Journal article icon

Journal article

Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling.

Abstract:

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A househo...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02311.x

Authors


Martin Browning More by this author
Pierre-André Chiappori More by this author
Valérie Lechene More by this author
Journal:
Economic Journal
Volume:
120
Issue:
545
Publication date:
2010
DOI:
URN:
uuid:c00f6fe0-55d9-4703-a811-c48a9e29f26a
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14785
Language:
English

Terms of use


Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP