


ΕΠΙΓΡΑΦΙΚΟΝ ΜΟΥΣΕΙΟΝ ♦ THE BRITISH SCHOOL
AT ATHENS ♦ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΓΡΑΦΙΚΗ ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ


ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ

Studies in honour of Harold B. Mattingly



ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΓΡΑΦΙΚΗ ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑ

ΑΘΗΝΑΙ 2014



Harold B. Mattingly at the Epigraphical Museum, 23.5.2010
(Phot. Joanna Mattingly)

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EDITED BY

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Athens, Sigeion and the politics of approbation during the Ionian War

I. IG I³ 17: A Reassessment

The strategic importance of Sigeion to Athens as a base for the control of the trade route from the Black Sea can hardly be overstressed. As every student of Herodotus knows, this small place in the Troad, conveniently located near the entrance to the Hellespont,¹ featured prominently in the Peisistratids' endeavours to secure the area for their polis. What is more, following the expulsion of Hippias in 511/10 Sigeion became a base for the deposed tyrant, who even struck local coinage with the quintessential Athenian owl.² After the Persian Wars Sigeion joined the Delian League since it features in the Hellespontine panel of the so-

Versions of this article have been presented at Oxford (2007 Ancient History Seminar), Berkeley, St Andrews (Classics Research Seminar), and of course at the Athens conference 'Ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Ἀρχή in honour of Professor Mattingly. I am grateful to the audiences for their constructive comments. I was particularly honoured by the fact that in the discussion that followed my presentation in Athens, my novel chronological proposal was publicly endorsed by both the honorand and Professor Rhodes. I am most grateful to Dr. A. P. Matthaiou, Professor R. Parker, Professor P. J. Rhodes, Mr. R. Souza, Professor R. Stroud, and Dr. P. Thonemann for having critically read drafts of this article. All dates are B.C.

Abbreviations used:

Interpreting the Athenian Empire = J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas, R. Parker (eds), *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, London 2009.

Mattingly, *AER* = H. B. Mattingly, *The Athenian Empire Restored: Epigraphic and Historical Studies*, Ann Arbor 1996.

Mattingly, *Troizen and Hermione* = H. B. Mattingly, *The Athenian Treaties with Troizen and Hermione*, *Historia* 49 (2000) 131-139.

1. J. M. Cook, *The Troad: An Archaeological and Topographical Study*, Oxford 1973, 174-188; also G. Bieg & R. Aslan, Eine Quellschöle in Spratt's Plateau (*Subaşı Tepe*) – Wo lag Sigeion?, *StTroica* 16 (2006) 133-145. In 2005 a German team under Professor Schäfer of Tübingen University started a proper archaeological investigation of Sigeion (area of Yenisehir). A preliminary report can be found on the web at <http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/klassarchaeologie/pr—sigeion.html>.

2. Hdt. V 65.3, 91.1, 94-95 (but a different ancient tradition pushed Athenian involvement in Sigeion back to the time of the Mytilenean tyrant Pittakos: see C. Carusi, *Isole e peree in Asia Minore. Contributi allo studio dei rapporti tra poleis insulari e territori continentali dipendenti*, Pisa 2003, 52-58). See also Thuc. VI 59.4, with A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes & K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume IV: Books V 25–VII, Oxford 1970, 336-337, and S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume III: Books 5.25-8.109, Oxford 2008, 452.

called Tribute Lists.³ But arguably the single most important piece of evidence for Athens' relations with Sigeion in the period of the Athenian hegemony is the decree *IG I³ 17* (figs. 1 and 2). Its latest inclusion in an epigraphical corpus is that in *Athenian Agora XVI*, where the text is printed as follows:

- (a) Σιγ[ειέον] stoichedon 23
 [ἔ]δοχσεν τῷ[ι βολῆι καὶ τῷ δέ]-
 [μ]οι· Οἶνε[ι]ς [ἔ]πρυτάνευε,]
 [.]ς ἐγραμμάτ[ευε, 9 ἔ]-
 5 πεστάτε, Ἀν[τίδοτος] ἔρχε, . . .]
 [.]χίδες ἐ[ι]π[ε]· ἐπαινέσαι τοῖς]
 [Σι]γαιεῦ[σ]ιν [ὁς ὅσιν ἀνδράσι]-
 [ν ἄγ]αθοῖς ἐς [τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθ]-
 [εναίον 17]
lacuna
 (b) 10 [. 20 ἐν σ]-
 [τέλει λιθί]νει τ[έ]λεσι τοῖς Σ]-
 ιγ[ε]ῖ[ν] καὶ καταθέτο ἐμ πό[λε]-
 ι καθάπερ αὐτοὶ δέονται ὅπο-
 ς ἂν ἔι γεγραμμένον καὶ μὲ ἄδ-
 15 ικῶνται μεδὲ ὑφ' ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τ-
 ῇ ἐπεῖροι. vacat
vacat

Significantly, the Sigeion decree is no. 1 in the said volume, that is, it appears to be the earliest extant decree from the American excavations of the Athenian Agora in the period from 1931 to 1968. The date (451/0) is of course provided by the partly restored archon Ἀν[τίδοτος] in line 5. Needless to say, the same archontic year was also given in *IG I³*. However, as times change, old premises collapse and new dogmas are formed. History does not remain unaffected. The high date for *IG I³ 17* was based on the infamous three-bar *sigma* lettering criterion, and, secondarily, on the occurrence of the tailed *rho*. Although the high chronology has long been thought the most plausible,⁴ it has not passed

3. *IG I³ 263-265, 267, 269-272, 277, 280-281, 285, 287.*

4. Beginning with the *editio princeps* of fragment A by B. D. Meritt, *Greek Inscriptions, Hesperia* 5 (1936) 360-361. Adherents of the high chronology and the consequent historical interpretation are adumbrated by Woodhead in *Agora XVI*. To his list add: D. Whitehead, Cardinal virtues: the language of public approbation in democratic Athens, *C&M* 44 (1993) 44-47; P. J. Rhodes, The Delian League to 449 B.C., *CAH*² vol. V, 59; C. Veligianni-Terzi, *Wertbe-*

uncontested. Mattingly in particular has struggled for years to lower the date of IG I³ 17 to the archonship of Antiphon, in 418/7.⁵ The latest developments in Attic epigraphy appear to vindicate him. The re-examination of old stones as well as the discovery of new evidence have amply shown that the three-bar *sigma* was used at least as late as the 410s.⁶ Once this obstacle has been removed, we can take a fresh glance at the real dating indications for the Sigeion decree.

It has long been recognised that the letters of IG I³ 17 were cut by the mason of IG I³ 31 (Athenian treaty with Hermione), or at least in his manner.⁷ Of course for the advocates of the high date this was never a problem, since the Hermione treaty with its three-bar *sigma* was placed in the context of the First Peloponnesian War. But we should now accept that the treaty actually belongs to the early stage of the Archidamian War (*post*-430, but *ante*-425), as both Mattingly and the late Michael Jameson have convincingly demonstrated.⁸ However, one has to concede that the chronological argument could also work the other way round: it is mainly the realisation that the treaty of Sigeion should be assigned a low date that strengthens the placement of the Hermione treaty in the 420s. We then have to move to the almost indisputable *terminus post quem* for IG I³ 17, and that is none other than the

griffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der Klassischen Zeit, Stuttgart 1997, 14; P. Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire* (transl. by P. T. Daniels), Winona Lake, Indiana 2002, 580; P. J. Rhodes, *A History of the Classical World: 478-323 BC*, Oxford 2006, 47 (but see below, p. 218); P. Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*, Cambridge 2007, 136-137; and now S. Hornblower, *op.cit.* (no. 2) 1046.

5. Mattingly, *AER*, 101-103, 349-351; idem, *Troizen & Hermione*, 132-139.

6. Apart from the numerous articles by Mattingly—conveniently collected in his *AER*—the following pieces have proved particularly influential: M. Chambers, R. Galluci, P. Spanos, Athens' Alliance with Egesta in the Year of Antiphon, *ZPE* 83 (1990), 33-63; A. P. Matthaiou, Περὶ τῆς IG I³ 11, in A. P. Matthaiou & G. Malouchou (edd.), *Ἀττικά καὶ ἐπιγραφαί. Συμπόσιον εἰς μνήμην Adolf Wilhelm (1864-1950)*, Athens 2004, 99-122. See also I. Tsirigoti-Drakotou, Νέξ στήλη πεσόντων ἀπὸ τοῦ Δημόσιον Σήμα: μία πρώτη παρουσίαση, *ADeltion* 55, A' (2000) [2004] 87-111, a casualty list, which does have the three-bar *sigma*, associated by the editor with the Sicilian expedition. For recent overviews of the lettering problem, see R. S. Stroud, *The Athenian Empire on Stone: David M. Lewis Memorial Lecture – Oxford 2006*, Athens 2006; P. J. Rhodes, After the Three-Bar *Sigma* Controversy: The History of Athenian Imperialism Reassessed, *CQ* n.s. 58 (2008) 501-506; N. Papazarkadas, Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire: Reshuffling the Chronological Cards, in *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, 67-88; and now the vigorous treatment of fifth-century Attic epigraphy by A. P. Matthaiou, *The Athenian Empire on Stone Revisited. David Lewis Lecture in Ancient History, Oxford 2009*, Athens 2010.

