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Thesis

Signals in two-sided search

Abstract:

We introduce signals to search models of two-sided matching markets and explore the implications for efficiency. In a labour market model in which firms can advertise wages and workers can choose effort, we find that advertisements can help overcome the Diamond paradox. Advertisements fix workers' beliefs, so that workers will react if firms renege on advertisements. Firms then prefer to advertise truthfully. Next, we consider a market with two-sided heterogeneity in which types are only priv...

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Oxford college:
Brasenose College
Role:
Author

Contributors

Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Role:
Supervisor
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Role:
Supervisor
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Funding agency for:
Poeschel, F
Grant:
PTA-031-2004-00250
Publication date:
2011
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:c1decfbb-5fdf-4c13-805e-2cc7fe115641
Local pid:
ora:6333
Deposit date:
2012-07-05

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