

**The Economy of Empire Building: Wild Ginseng, Sable  
Fur, and the Multiple Trade Networks of the Early Qing  
Dynasty, 1583-1644**

**A Thesis Presented**

**By**

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## **Abstract**

This project examines the multiple trade networks of the early Qing period and argues that the early Manchu rulers accumulated wealth from trade in the process of Qing empire formation. Empires come to mean rule over extensive, far-flung territories, far beyond the original 'homeland' of the rulers. The Qing empire was such a case, as it expanded from a tiny town in Northeast Eurasia to Chinese territory where Ming China ruled. This thesis thus sheds new light on the Qing empire from the economic aspect - describing how the Qing rulers, based on the fusion of steppe and agricultural economies, constructed the Qing empire.

The time frame covered spans from 1583, when Nurhaci started to embark on internal conflicts with other local Jurchen tribes, to 1644, when the Manchus seized control of Beijing, claiming rulership of China. The thesis builds on the archival sources in Manchu, Mongolian, Chinese, and Korean, as well as contributing to the understanding of the remarkable economic transformation over the course of the Qing empire. Previous academic scholarship in Chinese, Japanese, and English focuses on the bilateral trade connections between Nurhaci and Ming China. The primary aim of this thesis, however, is to counter this scholarship by differentiating between the achievements of Hong Taiji and those of Nurhaci over the course of the early Qing empire building. Additionally, it explores wealth accumulation via the establishment of multiple trade networks that developed during Hong Taiji's reign. These multiple trade networks were centred on two prized goods sourced from the Jurchen territory: wild

ginseng and sable fur. These valuable items were crucial sources of income for the Qing.

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## **Notes on Romanization and Terminology**

The *pinyin* system of Romanization has been used for Chinese terms, place-names, and personal names. The *pinyin* system has also been adopted for Manchu personal, places, and tribal names which only appear in Chinese sources and where the Manchu name, from Manchu sources, is not available. Manchu personal, place, and tribal names have been transliterated according to Jerry Norman's system in *A Comprehensive Manchu-English Dictionary*. Korean personal, place, and item names have been transliterated according to McCune-Reischauer system. For Mongolian personal, place and item names the text follows Nicola di Cosmo and Dalizhabu Bao's system in *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest: A Documentary History*.

The following abbreviations are used: Ch. = Chinese, Man. = Manchu, Mon. = Mongolian, Jap. = Japanese, Ko. = Korean.

This thesis uses the terms Jin state and Qing state to refer to time periods before 1636 and after 1636 respectively. The Jin state spanned 1616 to 1636, a time period significantly focused on in this thesis; the Qing period, beginning in 1636, is covered in the second half of the fifth chapter and the sixth chapter. It is important to note that the name of the Jurchen people changed to the Manchus in 1636.

## **Introduction**

Manchu men during the Qing period were commonly considered warriors. In typical depictions the men are often shown holding weapons, such as bows and arrows. Importantly, these weapons are held in active positions, for example a bow loaded with an arrow. In this way, Manchu men are depicted as warriors ready for battle. These typical representations of men extol the idealised self-image of the Qing empire, an empire founded on Manchu warriors. However, such images neglect half the story, the half in which the Manchus accumulated resources to finance the expansion of their empire. This thesis examines the various interlaced trade networks of the Qing during the pre-conquest period from 1583 to 1644, which also gave rise to the image of the Manchu warrior.

Nurhaci, the founder of what became the Qing dynasty, provided the economic base for Qing state formation. Once he had secured power over most of the Jurchen tribes, he gained a monopoly on the trade of wild ginseng and sable fur, the most valuable items produced by the Jurchens. As a result, he was able to establish a bilateral trade relationship with Ming China, as researched by previous scholarship. However, in the final years of Nurhaci's reign, these bilateral trade relations deteriorated, causing significant economic difficulties in the Jurchen territory. Grain shortages and hyperinflation continued into the reign of Nurhaci's son, Hong Taiji. In response Hong Taiji utilised his military might to take control of critical trading outposts, expanding trade networks and acquiring new and prosperous trading partners. The trade networks

that had been restricted to the Liaodong region during Nurhaci's rule spread to the Mongol and Korean territories under Hong Taiji. Through this newly developed trade connection with Korea, Hong Taiji was able to cultivate long-distance trade relations with Japan and the Southeast Asian states, expanding the Jurchen's economic reach considerably. Therefore, through the establishment of multiple interlaced trade networks, Hong Taiji mobilised essential resources for the building of the Qing state.

Therefore, this thesis argues that the economy underpinned the early years of Qing empire formation and conceptualises the Qing rulers' actions as a set of choices made in response to contemporary economic challenges and opportunities. The question of how the Manchus accumulated the economic basis for their ultimate conquest of China is an important one. The thesis describes the central links between commerce and the building of the Qing empire during the pre-conquest period. It contextualises the trade networks built by Nurhaci and Hong Taiji as the basis of empire construction, showing that the economy laid the decisive foundation for the creation of the Qing state.

## **The History of the Manchus: A Manchu-Centred Narrative of the Rise of the Qing**

Frederic Wakeman famously describes the construction of the Qing empire as a “great enterprise” in other words a challenging task for the Manchus.<sup>1</sup> However, the Qing's

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<sup>1</sup> Frederic E. Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, 2 vols (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985).

rise is typically examined from a Ming Chinese, Korean or Mongolian perspective. This section seeks to offer a new perspective by examining the Qing from their own historical viewpoint. It takes into account existing interpretations of the bilateral relationships between the Manchus and their neighbouring states, and thus contributes to the concept of Manchu history, which details the remarkable transformation of the Qing from a tribal confederation to a vast empire.

Previous scholarship, which argues that the Qing rulers were able to conquer Ming China because they took advantage of Ming weakness, remains influential.<sup>2</sup> Traditional Chinese interpretation of the rise of the Qing stressed the sinification of the Manchus, and how adopting Chinese ways enabled them to rule China for centuries. In the context of historical nationalism, this understanding gradually became mainstream in Chinese society after the Manchus lost power in 1911.<sup>3</sup> In the early twentieth century, nationalist writers such as Xiao Yishan promoted the need to “expel the Tatar barbarians (i.e. the Manchus), to revive Zhonghua (i.e. the Han Chinese)” (Ch. *quchu dalu, huifu zhonghua* 驅除韃虜，恢復中華), arguing that the Chinese had been scourged by the

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<sup>2</sup> This interpretation has its origins with Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, New impression ed. (Hong Kong; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 128 (First edition in 1940); Meng Sen 孟森, *Mingqingshi jiangyi* 明清史講義 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1981) (First written in the mid twentieth century). For more recent discussions, see Thomas Barfield, *Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 250–51, 263; Gu Cheng 顧誠, *Nanming shi* 南明史 (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2003); Lynn A. Struve, *The Southern Ming, 1644-1662* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1984); Li Hongbin 李鴻彬, *Manzu jueqi yu qing diguo jianli* 滿族崛起與清帝國建立 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2003); Dai Yi 戴逸, *Jianming qingshi* 簡明清史 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), vol. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Evelyn S. Rawski, ‘Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History’, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 04 (1996): 842.

Manchus over the course of the Qing period.<sup>4</sup> They claimed that the Manchus could only have been deemed legitimate in China because they had assimilated into Chinese culture.<sup>5</sup> Xiao Yishan claimed that Hong Taiji changed the name of his state from Jin to Qing in order to conceal the fact that under Nurhaci's rule, the Jin court had submitted to the Ming as loyal and obedient barbarians.<sup>6</sup> Michael Franz further argues that this assimilation and the subsequent adoption of Confucianism could be traced back to the pre-conquest era.<sup>7</sup> He also argues that the political organisation the Manchus created was a result of sinification.<sup>8</sup>

However, more recent scholars have noted that this sinification argument is problematic, particularly in relation to identity.<sup>9</sup> More recent research shows that in general the “mixed” institutions of the Inner Asian states borrowed elements from

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<sup>4</sup> Xiao Yishan labeled himself as an aggressive nationalist, see Xiao Yishan 蕭一山, *Qingshi dagang* 清史大綱, Reprint ed. (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2014), chap. zixu: 1 (First edition in 1944).

<sup>5</sup> Ping-ti Ho, ‘The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History’, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1967): 189–95; Ping-Ti Ho, ‘In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s “Reenvisioning the Qing”’, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 1 (1998): 123–55; Qian Mu 錢穆, *Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi* 中國歷代政治得失, Reprint ed. (Beijing: Shnghuo dushu xinzhì sanlian shudian, 2001), 145.

<sup>6</sup> Xiao Yishan 蕭一山, *Qingshi dagang* 清史大綱, chap. Zixu: 2.

<sup>7</sup> Franz H Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China; Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire.*, Reprint ed. (New York: Octagon Books, 1965), 3; Mary Clabaugh Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), 2; Pei Huang, *Reorienting the Manchus: A Study of Sinicization, 1583-1795* (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2011).

<sup>8</sup> Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China; Frontier and Bureaucracy as Interacting Forces in the Chinese Empire.*, 10–11.

<sup>9</sup> Karl A. Wittfogel, ‘General Introduction’, in *History of Chinese Society: Liao (907–1125)* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1949), 1–35.

sedentary states, but “this process was selective.”<sup>10</sup> Throughout the Qing period, the Manchus kept their Manchu identity alive. It is simply impossible to ignore the Manchu sources that were recorded throughout the Qing period, tellingly written not in Chinese but Manchu.<sup>11</sup> Pamela Crossley challenges the view of sinification and argues that the boundary of ethnic groups is ever-changing, with Manchu identity ideologically constructed in the process of imperial unification and centralisation.<sup>12</sup> Mark Elliott makes similar arguments and indicates that the “Manchu way” answers the question of how the Manchus could maintain an “ethnic coherence” in the face of “cultural incoherence.”<sup>13</sup> Manchu identity, throughout Qing history, had been in existence and

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<sup>10</sup> Nicola di Cosmo, ‘State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History’, *Journal of World History* 10, no. 1 (1999): 10. For the dual-institution of the early Qing state, see Liu Xiaomeng 劉小萌, *Manzu cong buluo dao guojia de fazhan* 滿族從部落到國家的發展, Reprint ed. (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2002).

<sup>11</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley and Evelyn S. Rawski, ‘A Profile of the Manchu Language in Ch’ing History’, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 53, no. 1 (1993): 63–102; Rawski, ‘Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History’, 829–30; Elliott Mark, ‘The Manchu-Language Archives of the Qing and the Origins of the Palace Memorial System’, *Late Imperial China* 22, no. 1 (2001): 1–70; Mitamura Taisuke 三田村泰助, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū* 清朝前史の研究 (Kyōto: Tōyōshi Kenkyūkai, 1965), 323–80.

<sup>12</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, ‘Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China’, *Late Imperial China* 11, no. 1 (1990): 30; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1999), 3.

<sup>13</sup> Mark Elliott, ‘Ethnicity in the Qing Eight Banners’, in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China* (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2006), 39; Mark Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001), 17; Cameron Campbell, James Z. Lee, and Mark Elliott, ‘Identity Construction and Reconstruction: Naming and Manchu Ethnicity in Northeast China, 1749–1909’, *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History* 35, no. 3 (2002): 101. For recent discussion on the eight banner system, see Ding Yizhuang 定宜莊, *Qingdai baqi zhufang yanjiu* 清代八旗駐防研究 (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2003); Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*; Teng Shaozhen 滕紹箴, ‘Nuerhachi shiqi niulu kao 努爾哈赤時期牛錄考’, *Minzu yanjiu* 6 (2001): 47–57;

remained dynamic.<sup>14</sup>

Chosŏn Korea and the Manchus have a long history of interdependence and mutual influence. Wang Zhen examines the political relations between the Korean state and the various Jurchen leaders from the fifteenth century to 1636, arguing that control over Korea continued to circulate between the Ming Chinese and the Jurchens. He further claims that, with the rise of Nurhaci, the Jurchens were no longer reliant on China or Korea, and a new political state of tripartite confrontation formed between the Ming, Chosŏn, and Jurchens.<sup>15</sup> Seonmin Kim's *Ginseng and Borderland* examines this new political state, detailing the territorial disputes between Qing China and Korea from 1636 to 1911. Of particular importance is the discussion of the Koreans adopting a Qing

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Liu Xiaomeng 劉小萌, 'Lun niulu gushan zhidu de xingcheng 論牛录固山制度的形成', in *Manzu de shehui yu shenghuo* 滿族的社會與生活 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1998), 104–17; Mitamura Taisuke 三田村泰助, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū* 清朝前史の研究, chap. 4.

<sup>14</sup> Lin Sun, 'Writing an Empire: An Analysis of the Manchu Origin Myth and the Dynamics of Manchu Identity', *Journal of Chinese History* 1, no. 1 (2017): 93–109. For recent comments on New Qing History from Chinese scholars, see Yao Dali 姚大力, 'Bu zaishuo hanhua de jiu gushi-keyi cong xinqingshi xuexi shenme 不再說漢化的舊故事-可以從新清史學習什麼', *Dongfang zaobao·shanghai shuping*, 5 April 2015; Wang Rongzu 汪榮祖, 'Wei xinqingshi bianhu xu xian dongde xinqingshi-jingda yao dali xiansheng 為新清史辯護須先懂得新清史-敬答姚大力先生', *Dongfang zaobao·shanghai shuping*, 17 May 2015; Li Zhiting 李治亭, 'Xinqingshi: xin diguo zhuyi shixue biaoben 新清史: 新帝國主義史學標本', *Zhongguo shehui kexuebao*, 20 April 2015; Tang Hongli 唐紅麗, 'Xinqingshi xuepai de zhuolidian zaiyu huayu goujian-fang zhongyang minzu daxue lishi wenhua xueyuan fujiashou zhonghan 新清史學派的著力點在於話語構建-訪中央民族大學歷史文化學院副教授鍾焯', *Zhongguo shehui kexuebao*, 6 May 2015; Liu Wenpeng 劉文鵬, 'Zhengque renshi xinqingshi yu neilu yazhou 正確認識新清史與內陸亞洲', *Zhongguo shehui kexuebao*, 13 May 2015; Yang Yimao 楊益茂, 'Xinqingshi beihou de xuefeng wenti 新清史背後的學風問題', *Zhongguo shehui kexuebao*, 7 July 2015.

<sup>15</sup> Wang Zhen 王臻, *Chaoxian qianqi yu ming jianzhou nüzhen guanxi yanjiu* 朝鮮前期与明建州女真关系研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2005).

China-centred tributary relationship to preserve their boundaries and power.<sup>16</sup> This relationship explicitly displays the changes in Korean-Manchu relations, portraying their interdependency as well as notable shifts in power.

Relations between the Mongols and the Jurchens have also been stressed in the academic literature. Inter-marriage relations contributed to the formation of a close relationship between Nurhaci and the Qorč'in Mongols, which strengthened the development of a military alliance between the two sides.<sup>17</sup> However, it is worth noting that Mongols were not the Manchus' equal partner after Nurhaci's reign.<sup>18</sup> With more Mongol tribes submitting to the Qing, the Manchu rulers "engineered" the Mongols' incorporation into the Qing system — the Mongols became banner-men, and the broader relationship shifted from equality to subordination.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, the Manchu identity was multifaceted, influenced and shaped by their numerous neighbours and more specifically, their trading partners. These relations also changed drastically as the

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<sup>16</sup> Seonmin Kim, *Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636-1912* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2017); Seonmin Kim, 'Ginseng and Border Trespassing Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea', *Late Imperial China* 28, no. 1 (2007): 33–61.

<sup>17</sup> Du Jiaji 杜家驥, *Qingchao manmeng lianyin yanjiu* 清朝滿蒙聯姻研究, Reprint ed. (Beijing: Gugong chubanshe, 2013); Du Jiaji 杜家驥, 'Qingchao de manmeng lianyin 清朝的滿蒙聯姻', *Lishi jiaoxue* 6 (2001): 15–18.

<sup>18</sup> Diao Shuren 刁书仁, 'Shiliu, shiji shiji zhiji dongya quanliao diqu de manmeng guanxi: yi nuer hachi dui dongbu menggu de celue wei zhongxin 十六、十七世紀之際東亞全遼地區的滿蒙關係：以努爾哈赤對東部蒙古的策略為中心', *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 25, no. 4 (2015): 45–56.

<sup>19</sup> Nicola di Cosmo, 'From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest', *Frontiers of History in China* 7, no. 2 (2012): 178, 186–89; Dali Zhabu 達力扎布, *Mingdai monan menggu lishi yanjiu* 明代漠南蒙古歷史研究 (Hohhot: Nei menggu wenhua chubanshe, 1997).

Manchus gained more power and influence over their neighbours. In accordance with this, this thesis focuses on neither the sinification argument nor foreign relations. Instead, it provides a Manchu-centred narrative of the rise of the Qing, which was created and re-created through trade.

### **Economic Interdependency Between China and its Frontiers**

Trade creates a world that is intermeshed and interdependent. The Jurchens to the north of the Ming frontier were economically reliant on China after the founding of the Ming dynasty. By the late Ming period the frontier zone was no longer an area of poverty, but instead fast becoming a region of concentrated wealth due to the influx of silver and development of trade. The rise of the Qing was thus not determined by a single reason, but was facilitated by multiple and diverse factors.<sup>20</sup> Geographic location strengthened the economic bond between the Manchus and their neighbours, as the Jurchen territory was a natural meeting point connecting Ming China, Chosŏn Korea and various Mongol tribes, with the Mongols to the west, the Ming to the south, and Chosŏn Korea to the east.<sup>21</sup> Owen Lattimore deepens the understanding of this area, emphasising the

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<sup>20</sup> Iwai Shigeki 岩井茂樹, 'Jū roku jū nana seiki no chūgoku henkyō shakai 十六・十七世紀の中国辺境社会', in *Minmatsu shinsho no shakai to bunka 明末清初の社会と文化*, ed. Ono Kazuko 小野和子 (Kyōto: Kyōto daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo, 1996).

<sup>21</sup> Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, 105. In his book, the name Manchuria is of foreign origin and has no proper Chinese translation. In more cases, the term Manchuria usually indicates the place where Manchukuo ruled in early twenty century. So the "Jurchen territory" will be used in this thesis to signify terms such as "northeast China" and "Manchuria" which are common terms for describing the same place.

ecological and geographical features, and suggests that Manchuria was the strategic meeting point connecting China and Mongolia.<sup>22</sup> This position was critical for the Manchus' rise in trading power.

The economic dependency between Nurhaci and Ming China has received some attention. Owen Lattimore was the first to note the interdependent relationship that had developed between the Jurchens and the Ming empire.<sup>23</sup> He argues that Nurhaci became the intermediary between the Chinese and the more distant forest people, further supervising trade to enhance his authority.<sup>24</sup> Lattimore also states that Nurhaci's main income source was tax revenue acquired through extended trade activities with the Ming.<sup>25</sup> However, it is debatable and even doubtful that the purpose of this wealth accumulation by Nurhaci and other Jurchen leaders was to become "personal vassals of the [Ming] emperor and something more than administrative subordinates of the provincial frontier officials."<sup>26</sup> As Nurhaci established his state in 1616, it seems unlikely that his ambition was merely to adhere to the Ming. Thomas Barfield furthers this argument by contextualising the rise of the Qing as relations between nomadic and sedentary states.<sup>27</sup> Barfield applies this theory to explain the rise of the Qing state even though the Jurchens were not a nomadic people. Like Lattimore, he emphasises that the

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<sup>22</sup> Lattimore, 119, 126–27. By contrast, "outer frontier" is the region with people of the outlying tribes who had not been so modified.

<sup>23</sup> Lattimore, 121.

<sup>24</sup> Lattimore, 122–23.

<sup>25</sup> Lattimore, 124–25.

<sup>26</sup> Lattimore, 124–25.

<sup>27</sup> Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, 9.

Jurchens were richly endowed with natural resources and that Nurhaci enlarged this base by engaging in trade with China.<sup>28</sup>

### **Silver Flows, Trade Networks and the Rise of the Qing State**

During the sixteenth century, European maritime expansion triggered connections between distant territories, expanding international trade. The rise of the Qing occurred against this background with an influx of silver from Spanish America and Japan to China. Silver was not only a currency but also a lucrative commodity; the market value of silver in China was double that of the Mediterranean world.<sup>29</sup> The Ming, as a silver-based economy, became a “suction pump” for the import of silver.<sup>30</sup> Prosperous domestic commerce promoted luxury consumption, which became a key feature of the Ming.<sup>31</sup> With the implementation of the “single whip tax reform” (*Ch.yitiaobian fa* 一條鞭法) in 1581, silver became the official and dominant monetary medium in China as a means to avoid the over-issuing of paper money and state-wide hyperinflation.

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<sup>28</sup> Barfield, 254.

<sup>29</sup> Richard Von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1996), 83–113.

<sup>30</sup> Dennis O. Flynn, ‘Silver in a Global Context, 1400–1800’, in *The Cambridge World History*, ed. Jerry H. Bentley, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, and Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, vol. 6 *The Construction of a Global World, 1400–1800 CE (Part 2 Patterns of Change)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 224.

<sup>31</sup> For more details of material studies of the Ming, please see Timothy Brook, *The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1998); Anne Gerritsen and Giorgio Giorgio, eds., *Writing Material Culture History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); Anne Gerritsen and Giorgio Riello, eds., *The Global Lives of Things : The Material Culture of Connections in the Early Modern* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016).

The total amount of silver flowing in from Spanish America and Japan to China was enormous. It was mainly caused by the mining of silver in Potosí and Iwami Ginzan (Jap.石見銀山), the largest silver mines in Spanish America and Japan respectively. It is hard to estimate the total volume of silver that made its way to China during this time, but it has been suggested that the silver coming from Potosí via Acapulco and Manila accounted for half of the foreign silver imported by the Ming, while silver from Japan represented a quarter, and silver from Potosí via Flotas de Plata and Macco less than a quarter.<sup>32</sup> Dennis Flynn calls this influx of silver “the Japan–Potosí Cycle of Silver (1540s–1640)”, which created a permanent link between the New World and Asia across the Pacific Ocean, representing the birth of global trade.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, silver flowed into China because the market value of silver in China was double that of the rest of the world.

The traditional interpretation on the end-market of silver flows in the globe is that foreign silver remained in China and advanced the economic prosperity of the Ming state.<sup>34</sup> However, this thesis argues that the end-point of much of this silver was, in fact,

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<sup>32</sup> S.A.M Adshead, ‘The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China’, *Asian Profile* 1, no. 2 (1973): 274–75. For more research on silver inflows to China, see Quan Hansheng 全漢昇, *Zhongguo jingji shi luncong* 中國經濟史論叢 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2012), vol. 1: 444 (The collection of essays written between 1936 and 1971); William S. Atwell, ‘International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650’, *Past & Present*, no. 95 (1982): 68–69, 75, 94–95; Flynn, ‘Silver in a Global Context, 1400–1800’, 215–16; Adshead, ‘The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China’, 274–75; Timothy Brook, *Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World*, Reprint edition (Profile Books, 2009), chap. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Flynn, ‘Silver in a Global Context, 1400–1800’, 229.

<sup>34</sup> Adshead, ‘The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China’, 273–74; Flynn, ‘Silver in a Global Context, 1400–1800’, 229; Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, ‘Cycles of Silver: Globalization as

the Qing. Ejima Hisao examines the silver currency reserves in the Jurchen territory and argues that the Jurchens were involved in “the cycle of the silver economy of the Ming (Jap. *gin keizai* 銀經濟)”.<sup>35</sup> Commercial networks between Nurhaci and the Ming linked the two territories to create an intercultural and trans-regional space crisscrossed with different economic agents. The formation of the Qing empire was rooted in these global silver flows and trade networks, as silver flowed from overseas into Ming China and then to the Jurchen territory. More importantly, the silver further promoted the development of the multiple trade networks of the Qing.<sup>36</sup>

A new approach to exploring the relations between commerce and conquest that has received increasing attention emphasises the role of commerce in the borderlands during the entirety of the Qing dynasty.<sup>37</sup> Nicola di Cosmo argues that inner Asian political entities managed the “extraction of resources” from their neighbours. This control of the material resources was a crucial ingredient in the accumulation of political power, providing the basis for empire.<sup>38</sup> He also emphasises that the rise of the Manchus displays the pivotal connection between material resources and political

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Historical Process’, *World Economics* 3, no. 2 (2002): 9.

<sup>35</sup> Ejima Hisao 江嶋寿雄, *Mindai shinsho no jochokushi kenkyū* 明代清初の女直史研究 (Fukuoka: Chūgoku shoten, 1999), 202.

<sup>36</sup> Kishimoto Mio 岸本美緒, *Shindai chūgoku no bukka to keizai hendō* 清代中国の物価と経済変動 (Tōkyō: Kenbun Shuppan, 1997), 215–38.

<sup>37</sup> Patterson Giersch, ‘Commerce and Empire in the Borderlands: How Do Merchants and Trade Fit into Qing Frontier History?’, *Frontiers of History in China* 9, no. 3 (2014): 361.

<sup>38</sup> Nicola di Cosmo, ‘The Manchu Conquest in World-Historical Perspective: A Note on Trade and Silver’, *Journal of Central Eurasian Studies* 1 (2009): 43, 46; Di Cosmo, ‘State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History’, 19.

and strategic choices in the process of empire building.<sup>39</sup> Peter Turchin has argued that trade networks which favoured the kind of natural environment that the Jurchens had were a common basis for the formation of large empires.<sup>40</sup> The abundant natural resources of the Manchu territories not only ensured their survival but also enabled them to prosper, with trading being the primary way in which they accumulated wealth and improved living standards.<sup>41</sup> In this thesis, I build on their approaches to argue that the trade networks of wild ginseng and sable furs were the two most dominant and lucrative trade networks between the Qing and its neighbours.

Wild ginseng had been harvested in the Jurchen territory for centuries, allowing the Jurchens to prosper. Mitamura Taisuke argues the Jurchen leaders functioned as merchant capitalists (Jap. *shōgyō shihonka* 商業資本家) as they engaged in trade activities in the border zones.<sup>42</sup> Nurhaci followed this tradition of accumulating silver

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<sup>39</sup> Di Cosmo, 'The Manchu Conquest in World-Historical Perspective: A Note on Trade and Silver', 46.

<sup>40</sup> Peter Turchin, 'A Theory for Formation of Large Empires', *Journal of Global History*, no. 4 (2009): 197.

<sup>41</sup> Luan Fan summarises that, in general, the economic forms for the Jurchens to survive including agriculture, fishing-hunting, robbery (during famine), and trading with Chinese. See Luan Fan 樂凡, 'Shilun maoyi dui mingdai nūzhen jingji de yingxiang 試論貿易對明代女真經濟的影響', *Yanbian daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* 2 (1996): 21–37; Luan Fan 樂凡, 'Mingdai nūzhen zu duoyuan jingji de tedian ji yingxiang 明代女真族多元經濟的特點及影響', *Heilongjiang minzu congkan* 54, no. 3 (1998): 72–76; Luan Fan 樂凡, *Yizhong wenhua bianyuan didai de teyou jingji leixing pouxi: mingdai nūzhen zu de duoyuan jingji yanjiu* 一種文化邊緣地帶的特有經濟類型剖析: 明代女真族的多元經濟研究 (Jilin: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999); Luan Fan 樂凡, 'Mingdai nūzhen zu de maoyi guanxiwang ji shehui xiangying 明代女真族的貿易關係網及社會效應', *Beifang wenwu* 61, no. 1 (2000): 73–76; Di Cosmo, 'The Manchu Conquest in World-Historical Perspective: A Note on Trade and Silver', 50.

<sup>42</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 156–57.

through trading rather than agriculture.<sup>43</sup> However, Mitamura Taisuke's conclusion is that the prosperous trade in wild ginseng and sable furs resulted from the luxurious and unhealthy lifestyle of Ming elites.<sup>44</sup> Van Jay Symons builds on Mitamura's arguments to examine the management of wild ginseng by the Qing and argues that the wild ginseng trade brought early wealth to Nurhaci.<sup>45</sup> Patterson Giersch, making a larger argument about the importance of frontier zones, similarly claims that the ginseng trade was vital in bringing wealth to Nurhaci, with commerce underpinning the emergence of leading lineages within clans.<sup>46</sup> Di Cosmo also states that the ginseng trade was necessary to Nurhaci's wealth accumulation, with the amount of silver flowing to the Jurchens every two years being equivalent to approximately a quarter of the total foreign silver imported to China in a single year.<sup>47</sup> Seonmin Kim argues that Nurhaci himself accumulated most of his income from exclusive trading rights in ginseng, which facilitated his rise in Manchuria.<sup>48</sup> Thus many scholars have emphasised the importance of the ginseng trade. This thesis examines the processes through which Nurhaci gained control over ginseng production sites and the markets which sold it.

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<sup>43</sup> Mitamura Taisuke 三田村泰助, *Sekai no rekishi: min to shin* 世界の歴史: 明と清 (Tōkyō: Kawade Shobō, 1972), 230.

<sup>44</sup> Mitamura Taisuke 三田村泰助.

<sup>45</sup> Van Jay Symons, *Ch'ing Ginseng Management: Ch'ing Monopolies in Microcosm* (Tempe, Ariz: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1981), 2–3.

<sup>46</sup> Giersch, 'Commerce and Empire in the Borderlands: How Do Merchants and Trade Fit into Qing Frontier History?'

<sup>47</sup> Di Cosmo, 'The Manchu Conquest in World-Historical Perspective: A Note on Trade and Silver', 52–54.

<sup>48</sup> Kim, 'Ginseng and Border Trespassing Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea', 38.

Sable fur was another important local product to the Jurchens, but it has received less attention.<sup>49</sup> Kawachi Yoshihiro traces the boom of the sable fur trade back to the mid-fifteenth century. He argues that under the influence of clothing fashion among the nobility of Ming China and Chosŏn Korea, the Jurchens established trade routes and accumulated a significant amount of wealth. As a result, Jurchen leaders, like Nurhaci, were able to re-define the order of Jurchen society.<sup>50</sup>

This thesis builds on this scholarship and sources in Manchu, Mongolian, Chinese, Japanese, and English, to argue that Nurhaci accumulated wealth from trade. The primary aim of the thesis is to show the achievements of Hong Taiji as well as explore wealth accumulation via the establishment of trade networks in the process of the early Qing empire building. It also stresses that economic crisis led to the transition of economic patterns from bilateral trade to multiple trade networks. Nurhaci possessed the ambition to establish a state, and trade did enable both wealth accumulation and control over the Jurchen tribes. But following Nurhaci's claims of sovereignty, the Ming ceased trade relations, sensing the threat that the Jurchen territory was becoming. This shows that Nurhaci's trade patterns were different from those of Hong Taiji, who oversaw the establishment of the Jurchen state.

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<sup>49</sup> For more research on sable fur, see Jonathan Schlesinger, *A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing Rule* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2017).

<sup>50</sup> Kawachi Yoshihiro 河内良弘, *Mindai joshin shi no kenkyū* 明代女真史の研究 (Kyōto: Dōhōsha, 1992), chap. 18; Kawachi Yoshihiro 河内良弘, 'Mingdai dongbeiya de diaopi maoyi 明代東北亞的貂皮貿易', in *Qingzhu wangzhonghan xiansheng bashi shouchen lunwenji* (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 1993), 496–99.

The prosperous period of Nurhaci's state was short, as an economic crisis emerged in the Jurchen territory following the Ming's decision to close down the trade. Gertraude Roth Li was the first to discuss the severe economic disorder in the Jurchen society that occurred during the period between the 1620s and 1630s. She emphasises the negative impact of the economic crisis of the Ming itself, which led to social instability and economic weakness in the Manchu state. She thus concludes that without "the last stroke of luck," the Manchus could not have conquered China in 1644 because the Manchu military and economy were on the verge of collapse.<sup>51</sup> Her research is based on a Manchu source, *The Old Manchu Chronicles* (Ch. *jiu manzhou dang* 舊滿洲檔), which records the history of the Manchus from 1619 to 1636. Her research ends in the year 1636, predicting a "lucky" Manchu victory in 1644. However, by drawing on scholarship by Frederic Wakeman, it becomes clear that the Manchu victory was not luck but rather a result of economic influence. One of these economic influences is examined by Wakeman. He argues that the economic crisis of the Ming was the consequence and part of the global financial crisis in the seventeenth century, caused by a decrease in the amount of silver flowing into Ming China.<sup>52</sup> In his book, Wakeman concludes that the collapse of the Ming economy was one reason for the fall of the Ming, even going as far as to argue that the Manchu state saved the Chinese empire

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<sup>51</sup> Gertraude Roth Li, 'The Rise of the Early Manchu State: A Portrait Drawn from Manchu Sources to 1636' (Harvard University, 1975), 186.

<sup>52</sup> Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1: 8.

from chaos.<sup>53</sup> While Roth Li is correct to point out the economic difficulties of the Jin state, the duration of the economic crisis in the Jurchen territory was short. The economic challenges of the Ming however were a critical factor in ensuring Manchu victory.

It has remained unclear how the Qing escaped the economic crisis Roth Li describes. This thesis endeavours to examine the economic transformation during Hong Taiji's reign that contributed to the Qing empire formation. A brief article by Li Xinghua calls for further examination of the commercial economy of the Qing during this pre-conquest period, particularly stressing the need to explore the trade connections during Hong Taiji's reign with Korea, the Yeren Jurchens (Ch. *yeren nüzhen* 野人女真), and the Tümed Mongols (Ch. *tumote menggu* 土默特蒙古).<sup>54</sup> This thesis addresses this gap by examining how the economy of the Qing was transformed in this period.

The first feature of this economic transformation was the establishment of a set of trade networks with the Mongols and Korea. Trade with Korea was particularly important because it not only provided the majority of economic resources required by the Jin and later the Qing state, but also it gave the Jin access to trade with Japan and Southeast Asia. Local items produced in Korea and Southeast Asian states were introduced to the Qing, such as medicine, cloth, and paper for writing. After successfully establishing this trade framework with Korea, the Qing shifted their focus

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<sup>53</sup> Wakeman Jr., vol. 1: 21-22.

<sup>54</sup> Li Xinghua 李興華, 'Qing ruguan qian shangye maoyi 清入關前商業貿易', *Manzu yanjiu* 99, no. 2 (2010): 15–20.

to opening trade networks with the Mongols. Trade with the Mongols was especially crucial after the termination of economic relations with the Ming as it indirectly re-linked the Qing to China. It is worth noting that much of this trade was conducted with local military bases along the Great Wall, which were guarding the Ming border. Wild ginseng and sable fur were exchanged for silk, cloth, paper for sacrifices and medicine. Silver also flowed into the Jin state through these multiple trade networks.

Another feature of economic transformation was the integration of trade networks with Korea and the Mongol territory centred on Shenyang. While the frameworks for trade with Korea and Mongolia were established separately, they were intrinsically linked by three trade towns. Zhongjiang was the main trade site for trade with Korea, while Hohhot was the main trade site for trade with the Mongols. Shenyang, as the trade centre of the Qing state, allowed products from different territories to converge and to be re-distributed. This demonstrates the characteristic feature of Jin/Qing trading patterns under Hong Taiji: the three trade sites— Shenyang, Zhongjiang and Hohhot— interacted with each other, with products flowing to and from Korea and Mongolia. Therefore, this thesis shows how the establishment of multiple trade networks saved the Qing from the economic crisis and facilitated the building of the Qing state.

Overall, this thesis examines the trade networks of the Qing from 1583 to 1644, shedding new light on how the economy underpinned the building of the Qing state. Trade had been a common way for the Jurchens to survive and prosper. The pattern of the Jin state and then the Qing trade changed from dependence on the Ming state to

dominance within a broader set of trade networks. Nurhaci was successful in extracting resources from China. However, he was unable to handle the economic crisis that arose when he established his state in 1616 as his economy was heavily reliant on bilateral trade with the Ming. In addition, the resources Nurhaci accumulated during the early part of his reign were not enough to cover the expenses over the next eighteen years from 1627 when Nurhaci died to 1644 when the Qing conquered China. This draws our attention to Hong Taiji's economic achievements in the establishment of multiple trade networks with Korea and Mongolia. These trade networks helped the Qing escape the economic crisis. More importantly, it enabled the Qing to break away from the Jurchen tradition of trade with the Ming and establish the independent economic pattern of the Qing state.

### **Thesis Outline**

The thesis consists of three parts, which are documented in seven chapters. The first part argues that bilateral trade with the Ming brought in large amounts of silver and provided the economic foundation for Nurhaci's expansion. The first chapter is focused on tribute trade, which was not the main income source for Nurhaci but functioned as an important bond connecting Nurhaci with the Ming, maintaining the status necessary to conduct frontier market trade. The second chapter is centred on frontier market trade. It shows that Nurhaci broke through the existing trade networks and gained a monopoly on the trade in wild ginseng and sable fur in the frontier markets. The third chapter

examines the silver inflows to Nurhaci, and how Nurhaci attempted to expand his trade networks to Korea and the Mongols. Part two comprises one chapter which describes the economic crisis the Qing experienced, analysing the problems with the bilateral trade that the Jurchens had conducted for centuries. It shows that it was necessary for the Jurchens to change their traditional economic pattern if they were to expand further. Part three consists of two chapters. Chapter five shows how Hong Taiji used military power to open up the Korean market and establish trade networks linking his territories to Japan and the Southeast Asian states. Chapter six argues that Hong Taiji adopted the same military actions as the Mongols to achieve his goals of conquest, establishing trade networks re-connecting the Qing to the Ming. Chapter seven summarises the legacies of the multiple trade networks during Hong Taiji's reign, detailing that the multiple trade networks enabled the circulation of commodities and silver between East Asia and Inner Asia. Therefore, from 1583 to 1644, the Qing economy can be understood as consisting of multiple trade networks, connecting diverse regions and transporting items that would lead to the establishment of empire.

## Part I Nurhaci and His Bilateral Trade with the Ming, 1583-1619

From the mid-fourteenth to the seventeenth century, three powers — Ming China (1368-1644), Chosŏn Korea (1392-1897) and the Mongol tribes — confronted each other at the eastern end of the Eurasian continent. The Jurchens, with whom this thesis is primarily concerned, controlled territory at the meeting point between these three powers (See Map 1).<sup>55</sup>

Nurhaci, the founder of the Jin state (which became the Qing state in 1636) was born in 1559 at Hetu Ala (Man., Ch. *hetu ala* 赫圖阿拉), a tiny rural town in the Jurchen territory. This town belonged to the Sukesu bira (Man., Ch. *suke suhu he* 蘇克蘇滸河), a small Jianzhou Jurchen tribe. There were four other independent Jianzhou Jurchen tribes: the Hunehe bira (Man., Ch. *hunhe* 渾河), Wanyan (Man., Ch. *wanyan* 完顏), Donggo (Man., Ch. *dong'e* 董鄂), Jecen (Man., Ch. *zhechen* 哲陳). They had settled in the area of the Suzi River after the mid-fifteenth century. Each tribe lived separately, had an independent city and a separate tribal leader while all struggled for overall leadership of the Jianzhou Jurchens.<sup>56</sup> The Jurchens also included the Haixi Jurchens (Ch. *haixi nüzhēn* 海西女真) and the Yeren Jurchens, who resided north of the Jianzhou Jurchens. The Haixi Jurchens were located in the area west of Kaiyuan, while the Yeren Jurchens occupied the region downstream of the Songhua River and the Amur River.

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<sup>55</sup> The Jurchens (Ch. *nüzhēn* 女真) were a Tungusic people of northeast Asia, whose history Chinese records trace back to the Jin dynasty (1115-1234). It was the Wanyan clan that unified the Jurchens and conquered the Song dynasty, forcing it to flee south of the Yangzi River. Over one hundred years later in 1234, the Jin dynasty collapsed after its defeat against the rising Mongol Empire.

<sup>56</sup> Fu Ge 福格, *Tingyu cong'an* 聽雨叢談 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 2.

The Haixi Jurchens were the strongest among the Jurchen tribes as they controlled the trade centre of the Jurchen territory, Kaiyuan.

Map 1 Jurchen Tribes and the Jurchen Territory



The abundant natural resources of the Jurchen territory allowed the Jurchen people to prosper. In 1588, Nurhaci proudly proclaimed:

[I have maintained] friendly relations with the Great Ming, dispatching persons to present tributes, possessing five hundred imperial orders, and claiming annual rewards. The local products of this place include bright pearl, ginseng, as well as the furs of black fox, dark fox, red fox, marten, Eurasian lynx, tiger, leopards, sea otter, otter, cyan rat and brown rat. [Such kinds of items] are provided for the state to trade at four military posts [along the Great Wall] of Fushun, Qinghe, Kuandian and Aiyang. [I] received rewards by regulation [of this trade], thereupon the Manchu people become substantial, and the state becomes rich.

與大明通好，遣人朝貢，執五百道敕書，領年例賞物。本地所產有明珠、人參、黑狐、玄狐、紅狐、貂鼠、猓狨、虎、豹、海獺、水獺、青鼠、黃鼠等皮，以備國用。撫順、清河、寬甸、靉陽四處關口互市交易，照例取賞，因此滿州民殷國富。

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This proclamation displays the extensive natural resources of Nurhaci's territory, as well as exhibiting the centrality of trade in ensuring economic prosperity. However, this text is problematic. The use of the term Manchu in the last sentence indicates that the text was revised following Nurhaci's reign. The name of the ethnic group changed in 1635 from Jurchen to Manchu, and accordingly we can assume that the term was

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<sup>57</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu 清太祖武皇帝實錄', in *Qing ruguan qian shiliao xuanji*, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1985), 312.

Imperial orders were those permitting trade with the Ming and will be discussed in footnote no.68

replaced in the successive revisions of the veritable records following Nurhaci's reign.<sup>58</sup>

Taken in isolation, this text intimates that Nurhaci's achievements had made his state rich by monopolising local resources and conducting bilateral trade with the Ming by 1588. However, Nurhaci had not yet achieved this by 1588. In fact, Nurhaci neither controlled these natural resources nor conducted trade relations with the Ming at this time. What he had done by 1588 was to conquer the Jianzhou Jurchen tribes, but the territory he controlled was in poverty. This is not to say this text is meaningless, as it exposes how Nurhaci mobilised resources through trade to build his state.

The Jurchens had a tradition of trading with the Ming starting from the early Ming dynasty. Nurhaci, like his Jurchen ancestors, had also benefitted greatly from this trade relationship, accumulating sizable wealth.<sup>59</sup> However, it is necessary to separate the

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<sup>58</sup> *Qing shilu* 清實錄, vol. Taizong 太宗, n.d., TC9.10.13. The English meaning of *Qing shilu* is *The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty*. For the database this thesis adopts for the Ming shilu & Qing shilu, please see <http://sillok.history.go.kr/mc/main.do>. The format of the citation for *Qing shilu* hereafter follows the book title, the emperor's reign title, abbreviation of the reign, and Chinese lunar date. There were several versions of the veritable records recording the historical events of Nurhaci. This text is quoted from the version of *The Veritable Records of Wu Huangdi* that was compiled in the Shunzhi period. For revisions of the veritable records, see Chen Jiexian 陳捷先, *Manwen qingshilu yanjiu* 滿文清實錄研究 (Taipei: Dahua shuju, 1978); Matsumura Jun 松村潤, 'Qing Taizu shilu yanjiu 清太祖實錄研究', trans. Ayula 敖拉, *Mengguxue xinxi*, no. 1 (2002): 13–25; Matsumura Jun 松村潤, 'Qing Taizu shilu yanjiu 清太祖實錄研究', trans. Ayula 敖拉, *Mengguxue xinxi*, no. 2 (2002): 23–31; Matsumura Jun 松村潤, 'Qing Taizu shilu yanjiu 清太祖實錄研究', trans. Ayula 敖拉, *Mengguxue xinxi*, no. 3 (2002): 30–34.

<sup>59</sup> Mitamura Taisuke 三田村泰助, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū* 清朝前史の研究, 169–71; Ejima Hisao 江嶋寿雄, *Mindai shinsho no jochokushi kenkyū* 明代清初の女直史研究, 217–358; Wang Zhonghan 王鐘翰, 'Manzu zai nuer hachi shidai de shehui jingji xingtai 滿族在努爾哈赤時代的社會經濟形態', in *Qingshi zakao* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957), 1–12; Yang Yang 楊旻, *Mingdai liaodong dushi* 明代遼東都司 (Beijing: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1988), chap. 5; Teng Shaozhen 滕紹箴, 'Ruguan qian manzu de shehui jingji gailun 入關前滿族的社會經濟概論', *Zhongguoshi yanjiu*, no. 1 (1982): 44–52.

trading pattern Nurhaci used from that of the previous Jurchen leaders, as Nurhaci did not simply adhere to the Ming but also built his state. Therefore, this thesis shows that Nurhaci was a bridge linking the histories of the Jurchens and the Qing rather than merely a Jurchen figure of the sort typically depicted in Jurchen history.

Part one argues that after he came to power, Nurhaci monopolised these natural resources and conducted bilateral trade with the Ming. The two trade approaches Nurhaci alludes to in the aforementioned text are the tribute trade and the frontier market trade, which are the primary focus of the first part of the thesis. This part, covered in three chapters, demonstrates the role that the bilateral trade with the Ming and a monopoly over wild ginseng and sable fur played in the building of the Jin state that Nurhaci established in 1616 (later known as the Qing state after 1636). The first chapter details the process of the tribute trade. The tribute trade was an element of the bilateral trade and required Nurhaci to win the trust of the Ming as a subordinate Jurchen tribe leader. As a result, the Ming gave Nurhaci access to economic privileges, allowing Nurhaci to trade with the Ming through the tribute trade and the frontier market trade. In the early years of Nurhaci's reign, he conquered the Jianzhou Jurchen tribes, securing his position as a leader of the Jurchens. His successful conquest allowed him to conduct the tribute trade with the Ming. Chapter two addresses how the frontier market operated. The frontier market trade was another pattern in the bilateral trade between the Jin state and the Ming, acting as a primary source of income for Nurhaci. Wild ginseng and sable fur were two principal goods traded by Nurhaci on the frontier

markets. This chapter shows how Nurhaci monopolised the territorial habitats of wild ginseng and sable fur in order to conduct the frontier market trade with the Ming. Chapter three discusses the legacies of the bilateral trade and argues that trade laid the solid foundation on which Nurhaci could build his state. Silver flowed from the Ming into the Jurchen territory after Nurhaci established the trading networks for ginseng and fur, enabling him to amass huge profits. In addition, Nurhaci attempted to expand his trade networks to the Korean and Mongol territories but he only achieved trade with the Qorč'in Mongols (Mon., Ch. *keergin menggu* 科爾沁蒙古).

Bilateral trade between Nurhaci and the Ming has already been mentioned in academic literature, but it is necessary to reiterate so as to link to the latter part of the thesis. Therefore, part one argues that the bilateral trade with the Ming brought in large amounts of silver to Nurhaci and provided the economic foundation for his further expansion.

## Chapter 1: The Tribute Trade, 1589-1616

This chapter is focused on the tribute trade that functioned to forge a bond between Nurhaci and the Ming. It argues that the primary function of the tribute trade was not to increase profits but to strengthen the bond between the two territories so as to maintain the privileged economic status necessary to gain access to the frontier market trade. The chapter begins with a brief explanation of how Nurhaci came to power. By securing leadership over the Jianzhou Jurchens, Nurhaci won the trust of the Ming, allowing him enter into the tribute trade with Ming China.

The tribute trade has typically been associated with the tribute system, understood as a system in which to administer political and diplomatic relationships between China and other states within the framework of a China-centred world.<sup>60</sup> Recent scholarship has begun to question this view of “China’s past as an empire without neighbours.”<sup>61</sup> Di Cosmo reminds us that the tribute system was established to structure relations between not only China and foreign states but also between China and its neighbours.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Yongjin Zhang, ‘The Tribute System’, *Oxford Bibliographies*, 2015; John Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), chap. Introduction.

<sup>61</sup> Vadime Elisseef and Hans Kaal, ‘The Middle Empire, a Distant Empire, an Empire without Neighbors’, *Diogenes* 11, no. 42 (1963): 60–64; Nicola di Cosmo, ‘Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier: Tribute, Trade, or Gift Exchange’, in *Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies In Chinese History*, ed. Don J. Wyatt and Nicola di Cosmo (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 353; Di Cosmo, ‘State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History’, 24; John E. Wills, Jr., ‘How Many Asymmetries? Continuities, Transformations, and Puzzles in the Study of Chinese Foreign Relations’, *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 16, no. 1/2 (2009): 13–30.

<sup>62</sup> Di Cosmo, ‘Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier: Tribute, Trade, or Gift Exchange’, 353; Di Cosmo, ‘State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History’, 24.

This thesis contributes to his theory by examining the relations between the Ming and the Jurchens.

The tribute policy of the Ming made it possible for the Jurchens to establish trade relations with the Ming. In the early Ming period, Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming dynasty (r.1368-98), focused his attention on the northern frontier; he viewed the barbarians to the north as posing the greatest threat to Ming supremacy.<sup>63</sup> These barbarians are referred to in Ming sources as the Jurchens and Mongols. However, the Mongols were the primary focus, as the Jurchens were still under the control of the Mongols following the Mongol invasion into their territory in the early Ming period. In order to sever the connection between the Mongols and Jurchens, the Ming court made incursions into Jurchen territory, partly because it was easier to pacify the various small Jurchen tribes than the stronger Mongols. This decision was crucial and necessary, especially after the Ming capital was relocated from Nanjing to Beijing in 1420. It created a geographical link between the Mongols and the Ming that passed through Jurchen territory.<sup>64</sup>

### **Nurhaci's Rise to Power Among the Jurchens, 1583-1589**

Becoming the leader of the Jianzhou Jurchens was the prerequisite for Nurhaci to institute trade relations with the Ming. Ironically, the rise of Nurhaci was preceded by

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<sup>63</sup> Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1:24.

