Electoral Rules and Legislative Behaviour:
Cross-national Micro-level Evidence from the Bundestag and the UK House of Commons, 2005-2015



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Abstract

This thesis presents a new approach to the long-standing question of how electoral rules influence the behaviour of legislators. It begins with the argument that fresh empirical advances can be made by moving beyond the pervasive but rigid assumption that all legislators want to be re-elected and, by extension, that every incumbent values this goal to the same degree. Rather, I propose that individual Members of Parliament (MPs) vary in the extent to which they personally desire or depend upon re-election. Following the principles of a difference-in-differences design, this observation allows me to devise a theoretical framework capable of testing whether MPs' vote-seeking behaviour differs *within* parliaments in a way that varies predictably *across* countries. Specifically, I propose that in electoral systems where party-centric behaviour increases re-election chances, MPs particularly invested in the goal of re-election should cater to the party to an even greater extent than their colleagues. Conversely, in systems where a personal vote can generate electoral gains, MPs most ambitious for re-election should engage in this type of vote-winning strategy to the greatest extent. I test this prediction across the UK House of Commons and the German Bundestag, and within Germany's mixed-member system. Newly-collected biographical data on over 1700 MPs is used to conduct the first systematic MP-level operationalisation of re-election ambition based on legislators' career backgrounds. Career politicians are thereby identified as those most ambitious for re-election. Using voting behaviour from 1.8 million vote choices in legislative roll-calls as a proxy for the degree to which an MP caters to the party or to his or her personal reputation, the quantitative multilevel analysis reveals strong evidence for the proposed behavioural pattern. The contribution made by this study is two-fold. First, it uncovers the interaction between electoral rules and individual re-election ambition as a new explanation for MP-level variation in legislative behaviour. Second, its research design overcomes shortcomings in previous empirical tests for the existing theory on how electoral rules impact MP behaviour (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995), producing more robust evidence in support of this influential framework.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Legislators want to be re-elected. This assumption has proven to be one of the most powerful and widely-accepted axioms in existing explanations for why legislators behave in the way they do. To identify the causal effect of institutional factors such as electoral systems on the behaviour of incumbents, previous approaches have found it conceptually useful to take an aggregate-level view of legislators as a homogeneous unit with fixed goals and ambitions. The implication of this proposed uniformity in motivations, however, is that every incumbent is assumed to value the goal of re-election to the same degree. But is this an empirically sound assumption to make?

We know that people differ in their professional ambitions or goals, and that politicians are no exception to this. At least since Max Weber's famous speech on *Politics as a Vocation* (1919), we are aware that political actors may vary in the degree to which they personally depend on or value a sustained career in politics, and ample evidence points to such variation among Members of Parliament (MPs). A member of the UK House of Commons, for example, notes how some legislators "have done damn all with their lives but politics, so they don't have much to go back to" (see Riddell 1993, 254), while another observes that "if you're a professional politician, the moment you leave office, you don't have a profession" (Sieghart 2009, as quoted in Byrne and Theakston 2015, 20). Further illustration of such dynamics comes from a recent parliamentary debate in the German Bundestag, during which one legislator attacked another by stating that "there is no-one in this parliament more

dependent on politics than you are. You don't have any professional qualifications, so what else would you do [for a living]?" (Plenarprotokoll 17/198 2012, 23874).

Other MPs face significantly less pressure to ensure a continued career in politics. A former Bundestag MP, for example, explains why she has found it easy to cope with electoral defeat: "I love working as a lawyer. No need to worry about me [after losing my mandate]" (Deininger 2013). "Politics? In the end, [they] can take it or leave it", is how Anthony King describes the mindset of legislators who have not focused their entire careers on politics (1981, 283). These anecdotal observations highlight the idea that parliamentarians are anything but a homogeneous entity when it comes to re-election ambition, but that they vary in the degree to which they personally desire and depend on achieving this goal.

Despite this more complex reality, the simplifying assumption that all MPs value re-election and should do so to the same degree has played an important role in enhancing our knowledge of how electoral rules influence the behavioural choices made by legislators. Specifically, the premise of uniformity in individual motivation has, in the tradition of the neo-institutionalist method (cf. Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003), helped isolate the causal impact of electoral institutions on legislative behaviour. The central theory from this macro-level literature predicts that where electoral systems make the cultivation of a personal vote electorally beneficial to the individual, we should see, at the aggregate-level, a greater degree of personalistic vote-seeking behaviour by MPs compared to systems where loyal support of the collective party reputation is believed to increase legislators' re-election chances (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Lancaster 1986; Mitchell 2000).

This theory's simple and compelling logic has generated a fast-growing research field focused on an empirical and comparative investigation of its intuitive predictions.

At all times relying on the assumption that legislators' re-election ambitions are fixed, scholars have tested whether aggregate-level proxies for party-centric or individualistic behaviour, such as party unity in legislative voting, vary across countries and electoral systems in a way predicted by the comparative theory. The findings, however, have proven mixed. Some cross-national contributions show a weak relationship between parliament-level party unity and the degree to which a country's electoral rules generate party-centric or personalistic behavioural incentives for their MPs (Depauw and Martin 2009). Others find limited evidence of such a link (e.g. Sieberer 2006) or identify differences only between some electoral systems (Carey 2007). Further studies suggest that the association is contingent on the candidate nomination process (Coman 2015; Shomer 2016), while MPs' attitudes expressed in surveys lend some support to the comparative theory (André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005).

In this thesis, I propose that the research field can benefit from a fresh approach to the empirical study of electoral rules and MP behaviour. My approach is thereby driven by the observation that existing contributions have largely overlooked the interaction between institutional- and individual-level sources of behavioural incentives as a way to shed new light on the effect of the electoral system. More specifically, I suggest that advances can be made by relaxing the implicit assumption that all incumbents desire re-election to the same degree. This step allows me to devise a new approach to the long-standing empirical puzzle of *whether* and *how* electoral rules influence the legislative behaviour of MPs.

In addressing this overarching research question, I do not limit my explanatory narrative to the dominant macro-level account, but take a more granular, actor-focused perspective sensitive to differences in behavioural incentives at the level of

the individual MP. This leads to a more nuanced question asking *which* types of institutional factors incentivise *which* MPs to cater to the party or to their personal reputation, and to what extent. Put differently: how is the impact of the electoral system moderated by variation in behavioural incentives and motivation at the MP-level? The following paragraphs introduce my behavioural model devised to address this question and outline the benefits of exercising greater sensitivity to the ambitions of the individual legislator.

My framework begins with the central proposition that incumbents should differ in the intensity with which they value re-election. By relaxing the commonly assumed uniformity in re-election ambition, I allow for variation in individual motives at the MP-level while also accounting for the existing expectations concerning the behavioural incentives generated by the electoral rules (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Mitchell 2000). As a result, this two-tiered approach offers a more differentiated prediction on the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour and facilitates a comparative test of whether individual MPs behave differently *within* parliaments in a way that varies predictably *across* countries.

Specifically, I propose that if the existing theoretical predictions hold explanatory value, then we should observe the following behavioural pattern: in electoral systems where it is more advantageous to defer to the party to enhance re-election chances, MPs who attach a particularly high value to this goal should cater to the party to an even greater extent than their colleagues. Conversely, in systems where dependence on the party label for re-election is less pronounced, and where incumbents expect a personal reputation to yield electoral gains, those MPs particularly invested in re-election should use this vote-seeking strategy to the greatest extent compared to MPs with lower re-election ambitions.

In addition to providing a new explanatory angle on behavioural patterns at the MP-level, the key conceptual benefit of the model's set-up as a within-system cross-country approach lies in its ability to establish a more robust account of an electoral system's influence on legislative behaviour. A core drawback in many existing aggregate-level approaches is the fact that macro-indicators of personalistic or party-centric behaviour, such as parliament-level party unity, are susceptible to confounding country-level factors unrelated to the electoral system – a limitation that may lead to spurious results (cf. André, Freire, and Papp 2014). The micro-level of analysis at the centre of my study is less affected by these potentially distorting elements in aggregate cross-country comparisons, while the comparative nature of the approach still allows for variation at the institutional level of interest (see also Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967; Lijphart 1971). This design enables me to develop a new empirical investigation of the influential theory on electoral rules and MP behaviour. My approach is thus motivated not only by the shortcoming of previous attempts but also by a conviction that the literature's theoretically intuitive and powerful framework deserves further empirical exploration.

An empirical test of my theoretical model requires an individual-level proxy of an MP's desire for re-election. To this end, I develop an original operationalisation derived from MPs' extra-parliamentary career backgrounds. Along with a number of subsidiary measures, I argue that those MPs whose previous career paths designate them as "career politicians" should have the greatest economic and emotional investment in ensuring a sustained career in parliament. This approach represents, to my knowledge, the first systematic use of career background to capture the degree to which an individual legislator desires and depends on re-election. To facilitate this operationalisation, I use new MP-level data collected for the purpose of this study. On the outcome side, I follow previous approaches in conceptualising

an MP's degree of party-centric or personalistic behaviour through the extent to which the individual displays party loyalty or dissent in parliamentary voting.

I test my behavioural predictions in two different settings. The main analysis is conducted across MPs from the German Bundestag and the UK House of Commons before comparing differences in MP behaviour across the two electoral tiers of Germany's mixed-member system. Using the newly collected biographical data on over 1700 MPs as well as the 1.8 million legislative vote choices made by the MPs between 2005-2015, multilevel analysis shows significant and highly substantive evidence for the difference in differences proposed by my comparative model: within the party-centric setting of the German electoral rules, those MPs most invested in re-election (i.e. career politicians) are nearly two times more likely to display *party-centric* voting behaviour than their non-career politician peers. Conversely in the UK, career politician MPs are up to three times more likely to engage in *personalistic* behaviour by displaying dissent. Tests across district and list MPs within Germany's two-tier system further validate these results.

The empirical analysis therefore uncovers a new explanatory account of how the interaction between electoral rules and individual-level motives enables or constrains the behavioural choices made by incumbents. Most importantly, however, these results add new and more robust evidence in support of the hypothesised – but still insufficiently substantiated – relationship between electoral rules and MP behaviour as proposed by the existing theory. By revealing this link through its MP-level perspective, this study also provides new and systematic evidence that the occupational background of an MP can have an impact on his or her legislative behaviour. My comparative approach and its consideration of the institutional environment, however, suggest that the direction of this effect is influenced by the

electoral system in which the individual operates. As a result, we learn about the interactive effect of institutional- and individual-level incentives on the degree to which MPs engage in party-centric or individualistic behaviour.

This study is thus first and foremost concerned with explaining the behaviour of Members of Parliament and, in doing so, conducts a new test of the conventional theories linking electoral rules and MP behaviour. On a second level, this is also a study about the professional backgrounds and ambitions of MPs both in their capacity as legislators and as individuals trying to navigate the uncertainties inherent to a career in politics. The following section puts my approach in the context of existing MP-level perspectives on behavioural incentives.

New insights through an MP-level approach

As outlined above, this thesis seeks to provide new insights into how electoral rules condition the behaviour of legislators. My approach distinguishes itself from most previous contributions by moving beyond the idea that motives such as re-election ambition must be held constant in order to identify the impact of electoral rules. Rather, I propose that MPs should differ in the intensity of their re-election ambitions and that this view can help us gain new empirical insights into the behavioural effect of electoral institutions.

The notion that legislators vary in the degree to which they desire certain goals is not new. Specifically, the ideas developed as part of Ambition Theory (Schlesinger 1966) as well as related applications (e.g. Black 1972; Herrick and Moore 1993; Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing 1994; Hibbing 1986; Rohde 1979) are relevant to my study insofar as they suggest that MP-level differences in the ambition to reach certain goals can help explain behavioural variation. Empirically, these US-centric

studies have focused largely on the individual ambitions of US Representatives, either for winning higher office within the legislature or for reaching more prestigious positions within the US political system beyond the House.

However, few related contributions have explicitly relaxed the commonly assumed uniformity in ambition for *re-election* (for some exceptions, see chapter 2), as is done in this thesis. Moreover, empirical applications of the more fine-grained view as proposed by Ambition Theory have largely been limited to single-case studies focused on the US context (cf. Crisp et al. 2004) and lack a comparative perspective, particularly across parliamentary systems (cf. Sieberer and Müller 2015). As a result, the existing analyses of legislators' ambitions and their behavioural effects often overlook variation in the institutional setting as a mediating factor. The comparative, cross-national MP-level approach developed in this thesis seeks to fill this gap.

Finally, and despite various empirical applications of Ambition Theory, the use of differences in MPs' ambitions to explain their behaviour continues to be rare. A core reason for this dearth lies in the difficulty of finding reliable real-life proxies that can capture individual-level differences in ambition (cf. Herrick and Moore 1993; Patty 2016). To test its theoretical framework, this thesis offers an original operationalisation of legislators' re-election ambitions by identifying incumbents who have focused their entire professional lives on politics as those who desire and depend on re-election the most.

In a broader sense, and through this operationalisation, my approach is contextualised by the growing scholarly interest in the behavioural consequences of MPs' individual characteristics and traits. Older studies of MP backgrounds were predominately concerned with descriptive or normative questions concerning the composition of parliament and its representativeness. Over the last decade or so, a

new wave of MP-level work in the context of parliamentary systems has focused on systematic and large-N analysis of how individual characteristics or socio-economic background can help explain MP-level variation in legislative activities such as speech-making, roll-call voting, or asking parliamentary questions. Explanatory variables include gender (e.g. Bäck, Debus, and Müller 2014; Cowley and Childs 2003), parental status (e.g. Baumann, Debus, and Müller 2015; McKay 2011), ethnicity (e.g. Saalfeld 2011), religious denomination (e.g. Baumann, Debus, and Müller 2015) and local political experience (e.g. Tavits 2009; 2010). Advances have even been made in establishing personality profiles of legislators and in testing for behavioural effects (e.g. Caprara et al. 2010; for the US Congress, see Hollibaugh, Ramey, and Klingler 2016; Ramey, Klingler, and Hollibaugh 2016).

An analysis of the legislative voting behaviour of career politicians contributes to this growing body of work. This focus gains particular relevance given that, despite a keen public interest as well as some speculative or anecdotal predictions (e.g. Cowley 2005; Herzog 1990; King 1981; Marshall-Andrews 2011; Riddell 1993), a systematic analysis of how MPs' professional backgrounds impact their legislative behaviour (and why) is still largely missing from this new wave of MP-level studies. Moreover, the focus of these studies on MP-level factors as the core behavioural determinants means that less attention is usually given to the potentially mediating impact of the larger institutional setting on the effect of these individual traits. By integrating an MP-level perspective into a comparative cross-national model, my approach seeks to uncover how differences in MP-level motivations and backgrounds interact with the larger institutional setting.

This thesis is thus motivated by the following observation: on the one hand, existing work on MPs' ambitions as well as the more recent analyses of the behavioural

impact of their backgrounds often lack sensitivity to the larger institutional environment. The prevalent macro-level approach to electoral rules and MP behaviour, on the other hand, has limited itself to a predominantly one-dimensional use of the conceptual flexibility offered by neo-institutionalism, as its explanatory focus on institutions largely precludes it from accounting for differences in individual traits and ambitions (in fact, these are explicitly held constant). As a result, macro- and micro-level explanations of legislative behaviour have developed mostly in isolation from one another, meaning that it remains unclear how incumbents' individual motives interact with the larger institutional setting in which they operate.

Against the backdrop of this disconnect between macro- and micro-level accounts, this study introduces an integrative approach to explaining legislative behaviour at the MP-level. Its comparative framework thereby responds not only to the existing dearth in cross-national analyses of MP-level differences in ambition, but, most importantly, is able to provide a new test for the impact of electoral rules on the degree to which individual MPs cater to the party or to their personal reputations.

Why care? Broader relevance and contribution

So why should we care about the way in which electoral institutions influence the behaviour of elected representatives? Electoral rules are a core institution of any political system built on the idea of representation. They not only translate the will of the electorate into parliamentary seats or other representative office but also shape the system's chain of delegation and determine the degree of influence that various principals can exert over the elected individuals (e.g. Mitchell 2000). Legislators in any representative party democracy – and in parliamentary systems especially – face pressure from two potentially competing sources: their voters and their parties (e.g. Carey 2007; Carey and Shugart 1995; Deschouwer and Depauw

2014; Miller and Stokes 1963; Vivyan and Wagner 2012). Each of these principals relate to important functions of a representative system. On the one hand, stable and effective governance hinges on cohesion within the majority party group, as does the opposition's ability to hold the government to account. On the other hand, legislators in a system built on representation should, normatively speaking, be responsive to the wishes and preferences of their voters and constituents.

Understanding how legislators tend to resolve this tension (and in which direction) therefore has important implications for representation, accountability, and governance (e.g. Campbell et al. 2016; Deschouwer and Depauw 2014; Mansbridge 2009; Vivyan and Wagner 2012). This means that the question of whether MPs prefer to cater to the party or to their own reputation goes beyond the descriptive study of elite behaviour. Rather, it sheds light on the relationship between the voter, the party and the representative, and shows how legislators balance the responsibility to act in the name of those who elected them[1] with the task of collectively ensuring the stability and effectiveness of the representative system.

The interactive approach taken in this study serves not only to gauge how electoral rules impact such choices at the aggregate-level; its granular focus also allows for more differentiated conclusions on which individual characteristics make legislators particularly responsive to certain features of an electoral system. Contrary to the prevalent macro-level analyses of institutional factors, I consider the chosen behaviour to be not just a result of the nudges and incentives received through institutions, but of the interaction between these system-level incentives and those generated by legislators' individual motivations and goals. Apart from providing a more comprehensive picture of who our elected representatives are and what guides

[1] Whether the MP should act as a "trustee" or a "delegate" remains debated not least since Edmund Burke's famous *Speech to the Electors of Bristol* (Burke [1774] 1975; see also Eggers and Spirling 2014a).

their behaviour as individuals, this approach can uncover new evidence for the previously theorised impact of the electoral system.

The broader benefit of understanding the behavioural patterns generated by electoral rules is that this can help us formulate more precise normative assessments. Suitable empirical analysis means that we can compare observed behaviour with the aims that have been set for a given electoral institution. Such evidence can then serve to ensure that these aims continue to be fulfilled and can help fine-tune or reform existing systems if a discrepancy is identified. Moreover, knowledge of how electoral rules shape legislators' behavioural incentives can inform the creation or implementation of new electoral rules. Examples include the design of Germany's mixed-member system in the late 1940s (e.g. Scarrow 2001), or the choice of electoral rules in various central and eastern European countries in the 1990s.

Beyond these more theoretical considerations, this thesis speaks to topical political dynamics and developments. The growing personalisation of politics, for example, provides one reason for paying greater attention to actors' individual motivations, and to the ways in which these may interact with the larger institutional environment. As more information becomes available on political decision-makers (for example through increased self-reporting on social media), researchers – and also voters – are better able to identify the variety of individual-level characteristics and ambitions that may drive their behaviour.

Moreover, the perceived strength of the party in parliamentary systems – i.e. the strong control the party is assumed to exercise over the behavioural decisions made by its legislators and candidates – has, until recently, limited research on personal-vote strategies across a variety of countries (cf. Vivyan and Wagner 2012). This helps explain the previously dominant focus on the US Congress, despite the

prevalent theory on electoral rules and MP behaviour being distinctly comparative (cf. André, Freire, and Papp 2014). Recent studies of legislative behaviour in parliamentary systems have, however, moved away from a more rigid notion of parties as unitary actors (e.g. Bowler 2010; Kam 2009; Vivyan and Wagner 2012).

This is an empirically justifiable view to take, not least because many western democracies have experienced a significant rise in partisan dealignment and voter volatility (Dalton 2012; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Kam 2009). As a result, the utility of the party label to the individual MP has declined in many countries, strengthening the incentives for incumbents directly to target the growing group of non-partisan voters and to turn to activities that provide them with some independence from fluctuations in the popular support for their party.[2] These developments have been shown to contribute to a rise in personalised vote-seeking, at least in systems where the institutional opportunity structure encourages such behaviour in the first place (e.g. André, Depauw, and Beyens 2015; Kam 2009). Moreover, the growth of social media has made the cultivation of a personal vote more accessible and the link with the electorate more direct (e.g. Jackson and Lilleker 2011; Miller 2015; The Economist 2015; Zittel 2015b).

Finally, and as outlined above, this study helps us understand some of the behavioural effects of MPs' personal backgrounds and traits. My specific focus on their pre-parliamentary occupations is contextualised by a keen public interest in career politicians, both in the countries at the centre of this study and beyond (Groves 2012; Herzog 1990; Kellner 2014; Kirkup 2014; Lorenz and Micus 2013; Oborne 2007; Riddell 1993; Saalfeld 1997; Savoie 2014). The public and scholarly "fascination" with these types of MPs (Allen 2012, 686), however, stands in stark contrast to the considerable uncertainty that remains over their actual behaviour.

[2] This may, in turn, further soften up party labels (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984).

The comparative findings presented in this study provide some empirical insight into this topical question and suggest that not only does an MP's pre-parliamentary career matter for his or her legislative behaviour, but that the way in which it matters is contingent on the electoral system in which the individual operates.

Definitions and delineations

Some terms used in this thesis require clarification. Although the specific operationalisations will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, it is instructive at this point to define more precisely the type of legislative behaviour that this study seeks to explain (i.e. the outcome variable). Specifically, the unit of analysis concerns the extent to which an individual MP engages in individualistic (which I will also call "personalistic") or party-centric (which I will also refer to as "collective") behaviour. When speaking of the former, I refer to an individual's attempts at boosting his or her so-called "personal vote".[3]

A commonly-accepted definition considers the personal vote as "that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities and records", as opposed to the support gained through a shared partisan affiliation or platform (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984, 111). Personalistic behaviour by MPs can therefore serve to create before voters an individual profile or "brand" independent of, and potentially actively conflicting with, the collective party label.[4]

[3] Although Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1984; 1987) have contributed to the popularisation of this term, it has been used earlier in a study on the UK electoral system (Williams 1966).

[4] For a discussion of a potential zero- or positive-sum relationship between the party's and the individual's interests, see chapter 5.

The opposing end of the behavioural spectrum, referred to also as "party vote-seeking" or "party-centred" behaviour (e.g. Crisp et al. 2004; Mitchell 2000; Shugart 2001), describes actions that serve to support and contribute to the party's collective reputation, unity and goals (Carey and Shugart 1995).[5] Overall, because the type of behaviour defined here is understood as serving the purpose of increasing re-election chances, I follow the relevant literature by referring to it also as vote-seeking behaviour.

In line with the existing theory it seeks to test, this study limits itself to examining behaviour driven by the desire to be re-elected. Related effects of electoral rules not covered explicitly in this study – but which may, of course, be partly guided by re-election ambition – include policy-making (e.g. Crisp et al. 2010; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2007; Persson and Tabellini 2004) or corruption (e.g. Chang and Golden 2007; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Trebbi, Persson, and Tabellini 2003). Moreover, this study concerns itself with the vote-seeking strategies of incumbent legislators as opposed to the behaviour of all candidates running in an election. This focus not only aligns with the majority of previous empirical attempts at providing evidence for the existing theory but also reflects the explicit set-up and recommendations of these theoretical contributions (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995).

Turning to the main macro-level explanatory factor, electoral rules, it is necessary to provide some conceptual clarity.[6] Following the existing theoretical and empirical contributions on the link between electoral systems and MP behaviour (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Crisp et al. 2004; Mitchell 2000; Shugart 2001), I focus on the two

[5] Hence, even when an MP engages in party-centric behaviour, strictly speaking, this still constitutes an "individualistic" act if – as the prevalent rational-choice approach assumes – it serves the primary purpose of increasing the likelihood of re-election for the given individual.

[6] For example, the first page of a seminal study on the political consequences of electoral systems (Grofman and Lijphart 1986) uses, seemingly interchangeably, three different terms: "electoral laws", "electoral systems", and "election rules".

main institutional sources of behavioural incentives captured by the existing theory. The first dimension relates to the mechanisms through which "votes translate into seats" (Bawn 1999, 487). This includes, first and foremost, the question of whether the electorate votes for party lists (and whether or to which degree these lists are open or closed) or for individual candidates, and whether candidates directly compete with co-partisans.[7] The second aspect relates to the ways in which individuals are nominated as candidates, usually referred to as "candidate selection" or "nomination procedure". I take these two components to make up a country's electoral system, a term which I will use synonymously with electoral rules.

Finally, some minor terminological aspects merit attention. While aware of potential differences in definition and origin between the terms "parliament" and "legislature" (e.g. Kreppel 2014; Laver 2008), the two will be used interchangeably.[8] Unless otherwise stated, they shall refer to a country's lower chamber, such as the German Bundestag and the UK House of Commons. Concerning the latter institution, many studies use the terms British and UK synonymously (i.e. British or UK parliament; British or UK MP). Given the official name of the institution, House of Commons of the United Kingdom, I stick to the phrasing UK MP as well as UK House of Commons.[9]

The structure of the study

This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 discusses in more detail the previous contributions relevant to this study and outlines both their advances and

[7] This dimension also comprises the system's district magnitude.

[8] Along with related words such as legislative, parliamentary, Member of Parliament, legislator.

[9] Between 1707–1801, the institution was in fact known as the Parliament of Great Britain. Today, the term British is inaccurate in this context as the parliament also includes MPs from Northern Ireland. As a side note, a similar point must be made about the portmanteau "Brexit", which should technically be referred to as "UKexit".

shortcomings with regards to answering the study's research questions. The chapter thus sets the context and motivation for the new behavioural model and empirical tests devised in this study.

Chapter 3 develops the theoretical framework at the core of this study. In a first part, I map out the main behavioural assumptions and indicate how these differ from those made in previous contributions. Specifically, I relax the premise that every MP should desire and depend on re-election to the same extent. This differentiated perspective is subsequently used to devise, with the aid of some formal notation, a behavioural model of how the interaction between the institutional opportunity structure and an MP's degree of re-election ambition shapes the individual's legislative behaviour. By considering this interplay between macro- and micro-level incentive structures, the model not only proposes new explanations of legislative behaviour but also provides a more robust test of the prevalent institutional story. The conceptual benefit of this approach is also illustrated by drawing parallels to a difference-in-differences design.

Chapter 4 is concerned with research design, case selection and the formulation of country-specific hypotheses. I begin by justifying the choice of the UK House of Commons and the German Bundestag as the main comparative setting used to test the behavioural model. The core argument is that these cases display significant institutional similarities with the exception of the main macro-level variable of interest, electoral rules. Subsequent sections advance the theoretical expectations for MPs operating under the UK and German electoral rules respectively. Following my model, the personal-vote incentives generated by the UK's single-member district rules lead to the prediction that those UK MPs most invested in re-election should engage in individualistic vote-seeking behaviour to the greatest extent compared

with their colleagues. Germany's mixed-member system, with its compensatory feature and dual candidacy provision should, at the aggregate level, provide strongly party-centric incentives. I therefore predict those MPs most ambitious for re-election to display the highest degree of party-centric behaviour.

Chapter 5 lays out the study's methodological approach, describes the original MP-level data used in the empirical tests, and develops the operationalisation of the required variables. To capture the extent to which an individual MP caters to the party or his or her own reputation, I employ the previously used proxy of an MP's degree of party loyalty in legislative voting. Regarding the main independent variable, I present an original approach that operationalises the degree of the MP's re-election ambition through his or her extra-parliamentary career paths. Various subsidiary independent variables provide additional proxies for the level of re-election ambition.

Chapter 6 presents the empirical results for UK and German MPs. Using multilevel models to account for the hierarchical data structure, it is found that within the German system, those incumbents most invested in re-election are considerably more likely to display party-loyal behaviour than those with lower re-election ambitions, while the opposite relationship is uncovered for the UK case. Predicted probabilities reveal the substantive magnitude of these effects while various tests confirm the robustness of the results. In confirming my model's behavioural predictions, these empirical differences-in-differences unearth a new explanatory angle on legislative behaviour and provide fresh evidence for the overarching theory on electoral rules and MPs' vote-seeking strategies.

Chapter 7 subjects my behavioural model to an additional test within the subnational setting of Germany's mixed-member system. Using detailed data of MPs' electoral histories to capture their most likely re-election strategies by electoral tier,

the analysis reveals moderate but significant behavioural differences between MPs from the two tiers. These are in line with my theoretical framework and with the cross-national findings presented in chapter 6. Apart from providing support for my predictions at the sub-national level, these tests also add a new and innovative approach to the on-going theoretical and empirical debate on behavioural contamination effects between tiers in multi-tier systems. The concluding chapter discusses the broader implications of the study's findings and points to opportunities for future research.

Chapter 2

Existing Approaches and Shortcomings

As outlined in the introduction, this thesis seeks to explain individual-level variation in the extent to which MPs use legislative activities to cater to their own reputation or to that of the party. In doing so, I provide a new test for the commonly assumed effect of the electoral system. The explanatory angle at the centre of my approach focuses on the interaction between electoral rules and the degree to which an individual desires re-election. Before drawing up this framework in chapter 3, I discuss relevant existing approaches. This analysis of previous work is organised along the study's two core explanatory dimensions – electoral rules and MPs' re-election ambitions – and demonstrates how my behavioural model both builds on and distinguishes itself from these existing contributions.

A core motivation for this study stems from the observation that despite the existence of a well-developed and logical theoretical framework linking electoral rules and MP behaviour, the research field suffers from a disconnect between these intuitive predictions on the one hand, and the provision of robust empirical evidence on the other. Such an assessment is shared by previous contributors: "Empirical analysis of the relationship between electoral institutions and personal-vote incentives has not matched the development of the theoretical framework linking electoral institutions to incentives" (Johnson and Wallack 2006, 2; see also André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Owens 2003; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). The first section of this chapter provides an analysis of this existing work and

identifies avenues for further empirical advances. A subsequent section pertains to the MP-level literature outlined in the introduction. I thereby discuss how this study links to existing perspectives on MP-level variation in legislators' ambitions.

2.1 Linking Electoral Rules and Legislative Behaviour

The research field concerned with exploring a causal connection between electoral rules and legislative behaviour offers an array of both theoretical and empirical approaches, with the recently published *Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies* describing this focus as a "central topic in comparative politics" (André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014, 15). Here, I discuss the advances and limitations in the existing scholarship's ability to show evidence for this relationship, thus providing the context – and underlining the necessity – for the original theoretical framework as well as the new empirical tests devised in this study. I begin by outlining the existing theoretical predictions.

2.1.1 The existing theoretical framework

While the research on the causal link between electoral rules and legislative behaviour today includes many comparative approaches spanning a variety of country cases and time periods (see below), students of the US Congress were among the first to take a systematic interest in how and to what extent legislators make use of institutional opportunity structures to enhance their re-election prospects. At all times operating under the assumption that re-election is the primary goal of any legislator, early work explored representatives' strategies through concepts entitled "electoral connection" (Mayhew 1974), "home style" (Fenno 1978), or "personal vote" (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; 1987).

This US-centric literature has provided important insight into the motivations and activities of legislators. However, as it was largely restricted to a single electoral system[1], this early work was unable (and did not seek) to show how different electoral systems impact legislators' behaviour differently. In this vein, Weingast observes how the dominant focus of institutionalist approaches on the US case made it "difficult to distinguish general results from those reflecting specialized assumptions required by American institutions", and identifies the study of electoral systems as a particularly beneficial focal point for a comparative expansion (1996, 182; see also Lancaster 1986; Samuels 2000).

Following some early cross-system perspectives (e.g. Lancaster 1986; Sartori 1976; Taagepera and Shugart 1989), Carey and Shugart's (1995) seminal theoretical contribution must be credited with generating considerable impetus for subsequent comparative work. By devising a detailed ranking of theoretically possible electoral systems according to the personal-vote incentives they are expected to produce, this contribution provided the research field with specific and testable expectations. Subsequent studies proceeded to develop related theoretical predictions with real country cases and electoral systems in mind (e.g. André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Carey 2007; Hix 2004; Mitchell 2000; Proksch and Slapin 2015; Shugart 2001; Sieberer 2006). The following paragraphs outline the comparative theory's basic predictions in order to gain a better understanding of the limitations in the empirical tests that ensued (see next section).

I begin by presenting Carey and Shugart's (1995) theoretical approach given its influence in the existing literature. To assess the behavioural impact of electoral systems, the authors devise three categorical variables, each with three dimensions:

[1]For early exceptions, see Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1984; 1987) comparing the UK and the US. Note also that there exists, of course, some variation in electoral rules at the US state-level.

Ballot describes the degree to which party leaders control candidates' access to the party label and, if applicable, the position on the party list. A higher degree of party control is predicted to increase party-centric incentives. *Pool* indicates the degree to which votes are pooled across the party (i.e. among co-partisans). When votes are not pooled at all, MPs are voted for individually. This creates the strongest incentives for individualistic behaviour. Finally, *Vote* measures whether votes are cast as a single vote for a party, as votes for multiple candidates, or as a vote for one candidate below the party level. Personal vote-seeking incentives are assumed to increase with each dimension.

In addition to these categories, the authors propose that a system's district magnitude (DM) constitutes a mediating variable: "[A]s it increases, the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking" (1995, 417). Usually using Carey and Shugart's (1995) approach as the theoretical foundation, subsequent efforts have been made to code countries and their electoral systems according to the personal-vote incentives they create (e.g. Hallerberg and Marier 2004; Johnson and Wallack 2012; Shugart 2001; Wallack et al. 2003).[2] The most comprehensive (and most used) such dataset covers 180 countries between 1978–2005 (Johnson and Wallack 2012; see chapter 4 for more detail).[3]

Beyond the detailed categorisations drawn up by Carey and Shugart (1995) – and while recognising that related factors such as candidate selection procedures or district magnitude can complement or mediate the behavioural impact (e.g. André and Depauw 2013; Carey 2007; Hix 2004; Shomer 2016) – scholars have found it

[2]Different interpretations and codings, however, mean that these rankings are not always consistent (see André, Depauw, and Martin 2016).

[3]Some difference between this dataset and Carey and Shugart's (1995) ranking exist, especially what concerns the coding of single-member district systems (see chapter 4, as well as André, Depauw, and Martin 2016; Depauw and Martin 2009).

heuristically useful to divide electoral systems into broader categories according to the degree of personal-vote incentives they are expected to create. These have generally been subsumed under the labels "Party-centred", "Intermediate", and "Candidate-centred" (e.g. Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Hix 2004; Mitchell 2000; Shugart 2001). The categories usually pertain to the archetypal electoral rules (see below). Systems that combine certain features (e.g. mixed-member systems[4]) can make the theoretical expectations more complex.[5]

Systems using closed-list proportional representation (PR) are generally considered party-centred; voters do not have the choice to express support for an individual but instead have to vote for a party as a whole. The candidate's electoral fate therefore depends predominantly on the party's reputation as a strong and unified actor. This implies that an incumbent MP should have a strong motivation to help enhance the collective reputation of the party and, conversely, should have little incentive for individualistic behaviour that undermines the party label; this would only damage the party reputation and hence his or her own re-election prospects.

In the intermediate category, electoral rules using single-member districts (SMD) are expected to generate a mixture of incentives. On the one hand, MPs run on the party label and depend on a strong and unified image of the party. Moreover, voters cannot choose between same-party candidates, lowering the necessity for a candidate or incumbent to distinguish his- or herself from co-partisan competitors. On the other hand, the electorate votes directly for a candidate and can thus sanction or reward certain actions (or lack thereof) taken by the incumbent.[6] This

[4]While a more detailed definition of mixed-member systems follows below, these normally have two (or more) electoral tiers, meaning that one portion of MPs are elected, for example, on party lists while others gain their seats by winning a district.

[5]See chapter 7 for a discussion of incentives generated by Germany's Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system.

[6]This mixture of incentives can at times lead to different classifications of SMD systems in terms of their personal-vote incentives (cf. André, Depauw, and Martin 2016; Depauw and Martin 2009).

should significantly increase the utility of personalistic vote-seeking strategies as compared to the party-centred category. Finally, open-list PR as well as single-transferable-vote (STV) systems are usually considered candidate-centred, as list rankings are not predetermined by the party. In choosing candidates, voters can therefore "really make a difference" (Mitchell 2000, 342) at the candidate-level, especially when list candidates are co-partisans. These provisions should generate strong incentives for a personal vote so as to distinguish oneself from competitors of the same party and to push voters to use their preference vote.

Carey (2007; 2009) further disaggregates these theoretical expectations. As part of his Competing Principals theory, legislators (as agents) are assumed to find themselves in a tension between the party-centric demands of their parliamentary party, and the constituency-oriented demands of their voters. The electoral system then determines which principal the legislator is more likely to cater to in cases where their demands do not overlap.[7] This concept therefore – at least theoretically – relies less on distinct categories of electoral systems but implicitly places them on a spectrum concerning the legislative behaviour they are likely to induce.

Finally, and following Carey and Shugart's (1995) *Ballot* variable, the relevant literature has theorised about the behavioural impact of candidate selection rules, postulating that greater control by the central party over candidate (re-)selection should lead to more party-centric behaviour (e.g. Depauw and Martin 2009; Sieberer 2006). Related studies emphasise the mediating effect of selection rules, as their behavioural impact is argued to be contingent on the type of electoral rules in place (e.g. Coman 2015; Preece 2014; Shomer 2016).

[7] For a similar concept, see also Heitshusen, Young, and Wood (2005, 36), who call this the "push and pull factors" of electoral rules.

2.1.2 Empirical advances and shortcomings

The early comparative theories of electoral rules and MP behaviour led by Carey and Shugart (1995) provided important impetus for scholars to conduct empirical tests of the proposed link. This endeavour has developed into a significant and highly active research field within the comparative study of political institutions. It is still in the process of expanding, as evidenced by fact that the many empirical contributions are very recent (see below), especially those taking cross-national approaches as well as those focusing on parliamentary systems. The following section expands on the arguments made in the introduction, as it analyses in more detail the core advances and shortcomings of these existing empirical efforts. This allows me to set out in greater depth the motivation and context for the approach taken in this thesis.

Single-case studies

Partly as a result of potentially distorting country-level factors present in cross-system approaches (see below),[8] the relevant empirical literature on the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour is dominated by single-country studies (cf. André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Crisp et al. 2004; Hix and Noury 2016). In the UK, where the single-member district electoral system is considered to create some incentives for personal vote-seeking, scholars find that MPs in electorally competitive constituencies are more likely to engage in such activities, for example by putting forward greater numbers of Private Members Bills (Bowler 2010), Early Day Motions (Kellermann 2013), or parliamentary questions (Kellermann 2016). Some of these activities are also found to pay off electorally (Bowler 2010; Kellermann 2013; Tucker 2013).

[8] Clark, Martinaitis, and Dilba (2008) also identify this as a core reason for the dominant focus on single-case studies.

Other contributions identify personal vote-seeking efforts among UK MPs in their speech-making on the floor (Killermann and Proksch 2013; Proksch and Slapin 2012; 2015), a finding reflected also by studies of legislative behaviour in the 19th and early 20th century House of Commons (e.g. Eggers and Spirling 2014a). Focusing on the Canadian SMD system, Kam (2009, Ch. 7) ascribes some of the legislative voting dissent to electoral insecurity (see also Schaufele 2014) while Loewen et al. (2014) show, *inter alia*, that introducing legislation translates into a higher probability of re-election for Canadian government MPs.

Beyond Westminster-style systems, researchers demonstrate that flexible list systems, such as the one employed in Belgium, can result in individualistic vote-seeking behaviour (Bräuninger, Brunner, and Däubler 2012), and that such behaviour pays off electorally under certain conditions (Däubler, Bräuninger, and Brunner 2016). Studying the incentives generated by the flexible list system in Slovakia, Crisp et al. (2013) find that MPs use dissent in legislative voting as a vote-seeking tool to increase their preference vote count, which in turn is rewarded by the party with better list positions in future elections.

Overall, single-case studies provide some evidence that the theoretical predictions on the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour hold up in individual country settings. When studying only one system at a time, however, the explanatory determinant of interest – electoral rules – implicitly remains "a constant rather than a variable" (André, Freire, and Papp 2014, 88); these approaches can only consider variation in the electoral context of individual constituencies or MPs, but are unable, by definition, to make use of system-level variation in electoral rules. Single-case studies therefore cannot reliably trace the causal chain between electoral rules and personal vote activity given that the former are held constant (Crisp et

al. 2004, 825). As a result, they are largely unable to provide the research design that the theoretical priors implicitly prescribe.[9]

Another drawback of the existing body of single-case studies is that it focuses almost exclusively on systems that promote individualistic (as opposed to party-centric) vote-seeking strategies.[10] This bias fails to do justice to the comparative nature of the underlying theory. As will be explained in more detail in chapter 5, this shortcoming likely is a result of the conceptual difficulty of empirically distinguishing party-centric behaviour from the decision not to cultivate a personal vote. Finally, the fact that case studies are usually conducted in isolation from one another means that the operationalisation of the outcome variable – i.e. MPs' choices of vote-seeking strategies – are not consistent across studies. This carries the risk of rendering the shown connection spurious, as certain observations may be owed to country-specific factors exogenous to electoral rules (such as political culture or norms surrounding MP behaviour, see below).

Cross-country aggregate-level studies

The most natural starting point for testing the theory linking electoral systems and MP behaviour is to take a comparative perspective across countries in order to gain the required variation in electoral rules as the main explanatory component.[11] On the outcome side, such an undertaking requires aggregate-level measures of the degree to which MPs cater to their own reputation or to that of the party. Cross-national survey studies have used incumbents' or candidates' self-reported

[9] A small number of contributions have made valid attempts at addressing this issue by studying country cases in which a reform of the electoral rules represents a treatment that can help identify such a causal effect more robustly (e.g. Coman 2012; Proksch and Slapin 2015).

[10] For exceptions, see studies of mixed-member systems, addressed in more detail in chapter 7.

[11] Such a cross-national empirical approach is also recommended by Carey and Shugart (1995) in their important theoretical contribution.

degrees of personalistic or party-centric attitudes and activities, and have largely shown a link between electoral systems and MP behaviour that reflects the overarching theory (e.g. André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005). One distinct advantage in using survey data is that researchers can test for personal-vote incentives as legislators perceive them (cf. André, Depauw, and Martin 2016).

However, self-reported attitudes do not always translate into respective actions. Sieberer and Müller, themselves using MP survey responses to investigate behavioural differences across electoral systems, concede that "it remains unclear to what extent these attitudinal differences translate into differences in behavior" (2015, 21; see also Ohmura 2014). Indeed, empirical work has suggested that MPs are likely to overstate certain activities, leaving a discrepancy between actual and reported behaviour (Martin 2011; Pilet, Freire, and Costa 2012). This issue somewhat lowers the explanatory power of exclusively survey-based studies. Nonetheless, such approaches continue to make a significant contribution to our understanding of the impact of electoral rules on MP behaviour or, at the very least, on MPs' attitudes towards certain strategies.

As a result of the theory's explicit interest in the link between electoral rules and the *behaviour* of legislators, however, the most commonly used outcome variable is of behavioural nature; parliament-level party unity in legislative voting constitutes the most popular aggregate-level proxy for the level of personalistic or party-centric behaviour present in a system.[12] The theoretical expectation guiding these approaches is that greater personal-vote incentives generated by the electoral system should lead to lower parliament-level party unity in legislative voting, while

[12]Measured, for example, through various applications of the so-called Rice Index (Rice 1925), see also footnote 32 in chapter 5.

more party-centred systems should increase unity (e.g. Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999; Carey 2007; Depauw and Martin 2009; Hazan 2003; Kam 2014; Owens 2003; Saalfeld 2005; Sieberer 2006; Traber, Hug, and Sciarini 2013).

Findings from this comparative literature, however, are mixed (cf. André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Coman 2015). Some studies reveal little association between electoral rules and party unity (e.g. Sieberer 2006) while others show a difference only between systems using closed lists and those in which co-partisans compete over votes (Carey 2007). Depauw and Martin (2009) identify some of the expected patterns across 16 European countries, but the magnitude and significance of their findings are contingent on the coding schemes used to score systems according to personal-vote incentives (see below), and on the inclusion of certain countries. Other studies find that the effect is mediated by the degree of central party control over candidate nomination (Coman 2015; Shomer 2016).[13]

Despite some of these fruitful empirical efforts aided by the universal re-election assumption, it can be argued that the pervasive engagement with the same institutional variables, as well as the recurring use of similar cross-country aggregate-level designs, have led to a stagnation in the research field's ability to provide new empirical insights into the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour. Moreover, many aggregate-level tests suffer from methodological drawbacks that can help explain the mixed findings across contributions. First, cross-country approaches often yield too few cases for meaningful statistical analysis (Lijphart 1971, 684). Depauw and Martin (2009), for example, demonstrate how parts of their findings are driven by individual country cases. A second issue stems from the fact that the cross-national outcome variable (party unity at the parliament level) often displays

[13]See also Samuels (1999), who shows that the impact of the electoral system is furthermore mediated at the party level, through factors such as ballot access, campaign finance resources and office benefits.

low variation, meaning that shown differences in unity rates lack substantiveness (e.g. Sieberer 2006). Third, some comparative studies use party unity scores that were measured over short time periods (e.g. Carey 2007; Coman 2015). The proxy is therefore susceptible to time-specific factors and individual bills. Finally, and as shown by André, Depauw, and Martin (2016), there is some inconsistency across the theoretical rankings of real-life electoral systems that often act as independent variables in empirical cross-country analyses. This means that the results of comparative aggregate-level studies can be susceptible to the ranking used, as suggested also by Depauw and Martin (2009).

These limitations present problems for the validity of the existing cross-national findings. Most significantly, however, the mixed results, questions over robustness, as well as the dearth in comparative tests compared to single-case studies are, in part, a product of the main conceptual difficulty intrinsic to the required cross-system perspective: uncontrolled country-specific conditions can influence or distort macro-level indicators, which in turn can obscure the hypothesised association and lead to spurious results (see also André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Clark, Martinaitis, and Dilba 2008; Kam 2009). Even Carey and Shugart, in their purely theoretical approach, warn against this pitfall: "Clearly, other factors besides electoral rules affect the value of personal reputation" (1995, 432). While the authors refer mainly to other institutional factors such as a country's constitutional set-up, this caveat must be expanded to country-specific behavioural norms as well as other, less palpable, factors such as political culture.[14] Lancaster and Patterson (1990, 463), for example, speak of "myriad of potential influencing variables that often make it difficult to control relationships rigorously in cross-national comparative analysis", a view echoed elsewhere (Hix and Noury 2016; Hug 2010; Lijphart 1971; Stecker 2015).

[14]For an excellent early discussion of such conceptual issues more generally, see Hopkins and Wallerstein (1967).

Consider, for example, the norm of collective cabinet responsibility (or "payroll vote") in the UK House of Commons, as well as its impact on the validity of cross-country comparisons of party unity. The government's Ministerial Code prescribes that members of the frontbench may not vote against their party without first resigning from their position (e.g. Cabinet Office 2010). Although not formalised, this norm also applies to members of the opposition's shadow cabinet. Seeing as a considerable proportion of UK MPs belongs to the frontbench (see, for example, footnote 72 in chapter 5), this provision limits the ability of many legislators to vote against the party, thus increasing the parliament's overall unity score.[15] A comparison of the House of Commons' unity rates with those found in parliaments in which frontbench members can (and occasionally do) vote against the party line, such as in the Bundestag, must therefore recognise these differences, for example by considering only MPs who have the realistic option to rebel in legislative voting.[16]

These differences in country-specific norms can help us understand why, for example, party unity in the Bundestag tends to be lower than in the House of Commons,[17] even though the prevalent theory would predict the opposite. Other examples concern the impact of vote-recording mechanisms on aggregate-level unity (e.g. Hug 2010; Stecker 2015). Apart from changing the choice sets presented to MPs, vote-recording rules may also be endogenous to the electoral system (Carey 2009; Hug, Wegmann, and Wüest 2015). While I discuss these dynamics in more detail in chapter 5, it is clear that such differences could distort macro-level comparisons of unity rates (Hix and Noury 2016; Hug, Wegmann, and Wüest 2015).

[15] To be sure, some endogeneity with the electoral rules may be present as the party leadership may attempt to work against the centrifugal forces generated by the more personalistic electoral rules (but see Proksch and Slapin 2015 for an opposing argument related to floor access).

[16] The large number of frontbenchers in the House of Commons compared to many other parliaments (see Theakston, Gill, and Atkins 2014) can further distort comparisons of unity rates.

[17] My data (see chapter 5) reveals that in the Bundestag (2005-2013), two percent of vote choices were against the party line, while they were only 1 per cent in the House of Commons (2005-2015). These figures are comparable with those presented by Sieberer (2006) for earlier periods.

The frequent lack of sensitivity to such country-level factors can help explain some of the inconclusive findings in the existing cross-national tests (cf. André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Clark, Martinaitis, and Dilba 2008; Hug, Wegmann, and Wüest 2015; see also Hix and Noury 2016 for a criticism of comparing unity rates more generally). Some efforts have been made to account for potentially confounding country-specific conditions, for example by controlling for other institutional factors and/or by including country-level fixed effects (e.g. Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Depauw and Martin 2009; Shomer 2016). Despite such measures, however, the approaches remain distinctly macro-level and continue to invite some of the issues related to distorting but unaccounted country-level influence.

Finally, and on a more conceptual level, comparative cross-national studies using aggregate-level variables often suffer from a disconnect between the level at which the relationship between electoral systems and MP behaviour is theoretically conceived (the MP-level) and at which it is subsequently tested (the macro-level) (see also Sieberer 2013; Skjæveland 2001). This discrepancy, combined with the risk of distorting country-level factors, invokes potential problems of ecological inference that arise when indicators collected at the aggregate-level are used to make claims about micro-level dynamics (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Schuessler 1999).

2.1.3 Addressing the existing shortcomings

The above analysis of previous empirical investigations of the prevalent theory on electoral rules and MP behaviour reveals the following quandary. To test for causality, we require variation in electoral rules, which is best achieved by considering more than one country-case. This requirement, however, makes it difficult to control for country-specific factors that may influence macro-level proxies of the degree of personalistic and party-centric activity present in a system (such as party unity).

One of the main purposes of this study is to provide some remedy for this issue. As indicated in the introduction, and as developed in detail in the next chapters, I propose a within-system cross-country approach that combines the advantages of a cross-national perspective with those of case studies, while mitigating some of the problems related to each of these approaches. The utility of what has also been termed "comparative intranation analysis" (Lijphart 1971, 689), or "cross-individual, multi-national studies" (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967, 47) has long been recognised in comparative politics, but has received only limited attention in the study of electoral rules and MP behaviour.[18]

As explained in more detail in the appropriate chapter, the core benefit of such an approach is that it allows me to test for the proposed theoretical link between electoral rules and MP behaviour by investigating whether behavioural variation between legislators *within* a given system varies predictably *across* systems. In line with its conceptual purpose (e.g. Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967; Lijphart 1971; Lijphart 1975), such a design is better able to hold constant country-specific influences on the outcome variable, as it is empirically concerned with "differences in differences" at the MP-level and across systems. Beyond this key advantage, the approach also addresses some of the other shortcomings identified in the existing literature. First, I can test the prevalent theory at the level at which it was drawn up (cf. Morton 1999, 138ff) while maintaining a distinctly cross-national perspective. Second, while we have some evidence from case-studies (albeit mostly from personalistic systems), these are usually disconnected from one another in terms of the key behavioural variables used. The model introduced here will present a more universal operationalisation that enhances cross-national comparability. Finally, this more disaggregated approach does not rely on sweeping cross-national

[18] Exceptions include André, Depauw, and Martin 2015; Proksch and Slapin 2015; Shomer 2016; Sieberer and Müller 2015, addressed in more detail in the next chapter.

rankings of systems according to their personal-vote incentives, but can devote greater attention to the discussion of relevant country-specific factors.

To develop such a comparative MP-level approach, I relax the rigidity of the implicit but pervasive assumption that all MPs should desire and depend on the goal of re-election to the same degree (see chapter 3). The existing theory outlined above informs us that the electoral system should shape the incentive structures (and, as a result, the behaviour) of legislators, whose actions are guided by the strategic consideration of whether catering to the party or creating a personal reputation is more likely to help them attain the goal of re-election (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995). Given that the degree of re-election ambition has previously been held constant across all MPs, the prevalent approach can be described as one-dimensional: following neo-institutionalist methods (cf. Diermeier 2014, 33), its theoretical set-up – and most ensuing tests – deliberately allow variation only at the institutional level. While such approaches have helped us understand (at least theoretically) the institutional sources of personalistic of party-centred behaviour, they conceptually preclude the possibility of any vote-seeking incentives emanating from individual-level variation in re-election ambition.

My theoretical framework will question this premise not only on the grounds of being empirically inaccurate; I also argue that the assumed uniformity in re-election ambition across MPs is not a necessary condition for testing the behavioural impact of electoral rules in the first place. Rather, the common adherence to this monolithic perspective has inhibited the development of new empirical insights. In light of this MP-level approach to testing for a relationship between electoral rules and MP-behaviour, the following section discusses previous approaches that have taken a more fine-grained view on legislators' ambitions.

2.2 Accounting for Variation in Legislators' Ambitions

As indicated in the introduction, the focus of this study rests on the behavioural incentives faced by legislators as individuals. Specifically, I build on the idea that incumbents differ in the degree to which they personally value and depend on re-election. To put this proposition in the context of previous work, I briefly discuss existing contributions concerned with variation both in politicians' ambitions generally, and in re-election ambition more specifically. Before doing so, it is instructive to address the difference between legislators' goals and ambitions. The literature concerned with parliamentary systems generally assumes that legislators pursue the goals of re-election, office, or policy influence (e.g. Müller and Strøm 1999; Norton 1999; Strøm 1990). These are usually considered to apply uniformly across all MPs, meaning that no consideration is given to the *degree* to which different MPs might desire them. Ambition can then be defined as capturing the intensity with which a given legislator values a given goal.

Variation in legislators' ambitions more generally

The idea that variation in MP behaviour can be co-determined by differences in ambition over certain goals is not new. One of the first and most influential contributions is Schlesinger's Ambition Theory, which posits that "a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals" (1966, 6). Schlesinger categorises political actors by the degree to which they are assumed to desire a given political position. Politicians can harbour *discrete ambition* (meaning the actor contents him- or herself with a given office for a specified time period), *static ambition* (the individual intends to hold on to a given office for a longer time) and *progressive ambition* (the actor seeks higher office than he or she currently seeks or is holding).

