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**European Business Cycles and Economic Growth,  
1300-2000**

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## EUROPEAN BUSINESS CYCLES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1300-2000

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*Abstract:* The modern business cycle features long expansions combined with short recessions, and is thus related to the emergence of sustained economic growth. It also features significant international co-movement, and is therefore associated with growing market integration and globalisation. When did these patterns first appear? This paper explores the changing nature of the business cycle using historical national accounts for nine European economies between 1300 and 2000. For the sample as a whole, the modern business cycle emerged at the end of the eighteenth century.

*JEL classification:* N10, E32, O47

*Key words:* Business cycle; economic growth; Europe

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Until recently, systematic data-based analysis of business cycles could be conducted only on very modern data, and even for much of the nineteenth century, this was only possible using disaggregated data offering partial coverage of the economy. In the last two decades or so, however, there has been dramatic progress in the quantification of economic activity between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading to estimates of aggregate GDP as well as output series for individual sectors. This has now led to a rich literature on economic growth, shedding light on the European Little Divergence, or reversal of fortunes between Mediterranean Europe and the North Sea area, as well as the Great Divergence between Europe and Asia (see Broadberry, 2021). For a growing sample of European economies, these data are available at annual frequency, so that the time is now ripe to conduct business cycle analysis to complement the study of economic growth and also to explore the interrelationships between short run fluctuations and long run trends.

This paper begins by analysing the changing nature of the business cycle of the nine European economies for which we have data, reaching back as far as the late thirteenth century. We show that for the sample as a whole: (1) Contractions were as frequent as expansions before the nineteenth century, but by the second half of the twentieth century expansions occurred almost 90 per cent of the time. (2) The duration of expansions increased while the duration of contractions decreased from the nineteenth century. (3) The rate of growing during expansions showed no trend increase, while the rate of shrinking during contractions trended down over time. (4) As a consequence of the changes in duration and rate, the amplitude of expansions decreased during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries before increasing substantially during the twentieth century, while the amplitude of contractions followed a similar pattern until the second half of the twentieth century when it decreased strongly rather than increasing sharply.

We also provide the same information for each of the nine economies in Appendix 1 to demonstrate that these trends were widely experienced across Europe.

The second step is to investigate the extent to which economic activity was synchronised across countries and how the degree of international co-movement changed over time. This is done by measuring the correlation of real GDP per capita growth between countries for the period 1300-2000, broken down in to 6 sub-periods: 1300-1500, 1500-1700, 1700-1800, 1800-1870, 1870-1950, 1950-2000. The number of statistically significant positive correlations between country pairs increased from 9.5 per cent of all possible pairwise correlations in the period 1300-1500 to 66.7 per cent during the period 1950-2000. The main conclusion that we draw from the time path of the changing business cycle facts and the changing degree of international co-movement is that the modern business cycle first emerged in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century.

We then examine some of the most significant contractions and expansions, exploring their implications for long run trends in economic activity. We show that: (1) although the Black Death had a hugely negative effect on GDP, its impact on per capita GDP was generally positive. However, the gains were sustained only in Britain and the Netherlands, leading to a reversal of fortunes between Mediterranean and northwest Europe. (2) This reversal of fortunes was accompanied by the Reformation, which led to a series of religious wars during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although these wars are associated with a number of major contractions, they did not yet lead to a significant increase in the degree of international synchronisation. (3) The analysis of the Industrial Revolution era using annual data for many European economies demonstrates clearly that British forging ahead and the spread of this Great Enrichment to the rest of Europe owed more to a reduction in the contribution of

contractions than to an increase in the contribution of expansions to long run growth. (4) Although many of the largest contractions of the last seven centuries occurred during or immediately after the Two World Wars, there was also a strong negative relationship between the depth of wartime contractions and the strength of postwar expansions, particularly across World War II.

Finally, we examine the business cycle for an aggregate European GDP per capita series estimated as a chained index from the individual country series, using population weights. In contrast to the unweighted average of the ratios (frequency, duration, etc.) for each country, this involves calculating the ratios for the weighted average of GDP per capita across all countries. This confirms all the main results derived from the unweighted average of the ratios. We discuss the interaction between the short run business cycle (as measured by annual growth rates) and the level of GDP per capita.

Appendix 1 provides data on business cycles in individual countries, including graphs of the annual growth rates and tables of the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of expansions and contractions. Appendix 2 sets out the matrices of international co-movement for the six periods. Appendix 3 checks the robustness of our results in two ways by analysing cycles in GDP rather than GDP per capita for the five countries for which we currently have both measures, and also examining the robustness of our main findings to measurement error.

## **2. DATA**

Quantification of economic activity at the macro level before the mid-nineteenth century received a major boost with the publication of Maddison's (2001), *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*, which set out levels and growth rates of GDP, population and GDP per

capita for the world covering the whole of the second millennium. However, Maddison's estimates contained a large amount of "guesstimation" or "controlled conjectures", with a number of observations set at or close to \$400 in 1990 international prices. This is equivalent to most people living at "bare bones subsistence", or the World Bank poverty level of \$1 per day, with a small rich elite on top. Furthermore, Maddison provided his conjectural estimates only for a small number of years, which precludes business cycle analysis.

However, stimulated by Maddison's work, economic historians have begun to produce estimates of per capita income in a national accounting framework, based on contemporary data and available at annual frequency. This is possible because medieval and early modern Europe was much more literate and numerate than is often thought, and left behind a wealth of data in documents such as government accounts, customs accounts, poll tax returns, parish registers, city records, trading company records, hospital and educational establishment records, manorial accounts, probate inventories, farm accounts, tithe files and other records of religious institutions. With a national accounting framework and careful cross-checking, it is possible to reconstruct historical national accounts back to the medieval period.

For some European countries, abundant quantitative information has survived, so that historical national accounts can be constructed directly on a sectoral basis in great detail. Britain has the richest data, with historical national accountants able to build on decades of detailed data processing by generations of scholars as well as well-stocked archives (Broadberry et al., 2015). The Dutch and Swedish data are also of sufficient quality to reconstruct GDP from the output side using the direct method, although in both cases the data sources are thinner for the pre-1500 period (van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012; Krantz, 2017). For other countries, where information on sectoral output is more limited or where there

has been less processing of the existing data, but data on wages and prices are widely available, Malanima (2011), Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013) and others have developed an indirect or short-cut method for reconstructing GDP, building on pioneering work by Crafts (1985) and Wrigley (1985). In the indirect method, the economy is first divided between agriculture and non-agriculture. In the agricultural sector, output is estimated via a demand function, making use of data on population, real wages and the relative price of food, together with elasticities derived from later periods and the more recent experience of other less developed economies. An allowance can also be made for international trade in food. For the non-agricultural sector, output is assumed to have moved in line with the urban population, but an allowance can be made for higher productivity in the non-agricultural sector.

The major input into our analysis of the business cycle is GDP per capita (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Berge and Jordà, 2013; Jordà et al., 2013, 2017). We do not use GDP because: (1) Estimates of GDP per capita are available for the nine economies throughout the medieval period, whereas estimates of GDP are only available for five economies over the same interval. (2) Very long run estimates of population are interpolated, which introduces spurious smoothness to estimates of GDP that could be problematic for the analysis of business cycles. In any case, in Appendix 3 we show that the business cycle facts are similar using GDP per capita and GDP.

Table 1 sets out the start dates for each series and the years for which there are gaps, while the data sources are listed together with the notes under the table. The data reach back to the late thirteenth century in the cases of Britain, France and Spain, the first half of the fourteenth century in Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands, the fifteenth century in Poland and the first half of the sixteenth century in Germany and Portugal. The British, Dutch and Swedish

series have been derived using the direct method, while the other series have been reconstructed using the indirect method.

