

GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL PATTERNING IN DIODORUS SICULUS

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Abstract: This paper explores the function of geographical and historical patterning in Diodorus' work, in particular parallels between Sicily and mainland Greece created both through explicit plotting of events and through intratextual and intertextual echoes. It examines how Diodorus relates two Sicilian leaders, Agathocles and Dion, to Alexander and Philip of Macedon; how he creates links between Agesilaus' invasion of Asia and Dionysius I's conflict with Carthage; and how he picks up Thucydides' Sicilian narrative in his account of Gelon's victory over Carthage. The paper also explores and questions the language of East and West that scholars have applied in speaking of links between mainland Greece and Sicily.

Keywords: Diodorus Siculus; Thucydides; Greek historiography;
East and West

'What literary scholar ever reads Diodorus or Polybius?'
P. Vidal Naquet (1995) 22

At the start of his eleventh book, Diodorus reports on Persian attempts to co-ordinate their planned invasion of Greece in 480 BC with Carthaginian operations against Greeks in the west: 'Xerxes sent an embassy to the Carthaginians to urge them to join him in the undertaking and closed an agreement with them, to the effect that he would wage war upon the Greeks who lived in Greece, while the Carthaginians should at the same time gather great armaments and subdue those Greeks who lived

in Sicily and Italy' (11.1.4). Later in the same book, in celebrating the Sicilian success against Carthage at Himera, he emphasises further the connection between events in Greece and Sicily by proposing a synchronism with the battle of Thermopylae: 'Gelon won his victory on the same day that Leonidas and his soldiers were contesting against Xerxes at Thermopylae, as if the deity intentionally so arranged that both the fairest victory and the most honourable defeat should take place at the same time' (11.24.1). As has often been noted, Diodorus is here building on—and adapting—a long-standing equation between the Greek victories over Persia and Carthage in 480 BC. Diodorus' use of synchronism is also found in Herodotus, though here it is reported that Gelon's victory occurred on the same day as the battle of Salamis rather than Thermopylae (7.166).¹ And ten years after these battles, Pindar had composed an ode for Gelon's successor as tyrant of Syracuse, Hiero, in which he presented the Syracusan victories at Himera and Cyme as having 'delivered Hellas from grievous slavery' (*P.* 1.75) and aligned those victories with Salamis and Plataea (*P.* 1.75–80).² A similar message was also conveyed when Hiero hosted a production of Aeschylus' *Persians* in Syracuse,³ and earlier still by Gelon's dedication of a golden tripod at Delphi (Diod. 11.26.7) to match the golden tripod dedicated by the Greeks as a

¹ The problems of these synchronisms have been much discussed: see, e.g., Pearson (1987) 132–6; Asheri (1991–2); Schepens (1994) 266–8; more broadly Feeney (2007) 43–67; Clarke (2008) 138–9, 231–4. More generally on Sicilian self-promotion in relation to mainland Greece, see, e.g., Prag (2010); also Harrell (2006) on the relation between local Sicilian and panhellenic concerns. Thermopylae is similarly invoked as inferior to a Roman success at Flor. *Epit.* 1.18 (2.2.14), where the 300 troops involved rather than the date are the basis for the comparison.

² This passage may help to explain the linking of Pindar and the Persian Wars in the biographical tradition: Diodorus' *floruit* notice of Pindar is placed immediately after his account of Gelon's successes, at the end of his account of the archon-year 480/79 (11.26.8); compare (and contrast) the Suda's notice that Pindar was forty in the year of Xerxes' invasion.

³ Schol. Ar. *Ra.* 1028; *Vita Aeschyli* (Page OCT, p. 333 ll. 24–5).

thank-offering for their victory over Persia: in Michael Scott's words, 'East and West were joined through their victory dedications'.⁴

The aim of this paper is to explore further the function of geographical patterning in Diodorus' work, and in particular the role of parallels between Sicily and mainland Greece. Diodorus, I will suggest, points to a number of other links through his explicit plotting of events as well as through implicit echoes, both intratextual and intertextual (above all with Thucydides). My analysis will take further the arguments of a previous paper (Rood (2004)), where I proposed that Diodorus can be seen as picking up a number of Thucydidean themes in his account of the final years of the Peloponnesian War, sometimes in competition with Xenophon's account of the same events. I argued in that paper that Diodorus continues a theme found already in Thucydides by presenting parallels between Sicily and mainland Greece, notably between the careers of Alcibiades and Hermocrates and between the political regimes in Athens and Syracuse.⁵ In this paper, I will be extending that analysis by looking at the period beyond the final years of the Peloponnesian War and by exploring direct patterning by Diodorus as well as his use of Thucydidean intertexts (above all Thucydides' Sicilian narrative). My analysis will fall in four sections: the first will set the scene for the subsequent discussion by questioning the language of East and West that scholars have often applied in speaking of links between mainland Greece and Sicily; the second will examine two Sicilian leaders, Agathocles and Dion, in relation to Alexander and Philip of Macedon; the third will

⁴ Scott (2010) 88; cf. ML 28 for the inscription on the tripod base, with the editors' comment on p. 61; also Paus. 6.19.7 and ML 29 for dedications by Gelon and Hieron at Olympia. Cf. also Diodorus' focus on temple-building in Sicily after the victory over Carthage (12.25.1, 12.26.7 for Syracuse; 12.25.2–4 for Agrigentum, cf. 13.82), with Pearson (1987) 139 on the implied contrast with the delay at Athens in rebuilding the temples burned by the Persians; also Morris (1992) 370 for another possible Persian Wars link.

⁵ Rood (2004) 357–8, 362–3.

move back in time to explore links between Agesilaus' invasion of Asia (396 BC) and Dionysius I's roughly simultaneous conflict with Carthage (399–396 BC); while the final section will pick up my initial focus on Diodorus' account of Gelon's victory over Carthage in 480 BC.

Given the generally low reputation of Diodorus in most modern scholarship, it may be helpful to clarify first what I mean when I speak of patterning by Diodorus. I do not mean to suggest that all the patterns that can be detected in his work are original to Diodorus himself.⁶ In considering Diodorus' narrative of 480 BC, we have direct evidence for patterning between mainland Greece and Sicily in the historians generally seen as his sources, Ephorus and Timaeus; and there is other evidence that Ephorus and Timaeus were concerned with such links and also that Timaeus was more broadly concerned with bolstering the position of Sicilian Greeks in relation to Greeks living further to the east.⁷ There is also evidence for the sort of

⁶ For the importance of considering lost sources, cf., e.g., Levene (2010) 111–17, discussing the analysis of Thucydidean echoes in Livy in Rodgers (1986).

⁷ Ephorus (*FGrHist* 70): see F 186 on 480 BC (with Vattuone (1983–4) 208 on the differences from Diodorus); also F 211 for a pact between Dionysius II and Persia (but this is likely to reflect some confusion in the source, a scholion on Aelius Aristides); for the positing of this sort of direct causal link, cf. Diod. 15.23.5 (the Persian king and Dionysius both courting Sparta); Purcell (1995) 139 n. 36 for later examples; also ML 92 for epigraphical evidence for an appeal by Carthage to Athens; and below, n. 26 (Curtius on Carthage/Tyre). There is no evidence for any such geographical linking in the scanty remains of *Hell. Oxy.* Timaeus (*FGrHist* 566): see e.g. F 94 for Gelon's readiness to help in 480 BC (where the source, Pol. 12.16b4–5, explicitly comments on how Timaeus seeks to exaggerate the importance of Sicily); F 105 (the story that Euripides was born on the day of Salamis and died on the day when Dionysius I came to power); FF 135–6 (the claim that Thucydides lived in exile and was buried in Italy—conceivably as a sort of parallel to Timaeus himself, who lived in exile in Athens). I will not myself be directly confronting the vexed question of Diodorus' source(s) for Sicilian history, on which see the opposing views of Meister (1967) and Pearson (1987), who favour Timaeus, and Stylianou (1998) 50–84, who favours Ephorus.

patterning I will analyse in earlier historians: Polybius' account of the First Punic War, for instance, includes passages that can be read as intelligent adaptations of sections of Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition.⁸ While I will be alert, then, to the significance of Diodorus' sources, it should be stressed that Diodorus' re-casting of his sources at the very least shows that he was concerned to preserve any parallels that he did take over from earlier historians. In some cases, moreover, the patterning between Sicily and the Greek mainland is almost certainly due to Diodorus himself—and so evidence either of Diodorus' creativity or (for those who deny him that) of the ease with which historians in antiquity were able to adopt the modalities of geographical *synkrisis*.⁹ Before looking at how Diodorus applies this comparative method, however, it will be helpful to consider how scholars in modern times have conceived the geographical division between Carthage and Sicily on the one hand and mainland Greece on the other.

East and West

Michael Scott's comment (quoted above) that 'East and West' were joined by the monuments set up at Delphi to commemorate Greek victories against the Persians and the Sicilian victory at Himera reflects common scholarly usage: to give one other example, Denis Feeney in his superb recent book on ancient conceptions of time writes of Ephorus linking the affairs of Athens and Sicily by presenting the barbarians 'to the west and the east' working together, of 'West/East synchronisms', and of a 'compar-

⁸ Rood (2012).

⁹ Further uncertainties arise in the case of fragments whose location in Diodorus is uncertain (e.g. 26.19 for a comparison of Antioch on the Orontes with Syracuse); the fragment (derived from a scholion on Strabo) is placed by most editors in the context of the fall of Syracuse in the Second Punic War, but could belong elsewhere (Goukowsky (2006) 291 n. 17 suggests that a Seleucid context is more likely).

ative West/East mentality'.¹⁰ The West and East that are here being joined are the western and eastern parts of the Mediterranean, in line with 'the Greek conceptual division of the Mediterranean into two domains' that has been proposed by Nicholas Purcell in the course of a brilliant discussion of the ideological significance of the Roman sacking of Carthage and Corinth. Purcell supports this conceptual division by appealing to the synchronic tendency that we have already seen applied to the battles of 480 BC and that also seems to be reflected in the Roman decision to destroy both Carthage and Corinth in the same year. Purcell goes on to cite Julius Caesar's simultaneous re-foundation of both cities a century or so later, claiming that 'the parallelism of East and West ... is explicitly asserted by Plutarch' ((1995) 139).

One problem in applying the language of East and West to the Mediterranean is the relativity of those terms. At one point in the *Odyssey*, the Phaeacian king Alcinous speaks of Odysseus as having come 'either from eastern or from western men' (8.29: ἤ ἐκ πρὸς ἡοίων ἢ ἐσπερίων ἀνθρώπων).¹¹ Alcinous here presumably means people living to the east or west of the Phaeacians' island rather than those living to the East or West in any absolute sense; or, more precisely, towards dawn and towards evening, in line with the general Greek tendency to use the sun's movement to define what we term compass points.¹² The relativity of dividing the Mediterranean into West and East is particularly problematic for a reason noted by Feeney: 'the more normal reference of West and East would be to Europe and Asia' ((2007) 59). Mainland Greece, then, can be seen as West in relation to Asia and East in relation to Sicily or Italy. And yet seeing

¹⁰ Feeney (2007) 45, 57, 50; similarly Baron (2013) 111.