<sup>64</sup> *Ming shilu* 明實錄, vol. Yingzong 英宗, n.d., ZT12.10.3.

the killing of his grandfather, Giocangga (Man., Ch. *juechang'an* 覺昌安), and father, Taksi (Man., Ch. *takeshi* 塔克世), mistakenly at the hands of the Ming in 1583. In the late sixteenth century, the Haixi Jurchens played a dominant role among the Jurchen tribes. However, the leaders of the Jianzhou Jurchens were simultaneously also contending among themselves for power. Meanwhile, among the Haixi Jurchens, the Yehe Jurchens (Ch. *yehe nüzhēn* 葉赫女真) and Hada Jurchens (Ch. *hada nüzhēn* 哈達女真) were caught up in the conflict. All of these conflicts were centred on access to resources. The Jurchens had fallen into a state of chaos, providing an opportunity for Nurhaci.

In the late Ming period, Wang Gao (Ch. 王杲) was a tribal leader among the Jianzhou Jurchens, possessing a grandiose vision to unite and rule them. However, Wang Gao died in 1575 at the hands of the Ming without achieving this unification. His son, A Tai (Man., Ch. *atai* 阿台), returned to his home in Gure Mountain city (Man., Ch. *guleshan cheng* 古勒山城, see Map 2) from where he endeavoured to seek revenge for his father by launching numerous attacks on the Ming. In the second lunar month of 1583, the Ming decided to initiate a truce with A Tai to avoid any further trouble.<sup>65</sup> At the same time, the Ming court turned its attention to finding another potential Jianzhou leader to rule all the Jianzhou Jurchens on behalf of the Ming. Nikan Wailan (Man., Ch. *nikan wailan* 尼堪外蘭), as a candidate for the leadership of the Jianzhou Jurchens, led Ming troops into battle with the aim of encircling and annihilating Gure

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<sup>65</sup> *Ming shilu*, vol. Shenzong 神宗, n.d., WL11.2.15.

Mountain City. After hearing of the attack, Nurhaci's grandfather and father, Giocangga and Taksi, hurried to the village to persuade A Tai to surrender. As A Tai's wife was the granddaughter of Giocangga, their motivations were particularly personal. However, A Tai refused to surrender. The battle developed into a stalemate.<sup>66</sup>

Subordinates of A Tai, believing this declaration, opened the gate, allowing Ming troops to swarm the city, but at great losses to Li Chengliang (Ch. 李成梁), Liaodong Regional Commander (Ch. *liaodong zongbing* 遼東總兵) of the Ming taking charge of the Jurchen tribes, issued an order assuring people safety if they came out of the town, but slaughtered them regardless.<sup>67</sup> Mistakenly assumed to be supporters of A Tai, Giocangga and Taksi were among those killed. When Nurhaci learned of the tragic death of his family members, he wrote a letter to the court, asking why his grandfather and father who were innocent had been killed. The Ming court admitted its mistake and tried to appease him by giving him 30 imperial orders (Ch. *chishu* 敕書) and 30 horses along with an official title as compensation.<sup>68</sup> There is no primary evidence showing that Nurhaci was dissatisfied with the compensation. Indeed, the imperial orders he received were the certificates necessary for the Jurchens to take part in the tribute trade and the frontier market trade with the Ming court. However, *The Veritable Records of*

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<sup>66</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 303.

<sup>67</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 303.

<sup>68</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 304.

There is no agreed translation of the Chinese term *chishu*, this thesis thus follows the precedent set in Evelyn Rawski's work, see Evelyn S. Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-Border Perspectives* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 68.

*Gao Huangdi* (Ch. *gao huangdi shilu* 高皇帝實錄), first rewritten in the Kangxi reign (r.1654-1722), records Nurhaci's anger at the Ming:

Why were my grandfather and father killed? You [the Ming court] are my irreconcilable enemies. What is your excuse?

我祖父何故被害？汝等乃我不共戴天之仇也！汝何為辭？<sup>69</sup>

Such discrepancy in the records could suggest that Nurhaci's descendants, the eventual victors, attempted to underplay the former monarch-subject relationship with the Ming as a way to serve as the rationale for the overthrow of the Ming by the Qing. It is also possible that Nurhaci at the time recognised that he remained too weak to be a viable rival of the Ming and was, therefore, guarded in his criticism.

In either case, Nurhaci declared that the murderer was Nikan Wailan and asked the Ming to capture him. The Ming border officials refused his request, instead stating that Nikan Wailan was to become the Jianzhou Jurchen leader with the Ming's full support. As a former subordinate of Taksi, Nikan Wailan additionally demanded that Nurhaci submitted to his rule.<sup>70</sup> Nurhaci, enraged and seeking revenge, began plotting the capture of Nikan Wailan.

However, Nurhaci's revenge did not start well. The majority of the Jianzhou Jurchens submitted to Nikan Wailan, cognisant of the Ming's support. Even some

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<sup>69</sup> Xie Guian 謝貴安, 'Qing shilu de wenxian jiazhi yu wenben jixi 清實錄的文獻價值與文本解析', *Henan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* 53, no. 4 (2013): 4–5.

<sup>70</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 304.

members of Nurhaci's own clan turned against him, vowing to kill him on behalf of their new leader.<sup>71</sup> In response, Nurhaci allied with Gua La (Man., Ch. *guala* 瓜拉), who was the leader of Sarhu town, and his younger brother Nomina (Man., Ch. *nuomina* 諾米納), as well as G'anghashan (Man., Ch. *ganghashan* 剛哈鄯), Cangshu (Man., Ch. *changshu* 常書) and Yangshu (Man., Ch. *yangshu* 楊書). All of these men belonged to the Suksuhu bira tribe and swore that they would revolt against Nikan Wailan.<sup>72</sup>

Nurhaci's determination for revenge resulted in a lengthy pursuit of Nikan Wailan. In 1583, Nurhaci and his men gathered more than 100 armoured soldiers, equipped with just thirteen suits of armour, and prepared to attack the town of Turun where Nikan Wailan resided.<sup>73</sup> Nurhaci and his followers quickly occupied the town, but Nikan Wailan had been warned, and had escaped to the town of Giyaban (Man., Ch. *jiaban cheng* 甲板城).

Additional setbacks followed. Even before the battle, Nurhaci's uncle had convinced Nomina to abandon Nurhaci, reminding him that both the Ming court and Wang Tai (Ch. 王台), the leader of the Haixi Jurchens, supported Nikan Wailan's claim as leader of Giyaban town.<sup>74</sup> On hearing of this, Nomina decided that he would not join Nurhaci's troops. Nurhaci responded by seizing Sarhu town (Man., Ch. *saerhu cheng* 薩爾澗城) to punish Nomina for his betrayal. This was the first of many towns

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<sup>71</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 304.

<sup>72</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 304.

<sup>73</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 304.

<sup>74</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 304.

claimed by Nurhaci.

From 1584 to 1586, Nikan Wailan evaded capture, but Nurhaci continued to pursue him. In the course of his pursuit, Nurhaci took control of several towns belonging to the Hunehe bira, Donggo and Jecen subtribes of the Jianzhou, taking captives, suits of armour, livestock and other booty. Thus, as he bided his time waiting for the opportunity to capture Nikan Wailan, Nurhaci was gradually building up the economic resources that would be vital for his own bid for leadership.

In 1586, Nikan Wailan together with his family and tribespeople moved to Olhon town (Ch. *eerhun cheng* 鵝而渾城) close to Ming territory. In the eighth lunar month, Nurhaci invaded Olhon but failed to find Nikan Wailan. Nurhaci thus sent a message to the Ming informing them to “send Nikan Wailan back to me. Otherwise, I will attack you.”<sup>75</sup> The Ming did not consider Nurhaci a powerful man, but they now saw him as a better Jianzhou Jurchen leader than Nikan Wailan. In the course of his pursuit of Nikan Wailan, in a matter of just a few years, Nurhaci had, in fact, unified several the Jianzhou Jurchen tribes and consequently the resources he now commanded far exceeded the meagre thirteen suits of armour with which he had begun his campaign. Probably due to Nurhaci’s increasingly evident leadership prowess, the Ming withdrew their protection of Nikan Wailan. In the seventh lunar month of 1586, Nurhaci killed Nikan Wailan.<sup>76</sup> As compensation, the Ming provided 800 *taels* of silver and fifteen *pi* of satin

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<sup>75</sup> ‘Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu’, 311.

<sup>76</sup> ‘Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu’, 311.

with dragon pattern as a way to settle the accidental killing of Nurhaci's father and grandfather.<sup>77</sup>

Although he had already successfully attracted the attention of the Ming as a potential Jurchen leader, if Nurhaci wanted to receive full Ming support, unification of all Jianzhou Jurchens was required. The first step was to integrate the various Jianzhou Jurchen tribes, who resided in the area of Suzi River. At this point, Nurhaci merely controlled the Suksuhu and the Hunehe bira, but still had to extend his control over the Jecen, Donggo and Wanyan. From late 1587 to late 1588, he successively attacked and gained control over the territories. Nurhaci had taken less than five years to claim power over all Jianzhou Jurchen tribes in the area of Suzi River, building his first capital, Fe Ala (Man., Ch. *foala* 佛阿拉, see Map 2) based on his father's city. Meanwhile, he had accumulated significant amounts of wealth.

The death of Nurhaci's father and grandfather, while tragic, provided the perfect opportunity for Nurhaci's rise to power. His success not only represented the fulfilment of his revenge against Nikan Wailan, but also brought him to the attention of the Ming court, which was seeking an influential Jianzhou Jurchen leader to balance relations with the Haixi Jurchens. Wao Gao and Nikan Wailan had both been candidates to become the supreme leader, but they had failed to demonstrate sufficient ability to rule the Jianzhou Jurchens. Nurhaci, however, achieved what both Wao Gao and Nikan

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<sup>77</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 311. *Pi* (Ch. 匹) is a measure word for rolls of cloth, 1 *tael* (Ch. 兩) of silver is equivalent to 1.327 ounces.

Wailan could not, he began the process of uniting the Jurchen territory.

### **The Tribute Trade, 1589-1615**

The tribute trade between Nurhaci and the Ming operated from 1589, when Nurhaci received an official title from the Ming, until 1615, when the last tribute mission arrived in Beijing. However, in previous scholarship, Nurhaci's involvement in the tribute trade is underexamined. For example, Ejima Hisao examines the tribute trade over the course of the Ming period, even examining Nurhaci along with other Jurchen leaders, but neglects to discuss how Nurhaci gained the imperial orders to access the trade in the first place.<sup>78</sup> Although Taisuke Mitamura argues that the tribute missions reflected Nurhaci's hold on power, he focuses much of his research on Nurhaci's younger brother, Surgaci (Man., Ch. *su'er hachi* 速兒哈赤), who acted as "Nurhaci's deputy" (Jap. *fukuō* 副王) until Nurhaci killed him.<sup>79</sup> This section aims to examine the tribute trade in relation to Nurhaci and his subsequent rise to power in more detail, contributing to current scholarship on the tribute trade.

Trade remained crucial to Nurhaci, as he had few other material resources. The majority of sources show that Nurhaci had only "some" Jurchen followers. He possessed little wealth except for the aforementioned thirteen suits of armour and the small inheritance he had received in 1587.<sup>80</sup> When his grandfather and father died,

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<sup>78</sup> Ejima Hisao, *Mindai shinsho no jochokushi kenkyū*, 153–84, 470–71.

<sup>79</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 130.

<sup>80</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 301.

Nurhaci received compensation including 30 imperial orders and 30 horses. Even so, he still lacked men, food and arms to support his campaigns. As he supposedly stated in the fourth lunar month of 1584, he had insufficient soldiers to resist the enemy.<sup>81</sup> A month later, he further emphasised the importance of resources when he stated:

[If] the grain is stolen, [my] subordinates will lack food, and then they will definitely rebel and scatter. If the tribes scatter, we will be isolated, and others will necessarily attack when the opportunity arises. Our bows, arrows and weapons are insufficient, how can we defend ourselves against our enemies?

糧石被掠，部屬缺食，必至叛散。部落散則孤立矣，彼必乘虛來攻。我等弓箭器械不足，何以禦敵？<sup>82</sup>

In subsequent years, whenever Nurhaci attacked a city, he would ransack it and carry away whatever he could find. By late 1588, Nurhaci had amassed more than 1,000 cavalrymen as well as introducing four important new weapons into his army: machetes, iron hammers, shields as well as bows and arrows (See Table 1).<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> 'Qing Taizu Wuhuangdi Shilu 清太祖武皇帝實錄', 307.

<sup>82</sup> 'Qing Taizu Wuhuangdi Shilu 清太祖武皇帝實錄', 307.

<sup>83</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong:WL16.1.25; *Chosŏn wangjo shillok* 조선왕조실록, vol. Sŏnjo 선조, n.d., Sŏnjo22.7.12. For the details of these weapons, see Mitamura Taisuke 三田村泰助, 'Chuqi manzhou baqi de xingcheng guocheng 初期滿洲八旗的形成過程', in *Riben xuezhè yanjiu zhongguo shi lunzhu xuanyi*, ed. Liu Junwen, vol. 6 (Mingqing) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993), 411.

Table 1 The Resources Nurhaci Mobilised, 1578-1588

Date	Incidents	Economic Resources Acquired
WL5(1578)	Death of father and grandfather	Inherited a few unspecified items of property from his father.
WL10.2 (1582)	The Ming court provided compensation for the deaths of Nurhaci's grandfather and father	30 imperial orders and 30 horses.
WL11.5 (1583)	Nurhaci seized Turun city.	(thirteen suits of armour of armour before seizing Turun city.) Returned in triumph. #
WL11.8(1583)	Nurhaci seized Sarhu city.	Returned in triumph. #
WL12.5 (1584)	Nurhaci seized Zhaojia city.	Returned in triumph. #
WL12.9 (1584)	Nurhaci seized Donggo tribe.	two suits of armour.
WL13.2 (1585)	Nurhaci seized Neishen city.	Returned in triumph. #
WL13.4 (1585)	Nurhaci conquered Jecen tribe.	Returned in triumph. #
WL13.9 (1585)	Nurhaci seized Antu gua'erjia city.	Returned in triumph. #
WL14.5 (1586)	Nurhaci seized Beihuan town.	Returned in triumph. #
WL14.7 (1586)	Nurhaci killed Nikan Wailan.	The Ming court promises 800 <i>taels</i> of silver and fifteen <i>pi</i> of silk annually.
WL15.5 (1587)	Nurhaci established Fe ala city.	#
WL15.6 (1587)	Nurhaci seized Keshan town.	Returned in triumph. #
WL15.8 (1587)	Nurhaci seized Ba'erda and Dongcheng city.	Returned in triumph. #
WL16.4 (1588)	Leaders of the Suwan and Donggo tribes submitted to Nurhaci.	#
WL16.9 (1588)	Nurhaci seized Wanyan tribe.	Returned in triumph. #

# indicates that no specific data indicates the quantity of resources received.

Source: 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu 清太祖武皇帝實錄', in *Qing ruguan qian shiliao xuanji*, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1985), 301-17.

The dramatic change in Nurhaci's fortunes followed the establishment of the tribute trade with the Ming in 1589, causing significant impacts on Nurhaci's military strength. Nurhaci was appointed Assistant Commissioner-in-chief (Ch. *dudu qianshi* 都督僉事,) by the Ming court, which suggests that by this date he had cemented his role as leader of the Jianzhou Jurchens, and in so doing accumulating wealth.<sup>84</sup> The support of the Ming was essential for Nurhaci at this stage because only by keeping good relations with the Ming would he be able to pay tribute and to trade. Therefore, his strategy was to maintain good relations with the Ming, in order to maintain access to the tribute trade and the frontier market trade.

It is necessary to briefly introduce the tribute trade system and how it operated in relation to the Jurchens. There was no clear regulation on the tribute trade when it was first established in 1388 by Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of the Ming dynasty. Zhu Yuanzhang dispatched a mission to establish contact with the Jurchen tribes, creating the system of Regional Military Commission (Ch. *jimi dusi weisuo* 羈縻都司衛所) based on geography and kinship connections. His primary purpose was not only to govern the Jurchens, but also to keep them divided.<sup>85</sup> The Ming court gave generous and lavish "rewards" to attract the Jurchen leaders, often causing heavy economic

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<sup>84</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong:WL17.9.11. There is no historical evidence in *The Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty* showing that Nurhaci was granted the title of dragon tiger general in 1594, but some secondary scholarship may find another source to support the argument. See Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia*, 65; Yan Chongnian 閻崇年, *Nuer hachi zhuan* 努爾哈赤傳, Reprinted Ed. (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2006), 323.

<sup>85</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, vol. T'aejong 태종, n.d., T'aejong4.4.4.

burdens on the Ming. To entice a Jurchen leader, the Ming court usually granted an official seal (Ch. *gaoyin* 誥印) and an imperial order to serve as official proof of identity.<sup>86</sup> Additionally, these new leaders received a set of robes with accessories such as belts (Ch. *guandai* 冠帶), fur clothing (Ch. *qiuyi* 裘衣), and money.<sup>87</sup>

The high frequency of Jurchen tribute missions burdened the court with costly rewards or return-gifts in an attempt to show a warm welcome to the various Jurchen leaders. As there was no standardised system of rewards, they often exceeded the price of the tribute gifts presented, making the trade especially profitable for the Jurchens in the early Ming period, as they received gifts that far exceeded the value of their own.<sup>88</sup>

The tribute trade system after the mid-Ming period gradually became standardised. The system was as follows: from early October to the end of December, during the agricultural slack season, the Jurchens were allowed to travel to Beijing to offer tribute, travelling via Kaiyuan or Fushun.<sup>89</sup> Only the Jurchen leaders, including governors,

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<sup>86</sup> The imperial order was a document written on silk. Basically, it was an official certificate of appointment from the Ming court, indicating that an official title had been granted to a specific Jurchen leader. But, as will be seen, the significance of the document lay not only in its function as a certificate of political authority, but also as a symbol of economic power. By the Wanli period (1572-1620), a total of 1,499 command letters had been allocated to the Jurchen leaders. In terms of the tribute trade, the number of these documents in circulation regulated the number of tribute missions travelling to Beijing. In terms of the horse market trade, the command letters were “admission tickets” which allowed their holders to trade at the markets.

<sup>87</sup> *Ming shilu*, vol. Taizong 太宗, n.d., YL1.12.8.

<sup>88</sup> *Ming shilu*, Taizong:YL15.11.4.

Take the horse as an example, in the markets, a first class horse was valued at five pecks of rice and five pieces of cloth; a second class horse at four pecks of rice and four pieces of cloth; a third class horse at three pecks of rice and four pieces of cloth; a fourth-class horse at two pecks of rice and two pieces of cloth; and the lowest class of horse was valued at one peck of rice and one piece of cloth.

<sup>89</sup> Shen Shixing 申時行, *Daming huidian* 大明會典, n.d., juan 107: Chaogong san. For the database

could lead a mission, and only with a limited number of people. According to *The Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty* (Ch. *daming huidian* 大明會典) revised in 1587, a mission of the Jianzhou Jurchen was allowed only 500 people.<sup>90</sup> Each mission-head had to be in possession of an imperial order to prove his identity, and as part of the allocated quota of tribute missions, the mission would be allowed to take only one horse as tribute to the Ming. Tradable high-quality local items these tribute missions could present included various types of fur, animals, and gelatin (See Table 2).

Table 2 The Items Produced in the Jurchen Territory

Fur	lynx furs (Ch. <i>shelisu pi</i> 猓狢獾皮), marten furs (Ch. <i>diaoshu pi</i> 貂鼠皮),
Animals	<i>tuhu</i> (Ch. 兔鷲, a kind of falcon), <i>songkoro</i> (Man.Ch. <i>haidongqing</i> 海東青, a kind of falcon), yellow caracara (Ch. <i>huangying</i> 黃鷹), walrus (Ch. <i>haixiang ya</i> 海象牙)
Medicine	gelatin (Ch. <i>ejiao</i> 阿膠)

Source: Shen Shixing 申時行, *Daming huidian* 大明會典, n.d., juan 107: Chaogong san.

When the mission arrived at the Kaiyuan or Fushun, the entrance to Ming territory along the Great Wall, Ming officials would check the identity of each person.<sup>91</sup> From this point on, the Ming court would provide them with accommodation and food until they reached Beijing. Two to three weeks later when the mission arrived in Beijing, they

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this thesis adopts is *daming huidian* (*the Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty*) on the website of Chinese Text Project, please see <http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=en&chapter=810157>.

<sup>90</sup> Shen Shixing 申時行, *Daming huidian*, juan 107: Chaogong san.

<sup>91</sup> Shen Shixing 申時行, *Daming huidian*, juan 107: Chaogong san.

would be housed at the hostels for tribute envoys (Ch. *huitong guan* 會同館).<sup>92</sup> After an audience with the Ming emperor, their local tribute products would be converted to silver. For example, during the Wanli period of the Ming (r. 1563-1620), one horse was valued at three *taels* of silver.<sup>93</sup> The Jurchens were prohibited from trading with ordinary Chinese people, but during the three days at the hostels for the tribute envoys, the Jurchen people could trade with other tribute bearers coming from other frontier areas, such as Japan and the Mongol territories.<sup>94</sup> After the three days had passed, the mission would begin their return journey accompanied by Ming officials to ensure that they did not purchase restricted goods on the route, such as iron farming tools which could be adapted for military use.<sup>95</sup>

As early as the spring of 1588, Nurhaci had sent Jurchens to pay tribute to the Ming and express loyalty to the court.<sup>96</sup> The local items he sent included pearls, ginseng, and valuable furs.<sup>97</sup> From 1588 to 1615, Nurhaci paid tribute to Beijing twenty-two times, including five occasions on which he personally led the mission (See Table 3).<sup>98</sup> We

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<sup>92</sup> The hostels for tribute envoys were residences where tribute bearers were lodged in Beijing.

<sup>93</sup> By the Wanli period, it appears that the Ming court often evaluated tribute gifts in silver, and embassies were frequently rewarded in silver rather than in kind. I have calculated this price in silver, see *Daming huidian*, juan 107: Chaogong san.

<sup>94</sup> *Ming shilu*, vol. Xianzong 憲宗, n.d., CH10.2.16; Shen Shixing, *Daming huidian*, juan 107: chaogong san.

<sup>95</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Xianzong:CH5.12.10.

<sup>96</sup> Mao Ruizheng 茅瑞征, 'Dongyi Kaolue 東夷考略', in *Qing Ruguan Qian Shiliao Xuanji*, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1985), 56.

<sup>97</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 312.

<sup>98</sup> According to *The Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty*, I have found that Nurhaci presented tributes to Beijing in 1590, 1597, 1601, 1608, and 1611. For other discussions, see Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia*, 65; Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu*

can see that the tribute trade between Nurhaci and the Ming was intensive in the years between 1588 and 1597, but gradually reduced after 1597 until it ceased in 1615. This shows a souring of relations, most likely due to Nurhaci's gradual conquest of the Jurchens, blatantly displaying his ambitions to build a state rather than continue to adhere to Ming rule.

Each tribute bearer was granted lavish rewards based on his official Ming title. For example, the Jurchen leaders who held the position of Commissioner-in-chief (Ch. *dudu* 都督) received one *biaoli* of material for making clothes and two *pi* of silk; the Jurchen leaders who held the position of Regional Military Commissioner (Ch. *du zhihui* 都指揮) received two *biaoli* of material for making clothes, five *pi* of silk and one suit of clothes made of silk; the Jurchen leaders who held the position of Commander (Ch. *zhihui* 指揮) received one *biaoli* of material for making clothes, five *pi* of silk and one suit of clothes made of silk; others without Ming titles received one *biaoli* of material for making clothes and five *pi* of silk.<sup>99</sup> It is difficult to calculate how much wealth Nurhaci gained but it is clear that significant wealth was accumulated through silk.

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*Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1:49-58.

<sup>99</sup> Shen Shixing, *Daming huidian*, juan 111: jici er.

*Biaoli* (Ch.表裡) is a measuring word referring to fabric for making clothes.

Table 3 The Jianzhou Jurchen Tribute Missions and Rewards, 1588-1615

Date	Wei	Tour Leader	Persons
WL16.10.16(1588)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	Song Ta 松塔	154
WL16.11.14(1588)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	A Tai*阿台	157
WL17.5.13 (1589)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	Shao Tong 少童	82
WL18.4.29(1590)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	<b>Nurhaci</b>	108
WL18.5.5(1590)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	Song Ta	97
WL18.7.21(1590)	Jianzhou left <i>wei</i>	Maha Taji 馬哈塔吉	#
WL19.7.10(1591)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	A Tai*阿台	#
WL19.10.6(1591)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	#	#
WL20.10.11(1592)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	Maha Haji 馬哈哈吉	98
WL23.8.29(1595)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	Shao Tong 少童	99
WL23.10.29(1595)	Jianzhou left <i>wei</i>	Maha Taiji 馬哈塔吉	100
WL25.5.14(1597)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	<b>Nurhaci</b>	100
WL25.7.9(1597)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	Surgaci 速兒哈赤	100
WL29.12.2(1601)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	Nurhaci	199
WL30.3.4(1602)	Jianzhou left <i>wei</i>	Ma Haha 馬哈哈	100
WL30.6.18(1602)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	Tribute supplements	
WL32.5.24(1604)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	#	399
WL32.6.16(1604)	Jianzhou and Maolian <i>wei</i>	Tai Shi 台失	100 (200 horses presented)
WL36.12.2(1608)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	<b>Nurhaci</b>	357
WL36.12.21(1608)	Jianzhou right <i>wei</i>	Surgaci	140
WL39.10.12(1611)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	<b>Nurhaci</b>	250
WL43.2.15(1615)	Jianzhou <i>wei</i>	#	#

# indicates that no specific data indicates who led the tribute missions and the quantity of rewards received.

\* This person, A Tai, was not Wang Gao's son.

Source: *Ming shilu*, vol. Shen-zong. As it is clear that Nurhaci had complete control of the Jianzhou Jurchens from 1589, the tribute data has been collected from 1589 to 1593. 1 horse equals 3 *taels* of silver.

Eventually, the tribute trade could no longer satisfy the Jurchens' resource needs or their desire for wealth accumulation. Over the course of two hundred years, the tribute trade had evolved from a relatively simple, flexible process to a complex, rigid one, with the effect of reducing tribute trade quotas and the financial burden on the Ming court. When Nurhaci exerted his control over the frontier market trade, the importance of tribute trade weakened as his financial power strengthened. In 1599, Nurhaci wiped out the Haixi Jurchens, his major rivals, to secure his monopoly over the tribute trade and the frontier market trade among the Jurchens. Nurhaci had expanded his power beyond his territory. As a result, tension between Nurhaci and the Ming increased. In 1609, the Ming banned Nurhaci's tribute mission from entering the Shanhai Pass with the aim of punishing Nurhaci for crossing the border to collect Korean ginseng.<sup>100</sup> As a result, it seems that Nurhaci re-evaluated his relationship with the Ming, gradually reducing the frequency of his tribute missions to Beijing in the following years. In 1615, there were only fifteen people in the tribute mission, which heightened Ming suspicions over a possible attack.<sup>101</sup>

Overall, the tribute trade functioned as a way for Nurhaci to maintain relations with the Ming rather than as a means to accumulate wealth. Maintaining such relations was an essential element in allowing Nurhaci to access the far-more profitable frontier market trade. However, by the mid-Ming period, the tribute missions had become so

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<sup>100</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong:WL37.2.10.

<sup>101</sup> *Ming shilu*, Shenzong:WL43.3.1.

regulated that the trade was no longer profitable at all for Nurhaci. In 1619 when Nurhaci proclaimed his separation from Ming authority, the tribute trade between the Jurchens and China came to an end. From the mid-fifteenth century, the expansion of the frontier markets offered the Jurchens a new approach to wealth accumulation. The frontier market trade thus supplemented the tribute trade, developing rapidly between the Jurchens and the Ming state. By the mid-Ming period, it had become the main channel by which the Jurchens accumulated essential resources that underpinned their economy.

## Chapter 2: The Frontier Market Trade, 1587-1619

The frontier market trade, the other primary bilateral trading pattern, allowed the Jurchens to trade with the Ming at the border zones. Wild ginseng and sable fur, the two most valuable items produced in the Jurchen territory, were traded at the frontier markets. Their tradeability increased as popularity for them grew in China. In regard to the prosperous ginseng trade in China, Mitamura Taisuke argues that wild ginseng was in such demand due to its medical value.<sup>102</sup> With respect to the trade in sable fur, Mitamura Taisuke and Kawachi Yoshihiro have argued that its value derived from the popular fashion of wearing fur in China, which started in the mid-fourteenth century as a means to display wealth.<sup>103</sup> Nurhaci also assisted the burgeoning trade in ginseng and fur. Mitamura Taisuke argues that the booming trade in ginseng and fur during the late Ming period was the result of close relations between Nurhaci and Li Chengliang.<sup>104</sup> As a youth Nurhaci was the follower of Li Chengliang and received his support in trade. As such, the items highly-prized by the Chinese were traded through the frontier market trade, bringing significant amounts of wealth to Nurhaci.<sup>105</sup>

However, it is still unclear how Nurhaci monopolised the trade in ginseng and fur.

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<sup>102</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 169–70.

<sup>103</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 170–71; Kawachi Yoshihiro, *Mindai joshin shi no kenkyū*, chap. 18; Kawachi Yoshihiro, ‘Mingdai dongbeiya de diaopi maoyi’, 496–99.

<sup>104</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 171–72.

<sup>105</sup> Ejima Hisao, *Mindai shinsho no jochokushi kenkyū*, 217–358; Teng Shaozhen, ‘Ruguan qian manzu de shehui jingji gailun’, 44–52; Wang Zhonghan, ‘Manzu zai nuer hachi shidai de shehui jingji xingtai’, 1–12; Luan Fan, ‘Shilun maoyi dui mingdai nüzhèn jingji de yingxiang’, 21–37; Luan Fan, ‘Mingdai nüzhèn zu de maoyi guanxiwang ji shehui xiangying’, 73–76.

Previous scholarship argues that access to ginseng and fur came easily to Nurhaci, implying that resources in the Jurchen territory were accessible to all, regardless of tribe. This chapter challenges this argument, detailing the long and difficult process of how Nurhaci came to control the trade of wild ginseng and sable fur. It also argues that the frontier market trade became Nurhaci's primary source of income laying the solid foundation needed to build his state and finance his further military expansion.

It was challenging for Nurhaci to break through the existing trade networks that had been dominated by the Haixi Jurchens. By the late sixteenth century, the Haixi Jurchens had monopolised the trade in wild ginseng and sable fur for decades, selling and trading at the frontier markets in Kaiyuan, the trading centre of the Jurchen territory. To challenge the Haixi Jurchen's control, Nurhaci contended for more imperial orders as well as seizing the areas where wild ginseng and sable martens could be obtained. As a result, Nurhaci expanded the scale of his trade networks from Fushun to Kaiyuan, with Fushun replacing Kaiyuan as the trading centre of the Jurchen territory.

### **The Trade Networks of the Haixi Jurchens**

Nurhaci embarked on establishing his trade networks after winning the trust of the Ming court in 1582. However, he still had to gain control of existing and lucrative trade networks dominated by the Haixi Jurchens, who had become the strongest tribe among the Jurchens by the late sixteenth century. Historians such as Ejima Hisao have

produced detailed narratives of the frontier markets the Haixi Jurchen controlled.<sup>106</sup>

This section, while building on this scholarship, focuses on the two most important tasks that lay ahead of Nurhaci at this time; namely, how to obtain enough imperial orders to take control of the frontier market trade with the Ming, and how to monopolise the areas where wild ginseng and sable martens could be found.

A key prerequisite for the Haixi Jurchens' monopoly was the number of imperial orders they had obtained. After the mid-Ming period, imperial orders came to play a major role in the Jurchen economy, not only because they were the certificates necessary for Jurchens to take part in trade with the Ming court, but also because they determined the quotas for both the tribute trade and the frontier market trade. Once in possession of an imperial order, a Jurchen leader could go to Beijing to offer tribute and would receive silver, clothing, salt and other goods in return. It also meant that the bearer was allowed to trade with other tribute bearers in Beijing for several days. Most importantly, the imperial orders permitted holders to trade at the frontier markets. By the sixteenth century the imperial orders had come to assume a role of vital importance to the Jurchen leaders, not only as an endorsement of authority, but as symbols of wealth. It is not surprising, therefore, that imperial orders became a regular source of conflict among Jurchens. By 1591, the Haixi Jurchens held 999 imperial orders in total, with Nurhaci possessing 500.<sup>107</sup> When compared to the Haixi Jurchens, Nurhaci's economic

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<sup>106</sup> Ejima Hisao, *Mindai shinsho no jochokushi kenkyū*, 217–405.

<sup>107</sup> Qu Jiusi 瞿九思, *Wanli wugong lu* 萬曆武功錄, n.d., juan 11: nuer hachi liezhuan. For the archival source, please see <http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&res=1916>.

power was weak. Another key prerequisite for the Haixi Jurchens' monopoly of the frontier markets was that they controlled Kaiyuan, the trading centre of the Jurchen territory.

Frontier markets were originally established by the Ming and functioned as commodity trading sites frequented by the Jurchens as well as the Mongols. They were usually close to military garrisons, with built-in platforms for lookouts and supervision of the surrounding territory, reflecting the strict regulation of trade by the Ming court.<sup>108</sup>

Various terms are used in the sources to refer to the frontier markets. In Chinese archival sources, the term *mashi* (Ch.馬市) is used, literally meaning “horse markets”, as the principal commodity purchased by the Chinese was initially horses. Henry Serruys adopted the term “horse fair” in his written work, which examined the horse fairs in southern Mongolia from 1400 to 1600.<sup>109</sup> In Korean sources, the frontier markets are identified by the names of the place in which the markets operated. Because there has not been an agreed-upon term to refer to these markets, this thesis uses the term the frontier markets, as these markets were commonly established on the border.

Like the Mongols, the Jurchens were required to present horses to the frontier

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<sup>108</sup> During the Ming period, there were nine military garrisons from the east to the west end of the Great Wall: Liaodong 遼東 (present-day Liaoyang, Liaoning province), Xuanfu 宣府 (present-day Xuanhua, Hebei province), Jizhou 薊州 (present-day Jixian, Hebei province), Datong 大同 (present-day Datong, Shanxi province), Yansui 延綏 (present-day Yulin, Shanxi province), Taiyuan 太原 (present-day Taiyuan, Shanxi province), Ningxia 寧夏 (present-day Yinchuan, Ningxia province), Guyuan 固原 (present-day Guyuan, Ningxia province) and Gansu 甘肅 (present-day Zhangye, Gansu province). One or several frontier markets surrounded each of the garrisons.

<sup>109</sup> Henry Serruys, *Sino-Mongol Relations During the Ming, III. Trade Relations: The Horse Fairs* (Peeters, 1975).

markets during the months prior to their tribute journey south to Beijing.<sup>110</sup> However, ginseng and fur replaced horses as the main commodities in the markets from the mid-Ming period, with the frontier markets becoming trade centres for a variety of other goods. During this time, the main products traded by the Jurchens ranged from horses to furs, ginseng and other valuable products. These were luxuries desired by the imperial family and upper classes of Ming China.<sup>111</sup> As the Ming political situation gradually became more stable and the economy developed, luxury products became increasingly prevalent among the upper classes, which in turn boosted the development of the frontier markets. Therefore, the establishment of the frontier market also benefitted the Ming.

The economic demands of the Jurchens also required the establishment of the frontier markets to trade with the Ming. These markets, which were controlled by the Ming, were the only way to access the majority of necessities, such as cloth, farm tools, and other necessary items. It is not surprising that the Ming court used the frontier market trade as an effective means of domination. Feng Yuan (Ch.馮瑗, 1572-1627), who was in charge of military affairs of Kaiyuan, clearly stated that the Ming could easily control the Jurchens through the frontier markets at Kaiyuan.

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<sup>110</sup> Shen Shixing, *Daming huidia*, juan 107: chaogong san.

<sup>111</sup> *Ming shilu*, vol. Xiaozong, n.d., HZ16.1.26; Mitamura Taisuk, *Sekai no rekishi: min to shin*, 230.

If we [the Ming court] close the *guan* [the frontier markets at Kaiyuan] and stop the trade, where [will] you barbarians obtain our cloth, silk, tableware, farming tools, etc. that your daily necessities? Where [will] you sell your cattle, sheep, horses, ginseng, sable fur, hazelnut, matsutake, and other goods? In this respect, tiny Kaiyuan is really a place that provides the various barbarians with a livelihood. It is not just that Kaiyuan [the Ming court] must not lightly cut off trade with the barbarians, but the barbarians do not dare cut off trade with Kaiyuan. This is the crux of the matter.

我若閉關不與通，我布帛口田器等項皆彼夷日用所需，彼何從得。彼之牛馬羊及參貂榛松等貨，又何所售。以此論之，彈丸開原，實諸虜所資以為生，不但開原不當輕與虜絕，即虜亦不敢輕與開原絕。此事之機也。<sup>112</sup>

According to the text, the frontier markets allowed the Ming to directly control the Jurchens by applying powerful economic leverage, employing a tactic that had been utilised by the Chinese for centuries. Should the Ming wish to cut off relations with the Jurchens, they needed only to close the markets. Feng Yuan's statement shows that Ming officials and literati were relentless in their control of the Jurchens.

The first frontier market of the Haixi Jurchens was established at Kaiyuan between 1405 and 1406.<sup>113</sup> It gradually developed into three separate markets: Xin'an guan (Ch. 新安關), Zhenbei guan (Ch. 鎮北關), and Guangshun guan (Ch. 廣順關), shown in Map 2.<sup>114</sup> The exact date when these three markets were established is unknown, but all

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<sup>112</sup> Feng Yuan 馮瑗, 'Kaiyuan tushuo 開原圖說', in *Mingdai menggu hanji shiliao huibian*, vol. 2 (Hohhot: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 2000), 329.

<sup>113</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Taizong: YL4.3.4, YL3.3.8.

<sup>114</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong: WL4.1.13. In discussion of the horse markets among the Haixi Jurchens, the Qing documents reveal that *nanguan* (Ch. 南關) referred to the Guangshun guan; *beiguan* (Ch. 北關) referred to the Zhenbei guan. For more details of the city planning at Guangshun and


were in operation by 1576.<sup>115</sup> The three frontier markets served three different groups: the Xin'an frontier market was designed for the Mongols, the Zhenbei frontier market was established for the Yehe Jurchens, and the Guangshun frontier market serviced the Hada Jurchens. The Zhenbei frontier market and the Guangshun frontier market were under the control of the Haixi Jurchens, who consisted of four tribes. The Yehe and Hada Jurchens were the two most prominent tribes of the Haixi Jurchens, not only because they resided close to Kaiyuan, but also they monopolised the frontier market trade with the Ming. The Yehe and Hada Jurchens controlled the Zhenbei frontier market and the Guangshun frontier market respectively, sharing the 999 imperial orders that were allocated to them by the Ming. The Haixi Jurchens also included the Ula Jurchens (Man., Ch. *wula nüzhēn* 烏拉女真) and Hoifa Jurchens (Man., Ch. *huifā nüzhēn* 輝發女真), who lived a significant distance from Kaiyuan and so did not dominate the trade network as the Yehe and Hada did. Instead, the Ula and Hoifa facilitated the role of transportation, linking the territorial habitats and the frontier markets at Kaiyuan.

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Zhenbei, see Sun Ming 孫明, 'Yehe wangcheng yu hada wangcheng jianzhi de bijiao yanjiu 葉赫王城與哈達王城建制的比較研究', *Dongbei shidi*, no. 4 (2006): 31–34.

<sup>115</sup> *Ming shil*, n.d., Shenzong:WL4.1.13.

Map 2 The Frontier Markets at Kaiyuan and Fushun



Source: adapted from Tan Qixiang 譚其驤, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji* 中國歷史地圖集, 2nd Edition, vol. 7 Yuan and Ming (Beijing: Zhongguo ditu chubanshe, 1992), 53.

As mentioned above, Kaiyuan had been operating as the trading centre in the Jurchen territory for decades by the time of Nurhaci's rise to power. The location was an important factor for the Ming court in choosing Kaiyuan as both a trading site and a military base: north of the Kaiyuan area, the climate was too cold for farming, and Kaiyuan, therefore, marked the northernmost extent of the official Ming territory.<sup>116</sup> Kaiyuan was the meeting point of Ming territory, the Mongol territory, and the Jurchen territory. Most importantly, it connected the Jurchen territory to an entire commercial and transportation network.

There were nine trade traffic routes over land and along rivers linking the territories of Ming China, Chosŏn Korea, the Jurchens, and the Mongols (See Map 3).<sup>117</sup> These routes centred on Kaiyuan, forming a well-organised network further linking the Jurchen territory with the Ming, Chosŏn, and the Qorč'in Mongols. This in turn facilitated the transportation of commodities. It is also evident that the trade in wild ginseng and sable fur benefited from these highly developed trade networks as their places of origin were quite far from Kaiyuan. Thus, Kaiyuan became the economic trading hub connecting the Ming, the Jurchens and the Mongols. As the frontier markets the Haixi Jurchens controlled at Kaiyuan gradually developed into the trading centre of


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<sup>116</sup> Jing Ai 景愛, 'Lishi shiqi dongbei nongye de fenbu ye bianqian 歷史時期東北農業的分佈與變遷', *Zhongguo lishi dili luncong*, no. 2 (1987): 95–119; Zhang Shizun 張士尊, *Mingdai liaodong bianjiang yanjiu* 明代遼東邊疆研究 (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 2002), 164–202; Li Jiancai 李健才, *Mingdai dongbei* 明代東北 (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1986), 15–30.

<sup>117</sup> Li Jiancai 李健才, 'Mingdai dongbei yizhan kao 明代東北驛站考', in *Dongbei shidi kaolüe* (Jilin: Jinlin wenshi chubanshe, 1986), 252–69.

the Jurchen territory, the Haixi Jurchens became the effective leaders of the Jurchens with their strong economic power.

Map 3 The Traffic Routes in the Jurchen Territory



Source: adapted from Li Jiancai 李健才, 'Mingdai dongbei yizhan kao 明代東北驛站考', in *Dongbei shidi kaolüe* (Jilin: Jinlin wenshi chubanshe, 1986), 255.

Unlike the frontier markets at Kaiyuan, the frontier markets at Fushun that Nurhaci controlled were much less developed, although they were established earlier, in 1464.<sup>118</sup> There was a significant discrepancy in the trade volume of the two principal frontier markets at Kaiyuan and Fushun.<sup>119</sup> Although there is no existing record of the exact

<sup>118</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Xianzong:TS8.4.13.

<sup>119</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian* 明代遼東檔案彙編 (Shenyang: Liaoshen shushe, 1985), 808, 815.

amount of items being traded, the transaction tax (Ch. *mashi choufen* 馬市抽分) shows that the trading volumes at Kaiyuan were notably higher than that at Fushun.

The transaction tax records refer to taxes from individual transactions in the frontier markets. The amount of tax was determined by the type and quality of the goods. For example, in Wanli period (r.1572-1620), the standard of taxation was as follows:

Silver six *qian* per gelding, five *qian* per foal, two *qian* per cow, one *qian* per roll of silk, three *fen* per sable fur, one *qian* per leopard fur, the value of one *wei* per ten *wei* of ginseng, the value of one *jin* per ten *jin* of hazel.

驢馬一匹銀六錢、兒馬一匹銀五錢、牛一隻銀二錢、鍛一疋銀一錢、紹皮一張銀二分、豹皮一張銀一錢、人參十圍抽一、榛私、二十斤抽一斤。<sup>120</sup>

According to existing documents, the total amount of the transaction tax levied at the Kaiyuan market was 2,762 *taels* of silver over the course of three months in 1583. By comparison, the amount of transaction tax levied at the Fushun frontier market was only 268 *taels* of silver during three months in 1578.<sup>121</sup> This difference in the trade volume was due to the frontier markets at Kaiyuan serving the entire Jurchen territory, while the Fushun frontier market only served Nurhaci and his Jianzhou Jurchen followers.

The frontier markets at Kaiyuan were also much busier than the Fushun frontier

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<sup>120</sup> Ren Luo 任洛, *Liaodong zhi* 遼東志, vol. 3, Liaohai congshu 遼海叢書 (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1934), juan 3: 68-69.

The measure word 1 *qian* (Ch. 錢) is equivalent to 0.1 *taels* of silver, 1 *jin* (Ch. 斤) is equivalent to 603.277 grams.

<sup>121</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 808,815.

market. The Kaiyuan markets were open daily, with traders numbering from several hundred to over 1,000 per day. In comparison, the Fushun frontier market was open only once every three days, with an average of less than 100 traders.<sup>122</sup> Therefore, trade at the frontier markets in Kaiyuan was significantly more profitable than at the Fushun frontier market.

The numbers of items sold at the frontier markets at Kaiyuan were also more diverse than those at Fushun. The goods sold at Kaiyuan included ginseng, honey, pine nuts, edible tree fungi, mushrooms, hazelnuts, Mongolian horses, sheepskin, sheepskin jackets, felt, as well as furs of marten, fox and Siberian doe deer.<sup>123</sup> In contrast, the goods sold at the Fushun frontier market were only included grains, linen, ginseng, horses, edible tree fungus, and the furs of Siberian doe deer.<sup>124</sup> It may be concluded, therefore, that the Fushun frontier market was much less developed than the frontier markets at Kaiyuan. This suggests that the frontier markets at Kaiyuan were the central markets for the entire Jurchen territory while the Fushun market represented only a small regional market that operated in the shadow of Kaiyuan. As control of economic resources, particularly through trade networks, translated directly into power, the Haixi Jurchens at this time were the dominant tribe in the Jurchen territory.

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<sup>122</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 727–86.

<sup>123</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 815–36.

<sup>124</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 815–36.

## **The Trade in Wild Ginseng**

Wild ginseng was highly sought by the Chinese, promoting growth in ginseng consumption and providing Nurhaci with a strong motivation to take part in the ginseng trade. This section examines how Nurhaci dismantled the existing Haixi Jurchen monopoly on the trade in wild ginseng by seizing control of the habitat areas, which in turn contributed to his accumulation of wealth and increased his economic power. Nurhaci focused on obtaining imperial orders by taking advantage of the internal conflicts among the Hada Jurchens. He began by conquering the three Jurchen tribes who encircled the production site and were responsible for gathering ginseng for the Haixi Jurchens. Through his command of these production sites, Nurhaci accumulated sizeable wealth, expanded the trade volume of the Fushun frontier market, and dominated the Guangshun frontier market at Kaiyuan after the fall of the Hada Jurchens. The wild ginseng trade also provided Nurhaci with a fundamental economic basis that enabled his expansion, allowing him to replace the Haixi Jurchens as leader of the Jurchens in terms of economic power.

### ***Wild Ginseng***

Ginseng was precious to the Chinese for centuries because of its medical uses and tradeability.<sup>125</sup> As He Bian argues, the seventeenth century was a unique period for

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<sup>125</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 169–70.

herbs in Ming China.<sup>126</sup> She shows that this period was the boom time for herbs due to an improvement in the quality, range, and accessibility of written records on herbs. These pharmacological works seem to have provided the ideological basis for ordinary people in the Ming state to consume ginseng, motivating people to purchase herbs for health benefits. Van Jay Symons in his book shows the economic feature of ginseng and briefly introduces Nurhaci's monopolisation of ginseng sources.<sup>127</sup>

Wild ginseng (Ch. *yeshanshen* 野山參) is mainly harvested in Changbai Mountain area. It has a main taproot with numerous long rootlets extending on both sides (See Figure 1). Generally speaking, the longer the rootlets are, the higher medical and economic value the wild ginseng has.

Picture 1 Wild Ginseng



Photograph by Lin Sun

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<sup>126</sup> He Bian, 'Assembling the Cure: Materia Medica and the Culture of Healing in Late Imperial China' (Harvard University, 2014), 6–7.

<sup>127</sup> Symons, *Ch'ing Ginseng Management: Ch'ing Monopolies in Microcosm*, 9–10.

The vigorous pursuit of ginseng by the Chinese, especially the elite, drove the rapid development of the ginseng trade from the sixteenth all the way up until the nineteenth centuries. However, the trade goes back further. As early as 1061, Su Song (Ch. 蘇頌) in his *Illustrated Canon of Materia Medica* (Ch. *bencao tujing* 本草圖經) notes the trade of ginseng.<sup>128</sup> In the late Ming period, wild ginseng production in Shangdang, Shanxi province within Ming territory had become exhausted, causing more demand for the wild ginseng produced in the Jurchen territory. By 1578, *The Compendium of Materia Medica* (Ch. *bencao gangmu* 本草綱目) states that the Jurchen territory, whose ginseng was renowned for its quality, had replaced Shangdang as the main production site for ginseng.

Shangdang is today called Luzhou. The local people consider ginseng to be a harmful item, and ginseng [in Shangdang] is no longer collected. [Ginseng] that is consumed now is Liaoshen [wild ginseng].