Figure A1.1 plots the annual logarithmic growth rate of GDP per capita for each country. This is a stationary series in all cases, although the amplitude varies considerably across countries. Before conducting the analysis in section 4, we note some features of the growth fluctuations in each country. For the case of Great Britain in Figure A1.1A, it should be noted that we are using the harmonised data from Broadberry et al. (2022), which reduced the variation in the amplitude of the GDP series between the medieval, early modern and modern periods. The main reason for this is that the agricultural output series in Broadberry et al. (2015) relied on different sources for the medieval, early modern and modern periods, which led to an exaggerated amplitude of real output during the early modern period. This was a result of the reliance on the early modern probate inventories database assembled by Mark Overton (Overton and Campbell, 1999; Overton et al., 2004) in which there are no continuous runs of data for individual farms, each of which is documented just once, following the occupying farmer's death. For the medieval and modern period, by contrast, the data are extracted from accounts with continuous runs of annual data. The volatility of the annual cyclical component of GDP has been harmonised across the sub-periods 1271-1450, 1451-1550, 1551-1720 and 1721-1870 utilising corresponding data on the volatility of prices. Real agricultural prices (the agricultural price index divided by the GDP deflator), of course, have the merit of being available on a more consistent and representative basis over these 600 years than the information available on agricultural output. Their changing cyclical behaviour is therefore taken as a proxy for genuine changes in the amplitude of the cyclical component of GDP between these four main periods.



It should be noted that the harmonisation of the British GDP series has been done in such a way as to preserve the original dating of the peaks and troughs of the business cycle. This is important because there are good reasons for thinking that the timing of the peaks and troughs in agriculture are accurate, since they have been checked against the historical record. In particular, Stratton (1978) provides a year-by year account based on archival documentation, classifying harvests in a way that takes account of regional variation and also noting serious outbreaks of diseases affecting livestock, such as sheep scab and rinderpest. Further, since the harmonisation has been conducted on the cyclical component of output after de-trending using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, the trend growth rate remains unaltered. The original “unharmonised” series from Broadberry et al. (2015) for agricultural output and its component parts can therefore continue to be used as a reliable guide to growth trends and the timing of peaks and troughs, although caution should be exercised when assessing the amplitude of short run fluctuations which are prone to exaggeration, especially during the period c.1550 to c.1720.

Turning to the case of France in Figure A1.1B, GDP per capita growth rates remained between  $\pm 10$  per cent bands for much of the time, but with a significant number of both large negative and positive shocks. The Spanish data in Figure A1.1C are the revised estimates by Prados de la Escosura (2017) and Prados de la Escosura et al. (2022). The Swedish data in Figure A1.1D are based on fewer sources for the pre-1500 period, especially for the period before circa 1400 (Krantz, 2017). For Italy, in Figure A1.1E, there is huge volatility around World War 2, with a sharp decline in output at the end of the war, followed by rapid growth from the 1950s to the 1970s. The data for the Netherlands in Figure A1.1F are rather less abundant for the period before 1500, and display low volatility compared with the Dutch Golden Age between circa 1500 and 1640, when the high degree of volatility reflects a very

high degree of openness to international trade (van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012). The Dutch economy also displays a similar pattern to Italy across World War 2.

The Polish data in Figure A1.1G are much less volatile than in all other countries, which suggests that Malinowski and van Zanden (2017) were more successful in capturing the trend in real GDP per capita than the cycle. We nevertheless keep it in the sample, since it is the only country representing eastern Europe. The German growth data in Figure A1.1H also stand out as having relatively low volatility before the twentieth century. In addition to high volatility around World War 2, the German data are also highly volatile around World War 1. The Portuguese cycle in Figure A1.1I shows declining amplitude until the end of the nineteenth century then a return to high amplitude during the twentieth century.

### 3. IDENTIFYING BUSINESS CYCLES

A business cycle is composed of two phases, an expansion followed by a contraction. An expansion is an increase in economic activity from the period following the trough to the peak, while a contraction is a decrease in economic activity from the period following the peak to the trough. To identify business cycles, we apply an algorithm that identifies expansions,  $E_t$ , and contractions,  $C_t$ , in the natural logarithm of a time series,  $y_t$ , as:

1.  $E_t = 1$  if  $\Delta y_t > 0$
2.  $E_t = 1$  if  $\Delta y_t = 0$  and  $E_{t-1} = 1$
3.  $E_t = 0$  otherwise
4.  $C_t = 1 - E_t$

where  $\Delta$  is the difference operator. Steps 1 and 2 define an expansion as a year of positive economic growth or a year of zero economic growth if it was preceded by an expansion, which ensures that the latest observation “in a horizontal zone is chosen as the turning date” (Burns

and Mitchell, 1946: 58). Steps 3 and 4 define a contraction as a year of negative economic growth or a year of zero economic growth if it was preceded by a contraction. Peaks,  $P_t$ , and troughs,  $T_t$ , are defined as:

$$P_t = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } E_t = 1 \text{ and } E_{t+1} = 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

$$T_t = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } C_t = 1 \text{ and } C_{t+1} = 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

The algorithm ensures that peaks and troughs alternate, that the minimum phase is at least one year and that the minimum cycle is at least two years, which are standard criteria of business cycle dating algorithms (Harding and Pagan, 2002).

The objects of interest are frequency, duration, rate and amplitude. At the country level, frequency is defined as the fraction of time spent in a phase, duration is the average length of a phase, rate is the average log growth rate in a phase and amplitude is the product of average duration and average rate of a phase. At the aggregate level, frequency, duration and rate are unweighted averages of the country-level numbers. Amplitude is aggregate average duration multiplied by aggregate average rate. The averages are calculated as arithmetic means.

We study the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita to calculate rate and amplitude because of the symmetry of expansions and contractions. For example, a fall in the level of a time series from 100 to 90 is a change of -10 per cent; a rise from 90 to 100 is a change of 11.1 per cent. The same pattern in the log of a time series is -0.105 log points and 0.105 log points respectively. However, using the natural logarithm, as opposed to the level, does not affect the dating of expansions, contractions, peaks or troughs.

Beyond the fact that it is not feasible to use expert judgement to identify business cycles in nine economies since the Middle Ages, the issue of rules versus discretion is minimal with annual data. By any definition, a year of rising economic activity is an expansion; a year of falling economic activity is a contraction. As a result, our algorithm perfectly reconstructs the business cycle chronology for the United Kingdom between 1700 and 2010 that was based on the judgement of the UK Business Cycle Dating Committee (Broadberry et al., 2023).

An old issue in business cycle dating is whether to detrend the data or not (Romer, 1994). The emerging consensus is to study the data in levels (Harding and Pagan, 2002; Broadberry et al., 2023). The main reason is that there are many methods for detrending, each with different possible specifications, which will affect the dating of turning points and the business cycle facts (Canova, 1994, 1998; Dimsdale and Thomas, 2019; Broadberry et al., 2023). In any case, the two approaches measure different objects: when the data are detrended, the focus is on growth cycles; when the data are in levels, the focus is on classical cycles. In this setting, the classical cycle is the object of interest, as it best reflects the changing nature of the business cycle over time. Filtering, by its nature, compresses some of this heterogeneity. For example, filters only retain fluctuations if the duration and amplitude are within a predetermined range and economies mechanically spend approximately 50 per cent above trend and 50 per cent below.

## **4. ANALYSIS**

### **4.1 The Business Cycle Facts**

We begin the analysis by setting out in Table 2 the basic business cycle facts for the whole sample of nine European countries. The numbers are shown for both expansions (trough to

peak) and contractions (peak to trough). The first result is that contractions were about as frequent as expansions before the nineteenth century, but by the second half of the twentieth century expansions occurred almost 90 per cent of the time. A second finding is that the duration of expansions increased from the nineteenth century while the duration of contractions decreased over the same period. A third result is that the rate of growing during expansions followed a U-shaped pattern over time but ended up lower in the second half of the twentieth century than before 1700, while the rate of shrinking during contractions trended down apart from a blip between 1870 and 1950. These three results reflect the importance of reducing the frequency and rate of negative growth in economies achieving the transition to long run sustained economic growth (Broadberry and Wallis, 2017). Many people seem surprised that the rate of growing during expansions did not increase more strongly during the transition to sustained economic growth, but this is consistent with the findings of Easterly et al. (1993) that, in today's world, poor economies grow faster than rich economies when they are growing, and are poor because they grow less frequently and experience rapid rates of negative growth during contractions.