7. M. B. Walbank, Honors for Parianos of Issa and his sons Athenodoros and Ikesios, *Hesperia* 42 (1973) 334 with n. 4; idem, *Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century B.C.*, Toronto & Sarasota 1978, 97.

8. Mattingly, *AER*, 34-35; idem, *Troizen & Hermione*, 132-133; M. H. Jameson, Athens and Phaselis, IG I³ 10 (EM 6918), *HOPOS* 14-16 (2000-2003) 27-28.

fact that the archon's name, whatever it is, appears in the prescript. On the basis of our extant knowledge, archontic names in the preambles of Attic decrees start being regularly recorded only after the Peace of Nikias in 422/1.⁹ Thus, the archon in line 5 can be neither Ἀν[τίδοτος] of 451/0 nor Ἀν[τιοχίδης] of 435/4.¹⁰

It will appear then that Mattingly's Ἀν[τιφῶν] of 418/7 is the winning contestant. Indeed, at least one leading scholar, P. J. Rhodes, recently abandoned his earlier endorsement of the high chronology of *IG I³ 17*, adopting instead Mattingly's suggestion of the archontic year 418/7.¹¹ But what could the implications of such a date be? Mattingly once attempted a historical contextualisation: based on the similar scripts of *IG I³ 17* and the disappointingly defective honorific decree for some individuals from Parion (*IG I³ 18*), he saw continuous unrest in Asia Minor originating from Lesbian exiles. Cogent though this is, for his reconstruction to work, Mattingly had to assume that Athens' capture of Antandros in the Lesbian *peraia* in 424 had not totally eliminated the threat from Lesbian dissidents *pace* Thucydides.¹² Rhodes has taken a similar approach, suggesting that the Persians' activity in Adramyttion some years before 418/7 may be somehow related. To be fair, in so arguing Mattingly and Rhodes have followed a line of reasoning first advocated by Dover.¹³ Yet one can but feel uneasy about such assumptions that contradict Thucydides' evidence, or lack thereof. However, in this case Thucydides' silence is symptomatic of the actual situation on the eastern front of Greek affairs. After reporting the ascension of Darius II to the Persian throne Thucydides turns his attention back to Asia Minor only to report Athens' miscalculated support for the rebel satrap Amorges. What Thucydides notoriously fails to mention is the so-called Peace of Epilykos –either a totally new agreement, or a renewal of the elusive Peace of Kallias– of 424/3 or thereabouts.

9. Mattingly, *AER*, 325-330, 342-345; see also the catalogue compiled by John Morgan *apud* A. S. Henry, *The Sigma Stigma*, *ZPE* 137 (2001) 98-99, thirty-four decrees certainly or almost certainly predating 421, with no archontic designation in the prescript.

10. I mention Ἀν[τιοχίδης] only for the sake of completion, even though he has never been a serious contender for line 5. His name could not possibly be restored by the three-bar *sigma* advocates, simply because his archonship still fell outside the crucial period. For Mattingly, Ἀν[τιοχίδης] was not a possibility for the reason I am giving in the text above.

11. Rhodes, *op.cit.* (n. 6) 504.

12. Mattingly, *AER*, 101-102. Athenian suppression of Lesbian scheming at Antandros: Thuc. IV 75.1: Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ὑπὸ τῶν Μυτιληναίων, ὥσπερ διεννοοῦντο, μελλούσης κατασκευάζεσθαι, οἱ τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ Δημόδοκος καὶ Ἀριστείδης, ὄντες περὶ Ἑλλάσποντον... οὕτω δὲ ξυναγείραντες ἀπὸ τῶν συμμάχων στρατιάν καὶ πλεύσαντες, μάχη τε νικήσαντες τοὺς ἐκ τῆς Ἀντάνδρου ἐπεξεληθόντας, ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὸ χαρίον πάλιν.

13. See K. J. Dover, *The Chronology of Antiphon's Speeches*, *CQ* 44 (1950) 44, speculating.

The fact of the matter remains that, despite the defective nature of our sources, few, if any, scholars will disagree that from 424/3 down to the time of Amorges' revolt Athens and Persia experienced little mutual wariness.¹⁴ There is, however, a piece of epigraphical evidence that merits further attention. *IG I³ 287*, traditionally believed to be the remnant of the Tribute List of the year 418/7, shows a striking increase of the tribute paid by Sigeion to Athens from 1000 drachmas to 2 talents.¹⁵ Could it be then that the Athenians honoured the Sigeians [ὅς ὄσιν ἀνδράσι]ν ἀγ]αθοῖς because they had willingly agreed to pay the increased tribute? I find rather implausible such an interpretation that would show the Sigeians making fools of themselves. Moreover, Kallet has recently raised serious doubts about the received date of *IG I³ 287*, let alone the very association of the various fragments that the said list supposedly consists of, even heretically suggesting that a date as late as 412/1 cannot be dismissed.¹⁶ The evidence of *IG I³ 287* has, therefore, no bearing on our discussion.

Consequently, on the question of chronology I will beg to differ from Mattingly, Meritt, Woodhead, and all those who have tackled the date of *IG I³ 17*. Mattingly's suggestion, though clearly much preferable to that of his rivals, runs into a serious obstacle: it presents the Athenians deliberating over an area of the Greek world at a time when very little was happening. Indeed, Asia Minor is historically a mystery in the period between the Peace of Epilykos in approximately 424/3 and the Athenians' miscalculated decision to support the rebel satrap Amorges at some point in the late 410s. Rather, the eastern Aegean, the Hellespont and Ionia only became the focus of fierce military action in the closing stage of the Peloponnesian War, which is, after all, the reason why this period is often referred to in modern bibliography as the Ionian War.¹⁷ As it happens, what scanty literary evidence exists about fifth-century Sigeion revolves exclusively around this particular period.¹⁸

14. Modern bibliography on the topic is vast, but inconclusive; see Briant, *op.cit.* (n. 4), 591-592, 978. Note however that as P. Thonemann has demonstrated in his recent ingenious reinterpretation of the «Xanthos stele» («Lycia, Athens, and Amorges», in *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, 167-194), our Hellenocentric sources do not necessarily tell us the whole truth.

15. *IG I³ 287* (= ML 75), col. II, l. 9: H Σι[γῆ]ϊῆς.

16. L. Kallet, Epigraphic Geography: The Tribute Quota Fragments Assigned to 421/2–415/4 B.C., *Hesperia* 73 (2004) 475-480. Interestingly, the archontic year 412/1 had first been pondered, but eventually rejected, by B. D. Meritt, Greek Inscriptions, *Hesperia* 8 (1939) 55.

17. Or Ionian-Decelean War, as in B. S. Strauss, The Problem of Periodization: the Case of the Peloponnesian War, in M. Golden & P. Toohey (eds), *Inventing Ancient Culture. Historicism, Periodization and the Ancient World*, London & New York 1997, 166-169.

18. The chronology of the Ionian War is notoriously difficult: good summaries can be found in P. Krentz, *Xenophon: Hellenica I-II.3.10*, Warminster 1989, 11-14, and A. Andrewes, Chron-

We first hear of Sigeion in the summer of 411, on the eve of the battle of Kynossema, at which point the city appears to be in the hands of the Peloponnesians, since a section of Mindaros' fleet is able to anchor there.¹⁹ Diodorus, however, offers a different story, one that is difficult to reconcile with Thucydides' account, and therefore probably incorrect. In Diodorus' version, it is Mindaros himself who takes shelter in Sigeion on the second day of his rushed sail to the Hellespont. Shortly afterwards the pursuing Athenians enter Sigeion uninterrupted, capturing only three abandoned ships since the rest of the Peloponnesian fleet has already departed.²⁰ Thus, the Diodoran version might, but ought not to, mean that Athenian control of Sigeion was resumed at this point. The problem in drawing this inference is that, on both accounts, the Athenians withdraw to Elaious, roughly opposite Sigeion, and in the ensuing fighting we see them and their Peloponnesian foes operating from their European and Asiatic bases respectively. Indeed, a few months later, early in the winter of 411/10, a Peloponnesian detachment under Dorieus of Thourioi was seen sailing past Sigeion on its way to Mindaros who was stationed at Abydos, if we are to believe yet another Diodoran version. But Xenophon, who in his capacity as Thucydides' continuator almost opens his *Hellenica* with this episode, places Mindaros at Ilion, makes no explicit mention of Sigeion, and simply reports Dorieus' escape to Rhoiteion. In several respects the two versions contradict each other and, surprisingly, scholars have tended to find more fault with Xenophon than Diodorus and/or his sources.²¹ But

ological Note 13, in *CAH*² vol. V, 503-505. In brief, there are three chronological schemes: the «early» chronology developed by Busolt, the «late» one accepted by Andrewes, and the golden mean advocated by N. Robertson, *The Sequence of Events in the Aegean in 408 and 407 B.C.*, *Historia* 29 (1980) 282-301. Robertson's views have been accepted, with some modifications, by Krentz. In what follows I have adhered to the «late» chronology, simply for the sake of convenience.

19. Thuc. VIII 101.3: εἰς δ' αἶ τῶν νεῶν καὶ ἐς Σίγειον κατῆραν καὶ ἄλλοσε τῶν ταύτη χωρίων, but *pace* A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes & K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume V: Book VIII, Oxford 1981, 342, 348-349, we should not necessarily conclude that Sigeion had revolted; it might simply have been forced into the Peloponnesian camp by Derkylidas' forces.

20. Diod. Sic. XIII 39.1-2: Μίνδαρος δ' ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ναύαρχος νυκτὸς μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς ἐκπλεύσας εἰς Ἑλλησποντον ἐκομίζετο κατὰ σπουδὴν, καὶ δευτεραῖος εἰς Σίγειον κατέπλευσεν οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι πυθόμενοι τὸν παράπλου, οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ἀπάσας τὰς παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων τριῖρεις, τριῶν δὲ μόνον προσγενομένων αὐτοῖς, ἐδίωκον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἦλθον εἰς Σίγειον, εὗρον τὸν μὲν στόλον ἐκπεπλευκότεν, τρεῖς δὲ ναῦς ὑπολελειμμένας, ὧν εὐθέως ἐκυρίευσαν. D. Kagan, *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*, Ithaca & London 1987, 217 n.26 passes over Diodorus' account, perhaps too easily.

21. Diod. Sic. XIII 45.2, ἤδη δὲ τοῦ Δωριέως ὄντος περὶ τὸ Σίγειον τῆς Τρωάδος, οἱ περὶ Σηστὸν ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι πυθόμενοι τὸν παράπλου ἀνήχθησαν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πάσαις ταῖς ναυσίν, οὐσαις ἐβδομήκοντα καὶ τέσσαρσιν; Xen. *Hell.* I 1.2-4 (with Krentz, *op.cit.* [n. 18], 87-90). The two

once again the general pattern, with the Peloponnesians operating on the Asiatic shore and the Athenians from the peninsula of Cheronnesos, is clear enough to make it highly improbable, albeit not impossible, that Sigeion was under Athenian control, if it had really been recovered in the first place. In fact, one of the severest criticisms levelled by modern commentators against the Athenian generals at the Hellespont is that they unjustifiably allowed the Spartans and their allies to keep too many bases in Asia Minor for too long.²² At any rate, the ensuing clash was a glorious Athenian victory, the so-called battle of Abydos.²³ Thereafter Sigeion disappears from our sources (only to emerge in the context of fourth-century politics), unless we allow –as I think we should– for Sophocles’ poetic *πικρὸν Σίγειον*. This phrase appears in *Philoctetes*, a play that was produced at the Great Dionysia, i.e. February/March, of 409, and I suspect that, far from being an in-

accounts have been scrutinised by H. D. Westlake, *Abydos and Byzantium: the Sources of Two Episodes in the Ionian War*, in *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History*, Bristol 1989, 225-231, and C. J. Tuplin, *Military engagements in Xenophon’s Hellenica*, in I. S. Moxon, J. D. Smart, A. J. Woodman (eds), *Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing*, Cambridge 1986, 54-55 (Kagan, *op.cit.* [n. 20], 230-231 is less careful, even though he expresses a preference for Diodorus). Tuplin, however, fails to mention the Diodoran geographical variant of Sigeion. The latter may be of some importance, because whereas Rhoiteion is indeed invisible from Ilion (where Xenophon’s Mindaros first realised Dorieus’ troubles), Sigeion is not. My own attempt at conflating the two accounts would then be as follows: Dorieus was sailing to Abydos to join Mindaros’ fleet. Unbeknownst to him, Mindaros had temporarily left Abydos for Ilion in order to perform a sacrifice to Athena. By the time Dorieus approached the Hellespont (i.e. roughly outside Sigeion) he was spotted by Athenian watchers, but he was also seen by Mindaros. It took some time for Mindaros to put out his ships to help Dorieus, by which point the Athenians had already engaged the Thourian commander.

22. A. Andrewes, *The Generals in the Hellespont, 410-407 B.C.*, *JHS* 73 (1953) 2; however, Kagan, *op.cit.* (n. 20) 274, while pointing out the delay, exonerates the generals by attributing their procrastination to their waiting for reinforcements. On Robertson’s chronological reconstruction (*supra* n. 18), there was simply no delay.

23. It is noteworthy that the battle’s synoptic description in the prologue to Diodorus’ 13th book is the «Naval battle between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians around Sigeion» (Ναυμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων περὶ τὸ Σίγειον καὶ νίκη Ἀθηναίων). Geographically, this cannot stand, and some believe that the said battle is that of Kynossema (thus C. H. Oldfather in the Loeb edition). But Kynossema is hardly better. Moreover, the elliptical clause in question, wedged in between the description of the Sicilian affairs recounted by Diodorus in XIII 43-44 and that of the bridging of Euripos recounted in XIII 47, should necessarily refer to XIII 45. At first sight, the naval battle περὶ τὸ Σίγειον seems to be the dismissible balderdash of some late compiler. Note, however, that Xenophon’s ἐναυμάχησαν περὶ Ἀβυδὸν has been seriously questioned on the grounds that «other evidence suggests the fighting took place downstream from Abydos» (Krentz, *op.cit.* [n.18], 90). Perhaps, after all, the «battle of Abydos» is a serious misnomer, and the ναυμαχία περὶ τὸ Σίγειον has more to it.

nocuous geographical designation, it is an allusion to contemporary events.²⁴ Nevertheless, the stage of military action never moved away from the wider area of Sigeion: the Athenian victory at Kyzikos, the re-capture of Byzantium, the naval battles at Arginousai and Aigospotamoi, some or all of them must have affected Sigeion in one way or another. In this light, one would hardly err in arguing that the Ionian War offers a formidable historical context for *IG* I³ 17, and, within this period, there is indeed an archon whose name is perfectly compatible with the extant letters in line 5: Ἀν[τιγένες ἔρχε, . . .]. The date would then be 407/6.

But can one seriously contend that old-fashioned lettering, especially three-bar sigmas, could still be employed in the last decade of the fifth century? «Old-fashioned» is a subjective term and, as Moroo now reminds us, the Athenians continued to use three-bar sigmas to denote staters throughout the fifth century and well into the fourth.²⁵ There is absolutely nothing anomalous in the assumption that, before the alphabetic reform introduced by Eukleides' statute in 403/2, a stone-cutter could use what was clearly a recognizable letter form. Besides, the inscriber of *IG* I³ 17 was familiar with the more developed four-bar sigma, for he clearly carved it in the word Σιγ[είον] of line 1. Furthermore, an oft-forgotten aspect of our mason's spelling is that he refrained throughout from using the aspirate sign: it is certainly absent from ὄπιος in line 14, twice from ὑφ' ἐνός in line 15, and almost certainly from the restored [ός] in line 7. In this respect he was

24. Both R. G. Ussher, *Sophocles: Philoctetes*, Warminster 1990, 123, and P. Pucci, *Sofocle: Filottete*, Rome 2003, 203, concur in reading *S. Phil.* 355-6 (καγὼ πικρὸν Σίγειον οὐρεῖω πλάττη | κατηγόμην) in terms of the play's internal plot (Neoptolemos distressed by his father's tomb); in that they are following –without acknowledging it– the ancient scholiast (Σ in Sophoclem: «πικρὸν Σίγειον» ἦτοι διὰ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἢ διὰ τὸ δυσχεῖμερον τοῦ τόπου). But given the date of the play (early 409), one wonders whether there is more in it, i.e. a sly allusion to contemporary events. Modern readings of *Philoctetes* with their emphasis on the underlying political discourse of the play (e.g. recall of Alcibiades and, more generally, rumination on contemporary Athenian political anxieties; cf. A. M. Bowie, *Tragic Filters for History: Euripides' Supplices* and Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, in C. Pelling (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*, Oxford 1997, 56-61; and, somewhat hyperbolically, M. Vickers, *Sophocles and Alcibiades. Athenian Politics in Ancient Greek Literature*, Ithaca & New York 2008, 59-81) certainly do not preclude such an exegesis.

25. See A. Moroo, *Neglected three-bar sigmas: the numeral signs for staters*, *ZPE* 141 (2002) 129-133, a welcome contribution that has given a fresh twist to the three-bar *sigma* debate, though, alas, it is not an entirely original one. Exactly the same point was first raised by A. Papagiannopoulos-Palaios, *Ἀρχαῖαι Ἑλληνικαὶ Ἐπιγραφαί*, Athens 1939, 105: «...τὸ τρισκελές σίγμα, δι' οὗ ἐπεκράτησε νὰ χρονολογοῦνται αἱ μέχρι τοῦ 446 π.Χ. ἐπιγραφαί, ἀπαντᾷ ἀκόμη καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔτος 408/7 π.Χ. πρὸς δῆλωσιν τῶν στατήρων ἐν *IG* I³ 313, 48-49», only to be «lost in translation» with dire consequences for the epigraphic developments of fifth-century Athenian history.

patently more progressive than some of his colleagues who were still marking the aspirate breathing in late-fifth century documents.²⁶ On the whole, the lettering and the spelling cannot exclude *a priori* a date in the very late fifth century.²⁷ Indeed, Professor Tracy, who kindly offered to examine a squeeze of *IG I³ 17* on my behalf, reached the following verdict: «The four bar sigma of the first line and the other letter shapes are right at home, it seems to me, in the late fifth century».²⁸

Surprising reinforcement for the very low date advocated here can be gained from an examination of epigraphical parallels, all of which were adduced in 2000 by Mattingly himself in his meticulous *Troizen & Hermione* article:²⁹

1) The first idiom is the double negation in the expression μέ ἀδικῶνται μεδὲ ὑφ' ἐνός. Here the two fifth-century parallels (both heavily restored) are *IG I³ 173*, and the decree for the Salaminian king Evagoras *IG I³ 113*, which on historical grounds certainly belongs to the last decade of the fifth century. This point provides only some slight support for the low chronology.

