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"Missionary Zeal of Recent Converts": Norms and Norm Entrepreneurs in the Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 1989-2011

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ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses the role of norms and norm entrepreneurs in the foreign policy-making of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia after the downfall of communism. In an attempt to unpack the mechanics and appliance of "soft power" in foreign policy practice in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, it identifies conditions and analyses processes via which norms come to play the role of an intermediary variable in the articulation and enactment of national interests. Capitalising on the agency-oriented strand of norm diffusion theory in international relations and discursive institutionalism scholarship in comparative politics, the dissertation argues that normative frameworks advocated by value-bound networks of so-called norm entrepreneurs can play a regulative function in foreign policy-making by setting boundaries for discourse and sustaining logics of appropriateness that constrain the pool of foreign policy choices at critical junctures. In the first part, "mission and conversion" (1989-1999), the dissertation focuses on the early stages of norm emergence and habituation in the three states in the 1990s, asserting that ideational influence incurred by American "missionaries" on Czech, Polish and Slovak "converts" to democracy via a range of socialisation processes related to NATO enlargement and Western democracy promotion efforts in the region gave rise

to norm entrepreneur groups bound by a shared commitment to a normative framework dubbed "dissident geopolitics". In part two, "zeal", the dissertation concentrates on the later stages of norm internalisation, demonstrated by norm enforcement in foreign policy. Using the case studies of Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy during the Iraq War (2002-2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) and the Russia Reset (2009-2011), the dissertation shows how sustained advocacy by norm entrepreneurs with structural power, who skilfully use framing to push their normative agendas in discursive competition with their contenders, has established "dissident geopolitics" as a permanent feature of the foreign policy-making process, which has produced activist and value-laden foreign policy outcomes that might not have been expected of "weak" states. Ultimately, the dissertation argues that *dominant* norms and norm entrepreneur networks can thrive in transition settings when they are less heavily *disputed*, but they tend to lose coherence and unity, respectively, as the foreign policy landscape diversifies with democratic consolidation.

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ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

ACUS	Atlantic Council
AEI	American Enterprise Institute
AMO	Asociace pro mezinarodni otazky (Association for International Affairs)
ANO	Aliancia noveho obcana (Alliance of the New Citizen)
AWS	Akcja wyborcza solidarnosc (Solidarity Electoral Action Party)
BBN	Biuro bezpieczenstwa narodowego (National Security Bureau)
BRICs	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CEVRO	Liberalne-konzervativni akademie (Liberal Conservative Academy)
CEZ	Ceske Energeticke Zavody (Czech Energy Works)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CFE Treaty	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CoD	Community of Democracies
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSSD	Ceska strana socialne demokraticka (Czech Social Democratic Party)
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DEMAS	Asociace pro podporu demokracie a lidskych prav (Association for Democracy Assistance and Human Rights)
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
EEDC	East European Democratic Centre
EPP-ED	Group of the European People's Party – European Democrats
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSB	Federalnaya sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation)
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GLOBSEC	Global Security Forum
GMF	German Marshall Fund
GOTV	Get out the vote
GROM	Grupa reagowania operacyjno-manewrowego (Operational Mobile Reaction Group)

HZDS	Hnutie za demokraticke Slovensko (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia Party)
ICC	International Criminal Court
IRI	International Republican Institute
ISP	Instytut spraw publicznych (Institute for Public Affairs)
IVO	Institut pre verejne otazky (Institute for Public Affairs)
KDH	Krestanskodemokraticke hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement Party)
KDU– CSL	Krestansko-demokraticka unie – Ceska strana lidova (Christian Democratic Party – Czech People's Party)
KGB	Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security of the Russian Federation)
KSCM	Komunisticka strana Cech a Moravy (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)
LNG	Liquid Natural Gas
LPR	Liga polskich rodzin (League of Polish Families Party)
MAK	Interstate Aviation Committee
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN	Multinational Force in Iraq
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MP	Member of Parliament
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NKVD	Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del (People's Ministry of Internal Affairs)
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NMD	National Missile Defense
NYU	New York University
ODS	Obcanska demokraticka strana (Civic Democratic Party)
OKS	Obcianska konzervativna strana (Civic Conservative Party)
OPAL Pipeline	Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung Pipeline
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSI	Open Society Institute
OSW	Osrodek studiow wschodnich (Centre for Eastern Studies)
PAC	Polish-American Conference
PAFW	Polsko-amerykanska fundacja wolnosci (Polish-American Freedom Foundation)
PaIiIZ	Polska agencja informacji i inwestycji zagranicznych (Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency)

PASS	Program for Atlantic Security Studies
PAUCI	Inicjatywa wspolpracy polsko-amerykansko-ukrainskiej (American-Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative)
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PGNiG	Polskie gornictwo naftowe i gazownictwo
PiS	Prawo i sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice Party)
PISM	Polski instytut spraw miedzynarodowych (Polish Institute for International Affairs)
PO	Platforma obywatelska (Civic Platform Party)
PSL	Polskie stronnictwo ludowe (Polish Peasant Party)
PSSI	Prague Security Studies Institute
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
SO	Samooborona (Self-Defense Party)
SDKU	Slovenska demokraticka a krestanska unia (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union Party)
SAC	Slovak Atlantic Commission
SARIO	Slovenska agentura pre rozvoj investicii a obchodu (Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency)
SDL	Strana demokratickej lavice (Party of the Democratic Left)
SdRP	Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland)
SEA	Stowarzyszenie euro-atlantyckie (Euro-Atlantic Association)
SFPA	Slovenska spolocnost pre zahranicnu politiku (Slovak Foreign Policy Association)
SLD	Sojusz lewicy demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance)
SMK	Strana madarskej koalicie (Party of the Hungarian Coalition)
Smer-SD	Smer-socialna demokracia (Direction – Social Democracy)
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
START Treaty	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TOP 09	Tradice odpovednost - prosperita 09 (Tradition Responsibility - Prosperity 09)
UMV	Ustav mezinarodnich vztahu (Institute for International Relations)
UN	United Nations
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USCN	US Committee on NATO
US-DEU	Unie svobody – demokraticka unie (Freedom Union Party)
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. The puzzle

1.1.1. Definition of topic

Recent converts are often prone to missionary zeal. Following the downfall of communism, the young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe quickly became known in international affairs for displays of moral fibre in combating authoritarian regimes and terrorism around the globe.[1] As outspoken advocates of human rights, they have engaged in harsh verbal shoot-outs with dictatorships in Burma, Cuba or North Korea, both from home and in the international arena, from their embassies, the UN, the EU or the Council of Europe, often to the exasperation of "old Europe". They have vigorously defended the cause of "colourful revolutionaries" across Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space – which also involved giving a cold shoulder to contra-revolutionaries in Russia and Central Asia – during a wave of regime change in the mid-2000s. These days, they are teaching their "transition know-how" to wannabe democratisers in North Africa, where popular protests amplified by Facebook and Twitter whisked away obstinate despots in an unexpected current of change. Interestingly, for the sake of containing autocracy, the small states of Central and Eastern Europe were ready to go far: in 1994, they reprimanded the international

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1 Rupnik, J., 2003. Why Are the Eastern Europeans Pro-American? *East European Constitutional Review* 12:69-71; Asmus, R., Vondra, A., 2005. The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe. *The Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18(2): 203-216; Svoboda, C., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 3.12.

community for standing idly by while genocide was gripping Rwanda, and in 1999, they readily committed to the risky and hotly disputed exercise in humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, bypassing the UN. Even more curiously, they took up arms in the war on terror – allegedly to defend the values of the Western civilisation – contributing to the surge in the 2000s against the remaining strongholds of the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as to the 2003 unilateral US strike against Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Why did these weak post-authoritarian states embark on an activist and value-laden pro-democracy foreign policy of too few spoils and too many controversies? That they would start fighting against autocracies elsewhere with such vigour – and with such geopolitical nomadism, at that – is both theoretically and empirically puzzling. Their own democratic consolidation was not yet complete and involvement abroad was costly due to high stakes and scarce military, economic and political resources at home. The discourse on the puzzle offers two explanations relevant for this dissertation. In international relations and the FPA literature, it has been commonplace to link CEE states' missionary zeal – demonstrated, inter alia, by their participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns but also by their interest in Cuba and George W. Bush's "freedom agenda" in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood – to their efforts to ingratiate the United States: at times, their foreign policies were almost fully aligned with Washington's. For that reason, Central and Eastern European states have, over the years been labeled as "servants and lackeys of the US", as well as "America's Trojan horses" – or even "Trojan donkeys" and "Trojan cockhorses" – set

out to divide Europe.[2] In comparative politics and area studies works, the explanation for the muscular, anti-authoritarian foreign policy has been traced back to communist legacies and, even more specifically, to the role of dissidents-turned-policy-makers. But the connection between the two explanations is scarcely made. Hence, it is fair to ask: has Central and East Europeans' communist experience been a prelude to the local elites' post-communist love affair with the Americans? And if so, how does CEE policy-makers' affinity to the US – it also matters "which" US this is – affect the way they understand and pursue foreign policy?

The analytical point of departure for the dissertation is the premise that elite linkages between the anti-communist superpower and the post-communist Central and East European small and medium-sized states are the key to the puzzle of the latter's foreign policy agenda that is perhaps best described as Atlanticism combined with a "muscular democratisation" programme. First, there is the self-explanatory empirical evidence of CEE states' foreign policy coordination with the United States. Following the downfall of communism in 1989, the region of Central and Eastern Europe re-emerged on the international scene as Europe's "Atlanticist" voice. Not unlike West Europeans after World War II, Central and East Europeans rallied behind the US, which emerged victorious from the Cold War, demonstrating fervent – and at times even infatuated – support for Washington's foreign policy agenda. A testimony to the CEE states' pro-American leanings is the abovementioned agnomen "Trojan horse": it was coined by French president Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s for Great Britain,

2 Palous, M., 2003. All Too Familiar With Dictators. *Washington Post*, 5.3; *The Guardian*, 2003. New Europe Gets Shock Lesson in Realpolitik. 28.4.; Svoboda 2011

then candidate for membership in the European Community as well as a staunch US ally, much like CEE states in the 1990s and early 2000s. Second, notable empirical evidence also exists for the sustained exposure of CEE elites to policy-makers in the highest echelons of power in Washington, especially during the negotiations preceding NATO enlargement. This grand project required close and sustained collaboration on tasks such as framing the geopolitical narrative; harnessing political support in Washington and among West European allies; and not least internal democratisation and overhaul of the defense sectors in the post-communist region. As such, it created a favourable opportunity structure for years of interpersonal interaction and ideational exchange between CEE elites and their American counterparts. Third – as one might rightly object that Central and East Europeans were equally close to West Europeans due to the multi-faceted process of European integration – it is the ideological underpinnings of CEE states' "crusader" foreign policy that point to influence of the US rather than of Western Europe. The black-and-white distinction between democracy and authoritarianism – perceived as incarnations of "good" and "evil" – and the kind of Kantian conviction that posits that democratisation elsewhere enhances one's own security, as well as the emphasis on the universal value of freedom, human rights and democracy and the readiness to protect the Western civilisation by military means, if necessary, are reminiscent of "hard Wilsonianism" or "democratic globalism", both US foreign policy doctrines.

Yet the relative abundance of anecdotal evidence merely suggests an attractive narrative. The Economist summed it up in a nutshell in a 2009 article, "At its height the bond between Eastern Europe and America was based, like the best marriages, on a mixture of emotion and mutual support. The romance dates from the Cold War:

when Western Europe was sometimes squishy in dealing with the Soviet empire, America was robust. [And] when the Iron Curtain fell, ex-dissidents and retired cold warriors found they had plenty in common."[3] Yet, switching from the journalistic jargon to the social science language, *who* are the Central and East European ex-dissident elites and American cold warriors, *what* is it that they share and *how* does it influence the latter's choices of foreign policy? The topic clearly requires further empirical research and more refined theorising, which is where the following dissertation steps in.

1.1.2. Theoretical delineation of topic

The theoretical framework that this thesis proposes for the analysis of the "missionary zeal" in the foreign policy of relatively diverse states from across the post-communist world is based on the theory of norm diffusion, rooted in the constructivist perspective on state behaviour. Returning to the questions posed above, *what* is it that CEE and US policy-makers have in common? CEE elites' set of Americanophile convictions and appropriate foreign policy tools will be described here as a set of foreign policy *norms*. The subject of this dissertation's inquiry must, for a start, be disentangled from material interests: the foreign policy investigated here has been consistently pursued in opportunity structures with low (Iraq War), medium (Russia Reset) and high (Ukraine's Orange Revolution) security and economic incentives,

3 *The Economist*, 2009. The End of an Affair? The Transatlantic Alliance is Waning in Europe's East. 10.9.

which suggests that it must also be driven by other, immaterial, factors. The concept of a "norm" – or a "standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" [4] – is particularly well-suited to capture the immaterial quality of the hypothesised ideological underpinnings of Central and East Europeans' activist and value-laden foreign policy. Crucially, unlike the notions of an "idea" and a "value" that are typically associated with individuals, smaller groups or the national rather than the international level of analysis, the concept of norms in foreign policy – exemplified by CEE states' accent on freedom, human rights and democracy – has an inter-subjective quality. Moreover, it is not only CEE states that perceive themselves as "Atlanticist", "anti-authoritarian" or "pro-democratic"; they are widely known as such: in other words, their "missionary zeal" has become a recognised foreign policy brand or, indeed, a "reputation" in the international arena. Hence, the topic of this dissertation will be theoretically defined as the role of norms in the foreign policy of Central and East European states. To what extent have norms motivated the agenda of "muscular democratisation"? If they did have an effect, how did they translate into foreign policy outcomes?

Moving on to the *who*, the bearers of norms identified by The Economist as "CEE ex-dissidents" and "US cold warriors", they will be conceptualised here as a network of "norm entrepreneurs", according to the agency-oriented strand of norm diffusion theory. Transcending borders, eras and administrations, members of this distinct elite group have been struggling to "advertise" – by rebranding and repackaging if

4 Finnemore, M., Sikkink, K., 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917, p. 891-2

necessary – and "sell" a very specific set of foreign policy norms on a strictly competitive market that by definition favours security and economic interests, for nearly two decades after the downfall of communism. As a network of norm entrepreneurs, they can be identified on the basis of several observable characteristics, including social traits and interpersonal contacts.[5] On the CEE side, the network is centred around heavyweights from top echelons of the political and intellectual elite, like Adam Michnik, Bronislaw Geremek, Alexander Kwasniewski, Adam Rotfeld or Radoslaw Sikorski in Poland; Janos Martonyi, Miklos Haraszti, Arpad and Kinga Goncz or Matyas Eorsi in Hungary; Vaclav Havel, Karel Schwarzenberg and Alexander Vondra in the Czech Republic; Martin Butora and Pavol Demes in Slovakia; Valdas Adamkus and Vytautas Landsbergis in Lithuania; Sandra Kalniete or Vaira Vike-Freiberga in Latvia; or Lennart Meri, Mart Laar and Toomas Hendrik Ilves in Estonia. Their American counterparts, recruited from the government institutions and affiliated agencies, diplomatic corps, partisan and independent think-tanks and media outlets included, for instance, Madeleine Albright from the US State Department, Richard N. Perle from the American Enterprise Institute, Ronald Asmus from GMF, Bruce Jackson and Paige Reef from the US Committee of NATO, James Wolsey from the CIA, Anne Applebaum from the Washington Post, and many others. Crucially, this dissertation does not posit that the network is the only community of norm entrepreneurs seeking to influence foreign policy in Central and Eastern Europe, but it will focus on explaining its origins and activities. Competition with other groups will be duly noted.

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5 The concept will be operationalised in Chapter 2, which deals with the theoretical framework.

Why norm entrepreneurs and not, for instance, lobby groups, epistemic communities or advocacy networks? Perhaps most importantly, the concept accounts for the "charitable" or "non-profit" nature of the enterprise: in contrast to lobbyists, norm entrepreneurs generally do not build their "business strategies" on a vision of securing material gains; the logic of appropriateness dictates that they do so because they believe it is "good" and "appropriate". At the same time, the possibility that they have multiple, over-lapping agendas has to be taken into account: norms can – and often do – complement and reinforce interests which do bring with them notable security or economic benefits. For instance, after 1989, American "missionaries" started preaching democratic norms to "converts" in the post-communist world not only because the logic of appropriateness dictated so, but also because they sought new allies in Europe, eyed investment in emerging markets and/or contemplated optimal containment strategies vis-à-vis the Russians. This observation, and others of the same sort, will inform the analysis presented in this dissertation. Moreover, the concept of norm entrepreneur seems particularly apt to capture the nature of the threads connecting the intricately woven network: norm entrepreneurs are bound not only by shared knowledge and understanding of cause-and-effect relationships – as epistemic communities tend to be – but also by a shared commitment to particular political, social and moral values.[6] As such, they constitute "principle issue

6 See also Arias-King, F., 2007. Orange People: A Brief History of Transnational Liberation Networks in East Central Europe. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratisation* 15(1): 29-72

networks", whose emphasis on common values marks their subtle distinction from epistemic communities. Lastly, norm entrepreneurs should be distinguished by their "strategy": they "do business" on existing markets but also actively create new ones. Hence, norm entrepreneurship – mobilising support for particular standards of appropriateness and persuading others to adopt new norms[7] – will be recognised here as the type of elite agency that drives CEE states' activist and value-laden foreign policy agenda. Having identified the agents of norm entrepreneurship, the aim of the thesis is to assemble the puzzle by explaining the *how* in The Economist's story: the mechanics by which norms make their way into foreign policy and the type of role that they tend to play.

1.2. Significance of topic

The explanandum itself poses interesting questions: for most IR theorists, it would be counter-intuitive to expect a consistently value-based foreign policy course in a relatively wide assortment of small and medium-sized post-authoritarian states. Yet, in the 1990s and early 2000s, there was a centre of gravity in the CEE region that enabled observers to speak of it as a whole. Even though Poland and the Baltic States were generally more militant in their "crusader" rhetoric and conduct, those were differences of degree, not in kind. The foreign policy agenda that the post-communist states shared during the period of democratic transition and consolidation relied on four constitutive pillars: an accent on a strong bond with the United States, and, by

7 Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897-901

extension, NATO as the main vehicle of the transatlantic partnership; a hard-line approach to former imperial power Russia, based on consistent criticism of the shortcomings of the latter's "managed democracy"; the support for projects driven by the ideals of spreading freedom and democracy around the world, and an emphasis on ties with post-Soviet countries motivated by a strive to export the region's transition experience into the Eastern neighbourhood. This foreign policy not only anchored CEE states in the security and political architecture of the Western civilisation, but also established their reputation as loyal allies and – due to their cooperation with the US on a number of democracy promotion projects – champions of liberal democracy around the world.

From explanandum to explanans: despite the obvious resonance of norms in Central and East European states' foreign policy discourse, the role of norms in the region's foreign policy-making has not yet been properly explained. Overall, the neo-realist view of international politics remains the dominant paradigm for the conduct and reflection of foreign policy in the post-communist region. Unlike the EU as a whole, which strives to move beyond the "modern" geopolitical paradigm in its common foreign policy (e.g. via the concept of "external governance"), most decision-makers and strategists in CEE states – and especially in the Baltic States and Poland – think largely in terms of states, spheres of interests and zero-sum games.[8]. Yet, at the same time, references to norms as motives for state action are abundant in strategic

8 Paulauskas, A., 2004. Lithuania's Foreign Policy. Speech by the acting President of Lithuania. Vilnius University, 24.5.

documents and public remarks of relevant CEE policymakers.[9] For instance, the Czech government has demonstrated its commitment to the norms by taking special interest in Belarus, Burma, Tibet and Cuba – all places that, like the former Czechoslovakia, "…know what it is like to be at the mercy of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes."[10] Further east, the Slovak authorities have voiced support for the "freedom agenda" on the international stage in an attempt to reinvent the once backwater country – referred to in 1997 as "black hole in the heart of Europe" by then-US secretary of state Madeleine Albright – as an avowed democratiser following the ouster of semi-authoritarian Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in 1998. In the foreign policy agenda for 2003, the government pledged to "…uphold the [hitherto] high levels in real-life provision of [human and minority] rights… and actively participate in the creation of norms in this issue area on the ground of international organizations."[11] The minuscule Baltic States have also acted upon norms by defining themselves as a "bridge" between the West and the East, engaging with the EU's Eastern neighbours in hopes of fostering democratisation and marketisation. In an

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9 For instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. Latvia's Foreign Policy Guidelines 2006-2010; The Estonian Government's European Union Policy for 2004–2006; The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic for Years 2003 – 2006; Strategy of the Slovak Republic: Successful Slovakia in a Secure World

10 Galante, John, Schipani-Aduriz, Andres, 2006. Exporting Dissent: Made in the Czech Republic. *Transitions Online*, 4.1.

11 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 2003. The Strategic Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic. Strategic Document

illustrative quote, Lithuanian ex-president Vytautas Landsbergis, asked whether Baltic engagement in Georgia is a "moral" or "strategic" issue, gave a clear answer: "Cooperation between the Baltic States and the South Caucasus countries is based on a moral ground."[12] Lastly, latecomers Romania and Bulgaria, too, have devoted considerable rhetorical action to secure public validation of their "desire to extend the global zone of freedom and democracy". Speaking on the lessons from the region's communist past, Romanian president Traian Basescu said that: "…we, the people today, wish to go to the very end in the assumption of the values of liberty. These values, prior even to being those of Romania or of Europe, flow from the universal, sacred value of the human person…any regime that humiliates [its] citizens…does not deserve to exist."[13] Whether norms work as independent or intervening variables, whether they function merely as rhetorical devices in foreign policy discourse or wield traceable influence on foreign policy output – and if so, how well they fare in states with various material capabilities and diverse security dilemmas – their role in the foreign policy-making of CEE states should be more systematically conceptualised and analysed.

Finally, the topic is timely as the foreign policy landscape in Central and Eastern

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12 Di Pupplo, Lilli. 2006. Vytautas Landsbergis: The European Union would support the South Caucasus countries more if there were more evidence in the region of a strong political line for independence and democracy. *Caucaz Europenews*. 26.6.

13 Basescu, Traian, 2006. Speech by the President, delivered on the occasion of the presentation of the report by the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania. Parliament of Romania, 18.12.

Europe is undergoing sweeping changes: the post-authoritarian setting in which norms seemed to have flourished is being replaced by a new state of European "normality" where, as CEE policy-makers have said in interviews, interests are increasingly crowding out norms. Hence, after the turn to realpolitik in President Obama's approach to the post-communist region – which included backtracking on the commitment of his predecessor to install parts of the US missile defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland – Central and East Europeans have made their turn: away from the benign superpower that they have clung to after the demise of communism. "Post-Atlanticism" has been coupled with a more pragmatic approach to Russia as the region's chief energy supplier: for instance, after the Russo-American reset came the Russo-Polish one. The other two pillars of CEE states' "crusader" foreign policy, democracy promotion and Eastern policy, have been preserved but transformed: less hawkish and less keen on humanitarian intervention or wars with rogue states, Central and East Europeans have, in many ways, come to emulate the EU's foreign policy conduct, based on "soft power". In some CEE states, this is a turnover of norm entrepreneurs: the idealistic ex-dissidents who masterminded the doctrine of "muscular democratisation" in the 1990s and early 2000s, have largely been replaced by a new generation of pragmatic policymakers on the centre-right and centre-left, like in Hungary or Bulgaria. In other CEE countries, it is a turnover of norms: Atlanticist icons such as Radek Sikorski in Poland and Mikulas Dzurinda in Slovakia now advocate rapprochement with Russia and a "Europeanised" – e.g. cautious, incremental and bottom-up – approach to democracy promotion. Interestingly, the foreign policy that once thrived in Central and Eastern Europe now flourishes further east, in small states that remain a few steps behind CEE when it comes to democratic consolidation and Euro-Atlantic integration, like Georgia or

Moldova. Hence, different sets of foreign policy norms may not be a political resource that can be tapped into at any time: they seem to be a political resource that can be tapped into at a particular moment in time that will be specified by the hypotheses in section 1.1.3.1.

This observation poses at least three sets of questions that inspire further inquiry: they revolve around the power of norms to shape and potentially transform state interests, the role of anti-authoritarian and transition legacies in foreign policy, and the influence of persistence and turnover of elite configurations on foreign policy-making. To what extent does the causal weight of norms matter, especially when measured against that of interests? To what extent are foreign policy norms dependent on the structural power of norm entrepreneurs in the foreign policy-making arena? Can norms survive the exit of norm entrepreneurs from positions of power, for instance by becoming "rhetorical traps" for foreign policy-makers in general? Do norms generally enjoy greater clout in post-authoritarian states? Does the type of authoritarian regime matter? Does the life-span of norms conceived in the era of transition extend beyond it?

1.3. Research design

1.3.1. Research questions and hypotheses

Crafting a comprehensive research agenda from the flurry of questions posed above is challenging. The overall frame for the analysis is the understudied – and, by some, undervalued – role of norms in the foreign policy-making of CEE states. Yet, since there are many competing normative frameworks as well as structurally diverse CEE

states, the focus needs to be narrowed down in a way that will allow for generalisations about wider patterns of foreign policy-making in the post-communist world. The dependent variable is the foreign policy of "muscular democratisation" shared by most countries of the region in the era of transition and consolidation. The set of independent and/or intervening variables – the explanans – accounting for it is more difficult to pin down. The dissertation examines the influence of norms and networks of norm entrepreneurs on foreign policy. More specifically, the content of the norms as well as the structural environment in which norm entrepreneurs operate – e.g. the opportunities and constraints of the international system and the domestic environment – as well as the creative agency of norm entrepreneurs will be regarded as hypothesised explanations of the puzzle (for more detail, see section 1.1.3.1.).

Given the links between Central and East European dissidents and American intellectuals and policy-makers, this dissertation proposes to only focus on one set of norms that it will dub "dissident geopolitics", [14] a conceptual brainchild of "democratic globalism". [15] In the US context, "democratic globalism" – also known as "democratic realism" – is understood as a kind of muscular Wilsonianism, minus the international institutions, that seeks to use US military supremacy to support US

14 Once again, it is important to stress that the dissertation does not assume that this is the only normative framework at play in the region. Nor does the concept of "dissident geopolitics" suggest that the norms in question are championed exclusively by ex-dissidents.

15 The term was coined by one of Washington's leading conservative thinkers, Charles Krauthammer, "democratic globalism" depicts the ideational mycelium of US foreign policy under the recently retired president George W. Bush.

security interests and, simultaneously, democracy, around the world.[16] In Krauthammer's own words, "We [Americans] will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is strategic necessity – meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom."[17] Krauthammer and other commentators argue that democratic globalism, which came to inform – if not motivate – US foreign policy for most of the 2000s, replaced the "Kissingerian" take on realism because it has incorporated the dissident universalism vis-à-vis American values and institutions that has always been an inescapable component of American national identity. Arguably, Americans have this in common with Central and East Europeans: both were never quite at ease with the kind of moral compromises required by strictly realist positioning. In Central and Eastern Europe, the spirit of "democratic globalism" is manifest in what this dissertation labels as "dissident geopolitics".

On the ontological level, "dissident geopolitics" relies on the founding norms of the liberal democratic community, which bind all of its members to defend and promote the Western developmental model. The norms include Isaiah Berlin's notion of negative liberty and universal values such as human rights and democracy, non-appeasement in the face of autocracy, as well as the moral obligation to extend the

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16 Fukuyama, Francis, 2004. The Neo-conservative Moment. *The National Interest* 76, p. 58

17 Krauthammer, Charles, 2004. Democratic Realism: an American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World. The Annual Irving Kristol Lecture, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., USA

zone of prosperity and stability to less successful states.[18] On a theoretical level, the underlying norms of "dissident geopolitics" rest upon an understanding of democracy and democracy promotion that is clearly sympathetic to hard Wilsonianism, the Manichean line of thought positing that tyranny is the new face of evil.[19] Hence, for the proponents of these foreign policy norms, fighting tyranny equates to defending democracy: when it comes to foreign policy, this means that if all else fails, democracy could and should be installed by deposing dictatorial regimes by force in reliance on ad-hoc "coalitions of the willing" rather than the medium of the United Nations.[20] For advocates of "dissident geopolitics", democracy not as a "particularly rare and delicate plant that cannot be transplanted in alien soil"[21], but as a venture that can be undertaken whenever there is democratic craftsmanship and proper zeitgeist. In turn, Central and East Europeans' understanding of democracy promotion is based on the notion of exporting Robert Dahl's procedural minimum.[22] Such – admittedly

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18 The conclusions about the normative framework are based on pointers given by interviewees.

19 Schaller, J., 2006. Neo-Conservatives Among Us? A Study of Former Dissidents' Discourse. *Perspectives* 25:43-62, p. 50-1

20 Stelzer, I., 2004. Neo-Conservatives and Their Critics. In: Irwin Stelzer (ed.). *The Neo-Con Reader*. New York: Grove Press, p. 9

21 Chull-Sin, D., 1994. On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Research. *World Politics* 47(3), p.138

22 Carothers, T., 2009. Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental? *Journal of Democracy* 20(1): 5-19

American – approach to democracy promotion differs starkly from the "developmental model" based on good governance that is championed by the rest of the European Union.[23]

The following dissertation seeks to explain how exactly this set of norms contributed to the persistence of the CEE states – recent converts' – "missionary zeal", i.e. the activist, value-laden foreign policy based on a commitment to the transatlantic partnership, the pursuit of democracy promotion as a global enterprise, a heavily securitized – or more simply, "tough" – stance on Russia and the export of transition know-how to the post-Soviet space, which was exercised, to a varying degree, by most of them in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the first part, dubbed the "mission", it attempts to establish how the normative framework dubbed "dissident geopolitics" arose in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. In the second part, called the "zeal", it proceeds to analyse – through case studies of the decision-making process leading up to several important foreign policy outcomes – whether, and if so, how, it penetrated and possibly steered foreign policy-making in post-communist CEE states in the 2000s. Each section has its own research question and corresponding hypotheses, which consider both structural and agency-based variants of international and domestic prerequisites – opportunity structures – for norm diffusion into foreign policy-making and foreign policy outcomes, respectively, bearing in mind that structures and agents are mutually constitutive and that the international and domestic factors are intertwined.

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23 Kopstein, J., 2006. The Transatlantic Divide Over Democracy Promotion. *The Washington Quarterly* 29(2): 85–98

Research question and hypotheses for part one, the "mission" and "conversion":

R1. Under which conditions, and by which mechanisms, did the normative framework "dissident geopolitics" establish itself in the realm of foreign policy-making across Central and Eastern Europe in the turbulent era of transition in the 1990s?

H1a. The norms in question found their way into CEE states by means of diffusion through extensive structural linkages between the US and CEE, as well as *socialisation* between agents from the American and CEE foreign policy-making community.

H1b. The norms persisted thanks to *resonance* with existing, domestic norms, reinforced by *framing* by agents ("norm entrepreneurs") whose position/legitimacy was relatively *undisputed* by other agents.

The following table summarises the conditions that need to be in place for "dissident geopolitics" to establish itself as a normative framework. It distinguishes between "necessary" ("N") and "complementary" ("C") factors.

Table 1.1: How do norms arise?

	Structural linkages with US	Interpersonal exchange with US	Resonance	Framing	Lack of alternative framing
Type of factor	C	N	C	N	N

Research question and hypotheses for part two, the "zeal":

R2. Under which conditions, and by which mechanisms, did the set of norms labeled here as "dissident geopolitics" motivate and translate into foreign policy outcomes in

the 2000s?

H2a. The effect of "dissident geopolitics" will be weaker in situations involving strong(er) security and material interests.

H2b. The better the access of relevant norm entrepreneurs to domestic decision-makers – *structural power* – and the greater their clout vis-à-vis other norm entrepreneurs – in other words, the extent to which their framing *resonates* – the higher the influence of norms on foreign policy outcomes.

H2c. The persistence of "dissident geopolitics" will depend on the consistency of the norm entrepreneurs' normative convictions, the norms' capacity to endure turnover of personnel and on the persistence of structural conditions preventing the rise of challengers to relevant norm entrepreneurs.

The following table summarises the conditions that need to be in place for "dissident geopolitics" to wield influence on CEE states' foreign policy. It usefully distinguishes between "necessary" ("N") and "complementary" ("C") factors.

Table 1.2: How do norms translate into foreign policy outcomes?

	Weak security interests	Weak material interests	Access to decision-makers	Lack of alternative norms	Consistent norms
Type of factor	N	C	N	C	N

Table 1.3: Summary: structural and agency-based factors at play at the stages of norm emergence and habituation

	Structural	Agency-based
International	Linkages between CEE and US	Interpersonal exchange between CEE and US agents
Domestic	Resonance with existing norms	Framing by *relatively undisputed* CEE agents

Table 1.4: Summary: structural and agency-based factors at play at the stage of norm internalisation/enactment in foreign policy

	Structural	Agency-based
International	Security and material interests	Asymmetric soliciting
Domestic	Access to decision-makers and persistence of norms	More/relatively undisputed framing

Given the plethora of factors involved in norm diffusion, the argument must be based on a careful assessment of their causal weight. Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to build and defend the case for the over-riding importance of domestic factors in the foreign policy-making of post-authoritarian states, arguing that the structural environment – the fluidity – of transition provides unique opportunities for *relatively undisputed* norm entrepreneurship which can – and often does – permanently engrave "transition" normative frameworks into the foreign policy-making domain. The survival of these norms – such as "dissident geopolitics" – however, will later depend on the extent to which they are *disputed* in the domestic arena, as well as on the consistency of the convictions of the norm entrepreneurs that brought them to life.

1.3.2. Case selection

The inquiry into the role of norms in the foreign policy of CEE states deals with three overlapping universes of cases: time, geographical space and foreign policy issues. There is a gravitational pull in each of them that allows us to contract them and thus narrow the topic down and yet still enable us to arrive at generalisations about the part that norms tend to play in foreign policy-making in the post-communist world. Time-wise, this dissertation is concerned with the period of transition and consolidation in the aftermath of 1989. Geographically, it will focus on the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. As for the issues that are due to be discussed in the second part, the dissertation will focus on three cases: the US-led invasion of Iraq (2002-2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004) and the Russia Reset (2009-2011). In so doing, it hopes to provide variety, richness and depth of analysis that will thoroughly test the explanatory power of "dissident geopolitics" in CEE states' foreign policy in the 2000s. While the first two cases represent instances of more or less successful norm entrepreneurship under the conditions of weak material interests (Iraq) and strong incentives (Ukraine), the third case (Russia) marks a relative failure of norm entrepreneurship, and its transformation, in a compelling security and economic macro-structure.

The transition and consolidation epoch has been chosen and divided into two phases that focus on norm habituation in foreign policy-making (1989-1999) and norm influence on foreign policy (1999-2011). After the downfall of communism, most CEE states – former Soviet satellites – adopted a two-pillar foreign policy agenda based on the powerful narrative of "return to the artificially divided Europe", symbolised by the much-desired and loudly proclaimed intention to join the West's

two most exclusive clubs: NATO and the EU.[24] This geopolitical aspiration, based on security and economic incentives as well as normative considerations, created a strong demand for immediate and sustained foreign policy cooperation with EU member states and the US. For their part, the "keymasters" of NATO and the EU also had ample reasons to engage in the post-communist East, including security concerns, economic interests in emerging market economies and, of course, liberal idealism. What followed was intense ideational exchange, eased by extensive "linkages" between Central and Eastern Europe and what was then referred to as "the West". Hence, in the early 1990s, external normative pressure mounted via processes such as diffusion, multilateral political conditionality, democracy assistance programs and activities of transnational human rights and democracy networks.[25] The 1990s were thus a fertile ground for the construction, diffusion and habituation of norms, which is why they represent the time frame for the first part of this dissertation, concerned with the development of norm entrepreneurship networks promoting foreign policy norms identified as "dissident geopolitics". In turn, the post-transition – or, some would say, consolidation – years of 1999-2011 are a wide-open window of opportunity for the

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24 Peter, L., 2000. East of the Elbe – The Communist Takeover and the Past. In: Pynsent, R.B.: *The Phoney Peace: Power and Culture in Eastern Europe.* London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, p. 17; Whitehead, L., 2001. Three International Dimensions of Transition. In: L. Whitehead (ed.) *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Vachudova, M., 2005. *Europe Undivided.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

25 Levitsky, S., Way, L.A., 2005. International Linkage and Democratization. *Journal of Democracy* 16(3): 20-34

study of the influence of norms on foreign policy: as domestic challenges of democratisation and marketisation gradually lost the urgency of the early days, foreign policy assumed a more independent, and in some countries, more prominent role that was complementary with, but also decoupled from, trials faced at home. As for the lower limit, set at 1999, it marks the ten-year-anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, as well as accession of the first CEE cohort to NATO. Moreover, it coincides with the start of EU accession negotiations, whence EU influence increased at the expense of the hitherto dominant US one. Hence, it is assumed that the "Americanised" community of norm entrepreneurs and norms that this dissertation examines had, by that point, already established itself in the various CEE states' foreign policy arena.

Geographically, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia have been selected as models for various types and cohorts of CEE states. The choice was based on their geopolitical positioning and related security dilemmas, material capabilities and corresponding foreign policy ambitions and finally "leader"/ "laggard" reputation related to the level of democratic consolidation at home and the progress towards NATO and EU membership abroad. Poland is the benchmark mid-size state equipped with sturdy military and economic resources – and full of aspirations to become a regional power – whose strategic importance can hardly be overlooked: within the post-communist space, conclusions about its patterns of foreign policy-making may prove particularly relevant for Romania as well. Czech Republic, a weak inland state facing few "hard" security threats is the ideal type of "small state" which – not unlike Sweden – is suspected of invoking norms out of sincere belief as well as out of geopolitical prerogative. The study of Czech foreign policy will allow for a clearer

distinction between interests and norms, as the former will most likely be free of the kind of geopolitical exigency that tends to overshadow normative discourse in vulnerable or endangered countries. Generalisations based on the analysis of the Czech case could be instructive for countries such as Hungary, Slovenia or Croatia. Finally, Slovakia is a "borderline" model on two accounts: a "laggard" due to its intense flirtation with semi-authoritarianism in the 1990s, it invites comparisons with Bulgaria. It is also a "periphery state" beset by security quandaries, which means that inferences drawn from the analysis of its foreign policy could provide interesting pointers – which, of course, won't be faithfully analogous – for future inquiry into the normative underpinnings of foreign policy-making in the Baltic States.

But the countries selected for case studies do not only mean to serve the purpose of "templates" for the rest of the region: intriguing comparisons can – and will – be made within the Central European trio. The Czech Republic and Poland, frontrunners on the road to NATO and EU entry, provide anticipatory patterns of norm diffusion for Slovakia, the "latecomer" of the region: are countries that undergo norm articulation and habituation processes at a later stage replicas or patches of the earlier examples? Moreover, given the structural similarities between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which share not only the "small state" status – e.g. similar material capacities – but also a common starting position due to their pre-communist and communist joint statehood, it is imperative to explore why their paths diverged after 1989 – to converge again in the mid-2000s, when their foreign policies and underlying foreign policy norms started to align. Meticulous investigation of the similarities and differences between Czech and Slovak networks of norm entrepreneurs as well as between their respective use of framing in the process of

norm habituation and norm enforcement in foreign policy will shed more light on the "velvet divorce" of the two countries, not only in statehood, but also in pathways of norm diffusion. Finally, the parallel tracing of foreign policy-making in "medium-sized" Poland on the one hand, and the "small" Czech Republic and Slovakia on the other hand, will provide insight into the differing patterns of foreign policy-making in countries which share domestic structures – the transition context and a reservoir of cultural memory that helps certain norms "resonate" – but not international ones. Last but not least, the choice of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia has also been informed by the language skills of the author: the command of all three languages gives one even access to primary sources, which is crucial when using the method of process tracing.

The Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy outcomes that will be considered in the second part of the dissertation were carefully selected according to criteria related to the international as well as the domestic context in which they are embedded. To test the explanatory power of norms versus interests, it is crucial to compare foreign policy discourse and output in situations with low, medium and high security and/or material incentives. Moreover, to isolate normative commitments from populist rhetoric designed to appeal to voters, this study also has to assess the causal weight of norms in circumstances with high, medium and low domestic costs. The electoral cycle is a good framing device for the evaluation of the domestic risk inherent in a specific foreign policy course: for simplicity's sake, it is likely to be lowest the aftermath of a general election, rising until it reaches its peak during the next election campaign. Hence, the choice of the build-up towards the Iraq War (2002-2003), Ukraine's Orange Revolution (2004) and the so-called 'Russia Reset' (2009-2011)

reflect these concerns. The controversial Iraq War involved high costs but took place at the beginning of the Czech and Slovak cycle and in the middle of the Polish one; Ukraine's Orange Revolution entailed medium incentives and happened in the midst of the cycle for the two small states and at the end of the Polish one, and, lastly, the disputed Russia Reset involved medium to high incentives and incurred medium to high costs as it dragged on for the better part of the cycle. The following three tables provide an overview of the cost-benefit configurations related to the *pursuit of* or *engagement in* the Iraq War, Orange Revolution and Russia Reset in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.

Table 1.5: Iraq War: incentives and disincentives (contrast: the Czech Republic and Slovakia vs. Poland)

	Czech Republic	Poland	Slovakia
Security incentives	Low	Medium	Low
Material incentives	Low	High	Low
Domestic costs	High	Medium	High

Table 1.6: Orange Revolution: incentives and disincentives (contrast: Poland and Slovakia vs. the Czech Republic)

	Czech Republic	Poland	Slovakia
Security incentives	Low	Medium	Medium
Material incentives	Low	Medium	Medium
Domestic costs	Low	Low	Low

Table 1.7: Russia Reset: incentives and disincentives (contrast: Poland and Slovakia vs. the Czech Republic)

	Czech Republic	Poland	Slovakia
Security incentives	Low	Medium	Medium
Material incentives	Low	High	High
Domestic costs	High	Medium	Medium

A possible objection against the triangle of the foreign policy cases is related to the

issue of selection bias: vis-à-vis the US and vis-à-vis the norms under investigation. First, common sense and preliminary research suggest that the foreign policy of the three states towards Iraq, revolutionary Ukraine and a "reset" in the relations with Russia was informed by prior considerations of the US position. As this study attempts to analyse the impact of "dissident geopolitics", a normative framework inspired by a US foreign policy doctrine, on Polish, Czech and Slovak foreign policies, a critic could attribute the foreign policy outcomes vis-à-vis the Iraqi invasion, the Orange Revolution and the Russia Reset to strategic band-wagoning, rather than norms and norm entrepreneurs. Yet, given the unipolarity of the international system – i.e. US supremacy – during the period under investigation, it is difficult to choose case studies that do not involve the US, and it does not make much sense to deliberately try to isolate and exclude the US factor, as the understudied nature of America's influence on the network of norm entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia is a centre-piece of the empirical and theoretical puzzle that initially sparked the author's interest in the topic itself. Moreover, the use of process tracing should reduce the risk of conclusions based on "bogus" causal links between the independent and dependent variables. The second dimension of the possible selection bias is related to norms. Evidence from media reports suggests that norms did, indeed, play at least a supporting role in the policy discourse that preceded the string of decisions that defined the official Czech, Polish and Slovak course of action in the run up to and during the Iraq War, the Orange Revolution and the Russia Reset. Hence, it would make sense to also include a case study where norms either were not involved or, at least, they were not immediately apparent. Yet "dissident geopolitics" is the independent, not the dependent variable here. That it is brought up in foreign policy discourse does not necessarily mean that it motivates or otherwise

facilitates foreign policy outcomes: the normative framework could have been used instrumentally, or it could have been evoked but out-played by either interests or an alternative set of norms.

A further choice with regard to the case selection was the final decision to cross out relations with the EU from the list of foreign policy issue areas that will be examined here. Much like the US, the EU commanded *asymmetric* passive, as well as active leverage on CEE states during the turbulent years of bumpy transition and wild capitalism in the 1990s: as such, it was a source of inspiration for an alternative set of foreign policy norms that was partly complementary – in its accent on freedom, democratic standards and minority rights – and partly contradictory – in its view of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion – to the normative framework that has been conceptualised here as "dissident geopolitics". It is possible to say that back then, the realm of foreign policy-making in Central and Eastern Europe was under two distinct "adaptational pressures" – induced by conditionality and socialisation – from two equally powerful processes: of "Americanisation" and "Europeanisation".[26] The first part of the dissertation traces the former process; while the second part of it examines those results of it – in other words, those aspects of CEE states' foreign policy – that appeared on the foreign policy agenda in its aftermath, delimited here by NATO entry (1999 and 2004). Arguably, "Europeanisation", dubbed the most massive socialisation process under way in the international system, is an ongoing stream of construction, diffusion and

26 This does not mean that the two were contradictory: most of the time, they complemented each another, but there were also occasions at which they worked against each other.

institutionalisation of policy paradigms, norms and "ways of doing things" that stretches far beyond accession negotiations or admission to the "club", whose internal rules are very different from those of NATO. Hence, the big bang enlargement of 2004 does not provide the same point of reference as the three leaders' NATO entry of 1999. While Europeanisation intensified after 2004, Americanisation diminished after 1999. Europeanisation is still under way in the foreign policy realm of CEE states. This issue area was not a priority in the run up to EU entry – which is partly why "Americanisation" overshadowed it for some time – but it has risen in importance after CEE states became EU members. Hence, the CEE states' engagement with and within the EU should be perceived as a competing "source" of norm diffusion, rather than as a foreign policy case study akin to, for instance, the Iraq War. Importantly, the dissertation does not include relations with the US as a case study for similar reasons: it does not want to run a risk of conflating causality.

1.3.3. Methodology and data

As this dissertation focuses on the mechanisms of norm diffusion in a small N set of cases, it will employ the method of process tracing that will enable it to reconstruct causal chains of norm habituation[27] in the 1990s and norm influence on foreign policy in the 2000s. The "mechanism-oriented" approach has recently acquired new advocates in both the IR and the comparative politics research traditions (Elster 1998,

27 The concept encapsulates the three stages of the norm life cycle, which will be unpacked in greater detail in Chapter 2.

Wendt 1999, George & Bennett 2005, Johnson 2006, Gerring 2007, Capoccia & Ziblatt 2011). Its main weakness lies in its flexibility: any mechanism can be scaled up or down (Tilly 2001), no one can possibly test for all the plausible alternatives. Yet as this is a catch-22 that cannot really be avoided, the following dissertation will embrace rather than shun competing explanations by incorporating them into the analysis. Norms and norm entrepreneurs, the dissertation's primary focus and the key variables of interest – it remains to be seen whether the way they operate classifies them as independent or intervening – will be placed into the context of the so-called "macro-structure" – security and economic interest in terms of costs and benefits, both at home and abroad. By engaging the mainstream neo-realist viewpoint alongside the constructivist perspective, as well as analysing the domestic context through transition theory, the dissertation aims to gauge the *relative* explanatory power of norms vis-à-vis other variables. Leading scholar in norm diffusion Martha Finnemore (1996) pioneered a similar approach. To this purpose, the dissertation will employ the method of process tracing. It is a micro-perspective strategy used to identify theoretically predicted intermediate steps constituting the causal link between the independent and dependent variables. Via process tracing, one can carefully map the foreign policy-making process, exploring the extent to which it coincides with prior, theoretically derived expectations about its workings, by mapping critical decisions leading up to the adoption of a particular policy line as well as by analysing the end product – the policy line – itself. Logistically, the challenge is the time as well as the amount of the overwhelmingly qualitative data it requires.

The dissertation will rely on two sets of data, deemed necessary to thoroughly explore the role of "dissident geopolitics" in motivating the value-laden foreign policy agenda

in three Central European states. The first tranche of data includes 181 semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with former and current decision-makers in the Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy-making communities between 2010-2012: members of the prime minister's office/chancellery and the presidential administration, officials at the foreign and defense ministries, ambassadors or consuls in Iraq, Russia and Ukraine, foreign policy experts in major political parties, non-partisan analysts at key think-tanks, activists in leading NGOs and journalists specialising in home and foreign affairs.[28] Moreover, this set of primary material will include references to the interviewees' biographies or CVs, which will serve as a basis for the identification of "norm entrepreneurs". The analytical approach poses the following methodological challenge: how do we ascertain that norms, and not interests, motivate behaviour, especially if there's a thin line between the two? Moreover, how do we verify the "genuineness" of responses accounting for past events? Foremost, it is crucial to understand the individual's own thought process, rank the ordering of motivations behind foreign policy decisions and mark possible changes in preferences over time. Next, it is important to cross-check the interviewees' stories with other sources and use counterfactual reasoning. The second set of primary sources thus consists of foreign policy documents as well as minutes of meetings concerning the countries' policies toward Iraq, Ukraine and Russia, foreign policy analyses compiled by mainstream political parties and relevant reports by selected think-tanks and NGOs. Furthermore, this second collection of data includes articles from the Czech, Polish and Slovak media: reports, public interviews with

[28] See Appendix 2.

policy-makers and op-eds.

Overall, the qualitative analysis conducted on the basis of these primary sources has both strengths and weaknesses. As for open-ended interviews, they provide the "deepest" possible insight into the core of the foreign policy-making process. Yet respondents may have adapted their views over time and thus have a tendency to present skewed recollections of events and their own actions. Furthermore, the interviewees may also factor reputational concerns – their own and their norm entrepreneur network's – in their responses in a desire to portray some of their past decisions in a better light. Yet ultimately, the thesis primarily addresses the *perceptions* – i.e. subjective interpretations of objective realities – of major actors involved in the foreign policy-making process. Hence, even hearing embellished or otherwise "airbrushed" narratives – in other words, being on the receiving end of "norm entrepreneurship" – in the course of interviews presents a unique opportunity to learn more about the enterprise by observing it in practice. The rest of the primary material that is used addresses some of the risks associated with the heavy reliance on interviews, as it enables the author to verify, where possible, the interviewees' accounts of the events studied here. Needless to say, governmental and partisan documents, as well as media reports may also have overt or hidden agendas that need to be recognised. Where applicable, the dissertation links sources to relevant norm entrepreneur networks and/or substantiates the claims they make by referring to other, less "ingrained" sources, for example by citing a Polish and English-language media report in the same footnote.

2. Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1. Introduction

How do norms spread and take root across countries? And how do they come to inform, motivate and perhaps even drive decisions in areas as diverse as foreign policy, judicial review, humanitarian intervention, environmental protection, social security, practices of multinational corporations, gender equality or minority rights in a globalised world? The scholarship inspired by these questions is not yet vast, but it is, for sure, burgeoning and increasingly complex: it straddles political science, international relations and area studies, but also economics, sociology and social psychology. The connecting thread between the intimately intertwined scholarly discourses on the various roles that norms can play across different fields is their common intellectual and methodological anchoring in the constructivist paradigm. Indeed, the "constructivist turn" in international relations and comparative politics that has followed the self-admitted "dismal failure" of both fields to predict or at least anticipate the shakeup of the international system that was the year 1989 seems like a good analytical point of departure for the debate on the patterns of foreign policy-making in the post-communist world.

In order to make sense of the nascent yet swelling body of literature on the dissemination of ideas that tell actors within relevant communities which behaviour is "good and appropriate" in particular situations, it is useful to tie the review of its constituent pillars to the three parts of this dissertation, as defined by the over-arching metaphor as the "mission", the "conversion" and the "zeal". There are three distinct scholarly discourses within the fast-expanding subset on the cutting edge of

international relations and comparative politics literature that touch upon the role of non-material factors in policy-making. The dissertation will thus explore the broadly defined scholarship devoted to the influence of norms on state behaviour and the impact of ideas on politics – the "mission" – the literature on the nature of socialisation processes in the international system and transnational diffusion – the "conversion" – and the debate on the effect of persuasion on foreign policy outcomes – the "zeal", which will also make a brief detour to the main alternative explanation, neo-realism. Each strand of literature puts forward a nuanced take on the different ways in which norms, or standards of "appropriate behaviour for a given identity", arise, travel cross-nationally and wield influence on institutions and actors of interest. The bulk of this chapter will provide an overview of the main lines of debates, highlighting elements that will anchor the empirical project and theoretical gaps the thesis can help close. The concluding part of the chapter will briefly spell out the theoretical framework for the remainder of the thesis.

2.2. "Mission"

2.2.1. Norms and international relations

How do norms, or, in other words, rules for the world, arise? Scholarly works focused on explaining the growing power of the "appropriateness" logic to shape and transform state behaviour in international relations mainly look to neo-institutionalist approaches for answers to this intriguing question, which is becoming increasingly relevant as globalisation tightens its grip on the international system. The literature generally tends to unpack processes through which principled ideas, or beliefs about what is right and wrong held by individuals, become norms, or collective expectations

about proper behaviour for a given identity buttressed by legal anchoring in the structures of national institutions and/or the international system. Pioneering studies by Odell 1982, P. A. Hall 1989, Haas 1990, Sikkink 1991, Finnemore 1993, Goldstein and Keohane 1993, Klotz 1995, Katzenstein et al. 1996, Yee 1996 and others have developed elaborate frameworks breaking down the so-called norm "life cycle". More recently, the literature on norms has also been attempting to establish why certain norms arise at particular times or why they take root in some locales and not others. The main theoretical problems of norm diffusion literature are related to the crude account of structure – it is more successful in explaining how norms spread than how they arise – as well as the normative bias that favours the study of "positive" norms.

Initially, the most "exciting" contribution of the scholarly discourse on norms was methodological. This constructivist domain finally recognised norms as an important causal force driving state behaviour and thus shaping international reality.[29] For neo-realists and neo-liberals, norms are, at best, a superstructure built on a material base: they serve a regulative function, helping states with given interests to maximise utility. Yet constructivists claim that the effects of norms run deeper: they do not only regulate behaviour, they motivate it, as they provide states with a collective understanding of their interests. In other words, norms do not follow from the material base; they constitute it: preferences stem from social practices, culturally determined roles and rules and historically contingent discourses.[30] If interests of states are thus

29 Payne, R.A., 2001. Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction. *European Journal of International Politics* 7(1): 37-61

30 Keohane, R., 1988. International Institutions: Two Approaches. *International Studies Quarterly*

redefined as the dependent variable, norms rise from the status of intervening variable to that of independent variable.[31]

Conceptually, the 1990s and 2000s debate has gushed out a steady, largely inflow of increasingly sophisticated frameworks attempting to capture the complex processes through which norms are seized by critical masses and popularised across the international society. The bulk of these actor- or agent-centric and process-oriented studies have focused on delineating the abovementioned norm life cycle and identifying determinants of successful norm diffusion. Following Sunstein 1997, Finnemore & Sikkink (1998)[32] distinguish between norm emergence, broad norm acceptance (or norm cascade) and the desired yet often merely wishful end point, norm internalisation. They argue that norms only take root in the relevant community if they are adopted by a critical mass of state actors, crossing the threshold or tipping point between the first and second stages of the norm life cycle. Once they captivate critical minorities, those tend to rush to defend and promote it via vigorous *norm advocacy*. Crucially, the deepened understanding of the gradual, incremental nature of norm diffusion has drawn attention to the stunning variety of processes that can be at play at various stages of norm evolution. Hence, theoretical debates about the degree

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32(4): 379-396

31 Constructivist scholars of IR are now less likely to frame their research by dichotomies, such as power vs. norms or interests vs. norms. They seem more interested in interactions.

32 Sunstein, C.R., 1997. *Free Markets and Social Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998

to which norm-based behaviour is driven by choice or habit, about specifications of the cost of norm violation and the benefits of norm adherence, and related issues, often hinge upon the "age" of the norm in question: emergence, acceptance and internalisation all involve different actors, motives and mechanisms of influence over a period of time. The first stage, of crucial importance to this dissertation. tends to be centred around persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. Persuasion is the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms and the subjective becomes the inter-subjective.[33] The second stage of the norm cycle, acceptance, involves slightly different processes, most notably imitation, as states that are "norm leaders" attempt to socialise other states to become "norm followers". The motivations for norm adoption at this point may range from pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation and strive of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem. At the end of the norm cascade, internalisation may or may not occur: if it occurs, norms gain a taken-for-granted quality and cease to be the matter of public debate. Empirically, studies of norm cycles have focused on a wide range of issue areas, including humanitarian intervention (Katzenstein et al. 1996), women's suffrage (Meyer 1999) or the struggle against apartheid (Klotz 1999).

The norm diffusion literature tends to provide a weaker account of structure: while it does explain how ideas become norms, it is less successful in unpacking how ideas – of norms – appear in the first place. Tracing novel norms back to inception, how do they really emerge? Structure-oriented approaches such as the English school or

33 Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 914, Klotz 1995: 29-33

sociological institutionalism, which perceive structures, not agents, as basic ontological building blocks, offer a welcome reminder that "norms do not float freely": the international society, the most general type of structure that can be broken down further into its constitutive elements, actively help create demand for certain norms to arise. One of these structures is the international society: scholars such as Bull & Watson (1984), or Gong (1984), for instance, make historical arguments that the content of international society comes from the liberal principles of West European democracies and becomes internationalised with the expansion of the West. The moral implications of such order, Bull (1977) argues elsewhere, steer all "sub-societies toward three common ends: ensuring security against violence, ensuring that promises will be kept and ensuring that property will be protected.[34] Another one of the mediating structures that can – and often do – give rise to norms is, in the language of sociological institutionalism, the expanding and deepening world culture: a powerful set of worldwide cultural rules whose core is the notion of rationality. Intimately intertwined with the pursuit of "modernity" and "progress", Weberian-(and Western-) style rationality is manifest in the ever-denser network of institutions – for example markets and bureaucracies – through which its over-arching goals can be achieved (Finnemore 1996, capitalising on Wallerstein 1974)[35]: those, in turn, serve as a catalysts for the emergence of norms. The combined advantage of the two

34 Bull, H., 1977. *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press

35 Wallerstein, I., 1974. The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16:387-415; Finnemore, M., 1996. Norms, Culture and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism. *International Organization* 50:325-347

original structuralist approaches to the study of norms is, above all, the all-encompassing perception of social structure, which has ontological primacy over any component actors. As such, it can empower a range of agents, including states, sub-state organisations and individuals. Structuralist scholarship on the changing dynamics of international politics has received a boost with the recent surge of interest in globalisation studies (Hurrell 1995, Schirm 2002, etc.), which, too, make a valued theoretical contribution by enhancing our understanding of norm emergence by drawing attention to processes such as convergence, isomorphism or homogenisation (di Maggio 1983).[36]

Another weakness of mainstream norm diffusion literature that should be considered here is the exaggerated normative view that it takes on its own ontology. The concept of a norm is often seen as (too) normative by critics, in as that norm diffusion scholars have almost exclusively focused on inherently positive or positive assigned norms, such as those related to respect for human rights, democracy, the free-market, non-proliferation or environmental protection, and respective actors, most notably international and transnational organisations, such as the UN, the EU, the World Bank, Amnesty International or Greenpeace, which champion them. Work on negative assigned or alternative norms or counter-hegemonic norm entrepreneurs – who generally tend to be perceived as norm breakers – is lacking (Wunderlich 2009). To conclude, a balanced study of norms with overwhelmingly positive connotations – such as "dissident geopolitics" – should include not only a section on the negative

36 Di Maggio, P., 1983. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review* 48(2): 147-160

consequences that its inconsistencies and limitations may pose but also a discussion of other norms they may have to compete with, especially if they are "undesirable".

2.2.2. Ideas in politics

Stripped of their inter-subjective quality and/or legal and behavioural pinning, norms boil down to ideas: hence, a brief excursion to discursive institutionalism, a budding constructivist strand in the field of comparative politics that highlights the transformative power of ideas and discourse, is in order. This body of literature is crucial inasmuch as it helps fill in some of the gaps in the IR literature on norm diffusion, which is generally weaker in explaining how norms actually come about in the first place. Discursive institutionalism is a relatively new umbrella concept for a growing number of works that study the substantive content of and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged in discourse between structurally embedded agents. Initially perceived as a mere detour on behalf of the two main scholarly discourses within mainstream institutionalist theory, historical institutionalism developed by Peter A. Hall and Kathryn Sikkink and rational institutionalism typified by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, or, alternatively, as a subset of sociological institutionalism, discursive institutionalism was dismissed by some critics as an ad hoc attempt to account for theoretical problems of the dominant schools of thought in explaining policy change (Blyth 1997, 2002).[37] The impression

37 Blyth, M.M., 1997. Any More Bright Ideas? The Ideational Turn in of Comparative Political Economy. Comparative Politics 29(2): 229-250; Blyth, M.M., 2002. Great Transformations:

was reinforced by the methodological "supporting role ascribed to ideas by rationalist and historical institutionalists: at the beginnings, at least, they did not treat them as causative or independent variables, in the positivist sense. Ideas were meant to help other forms of explanation: few attempts by rational and historical institutionalists have been made to date to assess the independent impact of ideas on economic and social institutions. Even sociological institutionalism presupposes the prior existence of certain stable norms (Mahoney & Thelen 2010).[38] Overall, institutionalists tend to ask, "what stabilises" or "what causes policy change", but not, "what ideas are" and "what they do".

The works of discursive institutionalists, focused on the substance as well as the properties of ideas and discourse, provide a much-needed addition to rationalist and historical institutionalist branches of comparative politics literature on policy conduct. Their contribution rests on further theoretical refinement and methodological precision, stemming from the acknowledgement that non-material factors may carry substantial causal weight in policy analysis. What discursive institutionalists share is an analytical framework, as well as commitment to go beyond "politics as usual" in explaining the dynamics of stability and change in the policy realm. In terms of a research agenda, this means focusing on the role of ideas in motivating and

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Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the 20th Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

38 Mahoney, M., Thelen, K. (eds.), 2010. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

constituting political action, the power of persuasion in policy discourse, the centrality of deliberation for democratic legitimacy, and construction and reconstruction of political interests, beliefs and values, and the forces of change in representations of history and culture.

In this spirit, scholars have attempted to draw attention to ideas. Scholars have spoken about an ideational turn (Blyth 2002), discursive institutionalism (Hay 2001) and constructivist institutionalism (Hay 2006). Ideas have been examined at different level of generality (Schmidt 2010): the literature looks into policy ideas (Kingdon, 1984, Hall 1989) programmatic ideas or Kuhnian-style paradigms (Berman 1998) and philosophical frameworks (Campbell 2004). Crucially, scholars have also distinguished between various types of ideas, including cognitive ones, justified by interest-based logic of consequences (Jobert 1989, Schmidt 2002), and, more importantly for this work, normative ones, legitimated by the norm-oriented logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1989, Schmidt 2000).

Other works have emphasised the need to re-examine discourse, proposing greater efforts be made to pursue discourse analysis (Hajer 2003) and coining concepts such as the "argumentative turn" (Fischer 2003) or "deliberative democracy" (Dryzek 2000) to capture the new trend in research design. Still other constructivists have been bridging the ideas/discourse divide, steering research agendas towards frames, narratives, myths, collective memories, stories, scripts, and the like (Roe 1994). A critical minority has also sought to blur the boundaries among the various institutionalisms in order to demonstrate that ideas and discourse can advance knowledge in the social sciences across theories and methodologies (Campbell and Pedersen 2001, Campbell 2004). Crucially, gaps still remain when it comes to

empirical accounts of how ideas and norms actually come about, which is something that this dissertation seeks to address.

Most pertinent for this dissertation is the discursive institutionalists' account of the various ways in which ideas *arise,* e.g. the stage of their life cycle that comes before they wield influence on policy discourse and policy conduct. On the interactive dimension, the agency-oriented strand of the theory has traced the discursive processes by which ideas are constructed in a "coordinative" policy sphere and deliberated in a "communicative" political sphere (Schmidt 2000, 2002). The former, coordinative discourse, recognises and conceptualises various groups of policy actors that tend to engage in the construction of policy ideas: "epistemic communities" of elites with shared ideas (Haas 1992) and "advocacy coalitions" of elites with shared ideas and policy access (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Some of the conceptual frameworks capitalise on studies of transnational diffusion. These actors, discursive institutionalists claim, can pose as entrepreneurs (Fligstein & Mara-Drita 1996) or mediators (Jobert 1989), by catalysing new ideas and inspiring discursive communities to adjust or shift policy discussions. The latter, communicative, discourse, in turn, involves another wide range of – mostly political – actors who bring the ideas developed in the context of the coordinative discourse to the public for deliberation and legitimation. These actors may include political leaders involved in the top-down mass electoral process of public persuasion (see, e.g., Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody l996; Zaller 1992), in public debates (Art 2006) or in the "policy forums "of informed publics (Rein and Schoen 1994). In pursuit of the public's stamp of approval, these actors engage in what leading constructivist scholars coined as "communicative action (Habermas 1996). But apart from actors engaged in top-down

persuasion, such "communicative action" can also be practiced by members of civil society, who tend to take up bottom-up discursive interactions involving grass-roots organisations, social movements, "mini-publics" (Goodin and Dryzek 2006) and local "empowered participatory governance" (Fung and Wright 2003). At the micro-level, they can also be citizens, whose voices are heard not only in opinion polls but also in votes.

Moreover, in an attempt to explain policy change, the structuralist branch – or "institutionalist" part - of discursive institutionalism offers valuable insight into the opportunities and constraints that various institutional frameworks may create and pose to nascent, innovative, minority, peripheral or otherwise non-mainstream ideas and discourses. Crucially, the institutions of discursive institutionalism are not the external, rule-following structures of the older rational and historical institutionalisms. They do not primarily serve as "sieves" for ideas and "restraints" on actors, be they rationalist incentives, historical paths, or cultural frames. Instead, they play a more nuanced role: they simultaneously constrain and enable constructs of meaning that are internal to "sentient" (thinking and speaking) agents. In this view, different institutions provide actors with different "background ideational abilities" and "foreground discursive abilities" (Schmidt 2010). In highlighting the "internality" of institutions to agents and the mutual constitution of structure and agency more broadly, discursive institutionalism overlaps with sociological institutionalism, which primarily examines ways in which institutions create "meaning" for individuals, providing important theoretical building blocks for *normative* institutionalism within political science. The task for this dissertation, which will primarily draw on discursive institutionalist scholarship, is to establish how the character of institutions

during democratic transition influences the emergence and cascades of norms discussed here.

2.3. "Conversion"

2.3.1. Learning: diffusion

How do ideas travel within or across borders? In the context of this dissertation's over-arching puzzle, how do ideas become foreign policy norms in the national context and how do these foreign policy norms emerge as a regional or international phenomenon? Perhaps the most elaborate explanation of how ideas flow, float, get hooked and take root in alien soil is nested in the abundant – and recently popularised – literature on transnational diffusion. One of its basic assumptions, which is highly relevant for this dissertation, is that ideas and norms can spread through *learning*. Though the concept of diffusion – or the flow of social practices among actors within some larger system [39] – is now comfortably seated within mainstream political science, its origins lie in sociology. Indeed, many of the diffusion models now championed by leading comparative political scholars have "borrowed" theoretical frameworks from the likes of Granovetter (1973), Tarrow (1988) or Strang & Meyer (1993).

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39 Strang, D., Soule, S.A., 1998. Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements. From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:265-290, p. 487

Sociological accounts of diffusion are generally focused on identifying determinants of diffusion patterns: channels of communication, innovator-adopter relations or structures of opportunity for adopters. Early "contagion" models of diffusion identified social cohesion and thickness of interpersonal ties as both necessary and sufficient conditions for the dissemination of social practices in the international system. Yet in a self-critical turn, the literature quickly ventured beyond the rather crude interpretation toward a more nuanced take on the phenomenon: in a seminal work, Granovetter concluded that, "…whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number of people, and traverse greater social distance when passed through weak ties rather than strong".[40] The logic of Granovetter's theory is that strongly related partners share many ties to third parties and thus have little new information to report to each other, as opposed to weakly related partners whose social circles overlap less. In a further – and decisively constructivist – refinement of the original relational model of diffusion, Strang and Meyer argue that in a globalised world, culturally analysed similarities and linkages can become substitutes for interpersonal ties between transmitters and adopters: if they see themselves as falling into the same category – i.e. assume that they are not only connected but also fundamentally similar – diffusion is likely to be rapid. Capitalising on building on Strang and Meyer's work, scholars of social movements and transnational activism, later termed the mechanism "attribution of similarity".[41]

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40 Granovetter, M., 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. *American Journal of Sociology* 78(6): 1360-1380, p. 1366

41 McAdam, R., 1993. The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas. *Annals of the American*

The later, constructivist strand of diffusion theory ascribes particular importance to creative agency which possesses a recognised capacity to actively create linkages and thus contribute to the circulation of social practices in relevant communities. Empowered agents or "culturally legitimated theorists" – business consultants, policy analysts, intellectuals or activists – can, according to diffusion scholars, promote, explain and "theorise" various innovative ideas or, in this case, norms, contributing to their dissemination in novel contexts. Focusing on global policy diffusion, Haas identifies "epistemic communities", i.e. networks of professionals with recognised expertise in a particular domain, claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain and a shared understanding of cause and effect relationships (Haas 1992: 3). Similarly, in the arena of transnational activism, Tarrow coins the term "rooted cosmopolitans", who mobilise domestic and international resources to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents or in favour of goals they hold in common with transnational allies.[42] Works by these scholars have inspired numerous constructivist studies in comparative politics (note the review of discursive institutionalism).

The globalisation-dominated scholarship of the 2000s has also seen an empirically driven surge in diffusion studies in political science, most of which have focused on solving epistemological problems and sharpening the under-developed theory. Given

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Academy of Political and Social Science 528(1): 58-74

42 Tarrow, S., 2005. *The New Transnational Activism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3

this dissertation's focus on the complexities of the process of norm construction, habituation and internalisation, note must be taken of the diffusion literature's renewed interest in the classification of the various diffusion mechanisms, labeled by some diffusion scholars as the "defining characteristic" of the post-1990 debate (Meseguer & Gilardi 2005).[43] Mainstream scholarly discourse recognises four causal mechanisms that can underpin diffusion: learning, emulation, coercion and competition. The latter two, which take into account incentives, could potentially offer valuable insight into the dynamics of the normative change considered here – clearly, there were perks involved in adhering to American-inspired foreign policy norms – yet importantly, they are also fraught with inconsistencies and limitations: the strategic element that they entail sits uneasily alongside the rationale behind learning and emulation, which are based on changes in the information environment that tend to be related to knowledge or prior adoptions. Diffusion is, by definition, voluntary.

The comparative politics literature on diffusion has made more important headways in identifying determinants of adoption patterns, which is highly relevant for this dissertation's section on "conversion" to a set of norms. Geographical proximity and neighbourhood effects have, unsurprisingly, emerged in the scholarly discourse as powerful predictors of diffusion; indeed, scholars of democratisation and transition theory have, for instance, used them to explain regional "waves" of democratisation

43 Meseguer, C., Gilardi, 2005. *What is New in the Study of Policy Diffusion?* A Critical Review.

(Beissinger 2007, Kopstein & Reilly 2000).[44] Political, cultural and historical proximity have also been ascribed causal weight: in a persuasive take on diffusion, Weyland (2006) argues that adopters constrained by bounded rationality instinctively look to similar peers abroad for cues on how to deal with difficulties at home.[45] Apart from analyses of structural prerequisites and/or determinants of diffusion patterns, the political science literature has also grown in accounts of the "politics of diffusion": what motivates policy-makers to look for lessons outside the borders of their own country? Diffusion scholars stress that in deciding whether to go for an innovation from abroad, potential adopters tend to look not only at its effectiveness but also at the political costs associated that may have been faced by prior adopters (Braun & Gilardi 2006).[46]

2.3.2. Teaching: socialisation and Europeanisation

Alternative, or, depending on the case, complementary avenues for the construction,

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44 Beissinger, M., 2007. Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics* 5:259-276; Kopstein, J., Reilly, D.A., 2000. Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Post-Communist World. *World Politics* 53(1): 1-37

45 Weyland, K., 2006. *Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

46 Braun, Gilardi, 2006. Taking "Galton's Problem" Seriously: Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 18(3): 298-322

diffusion and institutionalisation of norms such as "dissident geopolitics" in Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy are processes of socialisation. In other words, norms can also spread by *teaching*. Socialisation is, perhaps, best understood as the "induction of new members into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in the given society".[47] By definition, it involves an element of asymmetry, which means that it is often described as a lengthy "introductory course" for newcomers, or "pupils", by veterans, or, for simplicity's sake, "teachers". In contrast to diffusion, which tends to be voluntary, socialisation is, more often than not, based on coercion: tellingly, the latest trend in socialisation studies is focused on conditionality. Given the asymmetrical relationship between the US and CEE states, which in the 1990s devoted considerable material and non-material resources to enter NATO, a discussion of the scholarly discourse on socialisation is entirely appropriate.

The structuralist variant of the burgeoning literature on socialisation – rooted in the neo-institutionalist paradigm – posits that most rules and norms are transmitted via the media of international organisations (Ikenberry & Kupchan 1990, Schimmelfennig 2005, etc.). Thanks to those, the "society" where norms apply shrinks to a fraction of the total number of states in the international system: simply yet not simplistically put, it is through socialisation to the "rules for the world" that states earn membership of what is often referred to as the "international community". Once a state joins the club, external pressure is supposedly no longer needed to induce compliance; hence, the ultimate goal of socialisation is not only habituation but also

47 Barnes, J.F., Carter, T.M., Skidmore, M.J., 1980. *A World of Politics: A Concise Introduction.* New York: St Martin's Press, p. 35

internalisation of relevant rules and norms. In terms of theory development, the literature of the 2000s makes innumerable attempts to distinguish between various types of socialisation in order to avoid conceptual stretching. Substantively, Risse Kappen et al.[48] distinguish between adaptation and strategic bargaining; moral consciousness raising, shaming, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion, and, finally, institutionalisation and habituation. March & Olsen (1998) offer an alternative take on the classification of socialisation processes, proposing to focus on the underlying motivation of adaptational change, which can follow the logic of incentives or the logic of appropriateness.[49]

Starting with the late 1990s, scholarly discourse has further benefitted from a new, conditionality-centred research agenda – and its inherent conceptual and epistemological problems – driven by studies focused on Europeanisation, arguably the most massive international socialisation process that has ever taken place in the international system (Vachudova 2005). The complexity of Europeanisation, which affects member states, candidate countries and associated partners alike, sweeping through their polities, policies and politics, can hardly be overstated. The process involves a myriad of agents, instruments and mechanisms, rendering it difficult to define: most attempts to conceptualise it – including the widely used one by Radaelli

48 Risse Kappen, T., Ropp, S.C., Sikkink, K., 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

49 March, J., Olsen, J., 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of the International Orders. *ARENA Working Papers* WP 98/5

(2000) – have been criticised as "stretched". Nevertheless, the Europeanisation literature offers an intriguing excursion into different typologies of the determinants and mechanisms of socialisation. The most advanced structuralist frameworks developed to date explain how the "misfit" between EU-level and domestic-level institutions and policies induces "adaptational pressure" that compels the latter to converge with the former (Caporaso et. al 2001; Knill, Lehmkuhl 1999; Borzel, Risse 2000). Moreover, agency-centred works analyse subtler mechanisms – such as persuasion and social influence – by which elites in EU member states are socialised to EU norms (Checkel 2001; Johnston 2001; Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003), though these are generally perceived as supplementary. The study of Europeanisation is still dominated by the "rationalist logic of consequences". Europeanisation scholars also explore the effect of asymmetry on the likelihood of socialisation. Works exploring the EU enlargement process – see, for instance, Hughes et al. (2004), Jacoby (2001), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) and Vachudova (2005) – attempt to explain how the EU drives candidate countries to comply with the conditions of accession. In so doing, they unpack the complex mechanism of conditionality, both as a variable in bringing about desired outcomes and as a process that is, in itself, fluid, as it is constructed and reconstructed throughout, which affects the influence it wields (Hughes et al. 2004).

Much of the criticism related to both socialisation and Europeanisation literature targets the under-explained distinction between rules and norms, and between incentive-based and socialisation-based mechanisms of the diffusion of various ideas, rules and norms. In the case of Europeanisation, drawing a line between the rationalist

logic of consequences, and the constructivist logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1998) may seem easier due to the EU's extensive use of formal and informal conditionality. The diffusion model of "external incentives" (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005) is related to rules, and it capitalises on asymmetrical interdependence, whence "pupils" comply with the rules of the "teachers" from Brussels, because the latter can threaten to withdraw material rewards, such as EU accession, Eurozone or Schengen integration, structural funds, stabilisation packages, etc. The diffusion model of "social learning", by contrast, is connected with norms, and it makes use of social motivation. The "pupils" adopt the norms of the "teachers" from the EU because they come to perceive them as "good, desirable and appropriate". [50] Yet, Kelley puts it, it is difficult to separate the effects of conditionality from socialisation because there are few cases in which European institutions apply conditionality without also making effort to convince candidate countries of the desirability of a policy.[51]

The next major objection against socialisation and Europeanisation scholarship is related to the structure-agency problem. If international organisations teach governments about norms, where do these norms come from? Going back to the norm diffusion literature discussed in section 2.2.1, international organisations themselves

50 Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 912

51 Kelley 2004: 426, 454

learn from non-state actors, such as "norm enterpreneurs" or "advocacy networks".[52] Norm diffusion is a dynamic congruence-building process, during which these groups engage in moral proselytism (Nadelmann 1990: 481-2): in other words, they attempt to "sell" normative ideas to relevant audiences.[53] Linking this to discursive institutionalism, which was analysed in section 2.2.2, norm transmitters are "framing" their agendas in a way that resonates with the adopters. Linkages have to be constructed between emergent and existing norms via the use of heuristic filters in order for the former to take root. This framing process has been conceptualised as "localization" (Acharya 2004) or "cultural match" (Checkel 1999).[54] Scholars vary in the extent to which they ascribe importance to the presence of actual similarities – structuralist argument – between innovators and adopters, rather than just the attribution of similarity that is constructed by creative agents. Snow and Bedford, for instance, refer to norm entrepreneurs as "framing agents", who bridge differences in culture, conditions and contexts to deliver a particular innovation (Snow & Bedford 1999).

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52 Keck, S., 1999. Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics. *International Social Science Journal* 51(159): 89-101

53 Nadelmann, E., 1990. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. *International Organization* 44(4): 479–526, 481-2

54 Acharya, A., 2004. How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. *International Organization* 58(2): 239-275; Checkel, J.T., 1999. Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe. *International Studies Quarterly* 43(1): 83-114

2.4. "Zeal"

2.4.1. Framing and foreign policy

Do norms exert influence on our understanding of the material factors that underscore states' foreign policy dilemmas? The final part of this literature review will be devoted to framing. Works by constructivist heavyweights such as Kratochwil (1989), Adler (1991, 1997), Wendt (1992, 1994), Katzenstein (1996) and Checkel (1998) argue that its contribution to the articulation and enactment of national interests is considerable, which is in line with the basic premise of this dissertation. The general assumption here is that much of foreign policy is about *defining*, not *defending* national interests. Before states can pursue their interests, they have to define what those interests are. If Central and East European states consistently choose to pursue a pro-American foreign policy of "muscular democratisation", the question is: how did they arrive at the conclusion that it is in their interest to do so? The process of defining interests is as intensely political and consequential as our subsequent efforts to pursue those interests. IR scholars claim that all states want a combination of power, security and wealth. But different states may have developed different perceptions of what those concepts mean. Power to do what? What kind of security? Wealth for whom? The previous sections have demonstrated that while domestic politics play a large, sometimes determining role in explaining how the meaning of material interests shifts across space and time, domestic decision-makers also belong to dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their views of the world and their role in the world. In other words, foreign policy-makers are *socialised* to pursue certain interests – to want certain things – by internationally held norms and understandings of what is good and appropriate.

But how do norms translate into observable foreign policy outcomes? In the socialisation literature and discursive institutionalist works in comparative politics, emphasis is often placed on the morally persuasive aspects of the norms themselves (Acharya 2004). Less attention is paid to norm advocacy, the consistent but non-coercive argumentation that can be used to raise moral consciousness about what constitutes the "right things to do" (Checkel 2005, Bjorkdahl 2008) when foreign policy decisions need to be made. This is, once again, the domain of constructivist IR literature and most notably works centred around diffusion. How exactly is a "normative fit" constructed? The concepts of persuasion and framing, which have already been considered in the section on norm habituation in a novel context, provide valuable insight into reasons why policy-makers can end up taking a particular course of action in highly contested contexts (Risse Kappen 1994)[55], where choices lie not only between norms, power and interests, but also between different sets of norms which may be competing with one another. Frames were originally used by social science theorists (Tversky & Kahneman 1986). Constructivists studying norms in IR "borrowed" them from social movement theorists (see, for instance, McAdam et al. 1996, Tarrow 2005).

Persuasive framing is based on creative agency: it is generally pursued by norm advocates or norm entrepreneurs who are strongly committed to a particular norm and who are ready to invest energy in promoting the norm in order to shape the behaviour of others. Entrepreneurship is far from a novel concept in political science: it is a

55 Risse Kappen, T., 1994. Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures and the End of the Cold War. *International Organization* 48:185-214

popular explanans for collective action problems, equilibrium choice, the emergence of cooperation as well as norms.[56] In the norm diffusion literature, norm entrepreneurs are generally understood as agents distinguished by their "strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community".[57] They have at their disposal a number of resources, such as diplomatic, rhetorical and pedagogical skills, moral authority and legitimacy (generally derived from practising what they preach). Hence, it is not only the intrinsic characteristics of the norm that will make the norm take off, but also the quality of "advertising".