Our fourth finding is that the amplitude of expansions also followed a U-shaped pattern but ended up much higher during the second half of the twentieth century than before 1700, while the amplitude of contractions trended down apart from a blip between 1870 and 1950. The increasing amplitude of expansions after 1800 follows directly from the growing duration combined with a relatively stable rate of expansion, while the declining trend in the amplitude of contractions over the same period is due to the falling trends in both the duration and rate of contractions.

The changing nature of the business cycle in Europe thus appears to be related to the emergence of sustained long run economic growth. The pre-modern business cycle is characterised by broadly similar frequencies of expansions and contractions, short expansions and contractions of similar length, and also similar rates and amplitudes of contractions and expansions. At around the end of the eighteenth century, however, we see the beginnings of a systematic change in the nature of the European business cycle with a higher frequency of expansions than contractions, longer expansions and shorter contractions with similar rates of contractions and expansions, and higher amplitudes of expansions combined with lower amplitudes of contractions. These changes were associated with a general quickening of the pace of long run economic growth and continuously rising living standards (Broadberry and Wallis, 2017).

Data for each of the nine European economies are provided in Appendix Table 1 to demonstrate that the patterns that we have identified were experienced across a broad range of countries rather than being created as a statistical artefact from very diverse trends in different parts of Europe. Only Poland deviated significantly from the four patterns outlined above, reflecting the dramatic geopolitical and economic upheavals in eastern Europe during the twentieth century. All nine countries exhibit the first trend of a roughly 50:50 frequency of expansions and contractions before the nineteenth century with the frequency of expansions rising to around 90 per cent by the second half of the twentieth century. However, Poland missed out on both the sharp rise in the duration and amplitude of expansions and the sharp fall in the duration, rate and amplitude of contractions in the post-1950 period as the socialist system followed a different path from the rest of the continent before collapsing in 1989.

## 4.2 International Co-movement

So far, we have focused our attention on the changing properties of the European business cycle for the sample of nine economies as a whole. However, it is also interesting to examine how economic activity was synchronised across those economies and how the degree of international co-movement changed over time. To do this, we examine the correlation of the logarithmic growth rate of GDP per capita between countries for the period 1300-2000, broken down into 6 sub-periods. The results are summarised in Table 3, and the matrices of correlation coefficients are shown for each sub-period in Appendix 2.

Since we are interested in the evolution of a common European business cycle, we focus our attention only on statistically significant (at the 10 per cent level) positive pairwise correlations. During the period 1300-1500, we have data for seven countries so that the number of possible pairwise correlations is limited to 21  $[(N^2 - N)/2]$ , where  $N$  is the number of countries]. In this period there were only two significant positive correlations, between Britain and the Netherlands and between France and Italy (see Table A2.1), or 9.5 per cent of all possible pairwise correlations, so there is little evidence of a common European business cycle before 1500.

For the later sub-periods, we are able to include all nine countries so that the number of possible pairwise correlations increases to 36. For the period 1500-1700 the number of significant pairwise positive correlations increases to 5, or 13.9 per cent of possible pairwise correlations. After this, the percentage as well as the number of significant positive correlations

continues to increase monotonically, rising above 20 per cent of possible pairwise correlations by 1870-1950 and jumping sharply to two-thirds by 1950-2000.<sup>1</sup>

Our results for the period since 1870 are broadly consistent with the findings of Bergman et al. (1998), who included 10 European countries together with the United States, Canada and Japan, to identify an international business cycle. They break the period 1870-1950 into two parts covering the prewar and interwar periods, and also break the period 1950-2000 into two parts covering the Breton Woods and post-Bretton Woods periods. Between 1870 and 1950, they find relatively few significant positive pairwise correlations between these 13 economies, amounting to just 15.4 per cent of possible cases during the period 1873-1913 but rising to 35.9 per cent during the period 1920-1938. Between 1950 and 2000 they find significant positive pairwise correlations in 34.6 per cent of cases during the period 1948-1972, rising to 59.0 per cent of cases between 1973 and 1995.

There exists no hard and fast rule for identifying a critical juncture in the degree of international co-movement. The number of significant positive correlations of GDP per capita growth across countries as a percentage of all possible pairwise correlations in Table 3 was increasing from 1500 onwards, in line with Europe's global maritime expansion (de Zwart and van Zanden, 2018). However, the percentage remained below 20 per cent until the end of the eighteenth century, which would fit well as a critical juncture with the break in the frequency and duration of expansions and contractions in Table 2.

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<sup>1</sup> The significance of a correlation coefficient is a positive function of the number of observations, which varies from period to period. For example, the period 1300-1500 has 201 observations; the period 1950-2000 has 51 observations. Therefore, a given correlation coefficient could be significant in the first period and insignificant in the last. To assess the importance of this issue for our results, we recalculate the significance assuming 201 observations in each period, which shows a similar pattern of a rising number of positive and significant correlations from 1500-1700 and a rising fraction of positive and significant correlations from 1700-1800.



## **5. MAJOR EUROPEAN CONTRACTIONS AND EXPANSIONS**

We have shown how the nature of the business cycle changed in Europe together with the emergence of sustained long run economic growth, and in this section we highlight a number of key episodes along the way, where major contractions or expansions also had significant implications for long run growth.

### **5.1 The Black Death**

The most important business cycle event during the period 1300-1500 was surely caused by the arrival of the Black Death in the mid-fourteenth century, which had a devastating effect on the population of Europe. In Britain, for example, the Black Death dealt devastating blows to the supply of labour and the demand for goods and services. Population declined by one third within three years of its arrival in 1348, and by more than 60 per cent by the mid-fifteenth century, and recovery to the pre-Black Death level would not be reached until the seventeenth century. As a result, GDP fell to little more than half of its pre-Black Death level by the mid-fifteenth century and recovery to the 1348 level would not be reached until the 1560s. No subsequent contraction would ever be as deep and prolonged. However, the upshot for GDP per capita was dramatically different, as the reduced number of survivors found that neither land nor capital had declined, thus increasing per capita supply of these crucial factors of production. Given these dramatic changes in factor proportions, landless labourers found they could command higher real wages in a labour market characterised by excess demand, so that the per capita income gains were spread widely across the economy. Hence GDP per capita increased by around one-third in the first three years, rising to more than 40 per cent by the beginning of the fifteenth century as the plague kept returning, further reducing the population (Broadberry et al., 2015; 2022). These very divergent long run trends of GDP and GDP per

capita, combined with the similar short run peaks and troughs, can be seen in Figure 1A, which plots the British series together with the population data.<sup>2</sup>

However, the Black Death affected other economies in a range of ways, which contributed to a reversal of fortunes between the northwestern and Mediterranean parts of Europe, in what has come to be known as the European Little Divergence. In Figure 1B, we see that there was a similar sustained increase in GDP per capita in the Netherlands, although the decline in population was substantially less than in Britain, reaching a maximum decline of around a quarter by the 1360s. As a result, the increase in GDP per capita more than offset the decline in population so that GDP quickly rose above its 1348 level by the mid-1350s and population was already above its pre-Black Death level by the 1430s (van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2012).

Turning to Mediterranean Europe, Figure 1C charts the situation in Spain, where the scale of the negative shock to population was similar to that experienced in the Netherlands rather than in Britain. However, in contrast to the rest of western Europe, Spain did not experience an increase in per capita income, which has been attributed by Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2013) to the high land-to-labour ratio in a frontier economy during the Reconquest period. Instead of reducing pressure on scarce land resources, Spanish population decline destroyed commercial networks and further isolated an already scarce population, reducing specialisation and the division of labour. Thus Spain did not share in the general west European increase in per capita incomes after the Black Death.