上黨今潞州也，民以人參為地方害，不復採取。今所用者，皆是遼參。<sup>129</sup>

As a result, the Jurchen trade in wild ginseng flourished after the mid-Ming period,

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<sup>128</sup> Su Song 蘇頌, *Bencao tujing* 本草圖經, n.d., juan 4: caobu shang.

For the online version of this archival source, please see

<https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E6%9C%AC%E8%8D%89%E5%9C%96%E7%B6%93/%E8%8D%89%E9%83%A8%E4%B8%8A%E5%93%81%E4%B9%8B%E4%B8%8A%E5%8D%B7%E7%AC%AC%E5%9B%9B>.

<sup>129</sup> Li Shizhen 李時珍, *Bencao gangmu* 本草綱目, n.d., juan cao zhi yi: renshen.

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<https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E6%9C%AC%E8%8D%89%E7%B6%B1%E7%9B%AE/%E8%8D%89%E4%B9%8B%E4%B8%80>.

with wild ginseng regularly being presented to the Ming imperial court.<sup>130</sup> In the fifth lunar month of 1478, about 300 *jin* of wild ginseng was presented to the imperial family.<sup>131</sup> The imperial elite and their families also purchased wild ginseng from markets in Beijing, claiming the medical effect of wild ginseng was much stronger than that of Korean ginseng.<sup>132</sup> Looking at the region's geographical setting, He Bian concludes that the areas of Zhili (Ch.直隸) and Zhejiang (Ch.浙江), the richest places to the north and south of the Ming state respectively, became the largest consumers of ginseng.<sup>133</sup> Therefore, during the late Ming period, there was a significant increase in demand for wild ginseng to the extent that it became one of the most popular commodities in the frontier markets at the northeastern border of the Ming, greatly benefitting Nurhaci's grip on power.

### ***The Monopoly of the Wild Ginseng Trade, 1593***

High profits encouraged the Jurchens to conduct the trade in wild ginseng, but for Nurhaci, the process of contending for the production site of wild ginseng was fierce.<sup>134</sup>

Traditional research portrays Nurhaci's monopolisation of the wild ginseng trade as

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<sup>130</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Xianzong:CH3.5.9.

<sup>131</sup> *Ming shilu*, Xianzong:CH14.5.5.

<sup>132</sup> Xie Zhaozhe 謝肇淛, *Wuza zu* 五雜俎, n.d., juan 11: wubu san.

For the online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=186337&remap=gb>.

<sup>133</sup> Bian, 'Assembling the Cure: Materia Medica and the Culture of Healing in Late Imperial China', 153.

<sup>134</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 175–77.

more or less effortless.<sup>135</sup> However, in actuality Nurhaci had to defeat the Yehe Jurchens, a powerful and formidable tribe, in order to monopolise the ginseng trade. The primary production site of ginseng was located in an area of Changbai Mountain, which was tightly controlled by the Haixi Jurchens. As a result, the Fushun frontier market that Nurhaci controlled had little wild ginseng for sale.<sup>136</sup> Moreover, the Haixi Jurchens had established a special operation to monopolise wild ginseng, with various Jurchen tribes assigned different roles so as to facilitate the monopolisation. The Yehe and Hada Jurchens, the two most powerful tribes of the Haixi Jurchens, ensured that the wild ginseng that grew in their territories was only sold at the Kaiyuan markets, which they controlled.<sup>137</sup> The three small Jurchen tribes in the main production site of wild ginseng, the Neyen (Man., Ch. *neyin* 訥殷), the Jušeri (Man., Ch. *zhusheli* 朱舍裡) and the Yalu Bira (Man., Ch. *yalu jiang* 鴨綠江), had important production sites, and were permitted to gather and sell wild ginseng as well, but only at the Kaiyuan markets. Therefore, the trade in wild ginseng centred on the frontier markets at Kaiyuan rather than Fushun.<sup>138</sup>

In an attempt to seize ginseng production sites, Nurhaci launched numerous

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<sup>135</sup> Mitamura Taisuke 三田村泰助.

<sup>136</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 808–14.

In total of 24 deals in 1578, main products were horse, grains, clothes, furs rather than ginseng.

<sup>137</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong: WL4.1.13.

<sup>138</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 802–37.

In a total of 30 transactions that took place in 1584, the Haixi sold an average of approximately 1,772.5 kilograms per month. Thus it may be estimated that in total several tens of thousands kilograms of ginseng were traded at Kaiyuan per year. The documents show that ginseng was only traded in frontier markets in Kaiyuan.

military campaigns. In 1591, he successfully conquered the Yalu Bira tribe, gaining access to ginseng trading rights.<sup>139</sup> This marked an important success but the Neyen and the Jušeri Jurchen tribes were still under the control of the Haixi Jurchens, even though they were close to territory controlled by Nurhaci. Nurhaci responded by barricading the trade roads between the two tribes, severing their primary trade route. This greatly weakened the trade but due to the highly developed transportation network, the ginseng trade from Changbai Mountain to Kaiyuan continued. This prevented Nurhaci from conquering these smaller rural tribes.

Ultimately, it was the internal conflicts amongst the Hada Jurchens that allowed Nurhaci to finally defeat the Yehe Jurchens, seizing control of the ginseng production site and providing an opportunity to obtain more imperial orders and participate in the ginseng trade at the Guangshun frontier market at Kaiyuan. In 1591, the Hada Jurchens were thrown into turmoil by the death of their ruler. The 500 imperial orders held by the Hada Jurchens were shared by Nurhaci and the Yehe Jurchens. The 363 imperial orders Nurhaci obtained increased his imperial orders to a total of 863 imperial orders (including the orders he had obtained previously). The Yehe Jurchens received 137 imperial orders from the Hada Jurchens' collapse, bringing their total to 636 imperial orders.<sup>140</sup> Therefore, Nurhaci had become the biggest winner in the fall of the Hada Jurchens, dominating the Guangshun frontier market at Kaiyuan. For his next task,

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<sup>139</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 313.

<sup>140</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong: WL29.12.8; Qu Jiushi, *Wanli wugong lu*, juan 11: 'nuer hachi zhuan'.

Nurhaci focused on seizing the production sites of ginseng.

A war between the Jianzhou Jurchens and Yehe Jurchens over control of the production site erupted in 1593, with Nurhaci emerging victorious. Tensions began in 1591 following Nurhaci's accumulation of imperial orders and ginseng production sites. The Yehe Jurchens began to see Nurhaci as a serious threat to the extent that the leader of the Yehe Jurchens sent a message to Nurhaci:

Ula, Hada, Yehei, Hoifa and Manchu are all one country, how can a country be shared by five kings? Your country has many people, and ours has few. You can choose either the place of Elmin or Jakūmu to give to us.

兀喇、哈達、夜黑、輝發、滿洲總一國也，豈有五王之理？爾國人眾，我國人寡，可將額兒泯、架孔木二處，擇一讓我。<sup>141</sup>

The Yehe's intention with this message was to recapture key areas of the ginseng production as well as replace Nurhaci as the commander of the frontier market at Fushun (See Map 4). Elmin (Man., Ch. *eermin* 額兒泯/額爾敏) itself was a central point of ginseng production, and only a five-day walk from Kaiyuan.<sup>142</sup> Elmin therefore linked the trade route between Kaiyuan and Changbai Mountain, making Elmin a key strategic location for Nurhaci if he was to contend for control of the ginseng

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<sup>141</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 313.

<sup>142</sup> Sin Ch'ungil 申忠一, 'Jianzhou jicheng tuji 建州紀程圖記', in *Qing ruguan qian shiliao xuanji*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1989), 432.

Elmin is present-day Ermi town in Tonghua county, Jilin province.

trade that had been under the Yehe Jurchens.<sup>143</sup> Jakūmu (Man., Ch. *zhakumu* 紮庫木) was also an important location as it was situated between the city of Fe Ala, Nurhaci's capital, and the Fushun frontier market.<sup>144</sup> Elmin was to the east of Fe Ala, and Jakūmu was to the west. Therefore, the Yehe Jurchens clearly intended to make Nurhaci abandon either the Fushun frontier market or the ginseng production site. Nurhaci rejected both requests immediately.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Sin Ch'ungil, 'Jianzhou jicheng tuji', 432.

<sup>144</sup> Wada Sei 和田清, *Tōa shi kenkyū* 東亞史研究 (Tōkyō: Tōyō Bunko, 1955), 566–80. Jakūmu is present-day Xiayingzi in Xinbin county, Liaoning province.

<sup>145</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 313–14.

Map 4 The Production Site of Wild Ginseng



The Yehe Jurchens, together with the Jurchen tribes, sent another message to pressure Nurhaci to cease his attacks on two other Jurchen tribes: the Neyen and Jušeri, who resided near Changbai Mountain. Nurhaci again refused to comply.<sup>146</sup> These refusals weakened the Yehe Jurchens' control of the ginseng and threatened the viability of the trade route itself.

Nurhaci rejected the proposals of the Yehe Jurchens. In response, in the sixth lunar month of 1593, the Yehe Jurchens allied with other Jurchen tribes in an attempt to seize Hubkiya town (Man., Ch. *hubuqia* 戶布恰) from the Jianzhou Jurchens. Nurhaci reacted by taking control of Furgiyaki town (Man., Ch. *fu'er jiaqi* 富兒家奇), obtaining six suits of armour and eighteen horses in the conquest.<sup>147</sup> However, this did not prevent the Yehe Jurchens from continuing to make incursions into Nurhaci's lands. Three months later, a joint army consisting of the Yehe, the Hada, the Ula, the Hoifa, the Jušeri and the Neyen Jurchens, as well as the Qorč'in Mongols, the Sibe people (Man., Ch. *xibo* 錫伯), and the Gūwalca people (Man., Ch. *guaerjia* 瓜爾佳) allied to launch a punitive attack against Nurhaci, which resulted in the Gure Mountain battle (Ch. *gule shan zhizhan* 古勒山之戰).<sup>148</sup> The Jurchen troops were divided into three sections with 10,000 soldiers in each section, and advanced on Fe Ala. As mentioned above, Nurhaci's cavalymen numbered no more than 10,000, but he reportedly showed

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<sup>146</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 314.

<sup>147</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 314.

The location of the two mentioned place is unknown.

<sup>148</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 315.

remarkable confidence.<sup>149</sup>

Even though Nurhaci may have shown confidence as the enemy approached, the severity of the situation caused panic among many of the Jianzhou Jurchens. But Nurhaci had developed a cunning strategy of killing tribal leaders, which caused the soldiers to flee.<sup>150</sup> After a day's battle, Nurhaci returned in triumph. His booty included 3,000 horses and 1,000 suits of armour. Most importantly, however, Nurhaci had brought the Jušeri and the Neyen tribes under his rule.<sup>151</sup> By the end of 1593, Nurhaci, therefore, had complete control over the ginseng production sites.

Although there is no existing record of the trade volume from the Fushun frontier market after 1593, it can be assumed that, with Nurhaci occupying the production site of the ginseng, the trade volume of wild ginseng increased there. Nurhaci also expanded his ginseng trade to the Guangshun frontier market at Kaiyan through the imperial orders he had following the collapse of the Hada Jurchens. The Yehe Jurchens lost the production sites of ginseng as well as their monopoly on the ginseng trade. The next step for Nurhaci was to monopolise the trade in sable fur, the other valuable item the Jurchen territory produced.

### ***The Competition between Wild Ginseng and Korean Ginseng***

The monopoly of the trade in wild ginseng brought wealth to Nurhaci. However, that

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<sup>149</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 135–36.

<sup>150</sup> 'Manzhou shilu 滿洲實錄', in *Qing shilu 清實錄* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), 94–95.

<sup>151</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 136.

wealth was challenged by the competition between wild ginseng and Korean ginseng. As wild ginseng was in limited supply, the Ming domestic markets turned to Korean ginseng as an alternative, causing the markets to be overwhelmed by Korean ginseng imports, and devastating the wild ginseng trade with the Ming.<sup>152</sup> The East Asian War (1592-98), this thesis argues, created an opportunity for both Ming China and Chosŏn Korea to establish a frontier market for war supplies, which later became a trade hub for Korean ginseng and sable fur.<sup>153</sup> It was inevitable that the excessive import of Korean ginseng would adversely affect the sales of wild ginseng that Nurhaci monopolised. Due to the limited production of wild ginseng, the Ming domestic markets were overwhelmed by Korean ginseng.<sup>154</sup> Nurhaci attempted to rectify this by attempting to participate in the trade in Korean ginseng. However, his efforts were in vain.

Korean ginseng (Ch. *gaoli shen* 高麗參) was a plant native to the Korean territory. The production sites of Korean ginseng were centred on the area south of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers in the Korean Peninsula. It was also known as red ginseng (See Picture 2), because Korean people preferred to steam their ginseng, turning it red. The shape of Korean ginseng differs from that of wild ginseng, with a long main stem and short

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<sup>152</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo39.10.14.

<sup>153</sup> For the details of the war, please see James B. Lewis, ed., *The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence and Memory* (London: Routledge, 2014); Samuel Jay Hawley, *The Imjin War: Japan's Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China* (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 2005).

<sup>154</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo39.10.14.

rootlets extending only at the bottom. While Korean ginseng offered an alternative in the ginseng trade, its price was lower than that of wild ginseng due to its slightly lower medical value. Nurhaci was not allowed to engage in the Korean ginseng trade, as it was monopolised by the Chosŏn court.

Picture 2 Korean Ginseng



Photograph by Lin Sun

The newly established Zhongjiang frontier market was a trading hub for Korean ginseng, so economic ties between the Ming and Chosŏn developed rapidly. The market was on a tiny island, *Chidao* (Ch. 赤島, see Map 5) in the middle of the Yalu River, close to Ŭiju, an important city within the region. The market was established in the tenth lunar month of 1593, functioning as a critical centre for rice and other military

supplies between the Ming and Chosŏn during the East Asian War.<sup>155</sup> The initial purpose for establishing the market was to transport grain from the Ming to Ŭiju via land and maritime routes.<sup>156</sup> However, with the arrival of Chinese merchants and Ming border officials, the Zhongjiang frontier market gradually became the trading centre for Korean ginseng and raw materials like gunpowder between the Ming and Chosŏn.<sup>157</sup> The Ming court and a large number of Ming generals stationed in Seoul had been bulk-buying Korean ginseng, which caused the price to keep rising, making one *cun* of ginseng as expensive as one *cun* of gold.<sup>158</sup> The increase in Korean ginseng harvesting activities driven by such sizeable profits led to drastic declines in supply, such that it was almost possible to find any high-quality Korean ginseng.<sup>159</sup> In this way, the excessive imports of Korean ginseng negatively affected the sale of the wild ginseng that Nurhaci monopolised.

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<sup>155</sup> Yi Kŭngik 李肯翊, ‘Yŏllyŏshil gisull 燃藜室記述’, in *Chaoxian wenxian zhongde zhongguo dongbei Shiliao* (Jilin: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1991), vol. 18:309-10.

<sup>156</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo26.5.4.

<sup>157</sup> Yun Tusu 尹斗壽, *Oŭm yugo* 梧陰遺稿, n.d., juan 3: lun jinzhan yunliang zhazi.

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
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<sup>158</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo32.9.19; Cui Xian 崔峴, ‘Renzhai xiansheng bieji 訥齋先生別集’, in *Hanguo wenji congkan* (Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch’ujinhoe, 1999), juan 67: 452.

The measure word 1 *cun* (Ch. 寸) is equivalent to 3.581 centimetres.

<sup>159</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo39.10.14.

Map 5 The Zhongjiang Frontier Market



In response, Nurhaci attempted to secure access to Korean ginseng under the guise of military aid. In the fourth lunar month of 1592 when the East Asian War broke out, Japan invaded Chosŏn Korea and took over the Chosŏn capital, Seoul, in only two months. King Sŏnjo of Chosŏn requested military assistance from the Ming.<sup>160</sup> The Wanli Emperor of the Ming state sent his armies to assist Koreans to defeat the Japanese troops.<sup>161</sup> Seeing an opportunity to gain favour with the Chosŏn court, Nurhaci offered to join the fight, supplying Korea with highly trained elite military units.<sup>162</sup> However, the Chosŏn court rejected Nurhaci's offer so as to prevent Nurhaci from becoming a threat to the northwest frontier defence of the Chosŏn state.<sup>163</sup>

Five months later, Nurhaci again offered to provide military assistance. This time, his offer was accepted by the Ming court, as the united armies of the Ming and Chosŏn were unable to hold off the Japanese advances.<sup>164</sup> However, the Chosŏn court soon changed their decision and rejected Nurhaci's proposal for fear of adverse future consequences.<sup>165</sup> It seemed that offering military assistance was not a viable option for Nurhaci to establish a trade connection with the Chosŏn court.

Three years later, in 1595, Nurhaci applied for permission for the Jurchen people

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<sup>160</sup> 'Yuan Chaoxian 援朝鮮', in *Mingshi jishi benmo*, vol. 62, n.d.

For the online version of this source, please see

<http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=705808&remap=gb>.

<sup>161</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong:WL20.7.26.

<sup>162</sup> *Ming shilu*, Shenzong:WL20.9.14.

<sup>163</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo22.7.12, Sŏnjo 25.9.14.

<sup>164</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo25.9.15.

<sup>165</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo25.9.15.

to collect Korean ginseng without restrictions so as to develop a trade relationship with Korea. After 1592, there were a large number of Korean residents from the provinces of Hamgyöngbuk-to (Ko. 함경북도, Ch. *xianjing beidao* 咸鏡北道) and Hamgyöngnam-do (Ko. 함경남도, Ch. *xianjing nandao* 咸鏡南道) escaping to the Jurchen territory because of war (See Map 5). Nurhaci seized this opportunity and expressed his wish to contact Chosŏn again. In the seventh lunar month of 1595, he dispatched over ninety Jianzhou Jurchens to Manp'o (Ko. 만포, Ch. *manpu* 滿浦, see Map 5) in the Korean territory, returning fourteen escapees to the Chosŏn state with the intention of maintaining the friendly relations between the two states. Meanwhile, Nurhaci requested permission for his Jurchen people to enter the Korean country with the aim of collecting ginseng freely.<sup>166</sup> Upon receiving the news, King Sŏnjo rejected Nurhaci's request, fearing the Chosŏn court would not be able to hold off a Nurhaci invasion if he were allowed to enter the territory regularly.<sup>167</sup> King Sŏnjo also stressed to the Ming court that secret communication and alliances were prohibited between the Chosŏn and Nurhaci.<sup>168</sup>

The Chosŏn court used the Ming court as the official excuse to reject Nurhaci's request, saying that the Ming had not authorised a trading relationship between Korea and the Jurchen territories. The Chosŏn strengthened their border defences as an extra

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<sup>166</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.7.25.

<sup>167</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.7.25.

<sup>168</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.7.25.

precaution to prevent people from entering the territory.<sup>169</sup> However, large numbers of Jianzhou Jurchens often violated these rules, travelling across the river to gather Korean ginseng in Korean territory, taking advantage of the geographical proximity and the convenient location of the ginseng sources. As the number of people entering the Chosŏn territory increased to more than 200, tensions grew in the region, resulting in conflicts between the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Chosŏn state.<sup>170</sup> The famous incident was the Wi-wŏn Incident (Ko. 위원사건, Ch. *weiyuan shijian* 渭源事件). Wi-wŏn is a small town in the Korean territory. In the tenth lunar month of 1595, a group of Jianzhou Jurchens, without having obtained permission from the Chosŏn, travelled to collect Korean ginseng in Wi-wŏn. Some of the Jurchens were killed by the Chosŏn border soldiers.<sup>171</sup> In response to the Wi-wŏn Incident, Nurhaci gathered a number of elite soldiers and prepared to launch a war on the Chosŏn. Upon receiving the news that Nurhaci was amassing his army to march into Korean territory, the Chosŏn court dispatched a messenger to Nurhaci requesting peace, which was instantly rejected.<sup>172</sup> Simultaneously, the Chosŏn court sent another messenger to the Ming seeking their military assistance in the imminent conflict.<sup>173</sup> Nurhaci certainly did have more military power than the Chosŏn state, but the Chosŏn state was still fighting the Japanese invaders and was therefore unable to assemble extra troops to defend against

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<sup>169</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.8.23.

<sup>170</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.9.28.

<sup>171</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.10.7.

<sup>172</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.11.16.

<sup>173</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.10.7.

Nurhaci's army. It was critical for both China and Korea to maintain stability on their respective frontiers while the Japanese were invading Korea. In this way, the Ming court took up the role of mediator, officially declaring that Nurhaci was responsible for the Wi-wŏn Incident as his Jurchen people were not permitted by Korea to enter Korean territory. The Ming court thus demanded Nurhaci refrain from disrupting the peace.<sup>174</sup> Nurhaci finally compromised and abandoned his plans to attack Korea.<sup>175</sup> Two years later, Nurhaci again requested trade contact with Korea, but the Chosŏn court again rejected the request. They declared that Nurhaci was a barbarian.<sup>176</sup>

Nurhaci continued to access Korean territory secretly in the years that followed, which led to severe punishments from the Ming. The Ming court prohibited Nurhaci from presenting tribute for two years and even closed the Fushun frontier market, which resulted in great economic losses for Nurhaci, the form of up to 10,000 *jin* of untraded ginseng.<sup>177</sup>

Thus From 1592 to 1595, Nurhaci made multiple attempts to establish connections with Korea to access the Korean ginseng trade, but experienced repeated setbacks. However, success finally arrived in 1609, when the Zhongjiang frontier market closed, marking the termination of the Korean ginseng trade between the Ming and Chosŏn at

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<sup>174</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.12.14.

<sup>175</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.12.22.

<sup>176</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo31.3.9, Sŏnjo31.9.7.

<sup>177</sup> Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀, *Shimin sishi ji* 石民四十集, n.d., juan 36: nŭzhi zheshou ji yi.

For the online version of this source, please see

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Zhongjiang.<sup>178</sup>

### **The Trade in Sable Fur**

Sable fur, like wild ginseng, had attracted Chinese attention, giving rise to a boom in the fur trade for the Jurchens over the course of the Ming period.<sup>179</sup> Kawachi Yoshihiro argues convincingly that, with high demand for sable fur, the Jurchens quickly emerged as the key player in the fur trade over the course of the Ming dynasty.<sup>180</sup> This section examines how Nurhaci continued to dismantle the Yehe Jurchens' monopoly of the trade in sable fur, as he had already taken control of their monopoly in ginseng. It also argues that Nurhaci seized control of the sable fur production sites through his conquest of the Ula and Hoifa Jurchens. After securing his monopoly over the fur trade in the Jurchen territory, Nurhaci attempted to expand the fur trade network to Korea and the Mongol territory. Ultimately, Nurhaci failed to develop the fur trade in Korea but he did successfully ally with the Mongols.

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<sup>178</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo33.10.18.

<sup>179</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 170–71; Kawachi Yoshihiro, *Mindai joshin shi no kenkyū*, chap. 18; Kawachi Yoshihiro, 'Mingdai dongbeiya de diaopi maoyi'; Qiu Zhonglin 邱仲麟, 'Baonuan, xuanyao he quanshi: mingdai zhengui pimao de wenhua shi 保暖、炫耀與權勢：明代珍貴皮毛的文化史', *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 80, no. 4 (2010): 555–631.

<sup>180</sup> Kawachi Yoshihiro, *Mindai joshin shi no kenkyū*, 596–618.

## *Sable fur*

Sable is a species of marten and inhabits the forest environment of Siberia.<sup>181</sup> This section is focused on sable fur rather than mink fur to examine the fur trade in Northeast Asia, as sable fur dominated the fur trade in this region.

Sable has been highly valued in the greater Siberian region for centuries. In the second half of the Ming period, the demand for sable fur gradually increased among the Ming imperial elite.<sup>182</sup> By the late Ming period, sable fur had become a key tribute product for the Ming court. According to Liu Ruoyu (Ch. 劉若愚, 1584-?), a eunuch at the Ming court, the Ming royal family demanded approximately 10,000 sable furs per year.<sup>183</sup> These furs were required for the Ming court to award officials and elites, for example, acting as critical gift-giving luxuries to ensure loyalty.<sup>184</sup> These court traditions created a growing demand, promoting the trade in sable fur.

Initially, the Haixi Jurchens not only monopolised the trade in ginseng but also that in sable fur. According to existing transaction documents in a single year from 1584 to 1585, more than 477,243 sable furs were traded between the Haixi Jurchens and the

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<sup>181</sup> There is often times confusion between sable and mink. Mink is another species of marten that is more familiar to Europeans and North Americans. Both species of marten look similar in terms of body size and appearance but have different colouring.

<sup>182</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Xianzong:CH2.10.16.

<sup>183</sup> Liu Ruoyu 劉若愚, *Zhuozhong zhi* 酌中志, n.d., juan 16: neifu yamen shizhang.

For the online version of this source, please see

<http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=603329&remap=gb>.

<sup>184</sup> Shen Defu 沈德符, *Wanli yehuo bian* 萬曆野獲編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 231; Wen Bing 文秉, *Liehuang xiaoshi* 烈皇小識 (Shanghai: shanghai shudian, 1982), 215; Qiu Zhonglin, 'Baonuan, xuanyao he quanshi: mingdai zhengui pimao de wenhua shi', 555–631.

Ming at the Zhenbei frontier and the Guangshun frontier markets in Kaiyuan.<sup>185</sup> The main habitat of sable that the Haixi Jurchens controlled was around Lake Khanka, which spanned from the Tumen River to the west, bordered the Sea of Japan to the east and extended from the Khanka Lake in the north to Nakhodka of Russia in the south (see Map 6); the other prominent site was in the valley of the Nen River (Ch. *nenjiang* 嫩江) and the upper stream of the Amur River, which was controlled by the Qorč'in Mongols.

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<sup>185</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 815–37.

Map 6 The Main Habitat of Sable



### *The Monopoly of the Sable Fur Trade, 1611*

In the late Ming period, the Haixi Jurchens dominated the fur trade and had established an intricate “trade chain” which encompassed both hunting to selling. The work involved in this production chain was split between the Haixi Jurchens and their most prominent trading partner, the Yeren Jurchens. The Yeren Jurchens resided in a broader area of the sable habitat and depended on hunting fur for their livelihood. There were three sub-tribes of the Yeren Jurchens: the Woji Jurchens (Man., Ch. *woji* 窩集), the Hurha Jurchens (Man., Ch. *huerha* 虎而哈), and the Warka Jurchens (Man., Ch. *waerka* 瓦爾喀).<sup>186</sup> The Woji Jurchens were the most important trading partner to the Haixi Jurchens, as their territory included the centre of the habitat, meaning they controlled the majority of sable fur production. The Ula and the Hoifa Jurchens, the two tribes of the Haixi Jurchens, were responsible for transporting sable fur to Kaiyuan where the frontier markets were. Fur was transported through a developed transportation network along the rivers in the Jurchen territory. The Yehe and the Hada Jurchens, who occupied the Zhenbei and Guangshun frontier markets respectively, took charge of selling these products to the Ming court at Kaiyuan. The sable fur traded by the Yehe and the Hada Jurchens with the Ming enabled both groups to amass significant profits in the frontier markets.

The trade chain functioned as a two-way trade, which was beneficial to both the

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<sup>186</sup> Yang Bin 楊賓, ‘Liubian jilue 柳边纪略’, in *Liaohai congshu* 遼海叢書, ed. Liaohai shushe 遼海書社 (Taipei: Yiwen yinshuguan, 1970), juan 3: 2a-2b.

Haixi Jurchens and the Yeren Jurchens, but particularly favourable to the Ula and Hoifa Jurchens. The Ula and Hoifa Jurchens were essentially taking two roles in the trade networks. In the first, they functioned as trade middlemen, delivering fur to the frontier markets at Kaiyuan; in the second, they brought back Chinese goods such as daily necessities and farming tools from Kaiyuan to the Yeren Jurchens' territory.<sup>187</sup> Therefore, the Ula and Hoifa Jurchens (particularly the Ula Jurchens) had more power than the other Jurchen groups as they controlled the amount of sable fur that would be transported to Kaiyuan. This trade chain paved the way for Nurhaci to supersede the Haixi Jurchens as controller of the fur trade, and made the Ula Jurchens his primary target.

Because Nurhaci's territory did not produce sable fur, he attempted to undermine the fur trade coalition between the Yehe Jurchens and the Ula Jurchens.<sup>188</sup> With the collapse of the Hada Jurchens in 1591, the Yehe Jurchens took complete control of the sable fur trade. However, their economic power weakened when they lost control of the ginseng trade. By comparison, Nurhaci increased his economic power by obtaining more imperial orders, monopolising the ginseng trade, and gaining access to the Guangshun frontier market at Kaiyuan. The Gule Mountain Battle in 1593 marked the

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<sup>187</sup> Wei Yuan 魏源, *Shengwu ji* 聖武記, n.d., juan 1: 3a.

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<sup>188</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Xianzong:CH2.10.16.

As no deals of the sable fur trade in the Fushun frontier market have been traced, it is assumed that Nurhaci's place was not the production site of sable fur, for more details, please see *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 715–847.

end of the Yehe Jurchens' participation in the ginseng trade, and also provided an opportunity for Nurhaci to establish connections with the Ula Jurchens who had joined the Yehe-led army in the battle.

After 1593, Nurhaci spent six years establishing a trade alliance with the Ula Jurchens to gain access to fur. Bujantai (Man., Ch. *buzhantai* 布占泰), who was the younger brother of the former leader of the Ula Jurchens, became Nurhaci's key ally in the orchestration of this alliance. He was captured at the Gule Mountain battle but evaded execution, staying in Jianzhou Jurchen territory for three years. In 1596, he returned to the Ula territory with the support of Nurhaci and became the leader of the Hada Jurchens following the death of his elder brother.<sup>189</sup> The alliance in the fur trade between Nurhaci and Bujantai was established as soon as Bujantai returned in 1596. In order to repay Nurhaci for his support, in the twelfth lunar month of 1597, Bujantai offered Nurhaci a bride from his tribe to solidify their good relations.<sup>190</sup> In the same month, he came in person to Fe Ala, the capital of Nurhaci's tribe, leading 300 followers bearing gifts to show his gratitude to Nurhaci. Nurhaci gave gifts in return, including 50 pieces of armour and ten imperial orders. In 1599, Nurhaci's efforts were rewarded when the Woji Jurchens came to Nurhaci to trade sable furs for the first time:

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<sup>189</sup> *Qing shilu* 清實錄, vol. Taizu gaohuangdi 太祖高皇帝, n.d., WL24.7.1 (bingshen sui).

<sup>190</sup> 'Manzhou shilu', 107-08.

Bujantai used the reasons that he was reborn and the relationship between Nurhaci and him was like father and son.

On the first day of the first month in 1599, spring, the leaders of the Hurha tribe of the Woji Jurchens, Wang Ge and Zhang Ge, came to pay tribute with a hundred subordinates, offering black, white and red fox fur as well as black and white sable fur. Ever since the Hurha tribe of the Woji Jurchens have come to pay tribute every year. Their head Bojili requested the first marriage connection. The emperor [Nurhaci] praised him for being the first to paying allegiance, and gave six daughters of his senior officials' to six leaders of the [Hurha] tribe.

己亥春正月壬午朔。東海渥集部之虎爾哈路長王格、張格、率百人朝謁，貢黑白紅三色狐皮、黑白二色貂皮。自此渥集部之虎爾哈路，每歲朝謁。其長博濟裡首乞婚。上嘉其率先歸附，因以大臣女六，配其六長。<sup>191</sup>

The annual tribute from the Woji Jurchens shows that Nurhaci had already established trade with a fixed volume of sable fur, which is also detailed in a conversation between a Chosŏn ambassador and Surgaci, the younger brother of Nurhaci. The following text discusses the moment when Nurhaci's family received sable fur from the Woji tribe for the first time:

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<sup>191</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi:WL27.1.1 (jihai sui).

[The Chosŏn ambassador] asked whether Surgaci has any relations with the barbarians who live in the north of the [Tumen] river. [Surgaci] answers that the Chengdi Fanhu [the tribe located to the south of Nurhaci's territory] sincerely come to present tribute. The various villages and tribes in the south of the Molong [Amur] River also frequently present tribute. Surgaci and his people must provide accommodation for a month, interview them each day, and give rewards generously, entertaining them warmly. All the barbarians have sincerely submitted themselves to [Surgaci]. [The Chosŏn ambassador] asked what products the barbarians presented [Surgaci] answers that [they presented] sable fur, horses, and other items.

問小兒哈赤與渠北地諸胡相通往來否。曰城底藩胡，一心來貢。墨龍江以南諸屯諸部，亦時時通貢。小兒哈赤等必館留一月，逐日燕接，酬賞優洽，諸胡皆心附之矣。問諸胡所貢何物，曰貂皮馬子等物。<sup>192</sup>

After Nurhaci and the Ula Jurchens established a trading relationship in 1599, the amount of sable fur that Yehe Jurchens received decreased considerably. As Nurhaci seized more and more of the sable fur resources, the Yehe Jurchens started to experience difficulties in the sable fur trade at the frontier markets in Kaiyuan.<sup>193</sup> This shows that the Yehe could not maintain their trade ties with the Ming court in Kaiyuan, having lost control of the sable fur resources. However, the trading relationship between Nurhaci

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<sup>192</sup> Hwang Yöil 黃汝一, *Haewölchip* 海月集, n.d., juan 10: yincuo rilu (rilu shang).

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[http://db.itkc.or.kr/dir/item?itemId=MO#/dir/node?dataId=ITKC\\_MO\\_0735A\\_0110\\_010\\_0020](http://db.itkc.or.kr/dir/item?itemId=MO#/dir/node?dataId=ITKC_MO_0735A_0110_010_0020).

<sup>193</sup> Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼, 'Yu Ye Xianggong Jichu Yuanshuang 與葉相公計處遠爽', in *Huangming jingshi wenbian*, ed. Chen Zilong 陳子龍, juan 214, n.d.

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and the Ula Jurchens had its own instabilities, with periods of reduced trade orchestrated by the Ula Jurchens not being uncommon.<sup>194</sup> The Ula Jurchens ultimately held the decision-making power over whether the sable fur would be presented to and traded with Nurhaci. In order to mitigate this problem, Nurhaci enhanced their relationship by way of prominent marriage unions in 1601 and 1603.<sup>195</sup>

However, tensions remained due to disagreements over price of the sable furs. After they established their trade connection in 1599, the Ula Jurchens worked as agents to transport sources of sable fur to the Fushun frontier market controlled by Nurhaci. Nevertheless, the trade relationship was not a mutually satisfying one, as Nurhaci often forced the Ula Jurchens to sell the goods to him at unreasonably low prices, monopolising the frontier market trade at Fushun. In contrast, the Yehe Jurchens were unable to ask for lower prices, causing extreme price differences and increasing tensions between Nurhaci and the Ula Jurchens. The tensions escalated further when the Ula started trading with the Chosŏn state in an effort to combat Nurhaci's monopoly of the frontier markets.<sup>196</sup> In 1603, the fur trade between Nurhaci and the Ula Jurchens came to an end due to these disagreements over prices.

The Ula Jurchens undermined Nurhaci's monopoly and developed new trading

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<sup>194</sup> Zhang Xuan 張萱, 'Xiyuan wenjian lu 西園聞見錄', in *Mingdai zhuanji congkan zonglu lei* 明代傳記叢刊綜錄類, ed. Zhou Junfu 周駿富 (Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1991), juan 73: 23a-29a.

<sup>195</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi: WL29.11.1, WL31.1.1.

<sup>196</sup> Cheng Kaihu 程開祐, *Chouliao shuohua* 籌遼碩畫, n.d., juan 2: 5a-5b.

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<http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=100988&page=10>.

channels with the Chosŏn state as a result of the unsatisfactory conditions of their relationship with Nurhaci. When his trade alliance with the Ula Jurchens ended in 1603, Nurhaci shifted his focus to seek an opportunity to replace the Ula Jurchens to monopolise the fur trade. He also attempted to contact the Jurchens who resided on the south shore of the Tumen River to obtain fur so as to establish his own trade connections with Korea. Four years later, the tension between Nurhaci and the Ula Jurchens, which had been developing for years, increased further, bringing them to the verge of conflict. War finally broke out in 1607, with both sides engaging in battle at Ogaram (Ko. 오갈암, Ch.*wujie yan* 烏礪岩) in Chosŏn Korea with the aim of dominating trade opportunities to Korea. The fight ended with Nurhaci's victory and left Bujantai with significant losses. The battle of Ogal-am changed the power configuration of the two sides, with the Ula Jurchens losing their position in the sable fur trade. After the Ogal-am battle, Bujantai's diminished position forced him to visit Nurhaci with the hope of brokering peace, but Nurhaci did not stop his incursions into the Woji Jurchens' territory.<sup>197</sup> From 1607 to 1611, Nurhaci led a campaign to conquer the Woji Jurchens.<sup>198</sup> When he achieved this in 1611, he finally had control over the sources of sable fur, in effect monopolising the trade in sable fur in the Jurchen territory.

Following the battle of Ogal-am, Nurhaci extended his campaign to conquer the Hoifa Jurchens who were important middlemen in the sable fur trading networks. In the

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<sup>197</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi:WL36.9.1.

<sup>198</sup> *Qing Shilu*, Taizu gaohuangdi:WL35.5.1, WL37.12.1, WL38.11.1, WL39.7.1, WL39.12.1.

tenth lunar month of 1607, Nurhaci defeated the Hoifa Jurchens by sending merchants as spies into the Hoifa Jurchen's city prior to Nurhaci's final attack.<sup>199</sup> Following the conquest of the Hoifa Jurchens, Nurhaci dispatched a huge number of troops with the intention of taking over the Ula with a single attack. However, the Qorč'in Mongols interfered, forcing Nurhaci to return without success.<sup>200</sup> The Qorč'in Mongols sold fur to the Zhenbei frontier market at Kaiyuan and therefore protected the Yehe Jurchens.

The decline of the Ula Jurchens altered the economic and political configuration of the Jurchen territory. The Haixi Jurchens, particularly the Yehe Jurchens, had monopolised the fur trade for decades prior to Nurhaci. Nurhaci, through the conquest of the Ula Jurchens, established trade connections with the Woji Jurchens to monopolise the fur trade. By 1611, Nurhaci had fully monopolised the trade in ginseng and fur, selling both goods on the Fushun frontier markets. So Fushun became the new trading centre of the Jurchen territories, replacing Kaiyuan with its inflows of silver. Thus, the trade networks in ginseng and fur helped Nurhaci increase his economic power, which laid the foundation for his further military expansion.

### ***Attempts to Expand the Fur Trade Network to Korea and the Mongol Territory***

After gaining a monopoly over the trade in sable fur, Nurhaci turned his attention to expanding it to the Korean and Mongol territories, as sable fur was also widely desired

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<sup>199</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo40.10.21.

<sup>200</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi:WL36.3.1.

by both states. With the trade in Korean ginseng, Nurhaci failed to establish a direct connection with Korea. But he soon shifted his focus to building indirect economic relations with the Chosŏn court through the Pŏnho Jurchens, who had maintained trade relations with Korea during this period. However, the Koreans still refused to develop any connections with Nurhaci, partly due to pressure from the Ming, who did not give their permission for Korea to trade with Nurhaci. Thus, Nurhaci was unable to join either the Korean ginseng trade or the sable fur trade with Korea. Instead, he attempted to develop relations with the Qorč'in Mongols who controlled the other sable habitat in an area between the Nen River valley and the upper stream of the Amur River, abandoning his attempt to capture territory. In 1613, Nurhaci and the Qorč'in Mongols established a military alliance. This section shows that Nurhaci established the fur trade relation with the Qorč'in Mongols, but he failed to expand his trade networks, indicating that Nurhaci came to realise the weaknesses of the bilateral trade with the Ming. However, as the Ming still dominated the East Asia region, Nurhaci was unable to evade the Ming's influence to develop trade networks with Korea.<sup>201</sup>

### ***The Sable Fur Trade with the Pŏnho Jurchens, 1601***

The demand for sable fur in the Chosŏn state boomed during this period as a result of the Chosŏn imperial elite as well as ordinary people's desire for sable fur. In the early

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<sup>201</sup> Han Myung-gi, 'The Inestimable Benevolence of Saving a Country on the Brink of Ruin: Chosŏn-Ming and Chosŏn-Later Jin Relations in the Seventeenth Century', in *The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence and Memory* (London: Routledge, n.d.), 277-93.

years of King Sōngchong (r.1469-94), sable fur consumption was restricted to the imperial family, strictly regulated for clothing for high-level officials of the court.<sup>202</sup> In order to ensure regular supplies of sable, the Chosŏn court issued a regulation introducing a sable fur tax, requiring farmers who lived in the provinces of Hamgyŏng (Ko. 함경, Ch. *xianjing* 咸鏡) and P’yŏng’an (Ko. 평안, Ch. *ping’an* 平安, see Map 5) on the south side of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers to present sable fur to the court. However, these two provinces were not the main areas of quality sable fur (even though they were near to the hunting grounds) and the people who resided in these provinces were engaged in agriculture rather than hunting. Therefore, they had no direct access to sable fur. Korean farmers had little choice but to buy sable furs from the Jurchens to present them to the court.<sup>203</sup> This resulted in numerous farmers falling into poverty, as they purchased sable fur at their own expense to meet the tax quota determined by the Chosŏn court. After 1473, sable fur was no longer confined to the royal family and higher level officials and also became popular among the lower classes of the Chosŏn state. It gained popularity among wealthy families, and became an essential part of Chosŏn upper-class society. For example, ladies were expected to wear sable fur when meeting other women in rural areas; it was considered a disgrace if someone did not

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<sup>202</sup> *Kyŏngguk taejŏn* 경국대전, n.d., juan 3:93.

For the online version of this source, please see [http://korlah.org/Asset/Source/lscDocument\\_ID-576\\_No-01.pdf](http://korlah.org/Asset/Source/lscDocument_ID-576_No-01.pdf).

<sup>203</sup> Tagawa Kōzō 田川孝三, *Ri chō mitsugu osame-sei no kenkyū* 李朝貢納制の研究 (Tōkyō: Tōyō Bunko, 1964), 51–59.

wear it.<sup>204</sup> Sable fur in the Chosŏn state thus was not merely fashionable, it was socially expected.

The Pŏnho Jurchens (Ko.번호, Ch. *fanhu* 藩胡) acted as trade intermediaries between the Jurchens and the Koreans. In Korean archival sources, the Pŏnho Jurchens are referred to the Jurchens who resided on both banks of the Tumen River. However, in Chinese sources, the term Pŏnho refers to the Warka Jurchens, who were a tribal group of the Yeren Jurchens.<sup>205</sup> This thesis follows the Korean sources, with the term Pŏnho Jurchens referring to those native residents to Korea. These Pŏnho Jurchens consisted of many small tribes.

The Pŏnho Jurchens depended on the fur trade for their livelihood and were the leading traders at the frontier markets in the Chosŏn state. Since the areas where the Pŏnho Jurchens lived produced only a small quantity of sable fur, they bought sables from the Woji Jurchens and sold them to Korea at frontier markets that were situated on the south bank of the Tumen River. These trade activities were driven by the high price of sable fur. A sable fur could be exchanged for an ox.<sup>206</sup> The Chosŏn court even granted the Pŏnho Jurchens *chikch'ŏp* (Ko.직첩, Ch. *zhidie* 職牒), indicating their eligibility to continue trade relations with Korea. *Chikch'ŏp* were certificates that allowed the Pŏnho Jurchens to present tribute to Seoul and trade commodities in the

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<sup>204</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, vol. Sŏngchong 성종, n.d., Sŏngchong6.5.12, Sŏngchong6.7.14.

<sup>205</sup> The Warka Jurchens refers to those who lived the banks of the Tumen River during the Ming-Qing transition period. See Dong Wanlun 董萬倫, 'Mingmo qingchu tumenjiang neiwai waerka yanjiu 明末清初圖們江內外瓦爾卡研究', *Minzu yanjiu*, no. 1 (2003): 70–77.

<sup>206</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, vol. Chungjong 중종, n.d., Chungjong30.10.9.

frontier markets. They served the same function as the imperial orders for the Ming. According to *The Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty* (Ko. Chosŏn wangjo sillok 조선왕조실록, Ch. *chaoxian wangchao shilu* 朝鮮王朝實錄), a total of 100 *chikch'ŏp* were distributed to the Pŏnho Jurchens.<sup>207</sup> In this way, the various tribes of the Pŏnho Jurchen scrambled to obtain as many *chikch'ŏp* as possible.

Drawing the Pŏnho Jurchens to his side became a critical aim for Nurhaci. He was unable to obtain sable fur regularly from the Woji Jurchens because of the collapse of the trading relations with the Ula Jurchens in 1603. Additionally, his wild ginseng trade had declined due to the Korean ginseng trade with the Ming. Thus he was forced to boost his income through trading with the Chosŏn. The Pŏnho Jurchens were eligible to trade with the Chosŏn court because of their possession of *chikch'ŏp*. However, during the East Asian War the tribute and frontier market trade between the Pŏnho Jurchens and the Chosŏn court ceased, forcing the Pŏnho Jurchen tribes to relocate to the Jianzhou and Haixi territories seeking access to grain.<sup>208</sup> The economic and defence system of the Chosŏn state was also temporarily dismantled, providing an ideal opportunity for Nurhaci to win over the Pŏnho Jurchens. Through the Pŏnho Jurchens, Nurhaci would be able to engage in tribute and the frontier market trade indirectly with the Chosŏn, gaining access to significant wealth.<sup>209</sup>

Mirroring the centrality of imperial orders to trade with the Ming, *chikch'ŏp* were

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<sup>207</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo 38.9.28.

<sup>208</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo 38.6.7.

<sup>209</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo33.12.2.

paramount in establishing trade with the Chosŏn. In the second lunar month of 1600, three Pŏnho tribes surrendered to Nurhaci, and he obtained their *chikch'ŏp*.<sup>210</sup> Nurhaci immediately wrote to the Chosŏn court, seeking approval to continue the Pŏnho Jurchens' tribute and frontier market trade relations by using their *chikch'ŏp*.<sup>211</sup> However, a border official of the Chosŏn, Kim Chongtŭk (Ko., Ch. *jin zongde* 金宗得), replied to Nurhaci that he would not receive any official title as he already had been granted a title by the Ming court, and recommended Nurhaci to return to his own territory.<sup>212</sup> This response is unsurprising when one takes into account that the Chosŏn court was under the control of the Ming. Covert relationships ran the risk of displeasing the Ming court, and hence adversely impacting relations between the Jin and Chosŏn. This is especially significant given the fact that the Ming had just assisted the Chosŏn court against the Japanese invasion by providing troops. At this point Nurhaci had failed to develop either the ginseng or the fur trade with Korea.

### ***The Sable Fur Trade Network with the Qorč'in Mongols, 1594-1625***

This section argues that trade was the foundation of Manchu-Mongol relations that were a prominent element of the Qing dynasty. The Qorč'in Mongols are viewed as the most important partner in early Manchu rule. Du Jiaji argues that the intermarriage relations contributed to the formation of the close relationship between Nurhaci and the Qorč'in

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<sup>210</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo 34.2.20.

<sup>211</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo 34.10.23.

<sup>212</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo 34.10.23.

Mongols, with numerous Mongol women becoming wives of Manchu rulers and the Manchu nobility.<sup>213</sup> However, this thesis argues that underlying the marriage ties the close relationship between the two groups was based on economic ties. These were a prerequisite for the Qorč'in Mongols to establish intermarriage and military relations with Nurhaci. Along with betrothals, sable fur and plunder were the economic foundation of the Qorč'in Mongols.

Sable fur was not only a valued commodity for Chinese and Koreans, but also for the Mongols. It had been prized for its use in winter clothing since Genghis Khan's time. According to the *Secret History of the Mongols* (Ch. *menggu mishi* 蒙古秘史), when Genghis Khan married his first wife, Börte Ujin, his mother Hoelun received a coat of sable fur as a gift.<sup>214</sup> The Qorč'in Mongols also traded sable fur as an important source of income, profiting from their control of the other significant sable habitats situated between the valley of the Nen River and the upper stream of the Amur River, north of Lake Baikal. Even though economically tempting, Nurhaci abandoned his attempt to capture this hunting ground due to the establishment of a military alliance between the two groups in 1613.

The Qorč'in Mongols monopolised their fur resource, as is recorded in *Illustrations of Kaiyuan* (Ch. *kaiyuan tushuo* 開原圖說, written in Wanli's reign).<sup>215</sup> During the

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<sup>213</sup> Du Jiaji, 'Qingchao de manmeng lianyin', 15–18; Du Jiaji, *Qingchao manmeng lianyin yanjiu*.

<sup>214</sup> Yu Dajun 余大鈞, ed., *Menggu mishi* 蒙古秘史 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 2001), 130.

<sup>215</sup> Feng Yuan, 'Kaiyuan tushuo', 457–58.

early Wanli period (1573-1620), the Qorčīn Mongols relocated to the Songhua River, where some tribes of the Yeren Jurchens also resided. The Qorčīn Mongols seized control of the river, charging the Yeren Jurchens to cross to sell sable fur at Kaiyuan. Occasionally the Qorčīn Mongols also stole goods from the Yeren Jurchens. Eventually, the Qorčīn Mongols commanded each household of Yeren Jurchens located by the Amur River and the Songhua River, including some of the Ula Jurchens, to submit one sable fur and two fish leathers annually.<sup>216</sup> In doing so, the Qorčīn Mongols came to command the sable fur trade in the area.