¹¹ I am reluctant to accept with T. Schmitt (in Cancik und Schneider (1996–2003) IX.22, s.v. 'Orient und Okzident') that this *Odyssey* passage helps to explain the synchronism of 480 BC.

¹² Winds were also used (as in Ephorus, *FGrHist* 70 F 30, on the four peoples living around the margins of the inhabited world; cf. Ps.-Scymn. 167–77, where both winds and sun movements are used), but to a lesser extent.

Sicily and Italy as West does not automatically mark Greece as East. A further possibility available to the Greeks (and not just for the Greeks, of course) was to see themselves as neither West nor East, but as central.¹³

Purcell himself is acutely aware of the relativity of East and West. Indeed, one of his points is that it is part of the repertoire of imperial power to essentialise spatial terms that are purely relative.¹⁴ The political importance of these spatial definitions makes it all the more important, however, to be precise about the terms employed in the sources rather than to assume a continuity of usage from Herodotus onwards. In the case of Carthage and Corinth, for instance, all that Plutarch asserts is that the two cities were both destroyed and re-founded at the same time (*Caes.* 57.8). It is Purcell himself who claims that the parallelism is between East and West.

To get a sense of how Diodorus divides up space, we may start by looking at the structure of the opening six books, which offer a spatially organised treatment of (what we term) mythical events prior to the Trojan War.¹⁵ The arrangement of these books is particularly important not just because they can be read as programmatic but also because it is undoubtedly the product of Diodorus' own geographical vision (one of his main sources, Ephorus, only started his history after the Trojan War with the return of the Heraclids).

¹³ Cf., e.g., Xen. *Vect.* 1.6: 'One might reasonably suppose that the city [Athens] lies at the centre (*ἀμφὶ τὰ μέσα*) of Greece, nay of the whole inhabited world. For the further we go from her, the more intense is the heat or cold we meet with'; Arist. *Pol.* 1327b29–30, where the Greeks are geographically in the middle (*μεσέυει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους*) of the colder, more spirited peoples of Europe and the (by implication warmer) peoples of Asia. For Rome and Italy as central, cf. e.g. Str. 6.4.1, Vitruv. 6.1.11 (with a strong cold/north vs. warm/south contrast).

¹⁴ Cf. Horden and Purcell (2000) 11 on the 'all-too-familiar enshrining of geographical relativism in official designations' as 'an onomastic trait that originates in Antiquity'.

¹⁵ The temporal complexity in the treatment of the non-Greek and Greek pasts in these books is discussed by Rubincam (1987) 315–17; my focus here is spatial.

The ‘more normal’ alignment of East and West with Asia and Europe has been applied by Kenneth Sacks to these opening mythological books: ‘Books i–iii cover the “barbarian” (1.4.6) East and books iv–vi treat the West.’¹⁶ Sacks’ analysis might seem to be justified by the fact that Diodorus starts by mentioning his own travels in ‘a large portion of both Asia and Europe’ (1.4.1), and then promises a division into three books focussing on the antiquities of the barbarians followed by three treating ‘almost exclusively those of the Greeks’ (1.4.6). The mythological books proceed to cover conquerors in the extremes of both Asia and Europe, with detailed presentation of (mythical) figures such as Heracles and Dionysus and proleptic anticipation of (historical) figures such as Alexander and Caesar.¹⁷

Sacks’ equation of Greek and barbarian with West and East is nonetheless misleading. In Book 4, though Diodorus does start by picking up the initial distinction between barbarian and Greek (4.1.5), he describes Heracles’ travels in Egypt and in the west of Africa (4.17.4–18.2) as well as some myths localised in Asia Minor (Tantalus and the rulers of the Troad: 4.74–5). Diodorus also abandons at this point

¹⁶ Sacks (1990) 55–6. Though he calls the organisation of these books ‘simple’, Sacks does also note here that Book 5 includes islands in the Red Sea; but see also his formulation on p. 65: ‘Rather than dating myths, he simply divides them by East (books i–iii) and West (books iv–vi).’

¹⁷ Note the telling distribution of proleptic references in Books 1–3 versus 4–5 (Book 6 only survives in excerpts): Alexander is mentioned at 1.50.6, 1.84.8, 2.39.4, 4.15.4, Caesar at 3.38.2 (a reference to his conquest of Britain in the context of a discussion of geographical knowledge of the south and north), 4.19.2, 5.21.2, 5.22.1, 5.25.4; mention of both follows the outline at 1.4.6–7 according to which Books 6–17 span the period from the Trojan War to the death of Alexander and Books 18–40 cover events down to the start of the war between the Romans and the Celts in the course of which Caesar ‘advanced the Roman Empire as far as the British Isles’ (1.4.6–7). Note also that Rome is mentioned four times in the mythological narrative in the opening four books (1.83.8, 2.4.7, 2.17.3, 3.38.3) as opposed to more than thirty times in Books 4–5; similarly Carthage—even though it is located in Africa—is mentioned only at 3.44.8 in Books 1–3 (in a geographical comparison) as opposed to more than twenty times in 4–5.

the explicitly geographical transitions that he had used for barbarian lands, preferring to move from one character to another.¹⁸ A geographical division of a new kind then emerges in Book 5, which is devoted to islands. Sicily is strongly marked off at this point both by being described in detail at the start of the Book and by the Book's subsequent movement: Diodorus moves first from Sicily westwards and then beyond the Mediterranean to islands in the ocean off Libya and Europe; he then abandons his professed focus on islands to offer geographical and ethnographical treatment of the western barbarians omitted in the earlier Books (though not of the Romans). His account of the islands in the eastern Aegean is further cut off by a detour to islands in the eastern part of the southern Ocean (5.41.1). When he does turn back to the eastern Mediterranean (5.47.1), his account of the Aegean islands is marked by a lack of coherent geographical ordering.¹⁹ He also excludes altogether a number of islands between Sicily and the eastern Mediterranean, notably Corcyra, Ithaca, the other Ionian islands, Cythera, and Aegina.

The structure of Diodorus' opening mythological books, then, does at times point to a division into separate areas (whether Asia and Europe or two halves of the Mediterranean), but the division between Greek and non-Greek proves to be much more elaborate than that in both Europe and Asia. Analysis of the organisation of these books still leaves open, moreover, the question of the explicit terms through which Diodorus articulates his vision of space.

Like other Greek writers, Diodorus marks space in relation to the movement of the sun. His most frequent use of east and west is at a local level, for instance to describe the eastern or western parts of a building (e.g. 13.82.4). Here the cardinals are overtly used in a relative sense, without implying anything like an idea of 'the East' or 'the West' as

¹⁸ Contrast the geographical transitions at, e.g., 1.98.10, 2.1.3, 2.47.1, 2.48.1, 3.1.3 with the character-based transitions at, e.g., 4.7.4, 4.39.4–40.1, 4.57.1.

¹⁹ Ceccarelli (1989) posits the use of a new source at this point.

separate regions. The relativity of the terms as well as the difficulty of distinguishing between ‘east’ and ‘west’ as descriptors of directions and as descriptors of regions is shown at a larger scale when Diodorus describes how the Nile wanders from its general path from south to north, *ποτέ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνατολὴν καὶ τὴν Ἀραβίαν ἐπιστρέφων, ποτέ δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν δύσιν καὶ τὴν Λιβύην ἐκκλίνων* (1.32.2: ‘now turning towards the east and Arabia, now turning towards the west and Libya’). Here Diodorus does seem to be defining Arabia as an eastern region and Libya as a western one, but in both cases relative to the Nile.

Most significant for Diodorus’ understanding of space are passages where the point of orientation for east and west is occluded. Thus when he speaks of the ‘eastern ocean’ (2.43.5: *τὸν πρὸς ἀνατολὰς ὠκεανόν*, cf. 18.5.2) and ‘the western ocean’ (5.12.3: *τοῦ κατὰ τὴν δύσιν ὠκεανοῦ*), he seems to use the terms absolutely, locating the ocean on either side of the inhabited world as the place where the sun does actually rise and fall.²⁰ Such phrases tend to be used in quite a vague way. Thus when Diodorus claims, after finishing his account of Britain, that he has discussed ‘the islands which lie in the western regions’ (5.24.1: *ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δυσμῶς μέρεσιν*), it is not quite clear whether he is marking an area distinct from ‘the islands which lie within the Pillars of Heracles’ (a phrase used in the transition at 5.19.1) or summing up the whole of the book so far, including the account of Sicily. Similarly Sicily is both linked with but separate from the vague western regions when Diodorus (3.61.3) writes that Cronus ‘was lord of Sicily and Libya, and Italy as well, and, in a word, established his kingdom over the regions to the west’ (*κατὰ Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην, ἔτι δὲ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ τὸ σύνολον ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἐσπέραν τόποις*) and that there are places named after him ‘both throughout Sicily and the parts which incline towards the west’ (*κατά τε*

²⁰ Cf. also 5.19.1, of an island in the Ocean ‘lying to the west’ (*κεκλιμένη πρὸς τὴν δύσιν*).

τὴν Σικελίαν καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἑσπέραν νεύοντα μέρη).²¹ The corresponding language of ‘the east’ is used in a similarly vague way: thus Diodorus describes how Alexander ‘sacrificed to the Sun, who had given him the eastern regions to conquer’ (17.89.3: Ἡλίῳ ἔθυσεν ὡς δεδωκότι τὰ πρὸς ἀνατολὴν μέρη καταστρέψασθαι). While Diodorus’ use of west and east in these expressions is vague, it is clear that these phrases are used to mark areas near to the extremes of the inhabited world rather than to oppose Europe to Asia or the western to the eastern half of the Mediterranean.

There is also a revealing temporal dimension to Diodorus’ use of the vague spatial language of eastern and western regions. Such language is more common in the earlier portions of his work, reflecting the greater lack of spatial differentiation in earlier times (which is also matched by their greater temporal indeterminacy).²² It is also more commonly applied to the west than to the east,²³ perhaps reflecting the perception that the western Mediterranean became civilised (and so entered history, as it were) later than areas further to the east. In his later narrative, by

²¹ The second half of the first passage seems to sum up the first half, including Sicily in the west, while the second passage seems to distinguish Sicily from ‘the parts which incline towards the west’.

²² Though we should also remember that there would have been more focus on the far west in some of the final stages of the work that survive only in excerpts.