In the foreign policy discourse that always precedes the foreign policy output, framing helps name, interpret and dramatise issues, allowing advocates to create or explain broader social meanings.[58] Many empirical accounts of successful norm advocacy reveal that frames are employed by wilful agents to situate issues within a broader social and historical setting. Indeed, as cognitive consistency theory in psychology explains, an actor is more likely to accept new claims if they are shown to be similar to already accepted ideas. Put in general terms, norm advocates frame issues so that target audiences can see how well newly proposed ideas coincide with already

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56 See, for instance, Nadelman 1990; Young, O.R., 1999. *The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections.* London: MIT Press; Moravcsik, A., 1999. A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation. *International Organization* 53:267-306

57 Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 897

58 Brysk, A., 1995. Hearts and Minds: Bringing Symbolic Politics Back In. *Polity* 27(4): 559-585

accepted ideas and practices.[59] Actor A communicates to actor B, C and D that new normative concern Z should be embraced, partly because z is similar to already agreed norms x and y. Advocates attempt to construct, in other words, frames that resonate with broader understandings.

Norm entrepreneurs and frames are disputed in highly competitive foreign policy contexts. Debates about the usefulness of a particular frame can be quite contentious even among like-minded champions of similar or identical normative structures. In this respect, Meyer (1995) speaks of ferocious "frame contests": frames selected to advocate a body of norms may be arbitrarily selected and at times even contradictory. [60] Frames can be powerful distortive devices in foreign policy discourse: those who embrace one frame over a counter-frame "see different things, make different interpretations of the way things are, and support different courses of action concerning what is to be done, by whom and how to do it".[61] Yet importantly, no frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling. Entrepreneurs can flounder even when relying on "master frames", employed successfully by advocates facing similar

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59 Klotz 1995: 31

60 Meyer, D., 1995. Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War. *Political Communication* 12:173-92

61 Schoen, D., Rein, M., 1994. *Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies.* New York: Basic Books, p. 147

circumstances.[62]

What the constructivist literature on framing generally overlooks is that the success of this strategy in catapulting a certain set of norms to the forefront of foreign policy-making also hinges upon the macro- and micro-structural environment at hand: in other words, norm entrepreneurs must also use material levers to gain support for favoured normative frameworks. Norm advocacy in foreign policy more often than not also involves the discussion of security and economic incentives for taking a course of action prescribed to norm entrepreneurs by a particular set of norms. Moreover, strategic bargaining can be involved: entrepreneurs can abandon one frame and employ another to seek the same end result.[63] Their resources and relative power also influence the results of a frame contest.[64] And finally, even norm entrepreneurs can have ulterior motives. Any apparently resonant frame employed to push through a norm might be advocated or embraced for some hidden purpose, often for domestic political reasons: agents can, for instance, be acting insincerely to be re-elected.[65] Similarly, they may be trying to gain acceptance for a norm by lying about its

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62 Tarrow, S., 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 131

63 Tversky & Kahneman 1986

64 Marullo et al., 1996. Frame Changes and Social Movement Contraction: U.S. Peace Movement Framing After the Cold War. *Sociological Inquiry* 66(1): 1-28, p. 3

65 Cortell, A.P., Davis, J.W. Jr., 1996. How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms. *International Studies Quarterly* 40:451–78

implications or by linking it favourably and misleadingly in a frame to a normative framework that is deemed "good" and "appropriate" already. A different kind of distortion transpires when frames resonate because they remind audiences of already agreed, but potentially harmful normative commitments (frames for xenophobic or violent purposes may recall shared norms of nationalism or racism).[66] In conclusion, to gauge the influence of norms in foreign policy-making, one must closely examine the communicative processes that test the veracity of claims and claimants and focus on frames built on mutual agreement around a normative idea to avoid conflating the effect of norms with other variables (strategic social construction, etc.).[67]

2.4.2. Alternative explanations: neo-realism

Neo-realism remains the dominant paradigm for both conduct and reflection on foreign policy in the post-communist world. Hence, it will be invoked as the main competing explanation of the puzzle presented and addressed in this dissertation: post-communist CEE states' long-standing pro-American foreign policy of "muscular democratisation". For simplicity's sake, it is assumed that neo-realists would interpret the foreign policy in question as "soft" or otherwise mitigated band-wagoning with the United States. The following section will briefly review neo-realist theories

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66 Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 916

67 Barnett, M.N., 1999. Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo. *European Journal of International Relations* 5(1): 5–36

deemed relevant for the analysis of this curiously persistent foreign policy, shared by a relatively high number of structurally diverse small and medium-sized states in Central and Eastern Europe. Neo-realism rests upon two founding theories – Waltz's balance of power theory (1979) and Walt's balance of threat theory (1987) – but due to the limited scope, they will not be analysed here. After a brief introduction to the intellectual pillars of neo-realism, this section will sketch the "small states theory" as an overall frame for the literature review. Part of the critique will then focus on post-1991 scholarship, highlighting works, which, with varying success, aimed to explain the behaviour of small states in a unipolar, democratising and globalising world.

Neo-realism emphasises the enduring propensity for conflict between states in the Hobbesian anarchy of the international system. Yet while classical neo-realism – represented by Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr – ascribes the predisposition of states to fight wars to human nature, powered by an innate desire to dominate others, neo-realism adjudges it to the structure of the international system. Neo-realism – or else, the structuralist variant of realist thought – posits that because the international system is anarchic, i.e. lacking a central authority to protect states from one another, every state has to fight to survive on its own. Yet not all states have the capacity to defend themselves: hence, depending on their position in the international system, defined by relative power – which is measured by most neo-realists on a state's score on seven capabilities, including size, population, military strength, economical capability, resource endowment, political stability and competence – they

opt for different strategies of ensuring their security.[68]

Small and weak states theories, tailored to explain the behaviour of states with limited material capacity, posit that "lilliputs" are most likely to "bandwagon", not pursue adventurous and venturesome policies. Some IR scholars have rendered the category too broad to be suitable for analytical purposes[69], but others, starting with Walt, Vital and Rothstein have maintained that it is meaningful, as material size clearly sets the limit to what can be attained and fixes the international role and status of the nation more securely than any other factor.[70] Small states are "more vulnerable to pressure, more likely to give way under stress and more limited in respect of the political options open".[71] In general the weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon on a powerful ally's security provision, even at the expense of a partial loss of its sovereignty. Importantly, small states tend to be sensitive to proximate power, which means that they are primarily concerned with events in their immediate vicinity.[72] Yet in a globalised world, "size small" doesn't always imply weakness, just as "size large" doesn't necessarily come packaged with strength, especially if the crudeness of

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68 Waltz, K., 1979. *Theory of International Politics.* New York: McGraw Hill, p. 98, 131

69 For instance Karsh, E., 1988. *Neutrality and Small States.* London and New York: Routledge, p.3

70 Vital, D., 1967. *The Inequality of States: A Study of a Small Power in International Relations.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 3

71 Ibid., p.3

72 Walt, S.M., 1987. *The Origins of Alliances.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 29-30

the measurements is already in question: by the time communism collapsed in 1989, material capacity as the main indicator of strength had already become obsolete in neo-realist thought. Hence, scholarship developed in the 1990s provides some much-needed theoretical correctives to the original small states theory: while some authors have continued to refine the original "small states" category, which became much more narrow[73], others have resorted to reconceptualisation, coining the classification "weak state" (Buzan 1991, Ellman 1995)[74], where not only the physical base of the state matters: the idea of the state and institutional expression of the state is taken into account as well.

Whether a state falls into the "small" or "weak" category – and most CEE states would, especially in the era of transition when a contributing factor is that they are new or revived actors on the scene – expectations about its behaviour remain unchanged: it is most likely to jump on the band-wagon, and different variants of alliance theory offer a valued contribution to our understanding of neo-realists think small or weak states choose the partners that they do. As the original balance of power and threat theories have been criticised for their heavy dependence on realpolitik and traditional great power competition (Siverson & Emmons 1991), post-1991 literature has focused on the impact of domestic political structures and agents

73 Sutton, P., Payne, A., 1993. Lilliput under Threat: the Security Problems of Small Island and Enclave Developing States. *Political Studies* 41(4):579-593

74 Buzan, B., 1991. New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. *International Affairs* 67(3): 431-451; Ellman, M., 1995. The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neo-Realism in Its Own Backyard. *British Journal of Political Science* 25:171-217

on the states' preferred defense strategies and alliance formation. Neo-realist scholars that perceive power structures as the main determinants of the birth, survival and death of alliances have come up with a wide range of "trade-off models": for instance, for Morrow (1991) the trade-off is between security gains and autonomy gains, while for Levy and Barnett (1991), it is between external and domestic threats, for instance to social welfare, survival of governments or regime stability.[75] Some neo-realists ascribe even greater explanatory power to domestic variables: David (1991) and his innovative concept of omni-balancing comes close to recognising the primacy of the domestic milieu over the systemic setting. By his own admission, omni-balancing applies largely to the Third World, but it rams home an important message: leaders are weak and illegitimate, and the stakes of domestic politics are much higher than previously thought.[76] In the same vein, Schweller (2006) classifies balancing strategies into under-balancing, non-balancing, appropriate balancing and overbalancing, depending on the domestic context.[77] Weitsman (2004) asserts that different types of alliances are formed under various levels of threat, pointing out that as threat is an inherently perceptual concept, capability of the aggressor is as

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75 Morrow, J.D., 1991. Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances. *American Journal of Political Science* 35(4): 904-933; Barnett, M.N., Levy, J.S., 1991. Domestic Resources of Alignment: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73. *International Organization* 45(3): 369-395

76 David, S.R., 1991. Third World Alignment. *World Politics* 43(2): 233-256

77 Schweller, R.L., Unanswered Threats. *Political Constraints on the Balance of Power.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

important a factor as the aggressor's perceived intention.[78] Hence, under life threatening threat, states bandwagon; under high threat, they balance; under medium threat, they tether, and under low threat, they hedge. Schweller's and Weitsman's work offers important theoretical innovations and holds high relevance to the current war-fighting coalitions within NATO.

Alliance theories tailored to the uni-polar world with the US as hegemon offer even more insight into small or weak states' behaviour in the period that is investigated here. The concept of "soft balancing" was initially introduced to account for the lack of traditional balancing in the 1990s (Walt 2002, Joffe 2002) and soon became a target of criticism as IR scholars argued for (Paul 2005, Pape 2005) or against (Brooks & Wolworth 2005, Lieber & Alexander 2005) its explanatory power. "Soft balancing" encompasses actions that "do not directly challenge preponderance but that use non-military tools to delay, frustrate and undermine aggressive unilateral US military policies"[79]. Its emphasis on non-military means of using force has sparked a discussion on political alliances and the use of international institutions as foreign policy tools (Khong 2004, Stedman 2007). More specifically, the concept has been employed in the analysis of French, German and Russian efforts to block the US before the onset of the 2003 Iraq war (Paul 2004) as well as regional politics in the Middle East (Thayer 2003), Asia (Khong 2004) and Europe (Layne 2003, Oswald

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78 Weitsman, P., 2004. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 3-4

79 Pape 2005: 10

2006). “Soft balancing” also inspired Grigorescu (2008) to consider “soft band-wagoning” as a way of capturing the behaviour of the small states in Central and Eastern Europe during the Iraqi crisis. Just as ”soft balancers” imply that the policies they analyse fall short of actual military opposition to the uni-pole, Grigorescu assumes that support for the uni-pole that he refers to is only moderate and/or symbolic.[80] Apart from Grigorescu, “soft band-wagoning” has also been picked up on by Foot (2006) or Hansen et al. (2008). The strength of the “soft-balancers’” and “soft-bandwagoners’” argument lies in its power to explain not only whom states choose to support but also the *degree* of the support they offer. Overall, the nuanced concepts of “soft balancing” and “soft band-wagoning” offer valuable insight into the formation of alliances today: especially at a time when political coalitions or “coalitions of the willing” – they include the Gulf War in 1991, Somalia 1993, Haiti 1994, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001 or Iraq 2003 – rather than military alliances are becoming the norm.

The bulk of the criticism of contemporary neo-realist theories on state behaviour in general and dynamics of cooperation in the international system in particular focuses on the underlying pillars of neo-realist thought: most of the neo-realist scholarship still uses traditional neo-realist conceptualisations of power, threat and security. Yet in the post-Cold War world, the real and perceived threats have changed, and there have been multiple cases of states seeking partners and pursuing foreign policies in

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80 Grigorescu, A., 2008. East and Central European Countries and the Iraq War: The Choice Between “Soft Balancing” and “Soft Bandwagoning”. *Communist and Post-communist Studies* 41:281-299, p. 283

the absence of direct – and even indirect – threats and/or clear security gains. Perhaps these seemingly puzzling developments are the reason why the neo-realist literature currently suffers from a general lack of systematic, generalizable – or, in short holistic – theories of state behaviour and alliance formation in the post-1989 era. From the point of view that prevails in this dissertation – given the overall approach to social inquiry as well as the overarching puzzle – neo-realist scholars fall short of fully explicating the foreign policy of "muscular democratisation" for the following reasons. First, the idea that power structures and threat perceptions dictate foreign policy is somewhat problematic: the various Central and East European states pursued a degree of the same foreign policy despite their divergent structural positions: Hungary and the Czech Republic, inland European states safely inside NATO, were almost as "hawkish" on, say, Iraq or Russia, as the Baltics or Romania, whose security dilemmas – faced from outside NATO until 2004 – were clearly more complicated. Second, the assumption of rational decision-making must be questioned with respect to the foreign policy examined here: it often threatened to incur substantial short- and medium- term losses in strategic and potentially also economic terms, which, upon rational calculation, could have outweighed the ultimate gains, but CEE states decided to act upon it anyway. In conclusion, the neo-realist reading of the foreign policy case studies that are analysed in the dissertation cannot be discounted. Hence, it is included in the account of "macro-structure" – i.e. the grid of security and economic incentives for the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia – that precedes the examination of foreign policy discourse and output during the Iraq War, the Orange Revolution and the Russia Reset.

2.5. Conceptual framework

The admittedly eclectic conceptual framework that will frame the foreign policy analysis presented in this dissertation follows from the theoretical gaps that have been identified in the literature review. Though scholars have devoted considerable attention to the conceptual breakdown of the processes through which ideas become norms, less research has been conducted on the reasons why norms take root in certain locales and not others as well as why they might arise at particular times. Moreover, while the scholarly discourse is rich in accounts of the role of creative agency in norm diffusion, it concentrates on what actors or agents *do,* less so on who they *are.* Considering epistemic communities, rooted cosmopolitans or norm entrepreneurs, how do they actually come about? Lastly, most studies tend to focus on instances of successful norm entrepreneurship on the international level, where internalisation, the final stage of the norm life cycle, can be expressed in legal terms. But what about informal norms, in the foreign policy realm, for instance? Since those cannot really be "enforced" in the legal sense, the IR literature generally disregards them as too difficult to pin down. Yet this does not mean that they shouldn't be studied. Crucially, they can tell us more about a certain type of norms – without legal underpinnings – whose internalisation could potentially be reversed, alerting us to the fact that inter-subjective norms can take root but also be uprooted. Furthermore, since the emergence of "norm entrepreneurial states" – especially in reference to Scandinavia (Ingebritsen 2002 and 2006, Bjorkdahl 2008, etc.)[81] – has been the talk

81 Ingebritsen, C., 2002. Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics. *Cooperation and Conflict* 37(1): 11-23; Ingebritsen, C., 2006. *Small States in International Relations.* Washington:

of the town, it is fair to ask how the promotion of norms in the international arena – by individuals as norm entrepreneurs – became a foreign policy norm, in this case for small states. Finally, insufficient heed has been paid to the competitive/cooperative synergy between interests and norms. How well do norms fare when competing with interests? Can norms, which originally settled in a particular context thanks to the logic of appropriateness, later be used instrumentally to advance interests? Are they, methodologically speaking, an independent variable motivating foreign policy decisions or an intervening variable aiding the understanding of national interest in foreign policy-making?

Arguably, as research on norm diffusion lies on the cutting edge between international relations and comparative politics, the conceptual framework of this study can draw on constructivist works in both fields. The following section will first define and operationalise key concepts in chronological order, as they will be used in the dissertation's two constitutive parts: "mission" and "conversion", and "zeal". It will conclude by summarising the key points in a simple diagram.

2.5.1. Concepts: definition and operationalisation

2.5.1.1. Mission and conversion: norms, norm entrepreneurs, socialisation and cultural match

Norms will be defined as standards of appropriate behaviour for a given identity, following Katzenstein et al. (1996). The dissertation will also distinguish between the

constitutive and regulative function of norms. Katzenstein et al. argue that, "norms either define ("constitute") identities in the first place (generating expectations about the proper portfolio of identities for a given context) or prescribe or proscribe ("regulate") behaviours for already constituted identities (generating expectations about how those identities will shape behaviour in varying circumstances)".[82] Taken together, "norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave".[83] The dissertation will focus on the *regulative* function of norms, throughout the dissertation, and it will discuss the latter, *constitutive* function of norms, in greater detail in the first part of the analysis, devoted to the mission and the conversion – the emergence and acceptance or habituation stages of the norms life cycle – in the section on the socialisation of CEE elites by their American counterparts. As for the operationalisation of the concept of "norm", it will refer to the normative framework dubbed "dissident geopolitics", introduced in Chapter 1.

Norm entrepreneurs will be understood here as agents distinguished by their "strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community".[84] A *purposeful* norm entrepreneur "selects a norm that is perceived as morally appealing, familiar and

82 Katzenstein et al. 1996: 12

83 Ibid

84 Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 897

good, and that agrees with his values, beliefs, identities and practices".[85] As for the level of abstraction, norm entrepreneurs will be individuals, rather than states, as Finnemore and Sikkink originally envisioned. In practice, members of the Czech, Polish and Slovak communities advocating "dissident geopolitics" will be discerned by: self-identification, references by other members of the community and consistency of their views on international politics, which should be apparent from their public statements, interviews in the media and any published written works, including articles, books and the like. Moreover, norm entrepreneurs will be identified based on their curriculum vitae: in general, a history of non-conforming behaviour under communism, a negative perception of the communist regime, centre- to right-of-centre political views, extensive periods of time spent in the United States and, in the case of second-generation norm entrepreneurs, professional experience of working with founding norm entrepreneurs, all increase the likelihood that a person will belong to the network of norm entrepreneurs, though own admission and identification by other members must come first. As for the spot that norm entrepreneurs will occupy in the dissertation, the development of the community will be discussed in the first part on the "mission" and "conversion". In the second part on the "zeal" – foreign policy analysis will already treat its existence as a given.

Socialisation, the learning process based on the logic of appropriateness that has been highlighted as the main avenue for norm diffusion, will be defined as follows. Laid bare, socialisation is, perhaps, best understood as the "induction of new members into

85 Sikkink 1991: 26

the ways of behaviour that are preferred in the given society".[86] Crucially for the dissertation, this conceptualisation captures the asymmetry of the relationship between novices and veterans, or pupils and teachers. Yet for the sake of greater clarity, it must be complemented by a more detailed definition explaining the dynamics of the process: to this purpose, this dissertation has chosen Checkel's (2010) conceptualisation of socialisation. In Checkel's view, socialisation is the "interaction with broader institutional contexts (norms and discursive strategies)" that leads actors – such as senior politicians and bureaucrats from applicant states – to "acquire new interests and preferences".[87] This conceptualisation unpacks not only the process of learning, but it also identifies the expected outcome. Therefore, socialisation to "dissident geopolitics" will most probably be taking place via the following channels: on the international level via the NATO enlargement process involving governments, parliaments and embassies and on the transnational level via a) interactions between political parties, think-tanks and NGOs and b) via direct interpersonal contacts between elite members. Furthermore, given that socialisation in Checkel's theoretical framework is eased by resonance, the dissertation will also make use of the concept of a *cultural match*: a "positive" one will increase the probability that international norms will have constitutive effects, while a "negative" one will reduce it.[88] In other words, "domestic norms will shape the preferences of

86 Barnes, Carter & Skidmore 1980: 35

87 Checkel 2010

88 Checkel 1999: 91

key agents and predict the degree to which they resonate and have constitutive effect in particular states".[89]

2.5.1.2. Zeal: persuasion and framing

Lastly, persuasion and framing will be the conceptual anchors of the second part of the dissertation, focused on the influence of norms on foreign policy-making, which will be assessed on the basis of foreign policy discourse and output. Persuasion is the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms and the subjective becomes the inter-subjective.[90] As Finnemore and Sikkink put it, persuasion is the mission of norm entrepreneurs, who by using it seek to change the utility functions of other players to reflect some new normative commitments. Persuasion tends to be conducted through "framing" of the normative claims that the entrepreneurs strive to champion: hence, frames will be conceptualised here as rhetorical devices that make actors "see different things, make different interpretations of the way things are, and support different courses of action concerning what is to be done, by whom and how to do it".[91] In the actual analysis of foreign policy cases, persuasive framing will be examined via foreign policy discourse preceding the foreign policy output – the decision to go to Iraq, support the

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89 Ibid

90 Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 914, Klotz 1995: 29-33

91 Rein & Schoen 1993: 147

Orange Revolution and pursue a reset of relations with Russia – that needs to be explained. Via process tracing, the dissertation will attempt to demonstrate how the consistent use of a powerful frame can either reinforce and legitimate existing preferences or redefine them. It will also look into ways in which frames may also create "rhetorical traps"[92] and encourage broader or more long-term foreign policy lines. The ability of relevant norm entrepreneurs – or missionaries – to sway decision-makers or opinion-makers close to them – who will also be referred to as "converts – will represent the key to the understanding of the dynamics of norm influence on foreign policy-making in the countries investigated here.

2.5.2. Conceptual framework: an overview

Table 2.1: Mission", "conversion" and "zeal": norms and norm entrepreneurs in the norm life cycle

	1.1. Mission	1.2. Conversion	2. Zeal
Stage of norm life cycle	Emergence	Acceptance	Internalisation
Main concepts	Constitutive and regulative norm, norm entrepreneur – missionary	Socialisation, resonance, norm entrepreneur – missionary	Persuasion, framing, rhetorical entrapment, norm entrepreneur - convert
Developments on the ground	US norms arise as basis for "dissident geopolitics"; the community of norm entrepreneurs emerges	Norm entrepreneurs learn from US counterparts; "dissident geopolitics" take root via resonance	Norm entrepreneurs advocate "dissident geopolitics" in discourse preceding FP decision via persuasive framing

92 Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999

PART I: “Mission and Conversion”

Norm Emergence and Norm Habituation in the Foreign Policy-Making of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia in Transition

The Case of “Dissident Geopolitics”

Socialising New Converts

Empowering New Converts

Editing the Bible

Selling the Bible

3. Chapter 3. Mission and conversion

The following chapter unpacks the early stages of norm diffusion: the emergence of norms and norm entrepreneur networks, as well as the habituation of the latter to the incipient normative frameworks. While not discounting the importance of other normative frameworks, the dissertation focuses on an "Americanised" set of foreign policy norms dubbed "dissident geopolitics", championed by Czech, Polish and Slovak norm entrepreneurs who were exposed to and influenced by American foreign policy thought in the early years that followed the downfall of communism. Before they themselves became the missionaries of activist and value-laden foreign policy in their countries, in the 1990s, they were recent converts to democracy, courted, via various channels, by networks of American missionaries, who strived to turn them onto the path of norm-oriented foreign policy-making as they had come to understand it. The research questions and hypotheses targeted by this chapter are:

R1. Under which conditions, and by which mechanisms, did the normative framework "dissident geopolitics" establish itself in the realm of foreign policy-making across Central and Eastern Europe in the turbulent era of transition in the 1990s?

H1a. The norms in question found their way into CEE states by means of diffusion through extensive structural linkages between the US and CEE, as well as *socialisation* between agents from the American and CEE foreign policy-making community.

H1b. The norms persisted thanks to *resonance* with existing, domestic norms, reinforced by *framing* by agents ("norm entrepreneurs") whose position/legitimacy

was relatively *undisputed* by other agents.

Missionaries tend to pour into heathen territory in times of turmoil, as the pool of potential converts temporarily expands. When communism collapsed across Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, norm entrepreneurs from what was then collectively known as the "West" started sending emissaries into the region en masse, in hopes of recruiting local zealots for the global crusade against authoritarianism. The temporary normative vacuum created by the overwhelming geopolitical changes in Central and Eastern Europe provided a fertile soil for the construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of new norms in the foreign policy realm. Many prominent scholars of democratisation and regional experts—"Sovietologists" turned "post—Sovietologists"—today highlight the importance of the reigning zeitgeist, which provided the grand *meta—narrative* for the discourse between "Western" missionaries and their disciples from Central and Eastern Europe. The times seemed to herald the "end of history", as Francis Fukuyama put it in his best—selling book, arguing that market democracy had accomplished the ultimate victory.[93] Democracy became a "universal value", recognised by converts and heathens alike, though as a public good by the former, and a feared threat that had to be "faked" by the latter.[94]

At the early stages of norm diffusion, it was the "grey zone" of transition regimes—the "half-open", "half-closed" nature of the Czech, Slovak and Polish opportunity structure—spurred and sustained lively ideational exchange between Western

93 Fukuyama, F., 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin

94 Sen, A., 1999. Democracy as a Universal Value. Journal of Democracy 10(3):3-17

veterans and Eastern novices, who had a sense of *what* they wanted to do with their foreign policy orientation but needed to learn *how* to accomplish it.[95] Importantly, from a macro-perspective, Central Europeans made a clear geopolitical choice to re—join the transatlantic community, but they did not know what other foreign policy goals, such as "democracy promotion in Belarus and Cuba" or "supporting integration aspirations of the Western Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood" to set.[96] Likewise, in the early 1990s, they did not yet, from a micro-standpoint, develop the institutions, policy paradigms and "ways of doing things" that would create "lock-in" effects and translate declared normative commitments to "Western values" into foreign policy practice. Hence, *socialisation* in interaction with Western missionaries kick-started learning processes, one of which was norm diffusion.

Yet Central Europe was by no means a "tabula rasa", as some blue—ribbon observers tried to assert, and norm diffusion was filtered through the membrane of existing norms, "writings on the wall". This dissertation argues that in the fluid times of transition, small groups of "editors", or, more rigorously, norm entrepreneurs, managed to capture the momentum, "re—write" national meta—narratives and create a foreign policy tradition of "dissident geopolitics", which would then survive for years to come. Mapping the layout and interaction between different groups of norm entrepreneurs and outlining the process of "Americanisation" in Czech, Polish and

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95 Tarrow, S.G., 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

96 Understandably, as they were focused on their domestic transitions.

Slovak foreign policy that engendered both the underlying norms of "dissident geopolitics" and the corresponding norm entrepreneur networks, this chapter will argue that framing agents—in this case promoters of "dissident geopolitics"—tend to succeed in creating and applying new "logics of appropriateness", following March and Olsen, when they are *relatively undisputed*, which often happens in post-authoritarian settings. In so doing, they can create enduring foreign policy paradigms. Of course, this does not mean that norm entrepreneurs face no discursive competition. The chapter will take due note of alternative normative frameworks promoted by other norm entrepreneur groups[97] in the Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy arenas in the 1990s and beyond. It is in fact through vigorous norm advocacy, eased by *structural power* and reinforced by *framing,* in competitive foreign policy discourse, that zealous norm entrepreneurship cascades into norm habituation, at which point norms acquire wider legitimacy.[98]

Norm emergence and habituation—the "mission" and "conversion" of national

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97 To sustain the consistency of the over-arching metaphor, promoters of "dissident geopolitics" are converts and later missionaries. Norm entrepreneurs associated with un-democratic foreign policy traditions, such as "Meciarites" in Slovakia, or foreign policy agendas that are less "value-laden", such as pragmatists surrounding president Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic in the 2000s, are heathens. Norm entrepreneurs championing normative frameworks built on another interpretation or geographical projection of values underlying "dissident geopolitics"—freedom, democracy, democracy promotion—are "Europeanists", "peaceniks", "Slavophiles", etc, depending on the context.

98 Sunstein 1997; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998

foreign policy elite—can be explained by a nexus of mutually constituted structural and agency—centred variables already hinted at above. The chapter will break the analysis down into macro—structure and micro-structure, interweaving and engaging agency throughout. First, it will map nascent networks of norm entrepreneurs at home, establishing their perceptions of and their interactions with established and credible framing agents—in this case, the American norm entrepreneurs, via *socialisation*. Second, it will assess the *structural power* of Czech, Polish and Slovak norm entrepreneurs on their respective foreign policy stages, focusing on the institutions, organisations, informal networks and discursive forums that became the channels for norm advocacy, creating—or not—lock-in effects. Next, it will focus on the norms themselves: namely, on the workings of *resonance*, i.e., ways in which ascending "imported" frameworks tapped into existing home-grown ones, which themselves were defined by meta-narratives of cultural memory and state identities. Finally, the chapter will explore the norm entrepreneurs' choice and use of *framing* devices that were powerful enough to reconstitute state identities in a way that provided a nutritious mycelium for the normative framework of "dissident geopolitics" and to trump alternatives. In line with the hypotheses (compare with section 1.3.1.), the chapter assumes that the four variables play a necessary ("N") or complementary ("C") role in the emergence and habituation of "dissident geopolitics".

Table 3.1: How do norms arise?

	Structural linkages with US	Interpersonal exchange with US	Resonance	Framing	Lack of alternative framing
Type of factor	C	N	C	N	N

The four subsections, on norm emergence and habituation via (1) socialisation, (2) structural power, (3) resonance and (4) framing, will, in line with the over—arching metaphor, be entitled: "Socialising new converts", "Empowering new converts", "Editing the Bible" and "Selling the Bible". In the interest of a more thorough and balanced comparison, this chapter will not be divided into subsections by country, but will rather weave country—specific observations into its thematic narratives.

3.1. Socialisation: "socialising new converts"

The crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the resulting permeability of borders opened up multiple avenues for the socialisation of eager new converts to democracy, who flocked to Western missionaries for a variety of compelling reasons, including protection, inspiration and validation. Upon closer inspection, the composition of the large and fast-growing Central European "herd" of converts revealed a stunning variety. The immediate reference group for Americans and West Europeans alike were, of course, the "dissidents": elites, often previously persecuted and jailed, with a history of non-conformist behaviour under communism, who credited the West, and the U.S. in particular, with "winning" the Cold War.[99] They were most numerous in Poland, due to the over-extension of the Solidarity trade union, which encompassed a third of the working-age population in its heyday.[100] In the Czech part of

99 Countless interviews.

100 Garton Ash, T., 2002. *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Czechoslovakia, they were scarcer; in the words of Czech dissident Martin Palous, they were "islands of positive deviation".[101] The Slovak part of Czechoslovakia only developed a minuscule dissident community due in part to the Slovaks' different interpretation of the Prague Spring of 1968 and the era of "normalisation" in the 1970s, both of which affected them far less severely than they did the more "culpable" Czechs.

In addition to dissident groups, converts also hailed from the ranks of returned émigrés who had left their countries after the communist takeovers on the heels of World War II. Perhaps counter—intuitively, convert émigrés were most abundant in the Czech Republic—ranking second after the émigré—pervaded Baltic States—even though Poland had the largest diaspora of the three countries. Given the closed and repressive nature of the Czechoslovak incarnation of state socialism, there were more prominent Czechs that seemed to have both more reasons to leave and fewer opportunities to come back.[102]

The last batch of converts was recruited from the communist successor parties, which sought to rebuild their reputations. In Poland and Slovakia, these were SLD and SDL. In the Czech Republic, where the socialist camp divided into the unreformed Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) and the restored historical Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), the choice between the "West" and the "rest" was

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101 Palous, M., 1990. The Parallel Polis After 12 Years. *Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature* 2(1): 53-59, p. 54

102 Kovanda, K., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 3.3.

not as straightforward. While the former had no interest in converting, the latter seemed hesitant to openly support NATO accession, a foreign policy goal that was unlikely to score political points among Czech voters who preferred neutrality in the early 1990s. "…truly strong social democratic and socialist parties can act and rule only in countries protected by NATO, not in countries supervised by tanks," state the minutes from CSSD's re-founding congress in 1991 in a vague reference to NATO, without much specification of the party's preferred course of action.[103]

The motivations of the various converts in Central Europe for lending an ear to missionaries from the West followed both the incentive-based logic of consequences and the norm-oriented logic of appropriateness. Americans—and West Europeans, of course, though the dissertation focuses on the former—wanted to teach, and Central Europeans also wanted to learn. Emerging norm entrepreneurs in all three states were uniformly concerned with national security and the removal of Soviet troops from their soil. On top of this underlying rationale for their "Western" affiliation, converts placed varying emphasis on international norms and universal values. The commitment to those differed subtly between dissidents and émigrés on the one hand, and reform communists or socialists on the other hand. Moreover, nuances could be detected at the country level. The main mechanisms of socialisation between Central Europeans and Americans included formal and informal conditionality, persuasion and social learning, distinguished by the decreasing scale of incentives (see Figure 3.1). While in the case of dissidents and émigrés, persuasion and social learning,

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103 Protocol XXIV of the Re-founding Congress of CSSD, 1991. Prague: Fenix

based almost entirely on the logic of appropriateness, prevailed, in the case of reform communists and socialists, formal and informal conditionality also featured in the socialisation process.

Figure 3.1: Mechanisms of socialisation: graduated scale



Notes: the Y axis denotes the scale of incentives: the taller the column, the more incentives are involved in socialisation.

Starting with dissidents and émigrés, their desire to re-join the West and learn from American and West European missionaries—the former in particular—seemed to stem from genuine normative commitments to values such as freedom and democracy. In a telling snapshot, Polish president Lech Walesa said in his speech at a joint session of the Congress in November 1989 that, "The people of Poland link the name of the United States with freedom and democracy, generosity and high mindedness, human friendship and friendly humanity…. [I'm now speaking to] the Congress which for many people in the world oppressed and stripped of their rights is a beacon of freedom and a bulwark human rights."104 In the same vein, whilst also speaking to U.S. congressmen and senators four months later, Czechoslovakia's

104 Polish Solidarity Leader Address. 1989. U.S. Senate / U.S. House of Representatives. 15.11.

dissident leader Vaclav Havel, explicitly expressed the desire to learn from the Americans: "We are, of course, delighted that your country is so readily lending its support to our fresh efforts to renew democracy. We must all learn many things from you, from how to educate our offspring, how to elect our representatives, all the way to how to organise our economic life."[105]

The dissidents' desire to learn from abroad resonated with émigrés, who, having undergone socialisation already during their time away, started acting as missionaries themselves upon their return. For instance, Czechs Karel Kovanda and Michael Zantovsky were exposed to the American value system through their academic career and professional experience: the former studied and taught at Pepperdine, California University and the Massachussetts Institute of Technology, while the latter studied at McGill and worked at the editorial office of Reuters. Kovanda and Zantovsky provide excellent examples of early émigré norm entrepreneurship: both are credited with helping to persuade the tentative Vaclav Havel—who initially argued in favour of dismantling both military blocs, i.e., the Warsaw Pact as well as NATO— to pledge commitment to NATO membership.[106]

Lastly, reform communists and socialists were motivated by reputational concerns to convert to norms advocated by Westerners.[107] Communist successor parties had to

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105 Vaclav Havel Address, 1990. U.S. Senate / U.S. House of Representatives. 22.2.

106 Zantovsky, M., 2010. Interview with author. London. 15.12., Kovanda 2011 (Compare with: Asmus, R., 2002. *Opening NATO's Door.* New York: Columbia University Press).

107 Grzymala-Busse, A., 2002. *Redeeming the Communist Past: the Regeneration of Communist*

reinvent themselves on the international stage and earn the trust of their countries' new allies. As future prime minister Leszek Miller of SdRP/SLD and Peter Weiss, chairman of SDL in 1991–1996 describe it in personal interviews, these leftist reformists had to enter the Socialist International in "good standing"; register as political parties in the new democratic system, including formally recanting their communist ideology and taking other rehabilitative steps; and create a new platform at home that would win the sympathies of voters.[108] The quick turn-around of some former apparatchiks[109] testifies to the extent to which their conversion could have been a calculated move (see Appendix 1).

The instant macro-opportunity structure for the ideational exchange between converts to democracy among the Czechs, Poles and Slovaks and missionaries from the U.S. was the framework of NATO enlargement. The three states did not uniformly commit to this foreign policy goal in the early 1990s: Prague, and above all, Bratislava took longer to pledge allegiance than Warsaw. In Poland, whether or not to join NATO was not as much of an issue of contention than it was in Czechoslovakia. Of course, "exotic" proposals, such as that of Lech Walesa himself, to create a "NATO *bis*" as a sub-regional security system, or Marshall Jozef Pilsudski's inter-war vision of a

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Parties in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

108 Miller, L., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 20.6., Weiss, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava/Budapest. 27.1.

109 See Appendix 1 for norm entrepreneurs labelled as "co-opted" in the communist regime, who became more pro-American and hawkish than, for instance, left-leaning dissidents.

Central European federation with Poland at the helm dubbed "Miedzymorze", which received some support from right-wing and populist movements in Poland, did stir up the discourse. Overall, however, they were scarcer and did not offer viable alternatives to Partnership for Peace and NATO.[110] In the Czech Republic, the debate was more heated, as a significant proportion of the electorate leaned towards Austrian-style neutrality (see Table 4). Alpha converts including president Vaclav Havel, foreign minister Jiri Dientsbier and his deputy Lubos Dobrovsky, all ex-dissidents, were divided and initially favoured the dismantlement of both the Warsaw Pact as well as NATO. Havel did ultimately budge, due to both the persuasive power of Dobrovsky and Alexander Vondra, as well as the onset of hostilities in Yugoslavia, which alerted him to the fact that the "end of history" might not be as nigh. Dienstbier, on the other hand, was more hesitant.[111] In 1993, Havel cited "civilizational canonicity" and "shared values" as a reason for the need to pursue NATO membership.[112]

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110 Wohlfeld, M., 1996. Security Cooperation in Central Europe: Polish Views. NATO Research Fellowships (1994-1996); Roshwald, A., 2001. *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia 1914-1923.* London: Routledge, p. 35

111 *NATO Review*, 2012. The Chicago Summit. Vaclav Havel: Remembering the Big Little Man; Czech Television, 2003. "On the Way to the Castle and Back Again". An Interview with Vaclav Havel; Dobrovsky, L., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 31.3.; Vondra, A., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 22.8.

112 Havel, V., 1993. Proc by se melo NATO otevrit stredni Evrope. *Lidove noviny*. 16.11.

Table 3.2: Czech attitudes on NATO enlargement (MM/YY, %)

	05/93	02/94	02/95	03/96	05/97	02/98
Certainly yes	20	20	18	17	17	28
Rather yes	32	36	36	29	27	31
Rather no	29	28	34	30	28	24
Certainly no	19	16	12	24	28	17

"Do you think that we should be striving as much as we can for NATO membership?"

Source: STEM polling agency[113]

In Slovakia, NATO membership was even more disputed due to the meteoric rise of Vladimir Meciar, the power-hungry prime minister for much of the 1990s, who rhetorically supported NATO accession—his government's programme stated that the "basic security orientation of the Slovak Republic is defined by the strive to attain NATO membership"—but effectively advocated a controversial foreign policy course based on the notion of "bridging the East and the West".[114] Yet, all three countries joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994, which opened doors for intense socialisation.

Several institutions, frameworks and communication channels, both formal and informal, facilitated the exchange of ideas, values and norms between Central European converts and American missionaries at the backdrop of NATO enlargement.

113 STEM, 1993. Trends 1993-1998. November. Obtained by author.

114 MFA of the Slovak Republic, 1993-1995. The Slovak Road to NATO. Online Archive. (See also Horvath, P., 2004. Stredna Europa a jej integracne pokusy. *Slovenska politologicka revue* 2)

On the multilateral level, within the Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action Plan (Slovakia), socialisation took place via the exposure of military personnel and civilians from the region to the norms of human rights, Western-defined democracy and the rule of law, driven by the strive to teach Central European elites to define foreign policy positioning and national interests within the framework of these norms.[115] To this end, countless workshops and seminars took place at the Partnership training centres, NATO's Defence College, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Marshall Centre, through the Partnership Coordination Cell, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as well as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. High-profile Central European converts at the core of the future norm entrepreneur networks were often involved in relevant committees and working groups attached to the office of the prime minister, the foreign ministry, the defence ministry or the parliament.[116] It is key to note here that NATO, of course, is not an "American" but an international organisation. Hence, Central European converts were, via structured interactions on

115 Gheciu, A., 2005. Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'. *International Organization* 59(4): 973-1012

116 These included, for example: the Czech Inter-departmental Working Group for NATO Accession; the Polish parliamentary Sub-Committee on Integration with NATO and Strategies for the Defence of Poland; the set of Slovak inter-departmental working groups involved in the drafting of the PRENAME (PREparation for NATO Membership), strategy or the MP Commission for Fast NATO Integration, etc.; as well as negotiation teams and observer missions at NATO headquarters in Brussels (e.g., NATO liaison offices, most often attached to the local embassies, the team of the permanent representative—PERMREP—and later the Permanent Delegation to NATO in Brussels).

the diplomatic level, exposed to a multitude of "sermons" by not only American but also West European missionaries. Why groups of Czech, Polish and Slovak norm entrepreneurs of most interest to this dissertation seemed more susceptible to "Americanisation" than, for instance, "Europeanisation", will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.3, which will focus on *resonance.*

Bilaterally, the U.S.-CEE socialisation pipeline was powered by sources that included renewed and newly established structural and inter-personal links. First, though not necessarily "causal" forces instrumental in facilitating norm diffusion, diasporas and economic exchange initially fostered and tightened the U.S.-CEE bond and helped "catalyse" ideational exchange on a wider scale that involved both elites *and* societies, as today's missionaries from the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, tend to claim in interviews.[117] Starting with diasporas, Czech, Polish and Slovak communities in the United States, approximated at 6.4 million, 873,000 and 469,000, respectively[118], offered real and constructed reference points in U.S.-CEE history, channels of communication, advocacy and lobbyism. They also eased connections to high-ranking officials with Central European roots, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor to president Jimmy Carter and a prominent persona on the American foreign policy scene, and Secretary of State under president Bill Clinton Madeleine Albright, who quickly became vigorous defenders of the Central European

117 Countless interviews.

118 Some Americans of CEE descent also self-identify as "Czechoslovak". The data was retrieved from the table "First Ancestry Reported". US Census Bureau, 2010. American Community Survey.

countries' NATO membership and the U.S.-CEE alliance in general.

From a comparative perspective, the diaspora—more abundant and coop-ted in American politics—played a much more prominent role in the Polish case. Organisations such as the Polish-American Congress, the Polish American Association or the American Jewish Committee—of which dissident and later politician Bronislaw Geremek became a prominent member—also actively reached out to their liberated compatriots in hopes of re-establishing close rapport. The Polish-American Congress (PAC) was the umbrella institution of "American Polonia", which, for instance, actively lobbied with the Reagan administration in favour of abolishing sanctions against Poland imposed at the time of the martial law in the 1980s—a case it won in 1987. The PAC gave a hero's welcome to new Polish president Lech Walesa in 1989 following the historic round-table talks and bolstered Poland's position in the U.S. through sustained advocacy of economic assistance and promotion of different modes of ideational exchange, such as educational visits and scholarship programs. One of its major achievements was the "Support East European Democracy Act of 1989", which committed more than $800 million in aid to help Poland with economic transition.[119] PAC's activities extended beyond Poland to the wider region of Central Europe: in 1994, for instance, it also organised two meetings of Americans of Polish, Czech, Hungarian and Slovak heritage held with top leaders in the U.S. government including president Bill Clinton and vice president Al Gore, aimed to coalesce the latter towards pledging to back NATO membership for Central

119 Polish-American Congress, 2012. Milestones in the Story of the Polish-American Congress. The First Fifty Years: 1944-1994. Part II: 1981-1994. Online Archive.

European states.

Moving on from the diaspora to economic exchange, the American Chambers of Commerce established in the early 1990s in Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw also strived to reinforce the emerging U.S.-CEE bond by seeking investment opportunities and spreading global good practices on the emerging markets. The "treasure hunt" seemed most intense in Poland, where the share of American capital in the total foreign direct investment reached almost 14% by the mid-1990s. The Polish-American Enterprise Fund, launched with the blessing of the U.S. Congress, invested in over 50 joint ventures and helped to create and develop many companies playing a significant role in today's economy.[120]

As was the case with the diaspora, American investment was scarcer and less resource-intensive in the former Czechoslovakia. In the Czech context, it is worth to mention early projects of Procter & Gamble, Honeywell and Ingersoll Rand, which focused on product penetration, acquisitions and modernisation of Czech companies. In the Eastern part of the former Czechoslovak federation, American capital started pouring in later, in the mid- and late 1990s, due, in part, to the stalled progression of political and economic transition under prime minister Meciar. Nevertheless, American enterprises established a presence, initially through the massive projects of

120 After 20 years of almost continuous growth, the cumulative value of American direct investment in Poland reached USD 15,597 million at the end of 2008. Kuskowski, P., et al., 2010. Twenty Years of American Investment in Poland. *Report of the American Chamber of Commerce in Poland and KPMG.* Online Archive.

U.S. Steel and Dell.[121] In conclusion, though diasporas and economic exchange with the U.S.—with the latter certainly crowded out by European investment—extended and deepened the structural interconnections between the U.S. and Central Europe, they did not constitute the main avenues of norm diffusion. Rather, as Vaclav Havel's aide and head of Czech foreign intelligence Oldrich Cerny, former Slovak ambassador to the U.S. Martin Butora, and Polish ex-president Aleksander Kwasniewski jointly expressed in interviews, they represented additional benefits that increased the overall sense of "indebtedness" or "gratitude" to the United States.[122]

The main opportunity structure for norm entrepreneurship by American missionaries in Central Europe was the realm of organisations invested in human rights advocacy, democracy promotion and NATO enlargement. In the 1990s, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Freedom House, National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), among others, funded and supported a myriad of domestic projects and visiting fellowship programs focused on capacity building, party organisation, and civil society development through peer-to-peer advice, twinning and mentoring. Some members of these institutes, such as Jan Surotchak of IRI's office in Slovakia, became a "fixed star" of the local political

121 Bartonova, L., 2008. A Closer Look at American Investment in Slovakia. *Report of PriceWaterHouseCoopers and the American Chamber of Commerce in Slovakia.* Online Archive; Frelich, B., 2009. American Investment and the Potential for the Czech Republic. *Brief by CzechInvest.* Online Archive.

122 Cerny, O., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 27.2; Butora, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 4.2; Kwasniewski, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 14.6.

scene. James Denton, then in charge of Freedom House's visiting fellowship scheme, says today, "We tried to bring in some of those aspiring leaders that were radiating such enthusiasm about democracy, in order to imbue them with an understanding of international norms that we have developed over the years, so that they would go back and spread them in their own countries."[123] The beneficiaries included, for instance, Jan Zahradil, the resounding Atlanticist voice in the Czech Republic's centre-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS), several "hawkish" Czech journalists—including Martin Weiss from the Czech daily *Lidove noviny*—or Pavol Demes, the veteran human rights activist and future representative of the German Marshall Fund (GMF) in Central Europe.[124] For his part, Demes reiterates that this experience, among others, cemented his commitment to pursue active democracy promotion around the world, a mission he has always championed among Slovak policy-makers.[125] Symbolic gestures by American democracy watchdogs also helped boost the profile of leading Central European norm entrepreneurs and reinforce their sense of connection to the United States. NED, for instance, chose to honour heavy-weights including Alexander Vondra of the Czech Republic and Martin Butora of Slovakia by awarding them the Democracy Service Medal. The ceremony, held in 1999 in Washington, DC, tellingly teemed with norm Central European entrepreneurs such as

123 Denton, J., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 23.1.

124 The Directory of Visiting Fellows. The Visiting Fellowship Program in the USA. *Freedom House.* Washington, DC/Budapest, Hungary. Obtained by author

125 Demes, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 2.1.

Martin M. Simecka, the editor in chief of Slovakia's *SME* daily newspaper, Martin Palous, then Czech deputy foreign minister and Karel Schwarzenberg, the ex-Chancellor of the Czech Republic's Office of the President.[126]

Moreover, from among non-partisan institutes, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), the Atlantic Council (ACUS), the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the U.S. Committee on NATO (USCN), by admission of norm entrepreneurs in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, as well as in the U.S., were especially invested in missionary work in the region in the 1990s.[127] Manifest of their effort to open windows of opportunity for "socialisation" were events such as the Congress of Prague, co-hosted by the neo-conservative AEI—which would later complete the political education of convert par excellence, Radoslaw Sikorski of Poland—in May 1996, which attracted over 300 politicians, policy-makers, scholars and intellectuals from the U.S., Western Europe and Central Europe. Participants included, among others, Madeleine Albright, Richard N. Perle of the AEI, Ron Asmus of GMF, Bruce Jackson and Paige Reffe of the USCN, James Wolsey of the CIA, Anne Applebaum of the Washington Post,

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126 *National Endowment for Democracy*, 1999. Democracy Service Medal Ceremony. 20.10. Online Archive

127 Others included the Mott Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Ford Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation, the Institute for EastWest Studies, Education for Democracy, the Foundation for a Civil Society, the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe. (See also: Demes, P., 2010. *Twenty Years of Western Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe.* International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.)

among others. By integrating new converts to democracy from Central Europe into existing networks of American—and West European—norm entrepreneurs, the Americans established lasting structural links that helped kick-start the process of norm habituation, via "replication" of norm entrepreneur groups directly in the region: through partner organisations, such as Forum 2000 in the Czech Republic, Stefan Batory Foundation in Poland, Institute of Public Affairs in Slovakia (along with many others), new subsidiaries, such as GMF's Warsaw office, "twin" NGOs, including the Slovak Atlantic Commission (SAC) modelled on the Atlantic Council, conferences where norm entrepreneurs from both sides of the Atlantic continue to meet to this day—for instance, the Wroclaw Global Forum or the Global Security Forum in Bratislava—as well as fellowships and seminal joint publications – such as Ron Asmus' and Alexander Vondra's piece on the origins of Atlanticism in Central Europe.

Prominent American missionaries involved directly "on the ground" included, for instance, Wendy W. Luers, the ambassador of the U.S. to Czechoslovakia in 1983–1986, president of the Foundation for Civil Society, established in 1990. With offices in New York, Prague and Bratislava, the Foundation raised and expended over $11m towards mobilising human and financial resources to support projects strengthening the forces of democracy, civil society, the rule of law and free market economy in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Among other efforts, the Foundation established an Expert Advisors Program to engender reforms in the Czech and Slovak Republics through the placement of long-term, high-level Western advisors with ministries, mayors, and other policy makers. From 1995–1998, the Democracy Network Program, a project with a budget of more than $5 million sponsored by the United

States Agency for International Development (USAID), developed and strengthened indigenous, public policy-oriented non-governmental organisations in the two countries.[128] Luers, who served on a Team of External Advisors to the minister of foreign affairs of Slovakia, "…made an invaluable contribution to capacity building and democratic development in the country," says Eduard Kukan, who held the post in 1998–2006.[129] In recognition of her accomplishments, she was honoured by the Gratias Agit Award for the promotion of the Czech Republic abroad and the State Order of the Dual White Cross in Slovakia.

Another American "burning" for the cause of Central European converts was Anne Applebaum, the Pulitzer Prize-winning author and journalist of *The Economist* and *The Washington Post*—later married to would-be Polish minister of defense and foreign affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski—who "told the story" of Central European countries to the international media while living in Warsaw in the 1990s. While in Poland, Applebaum—adjunct fellow at the AEI for a while—organised and participated in countless formal and informal discussions with her Polish counterparts, including but not limited to Adam Michnik, Bartosz Weglarczyk, Marek Ostrowski and Marek Magierowski, all of whom were interviewed by the author, as well as converts of other vocations relevant to the foreign policy arena, as they were

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128 *Foundation for a Civil Society*, 2012. FCS President Wendy W. Luers: About. Online Archive; Obsitnik, V,, 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC., 6.12.; Surotchak, J., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 22.2.

129 Kukan, E., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 28.2.

contemplating ways in which norms constitutive of "dissident geopolitics" could be expressed and, later, defended on the international stage.

Multiple other "co-opted" American missionaries hailed from the USCN (USCN), a non-governmental corporation formed in 1996 to promote NATO expansion and strengthen the transatlantic partnership. Bruce Jackson, its president; Paige Reffe, the White House's liaison for the 1998 NATO summit in Lisbon and later the advisor to the Slovak government; Richard Perle, the chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, the federal advisory committee to the U.S. Department of Defense, in 1987–2003; and Julie Finley, the Washington, DC, Republican Party Chairman in 1992–2000, were instrumental in securing bipartisan support for both rounds of NATO enlargement. Their recruits included senators Dick Lugar, John McCain or Joe Biden and, of course, U.S. Ambassador to NATO in the 1990s, Alexander Vershbow.[130] Bruce Jackson, the USCN's Republican mastermind – alongside Democrat Ron Asmus – recalls that the committee met on a regular basis at informal occasions in Washington, DC, at the presence of Polish and Czech ambassadors Jerzy Kozminski and Michael Zantovsky, throughout mid- and late 1990s. In 1995, USCN staged a dinner for members and twelve senators whose support it sought with Polish dissident Adam Michnik, who "arrived late", Jackson laughs, but captivated everyone with his fascinating stories from the anti-communist

130 Reffe, P., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC., 30.8; Jackson, B., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC/Paris. 14.9.

underground, "selling them" onto NATO enlargement.[131] The USCN later became the Project on Transitional Democracies, whose proclaimed goal was to "accelerate the integration of Europe's new democracies into NATO and the EU".[132] "Bruce [Jackson] has maintained heavy involvement in the region, and he continues to lobby in its favour at the top echelons of American government," Jan Surotchak of IRI's office in Bratislava said in a personal interview.[133]

A closer glance at the network of American missionaries most heavily involved in Central Europe, it would seem that Czech, Polish and Slovak converts were mainly exposed to ideas, values and norms championed by the American centre-right and in neo-conservative circles. The contacts that Central European policy-makers established in the U.S. government reflect that: Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, whose deputy national security advisor was Steven Hadley of the USCN, was the main proxy for CEE states under the Bush administration. The ideological or outright partisan nature of norm entrepreneurship by members of the USCN is especially interesting in the case of Slovakia, whose stalled transition "postponed" the most intense period of socialisation of converts to democracy until after the departure of the Democratic administration of president Bill Clinton from power. The implications for norm diffusion will be discussed in greater detail in the section unpacking *resonance.* Appendix 1 presents an overview of the emerging norm entrepreneur networks in the

131 Jackson 2011

132 *Project for the New American Century*, 1997. Statement of Principles. Online Archive

133 Surotchak 2011

Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia in the 1990s: core members and their *domestic positioning*, including relevant posts in government or the non-governmental sector, attitude toward the communist regime and partisan affiliation, as well as institutions, ideational influences – U.S. foreign policy doctrines that enable the distinction between "hawks" and "doves" and interpersonal links that served as channels for socialisation, as a process that culminated in the "Americanisation" of their foreign policy thinking, in the 1990s. The data is organised in three tables, one per country, and complemented by a comprehensive analysis. The main findings are summarised in the table below. They indicate that though there are some broad similarities between the three countries, the make-up of early norm entrepreneur groups is slightly different. All three of them seem to be dominated by members who self-identify as the "centre-right". The analysis also suggests that the socialisation process took place mainly in the context of NATO enlargement. The Polish and Czech communities seem to resemble each other more: they contain more dissidents, and they seem to have undergone formative socialisation in the 1990s, as the norm entrepreneurs' interpersonal connections with American counterparts reveal. The Slovak network, which seems more "hawkish" overall, diverges from the Central European model, perhaps due to the delayed commencement of socialisation in the post-Meciar era.

Table 3.3: Early norm entrepreneurs and socialisation in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia

Domestic Positioning			Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Country	Communist Era	Partisan orientation	Institutions	Ideational Influence	Links
Czech Republic	dissidents and émigrés	centre-right, right	NATO, USCN (USCN)	"doves"	Clinton administration
Poland	dissidents, diaspora and some reform communists	centre-right, right and centre-left	NATO, USCN	"doves" and "hawks"	G.H.W. Bush, Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations, diaspora
Slovakia	dominance of unaffiliated "neutrals"	centre-right	NATO, USCN	"hawks"	G.W. Bush administration

3.2. Structural power: "empowering new converts"

Norm habituation, or norm cascades, carried out by critical minorities of norm entrepreneurs who attempt to popularise them through intense *persuasion*, tends to proceed more smoothly if norm entrepreneurs possess *structural power.* In the foreign policy realm, structural power by definition embodies access: not only to decision-makers in key positions but also to crucial institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, playing a recognised role in framing and thus shaping the foreign

policy discourse that precedes foreign policy decisions at critical junctures and formulation of long-term foreign policy lines. In line with arguments of discursive institutionalists, this dissertation argues that the substantive content of and the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged in discourse between structurally embedded agents can carry noticeable causal weight. The more intricate puzzle that this section attempts to disband and reassemble is built around the institutions that "house" the discourses: to what extent has *access,* or more colourfully, "colonisation" by norm entrepreneurs of the institutional architecture supporting foreign policy-makers, in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia in the 1990s and beyond, eased *norm habituation?* In other words, do advocates of normative frameworks such as "dissident geopolitics" have to be in power for these to translate into foreign policy outcomes, or do certain discourses become embedded in the grid of national interests over time, producing lock-in effects? If so, how?

In the 1990s, "new converts" in Poland and the Czech Republic acquired and exercised impressive leverage in institutions relevant to foreign policy. Presidential cabinets; prime ministerial offices; foreign ministries; defense ministries; delegations to NATO; and embassies or consulates in the U.S., Iraq (or wider Middle East), Ukraine and Russia, which are of key interest to this dissertation, seemed to teem with norm entrepreneurs whose resolute conversion—reinforced by socialisation—to democracy turned them onto their own path of "missionary work". In this thesis, universal values and international norms are the catechism that Czechs, Poles and Slovaks themselves start preaching in foreign policy, as part II, focused on their "zeal", will reveal.

In Poland, norm entrepreneurs orchestrated what could be termed "institutional

capture" (see table 3.4). In the 1990s, especially, there was hardly a noteworthy period of time—in terms of length or importance—wherein these norm entrepreneurs did not occupy top positions in most, if not all, relevant institutions. Several factors can help explain the stunning success in securing such broad *access*: the extensive outreach of Solidarity and thus the proliferation of dissidents, as well as the overwhelming consensus on what constituted Poland's national interest in foreign policy at the time. First, anti-communists were, almost by definition, both "pro-freedom and pro-American", given that the U.S. was perceived and celebrated as the victor of the Cold War. Next, the twin goals of NATO and EU enlargement, the pursuit of which was motivated primarily by security concerns, also provided a strategic imperative for the incorporation of universal values and international norms into foreign policy discourse, for former dissidents and ex-communists alike. "For instance, [Aleksander] Kwasniewski was as 'militant' a champion of human rights as [Lech] Walesa," says Janusz Reiter, a Solidarity activist, Gazeta Wyborcza journalist and serial ambassador, to the U.S. among other countries.[134] Hence, elite turnover seemed to have little to no effect on the continuous presence of the normative undercurrent in Polish foreign policy discourse.[135] Norm entrepreneurs were ostensibly less represented in diplomatic circles —most Central and East European states held on to professional diplomats post-1989—but in this respect, the "division

134 Reiter, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 3.5.

135 Confirmed by numerous Polish foreign policy analysts, such as Zaborowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 3.6; Cichocki, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 9.6; Smolar, E., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 13.6.

of labour" between institutions formulating and enacting Polish foreign policy made the fact somewhat less significant, as ambassadors reported either to the president, the prime minister, the foreign minister or the defense minister. Professor Roman Kuzniar, who now advises president Bronislaw Komorowski, insists today that at any point in Poland's post-communist history, the different stake-holding institutions took observable "special" interests in geographical or issue areas, such as the presidency in Ukraine under Aleksander Kwasniewski, the prime minister's office in Germany under Jaroslaw Kaczynski or the foreign ministry in Russia under Radoslaw Sikorski.[136] Overall, the fortunate amalgam of Solidarity's over-extension, foreign policy consensus and emphasis on national security made *structural power* less important for Polish norm entrepreneurship. It eased *norm habituation* and later norm enforcement in foreign policy, but the simple fact that norm entrepreneurs were "in power" does not fully explain why norms held out in Polish foreign policy. In other words, structural power is a complementary, rather than a necessary, factor explaining norm habituation in Poland.

136 Kuzniar, R., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 22.4.

Table 3.4: Norm entrepreneurs and structural power in Poland

Notes: Former dissidents are marked with a "D". The blue colour identifies proponents of "dissident geopolitics"

Institution							
Presidency	Lech Walesa (1990-1995), D	Aleksander Kwasniewski (1995-2005)	Lech Kaczynski (2005-2010), D	Bronislaw Komorowski (2010-), D			
Prime Minister's Office	Jan Olszewski (1991-1992), D	Jozef Oleksy (1995-1996), D	Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz (1996-1997)	Jerzy Buzek (1997-2001), D	Leszek Miller (2001-2004)	Jaroslaw Kaczynski (2006-2007), D	Donald Tusk (2007-)
Foreign Ministry	Krzystof Skubiszewski (1989-1993), D	Andrzej Olechowski (1993-1995)	Dariusz Rosati (1995-1997)	Bronislaw Geremek (1997-2000), D	Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz (2001-2005) / Adam Rotfeld (2005)	Anna Fotyga (2006-2007)	Radoslaw Sikorski (2007-)

Defense Ministry	Janusz Onyszkiewicz (1992-1993, 1997-2000), D	Bronislaw Komorowski (2000-2001), D	Jerzy Szmajdzinski (2001-2005)	Radoslaw Sikorski (2005-2007)	Bogdan Klich (2007-2011)		
US Embassy		Jerzy Kozminski (1994-2000), D	Przemyslaw Grudzinski (2000-2005)	Janusz Reiter (2005-2008), D	Robert Kupiecki (2009-)		
NATO PERMREP		Andrzej Towpik (1997-2002)	Jerzy Nowak (2002-2007)	Boguslaw Winid (2007 -)			
Iraqi Embassy/Consulate	Krzysztof Plominski (1990-1996)	Roman Chalaczkiewicz (1997-2002)	Andrzej Biera (2002-2003)	Ryzsard Krystosik (2004-2007)	Edward Pietrzyk (2007-2008)	Stanislaw Smolen (2008-)	
Ukrainian Embassy	Jerzy Kozakiewicz (1991-1996)	Jerzy Bahr (1996-2001), D	Marek Ziolkowski (2001-2005)	Jacek Kluczkowski (2005-2010), D	Henryk Litwin (2010 -)		
Russian Embassy	Stanislaw Ciosek (1989-1996)	Andrzej Zalucki (1996-2002)	Stefan Meller (2002-2005)	Jerzy Bahr (2006-2010), D	Wojciech Zajaczkowski (2010-)		

In the Czech Republic, *access,* and by extension the *structural power* of converts and later missionaries in the foreign policy realm, was similarly extensive, albeit more selective (see table 3.5). First, it rested on an enduring—or recurring— legacy of a mere handful of norm entrepreneurs, who either left a mark by defining, voluntarily or involuntarily, a foreign policy doctrine of sorts, or continued to promote their norm-driven cause while circulating around the different institutions—be they governmental or non-governmental—participating in foreign policy-making. This is true particularly of Vaclav Havel and Alexander Vondra, both ex-dissidents of unrivalled moral credit in the Czech Republic. Countless interviewees previously or currently active on the Czech foreign policy scene insist that while Havel's influence sustained the emphasis on defending human rights and democracy around the globe, Vondra's clout—he held the post of presidential advisor, U.S. ambassador, commissioner responsible for the preparation of the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, foreign minister and defence minister—secured the "Atlantic" link.[137] Interestingly, Havel's disciples, including his advisor in 1998–1999 Petr Kolar—later ambassador to the U.S. and Russia—and aide Gabriela Dlouha, helped preserve his ideational heritage via creative institutional engineering even upon his departure from the presidency: in 2004, they established a special division focused on human rights and democracy promotion at the MFA, coining the phrase "transformational cooperation". Previously, the agenda was largely handled by the MFA's office for international development.

Second, the different division of responsibilities between institutions involved in

137 Numerous interviews.

Czech foreign policy-making also sheds more light on the relative importance of *structural power* for norm entrepreneurship. In the Czech Republic, the foreign minister generally has more leeway: hence, it is less important for norm entrepreneurs to also hold the premiership if they are "in charge" of the foreign ministry.[138] This structural feature of Czech foreign policy-making proved important throughout the 1990s—prime ministers seemed more concerned with domestic transition—and in the early 2000s, the era of social democratic premiers who appeared to be more focused on the EU and party politics. The presidency, however, plays a more significant role in the context of Czech foreign policy-making, as it tends to be "active", though it is defined in symbolic terms in the Czech constitution. In short, personalities play a role. Both Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus exerted strong influence on foreign policy-making while in office: Havel as an advocate of "dissident geopolitics" and Klaus as a "pragmatist". Under the conditions of cohabitation between an advocate of "dissident geopolitics" as foreign minister and/or prime minister and a president backing another normative framework, structural power matters for norm entrepreneurship: under these conditions, for instance, it is more important for norm entrepreneurs to hold the premiership or the defense ministry as well as the foreign ministry, for instance. It is a detail to keep in mind throughout the analysis of foreign policy case studies in the time of president Klaus, who is not a defender of "dissident geopolitics". Interestingly, in the Czech case, the Senate can also play a vital role in providing opportunities for norm entrepreneurship.[139] In conclusion, *structural power* seemed to

138 Drulak, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 10.3.

139 To keep comparisons across country cases "clean", it is not included in Table 3.5, but the role of

play a more vital role in the Czech Republic than in Poland, both at the stage of *norm habituation*, when key stakeholders helped secure a lock-in effect, and at later stages of *norm internalisation* and norm enforcement in foreign policy—discussed in greater details in the second part of the dissertation, "Zeal", in chapters 4, 5 and 6—as norm entrepreneurs at the foreign ministry and embassies had to strive to countervail or "over-rule" the presidency.

Czech senators is discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6, which deal with foreign policy cases.

Table 3.5: Norm entrepreneurs and structural power in the Czech Republic

Notes: The blue colour identifies proponents of "dissident geopolitics".

Institution							
Presidency	Vaclav Havel (1993-2003)		Vaclav Klaus (2003-)				
Prime Minister's Office	Vaclav Klaus (1993-1998)	Milos Zeman (1998-2002)	Vladimir Spidla (2002-2004)	Stanislav Gross (2004-2005)	Jiri Paroubek (2005-2006)	Mirek Topolanek (2006-2009)	Petr Necas (2010-—)
Foreign Ministry	Jiri Dienstbier (1989-1993)	Jozef Zieleniec (1993-1997)	Jan Kavan (1998-2002)	Cyril Svoboda (2002-2006)	Alexandr Vondra (2006-2007)	Karel Schwarzenberg (2007-2009)	
Defense Ministry	Antonin Baudys (1992-1994)	Vilem Holan/Miroslav Vyborny (1994-1998)	Vladimir Vetchy (1998-2001)	Jaroslav Tvrdik (2001-2003)	Karel Kuhnl (2004-2006)	Jiri Sedivy/Vlasta Parkanova (2006-2009)	Alexandr Vondra (2010-)
US embassy	Michael Zantovsky (1992-1997)	Alexandr Vondra (1997-2001)	Martin Palous (2001-2005)	Petr Kolar (2005-2010)	Petr Gandalovic (2011-)		
NATO PERMREP	Jiri Sedivy (1995-1998)	Karel Kovanda	Stefan Fule (2005-2009)	Martin Povejsil	Jiri Sedivy (2012-)		

		(1997-2005)		(2009-2012)			
Iraqi Embassy/Consulate		Jana Hybaskova (2002-2004)		Jozef Vrabec (2011-)			
Ukrainian Embassy	Pavel Masa (1993-1997)	Jozef Vrabec (1997-2002)	Karel Stindl (2002-2007)	Jaroslav Basta (2007-2010)	Ivan Pocuch (2011-)		
Russian Embassy			Lubos Dobrovsky (1996-2000)	Jaroslav Basta (2000-2005)	Miroslav Kostelka (2005-2010)	Petr Kolar (2010-)	

Slovakia embodies the near-ideal case of the importance of *structural power*, as local converts to democracy had trouble translating their normative framework of choice into foreign policy outcomes whenever they were not in office. As a result, Slovak foreign policy exhibited less normative consistency after the downfall of communism than its Czech or Polish counterpart. Two structural factors, both of them domestic, can help explain the cyclical nature of Slovak norm entrepreneurship, which experienced a zenith at two points (the early 1990s when Slovakia was still a part of the Czechoslovak federation is excluded): in 1998–2006 and in 2010–2012. First, in the decade following the Velvet Revolution, the general lack of democratic consensus at home—in other words, the relative scarcity of converts in the top echelons of Slovakia's political elite— spilled over to the foreign policy realm. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and his inner circle had limited, if any, interest in developing and maintaining close relations with the U.S. or criticising Russia, let alone advocate and promote universal values and international norms abroad.[140] In fact, harsh criticism of Slovakia—Madeleine Albright famously dubbed it the "black hole" in the heart of Europe—tarnished its international reputation and Slovakia's NATO and EU integration was nearly derailed by a string of blatant violations of democratic standards committed by Meciar's lot of heathens in 1994–1998. At that intense time, *persuasion* by converts not co-opted in the system who defended a foreign policy line based on fast-track NATO and EU accession and human rights advocacy and/or democracy promotion from a norm-driven and value-laden standpoint, could not

140 Szomolanyi, S., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 2.1. (See also: Szomolanyi, S., 1998. *Klukata cesta Slovenska k demokracii*. Bratislava: Stimul

compensate for their general lack of *access*. They had held such access only briefly, in 1994, when Vladimir Meciar's second cabinet crumbled prematurely and had to be replaced by a caretaker government, which featured future missionaries Eduard Kukan or Mikulas Dzurinda.[141] Paradoxically, the struggle against the strongman, who returned with new vigour after the 1994 election, eased the "conversion" of the "anti-Meciarists" to democracy and fired up their "missionary zeal". It also intensified the socialisation efforts of the international community: Western, and especially American, missionaries literally "bombarded" Slovak converts with expertise and resources.[142] It is, for instance, estimated that Slovak NGOs received almost $4m in Western funding for the critical 1998 GOTV election campaign—conceptualised by Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik as an "electoral revolution"—which finally ousted the unrepentant Meciar.[143]

Hence, in 1998–2006, and then in 2010–2012, norm entrepreneurship flourished under the favourable conditions of substantial *structural power*: the posts of president, prime minister, foreign minister, US ambassador, and others, were all held by anti-Meciarists. Interestingly, both the Meciar and the post-Meciar eras signify that in

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141 Kukan held the post of foreign minister; Dzurinda was transport minister.

142 Smith, K.E., 2001. Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy. In: J. Zielonka and A. Pravda (eds.). *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transnational Factors.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 48

143 Butora 2011; Jarabik, B., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 5.5; Nic, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.1.

Slovakia's institutional architecture, *structural power* tends to revolve around the office of the prime minister, an observation that constitutes the second domestic structural explanation of the relative dependence of Slovak norm entrepreneurs on *access*. Vladimir Meciar, a heathen, Mikulas Dzurinda, a convert, and Robert Fico, a heathen, alike exercised defining leverage on foreign policy in their time. Foreign ministers tended to play a supporting—or, in the third case, corrective—role and did not outshine the premier. Under Mikulas Dzurinda, the U.S. ambassador's post also commanded substantial clout. Similar to the Czech Republic, Slovakia and its community of norm entrepreneurs also capitalised on an individual's legacy. Martin Butora, intellectual, ex-dissident, U.S. ambassador and freedom fighter, converted and taught the catechism of "dissident geopolitics" to a dozen disciples, including Milan Jezovica and Miroslav Wlachovsky, who went on to advise prime ministers and serve as deputy foreign minister and diplomat on key posts, respectively.

The period from 2006–2010, a time with norm entrepreneurs of convictions unrelated to "dissident geopolitics" in office, draws attention to the changing nature of *access* of norm entrepreneurs to decision-makers under the circumstances of their weakened *structural power*. With a prime minister less engaged in foreign policy, the foreign minister can operate more freely, which is crucial if he/she is one of the few missionaries in government. A more powerful foreign minister, in turn, can delegate more structural power to embassies by influencing appointments or informally encouraging agenda-setting and seconding tasks. This way, Slovakia's foreign policy has been influenced by norm entrepreneurship pursued by a group of career diplomats—including heavy-weights such as Jan Kubis (now at the United Nations), Miroslav Lajcak (formerly at the EEAS), Peter Burian or Milan Jezovica— who self-

identify as missionaries and boast a proven track-record of commitment to universal values and international norms in foreign policy-making. Interestingly, though they were educated in communist-era Moscow, often at the State Institute for International Relations, one of their things that their biographies have in common is heavy exposure to *socialisation:* many of them spent their formative years at the U.S. embassy (Jezovica, Burian) or in NATO, OSCE, UN or the EU, which signifies that an anti-communist past is not a necessary prerequisite for norm entrepreneurship.

Table 3.6: Norm entrepreneurs and structural power in Slovakia

Notes: the blue colour identifies proponents of "dissident geopolitics".

Institution							
Presidency	Michal Kovac (1993-1999)	Rudolf Schuster (1999-2004)	Ivan Gasparovic (2004-)				
Prime Minister's Office	Vladimir Meciar (1993-1998)	Jozef Moravcik (1994)	Mikulas Dzurinda (1998-2006)	Robert Fico (2006-2010)	Iveta Radicova (2010-2012)	Robert Fico (2012-)	
Foreign Ministry	Pavol Demes (1991-1992)	Jozef Moravcik / Eduard Kukan (1993-1994)	Juraj Schenk / Pavol Hamzik / Zdenka Kramplova (1994-1998)	Eduard Kukan (1998-2006)	Jan Kubis / Miroslav Lajcak (2006-2010)	Mikulas Dzurinda (2010-2012)	Miroslav Lajcak (2012-)
Defense Ministry	Imrich Andrejcak (1993-1994)	Pavol Kanis (1994)	Jan Sitek (1994-1998)	Pavol Kanis (1998-2001)	Ivan Simko/Juraj Liska/Martin Fedor	Frantisek Kasicky / Jaroslav Baska (2006-	Lubomir Galko (2010-2011), Martin

					(2002-2006)	2010)	Glvac (2012-)
US embassy			Martin Butora (1999-2003)	Rastislav Kacer (2003-2008)	Peter Burian (2011-)		
NATO PERMREP	Rastislav Kacer (1994-1998)	Emil Kuchar (1997-1999)	Peter Burian (1999-2003)	Igor Slobodnik (2003-2008)	Frantisek Kasicky (2008-)		
Iraqi Embassy/Consulate					Jozef Marhefka (2003-2011)	Miroslav Nad (2011-)	
Ukrainian Embassy		Robert Harencar (1993-1995)	Jozef Migas (1995-1996)	Vasil Grivna 1999-2005)	Urban Rusnak (2005-2009)	Pavol Hamzik (2009-)	
Russian Embassy		Roman Paldan (1993-1999)	Igor Furdik (1999-2004)	Augustin Cisar (2004-2009)	Jozef Migas (2009-)		

Moving on from the detailed exploration of the governmental aspect of *structural power,* a brief excursion into the non-governmental side of it is in order. *Access* to think-tanks, NGOs and the media that participate in framing and shaping foreign policy discourse in the run-up to foreign policy decisions also tends to empower norm entrepreneurs, albeit to a different degree in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. In Prague, the third sector seems to "matter" most, especially as far as human rights advocacy and democracy promotion, which constitute two of the four pillars of the broader normative framework conceptualised here as "dissident geopolitics", are concerned. Organisations such as *Forum 2000* or *People in Need*—the latter has been dubbed the alternate or "real" MFA—have been headed exclusively by missionaries since their establishment and command formidable discursive power, especially when their case is buttressed by media such as the daily newspaper *Lidove noviny*, magazine; webzine *Transitions [Online]*, a joint venture between RFE/RL and George Soros' Open Society Institute; and the weekly newspaper *Respekt*, the Czech Republic's *The Economist*.[144]

After EU accession, the independent platform of Czech NGOs invested in democratisation, DEMAS, founded in 2008, pooled the *structural power* of several prominent non-governmental organisations. Moving on to the other two pillars of "dissident geopolitics", "Atlanticist" and, by extension, often Russophobic havens, such as CEVRO or Jagello 2000, tend to rise in importance when liberal

144 Sustrova, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 25.3; Cerny 2011

conservatives of the *Civic Democratic Party (ODS)* are in power.[145] As for research centres and think tanks such as the *Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI), Program for Atlantic Security Studies (PASS)* or the supplier of brainpower to the MFA, the *Institute for International Relations (UMV),* they certainly can muster discursive power, but since they are bound by the blue-ribbon principle of "neutrality", contributing a norm-oriented or value-laden perspective to foreign policy discourse is a matter of choice, often dependent on the leadership du jour.

In Bratislava, non-governmental *structural power* is less of a factor than in Prague, as the clout of relevant think-tanks, NGOs and media is more dependent on the administration in office. *Pontis Foundation* (Slovakia's avatar of the *People in Need*), *Institute of Public Affairs* (IVO), especially, and the leading daily newspaper, *SME,* can be described as opinion-making hubs, partly due to the moral authority of the long-time leaders of the latter two, ex-dissidents and missionaries Martin Butora and Martin M. Simecka, respectively. Yet it is key to keep in mind the extent to which structural power may lie with the individuals, rather than the institutions themselves. For example, upon the departure of Simecka from *SME,* the newspaper's influence declined somewhat, though the new editor-in-chief Matus Kostolny, Simecka's disciple and former correspondent in Washington, DC, preserved much of his predecessor's normative legacy and adopted an even more pro-Atlanticist stance.[146]

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145 Jires, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 25.2.

146 Simecka, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 6.1; Kostolny, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.1.

The centre-right *SME* maintained close rapport with centre-right foreign ministers, who developed a habit of hosting "consultative breakfasts" on a regular basis with journalists and experts.[147] *Access* of Slovak norm entrepreneurs to think tanks such as the *Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA)*, an extended limb of the MFA akin to the Czech *UMV,* also matters less, for much the same reason as in the neighbouring country: the emphasis on value-neutral analysis. But importantly, its discursive power, if exercised, does not seem to hinge that much upon the ideology of the party or parties currently in power: it is equally valued by the centre-right and the centre-left.[148]

Needless to say, in the 1990s, *SFPA* seemed more prone to norm-driven and value-laden activism due to, as in the case of *SME,* "missionary leadership", says one of the founding "mothers", long-time Slovak MP and ambassador Magdalena Vasaryova.[149] Lastly, Slovakia's third sector had less to offer in terms of institutions devoted to championing an "Atlanticist"—let alone "Russia-realist" or outright "Russophobic"—foreign policy agenda in the 1990s or early 2000s, but after EU accession, the *Slovak Atlantic Commission (SAC)*, established by ex-ambassador to the U.S. Rastislav Kacer, provided an important corrective. Without a stretch, SAC, with close links to the U.S. Atlantic Council, quickly became an "embodiment" of non-governmental *structural power,* though it is important to mention that it has not extended its links

147 Toda, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.1.

148 Duleba, A., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 7.1.

149 Vasaryova, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.2.

with the centre-right to the centre-left political parties or administrations. Yet in terms of foreign policy discourse, SAC plays the premier league: its annual Global Security Forum (GLOBSEC) can now be regarded as one of the highlights in the enduring U.S.-CEE norm entrepreneur network's yearly calendar. Lastly, universities, which in the Slovak case also seem to "host" a number of norm entrepreneurs, are less relevant for their *structural power* than for the individuals that engage in foreign policy discourse.

In Warsaw, *access* of missionaries to NGOs, think tanks and the media contributing to the foreign policy discourse is extensive, but as non-governmental *structural power* seems to matter less in Poland, it represents a complementary, rather than a necessary facilitator of norm-driven and value-laden foreign policy outcomes. Interviewees tend to cite two related explanations: a sense of greater foreign policy "ambition" based on the state identity of Poland as a regional power and the resulting higher degree of institutionalisation—or formalisation—of foreign policy-making in Poland. The Polish government seems more committed to pursuing an activist and elaborately designed foreign policy than its Czech or Slovak counterpart and "selling the Polish brand" on the European and global foreign policy markets. Hence, NGOs, for instance, have a much slimmer chance of posing as "alternate" MFAs, as the *People in Need* does in the Czech Republic.

In the Polish case, print media, such as *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the post-Solidarity daily newspaper headed by heavyweight missionary Adam Michnik, and to a lesser extent, the daily newspaper *Rzeczpospolita* and weekly magazine *Polityka,* tend to defend the constitutive norms and values of "dissident geopolitics": of the three, the "hawkish" *Rzeczpospolita* is, perhaps, most supportive of clear-cut Atlanticism, in addition to

human rights advocacy and democracy promotion.[150] As for think tanks, most notably the *Institute for International Relations (PISM)* and *Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)* which both render policy-oriented research "services" to the MFA, though their expert studies often inform foreign policy documents, they do not exercise leverage in the spirit of advocacy, which is how *structural power* is conceived here, unless their members advise decision-makers directly, which has frequently been the case over the years. [151] Finally, Polish NGOs also "matter" less than, say, their Czech counterparts—the *Stefan Batory Foundation* seems to be a noteworthy exception[152]—due in part to their proliferation. As an interviewee from the third sector who did not want to be quoted by name on this particular statement, put it: "In Poland, everyone is what you call a 'missionary' to the extent that no-one is a 'missionary'."