The important observation that politicians or legislators may vary in the intensity with which they desire certain goals (and that this may have behavioural implications) is the core idea taken from Ambition Theory for the purpose of this study. Beyond this notion, however, Schlesinger's framework pertains primarily to ambition for higher office *within* the legislature,[19] or for political positions *beyond* those offered through the parliamentary mandate. As a result – and in line with the framework's empirical focus – subsequent applications have largely been limited to the US system,[20] where a variety of public offices are considered to carry greater political prestige than that of a Representative (e.g. Herrick and Moore 1993; Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing 1994; Hibbing 1986; Rohde 1979).[21]

The empirical application of Ambition Theory therefore lacks a larger, cross-national comparative approach (cf. Crisp et al. 2004; Sieberer and Müller 2015). The implication of this focus on single cases is that the consideration of legislators' ambitions as a driving force for their behaviour has largely neglected the potentially interactive effect of the institutional setting (for an exception, see Crisp et al. 2004). Moreover, the approach does not explicitly concern itself with variation in *re-election ambition*. At most, we can identify such a perspective as a by-product of the fact that the assumed variation in ambition for higher office beyond parliament implies variation in re-election ambition, as those striving for higher positions elsewhere may be invested in the goal of re-election to a lesser degree.

Applications of Ambition Theory to parliamentary systems take an even more rigid perspective on potential variation in re-election ambition, seeing as sustained membership of the national legislature is usually the prerequisite for achieving higher

[19] Referred to by Herrick and Moore as "intrainstitutional ambition" (1993, 765).

[20] The full title of Schlesinger's (1966) study is "Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States".

[21] But see the contributions by Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard (2009) covering the European Parliament, and by Samuels (2000) on Brazil, discussed below.

political office. As a result, re-election remains the paramount goal even for progressively ambitious legislators. This observation is shared by a recent study of progressive ambition across fifteen European democracies, worth quoting in full:

> In parliamentary democracies, a parliamentary mandate is often a formal or at least informal condition for advancement to higher offices such as government positions. Electoral defeat or even deselection as parliamentary candidate can put an effective end to further ambitions. Thus, the strategies of all MPs [...] are also oriented to the more immediate goal of reelection to parliament (Mayhew, 1974; Strøm, 1997). In that sense, progressive ambition is an add-on to, rather than a substitute for, static ambition in parliamentary systems (Sieberer and Müller 2015, 6-7).

Ambition Theory, especially when applied to parliamentary systems, therefore remains largely silent on the idea that MPs may vary in their re-election ambitions. Nonetheless, I take from this concept the important notion that MPs differ in the intensity of their preferences over certain career-related outcomes, and that "to understand members' behavior we must understand their ambition" (Herrick and Moore 1993, 765; see also Searing 1991; Strøm 1997). The following sections point to contributions that take an MP-level view on *re-election ambition* specifically.

Variation in re-election ambition

Rational-choice approaches to legislative behaviour have long focused on the US case (cf. Weingast 1996), and have adhered to the universal applicability of the "'Mayhewian' re-election assumption" (cf. Samuels 2000). This has meant that the idea of legislators differing in the degree to which they value re-election has received only limited attention in the field of legislative studies generally, and in the comparative literature linking electoral rules and MP behaviour more specifically. Moreover, neo-institutionalist accounts often deliberately hold constant potential variation at the MP-level. Nonetheless, a number of relevant exceptions exist. Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing (1994), for example, compare the behaviour of US

Representatives who announced their retirement with those seeking re-election, and find that the former reduce their personalistic vote-seeking efforts once they decided to step down. Similar studies have been conducted in the context of the UK House of Commons (e.g. Willumsen and Goetz 2016).[22] However, these approaches imply that legislators are either *fully* invested in the re-election goal – as assumed by the existing uniform assumption of re-election ambition – or *not at all* (i.e. those not running for re-election).[23]

It has been argued that the rigidity and uniformity of the prevalent re-election assumption does not always apply to country settings beyond the US case (e.g. Samuels 2000). The high turnover rates in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, for example, have been attributed to the fact that many deputies use the mandate as a springboard to extra-parliamentary public office (Samuels 2000). Essentially using turnover as an aggregate-level proxy for the average strength of legislators' re-election ambitions (aggregated at the party level within each country), Crisp et al. (2004) furthermore find across six Latin American presidential systems that "[r]apid turnover or short legislative careers are associated with less responsiveness to institutionalized electoral incentives" (2004, 839; see also Jones et al. 2002 for the case of Argentina). In other words, the pattern of variation in aggregate-level turnover rates suggests that only where MPs harbour high degrees of re-election ambition (i.e. where turnover is low) do the vote-seeking incentives created by electoral rules have an impact on MP behaviour.[24]

[22] Other studies of legislative behaviour also control for whether MPs indicated that they will retire at the following election (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Heuwieser 2016).

[23] See also the literature on the "last-period problem" (e.g. Parker and Dabros 2011; Zupan 1990).

[24] A recent contribution on the use of obstruction in congressional politics also relies on the notion that legislators might differ in the intensity of their re-election motivation (Patty 2016). While the study remains on a purely theoretical level, – recognising also the difficulty of finding a proxy for degrees of re-election ambition – it further underlines the conceptual utility of exercising greater sensitivity to individual differences in re-election ambition for our understanding of legislative behaviour.

The studies therefore demonstrate the potential for new empirical tests and findings once the commonly assumed homogeneity in re-election ambition is relaxed, and, in the case of Crisp et al. (2004), once the larger institutional setting is considered. However, using turnover as a proxy for levels of re-election ambition has the drawback of remaining at the aggregate level, meaning that issues of potentially distorting country-level factors persist (see above). Moreover, turnover rates are likely to be endogenous, to some degree, to a country's institutional setting.

Finally, a variety of contributions, focused mostly on SMD systems, consider individual electoral vulnerability as a source of variation in MPs' motivation to engage in personalistic vote-seeking behaviour (e.g. André, Depauw, and Martin 2015; Bowler 2010; Kam 2009; Kellermann 2013; Kellermann 2016; Wood and Norton 1992). This focus enables researchers to explain MP-level differences in vote-seeking efforts within a given country, and therefore constitutes a useful tool to identify electoral motivation. The empirical approach presented in this study takes this logic into account (see chapter 5).

However, I argue that more insights can be provided by considering variation in MPs' intrinsic desire for re-election beyond contextual factors potentially endogenous to the electoral rules. My empirical tests therefore make use of an original operationalisation of re-election ambition based on an individual's biographical background. In other words, while I concur with the view that incumbents who particularly "fear the loss of their seats in the next election will make every effort to shore up voter support against that eventuality" (Wood and Norton 1992, 237), I focus on an external – and largely overlooked – source of variation in this "fear". Moreover, the operationalisation of MP motivation in these existing approaches – i.e. the MP's electoral margin – cannot be transferred easily across

systems, especially to non-SMD settings.[25] Using MPs' career backgrounds can help alleviate this issue. I sum, while my approach takes inspiration from existing studies that are sensitive to MP-level differences in re-election ambition, I move beyond simple measures of whether an MP ran for re-election or not, and do not rely on aggregate-level indicators of re-election ambitions such as turnover rates (see chapter 5). My operationalisation also seeks to enhance independence from the institutional environment, and ensures that the empirical tests are conducted at the same level at which the overarching theory was drawn up, i.e. the MP-level.

Chapter summary

An analysis of relevant previous contributions reveals that the prevalent macro-level approach to testing for the effect of electoral rules on MP behaviour has, in the institutionalist tradition, held legislators' individual motivations fixed in order to isolate the impact of the electoral institutions. While important advances have been made using this approach, we are still faced with inconclusive findings and important limitations. As elaborated on below, I propose that a more differentiated consideration of legislators' re-election ambitions can help provide fresh empirical insights. A separate strand of literature on legislative behaviour has previously taken such an individual-level perspective on MPs' ambitions, but few contributions have explicitly questioned the universality of the re-election assumption. Moreover, given the lack of MP-level cross-national approaches, this literature has largely lacked sensitivity to the institutional environment as a mediating factor. As a result, the nuanced view on legislators' motivations has been used only to a limited extent to show a relationship between electoral rules and MP behaviour.

[25] See, however, the sophisticated operationalisation of electoral vulnerability employed by André, Depauw, and Martin (2015).

Motivated by this disconnect between macro- and micro-level explanations of legislative behaviour, my theoretical framework, introduced in the following chapter, establishes an original model of how legislators' individual motives are expected to interact with the larger institutional setting in which they operate. This framework subsequently enables me to conduct a new empirical test for the existing predictions linking electoral rules and MP behaviour.

THEORY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Chapter 3

The Theoretical Framework: Electoral Rules, Re-election Ambition and MP Behaviour

> Legislators do not respond to expectations – from whatever source – as incumbents of a particular kind of public office alone but in terms of qualities and characteristics which define them as human beings. How they respond and why they respond as they do are questions influenced by a whole sequence of their prior experiences, attitudes, and predispositions; by their current perspectives and goals; and by their anticipations of the future.
>
> (Wahlke et al. 1962, 69)

In this chapter, I develop the theoretical model used to conduct a new analysis of the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour. The first part outlines the model's underlying behavioural assumptions and identifies how they depart from those made in existing contributions. Specifically, I move away from the implicit view that every legislator should desire or depend upon re-election to the same degree and, by extension, that every legislator should display the same level of effort to achieve re-election. The conceptual benefit of this more granular view on MP motivation is revealed in a second part, in which I integrate this perspective into an original two-tiered model of how institutional- and individual-level determinants interact to shape an MP's incentives for personalistic or party-centric vote-seeking behaviour.

I rely on some parsimonious formal notation to illustrate the precise behavioural mechanisms behind my model. A subsequent section provides a more general

discussion of the resulting behavioural expectations. The benefit of using formal notation as a heuristic tool in theory-building has long been recognised both in comparative politics generally (e.g. Fiorina 1975; Gehlbach 2013; Morton 1999), and in the study of legislative behaviour more specifically (e.g. Black 1972; Kam 2006; Snyder and Groseclose 2000). It allows scholars to enhance the "clarity of thought" in their argument by illustrating its key causal mechanisms in a more concise manner, while being forced to make statements about the underlying assumptions (e.g. Fiorina 1975, 136).[1] Following a formal model's commonly-accepted purpose of "lay[ing] bare the underlying structure of the situation as opposed to describing its every detail" (Osborne 2002, 2), the notation used here will take a simple and stylised form to elucidate my theoretical framework.

3.1 Behavioural Assumptions and Conceptual Foundations

As a starting point to any theory attempting to explain human action, it is necessary to expound on its fundamental behavioural assumptions and conceptual foundations. As indicated in the opening chapters, the macro-level literature on the relationship between electoral rules and incumbents' vote-seeking behaviour is deeply rooted in a neo-institutionalist understanding of MP behaviour. This tradition views the institutional environment as the core framework that governs how individuals go about achieving their goals. It thus offers – by definition – an expedient analytical tool to help us predict or understand how institutions influence the behaviour of actors operating within a given macro-level setting (e.g. Diermeier 2014; Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003; Saalfeld 1995c; Saalfeld, Martin, and

[1] Moreover, my approach represents one of only a few contributions to the literature on electoral rules and personal-vote incentives that makes use of these advantages of formal analysis (see also Kam 2009; Proksch and Slapin 2012).

Strøm 2014; Strøm 1997). In light of the research questions it seeks to answer, the framework presented in this study is therefore embedded in this manner of thinking about MP behaviour. As explained below, however, I will take a more nuanced, two-tiered perspective that incorporates the individual level a further important source of behavioural incentives.

In line with the majority of contributions on legislative behaviour, my approach is based on a rational-choice perspective. This means that I consider legislators to be rational actors who behave in a way they consider most conducive to maximising their expected utility over a given outcome (e.g. Black 1972; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Saalfeld 1995c).[2] While not without limitations (cf. Searing 1991; Weingast 1996), rational-choice has become the dominant approach to the study of legislative behaviour, as it "can help to generate general, parsimonious models on the mechanisms of parliamentary politics that can be tested against a wide array of evidence" (Saalfeld 1995c, 33). In light of the underdeveloped link between macro- and micro-level approaches to the study of electoral rules and legislative behaviour, such a model is also appropriate given the argument that "the aim of all rational choice explanations is to link micro and macro levels of analysis" (Hechter 1987, 30).

As indicated above, I follow the prevalent neo-institutionalist view in assuming that the institutional setting can impact an MP's set of behavioural strategies used to achieve his or her goals. Regarding this set of goals, the literature on parliamentary systems has identified – and generally accepts – a legislator's core objectives to consist of re-election, office (i.e. attaining posts within the parliamentary party group (PPG), legislature or cabinet) and policy influence (e.g. Müller and Strøm 1999; Norton 1999; Strøm 1990). The behavioural model developed below thereby

[2] To be sure, the actor may not always make the correct choice (see Black 1972, 146), for example due to imperfect information or incorrect subjective probabilities.

subscribes to the important assumption that within this list, there exists what has been termed a "hierarchy of goals" (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005, 37; see also Sieberer and Müller 2015). Re-election must logically be considered the paramount goal of the MP, as it represents the *condicio sine qua non* for attaining the other two goals: "The iron-clad necessity of election in democratic legislatures makes the 'single-minded pursuit of reelection' the primary instrumental goal of legislators" (Strøm 1997, 160; see also Fiorina 1989; Mayhew 1974; Sieberer 2010).[3]

Mayhew's famous assertion that legislators are "single-minded seekers of re-election" (Mayhew 1974, 5), and that their behaviour should be geared towards achieving this goal, is omnipresent in the relevant literature. It constitutes the core premise of the most influential theoretical contribution on the link between electoral rules and MPs' vote-seeking efforts (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995, 418), and lies at the basis of almost every empirical test of the proposed causal relationship. Given that I will formalise part of the theoretical model developed below, it is expedient to express this common assumption on MP preferences with the aid of some formal notation. The prevalent approach in the literature therefore assumes any MP (denoted as legislator i) to strictly prefer being re-elected (RE) over not being re-elected (NE), such that $\mathbf{RE} \;\; P \;\; \mathbf{NE}$, which can be written in a utility function satisfying:

$$U_i\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) \;>\; U_i\left(\mathbf{NE}\right) \tag{3.1}$$

This inequality reflects utilities over preferences in an ordinal manner, making no claim about *how much* any legislator i prefers RE over NE. Given that most studies do not move beyond this simple ranking of preference, the intensity in re-election ambition is usually seen as uniform across all legislators. While recognising that

[3]Sieberer and Müller, in their application of Ambition Theory to parliamentary, share this view as they observe that "progressive ambition is an add-on to, rather than a substitute for, static ambition in parliamentary systems. The reelection goal implies that MPs react to institutional incentives created by the electoral system" (2015, 6-7).

MPs may differ in other aspects, the existing literature on vote-seeking behaviour therefore contends – often implicitly – that *all legislators* should be interested and invested in the goal of re-election to the *same degree*. In other words, one and the same ordinal ranking of preferences over re-election is taken to apply to every legislator. Following the neo-institutional tradition (e.g. Diermeier 2014; Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003), this assumption of homogeneity has been used – and is methodologically beneficial – to tease out the impact of institutional variables *alone*, by holding constant any variation in vote-seeking incentives that might emanate from the MP-level. This methodological utility of the assumed homogeneity in re-election ambition can help explain why "Mayhew's stark stylisation proved both catchy and enormously influential" (Strøm 1997, 169).

At the aggregate level, the blanket assumption that legislators want to be re-elected is an empirically sound one to make, and I do not challenge the idea that legislators are, on average, committed to achieving re-election. However, and as explained in more detail below, an important implication of this uniformity is the assumption that everyone desires re-election to the same degree. I argue not only that such a homogeneity in legislators' re-election ambitions may be empirically inaccurate, but, more importantly, that we lose valuable information at the MP-level that can be used to develop new explanations of legislative behaviour. This is because the behavioural application of this uniformity in re-election ambition implies that *all MPs* should seek to maximise their chances of re-election with the *same level of effort*.

My framework relaxes the simplifying nature of this dominant aggregate-level perspective on MPs' re-election ambitions and their behavioural effects. Rather, and while accepting the proposition that MPs want to be re-elected and that their

behaviour should reflect this, I posit that the desire for or dependence on re-election varies between individual MPs. This more realistic and fine-grained perspective, substantiated in more detail below, constitutes the linchpin of my theoretical model and the ensuing empirical tests. It enables me to devise a two-tiered framework of MPs' legislative vote-seeking behaviour, which takes into account both institutional and individual-level sources of behavioural incentives.

The general utility of a more integrative perspective on legislative behaviour has previously been recognised (e.g. Saalfeld 1995c; Searing 1991; 1994; Strøm 1997; Wahlke et al. 1962). Searing, for example, describes how such a unifying approach can consider the institutional setting as an important stimulus for goal-oriented behavioural patterns, while allowing for individual-level variation in behavioural incentives. This leads the author to state that "the motivational approach brings *homo sociologicus* and *homo economicus* into a flexible framework suitable for studying *homo politicus*" (1991, 1252).

Such a perspective has found only limited application to the empirical study of electoral rules and MP behaviour. However, it represents an expedient concept to answer the study's research questions by analysing under more realistic assumptions what motivates individual MPs to cater to the party or to their own reputation, and under which institutional conditions such behaviour will occur. The addition of this more sociological school of thought must not be understood as a move away from a rational-choice approach; rather, I rely on the explanatory strengths offered both by the neo-institutionalist and the motivation-based perspectives.[4] This combination enables me to conduct new and more robust tests of the conventional theories linking electoral rules and MP behaviour.

[4]This view is not contradictory to rational-choice theory, as it still maintains that a purposive actor behaves strategically to reach a goal, whatever that goal may be (Saalfeld 1995c). In my case, this goal remains re-election, except that some MPs are assumed to desire it more than others.

3.2 A Model of Electoral Rules, Re-election Ambition and MP Behaviour

3.2.1 MPs' re-election ambition: A more nuanced approach

My behavioural model begins with the argument that legislators differ, for reasons exogenous to the institutional environment or electoral context, in the utility they personally attach to getting re-elected. To put some flesh on this theoretical assertion, consider how an MP's personal career consideration may impact the intensity with which he or she desires or depends upon retaining the position as legislator. Support for such a career-based conceptualisation comes from a variety of contributions,[5] with one economic study observing that "[t]he obvious starting point for analyzing incentives faced by politicians is to quantify the relative costs and benefits of a career in politics" (Keane and Merlo 2010, 187). Building upon this suggestion, it can be argued that the value to a given MP of retaining the mandate (i.e. the value of re-election) is a function of the attractiveness or availability of an alternative career (or the prior attainment of career goals) outside the parliamentary arena, as well as the utility the individual attaches to these potential outside options (see also Black 1972, 146; Hechter 1987, 46).

This argument can be illustrated by a function in which the utility that a legislator i (U_i) attaches to re-election (RE) increases as his or her utility over alternative career options outside the mandate (denoted by OC) decreases,[6] such that the derivative of U_i (RE) with respect to U_i (OC) is negative:

[5] See the operationalisation of MPs' re-election ambitions through their career background, as explained in chapter 5.

[6] To be sure, a restriction to the political arena is likely to be entirely voluntary in the case of MPs who have focused their careers on politics (see operationalisation). In their case, the utility attached to outside options should therefore be very low.

$$\frac{d\left(U_i\left(RE\right)\right)}{d\left(U_i\left(OC\right)\right)} < 0 \tag{3.2}$$

In a similar vein, the idea that re-election is less valuable to MPs with readily available outside options can be thought of in terms of decreasing marginal utility. Analogously to the textbook example where £10 are "worth more" to the pauper than to the millionaire, retaining the mandate is assumed to be of greater value to MPs without alternative careers or sources of professional fulfilment and economic security than to those who may already have achieved various career goals elsewhere, or have lower transaction costs to an outside career should they fail to get re-elected.

Although the above function suggests that every single MP could in theory be placed along a spectrum according to the intensity with which he or she desires re-election, such a fine-grained approach is not feasible as part of an empirical analysis – not least because ambition is difficult to quantify in the first place (see chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion). For the purpose of this behavioural model, I therefore propose a simpler, binary conceptualisation that divides MPs into those with higher (denoted as MP_H) and those with lower re-election ambitions (MP_L). A detailed empirical operationalisation of this parameter – as well as a discussion of its strengths and weaknesses – is conducted in chapter 5.

As a result of this individual-level perspective on MPs' re-election ambitions, I move away from the simple ordinal ranking of preferences over re-election as assumed by the existing aggregate-level premise (see equation 3.1 above). Rather, and by introducing and comparing the two MP groups, the utilities are implicitly transformed from ordinal to cardinal,[7] now making a comparative statement about

[7]Cardinal utility can be understood as revealing information about "relative preferences" over outcomes (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007), and therefore describes an "intensity of preferences"(Binmore 2009). In game theory, numerical pay-offs are usually attached to given outcomes, making them comparable across actors.

how much the one outcome is preferred over the other. This can then account for the possibility that some MPs may attach greater utility to re-election than others.[8]

Expressed formally, the utility (or benefit) attached to re-election (RE) is thus greater for MP_H than for MP_L (equation 3.3). Conversely, the cost of failing to get re-elected (NE) is higher for the former than for the latter (3.4) (i.e. a lower utility best thought of as a negative value). Finally (3.5), the difference between the utilities over re-election and non-re-election is larger for MP_H (i.e. the benefit of re-election is greater while the cost of no re-election is also greater).[9] This yields the following inequalities where U_H denotes the utility of MP_H and U_L that of MP_L:

$$U_H\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) > U_L\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) \tag{3.3}$$

$$U_H\left(\mathbf{NE}\right) < U_L\left(\mathbf{NE}\right) \tag{3.4}$$

$$\left[U_H\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_H\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] > \left[U_L\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_L\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \tag{3.5}$$

The following section explains the conceptual benefit of the above assumptions as I integrate this more nuanced view on MP ambition into a larger model of interaction between electoral rules, MP ambition and vote-seeking behaviour.

3.2.2 Deriving the behavioural mechanisms

A baseline model of MP vote-seeking behaviour

My MP-level model consists of three core parameters, namely the strength of an MP's re-election ambitions, the degree to which a given electoral system generates

[8] To be sure, a comparison of the overall utility over re-election is still ordinal between the two MP groups, as one is assumed to desire this outcome *more* than the other.

[9] Taking equation 3.5 – and noting that it is not the absolute value of the numbers that matters, but their ordinality – we can imagine an example where $U_H(\text{RE})$ takes a value of 10, $U_H(\text{NE}) = -4$, $U_L(\text{RE}) = 8$, and $U_L(\text{NE}) = -2$.

incentives for individualistic or party-centric vote-seeking, and, as the behavioural outcome or action of interest, the degree to which the individual MP chooses to display such behaviour. Before combining these factors into an integrated framework, I develop a baseline model outlining the assumed expected utilities perceived by any legislator i acting in any electoral system.

I therefore begin by denoting a set of agents $L = \{MP_i\}$, consisting at this point only of legislator i. This agent has at his or her disposal a set of vote-seeking actions $A = \{personalistic,\ party\text{-}centric\}$ which the actor believes to influence the chances of achieving a set of goals $X = \{RE,\ NE\}$, where RE implies that the legislator is re-elected and NE implies no re-election.[10] At this point – and from a purely theoretical perspective – it is not crucial to specify whether the vote-seeking actions (i.e. the behavioural outcome or action of interest) are assumed to be expressed as part of an individual, one-off act (such as one legislative vote), or whether they are viewed cumulatively for each MP over time (i.e. reflecting the MP's behaviour at the aggregate level). In light of the ensuing empirical tests, however, it is instructive to think of the parameter in the latter fashion, as an MP's likelihood to display a given degree of personalistic or party-centric behaviour will be estimated across a series of decisions (in this case, a large number of legislative roll-calls).

Seeing as the behavioural mechanisms will be expressed through functions of expected utility, I furthermore denote probabilities the actor attaches to the occurrence of a certain outcome given certain actions. Legislator i believes that re-election (RE) can be achieved in return for *personalistic* behaviour with probability p (and since the only other outcome in the model is not getting re-elected,

[10] Note that these sets are a reflection of the most parsimonious view of the theory. A more complex approach would be to include a larger set of actions $A = \{personalistic,\ party\text{-}centric,\ neutral\ or\ ambiguous\}$ and a larger set of outcomes $X = \{RE,\ NE,\ no\ impact\ of\ selected\ action\ on\ re\text{-}election\ chances\}$.

NE occurs at $1 - p$), and in return for *party-centric* behaviour with probability q (and not re-elected at $1 - q$). As discussed in more detail below, these probabilities (and their relationship to one another) will eventually be modelled as a function of the electoral system within which the legislator operates.

Finally, and in line with other formal models on legislative behaviour (e.g. Black 1972; Kam 2006; Snyder and Groseclose 2000), I attach costs C to each of the two actions (cost C_P is attributed to personalistic behaviour and cost C_C to party-centric behaviour). Such costs are unobserved but can be hypothesised about (cf. Snyder and Groseclose 2000, 195). While it is not necessary as part of this stylised theoretical model to stipulate what these costs may be specifically, an important assumption is that they are (and need to be) independent of the parameters linked to an MP's probability of re-election.[11]

With the sets of agents, outcomes, and behavioural choices in place, I can now draw up utility functions in the tradition of Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The type of notation used here also draws on a previous formal approach to legislative behaviour developed as part of a study on party loyalty among Canadian Liberal MPs (Kam 2006). While I build upon the rational-choice assumptions that underlie the notation used by Kam, three central aspects distinguish my approach from this model. First, and given the research aims of his approach, Kam focuses on legislators' utilities over frontbench promotion (a factor that I will address in the empirical part of this study). In line with my research questions, however, I am interested in utilities over re-election, both as a goal in and of itself, and as a prerequisite for achieving subsequent goals, such as office or policy influence (see section 3.1 above). Second, Kam follows the pervasive assumption of homogeneity

[11] Costs attached to personalistic behaviour (C_P) may, for example, include the denial of office promotion by the party leadership. Costs related to party-centric behaviour (C_C) could arise when an MP remains loyal to the party while actually disagreeing with it (i.e. ideological costs).

in re-election ambition and therefore implicitly models only the behaviour of the average MP, making no mention of intrinsic differences in re-election ambition between MP groups.[12] Third, the approach is concerned only with the legislative behaviour in a single political system, meaning that the model does not incorporate the potentially differential effect across electoral systems. Apart from the fact that I seek to answer different empirical questions, the overall framework developed here departs from such an implicit "one size fits all" approach, as my model is specifically designed to capture the differential behavioural effect electoral rules are assumed to have on MPs with high and low re-election ambitions. The type of notation used by Kam has nonetheless aided the formal illustration of my model as presented here.

Overall, the conditions laid out above yield the following expected utilities (EU_i) of personalistic and party-centric behaviour for any MP_i:

$$EU_i \text{ (personalistic)} = p\ U_i(\mathbf{RE}) + (1-p)\ U_i(\mathbf{NE}) - C_P \tag{3.6}$$

$$EU_i \text{ (party-centric)} = q\ U_i(\mathbf{RE}) + (1-q)\ U_i(\mathbf{NE}) - C_C \tag{3.7}$$

To illustrate the choice set and related utilities faced by MP_i, I combine the two equations into inequalities reflecting EU_i (party-centric) $> EU_i$ (personalistic) (in which case legislator i is expected to display party-centric behaviour) and EU_i (personalistic) $> EU_i$ (party-centric) (at which point legislator i should behave personalistically).[13] After rearranging the resulting inequalities, I find that any MP_i will display personalistic behaviour iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$(p-q)\ [U_i(\mathbf{RE}) - U_i(\mathbf{NE})] > C_P - C_C \tag{3.8}$$

[12] Kam does, however, consider the behaviour of MPs who were demoted from their frontbench positions, a factor I address with relevant control variables.

[13] See also Kam's combination of equations in his model (2006, 565).

and that MP_i will display party-centric behaviour iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$(p - q)\left[U_i\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_i\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \; < \; C_P - C_C \tag{3.9}$$

Legislator i therefore reaches a decision by weighing up the overall costs attached to a given action ($C_P - C_C$) against the degree to which he or she expects this action to increase re-election prospects (i.e. the benefit).[14] Given that the above baseline model only considers one agent (MP_i), it assumes – in accordance with the existing literature – that every MP prefers to get re-elected over not re-elected to the same degree. This means that the parameter capturing the utility over re-election, $[U_i\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_i\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)]$, is positive and constant (see section 3.1). What therefore determines whether the costs associated with a given action outweigh the benefits are probabilities p and q, and more specifically whether their sum is greater or smaller than zero. The next section expands this model in line with my theoretical assumptions and elaborates on what determines these probabilities.

Introducing variation in electoral rules and re-election ambition

This section augments the above baseline model by introducing the two parameters at the core of my theoretical framework, namely variation in behavioural incentives generated by electoral rules (i.e. the macro-level) and the variation in MP-level re-election ambition. Until now, parameters p and q in the baseline model simply represent the respective probabilities with which an MP's chosen action is expected to boost re-election prospects; no further assumption was made about the relationship between p and q, or where the actor takes the information that determines these expected probabilities from. In applying to the model the notion that some

[14] Moreover, seeing as a utility function merely captures a preference relationship (i.e. ordinality), it is irrelevant whether this overall cost is negative or positive; the model is only concerned with the relationship between the costs associated with the chosen action and the expected benefit in terms of re-election chances.

electoral systems make party-centric behaviour more conducive for re-election while others promote personalistic incentives, I assume that the relationship between (i.e. the values of) p and q depend upon whether the electoral system is believed[15] to reward personalistic or party-centric action.[16]

In other words, the relationship between p and q indicates which strategy must be considered more conducive to achieving the goal of re-election. When $p-q>0$, then the electoral system produces incentives for a personal-vote strategy given that the probability of getting re-elected as a result of personalistic behaviour is larger than as a result of party-centric behaviour displayed by the MP. Expressed differently, $p>0.5$ and $q<0.5$ (i.e. $p>q$, or $p-q>0$). Conversely, if the electoral system puts a greater premium on party-centric over personalistic behaviour to boost the legislator's chances for re-election, then $p-q<0$ (i.e. $q>0.5$ and $p<0.5$, or $p<q$).

Having suggested that the values of p and q are a function of the electoral rules the given agent operates in, we see that the baseline model reflects the exclusively macro-level (i.e. institutionalist) approach prevalent in the literature, while micro-level parameters such as an MP's re-election ambition deliberately remain constant to isolate the effect of the institutional setting. Following my more fine-grained assumptions on MPs' re-election ambitions, I introduce into the model the idea that some MPs attach greater utility to the goal of re-election than others. This means that instead of dealing only with legislator i from the baseline model, I now consider the utility functions faced by MPs with high (MP_H) and low (MP_L)

[15] At this point, the legislator's "belief" of how the given electoral rules make personalistic or party-centric behaviour more beneficial is based on the existing institutional-level theories. A detailed country-level discussion of my selected cases will, however, heed the important recommendations made by André, Depauw, and Martin (2016) of also acknowledging MPs' real-life perceptions of their institutional environment and the incentives it creates.

[16] They are therefore not "subjective probabilities" in the classic sense (Black 1972; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007), but reflect the agent's estimate of the likelihood of a certain outcome (i.e. re-election) resulting from a certain action (personalistic or party-centric behaviour) *given the institutional setting.*

re-election ambitions respectively. In other words, the set of agents now consists of $L = \{MP_H, MP_L\}$.

The model now reflects the two-tiered nature of my approach, as one parameter describes whether the electoral system provides incentives for personalistic or party-centric behaviour (i.e. $p - q > 0$ or $p - q < 0$) while the other pertains to whether an MP has high or low re-election ambitions. Before drawing up the relevant models, it must be noted that costs C_C and C_P are assumed to be constant across MP_H and MP_L (see below for a more detailed discussion of the assumptions taken as part of this model).[17] Whether or not the costs related to a given action outweigh its benefits is therefore a function of the interaction between the probabilities generated by the electoral rules (p and q) and the individual MP's degree of re-election ambition.

As outlined above, for systems where personalistic behaviour is more likely to assist than to hinder re-election chances, the model assumes that $p - q > 0$. Parameter $(p - q)$ in baseline inequality 3.8 can therefore be replaced with a positive sign (i.e. I drop the parameter) when analysing behaviour within a system that generates personal-vote incentives. In this setting, MPs with high (MP_H) and low re-election ambitions (MP_L) should display personalistic behaviour respectively iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$\text{For } MP_H: \qquad [U_H(\mathbf{RE}) - U_H(\mathbf{NE})] > C_P - C_C \tag{3.10}$$

$$\text{For } MP_L: \qquad [U_L(\mathbf{RE}) - U_L(\mathbf{NE})] > C_P - C_C \tag{3.11}$$

[17] Remember that these costs are assumed to be independent of the parameters linked to re-election or electoral rules.

Having assumed above that $[U_H(\mathbf{RE}) - U_H(\mathbf{NE})] > [U_L(\mathbf{RE}) - U_L(\mathbf{NE})]$, inequalities 3.10 and 3.11 generate the following dynamics for MPs operating in a system with personal-vote incentives. When weighing up, as part of one behavioural decision, the potential costs of personalistic behaviour against its estimated benefits, MP_H is prepared to accept a higher cost in return for increasing his or her re-election chances than MP_L. Across a series of decisions – and keeping in mind that the costs are assumed to be constant across the two MP types within each decision – MP_H should therefore display personalistic behaviour more often than MP_L, leading to a higher aggregate or cumulative level of personalistic behaviour by MP_H.

The reverse logic applies to MPs operating in party-centric systems. Here, personalistic behaviour is more likely to hinder re-election chances while party-centric action is perceived to boost it. For these systems, $p-q < 0$. Parameter $(p-q)$ from baseline inequality 3.9 is therefore replaced with a negative sign. Within these systems, MPs with high (MP_H) and low re-election ambitions (MP_L) are therefore expected to display party-centric behaviour iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$\text{For } MP_H: \qquad -[U_H(\mathbf{RE}) - U_H(\mathbf{NE})] < C_P - C_C \tag{3.12}$$

$$\text{For } MP_L: \qquad -[U_L(\mathbf{RE}) - U_L(\mathbf{NE})] < C_P - C_C \tag{3.13}$$

Within a party-centric electoral environment, the greater utility attached to re-election on the part of MP_H (see inequality 3.5) means that this agent is prepared to accept higher costs associated with party-centric behaviour in return for increasing re-election chances than is the case for MP_L. Framed in terms of frequency, the greater desire for re-election should outweigh the costs associated with party-centric behaviour more often for MP_H, making this agent more likely to display party-centric behaviour in this institutional setting.

As is the case with any formal model, its highly stylised nature means that a series of assumptions are made, many of which are deliberately simplistic (Black 1972; Morton 1999). First, costs C_P and C_C associated with personalistic and party-centric behaviour respectively are seen as independent of the parameters related to re-election prospects. These chances are captured uniquely by probabilities p and q (as a result of the electoral system). Moreover, and as indicated above, the model assumes costs C_P and C_C to be the same for MPs with low and high re-election ambition within each behavioural decision (for some empirical justification, see chapter 5). In a similar vein, the probabilities attached to re-election, p and q, are assumed to be the same across the two MP groups, varying only as a result of incentives generated by the electoral rules (and of the resulting behaviour).

Implicitly, the model furthermore holds constant other factors that may impact an MP's choice of personalistic or party-centric behaviour. This step is consistent with the generally-accepted practice (and necessity) of keeping models simple and useful by holding constant variables not directly addressed by the theory: "[A] useful common assumption is *ceteris paribus* (all other things equal): aspects of the real world that could have an effect on the outcome are held constant", and that this step is conducted to tease out the effect of the variables of interest (Morton 1999, 31-32). The parsimonious nature of the conditions described here is therefore integral to the theoretical model, as this isolates the core variables by modelling the interaction between electoral rules and MPs' re-election ambitions as the driving forces behind the predicted behavioural differences. The relationship between these macro- and micro-level variables are therefore identified as the key lever that tilts an MP's behavioural choice in a certain direction. Before presenting the overarching behavioural expectations that emanate from this model, I point to a more disaggregated application of the framework.

Variation in strength of incentives across similar systems

The model presented above was drawn up with a comparison between two contrasting electoral systems in mind, one generating personalistic and the other party-centric behavioural incentives. However, the framework's basic assumptions are versatile, and can be used to account for variation in the strength of such incentives even across systems that are, on the whole, party-centric (or personalistic), but which differ in the intensity of the generated incentives. Consider, for example, two different electoral systems in which incumbents face party-centric incentives. However, the magnitude or strength of these party-centric dynamics differs between the systems, for example because one promotes some personalistic incentives under certain conditions (or for certain legislators) while, on the whole, remaining party-centric. The cross-system MP-level model proposed here can be used to identify, across these more similar systems, the impact on MP behaviour.

The following application of my model can account for potential differences in the magnitude of incentives across two party-centric systems by denoting two different sets of probabilities of re-election, given a certain action. The probability previously described by $p - q$ in the baseline model is now applied to each system, denoted as $r - s$ for the one generating greater party-centric incentives, and as $t - v$ for the one with lower such incentives.[18] Because MPs in both electoral systems are still assumed to operate in predominately party-centric environments, the differences in probabilities in each model remain negative, i.e. $r - s < 0$ and $t - v < 0$. At the same time, the probability of getting re-elected as a result of party-centric behaviour is even higher for the former than for the latter, meaning that $(r - s) < (t - v)$.[19]

[18]Note that while this example pertains to only two categories, the model can be expanded to include more than two categories, or can even be constructed as continuous by shifting the difference between p and q anywhere from -1 to 1.

[19]I.e. $(r - s)$ is even "more negative" than $(t - v)$.

Among legislators operating in the more party-centric system, those with high (MP_H) and low re-election ambitions (MP_L) should therefore display party-centric behaviour iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$\text{For } MP_H: \quad (r-s)\left[U_H\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_H\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \; < \; C_P - \; C_C \tag{3.14}$$

$$\text{For } MP_L: \quad (r-s)\left[U_L\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_L\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \; < \; C_P - \; C_C \tag{3.15}$$

whereas among legislators in the less party-centric system, the two MP types should display party-centric behaviour iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$\text{For } MP_H: \quad (t-v)\left[U_H\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_H\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \; < \; C_P - \; C_C \tag{3.16}$$

$$\text{For } MP_L: \quad (t-v)\left[U_L\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_L\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \; < \; C_P - \; C_C \tag{3.17}$$

What are the behavioural implications of these models? First, MPs with high re-election ambitions in both electoral systems are more likely to display party-centric behaviour than those with low re-election ambitions, given that both $r-s$ and $t-v$ are negative. However, as $(r-s) < (t-v)$, the difference in the likelihood between MP_H and MP_L to display party-centric behaviour within the more party-centric system is larger than the difference in likelihood between those MP types in the less party-centric environment. In other words, while MPs in both settings should be guided by party-centric incentives, the moderate personal-vote incentives hypothesised for the second system decrease the magnitude of the assumed behavioural effect generated by the overarching party-centric environment. The discussion of my study's case selection and research design in chapter 4 will indicate how this proposition will be tested empirically.

3.3 Behavioural Expectations and Conceptual Set-Up

3.3.1 Sketching out the behavioural expectations

The following section verbalises the behavioural expectations generated by the framework presented above. The existing theory on the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour, as well as the subsequent empirical tests, are based on the assumption that the uniform goal of re-election "energises" (André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014, 232) incumbent MPs to engage in certain vote-seeking behaviour. The MP-level assumptions introduced in this study add the important idea that individual differences in re-election motives should "energise" some MPs more than others.[20] At the same time, the existing macro-level theory (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Mitchell 2000) postulates that the electoral system determines which kind of strategy – catering to the party or the personal reputation – is most conducive to securing re-election. The model presented here combines this institutionalist view with the assumed MP-level variation in re-election ambition, leading to the overarching expectation that:

> *Those MPs most invested in the goal of re-election should employ with even greater effort the strategy that, given the institutional setting, is most likely to help them secure it.*

This phrasing already hints at the within-system cross-country structure of the model, as well as the interaction that guides its behavioural expectations. Figure 3.1 depicts this visually. The x-axis describes the degree to which the electoral rules provide personal-vote incentives (increasing from left to right) while the y-axis indicates whether, as a result of these institutionally generated incentives,

[20] See also Patty (2016) who, in his purely theoretical model linking obstructionism in the legislative process with re-election motivations, assumes that those legislators who value re-election more should demonstrate greater effort.

MPs cater more to the party or to their own reputation to enhance re-election chances.[21] By assuming homogeneity in the intensity of MPs' re-election motives, the existing literature predicts a positive relationship for the average MP (e.g. Carey 2007; Carey and Shugart 1995; Depauw and Martin 2009; Sieberer 2006). This is illustrated by the solid, upward sloping line; as the given electoral rules increase the pay-offs for individualistic behaviour, aggregate-level indicators of MP behaviour (such as parliament-level party disunity) should rise analogously.[22]




Figure 3.1: Visual depiction of the within-system cross-country predictions

[21] The assumed direction of causality therefore runs from the x-axis (electoral rules) to the y-axis (MP behaviour).

[22] Note that the lines' curvature and exact slope have no substantive meaning but were chosen for visual purposes. Following the existing theoretical predictions, the important characteristic of the line is that it has a monotonically increasing slope, i.e. that

$$\frac{d\,y}{d\,x} > 0$$

While the lines' upward slopes reflect the literature's aggregate-level expectation, my within-system cross-country approach is not primarily concerned with the fact that the gradients are positive. Rather, the predictions generated by my model are captured by the vertical differences between the dotted and dashed lines, as well as by the fact that these lines cross over at a given point. Specifically, these lines represent the hypothesised *relative* level of personal- and party-vote efforts between MPs with low (MP_L) and high (MP_H) re-election ambitions. They suggest that prior to (i.e. to the left of) the crossing point, MP_H displays more pronounced party-centric behaviour than MP_L, while this relationship flips over at the point when – given the electoral rules – the cultivation of a personal reputation becomes more conducive to boosting re-election prospects. In addition to illustrating the proposed MP-level behavioural contrast between party-centric and personalistic systems, figure 3.1 also indicates the expected patterns for sets of electoral rules which promote party-centric behaviour, but which differ in the strength of these incentives (and conversely for personalistic systems). In other words, the model allows me to test for behavioural differences between systems that lie entirely to the left of the crossing point (or to the right, for personalistic systems).

With the assumed behavioural mechanisms spelled out, I can now formulate the interactive cross-system MP-level prediction that will guide my subsequent empirical investigation and allow me to conduct a new test of the existing theory linking electoral rules and MP behaviour:

> *As variation between electoral systems shifts the strategy an MP is expected to employ in order to increase re-election chances from party-focused to personalistic, MPs with higher re-election ambitions should, in relation to their within-system colleagues with lower re-election ambitions, move from a greater degree of party-focused behaviour to a greater degree of personalistic behaviour.*

Importantly, the outcome parameter at the centre of this theoretical framework is not simply the degree to which an MP cultivates a personal vote or not – as the *explanandum* is often conceptualised in the literature (see my criticism in chapter 2). Rather, the focus rests on the strategy that increases re-election prospects. In some systems this can be achieved by pandering to the party, while in others this is done by cultivating a personal vote. In the same way as some previous contributions contrast "personal vote-seeking" with "party vote-seeking" (Crisp et al. 2004, 824; see also Samuels 1999), I therefore consider catering to the party label not simply as a lack of personal-vote effort, but as a re-election strategy in and of itself. Moreover, the empirical operationalisation will address what is meant by "a greater degree of party-focused/personalistic behaviour", as expressed in the formulation of my behavioural prediction above.

A final consideration must briefly be addressed here. In order to account for the assumed contrast between the two re-election strategies, the model views the balance between party-centric and individualistic behaviour to be largely a zero-sum game (or, at the very least, *not* an unambiguous positive sum game). In other words, catering to one's personal reputation is assumed to damage (or at least be unsupportive of) the party reputation, while party-centric behaviour takes away from the development of a personal vote. In their influential theoretical contribution, Carey and Shugart (1995, 418) highlight the tension between individualistic vote-seeking behaviour and the party label, and make this relationship their point of departure when examining how electoral systems shape incumbent behaviour. As will be explained in detail in chapter 5, the action of voting against the party line in legislative votes provides an expedient operationalisation for the purpose of this study, as it has the capacity to evoke such a zero-sum game between individual and party reputation.

Following the development of my behavioural model and resulting expectations, the task now is to devise a research design that reflects the required variation in the given parameters of interest, in order to test the proposed interactive relationship. Before doing so, I point to the benefits of the within-system cross-country set-up of my model as a means to provide more robust empirical tests of the existing theory on electoral rules and MP behaviour. This benefit is further illustrated by drawing parallels between my approach and a difference-in-differences design.

3.3.2 Benefit of the within-system cross-country approach

As has become evident above, the theoretical framework allows me to test whether the intensity and orientation of MPs' vote-seeking behaviour (personal vs. party-centric) differs across MPs *within* parliaments in a way that varies predictably *across* countries (i.e. electoral systems) according to the existing theory on electoral rules and MP behaviour. The benefit of such a within-system cross-country set-up is that it can be used to devise a new and more robust test of this influential theory. Specifically, my model helps tackle the conceptual drawbacks faced by many cross-national tests, in which the validity of results is reduced by potentially influential, but largely uncontrolled, country-specific factors (see chapter 2).

By analysing MP-level variation in legislative behaviour, while still taking a distinctly comparative perspective, my approach can account for the possibility that absolute levels of macro-level indicators (such as party unity) vary across systems for reasons unrelated to electoral rules. In other words, I combine the advantages of single-case studies (which can hold constant country-specific factors) with the benefit of a cross-national perspective (which provides the required macro-level variation). The utility of such a design compared to simple macro-level studies has

previously been recognised by scholars of comparative politics (e.g. Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967; Lijphart 1971; Lijphart 1975).

Despite its conceptual usefulness, however, such a "cross-individual, multi-national" (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1967, 47) approach has so far found only limited application in the literature on electoral rules and MPs' vote-seeking behaviour. Exceptions, addressed also in chapter 2, include an MP-level analysis of progressive ambition in fifteen European countries (Sieberer and Müller 2015). This study represents an important contribution in considering legislators' ambitions across parliamentary systems. However, its framework still holds constant legislators' ambitions for *re-election*, and the findings are presented largely at the macro-level. André, Depauw, and Martin (2015) show across systems that the impact of electoral rules on the constituency effort made by an MP is moderated by the individual's electoral margin, while Shomer (2016) studies variation both across systems and across individuals to demonstrate the mediating effect of selection rules. Although these contributions point to the conceptual usefulness of within-system cross-country designs, they are, in their substantive focus, still predominantly concerned with behavioural incentives that emanate from the institutional level (while modelling the goal of re-election as universal and fixed across MPs).

Proksch and Slapin (2012) show for the Bundestag and the UK House of Commons[23] – i.e. the cases at the focus of this thesis – that patterns in legislative speech-making vary at the MP-level in a manner consistent with theories on the impact of electoral institutions. In their approach, the authors are able not only to hold potentially distorting country-level influences constant, but also show that the rules on parliamentary speech-making are, to some degree, endogenous to the electoral system. Overall, the empirical advances made in these recent applications

[23]Proksch and Slapin (2015) later expanded the number of cases as part of a larger study.

of a within-system cross-national approach to legislative behaviour indicate the potential of such a design. In light of these findings, this thesis seeks to provide further empirical insight into the relationship between electoral rules and MP behaviour by using such a framework together with a new concept of MP-level motivation exogenous to the electoral setting.

3.3.3 The theoretical model as a Difference-in-Differences design

From a purely semantic perspective, my model tests for a "difference in differences": It asks whether the *difference* in behaviour between MPs with high and low re-election ambition within one electoral system *differs* from that observed in another system in a way that is consistent with the existing theory. Beyond this linguistic connection, my approach also displays important conceptual commonalities with the method for causal inference known as Difference-in-Differences (DD). Even though the data structure used to test my model does not lend itself to a strict application of this method (see chapter 5), it is instructive to draw some parallels between my approach and a DD design.

The purpose behind DD is to identify causally an effect triggered through a given change. More specifically, two sets of outcomes may move along in parallel – usually across time – until one of them is subjected to a treatment (after which it becomes the treatment outcome), while the other becomes the control group (Angrist and Pischke 2015, Ch. 5; Lee 2016, Ch. 5). The difference between the *pre-treatment* outcomes is then compared to the difference between the *post-treatment* outcomes. The discrepancy between these two differences – i.e. the "difference in differences" – then indicates the impact made by the treatment (Angrist and Pischke 2015, 178). Famous examples of this method include the way in which 19$^{\text{th}}$ century physician

John Snow identified contaminated drinking water as a cause of the London cholera epidemics. Tracing data on death rates by district, Snow observed that after one of the two water suppliers moved their water works upriver, the death rates fell much more sharply in the areas supplied by the company that had moved, compared to the rates in the districts supplied by the company that had not moved (see Angrist and Pischke 2015, 204-5).

A DD design therefore relies on the notion and existence of a counterfactual when examining the difference between what *did* occur after the treatment and what *would have* occurred if the treatment had never taken place. One of the key empirical conditions for DD to have explanatory (or causal) validity is therefore the *common trends assumption* (sometimes referred to as the parallel trend assumption), implying that the trends of both groups run in parallel until the treatment occurs (Angrist and Pischke 2015, 184-5). This condition is set to ensure that the control group fulfils its task (of controlling), which can be demonstrated empirically through parallel trends before the treatment (sometimes called "leads").

Parts of the basic logic of a DD design can be applied to my behavioural model in order to help us understand better its conceptual advantages over aggregate-level cross-country approaches. Figure 3.2 illustrates this adaptation. First, I consider the switch from an electoral system with party-centric incentives to one with personalistic incentives as the "treatment". Figure 3.2 implicitly designates the party-centric electoral system (along with the MPs within) as the control system (system 1), and the personalistic one as the treatment (system 2).[24]

Note that the treatment effect this switch is expected to have on the behaviour of MPs with high re-election ambitions is not considered to be in *absolute* terms,

[24]Note that this choice is arbitrary. The opposite order would not impact the adaptation.

but in *relation* to the behaviour of MPs with lower re-election ambitions: where in system 1, MP_H was expected to engage in less personalistic (i.e. more party-centric) behaviour than MP_L, the opposite is expected in system 2. The dashed line in figure 3.2 indicates the counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened to the behaviour of MP_H in relation to MP_L had the treatment not occurred (the former would have kept displaying more party-centric behaviour than the latter). The expected treatment effect (i.e. the behavioural impact of treating the MPs with system 2) is then the difference between this counterfactual and the actual behaviour of MP_H we expect to observe (in relation to MP_L).

To be sure, a number of central characteristics or conditions of a DD model are absent from my model. First, the lack of a time-related component means that the common trend assumption cannot be adequately addressed.[25] Second, the switch in electoral systems – considered to be the treatment in my adaptation – by no means occurs as a result of a natural experiment (as is often the case in conventional DD designs), but simply captures the difference in electoral rules. This reduces the power of the counterfactual, limiting the transferral of the classic DD design to my model. Nonetheless, I implement the idea of measuring a given impact not through a change in an aggregate-level measure but through the difference in changes at a lower level. This constitutes the key similarity between my model and a classic DD design, as well as the central advantage of my approach compared to existing macro-level tests (see also below).

We must note a final assumption in DD, namely that the composition of the treatment and control group remains the same before and after the treatment

[25]But consider, for example, country cases that experienced a change of electoral rules. The legislative terms leading up to this treatment could be seen as the "lead", before observing the difference in differences after the change of electoral rules (see Proksch and Slapin (2015) for an implicit application of this approach to their analysis of the case of New Zealand).




Figure 3.2: The behavioural model as a difference-in-differences design. Dashed line indicates counterfactual trend in treatment state, horizontal solid line indicates trend in control state. The increasing solid line traces predicted trend in treatment state.

(Angrist and Pischke 2009, 241). In other words, actors in the treatment group must not migrate into this group as a result of the treatment. On the one hand, this "problem of migration" (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 242) does not apply to the tests conducted here, because I look at two different country cases, ruling out physical migration.[26] In more general terms, however, we must be mindful that the chosen operationalisations of MPs with high and low re-election ambitions capture "the same types of people" in both country cases, in order to demonstrate that it is the change in electoral rules that drives the expected difference in differences. I address this condition empirically in the relevant section of chapter 5.

The similarities with a DD design again illustrate the conceptual advantages of my study's within-system cross-country approach over some of the existing comparative attempts to demonstrate a link between electoral rules and MP behaviour. One distinct asset of DD designs is that by "[c]omparing changes instead of levels, we

[26]However, this must be considered in the tests conducted across the German electoral tiers.

eliminate fixed differences between groups that might otherwise generate omitted variable bias" (Angrist and Pischke 2015, 202). Applied to the context of this study, these "levels" can be understood as aggregate-level measures of personalistic behaviour (such as party unity), while "groups" denotes different country cases. The quote therefore indicates the potential remedy for some of the issues identified in cross-national comparisons (see chapter 2), namely that these approaches often cannot adequately control for potentially influential country-level factors (i.e. suffer from omitted variable bias).

By analysing the impact of electoral rules on MP behaviour in *relative* (and micro-level) terms, instead of in *absolute* terms (through macro-level indicators), my approach is guided by these advantages of a DD design in limiting the impact of country-specific factors. This should make its empirical results more robust, as the model can cope with the possibility that the starting points (or absolute values) may be at different levels in each of the two cases, given fixed country-specific differences. Translated to the proxy of party unity, this means that I can account for the fact that absolute levels of party unity may differ across systems partly for reasons unrelated to the electoral system, as I argued to be the case for the Bundestag and the House of Commons (see chapter 2).

Chapter summary

This chapter developed the theoretical framework at the core of my study. In a first step, I relax the homogeneity in the prevalent re-election assumption by proposing that individual legislators in fact differ in the degree to which they desire or depend upon re-election. I subsequently use this perspective to draw up a behavioural model of how the interaction between the electoral system and an MP's degree

of re-election ambition shapes the individual's choices in his or her vote-seeking behaviour. Concretely, the model suggests that if the existing predictions on the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour hold true, then we should see those MPs most ambitious for re-election to employ with the greatest effort the type of behaviour that, given the institutional setting, is most likely to help them secure it.

