in good condition were available for national defence, which even Newcastle admitted was 'the finest fleet almost that ever was seen'.[2]

Newcastle himself took no initiative, but he was sure that the French were in earnest. On 20 January Scheffer, the Swedish representative at Paris, told his government that Choiseul had

1 Addit. MSS.32886, f.431: memorandums for the King, 22 Dec 1758
2 Addit. MSS.32888, f.370: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 6 March 1759

informed him that a large-scale descent on the English coast, using thirty or forty thousand men, was to be made in the hope of ruining English credit. France wanted Sweden to help with a force of 8000 men for a simultaneous landing in Scotland, using the Pretender. Sweden responded enthusiastically. Copies of this correspondence reached the English ministers.[1] Pitt, without explanation or any professions of alarm, reacted by ordering the Admiralty to prepare transports for 5000 men. Newcastle immediately assumed that Pitt was planning another raid on the French coast unknown to his cabinet colleagues;[2] and Pitt, obliged to account for his action, admitted that the purpose was simply to alarm the French and to make it possible to transport troops to Scotland or Ireland if the French invaded.[3]

That the French were making no attempt to conceal their intention to invade made some observers think that they had no real plans to do so, but were hoping to harm English credit and keep English ships at home.[4] But an explanation for this was soon provided: Choiseul told the French ambassador in Sweden that since it was possible to hide the preparations, France was giving out publicly that it was proposed to invade England and concealing only the times and the places.[5] Even before he knew of this, Pitt was convinced of the seriousness of the threat. At a cabinet meeting on 8 May, Pitt stated that 'we had given the alarm. We

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1 Addit. MSS.32887, f.252-5: Scheffer to Höpken, Paris, 20 Jan 1759. Addit. MSS.32888, f.140-4: Havrincour to Choiseul, 16 Feb 1759. ibid., f.304-8: Havrincour to Choiseul, 2 March 1759.

2 Addit. MSS.32890, f.114: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 April 1759

3 ibid., f.170: Anson to Newcastle, 18 April 1759

4 Addit. MSS.32888, f.359: Prince Louis to Newcastle, 6 March 1759. ibid., f.367: J. Yorke to Newcastle, 6 March 1759.

5 Addit. MSS.32891, f.461: Choiseul to Havrincour, 7 June 1759.

must now make people easy, by taking proper measures for their security', though the French were in no condition to think of making any attempt. But it was decided to send Hawke as quickly as possible to watch the Brest fleet with eighteen ships of the line and to warn the lords-lieutenant that the calling out of the militia might be necessary.[1]

Pitt soon abandoned his pretence that there was no risk of invasion. He suddenly claimed on 17 May that the position had been quite changed; the most recent intelligence, he asserted, showed that the threat was now a serious one. This intelligence came from Richard Wolters, merchant and consul at Rotterdam, who between 1745 and 1770 managed a spy ring with correspondents in the main French and Spanish ports.[2] This intelligence was of only limited value. Professor Cobban has shown that Wolters' agency, at least for a later period, has often been seen as more important than it really was. Newcastle knew that Pitt and Holdernesse received this intelligence, but despite his passion for information he did not trouble to ask Wolters to send it to him until later in the course of the war.[4] Hardwicke imagined on 18 May that Pitt had developed

> A sensibility of having sent so great a part of the strength of this kingdom to so great a distance, which makes him fear that this affair may at last become serious; and therefore he now affects to lay great weight upon those last intelligences of Wolters's, as the only clear and strong ones; whereas I have always understood that his is the lowest kind of intelligence, being little more than a common à la maine.

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1 Addit. MSS.32891, f.77: memorandums for the King, 9 May 1759. ibid., f.86: memorandums for the King, 11 May 1759. Western thinks the militia decision may have been taken on 9 May. English Militia, p 155. Whitworth ascribes it to 11th: Ligonier, p.288.

2 Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century, pp 61-2, 71.

3 A. Cobban, Ambassadors and Secret Agents (London 1954) p. 113

4 Newcastle only received this intelligence from 1759.

5 Addit. MSS.32891, f.171: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 18 May 1759

Hardwicke was right that Pitt was deliberately inflating the importance of this intelligence, but wrong in his explanation for this. Pitt's earlier actions show that he had taken the invasion threat seriously since December, though he had never admitted to the fact. His attitude does make sense, however, in the light of his views on the militia. 'The people of England', Beckford told him, 'look on you as the patron of the militia, and every measure that is taken which shall affect this constitutional body of men will be ascribed to your council and direction'.[1] Pitt's enthusiasm for the militia had in the past derived more from its political than from its military use. In 1757 he had been prepared to give up the whole experiment if it proved universally unpopular. Even now, the militia was far from popular in many counties; yet Pitt had to appear publicly to be championing it. The militia was 'held cheap'.[2] The most serious trouble was in Kent, where riotous mobs up to 500 strong threatened to burn the houses of all those who were trying to put the act into effect.[3] In Buckinghamshire, where Temple claimed that he 'had succeeded by the kind and almost unanimous assistance of the gentlemen, to force down the militia upon the common people', feeling was reflected in the fact that the price of a substitute had more than doubled.[4] There was also trouble in Huntingdonshire.[5]

It was quite possible that the same sort of disturbances might occur as those of two years ago. This was one of the factors

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1 Chatham MSS., 30/8/19: Beckford to Pitt,
2 Hist. MSS. Comm., Tenth Report, App. I (Weston Underwood), p 317
3 Addit. MSS.32893, f.70: Watson to Newcastle, 15 July 1759
4 Chatham MSS., 30/8/61: Temple to Pitt, 26 Aug 1759
5 Western, English Militia, p. 298

influencing Pitt's attitude. Devonshire thought that it was the main one.[1] But one MP, Charles Whitworth, writing in alarm to Pitt about the guarding of French prisoners, recognised that military and political considerations were both operating in the same direction:

> This service might in future be proper and well liked by the country in general, but to send those who scarce know their exercise may disgust the people to the service and have fatal consequences, especially if the French invade and try at once to release their prisoners ... This report of being called out to guard French prisoners will give the coup de grâce[2] to the whole and greatly damp our spirit and ardour.

As Whitworth implied, there is strong evidence that military factors played a part in Pitt's decision. Bute was confident that Pitt, despite his public pronouncements, had a low opinion of the tactical value of the militia: his real views on its operational effectiveness as a counter-invasionary force may have slipped out when he told Cumberland in his annoyance at the failure of the Rochefort expedition, much to the latter's amusement, that 'there had been no force on the coast of France, but twenty thousand of the Militia'.[3] Certainly the way in which Pitt used the militia during the course of the winter suggests that he had major reservations as to its usefulness in the face of any invasion: the regular regiments were places close to London, 'the second line, I mean our militia, at a greater distance'.[4] Subsequent events appear to confirm that Pitt's motives were partly practical. No militia battalions were yet embodied, but in October, even after the Hertfordshire battalions had been embodied, Pitt vetoed their

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1 Addit. MSS.32892, f.106: Devonshire to Newcastle, 16 June 1759
2 Chatham MSS., 30/8/66: Whitworth to Pitt, 28 May 1759. Cf. Chatham MSS. 30/8/53: Poulett to Pitt, 11 June 1759, which makes the same point.
3 Addit. MSS.32896, f.303: memorandums (Count Viry) 5 Oct 1759 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 77 n.1.
4 Whitworth, Ligonier, p. 304

use for the guarding of French prisoners on the grounds that they had not yet had the time to acquire the discipline necessary for the task.[1] The greatly increased popularity and efficiency of the militia by October, and the fact that other battalions were being used on the same service, indicates that on this occasion Pitt's motives were purely military; and he almost certainly felt the same doubts, on a much wider scale, earlier in the summer. Altogether, it is difficult to be any more definite about Pitt's motives than Professor Western, who concludes simply that they 'seem to have been a mixture of the political and the strategic'.[2]

Whatever the respective ingredients, Pitt's reluctance to make any real use of the militia in drawing up the preparations for invasion is open to no doubt. Newcastle soon realised that Pitt's plan was 'to delay as long as possible the calling out the militia to guard the French prisoners'.[3] When the officers commanding twelve of the most advanced militia battalions announced that they were ready to undertake this service, Pitt 'alter'd his measure' and decided to continue for the moment to use regular troops for this task.[4] But by the second half of June, embodiment could no longer be delayed without calling Pitt's credibility as a supporter of the militia very seriously into question. Ironically, it was Newcastle rather than Pitt who was responsible for this situation. In contrast to Pitt, he had both political and military reasons for wishing to expedite the formation of the militia battalions. French preparations were taking place opposite the

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1 Chatham MSS., 30/8/76.
2 Western, English Militia, p. 157
3 Addit. MSS.32892, f.56: Newcastle to Devonshire, 14 June 1759
4 ibid., f.26: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 June 1759

Sussex coast, and some reports indicated that Rye or Pevensey Bay were the most likely targets.[1] He therefore asked Abergavenny, the lord-lieutenant, to advertise another meeting to receive offers for commissions, and this produced just enough volunteers to try to carry the act into effect.[2] In Middlesex, Newcastle became greatly concerned by a demand in the Evening Post that the MPs for the county should make a representation to the King about Newcastle's failure to put the act into operation.[3] When the county meeting was held, even the Tory George Cooke admitted to Pitt: 'our lord lieutenant behaved very handsomely and talked of the militia in a better strain than expected'.[4]

Most reports indicated that the French would make their attempt with about 30,000 men and Newcastle thought that if the French were able to land it would be impossible to gather a similar number of troops to oppose them. If the militia was not used to guard French prisoners, not even half that number would be available.[5] But while Newcastle was anxious that the militia should be embodied, Pitt was still dragging his feet. What made the situation worse was that any blame for delay would fall upon Newcastle himself. Pitt's vigorous pronouncements were at variance with his unwillingness to take action. On 22 May, West presented Pitt with a draft of a message to the House of Commons about the drawing out of the militia. Pitt complained that the

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1 Addit. MSS.32893, f.128: Newcastle to Watson, 19 July 1759
ibid., f.204: Le Bosquet to Lockhart, 21 July 1759.
2 Addit. MSS.32892, f.203: Newcastle to Abergavenny, 24 June 1759
For letters to friends in Sussex asking for their attendance, see ibid., ff.357, 360, 362, 364, 366, 398, 400, 429, 431, 482.
3 Addit. MSS.32893, f.268: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 July 1759
4 Chatham MSS., 30/8/27: Cooke to Pitt, 9 Sept 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32892, f.59: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 14 June 1759

message was 'very dry', but at the same time 'supposed that it would not go to Parliament this week ... there was nothing in a week's difference'.[1] His amendments to the message were duly adopted.[2] Pitt also took it upon himself to write, without consulting any of his cabinet colleagues, to the lord-lieutenant of every county to ask him, as a means of exerting pressure, what progress was being made.[3] While in reality holding up the execution of the act, Pitt was ensuring that any criticism from the militia enthusiasts would fall on other shoulders.

On 17 June Newcastle decided to try to force Pitt to act by showing him the most recent intercepted letter from Choiseul, saying that the invasion would certainly take place and that the publicity being given to it in France was a deliberate policy.[4] Pitt could hardly delay any longer. Within a week, orders for embodiment had been issued to five couties, and to a further six counties by the end of the following month.[5] But even when called out, Pitt was unwilling to make use of the militia. Late in July he suggested to Newcastle that the militia might be discharged.[6] Newcastle was presumably unenthusiastic, and Pitt soon repeated his suggestion, wanting the disembodiment to take place before the winter.[7]

At the same time, it was Pitt who took the initiative in advocating the raising of more regular troops.[8] With the exception

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1 Addit. MSS.32891, f.233: West to Newcastle, 22 May 1759
2 ibid., f.267: Pitt to Newcastle, 24 May 1759
ibid., f.269: Newcastle to Pitt, 24 May 1759
3 ibid., f.401: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 June 1759. Addit. MSS. 35352, f.76: Hardwicke to Royston, 9 June 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32892, f.120: memorandums for the King, Hardwicke, etc., 17 June 1759
5 Western, English Militia, pp.447, App. A.
6 Addit. MSS.32893, f.183: memorandums for the King, 26 July 1759
7 ibid., f.392: memorandums for the King, 31 July 1759
8 ibid., f.425: business with Hardwicke, 2 Aug 1759

of one Highland battalion, no new troops had been raised since early in 1757: and with recruits coming in too slowly to fill the gaps in the existing regiments, Newcastle calculated that the regular forces were now 6000 men short of their proper strength.[1] Pitt refused to consider withdrawing any British troops from America or Europe: to do so would be to accord a measure of respect to the efforts the French were making.[2] He also wished to be able to send a reinforcement of 5000 men to America and the West Indies in the autumn.[3] To do this, and to provide enough regular troops to counter any invasion attempt that the French might make, it was necessary to accept any offer that might be made. Even in the Highlands troops were scarce; and in England there was the added problem that the embodiment of the militia tapped much of the potential supply.[4]

One obvious solution was to employ the traditional device of allowing noblemen and leaders of local society to raise troops of their own for service with the regular army. These corps were regular units, but the colonel, who generally paid the initial levy money and clothing expenses, had the power to nominate the officers. Argyll and Bute were engaged in a struggle for electoral influence in Scotland, and it was natural that such offers should come from both camps. Neither was free of objection. Argyll's proposal was criticised by Bute as 'tending to defeat all that has been done, to reduce, and suppress the Highland power'.[5] Bute's

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1 Hist. MSS. Comm., Twelfth Report, app., part V (Rutland) p 201
2 Addit. MSS.32893, f.404: Newcastle to Stone, 1 Aug 1759
3 ibid., f.102: memorandums for the King, 17/19 July 1759
4 Middleton, 'The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt', p.
5 Addit. MSS.32893, f.189: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 July 1759

own idea, for the raising of a troop of light dragoons by Lord Eglinton, was even more dangerous, since Skye, which the French were thought to have infiltrated thoroughly, was to be an important recruiting ground.[1] Pitt wanted both proposals accepted. He did not allow political considerations to stand in the way of his military requirements. He supported Argyll's scheme as well as Bute's, despite his anxiety to do nothing to offend the latter.[2] Newcastle, on the other hand, was torn between his fear of the prospect of invasion, which made him keen to accept 'any sort of force, that is strength at this time', and his fear, strongly shared by Hardwicke and the King, of the danger of raising troops in Scotland.[3] He finally admitted that he only recommended Eglinton's scheme to the King for political reasons, since Pitt was so insistent.[4]

By these methods, the overall strength of the regular forces was increased by some 10,000 men.[5] Yet Pitt abandoned his intention of disbanding the militia. The explanation for this is to be found in a significant change in public opinion towards the militia.[6] Almost as soon as it was called out, there was a strong movement of sentiment in its favour. From Yorkshire, Kinnoull reported that even Sir Rowland Wynn had declared his support: 'no man has been or is so strong in opinion against the militia, but he sees the strength of the torrent'.[7] At a review in London, the Norfolk militia earned great praise and interest, and of its

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1 Addit. MSS.32894, f.22: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 8 Aug 1759
2 See below, p
3 Addit. MSS.32893, f.404: Newcastle to Stone, 1 Aug 1759. ibid., f.480: postscript to Stone, 4 Aug 1759.
4 Addit. MSS.32894, f.245: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 7 Aug 1759
5 Middleton,'The Administration of Newcastle and Pitt', p.
6 Cf. Western, English Militia, p,157: 'Pitt's enthusiasm for the militia did no more than reflect a change in national feeling'.
7 Addit. MSS.32893, f.106: Kinnoul to Newcastle, 17 July 1759

subsequent posting to Hilsea barracks at Portsmouth the Duchess of Northumberland wrote, 'they ... are much caressed even at that greedy town'.[1] Horace Walpole told Mann: 'the very militia is considerable: the spirit, or at least the fashion of it, catches every day'.[2] Symmer made the same point in his report to Mitchell:

> The militia, which some time ago was a matter of mirth or sham politicks with a great many, becomes now to be considered in a different light: a spirit of emulation appears among the officers, and even among the common men in corps.[3]

By November, Pitt could claim that 14,000 men were serving in the militia 'without a murmur'.[4] There was no need for Pitt to worry about his popularity if the militia was continued in service: it was rather the reverse. By the end of the year, the militia had been embodied in twenty-six counties.

Some of the credit for the militia's new popularity must be given to Pitt himself. His constantly expressed contempt for anything the French might try to do created an atmosphere of confidence in marked contrast with that of the invasion scare of three years earlier, and in this climate the militia was able to flourish. The general reaction was to doubt whether the French were serious in their intention to invade and to be confident of easy and quick success if they did. As the summer advanced, the invasion was 'held cheaper than ever'. The confidence engendered by Pitt was a major strategic advantage. It affected not only the

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1 The Diaries of a Duchess: Extracts from the Diaries of the First Duchess of Northumberland (1716-1776), ed. J. Greig (London, 1926), p. 10. Chatham Corr., ii, 4.
2 Walpole, Correspondence, xxi, 311.
3 Addit. MSS. 6839, f.147: Symmer to Mitchell, 13 July 1759
4 Bed. Corr., ii, 393
5 Devonshire MSS. 397.73: Lord Frederick Cavendish to Devonshire, 30 July 1759. Letters of Mary Lepel, Lady Hervey (London,1821), p. 251. Walpole, Correspondence, ix, 238. Hist. MSS.Comm., Tenth Report, App. I (Weston Underwood), pp. 315, 318

morale of the fighting forces, but also the subscriptions from abroad to English funds. Negotiations for the £8,000,000 loan floated at the end of the year were completed before the French attempt eventually materialised. Dutch financiers took up £3.3 million of this sum: a small proportion of this was for English investors, but by far the greater part was for investors in Holland, and it was the speculative operators amongst these who had a major effect on the stability of the stocks.[1]

Pitt's preparations to meet the invasion threat provide an outstanding illustration of the way in which he drew political advantage even from the most unpromising strategic decisions. His intention, for both military and political reasons, was to rely as little as possible on the militia and to raise a substantial number of new regular troops - hardly a policy to commend him to many of his supporters. He therefore, though in fact he saw the danger before any of his fellow ministers and made provision accordingly, pretended until half way through May that there was no real danger and that any action he took was simply to 'make people easy'. This enabled him to announce his intention of calling out the militia in the future, without having to order its immediate embodiment. While leaving himself with the opportunity of making no effective use of the militia, he was able once again to present himself in opposition to Newcastle as its most enthusiastic advocate. But for the second part of his plan, the raising of regular troops, it was obviously necessary for Pitt to

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1 Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century, p. 160. The lists of van Neck, Amyand, Magens, Muilman, Tonnereau and Ringmacher account for £3,264,000. Part of the lists of Gideon (£60,000) and Salvadore (£250,000) would also have been for Dutch investors. Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 55.

accept that an invasion was probable, and he used an unimportant and unreliable piece of intelligence as the means of announcing his 'conversion' to this view. It was now clearly impossible to avoid indefinitely the calling out of the militia; instead, Pitt concentrated on delaying its embodiment as long as he could and on working unobtrusively, once it was called out, for its early discharge. It was only because of a rapid and unexpected change in public opinion towards the militia, for which Pitt himself was partly responsible, that the militia was continued in service throughout the winter. Pitt had contrived to lose none of his reputation as the militia's most powerful champion, while in reality doing more than anyone to prevent its use.