²³ It is significant that ‘the eastern regions’ at 17.89.3 is focalised through Alexander. The language of western extremes is most common in the book on islands, but even here Sicily is given prominence not so much through the west-east axis but in relation to other groups of islands in a line from the north-west (Britain) to the south-east (the islands in the Indian Ocean) (see esp. the transition at 5.41.4: ‘now that we have described the lands which lie to the west and those which extend toward the north, and also the islands in the ocean, we shall in turn discuss the islands in the ocean to the south which lie off that portion of Arabia which extends to the east’). For a north-west/south-east axis explicitly centred on Delphi, cf. Plut. *Mor.* 410A (‘two revered men coming from opposite ends of the inhabited earth met together at Delphi, Demetrius the grammarian journeying homeward from Britain to Tarsus, and Cleombrotus of Sparta, who ... had sailed beyond the Persian Gulf’), with Bowersock (2005) 170–1.

contrast, Diodorus continues to use geographical markers when he moves from place to place, but the places highlighted in this way tend to be more precisely defined. Often he uses as a transitional formula the neuter plural of the definite article with the preposition *κατά* and the name of a city or country (e.g., 20.53.4: *ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων ἱκανῶς εἰρηκότες ἐν μέρει διέξιμεν περὶ τῶν κατὰ Λιβύην καὶ Σικελίαν πραχθέντων* ('Now that we have said enough about these matters [viz., affairs in the successor kingdoms], we shall relate in their turn the events that took place in Libya and in Sicily'). If we look just at the places he mentions in transitions to and from Sicily, we find that he speaks of continents such as Asia (14.100.1), countries such as Hellas (15.6.1, 15.73.1) and Italy (16.16.1), and smaller units such as Rhodes (20.89.1), Mytilene (13.79.8), or Athens (14.7.1). These transitions sometimes describe events in Sicily or Carthage as 'of a different nature' (*τὰς ἑτερογενεῖς πράξεις*: 11.20.1, 16.5.1, 16.64.3–65.1),²⁴ but never use the language of east and west.

The Greek concern for geographical symmetry could still lead to the objection that East/West co-ordinates may be implied when Diodorus presents parallels between Persia and Carthage. But for this objection to have any power, the geographical polarity of east and west would have to be applied to areas other than the extreme east and west. Yet when Diodorus reports Alexander's final memoranda (18.4.4), for instance, he does not conceptualise his ambitions to conquer Carthage or to transplant populations between Asia and Europe in terms of east and west. It is only when he specifies that Alexander planned also 'to make a road along the coast of Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles' that general Greek conceptions make it reasonable to see the Pillars as a specifically western counterpart to Alexander's conquests in India. Here too, then, the East/West polarity is activated at the margins of the inhabited world.

²⁴ Cf. Vannicelli (1987) 172–3; Stylianou (1998) 87; also Biraschi (2010).

Further objections may be made to seeing a symmetrical geography lurking behind the Persia/Carthage pairing. For one thing, east-west symmetry is in general less strongly stressed in Greek geography than north-south symmetry.²⁵ It must also be recalled that other links between places may be more powerful than purely spatial relations: when Diodorus, drawing on Timaeus, reports that Alexander captured Tyre ‘on the day with the same name and at the same hour on which the Carthaginians seized the Apollo at Gela’ (13.108.4 = Timaeus, *FGrHist* 566 F 106),²⁶ it is the colonial link between Carthage and Tyre rather than the geographical location of the two cities that is prominent.²⁷

We have seen, then, that applying the language of East and West to parallels drawn by Diodorus between mainland Greece and Sicily or between Persia and Carthage is not justified by his geographical terminology. Nor is Diodorus at all unrepresentative of Greek writers of his own time or earlier. There is no space here to support this claim in detail, but a few generalisations can be made. Mainland

²⁵ Cf. Romm (1989) 110–11 on Herodotus. The stress on north-south symmetry, as Katherine Clarke reminds me, is doubtless due to the more striking geographical differences as one moves from north to south within the northern hemisphere; cf. also Diod. 18.5–6 for a strong north-south divide within Asia.

²⁶ Cf. Curtius 4.3.22 for a variant (after a Tyrian dreams that Apollo deserts the city, the Tyrians bind with a gold chain a statue of Apollo that the Carthaginians had carried off from Syracuse), following a chronologically impossible story that during Alexander’s siege of Tyre envoys from Carthage arrived, announcing that ‘the Syracusans were devastating Africa and had pitched their camp not far from the walls of Carthage’ (4.3.19–20).

²⁷ Similarly, to return to the sacking of Carthage and Corinth, Purcell (1995) 138–9 well points to the way Velleius Paterculus mentions how long both cities had been founded; rather differently Cic. *Amic.* 11 compares them in terms of their enmity to Rome (‘duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio’) and Flor. *Epit.* 1.33 (2.17.2) in terms of distinction (‘duo clarissimarum urbium’). Flor. *Epit.* 1.33 (2.17.1) also casts Carthage–Corinth–Numantia as successive destructions, rather than focussing on synchronicity (and note also that Flor. *Epit.* 1.35–6 (2.20.1, 3.1.1) casts Asia Minor, Africa, and Spain as east, south, and west).

Greeks could mark off Sicily and Italy as belonging in some sense to a separate sphere without seeing it as ‘the West’:²⁸ thus Thucydides’ Nicias speaks of ‘boundaries’ for those travelling by sea (6.13.1: ‘the Ionian Gulf for the coastal route and the Sicilian Sea for an open crossing’). Nicias here uses the hodological (journey-based) rather than cartographic perspective that is prevalent in most modes of Greek geographical writing²⁹—and that itself militates against any absolute division into East and West. As for conflicts between Greece and Persia, Greek writers did not view those as conflicts between East and West. Rather, as in Diodorus, the explicit polarity of East and West was most often used in speaking of the extremes of the known world, generally either to define the limits of human settlement and geographical knowledge or to stress the extent of an empire:³⁰ thus Appian’s proem contrasts the failure of the cities of mainland Greece to extend their power by invading ‘Sicily’ or marching into ‘Asia’ with the Romans’ success in extending the boundaries of its empire ‘from the setting of the sun and the Western ocean to ... the Eastern ocean, so that their boundary is the ocean both where the sun-god rises and where he sinks’ (*praef.* 8–9). This totalising language (which is expressed in the early parts of Diodorus, as we have seen, by a focus on Heracles and Dionysus and by proleptic allusions to Alexander and Caesar) does not

²⁸ Greek conceptions are often betrayed in translation: thus Warner translates *ἀπ’ αὐτῶθεν* at Th. 3.86.4 as ‘from the west’ (contrast Hammond: ‘from that area’), or again *τὴν ἐκεῖθεν προσγενομένην δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων* and *αὐτὰ τὰ προσγεγόμενα ἐκεῖθεν χωρία* at Th. 6.90.3–4 as ‘the additional Hellenic forces which we should have acquired in the west’ and ‘our new conquests in the west’ (contrast Hammond: ‘this entire additional force of overseas Greeks ... these foreign acquisitions’—phrases with ideological implications of their own).

²⁹ Though note that a more cartographic approach was adopted by some writers, e.g. Hipparchus.

³⁰ See e.g. Mayor (1881) n. on Juv. 10.1–2 (including the omitted material printed on p. 63); Fraenkel (1957) 451 n. 4; Woodman (1977) 241.

justify transferring the East/West division into the Mediterranean.³¹

The explicit conceptual division of the Mediterranean into East and West is far more common in Roman writers, especially after the civil war between Antony and Octavian. The difference can be illustrated by the use of a famous image of ‘the west’ in Polybius and in Justin’s epitome of Trogus’ history. When Polybius presents Agelaus of Naupactus warning against allowing ‘the clouds now gathering in the west (τὰ προφαινόμενα νῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσπέρας νέφη) to loom over Greece’ (5.104.10),³² he uses the language of the west without the corresponding language of the east. When Justin presents Philip V of Macedon echoing (in a different but more or less contemporary setting) that phrase, he does use the undifferentiated language of East and West—and even here it is Greece and Asia together that form the East: ‘to the West (*ab Occidente*) the new empires of Carthage and Rome were in the ascendant, and all that held these back from attacking Greece and Asia was their duel for supremacy. The victors in this conflict, he said, would lose no time in crossing to the East (*in Orientem*). He could see arising in Italy, he continued, the cloud of fierce and bloody war; he saw a storm coming from the west (*ab occasu*)’ (29.2.9–3.1).³³ Roman writers also strengthen the

³¹ Purcell (1995) 139, by contrast, writes that ‘the Greek conceptual division of the Mediterranean into two domains shaped the theme of the two options for world conquest, that of Dionysus or that of Heracles, as it appeared in the historiography of Alexander or of *condottieri* like Rome’s enemy Pyrrhus’—though Dionysus and Heracles are much more linked with the extremes of Asia and Europe, and Heracles in any case came to be portrayed as a conqueror in India (cf. Str. 15.1.7 for ancient debate on whether Heracles went to both eastern and western extremes).

³² Also flagged here by τοῦ συνεστῶτος πρὸς ταῖς δύσεσι πολέμου (‘the war in the west’) at 5.104.2, and cf. 9.37.10.

³³ For east/west language in Justin, note e.g. 12.2.1–2 (where the East embraces ‘Asia and Persia’, the West ‘Italy, Africa, and Sicily’); 30.4.15 (Macedonian’s eastern vs. Rome’s western empire); 41.1.1 (Parthia vs. Rome); Clarke (1999) 262–3. This language is used especially from the age of Alexander onwards. There are of course

geographical division by the use of metonymy. The formulation ‘the clouds from the west’ is so memorable because it is exceptional in Greek authors at this time; Diodorus’ more circumspect language of ‘places’ or ‘parts’ that lie ‘towards the west’ is much more common.³⁴ Roman writers, by contrast, were much freer in speaking of ‘oriens’ and ‘occidens’ absolutely.³⁵

This necessarily brief discussion has suggested that analysing comparisons between mainland Greece and Sicily in terms of ‘a comparative East/West mentality’, as Denis Feeney does, involves a misleadingly strong use of geographical polarisation.³⁶ Stressing the importance of exploring the precise terms of the comparison is not to deny the importance of the comparative mentality itself. Indeed, the rest of this paper will be aiming precisely to build on Feeney’s discussion of the significance of this comparative mode itself.

Agathocles and Alexander, Dion and Philip

Towards the start of his narrative of Alexander’s invasion of Persia, Diodorus describes how Alexander chose to place his troops on the far side of the River Granicus, site of his first major battle in Asia. He then points to a later parallel—the case of Agathocles, king of the Syracusans, who

numerous parallels in imperial Greek authors, e.g. App. *Mithr.* 438 (on Pompey’s campaigns against pirates).