Hence, Polish NGOs—be it niche ventures such as the *American-Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative* (PAUCI), "Atlanticist" pivots including the *Polish-American Freedom Foundation* (PAFW) and the *Euro-Atlantic Association* (SEA) or groups founded by prominent ex-officials, such as the *Lech Walesa Institute* or the *Foundation of Aleksander Kwasniewski*— have concentrated less *structural power,* though they have strived, with admirable consistency, to preserve the spirit of "dissident geopolitics", through engagement in foreign policy discourse and activity

150 Michnik, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 3.6; Magierowski, M.. Interview with author. Warsaw, 18.5; Ostrowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 8.5.

151 Zaborowski.2011; Gniazdowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 10.5.

152 Several decision-makers and policy-makers in interviews.

"on the ground". Over the years, they have also recognised the need to join forces. *Grupa Zagranica,* akin to *DEMAS* in the Czech Republic, provides an institutional umbrella to non-governmental organisations active in international development cooperation, democracy support and humanitarian aid.

3.3. Resonance: "editing the Bible"

If socialisation represents the necessary international facilitator of norm diffusion, *resonance* is its basic domestic requisite. While the former often initiates the first phase of the norm life cycle—norm emergence—the latter tends to drive the following, second phase of it—norm acceptance or habituation—wherein critical minorities—epistemic communities, advocacy groups, norm entrepreneurs—learn how to tap into existing normative frameworks and tune them to the embryonic ones from abroad that they are trying to popularise at home. In so doing, they are bracing for the final stage of *persuasion*, i.e., the heavy use of appropriate *framing* devices*,* in foreign policy discourse, to defend their case against those of other norm entrepreneurs, who may be disputing them. It is key to note that *resonance* is a structural factor that can, but does not have to, catalyse norm diffusion. The pool of available micro-narratives that entrepreneurs can amalgamate and harness in an infinite number of ways is formidable. As agents of persuasion, they must construct a *cultural match*, thus ensuring that exogenous norms are a "good fit" with endogenous ones.

This section investigates how historical narratives and post-communist state identities may have helped create a norm cascade that established "dissident geopolitics" as one

of the leading normative frameworks inspiring and motivating foreign policy-makers in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. It will be argued that a confluence of state identities and endogenous norms provided, at least initially, domestic sources of *resonance* that enabled norm entrepreneurs from both sides of the Atlantic to fashion the meta-narrative of a special U.S.-CEE relationship which, in turn, fuelled "Americanisation" of foreign policy thinking. Among the factors to be discussed are the idealised projection of America's image as a benign superpower, coupled with a selective interpretation of U.S.-CEE and Western Europe-CEE history and the inclination of "new converts" to self-identify as "victimised".[153] The grand narrative composed of these discursive elements ultimately translated into the "Americanisation" of some of the normative undercurrents of Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy.

Starting with the perception of the U.S., Czech, Polish and Slovak converts to democracy had an overwhelming tendency to perceive and portray America as the "winner of the Cold War", which had them shivering in icy chill, and on Europe's doorstep at that, for nearly four decades. Interpretations of communism's downfall, do, of course, differ: the U.S. did not only "win" the Cold War; the USSR "lost it". Yet Central European norm entrepreneurs adopted the former analytical lens. Both Havel and Walesa's post-revolutionary speeches in the U.S. Congress (see section 3.1.), while undoubtedly pushing a political agenda as well as expressing a genuine sentiment, reflect the predominant view that Washington, as a "beacon of

153 The "success story" element was incorporated into these countries' state identities upon completion of democratic transition.

democracy", put an end to the bipolarity that had yoked Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw to Moscow. This explains the sense of "gratitude" accented by multiple interviewees. Adam Michnik puts it simply: "We had so much to be thankful for…"[154] The natural extension of this historical "gratitude" was a certain awe: the Czechs, the Poles and the Slovaks seemed to regard the victorious super-power as a "model" of democracy, a conviction that sparked a desire to learn from the Americans, if not emulate their system, says Alexander Vondra of the Czech Republic.[155] American missionaries such as Anne Applebaum emphasise today that geographical distance eased the initial adulation: "It takes less effort to admire that which you don't know very well."[156] This observation helps explain why Central European norm entrepreneurs, though equally committed to the twin goals of NATO and EU enlargement, looked up to America, not Europe, at least when it comes to foreign policy, in the formative period of the 1990s. Karel Kovanda, the Czech émigré intellectual that returned after 1989 to join Vaclav Havel's circle and become a prominent missionary on the foreign policy stage, says that: "At the time, there was no adequate counterweight to the American 'idol' of democracy. If it were important to express loyalty to the West, the democratic world as such, it was 'obvious' that it should be expressed to the U.S."[157] Thus, the imprint of "gratitude" and the aspiration

154 Michnik 2011

155 Vondra 2011

156 Applebaum, A., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC/London, 30.8.

157 Kovanda 2011

to a "model" as the two main elements of the perception that Central European elites developed of America helped establish a foreign policy platform based on two basic predispositions: the need to preserve the alliance with the U.S. and the willingness to "learn" from it—especially about democracy and its promotion.

The tendency of Central European "weak states" to lean on the U.S. as a "distant protector" also stemmed from a certain conception of state identity. Based on a string of unfortunate historical experiences with West European great powers, Czech, Polish and Slovak converts could capitalise on a narrative of *victimisation*, and, via selective use of cultural memory, also on *amnesia*. In a seminal article on the "Origins of Atlanticism", a joint venture of U.S.-CEE norm entrepreneurship, Alexander Vondra and Ron Asmus aptly, and intentionally, describe the former Czechoslovakia and Poland as a cordon sanitaire "fatefully wedged between Germany and Russia".[158] Memories of historical traumas such as the Nazi and Soviet occupation or the Russo-German-Austrian partitions haunt some of the local elites—many of them norm entrepreneurs—to this day. All of them have ingrained what missionary Adam Rotfeld, a committed promoter of historical reconciliation now working on the demythologisation of Russian-Polish history in the two states' recently established joint Committee on Difficult Matters, calls an "instinctive distrust of 'great powers'" into the depths of the Central European political psyche.[159]

Thus, *resonance* can be relational: as leading Slovak missionary Martin Butora

158 Asmus & Vondra 2005, p. 204-205

159 Rotfeld, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 5.5.

explains it, "We clung onto the United States partly because we had done so in the past with France, the United Kingdom, and others, and it always backfired."[160] Importantly, in order to justify America's exceptionalism as a superpower, Central European norm entrepreneurs had to apply *amnesia* and re-tell the meta-narrative of their history, especially the 20th century bit, in a way that would constitute a "cultural match" and thus strike a chord in the post-Cold War and post-authoritarian setting of these states. America's "late" entry into both World War I and World War II, the controversial role that the United States played in, for instance, the "division of spheres of influence" at the "Big Three" conference at Yalta after the defeat of the Axis powers, the Hungarian uprising against the communist regime in 1956—a point at which, historian Charles Gati argues in his acclaimed account of the events, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's bellicose rhetoric "led" some to believe that the U.S. would intervene on the revolutionaries' behalf[161] —or the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia were conveniently "forgotten" and/or "airbrushed" from the storyline speaking of the benign great power.[162] Instead, America's positive contribution to the self-determination of Central European nations following World War I, the liberation of Europe after World War II and the overthrow of state socialism were highlighted to

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160 Butora 2011

161 Gati, C., 2006. *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt.* Chicago: Stanford University Press

162 Albright, M., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 25.7; Kwasniewski 2011 and multiple others.

imbue the macro-frame for U.S.-CEE relations with consistency and credibility. "The edited history of the Cold War, especially, has to be retold," says Zbigniew Brzezinski. "It has to include Nixon. Carter."[163]

Interestingly, depending on which historical encounter of the "pygmies" with the "benevolent giant" resonated most in the three Central European states, norm entrepreneurs in some of them also exhibited slight but perceptible favouritism towards the different U.S. administrations in power after 1989, as the results of the blitz elite survey conducted for this dissertation reveal. In the case of the Czechs, whose Atlanticism is mostly Wilsonian, high-profile interviewees including current foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg insist, the "golden era" seems to have reigned under president Bill Clinton, whose excellent personal rapport with his counterpart Vaclav Havel has been well-documented.[164]

The Slovaks, for their part, often describe their Atlanticism as Reaganite, in line with most of their East European compatriots, whose historical experience with the U.S. is not as extensive as, say, the Czechs' or the Poles'.[165] Though the Slovaks, in theory, should have as many reasons to feel "indebted" to president Woodrow Wilson for helping disband the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I as the Czechs, they

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163 Brzezinski, Z., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 12.9.

164 Schwarzenberg, K., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 28.4.

165 Samson, I., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 9.1; Meseznikov, G., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 5.1; Kacer, R., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 3.1.

play it down, not least because interwar Czechoslovakia was as much the "sun-state" of Tomas Garrigue Masaryk as it was the Prague-centric and tension-ridden multi-national conglomerate where Andrej Hlinka fought a fierce battle for Slovak autonomy.[166] For this reason, and others—most notably the late onset of socialisation due to the stalled transition under Vladimir Meciar—Bratislava's links with Washington were closest under president George W. Bush, whose friendship with Slovak prime minister Mikulas Dzurinda made the latter very proud, most of his aides agree.[167]

As for the Poles, their affinity towards the Americans seems most unswerving, due, to a certain extent, to the gravity of their security dilemma, as well as to the longevity and the accentuation of the shared history, which dates back to Tadeusz Koszcziuszko's epic heroism during the American revolution.[168] To summarise, this aspect of state identity, deeply rooted in "victimisation", initially helped erect two pillars of the normative framework conceptualised here as "dissident geopolitics": Atlanticism and, to varying degrees, the enduring caution vis-à-vis Russia.

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166 Palko, V., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.1.

167 Butora 2011

168 Thaddeus Kosciuszko was born in Poland on February 4, 1746. By the time he arrived in America in 1776, he was a skilled engineer who came to offer his services to the American colonies in their struggle for independence. On October 18, 1776 Kosciuszko was commissioned as Colonel of Engineers by the Continental Congress and began his outstanding service of fortifying battle sites, many of which became turning points in America's fight for independence against the British.

Table 3.7: Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy coordination with the US (1994–2011)[169]

To what extent was it likely that Czech/Polish/Slovak politicians would support U.S. foreign policy under presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama?				
	Most common response			"Golden era" of relations with the U.S.
	Clinton administration	Bush administration	Obama administration	
Czech Republic	Very likely	Very likely/Rather likely	Rather likely/rather unlikely	Clinton administration
Poland	Very likely	Very likely/rather likely	Rather likely/rather unlikely	N/A
Slovakia	Rather likely	Very likely	Rather unlikely	Bush administration

Notes: multiple choice – very likely, rather likely, rather unlikely, very unlikely. The results, aimed to provide an orienteering sketch of elite opinions, do not give percentages due to uneven samples and different interviewing techniques (e.g. personal, telephone and email).

Another state identity, which emerged upon successful completion of the Central European states' political and economic transformation, provided an additional source of *resonance* with the constitutive norms of "dissident geopolitics". The Czechs', Poles' and Slovaks' self-perception as "success stories" of post-communist transition—reinforced by notable validation from the international community which,

169 The "n" for this elite survey is approximately 35 elite members per country, out of the total of about 50 interviewees per country. The right-hand column denoted the "golden era" of relations with the U.S., is not only an aggregate of the left-hand column, but also a conclusion based on interviewees' responses to open-ended questions. For simplicity's sake, some precision is lost due to the reporting of "most common responses" as opposed to percentages for each particular response. The author plans to rectify this: first gather data from all interviewees and then conducting a descriptive statistical analysis.

by the late 1990s, could, and did, contrast their relatively straightforward trajectories with the winding ones commonly found in the post-Soviet space—was the mortar in the two other supporting pillars of the normative framework dubbed "dissident geopolitics": the drive to defend freedom around the world, as well as to promote democracy and share know-how with their less fortunate counterparts further East. Intriguingly, norm entrepreneurs from all three countries note that history tends to "repeat itself", citing the abovementioned sense of indebtedness. "A lot was done for us by the U.S. and other Western nations when we were in need, so we want to 'give back'", says Simon Panek of *People in Need*.[170]

Structurally contingent *resonance,* based on the perception-based moral clout of the U.S. and amplified by the analytical lens that emerging norm entrepreneur groups applied to Wendtian identities and historical narratives originating in Central Europe, created opportunities for the domestication of a specific set of "Americanised" foreign policy norms. In its very essence, "dissident geopolitics" is a set of *regulative norms* born out of anti-communism that have shaped patterns of foreign policy-making in Central Europe by constraining the choice of alliances—distinguishing "friends", such as America, from "foes", such as Russia—and determining the geographical focus of Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy. "Crusades", i.e., the commitment of resources or "blood and treasure", if any, are waged in places where missionaries can attribute similarity, namely in authoritarian regimes and countries in transition. Dependent on security dilemmas, material incentives and availability of resources,

170 Panek, S., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 22.3.

these can be located in the neighbourhood or in remote areas. For instance, it is no coincidence that all three states are heavily engaged in the post-Soviet space. In these cases, norms only seem to be playing a supporting role in the definition of national interests, as the Czechs, Poles and Slovaks have a multitude of good reasons to "invest" in a relationship with, say, the Belarusians, the Ukrainians, the Serbs or the Croatians. Yet, from a strictly neo-realist positioning, it is counter-intuitive to see them engross themselves in the affairs of Cuba and Burma, and more recently, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and other North African and Middle Eastern states swept by waves of regime change. In these instances, norms appear to carry greater causal weight in explaining foreign policy outcomes.

As for the *constitutive norms* of "dissident geopolitics", they capitalise, to varying degrees, on doctrines such as liberal internationalism, humanistic universalism and democratic globalism. On the ontological level, there is little immediately apparent that distinguishes "dissident geopolitics" from other normative frameworks based on the founding values of the liberal democratic community, which bind all of its members to defend and promote the Western developmental model. Yet the question is not *whether* to spread freedom around the world but *what kind* of freedom and *how*. The foreign policy toolkit corresponding with this normative framework is based on a Manichean line of thought positing that tyranny, also experienced by Central Europeans, is the new face of evil. The rather conservative or "hawkish" black-and-white ideational positioning—no doubt influenced by a lingering Cold War foreign policy mind-set at the time—that has characterised "dissident geopolitics" makes CEE norm entrepreneurs naturally though not exclusively more inclined to sympathise with U.S. foreign policy doctrines such as hard Wilsonianism, or the latest

version of it, Charles Krauthammer's democratic globalism, championed under president George W. Bush.[171]

Hence, as to *what kind* of freedom to protect, for advocates of "dissident geopolitics" and members of the American democracy promotion industry—at least until recently[172]—democracy is not a "particularly rare and delicate plant that cannot be transplanted in alien soil".[173] Based on a "procedural minimum" of basic freedoms and free and fair elections, it is a venture that can be undertaken wherever there is democratic craftsmanship and proper zeitgeist. Moreover, U.S. and CEE norm entrepreneurs alike believe, once the transition from authoritarianism commences, it linearly progresses towards a fixed endpoint: liberal democracy. The implications of this "transition paradigm" for democracy promotion are profound. First, it influences the view of how democratic reforms should be "sequenced": a heavy emphasis is placed on securing free and fair elections at the outset, and then "worrying" about other aspects of democratic governance, such as the rule of law, the role of the security apparatus, the representation and protection of minority rights or socio-economic development.

Moreover, to the *how* of defending democracy, its "minimalist" notion tends to forward the political, rather than developmental, approach to democracy promotion.

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171 Schaller 2006

172 Carothers, T., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 12.12.

173 Chull-Sin 1994

"Political" democracy promotion, commonly pigeonholed as "American", is marked by a greater tendency to "pick sides", i.e., engage with the democratic opposition instead of pushing for "dual track" diplomacy that also seeks to involve the incumbent regime in the transformational changes taking place. The foreign policies of the Czech Republic towards Cuba, or of Slovakia towards Georgia at the time of the Rose Revolution provide instructive examples of this.[174] Moreover, the procedural conception of democracy also inspires geographically scattered efforts at democracy promotion. In short, the location—inherent in this term is also the presence or absence of a democratic neighbourhood—of the transiting regime that is targeted or the levels of socio-economic development hitherto achieved there matter less to Central European "senders" of democracy assistance than the "transition momentum". Though they do not necessarily seek to transplant a template, they are willing to "teach" to whoever wants to "learn" about transition.

Last, the Manichean necessity of "bringing down the dictator" impacts as much the methods of protecting democracy as it does the means of combating its counterpart, authoritarianism. Within the framework of "dissident geopolitics", the use of force in the struggle against "new faces of evil" is excusable, under the right circumstances, often involving mass killings, if not outright genocide. Central Europeans have been, overall, keener on deposing dictatorial regimes via ad hoc "coalitions of the willing",

174 The paradigm has undergone profound shifts: its demise roughly coincides with the "excesses" of the second G.W. Bush administration.

without the approval the United Nations.[175] From a more general humanitarian standpoint, they have also been more "interventionist", i.e. in favour of lowering the barriers for "humanitarian intervention", recently re-conceptualized as "responsibility to protect".[176] In conclusion, this "Americanised" set of foreign policy norms, inspired, in part, by *resonance,* came to inform numerous foreign policy decisions by Central European states at critical junctures. As will be shown in the following chapters, it constrained their choices and/or defined the boundaries of what was "good" and "appropriate" ahead of, for instance, the war on terror, the "coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe or the reset of relations with Dmitri Medvedev's Russia. Table 3.8., below, offers a summary of the constitutive norms of "dissident geopolitics" and their regulative functions.

175 Stelzer 2004, p. 9

176 For instance, Sikorski, R.,2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 13.6; Vondra 2011

Table 3.8: Constitutive and regulative norms of "dissident geopolitics"

Constitutive Norms	Regulative Norms		
	Foreign policy tools	Foreign policy implications	Foreign policy outcomes (examples)
"Minimalist" democracy	Preference for democracy promotion over development aid	Delayed (post-EU accession) establishment of development aid agencies and prioritisation of development aid in general	Under-developed economic ties and dearth of development aid projects in the Eastern neighbourhood
"Political" democracy promotion	Emphasis on free and fair elections, targeted engagement with the opposition as opposed to "dual track" diplomacy	Scattered geography of democracy promotion efforts; overt support for "revolutionaries"	Involvement in Cuba, Burma and other remote areas, engagement in North Africa and the Middle East post-Arab Spring; ostracisation of "dictators" such as A. Lukashenka in Belarus
Heavy-handed approach to authoritarian regimes	Deposing dictators / combating terrorism	Willingness to circumvent international organisations	Engagement in Kosovo and especially Iraq
Manicheanism	Understanding of "friend" and "foe"	Alliance formation	Atlanticism and the relationship with Russia, Euro-scepticism

3.4. Framing and discourse: "selling the Bible"

Once the sources of domestic *resonance* for an incipient normative framework are identified, much of the success of *norm acceptance* depends on the norm entrepreneurs' ability to defend their catechism in dispute with other norm entrepreneurs: in other words, on *framing*. The norm entrepreneurs' discursive

capacity—or lack thereof—relies on three main factors: the consistency of the normative framework, the unity within the norm entrepreneur community and the clout of alternative norm entrepreneur groups. Starting with the first, one of the endogenous problems of the normative framework dubbed "dissident geopolitics" is its breadth. The logics of Atlanticism and Russophobia on the one hand, and global democracy promotion and strive to share "transition know-how" with states in the post-Soviet space on the other hand, can easily be de-coupled and perceived as two separate sets of foreign policy norms: one borne largely out of the post-Cold War state identity based on "victimisation" and "gratitude"—as in a sense of indebtedness—and the other conceived from the post-communist identity built also on "gratitude"—but as in a desire to "give back"—and the perception of "success" of political and economic transformation. In the 1990s, "dissident geopolitics" as a foreign policy doctrine formulated and advocated largely by opinion-makers and decision-makers with a direct experience with communism managed to stay intact. The overwhelming consensus in foreign policy, which prioritised NATO and EU integration, made it easier for "hawks" in the norm entrepreneur community to argue in favour of the NATO bombing of Milosevic' Serbia or the U.S. invasion of Iraq from the standpoint of Atlanticism and alliance commitments, and, at the same time, for their "dovish" counterparts to frame it as an instance of humanitarian intervention and/or democracy promotion. It also made it possible for "hawks" and "doves" to agree on a tough stance against Russia, though the former's criticism of the local regime's faults had more to do with lingering historical traumas and enduring security dilemmas and the latter's with a more general concern over human rights violations.

Hence, second, it follows that the integrity of the norm entrepreneur networks—or,

alternatively, their capacity to self-replicate—can also partially help explain why they prevail or fail. The internal tension within "dissident geopolitics", between the more general normative commitments to democracy promotion and export of "transition know-how" and the more particular normative pledges to stand by the United States and eschew or outright bash Russia, immediately creates a latent bifurcation within the respective groups of missionaries. This bifurcation runs the risk of an irreparable schism. While maintaining a shared devotion to a particular set of normative principles and a single mission, the various advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia are prepared to go to differing lengths to express their zeal in foreign policy. In other words, "hawks" and "doves", or Euro-sceptic Atlanticists and Euro-enthusiastic Atlanticists, harbour slightly different ideas about the kind of foreign policy tools that should be used to sustain the foreign policy course preferred by the majority of them. This ultimately raises the question: when do the differences start to matter more than the similarities?

Table 3.9, below, indicates that in terms of timeframe, the structural changes—i.e. splits—within norm entrepreneur networks tend to commence upon completion of transition and accelerate after NATO and EU integration. The completion of long-term unifying goals that used to be a matter of broad national consensus can change perceptions of security dilemmas, proliferate and/or complicate foreign policy agendas and kick-start and/or raise the importance of alternative socialisation processes, such as Europeanisation, which can propel normative shifts. In terms of country case differences, it appears that norm entrepreneur communities tend to suffer more ruptures in settings where security concerns—or the missionaries' assessments of them—play a less important role. For instance, in the mainland Czech Republic,

the rift between Euro-enthusiastic Atlanticists, such as Vaclav Havel and Karel Schwarzenberg, and Euro-sceptic and Russophobic Atlanticists like Alexander Vondra, was deeper than in peripheral Poland, where initially Euro-realist and Russophobic Atlanticists such as Radek Sikorski and even Lech Walesa seemed keener on readjusting their normative convictions and thus contributing to the overall integrity of the network. Lastly, norm entrepreneur communities can retain their sway if they are able to compensate for the loss of missionaries by recruiting new disciples. Arguably, in all three countries, the "doves" ultimately succeeded to an extent greater than the "hawks", due to, in part, of greater compatibility of their agenda with the new post-Cold War foreign policy lens of the up-and-coming generation of elites, which inevitably lacked the type of personal experience with communism that tends to sustain Atlanticism and Russophobia.

Table 3.9: Norm entrepreneur networks in transition and post transition: unity and diversity

	Rupture(s)	Post-transition milestone(s)	Clash between key norm entrepreneurs
Czech Republic	Euro-sceptic Atlanticists and Euro-enthusiastic Atlanticists, "hawks" v. "doves"	NATO enlargement, EU enlargement, Lisbon Treaty (in terms of CFSP)	Havel and Schwarzenberg v. Vondra
Poland	Russophobic Atlanticists and Russia-neutral Atlanticists, Euro-sceptic Atlanticists and Euro-enthusiastic Atlanticists, "hawks" v. "doves"	Russo-Georgian War, Russia Reset, EU enlargement, Lisbon Treaty (in terms of CFSP)	Walesa v. Kwasniewski, Kaczynski v. Sikorski
Slovakia	Russophobes and Russia—realists	EU enlargement, Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute, Russo—Georgian War	Kacer (Dzurinda) v. Kubis and Lajcak

Apart from the integrity of the normative framework and unity of the norm entrepreneur groups, the ability of advocates of "dissident geopolitics" to withstand competition cannot be understated. It appears that the extent to which norm entrepreneurs are disputed—barring a convoluted transition, as in Slovakia's case—increases over time. In times of transition at home, foreign policy generally receives less attention from the majority of the political elite, which is overwhelmed by pressing challenges related to domestic reforms. Even within the foreign policy realm itself, the powerful narrative of "returning to the community of liberal democracies or the Euro-Atlantic civilisational circuit"—which entails reputation-building,

establishing credibility with allies and fulfilling countless criteria stemming from conditionality—is likely to make *framing* easier, as it creates opportunities to "sell" difficult decisions that might go against public opinion or would simply not be as acceptable otherwise, such as the participation in the Iraq War, under a "label" of a broader necessity. Upon democratic consolidation in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, missionaries described by this dissertation started facing more credible and sustained challenges from other norm entrepreneurs in the discourse on foreign policy. Those hailed from two main groups that can be conceptualised as "pragmatists" and Euro-enthusiasts. Starting with the latter, they were recruited both from within and outside the network of advocates of "dissident geopolitics". The main points of contention were related to Atlanticism, found too excessive, and Russia policy, regarded as unnecessarily "hawkish", given the importance of the local market and energy supply.[177]

Moving on to the latter rival network of norm entrepreneurs, they confronted defenders of "dissident geopolitics" on more substantive terms. Their emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other states, the "small state" geopolitical compass that did, in their view, dictate them to devote equal attention to the "North, South, East and West" as Slovak prime minister Robert Fico aptly put it, and the primacy of trade, business and energy interests over universal values such as human rights and international norms including democracy—which did, in some cases, translate into canoodling with oligarchs or authoritarian leaders—spelled a

177 For instance, Spidla, V., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 23.3; Korcok, I., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 12.2; Saryusz-Wolski, J., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 28.2.

rather different logic of appropriateness that did not only go against norms such as Atlanticism or Russophobia but also worldwide democracy promotion and efforts to anchor post-Soviet states in the zone of freedom and prosperity.[178] The intricate maps of norm entrepreneur networks in post-transition Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia are sketched out in Table 3.10. The tabulation reveals that in Poland, the challenges to advocates of "dissident geopolitics" were fewer, and they came mainly from the Europeanist camp, which did not dispute universal values and international norms, but rather the extent to which the country should orient itself on the EU and the stance on Russia. It also indicates that the original norm entrepreneur network split: "hawks" such as Jaroslaw Kaczynski could no longer agree on the basics of foreign policy with "doves" like Donald Tusk and the reformed Radek Sikorski, despite a shared past in Solidarity and/or a history of cooperation. In the Czech Republic, proponents of "dissident geopolitics" competed with both pragmatists and Euro-enthusiasts. Yet, the threat of the former actually helped preserve the historic norm entrepreneur community, despite inside bickering. In Slovakia, the norm entrepreneur group defending "dissident geopolitics" was, perhaps, most disputed at various points in time: first by authoritarians, then by pragmatists. The constant attack, however, may have kept it intact, as it was easier for it to unite against "an enemy". Yet since norm entrepreneurship is also a more recent venture in Slovakia, the bifurcation between, say, Atlanticists and Euro-enthusiasts, may still be under way.

178 From anecdotal evidence, it is worth to mention Czech president Vaclav Klaus' close links with the Kremlin or Slovak prime minister Robert Fico's infamous "cocktails" at the Cuban consulate.

Table 3.10: Competing norm entrepreneur networks in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia in and post transition

	Authoritarians	Pragmatists	Euro—enthusiasts
Czech Republic		Vaclav Klaus' circle, 2003-	Social democrats (e.g. Vladimir Spidla) and advocates of "dissident geopolitics" who promoted ties with the EU more than the U.S. Karel Schwarzenberg), 2006-
Poland			Donald Tusk's circle / *Platforma Obywatelska* (Civic Platform) party, 2005-
Slovakia	Vladimir Meciar's establishment, 1993-1998	Robert Fico's circle / *Smer* (Direction) party, 2006-	

Notes: The table lists names of the most prominent representatives of alternative norm entrepreneur groups or the main institution/organisation/party of their origin as well as the year (approximation) at which they became—or, in Meciar's case, posed—a credible "threat".

3.5. Conclusion: missionary zeal of recent converts

This chapter examined the early stages of norm diffusion – *emergence* and *habituation* – in an effort to explain how norms and norm entrepreneur networks arise and nest in foreign policy arenas. "Dissident geopolitics" rose to prominence at the backdrop – and partly as a result of – of lively ideational exchange between Americans and Central Europeans – democratic missionaries and converts to democracy – throughout the turbulent transition years in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Arguably, the initial moral clout of the U.S., widely perceived across the post-communist region liberated from the yoke of communism as the benign superpower that "won" the Cold War, enabled the onset of norm diffusion to Central Europe from across the Atlantic, and a fortunate domestic/international of structural and agency-based factors, including socialisation, structural power, resonance and framing, sustained it through the phases of *emergence* and *habituation.* The tables in this chapter – and Appendix 1 – depicted the intricately woven networks of Czech, Polish and Slovak norm entrepreneurs – who jokingly refer to themselves as the "transatlantic mafia" – who first "converted" to "dissident geopolitics" and then started promoting it. These foreign policy communities survive to this day. The brief background check conducted per each core member – they are tabulated in the Appendix – suggested that what the majority of them shares is the exposure to socialisation by American missionaries, be it via institutions, such as *Freedom House, NED, US Committee on NATO, Foundation for Civil Society, Open Society Foundation, German Marshall Fund of the US,* or through inter-personal links, and, for the most part, centre-right or right political affiliation. It was also found that a significant number of them also had a non-conformist past: under communism or, in the case of Slovakia, Meciarism. Yet these structural similarities that emerged from their biographies were arguably less important than the individual norm entrepreneurs' understanding of agency, demonstrated through commitment to public service – many of them held quite a number of posts [179] – as well as the interpersonal

179 Though it can only be assumed, common sense suggests that there are fewer immediate opportunities for self-enrichment via corruption at foreign ministries or embassies than at other public institutions, say, trade, industry and finance ministries or regional development agencies dealing with

links, often friendships, between them.

Contrary to what has been proposed by some of the hypotheses in the introduction to this thesis, the conclusions that can be drawn from the chapter indicate that domestic requisites of norm diffusion command more explanatory power when pitted against international factors than initially thought. The effect of U.S. input – socialisation to foreign policy norms via structural linkages and interpersonal exchange – itself would not have materialised, or mattered, outside the political context of Central European transition from communism. Section 3.2 on *structural power* revealed how deeply the future advocates of "dissident geopolitics" penetrated the government and the non-governmental sector, which rendered them multiple opportunities to engage in vocal norm advocacy later. Section 3.3 on *resonance* unpacked some of Wendtian state identities and edited historical narratives that the foreign policy-making elites used to ease the domestication of "dissident geopolitics": for themselves and the public alike. The proximity of the authoritarian past, and by extension the tendency to "imagine" and "legitimise" communities by pitting them against it, is also an observable attribute of the post-authoritarian era which facilitated norm diffusion in this case. Finally, section 3.4. on *framing* highlighted the relative sparseness of discursive competition with alternative norm entrepreneur groups, also a structural feature of the transition setting, which initially empowered advocates of "dissident geopolitics", enabling them to "lock-in" the discourses of their choice. The national consensus on foreign policy in this period also kept the network itself intact, which would most probably

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matters such as privatization, public procurement or distribution of foreign aid.

not have been the case if the foreign policy landscape had been more diversified, given the breadth of the normative framework and consequently the diversity of its supporters. By examining prospects for norm entrepreneur communities beyond transition and hinting at internal rifts and external challenges, the chapter prepared ground for part two, the "zeal".

Table 3.11: Necessary and complementary factors in norm diffusion: hypotheses and findings

	Structural linkages with US	Interpersonal exchange with US	Resonance	Framing	Lack of alternative framing
Type of factor: **hypothesis**	C	N	C	N	N
Type of factor: **findings**	C	C	N	N	N

Hence, it appears the hypotheses posed in the introduction for part one of this dissertation, the "mission and conversion", do command some explanatory power, though understandably, they do not fully capture the complexities and subtleties of the patterns of norm diffusion that tend to emerge in transition contexts.

H1a. The norms in question found their way into CEE states by means of diffusion through extensive structural linkages between the US and CEE, as well as *socialisation* between agents from the American and CEE foreign policy-making community.

H1b. The norms persisted thanks to *resonance* with existing, domestic norms, reinforced by *framing* by agents ("norm entrepreneurs") whose position/legitimacy was relatively *undisputed* by other agents.

As outlined above, findings also indicate that socialisation was asymmetrical and based on the pupils' positive perception of the teachers. Furthermore, the persistence of "dissident geopolitics" as well as relatively undisputed *framing* by norm entrepreneurs was, in part, conditioned by *structural power*.

Part two will examine the dynamics of norm enactment in the foreign policy of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia during the Iraq War, the Orange Revolution and the Russia Reset. Once the stages of *norm emergence* and *norm habituation* give way to the phase of *norm internalisation*, norms can acquire a *regulative* role, locking in logics of appropriateness. Under which conditions and by which mechanisms do norm entrepreneurs succeed in applying them? Moreover, in the particular case of "dissident geopolitics", conceived in transition, to what extent is the normative framework and the corresponding network of norm entrepreneurs dependent on the setting that helped create

PART II: “Zeal”

Norm Enactment in the Foreign Policy-Making of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia Post-Transition

The Case of the Iraq War – the Allied Crusade

The Case of the Orange Revolution – the Neighbourhood Crusade

The Case of the Russia Reset – the Aborted Crusade

4. Chapter 4. War in Iraq: the "Allied Crusade" (2002-2003)

4.1. Introduction: coalition of the eager?

Participation in the invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq remains a showcase for CEE states' activist foreign policy of the early 2000s. Two days before the invasion, Washington released the list of the 30 allies that joined its "coalition of the willing". About half of them were post-communist states: though they were relatively weak militarily, their number marked an essential contribution to the perceived legitimacy of Washington's war effort[180]. For the Central and East Europeans' part, it was not that much of a stretch to dub the club the "coalition of the eager", in terms of both foreign policy discourse and output. As the peaceniks of "old Europe" writhed in distaste at the "hegemonic unilateralism" of the US – demonstrated, above all, by the circumvention of the UN[181] – the hawks of "new Europe" readily sanctioned what they perceived as "ethical war"[182] against a brutal dictatorship, invoking memories of the communist regime that had oppressed their people for four decades.[183]

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180 Grigorescu 2008

181 *The Economist*, 2003. France's High-Risk Diplomacy is in Danger of Hurting France Itself. 20.2; Habermas, J., Derrida, J., 2003. February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: a Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe. *Constellations* 10(3):291-297

182 Rihackova, V., 2005. Czech Republic: Europeanization of a Hesitant Atlanticist? *Institute for European Policy (Europeum) Working Paper*

183 Vilnius Group, 2003. Statement. 5.2

To what extent can the resolve of Czech, Polish and Slovak elites to help the US overthrow Saddam Hussein be explained by norm entrepreneurship? That "new Europe's" behaviour during the Iraq crisis quite conspicuously resembles a model case of "band-wagoning" makes it easy to overlook the fact that for these weak states, supporting the US was, in many ways, counter-intuitive. There were few apparent gains: by invading Iraq, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia were not containing a direct security threat, nor were they – possibly with the exception of Poland – chasing after slices of "post-war pie" simply because the US couldn't promise them many. On the other hand, losses seemed imminent: the danger of being left out in the cold by anti-war "old Europe" couldn't be discounted. Moreover, heated debate inside the three states indicates that the pockets of political elite as well as the civil society at home were opposed to going to war. Hence, the puzzle to crack here is the following: why did Czech, Polish and Slovak policy-makers bother to take a stance – and a controversial one, at that – on Iraq when they could have gotten away with doing nothing at all?[184] Were they, from their own point of view, mercenaries, crusaders, conscripts, recruits – or something else?

The chapter will show that they were recruits who, after careful consideration, enlisted in the "coalition of the willing" because a set of foreign policy norms conceptualised here as "dissident geopolitics" – promoted with passion and vigour by

184 President Jacques Chirac's unkind remark about "missing the opportunity to shut up" is good point of departure: why didn't CEE states simply stay silent?

a group of norm entrepreneurs inside and outside the establishment – dictated that overthrowing Saddam Hussein was "good" and "appropriate". Within the broader framework of the dissertation, Central and East Europeans' decision to beat the odds and jump onto the US-dragged bandwagon headed to Baghdad constitutes a "critical case". In the virtual absence of clear security and material interests, and in the face of medium to high international and domestic costs, the Iraq War makes it easier to isolate the effect of the set of norms – "dissident geopolitics" – considered here, which lowers the looming risk of conflating causality. Hence, the crusade against the Ba'athists deserves the prominent status of a "pilot case study" in the part of this dissertation that unpacks the "zeal" of the recent converts in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, proceeding to analyse the role of norms whose inception and habituation has already been traced in the first chunk of this study, which broke down the "mission". The macro-structural and micro-structural "vacuum"[185] enveloping the Iraq venture renders a good opportunity for zooming in on norms: did they act as an independent or intervening variable? How did they tweak or even alter the decision-makers' perception of the optimal foreign policy course on Iraq?

The chapter makes the case for the "allied crusade" in two steps. First, it conducts a mini-literature review in order to acknowledge the main competing explanation of the curious involvement of many post-communist CEE states in the notoriously scandalised Iraq War. Next, it proceeds to the country case studies. Starting with the

185 The lack of apparent security and economic incentives to go to war (the macro-structure of the international system) as well as the presence of notable risks on the home front (the micro-structure of domestic politics).

Czech Republic and Slovakia, it analyses the role of norms and norm entrepreneurs in steering foreign policy discourse in the desired direction – *persuasive framing* – and bringing about preferable policy output – swaying *converts* in the establishment in favour of the preferred foreign policy line – in an (ideal) setting: of few incentives and multiple risks prompting non-action, rather than action. Moving on to Poland, it applies the lessons learned about the dynamics of norm influence on post-communist foreign policy in "small states" to a locale and a situation in which incentives are greater, and risks are smaller, which means that the effect of norms is more difficult to disentangle from that of interests, as the two blend together in a common bid for backing – and participating in – the US-led invasion.

The country case studies consist of three main sections. The analysis commences with the analysis of the opportunities and constraints to norm entrepreneurship posed by the macro-structure: security and economic incentives and disincentives for participating in the "allied crusade". Next, it outlines the micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship, understood as presence and leverage of relevant norm entrepreneurs – or *missionaries* – in the foreign policy-making community: in other words, their *structural power* to sway *converts* among decision-makers and opinion-makers close to them. The third section in each case study gauges the persuasive influence of relevant norm entrepreneurs by following the various torrents in foreign policy discourse ahead of the US-spearheaded invasion, focusing on the *framing* used by advocates of "dissident geopolitics": historical *meta-narratives,* if any, and contemporary *micro-narratives*. Finally, the consistency of foreign policy output is examined through statements, decisions and documents. In so doing, this chapter argues that the agency of norm entrepreneurship helps us understand why the Czech

Republic, Poland and Slovakia acted when it was, at least from the realpolitik perspective, advisable not to. Furthermore, it asserts that the relative *structural power* of norm entrepreneurs at home – their ability to use *access* to decision-makers and apply *framing* with *resonance* – deepens our grasp of the different *degrees* of support that the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia – and other CEE states in a similar position, for that matter – rendered to the US.

4.2. Limitations of the realpolitik explanation: mercenaries that were too altruistic

Much of the literature on Central and East Europeans' involvement in the Iraq War does not go beyond the neo-realist outlook on "small state" behaviour. Though most works concede that CEE states had multiple reasons to back the Bush administration, they highlight variables such as power, threat and interests. The recently developed neo-realist theories of "soft balancing" and "soft band-wagoning"[186] – tailored to the uni-polar world of the 1990s and early 2000s – do offer some valuable insight into the dynamics of foreign policy-making in CEE states ahead of the Iraqi invasion. They explain not only whom Central and East Europeans supported but also how they did it. Both theories make a standard neo-realist assumption about state behaviour by positing that in a uni-polar international system revolving around a sole superpower –

186 "Soft-balancing" was initially introduced to account for the lack of traditional balancing in the unipolar international system of the 1990s (Walt 2002, Joffe 2002, Paul 2004, Pape 2005). "Soft band-wagoning" later became its conceptual counterpart (Foot 2006, Hansen et al. 2008).

in this case, the US – smaller and weaker states are expected to either balance against American power or bandwagon on it in hopes of obtaining security and/or economic benefits. But crucially, the theories also propose that the opposition to or the support for the US as the uni-pole will remain moderate or symbolic: in other words, the balancing and the band-wagoning will be "soft". Hence, the conceptual innovation lies in the emphasis on tools such as diplomacy and international institutions, rather than military capacity or economic power. If we apply the two theories to the Iraq crisis, "soft band-wagoning" elucidates why, for instance, some CEE states supported Washington but made only a modest contribution to the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF).[187] On the other hand, "soft balancing" illustrates why the Iraq War split Europe into "old" and "new": West Europeans turned against the Americans in an attempt to contain, by "soft" means, what they saw as "post-2001 US unilateralism". In so doing, they deepened the rift between them and Central and East Europeans, who clung on to the powerful yet benign hegemon for the fear of what they saw as the French attempts to build a "European Gaullism" as well as the new German "Westpolitik" reflecting diminished dependence on the US.[188]

Yet the "mercenary" logic falls short of fully explicating why CEE states became active members of the "coalition of the willing". Most importantly, the assumption of rational decision-making must be questioned in this respect: the Atlanticist stance on

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187 Grigorescu 2008

188 Sedivy, J., Zaborowski. M. (2004). Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Relations. *European Security* 13(3):187–213; Oswald 2006

Iraq threatened to incur substantial short- and medium- term losses in strategic and potentially also economic terms, which, upon rational calculation, could have outweighed the ultimate gains. In the international arena, the cacophony of spiteful remarks from Brussels, Berlin, Paris and elsewhere rammed home the disquieting message that the upcoming EU accession could be in jeopardy[189], while on the domestic front, the grumbling of hostile publics and the popularity surge of anti-war political parties raised the alarm that government stability and re-election might be in danger. Moreover, the idea that power structures and threat perceptions alone dictate foreign policy is somewhat problematic: the various Central and East European states supported the US despite their divergent structural positions: Hungary and the Czech Republic, inland European states safely inside NATO, were almost as hawkish vis-à-vis Baghdad as the Baltics or Romania, whose security dilemmas – faced from outside NATO – were clearly more complicated. Though more recent neo-realist works also concede that systemic pressures tend to be filtered through intervening domestic variables[190], their analytical frameworks have not yet been applied to the

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189 French president Jacques Chirac implied a French veto on enlargement, European Commission president Romano Prodi told the Poles that, "You can't entrust your purse to Europe and your security to America," after Warsaw completed a $3.5bn contract for American fighter aircraft and enlargement commissioner Guenther Verheugen said that Central and East Europeans will learn a lesson from Iraq, "They will…not make the same mistakes again. They know only too well where their money's coming from." *The Guardian* 2003

190 Schweller , R.L., 2004. Unanswered Threats: A Neo-Classical Realist Theory of Under-balancing. *International Security* 29(2):159-201; Weitsman, P.A., 2004. Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and the Triple Entente. *Security Studies* 12(3): 79-113

Iraq War.

4.3. Back to the constructivist argument: crusaders who were too pragmatic?

That non-material factors were at play in Central and East Europe in the run up to the strike against Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime is a standard observation. But few works to date have gone beyond the simple act of recognition to assess the causal weight of these factors and theorise the type of influence that they wielded on foreign policy in the region in 2002-2003. The following section attempts to rectify that. The three countries examined here do differ in the degree of the military/political support rendered to the US before and during the war. In the Czech Republic, the uneven leverage of norm entrepreneurs on decision-makers at the various stages of the foreign policy-making process – or, in other words lesser *structural power* – resulted in an ambiguous foreign policy outcome: the Czech stance on Iraq was clearly supportive of the US de facto, but less so de iure. In Slovakia, the strong influence of norm entrepreneurs – both in terms of *structural power* and *resonance,* based on a powerful *frame* that helped create rhetorical entrapment – on foreign policy-making translated into an outcome that clearly spelled loyalty to the US. In Poland, the unrivalled *structural power* of norm entrepreneurs in the foreign policy-making community within and beyond the government, combined with enticing material incentives that were reinforced by norms via *framing,* also facilitated an unequivocally Atlanticist foreign policy outcome.

Table 4.1: Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland before the Iraqi invasion: an overview

	Incentives	Costs	Norm entrepreneurs	Foreign policy outcome
Czech Republic	Low	Medium	Somewhat strong influence on foreign policy	Somewhat solid support for the US
Slovakia	Medium	High	Strong influence on foreign policy	Solid support for the US
Poland	High	Medium	Somewhat strong influence on foreign policy	Solid support for the US

4.4. The Czech Republic: hesitant reservists

In the months ahead of the American strike against the Ba'athists, the Czechs behaved like hesitant reservists: though they demonstrated a certain readiness to join the ranks of America's recruits, there was no great rush to get onto the battlefield.[191] The Czech Republic had less to lose than Slovakia by taking part in the "coalition of the willing": as a NATO member as well as an EU accession frontrunner, it was in a comfortable position vis-a-vis both Washington and Brussels. In this sense, it is puzzling that its

191 See, for instance, Kral, D., 2008. The Czech Republic. In: Rihackova, V., Weiss, T. (eds.) 2008. Views on American Foreign Policy: The Atlanticism of Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe. *Institute for European Policy (Europeum) Working Paper:* 63-104; Grigorescu 2008 or Kral, D., Pachta, L., 2004. Ceska republika a iracka krize: formovani ceske pozice. *Institute for European Policy (Europeum) Working Paper*

response to the US was so lukewarm. Yet, at the same time, it is important to note that the momentous build-up in the Czech Republic before the controversial venture in Iraq put the fragile Prague government, whose majority depended on a single vote, under conflicting pressures based on high expectations that it could not hope to reconcile. Abroad, the Europeans trusted the dependable candidate country to "not fall out of line"[192], while the Americans expected the ally to fulfil its duty".[193] At home, Czech politicians had good reason to fear "punishment" from the public, which was no less pacifist than its French counterpart: the resonant memory of the passive – yet pronounced – backlash against the 1999 NATO bombings of Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia certainly cautioned the cabinet given the US failed to secure the approval of the UN or NATO. From this angle, it is no surprise that the Czechs recruits' response to America's hornblow was half-hearted. But then the question is, why, given the circumstances, did they not resort to lip-service? The following section seeks to assess the explanatory power of norms and norm entrepreneurs to ascertain whether they enhance our understanding of the Czechs' pattern of foreign policy-making – or lack thereof; the Czechs sent mixed messages – during the Iraqi crisis: on the one hand, president Vaclav Havel signed the Letter of Eight, but on the other hand, prime minister Vladimir Spidla publicly said that the country was not officially a part of the coalition of the willing.

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192 Spidla 2011

193 Zantovsky, M., 2010. Interview with author. London 24.5.

Table 4.2: Attitudes of leading Czech political parties toward the Iraqi invasion

Political party	Government/Opposition	Stance on Iraqi invasion
ČSSD (social democrats)	Government (senior)	Rather negative
KDU-ČSL (Christian democrats)	Government (junior)	Affirmative
US-DEU (liberals)	Government (junior)	Affirmative
ODS (civic democrats)	Opposition	Affirmative
KSČM (communists)	Opposition	Negative

4.4.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

Geopolitically, the optimal foreign policy for the Czech Republic was, in fact, not to take sides on Iraq, or, in the not-so-subtle words of Jacques Chirac[194], to "shut up". Most Czech policy-makers agreed that it was in the small country's vital interest to prevent the deepening Euro-Atlantic rift over Iraq from weakening America's commitment to NATO and thus compromising the security of the European continent. Indeed, one of the foreign and security policy priorities set by the coalition government led by social democrat Vladimir Spidla in 2002 was to, "strengthen the transatlantic bond as a backbone of the European security architecture." [195] The generally prickly opposition led by civic democrats was, for once, on board: as their then-chairman Mirek Topolanek, put it, they were ready to do what it took keep the

194 The Guardian 2003

195 Government of the Czech Republic, 2002. Programme Declaration. Prague; Defence Ministry of the Czech Republic. Military Strategy of the Czech Republic: White Book.

US and the EU on the same boat.[196] At the height of the Iraq crisis, President Vaclav Havel publicly expressed the Czechs‘ grave concern over the squabble between their American and West European allies when he said: “It is neither in the interest of the world nor in the interest of the Czech Republic for the Alliance to start crumbling.“[197] Hence, it would seem that the optimal foreign policy would be to not take sides, but they opted for a different course of action.

As for other strategic motivations to join the “coalition of the willing”, the strive to de-fuse the “Axis of Evil“ – or, simply put, terrorism as a “hard“ security threat to the Czech Republic and her allies – was also an insufficient reason for the country’s backing of America’s mobilisation against Iraq. True, concern over the mushrooming of terrorist networks and proliferation of WMDs among “hostile“ regimes around the globe featured prominently in official Czech strategic documents drafted after the 9/11 attacks on the United States.[198] It also set the tone of key programmatic documents of the leading opposition party ODS.[199] Yet most Czech policy-makers – including the outspoken civic democrats, whose shadow defense minister Petr Necas

196 Kral 2008; Topolanek 2011

197 *Respekt,* 2003. Rozhodnuti je vzdycky riskantni: rozhovor prezidenta republiky Vaclava Havla. 13.1.

198 See, for instance, Defence Ministry of the Czech Republic 2002 or Defence Ministry of the Czech Republic, 2003. Security Strategy of the Czech Republic: White Book.

199 See, for instance, the shadow government’s defense programme, ODS, 2003. Moderni vojsko pro 21. stoleti: Modra sance pro bezpeci zeme.

coined the alarm-inducing concept of "mega-terrorism" to describe terrorist activity supported by states or regimes suspected of possessing or developing WMDs – agreed that intelligence, police methods and international regimes were the preferred method of dealing with terrorism.[200] Hence, it might seem that terrorism was not a good-enough casus belli for the Czechs. The positions of the Czech government ahead of the invasion were carefully coordinated with UN Security Council resolutions, complete with their emphasis on WMDs.[201] But confidence in the intelligence reports that Washington presented as compelling evidence of proliferation in Iraq was largely confined to norm entrepreneurs at the foreign ministry and right-wing media. Petr Uhl, a left-wing dissident turned journalist and later the government's commissioner for human rights, recalls an earlier conversation as well as a TV debate with foreign minister Cyril Svoboda in April 2003: "He told me with a serious expression on his face that he understood it perfectly and also that he had proof that Saddam Hussein had accumulated biological and even bacteriological weapons in Iraq."[202] Former head of Czech foreign intelligence services and norm entrepreneur Oldrich Cerny is also (still!) adamant that there were WMDs in Iraq: "Because of my former position,

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200 Svoboda, C. 2011, Svoboda, K., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 7.3.; Kovanda 2011

201 Pocuch, I., 2010. Interview with author. Prague, 4.5. See also Government of the Czech Republic, 2003. Resolution no. 66 About Measures Related to the Situation in Iraq. 13.1

202 Uhl, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague,10.3. See also: Czech Television, Channel 1, 2003. Interview with Cyril Svoboda, Jaroslav Zverina and Petr Uhl. Programme Spona. 12.4.

I knew [Saddam] used them against the Kurds.[203] But in the public debate on the course of action against the UN-defying Ba'athist regime, the argument built on the necessity of disarmament and Baghdad's links to Al Qaeda was overshadowed by the argument based on the responsibility of the international community to overthrow Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.[204] In other words, WMDs were a necessary, but not a sufficient, cause.

When it comes to economic incentives – or, in other words, the anticipated "spoils of war" – it is difficult to imagine that they would have been the main motivation behind the Czechs' decision to join the "coalition of the willing", given the uncertainty surrounding possible energy deals or post-war business contracts. Czech companies could, at best, hope to act as co-suppliers of the most heavily involved American, British, Australian and Polish enterprises.[205] As for US military aid, there were slim chances that it would soar as a result of the Czechs' decision to go to Iraq. In 2003, Washington contributed a modest $11m and, referring to Czechs as "graduates", unveiled plans for further cuts, to an estimated $8m in 2004.[206] There was a potential

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203 Cerny 2011

204 Kral & Pachta 2004

205 See, for instance, Czech Radio, Channel 7, 2003. Ceske firmy maji sanci. 25.4; Profit.cz, 2003. Jak se bude krajet iracky kolac. 13.4.

206 US Foreign Military Assistance, 2004. Congressional Budget Justification FY05 Foreign Operations, February; US Foreign Military Assistance, 2003. Congressional Budget Justification FY04 Foreign Operations, February.

gain for the Czechs in terms of trade: in the past, Czech exporters had extensive linkages with Iraqi companies – the Iraqis even call tractors "zetors" (a Czech brand) – and they were interested in picking up where they left off, but the overall share of trade that the Czechs could hope for was negligible.[207]

Arguably, the vague hope for security and material gains could not compensate for the clear risk of repercussions – both at home and abroad – for joining the "coalition of the willing". On the international level, it may seem that the boldest gamble pertained to the Czechs' reputation in the EU. Though the country's accession was geopolitically and economically "inevitable", the Czechs wanted to enter "in good standing".[208] By allowing themselves to be recruited by the Americans, they risked being dumped onto the same heap as the rest of Donald Rumsfeld's imagined community, "new Europe", be their support robust or symbolic. But Czech politicians claim they knew that Germany[209] would not punish them for backing the US, and that was enough of a reassurance. Foreign minister Cyril Svoboda insists that, "The accession process was too far along...and speaking in pragmatic terms, the Germans benefitted immensely from the enlargement because they invested so heavily in the new markets, including the Czech one. [Chancellor Gerhardt] Schroeder knew that we

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207 MFA of the Czech Republic, 2004. Postup Ceske republiky pri poskytovani humanitarni pomoci a obnove Iraku. Introduction to Development Aid Strategy in Iraq. 14.4.

208 Topolanek 2011, Kovanda 2011

209 Spidla 2011

weren't a Trojan horse; we were, at best, a Trojan cockhorse."[210] Hence, it seems that on the part of some Czech policy-makers, the *perceived* cost of alienating "old Europe" was not as high as one might have expected, given the media hype surrounding the intra-European row in Czech and international media.

Domestic costs of participation in the war against Saddam Hussein were much higher. The Czech public was outright dismissive of the idea of military intervention. Moreover, the ruling *Social Democratic Party* (CSSD) struggled to contain a powerful faction of peaceniks in the ranks of its own parliamentarians. Crucially, the Czech public was interested in offering a helping hand to the Americans and their allies; it merely was not in favour of a military solution to the Iraqi crisis. At the end of 2002, 53% of them were opposed to any attack on the Ba'athists without the mandate of the UN Security Council. At the same time, in apparent recognition of the necessity for their country to stay engaged, more than half of them supported various non-military forms of participation in the US-led disarmament, regime change and reconstruction efforts: 54% of those polled were in favour of dispatching a staffed field hospital; 47% were in favour of deploying an NBC unit, and 30% were in favour of administrating an airliner including a crew NBC unit.[211] Importantly, most proponents of "dissident geopolitics" did not *perceive* the cost of "passive" public discontent as too high. Their rivals, including the Prime Minister, thought

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210 Svoboda, C. 2011

211 CVVM, 2003. Support for Participation of the Czech Republic in the Action in Iraq. Opinion poll, March.

otherwise.[212]

Apart from public discontent, another possible cost of getting "conscripted" by the US to help "pacify" the Ba'athists was compromised government stability: why risk the downfall of the government to support the Americans? In early 2003, as the transatlantic as well as intra-European squabble over the attack against Iraq were turning nasty, the senior partner in the Czech Republic's fragile coalition government, the social democratic CSSD, also descended into a deep internal crisis because of the Iraq issue. Centrist government officials headed by Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla – advocating "responsibility" and "allied loyalty" – kept clashing with a vocal faction of left-wing liberal internationalists and peaceniks led by the chairman of the UN's General Assembly Jan Kavan and the chairman of the Czech parliament's foreign affairs committee Vladimir Lastuvka. The disunity within the ČSSD – and the apparent inability of Prime Minister Spidla to deal with it – were sharply criticised by the opposition civic democrats: during a heated parliamentary debate, norm entrepreneur Petr Necas even proposed – unsuccessfully – to connect the vote on the Czech military support for the anti-Ba'athist coalition to a confidence vote on the government on the grounds that it was damaging the Czech Republic's reputation of reliable ally.[213] ODS was not entirely off mark. Lastuvka's public statements – either

212 Spidla 2011

213 Parliament of the Czech Republic, 2003. Minutes from the 9th session of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament, 16.1. Necas belonged to the community of norm entrepreneurs that advocated "dissident geopolitics".

in the committee hearings, where he claimed that the Czech Republic was not on America's list of the "willing" or in the media, where he argued that the Czech position was closer to the French and German one[214] – were sending mixed messages ahead of the Iraqi invasion, damaging the Prime Minister's credibility just days after the first shots were fired in the Iraq War.[215]

The analysis of the macro- opportunity structure – e.g. possible gains and losses associated with participation in the "coalition of the willing" – shows that material factors do not fully account for the complexities and subtleties of the Czechs' behaviour during the Iraq crisis. Hence, non-material factors, namely norms and norm entrepreneurs will be factored in to help explicate why the divided Czech political elite allowed itself to be recruited at all, given the reasonably high political risk of the attack on Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.

4.4.2. Micro-structure: structural power

In 2002-2003, the Czech network of Atlanticist norm entrepreneurs consisted of a strongly charged nucleus of missionaries and several loosely attached clouds of

214 Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, 2003. Minutes from the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 20.2; *Pravo,* 2003. Lastuvka: Mluvi pouze za sebe. 31.1

215 Pehe, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 25.2. Leftist rebels in the CSSD came up with an anti-war declaration publicised at the 31st party congress in March days after the war broke out: it struck a chord with an overwhelming majority of CSSD delegates – opposition votes weren't even counted.

converts that extended into both the opinion-making and the decision-making aggregates of the foreign policy-making community. In the internal hierarchy, by far the most influential missionaries – by the norm entrepreneurs' own admission – were President Vaclav Havel, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Vondra, US ambassador Martin Palous, NATO ambassador Karel Kovanda and Kuwaiti ambassador Jana Hybaskova, whose rightful place in the network has already been established in Chapter 3.[216] In line with "dissident geopolitics", these norm entrepreneurs advocated action, though slight variations of it, over non-action, in Iraq from a pro-American standpoint. In 2002-2003, when the Iraqi crisis was in full swing, Czech norm entrepreneurs were overwhelmingly – though not exclusively – recruited from the political right, which had important consequences for their political agenda as well as their political clout. The centre-left Czech government, led by Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla, which took in 2002 after a relatively solid victory of the left – social democrats and ostracised communists – in the general election was not "infiltrated" by proponents of "dissident geopolitics" as much as its Polish counterpart (Slovakia had a centre-right cabinet in place at the time): crucially, the junior partners in the orange-yellow coalition, the Christian Democrats and liberals, openly expressed sympathy for the missionaries' cause, but there were much fewer supporters of "dissident geopolitics" in the ranks of the social democrats, the senior party, which held 12 out of 18 government posts. This was due less to the depth of the communist/anti-communist cleavage in Czech politics – in Poland, Solidarity encompassed nearly one third of the population, of varied political views, at one

216 Observation based on multiple interviews.

point; in the Czech Republic, dissidents were dubbed "islands of positive deviation" in a telling metaphor capturing both the scarcity and the isolation of the anti-communist opposition in the country – than to the generational exchange in CSSD. Spidla's predecessor Milos Zeman, who held a firm – some even say authoritarian – grip on the party while he was chairman in 1993-2001 and Prime Minister in 1998-2001, could have given his seal of approval to the controversial NATO strike against Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia in 1999 without even consulting the party or the government[217], whereas Spidla, a moderate tamer of forces who had been walking on thin ice ever since he took over from Zeman, the architect of CSSD's post-revolutionary success[218], could not afford to – and didn't want to – do any such thing to his fellow party members, who were, en masse, against repeating the "Kosovo debacle".

The norm entrepreneurs' goal in 2002-2003 was to officially engage their country in the US-led campaign seeking to overthrow the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, which was oppressing – and massacring – its own people. In the face of blatant authoritarian stamping on basic human rights, the philosophy of "dissident geopolitics" prescribed humanitarian intervention. In a telling snapshot of the zeitgeist amongst missionaries, Karel Kovanda, the Czech permanent representative at NATO during the Iraqi crisis, evokes the unpleasant memory of the paralysis and the resulting powerlessness gripping the international community at the time of the atrocities in Rwanda, in an

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217 *Czech Radio, Channel 7,* 1999. NATO: krize v Kosovu, CR clenem NATO.

218 Spidla 2011

admittedly imperfect, yet still fitting, analogy.[219] In the run up to 1994, Kovanda – from a non-permanent seat in the Security Council – was one of the first diplomats to use the term *genocide* to describe the massacres of Tutsis at a time when many ambassadors were reluctant to accept that conclusion.[220] From a similar humanitarian perspective, other missionaries say they approved of the Serbia bombings, for which NATO came under fire five years earlier.[221] Since most missionaries hailed from the centre-right or the right, few of them shared the belief in non-intervention and/or the pacifist sentiments that restrained some neo-realist sympathisers and their centre-left colleagues. This doesn't mean that all of them agreed with the UN-defiant way in which their mighty American allies took up arms: the more centrist their views – this mostly applies to academics, journalists and activists, e.g. opinion-makers – the more hesitant their endorsement of the invasion.[222]

The micro- structure for norm entrepreneurship in the Czech Republic was favourable in the run up to the invasion of Iraq: advocates of the set of norms investigated here had penetrated official power structures and relevant non-governmental organizations. Among opinion-makers, advocates of "dissident geopolitics", especially their

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219 Kovanda 2011

220 *LATimes*, 1995. Three Who Work to Keep the Peace. 24.10.; Security Council, 1995. Statement of H.E. Mr. Karel Kovanda, the Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic on the Security Council on the situation in Rwanda, 3566th meeting

221 Hybaskova 2011; Palous 2011

222 Pehe 2011; Svoboda 2011; Pojar 2010

"dovish" breed, were abundant. In the media, they infiltrated editorial boards, news desks and comment divisions, good examples include Tomas Klvana and Daniel Anyz (at newspapers *Hospodarske noviny* and *Mlada Fronta DNES*) as well as the Atlanticist lot at *Lidove noviny* (Lubos Palata, Daniel Kaiser) and *Respekt* (Erik Tabery), a weekly newspaper owned by missionary Karel Schwarzenberg. In the non-governmental sector, they infiltrated leading think-tanks and NGOs, including *People in Need* (chairman Tomas Pojar, activist Simon Panek), Vaclav Havel's *Forum 2000 Foundation* (Oldrich Cerny, Jiri Pehe), the *Euro-Atlantic Council*, *Institute for International Affairs* (UMV, director Jiri Sedivy) and the *Prague Security Studies Institute* (PSSI), interlinked with the foreign and defence ministry, respectively. In the academia, the Prague branch of America's New York University was an important hub for relevant norm entrepreneurs (dean Jiri Pehe).

But crucially, norm entrepreneurs defending the principles of "dissident geopolitics" also commanded enough *structural power* in the decision-making community in 2002-2003. Indeed, they headed most institutions relevant to the foreign policy-making process at the time: the presidency (Vaclav Havel), the foreign ministry (minister Cyril Svoboda and especially his deputy Alexander Vondra) and to a lesser extent, defence ministry (Jaroslav Tvrdik), the embassies in Brussels (NATO, Karel Kovanda), Washington (Martin Palous) and Kuwait (which also covered Iraq, Jana Hybaskova), as well as Senate chairmanship and vice-chairmanship for foreign affairs (Petr Pithart, Jan Ruml). Yet importantly for the Iraq crisis, norm entrepreneurs did not manage to persuade Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla to take their preferred course of action: Spidla arguably adhered to another set of norms, which included

sovereignty and non-intervention, which made him one of the "pragmatists".[223] They also lost influence on the presidency in the period following the Letter of Eight, which Vaclav Havel signed in his last 72 hours in office. His successor Vaclav Klaus, also a "pragmatist" and thus a proponent of different foreign policy norms, was a passionate critic of US unilateralism and was not afraid to say it out loud. This contributed to the overall ambiguity of the Czech stance on Iraq. In sum, the account of micro-structure indicates that advocates of "dissident geopolitics" wielded enough *structural power* in the opinion-making and decision-making circles ahead of the strike against the Ba'athists to translate their normative agenda into their preferred foreign policy outcome. Yet since this did not fully materialise, a factor or a set of factors other than *structural power* most probably holds more explanatory weight.

223 Spidla 2011

Figure 4.1: Czech decision-makers during the Iraq War: structural power



4.4.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

Thanks to norm entrepreneurs in high positions, the official policy discourse buzzed with zeal, especially *micro-narratives* based on solidarity with allies and moral responsibility to protect human rights and spread democracy. The "hawks" were in the frontline: by far the fieriest "Atlanticist missionary" – a "war instigator" for some – was deputy foreign minister Alexandr Vondra: rumours had it that it was him, rather

than minister Cyril Svoboda, who effectively "ran" the pro-American foreign ministry, due to his dissident past and related moral authority, excellent contacts in Washington and close relations with President Vaclav Havel.[224] During the months ahead of the invasion, Vondra repeatedly urged his colleagues – and the Czech people – to recognise brutal and terrorist-affiliated regimes such as Iraq as a "deadly threat" to the "over-riding values" of freedom, democracy and human rights that define our civilisation.[225] The enthusiasm vibrating in Vondra's passionate "sermons" was hard to match. Yet other Czech policy-makers delivered the same message in slightly calmer voices: President Havel directly appealed to the notion of Pax Americana and labeled the Iraq invasion as an "ethical war",[226] motivated by principles and values binding the international community to heed the rights of man – as opposed to the rights of states – above all else.[227] Gabriela Dlouha, who was Havel's close aide at the time, recalls that, "It was never about finding WMDs; it was about deposing a criminal dictator who was decimating his own people."[228] NATO ambassador Karel Kovanda also defended the decision to go to Iraq from a humanitarian perspective: overthrowing a beast like Saddam Hussein in the name of freedom and democracy

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224 *MF Dnes,* 2003. A.Vondra: nejsem valecny stvac. 19.4.

225 Vondra, A., 2002. Praha se zapise do dejin. *Pravo,* 18.11.

226 Rihackova 2005

227 Havel, V., 2002. Jsme duveryhodny spojenec. *Lidove noviny*, 20.11.

228 Dlouha 2011

was “praiseworthy“, he says today.[229]

The historical *meta-narrative* that Czech policy-makers used to explain their actions at home and abroad was based on the “attribution of similarity” between the plight of the oppressed Iraqi people and the totalitarian subjugation of the Czech nation under the Soviet yoke. Three weeks before the strike against the Ba’athists, US ambassador Palous published an article in the Washington Post, dismissing accusations that Central and East Europeans were acting as “servants and lackeys” of the United States. He claimed that the reason for the region’s support for democratisation efforts of the world’s leading superpower stems from its recent experience of “dangerous and devastating totalitarian rule”.[230] “It would be inaccurate to say that realpolitik wasn’t a part of the equation,“ he concedes seven years on. “But realpolitik always gives you a set of options: it is how you look at them that determines the outcome. Without the lens of our values, we would have decided otherwise.“ In addition to the memory of the country‘s own past, the recent wars in the Balkans provided a cognitive shortcut to Atlanticist norms for some Czech norm entrepreneurs. “Like many other politicians of his time, Havel remembered only too vividly what the Europeans’ inability to decide on intervention soon enough had allowed to happen during the Balkan wars,“[231] says his aide Dlouha of the decision to support the Americans. The same goes for Alexandr Vondra, who used the example of the war in Bosnia to contrast the impotence of the

229 Kovanda 2011

230 Palous 2003

231 Dlouha, G., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 4.3.

Europeans to the robustness of the Americans who, he claimed, had both the vision and the fibre to look past their backyard to places where basic freedoms were trampled on. "The carnage in Vukovar and Srebrenica were the price for the success at Maastricht," he wrote in November 2002.[232]

The unofficial policy discourse on Iraq followed a similar pattern: advocates of "dissident geopolitics" equated communism with the Ba'athist regime to evoke *resonance*. Right-wing daily newspapers such as *Lidove noviny* or *MF Dnes* – also the weekly magazine *Respekt* – keenly published op-eds and interviews with advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in favour of intervention in Iraq, though they also gave room to those that were more sceptical. Commentator Martin Weiss describe the atmosphere in the media as "go-getting": "We were all in favour. But we had to be objective," says Weiss.[233] Among think-tanks and NGOs, the world-renowned *People in Need* was particularly active in translating the normative commitment to freedom and democracy into public remarks that aimed to sway undecided policy-makers and – though chances of that happening were slim – the indignant public. Paradoxically, activists were often unsure if they agreed with Washington's course of action, but norms compelled them to defend it anyway. "At the time, I was consistently saying: Saddam Hussein has to be removed, though I had doubts about the timing as well as the execution of the operation," says activist Simon Panek – the man Vaclav Havel

232 Vondra, A., 2002. Evropa potrebuje USA a naopak. *Lidove noviny*, 20.11.

233 Weiss, M., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 25.3.

said he wished would succeed him – from *People in Need*.[234] Finally, among intellectuals, there was a tendency – quite typical for democratic globalists – to portray the Iraq crisis as an "either/or" critical juncture that would determine the fate of the Western civilisation. "When the Bush administration speaks about democratisation of Islamist countries, we shouldn't simply dismiss it and say that it all boils down to oil anyway...It can well be about our being and non-being. [Over-throwing Saddam Hussein] and 'expediting history' is the only way of avoiding global catastrophe," Jiri Pehe wrote in early 2003.[235] Today, he says: "There are a lot of Wilsonians – if not neo-cons – in our midst that definitely don't think that Fukuyama was a utopist because he heralded the end of human history."[236] Considering unofficial public discourse, it is important to note that norms may have actually been the deal-breaker in the near-pacifist Czech foreign policy-making community: these "dovish" norm entrepreneurs did watch the Americans' war effort with a good deal of scepticism. Yet ultimately, norms prevailed: in an illustrated quote, activist Marek Svoboda from *People in Need* put it this way, "The UN mandate is, by far, the most bullet-proof sanctification of such a course of action, but it is difficult to reach. When you are faced with what is practically genocide, unilateral action is excusable."[237]

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234 Panek, S., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 4.3.

235 Pehe, J., 2003. Valka v Iraku a urychlovani dejin. 22.1

236 Pehe 2011

237 Svoboda, M., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 22.2.

Norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" were *disputed* by formidable opponents in 2003. Unlike in Slovakia, where worldviews clashed more fundamentally due to the country's recent semi-authoritarian past, disputes in the Czech Republic stemmed from the diversity that generally characterises democratic pluralism: the norm entrepreneurs' agenda was contested by two main groups, the "pragmatists" led by president Vaclav Klaus for its emphasis on values, and "Europeanists" – represented by, for instance, Jan Kavan and Lubomir Zaoralek – for its "blind bowdown" to US interests. In 2003, president and former premier Klaus – whose approach to foreign policy has been described as "isolationist" by leading Czech analyst Petr Drulak – continued nourishing the habit of impugning the "truth-and-love-rs'"[238] for sidelining national interests and intervening in affairs of other states.[239] Ironically enough – Klaus as an avid free-marketer abhors the extreme left but also "market socialism" – the *Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia* (KSCM) expressed similar sentiments at the time.[240] Apart from the "pragmatists", believers in the norms underscoring "dissident geopolitics" were also eschewed by peacenik "Europeanists" from the ranks of the ruling CSSD, who criticised their support of various "experiments" in humanitarian intervention and democracy-

238 The nick-name refers to Havel's famous anti-communist assertion that, "Truth and love will triumph over lies and hatred."

239 See, for instance, Klaus, V., 2003. Jak vidim tuto valku. *MF Dnes*, 25.3 or Klaus, V., 2007. Projev prezidenta republiky, 28.10.

240 Drulak, P., 2007. *Ceska zahranicni politika mezi atlanticismem a izolacionismem*. Prague: Ustav mezinarodnich vztahu

building as half-baked and short-sighted as to its potentially disastrous consequences for the future of multilateralism. In sum, the account of foreign policy discourse in the Czech Republic ahead of the Iraqi invasion suggests that though the extent of *dispute* was notable, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" managed to induce *resonance* by *framing* the "allied crusade" as a struggle against an oppressive regime that the Czechs themselves had only recently defeated.

4.4.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

Czech foreign policy output reflected some of the *meta-* and *micro-narratives* outlined above, but the uneven *structural power* of norm entrepreneurs at different stages of the decision-making process stifled what could have been a resounding Atlanticist voice on the part of the Czechs. On 17 January, the Czech parliament, where norm entrepreneurs were scarce, made an important gesture when it offered its soil and airspace to allied forces involved in the invasion. But it also ruled that Prague would not render military support to the "coalition of the willing" unless Washington secured the UN's seal of approval: in other words, another resolution.[241] On 29 January, president Havel signed the Letter of Eight, largely thanks to the quick reaction of and some diligent hustling by two leading norm entrepreneurs, US ambassador Palous and deputy foreign minister Vondra. The Clausewitz-quoting

241 Parliament of the Czech Republic, 2003. Resolution of the Lower Chamber of Parliament in session no. 9 on the Government's Proposal of Measures Related to the Situation in Iraq. 17.1.

Prime Minister Spidla[242] – not a convert to "dissident geopolitics" – was asked to sign first, since all of the other signatories were Prime Ministers, but he refused. The day before the letter was released, lobbyist Bruce Jackson called Palous' embassy and urged him to secure Havel's support.[243] Palous alarmed Vondra, who called Havel at a theatre during the intermission: the president was spending his last days in office at a state visit in Bratislava. It was Vondra who convinced Havel to sign the letter and by return confirmed the president's approval to 10 Downing Street, where the signatures were collected.[244] "[Havel] overstepped his constitutional powers. I would have tried him for treason," says Prime Minister Spidla today.[245]

Had the president's signature been demanded 72 hours later, it would not have been delivered: Havel's successor Vaclav Klaus, again, not a convert to Atlanticist foreign policy norms, firmly rejected the idea of "forceful democratisation", of which he said that for him, it is something "from another planet".[246] Shortly after taking office, he had a row with US ambassador Craig Stapleton, who took offence when Klaus said he

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242 Spidla 2011

243 Revue Politika, 2003. Rozdeleny zapad. *Political-societal revue of the Centre for the Study of Democracy and Culture*, Prague. 20.7.

244 Dlouha 2011; Panek 2011; Pocuch 2011

245 Spidla 2011

246 Klaus 2003

found it likely that the Bush administration made the story about WMDs up.[247] Though Klaus was surrounded by advocates of "dissident geopolitics" – even his spokesperson was Tomas Klvana, who resigned within months because of "personal differences on the idea of what the job entailed" – he didn't become a convert to these norms. Importantly, there were many others – even in the ranks of those engaged in norm entrepreneurship of "dissident geopolitics", for instance Petr Pithart from the Senate – who didn't believe in the existence of WMDs, but decided to throw their support behind the Americans anyway, not because Iraq was a threat, but because they had faith in shared norms.[248] When the war commenced in Iraq, president Klaus expressed his sentiments in a statement where he said that he regretted the Americans' decision. He also said that contrary to what the international community might think, Czech Republic did not belong to the "coalition of the willing".[249]

On the eve of the invasion on 19 March, the government, largely thanks to the pressure of missionaries, formulated a "balanced" position stating that de iure the Czechs would remain outside the "coalition of the willing": the Czech army was not going to contribute to the military operations unless a new UN mandate came into

247 Pehe, J., 2011; Czech Radio, 2003. Interview with Craig Stapleton. Programme Radiozurnal, 11.12

248 Pithart, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 6.3.

249 Klaus, V., 2003. Declaration of the president to the beginning of the attack on Iraq. Press release. 20.3

force.[250] The MFA – namely its Department for Security, headed by Vondra – originally drafted a proposal that was much more pro-war, inasmuch as it authorised the use of force "under resolution 1441", which, according to this interpretation, sufficed as a multilateral framework for the invasion. But Vondra and minister Svoboda encountered strong resistance from ČSSD ministers, who, in turn, came up with an anti-war version of the government's statement.[251] Finally, a compromise was reached amidst threats of resignation from Vondra – and largely thanks to passionate argumentation by foreign minister Svoboda – for whom the social democrats' take was not acceptable. It is thus possible to say that these two norm entrepreneurs averted the Czech Republic's official "abstention" from the US-led "coalition of the willing": thanks to their skilled use of persuasive framing combined with clout stemming from their position and, in Vondra's case, access to Havel. Moreover, due to sustained pressure of defense minister Tvrdik, also a convert to norms conceptualised here as "dissident geopolitics", the 357-member unit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons experts – deployed in Kuwait as part of operation "Enduring Freedom" – got permission to enter Iraq territory from the parliament in the vote in late March. Czech troops entered Iraq only after the invasion on 1 April, as entourage of the 7th field hospital that the government agreed to send to Basra under the new UN resolution 1472, and upon sustained lobbying of Kuwaiti ambassador and

250 Government of the Czech Republic, 2003. Resolution of the government no. 286 on the reaction to the current development of the situation in Iraq. 19.1

251 Svoboda, C. 2011; Spidla 2011

norm entrepreneur Jana Hybaskova.[252]

Due to uneven leverage of norm entrepreneurs on foreign policy-making, the Czech Republic was not on the official list of allies, but it acted like an ally. Officially, the ambiguous foreign policy output indicates that missionaries did sway some decision-makers – for instance, foreign and defense ministers Svoboda and Tvrdik were converts to "dissident geopolitics" – but they failed to persuade others, most notably president Klaus and Prime Minister Spidla. The result was a cacophony of mixed messages from various members of the ruling elite. However, unofficially, the Czechs maintained close links with the American allies throughout the crisis, largely thanks to missionaries Alexandr Vondra and Jana Hybaskova as well as convert Jaroslav Tvrdik. In his communication, with the HQ of operations "Enduring Freedom" and "Iraqi Freedom" in Tampa, Florida, defense minister Tvrdik managed to maintain the Czech Republic's image of "loyal" ally, while Kuwaiti ambassador Hybaskova helped create an impression of an "active ally" through her flurry of activity on the ground: throughout the Iraqi crisis, she communicated messages of support to American diplomats in Kuwait; after the invasion, she was instrumental in the launch of the Czech Republic's humanitarian and development aid in post-war Iraq.[253] As for Vondra, that the Czechs' participation in the Iraq venture was "his doing" is virtually

252 Hybaskova, J., 2004. Cekani na valku. Prague: Rybka Publishers

253 Svoboda, K. 2011; Spidla 2011; Pehe 2011; Marian, J., 2010. Interview with author. Prague, 30.4; Hybaskova, J., Interview with author. Prague, 11.3; Blazevic, I., Interview with author. Prague, 8.3; Kral & Pachta 2004

undisputed. Overall, the case study indicates that *structural power* can go to great lengths in explaining the success, or lack thereof, of norm entrepreneurship. That advocates of "dissident geopolitics" held it in on the eve of the Iraq War helps explain why the country joined – if not fully – the "coalition of the willing". That they lost some of it, for instance, with the departure of Havel from his post, also helps us understand why their overall contribution to the crusade was modest, in the absence of an enticing macro-structure.

4.5. Slovakia: enthusiastic recruits

In the run up to the Iraqi invasion, the Slovaks acted like overly enthusiastic recruits, readily springing to attention and, some observers pointed out, even marching to the front line to show their willingness to fight in America's "just war". Interestingly, it had, perhaps, most to lose by joining the "coalition of the willing": as a small country still outside both NATO and the EU, it was in an unenviably awkward position of double asymmetry. Once excluded from the first round of both NATO and EU enlargement due to extensive abuse of democratic standards, the country had only recently reinvented itself as pro-democracy activist and pro-market reformer: on the one hand, it could not easily get away with displeasing Washington, but by "stirring waters", it also ran the risk of upsetting Brussels by reviving the reputation for trouble-making it had so ardently sought to shed along with its former strong-man, Vladimir Meciar, who was ousted in the election of 1998. The ruling government also faced barricades on the home front: above all, a disgruntled public whose pacifist sentiments were clearly at odds with the intentions of the Bush administration, hell-

bent at the time on over-throwing Saddam Hussein's regime. The following section traces the steps leading up to Bratislava's decision to support Washington's offensive in Iraq: what role – if any – did norms and norm entrepreneurs play?

Table 4.3: Attitudes of leading Slovak political parties toward the Iraqi invasion

Political party	Government/Opposition	Stance on Iraqi invasion
SDKU (Christian democrats)	Government (senior)	Affirmative
KDH (Christian democrats)	Government (junior)	Rather negative
SMK (party of the ethnic Hungarian minority)	Government (junior)	Affirmative
Smer (social democrats)	Opposition	Negative
HZDS (V.Meciar's party)	Opposition	Affirmative

4.5.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

Similarly to the Czech Republic, Slovakia did not have a macro-structure that would favour a pro-active stance on Iraq. Geopolitically, Washington's increasing impatience with Baghdad caught the Slovaks halfway to NATO: Bratislava had to do what it took to remain on track.[254] In mid-2002, the prevailing sentiment was that to secure NATO membership, it was enough "not to make a big mistake".[255] Since the

254 Batora 2011; Valasek, T., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.1.

255 *SME*, 2002. Pozvanku do NATO mame istu, vstup nie. 28.9

ouster of Vladimir Meciar, whose erratic leadership steered the country in international isolation in 1994-1998, Slovakia had made amends in Washington by behaving like a model ally: the foreign policy rationale of the rainbow coalition led by Mikulas Dzurinda was to "...act like a full member of the Alliance".[256] The Slovaks' courting of the world's sole superpower marked the recognition that the road to both NATO and the EU "led through Washington". [257] Incidentally, Prime Minister Dzurinda adopted this foreign policy course after a 1999 dinner discussion with Karel Schwarzenberg and Martin Butora, former aides to Vaclav Havel and prominent "norm entrepreneurs", according to former dissident turned editor-in-chief of Slovakia's leading daily newspaper SME, Milan Simecka, who also sat at the dinner table.[258] Hence, by mid-2002, when the debate on Iraq was in full swing, Slovakia had successfully reinstated itself in the international arena, but – NATO's Prague summit where the invitation to Slovakia and six other post-communist states was to be extended had not yet taken place – some Slovak opinion-makers and decision-makers were of the opinion that their country was "running out of credentials": the country's economic achievements or the contribution to the Kosovo campaign in 1999[259] seemed outdated at a time when the talk of the town was global terrorism.