2) The second point of grammatical interest is the final clause ὅπο[ς] ἂν ἔι γεγραμμένον (ll. 13-14). Mattingly compared it to the publication clause in *IG I³ 84*, ll. 26-28 (τὸ δὲ φρέφισμα τόδε, ὅπος ἂν ἔι εἰδέναι τῶ[ι] βολομένοι, ἀναγράφας ὁ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς βολῆς ἐν στέλει λιθίνει καταθέτο ἐν τοῖ Νελεῖ[οι], and since the leasing document dates to 418/7 he found further support for his chronological argument. Mattingly is right about the peculiarity of embedding a purpose clause in a publication proviso. However, the *exact* phraseological equivalent can be found in the well-known decree in honour of Oiniades *IG I³ 110* (ML 90), ll. 26-31: τὰ μέ[ν] ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βολῇ, ἐς δ[ι] τῇ γ γνώμην μεταγράψαι ἀντι[τῷ] τῷ «Σ[κ]ιαθίο», ὅπως ἂν ἦ γεγραμμένον, «Οἰνιάδην τὸν Παλαισ[κ]ιάθιον». But the decree for Oiniades was passed in 408/7, that is, a year before the date I would attribute to the Sigeion decree.

3) A third idiom meticulously analyzed by Mattingly is the construction ἐπαί-

26. See, for instance, *IG I³ 102* (409/8), 117 (407/6), 118 (*ca.* 407), in which the aspirate h is used more or less consistently.

27. Mattingly reasonably observed that the identification of the mason of *IG I³ 17* as that of the Hermione Treaty would strengthen his date. But in the light of the groundbreaking work by Tracy who has established some very long spans of activity for numerous Hellenistic stone-cutters (e.g., the Cutter of Agora I 6664 whose *floruit* is placed in 281/0–*ca.* 240: S. V. Tracy, *Athens and Macedon. Attic Letter-Cutters of 300 to 229 B.C.*, Berkeley 2003, 99-111) this should not be a problem at all.

28. Professor Tracy very kindly examined a squeeze held at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study and communicated his result to me *per epistulam* on March 23, 2010.

29. What follows should be read in conjunction with Mattingly, *AER*, 283-284; idem, *Troizen & Hermione*, 136-137.

νέσαι + object in dative + causal participle preceded by the particle ὥς. More recently Mattingly has isolated the phrasing ὥς + present participle of εἶμι + some form of ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός as predicate. In the table he formulated it can easily be seen that the vast majority of the relevant examples fall within the period 410/09 – 405/4: this is exactly the period in which I would like to place *IG* I³ 17. It is worth taking a closer look at some of these cases. Some are proxeny decrees. Some others, however, are honorific decrees for political entities rather than individuals. Many will be familiar with the amusing case of the Neapolitans from Thrace. In 410/9, they were honoured by the Athenians because they had fought with the Athenians against the besieging Thasian and Peloponnesian forces, and because they had proved themselves ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί towards the Athenian expeditionary force, and the people of Athens, and their allies:

- [ἔ]δοχσεν τῇ β[ο]υ[λῇ] καὶ τοῖ δῆμοι· Λεοντὶς ἐπρυτά[νευεν],
 5 Σιβυρτιάδη[ς ἐ]γραμμάτευεν, Χαιριμένης ἐπεστ[άτει, Γλ]-
 ἀύκιππος ἦρχ[ε, . . .]θεὸς εἶπεν· [ἐπ]αινέσαι τοῖς Νεοπ[ολίταις] <τοῖς>
 παρὰ Θάσον [πρῶτον μ]ὲν ὅ[υ]τι συνδιεπο[λέμεσ]αν τὸν πόλεμον μετὰ Ἀθηναίο[ν καὶ
 πολιο]-
 ρκόμενοι ὑπ[ὸ] Θασίων] {[πρῶτον μ]ὲν [[ὅτι ἄποικοι ὄντες Θασίων]] [καὶ πολιο]-
 ρκόμενοι [[ὑπ' αὐτῶν]]} καὶ Πελο[πον]νησίον οὐκ ἠθ[έ]λησαν ἅ]-
 10 [πο]στῆνα[ν] ἅπ' Ἀθηναίων, ἄνδ[ρες δ'] ἀγαθοὶ ἐγένον[το] ἕξ τε τῇ]-
 [ν στρα]τ[ίαν καὶ τὸν δῆ]μον τ[ὸν] Ἀθηναίων κα[ὶ] το[ύς] χυσ[υ]μά]-
 [χους. c.13]
- (*IG* I³ 101.1-12)

But for all the honours bestowed upon them the Neapolitans were not content and, at a later time, they came back to Athens with the request to have any mention of them as Thasian colonists removed from the *stele*. The Athenians conceded and passed a further resolution:

- Ἀχσίοχος εἶπε : ἐπαινέσαι τοῖς Νεοπολίταις τοῖς ἀπὸ [Θράικες *ἵος* ὅσιν ἀνδράσιν
 ἀγαθοῖς]
 ἕξ τε τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων καὶ *ἰότ*[ι ἕξ Θάσον ἐστρατεύοντο
 χυσμπολιορ]-
 50 κέσοντες μετὰ Ἀθηναίων : καὶ *ἰότ*ι χυσνναυμαχόντ[ες ἐνίκον] καὶ [κατὰ γέν χυσνεμάχον
 τὸν πά]-
 ντα χρόνον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα *ἰότ*ι εὖ ποιοῖσιν Ἀθηναίο[ις, καὶ ἀντὶ τ]ούτον [τὸν ἀγαθὸν
 χάριτας παρὰ Ἀ]-
 θηναίων εἶναι αὐτοῖς καθήκοντες ἐφσέφισται τ[ῷ] δέμω]ι *etc.*
- (*IG* I³ 101.48-52)

The important thing is that, just as in the case of Sigeion, it is the collectivity of the Neapolitans that receives honours from Athens. Grammatically this is expressed with the infinive ἐπαινέσαι + ethnic in the dative. Although no internal date has been preserved it is generally accepted that Axiochos' decree was passed in the archontic year 407/6. But the similarities between *IG* I³ 101 and the Sigeion decree do not stop here. The Neapolis decree contains a proviso to the effect that the Neapolitans do not suffer any damage by anyone, individual or city (ll. 52-54: [κα]ῖ ἡόπος ἄμ μ[ἐ] ἀδικῶνται μεδέν μέτ)|ε ὑπὸ ἰδιότο μέτε ὑπὸ κοινῷ πόλεος, τός τε σ[τρατεγός]ς ἡοὶ ἄν ἡεκάστοτε ἄ[ρχοσι] πάντας ἐπιμέ[λ]εσθαι αὐτῶν ἡό τι ἄν δέονται. There can be no doubt that this is the conceptual equivalent to the last clause in the Sigeion decree: καὶ μὲ ἀδ[ικ]ῶνται μεδὲ ὑφ' ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τ[ῇ] ἐπείροι.

The second example comes from a fragmentary decree in honour of the Halicarnassians:

[θ ε] ο ί
 [ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ] τῷ δήμῳ· Ἐρεχ-
 [θῆς ἐπρυτάνευε, Ἄμ]υθ[έ]ων ἐγραμμάτε-
 [υε, 9 ἐπεστά]τει, Γλαύκιππος
 5 [ἦρχε, 7 . . . εἶπε· ἐπ]αινέσαι τοῖς Ἀλ-
 [ικαρνασσεῦσι ὡς οὔσ]ιν ἀνδράσιν ἀγα-
 [θοῖς ἔς τε τὴν στρατιά]ν καὶ τὴν πόλιν
 [τὴν Ἀθηναίων] *etc*

(*IG* I³ 103.1-8)

Needless to say, the structure of *IG* I³ 103 is not merely similar to that of the Sigeion decree, it is actually identical;³⁰ and the date of 410/9, as unequivocally provided by the mention of the eponymous archon Glaukippos in line 4, brings us very close to the archontic year 407/6 which I am championing for *IG* I³ 17.