³⁴ The phrasing at 6.5.1 on Picus/Jupiter as king of Italy, ‘holding sway over the west (κρατῶν τῆς δύσεως) for one hundred and twenty years’, is not Diodorus’ own, but that of the source-text, the *Chronicle* of John of Antioch; similarly 26.13.1 (a highly compressed account of Hannibal’s march ‘from the west and the Pillars of Heracles’ (ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ... καὶ τῶν Ἡρακλειωτικῶν στηλῶν)) must reflect the language of the excerptor.

³⁵ For the undifferentiated ‘east’, cf. e.g. V. *Aen.* 1.289 ‘spoliis orientis’.

³⁶ Feeney’s free adoption of this spatial language (cf. above, n. 10) is particularly striking in view of his brilliant analysis of the dangers of anachronistic temporal conceptions. (I should add that in earlier writings I have myself used the East/West opposition in the same loose way.)

copied the strategy of Alexander and won an unexpected and decisive victory. He had crossed to Libya with a small force and by burning his ships deprived his men of any hope of escape by flight, thus constraining them to fight like heroes and thereby win a victory over the Carthaginians, who had an army numbering many tens of thousands' (17.23.2–3). The Sicilian Diodorus here suggests a parallel between the initial conflicts in Alexander's crossing to Asia and in Agathocles' crossing to Africa—a parallel that seems to amplify the achievement of the Sicilian Agathocles.³⁷ The Alexander/Agathocles parallel acquires further resonance in the account of Agathocles himself, both when he crosses to Libya, thereby implicitly putting into practice some at least of Alexander's plans for future campaigns (18.4.4, discussed above), and again when he defends Corcyra from a Macedonian attack.³⁸ This parallel can also, however, be taken as highlighting the far greater scope of Alexander's venture into Asia rather than any points of comparison between the two leaders.

When Diodorus comes to deal directly with Agathocles' career, he suggests indirectly a link with two earlier military leaders—another Sicilian, Dion, as well as Alexander's father, Philip II of Macedon. Diodorus highlights the rise of Agathocles in his proem to Book 19, in which he reflects on the tendency of powerful individuals (especially in Sicily) to overthrow democracies (19.1.5). He then focuses on 'the most extraordinary instance of all'—'that of Agathocles, who became tyrant of the Syracusans, a man who had the lowest beginnings (*ἀφορμαῖς* ... *ἐλαχίσταις χρησάμενος*), but who plunged not only Syracuse but also the whole of Sicily and Libya into the gravest misfortunes' (19.1.6). A similar

³⁷ This prolepsis is tellingly absent from the other Alexander historians, though see above, n. 26 for a different Agathocles link in Curtius. As Goukowsky (1976) 183 notes, Alexander and Agathocles are also aligned at Plaut. *Mostell.* 775.

³⁸ Diod. 21.2.2: 'the Siceliotes wished not only to be regarded as victors over the Carthaginians and the barbarians of Italy, but also to show themselves in the Greek arena as more than a match for the Macedonians, whose spears had subjugated both Asia and Europe'.

phrase is used later when Diodorus berates Timaeus for his hostile account of Agathocles: ‘Yet who does not know that of all men who ever came to power, none acquired a greater kingdom with fewer resources (*ἐλάττωσιν ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος*)?’ (21.17.2).

Agathocles’ rise to power from humble beginnings seems to have been a part of the historiographical tradition. It appears, for instance, in a digression where Polybius compares Agathocles with his fellow Sicilian tyrant Dionysius (15.35.2–4).³⁹ In Diodorus, Agathocles’ rise from lowly beginnings is also explored comparatively, but in a more indirect manner. The introduction of Agathocles at the start of Book 19 echoes firstly that of Philip at the start of Book 16: ‘Philip was king over the Macedonians for twenty-four years, and having started from the most insignificant beginnings (*ἐλαχίσταις ... ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος*) built up his kingdom to be the greatest of the dominions in Europe, and having taken over Macedonia when she was a slave to the Illyrians, made her mistress of many powerful tribes and states’ (16.1.3). The terms of this introduction are in turn resumed in Diodorus’ obituary notice on Philip: ‘Such was the end of Philip, who had made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time. [...] He is known to fame as one who with but the slenderest resources (*ἐλαχίστας ... ἀφορμάς*) to support his claim to a throne won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world’ (16.95.1–2). These echoes mark out both Agathocles and Philip as men who rose to positions of great influence from the lowest beginnings.

Diodorus invites a further (and more immediate) comparison between Sicily and Macedonia when he introduces Dion a few chapters after his introduction of Sicily: ‘With slenderer resources (*ἐλαχίσταις ... χρησάμενος ἀφορμαῖς*) than those of any conqueror before his time he succeeded contrary to all expectation in overthrowing the

³⁹ Bizière (1975) 7 n. 3 stresses the importance of the Dionysius comparison for Diod. 19.1, adducing Diod. 13.96.4, Isoc. 5.65 for Dionysius’ rise from lowly origins.

greatest realm in all Europe' (16.9.1).⁴⁰ The parallel of Philip and Dion is bolstered by other echoes. Their anticipatory introductions—themselves a significant structural parallel—attribute their rise to their personal qualities rather than to fortune. Philip also acquires just as Dion overthrows 'the greatest realm in all Europe' (μεγίστην τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην δυνασκειῶν (16.1.3) ~ μεγίστην δυναστείαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην (16.9.1)).⁴¹ Both Philip and Dion, moreover, are devoted to philosophy (16.2.3, 16.6.3) and valorous in battle (τοῦ δὲ Φιλίππου μετὰ τῶν ἀρίστων ἡρωϊκῶς ἀγωνισαμένου (16.4.6: 'Philip with his best troops fought with true heroism') ~ ἡρωϊκῶς δ' ἀγωνιζόμενος (16.12.4: Dion 'fighting with true heroism')).⁴²

Is it appropriate to view the historical comparison between Sicilian and Macedonian leaders as a form of geographical mapping? As with Agathocles, Dion's rise from lowly origins was also part of the historiographical tradition. Indeed, the same phrase Diodorus applies to Dion (in addition to Agathocles and Philip) is used in the first sentence of Plutarch's *synkrisis* of Dion and Brutus: 'We see, therefore, that both men had many noble traits, and especially that they rose to the greatest heights from the most inconsiderable beginnings (ἐλαχίσταις ἀφορμαῖς); but this is most to the credit of Dion.'⁴³ Nonetheless, the specific

⁴⁰ These intratextual echoes are noted by Sordi (1969) 22; Vannicelli (1987) 180–1 (see n. 48); and Lefèvre (2002) 535–6 (who stresses their pedagogical utility).

⁴¹ For Dionysius' power as the greatest in Europe, cf. also 16.5.4, 20.78.3; for Philip's, cf. 19.1.6, 32.4.1.

⁴² Itself something of a Diodoran cliché: the adverb ἡρωϊκῶς occurs 22 times in extant parts of Diodorus, seven times in conjunction with the verb ἀγωνίζεσθαι (including of Epaminondas at 15.87.1; cf. 16.2.3 (quoted in n. 44) for another Philip/Epaminondas link).

⁴³ Cf. already *Dio* 50.4 for the joy in Syracuse at the expulsion of Dionysius II: 'For since, among the many illustrations men give of the mutations of fortune, the expulsion of Dionysius is still to this day the strongest and plainest, what joy must we suppose those men themselves then felt, and how great a pride, who, with the fewest resources (ἐλαχίσταις ἀφορμαῖς), overthrew the greatest tyranny that ever was!'

parallel in Diodorus between Philip, Dion, and Agathocles is supported by the rareness of this phrase in extant Greek literature. Though the phrase ἀφορμαῖς χρῆσθαι is not uncommon,⁴⁴ a search in the *TLG* corpus of extant Greek literature for the dative plural forms ἐλαχίσταις and ἀφορμαῖς within one line of each other yields, besides the passages I have quoted from Diodorus and Plutarch, only two Byzantine excerptors of Diodorus and Plutarch, while a search for the accusative plural forms ἐλαχίστας and ἀφορμάς yields only a Byzantine excerptor of Diodorus (there are no results for the nominative and genitive plurals).⁴⁵

It could still be argued that Diodorus was far more concerned with the rise of great leaders from humble origins as a general historical pattern than with its precise geographical distribution.⁴⁶ A general pattern is also at stake, for instance, when Diodorus uses Solon's warning about Peisistratus (19.1.4) to illustrate the tendency of

Both the use of the phrase in Sicilian and mainland Greek contexts in Diodorus and the occurrence of the same phrase in Plutarch have possible source implications: they tell against, e.g., the view of Hammond (1938) that Diodorus closely followed different sources for the Sicilian and Philip narratives in Book 16.

⁴⁴ Thus Diodorus uses a similar phrase of Philip's Pythagorean training in close proximity: 'Philip, availing himself of the same initial training (ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενος), achieved no less fame than Epaminondas' (16.2.3); cf. e.g. Lys. 24.24, Isoc. 2.4, Dem. 3.33, Pol. 1.3.10, 23.3.9. For the phrase applied to the basis of a rise to power, cf. Pol. 1.5.2: 'we must first state how and when the Romans established their position in Italy, and what prompted them (τίσιν ἀφορμαῖς ... χρησάμενοι) afterwards to cross to Sicily, the first country outside Italy where they set foot.'

⁴⁵ Dative plural: one instance is a Constantinian excerpt from Diodorus 19 (the Agathocles passage), the other from a fifteenth-century history derived from Diodorus and Plutarch (Gemistus Pletho, *E Diodoro et Plutarcho de rebus post pugnam ad Mantineam gestis per capita tractatio*). Accusative plural: Constantinian excerpt of Diodorus 16.

⁴⁶ Pomeroy (1991) 62 comments (in relation to 16.95.2) on the common Hellenistic motif of the self-made man. As Katherine Clarke notes, the presence of this motif would not in itself stop the resulting geographical patterning being of note.

powerful men like Agathocles to overthrow democracies. Nonetheless, that mention of Peisistratus does also fit into Diodorus' concern to compare the Athenian and Sicilian experiences of tyranny.⁴⁷ And the linking of Philip and Dion is also strengthened, as we have seen, by broader reflection on power relations in Europe: earlier Dionysius had been alarmed at the position of the Carthaginians as 'the most powerful people in Europe' (14.41.2); he grew to become the greatest power in Europe himself; and his overthrow by Dion coincided with the rise of Philip, who takes over that position. Diodorus suggests, that is, the idea of *translatio imperii*⁴⁸—but not in the most common pattern whereby the succession of empires involves a shift from east to west. Through a distinctively Sicilian interpretation of that theme, he highlights the achievements of Carthage and Syracuse. As for Agathocles, the stress on his crossing to Africa to confront Carthage on home ground highlights the failure of Alexander's plans for world empire while also preparing for the decisive shift of power to Rome.

Dionysius and Agesilaus

I turn now to Diodorus' presentation of the more or less contemporaneous wars undertaken by the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius I against Carthage and by the Spartan king Agesilaus against Persia. Diodorus presents his account of Dionysius' war against Carthage (14.41–78, spanning three archon years) in between the Spartans' engagement in Asia under Thibron and Dercylidas (14.35.6–37.4, 38.2–3, 39.4–6) and the decision to send out Agesilaus (14.79.1). The chronological interweaving between conflicts involving Persia and Carthage evidently continues the linking found in the narrative of 480 BC, but now it is Greek powers taking the initiative against non-Greeks (though, unlike

⁴⁷ Cf. 13.95.5–6; also the implicit links discussed by Rood (2004) 364. For another specific Sicily-Athens connection, cf. 5.4.4 (the Athenians were first to receive the gift of corn after the Sicilians).

⁴⁸ Cf. Vannicelli (1987) 181.

Persia and Carthage, they do not co-ordinate their efforts). This purely chronological connection, I will suggest, is bolstered by a number of other links between the two narratives.

One link lies in Diodorus' stress on the greatness of the conflicts. When Dionysius enters on his war, he assumes that 'the war would be a great and protracted one since he was entering a struggle with the most powerful people of Europe' (14.41.2: *ὑπελάμβανε γὰρ ἔσεσθαι μέγαν καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὸν πόλεμον, ὥς ἂν πρὸς τοὺς δυνατωτάτους τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην μέλλων διαγωνίζεσθαι*).⁴⁹ Dionysius is here in the position of the historian Thucydides at the start of the Peloponnesian War, predicting a great conflict on the basis of the size of the forces involved (1.1.1).⁵⁰ But he is also in the position of the Spartans as Diodorus presents them deciding to increase their commitment to their war with Persia by sending Agesilaus: 'In Greece the Lacedaemonians, foreseeing how great their war with the Persians would be ...' (14.79.1: *κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Λακεδαιμόνιοι προορώμενοι τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ πρὸς Πέρσας πολέμου ...*).⁵¹

A further link with the Spartan expedition to Asia emerges from Diodorus' account of the steps Dionysius takes in preparation for the war. He gives a particularly detailed account of Dionysius' construction of weapons in

⁴⁹ For the idea of greatness, cf. 14.44.3: *μέλλων δὲ μέγαν ἐξεγείρειν πόλεμον* ('Since Dionysius was going to raise up a great war'); for the phrase, see also Smith (1900) 72 on the epic register of *τὸν πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν* at Thuc 1.121.1 (and cf. Hdt. 8.142.2). Note also 14.63.3 (Himilcar's perception that the siege of Syracuse would be lengthy).

⁵⁰ The opening sections of Thucydides are also evoked by the focus on naval innovations (14.41.3, 42.2–3: quadriremes and quinqueremes); in particular, the phrase *ἀκούων γὰρ ὁ Διονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ ναυπηγηθῆναι τριήρη πρῶτως* ('hearing that triremes had first been built in Corinth') hints at Th. 1.13.2 (*τριήρεις ἐν Κορίνθῳ πρῶτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ναυπηγηθῆναι*). Cf. also 14.42.1 for the invention of the catapult.

⁵¹ The expectation of a great war is a common motif in Diodorus, cf. 2.5.7 (Second Punic War), 12.76.1 (Peloponnesian War), 13.44.5 (Sicilian-Carthaginian conflict of 410–409 BC), 15.15.2, 15.28.5, 16.28.1, 17.111.4, 18.55.1; note also Pol. 5.104.2; App. *Syr.* 62.

Syracuse (14.41–3): ‘With so many arms and ships under construction at one place the beholder was filled with utter wonder at the sight. For whenever a man gazed at the eagerness shown in the building of the ships, he thought that every Greek in Sicily was engaged on their construction; and when, on the other hand, he visited the places where men were making arms and engines of war, he thought that all available labour was engaged in this alone’ (14.43.1). Diodorus’ description can be compared with Xenophon’s account of Agesilaus’ preparations in Ephesus: Agesilaus established prizes for hoplites, cavalry, peltasts, and archers, so that ‘one could see all the gymnasia full of men exercising, the horse track full of men practising their horsemanship, and the javelin throwers and archers working at their tasks. Indeed Agesilaus made the whole city where they were stationed a marvel to look at; the agora was full of all sorts of horses and weapons for sale, and the coppersmiths, joiners, smiths, leather workers, and painters were all fashioning weapons for war in such profusion that one would have thought the whole city was really a workshop for war’ (*Hell.* 3.4.16–17, trans. Marincola). Both descriptions stress the visual effect of the scenes, using the perspective of an anonymous onlooker; they also make repeated use of the language of totality; and they stress the productive power of rivalry (though Xenophon focuses more on exercise, Diodorus more on manufacture). Diodorus’ account is probably derived ultimately from Philistus, and it is possible that either Xenophon or Philistus was influenced by the other’s account.⁵² To set aside the issue of sources, it is striking that there is no counterpart in Diodorus’ work to Xenophon’s elaborate description of Agesilaus’ preparations in Ephesus. Perhaps the very elab-

⁵² See Sanders (1987) 145 on Philistus *FGHist* 556 F 28 (a later rhetorician’s testimonium on Dionysius’ preparation), with 30 n. 3 for modern scholarly views on whether Philistus influenced Xenophon or Xenophon influenced Philistus. That Xenophon’s account was later imitated by both Polybius and Livy in their accounts of Scipio’s preparations in Spain (see Levene (2010) 92–5 on *Pol.* 10.20.6–7 and *Liv.* 26.51.7–8) adds further to the geographical patterning.

oration of Xenophon's account led Diodorus to neglect that scene and highlight instead events in Sicily at the expense of the Aegean region.

The relation between the two expeditions becomes more complex as Diodorus' narrative proceeds. Agesilaus' venture proves to be short-lived once discontented cities in Greece unite against the Spartans, thinking it will be easy to defeat them since they were 'hated by their allies because of their harsh rule' (14.82.2: *μισουμένων γὰρ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων διὰ τὸ βάρος τῆς ἐπιστασίας*). This account of the hatred felt for the severity of Spartan rule echoes Diodorus' presentation of the feelings of Carthage's subjects. He brings those feelings out firstly as he describes the support for Dionysius as he marches through Sicily to attack Carthaginian possessions in the west: 'they were all eager to join his campaign, hating as they did the heavy hand (*μισοῦντες ... τὸ βάρος*) of Phoenician domination and relishing the prospect at last of freedom' (14.47.5).⁵³ Later, after the Carthaginians have withdrawn from Sicily, they are confronted by a disturbance in Africa: 'Their allies, who had long hated the oppressive rule (*μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος*) of the Carthaginians and even more at this time because of the betrayal of the soldiers at Syracuse, were inflamed against them' (14.77.1).⁵⁴ Diodorus' account suggests a link between Spartan rule in Greece and Carthaginian rule over their subjects in Sicily and Africa, painting a positive image of Dionysius' anti-Carthaginian policy. This link is then reinforced by his comment that when Agesilaus was left to make his way back to Greece, he passed 'through the same country as Xerxes did when he made his campaign against the Greeks' (14.83.3, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.8). By placing the

⁵³ Cf. also 14.46.3 for the hatred (*μῖσος*) felt by the inhabitants of Greek cities under Carthaginian rule for their Phoenician co-habitants; 14.48.1 for the people of Eryx going over to Dionysius because of their hatred (*μισοῦντες*) of the Carthaginians.

⁵⁴ The clustering is suggestive, even though hatred (*μισ-* stems) and severe rule (*βάρος*) are also associated at 13.66.6 and 20.55.4; note also the use of *βάρος* of Spartan rule at 14.6.2 and of Dionysius at 14.18.7.

Spartans in the position of Persia, Diodorus bolsters the parallel of their rule with that of Carthage.

It is not just by comparison with the Spartan invasion of Asia Minor that Diodorus magnifies the significance of Dionysius' conflict with Carthage. He also draws extended comparisons between the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily and the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415–413 BC. In this case, the comparisons are drawn through echoes of Thucydides' Sicilian narrative, which itself had portrayed the Athenian invasion as in some ways a replay of Xerxes' invasion of Greece,⁵⁵ as well as through earlier parts of Thucydides' Peloponnesian War narrative.

An initial echo of Thucydides appears when Diodorus presents Dionysius putting the case for war to the Syracusans: 'For the present, he pointed out, the Carthaginians were inactive because of the plague which had broken out among them and had destroyed the larger part of the inhabitants of Libya, but when they had recovered their strength, they would not refrain from attacking the Sicilian Greeks, against whom they had been plotting from the earliest time. It was therefore preferable, he continued, to wage a decisive war upon them while they were weak than to wait and compete when they were strong' (14.45.3). The argument that the Carthaginians are constrained from attacking only by the plague recalls the historical precedent of the Athenians attacking Sicily once they had recovered from plague (Thuc. 6.26.2), while the argument that the Syracusans should seize the opportunity to attack right away recalls the terms of the Mytilenaeon appeal to Sparta in 427 BC, where the plague had also been stressed as a source of weakness (Thuc. 3.13.3).⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Rood (1999); Harrison (2000).

⁵⁶ There is a slight tension with Diodorus' account of Dionysius' picture of Carthaginian strength; cf. 14.47.2 for the Carthaginians as weakened by plague and 'totally unprepared' (τοῖς ὅλοις ... ἀπαρασκευάστοι), in opposition to the Thucydidean picture of preparedness in Greece at the start of the Peloponnesian War. For plague in Carthage as an argument for Syracusan action, cf. also Diod. 15.73.1.

Further parallels can be suggested in the articulation of the war narratives in Diodorus and Thucydides. Diodorus' account of Dionysius' initial advance against Motye, 'a Carthaginian colony, which they used as their chief base of operations against Sicily' (14.47.4), recalls Thucydides' stress on the Athenians' perception of the strategic possibilities of Messene as a base (Thuc. 4.1.2, 6.48), suggesting in turn a geographical contrast between Carthage and Athens (the one approaching from the south-west, the other from the east), but a similarity in their designs on the island; Dionysius' failure to contain the war in the west of Sicily is later underlined by Himilco's perception of the advantages of Messene (14.56.1). The Motyans' despair at the expectation that they would suffer themselves what they had done to others (14.52.2),⁵⁷ while contributing to Diodorus' general stress on the importance of moderation, recalls Gylippus' appeal to the Athenians' past crimes in support of the harsh punishment of the Athenian captives in Sicily (13.30.6), and even more closely Xenophon's account of Athenian fears at the end of the Peloponnesian War (a theme itself anticipated in Thucydides' Melian Dialogue).⁵⁸ Thucydides' famous account of the final sea-battle at Syracuse is then picked up in Diodorus' focus on the sight of land troops on the shore as a source of encouragement to those fighting on board ships (14.59.6) and on the confusion between land and sea fighting (14.60.3).⁵⁹ Next, Thucydides' plague narrative (2.47–54) is echoed in multiple ways in Diodorus' account of the plague that hits the Carthaginians (14.70.4–71);⁶⁰ this account also includes an allusion to the Athenians' sufferings in the same spot (14.70.5, alluding back to 13.12).