256 Ondrejcsak, R., 2005. *Transformacia NATO a bezpecnostna a obranna politika SR*. Bratislava: Centre for Security Studies, p. 86. Dzurinda first said it in 1998; then he repeated it after the Washington summit in 1999.

257 Kacer 2011

258 Simecka 2011

259 During NATO's campaign against Slobodan Milosevic, Slovakia opened its airspace to American

"American senators will, above all, want to know how we can help them in future operations against terrorists," Tomas Valasek, Slovakia's leading security specialist, wrote at the time.[260]

Containment of international terrorism and non-proliferation were also strategic imperatives for Slovakia's involvement in Iraq. Yet rather than a threat to Slovakia, Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's WMDs were perceived as a threat to the "West", of which Slovakia was soon to become part.[261] Martin Butora, ambassador to Washington at the time, puts it this way: "[Terrorism] was a real danger. Our allies had already been affected by it. They were also convinced that WMDs were involved, and we believed them. If there is a danger that WMDs will be used against civilians or the Western world as such, you have a responsibility to step in."[262] The Bush administration had taken pains to overwhelm CEE allies with information about the Ba'athist regime's supposed stash of WMDs and alleged connections to terrorist groups in the run up to the Iraqi invasion. When state secretary Colin Powell was giving one of his final speeches in the UN – at the session of the UN Security Council on 5 February, 2003 – most US-based Central and East European diplomats were in

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fighter jets.

260 Valasek, T., 2003. Uloha novych clenov v bezpecnostnej politike EU. *Listy SFPA* 8:5-6

261 Vasecka, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 4.1.

262 Butora 2011

full agreement with his main points.[263] Back in Slovakia, warnings against terrorism resonated in countless public remarks of Slovak officials in the run up to the Iraqi invasion[264], though their authenticity in discourse as well as their influence on foreign policy-making must not be overstated: at least some of them were used instrumentally to appease the anti-war public. Finally, when it comes to material benefits – in other words, a reasonable rate of return – of the part-taking in the "coalition of the willing", the Slovaks could not, and did not, hope to extract too many, except for NATO membership: energy deals and visa waivers were not discussed, which, for instance, wasn't the case with the Poles.[265] Nor could Slovakia hope for more military aid from the US. In 2002, Washington made a modest contribution of $7.75m and in 2003, it threw in a slightly higher sum of $8m (though it originally planned for $1m more), with budget justification reports for Congress citing "Slovakia's continued progress in transition" as a reason for scrapping bits of the funding.[266] In fact, the aid was frozen mid-year in 2003 because of Bratislava's decision to cooperate with the ICC by not

263 *Center for Strategic International Studies*, 2003. Commentary on Secretary Powell's statement on Iraq. 5.2; Butora 2011

264 See, for instance, statements of Daniel Lipsic and Bela Bugar in Chmelar, E., 2006. Desat najvacsich lzi o vojne v Iraku. *chmelar.blog.sme.sk*, 19.3, as well as an interview with Mikulas Dzurinda, *SME*, 2003. Dzurinda: krestanstvo umoznuje aj pouzitie sily. 31.1; Meseznikov, G., 2008. Vojna v Iraku pat rokov po: zacal to Dzurinda, ukoncil Fico. *Hospodarske noviny*. 20.3.

265 Szomolanyi 2011; Havran, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 28.1; Butora 2011; Batora 2011

266 US Foreign Military Assistance, 2004; US Foreign Military Assistance, 2005

granting US citizens immunity from the court's powers.[267] As for post-war reconstruction of Iraq, another potential source of material gains, it wasn't clear at the time whether– and if so, to what extent – Slovak companies would be involved. As late as December 2003, Slovakia's *Investment and Development Agency* (SARIO) was merely speculating that Slovaks companies could potentially win contracts worth 2-5% of the $15.63bn earmarked by the US for restoration projects in Iraq.[268]

The modest security and economic incentives for joining the "coalition of the willing" were arguably off-set by the relatively high costs that Slovakia's government faced on both the international and domestic levels. Internationally, the main concern was the near-complete EU accession process: the prevailing sentiment among Slovak foreign policy-makers amidst the flurry of thinly veiled threats from Brussels and, above all, Paris, was the fear that a "wrong decision" on Iraq could still derail the country's pending European integration.[269] For the post-Meciar establishment, this was a "first": the twin goals of NATO and EU entry that had coexisted under the same foreign policy brand – the "return to the West" – for half a decade suddenly had to be de-coupled. But ultimately, government officials realised that EU accession was not compromised, says leading political scientist Grigorij Meseznikov of the Bratislava-based Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), a think-tank with links to Prime Minister

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267 *The Slovak Spectator*, 2003. US freezes military aid for Slovakia. 14.7.

268 *The Slovak Spectator*, 2003. Slovaks in Iraq's reconstruction. 22.12.

269 Batora 2011

Mikulas Dzurinda's party SDKU.[270] "[Ambassador] Butora convinced the Prime Minister that since other EU members – such as Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Portugal – supported the Bush administration, it was a rift within the EU, not between the EU and NATO."[271] The re-framing of the situation by a powerful norm entrepreneur thus helped ease the cabinet's fears of being excluded from EU enlargement. Domestically, the Slovak government was also faced with an interesting paradox: by agreeing to participate in the "coalition of the willing" and thus demonstrating Slovakia's loyalty to the US, it also risked compromising NATO entry by putting the success of the upcoming referendum, needed to ratify NATO membership, at risk. In stark contrast to the elite's pro-American stance, the attitude of the Slovak public towards operation "Iraqi Freedom" was that of open hostility: in March 2003, 60.3% Slovaks were against the participation of Slovak military forces in the campaign against Saddam Hussein.[272] This reflected badly on public support for NATO accession, which steadily decreased in the run up to the Iraq War, hitting a low of 43% at the time of the invasion. At the same time, opponents of NATO entry came to constitute more than 50% of the Slovak public.[273] Yet since there was still

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270 Martin Butora, IVO's co-founder and president, was persuaded by prime minister Dzurinda and foreign minister Kukan to take the post of US ambassador.

271 Meseznikov 2011

272 Polis, 2003. Opinion poll on Slovakia's participation in the Iraq War. March.

273 Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2003. Public opinion on NATO and EU entry. Analysis.

time before the referendum, and since the government did not have to worry about re-election – the electoral cycle had just begun – the domestic costs of joining the "coalition of the willing" were perceived as less high.[274]

The analysis of the macro- opportunity structure – or, more simply, the Slovaks' cost-benefit calculation of fighting back to back with the Americans – has shown that since material factors do not offer a satisfactory explanation of Bratislava's decision to support Washington, non-material ones were most probably at play. Norms and norm entrepreneurs help us understand why the Slovak political elite allowed itself to be recruited – and readily, at that – to a war of few spoils and many controversies.

4.5.2. Micro-structure: structural power

In 2002-2003, the Slovak network of the proponents of "dissident geopolitics" – not unlike its Czech counterpart – consisted of a core of missionaries and multiple layers of converts. Within the community, by far the most influential missionaries – by the norm entrepreneurs' own admission – were US ambassador Martin Butora, civil society leader Pavol Demes, deputy defense minister Rastislav Kacer and two of Butora's yes-men, diplomats Milan Jezovica and Miroslav Wlachovsky, who served as foreign policy advisors to Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda.[275] The political clout of this tiny clique professing the ideals of "dissident geopolitics", seasoned, unlike in

274 Simecka 2011

275 Observation based on multiple interviews.

the Czech Republic and Poland, in the recent struggle against "Meciarism" rather than in the four-decade resistance against communism, reflected the "consensus without discourse"[276] on Slovakia's foreign policy orientation that emerged in the aftermath of the 1998 electoral revolution. It also demonstrated the inalienable – though not unchallenged – supremacy of Slovakia's centre-right, already feted in both Brussels and Washington for its bold reforms. The country's foreign policy community teemed with converts: in contrast to the Czech Republic, where neo-realists, socialists and communists put up the intellectual and argumentative equivalent of a "good fight", in Slovakia, even the party of the – still relatively – freshly defeated former strongman, Vladimir Meciar, was on board: almost everyone was cheering on Washington as it dragged out and dusted off tanks in preparation for battle.[277]

The goal of norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" in 2002-2003 was to "help an ally in need" and topple Saddam Hussein's oppressive regime. The norm of "Atlanticism", pivotal to the Slovak version of "dissident geopolitics" at the time, attached a great deal of importance to "loyalty" and "trust" as the basic ingredients of the mix of interests and norms that generally characterises a political – and, in this case, also military – alliance.[278] In the Slovak context, Atlanticism was the norm that most strictly "prescribed" a pro-American foreign policy of engagement in Iraq: in the Czech case, the equivalent was the universal value of human rights and the

276 Szomolanyi, S., 1998. Kľukata cesta Slovenska k demokracii. Bratislava: Stimul

277 Batora, J., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 2.1.

278 Butora 2011; Wlachovsky 2011

"muscular" tool for its enforcement, humanitarian intervention. Noteworthy – and specific to Slovakia – was also the understanding as well as the extent of "indebtedness" to the US, a sentiment shared but diversified among post-communist CEE states: it resonated with particular strength and urgency with the Tatra tiger, given the recent contribution of US diplomacy and a range of governmental and non-governmental development and democracy promotion agencies such as NED, NDI, IRI or the Open Society Foundation to the defeat of Vladimir Meciar.[279] From the perspective of local opposition politicians and activists, US institutions and actors – Ambassador Ralph Johnson should be singled out here – made a big difference ahead of the crucial election of 1998 by maintaining a sharply critical stance toward Meciar's abuses of power, especially harassment of journalists and minorities.[280] Hence, the recently imprinted memory of the Slovaks' own fight against an oppressive regime, which the Americans helped overthrow by smuggling in "arms" – both financial and human resources, as well as know-how – cemented the norm of Atlanticism among anti-Meciarite elites and societal groups, which ended up providing the rationale for the participation in the coalition of the willing.

The micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship in Slovakia was very favourable in the run up to the Iraq crisis. Norm entrepreneurs were well represented among leading opinion-makers: civil society leaders such as director of the *German Marshall Fund*'s office in Bratislava Pavol Demes, academics such as head of the political science

279 Reichhardt 2002

280 Lesko, Marian. 1999. Velvyslanec aky bol na Slovensku iba jeden. *SME.* 14.5.

department at the Comenius University Sona Szomolanyi or journalists such as editor in chief of the leading daily newspaper *SME* Milan Simecka were all in favour of George W. Bush's strike against Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.[281]

But crucially, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" also wielded *structural power* in the community of decision-makers. By 2002, they had penetrated almost all institutions relevant to the foreign policy-making process at the time: the Prime Minister's office, the foreign and defence ministries and the embassies in Brussels (NATO) and Washington. The capacity of the concrete norm entrepreneur community to shape policy stemmed from an informal – though initially uneasy – alliance with senior figures in the ruling coalition in the aftermath of 1998. The interlink between the proponents of "dissident geopolitics" and the official foreign policy establishment was personified in Martin Butora, a Velvet revolution leader and OK98 campaign organiser, recruited by Prime Minister Dzurinda and foreign minister Kukan in 1999 to be Slovakia's ambassador in Washington. By 2002, Butora's embassy had become a powerful institution in framing Slovakia's foreign policy, enjoying close personnel links to the Prime Minister's office in Bratislava. In a telling snapshot of the institutional power balance, Frantisek Sebej, a MP for Mr Dzurinda's party SDKU in 1998-2002 as well as a norm entrepreneur, recalls that: "Even the policy towards Brussels went via Washington."[282] Thanks to Butora, norm entrepreneurs gained access to the apex of executive power: two deputies from the Washington embassy,

281 Szomolanyi 2011; Demes 2011

282 Sebej, F., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 11.1.

career diplomat Milan Jezovica and former think-tanker Miroslav Wlachovsky, alternated as chief foreign policy advisors to Prime Minister Dzurinda. Apart from the Prime Minister's office, missionaries also managed to muster support for norms at the foreign and defense ministries, swaying deputy foreign minister Ivan Korcok, defence minister Ivan Šimko and deputy defence minister Rastislav Kacer as well as NATO ambassadors Peter Burian and Igor Slobodnik.[283] Interestingly, also communist-trained politicians such as president Rudolf Schuster, foreign minister Eduard Kukan and chairman of the Slovak parliament's committee for foreign affairs Peter Weiss succumbed to the pressure of norm entrepreneurs defending the normative framework dubbed "dissident geopolitics". The key to the latter's clout was a powerful frame of Slovakia's "return to the West", as well as the abovementioned belief that the road to the West led via Washington. The norm entrepreneurs' access to decision-makers then gave them the opportunity to engage in persuasion. Overall, this section demonstrates that advocats of "dissident geopolitics" commanded enough *structural power* ahead of the Iraqi invasion to translate their norm-driven zeal into foreign policy.

283 Kukan 2011; Korcok 2011; Kacer 2011

Figure 4.2: Slovak decision-makers during the Iraq War: structural power



4.5.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

As a result, official policy discourse in the run-up to the Iraq war was imbued with *micro-narratives* centred around norms such as solidarity, non-compliance in the face of autocracy and defence of freedom and democracy. “Our part of the political elite

read the situation in Iraq Bush-style," says Peter Weiss.[284] Centre stage stood the highest-ranking convert to Atlanticist norms, Prime Minister Dzurinda himself. Pavol Demes and other norm entrepreneurs, including the Prime Minister's adviser Miroslav Wlachovsky, insist that Dzurinda's conviction – underlined by avowed statements and grand gestures – was genuine: "He invested in it both politically and personally. It started with the marathon that he ran in New York in the aftermath of 9/11. He wanted to physically demonstrate his sympathy and readiness to contribute."[285] In the run-up to the invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Dzurinda's public remarks echoed with messianism – some Slovak observers now joke that they have earned him the epithet "more pro-Bush than [President G.W.] Bush"[286] – built on a Manichean distinction between the avatars of "good" and "evil", democracy and autocracy, that is typical for democratic globalists and/or neo-conservatives: "Saddam Hussein's regime is dangerous…it has links to Al Qaeda. This inter-connection is evil, and it threatens by evil of colossal proportions."[287] To convince the Slovak public of the strategic necessity to disarm Iraq by force, he also stated: "Our [democratic] civilisation is targeted by [the Ba'athists'] contacts and weapons…it doesn't matter if

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284 Weiss, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 24.1.

285 Demes 2011; Demes, P., 2010. Friend, Partner, Ally. Bratislava: Devin Printing House

286 Szomolanyi, S., 2005. *New EU Member States: Contribution of Central and Eastern Europeans to European Unity? Slovakia As a Model Case.* Essay.

287 *SME* 2003

we are American, French or Slovak."[288] The Prime Minister's speech in front of the Slovak parliament ahead of the crucial vote that would sanction the dispatch of a Slovak military unit to Iraq also resonated with a deep regard for democratic values: "This ballot will be an expression of our ability to act as a free country able to help those that are not free and of our capacity to decide responsibly as a country that can protect the shared democratic values that it professes."[289] Next to the (over)-zealous Prime Minister, the rest of the government naturally seemed a bit "apathetic", but it mattered little because Dzurinda's stance was key in the cabinet that many perceived as a "one man's show". There were those that used norms instrumentally. The communist-trained foreign minister Eduard Kukan – a graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, class of '64 – claimed adherence to Atlanticist norms in a string of statements about the US ("paramount ally"), Iraq and need for preservation of world peace: even by force ("if all else fails") and via ad hoc coalitions ("in spite of the disapproval of some European members of NATO").[290] Yet, as his speech ahead of the vote on Slovakia's military contribution to the Iraq campaign indicates, his principal concern must have been Slovakia's entry to NATO.[291] But there were also those government officials, who, by their own

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288 Meseznikov 2008

289 *Press Agency of the Slovak Republic* (TASR), 2003. 7.2

290 *SME*, 2002. Slovensko sa hlada, Europa, ci Amerika. 2.12; *Slovak News Agency (SITA)*, 2002. 11.9; *SME*, 2002. 23.11

291 *Press Agency of the Slovak Republic* (TASR) 2003

admission, internalised Atlanticist norms: missionaries Milan Jezovica and Miroslav Wlachovsky and converts Ivan Korcok, Igor Slobodnik and Rastislav Kacer. The latter, deputy defence minister at the time, is adamant that the Slovaks joined the "coalition of the willing" to stand up for values, not get into NATO: "That was a done deal after the Prague summit [in November 2002]." Though most missionaries were from the political right, converts could be found on both sides of the political spectrum. President Schuster remains a showcase for the stunning metamorphosis from a communist apparatchik to defender of democratic values: when the statue of Saddam Hussein was knocked down in central Baghdad, he cried "tears of joy". At the time, he was in the Oval Office with his American counterpart, who later described the emotional moment in his memoirs.[292]

In unofficial foreign policy discourse, devoid of political constraints, the *micro-narrative* of the "evil dictatorship" that needed to be deposed had even greater *resonance*. Conservative norm entrepreneurs around the marginal *Civic Conservative Party* (OKS) and the weekly newspaper *Tyzden* were particularly vocal in their condemnation of the "enemies of freedom": one of their rank and file, intellectual and politician Peter Osusky, says today that he wanted to see Saddam "hang"[293]. Conservative-liberal norm entrepreneurs huddled around ambassador Butora's think-tank *Institute for Public Affairs* (IVO) and foreign affairs think-tank *Slovak Foreign*

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292 Bush, G.W., 2010. *Decision Points.* New York: Crown

293 Osusky, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 16.1. Editor in chief of Týždeň Štefan Hríb later wrote that the war in Iraq "showed the enemies of freedom that we still have strength".

Policy Association (SFPA) – an elongated arm of the foreign ministry – expressed their commitment to norms with more caution, but, nevertheless, most of them defended the invasion as "just" and "legitimate".[294]

Unlike their counterparts in the Czech Republic, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in Slovakia were relatively *undisputed.* The territory of the anti-war camp was small and scarcely populated. Rival norm entrepreneurs also did not apply consistent *framing*. Supporters of Washington's war effort hailed from across the political spectrum – the anti-Meciarites of the centre-right (SDKU, SMK, KDH) as well as the "reformed" Meciarites of HZDS, neo-conservatives (OKS) and high- and low-ranking communist cadres that had reinvented themselves, embryonic social democracy and ultra-liberal free marketeers of television magnate Pavol Rusko's ANO party. Of mainstream parties, only newcomer *Smer* (Direction) – a splinter from the social democratic party SDL, a base for leftist advocates of "dissident geopolitics", such as Peter Weiss – attempted to stir waters, raising its not yet so powerful voice against what it claimed was reckless adventurism and, according to some, even a crime against international law.[295] Indeed, Atlanticism, the norm of choice for followers of "dissident geopolitics", was perceived by *Smer* leader Robert Fico and most of the party's rank and file as servility – a CEE-directed accusation that was, for instance, passionately rebutted by Czech ambassador to the US Martin Palous in a Washington

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294 Meseznikov 2011; Gyarfasova, O., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 21.1; Samson, I., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 10.1.

295 Fico 2011

Post article[296] – that could not do anything but disservice to the country, damaging its long-term interests. "Slovakia should have stayed impartial, or the government should have clearly said what it got in return for support of the Iraq War," Robert Fico said in a TV debate in March 2003.[297] In sum, this section demonstrated on top of *structural power*, Slovak advocates of "dissident geopolitics" also applied *framing* that resonated ahead of the Iraqi invasion: the *micro-narrative* based on allied loyalty and solidarity with the oppressed. Moreover, in contrast to their Czech counterparts, they were virtually *undisputed* by other norm entrepreneurs, which made it easier for them to generate foreign policy output of their choice.

4.5.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

Hence, Slovak foreign policy output in 2002-2003 reflected the abovementioned *micro-narrative* inasmuch as norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" mustered enough political influence to sway the foreign policy agenda in their desired direction. At the Prague summit in November 2002, the Slovak delegation – thanks, in part, to sustained lobbying of Ivan Korcok[298] – signed the first international statement on the Iraqi crisis, put forward by seven applicant countries and three member states. It stipulated that these states were ready to join an international

296 Palous 2003

297 *Slovak Television*, 2003. O pat minut dvanast. TV Debate. 23.3. Retrieved from archive.

298 Samson 2011; Korcok 2011

coalition with the aim of disarming Iraq if Baghdad failed to meet the conditions of Resolution No. 1441. On January 29, 2003, three days after US ambassador Ronald Weiser officially requested Slovakia's participation in the "coalition of the willing", the Slovak cabinet responded with a resounding "yes" and opened its airspace to the US Air Force and international coalition forces. On January 30, 2003, Prime Minister Dzurinda approached his Spanish counterpart Jose Maria Aznar, expressing interest in signing the "Letter of Eight".[299] On February 6, the Slovak parliament approved the deployment of a nuclear, biological and chemical protection unit of 75 men to the crisis area, conditional upon a new resolution by the UN Security Council in accordance with a UN mandate.[300] Finally, on 5 February 2002, the stamp of the Bratislava government appeared on the letter of the Vilnius group that caused so much irritation in Paris. The idea itself originated on "Slovak" soil: it first came up at a dinner at Martin Butora's embassy, attended by Bruce Jackson and most Vilnius Group ambassadors. "This was a product of the Slovaks and the Latvians," Jackson later said of the letter.[301] Operation "Iraqi Freedom" commenced on 21 March. Slovakia sent altogether 716 troops – 4 of which were killed – to Iraq before it pulled

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299 *SME*, 2003. 31.1.

300 Until then, the unit could only operate from Kuwait, as the original Resolution No.1441 permitted. Ivan Korcok later said that Slovakia would support US military intervention even without a new UN resolution, *Slovak News Agency* (SITA), 2003. 13.3.

301 *Agence France Presse*, 2003. 20.2.

out in 2007. [302] Overall, Slovakia's case demonstrates just how important the *structural power* of norm entrepreneurs devoted to "dissident geopolitics" was at this critical juncture. An illustrative quote based on a counterfactual underlines this finding: the leader of then-opposition party *Smer* Robert Fico, the future Prime Minister who would later pull Slovakia's troops out of Iraq, says today that had it been him in Mikulas Dzurinda's chair, he would never have agreed to go to war.[303] Hence, norms and norm entrepreneurs played a pivotal role in the Slovaks' decision to "go to war" with the Americans. In the absence of compelling security and economic incentives, it is possible to classify them as an independent variable.

4.6. Poland: churchgoing mercenaries

In the run up to the invasion of Iraq, Poland's political elite could have easily been mistaken for a bundle of mercenaries courted ahead of a crusade, so generous were the promises of compensation and, indeed, of "booty" extended by Washington in exchange for Poland's "conscription". Of the three countries considered here, Poland was, perhaps, the most likely case of a vigorously pro-American stance on Iraq: for Warsaw, supporting the strike against Saddam Hussein actually represented the optimal foreign policy course. It was fraught by few costs: at home, the government enjoyed the backing of a broad coalition of pro-American and pro-democracy political

302 *SME*, 2007. Slovenski vojaci opustili Irak. 2.2

303 Fico, R., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 26.3.

and societal forces; vis-à-vis the EU, Warsaw commanded political leverage stemming from its geostrategic and economic significance for Brussels, which enabled it to dismiss threats coming from Paris (and, to a lesser extent, Berlin) of derailing the upcoming accession as unsubstantiated, if not "empty". Moreover, a pro-US foreign policy on Iraq seemed to reek with benefits: above all, highly prestigious – and US-financed – military involvement in the invasion, the war and the peacekeeping operations; moreover, a multi-million-dollar's worth of contracts in the phase of post-war reconstruction and potentially a fair share of the invaded country's largely untapped oil. In the long run, Poland could also hope for America's goodwill and protection, materialised, perhaps, in a missile shield or a permanent troop deployment that it had been pleading for years before. Replacement of visas with visa waivers was also on the table.

Polish analysts themselves tend to interpret their pro-US foreign policy in the run up to and in the course of the Iraq War as "band-wagoning"[304]. In the face of such overwhelming evidence in favour of the neo-realist perspective on the events of 2002-2003, the value added of applying an alternative analytical framework to a foreign policy outcome that seems almost self-explanatory appears to be, at first, nominal. But how did Polish policy-makers arrive at the decision to back their American counterparts? What motivated the mercenaries to accept the American bait as "good enough"? Would they have accepted it – under the same conditions – if it were offered by another great power, not the US? The dissertation argues that they would

304 Zaborowski 2011; Kuzniar 2011; Lewicki, Z., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 25.5; Zieba, R., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 26.5.

not have. Hence, the constructivist take on Poland's decision to participate in the "coalition of the willing" helps us understand that the bidder for their support was as important as the bid. How did the norm entrepreneurs investigated here position themselves during the debate on the issue of Iraq? The following section will first consider their political leverage – in the community of decision-makers and opinion-makers – and their political agenda ahead of the invasion in 2002-2003.

Table 4.4: Attitudes of leading Polish political parties toward the Iraqi invasion

Political party	Government/Opposition	Stance on Iraqi invasion
SLD (social democrats)	Government (senior)	Affirmative
PSL (the peasant party)	Government (junior)	Split
PO (liberals)	Opposition	Affirmative
PiS (conservatives)	Opposition	Affirmative
LPR (the far-right party)	Opposition	Negative
Samooborona (the far-left party)	Opposition	Negative

4.6.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

In contrast to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Poland also had a macro-structure – a bundle of compelling security and material incentives and low risks at home and abroad – that favoured action, rather than inaction, in Iraq. Arguably, the alignment between interests and norms helped secure a broader consensus on participation in the coalition of the willing than in the other two countries. Yet it also made the effect of norms more difficult to isolate, as joining the "coalition of the willing" was a strategic as well as a normative commitment for Polish policy-makers. Careful process tracing

can help prevent reaching a conclusion based on spurious correlation. To ascertain the extent to which Polish policy-makers decided on a course of action on the basis of norms, the following section will evaluate Poland's security and material interests – as well as potential risks associated with participation in the "coalition of the willing".

Geopolitically and strategically, getting conscripted to the Iraq War implied notable long-term benefits rendering the participation in the "coalition of the willing" as the optimal foreign policy for Poland. Few short-term gains were involved: like Czechs and Slovaks, Poles didn't regard the Ba'athist regime or the "Axil of Evil" as a direct security threat.[305] In fact, neither "rogue states" nor terrorism were mentioned in the country's official national security strategy.[306] Where they did feature, however, were strategic documents, briefings, speeches and public statements devoted to Polish-American military cooperation. Hence, ahead of the Iraqi invasion, Poland's security interests pertained to preserving and, if possible, strengthening the military aspect of the Polish-American relationship, not least by shoring up support for the current security priorities of its "number one" ally.[307] Indeed, fighting terrorism shot to the

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305 Miller 2011; Kobieracki 2011; Nowak 2011

306 National Defence Ministry of Poland, 2000. Strategia obronnosci Rzeczipospolitej polskiej. Strategic document.

307 Sikorski 2011; Bobinski, K., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 4.5; Waszczykowski 2011; Reiter, J., 2003. *Poland: Toward a More Perfect Union – Or A Superpower Alliance?* Paper obtained by author.

top of the two countries' shared security agenda straight after 9/11.[308] Not two months after the deadly attack on New York City and Washington, D.C., Poland organised a Central and East European anti-terrorism summit, where president G.W. Bush evoked powerful memories of the communist dictatorship to ensure that America's post-communist allies would enlist in the war on terror: "Like the fascists and totalitarians before them, these terrorists – Al Qaeda, the Taliban regime that supports them and other terror groups across our world – try to impose their radical views through threats and violence. We see the same intolerance of dissent, the same mad global ambitions, the same brutal determination to control every life and all of life."[309] Needless to say, Warsaw did not have to be beckoned.

Geopolitically, underscoring Warsaw's readiness to "have Washington's back" in the war on terror and the invasion of Iraq was its long-term, unabated anxiety to keep American forces on the European continent. As the Iraqi crisis unravelled, and the transatlantic rift deepened, Polish policy-makers were, in their own words, faced with an impossible choice of a child between its "father" and its "mother". But ultimately, the loyalty to the US prevailed. Jacek Kucharczyk of the *Institute for Public Affairs* (ISP) recalls that, "We thought that the decision of Chirac and Schroeder to resist Bush would lead to Americans leaving Europe and it would leave us at the mercy of Russians and Germans as well, but mainly the Russians were of course the

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308 Lansford, T., Tashev, B. (eds.), 2005. *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post 9/11 Era.* Aldershot: Ashgate

309 Bush, G., 2001. Address at a Warsaw Conference. 6.11

concern."[310] Framing Iraq as an issue of national security and invoking the memory of betrayal by West European powers – Eugeniusz Smolar, a journalist that would later join the foreign ministry spoke of "the tremendously unnerving Berlin-Moscow-Beijing 'axis of peace'"[311] – fed the hawkish atmosphere of fear-inspired mobilisation that would eventually help tip the balance in favour of intervention.

Strategically, a stint in the "coalition of the willing" also promised to bring more tangible, short-term security assets: presumably more military aid. In the year ahead of the Iraq War, the US and Poland established a Military Cooperation Working Group, which enhanced joint training, provided greater interoperability in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defense and, importantly for Poland, helped modernise its defense-acquisition process.[312] In July 2002, a joint statement of presidents George W. Bush and Aleksander Kwasniewski, released at the occasion of the latter's glamorous visit in Washington, D.C. – it was only the second state dinner of Bush's then-18-month presidency – unveiled the two countries' plans to "expand cooperation between [their] armed services both to deepen [their] military-to-military relations, and in particular to promote needed transformation in [Polish] defense."[313]

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310 Kucharczyk, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 5.5.

311 Smolar, E., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 10.6.

312 US-Poland Military Cooperation Initiative, 2002. White House, Office of the Press Secretary Washington, D.C., 17.7.

313 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2002. Joint Statement by President by President G.W. Bush and President A. Kwasniewski. 17.7.

Indeed, in the autumn of 2002, the two countries did precisely that, at the height of the bitter wrangling over Iraq. On December 27, Poland irked "old Europe" by choosing 48 Lockheed's F-16 fighter aircraft over two European rivals – Anglo-Swedish manufacturer Saab which produces the Viggen and France's latest Mirage 2000 warplane – to modernise its Soviet-built "museum" of an air force. Although capability, interoperability and economic interests played important role in the Polish decision to purchase the F-16, political considerations clearly dominated. [314] Commenting on the deal, US ambassador to Warsaw Christopher R. Hill stated, "It represents more than an airplane. It is a fundamental choice about strategic political and military relationships."[315] Some media even speculated that the sale was tied to Poland's support in Iraq as a quid pro quo arrangement. The timing of the seemingly monstrous offset deal certainly provoked suspicion: the 43 offset proposals – focused on high technology and long-term job creation – that were agreed on March 18 were worth more than $6bn[316], to be implemented over a period of 10 years. At the time, it seemed like the "contract of the century".[317] But Polish officials denied any links

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314 Seguin, B.R., 2007. Why did Poland choose the F16? *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies*. Occasional Paper Series. No. 11

315 US Diplomatic Mission to Warsaw, Poland, U.S. Department of State, 2006. Polish F-16 Roll-out Attended by Polish and U.S. Dignitaries. Embassy News. Embassy Events 2006. 18.9.

316 Lockheed Martin, News, 2003. Lockheed Martin and Poland Sign Offset Agreement Valued at More Than $6bn. 18.4.

317 *The Warsaw Voice,* 2003. Poland's Contract of the Century. 3.7.

between the Polish-American agreement and Polish participation in the "coalition of the willing". Foreign minister Cimoszewicz, for instance, argued that, "The decision to support the invasion of Iraq was mainly based on our understanding of the true meaning of alliance and solidarity. We did not expect to make political profits or economic gains."[318]

The foreign minister's latter claim about "spoils of war" is hard to believe: economically, the Poles had much to gain from becoming frontline soldiers in the "coalition of the eager". The arch-bait was Iraq's "black gold": cheap and largely untapped oil that Poland sought to reduce its energy dependence on Russia.[319] In the run up to the invasion, Polish media speculated that the oil could be transported via Ukraine's Odessa-Brody-Plock pipeline all the way to Gdansk.[320] Warsaw had expressed interest in contracts for post-war reconstruction for Polish companies in general: in late May 2003, the Polish MFA gave USAID a list of 230 Polish companies interested in snatching a piece of post-war pie.[321] Interestingly, that the "black gold rush" and the reconstruction contracts were, in a large part, behind the Poles' decision to support the Americans was only fully revealed after the invasion. Days before the first tanks rolled in, Polish officials were still adamant that it was

318 Little, R., 2004. U.S. Dollars Wooed Ally in Iraq Coalition. *The Baltimore Sun.* 17.4.

319 Miller 2011; Wisniewski, B., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 5.5; Bobinski 2011; Szafarz, S., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 24.5.

320 *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2003. Odessa dlug rura. 31.3.

321 *Rzeczpospolita,* 2003. Komu irackie kontrakty. 26.4.

"too soon" to discuss business deals,[322] though former deputy foreign minister Radek Sikorski, who was based at the American Enterprise Institute at the time, says that there had already been sustained lobbying by Polish officials.[323] In July 2003, Polish authorities said it out loud: foreign minister Cimoszewicz contradicted his earlier noble statements on the Iraq War as testing "the true meaning of alliance and solidarity" and confirming the "awakening of the Western civilisation" that happened in the aftermath of 9/11[324] when he announced at a business meeting where several big Polish firms signed contracts for rebuilding Iraq that, in fact, access to the oilfields was always [the Poles'] "ultimate objective."[325]

Lastly, it was the perceived military and economic prestige in the involvement in the Iraq War that was particularly alluring to the Poles: they believed they were the Americans' flagship allies in the controversial conflict in Iraq.[326] In the run up to the

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322 *Rzeczpospolita,* 2003. Zarobic na spadku po Saddamie, rynky patra na Irak. 17.3.

323 Sikorski 2011

324 Cimoszewicz, W, 2004. Keynote address by Polish Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, delivered at The Paderewski Seminar: The U.S. and Poland: A Special Relationship, the East Central European Studies Centre, Columbia University. 22.9.

325 Cimoszewicz's remarks were made to executives from a group of Polish firms that had signed a deal with a subsidiary of Halliburton, Kellogg, Brown, and Root, which had already won contracts for postwar reconstruction in Iraq. See *BBC News World Service*, 2003. Poland Seeks Iraqi Oil Stake. 3.7

326 Tchorek, K., 2011. Interview with author, Warsaw, 20.5; Smolar, E. 2011; Rotfeld 2011; Towpik 2011

invasion, Warsaw buzzed with rumours suggesting that the Poles hoped that the upcoming war would catapult them to the premier league of world politics: Pentagon officials were allegedly hinting that some American bases might be moved from Germany to Poland – a lucrative development considering the expenditures that this would entail – and another word on the street was that Washington was also keen on moving NATO headquarters to Warsaw. The important tasks and appointments that Poland received in the aftermath of the invasion – President Bush told the Polish people during a May 2003 visit to Cracow that, "America will not forget that Poland rose to the moment." [327] – seemed to confirm that the country's clout in the international community was indeed growing. The Polish government exuded deep satisfaction when the US awarded it one of the four administrative zones in Iraq to run. A Polish general ended up commanding an international division of 9000 stabilisation forces, while former finance minister Marek Belka was named deputy head of the American-run office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and the Chairman of the Council for International Cooperation for the Reconstruction of Iraq. Crucially, the US covered the transport and the cost of maintaining Polish troops in Iraq, supplying them with most of the equipment. Poland's only responsibility was to pay out the soldiers' wages.[328] Overall, the financing of the troops represented only 2% of the country's defense budget.

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327 Bush, G.W., 2003. Remarks By the President to the People of Poland. Wawel Royal Castle, Krakow, Poland, 3.5.

328 *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2003. 16.5.

Moving on from benefits to costs, Poland only faced medium-to-low domestic and low international risks of repercussions for joining the "coalition of the willing". At home, the public posed a problem for the government: though snap polls indicated that Poles agreed with the government's policy of backing the Americans on the superficial level, more thorough analyses of public opinion revealed that only 21% of them – as opposed to, for instance, 59% of their American counterparts – were in favour of actually raising weapons against live Iraqis in an all-out war. In a March 2003 poll, 73% Poles were against combat, a peacenik sentiment very much in line with the attitude of the 75% "pacifist" Frenchmen that also opposed the war.[329] By March 2003, the "ingrained Americanophilia" of the Polish public that both the Bush administration and the Miller government had taken for granted in the run up to the strike against the Ba'athists no longer held, as positive views of the US fell to 50% from nearly 80% of only six months earlier.[330] "We were incurring deep damage on Polish-American relations in the long term, and we knew it," says former US ambassador Jerzy Kozminski.[331] Apart from public discontent, the domestic costs of choosing action rather than inaction in Iraq were marginal, if not non-existent: government stability was not in jeopardy, as government as well as mainstream opposition parties were all in favour of supporting the Americans. In fact, the Iraq

329 *Pew Research Center for the People and the Press*, 2003. Global Attitudes Project: America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties. Washington, DC, March, p. 1

330 *Pew Research Center for the People and the Press*, 2003. Survey Report. 18.3.

331 Kozminski, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 18.6; Smolar, E. 2011

War served as a welcome distraction from the corruption scandals that were eroding confidence in Leszek Miller's government.[332] In the international arena, the only possible cost of jumping on the US-dragged bandwagon to Baghdad was reputational damage in "old" Europe at a time when Poland was still on the EU's doorstep. But Aleksander Smolar of the *Stefan Batory Foundation*, who has over the years wielded strong behind-the-scenes influence on Poland's foreign policy, shakes his head as plays back the conversations he had with officials from SLD, the senior coalition partner in government, in 2003: "EU membership wasn't in jeopardy. We played a similar internal political game inside the EU as Spain or Italy, which sought to weaken the German-French axis in the EU. We had their support, and the support of the Brits."[333] The Polish authorities also took active steps to mitigate the impact of their pro-American stance on relations with France and Germany. At a three-way summit in May 2003, president Kwasniewski conceded that, "it was an omission not to have consulted Paris and Berlin on the letter [of eight]".[334] The Polish political parties also sent a message to Brussels by showing a united front on the debated EU constitution, says then-Prime Minister Leszek Miller.[335] Foreign minister Cimoszewicz also called for joint German-Danish-Polish command of the

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332 Taras 2004

333 Smolar, A. 2011

334 Mcevoy, J. 2003. At Summit Poland Seeks to Smooth Ruffled French and German Feathers Over Iraq. *France Presse*. 9.5

335 Miller 2011

stabilisation force, but the offer was haughtily dismissed by the two West European countries.[336]

The analysis of the macro- opportunity structure – or, more simply, the Poles' cost-benefit calculation of rallying behind the Americans – has served to show that unlike the Czechs and the Slovaks, the Poles had material as well as non-material incentives to join the "coalition of the willing", which has important implications for the effects of norms and norm entrepreneurs on foreign policy discourse and foreign policy output. The following sections will provide instructive examples of both. The key to the understanding of the influence of norms can be found in foreign policy discourse: it will be shown that while references to norms were consistent among opinion-makers, they were inconsistent among decision-makers, particularly converts. Crucially, the foreign policy discourse in Poland ahead of the Iraq War signifies that in the presence of strong security and economic interests, norms only play a supporting role in foreign policy-making. Yet even the status of intervening variable is significant: the ferocious value-laden rhetoric on the part of Polish officials indicates that norms serve to explain and legitimate national interests. Moreover, the discussion of Poland's foreign policy output – stronger *military* support for the US than that rendered by the Czech Republic or Slovakia – will shed more light on the kind of foreign policy that norms alone can inspire. The main contribution to the US cause of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where material interests were not really at play, was *political* backing. Poland, which also had strong security and economic

336 Taras 2004

incentives to join the "coalition of the willing", offered political as well as *military* support.

Due to the favourable macro- opportunity structure as well as the favourable micro-opportunity structure for norm entrepreneurship, the policy discourse in the months preceding the strike against Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime resonated with norms, thanks to both missionaries and converts. Yet while opinion-makers evoked norms constantly, the decision-makers' record was mixed. Starting with the opinion-makers, Adam Michnik can easily be singled out as Poland's most vocal missionary in the run up to the Iraq War. On the eve of the invasion, he wrote a "crusader" editorial in *Gazeta Wyborcza,* where he sanctioned the war against Iraq as "just" – it is noteworthy that he used the same expression as Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic – likening Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler and Josif Stalin. "…Kristallnacht showed the world the crux of Nazism, and the great Moscow trials revealed to the world the true face of the Stalinist system. Gazing at the crumbling Twin Towers, I understood that the world faced another totalitarian challenge."[337] Seven years on, a disillusioned Michnik says of his zeal back then: "Everyone was pro-American at the time. This was before we found out about the secret prisons [for terror suspects]. These days, Platforma Obywatelska[338] can afford to not send planes to Libya. But in 2003, refusing to go to Iraq was something we thought of as unimaginable."[339] Other

337 Michnik, A., 2003. We, traitors. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 29.3

338 The senior party in the coalition government.

339 Michnik 2003

missionaries among opinion-makers expressed similar sentiments with more caution: for instance, Janusz Onyszkiewicz brought up Poland's own experience with totalitarianism to justify the attack on Iraq: "[It] made us more ready to accept the thesis according to which the change of the political system from within, without the external interference could be extremely difficult and sometimes very costly."[340] Eugeniusz Smolar says today with a hint of sympathy for the opinions he held in the spring of 2003 that, "We were the moral generation."[341] Interestingly, there was dissent among opinion-makers: public figures whom this work would label as missionaries due to their personal histories of struggle against communism supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein but disapproved of US unilateralism. Weeks before the invasion, a conflicted ex-president Lech Walesa issued a statement pleading with the UN Security Council to put a stamp of approval on the "inevitable" attack.[342] Walesa's former "kamerad" from Solidarity Jacek Kuron was less subtle: he said that the war in Iraq was a "shameful adventure" in which Poles were "making enemies" for themselves.[343] Pope John Paul II expressed equally strong moral revulsion at the use of military force: "[It] is a crime against peace. The invaders are not acting in the name of Western values." The solution to this puzzle lies in the wide appeal of

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340 Onyszkiewicz, J., 2003. Iraq Crisis in the Context of US-Polish Relations. In: M. Stastny (ed.). *Iraq Crisis and Politics in USA, Europe and V4 Countries*. Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs

341 Smolar, E. 2011

342 *PAP*, 2003. Oswiadczenie Lecha Walesy w sprawie Iraku. 12.3

343 *Zycie Warszawy*, 2003. Haniebna awantura. 4.9

Solidarity in communist-era Poland: while in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, dissidents were scarce "islands of positive deviation", in Poland they were abundant, hence the greater diversity in their take on the Iraq War: "We were more peaceful. If it were Walesa or Mazowiecki, and not Kwasniewski and Miller, Polish authorities would have more problems with supporting the US in this," says Henryk Wujec, an ex-dissident who advises Poland's current president Bronislaw Komorowski.

4.6.2. Micro-structure: structural power

In contrast to its Czech and Slovak counterparts, the Polish community of norm entrepreneurs cannot easily be described as atomic: though the core group of missionaries was reasonably small, the clusters of converts – who will be identified in the next section on the micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship ahead of the strike against the Ba'athists – were more extensive and much more diversified. The very heart of the community – Polish norm entrepreneurs say today – consisted of communist-era dissidents and émigrés based in Poland or the United States: former president Lech Walesa, former foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek, under-secretary of state at the MFA Adam Rotfeld, editor in chief of *Gazeta Wyborcza* Adam Michnik, twin brothers Lech and Jaroslaw – one mayor of Warsaw and the other chairman of the formidable opposition party, conservative *Law and Justice* (PiS) – Kaczynski, resident fellow of the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. Radoslaw Sikorski and former Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek. But crucially, the core group of Polish norm entrepreneurs also included communist-era apparatchiks, which, unlike in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, belonged to the inner circle of the

missionaries rather than to the outer belt of the converts: the most prominent one was president Aleksander Kwasniewski. Hence, in Poland, missionaries came from the political right, but also from the political left; from the ranks of Solidarity as well as from the middle echelons of the communist regime. The "rainbow coalition" was less tightly-knit than its counterparts in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: indeed, we can speak of two "nuclei" of missionaries, with conservatives and social democrats – or "hawks" – on the one hand and liberals – or "doves" – on the other hand. Due to the presence of the two "nuclei", communication within the core group of missionaries was less intense than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but importantly, the hawks' and the doves' political agendas were almost fully aligned.

Democratic globalism dictates non-appeasement in the face of autocracy – twice as fiery if the regime in question is rumoured to be getting cosy with terrorist groups – hence, during the Iraq crisis, Polish missionaries argued, above all, in favour of the strategic and normative commitment to overthrow Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. Yet the *micro-narratives* for this course of action – and the *framing* used to justify it – varied between the "hawks" and the "doves": while the former mainly alluded to reputational concerns and the need to cement the Polish-American relationship[344], the latter kept bringing up the argument of humanitarian intervention, strengthened by the reference to the US's role of "global policeman".[345] Speaking for the "hawks",

344 Rotfeld 2011; Kwasniewski 2011; Sikorski 2011; Waszczykowski, W., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 31.5.

345 Michnik 2011; Smolar 2011

President Aleksander Kwasniewski says today: "When we decided to support the US in Iraq, they called us a 'Trojan donkey'. But if we wanted to be perceived as good allies, we had to be successful advocates of the interests of our partners."[346] In the same breath, Adam Rotfeld insists that the Iraq War was a "credibility test" for the Poles at a time when commitments stemming from NATO membership and the war on terror were still relatively new for them.[347] For the "doves" among Polish missionaries, the strike against the Ba'athists was not only about Polish-American alliance but also about moral obligations intertwined with civilisational pertinence. Adam Michnik, one of the most spirited missionaries, recalls what he thought of the Ba'athists at the time: "You know, the regime of Saddam Hussein was a cross-breed between Hitler and Stalin, a horrible undemocratic regime. It wasn't unusual at the time to yell 'let's rid the world of Saddam Hussein'."[348] Fellow dissident Bronislaw Geremek, an advocate of humanitarian intervention sanctioned by the UN who supported the unilateral strike with reservations as a "lesser evil"[349] wrote in the immediate aftermath of the invasion that the institution needed to reform itself to be able to better respond to similar crises: "A glaring contradiction exists between the universality and supremacy of human rights and the principles of sovereignty and

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346 Kwasniewski 2011

347 Rotfeld 2011

348 Michnik 2011

349 See Michnik, A., 2003. Nie bylo wyboru. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 21.3; Taras, R., 2004. With Us or Against Us. Poland's Diplomatic Misadventure in Iraq. *Problems of Post-Communism* 51(1):3-17

non-interference in states' internal affairs, which are also enshrined in UN documents. One way to overcome this chasm is to introduce into the UN Charter a new chapter devoted to human rights and to reformulate Chapter IV, which concerns the use of force in international relations."[350]

The micro- opportunity structure for the entrepreneurship of these norms was very favourable in the run up to the invasion of Iraq, as the Polish foreign policy arena teemed with advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in favour of intervention in Iraq: their *structural power* was unshakeable. They were, of course, most abundant among opinion-makers: in the media, good examples include *Gazeta Wyborcza*'s editor in chief Adam Michnik and the same newspaper's Washington correspondent Bartosz Weglarczyk, senior foreign affairs columnist Marek Ostrowski at the leading weekly *Polityka*, programme director at the *Polish Radio* Eugeniusz Smolar and *Rzeczpospolita's* Washington correspondent Krzysztof Darewicz. In the non-governmental sector, they penetrated leading think-tanks and NGOs, including the *Centre for International Relations* (CSM) (chairman Janusz Reiter, Janusz Onyszkiewicz), *Polish Institute for International Affairs* (PISM) (director Ryszard Stemplowski), *Euro-Atlantic Association* (Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Tadeusz Chabiera), *Stefan Batory Foundation* (Aleksander Smolar), *Polish-American Freedom Foundation* (PAFW) (Jerzy Kozminski) and *Institute for Public Affairs* (ISP) (Jacek Kucharczyk, Lena Kolarska-Bobinska). Moreover, norm entrepreneurs could also be found in the academia: most notably Bronislaw Geremek at the College of Europe,

350 Geremek, B., 2003. Justifying Humanitarian Intervention. Project Syndicate. 5.5

Warsaw, Jerzy Buzek at the Polonia University, Czestochowa and Zbigniew Lewicki at the Centre for American Studies, Warsaw University, Warsaw. Crucially, leading opposition parties were also thick-sown with missionaries and converts, not least because they originated in the Solidarity movement and the *Solidarity Electoral Action* bloc (AWS), which led the Polish government in 1997-2011. In 2002-2003, both the *Civic Platform* (PO) and the *Law and Justice Party* (PiS) were headed by politicians – Donald Tusk and the Kaczynski brothers – who abode by the norms examined here.

Even more importantly, however, norm entrepreneurship had by 2003 borne fruit among relevant Polish decision-makers: true, some of them were recruited directly from the nucleus of missionaries, but crucially, many Polish decision-makers had become, by their own admission, converts to the norms discussed here by the time that the Iraq crisis was in full swing.[351] Almost all institutions with *structural power* in the foreign policy-making realm had been infiltrated: the presidency, the Prime Minister's office, the foreign and defense ministries, the National Security Council (BBN) as well as the US and NATO embassies. The most prominent converts occupied top executive positions: Prime Minister Leszek Miller, foreign minister Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz and defense minister Jerzy Szmajdzinski as well as BBN chief Marek Siwiec, all from the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD. Interestingly, numerous converts could also be found in the ranks of diplomats, many of whom had

351 Kwasniewski 2011; Miller 2011; Rotfeld 2011; Towpik, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 2.6; Nowak, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 28.5; Kobieracki, A., 2011. Interview with author. Vienna, 30.6.

been trained under communism; a good example is Jerzy M. Nowak, NATO ambassador during the Iraq crisis, Andrzej Towpik, his predecessor and then-undersecretary of state for defense policy at the defense ministry and Adam Kobieracki, director of the security policy department at the foreign ministry. US ambassador Przemyslaw Grudzinski, originally a historian, was another influential diplomat that had converted to norms: during the Iraq crisis, he served as Poland's ambassador to the US. In addition to the converts, the community of Polish decision-makers in the months preceding the strike against Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime was also thick-sown by heavy-weight missionaries, including President Aleksander Kwasniewski and undersecretary of state at the foreign ministry Adam Rotfeld. To conclude, the strategic positioning of advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in institutions with *structural power*, as well as their heavy presence in the foreign policy-making community overall, created a favourable opportunity structure for the norms enactment in foreign policy ahead of the crucial decisions on Iraq.

Figure 4.3: Polish decision-makers during the Iraq War: structural power



4.6.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

In the wake of the Iraq War, foreign policy discourse in Poland resonated with some of the abovementioned *micro-narratives,* but unlike in the Czech Republic or Slovakia, it also revolved around economic incentives. Foreign minister Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz spoke both about the need to depose an "arrogant Saddam who had for years humiliated the international community"[352] and the plan to use cheap Iraqi oil to diversify Poland's energy sources. Adam Rotfeld and Adam Kobieracki, who both

352 Gazeta Wyborcza, 2003. 29.3

held top posts at the foreign ministry in 2003, admit today that the ministry used the rhetoric of freedom and democracy to imbue the discourse with a normative rationale for the war, but it was equally interested in seeking security guarantees and business contracts in return for helping Washington topple the dictator in Baghdad.[353] The atmosphere at the defense ministry was similar: "We were too preoccupied with deciding which combat units to send to Iraq to think about freedom, though we knew that its pursuit was behind the whole operation [Iraqi Freedom]," says former NATO ambassador Andrzej Towpik, who served as under-secretary of state for defense policy at the time of the invasion.[354] Back in Washington, ambassador Grudzinski also drew references to both "shared values" and "investment in international security": tellingly, he wrote in an widely quoted article dated xx 2003 that Poland wanted to send a strong message that it is a trustworthy and reliable ally.[355] But by far the greatest "bilingualist" was president Aleksander Kwasniewski himself: the attitude expressed in his claim "if it is George Bush's view, then it is mine"[356] bears strong resemblance to the loyal – if not servile – stance of Mikulas Dzurinda in Slovakia. But in contrast to Dzurinda, who displayed a deep conviction to norms both politically and personally, Kwasniewski had the tendency to only speak the language

353 Kobieracki 2011; Rotfeld 2011

354 Towpik 2011

355 Grudzinski, P., 2004. Poland's Accession to the EU and Its Impact on U.S.-Polish Relations. Council of American Ambassadors. *The Ambassadors' Review*.

356 Rupnik 2003

of norms at public occasions. "Poland found out sixty-four years ago what passive pacifism can lead to," he roared during a post-war speech at the Nobel Institute, pushing the limits of his credibility by implying that Iraq posed as great as a security threat as the Third Reich.[357] Privately, he admits that supporting the Americans was a strategic decision.[358] Some critics go as far as to say that with two years left in office, the president used norms instrumentally, as he was bracing himself for an appointment to a prestigious international post.[359] Interestingly, Prime Minister Leszek Miller remains consistent in his account of the events leading up to the Iraq War: even seven years on, he talks of a "ruthless dictator" that had to be removed with the same conviction that echoed in his speech to the Sejm on March 26, 2003: "The way that the Iraq conflict will be resolved will….decide [the character of] international relations in the coming years; it will decide the values that we will build our future upon."[360] Rhetoric should not fool you, some Polish analysts suggest today. The socialist establishment's decision to go to Iraq was mainly motivated by reputational concerns: to prove that it was no longer communist, it allegedly had to be

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357 Kwasniewski, A., 2003. Nim wojna zapuka do drzwi. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. 19.9. (The speech was given at the Nobel Institute in Oslo on September 16 under a different title: "Jak wygrac pokoj we wspolczesnym swiecie—polski punkt widzenia" (How to Win Peace in Today's World—The Polish View")

358 Kwasniewski 2011

359 Tchorek 2011; Taras 2004

360 Miller, L., 2003. Speech in Sejm. 26.3

more zealous than the Polish right.[361]

Since decision-makers – even the missionaries among them – were less consistent in their use of *framing* before Warsaw announced that it was joining the "coalition of the willing", it makes less sense to account for the *disputes* with rivals here. Nevertheless, a brief excursion to the camp of pacifists is in order. There were isolated cases of radical opposition to the Iraq War among senior foreign policy-makers who adhered to a different set of foreign policy norms based on multilateralism, Euro-enthusiasm, scepticism toward the US and engagement, rather than eschewal, of Russia: Roman Kuzniar, head of the Strategy and Planning Department at the Foreign Ministry, even resigned from his prestigious post to demonstrate his disapproval with the government's decision to support the American superpower's risky venture in order to remain in the "biggest bully's" good graces. Kuzniar is adamant that he knew from the beginning that the Americans were "lying" about the true reasons for invading Saddam Hussein's Iraq. "Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld – it sufficed to look at them, who they are, gangsters."[362] Some members of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), a junior partner in the coalition government, expressed a similar view: seven MPs voted against the dispatch of troops to Iraq; 21 decided not to vote at all. Apart from the relatively rare individual cases in the mainstream, opposition to the Polish forces' participation in the Iraq War mainly rested with parties on the fringes of the political spectrum: the far-right *League of Polish Families* (LPR) and far-left *Self-Defense*

361 Gniazdowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 12.5; Tchorek 2011

362 Kuzniar 2011

(Samooborona). Three days before the Sejm debate on Poland's official position on the Iraq issue, the latter's MPs even staged a protest outside the parliament building, carrying banners demanding that Kwasniewski and Miller be sent to Iraq if they wanted to fight. Expert opinions and evidence of populist behaviour in the past suggests that these two parties snubbed the war because of short-term political gains, rather than alternative norms.[363] Overall, this section indicates that on in addition to *structural power*, proponents of "dissident geopolitics" in Poland also possessed discursive power, in the sense that they were relatively *undisputed.* Participation in the "coalition of the willing" seemed to be a matter of national consensus. Hence, *persuasive framing* based on norms was less necessary than in the case of the Czech Republic.

4.6.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

Poland's foreign policy output reflected the over-powering consensus in the foreign policy-making community: in the face of such homogeneity, the contribution of norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" to the articulation as well as the enforcement of the pro-American stance on Iraq is difficult to isolate. Nevertheless, it can at least be shown that key decisions were taken by policy-makers identified as missionaries and converts to the normative framework examined in this dissertation. The "Letter of Eight" was signed without much fuss, despite the damage to the

363 Zaborowski 2011; Kucharczyk 2011; Sienkiewicz, B., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 30.5.

personal rapport between Prime Minister Leszek Miller and German chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder, who then singled out Poland in his criticism of the initiative.[364] Poland also contributed the greatest number of soldiers to the MNF than all other CEE countries combined, after a resounding approval of the Sejm.[365] During the debate on Poland's military contribution, it was convert Jerzy Szmajdzinski, the defense minister, and missionary Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the president of the Law and Justice Party, who were particularly vocal in their criticism of the initial plan to send in only 200 troops. A week before the crucial vote in the Sejm, Kaczynski told Polish radio that, "…a country of 40 million sending 200 servicemen does not put itself in the best possible light."[366] In the end, Poland was the only CEE state to participate in the invasion, contributing the originally envisioned 200 troops from the special operations unit (GROM). When peace-keeping replaced combat, the Polish army contingent was extended to 2500 troops: more than the soldiers of all CEE countries combined. Moreover, Poland was the only state besides the US and the UK to administer a stabilisation sector in Iraq. Poles commanded a force of 9000 men in the Multinational Division Central-South. In sum, the Polish case has shown that in the context of a compelling macro-structure and under the conditions of norm entrepreneurs' *structural power,* there is less need for *framing* that attempts to evoke established notions of what is "good" and "appropriate", to boost the *resonance* of a

364 Lansford & Tashev 2005

365 Sejm, 2003. Vote in Session no.44. 26.3.

366 *Polish Radio 1*, 2003. 18.3.

foreign policy line. Norms serve as an intervening variable, giving a stamp of approval to a course of action that most probably would have been followed regardless, due to material incentives.

4.7. Conclusion: in America we trust

The first crusade was a candid tribute to norms as well as a vigorous defense of the US in the aftermath of 9/11. To a varying degree, the foreign policy line of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia during the Iraqi crisis expressed these states' commitment – devotion, even – to the set of norms that has been conceptualised here as "dissident geopolitics". When it comes to evaluating the three states' tangible input into operation "Iraqi Freedom", the Czechs' and Slovaks' military contribution was modest, while the Poles' involvement in combat and peace-keeping was quite clearly driven by incentives, as well as norms. Yet, the political support for the US – a policy response appropriate to the three states' structural position and material capabilities, expressed in both discourse and policy output – was solid, and it was, by various decision- and opinion-makers' own admission, motivated by the constitutive norms of "dissident geopolitics". Critics of the constructivist argument might raise the reasonable objection that though Prague, Warsaw and Bratislava stood by Washington, they also did not do any more than they "had to"; on these grounds, it would make sense to package and label their foreign policy as classic or "soft" band-wagoning with the sole superpower in a relatively stable equilibrium of uni-polarity. But it is important not to discount the three states' "starting position" – e.g. cost-benefit calculation of optimal foreign policy – which, with the exception of Poland,

dictated non-action, neutrality, rather than action, backing of the US. When evaluating the role that foreign policy norms played in decision-making during the Iraqi crisis, it is important to realise that in a relatively radical departure from neo-realist expectations about small state behaviour, policymakers in the Czech Republic and Slovakia decided to be active rather than passive, venturesome rather than cautious. Poland is, admittedly, a simpler or more probable case, as interests and norms reinforced one another. Interviews with leading foreign policy-makers at the time indicate that norms significantly eased the Poles' "reading" of the situation.

The macro-structural vacuum – absence of compelling security and material interests – in which the normative framework of "dissident geopolitics" operated in the run up to the Iraq War provides instructive lessons for further inquiry into the role of norms in the foreign policy of the three states and interesting pointers ahead of the analysis of the other two cases considered here: the Orange Revolution and the Russia Reset. The preliminary conclusions from the first comparison of Czech, Slovak and Polish foreign policy discourse and output suggests that a dividing line – albeit perhaps merely a dashed one at this stage – can be drawn between the two small states and Poland as the regional power. Norms seem to be serving as an intervening, rather than independent, variable in the latter. For Poland, there were more security and economic incentives, as well as fewer international and domestic costs, involved in joining the coalition of the willing. Poland was also keenly courted by giants led by the US, which seemed over-eager to make it one of the main stake-holders in the risky Iraq venture, Great Britain and Australia. This does not necessarily mean that norms played a smaller role: arguably, strong interests may ease the establishment of a broader normative consensus.

The first hypothesis therefore holds:

H2a. The effect of "dissident geopolitics" will be weaker in situations involving strong(er) security and material interests.

Therefore, the second hypothesis has also been confirmed:

H2b. The better the access of relevant norm entrepreneurs to domestic decision-makers – *structural power* – and the greater their clout vis-à-vis other norm entrepreneurs – in other words, the extent to which their framing *resonates* – the higher the influence of norms on foreign policy outcomes.

Lastly, norms seem to have stronger effects on foreign policy when norm entrepreneurs are consistent in their normative considerations and convictions. The analysis in the chapter has revealed that in the Czech Republic, where norm entrepreneurs were committed to "dissident geopolitics", norms resonated, whereas in Poland, where norm entrepreneurs abode by both dissident geo-politics and various interests, norms left a less resounding echo.

The final hypothesis has also been supported by the empirical evidence:

H2c. The persistence of "dissident geopolitics" will depend on the consistency of the norm entrepreneurs' normative convictions, the norms' capacity to endure turnover of personnel and on the persistence of structural conditions preventing the rise of challengers to relevant norm entrepreneurs.

Yet the conclusions remain tentative. The following two case studies, Orange Revolution and the Russia Reset, where macro-structure will present a greater challenge than in the Iraq War, will put the hypotheses to a further, much-needed test.

How well do norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" fare when security and economic inducements, international and domestic risks and rival norm entrepreneurs threaten to overwhelm them?

5. Chapter 5. Orange Revolution: the "Neighbourhood Crusade" (2004)

5.1. Introduction: coalition of the willing?

In contrast to the allied venture in distant Iraq, CEE states' crusade for democracy in neighbouring Ukraine at the time of the Orange Revolution seemed less counterintuitive, given the compelling security and economic enticements involved. Norm entrepreneurs hailing from Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw led the way in condemning—with notable chutzpah—the outgoing president Leonid Kuchma and his designated successor Viktor Yanukovych for electoral fraud, and steered their diplomatic clout at home, in the EU and the U.S. towards brokering a deal between the unrepentant establishment and the equally adamant opposition. They made a decisive contribution to the resolution of the stalemate and, by extension, the subsequent triumph of democratic forces led by Viktor Yushchenko in the repeated, this time free and fair, second round of the presidential poll. Yet, in so doing, they were also "helping" themselves to what they hoped would be a more stable, prosperous and democratic neighbourhood. To what extent can norm entrepreneurship explain the decision of Central European elites to throw support behind the coalition of self-proclaimed democrats in Ukraine? Moreover, did the string of pro-orange political signals follow foreign policy decisions that were as spontaneous and unanimous as the media fathomed them to be?

Advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in all three countries played a key role in setting the tone of the discourse and using structural power to push policy-makers over the

tipping point, towards declaring support for the orange camp at a time when it was not at all clear what the response should be, as events unfolded and tensions escalated. Within the broader framework of this dissertation, the Central and East Europeans' decision to back pro-democratic forces in Ukraine showcases the *persuasive power* of norm entrepreneurs, who managed to reframe and reconstitute their governments' perceptions of national interest. The remote Iraq War served as a "critical case" isolating and testing the explanatory weight of norms under the conditions of low security and economic incentives. The Orange Revolution, however, took place in the CEE states' neighbourhood, where security and economic concerns loomed large. Hence, the case will reveal how well "soft power" arguments based on norms fare when confronted with "hard power" considerations and uncover potential interaction effects. Moreover, the intimate geography of the Ukrainian tumult will introduce another competing explanation, which was not as prominent in the case of Iraq: domestic politics. Greater polarisation around and livelier debate on the Orange Revolution complicated the work of norm entrepreneurs, as the pool of well-framed narratives justifying different foreign policy courses was greater, which means that discursive competition was tougher. This setting will show whether norm entrepreneurs succeed or fail when they are *more disputed.*

This neighbourhood crusade differs from the allied one in the case of Iraq in at least three crucial respects. Geopolitically, the Czechs, the Poles and the Slovaks were dealing with "havoc in their backyard". Politically, they were leaders, not followers: the diplomatic effort that they channelled into supporting Ukrainian demonstrators was not spearheaded by other, mightier actors on the world stage, namely the EU or the US, who were reactive rather than proactive in this case. Economically, the Czech

Republic, and especially Poland and Slovakia, were infinitely more vulnerable and thus structurally constrained in their political choices at the time of the Orange Revolution, given Ukraine's role as a transit hub for Russian gas. They faced the real danger that if they bet the wrong way, they might have to negotiate with alienated, and potentially capricious, partners from both Kiev and Moscow in winters to come. Thus, whether or not to endorse the claims of the "orange-clad" protesters on Kiev's Independence Square and across Ukraine was not at all a straightforward choice. Interests in Ukraine and norms did not simply add up, as competing interests had to be factored in as well. Hence, it seemed at first that the three countries could not, as they did in Iraq, act with the same pro-democratic enthusiasm that had annoyed some of their West European partners. In the end, the case for the neighbourhood crusade was made. This chapter will demonstrate that the Czech, Polish and Slovak policy-makers were convinced—in part, by advocates of "dissident geopolitics"—that they should act as "brothers in arms", not only because it was "good" and "appropriate" but also self-interestedly "beneficial" in the long run, and thus worth short-term risks.

Like in the previous chapter on the "allied crusade", the analysis of the "neighbourhood crusade" will be dispensed in two tranches. The account and assessment of norm entrepreneurship in Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy discourse and output will be preceded by an examination of the so-called "macro-structure" of security and economic interests and a breakdown of the "micro-structure" of domestic politics, focused on gauging the *structural power* and *access* of norm entrepreneur groups to key stakeholders in the course of the Orange Revolution. Overall, this chapter will attempt to establish which norm entrepreneurial faction(s) ended up wielding influence on top-level decision-makers, and why: whether it was

the choice of frame, gate-keeping structures, or simply the original security and economic interests reinforced through interpretative action. In so doing, it will shed more light on the different degrees of support rendered to the protesters on the Independence Square by governments and foreign services of the different CEE states, addressing the question: to what extent does the theory of norm entrepreneurship aid our conceptual understanding of the Czechs', Poles' and Slovaks' patterns of foreign policy-making at the time of the coloured revolutions?

5.2. Czech Republic: standard bearers

In the course of the Orange Revolution, the elsewhere-engaged crusaders from the Czech Republic provided ad hoc, mainly rhetorical, backing to the democratic forces fighting for a free and fair re-run of the rigged presidential vote in Ukraine. Their Eastern and Northeastern neighbours from Poland and Slovakia ploughed on with much more noticeable vigour. Given the Czech Republic's stellar record as a long-time champion of freedom in much more obscure areas, such as Burma or Cuba—or Ukraine's troubled neighbour Belarus, for that matter— the foreign policy outcome might seem somewhat surprising. The costs were notably lower for the landlocked country, nested safely in the EU's core. "Soft" security risks associated with cross-border diffusion were not an issue, and disincentives related to trade and transit of energy supplies, as well as the concomitant "Russian threat," only played a minor role in the decision-making process, as Czech policy-makers readily admit today.

But the "positive" stage of the cost-benefit analysis-involving potential "booty" suggests that while the Czech Republic might have had less to lose, it also had less to

gain from frontline marching to the rescue of the wronged masses of Ukrainian voters on the Independence Square. In terms of *reputational* gains, the Czechs did not perceive them to be as substantial as did the Poles, who had regional and European ambitions, or the Slovaks, who still sought to polish up their somewhat tarnished record as Central European "foot-draggers". The Czechs' moral credit ranked high already due to their frenetic activity on the human rights and democracy fronts elsewhere around the world, and tellingly in more brutish regimes than in Ukraine. In terms of *reputational* concerns related to alliance politics, the Czechs also did not seem as eager to mimic American efforts in strife-ridden Ukraine as they seemed focused on other, equally important, targets of G.W. Bush's "freedom agenda" in the post-Soviet space, namely Belarus. Economic incentives were also scarcer. Due to its geographical location, the Czech Republic had understandably enjoyed less economic interaction with Ukraine before 2004 than Poland or Slovakia.

Subsequent self-descriptions of Czech foreign policy output at the time of the Orange Revolution often feature the phrase "missed opportunity".[367] While joining the "neighbourhood crusade" would have fitted nicely with the country's broader democracy promotion agenda, inertia among the decision-makers and distraction among the opinion-makers blended to create a muffled response to the camber of the orange forces against the dictatorship of the blue. Crucially, the Czechs' usual "dissident geopolitics", championed, to varying degrees, by several groups of norm entrepreneurs, did not designate Ukraine as one of the hotspots in the global struggle

367 For instance, Schwarzenberg 2011; Svoboda, C., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 1.4.

against the "evil" of authoritarianism, which immediately hindered the emergence of a powerful narrative for the Orange Revolution.

The questions to be addressed by the upcoming sections include: what part do norms play in the articulation of national interest in the Czech Republic when they are coupled with security and economic incentives? The case of Iraq has already shown that they can be influential in a macro-structural vacuum. But what happens when norm entrepreneur networks within norm entrepreneur states choose to apply norms selectively?

Table 5.1: Attitudes of leading Czech political parties toward the Orange Revolution

Political party	Government/Opposition	Evaluation of Orange Revolution
CSSD (social democrats)	Government (senior)	Positive
KDU-CSL (Christian democrats)	Government (junior)	Positive
US-DEU (liberals)	Government (junior)	Neutral
ODS (civic democrats)	Opposition	Positive
KSČM (communists)	Opposition	Negative

5.2.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

By disentangling the bundle of material incentives and disincentives in Ukraine and Russia, this section attempts to crack the puzzle of the Czechs' foreign policy of "hushed reassurances" to the crowd of disenchanted protesters with orange scarves, banners and flags on Kiev's Independence Square at the time of the Orange Revolution. It will be argued that though Prague, which held back more than Warsaw or Bratislava, was interested in crusader "booty", guarded, rather than head-on, action

was perceived as a shorter, or more direct, route towards securing it.

Economically, the Czech Republic, a keen explorer of Ukrainian markets, sought to maximise its investment opportunities, but it was unclear whether the victory of the orange forces would facilitate or hamper these efforts. In 2003-2004, Ukraine, with Belarus and Moldova, was re-identified as a "traditional" destination for Czech exports, which faltered after the downfall of the Soviet Union due to stalled reforms, restrictive macroeconomic policy and the fiscal crisis in Russia, but started swelling again in the decade following NATO accession.[368] Ukraine's post-1998 recovery—GDP grew by 50% in merely six years—and the Orange Revolution potentially spelled a pro-Western orientation and thus WTO membership as well as harmonisation with the EU's regulatory frameworks and structural reforms. Czech officials concede that these developments raised high hopes for even more dynamism in mutual economic exchange.[369] Accordingly, *CzechTrade*, the export and investment expert subsidiary of the Czech Republic's industry and trade ministry, which opened its first offices abroad in 1999, in six countries including Ukraine, increased the frequency of seminars for prospective investors.[370] Prague wanted to

368 Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, 2006. Export Strategy of the Czech Republic for 2006-2010. Government document; Government of the Czech Republic, 2003. Concept of Pro-export Policy 2003-2006. Government document; Government of the Czech Republic, 2004. Strategy for Sustainable Development. Government document.

369 Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, 2009. Prospective Domains for Export to Ukraine. Government document.

370 CzechTrade, 2005. Ukraine: the Neglected Partner, New Possibilities for Cooperation. Seminar

increase the overall turnover: accounting for a minuscule share of less than 1% of Czech exports, Ukraine had always lingered at the bottom of the heap of trading partners. Russia traditionally surpassed it by at least ten rungs on the ranking ladder.[371]

Penetration of the Ukrainian market did, to a certain extent, deepen after the Orange Revolution. In terms of both trade and investment, the Czech Republic embarked on a steep hike upward, as Table 5.1 demonstrates. A couple of years later, Ukraine was labeled "high-priority" in the new export strategy, along with great powers such as the U.S., BRICs, regional heavyweights Mexico, Egypt, Turkey and Vietnam as well as post-communist counterparts including Kazakhstan and Serbia.[372] In strategic documents, the ministry visibly increased the frequency of quoting the post-Soviet space as the region with the most "interesting" investment opportunities. Between 2009-2010 alone, Czech exports to Ukraine crept up by 20%, though to be fair, they rose even more quickly in Belarus (68%), Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Moldova, and Georgia (30%).[373] The automotive industry, and within in it the

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and Educational Course.

371 Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, 2009. Yearbook of Czech Foreign Trade. Government document.

372 Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, 2011. Key Markets and Domains for Czech Export in Priority Countries. Government document.

373 Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, 2011. Czech Exports Successfully Swelling to Most CIS Countries. Archive. 17.5.

flagship Czech carmaker Skoda, as well as pharmaceutical companies, led the way: Skoda alone accounted for more than 11.24 % Czech exports to Ukraine.[374]

In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine also became a recipient of Czech development aid, along with a hand-picked group of other target countries, including Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iraq, Kosovo, Cuba, Moldova, Myanmar and Serbia.[375] The projects, which focused on clean energy, given Ukraine's legacy of the Chernobyl catastrophe and Prague's undying love affair with nuclear power, included a string of twinning exercises centred on ecological auditing, one of the EU's areas of interest in the sector.[376]

Table 5.2: Foreign trade turnover between the Czech Republic and Ukraine after the Orange Revolution (2004-2008)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Import	14,502,8	16,449,9	14741,0	14408,9	19,324,3
Export	11882,3	16,936,5	14,471,0	14,408,9	19,324,3
Turnover	26385,1	33,386,4	36394,2	38,379,3	44,375,6
Balance	- 2620,5	486,6	6912,2	9561,5	5727,0

374 Bussinessinfo.cz, 2012. Companies and Joint Ventures in Trade and Other Areas of Economic Cooperation. In: Ukraine – Trade and Economic Cooperation with the Czech Republic. 1.4.

375 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2005. Conception of Transformational Policy and Description of the Program of Transformational Policy (TRANS). Government document

376 Ibid

Table 5.3: Foreign investment of the Czech Republic in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution (2004-2010)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Investment volume	42744.3	46937.4	46824.8	53785.5	78181.6	80371.4	79786.2
Dynamics of development	3221.03	4191.6	-112.7	6960.7	24396.1	2189.8	-446.7
Number of investors	305	313	334	351	395	431	432

Source: Ukrainian Embassy in the Czech Republic based on data provided by the Statistical Office of Ukraine, in 1,000 of USD

In hindsight, the Czechs fulfilled their objectives despite, rather than due to, changes brought about by Viktor Yushchenko's victory in 2004. For instance, while the country's overall Doing Business Indicators, as measured by the World Bank[377], improved, the disintegration of the orange contingent and its descent into endless bickering slowed down the planned second round of privatisation—the parliament aimed high, for as many as 577 companies in 2007— which had naturally sparked interest in the Czech Republic.[378]

Further to the economic (dis-)incentives for engagement in the Orange Revolution, Prague also had to reflect on Moscow's interests before orange could be designated as the "face paint" for Czech ministers and diplomats. During the decade of economic transition dubbed "wild capitalism", Russian companies had taken advantage of the massive and, at the same time, obscure privatisation processes in the Czech Republic

377 The World Bank, 2012. Doing Business. Economy profile: Ukraine.

378 Czech Consulate, Kiev, 2006. General Territorial Information: Ukraine.

to stock up on shares in key sectors of the local economy, retaining most noticeable influence in the energy sector. Like Poland and Slovakia, the Czech Republic had also "inherited" the communist-era dependency on Russian oil and gas, albeit a bit lower, at approximately 70%. Yet greater awareness of associated risks and a more committed pursuit of diversification, labeled "high priority" in most strategic documents dating from 1993 onwards, made the Czechs less vulnerable to the whims of the Russians, who had by then perfected the martial practice of using their sought-after resources as a political weapon.[379] In the 1990s, the Czech government made several key decisions to diversify the structure of supply and to increase domestic power-generating capacity, including building the IKL oil pipeline to reduce the dependency on Druzhba, contracting supplies of Norwegian gas and completing the Temelin nuclear power plant, to name but a few examples. Since the Czech Republic enjoyed a greater degree of energy security than the rest of the Central European countries, how Moscow would react to Prague's endorsement of the demands of the revolutionaries in Kiev was not as much of an issue as it was in Warsaw or Bratislava.[380]

379 Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, 2004. State Energy Conception of the Czech Republic. Government Document.

380 Svoboda, K., 2011. Interview with author. Prague., 3.3.

Table 5.4: Foreign trade turnover between the Czech Republic and Russia (1995-2005)

	1995	2000	2005
Import/share	16 726 / 3.5 %	14 915 / 1.3 %	33 646 / 1.8 %
Export/share	49 778 / 7.5 %	80 237 / 6.5 %	104 598 / 5.8 %
Balance	-33 052	-65 322	-70 952

Source: Czech Statistical Office, in millions of CZK[381]

And indeed, post-2004 developments indicate that at least from the trade and energy standpoint, the Czech Republic's relations with Russia did not suffer, even though the former invested modestly in the "wrong" crowd of Ukrainians during the Orange Revolution. The mutual economic exchange was too enmeshed and Czech energy supply too diversified for Moscow to attempt "revenge" by cutting its deliveries or raising prices, as it had previously done elsewhere. Following the Orange Revolution, the two countries institutionalised their bilateral cooperation by establishing an inter-governmental committee. Foreign trade turnover increased, and Czech exports to Russia ballooned (see table 5.2). Oil and gas deliveries, which continued to comprise nearly 80% of total imports from Russia, remained steady, except for an unexpected, yet relatively smoothly-solved, disruption in 2008.[382] The Czech Republic's dependency on Gazprom and Transneft's goodwill decreased, as the Czech government continued to make strides in boosting domestic power-generating

381 Czech Statistical Office, 2006. Yearbook. Foreign Trade. Table 11: Foreign Trade with Selected States

382 The 2008 disruption occurred at the height of negotiations regarding the installation of a US radar base in Czech Republic unwelcomed by the Russians. Russian officials cited "technical reasons" as the driver behind the dramatic 50 percent reduction in oil supply.

capacity and increasing the utilisation of the IKL pipeline.[383] Russian investors did maintain a presence on the Czech energy market—Lukoil started supplying the Prague airport[384] and Atomstroyeksport applied for the completion of two additional reactors at the Temelin nuclear power plant—but the degree of diversification increased overall.[385] In conclusion, it seems that in the context of the Orange Revolution, the Czech Republic had fewer Russia-related material disincentives to engage, which, theoretically, should have made the norm entrepreneurs' case to do so easier to argue.

Table 5.5: Foreign trade turnover between the Czech Republic and Russia, 2007-2011

	2007	2009	2011
Import	5 626,0	5 399,9	8 099,2
Export	2 870,4	2 621, 2	5 219,8
Balance	-2 758,7	-2 778,8	-2 879,4

Source: Czech Statistical Office, in USD m

383 Nosko, A., Lang, P., 2010. Lessons from Prague: How the Czech Republic Has Enhanced its Energy Security. Journal of Energy Security. 26.7

384 Czech Radio, Channel 7, 2010. Investment in the Czech Republic: More American, Faster-growing Russian. 8.4

385 The Prague Post, 2012. Temelin Nuclear Tender Deadline Looms. 4.4

5.2.2. Micro-structure: structural power

The micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship in the Czech Republic ahead of the Orange Revolution seemed slightly less favourable than in Poland or Slovakia. Internationally, the bitter after-taste of the "allied crusade" in Iraq left most of the pacifist members of the Czech foreign policy-making community—except for several Atlanticist norm entrepreneurs, the Czechs were fittingly described in chapter 4 as "hesitant reservists"—with a diminished appetite for interventionist exercises beyond borders. Domestically, the collapse of Vladimir Spidla's centre-left government after a poor showing for the senior coalition partner CSSD in the European Parliament elections, especially so shortly after EU accession, focused popular attention on structural problems at home. Catchphrases such as "partocracy" and "state capture" penetrated discourse again with a vengeance.[386] When the orange and blue factions in Ukrainian politics hit a seemingly irreconcilable stalemate, Czech norm entrepreneurs struggled to capture the attention of the political elite and the public alike, despite their *structural power*, of which they wielded a substantial amount.