(ii)

The most important political consequence of the invasion threat was to confirm the new state of relationships within the administration. The breach between Pitt and Leicester House was further widened; and Bute's rapprochement with Newcastle was correspondingly strengthened.

Following the failure of the expedition to the French coast, Leicester House had to try to find a new area of the war effort with which to associate itself. One opportunity was provided by Lord Pulteney's invitation to the Prince of Wales to patronise a regiment he was proposing to raise in Shropshire, as a means of building up his electoral influence in his struggle with Lord Powis. The invitation was eagerly accepted.[1] Much more significant

1 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, pp.24-5.

than this was the change in the attitude of Leicester House towards the militia, a reflection of the change in national feeling. Leicester House had so far been hostile to the militia.[1] When in April Temple had called a meeting of militia enthusiasts, Bute had 'shrug'd his shoulders, shewing a disapprobation'.[2] But the growing popularity of the militia persuaded Bute to adopt a new attitude. The Prince of Wales made gifts to the Norfolk militia, attended the review in London, and visited the regiment again at Kingston and at Richmond.[3] Gilbert Elliot was 'talking strongly for our militia' and Newcastle noted that 'Lord B. is now very strong for the militia; he was much the contrary the last year'.[4]

The invasion threat provided a third and more dramatic opportunity to identify Leicester House with the war. On 20 July, following the example of his father who in 1745 had asked for the command of the army in Scotland, the Prince of Wales wrote in deferential terms to the King to say that while the kingdom was threatened he could not bear the thought of remaining inactive: 'permit me therefore humbly to request of Your Majesty to give me an opportunity of convincing the world that I am neither unworthy of my high situation, nor of the blood that fills my veins'.[5] Both Newcastle and the King thought that the letter was a veiled request for the command-in-chief;[6] and Hardwicke assumed that it

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1 Western, English Militia, p.179
2 Addit. MSS.32889, f.348: memorandums (Count Viry) 3 April 1759
3 Addit. MSS.32893, f.192: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 July 1759
Walpole, Correspondence, ix, 241
4 Addit. MSS.32896, f.303: memorandums (Count Viry) 5 Oct 1759
5 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, p. 25
6 Harris, Life of Lord Hardwicke, iii, 132-4.

had been concerted between Pitt and Bute when they met on 6 July.[1] In fact, Pitt only heard of the application on 27 July, a week after it had been made. Bute told Pitt that he had assumed he would have heard of the application through 'another channel', concluding: 'I make no doubt, but my worthy friend will see the propriety, I had almost said necessity, of indulging His Royal Highness in so noble and reasonable a request'.[2]

Pitt resented Bute's failure to give him advance warning. He told Newcastle on the 27th that he 'knew, this morning, how set the P. of Wales was upon his request'.[3] Pitt's anger is not difficult to explain. He had never sought the breach with Bute: even after it had occurred, he tried to make it up. It was reported to Newcastle on 19 July by John Gordon, an 'old driveller who ... had a half-illiterate transcriber paid to copy his nonsense', that Pitt had been paying early visits to Leicester Fields and to Kew.[4] Presumably the purpose of these was to try to reconcile Bute to the acceptance of Argyll's proposals for raising troops. It may well be that at these interviews, as when he had been talked into an unwilling approbation of the sending of troops to Europe, Bute did not make clear to Pitt, faced with his conciliatory disposition and his powerful personality, the full extent of his dissatisfaction with him: even to Samuel Martin he only spoke in 'constant hints' of his disapprobation of

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1 Addit. MSS.32893, f.202: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 21 July 1759. For the date of this visit by Pitt to Bute, see Addit. MSS. 32892, f.444: memorandums for the King, 6 July 1759.

2 Addit. MSS.36797, f.44: Bute to Pitt, 25 July 1759 (Printed in Chatham Corr., i, 169-70, and wrongly dated 15 July 1756) The letter was drafted on 25th, shown to the Prince on 26th and received next morning by Pitt.

3 Addit. MSS.32893, f.328: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 July 1759

4 ibid., f.137: Gordon to Newcastle, 19 July 1759. Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 229

Pitt, and Newcastle commented: 'he may not inwardly be satisfied, but he will act outwardly in every thing as if he was'.[1] But whatever he may have said to Pitt, Bute - as before - was extremely critical of him to the Prince of Wales.[2]

It was therefore clear to Pitt, when Bute only informed him of the Prince's application a week after it had been made, that his new attempt at conciliation had failed. Pitt still did not want a complete breach, but he could not bring himself effectively to press the demand: he was held back by the same element of pride in his character that had in part been responsible for the original quarrel. When on the 27th Pitt met Newcastle and Holdernesse to discuss a reply to the Prince's letter, he at first spoke strongly against a refusal, but grew 'cool and reasonable' when Newcastle asked exactly what was meant by the request.[3] To Newcastle's delight, and in the knowledge that it would please the King, he agreed readily to an almost meaningless reply:

> I received your letter which is a mark of duty to me, and have the highest satisfaction in your spirit and zeal for the defence of my Kingdoms. It is my intention to give you, on a proper occasion, an opportunity of exerting them.
>
> George R.[4]

Both to Newcastle and Bute, Pitt used language which implied that he intended to do more than he did in support of the Prince. He knew perfectly well that Leicester House would be dissatisfied with the reply.

On the 30th the King told the Prince at an audience of 'some

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1 Addit. MSS.32893, f.410: Newcastle to Stone, 1 Aug 1759
2 Cf. Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, pp.26-7.
3 Addit. MSS.32893, f.319: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 July 1759
4 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, p. 26
5 In Addit. MSS.36796, f.38 there is a summary of a letter of 27 July from Pitt to Bute: 'appla uds the conduct of the Prince of Wales and promises to forward his wishes'. The original letter is not in the Bute MSS. at Mount Stuart.

seconds' that he would let him know when a proper occasion for his services arose. Bute naturally saw this as a 'putt off', and Pitt had to take further action if he was to prevent a total split with Leicester House. Pitt now hinted strongly to Newcastle that he did not intend to press for any significant commission for the Prince, but 'trifles were to be complied with' and he suggested that the Prince might be asked, in company with Ligonier, to review the Guards at Portsmouth or Chatham. Pitt also made it clear that he would recommend that no further promises should be given.[1] But Pitt was the victim of his earlier policy of advocating more than he privately wanted to achieve. Newcastle saw Pitt's idea as 'drawing the King out by degrees' and the King himself was equally suspicious. On 6 August Pitt wrote to Bute:

> Endeavours, sincere and earnest, have not been wanting, but hitherto difficulties and repugnancies, hard to be eradicated in age, oppose themselves so strongly as to leave me in the utmost solicitude for the success of the expedients suggested and which import so highly the Royal Family and the Nation.[2]

Bute was still not satisfied. He replied:

> I need not tell you that (the Prince) complains bitterly of the extreme neglect he ever meets with in any matter (be it what it will) that immediately concerns himself ... Nothing shall be wanting on my part to preserve peace and good-hunour, but at the same time, I will not be answerable for the consequences of this treatment.[3]

Pitt was still anxious to repair some of the damage, without wishing to make any substantial concession.[4] But Bute had learnt his lesson; he was no longer to be won over by words alone.

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1 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-66, pp 27-8, n.1.
2 Ibid., p. 28.
3 Chatham Corr., i, 416.
4 Cf. Addit. MSS.36796, f.39: Pitt to Bute, 6 Aug 1759

With relations between Pitt and Leicester House at their nadir, Bute was drawn further in the direction of Newcastle. The regulation of the Prince's establishment was completed with mutual congratulations.[1] Hardwicke was received with exceptional civility at Leicester House.[2] On one occasion, when temporarily exasperated with Pitt, Newcastle even thought of forming a common front with Bute, writing to Hardwicke:

> I cannot but hope, that you will see Lord Bute. The impossibility of going on with this gentleman, (Pitt) and the bearing his usage, will, I hope, put us all upon thinking how to get out of it.[3]

But Newcastle had no real intention of allowing his relations with Bute to stand in the way of his cooperation with Pitt. He constantly assured the King of his satisfaction with Pitt and of his good disposition.[4] Pitt, equally, was determined to create no unnecessary trouble for Newcastle. He declined to take an opportunity of reviving the Habeas Corpus issue; nor did he attempt to blame Newcastle for the King's refusal to comply with the Prince's request.[5] Having lost Leicester House, Pitt saw Newcastle as more important to him than ever.

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1 Addit. MSS.32891, f.279: Bute to Newcastle, 24 May 1759
ibid., f.372: Newcastle to Bute, 30 May 1759.
2 Addit. MSS. 32893, f.492: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 5 Aug 1759
3 Addit. MSS.32891, f.100: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 May 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32891, f.263: memorandums for the King, 24 May 1759
ibid., f.368: memorandums for the King, 3 June 1759.
Addit. MSS.32892, f.423: memorandums for the King, 5 July 1759
5 Walpole, Memoirs,

MINDEN

(i)

The arrival in England on 8 August of the news of Ferdinand's victory at the battle of Minden appeared for a time to make the preparations for invasion unnecessary.[1] Minden had fallen to the French on 9 July and the two main French armies joined together at the town in order to force Ferdinand to cross the Weser as low as possible. After an attempt against Minden had failed, the two armies remained stationary for a fortnight until Contades, hearing Munster had fallen to the French, determined to attack Ferdinand, for whom a defeat would have been disastrous. But Ferdinand's victory was complete. Contades lost 7000 men and retired to Cassel: Minden fell the following day.

An intercepted dispatch from Choiseul soon, however, made it clear that despite this reverse the invasion preparations were to continue. A French force under D'Aiguillon was destined for Scotland in October; once a footing had been gained, a Swedish contingent would follow the next month.[2] On 5 August La Clue, in command of the fleet to cover the invasion, set out from Toulon for Brest: two weeks later, Boscawen, who had retired to Gibraltar to re-victual from his blockade of Toulon, heard of La Clue's escape, and after a running fight lasting two days captured, destroyed or put out of action seven of La Clue's fleet, half his force. Once more it appeared, even to Newcastle, that the French

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1 Addit. MSS.32894, f.68: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 9 Aug 1759
ibid., f.90: J. Yorke to Newcastle, 10 Aug 1759. ibid., f.169-70: Roberts to Mellish, 14 Aug 1759

2 Cf. ibid., f.235: notes for meeting, 16 Aug 1759

would not persevere with their invasion plans, and Cressener's intelligence said that, instead, a large reinforcement would be sent to the defeated army in Germany.[1] But intercepted dispatches again contradicted this, and even gave a definite date, 22 October, for the embarkation.[2]

While it failed to lift the threat of invasion, Minden at the same time stretched national resources still more severely. Ferdinand had lost 2700 men and the British corps was now 1300 men short of its strength. Even before the battle, Sackville had pleaded for a reinforcement of British cavalry.[3] Intelligence suggested that the French would soon take into pay 6000 Palatine troops and that 15,000 recruits would be sent to the army in Germany: the question of providing a further reinforcement was urgent.[4] Newcastle realised the scale of the problem, but admitted that he had nothing to propose:[5] the invasion made it impossible, he thought, to send any troops from England.[6] Once again, it was Pitt who took the decision. He suggested a target figure of 10,000 new troops for Ferdinand.[7] Ferdinand was given powers to procure, in any way he could, up to 8000 troops in Germany, and Pitt proposed also to take two men out of every company in England, Scotland and Ireland and to send 600 Highlanders.[8] Newcastle had no hand in this plan. Torn between his wish to send a reinforcement and his fear of offending Bedford and reducing the forces at

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1 Addit. MSS.32895, f.209: Cressener's intelligence, 6 Sept 1759
ibid., f.491: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Sept 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32896, f.62-3: memorandums for the King, 24 Sept 1759
ibid., f.208: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Oct 1759. ibid., f.288: advices from Holdernesse's office, 5 Oct 1759.
3 Hist. MSS.Comm., Stopford Sackville, i, 306
4 Addit. MSS.32894, f.419: Cressener's intelligence, 24 Aug 1759
5 ibid., f.233: memorandums for the King, 16 Aug 1759
6 ibid., f.163-4: Newcastle to Munchhausen, 14 Aug 1759
7 ibid., f.182: memorandums for the King, 14 Aug 1759
8 ibid., f.237: minute, 16 Aug 1759. ibid., f.333: memorandums for the King, 21 Aug 1759

home, he saw Pitt's attempt to persuade him to express an opinion as a 'catch'.[1]

More important than these measures was the fact that after Minden Pitt began, for the first time, to accept that there was a powerful case for concluding an early peace. The Prussian King had for some time been pressing for one. Mitchell had remarked on his desire for peace as early as December of the previous year.[2] In May he returned forcefully to the charge: he had deceived the enemy by a defensive strategy, but it was a miracle that he had been so successful and such a plan could not be expected to work twice.[3] Newcastle was naturally anxious to take Frederick's representations seriously and to consider, jointly with Prussia, how a peace might be achieved at the end of the campaign and on what terms.[4] But Pitt was far from enthusiastic. On 12 June, replying to Mitchell, he had confined himself to the observation that 'no peace of Utrecht shall again strain the annals of England'.[5] He again showed his unwillingness for peace in his reaction to a new Prussian initiative. On 8 June Knyphausen and Michel told Frederick that Pitt's influence was increasing every day at Newcastle's expense and that Newcastle, realising that it was his own power that Pitt was using, saw in peace the only way to restore his position. Newcastle might try to achieve either a rapid peace in which Prussian interests would be neglected or a separate and secret negotiation from which Prussia would be excluded. To prevent this, the two envoys suggested that Frederick

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1 Addit. MSS.32895, f.81: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 31 Aug 1759
2 Bisset, Mitchell, i, 475
3 ibid., i, 169: ii, 62. Addit. MSS.32891, f.190: Mitchell to Newcastle, 20 May 1759
4 ibid., f.399-400: Newcastleto Hardwicke, 3 June 1759
5 Addit. MSS.6833, f.7: Pitt to Mitchell, 12 June 1759

should write to the English King advocating a joint Anglo-Prussian declaration to the belligerent powers, expressing the wish to hold a congress to discuss the terms of peace. Frederick duly wrote in these terms on 20 June.[1] The day after he heard of the Prussian proposal, Pitt bullied Newcastle into agreeing to a vague and discouraging reply by raising the possibility of recalling the British troops from Germany, a threat he constantly employed when he wanted to exert pressure on his colleague but which, as Hardwicke realised, was 'brutum fulmen'.[2] The reply simply expressed the hope that 'happy and considerable' success would make an offer of peace possible and assured Frederick that England would remain faithful to her engagements.[3]

The next proposal of the envoys was that letters should be sent to Yorke and Hellen, the Prussian minister at the Hague, with orders to leave them unopened until instructed, and then to deliver copies, containing a joint Anglo-Prussian offer of a peace congress, to the French, Austrian and Russian ministers there. Pitt wished to incorporate in this declaration a reference to the success of English and Prussian arms.[4] Newcastle naturally assumed that this was intended as a piece of obstruction. When Pitt talked of Senegal and Goree as 'good things to make peace with', Newcastle thought that this was not from any real wish for peace, but rather to encourage the retention of adequate forces to defend them.[5]

Whether or not Pitt was sincere at this stage, he soon became so. Minden was the catalyst. When he gave his stalling answer to

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1 Pol. Corr., xviii, 337-8, 341. There is no evidence to support von Ruville's theory that the Prussian overture was concerted between Pitt, Michel and Knyphausen (William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 237-8)

2 Addit. MSS.32892, f.351: memorandums for the King, 2 July 1759. Addit. MSS.32894, f.44: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 8 Aug 1759

3 Addit. MSS.32892, f.390.

4 Addit. MSS.32893, f.190: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 July 1759

5 ibid., f.405: Newcastle to Stone, 1 Aug 1759

the Prussian ministers, news of two decisive battles was expected every day.[1] A week before Minden, Wedell lost two-fifths of his force in an engagement with the Russians and was forced to retreat across the Oder. 18,000 Austrian troops were now able to join Soltikoff, and Frederick, who throughout July had been observing the main Austrian force, now made the campaign against the Russians his main object and crossed the Oder to attack Soltikoff. He was disastrously defeated, losing 20,000 of his 46,000 army, compared with an enemy loss of 17,000 out of 66,000 men. The enemy might now be in Berlin in a matter of days. Frederick renewed his appeal to England to start negotiations.[2]

Pitt now indicated for the first time that he was thinking seriously of peace. Negotiation had been impossible so long as the possibility of total defeat had been hanging over Ferdinand's army, and this had now been removed. But there were two major obstacles. Frederick's rout on 12 August left the Austrians and Russians free to make for Berlin or Hanover. And no news had yet arrived of the fate of Quebec: and as Hardwicke pointed out, the obvious policy of the French in any negotiation would be to propose an armistice, so that if Quebec were subsequently captured it would have to be restored without an equivalent.[3] Late in August Prince Sanseverino, a representative of Don Carlos, the new King of Spain, made an informal offer to Pitt of Spanish mediation between England and France, and he intimated that there was reason to suppose that France would not be averse to such a mediation. Pitt

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1 Chatham Corr., ii, 5-6.
2 Pol.Corr., xviii, 512
3 Addit. MSS.32894, f.138: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 12 Aug 1759

replied that it would be wise for England to make peace while still in a condition to make war. He indicated to Newcastle that he was not against a mediation or negotiation but that the rime 'was not quite ripe': it would be necessary to await news from America and 'one great event' in Europe.[1]