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<sup>2</sup> The lower volatility of the population data reflects reality rather than a statistical artefact. Although there is some interpolation in the English population series from Broadberry et al. (2015), it should be noted that after 1541, when continuous annual data from Wrigley and Schofield (1989) become available, the increase in volatility is relatively small.

Finally, Figure 1D illustrates the intermediate case of Italy, where there was some initial increase in GDP per capita in the 1350s and 1360s after the arrival of the Black Death, but this was not sustained during the 1370s to the 1390s. Although there were further periods of expansion during the fifteenth century, they were also not sustained so that by 1500 Italy was back at its pre-Black Death level of GDP per capita (Malanima, 2011).

To understand the role of business cycles in the differential long run performance of these two northwest European and two Mediterranean economies, we analyse the contributions of expansions and contractions using the formula set out by Broadberry and Wallis (2017). Long run economic performance, measured by the rate of growth of per capita GDP over periods of fifty years or so is the aggregation of short run changes measured at the annual level. Long run economic growth,  $g$ , is a combination of 4 factors: (1) the frequency with which an economy is in an expansion phase,  $f(+)$ , (2) the rate at which it grows during an expansion,  $g(+)$ , (3) the frequency with which an economy is in a contraction phase,  $f(-)$  and (4) the rate at which it shrinks during a contraction  $g(-)$ . Thus:

$$g = \{f(+)g(+)\} + \{f(-)g(-)\} \quad (3)$$

We use this identity in Table 4 to decompose GDP per capita growth during the crucial period 1349-1400 following the Black Death.

The key thing that we seek to understand is the much higher growth of GDP per capita during the 1349-1400 period in Britain and the Netherlands, compared with Spain and Italy, shown in the last line of Table 4. The first thing to note is that Britain does not stand out as exceptional on the expansion side. Its frequency of expansion was lower than in all the other three economies and its rate of expansion was not exceptionally high. Rather, the secret of Britain's success in having the highest GDP per capita growth rate lay on the contraction side.

Despite having a high frequency of contraction, Britain had one of the lowest rates of contraction, and thus a low contribution of contractions. Second, the frequency of expansion in the Netherlands was only slightly higher than in Spain and Italy. Third, the differences in the contributions of expansions and contractions were determined largely by the rates of expansion and contraction. The highest rate of expansions was in Italy, which had the highest contribution of expansions, but this was offset by Italy also having the highest rate of contraction and thus the highest contribution of contractions, so that its overall rate of GDP per capita growth was relatively modest. Although Spain had the lowest contribution of contractions, it still ended up with negative overall GDP per capita growth because its contribution of expansions was even lower.

## **5.2 The Economic Consequences of the Reformation**

It is possible to see the Reformation as playing a later part in the reversal of fortunes between northwest Europe and Mediterranean Europe highlighted in the previous section, and this is apparent in Figure 2 in the downward trend of GDP per capita in catholic Spain relative to the increasingly protestant Netherlands and Germany. This can be explained via Weber's (1930) thesis that the protestant work ethic should be seen as the spirit of capitalism, or the more recent interpretation that Martin Luther's emphasis on reading the Bible encouraged universal schooling and hence boosted human capital accumulation (Becker and Woessmann, 2009). Along the way one economic consequence of the Reformation was a number of serious European wars, including the Eighty Years' War in the Spanish Netherlands and the Thirty Years' War in the Holy Roman Empire.

The start of the Eighty Years War, or Dutch Revolt, coincided with the second deepest contraction in Dutch history during 1568-70. Although there were further serious contractions

in 1578-79 and 1600-02, these were not obviously worse than other contractions during the Twelve Years' Truce between 1609 and 1621, or indeed the final phase of the war 1621-48, which formed a side theatre of the Thirty Years' War.

Until 1635 the Thirty Years War remained a largely internal German affair, but with some external interventions by other European powers, including Sweden and Denmark in addition to Spain and the Netherlands. During the second phase between 1635 and 1648, the conflict spread further afield as France became more heavily involved. Nevertheless, the degree of international synchronisation does not seem to have changed between the pre- and post-1618 periods, with the proportion of statistically significant positive correlations between GDP per capita of seven countries involved in the conflict remaining at 38 per cent during both 1560-1618 and 1618-1660.<sup>3</sup>

### **5.3 The Industrial Revolution**

The final and decisive phase of the Little Divergence was the Industrial Revolution. The precise dating of this important episode varies among economic historians but is generally agreed to have begun in Britain during the eighteenth century and spread to much of western Europe by the late nineteenth century. Here we examine the links between the short run business cycle fluctuations and the long run growth of per capita GDP. Figure 3 charts the growth of GDP per capita in the four European economies that we also examined in the period following the Black Death. Setting GDP per capita in all four economies equal to 100 in 1750, we see that Britain had already grown faster by the end of the eighteenth century and pulled further ahead during the nineteenth century. Examining the period 1751-1800 in more detail in Table 5, we see in the final row that GDP per capita growth was slightly faster in Britain than in the Netherlands,

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<sup>3</sup> The seven countries are Germany, Spain, Netherlands, France, Sweden, Italy and Portugal.

and substantially faster than in Spain and Italy. Note further that this was due mainly to the fact that Britain had a low rate and contribution of contractions and despite also having a low rate and contribution of expansions. Again we see that the crucial evolution of the business cycle for long run economic performance lay in the dampening of contractions rather than in the acceleration of expansions.

#### **5.4 The Two World Wars**

The four deepest contractions of GDP per capita amongst the sample of nine European countries between 1270 and 2000 occurred during and after World War 2. Although slightly less severe, the contractions during and after World War 1 were also very serious, as can be seen in Figure 4A. The deepest contraction in World War 1, as measured by the amplitude of a continuous decline, was in France between 1916 and 1918, as the demands of total war deepened in the main land theatre (Hautcoeur, 2005: 170-173). However, the negative impact of the war was surely more severe in Germany, where three substantial contractions occurred between 1913 and 1923. The largest amplitude was during the contraction of 1913-1915 as mobilisation deprived agriculture of male labourers and horses, and also industry of key workers, while blockade reduced the supply of other key inputs. Further severe shocks followed in 1918-1919 at the end of the war and again during the hyper-inflation of 1923 (Ritschl, 2005: 43-51). Britain experienced an expansion of GDP per capita at the beginning of the war, but a very severe contraction during the postwar reconversion to peace as government expenditure was sharply reduced (Broadberry and Howlett, 2005: 207-210). Although the Netherlands was a neutral country, it was caught geographically between the two main belligerent powers. From the outset of the war, the Netherlands suffered from measures taken by Britain and Germany to prevent trading with the enemy, and Dutch trade was hit hard during the last two years of

the war by the intensification of the German U-boat campaign and the Allied blockade (de Jong, 2005: 138).

The deepest contraction in World War 2 occurred in Germany at the end of the war, as the country collapsed and was occupied by Allied troops. In Figure 4B, we see that in marked contrast to the experience of the 1914-1918 conflict, Germany entered a phase of expansion at the beginning of World War 2, reaching peak mobilisation in 1944 (Abelshauser, 1998: 123-124). Recovery began in 1947 and the expansion continued uninterrupted until 1975. Britain also experienced an expansion at the start of the war as mobilisation drew in previously unemployed resources, and the contraction that began after peak mobilisation in 1943 lasted until 1947, but had a much smaller amplitude than in Germany (Broadberry and Howlett, 1998: 43-47). France and the Netherlands suffered deep contractions lasting from 1939 to 1944. Both countries were occupied by Germany from the middle of 1940 and subjected to a strategy of exploitation. Milward (1977: 135-136) characterises Germany's strategy of exploitation of occupied territory as shifting from a short-term opportunistic approach to a long-term continuing-contribution approach from 1942 onwards, as the prospect of a short war receded. As the degree of exploitation increased, resistance grew and the economy contracted further, reaching a 1944 trough in both France and the Netherlands. Liberation led to a dramatic recovery, with the expansion lasting uninterrupted until 1975 in France and 1961 in the Netherlands.

The rapid postwar growth after both world wars has stimulated economic historians to examine the relationship between the depth of the wartime contraction and the strength of the postwar expansion. This negative relationship seems clearest in the case of World War 2, and has been seen in the recent literature on growth as a special case of catching-up growth, the

most popular explanation for Europe's Golden Age of growth between 1945 and 1973 (Abramovitz, 1986; Dumke, 1990). For World War 1, Eichengreen (1994: 297-298) also claims a negative relationship between the depth of the wartime contraction and the scale of the growth rate during the 1920s. However, the relationship was not as strong as after World War 2, and indeed of the four economies shown in Figure 4A, Britain and Germany grew relatively slowly despite experiencing two of the largest negative wartime shocks amongst west European economies. On the other hand, if the period is extended into the 1930s, these four economies do appear to converge, consistent with the catching-up hypothesis.

## **6. TOWARDS A EUROPEAN BUSINESS CYCLE**

Our European business cycle facts in Table 2 were based on an unweighted average of the ratios for each country, with the turning points varying in different countries. This is reminiscent of the approach of Burns and Mitchell (1946), who constructed their reference cycle for a single economy from a wide range of time series with different peaks and troughs, at a time when GDP estimates were not widely available. Since GDP estimates became widely available, it has been standard practice to derive business cycle peaks and troughs from aggregate GDP, which can be thought of as a weighted average of the individual series underpinning the aggregate measure. Here, we therefore examine the business cycle for an aggregate GDP per capita series for our sample of economies, as they became increasingly synchronised. Despite the incompleteness of our European historical national accounting database, it does cover a large share of the population and GDP of western Europe. For 1870, for example, although we cover only 55 per cent of the total European population of 310 million, this includes 89 per cent of the west European population of 180 million (Malanima, 2009: 9).



Table 6 sets out the basic business cycle facts for the aggregate European business cycle derived from a weighted average series across our nine European economies. The weights used here are population estimates from Malanima (2009: 9) for the period 1300-1870 and the Maddison Project Database, version 2020, for the period since 1870. The aggregate European GDP per capita series is constructed as a Paasche quantity index, chained using weights for 1400, 1500, 1600, 1700, 1800, 1870, 1913, 1950 and 2000.

The main results from Table 2 are all confirmed in Table 6 and in some cases come out more clearly. First, contractions were about as frequent as expansions before the nineteenth century but by the second half of the twentieth century expansions occurred more rather than slightly less than 90 per cent of the time. Second, the duration of contractions decreased from the nineteenth century while the duration of expansions began to increase slightly earlier from the eighteenth century. Third, the rate of growing during expansions followed a U-shaped pattern over time but ended up lower in the second half of the twentieth century than before 1700, while the rate of shrinking during contractions trended down apart from a blip between 1870 and 1950. Fourth, the amplitude of expansions also followed a U-shaped pattern but ended up much higher during the second half of the twentieth century than before 1500, while the amplitude of contractions trended down apart from a blip between 1870 and 1950.

Figure 5 plots out the aggregate GDP per capita series for Europe using the chained index for the period 1300-2000, showing both the short run business cycle fluctuations using annual growth rates in part A, and the effect of the transition to modern economic growth on the level of GDP per capita in part B. In part A, the short duration and relatively high rates of expansion and contraction between 1300 and 1500, combined with the broadly equal frequencies of expansion and contraction, result in the high amplitude and bunching together

of peaks and troughs during this period. This was followed by a period of reduced amplitude between 1500 and 1700, as rates of expansion and contraction both decreased, accompanied by stable durations and broadly equal frequencies. The years between 1800 and 1870 were characterised by an asymmetric increase in the duration, rate and amplitude of expansions combined with a decrease in the duration, rate and amplitude of contractions. This was followed by a more symmetric increase in the amplitude of contractions as well as expansions between 1870 and 1950, as the world economy faced the major shocks of two World Wars and the Great Depression. Asymmetry returned between 1950 and 2000 as the frequency of contractions fell to just 6 per cent and the duration of expansions increased to 13.7 years.

The upshot of these developments for the level of GDP per capita can be seen in Figure 5B. Although there was a small boost to European GDP per capita after the Black Death as a result of the permanent gains in northwest Europe analysed in Table 4 and temporary gains elsewhere, most of these gains had been lost by the mid-seventeenth century. A return to growth is visible during the second half of the seventeenth century, but only taking the level of GDP per capita back to its post-Black Death peak. Sustained modern economic growth only emerged for the aggregate European economy after 1800. The negative impact of the two World Wars and the Great Depression is clearly visible, but was followed by a remarkable period of stable growth during the second half of the twentieth century. During this Golden Age, contractions almost disappeared altogether.

## **7. CONCLUSIONS**

This paper has explored the changing nature of the business cycle in Europe between 1300 and 2000. Using historical national accounting data on GDP per capita for a sample of nine economies, we show how the pre-modern business cycle was characterised by similar

frequencies of expansions and contractions, short expansions and contractions of similar duration, and also similar rates and amplitudes of contractions and expansions. However, around 1800 we begin to see the appearance of the typical modern business cycle with a higher frequency of expansions compared with contractions, longer expansions and shorter contractions with similar rates of growing and shrinking, and higher amplitudes of expansions compared with lower amplitudes of contractions. These findings suggest that the long run growth rate of the economy is intimately tied up with the business cycle through the dampening of contractions, as highlighted by Broadberry and Wallis (2017).

An examination of international co-movement also highlights the growing importance of the synchronisation of the European business cycle across countries. The number of significant positive correlations of growth rates of GDP per capita across countries expressed as a percentage of all possible pairwise correlations increased after 1500, at a time when Europe began an era of maritime expansion overseas. However, this percentage only passed the 20 per cent threshold at the end of the eighteenth century, which fits well with the timing of other aspects of the changing nature of the European business cycle.

Section 5 analyses some of the most significant contractions of economic activity from the Black Death of the fourteenth century to the two World Wars of the twentieth century, exploring the implications for the emergence of a synchronised European business cycle and sustained modern economic growth. Despite the incompleteness of our sample of European economies, section 6 takes a tentative step towards an analysis of an aggregate European business cycle, which confirms all the main findings.

Appendix 1 provides individual country data in the form of graphs of the business cycle and tables of the business cycle facts for each country, while Appendix 2 provides the matrices of international co-movement for six periods. In Appendix 3, we examine the robustness of our main findings by replicating the results using data on GDP rather than GDP per capita for the smaller sample of economies for which these data are available. We also examine the issue of measurement error by adding random error to the estimates of real GDP per capita for Britain between 1800 and 1870, computing the business cycle moments, repeating 1,000 times and calculating the average of each business cycle moment.

**TABLE 1: Data Sources**

Country	Start date	Interpolated data
Great Britain	1270	
France	1276	
Spain	1277	
Sweden	1300	
Italy	1310	
Netherlands	1348	1809-1814
Poland	1409	1801-1810, 1900-1909, 1911-1912, 1914-1919, 1921-1928, 1939-1947
Germany	1500	
Portugal	1530	1852-1854, 1856-1860, 1862-8644

*Sources and notes:* Data since 1870 from Maddison Project Database version 2020 (Bolt and van Zanden, 2020). Data before 1870 as follows: Great Britain: Broadberry et al. (2015; 2022); Feinstein (1972). France: Ridolfi and Nuvolari (2021). Spain: Prados de la Escosura (2017); Prados de la Escosura et al. (2022). Sweden: Krantz (2017); Schön and Krantz (2012). Italy: Malanima (2011). Netherlands: van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012). Poland: Malinowski and van Zanden (2017). Germany: Pfister (2022). Portugal: Palma and Reis (2019).