Among opinion-makers, missionaries speaking out in favour of the "orange-scarved" protesters were abundant. They hailed predominantly from the ex-president Havel's circle of liberal internationalists, i.e. "dovish" advocates of "dissident geopolitics". They penetrated pro-democracy organisations such as Havel's Forum 2000, the

386 *Czech Radio, Channel 6*, 2004. Studio Stop. News and Analysis Programme. 23.2; *iDnes.cz,* 2005. Gross Defends Himself Against Corruption Allegations. 31.8; *Aktualne.cz,* 2011. How Standa Got Lucky Shown by "Corruption in the Czech Republic". 5.5; *BBCCzech.com*, 2004. Interview Programme. Guest: Zdenek Skromach. 8.7

Foundation of Michael Kocab, the local branch of the Open Society Fund, and, above all, the formidable human rights-defending juggernaut, *People in Need*, as well as media outlets including the Czech Republic's incarnation of *The Economist,* the weekly magazine *Respekt* (and its eponymous foundation) backed by Vaclav Havel's close friend Karel Schwarzenberg, and *Transitions Online.*

Interestingly, a niche "sub-culture" had also developed within this contingent of norm entrepreneurs, consisting of dissidents and intellectuals on the political left, such as ex-minister Jiri Dientbier, commentator and later the government's commissioner for human rights Petr Uhl and NYU professor Jiri Pehe, whose genuine, and often deeply personal, commitment to the defense of individual freedom around the world was almost entirely devoid of the latent Russophobia deeply rooted in the psyche of the prototypical Czech human rights champion. Their argument was different in the sense that it was pro-democracy, rather than pro-orange, and covertly sympathetic to Moscow's sensitivities.[387]

Missionaries with opinion-making clout who demonstrated readiness to push for engagement in Ukraine were also recruited from the ranks of "hawkish" proponents of "dissident geopolitics". This niche group of eager supporters of the transatlantic partnership, of which George W. Bush's "freedom agenda" in Eastern Europe seemed to some a cheer-worthy extension, dominated think-tanks such as the Conservative

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387 Pehe, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 14.3; Dienstbier, J., 2010. Official and unofficial Remarks During the Seminar Series at the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford University. 23.5.

Institute, the centre-right *CEVRO* academy, the Ostrava-based *Jagello 2000* and the daily newspaper *Lidove noviny*.

Interestingly, and in contrast to Poland and Slovakia, the Czech Republic lacked a sufficiently respected and prominent group of norm entrepreneurs—be they proponents of "dissident geopolitics" or not—who could also champion the notion of a democratic Ukraine from a knowledge-driven "East European" perspective, rather than a more general freedom/democracy one. With the singular possible exception of the *Association for International Affairs (AMO)*, Czech think-tanks and NGOs had not developed sufficient expertise in Ukrainian affairs. The epistemic community keen on exploring opportunities for "missionary work"—i.e. democracy promotion and "export" of transition know-how—in post-Soviet Eurasia did contain self-identified norm entrepreneurs, but it seemed almost exclusively focused on Belarus, one of the flagships of Czech foreign policy, which even had "its own" single-issue NGO, *Civic Belarus*.

As was the case in opinion-making circles, proponents of "dissident geopolitics" also commanded formidable *structural power* in leading decision-making bodies, such as the foreign and defense ministries and relevant embassies, as well as "advisory" bodies, including the parliament and within it the Senate, in the run up to and during the Orange Revolution in 2003-2004. Some were "hawks", for whom defending democracy in Ukraine equalled to containing Russia and perhaps also ingratiating the U.S., also involved in the campaign for a free and fair re-run of the presidential election featuring Yushchenko and Yanukovich. In the cabinet itself, it is important to mention foreign minister Cyril Svoboda, defense minister Karel Kuhnl, NATO ambassador Karel Kovanda and his soon-to-be successor and external adviser to the

government Jiri Sedivy, as well as ex-dissident and ambassador to Ukraine Karel Stindl. But governmental institutions of *structural power* were also penetrated by "dovish" advocates of "dissident geopolitics", who sympathised with the Ukrainians due to their understanding of democracy as a universal value and partially also "attribution of similarity" between the Velvet Revolution and the Orange Revolution, as will later be shown. The foreign ministry and the Senate represented hubs for "doves", several subordinates of foreign minister Cyril Svoboda, including Jiri Schneider and Havel's former aide, Gabriela Dlouha, as well as senators Petr Pithart, Karel Schwarzenberg and Jan Ruml.

However, rival norm entrepreneur networks, namely the "pragmatists", also occupied positions of *structural power*, complicating the task of advocacy for defenders of "dissident geopolitics". As the crisis in Ukraine unfolded in the autumn of 2004, it became clear that the patulous and intertwined tree of norm entrepreneur groups in the Czech Republic had grown a very strong sprout: the ultra-realist, state-centric, non-interventionist—even isolationist—and business-oriented norm entrepreneur community, personified in the new president, Vaclav Klaus. Also prominent in this new faction was the non-partisan vice-premier for the economy, Martin Jahn, who assumed the coveted position upon stepping down as long-time chief of CzechInvest, the state-run trade and investment agency.

In conclusion, this section suggests that proponents of "dissident geopolitics" wielded enough *structural power* ahead of the Orange Revolution to translate their norms of choice into foreign policy output. It also reveals the extent to which these missionaries could potentially be *disputed* by other norm entrepreneur groups: especially the pragmatists, who controlled the presidency. As chapter 3 indicated in

its more detailed account of the working of *structural power* in the Czech context, the foreign ministry and the presidency tend to compete in the foreign policy-making process, if the nominees on key posts disagree on the course of action that should be taken. Lastly, the section highlighted latent divisions among advocates of "dissident geopolitics": it remains to be seen whether the divergent motivations of "hawks" and "doves" for Czech engagement in strife-ridden Ukraine will complement or contradict each other upon their interpretation into *framing devices.*

Figure 5.1: Czech decision-makers during the Orange Revolution: structural power



5.2.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

Czech foreign policy discourse at the time of the Orange Revolution resonated with universal values and international norms such as human rights and procedural democracy, with an understandable emphasis on free and fair elections. Proponents of "dissident geopolitics" framed their push for engagement both in terms of Atlanticism and *solidarity* with the freedom-fighters on the Independence Square, though there was less of a tendency to perceive the Ukrainians' youth movement Pora ("It's Time") as a brainchild of the Czechoslovak student movement, or draw suspiciously simplistic parallels between 1989 and 2004, as was the case in Poland. While it seemed that the competing meta-narratives evoked by "hawkish" and "dovish" missionaries and their respective flocks of converts drew on divergent motivations, as a whole, the network managed to bridge the gap between factions and send a unified message by highlighting democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool of mutual interest. In essence, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" argued, democracy promotion could be perceived as strategic as well as normative commitment. It was as important for the Czech Republic to support the foreign policy of its allies as it was to secure a democratic outcome of the Ukrainian election.[388]

Yet while this type of *framing* clearly resonated, it was not immediately apparent that it would inspire any meaningful foreign policy response to the Orange Revolution. Opinion- and decision-makers today contend that in 2004, Ukraine was not a priority in the activities of the third sector or official Czech foreign policy. Even within the set

388 For instance, Vondra 2011 (hawkish view), Panek 2011. 22.3 (dovish view).

of policies pursued in the relatively intimate Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus and Moldova, and to a lesser extent the Western Balkans, grabbed the spotlight.[389] "The diplomatic corps as well as the NGOs have limited resources. It would be suicidal and amateurish to try to 'cover' the whole world," concedes activist Igor Blazevic.[390] His colleagues from the *Association of International Affairs* (AMO)*, People in Need* and as several MFA officials also describe Ukraine as a "too big of a mouthful".[391] Hence, in short, relatively powerful *framing* by norm entrepreneurs, who, as has been demonstrated, held *structural power,* clashed with the classic dilemma of a "weak state".

Advocates of "dissident geopolitics" strived to overcome it by concentrating and exercising their *discursive power.* "Doves", especially former anti-communist dissidents and forced émigrés, such as senator Jan Ruml and public intellectual Ivan Gabal, both of whom vigorously endorsed the Ukrainian voters' struggle for the right to choose their rulers, say that they were inspired by emotional, even sentimental, *solidarity* with the "orange-clad" protesters on Kiev's Independence Square because their fervour reminded them of the hours they spent demonstrating on Prague's

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389 Kratochvil, P., Tulets, E., 2007. Uloha Ceske Republic v evropskem sousedstvi. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institute for International Affairs,* Prague. May; Kratochvíl, P., 2007. Existuje ceska vychodni politika? Od uprku z vychodni Evropy k opozdenemu navratu. *Mezinarodni politika*. April; Svoboda 2011; Dlouha 2011

390 Blazevic 2011

391 Various interviews.

Wenceslas Square. "Solidarity should be distinguished from values. We simply, humanly, sympathized," says Gabal today.[392] The notion of solidarity capitalises on a cognitive mechanism that "attributes similarity": these norm entrepreneurs wished to engage Czech officialdom in the "orange-blue" spat because they believed, in a simplified way, that Eastern Europe rocked by revolutionary upheaval in the early 2000s was Central Europe in the late 1980s "2.0". Tomas Pojar and Simon Panek, who succeeded each other at the helm of *People in Need,* explain that to cheer for the demonstrating Ukrainians had a broader aspiration, that of supporting the camber of civil society in yet another "transforming country". After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine made the organisation's list of priority destinations for aid in 2004.[393]

However, going against one of the basic principles of "dissident geopolitics", which favours the "political" incarnation of democracy promotion, the community of Czech norm entrepreneurs did not openly gravitate towards either the orange or the blue camp: it was key, some of them say today, to captivate the public's imagination and create enough momentum to cajole Czech officialdom to express at least rhetorical support for the Ukrainian revolutionaries. "We had to make it about people power. 'No matter which garniture holds the reins, it is important that countries such as Ukraine are stable and democratic.'"[394] According to Vaclav Havel's aide Gabriela Dlouha, the head-on tactic succeeded, as the general populace automatically classified

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392 Gabal, I., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 24.3.

393 Pojar, T., 2010. Interview with author. Oxford/Tel Aviv, 28.5; Panek 2011

394 Pojar 2010

the Orange Revolution as "a rebellion against a dictator, a struggle against a 'neo-Marxist', 'neo-Stalinist' totalitarian regime", even more understandable because of the cultural proximity and the regime similarity. "They could not relate to the 'Arab Spring' as well [as they did to Ukraine]," adds Dlouha with the benefit of hindsight. Vaclav Havel himself described the events in Ukraine as a "revolution against post-communism", implying that the Czech Republic itself suffered from at least some isolated symptoms of the disease.[395] Petr Mares, the Czech Republic's current EU ambassador for the Eastern Partnership, highlights the pervasiveness of the meta-narrative of solidarity in the autumn of 2004: "On our TV screens, we saw the centre of Kiev, and the quality of that piece of information lay only in the fact that we were reminded fifteen times of how similar the atmosphere there was to that of November [1989]."[396]

"Hawkish" opinion-makers used an additional *micro-narrative* to argue in favour of Czech engagement in Ukraine: for them, the Orange Revolution represented an opportunity to get the Czechs on the American radar by portraying the Yushchenko-Yanukovich runoff as a "clash of value systems". Crucially, this use of *discursive power* was leveraged on the government less so than the public, which was fed the

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395 *iHned.cz*, 2005. Havel: Oranzova revoluce byla reakce vuci post-komunismu. 7.4. His social criticism offers yet another take on solidarity: while activists such as Panek would be more inclined to characterize post-communism positively, in terms of the Czech "success story" and "transition know-how", for ex-dissidents, the depiction also had negative connotations, based on the structural weaknesses inherited from the previous regime.

396 *Navychod.cz, 2005*. Oranzova revoluce prokazala, ze Ukrajinci jsou Evropane. Issue 1

storyline of *solidarity*. Policy-makers needed more reasons to act than pure sentiment, and the "hawks", most of whom remained Russophobic, asserted that "Ukrainian issues had always been a subset of the Czech Republic's Russia policy," says Ladislav Mrklas of *CEVRO*, a centre-right think-tank close to the leading conservative-liberal party, ODS. Joining the Americans in backing the "orange-scarved" revolutionaries on the Independence Square, he and others insisted, would send a signal to Russian "political technologists" that Ukraine was not their "turf". Zdenek Pavlacik of *Jagello 2000*, another pro-American organisation close to ODS, who set off to Kiev when the Ukrainian crisis escalated, reiterates that, "The American and Russian approach to the area is the same, albeit with an opposite value-sign. Moral support for the Ukrainians was an extended limb of our core allegiance."[397] This moral support as conceived by the "hawks" often seemed more anti-Russian than pro-Ukrainian. The conservative daily *Lidove noviny* for instance, ran an editorial on November 30th, 2004, entitled "Russia Renders a Helping Gun-Barrel Anytime".

Of the two complementary *micro-narratives*—solidarity and commitment to Euro-Atlantic, and by that norm entrepreneurs often meant anti-Russian, values—"served" to the Czech public and officialdom by opinion-makers, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" among decision-makers seemed to identify more with the latter. It is hardly surprising: the previous section, devoted to *structural power,* revealed that most relevant norm entrepreneurs on key posts were "hawks". The *framing* of the

397 Mrklas, L., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 10.3; Pavlacik, Z., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 15.3.

Orange Revolution corresponded with that: phrases such as "cordon sanitaire", as well as denunciations of Russia's expansionism, set the tone of the discourse, and suggested that the general call for a recount and a rerun, based on the international norms of freedom and democracy, stemmed from a deeper and more open conviction that the poisoned Yushchenko and vociferous Tymoshenko were "in the right"—hence the more open rooting for the "orange team", in the true spirit of "political" democracy promotion. Remarks by Ivan Pocuch from the MOD offer a telling example: "I am not saying that without Russian intervention—mostly use of energy resources as instruments of foreign policy—Ukraine would be a wonderful democracy. But it is evident that Russian methods of foreign policy-making are brutal, having returned to 'good old USSR practices'." [398] For some "hawks", Russophobia went hand in hand with soft Euro-scepticism. Foreign minister Cyril Svoboda filtered his arguments in favour of engagement in Ukraine through criticism of the EU's incremental, iterative approach to democracy promotion in the post-Soviet neighbourhood: "In contrast to the EU, Russia has a strategy: to recreate its empire. And nobody in the EU is willing to publicly define the borders of Europe. The Orange Revolution showed us where Ukraine belonged: into the EU, with us."[399] Yet, tellingly, discussion about Ukraine's EU membership prospects was almost entirely absent in the Czech Republic until the crisis escalated after the rigged second

398 Pocuch 2010

399 Svoboda, M. 2011

round of the presidential vote in 2004.[400]

Discursive competition of the "dissident geopolitics" network with other groups of norm entrepreneurs was not as fierce in the course of the Orange Revolution, namely because their usual arch-nemesis, the pragmatists led by president Vaclav Klaus, seemed generally disinterested in Ukraine and more neutral vis-à-vis their rivals by extension. In a vein that did not directly question the line of *framing* advocated by proponents of "dissident geopolitics", they focused on portraying the Orange Revolution as a window of opportunity for increasing the "traffic" of trade and investment: then-regional development minister Jiri Paroubek, of the social democratic CSSD, says today that in 2004, it was one of the few things that he could agree on with president Vaclav Klaus, who hailed from the opposite side of the political spectrum.[401] Overall, this section suggests that proponents of "dissident geopolitics", despite the bifurcation in the midst of their community, successfully applied two complementary *framing devices* to the Orange Revolution in foreign policy discourse to justify the call for political action. Hence, *frames* can add onto each other to create a cascade of discursive power. Moreover, the section indicates that a mere presence of other norm entrepreneur networks on the foreign policy stage does not necessarily mean that advocates of "dissident geopolitics" are *disputed.* The concrete issues matters, and it seemed that Ukraine did not stir up as much interest

400 Kral, D., 2006. Ceska debata o perspektivach clenstvi Turecka a Ukrajiny v EU. Institut pro evropskou politiku: *Europeum*

401 Paroubek, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 29.4.

among the pragmatists, due to, perhaps, its relatively low hitherto ranking on the Czech Republic's list of trading partners and/or foreign policy priorities.

5.2.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

Hence, in the course of the Orange Revolution, norm entrepreneurs, especially the network most relevant to this dissertation, commanded both *structural* and *discursive power*: how did they translate it into foreign policy output? The string of Czech foreign policy signals to Ukraine in the autumn of 2004—statements, speeches, public appearances, official and unofficial visits—reflected, within the structural constraints of diplomacy and of the country's foreign policy priorities, the discursive framing proffered by relevant norm entrepreneurs. Since Prague had not paid much heed to Kiev in the run up to the Orange Revolution, to expect a strong reaction subsequently seems counterintuitive and, indeed, the Czechs only turned out to be "standard bearers" in the "neighbourhood crusade": in other words, they did not "commit blood and treasure", but rendered only rhetorical and moral support to occupiers of the Independence Square. In the context of Czech foreign policy, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" succeeded in plucking Ukraine out of obscurity. For instance, the Czech Republic started developing its nascent economic interests on Ukraine's underexplored market only after the Orange Revolution. Hence, in this case, non-material motivations, i.e. norms, both "preceded" and "shaped" the understanding of material incentives.

Amidst an otherwise tepid response, the Czech foreign ministry emerged as the most vocal in its strict but balanced reactions to the unfolding events in revolutionary

Ukraine. Ex-dissident and "hawkish" missionary Karel Stindl, who served as ambassador to Ukraine at the time, is credited today by minister Cyril Svoboda himself for convincing him to "look into the Ukrainian situation" even before the presidential vote and encouraging him in the course of the Orange Revolution to evoke the *frame* of Ukraine's European civilisational canonicity in his public remarks.[402] Indeed, minister Svoboda, an otherwise zealous missionary, focused on "carrots" rather than "sticks": in other words, he avoided criticising president Leonid Kuchma and his designated successor Viktor Yanukovich for violations of democratic standards and instead focused on bolstering the credit of the "orange coalition" by raising hopes for Ukraine's future Western integration via repeated references to the country's "Euro-Atlantic identity". In the statement commenting on the rigged second round of the presidential vote, he wrote that, "Like the rest of the EU, I do not believe that these results reflect the will of the Ukrainian people. I have faith that Ukraine will not waste its chance for deeper integration in the main stream of European development."[403] Upon successful conclusion of the "roundtable talks" and the repeated run-off that upheld Viktor Yushchenko's victory, MFA chose to be prudently complimentary, acknowledging the freedom and fairness of the vote but sidestepping congratulations.[404] Norm entrepreneur missionaries including Tomas

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402 Svoboda 2012

403 MFA of the Czech Republic, 2004. Statement of the Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda on the Ukrainian Election. Archive. 25.11.

404 MFA of the Czech Republic, 2004. Statement of the Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda on the Presidential Election in Ukraine. Archive. 28.12.

Pojar of *People in Need* and Petr Kollar and Gabriela Dlouha at the MFA, who helped craft the statement, had agreed that back-patting was a better strategy than shaming if Prague were to help uphold democratic standards.[405]

Moreover, participants and observers from the time acknowledge actors beyond the MFA for maintaining a steady level of pressure on Czech and European foreign policy-makers, through agenda-setting and symbolic gestures. Then-US ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker highlights the positive discursive role of the Czech mission to NATO, which flagged the need to solve the orange-blue deadlock by constantly raising the issue with the diplomatic community, while Slovak and Polish activists interviewed for this dissertation recognise the emblematic "presence" of individual Czech politicians like Green Party senator Jaromir Stetina, who had travelled as a reporter to multiple war zones and revolutionary settings, including Afghanistan and lived in the tent city on the Independence Square for weeks. Yet overall, the Czechs' contribution to the "neighbourhood" crusade seemed modest, especially when compared to this nation of freedom fighters' "baseline" for engagement in authoritarian or transiting regimes.

An additional factor may help explain the outcome: the foreign policy response to the Orange Revolution may have been muffled also because policy-makers egged on by "pragmatist" norm entrepreneurs, rather than advocates of "dissident geopolitics", such as president Vaclav Klaus, preferred to remain silent and let the events take their

405 Dlouha 2011; Pojar 2010

course.[406] Seeking closer business ties with Ukraine, this group was willing to "talk Europe" as well, though only after the revolution was over. On his first official visit to post-orange Ukraine in June 2005, Klaus said in a speech that, "The Czech Republic fully recognises and respects Ukraine's efforts to join the European and Euro-Atlantic structures in the nearest future," purporting to hope that the extension of the invitation would not take too long.[407] Yet Roman Joch, a conservative intellectual close to Klaus—who has repeatedly come under fire for his controversial opinions on global warming, the Roma minority and his pro-Russian sentiments—warns that it was mostly an "act of goodwill" on the part of the president, interested in getting into the newly elected elite's "good graces" as he was eyeing unexploited business opportunities: "he told them what they needed to hear". Klaus, it became clear when the "orange coalition" crumbled, was equally ready to work with the "blue team". Moreover, at the time, it was a well-known fact that the ultra-realist president perceived enlargement as a means toward ant-federalist ends in the EU: the larger the membership, the weaker the central authorities, and the stronger the nation-states.[408] His discursive use of norms can thus be described as instrumental.

Moving past the foreign policy output during the Orange Revolution itself, given this dissertation's focus on uncovering the role norms can play in the articulation of

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406 Joch, R., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 16.3.

407 Presidency of the Czech Republic, 2005. Speech of President Vaclav Klaus at the Occasion of the Official Visit to Ukraine. 17.6.

408 *Aktualne.cz, 2012*. Posledni rok prezidenta: Klausovo evropanstvi. Analyses and Specials.

national interest, the infinitely more informed foreign policy course that the Czech Republic adopted toward Ukraine in the post-2004 period suggests that norm entrepreneurs, in this case advocates of "dissident geopolitics", can use their discursive power to upgrade issue areas or influence the way incentives are perceived post-critical junctures. After the Orange Revolution, the previously under-invested Czech foreign policy-making community as a whole started paying more attention to Ukraine, which became one of the prime destinations for investment, aid and later also transition-know how, via the MFA's new office for "transformational cooperation", established by missionaries Gabriela Dlouha, Peter Burian and Tomas Pojar.

It is key to note that the opportunity structure for such Czech endeavours in Ukraine did not drastically change: prior to the events of 2004, Czech foreign policy was simply focused elsewhere. In the aftermath of Yushchenko's triumph, in 2005, Prague opened a consulate in the haven of heavy industry, the Donetsk region, and president Klaus, acting as ambassador of Czech business via CzechTrade, the government's development agency, encouraged major Czech businesses such as state-controlled energy giant CEZ, and the "sharks" in the financial group PPF to make advances onto the Ukrainian market.[409] Interest articulation went hand in hand with a heavier accent on norm promotion. As early as mid-2005, the Parliament's research institute released a comprehensive report on EU-Ukraine relations, noting that the latter's integration prospects have not received enough attention until the ascent of pro-Western political

409 *iHned.cz*, 2006. Oranzova revoluce obchodovani s Ukrajinou prospela. 21.9.

elites in 2004.[410] Accordingly, MFA's office for "transformational cooperation" launched a dozen projects related to civil society development, to boost awareness of international norms and the exercise of democratic rights in the "transiting" country.[411] Stindl as ambassador to Ukraine spoke out in the Ukrainian media in an attempt to popularise the notion of experience-sharing.[412]

Moreover, thanks, in a large part, to "hawkish" defenders of "dissident geopolitics", such as Ivan Pocuch and Zbynek Pavlacik of MOD and *Jagello 2000*, respectively, who occasionally advised defense minister Alexander Vondra and prime minister Mirek Topolanek when the social democratic cabinet was replaced by a conservative-liberal one in 2006, the Czech Republic also became a vigorous supporter of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine in the run up to the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. At the summit, the Czech Republic signed, along with ten other countries—mostly new member states—the well-known letter endorsing the future integration of Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance.[413]

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410 Parliament of the Czech Republic, 2005. Vybrana temata Spolecne zahranicni a bezpecnosti politiky a vnejsich vztahu Evropske unie. Study.

411 Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. Human Rights and Transformational Policy. Priority Countries and Projects: Ukraine. Archive.

412 See, for instance, Syruk, M., 2007. A Referendum is the Wrong Way to Solve National Security Problems. *The Day*. 20.12.

413 *Natoaktual.cz, 2008*. Cesko chce Gruzii a Ukrajinu blize NATO. 20.3

In the true spirit of "dissident geopolitics", the Czech Republic also started upholding its reputation as a sanctuary for "political" émigrés after the re-election to president of the champion of the Kuchma-Putin tandem at the time of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych. For instance, it offered asylum to the husband of imprisoned ex-premier Yulia Tymoshenko and the orange lady's ex-minister Bohdan Danylyshyn. Prominent missionaries such as Vaclav Havel and Karel Schwarzenberg, who became the Czech foreign minister in 2006, also signed an open letter of global leaders to the Yanukovich administration from September 1, 2011, which highlighted the damage inflicted on Ukrainian democracy by the blue regime's persecution of political opponents.

In conclusion, the Czech case suggests that *structural power* and resonant *framing* by norm entrepreneurs does not necessarily have to ensure norm enactment in foreign policy, even if security and economic incentives are complementary, rather than contradictory, with the normative framework, which in this case is "dissident geopolitics". Yet, norm entrepreneurs can aid in reconstituting national interests in a way that inspires foreign policy shifts: following the Orange Revolution, Ukraine skipped up a few rungs on the ladder of foreign policy priorities due to, in part, the zeal of missionaries.

5.3. Poland: commanders

Throughout the Orange Revolution, Polish elites took on the role of "commanders", spearheading the dramatic battle for a free and fair election in Ukraine and recruiting conscripts from the ranks of allies large and small. Of the three countries considered

here, Poland was, once again, the most "probable" case of an activist and value-laden foreign policy course vis-à-vis Ukraine: leading the international community's crusade for democracy in 2004 represented not only the optimal foreign policy course du jour but also a logical extension of Poland's hitherto foreign policy line vis-à-vis its largest next-door neighbour.

In the context of the macro-structure, a blitz cost-benefit analysis immediately reveals that for Warsaw, defending the Ukrainians' right to choose freedom and democracy by acting as "mediator" between the rival orange and blue factions in the autumn of 2004, seemed to carry many perks. One of them was *reputational*. Domestically, the Polish government could score political points: the "orange lot" had developed a formidable fan base not only across the political spectrum (see table 5.4) but also in the society. For their part, Polish think-tanks and NGOs, given their history of engagement in Kuchma's "grey zone" regime, also egged the political establishment on to take advantage of the window of opportunity for democratisation, which, they argued, had gone from ajar to open. Internationally, Warsaw could hope for moral credit from Washington and Brussels—despite some Moscow-considerate hesitation on the part of several "old" member states—hastened to join in placing international pressure on president Leonid Kuchma and his candidate of choice in the disputed presidential poll Viktor Yanukovych amid escalating tensions in Ukraine. It is key to note here that after EU accession, Poland loosened the reins of its ambition to become a European heavyweight with greater leverage on European foreign and security policy: at the time of the Orange Revolution, it was prototyping its foreign policy "brand".

On top of domestic and international reputation, security and economic incentives

should not be discounted, either. Aiding the election victory of friendly pro-democratic forces was undoubtedly a desirable foreign policy goal for Poland, not only because of "soft" security risks associated with Ukraine's intermediary role in the delivery of Russia's oil and gas, but also due to business interests, such as preserving opportunities for future investment and hopes of reviving the largely dormant trade relations.

Yet, the cost-benefit calculation also suggests that some risks, especially those connected with the "unknown" future, were indeed involved in Poland's pursuit of a latently pro-orange foreign policy, depending on threat assessment by Polish elites. The law of unintended consequences posited that Warsaw could create a "hard" security hazard for itself by potentially contributing to further destabilisation of an already divided, and very large, neighbour. Moreover, it risked alienating Moscow, rooting for the opposite—blue— camp. By 2004, Russia had already developed a habit of using trade embargoes and raising energy prices to "get its way" in the former Eastern bloc.

Polish academics and analysts tend to portray their country's active involvement in the Orange Revolution as a balanced foreign policy course based on two pillars of Poland's activist and value-laden foreign policy agenda inspired by "dissident geopolitics": democracy promotion and transition experience-sharing with the Eastern neighbourhood. Indeed, the string of Poland's bold foreign policy decisions throughout the Ukrainian crisis reflected an overwhelming national consensus which was, Polish foreign policy-makers argue today, imbued with both strategic and

normative commitments.[414]. In other words, *causal beliefs* which hold that having democratic international partners produces domestic security benefits complemented *principled beliefs* relying not on contentions about empirical impacts of democracy, but rather on the notion of rights and responsibilities of democratic states to propagate the democratic code of practice internationally.[415]

The questions to be addressed by the upcoming sections are as follows: what part do norms play in the definition and enactment of national interest in Poland at a critical juncture when they are in line with some security and economic incentives but not others? The case of Iraq has already shown that non-material factors can act as an intervening variable when material interests are aligned. Moreover, are norms more or less important when the "crusade" for democracy takes place in the neighbourhood?

Table 5.6: Attitudes of leading Polish political parties toward the Orange Revolution

Political party	Government/Opposition	Evaluation of Orange Revolution
SLD (social democrats)	Government (senior)	Positive
PSL (the peasant party)	Government (junior)	Neutral
PO (liberals)	Opposition	Positive
PiS (conservatives)	Opposition	Positive
LPR (the far-right party)	Opposition	Neutral
Samooborona (the far-left party)	Opposition	Neutral

414 Countless interviews, for instance, Smolar 2011; Zaborowski 2011; Kuzniar 2011; Zieba 2011

415 Evidence from interviews.

5.3.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

More so than the Czechs or the Slovaks, the Poles had a macro-structure—serious security and economic concerns, partly offset by low risks at home and abroad—that could have swung the pendulum either way. Though inaction was not an option, action could have taken many different forms: detached neutrality, passive leverage or active engagement. Arguably, *persuasive framing* by norm entrepreneurs helped construct a link between certain security and economic incentives and norms of "dissident geopolitics", reinforcing the foreign policy-making elite's initially hesitant preference for the active engagement option.

Economically, championing freedom and democracy in Ukraine re-evoked the long-time budding promise of livelier trade and greater investment. Radek Sikorski, the heavyweight current Polish foreign minister who was then a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute at the time of the Orange Revolution, insists that the bidding was mutual: "... the Ukrainians understood that it was in their interest... to have freer access to our market."[416] In 2003, figures capturing trends in mutual economic exchange suggested that activity was quite animated on both sides: the Polish share of Ukrainian exports was 9.7 percent out of the 24 percent of goods and services destined for EU countries, and Ukrainian imports from Poland represented a third out of the 33.7 percent hailing from the EU.[417] Indicators considering potential

416 Countless interviews, for instance, Gniazdowski 2011. 10.5; Lewicki 2011; Sikorski 2011

417 Ibid

rather than the status quo also spoke of an upswing: in 2003, deliveries of goods and services to Ukraine swelled by 32.3 percent year on year, according to a comprehensive report by the Polish economy and labour ministry.[418] Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, in 2003, Polish exports to Ukraine also surpassed those to Russia, the hitherto number one endpoint for Polish merchandise from amongst the post-Soviet states.[419] Polish ex-president Aleksander Kwasniewski, who spearheaded Polish efforts at mediation during the Ukrainian political crisis, said in a personal interview that one of the hopes of the Polish government at the time was that the EU would swiftly sign a free-trade agreement with a "friendly" Ukrainian leader, i.e. Viktor Yuschenko.[420]

Table 5.7: Foreign trade turnover between Poland and Ukraine in 2002-2006

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
	EUR	%	EUR	%	EUR	%	EUR	%	EUR	%
Import	1249.3	111.4	1383.3	110.7	1639.8	118.5	2084.6	127.1	3164.6	151.8
Export	519.5	103.5	659.8	127.0	840.1	127.3	813.7	96.9	1052.0	129.3
Balance	729.7		723.5		799.7		1270.9		2112.6	

Source: Polish Statistical Office

With hindsight, as indicated by data in Table 5.4, the wishes for more entrepreneurial dynamism in Polish-Ukrainian trade, expressed for instance in the abovementioned

418 Ministry of Economy of Poland, 2007. Wspolpraca gospodarcza Polski s krajami WNP, tym szczegolnie s Rosja, Ukraina i Bialorusia. Department of Analyses and Prognoses. Government document.

419 Ibid

420 Kwasniewski 2011

remarks of Sikorski and Kwasniewski, became reality after the Orange Revolution, a positive development ascribed by multiple Polish interviewees to tighter and more amicable political cooperation between the two countries.[421] When after months of orange-blue gridlock the triumphant Viktor Yushchenko was sworn in as Ukrainian president, Polish-Ukrainian economic exchange received a significant boost. Within two years of the elite turnover, Ukraine, at the turn of the millennium ranked only as the 12th largest consumer of Polish produces, surpassed the formidable markets of Sweden, Belgium, USA and Denmark, moving up to a respectable standing at 8th place.[422] Negotiations also began on the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) as part of Ukraine's future Association Agreement with the EU. The various governments in Warsaw have remained avid lobbyists for the cause since Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2008.[423]

Yet Poland also had to consider economic disincentives as it contemplated various foreign policy courses vis-à-vis Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. The risk entailed in cheering for the "orange lot" was alienating ex-overlord Russia, which

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421 Countless interviews, for instance, Kazanecki, P., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 1.6; Pieklo, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 11.5 (experts on Poland's Eastern neighbourhood policy)

422 Ministry of Economy of Poland 2007

423 The last round of negotiations took place on 19-23 September 2011. European Commission, 2011. Trade, Creating Opportunities, Bilateral Relations, Countries and Regions: Ukraine. Online archive.

rooted for the other, blue team. Sustainability and reliability of oil and gas deliveries stood at the forefront of Polish concern. Throughout its post-communist history, Poland had remained one of Europe's largest importers of Russia's sought-after natural resources, depending on the fickle former imperial power for as much as 50-60% of its gas supply. On the eve of the Orange Revolution, the country, unable—but admittedly also unrushed—to pursue a policy of substantial diversification, at least in the short-term, was buckling under the burden of rising oil and gas prices. Due to a steep hike in the cost of crude—$27.2 to $61.2— and gas—$105.1/1000m^3 to $221.3/1000m^3—in 2003-2006, the overall value of mineral imports from Russia continued rising: in 2000-2006, the upsurge, at $5.5bn, surpassed the increase in the total sum of Polish exports to Russia. Hence, it is fair to say that Warsaw had to calculate in 2004 that it could not afford to pay even more for oil and gas, should Moscow decide to raise prices in an act of political "revenge" for the former's butting into the revolution in Kiev.

Table 5.8: Foreign trade turnover between Poland and Russia in 2002-2006

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
	EUR	%	EUR	%	EUR	%	EUR	%	EUR	%
Import	1410.0	119.0	1341.5	95.1	2299.5	171.4	3171.1	137.9	3760.6	118.6
Export	4662.8	94.0	4614.1	99.0	5165.7	112.0	7216.0	139.7	9739.0	135.0
Balance	-3252.8		-3272.6		-2866.2		-4044.9		-5978.4	

Source: Polish Statistical Office

Indeed, at the time, fears started to mount in Poland that the Kremlin might be keen on using its massive natural reserves as a political weapon. In 2003, the Polish economy ministry called on Azeri and Ukrainian counterparts to launch multilateral

exploration of alternative terrestrial routes for gas transport and signed an agreement with the EU and Ukraine on accelerating the completion and launch of the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline.[424] The year before, Gazprom approved a schedule for the construction of Nord Stream, a move perceived as alarming by governments in veteran transit countries, including Belarus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine and Slovakia. Local elites gushed that in bypassing them, Russia was attempting to exert political influence on them by giving itself a free hand to threaten their gas supply at its leisure while maintaining a steady flow of supplies to Western Europe.[425] Yet, it is key to note that while the Polish administration may have demonstrated some verbal concern over energy security, it did not act on it. Poland's Bureau of National Security (BBN) only started prioritising energy security after the first Russo-Ukrainian gas spat in 2006. After the dispute, which cut deliveries to Poland and other East European countries amidst a freezing winter, BBN held bilateral talks with its Ukrainian counterpart and compiled a comprehensive report on "hard" and "soft" security risks pertaining to energy security.[426]

Developments in Polish-Russian trade and energy relations following the Orange Revolution indicate that fears of slowdown and/or blackmail due to disagreements

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424 Ruszel, M., 2008. Odessa-Brody-Gdansk: nowe rozdanie. *Portal spraw zagranicznych.* 29.4.

425 Cohen, A., 2006.. The North European Gas Pipeline Threatens Europe's Energy Security. *Heritage Foundation*. See also *Deutsche Welle*, 2007. New Twists and Turns in German-Russian Gas Pipeline Saga. 13.7.

426 National Security Council of Poland, 2006. Rozmowy polsko-ukrainskie v BBN. Archive. 20.7.

over Ukraine were unsubstantiated. Quite the contrary, Polish-Russian trade continued to hike up after 2004, as Table 5.5 illustrates. In 2004, Poland's exports eastward to its large distant neighbour swelled by 71 percent, reaching $2.8bn and surpassing levels of economic activity commonly attained before the Russian economy hit rock bottom during the crisis of 1997. The Poles and the Russians did end up quarrelling after the Orange Revolution, but the causal link with potential Russian grievances related to Polish meddling in Ukraine's affairs is difficult to establish. In 2006, the Polish economy suffered losses of nearly $386m when the Russian government banned Polish meat imports, a decision most Polish politicians and some international observers perceived as "political".[427] In any case, Moscow paid a price, as Warsaw retaliated by vetoing talks on the new EU-Russia partnership deal ahead of a planned summit in mid-May 2006. Overall, the account of Poland's macro-structure reveals that Warsaw faced both incentives and disincentives when foreign policy-makers were deciding what to do about Ukraine.

5.3.2. Micro-structure: structural power

The micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship in Poland was very favourable in the run up to the Orange Revolution. Advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in the foreign policy-making community, and other groups of norm entrepreneurs – though possibly for other reasons – had long been attempting to translate the silent consensus on the need for a more active Poland in the Eastern neighbourhood, the historical Polish-

427 *Kommersant,* 2007. Russian Meat Embargo Politically Motivated – Poland. 6.4

Lithuanian Commonwealth, into foreign policy outcomes.[428] For the "missionaries'" part, the rationale, rooted in "dissident geopolitics", seemed clear enough. "Za nasza i wasza wolnosc," (for our freedom and yours) was Poland's unofficial motto, and within the community of democracies, the country had already grown a reputation for "fighting" other nations' revolutions and wars of independence. Indeed, from Tadeusz Kosciuszko, who fought America's War of Independence, Poland's history had never been short of romanticised crusades against imperial overlords and corrupt authoritarians outside its borders.[429] When protesters poured onto the streets of Kiev, Lviv and other major cities, the logic of appropriateness related to Warsaw's geopolitics of freedom – at least for the missionaries that preached it – dictated that Poles take up arms in another, crusade for democracy.

At the time of the Orange Revolution, defenders of "dissident geopolitics" commanded unrivalled *structural power.* Though the Polish norm entrepreneur network had "hawkish" and "dovish" nuclei similarly to its Czech counterpart, differences on Ukraine policy were even less pronounced in Warsaw than they were in Prague, unlike in the case of the Iraqi invasion. In the opinion-making circles, the non-governmental organisations engaged in pro-orange *persuasion* included the more openly pro-American and "hawkish" ones, such as the Polish-American Freedom

428 Efforts to that avail originated, for instance, in think-tanks and NGOs specialising on Eastern policy, such as the Centre for Eastern Studies, the Stefan Batory Foundation, the Institute for International Affairs, the East European Democratic Centre, the Foundation for Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation, etc.

429 *The Economist,* 2011. For Our Freedom and Yours. 7.7.

Foundation, the Kosciuszko Foundation, the Euro-Atlantic Association (SEA) and the Lech Walesa Institute. "Dovish" advocacy groups abiding by "dissident geopolitics" hailed from a range of smaller organisations, such as *American-Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative* (PAUCI), the main extra-governmental vehicle of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation sponsored and overseen by Freedom House and the National Endowment for Democracy, *Unia&Polska* and the *East European Democratic Centre* (EEDC). *The Community of Democracies* (CoD), an international organisation based in Warsaw, also jumped on board and pursued norm entrepreneurship in favour of Polish engagement in Ukraine. Led by former dissident and Vaclav Havel's close friend Bronislaw Misztal, CoD's forte was mustering regional support for the Polish-led effort to broker a deal for a more democratic Ukraine by involving, for instance, the Baltic States. Last, but not least, it is key to mention the invested media: traditionally, the daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*, and its legendary editor-in-chief Adam Michnik, but also the weekly *Polityka*, also proudly gospelised the "orange evangelium".

In contrast to the Czech Republic, the clout of Poland's missionaries was also buttressed by an epistemic community friendly to the ideas and values of "dissident geopolitics" which could exercise *structural power* via rendering its expertise on the post-Soviet space as advice to foreign policy makers. These norm entrepreneurs had penetrated leading comparative politics and international relations think-tanks setting the tone of foreign policy discourse and complemented the "missionaries'" argument on the normative commitment to promote democracy in the neighbourhood with the strategic one, based on the Kantian notion that "democracies do not wage wars

against one another".[430] The *Stefan Batory Foundation*, at its inception a project funded by the American philanthropist George Soros and led by prominent intellectual Aleksander Smolar, as well as the *Institute for Public Affairs* (ISP), International Affairs (PISM) and the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), were latently pro-orange in the autumn of 2004 whilst maintaining neutrality in public.

Among policy-makers, advocates of the foreign policy doctrine "za nasza, za wasza", based on "dissident geopolitics", also wielded substantial *structural power*. The presidency and foreign and defense ministries were "infiltrated" by them. Some, like president Aleksander Kwasniewski, and his advisors—former ambassador to Moscow Stanislaw Ciosek and ex-dissident Henryk Wujec—can be classified as outright missionaries: in part because that is how they self-identify, and in part because they did not need to be subjected to *persuasive framing* to be "turned orange"; they were agenda-setters since the outset. More missionaries, whose support for Viktor Yushchenko's vision for Ukraine seemed to stem from similar sentiments that had instigated the surge against Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in Iraq the year before, included foreign ministers Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz and his deputy Adam Rotfeld, as well as MFA's director of the department for Americas Henryk Szlajfer. These defenders of "dissident geopolitics" also managed to find prominent converts in defense minister Jerzy Szmajdzinski and the new prime minister, Marek Belka[431],

430 Smolar, A. 2012; Zaborowski 2012

431 *Gazeta Wyborcza,* 2010. Marek Belka – sylwetka. 27.5

who had just been "demobilized" from the "allied crusade".[432]

In addition to concentrating *structural power* at home, norm entrepreneurs of similar convictions managed to "colonise" the Polish delegation at the European parliament. The voices of freshly elected MEPs such as Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, former prime minister Jerzy Buzek and ex-EU negotiator Jacek Saryuz-Wolski, as it will be shown, became a strong harmony calling on EU officials to speak out against election fraud in Ukraine.

In conclusion, this section reaffirms the findings of chapter 3, which posited that in Poland, the *structural power* of norm entrepreneurs seems to be so abundant that it "stops to matter": advocates of "dissident geopolitics" surely had enough leverage to translate their norms of choice into foreign policy outcomes. The overwhelming national consensus on Ukraine policy at the time of the Orange Revolution, as well as the unity of the main network examined in this dissertation, and the apparent lack of rival norm entrepreneur groups – all in marked contrast to the Czech Republic – reiterate that Poland seems to be the "probable case". Thus far, the account of macro- and micro-structure suggest that "starts were aligned" for Polish involvement in Ukraine.

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432 Between June and October 2003, he served as Chairman of the Council for International Coordination in Iraq, responsible for establishing the country's interim government, and between November 2003 and April 2004, he was Director for Economic Policy in the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, in charge of monetary reform and creating the foundations of the new banking system, as well as overall supervision of Iraq's economy. Office of the Prime Minister of Poland, 2011. Archive. Profile: Marek Belka.

Figure 5.2: Polish decision-makers during the Orange Revolution: structural power



5.3.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

Discursive power exercised by missionaries via *framing* hence represents yet another complementary factor that helps explain the activist and value-laden foreign policy outcome that was Poland's mediation between the orange and blue camps. Discourse analysis reveals subtle differences between *meta-narratives* validating—and, to a certain extent, romanticising—the ends of the neighbourhood crusade and *micro-*

narratives rationalising the means of the enterprise.

Opinion-makers focused on the former, sifting through Polish history in the autumn of 2004 to dig out references that would imbue Polish commitment to democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbourhood – perceived by some of them as the "Russian door-step" – with a sense of urgency. Aleksander Smolar, a freedom fighter who headed the Batory Foundation and advised the president on a freelance basis at the time, highlighted the enduring resonance and sense of national pride related to the 18th-century Polish Commonwealth, or Rzeczpospolita, which used to encompass today's Belarus, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine: "Most Poles are emotionally attached to the memory. It was important to harness it in order to translate the enthusiasm about the Orange Revolution into direct Polish involvement."[433] Another prominent missionary, Krzystof Bobinski, a *Financial Times* correspondent linked to Solidarity in the 1980s who stayed in Poland and became a leading pro-democracy activist in the 2000s, is quick to point out that the *framing* had little to do with neo-imperialism: "This is magic. Historical imagination. This used to be *our* part of the world. We are genuinely interested in these societies."[434] As advocates of "dissident geopolitics" pushed for direct diplomatic engagement in the Ukrainian crisis, the sense of kinship with Ukrainian revolutionaries based on this notion of "imagined community", as Benedict Anderson would put it, of the Polish Commonwealth, was reinforced—by, for instance, editor-in-chief of *Gazeta Wyborcza* Adam Michnik, ex-dissident, ex-

433 Smolar 2011

434 Bobinski 2011

minister of foreign affairs and MEP Bronislaw Geremek and commentator Sylwester Szafarz who flew back from the U.S. when the chanting on the Independence Square in Kiev reached its crescendo—through the *macro-frame* of "mission": Ukraine was described as missionary territory.[435]

Normative competition with Russia on this mystical piece of land provided another *macro-frame* layered onto the "mission" *meta-narrative*: advocates of "dissident geopolitics" believed that their country would be safer if Ukraine became a democracy. Journalists from the more conservative daily *Rzeczpospolita,* a runner-up to the trend-setting centrist *Gazeta Wyborcza*—argued that Ukraine as a critical element of the "cordon sanitaire" between Poland and Russia could not be "lost" to the latter. In Polish foreign policy tradition, this line of reasoning originates in the paradigm highlighting the strategic importance of the Eastern neighbourhood for Polish security, coined by post-war émigré philosopher, historian and publisher Jerzy Gedrojsz.[436] Examples from the interwar period—strongman Jozef Pilsudski also attempted to anchor Ukraine in the "cordon sanitaire"—and World War II, which started with the invasion of Poland from the east, infused such newspaper stories with

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435 Michnik 2011; Szafarz 2011. For a more comprehensive overview of Szafarz's political views, see: Szafarz, S., 2009. O nowa politike zagraniczna RP. *Preglad socjalistyczny*; *Zycie*, 2004. Nie wolno zostawic Ukrainy. Wywiad s Bronislawem Geremkiem. 28.12., p. 9

436 Jagodzinski, A., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 2.5. (See also: *Politykaglobalna.pl,* 2010. Polska polityka wschodnia. 12.7; *Polskie Radio*, 2012. Przeslanie redaktora Jerzego Giedroycia. 14.9; *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2009. Gdy przemawiaja armaty. Polityka zagraniczna III RP. 22.11).

historical resonance and helped create Polish "ownership" of the orange cause.[437] Marek Magierowski of *Rzeczpospolita* puts it this way: "We had to beef up Yushchenko's credentials as an anti-Russian figure."[438]

On top of these antique meta-narratives, an additional contemporary one, based on Poland's more recent communist past, helped transcend the historically contingent "responsibility" for the Orange Revolution by evoking "solidarity", both as a principle and the trade union that played a key role in Poland's extrication from communism. In the eyes of the somewhat nostalgic Poles, 2004 was 1989, and the youths with orange banners on Kiev's Independence Square were "them", twenty years ago. The cognitive and rhetorical device that "activated" this simplified analogy is dubbed the "attribution of similarity". "The Orange Revolution seemed like a replica of the Solidarity revolution, so there was a lot of sympathy. Though Poland stayed neutral officially, it was an open secret that we all backed the politicians that spearheaded the social mobilization," says Jan Pieklo of the *American-Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative* (PAUCI).[439] This understanding of democracy promotion is political, rather than developmental, and as such, it taps straight into the normative framework of "dissident geopolitics". Moreover, the "solidarity" *micro-narrative* capitalised not only on nostalgia but also on the desire to "give back",

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437 For instance. *Rzeczpospolita*, 2004. Juszczenko broni zwyciestwa. 20.11; *Rzeczpospolita,* 2004. Kiedy Pora zlozy bron/ W sadzie triumf Juszczenki/ Moskwa sie dwiwi, 4.12 , countless others.

438 Magierowski 2011

439 Pieklo 2011

rooted in another aspect of Poland's state identity: that of a successful democratiser, ready to pass on the torch and share its know-how with democratic aspirants. Once recipients of massive Western aid, the Poles as "newbie Westerners" felt compelled to start acting as donors, says Pawel Kazanecki, one of Poland's most avid activists in the Eastern neighbourhood, of the East European Democratic Centre.[440] The argument followed, for the most part, the logic of appropriateness. Like many others, dissident Henryk Wujec, now aide to president Bronislaw Komorowski and election monitor at the time of the Orange Revolution, asserts that: "With freedom comes a responsibility to protect and spread it."[441] Bogdan Borusewicz, a veteran freedom fighter, who now chairs the Polish Senate and visited the Independence Square several times to "soak in the atmosphere and boost the spirits of the courageous protesters", cites the same reason for his support of the protesters.[442]

Moving on to relevant norm entrepreneurs among decision-makers, the abovementioned value-based *meta-narratives* helped them conceive supplementary reputation-oriented *micro-narratives* capturing the essence of Polish national interest at the critical juncture in autumn 2004. Advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in the government agencies with *structural power* had to justify the "how" of Polish engagement in Ukraine, i.e. the actual foreign policy toolkit that involved conflict mediation, which was just as important as the "why" of it. Hence, they argued, taking

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440 Kazanecki 2011

441 Wujec, H., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 23.5.

442 Borusewicz, B., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 28.6.

a leadership role in the Ukrainian crisis would catapult Poland to the premier league of Euro-Atlantic politics. Emphasising the uniqueness of the Polish contribution, president Aleksander Kwasniewski stresses that he saw an opportunity to bind American allies and European partners: "We had competence and contacts. For [Xavier] Solana, Ukraine in 2004 was virgin territory."[443] Jan Pieklo and other activists, such as Jacek Kucharczyk, who were dispatched to Kiev with a delegation of election observers at the president's bequest, echoes the sentiment with even greater openness: "We were middlemen. The U.S. government doesn't want to be meddling in internal affairs of countries that lie so close to Russia. So it provides the financing, and we do the diplomacy and pursue the advocacy and perform the monitoring. Then they can always tell the Russians that "it's not them, but these crazy Poles that they can do nothing about". That is how good foreign policy is made collectively among allies. It's like [NATO's] smart specialisation."[444]

This reputation-based *micro-narrative* for Polish involvement in the Orange Revolution was, similarly to the "solidarity" *meta-narrative,* rooted in the country's contemporary Wendtian identity as a "success story" of democratic consolidation and economic growth. True, it was forwarded by norm entrepreneurs among decision-makers who wished to pursue a bold and independent foreign policy from a strategic viewpoint, as well to demonstrate to "senior" EU members that Poland had "matured" beyond post-communism. MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, who coordinated the Poles'

443 Kwasniewski 2011

444 Pieklo 2011

pro-orange activities – press conferences, statements, briefings, speeches, and the like – in the European Parliament, and number two at the foreign ministry at the time, Adam Rotfeld, insist that to believe in something is one thing and acting on it another.[445] Hence, Polish elites needed, in a way, to prove that they were no longer apprentices, that they had learned the art of foreign policy practice. Marek Cichocki, the adviser to president Lech Kaczynski on Germany, says today that engagement in the Orange Revolution actually marked the ascent of Poland on the European foreign policy stage through the onset of the last stage of Polish-German reconciliation. Recounting his experience of the Ukrainian crisis in Brussels, Jacek Saryusz Wolski expresses a similar sentiment: "In order for Germany to be a 'normal state', Poland had to become democratic. We managed to explain in Berlin that it was the same for Poland and Ukraine."[446] Rotfeld offers a theorisation of what Poland adopted as a general approach to foreign policy-making: "Big states pursuing reactive policies must react to global shifts, but small and medium-sized states preoccupying themselves with peripheral or marginal issues must move beyond the policy of self-imposed isolationism in order to avoid being marginalized."[447]

Overall, this section demonstrates that advocates of "dissident geopolitics" commanded notable *persuasive power* ahead and during the Orange Revolution.

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445 Rotfeld 2011; Saryusz-Wolski 2011

446 Cichocki 2011, Wolski 2011

447 Rotfeld, A., 2011. Speaking at the conference Poland-Russia: Transatlantic Security Context, Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, Artes Liberales, Warsaw. 9-11.5.

Virtually undisputed historical *meta-narratives* and contemporary *micro-narratives* blended, framing Polish-Ukrainian relations in a way that made the "neighbourhood crusade" for democracy both justifiable and feasible.

5.3.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

The foreign policy output inspired, as confirmed by relevant then-decision-makers, by the abovementioned *framing* by norm entrepreneurs can be described as an ideal case of "dissident geopolitics". All major Polish institutions, including the Sejm, the Senate, the prime minister's office, the presidential administration, and the foreign ministry—in alignment with think-tanks and NGOs—joined forces to publicly appeal to their Ukrainian counterparts to abide by democratic standards for the upcoming election in October 2004. When the runoff between Yushchenko and Yanukovich in November made it clear that the circle surrounding the corrupt Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma failed to deliver those, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" – missionaries and their converts – among Polish policy-makers started exerting pressure on the international community to draw consequences. As demonstrators protesting the violation of their political rights flooded the Independence Square in Kiev, they prototyped the idea of organising "roundtable talks"[448] with the president

448 Members of president Kwasniewski's team in Kiev, Olga Iwaniak and Jacek Kluczkowski, proposed the idea Oleksandr Zinchenko, one of Yuschenko's key advisors, on November 24th. It is fair to mention, however, that a similar concept of dialogue had already been suggested by speaker of the Ukrainian parliament, Volodymyr Lytvyn the day before. In: Stanislawski, W., 2005. Pomaraczowa Kokarda: Kalendaryum kryzysu politycznego na Ukrainie. *Osrodek Studiow*

in office and the two rival candidates, who both claimed victory. The "roundtable talks" once again signify the "attribution of similarity": in 1989, Polish democrats negotiated transition with communists at a similar "roundtable".[449]

On the European level, Polish foreign policy output throughout the autumn of 2004 resonated with universal values and international norms, and it was more openly pro-orange. October through December, MEPs, above all Jerzy Buzek, Solidarity activist and ex-premier; vice president of the European Parliament Jacek Saryusz Wolski; and ex-dissident and former defense minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, maintained close contact with both the blue and orange Ukrainian election teams in Brussels and Kiev; organised frequent press conferences to keep the media on the issue; put together a European Parliament observer mission – four of the seven members were Poles – that was dispatched to Kiev on October 28; lobbied at the European Council for harsher condemnation of electoral fraud after the rigged second round of the vote on November 21; and indirectly campaigned in favour of the "orange camp" by supporting Ukraine's membership aspirations.[450] On October 20, ahead of the run-off between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, Onyszkiewicz attempted to boost the pro-European candidate's profile, as he claims eight years on, telling the media in

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Wschodnich

449 Kwasniewski 2011; Pifer, S., 2007. European Mediators and Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Talk given at Kennan Institute. 15.10. Kwasniewski proposed to hold round-table talks in Cuba in 2006 as well.

450 Wolski 2011

Brussels that, "The 15-year perspective for Ukraine to join the EU is definitely too long."[451]

Whilst maintaining an overall "pretense" of non-partisanship and neutrality, required by the need to pursue "dual-track engagement" with the government and the opposition throughout the crisis, Polish MEPs nevertheless gravitated towards the chanting orange-clad crowds and did not bother to hide their allegiance. As spelled out in chapter 3, this political approach to democracy promotion testifies to the subtle "Americanisation" of the normative undercurrents of Polish foreign policy. Following the fiasco of round two of the election, Jerzy Buzek, in Kiev with the EP observer mission, held official meetings with the CEC and the two election teams, as his role demanded, but he also made multiple unsolicited ventures out onto the Independence Square, who welcomed him with enthusiastic slogans featuring "Solidarity". After the run-off, on November 24, Buzek made a public plea to the EU's chief of diplomacy Javier Solana to "foster the development of democracy in [the EU's] largest neighbour, Ukraine", drawing a parallel with the EU's past efforts in "such distant" countries as Iraq, where the Poles kept fighting the "allied crusade", as well as Cuba.[452] In the same vein, his colleague Jacek Saryusz Wolski, who ensured that the European Parliament held an emergency session to discuss the situation in Ukraine on December 1, evoked the *meta-narrative* of "solidarity" directly when he said, "A vibrant, true democracy is being born before our very eyes. Almost a quarter of a

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451 Press Conference of Polish MEPs, 2004. Brussels. 20.11.

452 European Parliament, 2004. Session of the Foreign Affairs Commission. *EPTV*. 24.11.

century ago, similar events took place in the Gdansk shipyard where Solidarity was born."[453] More generally, Polish MEPs, mostly PiS conservatives, such as soon-to-be foreign minister in Jaroslaw Kaczynski's cabinet, Anna Fotyga, and PO liberals from the EPP-ED faction, also greatly contributed to the European Parliament's resolution of December 2, which chastised the Ukrainian establishment for its mishandling of the election. Though they failed to force words of support for Ukraine's European future into the conclusions of the November EU summit, they did manage to steer the EPP-ED towards composing a letter expressing those sentiments.[454]

Foreign policy output produced by the Polish MFA shunned orange favouritism in favour of a colourless accent on universal values and democratic standards. The choice of foreign policy toolkit highlights the relevance of the contemporary *micro-narrative* of a "mature" Poland: the Wendtian state identity rooted in the "success story" of post-communist transformation, and related reputational concerns. Following the first round of the presidential vote in Ukraine on October 31, the Polish MFA convinced the European Council to appeal to Ukrainian authorities for a free and fair runoff between Yushchenko and Yanukovich on November 21.[455] In the same vein, the ministry's post-election statement, of November 22, focused on highlighting the violations of democratic standards, as well as the looming damage to

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453 European Parliament, 2004. Debate on the Political Situation in Ukraine. *EPTV*. 1.12.

454 European People's Party, 2004. Letter in Support of Ukraine's EU Membership Aspirations. 16.11. Obtained by author.

455 Stanislawski 2005, p. 20

Ukraine's EU membership prospects: "This violation of democratic principles has met with resistance from international public opinion and a majority of Ukrainian citizens. This will lead the country into a political and social crisis, and move it away from the road to integration with Euro-Atlantic structures."[456] Deputy foreign minister Adam Rotfeld, a vociferous advocate of "dissident geopolitics", who co-drafted the document cited above, also steered the Polish MFA towards joining forces with the OSCE and demand publication of the "true and reliable" results, as well as a re-run.[457]

Moreover, in line with the reputation-oriented *micro-narrative* expressing Poland's desire to punch above its weight in Euro-Atlantic affairs, the MFA coordinated its sober diplomatic signals with the U.S. throughout the autumn of 2004. The Bush administration, which had previously warned president Kuchma that Kiev could face sanctions if the vote were botched, shared Polish interest in anchoring Ukraine in the zone of freedom and prosperity, given its "freedom agenda" in the post-Soviet space.[458] David Kramer, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, responsible for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus affairs, says today that Warsaw and Washington remained in close contact throughout the Orange Revolution. "The Poles worked with us very closely at that time. They were a huge

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456 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 2004. Statement on the Second Round of the Ukrainian Presidential Election. Archive. 22.11.

457 Rotfeld 2011

458 Armitage, R., 2004. U.S. Watches Ukraine Elections with Concern. *The Financial Times*. 29.10.

help in resolving the crisis."[459]

Despite outward neutrality, the MFA, much like the MEPs, had a political preference for the pro-Western orange coalition led by Viktor Yushchenko, but it was more successful in concealing it. Throughout the crisis, minister Cimoszewicz, a convert to the underlying norms of "dissident geopolitics", remained doggedly consistent in what Rotfeld, his number two, describes today as his "mandatorily dry" appeals to the Ukrainian authorities to uphold democratic standards, of which his remarks from October 10 and November 5 are indicative. When he visited Kiev in his capacity as Council of Europe chairman ahead of the second round of the vote in November, and president Kuchma and his feted protégé Yanukovich "fled the coop" to meet with the Russian president instead, he insisted that his meeting with democratic champion Viktor Yushchenko was not sending a political message in an obvious attempt to maintain the illusion of impartiality.[460] Yet, for instance, three days before the re-run of the second round of the vote in late December, a closed-door council with Yuschenko's team was held at the MFA in order to develop and agree a package of proposals for Ukraine's relations with the USA, the EU and NATO in the upcoming year.[461]

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459 Kramer, D., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 23.5.

460 Ibid, p. 23-24

461 Stanislawski 2005, p. 109

Moving on from the MFA to the presidency, foreign policy output originating there also testifies to Poland's norm-driven agency and leadership during the revolutionary moment in Ukraine. President Kwasniewski played a key role in conflict mediation: after the rigged run-off between Yushchenko and Yanukovich in November, he asked deputy foreign minister Adam Rotfeld to assemble a group of negotiators that would attempt to resolve the political stalemate in Ukraine through a series of "roundtable talks". Stanislaw Ciosek, the president's advisor on Eastern policy and a self-proclaimed convert to "dissident geopolitics", was appointed to act as a "Russia-joint", frequently meeting with the Russian ambassador in Kiev, the former reformist prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Henryk Szlajfer, a missionary heading the department for the Americas at the MFA, communicated with the American embassy in Kiev, among other parties, at Kwasniewski's bidding.[462] Throughout the "round-table talks", president Kwasniewski stayed in touch with, George W. Bush, who would later praise his efforts in international media, and the chief of EU diplomacy Javier Solana.

Interestingly, Kwasniewski's rhetoric ahead and during the negotiations reflects a *framing* shift, which highlights the extent to which he was filtering his foreign policy through different *meta*- and *micro-narratives*. While he did not waver in his accent on human rights, democratic standards, non-violence and non-interference—at one point, he insisted that an "international battle was not being fought for Ukraine", which was perceived as a rather feeble attempt at camouflage and criticised by crusading out-of-

462 Ciosek, S., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 15.6.

office missionaries as too "weak"[463]—his speeches and statements signify that he alternated between being impartial, as dictated by the *micro-narrative* based on reputational concerns, and pro-orange, as prescribed by the *meta-narrative* of solidarity.

The oscillation, some interviewees suggest, supplies evidence of the pragmatic or convert nature of Kwasniewski's normative convictions. For instance, before the president slipped into the costume of the arbitrator, he raised a lot more alarm about Russia, like in his speech on the campus of Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium, warning against the EU's passive spectatorship and Russia's alleged ploy to pull Ukraine into its orbit.[464] He changed his tune after he started chairing the roundtable: partly due to the structural constraints of the "dual track engagement" with the government and the opposition, and partly due to the influence of his advisor and fellow convert to "dissident geopolitics" Stanislaw Ciosek, who advocated Russian engagement in the process of conflict resolution.[465] Moreover, before he started mediating between the orange and blue teams, Kwasniewski rooted more openly for Yushchenko. But most of his official statements dated after the onset of the roundtable talks show more prudence, such as the one from November 23: "Poland

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463 *Der Tagesspiegel*, 2004. Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski: I Was Given Orange Teddy Bears in Kiev. Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski. 6.12. [criticism privately admitted by various members of the Law and Justice Party in interviews]

464 Stanislawski 2005, p. 14

465 Ciosek 2011

wants to share its experience at such a difficult moment. Especially at this place, at this Palace, where the 'round-table' discussions were held 15 years ago, we have the moral claim, the moral right to say 'yes' to dialogue and 'no' to violence, 'yes' to cooperation and 'no' to deepening conflicts."[466]

The consistency of Poland's official foreign policy output was upheld, in part, thanks to the steady pressure exerted on top-level decision-makers by advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in opinion-making circles, who could also afford to be more openly pro-orange. For instance, Grupa Zagranica, the umbrella organisation of Polish NGOs engaged in democracy promotion abroad, and within it the Batory Foundation headed by missionary Aleksander Smolar, convinced the MFA to fund a large Polish election observer mission.[467] Furthermore, relevant groups of norm entrepreneurs outside the establishment spearheaded the idea of an open letter pledging to defend the Ukrainians' right to make a democratic choice, later signed by multiple members of the government, which read: "We owe this to Ukraine, to ourselves and to the world. Ukrainian democracy needs our solidarity…we shall not let hope die."[468] Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Lech Walesa, Bronislaw Geremek, Bogdan Borusewicz, the Kaczynski brothers, Adam Michnik and others all listed as signatories, of which there were over one hundred. Individual missionaries also made valuable contributions towards the activist and value-laden Polish foreign policy effort at the time of the

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466 Stanislawski 2005, p. 42

467 *Instytut Geopolityki*, 2008. Polska bibliografia pomaraczowej rewolucji. Media analysis.

468 Ibid

Orange Revolution: Walesa, for his part, was in close contact with President Kwasniewski, for whom, according to multiple Polish policy-makers, he served as a mouthpiece of sorts, shouting what the latter could only whisper.[469] Lastly, official foreign policy output also sustained its boldness because it was backed by a passionate public and egged on by the media. *Gazeta Wyborcza*, for instance, ran an eight-page special issue on Ukraine ahead of the run-off in December, to shine even more spotlight on the events of autumn 2004, while thousands of ordinary Poles participated in pickets at the Ukrainian embassy in Warsaw and marched the streets all over the country in "solidarity chains". In sympathy with the demonstrators freezing on the Independence Square, members of the Polish public also crocheted the world's longest orange scarf.

In conclusion, the Polish case suggests that norms can help clarify and reaffirm policy-makers' understanding of national interest under the conditions of competing material incentives. Though Warsaw could have ascribed greater importance to the Moscow-related security and economic disincentives of conflict mediation in Kiev and chosen a less ambitious foreign policy course, norms helped tip the balance in

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469 For instance, Walesa's brusque meeting with Yanukovich on November 25, at which he presented his position and left straight away for the Independence Square, caused a stir and had to be smoothed over by the team of the Polish president in Kiev. Kwasniewski's emissaries reassured Yanukovich's advisors that the international mediation that they were trying to get them to approve was going to be impartial. Stanislaw Ciosek, a member of Kwasniewski's preparatory group, maintains today that Walesa's dismissive behavior helped convince Kuchma and Yanukovych that it was "easier" to deal with Kwasniewski and EU representatives who pledged neutrality.

favour of value-laden activism. Norm enactment in foreign policy was aided by pervasive *structural power* of and persuasive *framing* by advocates of "dissident geopolitics", who were undisputed by alternative norm entrepreneurs. Much like in the case of the Iraq War, norms serve as intervening variable that can help explain Poland's foreign policy towards Ukraine during the Orange Revolution.

5.4. Slovakia: cadets

Throughout the Orange Revolution, the less sizable, yet no less keen, phalanx of Slovaks seconded the Polish "attack" throughout neighbourhood crusade for a democratic Ukraine. In spite of Slovakia's geostrategic positioning on the EU's periphery and its utter dependency on Russian oil and gas, delivered via Ukrainian pipelines—structural disadvantages that arguably made the "weak state" even more vulnerable—it also proved its credentials as an emerging leader in regional democracy promotion efforts. Given the Slovaks' recent experience with democratic backsliding, followed by their spectacular reinvention from "laggards" to "top reformers", the story of the avid Ukrainian protesters resonated in Bratislava with, perhaps, even greater intensity than in Warsaw, as it seemed to read like an epilogue to their own.

Understandably, this *meta-narrative* was most enthusiastically applied by Slovakia's think tanks and NGOs, packed with veterans of the electoral revolution against Meciarism. Crucially, for the Slovaks, in contrast to the Poles, the pro-orange foreign policy course, based on solidarity with the demonstrators on the Independence Square and elsewhere, did not represent the optimal equilibrium. Professing a hope that the

Ukrainians would abide by democratic standards, but without chastisement or positive action, would have been a "safer bet". The costs were not astronomic, but they were perceived as high: the risk of contributing to deterioration of the situation, Ukraine's failure as a state or even the outbreak of an internal conflict were seriously considered in the non-Schengen state that had endured years of struggle with illegal immigration, often related to trafficking, at the shared border. Russia's reaction was also carefully weighed, not only because of energy supplies, but also because of the sentiments of the Slovak population, to whom the former imperial power could hardly be portrayed as the "black knight" blocking Ukraine's way on the re-ascended road toward democracy. Such reasoning had a greater chance of striking a chord in Poland.[470]

Yet, despite the risk-averse nature of Slovak officialdom, the pro-democratic foreign policy program in question still ranked as relatively desirable, given the perceived benefits. Much like Poland, in jumping on the orange-mantled bandwagon, Slovakia hoped to build an *international reputation* as a freedom fighter. Moreover, it sought to solidify its standing as a loyal ally to the transatlantic alliance in general and the United States—whose crusade against Saddam Hussein's Iraq it had joined the year before—in particular. Indeed, George W. Bush's "freedom agenda" in foreign policy featured the region of Eastern Europe quite prominently: the administration had already demonstrated readiness to stand up for aspiring democratisers at the time of the so-called "Rose Revolution" in Georgia.[471]

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470 Duleba 2011

471 For instance, *Eurasianet.org*, 2009. Georgia: Looking Back at the Rose Revolution. 29.12.

Furthermore, the cost-benefit analysis indicates Slovaks also had tangible security and economic incentives to cheer for team Yushchenko-Tymoshenko. Considering the country's piecemeal and ad-hoc attempts at cooperation with Ukraine to date, the revolutionary moment presented a welcome opportunity for the cabinet in Bratislava to try to build ties anew and also draft a more comprehensive long-term strategy based on economic exchange, collaboration in the energy sector and control of cross-border flows.

Slovak academics and analysts tend to describe the country's involvement in the Orange Revolution as "modest", largely thanks to the authorities' success in curbing the fervour of Slovak activists, who would have preferred Slovakia's engagement to be on par with Poland's. The head-to-head consensus among foreign policy-makers was reached after a heated debate, which evoked various *meta-narratives* before one of them emerged as the *macro-frame* for the Orange Revolution: based on a constructed "attribution of similarity", the Slovaks came to perceive it as an instance of transition, not dissimilar to their own electoral revolution in 1998, which compelled them to act. Yet though advocates of "dissident geopolitics" acquired enough *structural power* and remained virtually *undisputed,* similarly to the Czech Republic, Slovakia lacked the resources and know-how that would have enabled it to punch above its weight.

The section will aim to solve the following puzzles: what part do norms and norm entrepreneurs play in the articulation and exercise of national interest in Slovakia when they are confronted with both material incentives and disincentives? The case of Iraq suggested that they act as an independent variable with notable explanatory power under the conditions of macro-structural vacuum. But to what extent do they

motivate political action when security and business matter more?

Table 5.9: Attitudes of leading Slovak political parties toward the Orange Revolution

Political party	Government/Opposition	Evaluation of Orange Revolution
SDKU (Christian democrats)	Government (senior)	Positive
KDH (Christian democrats)	Government (junior)	Positive
SMK (party of the ethnic Hungarian minority)	Government (junior)	Positive
Smer (social democrats)	Opposition	Neutral
HZDS (V. Meciar's party)	Opposition	Neutral

5.4.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

To a lesser degree than the Poles, the Slovaks also had to re-evaluate vital strategic and economic elements of their long-term relationship with the Ukrainians to ensure their interests would not be compromised before they made their choice to join the ranks of the crusaders for a democratic neighbourhood. As the crisis unfolded across the divided country, Bratislava gradually became more vocal in its cheering for team orange, in effect attempting to shadow Warsaw, which presided over the round-table talks between the Kuchma-Yanukovich and Yushchenko-Tymoshenko camps. Since the crescendo indicates that Slovak foreign policy evolved, what was the cost-benefit calculation that foreign policy-makers operated with in autumn 2004? Did it change as the crisis in Ukraine escalated, and if so, how?

Economically, Bratislava had fairly strong incentives to get involved in the Ukrainian crisis: the "cynical" rationale, as a diplomat stationed at the Slovak embassy in Kiev

at the time put it, was to help steer the colossal neighbour closer to the EU, promote trade liberalisation and thus ease Slovak access to the largely unexplored Ukrainian market.[472] In 2003, two years after the two countries signed a treaty pledging tighter cross-border cooperation, Slovakia's economy ministry still assessed mutual flows of goods and services as "modest"—though "underwhelming" would have been a better descriptor, as several experts conceded in personal interviews —and at roundtables behind closed doors, government officials cited "unfulfilled potential".[473] The balance remained negative for Slovakia, a rather needy importer of Ukrainian steel, arms, heavy machinery, oil, textiles and agricultural produce. But capturing trends, Table 5.7 indicates that in the wake of the Orange Revolution, Slovak exports to Ukraine were on slowly climbing up, and the balance was tipping more in Slovakia's favour, which could have wetted Bratislava's appetite for "booty".

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472 "Off the record" remark by a diplomat stationed at Slovakia's embassy in Ukraine in the early 2000s.

473 *Slovak-Ukrainian Society*, 2004. Okruhly stol k obchodno-ekonomickej spolupraci medzi SR a Ukrajinou. Report from a roundtable discussion about Slovak-Ukrainian economic cooperation.

Table 5.10: Foreign trade turnover between Slovakia and Ukraine 2000-2004

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Import	8 732,3	9 382,6	8 473,1	8 586,5	8 437
Export	6 797,2	7 036,6	7 064,1	8 151,0	5 459
Turnover	15 529,5	16 419,2	15 537,2	16 737,5	13 896
Balance	- 1 935,1	- 2 346,0	- 1 409,0	- 435,5	-2 978

Source: SARIO[474], in millions of SKK

Seemingly eager to change the trade relationship after the most successful year yet in 2003, Bratislava embarked on a lively exercise in institutional engineering with Kiev in 2003-2004. As part of this initiative, the countries spearheaded the establishment of the Slovak-Ukrainian Chamber of Trade and Industry in April 2003 as well as of an inter-governmental committee for cross-border cooperation, which had its first session in May 2004, months ahead of the Orange Revolution.[475] Importantly, the Slovaks kept cooing about trade liberalisation and European integration. The subject supposedly dominated debates at most major expert fora.

Moving on from trade to FDI, overall, Slovakia did not fare much better as investor in Ukraine, either. In the first 18 years after the declaration of independence, 124 countries invested in Ukraine. To the more than $40bn in total FDI injected in Ukraine in that period, Slovakia only contributed $106.4m. Despite geographical proximity to Ukraine, it ranked a lame 16th among the 25 EU members in investment

474 Slovak Embassy in Ukraine, 2005. Export Plan for Ukraine. Document of the Ministry of Economy.

475 Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, 2003. Slovak-Ukrainian Committee for Cross-border Cooperation: Statutes. Retrieved from archive.

bulk, lagging behind more remote Cyprus (21.5%), Germany (16.5%), Britain (5.9%), Russia (6.7%) and even the U.S. (3.5%).[476] But table 5.8 suggests that apart from the Czech Republic, Slovak investment was equally minuscule elsewhere: at the time of the Orange Revolution, Slovakia's economy did not yet sport the growth rates that later earned it its nickname "Tatra tiger". It still needed FDI inflows more than outflows. In this respect, Ukraine was a treasure of hidden opportunities. By autumn of 2004, Ukrainian companies had not invested in Slovakia at all.

Table 5.11: Slovak FDI in Ukraine 1998-2002: comparative perspective

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Ukraine	37	446	46	146	5
Czech Republic	3136	-17482	961	1529	-769
Hungary	1953	-128	25	30	9
Poland	153	112	81	-29	549

Source: National Bank of Slovakia[477], SKK m

When brawling protesters swept the streets of Kiev and occupied Independence Square in November 2004, the Slovaks spotted a chance to start the treasure hunt: Viktor Yushchenko and his supporters could deliver Ukraine its European future and Slovakia its FDI. Advocate of "dissident geopolitics" Alexander Duleba, the country's leading Eastern Europe analyst and head of the *Slovak Foreign Policy Association*, a think-tank with close ties to the Slovak MFA, explains why the Slovaks associated the promise of intensive economic cooperation with the orange camp: "We

476 Slovak Statistical Office, 2010. Yearbook. Foreign Trade. Ukraine. (Data accounts for the period ending in 2010)

477 National Bank of Slovakia, 2003. Foreign Direct Investment. Statistics.

were convinced that if Ukraine joined the same international regimes—namely the WTO—signed a free-trade agreement and pursued EU membership, step by step, our economic exchange would increase two- or three-fold, which would help us reduce regional disparities and boost growth and create jobs in Eastern Slovakia, the most under-developed part of our country.[478]

Post-revolutionary figures did, to some extent, deliver on the expectations of missionaries, as Table 5.11 indicates. Economic exchange intensified, though at a fairly glacial pace, which indicates that elite turnover in Ukraine did not have much of a positive impact. In terms of investment, corruption continued to stall the permeation of the Ukrainian markets by Slovak companies, as highlighted by Slovakia's embassy in Ukraine, which compiled a detailed report on the investment climate in the country in 2005.[479] In fact, the abolishment of free economic zones, the reshuffle of priority areas of development as well as re-privatisation in the aftermath of the 2004 presidential election arguably complicated, rather than simplified, access and operation of foreign firms in Ukraine.

478 Duleba 2011

479 Slovak embassy in Ukraine 2005, p. 5, 10

Table 5.12: Foreign trade turnover between Ukraine and Slovakia 2004-2010

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Import	13185	15818	17224	15058	15793
Export	95057	12022	15659	19203	20837
Turnover	22681	27810	32882	34261	36630
Balance	-3679	-3796	-1565	4145	5044

Source: Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs[480], in SKK m

Further to Slovakia's macro-structure ahead of the Orange Revolution, given Russia's institutional, financial and rhetorical involvement in the Yushchenko-Yanukovych presidential race, the small country had to factor trade and energy with the former imperial power into its risk assessment when pondering various foreign policy options. Economic exchange—heavily oriented on Russia's natural resources, "black gold" and, of course, gas—had hovered almost exclusively in the black for years: while Russian exports had accounted for an approximately 10% share of the total Slovak imports, while the other way around, and understandably so given the stark difference in the countries' size, the stake only came to 1-1.5%. The figure represents the highest negative balance on Slovakia's foreign trade sheet, with very few upward swings for Slovakia, year after year.[481] To date, Slovakia is a net importer of oil and gas, and dependent on Russia for 100% of its oil, via the single pipeline with a telling name "Druzhba" ("friendship" in Russian) and 98% of its gas, which puts in on par with countries such as Finland, Bulgaria and Austria, the end-hub for the planned

480 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. 2011. Economic Briefing: Ukraine. Retrieved from archive.

481 Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic, 2004. Results of Foreign Trade. Statistics. Retrieved from archive.

Nabucco pipeline. Table 5.10, outlining the trends in foreign trade – including oil and gas imports – between Slovakia and Russia around the time of the Orange Revolution, suggests that the situation was progressively worsening for the former, even more so after 2004, mainly due to oil and gas price hikes. It is key to note that these developments cannot be causally traced back to the Slovaks' revolutionary "tryst" with the orange camp.

Table 5.13: Foreign trade turnover between Slovakia and Russia in 2003-2006

	2003	2004	2005	2006
Import	89,595	88,509	114,893	150,924
Export	9,817	10,824	15,524	20,362
Balance	-79,778	-77,685	-99,369	-130,562

Source: Slovak Ministry of Economy[482], in SKK m

Given the heavy reliance on Russian energy sources, it might come as a surprise that as late as 2003, drafting a coherent strategy for diversification had not really entered the Slovak officials' minds. As missionary Karel Hirman, advisor to several prime ministers on energy security put it: "Our excessive dependency concerned only a couple of mocked 'doom-mongers', which was ironic, since Russia had been flexing its muscles since the ascent of power-hungry Putin, who had already demonstrated readiness to use economic tools to pursue his modernised version of neo-imperialist foreign policy."[483] The country was, by own admission of several then-members of

482 Ibid

483 Hirman, K., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.1.

the establishment, less than ready to cope with a potential crisis.[484] In 2004, Slovakia still had not reached the targeted minimum 90-days' worth of supply required in an emergency: if cut off, its storage tanks would run dry in 55 days. This proved extremely problematic during the Russo-Ukrainian spat five years later.[485] Trailing the rest of Europe, Slovakia made a rhetorical commitment to diversify its energy supply in a policy paper released by the economy ministry in 2004, but settled for fairly nebulous pledges to support long-term projects in progress, such as Nabucco, and to go "green" and explore sources of clean energy.[486] Overall, in the cost-benefit calculation, the extent to which Slovakia's economy was intertwined with Russia's should have been factored in as a potential risk: in theory, Bratislava's orange allegiance could have endangered economic cooperation with the pro-blue Moscow and threatened energy security.

Yet, such scenarios, as Hirman hinted, were scarcely considered, and in any case, post-2004 developments suggest that they did not become reality, as Slovak-Russian maintained close economic ties. In 2008, for instance, the centre-left government led by Robert Fico ceremoniously signed another agreement with Gazprom, which vowed to keep the country warm until 2018.[487] Unprepared for trouble, the Slovaks had to

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484 Conclusion drawn from several interviews with government officials.

485 Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic. Energy Policy of the Slovak Republic in Perspective. Government document.