⁵⁷ Cf. already 14.46.3–4, where the Sicilian Greeks are harsh to Phoenician inhabitants, bearing in mind what they had suffered; the Motyan fears are in due course fulfilled at 14.53.1.

⁵⁸ Cf. Rood (2004) 364–5 on Diodorus' transfer of this motif to Sicily.

⁵⁹ Cf. Sanders (1987) 150.

⁶⁰ Note Diod. 14.70.4 (ἐνέπρεσεν) ~ Thuc. 2.48.2 (ἐσέπρεσεν); Diod. 14.71.1 (care for sick stopping) ~ Thuc. 2.51.5; Diod. 14.71.4 (upsetting of kin relations) ~ Thuc. 2.51.5; Diod. 14.70.6 (κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεσημβρίαν [ἡ])

This succession of parallels culminates in the contrasts Diodorus draws between the arrival and departure of the invading Carthaginian army (14.76.1–2):

οὕτως μὲν οὖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἡ τύχη ταχέϊαν τὴν μεταβολὴν ἐποίησε, καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἔδειξεν, ὥς οἱ μείζον τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐπαιρόμενοι ταχέως ἐξελέγχουσι τὴν ἰδίαν ἀσθένειαν. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν πόλεων σχεδὸν ἀπασῶν πλήν Συρακουσῶν κρατοῦντες, καὶ ταύτην ἀλώσεσθαι προσδοκῶντες, ἐξαίφνης ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδίας πατρίδος ἀγωνιᾶν ἠναγκάσθησαν, καὶ τοὺς τάφους τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀνατρέψαντες πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπέιδον ἀτάφους διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους, πυρπολῆσαντες δὲ τὴν χώραν τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐκ μεταβολῆς εὐθὺς εἶδον τὸν ἴδιον στόλον ἐμπυρισθέντα, εἰς δὲ τὸν λιμένα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει καταπλέοντες ὑπερηφάνως, καὶ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἐπιδεικνύμενοι τὰς ἑαυτῶν εὐτυχίας, ἡγνόουν ἑαυτοὺς μέλλοντας νυκτὸς ἀποδράσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους ἐκδότους καταλιπεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις.

With such swiftness did Fortune work a change in the affairs of the Carthaginians, and point out to all mankind that those who become elated above due measure quickly give proof of their own weakness. For they who had in their hands practically all the cities of Sicily with the exception of Syracuse and expected its capture, of a sudden were forced to be anxious for their own fatherland; they who overthrew the tombs of the Syracusans gazed upon one hundred and fifty thousand dead lying in heaps and unburied because of the plague; they who wasted with fire the territory of the

θερμότης ἐπνιγεν, ὥς ἂν τοσούτου πλήθους ἐν στενῷ τόπῳ συνηθροισμένου ('in the middle of the day the heat was stifling, as must be the case when so great a multitude is gathered together in a narrow place')) echoes Thucydides' account of the suffering of the Athenian prisoners in the stone-quarry at Syracuse (7.87.1–2) as well as the plague (2.52.2). For the links between the accounts (generally attributed to Philistus), see Littman (1984); Sanders (1987) 151–2; Lewis (1994) 144 n. 103; cf. also Levene (2010) 62 n. 158 on Livy 25.26, another Sicilian plague.

Syracusans now in their turn saw their own fleet of a sudden go up in flames; they who so arrogantly sailed with their whole armada into the harbour and flaunted their successes before the Syracusans had little thought that they were to steal away by night and leave their allies at the mercy of their enemy.

The theme of the mutability of fortune is a common historiographical trope, but this accumulation of reversals nonetheless demands to be read against Thucydides' account of the reversal to the Athenians' fortunes in Sicily (7.75.7):

μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο [τῷ] Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεύματι ἐγένετο, οἷς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἦκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δ' εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ' ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι, πεζοὺς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν πορευομένους καὶ ὀπλιτικῷ προσέχοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ναυτικῷ.

This was indeed the greatest reverse experienced by any Greek army. They had come with the intention of enslaving others, and now found themselves leaving in fear of enslavement themselves; they had set out to the accompaniment of paeans and prayers for success, and were now retreating with quite different imprecations in their ears; they were on foot, not on ship, and reliant now on infantry rather than navy.⁶¹

In both cases, the grandeur of an invading army's initial arrival is contrasted with the miserable circumstances of its departure. Besides this, the Carthaginians' fear that they will be attacked by those they set out to conquer (14.76.2)

⁶¹ Cf. also the stress on mutability at Thuc. 7.55. Cf. also Diodorus' account of the abandonment of Agrigentum in 406 BC (13.89).

evokes the Athenians' fears when they hear of their defeat in Sicily (Th. 8.1.2—see further below).⁶²

By drawing repeatedly on Thucydides, then, Diodorus aligns Athens and Carthage, highlighting the pattern of heroic Sicilian resistance to invasion. And yet Diodorus also upsets this pattern by presenting a much more disturbing image of Dionysius. The Syracusans are willing to take part in the war against Carthage because they hate Carthage for compelling them to take orders from a tyrant—and also hope war may give them a chance of freedom (14.45.5).⁶³ A negative image is further conveyed by a telling parallel with Sparta. In the course of his account of the war against Carthage, Diodorus presents a speaker at Syracuse, Theodorus, arguing that the Syracusans should take action not just against Carthage but against Dionysius himself (14.65.3): 'But it behooves us, fellow citizens, to put an end not only to the Phoenician war but to the tyrant within our walls. For the acropolis, which is guarded by the weapons of slaves, is a hostile redoubt in our city'. The focus on Dionysius' hostile control of the acropolis within Syracuse is paralleled by Diodorus' explanation of why Peloponnesian cities are unwilling to revolt from Sparta owing to the position of Sparta within the Peloponnese (14.82.4): 'For Sparta, lying as it does along the side of it, was a kind of acropolis and fortress (*καθαπερεί τις ἀκρόπολις ἣν καὶ φρουρά*) of the entire Peloponnesus'. Far from Dionysius' triumph against the Carthaginian invaders being simply contrasted with Agesilaus' rapid return along Xerxes' route to Greece, then, we see that Dionysius can be assimilated to

⁶² Meister (1967) 95 sees Diod. 14.76 as typically Timaeian, adducing 20.13.3–4 and 20.70 as parallels; but Thuc. 7.75 seems closer than either of those passages.

⁶³ Possibly alluding back to 13.114.1, the treaty with Carthage that had confirmed Dionysius as ruler of Syracuse. Cf. also 14.46.2 for the Syracusans' willingly joining the war despite their hatred of Dionysius' tyranny and 14.58.1 for the Sicels' attachment to Carthage owing to their hatred of Dionysius; also 14.61.1–3, where Dionysius is unwilling to encounter Himilco on land because of his worries over Syracuse, leading to his being abandoned by the Sicilian Greeks.

Sparta as a hostile acropolis destroying the freedom of his subjects. Indeed, Theodorus' speech presses this negative image of Dionysius further by aligning Syracuse under his tyranny with a sacked city (14.65.2) and by invoking both Gelon's victory over the Carthaginians at Himera⁶⁴ and the Syracusan victory over Athens to rouse the Syracusans to action against Dionysius. Rather than being seen as the latest in a line of heroic Sicilian patriots resisting foreign invasion, Dionysius is here aligned rhetorically with both Carthage and Athens.⁶⁵

The strands I have highlighted linking thematically the three great cities of Carthage, Syracuse, and Athens come together in Diodorus' account of Dionysius' death (15.74.3–4). Diodorus reports how a messenger hurries back to Syracuse to bring Dionysius news of his victory in the Lenaea at Athens in 367—a reversal of the focus on the Athenians and Carthaginians hearing bad news brought to them from Sicily. Dionysius turns to excessive drinking and dies—thereby, we now learn, fulfilling an oracle that he would die after conquering his betters. Dionysius, Diodorus explains, had taken 'his betters' to refer to Carthage—and it was for that reason that he had never pressed home his advantage at any point in his wars against Carthage.⁶⁶ The oracle, it turns out, meant better poets at Athens.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ For another link with 480, note the allusion to the Carthaginian's destruction of the tomb of Gelon and wife (14.63.3; also alluded to proleptically at 11.38.4–5). Diodorus similarly posits links with 480 in his account of the Carthaginian invasion of 410–409: the general Hannibal, who is 'grandson of Hamilcar, who fought in the war against Gelon and died at Himera', and desires 'to wipe out the disgraces which had befallen his ancestors' (13.43.5–6, cf. 13.59.5–6), tortures and kills 3,000 prisoners at the spot where his grandfather had been killed by Gelon (13.62.4); and the Selinuntines are surprised to be attacked by Carthage as 'they had been the only Sicilian Greeks to fight on the side of the Carthaginians in the war against Gelon' (13.55.1).

⁶⁵ Note also that Theodorus' appeal to the Syracusans to seize their opportunity (14.69.4) strengthens the parallel by echoing the rhetoric that Dionysius himself had used against Carthage.

⁶⁶ The earlier narrative had presented a more rationalistic account of Dionysius' motives: at 14.75.3 he makes peace so as to keep alive in

Diodorus and Thucydides on Athens, Sicily, and Carthage

We have seen in the last two sections that Diodorus draws links between events in Sicily and in mainland Greece by the use of verbal parallelism and by more extended narrative patterning. Besides this, he adopts Thucydidean motifs as a way of connecting Athens' disastrous invasion of Sicily with the history of Syracusan–Carthaginian conflict. In this section, I will take this analysis further by looking both at Thucydidean echoes and at broader historical patterning in Diodorus' account of the two great Carthaginian invasions of Sicily in the fifth century, in 480 and 410–409 BC.

Diodorus connects the Carthaginian invasion in 410 BC with the Athenian expedition five years earlier in a number of ways. One factor that leads the Segestans to seek help from Carthage is expectation of punishment for their alliance with Athens, which had played a central role in the run-up to Athens' invasion (13.43.1). Another factor in the Segestan decision, a quarrel over disputed land with Selinus (13.43.2–3), is an exact repetition of the antecedents to that invasion. Again, when the Segestans appeal to Carthage, that mirrors their actions a few years earlier—at least as Diodorus has portrayed them (12.82.7; this appeal is not mentioned by Thucydides⁶⁸). The Carthaginians are

Syracuse the fear of Carthage as a check on the Syracusans' ambitions for internal freedom (this link of internal and external is similar to the Roman concept of the 'metus hostilis', except here the external threat serves to keep Syracuse subjected to a tyrant rather than free from corruption at home); cf. Theodorus' accusations at 14.68.1. Scholars tend to posit a different source for 15.74 from the rest of the Sicilian narrative (Meister (1967) 104 sees it as un-Timaeon, and Stylianou (1998) 84 as non-Ephoran but possibly Timaeon); in its spatial implications at least it is coherent.