However, the Qorčīn Mongols were not eligible to trade with the Ming at Kaiyuan so they were dependent on the Haixi Jurchens for trade. The strategy of the Ming court at this time was to divide the Mongol tribes to prevent them from collaborating an attack on the Ming. Those tribes that submitted to the Ming were rewarded with permission to trade at the frontier markets. The Fuyu Mongols (Ch. *fuyu menggu* 福余蒙古) were one of these Mongol tribes, and were allowed to trade at the Xin'an frontier market at Kaiyuan. By using the name of the Fuyu Mongols, the Qorčīn Mongols also traded at the Xin'an frontier market, becoming wealthy from the sable fur trade.<sup>217</sup> As a result, the Qorčīn Mongols established a close trading relationship with the Haixi Jurchens, which is the reason behind the Qorčīn Mongols' alliance with the Yehe Jurchens in the battle against Nurhaci in 1593.

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<sup>216</sup> Feng Yuan, 'Kaiyuan tushuo', 457–58.

<sup>217</sup> Feng Yuan, 'Kaiyuan tushuo', 457–58.

The economic relationship between the Qorčīn Mongols and Nurhaci started with visits by envoys. In 1594, Nurhaci and the Qorčīn Mongols started to send envoys to each other. The relationship initially grew out of hostility, with Nurhaci blaming the Qorčīn Mongols for losing the battle against the Haixi Jurchens over the ginseng trade in 1593. However, Nurhaci treated the Qorčīn Mongol prisoners well, dressing them in luxurious clothing as well as sending them home on horses.<sup>218</sup> The following year, Mingga (Man., Ch. *ming'an* 明安), the leader of the Qorčīn Mongols, officially sent ambassadors to visit Nurhaci. The archival sources show that every sub-tribal leader of the Qorčīn Mongols started to send visitors to Nurhaci after 1594.<sup>219</sup> However, relations did not always go as smoothly as they are depicted in sources. The Qorčīn Mongols' main trading partner was still the Haixi Jurchens not Nurhaci, as their major trading site was the Xin'an frontier market at Kaiyuan.

Marriage strengthened their economic ties, with trade often occurring through gifts rather than the frontier market trade. In 1604, the Qorčīn Mongols were expelled by the Qalqa Mongols (Mon., Ch. *kaerka menggu* 喀爾喀蒙古), who were supported by Yehe Jurchens, from the Xin'an frontier market. Thus the Qorčīn Mongols were unable to trade with the Ming at Kaiyuan and were seeking trade allies, which provided an important opportunity for Nurhaci to forge an alliance that would prove paramount in the Qing's future road to empire.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Sin Ch'ungil, 'Jianzhou jicheng tuji', 29.

<sup>219</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 317-18.

<sup>220</sup> Feng Yuan, 'Kaiyuan Tushuo', 322; 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', juan3: 354-55, 358-60.

In 1612, the Qorčīn Mongols contracted their first marriage alliance with Nurhaci. Nurhaci prepared many gifts to strengthen the relationship.<sup>221</sup> As marriage arrangements between the two groups increased, their relationship became stronger and trading more frequent. For example, in the first lunar month of 1622, Nurhaci sent the Qorčīn Mongols 50 pieces of armour and other goods as wedding gifts.<sup>222</sup> As the Qorčīn Mongols had limited access to trade, Nurhaci's gifts were particularly welcomed. Both the Qorčīn and Nurhaci also sent ambassadors with trade items along with the gifts. Such trading visits continued until the first lunar month of 1622 when the Qorčīn Mongols formally allied with Nurhaci, showing that their positions were equal.<sup>223</sup> During Nurhaci's reign, the Qorčīn Mongols were not subordinates but collaborators. This determined their prime position during the entire Qing period.

Therefore, with his stronger military power, Nurhaci conquered the Ula and the Hoifa Jurchen tribes and furthermore monopolised the sable habitats. This provided Nurhaci with the fundamental economic base for his expansion. But he remained unable to build any meaningful trade connections with the Chosŏn court. For the Qorčīn Mongols, however, Nurhaci adopted a different strategy. Not only did he show respect towards the monopoly led by the Qorčīn Mongols, but he also developed trade relations with them. More importantly, Nurhaci promoted favourable relations with the Qorčīn

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<sup>221</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang* 內閣藏本滿文老檔, vol. Taizu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009), 4.

<sup>222</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:110.

<sup>223</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:108.

Mongols so as to avoid conflict with them.

In conclusion, this chapter illustrates the ways in which the frontier market trade, as a bilateral trading pattern, allowed Nurhaci to accumulate significant amounts of wealth. Wild ginseng and sable fur were the two most valuable items produced in the Jurchen territory, both of which he monopolised by taking over existing trade networks dominated by the Haixi Jurchens. Therefore, it has argued that the frontier market trade was Nurhaci's primary source of income, laying the foundation needed to build his state and finance his further military expansion.

### Chapter 3: Legacies of the Bilateral Trade

The bilateral trade with the Ming laid the foundation for Nurhaci to build his state. Nurhaci, though coming from humble beginnings, had been able to defeat the powerful Haixi Jurchens, establishing his trade networks of wild ginseng and sable fur by monopolising the areas where they could be found. The bilateral trade between Nurhaci and the Ming consisted of two elements: the tribute trade and the frontier market trade. The tribute trade was not the most profitable for Nurhaci, but it strengthened the bond with the Ming and the imperial orders he held from the Ming facilitated the development of the frontier market trade. The frontier market trade was Nurhaci's primary income source after he secured the monopoly over the wild ginseng and sable fur trades. In this way, silver flowed into the Jurchen territory through the frontier market trade from the Ming. All these factors facilitated Nurhaci's establishment of sovereignty over his territory, unifying the various Jurchen tribes in the process.

The proclamation of the Seven Grievances (Ch. *qidahen* 七大恨) in 1618 is commonly viewed as a signal that Nurhaci had ended relations with the Ming and begun to build the Jin state.<sup>224</sup> However, as early as 1608, Nurhaci had shown his desire to found his own state. With the accumulation of economic resources, Nurhaci had sufficiently consolidated his power within the Jianzhou and Haixi Jurchens, as well as among several of the Yeren Jurchen tribes. This chapter examines Nurhaci's military

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<sup>224</sup> Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1:58.

achievements in relation to state building, which were closely associated with the flows of silver from overseas into Ming China, and then on to Nurhaci's territory through trade.

### **The Global Silver Network**

When European maritime expansion triggered connections among distant territories to develop international trade, the globe came into “the silver century”, which lasted from the 1540s to the 1640s.<sup>225</sup> This section details the booming of the ginseng and sable fur trades, arguing that the prosperity of the frontier market trade brought huge inflows of silver to Nurhaci from the Ming court, and thus showing that Nurhaci's territory was the ultimate destination of the overseas silver rather than the Ming.

Silver flowed from Spanish America and Japan into Ming China, with Ming China acting as a “suction pump” for the import of silver.<sup>226</sup> As noted in the introduction, the “single whip tax reform” of 1581 made silver the official and dominant monetary medium in China resulting in hyperinflation.<sup>227</sup> Silver was not only a currency but also a lucrative commodity; the market value of silver in China was double that in the Mediterranean world.<sup>228</sup> The total amount of silver flowing from the major silver mines

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<sup>225</sup> Flynn and Giráldez, ‘Cycles of Silver: Globalization as Historical Process’, 9.

<sup>226</sup> Flynn, ‘Silver in a Global Context, 1400–1800’, 215–16, 224; Atwell, ‘International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650’, 68, 72–75; Quan Hansheng, *Zhongguo jingji shi luncong*, vol. 1:444; Evelyn S. Rawski, *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), 76.

<sup>227</sup> Flynn, ‘Silver in a Global Context, 1400–1800’, 224.

<sup>228</sup> Von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700*, 83–113.

in Spanish America and Japan into China was enormous.

By the early sixteenth century, the average volume had increased to as much as 900,000 to 1,300,000 *taels* of silver annually.<sup>229</sup> As direct trade between Ming China and Japan was forbidden, the silver usually was traded via Macau, the Ryukyu Islands and Southeast Asia before entering China.<sup>230</sup> S.A.M. Adshead argues that the silver traded through the Potosí-Manila route accounted for half of the foreign silver imported by the Ming, while the silver from Japan represented a quarter and the route via Flotas de Plata-Macco averaged less than a quarter.<sup>231</sup> In this way, it is estimated that the maximum amount of foreign silver imported by the Ming reached as high as 172,500 *taels* of silver. Therefore, world silver production flowed into China amassing tremendous profits due to the greater value of silver in China.

Silver flowed into the Jin state through the tribute trade and the frontier market trade, which were the major income sources of the Jurchens.<sup>232</sup> The tribute trade did not represent a significant income source, but Nurhaci still made a profit. According to *The Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty* revised in 1587, the quota for the number of the Jianzhou Jurchens permitted to accompany a mission was up to 400 in total. Each tribute representative was allowed to take one horse as tribute and was awarded with three *taels* of silver for each horse. Therefore, in the four years between 1588 and 1615,

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<sup>229</sup> Atwell, 'International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650', 71.

<sup>230</sup> Atwell, 'International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650', 71–72.

<sup>231</sup> Adshead, 'The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China', 273.

<sup>232</sup> Ejima Hisao, *Mindai shinsho no jochokushi kenkyū*, 206.

2,740 horses were converted into 8,220 *taels* of silver (See Table 3), suggesting that by 1615, Nurhaci had accumulated significant quantities of silver simply by virtue of these tribute missions.

After monopolising the wild ginseng (in 1593) and sable fur (in 1611) trade, Nurhaci expanded trade to the Fushun, Guangshun, Qinghe, Aiyang and Kuandian frontier markets. By 1618, Fushun had replaced Kaiyuan as the trading centre of the Jurchen territory, where Chinese merchants from Shandong, Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, Suzhou and Hangzhou came to trade.<sup>233</sup> As the currency for transactions, silver flowed to Nurhaci from the Ming court as a result of the wild ginseng and sable fur trade.

The great demand for wild ginseng and sable fur enhanced the prosperity of trade, bringing in abundant quantities of silver. In 1605, Nurhaci adopted a new method to store ginseng:

Initially [Nurhaci] sold ginseng to the Ming state after soaking it in water. The Ming people disliked damp ginseng and delayed [buying ginseng]. People of our country fearing that the damp ginseng could not be stored for a long time, eagerly sold to them at a lower price. When Taizu (Nurhaci) wanted to boil and dry them in the sun, officials disagreed with him. Taizu did not listen to officials, he boiled and dried [the ginseng] and gradually sold it. In the end, the price doubled.

曩時賣參與大明國，以水浸潤，大明人嫌濕推延，國人恐水參難以耐久，急售之，價又甚廉，太祖欲煮熟曬乾，諸王臣不從，太祖不徇眾言，遂煮曬，徐徐發賣，果得價倍常。<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi:TM3.4.14.

<sup>234</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 322.

This new method of preparing ginseng proved popular among buyers, resulting in Nurhaci increasing production volumes of ginseng so as to satisfy the demand of Ming China. In 1608, the Ming court specifically instructed Ming officials at various frontier markets to purchase ginseng and sable fur from Nurhaci's territory:

The military posts of Fushun, Zhenjiang, and Aiyang each offer fifty silver *taels* of silver and demand twenty-five *jin* of ginseng. The military post of Kuandian gives one hundred silver *taels* of silver and demands fifty *jin* of ginseng. The military post of Qinghe offers three hundred silver *taels* of silver and demands one hundred *jin* of ginseng and one hundred sable furs. The military post of Kaiyuan military post will provide one hundred and fifty silver *taels* of silver and demand ninety sable furs.

撫順、鎮江、靉陽三營俱發銀五十兩，各要參二十五斤。寬甸營發銀一百兩，要參五十斤。清河營發銀三百兩，要參一百斤、貂皮一百張。開原營發銀一百五十兩，要上好貂皮九十張。<sup>235</sup>

From these texts, it is evident that the frontier markets that could provide ginseng and sable fur to the Ming court were all controlled by Nurhaci, bypassing the frontier markets in Kaiyuan. This shows that Nurhaci had already monopolised the majority of ginseng and fur production by this time, and we can deduce that he accumulated significant wealth as a result. It is not easy to estimate the amount of silver Nurhaci obtained. Therefore, this thesis relies on Di Cosmo's recent work. He estimates that the trade in wild ginseng (at the price of nine *taels* of silver per *jin*) brought Nurhaci about

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<sup>235</sup> Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼, *Xiong tingbi ji* 熊廷弼集 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2011), juan 6:277-78.

16.65 metric tons of silver per annum, meaning that the sale of wild ginseng accounted for 25% of the total foreign silver that flowed into Ming China annually.<sup>236</sup> Chao Zhongchen further estimates that, between 1593 and 1594, the Ming court spent up to 30,000 *taels* of silver on ginseng.<sup>237</sup> By 1607, the costs of the ginseng trade on the Ming court had become so high that they closed the markets in Liaodong, halting the ginseng trade, so as to force the Jurchens to reduce their prices.<sup>238</sup> The closure was a severe blow to Nurhaci's economy, contributing to the Jurchen's economic crisis in 1619.

In regards to the sable fur trade, there is no record of the amount of silver Nurhaci accumulated. However, an estimate can be obtained through examination of the Ming taxation records. Taxation regulations on goods in the late Ming period state that the goods' tax rate was standardised to 3%.<sup>239</sup> The trade volume of sable fur from 1582 and 1583 was 4,600. This suggests that the tax would have amounted to five *qian* for every twenty sable furs.<sup>240</sup> If the price of each fur was 7.5 *qian*, the value of the sable fur sold each year during this period would be 3,450 *taels* of silver. The dramatic inflow

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<sup>236</sup> Di Cosmo, 'The Manchu Conquest in World-Historical Perspective: A Note on Trade and Silver', 54. According to Richard von Glahn's estimates the total import of silver in China in the five years from 1606 to 1610 was 340.3 metric tons, which averages 68 tons per annum. See Von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700*, 232.

<sup>237</sup> Chao Zhongchen 晁中辰, 'Ming houqi baiyin de daliang neiliu jiqi yingxiang 明後期白銀的大量內流及其影響', *Shixue yuankan* 1 (1993): 35–41.

<sup>238</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi:WL33.3.1.

<sup>239</sup> Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉, *Ming shi* 明史, n.d., zhi juan 57: shihuo wu.

For the online version of this source, please see

<https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E6%98%8E%E5%8F%B2/%E5%8D%B781>.

<sup>240</sup> *Mingdai liaodong dang'an huibian*, 816.

of silver promoted the development of the commodity economy in the Ming court, with increasing Chinese consumption of Jurchen ginseng and sable fur. At the same time silver also flowed to Nurhaci. Therefore, Nurhaci's fortune was made through the conquest of various Jurchen tribes and his consequent monopoly of the wild ginseng and sable fur trades.

### **From Wealth Accumulation to Military Conquests, 1608-26**

With the accumulation of economic resources, Nurhaci had consolidated his power among the Jianzhou, Haixi Jurchens, and several Yeren Jurchen tribes to the extent that in 1616, he was able to proclaim himself Khan of the Jin state. Shortly after this, he relocated his capital to Hetu Ala. Two years later, Nurhaci announced his Seven Grievances, discussed below, and renounced Ming rule. In the spring of 1619, the battle of Sarhū (Man., Ch. *saerhu zhizhan* 薩爾滸之戰) broke out between Nurhaci and the Ming, resulting in an overwhelming victory by Nurhaci. In the immediate aftermath of battle, Nurhaci also conquered the Yehe Jurchens, securing his position as leader of the Jurchen territory, now an independent state.

Nurhaci had been preparing for this break with the Ming for over a decade. As early as 1608, Xiong Tingbi (Ch. 熊廷弼), the Ming Right Minister (Ch. *you shilang* 右侍郎) in Liaodong, had warned the Ming court that the greatest enemy was not the Mongols, but Nurhaci. While the Mongols occasionally attacked Liaodong, they were only seeking wealth, never inflicting significant harm on the Ming. Nurhaci on the other

hand, he said, aimed to conquer the Ming. Xiong Tingbi suggested that the Ming ally with the Mongol tribes and focus Liaodong's defences on Nurhaci rather than the Mongols.<sup>241</sup> However, his warnings were ignored by the Ming court. In early 1616, Nurhaci secretly held his coronation ceremony in Hetu Ala, naming his territory the Jin state. Neither the Ming nor Chosŏn acted upon hearing this news later in the year, indicating that neither state saw Nurhaci as a real threat.<sup>242</sup>

As neither the Ming nor Chosŏn court took any preventative measures, Nurhaci had three years to prepare to attack the Ming. Frederic Wakeman argues that in the build-up to the establishment of the Jin state, Nurhaci was not hostile to the Ming, even engaging in friendly relations.<sup>243</sup> However, it is more likely that Nurhaci started to prepare for his conquest of the Ming as early as 1608. In the fifth lunar month of 1616, he commanded his guards to bring fifty people across the Ming border to collect ginseng, coal and trees, a notable act of defiance against the Ming.<sup>244</sup> In early 1618, Nurhaci further proclaimed seven charges against the Ming court, known as the Seven Grievances, formally announcing the disintegration of relations between two sides.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼, *Anliao shugao* 按遼疏稿, n.d., juan 2: 14a-20a.

For the online version of this source, please see

<http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=21613&page=1&remap=gb>.

<sup>242</sup> Wang Zaijin 王在晉, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu* 三朝遼事實錄, n.d., juan 1: 2a-2b.

For the online version of this source, please see

<http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=19079&page=6&remap=gb>.

<sup>243</sup> Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1:57.

<sup>244</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:15.

<sup>245</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., vol. Taizu gaohuangdi, vol. TM3.4.13.

The Seven Grievances have traditionally been contextualised as the prerequisite of the Jin-Ming war.<sup>246</sup> However, this thesis argues that it is necessary to examine the Seven Grievances from a different perspective. It is worth exploring why these reasons were selected as opposed to others. From a political point of view, the announcement served as an excuse for Nurhaci to publicly announce the dismantling of formal relations between the two states. From an economic perspective, however, it is more likely that the seven grievances also reflected the growing economic tension between the two sides that had been developing over the past twenty-five years.

The first grievance focuses on the killing of Nurhaci's father and grandfather mistakenly by the Ming court in 1583. While this initially appears to be a worthy grievance, Nurhaci had already received financial compensation from the Ming court, which he used as an asset to conquer other Jinzhou Jurchens.

The second and third grievances are related to Nurhaci's border crossings to gather wild ginseng from Ming territory. Wild ginseng was distributed in the area of Changbai Mountain region, including the territories of both Nurhaci and the Ming. He often sent people to pick ginseng secretly in Ming territory. This was vigorously contested by the Ming court, who continued to reaffirm that no one should be allowed to cross the border.

The fourth grievance reflects trading conflicts between Nurhaci and the Yehe Jurchens around sable fur. In 1615, with the purpose of securing relations with the

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<sup>246</sup> Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1:58.

Qalqa Mongols, the Yehe Jurchens decided that the woman who was supposed to marry Nurhaci should be given to a Mongol leader instead.

Both the fifth and sixth grievances are about the Ming court's decision to close the frontier markets in the 1610s to punish Nurhaci for his attacks on the Yehe Jurchens. Such punishment reveals that the Ming court supported the Yehe.

The final grievance demonstrates that when Nurhaci conquered the Ula Jurchens in 1613, the Ming court forced him to hand over the tribe's governance to the Yehe Jurchens.

Thus, the above grievances were based on economic conflicts between Nurhaci and the Ming court, highlighting the importance of trade in the Jurchen commercial economy.

The day after publishing the Seven Grievances, Nurhaci marched 20,000 soldiers to Fushun. As noted previously, Fushun was the centre of the frontier market trade, and also a key location for Ming frontier defence to the east of Liaodong, serving as the entrance for the Jurchens into Liaodong. Nurhaci dispatched soldiers pretending to be merchants into the city, invading Fushun covertly while the frontier market was open. The troops seized 9,000 horses, 7,000 pieces of armour, and numerous weapons.<sup>247</sup> They also took over some small but important military defence stations.<sup>248</sup> This military campaign wiped out military posts that were key to Ming defences, making the

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<sup>247</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizu gaohuangdi:TM3.3.14.

<sup>248</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizu gaohuangdi:TM3.5.17, TM3.7.20.

Wanli emperor both frightened and furious.<sup>249</sup> In response, the Ming state amassed 100,000 soldiers from all over the country, preparing to meet Nurhaci in battle.<sup>250</sup>

Both the Ming and Nurhaci sought military support from the Chosŏn court. The Ming requested from the Chosŏn 7,000 soldiers trained in fire arrow combat to make up for a deficiency in Ming soldiers. They argued that both states should encircle and suppress Nurhaci.<sup>251</sup> This sparked fierce debate within the Chosŏn court over which side to support. Kwanghae, the ruler of the Chosŏn state, was tempted to side with Nurhaci, as after he had become crown prince and taken the throne, the Ming had not written to acknowledge his new status as king. As crown prince, Kwanghae had the power to govern the Korean territories (Ch. *quanshu guoshi guanghai jun* 權署國事光海君).<sup>252</sup> So the Ming's lack of acknowledgement did not mean that he did not hold power within Korea, but the Ming court did not formally recognise him, leading to great resentment on Kwanghae's part. After sending numerous officials to visit the Ming court, Kwanghae was finally conferred as the King of Chosŏn in 1608, fourteen years later he had become the crown prince, but the bitterness remained.<sup>253</sup> Thus, Kwanghae was reluctant to respond to the Ming demand for military aid. Nurhaci attempted to persuade Kwanghae to remain neutral in the conflict, so as to avoid fighting a war on

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<sup>249</sup> Zhang Tingyu, *Ming shi*, liezhuan juan 127: Zhang Chen.

For the online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=10291>.

<sup>250</sup> Chen Wan 陳澧, 'Saerhu zhizhan shuangfang bingli kaobian 薩爾滸之戰雙方兵力考辯', *Liaoning daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui ban)*, no. 5 (1980): 69–71.

<sup>251</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, vol. Kwanghae ilgi 光海君日記, n.d., Kwanghae 10.run4.12.

<sup>252</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi:Kwanghae 卽位年.2.21.

<sup>253</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi :Kwanghae 1.6.2.

two fronts and instead focus all resources on fighting the Ming.<sup>254</sup>

At the battle of Sarhū, the Chosŏn court was finally forced to choose a side. In the second lunar month of 1619, the Wanli emperor demanded the Chosŏn court dispatch over 10,000 soldiers, reminding the Chosŏn that as a tributary state, they had the responsibility to protect the frontier zone of the Ming when called upon to do so.<sup>255</sup> Fearing Ming anger, the Chosŏn court sent the troops. The Ming army had finally assembled 100,000 soldiers, including support sent from the Yehe Jurchens and Koreans. Nurhaci massed a mere 60,000. The battle lasted five days and surprisingly ended in a victory for Nurhaci. The Ming lost 310 generals, 45,870 soldiers, and 28,600 horses, mules and camels.<sup>256</sup> In comparison, 30,000 of Nurhaci's soldiers lay dead or injured.<sup>257</sup> As a result of the victory, Nurhaci now commanded all the Haixi Jurchens and several of the Yeren Jurchen tribes. This decisive battle laid the foundation for Nurhaci's empire: his territory now stretched from the East China Sea to the border of Liaodong, reaching as far north as the area of Mongols and Nen River, and south to the Yalu River and the Chosŏn state. *The Veritable Records of Wu Huangdi* describes that those people who spoke in the same accent were all conquered; and all the tribes were finally unified.<sup>258</sup> The battle of Sarhū had dramatically weakened the power of the

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<sup>254</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi :Kwanghae 10.5.29.

<sup>255</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi :Kwanghae 11.2.3.

<sup>256</sup> Wang Zaijin, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, juan 1: 16a-16b.

<sup>257</sup> Inaba Kunzan 稻葉君山, *Qingchao quanshi* 清朝全史, trans. Dan Tao 但燾 (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006), 95.

<sup>258</sup> 'Qing Taizu wuhuangdi shilu', 358.

Ming and greatly strengthened the Jin state.<sup>259</sup>

Nurhaci continued to attack Ming-controlled Liaodong and achieved a series of military victories in the following years until his death in 1626. Key military stations of Kaiyuan, Tieling, Guangning, Yizhou and Jinzhou in the Liaodong region were seized (See Map 2). In 1625, shortly before his death Nurhaci relocated his capital from Hetu Ala to Shenyang, explicitly displaying the Jin state's rapid territorial expansion from governing a tiny town to commanding most of the Liaodong region.

At the same time Nurhaci started to conquer Mongol tribes including the Qorčīn and Qalqa Mongols. The Qorčīn Mongols were the starting point of Nurhaci's military campaigns. As mentioned in the previous chapter, they had a close relationship with the Yehe Jurchens due to trade ties through Kaiyuan. They had also supported the Yehe Jurchens in their attempt to invade Nurhaci's lands in 1593. A year after the failed invasion, they sent envoys to Nurhaci in an attempt to broker peaceful relations. However, the peace did not last long. In 1608, the Qorčīn Mongols once again took up arms against Nurhaci, this time siding with the Ula Jurchens. After facing a second defeat, the Qorčīn Mongols assuaged relations by organising influential marriages with important members of Nurhaci's tribe.

Throughout this period, the Qorčīn Mongols had maintained close trade relations with the Haixi Jurchens while also being subordinate to Ligdan Khan, the Khan of all

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<sup>259</sup> 'Battle Diary of the Mount Sarhū 薩爾滸山之戰書事' n.d. Unpublished Manchu MS Minzu University of China Library, Beijing.

the Mongols. However, following their second defeat at Nurhaci's hands in 1608, several Qorčın Mongols tribes submitted to Nurhaci's rule. Another Mongol tribe Nurhaci conquered was the Qalqa Mongols, who resided in the area of the Liao River. They encompassed five small sub-tribes: Üjıyed (Mon., Ch. *wuqi yete* 烏齊葉特), Bayarin (Mon., Ch. *balin* 巴林), Qungyirad (Mon.Ch. *haoqite* 浩齊特), Bayoote (Mon., Ch. *bayuete* 巴岳特), and Ĵaruud (Mon., Ch. *zhalute* 扎魯特). As the five sub-tribes of the Qalqa Mongols were engaged in constant conflict, Nurhaci and Ligdan Khan both took advantage of this weakness, easily conquering each of them separately. The five sub-tribes were conquered and divided between Ligdan Khan and Nurhaci by 1627.<sup>260</sup>

In conclusion, the first part of this thesis has examined the bilateral trade between the Ming and Nurhaci, which laid a solid economic foundation for Nurhaci to build his later state. The two forms of trade most prominently exploited by Nurhaci were the tribute trade and the frontier market trade. Through trade, silver flowed into the Jurchen territory, which made it possible for Nurhaci to accumulate wealth to finance his subsequent military campaigns. However, this approach to gaining power was no different from approaches employed by Nurhaci's predecessors. What Nurhaci did differently was to change the institutional structure of the trade when he declared independence from Ming control. Though his efforts were unsuccessful, as will be detailed in the following chapters, his endeavours later enabled his son, Hong Taiji, to establish multiple trade networks, through which he built the Qing empire. Therefore,

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<sup>260</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TM11.11.16.

Nurhaci's efforts not only established trade networks but also resulted in the sovereignty of Jurchen territory. While, he was unable to break away completely from Ming control, he succeeded in exerting power far beyond his original territory. Through this extension of territorial control, Nurhaci was able to gain power over critical trade networks. This command over trade was the primary reason Nurhaci was able to establish a state where his predecessors had failed to do so.

## **Part II: The Collapse of Nurhaci's Bilateral Trade, 1619-1626**

As detailed in Part I, the success of the bilateral trade with Ming China made it possible for Nurhaci to accumulate a significant amount of silver and economic resources, allowing him to allocate this wealth to military campaigns aimed at conquering other Jurchen tribes. However, the true nature of the bilateral trade was one of vulnerability. Once the trade between the Ming and Nurhaci ceased, the Jurchen economy was in trouble. The economic crisis in the Jurchen territory started in 1619 and lasted at least seven years until 1626 when Hong Taiji, Nurhaci's son, came to the throne. The dire economic state Hong Taiji inherited was that there were not even ten pieces of cloth that remained stored in the storehouse in the past during Nurhaci's reign, recalling the economic difficulties he experienced towards the end of Nurhaci's reign.<sup>261</sup> This shows that reserves of grain, fabrics, and other goods were insufficient during the period of the economic crisis. It also indicates that, after the collapse of the bilateral trade with the Ming under Nurhaci, the economy suffered greatly. Nurhaci was aware of the acute economic circumstances. As such, after the establishment of the Jin state in 1616, he attempted to establish trade connections with Chosŏn Korea and the Qalqa Mongols to relieve the economic difficulties. However, neither Chosŏn Korea nor the Qalqa Mongols filled the trade void. The Chosŏn court refused Nurhaci's proposal for trade outright. The Qalqa Mongols agreed to trade relations, but only for a short time.

Gertraude Roth Li was the first to point out the severe economic disorder in Jurchen

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<sup>261</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:CD4.5.25.

society that occurred between the 1620s and 1630s. She emphasises the negative impact of the economic crisis caused by the Ming, which led to social instability and economic weakness in the Manchu state. She thus concludes that the Manchu military and economy were on the verge of collapse.<sup>262</sup> Her research ends in 1636 and predicts the outcome of a Manchu victory in 1644, arguing that it was due to luck. However, this thesis argues that the duration of the Jurchen economic crisis was not as long as Roth Li suggests, suggesting instead that the economic difficulties were to a great extent relieved in 1627 with the Manchus' first invasion of Korea. Through the conquest, the Jin court received a significant amount of grain as plunder as well as being able to enforce trade connections with Chosŏn Korea.

Additionally, it is necessary to re-think the Jurchen economic crisis in a global context, as flows of silver and products were the foundation of the prosperity of the Jurchen economy. Ming China was the major provider of silver to the Jurchens. Frederic Wakeman examines the economic crisis of the Ming, connecting it to the general economic crisis of the seventeenth century caused by a declining amount of silver flowing to the Ming.<sup>263</sup> In his book, *The Great Enterprise*, Wakeman concludes that the collapse of the Ming economy was one reason for the fall of the Ming, suggesting that the Manchu state rescued the Ming empire from chaos, corruption, and futility by

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<sup>262</sup> Roth Li, 'The Rise of the Early Manchu State: A Portrait Drawn from Manchu Sources to 1636', 186.

<sup>263</sup> Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1: 8.

their invasion.<sup>264</sup> However, this is not to suggest that the Jurchen state avoided economic hardship, as it most certainly felt the economic crisis caused by these economic fluctuations of Ming and the globe.

Part II argues that the Jurchen economic crisis was the result of the inherent vulnerability in the traditional economic pattern of the Jurchens as well as the economic fluctuations in East Asia and the globe. The traditional economic pattern of the Jurchens refers to their heavy reliance on bilateral trade with the Chinese, which had been in place for centuries. This means that once the bilateral trade had ceased, Jurchen society was plunged into economic chaos due to silver inflation and food shortages. From a global point of view, the reduction in silver influxes also intensified silver inflation in the Ming state. Therefore, this thesis argues that the Jurchen economic crisis provided an opportunity for Hong Taiji to transform the Jurchen economic pattern from being heavily reliant on bilateral trade with China into being dominant in its own right through the development of multiple trade networks with other neighbouring states.

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<sup>264</sup> Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1: 19-21.

## **Chapter 4: The Jurchen Economic Crisis, 1619-1626**

The sixteenth century witnessed foreign silver pouring into Ming China from overseas, increasing the prosperity of the Ming state. This was particularly seen through a rapid growth in luxury consumption and increasingly lavish taste in luxury items in Ming society. It is worth noting that, through trade, silver flowed into the Jurchen territory, further developing the Jurchen economy. However, this period of prosperity was short-lived. By the early seventeenth century, an economic crisis had emerged in the Jurchen territories. The direct cause for the Jurchen economic crisis was the termination of trade between the Ming and Nurhaci. Indirect causes should also be examined, such as a decline in silver inflows and shortages of grain. This chapter shows the negative effects of the economic crisis in Jurchen society. It details Nurhaci's attempt to alleviate economic strain by developing multiple trade networks, which were ultimately unsuccessful.

### **Silver Inflation and Grain Shortages amongst the Jurchens**

The foundation of Jurchen economic prosperity was the economic boom of the Ming state, caused by the immense inflows of foreign silver in the sixteenth century. China was involved in the "Potosí/Japan Silver Cycle."<sup>265</sup> Europe was similarly involved in this cycle, also prospering during this period due to foreign silver inflows.<sup>266</sup> However,

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<sup>265</sup> Flynn and Giráldez, 'Cycles of Silver: Globalization as Historical Process', 9.

<sup>266</sup> Adshead, 'The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China', 273.

the Chinese in the Ming period used paper money and copper coins as opposed to silver. The Ming issued paper money was referred to *daming tongxing baochao* (Ch.大明通行寶鈔, hereafter *baochao*) and copper coinage was termed *tongbao* (Ch.通寶). In order to secure the circulation of paper money, the Ming court prohibited the usage of silver as a currency material several times. However, paper money had become severely depreciated by the mid-Ming period, leading the Ming court to loosen restrictions on the usage of silver. In 1436, one *tael* of silver had appreciated to 1,000 *guan* of *baochao*, which had been worth three to five *guan* of *baochao* in 1375.<sup>267</sup> The severe and rapid depreciation of paper money caused the Ming people to abandon it as a monetary source in favour of silver. Silver began to be widely used in Ming society in all forms of payment, becoming the *de facto* currency of the state.

The widespread usage of silver among the populace continued to increase the demand for silver, resulting in silver shortages in the Ming state. In 1581, a single tax on silver was introduced as a way to reduce demand. However, the policy backfired, merely causing silver to become the dominant currency, which raised demand further. By the mid-sixteenth century, the production volume of silver within Ming territory was not able to meet large-scale demand. Even in the early Ming period, the total production volume of silver was approximately 30,000 million *taels* of silver, comparatively lower than the 70 to 75,000 million *taels* of silver in the Tang and Song Dynasties.<sup>268</sup> The

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<sup>267</sup> *Ming shilu*, vol. Yingzong, ZT1.3.22.

<sup>268</sup> Li Longsheng 李隆生, 'Mingmo baiyin cunliang de guji 明末白銀存量的估計', *Zhongguo qianbi* 22, no. 1 (2005): 3–8.

Ming dynasty's domestic silver supplies were also lower than those of other prominent states in this period. A typical way this is measured is through the *yinke* (Ch.銀課), the income that the Ming government obtained from the mining and smelting of silver, which accounted for at least 30% of the total production of Ming silver.<sup>269</sup> Quan Hansheng compares the Ming state and Spain's annual *yinke* income, showing that from the fifteenth to seventeenth century, Spain's annual *yinke* income was twice that of the Ming, which clearly displays the severe silver shortages in Ming China.<sup>270</sup> As domestic production of silver was low, Ming China required significant amounts of silver from overseas. As mentioned in Part I, there were three routes of foreign silver flowing into Ming China: Acapulco-Manila, Flotas de Plata- Macau, and Japan-China. It is estimated that the maximum amount of foreign silver imported by the Ming was as high as 172,500 *taels* of silver. Therefore, the silver influx was immense, and the silver that flowed into the Jurchen territory through trade was also large.

The flow of silver into Ming China, however, was not sustainable, especially after the general economic crisis in the seventeenth century. The general crisis was a “crisis in government, society, and ideas which occurred, both in Europe and in England, between the Reformation and the middle of the seventeenth century.”<sup>271</sup> It was also a

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<sup>269</sup> Quan Hansheng 全漢昇, *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu* 中國經濟史研究 (Taipei: Xinya yanjiusuo, 1991), 601,617.

<sup>270</sup> Quan Hansheng, *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu*, 617.

<sup>271</sup> Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation, and Social Change*, Reprinted ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), Preface: ix-xiv.

turbulent period when war, climate change, and disease were pervasive.<sup>272</sup> According to S.A.M. Adshead, the seventeenth-century crisis is defined by two phenomena. First, it was an economic recession in Europe from 1590 to 1680, marked by the collapse of the monetary system with Seville at the centre. Second, it was a period of political unrest caused by the economic crisis.<sup>273</sup> Adshead further shows that the impact of the crisis was worldwide, not only affecting Europe itself, but also spreading to the Islamic world and East Asia.<sup>274</sup>

Frederic Wakeman argues that the collapse of the Ming economy was due to the general crisis as well as other secondary causes such as corruption within the Ming court and peasant uprisings.<sup>275</sup> His arguments emphasise that the economic crisis in Europe, whether directly or indirectly, did affect China. However, André Gunder Frank challenges these views arguing that there was no global economic crisis in the seventeenth century. While he does acknowledge a short-term economic crisis in East Asia in the mid-seventeenth century, he argues that the rest of Asia, i.e., West Asia (Persia), South Asia (India) and North Asia (Russia) were not affected.<sup>276</sup> Frank concludes that there was no prevalent long-term global crisis during the seventeen

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<sup>272</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 2013), chap. Introduction.

<sup>273</sup> Adshead, 'The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China', 271–72.

<sup>274</sup> Adshead, 'The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China', 272.

<sup>275</sup> Wakeman Jr., *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, vol. 1: Introduction.

<sup>276</sup> Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1998), 236–37.

century, with regional or national crises lasting only twenty to thirty years.<sup>277</sup> Regardless of the existence of a general crisis in the seventeenth century, it is agreed among historians that an economic crisis characterised by silver shortages and inflation emerged in East Asia in the first half of the seventeenth century.

In the early seventeenth century, large-scale silver production resulted in a fall in silver prices, plunging profits due to inflation and leading to economic and political difficulties in China. The global decline in the price of silver ended the “super-profits”, which had been enjoyed throughout the early and mid-Ming period.<sup>278</sup> It also dampened motivation to sustain silver production in Latin America, Central Europe, Persia and Japan.<sup>279</sup> Adshead associates the Ming political crisis with this decline in silver production from Europe to China. Furthermore, between 1596 and 1605, the collapse of the Seville monetary system resulted in widespread deflation, leading to a drastic reduction in silver inflows into China, and threatening political stability.<sup>280</sup> Wakeman argues that the economic depression in Europe was the reason for the reduced volume of silver entering China in the early seventeenth century. The inflow of silver continued to decline, ceasing altogether in the 1640s.<sup>281</sup> Therefore, both Adshead and Wakeman stress the reduction of silver inflow as a primary reason for the rise of

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<sup>277</sup> Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, 236-37.

<sup>278</sup> Flynn and Giráldez, ‘Cycles of Silver: Globalization as Historical Process’, 9.

<sup>279</sup> Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, 246.

<sup>280</sup> Adshead, ‘The Seventeenth Century General Crisis in China’, 273.

<sup>281</sup> Frederic E. Wakeman Jr., ‘China and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis’, *Late Imperial China*, 7, no. 1 (1986): 4–5.

political unrest in the Ming state.

The subsequent cessation of silver inflows into the Jin state was equally devastating. The Jurchen economy was hit by a sudden slump in trade, causing severe shortages in commodities and significant inflation. Even though the national treasury of the Jin state was in a financially secure state, the Jin court was unable to gain access to essential products through trade.<sup>282</sup>

During this period, Jurchen society also suffered severe silver inflation. In 1626, silver had been made the official currency of the Jin state, replacing copper coinage.<sup>283</sup> The following year, commodity prices rocketed to unsustainable levels. For example, one *dou* of rice increased from one *tael* to eight *taels* of silver, one fine horse rose from ten *taels* to 300 *taels* of silver, and an ox cost 100 *taels* of silver. Even worse for the Jurchen people, one *pi* of silk could cost up to 150 *taels* of silver, with even cheaper coarse cloth costing nine *taels* of silver per *pi*.<sup>284</sup> Patterned cloth soared from four or five *taels* per *pi* to 200 *taels* of silver.<sup>285</sup>

Grain shortages due to large population increases was another reason for the Jurchen economic crisis. After the Mongols submitted to Nurhaci rule, Mongols began to arrive in great numbers in the Jurchen territory, exacerbating the demand for grain.

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<sup>282</sup> Zhang Wei 張葳, *Jiu manzhou dang yizhu: qing taizong chao* 舊滿洲檔譯註：清太宗朝 (Taipei: Gugong bowuyuan, 1977), vol. 1:189.

<sup>283</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:233.

<sup>284</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang* 內閣藏本滿文老檔, vol. Taizong (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009), 472.

The measure word, 1 *dou* (Ch. 斗) is equivalent to 10.31 litres.

<sup>285</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:645.

From the first to the third lunar month of 1622, 2,573 Mongol men came under Nurhaci's command.<sup>286</sup> New orders to protect agriculture land were issued in an attempt to ensure local agricultural production. For example, in 1622, Nurhaci decreed that military officers were not allowed to train horses on arable land.<sup>287</sup> Moreover, population density was high in the Jurchen territory, which intensified the situation of grain shortage. Sin Ch'ungil (Ko. 신충일, Ch. *shen zhongyi*申忠一), a Korean envoy who visited Jianzhou in late 1595, documented the existence of eighteen villages between Manpo (Ko. 만포, in Korea) and Lipo (Ch. 梨坡, in the Jurchen territory), a short distance.<sup>288</sup> By 1618, Zhang Shizun estimated that there were 170,000-180,000 people in the Jin state.<sup>289</sup> By contrast, there were less than 100 people under the rule of Nurhaci in 1583. To provide enough food for this expanding population, an increase in agricultural output was required. A large proportion of land was allocated to farming as an attempt to supply enough food to soldiers and ordinary people, but the agricultural output of the Jurchen territory remained insufficient. This was due to a shortage of arable land in the Jin state. The majority of the Jurchen territory was mountainous, and arable land was thus scattered amongst the small plains in mountains. Land reclamation was labour-intensive, requiring a significant workforce, from men who were otherwise engaged in military conflicts. As a result, women took over some agricultural

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<sup>286</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:123–24, 130.

<sup>287</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:77.

<sup>288</sup> Sin Ch'ungil, 'Jianzhou jicheng tuji', 457.

<sup>289</sup> Zhang Shizun 張士尊, 'Mingqing zhanzheng baofa qian manzhou renkou shuzi xiaokao 明清戰爭爆發前滿洲人口數字小考', *Anshan shifan daxue xuebao*, no. 5 (2003): 5.

responsibilities at this time.<sup>290</sup> Furthermore, while touring the farmlands near Liaoyang in 1624, Nurhaci commanded that those who destroyed farmlands would be sentenced to caning, and the owners of livestock that damaged farmlands would be fined one *tael* of silver.<sup>291</sup> To some extent, such strategies of increasing grain yields presumably alleviated the commodity shortage. However, Nurhaci was unable to fully focus on agricultural issues due to the military campaigns, which required constant supplies of soldiers and grain.

### **Managing the Economic Crisis**

The development of trade seemed the natural panacea to the economic crisis. Nurhaci attempted to re-develop trade relations with Korea, but his efforts proved unsuccessful. However, he did succeed in establishing trading relations with the Qalqa Mongols, albeit only for a short time. He also focused on implementing new regulations in the domestic trade within the Jurchen territory. All of these endeavours, to some extent, relieved the economic crisis in the Jin state.

Chosŏn Korea was the first trading partner Nurhaci attempted to ally with, because of its abundant resources. The battle of Sarhū marked the end of the tribute trade and the frontier market trade between the Ming and Nurhaci, cutting Nurhaci off from valuable resources. However, the battle also enabled Nurhaci's freedom from Ming

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<sup>290</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:261.

<sup>291</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:203, 207.

control, which had prohibited him from trading with the Chosŏn during the East Asian War. Eight months after the battle, Nurhaci sent ambassadors twice in an attempt to establish direct contact with the Chosŏn court and persuade Kwanghae to betray the Ming to trade with Nurhaci.<sup>292</sup> In his return letter, Kwanghae refused the proposal.

Both your battalion [i.e. the Jin state] and my country serve the Heavenly Dynasty [i.e. the Ming], the Heavenly Dynasty has granted [us] generously. Now why do [you] betray the Heavenly Dynasty because the rewards received are less? In my country's moral tradition, it is restricted. However, the attitude of a big country should be to tolerate... Do not make a plan that rebels against the Heaven. [We should] be loyal to the Ming, would it not be good for us to keep good relations between the two countries [Korea and Jin]?

爾營與我國共事天朝，天朝撫之甚厚，而今何以些少之嫌，背叛天朝乎？在我國之道，固當斥絕；而以大國之度，理宜包容。……毋作逆天之計，以盡事大之誠，終保兩國之好，豈非幸乎！<sup>293</sup>

Kwanghae did aim to establish an informal and friendly relationship with Nurhaci. In another letter, Kwanghae explained that as a tributary state of the Ming, providing soldiers for the Battle of Sarhū was their duty. However, he sought Nurhaci's understanding in this matter and emphasised that Kwanghae wished to maintain friendly relations between the two sides. At the end of the letter, Kwanghae acknowledged the Jin as a state, asking the Jurchens to remain in their territory and to

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<sup>292</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Kwanghae ilgi:Kwanghae10.10.4,Kwanghae10.10.13.

<sup>293</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi:Kwanghae10.10.22.

keep the peace.<sup>294</sup> As it was dangerous for Kwanghae to betray the Ming, his solution was to maintain an official distance from Nurhaci for self-preservation. In a later letter, Nurhaci urged Kwanghae to stop being a passive onlooker and ally with the Jin.<sup>295</sup> With pressure from the Ming court, constant official communication between Nurhaci and Kwanghae was not easy.<sup>296</sup> Kwanghae thus refused to ally with Nurhaci, and stated that official letters between the two would no longer be necessary.<sup>297</sup> Therefore, during the period from 1619, when the Sarhū battle ended, to 1623 when Kwanghae lost his power, the Chosŏn court maintained a relatively neutral attitude toward Nurhaci. This was probably due to Kwanghae fearing both the Ming and the rise of Nurhaci, who had achieved many victories for the Jurchens.

Nurhaci seized this opportunity of relative peace with Korea to focus attacks on the Ming court without the fear of waging war on two fronts. However, when King Injo replaced Kwanghae to become ruler of Korea in 1623, attitudes shifted more strongly to support the Ming, leading to the termination of friendly ties between the Jin and the Chosŏn state. The trade connections between the two were not achieved until 1627, when the Manchus invaded Korea.

In regard to the Mongols, Nurhaci developed trade relations with the Qalqa Mongols for a short period. In the first lunar month of 1623, Nurhaci ordered the

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<sup>294</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi:Kwanghae11.4.21.

<sup>295</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi:Kwanghae11.7.14.

<sup>296</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi:Kwanghae11.7.18.

<sup>297</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Kwanghae ilgi:Kwanghae11.7.18.

Bayoote tribe (Mon., Ch. *bayuete* 巴岳特) of the Qalqa Mongols to trade with the Jin court, setting the exchange rate at one sheep to two *pi* of *maoqing* fabric (a thick navy textile).<sup>298</sup> Following its establishment, the bilateral trade continued to operate and expand smoothly, as shown by the fact that in the ninth lunar month, the Jin court exchanged 30 sheep for 100 *pi* of cloth from the Ĵaruud tribe of the Qalqa Mongols.<sup>299</sup> In the same month, the Jin court further regulated exchange rates with the Mongols in order to prevent the *beile* of the eight banners from lowering prices.

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<sup>298</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:148.

<sup>299</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:206.

Table 4 List of the Prices of Goods Exchanged between Nurhaci and the Qalqa Mongols

in 1623

Animals	a big bullock twenty <i>taels</i> of silver 大驢牛二十兩, a white-bellied ox fifteen <i>taels</i> of silver 白腹牛十五兩, a three-year-old ox ten <i>taels</i> of silver 三歲牛十兩, a two-year-old ox five <i>taels</i> of silver 兩歲牛五兩, a big sheep four <i>taels</i> of silver 大羊四兩, a low-grade sheep three <i>taels</i> of silver 末等羊三兩
Fabrics	one <i>pi</i> of Japanese silk two <i>taels</i> of silver 倭鍛一尺二兩, one <i>pi</i> of <i>maoqing</i> fabric two <i>taels</i> of silver 毛青布一尺二兩, one <i>pi</i> of felt one <i>tael</i> of silver 氈一尺一兩
Fur	one large sheepskin three <i>qian</i> 大羊皮三钱 one lambskin two <i>qian</i> 羊羔皮二钱 one small lambskin one <i>qian</i> 小羊皮一钱

Source: *Neige cangben manwen laodang* 內閣藏本滿文老檔, vol. Taizu (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009), 210.

Nurhaci decreed that those who went against the set prices would be punished and their products would be confiscated.<sup>300</sup> However, even with these regulations, trade with the Qalqa Mongols did not last long.