Pitt soon abandoned this second condition. Contades left Cassel on 18 August and the French remained at Giessen until December. More important, the Russians and Austrians failed to make use of their victory. Daun altered his plans to march on Berlin and retired to Bautzen. The danger to Hanover was lifted by the complete defeat of a detachment of Austrian and Imperial troops. The Russians resigned themselves to undertaking a siege on the Oder. In a second interview with Sanseverino, therefore, Pitt no longer laid any emphasis on news from Europe, but he stressed that the event of the campaign in America must be known before any negotiation started. He told Sanseverino:

> Sir, you talk to me as if you thought I had plus d'éloignement as to peace than some other of the King's servants may have. But I assure you that I had much rather that the King my Master should enter into a negotiation of peace, whilst he is able to carry on the war, than stay till his Majesty is unable to carry it on, as I can assure you France already is.[2]

He now suggested that the views of England and Prussia should be put in writing.[3] It was decided to send a declaration to Yorke and Hellen for communication to the ministers of the enemy powers at the Hague, saying that England and Prussia were ready to send plenipotentiaries to the most convenient place to treat for a general peace. The ending of the campaign was to be the date for

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1 Addit. MSS.32894, f.477: business with Hardwicke, 27 Aug 1759
2 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 236-7.
3 Addit. MSS.32896, f.38: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 Sept 1759

the remission of this declaration.[1] This was an obvious policy, as Pitt himself admitted.[2] It enabled him to wait for the news from America and for confirmation of the favourable turn of events in Europe. Newcastle was delighted by the fixing of a definite date: 'there we are tied down'.[3]

Assuming success in America, peace now looked much more likely than it had ever done. There was ample evidence, from intelligence and intercepted dispatches, of Choiseul's wish for early negotiations.[4] Pitt now had to think of how to justify to the public the terms which he would accept. This was a problem to tax all his ingenuity: for the conditions of which he was thinking, though they represented the only solution which might gain acceptance by the French, would be far from popular. He told Knyphausen that while England should retain the Lakes, Crown Point and Niagara, he did not intend to keep Louisbourg or Quebec if it were captured, and gave the impression that he would want either Guadeloupe or Goree, according to the opinion of the merchants.[5] Newcastle was delighted with Pitt's 'reasonable way of thinking' about America.[6] Chesterfield had described Cape Breton in the last war as 'the darling object of the whole nation';[7] and he now wrote of Quebec:

> Quebec, which I make no doubt of, will still be a greater (acquisition than Guadeloupe). But, must all these advantages, purchased at the price of so much English blood and treasure, be at last sacrificed as a peace-offering? God knows what consequences such a measure may produce: the germ of discontent is already great, upon the bare supposition of the case; but, should it be realised, it will grow to a harvest of disaffection.[8]

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1 Addit. MSS.32896, f.94-5: protocolle, 26 Sept 1759. ibid.,f.100: projet for declaration.
2 Addit. MSS.32897, f.371: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 Oct 1759
3 Addit. MSS.32896, f.135: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 27 Sept 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32895, f.208-11: Cressener's intelligence, 6 Sept 1759 ibid., f.334-5: intercept (Choiseul), 3 Sept 1759. ibid., f.467-71: intercept (Wedelfries), 18 Sept 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32897, f.33: memorandums (Knyphausen), 12 Oct 1759
6 ibid., f.90: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Oct 1759
7 Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748, p 134
8 Letters of Chesterfield, v, 2355

Pitt's public reputation was at risk. Newcastle described him as 'more popular every day than ever' and both Hardwicke and Kinnoul observed that any peace conditions would have to be endorsed by Pitt to be acceptable to national opinion.[1]

Pitt in his usual way set about the task of preparing the country and the House of Commons for terms which would involve the return of Cape Breton and Louisbourg to France. This time there was no need to use Newcastle as a scapegoat, and there was every reason to cooperate closely with him. With the loss of Bute's support, Newcastle was essential to Pitt. More important, the King still wanted the war to continue, and Newcastle would have a vital role in trying to win him over. Instead, the unpopularity of the peace terms could be mitigated by pleading the position of the King of Prussia. Pitt insisted that it should be clearly stated that the declaration was the idea of the King of Prussia.[2] Newcastle commented:

> I think, I see his view in that, to justify himself, <u>at home</u>. For as Mr Pitt has hitherto justified all his warlike measures by the King of Prussia's opinion; and as necessary for his support; he would now equally justify these pacifick overtures from the King of Prussia's authority.[3]

He told the House of Commons when it met on 13 November that it was within the country's capacity to continue the war for several years, but that nothing could have been done without the King of Prussia.[4] He would 'snatch at the first moment of peace', though he warned the House that it would be impossible to 'draw such a

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1 Addit. MSS.32895, f.156: business with Mansfield, 4 Sept 1759
Addit. MSS.32897, f.350-1: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 24 Oct 1759
<u>ibid</u>., f.501: Kinnoull to Newcastle, 30 Oct 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32896, f.21: memorandums to Hardwicke, 21 Sept 1759
3 <u>ibid</u>., f.38: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 Sept 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32898, f.223: West's report, 13 Nov 1759

peace as would please every body'.[1]

On 16 October came the news of Wolfe's success at Quebec. Early the following month, after consultation between Pitt, Knyphausen and Michel, the Anglo-Prussian declaration was finally issued.[2] All the signs for peace were set fair. The French funds were seriously hit by the news from Canada and payment of bills of exchange from the colonies had to be suspended. Cressener's intelligence reported that Choiseul was convinced of the necessity of peace.[3] Conflans' defeat by Hawke in Quiberon Bay on 14 November made it impossible to use the transports gathered at Vannes for the invasion, blockaded by the English and without a fleet to escort them.

But this hopeful picture did not last long. To take advantage of Austrian demoralisation - Daun was retreating towards Dresden and the other main force through Poland - Frederick ordered General Finck to occupy Maxen and send a brigade into Bohemia to destroy the Austrian magazines. Finck, with only 14,000 men, was totally defeated on 20 November: there was now once again a real danger to Berlin. Newcastle was justified in his fear that this battle would 'greatly alter the disposition, for peace, in our enemies'.[4] The French suspension of interest on redeemable funds provided large sums with which to carry on the war, and negotiations were in progress with Denmark and Sweden. The French reply to the Anglo-Prussian declaration was discouraging, saying that the only proper course was to separate the Anglo-French conflict from the war in Germany, where England and France were only

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1 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 226.
2 Pol. Corr., xviii, 644-5
3 Addit. MSS.32897, f.356-7: intercept (Wedelfries) 24 Oct 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32899, f.356: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 7 Dec 1759

auxiliaries; and France would take no measures for peace without consulting her allies. Another setback to the hopes of peace came on 5 December, when the Spanish ambassador told Pitt that his country, hitherto seen as a useful potential mediator, could not look with indifference on the destruction of the equilibrium established by Utrecht in America. The chances of peace again seemed to be fading: but there was no longer, after Minden, any disagreement between the two leading ministers over the desirability of an early end to the war, or even over the terms on which this might be achieved.

(ii)

Pitt's conversion after Minden to a policy of peace left the King isolated. He alone now wished to continue the war. It was the question of an indemnity for Hanover that most concerned him. Before the battle, he had raised this matter as soon as the Prussian ministers first made their overture.[1] He claimed that it was absurd to discuss plans before it was known what the outcome of the campaign might be: and whatever happened, another campaign would be necessary.[2] After the battle, when the declaration was drawn up, he told Newcastle he 'had nothing to say to the Protocol. We did as we pleased: he was nothing here; that he wished he had stayed at Hanover in 1755'.[3] He realised that British public opinion would not allow the sacrifice of any acquisition if it appeared that Hanover might reap the benefit. He therefore wanted to make no restitutions in America: even Quebec must be retained.[4]

1 Addit. MSS.32892, f.500: Devonshire to Newcastle, 10 July 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32893, f.190: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 July 1759
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 60
4 Addit. MSS.32897, f.90: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Oct 1759

Pitt was in perfect agreement with Newcastle in criticising this attitude as unreasonable;[1] and Newcastle himself talked once more of resignation, telling the King 'that His Majesty has been often displeased with me because I could not give him assurances of acquisitions at the peace: that I was unwilling to deceive, or amuse him.[2] But the question of Hanover continued to preoccupy the King.

He showed this in two ways. The first was over the choice of a mediator. Newcastle followed Pitt in preferring the idea of Spanish mediation to that of any other country.[3] But the King took the line that if there had to be a mediator at all, Denmark would be more suitable than Spain. Pitt described Denmark as 'the worst power in all Europe for us'.[4] It was known that France was flattering Copenhagen by presenting to her for comment some ideas on the future peace; Denmark duly made an approach to England, asking whether she would be prepared to communicate, in confidence, her views on the form which any negotiations might take.[5] But the King's wish to use Denmark was not only for reasons of obstruction: it was also because there were important channels of intelligence between Copenhagen and the Hanoverian chancery. Some of this intelligence - but not, it seems, all - had recently been communicated by the King to Pitt at Newcastle's request.[6] In any negotiation through Denmark the King would have an opportunity to

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1 Addit. MSS.32897, f.174: heads of Pitt's conversation, 17 Oct 1759

2 Addit. MSS.32894, f.499: memorandums for the King, 28 Aug 1759

3 ibid., f.477: business with Hardwicke, 27 Aug 1759. ibid.,f.481: result of conference with Hardwicke, 27 Aug 1759

4 Addit. MSS.32897, f.89: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Oct 1759

5 Addit. MSS.32895, f.467-71: intercept (Wedelfries) 18 Sept 1759

6 Addit. MSS.32891, f.402: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 June 1759. Addit. MSS.32892, f.116: Munchhausen to Newcastle, 17 June 1759 Addit. MSS.32896, f.41: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 Sept 1759 Pol. Corr., xviii, 644

press the case for Hanoverian acquisitions without the knowledge of his ministers.

More important was a patronage dispute which arose after Minden. The news of the battle sparked off a series of applications by Pitt for rewards for some of his supporters. Pitt's purpose was no doubt partly to try to stem the opposition of some of those who might be critical of the expected peace. To satisfy the Grenvilles, he took up a request for an ecclesiastical appointment they wanted and pressed Temple's claims for one of the two vacant Garters.[1] He asked 'as a favor' for baronetcies for Sir Richard Glynne, the Lord Mayor, and James Colebrook MP, who held a victualling contract which would be much reduced if the war were to end.[2] But not all Pitt's requests had this aim. He asked for a colonelcy of Guards for a Lt. Col. Boyd, supported Bristol's application for a Garter and threatened to resign if Amherst, after his success at Ticonderoga, was not made Governor of Virginia and a Major-General.[3] Pitt's reason for exerting this pressure was both to gain the credit for the successes in Germany and America, by representing them as his own achievements for which he was entitled to ask for a reward, and to strengthen his hand with the King, his fellow-ministers and his supporters in advance of the anticipated peace negotiations.

Much the most difficult case, mainly because it became connected with the King's Hanoverian ambitions, was that of Temple's Garter. When Newcastle pointed out that support of

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1 L.M. Wiggin, The Faction of Cousins: a Political Account of the Grenvilles, 1733-1763 (New Haven, 1958), p.219-20

2 Addit. MSS.32894, f.296: memorandums for the King, 19 Aug 1759
Addit. MSS.32895, f.179: memorandums for the King, 5 Sept 1759

3 Addit. MSS.32895, f.81: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 31 Aug 1759
Chatham MSS., 30/8/24: Bristol to Pitt, 26 March 1759

Bristol's request would make it more difficult to obtain a Garter for Temple, Pitt took advantage of this opening:

> I have no one, but that person. I say nothing upon it, but shall, from what shall be done in it, see, what I am to think with regard to myself. I don't mean (muttering something like) quitting.[1] I have had sufficient reason for that long ago.

Newcastle had several reasons for supporting this demand. He had raised it with the King even before the battle.[2] If Pitt were now to resign in the midst of such success, he would not consider remaining in office.[3] Temple was threatening to attack all Treasury measures, distinguishing them from those of Pitt.[4] Further, Henry Legge, after the death of his brother, was again threatening to take up his reversion, and Newcastle felt that if Legge were to retire and Temple were to be successful in his request, he would be able to regulate the Treasury as he chose.

In his normal way, Pitt gradually increased the pressure on Newcastle to insist on his demand with the King, while continually assuring him of his entire satisfaction with his conduct. From the start, the King gave an unqualified refusal.[5] He was 'very grave, very serious, and not at all gracious' to Newcastle.[6] Pitt was driving his point with increasing force. He insisted that Temple's Garter must be the only one given and that unless it were granted by the opening of the session he would make a declaration that he did not have the King's support;[7] and though he had formerly agreed with Newcastle that Parliament should meet in

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1 Addit. MSS.32895, f.81: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 31 Aug 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32892, f.444: memorandums for the King, 6 July 1759
3 Devonshire MSS., 260.263: memoranda, 15 Nov 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32895, f.321: memorandums for the King, 10 Sept 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32895, f.155: business with Mansfield, 4 Sept 1759
6 ibid., f.486: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Sept 1759
7 Torrens, History of Cabinets, ii, 515. Addit. MSS.32895, f.321-2: memorandums for the King, 10 Sept 1759

November, he now changed his mind and opted for October.[1]

The King soon saw that he might be able to use Pitt's demand for his own purposes. He said that he would be prepared to grant the Garter on the condition that Pitt and Temple would agree to support the gaining of territory by Hanover at the peace. Pitt refused to bargain on these terms.[2] He further tightened the pressure on Newcastle by telling him on 21 September that he wanted a decision in about a week's time, and then on the 27th by insisting on a definite answer before he next went to Kensington.[3] At the same time he held out an incentive to Newcastle by offering him the prospect of a satisfactory solution to the Treasury's problems in drawing up the arrangements for the coming year and of the sending of some light troops, requested by Ferdinand, to Germany.[4] He had no criticism of his colleague.[5] But Hardwicke was right when he said that while the appearance of Pitt's remarks was friendly, the substance of them was not.[6]

A new opportunity for Pitt soon arose. An anonymous woman, thought to be the Dowager Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, had written to Yorke at the Hague to say that the female sex had sometimes been effective as an instrument of peace and that she wished to play a part in ending the present war. Yorke replied politely but inconsequentially and sent the anonymous letter to Newcastle for his 'amusement'.[7] Newcastle was uneasy. He thought it possible that Yorke's correspondent 'may become a lady of

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1 Addit. MSS.32895, f.117-8: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 Sept 1759
2 ibid., f.491: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 19 Sept 1759
3 Addit. MSS.32896, f.21: memorandums to Hardwicke, 21 Sept 1759
Chatham Corr., i, 434.
4 Addit. MSS.32896, f.37: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 Sept 1759
5 Devonshire MSS.260.262: memoranda, 14 Nov 1759
6 Addit. MSS.32897, f.352: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 24 Oct 1759
7 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 65.

consequence' and suggested that he might consider sending the letters to Holdernesse.[1] But Holdernesse heard of these letters from Knyphausen and he at once informed Pitt of them.[2] As he admitted later on, his purpose in doing this was solely to try to damage Newcastle.[3] Pitt immediately saw the possibilities of this issue. He claimed that it was the right of a Secretary of State to be informed of every transaction about peace: no letter on this 'great subject' ought to be deemed amusing.[4] He suggested that the declaration at the Hague should be delivered not by Yorke and Hellen but by Prince Louis of Brunswick and Newcastle, to the intense annoyance of Hardwicke and his son, gave way over this.[5] Newcastle realised that Pitt was simply using the question to press his claim for a Garter for Temple.[6] Pitt was at the same time asking for promotion for George Townshend, and for Lord Talbot (who was acting with Temple); also for the deanery of Exeter for a Lyttleton relation and for a bishopric for Dr Warburton.[7] He was also criticising the Treasury in 'a more violent spirit than ever' and complaining - without any justification, Martin found - of the inadequate supply of specie to Amherst.[8] All this time he was 'as free and friendly as possible' with Newcastle personally.

But the King stood firm. He made a further abortive effort with both Pitt and Newcastle to exchange a Garter for a promise of

1 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 66.
2 Addit. MSS.32897, f.302: memorandums for the King, 23 Oct 1759
3 Devonshire MSS. 260.263: memorandums, 21 Nov 1759
4 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 68-9.
5 Addit. MSS.32897, f.520: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 31 Oct 1759
6 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 73.
7 Addit. MSS.32897, f.174: heads of Pitt's conversation, 17 Oct 1759. N. Sykes, 'The Duke of Newcastle as Ecclesiastical Minister', Eng. Hist. Rev., lvii (1942), 70-1.
8 Newcastle (Clumber) MSS., NeC 3593: Newcastle to Lincoln, n.d.
Addit. MSS.32898, f.245: Newcastle to Pitt, 14 Nov 1759
Addit. MSS.41354, f.36-7: Martin to Newcastle, 7 Nov 1759

Hanoverian acquisitions.[1] Even this did not convince the King that the ministers could not be gained. On 14 November Temple resigned the Privy Seal, apparently without giving any notice of his intention to Pitt.[2] The King commissioned Devonshire to 'bargain for the Garter' by trying to extract an undertaking to support Hanoverian claims, and Munchhausen used Viry for a similar purpose.[3] But Devonshire exceeded his commission. He first tried to persuade the King to give the Garter gracefully before the start of the session, rather than find himself forced to grant it in the middle of confusion in Parliament;[4] and when this failed he promised Temple the Garter if he would return to office, even after he had expressly refused to make any conditions.[5] Temple at once resumed the Seals and the King, as Hardwicke had always predicted he would do, grudgingly accepted the outcome.[6]

Once the affair was resolved, Pitt had no use for the Yorke issue and now treated it as 'the slightest thing in the world': it 'should be entirely forgot'.[7] He suggested, in opposition to Holdernesse, that Prince Louis should be invited to make the declaration in collaboration with Yorke, and he even approved of the idea of having Yorke as a plenipotentiary at the peace congress.[8] With Temple, he gave Newcastle 'the strongest assurances of their support and a thorough union with his Grace and

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1 Addit. MSS.32898, f.285-6: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 Nov 1759
2 Egerton MSS.1719, f.72: Lady Sophia Egerton to Bentinck, 16 Nov 1759
3 Devonshire MSS., 260. 263: memoranda, 21 Nov 1759
4 Devonshire MSS., 260. 260: memoranda, n.d.
5 Addit. MSS.32898, f.286-7: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 Nov 1759
6 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 64
7 ibid., 93. Devonshire MSS. 260.263: memoranda, 21 Nov 1759
8 Addit. MSS.35419, f.136: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 12 Dec 1759

his friends'.[1] The King was furious: 'I told you I would be forced; and I am forced'.[2] He made his displeasure with Newcastle so apparent that Newcastle continued to talk of resignation.[3]

But though it did not become immediately clear, the affair of Temple's Garter removed the most serious difference between the King and his ministers. The King had wanted the war to continue only because of his hope of Hanoverian acquisitions. This hope he now virtually abandoned. On 16 November, when the King raised the matter with Newcastle, Newcastle replied that it would be impossible for any English minister to support any increase in Hanoverian territory, and he added that Pitt, Hardwicke, Mansfield and Devonshire were all of the same opinion.[4] On 21 November, the King tried a new tack, asking Newcastle simply whether he would oppose such gains if, as Elector, he was able to make them. Newcastle replied that evacuations of occupied territory would be insisted upon all sides at the peace. The King answered that since his English ministers would do nothing for him, he wished they would agree to the separation of England from the Electorate by Act of Parliament - the very suggestion which had been contained in George I's suppressed will.[5] This indicated that the King had played his last card. He continued occasionally to raise the question of gains for Hanover, but no longer with any real hope of success. With no reason for wishing to continue the war, he now came round to the idea of an early peace. At exactly the time that Temple's affair was resolved, Newcastle reported that

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1 Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments, R1-156: Kinnoull to Rockingham, 16 Nov 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32898, f.287: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 Nov 1759
3 ibid., f.275: memorandums for the King, 16 Nov 1759
4 Devonshire MSS., 260. 263: memoranda, 16 Nov 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32899, f.6-7: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 Nov 1759

'for the first time' the King was beginning to admit that the country was in a better position to make peace than it might be in the future.[1] When the French reply to the Anglo-Prussian declaration arrived, the King was disappointed by its coolness.[2] Two years ago, the King had given way over the choice of men: now he had given way over what Newcastle called 'the red hot question', the one measure with which he was really concerned.