⁶⁷ This story in turn links suggestively with the stories that Dionysius seized power on the day that Euripides died (Timaeus, *FGrHist* 566 F 105; see above, n. 7) and that Euripides was born on the day of the battle of Salamis (ibid.; also *Vit. Eur.* ll. 20–1 Méridier).

⁶⁸ Cf. Lewis (1994) 128: 'If Segesta had already attempted to get Carthaginian help against Selinus in 416 ... she had had no success. It

initially reluctant to help Segesta, ‘having just witnessed the Syracusans’ defeat of the armaments of the Athenians’ (13.43.4). But the conflict then escalates as Segesta sends once again to Carthage while Selinus appeals to Syracuse (13.44.4). Next, Diodorus offers an emotive account of the Carthaginian’s siege and sack of Selinus before describing how they turn to Himera. He then maintains the emotional level as some of the besieged Himaraeans stage a desperate break-out, ‘having as spectators on the walls parents and children (θεατὰς ἔχοντες ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν γονεῖς καὶ παῖδας) as well as all their relatives’ (13.60.4)—a precise echo of his earlier account of the final naval battle in the Athenian expedition, where it was the Syracusans who had ‘their parents and children as spectators of the struggle’ (13.15.5: *θεατὰς τῶν ἀγώνων ἔχοντες γονεῖς καὶ παῖδας*⁶⁹), as well as a looser echo of Thucydides’ famous account of the final battle in the great harbour at Syracuse (7.70–1).⁷⁰ Once more literary echoing draws attention to historical patterning.

Diodorus’ account of Gelon’s great victory over Carthage at Himera in 480 BC offers readers the chance to draw further connections with Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative. The account, though much briefer than Thucydides’ narrative, has a similar stress on the emotional involvement of participants, especially their shifts in morale. Particularly close to Thucydides is Diodorus’ account of the Carthaginian response to the news of their defeat at Himera (11.24.2–4):

ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ἐν μικρῷ σκάφει διασωθέντες εἰς
Καρχηδόνα διεσάφησαν τοῖς πολίταις, σύντομον

was therefore surprising that a renewed application in 410 was more warmly received.’

⁶⁹ Cf. also 13.14.5 and 13.16.7 for the presence of spectators in the narrative of Athens’ siege of Syracuse.

⁷⁰ For such spectators in Diodorus, note also *θεατὰς ἔχοντες τῆς ἀρετῆς* at 13.72.8 (where the spectators are on walls) and 14.67.3 (from Theodorus’ speech denouncing Dionysius), *θεατὴν ἔχόντων τῆς ἀρετῆς* at 11.7.1, and *θεατὰς ἔχοντες τῆς ἀνδρείας* at 19.83.5.

ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ὅτι πάντες οἱ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀπολώλασιν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι παρ' ἐλπίδας μεγάλη συμφορᾷ περιπεσόντες ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο κατεπλάγησαν, ὥστε τὰς νύκτας ἅπαντας διαγρυπνεῖν φυλάττοντας τὴν πόλιν, ὡς τοῦ Γέλωνος πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει παραχρῆμα διεγνωκότος πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν Καρχηδόνα. διὰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἢ τε πόλις ἐπένθησε κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν αἱ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν οἰκίαι κλαυθμοῦ καὶ πένθους ἐπληροῦντο. οἱ μὲν γὰρ υἱούς, οἱ δὲ ἀδελφούς ἐπεζήτουν, πλεῖστοι δὲ παῖδες ὀρφανοὶ πατέρων γεγονότες ἔρημοι ὠδύροντο τὸν τε τῶν γεγεννηκότων θάνατον καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐρημίαν τῶν βοηθούντων.

A handful only of survivors got safely to Carthage in a small boat to give their fellow citizens a statement which was brief: 'All who crossed over to Sicily have perished.' The Carthaginians, who had suffered a great disaster so contrary to their hopes, were so terror-stricken that every night they kept vigil guarding the city, in the belief that Gelon with his entire force must have decided to sail forthwith against Carthage. And because of the multitude of the lost, the city went into public mourning, while privately the homes of citizens were filled with wailing and lamentation. For some kept inquiring after sons, others after brothers, while a very large number of children who had lost their fathers, alone now in the world, grieved at the death of those who had begotten them and at their own desolation through the loss of those who could succour them.

The model for Diodorus here is Thucydides' account of the Athenian defeat in Sicily and the subsequent position in Athens (7.87.6–8.1.2):

κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλεθρία δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα. ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπειδὴ ἡγγέλθη,

ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἠπίσταντο καὶ τοῖς πάνυ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγόσι καὶ σαφῶς ἀγγέλλουσι, μὴ οὕτω γε ἄγαν πανσυνδὶ διεφθάρθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν ... πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τε καὶ περιειστῆκει ἐπὶ τῷ γεγεννημένῳ φόβος τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δὴ· ἅμα μὲν γὰρ στερόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις ὀπλιτῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οἷαν οὐχ ἑτέραν ἐώρων ὑπάρχουσιν ἐβαρύνοντο· ἅμα δὲ ναὺς οὐχ ὁρῶντες ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἱκανὰς οὐδὲ χρήματα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ οὐδ' ὑπηρεσίας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι σωθήσεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας πολεμίους εὐθὺς σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλευσεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσοῦτον κρατήσαντας.

This was, as they say, ‘total annihilation’. Beaten in every way on every front, extreme miseries suffered on an extreme scale, and army, fleet, and everything else destroyed, few out of all those many made their return home. Such were the events in Sicily. When the news reached Athens, for a long time they could not believe that their forces had been so utterly destroyed, and would not credit even the unambiguous reports brought back by soldiers who had actually witnessed the events and made their escape. Then when they had to accept the truth ... on every side there was nothing for them but pain, and they were plunged into fear and the utmost consternation at what had happened. The burden of loss lay heavy on individual families and on the city at large—so many hoplites gone, so many cavalrymen, such a swathe of youth and no replacement to be seen. And when at the same time they could not see an adequate number of ships in the docks, adequate funds in the treasury, or an adequate supply of officers for the ships, they despaired of surviving the situation as it was. They thought that their enemies in Sicily, particularly after such a crushing victory, would immediately send a ship against the Peiraeus.

Both descriptions stress the small number of survivors; the despair felt back home at the unexpected news; grief at both a private and a public level; the lack of adequate reserves; and the fear of an attack by the very people they had sought to conquer.⁷¹

Diodorus was not the first or last historian to apply Thucydides' account of the despair in Athens after the loss of the fleet in Sicily to a conflict involving Carthage. Polybius uses many of the same motifs as well as some close verbal echoing in his accounts of the mood in Carthage in the aftermath of the First Punic War and of the response in Rome to the defeat at Cannae;⁷² similarly Appian echoes Thucydides' run of negatives in describing the Carthaginian response to news of the outbreak of the Third Punic War (*Pun.* 76, 82).⁷³ Nor was Polybius necessarily the first historian to adapt this Thucydidean passage. While Diodorus himself wrote a century after Polybius, he may have drawn the Thucydidean echo from an earlier historian such as Timaeus, Ephorus, or Philistus (a renowned imitator of Thucydides).⁷⁴ This type of description was not just part of the historiographical repertoire for elevating the emotional level,⁷⁵ but also a significant way of drawing out historical patterns.

The comparison Diodorus suggests between the Carthaginian and Athenian defeats in Sicily is reinforced by two sets of internal echoes. In arguing for the superiority of

⁷¹ For this fear, cf. also 14.76.2 (cited above), 16.81.3. The parallel between the Diodorus and Thucydides passages is also observed, and excellently discussed, by Feeney (2007) 52; cf. also Williams (1993) 274.

⁷² Rood (2012) 60–1, 62. Rapin (1706) I.316–17 compared Thuc. 8.1 with Livy's account of the aftermath of Cannae.

⁷³ Cf. also Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.2, Sall. *Iug.* 39; and the inversion at App. *Pun.* 134 (Roman disbelief at the news that Carthage has been destroyed).

⁷⁴ Note that Williams (1993) 273–4 even suggests that Antiochus could be the ultimate source of Diod. 11.20–4, and so that Thucydides' focus on morale could itself be echoing Antiochus' presentation of the Carthaginian invasion.

⁷⁵ Cf., e.g., Josephus' account of the Jewish response to news of the fall of Jotapata (*Bj* 3.432–6).

the Sicilian achievement in 480 BC over the mainland Greeks' victory against Persia, Diodorus presents Himera as a greater battle than Plataea and Gelon's stratagem as greater than Themistocles' (11.23.2): 'in the case of the Persians the king escaped with his life and many myriads together with him', while 'in the case of the Carthaginians not only did the general perish but also everyone who participated in the war was slain, and, as the saying is, not even a man to bear the news got back to Carthage (*μηδὲ ἄγγελον εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα διασωθῆναι*)'.⁷⁶ The proverbial phrase about no messengers surviving reappears twice in the extant parts of Diodorus, both times in connection with the Athenian disaster at Syracuse. The first passage occurs in Nicolaus' speech in the debate Diodorus presents at Syracuse over the punishment of the Athenian prisoners: 'from the preparations they made on such a scale not a ship, not a man has returned home, so that not even a survivor is left to carry to them word of the disaster (*μηδὲ τὸν ἀγγελοῦντα αὐτοῖς τὴν συμφορὰν περιλειφθῆναι*)' (13.21.3). The second occurs in a speech we have already noted, Theodorus' denunciation of the tyranny of Dionysius: 'only yesterday, as it were, when the Athenians attacked Syracuse with such great armaments, our fathers left not a man free to carry back word of the disaster (*οὐδὲ τὸν ἀπαγγελοῦντα τὴν συμφορὰν ἀπέλιπον*)' (14.67.1). This strong intratextual echo is reinforced by the Thucydidean resonance in Diodorus' initial stress on the proverbial nature of the phrase: 'as the saying is' (*τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον*) was applied by Thucydides to the 'utter destruction' met by the Athenians in Sicily (7.87.6, cited above).⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Cf. Lyc. *Alex.* 657 for the survival of one messenger; Jos. *Bj* 3.433, *Aj* 2.344; App. *Hisp.* 57, 63; Just. 24.8.16 for none (also Pol. 32.2.7; App. *Samn.* F 4.8 for speeches recommending this course), Flor. *Epit.* 1.46 (3.11.10) for 'scarcely a messenger'. The ancestor of the trope is Polydamas' warning at *Il.* 12.73; Eustathius ad loc. noted that the phrase was proverbial in cases of utter destruction (*πανωλεθρίας που γενομένης*). Cf. also Suidas s.v. ἀνάγγελον.