The development of the domestic trade networks was also a primary concern for Nurhaci. Hetu Ala, the first capital of the Jin state, rapidly became the trading centre of the Jurchen territory. Nurhaci also established a new trade market in south Hetu Ala, facilitating trade between the Jurchens and Mongol tribes. In his letter to each *beile* of the Qalqa Mongols, Nurhaci stated that people of all tribes and countries within the boundary of the Liao River were allowed to visit and trade with each other at this

<sup>300</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:210.

market.<sup>301</sup> By writing this letter, Nurhaci revealed the importance for the Jurchens of trading with the Mongol tribes. To ensure trade continued, he employed Chinese artisans to manufacture elaborate commodities and other valued items.<sup>302</sup> He believed that domestic trade would be greatly benefitted if merchants and artisans sold these products in the markets, so as to promote local consumerism.<sup>303</sup>

When the capital of the Jin state was moved to Liaoyang in 1621, Liaoyang replaced Hetu Ala as the trading centre of the Jurchen territory. Unlike Hetu Ala, which was a rural town, Liaoyang was the political, economic, and cultural centre of the Liaodong area, which had been previously governed by the Ming. The year after Liaoyang was seized by Jin troops in 1622, a market was built in west Liaoyang. Nurhaci introduced new rules to attract more trusted merchants to trade in Liaoyang. Trusted merchants were those who had previously traded in Fushun, Qinghe and other established markets. These merchants enjoyed special privileges, such as the ability to build the premises for trading in south Liaoyang.<sup>304</sup> Establishing markets was a means for Nurhaci to transform his capitals into trading centres so as to aid economic recovery.

Taxation was another important way in which Nurhaci increased state income and facilitated economic development. Nicola di Cosmo states that one of the main income sources of taxation was trade.<sup>305</sup> Following the taxation regulations of Ming China was

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<sup>301</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:49–50.

<sup>302</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:68.

<sup>303</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:71.

<sup>304</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:87.

<sup>305</sup> Di Cosmo, 'State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History', 23–25.

a good starting point for Nurhaci to increase his state's income. In Liaoyang, both pricing and taxes were administered based on Ming regulations, with an official assigned to taxation management.<sup>306</sup> The exact tax rate the Jin side introduced is unknown. However, it is clear that Nurhaci regulated all commodities that were priced with flat rates that were, in fact, lower than actual prices.<sup>307</sup> Such unified prices were lower than the market prices, otherwise there would not have been punishments for those who secretly sold at higher prices. This practice might have worked well in 1621, but the following year, Nurhaci decreed that small vendors without stores were banned from trading, as a way to regulate trade further and increase tax income.<sup>308</sup> Both Jurchen and Chinese merchants who owned shops were ordered to carve their names onto the shop fronts, otherwise they would be punished.<sup>309</sup>

A new tax policy was officially introduced in 1624, as the low tax rate policy was unable to meet the increasing economic demand of the state's military campaigns. Nurhaci increased taxes to 10%. For example, livestock was sold a tax of one *qian* of silver was charged on each tael, which implied a taxation rate of 10%. This was an extremely high taxation rate, as is evident when Hong Taiji reduced taxes to 3% following the economic recovery.<sup>310</sup> Also in 1624, Nurhaci commanded all Jurchen

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<sup>306</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:75.

<sup>307</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:72.

<sup>308</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:142.

<sup>309</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:142.

<sup>310</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:211; *Mingshi* 明史, n.d., juan 81: shihuo zhi wu.

For online version of *Mingshi*, please see <http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=410835>

and Chinese moneylenders to close their shops, so as to gain greater control over domestic economic activities.<sup>311</sup> The aim of the taxation policy was to ensure the economic monopoly of the Jin, in other words to establish Nurhaci's control over all trading activities in Jurchen territory. In implementing the taxation policy, Nurhaci gained disposable economic resources, which he used to enhance his leadership by allocating wealth to his ruling class based on performance in battle.<sup>312</sup> Moreover, Nurhaci's strict trade policy was a response to the urgent need for food in military campaigns. A sufficient supply of grain was essential for ensuring military successes, and maximising economic resources was a difficult and important task. It is evident that trading was an excellent means by which to gain access to grain as soon as possible. However, the policy resulted in severe economic consequences for the Jin state. The most serious consequence was silver inflation, causing not only high prices and commodity shortages, but also chaos and social disorder. This is evident from the emergence of robbery, fights, and even murders.<sup>313</sup> Ironically, the policy of commercial monopoly aimed at alleviating the economic strain on the state resulted in an exacerbation of the economic crisis.

In conclusion, the Jurchen economic crisis provided an opportunity for Nurhaci to make his state more economically independent in the midst of empire formation. He

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<sup>311</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:211.

<sup>312</sup> For the development of the Manchu ruling class, see Pamela Kyle Crossley, 'The Conquest Elite of the Ch'ing Empire', in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. Willard J. Peterson, vol. 9 (Part One: the Ch'ing Empire to 1800) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 310–59.

<sup>313</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:471–72.

achieved political independence in 1616. However, he struggled with resource mobilisation and distribution for territorial expansion. Without a sufficient supply of resources, military expansion and political stability within the court wavered. For the Jin state, economic issues seem to have been more challenging than military ones. Nurhaci followed the traditional Jurchen strategy of maintaining a monopoly over the trade in ginseng and fur. He acted as a middleman between the Ming and those Jurchens living in more remote areas, engaging them to work for him. Regarding the importance of the bilateral trade to Nurhaci, Kawachi Yoshihiro notes that after the mid-Ming period, several Jurchen figures accumulated wealth through the sable fur trade with Ming China and Chosŏn Korea. These newly wealthy figures and the old leaders of the Jurchen tribes matched each other in strength. Nurhaci was one of these new figures.<sup>314</sup> However, not all of these newly wealthy Jurchen figures obtained the same power as Nurhaci. He alone was able to use this newfound wealth and power to break away from Ming control to found his own state. The wild ginseng trade was another strategy Nurhaci employed to amass wealth. As such the Jurchen economy, based on trade, was formed, financing the early Jin state's military expansion, with the conquest of most of the Jurchen tribes, and the Qalqa and Qorč'in Mongols.

However, the emergence of the economic crisis in the Jin state was inevitable. Firstly, the economic pattern of Jurchen society was heavily reliant on the bilateral trade with the Ming. The Jurchens were a people traditionally focused on fishing and hunting,

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<sup>314</sup> Kawachi Yoshihiro, 'Mingdai dongbeiya de diaopi maoyi', 496–99.

meaning, as Hong Taiji said that both Jurchens and the Mongols lived on plunder.<sup>315</sup> However, it is worth noting that trade remained the primary method by which the Jurchens accumulated resources.<sup>316</sup> The tribute trade and the frontier market trade were therefore the pillars of the Jurchen economy. Secondly, the economic crisis was part of the general economic crisis of the seventeenth century. It is difficult to prove whether or not the economic crisis in Europe directly affected China and Jurchen society. However, it is certain that the economic crisis in Europe led to a severe decline in silver inflow to the Ming. It also resulted in silver shortages in Ming territory, which in turn caused a decrease in silver flowing into Jurchen society. With the rise of Nurhaci, the Jurchens replaced the Mongols as the main threat to the Ming in the northern frontier zone. The Ming court thus drew Ligdan Khan to their side, providing a significant amount of silver to the Mongol tribal leaders to suppress Nurhaci.<sup>317</sup> Due to the decline in silver inflows and the payment of substantial amounts of silver to the Mongols, the financial situation of the Ming was rapidly deteriorating.

The Ming's economic crisis gave Nurhaci an opportunity to become economically independent, which was a critical step in the process of empire building. However, following economic independence, Nurhaci realised the fragility of the Jurchen economy and tried to find a viable alternative to fill the Ming trade void. He explored short-term trading options with the Qalqa Mongols but failed to trade with Chosŏn

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<sup>315</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.9.14.

<sup>316</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.9.14.

<sup>317</sup> *Ming shilu*, vol. Xizong 熙宗, n.d., TQ3.12.24.

Korea. The economic crisis only ended with the establishment of multiple trade networks during Hong Taiji's reign, namely with Chosŏn and Mongols.

### **Part III The Road to Economic Recovery: Multiple Trade Networks between the Koreans, Mongols, and Chinese, 1627-1644**

Following his ascension to the throne of the Jin state in 1627, Hong Taiji faced an economic crisis as well as military threats from the Ming, Chosŏn, and Mongol tribes. Hong Taiji conquered large amounts of territory over the course of his reign.<sup>318</sup> Traditional scholarship has focused on how he achieved military success from multiple perspectives. For example, Yan Chongnian carefully examines each of Hong Taiji's wars, showing Hong Taiji's brilliant military capabilities.<sup>319</sup> Mitamura Taisuke further explores the military system of the Manchus, examining the establishment of the banner system during Nurhaci's reign, which facilitated the military expansion during Hong Taiji's reign.<sup>320</sup> Ding Yizhuang and Mark Elliott both examine the banner system, arguing that the eight banner system during Hong Taiji's reign enabled the Qing's conquest of China.<sup>321</sup> Liu Xiaomeng studies Hong Taiji from a political perspective, arguing that Hong Taiji changed the political system from sharing power with family members, as was typical during Nurhaci's reign, to securing centralisation, which was

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<sup>318</sup> The introductory section of Part III uses the term Qing empire to cover the period spanning from 1636 to 1644. But this thesis uses the terms Jin state and Qing state to refer to time periods before 1636 and after 1636 respectively. The Jin state spanned 1616 to 1636, a time period significantly focused on in this thesis; the Qing period, beginning in 1636, is covered in the second half of the fifth chapter and several parts of the sixth chapter.

<sup>319</sup> Yan Chongnian 閻崇年, *Qingchao tongshi: taizong* 清朝通史: 太宗 (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 2003), chap. 2–9, 11.

<sup>320</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū*, 283–322.

<sup>321</sup> Ding Yizhuang 定宜莊, *Qingdai baqi zhufang yanjiu* 清代八旗駐防研究, 7; Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*, 63–78, 90–93.

a vital aspect of the Qing success.<sup>322</sup>

However, the economic strength of the Manchus (together with the Mongols) depended on the political leaders' ability to explore trade opportunities with China and to accumulate resources from border towns.<sup>323</sup> Trade during the multiple wars of the Jin state was crucial to its success, as the trade routes Nurhaci obtained could not cover the expenses that occurred over the next seventeen years during the period from 1627, when Nurhaci died, to 1644, when the Qing seized Beijing. Thus it is essential to examine how Hong Taiji mobilised critical resources from the border towns, particularly after the termination of the bilateral trade with Ming in 1619.

Therefore, Part III addresses two issues. First, it studies the way in which warfare enabled Hong Taiji to build trade connections with Koreans, Mongols, and Chinese. Second, it examines how these newly established multiple trade networks assisted Hong Taiji assuage the economic crisis and accumulate more resources to finance military expansion.

The situation, Hong Taiji fully understood, was that the existence of his state depended on the resources gained from trade.<sup>324</sup> In regards to his strategy on resource accumulation, Hong Taiji stated:

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<sup>322</sup> Liu Xiaomeng 劉小萌, *Manzu cong buluo dao guojia de fazhan* 滿族從部落到國家的發展, 319–43.

<sup>323</sup> Nicola di Cosmo, 'Marital Politics on the Manchu-Mongol Frontier in the Early Seventeenth Century', in *The Chinese State at the Borders*, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 59.

<sup>324</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.9.14.

Did Shenyang and Liaodong where we dwell belong to us originally? They have been granted to us by Heaven. If we were not to take military action to conquer but sit watching the Ming court expand their territory, fortify their city walls, as well as upgrade their weapons to well equip themselves, would we be left living in peace? Considering this, we have to buy horses from the Mongols using the money and silk plundered from the Ming court and the goods gained through our trade with Chosŏn Korea. As such, it is the way that we wage war to resist the enemy.

我等所居瀋陽、遼東之地，原系我屬乎？乃天賜與我也。若不事征伐，坐視明國開拓疆土，修建城廓，繕治軍械，使得完備，豈能使我等安居耶？念及此，遂以征明所獲財帛及與朝鮮通商所得貨物，收購蒙古馬匹，所以興師致討者乃是故也。<sup>325</sup>

This text shows that Hong Taiji accumulated resources by trading with Chosŏn Korea and plundering Ming China to buy Mongol horses, which indicates that trade and warfare facilitated resource accumulation. Therefore, trade relations during Hong Taiji's reign differed from those during Nurhaci's reign, changing from dependency to domination, with Hong Taiji ensuring stable and constant resource supply for the construction of an empire. Warfare and developing multiple trade networks were inseparably intertwined, as Hong Taiji used military force to develop trade partners. Warfare, on the one hand, diminished external threats. On the other, it facilitated the development of trade routes.

It is necessary to briefly introduce the situation of military plight Hong Taiji was

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<sup>325</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:578.

in, with the Ming, Chosŏn, and Ligdan Khan posing significant threats to his rule. Through his battles with the Ming, Nurhaci had successfully expanded the territory of the Qing from a tiny town to most of the north Liaodong Peninsula. However, lost battles at Ningyuan and Jinzhou prevented him from taking the Shanhai Pass, the shortest route from the Jurchen territory to Beijing, halting the Jin state military expansion.

Aside from the Ming, Hong Taiji was also facing threats from Chosŏn on the eastern side of his state, which allied with the Ming court to attack the Jin state. The most dangerous threat came from Ka-Do Island, a Chosŏn-governed isolated island in the Yellow Sea close to the west of the Korean Peninsula. In 1621, Mao Wenlong (Ch. 毛文龍), a Ming general, stationed his troops at Ka-Do island with the support of Chosŏn and further established a new maritime pathway to attack the Jin state. Both the Ming and Chosŏn courts supplied materials to Mao Wenlong on Ka-Do Island.

On the western side of the Jin state, there were various Mongol tribes on the southern steppe. Ligdan Khan was the last in the Borjigin clan of Mongol Khans who ruled the Mongols from the Čaqar Mongols (Ch. *kaerka menggu* 察哈爾蒙古), blocking a land route from the Jurchen territory to Beijing, and thus preventing the Qing forces from entering Ming territory. Thus, the Qing state was confronted with attacks from the Ming, Chosŏn, and Mongols along several of its borders. Warfare was the primary means by which to counter these threats.

To some extent Hong Taiji also entered wars for economic reasons. Occupation of

important market areas such as Zhongjiang, Hoeryōng, Zhangjiakou, and Hohhot, created the emergence of multiple trade centres. Trade connections with Chosŏn, Mongols, and local authorities of the Ming at Zhangjiakou played different roles in shaping the Qing economy.

Chapter five examines trade with the Chosŏn state, which acted as the “provider” and transit point for the Qing to acquire resources. As the “provider”, the Chosŏn court possessed the majority of the economic resources that the Qing was in need of, including cloth, paper, food, and medicine. The Chosŏn state also acted as a transit point in that it sold products imported from China and Japan to the Qing state. Japan already had trade relations with the Chosŏn court at Tsushima Island. Thus I argue that Japanese products, such as Japanese swords (Ch. *wodao* 倭刀) and silver, flowed into the Qing territory via Chosŏn. Japan also extended trade connections to Southeast Asian states, and as a result, introduced medicine to the Qing via Chosŏn. Zhongjiang and Hoeryōng thus became important frontier markets between the Qing and Chosŏn.

Chapter six explores the networks of trade between the Qing and the Mongols, with the Mongols acting as a “resource sharer”, military partner, and trade transit point. The most wealthy and powerful tribe among the Mongols was the Qorčīn Mongols, such that trade networks with the Qorčīn Mongols were not only the most lucrative, but also facilitated the development of the Qing’s strongest military alliance. However, it is worth noting, other Mongol tribes also provided horses and soldiers to Hong Taiji, greatly boosting the Qing’s military power. As a trade transit point, the Tūmed Mongols

became the middlemen between the Qing and the Ming. Hohhot thus became the trade centre of the Mongol territory, transporting products from Ming to Qing territory. It is notable that the Ming court was another critical source for Qing state resources. The Ming during this period had no direct trade relationship with the Qing, but Chinese products still flowed into the Qing territory via Chosŏn and the Tümed Mongols. However, after Zhangjiakou was conquered by Qing troops, the Ming local authorities at Zhangjiakou established a direct albeit short-lived trade relationship with the Qing. This chapter also examines the means by which the Qing sustained internal resource levels. After the Yeren Jurchens and the Solon people, who resided near the Amur River, were conquered by Hong Taiji, sable fur and wild ginseng became the most lucrative trading products for the Qing.

Chapter seven summarises the legacies of the multiple trade networks during Hong Taiji's reign, showing how the multiple trade networks enabled the circulation of commodities and silver between East Asia and Inner Asia. It also counters the argument that silver from overseas did not flow out of China in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. This chapter instead details the way in which silver, together with other products, flowed from Ming China into Qing territory.<sup>326</sup> In the opposite direction, silver which had flowed from the Ming to the Mongols later flowed to the Qing. The three trade cities—Shenyang, Zhongjiang and Hohhot—interacted with each other,

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<sup>326</sup> Quan Hansheng 全漢昇, *Mingqing jingjishi yanjiu* 明清經濟史研究 (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye gongsi, 1987), 29.

with all the products traded flowing through these trade centres via two main trade routes. Thus, the new multilateral trading networks of the Qing resolved the economic crisis of the Jin state and further enabled the circulation of commodities and silver, which contributed to the construction of the Qing empire.

## Chapter 5: Trade through Power: Qing Trade Networks with Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asian States, 1627-1644

Manchu-Chosŏn relations have long been a central aspect of East Asian history, particularly in relation to trade. During Hong Taiji's reign, this trade was facilitated through the tribute trade. Chŏn Hae-jong, a prominent scholar in Korea, argues that the tribute trade at this time was an economic burden to the Chosŏn state, indicating it was unwelcome in Korea.<sup>327</sup> Alternatively, Zhang Cunwu examines the tribute trade between the Qing and Chosŏn states from 1637 to 1911, examining both the tribute trade and the frontier market trade. He argues that the trading volume within these trade networks was significant, benefitting the Qing's economic development.<sup>328</sup> This thesis will add to Zhang Cunwu's research by providing greater detail on how the Qing benefitted from these trade networks during the pre-conquest period.

Seonmin Kim argues that Korea's adoption of a Qing China-centred tributary relationship was a means by which to preserve Korean territorial sovereignty and power.<sup>329</sup> However, trade relations between the two states were initially facilitated through the frontier market trade. The frontier market trade acted as a conduit for trade relations between the Qing and Chosŏn states. Wang Zhen examines two vital frontier

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<sup>327</sup> Chŏn Hae-jong 全海宗, *Han-chung kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu* 韓中關係史研究 (Sŏul: Ilchogak, 1970), 181–242.

<sup>328</sup> Zhang Cunwu 張存武, *Qinghan congfan maoyi, 1637-1894* 清韓宗藩貿易 1637-1894 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1978), 240.

<sup>329</sup> Kim, *Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea, 1636-1912*, chap. Introduction; Kim, 'Ginseng and Border Trespassing Between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea', 33–61.

markets along the Yalu and Tumen River over the course of the Qing dynasty: Zhongjiang and Hoeryŏng. He concludes that neither frontier markets operated regularly and both failed to thrive until 1644 when the Qing conquered China. However, while the markets may not have thrived, they still provided a way in which to obtain much-needed resources. For example, Chosŏn grain helped relieve the Jin state's food crisis during Hong Taiji's reign.<sup>330</sup> Thus, further research on the trade relations between the Qing and Chosŏn states before 1644 is needed, particularly as a means to address how the Qing accumulated resources through trade to finance military expansion.

This chapter shows that the tribute trade and frontier market trade were two vital means by which the Qing consistently obtained vital resources from the Chosŏn state. This trade network was in turn ensured through warfare. There were two Qing invasions of Chosŏn Korea in 1627 and 1637 respectively. The plunder gained from the Qing invasions was sufficient to finance further military expansion, but it did not provide a stable and sustainable channel for the Qing to obtain resources from the Chosŏn state. More important than plunder then, the two invasions made it possible for the Qing to establish direct trade relations with Korea, something Nurhaci was never able to achieve. Trade relations, established through warfare, thus ensured the Qing's access to Chosŏn

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<sup>330</sup> Wang Zhen 王臻, 'Qingchao yu chaoxian zai yalujiang diqu de bianjing maoyi shulun 清朝與朝鮮在鴨綠江地區的邊境貿易述論', *Yanbian daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* 35, no. 3 (2002): 105–7; Wang Zhen 王臻, 'Qingchao dui lichao tumenjiang diqu de bianjing maoyi jianlun 清朝對李朝圖們江地區的邊境貿易簡論', *Dongjiang xuekan* 16, no. 4 (1999): 33–37.

resources.

This chapter argues that the Chosŏn court functioned as the “supplier” and transit point of the Qing economy. As the “supplier”, the Chosŏn court provided resources, which enabled Hong Taiji to alleviate the Qing’s domestic economic crisis as well as fund the Qing’s subsequent invasions of the Mongols. This trade was expressed in two forms: the tribute trade and the frontier market trade. The tribute trade ultimately represented a superior-subordinate relationship between the Qing and Chosŏn respectively. The frontier market trade was the main source of income for the Qing, ensuring trading high frequency and stable trade volumes, providing access to resources that the tribute trade could not facilitate. Zhongjiang and the Hoeryŏng were the main markets of the frontier market trade.

The Chosŏn court also acted as the transit point, re-connecting trade relations between the Qing and the Ming after trade had ceased in 1619. While wild ginseng remained the central trading commodity, the trading site changed to Ka-Do Island. More importantly, the Chosŏn court expanded the Qing’s trade networks into Japan and Southeast Asian states, such that Japanese and Southeast Asian products were introduced to the Qing via Chosŏn, namely Japanese swords and medicine. These products had a profound impact on the development of the Qing economy. It is thus argued that the Chosŏn provided the solid economic foundation that enabled the expansion of the Qing empire from 1626 to 1644.

## The First Invasion of Chosŏn Korea, 1627

This section illustrates the Jin's establishment of what this thesis will term "the gift system" as well as the frontier market trade following the first Jin invasion of the Chosŏn state. The war lasted from the first lunar month to the fourth lunar month of 1627, with the Jin winning numerous victories. The primary purpose of Hong Taiji's invasion was to take control of Ka-Do Island (See Map 5). The invasion also assisted the Jin in building trade connections with Chosŏn, facilitating the accumulation of economic resources that alleviated the domestic economic crisis, which had been exacerbated by further military expansion.<sup>331</sup>

The capture of Ka-Do Island had two significant impacts. First, it extinguished a notable threat to the east of the Jin state. Ka-Do Island had been used as a military base since 1619, when the Chosŏn court helped Mao Wenlong, a Chinese general, station his troops on the Korean-controlled island.<sup>332</sup> This action displays the severe deterioration of Chosŏn-Jin relations. King Injo, who replaced Kwanghae Gun as King of Chosŏn Korea in 1623, was in need of approval and support for his new diplomatic policy, which promoted Ming ties and alienated "the barbarians" (i.e. the Jin state). King Injo thus described Nurhaci as "an inept person (Ch. *xiaochou* 小丑)", stating he was certain the Chosŏn could defeat him with their larger and more wealthy state.<sup>333</sup> With tensions continuing to increase into Hong Taiji's reign, it was paramount for Hong Taiji to defeat

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<sup>331</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:461.

<sup>332</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok* 조선왕조실록, vol. Injo 인조, n.d., Injo5.4.1.

<sup>333</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo2.3.14.

Mao Wenlong to avoid fighting a war of two fronts, since Hong Taiji was also fighting the Ming.

Second, capturing Ka-do Island provided a means by which to resolve the internal economic difficulties the Jin state was facing. The establishment of trade relations with Korea remained one of Nurhaci's unfinished projects at the start of Hong Taiji's reign. As discussed in chapter two, the Chosŏn court repeatedly refused Nurhaci's requests for trade relations, preventing him from taking control of the source of the sable fur trade source. When Hong Taiji came to the throne in 1627, the economic crisis remained an unresolved issue for the Jin state, causing grain shortages and silver inflation. Waging war seemed to be a quick way to obtain resources so as to reverse the economic crisis. The Jin court urgently required the main economic resources exported by Chosŏn, which included silk, cotton cloth, and other types of fabrics. Paper was also required in large quantities, as well as seasoning, tea, and Japanese swords.<sup>334</sup> The need for these materials exposes the weaknesses in the Jurchen economy, which was heavily reliant on agricultural produce such that it could not meet the internal demands for handicraft skills. Therefore, apart from acquiring external resources to assuage the domestic economic crisis, the Jin state was also in urgent need of economic restructuring. Trade with Chosŏn was able to accomplish both these goals. Thus, the first invasion was the result of interlaced political, military, and economic issues.

During the war, Hong Taiji's troops defeated Mao Wenlong's troops at Ka-Do

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<sup>334</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo2.4.14.

Island but failed to capture Mao Wenlong himself. Following this, Hong Taiji advanced southward to invade Chosŏn Korea.<sup>335</sup> King Injo fled from Hanseong to Ganghwa Island in panic.<sup>336</sup> There was fierce debate on how to resist the Jin invasion within the Chosŏn court. King Injo declared his preference for negotiating with the Jin for peace.<sup>337</sup> By contrast, the Korean officials recommended seeking military assistance from the Ming to repel the Jin troops and regain their lost territory, the same strategy that the Chosŏn court had employed to combat the Japanese during the East Asian War (1592-1598).<sup>338</sup> However, the Ming court was too distracted with domestic uprisings to contemplate further military campaigns abroad, only sending one garrison led by Yuan Chonghuan to merely keep the Jin troops at bay.<sup>339</sup> These events failed to prevent Hong Taiji's invasion of Chosŏn Korea.<sup>340</sup> Therefore, pursuing peace became a coping strategy for the Chosŏn court.<sup>341</sup>

Grain was heavily plundered by the Jin during the invasion, relieving grain shortages in the Jin state. On the twentieth day of the first lunar of 1627, two days after Ŭiju was seized, wives of six Mongol bannermen on behalf of Jin came to Ŭiju in exchange for grain.<sup>342</sup> This drastic measure shows the severity of the grain crisis in the

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<sup>335</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:453–54.

<sup>336</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.4.1.

<sup>337</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo5.2.2, Injo5.2.29.

<sup>338</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo5.4.1.

<sup>339</sup> Zhang Tingyu, *Ming shi*, liezhuan juan 147: Yuan Chonghuan.

For online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=88096>

<sup>340</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.2.2, Injo5.2.29.

<sup>341</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo5.2.2, Injo5.2.29.

<sup>342</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:455.

Jin state, as wives of the bannermen were held in great esteem. Indeed, grain prices had increased to nearly eight *taels* of silver per *jin*.<sup>343</sup> The main cause of the grain crisis was a dearth of farmers, which subsequently resulted in declines of grain output.<sup>344</sup> Therefore, in exchange for the withdrawal of the Jin troops, the Jin state commanded the Chosŏn court to supply them with sufficient grain for a year.<sup>345</sup> After Hong Taiji had withdrawn his troops, the Chosŏn court provided 3,000 *dan* of grain, with 1,000 *dan* of grain for trading.<sup>346</sup> These grain provisions instantly eased the domestic grain crisis in the Jin state.

### ***The Agreement of Ganghwa Island***

In the aftermath of Hong Taiji's invasion, two agreements were reached. The first agreement was the Agreement of Ganghwa Island. The Jin general Liu Xingzuo (Ch. 劉興祚) represented the Jin in tribute trade negotiations with Chosŏn.<sup>347</sup> After arriving on Ganghwa Island, Liu Xingzuo stated the Jin state's conditions for peace, which included the Chosŏn court presenting annual gifts of luxury items and livestock to the Jin state, the amounts of which were to be decided by Chosŏn.<sup>348</sup> Later, King Injo sent Yi Gak (Ko. 이각 Ch. *li jue* 李覺), his younger half-brother, to pay a formal visit to

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<sup>343</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:472.

<sup>344</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:471–72.

<sup>345</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:480.

<sup>346</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:480.

The measure word 1 *dan* (Ch. 石) is equivalent to 60.477 kilograms.

<sup>347</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:463.

<sup>348</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:463.

Amin and other *beiles* at P'yōngsan Mountain with gifts, so as to show the Chosŏn's sincerity in peace negotiations.<sup>349</sup> It is interesting to note that the Chosŏn and Jin courts had different gift items documented in their records. The Chosŏn court recorded 15,000 *pi* of kapok (Ch. *mumian* 木綿), 200 *pi* of silk wadding (Ch. *mianchou* 綿紬), 250 *pi* of white linen (Ch. *baizhu bu* 白苧布), 60 tiger skins (Ch. *hupi* 虎皮), 40 buckskins (Ch. *lupi* 鹿皮), eight Japanese swords, and one horse with saddle (Ch. *anju ma* 鞍具馬).<sup>350</sup> The Jin, by contrast, recorded 100 horses, 100 tiger skins and leopard skins (Ch. *baopi* 豹皮), 100 *pi* of silk as well as 10,000 *pi* of cloth.<sup>351</sup> Regardless of the discrepancy in the records, it is clear that the Chosŏn and the Jin courts made peace through tribute.

The motivations of the Jin and Chosŏn courts that lay behind the Agreement of Ganghwa Island were different and based on different concerns. The Jin court was concentrated on “liberating” the Chosŏn court from Ming control so as to establish direct trade relations with Chosŏn themselves and subsequently ensure capital and economic resources to fully resolve the economic crisis. In contrast, the Chosŏn court were focused on preserving their relationship with the Ming court under the tribute system, attempting to reaffirm their higher status compared to the Jin state, regardless of their military defeat.<sup>352</sup> In early 1627, King Injo, together with Liu Xingzuo, the Jin

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<sup>349</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:463.

<sup>350</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.2.15.

<sup>351</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC1.3.14.

<sup>352</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.2.22.

state representative, burnt incense to worship gods, killed white horses and black cattle, and smeared blood as an oath to abide by the terms of the peace agreement made on Ganghwa Island. The full text of the agreement is:

The Chosŏn king took an oath with the Jin state on a day in the lunar month in 1627. We, the two countries, have agreed to reconcile and keep the promise [we made]; in the future [we] will each guard our own territory, [we] will not compete for trifles and will not seek anything that is unreasonable. If my country holds to its resentment against the Jin state, which goes against the will of reconciliation, and sends troops to invade, then Heaven too will send down disasters [on us]. If the Jin state still harbours malicious intentions and plots against reconciling, and [the Jin] sends troops to invade, then Heaven also will send down disasters [on the Jin]. The monarch and ministers of the two countries will each keep the faith and together enjoy peace. Sacred Heaven and Earth, respectful spirits of high mountain and river, supervise this oath.

朝鮮國王以今丁卯年某月日與金國立誓：我兩國已講定和好，今後各遵約誓，各守封疆，毋爭競細故，非理徵求。若我國與金國計仇，違背和好，興兵侵伐，則亦皇天降災。若金國仍起不良之心，違背和好，興兵侵伐，則亦皇天降禍。兩國君臣，各守信心，共用太平。皇天后土，崧瀆神祇，監聽此誓。<sup>353</sup>

However, traditional analyses of this text are problematic. First, scholars in the twentieth century named this agreement “an oath of brotherhood,” a term that is used in The Draft History of Qing (Ch. *qingshi gao* 清史稿).<sup>354</sup> However, the above text

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<sup>353</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.3.3.

<sup>354</sup> *Qingshi gao* 清史稿, n.d., liezhuan juan 111.

For online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=570713>.

makes no mention of brotherhood. The term ‘a brotherhood-like alliance (Ch. xiongdi zhiguo 兄弟之國)’ in the text shows that Chinese-Korean relations entered into a new era, with the Jin acting as an elder brother-like figure to the younger brother-like Chosŏn.<sup>355</sup> However, there is no direct mention of this in the text. Furthermore, in practice the Chosŏn court greatly resented the trade alliance, even hindering trade relations in the early 1630s. Second, Wang Zhen argues that the Agreement of Ganghwa Island was an unequal treaty.<sup>356</sup> However, no details in the agreement indicate that the positions of the countries were unequal. In fact, the text uses linguistically similar punishments if either state broke the oath. Therefore, the Agreement of Ganghwa Island was more akin to an armistice than a peace treaty, unlikely to effectively solve the concerns of both sides. This meant that a new agreement was urgently needed to address the underlying issues.

### ***The Pyongyang Agreement***

Two months later, an incident prompted the Jin side to propose a new agreement with the Chosŏn court so as to ensure that the Chosŏn court presented gifts to Hong Taiji. Amin, who was the leading Jin general during the Chosŏn invasion, had an insatiable desire for the wealth of the Chosŏn state, and plundered Pyongyang for three days.<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>355</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.2.2.

<sup>356</sup> Wang Zhen 王臻, ‘Dingbao zhiyi de jiaoshe ji zhanhou jinxian de maodun chongtu tanxi 丁卯之役的交涉及战后金鲜的矛盾冲突探析’, *Hanguo yanjiu luncong*, no. 1 (2008): 355–70.

<sup>357</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:465.

Following this, an agreement entitled the Agreement of Pyongyang was presented on the third day of the fifth lunar month of 1627.<sup>358</sup>

The details of the Pyongyang Agreement were quite different from those of the Agreement of Ganghwa Island in five ways. First, it specified that King Injo should present gifts to the Jin state. Second, it declared that the Chosŏn court should treat the Jin officials in the same way as they treated the Ming envoys. Third, the Chosŏn court was not allowed to build city walls or train troops. Fourth, it stated that whoever had been captured and registered by the Jurchens but had fled back to the Chosŏn state should be repatriated to the Jin immediately. Finally, both countries were expected to obey the oath forever. The Pyongyang Agreement is only found in *The Veritable Records of Qing Dynasty* (Ch. *qing shilu* 清實錄), as it was a unilateral proposal drafted solely by the Jin side, with Chosŏn Korea having no role in its creation.

King Injo was astonished by the vast differences between the two agreements. In response, he demanded to know the reasons for the disparity and reminded the Jin that the Agreement of Ganghwa Island had already been agreed to by both sides.<sup>359</sup> It is reasonable to assume based on the tone of King Injo, that the Jin changed their mind as soon as they announced the Agreement of Ganghwa Island with the Chosŏn court, composing another agreement with new details. In both cases, the Chosŏn court reluctantly accepted the Pyongyang Agreement. In defence of this decision, King Injo

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<sup>358</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC1.3.18.

<sup>359</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.3.23.

stated there were no other alternatives than to accept, but he also declared that the Chosŏn court did not necessarily have to abide by all the regulations.<sup>360</sup> The negative attitude of the Chosŏn court represented a potential danger that could obstruct the gifting and frontier market trade between the two states. This danger ultimately erupted into the second Jin invasion of Chosŏn Korea in 1636.

The achievements of Hong Taiji's first invasion included not only the temporary alleviation of the Jin state's eastern military threat, but also the successful transformation of the Chosŏn state into a resource oasis for the Jin state to finance military campaigns against the Ming. The agreements of Ganghwa Island and Pyongyang fulfilled the Jin's economic requirements. For the first time, direct trade connections with the Chosŏn state had been established, something the Jin state had been attempting to obtain for decades. Additionally, the resources provided by the Chosŏn state eased the Jin state financial crisis. However, these agreements were a heavy economic burden for the Chosŏn state, with the Jin state requiring greater and greater volumes of resources to sustain their military expansion. The first invasion had benefited the Jin state at the expense of the Chosŏn state.

### ***The Gift System, 1628-1636***

The Agreement of Pyongyang dictated that the Chosŏn court present gifts to Hong Taiji, and so the gift system began. This was an important income source for the Jin state

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<sup>360</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo5.3.21.

from 1628 to 1636. The gift system did not simply consist of the Chosŏn giving gifts to the Jin; it was fundamentally about the Jin acquiring critical resources from the Chosŏn state. As the military victor, the Jin side typically requested a large amount of items from the Chosŏn court, offering few items or nothing in return. Thus, it was not surprising that the gift system caused economic tensions between the two states. This was exacerbated by the introduction of two gift regulations, which included fixed gift amounts and pre-determined types of gifts that the Chosŏn court was allowed to present. The primary purpose of the gift system for Hong Taiji was to obtain daily essentials to compensate for the shortage of resources caused by the domestic economic crisis and further military campaigns against the Mongols.

The gift regulations first appeared in early 1628, requiring the Chosŏn state to present gifts twice a year, in autumn and winter.<sup>361</sup> This mirrored the Ming state's tributary system.<sup>362</sup> However, unlike the Ming-Chosŏn tribute trade, which favoured both sides, the gift system favoured only the Jin. While the Ming court dominated the tribute system, its return gifts to the Chosŏn state were always of higher value than those presented by Chosŏn so as to show the Ming's generosity. The Jin did not adopt this aspect of the Ming's tribute trade.

The types of gifts the Jin requested mirrored the Ming's tribute trade. For the gift system, the Chosŏn court presented the Jin with the same gifts they had given the Ming

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<sup>361</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.2.28.

<sup>362</sup> Shen Shixing, *Daming huidian*, vol. 105: chaogong yi.

court.<sup>363</sup> Sources are vague when it comes to specific amounts and types of gift exchanged between the Chosŏn and Ming courts. However, as a guideline *The Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty* notes the regulations set by the Ming court for tribute and protocol. It shows the required gifts from Chosŏn that were presented to the Ming consisted of gold and silver vessels, a variety of jewellery, white silk, various fabrics, different types of fur, ginseng, paper, and horses.<sup>364</sup> It is worth noting that *The Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty* was produced in 1575, and the listed gifts were not given specific amounts. It is thus difficult to confirm whether the practices detailed in 1575 were still used in 1628. However, it is likely that the types of gifts that the Chosŏn state presented in 1628 were equivalent to or of greater value than those gifted in 1575.

The vague description of the 1628 gift regulations resulted in economic tensions between the two states, with the Jin repeatedly asking for more items, burdening the Chosŏn state. For example, as early as 1627, the Jin state asked the Chosŏn court to supply 40,000 *pi* of kapok, 400 cattle, 400 *pi* of silk, as well as 4,000 *pi* of fabrics.<sup>365</sup> In response to the request, the Chosŏn court gradually reduced the number of gifts as well as reduced the amount of food and beverage given to the Jin envoys.<sup>366</sup> Meanwhile, the Chosŏn state presented unrequested gifts to the Jin, including 700 *jin* of ginseng

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<sup>363</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo10.12.24.

<sup>364</sup> Shen Shixing, *Daming huidian*, vol. 105: chaogong yi.

<sup>365</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.2.9.

<sup>366</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.2.3.

together with silk and cotton.<sup>367</sup> This could indicate the Chosŏn economy was struggling under the tributary system. Chosŏn Korea was a limited territory with minimal financial power. The economic situation of the Chosŏn state worsened following invasions by the Japanese and Jurchens, resulting in significant military losses and diminished financial power.<sup>368</sup> Another cause of Chosŏn economic difficulty was the court had to pay tribute to the Ming state at the same time as the Jin, so as to maintain the tribute relationship with China.

However, it appears the Jin court was not aware of or was not concerned about the economic hardship of the Chosŏn state. In response to the Chosŏn court reducing the number of gifts, Hong Taiji refused to accept any gifts in the spring of 1631.<sup>369</sup> In his letter to the Chosŏn court, Hong Taiji blamed King Injo for reducing gift volumes and regarded such behaviour as an insult to the Jin. Upon the receipt of the letter, the Chosŏn court declared Hong Taiji to be a rude barbarian.<sup>370</sup> In an attempt to demonstrate that the Chosŏn state was a civilised state as opposed to the Jin, King Injo decided to bequeath extra gifts to the Jin.<sup>371</sup> However, tensions increased again the following year when the Chosŏn court did not present the correct gifts due to economic declines. For example, in late 1632, 1,650 *pi* of fabric was presented to the Jin but it was not the

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<sup>367</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.2.3.

<sup>368</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo7.9.6.

<sup>369</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC5.1.26.

<sup>370</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo9.3.5.

<sup>371</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo9.3.5.

fabric detailed in the gift regulations.<sup>372</sup> The Chosŏn side seemed unable to afford the amount of gifts the Jin requested.

A new gift regulation was introduced in late 1632, which fixed the types of gifts the Chosŏn were allowed to present.<sup>373</sup> The gifts included the following,

Table 5 The list of the items the Jin requested from Chosŏn, 1632

Money	100 <i>taels</i> of gold 金百兩, 1,000 <i>taels</i> of silver 銀千兩
Fabrics	1,000 <i>pi</i> of assorted brocade 各色綿綢一千, 1,000 <i>pi</i> of assorted <i>ko-hemp</i> cloth 各色葛布一千, 10,000 <i>pi</i> of assorted fine cloth 各色細布一萬
Fur	100 leopard furs 豹皮一百, 400 otter furs 水獺皮四百, 200 <i>lūxie</i> furs 綠斜皮二百
Medicine	100 pairs of buffalo horn 水牛角百對, 200 <i>jin</i> of caesalpinia sappan 蘇木二百斤
Paper	1,000 quires of large-size paper 大紙千刀, 1,000 quires of low-class paper 次紙千刀
Mat	one fine mat with dragon pattern 龍紋細席一, 100 patterned mats 各色花席一百
Sauce	ten <i>dou</i> of black pepper 胡椒十柳鬥
Sword	twenty high-class broadswords 上等腰刀二十, twenty shun swords 順刀二十
Tea	200 bags of Songluo tea 松蘿茶二百包

Source: *Neige cangben manwen laodang* 內閣藏本滿文老檔, vol. Taizong (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 2009), 663.

Inherent in this regulation was a notable increase in the volume of gifts the Chosŏn court were expected to give. Hong Taiji had two reasons for this increase. First, the

<sup>372</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo10.11.17.

<sup>373</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:663.

volume of gifts presented to the Jin previously were far less than that presented to the Ming, as the Jin state only had to present gifts in spring and autumn. In comparison, the Chosŏn court had to present gifts to the Ming not only in spring and autumn, but also during important festivals. The increase in gifts was used by the Jin as a way to display that they were of equal status to the Ming. Second, Hong Taiji wanted retribution for the fact that the Chosŏn state had assisted the Ming in defeating Nurhaci at the Battle of Sarhū in 1619.<sup>374</sup>

However, the underlying reason for the increase was that the Jin required more resources. 1632 was an important year for the Jin state as the Čaqar Mongols were defeated. This meant that not only was a threatening enemy eliminated, but also, more importantly, a new route across the Mongol steppe into Ming territory had been opened. While this might suggest that the Manchus were better able to acquire resources themselves, in reality it created greater dependency on Chosŏn gifts. The Jin required rewards for the Mongol elite submitting to Jin rule. Therefore, Hong Taiji continuously pressured Chosŏn for more resources.

Fierce debate followed the introduction of the 1632 gift regulation, with Chosŏn protesting the sharp increase in gift volume demands. The Chosŏn court also contested the gift regulations inclusion of gold, silver, and ox horns, on the grounds that they were not domestic products.<sup>375</sup> The Chosŏn's response enraged Hong Taiji so much so that

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<sup>374</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.1.15.

<sup>375</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:665.

he expelled the Chosŏn envoy and rejected the gifts for the second time.<sup>376</sup>

On the ninth day of the first lunar month of 1633, the Chosŏn court officially agreed to the 1632 gift regulation except for the clause which stated that gold, silver, and ox horns were required as gift items.<sup>377</sup> The Chosŏn court, at the beginning of their letter, reiterated the economic difficulties they were facing and complained that the requested volume of gifts had increased ten times.<sup>378</sup> However, Hong Taiji was unmoved, insisting that the Chosŏn court comprehensively follow the new regulation, retorting that the problem was merely that the Chosŏn court did not want to give gold and silver as opposed to an actual physical lack. Gold and silver, as the main money substance, were important to the Jin, and as such Hong Taiji was unwilling to negotiate. Hong Taiji was certain that the Chosŏn court possessed gold and silver through their trading with the Ming.<sup>379</sup> Faced with the Jin's dominating pressure, King Injo accused Hong Taiji of deliberately attempting to undermine the Chosŏn state, boldly declaring that the Jin had no power to force Korea to follow the gift regulations.<sup>380</sup> Hong Taiji was predictably angered by this response, and so negotiations continued.<sup>381</sup>

In the sixth lunar month of 1633, terms were finally agreed. Hong Taiji compromised by stating that the Chosŏn court did not have to give gold, silver, and ox

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<sup>376</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:665; *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo10.12.24.

<sup>377</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.1.9.

<sup>378</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.1.9.

<sup>379</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.1.15; *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian* 清初內國史院滿文檔案譯編, vol. 1 (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1989), 3.

<sup>380</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.2.22.

<sup>381</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.2.24.

horns, but the volume of the remaining gifts was to remain unchanged, rather than being 10% lower as the Chosŏn court had requested in effect.<sup>382</sup> The 1633 gift regulation had secured resource supplies for the Jin.

However, both the 1632 and 1633 these new gift regulations brought about economic tension. The Chosŏn court began to present low quantity and quality of the gifts, aggravating the Jin and causing the deterioration of relations.<sup>383</sup> The Jin refused to accept several gifts and even expelled the Chosŏn envoy for a third time, complaining that the amount of the gifts presented was less than those given to the Ming court.<sup>384</sup> In early 1633, Hong Taiji sent a letter condemning the Chosŏn gifts' decline in both volume and quality. He also warned that envoy communication between the two states would be prohibited if the Chosŏn court did not restore the quality and quantity of gifts.<sup>385</sup> In response to Hong Taiji's statement, King Injo explained that natural disasters had caused the declines in gifts, and begged for his understanding.<sup>386</sup> Hong Taiji's reply merely demanded the Chosŏn court to make up for the gap gifts received, which they did by the spring of 1636.<sup>387</sup>

By examining this historical account, it appears that the reason behind economic tensions between the Chosŏn and the Jin courts during the 1630s was the increasing

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<sup>382</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:21.

<sup>383</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.1.15,TC7.6.5; *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo10.12.24.

<sup>384</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo10.12.24.

<sup>385</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.1.15.

<sup>386</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.1.9.

<sup>387</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:207. *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:689–90.

volume of gifts demanded by the Jin. It appears that the volume of gifts the Jin requested was so significant that the Chosŏn court was unable to afford it, particularly in light of the fact that the Chosŏn court also needed to pay tribute to the Ming simultaneously. However, the volume is clearly not the fundamental reason for tensions, as the gift quantity the Chosŏn court gave to Mao Wenlong, the Ming general at Ka-Do Island, far exceeded the quantity the Jin demanded. Even though the quantity requested by the Jin was large, it seems unlikely that the Chosŏn court could not afford to meet it. The most convincing reason for delays in the gift system is that Chosŏn did it intentionally. The Chosŏn court despised the Jin and valued the Ming, depending on Mao Wenlong's troops if they were ever to defeat the Jin in future.

#### ***The Frontier Market Trade at Zhongjiang, 1628-44***

This section mainly argues that from 1628 to 1636, the Chosŏn court dominated the Zhongjiang frontier market trade, as the Chosŏn court possessed all the resources the Jin desperately needed and Zhongjiang was the only channel from which the Jin could obtain these resources. The Zhongjiang frontier market, established in 1628, was the main market along the Yalu River over the course of the Qing dynasty. Under the Ming, it enabled China to trade with the Chosŏn state during the East Asian War from 1592 to 1598. After 1628, the Zhongjiang frontier market became the site for trade between the Jin and the Chosŏn states. Research on the Zhongjiang frontier market trade has

received more attention in Chinese academia.<sup>388</sup> Yet, despite this scholarship, how the Jin benefitted from the Zhongjiang frontier market before 1644 remains unclear. Wang Zhen argues that the Zhongjiang frontier market did not work smoothly due to trade mishaps caused by the Jin, such as the trading of bad quality products.<sup>389</sup> However, this section shows that the trade conflicts were caused by both sides, rather than just one.

The establishment of the frontier market trade was full of twists and turns. Seven months after ending the war in 1628, the Jin proposed to establish the frontier market trade with the Chosŏn state.<sup>390</sup> However, it appears that the Chosŏn court tried to delay the process. For example, the Chosŏn court sent only a few merchants for the opening of the market, even though the Jin urged the Chosŏn side to start trading.<sup>391</sup> It seems that the Chosŏn court intended to resist the market opening quietly, as after the invasion, they had little bargaining power to outwardly refuse. King Injo had to delicately balance the demands of foreign powers, as sending large numbers of merchants to the Zhongjiang market would decrease the number of the merchants able to trade at Bushan, which would inevitably upset the Japanese.<sup>392</sup> The more pressing underlying reason for limiting the number of merchants at Zhongjiang was pressure from Mao Wenlong

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<sup>388</sup> Zhang Cunwu, *Qinghan congfan maoyi, 1637-1894*, chap. 3; Duan Guangda 段光達, 'Dongbeiyi diqu geguo jian jindai maoyi guanxi de xingcheng jiqi tedian 東北亞地區各國間近代貿易關係的形成及其特點', *Shixue jikan*, no. 2 (2001): 54–60; Li Zongxun 李宗勛 and Chen Fang 陳放, 'Lüelun chaoxian yu qingchao maoyi de xingtai he yiyi 略論朝鮮與清朝貿易的形態和意義', *Dongbei shida xuebao (Zhaxue shehui kexue ban)* 228, no. 4 (33-7): 2007.

<sup>389</sup> Wang Zhen, *Chaoxian qianqi yu ming jianzhou nüzhèn guanxi yanjiu*, 251.

<sup>390</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.8.15.

<sup>391</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo5.10.28.