486 Ibid

487 The annual volume of 1bn m3 remained bulkiest in the EU27.

cram "diversification" into their heads the hard way soon thereafter. The disruption of energy supplies from Russia due to Gazprom's squabble with Yulia Tymoshenko's adamant cabinet over transit dues in 2009 caused, according to several high-ranking civil servants in office at the time, the gravest national security crisis in Slovakia's post-communist history.[488] Learning from their mistakes, Slovak policy-makers signed important contracts with European energy giants E.ON Ruhrgas of Germany and GDF Suez of France as soon as 2010.[489]

5.4.2. Micro-structure: structural power

The micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship in Slovakia in the run up to the "neighbourhood crusade" strongly resembled the one in place ahead of the "allied crusade": advocates of "dissident geopolitics" continued to wield notable *structural power*. At the time of the Orange Revolution, they had just started eyeing the Eastern neighbourhood with more interest, as the fulfilment of the historic goal of joining the European community forced them to broaden their horizons in search of a new foreign policy agenda. Ukraine was an obvious destination for the transport of Slovakia's transition know-how, an activity, which had already been identified as a

488 For instance, Fico, R., 2011; Kalinak, R., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 20.2.

489 *Visegrad.info,* 2010. Energy Security of the Visegrad Region.

potentially attractive new foreign policy branding.[490] Yet for various reasons, it was not yet perceived as such by the majority of missionaries in key decision-making posts, which means that *structural power* mattered more in this case: those few that cared about Ukraine came to play an important role in foreign policy-making in the autumn of 2004.

Similarly to the Czech Republic and Poland, advocacy of "dissident geopolitics" in Slovakia had "hawkish" and "dovish" incarnations: but while in the former two countries, the bifurcation had few implications for *structural power,* in Slovakia, it mattered. While "doves" – focused on democracy promotion and transition experience-sharing in the post-Soviet space, the first two pillars of the normative framework – dominated the ranks of opinion-makers, "hawks" – motivated by Atlanticism and to an extent lesser than in the Czech Republic or Poland, Russophobia, the other two pillars of "dissident geopolitics" – were recruited mainly from the circles of decision-makers, which created latent tensions. Simply put, missionary work in Ukraine had fewer devotees in the executive branch and in the diplomatic corps.

Starting with opinion-makers, *structural power* still rested in the hands of a handful of veteran public figures, such as Martin Butora, the recently retired U.S. ambassador who re-joined the leading centre-right think-tank *Institute for Public Affairs* after a failed presidential bid in 2003, or the elusive activist par excellence Pavol Demes,

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490 Conclusions drawn from several interviews, including Szomolanyi 2011; Korcok 2011; Valasek 2011

who headed the Central European bureau of the *German Marshall Fund*. But by 2004, an up-and-coming generation advocating "dissident geopolitics" from an anti-Meciar, rather than an anti-communist, perspective, had also become a more prominent voice. Professional activists, some of whom masterminded the GOTV "Rock the Vote" campaign that drew Slovak youth to the polls during the crucial election of 1998, such as Bratislava-based Milan Nic of the *Pontis Foundation* or travelling coaches of "coloured revolutionaries" Marek Kapusta and Balasz Jarabik, were among those most eager to convince Slovak policy-makers to express support for the scammed Ukrainian voters.[491] By autumn 2004, they had acquired sufficient *access* to decision-making circles to engage in meaningful persuasion. It is key to note that the ascent of these "junior" missionaries was organic, rather than "staged" by heavyweights such as Butora. Their participation in the struggle against Meciarism, as well as their expertise, impregnated them with a certain moral authority that appealed to advocates of "dissident geopolitics" among Slovak officials.

Moving on to decision-makers, "hawkish" proponents of "dissident geopolitics" remained over-represented in this echelon of the foreign policy elite. The most prominent Atlanticist converts included prime minister Mikulas Dzurinda, advised by a trio of missionaries (Milan Jezovica in Bratislava and Martin Butora's successor at the Washington, DC-based embassy, and Rastislav Kacer, seconded by his political

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491 Senior political figures included Martin Butora, former U.S. ambassador and then-head of the Institute of Public Affairs, and Pavol Demes, German Marshall Fund's representative in Central Europe, while the up-and-coming generation of activists steeled in the anti-Meciar struggle comprised Milan Nic, Balasz Jarabik or Marek Kapusta.

counsellor and later DCM Miroslav Wlachovsky), and foreign minister Eduard Kukan. The up-and-comers mentioned in the previous section received a significant boost in *access* upon appointment of Tomas Valasek, who had recently returned to the country from yet another stint in the think tank community in Washington, DC, to a post at the defense ministry. Valasek, who oversaw the ministry's international security initiatives, had close ties to Eastern Europe, as he had previously advised Ukraine and Bosnia, among others, on NATO and EU integration and edited a volume entitled the "The 'Easternisation' of Europe's Security Policy".[492] Along with Ivan Korcok at the MFA, Valasek claimed commitment to Ukraine's integration into the Euro-Atlantic political architecture, which, as the blue-orange bickering intensified, contributed to the growing awareness by Bratislava's foreign policy-making community of the strategic importance of Ukraine, as well as the emerging urge to engage in conflict management.[493] The appointments of Valasek and Korcok, ex-ambassador to the U.S. Rastislav Kacer argues today, reflected the desire of the second government of Mikulas Dzurinda to rejuvenate the foreign policy agenda, which, after NATO and EU accession, lacked a new direction.

In Slovakia, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" were not yet *disputed* by rival norm entrepreneurs to a degree that deserves a lengthier account as was the case with the "pragmatists" in the Czech Republic. But like in Poland, the local community of norm

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492 Valasek, T., 2004. The Easternisation of Europe's Security Policy. *Institute for Public Affairs and Center for Defense Information.*

493 Valasek 2001; Korcok 2011

entrepreneurs had a sub-culture of regional experts on the post-Soviet world, which conceived of democratic Ukraine from a knowledge-driven East European perspective that did not inevitably draw inspiration from "dissident geopolitics". As such, it should be decoupled from this particular normative framework and moreover, it should also be conceptualised as an *epistemic community,* practicing its own version of norm entrepreneurship. The group, which will be referred to as "experts" here, consisted of former academics, analysts or diplomats who had joined or returned from missions to the foreign and defense ministries in Bratislava. Their intellectual and professional interest in Eastern Europe, as well as personal experience gathered during long stints in countries such as Ukraine or Moldova, motivated them to push top policy-makers towards engagement with Ukraine, though not necessarily from a normative standpoint rooted in "dissident geopolitics". For instance, democratisation – the "experts" were, of course, in favour of free and fair elections – was not understood "politically", in terms of supporting a designated "opposition" and civil society from the bottom-up but "developmentally", in terms of promoting economic governance and rule of law from the top-down. "Experts", mostly hailing from opinion-making hubs, commanded some *structural power* among decision-makers: most notable in this camp were Ukraine ambassador Vasil Grivna, later in charge of public diplomacy and citizen services at the MFA, and Vladimir Tarasovic, deputy head of the *Institute for Security and Defense Studies* at the MOD.

To sum up, this section attempted to explain the workings of *structural power* possessed by advocates of "dissident geopolitics" ahead of the Orange Revolution. Though it was as notable as during the Iraq War, an internal division in the norm entrepreneur network, between "hawks", who were mostly decision-makers, and

"doves", who were mostly opinion-makers, as well as emerging competition from the outside of the group, of "experts", altered its mechanics: it operated differently than in 2003. The hitherto disinterest of "hawks" in Ukraine elevated the importance of the individual linkages that some of them had with "doves" among opinion-makers, and even among "experts", whose agenda was in line with that of the "doves", even if the impetus for advocacy of engagement during the Orange Revolution differed.

Figure 5.3: Slovak decision-makers during the Orange Revolution: structural power



5.4.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

Hence, in the course of the Orange Revolution, Slovak foreign policy discourse reflected two *micro-narratives* directed at the decision-making "hawks" by "doves" and "experts". Both slanted towards Atlanticism and perhaps best captured by the concept "anti-Meciarist geopolitics", the *micro-narratives* blended of "dissident geopolitics" and post-Soviet and transition expertise. The use of the "micro-" label for these narratives—in the case of Poland, it was more appropriate to speak of *macro-* or even *meta-narratives*—is intentional, and it relates to the shallow penetration of the local foreign policy debate by *framing devices* focused specifically on Ukraine. As such, it is a good conceptual fit with an earlier empirical conclusion posed by Alexander Duleba of the alternative norm entrepreneur network of "experts", who asserted that at the time of the escalated blue-orange rift, that the Slovak government could not claim to have a coherent Ukraine policy to speak of or adhere to. From this statement, two important pointers for the upcoming discourse analysis emerge: to what extent did norm entrepreneurs resort to a) generalisation or theorisation and b) artificially constructed, if not outright forceful, "attribution of similarity", to justify their motivation and preference for supporting the "neighbourhood crusade"?

Among opinion-makers who advocated "dissident geopolitics", parallels with the "velvet revolution" in Czechoslovakia, as well as with the struggle against Meciarism, combined into a pro-democratic *micro-narrative* that evoked sympathy with the orange-clad protesters out in the cold at the Independence Square. 1989 veterans, such as Martin Butora, recall that they stuck to rhetorical action based on universal values,

as they spoke out, calling on the political elite and the Slovak public to endorse the Ukrainians' right to a free and fair vote.[494] For 1998 graduates, like Pavol Demes, the uprising of 2004 bore striking resemblance to the social movement and voter mobilisation that helped the Slovaks carry out what academics later called an "electoral revolution" against Vladimir Meciar. They believed that the know-how based on their own experience was transferable to Ukraine. Upon departing for Kiev in his capacity as local GMF representative in November 2004, Demes told Butora and others at a brief meeting in Bratislava that, "History repeats itself. I have an emotional connection to their cause. We have done some work for them already, and now it's time to help them pull through."[495]

Yet within the fund-starved community of activists immersed in day-to-day tough competition for limited resources, pragmatism also dictated that the Atlanticist *micro-narrative* be featured in the foreign policy discourse using persuasive framing. In this respect, young newcomers such as Balazs Jarabik have to be recognised as a discursive force that helped steer their counterparts in the executive, for instance Milan Jezovica at the prime minister's office, to intercept the Orange Revolution as an opportunity to work more closely with the Americans.[496] Jarabik, funded by *Freedom House,* had been helping with fundraising for the Ukrainian opposition youth movement *Pora* since 2003, the year before the revolution. In this sense, the

494 Butora 2011

495 Demes 2011; Hospodarske noviny, 2004. Oranzovo-zlta revolucia. 2.12.

496 *Blisty.cz,* 2005. Tvorcovia revolucii: pro-americki Che Guevarovia. 17.6; Jarabik 2011

understanding of what it meant to be a "good ally", provided yet another reason for the strategic use of international norms such as "procedural democracy", to explain the rationale for engagement, rather than inaction, in revolutionary Ukraine. In the same vein as Demes, Jarabik maintains that the Slovak "experience"—which, remembering it today, he puffs up a little with a knowing smile as the "life experience" of his generation— was extremely relevant for the Ukrainians, adding that the Americans, for whom democracy promotion is a "professional vocation", knew and embraced that.[497] Needless to say, he concedes that what really counted out of the Central European input was Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski's personal relationship with Leonid Kuchma. "We didn't have that many contacts," he says.[498] Jarabik came to Ukraine after he had been expelled from Belarus, where he spent the bulk of his post-Meciar years as an activist.

For the "experts", the other breed of norm entrepreneurs among opinion-makers, both the democratisation and Atlanticist *micro-narratives* used by Demes or Jarabik were stripped of even the last bit of sentiment: they were used to accentuate the burning need for a Ukraine policy, as Alexander Duleba puts it.[499] Boris Latta, a left-leaning journalist who spent the Orange Revolution in Kiev as a correspondent, also insists that,

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497 Jarabik 2011

498 Ibid

499 Duleba 2011

We knew it was all about business for our policy-makers. "Crusading" could have endangered our prospects. Parroting that verbal support for the Ukrainian demonstrators would improve or deepen our good relations with the U.S. was our way of putting some pressure on them to show at least a bit of solidarity. Of course, they ended up doing barely enough to get the moral credit, but it was something.[500]

Among decision-makers, all of these *micro-narratives* resonated, though they were less actively applied as *framing devices* for Slovak-Ukrainian relations in the run up to the Orange Revolution. The underdeveloped nature of Slovak-Ukrainian relations, as well as the "hawks'" relative cluelessness about the neighbour labeled as a "priority" in several strategic foreign policy documents dating from the early 2000s, were to blame.[501] As ambassador to Ukraine Vasil Grivna, an "expert" norm entrepreneur, explains it: "To say something is a priority is one thing, to act upon it is another. Without decent traffic in terms of economic activity, you can hardly argue that 'adhering to our democratic standards will help you do business with us', which is what would have been a very juicy carrot – and as such, an effective electoral fraud deterrent—for Kuchma and Yanukovich."[502]

Yet still, there were a handful of missionaries and converts among Slovak policy-

500 Latta, B., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 29.1.

501 MFA of the Slovak Republic. Annual Reports of Foreign Policy 2004-2007. Retrieved from archive; MFA of the Slovak Republic, 2004. Foreign Policy Alignment for 2004. Retrieved from archive.

502 Grivna 2011

makers who did evoke norm-oriented *micro-narratives* in their public statements: hence, *structural power,* as section 5.3.2 proposed, proved crucial during the Orange Revolution. On the national level, "dissident geopolitics" found rhetorical expression through deputy foreign minister Ivan Korcok, and, on the international level, diplomat Jan Kubis, then-secretary general of Vienna-based OSCE, who collaborated closely with Slovak ex-ambassador to Ukraine Vasil Grivna while he was in Kiev as a member of the international mediation team.[503] Of great interest is the Slovak politicians' somewhat inflated perception of their limited engagement. Foreign minister Eduard Kukan describes it this way, "We were clearly invested in the issue." At the same time, when asked about Poland's contribution, he doesn't fail to add a justification: "We weren't fanatical, but reasonable. We reacted adequately, given our position."[504] In conclusion, Slovak foreign policy discourse was, perhaps, less rich in *persuasive framing* then would have been expected, given Ukraine's geographical proximity and shared historical and cultural ties. "[Alexander] Duleba could talk about Ukraine as a 'mythical country' and good neighbourliness…but that was pretty much it," says Grivna, whose interview responses suggest that he was capable of doing the same as Duleba.[505] Yet, the *micro-narratives* based on Atlanticism and democratisation activated the "attribution of similarity" between the Slovaks' experience of 1998 and the Ukrainians' struggle of 2004, which eased the

503 Kubis, J., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 10.5.

504 Kukan 2011

505 Grivna 2011

justification of involvement in the Orange Revolution on the part of decision-makers.

5.4.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

Some of the normative *micro-narratives* capitalising on "Meciarist geopolitics" and regional expertise ended up motivating foreign policy output prepared by the scarcer missionaries and/or converts among decision-makers. Needless to say, *structural power*—in other words, access to the "apex"—of the various groups of norm entrepreneurs proved crucial at this critical juncture. Without Vasil Grivna at the embassy in Kiev, Pavol Demes and Balazs Jarabik shuttling between embassies, opposition dens and freezing squares packed with revolutionaries in Kiev whilst maintaining telephone contact with decision-makers in Bratislava, and the Valasek-Korcok-Jezovica trio at the MOD, MFA and premier's team, respectively, Slovakia, at least when it comes to official foreign policy output, might have "missed" Ukraine's revolutionary moment altogether. It is fair to say that it got involved thanks to a handful of zealous missionaries.

As the Slovaks seconded the Poles, Bratislava played "cadet" to Warsaw's "commander". It released the appropriate political signals couched in the captivating language of international norms in most key instances during the unfolding crisis.[506] For instance, the November 23 statement of deputy foreign minister Ivan Korcok,

506 Kovalov, V., 2007. Ukrajina: oranzova deziluzia a trnista cesta tranzicie. In: Tarasovic, V., et al (ed.). *Panorama globalneho bezpecnostneho prostredia 2005-2006*. Bratislava: CENAA, p. 289-310

who called on the Ukrainian presidential administration and the Ukrainian Central Election Committee ahead of the hotly anticipated second round of the election to ensure that the vote would be free and fair, demonstrated a firm commitment to "procedural democracy", which he took for a universal value that should be granted to any Slovak, Ukrainian, Burmese or Cuban, as Korcok himself puts it seven years on.[507] In between the rigged run-off—and the final re-run, which rightly adjudged the victory to Viktor Yushchenko, Korcok, Ambassador Vasil Grivna and above all, OSCE heavy-weight Jan Kubis, were consistent in their active attempts to contribute to the resolution of the stalemate.[508]

Remembering the "round-table talks" with the benefit of 2011 hindsight, Jan Kubis emphasises that preventing a violent crackdown on the chanting orange crowds was instrumental, but extremely difficult for the Poles to secure, given Leonid Kuchma's conviction of their "partiality".[509] That is where the Slovak diplomat contributed most, according to his own words and those of another negotiator, who insisted that this part of his interview be off the record.[510] The declaration released after the first cycle of the negotiations indicates that the team led by Polish President Alexander

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507 Korcok 2011; Stanislawski 2005, p. 38

508 Stanislawski 2005; Kukan 2011; Kubis 2011; Grivna 2011

509 Kubis 2011; compare with Pifer 2007

510 Off-the-record remarks by a Polish diplomat involved in the round-table negotiations.

Kwasniewski succeeded, perhaps also thanks to Jan Kubis.[511] In the meantime, Vasil Grivna, an "expert" norm entrepreneur, made sure that the Slovak embassy on Yaroslavov Val in Kiev was the first one to condemn the electoral manipulation during the second round of the election.[512] Advocates of "dissident geopolitics" Pavol Demes and Balazs Jarabik provided the embassy with streaming updates on the situation out on the square and in the streets at the time. Moreover, ambassador Grivna, a polyhistor hailed as "omniscient" about Ukraine by several prominent Slovak academics, including Alexander Duleba, actively engaged in *persuasion* at the regularly scheduled meetings of diplomats representing the various EU member states, allegedly in order to convince policy-makers from countries such as France or Ireland, who, he claims, were not too knowledgeable about Ukraine, towards "dooming the establishment's mockery of Western democratic standards".[513] Grivna's zeal provides a good example of Slovak "partiality" in "safe places": though decision-makers understandably remained on diplomatic tiptoe in their official documents – which was the case elsewhere, but for instance, less so in Poland – policy discourse behind closed doors buzzed with norms such as freedom and democracy. "They thought Ukraine was like Slovakia in the 1990s. Unfinished business," says

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511 The declaration stated that both sides of the conflict "oppose the use of force and wish to avoid bloodshed, and that they have decided to join talks in order to solve the election crisis". Kubis recalls pushing for that particular formulation.

512 Slovak embassy in Ukraine, 2004. Statement on the Ukrainian election. 22.11. Obtained by author.

513 Grivna 2011

Alexander Duleba. "But it was infinitely more complicated." [514]

Similarly to Poland, the overall consistency of Slovakia's foreign policy output was also upheld ardent efforts of more explicitly pro-orange Slovak missionaries on the ground, whose commitment to civil society development dated back to pre-revolutionary Ukraine. Though these advocates of "dissident geopolitics" or "Meciarist geopolitics" were not producing foreign policy output in the strictest sense of the word, they inspired decision-makers through passive leverage and active *persuasion* and contributed to the overall perception – the Slovaks' and that of the international community – that Bratislava cast its net wide and was quite extensively "involved" in the Orange Revolution, which is a conclusion confirmed by David Kramer, then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, responsible for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus affairs. [515] Pavol Demes and Balasz Jarabik, who first visited Ukraine in 1999, organised a string of trainings for Ukrainian activists, which climaxed in Uzghorod in May 2004, focusing on non-violent resistance, distributing countless, largely NED- and Freedom House-produced, materials about democratisation, and holding multiple seminars about GOTV techniques. [516] "Meciarist geopolitics" motivated them to apply the *framing device* "attribution of similarity", both of them say today. The closely interlinked

514 Duleba 2011

515 Kramer 2011

516 Simecka, M., 2011. Diffusion and Civil Society Mobilization in Coloured Revolutions. *CEU Political Science Journal* 1:1-25

youth movements "Black" and "Yellow" Pora ("It's Time"), which played a key role in mobilising the Ukrainian electorate in 2003, drew much inspiration from their know-how. Interestingly, the parallel development and campaigning of two Poras is partly a reflection of two divergent influences from Serbian and Slovakian innovations in the context of Ukrainian activism: the more radical Black Pora, trained by Serbian activists, was closely modelled on Otpor, a Serbian opposition movement against Slobodan Milosevic, while the more moderate Yellow Pora, advised by Slovaks, incorporated many of the strategies of the OK98 campaign against Vladimir Meciar.

In conclusion, the case of Slovak foreign policy during the Orange Revolution highlights the impact that norms and norm entrepreneurs can have on perceptions of incentives, as well as the importance of *structural power* for norm entrepreneurship. In the absence of a well-designed Ukraine policy ahead of the Orange Revolution, section 5.3.1. demonstrated that Slovakia was missing out economic opportunities. Though advocates of "dissident geopolitics" – or of Slovakia's own "Meciarist" avatar of it – were not too concerned with that particular aspect of Slovak-Ukrainian relations, their missionary zeal during the Orange Revolution, coupled with the cause-effect arguments of the alternative norm entrepreneur network of "experts" who pleaded with decision-makers to start exploring Eastern markets, helped put Ukraine on the country's foreign policy radar after the Orange Revolution was over. The patterns of norm enactment in foreign policy in autumn 2004 speak lengths about the importance of *structural power.* Relatively few "dovish" missionaries among decision-makers and opinion-makers managed to use their *access* and persuasive power well to steer their generally uninformed "hawkish" counterparts to reflect on

norm-driven *micro-narratives* during the process of decision-making. Lastly, this section suggests that being *more disputed* in general does not necessarily constrain norm entrepreneurs. Advocates of "dissident geopolitics" and "experts" in effect formed an alliance that helped both of them advance their agendas, even if their motivations for a preferred course of action differed.

5.5. Conclusion: for Ukraine we fight

The foreign policy of the three Central European states vis-à-vis Ukraine at the time of the Orange Revolution represents the first major democracy promotion venture in the Eastern neighbourhood, as well as a tribute to "dissident geopolitics" under the conditions of notable economic and security incentives. It has demonstrated that even within a more enticing macro-structure – which, apart from Poland, was not in place at the time of the "allied crusade" – effective norm entrepreneurship can utilise *framing* to create resonant *meta-* and *micro-narratives* that aid foreign policy-makers in the articulation of national interest. Hence, norms may not be an independent variable with substantial explanatory power that would account for foreign policy outcomes, as they were, it was argued, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia during the Iraq War, but they can still serve as an intervening variable that affects foreign policy-making by filtering it through a logic of appropriateness. In this particular case, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" used a powerful *framing device* capitalising on "attribution of similarity" that stipulated that the Czechs', Poles' and Slovaks' experience with extrication from communism and/ or Meciarism should compel them to demonstrate solidarity with the Ukrainians protesting against the violation of their

basic political rights through engagement: via rhetorical support, conflict mediation, involvement of other actors such as the EU or the U.S. and transition experience-sharing.

The analysis of the patterns of norm enactment in foreign policy in the three countries, the missionary zeal, has reached several conclusions that have to be linked back to this dissertation's original hypotheses. First, the effect of norms does not necessarily pale as security and economic incentives get stronger because foreign policy-makers may not perceive them as such, especially if there is little "Ukraine policy" to speak of, like in the Czech Republic and even Slovakia. Hence, norm entrepreneurship can reconstitute national interests by reshuffling foreign policy priorities. Advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in the two smaller states can be credited with drawing attention to Ukraine, which rose in importance in the foreign policy agenda after the Orange Revolution. The norm entrepreneurs' capacity to enforce their logic of appropriateness even in situations of greater uncertainty may even suggest that the Czech Republic and Slovakia had reached the stage of *norm internalisation.*

The first hypothesis therefore does not exactly hold:

H2a. The effect of "dissident geopolitics" will be weaker in situations involving strong(er) security and material interests.

Moreover, this chapter has found that the domestic prerequisites of successful norm entrepreneurship, such as *structural power* and *framing,* go to greater lengths than expected in explaining the subtle variance in the value-laden Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy outcomes. Mirroring the Iraqi invasion, Poland as a regional

power opted for the most activist contribution to the solution of the blue-orange deadlock, while the two weaker states decided on a comparably more modest rhetorical and diplomatic support for the orange coalition led by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. The pervasive national consensus and *structural power* of norm entrepreneurs in Poland, the *access* of a handful of missionaries to key policy-makers in Slovakia, and the greater extent to which advocates of "dissident geopolitics" were *disputed* in the Czech Republic help us understand both why *framing* based on norms either moved beyond foreign policy discourse or did not, and the degree to which that was the case.

Therefore, the second hypothesis has been confirmed:

H2b. The better the access of relevant norm entrepreneurs to domestic decision-makers – *structural power* – and the greater their clout vis-à-vis other norm entrepreneurs – in other words, the extent to which their framing *resonates* – the higher the influence of norms on foreign policy outcomes.[517]

While the chapter on the Iraq War tested for norm influence in a macro-structural vacuum, the case of the Orange Revolution explored the material/immaterial nexus of norm enactment at the backdrop of strong incentives. The upcoming chapter on the Russia Reset adds an additional analytical layer: disintegration of norm entrepreneur networks and/or emergence of *structurally powerful* competing ones. It remains to be

517 Further to the extent of dispute, it appears that it is not the mere presence but the nature of alternative norm entrepreneurs that enables or hinders the enactment of "dissident geopolitics". In the Czech Republic, "pragmatists" were rivals, while in Slovakia, "experts" were facilitators.

seen how well normative frameworks fare in explaining foreign policy outcomes at the time of normative shifts.

6. Chapter 6. Russia Reset: the "Aborted Crusade" (2009-2011)

6.1. Introduction: coalition of the hesitant?

Similarly to the Iraqi invasion, the pursuit of a Russia reset on the part of Central European countries seemed counter-intuitive at first, though from a norm-oriented, not interest-driven perspective, given that latent Russophobia had long represented one of the steadfast pillars of "dissident geopolitics". Yet comparisons are relative: pitted against the region's involvement in the Orange Revolution, on the other hand, the choice of this foreign policy course was not that unlikely because like Ukraine, Russia belonged to the CEE states' broader neighbourhood, and tangible security concerns and economic incentives had to be factored into the cost-benefit analysis. Table 6.1 below depicts the clash, or lack thereof, between the logics of consequences and appropriateness at the three critical junctures that constitute the foreign policy case studies in this dissertation. The Russia Reset is a critical case because while the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia had bucked the logic of consequences before – in other words, they let norms reconstitute interests – they had not yet defied the logic of appropriateness, as it were understood by the proponents of "dissident geopolitics", by allowing incentives to adjust normative frameworks.

Table 6.1: Probability of foreign policy outcomes by interests and norms

	Iraqi invasion	Involvement in the Orange Revolution	Pursuit of Russia Reset
Security and economic incentives	Low to medium	Medium to high	Medium to high
Normative resonance	High	High	Medium to low
Probability of foreign policy course	Low – interests High – norms	Medium – interests High – norms	High – interests Low – norms

Hence, the Russia Reset challenges some of the proposed hypotheses about the power of norm entrepreneurship by testing the durability and sustainability of elite networks bound by value systems that are entrenched in specific historical contexts, such as "dissident geopolitics". In other words, do values transform as post-authoritarian states nestle in the safe and comfortable haven of democratic "normalcy" and redefine their interests accordingly? Do they change in response to tectonic shifts in the international system, which, in the course of a decade, can shift from intrepid American unipolarity to messy multipolarity as neophytes like Brazil, China and India struggle for political power while former global policemen of the Cold War tire of their former responsibilities? Do values mutate in the face of structural changes in the domestic arena, be they generational change, elite turnover after elections or party system re-alignment? Or, given the focus of this dissertation, do norms retreat or are they replaced when networks of norm entrepreneurs, or exceptional and/or powerful individuals within them, switch allegiances and change preferences?[518] Simply put,

518 Norms do not have to retreat only because norm entrepreneurs change their preferences. They can

can missionaries themselves become converts?

6.2. The realpolitik explanation revisited: mercenaries whose pay was cut?

The announcement by the Obama administration in 2009 of the intention to "press the 'reset' button" in US-Russia relations was met with what could, perhaps, best be described as thinly veiled umbrage in Central Europe. In February, Washington signalled rapprochement in Vice President Joe Biden's remarks at the Munich Security Conference, where it once symbolically sealed CEE states' "Western" fate by promising to secure their membership in NATO. Biden hinted that Americans were likely to "backtrack on their promise to the Central Europeans" by proclaiming that they would continue developing the missile defense program that had envisioned interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic, but only in ongoing consultation with the Russians.[519] In September, it became clear that the George W. Bush-era plan would be scrapped altogether. "This is catastrophic for Poland," a defense ministry spokeswoman told CNN at the time.[520] Months before, Moscow

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also be weakened by the emergence of alternative norms and norm entrepreneur networks. While the latter point is acknowledged, due to the focus of this dissertation on "dissident geopolitics" and the corresponding norm entrepreneur network, this chapter will predominantly deal with the former one.

519 Biden, J., 2009. Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy. The White House, Office of the Vice President. 7.2.

520 *CNN.com*, 2009. U.S. Scraps Missile Defense Shield Plans. 17.9.

threatened deploy rockets in its European enclave, Kaliningrad, and in the summer of 2009, it teamed up with Minsk and staged a mock nuclear attack on Poland as a military exercise.

Greater flexibility on missile defense on the part of the US heralded a broader foreign policy shift toward strategic bilateralism with Russia and, at the same time, nominal multilateralism towards NATO and European allies. The abandonment of the NMD scheme helped create the much-needed opportunity to explore deeper US-Russia cooperation in Europe, hitherto stalled by conflicts over NATO expansion, the 2008 war in Georgia, and the January 2009 energy crisis. It enabled the two powers to take further steps toward fulfilling a shared interest in moving ahead with talks on a new strategic arms control pact. Furthermore, it allowed them to translate the limited cooperation in Afghanistan—where the Russians made it clear that if the Americans had any chance of defeating the Taliban, they would have to go through them, if only by pressuring the Kyrgyz government to "evict" US forces from the critical Manas airbase—into a more durable partnership.[521] Last, the "strategic condominium style of negotiations and diplomacy", as most Central European commentators interpreted it, opened doors for Obama's foreign and defense policy team to start discussing greater Russian involvement in the effort of the international community to exert concerted pressure on a defiant Iran.[522]

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521 Mankoff, J., 2009. The Tricky U.S.-Russia 'Reset' Button. *Council on Foreign Relations*. 18.2.

522 Hynek, N., et al., 2010. The US-Russian Security 'Reset': Implications for Central-Eastern Europe and Germany. *European Security* 18(3):263-285

6.3. Back to the constructivist argument: crusaders who wavered in their faith?

Though these macro-structural developments, wherein the revamp of the missile defense shield was only a by-product of US foreign policy realignment, were understandable in principle, they could not be easily "forgiven" by Central Europeans. Regional discourse on NMD was, naturally, heavily laden with simplistic geopolitics and historicism, and President Obama's "back-pedaling" triggered the local elites' "abandonment issues". Initially, foreign policy discourse across the region reflected an irrational fear – CEE states were, after all, NATO and EU members – of falling back into the sphere of Russian influence, the "Near Abroad", on which Moscow was accused of claiming an analogue to the Monroe Doctrine.[523] In this spirit, prominent CEE thinkers, politicians and intellectuals wrote an open letter to President Obama and published it in the Polish daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* in July 2009. Among other grievances, they mentioned that it was "striking" how abruptly NATO "disappeared" from President Obama's explanations of the future of the third pillar and lamented about the weakening of the transatlantic partnership.[524] Madeleine Albright, the retired Secretary of State, says today that the letter, which came out of the blue, did not meet with much sympathy across the pond: "We all worked to have Europe whole

523 Van Herpen, M.H., 2008. Medvedev's Proposal for a Pan-European Security Pact. *Cicero.* Working Paper WP 08-03, October; Lo, B., 2009. Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture. *Centre for European Reform*. Policy Brief

524 Ibid

and free. The first president Bush said it, president Clinton said it, and I said it, over and over again. It was a theme. Then, all of a sudden, we get this whiny letter while people are dying in Iraq and Afghanistan that we aren't paying enough attention to Central Europe when we had clearly done that for a very long time," she says. "It was not responsible."[525]

Interestingly, however, the Central Europeans' frustration with the Americans over missile defense soon underwent a curious metamorphosis that produced the foreign policy outcome that will be analysed here: their own "reset" with the Russians. In 2009-2010, Warsaw, Prague and Bratislava reinvented themselves by adopting a foreign policy course based on "Europeanisation" of their positioning in international relations and "normalisation" of their approach to Russia. In so doing, they came to understand that a new European security framework with less US involvement was inconceivable without Russia's full-fledged participation in European security issues.[526] Moreover, they had to concede that Russia's attempts to divide NATO, undermine existing European security treaties, including OSCE and CFE, and revamp Europe's security architecture according to the 2008 Medvedev Plan – all of which clearly capitalised on the perceived decline of the US role in European affairs – would have to be taken on through the framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The new line of thinking was eloquently expressed in an

525 Albright 2012

526 Koran, M., 2009. O ''strategicznym porozumieniu'' USA-Rosja, czyli dlaczego proste rozwiazania nie zawsze sie, sprawdzaja. *Polski Przeglad Dyplomatyczny* 9(2).

address by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radoslaw Sikorski, delivered on in August 2009 in San Francisco: "We support building a more federal [European] Union, which is able to play in global fields of competition as one of the strongest players…I am sure that a Union, which is able to take its fair share of responsibility for global affairs, is compatible with interests of the United States."[527]

Hence, the unintended side-effect of the Czech, Polish and Slovak Russia reset, as Sikorski's key speech indicates, has been a progressive "de-Americanisation" of these states' foreign policies via Europeanisation, encouraged by the US itself. Once again, it was US Vice President Joe Biden – a one-time member of the US Committee on NATO that lobbied in favour of the CEE states' NATO membership in the US Congress in the 1990s – during his October 2009 trip to Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, who conveyed the message that Washington supported the efforts to "Europeanise" foreign policy-making in Central Europe. In his speech on the US-CEE special relationship, Biden went on to encourage Central Europeans to become partners, rather than protégés, by paraphrasing one of the old speeches of the former Czech president Vaclav Havel, saying that "[a] person who cannot move and live a normal life because he is pinned under a boulder has more time to think about hopes

527 Sikorski, R., 2009. Poland Believes That the European Integration is the Best Response to Challenges We Face in a Rapidly Changing, Multi-polar World. Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. San Francisco, CA, USA, 20.9.

than someone who is not trapped in this way".[528]

This chapter will argue that after initial hesitation, the Czechs, Poles and Slovaks decided to "co-press the reset button" because the reassessment of incentives and disincentives for the policy in a new, post-transition, setting motivated key groups of norm entrepreneurs to readjust their understanding of what is "good" and "appropriate". The Russia Reset was undertaken in an international macro-structure and a domestic micro-structure that was profoundly different from the one in which normative constructs such as "dissident geopolitics" used to thrive. EU accession, Washington's relinquishment of the traditional Europe-first foreign policy, democratic consolidation and the disintegration of norm entrepreneur networks changed the rules and stakes of the norm entrepreneurship game. This transformation came at the expense of the game's record-setting champions, the advocates of "dissident geopolitics", as they prompted greater competition and livelier dispute in which it became harder to win. Arguably, in order to compete in this new, more stringent environment, missionaries had to "re-convert" to norms different from those they had originally been trying to spread.

Like in the previous two chapters, the case for the "aborted crusade" will be made in two parts. The evaluation of norm entrepreneurship in relevant Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy discourse and output will capitalise on an assessment of the so-

528 The White House, 2009b. Remarks by Vice President Biden on America, Central Europe and a Partnership for the 21st Century. Speech delivered in Bucharest, Romania. Office of the Vice-president. 22.10.

called "macro-structure" – material interests – and "micro-structure" – *structural power* and *access* of norm entrepreneur groups to key stakeholders – in the course of the Russia Reset (2009-2011). Overall, this chapter will attempt to turn the constructivist line of reasoning on its head: until now, we have been asking whether—and if so, how—norms, as an intervening variable, come to wield the power to shape and transform state interests. Causality runs both ways, however, and state interests, especially if undergoing profound changes, also affect and mould normative frameworks. To what extent does the theory of norm entrepreneurship enhance our conceptual understanding of the Czech Republic's, Poland's and Slovakia's chosen Russia policy in the first genuinely post-Cold War era of US-Russia relations?

6.4. Slovakia: sanctimonious heathens

The announcement of the "reset" of US-Russia relations did not cause as much of a stir in Bratislava as it did in Prague and Warsaw. As the Slovaks had not been included in the plans for the missile defense shield that were "binned" as a result, they were less disappointed than the Czechs or the Poles, who clung onto the promise of what they perceived as the long-desired American presence on their soil. The interceptors and the radar, they believed, would provide the "defenseless" Central European "mini-states", each with a tragic history of man-handling and slicing by stronger "mega-states", with the ultimate security guarantee: not only against rogue countries, such as Iran, but, whether the Czechs or the Poles admitted it openly or just under Chatham House rules, also the self-proclaimed regional super-power, Russia.

In Slovakia, in contrast, Russophobia had never taken root, whether based on "hard"

and "soft" security concerns, fears of economic expansionism or simply distaste of cultural neo-imperialism that President Putin's political technologists put to such clever use during his second term. In 2007, two years before the "reset button" started flashing, Europe's first pan-European think-tank, the *European Council on Foreign Relations* (ECFR), dubbed the Slovaks "friendly pragmatists" in its assessment of the various EU member states' relations with Moscow. Of the post-communist newcomers to the Union, the Bulgarians, Hungarians and Slovenians fell into the same category; the Czechs and Poles were "allocated" elsewhere.[529] Though in 2009, Slovak discourse on international politics and security echoed some ominous prophecies with latently anti-Russian undertones at the time of the historic Medvedev-Obama summit in Prague, it is fair to say that articles such as this one, published in the leading daily newspaper *SME,* were rare: "We do wish for a peaceful Russia, and the Russians have the same entitlement to prosperity as any other nation. But the historical experience tells us that a strong and peaceful Russia does not go together."[530] Clearly, such *framing* did not resonate with the audience—neither the political elite, nor the general public, both of whom were comfortably settled in the role of "friendly pragmatists".

The aim of the following sections is to establish why it seemed that Slovak-Russian "rapprochement" was well under way by the time that the smiling presidents Obama

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529 Leonard, M., Popescu, N., 2007. A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations. *European Council on Foreign Relations.* November, p. 2

530 Morvay, P., 2009. Vonkajsia Hrozba. *SME*. 8.7

and Medvedev posed for photographers upon signing the START treaty in the Mirror Hall of the Prague Castle in May 2009. While the analysis of macro-structure will show that they had long-standing security and economic incentives to pursue this foreign policy line, the account of micro-structure and foreign policy discourse will highlight several powerful *macro-frames* used and misused by different groups of norm entrepreneurs in the course of their strictly competitive discursive struggle to bolster or undermine the raison d'etre for the enduring pragmatism in Slovakia's Russia policy. The greater extent of dispute, and the inability of the proponents of "dissident geopolitics" to muddle through, due to decreasing *structural power* and flagging discursive prowess crippled by lack of *resonance*, also significantly contributed to the maintenance of a Russia-friendly foreign policy course, as the analysis that follows will demonstrate.

6.4.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

Economically and strategically, it seemed that the former satellite had few other foreign policy options than to maintain ambivalent, if not cordial, relations with the ex-imperial overlord. First, for Bratislava, refraining from outward Russophobia and silently sustaining the status quo had existential implications for energy security, the single most important factor shaping Slovak-Russian relations. Next, Slovakia possessed little geographical leeway not to "play it safe" with Russia, especially from an economic perspective. In the Czech and Polish cases, inland positioning and regional ambitions, respectively, changed the cost-benefit calculation somewhat.

Starting with energy security, the quarrel between Russia and Ukraine in January

2009, symptomatic of complications arising from the half-political, half-economic nature of the murky business with oil and gas in the post-Soviet space, could only reaffirm Bratislava's preference for neutral foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow. In fact, the dispute facilitated a note-worthy foreign policy outcome that deserves closer examination: it elicited a Russia-friendly (and latently anti-Ukrainian) response, which was not that surprising because there were other EU member states that recognised at the time that Russia was in the right when it demanded that Ukraine pays what it is charged for gas consumption. The gas crisis in Slovakia lasted for 13 days and brought some of the country's business giants to a halt after Russia cut the flow of gas through Ukrainian pipelines. The crisis response commenced with the usage of gas from home storage facilities managed by the provider SPP, where the state held a controlling stake, then resorting to the storage capacities of international partners, including the Czech Republic, which was supplied through the Yamal pipeline, and finally reversing the flow through the main East-West transit pipeline from the Czech Republic to Slovakia.[531] Bratislava was still forced to declare a state of emergency as the supply cuts put the electricity system under severe strain.[532]

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531 Slovensky plynarensky priemysel, 2009. Gas Crisis Consequences: Do's and Don'ts from the Slovak Perspective. Presentation by SPP Board Chairman Bernd Wagner at the Conference "Strengthening Energy Security in the OSCE Area", Bratislava, 6.7.-7.7.

532 Commission of the European Communities, 2009. The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to the EU: An Assessment. Commission Staff Working Document. 16.7.

In the meantime, efforts at conflict resolution splintered amidst EU sputtering as Slovakia tested the unity of the EU bloc in an attempt to solve its problems bilaterally. Hence, on the sidelines of the emergency council of energy ministers in Brussels on January 12, Slovakia's representative Lubomir Jahnatek met Andris Piebalgs, the European energy commissioner, to lobby for approval to re-start generating electricity at its "vintage" Soviet-era nuclear power plant of Jaslovske Bohunice, amidst vocal protests from his Austrian counterpart.[533] Moreover, Bratislava "voted with its feet" by sending its own mission to Moscow even as it remained careful not to contradict EU policy.[534]

As for the attribution of "blame" for the crisis, the Slovaks had enough diplomatic prudence to not point fingers, but they made it fairly clear that as far as they were concerned, the fault did not lie with the Russians. Prime Minister Robert Fico, who visited Kiev en route to Moscow, attacked his Ukrainian colleague Yulia Tymoshenko, deeming her responsible for the plight of gas-starved Europe and warning her that should Kiev not reach out to Bratislava by accepting one of its proposed short-term solutions to the acute problems, Slovakia would have to "re-evaluate its relationship with Ukraine".[535] Russian media, namely the RIA Novosti

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533 Jozwiak, R., 2009. EU Starts Review of Gas Crisis. *European Voice*. 1.12.

534 Slovakia had shut the plant down in late 2008, based on a requirement set out in its EU accession treaty. Castle, S., Jolly, D., 2009. EU's Prestige at Risk in Continuing Gas Crisis. *The New York Times.* 15.1.

535 *SME,* 2009. SPP: do Kittsee nam chyba kus potrubia. 15.1.

news agency, picked up the thread by using Fico's quote, "Ukraine Losing Credibility", as a headline.

Premier Robert Fico's bellicose rhetoric vis-à-vis Ukraine marked a stark contrast with the conciliatory language used by the Czech EU presidency, represented by prime minister Mirek Topolanek and minister for European affairs Alexander Vondra, who made sure both bickering parties were chastised more or less equally. Slovakia's ambassador to Russia, Augustin Cisar, who remained in close contact with Gazprom throughout the crisis, puts it this way: "Ukraine, not Russia, was the problem. Try going to the store and buy something for free. The Ukrainians started to do that under Yushchenko…the Russians kept warning them, and then they finally had to stop supplying them, to which they responded by halting the flow to Europe and stealing our gas."[536]

Moving on to Slovak-Russian economic relations, macro-structural variables such as trade and investment further enhanced Slovakia's incentive to maintain rapport with Russia. In 2009, Russian energy hulk Rossneft remained interested in purchasing the 49% stake in Transpetrol, the Slovak oil transport monopoly, which had been held by Dutch Yukos Finance with American management, after the messy bankruptcy of oil titan Yukos and incarceration of the former tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky. However, the Slovak government wanted to buy the shares back. Robert Kalinak, then-interior minister, says today that lashing out at Moscow in the international arena "would not

536 Cisar, A., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 28.1.

have been the best negotiation strategy".[537] At the time of the US-Russia reset, Russians enterprises were also eyeing investment in the broad-gauge railway that the Slovaks had agreed to build several years earlier without following up.

Concluding with geopolitics, Slovakia's sustained working relationship with Moscow also had to do with the latter's asymmetric soliciting. The Kremlin started courting Slovak politicians more intensely after the centre-left government of Robert Fico replaced the centre-right cabinet of Mikulas Dzurinda in 2009. The uneven coalition of leftist populists and xenophobic nationalists, which pledged to pursue a foreign policy of "four world directions", effectively took Russia's side in the 2008 conflict with Georgia and also assumed a similar stance on Kosovar independence.[538] In sum, for all of the abovementioned reasons, including energy security, economic exchange and diplomatic alignment, Slovakia had many security and economic disincentives to keep, start or re-start ruffling Russia's feathers than either the Czech Republic or Poland.

6.4.2. Micro-structure: structural power

Before the onset of the "maxi-reset" between the US and Russia in 2009, the micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship in Slovakia underwent significant changes. The

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537 Kalinak 2011

538 *SME,* 2008. Fico: Vojnu vyprovokovalo Gruzinsko. 13.8; Toda, M., Sutkova, V., 2007. Slovensko neuzna nezavisle Kosovo. *SME.* 7.12.

elite turnover following the general election of 2006 heralded generational change in the Slovak foreign policy-making community: the hitherto *relatively undisputed* advocates of "dissident geopolitics" had come under discursive attack by other groups of norm entrepreneurs before, but this time around, they were also deprived of *structural power* by one of them, the "pragmatists", whose ascent was alluded to in chapter 3 (see Table 3.10).

Hence, power shifts on the domestic scene provided advocates of "dissident geopolitics" with formidable opponents, the "pragmatists" who seemed to adhere to a different set of norms, based largely on respect for national sovereignty, tendency not to intervene outside one's borders, favouritism of development aid over democracy promotion and strong – yet declaratory and inert – commitment to European integration. This logic of appropriateness reflected a commitment to "normal geopolitics", in many ways typical for a "weak state" within a strong regional grouping.[539] In foreign policy practice, as Milan Jezovica, the champion of Slovakia's missionary work on the international stage under prime minister Mikulas Dzurinda, puts it, the two competing normative approaches to foreign policy-making tend to manifest themselves as "activism" and "passivity", respectively. In other words, they extend behavioural and rhetorical pledges, to what Jezovica describes as "Western

539 See, for instance, Duleba, A., et al., 1998. Slovensko neuzna nezavisle Kosovo. Research Center of the *Slovak Foreign Policy Association*; Vlcek, D., 2011. Mocenske aspekty geopolitickych a bezpecnostnych zmien po roku 1989. *Euro Atlantic Quarterly*. 10.11.

values".[540] Once the more passive and business-like norm entrepreneurs began to compete with their activist and democracy-promoting counterparts from a position of *structural power,* the latter community, formerly tightly-knit, began to crumble. Some of its members adjusted their comprehension of what is "good and appropriate", especially in terms of balancing out Euro-enthusiasm and Atlanticism, while others did not, especially when the "Russia reset" entered the picture.

Among opinion-makers, the established foreign policy tradition of "dissident", or "anti-Meciarist", geopolitics retained a wide range of advocates among the "hawks" and the "doves", many of them removed from positions of *structural power* in 2006. Yet, their consensus on Russia policy was much weaker, than, say, on the subject of the Eastern neighbourhood. Some of the "hawks", mostly hardline Atlanticists, found themselves increasingly isolated on the Slovak political scene, in part because of their hostility towards Moscow. Deposed MPs unwilling to "budge" on Russia, such as Frantisek Sebej, found shelter in the extra-parliamentary *Civic Conservative Party* (OKS). Moderate Atlanticists, whose agenda overlapped, to a certain extent, with that of human rights activists – which is why it is difficult to classify them as "hawks" or "doves" migrated from executive and advisory posts to legislative and non-governmental ones while they were out of *structural power* in 2006-2010. Ex-premier Mikulas Dzurinda, the chairman of the *Slovak Democratic and Christian Union* (SDKU) became a regular MP and the self-proclaimed leader of the centre-right opposition bloc. Meanwhile, Dzurinda's protégé Milan Jezovica spent some time in

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540 Jezovica, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.4.

the third sector, alongside Martin Butora, who continued to head Slovakia's leading think-tank, the *Institute for Public Affairs* (IVO). Out-of-power moderate Atlanticists also congregated in the *Slovak Atlantic Commission* (SAC), founded by Butora's successor as US ambassador, Rastislav Kacer. They also continued to command *structural* power through the media, for instance *SME* daily newspaper. Though ex-dissident Martin M. Simecka resigned as editor-in-chief in 2006, his replacement Matus Kostolny proved perhaps even more hawkish on Russia, in the true spirit of "dissident geopolitics". Interestingly, as far as Russia was concerned, these moderate or "dovish" Atlanticists turned out to have more in common with the human rights contingent than with hardline "hawkish" Atlanticists such as Sebej, hence the rift within the formerly intact network.

Still within the opinion-making community, "doves" supportive of "dissident geopolitics" nested mostly in *structurally powerful* engines of pro-democracy activism, such as the *Pontis Foundation*, and they flocked toward moderate "hawks" as the US-Russia reconciliation gathered speed with the ascent of Barack Obama. Along with free-floating "dovish" norm entrepreneurs travelling around the world or based abroad, such as Pavol Demes and Balazs Jarabik, who played a major role in the Orange Revolution, as chapter 5 showed, they shared the view that Russia needed to be placated, rather than provoked. In practice, this meant that Russia received less of their attention and consequently less funding for projects, as it was simply "too big".[541]

541 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Rozvojova spolupraca; *Pontis Foundation*, 2009. Non-Profit Sector in Slovakia Still Dependent on External Resources. 2.9.

Lastly, an enterprise of "experts", whose *structural power* as an epistemic community remained unaffected by the elite turnover in 2006, also supported the notion of reset. Mostly, analysts at the *Slovak Foreign Policy Association* (SFPA) and diplomats, they focused on lobbying in favour of articulating "a" Russia policy. As was the case at the time of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, these norm entrepreneurs had a tendency to claim both before and after the Russia reset that Slovakia did not really have one, rather than accentuating universal values and international norms and offered their know-how to that avail. Interestingly, however, this network established a working rapport with the up-and-coming generation of foreign policy-makers that arrived with the new establishment in 2006. This was not the case necessarily with advocates of "dissident geopolitics".[542]

Moving on to decision-makers, proponents of "dissident geopolitics" suffered from insufficient *access* in 2006-2010, due, in part, to the relative scarcity of like-minded norm entrepreneurs in the establishment of the "pragmatists". Until Robert Fico's government lost the next general election in mid-2010, when US-Russia relations were already in better shape than in 2009, the year the reset was announced – for instance, the new nuclear arms reduction treaty, START, was signed in Prague in April 2010 – Slovakia's foreign policy establishment adhered to an alternative set of

542 Nic, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.1. Milan Nic, an activist who worked with Miroslav Lajcak when he was the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, says that while for some norm entrepreneurs, including Lajcak – he took the job of foreign minister in the government of the "pragmatic" Robert Fico – co-optation in the new administration was acceptable, for others it was not, due to a perceived "lack" or "differences" in the value orientation.

norms, which have been labeled as "normal geopolitics". Some critics, many of them "hawkish" hardline Atlanticists from OKS such as Sebej, described the new foreign policy doctrine as "Meciarist geopolitics", equating the prime minister's commitment to foreign policy "oriented equally on the north and south as the east and west" with an updated and polished version of Vladimir Meciar's effort to establish Slovakia as the "bridge between the east and the west" in the 1990s.[543] But to Atlanticist moderates, especially those who had spent the majority of their professional lives outside the executive and thus had fewer reasons to bash Robert Fico's cabinet for political reasons, the analogy rang false.[544]

Interestingly, the *structural power* of norm entrepreneurs increased as the government's term progressed, though not evenly across the different groups. The premier; Boris Zala, the foreign policy "ideologist" of his *Direction* (Smer) party; and the foreign policy "bureaucrat" Olga Algayerova[545], who became deputy foreign minister, mostly adhered to the interest-based logic of consequences, favouring security and economic incentives, but they became more keen on applying the norm-oriented logic of appropriateness into their foreign policy agenda, under the influence of "experts" and to a lesser extent, "doves". More specifically, some members of

543 For instance, Novakova, M., 2008. Analyza zahranicni politiky Slovenske republiky 1994-1998. *ePolis.cz.* 18.3.

544 For instance, Kusy, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 11.1; Batora 2011

545 Algayerova, O., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 23.2; Zala, B., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 22.9.

Fico's government began to internalise the notion of sharing Slovakia's experience from transition, especially with countries in the post-Soviet space. The senior partner in the coalition, Fico's populist *Smer* party—generally disinterested in foreign policy due to its obvious incapacity to provide extra political points—became interested in exploring in value-laden and norm-oriented foreign policy courses out of *reputational* concerns. Especially on the European stage, Slovakia had acquired a certain "brand" under the previous administration of Mikulas Dzurinda, which waged the "allied" and "neighbourhood" crusades. Hence, to preserve the "brand", Robert Fico's cabinet gradually opened up channels of communication with certain norm entrepreneur groups.

Moreover, the creeping "socialisation" of the new decision-making elite to norms inspired prime minister Robert Fico to recruit two "dovish" norm entrepreneurs for the job of foreign minister during his term: thus, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" regained some *access* and by extension *structural power*. The first foreign minister, Jan Kubis, ex-Secretary General of OSCE, had played a major role in mediating between the "orange" and "blue" political camps during the 2004 "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine, alongside Polish president Alexander Kwasniewski and others. The second appointee, Miroslav Lajcak, previously the EU's special representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, had similarly helped spearhead the historic process of reconciliation in the Western Balkans, and supervised the peaceful separation of Montenegro from Serbia. The incorporation of these norm entrepreneurs into the foreign policy-making process under the *Smer* party explains why Slovakia's activist foreign policy, based, to a great extent, on normative commitments, exhibited notable continuity even when the centre-left held the reins. Moreover, outside the core

realm of foreign policy-making, *access* to the cabinet by missionaries could be obtained via interior minister Robert Kalinak, the prime minister's closest confidant in the *Smer* party. Kalinak, a moderate Atlanticist officially recognised by the *Slovak Atlantic Commission* (SAC), a hub for norm entrepreneurs, for his contribution to the transatlantic partnership was, for instance, the driving force behind the centre-left government's decision to upgrade Slovakia's contingent in Afghanistan or host three former Guantanamo prisoners (most other allies took one or two).[546]

546 Aktualne.sk, 2008. Butora odmietol vyznamenanie – kvoli Kalinakovi. 20.12

Figure 6.1: Slovak decision-makers during the Russia Reset: structural power (2009-2010)



Figure 6.2: Slovak decision-makers during the Russia Reset: structural power (2010-2011)



Overall, this section argued that advocates of "dissident geopolitics" possessed less *structural power* to translate their norm-driven agendas into foreign policy output at the time of the Russia reset than during the Orange Revolution or the Iraq War. First, the network itself started disintegrating, as chapter 3 predicted: the faction of decisively anti-Russian "hawks" diverged from Atlanticist moderates and "doves", on a range of issues including Russia policy. Next, norm entrepreneurs' *access* to decision-makers was diminished due to the elite turnover in 2006, which marked the rise of the "pragmatists". Importantly, however, after the ouster of *Smer* from power

by centre-right parties in mid-2010, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" reacquired most of their lost *structural power* and *access*. The micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship, once again, came to resemble the one that was in place at the time of the Orange Revolution and the Iraq War (see Figure X). Moreover, this time around, "dovish" missionaries—moderate Atlanticists and human rights advocates—acquired a new convert in Slovakia's fresh-faced prime minister Iveta Radicova, the first woman to hold the post from mid-2010 until late 2011.

6.4.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

Missionaries hailing from the ranks of "hawks", "doves" and the epistemic community of "experts" dusted off and polished two competing *meta-narratives* to argue either in favour or against "normalisation" of relations with Russia. Needless to say, the debate targeted the global trend kick-started by the US, rather than a local reset policy. Section 6.3.1, outlining the macro-structural dimensions of the Slovak-Russian relationship, clearly indicates that Slovakia already had a working rapport with Russia by the time other countries started "pressing the rest button" in 2009.

The "hawks" largely claimed backward-looking legitimacy by drawing on the country's subjugated communist history in order to advocate caution and distance from Moscow. The "experts", in contrast, appealed to the freedom and prosperity of the integrated European present, thus using forward-looking legitimacy to justify a strive to establish a business-like, if not outright friendly, liaison with the Kremlin and by default also Gazprom. Interestingly, the *micro-frames* used by both groups also utilised references to 19th century pan-Slavism—that is, socio-cultural traits common

to Russians, Slovaks and other Slavic nations—to explain their respective foreign policy orientations. Whereas the "hawks" applied this type of framing to concede that their preferred course of action simply lacked elite and popular resonance in Slovakia, the "experts", on the other hand, applied it as a reinforcing device to fortify their "reconciliation" narrative.

"Doves", mostly moderate Atlanticists and/or human rights activists, approached the US-Russia reset with vigilance, based on the logic dictated by the *meta-narrative* that spoke of Russia as a Putinite neo-imperialist power. Matus Kostolny, the new editor-in-chief of the *SME* daily newspaper, said that, "Some of us still intensely regard Russia as a threat. I cannot accept the game of Russia is, in fact, a 'normal' player, such as, say, Denmark. I cannot agree to those terms, and I probably never will, either, because Russia simply does not behave in a standard way."[547] Echoing this sentiment, at the time of US vice president Biden's announcement of American intentions to "press the reset button" with the Russians, *SME* wrote that, "mirror thinking is the common mistake of meritorious Western politicians, who tend to consider their adversaries…as fairly rational, pragmatic people working towards the public good, due to, if anything, the desire to be re-elected."[548]

Many Slovak missionaries, both "hawkish" and "dovish", including Pavol Demes, Martin Butora and Rastislav Kacer, signed the jaded "open letter" pleading with the Obama administration not to "sacrifice Central Europe to Russia". But they admitted

547 Kostolny, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.1.

548 Morvay, P., 2009. Krive zrkadlo. *SME*. 9.2.

in interviews that in post-communist Slovakia, their wariness of the Kremlin represented a minority worldview that did not strike a chord with target audiences. In other words, this group of missionaries sought converts to their catechism largely in vain, both among decision-makers and the general public. The relative failure of norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" to enforce a tougher stance on Russia in Slovak foreign policy can be ascribed to the weak tradition of anti-communist dissent and opposition in the Slovak part of communist Czechoslovakia. In contrast to neighbouring Poland with the mighty Solidarity trade union, as well as several explosions of popular discontent, in 1956, the 1970s and 1980, or the Czech Republic with its respected "cultural politicians" and the shocking clampdown on the Prague Spring in 1968, Slovakia had neither a meaningful enough experience with popular anti-communist upheaval nor a strong ex-dissident core.[549]

Hence, when it comes to Russia, Slovak proponents of "dissident geopolitics" were struggling with lack of *resonance*. The underdeveloped dissident culture engendered a political environment in which the *meta-narrative* of a victimised small state wedged fatefully between Germany and Russia could not thrive. "The Czech political right, especially, bears the dissident legacy. From [Karel] Schwarzenberg to [Alexander] Vondra, many Czechs have accepted the inherited path-dependent intellectual trajectory dictating that the Russians are mortal enemies…because they installed

549 See, for instance, *SME*, 2009. Madarsky dissent bol o krok vpred. 21.10; Muska, F., 2007. I Slovensko melo za komunismu svuj vlastni disent. 23.3; multiple documents from the archive of the Institute of National Memory, accessed at: http://www.upn.gov.sk/

communism."[550] Moreover, unlike in the Czech Republic or Poland, the scarce Slovak dissidents with high moral credit such as Simecka, Butora, Miroslav Kusy, Sona Szomolanyi and others wielded less *structural power* in government, as they mostly ended up not in the top echelon of politics, but in journalism, academia or think tanks.[551] While their missionary work successfully "turned coats" in other cases—for example, in the "allied" and "neighbourhood" crusades analysed in chapters 4 and 5—it largely failed with respect to Russia (arguably, the Slovaks, in contrast to the Czechs and the Poles, never even commenced the crusade).

One such convert of these dissidents, long-time foreign minister Eduard Kukan, did not hesitate to criticise the internal situation in Russia at the occasion of human rights abuses that sparked international controversy, like the Khodorkovsky and Politkovskaya cases, but he also showed sympathy at the time of the Beslan tragedy, after which he offered to host recuperating victims and symbolically "adopted" a 2.5-year-old boy wounded in the anti-terrorist raid. Kukan puts it this way:

We had better relations with the Russians than, say, the Czechs because we didn't "irritate" them on purpose. We kept the political dialogue at a level that prevented tensions from escalating. Yes, we still pursued a value-laden foreign policy, and we did criticize the Russians for violating democratic standards, but not too aggressively:

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550 Simecka 2011

551 Other dissidents, or missionaries, who did manage to penetrate the political elite, such as Frantisek Miklosko, Fero Sebej, Peter Zajac, Rudolf Chmel, took positions with lesser structural power or posts unrelated to foreign policy.

I believe it makes no sense to jump around and insult; we have to act adequately to our size. When the centre-right was replaced by the centre-left, the Slovak government started this useless "kowtowing" to Moscow, which I'm convinced the Russians – as well as the Americans – don't even like.[552]

Miroslav Wlachovsky, the disciple of Martin Butora, who represented Slovakia at OSCE in 2009-2011, abides by similar "small state" logic when he explains why Slovakia has not focused more of its efforts on the projection of Western values and export of "transition know-how" to Russia. "It would be like throwing a pebble into a well. There will be small waves, but that is all."[553] Wlachovsky describes himself as a committed "hawkish" missionary.

The findings of this section indicate that the *persuasive power* of norm entrepreneurs is limited not only by *access* to decision-making structures, but also by *resonance.* The *meta-narrative* of the scary Russian bear did not send too many Slovaks running for the hills, and the booty in terms of business and energy seemed too valuable to give up for the satisfaction of "do-gooding", according to a Slovak diplomat who did not want to be named. Public opinion seemed to fall in line: the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends, for instance, found in 2009 that 47 percent Slovaks were "somewhat concerned" about Russia's role as an energy provider, while the

552 Kukan 2011

553 Wlachovsky, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 6.2.

weakening of Russia's democracy worried only 35 percent of them.[554] Hence, Slovak decision-makers, especially the "pragmatists", seemed less keen on abiding by "dissident politics" in foreign policy-making, even if it did not necessarily mean that individuals, such as Dzurinda, Jezovica and prime minister Radicova after she took office in mid-2010, consider it "good" and "appropriate".

Moreover, the extent to which "hawkish" missionaries were *disputed*—that is, had their *meta-narrative* challenged by alternative ones, which did possess the *resonance* that their Russophobic version did not—also practically ruled out foreign policy outcomes other than the continuation of Slovakia's hitherto conciliatory policy vis-à-vis Russia. The compelling security and material incentives to do so aligned with the "dovish" and "expert" logic of appropriateness. As far as these missionaries and their faithful flock of converts were concerned, Moscow did not pose a "threat" to Bratislava. Instead, they perceived Russia, from the "safe haven" of the EU, as yet another underexplored market with investment opportunities for major Slovak companies such as Matador and leading financial groups including Penta and J&T. Similarly, Slovaks were heartened by Russian interest in supplying parts for Slovak assembly lines, which could potentially turn "golden", as well its status as an energy heavy-weight with coal, oil and gas to spare for massive plants like Vojany and key pipelines passing through Slovakia, above all, Druzhba.[555]

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554 *German Marshall Fund*, 2009. Transatlantic Trends. Topline Data.

555 Gonchar, M., et al., 2011. Ukraine and Slovakia: In a Post-crisis Architecture of European Energy Security. Prospects for Transport of Hydrocarbons and bilateral cooperation. *Slovak Foreign Policy*

This set of perceptions, and the underlying norms that nourished them, arguably stemmed from a different understanding of shared Slovak-Russian history. The "dovish" and even more so, the "expert" norm entrepreneurs managed to decouple Slovakia's experience of Soviet communism from the broader historically-rooted affinity towards Russia as a Slavic nation, which lingered much more deeply in the "brain tissue" or psyche of the average Slovak, be they a politician or a passerby. Alexander Duleba, the foreign ministry's main proxy on expertise in the post-Soviet space, argues that:

To give you a "deep" explanation, it is above all a 19th Slovak century stereotype captured in the first Slovak political program formulated by [Ludovit] Stur during the first powerful wave of the Slovak national awakening. When the Austrians and the Hungarians struck a deal to carve up the empire at the expense of the rest of the nations in 1867, this generation of Slovak freedom-fighters said that since we were never going to achieve parity with the Hungarians, it was only the Russians who could help us.[556]

Until Slovakia achieved full independence for the first time as a Nazi satellite, this *meta-narrative*, expressed as "clinging to the Russian oak" in literary romanticism, informed the foreign policy logic of many Slovak-born politicians, including the leader of the autonomist movement in interwar Czechoslovakia, Andrej Hlinka,

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Association. Policy brief.

556 Duleba 2011, for instance, see also Stur, L., 1993. *Slovanstvo a svet buducnosti*. Bratislava: Slovensky institut medzinarodnych studii

officially recognised by premier Robert Fico as a "father of the nation", in 2007.[557] Even when it comes to more recent communist history, Slovak norm entrepreneurs of various convictions point out, the national memory does not bear the burden of Czech-style traumas that would have left imprints encouraging modern-day Russophobia. Augustin Cisar, Slovakia's ambassador to Russia at the time of the US-Russia reset, puts it this way:

There were several critical junctures in the 20th century that strengthened Slovak-Russian socio-cultural ties and the sense of kinship. We fought the Slovak National Uprising against the Nazis in 1944 back to back with the Soviet soldiers. The Red Army liberated us. In the Czech lands, the US army and general George Patton reached Pilsen in the east, which made Yalta and the "victorious February" in the game-changing 1948, when Czechoslovakia fell into the hands of the communists, much bitterer.[558]

Frantisek Kasicky, defense minister in the Fico cabinet, adds that the Czech and Slovak experiences of the 1968 Soviet invasion also differed. The crackdown on reform communists was mostly directed against the Czechs, as there were few of them among the Slovaks, despite the fact that the general secretary of the communist party at the time was a Slovak, Alexander Dubcek. The era of "normalisation" that

557 *SME,* 2008. Parlament mozno po Hlinkovi oceni zakonom aj Dubceka. 19.8.

558 Cisar 2011

followed also hit the Western part of the federation harder than the Eastern one.[559]

The Russia-friendly interpretation of Austro-Hungarian and Czechoslovak history by the majority of Slovaks sustained the abovementioned *meta-narrative* of "clinging to the Russian oak", which contradicted both Russophobia and the concept of reset. Needless to say, as a discursive tool, this *meta-narrative* had been overused for a multitude of purposes. Among those to invoke it were the ostracised strongman Vladimir Meciar in the 1990s to justify exclusion from the first round of NATO enlargement; the self-described neo-realist practitioner of "small state" international politics premier Robert Fico to explain his foreign policy of "four world directions"; but also a convert to "dissident geopolitics", Iveta Radicova, an otherwise committed promoter of human rights and democracy in neighbouring Belarus or even distant countries such as Cuba, who took the prime minister's office in mid-2010.

The last *macro-frame* with implications for Slovakia's Russia Reset – or lack thereof – that emerges from the analysis of foreign policy discourse concerns Russia's great power status. The conviction that the former imperial overlord is "too big", especially for democracy promotion efforts of small former satellites like Slovakia, also affects the understanding of what is "good" and "appropriate", for "doves", "experts" and "pragmatists" alike. For the former two, it may mean refraining from outward criticism of Russia's "managed democracy". "This does not mean that we are incapable of objectively assessing the kind of regime that they have in Russia. For us,

559 Kasicky, F., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 28.2.

human rights and democracy are undisputed values," says Iveta Radicova.[560] Her predecessor's foreign minister Jan Kubis, who strived for "normal relations" with Moscow during his term in office, adds that Slovakia's "missing" aversion towards Russia is a positive phenomenon: "We do not suffer from historical complexes and seek no 'revanche'."[561] But moving on to "pragmatists", the *meta-narrative* can also translate into kowtowing. Some of them, like premier Fico, seemed overly committed to the reset philosophy: his anti-Georgian statements after the 2008 war and anti-Ukrainian ones at the time of the 2009 gas dispute had to be smoothed over with Western partners by his foreign ministers.[562]

Overall, this section shows that on top of diminished *structural power,* Slovak advocates of "dissident geopolitics" also struggled with shrunken *resonance* – in the elite circles, the wider populace and among themselves alike, given the virtual absence of anti-communist dissent in Slovakia – needed for persuasive *framing*. Russophobia simply did not seem to strike a chord. Even after missionaries reacquired some of their *structural power* in government in mid-2010, foreign policy discourse on Russia registered few modifications. Hence, whether to "reset Russia policy" was a less relevant dilemma in Bratislava than it was in Prague or Warsaw.

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560 Radicova, I., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 3.1.

561 Kubis 2011

562 Kubis 2011; Lajcak, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.2., compare with *SME*, 2008. Kubis: Nik nechce Rusko zahnane do kuta. 9.10.; *SME*, 2009. Ukrajina slubuje, ze plynova kriza nebude. 8.12.

6.4.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

In terms of foreign policy output, the "absent", or half-hearted, at best, Russophobia in post-communist Slovakia makes the country's amicable Russia policy comparable to a disavowed crusade, not an aborted one. It is telling that most Slovak cabinets, be they penetrated by missionaries and converts or not, have attempted to preserve a good business-like rapport with Moscow. Yet, there were differences: on the rhetorical level, centre-right establishments seemed more keen on factoring norms and values constituent of "dissident geopolitics" into the equation, condemning, though more rarely than their Czech or Polish counterparts, human rights abuses inside Russia as well as cautioning against Moscow's energy clout and "soft-power" ambitions in the post-Soviet space, while their centre-left counterparts did their math differently. The Fico years, especially, were marked by what some observers labeled as "truckling" to Moscow, and interestingly also Washington. Given the apparent lack of sensitivity on the part of his administration to the normative frameworks projected by the respective great powers, this submission seemed rather to have been motivated by security and economic incentives, and as such, it epitomises "small state" behaviour.

Indeed, the marked consistency of Slovak foreign policy output upholds the case for the prevalence of the logic of consequences, commonly applied by weak players in the international arena, in Russia policy (reset or no reset): the norms underpinning "dissident geopolitics" did not really feature in the Slovak decision-making process. Russia was not "missionary territory" for Slovakia, in the same way that it was, at least on the declaratory level, for Poland, as the speech by foreign minister Radek Sikorski indicated. The two Dzurinda administrations, under which norm

entrepreneurs defending "dissident geopolitics" enjoyed *structural power* of the highest calibre, actively encouraged Russian companies to invest and bid in the second round of privatisation that they launched to help kick-start the flagging economic growth in the post-Meciar years.[563] Eduard Kukan, the foreign minister at the time, insists today that, "…business is business. If Obama criticizes human rights violations after talks with the Chinese, it means that they have not struck a deal."[564] Under Dzurinda, the Russians landed several prominent contracts, including a 49% stake in Transpetrol, the Slovaks' oil pipeline monopoly, which sold to Yukos in 2002 for $74m. When Yukos, whose jailed CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky became a martyred symbol of the Kremlin's iron-handed crackdown on uncomfortably popular or supposedly "disloyal" oligarchs, went bankrupt, the shares in Transpetrol were re-acquired by Robert Fico's government. The decision, economy minister Lubomir Jahnatek told the media at the time, had more to do with the *Smer* party's commitment to market socialism than with real or perceived threats that Russia may have posed to Slovakia's energy security, but cables from the US embassy published by WikiLeaks tell a different story.[565] Interestingly, throughout Khodorskovsky's politicised trial, Slovak officials remained stubbornly "mute" on the suspicious irregularities surrounding it. The fact that they did not know until 2008 what was

563 Cisar 2011

564 Kukan 2011

565 *The Slovak Spectator*, 2011. Did US Advise over Transpetrol? 23.5.; *SME,* 2008. Fico varuje pred energetickou vojnou v Europe. 24.4.

going to happen to Transpetrol may have weighed in, says Alexander Duleba from the neutral norm entrepreneur community of "experts", who frequently criticises the "dominant power politics" practiced in Russia.[566]

In trade and energy relations, elite turnover and related *structural power* shifts did not seem to have a noticeable effect on Bratislava's conduct of business with Moscow. The centre-left cabinet led by Robert Fico that replaced the centre-right establishment in 2006, and returned to power in 2012, was just as keen— if not keener—on luring Russian firms onto the Slovak market. Throughout both terms in office, the prime minister and his team spoke frequently, and with great enthusiasm too, about Slovakia's key transit role in the transcontinental monster-project of the broad-gauged Russian railway, with Slovakia's leg estimated to be worth EUR 5 bn. Aimed to connect China and the EU, the project had, by that date, received support from Brussels, Beijing, Berlin, Vienna and Prague. In 2012, the freshly re-elected prime minister Fico attempted to add credibility to his intention to cooperate with Russia more closely by making a European reference: "We will seek more joint ventures. It is an a very important destination for us and the EU alike."[567] The rare bump on the road towards greater economic exchange appeared under the government of Iveta Radicova, who was accused of being "slow" in evaluating the report on the feasibility and the costs of the broad-gauged railway passing through Slovakia. Several

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566 *SME*, 2007. Alexander Duleba: Ruska opozicia je bez sance osloviť volicov. 1.12.

567 *iHned.cz,* 2012. Slovensky premier Fico jde Rusku naproti. Ozivi i projekt sirokorozchodnr zeleznice. 13.4.

observers ascribed the stalling to the clout of deputy foreign minister Milan Jezovica, who was allegedly motivated by soft "Russophobia". [568] Hence, ongoing disagreements between decision-makers can inform contradictory outcomes, but it appears that they do not affect the general foreign policy line.

While the various groups of Slovak norm entrepreneurs shared the view it was in the country's national interest to collaborate with Russian firms, they diverged, not radically but subtly, in the type of political rhetoric that they used publicly and in official documents when commenting on the conduct of the Kremlin at home and abroad. Starting with the centre-left cabinet of Robert Fico, in power on the outset of the US-Russia reset, the prime minister openly took Russia's side at several controversial occasions involving the Eastern neighbourhood, much to the surprise and dismay of leading US and EU policy-makers, even Chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who had both maintained good relations with their Russian counterpart over the years. "Someone provoked, and we know who provoked. I reject the black-and-white vision that one side is good and the other side is evil," said Fico in a wildly debated statement at the time of the Russian-Georgian War in the summer of 2008, which was labeled by observers as the most "pro-Russian" by a EU statesman.[569] Fico's diplomacy—or lack thereof— was duly noted in the cables from the US embassy in Bratislava, later published by WikiLeaks and the Russian magazine *The Russian Reporter*. They indicate that the American

568 Toth, P.T., 2011. Sirokorozchodna: Ak zlyha Radicova, vit'azom bude Orban. *SME Blog*. 17.1.

569 Vasilko, T., 2010. WikiLeaks odhalili Ficovu diplomaciu pocas vojny. *SME*. 3.12.

ambassador in Bratislava at the time, Vincent Obsitnik, requested an explanation of the premier's "unfortunate remarks" from foreign minister Jan Kubis. More generally, the cables fed an image of Slovakia as an "ambiguous" member of NATO and the EU.[570]

But the pro-Russian inclination of this particular Slovak government was not personified in the prime minister alone. Foreign ministers Jan Kubis and Miroslav Lajcak, despite—or perhaps because of—their strong track record as "dovish" norm entrepreneurs, did not do much to promote a Russia policy relying on norms and values, such as human rights, democracy and democratic peace, at least not outwardly. Cables from Stockholm and NATO headquarters in Brussels note that the Slovaks were not pushing for a tougher stance on Moscow at the time of its conflict with Tbilisi, unlike the Czechs and the Poles.[571] Frantisek Kasicky, defense minister in Fico's cabinet and later Slovakia's permanent representative to NATO, claims that he "felt no pressure to act otherwise in the matter from the foreign ministry," led by Kubis at the time. [572] Yet, there are indications that some criticism was communicated to Moscow behind closed doors, via MFA chief for Russia, CIS and the Balkans Stefan Rozkopal, who designated Russia's actions as "straight from the communist

570 *Russkiy Reporter*, 2010. Voyna s Gruziei. Polnaya versiya gruzinskogo "dosye" WikiLeaks. 29.11.

571 *SME* 2010, 3.12.

572 Kasicky 2011

era".[573] The case of Kosovar self-determination is also illustrative: minister Lajcak, who succeeded Kubis in 2008, also did little to mitigate or overturn Slovakia's vocal rejection of the declaration of independence, another foreign policy outcome deemed pro-Russian on the international stage.[574] Prime minister Fico's claim that separatism goes against international law suggests that as a "pragmatist" who could be compared to president Klaus in the neighbouring Czech Republic, he abided by an alternative set of foreign policy norms, based on concepts such as sovereignty, inviolability of borders and non-intervention, which he has confirmed in an interview.[575] His re-election, in 2012, was hailed by the Russian media. To give a telling example, "It would be hard to find a politician in the EU more positively inclined towards our country," wrote the internet daily Pravda.ru.[576] Indeed, in 2011, while in opposition, Fico infamously gave a speech at the congress of Putin's party United Russia, where he talked about improving Slovak-Russian economic relations.[577]

In slight, but important, contrast to the centre-left government that was deposed in 2010, the centre-right cabinet in power in 2010–2012 assumed a slightly "friskier"—

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573 SME 2010, 3.12.

574 *Aktuality.sk*, 2010. Kosovo neuzname! Odkazuje Miroslav Lajcak. 9.4.; *HNonline, 2012*. Lajcak: Nas vztah ku Kosovu bude zavisiet od situacie. 12.4.

575 Fico 2011

576 *Pravda*, 2012. Po vi'azstve Fica je lopta na ruskej strane. 12.3.

577 Mihalikova, M., 2011. Ficovi Vycitaju Putina. *SME*. 23.9.

that is, less subservient—rhetorical stance vis-à-vis Russia. The new prime minister Iveta Radicova, who re-appointed several prominent "missionaries", including Milan Jezovica, to her foreign policy team, made a valuable attempt to revamp Slovakia's image as a "norm entrepreneur state" on the world stage, motivated, as she puts it, by both a commitment to norms and values and *reputational concerns*.[578] Quoting directly from the government's manifesto, "…the depth of relations with Russia will be delineated by the values Slovakia professes, as well as by clearly defined national interest. Slovakia is naturally invested in modern, pluralist, democratic Russia respecting individual freedom, and it will support Russia on this path bilaterally and via EU, NATO and other international organisations."[579] This rhetorical dedication to "dissident geopolitics", which prescribe worldwide democracy promotion, was complemented with clear support for the US reset policy. The MFA emphasised the need for strategic dialogue between the US and Russia, welcoming the next round of nuclear disarmament and backing further development of NATO-Russia cooperation.[580]

In reality, Slovakia made fewer targeted efforts at distributing development aid and indorse democratisation in Russia. Much like in the case of the Czech Republic, which concentrated on Belarus, Burma and Cuba, its focus lay elsewhere, namely in

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578 Radicova 2011

579 Government of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Government Program. 28.7.

580 MFA of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Annual Report: Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2010. Government Document.

the Western Balkans and Belarus, among other areas. But unlike Prague, Bratislava also showed less willingness to discuss friction points in the shared history or publicly criticise the Kremlin. In the true spirit of the reset, this occurred mainly behind closed doors, says deputy foreign minister Milan Jezovica, especially when it was suspected or proven that international standards were violated. At the time of prime minister Vladimir Putin's visit to Bratislava in May 2011, his Slovak counterpart, for instance, asked him to dig out the "invitation letter" for the Soviet occupying forces that rolled into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and also requested reassurance that the gas crisis of 2009 would not repeat itself.[581] Yet at the critical juncture signified by the rigged Russian parliamentary election in December 2012, Slovak officials and diplomats were largely off the radar. Domestic factors help explain why: the government collapsed over the second Greek bailout mere weeks before, and its caretaker substitute had not yet been installed. Hence, unfortunately, Slovakia's reaction to what some media dubbed the outbreak of a Russian Spring cannot serve as a test case for the country's alleged "lack of commitment to norms and values" in Russia policy. The disputed Russian vote was condemned by international human rights watchdogs including OSCE as well as heavy-weight decision- and opinion-makers in and out of Russia, including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the last general secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev.

To conclude, the findings indicate that Slovak zealots never embarked on a "crusade" in Russia: hence, Russia policy did not need to be reset in a way that would "activate"

581 *SME,* 2011. Radicova chce od Putina pozyvaci list z roku 1968. 13.5.

defenders of "dissident geopolitics" or other norm entrepreneur groups to justify or contradict it. The single most important factor for norm entrepreneurship is *resonance.* While the overall consistency of Slovakia's amicable Russia policy can be explained by strong security and material incentives, which encouraged "small state" behaviour, the silence of norm entrepreneurs on norms and values in Russia should be attributed to the virtual absence of *meta-narratives* that would resonate among them, with the decision-makers and perhaps also the public, thus constituting a *persuasive frame* for such a foreign policy course.