(iii)

Minden also made final the split between Pitt and Leicester House. During the battle, Ferdinand had repeatedly ordered the English cavalry to charge; Sackville had failed to do so, asking needlessly for a repetition and clarification of orders. Ferdinand's instructions for the next day, without mentioning Sackville, observed that if Granby had been at the head of the cavalry the victory would have been more brilliant, and that orders given through A.D.C.s must be obeyed immediately. Sackville claimed to be astonished by these orders: they were 'un coup de foudre'.[3] He asked Holdernesse for his recall and he also asked Bute for his help and advice: 'it is, I confess putting your friendship to a proof I never thought it possible I should have occasion to have made'.[4]

It is impossible to explain with confidence why Sackville acted as he did. It may have been from cowardice, or he may genuinely have wanted a clarification of orders. Almost certainly there was no political motive. It has been suggested that

1 Addit. MSS.32897, f.523: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 31 Oct 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32899, f.380: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 8 Dec 1759
3 Hist. MSS. Comm., Stopford-Sackville, i, 312
4 Bute MSS.: Sackville to Bute, 3 Aug 1759

Sackville's behaviour was a deliberate demonstration of independence, concerted in advance with Leicester House.[1] Such an explanation is not tenable. Since Sackville had abandoned the coastal expedition of the previous year in favour of the German campaign, he had lost much of his value and support at Leicester House. In March he had sought a rapprochement with Bute, fearing that Bute was 'absolutely determined to break with him'.[2] Nothing seems to have come of this. A month later, Calcraft told Lord Home that Sackville was 'ill both with Pitt and with Leicester House' and that his previous circle, with the exception of General Irwin, had completely deserted him.[3]

Bute was seriously embarrassed by Sackville's behaviour. Public opinion was as strong against Sackville as it had been against Byng.[4] Bute told Sackville that the affair was 'too delicate' for him to offer advice, and he regretted his inability to be of any real help.[5] He did nothing to hold up the delivery of the letter of resignation;[6] and there is no sign that he approached either Pitt or Newcastle for their assistance.[7] The ministers, indeed, were as embarrassed as Bute by the affair. Neither Newcastle nor Pitt wished to defend Sackville or antagonise

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1 von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 243 sqq. Ruville suggests that Sackville's action may have been planned in the belief that the Prince would succeed in his application for the command-in-chief. Ruville's statement that 'it is remarkable that the heir-apparent from the outset so warmly defended the obvious offence of the general' is not borne out by the facts. The tone of the Prince's letter to Bute of 11 August is proof that there was no collusion. (Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 29)

2 Bute MSS.: Erskine to Bute, 13 March 1759

3 Chatham MSS., 30/8/86: Calcraft to Home, 11 April 1759

4 Addit. MSS.17494, f.15) Calcraft to Capt Calcraft, 12 Aug 1759
Devonshire MSS.397.77: Lord Frederick Cavendish to Devonshire, 17 Aug 1759

5 Addit. MSS.36796, f.41: Bute to Sackville, 7 Sept 1759

6 Hist. MSS. Comm., Stopford Sackville, i, 314.

7 Bute's letter to Pitt of 7 Aug. is of course about the Prince's request, not about Sackville as Valentine assumes. Chatham Corr., i, 416. Lord George Germain, p. 53.

Bute. Pitt tried, as in the past, to claim that more was being done for Sackville than was really the case. The King's 'giving leave' to Sackville to return, instead of ordering him, was 'a very considerate softening of his misfortune', and he promised him 'all the offices of humanity, which our first, sacred object, the public good, will allow';[1] but he was at the same time

> under the painfull necessity of declaring my infinite concern, at not having been able to find ... any room (as I wish't) for me to offer support, with regard to a conduct, which my incompetence perhaps to judge of military questions leaves me at a loss to account for.[2]

Newcastle, also, wished to involve himself as little as possible. He was relieved that Sackville's recall and Granby's appointment to succeed him were decided upon during his absence in the country.[3] Both ministers, meanwhile, were anxious to press Bute's request for the Prince to review, Newcastle overcoming his earlier suspicions;[4] for the Governorship of Dumbarton Castle (in place of the Lowland regiment) for Lord Eglinton;[5] and for permission for Lord Aberdour to raise a troop of light horse in Scotland.[6]

Once Granby was safely appointed and it was clear that there was no chance of Sackville being restored to his command, Bute started to take up his cause with greater enthusiasm. Now there was no possibility of success, with the storm of protest that would have accompanied it, Bute could try to use the episode to strengthen his hand with the ministers by complaining of their

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1 Chatham Corr., i, 417-8.
2 Hist. MSS. Comm., Stopford-Sackville, i, 315
3 Addit. MSS.32894, f.291: Newcastle to Devonshire, 19 Aug 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32895, f.179: memorandums for the King, 5 Sept 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32894, f.183: Newcastle to Bute, 14 Aug 1759
6 Chatham MSS., 30/8/77: Aberdour's proposals. Addit. MSS.32896, f.61: memorandums for the King, 24 Sept 1759

treatment of Sackville. Sackville reciprocated this sudden access of support by offering to serve as a volunteer with the Prince in case of invasion.[1] Bute was plainly not supporting Sackville out of conviction. Hardwicke recognised that Bute's resentment was contrived;[2] and when Viry asked why Sackville had not followed Ferdinand's orders, Bute could only reply, 'ma foi, vous avez raison'.[3] But Temple's resignation and return to office without informing or consulting Leicester House further increased Bute's resentment against Pitt, though Pitt was not to blame for this.[4] The Prince wrote to Bute:

> Was there ever such an instance of neglect ... I see this proud, overbearing man daily looks on us with more and more disdain, this is a treatment insufferable, we must my Dearest Friend look out for other men than those we have hitherto been connected with.[5]

The new direction in which Leicester House was looking was that of Lord Holdernesse. He was now the favourite at Leicester House.[6] He had been paying Bute 'little fiddle faddle attentions and communications with which he is flatter'd for the time'.[7] He appears to have paid a visit to Sackville.[8] Bute in return supported Holdernesse's claim for the Garter.[9] But Pitt was still determined to do nothing to provoke Bute unnecessarily. Hardwicke was pressing strongly for Holdernesse's disgrace after his treatment of his son, but Pitt made his views clear to Viry, who reported them to Newcastle:

> If my Lord Holdernesse should be remov'd upon this occasion,

1 Addit. MSS.36796, f.42: Sackville to Bute, 3 Oct 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32896, f.323: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 6 Oct 1759
3 ibid., f.302: memorandums (Count Viry), 5 Oct 1759
4 Devonshire MSS., 260.263: memoranda, 21 Nov 1759
5 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 34
6 Addit. MSS.32899, f.11: memorandums (Count Viry), 21 Nov 1759
7 Addit. MSS.32896, f.324: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 6 Oct 1759
8 Egerton MSS.3432: Pitt to Holdernesse, 14 Sept 1759
9 Addit. MSS.32896, f.302-3: memorandums (Count Viry), 5 Oct 1759

> he (Pitt) would find himself fort embarassee, as he had engag'd himself originally in this question, and had taken it high at first ... That, as to Mr Pitt's situation at Leicester House, there was no intimacy, no great connection; but that Mr Pitt would not give them any handle to be displeas'd with him.[1]

Holdernesse's position at Leicester House owed much to Legge's disgrace there. On 29 August Legge's brother died, leaving him next in line for his Custom House place. Legge told Newcastle he could not perform 'any more pranks of generosity'.[2] Newcastle was greatly alarmed: the appointment of George Grenville would be a surrender to Pitt, while Barrington would mean that 'I must answer for ev'ry thing'.[3] Mansfield suggested as a way out of the difficulty that the reversion might be granted to Legge's infant son (he had no other suitable relations), and Legge assured Newcastle that he would be prepared to accept this, but only on the condition that a peerage was also granted to his wife.[4] On 26 September, to try to force Newcastle's hand, he decided to go into the country until his demand was met, and he was also 'talking impertinently' about Treasury measures.[5] Legge kept Bute informed of his intentions and his bargaining strength increased his value to Leicester House.[6] Newcastle was furious with Legge, but explained to him in a friendly way that it would be better to deal first with Temple's demand.[7] On 13 October he decided to call Legge's bluff. He promised that when the time was appropriate he would do everything possible to obtain a peerage for his wife:

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1 Addit. MSS.32899, f.164-5: memorandums (Count Viry), 28 Nov 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32895, f.16: Legge to Newcastle, 29 Aug 1759
3 ibid., f.76: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 31 Aug 1759
4 ibid., f.141-3: Mansfield to Newcastle, 3 Sept 1759. ibid., f.326: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 11 Sept 1759
5 Addit. MSS.32896, f.142: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 28 Sept 1759
6 Addit. MSS.36796, f.42: Legge to Bute, 27 Sept 1759. Addit. MSS. 32896, f.223: memorandums (Count Viry), 2 Oct 1759.
7 ibid., f.194-7: Newcastle to Legge, 4 Oct 1759.

meanwhile Legge's help over the supplies was essential. He made it plain that he could offer no more than a promise, which Legge would have to decide whether to accept or reject.[1] Hardwicke had seen clearly that Legge had been threatening more than he would carry out: 'people are apt to run from a falling house, but seldom from a flourishing one'.[2] Legge had overplayed his hand, and he returned without resentment, reserving his request until it was consistent with the King's affairs.[3]

Bute had backed Legge on the assumption that his pressure would be maintained, and he was far from pleased with this decision. It happened to coincide with a vacancy in Hampshire, where the two main interests were those of the rival Dukes of Chandos and Bolton. Bute had already declared his support for Simeon Stuart (not a relation), who was championed by Chandos' son, Carnarvon. Legge was now nominated, apparently in genuine ignorance that Stuart was also standing.[4] On 24 November, after the canvass had shown that there would be a large majority for Legge, Stuart gave up the fight. He wanted to 'treat on conditions', but Legge forced him to 'surrender at discretion'.[5] The following day Bute told Legge that since he had interfered in ignorance of Leicester House's wishes, this would not be held against him, but that he was expected to support the Leicester House candidate at the next election.[6] Legge replied that he would be glad if he were able to obey the Prince's commands, but that he would not be able to do

1 Addit. MSS.32897, f.45-9: Newcastle to Legge, 13 Oct 1759
2 ibid., f.141: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 16 Oct 1759
Cf. Addit. MSS.32896, f.172: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 29 Sept 1759
3 Addit. MSS.32897, f.136: memorandums for the King, 16 Oct 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32898, f.55: Legge to Newcastle, 2 Nov 1759
5 Addit. MSS. 32899, f.83: Stanley to Newcastle, 24 Nov 1759
6 (J. Butler), Some Account of the Character of the Late Rt. Hon. Henry Bilson Legge (London, 1764), p.14.

so if it would mean breaking faith with his own supporters.[1] The split was total. As when he had finally ceased to place any hope in Pitt, the Prince wrote to Bute about Legge, with whom he was 'more incens'd than ever': 'we must look out for new tools our old one's having all deserted us'.[2] With Legge lost to the fold, Leicester House had little choice but to look with favour on Holdernesse's overtures.

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1 (J. Butler), Some Account of the Character of the Late Rt. Hon Henry Bilson Legge (London, , 1764), 15-18. The contest was because another was shortly expected. Alexander Thistlethwayte, the other MP for the county, was dangerously ill and not expected to recover. Addit. MSS.32899, f.403: Clanricarde to Newcastle, 10 Dec 1759

2 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 35

ATTITUDES TO PEACE

(i)

The common front of Newcastle and Pitt on the question of peace did not last long. With increasing success in the war, Pitt widened the scope of his American ambitions, and it was this that provided the new stumbling-block. But it was only gradually that these ambitions were conceived. It is important to trace exactly how and when the two ministers once again found themselves at odds over the ending of the war.

Initially, Pitt was enthusiastic enough for peace to allow himself to be talked out of his suspicions of the attitude of Choiseul. The French reply to the Anglo-Prussian declaration stated that the only proper course was to separate the war between England and France from the war in Germany, where the two powers were only auxiliaries. D'Affry was 'much dejected' by this reply, but Newcastle was less dispirited.[1] He wrote to Page:

> Our publick offer of peace does good, shews a spirit of moderation, and will end in something good, either a general peace, or, a breach amongst France and her allies. Already France begins to talk of making peace separately with us, upon the points which singly regard them and us; this spirit may carry itself farther when once the Congress meets; especially, if the Queen of Hungary should insist upon terms, which we shall not consent to, I mean with regard to Prussia.[2]

Pitt had hitherto been working actively for peace. When Russia replied that she would not consider starting negotiations unless satisfaction were given to the wronged parties, Pitt mooted the idea of a representation to the King of Prussia that he should

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1 Addit. MSS.32899, f.276: J. Yorke to Newcastle, 4 Dec 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32900, f.357-8: Newcastle to Page, 27 Dec 1759

show a conciliatory disposition towards Saxony, which was taken to be the power to which Russia was referring.[1] Frederick proved cooperative: he was prepared to evacuate Saxony as a condition of a separate Anglo-French peace.[2] But Pitt, though Hardwicke found him more enthusiastic for peace than ever before, was at first discouraged by the French suggestion that the two wars should be separated. Hardwicke himself was equally doubtful.[3] Newcastle wrote to him:

> I see plainly Mr Pitt's apprehension, who thinks, and talks, upon this overture, exactly as your Lordship does. He is afraid, that, if we make a separate peace with France, including even the King of Prussia, and the King as Elector, Prussia and Hanover may not be able to carry on the war against the Queen of Hungary and possibly Russia, without powerful assistance from hence, which, he thinks, when our own affairs are made up, cannot be had. I admit there is great weight in this reasoning; but if we don't separate France from their allies, I am persuaded, we shall have no peace, and perhaps no congress. The Queen of Hungary depends so much upon the absolute impossibility for the King of Prussia to carry on the war; that she will consent to no terms, but the cession of Silesia; whereas if France was once bona fide separated, we should have a good chance for Russia, and Sweden, and the Court of Vienna might think twice before they risk'd a war upon their own bottoms.[4]

Hardwicke, initially sceptical, was convinced, and it was he who brought Pitt round to Newcastle's view. Hardwicke wrote to Newcastle:

> I endeavoured to show him (Pitt) that, if France thought fit to treat without her allies, that was nothing to us, provided the King took his allies along with him; that in the course of such a separate negotiation it would probably appear impracticable to finish a treaty without comprehending the affairs of Germany, and this might oblige France to induce her allies or some of them to come in ... This he at last allowed, and told me in what way he wished Joe might be writ to.[5]

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1 Addit. MSS.32900, f.117: memorandums for the King, 17 Dec 1759
2 Pol. Corr., xix: 39, 59-61
3 Addit. MSS.32900, f.424: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 30 Dec 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32901, f.42-3: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 2 Jan 1760
5 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 242-3

When Pitt suggested that D'Affry should be told that if France had anything to say on the subject, England would be ready to listen, Newcastle rightly thought that he had won his point, though Pitt insisted, against Newcastle's wish, that England should only consider treating separately with France if Prussia and Hanover were also included in the negotiation.[1] Mitchell was duly instructed in these terms.[2] Even the King approved of this.[3] Since the failure of his attempt to exchange promises of a garter for Temple for those of Hanoverian acquisitions, he had virtually given up hope of having the backing of the English ministers for any such gains. He no longer had any reason to wish the war to continue.

Newcastle was satisfied with the outcome, though he feared that 'it is now too late'.[4] But the picture suddenly brightened. D'Affry told Yorke that Choiseul hoped to send a certain O'Dunn to England to negotiate on American affairs. O'Dunn was thought in England to be the Pretender's agent and was actively involved in the invasion preparations: he himself could not be expected to be acceptable, but the idea of sending over a negotiator was welcomed and an encouraging reply was given to D'Affry. A second approach was made to Yorke by Count St-Germaine. He produced credentials from Belleisle, claiming that Choiseul would probably soon be disgraced and that the whole of the rest of the nation was for peace. He implied that France cared little for Guadeloupe or

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1 Addit. MSS.32901, f.282: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 Jan 1760
ibid., f.479: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Jan 1760
2 Addit. MSS.6818, f.17: Holdernesse to Mitchell, 25 Jan 1760
3 Addit. MSS.32903, f.456: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 22 March 1760
4 Addit. MSS.32901, f.407: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 22 Jan 1760
5 Cf. O. Macallester, A Series of Letters Discovering the Scheme Projected by France, in MDCCLIX for an Intended Invasion upon England with Flat-Bottom'd Boats (London, 1767), ii, 30, for an account of O'Dunn's position.