<sup>392</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo5.11.2.

on behalf of the Ming. Following the invasion of 1627, Mao Wenlong advised the Chosŏn court to pretend to agree to the open market so as to avoid another invasion by the Jin and allow time for Ming forces to come to the Chosŏn's aid. He also proposed that the Chosŏn side send a limited number of merchants to the newly established market.<sup>393</sup> In the face of Chosŏn delays, the Jin repeatedly urged the Chosŏn side to open the market.<sup>394</sup> After a month, on the ninth day of the twelfth lunar month of 1627, Hong Taiji wrote to the Chosŏn court restating the Jin's request to establish trade relations between the two states.<sup>395</sup>

Trade for grain, one of the most critical resources the Jin required, finally enabled trading at Zhongjiang to begin. Hong Taiji proposed Chosŏn grain to be transported to the Jin via the Yalu River or the sea.<sup>396</sup> This showed the urgency with which the Jin required the frontier trade to access grain.<sup>397</sup> The Jin's relentless requests for grain finally made the Chosŏn court agree to open trade links, which started in early 1628 when the Chosŏn court agreed to trade rice.<sup>398</sup> The Jin initially demanded an upfront rice trade of one-year's quota. However, the Chosŏn side warned that trading volumes of rice would be limited as Korea was suffering a grain shortage due to a lack of arable land as well as excessive spring rain and extensive summer drought.<sup>399</sup> Ultimately, the

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<sup>393</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo5.11.8.

<sup>394</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo5.11.9.

<sup>395</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:477.

<sup>396</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:477.

<sup>397</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.12.22.

<sup>398</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.1.4.

<sup>399</sup> *Chosŏn Wangjo Shillok*, Injo:Injo6.1.4.

Chosŏn side traded 3,000 *dan* of rice to the Jin so as to alleviate their domestic grain crisis, with 1,000 *dan* used for trading, and another 2,000 *dan* given as a gift.<sup>400</sup> In this way, the Jin and the Chosŏn courts established the Zhongjiang frontier market trade through the grain trade.

The Zhongjiang frontier market, as the official trading market between the Jin and Chosŏn states, bought a large number of products to the Jin and facilitated the flow of commodities and silver among Jin, Chosŏn, Ming, and Japanese. While scholarship on the market is unanimous on this aspect, there are two other details of the frontier market that require exploration. First, the exact geographic location of the market is debated among scholars. By examining primary sources, it is difficult to confirm where the market was. In *The Annals of Chosŏn Dynasty*, Ŭiju and Zhongjiang are used interchangeably to indicate the site of the marketplace. *The Old Manchu Archives* frequently indicates the frontier market was at Ŭiju.<sup>401</sup> In contrast, *The Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty* states that the market was at Zhongjiang.<sup>402</sup> This thesis argues that the market was most likely at Zhongjiang rather than Ŭiju as the frontier markets between two states were commonly established along borders as opposed to within state territory, which Ŭiju was.<sup>403</sup> In contrast, Zhongjiang was a tiny alluvial island in the Yalu River, just across from Ŭiju. Therefore, it is likely the Jin trade

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<sup>400</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC2.1.28, TC2.2.2.

<sup>401</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:481.

<sup>402</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC2.3.8.

<sup>403</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:480.

missions asked Chosŏn officials at Ŭiju to come to Zhongjiang for trading.<sup>404</sup> In regards to the sources, Zhongjiang and Ŭiju were probably used interchangeably as Zhongjiang was under the administrative control of the Ŭiju authorities, resulting in Ŭiju being used to indicate Zhongjiang in the Jin archival documents.<sup>405</sup> However, it is worth noting that Ŭiju was an alternative trade market during non-trading seasons, especially when the Jin were in such urgent need of products that they journeyed across the Chosŏn border to Ŭiju.<sup>406</sup>

Second, the Zhongjiang frontier market was established in 1628 not 1646 as is often stated in contemporary scholarship. Zhang Cunwu argues that trade between the two states begun in 1646, stating that there is no evidence in either the Chinese or Korean written sources to show that Zhongjiang or Ŭiju was a trading site during the Chongde reign (excluding a brief mention in *The Draft History of Qing*).<sup>407</sup> However, based on *The Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty*, as early as 1628 both states were trading at Zhongjiang.<sup>408</sup> Wang Zhen also shows that 1628 can be considered the starting point of the trade relations between the two states as the Chosŏn side traded rice with the Jin at Zhongjiang in this year.<sup>409</sup> Therefore, on the fourth day of the second lunar month of 1628, Zhongjiang became the site for Jin- Chosŏn trade relations.<sup>410</sup>

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<sup>404</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo12.8.16.

<sup>405</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo28.5.11.

<sup>406</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo7.2.16.

<sup>407</sup> Zhang Cunwu, *Qinghan congfan maoyi, 1637-1894*, 169.

<sup>408</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.2.4.

<sup>409</sup> Wang Zhen, *Chaoxian qianqi yu ming jianzhou nüzhèn guanxi yanjiu*, 249–50.

<sup>410</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.2.4.

The Zhongjiang frontier market was an ideal place for trading and by 1628, had been used as a trading site for decades. It was built in late 1593, functioning as a trading site for rice and other military supplies between Ming China and Chosŏn Korea during the Japanese invasion of Korea (1592-98).<sup>411</sup> With the arrival of the Chinese merchants and Ming border officials, it gradually became the centre for the wild ginseng and gunpowder trade between the Ming and Chosŏn.<sup>412</sup> It was also the circulation hub of silver flowing from Chosŏn to Ming. In 1609, the Zhongjiang frontier market closed, marking the end of trade between the two states at Zhongjiang. As discussed above, the Zhongjiang frontier market was re-opened after the Jin invasion of Chosŏn Korea in 1627, becoming the trading centre for fabrics, wild ginseng, and silver between the Jin state, Ming China, Chosŏn Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia.

However, constant conflicts between Hong Taiji and the Chosŏn court plagued the frontier market trade. On the surface, the Jin appeared to be the controllers of the trade, as the Jin had been the ones to coerce the Chosŏn court into trade relations so as to get access Chosŏn resources. However, in reality the Chosŏn court held power, as they were the sole providers of resources that the Jin desperately required. The Chosŏn court was aware of this power, both passively resisting trade relations and aggressively demanding better terms, causing constant tension.

Low frequency of trade was another reason for trade conflicts. The Zhongjiang

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<sup>411</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Sŏnjo:Sŏnjo26.12.3.

<sup>412</sup> Yun Tusu, *Oŭm yugo*, juan 3: lun jinzhan yuliang zhazi 論進戰運糧筭子.

frontier market trade frequency was negotiated and agreed to be bi-annual, i.e. during spring and autumn.<sup>413</sup> However, the biannual trade frequency was far from enough for the Jin who was in need of resources urgently, as suggested by the fact that the Jin raised the trade frequency to three times a year, i.e. during spring, summer, and autumn.<sup>414</sup> The Jin further proposed to increase the trade frequency to four times a year due to a severe demand for resources, which the Chosŏn court rejected.<sup>415</sup>

According to the existing, albeit limited, documentation from this time, there were eleven trade records between both parties, including debates over trade disputes.<sup>416</sup> This shows that the trade frequency of the Zhongjiang frontier market was largely kept to twice a year.<sup>417</sup> However, it is evident the Jin was displeased with this, even accusing the Chosŏn side of participating in the Zhongjiang frontier market only twice between 1628 and 1633.<sup>418</sup>

Additionally, the indifferent attitude of the Chosŏn court made trade relations continuously sour. For example, the Jin sent over 1,300 people to Zhongjiang for trading, while the Chosŏn side sent less than 30 people. More seriously, the cattle that the Jin needed urgently were not brought to market.<sup>419</sup> Faced with embittered

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<sup>413</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.9.14.

<sup>414</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.2.28.

<sup>415</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.9.14.

<sup>416</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.2.4, Injo6.2.28, Injo7.2.16, Injo9.5.10, Injo12.8.16; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC4.3.23, TC4.5.16, TC6.1.3, TC7.6.5, TC7.8.1, TC7.8.1, TC7.10.26, TC8.3.2, TC8.3.18, TC8.4.27, TC8.10.29, TC9.5.26, TC9.6.30.

<sup>417</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.9.14.

<sup>418</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.11.16, TC7.9.14.

<sup>419</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.3.3, Injo6.2.28.

accusations from Jin, the Chosŏn court insisted that the responsibility lay with the Jin merchants for not arriving on time.<sup>420</sup> The Chosŏn court also resented the provisions needed to accommodate the Jin merchants and their horses, which were viewed as an economic burden.<sup>421</sup>

The Chosŏn court also brought insufficient amounts of products that the Jin needed. The main products the Jin required were paper, pepper, redwood bark, fabrics, cattle, wine, and grain.<sup>422</sup> The Chosŏn court was aware of these needs and consistently limited the amount traded at Zhongjiang. The Chosŏn's claimed their lack of supply was due to the Ming blocking supply routes to Zhongjiang.<sup>423</sup> By 1633, the Chosŏn court explicitly expressed their lack of interest in trading with the Jin at Zhongjiang, blaming the distant location and their lack of domestic supplies.<sup>424</sup> It is evident that the Chosŏn side was reluctant to participate in the Zhongjiang frontier market trade.

Trade disputes were a common occurrence at the Zhongjiang frontier market. This was typically expressed through the trade in fabrics. Fabrics were one of the main commodities exchanged at the Zhongjiang frontier market, as the economic crisis of the Jin state had resulted in severe fabric shortages, particularly in relation to luxury fabrics such as *maoqing* and silk.<sup>425</sup> The Jin state traded wild ginseng and other products with

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<sup>420</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.3.3.

<sup>421</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.3.3, Injo6.2.28.

<sup>422</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.2.4, Injo12.8.16.

<sup>423</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo5.12.22; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC8.10.29.

<sup>424</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC2.8.27, TC8.3.2.

<sup>425</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC4.5.16, TC6.1.3.

the Chosŏn state in exchange of fabrics in an attempt to ease this shortage.<sup>426</sup> However, trade frictions frequently occurred between both sides, with the Jin criticising the quality and quantity of the fabrics that the Chosŏn side brought to market.<sup>427</sup> For example, in early 1633, the Jin court accused Chosŏn state of selling fabrics of poor quality, even returning the purchased cloth to Chosŏn.<sup>428</sup> In the sixth lunar month of the same year, the Jin state made another complaint to the Chosŏn state, declaring that in addition to the poor fabric quality, the Chosŏn court had cut corners in fabric production. Measurements of fabric were accused of being inaccurate, with a two *zhang* of silk being less than two *zhang*.<sup>429</sup>

The Chosŏn state had in fact prohibited the trade of the high-quality commodities with the Jin state.<sup>430</sup> Tensions further rose when the Jin state and the Chosŏn court blamed each other for pricing goods at unreasonable levels and accused the other of unfair trading. For example, the Jin state stated the Chosŏn court had sold two *zhang* of silk for four *taels* of silver, and one *zhang* of cloth for two *taels* of silver, blaming Chosŏn for the Jin state's continued fabric shortages.<sup>431</sup>

Hong Taiji responded to these trade disputes by reminding Chosŏn of their trade agreement, threatening that if Chosŏn did not abide by it, the Jin would implement

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<sup>426</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.2.4.

<sup>427</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.6.5, TC7.8.1.

<sup>428</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.1.15.

<sup>429</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:21. The linear measure word, 1 *zhang* (Ch.丈) is equivalent to 3.581 metres.

<sup>430</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:207.

<sup>431</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.6.6.

sanctions.<sup>432</sup> However, the Chosŏn court insisted that such shortages were due to the individual behaviours of merchants and so irrelevant to the Chosŏn court.<sup>433</sup>

Despite these disputes, it is evident that the trade was important to both sides as it continued throughout the Chongde reign. Additionally, the wild ginseng trade continued to grow, revealing the Chosŏn's high demand for wild ginseng, with greater and greater amounts crossing the border into Chosŏn Korea.<sup>434</sup> While trade relations between the two sides at Zhongjiang were full of tensions, the Zhongjiang frontier market trade remained the primary means by which Hong Taiji accumulated grains and fabrics, easing the economic crisis that had engulfed his state. Though it initially appears as if the Jin coerced the reluctant Chosŏn into an unequal trading relationship, in reality the Chosŏn side greatly benefitted from the Zhongjiang frontier market trade as well. Through the frontier market trade, Chosŏn merchants became intermediaries, trading items between the Jin and Ming at Ka-Do Island, a position which wielded significant amounts of power.

### ***Ka-Do Island: The Secondary Trade, 1629-37***

With the Zhongjiang frontier market as the primary trading site between Chosŏn and the Jin, Ka-Do Island acted as a secondary and alternative market for Hong Taiji to trade wild ginseng in exchange for Chosŏn resources. However, as mentioned above,

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<sup>432</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.9.14.

<sup>433</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC8.4.27.

<sup>434</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:CD1.9.7, CD7.6.6; *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo14.9.10.

Ka-Do Island was originally used by the Ming as a site from which to attack Hong Taiji due to its strategic geographic location. It was also utilised as a trade link between the Ming and Chosŏn states. Liu Siqi examines trade activities during Mao Wenlong's governance of Ka-Do Island, arguing that Mao Wenlong delivered vital supplies to Korea during the East Asian War (1592-98). This developed Ka-Do Island over time into a trade centre.<sup>435</sup> After the death of Mao Wenlong, trade activities between Hong Taiji and Liu Xingzhi (Ch. 劉興治), the new leader of Ka-Do Island, are unclear. Li Xinghua briefly mentions that Hong Taiji received resources from the Ming at Ka-Do Island.<sup>436</sup> This section will examine the trade relations at Ka-Do Island, arguing that Hong Taiji not only aimed to assuage the Island's military threat, but also aspired to develop Ka-Do Island into a secondary trading site. This section argues that Ka-Do Island functioned as an important transit point linking states of the Jin, Ming, and Chosŏn for a short period. However, it is important to note that the Zhongjiang frontier market remained the main channel Hong Taiji used to acquire resources from the Chosŏn state.

Ka-Do Island's role of linking trade between the Jin, Ming and Chosŏn states enabled Mao Wenlong to obtain a monopoly over trade. As mentioned in previous chapters, all frontier market trade was terminated between Nurhaci and the Ming court in 1622, meaning Jin products, such as wild ginseng and sable fur, could not be traded

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<sup>435</sup> Liu Siqi 劉巳齊, 'Mingmo pidao maoyi huodong chutan 明末皮島貿易活動初探', *Xue lilun* 8 (2016): 162–65.

<sup>436</sup> Li Xinghua, 'Qing ruguan qian shangye maoyi', 17–18.

with the Ming directly. However, Ka-Do Island remained open for trade, providing an indirect trading link between the Ming and Jin. This allowed Mao Wenlong to monopolise the trade in wild ginseng, especially as internal demand for wild ginseng in Ming China was constantly increasing. As Ka-Do Island had close contacts with the Ming, Chinese products flowed from Dengzhou to Ka-Do Island via existing maritime routes, with wild ginseng and sable fur, together with rice and fabrics, the main commodities traded.<sup>437</sup> Under the leadership of Mao Wenlong, Ka-Do Island became the transit point of wild ginseng and sable fur, which flowed from the Jin state to Dengzhou and then continued on to Ming China.<sup>438</sup>

However, the inflow of wild ginseng at Ka-Do Island did not indicate that Mao Wenlong and the Jin had established direct trade relations, despite the fact that they attempted to negotiate the trade possibilities as early as 1628. The Zhongjiang frontier market remained the main channel through which wild ginseng and sable fur flowed from the Jin state to Ka-Do Island via Chosŏn.

Today through the opening of the market at Zhongjiang, ..... [tradesmen] left for the market with the aim of gathering paper, pepper, redwood bark, black cloth in exchange for silver. On the way back, [tradesmen] turned to Xiadao [Ka-Do Island] to exchange black cloth.

今此中江開市, ... 齋紙地、胡椒、丹木、青布等物, 前往開市處, 換買銀兩, 回還之

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<sup>437</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo7.8.9.

<sup>438</sup> *Chongzhen changbian* 崇禎長編, n.d., CZ5.1.3.

時，轉入椴島，抵換青布。<sup>439</sup>

The text above details the trade process of Chosŏn merchants. They obtained wild ginseng and silver from the Zhongjiang frontier market and sold them on Ka-Do Island in exchange for fabrics from the Ming state. This indicates that the establishment of the Zhongjiang frontier market not only benefitted Hong Taiji, but also benefitted the Chosŏn side. Ka-Do Island enabled the Chosŏn court to exchange commodities and silver that they had obtained from the Jin with the Ming, allowing the trade on Ka-Do Island to prosper.<sup>440</sup> Mao Wenlong thus was able to attract not only Chosŏn merchants to the market but also Ming traders, further fuelling trade.<sup>441</sup> Mao Wenlong had successfully built trading links among the Chosŏn, Jin, and Ming states, making the circulation of commodities such as wild ginseng and fabrics possible.

The death of Mao Wenlong in 1629 gave Hong Taiji the opportunity he needed to establish direct trade relations with the new leader of Ka-Do Island. The establishment of such trade relations depended upon two brothers, Liu Xingzhi and Liu Xingzuo, who had a complex relationship with the Jin elite. Liu Xingzhi, the younger brother, had served the Jin court as a general, representing the Jin during tribute trade negotiations with the Chosŏn state in 1627, as detailed above.<sup>442</sup> However, Liu Xingzuo later fled

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<sup>439</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.2.4.

<sup>440</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.12.21, Injo6.2.4.

<sup>441</sup> Zhang Cunwu 張存武, 'Qing ruguan qian yu chaoxian de maoyi 清入關前與朝鮮的貿易, 1627-1636', *Tongbanghakchi* 21 (1979): 187–93.

<sup>442</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:463.

to Ka-Do Island, surrendering to the Ming, and was eventually killed by Jin troops.<sup>443</sup>

Liu Xingzuo's defection to the Ming was partly caused by his marginalisation among the Jurchen elite due to his Chinese ethnicity. Hong Taiji also documented that Daišan, senior *beile* of the Jin court (*beile* means 'lord' in Manchu), mistreated Liu Xingzuo by taking his horse and personal belongings multiple times.<sup>444</sup>

The older brother, Liu Xingzhi took over as administrator of Ka-Do Island following Mao Wenlong's death, an act that, outwardly at least, aligned him with the Ming. In order to assuage the military threat posed by Ka-Do Island, Hong Taiji wrote Liu Xingzhi in an attempt to persuade him to surrender.<sup>445</sup> In return, Liu Xingzhi sent two envoys to Hong Taiji.<sup>446</sup> The Liu brothers ultimately pledged that Ka-Do Island would remain neutral should there be a war between the Ming and the Jin.<sup>447</sup> Liu Xingzhi even hinted that he was considering submission to the Jin court, decreasing Ka-do Island's military threat to the Jin state.

A secret trade alliance was hatched between Hong Taiji and Liu Xingzhi between 1630 and 1631.<sup>448</sup> Hong Taiji attached great importance to this trade alliance with Liu Xingzhi, as evidenced by the generous gifts given to Liu Xingzhi and his wife,

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<sup>443</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:6–7.

<sup>444</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:198.

<sup>445</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:531,539,544-5.

<sup>446</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:553–54. In Manchu archives, Liu Xingzuo was called Liu Wuge 刘五哥. But Zheng Tianting argues that Liu Wuge is a young male of the Liu family not referring to Liu Xingzhi. See Zheng Tianting 郑天挺, 'Manzu de tongyi 满族的统一', *Nankai xuebao zhexue shehui kexueban* 5 (1982): 8.

<sup>447</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:553.

<sup>448</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:554.

including sable fur clothing, horses, and jewellery, among other luxuries.<sup>449</sup> In return, Liu Xingzhi sent envoys to bring gifts to the Jin, all of which were much needed by the Jin state. The gifts included 44 *pi* of satin, ten *jin* of mercury, ten *taels* of pure gold, and two *jin* of sodium borate. The gift of sodium borate and mercury reveal the importance of medicine to the Jin court, as both mercury and sodium borate were used for sterilising wounds.<sup>450</sup> Moreover, Hong Taiji expressed his willingness to establish direct trade networks with Liu Xingzhi as opposed to trading via the frontier market.<sup>451</sup> Through this direct trade link, the Jin gained access to silk, gold, silver, ox horns, and tea in exchange for wild ginseng and various kinds of fur.<sup>452</sup>

A central aspect of this direct trade link was the fact that it was secret.<sup>453</sup> It was imperative to keep these trade links a secret as Ka-Do Island was under the official authority of the Chosŏn court, and through them the Ming. Consequently, Ka-Do Island received much-needed grain and weapons from both patron states, supply links that would have been cut off should either state learn of their dealings with the Jin. In early 1631, Liu Xingzhi sent his people to carry the goods on foot all the way to the Jin state. The goods included 118 *pi* of *maoqing* fabric, 40.5 *jin* of mercury, 2.5 *jin* of soldering paste, one *jin* of redwood bark, 180 smoking pipes, and 48,000 needles. The Jin paid

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<sup>449</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:553–55.

<sup>450</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:555. Li Shizhen, *Bencao gangmu*, vol. jinshi er: dansha, shuiyin.

<sup>451</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:556.

<sup>452</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:556.

<sup>453</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:556.

146 *taels* of silver for all the items.<sup>454</sup> The large amount of silver the Jin paid to purchase the relatively small amount of resources from Liu Xingzhi displays the extent to which the Jin needed the goods. The secret trade between the Jin and Liu Xingzhi lasted for almost a year, until Liu Xingzhi was suddenly murdered.<sup>455</sup>

The death of Liu Xingzhi once again elevated the military threat posed by Ka-Do Island. In the aftermath of his death, in the sixth lunar month of 1631, Hong Taiji dispatched troops to seize Ka-Do Island.<sup>456</sup> However, as the Jin militarily primarily consisted of cavalry, they lacked enough battleships to take the island. Foot soldiers were marched to the coast of Chosŏn Korea, with Hong Taiji sending envoys to the Chosŏn court requesting battleships. However, the Chosŏn side denied the Jin's request.<sup>457</sup> At the same time, the Ming court dispatched troops to protect Ka-Do Island, defeating Jin troops by employing European-designed cannon, maintaining Ka-Do Island as a military threat and leaving the Jin vulnerable.

This vulnerability was immediately noticed by the Chosŏn court, who acted upon it through the wild ginseng trade. The price of wild ginseng was mutually agreed to be sixteen *taels* of silver per *jin*.<sup>458</sup> In mid-1633, when the Jin court sent people to trade at Anju (Ko. 안주 Ch. *anzhou* 安州), the price of wild ginseng was reduced to nine *taels*

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<sup>454</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:565.

<sup>455</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo9.6.28.

<sup>456</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo9.6.28.

<sup>457</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo9.6.28; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC5.5.28.

<sup>458</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC9.12.20, TC7.9.14.

of silver per *jin*, leading to the Jin to refuse to trade their wild ginseng.<sup>459</sup> In response, the Chosŏn side crossed the border into Jin territory to collect wild ginseng themselves.<sup>460</sup> The Jin were enraged and forbade the Chosŏn side to pick wild ginseng so as to protect their monopoly of the wild ginseng trade and their trading profits. One month later, King Injo sent a letter to Hong Taiji, politely explaining that the reason for the lower price of wild ginseng was due to natural fluctuations, adamantly assuring Hong Taiji that the Chosŏn side were not intentionally forcing the price down.<sup>461</sup> The price of wild ginseng was not resolved until late 1635.

The Chosŏn court were able to avoid higher prices as after Liu Xingzhi died in 1631, Ka-Do Island regained its status as a trading centre between the Ming and Chosŏn. This made the Chosŏn side the sole purchaser of Jin wild ginseng, re-selling it to the Ming at Ka-Do Island. The price of the wild ginseng rose from nine *taels* of silver per *jin* upon purchase from the Jin to twenty *taels* of silver per *jin* upon resale to the Ming.<sup>462</sup> This further enraged Hong Taiji, elevating tensions. The Chosŏn court had taken advantage of the geographic position of Ka-Do Island as the trading centre with the Ming, dominating the wild ginseng trade. Additionally, the Chosŏn court ensured that no Chinese products flowed into Ka-Do Island, cutting the Jin off from silk and other Ming manufactured fabrics. In response, Hong Taiji dispatched troops in an

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<sup>459</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.8.1.

<sup>460</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.9.14.

<sup>461</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC7.10.26.

<sup>462</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC9.12.20.

attempt to capture Ka-Do Island in 1637, but it once again failed.

Liu Xingzhi' death had significant impacts on the Jin economy, as it marked the end of trade relations between the Jin and Ka-Do Island, cutting the Jin off from important resources. Though the trade period had been short, Hong Taiji had received vital resources from Ka-Do Island, with the Island acting as a secondary market to guarantee supply. Following the termination of trade links with Ka-Do Island, Hong Taiji was determined to re-establish them. Resources were particularly important during 1636 and 1637, when the Jin state was entangled in wars with the Mongols. Faced with continuous sabotage and reluctant trade from the Chosŏn court, Hong Taiji invaded Korea again in 1637.

### **The Second Invasion of Chosŏn Korea, 1637**

As early as 1630, tribute relations between the Qing (as of 1636) and Chosŏn had become strained.<sup>463</sup> However, the ultimate transition from relations of equality to relations of monarch-subject did not occur until 1637, when Hong Taiji launched his second invasion of Chosŏn Korea. Wang Zhen explores the effects of the second Qing invasion, arguing that the war marked the establishment of monarch-subject relations, meaning that the Chosŏn court ended tribute relations with the Ming.<sup>464</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> Andre Schmid, 'Tributary Relations and the Qing-Chosŏn Frontier on Mount Paektu', in *The Chinese State at the Borders*, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 126–50.

<sup>464</sup> Wang Zhen 王臻, 'Bingzi zhiyi ji zhanhou qingxian jiaoshe de jige wenti 丙子之役及戰後清鮮交涉的幾個問題', in *Hanguo yanjiu luncong*, vol. 21 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2009), 373.

The result of this new monarch-subject relationship is that it allowed the Qing to accumulate vast amounts of resources for further empire expansion. This monarch-subject relationship was visibly expressed through the establishment of the tribute trade. The frequency of the tribute trade not only served to display the new form of relations between the two states, but also provided more resources for the Qing. Rice became a new product in the tribute trade, an important commodity as a food crisis was still plaguing the Qing state.

Even with the introduction of the tribute trade, the frontier market trade continued to provide a significant number of resources to the Qing state. The Hoeryŏng frontier market became another major market along the Tumen River, indicating the Qing court had monopolised all the frontier markets along both the Yalu River and the Tumen River.

Moreover, the new monarch-subject relationship with the Chosŏn court assisted the development of direct trade relations with Japan, something Hong Taiji valued greatly as he was able to gain access to Japanese medicine and weapons. Through relations with Chosŏn, the Qing court was able to participate in vital trading networks with neighbouring states, gaining access to coveted resources. Therefore, this section shows that as a result of the second invasion, the Chosŏn court continued to act as a resource “provider” and transit point for the Qing.

Previous sections have explored the impact of trade disputes in the lead-up to the second Qing invasion of Korea in 1637. However, though these disputes played an important role, at its foundation the second invasion was an ideological battle for

superiority. The Chosŏn court was reluctant to trade with the Qing because they viewed the Qing as barbarians. In contrast, the Chosŏn court hoped to align themselves with the Ming, the advanced civilisation of China. The second invasion shows that the Qing had proved its military capability and political legitimacy.

The Qing were evidently stronger in terms of military capability. On the eastern front, the Qing court had mostly eased the threat from Ka-Do Island by invading and taking control of the territory. On the western front, Hong Taiji had triumphed over the Čaqar Mongols, meaning the Qing had incorporated the Mongol tribes into their army, increasing their military strength further.

This strong military position was heightened when Hong Taiji received the statue of Mahākāla and Imperial Jade Seal from the Mongols, both of which held great meaning within Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetan Buddhism was important to the Qing, as it augmented their military power with a form of ideological legitimacy.<sup>465</sup> Mahākāla is a protector in Buddhism. The statue of Mahākāla was created by Drogön Chögyal Phagpa (Mon., Ch. *basiba* 八思巴) during Kublai Khan's reign (r.1260-1294). The statue was originally enshrined in Mount Wutai but was later moved to the Mongol steppe by the Čaqar Mongols.<sup>466</sup> By possessing the statue of Mahākāla, Hong Taiji's religious orthodoxy was recognised. The Imperial Jade Seal of the Mongols was another important item that the Khan of the Čaqar Mongols, Ligden Khan, possessed. Following

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<sup>465</sup> Johan Elverskog, *Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 93.

<sup>466</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:126–27.

Hong Taiji's conquest of the Čaqar Mongols in late 1635, he obtained the Imperial Seal, which was heralded as a sign that the Heavens blessed the Qing as rulers of all the Mongol tribes. The two items, the statue of Mahākāla and Imperial Jade Seal, were critical indicators of political legitimacy.<sup>467</sup> With these two items in his possession, Hong Taiji felt empowered to found the Qing empire and proclaim himself emperor.

The Chosŏn court, which was loyal to the Ming, refused to accept Hong Taiji as emperor, also refusing to submit the Chosŏn state as a tributary state of the Qing. In late 1635, Hong Taiji proclaimed himself emperor, dispatching envoys to the Chosŏn court informing them of his new title.<sup>468</sup> When the envoys arrived, the Chosŏn court was full of indignation. Hong Ik-han (Ko. 홍익한, Ch. *hong yihan* 洪翼漢), literati to the Chosŏn court, describes the Chosŏn state as a mini Chinese state (Ch. *xiao zhonghua* 小中華) with complete loyalty to the Ming. If the Chosŏn court were to serve the “barbarians” (i.e. the Qing court), it would shame the Korean ancestors, people, and descendants. The request represents an altering in the relationship between the Qing and the Chosŏn court from one of equals to one of monarch-subject. In response, King Injo recruited voluntary soldiers in an attempt to resist the Qing state, refusing to meet with the Qing envoys.<sup>469</sup> The Ming court praised King Injo for his loyalty to the Ming and hatred for the Qing.<sup>470</sup> The Chosŏn court thus prepared for a second Qing invasion. In late 1636,

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<sup>467</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:183,218.

<sup>468</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:224.

<sup>469</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo14.3.1.

<sup>470</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo14.9.1.

Hong Taiji dispatched troops to Chosŏn Korea.<sup>471</sup>

### ***The Agreement of Namhansansŏng***

The invasion was rapid, with the Qing forces swiftly taking large areas of land. King Injo fled to Namhansansŏng with Hong Taiji following close behind. Upon arrival, Hong Taiji sent a letter to King Injo, questioning why the Chosŏn court had submitted to Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties but repelled the Qing.<sup>472</sup> With few other options, the Chosŏn court replied to the letter, recognising Hong Taiji as emperor.<sup>473</sup> However, King Injo refused to leave the city to yield in person, indicating that the Chosŏn still viewed the Qing as “barbarians” and the Chosŏn submission was a form of humiliation.<sup>474</sup> In response, Qing troops marched to Kanghwa Island where the King’s wife and son were hidden, using them as leverage to force King Injo to surrender and concede defeat.<sup>475</sup> Qing troops also plundered the island, taking 13,000 *pi* of silk and cloth, 24,480 *taels* of silver, all kinds of fur clothing, and jewellery.<sup>476</sup> Following this defeat, Hong Taiji proposed peace terms in the Agreement of Namhansansŏng.

The Agreement of Namhansansŏng included several important clauses. One of its demands was for the eldest son to King Injo, Yi Wang (Ko. 이왕, Ch. *li wang* 李滢), to

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<sup>471</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:797–99.

<sup>472</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang’an yibian*, 1:226–27.

<sup>473</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang’an yibian*, 1:229–30,235.

<sup>474</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang’an yibian*, 1:236–37.

<sup>475</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang’an yibian*, 1:237–8,240–1.

<sup>476</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang’an yibian*, 1:239–40.

be held as a hostage by the Qing. The fact that the Chosŏn court had no choice but to send their heir to the Qing shows the extent to which the monarch-subject relationship had taken hold. From 1637 to 1645, Yi Wang was detained by the Qing. King Injo sent multiple requests to the Qing court, begging them to allow Yi Wang to return to Chosŏn Korea to be with his family. The Qing finally allowed Yi Wang to return home in 1645, but only for a limited amount of time and only if his two younger brothers were sent to the Qing in his place.<sup>477</sup> Yi Wang returned to the Chosŏn state gravely ill and died shortly after his arrival.<sup>478</sup>

The Chosŏn court were further humiliated by the request to write the Samjŏndo bimun (Ko. 삼전도비문, Ch. *santiandu beiwen* 三田渡碑文) or Songdŏkpi (Ko. 송덕비, Ch. *songde bei* 頌德碑), which was a stone tablet documenting the achievements and virtues of Hong Taiji. In late 1638, the inscription text was drafted by Chosŏn officials Yi Kyŏngsŏk (Ko. 이경석, Ch. *li jingshi* 李景奭) and Chang Yu (Ko. 장유, Ch. *zhang wei* 張維) at the request of the Qing, and sent back to them for approval.<sup>479</sup> The inscription justified Hong Taiji's second invasion of the Chosŏn state, also stating that the end of the war was due to Hong Taiji's benevolence. The Qing made minor modifications to the drafted text, making the text less lexically sophisticated.<sup>480</sup> One

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<sup>477</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD5.6.23, CD5.11.21, CD5.12.13.

<sup>478</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo23.6.27.

<sup>479</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo15.11.25, Injo16.2.8.

<sup>480</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:488–50; *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo16.2.8.

year later, the Chosŏn court sent the finalised stone tablet to the Qing.<sup>481</sup> The Samjŏndo bimun is an explicit representation of Hong Taiji's desire and even determination to engrain his achievements within Chosŏn society, attempting to transform the Qing's image as "barbarians" into legitimate rulers.<sup>482</sup>

The Agreement of Namhansansŏng also incorporated important clauses on trade.

The five main aspects were:

1. The Chosŏn court had to recognise the Qing state as monarch, presenting gifts on the birthdays of emperors, empresses, princes, as well as on days of the winter solstice, New Year and other festivals.
2. If Hong Taiji were to invade the Ming, the Chosŏn court was expected to call their armies. If Hong Taiji were to invade Ka-Do Island, the Chosŏn court was expected to dispatch bowmen and fifty ships. When the Qing army returned in triumph, the Chosŏn court was to prepare gifts to welcome the Qing army.
3. The Chosŏn court had to return all Jurchen prisoners to the Qing, and was forbidden to trade with the Warka Jurchens.
4. Trade with Japan would remain unchanged. The Chosŏn court had to guide the Japanese envoys to the Qing.
5. The Chosŏn court had to present tribute annually.<sup>483</sup>

The Agreement's terms clearly display the centrality of trade for the Qing. The tribute trade replaced earlier versions of the gift system, with the gift-giving frequency

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<sup>481</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo17.7.28.

<sup>482</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:441.

<sup>483</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:241–42.

increasing from annually to biannually. Additionally, the Chosŏn court was now expected to present gifts on special occasions throughout the year. The Qing court also emphasised indirect trade relations with Japan via the Chosŏn state within the Agreement, as Japanese medicine and Japanese swords were critical commodities for the Qing court. The clause regarding the Warka Jurchens further shows the Qing's focus on creating a trade monopoly along the Tumen River.

As a result of this Agreement, Hoeryŏng, located along the Tumen River, was developed into another prominent frontier market. With the Chosŏn court now pledged to support the Qing militarily, Ka-Do Island was finally seized in early 1637, leaving the Ming's maritime defence vulnerable to the Qing. The second invasion not only created a new political environment within East Asia, but also enabled the Qing to dominate trade relations with Chosŏn.

### ***The Tribute Trade, 1637-44***

This section discusses the tribute trade from 1637 to 1644, which was controlled by the Qing state.<sup>484</sup> It focuses on the products that dominated the trade and the impact these products had on the Qing. In comparison to other trade networks between the Qing and Chosŏn, the tribute trade was more frequent and ceremonious. The Chosŏn court had to not only present tribute once a year but also was expected to present gifts on various special occasions. Additionally, greater amounts of resources were demanded by the

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<sup>484</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:245.

Qing as part of the tribute trade. Medicine and paper remained urgently required products for the Qing, with rice being introduced to ensure domestic food supplies within the Qing's growing empire. This section argues that the Chosŏn court provided a significant amount of resources to the Qing court through the tribute trade, which was essential in the Qing's process of empire building.

The Qing-determined trade process was for Chosŏn to enter Qing territory by crossing the Yalu River and entering Shenyang by way of Fenghuang city (Ch. *fenghuang cheng* 鳳凰城) and Dongjing (Ch. *dongjing* 東京), with pre-determined tribute stops along the way.<sup>485</sup> The tribute trade began in 1640, three years after the invasion in 1637. Hong Taiji allowed the Chosŏn court to not present tribute in 1638 and 1639 as way to display his benevolence. He also attempted to prove to Chosŏn that the Qing were not “barbarians” by decreasing the frequency of the tribute to only once a year.<sup>486</sup> Products for the tribute trade included:

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<sup>485</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD5.r1.2.

<sup>486</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:245–46; *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo 6.2.28.

Table 6 The Requested Items that the Chosŏn state should present to the Qing, 1637

Gold and Silver	100 <i>taels</i> of gold 黃金一百兩, 1,000 <i>taels</i> of silver 白銀一千兩
Fabrics	200 <i>pi</i> of Koryŏ grass cloth 高麗夏布二百匹, 2,000 <i>pi</i> of fine silk of various colours 各色綿綢二千匹, 400 <i>pi</i> of fine linen cloth of various colours 各色細麻布四百匹, 10,000 <i>pi</i> of fine cloth of various colors 各色細布一萬匹, 1,400 <i>pi</i> of pure colour cloth 素布一千四百匹
Fur	100 of leopard furs 豹皮一百張, 100 tanned deer hides 無毛熟鹿皮一百張, 400 otter furs 水獺皮四百張, 300 <i>lŭxie</i> furs 綠斜皮三百張
Medicine	200 <i>jin</i> of caesalpinia sappan 蘇木二百斤
Tea	1,000 bags of tea 茶一千包
Paper	1,000 quires of good large-size paper 好大紙一千刀, 1,500 quires of small-size paper 好小紙一千五百刀
Swords	26 good broadswords 好腰刀二十六口, twenty <i>shun</i> swords 順刀二十口
Rice	10,000 baskets of rice 米一萬簍
Others	200 pairs of ox horns 水牛角二百對, ten <i>dou</i> of black pepper 胡椒十鬥, four mats of a dragon with five-claws pattern 五爪龍蓆四領, 40 patterned mats of various colours 各色花蓆四十領

Source: *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:241–42.

As the table above shows, the products requested as part of the tribute trade were very similar to those sought through the gift system decades earlier, except for the newly added commodities of rice and deer hide. Though several items' quantities witnessed little change, cloth and tea requests saw significant increases. When comparing the table above with the previous gift system, it is evident that the demand for cloth and tea increased dramatically during Chongde reign, with caesalpinia sappan, ox horns for medicinal purposes, and broadswords remaining important to Qing society.

As with previous trade agreements, rice and grain remained at the centre of the Qing's focus. Even though there was no grain crisis at that time of the tribute trade's establishment, a general shortage of grain plagued the Qing court. Rice was an important resource for the Chosŏn state, as it was not only a source of food, but also a tax medium.<sup>487</sup> In late 1636, the Qing court ordered the cultivation of grain domestically to ease the shortages.<sup>488</sup> Unfortunately, the cold weather in the spring of 1637 caused low output, intensifying grain scarcity.<sup>489</sup> It is therefore not surprising that the Qing court requested 10,000 *dan* of rice annually from the Chosŏn court in the Agreement of Namhansansŏng, a tribute that was known as *sep'yemi* (Ko. 세폐미, Ch. *suibi mi* 歲幣米).<sup>490</sup> The extent to which the Qing required rice is explicitly displayed in the fact that though the tribute trade began in 1640, *sep'yemi* began in 1638.<sup>491</sup> In

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<sup>487</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo4.10.9.

<sup>488</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:772.

<sup>489</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:253.

<sup>490</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:241–42.

<sup>491</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo17.10.23.

spite of Chosŏn's rice tribute, the grain shortage was not alleviated immediately, meaning the Qing court had to look for other solutions. Their first response was to urge Chosŏn farmers at Ŭiju to increase rice output. As Ŭiju was near Qing territory, grain could be easily plundered by the Qing. Additionally, the grain obtained from Ka-Do Island was transported to Dongjing via Ŭiju.<sup>492</sup> The Qing's rice demands resulted in great economic hardship for the Chosŏn state.<sup>493</sup>

Grain was also required for the army, which by 1640 was entangled in a war with the Ming.<sup>494</sup> The Qing demanded the Chosŏn court to provide grain for Qing troops, which the Chosŏn court responded to by shipping 10,000 bags of grain to Gaizhou (Ch. 蓋州) on the west coast of Liaodong Peninsula.<sup>495</sup> The Qing troops at Jinzhou received 5,401 bags of rice as a result, showing the Qing's large demand for rice.<sup>496</sup>

Such significant rice requests created tension on both sides. A crop failure in 1639 made the Chosŏn court unable to provide enough grain to the Qing that year.<sup>497</sup> The Qing accused Chosŏn of not providing enough grain intentionally. Tensions increased again in 1640, when a whole fleet of ships transporting grain to the Qing army sank. Hong Taiji declared that the loss of one or two ships was understandable, but the loss of a whole fleet was suspicious.<sup>498</sup> Though it is difficult to confirm whether the fleet's

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<sup>492</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD2.r4.2.

<sup>493</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo16.2.10, Injo17.10.23.

<sup>494</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD5.6.18; CD5.10.6.

<sup>495</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:CD5.6.18; CD5.10.6.

<sup>496</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:CD5.10.6.

<sup>497</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo17.8.21.

<sup>498</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD5.3.18.

sinking was intentional or not, it is certain that in 1641 and 1642, the Chosŏn state experienced crop failure and famine.<sup>499</sup> Despite this, in 1641, the Qing court insisted that the Chosŏn court provide grain for Qing troops fighting the Ming.<sup>500</sup> The Chosŏn court had little choice but to provide the grain as well as Chosŏn soldiers to the Qing army.<sup>501</sup>

Fabrics were another critical resource given in large volume to the Qing through the tribute trade. There were various types of fabric that were produced and exported by the Ming and Chosŏn. These fabrics tended to be luxury items such as silk, and were subsequently highly coveted within the tribute trade. As the tribute trade between the Qing and the Ming had ended in 1619, the Qing had been cut off from direct access to silk for decades. When silk was re-introduced to the Qing, it was used to reward the Jurchens and the Mongols for military successes.<sup>502</sup>

Another popular fabric was Japanese silk (Ch. *woduan* 倭鍛). It was another kind of silk produced by the Ming. The name derives from the fact that the weaving method of Japanese silk originated in Japan but was imitated by the Chinese in the coastal regions of Fujian Province such as Zhangzhou and Quanzhou.<sup>503</sup>

*Maoqing* fabric (Ch. *maoqing bu* 毛青布) was a thick navy fabric from Wuhu in

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<sup>499</sup> *Qing Shilu*, Taizong:CD6.6.25, CD7.3.29.

<sup>500</sup> *Qing Shilu*, Taizong:CD6.8.11.

<sup>501</sup> *Qing Shilu*, Taizong:CD8.6.25.

<sup>502</sup> *Qing Shilu*, Taizong:CD8.6.25.

<sup>503</sup> Song Yingxing 宋應星, *Tiangong kaiwu* 天工開物 (Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju, 1978), 94. Song Yingxing, *Tiangong kaiwu*, 94.

Ming China, and popular for winter clothing.<sup>504</sup> It was particularly sought after by people in the border areas, including the Qing elite.<sup>505</sup>

*Ko-hemp* cloth (Ch. *gebu* 葛布) was a kind of herbal fabric made from plant fibres found in most areas in China and in Nara, Japan. In the Ming state, *ko-hemp* cloth was popular for summer clothing. As the weaving of *ko-hemp* cloth required sophisticated techniques, its price was relatively high.<sup>506</sup> In contrast, in Japan, *ko-hemp* cloth was used for peasant clothing as well as mourning apparel of the upper classes.<sup>507</sup> The Qing, who were unable to make cloth, were fascinated by the sophisticated cloth-making techniques used in the cloth's production. As such, this cloth was reserved for the Qing elites as a symbol of their status and wealth.

Koryō grass cloth (Ch. *gaoli xiabu* 高麗夏布) was made of ramie and used for summer clothing. The Koryō grass cloth was typical of Ming China, particularly used in the making of official robes.<sup>508</sup> However, in the bilateral trade between the Qing and Chosŏn, Koryō grass cloth was produced by the Chosŏn state. In Korean, Koryō grass cloth is termed *hansanjŏ* (Ko. 한산저, Ch. *hanshan zhu* 韩山纒) and it was typically used for making hanbok. The Qing tended to use this cloth for their summer clothing due to its breathable qualities. The various fabrics presented in the tribute trade

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<sup>504</sup> Song Yingxing, *Tiangong kaiwu*, 116.

<sup>505</sup> Song Yingxing, *Tiangong kaiwu*, 116.

<sup>506</sup> Song Yingxing, , *Tiangong kaiwu*, 100–101.

<sup>507</sup> Ryōan Terajima 寺島良安, 'Wakan sansai zue 倭漢三才図会' n.d., vol. 27:360.

For the online version of this source, please see

<http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=109069&page=2&remap=gb>.

<sup>508</sup> *Mingshi*, juan 67: yufu san.

discussed above were strongly associated with wealth, status, and luxury. The lack of local cloth production in the Qing territories made these fabrics even more coveted and prized by the Qing elites.

Writing paper and redwood bark (Ch. *danmu* 丹木) were other items coveted by the Qing, as they enabled the recording of Qing history. Redwood bark was used to produce a cinnabar pigment, employed by Hong Taiji as a writing utensil. Paper was the important medium for writing letters and documents. After the creation of Manchu script in 1599, the writing and compilation of letters, as well as documents, gave rise to high paper demand. As the Qing were unable to manufacture high-quality paper, paper imported from the Chosŏn state was of great importance. It was also essential for empire building and the creation to Qing identity through the recording of history. In order to record the achievements of Nurhaci, Hong Taiji ordered the compilation of *The Veritable Records of Taizu and Taihou* (Ch. *taizu taihou shilu* 太祖與太后實錄), which was completed on the eighth day of the eighth lunar month in 1635.<sup>509</sup> Such records required a large volume of paper. According to the trade documents from 1635 and 1636, a total of 3,840 quires of paper were imported by the Qing from the Chosŏn state.

Medicine was another pivotal product the Qing state acquired through Chosŏn, imperative for healing soldiers' wounds.<sup>510</sup> Medicine that was able to stop bleeding and decrease inflammation was particularly valued. The Qing were engaged in a

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<sup>509</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:184.

<sup>510</sup> Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀, *Wubei zhi* 武備志 (Taipei: Huashi chubanshe, 1984), juan 143: 5787.

number of conflicts during this period. From 1627 to 1632, aside from the invasions of Chosŏn Korea, Hong Taiji conquered Ligdan Khan of the Chahar Mongols and waged several wars with the Ming, creating high demand for medicine. One of the medicines imported was caesalpinia sappan (Ch. *sumu* 蘇木), a plant native to Southeast Asia, whose antibacterial and anticoagulant properties are renowned. Another medical product highly valued was ox horns, which was ground up into a powder and swallowed. It was used to cure skin infections caused by external bacteria.<sup>511</sup> Black pepper, which originated from Southeast Asia as well, was used for curing colds.<sup>512</sup> Furthermore, *songluo* tea (Ch. *songluo cha* 松蘿茶) was utilised for healing wounds.<sup>513</sup> In this way, the tribute trade provided the Qing access to valuable Southeast Asian goods.

Japanese weapons were also introduced to the Qing through the tribute trade with Chosŏn. Japanese swords was a kind of swords that required advanced iron-making techniques to manufacture, making it resistant to rust with thin and sharp edges.<sup>514</sup> Such iron-making techniques were far superior to the Qing's. Japanese swords was approximately five feet long (166.7 centimetres) with an arc curve. It was so heavy that it required two hands to even hold.<sup>515</sup> The prototype of Japanese swords was *ōdachi*

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<sup>511</sup> Li Shizhen, *Bencao gangmu*, juan shoubu: niu.

<sup>512</sup> Li Shizhen, juan guo zhi si: hujiao.

<sup>513</sup> Liu Changjiang 刘长江, *Zhonghua gudai chajiu wenhua jingdian* 中华古代茶酒文化精典 (Taiyuan: Beiyue wenyi chubanshe, 2008), 88–94.

<sup>514</sup> Cheng Zongyou 程宗猷, 'Miben dandao faxuan 秘本单刀法选', in *Zhongguo gudian wuxue miji lu* 中国古典武学秘籍录, ed. Ma Li 馬力 (Beijing: Remin tiyu chubanshe, 2010), 90.

<sup>515</sup> Cheng Zongyou, 'Miben dandao faxuan', 90.

(Jap. おおたち Ch. *datai dao* 大太刀). Both Japanese swords and *ōdachi* were typically used in warfare, prized for their strength and durability in battle. When Japanese swords were introduced to the Ming, it was termed *dandao* (Ch. 單刀), and a series of styles were created for war.<sup>516</sup> Later, Japanese swords were modified into *miaodao* (Ch. 苗刀), a kind of longsword without an arc. As such, Japanese swords was the baseline from which numerous weapons developed. As the Qing was embroiled in numerous conflicts during this time, Japanese swords were highly valued and requested in great volume from the Chosŏn court.<sup>517</sup>

Picture 3 *Dandao*



单刀式图

Source: Cheng Zongyou, 'Miben dandao faxuan,' 91

These most coveted items display the flows of products in East Asia. Through trade, these products flowed to the Qing state, with the Chosŏn state acting as a transit point creating economic connections throughout East Asia.