Apart from proposing a new explanation of MP-level variation in vote-seeking behaviour, this comparative model is designed as an original test for the prevalent predictions concerning the behavioural effect of electoral rules. By relying on the basic idea behind a difference-in-differences design, the within-system cross-national set-up of my model seeks to alleviate some of the conceptual issues faced both by single-case studies as well as comparative aggregate-level tests of this long-standing theory. The next chapter presents the research design as well as the empirical setting used to test my framework.

Chapter 4

Research Design, Country Cases and Testable Hypotheses

I now introduce the empirical setting and research design used to test my theoretical framework. As explained above, my model takes a distinctly cross-national comparative approach but, importantly, seeks to test for cross-system patterns of behavioural differences between MPs operating within the same institutional setting. The two core explanatory parameters at the centre of my framework are the level of an MP's re-election ambition, and the degree to which the given electoral rules create incentives for party-centric or personalistic vote-seeking strategies. The model thereby asks whether the interaction between these two macro- and micro-level components shapes an MP's behaviour in accordance with the overarching theory linking electoral rules and vote-seeking behaviour. To be able to test for this, my research design – and empirical testing ground – must provide variation within each of these core parameters.

Some arguments concerning the variation in MPs' re-election ambitions have already been touched upon while outlining the theory's behavioural assumptions above. The section covering the operationalisation of the main explanatory variables in the next chapter will make an even stronger and more detailed case for why some MPs should value re-election to a greater extent than others. Meanwhile, variation in the electoral rules parameter (i.e. the macro-level component) is facilitated through case selection.

I test my behavioural model across two empirical settings. First, and as the study's main test, I use the cases of the German Bundestag and the UK House of Commons to examine whether my predicted pattern in MP-level differences holds across different electoral systems. This chapter is thereby used to justify why the two institutions constitute particularly expedient cases to test the theory across a party-centric (Germany) and a more personalistic (UK) electoral system. Following an analysis of the behavioural incentives that should theoretically be generated by the two systems,[1] I derive, for each country, testable MP-level hypotheses in line with my theoretical framework. It should also be noted that for the German case I focus, in this first step, on the incentives created by the electoral system as a whole, i.e. at the aggregate level of both electoral tiers of Germany's mixed-member rules. This follows previous comparative approaches and is done to juxtapose the German system as a whole with the UK's (see also Proksch and Slapin 2015).

As part of a second test, I examine my model across the two electoral tiers – list and district – of Germany's mixed-member rules. I argue that these two levels within Germany's party-centric system are highly useful to test my predictions across systems in which incumbents, on the whole, face party-centric incentives, but which differ in strength of these incentives (i.e. systems that lie to the left of the crossing point in figure 3.1 above). To conduct this sub-national analysis as part of one coherent approach, I dedicate chapter 7 both to the formulation of the tier-level hypotheses, and to the ensuing empirical tests. Besides facilitating an additional investigation of my difference-in-differences model, this analysis also makes a new theoretical and empirical contribution to the on-going debate on behavioural contamination between tiers in mixed-member systems generally, and in the German context specifically (e.g. Ferrara 2004; Manow 2013; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2013).

[1] This more detailed discussion of country cases constitutes a further advantage over larger cross-national studies, as these usually fail to address country-specific dynamics and legislators' own perceptions of behavioural incentives.

4.1 Case Selection: UK and Germany

4.1.1 The country cases

The principal reason for choosing the German Bundestag and the UK House of Commons is the difference in electoral rules, as well as the predicted divergence in personal- and party-vote incentives created by each of the systems. Such variation is required to examine empirically the behavioural impact of electoral rules in line with my study's model, as well as with the existing comparative theories. Germany's mixed-member proportional (MMP) system,[2] with its compensatory feature and dual candidacies, is usually considered an example of a party-centric system regarding the behavioural incentives it creates for its incumbent MPs (e.g. Bawn and Thies 2003; Johnson and Wallack 2012; Mitchell 2000; Moser and Scheiner 2005; Proksch and Slapin 2012; Roberts 1988; Saalfeld 2005; Sieberer 2010).

The UK system has been classified as "candidate-centred" (Shugart 2001, 185) or "intermediate" (Mitchell 2000, 342), given that its first-past-the-post single-member district (SMD) rules should produce reasonably strong personal-vote incentives (see also André, Depauw, and Martin 2016; André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Debus and Bäck 2014; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005; Hix 2004; Proksch and Slapin 2012). Cross-national coding schemes confirm this difference between the two cases, as they consistently score the UK's system higher than Germany's regarding the degree of personal-vote incentives (e.g. Coman 2015; Farrell and Mcallister 2006; Johnson and Wallack 2012; Shugart 2001; Söderlund 2016).[3] Sections 4.2 and 4.3 covering the two country cases will allow me to trace in more detail how the respective electoral institutions are assumed to

[2] For a detailed description of Germany's electoral system, see below (section 4.3).

[3] But see André, Depauw, and Martin (2016) who point out a variety of inconsistencies within and across some of these rankings.

generate these different incentives. Moreover, this study is not the first to make use of the German and UK country cases due to their differences in electoral rules. Proksch and Slapin (2012), for example, choose the same two institutions in light of the party-centric and personalistic incentives created by their electoral rules. This case selection enables the authors to demonstrate, as part of a similar within-system cross-country design, the differential impact of electoral rules on strategic decisions made by the party leadership regarding floor access.[4]

My choice of country cases has further benefits with regards to the study's research design. While the focus on the UK permits an examination of a pure majoritarian electoral system, the German MMP rules allow me to consider not only the behaviour of all German MPs at the aggregate level (i.e. from both tiers) (see chapter 6), but also permits an additional investigation of potential behavioural differences between list- and district MPs (chapter 7). This means that I can test my predictions over three variations of electoral rules that should move from low to moderate incentives for a personal vote: 1) PR closed-list (German list MPs), 2) SMD within a MMP system (German district MPs) and 3) pure SMD (UK MPs).[5] The case selection furthermore follows the existing argument that contrasting Germany's MMP system with the UK's SMD rules constitutes a particularly hard testing ground for a comparative theory of electoral rules and MP behaviour given that "[w]e would expect to find the starkest differences between a presidential SMD system, such as the United States, and a closed-list PR system" (Proksch and Slapin 2012, 526-7).

Even though the study's within-system cross-country approach is designed to moderate the impact of potentially influential but uncontrolled country-specific factors (see chapter 2), it is methodologically desirable for the chosen country

[4] As part of a expanded book version of this approach, the authors later included New Zealand and the European Parliament as additional cases (Proksch and Slapin 2015).

[5] See also Proksch and Slapin (2012) for a similar justification of this case selection.

cases to be similar in terms of features that might affect legislative behaviour or vote-seeking strategies (while being exogenous to the electoral system). Most importantly, both countries are parliamentary systems, and therefore share many of the same institutional characteristics that can otherwise have a differential impact on legislative behaviour. This key similarity between the two country cases has already enabled previous studies to "control for regime type, meaning differences in the values that members and leaders place on the party label are most likely a function of the electoral system" (Proksch and Slapin 2012, 527).[6]

Related similarities include the no-confidence vote, which has been shown to influence macro-level indicators of MP behaviour (Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Hix and Noury 2016). Moreover, the party leadership in both parliaments uses frontbench promotion as a carrot-and-stick mechanism to deter members from engaging in collectively damaging behaviour such as dissent (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Bülow 2010; Hix and Noury 2016; Kam 2009; Marshall-Andrews 2011; Patzelt 1999; Sieberer 2006). This similarity is important, as it suggests empirically that potential costs incurred by MPs for such personalistic behaviour (see section 3.2) are largely constant across the two country cases.

More broadly, the same electoral systems have been in place for a long time in both countries.[7] This means that the actors at the centre of this study (i.e. legislators, but also the voters) have operated within the same institutional framework for a sustained period, allowing for the consolidation of behavioural patterns.[8] Both

[6] See chapter 5 for a discussion of a number of country-level differences such as vote-recording procedures and the payroll vote.

[7] Minor changes in Germany include the enlargement of the parliament after re-unification (see next footnote), small subsequent changes to its size (see footnote 43 in section 4.3), as well as the rules governing overhang seats (see footnote 46 in section 4.3).

[8] To be sure, German re-unification meant that significant numbers of new voters – who previously lived and voted in a different, and less democratic system – were added to the electorate, along with new elites socialised in a different system. However, these norms have largely been consolidated by the time period covered in this study (2005-2013) (e.g. Stecker 2015).

countries furthermore have mature and stable party systems, with very low rates of party switching by MPs (O'Brien and Shomer 2013). The parliaments are also similar in size.[9] Moreover, both institutions have displayed very similar turnover rates over the past decades (Matland and Studlar 2004, 93).[10] This is important since it has previously been suggested that differences in turnover rates between countries may be an indication that in some systems, the legislature is considered mostly a springboard to further political office, while in others the vast majority of legislators take up the mandate with the intention to stay (Crisp et al. 2004; Samuels 2000).

In most parliamentary systems, the national legislature constitutes the most important platform for political office and ambition (Matland and Studlar 2004, 99-101). Indeed, both German and UK MPs with political ambitions are very likely to pursue their goals through continued membership in the national legislature (Edinger and Schwarz 2009; Marshall-Andrews 2011; Norton 1999; Patzelt 1999; Sieberer and Müller 2015).[11] Nonetheless, MPs in both countries may use the national mandate as a stepping stone to higher office on the sub-national level, such as becoming First Minister. However, as there are only three (for the UK) or 16 (for Germany) positions on offer for over 600 MPs as potential aspirants, and as these posts are relevant only for individuals from those regions, these sources for progressive ambition have limited impact. Moreover, regional leaders often take the route through the sub-national parliament. Similarly, membership of the European Parliament does not normally present a more attractive option, but mostly precedes a move to the national parliament (Meserve, Pemstein, and Bernhard 2009).

[9] During the periods covered by this study, the House of Commons comprised 646 and 650 seats, while the Bundestag had 614 and 622. The variation is explained by boundary changes and overhang seats respectively (see below).

[10] Both have an incumbency return rate (in per cent) in the high 70s (Matland and Studlar 2004, 93). Moreover, my own data reveals very similar (and low) percentages of MPs retiring from office voluntarily (18 per cent in Germany and 19 per cent in the UK).

[11] Neither German nor UK cabinet members have to hold a mandate in the lower house, but the vast majority does.

In sum, the existence of important institutional similarities coupled with the crucial difference in electoral rules render Germany and the UK an expedient case selection for the purpose of this study.[12] This choice has been guided predominantly by the existing theoretical predictions concerning the difference in behavioural incentives generated by the two electoral systems (e.g. Coman 2015; Johnson and Wallack 2012; Mitchell 2000; Shugart 2001; Söderlund 2016). However, the aggregate-level and bare-bone nature of such theoretical rankings cannot always account for the idiosyncrasies and complexities that different electoral systems unfold in specific country-settings. This point is illustrated, for example, by the fact that some cross-national datasets give the exact same score to the US and the UK (e.g. Coman 2015; Johnson and Wallack 2012), even though we know from more detailed country-level analyses that the US system creates much greater personal-vote incentives than is the case for the UK (e.g. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987).

A similar argument can be made about the treatment of mixed-member systems such as Germany's, for which comparative datasets either appear to provide an aggregated score for both tiers (Coman 2015; Farrell and Mcallister 2006; Söderlund 2016), or choose to consider only one tier at a time (Johnson and Wallack 2012).[13] However, coding decisions made in comparative rankings can have significant consequences, as these are often used as key variables in cross-national studies. For example, contributions on women's representation in legislatures (Thames and Williams 2010), institutional determinants of turnout (Robbins 2010), or the impact of electoral rules on international agreements (Crisp et al. 2010) all rely on the widely-used Johnson and Wallack dataset for their respective independent variables. However, it has been suggested that cross-national results can be susceptible to the ranking used (e.g. André, Depauw, and Martin 2016; Depauw and Martin 2009).

[12] In the conclusion, I discuss potential expansions to other country cases in future studies.
[13] See also Shugart (2001, 186-7) on the coding of mixed-member systems.

These considerations again underline the issues related to macro-level cross-country analyses, as the aggregate data used in these approaches leaves little room for the appropriate consideration of potentially influential country-level information and nuances. The literature has begun to recognise these limitations; André, Depauw, and Martin argue that while more recent contributions rely on country fixed effects to capture system-specific differences, a greater effort should be made to "dig deeper" into such country-level factors (2015, 487; see also Hix and Noury 2016). Heeding these recommendations, I analyse in more detail the ways in which the respective electoral rules create personalistic or collective vote-seeking strategies among UK and German MPs respectively, offering a degree of depth that comparative and aggregate-level cross-national studies cannot provide. Before doing so, I briefly address the time periods covered in this study.

4.1.2 The covered time period

Empirically, this study focuses on four legislative terms, two for each country case. These include the most recently completed parliaments (2010-2015 for the UK and 2009-2013 for Germany), as well as the preceding terms (2005-2010 for the UK and 2005-2009 for Germany).[14] Besides its temporal relevance, this time period provides useful variation on a number of dimensions discussed below. Moreover, none of the terms were terminated early by a snap election, as was the case in both countries for the parliamentary terms immediately preceding those covered here.[15]

[14] The maximum term length is five years in the UK and four in Germany.

[15] Also, all four elections following the chosen legislative terms were tightly contested, meaning that MPs would have been aware that small electoral shifts – and therefore individual behaviour – could make a big difference.

The 54^{th} and 55^{th} House of Commons terms

For the third consecutive time, the 2005 election returned a Labour government under Tony Blair, winning 32 seats more than required for the outright majority of 324.[16] The 2010 election resulted in a hung parliament. A coalition – the first in Westminster since the second world war – between the Conservatives (306 seats) and the Liberal Democrats (57 seats) was subsequently formed under David Cameron, commanding a surplus of 37 seats. Each of the UK's three main parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, Conservatives) was therefore in power and in opposition once during the period covered here. Seeing as government status has previously been found to impact a PPG's overall unity (Dewan and Spirling 2011), the two terms provide useful variation to test the hypotheses in different term-specific settings.

A number of term-specific conditions must be acknowledged, particularly those that may have implications for the model's behavioural predictions. First, the resignation in 2007 of Tony Blair and the subsequent (uncontested) election of Gordon Brown as party leader meant that there was a change of Prime Minister during the term. Such an event might influence vote-seeking behaviour as well as voter opinion.[17] A second point refers to the potential behavioural impact of the 2009 expenses scandal and of the far-reaching changes to constituency boundaries implemented in 2010, a factor often overlooked in the relevant literature on incumbents' vote-seeking behaviour. I return to a more detailed discussion of these term-specific conditions and their potential implications when drawing up appropriate control variables (chapter 5).

[16] Note that the actual "workable majority" differs, for example because the Speaker and deputies are not included, and Sinn Féin members do not take up their seats.

[17] A change of Prime Minister without a general election is not uncommon in the UK. In the hundred years up to the appointment of Theresa May in 2016, 12 out of a total of 24 changes of Prime Minister occurred without a general election (Milne and Braham 2016). Nonetheless, it was thought that Brown might call an early election, potentially impacting MPs' strategies.

The existence of a coalition between 2010-2015 may impact legislative behaviour, as members of the governing parties may be more inclined to distance themselves from the coalition partner's stance to maintain some of the party's ideological "purity". Finally, the 55th parliament was the first operating under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act which, in 2011, ruled that an election can no longer be called by the Prime Minister (by virtue of the Royal Prerogative), but only through a vote of no confidence or after receiving a two-thirds majority.[18] This gives MPs greater certainty over the electoral cycle and may therefore have implications for the intensity of their "continuous electioneering" (Campbell and Lovenduski 2015, 692). Moreover, this ruling out of "opportunistic elections" (Schleiter and Issar 2016) to take advantage of favourable national polls means that incumbents may seek to rely to a greater extent on their personal vote beyond the national swing.

The 16th and 17th Bundestag terms

The 2005 election returned Angela Merkel as Germany's first female chancellor, leading a so-called grand coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD.[19] The electoral race between these two major party groups was extremely tight, with the former taking 226 seats and the latter 222. Naturally, the grand coalition commanded a large majority occupying 448 out of 614 seats.[20]

The 2009 federal election returned the so-called black-yellow coalition (*schwarz-gelbe Koalition*) of CDU/CSU and FDP with 20 seats more than required for a majority

[18] However, these new rules did not appear to pose a great obstacle to Theresa May when calling a snap election for June 2017 despite previously denying that she considered this option.

[19] At the time, this was only the second such coalition since 1949, although the 2013 election saw this coalition return to power.

[20] Regarding my empirical approach, it must be noted that dissenting votes are unlikely to endanger the government majority in the case of such a large seat margin. Nonetheless, dissenting behaviour should remain highly undesirable given the image of disunity it creates (e.g. Greene and Haber 2015). Indeed, my robustness checks by legislative term confirm that my results hold equally in each of the two legislative terms.

of 312 seats. Among the core issues on the agenda of the 17th Bundestag were the Euro crisis and the Greek bailout packages, leading to considerable divisions within the coalition, as well as significant levels of dissent in legislative votes on the subjects. Despite these differences, the hope of large parts of the CDU/CSU was to continue the coalition after the 2013 election. However, the FDP failed to enter parliament for the first time in the history of the German Federal Republic. It has been suggested that the division both within the party and the coalition played a significant role in this downfall (Greene and Haber 2015). The 2013 election subsequently returned another grand coalition.

4.2 The Behavioural Expectations for House of Commons MPs

This section presents arguments why the UK, with its electoral rules, constitutes an expedient case to examine, in a comparative fashion, the behaviour of incumbents operating within a system that generates personalistic vote-seeking incentives. I begin by outlining the purely theoretical expectations on the link between the UK's electoral rules and personal-vote incentives. I then address the debate in the literature over the actual strength of a personalistic "electoral connection" in the UK, and present a number of reasons why the real-life dynamics of the UK political system may restrict the utility of a personal vote. I proceed to demonstrate that despite these limitations, the UK can justifiably be characterised as a system with moderate to strong personal-vote incentives. I conclude the section formulating a testable hypothesis in line with my theoretical framework.

Before delving into this section, it is expedient to consider again the definition of a personal vote (see section 1). At its most basic level, it is taken to refer to the

"portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record" (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, 9; see also Norton and Wood 1990, 196), i.e. electoral benefits gained beyond or in addition to the support a candidate might receive thanks to his or her party label. When speaking of personal-vote incentives, I therefore refer to the motivation for an MP to create such a personal brand for electoral purposes.

4.2.1 The theoretical impact of the UK's electoral rules

The UK House of Commons has as many seats as there are single-member constituencies (646 and 650 in the periods covered here). Each party can field one candidate per constituency; voters cast a single vote directly for an individual, and the candidate who receives a simple plurality of votes wins the seat (i.e. the key feature of a first-past-the-post system). The relevant scholarship generally concurs that this type of electoral system (i.e. SMD) produces reasonably strong personal-vote incentives (e.g. André, Depauw, and Martin 2016; André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014; André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Debus and Bäck 2014; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005; Hix 2004; Mitchell 2000; Proksch and Slapin 2012; Shugart 2001; Sieberer and Müller 2015).

The main institutional driving force behind the assumed personal-vote incentives in SMD systems is the fact that voters cast their vote for a candidate, allowing the electorate directly to sanction or reward the individual.[21] An incumbent's electoral fate is therefore determined solely by the votes he or she receives as an individual, and is not linked to the results achieved by party colleagues in other constituencies or by the party as a whole. This leads Johnson and Wallack (2012) to score the

[21] In fact, the Jenkins Commission of 1998, in its official review on a potential reform of the UK electoral rules, specifically emphasises this as an important and normatively desirable feature of the UK electoral system (see also Vivyan and Wagner 2012, 236).

UK as a 2 (i.e. "no pooling across candidates")[22] according to Carey and Shugart's (1995) *Pool* variable, indicating strong personal-vote incentives.[23]

Despite this possibility to vote directly for an individual, one key feature of the UK's electoral system theoretically reduces an even more pronounced pursuit of a personal vote. Voters cannot choose between candidates of the same party, which lowers the necessity and motivation for the incumbent to distinguish him- or herself from co-partisan competitors (Carey 2007). The legislator may simply choose to rely on the party label, knowing that a voter may consider it too costly to desert his or her preferred party in order to sanction the incumbent (Mitchell 2000). These dynamics, in which votes for a party and a candidate are observationally equivalent, lead Johnson and Wallack (2012) to code Carey and Shugart's *Vote* variable as a 1, describing a rule that creates personal-vote incentives of intermediate strength.[24]

A related argument refers to the district magnitude (DM) as a mediating co-determinant of personal-vote incentives. Carey and Shugart (1995) reason that in closed-list systems (they consider SMD systems such as the UK's a closed-list system with a DM of 1), incentives for individualistic behaviour are largest when the DM is 1, and decrease as DM increases (see also Mitchell 2000; Rasch 1999; Sieberer 2010). André and Depauw explain: "Individual accountability will decrease as district magnitude grows: legislators are less visible and electoral competition as a result will be less personalized. Incumbents' name recognition among constituents is higher in single than in multi-member districts" (2012, 3). Thus, even though

[22] All three variables (*Pool*, *Vote*, *Ballot*) have possible values of 0, 1, or 2, with a higher number indicating greater personal-vote incentives.

[23] Note that Johnson and Wallack (2012) follow a slightly different rationale than the one laid out by Carey and Shugart, who argue that in SMD systems where parties present only one candidate each, votes are effectively pooled across the party (1995, 421).

[24] Note again that in this coding, Johnson and Wallack (2012) depart somewhat from Carey and Shugart, who view SMD plurality systems as ones where the party submits a closed party list with one candidate (1995, 422; see also André, Depauw, and Martin 2016; Depauw and Martin 2009).

incumbents in the UK do not have to distinguish themselves from co-partisans (as would be the case in open-list systems), the DM of 1 is argued to increase the utility of a personalistic vote-seeking strategy.[25]

Candidate selection rules

I now turn to the remaining variable from Carey and Shugart's (1995) threefold approach, namely the one pertaining to candidate selection and ballot ranking rules (*Ballot*). For the UK, Johnson and Wallack (2012) code this variable as a 2 ("parties control neither access nor order"), suggesting strong personal-vote incentives. This score is based on the fact that candidate nomination in the UK is decentralised, with selection taking place at the constituency level (Denver 1988; Klein and Umit 2016; Norris 1997).[26] Local selectors possess significant power, while unwanted influence by the central party is rare (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Denver 1988; Norris 1997; Whiteley and Seyd 1999). Despite the theoretical coding of the nomination process as one creating strong personal-vote incentives, the selection rules in the UK merit a more detailed discussion at this point.

It has previously been argued that before incumbents can concentrate on their potential voters for a personalistic "electoral connection", they first need to consider the actors who decide over their re-nomination as a candidate (e.g. Baughman 2004). In the UK, these selectors are located at the level of the local constituency party. While the central party or national party committees of all three major parties must, in some form or another, approve the lists of potential candidates

[25] Also, the size of a district in terms of electorate can impact incentives for individualistic behaviour (André and Depauw 2012; see also Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987). Seeing as the contemporary UK constituencies are comparatively moderate in size (average electorate of about 68,000), this is likely to add to the incentives for a personal vote, compared to cases such as Germany, with an average of over 200,000. In Germany, however, the directly elected district MP is joined by between 0 and 3 (usually by 1) list MPs associated with the district.

[26] Note of course that there are slight differences between the nomination procedures used by the three major parties of the UK system (see Denver 1988).

selected by the local party (e.g. Bille 2001), it has been suggested that influence by the national party "is more nominal than real" (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, 87) and that the blocking of candidates is extremely rare (Denver 1988, 57).

This independence from the central party should further promote personal-vote seeking. Since personalistic behaviour is usually undertaken to boost an MP's vote share, this is likely to be endorsed by the local party in any case, especially when these activities are positive-sum in relation to the party's collective interests (such as constituency service; see section 5.1). Even when the activities are potentially detrimental to the party label (such as dissent in legislative voting), the local party may be more willing to accept this than the national party, seeing as the former is first and foremost interested in getting its local candidate re-elected. Moreover, local party groups tend to value a degree of independence, and are often suspicious of influence exercised by the national party (e.g. Denver 1988).

However, the most important argument for why the UK's selection rules should, at best, complement the personal-vote incentives created by the electoral rules is an empirical one. Contrary to some popular wisdom, de-selection poses only a limited threat to incumbents. Only very few legislators have been deselected in recent years, and the threat of deselection has been described as nothing more than a "paper tiger" (Norris and Lovenduski 1995).[27] According to Norris (1997, 40), "personal interviews revealed that most MPs regard reselection as a time-consuming nuisance rather than a serious threat" (see also Denver 1988; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Whiteley and Seyd 1999; Willumsen and Goetz 2016). My own data also shows only a handful of de-selections, most of which were related to the 2009 expenses scandal.

[27]However, the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour party in 2015 may have implication for the re-selection of some MPs prior to the 2020 election (see, for example, Eaton 2016; Ley 2015).

Given these observations, incumbents in the House of Commons should be more inclined to focus their re-election strategies on the electorate rather than on their selectors. In the following discussion of the UK case, I will thus focus predominantly on incentives for personalistic vote-seeking that are related to the cultivation of an "electoral" rather than a "selectoral" connection (Preece 2014). Moreover, the decentralised nomination procedure should amplify the personalistic incentives generated by the electoral rules, as has previously been suggested on a theoretical and empirical level (Shomer 2016; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005).

In sum, the theoretical arguments presented above predict that the way in which the UK's electoral system translates votes into seats, and the way in which candidates are (re-)selected, create a reasonably strong degree of personal-vote incentives. This prediction is reflected by cross-national ranking of electoral systems by personal-vote incentives. Johnson and Wallack (2012), employing a scale where 13 indicates the highest degree of personal-vote incentives, score the UK at 10 (very personalistic). A precursor of more elaborate rankings, Lancaster (1986, 72) also puts the UK electoral rules in the highest category. Similarly, in his coding of 33 countries, Coman (2015, 370) gives the UK system (together with countries such as Canada and the US) the highest score concerning legislators' "personal accountability".

4.2.2 The personal vote in the UK: Not so personal after all?

However, the fact that the UK's electoral system should theoretically lead to personal-vote incentives does not mean that these necessarily translate into MP behaviour. Indeed, there exists some debate over the extent and existence of a personal vote in the real-life dynamics of the UK political system (cf. Bowler 2010; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Campbell et al. 2016; Gaines 1998; Kellermann

2016; Norton and Wood 1990; Vivyan and Wagner 2012). Before elaborating on this debate, it is expedient to explain what is meant empirically by the "existence" or "extent" of a personal vote. Following previous approaches (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; 1987; Campbell and Lovenduski 2015; Norris, Vallance, and Lovenduski 1992), I refer to two empirical components. The first one asks whether MPs, when engaging in personalistic vote-seeking, *believe* that such behaviour will pay off electorally. I call this the supply-side of the personal vote. The second element concerns the question of whether voters actually demand and/or reward such behaviour (the demand side).[28] These two elements are, of course, mutually re-enforcing (e.g. Bowler 2010, 479).

In addressing the above-mentioned debate, I begin by listing reasons for why there may only be a limited personal vote in the UK (especially as compared with the US case), despite a theoretically conducive electoral system. First and foremost, a UK voter who prefers a given party or party leader has no choice but to cast his or her vote for the party's constituency candidate (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan 2016). The voting decision for a given candidate or incumbent may therefore be about the party the voter wants in government, or the leader he or she prefers as Prime Minister (Gaines 1998). This may leave the parliamentary candidate at the mercy of national swings (cf. Bowler 2010, 479), unable to affect the voter's decision through personal efforts beyond the party label (cf. Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan 2016). Indeed, much of the variation in UK voters' preferences for a given candidate can empirically be explained by the respondent's party affiliation (e.g. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987).

[28] Note that Swindle (2002) also speaks of the "supply and demand of the personal vote". However, he uses this terminology differently, namely to (somewhat confusingly) distinguish between the personalistic and the collective motivation for a personal vote.

In addition, UK MPs possess limited resources to engage in personalistic vote-seeking behaviour. Unlike in the US, campaign spending is restricted, and is usually organised centrally (Baughman 2004; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; Electoral Commission 2015). Coman (2015, 368) furthermore argues that a greater degree of dependence on the central party for campaign funding should lower personalistic behaviour. Finally, UK legislators are given only limited possibilities to influence legislation in a way that could enhance their personal support base in the constituency (cf. Bowler 2010; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984). The comparatively weak committee system also contributes to the paucity of such opportunities (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984).[29]

In sum, there exist a number of reasons why the personal-vote incentives in the UK may, in practice, be less pronounced than the purely theoretical focus on electoral rules suggests. These observations have even led some scholars to speak of an "impersonal vote" in the UK (Gaines 1998). Despite these conjectures, there are convincing arguments supporting the existence of strong personal-vote incentives in the UK, not least because "[t]he 'normative principle' of constituency influence is built into SMP electoral systems, after all" (Soroka, Penner, and Blidook 2009, 583; see also Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984, 111; Jenkins Commission 1998).

4.2.3 The case for a personal vote in the UK

The following section argues that UK MPs indeed face considerable incentives for personalistic vote-seeking despite the limitations outlined above. I begin by discerning a number of conditions that have contributed to the growing utility of personalistic vote-seeking in the UK context. Following the brief analysis of these

[29] However, see the next section on ways in which MPs have been found to use various legislative activities as personalistic vote-seeking tools.

external factors, I turn to discussing the demand for and supply of the personal vote. Given this study's focus on the *behaviour* of MPs, the supply side – i.e. that MPs believe that their behaviour makes a difference – constitutes the primary element for my theoretical predictions. Considering that demand and supply are mutually reinforcing, I also devote one section to tracing how voters demand and reward a greater degree of individualism on the part of their MPs.

This section develops not only theoretical arguments concerning a personal vote in the UK, but also points to some existing empirical indications. These have mostly been identified as part of single-case studies of the UK, as opposed to comparative, cross-system studies capable of identifying causality. While I use these observations to justify the UK case as an expedient case selection of a setting with some personal-vote incentives, it is one of the tasks of this thesis to provide a truly comparative, cross-national, and systematic investigation of the effect of electoral rules on MP behaviour, while making use of the advantages presented by an in-depth analysis at the country-level.

External conditions: Electoral dealignment and social media

Increasing voter volatility and partisan dealignment[30] in the UK have enhanced the value of building a personal brand independent of the party label. This dynamic was already recognised over thirty years ago (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984, 123), and has become omnipresent across more recent UK-focused contributions (e.g. Bowler 2010; Campbell and Lovenduski 2015; Kam 2009; Kellermann 2016; Norris 1997; Norton 1994; Norton 1999; Stanyer 2008; The Economist 2015). In light of a

[30]Electoral volatility is generally defined as the extent to which voters switch parties between elections. Measures of partisan dealignment indicate a decrease in the percentage of the electorate that identifies with or feels attached to a given a party (cf. Dalton and Wattenberg 2002).

decrease in strong party identification among voters,[31] it has been shown that in particular non-partisan voters are prepared to reward personalistic vote-seeking behaviour such as dissent in legislative votes (Kam 2009), leading to greater incentives for incumbents to cultivate a personal vote (André, Depauw, and Beyens 2015). The early literature has already pointed out the self-reinforcing nature of these dynamics, as "declining parties contribute to increasing personal votes which in turn detract further from the importance of party" (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984, 123).

A related implication of these developments is that the growing volatility "gives MPs – even those sitting for ostensibly safe seats – cause to doubt their own parliamentary immortality" (Norton 1999, 57). Hence, even MPs who enjoy a large majority in their constituency may feel an increasing need to shore up votes through measures beyond relying on the party label (Norris, Vallance, and Lovenduski 1992, 501). In sum, shifts in the electoral landscape of the UK put a greater premium on convincing voters of the representative's suitability as an individual, given that the electorate is less and less guided by partisan cues.

With the advent of personal websites and social media, incumbents today also have at their disposal an array of new channels to communicate directly with the electorate. Various studies indicate that UK MPs use tools such as Twitter, personal websites or newsletters to showcase their parliamentary activities, as well as their involvement in the local community and other aspects of constituency service (Jackson 2008; Jackson and Lilleker 2011; Stanyer 2008). Such behaviour appears, at least in parts, to be driven by the desire to cultivate a personal brand: "Whilst MPs have used the Internet to promote their party, the evidence is that, increasingly, the focus has been on promoting themselves" (Jackson and Lilleker

[31] Kam cites a decreases from 44 per cent in 1964 to 14 per cent in 2004 (Kam 2009, 73).

2011, 88).[32] Others note that politicians are increasingly "going digital to depart from the party line" (Miller 2015), advertising their independent-minded nature or support of constituency interests.[33]

In sum, social media, along with increasing dealignment and volatility, represent external incentives and opportunities for MPs to carve out their personal image. Moreover – and even though many voters likely are still unaware of their representatives' activities – these new channels significantly lower the costs for citizens to gain or be exposed to information about individual MPs. I must be noted, however, that these developments should only enhance the utility of a personal vote in electoral systems where such a strategy can theoretically pay off in the first place (see also Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). As will become evident in the discussion of the German case, a similar growth of conducive factors does not appear to have led to any behavioural effects within the party-centric setting of the German system.

4.2.4 The demand side: Voters' desire for individualistic behaviour

The previous section described how external conditions contribute to the utility of a personal brand within an electoral system that generates personalistic incentives in the first place. However, it must still be asked whether UK voters actually demand or respond to such personalistic efforts on the part of their representatives. Against the backdrop of the early literature on constituency service (e.g. Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Norris 1997; Norton 1994; Norton and Wood 1990; Wood and Norton 1992), a recent survey study concludes that "[t]he notion that voters are demanding

[32] Note also that as of 2007, MPs receive a £10,000 "communication allowance" to develop their web presence and communicate to their constituents their parliamentary work (Norton 2012, 411).

[33] A recent example comes from the rebellion faced by Labour interim leader Hariett Harman on 20 July 2015, when 48 backbenchers refused to follow her instructions to abstain during a vote on welfare reform. A Guardian live feed of the events showed Twitter entries written by various Labour rebels. Richard Burgon MP, for example, took to Twitter minutes after the vote to quote constituency interests as the reason for his dissent (Sparrow 2015).

ever more constituency activity from their MPs is now a widely-accepted tenet of British politics" (Campbell and Lovenduski 2015, 690). This picture corresponds with the Audit of Political Engagement (2010, 93), asking UK citizens how MPs should spend their time. The statement most often answered in the affirmative was "Representing the views of local people in the House of Commons" while the fact that 90 per cent of respondents disagreed with the statement that MPs should represent "the views of their political party" again emphasises the electorate's desire for a more individualistic style of representation beyond the party label.

Similarly, Johnson and Rosenblatt (2007) show that among seven suggested MP qualities, respondents most often favour independent-mindedness. Using sophisticated conjoint analysis, two studies present robust evidence that UK voters have a strong preference for MPs who go against the party line (Campbell et al. 2016; Vivyan and Wagner 2015). One of the core reasons for this sentiment is that "any action that distances MPs from parties will be viewed positively. By acting independently, MPs can signal that they have principles and are trustworthy" (Vivyan and Wagner 2015, 36). Voters are shown to be significantly more likely – by around 30 percentage points – to prefer an MP who dissents sometimes or often to an MP who never dissents (Campbell et al. 2016). These results are corroborated by the strong link shown between voters' perception of their MP's independent-mindedness and their satisfaction with the MP, an association that holds even among voters who identify with the MP's party (Campbell et al. 2016). These findings align with more anecdotal observations (Johnson 2009; The Economist 2015), and with extensive studies of legislative dissent in the UK (Kam 2009).

Vivyan and Wagner (2012) directly examine the impact of legislative dissent among Labour MPs on their individual election results, and find that such personalistic

behaviour is indeed electorally rewarding. The size of the electoral boost, however, depends on whether the voter holds a negative or a positive view of the party leadership. Importantly, the authors also show that voters tend not to punish an MP for dissent, even if they have a positive attitude towards the party leadership. Anticipating my discussion of the supply-side presented, this finding suggests that MPs should have little to lose – at least in terms of electoral reward — by using personalistic vote-seeking strategies such as legislative dissent. In sum, it appears that UK voters understand the personalistic component of the electoral system in demanding and rewarding greater individualistic behaviour from their representatives. Given that the electoral rules allow voters directly to reward such independent-mindedness (or to punish the lack thereof), there is a strong argument that UK MPs should indeed strive to supply such personalistic behaviour. The following section points to some evidence in this direction.

4.2.5 Supplying personalistic behaviour: MPs acting as if it mattered

This section demonstrate why the UK case presents us with a system in which legislators believe that personalistic behaviour can boost their re-election chances, i.e. that the assumption of $(p - q) > 0$ made in my model has support. In the words of the relevant literature, I argue that incumbents indeed appear to be acting as if their personalistic behaviour mattered for their electoral prospects (cf. André, Depauw, and Martin 2015; André, Depauw, and Martin 2016; Kellermann 2013).[34] Although my study builds on these existing findings, it seeks to provide more robust evidence that the observed personalistic behaviour is indeed driven by incentives generated by the electoral rules. While most of the studies addressed

[34]While the following section focuses on scholarly and quantitative findings, ample anecdotal evidence for this notion can, for example, be found in the recently aired BBC documentary "Inside the Commons" (The BBC 2014).

below are single-case studies, I analyse my behavioural model across different electoral institutions to provide stronger evidence of a causal link.

In pointing to existing findings of personalistic vote-seeking behaviour in the UK, I focus on the three main tools identified in the literature (e.g. André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014): constituency service, participation in the legislative process (such as the introduction of legislation or speech-making), and dissent in legislative voting. Concerning the first category, the pioneering contributions by Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1984; 1987) find that despite the then prevalent view of only a limited personal vote in the UK, MPs in the late 1970s increasingly began to view constituency service – for example through doing more surgeries and casework – as a personalistic vote-winning tool. Motivated by these findings, a large body of literature began to focus on constituency service as a vote-seeking tool (e.g. Norris 1997; Norris, Vallance, and Lovenduski 1992; Norton 1994; Norton and Wood 1990; Wood and Norton 1992). Although some of these early studies were able to measure only a modest pay-off for constituency service, they generally concur that "[m]ost MPs believe diligent constituency casework – holding surgeries, helping with welfare problems, writing to constituents – has a definite personal electoral pay-off" (Norris, Vallance, and Lovenduski 1992, 496).

Other contributions show that the constituency focus displayed by UK MPs ranks among the highest across a range of parliamentary democracies (André, Bradbury, and Depauw 2014).[35] These results correspond to other observations across Westminster-style systems, suggesting that legislators' constituency focus is strongest in SMD systems including the UK's (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005). This leads to the conclusion that "even strong party systems – often presented as places where legislators do not heavily 'work the district' – are actually home to

[35]Measured by self-reported number of hours per week spent on constituency casework.

many MPs who highly prioritize constituency activity" (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005, 41-42).

Incumbents operating within the UK electoral rules therefore appear to respond to demands for greater personalistic constituency focus. For this observation to be relevant, however, it must also be shown that these measures are, at least in part, employed out of electoral considerations. Wood and Norton (1992, 237), for example, observe that "explanations appealing to electoral motivation to account for personal vote changes have better success than those that seek other reasons", a finding corroborated by Campbell and Lovenduski (2015), who show that the most electorally vulnerable MPs display the greatest constituency focus (see also findings by Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Norris, Vallance, and Lovenduski 1992).[36] In a similar vein, Norton (2012, 408) observes that UK MPs are well aware of the fact that "a good reputation as a constituency MP could encourage supporters not to defect when the party became unpopular". Such observations are supported by the finding that electoral rules mediate the impact of an incumbent's electoral vulnerability on his or her constituency efforts (André, Depauw, and Martin 2015).

A more recent set of contributions identifies patterns in incumbents' legislative behaviour that indicate responsiveness to the personalistic incentives created by the electoral system. For example, UK MPs appear to use written parliamentary questions as well as the sponsoring and signing of Early Day Motions (EDM) to boost their electoral prospects (Kellermann 2013; Kellermann 2016). In a similar vein, Bowler (2010) shows that UK MPs initiate legislative proposals through Private Members Bills (PMB) in order to cultivate an "electoral connection" with their voters, as incumbents with lower vote margins are particularly likely to table a PMB.

[36] This finding, of course, does not preclude the potential existence of other reasons such a sense of duty and vocation as a local representative (e.g. Norton 1994; Searing 1994).

Analysis of parliamentary speech-making furthermore suggests that UK MPs may use this tool to cultivate a personal vote (Killermann and Proksch 2013). Extensive studies by Proksch and Slapin (2012; 2015) also show that in systems where a personal vote can help MPs electorally – and the authors argue that the UK is such a system – party leaders allow ideologically more extreme members to take the floor more often than is the case in party-centred systems such as Germany. Again, what underpins this finding is the argument that UK MPs may use speech-making with the aim of cultivating personal support beyond the party label.

Kam (2009) furthermore shows that UK MPs use dissent in legislative voting to cultivate a personal vote. This finding is also reflected in cross-national studies, as dissent is found to be a tool commonly used in electoral systems that provide personalistic incentives (André, Freire, and Papp 2014). Seeing as the empirical focus of my study will rest on legislative voting behaviour as an expression of personalistic or party-focused behaviour, this tool will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter outlining methods and operationalisation (chapter 5).

Finally, a recent contribution points to the importance of taking into account MPs' own evaluations and perceptions of a system's personal-vote incentives, above and beyond what the theoretical priors lead us to expect (André, Depauw, and Martin 2016). Based on MP survey responses across 15 European countries, the study shows that UK MPs rank among the top group compared to incumbents from other countries in terms of relying on individualistic re-election strategies over party-centric ones (André, Depauw, and Martin 2016),[37] and that SMD systems indeed provide MPs with incentives for such behaviour. This finding indicates a coherence between the scholarship's theoretical expectations and the UK MP's own perceptions of their electoral environment as one fostering personalistic behaviour.

[37] These figures also include responses from members of the Scottish and Welsh parliaments.

While we have some evidence that UK MPs appear to act "as if their individual behavior can affect electoral outcomes" (Kellermann 2013, 277), there is also some indication that these efforts produce a moderate degree of electoral reward. Tucker (2013), for example, shows that the electoral reward for asking oral questions increases at a modest but non-negligible rate with the number of questions asked.[38] Focusing on the sponsoring of PMBs, Bowler (2010) also finds a moderate electoral pay-off as a result of such activity, and, in addition, reveals a strong association between the number of PMBs proposed by the incumbent and the constituents' satisfaction with his or her efforts to look after constituency interests. Similarly, Kellermann (2013) demonstrates that the sponsoring of EDMs brings a noticeable electoral reward independent of national partisan swings (see also the findings by Vivyan and Wagner (2012) discussed above).[39] It should also be noted that beyond the purpose of ensuring re-election, MPs are strongly interested in increasing their personal constituency vote share compared to the previous election. Following UK electoral politics indeed reveals that MPs like to point to their constituency record over time, and compare their personal vote share with that of the party nation-wide in a given election. This observation again underlines the importance MPs attach to winning a personal vote.

In sum, UK MPs appear to have reasonably strong incentives to seek electoral pay-offs beyond those gained through the party label. This view has aptly been summarised by a recent study on the House of Commons: "Given the incentives facing individual legislators, it is not surprising that they would seek to use any available legislative tool to develop a personal vote" (Kellermann 2013, 264).

[38] Tucker (2013) estimates that a one standard deviation increase in number of questions asked increases the probability of re-election by 6.2 per cent.

[39] For studies concerning dyadic representation – not discussed in detail here – see for example Baughman 2004; Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan 2016; Slapin et al. 2016.

4.2.6 Summary

Despite the arguments presented above, the use and potential impact of personalistic vote-seeking in the UK should not be exaggerated. Elections remain largely focused on party leaders and the national swing, while the behaviour of individual MPs takes a back seat compared to the voters' partisan considerations at the ballot box. This still makes the UK "something of a hard case for the argument that an electoral connection structures the behaviour of individual MPs" (Bowler 2010, 480). However, individualistic activity certainly appears to be playing a considerable role in the minds of MPs, who "will pursue even fairly modest vote gains because they matter at the margin" (Bowler 2010, 481).[40] Scholars therefore conclude that a UK MP "is not as helpless to national electoral swings as bobbing flotsam; she has the opportunity – though limited – to distinguish herself on votes in the Commons and through constituency service" (Baughman 2004, 79).

The majority of the evidence for the UK case comes from quantitative academic studies. However, these dynamics have not escaped political commentators (The Economist 2015):

> MPs are becoming more independent. The internet makes it easier for them to develop personal brands, and the public's disillusionment with politics encourages them to behave like outsiders. Many in Westminster mention Gisela Stuart, a Labour MP [whose] seat should have gone Tory in 2010, but she held it by campaigning energetically on local issues and by being conspicuously independent-minded. If more MPs are acting like her (and it seems they are: the outgoing parliament was the most rebellious since at least 1945) the national swing will be even less relevant.

[40] Historic evidence further suggests that MPs' responsiveness to electoral considerations in their legislative behaviour is not a new phenomenon (Aydelotte 1977; Eggers and Spirling 2014a). Although these findings must be placed in the context of lower overall party cohesion and weaker parties in the early 19th century (e.g. Cox 1987; Eggers and Spirling 2014b), they illustrate the consequences of weak party labels within an electoral system that promotes personalistic behaviour.

This quote aptly captures the core observations made in the above sections, namely that the combination of voter dealignment and volatility, the role of new technological opportunities, as well as the demand for and supply of personalistic behaviour beyond the party label interact with the personalistic setting of the UK's electoral rules. This means that electoral rules with personal-vote incentives must be in place in order for such conditions to play a role. Indeed, a detailed consideration of cases such as Germany (see below) reveals that incentives for personalistic behaviour that are largely exogenous to the electoral rules only unfold their enhancing effect within systems that encourage personalistic behaviour in the first place (for a similar argument, see Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005).

To sum up, there are some empirical indications – mostly from single-case studies – that UK MPs indeed face institutional incentives for a personal vote. One aim of this study is to provide more systematic evidence for such a link between electoral rules and personalistic behaviour. The following section therefore applies my behavioural model to the UK case and derives testable MP-level hypotheses. Importantly, however, these country-specific predictions are then integrated and tested in a larger, comparative setting in order to uncover the interactive relationship between re-election ambition, electoral rules and MP behaviour in a cross-national approach.

4.2.7 The testable hypothesis for UK MPs

What are the implications of the above observations for this study's behavioural model? They suggest, with regards to my framework's macro-level explanatory dimension (institutional incentives), that legislators believe a personal vote to be beneficial for boosting their re-election chances. In other words, the assumption of $(p - q) > 0$ appears to apply to the UK setting. The second explanatory dimension

(intensity of individual re-election motives) implies that MPs who value re-election most should make use of this strategy to a greater extent than MPs with weaker re-election motives. Referring back to the models developed in section 3.2, I postulate that MPs compare the expected costs incurred from personalistic behaviour with the utility derived from achieving re-election. In systems with moderate to strong personal-vote incentives such as the UK, MPs with high (MP_H) and low re-election ambitions (MP_L) therefore display personalistic behaviour respectively iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$\text{For } MP_H: \qquad [U_H(\mathbf{RE}) - U_H(\mathbf{NE})] \;>\; C_P - C_C \tag{4.1}$$

$$\text{For } MP_L: \qquad [U_L(\mathbf{RE}) - U_L(\mathbf{NE})] \;>\; C_P - C_C \tag{4.2}$$

Thus, when weighing up the potential costs attached to personalistic behaviour ($C_P - C_C$) against the estimated benefits for re-election chances, MP_H should be more likely to display personalistic behaviour than MP_L, leading to a higher aggregate (or cumulative) level of personalistic behaviour by MP_H, *ceteris paribus*. This leads to the following testable hypothesis:

> H1: *In the UK House of Commons, MPs with high re-election ambitions are more likely to cultivate a personal vote than MPs with low re-election ambitions, ceteris paribus.*

4.3 The Behavioural Expectations for Bundestag MPs

I now outline why the Bundestag's electoral rules offer very limited incentives to carve out a personal vote, but instead strongly encourage MPs from both electoral tiers to engage in loyal and collective party-centric behaviour to increase their re-election prospects. As these dynamics stand in contrast to the individualistic incentives for House of Commons MPs as identified above, the difference in electoral rules between the two country cases allows for an expedient test of the study's main comparative predictions. Moreover, my in-depth analysis of vote-seeking incentives within a party-centric system makes a contribution to a literature in which detailed studies of individual country cases are mostly limited to systems that promote a personal vote. The empirical tests within the German case therefore also unearth new evidence for vote-seeking behaviour within a party-centric system.

This section develops the behavioural expectations for the Bundestag *as a whole*, meaning that the derived hypotheses will pertain to MPs from both electoral tiers of Germany's mixed-member system. Such an aggregate-level approach to the German system has previously been employed by comparative studies using a similar research design and case selection (e.g. Proksch and Slapin 2012; 2015). Following this empirical test across the UK and German systems as a whole (see chapter 6), I also apply my model to the tier-level within the German system in order to provide an additional test of my theoretical framework (see chapter 7).

4.3.1 The German electoral system

The 598 Members of the German Bundestag[41] are elected through a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system with each voter casting two votes, one for each of

[41] Note that the due to overhang seats, its actual size increases slightly; see below.

the system's electoral tier. As part of the district tier,[42] and using the so-called "primary vote" (*Erststimme*), voters elect 299 MPs under plurality rules in as many single-member districts (where each party can field one candidate).[43] The remaining MPs are elected through the list vote (*Zweitstimme*), based on closed party lists drawn up at the level of the 16 federal states (*Länder*).

The overall seat share is decided by the proportion of list votes received, meaning that won districts are subtracted from the total number of seats a party is entitled to according to the list vote proportion (often called the "compensatory feature"). After each of the 299 SMD winners are allocated their seats, the remaining seats are filled up from the party lists, starting with the highest ranked candidates.[44] Importantly for my behavioural expectations (see below), this feature makes the system "mixed-member proportional" (MMP) as opposed to "mixed-member majoritarian" (MMM). In the latter, parties gain an extra seat with each district won, since the list votes only determine the proportion of list candidates.[45] Some additional features of the German electoral system are worth mentioning. First, if a party wins more SMDs than entitled to according to its list votes, it is allotted overhang seats (*Überhangmandate*).[46] Second, there are no by-elections, as vacant seats are filled by the list candidates who just missed out in the previous election.

Candidates are nominated through separate procedures for the district and list tier.[47] Similarly to the UK, the selection of German district candidates occurs at

[42] Also knows as the constituency tier, SMD tier, nominal tier, or lower tier ("lower" because in MMP systems such as Germany's, this tier is not decisive for the overall seat distribution).

[43] This number has changed slightly over time, and with it the total minimum number of members. Before re-unification in 1990, there were 248 SMDs (and 247 before 1965), from 1990-2002 there were 328 and since 2002 there have been 299 (Pappi and Thurner 2002).

[44] There are two national thresholds, at least one of which needs to be cleared for a party to be considered for seat allocation: 5 per cent of secondary votes or winning three SMDs.

[45] Countries such as Italy, Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, or Taiwan use or have used this system.

[46] 614 MPs were returned in 2005 and 622 in 2009. The 2013 election employed new rules, adding compensatory seats (*Ausgleichsmandate*). For more detail on overhang seats, see Behnke 2012.

[47] Although minor differences exist between German parties, the general rules are similar.

the district-level. Candidates are chosen either by all party members of the local party branch, or by a committee of delegates elected by the members (Wessels 1997). The central party thereby has little direct power to influence or veto this decision (Roberts 1988). Regarding the nomination and ranking of list candidates, the executive of the *Land* (i.e. state-level) party organisation usually proposes a list (and order) of candidates, which is subsequently approved (or re-ranked) by state-level party delegates (Wessels 1997, 79). The ability to propose a list and its order provides the central party with considerable scope for influence (Altenbockum 2013; Bülow 2007; Dittberner 2003; Manow 2007; Roberts 1988).[48]

4.3.2 Complexities of the German system and existing predictions

As alluded to in section 2.1.1, mixed-member systems such as the German MMP rules render the theoretical expectations with regards to MPs' vote-seeking strategies more complex than is the case for systems in which all MPs are elected through the same rules (e.g. pure SMD or PR systems). Before proceeding, it is instructive to consider the main sources of this complexity.

At the face of it, and since German MPs are elected through two different methods, it seems natural to consider the two mandate types separately when exploring the behavioural impact of electoral rules. However, such an approach is faced by various complications. First, while every incumbent and candidate elected in the UK House of Commons always is, was, and for the foreseeable future will be a "district MP",[49] it is much less clear, both theoretically and empirically, what constitutes a *list* or *district* MP in the German setting (see chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion).

[48] Of course, a variety of considerations play a role in the nomination process, for example proportionality in the within-state regional distribution of candidates.

[49] At least for the time period covered in this study. A successful Alternative Vote referendum in 2011 would, of course, have changed this.

This issue results from both temporal and institutional dynamics. The German system allows MPs to run simultaneously on the party list and in a district ("dual candidacy"), meaning that MPs who hold one type of mandate in one term can, theoretically, run and be re-elected on the other tier in the subsequent election. This has important implications for models concerned with vote-seeking strategies because of the underlying assumption that MPs behave strategically with the next election – and the respective institutional incentives – in mind (e.g. Ohmura 2014; Stoffel 2014).[50] As discussed in more detail in chapter 7, behavioural predictions based on the mode through which the MP was elected may therefore be inaccurate (cf. Manow 2012, 54). Another complication stems from the compensatory nature of the electoral system, in which the list votes determine the party's overall seat share, and winning an additional district seat does not add to the overall seat count. This rule has been argued to put a premium on party-centric behaviour for MPs elected from both electoral tiers (see below, as well as Crisp 2007; Mitchell 2000; Moser and Scheiner 2005; Proksch and Slapin 2012; Saalfeld 2005).

The complexity of the German system is reflected in the variety and ambiguity with which cross-national rankings of personal-vote incentives handle the case. Both Lancaster's (1986) rudimentary categories as well as Johnson and Wallack's (2012) more detailed coding fully separate the German district and list tiers when assessing the strengths of personal-vote incentives for each mandate type. By doing so, the rankings essentially treat the two MP groups as operating under two different and, importantly, independent electoral systems.[51] However, given that Johnson and Wallack (2012) use "the tier with the greatest number of legislators" to establish a country's aggregate-level score, the same score is also used as the aggregate-level indicator for Germany as a whole. This is a questionable decision

[50] As will be discussed below, in reality this only applies to those parties that return district MPs.

[51] See Shugart (2001, 186-7) for a brief discussion of the difficulties associated with coding a mixed-member system.

seeing as the German system nominally allocates 299 seats to each tier, with only the handful of surplus seats (see footnote 46) resulting in marginally more list MPs. These few extra list seats therefore lead to the whole system being scored as very party-centric, essentially ignoring the existence of the district tier. Some datasets, such as the one compiled by Coman (2015), attempt to deal with this issue by providing a weighted average score.

Overall, these differences in assessing and scoring the strength of personal-vote incentives in Germany again underline the difficulties faced by sweeping cross-national comparisons (see also André, Depauw, and Martin 2016 for related arguments). Moreover, they teach us that in order to formulate clear testable hypotheses for the purpose of this study and beyond, the complexities of the German system must be subjected to a more nuanced dissection of their potential consequences for MP behaviour.[52] This will be undertaken in the following section.

4.3.3 Expectations at the aggregate-level of both electoral tiers

In this section, I follow and expand on the widely-accepted observation that the German electoral system as a whole (i.e. at the aggregate-level of both electoral tiers) produces strongly party-centric behavioural incentives for all its legislators, making the case an adequate selection for the purpose of this study. I conclude the section by formulating a testable aggregate-level hypothesis on the basis of these arguments. While aware of the difficulty surrounding the categorisation of legislators as "list" or "district" MPs (see chapter 7), I use these simple terms to denote an MP's most likely choice of re-election strategy. The empirical operationalisation will allow for a more differentiated consideration.

[52] This is not always adequately addressed in studies using the German system as a case of party-centric incentives.

Party-centric incentives at the aggregate-level

Research on behavioural incentives in mixed-member systems has produced a considerable debate regarding potential behavioural "contamination" between members elected in the two different tiers of the same system. This theory is generally defined as "the idea that the existence of one tier prevents legislators from the other tier from behaving as if they were elected in a 'pure' system made up of their tier alone" (Crisp 2007, 1462; see also Sieberer 2010, 486). For the case of MMP electoral systems such as Germany's, such a contamination effect is usually argued to be in the direction of party-centric re-election strategies, as potential personalistic vote-seeking incentives for district MPs are reduced by the existence of the list tier. This is argued to make the system as a whole party-centric (e.g. Gschwend and Zittel 2015; Mitchell 2000; Moser and Scheiner 2005). Sieberer speaks of a "clear majority" of scholars who are of this view (2010, 489).

Two core characteristics of the German electoral system – its compensatory feature and the possibility of dual candidacies – structure the prevalent view that the incentives for all MPs should come very close to those observed in pure PR systems, i.e. that they should first and foremost display party-centric behaviour to increase re-election chances (e.g. Baumann, Debus, and Müller 2015; Bawn and Thies 2003; Crisp 2007; Mitchell 2000; Moser and Scheiner 2005; Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss 2006; Proksch and Slapin 2012; Proksch and Slapin 2015; Roberts 1988; Saalfeld 2005; Shugart 2001).[53] The following paragraphs tease out the theoretical reasons behind, and empirical support for, such an effect.

[53]Note that a survey conducted among German legislators indicates some candidate-centric incentives (André, Depauw, and Martin 2016). However, these results include legislators from regional parliaments, as well as MPs from both electoral tiers of the Bundestag. Moreover, the results rely on only one survey response, and the question asked does not imply that the MP's behaviour might hurt the party label. See section 5.1 for a more detailed discussion.

Beginning with the perspective of the party leadership, the compensatory feature places a premium on party-centric behaviour. Only the share in party list votes determines a party's number of seats, while additional districts yield no extra seats (apart from a small number of potential surplus seats (Sieberer 2010)). The behavioural implication is that the party leadership should be strongly interested in cultivating a unified, collective party label that helps increase the list vote share: "In systems with linked tiers, where SMD seats or votes are subtracted from the total allotted in PR, parties will have far less incentive to encourage their candidates to behave personalistically" (Moser and Scheiner 2005, 264). Proksch and Slapin (2012, 526) equally observe that "party leaders' incentives are very similar to those in a pure closed-list system. They wish to maximize the number of ballots cast for their party list. This requires placing a great deal of weight on party unity". In particular concerning personal-vote seeking activities that might damage the collective party label, parties have little reason to accept, let alone promote, such behaviour (Crisp 2007; Proksch and Slapin 2015; Sieberer 2010).

The party leadership's expectation of unity is further enhanced by the fact that a public image of disunity can have adverse effects on voters' assessments, as the electorate tends to have a negative view of internal discord, potentially resulting in a decrease in trust in that party (Patzelt 1998). Moreover, the German media, as well as other political parties, are usually quick to point to disunity as a sign of weakness, internal disorder and lack of leadership (Eilfort 2003). Greene and Haber (2015) find that a perception of disunity is clearly damaging to German parties' collective electoral prospects, and that "[p]ersonal vote seeking strategies likely increase voters' confusion over the party's goals" (2015, 17; see also Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997). Any party seeking to maximise its vote share should therefore be strongly interested in maintaining unity, given its dependence on party votes.

Apart from the party leadership's expectations, MPs should also intrinsically favour party-centric behaviour, as this can boost their individual re-election chances in two important ways:[54] First, German MPs believe that party-loyal behaviour can help protect them from being demoted to a hopeless place on the party list, given that the central and state-level party have significant influence over list nominations. In this regard, Baumann, Debus, and Müller (2015) observe that "MPs adjust their behavior in parliament to incentives that reflect features of the respective electoral system. For German MPs, it is normally the party line, which is crucial for renomination" (2015, 185).[55] Referring specifically to dissent in legislative voting, one legislator states unambiguously that especially MPs who have to rely on the party list vote will "think twice about voting against the party, given the justifiable concern of potentially losing a good list position before the next election" (Bülow 2007). Further observations suggest that MPs are very much aware that sticking out for the wrong reasons might diminish re-election chances, and feel a real threat of potentially being denied a safe position as a result of such behaviour (see also Altenbockum 2013; Dittberner 2003; Patzelt 1997a; Roberts 1988; Sendler 1985).[56]

Second, a unified party image – made possible by MP's party-centric behaviour – is likely to contribute to a higher vote share of party list votes, which in turn increases MPs' electoral prospects (see previous paragraphs). Hence, not only the party leadership (i.e. the party as a collective entity), but also MPs running on the party lists (which due to double candidacies constitutes over 80 per cent of MPs, see below) should have a strong interest to play their part in maintaining unity, following the credo that "unity leads to success [and] disunity to failure"

[54] These align with Kreuzer's (2000, 488) observation that an incumbent needs to guard against "deselection as an official candidate, demotion to a lower list position and defection of voters".

[55] Linguistically, it is therefore not only "vote-seeking" incentives that drive MP behaviour in the German case, but it is also about putting oneself in a better position for the next election.

[56] Such dynamics have previously been conceptualised as a last mover advantage on the part of the party (Kam 2014, 412).

(Dittberner 2003, 5).[57] In other words, the vast majority of MPs would be shooting themselves in the foot by damaging the party label, thus risking a lower party list vote share – along with a potentially lower list placement.

In theory, German MPs running on the district tier should be guided by a reasonable degree of personal-vote incentives, similar to the ones identified for the UK case above (see also chapter 7). However, contamination theory suggests that the logic spelled out in the above paragraph must be extended to most incumbents, whether they end up being returned as district or list MPs. First, it has been suggested empirically that electoral rules promoting party-centric behaviour can override or diminish potentially individualistic effects of a decentralised nomination procedure (e.g. Shomer 2016; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005). In the German case, where the premium on party unity is particularly high due to the compensatory set-up, even local selectors usually internalise this necessity for party-centric behaviour. One German district MP describes his experience as follows: "I, for one, do not get praised by my constituency party for voting against the party line. ... Before you know it, they might say: he is not loyal to the party, what then does he want in Berlin?" (Bülow 2007; see also Dittberner 2003). Moreover, even district nominations are at times decided by the party leadership before being nodded through by the local party (Altenbockum 2013).

The second, and principal, reason for why the majority of district MPs are not expected to follow personalistic vote-seeking strategies to the same extent as they would in pure SMD systems, is that candidates can run simultaneously on both electoral tiers. Indeed, most elected MPs (over 80 per cent in recent decades) used this provision (Manow 2007; Manow 2013). The high prevalence of double candidacies already indicates the utility incumbents attach to this option. The dual candidacy

[57] Quotations from German sources have been translated into English by the author of this thesis.

provision is therefore argued to attenuate personal-vote incentives, since many MPs rely (or think they rely) on the "insurance" feature of also running on a list (Roberts 1988, 113).[58] Consider, as one example of many, the case of the CDU double candidate Kerstin Radomski, who very narrowly lost her district race during the 2013 federal election. The day after the election, she had already returned to her job as a high school teacher.[59] Once all votes had been counted, however, she was informed that her 40th place on the Nordrhein-Westfalen party list was – unexpectedly – enough to secure a mandate (through the party list) after all (Rheinische Post 2013).

Similarly, the insurance feature of a double candidacy matters due to the relatively low percentage of "safe" district or list positions compared with the total number of candidates. Wessels (1997, 91) estimates that an impressive 30 per cent of incumbents seeking re-election are placed in hopeless positions (both at the district and/or list level), while another 15 per cent have only some chance. This generates significant incentives for incumbents to ensure a place high on the party list and/or in safe seats. Moreover, the probability of re-election is much higher when running as a double candidate (e.g. Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Manow 2007). Crucially, this increased likelihood is, on average, not a result of the insurance feature, but of the double candidates' comparatively high list positions (Wessels 1997). The knowledge that "[t]he real fight is for list positions" (Wessels 1997, 92) should therefore foster significant party-centric incentives among the vast majority of MPs.

Frequently overlooked in the literature, a further motivation to obtain a high list position is the fact that an average of 40 seats are vacated between elections due to

[58]Note that of the six parties elected in the period covered here (2005-2013), only three (SPD, CDU, CSU) return a significant number of district MPs. Incumbents of Die Linke, Die Grünen or the FDP know that pretty much the only way to re-election will be through a high list position. These party-level differences are addressed in more detail in the empirical chapters.

[59]Note the relevance of this example for the "exit-option" argument advanced in the theoretical chapter and the operationalistion (sections 3.1 and 5.2).

MPs stepping down or passing (Klingemann and Wessels 2001, 281). These seats are subsequently (and promptly) filled by the candidates next in line on the party list. Consider, for example, the not-so-unusual case of the career politician Gabriele Groneberg (SPD),[60] who ran as a double candidate in four consecutive elections between 2002 and 2013. She failed to win a district mandate both in 2002 and 2005 but won a seat through a good list position. After losing out both on the district and list ticket in the 2009 election, she re-entered the Bundestag through the party list in 2012, when she was next in line to take up a vacated seat as a so-called *Nachrücker*. She lost this seat again in the 2013 election but subsequently re-entered the parliament after another MP dropped out in 2014. This example illustrates the value of achieving or remaining on a relatively high list position.[61]

Overall, the above analysis demonstrates that MPs operating within the German electoral system – with its dominant list tier enhanced by the dual candidacy provision and a compensatory system – should, on average, consider party-centric behaviour as the strategy most likely to increase their re-election chances.[62] The following section briefly points to further arguments supporting this assertion, before drawing up the testable hypotheses.

Indicators of party-centric behaviour

German MPs face an environment largely unresponsive to individual vote-seeking efforts. This is likely to be, to some extent, endogenous to the fact that the German system does not enhance an individualistic electoral connection in the first place.[63]

[60] Information obtained from the MP's profile on the Bundestag website (`www.bundestag.de`).

[61] Of course, as electoral fortunes of parties change, simply maintaining the last election's list position may not be enough to secure re-election.

[62] In reference to Carey's Competing Principals theory (2007; 2009), the party therefore represents the dominant principal for the legislator.

[63] Much in the same way as the more personalistic setting is reflected by a responsive environment in the UK (see section 4.2.3).

Indeed, even if or when German MPs engage in behaviour that can be considered personalistic, the electorate is rarely the target: Sieberer (2010) analyses official explanations given by MPs for their legislative voting behaviour between 2005 and 2009, and in only a fraction of analysed explanations does the MP reference constituency concerns as a reason for his or her dissent (see also Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2013). Moreover, despite the fact that dealignment and volatility among German voters have increased at a comparable rate and reached similar levels as in the UK (e.g. André, Depauw, and Beyens 2015; Dalton 2012), this has not coincided with an increase in activities by Bundestag MPs that can be used to cultivate a personal brand, such as legislative dissent (Bergmann et al. 2016), while such an association can be identified for the UK (e.g. Cowley 2005; Kam 2009; Vivyan and Wagner 2012).

Surveys conducted among Bundestag candidates furthermore reveal the high degree of party-focus generated by in the German electoral system. Asked whether the aim of their campaign was to attract attention to themselves as individuals or to the party, respondents from both electoral tiers overwhelmingly indicate party-centric attitudes (Zittel 2009; Zittel 2015a; Zittel and Gschwend 2008),[64] This paints a sharp contrast to the observations from the UK context (e.g. Campbell and Lovenduski 2015, see also section 4.2.3).[65] It has furthermore been suggested that the German voter usually has little understanding of the tier system, contributing to the general unimportance of the personality factor in the German electoral context (Moser and Scheiner 2005, 273). This argument is supported by surveys indicating that only half of the German electorate can correctly identify the list tier as the one that is decisive for the distribution of seats in parliament (Kurz 2013; Pappi and Thurner 2002). Data on the electorate's knowledge of candidate names (including the incumbent, if standing again) paint a similar picture. In Germany,

[64] Note some differences between the tiers, see chapter 7.

[65] It must be noted that these findings refer to all candidates as opposed to only incumbents. Surveys of the latter group, however, reveal a similar picture (Patzelt 1997a).

only about 40 per cent of eligible voters could name at least one candidate who ran in their constituency. The more candidate-centric UK, meanwhile, tops this ranking of ten countries with a figure of 61 per cent (Klingemann and Wessels 2001, 293). Finally, studies on ticket splitting (i.e. voting for a district candidate of one party but giving the *Zweitstimme* to a different party) suggest that strategic considerations such as coalition preferences or wasted votes are more important to the German voter than the personality factor (Bawn 1999; Gschwend 2007; Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Moser and Scheiner 2005; Pappi and Thurner 2002).[66]

Overall, there is considerable indication of very low personal-vote incentives generated by the German electoral system. Besides lacking a larger, comparative perspective that would strengthen the causal claims linked to the electoral system, however, these studies focus predominantly on how legislators have little incentive to cultivate a personal vote. Significantly less attention is paid to the question of how incumbents actively engage in party-centric behaviour to boost their electoral chances. This study seeks to investigate the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour by testing for the association in a comparative, cross-national setting, and by identifying party-centric behaviour as a conscious vote-seeking activity.

4.3.4 The testable hypothesis for all members of the Bundestag

The German electoral rules promote a strongly party-centric re-election strategy, making the system very similar to pure PR list rules in terms of the behavioural incentives it creates for incumbents. The theory informs us that the strategy that all German MPs should – on average and at the aggregate-level – consider the most conducive to their re-election goals is therefore one focused on contributing to a

[66] Some of the studies nonetheless provide limited evidence that voters may be prepared to split their vote due to personalistic considerations.

collective and unified party label. As argued previously, "candidates are indifferent about whether they are elected personally or as members of a party. Their primary concern is to reduce their career uncertainty" (Kreuzer 2000, 488). The arguments presented above suggest that the best way for most German MPs to reduce this uncertainty is through party-centric behaviour.

What are the implications of these dynamics for my behavioural model? Incumbents are assumed to engage in behaviour most beneficial to achieving re-election. In the case of the German system, this has been identified as party-centric behaviour, meaning that the case satisfies the institutional-level condition of $(p - q) < 0$, as stipulated in my theoretical framework. At the MP-level, legislators are assumed to differ in their ambition for the goal of re-election. Following my behavioural framework, German MPs with high (MP_H) and low re-election ambitions (MP_L) are therefore expected to display party-centric behaviour respectively iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):[67]

$$\text{For } MP_H\text{:} \qquad -\left[U_H\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_H\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \; < \; C_P - \; C_C \tag{4.3}$$

$$\text{For } MP_L\text{:} \qquad -\left[U_L\left(\mathbf{RE}\right) - U_L\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \; < \; C_P - \; C_C \tag{4.4}$$

The greater desire for re-election (see equation 3.5 and the arguments made in section 3.2) on the part of MP_H should therefore make this MP type more likely to display party-centric behaviour than MP_L, other things equal (or, put differently, to display such behaviour more often). This leads to the following aggregate-level expectation for all MPs from both mandate types:

> H2: *In the German Bundestag, MPs with high re-election ambitions are more likely to cater to the party than MPs with low re-election ambitions, ceteris paribus.*

[67] The negative sign at the beginning of the inequalities comes from the fact that the parameter $p - q$ is assumed to be negative for systems with party-centric incentives; see section 3.2.

4.3.5 Summary of predictions for both country cases

The purpose of the MP-level hypotheses for the German and UK cases is to provide a new explanation of legislative behaviour, and to facilitate an original within-system cross-country empirical investigation of the prevalent – but insufficiently tested – theory on the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour. Based on my theoretical framework, I propose that if this existing theory holds explanatory value, then we should observe the following patterns across the two country cases: in the UK, where the electoral rules provide some incentives to cultivate a personal vote, those MPs most ambitious for re-election should make use of this strategy to the greatest extent, *ceteris paribus* (see hypothesis H1). With the German electoral rules putting a premium on the party label and creating only weak personal-vote incentives, pandering to the party should – at the aggregate level of both electoral tiers – be the most conducive strategy for achieving re-election (and re-selection). I therefore propose that those incumbents who value re-election the most should cater to the party to the greatest extent (H2).

In light of these hypotheses, my approach to deriving distinct causal expectations from broader theoretical claims is thus consistent with the standard in existing micro-level studies of MP behaviour: "What is required here is a theory of action consisting of causal 'if ... then ... ' statements explaining what course of action will be taken by an individual under given situational constraints" (Saalfeld 1995c, 39-40). Within the theoretical focus of this study, these constraints are understood as both the institutional environment and the MP's degree of re-election motivation.

Figure 4.1 serves as a visual illustration of these testable hypotheses by applying my overarching theoretical model (see figure 3.1) to the two country cases. My behavioural predictions are captured by the vertical difference between the MP




Figure 4.1: Visual depiction of the behavioural hypotheses for Bundestag and House of Commons MPs

types (represented by the dots on the dashed lines), as well as the fact that they change position across the two systems.[68] The graph also combines these MP-level expectations with the predictions expressed by the existing macro-level theory, namely that all MPs, on average and at the aggregate level, should behave more individualistically in systems that provide greater electoral incentives for such behaviour (see solid line). Chapter 7 will further disaggregate the incentives created for Bundestag MPs according to the electoral tier they operate on. The German case on the above graph will then be split up to reflect the predicted variation in incentives generated by the different electoral tiers.

[68] Note that the two systems have been put on either side of the cross-over point to illustrate the expected differences. However, it is the ordering of the two systems (i.e. Germany to the left of the UK) that lies at the core of the theoretical predictions.

Chapter summary

This chapter introduced the research design and outlined the empirical setting in which my behavioural model is tested. The German Bundestag and the UK House of Commons are selected as empirical cases because they display significant institutional similarities with the exception of the main macro-level variable of interest, electoral rules. I derive MP-level predictions for each country case in line with my theoretical model. The personal-vote incentives generated by the UK's single-member district system lead me to expect those MPs most invested in re-election to engage in individualistic vote-seeking behaviour to the greatest extent compared with their colleagues. The strongly party-centric electoral rules used in Germany, on the other hand, mean that those MPs most ambitious for re-election should display the highest degree of party-centric behaviour. Testing these expectations in a comparative setting will allow me to provide new empirical insights into the long-standing question of whether electoral rules impact MP behaviour as predicted by the overarching theory. The next chapter provides detailed operationalisations of the key variables required to conduct these tests.

EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS

Chapter 5

From Theory to Empirics: Method and Operationalisation

This chapter outlines my methodological approach and describes the variables used to test the above hypotheses. To this end, I rely on an original and disaggregated large-N dataset collected for the purpose of this study. Before outlining the data and operationalisations, I briefly discuss the chosen research method. The main question that the theoretical framework is asking from the data is an approximation of whether certain independent variables can help explain variation in certain types of MP behaviour over a large number of observations (in this case individual MPs voting in legislative votes). Given this overarching goal, as well as the probabilistic phrasing of the hypotheses, statistical approximation constitutes the most expedient methodological tool. More specifically, the existing theories on electoral rules and MP behaviour – subjected to a more rigorous test here – are drawn up in a comparative fashion that both implicitly and explicitly demands a large-N quantitative analysis that is probabilistic in nature (Carey and Shugart 1995). The theory thus drives the choice of method.

There are, of course, drawbacks associated with such an approach. One core limitation of statistical analysis in the social sciences is that numerical measurements cannot capture the full extent of the underlying dynamics (e.g. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 110). This is a valid criticism of quantitative research on human behaviour. I would, however, not go as far as the sociologist and political scientist James Q. Wilson, who argues that nothing important about human behaviour

can be measured by "count[ing] and collat[ing] things" (The Economist 2012).[1] Following the goal of large-N statistical approximation, I am not aiming to establish law-like rules of human behaviour. Rather, this study seeks to identify certain behavioural (and probabilistic) trends supported by a clear theoretical framework. In line with other large-N studies of legislative behaviour (e.g. Saalfeld 1995b, 285), I thus concur with the view that:

> The sciences of human choice must be modest in their aims. At best, they can provide the skilled practitioner with some ability to predict the structural characteristics of organized human activity, along with some directional effects of changes in specifically defined variables (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 5).

This observation reflects the approach taken in this study, as it must be recognised that imperfect information and rudimentary proxies limit what can be achieved through statistical analysis. Nonetheless, the large number of observations allows me to estimate effects despite these uncertainties. In sum, this thesis seeks to establish the statistical likelihood of certain attributes having certain effects, and quantitative analysis provides the tools to achieve that.

5.1 The Dependent Variable: Legislative Voting Behaviour

5.1.1 Legislative voting in the context of other personal-vote tools

The behavioural outcome that this study seeks to explain is the degree to which an individual MP caters to the party's collective and unified image or, conversely, to his or her personal reputation and brand as an individual. Previous empirical analyses of such behaviour have generally focused on three broad activities: constituency

[1] Note, of course, that the quoted scholar himself used such methods, but warns against their utility and validity in the social sciences (The Economist 2012).

service, the introduction and debate of legislation (referred to here as legislative activity), and party loyalty in legislative voting (André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014).[2] This section outlines how and why I use the latter dimension to conduct the empirical test of my framework.

Carey and Shugart, in their seminal contribution on the link between electoral rules and MP behaviour, explicitly recommend legislative voting behaviour as an expedient operationalisation to test their theory of how electoral rules shape the way in which MPs address the tension with their principals (1995, 433). A large number of subsequent studies advocate or use party loyalty in legislative voting – both at the MP and the party level – as a proxy for party-centric or personalistic MP behaviour (e.g. André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014; Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Crisp 2007; Kam 2009; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2006; Sieberer 2010; Vivyan and Wagner 2012). However, few of these contributions discuss the assumptions behind and limitations of this proxy in sufficient detail (for an exception, see Kam 2009). Over the following sections, I outline the advantages and disadvantages of analysing legislative voting behaviour for the purpose of this study, and discuss both its broader implications, as well as those specific to the German and UK country cases.

I argue that the three activities previously identified as vote-seeking tools are shaped by different dynamics concerning the question of whether the action largely benefits both the party and the individual (i.e. is positive-sum) or whether one actor benefits at the expense of the other (zero-sum) (see also Crisp et al. 2013; Kam 2009; Swindle 2002). Given that most studies focus only on one category of personal-vote behaviour, a comparative discussion of these tools is largely missing

[2] A personal profile can also be cultivated through traditional or social media presence (Proksch and Slapin 2015, 26). However, these tools must usually be considered as supplementary, as they are used to advertise certain legislative activities or positions.

in the relevant literature.[3] Figure 5.1 provides a basic and stylised illustration of the logic behind each of these elements. The y-axis describes the utility (low to high) that the party as a collective actor (usually embodied by the party leadership), on average, attaches to the given MP activity in view of its own attempt to maximise the party's collective electoral prospects. A low utility is therefore attributed to MP actions that are likely to damage the party label. The x-axis denotes whether the individual MP expects to benefit electorally from the given action (high utility), or whether this might hurt his or her individual re-election chances (low utility).




Figure 5.1: Illustration of the zero- and positive-sum relationships between party and MP interests in three vote-seeking activities. See text for description.

Across both institutions, constituency service (panel A in figure 5.1) must normally be considered a positive-sum game. Traditional activities like holding surgeries, engaging in casework, or spending time in and communicating with the constituency is, in most cases, likely to boost both the image of the MP, as well as the party label under which he or she operates.[4] Panel A in figure 5.1 thus indicates that the average utilities over constituency service align for both actors at *high*.

[3] However, see Kam 2009 for a detailed discussion on the dynamics surrounding constituency service and legislative dissent.

[4] There are, of course, exceptions to this, seeing as some constituency service may damage the party label. However, panel 5.1 A illustrates the average pay-offs for the MP and the party.

Panel B in figure 5.1 describes how various forms of legislative activity (such as the introduction of legislation, signing of motions, or parliamentary speech-making) can be considered to lie – at the aggregate level – somewhere between positive- and negative-sum. This placement reflects the fact that some activities may be positive-sum under some conditions and negative-sum under others. Parliamentary speech-making, for example, can be used either to express party-centric support for the party label, or to build a personal reputation at the expense of the party (Proksch and Slapin 2012; 2015; Slapin et al. 2016).[5] Similar dynamics apply to the introduction of legislation. This variation is represented by the central position (i.e. the average) of the circle in figure 5.1 B.

Finally, figure 5.1 C denotes how the two choices offered in legislative voting[6] – loyalty or dissent – can be negative-sum or positive-sum in terms of the benefits they are expected to yield for the individual MP versus those of the party. Operating under the empirical assumption that dissent in legislative voting hurts the party label both in Germany and the UK (see below), the framework proposes that at the aggregate-level of the German electoral system, both the party and the MP attach electoral value to party-centric behaviour, while personalistic behaviour such as dissent is seen as detrimental for both (see solid dot in panel C).[7] Meanwhile in the UK, dissent as a personalistic tool stands in a zero-sum relationship with the party's collective interest in unity (see grey dots).

Before proceeding, we must address the empirical assumption that dissent is in fact considered as detrimental by the party in both Germany and the UK. In

[5] This variation might also be a result of parliamentary rules endogenous to the country's electoral system (Proksch and Slapin 2015). The authors also suggest that given the countries' electoral rules, parliamentary speeches that go against the party line may have elements of a positive-sum game in the UK, while they should damage both the MP and the party in the Bundestag.

[6] Putting aside for the moment the option of being absent or of abstaining, (see section 5.1.5).

[7] Note, of course, that one of the reasons why damaging personalistic behaviour is detrimental to German MPs is because it is detrimental for the party (see previous chapter).

PR list systems, or where no seats can be gained through winning additional districts (as is the case in Germany with its compensatory set-up), this argument is largely uncontroversial; the party has practically no incentives to encourage or accept dissent given that this would merely reduce its collective electoral prospects (e.g. Greene and Haber 2015; Moser and Scheiner 2005; Proksch and Slapin 2012; Sieberer 2010).

However, where each gained district increases the party's seat share in parliament (as in the UK), the party leadership may, in certain situations, support dissenting behaviour if this can help the individual MP (and thus the party itself) win a seat (cf. Campbell et al. 2016; Kam 2009; Proksch and Slapin 2012). In reality, however, the parties should, by and large, be interested in maintaining strong unity in legislative voting, not only because this is required to pass legislation or to hold the governing party to account, but also because a disunified image can generate a negative voter evaluation at the national level; Kam (2009, Ch. 6), for example, finds that the likelihood of a UK voter casting a vote for a party seen as disunited decreases by 13 per cent compared to a voter perceiving the party as united. In other words, "unity attracts votes, disunity repels them" (Kam 2009, 136). The somewhat ambiguous nature of the electorate's demands must thereby be noted. On the one hand, UK voters have been shown clearly to prefer rebellious MPs over loyal ones at the individual level (e.g. Vivyan and Wagner 2015). On the other hand, voters react negatively to a party-level image of disunity – which in turn is the collective result of MP-level disloyalty (Campbell et al. 2016; Kam 2009).

This seemingly inconsistent picture at the macro-level can, in parts, be explained by the fact that while disunity may lead to the loss of votes among party supporters, the dissenting individuals may attract non-partisan voters. This is suggested by

Kam's finding that the UK party leaderships' attempts to display unity and "to communicate with the party's core voters in the country at large [are] undercut by the actions of dissident MPs, whose dissension earns them the support of non-partisan voters in their districts" (Kam 2009, 149). The premium that the party leadership in the UK places on loyalty is furthermore evidenced by the office-related sanctioning mechanisms it employs to elicit such behaviour (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Cowley 2005; Kam 2009; Marshall-Andrews 2011; Norton 1999). There is thus strong evidence that party leaders in the UK should, in the vast majority of cases, attempt to maintain a high degree of party unity.[8] These dynamics are aptly illustrated by Tony Blair's passionate (yet, in hindsight, fruitless) appeal to his MPs days after Labour's landslide victory in 1997 (quoted in Cowley 2005, 57):

> Look at the Tory party. Pause. Reflect. Then vow never to emulate. Day after day, when in government, they had MPs out there behaving with the indiscipline and thoughtlessness that was reminiscent of us in the early '80s. Where are they now, those great rebels?

5.1.2 Conceptual advantages of using legislative voting as a proxy

The main reason for choosing legislative voting as a proxy for personalistic or party-centric behaviour is that an MP's legislative vote choice has two clear dimensions.[9] The one is supportive of the party's collective and unified image (voting along the party line) while the individualistic nature of dissent can be used to build a personal brand at the expense of the party label. This conceptual parsimony has previously been recognised in the literature: "[S]ome activities sharply juxtapose personal and party reputations – dissenting on a roll-call vote,

[8] Consider, however, the studies by Proksch and Slapin (2012; 2015), who argue that party leaders in the UK allow ideologically more extreme MPs to take the floor too boost their personal vote, and that the parliamentary rules guiding this provision are a reflection of the personal-vote incentives present in the UK electoral system.

[9] Note that the possibility for abstention or absence somewhat softens this dichotomy. See below for a more detailed discussion of these alternative options.

for example" (Crisp 2007, 1474; see also André, Freire, and Papp 2014; Campbell et al. 2016; Hechter 1987; Kam 2009). The contrast furthermore speaks directly to the tension between individualistic behaviour and the party label that constitutes the point of departure in Carey and Shugart's influential theory (1995, 418).

This dichotomy – expressed in a single decision – is less clear in the other activities that have been used as proxies. For example, the individualistically beneficial, but collectively damaging, counterpart to providing constituency service would not consist of engaging in *no* or *less* constituency service, but in one that actively goes against the party's interests. This would be much harder to identify as part of a comparative large-N approach. Moreover, the fact that the resources for constituency service are likely to vary between countries – and may be endogenous to the electoral rules – makes such a comparison more difficult.[10]

Similarly, it can be difficult to identify the extent to which a certain legislative action (such as introducing a Private Members' Bill or giving a speech) is damaging to the party label while potentially being personally beneficial. One study cleverly addresses this empirical issue by analysing the frequency of speech-making by ideologically extreme members of the Bundestag and the UK House of Commons (Proksch and Slapin 2012), assuming that speeches by these members are more likely to be damaging to the party label. The contribution suggests that differences in rules governing such legislative activities may be endogenous to the electoral system, hence lowering the validity of cross-country comparisons given that legislators do not face the same choice sets across cases.[11]

[10]The federal element of the German system, for example, means that citizens may be more likely to turn to the member of the state parliament with some of their queries (Mitchell 2000, 350).

[11]For a discussion of the potential impact of electoral rules on the choice of legislative vote-recording procedures, see section 5.1.4 below (as well as Hug, Wegmann, and Wüest 2015).

A related argument in favour of using legislative voting behaviour as a proxy pertains to its relatively high degree of comparability across countries when applied at the disaggregated MP-level, as done in this study.[12] In this vein, a recent study emphasises the necessity for more comparative studies of MP behaviour under the condition that such analyses use "behavioral data [...] that can be validly applied across different institutional contexts" (Sieberer and Müller 2015, 21). I argue this to be the case in a within-system cross-country comparison of MP-level party loyalty. Moreover, legislative voting behaviour represents – across systems – a simple behavioural currency that provides not only the party leadership but also the voter with a readily available and measurable indication of an individual's contribution to party unity or to his or her own personal brand (see also Hechter 1987, 51).

It must be recognised, however, that dissent in legislative voting constitutes "the ultimate act of defiance", particularly in parliamentary systems (Proksch and Slapin 2015, 26). In this regard, it has been argued that the literature's prevalent focus on party unity as a proxy should be supplemented with the study of other legislative activities in which MPs are less constrained but that can nonetheless be used to cultivate a personal vote, such as parliamentary speech (Proksch and Slapin 2015, 25-6).[13] While I agree with this proposal, I argue that the limitations in the existing cross-national studies of legislative voting (see chapter 2) still provide significant motivation to improve on these existing attempts.

Finally, survey-based approaches to gauging incumbents' re-election strategies suffer from the drawback that they usually remain ambiguous regarding the potential zero-sum dynamic between personalistic and party interests. Simply asking MPs

[12] As has been argued in chapter 2, aggregate cross-country comparisons of party unity rates are, of course, much more limited in their comparability.

[13] The use of (social) media constitutes another such activity. An analysis of the growing use of platforms such as Twitter (e.g. Miller 2015) would certainly constitute a worthwhile pursuit for future studies (see my conclusion for suggestions for future research).

whether they prefer to follow more personal or party-centric re-election strategies (see André, Depauw, and Martin 2016, 47) may be interpreted by some respondents as a zero-sum relationship and by others as positive-sum, and may therefore distort the comparability of replies across country cases.

In sum, I argue that the binary choice offered to legislators in roll-call votes enhances the conceptual usefulness as well as the comparability of this operationalisation (despite differences in vote-recording procedures, see below). The proxy therefore allows me to assess the extent to which groups of legislators with the same goals (high and low re-election ambitions respectively) engage in the same action (legislative voting) across institutions with different electoral systems. This approach furthermore follows the conviction that there is still a lot to be learnt from studying the link between electoral rules and legislative voting behaviour once we look past simple aggregate-level comparisons or single-case studies. Before discussing a number of limitations associated with this operationalisation, I outline the precise mechanism behind legislative voting as a vote-seeking tool.

5.1.3 The use of legislative voting as a vote-seeking tool

Legislative voting has previously been used to capture the extent to which MPs cater to the party or to their own personal brand both at the macro-level across countries (e.g. André, Depauw, and Beyens 2015; Carey 2007; Coman 2015; Hazan 2003; Owens 2003; Sieberer 2010) and at the MP-level (e.g. Kam 2006; Kam 2009; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010; Thames 2001; Vivyan and Wagner 2012). But what are the precise mechanisms behind the use of legislative voting as a tool to increase re-election prospects?

In parliamentary systems, rebelling against the party in legislative voting is generally considered the most drastic way to break party unity (Proksch and Slapin 2015). Refraining from such behaviour therefore signals loyalty to the party leadership and helps maintain a unified image. Dissent, on the other hand, can help the incumbent build name recognition and public approval as an independent-minded individual, which can translate into votes (Campbell et al. 2016; Crisp et al. 2013; Kam 2009; Ohmura 2014; Pattie, Fieldhouse, and Johnston 1994; Vivyan and Wagner 2012; Vivyan and Wagner 2015), particularly among the growing group of non-partisan voters (André, Depauw, and Beyens 2015; Kam 2009). A survey study of MPs from 15 European democracies shows that incumbents indeed view legislative voting as an opportunity to enhance their re-election prospects: "personal vote-seekers are more willing to desert the party line than members pursuing party-centred campaigns" (André, Freire, and Papp 2014, 104). Against the backdrop of these comparative findings, I briefly consider the mechanism behind legislative voting as a re-election tool in the UK and German settings.

Legislative dissent and the personal vote in the UK

A study by Pattie, Fieldhouse, and Johnston (1994) must be considered among the first systematically to link legislative voting behaviour to personal vote-seeking in the UK. Although focusing only on free votes, the authors show that MPs can achieve a small electoral pay-off for their voting behaviour in salient votes. This effect is attributed, in part, to the individual profile an MP is able to generate. On a more anecdotal basis, long-time MP Philip Holland observed that "[p]ersonal publicity in the media is more easily obtained ... by rebelling against one's own party in the House" (Holland 1988, 49) and that the UK media is usually quick to report on such behaviour, enhancing its usefulness to MPs (1988, 140).

Kam's comprehensive study of legislative voting in the House of Commons and other Westminster systems provides more systematic evidence of these mechanisms, showing that UK MPs gain name recognition and voter approval from dissent (2009, Ch. 5). This aligns with findings on the demand of UK voters for independence in MP behaviour (e.g. Campbell and Lovenduski 2015; Campbell et al. 2016; Vivyan and Wagner 2015). Moreover, since dissent in legislative voting is relatively rare, it usually attracts significant media attention (Kam 2009, 113). In line with Holland's (1988) observations above, the UK media is generally very receptive to such behaviour, and media reports on "rebels" often list the names of dissenting MPs (e.g. The BBC 2016). MPs thus know that they will have an audience for their dissent – especially in their local constituency – and will be aware that "[d]issent, because it is typically well publicized, reaches many voters at once" (Kam 2009, 106). Moreover, today's MPs need not rely on the traditional media to pick up on their legislative dissent, but may advertise this on their own social media profiles. This aligns with the broader observation that politicians in the UK are "using social networks to convince voters they aren't controlled by their parties" (Miller 2015).

In the UK context, dissent is often found to serve as a way of raising the legislator's public visibility rather than to convey policy positions (Kam 2009, 108). The increased name recognition and voter approval resulting from such behaviour can subsequently translate into votes (Kam 2009, Ch. 5). Vivyan and Wagner (2012), for example, show that among UK voters who generally support the governing party but have negative attitude towards the leadership, a voter represented by a moderately rebellious MP is 8 per cent more likely to vote for the incumbent than a voter represented by a loyal MP. Voters with a favourable view of the leadership are still 1.5 per cent more likely to vote for a more rebellious MP. The study also finds that voters hardly react to exact policy positions, but rather care about the

MP's general rebelliousness: "any association between MPs' legislative actions and constituent vote choice is related mainly to MPs' general rebelliousness" (Vivyan and Wagner 2012, 257; see also Bowler's (2010) finding on PMBs).

Related contributions show that "British voters have a strong and largely unconditional preference for legislators who dissent" (Campbell et al. 2016, 1; Vivyan and Wagner 2015) and that voters see rebellion against the party as a sign of the incumbent's integrity. Visible dissent (such as breaking the party line in legislative voting) is found to have the greatest effect on positive voter evaluation, further confirming the utility of the public nature of the voting act. Importantly, the positive voter approval of dissent is not only a result of the profile effect, but of the act of rebellion itself (Campbell et al. 2016). Moreover, this effect holds both for partisans and non-partisans, and is independent of policy proximity between the MP and the voter (see also Carson et al. 2010 in the US-context). Furthermore, individualistic behaviour may not only be rewarded by individual voters, but also through the support of local or national activist groups who then, in turn, mobilise voters (e.g. Bowler 2010, 481).[14] Overall, the above dynamics in the UK context have led to the conclusion "that dissent, like constituency service, is employed by MPs as a vote-winning strategy" (Kam 2009, 113).

Party loyalty as a tool to enhance re-election prospects in Germany

The discussion of the German case (section 4.3) already outlined various theoretical reasons why party-centric behaviour should be conducive to an MP's re-election prospects. I now apply these arguments specifically to legislative voting, and point to observations by MPs and parliamentary insiders to demonstrate these dynamics.

[14] One example is the support John McDonnell received from a campaign group after speaking out against an expansion of Heathrow during a speech (Proksch and Slapin 2015, 54-55).

As explained above, the fact that the party-list votes determine a party's overall seat share means that unity is the paramount goal of the party leadership and that most MPs have little incentive to damage the party label by voting against the party line; this would only hurt their own re-election chances seeing as a party perceived by voters as disunited is likely to suffer at the polls (Greene and Haber 2015; Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997; Patzelt 1998; Süddeutsche Zeitung 2013). This expectation is likely to apply even to cases where the party line is unpopular among voters (Rich 2014, 115), as list MPs have little incentives to cater directly to a specific set of voters, but should rather aim to please the party in their quest to boost re-election chances. These dynamics stand in sharp contrast to the UK case, where an unpopular party leadership can enhance the electoral value that dissent represents to an MP (Vivyan and Wagner 2012).

Rossmann (2015) aptly describes how the German electoral rules, coupled with electoral self-interest, generate strong incentives for loyalty in legislative voting:

> The fact that the CDU/CSU nearly won an absolute majority in 2013 was largely due to chancellor Angela Merkel's popularity. If now one was to go and damage the chancellor – and with her the basis of one's own electoral success – through too much dissent in legislative voting, then the success of the CDU/CSU at the next election would be endangered, and with it potentially one's own mandate.

In addition to the significant intrinsic (electoral) motivation for MPs to display loyal behaviour, the nomination rules also provide party-centric incentives; it has long been observed by German MPs, as well as legislative experts, that the threat of being demoted to a lower list position or an unsafe seat constantly hovers over potential dissenters (e.g. Bülow 2007; Fraenkel and Bracher 1957; Ismayr 1992; Patzelt 1997a; Süddeutsche Zeitung 2013; Sendler 1985).[15] A candidate's reliance

[15] Anecdotal evidence of these dynamics was furthermore observed by the author of this thesis while working in the Bundestag in 2012 (i.e. during a time in which the renomination process for the 2013 election was in full swing).

on the party's label and resources during the election can furthermore be used by the party leadership to remind legislators of their dependence, as well as their obligation to "return the favour" through party loyalty. SPD general secretary Franz Müntefering, for example, alerted potentially dissenting MPs to their indebtedness to the party ahead of a contentious vote on military deployment in 2001, and directly threatened them with negative consequences for their renomination (Dittberner 2003, 8-9; on such dynamics more generally, see Dichgans 1976). Apart from such direct reminders, MPs have noted that threats are often subtle and implicit, unfolding their effects ex-ante (Bülow 2010; Hirsch 1999; Sendler 1985).

Overall, the above observations suggest that German legislators – given the electoral rules – believe it to be crucial to display party loyalty in legislative voting so as not to diminish their own re-election chances, both by damaging the party label and through potential demotion to a lower list position in the next election.

5.1.4 Drawbacks and limitations of the party loyalty proxy

The proxy of legislative voting behaviour is not without issues. The following two sections provide a critical discussion of its limitations and drawbacks, both in general terms and in relation to the tests conducted in this study.

The "black box" of legislative voting and the bias towards party loyalty

For a number of reasons, legislative voting behaviour in parliamentary systems is inherently "biased toward party loyalty" (Tavits 2009, 808; see also Carey 2007; Kam 2014; Proksch and Slapin 2015). The government must usually maintain a majority to be able to govern, MPs rely on this majority for their mandate (Proksch and Slapin 2015, 44-6), and the opposition seeks to represent a unified alternative

(Dewan and Spirling 2011). Moreover, even when intra-party homogeneity in preferences breaks down, the party leadership possesses various sanctioning mechanisms to elicit loyalty (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Kam 2009; Patzelt 1999).[16]

Loyal voting is therefore usually the default option in parliamentary systems. Despite these conditions, MPs dissent from the party line for a variety of reasons, such as disagreement with the legislation at hand. The argument behind the legislative voting proxy is therefore that the institutional opportunity structure "enables or constrains" (Strøm 1997, 162) the extent to which an MP has an incentive to act on this disagreement (i.e. display dissent), or rather to remain loyal out of strategic electoral considerations. This logic aligns with the observation that "[a]s a general rule, therefore, MPs follow the party line unless special circumstances make breaking with the party line possible or desirable" (Jensen 2000, 233).

To illustrate this, take a German and a UK MP who are both considering voting against the party line. Weighing up whether to express their disagreement or not, the UK MP is more likely to show dissent than the German MP because the former also expects a potential electoral benefit, meaning his or her strategic and sincere considerations align (other costs equal). The German MP, on the other hand, is more likely to override this sincere position in order not to damage re-election chances given the electoral rules.[17] This logic has led to the expectation that party unity at the aggregate-level should be higher in systems such as Germany's than in the UK (see chapter 2). However, numerous country-level factors influence these aggregate-level measures, limiting the validity of a direct comparison. To circumvent

[16] Moreover, MPs are often unaware of the exact content of a given bill (Cowley 2005; Johnson 2009), and simply follow the instructions of the party whips or take cues from fellow MPs. In order to vote against the party line, however, an MP has to be able to defend this decision. As it is impossible to have a profound knowledge of every bill – particularly where there are many roll-calls – this further contributes to a bias towards party loyalty.

[17] Saalfeld (1995b, 180), for example, shows that German MPs often vote with their PPGs even when they do not agree with the party line.

this issue to some extent, I analyse variation between MPs with different re-election ambitions within the same system and compare those differences across systems.

Directly observing MPs' strategies, however, is complicated, given the difficulty in discerning whether the motivation behind an MP's vote choice was in fact sincere, i.e. reflecting his or her position or opinion on the matter, or strategic, i.e. the decision was made to advance an MP's goals, such as re-election (cf. Rothstein 1996, 148; see also Weingast 1996). This issue has previously been described as the "black box" of legislative voting (Regel 2011; Saalfeld, Martin, and Strøm 2014) given that we do not always know whether MPs voted loyally *despite disagreement* or *because of agreement* (Krehbiel 1993). In the UK, for example, we cannot say with certainty whether an MP's vote against the party line was strategic (e.g. to cultivate a personal vote), sincere (the MP disagreed with the legislation) or both (the MP disagreed and, as a welcome side-product, used the opportunity to build a personal vote). For the Bundestag, we also cannot clearly discern whether the default option of sticking with the party line was chosen because that was the MP's position (sincere choice) or because it was a strategic choice perceived to enhance re-election chances, or whether these two motivations overlap.

Hence, much like legislative voting in parliamentary systems cannot be explained through an MP's agreement or disagreement with the party line alone (e.g. Dewan and Spirling 2011; Kam 2001; Kam 2009; Willumsen and Öhberg 2013), it also cannot be considered solely in terms of being a strategic vote-seeking tool. Nonetheless, strategic considerations linked to re-election ambitions have been shown to be very powerful in swaying an MP's voting decision, as such rationality can indeed supersede preference-based voting (e.g. Bräuninger, Müller, and Stecker 2016; Kam 2009; Sieberer 2010; Skjæveland 2001). Some control variables (as well as random

MP-level intercepts to account for un-modelled differences between MPs) will help address these aspects. I also show that none of our MP groups of interest (i.e. MPs with high and low re-election ambitions) disproportionally represent ideologically more distant positions within their parties. In sum, and while recognising that the research field is still faced with significant challenges to lift the lid of this "black box", I follow the approach advocated by previous contributions that "[s]trategies thus cannot be directly observable, but we should be able to infer them from actual behaviour" (Strøm 1997, 161-2).

Differences in vote-recording procedures

The rules governing the recording of legislative votes differ between institutions, including the two covered in this study. Such country-level differences have previously been argued to limit the validity of cross-national aggregate-level studies of party unity, as legislators vote under different conditions, hindering a direct comparison (cf. Carrubba et al. 2006; Hug 2010; Hug, Wegmann, and Wüest 2015; Proksch and Slapin 2015). Even though the within-system cross-country approach taken in this study has been devised as a remedy to some of these issues in cross-institutional comparisons (see chapter 3), I briefly consider the difference in vote-recording procedures, as well as the potential implications for this study.

In the House of Commons, verbal disagreement in response to the Speaker's announcement of the result of an orally expressed vote suffices to prompt a so-called division. MPs subsequently "divide" into one of the two division lobbies to register their vote choice. In the Bundestag, voting usually occurs by show of hand; only upon the request by a PPG or by a group of five per cent of MPs is a roll-call (i.e. the recording of names and vote choices) carried out.

First, since roll-calls in the Bundestag are requested by parliamentary actors, they can be employed strategically by a PPG to discipline its MPs, engage in public position taking, or reveal the internal division of rival PPGs (Carrubba et al. 2006; Hug 2010; Snyder and Ting 2005). However, the parliament-level impact of these dynamics remains ambiguous (cf. Coman 2015; Sieberer 2006). On the one hand, the fact that recorded votes in the Bundestag are generally the most salient both in terms of content and visibility means that the party should have a strong interest in maintaining unity in these votes. This may further increase the incentive for MPs to cater to the party. On the other hand, given that the topics of recorded votes tend to be the most salient (and most debated) – and that opposing parties may want to use vote-recording requests to expose divisions – these votes may see a lower degree of internal cohesion (e.g. Sieberer 2006).

Second, recorded votes remain a subset of all legislative votes taken in the Bundestag (and, to a much lesser extent, in the House of Commons). This should, however, have only a limited impact on the empirical analysis conducted in this study, as it is not its aim to extrapolate from recorded votes to all legislative votes (recorded or not); rather, I analyse the degree of *visible* party loyalty, i.e. the publicly observable behaviour of an MP vis-à-vis the party in votes important to the party leadership. Recorded votes have been argued to provide just that (Carey 2009; Saalfeld 1995b).

Third, the vote-recording procedure in the House of Commons contributes to a higher number of recorded votes compared to the Bundestag (Coman 2015; Hug 2010; Saalfeld 1995a). Over the time periods covered in this study (2005-2013 for Germany and 2005-2015 for the UK), an average of 4.36 roll-call votes per month occurred in the Bundestag, against 20.41 per month in the House of

Commons.[18] This means that some votes in the House of Commons include minor matters, and are therefore likely to be less important to the party leadership. In theory, UK MPs can use such divisions to create a personal vote without fear of sanctions issued by the party. At the same time, dissent is most likely to be electorally beneficial to MPs if occurring on more salient topics (Kam 2009; but see Campbell et al. 2016). Minor issues are therefore less likely to provide this platform, unless perhaps in the context of constituency-specific concerns. Nonetheless, these conditions may provide greater leeway for UK MPs to use dissent as a tool to build a personal profile than would be the case for a smaller subset of recorded votes.

There is thus some indication that vote-recording procedures may enhance (or may to some degree be endogenous to) the incentives provided by the electoral systems – as was found by Proksch and Slapin (2012; 2015) concerning the differences in speech-making rules. Indeed, a more personalistic electoral system may be likely to have more transparent vote-recording mechanisms so that MPs can better use legislative voting to showcase their behaviour to voters (Carey 2009; Hug, Wegmann, and Wüest 2015). A comparative analysis of this argument finds little evidence concerning electoral rules, but does reveal an association with more candidate-centred nomination rules (Hug, Wegmann, and Wüest 2015).

Overall, differences in vote-recording provisions can pose significant problems for aggregate-level cross-country comparisons of party unity (cf. Carrubba et al. 2006; Hix and Noury 2016; Hug 2010; Hug, Wegmann, and Wüest 2015; Proksch and Slapin 2015). They affect the comparability of the unity scores, given that MPs are faced with different choice sets. To address this, at least in part, Coman (2015) includes the frequency of recorded votes in his aggregate-level study of 33 parliaments,

[18] These figures from my data correspond to the ones calculated by Coman (2015) over shorter periods of time. The total number of votes excludes "free votes" (see below), and the monthly averages are calculated using twelve months per year (i.e. parliamentary recess time is included).

finding no influence of this variable on the manner in which electoral rules impact personalistic vote-seeking at the macro-level. However, this frequency variable cannot capture the nuances – and potential behavioural implications – of vote-recording, such as the conditions under which roll-calls can be requested (see above).

Aware of the variation in vote-recording procedures and their potential behavioural impact, this study's within-system cross-country design helps mitigate the issues of comparing unity rates across systems; I investigate how MP-level degrees of loyalty and dissent vary *within* the same institutional environment – i.e. how the behaviour of certain MP groups compares to that of their peers – before comparing these MP-level differences *across* the two countries. Such an approach lowers the potential influence of cross-country differences, as I compare MPs' degrees of loyalty generated under the same conditions.

5.1.5 MPs' legislative voting behaviour: The data

Before outlining the data used for the dependent variable, it is instructive to provide a brief overview of the structure of my dataset as a whole. Given my focus on the most disaggregated level of analysis, one observation in the dataset is made up of the voting decision of one MP in one legislative vote. The dataset consists of all MPs and all votes from the two parliamentary terms in each country case. In line with my theoretical framework, this structure allows me to test an individual-level theory with individual-level data. The highly disaggregated format also means that I can account both for vote-level and MP-level characteristics (see also Sieberer 2010). Table A1 in the appendix illustrates this data structure.

As discussed above, the extent to which an MP caters to the party or to his or her personal reputation is operationalised by the degree to which the individual

remains loyal or dissents vis-à-vis the party line in legislative voting. The unit of analysis is therefore the vote choice of an individual MP in a legislative vote. To estimate an MP's likelihood of dissent against remaining loyal,[19] this unit is analysed over all roll-calls votes (RCVs) taken during the selected legislative terms of the Bundestag (2005-2013) and the House of Commons (2005-2015).

The UK roll-call data is registered in the official proceedings reports of the UK House of Commons, Hansard, and is regularly collected and updated by a data collection project from which the data used here is obtained.[20] I exclude free (i.e. "unwhipped") divisions, as these do not provide a hard measure of party loyalty.[21] This leaves a total of 2449 votes analysed here. I include all MPs belonging to the three major party groups (Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour).[22] Minor parties are excluded on the grounds of small numbers of MPs and low attendance rates, making the establishment of a "party line" difficult.

Over the two terms, the dataset includes a total of 864 individual MPs, of which 228 served only in the 2005 term, 242 only in the 2010 term, and 394 in both terms. Given that the unit of analysis is the vote choice of an MP per division, the UK data yields nearly 1.6 million "voting opportunities" for MPs (i.e. observations). It should also be noted that the analysis of this chosen time period for the UK case makes an important empirical contribution to the relevant literature, seeing as there has been little systematic MP-level analysis of legislative votes that took place in

[19] Given the bias towards party loyalty (see above), we must be aware that not cultivating a *personal vote* does not necessarily mean cultivating a *party vote*. For this reason, the dependent variable is operationalised as the likelihood of dissent – an activity which is likely to damage an individual MP's re-election chances in one system and enhance them in the other.

[20] `www.publicwhip.org.uk`; manual cross-checks with Hansard have been undertaken.

[21] It is not always easy to identify free votes, as PPGs rarely publish this information. However, I use a variety of methods such as media reports, a list of free votes provided by the Commons Library as well as a manual analysis of each vote, identifying a total of 78 free votes and one each that was free only for Labour and Conservative respectively.

[22] This also includes MPs who won by-elections.

the House of Commons after 2005 (for studies covering the pre-2005 periods, see Benedetto and Hix 2007; Cowley and Childs 2003; Dewan and Spirling 2011; Kam 2009).

The vote choices of Bundestag MPs are recorded in the parliament's plenary minutes. These have been extracted and processed as part of a large project collecting all roll-call votes in the Bundestag since 1949 (Bergmann et al. 2016). This data has been made available to me for the two legislative terms analysed in this study.[23] Free votes are excluded,[24] leaving a total of 419 legislative roll-call votes. I include all MPs[25] from the six parties represented in the covered legislative terms.[26] Vote choices of the three MPs who were independent at the time of the vote were removed. Over the two terms, there were 861 different MPs (a similar number to the 864 UK MPs), with 212 serving only in the 16$^{\text{th}}$ term, 221 only in the 17$^{\text{th}}$ term, and 428 serving in both terms.[27] The number of observations amounts to over 260,000 "voting opportunities".

The dependent variable *Deviating Vote* is binary, coded 0 if the MP voted with the PPG majority and 1 if against. This is the most common method of identifying whether an MP dissented in a given vote (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Sieberer 2010). However, two methodological aspects merit further consideration, namely non-participation and abstention. There is no formal method of registering abstention in the Commons, although MPs have at times walked through both division lobbies to indicate this (Kam 2009). This is an extremely rare step, usually

[23] I am grateful to Ulrich Sieberer, Stefanie Bailer and Tamaki Ohmura for sharing this data.

[24] These are identified as such in the records and and in the datasets made available to me.

[25] Including MPs who entered the Bundestag after a seat was vacated (*Nachrücker*).

[26] These are: CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, Grüne, Linke. See section 5.3 for a discussion of separate dummies for CDU and CSU.

[27] To be precise, there were 864 MPs, but two of them stood down and one of them passed before they attended a vote. Table 5.3 describing MPs' career backgrounds in the following section therefore includes all 864, but the analysis of deviating vote choice will include only 861.

taken to correct having walked through the wrong lobby moments before (Cowley 2005).[28] As a result, abstentions are excluded from the analysis of the UK case.[29]

Roll-calls in the Bundestag formally provide MPs with the option of abstaining, and PPGs sometimes prescribe this as the party line. Although abstaining when the party votes *yes* or *no* may be qualitatively weaker than outright dissent, it must nonetheless be considered as a clear deviation from the party line; Saalfeld (1995b) shows for the Bundestag that abstention is in fact most often employed as dissent. This finding is reflected by the fact that German MPs, as well as newspaper reports, usually consider abstention as an act of rebellion in the same way as outright dissent (e.g. Bülow 2007; Rossmann 2015; Rossmann and Fried 2015). Following these observations, as well as previous MP-level studies of voting behaviour in the Bundestag (e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008; Sieberer 2010), I code abstentions as dissent.[30]

The interpretation of non-participation has led to some discussion, particularly when attempting to use voting behaviour to infer legislators' ideological position, but also when assessing their strategic behaviour (e.g. Rosas and Shomer 2008; Rosas, Shomer, and Haptonstahl 2015; Willumsen and Öhberg 2013). In this study, however, I follow previous MP-level studies of legislative voting in the Bundestag and the House of Commons in counting absence as non-participation (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Sieberer 2010). In neither system can the reason for absence be verified systematically, nor can it automatically be seen as an expression of dissent (Cowley and Childs 2003, 348; Saalfeld 1995b, 73-77). Nonetheless, I include in

[28] Across the nearly 1.6 million observations, this occurred 360 times (or 0.02 per cent).

[29] As robustness checks, coding abstentions as defections or loyalty does not change the results.

[30] Across the Bundestag dataset, there are less than 1 per cent of cases in which an MP abstained while the party line was yes or no. Nonetheless, I conduct appropriate robustness checks. The statistical models were re-run with abstentions coded as 1) non-participation; 2) loyalty; 3) deviance if the party line is "abstain" and the MP votes "yes" or "no". Neither interpretation had substantive or statistically significant impact of the main explanatory variables (regressions not shown). Naturally, the overall level of dissent in the predicted probabilities decreased slightly.

the model a control variable for the number of MPs present at a given vote. The development of a more sophisticated method of modelling potentially strategic absence in the Bundestag and the House of Commons must be left to future work (see also Rosas, Shomer, and Haptonstahl 2015).

In sum, roll-call data is used to establish an MP's propensity to deviate from, or to remain loyal to, the party line. As argued above, this is assumed to capture the degree to which the individual caters to the party's collective reputation or to his or her own brand, other factors constant. At its foundation, the operationalisation is therefore about frequency of dissent. This follows previous contributions, although these rarely address the implicitly made assumptions. A frequency-based approach, for example, cannot directly capture the severity of a deviating vote, even though an MP's vote choice may be of greater importance to the party leadership (or the voters) in some votes than in others. The disaggregated data structure provides me with some leverage to address this issue. Through a number of variables including the subject of the vote, attendance rate, or the margin by which the legislative vote was decided, I can control for indicators of salience and am able to consider subsets of votes according to such characteristics.[31]

There are also clear theoretical and empirical merits of using the prevalent frequency-based operationalisation of party loyalty. In the UK case, for example, it has been shown that voters base their evaluation of an MP's independent-mindedness on the "key attribute [of] the frequency of dissent, defined as how often the MP 'speaks out or votes against his/her party leadership' "(Campbell et al. 2016, 11). Similar observations apply to the German context, where the party leadership, MPs themselves, as well as the media usually consider dissenters as those who go against the party line "too often" (e.g. Bülow 2007; Rossmann 2015).

[31] I also run the multilevel regressions with votes as upper-level units, see section 6.4.

Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of percentage of dissenting vote choices, Bundestag and House of Commons

House of Commons	54^{th} term (2005-2010)	55^{th} term (2010-2015)	both terms (2005-2015)
All MPs	1.1 (2.8)	0.9 (2.1)	1.0 (1.9)
Conservatives	0.7 (0.9)	1.2 (2.7)[g]	1.0 (1.9)
Liberal Democrats	0.5 (0.4)	1.9 (2.5)[g]	1.1 (1.3)
Labour	1.4 (0.4)[g]	0.4 (0.8)	1.0 (2.5)
Bundestag	16^{th} term (2005-2009)	17^{th} term (2009-2013)	both terms (2005-2013)
All MPs	2.5 (3.6)	1.7 (3.1)	2.1 (3.2)
CDU	1.6 (3.1)[g]	0.7 (1.8)[g]	1.2 (2.8)
CSU	2.2 (2.7)[g]	1.4 (4.7)[g]	1.7 (3.5)
SPD	2.6 (3.9)[g]	2.5 (3.3)	2.6 (3.6)
FDP	3.8 (3.8)	1.0 (2.0)[g]	1.7 (2.2)
Die Grünen	3.6 (3.9)	4.2 (4.8)	4.1 (4.3)
Die Linke	3.0 (2.6)	1.5 (1.0)	1.9 (1.4)

Percentage of individual-level vote choices that deviated from the party line, standard deviation in parentheses.
[g] indicates that the party was in government in given term.

Although the dependent variable focuses at the micro-level to capture variation in party loyalty between MPs, I present descriptive statistics on three levels. Table 5.1 shows the degree of party unity in the House of Commons and the Bundestag at the level of the parliament and of the parties (for each legislative term separately, and the pooled figure for both terms). For each of these two macro-levels, the figures describe the total percentage of individual-level vote choices that deviated from the party line.[32] Parties in the Bundestag – with 2.1 per cent of dissenting votes across the two terms – are on average less unified than in the House of Commons (at 1.0

[32]The figures are aggregated from the micro-level. Only attended votes are used. An alternative indicator of macro-level unity is the Rice score (Rice 1925), where percentage of deviating votes is subtracted from the percentage of loyal votes. However, I argue that this measure artificially inflates variation in descriptive statistics. As I will not use macro-level measures in my analysis, the method of depicting party unity has no implication for this study.

per cent). As has already been pointed out in chapter 2, the fact that Bundestag MPs at the aggregate-level behave less loyally than their UK counterparts goes against the prediction generated by the prevalent theory on electoral rules and MP behaviour. Potential explanations have already been discussed in chapter 2.




Figure 5.2: Descriptive statistics: MP-level variation in percentage of deviating votes by party, House of Commons 2005-2015. Each circle represents percentage of deviating votes cast by an individual MP per term. Cross indicates party average.

Moving to the level of analysis at the focus of this study, namely MP-level variation in party loyalty or dissent in legislative voting, figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show that there exists considerable MP-level variation between the individual legislators in the Bundestag and the House of Commons (grouped by party).[33] This variation, however, occurs within a high level of overall party unity, as few legislators dissent in more than 15 per cent of votes in the Bundestag and 10 per cent in the Commons. I return to a discussion of this variation when interpreting the empirical results below.

[33]Each dot indicates the percentage of attended votes in which the given MP displayed dissent, per term.




Figure 5.3: Descriptive statistics: MP-level variation in percentage of deviating votes by party (CDU, CSU, FDP), German Bundestag 2005-2013. Each circle represents percentage of deviating votes cast by an individual MP per term. Cross indicates party average.




Figure 5.4: Descriptive statistics: MP-level variation in percentage of deviating votes by party (Grüne, Linke, SPD), German Bundestag 2005-2013. Each circle represents percentage of deviating votes cast by an individual MP per term. Cross indicates party average.

5.2 The Independent Variables: Career Background and Re-election Ambition

Previous studies of MP behaviour have often acknowledged that legislators indeed "differ in many ways" (Herron 2002, 361) or that they possess "charming idiosyncrasies" (Strøm 1997, 158). Yet, this assertion is usually followed by the qualification that the uniformity and intensity of the overarching goal of re-election should largely diminish the impact of these differences on their behaviour. The model presented in this study moves beyond this view, as it proposes (and presupposes) that the intensity of re-election ambition varies between MPs, and that this has implications for their behaviour.

Regarding a suitable operationalisation for variation in legislators' ambitions more generally, it has previously been recognised that "[s]ystematic examination of ambition is problematic because ambition is best thought of as a psychological predisposition (Hibbing 1989, 28). Lacking psychological profiles of elected officials, we must use surrogate measures" (Herrick and Moore 1993, 766; see also Patty 2016, 181). As suggested on a more theoretical level in chapter 3, I argue that the level of desire for and dependence on re-election can to a satisfactory extent be captured by and inferred from an MP's previous career path. This operationalisation follows from the idea that an MP cannot think of re-election without thinking about how important this goal is to his or her professional path, or about the alternative (outside) options he or she may possess (see also Keane and Merlo 2010).

To facilitate this operationalisation, I use a newly-constructed and disaggregated dataset containing a large number of variables on MPs' career backgrounds and related biographical information. This effort represents, to my knowledge, the first systematic and large-N approach to capturing individual-level variation in

legislators' re-election ambitions through their professional backgrounds. The operationalisation across my two country cases also responds to previous criticism that a cross-national consideration of MPs' ambitions in parliamentary systems is still largely missing from the literature on legislative behaviour (Sieberer and Müller 2015, 4). Moreover, while work on elite backgrounds has previously – and mostly on an anecdotal level – noted a link between an MP's career path and his or her re-election ambition (see below), this MP-level view has thus far not been integrated into the study of how electoral rules influence MP behaviour. This section provides the operationalisation required for such an approach.

5.2.1 Career background as a proxy for re-election ambition

It has previously been observed that the extent to which an individual depends on remaining a member of a given group is a function of the opportunity costs of leaving that group (e.g. Hechter 1987). My theory chapter has applied this to MPs' ambitions to remain in parliament, arguing that when there is no readily available professional alternative to the mandate, or when such an alternative is not desired, then the individual should be particularly ambitious to retain his or her seat. Over this section, I propose that this is to a large extent the case for MPs who have focused their entire lives on a professional career in politics, i.e. career politicians (for a discussion of this term, see below).[34] The following sections outline this argument in more detail.

I view the strong motivation for career politician MPs to remain in parliament as consisting of an economic and an "emotional" dimension. While the former refers largely to the individual's economic dependence on the mandate, the latter captures

[34] I furthermore argue that this is the case both in the German and the UK context (see below). Comparability is also enhanced by the fact that the national parliaments in both countries provide by far the most significant platform for maintaining and advancing a career in politics.

a more psychological component. More specifically, it is based on the idea that a career politician considers this path as his or her "vocation", has made a significant personal and emotional investment in this career choice, and relies on the mandate for his or her professional status and identity.[35] In other words, these MPs both *want to* (psychologically speaking) and *need to* (economically speaking) remain in politics, with the two dimensions closely intertwined.[36] Having worked towards attaining this position for their whole professional lives, career politicians should therefore be particularly wary of losing this investment (Patzelt 1999; Roberts 1988) and, to speak in the formal language used above, should attach very low utility to career options outside parliament: "The greater the cumulative investment of the individual in political office-seeking, the greater will be the value placed on the offices to which the individual might aspire" (Black 1972, 156).

In this regard, it has previously been recognised that for German "careerist" MPs, "failure to be reselected, or electoral defeat, would mean the loss of their profession" (Roberts 1988, 113). Röper echoes this notion, observing that those incumbents who are not protected by an additional career are usually "forced to cling to their mandate" (2005, 427). MPs are very aware of this logic, as illustrated in a recent Bundestag debate in which FDP chief whip Jörg van Essen directly comments on the idea that those without a professional standing outside the mandate are most dependent on retaining it (Plenarprotokoll 17/198 2012, 23874).

The same dynamics have been identified in the UK, where growing professionalisation[37] is argued to have led to greater sensitivity to re-election (Carman 2006)

[35] See also King (1981, 250), who speaks of a psychological commitment.

[36] Both these dynamics have previously been recognised by Max Weber, who, in his influential analysis of *Politics as a Vocation*, explains that the actor (in Weber's case the administrative political staff) is dependent on his or her principal through two dimensions that appeal to personal interest, "material remuneration and social honour", and that the fear of losing these is the decisive foundation of solidarity towards the principal (1919, 11).

[37] Defined here as an increase in MPs focusing their professional ambitions uniquely on politics.

and where "full-time politicians [are] ... determined to cling on to both office and seats" (Riddell 1995, 189; see also King 1981; Norton 1999). Norris observes that "[o]nce members treat politics as their primary occupation this increases the pressures for re-election" (1997, 32). This rationale is also recognised by UK MP themselves: "The pressure is to be the ever-more professional politician. And if you're a professional politician, the moment you leave office, you don't have a profession" (Sieghart 2009, as quoted in Byrne and Theakston 2015, 20; see also Riddell 1993, 254). Another UK MP captures both the economic and psychological dimension of career politicians' re-election ambitions:

> Where a new MP has never had any other occupation or profession and job other than that of, say, a parliamentary researcher then, naturally, the parliamentary career is the only career upon which he or she can rely, not only for an income but also for their success (Marshall-Andrews 2011, 60).

To be sure, the assertion that career politicians are dependent entirely on the mandate might be overly simplistic since a former MP can be seen as quite employable (Peichl, Pestel, and Siegloch 2011) or could enter a new profession. Nonetheless, the transaction costs of (involuntarily) having to change profession, usually at a later stage in one's career, should provide strong incentives to remain in parliament. Indeed, it has been found that "the widely-held perception that MPs make a smooth transition into lucrative private sector employment is mistaken and that in actual fact many former MPs encounter great difficulties in resuming a career outside of politics or finding new work" (Byrne and Theakston 2015, 4). This transition should be particularly difficult for career politicians. One former legislator observes that being an MP is "not a job that equips you for anything. They [ex-MPs] have no skill set, they're the wrong age and they're by definition unfashionable", and that this is exacerbated for MPs who do not have a pre-parliamentary career to fall back onto (quoted in Byrne and Theakston 2015, 20).

Very similar observations have been made in the German context, where MPs can also struggle for employment after exiting parliament (Edinger and Schwarz 2009). This applies especially to those without a pre-parliamentary career, as the mandate brings with it a "financial dimension which in some cases can be considered as existential" (Edinger and Schwarz 2009, 13). This is echoed by the view that politics as a profession constitutes a "precarious employment relationship" given the risks associated with losing the seat (Best and Jahr 2006).

In addition to these predominantly economic aspects, career politicians should also be driven by an "emotional" dependence upon the status and social recognition, as well as the personal professional fulfilment, that come with the mandate. Surveys among both former German and UK legislators show that many MPs fear a decline in their social standing and identity after exiting parliament (Byrne and Theakston 2015; Edinger and Schwarz 2009). Again, these sentiments should be most pronounced among MPs who have focused their career uniquely on politics. In this vein, long-time MP Julian Amery observes that due to the increasing "professionalization of politics" there are now more "people who depend wholly on their position in Parliament for any importance they may have" (Amery 1992, as quoted in Riddell 1993, 148). Such dynamics help explain why legislative experts such as Norton speak of the "necessity of re-election" for incumbent career politicians (1999, 60), who enter parliament with the clear intention to stay (Norton 1999, 57).

On the contrary, consider the situation of a German MP who unexpectedly lost her seat, but subsequently continued practising in her law firm: "I love working as a lawyer. No need to worry about me, I will be fine [after losing my mandate]" (Deininger 2013; for a similar example, see Altenbockum 2013 as well as Brown

2010 for the UK case). Similarly, Norton points out that "for instance, a successful lawyer may enter parliament, spend a few years in the House of Commons, and then leave to take up a position as a judge" (1999, 57). These observations take us to the perspective of non-career politicians. MPs who have been working in an alternative profession are more likely to possess a plausible exit option should they fail to get re-elected, or, as King puts it: "Politics? In the end, he can take it or leave it" (King 1981, 283). Moreover, these MPs are, on average, expected to view the mandate as only one component of their professional careers. Having spent parts of their professional lives in other fields, they are assumed to possess lower emotional attachment to the mandate and to the profession of politics more generally. This should render them more independent of the mandate,both in terms of emotional and economic aspects.

More systematic survey studies indicate that of the MPs who wish to take up a job after exiting parliament, roughly half aim to return to their old occupation (Best and Jahr 2006). German MPs, for example, have been shown to make use of this option, with two of the largest occupational groups in the Bundestag – teachers and lawyers – returning to their previous jobs particularly often after exiting parliament (Edinger and Schwarz 2009, 29; see also Brown 2010 for the UK case). Such options should lower the MPs' dependence on re-election. However, this is not to say that non-career politicians have no ambition to get re-elected.[38] Rather, the greater necessity for career politicians to keep their mandate should particularly "energise"[39] these MPs to identify and engage in the most conducive activities. In sum, and to speak in the words of Max Weber (1919), politicians who live both "for" and "off" politics should, on average, be most invested in the goal of re-election.

[38] In fact, any individual who has taken upon his- or herself the strenuous path to nomination, let alone winning a seat – in German, this slog is not called *Ochsentour* for nothing – must at least at some point have had a strong ambition to become an MP.

[39] See André, Depauw, and Shugart (2014, 232) using this term.

While potential limitations will be discussed in a subsequent section, we must also think about additional dynamics that this proxy may be capturing. Career politicians might know the "rules of the game" better than their non-career politician colleagues. In terms of my theoretical framework, this means that their behaviour might reflect the use of the most conducive strategy not only because of their higher ambition for re-election but also because of their know-how and informational advantage over the less experienced non-career politicians. In the end, however, it must be recognised that precisely the higher ambition for re-election is likely to drive these MPs to acquire the skills and resources needed to identify and execute the best strategy. This logic has previously been acknowledged: "Other things being equal, the strongest congressional candidates are those for whom politics is a career. They have the most powerful motive and the greatest opportunity to master the craft of electoral politics" (Jacobson 1987, 46).

5.2.2 Numerical operationalisation of the *Career* variable

The concept of a career politician

The coining of the term *Berufspolitiker* ("professional politician") can most likely be attributed to Max Weber (1919) and his seminal lecture on *Politics as a Vocation* (cf. Herzog 1990, 28). More recently, and in the anglophone context, King (1981) must be credited with popularizing the term "career politician", now commonly used both in the scholarly and public debate. As subsequent contributions have attached different meanings – and different types of MPs – to this label, it is instructive to provide a clear definition given also that any attempts at defining the concept are closely interlinked with its operationalisation, which follows below.

In line with the majority of the (largely descriptive) contributions concerned with the concept of career politicians (e.g. Allen 2012; Cairney 2007; Durose et al. 2013;

Groves 2012; Herzog 1990; Kam 2006; Kellner 2014; Lamprinakou 2014; Riddell 1993; Riddell 1995; Saalfeld 1997; Theakston, Gill, and Atkins 2014), I consider an MP to be a career politician if his or her previous remunerated occupation(s) has/have been only in politics or a closely related field, i.e. an individual who lives and has only ever lived "from politics" (Weber 1919). This definition (and subsequent operationalisation) relies on a predominantly career-based approach to the concept. Although this represents the most commonly accepted approach, a slightly different understanding must be acknowledged. King, in his predominantly qualitative approach, focuses on politicians' "self-image" (1981, 250) and emphasises that an MP might choose a certain non-political profession to begin with, but might have done so with a later political career in mind.[40] Some individuals may therefore be emotionally (or psychologically) attached to the mandate, despite their career paths perhaps suggesting otherwise. These more qualitative dimensions, however, are difficult to capture through a purely career-based operationalisation. Rather, the approach taken here aligns with what King refers to as the "professional politician" as "someone preoccupied with winning and losing in the political game" (1981, 257).

While this operationalisation – which is also the dominant approach in the literature – may be less sensitive to the qualitative and psychological component of the MP's self-image, it has the advantage of better capturing both the economic and emotional dependence on the mandate. This makes the career-based proxy more useful with regard to my theory, which relies on variation in MPs' dependence on and desire for re-election. As discussed below, I also include subsidiary variables capturing an MP's commitment to a sustained career in politics.

[40] In this vein, former US President Woodrow Wilson is reported to have said: "The profession I chose was politics; the profession I entered was the law. I entered the one because I thought it would lead to the other" (Eulau and Sprague 1964, 1; also quoted and discussed in King 1981, 260).

The Career variable: Data and operationalisation

To operationalise the career politician variable, I rely on an original, large-N dataset that includes detailed information on the biographical backgrounds and parliamentary careers of over 1700 MPs across the two country cases. I collected and hand-coded the required data on MPs' professional backgrounds (as well as the data for the control variables) using standard sources of MP biographies,[41] as well as MPs' and Parliament websites.[42] This information undoubtedly suffers from some bias as MPs provide it themselves and may be interested in displaying their background in a certain light (Maddox 2004, 523).[43] However, self-reported data is the only comprehensive source for this variable, and it may be assumed that public scrutiny of the biographies should eliminate gross misrepresentations.

The main explanatory variable *Career* is constructed in two steps. First, I use and refine existing categories to classify professions according to their proximity to the political sphere (based especially on Allen 2012; Cairney 2007; Saalfeld 1997, but see also Durose et al. 2013; Norris 1997; Riddell 1993; 1995). Table 5.2 provides examples. Professions in the first group, *General*, are assumed, on average, to have little connection to the professional field of politics, nor do the skills acquired lend themselves, in most cases, to a seamless transition. *Brokerage* includes professions outside the political sphere but somewhat closer, in skills, to a career in politics. *Instrumental* encompasses jobs with an immediate connection to political work but excludes those linked directly to work for an MP or a party. The final group, *Political*, is reserved for these professions. MPs' careers are sorted into these four categories, coded 1 if the MP has ever had a career from a given category (0 if

[41] The principal sources for MP-level data were *DOD's Parliamentary Companion* (2009; 2014) for the House of Commons and *Kürschners Volkshandbuch* (2009; 2012) for the Bundestag.

[42] `www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/mps/`; `www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete`.

[43] Given a generally negative public opinion of career politicians, MPs may try to (over-) emphasize non-political experience. At the same time, an MP stressing political experience might thereby self-identify as a career politician.

not). This structure has been chosen to take into account that careers are dynamic, i.e. an MP may have had a variety of careers fitting into different categories.[44]

Table 5.2: Categories[a] at the basis of the independent variable *Career*

No Professional Political Experience		*Professional Political Experience*	
General	**Brokerage**	**Instrumental**	**Political**
Manual Wage Earner	Academic	Trade Union	Party Worker
Engineer, Architect	Law (Solicitor/Barrister)	NGO / Interest Group Representative	MEP/MSP/AM / Full-time Councillor
Finance, Business	Teaching	Journalism	Parliamentary Staff
Medical Industry	Social Worker	Think-Tank Employee	Special Advisor

Categories based in part on Cairney (2007), Allen (2012)
[a]Most common examples only

In a second step, I use these categories to build the categorical variable *Career*. In the first of three categories, an MP whose occupations fall exclusively in the *Instrumental* and *Political* dimensions is coded as *Career Politician* (0). Conversely, an MP who only had either a *General* or a *Brokerage* profession or both is coded as *Non-Career Politician* (2). Finally, MPs with occupations from both halves of table 5.2 are considered to have had a *Mixed* (1) career. This accounts for the fact that some MPs may have switched occupational focus. In terms of predictions following from my theory, I expect MPs with mixed career backgrounds to lie between career and non-career politicians in their behavioural incentives. I return to discussing this category when conducting the empirical tests in the next chapter.

The decision of which career paths denote an MP as a career politician is guided by previous research on elite backgrounds and career politicians. The professions featuring under *Instrumental* or *Political* have previously been described as "occupations that provide an apprenticeship for higher elected office" (Cairney 2007,

[44]While the vast majority of cases are straight-forward, a small number of judgement calls were required, as is generally the case when quantifying MPs' previous occupations (cf. Barber 2014).

214), with another contribution noting that MPs in these categories are "broadly considered to be the archetypal professional politicians" (Allen 2012, 688; see also Herzog 1990). In a similar vein, Peter Riddell, who has written extensively on MPs' careers, considers careerist politicians as those who have spent their professional lives "having been employed as members of the staff of the political parties, as advisers to ministers or shadow spokesmen, working for political consultants and lobbyists and as full-time trade union officials or councillors" (1995, 187).

Similar occupations denoting individuals as career politicians can be found in both the German and UK media (e.g. Groves 2012; Kirkup 2014; Krohn 2013), in research by legislative experts (e.g. Lamprinakou 2014), and in surveys. A recent YouGov poll (Kellner 2014), for example, describes such MPs as never having "had a 'real' job outside the worlds of national politics/think tanks/journalism/local government before becoming an MP"; these are all occupations featured here in the *Instrumental* and *Political* categories. Finally, MPs themselves list these occupations as those distinguishing a politician as a careerist: "I'd been a councillor and [political] adviser and worked in think tanks – a Westminster village person and perceived as such. It all went according to plan. And then: done – the standard political career" (quoted in Durose et al. 2013, 262).

Despite these empirical foundations, my operationalisation is not without problems. First, and as indicated above, purely career-based measures cannot fully capture an MP's self-identification as a career politician. Given the difficulty of gauging this subjective self-perception for every MP in a large-N approach (cf. Best et al. 2001), however, I follow previous work in using career background. Moreover, the career-based approach enables me to capture with greater certainty not only the psychological, but also the economic dimension of the MP's re-election ambition.

Second, political engagement and socialization may have occurred through channels other than remunerated occupation, increasing the individual's previous proximity and exposure to politics. Due to the lack of perfect information, however, I rely on the data on remunerated professions. Again, this allows me to tap into the economic dependence on the mandate. Nonetheless, a number of additional variables (see below) will, to some extent, account for an MP's involvement in politics beyond his or her main professions. Finally, the *Career* variable aggregates degrees of dependence on the mandate into a categorical variable. In an world of perfect information, of course, each individual MP could be placed on a continuous and fine-grained scale of how much he or she values re-election, as is implied by the linear function (equation 3.2) presented in chapter 3. However, not only do we lack the data for such an approach, but the simplicity of the above operationalisation also has the advantage of allowing for clear theoretical predictions and tests.

Using an MP's career path as a surrogate measure for re-election ambition is far from perfect, but, given the lack of reliable and large-N psychological profiles of elites, can perhaps be considered as good a proxy as any. Devising such proxies for social scientific phenomena is a necessary and manageable challenge at the end of which new and innovative explanatory angles for MP behaviour can emerge. Moreover, if the empirical analysis reveals some of the expected effect even in the face of these imperfect measures, then we can be hopeful that more precise proxies might show even larger behavioural effects.

Table 5.3 provides descriptive statistics on the distribution of *Career* types within each institution and party. In the House of Commons, just under one-fifth of MPs qualify as career politicians, a figure validated by previous observations (e.g. Groves 2012; Kirkup 2014; Lamprinakou 2014). At over one quarter, the Bundestag contains

Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics of MPs' previous professional experience

House of Commons	*Non-Career Politician*	*Mixed*	*Career Politician*
All MPs	**440 (51 %)**	**256 (30 %)**	**168 (19 %)**
Conservatives	220 (63 %)	97 (27 %)	33 (10 %)
Liberal Democrats	45 (61 %)	16 (21 %)	13 (18 %)
Labour	175 (40 %)	143 (33 %)	122 (28 %)
Bundestag	*Non-Career Politician*	*Mixed*	*Career Politician*
All MPs	**414 (48 %)**	**228 (26 %)**	**222 (26 %)**
CDU	140 (55 %)	62 (24 %)	54 (21 %)
CSU	31 (54 %)	13 (23 %)	13 (23 %)
FDP	75 (68 %)	19 (17 %)	16 (15 %)
SPD	116 (45 %)	77 (29 %)	67 (26 %)
Die Grünen	28 (31 %)	28 (31 %)	33 (37 %)
Die Linke	24 (26 %)	29 (32 %)	39 (42 %)

Entries show number and percentage of MPs with specified career background. Bundestag (2005-2013) and House of Commons (2005-2015) MPs.

a slightly higher share of career politicians.[45] Differences exist between PPGs. The lower share of career politicians among the centre-right parties (Conservatives, CDU, CSU and FDP) can partly be attributed to their emphasis on and recruitment from business (e.g. Best et al. 2001), while the centre left's (Labour, SPD, Grüne, Linke) link with trade unions contributes to its higher share.[46] While PPG dummies will account for these differences, I also run the empirical analysis for each party group separately (see section 6.4).

[45]This figure also aligns with previous estimates (e.g. Hackhausen 2003).

[46]This similar distribution of career politicians within centre-left and centre-right parties in Germany and the UK indicates that the variable is capturing similar people across the countries, adding to the validity of the categories.

5.2.3 Comparability of German and UK career politicians

To ensure that my proxy is conceptually suitable for the within-system cross-country design of my model, career politicians in the two countries must, simply put, be the same people. More specifically, the operationalisation must meet the empirical condition that there is no substantive endogeneity in the level of party loyalty of career politicians for reasons exogenous to the electoral rules. In other words, we must exclude the possibility that more party-loyal individuals self-select into becoming career politicians in Germany while, in the UK, less party-loyal individuals are more likely to be career politicians in the first place.

Judging from anecdotal evidence and the detailed coding of over 1700 MP biographies, there is no reason to believe that career politicians should be systematically (and from the start) further from the party leadership in one system and closer in the other for reasons exogenous to the electoral rules. Beyond such anecdotal indications, I conduct a quantitative test of this condition. This step also addresses the role of ideology in voting behaviour, and tests for the assumption made in the behavioural model that the two MP types should, on average, incur the same ideological costs in their voting behaviour. Specifically, I compare the proportion of career politicians in intra-party factions located at the more extreme wings of the two countries' main parties with the share of career politician MPs within the given party as a whole.[47] If indeed we were to find that career politicians in the Bundestag or the House of Commons appear in these party factions at a level that is disproportionately higher or lower than their share within the whole party, then my assumption would be in question.

[47] Another method of testing for this would be to use MPs' ideological self-placements from survey responses (e.g. Kam 2009; Proksch and Slapin 2012). Apart from suffering from low response rates, however, these surveys are usually conducted under the promise of anonymity, meaning that I would, in most cases, be unable to link these with my data.

I begin by analysing the membership composition of left-wing party factions within the main centre-left parties of both countries, the SPD and Labour. In the Bundestag, the *Parlamentarische Linke* constitutes the largest such faction within the SPD. Moreover, the group's website provides a list of members' names for the 17th term.[48] Another advantage of using this faction is that it is clearly to the left of the party main stream (as its name suggests). This ideological position therefore resembles that of the faction within the UK Parliamentary Labour Party analysed below.[49]

As the point of reference, 30 per cent of all SPD legislators in the 17th term were career politicians. Meanwhile, the share of members in the *Parlamentarische Linke* who are career politicians lies at 27 per cent, i.e. very similar to that of the party as a whole. Appropriate tests also show that this small difference is statistically insignificant. The figures therefore suggest that SPD career politicians are not more likely to self-select into (or self-deselect from) an ideologically more distant faction. Moving to a similar test for the House of Commons, I consider the membership composition of the Socialist Campaign Group, a vocal left-wing democratic socialist faction within the Parliamentary Labour Party. In both the 54th and 55th parliaments, the membership reflects the proportion of career politicians in the party as a whole: In the 2010-2015 parliament, 32.5 per cent of Labour MPs were career politicians, while one third of SCG members are categorised as this MP type. A similar match is observed in the 2005-2010 term, where the 26 per cent of career politicians within the SCG were representative of their presence in the party as a whole (25 per cent).

[48] Very few of the German intra-party factions are organised to the extent that they provide comprehensive lists of their membership. Communication with the *Parlamentarische Linke*, for example, revealed that this group does not make available any members lists of previous parliamentary terms. This is why the analysis here is restricted to the 17th term.

[49] It should be noted, however, that the Socialist Campaign Group (SCG) arguably is located further from its party leadership than is the case for the *Parlamentarische Linke*.

Similar patterns are observed within the large conservative party groups (CDU/CSU in Germany and the Conservatives in the UK). Taking the *Berliner Kreis*, a staunchly conservative faction within the CDU/CSU,[50] I find that the 22 per cent of career politicians within this grouping reflect the 23 per cent of career politicians present in the CDU/CSU as a whole in the 17$^{\text{th}}$ term. Regarding the Conservative Party in the House of Commons, I do not rely on official party factions as these were often small, and loosely organised, over the past legislative terms.[51] Rather, I turn to one of the core dividing issue in the party, namely MPs' positions on the EU. Using Heppell's (2013) categorisation of all Conservative MPs from the 2010-2015 parliament according to their stance towards Europe, I find that 9.8 per cent of the MPs deemed eurosceptic were career politicians, against a proportion of 8.8 per cent within the Conservative Party as a whole.[52] In addition, I considered MPs' positions towards social values, as identified by Heppell (2013).[53] Of the MPs coded as having conservative values, 7.8 per cent were career politicians (against 8.8 in the party as a whole).

The above analysis suggests that neither in the German Bundestag nor in the House of Commons are career politicians over- or under-represented within the more ideologically extreme factions or positions in their parties.[54] This observation supports the assumption that a difference in differences in party loyalty across the two countries is not driven by the fact that career politicians are – from the start, and for reasons unrelated to the electoral rules – individuals with more moderate

[50] As noted above, it is difficult to find reliable and exhaustive membership lists for party factions in Germany. The members of this group were identified by the author through the faction's website, media reports as well as letters signed by members.

[51] The *1922 Committee* within the Conservative Party is an organisation for all backbenchers and cannot be associated with a certain (or permanent) ideological leaning.

[52] Heppell (2013) produced four categories, *Europhile, Agnostic, Soft Eurosceptic, Hard Eurosceptic*. I collapsed these into a binary variable.

[53] I transformed Heppell's (2013) three categories (*Liberal, Agnostic, Conservative*) into a binary variable with Conservative coded as 1 and the other two as 0.

[54] To be sure, being eurosceptic is hardly an extreme position in the UK Conservative Party.

or centrist views in the one institution while being further away from the party leadership in the other.[55]

Career politicians in the two institutions are comparable on a number of additional levels. The coding of the MP-level biographical data reveals that career paths of career politicians are indeed very similar across the two country cases, and the empirical discussion provided in section 5.2.1 confirms that German and UK MPs with the same career backgrounds should be most wary of losing the mandate. Moreover, party leaders in both countries continuously underline the importance of party unity, as well as the fact that the party label helped MPs get elected (e.g. Bülow 2010; Cowley 2005; Dittberner 2003; Kam 2009). As a result, career politicians in both countries should be aware of these party-centric expectations by the party leadership (e.g. Marshall-Andrews 2011; Norton 1999; Oborne 2007; Patzelt 1999; Röper 2005).

Furthermore, and although the focus of the theoretical framework is on re-election in its property as the primary goal of the MP, it must be recognised that career politicians both in Germany and the UK have been argued to value parliamentary or executive office to a greater extent than their colleagues, given that frontbench office represents a significant opportunity to advance within the career path they have devoted themselves to (e.g. Douglas 1984; Herzog 1990; Kam 2006; Marshall-Andrews 2011; Norton 1999; Patzelt 1999; Riddell 1993; Röper 2005; Schwarz and Lambert 1971). The same applies to policy influence, which is, to a large extent, a function of office. It should therefore also attract greater intrinsic interest of career politicians, having made it their profession to influence politics (King 1981).

[55]The data also reveals that career politicians in both countries are not more or less likely to fall into a certain *Office* category (see below).

Given that both German and UK party leaders use their distributional power to elicit loyalty from their members or, at the very least, that MPs believe this to be the case,[56] career politicians have an additional incentive to heed to these party-centric expectations. Importantly, – and as has been pointed out in the section on case selection (4.1) – these mechanisms are present both in the House of Commons and the Bundestag (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Bülow 2007; Bülow 2010; Cowley 2005; Dittberner 2003; Hirsch 1999; Kam 2009; Patzelt 1998), meaning that this influence by the party leadership is largely held constant across the country cases.[57]

These office-related considerations notwithstanding, re-election remains the pre-condition for the attainment of these goals, so that career politician MPs in both countries should first and foremost be invested in increasing their changes of being returned to parliament. I therefore expect the difference in behavioural incentives created by the two electoral systems to override the effect of the office-related sanctioning mechanisms. Indeed, if it can be shown that career politicians behave differently in the two settings – which, on the one hand, hold similar office-related sanctions, while, on the other hand, having electoral systems with opposing behaviour incentives – then this would suggest that re-election ambitions can prevail over ambitions for office advancement once elected.

5.2.4 Further career-based proxies for re-election ambition

Apart from acting as control variables, a number of other MP characteristics can be used as proxies for re-election ambition. In this section, I introduce and operationalise these measures before outlining the relevant control variables.

[56] Note, however, that some minor offices in the German Bundestag are elected (Patzelt 1999), as was the case until 2011 for the Labour Shadow Cabinet. Nonetheless, party colleagues are unlikely to reward dissenting behaviour as this damages the collective party label.

[57] Note that according to my data neither in the House of Commons nor in the Bundestag are career politicians significantly more or less likely to hold a frontbench position than other MPs.

Attractiveness of outside option

The economic dimension of the *Career* variable can be criticised given that even a legislator who possesses the safety-net of potentially returning to a previous occupation is likely to compare the attractiveness of this fall-back option to the appeal of retaining the mandate.[58] To take this argument into account, I construct a variable capturing the (monetary) attractiveness of the MP's previous career compared to the mandate. Specifically, I argue that MPs to whom winning the mandate represented a significant rise in financial remuneration should value re-election to the greatest extent. While this monetary operationalisation is not without issues (see below), the level of income discrepancy offers a hard measure that allows for a clear comparison and a realistic proxy for the appeal of retaining the mandate. As status and social recognition generally rise with income, this proxy also captures the more psychological element of an MP's re-election ambition.

The binary variable *Previous Income* divides MPs into those whose previously best-paid jobs yielded a significantly lower income than the parliamentary mandate (coded 1), and those who had a previous occupation that paid a similar or higher salary (coded 0). Section 7.2.2 in the appendix explains in detail how this subsidiary variable is operationalised.[59] Some general limitations of this variable must be addressed. First, using financial measures as a proxy for the attractiveness of the mandate neglects other factors which render a profession appealing, such as personal gratification, social status, and working conditions.[60] Furthermore, some MPs might display a more post-materialist stance towards careers and economic goods. Some of these dynamics will be captured by the

[58] Nonetheless, it must be recognised that while even an MP with a less attractive outside option possesses *some* exit option, a career politician – as operationalised above – is assumed to have no such option at all.

[59] I address the topic of pensions in a subsequent section.

[60] This idea has been captured in the field of occupational psychology by the concepts of "subjective" and "objective" career success (Heslin 2005).

dummies controlling for PPG membership, as I expect MPs from parties such as Die Grünen or Die Linke to be more prone to display such post-materialist attitudes.

Second, this operationalisation implies that future prospects are inferred from previous career paths – a criticism that also applies to the *Career* variable. Indeed, MPs may successfully enter a new profession after leaving parliament. Nonetheless, I argue that individuals with previously lower-paying careers should find it more difficult to maintain the financial standard of the mandate once they leave parliament, compared to MPs with high-paying prior careers.[61] Moreover, and from a psychological perspective, having had another high-paying (and high-status) career before the mandate should attenuate feelings of a loss of status after leaving parliament (Byrne and Theakston 2015; Edinger and Schwarz 2009).

Third, the variable represents only a crude measure that suffers from issues related to incomplete information on MPs' financial assets or other sources of income, variation in remuneration for the same occupation across time and regions, as well as vague job titles used in MP biographies. These issues notwithstanding, the parsimonious nature of the *Previous Income* variable should provide a simple and valid proxy for the attractiveness of an MP's outside option, and hence for re-election ambition. In line with my model, I expect that in the UK, MPs with lower previous income should be *more* likely to behave individualistically (compared to their high-income peers), while Bundestag MPs with the same characteristics should be *less* likely to do so.

[61] Also, involuntary retirement from parliament implies that the MP was not prepared to enter professional retirement yet. For German MPs, it has been found that that nearly three quarters of MPs who leave parliament (voluntarily or involuntarily) have not reached retirement age yet (Edinger and Schwarz 2009) and that nearly half of MPs who wish to keep working after the mandate aim to take up their old job (Best and Jahr 2006).

Previous attempts at entering parliament

Although many factors influence whether a candidate is successful on the first attempt (such as a landslide victory for party or the constituency track record), how often an MP ran for parliament is some indication of his or her commitment to a sustained career in politics (King 1981), or – more colloquially – how desperate an individual is to be in parliament.[62] It has also been noted that aspiring politicians are often expected to run in hopeless constituencies before being given a more winnable seat,[63] and that for "MPs [who] have been prepared to run this obstacle race [this] says much for their determination" (King 1981, 265).

Concerning the operationalisation, I follow King's logic that if the vast majority of MPs who ran more than one unsuccessful campaign before entering the House "are not career politicians, [...then] they are certainly behaving very strangely" (1981, 266). I therefore code the variable *Unsuccessful* as 1 if the MP ran for parliament unsuccessfully more than once.[64] In line with my theory, I expect these MPs to be more likely to engage in personalistic vote-seeking in the UK. Among Bundestag MPs, I expect the opposite or no effect on party loyalty.

Local politician background

The variable *Local Politician* is coded 1 if an MP has ever been a local councillor or a mayor (0 otherwise). On the one hand, the inclusion of this variable builds on the existing argument that these MPs should, *inter alia*, have a stronger local support base, making them more independent in their behaviour vis-à-vis the party (Tavits

[62] King phrases this as "the number of rebuffs that an aspiring politician was prepared to endure before finally being returned to the House" (1981, 265).

[63] We have to note that this may, in fact, make some MPs take up a career outside of politics in order to sustain themselves between their repeated attempts at entering parliament.

[64] For the UK, I collected this data from the MP biographies while the information on German MPs comes from a dataset provided to me by Philip Manow (Manow and Flemming 2012).

2009). Indeed, Tavits finds across five European democracies[65] that local politician MPs are more likely to dissent in legislative voting. Beyond accounting for this finding, the variable also provides an additional test of the overarching theory. Although most local politicians also exercise an additional profession,[66] such a biographical background to some degree captures an MP's extra-/pre-parliamentary involvement in politics. Given that the career politician variable is operationalised by considering only remunerated careers, the *Local Politician* offers a further proxy for an MP's psychological commitment to a career in politics. I thus expect local politicians to be less loyal to the party than their non-local politician colleagues in the UK setting, and the opposite or no effect in the Bundestag.

Length of tenure

Finally, I consider how long an MP has been in parliament, measured by the number of *Terms* served at the time of the vote. Previous contributions generally expect that growing seniority means greater involvement in the formulation of party policy, which in turn should lead to greater loyalty (e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008; Tavits 2011).[67] Moreover, in both the House of Commons and the Bundestag, there are pronounced expectations to behave in a collective and loyal manner (e.g. Cowley 2005; Dittberner 2003; Kam 2009; Patzelt 1998; Patzelt 1999). Senior MPs should therefore be more likely to have internalised these norms of loyalty and group solidarity (Kam 2009). On the other hand, these MPs may feel they have the standing to vote against the party line more often (Tavits 2011).

The duration an MP has served in parliament also has implications for studies concerned with vote-seeking behaviour. First, the longer an MP's tenure, the

[65] These do not include the UK or Germany.
[66] In both countries, being a local politician and being a career politician are not correlated.
[67] See below for a separate control capturing an MP's frontbench status.

more well known he or she is likely to be (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Martin 2011). In systems that reward a personal vote, these MPs may therefore feel less of a need to act rebelliously in order to carve out an individual brand. However, in light of the strong and growing demand by UK voters for more independent-minded MP behaviour (Campbell and Lovenduski 2015; Campbell et al. 2016; Vivyan and Wagner 2015), senior legislators cannot simply rest on their laurels of name recognition, but may want to continue to distinguish themselves through independent-minded behaviour. This is all the more relevant given that voters' approval as a result of dissent is not merely a function of name recognition but of the intrinsic appreciation of dissent in and of itself (Campbell et al. 2016).

Related to my theory, I argue that the longer an MP has spent in parliament, the more difficult or undesirable it would be to return to a previous job, or to take up a new profession. The length of tenure can therefore be seen as a *discount factor* of the value and accessibility of an outside career option. Having been in parliament for longer may therefore increase an MP's re-election ambition, and lead to greater engagement in (and knowledge of) the most conducive re-election strategy. Moreover, MPs in the Bundestag and House of Commons are subject to the same regulations on pensions, as MPs accrue their pensionable salary per year of membership.[68] MPs who are not protected by additional careers therefore have an even greater incentive to remain in parliament for longer.

Translating these dynamics to our country cases, I expect Bundestag MPs to become more loyal with growing time served, while the opposite should be the case for UK MPs.[69] Given that MPs in both institutions are exposed to similarly

[68] In both cases at 1/40 of the last paid salary per year of membership. Before 2008 in the Bundestag there was a minimum requirement of 8 years of membership to qualify.

[69] Some empirical support for the UK prediction comes from a study of 2001-2005 Labour MPs, finding that longer-serving legislators tend to be less loyal (Benedetto and Hix 2007).

strong norms and expectations surrounding party loyalty, I argue that if indeed we should see the effect of the *Terms* variable to be in opposite directions between the two institutions, then some of this difference is likely to be due to the opposing behavioural incentives created by the electoral rules.

5.3 Control Variables

A variety of control variables are included in the model in order to isolate the effect of the main explanatory variables on an MP's likelihood of voting against the party line. Some of the controls are introduced because they have previously been found to influence an MP's level of party loyalty in the two country cases and beyond, while others provide new arguments and measures. Although most variables are located at the MP-level given the study's micro-level focus, I also account for factors impacting party loyalty at the party- and vote-level. Many of the variables presented here would be deserving of studies of their own, but the scope of this thesis restricts me to the aspects most pertinent to this study's theory and aims.

MP-level controls

An essential control pertains to whether an MP was *Standing Down* after the term, i.e. whether the individual did not seek re-election following the term of the given legislative vote (coded 1, otherwise 0). This accounts for potential effects arising from the so-called last-period problem, where MPs have been argued to behave differently once they have decided to step down (cf. Parker and Dabros 2011; Zupan 1990). More specifically, the control ties in with my theoretical framework: if an MP decided to step down, there should be no electoral incentive to engage in certain vote-seeking behaviour (Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing 1994; Jun and Hix 2010). We

should therefore see retiring UK MPs to be less likely to dissent, and the opposite effect for Bundestag MPs.[70]

In addition to the *Terms* variable introduced above (and for similar reasons), I control for an MP's *Age* and its squared term (e.g. Bailer and Ohmura 2013). I also account for previous findings pertaining to the MP's *Gender* (Cowley and Childs 2003). *Margin* is an important control as it accounts for the idea that MPs may seek to cultivate a personal vote particularly when the majority by which they won their seat was small (e.g. Bowler 2010; Eggers and Spirling 2014a; Kam 2009; Norris 1997; Stoffel 2014). Due to data availability, the variable is operationalised differently in the German and the UK contexts. For German district MPs, I control for the difference in percentage points received by the winner and the runner-up, whereas for UK MPs, I use the absolute number of votes of this margin (in steps of 100).[71] For German list MPs, I control for the list position on which the MP entered parliament. As this variable will only be used in the sub-national analysis of Germany's electoral tiers in chapter 7, I revisit this variable there.

An MP's front- or backbench status constitutes another important control. First, MPs holding parliamentary or executive office should, on average, be more likely to agree with the party line given their greater involvement in the formulation of party policy (Patzelt 1999; Tavits 2011). Most importantly, however, members of the government frontbench in the House of Commons are bound by "collective ministerial responsibility" meaning they must resign their frontbench post before voting against the party line (Cabinet Office 2010). Opposition frontbenchers are subjected to similar, albeit informal, expectations. As suggested in chapter 2, this

[70] Moreover, office-related sanctions for disloyal behaviour lose their effect if an MP has decided to step down. However, this applies to both German and UK MPs, so that a difference in the stepping down variable is mostly likely attributable to re-election concerns (or lack thereof).

[71] Although this follows the prevalent method, there are a number of other measures that can capture how winnable or safe a seat is, such as polls (see Norris 1997 for examples).

limits the manoeuvring space of a number of UK MPs and likely increases the overall party unity compared to countries with no such provisions. Similarly, the existence of a Shadow Cabinet as well as other frontbench positions in the House of Commons mean that the UK frontbench is larger than in many other country cases including the Bundestag (Theakston, Gill, and Atkins 2014).[72] This again underlines the benefit of my difference-in-differences approach, which lowers the influence of country-specific factors. For both countries, I operationalise *Office* as follows:[73] Coded 0 if the MP has always (i.e. in the current and previous terms) been a backbencher; 1 if the MP held office for the duration of the analysed term or for part of it;[74] and 2 if the MP held office in a previous term but no longer in the analysed one (see also Benedetto and Hix 2007; Kam 2006).[75]

Party-level controls

At the party level, the binary variable *Government* controls for whether the MP's party formed part of the government at the time of the vote. For the UK case, Dewan and Spirling (2011) show that the opposition is more likely to vote as a unified block in order to elicit policy concessions from the governing party (i.e. engage in "strategic voting"). On the other hand, and on a more comparative level, it has been argued that governing parties should be more unified as they possess

[72] After the 2005 UK election, for example, 140 Labour MPs (or 40 per cent of the PPG) belonged to the frontbench. The expansion of the frontbench over recent decades (Parry and Kelly 2012) has been argued to be employed by the party leadership as a tool to maintain unity (Goodman 2013).

[73] The most common positions are as follows. *House of Commons*: (Shadow) Cabinet Minister, (Shadow) Minister of State, Whip, Parliamentary Under-Secretary and Parliamentary Private Secretary. *Bundestag*: Chancellor, (junior) Minister, (vice-)President of the Bundestag, Council of Elders member, chair of a permanent committee, (vice-)chair of a PPG, party whip. If the minor positions of spokesperson, chair of a PPG working group and committee vice-chair are also considered as office, the Bundestag regression results remain very similar.

[74] This category is coded in this manner because for the UK case I do not have data on the exact date at which an MP was demoted or promoted. I do have the data on German MPs' frontbench position at every vote (*Office at Vote*). Using this variable as a control yields the same results as those obtained by using the more crude categorical variable.

[75] Given the payroll vote, this variable is aggregated further in the UK case by splitting MPs into those who held office for the whole term and those who were on the frontbench for only part of the term. Running the regressions with only the three categories does not change the results.

the confidence vote as a potential sanctioning device, and have the power to set the agenda (Sieberer 2006). Conflicting results in the comparative literature (e.g. Rahat 2007; Sieberer 2006; Sieberer 2010) regarding the effect of government membership on voting loyalty means that no theoretical expectation will be put forward here (for a similar approach, see Sieberer 2006).




Figure 5.5: Descriptive statistics: Percentage of deviating votes of each MP for each term, by Backbench and Government status, House of Commons, 2005-10 and 2010-15. Each circle represents one MP. Y-axes truncated at 10 per cent for better comparability and depiction of variation.

Descriptive statistics in figures 5.5 and 5.6 show, for each institution, the variation in deviation rates among frontbenchers and backbenchers as well as government and opposition MPs.[76] These graphs are important to consider prior to the empirical analysis, as they reveal the MP subgroups that display the greatest variation in loyalty and dissent. Unsurprisingly given the payroll-vote provision, most of the variation in the House of Commons is found among backbenchers, and especially among government backbenchers. While my empirical analysis will also include all

[76]The frontbench category also includes MPs who served there for only part of the term.




Figure 5.6: Descriptive statistics: Percentage of deviating votes of each MP for each term, by Backbench and Government status, Bundestag, 2005-09 and 2009-13. Each circle represents one MP. Y-axes truncated at 20 per cent for better comparability and depiction of variation.

MPs across the two institutions, these figures demonstrate why, in the case of the House of Commons, I will focus predominantly on backbenchers (see section 6.1.2). For the Bundestag, some variation is observed among MPs who hold frontbench office. As there is no payroll vote, this makes an analysis of all MPs more instructive. To increase comparability, however, I will also present and discuss results only for German backbenchers.

Finally, I include party dummies to account for previous findings regarding a potential effect of PPG membership on party loyalty (Depauw 2003; Rahat 2007; Saalfeld 1995b; Sieberer 2006; Sieberer 2010). These variables furthermore hold constant potentially influential party-specific factors such as party size (e.g. Shomer 2016). Moreover, and as has been shown in table 5.3 above, individual parties in the Bundestag and the House of Commons differ in their shares of career politicians, making it crucial to account for an MP's party member-

ship. The variable furthermore allows me to run the models for each party group separately in order to ascertain whether the results hold across parties (see below).[77]

Parliament- and vote-level controls

I include a *Legislative Period* dummy to hold constant term-specific factors. Robustness checks will also be run per term in addition to the pooled structure. To account for the electoral cycle, I conduct an analysis by each parliamentary *Session*. This not only serves as a robustness check to test whether the results hold across parliamentary sessions, but also accounts for the idea that as the election (and, in the German case, the list nomination procedure) draws closer, MPs should intensify the re-election strategy identified as most conducive.

Finally, and following previous contributions (e.g. Carey 2007; Sieberer 2010; Snyder and Groseclose 2000), various vote-level controls control for the salience of the vote. The categorical variable *Closeness* captures the margin of votes by which a legislative roll-call passed.[78] The continuous variable *Attendance* (measured in number of MPs participating in a given vote[79]) similarly accounts for salience. Finally, I control for the *Subject* of the vote (see Klüver and Spoon 2013; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010), classifying roll-calls into the areas *Economy*, *Foreign Affairs and EU*, and *Other*. Summary statistics of all variables used in the models are shown in table A12 in the appendix.

[77] While some contributions on the Bundestag (e.g. Sieberer 2010) consider CDU and CSU as one PPG, I differentiate between the two as they are *de jure* and *de facto* two different party groups. Running the regression with CDU/CSU as one PPG yields very similar results.

[78] For both (similarly large) parliaments, I choose the following categorical variable (as opposed to continuous) in order to be able to look at subsets of votes according to their closeness: close $<$ 50 votes $<$ moderate $<$ 100 votes $<$ large. Note also that some endogeneity should be present: the more MPs deviate, the smaller the margin gets.

[79] Note that in the Bundestag, attendance in recorded votes is mandatory. This is reflected by an average attendance of 91 per cent and a low standard deviation (3.5 per cent).

UK-specific events and controls

Two factors unique to the 2005-10 and 2010-15 terms of the House of Commons must be considered. First, the MP expenses scandal of 2009 sent shock waves through Westminster after it was revealed that a large number of MPs had misused expense claims and allowances, in parts for personal gain. Although the impact of this scandal on the MP-voter relationship more generally has already been explored elsewhere (e.g. Eggers 2014; Graffin et al. 2013; Pattie and Johnston 2012; Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov 2012), we must consider the event's potential differential impact on the vote-seeking efforts of certain MPs (i.e. those implicated in the scandal and those not). This also allows me to address the possibility that our MP groups of interest (career or non-career politicians) may have been disproportionally implicated in the scandal, and that this may have a behavioural impact.[80]

I obtained an array of variables capturing an MP's involvement in the scandal, including whether the MP was found guilty by the Legg enquiry and/or the Telegraph, the amount to repay, as well as the ratio between pre-scandal and scandal-related press coverage of the MP.[81] Combining this data with my dataset reveals that career politicians were not more likely (or unlikely) to be entangled in the scandal. As shown below, running the UK models with the scandal-related controls also does not impact the effect of the main explanatory variables.[82]

Finally, an understudied aspect in the UK literature on a personal vote is the potential impact of boundary changes.[83] The 2010 election saw the implementation of the

[80]The popular view might be that career politicians were more likely to abuse the system.

[81]I thank Nick Vivyan (Vivyan, Wagner, and Tarlov 2012) and Scott Graffin (Graffin et al. 2013) for sharing this data.

[82]The confines of this study unfortunately do not permit me to explore this undoubtedly interesting topic beyond the scope of these robustness checks.

[83]Part of the reason is that the changes of the previous (i.e. fourth) boundary commission were implemented in 1997, while many studies cover the period between 1997 and 2010, during which no boundary changes (apart from Scotland) occurred.

Fifth Periodic Review of Westminster Constituencies, which changed boundaries for numerous constituencies in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and increased the number of parliamentary seats from 646 to 650.[84] This has implications for our study, as many MPs re-running in 2010 had to cater to partly different constituents than the ones who elected them in 2005 (for a similar argument see Norton 1994, 717).

To account for a potential impact on MP's vote-seeking behaviour, I have obtained and merged with my dataset information on the extent of boundary changes in each constituency, captured by the *index of change* compiled by Rallings and Thrasher (2007). The data reveal that over 75 per cent of constituencies experienced a change, and that there exists significant variation in the extent of such change. Importantly for my study, constituencies of career politicians were not more or less likely to experience a change, nor did they see different levels of change. Including these indicators in the UK regression models also does not alter the other explanatory factors, nor does the variable itself have a statistically significant impact on an MP's likelihood to vote against the party line.

Controls specific to the German electoral system

While chapter 7 will provide a detailed discussion on categorising German MPs according to the two electoral tiers present in Germany's electoral system, I briefly outline the controls used in the tests conducted at the aggregate-level of the German system (chapter 6). *Mandate Type* captures whether the MP was elected on the list or the district tier. The more nuanced variable *Candidacy Mode* takes into account that there are four different ways through which a successful candidate could have

[84] Only 83 constituencies in these three countries remained unchanged. The 59 Scottish constituencies remained the same as in 2005, when they had undergone change.

run for and been elected into parliament (Manow 2013; Sieberer 2014). The MP 1) ran only on a list and won the list seat (*pure list MP*), 2) ran as dual candidate and won a list seat (*dual list MP*), 3) ran as dual candidate and won a district seat (*dual district MP*), 4) ran only in a district and won the district seat (*pure district MP*). The behavioural predictions surrounding these categories will be addressed in the empirical chapter focusing on the German electoral tiers (chapter 7).

Finally, I account for the fact that the party lists for Bundestag elections are drawn up and voted on at the state-level, and that different parties often have different list to district seat distributions across states. I therefore re-run the main models with dummy variables for the federal state in which the MP ran for parliament.

Chapter summary

In this chapter, I presented the empirical proxies used to test my behavioural model across the cases of the Bundestag and House of Commons. The main MP-level explanatory dimension – the degree to which an individual MP desires or depends on re-election – is operationalised through the individual's career background, following the argument that those MPs who have focused their entire professional lives on a career in politics should be most ambitious to retain their seat in parliament. The main outcome of interest – the degree to which an MP caters to the party or his- or her personal reputation – is captured by the extent to which the legislator votes against the party line in legislative votes. A variety of control variables has been introduced in order to isolate the effect of the core determinants of interest. In the next chapter, I conduct the study's main empirical analysis using these variables.

Chapter 6

Empirical Tests and Results Across German and UK MPs

The following chapter presents the empirical results for the study's main comparative hypotheses on the House of Commons and the Bundestag. The multilevel analysis covering 1.8 million legislative vote choices[1] made by 1700 MPs shows strong and robust evidence in support of the model's behavioural propositions: career politicians in the Bundestag are only about *half as likely* to vote against the party line than their non-career politician colleagues, while in the Commons, career politicians are up to *three times more likely* to deviate, other factors equal. The substantive impact of these highly significant effects is demonstrated through a variety of predicted probabilities. Moreover, the shown difference in differences is supported by additional variables capturing an MP's re-election ambition and holds across parties and legislative terms, as well as under different estimation methods.

6.1 Empirical Tests and Results

Choice of main estimation method

Given the binary character of the dependent variable *Deviating Vote* as well as the probabilistic nature of the hypotheses, a logistic regression represents an appropriate methodological option to estimate the likelihood of dissent. Beyond

[1] When taking only attended votes, the number decreases to about 1.3 million voting decisions.

the nature of the dependent variable, however, we must also consider the data structure when choosing the statistical instrument. Since a legislator's vote choices are nested at the MP-level, observations are clustered by MPs. This means that the vote choices of the same MP cannot be considered independent of one another. If this hierarchical data structure is not adequately dealt with, then the estimated effects likely become flawed by errors of non-independence, resulting in distorted standard errors and confidence intervals (Snyders and Boskers 2012).

I therefore use multilevel modelling as a technique designed to handle this kind of hierarchical data (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Snyders and Boskers 2012). In my case, this method is able to take into account the variation in vote choices made by each individual MP (i.e. the variation "within" each MP) as well as the variation between the MPs. Specifically, I estimate random-effects multilevel logistic models with MPs as upper-level units. This is necessary to hold constant the possibility that – apart from fixed effects such as the modelled MP-characteristics of the independent variables – random effects in the shape of un-modelled MP-specific factors are present. Furthermore, using multilevel models is a tried and tested method to estimate the individual likelihood of dissent, employed by previous studies of MP-level determinants of party loyalty in the two country cases and beyond (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer 2013).[2]

Estimating the models with MPs as upper-level units also represents a conservative and hard test, as this method in effect reduces the number of observations to the number of MPs (around 860 in the full models in each country case). As robustness checks, I run the models as simple logistic regressions with standard

[2]Given the relatively small percentage of dissenting votes cast in both country cases, I also considered the option of estimating the model using rare event analysis. However, the high number of observations means that such an estimation method is neither adequate nor required (King and Zeng 2001). Moreover, this method has not, to my knowledge, been used previously in analyses of legislative voting behaviour in parliamentary systems.

errors clustered by MPs and as fractional logit models (see section 6.4), both of which confirm the results. Moreover, an MP's party membership could be used as another level, given that MPs are nested within parties. In line with previous contributions working with similar data structures, however, I control for PPG membership in the shape of dummy variables instead. The small number of parties does not lend itself to being evaluated as a distinct level (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 62), but does at the same time make the inclusion of PPG dummy variables manageable (see Sieberer 2010, fn. 18). Overall, treating PPGs as categorical controls does not violate theoretical assumptions or empirical conditions and will achieve the desired effect of holding an MP's party affiliation constant.

Before running the models, we must test for multicollinearity between the independent variables to ensure that no highly correlated variables are included in the same model. In both country cases, the variables *Age* and *Term* (i.e. number of terms served in parliament) show moderate – and unsurprising – correlation (0.68 in the UK and 0.47 in Germany, both at $p < 0.01$). Furthermore, there exists some correlation between the variables *Term* and *Office* in both countries.[3] The German case also reveals correlation between the *Legislative Period* dummy and two variables pertaining to vote salience, namely *Closeness* and *Attendance*. This is due to the larger seat majority held by the governing coalition in the 16^{th} Bundestag term compared to the 17^{th}.[4] Beyond the simple correlation tests, I ran (multi-)collinearity diagnostics. The VIF indicator suggests that the used variables are robust to such checks. However, the simultaneous inclusion of the above variables approaches levels that warrant concern when the Condition Number is used as an indicator. In the estimation of the regression models,

[3] These lie above 0.5 for Germany. The variables are therefore not used in the same specifications.

[4] Note also that being a career politician and having a lower-earning outside career are, naturally, correlated with each other to a point where they cannot be included in the same model due to collinearity. The *Previous Income* variable is introduced separately into the model as part of a subsidiary test.

I deal with these correlations by introducing the concerned variables into the models separately. Finally, and as will be addressed in more detail as part of robustness checks (see section 6.4), the shown results are not driven by influential outliers.[5]

6.1.1 Results across all MPs

In the following discussion, it is at all times implied that the described effects occur with the remaining variables held constant, unless otherwise stated. These effects are estimated using the hierarchical regression models described above. For both the Bundestag and the House of Commons, the disaggregated data structure allows for the estimation of a large variety of specifications and subsets, the most instructive of which are presented here. I begin by addressing the results for all MPs across the two institutions before moving to the important subset of backbenchers. In a first step, the results are presented in the form of easily interpretable odds ratios (OR), where a value above one indicates a greater propensity to dissent against the party line[6] and a number below one denotes greater likelihood of loyalty. In a second step, I interpret the results through marginal effects, and discuss their substantive impact as well as their broader implications.

The core empirical result is that the main variable *Career* shows a large and highly significant effect on MP-level legislative voting behaviour in the direction expected within the two country cases: in the House of Commons, career politician MPs are significantly *more likely* to rebel against the party than their non-career politician peers (H1), while among Bundestag MPs they are considerably *less likely* to do so (H2). Figure 6.1 serves as an introductory illustration of this finding by showing the odds ratios of a career politician's likelihood to dissent compared to that of a

[5]Note also that one of the precise purposes of employing hierarchical models is to avoid heteroskedasticity, which would occur if clustered types of data were not accounted for.

[6]I use the terms "vote against the party line", "defect", "deviate", and "dissent" synonymously.




Figure 6.1: Odds ratios of a career politician defecting from party line compared to a non-career politician, based on all Bundestag (2005-2013) and all House of Commons (2005-2015) MPs. 95% confidence intervals. Based on regression output shown in tables 6.1 and 6.2.

non-career politician, as generated by four different model specifications run within each country case and shown in the regression output in tables 6.1 and 6.2. The empirical difference in differences across the two countries is illustrated by the fact that the odds ratios (and 95 per cent confidence intervals) of German career politicians consistently lie to the left (i.e. below) the 1-line, while those of UK career politicians remain to the right (i.e. above 1) for all specifications.

Next, I discuss in more detail the regression analysis at the basis of these results. Subsidiary and control variables are addressed in a later section. Starting with the Bundestag, table 6.1 shows that across all specifications, the likelihood of a career politician deviating from the party line is significantly lower than that of a non-career politician, at ORs between 0.55 and 0.63 (all at $p<0.01$). In other words, a Bundestag career politician is nearly only half as likely to dissent, all else equal.

Table 6.1: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, German Bundestag 2005-2013, all MPs

	Pooled data: German Bundestag 2005-2013, all MPs							
	A1: All MPs (with *Age*)		**A2: All MPs (with *Terms*)**		**A3: All MPs (*Candidacy*)**		**A4: MPs not standing down**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career								
Mixed	1.00	.11	0.98	.12	1.01	.11	1.05	.13
Career Politician	0.62***	.07	0.60***	.08	0.63***	.07	0.55***	.07
Local Politician	1.06	.10	1.00	.10	1.06	.10	-	-
Unsuccessful	0.94	.17	1.00	.19	0.96	.16	-	-
Age	0.97	.03	-	-	0.97	.03	0.96	.03
Age^2	1.00	.00	-	-	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Terms	-	-	0.85***	.02	-	-	-	-
Mandate Type	1.09	.10	1.09	.10	-	-	1.08	.11
Gender	0.97	.10	0.99	.11	0.94	.10	-	-
Standing Down	1.03	.08	0.93	.07	1.03	.08	-	-
Government	0.57***	.03	0.62***	.04	0.58***	.03	0.76***	.05
Attendance	-	-	1.02***	.00	-	-	1.02***	.00
Candidacy ref.: List Only								
Dual List	-	-	-	-	1.23	.18	-	-
Dual District	-	-	-	-	1.22	.21	-	-
District Only	-	-	-	-	1.76***	.38	-	-

(continued)

Table 6.1 continued

	Pooled data: German Bundestag 2005-2013, all MPs							
	A1: All MPs (with *Age*)		**A2: All MPs (with *Terms*)**		**A3: All MPs (*Candidacy*)**		**A4: MPs not standing down**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Office ref.: No office								
Office whole/part term	0.52***	.04	-	-	0.53***	.04	0.47***	.04
Office in past	0.96	.11	-	-	0.96	.11	1.04	.13
Subject ref.: Economy								
Foreign and EU	2.72***	.11	2.60***	.10	2.72***	.11	2.52***	.11
Other	1.81***	.07	1.94***	.08	1.81***	.07	1.89***	.08
Closeness ref.: Close								
Medium	-	-	2.31***	.25	-	-	2.10***	.24
Large	-	-	6.01***	.54	-	-	5.71***	.55
PPG ref.: CDU								
SPD	2.11***	.26	2.43***	.32	2.22***	.29	3.07***	.44
FDP	1.59***	.27	1.42***	.26	1.65***	.28	2.03***	.37
Linke	2.09***	.38	1.78***	.35	2.24***	.41	2.95***	.57
Grüne	3.53***	.63	3.37***	.64	3.62***	.65	4.89***	.95
CSU	1.72***	.35	2.07***	.45	1.58***	.32	2.45***	.55
Legislative Term	0.57***	.02	-	-	0.57***	.02	-	-
Constant	0.02***	.01	0.00***	.00	0.01***	.01	0.00***	.00
Voting Decisions N	236,173		236,173		236,173		197,097	
Groups (No. of MPs)	861		861		861		718	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	3,568***		3,936***		3,514***		2,859***	
Intraclass Correlation	.27		.31		.27		.26	
Log Likelihood	-20,045		-19,553		-20,042		-16,341	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Model A1 includes all Bundestag MPs as well as all MP-level controls with the exception of *Terms* (omitted due to its high correlation with *Age*). It also includes the *Legislative Term* dummy at the expense of the salience controls of *Closeness* and *Attendance* due to correlation. The model reveals that a career politician is significantly less likely to vote against the party line than a non-career politician (OR: 0.62, at $p<0.01$). Model A2 includes the previously omitted salience controls and substitutes the *Term* variable for *Age* and its squared term. As a check, it also excludes *Office* due to its correlation with *Term*, and to see if the results hold without controlling for an MP's backbench status. The odds ratio of a career politician dissenting remain very similar to Model A1, but we learn that MPs are less rebellious as they spend more time in parliament. This result will be discussed in more detail below.

Model A3 replicates A1 but includes the *Candidacy Mode* instead of the more simple *Mandate Type* (for a discussion see below). Odds ratios and significance levels remain very similar. Finally, model A4 limits the analysis to those MPs who did not stand down in the election following the term in which the vote took place. This reveals that among MPs who did not step down, career politicians are even more likely to be loyal (OR of 0.55, at $p>0.01$) than non-career politicians, again suggesting that electoral considerations play a role in MPs' party loyalty.[7]

Moving to the analysis of the UK case, table 6.2 confirms that among all MPs (i.e. front- and backbenchers) in the House of Commons, career politicians consistently are more likely to vote against the party line than non-career politicians, at odds ratios ranging from 1.51 to 1.68 and at highly statistically significant levels ($p<0.01$). This confirms hypothesis H1. Before moving to a more detailed

[7]These differences between career and non-career politicians become even greater (both in magnitude and significance) when excluding the party Die Linke from the analysis. As shown in section 6.4, this party is the only one for which the finding does not hold at the party-level.

model-by-model discussion, it should be mentioned that these odds ratios become even more substantive when we consider only backbenchers. I show and discuss the results for this important sub-group below (see table 6.4).

As was the case for Model A1 of the German data, B1 for the UK does not include *Term*, omitted due to its correlation with *Age*. Moreover – and as for A2 for the Bundestag – B1 does not control for the MP's backbench status in order to underscore the effect of this control when introduced in the subsequent models. The model shows that the odds of a career politician dissenting are nearly 1.7 times the odds of a non-career politician doing so, at a highly significant level ($p>0.01$). Model B2 then includes *Term* instead of *Age* and introduces the *Office* control. This reveals an odds ratio of 1.51 (at $p<0.01$) for a career politician to defect. While the magnitude of effect therefore remains largely similar, the inclusion of *Office* slightly lowers the odds ratio's standard error (see also the tighter confidence interval for the second and third UK odds ratio in figure 6.1), confirming the importance of considering an MP's backbench status in the UK context (see next section).

Model B3 replicates B1 but includes the UK-specific controls pertaining to boundary changes and the expenses scandal[8] (as well as the *Office* control). The inclusion of these UK-specific factors do not impact the main variables, and the slight decrease in the career politician odds ratio (to 1.55) compared to B1 is due to the inclusion of *Office*. Finally, specification B4 considers only the subset of MPs who did not stand down after the term. The career politician odds ratios remain consistent with those estimated for all MPs.

[8] I control for the degree of boundary changes (measured by the *index of changes*, see section 5.3) that the MP's constituency has experienced, and whether the MP was found guilty by the Legg enquiry conducted after the expenses scandal. The results of the main variables remain unaffected when using other operationalisations of scandal implication (see footnote 81 in chapter 5) or a binary variable indicating whether an MP's constituency boundary changed or not.

Table 6.2: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, UK House of Commons 2005-2015, all MPs

	Pooled data: UK House of Commons 2005-2015, all MPs							
	B1: All MPs (with *Age*)		**B2: All MPs (with *Terms*)**		**B3: All MPs (UK controls†)**		**B4: MPs not standing down**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career								
Mixed	1.33**	.17	1.33***	.14	1.33***	.14	1.44**	.20
Career Politician	1.68***	.26	1.51***	.19	1.55***	.20	1.56***	.26
Local Politician	1.29**	.15	1.21**	.11	1.18*	.11	1.21	.15
Unsuccessful	1.36**	.20	1.27**	.15	1.24*	.15	1.24	.20
Age	0.89***	.03	-	-	0.95	.03	0.90**	.04
Age^2	1.00***	.00	-	-	1.00**	.00	1.00***	.00
Terms	-	-	1.13***	.03	-	-	-	-
Margin	0.99***	.00	0.99*	.00	0.99	.00	0.99***	.00
Gender	1.66***	.23	1.31***	.16	1.42***	.16	1.77***	.26
Standing Down	0.73***	.05	0.72***	.05	0.74***	.05	-	-
Government	2.70***	.09	2.16***	.07	2.14***	.07	2.70***	.10
Attendance	0.99***	.00	0.99***	.00	0.99***	.00	0.99***	.00
Subject ref.: Economy								
Foreign and EU	3.70***	.14	3.71***	.14	3.71***	.14	3.66***	.15
Other	2.54***	.08	2.54***	.08	2.54***	.08	2.48***	.08

(continued)

Table 6.2 continued

	Pooled data: UK House of Commons 2005-2015, all MPs							
	B1: All MPs (with *Age*)		**B2: All MPs (with *Terms*)**		**B3: All MPs (UK controls†)**		**B4: MPs not standing down**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Office ref.: No office								
Office whole term	-	-	0.12***	.01	0.13***	.02	-	-
Office part term	-	-	0.63***	.07	0.69***	.07	-	-
Office in past	-	-	0.20***	.02	0.21***	.02	-	-
Closeness ref.: Close								
Medium	0.16***	.00	0.16***	.00	0.16***	.00	0.17***	.01
Large	0.44***	.01	0.44***	.01	0.44***	.01	0.48***	.01
PPG ref.: Conservatives								
LibDem	1.59**	.31	2.55***	.41	2.57***	.42	1.51**	.31
Labour	0.50***	.07	0.68***	.07	0.68***	.08	0.51***	.07
Legislative Term	1.67***	.05	1.16***	.04	1.29***	.05	1.66***	.06
Constant	0.03***	.03	0.01***	.00	0.04***	.03	0.02***	.02
Voting Decisions N	1,056,857		1,056,857		1,056,857		882,834	
Groups (No. of MPs)	864		864		864		722	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	16,884***		10,370***		9,923***		13,671***	
Intraclass Correlation	.38		.28		.28		.38	
Log Likelihood	-43,040		-42,766		-42,765		-35,340	

† Controls related to boundary changes and expenses scandal included but not reported.

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

[a]MPs not holding office in term of vote.

Finally, the results for MPs from the mixed career background category must briefly be addressed. These MPs have had both non-political and political pre-parliamentary careers. On the one hand, such individuals have not focused their entire lives on politics and possess, on average, a more plausible exit option. On the other hand, they have displayed some professional focus on politics and therefore may be eager to remain in this field. The behavioural expectation is that MPs with mixed career backgrounds should, on average, lie between career and non-career politicians in terms of their incentives and vote-seeking behaviour. The results presented here support this expectation in both country cases. These findings suggest that an MP's desire for re-election could indeed be seen on a more linear scale, as suggested in the first part of my theoretical framework.

In sum, the regressions for all MPs of the two country cases convincingly demonstrate that the behavioural effect of being a career politician on the likelihood of voting against the party line goes in the opposite direction in the UK and Germany. The magnitude of this effect is similar in both countries, as well as statistically highly significant and consistent across specifications. The results therefore support the study's core within-system cross-national prediction. Before discussing substantive effects with the aid of predicted probabilities, I show and discuss the results for a subsets of legislators of particular interest, namely backbenchers.

6.1.2 Results for backbenchers

As has been shown during the presentation of the control variables, we observe higher levels of dissent (as well as greater variation) among backbenchers than among frontbenchers in both institutions. One explanation for this is that front-bench MPs are more involved in the formulation of policy, and are expected to be

role-models in terms of party loyalty. In the House of Commons, moreover, the concept of "cabinet collective responsibility" formally prescribes, as set out in the Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office 2010), that members of the government frontbench must resign their post before voting against the party. Since a substantial portion of MPs belong to the frontbench (see footnote 72 in chapter 5), and since this norm implicitly applies also to opposition frontbenchers, this provision significantly limits the manoeuvring space of a number of UK MPs.[9]

To take this provision into account, I test my theory for the subset of MPs who did not hold a frontbench position during the given parliamentary term.[10] This step is consistent with the existing literature, as focusing the empirical analysis on those MP who are able to vote against the party line is the prevalent approach in previous MP-level contributions on "backbench dissent" in the House of Commons (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Cowley and Childs 2003; Kam 2009). Since I remove the MPs who are formally constrained in their voting behaviour, I expect that the use of dissent as a vote-seeking tool should be particularly visible among backbench MPs (see also Kam 2009). Translated to my behavioural model, the difference between career and non-career politicians should thus be even more pronounced among backbenchers than among all MPs.

To enhance comparability, I also consider the behaviour among German backbenchers. Frontbenchers in the Bundestag are not formally constrained in their legislative voting behaviour, so I do not expect a significant change to the difference between career and non-career politicians found among all German MPs (see table 6.1). Even among frontbenchers, those most ambitious to get re-elected should

[9] Moreover, and concerning our theory, frontbenchers can already rely on their position to enhance name recognition (e.g. Martin 2014). Backbenchers are less likely to be well known, and should therefore have a greater incentive to use dissent as a vote-seeking tool.

[10] Note that my data shows that neither in the House of Commons nor in the Bundestag are career politicians significantly more or less likely to hold a frontbench position than other MPs.

Table 6.3: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, German Bundestag 2005-2013, backbenchers only

	Pooled data: Bundestag (2005-2013), by backbencher type					
	A5: All back-benchers[a]		**A6: Gov. back-benchers**[b]		**A7: Pure back-benchers**[c]	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career (ref.: Non-Career)						
Mixed	1.11	.14	1.04	.20	1.15	.15
Career Politician	0.63***	.09	0.59***	.12	0.66***	.09
Local Politician	1.06	.12	1.08	.17	1.04	.12
Unsuccessful	0.97	.19	1.01	.33	0.94	.20
Age	0.97	.04	0.96	.06	0.98	.04
Age^2	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Mandate Type	0.99	.10	0.69***	.11	0.89	.10
Gender	1.02	.12	1.07	.20	1.00	.12
Standing Down	0.87	.09	0.85	.13	0.85	.09
Government	0.92	.06	-	-	0.98	.07
Office in the past	1.12	.16	1.12	.35	-	-
Subject (ref.: Economy)						
Foreign and EU	2.69***	.12	1.58***	.10	2.64***	.12
Other	1.89***	.08	1.53***	.09	1.91**	.09
Closeness (ref.: Close)						
Medium	2.27***	.27	1.20	.17	2.11***	.26
Large	5.97***	.59	1.57***	0.18	5.46***	.55
Attendance	1.02***	.00	1.02***	.00	1.02***	.00
PPG dummies[†]						
Constant	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00
Observations (n)	171,299		104,017		159,079	
Groups (No. of MPs)	699		477		638	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	3,056***		1,955***		2,614***	
Intraclass Correlation	.31		.37		.28	
Log Likelihood	-15,731		-7,878		-14,324	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
[a]MPs not holding office in term of vote. [b]Government MPs not holding office in term of vote. [c]MPs who have never held office. [†]PPG controls included but not reported.

behave most loyally, even if the overall level of their loyalty or dissent is likely to be lower than that of backbenchers.

Table 6.3 confirms this empirically for the case of Germany. Model A5, which considers all backbenchers (i.e. those legislators who did not hold a frontbench position in the given term) reveals that the odds ratios of a career vs. a non-politician dissenting remain stable at 0.63 (at $p<0.01$) compared to the model including all MPs. The same applies to government backbenchers (see model A7, OR: 0.59, at $p<0.01$) and pure backbenchers (i.e. backbenchers who have never held a frontbench position), with an OR of 0.66 (at $p<0.01$; see model A8).[11] Predicted probabilities in a subsequent section, however, will demonstrate that backbenchers overall are more likely to dissent than frontbenchers, while the differences between career and non-career politicians remain similar.

Table 6.4 shows the regression results for UK backbenchers. As expected, the difference between the propensity for career and non-career politicians to defect from the party line becomes even more pronounced, compared to the results for all UK MPs shown above. Among all backbenchers (B5) and among government backbenchers (B6), the odds ratios of a career politician defecting compared to a non-career politician increase to around 1.7 and 1.95 respectively, at highly statistically significant levels ($p<0.01$). This difference between career and non-career politicians becomes even more considerable when analysing only pure backbenchers (i.e. backbenchers who have never held a frontbench position), as the odds of the former dissenting are over three times the odds of the latter doing so (B7 and B8). I return to the substantive impact of this difference when presenting and discussing marginal effects.

[11] Since I also have data on whether a Bundestag MP belonged to the frontbench at the time of the observation (i.e. vote choice), I re-run the models with this more precise variable. As expected, the results remain very similar.

Table 6.4: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, UK House of Commons 2005-2015, backbenchers

	Pooled data: UK House of Commons 2005-2015, by backbencher type							
	B5: All back-benchers[a]		**B6: Gov. back-benchers**[b]		**B7: Pure back-benchers**[c]		**B8: Pure back-benchers**[c]	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career								
Mixed	1.53**	.25	1.49*	.31	1.56*	.39	1.38	.35
Career Politician	1.78***	.35	1.95***	.47	3.90***	1.12	3.19***	.99
Local Politician	1.01	.15	1.02	.19	0.77	.17	0.86	.19
Unsuccessful	1.65***	.29	1.76***	.38	1.46	.40	1.65*	.45
Age	0.93	.05	-	-	1.20**	.09	-	-
Age^2	1.00	.00	-	-	0.99**	.00	-	-
Terms	-	-	1.14***	.06	-	-	1.48***	.08
Margin	1.00***	.00	1.00	.00	0.99***	.00	0.99**	.00
Gender	1.11	.21	1.16	.29	1.69*	.45	1.16	.32
Standing Down	0.90	.08	0.72	.15	0.75**	.10	0.85	.12
Government	2.95***	.12	-	-	5.38***	.40	4.90***	.35
Attendance	0.99***	.00	0.99***	.00	0.99***	.00	0.99***	.00
Office ref.: No office								
Office in past	0.73**	.11	0.45***	.10	-	-	-	-

(continued)

Table 6.4 continued

	Pooled data: UK House of Commons 2005-2015, by backbencher type							
	B5: All back-benchers[a]		**B6: Gov. back-benchers**[b]		**B7: Pure back-benchers**[c]		**B8: Pure back-benchers**[c]	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Subject ref.: Economy								
Foreign and EU	4.22***	.17	4.65***	.20	4.70***	.24	4.68***	.24
Other	2.52***	.08	2.38***	.08	2.40***	.10	2.39***	.10
Closeness ref.: Close								
Medium	0.14***	.00	0.11***	.00	0.12***	.00	0.12***	.00
Large	0.40***	.01	0.26***	.01	0.35***	.01	0.35***	.01
PPG ref.: Conservatives								
LibDem	2.60***	.75	3.22***	1.21	1.66	.99	2.66	1.60
Labour	0.78	.13	0.73	.15	1.21	.37	0.56**	.14
Legislative Term	-	-	-	-	1.87***	.14	-	-
Constant	0.05***	.07	0.02***	.01	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00
Voting Decisions N	425,261		283,123		200,691		200,691	
Groups (No. of MPs)	418		325		199		199	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	9,966***		9,734***		5,922***		5,836***	
Intraclass Correlation	.34		.40		.36		.37	
Log Likelihood	-32,265		-25,530		-17,824		-17,837	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
[a]MPs not holding office in term of vote. [b]Government MPs not holding office in term of vote. [c]MPs who have never held office.

Finally, the importance of considering the backbench status of a UK MP is further illustrated by the fact that the inclusion of the *Office* control in the UK models covering all MPs (table 6.2) narrows the confidence intervals (i.e. lowers the standard errors) of the OR of the main variable of interest, *Career*. This is not the case in the Bundestag models (see table 6.1), which provides some evidence for the expectation and previous observation that Bundestag frontbenchers are less restricted in their voting behaviour (see figure 5.6 in chapter 5).

6.2 Results for Subsidiary and Control Variables

6.2.1 Additional variables capturing re-election ambition

Attractiveness of outside option

I re-ran the main regression models substituting the *Career* variable with *Previous Income*. This variable was operationalised as a subsidiary test to capture the attractiveness of an MP's previous career. The results support the theoretical predictions: in the UK, incumbents with a higher-earning previous career are less likely to vote against the party than those with a lower-earning career, while the opposite effect is found among Bundestag MPs.

Figure 6.2 shows the respective odds ratios. These are based on different specifications including a replication of the study's main models (see regression output in tables A2 and A3 in the appendix).[12] The effect of the *Previous Income* variable is substantive and statistically significant, as well as in the opposite direction across

[12]Models C1 and D1 for each country are based on a parsimonious model in which I control only for government status, party and legislative term. C2 and D2 augment this by including the *Office* control. C3 and D3 are a replication of the full model for each country case, with *Previous Income* substituted for *Career* (based on A1 for the Bundestag and on B1 for the House of Commons).




Figure 6.2: Odds ratios of MP with lower-income career deviating, compared to MP with higher income, based on all Bundestag (2005-2013) and all House of Commons (2005-2015) MPs. 95% C.I. For model descriptions see footnote 12.

the two institutions: a German MP with a previously lower income is significantly *less* likely to defect compared to a higher-earning MP (ORs around 0.75 at $p<0.05$ in all three models), while a lower-earning UK MP is significantly more likely to defect than his or her colleague with a higher previous income (ORs between 1.24 and 1.47, at $p<0.05$ and $p<0.01$). Even though the effects are not particularly large, this subsidiary test – and particularly the fact that the effect is in the opposite direction in the two countries[13] – provides more evidence for the proposal that those MPs who likely have the greatest incentives to remain in parliament should engage in more party-centric behaviour in the context of the Bundestag, and should behave more individualistically within the UK system to increase re-election chances.

[13]The opposing direction of effect between the country cases also holds for each legislative term separately and when considering only backbenchers. Among this subgroup, the variable retains statistical significance in all cases except when re-running model D3 for backbenchers only.

Previous attempts at entering parliament

The *Unsuccessful* variable accounts for the notion that having repeatedly attempted to enter parliament signifies, at least in part, a strong attachment to the mandate once election is achieved (see section 5.2.4 and King 1981). The regression results partly confirm the related expectations. Across all models for the UK case (see tables 6.2 and 6.4), having run unsuccessfully more than once is associated with a considerably higher likelihood of defection. Odds ratios vary between 1.24 and 1.65, and reach statistical significance in the majority of specifications. Moreover, the effect is particularly pronounced among backbenchers (table 6.4). Although not shown in the models, these results also hold when the *Career* variable is excluded. For the Bundestag, the odds ratios remain below or around one, but are statistically insignificant.

Local politician background

The results for *Local Politician* – used as a further proxy for re-election ambition – partly confirm the expectations. When considering all UK MPs (table 6.2), having been a local politician is associated with an increased likelihood of dissent. However, this effect largely disappears when looking only at backbenchers. One likely reason is that the very strong effect of being a career politician on party loyalty overrides this weaker proxy for re-election ambition. In the German case, the variable shows little effect. However, it has some impact in the tests pertaining to the two electoral tiers. I therefore return to this variable in chapter 7.

Length of tenure

Another interesting finding pertains to the number of terms served in parliament. I argued above (section 5.2.4) that the time spent in parliament can, in part,

be seen as a measure of an MP's commitment to a career in politics, and as a discount factor concerning the availability of the MP's previous occupation. In line with the study's theory – and while aware of a variety of potential links between seniority and voting behaviour – I proposed that as an incumbent commits, with growing tenure, more and more to a career in politics, he or she should be more likely to engage in (but also to have the most experience with) the most conducive re-election strategy. This expectation is borne out by the data, as length of tenure increases the likelihood of dissent in the House of Commons while decreasing it among Bundestag MPs. As argued above, the fact that MPs in both systems are exposed to very similar norms and expectations of loyalty strengthens the idea that this diametrically opposed result for the two country cases is, at least in part, a result of the different re-election strategies generated by the electoral rules.

Parliamentary sessions and the electoral cycle

I also consider the electoral cycle by accounting for the *session* (i.e. year) of the parliamentary term in which a given vote took place. In a first step, I re-ran the above models for the Bundestag and the House of Commons controlling for *session*. The estimates for the main variables of interest remain very similar.[14] In a second step, I ran the models by parliamentary session. An analysis of these temporal subsets serves two purposes: first, it functions as a robustness check to ensure that the demonstrated differences-in-differences observed across the two country cases are consistent across parliamentary sessions.

Second, they allow me to check for potential effects resulting from the electoral cycle. In line with the theoretical framework, and as indicated in the operationalisation of this control in section 5.3, I expect German career politicians to become

[14]The models are not shown, given that I report the results from the session-by-session subsets.

more loyal compared to their non-career politician peers as the election approaches, while the opposite should hold in the UK. In the German case, the third and fourth legislative terms are the times when the list re-nomination procedures take place, meaning that an MP particularly eager to get re-elected (i.e. to obtain a high list position and/or dual candidacy) should have the greatest incentive to remain loyal during this time. In the UK, on the other hand, an MP should be more likely to advertise his or her independent-mindedness as the election draws closer.




Figure 6.3: Odds ratios of career politician defecting, compared to non-career politician. By parliamentary session, Bundestag 2005-2013. 95% C.I.

Figures 6.3 and 6.4, for the Bundestag and the House of Commons respectively, show the odds of a career politician voting against the party line compared to the odds of a non-career politician doing so, by parliamentary session. For the Bundestag, Model A1 is used as the basis for the calculation of the odds ratios, meaning all German MPs are included. For the UK, I use the subset of pure backbenchers (Model B7). When all UK MPs (B1) are used, the patterns by session

are very similar (not shown). It should also be noted that, while I do control for *Legislative Term* in the pooled models, the patterns in both institutions also hold when estimated for each parliamentary term separately.




Figure 6.4: Odds ratios of pure backbench career politician defecting compared to non-career politician. By parliamentary session, Commons 2005-2015. 95% C.I.

Figures 6.3 and 6.4 confirm the differential behavioural expectations. In the Bundestag, career politicians become more loyal compared to non-career politicians as election and re-nomination draws closer. Among UK backbenchers,[15] on the other hand, career politicians are around two-and-a-half times more likely to dissent than non-career politicians in the early part of the parliamentary term, while in the later sessions, these odds ratios approach or even eclipse five.[16] The

[15]The Fixed-term Parliaments Act had not taken effect in the 2005-10 term, meaning that elections could, theory, happen at any given point. In fact, it was thought that Gordon Brown might call an election, which may explain the large jump observed in the third year of the 2005-10 term: when all MPs are considered, the odds ratios for career politicians climb from 1.35 to 1.53 to 2.04 in the first three sessions, peaking in this third year.

[16]The wider confidence intervals in the depicted UK model are of course due to the fact that I only consider the subset of pure backbench MPs, restricted also to a single session at a time.

session-by-session findings thus suggest that MPs in both institutions engage in the most beneficial strategy as the election nears, providing additional indication that electoral considerations influence the observed MP behaviour. Moreover, the tests again illustrate the merit of the study's within-system cross-country design, seeing as a simple observation of aggregate-level unity rates per session could not account for session-specific factors.[17]

6.2.2 Further control variables

Before conducting a series of robustness checks, the results for a number of control variables merit closer discussion. I begin by focusing on MP-level controls before considering vote-level variables. In the House of Commons, an MP who was *Standing Down* after the given term is significantly less likely to vote against the party line. The majority of odds ratios among all MPs and among backbenchers lie at around 0.75 and are highly statistically significant. This lends some support to the expectation that UK MPs employ dissent as a vote-seeking tool, making the finding consistent with the theory's overall expectations for the UK case (e.g. Kam 2009). In Germany, where a personal vote is assumed to be much less beneficial, there is no statistically significant effect.

The results for the *Margin* control are in line with previous findings on a personal vote in the UK (e.g. Bowler 2010; Kellermann 2013; Kellermann 2016), and suggest that UK MPs employ dissent as a personal-vote tool for electoral reasons. The majority of specifications in tables 6.2 and 6.4 show that the smaller a UK MP's margin of victory in his or her constituency, the more likely the legislator is to vote against the party line. As will be shown and discussed in chapter 7 below, the same direction of effect is observed (at statistically significant levels) for German district

[17] For example, unity within a governing party or coalition may become weaker as term goes on.

MPs, indicating that directly elected Bundestag MPs do react to the moderate personal-vote incentives for electoral reasons.

An MP's *Gender* is found to affect the propensity to vote against the party line in the UK context, where male MPs are more likely to dissent from the party line, particularly when all MPs are considered (table 6.2).[18] Such an effect generally is not discernible among Bundestag MPs. Although these findings – as well as the difference between the countries – are indeed very interesting, a more detailed discussion and analysis must be left to future studies (see also Cowley and Childs 2003). An MP's *Age* has no effect on party loyalty among Bundestag MPs. For UK MPs, this variable becomes significant only when the *Office* variable is excluded. Although the two variables are not highly correlated, *Age* appears to be capturing an MP's seniority in the case of the House of Commons.

As expected for both institutions, German and UK MPs who hold office for the whole or part of the term are significantly less likely to vote against the party line than backbenchers. In particular in the UK, with its concept of the payroll vote, the probability of an MP who held office at some point during the term voting against the party line is only a fraction of the probability of a backbencher doing so. Contrary to previous theoretical suggestions and popular beliefs – as well as empirical findings on a more limited sample of MPs (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Cowley 2005; Kam 2006) – I do not find demoted legislators (i.e. those who once held office but do not any longer) to be more rebellious. In fact, demoted UK MPs are found to be less likely to vote against the party line than backbenchers who have never held any office, while no difference is found among German MPs.

[18] For UK backbenchers, this effect is only substantive and significant among pure backbenchers and when controlling for age.

Results for *Government* in the UK context align with previous theories and findings (e.g. Dewan and Spirling 2011), as MPs who are members of the governing party are significantly more likely to deviate. This result holds for all MPs as well as backbenchers. The majority of the specifications for Bundestag MPs indicate the opposite effect at statistically significant levels. While a variety of reasons may explain the greater or lower propensity for government MPs to vote against the party line, these opposing results for the Bundestag and House of Commons reflect my behavioural model.

Given that dissent is most publicised – but also most damaging to the party label – when a legislator votes against his or her own government, UK government MPs seeking to cultivate a personal vote may be particularly inclined to do so given the high visibility of their dissent. In the Bundestag, on the other hand, the party-centric behaviour should be especially important to and valued by the governing party leadership, seeing as a lost or unnecessarily close legislative vote would have far greater consequences for a governing party than for an opposition party (which, given their lower seat share, would usually expect to lose a vote in any case). Hence, while voting against your own government in the UK may be seen as particularly useful to display independent-mindedness and courage to the voter, the especially strong value placed on unity by the governing party in the Bundestag should lead to greater party-centric incentives.

These proposals find further empirical support when running the regressions only for government MPs, thereby conducting the difference-in-differences test between MPs with high and low re-election ambitions across government and opposition. Among German government MPs, the level at which career politicians are more likely to dissent than non-career politicians is lower than that level for all German

MPs (ORs of 0.55 for government MPs only against 0.62 for all MPs, both at $p<0.01$). Among UK government MPs, meanwhile, these odds ratios lie at 1.77, compared to 1.55 for all MPs (both at $p<0.01$).[19]

Moreover, these findings tie in well with the controls pertaining to a vote's salience. In the House of Commons, MPs are most likely to defect in close votes (*Closeness*),[20] while German MPs are more likely to defy the whips in votes that end up being passed with a large majority. This reflects my theoretical model, as a more salient vote – and one in which unity is particularly important to the party leadership – might provide a more conducive platform for UK MPs to cultivate a personal vote (e.g. Kam 2009; Pattie, Fieldhouse, and Johnston 1994). The party leadership in the Bundestag, meanwhile, is likely to place a particularly high premium on loyalty in these votes. MPs should therefore be especially wary of upsetting the party, while a demonstration of party-centric behaviour should be especially welcome.

The vote-level variable *Subject* shows very similar patterns in both countries, as MPs tend to be most rebellious in votes on foreign policy and the EU. This comes as little surprise, given that foreign policy issues concerning military deployment or aid, as well as votes pertaining to the EU or the Euro are often among the more contentious pieces of legislation in both institutions. The finding that, in both countries, votes on the economy provoke the least disunity also appears intuitive given that positions on economic policy usually form the ideological core of a party, with MPs expected to be most homogeneous on these issues.

[19] The regressions are based on models A1 and B1 (with the *Office* control) respectively. Regression results not shown.

[20] To be sure, some endogeneity is likely to be present: the more MPs deviate, the smaller the margin is likely to get.

I re-ran the main Bundestag models with a dummy variable for the federal state in which an MP ran. This accounts for the fact that party lists are drawn up and MPs are elected at the state-level, and that different parties may have different list/district seat distributions across states. The inclusion of this dummy does not impact the results (regressions not shown). Finally, the results for the controls pertaining to the German electoral tiers (*Mandate Type* and *Candidacy Mode*) are revisited and discussed in chapter 7.

6.3 Substantive Effects and Predicted Probabilities

6.3.1 Predicted probabilities

The above results, together with the relevant robustness checks conducted below, show convincing evidence for the direction and statistical significance of the effects advanced by the study's hypotheses. These were designed to demonstrate that the predicted link between electoral systems and legislative behaviour becomes visible at the micro-level when considering that an MP's type and intensity of vote-seeking efforts should also be influenced by the individual's level of re-election ambition.

More specifically, we now have some evidence that career politicians operating within the UK electoral rules are more likely to act personalistically in their legislative voting behaviour than their non-career politician peers, while the opposite is observed among Bundestag MPs. We also know the magnitude of these effects, and that they are statistically significant across a variety of specifications. This section addresses the final dimension of any statistical effect, namely the degree to which it has a substantive (or "real-life") impact. To this end, I estimate predicted probabilities of various MP types voting against the party line. For reasons of space, I show a

selection of these marginal effects for the most instructive sets of MP (and vote) characteristics only. However, across the wide variety of possible MP sub-groups, a career politician in the Bundestag remains always less likely to vote against the party line than a non-career politician colleague, while the opposite is consistently the case among House of Commons MPs.




Figure 6.5: Predicted probabilities of dissent for Bundestag career and non-career politicians, among different MP groups. Groups indicated in graph titles. Other MP characteristics at mean. 95% C.I.

Beginning with Bundestag MPs, figures 6.5 and 6.6 show predicted probabilities of a career and non-career politician legislator dissenting from the party line, across the indicated MP subgroups and with all other MP characteristics held at their means.[21] Even though the marginal effects are reported as predicted probabilities (i.e. as a fraction of 100), I discuss these in their more intuitive characteristic of an

[21] Across the specifications, the categorical variable *Closeness* is held at its modal value (3), which includes over three quarters of all legislative votes. Furthermore, in order to consider the most salient votes (i.e. those in which unity should be most important to the party leadership, for similar approaches see Carey 2007; Olivella and Tavits 2014; Snyder and Groseclose 2000), I set the attendance rate to one standard deviation above its average (587). Using the average attendance rate slightly lowers the overall probabilities of dissent but does not change the relative predicted differences between career and non-career politicians or their statistical significance.

MP's percentage of vote choices in which the individual deviated from the party line. Across all MPs, and with all MP-characteristics held at their means, a career and a non-career politician are predicted to dissent in 2.0 and 3.2 per cent of legislative votes respectively (figure 6.5 A).[22] The relative difference between the MPs increases slightly when considering only those MPs who did not step down after the given term,[23] as the respective percentages of dissent lie at 1.7 and 3.1 respectively (see figure 6.5 B).




Figure 6.6: Predicted probabilities of dissent for Bundestag career and non-career politicians, among subsets of backbenchers and opposition MPs. Groups indicated in graph titles. Other MP characteristics at mean. 95% C.I.

Figure 6.6 considers additional MP subsets. Looking only at backbenchers (while keeping all other MP characteristics at their means) reveals that German backbenchers overall display, as expected, a slightly higher likelihood of dissent than all MPs (6.5 A). Among backbenchers, career politicians are now predicted to dissent in 2.4 per cent of votes and non-career politicians in 3.6 (see 6.6 A). I will return to

[22] Calculation based on Model A2 in table 6.1. Results are very similar when A1 or A3 are used.
[23] Based on Model A4 in table 6.1.

this observation when considering backbenchers in the House of Commons below. Finally, 6.6 B considers only opposition MPs, as it has been argued above that the pressure for these MPs to act in a party-centric manner may be less severe than for government MPs. This is reflected in the increase in overall probability of dissent compared to all MPs. At the same time, the difference between career and non-career politicians persists (2.6 against 4.1 per cent respectively). All of these predicted differences between career and non-career politicians are highly statistically significant (the confidence intervals do not overlap).

Before I discuss the substantive meaning of the predicted levels of dissent, I show the marginal effects for UK MPs. Seeing as frontbenchers in the House of Commons are severely restricted in their voting behaviour due to the norm of the payroll vote (see above), the illustration of marginal effects follows previous MP-level studies of legislative voting behaviour in focusing on backbenchers (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Cowley and Childs 2003; Kam 2009).

Figure 6.7 shows predicted probabilities of dissent among all UK backbenchers and among government backbenchers only, by career and non-career politician (all other MP characteristics at their means).[24] Among all UK backbenchers (i.e. MPs who did not hold office in the term of the vote),[25] a career politician is predicted to dissent in 2.7 per cent of votes against 1.6 for a non-career politician (6.7 A). When considering only backbenchers belonging to the governing party (6.7 B),[26] both the relative differences as well as the absolute predicted percentage of deviating votes rise to 4.0 and 2.0 per cent respectively.

[24] To enhance comparability of the aggregate-level party unity with the German case, I again hold the categorical variables *Closeness* at 3.

[25] Marginal effects based on model B5 from table 6.4.

[26] Calculation based on model B6 from table 6.4.




Figure 6.7: Predicted probabilities of dissent for House of Commons career and non-career politicians, all backbenchers. MP sub-groups indicated in graph titles. Other MP characteristics at mean. 95% C.I.

This predicted difference between career and non-career politicians becomes even more substantive when only pure backbenchers are considered (figure 6.8). To ensure that only the characteristic of being a career or non-career politician impacts the predicted probability, I now also set all vote-level controls to their means.[27] Among pure backbenchers, career politicians are predicted to dissent in 3.5 per cent of votes against 1.0 per cent for non-career politicians.[28] When considering only government backbenchers – the group receiving most attention in studies on party loyalty in the House of Commons (e.g. Benedetto and Hix 2007; Cowley 2005; Cowley and Childs 2003) – this climbs to 5.3 and 1.4 per cent respectively. Again, these differences are highly statistically significant. The figures shown on top of the bars represent predicted absolute numbers of deviating votes, to be discussed in the next section.

[27]Calculations based on model B7 from table 6.4. Instead of holding *Closeness* at 3, each of these categories is now entered as a dummy and held at its mean.

[28]Note that if *Closeness* was to be held at 3, as was the case in the predicted probabilities calculated for all backbenchers, then these percentages would be higher.




Figure 6.8: Predicted probabilities of dissent for House of Commons career and non-career politicians, pure backbenchers. MP sub-groups indicated in graph titles. Other MP characteristics at mean. 95% C.I. (B) also indicates predicted number of dissenting votes.

Finally, and as an alternative control for a vote's salience, I consider the probability of dissent of pure backbenchers in the 1206 divisions (of a total of 2449) across the two House of Commons terms that saw at least one MP vote against the party line (regression output not shown). The resulting predicted probabilities as well as the difference between the two MP groups of interest become even more pronounced (see figure 6.9), as a career politician is predicted to dissent in 9.1 per cent of votes, against 2.8 for a non-career politician.

In sum, the marginal effects shown for the two country cases again confirm that the impact of being a career politician compared to a non-career politician, in terms of the probability of voting against the party line, is reversed for MPs operating in the UK and German electoral systems. Moreover, a comparison between the predicted probabilities of German and UK MPs reveal that the absolute percentages of dissent between the two countries are largely similar, once we take into account




Figure 6.9: Predicted probabilities of dissent for House of Commons career and non-career politicians, pure backbenchers. Includes only divisions in which at least one MP rebelled. MP characteristics at mean. 95% C.I.

only those UK MPs who actually can vote against the party line, i.e. backbenchers. This observation again speaks to the criticism of comparing aggregate-level unity rates across systems without taking into account country-specific factors such as the convention of cabinet collective responsibility.[29]

6.3.2 Substantiveness of the effects

Finally, we must address the substantive meaning of these marginal effects. In absolute terms, the predicted percentages are, of course, small values (and hence small differences) that reflect the highly unified environments of the two institutions. As previously argued by studies of parliamentary systems (e.g. Coman 2012; Kam 2009; Tavits 2009; Vivyan and Wagner 2012), however, even numerically small effects on voting behaviour must be considered substantive in these highly

[29]See also the question of whether this norm may to some degree be endogenous to the country's electoral rules (see chapter 5 above).

disciplined settings; the generally high levels of unity in parliamentary systems mean that a deviating vote becomes very noticeable, amplifying the visibility and severity of dissent. As a result, breaking the party line in a roll-call is usually seen as the ultimate expression of individualistic behaviour (see Proksch and Slapin 2015, 26), not least due to the importance the PPG leadership attaches to unity, as well as the considerable media coverage that often accompanies rebellion in legislative votes (e.g. Eilfort 2003; Kam 2009; Rossmann 2015). Moreover, governments rely on a healthy majority of votes, with significant consequences if a roll-call is lost.

Most importantly, however, the main empirical interest of this study lies in the *relative* behavioural difference between MPs with low and high re-election ambitions. The magnitude of the aggregate-level degree of dissent is hence secondary to the shown differences between MP types, all of whom operate in a highly unified environment that must be considered as given (see also Coman 2012, 214). Nonetheless, it is instructive to assess the substantive magnitude of the levels of dissent displayed by the MP groups of interest. To this end, I have calculated the absolute number of predicted dissenting votes in the UK context, based on the predicted probabilities and the total number of legislative votes.[30] Examples have been included in figure 6.8 B above, showing that among pure backbencher in the House of Commons, a career politician is predicted to defect in 130 votes over the two parliamentary terms, against only 35 votes for a non-career politician.

Broken down by parliamentary term (each term saw a very similar number of legislative votes), this means that a non-career politician is predicted to defect in only around 18 votes against 65 for a career politician. This difference must be considered very substantive, as must the absolute value of dissent predicted for a

[30]The figures are therefore based on the assumption that the hypothetical MP is a member of both parliamentary terms and attends all votes.

pure backbench career politician, given that this figure would rank the hypothetical MP among the more rebellious in any of the two legislative terms. Moreover, a recent experimental study on UK voters' preferences for independent-minded MPs finds "evidence that moderately independent MPs are seen almost as positively as very independent ones" (Vivyan and Wagner 2015, 39). In light of this observation, as well as of the pronounced media attention that dissent can provoke in the UK (e.g. Kam 2009), even a small or moderate number of dissenting votes can therefore go a long way in creating name recognition and in helping the MP build a "profile effect" through dissent (Vivyan and Wagner 2012, 240).

In the Bundestag, where fewer votes are recorded, the absolute predicted number of dissenting votes naturally is smaller.[31] However, the severity of one dissenting vote is significantly amplified in an environment in which fewer legislative votes are taken in the first place, and in which these votes are more likely to be salient due to the recording mechanism (see chapter 5). With an average of only four roll-calls per month, a dissenting vote will therefore be very noticeable to the party leadership. The regular warnings and expectations of unity expressed by party leaders ahead of recorded votes (e.g. Bülow 2010; Dittberner 2003; Patzelt 1999), as well as the way in which newspaper articles cover dissent in legislative voting in the Bundestag (e.g. Rossmann 2015; Rossmann and Fried 2015) emphasise the significant impact that even a single dissenting vote can have.

Another argument underlines the substantiveness of the estimated probabilities of dissent and of the shown differences between the MP groups in the Bundestag context. In the UK, the target of an MP's individualistic behaviour is predominantly the voter, who may not always be well informed about the incumbent's activities.

[31] For example, the marginal effects for all Bundestag MPs indicate that career politicians are predicted to dissent in around 8 votes, against 14 for non-career politicians.

This means that a UK MP seeking to cultivate a personal brand may look to do so through a greater number of dissenting votes. In the Bundestag context, on the other hand, one of the two principals targeted by the incumbent to increase re-election chances is the party leadership. This means that the incumbent will be aware that his or her behaviour will be monitored closely by this principal, and that even infrequent dissent will be noticed.

In sum, the effect of an MP's career background on voting behaviour must be considered very substantive, and the magnitude and consistency of the shown effects are considerable. Given previous assessments on the allegedly weak behavioural impact of legislators' social backgrounds more generally (e.g. Wessels 1997, 77), it is highly encouraging that MP-level characteristics can, at all, be identified as significant co-determinants of voting behaviour. Moreover, as parliamentary systems are generally "biased towards party unity" (Tavits 2009, 808, see also section 5.1.4), one might expect that for legislatures with lower aggregate unity, such effects would be amplified. I return to a broader discussions of the findings in the conclusion.

6.4 Robustness Checks and Results for Subsets

Robustness checks for the above results are carried out across two dimensions. The first one pertains to the method of estimation, while in a second step I test whether the effects hold across a number of subsets of the data such as legislative term or party. Before continuing with these checks, it should also be mentioned that adding and removing various controls to and from the main model does not significantly change the results of the main variable *Career*, indicating that the coefficients are robust to changes within the models.

6.4.1 Robustness of estimation method

Although a multilevel model (referred to as the main model in this section) appears to be the optimal choice for the data and objective at hand, it must be ensured that the obtained results are robust to the estimation method. As a first robustness check, I re-run the main models using a standard logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by MPs. This is a methodologically valid alternative to account for the data structure. As expected, the regressions yield very similar results to those of the main models (see tables A4 and A5 in the appendix). Due to the difference in algorithmic model estimation, a direct comparison of AIC/BIC indicators between these models and the main models is not adequate when attempting to compare model fit. However, the lower log likelihood of the standard logistic regression shows that the multilevel models fit the data better. Moreover, the statistical significance of the LR-tests in the multilevel models directly confirms that this is a more appropriate method of estimation than a standard logistic regression (see the Chi^2 of LR-Test vs. logistic regression indicators in each table).[32] Similarly, the interclass correlations (ICC) in each of the specifications of the main models are significantly different from 0 (most lie at around 0.3), again confirming the utility of the multilevel approach.

Second, I re-run the models by clustering by legislative vote instead of MP (see Benedetto and Hix 2007 for a similar approach). This leads to very similar results for the main variables of interests. However, the odds ratios display greater statistical significance (i.e. lower standard errors), confirming that the main models with MP-level groups provide a more conservative approach and harder testing ground. Third, I re-run the models using fractional logit models. For this purpose,

[32] More specifically, these test the null-hypothesis that the residual variance between the MPs is zero. The statistical significance of the indicators implies that multilevel models are in fact necessary and the most suitable (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012, 536).

I generate a dependent variable of the proportion of deviating votes an MP has cast over the course of all votes he or she attended. Hence, there are now 861 (Bundestag) and 864 (House of Commons) observations, i.e. one observation per MP. Since vote-specific predictors cannot be included in this single-level structure, it only considers MP-level variables. Although this makes the approach unsuitable as a main model, the fractional logit models check whether the shown effects hold even in this simpler estimation method. This is indeed the case, indicating that my results are robust to an estimation method using an alternative operationalisation of the dependent variable (see tables A4 and A5 in the appendix).[33]

6.4.2 Robustness across subsets of the data

Analysis by legislative term

Although some specifications of the main models included the *Legislative Term* dummy, it is conceivable that uncaptured term-specific factors (e.g. seat majority or other temporal factors such as policy focus or polls) make the observed effects significant and substantive in one term but not in the other, while still driving the aggregate effect in the pooled regression. I therefore re-run the main models separately for each term of each country, for all MPs and for backbenchers (results shown in tables A6 and A7 in the appendix). In both country cases, the odds ratios describing the difference between the likelihood of career and non-career politicians voting against the party line retain their magnitude and statistical significance within each legislative term separately. The robustness of the results has also been tested at an even more disaggreated temporal component, as I showed in section 6.2.1 that the effects are consistent across parliamentary sessions in both institutions.

[33] I furthermore ran hierarchical models only with legislative vote as the upper-level units (see also Benedetto and Hix 2007) and with both MPs and votes as two upper levels. Results of the core explanatory variables remain very similar.

Analysis by party group

Next, I test whether the results obtained through the pooled data also hold by each party group. Beginning with the UK, the checks confirm that within each party, a career politician remains significantly more likely to defect than a non-career politician. When replicating the main models from table 6.2, the odds ratios across the three parties range between 1.62 and 1.65, and are statistically significant (see table A9 in the appendix). Results for all and for pure backbenchers also hold for each party group. This confirms the consistency of the results across the UK parties, as we can rule out that the effect shown in the main analysis is driven merely by the behavioural difference within one or two parties.

The same tests for the Bundestag (see table A6 in the appendix) confirm that the results obtained in the pooled analysis hold across party groups with the exception of one party (Die Linke, see below). Previous MP-level studies of party loyalty and personal-vote incentives in the Bundestag have – apart from the inclusion of party dummies – largely ignored the necessity for testing the pooled results by party group (e.g. Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer 2013; but see Stoffel 2014). However, such tests are highly relevant in light of the tested theoretical frameworks, because only the two big party groups (CDU/CSU and SPD) win significant numbers of district seats, while MPs of the FDP and Die Grünen are, with one exception, only ever elected as list MPs.[34]

Indeed, I find a considerable difference in differences between, on the one hand, the parties with significant numbers of district MPs (CDU/CSU and SPD) and, on the other hand, those in which MPs know that the party list is pretty much their

[34]Hans-Christian Ströbele being the one and only Green MP to have won a district (and has done so in every election since 2002). While Die Linke won only 3 district mandates in the 2005 election, it obtained 16 in 2009.

only hope for election (FDP and Grüne). While significant across all parties, the odds ratios of a career politician defecting lie at 0.64 and 0.63 for the CDU/CSU and SPD respectively, while the difference becomes even more significant within the FDP (0.42) and Greens (0.34). This variation across parties further confirms the moderate behavioural differences found between the German electoral tiers as shown in more detail in chapter 7 below:[35] Within parties where party-centric behaviour is by far the most beneficial strategy (i.e. FDP and Greens), those MPs most invested in re-election make use of this strategy to a particularly strong degree. In parties where MPs can be elected both in a district and off the list, this effect is somewhat mediated by the potential independence from the party list as a result of becoming (or hoping to become) a district MP. Such incentives notwithstanding, the tests confirm that MPs predominately follow a party-centric strategy across all parties (except one).

The party that breaks ranks with the above findings is Die Linke, a small, far-left socialist and anti-capitalist party with origins in the German Communist Party as well as the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED, the party formerly at the head of the German Democratic Republic).[36] The difference between career and non-career politicians in their propensity to show dissent does not hold among MPs of this party. Rather, a weak opposite effect is observed, as career politicians are *more* likely to defect, at an odds ratio of 1.46 (at $p<0.05$). While this finding would deserve more in-depth analysis, I limit the discussion to a number of potential reasons for why the effect observed for Die Linke might differ from the one consistently found for the other party groups.

[35] It could be argued that the party-level difference is due to other party-specific factors. However, the fact that CDU/CSU and FDP are similar on an ideological dimension, as are SPD and the Greens, strengthens the idea that some of the observed differences are due to the greater role of the district tier in the CDU/CSU and the SPD.

[36] The party won 9 per cent of list votes in the 2005 election and 12 per cent (76 seats) in 2009.

First, the party in its shape today is a lot younger and less established than its Bundestag counterparts, and was not represented in the 2002-2005 parliament.[37] Moreover, the party that entered parliament in 2005 was still known as the PDS, becoming Die Linke only after a fusion with the WASG in 2007. Partly as a result of this recent and fragmented history (see also below), the intra-party discourse is – to a greater extent than is the case among the other Bundestag parties – dominated by considerable infighting and factionalism, as well as the crowding around certain party figures and leaders.[38] There are at least six official intra-party factions in the parliamentary party alone which, given the small size of the party, speaks of significant fragmentation.[39] It is therefore likely that the legislative voting behaviour of Die Linke MPs is dominated less by their strategic re-election considerations, especially given the complexity over who exactly represents the party's (ideological) leadership to which an MP attempting to engage in party-centric behaviour would normally seek to cater.

Moreover, the party's representation, electorate and recruitment are focused strongly (but not exclusively) on the federal states that previously formed the German Democratic Republic. It has been suggested that the party's history and regional focus may contribute to a distrust of centralised party structures as well as foster a greater rejection (at least in its early years after re-unification) of the norms surrounding party discipline and unity compared to West-German parties (Davidson-Schmich 2003; Davidson-Schmich 2006; Patzelt 1997b; Stecker 2015). In my data, this is suggested by the finding that frontbenchers are not more loyal than backbenchers within this party (see table A8 in the appendix). Moreover, the fact that Die Linke is generally seen by voters as internally divided means that

[37] Although it narrowly entered parliament in the elections of the 1990s.

[38] Names of party leaders that have become synonymous with such intra-party conflict and division include Lothar Bisky, Sahra Wagenknecht, Gregor Gysi or Oskar Lafontaine.

[39] See also the studies by Davidson-Schmich (2003; 2006)

an individual pay-off for party-centric behaviour within this more individualistic setting may be limited. Finally, given the ideologically extreme positions of many representatives, the career politician label may be capturing something else for some Die Linke MPs, namely a life-long training and readiness to fight for one's beliefs. These dynamics may supersede the more strategic considerations surrounding re-election goals that we observe among the MPs of the other party groups.

Outliers

As has become evident from the graphical illustration of MP-level defection rates (see figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 in chapter 5), a small number of legislators in both countries vote against the party line at a considerably higher rate than their peers. To ensure that these MPs are not influential outliers driving the observed effect of the main variables of interest, I generated scatter plots of MPs' deviation rates by their career background, for each legislative term of each institution. These plots indicate that those MPs with particularly high defection rates do not disproportionally come from one of the *Career* categories.[40] In this sense, the more rebellious MPs do not constitute "influential" outliers driving the overall results. There is, however, one particular case among the Bundestag MPs that can be considered an influential outlier under specific circumstances, and that has been dealt with appropriately.[41] These diagnostics notwithstanding, it must be asked whether the well-known and perpetual rebels[42] are similarly subject

[40] Of course, some disproportionality would still be consistent with the study's theory.

[41] Bundestag MP Ströbele is the only district MP of the Green party and is known to be one of the most rebellious parliamentarians. This could distort tests for the German district MP hypothesis conducted in chapter 7 below. However, when the regressions are run with and without this MP, results for all variables remain practically unchanged. Only the PPG dummy for the Green party naturally shows a large odds ratio when Ströbele is included in the model pertaining to pure district MPs in chapter 7 (Model A10).

[42] For the UK these include, for example, Kate Hoey, Philip Hollobone, and – until his election as party leader – Jeremy Corbyn. In the Bundestag, famous rebels are Peter Gauweiler, Hans-Christian Ströbele or Klaus Barthel.

to the behavioural logic implied by the theoretical framework. To account for this and to provide another robustness check concerning outliers, I remove the ten most rebellious MPs in each term and re-run the models with this slightly reduced dataset. For both countries, the results are very similar to the ones obtained by using all MPs, as the magnitude and statistical significance of the main variables' coefficients are hardly affected (see tables A10 and A11 in the appendix).[43]

Chapter summary

This chapter presented the study's main empirical tests and results. These confirm, across the cases of Germany and the UK, the interactive predictions formulated by my theoretical framework. For the Bundestag it is found that career politicians – i.e. those MPs seen as most ambitious for re-election – are almost two times more likely to display loyal behaviour in a legislative vote than their non-career politician colleagues. The opposite effect is observed for career politicians in the UK House of Commons, where this MP group is shown to be up to three times more likely to dissent. Predicted probabilities reveal the substantive magnitude of these effects while further tests confirm the robustness of the results. The cross-national MP-level findings allow for the following answers to the study's research questions: First, they suggest that the type and extent of vote-seeking behaviour employed by an MP is a function of the interactive effect between the incentives generated by the electoral system and the MP's level of re-election ambition. Second, this adds evidence in favour of the literature's long-standing theory linking electoral rules and MP behaviour. Before providing a more detailed discussion in my concluding chapter, I validate these findings by testing my behavioural model in another setting.

[43] One consequence, of course, is that the absolute values of the predicted probabilities of dissent decrease slightly when the most rebellious members are removed. However, the relative differences between career and non-career politicians remain very similar.

Chapter 7

Testing the Model Across Germany's Electoral Tiers

The study's main empirical tests, conducted in chapter 6, showed that the within-system difference in legislative voting behaviour between incumbents with high and low re-election ambitions differs across the UK and the German setting in a manner consistent not only with my theoretical framework, but also with the existing theory linking electoral rules and MP behaviour. With its focus on the Bundestag and the House of Commons, this test was thus conducted across systems that generate party-centric and personalistic incentives respectively. However, and as outlined in chapter 3, my theoretical framework can also be used to examine the difference in behavioural incentives between systems that, while being party-centric (or personalistic) on the whole, differ in the strength of these incentives.

The two-tiered structure of Germany's mixed-member electoral system provides an expedient setting to conduct such an analysis: while both tiers are heavily influenced by the party-centric features of Germany's electoral system, the district tier provides some degree of personalistic incentives compared to the very party-centric list tier. The main purpose of this subsidiary analysis is to corroborate the study's core findings from chapter 6 by establishing whether the shown differences-in-differences for MPs with low and high re-election ambitions also hold across the list and district tiers of the German electoral system.

On a second level, this chapter also makes a direct and original contribution to the literature concerned with contamination effects in mixed-member systems generally, and to the long-standing theoretical and empirical debate within the Germany-focused literature more specifically. Numerous studies have used mixed-member systems as a testing ground for the behavioural impact of electoral rules (see below). The conceptual advantage of this research design is that it can hold country-specific factors constant, while being able to test whether MPs elected on a more party-centric tier (such as Germany's list tier) display more party-loyal behaviour compared to those from the more personalistic tier (such as Germany's district tier) (e.g. Crisp 2007; Hix 2004; Mitchell 2000; Sieberer 2010).

By showing that this theoretical divide is reflected by a difference in behaviour (such as pork-barrelling or party loyalty in legislative voting), early work considered this research design as a natural choice and fertile ground for demonstrating the behavioural impact of electoral rules (e.g. Herron 2002; Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Stratmann and Baur 2002; Thames 2001; Wessels 1997). Recent findings have proven to be more mixed, as they point to the potential existence of so-called contamination effects between the tiers (e.g. Clark, Martinaitis, and Dilba 2008; Ferrara 2004; Jun and Hix 2010; Manow 2013; Olivella and Tavits 2014; Papp 2016; Rich 2014; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer 2013; Sieberer 2014). As explained in chapter 4, contamination theory implies that behavioural differences between tiers in mixed systems are diminished or blurred, for example due to the option of dual candidacies or a strong central party structure (Crisp 2007; Ohmura 2014; Papp 2016; Rich 2014; Sieberer 2010; Stoffel 2014).

While bearing these considerations in mind, the following test is built on the argument that even if there exists some behavioural contamination between the

tiers of Germany's mixed-member system, – potentially caused by the dominant party-centric incentives generated at the aggregate-level for all German MPs (i.e. the level that aggregates the two electoral tiers, see previous chapter) – this does not preclude the possibility of some cross-tier variation in behavioural incentives. In other words, "contamination" must not automatically be understood as complete assimilation between the tiers, but merely that members of each tier are, in their predicted behaviour, brought closer together. For the German case, with its dominant party-centric setting, I argue that the personalistic incentives of the district tier are merely pushed closer to the party-centric ones generated by the list tier. This still leaves theoretical room for MP-level differences across the two tiers, and allows me to use the German case as an additional test for my behavioural model.

Specifically, I propose that the vast majority of Bundestag MPs seeking re-election should recognise and employ party-centric behaviour as the most beneficial strategy (see Hypothesis 2 in chapter 4), the magnitude of these party-centric incentives differ between MPs aiming to get re-elected in a district or off the party list (acknowledging the effects of dual candidacies). I subsequently combine this argument with the study's theoretical framework in order to derive, for each electoral tier, clear testable hypotheses that incorporate an MP's level of re-election ambition. In a final step, I subject these hypotheses to empirical tests using both new and existing operationalisations of MPs' electoral tiers. I find that, across the two tiers, the differences-in-differences between career and non-career politicians' likelihood to dissent in legislative voting reflect my model's interactive predictions. This result provides further empirical evidence not only for the proposed behavioural impact of electoral rules, but also for the interaction between institutional and individual-level incentives as shown in the cross-national analysis in chapter 6.

7.1 Separate Expectations for List and District MPs

Before devising separate hypotheses by electoral tiers, we must briefly acknowledge some of the conceptual and empirical difficulties in classifying legislators as "list" or "district" MPs. The main complexity arises from the fact that incumbents can run as dual candidates and can switch candidacy type from one election to the next. Using an MP's current mandate type therefore may not always capture the MP's preference for a given electoral tier when seeking re-election in the future (see also Manow 2013; Ohmura 2014). In other words, while MPs are assumed to follow the strategy most conducive to achieving re-election, it is not always clear which electoral tier determines their behavioural incentives on an individual level. When speaking of list or district MPs in the predictions drawn up below, I therefore refer to the tier on which the given MP is assumed to focus his or her re-election efforts. The empirical tests will address some of these complexities through three different operationalisations of an MP's tier type (see section 7.2).

7.1.1 Deriving separate expectations for list and district MPs

The following section outlines the reasons why the two electoral tiers can be considered as generating different behavioural incentives. I subsequently apply these predictions to my MP-level behavioural model and develop hypotheses for MPs with low and high re-election ambitions operating across these tiers. This allows me to test in a new and more nuanced manner whether the different behavioural incentives identified across the two electoral tiers also translate into behaviour.

List MPs

The behavioural incentives for MPs hoping to get re-elected through the party list are straight-forward, as they largely reflect the theoretical expectations for pure

list systems: because German list MPs are elected through closed party lists and hence run predominantly on the party label, their re-election chances increase as the proportion of list votes increases. As argued in chapter 4, these MPs should thus be interested in maintaining a unified image of the party as this will boost the electoral prospects of the party as whole, and therefore their own prospects (Greene and Haber 2015; Noelle-Neumann and Köcher 1997; Patzelt 1998; Proksch and Slapin 2012).

Moreover, the fact that voters do not elect list MPs directly means that incumbents have little intrinsic incentive to engage in personalistic vote-seeking behaviour, especially one detrimental to the party label (Hix 2004, 196; see also Rich 2014, 115). Cross-national rankings therefore agree that the closed-list PR rules create strongly party-centric incentives (cf. André, Depauw, and Martin 2016). These dynamics should be amplified in the German case by the fact that list nominations (and positions) are decided at a more centralised *Land*-level and that the central party does, in practice, possess considerable influence (see section 4.3 as well as Altenbockum 2013; Bülow 2007; Manow 2007; Roberts 1988). Indeed, surveys show that list MPs consider the central party a more important principal than district MPs do (Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Zittel and Gschwend 2008).

It must be recognised, however, that German list MPs may not fully behave as if they operated in a pure list system; some MPs who previously followed a list strategy may hope to get elected in a district seat in the future, giving them some incentive for more individualistic, constituency-oriented behaviour. Nonetheless, Bundestag list MPs should, on average, have very little incentive to create a personal vote detrimental to the party label, but should predominantly engage in what Crisp calls "party vote-seeking" (2007, 1465).

District MPs

Theorising about behavioural incentives for district MPs is more complex. Ignoring contamination theory for the moment, we might expect German district MPs to be guided by dynamics present in the "intermediate" category: as in the UK, voters can vote directly for the incumbent district candidate and can sanction or reward his or her behaviour. This should produce a reasonable degree of personal-vote incentives, as argued by early proponents of a mandate divide (e.g. Lancaster and Patterson 1990). Additionally, successful district MPs win their seat irrespective of the overall vote share of their party, encouraging the cultivation of a personal vote and a local support base so as to remain unaffected by fluctuations in the electoral fate of the party in terms of party votes (*Zweitstimmen*).

Hence, although district MPs are aware of the potentially damaging nature of personalistic behaviour (as well as of the party's efforts to discourage such action), a personal vote might yield individual pay-offs: "Intra-party heterogeneity signals to voters the inability to commit to a specific policy stance, although personal vote seeking might benefit individual MPs" (Greene and Haber 2015, 17). Furthermore, the largely decentralised selection procedure for district candidates may, in theory, incentivise incumbents with a district strategy to cater to the local selectors by choosing their position over the party's when such disagreement arises (but see Bülow 2007). Despite these theoretical expectations, contamination theory suggests that such personal-vote incentives should be limited (see chapter 4). However, this does not automatically mean that personal-vote incentives completely diminish for MPs hoping to gain re-election through a district seat, but rather implies that these personalistic incentives are less pronounced than they would be if the MPs operated in a pure SMD system.

Implicitly following this logic, a body of literature challenging the idea of a behavioural assimilation between the tiers suggests that district MPs may show some reaction to the institutional personal-vote incentives inherent to SMD systems. At the same time, authors concede that these incentives remain weak, and of supplementary nature: "[The literature] is able to unveil *traces* of personal vote seeking behavior aimed to *supplement partisan strategies* for strategic reasons" (Gschwend and Zittel 2015, 340; italics by me). The following paragraphs point to a number of these arguments.

First of all, the nominal (i.e. district) tier of the German electoral system was, in the late 1940s, designed precisely to introduce a personal aspect into an electoral system otherwise aimed at ensuring a high degree of proportionality (e.g. Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Scarrow 2001).[1] Indeed, a number of studies find that MPs elected on the district tier are more likely to be assigned to committees that allow them to distribute pork (if only to a limited degree) to their constituencies (Stratmann and Baur 2002; Zittel 2014; but see Manow 2013).

Moreover, candidates running in a district are found to be more likely to personalise their electoral campaigns, for example by using the internet to promote their campaigns beyond the party label (Zittel 2009; Zittel 2015b). At the same time, and pointing to contamination theory, these studies recognises that "in most cases, these efforts will, by their very nature, fall within the realm of professionalized, party-driven campaign structures" (Zittel 2009, 309). Nonetheless, such efforts demonstrate some value of personalistic vote-seeking for those hoping to win a district seat. From the voter side, Bawn's study of ticket splitting is furthermore able to show that MP groups the author refers to as "district incumbents" are

[1] This intention is evidenced by the fact that in German, the electoral system is known as *personalisiertes Verhältniswahlrecht*, i.e. "personalised proportional electoral rules" (cf. Scarrow 2001, 63).

in fact able to gain a small personal vote beyond what the party receives in *Zweitstimmen* (Bawn 1999, 497).

Some further indication of a behavioural divide between the tiers comes from a survey asking Bundestag candidates to indicate (on a scale of 1-10) whether "their main campaign goal was to maximise attention to themselves rather than to their party" (Zittel and Gschwend 2008). While the average response was, unsurprisingly, heavily in favour of a party-centric strategy, differences exist between list and district MPs,[2] as the former are more likely to draw attention to themselves than to the party (average score of 3.8 for district MPs and 2.5 for list MPs). Moreover, a realistic chance of winning the district is shown to increase personalisation of the candidate's electoral campaign (Zittel and Gschwend 2008).

Focussing on dissent in legislative voting (i.e. the focus of this study), Ohmura (2014, 79) finds that "[o]nly MPs with a pure district strategy exhibit behaviour that is significantly different from that of MPs with a pure list or a dual candidacy strategy" and that these MPs attempt to gather a personal vote through sticking out from the party (see also Sieberer 2013). Specifically, these MPs dissent more often from the party line on nationally relevant and salient votes in order to attract personal attention. Similarly, Sieberer (2010) finds that MPs who entered the parliament on the district tier are indeed more likely to vote against the party line than list MPs.[3]

Finally, it has been shown that incumbents consider constituency-focused behaviour a far more important prerequisite for achieving a district-nomination over a list-

[2]The authors thereby consider any candidate running in a district (whether as a double candidate or not) as a "district MPs".

[3]However, this pattern appears to be exceptional to the 16th LP, an observation that is recognised by the author himself as part of a later study (Sieberer 2014).

nomination, while the opposite holds true when it comes to displaying party-centric attitudes (Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Wessels 1997). MPs who have won a district seat have furthermore expressed that they feel more "protected" in terms of re-nomination, and less of a need to pander to the leadership in order to gain a favourable list spot ahead of the next election (Altenbockum 2013; Bülow 2007).

Overall, a number of studies suggest that there may indeed exist some differences in the level of party-centric behaviour shown by list and district MPs in the German system. By again introducing my more nuanced assumption concerning MP-level differences in re-election ambition, this chapter serves to conduct a new test for these behavioural differences between tiers. In doing so, it also seeks to validate the cross-national results shown in chapter 6. The following section outlines the precise behavioural expectations that guide these tests.

7.1.2 Testable hypotheses at the tier-level

As explained above, certain core features of the German electoral system – in particular the compensatory link between district and list votes as well as the possibility of dual candidacies – create pronounced party-centric incentives for all MPs seeking re-election. However, there exist theoretical arguments as well as empirical indications that the pull towards party-centric behaviour is less pronounced for those incumbents who focus their main re-election strategy on the district tier. This candidacy mode may therefore generate some incentives to achieve electoral gain through a personal vote, and may provide district MPs with greater freedom to act more independently. In other words, while both groups believe to benefit from party-centric behaviour, the magnitude of this benefit should be greatest for list MPs. District MPs, meanwhile, have some incentives to

cultivate a personal reputation. The following section translates these arguments of a weak "role differentiation" – to borrow a term used by Manow (2013) – between the tiers into testable hypotheses, and shows how these help test the study's theoretical framework at the disaggregated level of Germany's electoral tiers.

Before drawing up the testable hypotheses, I refer back to the formal approaches developed in chapter 3. While the main behavioural model pertained to the comparison between systems with party-centric and personalistic vote-seeking incentives, a more differentiated approach was developed for systems in which all MPs should be guided by party-centric motivations, but which may differ in the strength of these incentives. Applying this model to the tier level of the German mixed-member electoral system means that *list* MPs with high (list MP_H) and low re-election ambitions (list MP_L) should display party-centric behaviour iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$\text{For a list } MP_H\text{:} \qquad (r-s)\left[U_H\left(\mathbf{RE}\right)-U_H\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \;<\; C_P-\;C_C \tag{7.1}$$

$$\text{For a list } MP_L\text{:} \qquad (r-s)\left[U_L\left(\mathbf{RE}\right)-U_L\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \;<\; C_P-\;C_C \tag{7.2}$$

whereas *district* MPs with high (district MP_H) and low re-election ambitions (district MP_L) should display party-centric behaviour iff ($\Leftrightarrow$):

$$\text{For a district } MP_H\text{:} \qquad (t-v)\left[U_H\left(\mathbf{RE}\right)-U_H\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \;<\; C_P-\;C_C \tag{7.3}$$

$$\text{For a district } MP_L\text{:} \qquad (t-v)\left[U_L\left(\mathbf{RE}\right)-U_L\left(\mathbf{NE}\right)\right] \;<\; C_P-\;C_C \tag{7.4}$$

As stipulated above (and as was the case with hypothesis 2 derived in section 4.3.4), MPs with high re-election ambitions in either electoral tier of Germany's mixed-member system are more likely to display party-centric behaviour than those with lower re-election ambitions (ceteris paribus), as both $(r-s)$ and $(t-v)$ are negative. Given that $(r-s) < (t-v)$, however, the difference in the likelihood

between a district MP_H and a district MP_L to display party-centric behaviour is smaller that the difference in likelihood between a list MP_H and a list MP_L. In other words, while both list and district MPs should be guided by party-centric incentives, the moderate personal-vote incentives for district MPs decrease the magnitude of the assumed behavioural effect.[4]

A number of testable hypotheses result from these arguments. The first two hypotheses are based on the view that there exists, indeed, a behavioural contamination between the tiers which makes both mandate types more likely to cater to the party. The hypotheses therefore disaggregate H2 from the previous section into one prediction for list MPs and one for district MPs, respectively:

> H3a: *Among German **list MPs**, those with high re-election ambitions are more likely to cater to the party than those with low re-election ambitions, ceteris paribus.*

> H3b: *Among German **district MPs**, those with high re-election ambitions are more likely to cater to the party than those with low re-election ambitions, ceteris paribus.*

The follow-up hypothesis takes into account the application of the difference-in-differences approach to the German electoral tiers, thereby testing for behavioural differences between the tiers. Following the arguments on a weak "role differentiation" developed in the section above, it stipulates that:

[4] These predictions rely on the assumption that MPs with weaker or stronger re-election ambitions do not disproportionally self-select into one tier (i.e. that there is no "problem of migration", to speak in the language of difference-in-differences designs (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 242)). The data shows that this is generally not the case. Only in the SPD are career politicians slightly more likely to be list MPs. However, as I am interested in the relative difference between career and non-career politicians *within* each tier, this does not affect my conclusions drawn from the results.

> H4a: *The difference in likelihood between* ***district MPs*** *with high and low re-election ambitions to cater to the party is* smaller *than the difference in this likelihood between* ***list MPs*** *with high and low re-election ambitions, ceteris paribus.*

Finally, we must consider the null-hypothesis, namely that there is no behavioural difference between list and district MPs (i.e. a complete "role consolidation"):

> H4b: *The difference in likelihood between* ***district MPs*** *with high and low re-election ambitions to cater to the party and is* the same *as the difference in this likelihood between* ***list MPs*** *with high and low re-election ambitions, ceteris paribus.*

7.1.3 Purpose and summary of tier-level hypotheses

Figure 7.1 summarises the behavioural expectations at the level of the German tiers and puts them in perspective with the larger comparative tests conducted in chapter 6. Testing for this proposed behavioural difference between list and district MPs serves two related purposes. First, given the theoretical argument that there should exist some difference in behavioural incentives between the two tiers, I use these conditions to test whether my behavioural model holds not only in the cross-national setting explored in chapter 6, but whether this interaction between institutional and MP-level behavioural incentives can also be observed at the tier-level settings of the German system. In other words, the tests serve to validate the finding that the predicted link between electoral systems and legislative behaviour becomes visible at the micro-level when considering that an MP's vote-seeking efforts should also be influenced by the individual's level of re-election ambition.




Figure 7.1: Visual depiction of the behavioural hypotheses for German list and district MPs

Second, my cross-system MP-level behavioural model is used to test for the level of contamination effects present between the two electoral tiers in Germany's mixed-member system. Existing empirical evidence for behavioural differences between the tiers is mixed (see above). I therefore use my approach to develop a new test of this long-standing question of a "role differentiation" or a "role consolidation" (Manow 2013, 305) between German MPs operating in the different tiers.

7.2 Empirical Tests and Results by Electoral Tiers

7.2.1 Operationalising German List and District MPs

I begin the empirical analysis of the above hypotheses by outlining how MPs will be categorised in terms of electoral tiers. A number of issues associated with this task have already been pointed out above. Most importantly, because MPs can switch mandate types, it is not always clear to what extent an incumbent's electoral tier at a given point in time reveals the institutional incentives that guide the individual's future re-election attempts.

To address these complexities in the empirical tests, I rely on three sets of variables. While these are explained in more detail below, it is instructive to think of them as differing in their temporal focus. The first category, *mandate type*, considers the tier – list or district – that the MP represents during the given parliamentary term. Second, I go back one (temporal) step to include also the *candidacy mode* under which the MP ran in the election. Finally, I zoom out even more, and provide a previously understudied approach by considering MPs' complete *electoral histories*. This information allows me to establish the electoral path that the individual previously took into parliament. Overall, the three-tiered approach used here is more comprehensive than what most existing tests of contamination effects in the German system (and in mixed-members systems more generally) can offer, as these usually limit themselves to one of the first two categories.[5]

At the most basic level, it is tempting simply to view those MPs who entered a given parliament through the list tier as "list MPs" and those elected in constituencies as "district MPs". This method has been used by a number of

[5]But see Ohmura (2014), who adds data on an MP's re-election probability in each tier to get a more comprehensive picture of an MP's most likely future re-election strategy.

contributions on MP-level party loyalty and contamination theory (e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008; Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer 2013; Wessels 1997),[6] as well as on MP's legislative vote-seeking behaviour more generally (Proksch and Slapin 2012; 2015). My first operationalisation therefore follows the majority of existing contributions in using the type of seat the individual held in the given parliamentary term to ascertain the MP's electoral tier (*mandate type*, coded 0 for list MP, 1 for district MP).

Recent contributions, however, warn against deducing behavioural incentives exclusively from an MP's current mandate type, as this overlooks the role of double candidacies as well as the dynamic nature of future re-election strategies (e.g. Manow 2012; 2013; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2014). Nonetheless, there is some empirical validity in this method. The vast majority of German MPs never change mandate type throughout their careers, even if many of them run on both tiers. Bawn and Thies (2003), for example, find for the 1994 cohort that fully 86 per cent of MPs have only ever been elected either on the list or the district tier. Manow (2013) puts this figure at 75 per cent for all MPs between 1949-2009. These observations imply that even though many MPs run as dual candidates, the pronounced MP-level continuity in mandate type provides many incumbents with high certainty that if re-elected, it will be on the same tier they entered the previous legislature(s) on. It is therefore a plausible (empirical) assumption that most MPs assess their institutional incentive structure on the basis of their current mandate.

These arguments notwithstanding, a sophisticated analysis of MPs' behavioural incentives must disaggregate the simple *mandate type* categories in order to account for the role of dual candidacies. As explained also in chapter 5, the variable

[6] Note that two of these studies (Sieberer 2010; Sieberer 2013) do include controls for whether the MP ran only as a list candidate.

candidacy mode provides a more nuanced picture as it captures the four different ways in which a successful candidate can enter a given parliament (Manow 2013; Sieberer 2014): Pure List (coded 0), Dual List (1), Dual District (2), or Pure District (3).[7] Table 7.1 shows descriptive statistics of the candidacy modes of the MPs in each of the two legislative terms at the focus of this study.[8]

Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of candidacy modes, German Bundestag, 2005-2009 and 2009-2013

	16th term		**17th term**	
	Obs.	(%)	Obs	(%)
Pure List MPs	33	5.2	15	2.3
Dual List MPs	308	48.1	338	51.9
Dual District MPs	216	34.2	225	34.5
Pure District MPs	80	12.5	74	11.4

Note: Includes all MPs holding seats in respective parliaments (i.e. including those who filled a vacated seat).

The distinct advantage of this categorisation for our tests is that it takes into account whether the MP relied on the insurance feature of a dual candidacy or whether the individual ran only on one tier. Following my theoretical framework, as well as previous contributions (Sieberer 2014), an MP's propensity to behave in a party-centric manner should decrease with each of the above categories. Translated to my model, as well as hypothesis H4a, we could therefore speak of some evidence in favour of a role differentiation if we find the difference between career and non-career politicians in their propensity to dissent to decrease with each category.

[7] I am grateful to Ulrich Sieberer (Sieberer 2014) and Philip Manow (Manow and Flemming 2012) for sharing their data on MPs' candidate types.

[8] It should again be noted that the smaller German parties (i.e. the Greens, Die Linke, and the FDP) return very limited numbers of district MPs. Hence, dual candidates in these parties are aware that pretty much the only way to re-election is through the party list (see previous chapter).

Finally, this differentiated categorisation of candidacy modes allows for the establishment of sequences of the specific pathways that each MP has taken into the Bundestag over the course of his or her parliamentary career (see also Manow 2013). The main benefit of considering legislators' electoral histories is that they provide a more comprehensive operationalisation of an MP's mandate type: a consistent electoral path increases an incumbent's certainty that if re-elected, it will most likely be through the previously taken path. Moreover, having had success with a given path before will make the MP be more likely to want to continue on this strategy in future elections.[9] Using the electoral path data thus means that we can make a stronger assumption about which tier is likely to be the MP's re-election strategy.[10]

I have obtained detailed information on the complete *electoral histories* of the legislators represented in the two parliaments.[11] Combining this data with MPs' legislative voting records represents, to my knowledge, a new approach to test for behavioural differences between tiers (i.e. contamination theory),[12] and constitutes the first analysis of the link between an MP's past electoral history and his or her degree of party loyalty in later terms. The data on legislators' past electoral pathway into parliament yields an exhaustive list of nine possible tracks a sitting MP could have experienced.[13] As part of all successful elections over the course of his or her parliamentary (i.e. electoral) career, any MP either:

[9] In order to take into account past elections, the empirical analysis will look only at MPs who have served more than one term (see table 6.4 below). I also control for the MP's number of terms to take into account how "established" the given electoral path is.

[10] Keeping in mind, of course, that the MP can always still change candidate mode or mandate type in a subsequent election.

[11] I am grateful to Philip Manow for sharing this dataset with me (Manow and Flemming 2012). It should be noted, however, that about 80 MPs (out of a total of 861, or 9 per cent) are missing from the Manow dataset. Data analysis reveals that MPs miss at random with respect to the characteristics considered in this study. The dataset therefore remains representative of the population.

[12] Manow (2013) considers the impact of these sequences on other patterns of legislative activity, such as committee assignments.

[13] See Manow 2013 for a similar approach.

1) only ever ran as a dual candidate and was always elected as a list MP,
2) only ever ran as a dual candidate and was always elected as a district MP,
3) only ever ran as a dual candidate and has experienced changes of mandate type,
4) never ran as a dual candidate and was always elected as a list MP,
5) never ran as a dual candidate and was always elected as a district MP,
6) never ran as a dual candidate and has experienced changes of mandate type,
7) sometimes ran as a dual candidate and was always elected as a list MP,
8) sometimes ran as a dual candidate and was always elected as a district MP,
9) sometimes ran as a dual candidate and has experienced changes of mandate type.

Given that a number of these theoretically possible paths were taken only by a few MPs,[14] I collapse some of them to make the predictions and tests more manageable, and to focus on those that are empirically and theoretically relevant. This leaves four categories that together constitute the *electoral history* variable. The first, *always dual and list*, is made up of path 1 in the list above. At over 40 per cent of MPs, this constitutes the largest group. The second, *always dual and district*, includes those who only ever ran as dual candidates and were always elected on the district tier (path 2, making up 21 per cent). Another 9 per cent only ever ran and were elected in a district (*never dual always district*, path 5).[15] The remaining 29 per cent had *more complex paths*, and are made up of the residual categories.

What are the behavioural expectations concerning these categories? Following the logic spelled out in this chapter's theoretical section, those MPs who have always entered parliament on the list tier should have the greatest incentives for party-centric behaviour. A similar, but slightly weaker, motivation should exist for those MPs with mixed electoral paths. Given that these MPs are, on average, less likely to have established themselves as district MPs (although some of them may have), the safest option should be to obtain a high spot on the party list.

[14] E.g. paths 6, 4 and 7 have only been taken by 0.7, 2.2 and 2.8 per cent of MPs respectively.
[15] Overall, these distributions are similar to the ones identified by Manow (2013) for all MPs ever to have served in the Bundestag.

Meanwhile, MPs who have always entered parliament through the district tier (whether as dual candidates or not), are likely to have established a constituency link that makes them less dependent on the party, both in terms of relying on a favourable list position, and on the party's electoral performance in the list votes. In this vein, a German MP who has only ever entered parliament on the district tier observes: "For me, it was always a special form of freedom to be able to say: I am dependent on no-one else but my district. I don't need to cater too much to the central *Land* party in order to obtain a favourable list place" (Altenbockum 2013). Splitting the district MPs into those who were also on the party list as dual candidates and those who only ever ran as pure district MPs further increases my leverage to test for behavioural differences. The former MP type should have some personal-vote incentives, but may still keep one eye on the insurance feature represented by a dual candidacy (i.e. display some party-centric behaviour). The latter group, on the other hand, does not rely on the party list at all, and should therefore have the lowest incentives for party-centric behaviour.

Instead of simply testing the above predictions by using levels of party unity shown by the different groups, I again rely on my MP-level cross-system approach as a more robust analytical tool. I thus expect the following empirical observations, if indeed MPs act upon the difference in behavioural incentives created by the two electoral tiers: the difference between MPs with low and high re-election ambitions, in their likelihood to dissent, should decrease with each category (beginning with the *always dual and list* category[16]), as it successively becomes less important to cater to the party to boost re-election chances. The difference should therefore be the smallest among district MPs who have never relied on a dual candidacy (*never dual always district*).

[16]If there were more MPs who only ever ran and got elected off the party list, then this group would be the most extreme on this list-side of the spectrum (see ftn. 14 above).

In sum, and although the operationalisation of electoral tiers using MPs' electoral histories is complex, it is conceptually superior to the simple use of mandate types and candidacy modes that dominate the empirical contributions on contamination theory. Together with my differentiated assumptions concerning MPs' re-election ambitions, this operationalisation enables a novel test for behavioural differences between the tiers.

Concerning the operationalisation of the main independent variables and controls, I rely on those used in the cross-country tests in chapter 6. However, I also include a control variable for the *list position* on which a list MP was nominated and elected. To operationalise this, I compare an MP's position with the total number of list candidates nominated for the party in the given *Land*.[17] I then take the percentile in which the MP's position falls.[18] The expectation is that MPs who were elected on lower list positions should be more loyal; the more precarious position means they cannot afford to be demoted to an even lower slot in the next election.[19]

7.2.2 Empirical results by electoral tiers

The following section presents the empirical results for the behavioural expectations related to the two electoral tiers. As a reminder, the null hypothesis (following contamination theory) suggests that there should be little to no behavioural difference between MPs from the different electoral tiers (H4b), while the theories developed above expect some behavioural difference or "role differentiation" (H4a).

[17] Based on the dataset provided to me by Philip Manow (Manow and Flemming 2012).

[18] To be sure, and although this variable only serves as a control, it represents just a basic measure of the quality of an MP's list position, given that the number of list seats a party wins in a *Land* depends on how many district MPs are elected from that party. While the total length of a party's list should reflect this to some extent, future studies may also want to incorporate past election results to create such a control (see also Ohmura 2014; Stoffel 2014).

[19] Some endogeneity may be present, as previously more disloyal MPs may already have been put on lower list positions. However, given that this lower position still sufficed for (re-)election suggests that it was not low enough to serve as (immediate) punishment.

Results from electoral tier variables in main models

In a first step, I refer to the results for the two control variables that capture an MP's electoral tier in the main models of the previous chapter (table 6.1). The inclusion of the simple *mandate type* control – a method used in previous tests of behavioural differences between the tiers (e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008; Sieberer 2010) – does not reveal any substantive or statistically significant difference in the likelihood to defect between MPs holding list or district seats in the given terms (see table 6.1).[20] The more nuanced control *candidacy mode* (see model A3 in table 6.1), however, shows that an MP who, in the election preceding the given term, ran only as a district MP (*pure district MP*) was significantly more likely to dissent than a pure list MP (OR: 1.76, at $p<0.01$). The category also exhibits a much higher odds ratio than that of dual candidates (ORs around 1.2). Confirming previous findings (Ohmura 2014), this result suggests that MPs who did not rely on the party list at all make some use of this greater independence, and of the weak personal-vote incentives generated by the district tier.

Testing for behavioural differences by candidacy mode

Simple control variables for an MP's candidate or mandate type, however, merely test for the absolute likelihood of the given MP type to defect, thereby replicating and confirming what has already been shown elsewhere (e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010; Sieberer 2013; Stoffel 2014). The original contribution of this chapter is the empirical investigation of potential behavioural differences between the tiers through my model's difference-in-differences design and its use of variation in re-election ambition. To this end, I run regressions for

[20] However, confirming Sieberer's (2010) result for the 16th term only, district MPs are more likely to defect in this term. For a discussion of this, see Sieberer 2014.

each MP subset of the *candidacy mode* variable (table 7.2)[21] and of the *electoral history* categories (table 7.3) described above.

In line with hypothesis H4a, results from both regression tables confirm the existence of a weak "role differentiation" between the electoral tiers, and therefore reject expectations of a complete behavioural assimilation or role consolidation between MPs elected on the two tiers (H4b). Table 7.2 shows that the most significant difference between career and non-career politicians to defect is found among those who entered the given parliament on the list tier (model A6, OR of 0.59 at $p<0.01$). This is followed by MPs who ran as dual candidates but were elected on the district tier (A7, OR of 0.66, but significant only at $p<0.1$). There is no statistically significant difference between career and non-career politicians in the likelihood to defect among those MPs who only ran as district candidates for the given parliament (A8).[22] Hence, a large portion of the behavioural difference between career and non-career politicians identified in the main models (table 6.1) appears to be driven by the difference among list MPs. This finding points to differing behavioural incentives generated by the two tiers.[23]

A number of control variables yield relevant results. First, the smaller the electoral margin by which a district MP was elected, the more likely the MP is to defect from the party line. This effect is in the same direction than was the case for UK MPs, and again suggests some personal-vote seeking incentives for directly elected MP even in the party-centric setting of the Bundestag. Second, I also account for

[21] As there are too few "pure list" MPs (see 7.1) for statistical analysis of this group alone, I combine these MPs with the dual list MPs. Note also that the *candidacy mode* variable is essentially a more disaggregated version of the *mandate type* variable, which is therefore not tested separately.

[22] To be sure, the statistical significance is also related to the number of observations within each category. However, even if we take a smaller sample of list MPs, differences in significance remain.

[23] It should also be noted that the difference in differences between career and non-career politicians become even more pronounced when excluding MPs from the far-left party Die Linke (see section 6.4 for a more detailed discussion of party-level results).

Table 7.2: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, German Bundestag 2005-2013, by candidacy mode

	Bundestag (2005-2013), MPs grouped by candidacy mode					
	A8: Pure/Dual List MPs		**A9: Dual District MPs**		**A10: Pure District MPs**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career (ref.: Non-Career)						
Mixed	1.12	.16	1.21	.26	0.52*	.19
Career Politician	0.59***	.09	0.66*	.16	0.56	.23
Local Politician	0.96	.11	1.05	.19	1.43	.47
Unsuccessful	1.08	.21	0.62	.27	0.79	.65
Age	1.00	.04	0.94	.08	0.90	.10
Age^2	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Gender	1.03	.12	0.88	.17	3.96	3.7
Standing Down	0.86	.09	1.09	.20	1.26	.30
Margin	-	-	0.96***	.01	0.96***	.01
Government	0.57***	.04	1.56***	.22	0.50	.28
Office ref.: No office						
Office whole/part term	0.48***	.05	0.52***	.09	0.33***	.11
Office in past	0.90	.13	0.48**	.15	0.61	.27
Subject (ref.: Economy)						
Foreign and EU	3.07***	.16	2.38***	.18	1.60***	.17
Other	2.00***	.11	2.25***	.17	1.26**	.14
Closeness (ref.: Close)						
Medium	2.48***	.37	3.09***	.64	1.15	.28
Large	7.53***	.94	5.51 ***	1.0	2.32***	.45
Attendance	1.02***	.00	1.02***	.00	1.01***	.00
PPG ref.: CDU						
SPD	2.12***	.42	4.15***	.81	1.08	.59
FDP	1.44*	.29	-	-	-	-
Linke	1.69**	.38	13.0***	7.4	0.2	.36
Grüne	2.89***	.62	-	-	37.2**	63.1
CSU	5.88***	3.67	3.15***	1.2	2.36**	.99
Constant	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00
Observations (n)	122,610		81,380		29,531	
Groups (No. of MPs)	496		322		106	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	1,579***		1,201***		373***	
Intraclass Correlation	.24		.34		.33	
Log Likelihood	-11,247		-5,673		-2,332	

SE = Standard Error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

the position on the party list at which list MPs were elected in order to account for their electoral "margin" in the previous election (see operationalisation above). When splitting the MPs by the 50th percentile of their list positions and re-running model A8 from table 6.1 for these two subgroups, I find that among those MPs on the lower half of list positions, the difference in loyalty between career and non-career politicians is larger (OR: 0.54) than the difference among those on higher list positions (OR: 0.63).[24] These findings suggest that MPs on more precarious list positions are particularly aware of the necessity for party-centric behaviour.[25]

Testing for behavioural differences by MPs' electoral histories

Next, I consider MPs according to their *electoral history*. Table 7.3 shows the regression results by these MP subgroups. I include only MPs who have successfully run in two or more elections (i.e. I exclude MPs in their first term), in order to consider only incumbents who have had the chance to build a previous sequence of pathways into parliament.[26] Moreover, I control for the number of terms an MP has served in parliament in order to take into account how "established" the MP's electoral path is.[27]

To illustrate the main findings from the regression output in 7.3, figure 7.2 shows, by electoral history category, the odds ratios of career politicians dissenting compared to non-career politicians. The results provide further evidence of a moderate degree of role differentiation between the MP types (and therefore between electoral tiers), as the difference in differences across the MP subgroups closely reflect my behavioural predictions: among those MPs who have always only relied on the party

[24] Models are replications of model A8 for the two subgroups. Regressions not shown.

[25] This is also confirmed by simple models controlling for the MP's party, frontbench status and his or her list position compared to the *Land* party list as a whole (see operationalisation above), as I find that the lower the MP's list position, the less likely he or she is to vote against the party line (OR: 0.99, at $p<0.05$). Regressions not shown.

[26] Running the regressions with all MPs yields very similar patterns and results.

[27] The *Office* variable is excluded due to correlation with *Term* (see chapter 6). However, the shown patterns are robust to the inclusion of the *Age* and *Office* controls instead of *Term*.




Figure 7.2: Odds ratios of a career politician defecting compared to a non-career politician. Bundestag MPs (2005-2013), by electoral history. 95% C.I.

list to enter parliament (model A11 in table 7.3 below), career politicians are more than twice as likely to display party-centric behaviour than non-career politicians (OR of dissent: 0.43, at p<0.01).[28] A similar odds ratio (0.51, at p<0.01) is found for MPs with a more complex electoral history (A12).[29] Seeing as MPs in this group are, on average, faced with greater uncertainty regarding their re-election strategy, the best option is to follow the party-centric incentives created by the compensatory rules and dual candidacy provision.[30]

[28] Again, the difference becomes even larger (OR: 0.34) when excluding Die Linke MPs.

[29] As the substantive impact of the differences in likelihood to dissent has already been shown in chapter 6, I do not provide predicted probabilities again, but instead focus on the odds ratios for the illustration of effects.

[30] The results presented in table 7.3 also hold when using only MPs from the CDU/CSU and SPD, the only two parties in which significant numbers of MPs get elected on the list and district tiers. In fact, the differences-in-differences become even more substantive as the odds ratios of career politicians in models A11-A14, replicated only for CDU/CSU and SPD legislators, become: 0.28, 0.53, 0.75 and 1.08 respectively, with the first two statistically highly significant.

Table 7.3: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, German Bundestag 2005-2013, by electoral history

	Pooled data: Bundestag 2005-2013, MPs grouped by electoral history[i]							
	A11: Always dual and list		**A12: More complex paths**		**A13: Always dual and district**		**A14: Never dual always district**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career								
Mixed	0.85	.21	0.79	.21	0.60	.22	2.74*	1.55
Career Politician	0.43***	.11	0.51***	.12	0.74	.31	1.08	.64
Local Politician	1.04	.22	1.15	.24	2.24**	.74	1.83	1.05
Terms	0.81***	.05	0.93	.05	0.77**	.08	0.75**	.10
Gender	1.13	.23	1.06	.23	0.42**	.15	-	-
Standing Down	0.79*	.11	1.17	.16	1.17	.25	0.45*	.20
Government	0.47***	.05	0.77**	.09	0.63***	.10	0.32	.36
Constant	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00
Attendance	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Closeness	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Subject	✓		✓		✓		✓	
PPG Dummies	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voting Decisions N	54,942		61,773		26,416		14,465	
Groups (No. of MPs)	199		209		90		45	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	877***		1,132***		450***		111***	
Intraclass Correlation	.30		.30		.31		.31	
Log Likelihood	-4,887		-4,599		-2,108		-889	

[i] Models includes only MPs who served more than one term (see text for explanation); results also hold with all MPs.
SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Moving on to MPs who have only ever entered parliament through the district tier, the analysis shows that for those incumbents who always ran as dual candidates (model A13), the difference between career and non-career politicians is significantly smaller than was the case among list MPs, or among those with more complex career paths (OR: 0.76, not statistically significant). Finally, among the MPs who only ever ran on the district tier (A14), career politicians are even slightly *more* likely to dissent (OR: 1.08), albeit not at a statistically significant level. In other words, the MPs least dependent on a party-centric focus to boost re-election chances also appear to make use of this greater liberty for some independent behaviour.[31]

These above results reveal and underline the explanatory benefit of considering MPs' electoral histories when testing for behavioural differences between tiers. Relying on the literature's prevalent approach of using only an MP's current candidacy mode or mandate type overlooks, for example, the argument that district MPs may still cater to the party in their early terms in order to obtain the insurance feature of a double candidacy or a list high list nomination, given that they may not yet have built up a profile in the district. Once MPs are re-elected in a district a number of times, they are likely to feel less reliant on the party list (see also Altenbockum 2013; Bülow 2007).[32] This observation also helps explain why MPs with more complex electoral histories should be more prone to engage in party-centric behaviour, as these MPs are likely to feel less settled in their re-election strategies, making a high list position and a unified party image their safest bet.

[31] Another finding in the above analysis is that among district MPs, local politicians show a greater likelihood to defect (although reaching significance in only one model). In line with Tavits (2009) as well as the tier-level findings above, this provides some support to the idea that German district MPs indeed react to some of the personal-vote incentives provided by this tier.

[32] Future work may also benefit from considering MPs' failed re-election attempts in order to provide an even more detailed picture of MPs' electoral pathways and their behavioural consequences.

Discussion and chapter summary

To sum up, a more nuanced categorisation of the electoral tier associated with a given incumbent reveals some behavioural differences between tiers. Even though a party-centric re-election strategy appears to be favoured by all MPs at the aggregate level, the empirical tests indicate that these incentives are particularly strong for incumbents who predominately focus on the party list to get re-elected. Legislators who rely on the district tier to a greater extent are shown to engage in party-centric behaviour to a lesser degree. From the perspective of research design, the results again underline the benefit of employing a difference-in-differences approach.

The above chapter makes two core contributions to the study's research question. First and foremost, it provides additional support for the cross-national evidence identified in the main chapter comparing the UK and German settings. I show here that across the two German electoral tiers, a legislator's degree of party loyalty is co-determined by an interaction between the behavioural incentives generated by the given electoral tier, and the extent to which the individual desires or depends on re-election. This approach also offers a new explanation for MP-level variation in legislative voting loyalty in the context of the Bundestag.

Second, the chapter tests for behavioural influence by electoral institutions, and thereby speaks directly to the on-going scholarly debate concerning the existence and extent of contamination effects in mixed-member systems. My results indicate a non-negligible behavioural difference between Bundestag MPs operating on the two electoral tiers. This means that while there is some contamination present – i.e. district MPs do not behave in the way we would expect them if the list tier was not present – there does not appear to be a complete "role assimilation" (Manow 2013) between MPs from the two tiers. This finding contributes to a still inconclusive part

of the literature not only through the formulation of previously untested MP-level hypotheses, but also through a novel and differentiated empirical investigation of electoral incentives within the German setting as the paradigmatic case of a mixed-member system.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Discussion and Conclusions

Why do legislators differ in the extent to which they engage in personalistic or party-centric behaviour in their legislative activities? The established and purely macro-level theory emphasises the key role played by electoral rules in shaping behavioural re-election strategies for all MPs at the aggregate-level (e.g. Carey and Shugart 1995; Lancaster 1986; Mitchell 2000). While the existing literature offers some evidence for the predicted relationship, I argue that there exist significant opportunities for new and more robust empirical advances. This diagnosis can also help explain why the recently published *Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies* describes the relevant body of research as both "established and fast-growing" (André, Depauw, and Shugart 2014, 232). On the one hand, an intuitive and established theory has, for a number of years, informed us how legislators are expected to respond to institutional incentives. On the other hand, while some progress has been made, researchers are still looking for the most effective ways to test these theoretical predictions. This thesis represents one such effort.

I begin with the argument that new empirical advances can be made by taking a more differentiated view on the motives and ambitions of the individual legislator. Following the dominant institutionalist tradition, previous studies on the relationship between electoral rules and MP behaviour have largely relied on the homogeneous assumption that all MPs should value re-election to the same extent. I relax this premise by taking the more realistic view that some incumbents should desire re-election to a greater degree than others. Building on the conceptual idea behind a difference-in-difference design, this perspective enables me to test

whether individual MPs behave differently *within* parliaments in a way that varies predictably *across* systems.

Specifically, I propose that if the existing theory holds true, then we should see those MPs most ambitious for re-election employ to a greater extent than their colleagues the type of vote-seeking strategy that is most likely to help them secure it, given the electoral system. The purpose of developing and testing this comparative prediction is two-fold. First, the model provides a previously overlooked explanation as to why MPs differ in the degree to which they cater to the party or their personal reputation even when operating within the same electoral system. Second, the conceptual set-up of the within-system cross-national approach allows for a verification of the existing theory on electoral rules and MP behaviour under more robust conditions.

To conduct the empirical tests, I use newly-collected data on the career backgrounds of over 1700 MPs to establish how desirable the goal of re-election is likely to be to a given legislator. As part of this original MP-level operationalisation, I identify career politicians as those most ambitious for re-election. A number of subsidiary proxies also capture such differences. On the outcome side, I focus on the degree to which legislators display party-centric or personalistic behaviour over a large number of legislative vote choices. Finally, to gain variation in electoral rules and to enable a cross-national comparative approach, I analyse the behaviour of MPs across the more party-centric setting of the German electoral system and the more personalistic rules of the UK system. A supplementary test is carried out across the two tiers of Germany's mixed-member rules.

The empirical results provide strong evidence in support of my interactive predictions. Career politicians operating under the more party-centric behavioural

incentives of the German electoral system are almost twice as likely to remain *loyal* to the party in a legislative vote than their non-career politician peers, while the exact opposite is observed for the same MP type in the more personalistic setting of the UK's electoral rules. Career politicians in the House of Commons are up to three times more likely to *dissent* against the party line than non-career politicians. These results are highly significant and substantive, and hold across parties as well as legislative terms. Further behavioural differences in line with my theory are found across Germany's electoral tiers. Among those MPs most reliant on the party list for re-election, career politicians display especially loyal behaviour compared to their non-career politician peers. Meanwhile, among MPs who rely predominately on the less party-centric district tier, career politicians do not behave more loyally than their peers.

On the basis of these results, I can answer the study's core research questions in the following way. First, and confirming the main interactive hypothesis, institutional incentives do not unfold homogeneously across all MPs. Rather, their impact appears to be mediated by the degree to which an individual MP values re-election. In other words: electoral institutions matter, but individual-level differences in motives and ambitions matter, too. My study suggests that the interaction between these two elements shapes behavioural patterns. This finding furthermore indicates that there is, indeed, a significant pay-off in abandoning the existing assumption of homogeneity in re-election ambition among MPs.

Second, and in response to the study's overarching research question, the results suggest that electoral rules impact the behaviour of legislators in a way predicted by the literature's main theory. The shown differences in differences across the UK and Germany and across Germany's electoral tiers reflect the hypothesised

party-centric or personalistic incentives generated by the given electoral system. The study's within-system cross-national design thereby plays an important role in helping reduce the influence of confounding and potentially distorting country-level factors that at times have limited the validity of existing cross-national and aggregate-level approaches. Accordingly, my research makes a new contribution to the long-standing study of electoral rules and MP behaviour by uncovering fresh empirical insights beyond those provided by the conventional cross-national or single-country studies.

It must nonetheless be recognised that the rational pursuit of goals such as re-election is not the only driving force behind legislators' actions. Socialisation and norms, for example, also condition the behaviour of MPs (e.g. Crowe 1983; Kam 2009; Skjæveland 2001), as do MPs' intrinsic motivations to fulfil, normatively, certain roles or duties as representatives (e.g. Campbell and Lovenduski 2015; Norton 1994; Patzelt 1997a; Searing 1994). Although not modelled explicitly, my consideration of MPs' career backgrounds and degrees of socialisation with the political sphere captures some of this MP-level variation beyond re-election ambition.

Naturally, and despite a range of existing efforts, a great deal of variation in the behaviour of legislators remains to be accounted for, and some aspects might very well never be explained; we are, after all, dealing with the fickle nature of human behaviour. Nevertheless, I hope to have added a new piece to the puzzle of why MPs engage in more party-centric or more personalistic behaviour. A subsequent section points to some limitations of my approach and suggests related avenues for future research. Before doing so, I discuss the generalisability of my findings and outline in more detail some of their broader implications.

Generalisability of the findings

Applicability to earlier parliamentary terms

Both for the Bundestag and for the House of Commons, this study reveals a strong relationship between an MP's pre-parliamentary career background (as a proxy for re-election ambition) and the individual's likelihood to display personalistic or party-centric behaviour in legislative voting. In both countries, this finding holds for the pooled data across the two parliamentary terms (2005-13 and 2005-15 respectively), and for each term separately. However, it must also be asked whether these results are likely to hold in earlier parliaments.

I expect this to be the case for the Bundestag. The German electoral system has not experienced any significant change since its inception, and its behavioural incentives have always been considered distinctly party-centric (e.g. Dichgans 1976; Fraenkel and Bracher 1957; Johnson and Wallack 2012; Patzelt 1999; Saalfeld 1995b; Sendler 1985).[33] Moreover, German MPs have not become significantly less party-loyal in their voting behaviour over the past decades (Bergmann et al. 2016), despite the growth of external incentives for a personal vote, such as voter volatility and dealignment, as well as opportunities presented by social media. This suggests that the party-centric electoral rules reliably condition the behaviour of incumbents. Finally, the share of career politician MPs in the Bundestag has not changed much, at least in recent decades (Micus 2012). The stability across the key parameters of electoral rules, party unity, and the share of career politicians therefore leads me to expect very similar results for earlier parliaments.

The UK represents a more dynamic environment. While I still expect career politicians to be more likely to dissent across earlier parliaments (for some empirical

[33] For a brief discussion of the impact of reunification, see chapter 6.

indication, see Cowley 2005; King 1981), the magnitude of this effect is likely to have increased. Although the UK electoral rules have always promoted some degree of personal-vote incentives (e.g. Aydelotte 1977; Eggers and Spirling 2014a; Williams 1966), rising voter volatility and dealignment, as well as the growth of social media, are likely to have reinforced the electoral utility of such behaviour (e.g. Bowler 2010; Kellermann 2013; Kellermann 2016, see also chapter 4.2). These developments lead me to expect the behavioural differences between career and non-career politicians to have grown in recent parliaments. Moreover, the House of Commons has seen an increase in the number of career politicians over recent decades (e.g. Cowley 2005; King 1981; Lamprinakou 2014; Riddell 1995). Such dynamics have led to the suggestion that "the greater the number of careerist MPs, the greater the competition between them to get noticed [by the electorate]" (Norton 1994, 718), adding to my expectation of an increase in the behavioural difference between career and non-career politicians.

Generalisability to other country cases

How are my results expected to hold across other country cases? On the level of the individual country, it is not controversial to expect that MPs who are most ambitious for re-election should display the greatest effort in employing the strategy identified as most conducive to achieving this goal. The comparative question, however, is whether the magnitude of the difference in differences shown in this study varies across a larger number of country cases in a predictable pattern.

The electoral rules for the Bundestag and the House of Commons do not lie at the extreme ends of a theoretical spectrum in the degree to which they promote party-centric or personalistic vote-seeking strategies for their incumbents. These end points are, on the party-centric side, occupied by parliamentary systems with closed

list PR and multi-member constituencies (such as Portugal, Spain or Norway), and, on the personalistic side, by presidential systems with a first-past-the-post system (such as the US). My case selection therefore provides a harder testing ground for the existing theoretical model, given that the hypothesised incentives lie closer together (for a similar argument, see Proksch and Slapin 2012). The fact that substantive behavioural differences – or, more specifically, differences in differences – have been identified between the cases of the UK and Germany leads me to expect that the pattern should hold across other country cases. In other words, and following the existing theory linking electoral rules and MP behaviour, I expect the behavioural difference between MPs with low and high re-election ambition to be even larger within electoral systems that provide stronger party-centric or personalistic vote-seeking incentives.[34]

While a separate section is dedicated to suggestions for future research, it should be noted here that an expansion to other country cases would facilitate an even more significant and robust test of the existing theory on electoral rules and legislative behaviour. The inclusion of more country cases could also serve to corroborate the findings of existing case studies. For example, recent evidence of personalistic vote-seeking efforts generated by flexible list systems in countries such as Belgium (Bräuninger, Brunner, and Däubler 2012; Däubler, Bräuninger, and Brunner 2016) or Slovakia (Crisp et al. 2013) could be validated by testing whether the MPs most invested in the goal of re-election also make use of these strategies to the greatest extent.[35] Additional suggestions for empirical expansion are outlined below; first, I discuss some broader implications of my findings.

[34]This is also reflected in the graphical illustration of my theoretical predictions (see figure 4.1 chapter 3) by the widening gap between the lines denoting the two MP types.

[35]When expanding the empirical analysis, care should also be taken to ensure that the chosen MP-level proxies for re-election ambition – in my case career background – are comparable across country settings.

Electoral rules, re-election ambition and MP behaviour: Broader implications and significance

The introduction of this thesis identified a number of broader insights to be gained from a cross-national MP-level study of electoral rules and legislative behaviour. Some of these can now be addressed in light of my empirical results. I begin by outlining implications for existing debates concerning the impact of MPs' career backgrounds on their behaviour. A subsequent section discusses the potential relevance of my results for electoral system design, and for our understanding of intra-party politics and party institutionalisation in new democracies.

Career politicians and the interaction with the institutional setting

The MP-level approach taken in this thesis contributes to a recent wave of interest in systematic and large-N approaches to explaining MP-level variation in legislative behaviour through actors' individual characteristics and backgrounds (e.g. Bäck, Debus, and Müller 2014; Baumann, Debus, and Müller 2015; Cowley and Childs 2003; Saalfeld 2011; Tavits 2009; see also the early contribution by Rueckert and Crane 1962). Specifically, I add new theoretical and empirical insights regarding the legislative behaviour of career politician MPs, a class of legislators that has found itself at the centre of considerable public and journalistic – as well as some academic – debate across western democracies.

For a number of reasons, public opinion in the UK, Germany and beyond is generally critical of individuals who have focused their entire careers on politics (e.g. Allen 2012; Edinger 2012; Godwin 2014; Hesse 2013; Kellner 2014; Kirkup 2014; Koschnick 2014; Lorenz and Micus 2013; McSmith 2009; Oborne 2007; Riddell 1993). A significant part of this debate revolves around the concern that an

increase in career politicians makes legislatures less representative of society (e.g. Oborne 2007) and that professional politicians are out of touch with the problems of ordinary citizens (e.g. Allen 2012; Groves 2012).[36]

While these considerations are important from a normative or descriptive perspective concerning the kind of individuals who act as elected representatives, the analysis conducted in this study speaks to the behavioural "so what?" question. This gains particular relevance thanks to the growing public interest in career politicians as a distinct MP group. Moreover, it was noted over two decades ago that "an intriguing, but still unresolved, issue is how far the rise of the career politician has made MPs more ... rebellious' (Riddell 1993, 143-4). This remains an empirical puzzle today, as a systematic investigation of the actual *behaviour* of career politicians is still largely missing from the debate.[37]

A common speculation in the context of the UK is that a rise in career politician MPs should lead (or has already led) to greater toothlessness in parliamentary scrutiny and to subservience to the party leadership (e.g. Cowley 2005; King 1981; Koschnick 2014; Oborne 2007). My finding that UK career politicians actually have a higher likelihood for dissent therefore goes against this received – but not systematically tested – wisdom that these types of MPs should be subservient yes-men (and -women), or "lobby fodder" (cf. Douglas 1984; King 1981; Marshall-Andrews 2011; Oborne 2007; Riddell 1993). The persistence of this truism, however, is not only owed to the lack of systematic behavioural tests,[38] but also to the fact that

[36] Both German and UK media include articles with dramatic titles such as "Career politicians: the gravediggers of democracy", "Can we stop the rise of the career politician?", "Forget Eton, it's career politicians we can't stand", "Career politicians take over Commons", or, "FTSE 100: Career politicians are 'holding back British business' ".

[37] Relevant contributions are often anecdotal or empirically speculative (e.g. Cowley 2005; Groves 2012; Marshall-Andrews 2011; Norton 1999; Röper 2005; Schwarz and Lambert 1971).

[38] But see the previous – albeit very basic and often overlooked – macro-level longitudinal observation that "[t]he rise of the career politician [in the UK], often blamed for the creation of subservience, has in fact had the opposite effect" (Cowley 2005, 38; see also King 1981).

institutional factors, such as electoral rules, have previously been overlooked in predictions about the behaviour of career politicians.

My comparative cross-national results suggest that the degree of party-centric behaviour displayed by an incumbent is, ceteris paribus, not merely a function of the individual's characteristic of being a career politician (and the re-election ambition captured by this quality), but of the interaction between individual traits and the electoral rules under which the incumbent operates. One important implication of this findings for the debate on career politicians is therefore that the conventional wisdom derived from anecdotal observations in a single country should be subjected to systematic and cross-national tests in order to identify a potentially interactive influence of the larger institutional setting. Such an approach reveals that in a system like the UK's, a career politician's strong economic and emotional dependence on the mandate may in fact strengthen the incumbent's responsiveness to the principal who ensures that the MP retains his or her job – the voter. Conversely, where the electoral system generates strong party-centric incentives, like in the Bundestag, the institutional setting appears to amplify the party-loyal behaviour that the received wisdom associates with this type of MP.

In sum, these findings on career politicians again illustrate that neither an exclusively institutional-level nor a predominantly MP-level approach to explaining legislative behaviour can fully grasp the underlying incentives and dynamics. Despite previous recommendations (e.g. Searing 1991; Strøm 1997), recent contributions still call for greater efforts to combine the conventional institutionalist view with more systematic analyses of legislators' individual backgrounds and motivations (e.g. Allen 2012; Bäck, Debus, and Müller 2014; Baumann, Debus, and Müller 2015; Debus and Bäck 2014; Tavits 2009). I hope to have made a contribution in this regard, as my findings indicate the explanatory value of a more integrative and granular behavioural model.

Some implications for electoral design and party institutionalisation

The results presented in this thesis hold tentative lessons for designers of electoral systems in new democracies. Insights from eastern and central Europe, for example, suggest that electoral rules – among or in combination with other institutional factors – provide considerable leverage to promote key features of a representative democracy including accountability and the development of stable party systems based on institutionalised parliamentary parties (e.g. Bielasiak 2002; Horowitz and Browne 2005; Mcmenamin and Gwiazda 2011; Olson 1998). More generally, the choice of electoral system is often faced with a trade-off between normative ideals about the accountability of representatives, and, particularly in parliamentary systems, the need for cohesive and stable parliamentary party groups.

My findings suggest that designers of electoral rules should look beyond the institutional setting as the key predictor of how the intended balance between these normatively desirable factors is likely to play out in the actual practice of the electoral system. Particularly, the behavioural influence of the electoral institution is likely to be mediated by the types of people (e.g. legislators or party leaders) that operate within them. More specifically, the institutional incentives should interact with the individuals' career goals and the opportunities incumbents have for seeking (political) careers beyond the legislature – i.e. how valuable a sustained career in parliament is perceived to be by the legislator.

In some countries, the pay-offs for becoming and remaining a member of parliament may be considerable given, for example, the economic benefits of the mandate compared to other professions in the specific country. In other settings, legislators may, on average, possess more attractive fall-back options beyond the legislative mandate, or may use parliament only as a springboard to further office (see also

Samuels 2000, addressed below).[39] Such differences should have implications for the behavioural effect of the electoral rules, and for the degree to which they can fulfil the normative goals that have been set for them.

For example, a party-centric PR system in combination with a large number of MPs with strong re-election ambitions should be highly effective in unfolding its party-centric dynamics and, as a result, in generating very cohesive parties. Meanwhile, having a similar electoral system but a majority of legislators who only look to use parliament as a launching pad for other careers should reduce the impact of the party-centric incentives. Conversely, the high individual accountability provided, in theory, by SMD or preferential list systems is likely to unfold only if incumbents face high opportunity costs for leaving parliament, in turn making them responsive to the electoral considerations that structure the relationship between the MP and the voter in a personalised system.

These proposals, as derived from my findings, are supported by previous work in the context of Latin America. In the Brazilian case, for example, Samuels (2000) shows that because many legislators seek political office beyond the national assembly, the candidate-centred electoral system and candidate selection rules do not necessarily generate the individualistic behavioural dynamics that the theory would expect. Rather, they may even discourage incumbents from running for re-election (thereby making the cultivation of a personal vote unnecessary), given the strong intra-party competition in the (re-)nomination process as well as the attractiveness of extra-parliamentary political office. In a similar vein, Crisp et al. (2004) provide some indication across six Latin American countries that a higher turnover rate reduces the behavioural impact of the electoral system (for related findings see also Jones et al. 2002; Leoni, Pereira, and Rennó 2004).

[39] Some endogeneity might be present due to potential self-selection of specific candidates.

Overall, a more disaggregated consideration of MPs' re-election motives can inform our understanding of how the choice of electoral rules can have a differential behavioural impact depending on the goals and ambitions of the individuals operating within them.[40] By demonstrating the broader explanatory potential of a more actor-focused perspective on the effects of electoral rules, my findings thus hold, together with previous contributions (see above), some conclusions that may be of relevance to the designers of electoral systems in new democracies.

Limitations and suggestions for future research

The approach taken in this study can add only one piece to the complex mosaic of how institutional- and individual-level incentives interact to shape the behaviour of legislators. As a result, there remain numerous explanatory avenues to explore. The following discussion of my study's limitations as well as related suggestions for future research can be organised along three dimensions; these pertain to the outcome variable of interest, i.e. the behaviour of legislators, and to the two core explanatory angles of my approach, electoral rules and MP-level motivation.

In terms of legislative behaviour, this thesis focuses on the previously employed proxy of legislative voting as the main outcome variable. Some drawbacks associated with this approach have already been addressed in chapter 5. Despite the conceptual usefulness of this variable, further applications of my within-system cross-national model would benefit from the analysis of other tools used by legislators to engage in party-centric vote-seeking strategies or to cultivate a personal vote. A study of the quantity and content of parliamentary speeches, for example, could provide further insight into how those MPs most invested in retaining their mandate would employ this tool in their bid to secure re-election. One of the benefits of considering

[40] A certain degree of endogeneity or self-selection notwithstanding.

legislative speech as an outcome variable is that MPs are less constrained when using this tool (cf. Proksch and Slapin 2015), meaning that we should find it easier to identify the strategic, vote-seeking component of their behaviour.

Previous cross-national MP-level analysis of parliamentary speech-making in the Bundestag and the UK House of Commons (Proksch and Slapin 2012; 2015) reveals that the rules governing floor access are to some degree endogenous to the incentives generated by the electoral system, and that MP-level differences in the likelihood of taking the floor align with the overarching theories on electoral rules and vote-seeking behaviour. This contribution thus provides some important pointers as to how my model might apply to legislative speech. I would expect those MPs most ambitious for re-election to make particularly strong use of the greater freedom and independence granted in speech making in the House of Commons; meanwhile, one might anticipate that the more restrictive party-centric rules and expectations surrounding speech in the Bundestag provide a particularly effective platform for MPs with high re-election ambitions to showcase their party loyalty. A detailed empirical analysis of these predictions could further our understanding of how legislative speech as a vote-seeking tool is reflected in the interactions between the institutional setting and an MP's re-election ambitions.

Future studies would also benefit from focusing on MP activities beyond the traditional parliamentary setting. In particular, the prevalent use by MPs of social media platforms such as Twitter provides researchers with vast amounts of data on how incumbents position themselves vis-à-vis their electorate or their party. While legislators can use this tool to signal party loyalty both towards the party leadership and to the voter, it also represents a ready opportunity for MPs to carve out a personal and independent image, potentially at the cost of party unity (e.g. Jackson

and Lilleker 2011; Miller 2015; The Economist 2015).[41] Although some advances have been made in the study of MPs' social media use (e.g. Jackson and Lilleker 2011; Margaretten and Gaber 2014; Scherpereel, Wohlgemuth, and Schmelzinger 2016; Zittel 2015b), it would be highly instructive to integrate such information into a larger comparative framework of institutional and individual-level incentives. This would be particularly enlightening seeing as MPs are much less constrained in their social media use than is the case for behaviour within the parliamentary sphere (cf. Proksch and Slapin 2015).

Concerning the use of MP-level motivation as an explanatory variable, this study relies on quantitative coding of a large number of MP biographies. However, the establishment of more detailed profiles of legislators based on rigorous studies of biographical information would allow us to validate such large-N operationalisations. King's in-depth study of UK MPs' biographies and careers remains an important example of a more qualitative approach (1981), while recent cross-national survey projects have been able to use first-hand information provided by MPs (Deschouwer and Depauw 2014). Another option would be to corroborate the quantitative findings with MP interviews. However, as the response rates to surveys or interviews have decreased drastically over recent decades, researchers will increasingly have to look to other mechanisms to extract information about members' backgrounds, ambitions and motivations.

The approach presented here might also benefit from a more nuanced analysis of the demand for certain legislative behaviour, as expressed by the voter. For example, future studies could incorporate constituents' assessments of the party label or the party leader, as well as the ideological proximity between voter and

[41] This was possibly the reason behind former Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron's infamous assessment that "too many tweets might make a tw*t" (Siddique 2009).

MP, in order to gauge the effectiveness (and target) of an MP's re-election strategy (for some relevant advances, see Campbell et al. 2016; Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan 2016; Vivyan and Wagner 2012). In a similar vein, a recent analysis points to the importance of qualitative evidence in considering the perceptions that MPs themselves have of the institutional settings in which they operate (André, Depauw, and Martin 2016). Cross-national explanations of MP behaviour could therefore be enhanced by combining this more subjective MP-level view with individual-level variation in ambition and motivation in order to gain better insight into the precise incentive structures faced by MPs.

Future research may also want to consider legislators' personality profiles as a behavioural determinant (cf. Debus and Bäck 2014). Although some contributions have begun to recognise the explanatory value of a psychological perspective on elite behaviour at the MP-level (Caprara et al. 2010; Russell 2014), the focus of the relevant political psychology literature still rests predominantly on the profiles of voters or political leaders. However, systematic and large-N estimations of legislators' personality traits (for example by using speech or text analysis) would add new dimensions to our understanding of why MPs behave the way they do. Recent and highly encouraging work has already begun to demonstrate the potential of such an approach (Hollibaugh, Ramey, and Klingler 2016; Ramey, Klingler, and Hollibaugh 2016).

Finally, my empirical tests are limited to the cases of the UK House of Commons and the German Bundestag, and to the electoral tiers of Germany's mixed-member system. Expanding the analysis to include other country cases would enhance the explanatory power of the approach by increasing variation in electoral rules as the main macro-level determinant (see above). Moreover, future research would profit

from additional in-depth analyses of strongly party-centric electoral systems. Given the lack of incentives for a "personal vote", these systems are often less interesting to researchers. Yet, as the comparative MP-level analysis conducted in this study has suggested, a move beyond the rigidity in the existing re-election assumption can uncover electoral strategies even within party-centric systems.

By exercising sensitivity both to the larger institutional setting and to MPs' personal backgrounds and ambitions, this thesis has provided new theoretical and empirical insights into the long-standing question of how electoral rules impact the behaviour of legislators. Nonetheless, much work remains to be done in order to provide an even clearer and more robust understanding of this causal link. It is my hope that the framework and results presented in this thesis can be of use to future efforts and advances to come.

APPENDIX

Appendix

Operationalisation of *Previous Income* variable

To operationalise the *Previous Income* variable discussed in section 5.2.4, I establish the discrepancy between the estimated salary of an MP's best-paid previous occupation and the parliamentary salary. To facilitate this, I use publicly available data on average remunerations for given occupations (see below). The yearly salary for Bundestag MPs was 88,068€ in 2009 and 99,024€ in 2013.[42] In the UK House of Commons, it was £64,766 in 2010 and £67,060 in 2015,[43] and is therefore comparable to the salary of German MPs.[44]

The binary variable *Previous Income* divides MPs into those whose previous occupations yielded a significantly lower income than the mandate, and those whose prior income was at a similar level or higher. As the cut-off, I consider an MP to be in the lower income category (coded 0) if his or her previous income did not reach the level of the parliamentary salary minus 20 per cent (i.e. about 70,000€ in 2009 and 79,000€ in 2013 in Germany, and about £52,000 (2010) and £54,000 (2015) in the UK). Any MP whose previous occupation had an average income above that threshold was considered to yield a similar or even higher income than the one provided by the mandate (coded 1).[45] To determine each MP's category, I

[42] This figure increased in irregular increments between 2005 and 2009. Moreover, MPs receive a monthly (tax-exempt) stipend of around 4000 Euro to cover rent in Berlin, office supplies as well as other costs including the running of the district office.

[43] UK MPs can also claim some expenses related to travel, staff and accommodation.

[44] It must be recognised that MPs receive additional payment if they hold ministerial office. However, I use the remuneration for the mandate as the baseline.

[45] The reason I use the 20 per cent margin instead of the actual parliamentary salary is that any occupation falling above the mandate in terms of salary must be considered very well-paying in both countries, with only few occupations reaching these levels.

rely on data covering the average national income by profession in the given years, as provided by the German and UK statistics offices.[46] For each MP, I compare this income data with the legislator's biographical information to establish whether the average salary of his or her best paid previous occupation falls into the lower- or higher-earning category. When estimating this difference, the focus rests on the points in time at which an MP would have to consider his or her outside options, namely the election years of the time periods covered here. I therefore use average income data measured as closely to the time of the election years as possible (official data for Germany is available for 2010 and 2014; and for 2010 and 2015 for the UK).[47]

For the vast majority of MP profiles, the establishment of the appropriate category is largely unambiguous. In most cases, it is clear that the legislator's best-paid previous occupation either falls in the lower-income (examples include civil servants, lower-ranked employees in health-/social care, teachers, trade union officials, manual wage earners etc.) or the higher-income category (e.g. high-ranking legal practitioner, high-ranking health professional or engineer, individuals with leading (managerial) position in large companies, in banking, finance or consulting). In the small number of cases that saw some ambiguity, more detailed research into the MP's professional backgrounds was conducted. Given the lack of detailed information on the MP's occupation, however, judgement calls had to be made in a limited number of cases. At times, such discretion is inevitable as part of a quantitative, large-N coding of legislators' biographies (cf. Barber 2014). Descriptive statistics of the variable are provided in table A12 below.

[46] For Germany, the Statistisches Bundesamt (2012; 2016) covers average income data for 2010 and 2014 respectively. For the UK, I rely on data provided by the Office of National Statistics (2010; 2015), supplemented by rankings conducted by private data providers such as Reed (2016).

[47] To be sure, this is an imperfect measure, as the average income of an occupation may have changed between the time the MP actually exercised it and the time this occupation would serve as a potential fall-back option. The vast majority of occupations, however, display only limited fluctuations in salary over time.

Table A1: Illustration of structure of used dataset

MP_id	vote_id	vote_char	MP_char	MP_party	dissent	...
1	101	a	p	d	0	...
1	102	b	p	d	1	...
1	103	c	p	d	0	...
2	101	a	r	e	0	...
2	102	b	r	e	0	...
2	103	c	r	e	1	...
...	...	...	...	...	...	...

Table A2: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, German Bundestag 2005-2013, *Previous Income* variable

	Bundestag (2005-2013), with *Previous Income* variable					
	Model C1		**Model C2**		**Model C3**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Previous Income ref.: *Higher Income*						
Lower Income	0.78**	.09	0.76**	.08	0.76**	.08
Government	0.54***	.03	0.74***	.04	0.57***	.03
Legislative Term	0.58***	.02	-	-	0.57***	.03
Office ref.: No office						
Office whole/part term	-	-	0.45***	.04	0.52***	.04
Office in past	-	-	0.86	.10	0.96	.10
Local Politician	-	-	-	-	1.12	.10
Unsuccessful	-	-	-	-	0.98	.17
Age	-	-	-	-	0.98	.03
Age^2	-	-	-	-	1.00	.00
Mandate Type	-	-	-	-	1.10	.10
Gender	-	-	-	-	0.96	0.10
Standing Down	-	-	-	-	1.03	.08
Subject ref.: Economy						
Foreign and EU	-	-	-	-	2.73***	.10
Other	-	-	-	-	1.81***	.07
Constant	0.01***	.00	0.01***	.00	0.01***	.01
PPG dummies	✓		✓		✓	
Observations (n)	236,173		236,173		236,173	
Groups (No. of MPs)	861		861		861	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	3.885***		3,816***		3,644***	
Intraclass Correlation	.29		.29		.28	
Log Likelihood	-20,431		-20,478		-20,051	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A3: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, UK House of Commons 2005-2015, *Previous Income* variable

	Commons (2005-2015), with *Previous Income* variable					
	Model D1		**Model D2**		**Model D3**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Previous Income ref.: *Higher Income*						
Lower Income	1.47***	.16	1.29***	.12	1.24**	.14
Government	2.64***	.08	2.23***	.22	2.82***	.09
Legislative Term	1.03	.03	-	-	1.27***	.04
Office ref.: No office						
Office whole term	-	-	0.14***	.02	-	-
Office part term	-	-	0.70***	.07	-	-
Office in past	-	-	0.22***	.02	-	-
Local Politician	-	-	-	-	1.23**	.14
Unsuccessful	-	-	-	-	1.35**	.20
Age	-	-	-	-	0.89***	.03
Age^2	-	-	-	-	1.00***	.00
Gender	-	-	-	-	1.67***	.23
Standing Down	-	-	-	-	0.73***	.05
Margin	-	-	-	-	0.99***	.00
Subject ref.: Economy						
Foreign and EU	-	-	-	-	5.50***	.20
Other	-	-	-	-	2.86**	.08
Constant	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00
PPG dummies	✓		✓		✓	
Observations (n)	1,054,766		1,054,766		1,054,766	
Groups (No. of MPs)	862		862		862	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	19,265***		12,422***		17,112***	
Intraclass Correlation	.41		.32		.38	
Log Likelihood	-47,055		-46,773		-45,740	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A4: *Robustness checks with different estimation models:* Logistic regressions with clustered standard errors and fractional logit models, German Bundestag, 2005-2013

	Robust *SEs* clustered by MP^{+}				Fractional logit model†			
	All MPs^{a}		**All back-benchers**^{b}		**All MPs**		**All back-benchers**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career								
Mixed	0.99	.12	1.03	.14	1.02	.13	1.07	.14
Career Politician	0.62***	.08	0.64***	.09	0.59***	.08	0.62***	.09
Local Politician	1.00	.17	0.95	.11	1.12	.12	1.09	.13
Unsuccessful	1.09	.20	1.07	.21	1.00	.19	0.86	.18
Age	0.96	.04	0.98	.04	0.95	.04	0.97	.04
Age^2	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Mandate Type	1.29*	.20	1.22	.20	-	-	-	-
Gender	1.01	.11	1.03	.13	1.06	.11	1.04	.12
Standing Down	0.83	.13	0.77	.14	-	-	-	-
Government	0.57***	.06	0.85	.10	-	-	-	-
Office ref.: No office								
Office whole/part term	0.55***	.07	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office in past	1.09	.20	1.12	.22	-	-	-	-
Constant	0.03***	.02	0.00***	.00	0.04***	.03	0.02***	.03

(continued)

Table A4 continued

	Robust *SEs* clustered by MP^{+}				Fractional logit model†			
	All MPs^{a}		**All back-benchers**^{b}		**All MPs**		**All back-benchers**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Subject	✓		✓					
Closeness			✓					
Attendance			✓					
PPG dummies	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Legislative Term	✓							
Voting Decisions N	236,173		171,299		-		-	
Number of MPs	861		699		861		648	
Log Likelihood	-21,829		-17,259		-85.5		-69.0	

SE = standard error. $^{+}$Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. Logit models with standard errors clustered by MP. †Fractional logit model. Dependent variable: Proportion of deviating votes. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
^{a}Replicates model A1. ^{b}Replicates model A5.

Table A5: *Robustness checks with different estimation models:* Logistic regressions with clustered standard errors and fractional logit models, House of Commons, 2005-2015

	Robust *SEs* clustered by MP[+]				Fractional logit model[†]			
	All MPs[a]		**All back-benchers**[b]		**All MPs**		**All back-benchers**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career								
Mixed	1.29*	.19	1.35*	.24	1.21	.20	1.30	.23
Career Politician	1.74***	.33	1.80***	.44	1.80***	.38	1.75***	.38
Local Politician	1.14	.17	1.04	.19	1.19	.19	1.03	.19
Unsuccessful	1.33	.23	1.35	.18	1.61***	.30	1.52**	.29
Age	-	-	1.03	.06	1.04***	.01	1.01*	.01
Age^2	-	-	1.00	.00	-	-	-	-
Term	1.10***	.03	-	-	-	-	-	-
Margin	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	-	-	-	-
Gender	1.26	.27	1.30	.35	1.39	.32	1.16	.31
Standing Down	0.72**	.12	0.72*	.13	-	-	-	-
Government	1.83***	.14	2.47***	.22	-	-	-	-
Office ref.: No office								
Office whole term	0.06***	.01	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office part term	0.49***	.09	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office in past	0.13***	.02	0.55***	.11	-	-	-	-
Constant	0.05***	.01	0.01***	.01	0.01***	.01	0.01***	.00

(continued)

Table A5 continued

	Robust *SEs* clustered by MP^{+}				Fractional logit model†			
	All MPs^{a}		**All back-benchers**^{b}		**All MPs**		**All back-benchers**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Subject	✓		✓					
Closeness	✓		✓					
Attendance	✓		✓					
PPG dummies	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Legislative Term	✓		✓					
Voting Decisions N	1,056,857		425,261		-		-	
Number of MPs	864		418		864		418	
Log Likelihood	-47,951		-37,249		-47.7		-37.7	

SE = standard error. $^{+}$Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. Logit models with standard errors clustered by MP. † Fractional logit model. Dependent variable: Proportion of deviating votes. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
^{a}Replicates model B2. ^{b}Replicates model B5.

Table A6: *Robustness checks by legislative term:* Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, German Bundestag

	2005-2009 (16th Parliament)				2009-2013 (17th Parliament)			
	All MPs		**All back-benchers**		**All MPs**		**All back-benchers**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career								
Mixed	0.98	.14	1.12	.17	1.05	.16	1.08	.20
Career Politician	0.57***	.09	0.65***	.11	0.65***	.10	0.67**	.12
Local Politician	1.12	.13	1.17	.16	1.09	.14	1.08	.16
Unsuccessful	1.04	.24	1.14	.30	0.93	.21	0.83	.21
Age	0.96	.05	0.99	.06	0.96	.05	0.92	.05
Age^2	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Mandate Type	1.62***	.23	1.39**	.23	0.80	.11	0.78	.14
Gender	0.83	.10	0.90	.30	1.11	.15	1.17	.19
Standing Down	0.95	.15	0.85	.15	0.90	.18	0.72	.17
Government	0.34***	.05	0.50***	.09	0.21***	.03	0.76***	.05
Office ref.: No office								
Office whole/part term	0.58***	.08	-	-	0.44***	.06	-	-
Office in past	1.22	.29	1.32	.32	0.82	.23	0.89	.25
Constant	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00

(continued)

Table A6 continued

	2005-2009 (16th Parliament)				2009-2013 (17th Parliament)			
	All MPs		**All back-benchers**		**All MPs**		**All back-benchers**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Subject	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Closeness	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Attendance	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voting Decisions N	89,878		66,395		146,295		104,904	
Groups (No. of MPs)	637		468		651		467	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	1,637***		1,302***		2,273***		1,921***	
Intraclass Correlation	.30		.29		.32		.32	
Log Likelihood	-9,283		-7,392		-10,051		-8,273	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Due to correlation, *PPG* and *Government* controls cannot be included in same model. Results for variables of interest remain similar when *PPG* dummies are used instead of *Government*.

Table A7: *Robustness checks by legislative term:* Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, UK House of Commons

	2005-2010 (54th Parliament)				2010-2015 (55th Parliament)			
	All MPs		**Pure back-benchers**		**All MPs**		**Pure back-benchers**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career								
Mixed	1.21	.17	1.36	.50	1.42***	.18	1.50	.43
Career Politician	1.69***	.27	6.89***	3.1	1.47**	.23	2.79***	.97
Local Politician	1.24*	.16	0.85	.31	1.23*	.14	0.89	.21
Unsuccessful	1.19	.19	1.52	.66	1.13	.17	1.61	.48
Age	0.98	.06	1.20	.17	0.99	.04	1.05	.09
Age^2	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Margin	0.99	.00	0.99	.00	0.99	.00	1.00	.00
Gender	1.27	.20	1.33	.54	1.38**	.19	1.90**	.57
Standing Down	0.74**	.11	0.88	.31	0.63***	.10	1.39	.56
Government	0.51***	.07	1.57	.71	1.78***	.23	3.46***	1.2
Office ref.: No office								
Office whole term	0.07***	.01	-	-	0.09***	.02	-	-
Office part term	0.4***	.07	-	-	1.06	.67	-	-
Office in past	0.16***	.03	-	-	0.23***	.03	-	-
Constant	0.06***	.09	0.00**	.00	0.02***	.02	0.00***	.00

(continued)

Table A7 continued

	2005-2010 (54th Parliament)				2010-2015 (55th Parliament)			
	All MPs		**Pure back-benchers**		**All MPs**		**Pure back-benchers**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Subject	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Closeness	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Attendance	✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voting Decisions N	522,205		77,089		534,652		123,602	
Groups (No. of MPs)	622		95		636		147	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	6,172***		2,456***		4,918***		2,895***	
Intraclass Correlation	.32		.36		.27		.32	
Log Likelihood	-21,234		-8,313		-20,986		-9,246	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Due to correlation, *PPG* and *Government* controls cannot be included in same model. Results for variables of interest remain similar when *PPG* dummies are used instead of *Government*. Results also hold for all backbenchers.

Table A8: *Robustness checks by party:* Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, German Bundestag, 2005-2013

	Pooled data: German Bundestag 2005-2013, all MPs									
	CDU/CSU		**SPD**		**FDP**		**Die Linke**		**Die Grünen**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career										
Mixed	0.83	.17	1.08	.23	1.18	.48	1.75***	.29	0.83	.22
Career Politician	0.64**	.14	0.63**	.14	0.43*	.19	1.45**	.25	0.34***	.10
Local Politician	1.22	.21	1.20	.22	0.70	.23	0.88	.12	1.20	.26
Unsuccessful	0.90	.32	0.81	.38	1.37	.61	0.84	.15	0.86	.38
Age	0.88**	.06	0.90	.06	1.20*	.11	1.05	.05	1.01	.07
Age^2	1.00**	.00	1.00	.00	0.99*	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Mandate Type	1.06	.17	1.0	.11	-	-	1.33	.26	18.0***	18.9
Gender	1.06	.23	0.89	.17	0.85	.32	1.10	.13	0.84	.18
Standing Down	1.17	.18	1.05	.14	0.89	.21	1.04	.28	1.22	.28
Office ref.: No office										
Office whole/part term	0.42***	.08	0.58***	.09	0.27***	.04	1.25	.17	0.51***	.10
Office in past	0.71	.25	0.89	.14	2.38*	1.1	2.14**	.73	0.78	.19
Constant	0.12	.19	0.16	.28	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.01***	.00

(continued)

Table A8 continued

	Pooled data: German Bundestag 2005-2013, all MPs									
	CDU/CSU		**SPD**		**FDP**		**Die Linke**		**Die Grünen**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Subject	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Legislative Term	✓						✓		✓	
Government			✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voting Decisions N	91,038		66,490		30,707		24,161		23,524	
Groups (No. of MPs)	310		259		110		92		89	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	920***		1,553***		394***		6.4***		299***	
Intraclass Correlation	.29		.32		.34		.03		.17	
Log Likelihood	-4,784		-6,988		-2,453		-2,235		-3,187	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models replicate A1 for indicated party. The inclusion of *Closeness* or *Attendance* instead of *Legislative Term* does not change the results for the main variable of interest, *Career*. Where a party was both in government and opposition over the two terms, the *Legislative Term* variable is collinear with *Government*, so I only include one.

Table A9: *Robustness checks by party:* Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, UK House of Commons, 2005-2015

	Pooled data: House of Commons 2005-2015									
	Conservatives				**Labour**				**LibDems**†	
	All MPs		**Pure back-benchers**		**All MPs**		**Pure back-benchers**		**All MPs**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career ref.: Non-Career										
Mixed	1.21	.18	1.18	.39	1.68***	.29	2.16*	.86	0.81	.19
Career Politician	1.65**	.37	2.53**	1.2	1.65***	.31	6.33***	2.7	1.62**	.38
Local Politician	1.03	.14	0.79	.22	1.32*	.21	0.78	.31	1.39*	.26
Unsuccessful	1.38**	.22	1.79*	.57	1.23	.30	1.05	.54	1.10	.23
Age	0.97	.05	1.09	.12	0.89**	.04	1.52**	.32	1.14	.09
Age^2	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00**	.00	0.99*	.00	0.99*	.00
Margin	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	0.99***	.00	0.99**	.10	0.99**	.10
Gender	1.40*	.26	1.96*	.71	1.51**	.25	1.31	.54	1.54	.44
Standing Down	0.72***	.08	0.82	.17	0.55***	.06	0.55***	.06	1.17	.21
Office ref.: No office										
Office whole term	0.13***	.02	-	-	0.05***	.01	-	-	0.19***	.06
Office part term	0.70**	.11	-	-	0.66**	.11	-	-	1.14	.37
Office in past	0.25***	.04	-	-	0.14***	.02	-	-	0.24***	.08
Constant	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00	0.28	.36	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00

(continued)

Table A9 continued

	Pooled data: House of Commons 2005-2015									
	Conservatives				**Labour**				**LibDems†**	
	All MPs		**Pure back-benchers**		**All MPs**		**Pure back-benchers**		**All MPs**	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Subject	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Attendance	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Closeness	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Government	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	
Voting Decisions N	427,943		107,144		530,124		87,657		98,790	
Groups (No. of MPs)	350		105		440		88		74	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	3,849***		2,661***		5,662***		2,523***		227***	
Intraclass Correlation	.25		.32		.34		.39		.11	
Log Likelihood	-17,625		-8,221		-19,148		-8,614		-5,215	

SE = standard error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

† Results for LibDem pure backbenchers not shown due to too few observations (6).

Direction of effect also holds for all backbenchers per party. Because *Government* and *Legislative Term* are collinear for every party, the latter is not included in the model.

Table A10: *Robustness check excluding outliers*†: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, German Bundestag

	German Bundestag, 2005-2013					
	All MPs[a]		**All back benchers**[b]		**Pure back-benchers**[c]	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career (ref.: Non-Career)						
Mixed	1.06	.11	1.20	.15	1.15	.15
Career Politician	0.68***	.08	0.70***	.09	0.71***	.09
Local Politician	1.02	.92	1.00	.11	1.00	.11
Unsuccessful	0.97	.16	0.99	.19	1.01	.20
Age	0.98	.03	0.97	.04	0.98	.04
Age^2	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Mandate Type	1.05	.09	0.89	.09	0.89	.10
Gender	0.96	.09	1.01	.11	0.98	.11
Standing Down	0.95	.08	0.76***	.07	0.85	.09
Government	0.54***	.03	0.94	.07	0.99	.08
Office ref.: No office						
Office whole/part term	0.56***	.05	-	-	-	-
Office in past	0.87	.12	1.01	.18	-	-
Constant	0.02***	.01	0.00***	.00	0.00***	.00
Non-MP controls:						
Subject	✓		✓		✓	
Closeness			✓		✓	
Attendance			✓		✓	
PPG dummies	✓		✓		✓	
Legislative Term	✓					
Observations (n)	232,334		167,984		156,295	
Groups (No. of MPs)	848		686		626	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	2,255***		1,883***		1,641***	
Intraclass Correlation	.24		.26		.26	
Log Likelihood	-18,307		-14,323		-13,152	

SE = Standard Error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. †See text for description of outliers; [a]Replicates model A1; [b]Replicates model A5; [c]Replicates model A7.
MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A11: *Robustness check excluding outliers*†: Multilevel logistic regressions of deviating vote choice, UK House of Commons

	House of Commons, 2005-2015					
	All MPs[a]		**All back benchers**[b]		**Pure back-benchers**[c]	
	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*	Odds Ratio	*SE*
Career (ref.: Non-Career)						
Mixed	1.37***	.16	1.62***	.24	1.61*	.36
Career Politician	1.60***	.23	1.71***	.31	3.43***	.95
Local Politician	1.31**	.14	1.07	.15	0.94	.19
Unsuccessful	1.26*	.18	1.49**	.23	1.39	.34
Age	0.90***	.03	0.94	.04	1.14	.07
Age^2	1.00***	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
Margin	0.99***	.10	1.00	.00	0.99	.00
Gender	1.72***	.05	1.18	.21	1.67**	.41
Standing Down	0.66***	.05	0.83**	.07	0.70**	.11
Government	1.88***	.07	1.81***	.10	2.73***	.26
Office in the past	-	-	0.77*	.11	-	-
Constant	0.03***	.03	0.07**	.09	0.00***	.00
Non-MP controls:						
Subject	✓		✓		✓	
Closeness	✓		✓		✓	
Attendance	✓		✓		✓	
PPG dummies	✓		✓		✓	
Legislative Term	✓		✓		✓	
Voting Decisions N	1,042,089		410,493		189,302	
Groups (No. of MPs)	857		409		193	
Chi^2 of LR-Test: rho=0	8,956***		4,802***		2,195***	
Intraclass Correlation	.34		.29		.30	
Log Likelihood	-36,934		-26,308		-13,170	

SE = Standard Error. Binary dependent variable: Deviating vote. †See text for description of outliers; [a]Replicates model B1; [b]Replicates model B5; [c]Replicates model B7;
MPs as upper-level units. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A12: Descriptive statistics of variables used in models

Variable Name	Description	Mean (s.d.)	
		UK	Germany
MP-level			
Deviating Vote	MP voted against majority of PPG	0.01 (0.10)	0.02 (0.14)
Career Politician	Only a political career prior to mandate	0.19 (0.40)	0.30 (0.46)
Mixed	Both a political and non-political career	0.30 (0.46)	0.23 (0.42)
Non-Career Pol.	Only a non-political career	0.51 (0.50)	0.47 (0.50)
Local Politician	MP is or has been councillor/mayor	0.51 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)
Term	Number of terms served in parliament	3.16 (2.11)	2.88 (1.88)
Age	Age at start of respective term	52.4 (10.5)	49.3 (9.91)
Gender	MP is male	0.79 (0.41)	0.67 (0.47)
Lower	Lower-earning career prior to mandate	0.62 (0.49)	0.74 (0.44)
Standing Down	Did not run for re-election	0.17 (0.38)	0.17 (0.38)
Unsuccessful	More than one unsuccessful candidacy	0.16 (0.36)	0.27 (0.44)
Government	In government party in term of vote	0.58 (0.49)	0.61 (0.49)
No office	MP holds no office in term of vote, and has never done so	0.19 (0.38)	0.67 (0.47)
Office whole/part	MP holds office either for whole term of the vote or for part of it	0.58 (0.49)	0.28 (0.45)
Office in past	MP has held office in previous terms but not in term of the vote	0.23 (0.42)	0.05 (0.23)
Vote-level			
Close vote	Vote passed by fewer than 50 votes	0.11 (0.31)	0.10 (0.31)
Medium	Vote passed by between 50-100 votes	0.50 (0.50)	0.16 (0.36)
Large	Vote passed by more than 100 votes	0.39 (0.49)	0.74 (0.44)
Attendance	Number of MPs who attended the vote	446 (132)	564 (23.4)
Economy	Vote was on topic concerning economy	0.30 (0.46)	0.36 (0.48)
Foreign and EU	Vote was on foreign affairs or EU	0.09 (0.28)	0.25 (0.43)
Other	Residual category for topic of vote	0.62 (0.49)	0.40 (0.49)
UK only			
Boundary changed	Constituency boundary changed in 2010	0.60 (0.49)	-
Index of Change	Level of constituency boundary change	0.17 (0.25)	-
Legg	MP guilty by Legg expenses enquiry	0.42 (0.49)	-
Telegraph	MP found guilty by The Telegraph	0.35 (0.47)	-
Amount Repay	Amount (£) MP had to repay in expenses	1394 (4503)	-
Press Coverage	Ratio pre/post scandal coverage of MP	11.8 (12.3)	-
Margin	Difference 1st and 2nd place in district (in number of votes divided by 100)	80.5 (50.3)	-

(*table continues*)

Table A12 continued

Variable Name	Description	Mean (s.d.)	
		UK	Germany
Germany only			
Margin	Difference 1st and 2nd place in district (difference in percentage points)	-	14.0 (10.8)
Office at Vote	MP holds office at time of vote	-	0.37 (0.48)
List Position	Position compared to spots available	-	0.23 (0.18)
Mandate Type	MP elected from district tier	-	0.47 (0.50)
Candidacy Mode:			
Pure List	MP ran only on list for given term	-	0.03 (0.17)
Dual List	MP ran as dual but won list	-	0.50 (0.50)
Dual District	MP ran as dual but won district	-	0.35 (0.48)
Pure District	MP ran only on district for given term	-	0.12 (0.33)
Electoral History:			
Always Dual Always List	MP only ever ran as dual candidate and only ever won list seat	-	0.40 (0.49)
Always Dual Always District	MP only ever ran as dual candidate and and only ever won district seat	-	0.20 (0.40)
Never Dual Always District	MP only ever ran as district candidate and only ever won a district seat	-	0.09 (0.29)
More Complex Paths	MP has more complex electoral history	-	0.31 (0.46)

s.d. = Standard Deviation.
Descriptive statistics based on pooled dataset over both legislative terms.

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