Canada, but would want to preserve all her possessions in India. Above all, he wanted to avoid another campaign. To keep open this alternative channel, a friendly answer was also given to St-Germaine. Meanwhile, an approach was also made to Choiseul. On 17 February, the Prussian King asked the Bailli de Froullay at Paris to explore whether Choiseul was sincere in his expressed wish that the war should come to an end. The reply was vague, but not without encouragement: if Prussia wanted to avoid a new campaign, he said, peace preliminaries should be signed between England and France by the end of June. Frederick himself welcomed this reply, seeing it as clear evidence of France's wish to avoid another campaign.[1]

So far, Pitt and Newcastle were in complete agreement. Hardwicke told Newcastle that he found Pitt 'more forward for peace than I have known him before'.[2] Newcastle was equally pleased with Pitt's 'very reasonable' views on the question of peace.[3] Late in March, he wrote to Joseph Yorke:

> We, that is the material part of us, agree in all foreign affairs, except perhaps as to the advisableness of adding a little more strength to Prince Ferdinand's army.[4]

The outlook for an early peace was therefore bright, both from the point of view of the English ministers' agreement and from that of the attitude of the French. But this hopeful state of affairs did not last. Pitt's reaction to Choiseul's reply to Froullay's overture astonished Newcastle, who (like Frederick himself) had interpreted it in a favourable light. He complained

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1 Pol. Corr., xix, 108, 203-6
2 Addit. MSS.32901, f.280: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 15 Jan 1760
3 Addit. MSS.32902, f.431: memorandums for the King, 27 Feb 1760
4 Addit. MSS.32904, f.74: Newcastle to Yorke, 28 March 1760

to Hardwicke:

> By a most extraordinary way of reasoning Mr Pitt has found out, that the result is to be, that Prussia is to treat for us, and make our peace, or, in other words, that our conquests should be at the discretion of the King of Prussia; for him to make his own bargain with them; whereas, if there is anything to be infer'd from the French paper, it is, that the King of Prussia must make his peace, by us, and thro' us. The King of Prussia and his ministers here are very well satisfied with their answer. Mr Pitt has almost quarrell'd with Kniphausen upon it; and, if I can discover his plan, it is, to fling the blame both of the war, and the peace, or rather the not making a proper peace, upon the King of Prussia.[1]

Newcastle's explanation - that Pitt was preparing the ground for attributing the course of future events, whatever form they took, to the King of Prussia - was in keeping with Pitt's habitual methods, but it was only part of the story. The truth was that Pitt had reversed his attitude and had decided that there must be at least one more campaign. Hardwicke recognised this, and correctly diagnosed that the reason was to be found in America:

> There is such a backwardness in <u>some</u> of the principal persons, who are to direct, and such a <u>nothingness</u> in <u>some</u> of those, who are to execute, that there is no ground to hope for a pacification, especially if France means nothing but to yield us the limits, which we insisted upon before this expensive war began. It is not impossible but this nation may be undone by its successes in America.[2]

Pitt's previous views on the question of American acquisitions, of course, had been in line with those of Newcastle. Ever since the capture of Louisbourg, he had been prepared to return it to the French at the peace. The matter had been discussed in cabinet as recently as 6 February, and three days later Pitt wrote to Amherst ordering him to destroy the fortifications there, in order to reduce the value of the place to the French after the

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1 Addit. MSS.32904, f.278-9: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 April 1760
2 <u>Ibid</u>., f.129: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 31 March 1760

close of the war.[1] But Pitt now for the first time became convinced that a peace in which England retained the whole of Canada might be practicable. There was indeed some evidence for this view. St-Germaine's remarks that France cared little for Canada had to be treated with reserve - as an 'avanturier of some credit' he was an inadequate authority of which to base a policy - but the King of Prussia had independently received the same intelligence from his own most reliable source, and this he communicated to Pitt alone of the English ministers.[2]

But it rapidly became clear that there could be no hope of a peace in which England acquired the whole of Canada without another campaign. D'Affry's overture was not followed up; and intelligence from both Yorke and Cressener agreed that Choiseul was looking increasingly likely to defeat his rival Belleisle, and that the continuation of the war would be the probable result.[3] By the start of April, there appeared to be little hope of peace before the end of the year's campaign: even Joseph Yorke, usually irrepressibly optimistic, came reluctantly to this conclusion.[4] It was at this point that Pitt, now convinced that the acquisition of Canada might be attainable but that this would require at least one more campaign, brought into the open the divergence between his own views and those of his colleagues. His angry reaction to Choiseul's reply to Froullay was the pretext, not the cause. His particular objection to the phrase 'aucun parti ne gagnera grande chose dans cette guerre' sounded artificial and contrived: as

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1 Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners in America, ed. G.S. Kimball (New York, 1906), ii, 250-2.
2 Pol. Corr., xvii, 703
3 Addit. MSS.32903, f.475-7: intelligence, 24 March 1760
Addit. MSS.32904, f.192-4: J. Yorke to Holdernesse, 4 April 1760
4 ibid., f.140: J. Yorke to Newcastle, 1 April 1760

Hardwicke pointed out, 'it was not to be expected that France should say at first that any of the parties should be great gainers by the war, much less that we should'.[1] Subsequently, whenever Newcastle attempted to put forward his pacific views, Pitt made his opposition strongly felt. When Newcastle raised the financial problems involved in continuing the war, Pitt 'flew into a violent passion': England was a hundred times better able to carry on the war than France.[2] The accord of the two ministers on the question of peace had been finally and decisively broken.

Without a full examination of the way in which the controversy over the retention of Canada unfolded in the new reign, it is difficult to assess accurately the strength of the various factors which were responsible for Pitt's change of policy on America between February and early April. The diplomatic and military situation, for the first time during the course of the war, permitted the view that the acquisition of the whole of Canada might be a feasible objective, but domestic pressures were acting in the same direction in influencing Pitt's volte-face. The beginnings, early in the year, of the pamphlet war between the advocates of retaining Canada and those of Guadeloupe gave him an added incentive to extend his ambitions, especially as the majority of the West Indian interest, fearing saturation of the market, came down strongly on the side of Canada.[3] Beckford, of course, was the most influential of those who took this line. Hardwicke was probably right in recognising that Pitt's decision was inspired by a combination of domestic and external circumstances. He wrote to

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1 Addit. MSS.32904, f.303: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 10 April 1760
2 ibid., f.279: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 9 April 1760
3 W.L. Grant, 'America versus Guadeloupe, an Eposide of the Seven Years' War', Am. Hist. Rev., xvii (1912), 742

Newcastle some years later:

> ... as to the retention of conquests, Mr Pitt made North-America entirely his object. Some of his friends objected to him that he did this out of partiality to his friend Beckford, and out of condescension to the particular interests of our Sugar Colonies; but in that I suppose they did him wrong; tho' I allways suspected that one reason why he contended so much for the totality of the Fishery, impracticable to be obtain'd, was that he saw the country of Canada was not greatly worth keeping.[1]

In this instance, the national interest, as Pitt saw it, coincided happily with his own political advantage. But the unanimity of the two ministers on the question of peace had been decisively broken.

(ii)

It was Pitt's attitude to the question of peace that determined the attitude adopted by Leicester House. Pitt, in his usual way, had no wish to give Bute or the Prince unnecessary cause for offence. When Hardwicke insisted on the King's avowal of the private correspondence between Newcastle and Yorke, Pitt told Newcastle that though he was not himself opposed to this, 'Leicester House was the first and chief difficulty. His own being implicated in it, and by that means obliged in some measure seemingly to take part with Holdernesse, the next'? When Charles Townshend, to press his claim to be a plenipotentiary at any future peace congress, told West that he 'had the ear of the Prince of Wales more now than any body', Pitt said that he did not know whether or not this was true, but that it would be advisable to have at least one plenipotentiary supported by Leicester House.[3]

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1 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p 279
2 Addit. MSS.32893, f.103:
3 Addit. MSS.32900, f.120-1: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Dec 1759

But Pitt could not afford to give ground over the Sackville issue. The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General had been asked to consider whether an officer could be tried by a court-martial after dismissal or for an alleged offence committed abroad. They reported that he could. Holdernesse informed Sackville of this and asked him how, in view of the fact that there was no specific charge against him, he proposed to take advantage of the court-martial which he had requested to justify his conduct - the very question which some twenty years later Sackville, with a strange irony, was to address to Burgoyne. Sackville simply requested 'that His Majesty would direct me to be legally prosecuted for whatever crime I may have been thought guilty of'.[1]

Ferdinand's criticisms of Sackville were very strongly worded: the ministers could show no outward display of sympathy. Nor did Sackville's defence enhance his reputation: when the court-martial closed on 5 April, it was the general opinion that he would certainly be found guilty.[2] But the verdict fell short of what was expected. It simply adjudged him guilty of disobedience and concluded, 'it is the further opinion of this court that the said Lord George Sackville is, and he is hereby adjudged, unfit to serve His Majesty in any military capacity whatever'. Sackville himself was surprised by the leniency of the sentence, holding that it was the equivalent of an acquittal, but that this had been concealed by the need to save the faces of the King and his ministers.[3] The King had been trying to exert pressure on

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1 Addit. MSS.32901, f.333: Sackville to Holdernesse, 17 Jan 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32904, f.215: Barrington to Newcastle, 5 April 1760
3 Addit. MSS.36796, f.52: Sackville to Bute, 16 April 1760
Egerton MSS.1719, f.116: Lady Sophia Egerton to Bentinck, 22 April 1760

the court-martial to take a strong line against Sackville, and Newcastle connived at this attempt, though keen above all to avoid the death penalty.[1] It was the King himself who proposed to increase Sackville's disgrace by giving the sentence the widest possible publicity within the army.[2] Neither Newcastle nor Pitt, anxious now to do nothing further to antagonise Leicester House, wished to adopt this suggestion, but neither could easily oppose it openly, and the King had his way. To try to soften the blow, Pitt meanwhile sounded Bute about the possibility of obtaining extra appointments for his brother at Turin.[3]

This attitude produced more of a response from Bute than Pitt had bargained for, or indeed than he wanted. The Sackville affair, just when it appeared to be ending, flared up again on 22 April when Sackville appeared in the House of Commons. This provocative action was followed, the next day, by an order sent through Devonshire, as Lord Chamberlain, not to appear at court. Leicester House was furious: the Prince wrote:'... the K---'s message is a true slap in the face to me, for what right can he in reality claim in my house; my honour forces me to remain but little longer passive'.[4] But the activity of Leicester House took an unexpected form. Bute was embarrassed by having to appear as Sackville's only defender: not a single effective political figure supported him in this task. Since the Hampshire election dispute, Legge had been irreconcilably alienated, and he now had no choice but to act with Newcastle, earning his gratitude for his part in the Qualification

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1 Addit. MSS.35419, f.186: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 March 1760
Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. of Duke of Rutland, ii, 205-6
2 Addit. MSS.35430, f.194: Barrington to C. Yorke, 31 July 1760
Addit. MSS.32904, f.404: Barrington to Newcastle, 17 April 1760
3 Addit. MSS.36796, f.51: Mackenzie to Bute, 22 Feb 1760
4 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p 43

and Scottish militia disputes.[1] Holdernesse was still paying court to Bute, but he was excluded from any part in affairs and his limited value became increasingly apparent: even when Pitt was ill, he evaded responsibility by taking his holidays 'at a pretty unusual time'.[2] There were therefore powerful reasons to induce Bute to try to improve his relations with the ministers. In March, in an interview with Lincoln, Bute tried to find out 'whether the Prince of Wales is to expect any favor from the King's administration', and what intentions Newcastle himself had for the new reign.[3] Then on 30 April he approached Gilbert Elliot, whom Pitt had brought in as a Lord of the Admiralty in 1756 and 1757. Elliot was a common friend whom, it seems, Bute had vainly employed in an earlier attempt at reconciliation in November of the previous year.[4] Bute now wrote him a long letter expressing personal respect for Pitt and pointing to the advantages of a renewal of their former alliance:

> If you please, you may tell him, that on the strictest search I can discover no one idea in my mind, that opposes tying the knot of union as tight as ever; if he is able to say as much, the business is in a manner done.[5]

Elliot's note on his conversation with Pitt, containing the reply to this overture, casts so much light on Pitt's relations with Leicester House, as well as on the image he was trying to convey of himself, that it is worth quoting in full:

> The droping of one or two of the principal actors make a great change in the scene - favour not every thing in this country - a high, imperious tone, the singleing of confidence into one hand to the exclusion of all mankind, the

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1 Addit. MSS.35419, f.174: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 5 March 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32908, f.252: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 13 July 1760.
3 Addit. MSS.32998, f.388: memorandums, 6 March 1760. Presumably this interview - of which there is no direct account - is the one referred to in Addit MSS.5726D, f.213, dated 'Exchequer, Sunday morning, 1760'
4 Devonshire MSS. 260.263: memoranda, 17 Nov 1759
5 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p.105

flippant use of the P(rince's) name gives disgust: talking tauntingly of my progress at Court, and in certain quarters of it. I own placed there a bulwark against the D(uke of Cumberland), to contend with the intrigue and favour of the D(uke) of N(ewcastle), with the K(ing) hardly speaking to me, I have practis'd L(ady) Y(armouth), and with success. I have found her a very fair honest woman and well disposed to aid every measure for the interest of this country. But in such circumstances to be continually met with obstruction instead of support from Leister House, to be ground between two Courts is too much: has he forgot how we first came together, then feeling the disadvantage of his situation as a S.P. (Scottish peer?) talking of our generosity since they had nothing to bestow, that all would be in our hands in a future day, after some interval told shortly that he himself was destined for the Treasury, that he agreed to it mostly on my account, as every other person in that situation would sap and undermine me, he would only act as my friend and throw all into my hands: these expressions not be sure taken in their full extent flowing from not so much the effusions of the heart, yet tho not meaning all, surely meaning something: now every one more at home at Leister House than I, different lines at different times entered into almost with every quarter, persons talked of to day as the lowest and most unable of men, to morrow caressed and confidentially used: I have never gone into these representations of men's characters knowing how changes come about: a root of umbrage in that mind which nothing can remove or draw in

aut calidus sanguis, aut inscitia rerum.

As one connection been made, can he suffer any other person to make one, who might do it. I have purposely avoided it feeling the jealousy it would occasion. As to want of confidence and communication so much complained of: I have acted upon the concerted plan, I have effectually barred the entrance to those who were meant to be excluded, carryed on the war on its plan, armed the country even Scotland when every other Minister threw out suspicions on that quarter, but have not carefully transmitted every little scrap of paper, all the little paltry detail, I have not waited for direction and approbation, but seized the moment when I could to secure these measures: my health, infirmity's, temper dont admit of making such court: neither would; I would never have been Minister to act in collusion with any P(rince) and M(inister). I will not be rid with a check rein, nor postpone measures or delay business till I hear from (the) K(ing): such being the case I know it is impossible for me to act in a responsible ministerial office with L(ord) B(ute); he has all confidence, all habitude, gives hourly indications of an imperious nature, I cant bear a touch of command, my sentiments in politicks like my religion are my own, I cant change them, I'll controvert them with any Minister and the Sovereign must judge betwixt us: the rights of my office are not enough to me, if I am to be in a responsible situation; I cannot be dictated, prescribed to etc.: neither acting as a friend can I then

> contend for the closet or drive measures by national weight, as I do at present, when I pretend not friendships to the Ministers with whom I act: my age, infirmitys, turn of mind make it impossible for me to undertake new oppositions, the heats and colds of the House of Commons are too much for me, neither will I retire peevish and discontented but recur to the P(rince) and Lord Bute friendships to put me in some honourable bystanding office where I have no responsibility but aid counsels if called upon. I will even make way for his greatness, assist it, only I cannot make part of it.
>
> Let me conclude with saying, by distrusting his friends he'll become dependent on his enemys.[1]

The aim of Bute's offer is clear. Pitt was to continue in the new reign as Secretary of State, while Bute was to replace Newcastle as First Lord of the Treasury. This is apparent from the Prince's letter to Bute after hearing of Pitt's reply:

> The late instance in the transaction with Mr P is perhaps the strongest that ever happened to a man of your strong sensations; he has shown himself the most ungrateful and in my mind the most dishonorable of men, I can never bear to see him in any future Ministry; what I still flatter myself is, that some method may turn up of regulating affairs, which may still make the Treasury not unpalatable to you.[2]

It is not surprising that Pitt rejected this approach. Personal and political factors both worked in the same direction. His pride would not allow him to be 'rid with a check rein', and quite apart from this, his present position depended largely on his use of Newcastle as an intermediary with the King, and on his success in effectively controlling the Commons while disclaiming all responsibility for this power: Newcastle's theoretical strength was turned to Pitt's own purposes. In the new reign this policy would no longer be practicable. The Prince would obey Bute in everything, and it would be impossible to claim that Bute had the

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1 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, pp 105-7

2 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 45. Cf. G.F.S. Elliot, The Border Elliots and the Family of Minto, p. 363-4

control of the House of Commons.

Inevitably, relations with Leicester House further deteriorated. Pitt asked Viry to find out, as from himself, what Bute thought about the possible conditions of a future peace. Viry discovered that Bute was harping on the immense expense of the war and concluded that 'he wishes for peace, but will not say so'.[1] Bute was determined not to smooth Pitt's path: Viry reported to Newcastle that 'when Lord B. thought Mr P. was for peace, he always made difficulties. That when Lord Bute thought Mr Pitt was for the continuance of the war, Lord B. appear'd to be for peace'.[2] Probably Viry was right. Bute had failed to identify Leicester House with any aspect of the war effort, and he had failed to reunite with Pitt and thereby to gain some of the administration's reflected glory. Almost certainly he wanted a peace at the first opportunity: but in view of Pitt's popularity he could hardly stand forward at the head of a peace party. It is a measure of Bute's political impotence that he could not even give expression, other than to the Prince, of his anger and frustration with Pitt.

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1 Addit. MSS.32909, f.46: secret memorandums, 25 July 1760
2 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 108.