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<sup>516</sup> Cheng Zongyou 程宗猷, 'Miben dandao faxuan 秘本单刀法选', 91.

<sup>517</sup> *Qing shilu*, vol. Shizu 世祖, n.d., SZ1.1.1.

Japan also acted as an important transit point for the Qing in terms of maritime trade, transporting products from Southeast Asia to Chosŏn. This trade link enabled caesalpinia sappan and black pepper, which originate in Southeast Asia, to be transported from Chosŏn to the Qing via Japan.<sup>518</sup> It is interesting to note that in the Agreement of Namhansansŏng, Hong Taiji explicitly emphasised that the Chosŏn court was to maintain trade links with Japan, also including a clause that stated the Japanese envoys were to be introduced to him personally.<sup>519</sup> Hong Taiji was attempting to not only gain access to Japanese goods through Chosŏn, but he was also aiming to establish direct trade with Japan itself.

While the Qing gained highly valued goods, wealth, and power from the tribute trade, the Chosŏn state began to experience economic hardship. When compared to the previous gift system, the volume of goods requested as part of the tribute trade was not large. But the tribute trade also required the Chosŏn court to present gifts to the Qing during various special occasions, such as at festivals and the emperor's birthday.<sup>520</sup> The number of occasions at which gifts were required expanded to include military victories and royal burials, such as when Hong Taiji's beloved concubine Harjol died.<sup>521</sup> Consequently, the frequency of gift giving continued to grow, with gift volume expectations also high. For example, in the third year of Chongde reign, the Chosŏn

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<sup>518</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD4.9.11.

<sup>519</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:241–42; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD2.1.28.

<sup>520</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:241–42.

<sup>521</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD6.12.13, CD7.6.25, CD4.7.19, CD7.6.25.

court presented gifts twelve times to the Qing.<sup>522</sup> For every gift presentation, the Chosŏn court needed to prepare gifts for the emperor, the empress, and the crown prince, resulting in significant economic burdens for the Chosŏn side. During New Year celebrations, the Chosŏn court annually presented Hong Taiji with 70 *pi* of silk of all kinds, twenty *pi* of *ko-hemp* cloth, 62 mats, ten leopard furs, and 2,000 quires of white paper. In addition, the gifts to the empress included 60 *pi* of silk of all kinds, ten *pi* of *ko-hemp* cloth, and 30 mats. The gifts to the crown prince included 25 *pi* of silk of all kinds, fifteen *pi* of *ko-hemp* cloth, 40 mats, six leopard furs, and 500 quires of white paper.<sup>523</sup> While the gift volume for each special occasions was less than that expected for the regular tribute trade annually, the frequency of gift presentation was high, and each special occasion required significant expenditure on behalf of Chosŏn.<sup>524</sup>

The Qing dominated the tribute trade from 1637 to 1644. For the Qing, the tribute trade represented the primary means by which they were able to mobilise resources from Chosŏn directly, as well as from Japan and the Southeast Asian states indirectly. Medicine, paper, swords, rice, and fabrics were the most critical items traded for the Qing. However, the tribute trade, while greatly benefiting the Qing and contributing to their empire building, resulted in heavy economic burdens for Chosŏn.

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<sup>522</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:257-8,275,292-3,302,315,316,372,381,382,388,388-9,399-400.

<sup>523</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:257-58.

<sup>524</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:275,372,399-400.

### *The Frontier Market Trade at Hoeryǒng, 1632-44*

This section explains the development of Hoeryǒng into another important frontier market, displaying the way in which the Qing's frontier market trade had extended from the Yalu River to the Tumen River. According to *The Draft History of Qing*, the Hoeryǒng frontier market was open once a year.<sup>525</sup> The Hoeryǒng frontier market, as shown by Wang Zhen, dates back to 1638.<sup>526</sup> However, this section argues that the establishment of the Hoeryǒng frontier market can be traced back even further to 1632. In 1628, the Qing wrote to the Chosŏn court requesting the creation of a frontier market at Hoeryǒng.<sup>527</sup> The Chosŏn court, however, politely rejected the proposal, as Hoeryǒng was uninhabited.<sup>528</sup> Despite the refusal, the Qing continued to coerce the Chosŏn court until they agreed. In the third lunar month of 1628, Pak Chungnam (Ko. 박중남, Ch. *piao zhongnan* 朴仲男), a Korean official, and Cha Ro (Ko. 차로, Ch. *zhelao* 者老), an influential Pŏnho Jurchen, acted as representatives of Hong Taiji to lead about ten merchants from Shenyang to the Hoeryǒng for trading.<sup>529</sup> However, it seems unlikely that the Chosŏn side welcomed their arrival. The Koreans tried to give gifts to the Qing in an attempt to get them to leave the market, however these gifts backfired and merely increased the Qing's desire to trade regularly with the Chosŏn.<sup>530</sup>

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<sup>525</sup> *Qingshi gao*, liezhuan 313: shuguo yi chaoxian liuqiu.

For online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=250151>.

<sup>526</sup> Wang Zhen, 'Qingchao dui lichao tumenjiang diqu de bianjing maoyi jianlun', 34.

<sup>527</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.2.22.

<sup>528</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:481; *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.2.22.

<sup>529</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo6.3.16.

<sup>530</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo6.3.23.

By early 1632, the Qing sent seventy merchants to trade at Hoeryŏng, setting the price of cattle at the same price as at the Zhongjiang frontier market and the price of fabrics at five *qian* of silver more than at Zhongjiang.<sup>531</sup> This can be viewed as the official establishment of the Hoeryŏng frontier market.

Despite the establishment, the Hoeryŏng frontier market was intermittent. In 1633, the Qing court officially sent merchants to Chosŏn for trading. Though trading relations were agreed to, the trade lasted only a year.<sup>532</sup> In 1634, the Chosŏn court proposed to close the Hoeryŏng frontier market, as the gift system had made the Heoryong frontier market trade redundant.<sup>533</sup> Another reason for the Chosŏn's proposal to close trade was that Hoeryŏng was remote and had only a small population, meaning it could not support the continuous operation of a frontier market.<sup>534</sup> The Chosŏn court also needed to bear the cost of feeding and accommodating the traders sent by the Qing, which they were reluctant to do.<sup>535</sup> The Qing responded to the Chosŏn proposal by accusing them of being uncooperative.<sup>536</sup> The Chosŏn's defence was that they could not force merchants to trade.<sup>537</sup>

Possibly under pressure from the Qing, the Chosŏn court urged the local people to trade with the Qing merchants with restriction, with the Chosŏn court sending officials

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<sup>531</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, Injo:Injo10.3.29.

<sup>532</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.8.1.

<sup>533</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC8.10.29.

<sup>534</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC8.12.4.

<sup>535</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo10.3.29.

<sup>536</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC8.12.12.

<sup>537</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:TC9.1.28.

to supervise the market.<sup>538</sup> Following this event, the market became more regular, developing into an established frontier market.<sup>539</sup>

In conclusion, this chapter argues that the Chosŏn court functioned as a “provider” and transit point for the Qing to accumulate resources. Through the gift system and the tribute trade, the Chosŏn court provided significant amounts of vital resources to the Qing, which included rice, fabrics, and paper. Additionally, the Chosŏn court gave the Qing access to items that were produced in Japan and the Southeast Asian states, including medicine, pepper, and Japanese swords. During this period, the frontier market trade was extended from the Yalu River, the site of the Zhongjiang frontier market, to the Tumen River, the site of the Hoeryŏng frontier market. These two frontier markets were important for the Qing to sell items, such as wild ginseng, in exchange for additional resources. However, due to continual trade disputes, it is difficult to estimate the exact trade volumes at both Zhongjiang and Hoeryŏng frontier markets.

The two Qing invasions of Chosŏn Korea altered the political environment in East Asia. It assuaged the military threat from Mao Wenlong on Ka-Do Island. Furthermore, the Qing were able to force Chosŏn to submit to their rule, ensuring a constant resource supply to a burgeoning empire. The Qing mobilised resources from the Chosŏn court, which were in turn employed to draw the Mongols into their sphere of control.

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<sup>538</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:173–74; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC9.3.22.

<sup>539</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:680. *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD3.11.26, CD7.3.29.

## Chapter 6: Trade through Conquest: The Mongol Tribes and the Qing, 1627-1644

The Manchu-Mongol relationship was paramount in the construction of the early Qing empire. Such connections even contributed to the development of the Manchu language, which borrowed heavily from the traditional Mongolian alphabet. However, this relationship was not one of equals. Di Cosmo examines the process by which Manchu-Mongol relations turned from partnership to subordination during Hong Taiji's reign. He details the new political system that Hong Taiji brought in, termed the League-Banner system (Mon. *jasag*), which was designed specifically for dealing with the Mongols, leading them to eventually accept Qing rule after Ligdan Khan was defeated by Hong Taiji in 1632.<sup>540</sup> He further defines the new relationship between the Manchus and the Mongols as tutelage, suggesting that the Mongols enjoyed limited sovereignty as opposed to fully submitting to the Manchus. This is different to the way the Qing approached China, which they ultimately conquered in its entirety.<sup>541</sup>

Manchu-Mongol relations were developed through several channels. As Pamela Crossley notes, the Mongol nobilities were integrated into the Qing conquest elite during the pre-conquest era, which cemented Manchu military power.<sup>542</sup> Additionally,

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<sup>540</sup> Di Cosmo, 'From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest', 175–97.

<sup>541</sup> Di Cosmo, 'From Alliance to Tutelage: A Historical Analysis of Manchu-Mongol Relations before the Qing Conquest', 193.

<sup>542</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, 'Making Mongols', in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 58–82; Crossley, 'The Conquest Elite of the Ch'ing Empire'.

the Qing used religion to further Manchu-Mongol relations. Johan Elverskog argues the Qing's adoption of Tibetan Buddhism helped the Qing secure the loyalty of the Mongols over the course of the Qing dynasty. He clarifies that Buddhism should not be considered as merely a tool for the Manchus to rule the Mongols but as an agency.<sup>543</sup> In other words, Elverskog argues that the Qing embraced Buddhism fully. Marriage alliances were another aspect that dominated Manchu-Mongol relations, which were continuous throughout the Qing period. Marriage alliances not only strengthened the vulnerable relations that had been an element of Nurhaci's reign, but also maintained peace in the Inner Mongolian region during the post-conquest period. Di Cosmo even terms Manchu-Mongol relations "marriage diplomacy", arguing that the marital connections made it possible for both states to improve protection against external enemies, as well as maintain political balance within political negotiations.<sup>544</sup> Du Jiaji also emphasises the centrality of Manchu-Mongol intermarriage in relations, but he focuses specifically on royal marriage. He carefully calculates the number of Mongol women who married Manchu noblemen and vice versa, arguing that these Mongol and Manchu women created close bonds connecting the Mongol clansmen to the Qing emperors.<sup>545</sup> Though these relations are thoroughly documented, it remains unclear whether Mongol-Manchus relations were limited to the political and military sphere.

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<sup>543</sup> Elverskog, *Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China*, 7–8.

<sup>544</sup> Di Cosmo, 'Marital Politics on the Manchu-Mongol Frontier in the Early Seventeenth Century', 62–63.

<sup>545</sup> Du Jiaji, 'Qingchao de manmeng lianyin', 18.

This chapter argues that the various Mongol tribes played crucial economic roles in the formation of the Qing state, making it possible for Hong Taiji to establish a new trade network along Great Wall, reconnecting trade with China and further developing trade with the Mongols.

It is important to note, however, that the Mongols were not a unified state but consisted of several diverse and distinct tribes, with each tribe fulfilling a different role within Manchu-Mongol relations. The Qorčīn Mongols, the tribe that the Qing did their utmost to win over, were providers and sharers of resources with the Qing. This included military power, with the Mongols providing horses and soldiers, greatly boosting the Qing's military power. The Tūmed Mongols acted as the transit point in terms of trade, becoming the middlemen between the Qing and the Ming. In this way, the Qorčīn Mongols and Tūmed Mongols were the two primary Mongol tribes within Manchu-Mongol relations, but they enacted distinct economic roles within the Qing economy

Areas within Mongol territory also gained significance during this period as a result of Manchu-Mongol relations. Hohhot became a new trade centre in the southern Mongol territory, also acting as a transit point for Chinese products to flow to the Qing. It was through the Mongols that wild ginseng came into domestic Ming markets.

These economic developments were forged through the Qing's warfare with the Čaqar Mongols, who were ruled by Ligdan Khan, the last Mongol Khan in Borjigin clan. After two military campaigns, Hong Taiji not only assuaged the threat from Ligdan

Khan, securing legitimacy for the Qing rule Mongols, but also established a trade network with the Mongols, through which indirect trade with Chinese was achieved.

This chapter also explores Hong Taiji's establishment of direct trade connections with Ming local authorities, albeit for a limited time. The local Zhangjiakou authority maintained temporary trade relations with the Qing, such that Zhangjiakou became another important trade site of the Qing. This also sustained the Qing's internal resource provision. After the Yeren Jurchens and the Solon people were conquered by Hong Taiji and forced to present fur as tribute to the Qing, sable fur along with wild ginseng became the Qing's main profit-making products from external trade, with fur being a particularly favoured item for the Mongols. Therefore, this chapter argues that the Qing developed a new trade network with Mongols and Chinese through the frontier market trade. It also details the Solon people's role in the tribute trade, which acted as a new trading channel from which the Qing could mobilise resources.

### **The Trade Network with the Mongols, 1628-1644**

Research on trade relations between the Manchus and Mongols during the period from 1600 to 1644 is noticeably absent. Henry Serruys, the leading scholar in Sino-Mongol relations, examines the tribute relation and trade relation between the Ming and Mongols from 1400 to 1600. However, his research ends in 1600, at a time which he argues witnessed the official closure of all frontier markets between the two states. This section challenges this view, arguing that several frontier markets still functioned for

the Qing to trade with the Ming through various Mongols groups, displaying the centrality of Qing-Mongol relations.

This section discusses Hong Taiji's establishment of trade networks with various Mongol tribes, which led to indirect trade with the Ming. These trade networks were predominately established through warfare, particularly through two invasions which eventually saw Hong Taiji defeat Ligdan Khan in 1632.

Ligdan Khan, as the successor of Genghis Khan, ruled the Eastern Mongols, posing a significant threat to Hong Taiji. He impeded Hong Taiji from allying with other Mongol tribes as well as blocking an alternative path to Ming China when Hong Taiji's troops failed to cross the Shanhai Pass. In fact, the tribute trade between the Qing and Mongols officially started in 1636, after Hong Taiji defeated Ligdan Khan to become the new leader of the Eastern Mongols. This section first briefly introduces the two wars, which not only provided Hong Taiji with notable plunder but also gave Qing the political legitimacy to rule over the Mongols.

### ***From Enemy to Ally: The Mongol-Ming Alliance***

To examine Manchu-Mongol relations, it is important to return to 1626. As detailed at the beginning of Part III, this was the year Hong Taiji took over the rulership of the Jin from Nurhaci and following in his father's footsteps, decided to attack the Ming. The military strategy Hong Taiji proposed was to attack Beijing via a narrow coastal corridor from Jinzhou to the Shanhai Pass, the shortest route to Beijing from the Jurchen

territory. The route was 500 kilometres long, normally a ten-day walk. Hong Taiji chose Ningyuan as the site of the first battle, even though Nurhaci had been defeated there a year ago. The decision was based on Ningyuan's geographical location, which was along the narrow coastal path between the Jurchen territory and the Shanhai Pass, making it the gateway to access the shortest route to Beijing.<sup>546</sup> The Ming identified Ningyuan and Jinzhou as the most likely places from which the Jin would attack, and therefore sent extra reinforcements to both areas.<sup>547</sup> In the fifth lunar month of 1627, the Qing armies were once again defeated by Ming troops at Ningyuan and Jinzhou. Faced with military defeats and domestic instabilities, Hong Taiji turned to his western front, constructing a new path to the Ming through the Mongols.

At this time, the Mongols on Hong Taiji's western front were the most important rivals of the Qing, with the military powers of the two sides being evenly matched. Ligdan Khan was the last Khan of the Northern Yuan Dynasty and the heir in the Borjigin clan to the Mongol Khans from Čaqars. However, the Mongols had been in noticeable decline during both Nurhaci's and Hong Taiji's reign.

The Mongols, however, were not a unified political force, but consisted of several tribes. The Mongols had not been united since the Northern Yuan court, which had retreated to Mongolia in 1368 and gradually disintegrated into various Mongol tribes. From this two powerful over-arching Mongol groups emerged, the Western Mongols

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<sup>546</sup> Gu Zuyu 顧祖禹, *Dushi fangyu jiyao* 讀史方輿紀要, n.d., juan 37: shandong ba.

For online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&res=569304&remap=gb>.

<sup>547</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:149–50.

and the Eastern Mongols. The Oirats, or the Western Mongols, resided in Central Asia, relatively far from East Asia. The Eastern Mongols dominated the southern Mongol steppe close to the Great Wall. The Čaqars tribe emerged during the mid-Ming period when Dayan Khan (r.1478-1516) reunited the Mongols under Chinggisid supremacy. He reorganised the Eastern Mongols into two wings with six *tümens* (Mon., literally “ten thousand”). The left wing included Qalqa, Čaqar, and Uriankhai. The right wing consisted of the Ordos, *Tümed*, and *Yöngshiyebü*. Dayan Khan himself ruled the left wing of the Eastern Mongols, and was therefore ruler of the Čaqars. By contrast, Jinong (Mon. Jonon) ruled the right wing on behalf of Dayan Khan.<sup>548</sup> By the fifteenth century, the rulers of the Čaqars inherited the position of Khagan, obtaining the legitimacy of ruling all Mongol tribes.<sup>549</sup> By Hong Taiji’s reign, the Čaqars tribe was under the direct control of Ligdan Khan and resided near the Xar Moron River in what is today Inner Mongolia. However, the various *tümens* of the Eastern Mongols had been torn apart after the death of Dayan Khan, such that these tribes failed to integrate into a united force.

The Ming and Mongols were engaged in almost continuous warfare during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as the Ming Dynasty usurped the Northern Yuan Dynasty. Despite these conflicts, a new threat was rising to the north of Ming China.

The Qing replaced the Mongols as the greatest threat to the Ming court in the early

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<sup>548</sup> Jinong is a Mongolian title for crown prince.

<sup>549</sup> Khagan is a title in the Mongolian language equal to the status of emperor.

seventeenth century. The Mongols too similarly saw the Qing as a threat to their sovereignty. This meant the Ming and Mongols became unlikely bedfellows, united by their fear of Qing military expansion. The Ming and Ligdan Khan had just transformed from rivals to allies. As Nurhaci had united most of the Jurchen tribes in the Jurchen territory, it was inevitable that the Qing would continue to grow rapidly stronger. In stark contrast, the Mongols had been divided into several *tümen* for centuries, continuously unable to form a united front against invading armies, such as the Ming's. As a result, the new-born Qing state became an integrated power which was able to resist not only the Ming state but also the Mongols. Even by 1619, which saw the rise of Nurhaci following his victory at the Battle of Sarhu Battle, the Ming court was forced to recognize that, with their unification, the Jurchens were gradually replacing the Mongols as the most pressing threat to the Ming court. This compelled the Ming court to shift their strategy from suppressing the Mongols to allying with them to resist the Qing.

This alliance produced instant and powerful effects. The Ming realised that allying with a power from the steppe was beneficial to resisting the rise of the Manchus. It also enabled Ligdan Khan to reunite the entirety of the Mongol tribes, significantly increasing the Mongol's military power. Tensions between the Manchus and the Mongols began to increase when Ligdan Khan attacked Nurhaci's forces at Guangning in 1628.<sup>550</sup> Nurhaci began to view Ligdan Khan as a man who was so greedy for the

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<sup>550</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:41–42.

Ming's properties that he would make an enemy out of unrelated people (i.e. Jurchens). Nurhaci further degraded Ligdan Khan by declaring he was a person who was prone to exaggeration, noting his proclamation as the Khan of all Mongols when in reality Ligdan Khan had yet to control the left wing of the Mongol tribes.<sup>551</sup>

Nurhaci's insights about Ligdan Khan's power among the Mongol tribes were painfully accurate. Though Ligdan Khan had gained control of the tribes, his influence over them faded quickly, with the various Mongol tribes becoming more and more isolated from each other, and acting independently. His declining power is further shown by the fact that, as early as the reign of Buyan Sechen Khan (r. 1592-1604), who was Ligdan Khan's grandfather, all the Mongol tribes presented tribute nominally to the Čaqar Mongols. However, under Ligdan Khan's leadership, the tradition of presenting tribute came to an end.<sup>552</sup> Ligdan Khan had lost the control of the Mongol tribes, so that he turned in desperation to the Ming.

Generous financial support was always an effective means of attracting the steppe people to ally with the Ming. In the fifth lunar month of 1620, the Ming court provided 1,000 *taels* of silver to persuade Ligdan Khan to join them in their fight against the Qing.<sup>553</sup> Three months later, Ligdan Khan received 18,000 *taels* of silver and an additional 30,000 *taels* of silver specifically for horse expenses.<sup>554</sup> In 1622, in order to

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<sup>551</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizu:46.

<sup>552</sup> *Chongzhen changbian*, CZ1.7.10.

<sup>553</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong:WL48.5.21.

<sup>554</sup> *Ming shilu*, vol. Guangzong 光宗, n.d., TC1.8.7.

ally the Čaqar and Qalqa Mongols, Wang Huazhen (Ch.王化貞), who was the governor of Liaodong, gave more than 10,000 *taels* of silver.<sup>555</sup> The Čaqar and Qalqa tümens, two powerful Mongol tribes, were the primary tribes the Ming was willing to ally with, and the rewards they received were the most considerable.<sup>556</sup> The financial rewards made the Mongol tribes more demanding, so that in the ninth lunar month of 1622, Ligdan Khan sent his followers to request the seasonal rewards of the last autumn, as well as the spring and autumn of the current year.<sup>557</sup> In order to maintain the alliance, the Ming complied.<sup>558</sup> The Ming court eventually officially standardised the financial rewards at 50,000 *taels* of silver for each tribe every spring and autumn respectively.<sup>559</sup> These rewards were costly for the Ming, with the court providing 300,000 *taels* of silver to the Čaqar and Qalqa Mongols in total during the period from spring 1622 to autumn 1623.<sup>560</sup>

The promise of generous financial rewards not only attracted the Čaqar and Qalqa Mongols but also attracted other Mongol tribes. For example, the Qaračin Mongols, together with their 36 subordinate tribes, sought rewards for bolstering the military

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<sup>555</sup> Wang Zaijin, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, juan 7: 5-6.

For online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&res=1932&remap=gb>.

<sup>556</sup> Wang Zaijin, juan 11: 10-11.

<sup>557</sup> Wang Zaijin, juan 11: 10-11.

<sup>558</sup> Wang Zaijin, juan 11: 10-11.

<sup>559</sup> Wang Xiangqian 王象乾, 'Zoubao fushang qianliang shu 奏報撫賞錢糧疏', in *Huangming jingshi wenbian*, n.d., juan 464: 8a-13b.

For online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=48009&page=21>.

<sup>560</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Xizong:TQ3.12.24; Wang Zaijin, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, juan 15:19.

power of the Ming armies by several hundred troops.<sup>561</sup> The Qaračın Mongols, however, were not satisfied with the rewards they received and continued to ask for more, threatening to withhold military support if their demands were not met.<sup>562</sup> Therefore, the Ming continued to be forced to provide continuous money to maintain the cooperation with the key Mongol tribes, which, to some extent, prevented these Mongols from allying with the Qing.

However, the strategy of financial stimulation that the Ming adopted to win over the Mongols was ultimately unsuccessful, as the cost of maintaining it grew at unsustainable rates. Moreover, it resulted in conflicts among different Mongol tribes due to the uneven rewards, providing an opportunity for the Qing to act on these internal divisions.

The Qing's first strategy was to court the Mongol tribes excluded from the Ming's rewards. These tribes were mostly under the official control of Ligdan Khan but enjoyed independence. The first tribe to join the Qing was the Qorčın Mongols, an independent Mongol tribe which did not possess a strong affiliation to either the Western or Eastern Mongols. The bilateral relationship between the Qing and Qorčın began through intermarriage as early as 1612. These marital connections continued to strengthen ties between the Qorčın Mongols in the Qing until 1623, when the Qorčın Mongols publicly

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<sup>561</sup> Wang Zaijin, *Sanchao liaoshi shilu*, juan 11: 10-11.

<sup>562</sup> Wang Xiangqian 王象乾, 'Beichen Fukuan Shiyi Shu 備陳撫款事宜疏', in *Huangming Jingshi Wenbian*, n.d., juan 464: 1a-8a.

For online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=48009&page=2>.

allied with the Qing. In the following year, both sides took an oath of alliance.<sup>563</sup> With the support of the Qing, the Qorčīn Mongols thus were able to defeat Ligdan Khan's attempted conquest. In 1626, Auuba (r.1626-32), the leader of Qorčīn Mongols, was given the title of Tüšiyetü qan by the Qing as a show of the gratitude of their support.<sup>564</sup> His descendants continued to inherit the noble title of Tüšiyetü prince in the Qing dynasty, a title of significant power and nobility. The centrality of Qing- Qorčīn Mongols relations is further shown through Hong Taiji's rejection of peace negotiations with the tribes of the Čaqar, Naiman, and Auqan, on the grounds that he was unwilling to betray the Qorčīn Mongols.<sup>565</sup>

The second tribe that the Qing conquered was the Qalqa Mongols. The Qalqa Mongols had five major divisions: ĵaruud (Mon., Ch. *zhalute* 扎魯特), baĵarin, bayoote, üĵiyed, and qungĵirad, which were won over by Nurhaci through intermarriage or military actions one by one. The ĵaruud allied with Nurhaci through intermarriage starting from 1614, with the formal alliance with the Qing established in 1626.<sup>566</sup> The head of the bayoote submitted to Nurhaci in 1621.<sup>567</sup> The baĵarin Mongols allied with the Qing in 1623.<sup>568</sup> In response, Ligdan Khan attempted to reunite the Qalqa Mongols to enhance his military capability.<sup>569</sup> The result was that the Qalqa Mongols became

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<sup>563</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:218–19.

<sup>564</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:259–60.

<sup>565</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:467.

<sup>566</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:9,261.

<sup>567</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:94.

<sup>568</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:157, 162.

<sup>569</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:454.

divided based on these alliances, with some tribes allying with Nurhaci, and others with Ligdan Khan.

During Hong Taiji's reign, the third tribe who submitted themselves to the Qing was the Qaračin Mongols, with oaths taken in 1628.<sup>570</sup>

The fourth tribe that the Qing conquered was the Naiman and Auqan divisions of the Čaqar Mongols. The Čaqar Mongols comprised of four main divisions: Kesigten, Naiman, Qayucid, and Auqan, among which the Naiman and Auqan were relatively stronger. Hong Taiji thus sent envoys to persuade the Naiman and Auqan divisions to submit to him freely.<sup>571</sup> Though the Ming attempted to win over the Naiman and Auqan so as to thwart the Qing, they failed to fully persuade them, only securing part of the Naiman Mongols.<sup>572</sup> The submission of the Naiman and Auqan Mongols to the Qing weakened the overall strength of the Čaqar Mongols, resulting in a chain reaction that saw other divisions of the Čaqar Mongols submitting to the Qing as well.

By 1627, the Qing had conquered the Qalqa, Qorčin, Qaračin, Naiman, and Auqan Mongols one after another, significantly impairing the military strength of Ligdan Khan. This section shows that the Ming used money to ally with Mongols to defend against Hong Taiji, which formed a tough situation for him to break through.

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<sup>570</sup> *Shiqi Shiji Mengguwen Wenshu Dang'an(1600-1650)* 十七世紀蒙古文文書檔案 (1600-1650) (Tongliao: Nenmenggu shaonian ertong chubanshe, 1997), 32; *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:484.

<sup>571</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:455.

<sup>572</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Xizong:TQ7.5.3, TQ7.9.25.

### *The Jin Conquest of Ligdan Khan, 1632*

There were two military campaigns in which Hong Taiji fought against Ligdan Khan in 1628 and 1632, with the latter resulting in a Qing victory. The plunder from the Qing's invasion of Ligdan Khan was significant, alleviating the Qing's food and resource shortage. They also shared the plunder with their Mongol tribe allies, strengthening the alliance. Most importantly, the campaigns marked Hong Taiji's replacement of Ligdan Khan as the new ruler of all the Eastern Mongols.

The first campaign between Ligdan Khan and Hong Taiji in 1628 ended without direct military confrontation. On the sixth day of the ninth lunar month, Hong Taiji called the troops comprising of the Mongol tribes of the Qorčīn, Qaračīn, Auqan, Naiman, and Qalqa to go on a punitive expedition against Ligdan Khan. Ten days later, Auuba, leader of the Qorčīn Mongols, did not turn up at the meeting site.<sup>573</sup> The Qorčīn Mongols' failure to turn up caused the failure of the invasion, causing the Qing army to halt its advance and making Hong Taji infuriated. In his letter to Auuba, Hong Taiji detailed Auuba's betrayal.<sup>574</sup> How could Auuba fail to meet the Qing armies after the Čaqar Mongols had attacked the Qorčīn Mongols numerous times? How could Auuba betray the Qing in the face of their marital ties and the Qing's gifts of eastern pearls, gold, all kinds of silk and fur, and 5,000 *taels* of silver?<sup>575</sup> In response to Hong Taiji's

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<sup>573</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:492–93.

<sup>574</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:493–95.

<sup>575</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:493.

criticism, Auuba promised he would come to Hong Taiji himself to offer an apology.<sup>576</sup>

In the meantime, Ligdan Khan moved westward and conquered the Tümed and Yöngshiyebü tümens who resided in the north of Zhangjiakou and Datong.

Ligdan Khan's power was further strengthened by the Ming's continued financial rewards, given as an expression of their gratitude for Ligdan Khan preparing to fight against Hong Taiji. Ligdan Khan received 1,000,000 *taels* of silver from the Ming side every two years, most of which was used for buying horses. Liaodong local authorities alone offered 400,000 *taels* of silver, Datong local authorities 240,000 *taels* of silver, Shanxi local authority 100,000 *taels* of silver, Zhangjiakou local authorities 180,000 *taels* of silver, along with a bonus reward of 81,000 *taels* of silver.<sup>577</sup> As a result, Hong Taiji's first military campaign against Ligdan Khan in 1628 was a failure, engulfing the Qing in numerous political dilemmas. On the Qing's eastern front, trade with Chosŏn was not smooth, meaning it was difficult to obtain resources. On the western front, the failure to attack the Mongols made it difficult to fend off the Ming's attacks. The attempted conquest of Ligdan Khan had only made the Jin's situation on the western front even more challenging.

On the verge of facing political unrest, Hong Taiji tried to re-initiate peace negotiations with the Ming in an attempt to buy some time. However, these attempts at peace negotiations failed, leading to Hong Taiji's invasion of Beijing. This lasted five

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<sup>576</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, Taizong:495.

<sup>577</sup> *Chongzhen changbian*, CZ2.3.16.

months from late 1629 to early 1630, ending in a Ming victory. On the second day of the tenth lunar month of 1629, Hong Taiji dispatched his troops together with *beiles* of the Čaqar, Qalqa, Bayarin, Ĵaruud, Aoqan, Naiman, and Qorčın Mongols.<sup>578</sup> The Jin troops entered the Mongol territory and passed through the Great Wall at the breakthrough point of Jizhen (Ch. 薊鎮), arriving in Zunhua in a month.<sup>579</sup> Zunhua was located 143 kilometres northeast from Beijing, a mere day's ride. The vanguard units of the Jin troops also successfully occupied the cities on the way to Beijing.<sup>580</sup> The Chongzhen emperor of the Ming declared martial law in response to the possible fall of Beijing.<sup>581</sup> At the same time, Yuan Chonghuan led 9,000 troops from the Shanhai Pass to Beijing in two days in an attempt to save the capital city. The city centre of Beijing became the deciding battlefield between the Ming and Qing armies. This battle ended with a Ming victory, forcing Hong Taiji to request peace negotiations with the Chongzhen emperor and retreating from Beijing.<sup>582</sup>

Though Hong Taiji was defeated by the Ming court, plunder was still substantial, both for financing the invasion and rewarding the Qing troops, which to some extent eased the financial burden of the Jin state. The Qing troops captured an abundance of plunder en route to the battlefield. Though it is difficult to calculate how much plunder they obtained, it was extensive enough for official Ming records to record Hong Taiji's

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<sup>578</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:505-06.

<sup>579</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:505-08.

<sup>580</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:509.

<sup>581</sup> *Chongzhen changbian*, CZ2.11.1.

<sup>582</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:527.

troops returning to Qing territory with fully loaded caravans.<sup>583</sup> The Chosŏn side also mentions the plunder, documenting that the Qing troops occupied more than 30 cities and captured more than 10,000 men and women.<sup>584</sup>

Regarding the distribution of plunder, Hong Taiji was generous. He rewarded each soldier with valuable livestock, such as horses, oxen, and mules.<sup>585</sup> For the generals and soldiers who showed significant bravery in attacking Zunhua city, they received even more generous rewards, such as seven satins with dragon pattern, two camels, 81 *pi* of satin, 745 *pi* of cloth, 28 oxen, and 28 horses.<sup>586</sup> Aside from these rewards, the rest of the plunder was shared among the lords of the eight banners.<sup>587</sup> Therefore, the amount of plunder, based on existing records, included 11,800 *pi* of fabric, 408 horses, one camel, and 5,000 *taels* of silver.<sup>588</sup>

Hong Taiji decided to first ally with the Mongols, previously a Ming-China ally, in an attempt to strength the Qing's military position and subsequently weaken the Ming's. Although Beijing, the capital of the Ming, had successfully been threatened, it was evident that the Qing were unable to conquer the Ming at this time.<sup>589</sup> The new

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<sup>583</sup> Fang Yujin 方裕謹, 'Ming yu houjin dalinghe cheng zhizhan shiliao pianduan 明与后金大凌河城之战史料片断', *Lishi dang'an* 1 (1981): 21.

<sup>584</sup> *Chosŏn wangjo shillok*, n.d., Injo:Injo8.2.27.

<sup>585</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC3.11.25, TC3.12.5.

<sup>586</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:510–11.

<sup>587</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:515.

<sup>588</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:509, 512, 513, 515, 519.

<sup>589</sup> Zhao Lian 昭槿, 'Xiaoting Zalu 啸亭杂录' n.d., juan 1: taizong faming.

For online version of this source, please see <https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/%E5%98%AF%E4%BA%AD%E9%9B%9C%E9%8C%84>.

military strategy that Hong Taiji proposed was to attack vulnerable cities lying in the inner territory of the Great Wall. The narrow coastal corridor between the Shanhai Pass and Jinzhou was the only route of passage from the Jurchen territory into the Ming. However, this route was strongly guarded by the Ming, such that it was considered foolish for the Qing troops to attempt to attack.<sup>590</sup> The only solution was to avoid this route altogether, which meant the creation of a new route. This new route was found through the Mongol territory.

However, this new route possessed two main problems. First, it was a far greater distance compared to the coastal corridor. It would have taken two and a half months for Qing troops to march on Beijing using this route.<sup>591</sup> By contrast, it took Dorgon, the Regent of the Qing after the death of Hong Taiji, only one month to arrive in Beijing via the narrow corridor in 1644.<sup>592</sup> Second, the new route proved unsafe as Ligdan Khan still possessed significant power over the Mongol territory.

Hong Taiji faced further setbacks when the four cities where he had stationed his troops inside the Great Wall were recovered by the Ming. This incident proved that he would be unable to control military bases within the Great Wall from a distance. As a result of this, Hong Taiji shifted his focus to clearing the threat from the Mongols and opening the western front to the Jin.

It was imperative for Hong Taiji to ensure full control over the Mongol tribes. Even

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<sup>590</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC4.2.4.

<sup>591</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:505, 515.

<sup>592</sup> *Qing shilu*, vol. Shizu, n.d., SZ1.4.9, SZ1.5.2.

though the Jin and Ligdan Khan had no direct military confrontation in 1628, the attempted invasion had resulted in Ligdan Khan relocating his court to the north of Zhangjiakou and Datong, providing an opportunity for the Jin to win over other Mongol tribes, such as the Aru Qorčın, which took an oath in 1630.<sup>593</sup> After that, the Aru Qorčın visited Hong Taiji frequently, showing that both sides were adamant to maintain their ties.<sup>594</sup> Other Mongol tribes that submitted were the Qorčın and Qaračın Mongols, who visited Hong Taiji frequently as well. Hong Taiji and these submitted Mongol tribes kept close ties, especially in early 1631, after the trade issues of Ka-do Island were resolved.<sup>595</sup> Hong Taiji even held meetings to strengthen the connections among the Mongol tribes.<sup>596</sup>

The second military campaign between Ligdan Khan and Hong Taiji was in 1632. Hong Taiji strategised the campaign for as long as nine months before moving against the Qorčın Mongols. As early as the seventh lunar month of 1631, Hong Taiji wrote letters to the Qorčın and Aru Qorčın Mongols, requesting them to recruit and dispatch soldiers for a battle against the Čaqars in the third lunar month of the next year.<sup>597</sup> On the first day of the first lunar month of 1632, Hong Taiji gathered 100,000 soldiers to march against the Čaqar Mongols, with the Mongol tribes of Qorčın, ĵaruud, Aru Qorčın, Aoqan, Naiman, Qaračın, ĵaruud, baĵarin and dörbed Mongols marching with

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<sup>593</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:532, 561.

<sup>594</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:532,533,563,566-7,569-70,572,574,576.

<sup>595</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:562-4-76.

<sup>596</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:572.

<sup>597</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:576–77.

him.<sup>598</sup> Upon learning of the Qing troops, Ligdan Khan fled to the Ordos Plateau, leaving his territory open for a Jin victory.<sup>599</sup> Having conquered the Čaqar Mongols at last, Hong Taiji shifted his armies towards Ming territory, stationing his armies in Hohhot.<sup>600</sup>

The invasion of the Čaqars not only cleared Ligdan Khan's threat to the Qing on their western front but also brought a considerable amount of resources to the Qing. Following his successful conquest, Hong Taiji sent letters to the Liaodong local authority, requesting that the million *taels* of gold that was intended for the Čaqars to be given to him directly, as ruler of Čaqars. However, the Liaodong local authority ignored his request.<sup>601</sup> However, this did not dampen Hong Taiji's growth in power over the Mongols. The flight of Ligdan Khan caused the remaining Mongol tribes to submit themselves to Qing rule. In the meantime, Hong Taiji turned his attention to the eastern front, preparing to expand the Qing territory to the south to include most of the Liaodong peninsula, which would completely assuage any threat of attacks from Ka-do Island by the Ming and Chosŏn.

### ***The Tribute Trade between the Qing and Mongols, 1636-1644***

With Hong Taiji having replaced Ligdan Khan as leader of the Eastern Mongols, the

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<sup>598</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:628,631, 534-35, 638.

<sup>599</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:637-38.

<sup>600</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:637,639.

<sup>601</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:660.

relationship between the Qing and the Mongols changed from one of equals to one of superior-subordinate by the promulgation of new laws and regulations. This marked the beginning of the tribute trade.

As early as 1629, Hong Taiji demanded that the Mongol tribes now under Qing control, Qorčın, Aoqan, Naiman, Qalqa, and Qaračın, obey all Qing regulations.<sup>602</sup> In 1633, Hong Taiji sent people to the Qorčın Mongols to introduce the law.<sup>603</sup> After Hong Taiji became the Khan of the Eastern Mongols, the Mongol tribes officially presented tribute to him frequently. In 1639, for example, the document of the *Lifan Yuan* (Ch.理藩院) written in Mongolian recorded eleven entries of tributes paid by the Mongol tribes.<sup>604</sup>

Horses were the main item the Mongols presented due to their strong horse culture. Elizabeth Kimball Kendall travelled through Mongolia in 1911, observing that “to appreciate the Mongol you must see him on horseback, and indeed you rarely see him otherwise, for he does not put foot to the ground if he can help it.”<sup>605</sup> The Mongol horses are best known for their role in the wars of Genghis Khan, who is reputed to have said: “It is easy to conquer the world from the back of a horse.”<sup>606</sup> Almost regarded as a weapon in itself, the Mongol horse compared favourably with other

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<sup>602</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC3.1.15.

<sup>603</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:32.

<sup>604</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 219–68.

<sup>605</sup> Elizabeth Kimball Kendall, *A Wayfarer in China: Impressions of a Trip across West China and Mongolia* (London: Constable, 1913), 255.

<sup>606</sup> Yu Dajun, *Menggu mishi*, 133.

breeds in battle. They were small in size but sturdy in the limbs, making them the main commodity traded in the frontier market trade between the Ming court and the Mongols, although the Chosŏn court were the major providers of horses in the early Ming period.<sup>607</sup> The budget of the Ming court to purchase Mongol horses reached 410,300 *taels* of silver in 1612.<sup>608</sup>

The Mongol horses were also important to Hong Taiji. In 1639, the Qorčīn Mongols presented seven horses with saddles as well as another 104 horses as tribute. However, Hong Taiji only accepted seven horses with saddles and seventeen horses.<sup>609</sup> This does not mean that Hong Taiji did not require Mongol horses, rather it shows the privileged treatment the Mongols enjoyed from the Qing. In order to meet the demand for Mongol horses, the Qing usually purchased them at Hohhot, a trading city where various Chinese products were also available. Other typical tribute items presented by the Mongols were local products, including beef jerky, cheese, and mutton.<sup>610</sup> It is interesting to find that the Tümed Mongols, who resided at Hohhot, presented Japanese silk, indicating that they had trade relations with the Ming. In 1639, the Tümed Mongols also presented tribute of 287 *pi* of sorted silk, suggesting their trade with the Ming was relatively lucrative.<sup>611</sup>

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<sup>607</sup> Henry Serruys, *Trade Relations: The Horse Fairs (1400-1600)*, vol. 3, Sino-Mongol Relations during the Ming (Bruxelles: Institut belge des hautes études chinoises, 1975), 13–18.

<sup>608</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong: WL40.10.22.

<sup>609</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 227.

<sup>610</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 227.

<sup>611</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 231.

Therefore, the tribute trade between the Qing and Mongols was different from the trade between the Qing and Chosŏn. It was obligatory for the Chosŏn court to present the products requested by the Qing. By comparison, it was ceremonial for the Mongols to present their products to the Qing. This showed that, during the pre-conquest period, the position of the Chosŏn court was lower than that of Mongols due to the fact that the Mongols were the more important military power to the Qing.

### ***Hohhot: The Trading Centre beyond the Great Wall, 1636-1643***


Hohhot was the crux of the Qing trading network. Its history as a place for trading can be traced back to 1611 when the Tümed Mongols began to exchange horses for silver.<sup>612</sup> Though it was not easy for the Ming to establish a new trading centre beyond the Great Wall with the Mongols, the Tümed Mongols were able to persuade them. The Tümed Mongols were native residents of Hohhot and won the trust of the Ming through their submission and performance of loyalty and obedience.<sup>613</sup> Due to the legacy of the Tümed Mongols, Hohhot became the primary trade centre in the Mongol territory, especially after 1638 when the Qing began to trade officially. Horses were no longer the primary product in Hohhot, being replaced by various commodities, such as Chinese fabrics, wild ginseng, and fur.

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<sup>612</sup> *Ming shilu*, n.d., Shenzong:WL40.12.21.

<sup>613</sup> *Ming shilu*, Shenzong:WL39.7.19.

Map 7 Hohhot, and the Frontier Markets Inside the Great Wall



Source: Tan Qixiang 譚其驤, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji* 中國歷史地圖集, 2nd Edition, vol. 7 Yuan and Ming (Beijing: Zhongguo ditu chubanshe, 1992), 55.

It was wise for Hong Taiji to occupy Hohhot, as Hohhot was the main trading site beyond the Great Wall. As early as Nurhaci's reign, the Jurchens had been trading with the Mongols, albeit on a small scale. The commodities traded included horses, cattle, sheep, and other livestock, along with small amounts of *maoqing* fabric as well as Japanese silk.<sup>614</sup> It is also important to note that the price of *maoqing* fabric and Japanese silk was lower than when trading directly with the Ming: one *chi* of *maoqing* fabric was worth two *taels* of silver, the price of Japanese silk was the same as that of *maoqing* fabric.<sup>615</sup>

Hong Taiji first arrived in Hohhot in 1632 as Ligdan Khan fled, leaving behind a large amount of wealth, showing Hohhot's economic prosperity. The products included 317 *pi* of *maoqing* fabric, 93 pieces of fur cloth, 550 other furs, as well as 1,600 *taels* of silver.<sup>616</sup> However, Hong Taiji did not seize Hohhot until 1634 when he returned to Hohhot to conquer the rest of the Čaqars who still resided there. These Mongols who refused to submit themselves to the Qing, turned to seek help from the Ming.<sup>617</sup> With trading being the lifeblood of Ligdan Khan, they requested to receive rewards and trade in horses in Hohhot, which was approved by the Ming to pacify and unite them in an attempt to resist the Qing.<sup>618</sup> However, the remaining Čaqars were inevitably defeated

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<sup>614</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:210.

<sup>615</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizu:210.

<sup>616</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:639, 640–41.

<sup>617</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC8.6.30.

<sup>618</sup> *Chongzhen shilu* 崇禎實錄, n.d., CZ7.12.14.

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by the Qing troops. Hohhot thus became the site of Qing-Ming trade, rekindling trade relations between the Ming and Qing via the Tümed Mongols, who acted as a buffer zone.

Developing trade contacts with the Mongols was therefore a priority for the Qing. This is shown by the fact that in 1636, for the first time, the Qing actively prepared 80,000 *taels* of silver to trade in Hohhot. Hong Taiji was uncertain about whether this transaction would be accepted by the Mongols. As such, he stressed to the merchants before departure that if trade was impossible to facilitate, the silver was to be left for future collection.<sup>619</sup> Two months later, the merchants returned and completed the transaction.<sup>620</sup> In this way, the Qing officially established trading connections in Hohhot from 1636. According to the archives, the Qing conducted trading activities a total of fourteen times during the period between 1636 and 1641, which meant that on average the frequency of trade was three times a year.<sup>621</sup> With the frequency of trade increasing, the number of merchants that were sent for trading grew as well. For example, the Qing once sent as many as over 100 merchants to trade at Hohhot.<sup>622</sup> Silver was the main currency that the Qing adopted to trade with at Hohhot, while sometimes silk and cloth were used for exchange as well.<sup>623</sup>

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<sup>619</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:708.

<sup>620</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:733.

<sup>621</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:748, 762; *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:283, 286, 323, 325, 328, 445; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD2.6.16,CD2.7.5,CD3.3.26,CD5.8.29,CD5.12.29,CD6.8.4.

<sup>622</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD2.6.16.

<sup>623</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:283.

Eight bannermen, mainly the Mongol bannermen, were in charge of trading in most cases. Koreans, as an exception, were allowed to accompany bannermen for trading at Hohhot with cloth, silk, fur, and other Korean local products.<sup>624</sup> These Koreans were tribute representatives who presented gifts to Hong Taiji, indicating that Korean products started to be circulated in the Mongol territory. It is also reasonable to assume that the two main trade networks of the Qing economy, the Koreans and Mongols, had been linked through Hohhot by 1638.

Horses, medicine, silk, cloth, and paper used for sacrificial offerings were the most coveted products the Qing obtained at Hohhot, all of which were traded at high volumes. For example, on the first day of the seventh lunar month of 1638, Hong Taiji prepared 25,066 *taels* of silver, four sable furs clothing, 122 sable furs, and three pieces of saddle to trade in Hohhot. According to the record, products obtained from this trade included 3,936 *pi* of silk, 1,085 *pi* of cloth, 189 horses, 300 cattle, 13,819 bags of tea (80 packets per bag), and 2,570 pieces of sacrificial paper.<sup>625</sup> It is apparent that the unit price of each commodity was low, attracting the elites of the eight banners to trade in Hohhot.

Medicine was heavily sought in the Qing-Mongol trade. Requested medicine included yellow lead, realgar, gamboge and iodine, which could reduce swelling and stop bleeding, as well as be used as a disinfectant. During one documented trading

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<sup>624</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:283–84.

<sup>625</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:323.

mission, the Qing court gave the merchants 1,000 *taels* of silver to purchase various medicine.<sup>626</sup> This suggests that the frequent wars of the Qing had caused considerable injuries, making medical supplies desperately needed. Furthermore, azurite (Ch. *shiqing* 石青), a kind of paint, was also regularly sought by the Qing to paint Buddhist statues. Silk and cloth originating from the Ming were also welcomed by the Qing elite.

The products sold by the Qing included wild ginseng and fur, providing large amounts of silver for the Qing to purchase the products they needed. Wild ginseng remained the most valuable commodity for the Qing. Below is an example of a record written in Mongolian in 1638 detailing the exchange of wild ginseng between the Qing and the Ming through the Tümed Mongols.

Presented to Darhan Lama by Hong Taiji, written to all of the officials commanded by Darhan Noyin. Zang Hooya came out to talk. The Chinese say that a chief official was made in Tobog's name. I spoke with him and will reply you tomorrow. Regarding the trade in wild ginseng, the Taifu wishes to find a slightly lower price with Zang Hooya and discuss prices, we [the Qing] say that it costs 16 *taels* of silver per *jin*. The Chinese say that they will offer 14 *taels* of silver. At a price for one *liang* [a unit of weight] of wild ginseng for one *tael* of silver, we should surreptitiously sell them a small quantity.

