

Die uralte moderne Lösung:

Nation, Space and Modernity in Austro- German Zionism before 1917

Alex Marshall

DPhil Candidate, German

Brasenose College, University of Oxford

Contents

Contents.....	<u>2</u>
Short Abstract.....	<u>5</u>
Long Abstract.....	<u>7</u>
Acknowledgements.....	<u>16</u>
Abbreviations.....	<u>17</u>
Introduction: People and Land.....	<u>18</u>
Overview of Zionist History.....	<u>23</u>
Overview of Zionist Ideology.....	<u>26</u>
Overview of Nationalism.....	<u>27</u>
Nationalism and the Jews.....	<u>33</u>
Structure.....	<u>35</u>
I. Moses Hess.....	<u>41</u>
Resolving Contradictions.....	<u>43</u>
Emotional Interpretations.....	<u>45</u>
History and Utopia.....	<u>50</u>
Precursors, Allies and Inspirations.....	<u>55</u>
Jewish Identity.....	<u>61</u>
Repression of Discontinuity.....	<u>67</u>
Anxiety and Heterogeneity.....	<u>69</u>
II. The Pressure of Diaspora.....	<u>72</u>
The Failure of Civil Improvement.....	<u>74</u>

The Self-Hatred Problem.....	75
Judennot.....	77
Antisemitism and its Causes.....	78
Solidarity.....	81
Inertia.....	83
Herzl and Jewish Flaws.....	87
Nordau and the Body Politic.....	93
Duelling Tragedies.....	98
The Mauschel Divide.....	106
Jewish Others.....	118
Religion and Frömmeler.....	119
Looking Eastward.....	124
Palestinians in Europe.....	128
Albia Moments.....	131
Self-Hatred and Separation.....	135
III. Aus schwarzrotgoldenen Bändern: Inspirations and Foreign Policy.....	138
Multinational Empires.....	143
Austria and the Habsburgs.....	143
Ottoman Turkey and the Sultan.....	147
Imperial Powers.....	161
Germany and its Protection.....	161
Britain and the English-Speaking World.....	167
Parnell and His Adversary.....	171
Ancient and Non-Western Nations	172
Nordau and Sparta.....	173
Other Non-National Peoples.....	174
Universal Contribution.....	177
Hierarchy.....	181
Nationhood and High Culture.....	184
IV. Grosse Dinge schweben in der Luft: People, Land and Zionism without Zion.....	187
The Land as Invented Tradition.....	190
Parallel Transformation.....	196
A Crossroads between East and West.....	199
The New Jew.....	201
Zionist Politics as Surrogate Nationhood.....	209
National Movements and The New Jew as Nation.....	213

Utopias of Possibility.....	219
Herzl and Genre.....	223
The Orient as Utopian Space.....	230
Symbolic Presence.....	233
V. Old and New: Modernity.....	237
What Is Modernity?.....	238
Bad Modernity.....	241
Nordau’s Cultural Despair.....	241
Pinsker and Ambivalence.....	246
Good Modernity	248
Herzl’s Balloon.....	248
New Societies.....	249
Altneuland’s Cautious Utopia.....	258
Jewish Modernity.....	262
Herzl, the Jewish Bourgeoisie and the Stock Market.....	264
Biblical Modernity.....	266
Utopia as Performance of Modernity.....	270
National Narratives as Rationalised History.....	273
Afterword: Presumption, Pragmatism, Performance.....	276
The Inevitable and the Inescapable.....	277
Accepted Presumptions.....	278
Performance and Pragmatism.....	280
The Post-Political is the Most Political.....	281
Bibliography.....	284
Primary Texts.....	284
Secondary Texts.....	286

Acknowledgements

Though it often seems otherwise, even the most solitary things are rarely achieved independently. For this reason, I would like to thank the following people.

My supervisor, Ritchie Robertson, who has not only been kindly, resourceful and gentle in his criticism, but also consistently reliable and quick to respond to emails.

Albert and Rachel Lehmann, without whose generous endowment to the field of Jewish Studies I would not have been able to pursue this research.

My parents, Brian and Sue, for moral, intellectual and very often material support, and for a childhood filled with snippets of German, varied books, silly poems, odd words and dogs.

German teachers and lecturers who kindled and rekindled my interests, especially Mrs S. Moseley from The Lancaster School in Leicester, and Peter Davies, Sabine Rolle, Mary Cosgrove and Sarah Colvin from the University of Edinburgh.

My friends from my faculty, college and hometown, too numerous to mention or prioritise.

Finally, I dedicate this to anyone currently or formerly detained in Campsfield House, Kidlington, Oxfordshire. While my exploration of the consequences of European nationalism was conducted in typical Oxbridge comfort and abstraction, theirs, so close by, has not been.

Short Abstract

Zionism represents a turning point in the rise of the nation-state to its present near-ubiquity, a national movement which did not construct an identity concurrently with its embrace of nationalism, but reconstructed a diaspora to fit it. I explore how early Political Zionists, particularly Theodor Herzl, perceived both the push and pull of nationalism, and why they were drawn to adopt an ideology and political structure whose basic principles, I argue, were intrinsically hostile to Jews.

I begin by examining the socialist Moses Hess as a forerunner and microcosm of later Zionism, arguing his work is underpinned by anxiety about social heterogeneity. The second chapter focuses on portrayals of diaspora, its contradictions and the ambivalence they caused towards less assimilated Jews, nonetheless used as models for national identity. I continue by investigating the countries Herzl looked to as partners on the world stage and models of nationhood, arguing his vision of nationhood was far broader than that of most nationalists and involved a recognised role among other nations. The fourth chapter concerns understandings of 'homeland' and the relationship between people and territory, concluding Zionism's effect is achieved, not just by inhabiting Palestine, but by public desire and effort to do so. I devote my final chapter to concepts of modernity, its perception as both paradoxical and inescapable, and how national historical narratives arrange history into a rational, linear structure.

While Zionists left many presumptions of nationalism and modernity unchallenged, most importantly that both nation and state transcend political divides, my conclusion stresses those presumptions they accepted, those aspects they saw as inescapable, and those they pragmatically performed belief in, to achieve Gentile acceptance of Jewish nationhood. I surmise that it was this sense of inevitability, along with the difficulties of diaspora, which gave Jews reason to make displays of accepting the nation-state.

Long Abstract

As a national movement, the branch of Zionism led by Theodor Herzl presents some odd contradictions. The nation-state is a territorial entity, and, as a diaspora with no single territory, the geographical situation of the Jews was ill-suited to it. Furthermore, nationalism was frequently the driver behind growing antisemitism in Europe. Why, then did a group frequently victimised by nationalists, and whose situation required enormous upheavals to create a nation-state, embrace this ideology? This is particularly intriguing since, at every turn in its history from, inception to present day, Zionism has presented itself first and foremost as a reaction, even a weapon, against antisemitism. Yet while many arguments for Zionism stress Jewish self-defence, this was seldom referred to by turn-of-the-century Zionists. Indeed, many hoped to make self-defence unnecessary. In addition to these seeming contradictions, Zionism offers an example of a national movement which did not construct a national identity concurrently with its development or embrace of nationalism. Rather, it showed a group already widely conceived of as a nation, going to great lengths to *reconstruct* itself in the state-based, spatially bounded mould of other nations.

As both Hannah Arendt and Martin Buber observed, Zionism was a form of assimilation, not of individual Jews into a specific nation, but of Jewish identity into the generic structure of the nation. In this sense Zionism reveals a key moment in nationalism's establishment as a

political system. Even an identity far removed from the model of the nation-state in both self-understanding and basic geography now aspired to this form of collective existence. When understood as a national movement, and a reaction to the hostility of other national movements, Zionism reveals two fascinating moments in history which I believe it is vital to understand: Firstly, it is the tipping point where nationalism became the default, even universal relationship between identity and sovereignty. Secondly, it is a point at which a group oppressed by a political system begins, with great effort, to accept and advocate the principles of that system. For this reason Zionism offers a strong insight into the anxieties experienced on the edges of the nation-state, and the role of the pressures associated with marginalisation in the spread of dominant ideologies.

My thesis opens with an examination of Moses Hess and his call for a Jewish national renaissance in Palestine, to replace the old empires and religious hierarchies along with the newly unified Italian nation. Hess's ideas, complex, abstract and frequently contradictory, were a reaction to a different background and a different phase of nationalism to the 1880s and 1890s. Nevertheless, his concerns about Jewishness within nationalism and teleological views of history, are analogous to, even a microcosm of the Zionists who rediscovered him a generation later, even if their ideas were not especially shaped by or modelled on his. I particularly focus on how Hess understood historical change, which increasingly involved nations as historical actors and did not allow overlaps between them or contradictions and diversity within them. Drawing on Ken Koltun-Fromm's argument that Hess's work is best understood in terms of emotional, rather than intellectual or logical consistency, I argue that the dominant emotion underpinning his work is anxiety, and this sentiment is primarily provoked by heterogeneity, be it within wider society, collective identities or even his own thought, as well as the desire for a historical role which he considers dependent on nationhood. This chapter serves as an introductory case study to the other

chapters.

The second chapter begins my analysis of Herzlian Zionism by investigating perceptions of Jewish life without statehood or unified territory. It focuses largely on Herzl and his friend and contemporary Max Nordau, and their portrayals of diaspora Jews' condition and presumed qualities. It incorporates their non-fiction, the duelling tragedy that each wrote (Herzl's *Das neue Ghetto* and Nordau's *Doktor Kohn*), and Herzl's novel *Altneuland*, particularly the first part set in contemporary Vienna. It demonstrates that political Zionism was a reaction, not just to the failure of assimilation amid casual and structural antisemitism, but also to the paradox this situation engendered, namely, that the call to shed difference presupposes its recognition. In order to become a truly German Jew, it was necessary to cease to be a Jew entirely, while it simultaneously remained impossible to stop being perceived as one. Investigating Zionists' portrayals of assimilated, secular German Jews, and comparing them to those of other groups within the Jewish people, this chapter explores how they dealt with and understood the contradictions and double-bind of assimilation, and how they looked to Eastern European, Yiddish-speaking and/or religious Jews, both as contrasting or distasteful figures, and as models for authentic Jewishness. These contradictions, ambivalences and double-binds seem to have obstructed reconciliation of Jewish identity with the frameworks of nationalism, and were perceived as doing so by Zionists. I note in particular that Herzl, like Hess, was a fervent German patriot in his youth and experienced an explicitly antisemitic rejection of these efforts, and examine how each writer understood these analogous events. The chapter particularly draws on Herzl's polemic 'Mauschel', showing how it attempts to imply a positive Jewish national identity through imagining, and repudiating, a composite of supposed Jewish flaws.

Having examined how Zionists understood the problem of diaspora, I look at their sources for potential solutions. I investigate the various countries which Herzl in particular looked to,

both as real or imagined partners on the world stage and as potential models of nationhood. Herzl drew heavily on established nation-states for inspiration, particularly Britain and Germany and, to a lesser extent, France, and this chapter examines how he mixed and matched cultural and political institutions from these nations. I include his views of the constituent nations of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, and of the potential roles of the Jewish people if they became a vassal-state without full independence. Though it was only established nation-states which provided sources for his visions of statehood, Herzl was as accommodating to the model of nationhood within empires as he was to modern nation-states. I also examine the institutions Herzl expected a Jewish state to pioneer, and that he explicitly expected to be adopted by other nations, concluding that this process of influence was intended to be reciprocal, and this diversity of influence is itself an innovative, influential, and recognisably Jewish quality of the state. In observing these facts, and the compromises Herzl was willing to make in his dealings with Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the chapter argues that despite only borrowing from those nations already established as states, Herzl's understanding of nationhood and territorially grounded statehood was far broader than that of most nationalists.

However, Herzl's broad understanding of nationhood is casually inclusive of the Czechs and Armenians, whom he unequivocally treated as 'nations', even though they had nothing approaching states of their own. His understanding of nationhood instinctively includes nationalities within multinational empires, whether combined with statehood or not. Herzl even considers temporary membership of the Ottoman Empire as a constituent nation in place of full statehood. "A Jewish State" is therefore an incomplete summary of Zionism's core demand. The fourth chapter concerns Herzl's, Nordau's, and, to a lesser extent, Pinsker's understanding of how Jews would relate to the space on which they were to build their putative state. I develop arguments in Shlomo Sand's *The Invention of the Land of Israel*, that Zionists depended on

Christian Orientalist conceptions of the Holy Land, and challenge the understanding of Zionism as a belief in a Jewish state in Palestine. Since both Palestine and statehood were potentially optional to Herzl, I examine ways Zionism functioned, or imagined functioning, independently of both land and sovereignty. The chapter examines how Herzlian Zionism understood the concept of 'homeland' and envisioned its physical and ideological construction. I address Herzl's theoretical justifications for the advantages of Palestine over Argentina, and in doing so examine the interrelations between Orientalism and the utopian form he chose to use, noting that both serve as a fantastic space and a blank canvas, inversions of the author's existing society to enable comment on it. In particular, I examine the many effects on Jewish existence that Herzl and other Zionists hoped to achieve before statehood, or even independently of it. The chapter concludes that Herzlian Zionism, far from just a demand for a state in Palestine, anticipated a great many positive changes in Jewish identity and development towards the desired nationhood without Palestine, statehood, or even Jewish concentration in a single country. These changes involve Jews being transformed alongside, and even by, the development of their homeland. However, for Herzl, it seems any fantastical or exotic space to which national-historical myths or associations could be attached can serve as home, and the effects of having a homeland are achieved, not just by inhabiting it, , but by the public performance of desiring and struggling to acquire a space.

Finally, having analysed Zionist understandings of existence without full nationhood, in comparison to views of established nations and the function of homeland and territory, I raise another question. How can the transformation of the diasporic Jewish people into a territorially grounded nation, matching that of other nations, be understood as a modernisation project, especially given the importance of an 'ancient homeland' to the Zionist national myth? I therefore devote my final chapter to Herzl and Nordau's understanding of modernity. Both expressed strong, but very different opinions on the rapid and constant developments of the

modern world, and I explore the complications and implications of viewing Zionism as a modernisation project. Working from Marshall Berman's understanding of modernity as a process of constant upheaval, and Zygmunt Bauman's definition as systems of rational categorisation and organisation, I observe that, paradoxically, modern society attempts to create natural structures through human activity, and argue that almost all attitudes to modernity are by necessity ambivalent. Since modernity is ultimately irreversible, modernisation must harness desirable processes associated with the modern age against those perceived as negative. I explore Herzl's objections to the growing phenomena of high finance, inequality produced by capitalism, and antisemitism, all of which he understands as modern developments, and the modernising solutions he proposes: state monopolies, rational organisation, and of course nationhood. These I compare to Nordau's critiques of modern culture, which also hinge on rational, supposedly natural systems of categorisation. I compare Nordau's attempts to address negative associations of modernity with Jews, and Herzl's attempts to envisage positive ones. Most importantly, I examine the tensions between ancient and modern which Herzl deliberately creates when he envisions a "modern solution to the Jewish question" and imagines modern technology and organisation, in a space, Palestine, constructed as distinctly pre-modern. Zionism, I claim, is supremely modern in exactly the same way as any national historical narrative. It arranges historical events and future ambitions into a rational, linear structure, in order to fit a scientific, rationally organised and supposedly natural system of categorisation.

Herzl acknowledged unequivocally that both state and nation are constructions, products of patriotic movements, not inspirations. His vision of modernising Jewish identity to fit the nation-state involved constructing an identity in exactly the same way. Like Nordau and many others, when he envisaged the development of Judaism into a national identity, he did not consider statehood necessary to begin this process. Zionism had far less to do with inhabitation

of a specific territory than with perception as a nation by other nations, and invited this perception by performing the behaviour of a national movement. At the time of its inception, Austro-German political Zionism was less a resurrection of Jewish nationality than Jews recognising what a world of nation-states and national movements expected of them, and making efforts to fulfil those expectations.

Zionism presents a complex mixture of performance, pragmatism and wholehearted enthusiasm. The Zionist embrace of nationalism is frequently tentative, conditional and aimed at self-preservation. I conclude by condensing my analysis into three questions: What conditions created by nationalism did Zionists believe to be inevitable or inescapable? What presumptions of nationalism did they believe wholeheartedly? And what, in their pragmatic efforts to guarantee Jewish safety, did they want to be seen to accept?

Zionism often sees antisemitism as either an immutable historical fact, or a disease only curable by changing the Jews. It is presumed to be a force of nature, not a phenomenon with systemic causes which can be addressed and fought. While Western Zionists often accept unpleasant stereotypes about assimilated, German-speaking Jews and their Yiddish-speaking brethren to the east, they reimagine some, particularly eastern Jewish stereotypes as positive qualities, and to see both groups as ultimately redeemable. However, they seem consistently aware that the double-bind obstructing assimilation is inescapable. Modernity, too, is irreversible. Whether those living through its upheavals like or dislike the modern world, the only solution to the problems of modernity is more modernity, and similarly, nationhood is seen as the solution to the problems caused by nationalism.

Zionists seldom interrogated either the truth of the stereotypes of diaspora Jews, or the association between nation and modernity. It is presumed to be the normal way people arrange

themselves and most either do or should exist that way. Nationalism is seen as rationalizing a society in line with natural human bonds. Whether Zionists accept nationhood uncritically, or simply as the most natural or modern kind of identity, basic precepts of being a nation-state are usually left unexamined.

Religion and biblical imagery tend to be more decorative than fundamental in Herzlian Zionism. The pragmatic need for a nation-state includes a pragmatic need for a national myth, and for nationalistic sentiments. Zionists dreamt of living in Palestine because these dreams were necessary to be seen as a nation. Elaborate ceremonies, international institutions and public demand for a state in Palestine partly achieve nationhood before statehood, simply by behaving like any other nationalists. This performance was heavily intended for Gentile consumption, and understandably, since it is not Jewish self-perception but the Gentile imagination which causes antisemitism. The more far-fetched the public demands of Zionism, the better, since the demands themselves, not their realisation, served Zionist aims. The current State of Israel was long preceded by an imaginary Jewish State. Since imagination is the fabric of nationhood, this performance for an antisemitic world did achieve many of Herzl's aims.

However, where Zionism makes a public performance of the political principles of nationalism, even where the rise of this political ideology is seen as inevitable, and even where nations are accepted as political constructions, the presumption that nationhood, once established, is *outside* politics is left unchallenged. Nationalists may accept nationhood as socially constructed and as a political goal, but perform it as natural and apolitical. While the state sets itself up as the most effective and only legitimate vector for policy, its counterpart, the nation, is set outside political debate. The nation is presumed to have no political content of its own. A world of nation-states is seen as inevitable. There are, as the history of the Jews attests, very real social consequences for failing to perform nationhood satisfactorily. It is this

combination of seeming inescapability and sharp incentives that cemented the rise of nationalism and guaranteed its present near-ubiquity.

Abbreviations

AS: Moses Hess, *Ausgewählte Schriften*

BT: Theodor Herzl, *Briefe und Tagebücher*

GZW: Theodor Herzl, *Gesammelte zionistische Werke*

DK: Max Nordau, *Doktor Kohn*

E: Max Nordau, *Entartung*

ZS: Max Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften*

AE: Leo Pinsker, *Autoemanzipation!*

Volume number, where applicable, follows in Roman numerals.

Introduction: People and Land

Zionism, “the last, least typical of European nationalisms”, as Hugh Trevor-Roper called it,¹ presents some odd contradictions. The nation-state is a territorial entity, and, as a diaspora with no single territory, the geographical situation of the Jews was ill-suited to it. Furthermore, nationalism was frequently the driver behind growing antisemitism in Europe. Why then, did a group frequently victimised by nationalists, and whose situation required enormous upheavals to create a nation-state, embrace this ideology? This is particularly intriguing since, at every turn in its history, from inception to present day, Zionism has presented itself first and foremost as a reaction, even a weapon, against antisemitism. Yet, while many arguments for Zionism stress Jewish self-defence, this was referred to by turn-of-the-century Zionists relatively rarely. Indeed, many hoped to make self-defence unnecessary. In addition to these seeming contradictions, it offers an example of a national movement which did not construct a national identity concurrently with its development or embrace of nationalism. Rather, Zionism showed a group already widely conceived of as a nation, going to great lengths to *reconstruct* itself in the state-based, spatially bounded mould of other nations.

The slogan, “a land without a people for a people without a land”, put forward as an idea by Lord Shaftesbury and first used among Zionists by Israel Zangwill,² shows the centrality of the

1 Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘Jewish and Other Nationalisms’, *Commentary* 35, no. 1 (1963), 15-21.

2 Diana Muir. “A Land without a People for a People without a Land”. *Middle East Quarterly* 15, no.2 , (2008): 55-62, pp55-6

nationalist framework to the Zionist project. There were, of course, *people* living in Palestine, a fact which Zionists were well aware of at the time.³ Similarly, many Jews did own *land*, indeed some, for example among Zionism's philanthropic backers, owned property in Palestine. However, as Diana Muir stresses

Nineteenth-century Westerners associated peoples or nations with territory, and so to be a land without a people did not imply that the land was without people, only that it was without a national political character.⁴

'People', Muir observes, were and are not synonymous with 'a people'. In the same way, the real estate both inside and outside of Palestine was still *land*, but the relationship between it and the individual Jews who owned it lacked the political and national character of *a* land. Muir notes that the slogan was only in use among Zionists for around four years,⁵ however the fact that it was used, that it was ever even comprehensible to people who knew Arabs lived in Palestine and Edmund de Rothschild owned land there, show the distinction between 'people' and 'a people', 'land' and 'a land' was quite comfortably recognised, even if use of the slogan soon petered out among Jews. 'People', and 'land', as singular count nouns, are units within this framework, roughly equivalent to 'nation' and 'homeland'. Hannah Arendt observes that "the Zionists, in a sense, were the only ones who sincerely wanted assimilation, that is, "normalization" of the people ("to be a people like all other peoples)".⁶ Martin Buber warns against a form of Zionism which, with the admission of defeat that "Die Zeit der Humanität ist vorüber! Man kann nicht gegen den Strom schwimmen!" abandons the uniqueness and messianic mission of the Jews and resolves "dem großen Wolfsrudel nachzutun", concluding that "Von allen Arten der Assimilation, die wir im Laufe unserer Geschichte geübt haben ist diese, die nationale Assimilation, die

3 Muir, 'A Land without a People for a People without a Land', p61

4 Ibid., p58

5 Ibid., pp55; 61

6 Hannah Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, eds. Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman (New York: Schocken, 2007), p357

schlimmste und gefährlichste.”⁷ This Zionist form of assimilation is not of a person into a nation, but of a people into nationalism, a nation into a system of nations.

In this sense Zionism reveals a key moment in nationalism’s establishment as a political system. Leah Greenfeld describes the gradual process by which the principle of nationalism spread:

As the sphere of influence of the core Western societies (which defined themselves as nations) expanded, societies belonging or seeking entry to the supra-societal system of which the West was the center had in fact no choice to become nations.⁸

With Zionism, we see an identity far removed from the model of the nation-state in both self-understanding and basic geography beginning to aspire to this form of collective existence. As Alain Dieckhoff notes:

[O]ther people’s nationalism, often accompanied by anti-Semitism, forced the Jews to stop thinking of themselves as a historico-cultural group serving as a ferryman crossing between peoples, and to agree to become a political and territorial nation.⁹

When understood as a national movement, and a reaction to the hostility of other national movements, Zionism reveals two fascinating moments in history which I believe it is vital to understand. Firstly, it is the tipping point where nationalism became the default relationship between polity and identity, the “universal form of sovereignty.”¹⁰ Many histories of Zionism, observe that, as Anita Shapira puts it, “A people with no country of its own, not to mention a state, could not adopt a national idea based on citizenship,”¹¹ but rarely focus on why these pieces – people, country, state, nation and citizenship – must necessarily fit together. The classic Zionist

7 Martin Buber, *An der Wende; Reden über das Judentum* (Cologne: J. Hegner, 1952), pp23-4

8 Greenfeld, Leah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1992), p14

9 Alain Dieckhoff. *The Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel* (London: Hurst, 2003), p1

10 Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995), p22

11 Shapira, ‘Herzl, Ahad Ha-Am, and Berdichevsky: Comments on Their Nationalist Concepts’. *Jewish History* 4, no. 2 (1990): 59-69, p60.

narrative of a people deprived of a country rarely asks why deprivation of a country must result in deprivation of rights. Secondly, it is a key moment in a group's reaction to its own oppression: the choice to adopt an ideology or political structure implicated in a system of oppression, with the precise aim of escaping that oppression. The othering of the Jew not only reaffirms the antisemite's national identity, it polices the borders of nationalism. The insecurity an ideology or structure generates around its margins creates pressure on people on or outside its edges to move inwards and accept its principles, not just by making their lives difficult, but also by making their self-perceptions uncomfortable. By revealing the anxieties around the margins of nationalism, Zionism shows an ideology successfully enforcing itself.

In a discussion of 'false consciousness', James C. Scott, though highly sceptical of the term, points to a distinction between "thick" and "thin" understandings of false consciousness: the first where oppressed peoples wholeheartedly accept an oppressive system and the ideas which justify it, the second where "the dominant ideology achieves compliance by convincing subordinate groups that the social order in which they live is natural and inevitable".¹² However Scott offers his own, "paper-thin" model of hegemony, where "The expectation that one will eventually be able to exercise the domination is a strong incentive serving to legitimate patterns of domination."¹³ More attractive than the chance to exercise domination, I would argue, is the chance to avoid subjection to it. Greenfeld observes that

The adoption of national identity must have been, in one way or another, in the interest of the groups who imported it. Specifically, it must have been preceded by the dissatisfaction of these groups with the identity they had previously.¹⁴

Scott's model may go a long way to explain how nationalism was in the interest of the Jews, and

12 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1990), pp72-4

13 *Ibid.*, p82

14 Greenfeld, *Five Roads to Modernity*, p14

what their dissatisfaction was with their previous identity. Rather than hegemony, Scott posits a “hidden transcript” of resistant discourse, occurring away from the eyes of dominant groups. To hide this transcript, the downtrodden, “lay it on thick” by putting on a *display* of making peace with an ideology in order to make their lives easier,¹⁵ a case not so much of “false consciousness” as of “fake consciousness”. Resistance, even if it is not futile, can come at a cost.

A century-and-a-half has passed since the first text proposing secular Jewish nationalism. Between the formation of the Zionist movement and the foundation of the State of Israel, not only did fifty years pass, but huge political and social upheavals in Europe, Palestine and Jewish life took place. From the Second World War and the Holocaust to the decline of the Kibbutz, Zionism’s ideological beginnings have been so eclipsed by larger, more recent, more material events, that any attempt to understand contemporary Israel simply by reading its early theorists is doomed to failure. While Hess’s socialist internationalism and Herzl’s enlightenment cosmopolitanism may be interesting models for progressive, liberal Zionist or post-Zionist redefinitions of Israeli identity, they remain theoretical texts on a location these men had visited once, if at all. The thinkers examined here – in Hess and Herzl’s cases, confirmed pacifists – barely made plans for an army, let alone the aftermath of conflicts and injustices. It is not my intention to unearth or refine the abstract principles of nineteenth-century Europeans and apply them to the experiences of people in the Middle East today, or to try to shape identities I do not have a personal stake in. My work here is intended as a study of a mostly imaginative project in Europe a century ago. Its usefulness for analysing the very real, very current situation of the Israel-Palestine conflict is at best limited, and any increased understanding of Zionism as a current phenomenon will be to the reader’s credit, not mine.

However, by examining the Austro-German, “Political” branch of Zionism in the years

15 *ibid.*, p82

before the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the point when Zionism “became a fact of international politics”,¹⁶ I have deliberately chosen to focus on the most theoretical period in the history of Zionism, when it seemed most dauntingly unachievable even to its most passionate proponents. Zionism was, after all, a development in European politics, reacting to European nationalism and European treatment of minorities, and it was never more European in character than when the majority of these proponents had little or no experience of Palestine. With facts on the ground in its destination largely irrelevant, this pipe-dream phase offers, I believe, the purest insight into Zionism as the adoption of an *idea*. Furthermore, its development was shaped not by the real or predicted challenges of settlement in Palestine, but current conditions in diaspora. It therefore demonstrates the closest association between nationalism’s treatment of ethno-religious minorities, and Jewish embrace of nationalism as an ideology. In short, it is in its early stages that the relationship between oppression within a political system and adoption of its stated principles by its victims can be seen most clearly.

Overview of Zionist History

While Israel’s national hero and the most famous founder of Zionism is the Austrian journalist, *Feuilletonist* and playwright Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), he was by no means the originator of the idea. Religious groups had travelled to Palestine with the intent of settlement several times before, such as those led by the false Messiah Shabbatai Zevi in the 1660s, Judah he-Hasid in 1700, Menachem Mendel in 1777, and the traditionalist Lithuanian *Perushim* in 1808 and 1809. Zvi Hirsch Kalischer’s *Derishat Zion* (“Need for Zion”, 1862) provided a comprehensive vision of settlement of Palestine, providing a home for persecuted Jews seeking refuge. Yehoshua Stampfer, inspired by Hungarian success in the Compromise of 1867, travelled to Palestine on foot, ultimately helping found the first settlement, Petah Tikva. None of these, however,

16 Dieckhoff, *The Invention of a Nation*, pp7.

envisaged statehood. Simultaneously, many Christian writers called for the return of the Jews to their supposed homeland: Napoleon, in a letter to the 'Rightful Heirs of Palestine!' in 1799,¹⁷ Shaftesbury in 1839, and the French civil servant Ernest Laharanne in 1860, among several others. When Herzl met the British consul in Vienna, the Anglican clergyman William Hechler, in 1896, he found Hechler already had extensive plans for the restoration of Jews to Palestine, with the location of the rebuilt temple marked on one of his many maps.¹⁸

However, the first Jew to have the idea of Jewish statehood in Palestine as a secular project was Moses Hess, a pioneering libertarian communist and contemporary of Karl Marx. Inspired by Italian unification the year before, and citing Laharanne at length, he published *Rom und Jerusalem* in 1862. Two decades later in 1882, and in response to pogroms in the Russian Empire, Leo (also 'Leon' or 'Lev') Pinsker (1821-1891) published the pamphlet *Autoemanzipation!*. This inspired the title of *Selbst-Emanzipation*, a magazine published in Vienna by Nathan Birnbaum, which, in its first issue on 1st April 1890, coined 'zionistisch'.¹⁹ Birnbaum, who later left the Zionist movement disillusioned with its treatment of Eastern European Jews, also helped spearhead a Yiddish cultural revival across Europe. Along with the Russian thinker Ahad Ha'am's 'Cultural Zionism', a modern Jewish culture opposed to both the old-fashioned religious orthodoxy and the dangers of Jewish assimilation was envisaged, comparable to cultural projects by other national movements. Since around 1870, and gaining momentum after the pogroms in 1881-4, a Russian group known as *Hibbat Zion*, or *Hovevei Zion* ("Love/Lovers of Zion") had been organising emigration to Palestine, including Rishon LeZion in 1882, the second modern Jewish settlement in the region, financed by Edmond de Rothschild. And in 1891, Baron Maurice de Hirsch founded

17 Isaiah Friedman, ed., *The Rise of Israel. Herzl's Political Activity, 1897-1904* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), p2

18 Theodor Herzl, *Briefe und Tagebücher*, ed. Alex Bein, 7 volumes (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen, 1996), vol. II, p311

19 Alex Bein, 'The Origin of the Term and Concept Zionism', *Herzl Year Book: Essays in Zionist History and Thought* 2 (1959), 1-27, p7

the Jewish Colonisation Association, funding Jewish emigration to Argentina.

By the time Herzl published his own pamphlet, *Der Judenstaat*, in 1896, the idea already had a great deal of currency and several colonisation projects were already underway. The pamphlet outlines Herzl's assessment of the Jewish question as a national one, attributing antisemitism to the Jews lacking their own country. Herzl then describes two organisations, the 'Jewish Company' and 'the Society of Jews', both named in English, and outlines in surprising detail the policies and social structures of the state they will build.²⁰ Notably, Pinsker seems not to have read Hess, and Herzl only read either after writing *Der Judenstaat*. These three origins seem to be independent. However, it was Herzl who, along with the journalist and doctor Max Nordau (1849-1923), convened the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, after which he declared "In Basel habe ich den Judenstaat gegründet" (*BT. II*, 538). Certainly Herzl helped create both the organisations and the momentum which led to the movement's success. Not only that, but unlike "Practical Zionism", which prioritised settlement, Herzl's "Political Zionism" sought legitimate statehood even if it meant blocking emigration, an approach which led him into negotiations with a large number of German, Turkish, British, Austrian, Russian and Italian dignitaries, including Kaiser Wilhelm II, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, Pope Pius X and Victor Emmanuel III. This won him several successes: tentative, though impossibly conditional and rapidly revised offers of a 'vassal state' in the Ottoman Empire; German support, without which "the Jewish community in Palestine would not have survived" the First World War;²¹ and numerous offers from the UK. British support culminated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and included short-lived plans for the Sinai Peninsula in 1902, and the Uasin Gishu plateau in what is now Kenya in 1903. (Mis)named the 'Uganda Proposal', the latter caused great divisions within the movement, prompted an assassination attempt on Nordau for even entertaining the idea (his assailant

20 Theodor Herzl, *Gesammelte zionistische Werke*, 5 volumes (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1934), vol. I, pp19-105

21 Isaiah Friedman, *Germany, Turkey, Zionism, 1897-1918* (New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction Publishers, 1997), p.ix

shouting “Death to the African Nordau!”), and inspired the Territorialists, an offshoot of Zionism seeking statehood anywhere, rather than simply Palestine.

Overview of Zionist Ideology

‘Zionism’ is a difficult term to define. While it is frequently presumed to be a religious or messianic movement, its early justifications were entirely secular, its leaders largely irreligious, and its fiercest opponents mostly composed of religious Jews. As well as Jews there are Christian Zionists. Furthermore, while overt racism can often be found in Zionist thought and Israeli society, to characterise Zionism as a racial movement, with an identity defined by inherited biological traits, is also difficult. Indeed, Herzl actively disputed with Israel Zangwill that the Jews were a race, writing in his diaries:

Israel Zangwill hat einen langnasigen Negertypus, sehr wollige tiefschwarze in der Mitte gescheitelte Haare und im glattrasirte Gesicht den Ausdruck von hartem Hochmuth eines nach schweren Kämpfen durchgedrungenen ehrlichen Strebers. [...] Er ist auch für unsere territoriale Selbstständigkeit. Er steht aber auf dem Racenstandpunkt, den ich schon nicht acceptieren kann, wenn ich ihn und mich ansehe. Ich meine nur: wir sind eine historische Einheit, eine Nation mit anthropologischen Verschiedenheiten. Das genügt auch für den Judenstaat. Keine Nation hat die Einheit der Race.
(BT.II:281)

Not only does Herzl reject race as a defining characteristic of the Jews, he also rejects it as a defining characteristic of *any* nation.

As it was originally a movement for the foundation of a Jewish state, the word ‘Zionist’ was arguably destined to vanish into obsolescence with Israel’s Declaration of Independence in 1948. It did not. Used as a political insult, ‘Zionist’ can recall the most vicious and convoluted antisemitic conspiracy theories, serve as a synonym for neoliberal and neocolonialist, or simply be an epithet for ‘Jew’. Used by its proponents and sympathisers, it is frequently defined in one of

two ways. If you believe in either a “Jewish State in Palestine”, or in “Jewish self-determination”, you are a Zionist.

Both definitions present their own set of problems. Herzl envisioned an extremely cosmopolitan society, peopled by and tolerating not just Jews but people of all nations and creeds.²² He was quite willing to compromise on full statehood, indeed the utopian society in his novel *Altneuland* is explicitly shown not to have a state, and like a few other Zionists, he considered several other locations. By that definition then, Theodor Herzl was not a Zionist. ‘Self-determination’ runs into the same contradiction as any national movement: the collective self. A single, unified will is rare enough among individual human beings, and the ‘self’ invoked by ‘national self-determination’ is to be mostly composed of other people. How the composition of this collective is determined, and what this ‘self’ determines in turn, are both infinitely variable and expressly political. I will therefore understand Zionism as *the Jewish-led movement to transform the Jewish diaspora into a territorially bounded nation*.

Overview of Nationalism

Nationalism, too, is complicated to define. It can be, and has been, used for assertion of the right to a nation-state, both in the ‘Spring of Nations’ in the mid-nineteenth century, and the anticolonial movements that followed the Second World War. Furthermore, as Michael Billig observes, “nations, national identities and national homelands appear as ‘natural’. Most crucially, the ‘world of nations is represented as a ‘natural’, moral order.”²³ Nationalism is often associated

22 Herzl’s cosmopolitan outlook seems to match the third principle of *ius cosmopolitanum*, or *Weltbürgerrecht* that Kant outlines in *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf*. Kant stresses “das Recht eines Fremdlings, seiner Ankunft auf dem Boden eines andern wegen, von diesem nicht feindselig behandelt zu werden”, with the goal that “Menschen und Staaten, in äußerem auf einander einfließendem Verhältnis stehend, [sind] als Bürger eines allgemeinen Menschenstaats anzusehen”. Herzl proposes a Jewish state with a diverse and tolerant population and an outward-looking, internationalist desire to contribute to the world. (Immanuel Kant, *Werke*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, 12 volumes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), vol. XI, pp646; 697) Herzl’s statement, “Machet Euren Staat so, dass sich der Fremde bei Euch wohl fühle” (*BT*.III:43) certainly seems to support this.

23 Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p30

with conflict, presumed to challenge the peaceful balance of everyday life: the jingoistic passions in the run-up to the First World War, the violent particularism of the extreme right, or new lines drawn on the world map by separatist and anticolonial movements. This reading “always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery” and “overlooks the nationalism of the West's nation-states”.²⁴ Rather, as Billig's title suggests, nationalism is also reproduced *as* the peaceful balance of everyday life. “The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building.”²⁵

In addition, ‘nationalism’ has a broad set of connotations. To many opponents, it is the negative equivalent to ‘patriotism’, the one an acceptable expression of attachment to your country, the other excessive, exclusionary and aggressive. It is rare to see prejudice or militarism attributed to fanatical patriotism, and far more common to see it blamed on fanatical nationalism. Conversely, ‘nationalism’ and its variants are increasingly used by the far right for their own ideological positions, the British National Party and Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands being two notable examples. I will therefore avoid senses of ‘nationalism’ that, either approvingly or disapprovingly, connote irrational passions to ‘the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations’,²⁶ and understand it as the principle that the people and peoples of the world should be arranged into nation-states, and, where a state does not yet exist, members of a nation have the right or duty to demand one.

It is also worth noting that nationalism is not necessarily a right-wing phenomenon, nor is it an atavistic tribal instinct. Giuseppe Mazzini, the Italian nationalist, following a critique of capitalism largely reminiscent of Marx's, wrote:

If the right to well-being, to the greatest possible well-being, belongs to every living person, who will

24 Ibid., p10

25 Ibid., p8

26 OED, ‘nationalism’, 1a.

solve the difficulty between the working-man and the manufacturer? If the right to existence is the first and inviolable right of every man, who shall demand the sacrifice of that existence for the benefit of other men? Will you demand it in the name of Country, of Society, of the multitude of your brothers?²⁷

Nationalism, here, is not an attempt to assert dominance over outsiders, but to reconcile internal conflicts. Although his aim of avoiding “the worst of all social crimes, a civil war between class and class”²⁸ serves to unite the interests of exploiter with exploited rather than resolving them and ending exploitation, Mazzini’s nationalism remains one of reconciliation. This model of nationalism reflects the classical liberal practice of using the state to redistribute wealth and mitigate social injustices, and does so by constructing an identitarian, rather than economic category.

‘Nation-state’, too, presents a difficult set of variations. ‘State’ is a relatively modern concept – and as we will see, both the state and nationalism have frequently been explicitly understood as part of the modernisation process. It is most usefully defined in Max Weber’s coinage, “innerhalb eines bestimmten Gebietes [...] das Monopol legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit”.²⁹ The state comprises organisations and institutions that, alongside other functions, claim the right to deploy or delegate physical violence within the designated limits of a geographical area. Allowing for slightly differing use of terminology in federations such as the United States (where we might substitute ‘Federal Government’), the state’s monopoly extends upwards as well as downwards: higher authorities, such as the European Union, United Nations or OPEC, can only rarely, and usually very contentiously, supersede the authority of a state, and seldom have any power of their own to exercise force. In its relationship to the nation, however, I will understand the state, not by its internal sociological function, but as the territorial limits of

27 Omar Dahbour and Micheline Ishay, eds., *The Nationalism Reader* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Books, 1995), p89

28 *Ibid.*, p91

29 Max Weber, *Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1988), p506

its jurisdiction, i.e. as a set of political borders distinguishing it from other states. It is largely for this reason that 'space' will form part of my enquiry. Meanwhile "What is a nation?" is a contentious political question which has puzzled thinkers at least as far back as Ernest Renan.³⁰ Though it generally implies common language, shared cultural traits, or ethnic identification, the precise nature of this mixture is highly variable. Ernest Gellner observes that part of the creation of a national identity is the construction of a "high culture", including, and based around, a standardised national language, though of course, this frequently adopts popular culture and regional dialects.³¹

Furthermore, although 'ethnicities', 'cultures' and 'languages' are frequently referred to as count nouns, they do not naturally occur as single units. Rather, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences are 'subtly grouped, shading into each other, overlapping, intertwined',³² with cultures and ethnicities, like languages and dialects, existing on a continuum. Indeed, "The concept of 'a language' – at least in the sense which appears so banally obvious to 'us' – may itself be an invented permanency, developed during the age of the nation-state."³³ The boundaries that contain a single language, culture or ethnicity must be constructed, and this is frequently done in reference to the borders and institutions of an existing or putative nation-state. Furthermore, state institutions have the ability to standardise language, education and cultural policy. There are 'national' broadcast and print media, though not always unaffiliated with government. And, quite simply, a group of people governed under one set of policies will inevitably share experiences, concerns and understandings of political institutions, even if they have far more differences than traits in common. The very fact of sharing a single polity has an enormous influence on shaping, as well as defining and setting boundaries for the language, culture and

30 Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?: Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882).

31 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, ed. John Breuilly (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), pp72-3

32 Ibid., p47

33 Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p30

ethnic identity that are associated with that polity by the basic principle of nationalism. I will work mostly from Ernest Gellner's definition of nationalism, as '*the striving to make culture and polity congruent*', in other words the principle that cultural and political boundaries should be identical, but with the essential caveat that the cultural boundaries and the high culture that they define are constructed specifically for the purpose of defining a state.³⁴

My argument will avoid relying, as many readings of Herzlian Zionism do, on differentiating ethnic, cultural, or linguistic nationalisms from civic nationalisms, which are "based on an instrumentalist rationale, according to which national cultural unity is no more than a means for the realization of important political goals"³⁵ When Anita Shapira sympathetically concedes that Ahad Ha-'Am and the Russian Zionist Micah Joseph Berdichevsky never "followed irrational nationalism to its natural conclusion", she nonetheless concedes that their romantic, cultural nationalisms were irrational. This she contrasts starkly to Herzl, whose nationalism was "simply a logical solution to a problem."³⁶ Nationalism is neatly delineated into a rational, desirable, liberal version and a more passionate, aggressive, even atavistic cousin.

In laying the ground for his liberal defence of the principles and critique of the practices of Zionism, Chaim Gans, too, presents a double-layered framework for this long-established distinction. His definition is both chronological and functional:

A defining characteristic of ethnocultural nationalism is that the nation chronologically precedes the state that is subsequently established by that particular nation. In contrast, a defining characteristic of civic nationalism is that the state chronologically precedes the nation, which is then forged as a result of people's affiliation with this state.

Simultaneously, the "nationalisms of groups that existed before the states subsequently established by them as means for advancing their ethnocultural interests" are firmly

34 Ibid., p42

35 Chaim Gans, *A Just Zionism: On the Morality of the Jewish State*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p19.

36 Anita Shapira. 'Herzl, Ahad Ha-'Am, and Berdichevsky: Comments on tTheir Nationalist Concepts'. *Jewish History* 4, no. 2 (1990): 59-69, pp68; 60.

differentiated from the states that “created their nations as means for implementing values such as democracy, equality, social solidarity, and cohesion among their respective citizenries.”³⁷ However, Gans’s distinction focuses almost entirely on the forging, not the deployment of these nations. It does not acknowledge that the nations preceding states are frequently constructed, resurrected or patched together from folk cultures with the end of statehood in sight, and that even the United States traces the national history of its people back far beyond statehood. Indeed, while Gans insists Zionism is an ethnocultural nationalism, he also identifies urges towards civic nationalism in both Herzl’s and Pinsker’s writing.³⁸ And how are we to define a nationalism whose declared aim is not just escaping the suppression of an ethnocultural identity, but also ensuring that civic goals like democracy, equality and social solidarity are available in practice to its members?

‘Civic’ and ‘identitarian’³⁹ are not types or flavours of nation-state, but justifications and behaviours. Civic nationalism is the argument for why a nation-state and/or unity is useful or desirable, identitarian nationalism for what an ethnic or linguistic identity group needs and merits. The rhetoric of civic nationalism may promise rights to and demand unity of all citizens while that of identitarian nationalism calls the rights and loyalty of certain groups into question. All nationalisms necessarily rely and act on both justifications to a certain extent, and both justifications enforce and depend on the general principle of the nation-state.

‘Nation’ will here be understood as the community of solidarity and collective identification presumed or intended to fit an existing or proposed state. The physical limit on the extent of this state’s jurisdiction, defined, if not by physical barriers or distance, then by the agreed boundaries implied by Weber, comprises the ‘space’ of the title, and will be investigated in

37 Gans, *A Just Zionism*, pp10-11

38 *Ibid.*, p11

39 Be this national identity ‘ethnic’, ‘cultural’, ‘ethnocultural’, ‘linguistic’ or any other variant.

my fourth chapter.⁴⁰ My fifth chapter will investigate ‘modernity’, and the extreme difficulties Zionists and their contemporaries had in defining and understanding it. For this reason it is difficult to define the concept, but I will tentatively define it here as the advances, usually experienced as a series of upheavals and transformations, carried out with the intention of increasing mastery over both nature and human social relations. Details of the role of nationhood in the modernisation process, and the role of a set geographical space in building this nationhood will go some way to explain the concept of nationhood Zionism relied on.

Nationalism and the Jews

Isaiah Berlin writes, of the background to Herzl’s turn to Zionism:

Despite passionate denials of this proposition from many sides, it became increasingly clear to almost everyone who approached the problem from the outside that the Jews were a unique combination of religion, race, and people; that they could not be classified in normal terms, but demanded an extraordinary description, and their problem an extraordinary solution.⁴¹

Zygmunt Bauman elaborates on how this ambivalence engendered antisemitism:

Inside every nation, they were the ‘enemy inside’. The boundaries of the nation were too narrow to define them, the horizons of national tradition were too short to see through their identity. *The Jews were not just unlike any other nation; they were also unlike any other foreigners.*⁴²

Precisely *why* the Jews could not be classified in normal terms is not addressed, however. Our modern conceptions of ‘race’, ‘people’, ‘Volk’, ‘nation’, and even ‘religion’, in the sense of something distinct from other forms of identification, were all developed during or after the Enlightenment, which Jews, of course, pre-date by millennia. The impossibility of fitting Jews into these categories shows, not the uniqueness of Judaism, but the fashion in which these

40 Indeed, even where boundaries are disputed, to dispute a boundary is normally to dispute the extent and location of a space, not its existence. Note this working definition will specifically exclude “spaces” without spatial presence, such as wholly textual “discursive spaces” – websites, hashtags and letters’ pages.

41 Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Origins of Israel’, in *The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History*, ed. Walter Laqueur (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), 204-221, p205

42 Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p52

systems of identification were developed around the Jews, with little heed to their own perceptions of their identity and the reality of their existence. It is not so much that Jews are incompatible with these categories, but rather that these categories are incompatible with Jews. However, at the same time, the Israelites were a well-respected example of a people that resembled a nation-state, and as such one of the main earlier models available to nationalism to draw on. The philosopher and early theorist of German nationhood Johann Gottfried von Herder wrote that the flight out of Egypt transformed the Jews ‘aus einer Nomadenhorde zu einer kultivierten Nation.’⁴³ Victorian ‘British-Israelites’ “theorised that many or all English people were descended from the ancient Hebrews, though they felt no affinity for modern Jews”, even claiming the Hebrew etymology *brit ish*, ‘covenant of mankind’.⁴⁴ Just as Jews in the Middle Ages were spared attempts at total eradication as witnesses to the events of Christian Scripture,⁴⁵ Jewish identity could never be fully dissolved through assimilation, so long as the Israelites lent both theoretical models and legitimacy through association to assertions of nationhood.

As has often been the case with Gentile conceptions of the Jews, philosemitic aspects of the nation-state tend to romanticise Biblical Israel, while the antisemitic parts target, or at best ignore, contemporaneous, flesh-and-blood Jews. By way of example, Herder is “profoundly positive about the ancient culture of the Hebrews, but largely negative about what Jews have become in the diaspora.”⁴⁶ Rather than simply serving as an internal Other to identity groups, a well-known image of the Jew, albeit one which was romanticised, largely Biblical, and centuries out of date, also formed a positive model for nationhood. Thus, while the concept of Jews was necessary for the construction of the nation, the facts of their lives and culture at the time was

43 Johann Gottfried Herder, *Werke*, eds. Günter Arnold and others, 10 volumes (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985-2000), vol. VI, p485

44 John M. Efron, *Defenders of the Race: Jewish Doctors and Race Science in Fin-de-Siècle Europe* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1994), p39

45 Ritchie Robertson, *The “Jewish Question” in German Literature, 1749-1939: Emancipation and its Discontents* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p152

46 Sonia Sikka, *Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p244

ignored or disdained. The concept of the Jews was indispensable, Jews themselves inadmissible. It is for this reason, I would argue, that diasporic Jews can neither be fully reconciled with, nor fully integrated into, the ideal model of the nation-state. Not only did the Jews become “the foil for the evolution of [...] nationalism”,⁴⁷ they also became part of its blueprint. However much ire and frustration their existence provoked, the identity of the Jews could be neither be dissolved nor replaced with another foil without shaking the very foundations of nationalism.

Furthermore, where Jews come into any kind of wealth, or economic power, their irreconcilability with the nation becomes especially dangerous. Mazzini’s model of redistribution allows for economic justice within states, and even between them, but not *across* their borders. Where capital fails to respect national borders, as it inevitably does, it is only foreign capital which offends this model. Therefore, if German capitalists turn a profit from wars or exploitation, it can be understood as an enrichment of the German nation, whereas the profits of German-Jewish capitalists come at the expense of the nation. The stereotype of Jewish capital is sustained, as Bauman argues, “entirely by the self-definitional and self-assertive interests of its [antisemitic] carriers.”⁴⁸ Rather than the ‘Sozialismus des blöden Mannes’,⁴⁹ economic antisemitism is the socialism of those who believe a single, unified national interest and the containment of capital to ever be achievable. In this sense even liberal, redistributive nationalism is prone to the same faults. Zionism, in reaction to these phenomena, attempts to reconcile Jews with nations either by centring the diaspora in a state, or utterly dissolving it through emigration.

Structure

My thesis opens with an examination of Moses Hess and his call for a Jewish national renaissance

47 George Mosse. *Germans and Jews*. (London: Orbach & Chambers, 1971), p20

48 Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, p41

49 A phrase attributed variously to the Social Democrats Viktor Adler and Engelbert Pernerstorfer, and the left-liberal Ferdinand Kronawetter, see Andrew Gladding Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p89

in Palestine, to replace the old empires and religious hierarchies along with the newly unified Italian nation. Hess's ideas, complex, abstract and frequently contradictory, were a reaction to a different background and a different phase of nationalism to the 1880s and 1890s. Nevertheless, his concerns about Jewishness within nationalism and teleological views of history, are analogous to, even a microcosm of the Zionists who rediscovered him a generation later, even if their ideas were not especially shaped by or modelled on his. I particularly focus on how Hess understood historical change, which increasingly involved nations as historical actors and did not allow overlaps between them or contradictions and diversity within them. Drawing on Ken Koltun-Fromm's argument that Hess's work is best understood in terms of emotional, rather than intellectual or logical consistency, I argue that the dominant emotion underpinning his work is anxiety, and this sentiment is primarily provoked by heterogeneity, be it within wider society, collective identities or even his own thought, as well as the desire for a historical role which he considers dependent on nationhood. This chapter serves as an introductory case study to the other chapters.

The second chapter begins my analysis of Herzlian Zionism by investigating perceptions of Jewish life without statehood or unified territory. It focuses largely on Herzl and his friend and contemporary Max Nordau, and their portrayals of diaspora Jews' condition and presumed qualities. It incorporates their non-fiction, the duelling tragedy that each wrote (Herzl's *Das neue Ghetto* and Nordau's *Doktor Kohn*), and Herzl's novel *Altneuland*, particularly the first part set in contemporary Vienna. It demonstrates that political Zionism was a reaction, not just to the failure of assimilation amid casual and structural antisemitism, but also to the paradox this situation engendered, namely, that the call to shed difference presupposes its recognition. In order to become a truly German Jew, it was necessary to cease to be a Jew entirely, while it simultaneously remained impossible to stop being perceived as one. Investigating Zionists'

portrayals of assimilated, secular German Jews, and comparing them to those of other groups within the Jewish people, this chapter explores how they dealt with and understood the contradictions and double-bind of assimilation, and how they looked to Eastern European, Yiddish-speaking and/or religious Jews, both as contrasting or distasteful figures, and as models for authentic Jewishness. These contradictions, ambivalences and double-binds seem to have obstructed reconciliation of Jewish identity with the frameworks of nationalism, and were perceived as doing so by Zionists. I note in particular that Herzl, like Hess, was a fervent German patriot in his youth and experienced an explicitly antisemitic rejection of these efforts, and examine how each writer understood these analogous events. The chapter particularly draws on Herzl's polemic 'Mauschel', showing how it attempts to imply a positive Jewish national identity through imagining, and repudiating, a composite of supposed Jewish flaws.

Having examined how Zionists understood the problem of diaspora, I look at their sources for potential solutions. I investigate the various countries which Herzl in particular looked to, both as real or imagined partners on the world stage and as potential models of nationhood. Herzl drew heavily on established nation-states for inspiration, particularly Britain and Germany and, to a lesser extent, France, and this chapter examines how he mixed and matched cultural and political institutions from these nations. I include his views of the constituent nations of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, and of the potential roles of the Jewish people if they became a vassal-state without full independence. Though it was only established nation-states which provided sources for his visions of statehood, Herzl was as accommodating to the model of nationhood within empires as he was to modern nation-states. I also examine the institutions Herzl expected a Jewish state to pioneer, and that he explicitly expected to be adopted by other nations, concluding that this process of influence was intended to be reciprocal, and this diversity of influence is itself an innovative, influential, and recognisably Jewish quality of the

state. In observing these facts, and the compromises Herzl was willing to make in his dealings with Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the chapter argues that despite only borrowing from those nations already established as states, Herzl's understanding of nationhood and territorially grounded statehood was far broader than that of most nationalists.

However, Herzl's broad understanding of nationhood is casually inclusive of the Czechs and Armenians, whom he unequivocally treated as 'nations', even though they had nothing approaching states of their own. His understanding of nationhood instinctively includes nationalities within multinational empires, whether combined with statehood or not. Herzl even considers temporary membership of the Ottoman Empire as a constituent nation in place of full statehood. "A Jewish State" is therefore an incomplete summary of Zionism's core demand. The fourth chapter concerns Herzl's, Nordau's, and, to a lesser extent, Pinsker's understanding of how Jews would relate to the space on which they were to build their putative state. I develop arguments in Shlomo Sand's *The Invention of the Land of Israel*, that Zionists depended on Christian Orientalist conceptions of the Holy Land, and challenge the understanding of Zionism as a belief in a Jewish state in Palestine. Since both Palestine and statehood were potentially optional to Herzl, I examine ways Zionism functioned, or imagined functioning, independently of both land and sovereignty. The chapter examines how Herzlian Zionism understood the concept of 'homeland' and envisioned its physical and ideological construction. I address Herzl's theoretical justifications for the advantages of Palestine over Argentina, and in doing so examine the interrelations between Orientalism and the utopian form he chose to use, noting that both serve as a fantastic space and a blank canvas, inversions of the author's existing society to enable comment on it. In particular, I examine the many effects on Jewish existence that Herzl and other Zionists hoped to achieve before statehood, or even independently of it. The chapter concludes that Herzlian Zionism, far from just a demand for a state in Palestine, anticipated a great many

positive changes in Jewish identity and development towards the desired nationhood without Palestine, statehood, or even Jewish concentration in a single country. These changes involve Jews being transformed alongside, and even by, the development of their homeland. However, for Herzl, it seems any fantastical or exotic space to which national-historical myths or associations could be attached can serve as home, and the effects of having a homeland are achieved, not just by inhabiting it, , but by the public performance of desiring and struggling to acquire a space.

Finally, having analysed Zionist understandings of existence without full nationhood, in comparison to views of established nations and the function of homeland and territory, I raise another question. How can the transformation of the diasporic Jewish people into a territorially grounded nation, matching that of other nations, be understood as a modernisation project, especially given the importance of an ‘ancient homeland’ to the Zionist national myth? I therefore devote my final chapter to Herzl and Nordau’s understanding of modernity. Both expressed strong, but very different opinions on the rapid and constant developments of the modern world, and I explore the complications and implications of viewing Zionism as a modernisation project. Working from Marshall Berman’s understanding of modernity as a process of constant upheaval, and Zygmunt Bauman’s definition as systems of rational categorisation and organisation, I observe that, paradoxically, modern society attempts to create natural structures through human activity, and argue that almost all attitudes to modernity are by necessity ambivalent. Since modernity is ultimately irreversible, modernisation must harness desirable processes associated with the modern age against those perceived as negative. I explore Herzl’s objections to the growing phenomena of high finance, inequality produced by capitalism, and antisemitism, all of which he understands as modern developments, and the modernising solutions he proposes: state monopolies, rational organisation, and of course nationhood. These I compare to Nordau’s critiques of modern culture, which also hinge on rational, supposedly

natural systems of categorisation. I compare Nordau's attempts to address negative associations of modernity with Jews, and Herzl's attempts to envisage positive ones. Most importantly, I examine the tensions between ancient and modern which Herzl deliberately creates when he envisions a "modern solution to the Jewish question" and imagines modern technology and organisation, in a space, Palestine, constructed as distinctly pre-modern. Zionism, I claim, is supremely modern in exactly the same way as any national historical narrative. It arranges historical events and future ambitions into a rational, linear structure, in order to fit a scientific, rationally organised and supposedly natural system of categorisation.

I. Moses Hess

Though *Rom und Jerusalem* had little impact during Moses Hess's life, and the attention it attracted dissipated not long after his death, Theodor Herzl, "entzückt und erhoben", wrote of this "hoher edler Geist" in 1901: "Alles, was wir versuchten, steht schon bei ihm" (*BT.III:240-1*). Though Herzl came to Zionism wholly independently of Hess, and their views differed starkly in many ways, Herzl strongly implies he has nothing to add to *Rom und Jerusalem*, and at the very least, *Rom und Jerusalem* speaks to Herzl as a contribution to Zionist efforts. On the one hand, Hess shares many of the attitudes, experiences and anxieties of later Zionists, and of course came up with the same idea, but on the other, the intellectual and political background of Hess's thought and the angle from which he approaches Jewish identity are entirely different. He shows next to no interest in Palestine as a place, and is more interested in the long, teleological progression of history than any specific process of modernisation. By way of example, while Herzl saw his Zionism as a response to the Dreyfus Affair and Pinsker his to pogroms beginning in 1881, Hess's Jewish nationalism followed not a threat or humiliation, but a victory. The Rome of the title refers to the (at that point, theoretical) capital of the newly unified Italian state. Hess can therefore be understood as a separate incident of Zionism, albeit *avant la lettre*, following a starkly different path under starkly different circumstances, but to the same destination and revealing many of the same presumptions and concerns. For this reason he serves as a neat microcosm of the processes to be examined here, and a logical place to begin that investigation.

Hess's work is often vague and contradictory. His social theory and understanding of his Jewish identity are often inconsistent and unsystematic. Yet, conversely, perhaps the only consistently recurring theme within his work is not just political and social, but ideological unity, the convergence of a disordered world into smoothly ordered oneness. *Die heilige Geschichte der Menschheit* (1837) outlines a rough dialectic whereby an age of Judaism beginning with Adam and an age of Christianity beginning with Jesus resolve into an age of Socialism, beginning with Spinoza. *Die europäische Triarchie* (1841) imagines German philosophy, French revolutionary fervour and English practicality liberating Europe by respectively bringing about freedom of thought, deed and policy. Finally, *Rom und Jerusalem* (1862) asserts the existence of a Jewish nation, assigns it a role in history and calls for the Jews, like the now unified Italian nation, to awaken and found a Jewish state in Palestine. In doing so they will help bring about a utopian age where the organic, social and cosmic levels of existence together reach a harmonic state of messianic, utopian maturity. Hess's work is constantly striving, not to address and reconcile its myriad of contradictions, but to craft a unified worldview in spite (possibly in ignorance, but more often outright defiance) of them. He is at once materialist and idealist, proposing a return to Judaism while still calling himself an atheist,⁵⁰ anti-utopian and wildly optimistic socialist, pacifist and revolutionary, nationalist (at times Jewish, at times German) and internationalist.

Indeed the latter pairing, of internationalism and nationalism, is in its way the easiest for him to reconcile. The concept of internationalism presupposes, in one form or another, nations to unite.

Wenn ich für die Wiedergeburt meines eigenes Volkes arbeite, so habe ich darum meine humanitären Bestrebungen nicht aufgegeben. Die heute nationale Bewegung ist nur ein neuer Anlauf auf dem Wege, den die französische Revolution seit ihrem Beginne eingeschlagen hat. (AS:232)

50 “[D]er zur Anonymität verurteilte Autor [ist] ein übergelaufener „spekulativer“ Atheist und Revolutionär”, Moses Hess, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. Horst Lademacher (Cologne: Joseph Melzer Verlag, 1962), p437

Joep Leerssen describes ‘an international network of nationalist movements, where activists in Hungary or Poland would support movements in Italy or vice versa’,⁵¹ while Hugh Seton-Watson draws attention to a tendency among mid-nineteenth-century nationalisms towards ‘a sort of Messianism which transcends the normal pattern of nationalist rhetoric and arrogance’, conferring on the nation a “divine mission’ as the ‘bearer of universal values’.⁵² The self-realisation of nations leads to greater self-realisation for humanity. Mazzini states “Before *associating* ourselves with the Nations which compose Humanity we must exist as a Nation.”⁵³ While Hess rarely addresses contradictions in his worldview head-on, in this passage the one aspect can be reconciled with its seeming opposite as a component part. Indeed the path beaten by the French Revolution seems not to refer to internationalism alone but to his revolutionary beliefs as a whole.

Resolving Contradictions

Hess initially published *Die heilige Geschichte der Menschheit* anonymously as ‘Ein junger Spinozist’. Excommunicated from Judaism, influenced by Christianity but never fully converted, and frequently castigated as an atheist, Spinoza may appeal to Hess less as a philosopher than as a man. Rather than the specifics of his philosophy, Hess values Spinoza as a symbol of a synthesis which resolves divides and contradictions. Hess’s own work, however, can be inconsistent, contradictory and often deliberately vague. Although he predicts a unified, peaceful, egalitarian world to come, both Shlomo Avineri and Ken Koltun-Fromm read him as an anti-Utopian, reluctant to comment on the future. His generation could “only do the preparatory work for such

51 Joseph Theodoor Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), p152

52 Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen, 1977), p89

53 Dahbour and Ishay, *The Nationalism Reader*, p94

a society”⁵⁴ and Hess refuses to second-guess Jewish tradition and religious life in “New Jerusalem”.⁵⁵ However, as will be explored later, Thomas More coined ‘Utopia’ as a conscious pun, meaning ‘no place’ (rather than ‘eutopia’ for ‘perfect place’). Rather than depicting an impossibly perfect society, Hess anticipates the possibility of *something* better, but is not so arrogant as to explain what.

Contradictions are especially visible when Hess talks about race. He maintains a system of near-Linnaean ethnic subdivisions. Joep Leerssen outlines how anthropology systematised humans at the same time as biology created taxonomies of organisms in general and was itself codified as a science.⁵⁶ Drawing from contemporary theories, Hess posits Semitic and Indo-European/Indo-Germanic (he uses both terms), Roman and Germanic as supranational categories.⁵⁷ However his usage of ‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘Volk’ and ‘Stamm’ is consistent enough to delineate clear distinctions. Hess variously applies all four to Jews, and all but ‘Stamm’ to Germans. Hess also compares Europe to Asia, Africa and America, though without specifying whether ‘America’ means north, south or just the USA, or where Europe begins and Asia ends. His geographical and racial categories are often this ill-defined. In *Rom und Jerusalem* he writes “Von Deutschland ist für die nationale Wiedergeburt der Völker nichts zu hoffen” (AS:316), implying that *Völker* exist prior to this renaissance, that ‘national’ is a quality to be won through political upheaval, and that individual nations have roles to play in the awakening of them all. While self-awareness and awakening of a *Volk* as a nation is possible, national rebirth is a particular variant and far from a given. There are three further, ill-defined concepts internal to ‘Volk’ and nation: ‘Nationalität’, ‘Staatsbürgertum’ and ‘Solidarität’.

54 Shlomo Avineri, *Moses Hess: Prophet of Communism and Zionism* (New York: New York University Press, 1985), p141

55 Ken Koltun-Fromm, *Moses Hess and Modern Jewish Identity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p108

56 Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe*, pp52-7

57 Like ‘Romance’ and ‘Germanic’, ‘Semitic’ and ‘Aryan’/‘Indo-European’ are originally linguistic terms, and their appropriation by biologists was bemoaned by contemporary philologists such as Ernest Renan, *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?*, p16

Trotz aller Aufklärung und Emancipation wird doch der Jude im Exil, der seine Nationalität verleugnet, nicht die Achtung der Nationen gewinnen, in deren Mitte er wohl als Staatsbürger naturalisiert, aber nicht der Solidarität mit seiner Nation enthoben werden kann. (AS:243)

Here, 'Nationalität' is an existing fact to be acknowledged or denied, 'Staatsbürgertum' a political category into which Jews can be naturalised, and 'Solidarität' the visceral bond with a pre-existing nation. While Hess is not consistent with these terms, they have their own relative meanings. Compared to 'Volk', 'nation' is official and political. Compared to 'Staatsbürgertum', nationality is a bond of community. What is consistent is not a specific meaning but a distinction between pre-existing communities of solidarity and their political realisation. For Hess these bonds of collective national solidarity exist before and outside the political structures of nationhood.

Emotional Interpretations

In *Moses Hess and Modern Jewish Identity*, Koltun-Fromm attempts to understand Hess and all his contradictions, not as a unified, consistently argued philosophy, but as broadly consistent on an emotional level, while its inconsistencies unavoidably reflect an "ambiguous, uncertain and fragmented religion".⁵⁸ This emotional reading of Hess is a highly compelling and productive one. While Hess seems not to use consistent terminology for nationalism, this may well simply be because nationality itself is not a clear-cut, unambiguous system. Similarly, while his various terms for nationhood are all but interchangeable, he is consistent in expressing an uncomfortable tension between pre-existing identities, manifested as a sense of solidarity, and the nation as a political category.

This resonance accounts for the impression *Rom und Jerusalem* left on Herzl. Hess's Jewish

58 Koltun-Fromm, *Moses Hess*, p125

identity is frequently expressed as an emotional one. Hess writes that “Jeder Jude, selbst der getaufte, haftet solidarisch für die Wiedergeburt Israels” (AS:287), and this appeal to feelings of solidarity resonates with Herzl’s overall understanding and positing of a Jewish identity outside of religion, though Herzl was far more sceptical of the loyalties of Jews who converted to Christianity. Hess argues elsewhere that the Jewish religion is defined by a sentimental attachment, not just to the people of their community, but to Palestine and anything associated with it:

Mein Großvater zeigte mir einst Oliven und Datteln: „Diese Früchte“, belehrte er mich mit leuchtenden Blicken, „wachsen in Erez Jisroel“ (in Palästina). – Alles, was an Palästina erinnert, wird mit demselben Gefühl der Liebe und Verehrung gleich uralten Erinnerungen des väterlichen Hauses von den frommen Juden angeschaut. (AS:237)

This argument for emotional attachments is itself made via emotional attachments: the childhood memory of an old man, beaming as he instructs his young grandson on the subjects of faith, heritage and exotic fruits. Indeed, for assimilated or secularised Jews or their children, this image of their grandfathers’ generation, not embarrassed or indifferent but excited at the thought of being Jewish, would be a pleasantly compelling one. The fruits here could be easily replaced with soil, a map of the Levant, or a Torah pointer. It is not the specific objects that strike a reader, or even the excitement over Palestine. Rather, it is the emotional attachment to the fact, not the content of being Jewish.

This solidarity is not just argued or demonstrated. Hess describes his reaction to the Damascus Affair, a scandal in 1840 where eight prominent Jews were accused of the ritual murder of a French Catholic priest, imprisoned and tortured, one dying, one confessing and another converting to Islam. It grew to the stature of an international incident: a delegation of prominent Europeans travelled to Damascus to secure the prisoners’ release, including Sir Moses Montefiore

and Adolphe Crémieux, and there was much debate in the European press over whether the men were innocent, whether the centuries-old myths of Jewish ritual sacrifice were in fact true, and whether these supposed practices were the work of the entire Jewish religion or a minority of fanatics.⁵⁹ Hess refers to the incident as awakening “ein ebenso bitteres wie gerechtfertigtes Schmerzgefühl in allen jüdischen Herzen” (AS:240), and writes, to what would largely be a German readership:

In jenen Ländern, welche den Okzident vom Orient scheiden, in Rußland, Polen, Preußen, Österreich und der Türkei, leben Millionen unserer Stammesgenossen, die Tag und Nacht die inbrünstigen Gebete für die Wiederherstellung des jüdischen Reiches zum Gotte der Väter emporsteigen lassen. Sie haben den lebendigen Kern des Judentums, ich meine die jüdische Nationalität, treuer bewahrt als unsre okzidentalen Brüder, die alles im Glauben unserer Väter neu beleben möchten, nur nicht die Hoffnung, die diesen Glauben geschaffen und durch alle Stürme der Zeiten hindurch lebendig erhalten hat, die Hoffnung auf die Wiederherstellung unserer Nationalität. (AS:244)

Concern for Jews to the east, be that Russia or Damascus, is not rare among Western Zionists: Herzl expressed similar sentiments and his friend and successor Max Nordau frequently addressed the issue in very emotive terms, as will be detailed in later chapters. Nor is it unjustified, given both the Damascus Affair and the disabilities within the Russian Empire, including pogroms from 1881 onwards. It is also not exceptional for them to be romanticised as true bearers of Jewish national sentiment. By invoking this image of authentic Jewry and emphasising its externality to his reader, Hess shames Western, assimilated Jews for their inauthenticity while inviting them to compare themselves to and feel solidarity with Jews outside the lands of their birth and citizenship. Hess not only describes, but performs with his reader a Jewish solidarity which transcends existing nations and yearns, like his grandfather, for the olives and dates of the Promised Land.

⁵⁹ Consensus tended to favour a minority of fanatics, leaving the majority of Jews ignorant of the gory and far-fetched practice. See Jonathan Frankel, *The Damascus Affair: 'Ritual Murder,' Politics, and the Jews in 1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

Yet, as well as the positive drive towards Jewish solidarity, there is also a negative drive, and this too is emotional in its logic and its appeal to the reader. Hess describes his former German patriotism, asking “Sangen wir nicht noch gestern mit Nikolaus Becker: „Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein?“” and recounts sending Becker his own musical arrangement of this famous patriotic poem, ‘Rheinlied’, best known in its arrangement as ‘Die Wacht am Rhein’. Hess received a coldly dismissive reply with ‘Du bist ein Jud’ scrawled on the back (AS:241-2). He regrets this incident, but introduces it, not as an insult on Becker’s part but an ‘unverzeihliche Dummheit’ on his own. The tone is one of embarrassment. Now a proud Jew, Hess looks back, shame-faced at his younger, failed, *Teutomane* self. Older, wiser and secure in his new national identity, he accepts “Die Beleidigung war offenbar keine persönliche”, but writes that at the time “Ich nahm Beckers Hep Hep als eine persönliche Beleidigung auf” (AS:242). ‘Hep Hep’ is particularly telling. The Hep-Hep riots (named after the perpetrators’ rallying cry) were a series of anti-Jewish riots in 1819, only a few years after the end of the Napoleonic wars and the expulsion of French troops from the Rhineland. The Germans having fought the French in the Wars of Liberation adds an extra layer of emotional resonance. Hess leads into the anecdote by summing up what were presumably the intellectual fashions of the time, asking rhetorically of other formerly patriotic German Jews: “Waren sie nicht Deutschtümler und Franzosenfresser?” (AS:241) His use of Ludwig Börne’s satirical term, from the satire ‘Menzel der Franzosenfresser’, shows his disdain for his former patriotism. The rejection of his arrangement of what is very much an anti-French anthem, and the casual antisemitic abuse that accompanied it, undermined Hess, not just as a German and a German patriot, but as an enemy of the French. In the same letter, he argues that the Jews, not, as is usually asserted, the French or Russians, are the ‘Erbfeind’ of German liberalism (AS:245), that it is against the internal enemy, the Jews, not against the external threat from the French, that Germany defines itself. Hess associates this

rejection with violence, indeed the violence of a German population victorious over the French. This rejection as an enemy of the French invokes a instinctual, physical fear of becoming a proxy or replacement for them as Germany's enemy. At the same time, Hess juxtaposes this with a sheepish recollection of having himself been one of these patriots.

Finally, this sentimental attachment is not just the cause, but the purpose of Hess's Judaism:

Ich selbst würde, wenn ich Familie hätte, trotz meiner dogmatischen Heterodoxie, mich nicht nur im öffentlichen Leben einer frommen jüdischen Gemeinde anschliessen, sondern auch in meinem Hause alle Trauer- und Festtage vorschriftsmässig feiern, um in mir und meinen Nachkommen die jüdischen Volkstraditionen lebendig zu erhalten. (AS:254)

Hess, neither orthodox nor even a believer in God, commits himself to raising this hypothetical family in orthodox Judaism. He sees the Jewish love of family as the driving force of the religion, yet he also sees it as something he would do *for* his family. The Jewish faith maintains Jewish bonds: not just bonds between Jews but bonds that are themselves Jewish.

For Hess, the ties within a nation, like the ties within a family, are identifications on an emotional level. His affection for his Jewishness is bound up with his affection for his misty-eyed grandfather, and a desire to play the same role for another generation or two of Hess boys. He looks back on his letter from Becker almost as a prodigal son, returning to the fold, ashamed of the silliness he has now grown out of. Hess – atheist, fascinated with Christianity, married to a Christian and writing in German rather than Hebrew or his mother tongue, Yiddish – primarily understands his Jewishness in these terms. He does not feel a need to follow the religion or contribute to a literature in the national language. Rather, he understands the world as composed of nations, and identifies himself deep in his bones with the Jewish one.

History and Utopia

Perhaps the passage that best reveals Hess's view of history and historical actors is in *Die europäische Triarchie*: He begins "Nur das *römisch-germanische Europa* ist der eigentlich historische Weltteil". The Roman/Germanic axis draws a thread between the Roman and Holy Roman empires and the dominant cultural forces, France and Germany, in Europe. Asia has no history of its own, it is 'das Land des Anfanges, aber nicht des Fortganges', and he claims "der Orient gestaltet sich daher zu einem Kreis, der seinen Anlauf ins Unendliche wiederholt, ohne aus ihm herauszukommen." The Hebrew people he considers an exception among Asiatic peoples, due to their presence in Europe and role as go-betweens, "weil es, wie schon seine Name besagt, von *drüben herüber* zu uns kam und den Westen mit dem Osten vermittelte." America, too, exists outside of history, as does Africa, though for opposite reasons:

Amerika hat, umgekehrt, deshalb keine Geschichte, weil es nur das friedliche Ziel, das Ende, aber nicht den Kampf selbst darstellt. Amerika ist der Zufluchtsort derer, die des Kampfes müde sind. – Afrika endlich mit seinen schwarzen Bewohnern, das größtenteils noch immer verschlossene Afrika, fällt außerhalb aller Historie.

Each part of the world except Europe is in some way excluded from history.⁶⁰

As he does with several other ideas about the function of nations in history, Hess takes this from Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*. Hegel compares history to the daily passage of the sun, stating "Die Weltgeschichte geht von Osten nach Westen, denn Europa ist schlechthin das Ende der Weltgeschichte, Asien der Anfang."⁶¹ As well as seeming to deliberately

60 The phrase "Zu uns" implies not, indeed he seems to be writing as a German to an international audience, as implied by the statement elsewhere, "Kommt Zeit, kommt Rat, sagt ein gutes deutsches Sprichwort" (AS:89)

61 *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Werke*, eds. Eva Moldenhauer, Karl Markus Michel and Helmut Reinicke, 20 volumes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), vol. XII, p134. This idea dates back at least as far as the Renaissance, and the idea of *translatio studii* (transfer of knowledge) was often accompanied by a *translatio stultitiae* whereby darkness and ignorance fall on regions as the light of knowledge moves on.

exclude various parts of Europe, mostly Eastern and most notably Slavonic, Hess ascribes the same historical functions to the continents of the Old World as to nations: Asia for the beginning, Europe for the continuation, Africa and America as the void around history, before and after respectively. For Hess, history is not simply the past, or circular Asia would be included within it, but a line from past to present. History is a 'Kampf' from which huddled masses longing to catch their breath can extricate themselves.⁶² What Hess stresses in this passage overall, however, is the insignificance of Africa and the Orient in world history. While it is not clear whether Hess at this point considered himself a member of the Hebrew race, he is already ascribing to the Jews the significance that will later be the thrust of *Rom und Jerusalem*. However, this significance is only acquired by association with Europe, and the Jews are still considered an Eastern, Asian element.

However, Hess's is a triarchy. Although long portrayed as a mixture of Norman and Saxon, England, bringer of 'sozial-politische Freiheit' alongside 'sozial-geistig' and 'sozial-sittlich' (AE:112), sits slightly incongruously between the binaries of Roman/Germanic and thought/deed. Hess seems to struggle to find a precise freedom for England's much-admired practicality to usher in. While England must be awkwardly added, other states are removed. Avineri points to triarchy as a response to a well-established conservative 'pentarchy' incorporating Russia and Austria.⁶³ Russia is to spread Europe's liberation to Asia after completion (AS:109), but Hess's never explains his removal of Austria. Rather than five intersecting states, Hess's triarchy assigns national roles in the ideological future of humanity, Austria neatly subsumed into the German nation. Like any classification system, Hess's often

62 This too Hess borrows from Hegel, though Hegel describes those westward emigrants as 'gelangweilt', rather than, as Hess does, 'ermüdet' (Ibid., p122). The idea of 'Europamüde' travellers bound for the new world had already been popularised by Ernst Wilkomm's novel *Die Europamüden* (1838) and Heine's poem 'Vitzliputzli' (Heinrich Heine, *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, ed. Manfred Windfuhr, 16 volumes (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1973-97) vol III, pp56-75, 138)

63 Avineri, *Moses Hess*, p47

suppresses or ignores internal diversity. In *Rom und Jerusalem*, while there is a social level between the organic and cosmic levels of existence, Hess never addresses where family and nation fit into this scheme, despite both being crucial to his understanding of Jewishness. For Avineri, *Die heilige Geschichte* shows that “the social and the national have been interlocked in his thought from the very beginning”,⁶⁴ and perhaps explains their elision.

A consistent theme in *Rom und Jerusalem* is the reflection of Indo-European and Semitic spirit in the Hellenes and Hebrews respectively. Even in *Die europäische Triarchie* these sentiments appear, including the Jews as a historical force:

So war der jüdische Stamm das auserwählte Volk von Gott dem Vater, und der Schauplatz der heiligen Geschichte im Altertum auf Palästina beschränkt, während er sich im Mittelalter über das römisch-germanische Europa ausdehnt, weil eben diese Welt für die Mystik, wie die jüdische für die Prophetie, empfänglich und daher die von Gott dem Sohne auserwählte war. (AS:85)

For Hess, these various fixed national and supranational categories, rather than the economic or political categories one might expect of a communist and Hegelian, are inevitably the major historical and indeed ideological actors.

Conspicuous by their absence, however, are the existing inhabitants of Palestine. Even the Jewish ones, mentioned only in passing as being “in Turkey”, alongside those of Eastern Europe. Strangely, the Oriental is as rare a figure in *Rom und Jerusalem*, directly concerned with the Middle East, as he is in *Die europäische Triarchie*. While *Rom und Jerusalem* does concern itself with the landscape and plant life of the Orient, references to Turks are rare and Arabs and Kurds are entirely absent – indeed even in Hess’s discussion of Semitic peoples only the Jews are specifically named, and whether speakers of Turkic or, like Kurds and Persians, Indo-Iranian languages would fit this category is not addressed. Hess does, in *Briefe über Israels Mission in der*

64 *ibid.*, p45

Geschichte der Menschheit, make one statement about actual people that is applicable to both these ahistorical continents. Though crudely deterministic, Hess's broad indifference to these parts of the world seems to be just that, rather than in any way mean-spirited. Of African-Americans, he writes not of backwardness or inferiority, but of their potential moral superiority:

Die Negerrasse, die in Amerika in der Sklaverei lebt, ist vielleicht mehr für das soziale Leben geschaffen als die Rasse, die sie beherrscht. Im allgemeinen sind die Ureinwohner heißer Länder geselliger als die kalter Gegenden. Das Blut ist unter einer heißen Sonne edler als in einem eisigen Klima; und wo die Natur fruchtbarer ist, ist der Mensch weniger raubgierig. Selbst in Europa sind die südlichen Völker geselliger als die nördlichen[.] (AS:340)

To this people, doubly excluded from history by his reckoning, Hess is if anything more charitable, drawing on a commonplace idea at the time, best known from Montesquieu, that climate determines national temperament.⁶⁵ Here he breaks with Hegel, who sees Africans as mankind in a pure state of nature,⁶⁶ or at the very least sees this state of nature as more noble than it is savage. Hess also refers to the difficulty faced by potential colonists “daß das heilige Land von einer zu unwissenden und zu barbarischen Bevölkerung bewohnt ist” (AS:338), but does not make clear what population he is specifically referring to. Unlike Herzl, who neatly delineated Arabs, Kurds and Turks, Hess seems uninterested in the nations of the Orient, even in *Rom und Jerusalem*, where he proudly considers himself a member of one.

Of the few mentions of the Turks at all, the only significant reference is the following.

Hess's understanding of the Orient is a complex one:

Auf den Trümmern des christlichen Roms erhebt sich das wiedergeborene italienische Volk. – Wie das Christentum, so hat auch der Islamismus nur die Resignation gelehrt; und wie Österreich zu Italien, so verhält sich die Türkei zu Palästina. – Das Christentum und der Islamismus sind die Inschriften auf

65 Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe*, pp65-6

66 Hegel, *Werke*, vol. XII, pp122-4

den Grabsteinen, welche barbarischer Druck auf die Gräber der Nationen gewälzt hat. – Solange die Österreicher in Italien, die Türken im heiligen Lande unsrer Väter herrschten, konnten das italienische und jüdische Volk nicht wieder zum Leben erwachen. (AS:243)

Rather than viewing Orientals as different from Europeans, he is keen to apply exactly the same historical processes, and with his typical neat simplicity, to Ottoman Islam as to Italian and Austrian Catholicism. The first, second and third wars of Italian Independence were all fought against the Austrian empire, which had held control of the kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. With Turkey too, Hess sees an old, religious Empire standing over the grave of a dormant nation. Imperialism here is conflated with religion, national awakening with freedom, and nations are seen as pre-dating their oppressors. While Hess's outlook shares the same racial determinism as Orientalism, along with the vital importance placed on conflated ethnic and linguistic categories such as Semitic and Indo-European, it is difficult to place Hess wholly within the standard Orientalism which a reader might expect of his contemporaries, and particularly of later Zionists.⁶⁷ Although he uncritically accepts an ahistorical "timeless Orient", which Avineri traces, again, back to Hegel,⁶⁸ he does not share the Orientalist's burning curiosity for the mysterious east. Hess's Orientalism is marked less by dismissiveness or exotic fantasy than indifference. A timeless and ahistorical land or people exerts no fascination for Hess, for whom peoples and lands are defined by their historical function. When Turkey finds a role in history Hess, knowing next to nothing about it, simply treats it as part of Europe.

All Hess's views of history seem to progress towards a utopian vision where the peoples of the world have awakened and liberated themselves, and live in a state of peaceful and equal

67 Edward Said explains his concept of 'Orientalism' as "a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience", most readily accepted as an "academic" designation, "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient which is "mainly, although not exclusively, a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such disparate realms as the imagination itself", and as such a system of "cultural domination" predicated on the division between two realms, Orient and Occident, in the Occidental imagination. (Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 2003), pp1-4; 25)

68 Avineri, *Moses Hess*, p52

coexistence. However, much like Marx, Hess is at least as much an anti-utopian as a utopian, showing little interest or even steadfast refusal to describe what this world would look like. Hess is even reluctant to describe how this liberation would take place. Rather, his focus is on which nations will carry it out. The political players in Hess's world are the great, ice-encrusted multinational empires, who are on their way out, and the plucky emerging nations who will usher in the new era. However, it is only European nations that have this historical task, and many of the people and peoples of the earth have little to contribute. To be outside this alliance of European nations, whether as a timeless museum-piece to the east or the rest-home across the Atlantic is, for Hess, to be without a role in the proud unfolding of history to come.

Precursors, Allies and Inspirations

This view of history in Hess's texts changes over time. By *Rom und Jerusalem*, the only member of the triarchy still remaining as a force in the redemption of humanity is France.

Der Völkerfrühling hat mit der französischen Revolution begonnen; das Jahr 1789 war das Frühlingsäquinoxium der Geschichtsvölker. Die Auferstehung der Toten hat nichts Befremdendes mehr zu einer Zeit, in welcher Griechenland und Rom wieder erwachen, Polen von neuem aufatmet, Ungarn zum letzten Kampfe rüstet und eine gleichzeitige Erhebung aller jener unterdrückten Rassen sich vorbereitet, die, abwechselnd von asiatischer Barbarei und europäischer Zivilisation, von stupidem Fanatismus und raffinierter Berechnung mißhandelt, mißbraucht und ausgesogen, dem barbarischen und zivilisierten Hochmuth der herrschenden Rassen im Namen eines höhen Rechts das Herrscherrecht streitig machen. (AS:223)

It is clear here that between the two works, Hess has been greatly impressed by the events of 1848. Indeed he characterises these national revolutions as 'die Auferstehung der Toten' which, while a characteristic metaphor for Hess, is a potent one. Hess saw the French as the catalyst for

these national revolutions, not simply by being the first nation to revolt in February 1848, but beginning in 1789 and by their very nature. Furthermore they and the Jews are analogous. Hess states: “Der sympathische Franzose assimiliert mit einer unwiderstehlichen Anziehungskraft jedes fremde Rassenelement. Auch der Jude ist hier Franzose”, then quotes Thomas Jefferson as saying “Jeder Mensch hat zwei Vaterländer, zuerst sein eigenes, sodann Frankreich” (AS:242). He later compares this explicitly to the Jews’ function:

Franzosen und Juden! Allerdings sie sind füreinander geschaffen. Bei aller Ähnlichkeit in ihren humanen und nationalen Bestrebungen unterscheiden sie sich in denjenigen Eigenschaften, die sich ergänzen, aber nicht vereint in einem und demselben Volke sein können. – Das französische Volk hat vor dem jüdischen die Leichtigkeit voraus, seinem humanen, sympathischen Wesen alle Elemente zu assimilieren; das jüdische hat mehr sittlichen Ernst als das französische und drückt mehr seinen eignen Typus seiner Umgebung auf, als es fremden Typen gestattet, sein eignes Wesen umzugestalten. (AS:287)

Rather like Herzl, Hess views the ubiquity and diversity of the Jewish people as a defining quality yet, in addition, he gives this internationalism an importance by associating it with the revolutionary *Vorkämpfer* France.

In the meantime Hess has changed his view of Germany quite drastically. While in *Die europäische Triarchie* he writes: “Der Deutsche soll mehr eine universale Tendenz haben, denn sein Eigentümliches, der Geist, ist universeller Natur” (AS:120), twenty years later he is convinced of the opposite, drawing very negative comparisons between Germany and the cosmopolitan, universalist French: “Der Deutsche dagegen möchte alle seine Vaterländer und Landesväter ganz allein besitzen. Ihm fehlt die erste Bedingung jeder chemischen Assimilation: die Wärme.” This seems to be in response to rising anti-Semitism, as Hess writes following his description of the Nikolaus Becker incident, that “Der Deutschtümler liebt in seinem Vaterlande nicht den Staat, sondern die Rassenherrschaft” (AS:242). Yet, while the players have changed,

Hess maintains a very similar worldview: the entirety of human society is to be transformed by the collective actions of certain *Geschichtsvölker*, within the resurrection-like Spring of Nations. Nations, not the individuals and groups that compose them, or the classes and supranational groups that criss-cross them, are the primary historical actors in Hess's worldview. As Hess defines himself less and less as a German and more and more as a Jew, *Rom und Jerusalem* simply reassesses which nations are to be instrumental in the liberation of mankind and replaces Germany with the Jews.

Indeed, it is not just as republicans and revolutionaries that Hess admires the French but as imperialists. Hess gives much of the eleventh letter of *Rom und Jerusalem* over to the potential mutual benefits of French support for a Jewish state, and expects France to easily recognise these benefits.

Oder zweifeln Sie etwa noch, daß Frankreich den Juden die Hand bieten werde zur Gründung von Kolonien, welche von Suez bis Jerusalem und von den Ufern des Jordans bis zu den Küsten des Mittelmeeres ihr Netz ausbreiten könnten. (AS:277)

In an addendum to this letter, he quotes passages from the 1860 pamphlet *La nouvelle question d'Orient; empire d'Egypte et d'Arabie; reconstitution de la nationalité juive* by Ernest Laharanne. Little is known of Laharanne except that he was a pamphleteer, private secretary to Napoleon III and editor of the republican newspaper *L'Etat*. The pamphlet itself proposes a Jewish state from Suez to Smyrna. Yet Hess has found a non-Jewish supporter for a Jewish state in Palestine who pre-dates his own writing by two years. The notes to *Rom und Jerusalem* also recognise the geopolitical usefulness of a Jewish state in Palestine. Hess remembers a report in December 1861 in the Hebrew newspaper *Hamagid* of a meeting in Melbourne:

Sodann sprach ein christlicher Geistlicher für die Wiederherstellung des jüdischen Staats: „Welcher Macht“, sagte er, „kann schließlich das Heilige Land als Erbteil zufallen? [...] Niemand anders als die

rechtmäßigen Erben, die Juden, werden das Erbteil antreten, welches ihre Väter mit der Hilfe Gottes erworben haben.“ (AS:435-6)

Before completing *Rom und Jerusalem*, Hess seems to have been well aware of this tendency among Christians and politicians interested in questions of the Orient, where Jewish settlers to Palestine were seen as a potentially useful imperial proxy, a role which, like Herzl, he is eager for his people to fulfil.

It is also easy to spot non-Jewish predecessors of Hess's view of the Jews' problems and failings in the diaspora. He identifies the Jews' difficulty as their lack of a geographical homeland, which he also characterises as a punishment:

Die größte Strafe, die uns auferlegt wurde, weil wir von dem uns durch die Vorsehung vorgezeichneten Wege abgewichen sind, und die unser Volk immer am tiefsten gebeugt, ist, daß wir seit dem Verlust unseres Landes, Gott nicht mehr als Nation durch Institutionen dienen können. Sie setzen eine im Lande unserer Väter bestehende Gemeinschaft voraus. Ja, das Land fehlt uns, um unsere Religion auszuüben! (AS:340)

The idea of the Jews being punished with loss of a homeland and state-like institutions in which to practise their religion seems partly indebted to the story of the Wandering Jew Ahasverus, an antisemitic idea, often read as an allegory for the entire people, of a Jew who insulted Christ and was cursed to wander the earth forever. The passage also implies that land is essential to their validity as a faith and nation (which in Hess's worldview are inseparable), and not simply solidarity between Jewish centres, which he argues maintained them throughout the Middle Ages (AS:435). Hess also explicitly phrases critiques of inequality in terms of the Jews' rootlessness:

Ein gemeinsamer, heimatlicher Boden ist für sie erste Bedingung gesünderer Arbeitsverhältnisse. Der gesellige Mensch bedarf, wie die geselligen Pflanzen und Tiere, zu seinem Gedeihen und Fortkommen eines weiten, freien Bodens, ohne welchen er zum Schmarotzer herabsinkt, der sich nur auf Kosten

fremder Produktion ernähren kann. (AS:286)

This is strongly reminiscent of a passage by Johann Gottfried Herder:

Das Volk Gottes, dem einst der Himmel selbst sein Vaterland schenkte, ist Jahrtausende her, ja fast seit seiner Entstehung eine parasitische Pflanze auf den Stämmen anderer Nationen; ein Geschlecht schlauer Unterhändler beinah auf der ganzen Erde, das Trotz aller Unterdrückung nirgend sich nach eigener Ehre und Wohnung, nirgend nach einem Vaterlande sehnet.⁶⁹

Particularly looking with the benefit of hindsight from the other side of the twentieth century, Herder's seems a surprising passage for the proud Jew Hess to draw on. However three factors distinguish the Jew-as-parasite trope from that which characterised National Socialism and other viciously racial forms of antisemitism. Firstly, as Sonia Sikka has recently pointed out, "Herder never suggests that there is any biological determinant to the Jewish character, or that Jewish identity is conferred by anything other than language, religion, and way of life."⁷⁰ Secondly, the Jews are compared to a plant, rather than, as in later antisemitic imagery, an animal, and while certain plants are parasitic by nature as much as certain animals, the visual imagery of the metaphor implies distance from soil in plants as opposed to behaviour and economic activity in animals. Parasitic plants cannot survive in soil alone any more than a tapeworm and an earthworm could swap places, and organisms cannot regress or 'sink' into other ways of feeding. These natural metaphors of individual animals for human collectives are not scientifically accurate, but do not need to be for the image to have currency. Mistletoe in soil is starkly different, and far more plausible than a leech or a flea hunting and foraging. Finally, it is, at worst, a semi-sympathetic argument, as Sikka also argues, in the context of calls for the Jews emancipation, either in the lands they inhabit or (tentatively) Palestine. In other words, Herder calls for the plant denied its own soil to be repotted, either by assimilating it into the trunk of the

69 Hegel, *Werke*, vol. XII, p450

70 Sikka, *Herder on Humanity*, p242

German nation or by giving it a pot of its own.⁷¹ He follows in the same backhanded tradition as Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, which calls for emancipation while presupposing collective flaws, but the focus has shifted from the civic to the national and the territorial. Despite the derogatory imagery and masked hostility, unlike the rhetoric of (usually animal) parasitism that followed on from Herder's, this analogy is a relatively easy one to rehabilitate and to characterise in terms of territory and nationhood rather than inherent traits, and a particularly apt one for Hess's nationalism.

While it is likely that Hess is at least partly indebted to Herder for this conclusion, there are of course notable differences. Where Herder is critical of the Jewish people and their character, Hess naturally characterises this problem as one of their oppression. Where Hess writes solely of their geographical situation, for Herder, it is the lack of any *longing* for a fatherland that ultimately confirms the Jews' failings. *Rom und Jerusalem*, with its sentimental attachments to the Palestine and the fruits that grow there, can easily be read as a refutation of this passage: describing, demonstrating and performing the very longings Herder denies. Hess calls for a Jewish state in Palestine in defiance of non-Jewish nationalists' criticisms of Jews in Germany and Europe, and in co-operation with non-Jewish imperialists' concerns and plans for the Middle East. His proto-Zionism is frequently unable and seemingly unwilling to function outside the agendas and beliefs about the Jews that characterise both their antisemitic enemies and philosemitic supporters.

While inspired by the Italian *Risorgimento*, Hess writes relatively little on it, and does not elaborate a role for it in the same way as for France. Hess, after all, lived in France, advocated Franco-German understanding, and had had the whole of his career as a writer to celebrate

71 Instead of religious conversion, Herder "calls for a form of integration that would turn Jews into productive and virtuous citizens (which assumes they are not that presently), so that 'their Palestine is then there where they live and nobly work, everywhere'. At the same time, Herder also proposes, tentatively, the reestablishment of the Jewish *Volk* in a literal Palestine." Ibid., p245

France as a revolutionary power. The metaphor he adapts from Herder allows him to assert the exceptional nature and circumstances of a Jewish nation and articulate demands for its awakening and liberation, while the comparison with France offers the Jews a specific and inherently humanitarian role alongside the great liberator of Europe.

Jewish Identity

Hess's relationship to Jewish identity is complicated. On the one hand, he was quite happy, even in his call for a return to Judaism, to refer to himself as an atheist. On the other, Avineri points to his early aspiration to be the 'Napoleon of religion',⁷² implying that although he clearly wished to transform it as Napoleon had done Europe, he was still committed to its existence. Furthermore, to characterise his beliefs as 'secular' is difficult, given his strong opposition to Reform Judaism's distinction between Jewish faith and nationhood, and his attempts to collapse distinctions between the social and the cosmic. In short, the secular requires strict separation of divine from earthly, and Hess was not given to separations. While his belief in the Jews' existence as a nation is a constant throughout his work (whether he considers himself a member or not), whether this nation is a nation of religion is a difficult question to answer, resting as it does on categories which Hess refuses to recognise. The failure of efforts to assimilate is always at the forefront of *Rom und Jerusalem*. He is cynical about both emancipation and the purely religious conception of Jewish identity, condemning "Die jüdischen „Reformatoren“, die sich von der jüdischen Nationalität „emanzipiert“ haben" (AS:237). His Jewish nationalism is very much a rejection of assimilation, Reform Judaism and the conditions of diaspora. In Hess's analysis, these conditions cause sentiments of Jewish identity to be constantly concealed:

Solange der Jude seine Nationalität verleugnen wird, weil er eben nicht die Selbstverleugnung hat,

72 Avineri, *Moses Hess*, p13

seine Solidarität mit einem unglücklichen, verfolgten und verhöhten Volke einzugestehen, muss seine falsche Stellung mit jedem Tage unerträglicher werden. – Wozu die Täuschung – Die europäischen Völker haben die Existenz der Juden in ihrer Mitte niemals anders denn als eine Anomalie betrachtet. (AS:242)

As with Herzl, Hess imagines Jewish nationalism acting not as a hindrance, but as an aid to the assimilation of those Jews who stay behind. He describes the assimilationists' malaise of being unable to shed enough of their Jewish identity to become fully German:

Trotz aller Aufklärung und Emancipation wird doch der Jude im Exil, der seine Nationalität verleugnet, nicht die Achtung der Nationen gewinnen, in deren Mitte er wohl als Staatsbürger naturalisiert, aber nicht der Solidarität mit seiner Nation enthoben werden kann. (AS:243)

Or, as Isaiah Berlin summarises:

As for the other Jews, they will, if they wish it, assimilate to the countries of their birth; and in this way, as men who recognise themselves to be of foreign origin and have, by an act of free choice, decided to change their nationality, will obtain more respect than those who pretend they have no nationality to change.⁷³

Like Herzl, Hess is concerned that Jewishness in diaspora entails disloyalty, mixed solidarities and the distrust of their compatriots, all of which will be dispelled when the Jews become a full nation in their own right. Indeed, Berlin's interpretation misses two details: firstly Hess's inconsistent terms for nationality (*Nationalität*, *Staatsbürgertum* and *Solidarität*) and secondly the ambiguity of denying nationality. This could, as much as a denial of any nationality, be several things: a claim of another nationality which entails denial of Jewish nationality, or a denial of Jewishness as a nationality. Whichever is the case, Hess offers them some form of identity that they are then free to deny in favour of any other.

For Koltun-Fromm, race in Hess's work is an 'inescapable framework', one without which

73 Isaiah Berlin, *The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess* (Cambridge: Published for the Jewish Historical Society of England by W. Heffer, 1959), p34

“one could not recognize oneself”.⁷⁴ He quotes Charles Taylor’s idea that these frameworks mean answering questions “which inescapably preexist for us, independent of our answer or ability to answer.”⁷⁵ Allowing for the permeability of race, nation and other ethnic categories in Hess’s work, his racial Jewish identity does seem to fit this, recovering “meaning and orientation for Jews confronted with the destabilizing forces of modernity.”⁷⁶ Indeed, Hess makes no effort to hide how these frameworks and unanswered questions became relevant to him. He refers to “Deutschland, wo die jüdische Nationalität das letzte Argument zu sein scheint” (AS:224), and introduces his idea of Jewish racial difference with the statement: “Die Deutschen hassen weniger die Religion der Juden, als ihre Rasse, weniger ihren eigentümlichen Glauben, als ihre eigentümlichen Nasen” (AS:235). Hess expresses a radically different understanding of what it is to be a Jew to the *Haskalah* consensus: that it is a race rather than, or as much as, a religion, and phrases this understanding with reference to the Jews’ opponents.

Not only does Hess seem to be working on antisemites’ terms, he also seems unusually forgiving to them. As he decides “Heute möchte ich fast dem deutschen Sängler Abbitte tun” (AS:242), almost to offer apologies to the figures of German patriotism. Becker is merely the most offensive example of these, and Hess all but excuses the incident, seeing it less as a personal insult than the inevitable result of misplaced patriotism. His reaction, in fact, is to deliberately provoke insult. He quotes the satirist and “deutsche Patriot” Ludwig Börne, who was born Loeb Baruch and took his more Germanic-sounding name on converting to Lutheranism in 1818: “Sooft meine Gegner an Börne scheitern [...] werfen sie ihren Notanker Baruch aus” (AS:250). Hess, with more defiance and pride than resentment, changes his former pen-name from Moritz to that on his birth certificate:

74 Koltun-Fromm, *Moses Hess*, p67

75 Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p30

76 Koltun-Fromm, *Moses Hess*, p86

Ich habe mir vorgenommen, ihnen die bequeme Waffe noch bequemer zu machen, indem ich fortan meinen alttestamentarischen Namen Moses adoptieren werde, und bedaure nur, daß ich nicht Itzig heiße. (AS:250)

Hess deliberately provokes anti-Semitic taunts and in doing so defiantly asserts his newly rediscovered nationality. It is inevitable to Hess that antisemites will insist on his Jewishness, and use this to directly undermine him as a German patriot. His only regret is that he lacks a name that would invite more jeers, since he is no longer a German patriot but a Jewish one, and in doing so he ensures this abuse is an affirmation of, not an attack on, his identity.

Hess's awareness of the Jews' existence as a race comes not from any internal understanding, or even an effort by Jews to separate *themselves* from other races, but from largely hostile outside perceptions, and from seeing how Jews are defined within the frameworks of those outsiders. This determines not only his understanding of what it is to be a Jew or his assessment of the Jews' social position, but also the pride he feels in being Jewish. It is perhaps for this reason that he can afford to be forgiving to Becker: the poet's slur affirmed him as a Jew. Rather than being stripped of a nationality and left without one, and therefore without a part to play in the unfolding betterment of mankind, Hess can now reexamine the incident in positive terms. In this new understanding, Becker dismisses Hess's youthful delusions of belonging to one nation, but 'Du bist ein Jud' shows him his true nationality and true historical role.

Hess's urge to see aspects of humanity converge and unify cuts through his worldview from top to bottom, and he resists, particularly within his new-found Jewish identity, any idea of a clear divide between these levels:

Das Judentum trennt nirgends das Individuum von der Familie, die Familie von der Nation, die Nation von der Menschheit, die Menschheit von der organischen und kosmischen Schöpfung und diese vom Schöpfer. (AS:230)

Individuals contain the seed of cosmic redemption. “Aus der unversiegbaren Quelle der jüdischen Familienliebe”, he writes in the very first letter of *Rom und Jerusalem*, “stammen die Erlöser des Menschengeschlechts” (AS:227) and “Jeder Jude hat den Stoff zu einem Messias, jede Jüdin hat den zu einer *mater dolorosa* in sich” (AS:228). The Jewish family is the salvation of all people and peoples. Every individual Jew is in some way a carrier for the salvation, not only of their own people but of humanity and the cosmos as a whole. By reference to the *mater dolorosa*, Hess links Christian and Jewish ideas of a Messiah through their mother-figures, implying that the synthesis of Judaism and Christianity hoped for in *Die heilige Geschichte der Menschheit* is still a part of his worldview. Berlin describes Hess as “a man who abandoned no belief unless he had convinced himself by rational methods that it was false”,⁷⁷ and this would certainly account for the continued urge towards a Christian-Jewish synthesis, even after twenty-five years and a radical upheaval in his identity. In the same way as Herzl’s *Altneuland* imagines Palestine at the crossroads of the world, and so especially appropriate for the cosmopolitan Jews, Hess too sees his people as typically suited for what is to be their environment:

Die jüdische Rasse, welche in der ganze Welt zerstreut ist, hat mehr als irgendeine andere die Fähigkeit, sich unter allen Breitengraden zu akklimatisieren. Wie das Vaterland der Juden, Palästina, südlich und nordische Naturprodukte erzeugt, so scheint auch das Volk dieses mittleren Klimas unter allen Himmelsstrichen zu gedeihen. (AS:236)

While Hess’s metaphor is as typically organic as Herzl’s is political and technological, this idea, along with that of seeds of salvation, demonstrates a fervent optimism about the potential nature of the Jews. Hess does not simply defend the Jews, call for their nationhood or ascribe them a historical role, but asserts his own self-perception as a Jew. He shows boundless positivity for this Jewish identity, both in that he expresses positive sentiments, and that he actively posits Jewish self-perception. Simultaneously, he defines this identity negatively through outsiders’ negative

77 Berlin, *The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess*, p39

perceptions.

Even in *Rom und Jerusalem*, and even with the assertion that “Der Rassenkampf ist das Ursprüngliche, der Klassenkampf das Sekundäre” (AS:317), Hess’s nationalism and Judaism always seems to work in the service of his communism and internationalism. Though he resists oppositions between the two, imagining “Ackerbau, Industrie und Handel” in Palestine running on unspecified “mosaischen d.h. sozialistischen Grundsätzen”,⁷⁸ it is synthesis of Judaism with Christianity in *Die heilige Geschichte der Menschheit*, and its realisation as Jewish nationhood that will bring about socialism and unity of the human race: neither work towards the Jews’ self-realisation. In *Die europäische Triarchie*, Hess characterises his bright futures in Christian metaphor:

Europa, wie es schon im Keime vor uns liegt, ist die konkrete Erfüllung der christlichen Idee, das Reich Gottes. – Bis auf das scheinbar äußerlichste Moment wird doch das Reich Gottes auf Erden realisiert werden. Da wird nicht einmal das „neue Jerusalem“ mit seinen Herrlichkeiten fehlen, – die heilige Stadt, „in welcher kein Tempel, weil der Herr, der allmächtige Gott ihr Tempel ist“. (AS:90)

By *Rom und Jerusalem*, Hess’s metaphor is the avowedly Jewish Messianic era (AS:341). Yet, although this tendency is more pronounced, it was always below the surface. Avineri argues that Hess saw nationhood and the Holy Roman Empire as derived from Israelite society, and asks: “Who of the German Romantics dreaming of the restoration of the Golden Age of the medieval Empire would be ready to admit that this idea was basically – Jewish?”⁷⁹ Hess’s fight for communism unifies negative causes. He identifies capitalism with Christianity, not (as was a more popular option, and as Marx did)⁸⁰ with Judaism and claims that to worship both God and

78 AS:289. This refers to the Jubilee in Leviticus 25:10-14, where every fifty years land, slaves, indentured servants and other forms of property are returned to their original owners, but Hess does not specify this.

79 Avineri, *Moses Hess*, p68

80 “Der Jude hat sich auf jüdische Weise emanzipiert, nicht nur, indem er sich die Geldmacht angeeignet, sondern indem durch ihn und ohne ihn das Geld zur Weltmacht und der praktische Judengeist zum praktischen Geist der christlichen Völker geworden ist. Die Juden haben sich insoweit emanzipiert, als die Christen zu Juden geworden sind”, Karl Marx, *Werke, Schriften, Briefe*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber, 7 volumes (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1971), vol I., p482

Mammon is not impossible but inevitable.⁸¹ The individualistic idea of ‘Chacun pour soi’ is derived from Christianity, as “Kein Volk ist von diesem Egoismus weiter entfernt als das jüdische” (AS:232). Even in his attacks on religion and inequity, Hess is careful to shield Judaism while he undermines Christianity’s claims to socialism. More than any of his contemporaries, even those like Marx and Lassalle who were unavoidably aware of their status as Jews, Hess expresses his communism in Jewish terms, and fervently resists distinctions between the Jews’ faith and their nationality. Though Hess remains limited to the frameworks through which Jews are perceived by their enemies, there is nonetheless an attempt to posit and celebrate Jewish structures of identity and metaphor within those frameworks.

Repression of Discontinuity

Koltun-Fromm draws attention to Hess’s claim that parts of *Rom und Jerusalem* were lifted from ‘Die Polen und die Juden’, written over two decades earlier in 1841 and previously unpublished, and demonstrating that a revival of Jewish nationhood had long been on Hess’s mind. Yet Koltun-Fromm also alleges that the earlier text was tampered with, edited to fit *Rom und Jerusalem*,⁸² in an attempt to create the appearance of continuity in his philosophy where there is none. This is better suited by the phrase Koltun-Fromm uses: a ‘repression of discontinuity’.⁸³ The sly edit reflects, not an urge towards continuity, but away from discontinuity. Koltun-Fromm argues that, being part of an analysis of an “ambiguous, uncertain and fragmented religion”, Hess’s contradictions are essentially an accurate reflection of the identity he hopes to transform.⁸⁴ As with utopias and internationalism, Hess is contradictory because he works with an identity which is itself unavoidably contradictory.

81 Avineri, *Moses Hess*, p107, 124

82 Koltun-Fromm, *Moses Hess*, p53

83 *Ibid.*, p56

84 *Ibid.*, p119

Koltun-Fromm argues:

Hess struggles to unite conflicting accounts of identity because he is mired in the Hegelian legacy that seeks unity, coherence and reconciliation, even as he tries to revise that tradition by noting the fragmentary, ambiguous relations.⁸⁵

However Hess's struggle to unite seems far stronger than a simple urge towards unity. Hess does not, for example, recognise diversity within his categories. Hess's urge towards unity, coherence and reconciliation comes not from an intellectual tradition, but an emotional position, and his utopia is one where all aspects of his worldview work in harmony without contradiction. He does not desire homogeneity nearly so much as he fears heterogeneity. Koltun-Fromm understands identity, particularly Jewish identity, by its tendency towards fragmentation and internal complexity, "not something one owns, but an image one struggles with and often against"⁸⁶ so that "an identity in crisis is not incoherent or episodic but an inescapable experience of modern life".⁸⁷ The frameworks of coherent identity are only problematic for thinkers "who believe that multiple frameworks, narratives and traditions stretch identity beyond recognition and recovery".⁸⁸

Hess was very much one of those thinkers. His identity as a Jew is a source of anxiety not because he rejects it: he frequently assigned Judaism vital historical roles. Rather, his identity is a source of anxiety because it is unavoidably fractured. Hess treats Becker's letter, not as a moment of trauma, but as a mistake to be learned from, a youthful indiscretion almost. It is a moment when a man of heterogeneous identity: a German patriot of Jewish origin, is forced, by his rejection as a German patriot, to assume instead the more homogeneous position of Jewish patriot. Hess's definitions of nationhood, *Volk*, *Stamm*, *Staatsbürgertum* and *Solidarität* are ill-

85 *Ibid.*, p11

86 *Ibid.*, p12

87 *Ibid.*, p9

88 *Ibid.*, p9

defined and inconsistent, but their meanings relative to each other always reveal a chasm between national identity, sentiment or belonging and the nation as a political entity, a chasm which is a source of discomfort to him and which he dreams of closing. Hess must posit categories for reconciliation that are whole and internally consistent, even if this means glossing over contradictions and variations, because of his deep horror of heterogeneity. While he can love the ancient burnt offerings that are “von der jüdischen Nationalität unzertrennlich” as if they were “die Narbe im Antlitz meiner Geliebten” (AS:274), it is only ancient scars that he can love, not open wounds and unhealed fractures.

Anxiety and Heterogeneity

Moses Hess, though as full of his own idiosyncrasies as any other member of the highly diverse Zionist movement, maintains an emotional resonance even with the starkly different Herzl. While he differs from many of those who came after him in his understanding of Jewish identity, his diagnosis of Jewish problems and plans for wider society, his anxieties and emotional reactions to the Jewish condition all seem very similar to those motivating his successors, and he has come to the same solution. His many ideological contradictions themselves throw up a further contradiction. Hess was a philosopher who strove towards smooth homogeneity – perhaps even editing continuity into his work to create it – in both his own beliefs and in the world he hoped they would build. While in *Rom und Jerusalem* he does address the many complications of his identity and even leave them open and unresolved to a certain extent, his ideas of the Jewish people as a historical actor still nonetheless rely on them as a single, distinct and internally consistent unit. Patriotic Jewish atheists and *Hassidim* do not form separate historical actors or complicate the historic function of their people, any more than Bavarians and

Hamburgers, or Yorkshiremen and Bretons, or indeed Austrians, complicate the European triarchy. Hess presumed that the peasants were already Frenchmen and the Italians had already been made.

Ultimately, Hess is put into an impossible position to resolve comfortably. His fight against inequality as a communist already borders uneasily on rejection of heterogeneity. Equality within nationalism must, in order to function, posit a nation of which all members are united as equals. For Hess, therefore, to be both socialist and nationalist makes the draw of homogenisation, and the association of internal social differentiation with the worst excesses of capitalism, even stronger. As a Jew, he must find his way within a heterogeneous and fractured identity which blurs faith and ethnicity, yet as a German and a European, he must work within a framework which strictly separates religious from national categories, while facing aggression and rejection from a nationalism which sees the Jews as a disruption of its own homogeneity. Hess, though his own ideology and German-Jewish identity are fractured on many levels, seems unable to accept the dissonance and internal inconsistency that are not only inevitable within the world at large but particularly so in his position and political beliefs.

There is plenty of justification for this anxiety. As a Jew, Hess had at least one vivid memory of being treated as heterogeneous. Furthermore, Hess's understanding of the world accepted two nationalist presumptions: that the actors in history's great march of progress are nations, and that nations are internally homogeneous. To be a heterogeneous body within a nation was to be without a nation, and therefore with no hand in history. Hess was not concerned with his own emancipation or that of the Jews, but of all of humanity. His desire, first and foremost, was not nationalistic, but universalist and utopian. However, his understanding of the world and of the progress of history was one that mediated all political activity through the lens of nationalism, and neither recognised nor tolerated complex, heterogeneous identities. Unlike

the far more pragmatic later Zionists, for Hess, membership of a nation was not simply a practical requirement of society, but the wider moral calling of all humanitarians, internationalists and socialists, and his experience as a German had shown him the only nation available to him.

II. The Pressure of Diaspora

Zionism can be understood both in terms of entrance and exit, of entry into a Jewish state in Palestine and exit from the diaspora (rather more complicated to define in spatial terms). Theodor Herzl's *Der Judenstaat* opens with a description of antisemitism and rootless diasporic existence (GZWI:23-4). Nordau's speeches to the early Zionist Congresses described oppression of Jews across the world, and the first in particular was enthusiastically received by the delegates. Moses Hess's *Rom und Jerusalem* opens with a description of the hatred for Jews emanating from the "unversiegbare Giftquelle" of Rome (AS:223). Leo Pinsker's *Autoemanzipation!* is broadly dominated by descriptions of the privations and violence faced by Jews, primarily in Russia. Perhaps the most succinct summation of Herzl's approach to Zionism, and particularly the daunting magnitude of the project, is in the preface to *Der Judenstaat*:

Auf die treibende Kraft kommt es an. Und was ist diese Kraft? Die Judennot.

Wer wagt zu leugnen, dass diese Kraft vorhanden sei? Wir werden uns damit im Kapitel über die Gründe des Antisemitismus beschäftigen.

Man kannte auch die Dampfkraft, die im Theekessel durch Erhitzung des Wassers entstand und den Deckel hob. Diese Theekesselercheinung sind die zionistischen Versuche und viele andere Formen der Vereinigung „zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus“. (GZWI:20)

Here we see three common themes in Herzl's writing: firstly the use of metaphors from technology or the modern world, secondly, the centrality of antisemitism and Jewish suffering as

the justification for the movement, and, finally, the way hardship is instrumental in making a state in Palestine possible. All three are encapsulated in one of Herzl's favourite metaphors: steam.

Antisemitism and suffering in diaspora are, then, not only a fundamental issue for Zionists but their obvious starting point. Study of the spread of nationalism, like any ideology or structure, must understand the exceptional suffering, regular hardships and ongoing anxieties that it generates among those who do not, or cannot, accept it. If the existence of Jews in exile is so precarious, impoverished and degraded as to need such a large and wildly implausible project (and Herzl in particular readily admits this implausibility), it is worth examining in detail how they perceived this existence. The adversary of Jewish nationalism is variously described as antisemitism, anti-Zionism, diaspora or diaspora Jewry, and in practice seems to be a complicated mixture. By examining what, in particular, Herzl, Nordau and others wished to leave behind, and how they portrayed and interpreted it, I hope to understand how they perceived their Jewish identities in personal terms, as perceived by others, and in relation to nationalism and antisemitism. The assimilated Jews who tended to make up the ranks of Zionist thinkers found themselves in a double-bind where "The immediate past was the world of the ghetto, while the present represented the status quo within a society that painted Jews in terms of unflattering stereotypes."⁸⁹ In particular, this other, defined by existence outside of a defined space, is frequently implied to be backward and pre-modern. Here, I will examine the tension between assimilation and authenticity as Jews that made the figure of the Jew irreconcilable with the ideals and demands of nationalism, and the difficulty faced by Zionists in positing a distinctive image of Jewry with both civic and national virtues. In doing so I will analyse how life without fully realised nationhood was understood.

89 Mosse, *Germans and Jews*, pp80-1

The Failure of Civil Improvement

Christian Wilhelm von Dohm's *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, first published in 1781-2, was one of the earliest, and certainly one of the most influential German texts calling for the civic emancipation of the Jews. It argued, seemingly with genuine intent to come to their defence, that the Jews' many collective and individual failings came as a result not of their nature but of their oppression in diaspora. These arguments, however, laid shaky foundations for Jews to take advantage of the freedoms Dohm offered. Firstly it was unavoidable for him to concede, tacitly and often explicitly, that these faults genuinely existed in the people whose emancipation he was fighting for:

Der fanatische Haß, womit die Vorfahren der heutigen Hebräer den ersten Stifter des Christentums verfolgten, ist noch auf ihre itzige späte Nachkommen gegen alle Bekenner desselben vererbt worden; und die Ausbrüche desselben haben sich oft deutlich gezeigt, wenn sie nicht durch Gewalt zurückgehalten wurden. Besonders ist von jeher unter allen Nationen den Juden, Mangel an Treue und Ehrlichkeit, die wesentliche Eigenschaft in dem einzig ihnen verstatteten Nahrungsmittel, – dem Handel, schuld gegeben worden.⁹⁰

Secondly, in order to speak of the Jews, Dohm needed to understand them as a category. In order to call for their integration, outsiders must be named, categorised and understood as outsiders. A call for the dissolution of difference is itself a signpost announcing that difference. Dohm characterises the Jews, not only as former haters of Christianity, but as a separate nation⁹¹ from the outset, as “unglücklichen asiatischen Flüchtlinge”.⁹² Thirdly, this identification of outsiders is consistently in reference to the values of Christian, “European” Germans,⁹³ and primarily for their benefit:

90 Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, 2 volumes (Berlin; Stettin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1781-2), p32

91 Ibid., vol. I, 'Vorerinnerung', p11

92 Ibid., vol. I, p8

93 “Gewiß aber enthält die itzige Religion der Juden kein Gebot des Hasses und der Beleidigung fremder Glaubensgenossen.”, Ibid., vol. I, p22

Sollte viele fleißige und gute Bürger dem Staat weniger nützlich seyn, weil sie aus Asien abstammen, sich durch Bart, Beschneidung und eine besondere ihnen von ihren ältesten Vorfahren hinterlassene Art, das Höchste der Wesen zu verehren, unterscheiden?⁹⁴

Finally, and perhaps most importantly for this chapter, Dohm consistently places the Jewish failings he hopes to ameliorate in opposition to a universal humanity, stating that “Der Jude ist noch mehr Mensch als Jude”,⁹⁵ and hoping that “Diese menschlichen Gefühle würden in seinem Herzen lauter reden, als die sophistischen Folgerungen seiner Rabbinen.”⁹⁶ Dohm’s sympathetic call for justice hinges on positing the non-Jewish world as general, universal and human, the Jewish as specific, flawed and, paradoxically, largely omitted from or ignored by the all-encompassing.

Yet the importance of Dohm’s piece – still, despite its flaws, a strident and unambiguous call for their emancipation and betterment – to German Jews and the moves towards assimilation was immense, and it also had value for the Zionist movement. As Jacques Kornberg argues, “When he became a Zionist, Herzl had only to push Dohm’s argument one step further. The Jews’ cure for Jewish decay was full citizenship in the state, but in a state of their own.”⁹⁷

The Self-Hatred Problem

Put simplistically, ‘Jewish self-hatred’ can be described as expressions of antipathy by Jews, speaking as Jews, towards Jews, perceived as Jews. Herzl was critical of Zionism’s Jewish opponents, and included deeply flawed Jewish figures in his fiction. Both are combined in the essay ‘Mauschel’, which describes a (hypothetical) anti-Zionist who fulfills the full set of antisemitic stereotypes. There are many definitions of ‘Jewish self-hatred’ which could apply to

94 Ibid., vol. I, p16

95 Ibid., vol. I, p28

96 Ibid., vol. I, p28

97 Jacques Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p18

him, Nordau or their characters. Yet these are complicated texts and it is a complicated phenomenon. Sander L. Gilman, in his extremely influential book, explains “Self-hatred results from outsiders’ acceptance of the mirage of themselves generated by their reference group – that group in society which they see as defining them – as a reality.”⁹⁸ As with the failures of emancipation and assimilation, it is not Jews’ official political status or their own understanding of their Jewishness that dominates, but perceptions of the dominant group that they as outsiders are attempting to be accepted by. Gilman expands on the double-bind in assimilation:

On the one hand is the liberal fantasy that anyone is welcome to share in the power of the reference group *if* he abides by the rules that define that group. But these rules are the very definition of the Other. The Other comprises precisely those who are not permitted to share power within the society. Thus outsiders hear an answer from their fantasy Become like us – abandon your difference – and you may be one with us. On the other hand is the hidden qualification of the internalized reference group, the conservative curse The more you are like me, the more I know the true value of my power, which you wish to share, and the more I am aware that you are but a shoddy counterfeit, an outsider. All of this plays itself out within the fantasy of the outsider.⁹⁹

Efforts to assimilate, Gilman argues, do not diminish this process but catalyse it. ‘Indeed, the more the original language vanishes and the outsider assumes the language of the privileged group, the more the values of this reference group are reified.’¹⁰⁰

Most importantly for this analysis, two opposing images of the Jew are created. “For every ‘noble savage’ seen through colonial power a parallel ‘ignoble savage’ exists [...] There are nobler savages and yet ignobler ones.”¹⁰¹ Romanticised images of Othered groups often mix flaws with virtues, or show a grudging admiration these flaws as they show a difference from the reference group. Closeness to nature and preservation of tradition presume primitivity and backwardness,

98 Sander L. Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews* (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p2

99 *Ibid.*, p2

100 *Ibid.*, p17

101 *Ibid.*, p4

and authentic passions become irrationality, according to context. The similarities to colonial processes of dominance and assimilation here are explicit, and there are many parallels to be drawn between non-Jewish and Western understandings of the Jews and of the Orient.¹⁰² What is most useful for Zionist understandings of diaspora, however is Gilman's parallel images of the Good Jew and Bad Jew, consistently identified in Jewish writing throughout his book. This chapter will both extend their applicability and expand the categories themselves.

Naturally, the concept of 'Jewish self-hatred' is a porous and elastic one. Paul Reitter demonstrates the concept's tendency towards circular argument and applicability to either a seemingly endless array of sources (in the case of Gilman) or (in the case of Shulamit Volkov) Franz Kafka and nobody else.¹⁰³ Put simply, statements which could be classed as collective self-hatred, or merely self-criticism, mostly tend to be about other people. For this reason, the concept of 'Jewish self-hatred' is of limited use, except where it is a trait given to fictional characters. This is a fairly consistent literary device in Zionist writing, since the negativity of assimilated Jews towards their own Jewishness was one of their chief complaints, even if this predated Theodor Lessing's coinage of the term in 1930. I will therefore avoid relying on 'self-hatred' as a concept. Rather, when examining negative statements by Jews about Jews, I will attempt to unpack both the collective 'self' these statements reflect, and what, specifically, they found to hate about it.

Judennot

As secular Zionism has, since Hess, consistently defined itself as a reaction and solution to

102 This is explored in great detail in Derek Jonathan Penslar and Ivan Davidson Kalmar, eds., *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham, MA; Hanover: Brandeis University Press; University Press of New England, 2005).

103 Paul Reitter, 'The Jewish Self-Hatred Octopus', *The German Quarterly* 82, no. 3, (2009), 356-372; Shulamit Volkov, 'Selbstgefälligkeit und Selbsthaß: Die deutschen Juden zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts', *Geschichte in Wissenschaft Und Unterricht* 37 (1986), 1-13, p9

antisemitism, it would seem logical to begin by asking how precisely Zionists perceived antisemitism. An extremely common theme, most notably in Nordau's writing but also present in Herzl and Hess, is concern for Jews elsewhere. This elsewhere is almost invariably eastward. This sincere concern is quite understandable, given the far greater, far more material privations of Jews east of the German-speaking world. Russian Jews had faced several pogroms since the 1880s, while in Romania and even within Austrian borders in Galicia, poverty among the Jews was rife. Indeed, looking the other way, Pinsker acknowledges the relative safety, and indifference to antisemitism, of his Western co-religionists, saying in the foreword to *Autoemanzipation!*, "Die Juden im Okzident aber haben den Hepp-Hepp-Ruf wieder ertragen gelernt, wie ihre Väter in vergangenen Tagen".¹⁰⁴ Referring to the antisemitic Hep-Hep riots of 1819, Pinsker implicitly accepts the threat of antisemitic violence in the west. Not only did Zionism provide a vector for solidarity between Eastern and Western Jewry, this solidarity in turn was a performance of the behaviour expected of a nation. Yet the nature and function of these appeals by Western Jews on behalf of Eastern Jews requires analysis.

Antisemitism and its Causes

Altneuland (1902) is the story of a young Doctor of Law, from Vienna, Friedrich Löwenberg. Unable to find work, disdainful of the largely Jewish social circle who would make up his clientele, and having seen the object of his unrequited love announce her marriage to a rich investor, he answers an ad looking for 'ein gebildeter und verzweifelter junger Mann', and spends the next twenty years on a South Sea island with an eccentric Prussian Junker named Kingscourt. On the way there and back they pass through Palestine. In 1903 it is dusty, impoverished and deserted. In 1923 it is a blooming utopian society. Coincidentally, they run into a young Eastern Jewish boy, David Littwak, whose family they helped in Vienna, and who has grown up to be a

104 Leo Pinsker, *Autoemanzipation!: Mahnruf an seine Stammesgenossen von einem russischen Juden* (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1936), p5

successful shipping magnate. Littwak gives the two a tour of this 'New Society' and, at the end, Littwak is elected President and both travellers decide to stay.

In the New Society, antisemitism has been eradicated, and the explanation is highly revealing about the Zionist understanding of its causes.

Doch auch den Juden, die an ihren Wohnorten verblieben waren, ging es endlich gut. Sie waren von Angriffen verschont, seit die jüdische Konkurrenz schwächer geworden oder ganz verschwunden war. In den mit Juden überfüllten, oder wie man damals zu sagen pflegte, verjudeten Ländern war eine bemerkenswerte soziale Erleichterung eingetreten. (*GZW.V*: 297)

The easing of social conditions indicates that, in Herzl's imagination, the competition that poisons modern society is most keenly felt when it occurs between peoples, not individuals. Rather than, as a purely market-based analysis or a Marxist reading of history would have it, for Herzl, individual workers do not compete with workers and classes do not compete with classes to nearly the same extent that Jews compete with Gentiles. Pinsker, too, characterises the Jews' presence, in similar terms to Herzl, as provoking antisemitism when it reaches a 'Saturationspunkt' (*AE*:31). Simply removing the Jews elsewhere serves to ameliorate this competition, implying that Jews as competitors are a fixed and immutable category. While antisemitism is portrayed here as primarily an economic phenomenon, Herzl implies nation, not economics, is the main source of this social categorisation. Rather than economic competition between economic strata, it is economic competition between peoples.

Leo Pinsker goes further. By pathologising antisemitism he turns it into an individual failure rather than a social or structural tendency. "Es ist eine unbestreitbare Tatsache," he argues, "daß die Abneigung gegen die Juden tief im Volke wurzelt" (*AE*:11), but what this deep root is, he does not specify. By characterising the Jews as 'ein heterogenes Element, welches von keiner Nation gut vertragen werden kann' (*AE*:5) Pinsker presupposes that nations, a category he does

not interrogate, do not tolerate heterogeneity. This intolerance is treated as an unavoidable fact: “Diese Tatsache hat ihre ethnologische Begründung und kann keinem Volke zum Vorwurf gemacht werden” (AE:11). While the scathing pathologisation of antisemitism seemingly contradicts the implication that these prejudices are unavoidable, they serve a similar function. Both depoliticise antisemitism. This in turn delegitimises it as a movement, as a political position, and as a possible answer to the Jewish question. Yet depoliticisation also treats it as an unavoidable symptom of the disease of diaspora, its causes buried deep in the human psyche instead of arising from political conditions.¹⁰⁵

It is worth noting that Pinsker was neither writing a sociological text nor claiming to: his was a pragmatic attempt at a short-term solution:

Wir müssen uns zu der Einsicht bekehren, daß ehe die große Humanitätsidee alle Völker der Erde vereinigen wird, noch eine Reihe von Jahrtausenden vergehen kann, und daß bis dahin ein Volk, welches überall und nirgends zu Hause ist, auch überall als fremder Körper von den Volksorganismen empfunden werden will. (AE:22).

Even with the biological metaphors of foreign bodies and *Volksorganismen*, for Pinsker this remains a matter of sentiment [*Empfindung*]. The Jews will be perceived and felt as biological pathogens until the distant days of internationalist utopia. As Alex Bein observes, antisemitic discourse frequently characterised Jews in relation to the *Volkskörper*, and, precisely as Pinsker describes them, as foreign bodies, and he seems to have anticipated the increasing currency of this image until the mid-twentieth century.¹⁰⁶ However, whether he believes it or not, Pinsker sees little need to challenge this pseudo-scientific understanding.¹⁰⁷ Whether this quality of the Jews

105 Indeed, with regard to the metaphor of bodily illness, Aḥad Ha’am writes in his afterword “Leon Pinsker war Arzt, und niemals ist eine Diagnose hellsichtiger gestellt und eine Therapie klarer vorgeschrieben worden als in der vorliegenden Untersuchung über das Wesen der Judenfrage.” (AE:38)

106 Alex Bein, ‘The Jewish Parasite: Notes on the Semantics of the Jewish Problem, with Special Reference to Germany’, *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 9, (1964), 3-40, p8

107 As Bein puts it, “the use of biological concepts when the actual topic is the social problems of human existence”, *Ibid.*, p40

actually is biological, and whether this intolerance is inherent to nations and humanity or a product of social conditions does not bother him. Nations are and behave this way in 1882, and in 1882 a Jewish state is the solution which presents itself.

Solidarity

Nordau seems mainly, though not solely, preoccupied with the Jews of Russia and Romania. Asserting that “Die Judennot hat zwei Formen, eine sachliche und eine sittliche”,¹⁰⁸ Nordau told the first Zionist Congress in 1897, of the situation of Western Jews:

Die Brot- und Obdachfrage, die Frage der Sicherheit von Leib und Leben martert sie weniger. Hier ist die Not eine sittliche. Sie besteht in täglichen Kränkungen des Selbst- und Ehrgefühles. Sie besteht in der rauhen Unterdrückung ihres Dranges nach seelischen Befriedigungen, nach denen zu streben kein Nichtjude sich zu versagen braucht. (ZS:40)

Of Jews elsewhere (in this case Morocco and Persia), he stated:

Die Aermsten haben nicht einmal mehr die Kraft, sich gegen ihr Elend aufzulehnen. Sie tragen es in stumpfer Ergebung, klagen nicht und rufen unsere Aufmerksamkeit nur an, wenn der Pöbel in ihr Ghetto einbricht und unter ihnen plündert, schändet und mordet. (ZS:42)

In his speech to the fourth Congress in 1901 he expressed similar sentiments:

In Bessarabien haben 12 000 Juden seit der letzten Ernte alle Qualen einer schrecklichen Hungersnot erlitten. In Indien waren 6 Millionen Menschen in ganz derselben Lage und Europa hat für Hindus mehr Sympathien als für uns Juden. (ZS:102)

While I will give the ethical form of ‘Judennot’ in Nordau’s understanding more analysis later, three things are striking here: firstly, the privations of Eastern Jews are explicitly shown through comparison with those of Western Europe, secondly this suffering is compared to that of other peoples (towards whom Europe takes a far more sympathetic attitude) and finally, in the case of

108 Max Nordau, *Zionistische Schriften* (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1923), p39

Jews in the Islamic world, their suffering can become so great as to deny them the agency to resist it. There is always a gulf, potentially an insurmountable one, between the Jews who constitute the speech's audience and the Jews who constitute its subject matter; between those who will fight for Zionism and for whom the speech is intended, and those Zionism will fight for and for whom the movement is intended. Yet despite this acknowledgement of huge differences between Jews' collective experiences of antisemitism, Nordau still states early in his speech to the First Zionist Congress: "Wir sind Zionisten geworden, weil die Not des jüdischen Volkes uns ans Herz greift" (ZS:108). This conception of *Volkstum* must posit divisions for a unifying identity to transcend: acknowledging a wide gulf in needs, experience and, perhaps most notably, class, that can be bridged by Jewish solidarity. The solidarity between countrymen demanded by nationalism in turn requires recipients, and these heartfelt sympathies for the downtrodden Jews of the Russian Pale gave more privileged Jews a way to assert a more authentic Jewishness.

With Herzl, this solidarity with Jews is not just a natural sentiment, but escalates to one that basic decency demands. At a dinner party in the second chapter of *Altneuland*, one of the guests, Rabbi Dr. Weiss, explains to a group of middle-class Viennese Jews about the situation away from the metropolitan centre:

„Bei uns in Mähren wird die Lage auch schlecht. In den kleineren Landstädten sind die Leute wirklich in Gefahr. Sind die Deutschen schlecht aufgelegt, schlagen sie den Juden die Fenster ein. Sind die Tschechen schief gewickelt, brechen sie bei den Juden ein. Die armen Leute fangen an auszuwandern. Aber sie wissen nicht, wohin sie sollen.“

„Moritz!“ schrie in diesem Augenblick Frau Laschner, „ich will übermorgen ins Burgtheater.“
(GZWV:139-40)

The first book of *Altneuland*, particularly the second chapter, serves broadly as an exposition of bourgeois Jewish superficiality and cultural poverty. A speech on the sufferings of poorer Jews elsewhere is interrupted, not just with a selfish individual desire for pleasurable diversion, but

with one so superficial as to specify the location in preference to the play, and most likely to be seen there rather than to see anything in particular. The Jewish dilettantism that characterises the start of the book is not just lampooned, but, here, implicated in a lack of national solidarity between Jews. The flaws attributed to Western Jews by Western antisemites are linked here to the flaws in their Jewish identity.

Inertia

While this lack of solidarity with other Jews is, in Zionist terms at least, the most significant trouble in Jewish life portrayed in *Altneuland*, it is by no means the only one, and, in Nordau's words, it is the ethical that tends to be most prominent. The advertisement answered by the protagonist seeks "ein gebildeter und verzweifelter junger Mann". Not only does this phrase form the title of the first book, it is also made explicit that an educated but despairing young man would quite obviously turn out to be Jewish. (GZVV:252) This despair in spite of education is a consistent feature of diaspora society in *Altneuland*. A sense of inertia is at the foreground of the novel from the very beginning:

Dr. Friedrich Löwenberg saß in tiefer Melancholie an dem runden Marmortische seines Kaffeehauses. Es war eines der alten gemütlichen Wiener Cafes auf dem Alsergrunde. Er kam seit Jahren dahin, schon als Student. Mit der Regelmäßigkeit eines Bureaukraten pflegte er um die fünfte Nachmittagsstunde einzutreten. Der blasse, kranke Kellner begrüßte ihn ergebenst. Löwenberg machte eine höfliche Verbeugung vor der ebenfalls blassen Kassierererin, mit der er nie sprach. Dann setzte er sich an den runden Lesetisch, trank seinen Kaffee, las alle Zeitungen durch, die ihm der Kellner beflissen brachte. Und wenn er mit den Tages- und Wochenzeitungen, Witzblättern und Fachjournalen fertig war, was nie weniger als anderthalb Stunden in Anspruch nahm, kamen die Gespräche mit Freunden oder die einsamen Träume. (GZVV:129)

Opening with an exposition of the failings of the status quo is standard, for both the utopian genre and for Zionist discourse, yet Herzl's exposition is not a description of the more material suffering of poor or Eastern European Jews, but of the listless, aimless existence of the bourgeois protagonist. Instead of Rabbi Dr. Weiss's descriptions of violence, Herzl chooses to foreground the almost comically pointless melancholy of Löwenberg, moving from one circular table to another, leafing through the papers and never getting to know the staff. While persecutions in Moravia add emotional resonance to the first part of the book, they are downplayed, and Herzl, obviously aiming more for an audience of Löwenbergs than Weisses, frames the problems of diaspora very much in his own community's terms. Furthermore, as will be shown here, this sense of inertia reveals Herzl and Nordau's identification of flaws in the class structure of the Jewish diaspora.

An explanation for this inertia is given by both Herzl and Nordau. Herzl writes in his diaries:

Die causa remota ist der im Mittelalter eingetretene Verlust unserer Assimilirbarkeit.

Die causa proxima ist unsere Überproduction von mittleren Intelligenzen, die keinen Abfluss nach unten haben und keinen Aufstieg nach oben – nämlich keinen gesunden Abfluss und keinen gesunden Ausstieg. (BT.II:199)

For Herzl, this mediocrity, as well as a cause of antisemitism, seems to be a problem in itself. He clarifies the process in *Altneuland*:

Die Söhne sollten etwas anderes werden, als die Väter gewesen. Los vom Handel, von den Geschäften. Da hatte ein Massenauszug des Nachwuchses nach den "gebildeten" Berufen stattgefunden. Das Ende war ein jammervoller Überfluss an studierten Leuten, die keine Beschäftigung fanden, zu bescheidener Lebensführung nicht mehr taugten, in Ämtern nicht unterschlüpfen konnten, wie ihre christlichen Kollegen, und sozusagen auf dem Markte lagen. (GZVV:130)

Now that the upward 'Aufstieg' is cut off by institutional antisemitism, and the downward

'Abfluss' by overqualification, as sons hurry to escape the stigmatised professions of their fathers, Jews find themselves in this coffee-house malaise of underemployment, which in turn provokes the antisemitism that engendered the situation in the first place. Antisemitism is not just an ineradicable vicious circle, but one which deforms Jews to fit its stereotypes. A similar process, trapping Jews in stereotypical financial professions, is given a comic turn in Herzl's play *Das neue Ghetto*:

WASSERSTEIN: Ich bin im Grundwasser!

BICHLER: Alles an der Börse verspielt?

WASSERSTEIN: Ich hab' gezahlt, bis ich fertig war. Dann...

BICHLER: Hörten Sie auf zu spielen.

WASSERSTEIN: Was fällt Ihnen ein? Schuldig bin ich geblieben, aus hab' ich endlich bleiben müssen von der Börs'.

BICHLER: Bitter! Und was treiben Sie jetzt?

WASSERSTEIN: Ich geh' an die Börse. (GZVV: 11)

Like Löwenberg and his fellow Viennese Jews, Wasserstein is trapped in a vicious cycle of stock trading, failure and debt – and it is rare for Herzl to mention the stock market in any context without explicitly treating it as a trap from which the Jews must be liberated. Indeed the role of debt in Wasserstein's entrapment neatly inverts a classic antisemitic stereotype. Jews in finance collide directly with an inversion of the Shylock archetype, with a Jew entrapped, not entrapping Gentiles, in debt.

Nordau expresses similar sentiments when he talks of the 'proletarianisation' of the Jewish people:¹⁰⁹

Unter Proletarisierung versteht man gemeinhin die Herabdrückung von einzelnen und

109 It is worth noting, however, that, for many contemporaneous thinkers, "proletarianization was not a "class" term, but [...] denoted uprootedness." (Mosse, *Germans and Jews*, p105). Nonetheless, if found in an entire people, this uprootedness still represents a form of economic homogeneity, even if not in classical Marxist terms.

Bevölkerungsgruppen in die untere Gesellschaftsklasse, ihre Umwandlung in abhängige Lohnempfänger ohne die wirtschaftliche Sicherheit des folgenden Tages, ihre Ausschließung aus den höheren Berufen und der reicheren Geistesbildung mit ihren inneren moralischen Genugtuung und ihren äußeren Ehren und materiellen Erfolgen. (ZS:208)

Proletarianisation is explicitly linked to oppression, saying that antisemitism “nimmt den besten, vorbildlichsten Juden die Möglichkeit, ihre Fähigkeiten bis zu deren natürlichen Grenzen zu entfalten” (ZS:5). Nordau’s term ‘proletarianisation’ seems at odds with Herzl’s analysis, particularly since Nordau mentions only downward, not upward mobility. This is perhaps because he seems to place more emphasis on the east and Jewish poverty, and Herzl seems more concerned by cultural traits of German and Austrian Jews. However, both settle on the same problem with the Jewish people: shaped by antisemitism, the Jews have a homogeneous class structure. Rather than egalitarian and democratic, it is framed as a failure to produce a healthily diverse and stratified body politic, and hence a failure to produce the great figures so central to Herzl’s understanding of politics and history. Whether this is portrayed as mediocrity or proletarianisation, the Jews lack both greatness and difference: top and bottom strata that can feel and express solidarity with each other.

To understand this better, it is worth comparing Ernest Gellner’s ideas of stratification in agrarian and industrial societies. Agrarian societies, he argues, are marked by “horizontal cultural cleavages”, and

Contrary to what Marxism has led people to expect, it is pre-industrial society which is addicted to horizontal differentiation within societies, whereas industrial society strengthens the boundaries between nations rather than those between classes.¹¹⁰

He goes on to contrast industrial society’s “egalitarian expectations and aspirations” with the fact

110 Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p12

that early on it “engenders very sharp and painful and conspicuous inequalities”.¹¹¹ Starting from Gellner’s initial definition that “nations are the artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities”,¹¹² nationalism allows identification and unity between unequal strata of society. This is frequently the stated aim of national movements, particularly liberal and progressive ones. Mazzini’s aforementioned view of the nation as a ‘tribunal’ to ‘appeal’ to where interests conflict,¹¹³ and his fear of “the worst of all social crimes, a civil war between class and class”¹¹⁴ presuppose the continued existence of social stratification – the nation guarantees the unity, cooperation and mutual respect of economic classes, not their dissolution – but the differences may only be economic, not differences of culture or identification.

Herzl and Jewish Flaws

Antisemitism does not simply affect the Jews’ situation, but transforms their character and even their bodies. Löwenberg is served by a waiter and cashier who are both described as ‘blaß’. While Herzl does not say whether they are Jewish or not, or if Löwenberg’s complexion matches, this association of Jewish listlessness with coffee-house pallor plays on the stereotypical *Kaffeehausjude*,¹¹⁵ showing a Jew in an environment which induces pallor. Whether the Jewish protagonist is pale or not, his life certainly is.

It is the diaspora habits and character, however, that receive the most criticism. Shortly after the object of Löwenberg’s unrequited love becomes engaged, Herzl writes:

In diesem Kreise, wo man nur für Vergnügen und Vorteil Sinn hatte, war Geld alles, und doch war er auf diesen Kreis der jüdischen Bourgeoisie angewiesen. Mit diesen Leuten und leider auch von diesen Leuten mußte er leben, denn sie stellten die Klientel einer zukünftigen Advokatenpraxis vor.

111 Ibid., p72

112 Ibid., p7

113 Dahbour and Ishay, *The Nationalism Reader*, p89

114 Ibid., p91

115 This concept, whose specific connotations will be investigated elsewhere, is most notably examined in John M. Efron, “The “Kaftanjude” and the “Kaffeehausjude”: Two Models of Jewish Insanity: A Discussion of Causes and Cures among German-Jewish Psychiatrists”, *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 37, (1992), 169-188

Not only does Herzl present what he considers the fundamental problems with the Jewish bourgeoisie, he shows those Jews who tire of these qualities, such as Löwenberg, to be inescapably bound to them. This is an idea central to 'Mauschel', and one which will be examined later in its own right. In the Jewish circles at the beginning of *Altneuland*, the most popular cultural activity is social gatherings attended by two men named Grün and Blau, "Die zwei geistreichsten Menschen von Wien" (GZW.V:138). Grün specialises in puns, Blau in personal comments. Luckily, "Er hat das richtige Gesicht dafür. Seine Wangen werden nicht rot, wenn man sie ohrfeigt".¹¹⁶ Like Laschner's stereotypical forename Moritz, a Germanisation of 'Moses', the pair are given recognisably Jewish names which mark them out as a double act and associate their pairing with Jewishness. The two are rivals, and very popular in 'the better Jewish circles'. Viennese Jewish culture is not only revealed as shallow and malicious, but largely shown to centre on assertions of symbolic social status, despite, or perhaps because of the homogeneous mediocrity Herzl complains of elsewhere. Blau's first joke at Grün's expense is also particularly telling: "Grün – essen Sie nicht so laut! Man hört seinen eigenen Fisch nicht" (GZW.V:139). Blau plays on stereotypes about Jewish table manners by drawing attention to the same, Jewish, flaws in the entire, Jewish, circle. The diaspora bourgeoisie mock each other for being the most Jewish at a table of Jews and in doing so assert status, as Blau, claiming to be less Jewish, assumes a higher position over Grün.

This materialism, superficiality and petty competition are qualities Herzl particularly ascribes to his woman characters. Rabbi Weiss is not only interrupted by a woman, but it is her husband, who does want to listen, who shuts her up. In Herzl's work Jewish failings are more

116 Clemens Peck observes that Blau, "ein mittelgroßer Mann von etwa dreißig Jahren, hatte ein glattrasiertes Gesicht, und auf der stark gebogenen Nase saß ihm ein Kneifer" (GZW.V:138), who is frequently slapped in the face for his jokes, bears an eerie resemblance to Karl Kraus, whose essay 'Eine Krone für Zion' mounted a fierce and drily mocking attack on Zionism. Clemens Peck, *Im Labor der Utopie: Theodor Herzl und das „Altneuland“-Projekt* (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 2012), p247

exaggerated on the women's side, and those Jews who attempt to resist these social mores are invariably men.

These failings are foregrounded most among anti-Zionist Jews. No sooner than laughter at the idea of Palestine dies down, Grün and Blau begin:

Grün schrie: "Ich werde Botschafter in Wien."

Erneutes Gelächter. Einige riefen dazwischen: "Ich auch, ich auch."

Da sagte Blau ernst: "Meine Herren, alle können es nicht werden. Ich glaube, die österreichische Regierung wird so viele jüdische Botschafter nicht annehmen. Sie müssen sich um andere Posten umsehen." (*GZVV*:141)

These and the avalanche of jokes that follow (listed rapidly, unattributed to either wag) are most likely not Herzl's own. Especially since Blau is a caricature of Karl Kraus, Herzl himself is less likely to be their original source than their original butt. His audience for this book, after all, was German-speaking Zionists, who must have spent many gatherings explaining their far-fetched and implausible project to other Jews. Rather than displaying his own self-deprecating wit, Herzl presents tired one-liners his readers would be wearily familiar with.

Besides rudeness and disrespect, the inability to take Weiss's suggestion seriously shows several things. Their jokes are immediately prioritised over any kind of deference to his age and authority or the sensitivity of the topic. They also fail to take the Zionist project and even the inevitable antisemitism of Austrian government seriously. Flippancy about their own Jewish identity is revealed soon after: "Ich bin stolz, daß ich ein Jud' bin," Laschner quips, "denn wenn ich nicht wär' stolz, wär' ich doch auch ein Jud'. Also bin ich lieber gleich stolz." (*GZVV*:142) The joke again reveals the inescapability of being Jewish, and the function of humour as a futile attempt to escape and reconcile it. However, Laschner at least wants to hear the rabbi, and however ambiguously ironic his joke may be, it remains an assertion of pride.

Western Jews' superficiality and materialism is shown alongside their unseriousness about their own identity as Jews. Indeed this may well be an act of self-ironisation on Herzl's part: writing as a Jew, he makes Jewish use of humour a source of humour, and attacks Jewish self-deprecation in particular. Herzl presents this unseriousness as the major failing of diaspora Jews existing in this state of inertia. Even in the New Society, Grün and Blau continue to make the same jokes, (GZVV:407) and, unlike her near-identical daughter, Löwenberg's thwarted love Ernestine has become a "fette, verblühte, in allzu grelle Farben gekleidete Dame" (GZVV:230). This old generation of Viennese Jewry has not changed but transplanted itself, and it is only their children who begin the transformation.

This crude, materialistic dilettantism is shown in the characters of Wasserstein and Rheinberg in *Das neue Ghetto*. The pair form part of background to the hero, Jakob Samuel's display of an assertive Jewish honour, a society of superficial middle-class Jews largely indifferent to their heritage. Wasserstein is introduced pottering around, in the capacity of 'Gratulant', mentally pricing the furniture and wedding presents (GZVV:9). His eye for finery is matched by an ignorance of high culture: later he needs Bichler's comment, "Sie werden lyrisch!" explained to him (GZVV:13), and an uncouth manner, entering at one point "*von links hinten, in der einen Hand ein Champagnerglas, in der anderen ein Sandwich, er kaut mit beiden Backen*" and then proceeding to add up money out loud with his mouth full. (GZVV:25) Yet, in sharp contrast to the many negative Jewish stereotypes Wasserstein fulfils to a ridiculous extent, he does not fill any positive ones about skill with money, and his ineptitude is matched by his business partner Rheinberg:

WASSERSTEIN: In Berlin starke Kohlenverkäufe. Hier kauft jemand Massen. Man vermutet Schlesinger.

RHEINBERG: (*lacht*) Wasserstein, Sie sind ein Esel.

WASSERSTEIN: (*demütig*) Warum, Herr von Rheinberg?

RHEINBERG: Der Jemand, der in Berlin verkauft und hier kauft – bin ich. (GZVV:26)

To a certain extent their relationship functions as a comedy duo. Like Stan Laurel or any other classic funny-man, Wasserstein is more obviously crass, materialistic and stupid, while Rheinberg, technically his employer, is equally flawed, with the added lack of self-awareness of Oliver Hardy or any other straight-man. Indeed their names hint at the dynamic: the Rhine and mountains being more grandiose than water and stones, but ultimately cut from the same material. The exchange continues

RHEINBERG: Wenn ich Sie im Tempel bemerkt hätte – ich wollte Ihnen einen Auftrag geben.

WASSERSTEIN: (*kaut betrübt*) Mein Pech!... Ich bin weggegangen. Wer denkt im Tempel ans Geschäft?

RHEINBERG: Wasserstein, Sie sind...

WASSERSTEIN: Ein Esel, ich weiß, Herr von Rheinberg. (GZVV:26)

Wasserstein's sin, for which he anticipates an insult, is actually a vestigial respect for Jewish institutions. For Rheinberg, placing faith over business is simple stupidity and his comic lack of self-awareness compared to Wasserstein mirrors his denial of his Jewishness. Similarly, he conceals his business failings, in stark contrast to Wasserstein's openness. Showing a parallel dynamic, the scene begins with this exchange between the hero's wife Hermine and her sister Charlotte:

CHARLOTTE: (*zu Hermine*) Hat Du die Schlesinger im Tempel gesehen? Ein Pariser Kleid.

HERMINE: Im Tempel sollte ich darauf achten?

CHARLOTTE: Oh weh, Du bist sentimental.

HERMINE: Charlotte!

CHARLOTTE: Danke Dir: die Schlesinger – solche Ärmel! Prachtvoll... (GZVV:24).

Though in stereotypically gendered areas, both Jewish men and Jewish women are shown bringing worldly, bourgeois interests into the temple, being criticised for it, and counter-attacking, while Jewish women display womanly flaws in excess.

Sometimes Rheinberg actively distances himself from his Jewishness. Wasserstein is rebuked for calling attention to antisemitism, from the same antisemite who provokes the fateful duel.

SCHRAMM: Ja, mein Lieber (*Händedruck*) Es sind mir zu viele – Leute da. ... Wiedersehen (*Ab.*)

WASSERSTEIN: (*der den beiden nachhorchte, zu Rheinberg*): Er hat sagen wollen: zu viele Juden!

RHEINBERG: (*streng*): Wasserstein, Sie sind ein Esel! Übrigens – wenn man Sie sieht, kann man ein Antisemit werden. (*GZWV:33*)

What angers Rheinberg, and even what he sees as the cause of antisemitism, is not just Jewish flaws but Wasserstein's failure to ignore antisemitism and deny or play down his own Jewishness. And, unlike Rheinberg, when an altercation breaks out, it is Wasserstein who decides to have his belligerently antisemitic client thrown out. He takes the most pleasure when Schramm gets his dues, rubbing his hands and saying "Aaah – das war ein Genuß! Und die Ohrfeige wird er uns nicht ableugnen – wir haben Zeugen!" (*GZWV:102*) When the hero dies, he reacts with "Höre Israel!" and murmured prayer. Wasserstein has deep and stereotypically Jewish flaws, but potential to become a proud member of his nation nevertheless. Rather than simply a pair of stereotypically flawed Jews, Rheinberg is flawed both in stereotypically Jewish ways and specifically as a Jew, in relation to his Jewishness, whereas Wasserstein, however prone to the foibles of the Viennese Jewish bourgeoisie, still recognises himself as a Jew and is still willing to stand up for them. Even Blau has this redeeming feature. His joke about Jewish ambassadors is effectively a counter to preceding anti-Zionist jokes, and hinges on acknowledging institutionalised antisemitism. When Mrs. Löffler wants to avoid discussing Jewish matters in front of the servants, Blau quips "Entschuldigen, gnädige Frau, ich hab' nicht gewußt, daß ihre Dienstboten nicht wissen, daß Sie Juden sind" (*GZWV:142*). Similarly, he spends the party, and presumably the next twenty years, whipping a lawyer, Dr. Walter, into a fury, simply by using his former name of Veiglstock (*GZWV:142, 295*). For all his flaws and superficiality, Blau's victim of

choice is still those Jews who attempt to hide their identity. However much he may ironise himself, use mock hypocrisy and hide pride in his Jewishness behind a smirk, Blau retains this pride and despises Jewish self-denial. In *Das neue Ghetto*, Herzl starkly distinguishes Wasserstein's mostly personal set of flaws from Rheinberg's, which more than anything concern his own relationship to Jewishness, and so creates two diasporic archetypes. In *Altneuland*, flawed diaspora Jews are a little more nuanced and sit on a sliding scale between the two points. However, for the men at least, flaws like Blau's rudeness and hypocrisy or Laschner's Yiddish malapropisms sit alongside a willingness to defend their Jewishness, even if only through several protective layers of irony.

Nordau and the Body Politic

Nordau, like Herzl, is highly critical of many traits he considers Jewish. Yet Nordau is keener to extend them beyond archetypal individuals. After a comparison of the British 'loafer', the Italian 'lazzarone' and the Jewish 'Luftmensch', Nordau extends the Jewish archetype to the people in general:

Viele Luftmenschen geben zusammen ein Luftvolk. In der Tat, das jüdische Volk ist ein Luftvolk. Buchstäblich, denn es hat keinen Fußbreit eigenen Bodens und hängt vollständig in der Luft, bildlich, denn es hat keinen festen wirtschaftlichen Boden unter seinen Füßen und lebt, wie der einzelne Luftmensch, Tag für Tag von Wundern und fabelhaften Zufällen, nicht von einem regelrechten, sichern Erwerb. (ZS:181)

Unlike the loafers and *lazzaroni*, this is not the situation of individuals but the entire people, and the qualities of their least productive members become those of the Jews as a nation. The problem Nordau identifies is that individual failings among other peoples are reflected in the situation and resulting traits of Jews as a whole. More precisely, concerning the presence of the 'Luftmensch' among a 'Luftvolk', Nordau writes:

Das gesamte Judentum wird immer nur so stark sein wie sein schwächster Punkt und den Maßstab, mit dem man es mäßt, wird immer der niedrigststehende Jude liefern. Sie können den Kaftanjuden nicht von den Schößen Ihres feinen Fracks abschütteln! Ihre Anstrengungen zu diesem Zwecke machen Sie in den Augen der Nichtjuden nur lächerlich und verächtlich. Die Verachtung, die der hündisch kriechende Bettler in schmierigem Kaftan und mit den fettigen Schläferingeln einflößt, fällt auf uns alle zurück. (ZS:243)

Again, as with Herzl, to be a Jew with all its baggage is inescapable, and associations between smartly dressed Western Jews – clearly Nordau’s audience – and the kaftan-wearing *shtetl* Jews in the East cannot be avoided or erased. Not only can the embarrassment of dirty kaftans and greasy sidelocks not be jettisoned, the attempt to do so is equally undignified and embarrassing. It is also particularly worth noting that the contempt for Jews, both for this association and for their attempts to escape it, is explicitly acknowledged as coming from non-Jews.

It is not just the nature of Jews’ work that Nordau sees as corrupted by diaspora, but its organisation. He states to the Fourth Zionist Congress:

Das jüdische Volk war chaotisch; es bildete keinen Organismus; es war ein Menschenstaub; es wußte selbst nicht, was es wollte, konnten selbstverständlich auch die Regierungen dies nicht wissen. Das geändert zu haben, scheint wenig, es ist aber in Wirklichkeit sehr viel. (ZS:146)

At the Fifth, a year later, he makes this sentiment even more explicitly about work: “Sie müssen die Arbeitsanarchie aufgeben und sich organisieren. Keine Konkurrenz, Kooperation! lautet unser dringender Rat” (ZS:135). He ascribes it to diaspora (ZS:368), but also presents this failing as a cause of Jewish poverty, a dominant factor, by his understanding, in creating diaspora conditions:

Das jüdische Volk ist bettelarm und muß es unabänderlich bleiben, erstens weil es sich Beschäftigungen hingibt, von denen mit mathematischer Bestimmtheit nachgewiesen werden kann, daß sie schlechterdings nichts einbringen können, zweitens, weil es eine anarchistische

Individualwirtschaft statt einer Volksökonomie betreibt und jeder einzelne Jude seine ganze Kraft in rücksichtslos wütendem Wettbewerb mit seinem jüdischen Nachbar vergeudet, drittens, weil es die blutwenigen Mittel, die es besitzt, falsch und zwecklos verwendet, also tatsächlich zum Fenster hinauswirft. (ZS:134)

For Nordau, the failure of the Jewish nation to co-operate as one organism denies it self-knowledge and purpose. However, a nation abandoned to the ‘Arbeitsanarchie’ of unplanned and uncoordinated labour in whatever professions the market presents does not seem particularly unusual for capitalism, least of all unique to the Jews. Nordau, in a similar vein to many antisemites, conflates Jewish failings with those of modernity. ‘Arbeitsanarchie’ paints Jews as lacking unity, direction and economic or professional stratification, all of which Zionism purports to solve, and implicitly treats nationalist sentiment as a generalised solution to the ills of modern capitalism. This complex attitude to modernity will be examined in a later chapter.

With Nordau, there is far more emphasis on the Jewish body being shaped by oppression. Jews in his writing are “Tiefseegeschöpfe unter einem ungeheurn Druck” (ZS:83), reminiscent of Herzl’s ubiquitous steam metaphor. They are shaped, like the face of the earth, by violent forces, although Nordau prefers the more gradual oceanic theory to the volcanic,¹¹⁷ implying that it is not the short-term catastrophes such as pogroms he is ultimately fighting, but the long-term privations and disabilities. While in Herzl’s metaphor, pressure drives the Jews onwards to create a nation for themselves, in Nordau’s, it has done more than simply shape their culture. With the implied bizarre exoticism of deep sea creatures and the extremity of their environment, his implication is that the Jews have become misshapen and deformed. He specifically points to

117 “Nach der vulkanischen Theorie verdanken Meere und Festländer, Gebirge und Gesteinschichten ihre Entstehung furchtbaren Umwälzung, Erdbeben, vulkanischen Ausbrüchen, dem jähen Versinken und Auftauchen von Erdteilen, Katastrophen, die in Abständen von Hunderttausenden oder Millionen Jahren plötzlich eintreten und mit einem Schlage das Antlitz der Erde verändern. Die neptunische Theorie dagegen nimmt an, Länder und Seen und alle ihre Einzelheiten seien das Werk dauernder Naturkräfte, die geräuschlos, doch unablässig an der Arbeit sind, jeden Augenblick nur ganz winzige Veränderungen setzen, jedoch nach Jahrtausenden ruhig und gleichmäßig Festländer und Gebirge aufgebaut und abgetragen, Meere vertieft und ausgefüllt haben.” (ZS:80-1)

Jewish poverty as a cause of their physical degeneration, saying “[...] ihre Kinder sterben als Säuglinge oder erwachsen zu rachitischen Zwergen, der ganze Stamm ist zu Krankheit, Unwissenheit, Laster und Wahnsinn verurteilt [...]” (ZS:242). However, Jewish customs, both religious and secular, also have a hand in shaping the Jewish body in all its frailty:

Das jüdische Volk muß sich die allzu frühe Eheschließung und die allzu frühe Einschulung der Kinder abgewöhnen. Die Verheiratung halbwüchsiger Jünglinge und Mädchen, die wirtschaftlich noch lange nicht selbstständig sind, ein Brauch, der an unsere morgenländischen Ursprünge erinnert, ist ein Krebschaden an unserem Volksorganismus. (ZS:133)

This practice of early marriage, which Nordau explicitly sees as an oriental quality, is not only compared to a disease (which, for a physician generally given to biological metaphor, is not especially shocking) but, as Nordau continues, is posited as an explanation for both further social failings such as the fragility of Jewish marriages, and physical infirmity. When Nordau relates this to the premature ageing of Jewish women, further implications appear. This ill health is not a purely medical problem, but is framed in aesthetic and moral terms.

Kaum weniger schädlich als die frühe Ehe ist die frühe Einschulung der Knaben. Diese bleibt eine Sünde, selbst wenn das Cheder seine barbarische Gesundheitswidrigkeit verliert. Es verhindert die körperliche Ausbildung und legt Keime spätern Siechtums in den Organismus, wenn man das Kind vor vollendetem sechstem Jahre zur Schule schickt und es mehr als fünf Stunden täglich zu geistiger Anstrengung anhält. (ZS:133-4)

Nordau associates this “barbaric” tradition with Jewish infirmity. Not only poverty but backwardness characterise the Jewish condition, yet this lack of modernity produces some (most often physiological) failings just as modernity itself is often associated with others. While Nordau is contemptuous of some outmoded customs, he laments the loss of others.

Und noch eine Wirkung hat der Eintritt in einen Zionsverein: der Jude lernt wieder, sich in die Geschichte, die Bräuche, das Wesen seines Volkes zu vertiefen, ihren Wert, ihre Schönheit zu

empfinden, an jüdische Dinge zu denken, von jüdischen Dingen zu sprechen und unter dem Worte “jüdische Dinge” nicht nur Sonnabendnachmittag-Synagogenhofklatsch und Kehillaintrigen zu verstehen, sondern Größeres, Würdigeres, Schöneres, die geistigen und materiellen Aufgaben eines Volkes, das groß ist durch seine Vergangenheit, seine heiligen Bücher, seine Leiden und seine Ideale.
(ZS:370)

‘Lernt wieder’ implies that Western Jews have lost this awareness; that their understanding of their Jewish identity is, reminiscent of *Altneuland*, limited to petty social competition. Where Herzl presents this as a fact of diaspora, Nordau presents it far more as Jewish self-perception. It is also notable that the flaws: the unhygienic *cheder*, gossip and intrigue within the *kehilla* (Jewish social circle), are quite specific, and either named in Hebrew or specifically linked to the Sabbath and synagogue, while the ‘Größeres, Würdigeres und Schöneres’ are all vague, abstract, and in German. This contrast between the specificity of flaws and the vagueness of qualities also manifests itself in Herzl’s essay ‘Mauschel’, which will be examined later.

What is particularly remarkable about both writers is how their perception of antisemitism places far less weight on the suffering and persecution than on its effect on the social, personal and even physiological qualities of Jews. While, as Germanised Jews living in the relative safety of Vienna, they were insulated from the worst of antisemitism, this tendency marks a preoccupation, not with the failings of the Jews’ enemies, but with those of the Jews themselves. Exactly as with Dohm, in order to be explained away, these failings must be explicitly acknowledged. Yet this view of diaspora Jewish failings seems more than an attempt to explain them away. Nordau and especially Herzl exhibit constant unease over these traits, which in many ways repeat the charges of antisemites, however these individual traits invariably reflect, in one way or another, flawed relationships between Jews.

Duelling Tragedies

It is intriguing that both Herzl and Nordau wrote tragedies culminating in a fatal duel, as a medium for their opinions on Jewish society and politics, even though the duel was a popular, almost obligatory plot device in the theatre of the time. Even if we note that Nordau's *Doktor Kohn* was written five years after Herzl's *Das neue Ghetto*, and that it may well have been a response to or adaptation of his friend's play (contemporary critics saw it as a poor copy)¹¹⁸ the duelling tragedy was still a genre he actively chose to contribute to. Perhaps the most vital difference between the plays is their relationship to the two men's Zionism. Herzl's, written in a frenzy in October and November 1894, was written around six months before *Der Judenstaat*, and over a month before the start of the Dreyfus trial,¹¹⁹ when Herzl was keenly aware of the problem but had yet to settle on a remedy. Nordau's, by contrast, was written in 1898, when he had already taken his place in the movement. Yet despite this, Nordau's play is in some ways a less Zionist text than Herzl's. While the desire felt by the hero, Kohn, to revive a Jewish homeland is briefly but unambiguously mentioned, the overwhelming focus is on diagnosis, not prescription, and Nordau's is a largely descriptive portrayal of the kind of cultural ambivalence and social inertia that characterise the first book of *Altneuland*. *Das neue Ghetto*, however, is far more a strident affirmation of what Herzl then considered a solution. While the death of Nordau's hero is a tragic consequence of the situation, and its senselessness explicitly mentioned, the dignified death of Herzl's is a heroic culmination of his qualities. While there is more explicit Zionism in *Doktor Kohn*, affirmation of Jewish identity as a cure for antisemitism is far more prominent in Herzl's play, and there are even implications that these ills and the remedy are partially spatial.

Das neue Ghetto, like *Altneuland*, opens with an unflattering portrayal of middle-class

118 Petra Zudrell, *Der Kulturkritiker und Schriftsteller Max Nordau: Zwischen Zionismus, Deutschtum und Judentum* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003), p223

119 Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl*, p190

Jewish society. With the exception of the hero, Jakob Samuel, also a Doctor of Law, the Jewish characters are stereotypical *parvenus*, particularly the women, and among them particularly his wife. His closest and most Austrian-sounding friend Franz Wurzlechner, a Gentile, fearing the effect of their association on his political ambitions, breaks off contact with him. A worker from a client's coal mine approaches him, describing their oppressive working conditions. His rabbi attempts to dissuade him from helping and, to illustrate the folly of Jews getting involved, tells him a story: one summer night, a young man follows a cry for help from outside the ghetto (presumably a ruse to entrap him) and is found dead the next morning at the gates. However, the attempt to discourage Samuel fails, and he travels east to the mine. This provokes an argument with the client, Schramm, who calls Samuel 'Judenpack', is slapped by the hero and challenges him to a duel. Samuel is fatally wounded and dies with the last words "Ich will – hinaus!... Hinaus – aus – dem – Ghetto!" (GZVV:124)

In *Doktor Kohn*, instead of a portrait of flawed Jewish social circles, the first few scenes depict long, antisemitic conversations between relatively minor characters. The hero's conundrum, meanwhile, is more down-to-earth and based on individuals' interpersonal relationships than Samuel's. Dr. Leo Kohn, a brilliant mathematician, wishes to marry his sweetheart Christine, and to take the position of professor at Vienna University where he is currently a *Privatdozent*. He is hindered in both of these by antisemitism: the Rector, though partially sympathetic and far less outspoken than the other two professors, is reluctant to give the position to a Jew, and Christine's family are equally reluctant to see her marry one. The tension with her brother Karl leads him to insult Kohn. After much agonising, Kohn challenges Karl to a duel, which he subsequently loses. He does not regain consciousness and for the final act, he is on his deathbed offstage.

There are several clear similarities between the plays. Both heroes have obviously Jewish

names: 'Jakob Samuel' is two typically Jewish given names, either of which could double as a surname, while Kohn has even more specific significance: for example the popular comic stereotype 'der kleine Kohn'. Hans-Peter Söder notes:

Nordau could not have picked a more graphic trope. For a German audience the name "Kohn, or Cohn" called up the whole register of antisemitic clichés. Indeed, in Germany the name Cohn was synonymous with the worst Jewish stereotype.¹²⁰

As Söder notes, Dietz Bering's study *Der Name als Stigma* found it to be the surname with the strongest antisemitic associations.¹²¹ In addition, Nordau's hero has both the common Jewish forename 'Leo' (often changed from either 'Levy' or, coincidentally the origin of the name 'Herzl': 'Loeb')¹²² and the "most common Jewish forename", as the joke goes: 'Doctor'. Both are devoid of negative Jewish traits: Samuel as an idealistic but otherwise unremarkable member of the Viennese bourgeoisie, Kohn with only the Jewish head for figures alluded to by the Rector. In contrast to the stereotype though, Kohn is only good with numbers in their abstract form, with art and learning for their own sake, and not at all with money:

MOSER: Aber lieber Dr. Kohn, wie können Sie, ein praktischer Mathematiker –

KOHN: Auf diesen Titel habe ich keinen Anspruch. Börsenspieler, Spekulanten und dergleichen mag man praktische Mathematiker nennen. Ich rühme mich, ein theoretischer Mathematiker zu sein.¹²³

Indeed, since in this exchange he is refusing a dowry just as his professional career hits a glass ceiling, he could be seen as possessing far more hotheaded romanticism than financial sense. Like with Herzl's inept financier Wasserstein, Nordau has not only explicitly removed a stereotypically Jewish trait in favour of an intellectual disposition, but also replaced it with

120 Hans-Peter Söder, 'Captain Dreyfus in Germany? Max Nordau's *Dr. Kohn* as a "Bourgeois Tragedy"', *Modern Judaism* 15, no. 1 (1995), 35-47, p7

121 Dietz Bering, *Der Name als Stigma: Antisemitismus im deutschen Alltag 1812-1933* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988), pp206-23

122 In his description of Herzl's fantasies of Marrano heritage, Kornberg notes the belief that his Spanish family was named 'Loebl', a diminutive of the Hebrew 'Loeb' ('לֵב'), meaning 'heart', which was in turn Germanised to 'Herzl'. *Theodor Herzl*, pp76-7

123 Max Nordau, *Doktor Kohn* (Berlin: E. Hofmann & Co, 1902), p81

Gentile flaws. Kohn is also visibly, though not exaggeratedly, Jewish in Nordau's stage directions: "schwarzer, feiner Schnurrbart, etwas krauses schwarzes Haar, leicht gebogene Nase, ausgesprochen jüdischer Typus" (DK:22). Neither character – though Kohn less than Samuel – is able to hide his Jewishness, and neither is interested in doing so.

This in turn leads to the major tension in *Doktor Kohn*: while every Jewish character in *Das neue Ghetto* is unambiguously aware of and open about their Jewishness, this is far from the case in Nordau's play. Moser, Kohn's prospective father-in-law, is a Jewish convert to Christianity and – like Nordau himself – in a mixed marriage. His son, Karl, who is ultimately to kill Kohn, has been raised wholly ignorant of his Jewish roots. Moser's long discussion of Jewish identity with Kohn in Act II leads to him challenging his own brother-in-law, Quinke, over the latter's explicit and unashamed antisemitism. Indeed, while *Das neue Ghetto* portrays many of what Herzl perceived as Jewish failings, *Doktor Kohn* only seems to focus on one: denial of Jewishness. Though *Doktor Kohn* is thematically far more about antisemitism than it is about Jewish failings, it is this Jewish failing that ultimately causes most of the dramatic tension in the play and leads to the duel. In *Das neue Ghetto* by comparison it is largely antisemitism that provokes the action and culmination, and self-hatred is mostly used for colour and comic relief. Furthermore, while Samuel is challenged in the heat of the moment after responding angrily to an insult, Leo Kohn himself issues the challenge, again in response to an insult but with far more contemplation. This complication is understandable: while Samuel only needs to risk killing an antisemitic Gentile, who the audience can unambiguously side against, Kohn must duel with someone he not only considers a member of his family, but who he also knows to be a fellow Jew. As Söder points out, *Doktor Kohn* may be understood as Moser's tragedy as much as Kohn's.¹²⁴ After decades of sacrificing his heritage and faith in the name of German patriotism, he still cannot fully escape

124 Söder, 'Captain Dreyfus in Germany', p9

antisemitism or the embarrassment of his own Jewish past. As, through Kohn, he slowly rediscovers his pride and assertiveness as a Jew, he also discovers that his own son has become murderously antisemitic. Finally, his family torn apart by the duel, he is unable to offer Kohn's bereaved, pious father Amschel his hospitality, as he has no mezuzah (small, boxed prayer scrolls), and, since he does not keep kosher and so have proper separate utensils, cannot even offer him refreshment. Adding to the humiliation, Amschel Kohn's explanation of the mezuzah is condescendingly brief: "Es wäre zu lang, Ihnen zu erklären, was das ist. Es ist ein geheiligter Gegenstand, der an die Thürposte genagelt wird" (DK:190). As the play ends he is unable to be properly German or Jewish.

In both plays, to be a Jew is inescapable. In *Das neue Ghetto*, Jews are confined to a closed social circle, where necessity forces even the protagonist's closest and most loyal Gentile friend to break off contact. And while, unlike *Das neue Ghetto*, *Doktor Kohn* involves mixed marriage as a central theme – both couplings are entirely harmonious – the characters fail in their attempts to abandon their Jewish identity. Moreover, even their individual actions are only perceived in terms of their Jewishness: Samuel tells his friend, when challenged to a duel: "Wenn du, Franz Wurzelechner, eine solche Geschichte gütlich beilegst, bist Du ein ruhiger, g'scheiter Mensch. Ich, Jakob Samuel, bin ein Feigling" (GZVV:51). This same principle is demonstrated in practice in *Doktor Kohn*:

KOHN: Herr Leutnant, ich beschwöre Sie, sich keines verletzenden Wortes zu bedienen. Sie müssen mich als einen Unbewaffneten, ja Waffenunfähigen betrachten –

KARL: Waffenunfähigen! Stimmt!

KOHN: Ihnen gegenüber, Herr Leutnant! Bloß Ihnen gegenüber! Und Ihre Ritterlichkeit muß Sie abhalten, einen Wehrlosen anzugreifen.

KARL: Das sind Spitzfindigkeiten, zu deren Würdigung ich nicht genug Talmudist bin. Ich wiederhole Wenn Sie Ehre im Leibe hätten –

KOHN: (bebend) Jede Beleidigung fällt auf Sie zurück, da ich sie nie erwidern darf. (DK:162)

It is worth noting that, by refusing to fight his own prospective brother-in-law, Kohn is not simply claiming defencelessness, but asserting himself as a member of Karl's family. It is not just his sense of honour that is dismissed as Talmudic sophistry, but his desire to be part of Gentile society. The double meaning of "Jede Beleidigung fällt auf Sie zurück", at the same time, serves to highlight the absurdity of Jewish antisemitism. This ambivalence remains with Kohn until the end, and even after challenging Karl later on, he still gets cold feet and fires into the air. Söder argues:

Although the subject matter of Nordau's play *Dr Cohn* [sic] is clear cut, its moral and didactic message is surprisingly ambiguous. The play by this co-founder of Zionism cannot be counted entirely to the genre of the Zionist theater. [...] As paradoxical as it may sound from the mouth of the iron-willed materialist Max Nordau, the *Judenfrage* (Jewish question) comes down to the question of personal ethics and especially to the question of honor.¹²⁵

Kohn makes brief allusions to his Zionism, but given their negligible, passing significance, Söder is right to dismiss this as a theme. Rather, personal ethics and honour are put forward as solutions, but, given the play's pessimism, they are only useful to a limited extent. Indeed, unlike Samuel's proud last words, Kohn's death seems senseless, even avoidable. The play, perhaps in this sense a gentle rebuttal of *Das neue Ghetto* as much as a more low-key and interpersonal adaptation, prescribes Zionism, not positively, but negatively, by showing the failings of any kind of Jewish revival while still in diaspora.

However, these plays are not, as Anita Shapira implies in her comparison to Ahad Ha'am, simple condemnations of meekness and prescriptions of courage. She writes:

The heroes of plays written by Herzl and Nordau died as a result of duels in which they became involved while trying to protect "Jewish honor." According to Ahad Ha-'Am, a true Jew would not feel

125 Ibid., p9

insulted by a boorish remark. Instead of fighting and getting killed, he would simply avoid the fellow. The true Jew was someone who was not ashamed of his physical inferiority. Rather, he felt superior to non-Jews: while non-Jews were immersed in bloodshed and power struggles, the Jew watched disdainfully, wondering at their moral degradation. In a word, weak was superior.¹²⁶

While Ahad Ha'am's almost perfectly reflects the position of Kohn's father Amschel, "Todtschießen und Todtschlagen sollen die anderen. Unsere Waffe ist der Geist." (DK:187), this unassuming non-violence is not wholly incompatible with Samuel and Kohn's behaviour. Firstly, Kohn does everything he can to refuse to fight Karl, even choosing to fire into the air. Samuel laments the fact that, as a Jew, he cannot refuse to fight without reaffirming the worst stereotypes. Indeed, for Samuel, weak is also superior, and he flatly states "Wenn der Starke großmütig ist, wo ist das Verdienst? Aber der Schwache! Da wird's rühmlich" (GZVV:91). Though proud and assertive compared to the other Jewish characters, by the standards of duelling heroes they are extremely mild-mannered. Finally, and most notably, both heroes lose. Unlike, for example, Eugene Onegin, their tragedy is never killing for their honour but dying for it. Herzl and Nordau still believe that it is more heroic to be a victim than a perpetrator. The principle they die for, and that Kohn stubbornly refuses to kill for, is not just pride in Jewish identity, but exactly the unashamed meekness that Ahad Ha'am so valued in Jews. Indeed, it is antisemitism that prevents both characters from being as prudent, thick-skinned and non-violent as Ahad Ha'am recommends.

The mine's eastern location in *Das neue Ghetto* (specifically Dubnica in what is now Slovakia) sets Samuel in opposition to Habsburg ethnic power structures. Jakob's solidarity is double: with the downtrodden and, perhaps rather pertinently to both the plot and the story he is told by a rabbi, with national minorities of the Habsburg empire. Rabbi Friedheimer's story of the unfortunate young Jew stabbed to death at the gates of the ghetto (GZVV:90) is itself

126 Shapira, 'Herzl, Ahad Ha-'Am, and Berdichevsky', p64.

particularly interesting when read in conjunction with the following passage from Max Nordau's speech to the first Congress:

Im Ghetto hatte der Jude seine eigene Welt, sie war ihm die sichere Heimstätte, die für ihn die geistige und sittliche Bedeutung eines Vaterlandes hatte; hier waren die Genossen, bei denen man gelten wollte, aber auch gelten konnte; hier bestand die öffentliche Meinung, deren Anerkennung das Ziel des Ehrgeizes, deren Geringschätzung oder Unwille die Strafe der Unwürdigkeit war, hier wurden alle spezifisch jüdischen Eigenschaften geschätzt und durch ihre besondere Entwicklung war die Bewunderung zu erlangen, die der scharfe Sporn der Menschenseele ist. (ZS:48)

For Nordau, the old ghetto constituted both a secure home and an abstract fatherland of sorts, and this does not seem to be an unusual perspective. When Moses ben Abraham is killed, he is found "erstochen vor dem aufgerissenen Tore des Ghettos". The site of the conflict, where, through his death, Moses proves his honour and courage, is not just a border, but a border under attack. Though not fighting, he has risked and lost his life, on the borders of Jewish territory, in an act that was bold, defensive and humanitarian. In addition, since before hearing the cries for help, he sat "in einer Sommernacht über den alten Büchern unserer Weisen und lernte", the story can be understood as a man leaving a religious, studious Judaism which eschews action in favour of reading and choosing instead danger, honour and defence of Jewish territory. It is unsurprising that Rabbi Friedheimer and Samuel differ somewhat in their attitude to the story:

FRIEDHEIMER: Nun, was sagen Sie zu der Geschichte?

JAKOB: Daß ich diesen Moses von Mainz liebe und auf ihn stolz bin. Und so muß jeder von uns handeln. Der Notruf kann einmal echt sein.

FRIEDHEIMER: Aber wir sind zu schwach.

JAKOB: Wenn der Starke großmütig ist, wo ist das Verdienst? Aber der Schwache! Da wird's rühmlich.

FRIEDHEIMER: (*zückt die Achseln, breitet die Arme aus und läßt sie wieder fallen*) (GZV:91)

The directions describing Friedheimer's reaction confirm Herzl's own position: his is an outdated, ghetto mentality and rather than even fight words with words, he dismisses Jakob's

ambitions with nothing more than a stereotypically Jewish shrug.

The two plays seem to have opposing purposes. While Herzl uses privations of diaspora life to provoke a duel where his hero proves his honour, Nordau's duel is, more than anything, the tragic culmination of a play largely about antisemitism and assimilationism. This reflects to some extent their wider approaches to Zionism: while Herzl both worked on and fantasised heavily about nation-building, Nordau's consistent focus was always the deprivation, antisemitism and distorted Jewish character to be fought.

The *Mauschel* Divide

The blandness of these two heroes mirrors Herzl's article 'Mauschel'. Amos Elon, translating its title as 'Kike', describes it as "a rare act of invective" which "reads like a piece of anti-Semitic horror propaganda".¹²⁷ Published in the Zionist newspaper *Die Welt*, 'Mauschel' characterised Zionism's Jewish opponents with the worst of antisemitic stereotypes.

Aber zu dem Ekel, den wir vor ihm empfanden, gesellte sich bisher immer Mitleid; wir suchten nach milden, historischen Erklärungen dafür, daß er ein so verkrümmter, verdrückter und schäbige Geselle sei. (GZWI:209)

The slur 'Mauschel', allegedly used by Kaiser Wilhelm II a year before the article was written,¹²⁸ invokes a stereotypical Jewish nickname. It is notably related to 'mauscheln': to speak German with noticeably Yiddish grammar and pronunciation. Mauschel himself is a composite figure, a

127 Amos Elon, *Herzl* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p251

128 While Isaiah Friedman and John C. G. Röhl disagree as to whether the Kaiser was "Motivated from the first by base anti-Semitic prejudice and crude calculations of egotistical advantage" (John C. G. Röhl, 'Herzl and Kaiser Wilhelm II: A German Protectorate in Palestine?', *Austrian Studies* 8 (1997), 27-38, p36) or whether "it would be incorrect to deduce that German policy toward Zionism was motivated by anti-Semitism," (Friedman, *Germany, Turkey, Zionism, 1897-1918*, p.xi), both note his casual expression of anti-Jewish sentiment in the margins of a report on the First Zionist Congress: "Let the Mauschels go to Palestine, the sooner they move off the better. I shall not put obstacles in their way." (Ibid., p59; Röhl, 'Herzl and Kaiser Wilhelm II', p29) We certainly see that this epithet was in use, even among semi-sympathetic Gentile figures.

receptacle for seemingly every Jewish flaw Herzl can think of. Beginning “Mauschel ist Antizionist” (GZWI:209), it is a call to abandon an unsavoury Jewish character. or rather unsavoury aspects of the supposed Jewish character:

Sieht man nun schon allmählich, welch eine gesunde Volksbewegung unser Zionismus ist; wie wir dahin gelangen werden, uns von den schmachvollen Elementen zu säubern? Weg mit der faulen Duldung. Wir brauchen über Mauschels Streiche nicht mehr zu erröten, wir brauchen sie nicht zu verschweigen, nicht empfindsam zu verteidigen. Ah, wir sind Narren? Nun, so verrückt sind wir nicht, noch länger für Mauschel die Verantwortung zu tragen. (GZWI:214)

While most of the piece’s venom is directed at the anti-Zionist ‘Mauschel’, Herzl makes a savage attack on the idea of Jewish nature as fixed or inherent. While he necessarily concedes Mauschel-like qualities, he consistently asserts Jewish potential to abandon them and embrace positive ones. It also contains the following attack on the concept of race:

Die Rasse! Als ob Jude und Mauschel von derselben Rasse wären. Der Gegenbeweis war freilich schwer zu erbringen, und vor dem Antisemitismus schienen Jude und Mauschel für immer, unauflöslich, rettungslos verbunden. (GZWI:211-12)

Daniel Boyarin takes this passage to mean that “this Jewish essence had been produced racially through an admixture” and that “This notorious antisemitic remark is the exact equivalent of Houston Chamberlain’s charge that the Jewish race had an ‘admixture of negro blood,’ and thus doubly racist in import.”¹²⁹ Yet this interpretation is simplistic, and incompatible with Herzl’s other statements. Reitter counters that “Herzl embraces as real Jews all Jews who are not Zionists, but also not against political Zionism. With them, he avers, he has no problem.”¹³⁰ Already Herzl’s Mauschel figure is revealed as flexible, and political before it is racial. Furthermore, Herzl shows very little interest in race elsewhere, as a biological concept or otherwise. As shown earlier, he

129 Daniel Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp298-9

130 Reitter, ‘The Jewish Self-Hatred Octopus’, p363

disagreed strongly with Israel Zangwill that Jews are a single race.¹³¹ This disavowal of racial affinity with Mauschel is not racism, but the opposite. It is an active effort to disavow biological race as a category, and an inconveniently immutable one that would make separation of his ghastly figure from the Jewish people, and therefore a transformation in their character and situation, even more difficult.

As well as an attack on anti-Zionist Jews, 'Mauschel' is a direct answer to criticisms that the Jews themselves actually have no interest in the movement:

So kommt es, daß wir manchmal von ernstern Freunden unserer Sache die Bemerkung hören müssen:

“Die Juden selbst wollen ja vom Zionismus nichts wissen.” Die Juden? Nicht doch. Nur Mauschel nicht!

Kein wahrer Jude kann Antizionist sein, nur Mauschel ist es. (GZWI:213)

To oppose Zionism is to oppose your own existence as a Jew, and rather just a “no true Scotsman” fallacy, 'Kein wahrer Jude' asserts Zionism – or at the very least, indifference to it – as the sole authentic expression of Jewish identity. Two further failings of Mauschel compound this relationship. Firstly, (and using the same gesture as Friedheimer) he rejects any sense of honour: “Mauschel zuckt die Achseln: was heißt Ehre? Wozu braucht man die Ehre? Wenn die Geschäfte gehen und man gesund ist, läßt sich das übrige ertragen” (GZWI:213). To be anti-Zionist is to be treacherous and self-interested. And Mauschel is disloyal, not just to his own Jewish nation, but to all nations: “Für den schlimmsten Fall richtet Mauschel seinen Blick ins Weite, aber nicht nach Zion, sondern nach irgend einem Lande, wo er allenfalls bei einer anderen Nation unterschlüpfen kann” (GZWI:213). Indifference to Zionism is closely associated with indifference to any nation: Mauschel asks not what he can do for his people but which people can do what for him, the same principle of *ubi bene ibi patria* bemoaned by Moses Hess (AS:242). The patriotism he lacks is not specific to anywhere, but a general, non-specific personal trait that he is incapable

131 It is notable, however, that Herzl illustrates Zangwill's racial difference with reference to his 'Negertypus', exhibiting a variation on the tendency towards internal orientalism detailed earlier (BT.II:281)

of feeling for any homeland.

Herzl makes no secret that this Mauschel is a composite character:

Wer ist denn dieser Mauschel? Ein Typus, meine lieben Freunde, eine Gestalt, die in den Zeiten immer wiederkehrt, der fürchterliche Begleiter des Juden, und vom Juden so unzertrennlich, daß man beide miteinander stets verwechselt hat. (GZWI:210)

Yet Mauschel is not himself a Jew. Herzl consistently and pointedly uses 'Jew' in opposition to Mauschel. In fact, Herzl sets up the same opposition for 'Mensch': Mauschel is so debased, deformed and repugnant as to be scarcely human, and 'Verzerrung' implies he is a transformation away from some true model of Jewishness (and therefore in turn implies the existence of this true Jew). He is also inescapable: "Und dann: er ist doch unser Volksgenosse – wenn auch nicht die mindeste Veranlassung vorliegt, uns etwas auf seine Genossenschaft einzubilden" (GZWI:209). While the Jew is no better or worse than any other person, he is haunted by this spectre, embodying both the full range of stereotypical Jewish flaws and the Jew's – or at least Herzl's – own deep-seated anxiety about exemplifying them.

Wenn wir alle die förmlich von uns absondern, die sich gegen unsere Volksgenossenschaft verwahren, wird man in diesen Ausgeschiedenen eine seltsam gemischte Gesellschaft zu sehen bekommen. Da ist der Finanzier, der soviel Butter auf dem Kopfe hat, daß er sich vor einem ebenso verdächtigten Mauschel, vor dem journalistische Erpresser, fürchtet und diesen füttert. Da ist der Advokat mit einer Kundschaft, die sich an den Grenzen der Paragraphe aufhält. Da ist der rotgeschminkte Politiker, der jetzt den Sozialismus betreibt, ausnützt und entwertet. Da sind die zweifelhaften Geschäftsleute, die falschen Ehrbaren, die heuchlerischen Frommen, die verlogenen Biedermänner, die findigen Ausbeuter... (GZWI:214)

These multiple Mauschels come across as a list of both stereotypical Jewish professions and stereotypically Jewish ways to abuse them. Mauschel not only possesses all negative Jewish qualities, both in the sense of monopolising them and of having the full set, he also drags the

Jews down in comparison to other peoples of Europe:

Die Deutschen sind ein Volk von Dichtern und Denkern, weil sie Goethe, Schiller, Kant hervorgebracht haben. Die Franzosen sind die Tapferen und Geistreichen, weil sie Bayard und Duguesclin, Montaigne, Voltaire und Rousseau aufstehen ließen. Wir sind ein Volk von Schachern und Gaunern, weil Mauschel wuchert und Börsenstreichen macht. Mauschel hat immer die Vorwände geliefert, unter denen man uns anfiel. Mauschel ist der Fluch des Juden. (GZWI:211)

Mauschel here is made to sound like part of the 'uns'; the victims of the antisemitism his character supposedly incites, a member of the Jewish people who he casts in such an unfavourable light compared to the Germans and the French. Where Mauschel is an embarrassment, if not a liability to Jews, Herzl's 'us' is ambiguous as to whether it includes Mauschel among the victims of these attacks.

Yet, for the greater part of the article, 'The Jew' and Mauschel are set up as opposites. The Jew, universally in possession of good qualities, is shown as entirely unlike the crooked wheeler-dealer shadowing his every step. This is often done with reference to particular Jewish stereotypes

Der Jude erträgt die Armut mit Würde und Gottvertrauen, im Reichtum öffnet sich sein Herz weit für die Mühseligen und Beladenen, und er besteuert freiwillig sein Wohlergehen durch große Gaben. Mauschel ist in der Armut ein erbärmlicher Schnorrer, im Reichtum ein erbärmlicher Protz. (GZWI:210)

This pair of stereotypes also has its own pedigree, also in Jewish use of antisemitic stereotypes, in the form of the rich Gumpelino and his grubby servant Hirsch/Hyacinth in Heine's *Die Bäder von Lucca*.¹³² Both rich and poor Mauschel, *Protz* and *Schnorrer*, commit the same social faux pas: not simply to be rich or poor in a stereotypically Jewish way (the Yiddish loanword 'Schnorrer' describes an undignified scrounger) but to be rich or poor in a visible, ostentatious or indiscreet way. The Jew's contrasting qualities, however, are far less specific: merely generic good

132 Heine, *Werke*, pp81-156

ways to behave when rich or poor. This focus on Mauschel's character in extremes of wealth seems to contradict Herzl's ideas elsewhere about Jewish mediocrity, showing it is very much Mauschel's extreme character in relation to money: a show-off in wealth, a *schnorrer* in poverty, not extremes of how much he has, that Herzl objects to. Mauschel's downfall, even when it comes to money, is not in the world of economics but the world of appearances and performance. The contrast Herzl sets up between specifically Jewish failings and universal qualities is even more pronounced when it comes to Mauschel's politics:

Der Jude ist fähig, der Regierung seines Landes aus Überzeugung starr und ehrlich Widerstand zu leisten, oder sich offen als Anhänger zu bekennen. Mauschel verkriecht sich hinter den staatsfeindlichsten Oppositionen und hetzt diese heimlich, wenn ihm die herrschende Autorität nicht behagt, oder er flüchtet sich unter den Polizeischutz und tut Angeberdienst, wenn ihm vor dem Umsturz bange wird. (GZWI:210-11)

Mauschel has stereotypically self-serving politics, though it could be argued that, for Viennese Jews in Herzl's time, politics was a far less secure environment for pure conviction, particularly when both the ruling authority and revolutionary parties were prone to antisemitism. Yet in this case it is the Jew whose traits are most interesting. He is both loyal follower and courageous dissident. Where Mauschel's flaws are all specifically and stereotypically Jewish, those shining qualities Herzl ascribes to the Jew are universal virtues: political integrity and strength of political conviction entirely empty of any specific political content. This seems to hold for much of the piece: where Mauschel's qualities embody specific negative stereotypes about Jews, Herzl refers to the Jew almost entirely in universal positives, or at the very least, bourgeois qualities devoid of any specific cultural associations.¹³³ Indeed, this blandness seems to be Herzl's aim:

Der Jude ist ein Mensch, wie andere, nicht besser, nicht schlechter, höchstens verschüchtert und

133 This is not uncommon in German literature's portrayal of Good Jews, the most famous example being the universalist protagonist, largely devoid of Jewish qualities in GE Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*, and his rationalist modern counterpart, the protagonist of Schnitzler's *Professor Bernhardt* (c.f. Robertson, *The "Jewish Question"*, pp32-45). Certainly, The Jew on the political stage is neither a pragmatic Englishman nor a French firebrand.

verbittert durch die Verfolgungen, und von einer großen Standhaftigkeit im Leiden. Mauschel hingegen ist die Verzerrung des menschlichen Charakters, etwas unsagbar Niedriges und Widerwärtiges. (GZWI:210)

His ideal itself is the bland equality of an everyman; simply the removal of the specific, non-national flaws that typify diaspora stereotypes. In this sense ‘Mauschel’ is similar to *Altneuland*. The Russian cultural Zionist Ahad Ha’am wrote a scathing critique of the novel, comparing the New Society to a hypothetical Black society, and asserting that there is nothing specifically Jewish about Herzl’s utopia.¹³⁴ If we are to agree at least partly with Ahad Ha’am, then, like ‘Mauschel’, *Altneuland* combines an empty “Good Jew” model with an scathing attack on the “Bad Jew.”

The fact Herzl refers to some of the worst antisemitic stereotypes in this text is clear. A tendency to attack opponents of Zionism in antisemitic terms is common with Herzl, and also present in Nordau’s work, particularly with regard to ideas of honour and loyalty.¹³⁵ However to describe ‘Mauschel’ as an antisemitic text is problematic. Firstly, there is no implication that these are biological, cultural or religious traits of *all* Jews, *most* Jews, or even *many* Jews. Indeed, although Herzl clearly imagines that some Jews do share them, one implication of his argument seems to be that Mauschel’s myriad ‘Jewish’ failings are by definition traits of *no* Jews, and any Jews that do possess these qualities, are in that respect further from the potential, “true” Jewish identity. On the surface, this is a call to Zionists to jettison such Jews as Mauschel, although Herzl cheerfully acknowledges that through anti-Zionism Mauschel is happy to jettison himself. Yet it can just as easily be read as a call to Zionists to jettison those aspects of themselves, or those

134 Eugen Dühning, *Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Culturfrage* (Karlsruhe; Leipzig: H. Reuther, 1881).

135 “Wir fanden diese Kampfweise sicher tief verächtlich, aber wir regten uns über sie nicht sehr auf. Wir sagten uns, daß so elende Angriffe weniger uns als ihren Verüßern schaden mußten. [...] Wir kreuzen dann die Klinge mit ihnen und bestehen sie in offenem Kampfe, den wir unsererseits immer ehrlich führen. Aber diese Fechtgänge vor unparteiischen Richtern, wo Stahl gegen Stahl klingt, passen diesen Strauchrittern nicht. Sie haben mehr Vertrauen zu ihrer Methode des nächtlichen Überfalls aus dem Hinterhalt mit der Wegelagereremaske vor dem Gesicht und des Dolchstoßes in den Rücken.” (ZS:216)

aspects of the Jewish people that correspond to Mauschel. Or, since Herzl denies so adamantly that Mauschel even *is* a Jew, that he is human, or that he is even anything more than a haunting ‘Gestalt’, this shadowy figure could easily stand for the Jew in the antisemitic imagination, as Herzl calls upon Zionists not just to leave the antisemites that plague them in diaspora, but to also leave behind the provocative character that diaspora has created and that antisemites so detest.

Comparable to ‘Mauschel’ are Marx’s *Zur Judenfrage*, Walther Rathenau’s ‘Höre, Israel!’ and, to a much less specific extent, Nordau’s *Entartung*. All four texts deal with an author’s attempts to redirect antisemites’ criticisms away from himself as a Jew. However, the nature of these criticisms, where they are redirected, and what kind of audience this act of redirection is aimed at, is very varied. *Zur Judenfrage* was a response to Bruno Bauer’s book *Die Judenfrage*, an argument against emancipation for the Jews while Germans remained unfree, and a call for Jews to abandon their religion in order to join modern civil society. Marx counters this with a complex argument that ultimately mirrors Dohm’s:

Suchen wir das Geheimnis des Juden nicht in seiner Religion, sondern suchen wir das Geheimnis der Religion im wirklichen Juden.

Welches ist der weltliche Grund des Judentums? Das *praktische* Bedürfnis, der *Eigennutz*.

Welches ist der weltliche Kultus des Juden? Der *Schacher*. Welches ist sein weltlicher Gott? Das *Geld*.

Nun wohl! Die Emanzipation vom *Schacher* und vom *Geld*, also vom praktischen, realen Judentum wäre die Selbstemanzipation unserer Zeit.¹³⁶

Marx, as one might expect, locates the source of *Judentum* in the Jews’ material needs and existence, calling for these, not the Jews themselves or their religion, to be abolished, as a *Selbstemanzipation* of the Jews. Using the association of their faith with their stereotypical professions, Marx counters the attack on Jews’ beliefs by, albeit ambiguously, redirecting it as an

136 Marx, *Werke, Schriften, Briefe*, vol. I p481

attack on the existing economic system. Similarly Nordau's *Entartung*, as will be shown in detail later, offers pseudo-medical explanations for distasteful aspects of modern art and culture otherwise blamed on Jews. This sets up an alternative to the far more popular explanation for the problems of modernity, which was to blame Jewish influence. In 'Höre, Israel!' however, Rathenau, like Herzl, seems to address a Jewish audience, or at least wants to be seen to do so by Gentile readers, and deals with personal flaws attributed to Jews. Alongside criticisms of various physical and social traits, and as with Herzl, his target is often Jewish women:

Haben doch in jener Zeit die Weiber das Lächeln verlernt; ihr Lachen ist grell und unfroh und ihre Schönheit schwermüthig geworden. Verstündet Ihr diese seltene und fremdartige Schönheit, so würdet Ihr sie nicht ersticken in Ballen von Atlas, Wolken von Spitzen und Nestern von Brillanten.¹³⁷

Rathenau's solution is simple: while he accepts collective, public strategies against the culture he is so keen to abandon,¹³⁸ he is again more concerned with individuals, writing "Seht Euch im Spiegel! Das ist der erste Schritt zur Selbstkritik!"¹³⁹ and "Das Ziel des Prozesses sollen nicht imitirte Germanen, sondern deutsch geartete und erzogene Juden sein."¹⁴⁰ The pre-Zionist Herzl seems to have had no more desire than Rathenau to cease to be a Jew, even in his student duelling days. Rather, he seems to have consistently wanted to abandon Jewish culture as it then stood for German, and to do so successfully *as a Jew*. 'Mauschel', unlike 'Höre, Israel!', is clearly addressing, not the flawed Jews he hopes to change, but the Jews who had already sided with Zionism and against Mauschel. While Rathenau redirects attacks on the collective failings of their co-religionists away from himself and properly Germanised Jews, Herzl redirects collective criticisms of the Jews away from a true self, hypothetical and yet to be fulfilled and towards poor old Mauschel.

137 Walter Rathenau, 'Höre, Israel!', in *Deutschtum und Judentum: Ein Disput unter Juden aus Deutschland*, ed. Christoph Schulte (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993), 28-39, pp34-5

138 "Das Ziel: der Verjudung des öffentlichen Wesens entgegenzuarbeiten, ist berechtigt." – Ibid., p37

139 Ibid., p34

140 Ibid., pp32-3

As is so often the case with collective criticisms of Jews by Jews, there are strategic and tactical aspects to the piece: a desire to remove undesirable Jewish qualities to encourage the Jews' outside acceptance (particularly to remove others' undesirable qualities and hasten one's own acceptance), while demonstrating commitment to abandoning Jewish faults and joining these outsiders. This process serves both the assimilation into a host nation such as Germany, and of the Jewish people into the community of nations. The essay consistently expresses anxiety, embarrassment and even 'Ekel' at the contradictions between how Zionists see themselves or believe themselves to be seen as Jews, and how they intend to be seen; between the ugly traits that they perceive as Jewish and wish to escape, and the category of 'Jew' they wish to purge and rehabilitate. In his way, Mauschel exemplifies the inherent complication of any self-hatred or self-criticism: that, with a handful of exceptions, the 'self' being subjected to hatred or criticism is externalised by the process. The hated Jews seldom include the self-hater personally, and are also rarely the *same kind* of Jew. Self-hatred and self-criticism imply a separate aspect of the self to be fenced off and criticised, and where this self is collective, it is all the easier to achieve. They posit not just a Bad Jew that the Good Jew is expected to disavow, but a Bad Me – or more likely, a Bad Us – that the Good Me can insist needs to change.

It is for this reason that Karl Kraus's seemingly nonsensical statement of self-hatred, as quoted by Reitter, requires such a heavy layer of irony:

Man weiß, daß mein Haß gegen die jüdische Presse nur noch von meinem Haß gegen die antisemitische Presse übertroffen wird, während hingegen mein Haß gegen die antisemitische Presse nur wieder von meinem Haß gegen die jüdische Presse übertroffen wird[.]¹⁴¹

By contrast to the previous set of texts, Kraus seems to deliberately court the antipathy of antisemites. He writes as a Jewish journalist, himself accused of publishing antisemitic material.

141 *Die Fackel*, Issues 557-60, 1921, p63, quoted in Paul Reitter, *The Anti-Journalist: Karl Kraus and Jewish Self-Fashioning in Fin-de-Siècle Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp361-2

Not only does Kraus find a deliberately contradictory way to express his equal hatred of the Jewish and antisemitic press, he does so, a contradiction in itself, as a representative of both. As an antisemitic Jew, an antisemitic journalist who hates antisemitic journalism and a Jewish journalist who hates Jewish journalism, Kraus must thrice reiterate (at least) that his is a deliberately hypocritical hatred of *himself* in order to make it clear that his statement does not externalise this hatred. Indeed, he immediately continues: “[...]aus welcher Reaktion, die sich jeweils und stets mit gleich starker Überzeugung für die endgiltige hält, sich die mir von beiden Seiten vorgehaltenen ‘Widersprüche’ hinreichend erklären mögen”, scoffing at the idea that critics from both camps might consider this stance contradictory. As Reitter observes, he starts by acknowledging that this bafflingly absurd statement is something his reader should know from the outset.¹⁴² Kraus’s heavily ironic statement rests on the assumption that self-hatred is by default a hatred of an other, an attempt to distance the hater from the hated within the category posited as ‘self’, and serves to force an internal distinction. Where Kraus resists this with ironic absurdity, tautology and hypocrisy, Herzl deliberately uses this, relying on Jewish attacks on (other) Jews’ flaws – a trope his audience would be well aware of – to draw his distinction between the downtrodden, degenerate diaspora Jew and an image of a real Jew they have the potential to become.

While Herzl’s portrayal of rabbinical figures and religious leaders tends to be sympathetic but critical, the clear exception is Rabbi Dr. Geyer, whom David Littwak introduces as his political rival a few chapters after Löwenberg’s arrival in utopian Haifa. Geyer, as well as a rabbi and aspiring politician, is a newspaper proprietor and heavily invested, emotionally if not also professionally, in this conflict with David. Architect Steineck – one half of a pair of heartily emotional professional brothers and a ‘Schreihals’, but a close friend of David, a member of the

142 Reitter, ‘The Jewish Self-Hatred Octopus’, p78

group which guides Löwenberg and therefore a reliable, if hyperbole-prone source for authorial opinion – describes Geyer as follows: “Ein vermaledeiter Pfaffe ist er, ein Augenverdreher, Leuteverhetzer und Herrgottsopper. Die Intoleranz will er bei uns einführen, der Halunke” (*GZW.V:249*). Geyer’s base of support is introduced with the character Mendel, “ein stämmiger, sonnengebräunter Mensch” with a brash, vulgar manner and Yiddish inflections. (*GZW.V:257*) In contrast to the virtuously poor Eastern Jews in Diaspora, represented by the Littwaks, Mendel symbolises the proletarian mob. Indeed, his Yiddishisms, in neat alignment with stereotypes of Jewish speech and emotion, become noticeably more pronounced as the debate continues and Mendel’s hackles rise.¹⁴³ Immediately after Mendel, Rabbi Samuel, an ‘einfacher Landrabbiner’ is introduced, a virtuous rabbi to show up Geyer and his electoral base (*GZW.V:258-9*). Steineck reveals that previously “Euer Doktor Geyer war damals ein antizionistischer Rabbiner” and “Er war auch damals unser wütender Gegner”, and adds: “Er ist der Rabbiner des nächsten Vorteils”. He is further exposed as having worked for the benefit of ‘Kommerzienräten und Hochbankiers’, and in doing so fabricated the supposed mission of the Jewish people (to carry the Torah and exemplify Jewish ethics among Gentile peoples) in order to maintain the profitable diaspora (again, for Herzl, a banking elite parasitises the Jews). He exhibits ‘Arroganz und Scheinheiligkeit’ and his main policy seems to be that “Ein Nichtjude soll in die neue Gesellschaft nicht aufgenommen werden” (*GZW.V:262*).

Geyer corresponds less to Herzl’s stock rabbi figure than he does to two others. Firstly, he shares many of the qualities of the anti-Zionist described in ‘Mauschel’, a clear broadside against Herzl’s political opponents. Herzl expects them to come around to Zionism as soon as it starts to benefit them, and to maintain their usual backstabbing tendencies. Geyer also supports the antisemite’s favourite justification, that the Jews hate Gentiles as much and in exactly the same

143 For example, “Wer hat, ausgetrocknet de Sümpf, gegrab’n de Kanal’, gepflanzt de Bäum’, wer hat geschwitzt un gefror’n, bis dos alles fertig war? Mir, mir, mir!” (*GZW.V:264*)

way that Gentiles hate Jews, and that antipathy between peoples is inevitable. Secondly, he shares a number of traits with the antisemitic demagogues Karl Lueger and Georg von Schönerer, whom Carl E Schorske groups with Herzl as former liberals turned opponents of Austro-liberalism, “resulting from the liberal failure to bring the masses into the state”.¹⁴⁴ Geyer, a Jewish mirror-image of Viennese antisemites, by getting roundly defeated in both debate and election, shows a triumph of Austrian liberalism transplanted into Herzl’s new, Jewish state. Herzl conflates his composite figure of Jewish flaws with the antisemitic figures of his own environment, simultaneously getting a wry dig in at Lueger and Schönerer. In a more aggressive manner, he associates Mauschel with the antisemitic environment that, in Herzl’s eyes, anti-Zionists hope to perpetuate. Herzl demonstrates through Geyer and his defeat, that not only should Jews reject the behaviours and prejudices of their enemies, but, despite a few obnoxious individual exceptions, the Jewish people in general can in the long term be relied on to do so, and Mauschel must be left behind even when he follows the Jews to Palestine. Herzl depicts the blandly bourgeois civic virtues he attributes to ‘the Jew’ triumphing over Mauschel in practice as a mark of his utopia’s success.

Jewish Others

Anita Shapira writes

On the surface, we might expect the anti-Semitic Gentile, or the non-Jew in Palestine, e.g., the Arabs or the British, to have served as that "Other." Yet the fact is that at least until the creation of the state of Israel, the Arab did not play the role of the "Other" in Zionist thinking. To a certain extent, he even was conceptualized as a positive and romantic native model Jewish pioneers could emulate. [...] The

144 Carl E. Schorske, ‘Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Trio’, in *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), p119

"Other" in the case of the new Jewish national identity was the "diasporic Jew."¹⁴⁵

This othered figure, however, arrives in multiple forms, and is treated with far more ambivalence than Shapira implies. There is not one Jewish Other in Zionism, but several: the religious Jew, the Eastern European Jew, the self-denying assimilationist and the Oriental traces that supposedly remained in European Jews. As Others often are, these are semi-positive figures, and indeed, like the Arab in Shapira's analysis, these visions of Jewishness could also serve as a "positive and romantic native model", particularly when to be partly Oriental means to be more strongly associated with Palestine.

Religion and Frömmel

The function of rabbis in Herzl's writing is complex. The role he envisions in his diaries is a largely secular, civic one:

Auf den Schiffen wird – diesmal nicht nach Besitz-, sondern nach Bildungsklassen – für Unterhaltung und Belehrung gesorgt. Die jüdischen Schauspieler, Sänger, Musiker, gehen ja auch mit, ebenso wie die jüdischen Professoren und Lehrer. [...] Jede Gruppe hat ihren Rabbiner, der mit seiner Gemeinde geht. Sie sehen, wie zwanglos auch das alles gruppiert. Die Ortsgruppe bildet sich um den Rabbiner herum. So viele Rabbiner, so viele Ortsgruppen. Die Rabbiner werden uns auch zuerst verstehen, sich zuerst für die Sache begeistern und von der Kanzel herab die anderen begeistern.
(BT.II:172)

Herzl stresses their role, not in spiritual guidance or religious study, but as a centrepoint for secular groups and on a par with Jewish performers and academics. Rabbis, for Herzl, have an important role as authorities within the Jewish community, and as authorities on Jewish matters, yet the religious content is secondary if not irrelevant. Indeed, before writing this passage, Herzl had already ascribed a similar function to God himself:

Wenn ich Gott sage, will ich die Freidenker nicht verletzen. Sie mögen meinerwegen den Weltgeist

145 Anita Shapira. 'Anti-Semitism and Zionism'. *Modern Judaism* 15, no. 3 (1995): 215-232, p224

oder irgendein anderes Wort an die Stelle dieser lieben, alten wundervollen Abbeviatur setzen, durch die ich mich mit den Einfältigen verständige. Wir meinen ja in Seminarstreit um Worte doch alle ein und dasselbe. Ja, wir meinen im Glauben wie im Zweifel alle ein und dasselbe, daß es unerklärlich ist. (BT.II:124)

Both religious leaders and religion itself are used as abstract rallying points and ideological drivers. His dismissal of the 'Seminarstreit', presumably petty academic squabbles over the precise nature of God (and with echoes of stereotypes about Talmudic hair-splitting) shows he values the intense study traditionally central to the Jewish religion far less than the unity it can be harnessed for, and is quite willing to sacrifice one for the other.

This ambivalence reflects his real-life relationship with religious Jews, particularly Vienna's chief rabbi, Moritz Güdemann. Early on, Herzl writes "Güdemann! Sie mache ich zum ersten Bischof der Hauptstadt" (BT.II:73). Herzl himself still disavows religion in his correspondence with Güdemann ("Ich bin bei aller Pietät für den Glauben unserer Väter kein Frömmeler und werde es nie sein", (BT.II:135), but envisages a vital civic role for the religious leader.

Bei Güdemann disputirte ich einmal einen alten Rabbiner namens Fleissig an die Wand. Dieser alte Herr trägt Stiefelhosen und langen Leibrock der ein verschämter Kaftan ist und so antiquirt ist auch sein scharfsinnig beschränktes Denken. Diese Art Juden vollbringt im Käfig ihrer Weltauffassung die Tausentmeilen-Wanderungen von Eichhörnchen auf der Spule. [...]

Er glaubt, das die Sache grosse Gefahren für die Juden heraufbeschwören könnte: nämlich bei der Auswanderung könnte es zu Verfolgungen kommen. (BT.II:249-50)

While the old rabbi's objections are in fact very down-to-earth – the dangers Zionism could potentially bring to Jews, it is his theological hair-splitting – a common stereotype of Jewish religious thought, that frustrates Herzl – who compares his profundity within a limited worldview to the miles run in circles by a squirrel in a cage. No doubt exacerbated by an almost sitcom-worthy incident in December 1895, where Güdemann visited Herzl to find him decorating

a Christmas tree with his children (Herzl tries to explain it as a Hanukkah or winter solstice tree (BT.II:288), the dispute culminates with Herzl saying the following:

Sind Sie der Hirt Ihrer Gemeinde? [...] Ich gestatte Ihnen so vorsichtig zu sein wie Sie wollen. Bekämpfen Sie meinerwegen den Zionismus, aber verschweigen Sie ihn nicht. Mann kann eine Sache zur Kenntniss der Leute bringen, indem man sie ungeschickt bekämpft, und auf vielerlei andere Weise. Das ist die Kunst der Rede. (BT.II:475)

While Herzl seems to want little more than to defeat Gudemann's position in the marketplace of ideas, the contempt implied by "Sind Sie der Hirt Ihrer Gemeinde?" shows how little Herzl values hierarchies and social organisation based on religion. Rather, religion is used as a means of hierarchichal organisation based on national, and state politics.

In Herzl's fiction, a key role in his portrayal of diaspora is played by rabbis. In *Altneuland*, Rabbi Weiss is not only the character who introduces Zionism and takes the issue of Jewish suffering outside the comfortable Viennese circle, he is also the character who urges solidarity between different subsections of the Jewish people, and the first to take Grün and Blau to task for their flippancy towards their own identity. Yet his function, like the rabbis on the boats, is devoid of any particular religious content. The rabbis of the diaspora are, with Herzl, always authorities on Jews, and rarely Judaism. Even when a rabbi is given quite literally the last word in the novel, and even when this word is 'God', the function remains the same.

"Wir sehen hier eine neue, eine glücklichere Form des Zusammenlebens von Menschen – wer hat das nun geschaffen?" Der alte Littwak sagte: "Die Not!" Architekt Steineck sagte: "Das wiedervereinigte Volk!" Kingscourt sagte: "Die neuen Verkehrsmittel!" Dr. Marcus sagte: "Das Wissen!" Joe Levy sagte: "Der Wille!" Professor Steineck sagte: "Die Naturkräfte!"
Der englische Prediger Hopkins sagte: "Die gegenseitige Duldung!"
Reschid Bey sagte: "Das Selbstvertrauen!" David Littwak sagte: "Die Liebe und das Leiden!" Der alte Rabbi Samuel aber stand feierlich auf und sagte: "Gott!" (GZ.W.V:419-20)

Rabbi Samuel's religious contribution is not only brief and devoid of any religious specifics, but comes in a context of multiple responses to the same question. Rabbi Samuel, a relatively minor character compared to David Littwak, Reschid Bey or Kingscourt, simply functions as a mouthpiece for a generic religious perspective, and to illustrate a broader point about the New Society: that it is pluralistic and tolerant and that, while religion is not a prominent force, it nevertheless has a place within society, and this place is partly to provide the final, symbolic, emotive charge to the novel.

In *Das neue Ghetto*, Rabbi Friedheimer's position is slightly more complex. Like Weiss, he has the privilege of introducing both solidarity with Jews less well off elsewhere and the major theme of the text:

FRIEDHEIMER: Eben jetzt brauchen wir wieder viel für die russischen Auswanderer, die wir übers Meer schicken – die Ärmsten! Ja meine Freunde, wir sind noch lange nicht so schlimm daran, wie jene Glaubensbrüder. Wir dürfen wenigstens in unserem Vaterlande bleiben.

JAKOB:Aber fragt mich nicht, wie!

FRIEDHEIMER: Wie immer! Wir genießen den Schutz der Gesetze. Es ist wahr, man sieht uns wieder scheel an wie in der alten Zeit, als wir im Ghetto lebten. Aber die Mauern sind doch gefallen.

(GZWV:35)

It is also Friedheimer whose story gives Samuel the inspiration to stand up to Schramm. Yet, his understanding of it is the polar opposite of Jakob's: a call to avoid danger and stay in with your books. His attitude to antisemitism is very similar:

Die Bewegung hat auch ihr Gutes. Seit der Antisemitismus im Lande ist, sehe ich wieder mehr Frömmigkeit. Der Antisemitismus ist eine Mahnung, daß wir treu zusammenstehen sollen, daß wir nicht dem Gott unserer Väter abtrünnig werden sollen, wie mancher es tat... (GZWV:36)

Friedheimer acknowledges the invisible ghetto that is the central theme of the play, but seems committed to remaining in it, and is grateful to antisemitic movements for helping re-entrench

Jewish community and religiosity. Friedheimer, in Herzl's portrayal, is not just more interested in religion than the fight against antisemitism, but is quite happy to use the Jews' enemies for these ends. He has, later on, some real-life counterparts. In 1897, the first Zionist Congress was scheduled to be held in Munich, but was moved to Basel after a large number of German Rabbis signed a letter refusing to allow the Zionists to hold such an irreligious event on German soil. Friedheimer's attitude is not unlike that which Herzl attributes to these 'Protestrabbiner', "die sich gegen die Erlösung ihres Volkes wehren" (GZWI:174), and whom he accuses of indifference to antisemitism:

Wo aber waren und sind die Protestrabbiner mit ihren Protesten, wenn unglückliche Juden, unglücklich nur, weil sie Juden sind, beschimpft, beraubt und erschlagen wurden und werden? Jetzt in Algier, und jetzt in Rußland, bald in Persien und bald in Galizien, hier und dort und überall Klagerufe.
(GZWI:174)

While Rabbis, for Herzl, are always the most keenly in touch with their identity as Jews, Friedheimer and religious anti-Zionists are committed to maintaining it in its old, outdated form. They are primarily a source of Jewish authenticity, but nonetheless outmoded and committed to the old order of Jewish identity misshapen by the privations and inertia of diaspora.

This attitude is less pronounced in Nordau's case. Though this may simply come from being himself the son of a Rabbi, there are still strong implications that he shared the same understanding of religious Judaism as his fellow 'jüdische Freidenker' Herzl. He writes of his father as a "typischer Maskil" and believer in "die berühmte 'Mission des Judentums'", and that "Das Ergebnis war, daß seinen Schülern, obwohl er ihnen die hebräische Sprache beibrachte, das jüdische Nationalgefühl fremd geblieben ist" (ZS:485). The Jewish faith here is shown as independent of, if not contradictory to nationalistic sentiments towards Jewishness, and his father is put alongside Moser and other assimilationists rather than the more authentically

Jewish rabbinical figures in Herzl's writing. In contrast, Nordau is not averse to describing religious opponents of Zionism in terms of Jewish stereotypes, describing Güdemann's "Wortklauberei" and "kleinlicher Wortspielerei" (ZS:3-4). The character of Amschel Kohn in *Doktor Kohn*, though not referred to as a rabbi, is extremely pious. Like Friedheimer, he is shown voicing the outmoded Jewish passivity and reluctance to fight that his son and Samuel reject:

AMSCHEL KOHN: Was hat mein Sohn ritterlich zu sein? Er ist kein Ritter. Wir haben von unseren Voreltern gelernt, die Faustgewalt zu verabscheuen. Todtschießen und Todtschlagen sollen die anderen. Unsere Waffe ist der Geist. (DK:187)

The later statement "Wir haben unsern Kadisch verloren. Das ist der, der für uns betet, wenn wir im Grab liegen" (DK:195) also has similar implications of religious Jews' archaism. Amschel Kohn and his wife, pious but passive, are shown, through their son's willingness to fight for his honour, to have no future ahead of them. Interestingly, 'Kadisch' is explained, implying that Nordau was writing for those who were either unfamiliar with the concept or who had forgotten about it (also a tendency in German-Jewish ghetto fiction and seemingly a convention of the genre in texts for secularised and acculturated Jews). As with the mezuzah, this has an extra sting of condescension in Nordau's play: not only does Amschel Kohn assume Moser needs this routine and emotional aspect of Jewish life explained to him, some Jewish members of the audience might also need this definition. Ignorance of Jewish concepts is assumed of the assimilated convert by a more pious, more truly Jewish generation. This generation foregrounds Moser's inauthenticity and inability to live a properly Jewish life. While pious characters are not used to posit Jewish authenticity in Nordau's play, they nonetheless draw clear attention to its absence.

Looking Eastward

The figure of the Ostjude frequently appears, among turn-of-the-century German Jews and Zionists in general and oppositions between the Eastern and Western Jewish archetypes were

current in understandings of Jewish identity. Gilman traces the way in which the Jewish East was broadly an invention of Western Jews,¹⁴⁶ and Noah Isenberg notes how, in the example of Arnold Zweig's romantic description of Russian Jewish life in extremely Middle-Eastern, often Islamic-themed terms, demonstrates a surprisingly neat microcosm of Orientalism.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, this opposition is given the same explicitly hierarchical function by both Herzl and Nordau: Herzl stating that the bulk of his *Arbeitsheer* will consist of Russian Jews, 'das grosse Reservoir der unskilled labourers', (*BT:II:115*) and Nordau flatly stating "Das Heer der Zionisten rekrutiert sich naturgemäß im Osten. Aber ein großer Teil seines Offizierkorps muß ihm aus dem Westen kommen" (*ZS:362*). As referred to earlier, Eastern Jews constitute a group within the Jewish nation with which German Zionists can exercise the bonds of solidarity central to nationhood. Neatly illustrating the importance of this east/west distinction, Efron shows that, unlike many other areas of racial science dealing with Jews, the psychopathology of Jews was largely led by Jews, and conducted for the benefit of Jews themselves.¹⁴⁸ He identifies how initially the Eastern, unassimilated shtetl Jew was pathologised as particularly prone to mental illness, rooted in either their deprivation and isolation or "lapsed ethical standard".¹⁴⁹ This was gradually replaced by a pathologisation of the westernised, secular Jews of Germany and Austria, caused by their urbanisation and embourgeoisement which held up the greater moral hygiene of Eastern Jews in relation to alcohol and sex.¹⁵⁰ However, when westernised "coffee-house" Jews were pathologised, insanity was attributed to loss of identity, customs and particularly religious faith.¹⁵¹ Herzl and Nordau were writing alongside a tradition which, even in medicine, aimed to understand Jewish taxonomy in terms of this division and, as Efron's examples demonstrate, Eastern backwardness was consistently juxtaposed with Western inauthenticity.

146 Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred*, pp270-86

147 *Orientalism and the Jews*, pp94-108

148 Söder, 'Captain Dreyfus in Germany', p172

149 Efron, 'Kaftanjude and Kaffeehausjude', pp173-4

150 *Ibid.*, pp188; 180-1; 182-3

151 *Ibid.*, p183

Nordau, who tended far more than Hess or Herzl to emphasise the existing suffering in diaspora rather than the future of Zionism, frequently did so through reference to *Ostjuden*. While this is a performance of solidarity which he invites his readers to share, solidarity is never far from contempt and unease. He writes of rising antisemitism in Romania: “Die rumänische Regierung hat es systematisch darauf angelegt, die Viertelmillion Juden ihres Landes [...] auf die Kulturstufe nomadischer wilder Zigeuner hinunterzudrücken” (ZS:266), seamlessly blending pity for deprived Romanian Jews, contempt for the culture they have been reduced to and further sympathy for them for living in it. Herzl’s portrayals of Eastern Jews involve less separation and *Altneuland* portrays them as an immigrant community in Vienna rather than living in *shtetls* elsewhere. This allows him to show Viennese Jews’ callousness to poor Jews at home as well as far away, as Schiffmann castigates Löwenberg for helping young David Littwak (GZWV:135) and indeed their poverty in Vienna is shown to equal their former poverty in Galicia (GZWV:147-8).

While Nordau and Herzl share this ambivalence towards the Eastern Jew, Nordau finds other ways to attack Westernised Jews. He mocks irreligion and conversion among Jews, saying those uninterested in God “waren noch weit zahlreicher als die Taufjuden, so zahlreich, daß Spötter sagen konnten: ‘Das Judentum ist heutzutage eine Religionsgemeinschaft von Atheisten.’” (ZS:452) However he implicitly treats this community, even a religious community, as able to function perfectly well without religion. Mixed-faith marriages and baptism, in contrast, he perceives as a definite threat:

Das Judentum war in den westlichen Ländern im Absterben begriffen. Mischehen, Taufen, Freidenkertum lichteteten seine Reihen und man konnte ungefähr den Zeitpunkt voraussehen, wo es sich vollständig würde aufgelöst haben. (ZS:296)

Given Nordau’s wife Anna was a German Protestant, and coming from someone who elsewhere claimed to be a ‘Freidenker’, this passage is oddly self-critical. Nordau, as a Germanised and

secular Jew with seemingly no intention to be otherwise, nevertheless sees these aspects of assimilation as threats to Jewish identity.

Herzl's Jews are often internally stratified by the balance of German to Yiddish in their speech, so, in *Altneuland*, while the decadent bourgeois Jews largely speak perfect High German, Laschner, whose joke reveals him as not only most proud to be a Jew but also most aware of his Jewishness, speaks German peppered with Yiddish syntax and truncation, and Chajim Littwak, father of David, speaks almost pure Yiddish, though very much filtered through Herzl's German. Yet, interestingly, his son speaks High German even as a child, implying that the transition from diasporic, Eastern Jewish immigrant to Vienna to proud Zionist settler somehow begins with the new generation, with standardised education¹⁵² (young David's declared ambition) and with the desire to move to the Holy Land, not with the actual physical act of migration. The Yiddish language is placed at an opposite pole to the superficiality and inauthenticity of middle-class Jewish life. However Herzl's attitude to Yiddish is less than charitable, saying "Wir werden uns die Judenjargons, Jüdischdeutsch, abgewöhnen, die nur Sinn und Entschuldigung als verstohlene Sprache von Häftlingen hatten" (*BT.II:75*). While this sympathetically paints Yiddish as a product of oppression, it nonetheless sees it as a fault alongside others caused by this condition. Indeed Yiddish was already frequently understood in similarly primitive terms to those that cause Nordau's anxiety over 'wilde Zigeuner'. Gilman writes of the publisher Gottfried Selig

When he speaks about the use of Hebrew words in Yiddish, he notes that they are often so deformed that they appear to be bits of the Hottentot language [...] Thus in the eyes of the formerly Yiddish-speaking convert, Yiddish moved from being a language of a "nation within nations" to a language of the "barbarian".¹⁵³

Jewish distaste for Yiddish goes back as far as the *Haskalah*, whose proponents "wanted a purified

152 Of course, for the children of migrants to speak the local language better than their parents and without their accent is a common phenomenon.

153 Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred*, p99

classical Hebrew in order to replace Yiddish, which Mendelssohn, too, had considered the root cause of cultural degradation”.¹⁵⁴ This view of Yiddish, where both Hebrew and German are equally preferable if not interchangeable,¹⁵⁵ shows an intense discomfort with low, popular languages and dialects in relation to pure, standardised, high languages. Yet in *Altneuland*, Yiddish at least acquires some positive qualities, and, crucially, its failings become rooted in class, rather than race. David explains: “In einigen Volkstheatern werden Possen im Jargon aufgeführt. Die sind lustig, aber nicht sehr geschmacksvoll” (*GZVV*:218). Yiddish theatre, though earthy and associated with the ordinary ‘Volk’, is distasteful but amusing. This mimics the Orientalist, imperial association of the East with pleasure, decadence and hedonism.

Nordau’s attitude to the Yiddish language, however, is broadly ambivalent. On one hand he attacks Yiddish as a medieval living fossil, undeveloped for centuries and, in almost direct contradiction to this, attacks it for its Hebrew and Slavic influences, implying a strong discomfort with ‘impure’, noticeably heterogeneous languages. Yet he also praises Yiddish-speaking Jewry for maintaining it (*ZS*:248). Nordau’s view of Yiddish is a neat microcosm of his and Herzl’s attitude to *Ostjuden*: distastefully backward but authentically Jewish.

Palestinians in Europe

Particularly pertinent in Nordau’s writing is the choice of ‘Zigeuner’ for comparison to the Jews. A degradation in the Jews’ level of culture is associated instinctively with a people who not only shared the Jews’ history of persecution, but also their non-national, diasporic, nomadic status. Nicholas Saul points to the tendency in German discourse to contrast Jews and Roma, both of whom the German state had attempted to assimilate. Either the Roma’s level of assimilation and civilisation is unfavourably contrasted to that of the Jews,¹⁵⁶ or the Roma are romanticised in

154 Selma Stern-Taeubler, ‘The First Generation of Emancipated Jews’, *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 15, (1970), 3-40, pp38-39

155 Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred*, p105

156 Nicholas Saul, *Gypsies and Orientalism in German Literature and Anthropology of the Long Nineteenth Century*

comparison to the Jews.¹⁵⁷ Gilman too draws specific attention to crossovers in perceptions of Jews and Travellers, even having explicitly Oriental connotations in the form of the Moor.

It is Carmen's appearance [in Merimée's novella] that leads the narrator astray. But this overlapping of images of Otherness – the Moor, the Jew, the Gypsy – is possible only from the perspective of the French narrator, for whom Otherness in Spain is an amalgam of all these projections.¹⁵⁸

Anxiety about similarity to the equally scattered, even more socially excluded gypsies therefore seems to draw on existing currents of thought where statelessness and the Orient blur into a single, swarthy other.

This link is a common one. Herzl, explaining in a draft speech to the Rothschilds why he prefers Argentina to Palestine, writes “die meisten Juden sind keine Orientalen mehr” (*BT*:II:156). While he is unambiguously denying that the Jews are Orientals in the modern era, it is a category he associates with their origins, and with their relationship to Palestine. Walter D. Mignolo argues that “Jews who remained in the lands of Western Christians (soon to become Europe) became the internal colonial subject.”¹⁵⁹ Jews were perceived as Orientals, at least in part, because their relationship to Europeans was akin to that of Orientals. If we return to Dohm's statements at the start of this chapter, the Jews are “unglücklichen asiatischen Flüchtlinge,”¹⁶⁰ with origins in Asia.¹⁶¹ Not just the Jews' friends but their enemies see them in these terms: Ritchie Robertson, listing several examples of both Jews and Gentiles, from Johann Gottfried Herder to Else Lasker-Schüler, perceiving Jewishness as Oriental, writes “The term ‘Oriental’ serves as a marker of difference rather than as an expression of substantive and factual content.”¹⁶² As Derek Penslar and Ivan Davidson Kalmar note

(London: Legenda, 2007), p8

157 Ibid., p14

158 Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred*, p13

159 Gianni Vattimo and Michael Marder, eds. *Deconstructing Zionism: A Critique of Political Metaphysics*. (New York; London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), p64

160 Dohm, *Bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, vol. I, p8

161 Ibid., vol. I, p16

162 Robertson, *The "Jewish Question"*, p428

Jews responded to the anti-Jewish orientalism of the late eighteenth to early twentieth century in three different ways (typical, we believe, for other targets of orientalism, including Muslims, as well): first, by rejecting it wholesale; second, by idealizing and romanticizing the Orient and themselves as its representatives; and third, by setting up traditional Jews as oriental, in contrast to modernized Jewry which was described as “Western.”¹⁶³

We see Zionists as especially keen to use this marker of difference as collective self-assertion. This understanding of Jews, however, is also used to attack them directly, as exemplified by the Prussian historian Heinrich von Treitschke’s characterisation of insufficiently assimilated Jews as “deutsch redende Orientalen” .¹⁶⁴

At the same time, a reciprocal understanding of their supposed home was taking shape. The importance of Orientalism and Christian views of the region will be explored in detail in a later chapter, and Edward Said isolates an intellectual tendency whereby, in a quest to liberate the Orient through European conquest, the traveller “must use the Old Testament and the Gospels as his guide in Palestine.”¹⁶⁵ It is perhaps unsurprising then, that, in his article ‘Der ewige Jude’, Herzl writes the following passage :

Aber ob es ein Tory oder ein Whig sein wird, der mit der Judenfrage auch ein Stück der Orientfrage zu lösen unternimmt, er wird das Werk eines Staatsmannes im großen Stile tun, und er kann sicher sein, daß die Welt, so weit sie zivilisiert ist, seinen Worten und Taten mit Teilnahme, vielleicht mit Bewunderung folgen wird. (GZWI:237)

Herzl’s characteristic fascination for great visionaries and statesmen is clearly present here, as is the idea that, Tory or Whig, this is an issue that transcends politics. Furthermore, the Jews and the Orient are framed as interdependent and, more importantly, as questions for Gentile European (probably British) power to solve in the form of one ambitious and capable individual.

163 *Orientalism and the Jews*, p.xviii

164 Walter Boehlich, *Der berliner Antisemitismusstreit* (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 1965), p12. Strangely enough, this is also a neat summary of Herzl’s character Reschid Bey.

165 Said, *Orientalism*, p172

Nor were Herzl's daydreams in vain: alongside the support the Zionist movement found in British diplomatic circles, British Protestants, as Shlomo Sand has shown, provided a great deal of the momentum and framework for Zionism.¹⁶⁶ Indeed, in a neat crossover of external and self-perception, Benjamin Disraeli, from the age of twelve a British Protestant, frequently played up his Jewishness as Oriental.¹⁶⁷ Both sympathetic, Bible-centred, often exotic, perceptions of Jews as a religious community and people, and their delegitimisation as citizens of the countries they actually lived in, are done with specific reference to their belonging in the Orient. Gentile (and particularly philosemitic) understandings of the Jews, and Orientalist understandings of Palestine and the Middle East are both rooted in Biblical mythology, and it is through this mythologised understanding that the two reinforce each other. Since Western European Jews, after all, were Western Europeans, it is unsurprising that they embraced Orientalist understandings of Palestine. However, it is worth remarking that their self-understanding could also mirror Western European Gentiles' understandings of both Jews and Palestine.

Albia Moments

In an incident comparable to Hess's letter, a few years after joining the student duelling *Burschenschaft* Albia, Theodor Herzl asked to be honourably discharged after a reading of antisemitic speeches made at a memorial dinner for Richard Wagner. While in the end a compromise was reached whereby Herzl's name was stricken quietly from their membership, Albia were reluctant to release him honourably, claiming his reaction was based solely on a newspaper report, and threatened to discharge him ignominiously. It is easy to characterise these as traumatic watershed moments, where the great originators of secular Zionism came to understand that they could never be accepted as Germans, yet this does not seem to tally with the

166 Shlomo Sand, *The Invention of the Land of Israel: From Holy Land to Homeland*, trans. Jeremy Forman (London: Verso, 2013), pp119-77

167 Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), pp68-88

writers' own presentation.

While Hess recalls Becker's letter in tones, not of anger or betrayal but of embarrassment, Herzl makes next to nothing of his incident. The two letters he writes to Albia's Burschen-Convent are calmly argued and businesslike; indeed the second is a simple one-sentence acknowledgement of his discharge (*BTI*:125-6). His diaries at the time do not mention the incident, and the next entry over a week later expresses excitement at having entered a literary competition (*BTI*:635-6). In his brief 'Selbstbiographie', he allocates his entire career as a *Couleurstudent* only one paragraph:

In Wien studierte ich die Rechte, nahm an allen Studententorheiten teil und trug die bunte Mütze einer Verbindung, bis diese eines Tages den Beschluß faßte, daß fortan keine Juden mehr als Mitglieder werden aufgenommen sollte. Die es schon waren, erhielten die freundliche Erlaubnis, in der Verbindung zu bleiben. Ich sagte den edlen jungen Leuten Lebewohl und fing nun an, mich ernstlich an die Arbeit zu setzen. (*GZWI*:12)

Interestingly, however, Herzl does not even mention the Wagner incident that was so central to his letter. It is the decision not to admit Jews that he seems to recall as his motive. It seems likely that it was a gradual rise in antisemitism, not one speech reported second-hand, that he perceived as his main reason for leaving. This in turn would also explain the seeming indifference to the final, decisive incident in his letters and diaries. Hess and Herzl seem far less affected by these moments than one might expect, and both seem – at least with a few decades under their belts – to dismiss their former Teutomania as fashionable youthful embarrassment. Yet it is still notable that both came to Jewish nationalism from a background of passionate German patriotism, and that it was not their scepticism towards either Germany or nationalism that prompted them to abandon it, but German nationalism's rejection of them.

Kornberg writes that Herzl's pre-Zionist attitude was "a strange mix of Jewish pride and

Jewish feelings of inferiority, of an appreciation for the Jewish consciousness and a hatred of typical Jewish behaviour.”¹⁶⁸ This seems to square both with Herzl’s pre- and post-Zionist writing and activity where, as shown throughout this chapter, Herzl can show Jews as Wassersteins and Rheinbergs or Rabbi Geyers on the one hand, while on the other, expressing a strong sense of pride in being a Jew himself, and goes to great efforts to reconcile the two positions. Kornberg draws attention to Herzl’s early preference for Prussian over Austrian traits, both as a model for a new Jew and in general, and notes that Albia’s opposition to “Austrian slackness” along with the “composed bearing” and courage taught by swordsmanship offered Herzl the chance to cultivate and display un-Jewish traits.¹⁶⁹ Compare this attitude, however, to the barely-contained rage in his review of Eugen Dühring’s *Die Judenfrage als Frage der Rassenschädlichkeit*, which, as its title suggests, dismissed religious understandings of the Jewish question, addressing it as a racial one, treating Jews as racially distinct, and on those grounds opposing assimilation. Herzl accused the ‘Spitzbube’ Dühring of sullyng the name of freedom by daring to use the word, and suggested knocking his teeth in (*BTI*:615). Herzl’s overall reaction to the text is intriguing in itself. He draws parallels between Dühring’s racial antisemitism and the religious Jew-hatred of the Middle Ages: In Herzl’s analysis, the Christian child sacrificed in the myth of blood rituals is compared to the Christian capital killed off by competition with the Jews (*BTI*:613-4). Herzl then proceeds to denounce Dühring’s proposal to except Jews from basic civil rights as a reincarnation of the old ghetto (*BTI*:615). Intriguingly, when Dühring dismissed the possibility of what he calls a ‘Judenstaat’, the pre-Zionist Herzl either ignored or utterly overlooked this.¹⁷⁰ Instead, Herzl, in an echo of both *Das neue Ghetto* and *Orientalist*, biblical views of Jewish qualities, ridicules Dühring’s fixation with loyalty and counters it with reference to the ancient people of Israel, saying “Und dieser scheinliberale Faselhans von Dühring, der immer nur von ‘Treue’ und

168 Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl*, p85

169 *Ibid.*, pp57-8; 70

170 Dühring, *Die Judenfrage*, pp110-11

abermals von 'Treue' spricht, imponirt ihm nicht die heldenhafte Treue dieses ahasverischen Volkes gegen seinen Gott?" (BTI:611). However Herzl's fury at Dühning, his Couleurstudent Prussophilia, his desire to escape Jewish traits and his angry departure from Albia are not so incompatible.

Alex Bein suggests that Herzl's pseudonym in Albia, 'Tancred', after the crusading Prince of Galilee, shows an attraction to Jerusalem even then.¹⁷¹ (While it is a rare privilege to choose your own nickname, they are often affectionately mocking rather than outright hostile, and less likely to stick if the recipient dislikes them). More than that however, it may imply a desire to be *associated with* Palestine and Jerusalem by his fellow members. Herzl, who considered conversion for a whole generation of Jewish children and for a symbolic congregation of Jews *en masse*, but never seriously for himself, had a strong desire to assimilate, but to do so *as a Jew*, not in spite or instead of being one. Dühning offends not just his pride as a Jew, but also his principles of freedom. Antisemitism is not a challenge to his existence as a Jew (as, of course, he later comes to see it as shaping and driving the Jews), but to his existence as a German. As with Hess, there is an extra twist of the knife added in that they are rejected, not simply as Germans but as German patriots. Herzl desires pride and dignity in his Jewish identity, but to do so he also demands that his Jewish identity change to accommodate the traits he can value and feel pride in. Rather than attempt to cut himself loose from the spectre of Jewish identity that he nicknamed Mauschel, Herzl accepts and takes pride in this categorisation, all the while attempting to turn the category of 'Jew' into an empty vessel, in order to fill it with his own desired collective traits.

171 Alex Bein, *Theodor Herzl: Biographie, Mit 63 Bildern und einer Ahnentafel* (Vienna: Fiba-Verlag, 1934), p65

Self-Hatred and Separation

Although Herzl and Nordau differ in many ways in their understanding of Zionism, antisemitism and Jewish identity, both seem to be fighting on two fronts simultaneously: a strong desire to modernise and secularise Jewish identity, but also a deep sense of unease at secular, modernised Jews who abandon anything Jewish. Indeed this is precisely the criticism Nordau levels at Reform Judaism (ZS:20). While Zionism's definitive enemy is the Jews' diasporic existence, it deals simultaneously with both backwardness and assimilation, and Hess, Herzl and Nordau all explain these as products of diaspora. These threats usually align with other binaries: destruction and evaporation, east and west, religious and secular, ancient and modern, followers and leaders, proletariat and bourgeoisie, poverty and decadence, the walled and the invisible ghetto, kaftan and café. What is definitive about this anxiety is not the categories themselves but the insurmountable chasm and conflict between them. While other peoples need not choose between ennobling national traits and adherence to their identity, Zionists can neither draw on a positive image of Jewishness nor fully abandon it for another nation.

Self-hatred becomes in its own right a quality Jews can despise in themselves.¹⁷² Gilman describes how it becomes a quality of the Bad Jew figure:

The protean category of the self-hating Jew was thus developed. It placed "bad" Jews within an accepted and recognized category of the anti-Semitic science of race, the psychopathology of the Jew, and separated them from the Jewish identity of the observer.¹⁷³

Indeed, this separation is a key function in Herzl and Nordau's fiction and, of course 'Mauschel'. Fierce emphasis is put on these detestable Jewish figures' detestable attitude to their own Jewishness. The antisemitic nationalist view of the unpatriotic internationalist Jew contains what

172 This strange circularity becomes even more strange and circular when, as Gilman observes: "it is Herzl, and his essay "Mauschel," that provides [Karl] Kraus with his model for the idea of the Jew as a virulent opponent of the Jew, an opponent built upon the identity of enemies with their language." Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred*, p238

173 *Ibid.*, p307

by the principles of nationalism is at least a backhanded compliment: however surreptitious they may be about it, the Jews supposedly recognise and are loyal to their own people. Zionists found themselves caught, not only between Good Jew and Bad Jew in the sense of personal qualities, but also a Good and Bad relationship to their own Jewishness. In the transition of perceptions of the Jews from an element within the German nation to a nation in their own right, a Good/Bad and a Bad/Good Jew exist, the civilised but embarrassed (acculturated, secular or converted) Jew, and the backward but authentic (Eastern, religious, Yiddish-speaking) Jew. This is unsurprising, given the rejection of Jewishness demanded by the Good Jew, and the emphasis on the Bad Jew's failings as Jewish. What the image of Mauschel (or Rheinberg, or Rabbi Geyer, or Karl Moser) achieves is to break this opposition and posit a Bad/Bad Jew, whose individual faults are bound up with a faulty Jewishness, a flawed, inauthentic, self-hating Jew devoid of virtues both personal and national. What Herzl and Nordau both struggle to achieve is to posit a Good/Good Jew, both virtuous and self-assured in his Jewishness, who is anything but a bland, empty vessel, leaving 'ein Mensch wie jeder andere' as their (understandably) modest ultimate aim. Rather than the assimilationist dream of being "ein Mensch auf der Straße und ein Jude zu Hause", this bland, positive figure imagines 'der Jude' as a simple *Mensch*.

This anti-Zionist bogeyman not only embodies the most hated Jewish traits but, as he possesses so much cynical and selfish individualism, robs him of the authenticity and recognition of his own Jewishness that, for Herzl, can only lead to Zionism. Mauschel's denial, through anti-Zionism, of his own membership of the Jewish people allows Herzl to set up a "true" Jew in opposition, one who manages to sustain both positive traits and authentic Jewish identity. It is this reconciliation of a contradictory identity as much as the externalisation of its supposed flaws, that characterises Mauschel. Before Zionism, Herzl was already eager to escape this double-bind. Both his duelling tragedy and principled resignation from Albia show a desire to

demonstrate through action and spectacle that Jews can not only exhibit supposedly Gentile qualities, but exercise them as Jews in the name of the Jewish people. Zionism serves the same function, while fully allowing Jews to exercise patriotism. Not only did Herzl, as Kornberg put it, take Dohm's remedy one step further by arguing for the Jews' emancipation in their own country, he extended the diagnosis to specifically diasporic maladies and a faulty relationship to their own nation. Herzl and Nordau, in their portrayals of Jewish culture, show two paths taken by Jews – authenticity and assimilation, and both are accompanied by perceived personal flaws. However, the most contemptible quality for Herzl, and the most tragic for Nordau, is loss of Jewish consciousness. Zionism does not just extend the logic of assimilation, but nationalises it, and in doing so proposes a way to achieve authentic, self-aware Jewish identity without the supposedly backward qualities of the religious or Eastern Jews who have preserved their Jewishness. Zionism attempts to cut a seeming Gordian knot and reconcile Jewish traits and self-recognition through a radical upheaval in a third variable: geography. However, this transformation is not rooted in geography but perception. The pleasant blandness is not just down to lack of imagination on Herzl's part: this Jewish figure does not *need* specific qualities. Indeed, for his two most important functions, distinctive traits would be a positive liability. On one hand, this unremarkable everyman makes a demand on behalf of the Jews to be seen universal terms and own a stake in common humanity. On the other, Zionism does not change the national *qualities* of the Jews, but their national *identification*. 'Mauschel' is both a call and a tool for Jews to stop imagining bourgeois civic virtues in other national communities, and to imagine them as the virtues of a Jewish nation.

III. Aus schwarzrotgoldenen Bändern: Inspirations and Foreign Policy

Herzl's search for national models in contemporaneous Jewish culture left him with nothing universally positive except simple normality. Nevertheless, a moderniser and state-builder like Herzl was not to be satisfied with such a limited vision, and the lands and peoples that made up the world provided various alternative examples of nationhood. Though his enthusiasm for *deutschnational* patriotism was confined to his youth, his love of German-language culture, including, as literary editor of the *Neue Freie Presse*, a substantial influence on its literature, was a constant throughout his life. More than most other Zionists, he expressed great interest in Germany and other nations when formulating his plans for Jewish statehood. In 1895, before even *Der Judenstaat*, he writes in his diaries:

Wissen Sie, woraus das deutsche Reich entstanden ist? Aus Träumereien, Liedern, Phantasien und schwarzrotgoldenen Bändern – in kurzer Zeit, Bismarck hat nur den Baum geschüttelt, den die Phantasien pflanzten. (BT.II:65)

Two things are intriguing here. Firstly, and contrary to what might be expected from a thinker of his time, Herzl acknowledges that the German nation is not natural and immutable but a construction. He is “actually conscious of the creative character of nationalism: belonging to a nation was something wholly contingent – not an innate quality but an acquired idea.”¹⁷⁴ For

¹⁷⁴ Dieckhoff, *The Invention of a Nation*, pp33.

Herzl, the unified state is the product of national sentiment, built from popular fantasy and political performance. Secondly, that he explicitly uses Germany, where he had never lived, and whose patriots and national movements were increasingly antisemitic, as a model.

Herzl's was always to be a cosmopolitan society. As Kingscourt jokes in *Altneuland*:

Das ist offenbar dem deutschen Reichsjesundheitsamt nachgebildet. Da brauch' ich nicht erst die Einjeborenen zu befragen. Ich kenne mich schon ganz aus in Altneuland. Es ist 'ne Mosaik — eine mosaische Mosaik. Juter Witz, was? (*GZVV*:395)

However, this mosaic is less Mosaic than it initially seems. *Altneuland*'s New Society is composed, not of bits and pieces of Jewish culture from around the world, but the institutions of states and majority cultures, indeed the example that provokes the pun is a health ministry modelled on Germany's. It is therefore worth examining how Herzl saw those nations who were to make up the pieces of his mosaic.

This chapter will examine ways in which Theodor Herzl viewed European conceptions of nationhood, and how he was inspired by and appealed for approval to existing nations and national movements. Though secular Herzlian Zionism viewed other nations' structures as models of legitimacy and sought to win their respect for the Jewish people, both this admiration and the belief that it could be deserved seem to go beyond simple pragmatism. Indeed, given Herzl's rather negative view of diaspora Jews, it seems to be something of a preference for identities that are recognised as national, politically established and geographically grounded. However, Herzl imagined two nations: the set of proposals in *Der Judenstaat* and his diaries, which he seemed to be serious about implementing, and the conscious utopia of *Altneuland*. The latter is far from a simple, fictionalised and utopian repetition of the former. As a general rule, references to Herzl's visions of statehood or the nature of the country will concern that outlined in *Der Judenstaat*, or defined by Herzl's intention to see it realised, and the futuristic paradise

described in *Altneuland* will usually be described as the 'New Society' or in terms of its (relatively) utopian and fantastic nature. Since *Der Judenstaat* (1896) was published six years before *Altneuland* (1902), and after 1895 Herzl's diaries were more concerned with diplomacy than daydreams, his writing on the one nation largely pre-dates his writing on the other. For this reason it is unsurprising that the two differ, yet one is an unashamed work of fiction while the other seems intended to be realised, accounting considerably for further discrepancies. Just as the two differ in character, he looked to different countries for inspiration. Herzl was at once idealist and pragmatist, a utopian and self-declared dramatist in the role of a diplomat. In light of this, while it is easy to imagine his more realistic nation as a set of workable social policies and his more fictional one as an attempt to inspire his people, in practice *Der Judenstaat* is partially utopian in both aim and sentiment, while as fantasy *Altneuland* is strikingly cautious.

Since both countries were the literary aspect of a largely diplomatic project to reshape the world, inevitably the real world encroached on Herzl's visions of nationhood. Briefly summarised, Herzl was initially limited only by his own cautious imagination. As soon as negotiations with the Ottoman Crown began, he needed to reconsider, first on learning that the Sultan would never let Jerusalem fall under non-Muslim control and soon after that Palestine could not simply be bought from the Crown. Finally the Sultan ruled that Jewish immigration would only be permitted if spread out around the Empire, specifically forbidding Palestine. Herzl treats only this internal dispersion of Jews as insurmountable, and reforms his visions to fit the Ottoman system. At the same time, he sought support from more powerful countries for his project in Palestine, most often from Germany, whose protectorate he hoped this land would become, but also from Britain and Russia among others.

Unlike so-called "practical Zionists", focused on settlement, Herzl's approach to Zionism was very much a top-down, idealistic one. Rather than gradually settle Jewish communities in

Palestine or elsewhere, Herzl's strategy was to seek permission first and foremost, and he was particularly concerned about what he called 'infiltration' of Jews to the region. The negative connotations of the term show Herzl wanted Jewish immigration to be, not only large-scale, but also official and legitimate. While it is unlikely that he was influenced by antisemitic opposition to settlement, he was nonetheless careful not to inflame it. Herzl's was not simply a project to evacuate the Jews to a place of safety but a transformation of Jewishness into a national identity and, for this reason as well as practical diplomatic considerations, Herzl imagines this new identity always with one eye on existing countries for approval. Additionally, while Herzl has a great many ideas of his own, nationalisation of the stock market and a seven-hour working day being the most commonly mentioned, he frequently looks to existing nation-states as models.

Pinsker writes "Das Bewußtsein des Volkes ist erwacht. Die großen Ideen des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts sind auch an unserem Volke nicht spurlos vorübergegangen" (AE:27). He situates his nascent Jewish national movement in the context of other nationalisms, not only admitting an influence but, with his reference to an awakened national consciousness, phrases it in the common vocabulary of national movements. But while Pinsker directly addresses the nature of nations in general, Herzl expresses a variety of opinions on specific ones. This is perhaps clearest in *Der Judenstaat*, his most important and most directly prescriptive text, where he openly borrows from one of the most culturally significant polities in European history:

Darum denke ich mir eine aristokratische Republik. Das entspricht auch dem ehrgeizigen Sinne unseres Volkes, der jetzt zu alberner Eitelkeit entartet ist. Manche Einrichtung Venedigs schwebt mir vor; aber alles, woran Venedig zugrunde ging, ist zu vermeiden. Wir werden aus den geschichtlichen Fehlern Anderer lernen, wie aus unseren eigenen. Denn wir sind ein modernes Volk und wollen das modernste werden. (GZWI:94)

The Venetian republican system consisted of several councils of government of varying size, from

the Council of Ten to the two-thousand-member Great Council, headed by a Doge (a cognate of *Duke* or *Duce*), elected for life by the councils from Venice's ruling families. This aristocratic republic is an idea he holds consistently: his daydreams of state ceremony involve a Doge (BT:II:91), and it is the form of government he suggests in his discussion with Papal Nuncio Agliardi (BT:II:345) as well as in his first discussions with Turkish diplomats (BT:II:361-2). He explains this choice of structure:

Ich wähle Aristocratie, weil ich für die Zukunft eine elastische Regierungsform brauche. Monarchie würde zur Revolution führen.

Für Republik sind wir nicht tugendhaft genug, Montesquieu. (BT:II:95)

Montesquieu's own analysis of the advantages of aristocracy is that "*la modération est donc l'âme de ces gouvernements*",¹⁷⁵ so it may well be the stability of the Venetian system that appealed to the instinctively conservative Herzl. Interestingly, Herzl refers to Montesquieu's assertion that, while a despot rules by fear, a monarchy is held together by honour and a democracy by virtue.¹⁷⁶ For Herzl, it is the lack of this virtue that makes Jews unsuitable. He chooses this form not just because of the strength of Venice but because of the weakness of the Jews: aristocracy will also provide a structure for a positive Jewish quality which has degenerated in diaspora.

Venice is only one example where Herzl looks to established polities, both present and past, as examples of healthy civic culture. These he contrasts to similar, but deeply flawed, Jewish traits and holds up as possibilities of positive transformation. His perceptions, both positive and negative, reveal a great deal about his presumptions about the nature of the Jewish people and of national legitimacy, and how he envisaged his project where this people would acquire this legitimacy. This chapter will investigate how Zionist visions of modernisation drew on other nationalisms, and visions of nationhood defined by roles in international politics, rather than

175 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Roger Caillois, 2 volumes (Paris: Gallimard, 1951), vol. II, p254

176 *Ibid.*, vol II. pp259; 257; 251

borders, habitation and territory.

Multinational Empires

Austria and the Habsburgs

Although it makes for a logical starting point, Herzl has surprisingly little to say about his home country. Unlike simpler polities like Germany or France, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a supra-national polity incorporating several *Völker*, German and Hungarian as the name suggests, alongside Romanians, assorted Slavic nations and even a few Italians. This involved frequent conflicts, for example in 1880, when Czech received equal status to German in Bohemian government. Subsequent resistance from the region's German speakers lasted well into the 1890s. Until he began discussing this conflict, which Herzl refers to as the 'Sprachenstreit', this reticence on his own homeland seems to go beyond simple political pragmatism, as Austria either as a place to be admired or a political player in his diplomacy is conspicuous by its absence. Herzl had many disputes with Moriz Benedikt, editor of the *Neue Freie Presse*, who steadfastly refused to publish a word on Zionism even in Herzl's obituary. Later, joking about one of these disputes to the Austrian joint foreign minister, Herzl gives a possible explanation for his lack of inspiration from his own homeland:

Benedikt gebe die Existenz eines jüdischen Volkes nicht [zu], die ich behaupte. „La preuve est que j'en suis “

„Et lui“, fragte Golu[chowski], „ qu'est ce qu'il est? Protestant?“

„Non. Il appartient à une espèce que je n'ai jamais vue: il est autrichien. Je connais des allemands, des polonais, des tchèques [sic] – je n'ai jamais vu un autrichien.“ (BT.III:675)

This declaration has little to do with opposing the Habsburg political structure (Herzl publicly and proudly described himself 'ein überzeugter Freund monarchischer Einrichtungen')

(GZWI:93)) but is more an observation that an Austrian identity (as opposed to, say, German, Czech or Ruthenian) is rarely professed and that, for Benedikt, it has replaced his more obvious Jewishness. Herzl also seems amused that a national identity which he sees as unusual if not absurd has superseded Benedikt's Jewishness. At the same time, the identities Herzl contrasts to 'Austrian' are all constituent nations of the Habsburg Empire, and most also existed in significant numbers outside its borders. Herzl, it seems, recognises broadly territorial nations that do not exist as polities, and does so without a second thought. While bearing no ill will towards the Habsburg Empire as a political entity or the existence of its borders, as an identity this political entity simply does not fit into his scheme of nationhood, and Herzl seems to find professing loyalty to a polity laughable. Herzl's mindset, at least in regards to the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire, seems to be the usual mindset of multinational empires.

Herzl occasionally wrote to Austrian Prime Minister, Count Badeni, who had been forced to step down during the *Sprachenstreit*, and discussed the issue with the later Prime Minister Ernest von Koerber, and this interest gave him ample opportunity to discuss relationships between nations within the Empire. As a Germanised Hungarian it is a topic which touched his identity no less than it would any other Habsburg subject. As he describes in a letter to *Polizeipräsident* Johann von Habrda, his solution, which he often reiterates, is consistent with his avowed monarchism:

Die Sprachenverordnungen [...] müssten aus der Discussion der Politiker zeitweilig ausgeschaltet werden. Hierfür also für die Ausschaltung die Autorität S[eine]r Majestät einzusetzen, wäre minder bedenklich, als zwischen Oesterreich und Ungarn. Ja, die allgemeine persönliche Beliebtheit unseres Kaisers würde durch ein väterliches Eingreifen in den deutschböhmischen Streit nur gewinnen.
(BT.III:28-9)

Sceptical of politicians, Herzl's solution rests on top-down application of authority, specifically

that on which the country's sovereignty is based. His view of the controversy also seems to go further than simple compromise between the two parties: while Herzl acknowledges that the quarrel is between Germans and Czechs, (*BT.III:29*; 111) he nonetheless sees the conflict as affecting "das Verhältniss beider Theile der Monarchie" (*BT.III:28*), when, of course, the Czechs had no head of their own on the eagle. Herzl seems to see the dispute as affecting not just Czech-German relations but, perhaps because similar demands could be made for other languages, the fabric of the entire monarchy. His solution then, is less an assertion of a royal figurehead as a means of compromise between the two parties, than an assertion of authority. This meshes neatly with his concerns for the effects of the dispute.

Interessiren dürfte auch, dass die Wendung in der inneren Politik Oesterreichs, die Versuche Ew. Exc[ellenz] geordnetere Zustände herzustellen deutscherseits die grösste Anerkennung u. Sympathie finden. Die Aspirationen der Deutschradikalen werden entschiedenst abgelehnt, weil man ein gestärktes Oesterreich braucht (*BT.III:111*)

Royal authority is asserted to preserve the strength of the Empire, even though national identities, which Herzl seems to recognise far more readily, suffer as a result. Assertion of strength and authority seem to be the concern of polities, not territorial nations, and, perhaps surprisingly, Herzl is pragmatically uncommitted to whether unity of the one or recognition of the other takes precedence. While, unlike many countries, Herzl treats Austria or the Habsburg Monarchy neither as models nor as particularly useful allies. His view of identities within the Empire reveals both the stress he places on the symbolic authority, and the ease with which he treats nations as separate entities from both the real and symbolic structures of the state. Although Herzl may treat the nation-state as the most desirable and modern form of national sovereignty, it does not seem to be the only one.

Indeed, the cosmopolitanism of the Empire seems to have influenced Herzl a great deal.

He was very interested in the restoration of what he referred to as *Judenehre*, and in a passage on its reconstruction writes: “Ich brauche das Duell, um ordentliche Offiziere zu haben und den Ton der guten Gesellschaft französisch zu verfeinern” (*BT*.III:91). Matti Bunzl compares duelling in Herzl’s play *Das neue Ghetto* to the function of sport in *Altneuland*: “Wettspiele nach englischem Muster: Kricket, Fußball, Rudern” (*GZW*.V:203), demonstrate “the collective transcendence of Jewish emasculation”.¹⁷⁷ Bunzl’s analysis treats Zionism as a discourse on Jewish masculinity, and I will examine this in detail later. What is notable here, however, is that Herzl borrows methods of developing bourgeois and aristocratic masculinity in childhood from the English public school, but for fully-fledged adult masculinity draws on France. Herzl’s reformed, manly Jew, who turns his cosmopolitanism into a strength, can take the best of masculine ritual throughout his life. However, that a proud Habsburg subject such as Herzl should treat duelling as a specifically French refinement to society implies that he sees its role in bourgeois Austrian society as similar. Associations with France, in his cultural context, are refined in and of themselves. Much later, in 1904, he muses, reminiscent of Vienna’s *Ringstraße*: “Unterwegs in altneuem Rom kam mir der Gedanke, eine Strasse in Jerusalem zu bauen, welche Strasse der Diaspora heissen soll u. die Baustile aller Zeiten u. Völker haben soll, durch die wir gezogen sind” (*BT*.III:649). Herzl not only borrows from historic, opulent Rome, but does so with an explicit comparison to Jewish diversity. The landscape of such a major Jewish centre is shaped to reflect the proud diversity in diasporic history. Not only does Herzl borrow traditions of masculine development from other countries, he also borrows his own homeland’s cosmopolitanism (though this cosmopolitanism is asserted, rather than described in detail), and seems to see no problem with a culture importing foreign elements and conserving them as such.

To understand Herzl’s relations and attitudes to the Ottoman Empire, it is worth bearing

177 Bunzl, ‘Theodor Herzl’s Zionism as Gendered Discourse’, p82

in mind that he himself came from an equally diverse empire, to which he evidently felt a strong loyalty. Equally interesting is his easy readiness to recognise multiple national identities within and across existing political boundaries, and that he even considered loyalty to a purely political identity amusingly absurd. Furthermore, his proposal for an aristocratic republic, probably heavily influenced by his Habsburg loyalties, is rather neatly compatible with the Ottoman structure. The structure of a Venetian-style aristocracy mimics the hierarchical principles of the Sultan's Empire, but, since Herzl explicitly opposes a monarchy, there is no uppermost figurehead who might challenge the Sultan's authority. Zionism's potential to fit the Ottoman system goes some way, perhaps, to explain Herzl's enthusiasm for joining it. Though it is not a place among nation-states, this possibility nonetheless offers the Jews a place within an established system where they would be recognised as a nation.

Ottoman Turkey and the Sultan

Since Palestine lay within the Ottoman Empire, Herzl was always well aware that negotiations with the Turkish crown would be necessary. As might be expected of a diplomat, there is a discrepancy between Herzl's communication with the Sultan and his government and the thoughts he records privately, particularly as he grows increasingly frustrated in his efforts to secure a deal on Palestine, and in light of the shaky finances and uncertain situation of the empire, which many, possibly including Herzl, did not expect to last long. He expresses three sentiments on Ottoman Turkey: his positive statements to its diplomats, but also both admiration and extreme frustration recorded privately in his diaries. It is unsurprising that his private opinions differ from his more diplomatic communications. He casually refers to the Sultan as a 'mamser-ben-nennide', or son-of-a-bitch (*BT.III:136*), in a letter to the veteran Hungarian Orientalist Armín Vámbéry, with whom Herzl struck up a friendship, and in his diaries to "das regierende Lumpengesindel in u. um Yildiz Kiosk" (the Sultan's residence in

Constantinople, (BT.III:79)).

This distinction between public and private is perhaps not so clear-cut. While envisaging the policies of a future Jewish state, he writes “Wie mache ich den Selbstmord unehrlich? [...] Seine Briefe und Schriften dürfen nicht publicirt werden.” (BT.II:150-1), Whether this would be an effective method of prevention or not, it reveals that Herzl was accustomed to the supposedly private writing of great figures, most likely including diaries, being published posthumously. His diaries are not simply his thoughts, but, at least in part, the thoughts he wanted to be counted towards his legacy. Of course, had they been published while negotiations with the Ottoman Empire were still in progress, a prudent editor would have expunged rude comments about the Sultan, yet as a whole, Herzl’s diaries are better understood as a public record of his private perspective, albeit for a hypothetical public several years in the future. Rather than between public statements and his true feelings, Herzl’s diaries show a discrepancy between statements to one audience and another. Given the precarity of the Ottoman Empire, and the potential need of future Zionists to deal with its diplomatic rivals and what might come after it, it was perhaps as pragmatic to leave evidence of private antipathy as it was to show public respect.

Herzl’s view of the Ottoman Empire itself, rather than its government, is strikingly different and far more consistent. His view of the society is certainly not universally positive. Herzl, for example, rather dislikes the local delicacies, saying “Wieder die abscheuliche Malzeit [sic] mit den zahllosen barbarischen Gerichten, die man nach orientalischer Sitte mit Ausrufen des Entzückens hinunter würgen muss. Das reine Schlangenfutter” (BT.III:448). Herzl is also disdainful of the hypocritical cries of delight he is expected to produce while forcing this down, an custom he describes as ‘oriental’ which, along with terms like ‘barbarisch’ imply that, like many European travellers, he still sees his what might one day become his people’s capital as a strange and different world. Not only that, but this snake-food confirms his judgement of the

culture as a whole as alien and hypocritical, along with Turkish diplomacy and the prevalence of bribery. This bribery is referred to consistently as 'Bakschisch' and, despite complaints (*BT.II:263*), he is, directly or indirectly, he is reluctantly willing to take part in it (*BT.II:305; 321; 465*). Nonetheless, he is consistently positive about Constantinople as a city, and this goes beyond the standard ambivalence of the exotic view, or the classic English tourist who loves the landscape but hates the food. During his first diplomatic visit, he witnesses a royal parade, which he describes in great detail (*BT.III:368-70*). He is impressed by the picturesque Oriental landscape – “Die weisse Yildiz-Moschee im Sonnenschein. Jenseits, drüben der blaue Bosporus, ferne die Inseln im Duft” – but especially by the huge diversity of ranks and colours on display. He describes how, just as the Sultan passes, “Vom Minaret ruft ein Muezzin mit heller Stimme zum Gebet. Militärmusik dazwischen”, juxtaposing the nationalistic and militaristic with the city's religious sounds and skyline. The end of the march is equally significant:

Dann fährt er [der Sultan] hinter das Moscheegitter, steigt beim linken Flügelvorsprung aus, geht langsam die Treppe hinauf. Zurufe. Er grüsst nochmals und tritt in die Moschee ein, der nun alle Spaliersoldaten das Gesicht zuwenden. Die Andacht dauert etwa zwanzig Minuten. Im Moscheehof breiten die Pilger Gebetteppiche aus, knien, hocken nieder.

The parade which so enchants Herzl, who describes it finally as a “märchenhaft prächtige Bild”, not only makes a public spectacle of hierarchy, it shows symbolic military power and, finally, completes the display by uniting hierarchy, human embodiment of sovereignty, skyline, physical state power and religion. When Herzl returns three years later in 1901, he describes

Der Hofstaat, Eunuchen, Prinzessinnen in geschlossenen Landauern, Paschas, Würdenträger, Schranzen u. Lakaïen de toutes les couleurs. Alles marschirt bei Musikbegleitungen vorüber. Drüben blaut wie ein Wunder der Bosporus. Dann ruft der Muezzin vom Minaret u. der Padischah fährt im halbgeschlossenen Wagen zur Moschee. (*BT.III:257*)

However, by February 1902 this tone of wonderment has given way to one of affection, “Es ist die

alte Stadt: Farben, Farben u. Hundegebell – et tout le reste” (BT.III:343), and in July the same year, with the classic wonderment of the Orientalist, he simply writes “Wieder in Wunderland” (BT.III:424). While Herzl can be disdainful of the everyday culture and downright venomous towards the state’s rulers, he holds a great deal of admiration for both the cityscape and the ceremonies and rituals of their rule.

In his diplomatic relations, Herzl offers two major inducements: the potential of the Jewish people to end Turkey’s financial troubles, and the loyalty they can offer the Ottoman Crown. Both are to some extent pragmatic, but seem nonetheless sincere in what they reveal of Herzl’s perceptions of the Ottoman Empire, the Jewish people and their potential for synthesis. Even before Herzl travelled to Constantinople, discussions with Turkish diplomats were shaping his image of a future Jewish state. Initially, his expectations were simple and proprietary. He states in *Der Judenstaat*:

Wenn Seine Majestät der Sultan uns Palästina gäbe, könnten wir uns dafür anheischig machen, die Finanzen der Türkei zu regeln. Für Europa würden wir dort ein Stück des Walles gegen Asien bilden. Wir würden den Vorpostendienst der Kultur gegen die Barbarei besorgen. Wir würden als neutraler Staat im Zusammenhange bleiben mit ganz Europa, das unsere Existenz garantieren müßte. (GZWI:45)

Herzl’s starting vision of Jewish statehood is relatively simple: the Jews are simply given the country, providing their financial skills in exchange. At the same time, however, he implies conflicting roles in what he perceives as a rivalry between Europe and Asia and, as with his verdict on Turkish food, he not only seems to perceive the East as barbaric, but seems to be using ‘Barbarei’ as shorthand to be understood from a European perspective. While the Jews form both an enclave of Europe as defence against the barbarians and a piece of neutral territory, Herzl does not treat this as contradicting friendly relations with the Sultan. This was not necessarily Herzl’s

own intention, but perhaps simply how he expected a Jewish state to be perceived and used by others, which seems somewhat less contradictory. Rather than taking both sides in a conflict, or, as Mignolo argues, “Jews would no longer be seen as ‘barbarians’ but integrated into Western civilization in its struggle against barbarism”,¹⁷⁸ Herzl speculates as to how a state which exists on its own terms might fit into the powerplays of other polities, fitting Jews not into Western civilisation but the (Western-dominated) world stage. He already took a flexible position on the exact nature of statehood, writing in a draft speech to the Rothschilds in 1895: “Eine Colonie ist ein kleiner Staat, ein Staat ist eine grosse Colonie. Sie wollen einen kleinen Staat, ich will eine grosse Colonie machen” (BT.II:410). While, here at least, ‘Colonie’ seems more likely to refer to a small society rather than an imperial colony, he nonetheless sees state and colony as largely interchangeable concepts only really differentiated by scale, and his point of departure for relations with the Sultan is simple: the Jews will perform a much-needed service for the Ottoman Empire, and in return will receive land for their much-needed state.

The first obstacle Herzl encounters is Jerusalem. After being informed by a Turkish diplomat that the Mosque of Omar must remain under Muslim rule, he writes:

Da könnten wir ja Rath schaffen, sagte ich: wir exterritorialisiren Jerusalem, das Niemandem und Allen gehören wird, der heilige Ort, den alle Gläubigen dann gemeinsam haben. Das grosse Condominium der Cultur u. Sittlichkeit. (BT.II:339)

Immediately Herzl characterises his seemingly pragmatic reaction in terms of what a Jewish state can offer the world, and at this point, the Jews’ theoretical neutrality becomes even more of a national asset. Extraterritoriality apply to persons more often than areas, usually diplomats, though also ships, military bases and UN buildings, and so Herzl’s application of the term to an entire city is unusual. Even the status of the Vatican City was at the time disputed, and there did

178 *Deconstructing Zionism*, p69

not seem to be any comparable places with that status. Yet this extraterritoriality is not inconsistent with Herzl's view of the nation as a whole, since he had only two weeks earlier told the Grand Duke of Baden: "Würde die Türkei in absehbarer Zeit getheilt, so könnte man in Palästina einen état tampon schaffen" (*BT*:II:332). For Herzl, neutrality, especially on Christian-Muslim issues, is a vital quality for a future Jewish state. Two years later in Jerusalem, he tells Kaiser Wilhelm II:

Das ist das Vaterland von Ideen, die nicht einem Volke, nicht einer Confession ausschliesslich gehören. Je höher die Menschen in der Gesittung steigen, umso deutlicher erkennen sie das Gemeinsame in diesen Ideen. Und so ist auch aus der wirklichen Stadt Jerusalem mit ihren schicksalsvollen Mauern längst eine symbolische Stadt geworden, die allen Culturmenschen heilig ist. (*BT*:II:676)

This 'Vaterland von Ideen' is consistent with the important place Herzl gives to ideas throughout his writing. At the same time, he has developed the theme of Jewish universality. This implies the tendency towards universality which is already developed in Jews is itself a universal quality of humanity, associated with modernity and civilisation. That the Jewish state should simply administer religious sites, disinterestedly and purely on behalf of other faiths, is not only starkly different to how events ultimately did turn out, but also seems to treat the Jewish religion as either dispensable or irrelevant to the state's political and administrative function.

Herzl then, had to base his state on the impossibility of a proprietary relationship between the Jews and their state. The ex-diplomat Philipp de Newlinski reports that the Sultan is refusing to sell, saying "Mein Volk hat dieses Reich mit seinem Blut erkämpft und gedüngt. [...] Das türkische Reich gehört nicht mir, sondern dem türkischen Volk" (*BT*:III:368). The Sultan not considering Palestine his to sell or give away is entirely at odds with Herzl's expectation of the Jews owning their state. Yet he is impressed:

Ich war von den wirklich erhabenen Worten des Sultans gerührt und erschüttert, obwol [sic] sie alle

meine Hoffnungen vorläufig zu Schanden machen. Es ist eine tragische Schönheit in diesem Fatalismus, der sich todtschlagen und theilen, aber bis zum letzten Athemzug wehren will, wenn auch nur durch passiven Widerstand. (BT.III:368)

Indeed, it is later the same day that Herzl sees the royal parade into the Yildiz Mosque which he describes with such detail and wonderment, and it is clear that the imperial attitudes, pomp and ceremony of Ottoman Turkey have made a distinct impression on Herzl.

This clear, and rather sentimental, admiration may in part explain why Herzl so readily jettisons his initial objection to the idea of a *Vasallenstaat*, i.e. a semi-autonomous territory within the Ottoman Empire, a status which had been held by Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania among others. Before Herzl had even received a reply from the Sultan, a Turkish diplomat warned him of the impossibility of obtaining Palestine, and suggested a *Vasallenstaat* instead. This term, along with 'Halbsouverän' and 'Suzeränität', largely referred to Ottoman tributaries, denoting semi-autonomous states paying tribute to the Sultan. Vassals then included Bulgaria, Albania and Egypt, and, until 1878, Romania and Serbia. Although he was initially dismissive of the idea, by his return to Vienna Herzl had accepted national vassalage as a goal, and was not only working towards it but describing it and its role enthusiastically in his diaries. By September of 1899 he had become extremely optimistic about a Jewish future within the Ottoman Empire, telling the French journal *Pain*:

La Turquie est vaste, elle est loin d'être cultivée comme elle devrait et pourrait l'être; il y a place pour des millions d'habitants encore, et les Juifs, sous la protection des lois turques, seraient à l'abri de toute persécution, dans la jouissance de la liberté de conscience la plus absolue (BT.III:58).

In his public statements at least, Herzl seems to have complete trust in royal authority and Ottoman state power to guarantee Jewish safety. He also seems happy to accept imperial protection against external threats, charging Jewish troops only with internal order.

Die nicht nur vollkommen freie, sondern von der kaiserlich türkischen Regierung auf jede Weise zu begünstigende Einwanderung von Juden in Palästina. Die eingewanderten Juden erhalten eine völkerrechtlich garantierte Autonomie in der Verfassung, Verwaltung und Rechtspflege des ihnen überwiesenen Territoriums (Palästina als Vasallenstaat).

Es wird in den Constantinopler Verhandlungen des Näheren festzustellen sein, in welcher Weise der oberherrliche Schutz S[eine]r Majestät des Sultans im jüdischen Palästina ausgeübt und die Aufrechterhaltung der inneren Ordnung durch eine eigene Schutztruppe von den Juden selbst besorgt werden soll (*BT.II:435-6*).

Not only does Herzl seem happy to accept Ottoman authority, he positively celebrates it. He continues:

Die Abmachung kann in folgende Form gebracht werden. S[ein]e Majestät erlässt eine allergnädigste, gesetzkräftige und den Mächten vorher mitgetheilte Einladung an die Juden der ganzen Welt, nach dem Lande ihrer Väter zurückzukehren.

Herzl implies that the Sultan's personal, imperial stature will serve to draw Jews to any future state, and is quite clear that he sees this colonisation as validated by imperial permission.

Herzl's communications with the Turkish administration, however pragmatic they may seem and how much they may differ from his private opinions and negotiations with other countries, nonetheless reveal a great deal about what he believes the Jews might offer in exchange for Ottoman vassalage. He writes in September 1900, on behalf of all the world's Zionists, congratulating the Sultan on his Jubilee, (*BT.III:145*) and in a telegram in 1899 states:

Les sionnistes ont le désir de soulager leurs frères malheureux dans différents pays d'Europe et ils veulent contribuer à leur grandeur et prospérité de l'Empire ottoman. Ils espèrent donc que la loyauté de ces tendances sera apprécié[e] et encouragée par la Haute Sagesse du Khalife. (*BT.III:46*)

While Herzl and his movement were still making great efforts to raise money to consolidate Turkey's debts, his ideas had by this point changed. He no longer imagined the Jews in a simple

transactional relationship to the Ottomans, as in *Der Judenstaat*, but envisaged them as loyal subjects. While he continued to offer Turkey what was effectively a nation of Jewish accountants, by 1902 his offers to the Sultan stressed the Jews' potential as subjects of European origin as well as as Jews.

Nous autres juifs, nous jouons un certain rôle dans la vie universitaire du monde entier. Les universités de tous les pays comptent parmi leurs professeurs des Juifs, et nous avons de grands savants dans toutes les disciplines.

Nous pourrions créer une Université Juive dans l'Empire de V[otre] M[ajesté] I[mpériale] par exemple à Jérusalem.

Les étudiants ottomans n'auraient plus besoin d'aller à l'étranger. Ils resteraient dans le pays, obtiendraient la plus haute instruction scientifique et ne cesseraient pas d'être sous les lois de leur patrie.

L'Université Juive devrait réunir toutes les qualités scientifiques des meilleures universités, écoles polytechniques et hautes écoles d'Agronomie. L'institution ne promet rien, si elle n'est pas de tout premier rang. Alors seulement elle peut rendre des services réels à la science, aux étudiants et au pays.

(BT.III:393)

Not only is this an attempt to carve out a specifically Jewish function within the Empire, it is also an attempt to make an explicitly Jewish contribution to the international profile of the Ottoman Empire. Even what often looks like simple bribery Herzl sees as demonstrations of the Jews' potential loyalty. During the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 he writes:

Bodenheimer-Köln hatte eine glänzende Idee: für die türkischen Verwundeten sammeln zu lassen, um dem Sultan die Sympathie der Juden zu zeigen.

Ich griff diese Idee sofort auf u. lancirte sie unter den hiesigen Juden auch unter Nichtzionisten.

(BT.II:502)

As well as good vassal character, this demonstrates a certain internal honour, important to Herzl's concept of 'Judenehre'. By making this goodwill gesture in advance, the Jews would not only show

honour and loyalty, but a specific kind of honour analogous to the loyalty they wish to show the Sultan. His clarifications to the diplomat Mahmud Nedim Pascha reveal both his real anxieties and precisely what he wishes to demonstrate through this philanthropy: “Dadurch soll den Verdächtigungen von antisemitischer Seite, als ob wir nicht aus Menschlichkeit sondern gegen die Christen sammeln, jeder Vorwand genommen werden” (*BT.II:505*). Herzl is keen, not just to counter the predictable accusations of Jewish antipathy to Christians, but to characterise it as a demonstration of Jewish virtue and universal goodwill.

Oddly, Herzl’s experiences with the Sultan and in the heart of the Ottoman Empire, despite largely frustrating his efforts and initial visions of Jewish statehood, seem to have finally swung him in favour of Palestine as the only suitable location for a Jewish state. Arriving for the first time in Constantinople, he tells Ziad Pascha Jusuf and other diplomats “dass wir Palästina als vollkommen unabhängiges Land erwerben wollten, u. wenn wir es nicht bekämen, würden wir nach Argentinien gehen” (*BT.II:357*). One of Herzl’s first ports of call as a Zionist was Baron Maurice de Hirsch, whose Jewish Colonisation Association was already sponsoring large-scale immigration to Argentina, and Herzl hoped to transform the aim of this project to full statehood. *Der Judenstaat* and its preceding piece in the *Jewish Chronicle* weighed up Argentina and Palestine as equal options, but by his departure from the Ottoman Empire Herzl had not just relegated South America to a second choice but ceased to consider it almost entirely. Clearly, for him to all but abandon his alternative implies not only that he took a Vasallenstaat in Palestine very seriously as an offer (however tentative and unofficial), but saw it, with enthusiasm, as the best offer available.

Herzl certainly left Constantinople with a positive view of the Islamic world as a destination for Europe’s Jews. In discussions that October, he reports the words of another Turkish diplomat:

Mahmud Nedim sprach auch auf eine komische Weise von unseren Religionen. „Die Moslems“, sagte er „stehen den Juden näher als den Christen. Wer Moses oder Abraham beleidigt, dem wird bei uns der Hals abgeschnitten. Auch sind wir wie Sie beschnitten. Sie könnten sich für einen Mohamedaner, ich für einen Juden ausgeben. Christus erkennen wir nicht als Gottes Sohn an, wenigstens nicht mehr als einen Anderen. Für uns sind das lauter Propheten.“ (BTII:457)

Herzl, who had at this point made very little of affinities between Islam and Judaism (though he would later do so in *Altneuland*), finds this ‘komisch’, and seems a little surprised. Yet he seems to share this optimism, writing to Sidney Whitman, a journalist and enthusiastic writer on Germany and Turkey, about “les Juifs qui toujours depuis le moyen age [sic] ont été les amis reconnaissants des Turcs” (BTII:515). He implies in a letter to the German diplomat Bernhard von Bülow in September 1898 that he sees at least some Jews as closer in descent to Muslims than Europeans and so better suited for both the land and protecting its Christians:

Die Rückkehr selbst der halbasiatischen Juden unter der Führung vollständig moderner Menschen müsste zweifellos die Assanierung dieses verwahrlosten Orientwinkels bedeuten. Cultur u. Ordnung käme dahin. So wäre die Wanderung der Juden schliesslich ein effectiver Schutz der Christen im Orient. (BTII:617)

‘Assanieren’, a term used for the Habsburg Empire’s slum clearances during the late 1800s, implies hopes to rejuvenate the land and hopefully make it suitable for European inhabitants. It does, unfortunately, imply that he sees the area as a dilapidated slum, (and like many slum clearances and gentrification projects, it may not be to the advantage of existing inhabitants). The term ‘halbasiatisch’ seems to refer to Karl Emil Franzos’ usage for the region of Eastern Europe and Russia.¹⁷⁹ Reflecting a typical Orientalist view of the Jews as at once European and Asian/Oriental, it is the more authentic *Ostjuden* who are referred to as half-Asian. Meanwhile, his celebration of Muslim tolerance is less a comment on Jewish-Muslim relations than a rejection of Jewish life in Europe. Although in hindsight, expecting a warm reception for Jewish

179 “Halb-Asien”, *Der grosse Brockhaus: Handbuch des Wissens*, 20 volumes (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1928).

settlers by local Arabs seems tragically naïve, if Newliniski is to be believed a rosy view of the Ottoman Empire in comparison to Christendom is not so far-fetched:

Der Kaiser soll dem Sultan gesagt haben: „Die Zionisten sind der Türkei nicht gefährlich, die Juden aber sind überall eine Plage, die wir loswerden möchten.“ Der Sultan soll darauf in seiner gewöhnlicher Weise geantwortet habe, er sei mit seinen jüdischen Unterthanen ganz zufrieden. Die Kaiserin wieder soll gesagt haben, die Reise wäre sehr schön, das Unangenehme sei nur, dass sie so viele Juden werde sehen müssen. (BT.II:702)

Herzl's view of the Middle East as a far more tolerant place for the Jews than Europe is consistent with the main Muslim character in *Altneuland*, Reschid Bey. Not only is Reschid Bey supremely tolerant of the Jews, he puts this down to his Middle Eastern origins rather than his European education:

Sie müssen schon entschuldigen, aber Duldsamkeit habe ich im Abendlande nicht gelernt. Wir Mohammedaner haben uns von jeher besser als Christen mit der Juden vertragen. Schon in der Zeit, als die ersten jüdischen Kolonisten hier erschienen, zu Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts, kam es vor, daß streitende Araber einen Juden zum Richter wählte oder sich geradezu an den Waad¹⁸⁰ einer jüdischen Niederlassung um Rat, Hilfe oder Urteil wandten. Da gab es wirklich keine Schwierigkeit. Und so lange die Richtung des Dr. Geyer nicht die Oberhand bekommen wird, so lange wird auch das Glück unseres gemeinsamen Vaterlandes dauern. (GZ.W.V:248-9)

Most importantly, however, Herzl is conscious of the Ottoman Empire's broad ethnic diversity, writing in 1897: "Bei Arabern und Kurden sind wir beliebt. Streitende Araber gehen zuweilen statt zum türkischen Richter, zu einem Juden, der richten soll" (BT.II:484). Notably, the Jewish judge will later be used as an example of tolerance in *Altneuland*. Herzl's view of national diversity within the Ottoman Empire is not universally positive, however, and he does anticipate a certain amount of ethnic conflict.

180 Rabbinical council

Herzl writes to Nordau that a Vasallenstaat without autonomy and territory “wäre die Ansiedlung neuer Armenier in der Türkei” (BT.II:563). Considering Herzl followed Ottoman massacres of Armenians closely in 1896 (BT.II:377), this is a striking comparison, especially since, like Jews, Armenians were stereotyped as “shyster[s], who fleeced the Turkish peasant, amassing the entire Ottoman economy into [their] own sticky hands”¹⁸¹ While British and French public opinion sided strongly with the Armenians, the German-speaking world was ambivalent.¹⁸² Herzl’s praise for Ottoman tolerance, exemplified by the treatment of Jews fleeing Spain after 1492, was widely echoed in Germany,¹⁸³ while Armenians and their supporters were often characterised by opponents as antisemitic.¹⁸⁴ Armenians and Jews may not then have been such an obvious comparison then as they would be today. Furthermore, his initial objection to Ottoman vassalage was not from the Jews’ perspective, but the Sultan’s: “Ich erwiderte, dass dies eine Unaufrichtigkeit von vornherein wäre, denn die Vasallen denken doch immer nur daran, sich möglichst bald unabhängig zu machen” (BT.II:357-8). Herzl’s fear, as much as the danger to Jews as a minority, was perhaps the risk that, without guaranteed territory and autonomy, they might show disloyalty to the crown in pursuit of independence.

