Thesis
Signals in two-sided search
- Abstract:
-
We introduce signals to search models of two-sided matching markets and explore the implications for efficiency. In a labour market model in which firms can advertise wages and workers can choose effort, we find that advertisements can help overcome the Diamond paradox. Advertisements fix workers' beliefs, so that workers will react if firms renege on advertisements. Firms then prefer to advertise truthfully. Next, we consider a market with two-sided heterogeneity in which types are only priv...
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Authors
Contributors
+ Keller, G
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Role:
Supervisor
+ Postel-Vinay, F
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Role:
Supervisor
Funding
+ Economic and Social Research Council
More from this funder
Funding agency for:
Poeschel, F
Grant:
PTA-031-2004-00250
Bibliographic Details
- Publication date:
- 2011
- Type of award:
- DPhil
- Level of award:
- Doctoral
- Awarding institution:
- University of Oxford
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:c1decfbb-5fdf-4c13-805e-2cc7fe115641
- Local pid:
- ora:6333
- Deposit date:
- 2012-07-05
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Poeschel, F
- Copyright date:
- 2011
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