Darhan lama, darhan noyin ehilen buhude saide tu bicig ugbe. zang hooya garcu ireju helelcebe hited in uge. tobog, nere sang in tosto nige taifu ireji bainem. bi tegune helelcer margata tan du uge ungguye genem. orhodoi in tosto, taifu zang hooya hoyar idesi erihu sinag uneni helelcebe. nige jing du bide arban Naiman lang gebe. hited arban durben lang

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<sup>626</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:325.

ugguye genem. ging ni lang du lang ughu metu. bagahan bagahan igoji abuya genem. <sup>627</sup>

This text shows that both the Qing and Ming sent their representatives to conduct trade, negotiating the price of wild ginseng. It is evident that Hong Taiji sent representatives to trade wild ginseng, as the archival text was written in Mongolian as part of the Qing official documents.

This text also illuminates the role of the Tümed Mongols, who played the role of middlemen in trade deals. The text uses the term Tobog (Mon.), which was originally a Chinese term written in Mongolian, equivalent to the term *taifu* (Ch.太傅), referring to an official title of the Ming state. This is significant as it clearly shows the presence of the Chinese at Hohhot. Furthermore, Darhan Noyin, who represented the Qing, was a member of the tribe abaya (Mon.), a sub-tribe of the Tümed Mongols, that later submitted to the Qing.<sup>628</sup> This shows that the Tümed Mongols were intermediaries for the Qing to trade with the Ming. While the Mongolian text does not indicate the site where this trade took place, the Manchu and Chinese versions of the text reveal the place to be Hohhot. It is noted in these texts that in the seventh lunar month of 1638, three months before trading wild ginseng with the Chinese, Darhan Noyin departed for the market, taking 1,700 black sable furs and 2,700 *jīn* of wild ginseng to the place where the Tümed Mongols resided.<sup>629</sup> This place is most likely Hohhot, not only

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<sup>627</sup> *Qing nei mishuyuan mengguwen dang'an huibian* 清內秘書院蒙古文檔案彙編, vol. 1 (Hohhot: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe, 2003), 260.

<sup>628</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 311.

<sup>629</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:328.

because Hohhot was the residential site of the Tümed Mongols from historical records, but also because Darhan Noyin purchased horses in Hohhot in the tenth lunar month after completing the wild ginseng deal.<sup>630</sup> In this way, we can see the whole story: Darhan Noyin took wild ginseng and sable fur to trade with the Chinese in Hohhot, and then purchased horses on his return.

As noted in the text, the price of ginseng was an important topic to both the states and merchants involved in the trade network. The ginseng price at Hohhot was lower than that offered by Chosŏn Korea. Hohhot's ginseng price was sixteen *taels* of silver per *jin* compared with Chosŏn Korea's price of twenty *taels* of silver per *jin*. It is worth noting that the Chosŏn court, after acquiring wild ginseng from the Qing at the lower price, sold it to the Ming on Ka-do Island for twenty *taels* of silver per *jin*, even though they denied this.<sup>631</sup> This suggests that the Qing intentionally drove prices down in order to entice Ming trade into Hohhot. Pricing pressure from the Chosŏn side was so intense that at one point in 1633, wild ginseng price was as low as nine *taels* of silver per *jin*.<sup>632</sup>

Sable fur was also an important product of the Qing state, as is suggested by the fact that Darhan Noyin took 1,700 black sable furs to Hohhot for trading, but the price details are unknown.<sup>633</sup>

While trade volumes continued to expand at Hohhot, so too did the number of

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<sup>630</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD3.10.21.

<sup>631</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:669–70; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC9.12.20.

<sup>632</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.8.1, TC7.9.14.

<sup>633</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:328.

economic crimes. For example, Hong Taiji punished some eight bannermen who embezzled public funds in Hohhot.<sup>634</sup> Tax evasion also became common.<sup>635</sup> Furthermore, the threat of external attack to gain access to the riches at Hohhot also increased as trade volumes grew. Hohhot was expanded in 1644 to strengthen its military defences, which included heightening the city walls and building watchtowers.<sup>636</sup> The main reason was to prevent harassment from the Qalqa Mongols.<sup>637</sup>

### ***The Frontier Markets: Trading Inside the Great Wall, 1628-1642***

Before the emergence of Hohhot as a trading site, Hong Taiji established a temporary trading relationship with the Ming via three frontier markets that were originally designed for trading between the Ming and the Mongols: Zhangjiakou pu (Ch. 張家口堡), Shahe pu (Ch. 沙河堡), and Shahukou (Ch. 殺虎口), as shown in Map 7. At Zhangjiakou pu and Shahe pu, Hong Taiji established direct trading connections with the local authorities, with both sides making a vow of peace following the Jin conquest of the Čaqar Mongols. At Shahukou, Hong Taiji established an indirect trading relationship with the Ming via the Tümed Mongols. However, the trading markets at Zhangjiakou pu, Shahe pu and Shahukou were short-lived and when they did witness

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<sup>634</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:350.

<sup>635</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD4.1.29.

<sup>636</sup> *Qing nei mishuyuan mengguwen dang'an huibian*, 1: 299; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD6.5.28.

<sup>637</sup> *Qing nei mishuyuan mengguwen dang'an huibian*, 1:276–77; *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD6.7.23.

trade, it was low in frequency. These frontier markets were gradually closed with Hohhot becoming the primary trading centre in the Mongol territory by 1638.

Though these frontier markets were fleeting, it is important to examine their development, as it reveals critical political relations that were forged or destroyed through trade. The Ming court had a long tradition of trading with the right wing of the Eastern Mongols, but refused to trade with the left wing of the Eastern Mongols in an effort to create divisions amongst the Mongol tribes. Henry Serruys examines these trading sites, detailing the trade relations between the Ming and the Mongols from 1400 to 1600.<sup>638</sup> The trade tradition between the Mongols and the Ming was rooted in a policy of disintegration that seemed to be a practice that the Ming rulers preferred to employ over the course of the Ming dynasty. The policy meant that the strategy of the Ming court was to divide the Mongol tribes to prevent them from collaborating an attack on the Ming. The purpose of the policy was to prevent integration among the various Mongol tribes, which would have jeopardised the Ming's security. In the early Ming period, the Yongle emperor employed this policy, aiming to reduce the power of the Mongol-led Northern Yuan court. He began to support the opposing party within the Mongols so as to strike at the heart of Mongol unity.<sup>639</sup> The Ming also granted political significance to economic and trading activities with the various Mongol tribes (mainly the Uriyangqan Mongols) who had accepted the titles conferred by the Ming

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<sup>638</sup> Serruys, *Trade Relations: The Horse Fairs (1400-1600)*.

<sup>639</sup> Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, 303.

court. Only these tribes were allowed to trade with the Ming in the form of the tribute trade and the frontier market trade.<sup>640</sup>

The policy worked well, as the Mongols divided into two branches in 1403: the Western Mongols and the Eastern Mongols. The Western and Eastern Mongols remained divided until the seventeenth century, except for a short period from 1416 to 1454 when Esen Khan, the leader of the Western Mongols, unified the Mongols. The Western Mongols built trading relationships with both Central Asia and the Ming, but these did not negate the development of political tensions. The Battle of Tumu in 1449, between the Ming and the Mongols shows that trade relations did not ensure peace. This battle grew into a larger crisis, with numerous border conflicts between Esen and the Ming, even resulting in the capture of the Ming Zhengtong Emperor. The crisis ended when Esen died unexpectedly, resulting in a dramatic decline in the Western Mongols' power. The Mongols also gradually lost their trading and political ties with the Ming, forcing the tribe to migrate west on the steppe. The Western Mongols did not re-emerge in Qing history until the high Qing period when Zunghar Khanate attacked the Qing court.

As a result of the Tumu Battle, the Ming court gradually reduced the frequency of envoys to trade with the Mongols, and eventually cut off all official communications until the early sixteenth century. The termination of trade brought severe economic losses to the Mongols, resulting in the Western Mongols raiding the Ming border towns.

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<sup>640</sup> *Ming shilu*, vol. Taizu, n.d., HW22.5.25.

With the fall in fortunes of the Western Mongols, there was an opportunity for the Eastern Mongols to fill the void.

The Eastern Mongols took the place of the Western Mongols in trade relations with the Ming. However, the trading relationship between the Eastern Mongols and the Ming was not smooth or united, as the policy of disintegration from the Ming court applied to the Eastern Mongols as well. After the Western Mongols had retreated further, Dayan Khan united the Eastern Mongols but failed to reconnect trade relations with the Ming due to a decline in the rewards granted by the Ming. As was the case with the Western Mongols, this resulted in the re-commencement of Mongols raids on the Ming border. The legacy of Dayan Khan was to re-organise the Eastern Mongols into two segments: the right wing and the left wing, which in turn comprised of six *tümen*s. The right wing included the Ordos, *Tümed*, and *Yöngshiyebü tümen*, who all resided in the regions of present-day Hebei, Shanxi, and Gansu provinces. They were actively involved in trading with the Ming and able to maintain a stable trade relationship.

Altan Khan (1507-82), a grandson of Dayan Khan, was the ruler of the *Tümed* Mongols and became the leader of the right wing. From 1532 onwards, Altan Khan had continued to request rewards from the Ming, but his requests were refused by the Ming court, which resulted in Altan Khan's invasion of Ming China. Border raids and attacks continued until 1551 when the Ming established three frontier markets at Datong, Xuanfu, and Yulin, specifically for the right wing of the Eastern Mongols. However, it was not until 1570 that the Ming court and the Eastern Mongols reached a formal

agreement to establish trade markets.<sup>641</sup> Dali Zhabu argues that these trade agreements ensured that the Ming court was dominant in trade relations with the Eastern Mongols.<sup>642</sup> According to the agreement on the tribute trade, the right wing was to present tribute to Datong instead of Beijing annually, and Altan Khan could send ten representatives and ten horses. Altan Khan's younger brother, nephew, and oldest son could send four representatives and eight horses, and the rest of the tribal leaders could send a few representatives and horses; the total number of delegates, however, could not exceed 150 persons.<sup>643</sup>

Regarding the frontier market trade, the markets in Xuanfu and Datong were opened on an irregular basis, and the commodities traded included gold, silver, horses, cattle, fur, silk, clothing, and pots.<sup>644</sup> In this way, the Ming court built a peaceful co-existent relationship with the right wing of the Eastern Mongols at the frontier markets from Xuanfu to Gansu. The right wing was also invited to take part in the regular frontier markets. This trading relationship was maintained until the fall of the Ming in 1644.

The left wing of the Eastern Mongols was cut off from direct trade with the Ming

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<sup>641</sup> Xia Xie 夏燮, *Ming tongjian* 明通鑑, n.d., 65:14b-15a.

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<sup>642</sup> Dali Zhabu, *Mingdai monan menggu lishi yanjiu*, 225, 230.

<sup>643</sup> Dali Zhabu 達力扎布, *Menggu shi gangyao* 蒙古史綱要 (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 2011), 160.

<sup>644</sup> Dali Zhabu, *Menggu shi gangyao*, 160.

as part of the Ming's disintegration policy. So as to create resentment among the tribes, the left wing was excluded from the frontier markets. However, even though the Ming court only established trading relations with the right wing of the Eastern Mongols, the left wing of the Eastern Mongols were able to indirectly restore economic connections with the Ming court through the right-wing tribes.

The left wing of the Eastern Mongols was excluded from these trading connections with the Ming until the rise of Nurhaci. When Altan Khan made requests to trade with the Ming, Daraysung Gōdeng Khan (r.1547-57), the ruler of the left wing of the Eastern Mongols, followed suit. However, as mentioned above, the Ming refused the requests and only traded with the right wing. As a result, the left wing along with the Qorčīn Mongols moved southward to the Liaodong area and took control of the three Uriankhai guards so they could trade indirectly with the Ming at Xifengkou, Guangning, and Kaiyuan in 1543. In this way, the Ming court lost the Uriankhai guard as a buffer zone in the Liaodong area.

The left wing comprised of the Qalqa, Čaqar, and Uriankhai tümen. The Čaqars controlled the Duoyan guard with its frontier market at Xifengkou; The Qalqas controlled the Taining guard with its frontier market at Guangning and part of the Fuyu guard with its horse market at Kaiyuan. The rest of the Fuyu guard was controlled by the Qorčīn Mongols, which belonged to neither the left nor right wing. They lived in an area of the Nen River and ruled over several Jurchen tribes, collecting tribute from

them.<sup>645</sup>

Therefore, from the mid-Ming period onwards, only the Eastern Mongols maintained a regular trading relationship with the Ming. The right wing presented tribute and traded at the frontier markets in Datong and Zhangjiakou regularly, while the left wing traded with the Ming indirectly by taking control of Uriankhai's frontier markets at Kaiyuan and Guangning. However, with the Qing's expansion in the Liaodong territory, Datong and Zhangjiakou became the major frontier markets among the Eastern Mongols. With the rise of the Qing, the Ming court shifted their strategy from disintegration to cooperation with all Eastern Mongols, even establishing economic connections with the left wing. The Qing also recognised the importance of these frontier markets, as displayed by their military campaigns against the Mongols. Following Hong Taiji's successful conquest of the Mongols in 1638, the trade networks with Mongols was founded. The Ming state, now in a turmoil, closed the frontier markets with the Mongols.

### **The Frontier Market at Zhangjiakou, 1628-1642**

Zhangjiakou pu (hereafter Zhangjiakou) had been a trade town for decades prior to 1628. It was originally designed for military purposes and was affiliated with Xuanzhen, one of nine military garrisons of the Ming dynasty. The Zhangjiakou frontier

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<sup>645</sup> Feng Yuan, *Kaiyuan tushuo*, 200.

market was established in 1429 and expanded in 1574.<sup>646</sup> Zhangjiakou gradually grew to become an important trading town along the Great Wall, facilitating trade mostly with the Mongols. Zhangjiakou was acclaimed as the central frontier market town of all Mongol tribes due to its strategic location. With the development of trade, the variety and diversity of products increased, with the most notable products being fur and fabrics.<sup>647</sup>

It is not surprising that Hong Taiji sought trading opportunities at Zhangjiakou when the trade relationship between the Qing and Chosŏn Korea was experiencing setbacks or difficulties. In 1632, after conquering the Čaqars Mongols, Hong Taiji stationed troops at Zhangjiakou. He asked for peace negotiations with the local authority of Zhangjiakou, also requesting that the Ming send him the rewards usually granted to Ligdan Khan as leader of the Mongols. Hong Taiji also expressed his intention to trade with the local authority at Zhangjiakou, stating that such trading activities would be beneficial to both sides.<sup>648</sup> His request received no reply. Out of a pressing need to re-commence trading, Hong Taiji made the same request again nine days later.<sup>649</sup> Faced with political pressure from Hong Taiji, the local authorities began

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<sup>646</sup> ‘Xuanfu shoudaoxia shang xilu zongtu shuo 宣府守道轄上西路總圖說’, in *Xuanda shanxi sanzhen tushuo*, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995).

<sup>647</sup> Mei Kesheng 梅客生, ‘Qingba Queshui Shu Xuanfu Queshui 請罷權稅疏宣府權稅’, n.d., juan 452: 14a-18a.

For online version of this source, please see <http://ctext.org/library.pl?if=gb&file=47901&page=28>.

<sup>648</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:643.

<sup>649</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:644.

trading activities two days later, sustaining the trade for five days.<sup>650</sup>

Representing the Qing, elites from the eight banners and the Qorčīn Mongols brought silver to trade at Zhangjiakou.<sup>651</sup> Though primary documentation does not record the trading volumes, it seems that trade was welcomed by both sides. On the day after trading finished, both sides pledged to be allies and seek peaceful co-existence. The Zhangjiakou local authorities even presented gold, silver, satin with dragon patterns, and *maoqing* fabric to Hong Taiji as a gift.<sup>652</sup> In response to this, Hong Taiji expressed his willingness to keep the oath before departing for Shenyang.<sup>653</sup>

Another welcomed aspect of trade at Zhangjiakou was the low prices. The Qing spent five to six *taels* of silver in purchasing one *pi* of the satin with dragon patterns, which was remarkably lower than the price during the economic crisis between 1619 and 1626, at which time the price of one *pi* of satin with dragon patterns reached as high as 200 *taels* of silver. Thus, Hong Taiji was very satisfied with the low price. As there is no surviving product list, it was difficult to know other products that were traded at Zhangjiakou other than satin with dragon patterns.

Besides the direct trading link with the local authority at Zhangjiakou, the Qaračīn Mongols also assisted in maintaining trade between the Jin and the Chinese at Zhangjiakou, acting as an important middleman between the Qing and the Ming. The

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<sup>650</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:645.

<sup>651</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong: 645

<sup>652</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:646.

<sup>653</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:651.

Qaračın Mongols resided closed to Zhangjiakou and had a long tradition of trade with the Ming.<sup>654</sup> As early as 1628, when Hong Taiji led troops into Mongol territory in an attempt to conquer the Čaqar Mongols, he ordered the Qaračın Mongols, who had allied with the Jin, to continue trading with the Ming.<sup>655</sup> When the Qaračın Mongols submitted to the Jin, one of their main responsibilities was to ensure trade relations with the Ming continued.<sup>656</sup> In this way, Hong Taiji was able to ensure resources from the Ming through the Qaračın Mongols.

However, the trade between the Qaračın Mongols and the Ming was far from smooth. The Qaračın Mongols wrote to Hong Taiji to complain of unfair trade practices, explaining the situation in detail. The Ming would often refuse to weigh products, leading to unbalanced trades. The Ming also sold poor quality products to the Mongols. The Qaračın Mongols sought Hong Taiji's advice on how they were to confront the Ming merchants.<sup>657</sup> However, there is no historical record of Hong Taiji's reply. The Qaračın Mongols continued trade with the Ming at Zhangjiakou, for the sake of the Qing.<sup>658</sup>

The establishment of a trading relationship with the Ming at Zhangjiakou was the starting point from which the Qing launched the trade networks with the Chinese. As trading at Zhangjiakou enabled the Qing to obtain cheap resources, Hong Taiji had high

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<sup>654</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 109.

<sup>655</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 32, 109.

<sup>656</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 32.

<sup>657</sup> *Shiqi shiji mengguwen wenshu dang'an(1600-1650)*, 140.

<sup>658</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:85.

hopes for the trade at Zhangjiakou, despite the trade disputes. However, the reality proved more difficult.

Trade at Zhangjiakou was not consistent until 1638. The so-called alliance between Hong Taiji and Zhangjiakou was short-lived, for Qing troops invaded Zhangjiakou again in 1634 with the purpose of replacing the Čaqar Mongols in the Mongol-Ming trade.<sup>659</sup> In 1638, Hong Taiji requested peace negotiations to establish trade relations with the Ming. However, the officials of the Zhangjiakou local authority ignored Hong Taiji's requests. In the sixth lunar month of 1638, the Qing sent people to trade at Zhangjiakou, but they were denied. A month later, the Qing again sent representatives to initiate trade negotiations with the authorities at Zhangjiakou.<sup>660</sup> Under this continuous pressure from the Qing, the Zhangjiakou authorities finally agreed to establish trading connections with the Qing in late 1638.

The Zhangjiakou frontier market trade occurred once a year, as according to Hong Taiji's request.<sup>661</sup> Fabrics were the most valuable commodities traded, especially demanded by the Qing who used these fabrics as a reward for the Manchu nobility.<sup>662</sup> However, the Qing's dependency on the market declined as Hohhot began to emerge as the trading centre of the region.

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<sup>659</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:81.

<sup>660</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:328.

<sup>661</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD5.8.10, CD6.12.26, CD7.6.15.

<sup>662</sup> *Qing shilu*, Taizong:CD4.8.27.

### *The Frontier Markets at Shahe Pu and Shahukou, 1635-1638*

Shahe pu and Shahukou in Shanxi province served as smaller and short-lived frontier markets for the Qing, developed primarily to create more trading opportunities with the Ming. Indeed, trade at Shahe pu was active only once in 1636.<sup>663</sup> After 1636, there are no further records of trade occurring. In Shahukou, the Qing traded with the local authority through the Qaračın Mongols. In 1636, the Qing provided 50 sable furs and 100 *jin* of wild ginseng to trade at Shahukou.<sup>664</sup> The Ming was very much aware that the Qaračın Mongols were the Qing's representatives at Shahukou and that they were prepared to trade horses for sable fur and wild ginseng.<sup>665</sup> The Tümed Mongols also acted as the Qing's representatives in trade dealings between the Qing and the Ming.

In the fifth lunar month of 1636, the Qing prepared 80,000 *taels* of silver and sent merchants to trade at Shahukou and Hohhot.<sup>666</sup> Two months later, the first batch of merchants successfully finished trading at Shahukou and returned to Shenyang safely.<sup>667</sup> However, the second batch of merchants sent to trade at Shahukou failed to initiate exchanges, as the Ming attacked the Tümed Mongols that were trading in Shahukou, resulting in heavy casualties.<sup>668</sup> It appears that the Ming's attack marked the end of the Qing's trade at Shanukou through the Tümed Mongols. The last

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<sup>663</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:188.

<sup>664</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC10.2.15.

<sup>665</sup> *Mingqing shiliao xinbian* 明清史料辛編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), juan 1:457-64.

<sup>666</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:708.

<sup>667</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:724.

<sup>668</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:733-34.

recorded trade is from 1638 when the Qing prepared 9,220 *taels* of silver and 100 *jin* wild ginseng for trading.<sup>669</sup> Following this, there are no further archives recording the Qing's trading activities at Shahukou.

Therefore, the Qing's trade at Zhangjiakou was low in frequency, while the trade at Shahukou and Shahe pu was brief. These multiple cases of disturbed and unreliable trade motivated the Qing to develop a trading centre in the Mongol area, at a site where they could ensure sustainable trade. Hohhot was the obvious choice.

The significance of these trading sites is that they made it possible for the Qing to reconnect trade relationships with the Ming based on the legacy of trade relations between the Ming and Mongols. After conquering the Eastern Mongols, the Qing replaced the Mongol tribes in the trading relations with the Ming at the frontier markets of Zhangjiakou, Shahe pu, and Shahukou, albeit for a short period. More importantly, Hohhot rose to be the trading centre of the Mongol territory, which indicates that the Qing expanded the trade networks. Some Mongol tribes, such as the Tümed and Qaračin Mongols, acted as middlemen representing the Qing in trade with the Chinese. Following Hong Taiji's conquest of the Mongols, he became the new leader of the Eastern Mongols with more Mongol tribes submitting to him resulting in the development of the tribute trade. Unlike to the tribute trade between the Qing and Chosŏn, the tribute trade between the Qing and the Mongols was much friendlier. In most cases, Hong Taiji declined or under-collected tributes from the Mongols to

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<sup>669</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:283.

maintain the friendly relations. Thus, developing the trade network with the Mongols greatly expanded the Qing's power, not only providing the Qing with an economic foundation, but also opening new trade routes linking Ming territory and the Jurchen territory via the Mongols.

### **The Tribute Trade in Sable Fur: The Qing, The Solon People and the Yeren Jurchens, 1627-42**

Fur was another popular item among the Chinese, Koreans, Jurchens, and Mongols. With Hohhot becoming the main trading centre of the Mongol territory, the demand for sable fur increased. As mentioned in Chapter Two, during Nurhaci's reign, the production area of sable fur reached from the Tumen River in the west to the Sea of Japan in the east, from Khanka Lake in the north to the Russian city of Nakhodka in the south. It was the Woji and Warka Jurchens who became the primary providers of sable fur, as they resided in this area. During Hong Taiji's reign, the demand for sable fur was increasing with the development of the Qing economy. In response to this, Hong Taiji's launched a series of military campaigns to invade the area surrounding the Amur River. Following in his father's footsteps, Hong Taiji successfully conquered a large number of tribes who were engaged in fur hunting. These tribes were broadly referred to as the Yeren Jurchens and the Solon People. After the conquest, these tribes were incorporated into the tribute trade as a means by which to meet the domestic demand for sable fur. In this way, the Qing obtained sustainable access to sable fur through the tribute trade

from 1636 onwards. The Yeren Jurchens and Solon people also benefited from this exchange by gaining textiles and other necessities in return.

The Woji Jurchens, who were conquered by Nurhaci, presented sable fur to the Qing for decades. As early as 1599, the Hurha tribes of the Woji Jurchens were presenting sable fur to Nurhaci.<sup>670</sup> The core production site of sable fur lay at the heart of the Hurha tribe's territory, however, other tribes of the Woji Jurchens also resided in this area. In order to monopolise the sable fur trade, Nurhaci invaded the production site and therefore attacked the Woji Jurchens. Between 1611 and 1625, Nurhaci launched ten military attacks against them, finally securing control over the sable fur trade in 1625.<sup>671</sup> After 1627, when Hong Taiji ascended to the throne, these various Woji Jurchen tribes continued to present sable fur, together with other types of fur, such as fox fur, to the Qing court approximately twice a year.<sup>672</sup> The quantity of fur present was notable. For example, in 1631, the Woji Jurchens presented 5,396 sable furs.<sup>673</sup>

Following the conquest of the Čaqars on the western front of the Qing territory, Hong Taiji shifted his focus and invaded the Amur River region, which we can deduce was in order to expand his territory and sources of sable fur. The residents of the Amur River included the Solon people and Hurha Jurchens (who are not the same as the Hurha

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<sup>670</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi:WL27.1.1, TC9.11.7.

<sup>671</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi:WL37.12.1,WL38.11.1,WL39.12.3, WL43.11.1, TM2.2.1, TM4.6.8, TM10.3.22, TM10.8.1.

<sup>672</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong: TC1.12.27, TC2.5.25, TC2.12.1, TC4.5.29, TC6.1.8, TC6.10.26, TC7.1.23, TC7.6.24, TC7.10.20, TC7.10.26, TC8.10.29, TC8.12.27.

<sup>673</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:603.

tribes of the Woji Jurchens). The Solon people resided near the middle-upper stream of the Amur River, where they were the ancestors of the current ethnic groups of Ewenki, Oroqen, and Daur, among others. The Hurha Jurchens were dispersed around the middle-lower stream of the Amur River. As early as 1616, Nurhaci's troops reached the middle stream of the Amur River and conquered several small tribes.<sup>674</sup> From then on, the Solon people regularly presented sable fur as tribute to the Jin state. For example, in 1634, the Solon people sent 35 envoys to present sable fur and fox fur.<sup>675</sup>

Despite the continuous tribute from the heads of several tribes in the Amur River region, Hong Taiji continued to expand the Qing conquests in this area, conquering additional tribes. On the tenth day of the twelfth lunar month of 1635, Hong Taiji decided to invade the Hurha Jurchens who refused to present tribute to the Qing.<sup>676</sup> It is worth noting that the invasion was not violent, as *The Documents of the Palace Historiographic Academy* (Ch. *nei guoshiyuan dang* 內國史院檔) states that Hong Taiji informed his followers, “the people in Heilongjiang region speak the same language as ours, we should allow them to submit themselves to us so they can work for me.”<sup>677</sup> When launching the offensive, he instructed his officers to address their opponents as kin so as to emphasise the ancestral link between the two groups.<sup>678</sup>

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<sup>674</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizu gaohuangdi:TM1.8.19.

<sup>675</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC8.10.9.

<sup>676</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong: TC8.12.10.

<sup>677</sup> Kusunoki Yoshimichi 楠木賢道 et al., trans., *Naikokushiin tō:tenchō hachinen* 內國史院檔天聰八年 (Tōkyō: Tōyō Bunko, 2009), 380.

<sup>678</sup> Kusunoki Yoshimichi, *Naikokushiin tō:tenchō hachinen*, 380.

Hong Taiji was also said to have instructed his followers, “Although we attack them, all of you must send my good wishes to them, and not take the path of blood and destruction.”<sup>679</sup> In the fourth lunar month of 1635, the Qing troops returned with 2,483 Jurchen males, 1,124 sable furs, as well as 2,097 other furs.<sup>680</sup> From 1639 to 1643, the Qing launched three wars against the tribes of the Amur River, finally conquering the region and the Solon people in their entirety in 1643.

The Qing maintained contact with the Yeren Jurchens and the Solon people through the tribute trade. Through the tribute trade, the tribes received rewards, such as cloth, from the Qing court. As such, the tribute trade materialised the exchange of the sable fur from the Yeren Jurchens and Solon people for clothes. For example, in late 1633, the Solon presented 1,769 sable furs to the Qing and obtained 2,630 *pi* of *maoqing* fabric in return.<sup>681</sup> From this exchange it can be deduced that one sable fur was equivalent to one *pi* and a half of *maoqing* fabric. The Qing court also rewarded the tribes with satin and silverware, among other things.<sup>682</sup>

The Qing also sent merchants to trade for sable fur directly. For example, in 1638, the eight banners sent merchants to trade *maoqing* fabric for sable fur in the area of the Amur River and Nen River. The Yeren Jurchens and Solon people prepared 3,498 sable furs for this trade. The Yellow Banner obtained 406 sable furs, the Bordered Yellow

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<sup>679</sup> Kusunoki Yoshimichi, *Naikokushiin tō:tenchō hachinen*, 380.

<sup>680</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:159–60.

<sup>681</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:44.

<sup>682</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TC7.11.8.

Banner obtained 389 sable furs with eleven *pi* of *maoqing* fabric untraded, the Red Banner obtained 767 sable furs with six *pi* of *maoqing* fabric untraded, the Bordered Red Banner obtained 300 sable furs with 23 *pi* of *maoqing* fabric untraded, the Bordered White Banner obtained 286 sable furs with 48 *pi* of *maoqing* fabric untraded, the White Banner obtained 265 sable furs with eight *pi* of *maoqing* fabric untraded, the Bordered Blue Banner obtained 308 sable furs with more than 21 *pi* of *maoqing* fabric untraded, and the Blue Banner obtained 241 sable furs with more than 112 *pi* of *maoqing* fabric untraded. In total, the eight banners obtained 2,478 sable furs.<sup>683</sup> In this way, the Jurchens and the Solon people achieved a synergistic relationship in trading with the Qing. The Qing obtained sable fur and the Jurchens and the Solon people obtained cloth and other coveted items.

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<sup>683</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:392–93.

## **Chapter 7: Legacies of the Multiple Trade Networks: Silver, Globalisation, and Qing Empire Construction**

The multiple trade networks during Hong Taiji's reign enabled the circulation of commodities and silver between East Asia and Inner Asia. The three trade centres—Shenyang, Zhongjiang and Hohhot—interacted with each other, as products flowed between the centres and along the trade networks. The new multilateral trading networks resolved the economic crisis of the Jin state and further facilitated the circulation of commodities. This thesis responds to traditional scholarship regarding the silver trade, showing how the final destination of foreign silver was the Qing state as opposed to Ming China. All of these elements were critical in the construction of the Qing empire.

### **The Inflow of Silver to the Qing**

Silver flowed to the Qing along the same trade routes and through the same trading centres as commodities. After the late sixteenth century, silver flowed regularly from America to Manila and then into Ming China. From the Ming, the flow of silver split into two routes: one to the Mongols, and the another flowing to the Qing. The inflow of silver provided abundant currency reserves for Nurhaci, supporting the development of the Jurchen economy. During Hong Taiji's reign, there were two routes of silver flows into the Qing. The first route was "Japan—Chosŏn—the Qing" for silver that was mined in Japan. The second route was "Manila—the Ming—the Mongols—the

Qing” for the silver that originated in Potosí. Silver from America, Ming China and, Japan flowed into the Qing state, funding the empire building of the Qing.

The first inflow route of silver to the Qing was via the trade with the Chosŏn state. As part of this route, silver flowed only within East Asia. As very little silver was produced in Chosŏn Korea, most of the silver the Chosŏn court obtained came from trading with Japan.<sup>684</sup> When Oda Nobunaga, the powerful Daimyō of Japan in the late sixteenth century, was assassinated in 1582, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the second of Japan’s three legendary leaders, carried on his unfinished legacy. He ordered all the gold and silver mines in Japan to begin mining gold and silver for overseas trade. Later, the Tokugawa shogunate, the last feudal Japanese military government which existed between 1603 and 1868, allowed 100,000 to 200,000 *guan* of silver (one *guan* is equivalent of 100 *taels*) from Tsushima han to be traded with the Ming annually.<sup>685</sup> The silver production from the Iwami Ginzan silver mine, the biggest silver mine in Japan during the early Edo Period, accounted for 30% of global silver production. *Keichō chōgin* (Jap.慶長丁銀), which was 79.19% silver, was the currency of Japan from 1601 to 1695, and its production output reached 200,000 *guan* annually in 1601.<sup>686</sup> Japanese silver flowed into Chosŏn Korea and became the local currency. Through the gift trade

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<sup>684</sup> Diao Shuren 刁书仁, ‘Chaoxian shichen de baiyin simao jiqi dui dongya maoyi de yingxiang 朝鲜使臣的白银私贸及其对东亚贸易的影响’, *Shehui kexue zhanxian* 11 (2013): 96.

<sup>685</sup> Gao Shujuan 高淑娟, *Zhongri duiwai jingji zhengce bijiao shigang* 中日对外经济政策比较史纲 (Beijing: Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 2004), 279.

<sup>686</sup> For more details, please see

<https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%85%B6%E9%95%B7%E4%B8%81%E9%8A%80>.

and tribute trade, the Chosŏn court provided 1,000 *taels* of silver to the Qing annually, which was most likely Japanese mined silver. In return, Ming silver flowed into Chosŏn Korea through the Qing state. For example, in late 1634, Hong Taiji rewarded the Chosŏn court with 30 *taels* of silver, which increased to 1,835 *taels* of silver in early 1638.<sup>687</sup> However, it is worth noting that silver from different locations contained different proportions of silver, despite the fact that these different proportions were consistently translated as silver in all documents. As mentioned above, the silver the Chosŏn court presented to the Qing was Japanese silver, which was 79.19% silver. The silver the Qing used mainly originated from the Ming. Known as *wenyin* (Ch. 纹银) and the official currency of the Ming state, this silver was 98% silver.<sup>688</sup> It is evident that the flow of silver originating in Japan was centred on East Asia, with Ming China acting as an important conduit within this trade network.

The second silver route into the Qing state was via the trade network with the Mongols and Chinese. Ming China also played a pivotal role within this trade, as the silver trade from America was mainly driven by the Ming state's high demand for silver. Ming China's high demand was due to insufficient production sites domestically and the access to lucrative trade routes. The production of silver by the Ming era was lower than it had been during the Song dynasty and far lower than at Potosí. Quan Hansheng argues that the annual *yinke* income of the Ming during the fifteenth century was as low

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<sup>687</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:123, 302.

<sup>688</sup> For more details, please see <https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%BA%B9%E9%93%B6>.

as 10% of the Spanish royal family's *yinke* during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and even lower than 1% of their seventeenth and eighteenth-century income.<sup>689</sup> *Yinke* refers to the income the Ming government obtained from the mining of silver and smelting, which occupied at least 30% of the total production of silver by the Ming.<sup>690</sup> By contrast, the *yinke* income of the Spanish royal family in Peru was only 20% of the silver mine production.<sup>691</sup> This shows how low the domestic silver production of the Ming state was, such that the Ming required silver imports to supplement the domestic shortage.

However, these imports did not mean that Ming China was the final destination of this silver. Silver flowed out of the Ming state through numerous trade networks. In the late sixteenth century, this thesis has argued that Ming silver mainly flowed into the various tribes of the Jurchens and the Mongols via the tribute trade and the frontier market trade. The Ming court maintained a trade relationship with Nurhaci and the right wing of the Eastern Mongols. In 1619, when Nurhaci explicitly cut off trade relations with the Ming, the silver from the Ming stopped flowing into the Qing state but continued to flow into the Mongol territory. With the rise of the Qing, more silver from the Ming flowed to the Mongols as an incentive to resist the Qing. It was during 1628 and 1633 that this silver began to find its way to the Qing once again, flowing from the Ming, to the Mongols, and then to the Qing. During the first Qing invasion of the

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<sup>689</sup> Quan Hansheng, *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu*, 617.

<sup>690</sup> Quan Hansheng, *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu*, 601,617.

<sup>691</sup> Quan Hansheng, *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu*, 617.

Čaqars, the plunder that the Qing obtained was mainly Ming silver. However, it was not until 1633 when all the Eastern Mongols had submitted to the Qing, that the silver flowing from the Ming to the Mongols consistently found its way to the Qing. Therefore, the Qing state obtained silver from America, Japan, and the Ming via multiple networks. The silver that flowed on two distinct routes converged at the Qing state. The Qing utilised this silver to finance its empire construction.

### **From Military Conquests to Wealth Accumulation: The Interaction of the Trade Networks, 1627-1644**

Economy was an important issue throughout the early Qing period. This thesis argues that wealth accumulation was achieved primarily through warfare. The economic crisis of the Jin state motivated Hong Taiji to develop new trade networks with his neighbouring states so as to obtain resources, but the means he adopted to develop these trade networks was warfare. This challenges the view that Qing expansion was “largely the result of economic instability rather than strict military planning”.<sup>692</sup> In fact, economic instability resulted in military planning that later culminated in the Qing empire. Plunder was an important economic result of warfare, but it did not provide a consistent strategy for wealth accumulation. Therefore, a critical outcome of warfare was the construction of stable and regulated trade networks. In this way, strict military planning not only enabled Hong Taiji to defeat his rivals but also facilitated the

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<sup>692</sup> Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, 254–55.

development of new trade partners. The legacies of the multiple trade networks both financed Qing expansion as well as enabled the circulation of commodities and silver between East Asia, Inner Asia, and Southeast Asian states.

Trade networks with Korea and the Mongols and Chinese were not independent but rather interactive. Shenyang, the capital of the Jin state, was the connection point of these two trade networks. Shenyang was seized by Nurhaci in 1621 and became the capital of the Jin state in 1625. Later, Hong Taiji expanded Shenyang and proclaimed himself emperor of the Qing state in 1636. He further promoted policies to transform Shenyang into the trading centre of the Qing economy. Shenyang became the site where products flowed between the two trade networks. For example, in 1633, Hong Taiji rewarded the Qorčın Mongols with local products from Chosŏn, such as Korean paper.<sup>693</sup> Additionally, in 1638, Hong Taiji rewarded the Jurchens from the Amur River and Solon people who came to present fur to the Qing with Koryŏ grass cloth.<sup>694</sup> Commodities were also freely traded in Shenyang.<sup>695</sup> Furthermore, the market was regulated. In order to encourage the development of commerce, eight trade offices were established in Shenyang, administered by the eight banners. For example, in 1636, in response to the food shortage, Hong Taiji ordered the eight banners to hand over grain freely to artificially lower the grain price.<sup>696</sup>

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<sup>693</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:17–18.

<sup>694</sup> *Qingchu nei guoshiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, 1:401–2.

<sup>695</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:TM11.9.7.

<sup>696</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:772.

Tax rates reflect the prosperity of trade at Shenyang. On the sixth day of the second lunar month of 1630, the Qing court ruled that to trade ox, mules, donkeys, sheep, and goats required a tax to be paid at the Bell Tower (Ch. *zhonglou* 鐘樓). Though the exact tax rate is unknown, it is worth noting that this trading tax was routinely levied rather than an occasional occurrence.<sup>697</sup> It is hard to know the exact trade volume at Shenyang, but it can be assumed that the volume was significant, as the Qing court addressed four cases pertaining to economic corruption and tax evasion there.<sup>698</sup> The prosperity of trade in Shenyang reflects the prosperity of the Qing economy at this time.

The multiple trade networks linked trade between Inner Asian, East Asian, and Southeast Asian states. From a broader perspective, this shows that trade interactions were rooted in a global trade network. During the medieval period, trade was grounded in indirect links. For example, trade on the Silk Roads across Eurasia was fluid and discontinuous. It started in China, moving through numerous central Asian states, and finally arriving in Europe. Under such a trade pattern, commodities passed through several trade intermediaries, who were responsible for one small aspect of the trade. As such, the state of origin and the consumption state possessed indirect trade relations.

However, with increases in globalisation, more direct links between the original state and the consumption state started to form. Globalisation began to take its shape from 1400 to 1600, when trade relations between the east and the west were established

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<sup>697</sup> *Neige cangben manwen laodang*, 2009, Taizong:525.

<sup>698</sup> *Qing shilu*, n.d., Taizong:CD4.1.29.

with minimal transit stops. Despite the limited navigation skills and several Asian states' ban on maritime trade, inter-regional and intra-regional commodity flows greatly increased during this period. Manila, Nagasaki, and Tsushima Island became geographical transit stops for the transportation of commodities. As for the Qing state, wild ginseng and furs, the most globally coveted products of the Qing, flowed in great quantity to the Ming and the Chosŏn state. However, it is also paramount to note which products flowed to the Qing and where they came from, as well as how silver flowed to the Qing from the Ming, Japan, and Potosí. Therefore, in the context of global economic history, the establishment of the multilateral trade networks channelled commodities from East Asia and Southeast Asia into Inner Asia; and vice versa. This means that the rise of the Qing was rooted in global trade just as much as it derived from regional networks.

## **Conclusion**

The thesis has aimed to show the centrality of trade in the rise of the Manchus, showing how both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji used ginseng and sable fur to build the trade networks that financed Qing expansion. It has employed a global economic historical approach, which emphasises the importance of trade in the construction of the Qing state from 1583 when Nurhaci began to conquer other Jurchen tribes to 1644 when the Qing seized Beijing, marking their victorious conquest of China. These trade networks had profound impacts that went beyond Jurchen territory and even Asia, affecting and affected by global economic movements.

While both Nurhaci and Hong Taiji were instrumental in the Qing's rise, neither was able to see the culmination of their efforts in the long-desired conquest of China. Nurhaci, as detailed in this thesis, died in 1626, and Hong Taiji died in 1643. Hong Taiji's six-year-old son, Emperor Shunzhi, came to the throne after a shift in political power, with Hong Taiji's brother, Dorgon, acting as regent of Qing state. As these political manoeuvres were occurring in the Qing state, Ming China was facing its own political changes. The uprising led by Li Zicheng was destroying the Ming state and the last Ming emperor committed suicide. Qing troops took this opportunity to cross the Shanhai Pass, the narrow corridor linking the Jurchen and Ming territories. Their subsequent seizure of Beijing symbolised the beginning of Qing China.

Global history is central to the study of these events, helping to rethink the rise of Manchus, and providing a means to explore the connectedness of these events beyond

the historical narratives from a national or regional level.<sup>699</sup> This thesis has emphasised the role of mobility as a concentrated point in global history, detailing the movement of people, goods, and ideas across political and cultural borders.<sup>700</sup> Silver is one such example that was explored within the thesis, with silver flows forming various networks, providing a new view of the world as crisscrossed not by national borders but by enduring and far-reaching economic ties.<sup>701</sup> Silver dominated the world between the 1540s and the 1640s, with both east and west operating in “the silver century”.<sup>702</sup> Ming China drew in vast amounts of silver from Spanish America and Japan, with silver not only a currency but also a lucrative commodity.<sup>703</sup> During Nurhaci’s reign, a large amount of this silver flowed from the Ming to Nurhaci through the bilateral trade, so that the Jin state was the ultimate destination of the overseas silver rather than the Ming. As argued in the thesis, this silver brought huge amounts of wealth to the Jin state, playing a central role in the development of the Jin economy, and supporting and financing the construction of the Qing empire.

However, economic prosperity in the Jurchen territory was unstable, experiencing

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<sup>699</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, *What Is Global History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 3; John Darwin, ‘Afterword’, in *The Prospect of Global History*, ed. James Belich et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 183; James Belich, John Darwin, and Chris Wickham, ‘Introduction’, in *The Prospect of Global History*, ed. James Belich et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 3.

<sup>700</sup> Belich, Darwin, and Wickham, ‘Introduction’, 15.

<sup>701</sup> Belich, Darwin, and Wickham, 17.

<sup>702</sup> Flynn and Giráldez, ‘Cycles of Silver: Globalization as Historical Process’, 9.

<sup>703</sup> Flynn, ‘Silver in a Global Context, 1400–1800’, 215–16, 224; Atwell, ‘International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650’, 68, 72–75; Quan Hansheng, *Zhongguo jingji shi luncong*, vol. 1:444; Rawski, *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China*, 76. Von Glahn, *Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700*, 83–113.

booms and busts. The latter is epitomised in the Jurchen economic crisis, which sent waves of silver shortages and inflation throughout East Asia in the first half of the seventeenth century. The crisis was partly the result of a decline in silver influxes, causing economic declines not only in East Asia but globally. The subsequent end of silver inflows to the Jin state was equally devastating, resulting in severe shortages in commodities as well as significant domestic inflation. Silver flows into the Jin/Qing state eventually re-emerged with the establishment of the multiple trade networks during Hong Taiji's reign. It was mainly during 1628 and 1633 that this silver began to find its way to the Qing once again, flowing from the Ming, to the Mongols, and then to the Qing. As such, the Qing were intertwined in global networks that both assisted their path to empire and put it at risk. The trade networks they participated in and built themselves provided invaluable access to resources that financed military expansion and created greater economic diversification and sophistication domestically. These networks, as the case of silver shows, cannot be studied locally, but must be placed within the global context from which they came. In this way, we are better able to understand the contributions these networks had as well as the threats they posed to the Qing's rise.

Jurchen local commodities and their movement, which were paramount in the Qing's development, in turn influenced regional and global states. For centuries, wild ginseng and sable fur had been the two most lucrative trade items for the Jurchens, particularly coveted by the Chinese, Mongols, and Koreans. Shared cultural and

consumption preferences made it possible for the Qing to establish trade networks across the Ming, Mongols, and Chosŏn territories. Through the sale of ginseng and sable fur, the early Manchu rulers gradually built up trade relations, exchanging their local products for much-needed resources and wealth. During Nurhaci's reign, the bilateral trade brought a sizable amount of silver, which enabled his military conquests of other Jurchen tribes, laying a solid economic foundation for Nurhaci to build his later state. After Hong Taiji became ruler, the multiple trade networks facilitated the circulation of commodities and silver between East Asia and Inner Asia, which resolved the economic crisis of the Jin state and further promoted the movement of commodities.

In this way, these trade networks can be understood as a system. The concept of a system is a crucial focus of global history, as it displays the way in which seemingly distinct parts work together in a coherent way to affect global events.<sup>704</sup> The Qing economy was such a system, experiencing a crucial shift from dependence to dominance. The tribute trade and the frontier market trade were two parts of the Qing economic system that played different roles but worked coherently.

During Nurhaci's reign, the tribute trade primarily functioned as a means for Nurhaci to maintain relations with the Ming rather than as a means to accumulate wealth, albeit he still gained significant wealth. The purpose of the frontier market trade, on the other hand, was more concentrated on capital. After monopolising the wild ginseng and sable fur trade, Nurhaci's main source of income was the frontier market

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<sup>704</sup> Crossley, *What Is Global History?*, 83.

trade. This monopolisation was coupled with political power. While the frontier market trade was therefore defined by Jurchen dominance, the bilateral trade was consumed by dependence. The true nature of the bilateral trade was one of vulnerability, as trade relations between the Ming and Nurhaci ended in 1619. Once trade ceased, the Jurchen economy was in trouble. The frontier market trade was able to assuage the negative effects of the bilateral trade's instability, such that the two distinct trades played off each other in the Qing economic system. The Qing's economic and political rises and falls were tied to networks that went beyond their territorial boundaries, with both power and vulnerability channelled through trade.

The crucial period of the Qing empire building was during Hong Taiji's reign. Warfare and developing multiple trade networks were inseparably intertwined, as Hong Taiji used military force to gain trade partners. The two most important trading partners during this period were Chosŏn and Mongols. With the Chosŏn court functioning as the "supplier" and transit point of the Qing economy, the tribute trade and frontier market trade were vital means by which the Qing consistently obtained much-needed resources from Chosŏn. The various Mongol tribes in turn played crucial economic roles in the formation of the Qing state as "resource sharers". The Qorč'in Mongols "shared" their military power, providing horses and soldiers, which greatly bolstered the Qing's military power. The Tümed Mongols acted as the transit point in terms of trade, becoming the middlemen between the Qing and the Ming. These new multilateral trading networks resolved the Jurchen economic crisis and channelled commodities

from East Asia and Southeast Asia into Inner Asia, and vice versa, funding the construction of the Qing state. Hong Taiji transformed the Qing economy to dominate trade connections with the Chinese, Koreans, and Mongols. The rise of the Qing empire was rooted in global and cross-regional trade.

This thesis has shown that numerous ways in which the Qing's path to empire was embedded in networks that spanned state boundaries. These networks were mostly expressed through trade, which had immense impacts on political and cultural developments. Therefore, commerce and empire-building in the borderlands cannot be separated.<sup>705</sup> And just as these cannot be separated, neither can the Qing's rise be excluded from a global context. The construction of the Qing empire was an amalgamation of local and global events, the circulation of domestic and foreign commodities, and the networks that tied all these things together. Ultimately, the Qing's rise must be placed within this global world-view, as its power was drawn from networks that went far beyond its borders. This is in fact critical in the study of any empire, as no state can exist merely within its own borders. Forms of globalisation have always been part of global economic history and consistently central to the rise of empires – the Qing is only one example.

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<sup>705</sup> Giersch, 'Commerce and Empire in the Borderlands: How Do Merchants and Trade Fit into Qing Frontier History?', 361.

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