**TABLE 2: The European Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000**

	1300- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1300- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	51.9	50.3	50.4	58.2	66.4	89.3	56.6
Duration (years)	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.7	4.8	12.2	2.9
Rate (% per year)	4.6	4.6	3.4	3.0	3.8	3.8	4.2
Amplitude (%)	12.0	11.0	7.8	8.1	18.2	46.4	12.2
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	48.1	49.7	49.6	41.8	33.6	10.7	43.4
Duration (years)	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.0	2.3	1.3	2.3
Rate (% per year)	-4.8	-4.6	-3.3	-2.9	-4.0	-1.4	-4.1
Amplitude (%)	-13.0	-11.0	-7.6	-5.8	-9.2	-1.8	-9.4
Observations	1,236	1,777	909	639	729	459	5,706

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of European business cycles in GDP per capita between 1300 and 2000 for nine European economies.

**TABLE 3: Number of Significant Positive Correlations between Country Pairs of GDP per capita Growth by Period**

	Significant positive pairwise correlations	Possible pairwise correlations	Percentage of significant positive pairwise correlations
1300-1500	2	21	9.5
1500-1700	5	36	13.9
1700-1800	7	36	19.4
1800-1870	8	36	22.2
1870-1950	9	36	25.0
1950-2000	24	36	66.7

*Notes:* This table shows the international co-movement of logarithmic growth rates of GDP per capita between 1300 and 2000 for nine European economies.

**TABLE 4: Contributions of Expansions and Contractions to Long Run Economic Performance, 1349-1400**

	GBR	NLD	ESP	ITA
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>				
Frequency (%)	50.0	57.7	55.8	55.8
Rate (% per year)	4.4	3.9	1.9	7.6
Contribution (% per year)	2.2	2.3	1.1	4.2
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>				
Frequency (%)	50.0	42.3	44.2	44.2
Rate (% per year)	-3.5	-4.2	-3.1	-8.1
Contribution (% per year)	-1.8	-1.8	-1.4	-3.6
GDP per capita growth	0.8	0.6	-0.2	0.3

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, rate and contribution of business cycles in GDP per capita between 1349 and 1400 for four European economies.

**TABLE 5: Contributions of Expansions and Contractions to Long Run Economic Performance, 1751-1800**

	GBR	NLD	ESP	ITA
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>				
Frequency (%)	54.0	56.0	52.0	48.0
Rate (% per year)	2.3	5.1	3.6	1.9
Contribution (% per year)	1.2	2.9	1.9	0.9
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>				
Frequency (%)	46.0	44.0	48.0	52.0
Rate (% per year)	-2.3	-6.1	-3.4	-2.0
Contribution (% per year)	-1.1	-2.7	-1.6	-1.0
GDP per capita growth	0.4	0.2	0.0	-0.2

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, rate and contribution of business cycles in GDP per capita between 1751 and 1800 for four European economies.

**TABLE 6: The Aggregate European Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000**


	1300- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1300- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	53.0	53.2	51.5	62.0	71.6	94.1	58.7
Duration (years)	1.9	1.9	2.2	2.4	4.3	13.7	2.4
Rate (% per year)	4.1	2.0	1.6	1.8	2.4	2.9	2.7
Amplitude (%)	7.8	3.8	3.5	4.3	10.3	39.7	6.5
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	47.0	46.8	48.5	38.0	28.4	5.9	41.3
Duration (years)	1.7	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.8	1.0	1.7
Rate (% per year)	-4.3	-2.3	-1.7	-1.3	-2.0	-0.5	-2.7
Amplitude (%)	-7.3	-3.9	-3.4	-2.1	-3.6	-0.5	-4.6
Observations	200	200	100	70	80	50	700

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of aggregate European business cycles in GDP per capita between 1300 and 2000, derived from a weighted average series across nine European economies.




**FIGURE 1: Population, GDP and GDP per capita, 1300-1500 (1348=100)**


**A. England**



**B. Holland**




**C. Spain**




**D. Italy**



**FIGURE 2: GDP per capita in Three European Economies, 1560-1660 (1618=100)**




**FIGURE 3: GDP per capita in Four European Economies, 1750-1870 (1750=100)**




**FIGURE 4: GDP per capita during and after the Two World Wars**

**A. World War 1 (1913=100)**




**B. World War 2 (1938=100)**




**FIGURE 5: Aggregate GDP per capita Series for Europe, 1300-2000**

***A. Growth of GDP per capita (% per year)***




***B. Level of GDP per capita (1700=100)***




## APPENDIX 1: INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY DATA: EUROPEAN BUSINESS CYCLES, 1300-2000

FIGURE A1.1: The Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000 (%)


### A. Great Britain




### B. France




### C. Spain




**FIGURE A1.1 (continued): The Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000 (%)**  
***D. Sweden***




***E. Italy***




***F. Netherlands***




**FIGURE A1.1 (continued): The Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000 (%)**  
***G. Poland***



***H. Germany***



***I. Portugal***



**TABLE A1.1: The British Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000**

	1300- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1300- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	53.7	52.7	53.5	60.6	59.3	82.4	56.8
Duration (years)	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.0	3.4	6.8	2.2
Rate (% per year)	3.7	3.3	2.9	3.4	2.9	2.7	3.3
Amplitude (%)	7.4	6.3	5.5	6.8	9.9	18.4	7.3
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	46.3	47.3	46.5	39.4	40.7	17.6	43.2
Duration (years)	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.3	2.4	1.5	1.7
Rate (% per year)	-3.8	-3.4	-2.5	-2.7	-2.1	-0.7	-3.1
Amplitude (%)	-6.5	-5.8	-4.3	-3.5	-5.0	-1.1	-5.3
Observations	201	201	101	71	81	51	701

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of British business cycles in GDP per capita between 1300 and 2000.

**TABLE A1.2: The French Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000**

	1300- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1300- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	48.8	49.8	51.5	54.9	60.5	96.1	54.8
Duration (years)	1.7	1.8	2.4	1.9	2.4	23.5	2.1
Rate (% per year)	8.0	6.4	5.0	5.1	5.7	3.8	6.5
Amplitude (%)	13.6	11.5	12.0	9.7	13.7	89.3	13.7
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	51.2	50.2	48.5	45.1	39.5	3.9	45.2
Duration (years)	1.8	1.8	2.3	1.5	1.7	1.0	1.8
Rate (% per year)	-7.6	-5.9	-5.0	-4.3	-5.0	-1.1	-6.0
Amplitude (%)	-13.7	-10.6	-11.5	-6.5	-8.5	-1.1	-10.8
Observations	201	201	101	71	81	51	701

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of French business cycles in GDP per capita between 1300 and 2000.



**TABLE A1.3: The Spanish Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000**

	1300- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1300- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	53.7	46.8	47.5	64.8	61.7	90.2	55.5
Duration (years)	2.1	1.5	1.6	2.9	2.8	9.8	2.1
Rate (% per year)	5.5	5.2	3.8	2.7	4.2	4.8	4.7
Amplitude (%)	11.6	7.8	6.1	7.8	11.8	47.0	9.9
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	46.3	53.2	52.5	35.2	38.3	9.8	44.5
Duration (years)	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.3	1.7
Rate (% per year)	-6.3	-5.1	-3.1	-3.5	-4.5	-1.1	-4.8
Amplitude (%)	-11.3	-8.7	-5.3	-5.6	-7.7	-1.4	-8.2
Observations	201	201	101	71	81	51	701

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of Spanish business cycles in GDP per capita between 1300 and 2000.

**TABLE A1.4: The Swedish Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1300-2000**

	1300- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1300- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	46.5	50.2	44.6	62.0	77.8	88.2	55.3
Duration (years)	2.8	1.6	1.7	2.3	3.9	11.5	2.4
Rate (% per year)	5.3	6.8	4.9	2.6	4.3	2.6	5.3
Amplitude (%)	14.8	10.9	8.3	6.0	16.8	29.9	12.7
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	53.5	49.8	55.4	38.0	22.2	11.8	44.7
Duration (years)	3.2	1.7	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.5	2.0
Rate (% per year)	-5.5	-6.5	-4.1	-3.1	-3.3	-1.0	-5.0
Amplitude (%)	-17.6	-11.1	-7.8	-5.0	-4.3	-1.5	-10.0
Observations	200	201	101	71	81	51	700

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of Swedish business cycles in GDP per capita between 1300 and 2000.