6.5. The Czech Republic: heavy-hearted re-converts

Unlike in Russia-friendly Slovakia, in the generally more Russia-wary Czech Republic, opinion-makers and policy-makers reacted to the US-Russia reset with what could best be described as confused anticipation. The historical symbolism contained in the choice of Prague as the venue for the next round of START negotiations evoked national pride as well as strategic reassurance, but president Obama's clumsy back-pedaling on the NMD plan developed by his predecessor raised eyebrows, to say the very least. Following the cancellation of the missile shield plan for Central Europe, it was the Czechs, and more specifically, worried norm entrepreneurs among them, that masterminded the 2009 open letter to the Obama administration. This tool of discursive *persuasion* was handcrafted and personally delivered to Washington by the leading "hawk", Alexander Vondra, who also recruited most of the "big-shot"

signatories.[582] Vondra's present day admission that the deep concern over America's "sudden" indifference reflected lingering anxiety about a "resurgent" Russia testifies to the cohesion of Americophilia and Russophobia, or relations with US and Russia, respectively, in the Czech Republic. It also reveals the extent of enduring post-traumatic stress of the Cold War, which had imprinted the bipolar mindset deeply into the psyche of the prototypical "missionary" in the Czech foreign policy-making community.[583]

As the initial shock subsided, however, the Czechs also decided to jump on the US-yoked bandwagon on Russia policy, albeit more grudgingly than the Poles – as will be shown – and it ended up delivering them to a rather unexpected destination: Brussels. Simply put, the reset of US-Russia relations forced Czech opinion-makers and decision-makers to reassess the political value of their Euro-scepticism. Hence, the foreign policy by-product of the Czech mini-reset—which coincided with their first stint at the EU presidency in the first half of 2009—turned out to be Europeanisation. Whilst it did not transform the traditional British-style Euro-isolationists into Euro-enthusiasts, it did, at least, mould some of the Euro-phobic Atlanticists into Euro-

582 Confirmed by several signatories.

583 Vondra 2011

Atlanticists. [584] Of course, as the long, incremental and iterative process of Europeanisation—most often conceptualised as "construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of policy paradigms, normative frameworks and 'ways of doing things'"—has fewer benchmarks in the foreign policy realm, assessing its impact, and, most importantly, isolating its effects from those of other variables, remains analytically challenging. Yet the gradual and tentative Czech turn to Europe post-EU presidency and post-announcement of the reset suggests that the *re-framing* of the Czech stance on the US, Russia and the EU might have been informed less by interests, which tend to be slightly more malleable, than by norms, which, on the other hand, can be deeply ingrained and thus take time to readjust.

The aim of the following sections is to uncover the motivations and rationales that the Czechs had for re-adjusting their logic of appropriateness by deciding to pursue, if grudgingly, a Russia- and Europe-friendlier foreign policy. Ultimately, this section will argue that in mending relations and adjusting threat perceptions of Russia, the Czech foreign policy elite finally started embracing the concept of the EU's common foreign and security policy. In other words, the small country took the longest and most winding road to Brussels: via Moscow.

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584 Drulak 2011. (See also: Svitil, P., 2011. Evropeizace ceske zahranicni politiky v souvislosti se vstupem do EU. Working Paper. Prague: Vysoka skola ekonomicka.; Handl, V., Pick, O., 2005. *Ceska zahranicni politika 1995-2005: od "navratu do Evropy" k evropeizaci*. Prague: Institute for International Relations).

But the normative resilience of "dissident geopolitics" and *structural power* of Atlanticist norm entrepreneurs, whose approach to foreign policy-making came under serious scrutiny and discursive pressure by Europeanist norm entrepreneurs in 2008–2011, prolonged and complicated the metamorphosis. The Czechs were driven less by *reputational* motivations—that is, the desire to prove themselves as "good allies" to the US or to enter the "premier league" of European politics—than by *normative* concerns as they grappled with dilemmas stemming from the increasing inconsistency between their Russia-wary logic of appropriateness and the punitive logic of consequences. The fast-changing nature of the transatlantic order, marked by America's "Pacific turn", the European Union's Euro-crisis and the resulting re-prioritisation and cuts in defence budgets, imposed costs on East European countries keen on ruffling Russia's feathers. To ensure not only short-term security but also long-term "safety", a subtler perceptual public good, it seemed that Prague had little choice but to start "appeasing" Moscow, since a third party was increasingly unlikely to step in to do it for the Czechs.

6.5.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

Geopolitically and strategically, patching up the rocky relationship with Russia carried substantial long-term benefits for the Czech Republic. Most importantly, the Czechs were interested in filling the "hard" security vacuum, left after the abandonment by the Americans of the original NMD scheme, with alternative guarantees from standing allies and potential reassurances from former adversaries, including the jumpy ex-imperial overlord, Moscow. Moreover, though Prague was in

a better position than Warsaw and the even more vulnerable Bratislava with respect to energy security, it was still keen on solidifying it, particularly following the reductions in gas supply in March 2008, at the height of the negotiations about the installation of the US radar complex, as well as the disruptions during the Russo-Ukrainian dispute over transit in January 2009.

Starting with the missile shield, the Czech government, and within it, Atlanticist norm entrepreneurs, had a very "emotional" reaction to what was perceived as the Obama administration's "U-turn". The next section, on Poland, will show that this was less so the case there. Cabinet members of the *Civic Democratic Party* (ODS), the senior partner in the centre-right coalition, openly expressed disappointment, lamenting the "futile" sacrifices they had made throughout the tough negotiations when they faced a hostile public. The government had launched an expensive information campaign, and it had offered $73m to inhabitants of Brdy, the proposed site for the radar facility, in an attempt to get them on board. Similarly, they had confronted prickly political opponents from the *Czech Social Democratic Party* (CSSD), which promptly hailed president Obama's pronouncement as a "great victory for the Czech people".[585] On the most extreme end, some Czech commentators compared the US decision to the 1938 Munich Agreement between Germany, France, Britain, and Italy, which allowed for Czechoslovakia's annexation by Nazi Germany.

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585 *iDnes.cz*, 2009. Radarova prestrelka Paroubka a Havla trva, sef CSSD neslevil z kritiky. 21.9.; *Ceske Noviny*, 2011. WikiLeaks: Paroubek byl pro radar, ale ridil se atmosferou v CSSD. 5.9.; Hancilova, B., Bagge, D., 2009. Obama's Missile Defense Rethink: The Czech Reaction. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.* 6.10.

The Czechs did have reasons to believe that the Russians pulled the strings: for their part, the disruption of gas supply in 2008, at the height of the negotiations, they were convinced them that Moscow would stop at nothing to make Prague – and by extension other stakeholders, including Washington – reconsider.[586] Ex-premier Topolanek's recollection of the situation today contains a thinly-veiled comparison of the US step back to the abovementioned "sell-out" Munich Agreement: "It was a stab in the back. I understand that for the new American administration, it was problem number '256'. Washington needed to close the START deal with Moscow, which is why they sacrificed the missile shield. So about us, without us."[587] Other civic democrats also spoke of "betrayal" and "cowardice".[588] The celebrity ex-president and Nobel Peace Prize nominee Vaclav Havel tied the issue of NMD to relations with Russia, telling the daily newspaper *Lidove noviny* that though Moscow did not truly care about the radar system's placement, it did use the situation to "check how much we fear [them]".[589]

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586 Vondra 2011; Hybaskova, J., Interview with author. Prague, 11.3.; Gandalovic., P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 2.4.

587 Topolanek, M., 2011. Interview with author, 23.3.

588 *Lidove noviny,* 2009. Obama je zbabelec, rekl v reakci na rozhodnuti o radaru Jan Vidim. 17.9.

589 Ibid

The full extent of the Czech elite's disenchantment with the new generation of American policy-makers revealed itself two years after the revocation of George W. Bush's NMD scheme in 2009. In June 2011, Prague withdrew from plans to participate in Barack Obama's revamped NATO version of NMD out of frustration at its diminished role in the system. Defense minister Alexander Vondra, whom American diplomats regarded as one of the staunchest allies of the US in the entire region, as wires published by *WikiLeaks* reveal*,* [590] dismissed the offer as a "consolation prize". "Our ideas about the future cooperation are more colourful than just a room or two with some screens there," he said.[591]

Moving on to the energy sector, though related "soft" security concerns were factored into the risk-analysis calculus relevant to Russia policy, the Czech Republic already had a working rapport with Russia, hence the lesser need for pushing the "reset button" in this respect. The 2009 spat between Moscow and Kiev over transit fees was not a game-changer, as it did not affect the landlocked country with a strong commitment to diversification as much as its peripheral neighbours Poland and Slovakia. Moreover, the predominant view within the foreign policy-making community in Prague dictated calm, not anxiety, during the gas crisis. Many believed that Moscow's clumsy efforts at "extortion" of transit fees from Kiev, which put at stake its relationships with EU members and its reputation as business partner,

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590 *Aktualne.cz,* 2011. Vondra je nas hlavni spojenec v CR, psala ambasada USA. 5.9.

591 Bilefsky, D., Dempsey, J., 2011. Czechs, Disliking Role, Pull Out of U.S. Missile Defense Project. *The New York Times*. 15.6.

exposed the bear as toothless and the Russian economy as utterly dependent on oil and gas windfalls. "Ukraine is a state of the second order, divided into an east and a west, with a notably unstable political scene. Such states are virtually expected to stir up trouble. But Russia is regarded as a great power, which should be solving, not causing, these types of problems,"[592] conservative commentators sneered on pages of outlets such as *Britske listy* or *Lidove noviny.*

Moreover, the leadership role that the Czech EU presidency assumed in the resolution of the Russo-Ukrainian dispute in January 2009 lulled, rather than intimidated, the Czech elite about its Russian counterpart, through exposure. Prague came to regard the Gazprom-Naftogaz showdown as a "commercial dispute" [593], and its "shuttle diplomacy" earned praise from domestic and international observers alike.[594] "What we saw and spoke about once again reassured us that the Kremlin and Gazprom was simply interested in doing business, not practicing political blackmail," says Mirek Topolanek, the prime minister.[595] While his foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg kept busy in Gaza—the Czech Republic was thrust straight into the so-called double-

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592 *Britske listy,* 2009. Plynova krize a slabost Ruska. 21.1, See also Tichy, L., 2010. Problematika vzajemne zavislosti v energetickych vztazich mezi Ceskou Republikou a Ruskou federaci a pusobeni Evropske Unie. *Central European Political Studies* 12(2-3)

593 Conclusion drawn from several interviews.

594 Kral, D., et al., 2009. *The 2009 Czech EU Presidency: Contested Leadership at a Time of Crisis.* Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.

595 Topolanek 2011

G, as in Gaza and Gazprom, crisis shortly upon assuming the rotating EU presidency— Topolanek made history when he became the first leader of a former Soviet satellite to successfully represent the EU in crisis talks with Russia. The Czech negotiators made the first important steps towards resolving the drawn-out pricing dispute that disrupted essential gas supplies to Europe by securing an agreement allowing independent pipeline monitors into both Ukraine and Russia.[596] They also announced their intention to push for the installation of "counting stations" on the Russia-Ukraine and Ukraine-EU borders to increase transparency on gas flows.[597] The outspoken vice-premier for European affairs and advocate of "dissident geopolitics" Alexander Vondra, who seconded Topolanek in crisis resolution on the EU's behalf, treated both Russia and Ukraine with carefully weighed harshness when he promised the former further diversification, and the latter new transit routes that would circumvent it.[598]

Hence, though the 2009 gas crisis provided few additional incentives for the Czech Republic to "press the reset button" as well and start appeasing Russia, the former country's sustained efforts at reducing the dependence on the latter's resources do

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596 Doran, P.B., Mitchell, A.W., 2009. The European Gas Crisis: Czech Presidency Sees Opportunity. *Center for European Policy Analysis*. 15.1.; *Euractiv.cz*, 2009. Vysledky ceskeho predsednictvi v energetice. 16.7.

597 *EUObserver*, 2009. EU Considers Emergency Measures as Gas Crisis Intensifies. 6.1.; *Lidove noviny,* 2009. Plynova krize je problem Ruska a Ukrajiny, ne EU. 7.1.

598 Svoboda, K., 2009. Plynova Kriza a Ukrajina. *SME*. 12.1.

suggest that Prague was aware that it was not always "business as usual" with Moscow. Internationally, the Czech presidency made a vital contribution to the EU's external energy security when it organised a "Southern Corridor Summit" in Prague on May 8, 2009, where the Nabucco project— widely regarded as "anti-Russian", competing with Moscow's South Stream blueprint —was revitalised in the presence of the suppliers of oil and gas from Central Asia and transit countries, as well as the European Commission and the Presidency.[599] Domestically, the foreseeing Czechs, who diversified their energy supply and transport routes as early as 1997 and suffered notably less than others in 2009 as a result, readjusted their official energy strategy. Crucially, the transport monopoly RWE Transgas increased its investment and involvement in nascent LNG projects, namely LNG Adria on the Croatian island Krk with Algeria and Qatar as suppliers and Baltic Sea LNG, spearheaded by Poland's energy monopoly PGNiG, which also planned to rely on Qatari sources.[600] Moreover, Prague made significant headway in boosting the country's European transit profile by subscribing to build Gazelle, an extension of the Nord Stream pipeline locked onto Germany's OPAL pipeline, designed to transport gas via the Czech Republic to the south of the EU. Czech policy-makers also started contemplating building another pipeline leg that would connect the city of Breclav to the Austrian hub Baumgarten, to

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599 Czech Presidency of the European Union, 2009. The Declaration-Prague Summit, Southern Corridor, 8.5.

600 Pertzilka, O., Kastl, P. Jaky vliv bude mit "plynova krize" a ekonomicka recese na budoucnost dodavek zemniho plynu pro Ceskou republiku? *Pro-Energy Magazin*: 26-30

gain access to Nabucco.[601] The flurry of activity implies that at the time of the 2009 crisis, the Czechs had enough diversification experience and diplomatic chutzpah in their business relations with the Russians for the dispute to affect their overall policy towards the former imperial power. This could have both encouraged and discouraged them from pursuing a more general "reset".

6.5.2. Micro-structure: structural power

The micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship – especially of "dissident geopolitics" – in the Czech Republic at the time of the US-Russia reset was much more favourable than in Slovakia. As a result, it was lop-sided in a direction other than reconciliation, that of continued vigilance vis-à-vis Russia, which was a foreign policy line expected of this norm entrepreneur network. When social democrats were replaced by conservative liberals in the general election of 2006, the hitherto fair opportunities for advocacy of foreign policy agendas inspired and driven by commitment to the normative framework dubbed here "dissident geopolitics" improved. To the extent that the *structural power* commanded by this group of norm entrepreneurs in Prague can be compared across time, throughout the "allied" and "neighbourhood" crusades, and space, in comparison with Warsaw and Bratislava, it could be boldly labeled as "loftiest" at the time of the Russia Reset. Hence, in 2009, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in the Czech Republic found themselves in a structural setting profoundly

601 *Technicky Tydenik*, 2009. Proc plynova krize nenarusila v Ceske republice dodavky plynu? Nebyla to nahoda. 21.1.

different from those in place elsewhere across the "post-communist space": they were relatively undisputed, if not *undisputed.* The over-arching argument presented in this dissertation, positing that minuscule elite networks bound by shared loyalties to political, social and/or moral values, tend to punch above their weight in foreign policy-making in *post-authoritarian and transition contexts*, where they are less likely to be contested, will face an important test. Why did the Czech Republic not go down the same causal pathway as Poland and Slovakia and see the influence of these groups wane in the *post-transition setting*?

Among opinion-makers, norm entrepreneurs of the network promoting "dissident geopolitics", self-identified as "hawks" and "doves", held on to *structural power*, though the divergence in their stance on Russia dispersed their clout. With respect to the bifurcation, foretold in chapter 3, the Orange Revolution of 2004, as well as the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, provide important pointers, as they both spurred discourses of "frustration" with Russia's presumed efforts to protect its Cold War-era "sphere of influence". For the "hawks", more Atlanticist than the "doves", relations with Moscow revolved around security dilemmas and Russia's external power projection. This is, in part, why they often had the tendency to "triangulate" and broach the subject of the alliance with Washington in most of the relevant debates. Outspoken opinion-makers in this tradition of foreign policy thought included, for instance, Zbynek Pavlacik of Jagello 2000 or Tomas Klvana, formerly of the daily newspaper *Hospodarske noviny.*[602] In the same vein, think tanks such as *CEVRO*, and

602 Pavlacik was recruited by the centre-right government to advise on NMD, while Klvana was tapped to run the information campaign.

media outlets including *Respekt* as well as *Lidove noviny*, remained outspoken about "hard" security risks, citing Russia's expansive adventurism in the post-Soviet space, as well as "soft" security risks in post-communist Europe: shady business deals, supposed attempts to "buy-out" energy companies, alleged cyber-attacks and suspect cases of espionage, even in the Czech Republic itself, very much in the spirit of Edward Lucas' book "The New Cold War".[603] This way, "hawks" were building the case against the reset.

Still within the opinion-making community, for "dovish" advocates of "dissident geopolitics" that held some *structural power*, internal developments in Russia's managed democracy seemed, at least on a rhetorical level, just as important as its power games in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood. Substantively, human rights abuses, electoral fraud, dormant civil society, demographic crisis, dire healthcare needs, and the like, concerned them from the perspective of development aid and democracy promotion. In 2009-2011, "doves", mostly activists such as Oldrich Cerny of *Forum 2000* or Simon Panek and Marek Svoboda of *People in Need*, forged an intellectual and discursive alliance with an emerging norm entrepreneur network of "experts", similarly to their Slovak counterparts. The NGO association DEMAS, for instance – mainly concerned with development aid and democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space – can be described as an epistemic community dealing with East European affairs from a value-neutral standpoint based on accumulated know-how and shared

603 Lucas, E., 2008. *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West.* London: MacMillan

beliefs in cause-effect relationships.[604] The same goes for UMV, MFA's source of analysis, and PSSI, formerly headed by deputy foreign minister Jiri Schneider, which, in turn, built their research agendas around the security quandaries along the EU-Eastern Europe-Russia axis. Interestingly, on Russia policy, where these two groups preferred engagement to ostracisation, and similarly preferred separation and compartmentalisation of the different aspects or problems in Prague's relationship with Moscow—reminiscent, indeed, of the US "reset policy", as well as the EU's Russia strategy—they also aligned with the norm entrepreneur "subculture" of leftist intellectuals mentioned in chapter 6: Jiri Pehe from NYU and ex-dissidents such as Petr Uhl, as well as Vaclav Havel's former aide and ex-ambassador to Moscow, Lubos Dobrovsky.

Moving on to the decision-making community, it teemed with norm entrepreneurs of both the "hawkish" and "dovish" incarnations due to the elite turnover in the general election of 2006. Though the latter, whose core grew out of ex-president Vaclav Havel's circle, had retained *structural power* over the years—an embeddedness that contributed to the overall continuity of Czech foreign policy—the former, who

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604 The Polish equivalent is Grupa Zagranica. DEMAS' mission statement "builds on the solid foundations laid by the important segment of the Czech non-profit sector engaged in the field of democracy assistance, on the Czech experience and know-how of the transition to democracy, and also on an enduring sense of shared responsibility for democratic development in countries less fortunate than the Czech Republic. Within the framework of DEMAS, the members will be able to identify their common interests and values, and co-operate more effectively in achieving the maximum impact in the field of human rights".

enjoyed less exposure during the social democrats' tenure in office in 1998-2006 found themselves strengthened after 2006. Self-proclaimed and socially "credentialed" advocates of "dissident geopolitics" ended up holding all of the key posts: prime minister Mirek Topolanek and his successor Petr Necas, foreign minister Karel Schwarzenberg and his deputy Jiri Schneider, minister for European affairs and later defense minister Alexander Vondra —along with his subordinates Jiri Sedivy and Ivan Pocuch— as well as Russian ambassador Petr Kolar. Within this group, Karel Schwarzenberg, Vaclav Havel's friend, leaned more towards "dovish" liberal internationalism, eventually mutating into a proponent of "Europeanisation" and also of a Russia-friendlier policy, which instigated clashes with his counterpart at the defense ministry, Alexander Vondra.

For their part, "doves" still dominated the foreign ministry, especially after the establishment of the unit focused on "transformational cooperation". Though one of the masterminds of the institutional reshuffle, Tomas Pojar (the other one was Petr Kolar, the ambassador to Russia), who used to head *People in Need* before he became deputy foreign minister, departed mid-term for an embassy posting in Israel, he left a weld phalanx of disciples who carried on with the missionary work: above all, Helena Stohanzlova and for part of the electoral cycle, Gabriela Dlouha, who co-headed the office of "transformational cooperation" in the 2006-2010 electoral cycle.

Figure 6.3: Czech decision-makers during the Russia Reset: structural power



Overall, this section has highlighted the increased *structural power* commanded by proponents of "dissident geopolitics", especially "hawks", in the Czech Republic at the time of the US-Russia reset. The figure above indicates that they held most relevant posts in the executive and diplomatic corps. Alternative norm entrepreneur groups, such as the "pragmatists" whose *structural power* proved important for the discursive competition ahead of the Orange Revolution, were weakened during the Russia Reset. Yet within the network bound by "dissident geopolitics", the bifurcation between "hawkish" missionaries and "dovish" converts indicates that *structural power* was less concentrated.

6.5.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

Hence, the different groups of missionaries, if the metaphor is extended, shared the faith in "dissident geopolitics" but not the catechism: in other words, they had different convictions about how the principles should translate into a mode of engagement with Russia. While they did not clash on the *meta-narrative* used to explain the rationale for the Czech Republic's Russia-wary foreign policy course, they did diverge in their use of persuasive *framing* in foreign policy discourse, i.e., in *micro-narratives*. On the macro-level, both "hawks" and "doves" applied selective amnesia, a common myth-making technique in the cultural memory of different nations, which enabled them to equate post-communist Russia to the communist Soviet Union.[605] Hence, Vladimir Putin, of FSB, was KGB's Beria disguised in a Savile Row suit and sporting a Rolex watch; the 2008 Russian "assault" on Georgia was the modern-day repetition of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[606]

The qualitatively traceable consequence of this *meta-narrative* for Czech foreign policy towards the former imperial power is its near-inevitable securitisation. The Soviet chimera evoked and reinforced the familiar security dilemma of the self-identified "small state fatefully wedged between France and Germany". Whereas for the "hawkish" Atlanticists, it tended to facilitate efforts to ensure protection of Bohemian territory by a third party, for the "dovish" liberal internationalists, it

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605 Esbenshade, R.S., 1995. Remembering to Forget: Memory, History, National Identity in Postwar East-Central Europe. *Representations* 49:72-96

606 Pehe 2011; *Aktualne.cz, 2008*. Rekneme nahlas, ze Rusko je agresorem, vyzval Havel. 31.8.

motivated strives to project Western values and promote civil society development in the Kantian spirit of "more democracy, more security", the two concepts twinned in a way that clearly signified the ideational influence of the American "democratic globalism" paradigm.[607] Both *micro-frames* were at odds with the newly fashionable "reset" policy: whilst for the former lot of missionaries, it was a sell-out of Central Europe akin to the Munich Agreement of 1938, for the latter group of them, it was a resignation on the "freedom agenda" in the post-Soviet space.

The "hawkish" version of the main *meta-narrative* for Czech-Russian relations utilised *framing devices* that painted the danger of a returned "satellite" dynamic in overly dark colours. In these norm entrepreneurs' eyes, power-hungry Russia could swallow the states that used to belong to its sphere of influence if it chose to, in a decade, or later. Hence, the logic of appropriateness dictated, it was important for the Czechs to stay on their toes and also seek the support of Goliaths to cling to in times of crisis. Interestingly, this inherent distrust in "Russia 2.0", as a Czech diplomat that did not want to be named puts it, helps explain both the Americophilia and the Euro-scepticism of Czech Atlanticists. Even the otherwise tame and Brussels-friendly Cyril

607 Conclusions drawn from countless interviews. The link to "democratic globalism" was mentioned by several leading conservatives, such as Vondra (2011) and Topolanek (2011) among decision-makers and Mrklas (2011) and Karasek (2011) among opinion-makers. In fact, while consolidated democracies are less likely to engage in conflicts, the same assumption does not hold for transiting democracies, which are often unstable and quite bellicose. In this view, Russia as a "democracy" might end up posing a greater security risk, a scenario that Czech norm entrepreneurs do not really take into account.

Svoboda, the long-time foreign minister and MP in the Czech lower house of parliament at the time of the US-Russia reset, was quick to bash both Washington, for "giving up" on Central Europe, and also Brussels, for not "trying at all" to put Russia in its place. He criticised the EU's continuing "meek acceptance" of the Russians' whims in the post-Soviet space, saying,

In contrast to the EU, Russia actually has a strategy. The Kremlin is not in a rush because it has a long-term plan. The Russians consider Central and Eastern Europe as "their" space, which they held once, and will control, in some form or other, again. No one in Brussels wants to delineate the borders of Europe for the fear that the bear will start grumbling. Not including a clause on future membership on the treaty signed with Ukraine during the French presidency was a disgrace.[608]

Cyril Svoboda's tirade is symptomatic of a *macro-frame* that has already been mentioned in the case of Slovakia: the enduring recognition of Russia as a "great power", a conceptual label in international relations that quite a few observers outside Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space have shed as obsolete.[609] Jan Ruml, dissident and former interior minister, for instance, puts the re-invented "great-power politics" of Moscow on par with those of Beijing in terms of the threat that he believes they pose to the "Euro-American world", and dissident and head of Vaclav Havel's *Forum 2000* foundation Oldrich Cerny speaks of Russia's "under-estimated"

608 Svoboda, C. 2011

609 See, for instance, Gvosdev, N., 2009. "Because It Is": Russia, the Existential Great Power; Trenin, D., 2011. Russia: from Empire to Great Power. *The Valdai Discussion Club*. Brief. 29.6.

neo-imperialism.[610]

The key to the puzzle of the respect for Moscow's status on the international stage, and the instinctive fear of it, rests in the understanding of two 20th century traumas that provided Czech advocates of "dissident geopolitics", "hawks" in particular, with powerful historical *micro-narratives* justifying Russophobic foreign policy. They are the Munich Agreement of 1938 and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. As defense minister during the reset Alexander Vondra puts it today, "alliances can crack under the pressure of an avalanche of contingencies".[611] This is why, adds the Czech Republic's longtime ambassador to Russia and Vaclav Havel's aide Lubos Dobrovsky, "we requested, since the onset of the NATO enlargement process, the presence of American troops on our soil, to ensure the validity and the enforcement, if necessary, of Article V. of the Washington Treaty".[612] He, just as the lot of non-dissident but no less "hawkish" Atlanticists such as prime minister Mirek Topolanek and others, who fought for NMD a decade later, concedes that it was Russia, not Germany or another state, that the Czech Republic needed to be "shielded" from. Topolanek dubbed the backtracking on the Bush-era project the new "Munich", "Teheran" and "Yalta".[613] Referring to such Czech outbursts, Madeleine Albright, the

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610 Cerny 2011; Ruml, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 5.3.

611 Vondra 2011

612 Dobrovsky 2011

613 Topolanek 2011

Czech-born US Secretary of State under the Clinton administration, dubs Munich, the synonym of appeasement which inspired the famous Czecho-slovak outcry "about us, without us", the epitome of a small power's ultimate trauma. Writing about the onset of "Prague Winter" after 1938, she is as harsh on the French and British allies that actively participated in the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1938 as she is on her absent American compatriots.[614] To this date, Munich, at least in the Czech part of the former federation, remains an ever-present framing device for a diktat of any sort. Vaclav Havel, the dissident turned president, also used it during the Russian-Georgian War in 2008.

On top of Munich, which has fuelled distrust of great powers and planted seeds of doubt about alliances, the Soviet invasion of 1968, another 20th century shock, embitters the cocktail of trauma and abandonment, which an entire generation of "hawkish" Czech policy-makers has still not digested, with outright Russophobia. Echoing Havel's statement "truth and love will triumph over lies and hatred", Petruska Sustrova, a well-known commentator from Havel's circle of "truth-and-love"-ers, as dissidents and activists in the Czech Republic tend to be nicknamed, says: "This does not mean that the Czechs hold a grudge against the Russian nation, or despise the Russian culture. This is an ingrained antipathy toward an occupier, an

614 Albright, M., 2012. *Prague Winter: a Personal Story of Remembrance and War*. New York: HarperCollins Press; Mikulova, K., 2012. Madeleine Albright: A Long Prague Winter. *The Economist.* 2.8.; Albright 2012, 25.7.

occupying force."[615] Overall, the elite myth-making that informs the discursive *framing* of Czech-Russian relations in contemporary debates on foreign policy can, perhaps, best be explained in the words of Michael Zantovsky, an émigré and former US ambassador. "It is telling that the fears and efforts to fortify our lands from the Eastern aggressor were most intense at the time when the threat was perhaps the smallest— at the time of [Boris] Yeltsin, when Russia was virtually on its knees. It is about cultural memory."[616]

The "dovish" incarnation of the *meta-narrative* of Russia as an aggressive great power uses a slightly different *micro-frame*, portraying Russia as not that much of a threat to the Czech Republic than as a "black knight" with a potentially dangerous "soft power" projection of an "alternative value system" in the troubled post-Soviet space that should, in the "doves'" eyes, be pulled into the Western orbit. Interestingly, the concepts used by Czech analysts and activists, whose longtime forte has been work in dictatorships such as Belarus, Cuba and Burma, seem to justify their focus on CIS countries, rather than Russia proper. For instance, they carefully distinguish between "authoritarianism" and "competitive authoritarianism" – the latter label was assigned to Russia under Putin and Ukraine under Kuchma alike, for instance – arguing in a fiery manner that the value system that they abide by dictates that they target regimes that are more oppressive. Petr Drulak, president of UMV, the Czech peer of Polish PISM—the leading foreign policy think-tank pegged to the foreign

615 Sustrova 2011

616 Zantovsky 2010

ministry—who belongs to the norm entrepreneur community of "experts" that allied with the "doves" at the time of the reset explains that Russia cannot be treated like North Korea, "In dialogue with the ministry, we always argue that it is important to highlight human rights abuses, be they in small or large countries. But we have also criticised Czech diplomacy for being 'undiplomatic' vis-à-vis Russia, especially during the Russian-Georgian War."[617] From among the "doves", Tomas Pojar, the activist-turned-diplomat, who co-founded the division for "transformational cooperation" at the MFA alongside the Czech Republic's Russia ambassador, Petr Kolar, also insists that Czech democratisation efforts in Eastern Europe are not primarily anti-Russian. "Perhaps that is how we differ, in terms of motivation, from some 'hawks'. We are not doing this, not even in part, to protect the Czech Republic from Russia. We simply believe that the more stable, more prosperous and more democratic our neighbourhood is, the better for both us and the people that live there."[618]

Pojar's confession highlights the extent to which "doves" understand how difficult it is to retain balance on the fine line between emotions and historicism, on the one hand, and norms and values on the other hand. Gabriela Dlouha, who worked at the very heart of the abovementioned "transformational" enterprise, also points out that outspoken criticism of human rights abuses and ostracisation, which some "hawks" seem to prefer to talks behind closed doors and engagement, does not necessarily

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617 Drulak 2011

618 Pojar 2010

"…help us achieve what we want. There is no direct proportion between being nice and getting business contracts, and being harsh about human rights and democracy and contributing to democratisation in Russia."[619] Hence, the perception of Moscow as a "non-standard" or "less predictable" partner may be shared between "hawkish" Atlanticists and "dovish" liberal internationalists, but they agree less on the foreign policy toolkit that should be applied to increase the amount of consistency and trust in the relationship while retaining a firm stance on international norms.

Tellingly, though, the "hawks" and the "doves", tend to be equally vocal about the importance of a tough Russia policy when a third network of norm entrepreneurs, the "pragmatists" led by Vaclav Havel's successor at the Castle Vaclav Klaus, starts claiming that Russia is a "normal" actor that should be treated accordingly, with respect and trust.[620] Klaus, the champion of national sovereignty and non-intervention —the latter often conflated with appeasement Munich-style—was, for instance, one of the few Western politicians (those included a fellow "pragmatist", Robert Fico in Slovakia) who condemned the Georgians for their alleged recklessness following the onset of the hostilities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and has also been accused by the Czech media of hobnobbing with high-ranking Gazprom executives. "Hawkish" journalists also revealed that Lukoil money is fuelling Klaus' well-oiled publishing

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619 Dlouha 2011

620 See, for instance, *Novinky.cz*, 2011. "Jsou to jejich volby", rekl Klaus o Rusku a zvedl politology ze zidli. 8.12.; *iDnes.cz*, 2009. Medvedev neni Breznev, ale v Rusku bych zit nechtel, rekl Klaus. 7.11.

machine, financing his book on the "myth of global warming". For these reasons, Klaus is often described by rival norm entrepreneurs as "pro-Russian".[621] When asked for a comment on the Lukoil expose, Klaus said: "I am glad that my book will come out in Russia, which has been damaged by the communist regime, liquidating human freedom and trying to command wind and rain, similarly to present-day environmentalists."[622]

Yet while the "pragmatists" *micro-narrative* of "normalcy" in Czech-Russian relations does not resonate with proponents of "dissident geopolitics", it does strike a chord with others. Those include members of the mainstream social democratic party, *CSSD,* and another socialist grouping, *Zemanovci,* of the former prime minister Milos Zeman, which also happens to be sponsored by Lukoil.[623] The longtime "shadow" foreign minister Lubomir Zaoralek of *CSSD* explains it this way: "The Czech right, always looking for an external or internal enemy, has overdone it and turned human rights into a fetish. The whole world is rushing to China, the West is penetrating the Russian market. We cannot close our eyes to opportunities." His colleague, ex-premier Jiri Paroubek, adds that when he met with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in 2009, it was regarded by some zealous missionaries as "treason".[624]

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621 Joch 2011

622 *iHned.cz*, 2008. Preklad Klausovy knihy zaplatil Lukoil. 18.8

623 *iHned.cz,* 2012. Lukoil na Hrad. 29.5.; *iDnes.cz*, 2012. Klaus podporil Zemana v boji o Hrad. Je to vyznamna osobnost, tvrdi. 28.5.

624 Zaoralek, V., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 9.12; Paroubek 2011

Likeminded commentators hailing Klaus' efforts to revive Czech-Russian business ties once responded to the Klaus-bashers with taking a punch at Havel. "The Czech Republic cannot afford another debacle, such as Vaclav Havel and his groupies exiting the arms industry, in which we belonged to the top, in the 1990s, because of some short-term political or personal gain."[625]

In sum, this section suggests that at the time of the Russia Reset, norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" possessed not merely *structural* but also *discursive power*, stemming from the use of complementary *meta-narratives* framing Czech-Russian relations in a way that entailed high *resonance.* It further indicates that though these norm entrepreneurs were *disputed* by rivals, the combination of *structural power* and *resonance* gave them a very good chance to exert influence on foreign policy and translate their logic of appropriateness from discourse to output.

6.5.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

At the outset of the US-Russia reset, Czech foreign policy output reflected the government-Castle – i.e. "dissident geopolitics" vs. "pragmatist" duality. For President Klaus's network of norm entrepreneurs, the broader reset marked a sign that the Czech Republic should pursue one as well, in line with what they had been advocating. Yet for their counterparts from the group of norm entrepreneurs bound by "dissident geopolitics", it spelled disappointment and elicited a Russophobic

625 *EUserver.parlamentnilisty.cz,* 2012. Politika Vaclava Klause k Rusku je statnicky prozirava. Navsteva ruskeho prezidenta znamenala vic, nez kdyby prijela cela Evropska komise. 17.5.

response. Ultimately, however, the US-Russia reset led some of these missionaries, especially "doves", to reassess the value of the Russia policy that they had been pursuing. Hence, the Castle's approach was marked by consistency, whereas the standpoint of the two centre-right governments influenced by "dissident geopolitics" that succeeded each other in the 2008–2011 period underwent a subtle but noticeable shift.

Using energy policy as an example, the rift was particularly evident. President Klaus continued to argue for a stronger Russian presence on the Czech market, even in the sensitive energy sector, where his Atlanticist and liberal internationalist opponents had been attempting to diversify supply, "over-selling", as his critics sneered, the Russian bid for the $1bn expansion of the country's main nuclear power station, Temelin. Meanwhile, prime minister Petr Necas, elected in 2010, courted the French competition, travelling to France—where policy-makers told him to "remember where he belongs"—twice in twelve months.[626] In the end, the contract went to the Americans, a decision facilitated by intense lobbying of several influential "hawkish" norm entrepreneurs, says adviser to defense minister Alexander Vondra, Jan Havranek.[627] "[Vondra] is not against doing business with Moscow. He's realistic and knows we cannot ignore it. But he would not sacrifice his commitment to security and democratic standards, " he explains. During president Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Prague in December 2011, the Czechs and the Russians signed contracts worth

626 *Aktualne.cz, 2012.* Pomnete, kam patrite, rika Francie usilujici o Temelin. 5.1.

627 Havranek, J., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 14.2.

$2.6bn.

But even as the different norm entrepreneurs surrounding Klaus and the centre-right coalition alike did not shy away from pursuing economic interests, they used divergent rhetoric vis-à-vis Russia. At the time of the brutal crackdown on demonstrators protesting electoral fraud that certain media anointed a "Russian Spring" in Moscow and other Russian cities, prime minister Petr Necas criticised the Kremlin's response and urged the Russian authorities to investigate incidents of police brutality: "The police dispersing a demonstration, that happens on Wall Street too, but to have journalists getting beaten up so badly that they end up in hospital with damaged spines is hardly compatible with democracy."[628] Karel Schwarzenberg, the heavyweight foreign minister, also told the Czech media that, "It seems that many observers have been critical of the elections in their remarks and reflections. This is deplorable because we hoped that the times when force was used to influence a vote were over."[629] The minister, who did not meet President Medvedev, in Prague at the time, due to impending responsibilities in Brussels, also said that he would have confronted the Kremlin chief if he had the chance. Yet the foreign ministry did not issue an official statement on the Russian elections, like it did, for instance, at the time of the botched presidential vote and demonstrations in Belarus, a year earlier, or during the Orange Revolution. Klaus, who did speak to Medvedev, on the other hand,

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628 *Aktualne.cz,* 2012. Klaus asi vi vic, mirni Necas ruske nadeje na Temelin. 8.12.

629 *Czech Press Agency (CTK),* 2012. MfD: Schwarzenberg kritizoval parlamentni volby v Rusku. 8.12.

remained amicable, and indirectly downplayed the mass protests in Russia by comparing them to recent strikes of doctors and teachers in the Czech Republic, an analogy – between a "denial of democracy" and a "privilege stemming from democracy" immediately labeled as "cynical" by leading norm entrepreneurs propagating "dissident geopolitics".[630]

Indeed, looking back to the period preceding the US-Russia reset, the representatives of the main norm entrepreneurial networks largely remained consistent in their critical, or uncritical, appraisals of Russia's democratic deficit. The "pragmatists" were either mute or downplayed the Kremlin's misconduct. However, the comments of advocates of "dissident geopolitics" on developments in the most publicised cases, of the murdered investigative journalist of *Novaya Gazeta* Anna Politkovskaya, poisoned agent Alexander Litvinenko, jailed tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky and attorney Sergei Magnitsky, who died in police custody, show clear signs of chutzpah. "Hawks" and "doves" have a strong track record of norm-oriented and value-laden criticism of Russia's internal and external conduct, including a petition against the alleged "chicanery" and mistreatment of Khodorkovsky in prison, signed by Havel, Vondra, Schwarzenberg, current US ambassador Petr Gandalovic, and others[631]; vigorous support of Georgia after the outbreak of the war with Russia in 2008 (minister Schwarzenberg clashed with Vaclav Klaus, who condemned not only Tbilisi for "fatal irresponsibility" but also his counterparts from Poland, Ukraine and the

630 Pehe, J., 2011. Natlakove skupiny podle Klause. *Pravo*. 10.12.

631 *Aktualne.cz,* 2006. Chodorkovsky je ve vezeni sikanovan. 19.4.

Baltics for travelling to the Caucasus to express their support for the small country[632]); or even the odd article in the opposition daily *Novaya Gazeta*, which had at least seven of its journalists, including Politkovskaya, killed, slamming the Russian regime as "the harshest of all known forms of post-communist political systems" combining "old stereotypes and a new business-mafia environment", for "insulting the dignity of citizens, controlling the judiciary, the mass media and manipulating election results".[633]

Moving on to EU policy, hopes that the geopolitical implications of the Russia reset and Washington's abandonment of its traditional Europe-first foreign policy would bring the Czech Republic closer to the EU, like they did Poland, proved premature. Here, the bifurcation within the network of norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics", as well as the strong Euro-scepticism of the "pragmatists" created obstacles. The disagreement between "hawks" and "doves" over the extent to which the country should rely on American and European allies, as "dovish" opinion-makers Jiri Pehe and Petr Drulak, along with other observers, pinpoint, went beyond threat perceptions of Russia.[634] The ideational, and idealised, commitment to the transatlantic partnership on the part of the "hawks" did not wane, as hardline Atlanticists such as defense minister Alexander Vondra, whose disappointment with the Obama administration cannot be disputed, concede. "We have recognized its

632 *Novinky.cz,* 2008. Schwarzenberg kvuli Gruzii kritizoval prezidenta Klause. 19.8.

633 *Ceskapozice.cz*, 2011. Vaclav Havel Slams Undemocratic Russian Regime. 9.12.

634 Drulak 2011; Pehe 2011

limitations and adjusted our position accordingly, cementing it in the 'common European home'".[635] Rhetorically, this may have been the case, but leaked diplomatic cables and official Czech foreign policy documents suggest otherwise. Commenting on the EU's intention to "unfreeze" the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiations with Moscow, Vondra said that it will only allow the French president Nicolas Sarkozy's "love fest" with Russia to go forward, referring to the upcoming EU-Russia summit, and reiterated the need for a common US-European position on Russian president Dmitri Medvedev's proposal for a new Euro-Atlantic security system.[636] Though Vondra's Americophilia suffered a notable setback after the "reset" with Russia and the cancellation of the NMD project in Central Europe, he continued to clash with Schwarzenberg, then foreign minister, on the latter's Euro-enthusiasm.[637] Schwarzenberg, who threatened to leave the three-party coalition multiple times over EU-related matters, has, for instance, been under attack from both the "hawks"—most of all Vondra but also prime minister Petr Necas—and president Klaus' "pragmatists" for the Euro-centric draft foreign policy doctrine that he introduced in 2011.[638]

The motivations of the "hawks" and the "pragmatists" for refusing to "substitute" the

635 Vondra 2011

636 US Embassy in Prague, 2008. Cable 08Prague696. 11.5.

637 Pehe, J., 2012. Velky koalicni spor? *Pravo.* 27.6.

638 *The Prague Post*, 2011. Hazy Foreign Policy Splits Govn't. 20.7.

US with the EU because of the US-Russia reset were notably different. Klaus' request to opt-out from the human rights provision in the Lisbon Treaty indicates that his Euro-scepticism had little to do with international norms such as democracy: rather, it was based on the notion of national sovereignty.[639] The "hawks'" Euro-realism, on the other hand, highlights the embeddedness of the normative undercurrents in Czech foreign policy: namely Atlanticism, which constitutes one of the founding pillars of "dissident geopolitics". As Madeleine Albright, speaking about differences between Polish and Czech foreign policy, puts it, since the Czechs have fewer geopolitical reasons to fret, they feel less constrained in expressing disappointment with the US, anger at Russia and aloofness towards the EU, than the Poles or the Balts.[640]

In conclusion, the Czech foreign policy-making elite was much less keen than its Slovak counterpart to commence a reset policy vis-à-vis Russia. Due, in part, to the *structural power* of norm entrepreneurs inspired by "dissident geopolitics", as well as the consistency of their normative convictions, which were based on *meta-narratives* with notable *resonance,* the Czech Republic continued to pursue a foreign policy course that followed the logic of incentives but also did not compromise on norms and values. Yet, a budding normative shift can be observed in the country's approach

639 Klaus argued that acceptance of this protocol by the Czech Republic would open the government to lawsuits from Sudeten Germans who had property stripped in the wake of World War II by the controversial Benes Decrees. In order to avoid a redrafting of the Lisbon Treaty and relaunch the ratification process in the other 26 member states, EU officials struck a compromise allowing the opt-out to be included in the next EU treaty, the Croatian accession treaty.

640 Albright 2012

to the EU, which, at least among "doves", started warming and thus melting some of the Americanophilia that had defined "dissident geopolitics" since its inception. Europeanisation can, in part, be regarded as a by-product of the US-Russia reset.

6.6. Poland: "turncoat" de-converts

While the Czechs eschewed the Russia Reset as counter-intuitive and the Slovaks accepted it as a reaffirmation of what they had been doing anyway, the Poles did both: after a temporary glitch, they got on board. The confidence-exuding new EU member, eager to win recognition on the European stage, took less time than expected to pragmatically "switch allegiances", subtly shun Washington and start courting both Moscow and Brussels with a new intensity. On the part of the Poles, it was, at least initially, perceived as a strategic necessity. Following president Obama's decision to rationalise Bush's NMD blueprint, which was supposed to include not only ground-based interceptors but also, the Polish authorities hoped, a Patriot air-defense battery with a service team of American troops to man it, the Tusk government seemed, at first, outraged at the acquiescence to Russian interests. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War, in which Poland was heavily invested, mediating and lobbying on the behalf of the Caucasian country, had "strengthened apprehension—which had long been in the [Polish] blood—against Russia".[641] In the course of the eventful 2009, the media ran dozens of alarmist articles about the renewed "arms race", pointing fingers at the Putin-Medvedev tandem, and chastising the Obama administration for "abandoning"

641 Ostrowski, M., 2011. Co s ta Rosja. *Polityka.* 17.12.

the Central European allies in times of need.[642]

Yet behind closed doors, Poland had already begun fingering the Polish-Russian "reset button" even ahead of a similar step by the US in 2009. In fact, sustained, though not always publicised, efforts of Polish officialdom on this front predated the American ones by at least a year. Commenting on the nascent Polish-Russian reconciliation, Mark Brzezinski, the Polish-American analyst and son of the famous Zbigniew, emphasised its strategic value for both parties involved in an illustrious op-ed in *The New York Times*, "Poland understands the drawbacks of being a border country, and Russia understands it would be better off if its neighbours feared Moscow less".[643]

The resulting Polish-Russian reset, based on not only Russia-related security considerations but also normative shifts, expedited the blossoming process of Europeanisation of Polish foreign and security policy. Internationally, the ambitious Poles clearly acted upon *reputational* concerns, kindled by the desire to "dance with the big boys", as *The Economist* eloquently framed it. According to this interpretation, Poland started "scampering" after big European countries such as France and Germany to establish itself as a valued player, a forward, perhaps, on the field of European diplomacy.[644] Intensifying efforts at "normalisation" of its relations with

642 *Gazeta Wyborcza,* 2009. Putin zbroi sie precziw tarczy antyrakietowej. 29.12.

643 *The New York Times*, 2011. Obama, Poland and Russia. 26.5.

644 *The Economist*, 2010. Polish Foreign Policy: Dancing with the Big Boys. 25.11.

Russia was a major part of transforming itself from a European "pet" to a true leader. Domestically, however, norms, coupled with interests, also have to be factored in: the concept of historical reconciliation, used as a *framing* and *rhetorical* device to justify rapprochement with the long-time foe, was a powerful, if expensive, fuel that fired up the "reset" engine. There was a precedent: a couple of years earlier, Poland had rebuilt its relationship with Germany, despite deep-rooted historical animosities. The fatal 2010 Smolensk plane crash[645], which drastically thinned down the ranks of the Cold War generation in the Polish political elite and shook Polish society to the core, provided a short-term trigger. It evoked unexpectedly heartfelt Russian sympathy and provided compelling incentives for the Poles to attempt to reconcile with the Russians much the same way they did with the Germans.

The aim of the following sections is to establish what role, if any, networks of norm entrepreneurs played in facilitating this foreign policy outcome, which can be described as the "aborted crusade". How did different norm entrepreneurs, hitherto passionate about keeping away from the clawed Russian bear, use their *persuasive power* to explain their sudden yearning to tame it? How did those who went against the mainstream *frame* their decision to argue in favour of the status quo? The Polish case will demonstrate that sweeping geopolitical shifts—and powerful security and economic incentives—can transform the kaleidoscopic understanding of what is "good" and "appropriate". It is, ultimately, the fundamental primacy or resurgence of realpolitik, which generally trumps normative deliberations in the foreign policy-

645 *Politykaglobalna.pl,* 2010. Stosunki polsko-rosyjske pol roku po katastrofie smolenskiej. 25.12.

making of countries with enduring security quandaries, that elucidates why the interest-driven Polish reset took less pain than the norm-driven Czech one.

6.6.1. Macro-structure: incentives and disincentives

Geopolitically and strategically, pursuing a "reset" with former imperial power Russia implied notable long-term benefits, which surely helped popularise on-going exploratory efforts by isolated groups of norm entrepreneurs to "advertise" this foreign policy as optimal within the community of opinion-makers and decision-makers in the initially hesitant Poland. In 2009, the Polish "security grid" featured two Russia-related items that represented pressing concerns: the "scrapped" missile defence and flailing energy security. First, the announcement of the Obama administration on September 17, 2009—the date of the Soviet invasion of Poland 70 years earlier, saturated with historical symbolism—awakened many old "chimeras", especially in conservative circles. For many Polish observers, "reassessing" the missile shield in Central Europe was a euphemism for "shelving" the Bush-era NMD blueprint, and the announcement crushed, at least temporarily, the ever-flickering hopes for American military presence in the EU's Eastern periphery. Naturally, the decision, hailed by Russian authorities, raised havoc: the Polish elite vividly remembered that in 2007, then-president Vladimir Putin warned of a new Cold War if the shield was deployed,[646] and thus had a tendency to perceive it as a kowtow to

646 *Rzeczpospolita,* 2008. Putin: wycelujemy w Polske. 12.9., compare with: *The Guardian*, 2007. Russia Threatening New Cold War over Missile Defence. 10.4.

Russian interests.[647] The length and strain of the often prickly NMD bargaining reinforced the perception of futility and, for some Russia-bashers, especially in the *Law and Justice* (PiS) party, outright betrayal. Polish politicians had been locked in tough talks with their American counterparts since 2002. The two parties had hit a stalemate in 2008, when Washington refused to sponsor the modernisation of the Polish army whilst promising to double Warsaw's military aid[648]. Moreover, the Polish elites felt betrayed because the negotiations went on largely against the will of the population, of which 53% harboured little enthusiasm for yet another foreign superpower's "military base" on their war-ridden soil, as Polish polling agency CBOS reported in March 2009.[649]

One of the problems with the cancellation of the NMD agreement was its abruptness. Signed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and defense minister Radek Sikorski, on August 20, 2008, it had barely celebrated its first birthday when it was revoked.

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647 A recently leaked recording of a conversation between President Obama and Premier Medvedev in Seoul reaffirmed the suspicion of some members of the Polish elite that the American president essentially bows down to the Kremlin. Apparently, president Obama asked for "time" to decide what to do with the planned missile defense shield in Europe until after his re-election, reassuring his partner that he understood Russian concerns. *Gazeta.pl,* 2012. Nagrano rozmowe Miedwiediewa i Obamy ws. tarczy antyrakietowej. Przekaze Wladimirowi! 26.3.

648 *Zycie Warszawy*, 2008. Polska nie zgadza sie na instalacje tarczy. 4.7.

649 *CBOS*, 2009. Do you support or oppose the deployment of an anti-missile shield in Poland? Opinion poll. March. In March 2009, 53% of the respondents rejected the scheme, 22% supported it, and 25% were not sure.

Interestingly, Polish norm entrepreneurs decided to vent their frustration in the international media: some of them concede today that it was a calculated move aimed to exert maximum pressure on Washington. For instance, Poland's envoy in the US, Witold Waszczykowski of PiS, told Spiegel International that he felt powerless, "We can't just stand there and scream: 'Missiles or death'."[650] Other norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" spoke out in less amicable terms in the Polish outlets. Poland's celebrity ex-president and Nobel Peace Prize winner Lech Walesa resorted to out-and-out value-laden condemnation of Washington's lack of "moral spine": "The Americans have always only taken care of their own interests and they have used everyone else."[651] As the ECFR framed it for the wider European audience of experts at the time, Poland levered up because it, "wanted not missile defense but US 'hostages' on [its] territory. Mistrustful of both the EU and NATO, it wanted the "triple lock" of a bilateral American security guarantee against Russia."[652] Though in the end, Warsaw did manage to secure a satisfactory deal on missile defense with the US—sealed in December 2009, the package included both Patriot missiles and American troops—Polish policy-makers, in the words of Witold Waszczykowski, came to understand that the shadow of the Russian bear fell on them alone. As he explains it today, somewhat poetically, "it suddenly got cold in the lonely Katyn

650 *Spiegel International*, 2009. Warsaw Fear Washington Losing Interest in Eastern Allies. 17.9.

651 *TVN24,* 2009. Walesa: Amerykanie dbaja tylko o wlasny interes. 17.9.

652 Witney. N., 2009. Missile Defense, Bald men and Combs. *The European Council on Foreign Relations.* Commentary. 1.10.

forest, and we realised that we would have to 'face the beast' on our own: American battalions would not come to our rescue".[653] Hence, the perceived "subtraction" of the American factor from the Polish security equation changed the grid of incentives that informed the risk analysis of various versions of Russia policy: by the end of 2009, it was clear that continuing to alienate Moscow, as was the case under the previous administration of the Kaczynski brothers in 2005-2007, was not a "safe" option for Warsaw anymore.

Zooming in on energy security, Poland had an additional disincentive to continue squabbling with Russia. The latter's gas spat with Ukraine in January 2009, which had interrupted Poland's supply flow, as well as rapidly progressing works on what was once an unthreatening skeleton of the underwater natural gas pipeline Nabucco from Russia's Siberian gas fields to Germany's Baltic coast, spelled trouble. Policy-wise, Polish policy-makers, some of whom openly accused their Russian counterparts of using the natural riches of their vast northeast and Nabucco in particular of pursing the classical divide-and-conquer strategy aimed at weakening the EU and NATO[654], had already knocked their teeth out with the hardline approach. They had tried slamming the pipeline—the vocal Sikorski called the €7.4bn pipeline a "waste of European consumers' money that was pushed through over our heads" and, as

653 Waszczykowski 2011

654 *Polska Agenja Prasowa*, 2009. Nord Stream: Polska i kraje baltyckie nezadowolone , Niemcy – przeciwnie. 6.11.

WikiLeaks reveal, Germany the "Trojan horse" of Russia in Europe[655]. They also attempted filing an arbitration procedure against the energy giant Gazprom by the gas monopoly PGNiG to demand a discount on gas imports, and proposing alternatives, such as the second line of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, as well as the Amber pipeline through the Baltic states and Poland as land-based alternatives to the offshore pipeline.[656] In the meantime, Poland's 92% dependency on Russia's gas continued to inflate its swollen trade deficit, which had grown at an unchanging pace from $530m in 1997 to $7.82bn in 2009, according to the statistical office's (GU) figures.[657] Poland spent $8.7bn on the purchase of Russian mineral products, including oil and gas, lubricants and other related materials, more than any other country, in 2009 alone.[658]

Hence, economically, a related enticement for the Poles to attempt to establish at least a working rapport with Russia was the severely skewed trade and investment curve. In 2010, for instance, Russia ranked as Poland's seventh largest trading partner, receiving 3.8% of its exports, lagging far behind Germany, with a 25.8% share, as

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655 *The Baltic Course*, 2010. Polish Foreign Minister Slams Nord Stream Pipeline. 7.1.; *Polska Agencja Prasowa,* 2011. Sikorski trafiony w WikiLeaks. 17.9.

656 The Amber project foresees laying a natural gas pipeline across the Tver, Novgorod and Pskov oblasts in Russia and then through Latvia and Lithuania to Poland, where it would be re-connected to the Yamal–Europe pipeline.

657 *Polish Statistical Office,* 2010. Yearbook. Foreign Trade.

658 *Warsaw Business Journal*, 2011. A Guide to Polish Export: Made in Poland 2011, p. 78

well as France and the UK, with 7.2% and 6.8% shares, respectively.[659] Polish companies remained under-involved on the Russian market: only 33% of them reported activity in Russia, in comparison to 75% in Germany and 48% each in the Czech Republic and Ukraine, in 2009, according to a survey conducted by the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PaIiIZ).[660] That had not always been the case historically: in the communist-era COMECON system, Russia and Poland were partners of the first order, and between 1950 and 1990, they engaged in intense economic exchange. Moreover, in the course of the 2000s, for many Poles, "Russian trade" had become synonymous with massive smuggling, mainly of alcohol and cigarettes, from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Russia's legendary prickliness also made matters difficult, as politics often seemed to get in the way of business. For instance, after the Smolensk plane crash, the thaw in Russian-Polish relations facilitated economic exchange, but following the Polish criticism of the Russian report into the catastrophe, Moscow banned Polish transportation companies from entering the country. The transit dispute, which lasted eight straight days, had an estimated cost of $9.4m for Polish freight companies. Needless to say, Poland also used political repercussions in economic relations with Russia: the infamous meat and vegetable embargo cost Moscow months of blockage of negotiations about the new EU-Russia treaty by an adamant Warsaw. Although Russia sometimes acted unpredictably, the potential gains were too great for many to ignore. "We had few

659 Ibid

660 *PaIiIZ*, 2011. Aktywnosc inwestycyjna polskich przedsiebiorstw za granica w postaci inwestycji bezprosrednich. Report.

other choices than to start reaching out to the Russians if we wanted to make headway in trade and investment," Maciej Oleks-Szczytowski, economic advisor to foreign minister Radek Sikorski, said in a personal interview.[661]

Domestic politics, and two short-term triggers in particular, elite turnover in 2007 and the 2010 Smolensk plane crash, also re-shuffled the macro-structure of the security and economic incentives favourably, tipping the fragile balance between reconciliation versus retaliation towards the former. Interestingly, the liberal government of Donald Tusk's *Civic Platform* (PO) party, which rose to power in 2007, demonstrated readiness to re-establish "normalcy" in Polish-Russian relations even before the US-Russia reset" was on the table. In 2007, the young and dynamic prime minister initiated the launch of the joint bilateral "Commission on Difficult Issues", aimed at unpacking sensitive episodes in the two nations' shared history and verbalising stifled grievances through academic, analytical and policy dialogue, much to the dismay of the PiS conservatives, with which PO had practically shared a "womb" in Solidarity and its political heir, *Solidarity Electoral Action* (AWS), which disintegrated in 2001. "At that time, there was no talk of a "reset". The idea of a political 'cease-fire' with Russia itself was controversial and too heavy for some to stomach," says Mateusz Gniazdowski, an analyst from the *Centre for Eastern Studies* (OSW), which supplies the Polish MFA with brainpower on the post-Soviet space.[662] Unfortunately, contingency—the Smolensk tragedy of 2010— accomplished what the

661 Oleks-Szczytowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 9.6.

662 Gniazdowski 2011

pragmatists in Tusk's cabinet alone could not force the odd bed-fellowship of ex-dissidents, hawks, Russophobes and conspiracy theorists to understand: the key to a tamed Russia was "stick-and-carrot" engagement, not geopolitical ostracism and rhetorical abuse.

The shock of the accident and Moscow's reaction to it initiated the process of Polish-Russian rapprochement. The plane crash, which killed 96 high-ranking Polish officials including president Lech Kaczynski, the chief of the Polish general staff, the head of the central bank, the director of the Institute of National Remembrance, and many others, bore almost sinister symbolism: the delegation was on its way to Katyn, to commemorate the mass murder of a previous Polish elite, the 20,000 reservist officers slaughtered by Stalin's NKVD. Moscow's unprecedented sympathy became the game-changer, as Aleksander Smolar of the *Batory Foundation* puts it, in the two countries' relations: "The old rules and tested tricks simply did not apply anymore".[663] In November 2010, Russia won praise from Poland when the Russian parliament, the *Duma,* condemned the atrocities committed by the Soviets at Katyn. During a ground-breaking visit in December 2010, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev—the first Russian leader to touch down in Warsaw in eight years—pledged full transparency in investigating the tragedy. The Kremlin potentate also awarded a friendship medal to octogenarian Polish film director Andrzej Wajda, whose film "Katyn" was shown on Russian television earlier this year. Wajda's father was among those who perished at Katyn in 1940.

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663 Smolar, A. 2011

Overall, profound changes in the grid of security and economic incentives created a favourable macro-structural environment for the Polish-Russian reset. The perceived withdrawal of the US from Central Europe, challenges in the energy sector and prospects for trade investment, as well as the elite turnover in the 2007 general election and the Smolensk tragedy, placed reconciliation with Russia within the realm of possibility for the first time in Poland's post-communist history.

6.6.2. Micro-structure: structural power

In Poland, the micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship did not seem too favourable when the US and Russia first released a political signal about the possibility of "resetting" relations. Long-term, deeply embedded structural trends that had informed Poland's Russia policy since the downfall of communism practically dictated preservation of the status quo: icy civility, with the occasional diversion to explosive rhetoric, laden with historical references. Short-term shifts on the domestic political scene in 2004–2007 both created and diminished opportunities for norm entrepreneur networks invested in advocacy related to Warsaw's foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow. The decimation of the discredited socialists amidst corruption scandals and allegations of cooperation with the US on secret renditions—SLD demonstrated a poor showing in both the 2005 and 2007 general elections—had transformed Poland's political spectrum, swinging the pendulum to the right and establishing a near-total domination of post-Solidarity parties, notably conservative *PiS* and liberal *PO*. Hence, after a half-decade of leftist supremacy, norm entrepreneurs promoting "dissident geopolitics" acquired even greater *access* to decision-makers, as well as more *structural power*, since some of them joined the government themselves. Yet the

rightist turn also reduced the extent of flexibility and thus manoeuvring capacity in foreign affairs, which used to be the forte of the pragmatic social democrats.[664] Since a heavier accent on universal values and international norms, which tend to be deeply ingrained and thus likely to change only after incremental and iterative processes of behavioural and belief adjustment, generally decreases elasticity, in 2005, the change in Poland's Russia policy seemed more, not less, improbable, until leading norm entrepreneurs kick-started the painful metamorphosis that tends to accompany value shifts.

Among opinion-makers, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" still reigned strongly: "hawkish" Atlanticists and "dovish" human rights campaigners, especially, remained outspoken on internal developments in Russia, as well as the Kremlin/Gazprom tandem's external ventures in the CIS. Already in 2005-2007, however, it became obvious that the undying "Olympic" flame of their missionary zeal was running out of fuel. For their part, "hawks" such as ex-president Lech Walesa and *Gazeta Wyborcza* editor-in-chief Adam Michnik along with ex-ambassadors to Washington Jerzy Kozminski and Janusz Reiter, and their "seconds", hailing from think-tanks and NGOs such as the *Lech Walesa Institute*, the *Polish-American Freedom Foundation*, the *Kosciuszko Foundation* and the *Euro-Atlantic Association (SEA)*, were, in their own words, already grappling with thinly-veiled disillusionment with the US before

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664 Conclusions drawn from the seminar on the future of the Polish left organised by *Stowarzyszenie Spoleczno-Kulturalne Warszawa w Europie* and *Roza Luxembourg Foundation*, "Demokracja a la carte. Lewica w mizerii", in Warsaw on November 29, 2011. Compare with, for instance, the testimonies of social democrats in interviews (Miller 2011).

the US-Russia reset announcement, in 2009, and, by extension, they were also re-assessing the value of Poland's standing foreign policy towards Russia.[665] Slow progress of the NMD negotiations, unexplained exclusion from the American visa waiver programme, a nasty investigation of Poland's possible involvement in hosting C.I.A. "black sites" and the post-Bucharest stagnation of NATO enlargement policy soured the hitherto sweet love affair and produced a bitter cocktail of confusion that left the cold warriors, as the ECFR dubbed the Poles in their "Power Audit of EU-27 Russia Relations", undecided on Vladimir Lenin's classic question of "what was to be done" with the Russians. This uncertainty was especially acute because of the perceived lack of security guarantees from the Europeans and strategic reassurance from the Americans.

On the other hand, "doves" and "experts" among opinion-makers, whose role was foreshadowed in chapter 5, started speaking out in favour of reconciliation with Russia more openly in 2007, making subtle hints about the need for "neutralisation via engagement". As the "doves", especially, previously maintained a running stream of criticism of human rights abuses across Russia's vast wastelands, it struck some observers as counter-intuitive. Yet it made sense in the case of the "experts", such as Alexander Smolar (Batory Foundation), Pawel Kazanecki (EEDC and then the MFA), or Bartlomiej Sienkiewicz and Mateusz Gniazdowski (OSW), who also qualify as members of epistemic communities due to their expertise on the post-Soviet East. These norm entrepreneurs based their judgment not only on beliefs and values, but

665 For instance, Kozminski 2011; Reiter 2011

also on their accumulated knowledge of the difficult, often cyclical processes of democratisation in the region. These processes, they understood, tend to produce multiple, quite stable, equilibria in the "grey zone" between democracy and authoritarianism, and the vital role of external actors and mechanisms such as conditionality in its facilitation.[666] This approach to democracy promotion differs from the "political one" generally preferred by advocates of "dissident geopolitics", including the "doves", who tend to adhere to the "transition paradigm": a belief in the linear progression of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.

As for the executive and diplomatic corps, *structural power* of advocates of "dissident geopolitics" at the time of the Russia Reset remained over-whelming, much like during the Orange Revolution, yet missionary work in persuading decision-makers to warm to the idea of Polish-Russian rapprochement brought with it the inevitable rift within the community, between the "hawks" and the "doves". The initial converts to reconciliation, mostly of the "dovish" breed, such as Adam Rotfeld, deserted from the norm entrepreneur network's crusade against Russia after EU accession. They became the missionaries that would later recruit other "doves". Other proponents of "dissident

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666 Kazanecki 2011; Sienkiewicz 2011. See also: *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2006. Kiedy w Rosji zwiedla demokracja. 7.5.; Rogoza, J., 2012. Restrykcje kontra protest: wladze Rosji utrudniaja aktywnosc opozycyjna. *Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich*. Brief. 25.7.; Kononczuk, W., 2011. Polityczny wyrok na CHodorkowskiego i Lebiediewa. *Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich*. Brief. 1.12.; *Fundacja S. Batorego,* 2012. Nowa twarz Rosji? Recordings of conference panels. 20.5.; Smigielski, R., 2011. Putin czy Miedwiedew? Rosja na rok przed wyborami prezydenckimi. *Polski Institut Spraw Miedzynarodowych.* Brief. 12.5.

geopolitics" had a hard time accepting it. For "hawkish" Atlanticists of the Kaczynski twins' fleeting yet retaliatory administration of 2005–2007, rapprochement was clearly not an optimal foreign policy course, as they seemed to bash Moscow in unusually harsh terms almost every chance they got, such as for the Nord Stream project, the meat and vegetable embargo imposed on Poland, the problems with Polish-Russian trade in Kaliningrad, the alleged cyber attacks on Estonia, the involvement in the Orange Revolution and the war with Georgia, to name a few. Yet for "dovish" Atlanticists pledging allegiance to the EU—mostly from *PiS'* liberal counterpart on the centre-right, *PO,* which ousted its rival in the "corrective" victory in 2007—the "kiss and make-up" strategy emerged as a realistic possibility as early as the mid-2000s. The leading missionary, the retired politician Adam Rotfeld, who ended up chairing the newly established committee dealing with "difficult issues" in Polish-Russian relations, managed to "convert" several leading *PO* representatives before they took up high positions of *structural power*: prime minister elect Donald Tusk, would-be president Bronislaw Komorowski and defense minister designate Bogdan Klich.[667] By far the most curious "conversion", however, befell the "alpha hawk" of the Kaczynski government, Radek Sikorski, who became foreign minister in the Tusk cabinet in 2007.[668] Rotfeld had powerful allies in fellow missionaries of the

667 Conclusion drawn from several interviews with members of Civic Platform (PO) and Polish analysts about Rotfeld's influence on the foreign policy thinking within the party.

668 Sikorski's transformation can be observed through the lens of his rhetoric and political activity as a high-ranking official serving in two governments, those led by Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO). See, for instance, the account of bilateral relations between Poland and Russia on info.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.pl.

Polish-Russian reset in the Polish diplomatic service: Adam Kobieracki, who served at MOD, at NATO and later the OSCE, and Jerzy Bahr, chief of the National Security Council and ambassador to Russia at the time of the "reset".

Overall, the account of the micro-structure for norm entrepreneurship of "dissident geopolitics" indicates that though the network wielded unrivalled *structural power*, it was divided on how to apply it. The "defection" of the "doves", who started flocking towards the "experts" as far as Russia policy was concerned, bifurcated the hitherto unified community, which worked together so well during the Orange Revolution. Yet, since it was the "doves", not the "hawks", who held political power from 2007 on, it was ultimately their take on the Russia Reset that had a better chance of translating itself into foreign policy output.

Figure 6.4: Polish decision-makers during the Russia Reset: structural power



6.6.3. Foreign policy discourse: framing

The two main nuclei of the norm entrepreneur network advocating "dissident geopolitics"—the "hawks" and the "doves"—evoked increasingly divergent *meta-narratives* in foreign policy discourse to justify their respective stances on what would go down in Poland's post-communist history as the onset of "reconciliation" with Russia. Yet, for all their differences, interestingly, they had in common the tendency to abide by the logic of consequences and rhetorically instrumentalist normative frameworks for the purpose of their embittered domestic political struggle and, in the case of the "doves", due to the emerging reputational concerns tied to

Poland's aspirational leadership role on the European stage.[669] Hence, the *PiS'* Russophobic profession and the *PO's* rapprochement zeal both seemed to stand on the firmly planted feet of ultra-realism, rather than on thoughts of a wind-combed head in the clouds.[670] Missionary Adam Kobieracki, a self-described pragmatic in practice, who nevertheless concedes he is ultimately driven by ideals, puts it this way: "The Polish rules of the political game are becoming modern…when you look at political parties in Europe, can you tell which ones genuinely abide by norms and principles? In Poland, too, their use is becoming more and more instrumental. To call it a pragmatic approach would be a very diplomatic term. Cynicism captures it better.[671] Hence, since foreign policy became a battleground for domestic politics, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between genuine *internalisation* of normative frameworks like "dissident geopolitics" and their tactical manipulation. Yet, though this section is merely supposed to review the *meta-narratives* that framed the foreign policy discourse at the time of the reset, concerns over motivations have to be

669 See, for instance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 2012. Annual Address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy for 2012. 29.3.

670 Multiple interviews. In international press, see, for instance, *The Economist*, 2011. Poland's Foreign Policy: Sikorski Speaks. 18.3.; *The Financial Times*, 2010. Shift from Global Ambition Puts the Accent on Europe. 16.11.; within the Polish debate, compare with, for example, Krasuski, M., 2011. Pragmatyzm polskiej polityki zagranicznej v kontekscie clonkowstwa w Unii Europejskiej. *Fundacja Kazimierza Pulaskiego*. Brief. 13.1; *Rzeczpospolita*, 2011. Krytyka prawicowego rozumu. 29.10.

671 Kobieracki 2011

shelved.

The "hawks'" *meta-narrative,* which focused on the portrayal of the "Russian bear" as menacing, aroused historical chimeras to reinforce the image of Russia as an aggressive power posing a threat to Poland. Essentially, it pushed a self-serving agenda: the conservatives needed to justify their Russophobia, and, in turn, pinpoint their opponents' "failure" to "protect the Polish eagle". Before the reset of US-Russia relations, officials in the Kaczynski government of 2005–2007 mostly tapped 20th century history and cultural memory related to World War II, which had produced powerful political mythology in Poland. The steps taken by the Hitler/Stalin to carve up Central and Eastern Europe ahead of the attack on Poland that kick-started World War II were frequently used as *micro-frames* for anti-Russian rhetoric. Hence, Radek Sikorski, when serving as Jaroslaw Kaczynski's defense minister, condemned Nord Stream as the "Molotov-Ribbentrop" pipeline. Following the Russian invasion and occupation of Georgian provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia, president Lech Kaczynski—appearing alongside his counterparts from Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine and the Latvian prime minister at a 150,000-head rally in Tbilisi in mid-August 2008—compared the conflict to the "fait accompli" of the Munich Agreement of 1938: "Those who were then appeasing Hitler were firmly convinced that they were right…. today, Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic States, and later time may come for my country— Poland."[672]

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672 *Rzeczpospolita*, 2008. Lech Kaczynski: jestesmy tu po to, by by podjac walke. 12.8.; *Newsweek,* 2008. Lech Kaczynski: How the West Got Georgia Wrong. 26.9.

Similar imagery justified the "hawks'" attacks on the Russia policy of the Tusk government, which succeeded the Kaczynski administration in 2007. For instance, Witold Waszczykowski, fresh out of his seat as deputy at the foreign ministry, criticised the Polish-Russia "reset" by accusing the liberals of "sacrificing Poland's Eastern policy", based up to that point on "values and standards"—active promotion of democratic change and support for Western integration ambitions—to "short-term economic gains on the Russian market".[673] Waczykowski's tirade is also interesting in its deliverer's obvious attempt to portray his opponents' decisions as interest- not value-driven. While the "hawks", in turn, were criticised by the "doves" for hyperbolising the "Russian threat" for domestic political ends, the consistency of the former's rhetorical and diplomatic actions might suggest that future election victories or headway in popularity ratings might not have been the only motivation for advocating a tough approach to Russia. In this respect, it is important to distinguish between "missionaries" and "converts". The genuineness of the original "hawks'" historically-rooted perception of Russia and, subsequently, the subjective "realness" of the threat for some core members of this part of the norm entrepreneur network, are clearly reflected in the "hawks'" near-desperate strive to secure US military presence on Polish soil. Marek Magierowski, chief of the foreign desk at the conservative *Rzeczpospolita* daily, says today that despite public reassurances that the NMD project was not aimed against Russia, few Polish "movers and shakers" thought so in

673 *Niezalezna,pl,* 2012. Polski reset z Rosja. 23.3.

private. “I was even writing in my newspaper that it is not an anti-Russian venture. I lied.”[674] The “hawks’” constant attacks of Russian efforts to investigate the tragic plane crash at Smolensk, which, some of them firmly believe, the Kremlin helped orchestrate, as a “second round of the Katyn massacre”, provide another telling example of the authenticity of their normative convictions.[675]

In 2009-2011, the “hawks’” *meta-narrative* of expansive and dangerous Russia – and especially its head-on delivery – were progressively losing *resonance.* First, the “hawks” alienated their American colleagues. For instance, President Lech Kaczynski made sure he expressed his “lack of satisfaction” with the decision to scrap the missile shield in his first personal meeting with President Barack Obama after the announcement of Washington’s “change of plans”, even in circumstances that were less than ideal—at an annual luncheon held for the leaders of UN member states in New York in September 2009.[676] Second, the “hawks” estranged themselves from the public, through largely erratic and conspiracy-laden bashing of Moscow’s investigation of the Smolensk tragedy. Ex-premier Jaroslaw Kaczynski, for his part, remains adamant that the Kremlin co-plotted a mass assassination and has recently appealed to the EU to launch another independent, and international, inquiry. He

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674 Magierowski 2011

675 Some of these views are expressed on a well-known conservative webpage smolensk-2010.pl, where the catchphrase is: “We Want the Truth”. See, for instance, Smolensk-2010.pl, 2010. Wiktor Suworow: to jest drugi Katyn. 29.8.

676 *Polska Agencja Prasowa,* 2009. Kaczynski pogadal z Obama. 25.9.

previously dismissed the report of the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK), which cited the pilots' mistakes under intense psychological pressure from the heavy-weights aboard to land in dense fog as the main reason for the crash, as a "piece of propaganda".[677] A similar attempt to re-open the case was made by the Polish American Congress, a hub for Atlanticists from both sides of the ocean.[678]

Pitted against the "hawks'" antagonistic *meta-narrative*, the "doves'" version, for the "new era" in Polish-Russian relations, spelled "reconciliation" from a position of a successful and confident EU member. Egged on by several prominent missionaries including Kobieracki and Rotfeld (the latter's influence is clearly visible in the social network map depicted in Figure 6.5.1), Donald Tusk's government of converts to the reset focused on restoring "normalcy" in diplomatic communication and changing the public perception of Russia by re-introducing the former imperial power simply as a trading partner and energy supplier, with common European roots and possibly also a European future. Commenting on the "cease-fire" between Moscow and Warsaw under his leadership, prime minister Tusk told the media that, "…I accepted as a personal challenge to breach that historic fatalism, so that Poland and Russia would start building friendly relations that would enable them to cooperate—especially

677 Kosc, W., 2011. Smolensk Tragedy Report Continues to Complicate Russian-Polish Relations. *Russia Beyond the Headlines*. 21.1.

678 *Smolenskcrash.eu*, 2012. Polish-American Congress National Directors Council Adopts Resolution on Smolensk Crash. 20.5.

economically."[679] Foreign minister Radek Sikorski also attempted to give Russia a "geopolitical make-over" by flagging it as a European power. Hinting that the "loser of the Cold War" might one day join the Western institutional architecture, he accented that Poland should be involved in the integration process. Poland, he argued, should ensure that Russia would have an option of "broadly understood West under acceptable conditions".[680] In a personal interview, Sikorski explains that in embracing the reset, he did not resign on the normative framework of "dissident geopolitics": "Russia is missionary territory."[681]

Hence, as Sikorski's confession suggests, the "doves'" normative revamp at the time of the Russia Reset may have concerned the application of norms in foreign policy practice, rather than the *substance* of "dissident geopolitics". In short, Russophobia ceased to be one of the ideational pillars of the framework: instead, Russia policy was "re-compartmentalised". Once defenders of "dissident geopolitics" re-labeled the country from an ex-imperial overlord to an undemocratic East European country, it could fall within another ideational pillar of the framework, entailing the commitment to democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space. As a result, Russia Reset became acceptable: relations could be de-securitised; they could became more business-like and from a value-laden standpoint, Russia could start being treated more like other "grey zone" regimes in the post-Soviet space, enduring criticism of the same calibre

679 *Polska Agencja Prasowa*, 2011. Tusk: moim zdaniem podjalem wielke wyzwanie. 7.9.

680 *Wiadomosci.pl,* 2010. Sikorski: trudne sprawy z Rosja? Jest ich wiele. 27.10.

681 Sikorski 2011

as, say, Ukraine.

Hence, the "doves'" perception of Russia was de-historicised and *reframed:* this part of Polish elite came to understand in the late 2000s that it was dealing with "Putin's Russia", not the "Soviet oppressor. Similarly to Sikorski, the leading missionary among opinion-makers, Adam Michnik, is forward-looking, inasmuch as he describes himself as an "anti-Soviet Slavophile". "For many Poles, it was about mentally divorcing the Soviet Union they used to know from contemporary Russia," he said.[682] The "doves'" reinvention coincided with a broader metamorphosis in Polish society. The German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends, published in 2009, suggest that 59 percent of the Poles were somewhat confident that the EU could handle relations with Russia. More so than their own security, they seemed to fret over Russia's behaviour towards the Eastern neighbourhood.[683] Hence, the reset, as Michnik hinted, was a wider phenomenon. His counterpart among the decision-makers, missionary Adam Rotfeld, co-chairman of the Polish-Russian committee dealing with "difficult issues", which published an acclaimed joint account of 20th century history, "Black Stains/White Stains" ("Biale plamy/Czarne plamy)—with the aim of "founding our shared future on truth and understanding" —underlines the importance of geopolitical shifts, which, he claims, played a major role in changing the Polish elite's threat perceptions and in re-defining national interests:

My expectation is that Russia will, in the future, become part of the Euro-Atlantic

682 Michnik, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 3.6.

683 *German Marshall Fund* 2009

security architecture… on the condition that it will … recognize that this is where her place is. We decided to commence dialogue on equal standing as partners. We did not wait for any grand gestures from the Russian side, because we don't offer any gestures of this sort either. The 'reset' rests on plain understanding that both the Poles and the Russians must pursue their interests.[684]

Hence, though modern Russia was "missionary territory", as Sikorski put it, the arsenal of weapons that Polish crusaders were willing to use to push the Russian heathens to bow-down to universal values and international norms clearly shrunk as Polish-Russian relations went on a mend. Ex-president Aleksander Kwasniewski, one of the departed "flexible" leftists who had, nevertheless, also always managed to retain missionary status whilst pursuing interest-oriented foreign policy, describes Sikorski's "conversion" this way:

I think he is not too happy about some of his statements from a few years ago. He understands now. We have a new era, no USSR; the Cold War is over. Russia has a market economy; it is possible to communicate with her. When Russians speak about modernization, we have to applaud them. The rhetoric does need reinforcement: clear signals, persuasive arguments, hard facts and difficult deeds, to convince us that things really are changing. We still have to speak about democracy, rule of law, judiciary. But some things are taboo. We cannot speak openly about Khodorkovsky's case.[685]

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684 Rotfeld 2011

685 Kwasniewski 2011

This part of the crusade, Kwasniewski argues, should been "delegated" to opinion-makers: intellectuals, dissidents, analysts, activists and journalists outside the realm of politics.

But "hawks" among decision-makers clearly did not share this conduct of the crusade: they did not develop the same finesse for muted or at least delicately framed criticism. The Kaczynski brothers, in fact, had a habit of openly commenting on the Russian authorities' treatment of opposition figures, even in the Western media, when they were in power: "Nobody denies that Ms. Politkovskaya was murdered and that the Litvinenko case is highly suspicious," the older twin, Lech, told International Herald Tribune in 2006.[686] Such blunt accusations did not even appear on the pages of Michnik's *Gazeta Wyborcza*, which, nevertheless tirelessly raised subjects such as liquidation of independent media and judiciary, discussed, at length, jailed tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky's botched case, and criticised Ramzan Kadyrov's subjugation and "state capture" in post-war Chechnya, using terms such as "legal nihilism" or "dismantlement of democracy".[687]

To conclude, discourse analysis has revealed that competing *meta-narratives* pitted "hawks" and "doves" against each other in an interesting instant of "intra-network"

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686 *International Herald Tribune,* 2006. Report: Poland's President Uneasy About Russian-German Ties. 2.12.

687 See countless articles in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (such as Michnik, A., 2010. Putin broni prawnego nihilizmu. *Gazeta Wyborcza.* 31.12.; Michnik, A., 2010. Wyznania anty-sowieckiego rusofila. *Gazeta Wyborcza.* 5.10., etc.).

discursive competition. The extent to which both nuclei of the community previously bound by a shared commitment to "dissident geopolitics" were *disputed*, though by each other, rather than by "pragmatists" or other contenders, like in the Czech Republic or Slovakia, was notable. Ultimately, the *framing* of the "doves" seemed to *resonate* more – though it was also forwarded by *structural power* – as it capitalised on a comprehensive forward-looking vision of Russia as a business partner, energy supplier and potential democratiser, rather than on a narrow portrayal of Russia as a "Soviet power" 2.0.

6.6.4. Foreign policy output: missionary zeal?

Consequently, based on *structural* power and *resonance,* Warsaw's foreign policy output vis-à-vis Moscow in 2008–2011 reflected the re-framed *meta-narrative* of the "doves". Advocates of "dissident geopolitics" hailing from their ranks insisted that dialogue, not retaliation, would expedite the process of "normalisation" in Polish-Russian relations, which came to represent a "good" and "appropriate" outcome. For the "hawks", who, as the abovementioned account of foreign policy discourse on the desirability of a "reset" with Russia suggests, followed a different logic of appropriateness, the Tusk government's choice of policy—what might best be captured as an "aborted crusade" —represented a shameless "kowtow" to economic interests, and with "insensitive timing" at that, given the fresh crust on the wound inflicted by the Smolensk catastrophe. Such denunciations were not entirely unfounded: foreign minister Sikorski signed a publicised ten-year energy treaty (2012–2022), sanctioned also by the EU, with his counter-part Sergei Lavrov, only months after the airplane disaster, in November 2010. Gazprom agreed to boost gas supplies by 38% as well as eliminate "middle-men"—namely RosUkrEnergo, perceived as the main culprit for the gas crisis of 2009—by becoming the direct contractor, and it also lifted a previously problematic clause that banned PGNiG from re-exporting gas to other countries without its consent.[688]

What also irked the "hawks" was the fact that the Tusk cabinet left the investigation

688 *PGNiG,* 2010. PGNiG SA podpisalo aneks do kontraktu jamalskiego na dostawy gazu ziemniego. Retrieved from online archive. 29.10.

of the Smolensk tragedy largely in the hands of the "suspiciously pliable" Kremlin, which authorised the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee (MAK) with the task. Some "hawkish" observers were quick to link it to the PGNiG deal and howl about a "trade-off". [689] Another round of grumbling followed the bilateral agreement of December 2011 on visa-free travel for business and tourism, aimed at facilitating trade between Poland and Russia's Kaliningrad region.[690] Minister Sikorski signed it in Moscow: it was the first trip by a Polish official to the Russian capital following, too early for the taste of some, a disputed parliamentary election that secured another victory for Vladimir Putin's United Russia Party and a police crackdown on protesters in the streets of Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities that spurred international uproar.[691] In September 2010, Polish police also briefly arrested Ahmed Zakayev, the UK-bound softly spoken Shakespearean actor as well as leader of the Chechen separatists, citing an Interpol warrant, which was perceived by some international commentators as a public display of the country's new cosiness with Russia.[692] Some "hawks", but even some "doves", say today that at the time that Poland was too focused on the "dividends" it was cashing from the "reset", namely closer ties with

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689 Waszczykowski 2011 (recollection of the reaction in the conservative circles of his own party, PiS)

690 *EUBusiness.com*, 2011. Poland, Russia Agree on Visa-Free Travel for Kaliningrad. 15.12.

691 *Thenews.pl*, 2011. Poland and Russia Sign Cross-border Trade Deal. 14.12.

692 See, for instance, *BBC*, 2010. Chechen Separatist Leader Zakayev Arrested in Poland. 17.9.; *The Economist,* 2010. Akhmed Zakayev, Poland and Russia: an Arresting Move. 17.9.

Germany and France, which had "finally started to take it seriously as a constructive and heavy-weight partner". [693] *Reputational concerns*, and the quest for rapprochement with Germany, certainly played a role, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski and Jerzy Buzek, two of Poland's most influential MEPs, hailing from the centre-right, as well as Lech Kaczynski's ex-advisor and academic expert on Germany Marek Cichocki, concede today.

Faced with accusations of not even the softer-sounding "pragmatism" but outright cynicism, converts to the cause of the Polish-Russia reset in Donald Tusk's government remained un-flinching in repeating that by pursuing Poland's economic interests on the "un-ignorable" Russian market, they were not at all surrendering on promotion of universal values and international norms that the establishment in the country's semi-authoritarian regime seemed to be ignoring, at least on occasions. Yet the *framing devices* used in diplomatic discourse and the policy toolkit applied in practice signifies to the de-politicisation—and, arguably, to the Europeanisation—of Poland's foreign policy towards Russia and approach to democracy promotion in general. The country's long-term foreign policy outlook for 2012–2016 was formulated by prominent missionaries including Rotfeld and Kobieracki in tandem with missionary-friendly epistemic communities at the OSW and PISM in Sikorski's incubator of ideas at the ministry between 2009 and 2011, when the reset was in fully swing. This outlook, for instance, maintains that, "Poland remains open to EU-Russia dialogue, and intends to support the modernisation programmes in this country,

693 Smolar, A. 2011 and Smolar, E. 2011 ("doves"), Kozminski 2011 and Waszczykowski ("hawks"), etc.

understood as development rule of law, political pluralism, freedom of speech…"[694]. The overall tone and figures of speech blend well with the founding principles of the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernization, though in all fairness, the Poles, according to their own perception and self-description, did place a heavier emphasis on human rights and democratic standards associated with a *procedural* understanding of democracy than the Eurocrats, who focused more on growth, innovation, investment, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), alignment of technical regulations and standards, research and development, energy efficiency, intellectual property rights and transport, leaving corruption, judiciary and civil society at the bottom of the heap.[695]

In this sense, though the decision-makers in Warsaw did de-Americanise—that is, depoliticise and "developmentise"— their logic of appropriateness and their understanding of the optimal approach to democracy promotion, at least the way it was understood and pursued under the second Bush administration, in the course of the Russia Reset they did not entirely "Europeanise" it, either. In fact, Poland's new, balanced foreign policy strategy towards Russia, which seemed to divide attention equally between interests and norms was, to a great extent, inspired by what the US ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul under the Obama administration dubbed the

694 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 2012. Prioritety polskiej polityki zagranicznej 2012-2016. Government Document.

695 Council of the European Union, 2010. Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernisation. EU-Russia Summit. 31.5.-1.6. Press Release. Rostov-on-Don. 1.6.

"dual-track approach", based on engagement with both the authorities and the "opposition".[696] As ambassador McFaul put it in a personal interview in Moscow in March 2012, he had many talks with his Polish counterpart, ex-dissident and Slavophile Jerzy Bahr, on that topic in 2009-2011, and he found that the two of them could agree, for the most part, on the toolkit for Russia policy. From this perspective, Warsaw's "standardised" foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow, enacted by the converts in the Tusk cabinet, did not come out as too different from the US version of it under the Obama administration, to which ex-president Kwasniewski, as well as blue-ribbon experts from several think tanks with a "dovish" orientation, admit.[697] Yet, how Poland got to where the US was is what needs to be kept in mind: arguably, it was less due to generational change or elite turnover than to geopolitical shifts combined with normative adjustments. To speak of bandwagoning here would be too simplistic.

Several examples of rhetoric delivered by Polish converts to the Russia Reset in the context of Poland's Russia policy testify to the Europeanisation of the notion of "dissident geopolitics" as a foreign policy paradigm based on the worldwide promotion of international norms. Hailing existing efforts at modernisation, "de-Stalinisation" and historical reconciliation—if not head-on democratisation—in Russia became a specialty of "alpha-convert", minister Sikorski. In October 2010, for instance, he praised the Russian initiative to distribute a shortened version of

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696 McFaul, M., 2012. Interview with author. Moscow, 6.3.

697 Kwasniewski 2011; Zaborowski 2011; Baranowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 7.6; Michalski, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 20.6.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago" to all schools, which, he stressed, would have been "unimaginable" several years ago.[698] Much the same was said about prime minister Vladimir Putin's urge to his Western counterparts to condemn all pre-war deals with the Nazis as morally wrong at the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the onset of World War II in the Polish port of Gdansk, as well as about the Kremlin's unofficial go-ahead to run Polish director Andrzej Wajda's film "Katyn" on Russian TV following the Smolensk catastrophe. Moreover, expertly delivering criticism of the Medvedev/Putin establishment, when needed, with care, without emotion and historic analogies, so frequently evoked under the Kaczynski government, became another achievement of Polish diplomacy under Tusk's "dovish" administration. In his account of the MAK report's deficiencies—the Smolensk air-crash arguably remains one of the most sensitive aspects of Polish-Russian relations today—the prime minister stuck to "incomplete", as opposed to "propaganda", bellowed by "ultra-hawk" Jaroslaw Kaczynski.[699] Overall, Polish foreign policy output in 2008-2011 indicates that the country's political elite internalised several critical aspects of the reset – including "dual-track" engagement in diplomacy and a Europeanised, "developmental" understanding of democracy promotion – under the leadership of "dovish" defenders of "dissident geopolitics". In so doing, these Polish foreign policy-makers facilitated a broader normative shift that profoundly transformed the way Russia was perceived: the *meta-narrative* of Polish-Russian relations.

698 Wiadomosci.pl, 2010. 27.10.

699 Kosc 2011

6.7. Conclusion: from Russia we withdraw

The foreign policy of the three Central European states vis-à-vis Russia at the time of the US-Russia reset marks an important departure from "dissident geopolitics" as a normative framework rooted in Cold War perceptions of the two superpowers involved. It has demonstrated that within a transformed macro-structure, which, in this case, contained major security disincentives for Russophobia – America's pivot from Europe to Asia, exemplified by the backtracking on the missile defense shield in the region, on the one hand, and greater sense of security in Europe, propelled by the sophistication of the EU's CFSP, on the other hand – as well as important economic incentives for cooperation, such as energy security concerns and trade and investment "booty", norms can transform to be a "better fit" with interests. Hence, it seems that the assertion that interests are filtered through norms – the logic of appropriateness – holds the other way around as well: the boundaries of what is "good" and "appropriate" can be redrawn in response to a compelling logic of consequences, stemming from a new, post-Cold War, world order. Yet, what *type* of macro-structure needs to be in place for it to happen? An enticing macro-structure can encourage norm enactment, as was the case during the Orange Revolution with all three states, and at the time of the Iraq War, with Poland. An uninviting macro-structure can discourage norm application in foreign policy, as it happened ahead of the Iraqi invasion with the Czech Republic and Slovakia (though the countries chose to go against it, due, in part, to effective norm entrepreneurship).

The findings of this chapter suggest that the macro-structure has to be *disputed* to inspire normative shifts. At the time of the Russia Reset, it was the ambiguity that pitted the "hawks" and the "doves" against each other and kick-started a discursive

battle: arguably, the cost-benefit calculation contained an almost equal share of security and economic incentives and disincentives, which could be, and were, interpreted in different ways. "Dovish" advocates of "dissident geopolitics" in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia eventually tipped the balance in favour of a reset – or more precisely, reconciliation – policy with Russia, through the use of *meta-narratives* based on forward-looking deconstruction of analogies between Soviet and modern Russia; de-securitisation of their relationship with Russia in the context of the EU and CFSP, which nourished a sense of greater safety and imbued the new member states with more self-confidence; and a more targeted and less politicised understanding of democracy promotion.

The normative earthquake took time to deliver the "abortion" of the Russia crusade in the three countries: in Slovakia and Poland, the foreign policy shift was smoother than in the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, the main explanatory factor appears to be *resonance* – arguably, the crusade was never even embarked on, partly because "dissident geopolitics" as a normative framework originates in Meciarism, less so than in communism. Yet the *framing* argument also reveals that while defenders of "dissident geopolitics" and "pragmatists" alike embraced the reset, they did so for different reasons: while the former had to reconceptualise their normative framework, the latter did not, as they abode by "small state" logic of consequences since the outset. In Poland, it seems to be the ambiguous macro-structure, perceived favourably by the "dovish" advocates of "dissident geopolitics" – most probably due to Europeanisation – that explains the reset. "Doves" reached the observed foreign policy outcome via *framing* in *dispute* and *structural power*. In the Czech Republic, security and economic incentives also command some explanatory power: though in

this case, the resilience of norms and norm entrepreneurs – cemented by their *structural power* and relative lack of *dispute* in foreign policy discourse – prolonged the process of decision-making.

Going back to the original hypotheses about norm enactment in foreign policy – or the missionary zeal – it has been found that some of them hold.

H2a. The effect of "dissident geopolitics" will be weaker in situations involving strong(er) security and material interests.

H2b. The better the access of relevant norm entrepreneurs to domestic decision-makers – *structural power* – and the greater their clout vis-à-vis other norm entrepreneurs – in other words, the extent to which their framing *resonates* – the higher the influence of norms on foreign policy outcomes.[700]

H2c. The persistence of "dissident geopolitics" will depend on the consistency of the norm entrepreneurs' normative convictions, the norms' capacity to endure turnover of personnel and on the persistence of structural conditions preventing the rise of challengers to relevant norm entrepreneurs.

In conclusion, it has to be noted that in the context of the Russia Reset, the original proposition H2c about norm endurance and sustainability of norm entrepreneurship networks crucially reflects on the importance of the macro-structural context in which

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700 Further to the extent of dispute, it appears that it is not the mere presence but the nature of alternative norm entrepreneurs that enables or hinders the enactment of "dissident geopolitics". In the Czech Republic, "pragmatists" were rivals, while in Slovakia, "experts" were facilitators.

norms and norm entrepreneurs were conceived. Arguably, it was the completion of transition that changed the opportunity structure for discursive competition, not as much by opening way for alternative normative frameworks, but by transforming existing foreign policy paradigms. As such, it highlights the capacity of foreign policy-making elites for *learning* and *socialisation*, in this case also via Europeanisation, in much the same way that they did in the 1990s via Americanisation.

7. Chapter 7. Conclusion

7.1. Missionary zeal of seasoned converts

This dissertation attempted to unpack the "missionary zeal of recent converts": the activist and value-laden foreign policy course pursued, over an extended period of time after the downfall of state socialism, by a relatively wide variety of post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. Using examples from the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, it attempted to break the foreign policy line down into elements, the "what", uncover its underlying motivations, the "why", identify its primary advocates, the "who", establish to what extent it is context-dependent, the "where", and finally, show what it is an instance of: in essence, the "why should we care".

The empirical puzzle consisted of two tiers. The first one concerned the string of foreign policy outcomes connected by the thread of rhetoric and political action resonating with universal values, such as individual freedom, human rights and democracy, conceptually packaged as a "muscular democratisation" programme. Ever since CEE states liberated themselves from the yoke of Soviet communism, they started speaking out, consistently, against abuses of inviolable rights elsewhere, and fighting against, with notable chutzpah, authoritarian regimes in remote areas and in the neighbourhood alike, be it rhetorically, diplomatically, militarily or, later, via development aid and democracy assistance. Over the years, Rwanda, Serbia, Afghanistan, Russia, Iraq, Burma, Ukraine, Burma, Georgia and Belarus, among others, have become the targets of their valuable efforts to extend the zone of freedom, stability and prosperity. In short, soon after the end of the Cold War in 1989,

the recent converts to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe joined the global democratic crusade. Their notable zeal still has not fizzled out, which is noteworthy, given it is already 2012, and they have become seasoned converts. Nowadays the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia engage with mature democratisers in the Western Balkans and staggering democratisers in the Commonwealth of Independent States; they coach wannabe democratisers in North Africa and "invisible" democratisers in closed dictatorships such as Cuba, now also Syria, or Zimbabwe.

The second tier of the empirical puzzle involved Atlanticism: the avid alignment of CEE states' foreign policy agenda with that of the US but also the curious "Americanisation" of the Central European understanding of universal values, including democracy promotion. As early as the 1990s, statements of gratitude and symbolic gestures, such as erecting Ronald Reagan statues in squares or renaming boulevards after Woodrow Wilson, as well as maintaining close rapport with the US as the arch-advocate of CEE states' NATO accession – widely perceived as the "pre-entry" into the European Union – signalled to the international community that post-communist Central and Eastern Europe was a "pro-American region", willingly and heavily invested in the "special relationship" it believed it had with the world's then-sole superpower. Indeed, in the 2000s, after NATO integration, Central and East European allies provided numerous observable and tangible tokens of their support for the US and its foreign policy escapades around the world. The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, for their part, participated in the venturesome Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns; they keenly engaged in Cuba and later in the EU's Eastern neighbourhood, mimicking, as some observers put it, George W. Bush's "freedom agenda". Moreover, many of the projects undertaken within their "muscular

democratisation" programme were pursued in the spirit of American – or political – approach to democracy promotion and fully or partially funded by US government agencies or non-governmental organisations, which made them susceptible – for instance, at the time of the "bulldozer revolution" in Serbia or the "coloured revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space – to accusations and attacks by local establishments, which claimed that they were serving as America's "mouthpieces". The CEE states' fiery Atlanticism even irritated some of their West European partners, which labelled them as "Trojan horses" – or mockingly "Trojan cock-horses" – of the US in Europe. It did seem, at least until these countries' accession to the EU, that they were ready to go to great lengths to prove themselves as "good allies": Poland, for instance, even took part in the controversial "secret renditions" amidst the raging war on terror. CEE states' devotion to America seemed to go beyond "bandwagoning": their good rapport with multiple US administrations and strong resonance of American foreign policy doctrines such as "democratic globalism" with local elites also suggested that "socialisation" played a role in cementing their relationship.

The theoretical puzzle originally pitted the two-tier foreign policy course observed across Central and Eastern Europe against "small state" theory: from a neo-realist viewpoint, some of these countries risky and often costly behaviour in international relations seemed counter-intuitive. Yet at the same time, it was clear that the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and other states in the region were not merely "small states"; they were former satellites that had only recently experienced extrication from an authoritarian bloc to which US democracy served as counterpart: when this analytical lens was applied, both Atlanticism and the "muscular democratisation"

programme did not seem nearly as improbable and/or disconnected as before. Why would these states *not* abide by values associated with or championed by the victor of the Cold War that had held them hostage, the US? Hence, from a theoretical viewpoint, the dissertation had to reconcile these countries' size and relative strength or weakness, their authoritarian past and transition present, their security concerns and normative allegiances, and multiple alternative explanations, to undertake the examination of their patterns of foreign policy-making in 1989-2011.

Given the CEE states' self-proclaimed and – and immediately apparent – focus on universal values and international norms in foreign policy-making, the dissertation's theoretical framework decided to draw on constructivist scholarship in international relations and comparative politics in general and on *norm diffusion* theory in particular. In other words, it chose to conceptualise the shared foreign policy paradigm that CEE countries seemed to adhere to as a set of *regulative norms*. Reflecting the two strands of the observed foreign policy course, Atlanticism and the "muscular democratisation" programme, the normative framework was dubbed "dissident geopolitics": commitment of "blood and treasure" to allies associated with their authoritarian plight and in areas where "attribution of similarity" could be applied. Deconstructed, it seemed to consist of four main pillars: commitment to the transatlantic partnership, democracy promotion as a global enterprise, a heavily securitised – or more simply, "tough" – stance on Russia and export of transition know-how to the post-Soviet space.

Logics of appropriateness do not form in a vacuum, and norms do not "float freely": hence, it was important to establish how a normative framework such as "dissident geopolitics" arose in the first place. Handpicking the agency-based branch of norm

diffusion theory, the dissertation undertook an exploratory study of elite networks that profess and champion normative constructs: *norm entrepreneurs*, in an attempt to establish how they ascend, sustain themselves, and succeed in pushing their agendas on a competitive foreign policy "market" with ideas, values, interests, incentives and alternative norms. In sum, the activist and value-laden foreign policy outcomes witnessed in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-2011 were, after careful consideration, classified as instances of *norm entrepreneurship*. In the context of the empirical and theoretical puzzles, the dissertation started with the premise that elite linkages and socialisation processes involving the anti-communist superpower, the US, and the post-communist Central and East European small and medium-sized states, gave rise to value-bound social networks of *norm entrepreneurs* whose engagement in the latter's foreign policy-making held the key to the detected "missionary zeal".

7.2. Research questions and hypotheses: critical review

The research questions and preliminary hypotheses proposed at the outset attempted to pinpoint which combinations of structural and agency-based factors, domestic and international, facilitated and hindered US-inspired norm entrepreneurship in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-2011. Hence, successful *norm entrepreneurship* of the normative framework dubbed "dissident geopolitics", which serves as an independent or intervening variable in this dissertation, is understood as translation of norms into foreign policy outcomes in Central Europe, namely in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Reflecting the three progressive stages of norm diffusion proposed by

Finnemore & Sikkink in their seminal study (1998) of normative regimes – *emergence, habituation* and *internalisation*, with the latter equated here with norm enforcement in foreign policy – the dissertation was divided into two parts. "Mission and conversion" (1989-1999) focused on the two early phases of norm diffusion, tracing the rise of the dominant normative framework in the foreign policy arena of Central and Eastern Europe, "dissident geopolitics", and of the corresponding norm entrepreneur network. "Zeal", in turn, concentrated on the last phase of norm diffusion, analysing the dynamics of norm entrepreneurship – norm enactment – in the foreign policy of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia in 1999-2011. It offered three "deep" foreign policy case studies per country: the Iraq War, or the "Allied Crusade"; the Orange Revolution, or the "Neighbourhood Crusade"; and the Russia Reset, the "Aborted Crusade", conducting comparisons throughout. The research questions for both parts of the dissertation are revisited below:

R1. Under which conditions, and by which mechanisms, did the normative framework "dissident geopolitics" establish itself in the realm of foreign policy-making across Central and Eastern Europe in the turbulent era of transition in the 1990s?

R2. Under which conditions, and by which mechanisms, did the set of norms labelled here as "dissident geopolitics" motivate and translate into foreign policy outcomes in the 2000s?

7.2.1. Findings: "mission and conversion"

Starting with the findings of part 1, "mission and conversion" highlighted the explanatory value of agency and the domestic mycelium at the early stages of norm

diffusion. The normative framework dubbed "dissident geopolitics" rose to prominence in the 1990s, against the backdrop of lively ideational exchange between missionaries – Americans – and converts to democracy – Central Europeans. As *The Economist* aptly put it, after 1989, the Cold Warriors in the US and the dissidents in CEE found out that they had "plenty in common": the optimism dictated by the ruling zeitgeist, which seemed to foretell the "end of history", the recognition of the US as the winner of the Cold War and a global beacon of democracy, the aspiration towards "Europe whole and free" and the ambition to combat authoritarianism and thus spread freedom around the world.

NATO enlargement and civil society building in Central and Eastern Europe, especially, provided the macro-structure that encouraged processes of voluntary and anticipatory *social learning.* Institutions such as NED, Freedom House, U.S. Committee on NATO, Foundation for Civil Society and the German Marshall Fund, among others, and interpersonal links with heavy-weight US politicians and intellectuals including Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Ron Asmus sparked a decade-long dialogue which, as most CEE interviewees admit, helped domesticate an "Americanised" amalgam of the *constitutive norms* of "dissident geopolitics" in Central European foreign policy discourse. Table 3.9 in chapter 3 identified the main elements of "dissident geopolitics" as procedural democracy, "political" democracy promotion, a heavy-handed approach toward authoritarian regimes and Manicheanism. This set of norms, as part 2 of this dissertation has demonstrated, came to inspire political rhetoric, condition the choice of foreign policy tools, inform the distinction between "friends" and "foes", and determine the geographical focus of foreign policy agendas. Along with "dissident geopolitics"

arose networks of their primary "carriers" and "advocates", *norm entrepreneurs*. The core members of these networks – identified through self-affiliation, cross-checked references and foreign policy track record – are listed in Appendix 1, which suggests that they share exposure to socialisation by American missionaries, be it via institutions or through inter-personal links, and, for the most part, centre-right or right political affiliation. It was also found that a significant number of them also had a non-conformist past: under communism or, in the case of Slovakia, communism and/or Meciarism.

The chapter on "mission and conversion" found that most of the learning that facilitated norm *emergence* and *habituation* was, to a great extent, enabled by the "post-communist" transition context. Though a range of international and domestic, structural and agency-based, factors, including *socialisation, structural power, resonance* and *framing*, exerted causal and catalytic influence on norm diffusion, the crucial U.S. input – socialisation to foreign policy norms via structural linkages and interpersonal exchange – would not have materialised outside the "opportunity structure" of transition politics. Structurally, *resonance* of exogenous norms with "post-communist" state identities and *meta-narratives* of 20th century history, which identified the US as the only "benign" great power, legitimised the "teachers" and eased the domestication of norms via a constructed "cultural match". In terms of agency, *framing* by norm entrepreneurs who practically "colonised" most major institutions relevant to foreign policy-making, thus capturing unrivalled *structural power,* and dominated foreign policy debates, ensured that "dissident geopolitics" remained an *undisputed* foreign policy paradigm throughout the 1990s.

Hence, the conclusions of "mission and conversion" largely upheld the proposed

hypotheses:

H1a. The norms in question found their way into CEE states by means of diffusion through extensive structural linkages between the US and CEE, as well as *socialisation* between agents from the American and CEE foreign policy-making community.

H1b. The norms persisted thanks to *resonance* with existing, domestic norms, reinforced by *framing* by agents ("norm entrepreneurs") whose position/legitimacy was relatively *undisputed* by other agents.

Yet, based on the conclusions drawn from the empirical research, the classification of "necessary" and "complementary" factors at play at the stages of norm *emergence* and *habituation* had to be adjusted. Interpersonal exchange with the US was downgraded from a "necessary" to a "complementary" factor, while *resonance* was upgraded from a "complementary" to a "necessary" factor, which highlights the overall argument about the importance of domestic factors in norm diffusion. The original and updated categorisation is depicted in table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1: Necessary (N) and complementary (C) factors in norm diffusion: hypotheses and findings

	Structural linkages with US	Interpersonal exchange with US	Resonance	Framing	Lack of alternative framing
Type of factor: hypotheses	C	N	C	N	N
Type of factor: findings	C	C	N	N	N

7.2.2. Findings: "zeal"

Part 2, the "zeal", examined the dynamics of norm enactment in the foreign policy of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia during the Iraq War, the Orange Revolution and the Russia Reset, conceptualised here as three "crusades" of the recent converts to democracy. Every case corresponds with at least one constitutive pillar of "dissident geopolitics" as it was defined in the introduction: commitment to the transatlantic partnership, democracy promotion as a global enterprise, a heavily securitized – or, more simply, "tough" – stance on Russia and export of transition know-how to the post-Soviet space. It attempted to establish what role the designated set of norms and the corresponding network of norm entrepreneurs played in the articulation and exercise of national interest at critical junctures. The three chapters consisted of several sections: first and foremost, they outlined the so-called "macro-structure", the main security and economic incentives and disincentives that the Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy-makers had to consider in the course of the decision-making process before the Iraqi invasion, engagement in the Orange Revolution and pursuit of the Russia Reset. Arguably, perceptions of the different interests vary, which is why it is important to identify them and examine how different groups of norm entrepreneurs instrumentalised them for the purposes of their advocacy. Second, the chapters introduced the "micro-structure" for norm entrepreneurship to highlight the structural opportunities and constraints that advocates of "dissident geopolitics" faced in the arena of domestic politics. In essence, these sections assessed the dominant norm entrepreneur network's *structural power:* especially, the presence that it managed to establish in the government and beyond it, as well as any rival norm entrepreneur groups that may have been more successful in doing so. Third, the chapters reflected

on the foreign policy discourse ahead of the Iraq War, Orange Revolution and Russia Reset, accounting for the main *framing devices* –state identities, historical *meta-narratives* and contemporary *micro-narratives* – used by defenders of "dissident geopolitics" and their contenders, if any, to forward the foreign policy agendas deemed by them as "good" and "appropriate" in the context of their normative framework of choice. Finally, the last section of each chapter listed relevant foreign policy output – statements, speeches, policy documents, manifestos, media remarks and the like – in an attempt to ascertain the extent to which it was informed by norm entrepreneurship, referring to interviewees' recollections of the events throughout. The chapters found that under the conditions of *structural power* and *resonance,* norms can act as intervening variables, capable of adjusting the decision-makers' understanding of *macro-structure*. Yet, the dissertation also revealed that interests and norms are mutually constituent: causality runs both ways, and changes in *macro-structure* can also encourage normative shifts. Table 7.2 reviews the probability of the foreign policy outcomes observed in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia at the three critical junctures according to the logics of consequences and appropriateness. It indicates that in two out of three cases, norms helped tip the balance in favour of the foreign policy decisions taken, even though interests seemed to have advised otherwise. The Russia Reset stands out as an outlier: causality runs in the opposite direction, as the logic of appropriateness was adjusted to better reflect the macro-structure.

Table 7.2: Probability of foreign policy outcomes by interests and norms

	Iraqi invasion	Involvement in the Orange Revolution	Pursuit of Russia Reset
Logic of consequences	Low to medium	Medium to high	Medium to high
Logic of appropriateness	High	High	Medium to low
Probability of foreign policy course	Low – interests High – norms	Medium – interests High – norms	High – interests Low – norms

The "allied crusade" at the time of the Iraq War represents a candid tribute to the underlying norms of "dissident geopolitics". It was undertaken in a *macro-structure* that mainly consisted of disincentives: the cost-benefit calculation of optimal foreign policy dictated non-action, neutrality, rather than action, backing of the US by joining the "coalition of the willing". Perhaps with the exception of Poland, where the vision of economic gains may have eased the establishment of a broader normative consensus, advocates of "dissident politics" had to evoke the narrative of "gratitude" vis-à-vis the US and flag the strategic imperative to defend the values of the Western civilisation, to "sell" the crusade to decision-makers. Largely because of their unrivalled *structural power* and *resonance* of the discourse with the relevant audience, they succeeded. The case of the Iraq War demonstrates that norms can trump material disincentives if norm entrepreneurs are empowered by the domestic opportunity structure.

The "neighbourhood crusade" during the Orange Revolution reveals that normative frameworks such as "dissident geopolitics" can also enhance the understanding of a previously under-appreciated macro-structure and/or reassure elites in their initial

foreign policy choices. All three states investigated here had strong incentives to engage in Ukraine at the time of the Orange Revolution. In the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which lacked a comprehensive "Ukraine policy", however, norm entrepreneurs advocating "dissident geopolitics" used a powerful *framing device* capitalizing on "attribution of similarity", which stipulated that their countries' experience with extrication from communism and/ or Meciarism should compel them to demonstrate solidarity with the cause of the "orange" camp: via rhetorical support, conflict mediation, involvement of other actors such as the EU or the U.S. and transition experience-sharing. Their contribution helped bring Ukraine "on the radar" and facilitated post-2004 efforts to make it a priority in Czech and Slovak foreign policy in terms of trade, investment and energy policy. In Poland, the discursive power of norm entrepreneurs helped explain not as much the involvement in the Orange Revolution itself as its mode. Poland had both a compelling macro-structure and a Ukraine policy, which alone could have facilitated "action": hence, defenders of "dissident geopolitics" and their *meta-narratives* simply amplified the effect, contributing to the overall momentum. Moreover, this chapter found that the domestic prerequisites of successful norm entrepreneurship, such as *structural power* and *framing,* go to greater lengths than expected in explaining the subtle variance in the Czech, Polish and Slovak foreign policy outcomes.

The "aborted crusade", which followed the Russia Reset, marks a transformation of "dissident geopolitics" as a normative framework rooted predominantly in Cold War-era perceptions of the two then-competing superpowers. Analytically, it brought attention to the influence that a profoundly transformed macro-structure can exert on normative frameworks and norm entrepreneur networks. In other words, while norms

can reconstitute national interests, the latter can also mould the former. Moreover, the chapter highlighted the effect of *dispute* in discursive competition on norms that no longer correspond with macro-structural realities. As the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia had to assess a roughly equal number of incentives and disincentives, which were interpreted in competing ways by rival groups of norm entrepreneurs, ahead of the reset, advocates of "dissident geopolitics" were compelled to reassess the value of their normative framework of choice and *reframe* it to construct a better "fit" with the international system in order to counter the arguments of their competitors. In the Czech Republic, where there was little *dispute*, norm entrepreneurs also took longest to adjust their logic of appropriateness. Throughout the process of the normative shift, norm entrepreneur groups in all three countries either bifurcated on the inside, like in the Czech Republic, or outright disintegrated, like in Poland, where "hawks" and "doves" founded their own enterprises. Returning to the beginning, the final chapter brought the dissertation back to the constructivist argument about the mutual constitution of structure and agency and, by extension, and to the importance of the transition context for successful enactment of "dissident geopolitics".

The original hypotheses have a mixed record, as the findings have highlighted the need for nuance. H2a, below exhibits insufficient sensitivity to the *kind* of effect norms are expected to have in situations involving strong security and material interests. Even when the latter are compelling, norms can play the role of intervening variable, reaffirming a foreign policy decision based on the logic of consequences, like in the case of the Orange Revolution. That does not necessarily make their influence "weaker".

H2a. The effect of "dissident geopolitics" will be weaker in situations involving

strong(er) security and material interests.

H2b, in turn, is simplistic in its reference to the resonance of norm entrepreneurs' agendas with their audiences and clout vis-à-vis competitors. First, the case studies have shown that advocates of "dissident geopolitics" most often do not aspire to persuade the public about the "appropriateness" of their cause: convincing relevant decision-makers, for instance at the time of the Iraq War, was enough. It seems that the norm entrepreneurs' capacity to do so was facilitated by the "elite capture" of domestic politics in transition. In the post-transition context, during the Russia Reset, for instance, Polish elites made a broader effort to "sell" the policy of reconciliation to the masses, while their Slovak counterparts argued that they could not hope to pursue a tough Russia policy in a country that was not Russophobic, which indicates that public opinion mattered more. Moreover, findings indicate that while the influence of advocates of " dissident geopolitics" vis-à-vis their rivals rises with greater *structural power* – which does not necessarily mean *access* to the executive, as in the Czech Republic, for instance, think-tanks and NGOs also command formidable *structural power* from outside the government – it does not always decrease when these norm entrepreneurs are contested. It is the nature of *dispute* that matters. If advocates of "dissident geopolitics" are contended from the outside, the *dispute* can help them hone their persuasive skills, like in the Czech Republic, where advocates of "dissident geopolitics" had to counter the "pragmatists". But if different groups within the network fundamentally disagree, as was the case in Poland after the Russia Reset, the *dispute* can threaten the integrity of the community. Even so, however, *dispute* can contribute to the reinvention and self-replication of the norm entrepreneur group: in Poland, "doves" successfully rebranded "dissident geopolitics", ridding of the

remnants of Cold War-era stereotypes.

H2b. The better the access of relevant norm entrepreneurs to domestic decision-makers – *structural power* – and the greater their clout vis-à-vis other norm entrepreneurs – in other words, the extent to which their framing *resonates* – the higher the influence of norms on foreign policy outcomes.[701]

Finally, H2c is not clear on the kind of "persistence" that it envisions for "dissident geopolitics". Even the case of the Russia Reset, dated 2009-2011, indicates that the normative framework has maintained a presence: though it lost defenders, as well as some of its consistency, it has survived, in broad terms, in the foreign policy discourse of all three CEE countries. Yet dominance is another issue: it has been argued that the post-communist transition setting, in which the framework arose, was a unique opportunity structure in which it could thrive virtually *undisputed*. Yet in the post-transition context with greater elite diversification and more dynamic elite turnover, emergence of new norm entrepreneur groups and generational change took a toll on the consistency of "dissident geopolitics". In the Czech Republic, it did, nevertheless, remain centre stage, which would suggest that norms were *internalised* and sustained through institutions, as well as elite networks. In Slovakia, it suffered due to the departure of norm entrepreneurs associated with "dissident geopolitics" from government: it remains to be seen to what extent the endurance of the normative

701 Further to the extent of dispute, it appears that it is not the mere presence but the nature of alternative norm entrepreneurs that enables or hinders the enactment of "dissident geopolitics". In the Czech Republic, "pragmatists" were rivals, while in Slovakia, "experts" were facilitators.

framework in the country depended on *structural power* alone. In Poland, the given set of foreign policy norms underwent a transformation upon the fragmentation of the original norm entrepreneur network, with the breakaway of the "hawks". Yet, "doves" successfully managed to keep "dissident geopolitics" alive: their version, for the post-transition era, shed Russophobia but retained Atlanticism, the accent on worldwide democracy promotion and the strive to export "transition know-how" to the Eastern neighbourhood. It also incorporated new elements.

H2c. The persistence of "dissident geopolitics" will depend on the consistency of the norm entrepreneurs' normative convictions, the norms' capacity to endure turnover of personnel and on the persistence of structural conditions preventing the rise of challengers to relevant norm entrepreneurs.

7.3. Contribution to the literature

The dissertation aspired to make both empirical and theoretical contributions to the international relations and comparative politics scholarship concerned with norm diffusion, socialisation, post-communist transition and foreign policy-making from a constructivist viewpoint. Empirically, its value-added lies in the richness of the primary research, the application of process tracing, and the unique combination and comparison of case studies. First, the 181 open-ended interviews with elite actors involved in foreign policy-making in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and the US offer a comprehensive overview of the perceptions, identities and *meta-narratives* that have framed foreign policy discourse in the region in transition and beyond. Crucially, the analysis did not seek to present the insights thus gathered as statements

of fact: indeed, one of the conclusions that has been drawn from the empirical research is that norms, too, are an item on the competitive market with rationales for different foreign policy courses, which are championed not only by norm entrepreneurs but also epistemic communities and lobby groups, among other actors. Hence, it has been recognised that the interviewees' recollections of events and especially justifications of their past decisions inevitably contained biases and/or self-serving agendas, often simply the desire to portray controversial choices – such as Polish ex-premier Leszek Miller's decision to take part in "secret renditions" – in a better light. The risk that interviewees would inflate the importance of norms in their decision-making with the aim of "selling their brand" and addressing reputational concerns of their network did indeed loom large. Yet, as it is also persuasive and resonant *framing* that conditions the success of norm entrepreneurship itself, the author had, perhaps, a welcome opportunity to test what it means to be on the receiving end of the endeavour.

Next, the use of process tracing and the choice of cases fill another empirical gap. Though the topic itself is hardly novel, it is approached in a way that has been chosen by few researchers to date. Process tracing is, by definition, committed to detail, and it demands a plethora of primary sources. Foreign policy-making in Central and Eastern Europe tends to be analysed in a piecemeal fashion, responding to events, rather than seeking patterns. Process tracing enables the tracking of consistency via crosschecking and also uncovering linearity or cyclicality of processes over time through close examination of the different stages that they go through. Moreover, the combination of foreign policy cases that appears in this dissertation marks another innovation: as most studies concerned with foreign policy-making in the region tend

to capitalise on neo-realist theories, they remain unlikely to perceive such diverse outcomes as instances of the same phenomenon. Thematically, Atlanticism – mostly in connection with NATO enlargement – and Russia policy in Central and Eastern Europe, for their part, have received some coverage in the literature, but democracy promotion efforts of CEE states have only sparked the attention of researchers recently. Though the "coloured" revolutions in the post-Soviet space, for instance, where countries such as Slovakia, Poland or the Baltic states first played the role of "donors" of democracy assistance, have taken place seven to eight years ago, they remain underexplored. The overwhelming focus in the FPA research agenda on the dual-track NATO and EU enlargement – and more recently Europeanisation – as the most massive socialisation processes in the regional context, has to a certain extent, overshadowed other themes.

Theoretically, the dissertation also sought to position itself uniquely in the realm of Central and East European FPA but also within IR literature on norms more generally, by striving to fine-tune general theoretical arguments about norm diffusion, especially at its early stages. Constructivist takes on the emergence and operation of normative regimes has, thus far, been applied near-exclusively on the level of the international system. For its part, the theory of norm entrepreneurship has mostly focused on advocacy groups and epistemic communities, not foreign policy-making elites. Yet recently, especially within the context of international organisations or regional integration groupings such as the EU, scholars have been increasingly intrigued by so-called norm entrepreneur states – within the EU, Sweden, and arguably also the Czech Republic and Poland at this point, provide instructive examples – which consistently lobby in favour of value-laden agendas in issue areas

as diverse as climate change, gender equality or democracy promotion. This dissertation attempted to reflect the observable trend as well: in a way, it has looked into the conditions and mechanisms facilitating the advent of these norm entrepreneur states, in the arena of human rights advocacy and democracy promotion. Furthermore, it attempted to unpack, in greater detail than is commonplace in the IR scholarship on norm diffusion, how norms and norm entrepreneur networks emerge. The dissertation posits that the transition context – the half-open, half-closed opportunity structure that tends to facilitate diffusion – can generate processes of learning and socialisation that nurture norm entrepreneur networks striving to lock-in novel foreign policy paradigms, such as "dissident geopolitics", and prototype foreign policy "brands". More generally, in a post-authoritarian setting, *structural power*, which, it appears, cumulates in transition, as well as *resonance* – of value-laden and norm-oriented foreign policy agendas in post-authoritarian settings – eases the work of norm entrepreneurs, who can use that limited time between authoritarian extrication and democratic consolidation to penetrate institutions and recruit disciples that will share their logic of appropriateness and carry on their legacy. "Dissident geopolitics" as a normative framework with a *regulative* function survives in Central and Eastern Europe to this day, due to enduring elite linkages and a supportive umbrella of think-tanks, NGOs and conferences: devoid of the Cold War-era imprint of amplified Atlanticism and Russophobia, it continues to inspire foreign policy-makers to wage democratic crusades around the globe, in the purified form that has retained the accent on universal values and democracy promotion.

7.4. Pointers for future research

Conscious of its limitations, the dissertation recognises several avenues – pertaining to empirical research, theory and methodology – via which future inquiries could be conducted. Empirically, accounts of norm entrepreneurship in Central and East European foreign policy arenas should include more diverse foreign policy case studies and more varied country case studies. This dissertation originally planned to include Cuba alongside Iraq, Ukraine and Russia, but in the interest of analytical depth, the venture had to be shelved. If Cuba had been taken on as a foreign policy case study, it would have completed the picture by epitomizing the fourth pillar of "dissident geopolitics", the commitment to worldwide democracy promotion. Moreover, the choice of country cases – constrained by the author's contacts and language skills – could have been more liberal, inspiring more generalizable conclusions about patterns of foreign policy-making in the region. Substituting Slovakia for one of the Baltic states, for instance, would have incorporated the kind of opportunities and constraints for norm entrepreneurship that arise with more pressing security dilemmas, as well as raised more issues related to *resonance*, given the Baltics' own, unique version of small, peripheral states' troubled history. Finally on the empirical note, process tracing could have been enriched by considering public opinion, which could have been pitted against elite perceptions. *Resonance* and *framing,* as they are understood in this dissertation, pertain mainly to foreign policy-makers, but foreign policy conduct also serves the purpose of domestic political competition, which is an aspect that this study has not reflected to a sufficient degree.

Theoretically, future works should heed the mutual (re-)construction of structure and agency and include more, or different, alternative explanations. On the ontological

level, this dissertation has a stronger take on the influence of structure on agency, as it claims that the unique circumstances of the transition context gave rise not only to an enduring normative framework but also *structurally powerful* norm entrepreneurs. The other side of the puzzle, not quite cracked in the last chapter covering the Russia Reset, is the norm entrepreneurs' role in the transformation of the opportunity structure for norm advocacy in foreign policy-making: arguably, the "post-transition setting" itself can be perceived a construct, dependent on re-invented state identities stemming from acquired "confidence" of the new EU member states, which do not have to rely on a distant "benign superpower" and can "punch above their weight" in the context of the EU's common foreign and security policy. Furthermore, future research would benefit from including Europeanisation as a learning process complementary with – or alternative to – Americanisation at the early stages of *norm emergence* and *habituation*. At the outset, the dissertation assumed a relatively narrow focus on "dissident geopolitics" as an overtly pro-American set of norms, based on responses of interviewees, skin-deep empirical observations and analysis obtained from secondary literature. Yet, Europeanisation has also been at work since the early 1990s, and it could help explain the internal tensions within norm entrepreneur networks, as well as their bifurcation and/or disintegration later on, especially in relation to generational change. As one interviewee put it, while the post-communist tier of norm entrepreneurs spent the formative career years in Washington, the next one did so in Brussels. A comparative study of norm diffusion originating in the US and Western Europe would allow for more nuanced interpretations of the post-Cold War era context and possibly also enable the analytical distinction between the first two pillars of "dissident geopolitics", Atlanticism and Russophobia, and the latter two, global democracy promotion and engagement in the structurally similar Eastern

neighbourhood. Finally, as far as alternative explanations are concerned, this dissertation has used the interests vs. norms dichotomy, and the neo-realist paradigm in international politics, to argue that small state behaviour can diverge from the expected patterns, mostly "hard" or "soft" bandwagoning, in a post-authoritarian context. Yet pitting constructivism against domestic politics instead might have been more instructive, especially as far as *structural power* and *resonance* are concerned. The institutional frameworks of the countries studied here – touched upon in chapter 3, which discussed, for instance, the *structural power* of NGOs in the Czech Republic or the political clout of embassies in Slovakia – electoral cycles that steer foreign policy-makers towards pursuing "likeable" agendas when possible elite turnover threatens to depose them as well as instrumentalisation of "threats" at different points in time may go to great lengths in explaining patterns of norm enactment in foreign policy.

Finally, from a methodological standpoint, upcoming works should assume a more balanced approach in their use of primary sources. This dissertation has drawn heavily on interviews, which elevate the risk of bias and, as has been mentioned before, reputational concerns of the respondents. Hopefully, some of it has been offset by the strive to offer modest conclusions with the knowledge that this is, above all, a dissertation that accounts for elite (self-)perceptions. Process tracing would benefit from rigorous social network analysis that would map the norm entrepreneur groups in greater detail. Moreover, the dissertation's strength, discourse analysis, could be complemented with elite surveys that would allow for comparable results across country cases.

To conclude, this thesis has demonstrated that norms wield the power to shape and

potentially transform national interests. In doing so, they act as an intervening variable in the articulation and enactment of foreign policy. It has also shown that anti-authoritarian and transition legacies can provide the basis for enduring – though not necessarily dominant – logics of appropriateness and more permanent foreign policy "brands". Sustained by self-replicating elite networks and institutional umbrellas of non-governmental organisations, norms conceived in the half-open, half-closed opportunity structure of post-authoritarian transformation can survive the exit of norm entrepreneurs who originally advocated them from positions of *structural power*, by becoming "rhetorical traps" rooted in Wendtian state identities and *meta-narratives* with domestic *resonance*. Yet, the findings of the thesis also suggest that normative frameworks locked in via persuasive *framing* based on a particular elite group's understanding of what is "good" and "appropriate" can later be used instrumentally, for instance to advance a certain *reputation* on the international stage. Hence, when recent converts become seasoned, so does their missionary zeal.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1.

Table 1. Early norm entrepreneurs and socialisation in the Czech Republic

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Towards Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
Vaclav Havel (president)	D	C-R	Countless U.S. universities, U.S. Congress, State and Defense Secretariats, USCN, Atlantic Council, NED, Freedom House, GMF, Atlantic	D	George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus, Anne Applebaum, Adrian A. Basora, Bruce

Notes: Attitude towards the communist regime: "D" – dissident, "N" – neutral, "E" – émigré, "C" – coopted. Political views: "R" – right, "C-R" – centre-right, "C" – centre, "C-L" – centre-left, "L" – left. GMF – German Marshall Fund, PASS – Program of Atlantic Security Studies, NED – National Endowment for Democracy, RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, C.U. – California University

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Towards Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
			Council, OSI		Jackson, Wendy Luers
Alexander Vondra (deputy foreign minister and NATO membership negotiator)	D	R	NATO, U.S. embassy in Prague, Atlantic Council, GMF, USCN, AEI, Foundation for a Civil Society	H	Madeleine Albright, Ron Asmus (GMF), Richard Perle, Bruce Jackson, Alexander Vershbow (as U.S. Amb. to NATO), Kurt Volker, Wendy Luers
Karel Schwarzenberg (advisor to the president)	E	C-R	Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, OSCE, OSI, U.S. embassy in Prague, Foundation for a Civil Society	D	Ron Asmus, David Kramer
Karel Kovanda (ambassador to NATO)	E	C-R	UN Security Council, NATO, Czech Working Group for NATO,	D	Madeleine Albright, Ron Asmus, Zbigniew Brzezinski,

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Towards Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
			USCN, MIT, Pepperdine, California University		Alexander Vershbow (as U.S. Amb. to NATO), Kurt Volker
Michael Zantovsky (ambassador to the U.S.)	E	C-R	Czech embassy in the U.S., New York University in Prague, PASS, McGill, Reuters, OSI, USCN, GMF, Atlantic Council	D	Countless contacts made while at embassy
Martin Palous (ambassador to the U.S.)	D	C-R	Czech embassy in the U.S., Northwestern University, OSI, USCN	D	Countless contacts made while at embassy
Petr Pithart (prime minister and chairman of the Senate)	D	C-R	U.S. embassy in Prague, Central European University, Foundation for a	D	Adrian A. Basora, Madeleine Albright, George Soros, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Wendy

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Towards Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
			Civil Society		Luers
Oldrich Cerny (advisor to the president, head of Czech intelligence)	D	C-R	NATO, USCN, NED, Atlantic Council, Foundation for a Civil Society, Forum 2000	H	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Soros
Jiri Dientsbier (foreign minister)	D	C/C-L	United Nations, Foreign Ministry, U.S. embassy in Prague, NED, Freedom House, Foundation for a Civil Society, OSI	D	Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright (as U.S. ambassador to the UN), Zbigniew Brzezinski, Wendy Luers
Jan Ruml (interior minister)	D	C-R	U.S. embassy in Prague, Foundation for a Civil Society, OSI, NED	D	Amb. Adrian A. Basora, Madeleine Albright, Wendy Luers
Lubos Dobrovsky (advisor to president Havel and ambassador	D	C-L	U.S. embassy in Moscow, NATO, USCN	D	James Franklin Collins (U.S. ambassador to

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Towards Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
to Moscow)					Moscow)
Jiri Pehe (Open Media Research and office of the president)	E	C-L	Columbia University, New York University, Freedom House, RFE/RL, Foundation for a Civil Society	D	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, countless links with journalists, including Anne Applebaum, and academics, including Michael McFaul

Table 2. Early norm entrepreneurs and socialisation in Poland

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
Lech Walesa (president)	D	R	U.S. Congress, State and Defense Secretariats, NATO, USCN, Atlantic Council	H	George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus
Bronislaw Geremek (Sejm's Committee on Foreign Affairs, foreign minister)	D	C-R	U.S. Secretariat of State, NATO, U.S. embassy in Warsaw, Columbia University, Atlantic Council, GMF, USCN, American Jewish Committee	D	James Baker, Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus (GMF), Thomas R. Pickering (as Amb. to the U.N.), Sen. John McCain, House Speaker Newt Gingrich

Notes: Attitude towards the communist regime: "D" – dissident, "N" – neutral, "E" – émigré, "C" – coopted. Political views: "R" – right, "C-R" – centre-right, "C" – centre, "C-L" – centre-left, "L" – left. SEA – Euro-Atlantic Association

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
Adam Michnik (editor in chief of Gazeta Wyborcza)	D	C / C-L	Countless U.S. media, Atlantic Council, Wilson Center (freedom award), NED[702]	D	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus (GMF), Anne Applebaum, Andrew Michta, Nicholas A. Rey (as Amb. to Poland)
Jerzy Buzek (prime minister)	D	C-R	SEA, U.S. Secretariat of State, NATO, USCN, Atlantic Council	D	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus (GMF), Sen. John McCain, David Kramer
Bronislaw Komorowski (defense minister)	D	C-R	SEA, NATO, USCN, Atlantic Council	D	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus (GMF), Sen. John McCain, David Kramer

[702]Rosen, J., 1997. The Media and Democracy: a Dialogue. *Journal of Democracy* 8(4): 85-93

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
Janusz Onyszkiewicz (defense minister)	D	C-R	SEA, NATO, USCN, Atlantic Council	H	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus (GMF), Sen. John McCain
Jerzy Kozminski (ambassador to the U.S.)	D	C-R	Czech embassy in the U.S., Polish-American Freedom Foundation	H	Contacts made while at embassy
Andrzej Towpik (ambassador to NATO)	C	C	Partnership for Peace, NATO, Columbia University	D	Contacts made while at NATO, incl. Alexander Vershbow (as U.S. Amb. to NATO)
Jerzy Nowak (NATO entry negotiator, ambassador to NATO)	C	C-R	NATO, OSCE, United Nations (Europe), American Eisenhower Fellowship, SEA, East-West Institute	H	Contacts made while at NATO
Przemyslaw Grudzinski	N	C-R	NATO, Princeton University (Fulbright	D	Contacts made while at Princeton/GWU and later at

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
(ambassador to the U.S.)			Fellow), George Washington University		the embassy
Radoslaw Sikorski (deputy defense and foreign minister; defense and foreign minister)	D	C-R/R	Various media (including U.S. magazine National Review), Department of State and Defense, NATO, USCN, Atlantic Council, AEI, New Atlantic Initiative, GMF	H	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Soros, Anne Applebaum (also by marriage), Rupert Murdoch, Ron Asmus, Bruce Jackson, Alexander Vershbow, Sen. John McCain, Sen. Joe Biden, Sen. Dick Lugar, Charles Krauthammer, David Kramer and countless others
Bronislaw Misztal (Head of the Community of Democracies)	N	C	Atlantic Council, Catholic University in America, University of Chicago, Northwestern University, Cornell	D	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Soros, Andrew Michta, Ron Asmus

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("H" -hawk / "D" -dove)	Interpersonal Links
			University		
Aleksander Smolar (Head of the Stefan Batory Foundation, adviser to premiers and foreign ministers)	D	C-R	SEA, Stefan Batory Foundation, Atlantic Council, NED	D	Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Soros, Andrew Michta, Ron Asmus Michael McFaul
Aleksander Kwasniewski (president)	C	C-L	U.S. Congress, State and Defense Secretariats, NATO (Riga Initiative), Atlantic Council, Georgetown University	H	Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus (GMF), Sen. John McCain
Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz (prime minister, foreign minister)	C	C-L	U.S. Secretariat of State, NATO	H	Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus (GMF)

Table 3. Early norm entrepreneurs and socialisation in Slovakia

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("hawk" / "dove")	Interpersonal Links
Mikulas Dzurinda (prime minister)	N	C-R	U.S. Congress, State and Defense Secretariats, NATO, USCN, SAC, Atlantic Council, IRI, Foundation for Civil Society	H	Madeleine Albright, G.W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, Wendy Luers, Ron Asmus, Kurt Volker (as Amb. to NATO), Sen. John McCain, Bruce Jackson, Julie Finley
Martin Butora (U.S. ambassador)	D	C-R	NATO, Slovak embassy in the U.S., NED, SAC, U.S. Committee of NATO, Atlantic	D	Contacts made while at embassy

Notes: Attitude towards the communist regime: "D" – dissident, "N" – neutral, "E" – émigré, "C" – coopted. Political views: "R" – right, "C-R" – centre-right, "C" – centre, "C-L" – centre-left, "L" – left. GMF – German Marshall Fund, SAC – Slovak Atlantic Commission, SFPA – Slovak Foreign Policy Association (think-tank linked to the foreign ministry)

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("hawk" / "dove")	Interpersonal Links
			Council, Princeton University, Foundation for Civil Society		
Milan Jezovica (political adviser to the prime minister)	N/C	C-R	Slovak embassy in the U.S., SAC, U.S. Committee of NATO, Atlantic Council, Foundation for Civil Society	D	Contacts made while at embassy
Miroslav Wlachovsky (diplomat at U.S. embassy)	N/C	C-R	Slovak embassy in the U.S., SAC, U.S. Committee of NATO, Foundation for Civil Society	H	Contacts made while at embassy
Rastislav Kacer (U.S. ambassador)	N	C-R	NATO headquarters (Brussels), Slovak embassy in the U.S., defense ministry, SAC, U.S.	H	Contacts made while at embassy

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("hawk" / "dove")	Interpersonal Links
			Committee of NATO, Foundation for Civil Society		
Eduard Kukan (foreign minister)	C	C-R	U.S. Congress, State and Defense Secretariats, NATO, USCN, Atlantic Council, Foundation for Civil Society	H	Madeleine Albright, G.W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Richard Perle, Wendy Luers, Ron Asmus, Kurt Volker (as Amb. to NATO), Sen. John McCain, Bruce Jackson, Julie Finley
Peter Weiss (vice-chairman of the Slovak parliament)	C	C-L	SAC, IRI, Foundation for Civil Society	H	Bruce Jackson, Kurt Volker
Igor Slobodnik (ambassador to NATO)	N/C	C-R	NATO, SAC, Atlantic Council, Foundation for Civil	H	Contacts made while at NATO

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / "Americanisation"		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence ("hawk" / "dove")	Interpersonal Links
			Society		
Ivan Korcok (advisor, Slovak mission to NATO)	N/C	C	NATO, SAC (Atlantic Council) , Foundation for Civil Society	D	Ron Asmus, Paige Reffe, contacts made while at NATO
Ivo Samson (analyst at SFPA)	N	C-R	SAC, Atlantic Council, Foundation for Civil Society	H	Ron Asmus
Peter Burian (U.S. ambassador and NATO ambassador)	N/C	C-R	NATO, Slovak embassy in the U.S., Foundation for Civil Society	D	Ron Asmus Michael McFaul
Martin M. Simecka (editor in chief of SME)	D	C-R	USCN, SAC, Atlantic Council, Foundation for Civil Society	H	Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron Asmus (GMF)
Miroslav Kusy (intellectual and	D	C-R	SAC, Atlantic Council, Foundation	H	Madeleine Albright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ron

Domestic Positioning			International Socialisation / “Americanisation”		
Name and primary occupation / office	Attitude Toward Communist Regime (D / N / E / C)	Political Views (L, C-L, C, C-R, R)	Institutions	Ideational Influence (“hawk” / “dove”)	Interpersonal Links
professor)			for Civil Society		Asmus (GMF)

The tables attempt to give an overview of nascent norm entrepreneur networks in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia in the 1990s. They list the core members and the positions of structural power that they held in government or non-governmental organisations relevant to foreign policy-making. The left side of the tables, devoted to the domestic positioning of relevant norm entrepreneurs, lists their attitudes toward the communist regime and political views, based on own admission and/or party affiliation. Both categories aimed to shed more light the extent to which "dissident geopolitics" is rooted in anti-communist movements across the region. In the Czech Republic, most members of the network are dissidents or émigrés, who returned to the country after the downfall of communism and self-identify as "centre-right" or "right". In Poland, the group of norm entrepreneurs seem to exhibit a slightly greater variety, both vis-à-vis the communist past and the political positioning of founding members, of whom a couple hails from the "centre-left". As the anti-communist opposition negotiated the transition with the communist establishment at the now famous "round-table", "dissident geopolitics" seems to have had greater appeal across the political spectrum, even among former apparatchiks, eager to rebuild their reputation and re-establish themselves on the Polish political scene. Perhaps due to the outreach of the Solidarity trade union, which at one point encompassed a third of the working-age population, Poland has fewer norm entrepreneurs that were "neutral" under the communist regime: they are former communists or anti-communists; the middle ground remains largely virgin territory. In Slovakia, the norm entrepreneur network consists of almost equally of dissidents, co-opted former members of the establishment and unaffiliated "professionals". The mix testifies both to the underdevelopment of dissent under communism and the overextension of the grey zone consisting of apolitical professionals. Consequently, though Slovakia's

community of norm entrepreneurs is dominated by the "centre-right", it has more members that label themselves "centre-left" than, say, the Czech Republic, where dissidents were more abundant. Both Poland and Slovakia émigré norm entrepreneurs are scarcer than in the Czech Republic, albeit for different reasons: whilst the former was a more "open" national-accommodation communist regime with more opportunities to travel and return in good standing, the latter – though Czechoslovakia as a whole is classified as a relatively "closed" bureaucratic-authoritarian communist regime – seems to have had fewer dissident that "needed" to leave the country.

The right side of the tables, focused on socialisation, catalogues the institutions, ideational influence and interpersonal links that played a major role in facilitating the "Americanisation" of the relevant norm entrepreneurs' foreign policy thinking. The category of "institutions" includes universities where they may have studied or taught, think-tanks and NGOs that they may have joined or interacted with and U.S. government agencies as well as international organisations with American presence that they may have come into contact with in their professional careers. The tabulated information was carefully selected by the author, based on responses of interviewees and/or analysis of norm entrepreneurs' biographies. It exposes the extent to which socialisation, as a process, and "Americanisation", as an outcome, was filtered through diasporas and/or NATO enlargement. Further right, the column denoted "ideational influence" distinguishes between "hawks", inspired by more conservative American foreign policy paradigms such as "hard" Wilsonianism and democratic globalism, and "doves", drawn to their more liberal counterparts like humanistic universalism and liberal internationalism, which differ in the emphasis that they lay on national security, the approach to conflict resolution – by military vs. diplomatic

means – and the willingness to intervene beyond borders – bilaterally and/or multilaterally – the reliance on international organisations, the degree of politicisation "permitted" in democracy promotion, and the like. While in the Czech Republic, "doves" seem to slightly outnumber the "hawks", in Slovakia, the opposite is the case. Czech norm entrepreneurs may be less "militant" because of the long-time presence of Soviet troops on their soil, the proliferation of dissidents who engaged in peaceful resistance against the communist regime and the state's inland geographical position, which, by definition, poses fewer security dilemmas. The Polish community of norm entrepreneurs seems to contain a roughly equal number of "hawks" and "doves", many of which are émigrés or leftists: core members who spent the communist era in Poland and/or hail from the centre-right or rightist circles may be more aware of security concerns or harbour more acute threat perceptions, given the country's peripheral geographical locus. The Slovak norm entrepreneur network less "peacenik" due to the later onset of socialisation in the context of Meciarite/anti-Meciarite political competition, marked by the dominance of the centre-right, which seemed eager to get back into the "good books" of the Bush administration to get back on track toward NATO membership. Comparison across time also highlights that the Czech, Polish and Slovak groups of norm entrepreneurs developed in different "formative periods": the first two under the Clinton administration and the third under the G.W. Bush administration. The relative rarity of "doves" among Slovak norm entrepreneurs may, in part, be ascribed to the fact that the country was a "late bloomer" when it comes to norms. Lastly, the prevalence of "doves" in the Czech

network of norm entrepreneurs may also point to a historical reference: Czech Atlanticism is Wilsonian, rather than Reaganite.[703] The "hawk"/"dove" distinction was included in the tables as it will have profound implications for the unity of norm entrepreneur communities in the post-transition era. Lastly, the category labelled "interpersonal links" offers insight into people-to-people contacts that interviewees designated as "significant influences" on the development of their foreign policy thinking. They are not ranked according to importance. The shortcut "contacts at embassy/in Brussels, etc." is used whenever a norm entrepreneur's post suggests that he or she must have established rapport with a U.S. counterpart or several, but either failed to highlight a particular figure during the interview, which might suggests that institutions that he or she were at were more important than the individuals that they engaged with, or the information is missing. Overall, tables 1, 2 and 3 map the patterns of interaction between U.S. "missionaries" and CEE "converts" in the 1990s, which onset the process of "Americanisation" in the foreign policy-making communities of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia and established the core of norm entrepreneur networks that are now often jokingly referred to as the "transatlantic mafia".

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[703] Across Central and Eastern Europe, positive perceptions of the U.S. as the "liberator" are rooted in the primary identification of the world's sole superpower – at least in the 1990s – as the "winner of the Cold War". In the Czech Republic, however, Atlanticist sentiments go back to the First Czechoslovak Republic, established, in part, thanks to American president Woodrow Wilson's commitment to the principle of self-determination, which helped justify the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Though Poland also has a longer common history with the U.S., no particular period proved as defining as the interwar era did for the Czech Republic.

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Albright, M., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 25.7.
[Former US Secretary of State]

Algayerova, O., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 22.2.
[Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic]

Anyz, D., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 31.3.
[Journalist and former Washington, DC correspondent, *Hospodarske noviny* daily, Czech Republic]

Applebaum, A., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC/London, 30.8.
[Columnist, *Washington Post*]

Arbe, S., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 12.2.
[Director of the Centre for European and North-Atlantic Relations, Slovakia]

Balek, P., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 3.1.
[Deputy Head of the Czech Republic's Mission to the European Union]

Baranowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 7.6.
[Senior Program Officer, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Poland]

Basora, A., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC. 30.11.
[Former US Ambassador to the Czech Republic]

Batora, J., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 2.1.
[Associate Professor and Director, Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Comenius University, Slovakia]

Blazevic, I., Interview with author. Prague, 8.3.
[Director, Human Rights and Democracy Department, People in Need Foundation, Czech Republic]

Bobinski, K., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 4.5.
[President, Unia & Polska, Poland]

Bocianova, K., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 19.3.
[Party of European Socialists, Czech Republic]

Bodnar, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 7.6.
[Management Board, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Poland]

Borusewicz, B., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 28.6.
[Speaker of the Polish Senate]

Brzezinski, I., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC. 5.12.
[Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy]

Brzezinski, Z., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC. 12.9.
[Former United States National Security Adviser]

Butora, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 4.2.
[Former Ambassador to the US, Honorary President, Institute for Public Affairs, Slovakia]

Carothers, T., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 12.12.
[Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC]

Cerny, O., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 27.2.
[Former Chief of Foreign Intelligence; Head of the Forum 2000 Foundation, Czech Republic]

Chabiera, T., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 24.4.
[Board member, Euro-Atlantic Association, Poland]

Charap, S., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC. 13.7.
[Center for American Progress, Washington, DC]

Chmelar, E., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 30.1.

[Head of the Institute of Political Sciences, Pan-European University; commentator, Slovakia]

Chorvatovic, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 9.1.

[Chief of News Desk, *SME* daily, Slovakia]

Cichocki, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 9.6.

[Adviser to former Polish president Lech Kaczynski, Poland]

Ciosek, S., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 15.6.

[Former Ambassador to Russia, Presidential Envoy in Ukraine at the time of the Orange Revolution, Poland]

Cisar, A., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 28.1.

[Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to Russia]

Demes, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 2.1.

[Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Bratislava]

Denton, J., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 23.1.

[Former Director of Freedom House, USA]

Dlouha, G., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 4.3.

[Former aide of president Vaclav Havel, Director for Human Rights and Transformational Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic]

Dobrovsky, L., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 31.3.

[Former Czechoslovak Minister of Defense and former Czech Ambassador to Russia]

Drulak, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 10.3.

[Director, Prague Institute of International Relations, Czech Republic]

Duleba, A., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 7.1.

[Director, Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Slovakia]

Durovkova, K., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 28.1.

[Activist, People in Peril, NGO, Slovakia]

Eichler, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 11.3.
[Institute for International Affairs, Czech Republic]

Fedor, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 27.4.
[Former Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic]

Feinstein, L., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 28.6.
[United States Ambassador to Poland]

Fico, R., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 26.3.
[Prime Minister of Slovakia]

Fischer, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 27.2.
[Former aide to president Vaclav Havel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic]

Fly, J., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC. 7.12.
[Former National Security Adviser; Executive Director, Foreign Policy Initiative, Washington, DC]

Gabal, I., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 24.3.
[Former aide to Vaclav Havel, GAC and Gabal Analysis and Consulting Firms, Czech Republic]

Gandalovic, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 3.4.
[US Ambassador, Czech Republic]

Gniazdowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 10.5 and 12.5.
[Head of the Central European Department, Centre for Eastern Studies, Poland]

Grabinski, T., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 14.4.
[Ex-dissident and journalist, Poland]

Grivna, V., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 3.2.
[Ambassador of Slovakia to Ukraine]

Gyarfasova, O., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 21.1.

[Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Public Affairs, Slovakia]

Hamilton, D., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC. 5.12.

[Former Associate Director of Policy Planning for two US Secretaries of State; Director, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins SAIS, Washington, DC]

Hamzik, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 9.1.

[Former Foreign Minister of Slovakia; Ambassador to Ukraine, Slovak Republic]

Havran, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 28.1.

[Commentator, Slovakia]

Havranek, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 14.2.

[Adviser to Czech Defense Minister Alexandr Vondra]

Hirman, K., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.1.

[Director of the Section for Energy Activities, Slovak Agency for Innovations and Energy and Adviser to the Slovak Prime Minister, Slovakia]

Horvath, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 2.1.

[Formerly Slovak Finance Ministry; Board, National Bank of Slovakia; Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford]

Hybaskova, J., Interview with author. Prague, 11.3.

[Former Czech Ambassador to Kuwait, Ambassador of the European Union in Iraq]

Jackson, B., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC/Paris. 14.9.

[Former member of the Foreign Affairs Sub-committee at the Republican National Convention, 2000; Founder, US Committee on NATO; Director, Project for Transitional Democracies]

Jagodzinski, A., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 2.5.

[Ex-dissident and director of the Polish Institute, Slovakia]

Jarabik, B., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 5.5.

[GOTV campaign before the 1998 election in Slovakia; Associate Fellow, FRIDE; activist]

Jerabova, V., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 6.4.
[Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic]

Jires, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 25.2.
[Director, CEVRO Institute, Czech Republic]

Joch, R., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 16.3.
[Adviser to president Vaclav Klaus; Executive Director, Civic Institute, Czech Republic]

Kacer, R., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 3.1.
[Former Ambassador to the US; President and chairman of the Executive Board of the Slovak Atlantic Commission, Bratislava]

Kaiser, D., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 24.3.
[Former correspondent in Washington, DC; journalist, *Lidove noviny* daily, Czech Republic]

Kalinak, R., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 20.2.
[Interior Minister of Slovakia]

Kanis, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 17.2.
[Former Defense Minister of Slovakia]

Karasek, T., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 6.3.
[Association for International Affairs and Charles University, Czech Republic]

Kasicky, F., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 28.2.
[Former Defence Minister of Slovakia; NATO PERMREP]

Kazanecki, P., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 1.6.
[East European Democratic Centre and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland]

Klich, B., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 5.5.
[Minister of National Defense of Poland]

Klvana, T., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 21.2.

[Adviser to prime minister Mirek Topolanek on US NMD; journalist, *Hospodarske noviny* daily, Czech Republic]

Kobieracki, A., 2011. Interview with author. Vienna, 30.6.

[Formerly Polish MFA; former Assistant Secretary General for Operations, NATO; Director of Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE]

Komorowska, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 6.6.

[East European Democratic Centre, Poland]

Korcok, I., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 12.2.

[Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, former Head of Slovak Delegation to the EU]

Kostolny, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.1.

[Former correspondent in Washington, DC and editor-in-chief, *SME* daily, Slovakia]

Kovanda, K., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 3.3.

[Former NATO Ambassador; Deputy Director General, External Relations and Political Director, European Commission, Czech Republic]

Kozminski, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 15.6.

[Former US Ambassador, Director of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation, Poland]

Kramer, D., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 23.5.

[Former United States Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; President, Freedom House, USA]

Krauthammer, C., 2011. Interview with author. Washington, DC. 13.12.

[Columnist, *Washington Post,* USA]

Kubis, J., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 10.5.

[Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia; Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Slovakia]

Kucharczyk, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 5.5.

[President, Institute of Public Affairs, Poland]

Kuchynova-Smigolova, V., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 2.5.

[Former Security Policy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; OSCE Ambassador, Czech Republic]

Kudela, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 6.4.

[Former aide of Vaclav Havel, adviser to defense minister Alexandr Vondra, Czech Republic]

Kukan, E., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 28.2.

[Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia]

Kulesa, L., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 6.6.

[Formerly National Security Bureau; Head, Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Poland]

Kusy, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 11.1

[Chairholder, UNESCO Chair for Human Rights Education, Comenius University, Bratislava]

Kuzniar, R., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 22.4.

[Formerly MFA; adviser to president Bronislaw Komorowski; Director of Strategic Studies and the Security Section, Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland]

Kwasniewski, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 14.6.

[Former President of Poland]

Lachowski, Z., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 30.5.

[Deputy Head, National Security Bureau, Poland]

Lajcak, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 15.2.

[Former EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Hercegovina, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic]

Latta, B., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 29.1.

[Former correspondent in Ukraine, journalist in *Pravda* daily, Slovakia]

Lewicki, Z., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 25.5.

[Expert in American Studies; lecturer at the University of Warsaw; formerly MFA, Poland]

Magierowski, M.. Interview with author. Warsaw, 18.5.

[Deputy Editor, *Rzeczpospolita*, Poland]

Majer, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 14.2.

[Ministry of Defense, Slovakia]

Marian, J., 2010. Interview with author. Prague, 30.4.

[Director of the Division for Russia and Belarus, MFA; formerly Association for International Affairs, Czech Republic]

McFaul, M., 2012. Interview with author. Moscow. 6.3.

[United States Ambassador to Russia]

Meseznikov, G., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 5.1.

[President, Institute for Public Affairs, Slovakia]

Michalski, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 20.6.

[Director of Division for East European Affairs, MFA, Poland]

Michnik, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 3.6.

[Editor-in-Chief, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Poland]

Michta, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 16.6.

[Senior Transatlantic Fellow and Director, Warsaw Office, German Marshall Fund of the United States]

Migas, J., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 13.1.

[Former Ambassador to Ukraine, Ambassador to Russia; Former Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic]

Miller, L., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 20.6.

[Former Prime Minster of Poland]

Misztal, B., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 22.6.
[President, Community of Democracies; MFA of Poland]

Mojzita, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.2, 11.2 and 17.2.
[Slovak Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina]

Mrklas, L., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 10.3.
[CEVRO Institute; Charles University, Czech Republic]

Nic, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.1.
[Former Director of Deputy Minister's Office, MFA of the Slovak Republic]

Nowak, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 28.5.
[Formerly MFA, various posts; former Ambassador to NATO; President of Euro-Atlantic Association, Poland]

Obsitnik, V., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 6.12.
[Former Ambassador of the US to the Slovak Republic]

Olex-Szczytowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 9.6.
[Special Adviser on Economics and Business to Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

Ondrejcsak, R., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 24.1.
[Former Deputy Defense Minister; Director, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, Slovakia]

Ostrowski, M., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 8.5.
[Chief of Foreign Affairs Desk, *Polityka* weekly, Poland]

Osusky, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 16.1.
[Civic Conservative Party, Slovakia]

Palata, L., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 9.3.
[Journalist, *Lidove noviny*, Czech Republic]

Palko, V., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 15.1.
[Former Interior Minister of Slovakia]

Palous, M., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 20.3.
[Former US Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the United Nations for the Czech Republic]

Panek, S., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 4.3 and 22.3.
[Director, People in Need Foundation, Prague]

Paroubek, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 29.4.
[Former Regional Development Minister and Prime Minister, Czech Republic]

Pavlacik, Z., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 15.3.
[Jagello 2000; former adviser to prime minister Mirek Topolanek, Czech Republic]

Pehe, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 25.2 and 14.3.
[Director, New York University, Czech Republic]

Petracek, Z., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 30.3.
[Journalist, *Lidove noviny* daily, Czech Republic]

Phlipot, C., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 17.6.
[Senior Advisor to the Permanent Secretariat of the Community of Democracies, Poland]

Pick, O., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 6.4.
[Diplomatic Academy, MFA; adviser to several prime ministers, Czech Republic]

Pieklo, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 11.5.
[Director of PAUCI, Poland]

Pisarska, K., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 31.5.
[Director, European Academy of Diplomacy, Warsaw]

Pithart, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 6.3.
[Former Prime Minister; Chairman of the Senate, Czech Republic]

Pocuch, I., 2010. Interview with author. Prague, 4.5.

[Ambassador to Ukraine; previously various posts at MOD, Czech Republic]

Pojar, T., 2010. Interview with author. Oxford/Tel Aviv, 28.5.

[Former Director of People in Need Foundation; Deputy Minister at the MFA; Ambassador to Israel, Czech Republic]

Povejsil, M., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels/Prague. 12.3.

[Former PERMREP to NATO; PERMREP to the EU, Czech Republic]

Pribik, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 6.4.

[Former Ambassador to Cuba, Czech Republic]

Prokes, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 9.4.

[Adviser to Lubomir Zaoralek, former Speaker of the Parliament, Czech Republic]

Radicova, I., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 18.1.

[Former Prime Minister of Slovakia]

Reffe, P., 2012. Interview with author. Washington, DC, 30.8.

[Founder, US Committee on NATO; liaison for the 2002 NATO summit in Prague at the White House; adviser to the Slovak government under Mikulas Dzurinda, USA]

Reiter, J., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 3.5.

[Former Polish Ambassador to Germany and to the United States]

Rotfeld, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 5.5.

[Former Minister and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the Russian-Polish Committee on Difficult Matters, Poland]

Ruml, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 5.3.

[Founder and former leader of the Freedom Union Party; former senator, Czech Republic]

Samson, I., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 9.1.

[Head of the International Security Program, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Slovakia]

Saryusz-Wolski, J., 2011. Interview with author. Brussels, 28.2.

[Member of the European Parliament, Poland]

Schneider, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 27.2.

[Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Secretary for European Affairs, Czech Republic; former Head of PSSI, Czech Republic]

Schwarzenberg, K., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 28.4.

[Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic]

Sebej, F., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 11.1.

[Member of the Slovak Parliament and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Bratislava]

Sedivy, J., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 4.3.

[Former Deputy Defense Minister; Assistant Secretary General Defense Policy and Planning, NATO, Czech Republic]

Sienkiewicz, B., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 30.5.

[Centre for Eastern Studies, Poland]

Sikorski, R., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 13.6.

[Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Minister of National Defense, Poland]

Simecka, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 6.1.

[Former Editor-in-Chief of *SME* daily newspaper, Slovakia]

Slobodnik, I., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava. 15.8.

[Former PERMREP of the Slovak Republic to NATO]

Smolar, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 16.5.

[Professor of Political Science, CNRS, Paris; President, Stefan Batory Foundation, Poland]

Smolar, E., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 10.6 and 13.6.

[Polish Institute of International Affairs, Poland]

Spidla, V., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 23.3.

[Former Prime Minister, Czech Republic]

Stano, P., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 10.2.
[Slovak Mission to the EU]

Staszkiewicz, M., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 19.2.
[Former Director, Association for International Affairs; Deputy Executive Director, Aspen Institute, Czech Republic]

Stohanzlova, H., 2010. Interview with author. Prague, 5.5.
[Division for Transformational Cooperation, MFA, Czech Republic]

Sulc, F., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 24.3.
[Adviser to Defense Minister Alexandr Vondra, Czech Republic]

Surotchak, J., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 22.2.
[Regional Director, Europe, International Republican Institute, Slovakia/USA]

Surotchak, L., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 18.2.
[Director, Pontis Foundation, Slovakia]

Sustrova, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 25.3.
[Former Deputy Minister of the Interior; former Vaclav Havel's aide; commentator, Czech Republic]

Svarovsky, M., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 15.2.
[Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy of the Czech Republic to Poland]

Svoboda, C., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 1.4 and 3.12.
[Former Foreign Minister, Czech Republic]

Svoboda, K., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 3.3 and 7.3.
[Association for International Affairs and Charles University, Czech Republic]

Svoboda, M., 2011. Interview with author. Prague, 22.2.
[Head of Human Rights and Democracy Department, People In Need Foundation, Czech Republic]

Szafarz, S., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 24.5.

[Consul General in Shanghai, China; formerly Washington, DC-based journalist for Polish media, Poland]

Szomolanyi, S., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 2.1.

[Professor, Comenius University, Bratislava]

Szymanski, K., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw. 21.9.

[Member of the European Parliament, Poland]

Tchorek, K., 2011. Interview with author, Warsaw, 20.5.

[Correspondent, *The Guardian* and *The Economist,* Poland]

Toda, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.1.

[Head of the Foreign Affairs Desk, *SME* daily newspaper, Slovakia]

Topolanek, M., 2011. Interview with author. Prague. 23.3.

[Former Prime Minister of the Czech Republic and former President of the European Council]

Towpik, A., 2011. Interview with author. Warsaw, 2.6.

[Former PERMREP to NATO, Polish Ambassador to the United Nations]

Uhl, P., 2011. Interview with author. Prague,10.3.

[Commissioner for Human Rights of the Czech Republic]

Valasek, T., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.1.

[Former Deputy Defense Minister of Slovakia; Director of Foreign Policy and Defense, Centre for European Reform, United Kingdom]

Vasaryova, M., 2011. Interview with author. Bratislava, 9.2 and 11.2.

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