FURTHER REINFORCEMENTS

(1)

Pitt's decision that there should be at least one more campaign involved him in the embarrassing necessity of strengthening the British presence in Germany. Hitherto, in the hope that the present campaign would be the last, little had been done. On 11 December, in partial response to Ferdinand's request for a reinforcement or at very least for the bringing of the British corps up to full strength, it was unanimously agreed to obtain an extra 7,000 German troops for Ferdinand.[1] Pitt soon went rather further by agreeing to strengthen two regiments of cavalry in Ireland and to send these to Germany, and by proposing to add two privates to each troop of dragoons from England to Germany, and also to draft one man from each infantry company.[2] But this was all he would do. When Hardwicke pressed for a larger reinforcement, he 'resorted to his old exaggerations of Prince Ferdinand's superior abilities, and the superior vigour and spirit of his troops; and the low dispirited state of the French army'.[3]

Newcastle was quite happy with this situation. So long as there was any risk of invasion, he wished to keep as powerful a regular force in the country as he could. He admitted to the King that whatever decision was taken would be Pitt's rather than his own.[4] But for the present he had no intention of trying to put any pressure on his colleague. Even after Quiberon Bay he assumed

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1 Addit. MSS,32899, f.106-7: Ferdinand to Pitt, 26 Nov 1759
Addit. MSS.32900, f.10: memorandums for the King, 12 Dec 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32901, f.195: Pitt to Newcastle, 11 Jan 1760. ibid., f.226: memorandums for the King, 14 Jan 1760
3 ibid., f.281: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 15 Jan 1760
4 Addit. MSS.32898, f.81-2: memorandums for the King, 4 Nov 1759

that the invasion would go ahead: to send troops out of the country would only be to provide further encouragement.[1] Newcastle was pulled in the opposite direction by his fear that Austria might have persuaded France that the only way to recover Quebec was in Germany, and that Austria and Russia, after demolishing Frederick, might themselves turn on Hanover and Hesse.[2] A reinforcement might prevent this: but it was the fear of invasion that predominated. Newcastle was worried even by the idea of sending any troops from Ireland, and he told Yorke that only if the invasion was successfully weathered would it be possible to think of sending a significant reinforcement to Germany.[3]

It was not until February that the attempt materialized. On the 21st, Thurot's squadron landed in Ireland. It captured Carrickfergus and took four companies of troops prisoner, but as soon as Bedford took counter-measures Thurot re-embarked, and the three French ships quickly surrendered. The whole affair created little alarm. But Newcastle did not change his attitude. He thought the French would renew their attempt, and it was for this reason that he opposed the request of the Prussian ministers for 10,000 English troops to be sent to the continent.[4]

But by April Newcastle, despite a nagging anxiety, had come to accept that the French would almost certainly make no new attempt and that there was no need for a force of 30,000 regulars and 24,000 militia in England.[5] It was now that both Newcastle

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1 Addit. MSS.32899, f.56: Newcastle to Granby, 23 Nov 1759. ibid., f.115: Newcastle to Rigby, 26 Nov 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32901, f.459: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 25 Jan 1760
3 Addit. MSS.32900, f.313: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 25 Dec 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32902, f.86: memorandums for the King, 7 Feb 1760
ibid., f.446: Newcastle to Rigby, 27 Feb 1760
5 Addit. MSS.32904, f.375: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 15 April 1760

and Pitt saw the advantages to be gained from sending a major reinforcement: it was their conflicting views on the desirability of an early peace that chiefly influenced them. Newcastle saw the sending of troops as a way of bringing the war to an early end: 'if by such a reinforcement', he wrote to Devonshire, 'we could enable Prince Ferdinand, to strike a successful stroke, at the beginning of the campaign, I am morally sure, the pacifick party in France would prevail; and we should have overtures before midsummer'.[1] Pitt, in contrast, wanted a reinforcement as a means of carrying on a new campaign. As Hardwicke realised, 'a peace now appearing to be at a greater distance, he sees the necessity in a stronger light'.[2]

Once again, Pitt took the initiative, while deliberately creating the impression of dragging his feet. He had already left his options open by going out of his way to tell the Commons in October that a further reinforcement might in the future prove unavoidable.[3] It is quite clear that it was Pitt rather than Newcastle who first raised the question.[4] But he told Newcastle on 8 April that 'he dared not go farther, than he has already done: but that, if the King's other ministers thought the measure right, and thought proper to advise it, he should not oppose it, nor be displeased with it.'[5] Newcastle did not believe, at first, that Pitt's support for the idea of sending troops was genuine. But Hardwicke had a better understanding of Pitt's conduct:

> it is amazing to me that, considering how much depends upon the events of this campaign in Germany, he should not even

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1 Addit. MSS.32904, f.260: Newcastle to Devonshire, 8 April 1760
2 ibid., f.454: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 20 April 1760
3 Walpole, Memoirs, iii, 226
4 Stowe MSS. 263:Business for Hardwicke, Mansfield & Stone,18 Feb
5 Addit. MSS.32904, f.259: Newcastle to Devonshire, 8 April 1760

> propose the sending some British infantry to that country. Perhaps he wants to be ravished to it.[1]

Devonshire made almost the same point, believing that Pitt, not caring to 'take the load of sending more troops on himself', would raise no objection if Newcastle 'took the weight a little off his shoulders'.[2] Pitt was in his usual way determined to exact the maximum price for his seemingly reluctant support, and he went about it with his accustomed skill. On the one hand, he made use of the feeling that there was an unnecessarily large number of troops in England. Devonshire pointed out apprehensively that if this were so, the case for another coastal expedition, as well as that for a reinforcement for Germany, would be strengthened.[3] Pitt took full advantage of this. As he had once done so successfully before, he raised the possibility of another amphibious operation and played this off against Newcastle's evident wish that any available troops should be sent to Ferdinand. Hardwicke again saw Pitt's intention, and warned Newcastle:

> I know some sensible people, who suspect such a project of an expedition, as you hint at, is meditating. Lord Anson certainly knows nothing of it, but there are those, who suspect, that Lord Howe is in the secret. If this be true, one view of it is to create an objection against sending more troops to Germany.[4]

On the other hand, and at the same time, Pitt equally made use of the opposite view - that to send troops out of the country, whether to Germany or to the French coast, might reduce strength at home to a dangerously low level. He professed to Newcastle that he 'had his apprehensions at home'.[5] His solution was as

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 245.
2 Addit. MSS.32904, f.306: Devonshire to Newcastle, 10 April 1760
3 ibid., f.314: Newcastle to Yorke, 11 April 1760
4 ibid., f.303: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 10 April 1760
5 ibid., f.378: Newcastle to Granby, 15 April 1760. Cf. Hist. MSS. Comm., Report on MSS. of Duke of Rutland, ii, 205

ingenious as it was contrived. Lord Shaftesbury was leading a move to relieve the militia counties of part of their financial burden by transferring payments for the families of militia men from the counties to the Treasury.[1] Pitt had committed himself to support such a move, and made a 'strong, pathetic lamentation' when Newcastle refused to agree.[2] He was presented with a perfect opportunity to give wider publicity to this championship of the militia when his cousin Jack Pitt, MP for Dorchester, introduced a bill designed to achieve Shaftesbury's purpose. Whether Pitt suggested to his cousin that such a bill would not be unwelcome is a matter for conjecture. Whatever the answer, Pitt was enabled by its introduction to combine the militia issue with that of the reinforcement. He told Barrington that

> as for himself, he thought it was dangerous to lessen the regular force of the kingdom, unless the militia was kept in humour by passing Jack Pitt's bill.[3]

Both Barrington and Hardwicke recognised Pitt's purpose, and the latter suggested a compromise solution: Newcastle's friends should agree to such parts of the bill as seemed reasonable, and Pitt should agree both to send a satisfactory reinforcement and to promise not to try to continue the militia beyond the present Parliament, but to leave it open for the new House to discuss.[4] It is easy to see why Hardwicke wanted this. Sir Francis Dashwood and others were suspicious that the government's intention was to keep the militia in being in order to protect 'German measures' and to discontinue it as soon as peace was signed.[5] This anxiety was

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1 Chatham MSS., 30/8/56:
2 Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 437
3 Addit. MSS.32904, f.424: Barrington to Newcastle, 18 April 1760
4 ibid., f.454: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 20 April 1760
5 ibid., f.161: memorandums for the King, 2 April 1760

clearly something which Pitt might be able to exploit; and he did so by telling the Commons that without the militia troops could never have been sent to America, Africa or Germany, and that if any minister should oppose the militia in any way, he would in turn oppose the sending of any more troops to the continent.[1]

It was not only the cause of the militia in England that Pitt took up in his attempt to dissociate himself from the reinforcement which in reality he so much wanted. Gilbert Elliot was promoting a bill for a militia in Scotland. This was part of Bute's campaign for electoral influence: the only existing militia in Scotland was that in Argyll. Pitt was at first anxious not to do Leicester House's own work, and he simply intimated to Newcastle that he was 'undetermined, though rather for it as a friend to militia', while admitting that because of the Disarming laws the Highlands presented a genuine difficulty.[2] Devonshire urged that the bill should be disposed of as quickly as possible since this attitude might not last.[3] His fears were well founded. Pitt now saw the value of using the bill as another of his bargaining counters. He suddenly became enthusiastic in its support, starting to look up earlier legislation on the subject, with a view to presenting the case for a Scottish militia as powerfully as he could.[4] Yet he did so without identifying himself with Leicester House: he accepted, for example, the line for disarmament laid down by the present laws, which Elliot and Bute opposed.[5] Newcastle, pressed

1 Addit. MSS.32904, f.394: West's report, 15 April 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32903, f.82: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 March 1760
3 ibid., f.228: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 12 March 1760
4 Addit. MSS. 32904, f.102: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 30 March 1760
5 ibid., f.394: West's report, 15 April 1760. Cf. Addit. MSS. 35374, f.164-5: J. Yorke to Hardwicke, 4 March 1760

both by the King and by his 'warm young friends', had little choice but to throw his weight against the bill.[1]

Pitt exerted further pressure on Newcastle, and secured his position with his Tory supporters, by a second stand which he took, this time over a bill introduced by Sir John Philipps and William Beckford. The purpose of the bill was to oblige every MP to swear to his landed qualifications, laid down by the Tory act of half a century ago. This move, like those of Jack Pitt and Elliot over the militia, came at an opportune time. Pitt had recently endangered his relations with the Tory country gentlemen by supporting Beckford's plea for the continued prohibition of the distilling of spirits.[2] But over the Qualification bill the landed gentry and the City could forget their differences. During the long years of Whig ascendancy fictitious qualifications had become increasingly common, and Hardwicke thought that the bill would create 'much altercation and some ill blood, ... and a considerable change of persons upon the election of a new Parliament'.[3] The Tories claimed that the passing of the bill should be their reward for supporting the administration, and Pitt predictably said that he would declare for it, while leaving the government line for Newcastle to determine.[4] Newcastle himself was in something of a dilemma over this issue. He wrote to Hardwicke:

> I own I am very uneasy upon this point. I should be sorry either that the bill should pass as it is; or that we should do anything to create a coolness with Mr Pitt, etc.[5]

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1 Addit. MSS.32903, f.297: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 15 March 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32902, f.388: Memorandums for the King, 25 Feb 1760
3 Addit. MSS.32901, f.489-90: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 27 Jan 1760
Cf. Walpole, Memoirs, ii, 86
4 Addit. MSS 32902, f.328: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 Feb 1760.
5 Addit. MSS.32903, f.94: West's report, 4 March 1760

In a debate on 5 March, he favoured a move by Legge to postpone the second reading in order to enable Pitt, who was ill, to attend. This was carried by 101 votes to 29, the 'young gentlemen' forming the nucleus of the minority.[1] When Pitt eventually spoke on the bill in the debate on 21 April, he adopted the theme of cooperation: the support of the landed interest was essential for the effective prosecution of the war, and the passing of the bill would mean a quiet general election; it was a small return for those who had so readily given fifteen millions a year.[2] With the bill somewhat diluted, the question for its commitment was carried by only 121 votes to 76 - an even clearer sign of the limited nature of Newcastle's control over his supporters.

Pitt was fortunate in the timing of these disputes, which allowed him both to embarrass Newcastle and to strengthen himself with his own supporters in his bid to escape their censure for his acceptance of the impending reinforcement. Meanwhile, he was seemingly giving ground on the question of the troops. By 15 April, Newcastle thought '<u>at last</u>' that a body of four to six battalions might be sent.[4] But Pitt was determined to extract all possible political value out of the question of the militia before a final decision was taken. On 23 April the cabinet discussed the possibility of sending a reinforcement to Ferdinand.[5] There is no record of what happened at this meeting, but it is apparent that no decision was taken. This was two days before the debate on Jack Pitt's bill. Pitt had already warned Newcastle that unless

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1 Addit. MSS.32903, f.94: West's report, 4 March 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32905, f.14: West's report, 21 April 1760
3 <u>The Journals of the House of Commons</u>, xxviii, 874
4 Addit. MSS.32904, f.375: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 15 April 1760
5 Addit. MSS.32905, f.35: Newcastle to Granby, 22 April 1760

the militia was kept in good humour he would oppose the sending of even the smallest reinforcement to Germany. In the debate, he was able to take advantage of a request made by Robert Vyner that the administration should announce its intention of continuing the militia after the war. He replied - conveniently, 'as a private man' - that he hoped a bill for this purpose would be moved at the start of the next session: if so, he would not hesitate to second it: he 'would no longer amuse the countrey gentlemen'.[1] Having given himself the opportunity of using the issue in the future, he readily agreed to Hardwicke's 'expedient' over the bill, a compromise solution which accepted that the financial burden of the counties should be partially removed.

On the 30th, five days later, the decision to send four battalions of troops was finally taken, with Pitt now raising no difficulties.[2] But even in agreeing to the decision, Pitt was able to carry one stage further his association with the militia. He insisted as a condition of sending the troops that some of the best militia regiments should be encamped with regular troops 'to make the face of an army at home' - a condition which, despite Hardwicke's doubts, Newcastle was quite happy to accept.[3] He also laid down that the present reinforcement should return at the end of the campaign. To encamp the militia with regular troops was a popular move, but neither of these conditions indicate any great faith in the ability of the militia to act effectively on its own in the event of a renewed invasion attempt.

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1 Addit. MSS.32905, f.105: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 April 1760
Addit. MSS.35419, f.199: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 April 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32905, f.181: Barrington to Newcastle, 30 April 1760
3 ibid., f.196: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 1 May 1760. ibid., f.244: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 May 1760

Nevertheless, Pitt was getting the best of both worlds. While making his conditions, he at the same time took the lead in determining the composition of the reinforcement. The decision on the 30th was taken without the formality of a meeting; but Pitt quickly took steps to ensure that one was called, allegedly to enforce his stipulations, but in reality to increase the number of troops to be sent. This is clear from Newcastle's account:

> Mr Pitt open'd the conference well, ... that myself and others were sending more foot to Germany. That he would not say he was for it, but as others were, and if they could be spared, he would not be against it. Then four regiments were mentioned. Then Mr Pitt ask'd whether Lord Ligonier thought they could be spared? Yes. Then whether any more? Ligonier hesitated, but at last we voted for six battalions. Duke of Newcastle, Lord Holdernesse, Mr Chancr. of the Excheqr., Lord Ligonier, and Mr Pitt most readily agreed. Then shall the Irish Regiment[1] of Horse go, over and above that sent? Yes.

It was only now that Pitt could safely mention his supposed conditions. In spite of these, Newcastle was delighted: the decision had been taken 'before even I had hoped'. He told Granby with evident satisfaction, 'it is a noble reinforcement, and exceeds whatever your Lordship ask'd upon your return from Germany'.[2] Even Hardwicke did not fully appreciate what Pitt was doing: he wrote to Newcastle on 2 May, the day after the meeting, 'it seems we were both out in our conjectures the night before last, but I rejoice that the thing is done in any way'.[3]

That the full extent of Pitt's political agility was not recognised even by so shrewd and experienced an observer as Hardwicke is a sufficient tribute to the skill that he displayed.

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1 Addit. MSS.32905, f.196: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 1 May 1760
2 ibid., f.205: Newcastle to Granby, 2 May 1760. ibid., f.295: Newcastle to Granby, 6 May 1760
3 ibid., f.244: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 2 May 1760

The reinforcement, like its predecessors, was Pitt's own work, yet the way in which he contrived to lead from behind, constantly presenting himself as the only serious opposition to what were in fact his own policies, enabled him to win concessions for the acceptance of his own real views and thereby to exercise power without having to take the responsibility. The existing political framework, as Pitt recognised when he poured cold water on Bute's proposals for a rapprochement in the new reign, was a necessary condition of the success of this policy. The King's death made Newcastle, with the emergence of Bute, a very much less plausible scapegoat, and Pitt's credibility was quickly called in question. As early as 30 November, Dashwood complained that he had been deceived by the earnestness of Pitt's previous pronouncements about the militia. He expressed to Temple his 'surprise and astonishment at Pitt's apparent volte-face, adding that he was now convinced that 'it is never intended by the present minister in Power, that this nation should continue possessed of so natural and so national a security'.[1] In a wider context, Edmund Pyle later the same year accurately explained Pitt's attitude to the war on the continent:

> What is all this rout made about Mr Pitt for? Why, in good truth, for talking more against German attachments, than ever man did, till he got into the Ministry; and then going greater lengths in expence of British money, for the preservation of German Dominions than ever any Minister did, or dare, I won't say advise (tho' that is the right word) but consent to. This is Mr Pitt: who is now bringing in - I know not whom,[2] - and Scotch Bute bears the blame, with the vulgar.

But this was for the new reign: for the moment, the basis of the policy was unchallenged.