**TABLE A1.5: The Italian Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1310-2000**

	1310- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1310- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	48.4	52.7	51.5	53.5	67.9	96.1	56.4
Duration (years)	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.5	4.1	23.0	2.6
Rate (% per year)	6.2	3.2	1.9	2.5	3.0	4.5	3.9
Amplitude (%)	11.8	7.0	4.4	6.3	12.3	103.5	10.1
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	51.6	47.3	48.5	46.5	32.1	3.9	43.6
Duration (years)	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.3	2.0	1.0	2.0
Rate (% per year)	-5.5	-3.6	-2.0	-2.7	-3.3	-1.5	-3.8
Amplitude (%)	-11.0	-7.2	-4.0	-6.2	-6.6	-1.5	-7.6
Observations	190	201	101	71	81	51	690

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of Italian business cycles in GDP per capita between 1310 and 2000.

**TABLE A1.6: The Dutch Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1348-2000**

	1348- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1348- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	57.2	53.7	54.5	63.4	66.7	90.2	60.3
Duration (years)	2.0	1.7	2.0	2.4	3.6	8.3	2.2
Rate (% per year)	3.4	8.5	5.0	3.0	2.8	4.7	5.5
Amplitude (%)	6.8	14.5	10.0	7.2	10.1	39.0	12.1
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	42.8	46.3	45.5	36.6	33.3	9.8	39.7
Duration (years)	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.9	1.3	1.5
Rate (% per year)	-4.1	-9.1	-6.7	-3.4	-3.8	-1.3	-6.2
Amplitude (%)	-6.2	-13.7	-10.7	-4.8	-7.2	-1.7	-9.3
Observations	152	201	101	71	81	51	652

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of Dutch business cycles in GDP per capita between 1348 and 2000.

**TABLE A1.7: The Polish Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1409-2000**

	1409- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1409- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)	54.9	48.8	45.5	63.4	69.1	80.4	56.2
Duration (years)	5.4	7.3	4.7	6.2	15.3	6.6	7.0
Rate (% per year)	0.3	0.9	0.7	1.8	2.8	3.2	1.3
Amplitude (%)	1.6	6.6	3.3	11.2	42.8	21.1	9.1
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)	45.1	51.2	54.5	36.6	30.9	19.6	43.8
Duration (years)	6.8	7.4	5.8	4.0	6.3	2.0	5.8
Rate (% per year)	-0.7	-0.7	-0.8	-0.9	-1.9	-3.2	-1.1
Amplitude (%)	-4.8	-5.2	-4.6	-3.6	-12.0	-6.4	-6.4
Observations	91	201	101	71	81	51	591

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of Polish business cycles in GDP per capita between 1409 and 2000.

**TABLE A1.8: The German Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1500-2000**

	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1500- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>						
Frequency (%)	48.5	58.4	57.7	74.1	92.2	60.2
Duration (years)	2.2	2.5	2.3	5.1	10.8	3.0
Rate (% per year)	1.9	1.2	2.6	4.1	3.7	2.2
Amplitude (%)	4.2	3.0	6.0	20.9	40.0	6.6
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>						
Frequency (%)	51.5	41.6	42.3	25.9	7.8	39.8
Duration (years)	2.3	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.0	2.0
Rate (% per year)	-1.9	-1.3	-1.9	-9.2	-1.3	-2.6
Amplitude (%)	-4.4	-2.3	-3.0	-16.6	-1.3	-5.2
Observations	200	101	71	81	51	500

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of German business cycles in GDP per capita between 1500 and 2000.

**TABLE A1.9: The Portuguese Business Cycle in GDP per capita, 1530-2000**

	1530- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1530- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>						
Frequency (%)	49.4	46.5	43.7	60.5	88.2	53.8
Duration (years)	1.8	1.6	2.2	2.5	9.8	2.2
Rate (% per year)	5.5	5.1	3.3	4.2	3.9	4.9
Amplitude (%)	9.9	8.2	7.3	10.5	38.2	10.8
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>						
Frequency (%)	50.6	53.5	56.3	39.5	11.8	46.2
Duration (years)	1.8	1.9	3.1	1.5	1.5	1.9
Rate (% per year)	-5.3	-4.6	-3.3	-3.2	-1.5	-4.4
Amplitude (%)	-9.5	-8.7	-10.2	-4.8	-2.3	-8.4
Observations	170	101	71	81	51	470

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of Portuguese business cycles in GDP per capita between 1530 and 2000.

## APPENDIX 2: INTERNATIONAL CO-MOVEMENT, 1300-2000

**TABLE A2.1: International Co-movement, 1300-1500**

	GBR	FRA	ESP	SWE	ITA	NLD	POL
GBR	1						
FRA	0.0	1					
ESP	-0.1	0.0	1				
SWE	0.0	0.0	0.0	1			
ITA	0.0	0.1*	0.0	-0.1	1		
NLD	0.3*	0.1	-0.1*	-0.1*	0.0	1	
POL	0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	1

*Notes:* This table shows the correlation of logarithmic growth rates of GDP per capita in seven economies (Great Britain (GBR), France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD) and Poland (POL)) between 1300 and 1500. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

**TABLE A2.2: International Co-movement, 1500-1700**

	GBR	FRA	ESP	SWE	ITA	NLD	POL	DEU	PRT
GBR	1								
FRA	0.2*	1							
ESP	0.1*	0.1	1						
SWE	0.1	0.0	0.1	1					
ITA	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1	1				
NLD	-0.1*	-0.1*	0.0	0.1	0.0	1			
POL	0.0	-0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1		
DEU	0.2*	0.2*	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	
PRT	0.0	0.2*	-0.1*	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.1	1

*Notes:* This table shows the correlation of logarithmic growth rates of GDP per capita in nine economies (Great Britain (GBR), France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Poland (POL), Germany (DEU) and Portugal (PRT)) between 1500 and 1700. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

**TABLE A2.3: International Co-movement, 1700-1800**

	GBR	FRA	ESP	SWE	ITA	NLD	POL	DEU	PRT
GBR	1								
FRA	0.1	1							
ESP	0.2*	-0.1	1						
SWE	0.1	0.1	0.0	1					
ITA	0.1	0.3*	-0.1	0.2*	1				
NLD	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	1			
POL	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	1		
DEU	0.1	0.3*	-0.1	0.2*	0.1	-0.1	0.3*	1	
PRT	0.2*	-0.2*	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	1

*Notes:* This table shows the correlation of logarithmic growth rates of GDP per capita in nine economies (Great Britain (GBR), France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Poland (POL), Germany (DEU) and Portugal (PRT)) between 1700 and 1800. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

**TABLE A2.4: International Co-movement, 1800-1870**

	GBR	FRA	ESP	SWE	ITA	NLD	POL	DEU	PRT
GBR	1								
FRA	-0.1	1							
ESP	-0.1	0.0	1						
SWE	0.2	-0.2*	0.2*	1					
ITA	-0.3*	0.3*	0.1	-0.1	1				
NLD	0.2	0.2	-0.1	0.1	0.0	1			
POL	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	1		
DEU	0.2	0.4*	-0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2*	0.1	1	
PRT	-0.1	0.2*	0.0	-0.1	0.2*	0.0	0.3*	0.0	1

*Notes:* This table shows the correlation of logarithmic growth rates of GDP per capita in nine economies (Great Britain (GBR), France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Poland (POL), Germany (DEU) and Portugal (PRT)) between 1800 and 1870. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

**TABLE A2.5 International Co-movement, 1870-1950**

	GBR	FRA	ESP	SWE	ITA	NLD	POL	DEU	PRT
GBR	1								
FRA	-0.2	1							
ESP	0.0	0.0	1						
SWE	0.0	0.5*	0.0	1					
ITA	0.1	0.6*	0.0	0.3*	1				
NLD	-0.1	0.7*	0.0	0.3*	0.7*	1			
POL	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	1		
DEU	0.3*	-0.3*	0.0	-0.1	-0.2*	-0.5*	0.2*	1	
PRT	0.0	0.2	0.2*	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	1