In sum, there can be little doubt that, on the basis of these grammatical observations, had there been no archontic indication for *IG* I³ 17 we would have felt compelled to date it to the last decade of the fifth century. Here is the place to pause and scrutinize another noteworthy grammatical feature of the Sigeion decree, namely the use of ἔς instead of περὶ. As traditionally restored lines 6-9

30. This, of course, applies also to the prescript, which is of «Type II» according to the classificatory scheme put forward by A. S. Henry, *The Prescripts of Athenian Decrees* (*Mnemosyne* Suppl. 49), Leiden 1977. Interestingly, at 6-7, Henry cites four «Type II» prescripts: the Egesta decree *IG* I³ 11 (458/7 for Henry, but actually of 418/7), the aforementioned *IG* I³ 84 and 110 (418/7 and 408/7 respectively), and the Sigeion decree (451/0 for Henry).

read: [ἐπαινέσαι τοῖς | Σι]γειεῦ[σ]ιν [ὅς ὅσιν ἀνδράσι|ν ἄγ]αθοῖς ἐς [τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων .17.]. The use of the preposition ἐς (to, towards) instead of the commonplace περί (about, concerning) has not escaped scholarly attention.³¹ It ought, however, to have raised alarms, especially in view of two of the inscriptions cited above, namely *IG* I³ 101 and 103, where the Neapolitans and the Halicarnassians respectively are said to have been good men ἐς τε τὴν στρατιάν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων.³² The other similarities between these two inscriptions and *IG* I³ 17 question the credibility of the received restorations in lines 8-9 of the Sigeion decree, and, in addition to the archon An[tigenes], I wish to suggest the following supplement:

----- Ἀν[τιγένης ἔρχε, . . .] [.]χίδες ε[ῖ]π[ε]· ἐπαινέσαι τοῖς [Σι]γειεῦ[σ]ιν [ὅς ὅσιν ἀνδράσι]- [ν ἄγ]αθοῖς ἐς [τε τὴν στρατιάν] [καὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν Ἀθηναίων].	<i>stoichedon</i> 23
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But regardless of the supplement ἐς [τε τὴν στρατιάν], if I am right about the chronology I suggested above, a pattern is slowly emerging. The aforementioned decrees for the Neapolitans and the Halicarnassians belong to a peculiar category: they confer honours on political entities –to be more precise, city-states– rather than private individuals. This type of honorific decree seems to have had almost no predecessors before the Ionian War,³³ another argument in support of my low

31. A. S. Henry, *Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees*, Hildesheim 1983, 14-15 and especially Veligianni-Terzi, *op.cit.* (n. 4) 193 have shown that the expression ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι + εἰς was current predominantly in the fifth-century (a verdict that has recently received further support from the publication of a honorific decree from 422/1: A. P. Matthaiou, Ἀττικὸν ψήφισμα πρὸς τιμὴν Πολυπεΐθου Σιφνίου, in *Πρακτικὰ Ἀ' Διεθνοῦς Σιφναϊκοῦ Συνμποσίου. Σίφνος, 25-28 Ἰουνίου 1998. Τόμος Α': Ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοι*, Athens 2000 = *SEG* L 45.7-9: ἐπαινέσαι Πολυπεΐθῃ|ν τὸν Σίφνιον, ὅτι ἀνὴρ ἐστιν ἀγαθός ἐς τὸν δῆμον τ[ὴν] Ἀθηναίων *etc.*) For the use of ἐς in *IG* I³ 17, see Whitehead, *op.cit.* (n. 4) 47.

32. *IG* I³ 101.10-11, heavily, but safely, restored on the unequivocal evidence of ll. 53-54; *IG* I³ 103.6-8, again partly, but safely, restored on the basis of the *stoichedon* pattern.

33. It has to be made clear that I am not thinking of alliances or interstate trade agreements in which approbative clauses may exist, but are incidental (e.g., *IG* I³ 62, the decree regulating Athens' financial dealings with Aphytis). Seemingly the only exception is, *IG* I³ 1454, the decree for the *koinon* of the Eteocarpathians (dated *ca.* 445-430 in the corpus, but see B. Smarczyk, *Untersuchungen zur Religionspolitik und politischen Propaganda Athens im Delisch-Attischen Seebund*, Munich 1990, 67-68 n. 33, for a conspectus of datings, including some very late ones). But this is a peculiar document, honouring first an unknown Carpathian –and

chronology. It is not hard to see why. Such collective honours for cities rather than citizens mark a departure from the ruthless Athenian attitude of the pre-Sicily period. Once the realization that Athens was on the brink of losing the war dawned, the Athenians seemed to have softened. To the best of my knowledge, the earliest example of such honours is the decree praising the Samians for opposing an oligarchical coup in 412, the first relatively good news to reach Athens after the Sicilian catastrophe.³⁴ The same attitude is reflected in a series of settlements imposed by Athens on her recalcitrant allies in Asia Minor at approximately the same period. Think of Alcibiades and his colleagues' regaining of Selymbria, Chalcedon, and Byzantium: the same man who, if not solely responsible for the atrocities at Melos, had at least been complicit in them, merely imposed mild terms on all three cities, insisting only on the payment of tribute arrears.³⁵ What is more, Alcibiades was personally involved in the drafting of the settlement with Selymbria (*IG* I³ 118), the «conciliatory nature» of which has long been noted,³⁶ and he singlehandedly saw to it that the Athenians ratified the treaty made by the generals in Ionia with the Klazomenians at Daphnous because the latter «had been good men» (*IG* I³ 119.6, ἐπειδὴ ἄνδρες ἐγένοντο ἀγ[αθοί]). As Andrewes once duly observed, «[t]his was no time for ferocious punishment; there were others to be enticed back on the Athenian side».³⁷ And enticement is what we find in the decrees for the Neapolitans, the Halicarnassians, the Klazomenians at Daphnous, and, if I am right in my interpretation of *IG* I³ 17, the Sigeians. Approbation instead of opprobrium and protection instead of maltreatment, these were the ingredients of Athens' new emollient approach towards her allies in the Ionian War.³⁸

possibly his sons— and subsequently the Eteocarpthians for having provided sacred cypress wood for the temple of Athena (see now the comprehensive analysis by J. Ma, *Empire, Statues, and Realities*, in *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, 129-134). Such peculiarities and its isolated chronological setting, if correct, render the Eteocarpthian decree almost a unicum that does not affect my argument.

34. *IG* I³ 96, esp. ll. 1-2, [τῶ]ι μὲν δέμοι τοῖ Σαμίον ἐπαινέσαι ὅτι σφᾶς αὐτὸς [ἀπελευθέρωσαν] etc. (note the structure ἐπαινέσαι + dative, though ὡς + participle is here replaced by a ὅτι clause); cf. Thuc. VIII 21, with Gomme, Andrewes & Dover, *op.cit.* (n.19) 44-49, and G. Shipley, *A History of Samos: 800-188 B.C.*, Oxford 1987, 122-128.

35. Selymbria: Xen. *Hell.* I 1.20-21; Plut. *Alc.* 30. Chalcedon: Xen. *Hell.* I 3.8-12. Byzantium: I 3.14-22; Plut. *Alc.* 31; cf. J. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade. Étude sur l'histoire d'Athènes à la fin du V^e siècle*, Paris 1951, 283-284. For the interesting theory that Alcibiades' shadow looms prominently behind the Melian Dialogue, see M. Vickers, *Alcibiades and Melos*: Thucydides 5.84-116, *Historia* 48 (1999) 265-281.

36. Thus ML 87.

37. A. A. Andrewes, *The Spartan resurgence*, *CAH*² vol. V, 487.

38. Apart from Hatzfeld, *op.cit.* (n. 35) and Andrewes, *op.cit.* (n. 37) the only other scholar

The wider historical implications from the new date of *IG I³ 17* are readily discernible, although more will be said in the next section; the specifics, however, remain elusive. For instance, a question worth asking, but one defying a definitive answer, is whether *IG I³ 17* was passed before or after the battle of Notion, which almost certainly fell relatively late within the archonship of Antigenes.³⁹ I am inclined to believe that *IG I³ 17* preceded Notion and was, therefore, not a side-effect of the notorious Athenian defeat. In fact the Sigeion decree has a distinctive «Alcibiidean» flavour in that it echoes the series of decrees proposed by the Athenian general in relation to the Hellespontine region. On the other hand, the proposer of *IG I³ 17* is patently not Alcibiades, nor can he be identified with any known individual.⁴⁰ Of course, one could either conjecture an accomplice or simply dissociate it from Alcibiades altogether. Influential as he was, Alcibiades did not monopolize Athenian foreign policy and his actions should be seen as the manifestation of the *zeitgeist* of post-Sicily Athens.⁴¹

But the crux of the decree, as it stands, is undoubtedly the last clause promising protection «against anyone whomsoever on the mainland» (ll. 15-16: μεδὲ ὑπ' ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ). Now ἡπείρος is an interesting word. In characteristic Greek proclivity for polarization, ἡπείρος usually means «mainland» as opposed to islands,⁴² and indeed, this is how Hiller construed the lines in question in his

known to me to have grasped these «new tones of Athenian imperialism» is R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford 1972, 367-369. P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire, G&R New Surveys in Classics* no. 17, Oxford 1985, 34, makes similar observations, but his phrasing suggests that he understands such examples of «generous treatment» to have been sporadic rather than systematic.

39. Only Busolt's chronological reconstruction would place the battle of Notion at end of the archontic year 408/7, but nobody believes it nowadays. Thankfully, both the «late» chronology scheme and that introduced by Robertson, *op.cit.* (n. 18) place the battle of Notion in 406.

40. There is a rather limited number of Attic names that would fit the space available: [Διει]υ]χίδες, [Εὐα]ρ]χίδες, [Εὐμ]α]χίδες, [Εὐτ]υ]χίδες, [Ἐνι]ο]χίδες, [Μορ]υ]χίδες, [Σεμ]ι]χίδες, [Υφ-σ]ε]χίδες, [Υφσ]ι]χίδες. Of these Διευχίδης, Εὐμαχίδης, Εὐτυχίδης and Ὑψηλίδης are not attested for the fifth century, whereas the rest do not allow identification with our proposer. In general, see *LGPV* II s.vv.

41. Kagan, *op.cit.* (n. 20) 284 notes: «The Athenians appear to have been consciously following a new policy of correctness and conciliation as they tried to restore control over their empire... at least Alcibiades and Theramenes and probably Thrasyllus shared in the formulation of these strategies and policies».

42. In other words, ἡπείρος is roughly a synonym of περσεία. In her monograph on the *peraiai* of Asia Minor, Carusi, *op.cit.* (n. 2), 271-279 observed that, with the exception of Hdt. VIII 44.1, the term περσεία became current only well in the Hellenistic period. I would add that περσεία actually substituted for ἡπείρος. This lexical development is worthy of further investigation, but such an undertaking lies outside the scope of the present article.

edition of *IG* I² 32 (i.e., fragment b of *IG* I³ 17). But it also has an important secondary meaning—already extant in Aeschylus and Herodotus – specifically designating the Asiatic continent.⁴³ The second sense clearly derives from the first one, and the distinction between the two is not always clear-cut.⁴⁴ It is difficult to pinpoint the exact connotations of ἡπειρος in *IG* I³ 17, and in my view both meanings merged in the mind of whoever phrased it. Earlier commentators of the protection clause in question had noted that the vague phraseology and, more specifically, the absence of any explicit reference to the Persians meant that the danger envisaged here must have come from elsewhere. Of course they were thinking of the late 450s, but their argument retains its force even in a later context such as that advocated here. Now the Athenian generals' victorious campaign of 408/7 had deprived the Spartans of all their Hellespontine bases bar Abydos.⁴⁵ To resume a point that I have left pending: I believe that Sigeion must have been won over to the Athenians at this precise point. In this case, the restored στρατιά of line 8 would have been one of the numerous Athenian military forces operating at the time. Be that as it may, Abydos, the last remaining Peloponnesian stronghold at the Hellespont, could arguably be described as lying ἐν τῇ ἐπείρῳ in the sense of its being in Asia. Xenophon comes close to this when he relates the Athenians' abortive attempt at capturing Abydos and follows it with their subsequent winter raids εἰς τὴν ἡπειρον with the aim of ravaging the King's territory.⁴⁶

There was, however, one further place –outside the Hellespont, but fairly close to Sigeion– that lay under the enemies' sway: Antandros. In the Archaic period Antandros was, along with Sigeion, part of Lesbos' extensive *peraia*, and it remained so even after Sigeion had been irrecoverably lost for the Mytileneans. Seized by Mytilenean dissidents in 427, and recaptured by Athens in 424, Antandros had by the summer of 411 seceded from the Athenian Empire,⁴⁷ probably on

43. A. *Per.* 718: θούριος Ξέρξης, κενώσας πᾶσαν ἡπείρου πλάκα; Hdt. IV 91: Δαρεῖος ὁ Ὑστάσπεος, Περσέων τε καὶ πάσης τῆς ἡπείρου βασιλεύς.

44. Indeed, there is at least one attestation of the word ἡπειρος in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, where one can arguably trace the modality of transition from one meaning to the other: Xen. *Hell.* VI 1.12: οἷσθα δὲ δήπου ὅτι καὶ βασιλεὺς ὁ Περσῶν οὐ νήσους ἀλλ' ἡπειρον καρπούμενος πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν. My impression is that the oscillating significs of the word have to do with the abstract process of mapping the world, and I would further contend that for the mainland Greeks the geographical perception of Asia Minor consisted in an array of ἡπειροι in relation to the Aegean islands, from Cos and Samos to Chios and Lesbos, and even the tiny Tenedos.

45. D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, Leiden 1977, 128: «...Abydos remained the main Spartan base from 411 to the end of the war»; Andrewes (n. 36), 487.

46. Xen. *Hell.* I 2.17.

47. Lewis, *op.cit.* (n. 45), 110-111; H. D. Westlake, Ionians in the Ionian War, *CQ* 29 (1979) 38-39.

the same occasion as Sigeion. After the battle of Kyzikos Antandros was the place chosen by Pharnabazos to muster the defeated Peloponnesian troops with the aim of building a new fleet.⁴⁸ It was still being used by the Peloponnesians as a ship-building base and dockyard in 405,⁴⁹ so it looks almost certain that Antandros was never recovered by the Athenians. All in all, Antandros could easily be described as situated ἐν τῇ ἐπεύροι in both meanings of the word, i.e. it was in Asia, but also in the Lesbian *peraia*. Antandros was certainly a threat to Sigeion, or rather that Sigeian faction that had chosen to ally their city with Athens, whose foremost concern was that they should not be harmed by any of the Peloponnesian and/or Persian forces operating in northwestern Asia Minor: in its vagueness the phrase μὲ ἀδικῶνται μεδὲ ὑφ' ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐπεύροι could neatly allay the Sigeians' fear of both dangers.

II. The nature of Athenian imperialism: from Mytilene to Melos to Aigospotamoi

To say that Athenian imperialism has met with scholarly negligence would be a gross exaggeration. Far from it—political, economic and social conditions as well as parameters of Athenian expansionism have all been scrutinized, with a great deal of modern theory being aptly infused.⁵⁰ The ensuing output has been significant and of high quality. Nevertheless, there has often been a disproportionate preoccupation with origins. The question usually asked is «when did it all start», but very rarely have scholars tried to elucidate when and how it finished.⁵¹ Instead there has been a tendency to examine Athenian imperialism as a monolithic phenomenon; a monster that once it gripped Athens in its claws could not stop from growing bigger and greedier before eventually bringing the city to her knees. Some of the observations made above will have made clear that the actual situation was not that simple. The examination of Athens' conduct of war after Sicily, especially the settlement of affairs on the eastern front (in Byzantium, Chalcedon, Selybmria, and of course Sigeion), brings out the pattern of mild

48. Xen. *Hell.* I 1.25-26, with Lewis, *op.cit.* (n. 45), 128, and Kagan, *op.cit.* (n. 20) 274.

49. Xen. *Hell.* II 1.10, τῷ δ' ἐπιόντι ἔτει [ἐπὶ Ἀρχύτα μὲν ἐφορεύοντος, ἄρχοντος δ' ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἀλεξίου], Λύσανδρος ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἑφεσον μετεπέμψατο Ἑτερόνικον ἐκ Χίου σὺν ταῖς ναυσὶ, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας συνήθροισεν, εἴ ποὺ τις ἦν, καὶ ταύτας τ' ἐπσκευάζε καὶ ἄλλας ἐν Ἀντάνδρῳ ἐναυπηγεῖτο; cf. Kagan, *op.cit.* (n. 20) 380.

50. Any attempt to cite the enormous bibliography is destined to fail. The classic treatment is still J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (transl. by P. Thody), Oxford 1963.

51. See, e.g., very recently C. Pébarthe, *L'empire athénien est-il toujours un empire comme les autres?*, *DHA Suppl.* 5 (2011) 57-88, a useful study, which however does not look into Athenian imperialism in the late fifth century B.C.

policy which stands in stark contrast with the more familiar model of the aggressive Athenian expansionism of the 420s and the early 410s.

That this pattern is not the result of accidental preservation of epigraphical material or of manipulative isolation of selected ancient extracts can be seen by heeding some further literary sources. The impact of the battle of Aigospotamoi on the Athenian collective psyche has been wonderfully immortalized by Xenophon in his quasi-poetic account of that horrendous night when the sleepless Athenians, from the Piraeus to the astu, mourned not only their dead ... ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἔτι ἑαυτοὶ ἑαυτούς, πείσεθαι νομίζοντες οἷα ἐποίησαν Μηλίους τε Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποίκους ὄντας, κρατήσαντες πολιορκίᾳ, καὶ Ἰστιαίας καὶ Σκιωναίους καὶ Τορωναίους καὶ Αἰγινήτας καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων.⁵² It is surprising how little attention has been paid to what has been described as «Xenophon's most famous sentence». Thus, the specific examples cited by Xenophon are thought to bring out a variety aimed at demonstrating that the «Athenians habitually behaved harshly».⁵³ This calls for scrutiny. The geographical pattern is wide enough, but the brunt of the extract is modified by the participial clause κρατήσαντες πολιορκίᾳ. Its position has been taken to apply only to the Melians. But is this true? Skione and Torone were also destroyed after a siege,⁵⁴ so they too must be taken together with κρατήσαντες πολιορκίᾳ. And if the annihilation of the Aeginetans alluded to here is that of 424,⁵⁵ as it should be, then we have yet another specimen of a harshly punished besieged people. It would be inconsistent then if Hestiaia were somehow different and we should certainly infer that all five cases singled out by Xenophon refer to harsh punishment of Athenian allies following a siege. Thus πολιορκία is the key concept by virtue of which Xenophon masterfully introduces his next theme, the siege of Athens of 405/4. This is one crucial aspect of Xenophon's extract. The other is the chronological distribution of the examples adduced. Melos, of 415, comes closest to the time of action described by the historian. The others fall in the 420s, with the exception of Hestiaia, which almost certainly dates to 446.⁵⁶ Scholars have detected intertextuality in Xenophon's account: Xenophon, they argue, consciously responded to a

52. Xen. *Hell.* II 2.3. For a positive literary assessment of this passage see V. Grey, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica*, London 1989, 144-145.

53. E.g. Krentz, *op.cit.* (n. 18) 181.

54. Torone: Thuc. V 2.2-3; Skione: Thuc. V 32.3, with Gomme, Andrewes & Dover, *op.cit.* (n. 2) 30.

55. Thuc. IV 56.2-57 (Aeginetans settled at Thyrea). G. E. Underhill, *Commentary on Xenophon's Hellenica*, Oxford 1900, *ad loc.* cites Thuc. II 27; but the expulsion of the Aeginetans from their island though harsh enough did not entail, as far as we know, any loss of life.

56. Thuc. I 114.3.

series of points first raised by Thucydides.⁵⁷ This inference, especially in the exemplary form recently presented by Rood, seems basically correct, but we should be careful not to construct too neat a picture. Neither Thucydides nor Xenophon mention any city harshly destroyed by Athens in the post-Sicily period. Xenophon, in particular, ever the moralist and covering a much larger period than his predecessor, would have had every opportunity to record any instance of excessive Athenian cruelty. That he did not do so should surely be ascribed to the fact that there had not been a single such case.

The hiatus of ten years separating Melos from the aftermath of Aigospotamoi invites us to move to that eternal Thucydidean enigma, the Melian Dialogue. Often dubbed «disproportionate to its military significance», or something along these lines, the episode of Melos' ruthless destruction, or rather the parley preceding it, has been predominantly considered as the ultimate Thucydidean discourse on imperialistic power.⁵⁸ Yet more than one scholar has posed the query: why the emphasis on Melos? This question is essentially linked with the related issue of the Dialogue's date of composition. Approaches hitherto taken vary widely, but I strongly believe that an answer can easily be given once the Melian episode is approached through the prism of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, secondarily through Thucydides' own analysis, and last but not least in light of Athens' re-orientated external policy, as revealed by the inscriptions. Then Thucydides' choice turns out to be anything but arbitrary. The historian did not randomly single out a small city crushed by a brutal hegemonic power just for the sake of constructing a discursive paradigm. Nor was the fact that Melos was considered to be a Spartan colony historiographically overriding,⁵⁹ although it certainly mattered in the minds of *syngeneia*-obsessed contemporary Greeks. As it happens, the Melian episode is the last act of Athenian brutality before the Sicilian disaster; it is the culmination and the epitome of Athens' imperialistic arrogance. But, most importantly, it is also the *very last successful manifestation of*

57. See W. Jaeger, *Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy*, Cambridge 1938, 208, n. 12; E. M. Soulis, *Xenophon and Thucydides: A Study on the Historical Methods of Xenophon in the Hellenica with Special Reference to the Influence of Thucydides*, Athens 1972, 114; T. Rood, Xenophon and Diodorus: Continuing Thucydides, in C. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and his World*, (*Historia Einzelschr.* 172), Stuttgart 2004, 351-359.

58. Thuc. V 84-116. Once more, the secondary bibliography is enormous and, to a large extent, overlaps with that concerning Athenian imperialism. One could hardly do better than start with S. Hornblower (n. 2), 216-256 and work one's way back through the cited bibliography.

59. Laconian origins of Melos: I. Malkin, *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*, Cambridge 1994, 74-78.

this spirit in the whole Peloponnesian War. And despite some scholars' inclination to date the composition of the Melian Dialogue before the end of the Peloponnesian War, the menacing allusions to Athens' final defeat, as appear in V 89-91, are simply too noticeable to dismiss as coincidences. The Melian Dialogue was almost certainly written after 404.⁶⁰ When in 405/4 the Athenians faced for the first time the prospect of total annihilation, both they and their opponents found their recent record of war conduct morally impeccable. Alas, the memory of their older wrongdoings had not faded away. There was of course an array of pertinent examples, e.g., Aigina, Skione, Torone, but when Thucydides, just like any other Athenian, pondered his motherland's hegemonic behaviour before the final defeat it was Melos that naturally came to mind as the very last act of brutal, inhumane imperialism. The emphasis on Melos, as formulated in the homonymous Dialogue, was mainly dictated by chronological considerations. This may seem like a mundane answer to a long-standing debate, but, despite its simplicity, if not because of it, it is very appealing.

Of course, by itself this «chronological» explanation accounts neither for the dialogic form Thucydides chose for the Melian debate nor for its actual content, which must be Thucydides' elaboration on an extant ideological discourse. What it does show, however, is the need for contextualization. The more benevolent position adopted by Athens under Alcibiades after 411 proves, to paraphrase profanely a popular motto of the modern anti-globalization movement, that «another imperialism was possible»; an imperialism where power did not have to equate to blind, brutal and immoral force, but one that could achieve success and steadiness through some concessions. This should hardly come as a surprise to any diligent reader of Thucydides. The historian himself was aware of this alternative imperialistic model. He had mused on it, not as much in the Melian Dialogue as in the equally well-known Mytilenean Debate.⁶¹ Therein Diodotos, arguably Thucydides' mouthpiece, successfully advocates a reasoned treatment of the rebellious Mytileneans: avoidance of unnecessary violence and even some limited clemency constitute the axis of his speech. Remarkably he even refers to the Mytilenean commons as benefactors (εὐεργέται),⁶² a term reflecting language found in honorific decrees. Now Diodotos was no philanthropist. He did not set

60. J. de Romilly (n. 49) 275-286.

61. Thuc. III 37-49: For an introduction to the vast bibliography see S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*. Volume I: Books I-III, Oxford 1991, 420-438, esp. 421-422 for the major works before 1991.

62. Thuc. III 47.3: εἰ δὲ διαφθερεῖτε τὸν δῆμον τὸν Μυτιληναίων, ὃς οὐ μετέσχε τῆς ἀποστάσεως, ἐπειδὴ τε ὅπλων ἐκράτησεν, ἐκὼν παρέδωκε τὴν πόλιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδικήσετε τοὺς εὐεργέτας κτείνοντες etc.

out to undermine Athenian imperialism. On the contrary, his main concern was the effective preservation of Athenian supremacy and, ultimately, the unhindered exaction of money from the subject cities.⁶³ As it happens, Athenian policy in the Ionian War was not much different. As we have seen, the surrender of Kyzikos, the settlement with Selymbria and the capture of Chalcedon were all concluded with an explicit obligation of remuneration in money.⁶⁴ A last episode of the Ionian War, rather neglected because omitted by Xenophon, brings out a similar pattern. In 410 an Athenian fleet under Theramenes sailed around the Aegean laying waste to enemy territory and collecting booty. The motive for Theramenes' raids, as given by Diodorus, has an interesting beneficial facet: relief of both the Athenians *and* the allies from their excessive monetary obligations. Eventually Theramenes made a stop at Paros. There, as in other islands, he restored democracy and exacted a large sum of money from the supporters of oligarchy. Nothing in Diodorus' narrative implies that Theramenes indulged himself in any unnecessary atrocities against the (presumably wealthy) oligarchs, and we should be fairly certain that bloodshed was avoided.⁶⁵ The Parian incident perfectly exemplifies both Athens' preoccupation with refilling the empty imperial reserves and the relatively soft methods by which such aims were met. In its similarity to the Hellespontine operations it shows how, roughly in the last decade of the fifth century, Athenian hegemony was pursued, and temporarily achieved, by clinging to a Diodotian model of conduct of war.

Thus, Athenian imperialism proves to be a flexible phenomenon rather than the strict unbending structure very often assumed. Moreover, it did undergo a substantial change. Granted, its transformation was the result of the historical accident of Sicily, but still this does not justify historians' lax approach. To say that Athens, be it under Pericles, Cleon, or some other demagogue, was constantly

63. Thuc. III 46.3-4: ἡμῖν τε πῶς οὐ βλάβη δαπανᾶν καθημένοις διὰ τὸ ἀξύμβατον καί, ἣν ἔλωμεν, πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβεῖν καὶ τῆς προσόδου τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπ' αὐτῆς στέρεσθαι; ἰσχύομεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους τῷδε. ὥστε οὐ δικαστὰς ὄντας δεῖ ἡμᾶς μᾶλλον τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων ἀκριβεῖς βλάπτεσθαι ἢ ὁρᾶν ὅπως ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον μετρίως κολάζοντες ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔξομεν ἐς χρημάτων λόγον ἰσχυοῦσαι χρῆσθαι *etc.*

64. For the cases adumbrated in the text see L. Kallet, *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition and its Aftermath*, Berkeley 2001, 223-224; for Athenian finance (both imperial and domestic) in this period see L. J. Samons II, *Empire of the Owl. Athenian Imperial Finance*, (*Historia Einzelschr.* 142), Stuttgart 2000, 249-293.