⁷⁷ Note too how Diodorus' comparison between the later fate of Gelon with that 'of the most distinguished of the leaders of the Greeks,

The other set of internal echoes relates to the theme of moderation in success. Diodorus first praises Gelon after the battle of Himera for ‘bearing his good fortune as men should, not toward them alone but even toward the Carthaginians, his bitterest foes’ (11.26.1: *τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἀνθρωπίνως ἔφερεν οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμιοτάτων Καρχηδονίων*). Then, in the Syracusan debate over the Athenian prisoners in 413 BC, he presents Hermocrates arguing that ‘a fairer thing than victory is to bear victory with moderation’ (13.19.5: *ὥς κάλλιον ἐστὶ τοῦ νικᾶν τὸ τὴν νίκην ἐνεγκεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως*). The counter argument in that debate, delivered by the Spartan general Gylippus, is in due course precisely echoed in the Roman debate over Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War (13.30.5, 27.18.1).⁷⁸ The importance of moderation in success is itself a common one in Diodorus,⁷⁹ but its articulation at these emphatic moments still serves to bind together the fortunes of Carthage and Athens.

Diodorus’ use of Thucydides to link the Carthaginian and Athenian invasions of Sicily can also be read as offering a commentary of sorts on the earlier writer. Two passages in Diodorus are particularly suggestive—both, significantly, from speeches given to Nicias, the Athenian general whose speeches in Thucydides are the vehicle for much of the symbolic construction of the magnitude of the Athenian defeat in Sicily. First, Diodorus reports Nicias’ words of encouragement before the final battle in the Great Harbour (13.15.2): ‘Those who were fathers of children he reminded of their sons; those who were sons of distinguished fathers he exhorted not to bring disgrace upon the valorous deeds

Pausanias and Themistocles’ (11.23.3: ‘the former was put to death by his fellow citizens because of his overweening greed of power and treason, and the latter was driven from every corner of Greece and fled for refuge to Xerxes’) picks up Thucydides’ parallel account of the later careers of the two Persian Wars heroes (1.128–38). For a less pro-Sicilian perspective, see the praise of Epaminondas over Gelon (among others) at 15.88.2.

⁷⁸ Cf. Sacks (1990) 107.

⁷⁹ Cf. Sacks (1990) 42–6.

of their ancestors; those who had been honoured by their fellow citizens he urged to show themselves worthy of their crowns; and all of them he reminded of the trophies erected at Salamis and begged them not to bring to disrepute the far-famed glory of their fatherland nor surrender themselves like slaves to the Syracusans'. Diodorus here offers a re-writing of the emotional pre-battle speech that Thucydides gives Nicias at 7.69.2—and makes explicit what is implicit in Thucydides, namely that the coming defeat is to be read as a reversal of the success at Salamis.⁸⁰

Even more suggestive is a section from Nicias' attempt to persuade the Athenians not to invade Sicily in 415. One of the arguments Diodorus attributes to Nicias is precisely the failure of the earlier Carthaginian invasion of Sicily: 'how could they hope to subdue the greatest island in the inhabited world? Even the Carthaginians, he added, who possessed a most extensive empire and had waged war many times to gain Sicily, had not been able to subdue the island, and the Athenians, whose military power was far less than that of the Carthaginians, could not possibly win by the spear and acquire the most powerful of the islands' (12.83.6).⁸¹ Here Diodorus uses Nicias to point up not so much Thucydides' historiographical patterning as the selectivity involved in that patterning. He draws our attention to the suppression of the Sicilian version of 480 BC that is implied by Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition. As we have seen, the Sicilian story equated that victory with the victories of the mainland Greeks over

⁸⁰ Cf. how the echo of Th. 7.70–1 in the Salamis narrative in Lysias' *Epitaphios* (2.37–9), noted by Rood (1999) 160 n. 45, also invites reflection on Thucydides' structuring of his narrative.

⁸¹ Kagan (1981) 170 implausibly suggests that Diodorus' report of Nicias' appeal to Carthage could be founded on reliable evidence; contrast Sacks (1990) 131 who argues from the vocabulary that 'it is probably Diodorus who added to the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades the proud sentiments about Sicily'; also Levene (2010) 114–15, who argues that Diodorus used the same anti-Thucydidean reworking of the debate (probably by Ephorus) that inspired Fabius' arguments against transferring the war to Africa at Livy 28.41–2.

Persia. In presenting Athens as a new Persia, Thucydides makes no allusion to the fact that the cities of Sicily had also resisted foreign invaders in 480 BC. He even has the Syracusan leader Hermocrates encourage his fellow citizens by alluding to the general failure of large expeditions abroad (6.33.5–6) without any mention of their victory over Carthage.⁸² Thucydides also underplays the scope of the Syracusans' naval experience in suggesting that they acquire naval proficiency in response to the Athenian invasion much as the Athenians had in response to the Persian invasion ('Hermocrates' at 7.21.3). The battle of Himera, moreover, is omitted from both the *Archaeology* (where the Carthaginians are mentioned only at 1.13.6 for their defeat in a sea-battle at the hands of the Phocaeans) and the *Sikelika* (6.1–5).

Diodorus delivers a riposte to Thucydides' historiographical slight. In relation to Sicily, he presents Athens as a new Carthage rather than as a new Persia—and as a one-off threat rather than a continuous enemy. And yet Diodorus' commentary on Thucydides is not purely negative. He also seems to follow the strong Homeric hints of Thucydides' Sicilian narrative by noting at the start of Book 13 that his previous six Books have covered the period of 768 years between the Trojan War and Athens' invasion of Sicily (13.1.2).⁸³ This articulation of time may encourage

⁸² Hermocrates also goes on to propose that the Syracusans send ambassadors to the Carthaginians, who are 'in constant fear that the Athenians may attack their own city' (6.34.2). For the Carthaginian aspect, note also Alcibiades' claim at Sparta that the Athenians want to conquer Italy and Carthage (6.90.2)—a claim that is meant to frighten the Spartans, but at 6.15.2 Thucydides has suggested that Alcibiades' own thoughts were not too different.

⁸³ The only other initial overview with a precise number of Books occurs at 19.1.10, with an indication of the years between the fall of Troy and the start of Agathocles' tyranny; Rubincam (1998) 232 offers a good explanation for this pattern (initial hexadic structuring) that throws further stress on the events chosen for these books. Troy is also used as a chronological marker at the start of Books without a precise number of Books at 14.2.4 (down to the fall of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War), 20.2.3 (down to the year before Agathocles' crossing to Africa); cf. Clarke (2008) 123–5, noting how such markers give 'Diodo-

comparison between the Athenian disaster and the sack of Troy—while also serving as a reminder that it will be Carthage that will eventually go the way of Troy.⁸⁴

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This paper started from the synchronic link drawn by Diodorus between the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC and the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, and with a warning against the modern tendency to conceive such links in terms of ‘east’ and ‘west’. It went on to suggest that a number of other parallels can be found in Diodorus’ narrative between events and characters in mainland Greece and in Sicily (expeditions by Agesilaus and Dionysius; the figures of Agathocles, Philip, and Dion) and between successive invasions of Sicily by foreign powers (Athens and Carthage); and that these parallels are established both intratextually, through verbal and narrative patterning, and intertextually, through allusions to Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative. For ‘Diodorus’ we can of course choose to substitute other names—Timaeus, Ephorus, Philistus—provided we acknowledge Diodorus’ role in preserving in his own reworking of his sources their patterning of history. In other words, we must allow that Diodorus in constructing his universal history put some thought into patterns across time and space. His geographical and temporal patterning is a topic that deserves exploration in its own right and not just for any clues it may offer to the now lost works of his sources.

To allow Diodorus this much freedom is not to elevate his work into the highest rank of ancient historical writing.

rus’ native land a pivotal role in the periodisation of Mediterranean history’ (125).

⁸⁴ Cf. Diod. 32.24 for Scipio’s citation of famous Homeric lines on the destruction of Troy (*Il.* 6.448–9) on the occasion of the sack of Carthage (with a reminder of the mortality of Rome); also Rood (1998) 253–4 on the echo of Th. 7.87.5 in Appian’s version of the scene (*Pun.* 132).

The use of Thucydides I have posited largely involves sections that were often imitated by other authors and may also have played a role in discussions of Thucydides as a stylistic model.⁸⁵ The broader type of historical patterning I have suggested is also widespread: it is reflected, for instance, in the way Thucydides links Athens' invasion of Sicily with Xerxes' invasion and in the way that the Persian Wars were themselves often interpreted in the light of the Trojan War;⁸⁶ it can also be seen in the tendency for stock anecdotes to be transferred from one war to another.⁸⁷ Such historical patterning can also be found in non-historiographical works, notably in the Greek novel (for instance, in Chariton's modelling his 'depiction of a Syracusan expedition to Ionia on Thucydides' account of the Athenian expedition to Syracuse'⁸⁸) and in works such as the pseudo-Plutarchan *Parallela Minora*.⁸⁹ Whatever its uses in other genres, within historiography it creates the possibility of a deep intellectual engagement with past historians—a possibility that was powerfully exploited by Thucydides in his use of Herodotus and by Polybius in his use of Thucydides. But while I have suggested that Diodorus does offer a distinctively Sicilian reading of Thucydides,

⁸⁵ Cf. D. Hal. *Thuc.* 26–7 on the Syracuse battle narrative. For imitations of that battle cf., e.g., Sall. *Jug.* 60; a later section of the retreat (7.83–4) is imitated at, e.g., J. *AJ* 4.92, Stat. *Theb.* 4.826–8 (cf. also Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 38; Long. *Subl.* 38.3).

⁸⁶ Cf. e.g. the suggestive patterning of the Trojan and Persian Wars in lyric and the visual arts; or even neo-analytical approaches to narrative patterning in Homer.

⁸⁷ E.g., the story of Scipio's releasing spies before the decisive battle of the Second Punic War (Pol. 15.5.4–7, Liv. 30.29.2–3; App. *Pun.* 39), seemingly modelled on an episode from the Persian Wars (Hdt. 7.146–7); or solar eclipses at the start of expeditions at Hdt. 7.37.2 (Xerxes' expedition) and Justin 22.6.1 (Agathocles' Carthaginian expedition).

⁸⁸ Smith (2007) 180; cf. 84 on 'the east-west dynamic that pervades Chariton's novel'. The language of east-west is supported at least by the narratorial summary at 8.1.3.

⁸⁹ E.g., 305C, 306D–E for parallel episodes in the Persian and Punic Wars, and 309B, 311D–E for parallel episodes in the Trojan and Punic Wars.

his work as a whole is purposefully built on an aesthetic of repetition that seems to privilege moral generality over historical particularity.⁹⁰

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