*Notes:* This table shows the correlation of logarithmic growth rates of GDP per capita in nine economies (Great Britain (GBR), France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Poland (POL), Germany (DEU) and Portugal (PRT)) between 1870 and 1950. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

**TABLE A2.6 International Co-movement, 1950-2000**

	GBR	FRA	ESP	SWE	ITA	NLD	POL	DEU	PRT
GBR	1								
FRA	0.3*	1							
ESP	0.0	0.4*	1						
SWE	0.4*	0.6*	0.3*	1					
ITA	0.2	0.6*	0.4*	0.4*	1				
NLD	0.4*	0.5*	0.0	0.4*	0.3*	1			
POL	0.4*	0.2	0.1	0.4*	0.1	0.2	1		
DEU	0.1	0.5*	0.0	0.4*	0.6*	0.3*	0.3*	1	
PRT	0.4*	0.6*	0.3*	0.2	0.4*	0.5*	0.1	0.1	1

*Notes:* This table shows the correlation of logarithmic growth rates of GDP per capita in nine economies (Great Britain (GBR), France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Poland (POL), Germany (DEU) and Portugal (PRT)) between 1950 and 2000. \* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.

## **APPENDIX 3: ROBUSTNESS**

So far, we have conducted our analysis of business cycles on data for GDP per capita since for many of the countries in our sample, we lack annual data for GDP. This is due to the fact that for these countries, real wages form the basis of the GDP per capita estimates and population data are not available on an annual basis. For five economies, however, we do have annual data for GDP and population as well as GDP per capita, and for these economies we can conduct the analysis on GDP. Here we set out the business cycle facts and analysis of international co-movement for GDP instead of GDP per capita as a check on the robustness of our findings. This is followed by an exercise to check the robustness of our findings to measurement error.

### **A3.1 Business Cycles in GDP**

The European business cycle in GDP follows much the same pattern as the business cycle in GDP per capita in a common sample of five economies. In addition, the patterns are also very similar for GDP per capita in both the full sample and the sample of five economies. Table A3.1 shows that in the common sample of five economies: (1) Contractions were roughly as frequent as expansions before the nineteenth century but expansions then increased in frequency to nearly 90 per cent by the second half of the twentieth century. (2) The duration of expansions significantly increased from the nineteenth century while contractions decreased over the same period. (3) The rate of growing during expansions showed no trend increase over time, while the rate of shrinking during contractions trended down. (4) The amplitude of expansions increased from the nineteenth century as the amplitude of contractions decreased.

### **A3.2 Measurement Error**

An important issue in historical national accounting is measurement error (Feinstein, 1972; Solomou and Weale, 1991; Sefton and Weale, 1995; Feinstein and Thomas, 2002). While there are estimates of the standard errors associated with some national accounts from the nineteenth century onwards, we have less understanding of the likely margins of error further back in time. To assess how measurement error alters the business cycle moments, we run a series of simulations.

The benchmark is the British business cycle between 1800 and 1870 since its properties are typical of the modern business cycle and are well documented (Broadberry et al., 2022; Broadberry et al., 2023). To the logarithmic growth of GDP per capita for Great Britain between 1800 and 1870, we add random error, compute the business cycle moments, repeat



1,000 times and calculate the average for each business cycle moment. The error has a normal distribution, a mean of zero and a standard deviation equal to either 50 per cent or 100 per cent of the standard deviation of the logarithmic growth of GDP per capita in Great Britain between 1800 and 1870, which was 3.5 per cent.

Table A3.2 displays how the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of expansions and contractions are affected by measurement error. As the volatility of error rises, the share of expansions and contractions approaches parity as expansions become less frequent and contractions more frequent, the rates of expansion and contraction converge and the amplitude of phases increases. Table A3.3 shows how international co-movement is altered by measurement error. As the volatility of error rises, the correlations are attenuated.

This exercise suggests that measurement error can affect the business cycle facts. A modern business cycle, measured with error, appears more like a premodern cycle that spends more time in contraction, is more volatile, and is less synchronised with other economies. Therefore, measurement error leads to bias in one direction: the observed origin of the modern business cycle is later than the true, unobserved origin. While the simulations have shown the likely sign of the bias, the size is unclear. In counterfactual 2, with the largest measurement error that was equal to the standard deviation of growth, the signal is still discernible through the noise.

**TABLE A3.1: The European Business Cycle in GDP, 1300-2000**

	1300- 1500	1500- 1700	1700- 1800	1800- 1870	1870- 1950	1950- 2000	1300- 2000
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>							
Frequency (%)							
GDP	54.4	52.4	50.9	69.3	72.8	87.5	59.3
GDP per capita	53.2	50.4	49.1	62.8	66.9	86.3	56.8
Duration (years)							
GDP	2.9	2.4	2.5	4.6	7.8	10.1	3.3
GDP per capita	2.9	2.8	2.4	3.2	5.8	8.6	3.2
Rate (% per year)							
GDP	3.6	5.7	3.9	3.3	4.1	4.3	4.6
GDP per capita	3.6	4.9	3.5	2.7	3.4	3.6	4.0
Amplitude (%)							
GDP	10.4	13.7	9.8	15.2	32.0	43.4	15.2
GDP per capita	10.4	13.7	8.4	8.6	19.7	31.0	12.8
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>							
Frequency (%)							
GDP	45.6	47.6	49.1	30.7	27.2	12.5	40.7
GDP per capita	46.8	49.6	50.9	37.2	33.1	13.7	43.2
Duration (years)							
GDP	2.7	2.3	2.7	2.0	2.6	1.5	2.4
GDP per capita	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.0	2.7	1.5	2.5
Rate (% per year)							
GDP	-3.7	-5.5	-3.9	-2.4	-3.1	-1.0	-4.2
GDP per capita	-4.1	-5.0	-3.4	-2.7	-3.1	-1.5	-4.0
Amplitude (%)							
GDP	-10.0	-12.7	-10.5	-4.8	-8.1	-1.5	-10.1
GDP per capita	-12.3	-14.0	-8.5	-5.4	-8.4	-2.3	-10.0
Observations	845	1,005	505	355	405	255	3,345

*Notes:* This table shows the frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of European business cycles in GDP and GDP per capita between 1300 and 2000 for five economies: Great Britain, Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden.

**TABLE A3.2: Measurement Error and the British Business Cycle, 1800-1870**

	Standard deviation of error / Standard deviation of growth		
	Actual	Counterfactual 1	Counterfactual 2
	0%	50%	100%
<i>Expansions (Trough to peak)</i>			
Frequency (%)	60.6	57.7	54.9
Duration (years)	2.0	2.1	1.9
Rate (% per year)	3.4	4.1	4.8
Amplitude (%)	6.8	8.6	9.1
<i>Contractions (Peak to trough)</i>			
Frequency (%)	39.4	42.3	45.1
Duration (years)	1.3	1.6	1.6
Rate (% per year)	-2.7	-2.9	-4.9
Amplitude (%)	-3.5	-4.6	-7.8

*Notes:* This table shows the actual and counterfactual frequency, duration, rate and amplitude of British business cycles between 1800 and 1870 for different levels of measurement error. The simulations are run 1,000 times.

**TABLE A3.3: Measurement Error and International Co-movement, 1800-1870**

	Standard deviation of error / standard deviation of growth		
	Actual	Counterfactual 1	Counterfactual 2
	0%	50%	100%
France	-0.1	-0.1	0.0
Spain	0.1	0.1	0.1
Sweden	0.2	0.1	0.1
Italy	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2
Netherlands	0.2	0.2	0.1
Poland	0.1	0.1	0.1
Germany	0.2	0.2	0.1
Portugal	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1

*Notes:* This table shows the actual and counterfactual correlation of logarithmic growth rates of GDP per capita in Great Britain and eight economies between 1800 and 1870. The simulations are run 1,000 times.

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