65. Diod. Sic. XIII 47.7-8: βουλόμενος δὲ τοὺς τε πολῖτας καὶ συμμάχους ἀναπαῦσαι τῶν εἰσφορῶν, τὴν τε τῶν πολεμίων χώραν ἐπόρθησε καὶ πολλὰς ὠφελείας ἤθροισεν. ἐπῆρει δὲ καὶ τὰς συμμαχίδας πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς νεωτερίζοντας εἰσεπράττετο χρήματα. καταπλεύσας δ' εἰς Πάρον καὶ καταλαβὼν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει, τῷ μὲν δήμῳ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποκατέστησε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἀφαμένων τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας χρημάτων πλῆθος εἰσεπράξατο.

and relentlessly ruthlessly neglects the evidence. She was ruthless, but only down to Melos, and even then not always so, as can be seen in Diodotos' triumph over Cleon. There can be little doubt that the Syracusans and their allies would have experienced the «Melian» treatment had the Athenians prevailed, but this was not to be. And once the tides of war changed, once the Athenians realized that the hideous crimes they had so often, albeit not persistently, perpetrated against their defeated foes could now boomerang on them, they reorientated their whole strategy. Self-evidently they would pursue military victory with vigour, but they would follow their battlefield successes with benevolence, understanding and approbation. And this was largely, albeit not exclusively, the policy of Alcibiades.

One is left to wonder what Thucydides would have made of this. He had lived through the war and knew, or professed to know, the reasons behind Athens' defeat. I suspect that Thucydides had actually realized the importance of the repentant Alcibiades' new policy. Halfway through his account of the infamous assembly that voted for the undertaking of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides digressively offers a portrait of Alcibiades and his treatment by his fellow-citizens: φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίκαιαν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ' ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν, ὥς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντος τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.⁶⁶ There are some difficult textual problems about this passage, but its meaning has been considerably clarified by Dover: Alcibiades' adroit war conduct belongs in no other period than 411-407. His removal after Notion promptly led to Athens' collapse.⁶⁷ Now, this is important. Thucydides' earlier portrayal of Alcibiades was far from flattering. He dismissed the flamboyant general as immature and certainly imputed to him the defeat at Mantinea. But post-Sicily Alcibiades was a different man, one who *could* have led his compatriots to an unexpected victory had he not fallen victim to the envy his extraordinary personality unfailingly generated. Of course, any reader of Thuc. VI 16.5 will almost immediately recall Alcibiades' military efficiency that students of Xenophon, Diodorus and Plutarch are so familiar with, but we should not restrict ourselves to thinking exclusively of battle strategy, tactics and the like. Treatment of defeated enemies and rebellious subjects as well as acknowledgment and commendation of Athens' loyal allies were undoubt-

66. Thuc. VI 15.4, with the scrupulous analysis by Gomme, Andrewes & Dover, *op.cit.* (n. 2) 242-245.

67. Dover's inference (see n. 66 above) is defended by D. Gribble, *Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation*, Oxford 1999, 182-185, *contra* Hatzfeld & Brunt.

edly part and parcel of τὰ τοῦ πολέμου. And at that Alcibiades certainly excelled. What is striking, however, is to discover that Alcibiades' foreign policy view during the Ionian War was ironically anticipated by the similar stance he had taken at the time of his treacherous transfer of allegiance to the Spartans; in 415 he had urged his newly found friends to pay heed to his advice so that they would «rule a willing Greece not through violence, but by goodwill».⁶⁸ It appears from this passage that Alcibiades' *eunoia* (εὐνοία) towards Selymbria and Chalcedon in 408, far from being incidental, marked a dramatic, but genuine, change of mind that probably occurred much earlier in 415.

The previous discussion suggests that Thucydides was aware of Athens' transformation as revolving around the reborn Alcibiades: he alluded to it in VI 16.5, but never got round to fully developing it. Xenophon, I have contended, even if not fully aware of it, was so well conditioned to Athens' new policy that he could not have brought himself to argue otherwise even if he had wished to do so. If he failed to theorize it, that was largely due to the fact that he was the lesser historian. One last Xenophontic passage should suffice to demonstrate the importance of Athens' policy of praising her allies. I have already argued that after Sicily Athens did not commit any atrocities against her enemies. There was, however, one particular point when Athens briefly contemplated resuscitating some old bad habits: just before the battle of Aigospotamoi a decree was passed, probably on the instigation of the Athenian general Philokles, whereby the Athenians decided to cut off the right hand of any enemy captured alive. The crushing Peloponnesian victory meant Athens' malicious plans never materialized; instead Philokles was executed by Lysander himself, and, on a dubious ancient tradition, all Athenian captives were put to death.⁶⁹ But the crucial thing is that Athens had

68. Thuc. VI 92.5: καὶ τῆς ἀπάσης Ἑλλάδος ἐκούσης καὶ οὐ βίᾳ, κατ' εὐνοίαν δὲ ἡγήσθε. Gomme, Andrewes & Dover, *op.cit.* (n. 2) ad loc. noted: «[E]mpires and leagues are in fact normally held together βίᾳ: an empire held together by goodwill is a superior achievement, and therefore an ideal». Needless to say, by virtue of the analysis I have provided above, this remark misses entirely the point. P. Low, *Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power*, Cambridge 2007, 53 is considerably better.

69. Xen. *Hell.* II 1.31-32. Note that Xenophon speaks first of ἃ ἐψηφισμένοι (sc. Ἀθηναῖοι) ᾗσαν ποιεῖν and then of the ἐκκλησία in which the ψήφισμα περὶ τῆς ἀποτομῆς τῶν χειρῶν was passed. This is good political terminology, but should we think of an assembly decree passed at Athens? I think the answer should be in the negative; it seems more likely that we have here a resolution reached by the Athenian expeditionary force, a case of an army qua *polis* (for a recent brilliant discussion of the topic see S. Hornblower, «This was Decided» (edoxe tauta): The Army as *polis* in Xenophon's *Anabasis*—and Elsewhere, in R. Lane Fox (ed.), *The Long March. Xenophon and the Ten Thousand*, New Haven & London 2004, 243-263, who does not, however, probe into the present passage). Execution of Athenian captives: Plut. *Alc.* 37.4; *Lys.*

the intention of carrying out the repugnant decision. It was a *paranomia*, according to Xenophon, that immediately gave the Peloponnesians the excuse to invoke Athens' earlier misdeeds and call for her destruction. Most significantly, it was a reversal of the policy implemented by Alcibiades during the Ionian War. Unsurprisingly, the one man explicitly said to have opposed the barbaric decree was Adeimantos, arguably Alcibiades' only friend amongst the Athenian generals at Aigospotamoi.⁷⁰ Philokles' ill-conceived decree tallies well with the equally misjudged Athenian strategy at Aigospotamoi. The abandonment of the policy of approbation, which was so successful as long as it lasted, turns out to be a mistake both symptomatic and symbolic of what was wrong about an Athens that failed to build on the good work done by her most efficient leader after Pericles. Last but not least, the very fact that the mutilation decree *was* recounted by Xenophon –no doubt because of its ethical implications– counterfactually proves that the historian would not shy away from pointing out his native city's wrongdoings.⁷¹

To sum up: re-examination of *IG I³ 17* has shaken some old assumptions. The traditional date of 451/0 is no longer tenable. One has to choose between Mattingly's 418/7 and the archonship of Antigenes in 407/6. The lettering does not exclude either date, but epigraphical parallels and historical contextualization appear to reinforce the low dating. Paradoxically, the new low chronology, though not totally consistent with Mattingly's reconstruction, would not even have been considered without his seminal work; Mattingly has to be applauded. When I first looked at *IG I³ 17* I was mostly concerned with technical issues of epigraphical methodology. Soon it became apparent that the Sigeion decree highlighted an aspect of Athenian foreign policy during the Ionian War which, although it has not passed unnoticed, has been rather overlooked: following the Sicilian catastrophe Athens showed an uncharacteristically forbearing attitude towards her allies. In turn, this brought my attention to a far more important historical issue: the development of Athenian imperialism. Athens' hegemonic aspirations were never in doubt. What is debatable, however, is whether Athens stubbornly and relentlessly followed a policy of bullying and havoc. And this proves to be untrue.

13.1. Diod. Sic. XIII 106.7 mentions only Philokles' death; Xenophon records the Peloponnesians' decision to execute the Athenian captives, not the action itself (see Krentz, *op.cit.* [n.18] 180).

70. Adeimantos and Alcibiades: see B. S. Strauss, *Aegospotami reexamined*, *AJP* 104 (1983) 30–31.

71. E. Badian, *Xenophon the Athenian*, in C. Tuplin (ed.), *Xenophon and his World*, *Historia Einzelschr.* 172 (2004) 49–52 has been the latest to argue, probably correctly, that Xenophon's treatment of Athens in *Hellenica* is by and large favourable.

The exact form of Athenian imperialism was a negotiable constant. To the imperialistic model of Cleon and the young Alcibiades one can juxtapose the alternative path of Diodotos and the Alcibiades of the Ionian War. This was a model that aimed at maintaining Athenian hegemony by forgiving and conferring honours upon loyal allies. It did not lead to Athenian victory, not because it was intrinsically ineffective, but partly because it was put to work too late in the Peloponnesian War and mainly because its advocates –most notably the mature Alcibiades– were politically defeated by their opponents.



Fig. 1. *IG I³ 17, fr. a* (Courtesy of the Athenian Agora Excavations – ASCSA)



Fig. 2. *IG* 1³ 17, fr. *b* (Courtesy of the Epigraphical Museum)