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1 Dashwood MSS., B8/1/5a: Dashwood to Temple, 30 Nov 1760

2 Memoirs of a Royal Chaplain, 1729-1763, ed. A. Hartshorne, p. 334

(ii)

Pitt's pressure over the reinforcement did not harm the good relations of the two leading ministers. Once the King had consented to give Temple his Garter, Pitt had started to treat Yorke's affair as 'the slightest thing in the world', and Newcastle remarked that 'Mr Pitt seems to be as willing, as we can desire, to go on with us, upon a different foot of union ... from what he had ever done before'.[1] Newcastle, in turn 'better than ever' with Pitt, recommended Dr Warburton for a bishopric and suggested that Temple might both be summoned to the cabinet and considered as a possible peace plenipotentiary; and hearing that Pitt wanted Howe and Keppel appointed Colonels of Marines, he even proposed, with that desire to please which so often made him appear ridiculous, the creation of a new rank of Major-General of Marines.[2] It was this wish to avert any dispute with Pitt that led to the difficulties with his 'young friends': even the majority in the Qualification bill debates was 'discontented', and Hardwicke urged him to take a more positive lead.[3]

Pitt, for his part, did nothing that might deter Newcastle's accommodating approach. He thanked him for thinking of Temple as a plenipotentiary, though - eager to avoid too close an association with what might be an unpopular peace - he admitted that he was himself unenthusiastic about the idea. But he entirely agreed with Newcastle in wishing to appoint Yorke and to exclude Holdernesse;

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1 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 92. Addit. MSS.32899, f.5: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 21 Nov 1759

2 ibid., f.333: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 6 Dec 1759. ibid., f.362: Newcastle to Pitt, 7 Dec 1759. Addit. MSS.32901, f.194-5: Pitt to Newcastle, 11 Jan 1760. Cf. Chatham MSS., 30/8/51: Newcastle to Pitt, 5 Dec 1759

3 Addit. MSS.32903, f.294: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 15 March 1760 Addit. MSS.32905, f.39: memorandums for the King, 22 April 1760

and he told Newcastle, partly with an eye to Leicester House, that if he wanted his nephew Charles Townshend as a plenipotentiary with particular responsibility for America, he would be prepared to accept this choice.[1]

The concordat between the ministers imposed further strains on the relations subsisting between Newcastle and the King. Having promised to give the Garter to Temple, the King was reluctant to carry out his word. Temple was 'hurt to the greatest degree' by the delay, and on 23 January Newcastle was obliged to make a new representation on his behalf.[2] A week later, the King finally agreed. But he resented the way in which the matter had been concluded: he complained to Newcastle that he had been pressurised against his own will.[3] Nor was there any improvement once this dispute was out of the way; Newcastle told Hardwicke that he feared there had been

> a thorough change of conduct, and sentiment in His Majesty towards me; and that it was impossible for me to go on, and stand middle man; subject to the resentment of every disappointed person, without any countenance, or support from the King.[4]

The King no longer had any hopes of Hanoverian acquisitions with English support: no substantial source of disagreement over policy remained. But patronage was a matter over which the King could express his resentment against his minister for his refusal to give him any encouragement over the one matter of policy which he had had at heart. On 4 March, while grudgingly agreeing to grant a peerage to Sir Robert Henley, the King 'flew out' at the

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1 Addit. MSS.32900, f.120-1: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Dec 1759
2 Addit. MSS.32901, f.428: Lincoln to Newcastle, 23 Jan 1760
3 Addit. MSS.32898, f.284: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 Nov 1759
4 Addit. MSS.32901, f.477: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Jan 1760

suggestion that peerages should be granted at the same time to Legge's wife and to Newcastle's nephew Lewis Watson MP. Newcastle 'took it up high and talk'd in a strain that I seldom do', delivering to the King a written representation of his case, which claimed that in six years at the head of the Treasury he had never, in marked contrast to Fox, recommended a single one of his own friends.[1] He wrote in his 'memorandums for the King':

> Discouragement. I am greatly mortified at these difficulties; which make a great impression upon me, discourage my pursuit of the King's business, and will put it out of my power to serve him, if I have not the usual credit of ministers in such cases.[2]

The King had surrendered over policy: he now once again gave way over patronage. Newcastle had no need for 'the usual credit of ministers': but it was by appearing to withhold this from him that the King could make Newcastle's life most uncomfortable. This was the price of the coalition, in which Pitt took the decisions and Newcastle the blame.

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1 Addit. MSS.32903, f.81: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 4 March 1760
ibid., f.446-8: representation to the King, 22 March 1760

2 ibid., f.489: memorandums for the King, 24 March 1760

BELLEISLE

(i)

The last days of George II's reign saw, both in political relationships and in the making of war policy, the completion of the volte-face which had occurred since the administration had been formed. So far as policy was concerned, the final reinforcement of the reign was undisguisedly the work of Pitt, the traditional opponent of 'continent measures', while the traditional supporters of this policy were hesitant or even hostile. And politically, the distance travelled since the beginning of the coalition was marked most strikingly by the fact that Fox and Bute, whose irreconcilability was one of the very few constant factors in the confused days of 1757, were looking seriously in each other's direction in their search for allies.

When Frederick recalled part of his cavalry from Ferdinand, a further reinforcement of 1000 horse was sent from England. Newcastl took the line - not unreasonably in the light of his interpretatior of Pitt's recent behaviour - that it would now be impossible, for political reasons, to send any more troops.[1] But Granby was pressing hard, and Pitt once again led the way in acceding to this request. As he was going into the closet on 21 July, he asked Newcastle what he thought of the idea of sending an immediate reinforcement of three battalions of Guards. Newcastle thoroughly approved, and Pitt at once approached the King. Parliament had

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1 Addit. MSS.32907, f.195: Newcastle to Granby, 13 June 1760

risen, and for the moment Pitt could afford to disregard the views of the Tory country gentlemen. But there was more of a problem in the City, which was beginning to 'despond and abuse continental measures in the old way'.[1] The move required the more courage on Pitt's part because - anticipating the new reign - he could no longer resort to the expedient which he had always so far employed of unloading the responsibility for his own actions on to the leaders of the Whigs. Though Newcastle was 'very agreeably surprised', Hardwicke was far from enthusiastic, taking the view that the reinforcement would arrive too late to be of any value and that it would involve a dangerous reduction of the regular force in England.[2] Ironically, it was his Whig distrust of the militia that led Hardwicke to oppose the Whig policy of further continental involvement. The King, too, supported this reasoning; but Pitt prevailed and the three battalions were duly sent. It would have taken remarkable political foresight to have predicted at the outset of the administration that within three years, with Pitt in complete control, there would be 22,000 British troops in Germany.[3]

This was indeed as far as Pitt would go. With Ferdinand and Granby asking for a further 2000 troops, Newcastle would have liked to have agreed. But at a meeting on 25 August it was decided that nothing more could be done.[4] Newcastle no longer made any attempt even to influence the decision. He wrote to Hardwicke:

Whatever my own private opinion was, our friend was so

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1 Addit. MSS.17495, f.85: Calcraft to Col. Harvey, 29 July 1760
2 Addit. MSS. 32908, f.438: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 22 July 1760
3 Sir R. Savory, His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany During the Seven Years' War (Oxford, 1966), p 202
4 Addit. MSS.32910, f.280: memorandums for the King, 25 Aug 1760
ibid., f.302: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 26 Aug 1760

> strong against it, and between you and I, was so much offended at the demand, after all that we had sent, and particularly after his own measure of sending the three battalions of Guards, sent, as he then declared, in order to avoid the demand of recruits at the end of the year. After this, and when I remembered that my friend my Lord Hardwicke could hardly relish the sending the three battalions of Guards, I did not think proper to be alone, in a doubtful point, whatever my private wish might be.[1]

A change in English public opinion made it impossible for Pitt to avow his support for a further reinforcement, as he would have had for the first time to do if he had thought the risk worth taking: with the King and Hardwicke opposed to the measure, and Newcastle not prepared to speak up in its support, Pitt would no longer have been able to claim that his hand was being forced by his cabinet colleagues. At the close of the last war, there had been a sudden surge of feeling against British participation in the war on the continent, and the same was beginning to happen again now.[2] As early as 10 December of the previous year, Lady Sophia Egerton had reported that the King of Prussia 'is almost as much run down, as he was once cried up ... The old grief breaks out, that the English must be incumbered with the continent'.[3] The disquiet of the City was one sign of this. When Pitt argued that without a decisive battle he would be against the continuation of the war in Germany after the end of the present campaign, Hardwicke admitted that nine people out of ten would be of this way of thinking.[4]

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1 Addit. MSS.32910, f.336: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 26 Aug 1760

2 Lodge, Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy, 1740-1748, p 369

3 Egerton MSS.1719, f.81: Lady Sophia Egerton to Bentinck, 10 Dec 1759. But M. Schlenke, England und das Fridrizlanische Preussen, 1740-1763, p 253, considers that the real turning-point in the English attitude to Prussia occurred only in December 1760. Cf. von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 163; R. Pares, 'American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-1763', Eng. Hist. Rev., li (1936) p

4 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 247. Addit. MSS.32911, f.269: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 13 Sept 1760

The growing unpopularity of the German war was the main consideration which prompted Pitt to project a new expedition to the French coast. His first suggestion, on 30 September, was an attack on Boulogne, but he also suggested Bellisle as a possible target. This was something he had consistently had in mind. In 1756 he had considered that an operation against Belleisle might be the best way of replying to the loss of Minorca. Two years later, the island had been among his short-list of objectives for the coastal expedition; and he had again revived the idea in February 1760.

From a purely operational point of view, there were serious disadvantages in the choice of Belleisle. But the shift in public opinion in England gave great attractions to the idea of a new expedition to the French coast, and particularly to an expedition against Belleisle. First, there was considerable political advantage to be gained by advocating a new expedition. It provided Pitt, as Hardwicke recognised, with another opportunity of appealing to those who put their faith in the militia and who disliked the German war.[1] The prospect of the expedition greatly increased Newcastle's apprehensions about the way in which Pitt might use the militia issue at the start of the next session: it was 'ten thousand times worse than twenty ridiculous expeditions'.[2] The King was criticising him for his failure to insist that the militia should be discontinued.[3] Worse, some of the Tories in Essex and Lincolnshire were setting up a 'militia interest'. On 5 October

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1 Addit. MSS.32913, f.69: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 12 Oct 1760
2 ibid., f.185: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 Oct 1760
3 ibid., f.208: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 19 Oct 1760. ibid., f.226-7: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 20 Oct 1760

Newcastle complained to Devonshire, 'I see black as to our elections, in some places, and blacker, as to the point of the militia'.[1] When, in an attempt at compromise, he told Lady Yarmouth that on the militia question each individual must act according to his own conscience, she 'seem'd to hint, that that would not satisfy, and in short to apprehend the worst of consequences from it'.[2] The expedition gave further leverage to Pitt's efforts to promote himself as the champion of the militia against the advocates of the German war.

The growing discontent with the German war provided Pitt with a second and more important reason for undertaking the Belleisle operation. The more apparent the unpopularity of the continental theatre, the more Pitt became anxious to achieve a peace at the end of the campaign.[3] Cressener's intelligence reported a new disposition among the French ministers to end the war; and events in Europe - the inactivity of the Russians and the defeat of two secondary but pivotal French and Austrian armies under Muy and Laudohn - provided further encouragement. And there were powerful reasons for the choice of Belleisle as a target which might persuade the French to come to terms. The Spanish Ambassador in England, Fuentes, was presenting a series of quite unacceptable claims over Newfoundland, and Ensenada, a long-standing opponent of England, had been recalled from exile to Madrid. There was a genuine risk that Spain might decide to enter the war, and while

1 Addit. MSS.32912, f.301: Dean of Lincoln to Hardwicke, 27 Sept 1760. ibid., f.363: Newcastle to Devonshire, 5 Oct 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32913, f.183: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 Oct 1760
3 The discontent was not only with the German war but with the continuation of the war as a whole. 'May not victory itself be purchased too dear? ... Calculate at 3% what the annual income of 25 millions come to'. Westminster Journal, 1 Dec 176

this remained a serious possibility there was little incentive for the French to agree to early negotiations for peace. Pitt was already preparing to yield to Spain on the second major question at issue - that of the cutting of logwood - while characteristically planning to put the blame on Newcastle for the surrender.[1] Belleisle would be invaluable to England as a naval base between the French and the Spanish fleets: its possession would cause Spain to think very seriously before entering the war, and this fact would encourage the pacific party within France. Further, Belleisle would be an obvious pawn with which England would try to buy back Minorca at the peace: this again would deter Spain, since it would cast doubt on the ability of the French to deliver the island to them as a reward for participation in the war

These developments made it important for Pitt to take action to bring about a peace at the end of the campaign. Half way through September, noticeably less keen to defend the cause of the King of Prussia now that he was being widely criticised in England, Pitt told Knyphausen

> that the King of Prussia, and England, should seriously <u>now</u> think of peace; that it would be impossible to support the war in Germany upon the foot it now is, another year; that His Prussian Majesty must make some sacrifice; that if he would make a sacrifice to Russia, and gain that power, then <u>we</u> might make war to <u>eternity</u>.[2]

This last point alarmed Newcastle, but Hardwicke reassured him:

> Mr Pitt's discourse to Knyphausen I like extremely, for I look upon the <u>warring to eternity</u> to be fanfaronade, and thrown out to catch the King of Prussia only. So far as it tends to drive on peace, I extremely approve it.[3]

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1 Cf. Pares, <u>War and Trade</u>, p 570
2 Addit. MSS.32911, f.304: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Sept 1760
3 <u>ibid</u>., f.382: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 18 Sept 1760

Hardwicke's interpretation was the right one. On 21 September Barrington wrote to Newcastle, 'I hear this morning that Charles Townshend, who has been at Stow since Mr Pitt was there, says the language of that place is Peace at any Rate'.[1]

But this did not last. On the 26th, five days later, Pitt told Newcastle that it was necessary to 'prepare for war in its full extent'.[2] His conciliatory attitude to Spain was at the same time replaced by a significantly harsher line, with an emphasis on delaying rather than expediting the negotiations.[3] This seeming change of front is easily understood. The purpose of the Belleisle scheme was to bring about a quick peace: the King of Prussia himself had been pressing for a new coastal expedition on these grounds.[4] But if Belleisle were to be besieged and captured, it would be unwise to begin negotiations before it could be used as an instrument in the bargaining - it was exactly the argument that Pitt was later to use over Havana and Manilla. The final obstacle to the conclusion of an early peace was removed with the arrival on 5 October of the news that Montreal and the whole of Canada had surrendered to Amherst. It was to accomplish this event that Pitt had last winter come out in support of a further campaign. The Belleisle expedition, if pushed ahead quickly and effectively, might be the coup de grace. Meanwhile, any admission that peace was the object of the exercise would hardly encourage vigorous preparation and would lead to demands that negotiations should immediately begin. Pitt therefore avoide

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1 Addit. MSS.32912, f.3: Barrington to Newcastle, 21 Sept 1760
2 ibid., f.145: Newcastle to Page, 26 Sept 1760
3 Pares, War and Trade, p 571
4 Bisset, Mitchell, ii, 155. Pol. Corr., xix, 291-2, 330.

any discussion of the question of peace, while preparing his cabinet colleagues for the acceptance of terms in which the King of Prussia would be the chief loser. Newcastle reported:

> I then talked to Mr Pitt upon the great object of peace; and whether something might not be done, after the great conquests which we had made. He exclaimed against the King of Prussia, for not having open'd himself to us, upon the terms he would accept. I then said, why might not we, at least, settle amongst ourselves; and with the King of Prussia, what terms we would take ... No, my Lord, not suffer the King of Prussia, to enter into the conditions of our peace. He has nothing to do with that. He pays us no subsidy, which entitles us to make the demand of him. But, Sir, to settle it amongst ourselves. He made little or no answer, did not oppose it, but passed it by, as not worthy of his notice.[1]

Newcastle, however, saw Pitt's tactics as designed to place a new obstacle in the path of an early peace. He complained to Hardwicke:

> I was in hopes, that the very great success in North America ... would have turned our thoughts from such a speculative, chimerical expedition, ... and have employed us in considering, how to profit of this great success which Providence has flung into our hands, by lessening the enormous exchange of the war; or, what would still better become us, by making use of it, to set on foot immediately some plan for bringing about a general and reasonable peace. But, on the contrary, little, very little has been said to me upon that head, upon which some few days ago, I should have had volumes. But that ... (is) alledged as a stronger argument than ever, for pushing on this expedition.[2]

Newcastle could not appreciate that the Belleisle expedition might be the most effective way of securing what he so much wanted. Misunderstanding Pitt's real purpose, he allowed all his fears of invasion to reassert themselves in his attempt to provide arguments against the undertaking. He was prepared to allow 5000 troops to be sent to the French coast as a demonstration only, providing that

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1 Addit. MSS.32913, f.187: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 Oct 1760
2 ibid., f.45-6: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 11 Oct 1760

they would return very quickly: but it was far too late in the year to plan a conquest or a siege.[1] On 1 October, Pitt ordered from the Admiralty, without consulting his fellow ministers, transports for 10,000 men. Newcastle again remonstrated: the French would be certain to use their flat-bottomed boats in an enterprise against England.[2] And even if the troops could be spared, they should be sent to the Lower Rhine rather than to Belleisle.[3]

Newcastle was unnecessarily alarmed. Pitt had chosen Belleisle for political and diplomatic reasons. Before finally committing himself to the project he had to convince himself not only that the broad strategy was right, but also that the plan was operationally practicable. He admitted to Newcastle that he had one major worry: that the lateness of the year might make the risk one that was not worth taking.[4] Here he had to rely on professional advice. All the evidence points to the fact that he was prepared to be guided by Ligonier and Anson on the question of the feasibility of the expedition at so late a season of the year. At first, Ligonier stated that at least three more weeks would have to be taken up in making the necessary preparations, and Pitt at once seemed ready to abandon the project. But Ligonier became increasingly enthusiastic about the idea; when he promised that he would do everything possible to speed the preparations, Pitt's hopes revived.[5] By the middle of October, however, Ligonier had come round to the view that, after all, it would be too late in

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1 Addit. MSS.32912, f.219: Newcastle to Yorke, 30 Sept 1760
2 ibid., f.363: Newcastle to Devonshire, 5 Oct 1760
3 Addit. MSS.32913, f.14: memorandums for the King, 10 Oct 1760
4 ibid., f.45: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 11 Oct 1760
5 Addit. MSS.32912, f.325-6: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 3 Oct 1760

the year for a diversion of this kind.[1] Anson, though he seems to have concealed the full extent of his fears from Pitt, was equally worried by the lateness of the season.[2] Pitt was apparently convinced by the validity of these arguments, and called Commodore Keppel to the cabinet to provide further justification for the abandonment of the operation. Keppel, who had reconnoitred Belleisle four years ago, expressed no opinion about the time of year, but he clearly implied that in view of the inadequate depth of water for the ships and the proximity of the garrison to the landing-place the operation was not practicable. Later events showed that Pitt was unimpressed by these fundamental objections: it was only the question of the time of year that concerned him. But he immediately proposed that the two points Keppel had raised should be referred to Hawke, who from his position in Quiberon Bay would be able to carry out a detailed survey. Anson duly requested a report on the matters that Keppel had brought up.[3]

Hawke made no secret of his opposition to the choice of Belleisle. It was well guarded and it would be impossible to approach close enough with the ships.[4] Pitt was not convinced by these arguments. He had for at least four years had Belleisle in mind as an objective for an expedition: presumably the information which he had collected over this period of time had persuaded him that the objections raised by Keppel and Hawke would not be fatal to the success of the attempt.[5] That he revived the project next

1 Addit. MSS.32913, f.128: memorandums for the King, 14 Oct 1760
2 ibid., f.47: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 11 Oct 1760
3 Addit. MSS.15956, f.54-6: Anson to Hawke, 9 Oct 1760
4 Addit. MSS.32913, f.163-6: Hawke to Anson, 17 Oct 1760
5 As recently as February, when Pitt had last put forward the idea of a Belleisle expedition, he had decisively rejected the suggestion of a reference to the officers: its practicability was not in question. Stowe MSS., 263. von Ruville, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, ii, 188

spring shows that despite their warnings he still considered the plan might effectively be carried out. The only matter that had from the start worried him was that of the time at which it could be executed, and neither Hawke nor Keppel had addressed themselves to this point. But Pitt had already, before Hawke's report arrived, decided that the expedition could not go ahead during the remainder of the present year. His own doubts, fortified by those of Ligonier and Anson, may have been the main factor in leading him to this conclusion. Or he may have thought that even if Belleisle were to be captured, it would no longer achieve its original objective, that of bringing about an early end to the war. For during October, events on the continent destroyed the hopes of peace which even the previous month had seemed so high. On 30 September, Ferdinand established a blockade of Wesel under the Hereditary Prince. If the French could be prevented from reinforcing their very weak garrison there, the twon would quickly fall and the supply line of the French would be seriously threatened while that of the allied army would be secured. A battle was inevitable and the English ministers were optimistic about its probable outcome. But in the engagement on 16 October the French were completely successful in achieving their aim of driving back the allied army. At almost the same time, equally serious news arrived in England from Berlin, which on 8 October had fallen to the Russians.

Pitt had argued that the probability of success at Wesel made it all the more important to push ahead with the plans for the expedition: a double blow would do more than anything to dispose

the French to an early peace.[1] Instead, the enemy alliance had won a double victory. It was no longer to be accepted that they would be prepared to talk of peace on any acceptable terms. The capture of Belleisle could no longer be the coup de grace which Pitt had planned.

It was for reasons other than Hawke's report, therefore, that Pitt decided to shelve the project. His only concern, when Hawke's views arrived, was that he should be able to use it to justify the setting aside of the expedition. Newcastle had recognised that a convincing justification would be needed after 'such a pompous parade, as has been made for this expedition; the roads from Portsmouth to London filled almost every day with troops; carriages for artillery, sufficient to undertake the siege of Lisle; the King reviewing the troops ... and ... to come to nothing, and Pitt known to be the sole adviser and director of it'.[2] Newcastle wrongly assumed that Hawke would report that the expedition was practicable and that this would further strengthen Pitt's hand. But Hardwicke once again arrived at the right explanation. He was relieved that if Pitt had been in earnest he would never have suggested the reference to Hawke, whose enquiries would waste valuable time and whose 'diffident and ballancing' character would incline him to take the cautious view.[3] Pitt's reaction to the arrival of Hawke's conclusions showed clearly that Hardwicke was correct. He was furious with him, not for his verdict, but for not producing a detailed case in support of his assertions.

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1 Addit. MSS.32913, f.46: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 11 Oct 1760
2 ibid., f.330: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 Oct 1760
3 ibid., f.69: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 12 Oct 1760

Following his normal pattern, he threw out allegations - quite unfounded - of intrigues behind his back. He complained that Hawke

> had not answer'd the only question which he was directed to return an answer to, viz. whether there was depth of water sufficient for the ships to come, and land the troops ... That he was a very good sea officer, but no minister, that this seem'd to be concerted; that the whole should come out; ... that there was to be sure an end to the project of Belisle, but in a way very injurious to him (Mr Pitt) the author of it ... That if Sir Edward sent a plain answer to a plain question, viz. was there ... depth of water enough for landing? and Sir Edward's opinion was that there was not water enough, he (Mr Pitt) should himself have proposed ... to lay aside the project, andcould have justified himself for so doing, from the impracticability of the landing.[1]

There could be no more clear indication of Pitt's intention in referring Keppel's objections to Hawke.

The following day, the political situation was transformed by the sudden death of the King. Pitt had already decided that the project should not go ahead. But early in the new reign he continued to use the issue as a weapon in the struggle for power. There were also strategic reasons for making it appear that the scheme was still alive, as reports came in of the confusion that the English plan was causing in France. On 13 November Pitt persuaded the cabinet that the expedition should go ahead and on the 17th he gave orders to Hawke to cover the operations of the commanders. Five days later, he told Hawke that the expedition had been postponed. With the French ports in a state of alarm, it was only on 11 December that he told Keppel that he was not to proceed.

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1 Addit. MSS.32913, f.326-7: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 Oct 1760

(ii)

By the close of the reign, all of those at the centre of the political world had come to accept that there could be no alternative to the existing administration. The King recognised, despite his reservations, that the continuance of the coalition was essential. His surrender to his ministers over both men and measures still rankled. He could not conceal from Lady Yarmouth that he would never wholly forgive them for their refusal to consider any acquisition for Hanover, and he withheld from Pitt his Hanoverian intelligence in retaliation.[1] He complained that Newcastle was putting forward all his own friends as candidates for the general election and for grants from the Civil List, complaining again that all the recommendations were 'in a circle' of Newcastle's own friends.[2] A difficulty which was potentially much more serious arose in August when Ligonier became dangerously ill. If Ligonier died, Cumberland, who had had a stroke at the end of the month but who made a rapid recovery, might be fit enough to succeed him. The King even told Newcastle that he would be the only possible successor: though not a great general, he alone would be able to keep the army in order at home.[3] His affection for his son remained as deep as ever; he was greatly distraught by the news of his illness and immediately sent his own doctor to attend him.[4] At the same time, Sir Edward Walpole wrote to Fox, 'I wish you joy of being his Majesty's first favourite. He says he will never forget your kindness to his son'.[5] On a personal

1 Addit. MSS.32910, f.30: Newcastle to J. Yorke, 15 Aug 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32909, f.439: memorandums for the King, 12 Aug 1760
Addit. MSS.32910, f.123: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 Aug 1760
3 ibid., f.168: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 20 Aug 1760
Cf. Namier, Structure of Politics, p. 180
4 Addit. MSS.32910, f.262: Sir E. Wilmot to Newcastle, 24 Aug 1760
5 Addit. MSS.51431: Walpole to Fox (24 Aug 1760)

level, nothing had changed since the start of the coalition.

But the ministers were unduly worried about the consequences. Pitt suspected that the King was secretly consulting with Cumberland over the course of the war in Europe.[1] Newcastle told Lady Yarmouth with alarm that Cumberland's appointment would probably entail the resignation of Prince Ferdinand.[2] But the King once again was threatening more than he intended to carry out. By the end of September - when in any case Ligonier had substantially recovered - he admitted that he had given up all thought of Cumberland as his successor.[3] His real views on the indispensability of the coalition had been made clear in an emotional interview with Newcastle at the end of July when, after the death of Lady Lincoln, the wife of Newcastle's nephew and heir, he received Newcastle at court 'with the tenderness and affection of the kindest father and relation'. He told him, Newcastle reported:

> that, tho' I knew, he was not partial to Mr Pitt, yet he would do justice; and told me, that Mr Pitt had talked, in the properest manner, to my Lady Yarmouth, upon my subject ... That tho' he and I differ'd sometimes, yet, that I was absolutely necessary to the King's service. That I had the Parliament, made the Parliament, and that nobody but me, could keep things together, or on this foot. This His Majesty quoted as a further inducement to me, to take care of myself; and tho' to be sure, it shew'd a very good disposition for union in Mr Pitt, yet (considering every thing) it was highly commendable and generous in the King; and shew'd, that he wisht a good union, and agreement between us.[4]

The ministers themselves, like the King, recognised that the existing framework was the best that could be devised. Even at the

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1 Addit. MSS.32910, f.121: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 16 Aug 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32911, f.363: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Sept 1760
ibid., f.403: memorandums for the King, 19 Sept 1760
3 Addit. MSS.32999, f.43-4: note of audience, 20 Sept 1760
4 Addit. MSS.32909, f.160: extract of a letter from Newcastle, 31 July 1760

height of the dispute over the Belleisle project, Newcastle assured the King that he thought it essential to keep Pitt in the administration; and he recorded that Pitt, despite the disagreement, was 'far from displeased with me, and in very good humour'.[1] Newcastle summarised the pattern of political relationships at the time of the King's death:

> ... as to the closet, I must do as well as I can. But, in general, I have great reason to be satisfied with it; tho' I own I am sometimes horridly vexed ... The only minister I can speak to, in confidence, is Mr Pitt.[2]

After the King's death, Pitt told Bute straightforwardly that Newcastle's retention was 'indispensably necessary': though he might sometimes disagree with him, it was always without bitterness and they both 'pursued the same general point sincerely'.[3] Pitt's discussion with Bute was almost a carbon copy of the King's with Newcastle in July.

In the face of this identity of interest between the King, Pitt and Newcastle, Leicester House had little choice but to accept the status quo. Bute realised that if the King died while the war was in progress, his scope for action would be severely limited: he therefore secretly hoped, as Viry observed, for an early peace. Every attempt by Leicester House to gain credit by advocating a distinct war policy of its own had failed. Bute had simply resorted to the expedient of trying to acquire some of the reflected glory of the administration's own policy. He had resisted the opportunity to express his disapproval of Pitt's reinforcements for Germany.[4] He had supported the project for a new expedition to

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1 Addit. MSS.32909, f.183: Yorke to Newcastle, 1 Aug 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32911, f.342: Newcastle to Mansfield, 16 Sept 1760
3 Yorke, Hardwicke, iii, 308
4 Addit. MSS.32909, f.46-7: secret memorandums, 25 July 1760

the French coast, and the Prince of Wales had attended the troops every day on their march to Portsmouth.[1] This policy made open opposition to the coalition impossible. All that could be done was to make the best of the existing situation. Bute suggested to Pitt a meeting to discuss the Prince's affairs, with a view, as in the earlier interview with Lincoln, to securing as favourable treatment as possible during the remainder of the reign. Pitt replied that he could not agree to this without the knowledge of the King and the other ministers. He had no wish for Leicester House to capitalise on his own credit and popularity. Nor, on the other hand, was there any reason to risk alienating Bute's reluctant support. Pitt admitted to Viry that though he would take no initiative towards improving relations with Bute, he would be prepared to 'manage' Holdernesse 'on account of Leicester House'.[2] Bute had two candidates as potential successors to Ligonier: Tyrawley, who loathed Pitt, and Sinclair, who was hopelessly deaf and, worse, was a Lowland Scot. Though he knew that Sinclair would never be considered by the King or Newcastle, Pitt, however hesitantly, put forward Sinclair's claims.[3] Hardwicke recognised that Pitt was not serious; but the fact that he advocated Sinclair at all showed his anxiety to do what he could to keep on reasonable terms with Bute.[4]

As it was, Leicester House, furious but impotent, could only express its discontent in petty and unpublicised gestures. When the Prince of Wales appointed two new Lords of the Bedchamber, the King was given no advance warning.[5] Only Holdernesse, still

1 Addit. MSS.32913, f.330: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 Oct 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32909, f.345: secret memorandums, 8 Aug 1760
Cf Stowe MSS.263, f. 15.
3 Addit. MSS.32911, f.363-4: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 17 Sept 1760
4 ibid., f.382: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 18 Sept 1760
5 Addit. MSS.32912, f.47: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 23 Sept 1760

supplying Bute daily with information, was in favour. But Holdernesse was completely isolated at court.[1] The King refused to discuss business with him: he was a 'fifth wheel to the carriage'. Even Lady Yarmouth gave him no support, and Newcastle found him 'very silent, very gloomy, and angry ... with the face of a hang dog', starting to talk of resignation.[2] With Holdernesse so powerless, and with no other backing at court, Leicester House had no choice but to wait and hope. There was always the hope that Pitt might strain his popularity too far. The Prince wrote to Bute early in October:

> I myself imagine (the expedition is) intended sooner or later for Germany if that should be the case I hope this nation will open her eyes and see who are her true friends, and that her popular man is a true snake in the grass.[3]

Leicester House's frustration, bitterly critical of the administration but forced to accept it and even to support its policies, had reached a point where it could no longer be contained. The only other potentially effective political force that was excluded from any share of power was Windsor Lodge, and it was in this direction, inherently the most improbable of all, that Bute started to look. As in 1765, it was the fact that the court party was united in opposition to them that drew Bute and Cumberland together. As early as November of the previous year, Fox had remarked on his good reception at Leicester House.[4] In April, the union of Leicester House with Fox's supporters in defence of Sackville had given rise to comment.[5] When Ligonier fell ill,

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1 Bisset, Mitchell, ii, 127
2 Addit. MSS.32911, f.98: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 6 Sept 1760
3 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 47
4 Ilchester, Henry Fox, ii, 110
5 Addit. MSS.1719, f.116: Lady Sophia Egerton to Bentinck, 22 April 1760

Viry thought that Leicester House would much prefer Cumberland to Granby as his successor, if Tyrawley or Sinclair were vetoed: Cumberland, whose own health made it unlikely that he would live for very long, would be far less of an embarrassment in the new reign than the young and successful Granby, supported by Newcastle and the main body of the Whigs. It is perhaps significant that Leicester House did not use the occasion of Ligonier's illness to ask for the command to be given to the Prince of Wales, since, as Calcraft observed, this would have created considerable embarrassment for Cumberland's supporters.[1] If, instead, Cumberland were appointed and died soon, Leicester House might have Fox's subsequent support, a prospect which worried Pitt enough to determine him, shortly before the King's death, to make an early visit to Leicester House to 'try his fate' there.[2] From the opposite angle, both Hardwicke and Walpole thought that Fox was himself looking to the possibility of an agreement with Leicester House in the event of his patron's death. The alliance of 1762 was already foreshadowed before the end of the old reign.

But despite these attempts at a new arrangement, the death of the King forced Leicester House to recognise the reality from which it had been trying to escape. The simple fact was that there was no alternative to the existing government. It was unthinkable to try to replace Pitt so long as the war continued. Newcastle had already committed himself not to stay after the King's death.[4] But on the very day of George III's accession, Bute told Pitt 'that he

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1 Addit. MSS.17495, f.110: Calcraft to Tyrawley, 21 Aug 1760
2 Addit. MSS.32913, f.188: Newcastle to Hardwicke, 18 Oct 1760
3 ibid., f.208: Hardwicke to Newcastle, 19 Oct 1760
Walpole, Memoirs of the Reign of King George III, i, p. 6
4 Letters from George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766, p. 133

had laid aside thoughts of being First Lord of the Treasury, meant to hold the situation of a private man at the side of the King and give his best support to publick measures'.[1] Pitt simply replied to Bute that 'his advancement to the management of the affairs of this country would not be for His Majesty's service'. Two days later, Bute asked Newcastle to continue in the Treasury, promising him 'the utmost confidence and cordiality'; and Newcastle, once more unable to leave his treadmill, could not refuse.

It was this aspect of Newcastle's character - his inability to tear himself away from office, business and what he took to be power - that Pitt had so successfully exploited for the last three years. The pressure that Pitt had exerted on him had never been such that there was a serious risk of his resignation. While Newcastle was left free to administer the whole range of government patronage, Pitt used his own weakness in the coalition as a source of strength in the determination of policy: and it was largely Newcastle's own policy that he carried out, ensuring that Newcastle, with the confidence of the King and with the support of a large majority in the House of Commons, was accorded the responsibility for the unpopular aspects of that policy. Pitt was meanwhile able to attribute his failure to carry out all the wishes of his supporters to his lack of credit in the closet and to the fact that it was not he who controlled the House of Commons. So successful had these tactics been that by the end of the reign Pitt's credibility with his own supporters was greater than ever. In the face of the outstanding achievements of the war, the old dogmas about how it should be prosecuted were increasingly being forgotten

1 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p 121

or regarded as flexible and adaptable. With the country united in support of the administration, the traditional and impracticable attitudes of oppositions were gradually dying. Pitt, seeing this process at work, was by the close of the reign starting to take advantage of it. There was now less need, for example, to dissociate himself from the help given to the German theatre, though the growing unpopularity of the continental war imposed a need for a new kind of caution: but it is significant that when the final reinforcement of the reign was sent, Pitt was beginning to admit what had been true since the start of the coalition - that the real power was his and that the King and Newcastle were no obstacle to its use. Early in August, Bute complained to Pitt that he had never in the past paid such attention as he was now doing to the views of the King and of Newcastle. Pitt replied

> that then he was only Secretary of State in appearance. But that, at present, His Majesty and his brother-Ministers acted towards him in such a manner, that he had reason to be contented, and that he was Secretary of State.[1]

Political controversy had died down to such an extent that Pitt was now able to admit to his power: it was ironically at this very moment that the political world was once more thrown into a decade of renewed turmoil.

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1 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 108

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NOTE

Any study of mid-eighteenth century politics must inevitably rely heavily on the Newcastle Papers, and any work on the years 1757-60 more so than for most other periods. The adequacy of contemporary evidence is in direct proportion to the extent of political activity. Between 1754 and 1757, there are numerous authorities for the historian to consult, and the same applies to the period after the death of the King. But for much of the period between June 1757 and October 1760, the sources which contain important material for both earlier and subsequent years tend to dry up, leaving the field almost entirely clear for the indefatigable Newcastle, whose correspondence not only continues in full flood, but even increases significantly in volume. At times, the historian is compelled to rely almost exclusively on this evidence.

Where manuscript materials have been printed, reference has been made to the printed document in all cases where the quotation is full enough for the purposes of the citation. A second point requiring explanation is that reference is made to a number of letters from Newcastle to his colleagues of which more than one copy survives in manuscript sources. In these cases, the citation is from the copy in the Newcastle Papers rather than from the original letter in Newcastle's hand. This is simply a matter of convenience: the copperplate copies rescue the historian from

the formidable task of having to decipher Newcastle's own handwriting. Reference is only made to, for instance, the Hardwicke or Devonshire Papers in the rare cases where the Newcastle Papers contain no copy of the letter in question. It should finally be noted that only those works which have made a material contribution are included in the bibliography, whether that contribution is a matter of fact or of interpretation.

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