As with the Habsburg Empire, Herzl treats Arabs, Kurds, Turks and Armenians as valid identities despite their lack of an independent nation or, especially in the case of Arabs, despite being far from contained within Ottoman borders. The stumbling block, however, is Palestine:

Der Sultan will sein Reich allen Juden öffnen, die türkische Unterthanen werden, aber die Ansiedlungsbezirke soll von Fall zu Fall die Regierung bestimmen u. Palästina soll ausgenommen sein. Die Comp[agnie] Ott[omane-]Juive soll in Mesopotamien, Syrien, Anatolien, wo immer colonisiren dürfen, nur in Palästina nicht! Ein Charter ohne Palästina! Ich refüsirte sofort. (BT.III:350)

181 Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “‘Down in Turkey, Far Away’: Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany”, *The Journal of Modern History* 79, no. 1, (2007), 80-111, p100

182 *Ibid.*, p85

183 *Ibid.*, p97

184 *Ibid.*, p95

Given one of the chief limitations to be placed on Jewish settlement was preventing congregation in *any* area, this demonstrates how far his focus has drifted from simply *a* territory to this particular one. Herzl, almost as soon as the *Vasallenstaat* idea is floated, becomes keen to demonstrate loyalty, and only partly for practical reasons.¹⁸⁵ While his private comments on the Sultan himself are clearly less than charitable (for example the nickname mentioned to Vámbéry), he demonstrates genuine admiration for the office of Sultan and the Empire it represents. This is particularly notable in his physical description of the Sultan, which focuses on the negative aspects of the Sultan's body, and the impressive-looking parts of his uniform:

„Der Herr“ stand vor mir, genau wie ich mir ihn vorgestellt hatte: klein, mager, mit grosser Hakennase, gefärbtem Vollbart, schwacher zitternde Stimme. Er trug seine grosse Uniform von Selamik, Mantel über dem Waffenrock, Brillantorden, Handschuhe. Er gab mir die Hand u. wir setzen uns. Ich setze mich gleich tief u. bequem in meinen Sessel. Er sass auf dem Divan, den Säbel zwischen den Beinen.
(BT.III:258)

Most strikingly however, are the stereotypical Jewish qualities of the Sultan: his hooked nose, small stature and weak voice. The physical similarity of Turks and Arabs to Jews is a concept Herzl was by that point already familiar with, and as Phillip F. Veit observes, the Sephardic Jews of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire were often considered to be noble and aristocratic in bearing compared to those of Ashkenaz. German Jews such as Heinrich Heine dreamed of Marrano heritage.¹⁸⁶ Given, then, Herzl's desire for Jewish national regeneration, and that he shared Heine's fantasy,¹⁸⁷ it is interesting that the Sultan's physique represents not only as unlikely a match for his trappings of state as the Jews do for proud nationhood, but also a rather good likeness for a Jewish aristocrat.

In addition to the very practical benefit of Imperial protection, Herzl hoped for the

185 David Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p52

186 Philipp F. Veit, 'Heine: The Marrano Pose', *Monatshefte* 66, no. 2 (1974), 145-156.

187 Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl*, pp76-7

legitimacy of being part of the Ottoman Empire. Herzl instinctively recognised nations within the Habsburg Empire, so it is unsurprising that he would be ready to accept the same legitimacy for his people in another multinational Empire. While it would not be a nation-state as we would imagine it now, Herzl did not live in a nation-state, let alone a world of them. His willingness to entertain this possibility implies he was not aiming for legitimacy within a system of nation-states but within any system, and the international recognition that would entail. Indeed, his dryly ironic remark, “Mein „Judenstaat“ habe der türkischen Regierung Furcht eingejagt! – quel honneur!” (*BT.III:169*) betrays pride that Zionism and, by implication, a newly national Jewish identity have been recognised at all. As offers of cooperation from Germany and especially Britain began to materialise and the Sultan became ever more uncooperative, Herzl’s interest in the Ottoman regime began to wane. Furthermore, his refusal to replace dispersal in Europe with dispersal in Asia shows that he wanted his vassal state in the East, not only to look like a nation-state, but, perhaps, to have the potential to become one when the Ottoman Empire’s time came. Yet in the early days of his negotiations, he at once admired the Empire, wanted the Jewish state to have recognition as a nation on its terms, and, most importantly, aspired to a symbiotic relationship where Ottoman and Jewish national legitimacy would reinforce each other within the framework of nationhood.

Imperial Powers

Germany and its Protection

Germany, unsurprisingly, features as Herzl’s primary model for nationhood. Both Kornberg and William McGrath point to Herzl’s time as a Couleurstudent in the pan-German nationalist fraternity Albia, whose ejection of Herzl was detailed in the previous chapter. McGrath notes that

“the probability that Herzl’s mature work was significantly influenced by his association with the German nationalist student movement is great indeed”,¹⁸⁸ while Kornberg asserts that “What attracted Herzl to Albia was more its self-assertive, militant, and aggressive nationalist style than its political doctrines.”¹⁸⁹ Whether his early pan-Germanism fed into his later Zionism, or was an outlet for existing sentiments, Zionism was not the first form of nationalism Herzl embraced. Given Herzl’s generally pacifist outlook, it is perhaps unusual that he took inspiration from Germany, established with blood, iron and wars to provoke popular unity. While in early 1901 he once, and briefly, considered colonising Cyprus and taking Palestine by force, (BT.III:184) he is far more given to the fantasy of a bloodless foundation. When Ali Noury Bey Dilmeç, a Swedish-born diplomat for the Ottoman Empire, outlines a course of action bombarding Yildiz from the sea and installing a more accommodating Sultan, Herzl, confused as to whether this is a serious suggestion or mere fantasy, objects to this regime change, saying: “dass ich an einem solchen Anschlag nicht theilnehmen darf, wenn es auf Mord u. Raub hinausläuft” (BT.III:666).

Though Herzl clearly rejected the idea of a nation founded through bloodshed, as shown by the passage quoted at the beginning of the chapter, he defines German nationhood far less by its actions than by its symbols. Not only is Herzl thinking of the ‘Vaterland von Ideen’ this early on, he openly displays his German influences. German nationhood, for Herzl, is neither a purely political construction nor a natural, atavistic entity that simply needed political recognition. Rather, it is a popular fiction but no less valid for it. Germany is a nation not just held together, but largely constructed and consciously so, through symbols, rituals and mythologies, and the political emergence of this nation-state was simply its culmination.

This view, where national myth gives rise to nationalist sentiment and finally nationhood,

188 William J. McGrath, ‘Student Radicalism in Vienna’, *Journal of Contemporary History* 2, no. 3 (1967), 183-201, p199

189 Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl*, p53

is reflected in Herzl's daydreams of a Jewish state. For Herzl, a nation's spectacle and reality are intertwined:

Und eigentlich bin ich darin noch immer der Dramatiker. Ich nehme arme, verlumpfte Leute von der Strasse, stecke sie in herrliche Gewänder und lasse sie vor der Welt ein wunderbares, von mir ersonnenes Schauspiel aufführen. (BT.II:99)

As he pictures the first settlers' landing, he describes the future nation's symbolism.

Wenn uns auf dem Landnahmeschiff das neue Land in Sicht kommt, wird die Fahne der Society gehisst (die später Staatsfahne wird).

Alle müssen sich entblößen. Grüßen wir unsere Fahne!

Mit einer schlechten billigen Fahne in der Hand, steigt der Erste ans Land. Sie wird dann im Nationalmuseum aufbewahrt. Für die Legende eine eigentümliche Kappe bauen lassen, wie Stanley. Bei der Landnahme, den gelben Fleck tragen, und alle Landnehmer bekommen das gelbe Bändchen. (BT.III:120)

Herzl, effectively writing national history in advance, imagines a foundational moment, to be immortalised in a museum not yet built, and starkly visual. Indeed, it is a highly suitable moment for paintings, history book illustrations or even photographs, provided 'der Erste ans Land' lets a photographer off before him. In addition to this image, it creates a national artefact, one which symbolises the simplicity and poverty of the first settlers. Herzl's imagined national narratives make many, consistently admiring, references to Henry Morton Stanley who, at least as American as he was British, formed a part of both colonial and pioneer mythologies. Indeed, the inspiration from his iconic headgear (a pith helmet with a bandana around it) further demonstrates the importance of props, costumes, and future relics in Herzl's foundational image.

However, Herzl's borrowing from the German nation goes further than simply Bismarckian methods of nation-building. It is not entirely true, as Gans claims, that "Herzl envisaged German as the language of the Jewish state, rather than Hebrew or any other Jewish

language.”¹⁹⁰ Herzl concedes “Wir können doch nicht Hebräisch miteinander reden. Wer von uns weiss genug Hebräisch, um in dieser Sprache ein Bahnbillet zu verlangen?” however he continues: “Jeder behält seine Sprache, welche die liebe Heimat seiner Gedanken ist. Für die Möglichkeit des Sprachenföderalismus ist die Schweiz ein endgiltiges Beispiel” (GZWI:94). Herzl actually planned on having no “official language” at all, but expected German to become the de facto language of government (and for reasons unspecified, characters of all backgrounds in Altneuland). Herzl wrote “Uebrigens dürfte, par la force des choses, deutsche Sprache – Amtssprache werden. Judendeutsch! wie gelber Fleck für Orden!” (BT.III:90). ‘Judendeutsch’, however, is not Yiddish, which he refers to as ‘Die verkümmerten und verdrückten Jargons’, a ‘Ghettosprache’ (GZWI:94), and ‘Judenjargons, Jüdischdeutsch [...] die nur Sinn und Entschuldigung als verstohlene Sprache von Häftlingen hatten” (BT.III:75), hardly a useful language of government. Rather, German as the language of the Jewish state is claimed as ‘Judendeutsch’, a hostile stereotype turned into a mark of pride in the same way the yellow star would become a medal of honour. This proposition is far more radical than Gans suggests when he continues “Herzl did not consider language to be a distinct component of cultural identity to which the members of ethnocultural groups adhere precisely because they perceive it as such.” Not only do Jews reclaim stereotypes of a distinctively Jewish manner of speaking High German, and lay claim through this to a valid, established language, but also, by making this a state language, the act of a Jew speaking High German is given validity through nationhood. Contrary to Gans’s claim, Herzl did choose a Jewish language, by claiming German as Jewish.

Herzl also hoped to have his admiration returned. His desire for recognition, in part, is practical. Herzl pushed for both German diplomatic pressure on the Sultan and the status of a German protectorate. This was a rather standard imperial arrangement, Britain, France and

190 Gans *A Just Zionism*, p12.

others having had protectorates at the time. However, historically ‘protectorate’ is a highly variable term, and one Herzl was using well before the League of Nations existed to standardise the relationship in the form of a mandate. At this early, entirely hypothetical stage in its negotiation and design it is naturally unclear what specific shape he expected this protectorate to take. What is clear is that Herzl considered some form of German or European oversight either desirable, necessary or at the very least inevitable. This seems to have as much to do with the country and its figurehead’s authority and legitimacy as it does with practicality. He writes to Bülow: “Ein Wort des Kaisers kann die grössten Folgen für die kommende Gestaltung der Dinge im Orient haben” (BT.II:617) and returning from an audience with the Sultan, writes in an analogy to Androcles: “Wir Juden haben einen Protector in der Welt nöthig u. möchten, dass dieser Protector (der bewusste Löwe) vollkräftig werde” (BT.III:274). While Germany’s strength and influence have great practical value to Zionism, there is clear admiration of the power of the lion and the authority of the Kaiser’s word in Herzl’s descriptions.

Herzl wrote to Bülow and also told the Grand Duke of Baden that his movement would be “eine wirkliche Sanirung der Türkei” which would serve to protect the Christians of the Orient. (BT.II:468). His desire to assist Germany’s imperial ambitions also exposes something interesting about the Jewish state’s uses. He writes in a draft letter to the Kaiser in June 1898:

Aus der Fülle der für die Zionssache sprechenden Gründe sei nur dieser hervorgehoben: das einzige Culturelement, womit Palästina besiedelt werden kann, sind die Juden. Das Land ist zu arm, um Andere anzulocken. Für uns ist es reich an Erinnerungen und Hoffnungen. Und Palästina muss besiedelt werden, denn es ist der Weg nach Ophir wie nach Kiao-Tschou. Und wenn per impossible auch für andere Culturelemente die anziehenden Bedingungen geschaffen würden, so entstünde die bitterste Eifersucht zwischen den Völkern. Den Juden, scheint mir, liesse Europa die Besiedlung eher zu. Vielleicht nicht so sehr wegen des historischen Rechtes, das im heiligsten Buche der Menschheit verbürgt ist, als wegen der an den meisten Orten vorhandenen Neigung, die Juden ziehen zu lassen.

(BT.II:591-2)

The sentimental Jewish attachment to Palestine, and the drive this gives to a state built on an idea, could be assets to Germany. Referring to the biblical Ophir and the German colony in China Kiautschou Bay, Herzl associates with both wealth and the East. Both the German crown and German companies were at that time planning investments in the Baghdad railway, a construction project from 1903 to 1940 connecting Berlin to Baghdad via Constantinople and Ankara. This region therefore had great potential (fulfilled in *Altneuland*) as a passageway to the East. At the same time, the dual loyalty which German Jews often found themselves accused of now makes this asset even stronger:

Ich machte überhaupt darauf aufmerksam, dass mit den Juden ein deutsches Culturelement in den Orient käme. Beweis dafür: deutsche Schriftsteller – wenn auch von jüdischer Abstammung – führen die zionistische Bewegung. Die Congresssprache war die deutsche. Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Juden gehört der deutschen Cultur an. (BT.II:606)

He sums this position up rather neatly in a letter to Bülow in 1898, and clearly considers the magnitude of his project to be, along with the plan for a Baghdad railway, a “Geschichtswende im Orient” (BT.II:618).

Für die Türkei bedeutet der Zufluss eines intelligenten, wirthschaftlich energischen Volkselements eine unverkennbare Kräftigung. Darum wäre es ein Freundesrath, den der Kaiser dem Sultan gäbe. [...] Im Bedürfniss des ganzen nichtrussischen Europa liegt die Schaffung eines kürzesten südlichen Weges nach Asien: es ist die Eisenbahn vom Mittelmeer an den persischen Golf. Die Juden könnten, müssten diese Völkerstrasse bauen, welche anders unternommen vielleicht die schwersten Rivalitäten hervorriefe. (BT.II:617)

That Jews of all nations might constitute a little piece of Germany elsewhere is not a new idea, nor one the German crown would necessarily dismiss. In 1848 Adolf Stenzel called for the Frankfurt Parliament to support Polish autonomy because, since they spoke Yiddish, its Jews

constituted Germans.¹⁹¹ For Herzl to make similar appeals to German interests in Palestine is, then, perhaps less surprising.

Germany, like Britain and France, was a nation-state as we would now recognise the term, and plays perhaps the most important role in Herzl's relations to other countries. It provided the main models of legitimate nationhood from which Herzl drew inspiration; for both diplomatic and ideological reasons he frequently sought German approval for statehood. It is unsurprising that he should look to a country where Jews were politically emancipated but still at a practical disadvantage within the framework of their national identity, and where the Jewish question had ceased to be a political one and was, as he put it in *Der Judenstaat*, a national one (GZWI:26).

Britain and the English-Speaking World

In both *Altneuland* and *Der Judenstaat* Herzl draws on English sporting tradition, and his interest in the British Empire begins as early as *Der Judenstaat*. Using English terms, he imagines basing his colonial movement in Britain (Herzl says little about Scotland or Wales and, as is common in German, uses 'England' and 'Britain' interchangeably):

Die Jewish Company ist zum Theil nach dem Vorbilde der grossen Landnahmegesellschaften gedacht – eine jüdische Chartered Company, wenn man will. Nur steht ihr nicht die Ausübung von Hoheitsrechten zu, und sie hat nicht allein coloniale Aufgaben.

Die Jewish Company wird als eine Actiengesellschaft gegründet, mit der englischen Rechtssubjectivität, nach den Gesetzen und unter dem Schutze Englands. Der Hauptsitz ist London. (GZWI:48)

'Company', though also relevant to German Imperial ambitions, refers to Cecil Rhodes' Chartered Company, the best-known of several privately-run but crown-approved colonisation firms. Herzl displays particular admiration for Rhodes, shown when in January 1902 he sends him, through

191 Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred*, p201

Israel Zangwill, a 'Verbalnote', outlining his plans, drawing comparisons between the Jewish and English nations and admiringly describing Rhodes' as a colonial project (*BT.III:328*). As with Stanley's cap, this shows a strong regard for British colonialism which Herzl associates with the act of breaking new ground. Typically for Herzl, there is a huge emphasis on ideas and dreams:

Es gibt Träumer, die über grössere Zeiträume hinwegblicken, aber denen fehlt der praktische Sinn. Dann gibt es wieder Praktiker, wie die Trustmagnaten in Amerika, aber denen fehlt die politische Phantasie. Sie aber, Mr Rhodes, sind ein phantasievoller Praktiker oder praktischer Phantast. Sie haben es schon gezeigt. (*BT.III:327-8*)

All Herzl asks, however, is that Rhodes give his seal of approval, and say "Ich, Rhodes, habe diesen Plan geprüft u. richtig u. ausführbar befunden." Ever the propagandist, Herzl is naturally keen to have a prominent figure rubber-stamp his movement, and we see how vital authority and recognition are to his Zionism.

However, he does not simply want approval and inspiration. He hopes to have positive qualities in Rhodes and the British Empire recognised in his project and for his admiration to be reciprocated. With the British Empire in particular he hopes to be seen by a valid nation as valid in the same fashion. In return, as with the Sultan, he offers loyalty. Shortly before the offer of El-Arish is suggested, he writes to the Marquess of Lansdowne that, should His Majesty's Government support the Zionist cause, all the world's Jews would support Britain:

Auch alle anderen Juden der Erde fallen mit einem Schlage England zu, wenn nicht politisch, so doch moralisch. [...] Es gibt gering gerechnet zehn Millionen Juden in der ganzen Welt. Sie werden nicht überall die Farben Englands offen tragen dürfen, aber im Herzen werden sie alle England tragen, wenn es durch eine solche That die Schutzmacht des jüdischen Volkes wird. Mit einem Schlage bekommt England zehn Millionen heimliche, aber treue Unterthanen, die in allen möglichen Berufszweigen in der ganzen Welt wirken. (*BT.III:469*)

Loyalty to Britain represents not only reciprocity where Jews express as well as earn recognition,

but also the hope that Britain will validate the Jewish nation by valuing its gratitude. As with Germany, Herzl takes the antisemitic charge of dual loyalty (in this case, a highly secretive dual loyalty, with perfidious anglophile sleeper agents everywhere) and turns it into a diplomatic asset. Whether Herzl genuinely believes this charge, however, seems less relevant than the use he sees in it to appeal to European powers.

America is frequently mentioned in *Altneuland*, as an example of prosperity, and alongside England, France and Germany: for example as well as German and French, there are separate English and American *Kaufhäuser* (GZW.V:222), while David Littwak states:

Und ihr werdet es für einen Scherz halten, wenn ich euch sage, daß Neudorf gar nicht in Palästina gebaut worden ist, sondern anderswo. Es ist gebaut worden in England und Amerika, in Frankreich und in Deutschland. Es ist entstanden aus Erfahrungen, Büchern und Träumen. Die mißglückten Versuche von Praktikern wie von Phantasten mußten euch zur Lehre dienen, ihr wißt es gar nicht.
(GZW.V:266)

A nation built of ideas is an unsurprising addition for Herzl, but the inclusion of America is noteworthy, as is the substantial difference from its portrayal in his diaries. Herzl writes of America as a source of both competition and antisemitism,¹⁹² but usually sees it in positive terms. He uses “diese amerikanische Zeit” (BT.II:533) to justify the plausibility of large sums of money, and, compares his pioneers to the Pilgrim Fathers, describing Zionism as “die neue Mayflower” (BT.III:421). America is a byword for both a new world and a staggeringly prosperous society. It also represents, like the French-style duelling culture, a model for new masculinities:

Eine Cavalcade stürmte uns von der Colonie Rechowoth entgegen, etwa zwanzig junge Bursche, die eine Art Phantasia aufführten, hebräische Lieder jauchzten u. unseren Wagen umschwärmten. Wolffsohn, Schnirer, Bodenheimer u. ich hatten Thränen in den Augen, als wir diese flinken muthigen

192 “Die Juden ziehen schon jetzt jeden Augenblick aus einem Land ins andere. Eine starke Bewegung geht sogar übers Meer, nach den vereinigten Staaten – wo man uns auch nicht mag. Wo wird man uns denn mögen solange wir keine eigene Heimat haben?” (BT.II:170)

Reiter sahen, in die sich die hosenverkaufenden Jünglinge verwandeln können. Hedad! schrienen sie u. stürmten auf ihren arabischen Pferden querfeldein. Mich erinnerten sie an die Far-West-Reiter der amerikanischen Steppen, die ich einmal in Paris gesehen hatte. (BTII:677)

The appeal of cowboys to Herzl is intriguing. After all, the supposed masculine, working-class authenticity of this archetype appealed to the urban bourgeois imagination in America as well as in Europe. Particularly notable are the mentions of Arab horses and the show in Paris: these pioneers in the Holy Land, who cheer in Hebrew, are oriental cowboys, bringing the Wild East to a European audience. Yet America is only a model for a pioneer society's culture and possibilities, not than the methods. Herzl writes:

In America occupirt man die Erschliessung eines neuen Territoriums auch noch auf eine recht naïve Art. Die Landnehmer versammeln sich an der Grenze und stürzen zur bestimmten Stunde gleichzeitig und gewaltsam darauf los.¹⁹³

America has the energy of a pioneer society, but without the modern organisational methods Herzl so admires. It is a positive example for aims but a negative, or at least naïve example for methods. In *Altneuland*, however, it is a fountain of some of the entrepreneurial spirit needed for a New Society, as well as a source of immigrants to, but is no longer any kind of model. Now the utopia is constructed, these models are no longer necessary. This use of course has practical value: the USA was a great draw for Jewish emigrants, and to treat it as any other part of diaspora stresses the New Society's victory over its main competitor.

Although seldom mentioned in *Der Judenstaat* or his diaries, Australia is a constant presence in *Altneuland*. His settlers, for example, use eucalyptus trees to drain the swamps (GZW.V:280-1), and Australia has an even more explicit function than America:

[D]as große, blühende, stolze, reiche Australien [...] war zu Anfang des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts eine

193 BTII:193. Herzl describes the nineteenth-century "Land Runs". Under the Homestead Act of 1862, settlers could claim ownership of land after living on and "improving" it for five years. Certainly expansion into Native American territory was rarely a centrally-planned undertaking and largely led by settlers and pioneers.

verachtete Sträflingskolonie und wuchs in wenigen Jahrzehnten zu einem mächtigen, gesunden Staatswesen heran. Zu Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts war es ein Kronjuwel des britischen Weltreiches. (GZVV:298)

Herzl deploys the redemptive myths of the Australian convict and rehabilitation through labour. As a dispersed, hated, downtrodden and frequently impoverished people, Jews are the ideal nation for this narrative of redemption. Travelling through a beautiful, flourishing region, David Littwak shocks Löwenberg and Kingscourt with the following revelation:

„Nein,“ sagte David. „Wir haben es ihm absichtlich verschwiegen, weil er zuerst einen unbefangenen Eindruck haben sollte. Daß diese Musterwirtschaft eine Sträflingskolonie ist, damit wollten wir ihn überraschen.“(GZVV:362)

Herzl naturally admired pioneers and nation-builders. Making very real plans from Europe, he looks to Britain, the great expeditionary power, for inspiration. In *Altneuland* he frequently turns to the promise and mythology of the New World.

Parnell and His Adversary

Herzl admires Britain as a country which has emancipated the Jews, even imagining himself as a chest-thumping English patriot: “Das sind die Menschen, das ist das Milieu, die ich zu meinem Wohlbefinden brauche. Comme je les comprends, les juifs assimilés de l’Angleterre! In England lebend wäre ich vielleicht ein Jingo” (BT.III:113). However, it is as a world power that he most admires Britain, and particularly as a colonial power. This is, however, somewhat ambivalent. He states, as a simple entry in his diary: “Ich werde der Parnell der Juden sein” (BT.II:256). Identifying with Charles Stewart Parnell, an Anglo-Irish nationalist leader, implies that he views Ireland as, like the Jews, downtrodden and in need of national revival. Yet he makes little mention of the country elsewhere, and indeed admires Ireland’s coloniser precisely for its colonialism. While it may seem inconsistent to model himself and his movement on both the

Empire and its anti-imperialist opponents, it seems that he simply admires the nationalist movement as a nationalist movement, respecting both players disinterestedly from the sidelines. The redemptive narrative of Australia, and the romance of pioneers such as Henry Morton Stanley exert a powerful appeal on a man whose project is, ultimately, one of colonisation.

Against a background of increasing Anglo-German rivalry, Herzl was not only willing to hedge his diplomatic bets and play both sides, but seemed to show genuine admiration for both powers, Irish nationalists, and the distant, isolationist USA as models for his state-building project. Whether he relied on opening land routes to the East for Germany, or played on Jewish stereotypes to offer loyalty to the British, Herzl's relationships to these countries were not just diplomatic, but showed Herzl searching for a position for his future Jewish state within the diplomatic world. Herzl envisaged offers alongside his requests, desiring inspiration for new national myths as much as he did material support. His state would not just have a use to one or all of the Great Powers, but a role where this dependency would be reciprocal.

Ancient and Non-Western Nations

Herzl was in a wide variety of ways extremely unusual among Zionists. Certainly his interest in other countries' cultures and frequent comparisons to the Jews mark him out from figures such as Pinsker or Nordau, as does his utopian instinct. Zionism nonetheless had to exist in a world with other nations and peoples, and to avoid all mention of them would of course have been impossible. Nordau, on the rare occasions when he drew on other peoples, did so primarily as a rhetorical device, and his choices of example differed strongly from those used by Herzl as models. Explaining the scapegoating of the Jews, he recognises to a certain extent alternative models of identity and peoplehood:

Wenn die stammes- und glaubenseinheitlichen Völker des Altertums von irgendeinem Ungemach heimgesucht wurden, wofür sie keine ausreichende Erklärung in eigenem Verschulden fanden oder finden wollten, so vermuteten sie, daß die Stammesgötter ihnen zürnten, und suchten sie zu versöhnen. (ZS:239)

For these “stammes- und glaubenseinheitlichen Völker”, the possibility, in theory entirely unproblematic to the modern structures of civic nationalism, of being part of a civic, linguistic or cultural community without sharing its beliefs or ancestry does not exist. However Herzl does not envisage this issue arising: no religious or racial minorities develop whose presence within them might challenge it, and how this unity is maintained is not mentioned.

Nordau and Sparta

In his address ‘Heloten und Spartaner’, Max Nordau reminisces about a tragedy he wrote in his youth, focused on the Helots whose mostly agricultural labour supported the martial culture of the Spartan empire, and whose treatment was notoriously violent and consciously degrading.

Sie mögen wie jede leidende Kreatur ihre Seufzer und Schreie gehabt haben, Märchen und Sagen, in denen sie die Herren, die der Spartaner ihre Diener waren, Sprichwörter und Fabeln, in denen sie sich an ihren Peinigern für Qualen mit Witzen rächten, todestraurige Lieder, in denen sich ihre Verzweiflung ausweinte. (ZS:419)

Though this may well draw on slave traditions in the Americas too, and indeed be a common or universal phenomenon, his speculation about melancholic folk songs and subversive, vengeful humour seems most likely to be inspired by Jewish, particularly Yiddish culture. Certainly, though at the time, as he says, “An eine Aehnlichkeit ihres Schicksals mit dem meines eigenen Stammes dachte ich nicht, wenigstens nicht im hellen Bewußtsein” (ZS:420), in this speech Nordau draws these comparisons retrospectively. However, it is the Spartans who provide a model for Zionism and the increased sense of Jewish honour which accompanies it:

Die zionistischen Juden sind keine Heloten. Sie sind Spartaner. „Mit dem Schilde oder auf ihm.“ Das ist heute zionistisch-jüdisch, wie es einst spartanisch war. In den Zionisten ist die stolze Erkenntnis lebendig: es ist eine hohe Ehre, Jude zu sein, denn es schließt hohe Pflichten in sich, das Maß für den sittlichen Wert eines Mannes aber gibt die Pflicht, die er auf sich zu nehmen bereit ist. (ZS:423)

A cynical reading might infer that, for Nordau, the aim of Zionism is simply to switch sides, from oppressed to oppressor, a Fanonian desire to take the place of the colonist.

However, other passages show his motives in different terms:

Auf den Baseler Kongressen lernte ich ein anderes Judentum kennen, das mich wieder mit mir und meinem Stamme versöhnte. Seit ich dieses Judentum vor Augen habe, denke ich nie wieder an meine Helotentragodie. (ZS:423)

Rather than a simple matter of reversing oppressor and oppressed, Nordau aspires to the historical view of Spartan courage, honour and martial prowess, which downplays their cruelty to the Helots. Indeed, Zionism lets Nordau forget the tragedy of the Helots altogether, since Spartans can be and often are remembered and romanticised without Helots, but not Helots without Spartans. And, of course, Zionism allows Nordau perhaps not to forget the Helot-tragedy of diaspora Jewry (whether there can be Spartans without Helots is not addressed). It is this which not only enables him to feel pride in his tribe, but also enables him to reconcile himself with membership. Helot and Jewish existence (both groups secondary to, and easily erased from, the collective identity of societies they live in) are associated with a degradation which must be remedied before his own identity and relationship to his Jewishness can be reconciled.

Other Non-National Peoples

Nordau argues:

Die Wahrheit ist, daß das jüdische Volk in seiner Gesamtheit das unvergleichlich ärmste unter allen Völkern der Erde ist. Es mag vielleicht wilde Stämme geben, die in noch größerem Elend leben, diese

aber empfinden ihr Elend nicht, während die Juden es bitterlich fühlen. (ZS:406-7)

In his qualification 'in seiner Gesamtheit' he draws a distinction between individual and collective suffering: while individual Jews may well be better off than, say, Inuits or Fuegians, their misery as a people is pronounced and deeply felt. National suffering, here, is implied as a distinct category. The nature of this is expanded on elsewhere.

Die Eskimos haben das Recht und den Raum und den Stoff, ihre Schneehütten zu bauen, wie und wo sie wollen, und Robben zu jagen, wo [...] sie können. Selbst die Feuerländer dürfen ihre Feuer anzünden und fischen, wo es ihnen beliebt. Das jüdische Volk allein hat nicht das Recht, seine Kräfte uneingeschränkt zu gebrauchen, um seine ursprünglichsten Leibesbedürfnisse zu befriedigen. Und während es wirtschaftlich schlechter gestellt ist als die ärmsten Wilden, hat es doch alle Bedürfnisse gesitteter Menschen, vermehrt um einige kostspielige Bedürfnisse religiöser Natur, die der nichtjüdische Kulturmensch nicht kennt, und so ist es relativ noch weit ärmer als der ärmste Stamm von Wilden, hinter dem es auch schon an absolutem Besitze zurücksteht. (ZS:116-17)

Internal distinctions such as Selk'nam, Haush, Yaghan, Alcalufe or other tribes of the Tierra del Fuego archipelago are omitted by, and probably unknown to Nordau and his contemporaries. The nationalist goal of one people inhabiting one territory is presupposed in this understanding of Fuegian peoples. These examples he uses are not particularly important for their specific characteristics, aside from the fact that the majority of of the audience at the Fifth Zionist Congress could be expected to know what an 'Eskimo' was. Rather, they and 'Feuerländer' serve as bywords for primitive-sounding peoples who live in extremely adverse conditions, yet still have their own territory. For a middle-class-dominated movement planning to move to harsher climes in search of statehood, there is encouraging resonance in this comparison.

Notably, while Herzl frequently looks to nations with nation-states and successful national movements to inspire Zionism, Nordau avoids such comparisons in favour of peoples with whom the putative Jewish state will not need to interact or share the world because they are either

geographically or temporally too remote. These are typically downtrodden or deprived, and aside from the aforementioned 'wilde Zigeuner' (ZS:266), from either classical literature or travel writing rather than his own considerable travels. This mirrors the stark difference in Herzl and Nordau's general attitudes to interactions with other peoples. Nordau writes:

Von welchem andern Volke der Erde hat man sich jemals erdreistet, zu fragen: wozu dient es? Wo hat man je gehört, daß ein Volk zu etwas dienen muß? Ein Volk ist Selbstzweck. Es lebt sich, nicht anderen zu Gefallen. Es darf natürlich keinem anderen schaden, weil es sonst Abwehr hervorruft, die es vernichten kann. Aber es braucht niemand zu nützen. Es braucht sein Dasein und seine Daseinsberechtigung nicht dadurch zu erkaufen, daß es anderen Dienste leistet. Nur von uns findet man es selbstverständlich, daß wir unser Recht aufs Dasein durch anderen geleistete Dienste erweisen müssen. Nur wir haben nicht das Recht, für uns selbst zu leben. (ZS:126-7)

Nordau's idea that "Ein Volk ist Selbstzweck" contrasts strongly with Herzl's tendency to understand *Volkstum* in terms of other peoples' perceptions. However the two are not entirely at odds: while Herzl frequently finds purposes for the Jewish nation among other nations, these purposes are in turn a means to an end. It is by serving these purposes that the Jews are recognised, and therefore established as a nation, which can then be, as Nordau argues, an end in itself. For Nordau, with the exception of Sparta, other nations are not models for Jewish nationhood, and even Sparta is chosen for its contrast with the Helots of his half-formed tragedy. Rather, he uses other peoples to illustrate the exceptional suffering of the Jews, that they are deprived of something even the most impoverished Fuegian can take for granted. Nordau presumes territorial integrity is the natural state of human peoples, and takes as read Herder's statement "Raubt man ihnen ihr Land: so hat man ihnen alles geraubet."¹⁹⁴ Noble savages have a dignity that, for Nordau, the 'savage' Roma lack, and the Jews are denied.

194 Herder, vol VI, p259

Universal Contribution

Herzl's diaries also give occasional insights into his understanding of international politics beyond the Jews and their state. He is careful to balance relations with Britain against those with Russia (*BT.III:182*) and, investigating a colony in the El-Arish peninsula, he expects to serve as a buffer state "not from the goodwill but from the jealousy of the powers"¹⁹⁵ Of German/Turkish relations he writes:

Siemens von der Deutschen Bank ist wegen der Bagdadbahn in Konstantinopel. Die Türken haben sein Messer u. das Wasser an der Kehle. Deutschland macht ungeheure Fortschritte im Orient. Die Vortheile, die der Sultan davon hat, sind aber höchst platonischer Natur. Porzellanvasen, Händedrucke, Orden, Telegramme – das ist Alles. Der deutsche Kreuzzug sieht wie Eisenbahnbau und dergleichen Scherz aus. Indessen fängt den Türken der Knopf an aufzugehen. (*BT.III:77*)

Rather uncharacteristically, he sees German material power as far more potent than Turkish "platonic" advantages, and his understanding of the behaviour of nations among themselves is surprisingly pessimistic compared to his usual idealism. Though this view does not involve these countries seeing a Jewish state as an equal, it does involve its recognition, to a certain extent, as a nation. Though his state is to be used as a pawn, it would at least be on the board.

Herzl's view of a Jewish state's usefulness is far more than the offers it can make to particular states or nations during negotiations. It is not even a matter of becoming a geopolitical necessity. Herzl views the state itself as a service to humanity, saying personally to Kaiser Wilhelm II, in a personal audience in Jerusalem "Wir Juden grüssen Ew. Majestät in diesem hohen Augenblick und wünschen dabei aus tiefster Brust, dass ein Zeitalter des Friedens und der Gerechtigkeit anbrechen möge für alle Menschen. Auch für uns" (*BT.II:676-7*). His rhetoric is one of reconciling nations, and he hopes that this peace and justice would not exclude the Jews. The

195 Said in English to Joseph Chamberlain, (*BT.III:552*)

implication here is twofold: both that lack of a state is excluding the Jewish people from this peace and justice, but also the clear hope that grandiose dreams of universal benefit will persuade the German state to help end Jewish statelessness. As well as these more abstract visions, Herzl intends more concrete Jewish achievements. He recalls a conversation with the architect Oskar Marmorek who, along with his brother the microbiologist Alex Marmorek, was the inspiration for the two Steinecks in *Altneuland*:

Gestern sagte mir Oskar Marmorek dass Alex [Marmorek] die Tuberculose-Heilungsversuche am Menschen gelungen seien. Es is eine so colossale Sache, dass ich skeptisch bin. Ich wünsche es diesem seelenguten edelsten Menschen Alex u. der Menschheit insbesondere aber dem Zionismus, dass es wahr sei.

Ich schrieb heute an Alex über die eventuelle Benutzung seiner Entdeckung zur Förderung unserer Bewegung eventuell durch Ueberlassen der Exploitirung an die Bank. (BT.III:92)

Marmorek at this point had already offered the proceeds from his treatment to the Zionist cause (BT.II:744). This achievement is to benefit not only the Zionist cause, but the whole of humanity, and in the capacity of a Jewish, Zionist, national achievement.

Herzl's own ideas for a Jewish state repeat this pattern, and he frequently returns to two economic innovations: the seven-hour day and a state monopoly on the stock market. Both he portrays as specifically Jewish. The seven-hour day, Herzl is adamant, will symbolise the Jewish willingness to work hard, in contrast to antisemitic stereotypes, and the significance of the number seven is clear. He writes in his draft speech to the Rothschilds:

Der Siebenstundentag! Ich wähle die Siebenzahl, weil sie mit alten Vorstellungen des Judenvolkes zusammenhängt und weil sie vierzehn allgemeine Arbeitsstunden – mehr geht in den Tag nicht hinein – ermöglicht. (BT.III:160)

The *Börsenmonopol* is more complex. Though seeing it as very much a Jewish-dominated institution, he is highly scathing of the stock market and by extension the financial sector,

particularly for their effect on Jews:

Wie steht es aber mit dem Geldhandel? Das scheint ja eine der Hauptfragen zu sein. Wir sind jetzt leider ein Volk von Börsianern. Unsere Leute werden wohl alle zur Börse hinstürzen? Ah, oder werden wir am Ende die nützliche, die unentbehrliche Einrichtung, der Börsen gar nicht haben? Und Sie fangen an, mich auszulachen. Geduld, meine Herren!

Zunächst glaube ich nicht an die Börsenlust unserer Leute [...] Ich meine, sie thäten alles lieber, als dass sie an die Börse gingen. (BT.III:177)

Indeed, he sees Zionism and the Börsenmonopol as a liberation of the Jews from the stock markets, and writes in his draft speech to the Rothschilds “Glauben Sie mir, diese kleinen Börsianer werden uns dankbar und treu dienen, wohin wir sie stellen; wenn sie es nicht vorziehen, freie Unternehmer von Arbeiter und Geschäften aller Art zu werden.” (BT.II:177) Herzl seems to take the necessity of stock markets for granted: his only mention of a society without them is when he introduces his monopoly a few lines earlier, saying “Sie fangen an, mich auszulachen. Geduld, meine Herren!” Herzl automatically anticipates that the idea of a society without a stock exchange will meet with ridicule.

This creates a complicated double effect. On one hand, Herzl has a flagship national institution based on a highly prevalent Jewish stereotype, one he himself puts forward, yet this institution itself makes that stereotype unworkable. A negative symbol of the diaspora Jew is reclaimed as part of national identity, and, in both practical and symbolic terms, the new Jew is liberated from it. By making it part of nationhood and indeed the state structure (nationalised in both senses of the word), Herzl destigmatises this structure. Nor are these innovations simply designed to serve a future state: “Das Börsenmonopol wird wahrscheinlich die erste Sache sein, die uns Europa nachmacht” (BT.III:133). The notorious presence of Jewish finance in other countries becomes, through this institution, famed, admired and imitated, while Jewish national finance is safely contained within its own borders, and spread to other nations in a manner

entirely above board. The stereotypes of diaspora are reclaimed, restructured and made into a proud national achievement.

The seven-hour day has a similar importance:

Wir selbst möchten im Judenlande alle neuen Versuche benützen, fortbilden, und wie wir im Siebenstundentage ein Experiment zum Wohle der ganzen Menschheit machen, so wollen wir in Allem Menschenfreundlichen vorangehen und als neues Land ein Versuchsland und Musterland vorstellen. (GZWI:100)

Even going so far as to call it the 'Siebenstundenland' (GZWI:76) and its inhabitants 'Siebenstundentägl'er' (GZWI:67), Herzl makes these contributions central to his idea of nationhood, and the emphatically Jewish innovations allow this hypothetical country to make its very positive mark on the world. Most importantly, Wagner's accusation that Jews are imitators, not innovators, is turned on its head. Herzl's imagined contribution to the world is to be validated by imitation, and just as the Jewish state and its streets will bear the influence of the world, so the world will readily accept the influence of the newly state-based Jews.

As with the Sultan, this country is defined by a reciprocity of contribution as an internal element. That is, just as a Jewish state will contribute to the Ottoman Empire as a component part and European powers as a useful ally, so it will also contribute to the world as, finally, a legitimate nation among nations. Though his focus is frequently on European powers and later, increasingly, on the Ottoman Empire, Herzl nonetheless remains consistent in maintaining that his Jewish state appeals to all nations and all humanity, a theme which continues in *Altneuland*. As well as countering stereotypes of the unimaginative Jew, living parasitically from the creativity of others, this allows the Jews to function within the world, as a nation and among nations.

Hierarchy

Herzl's attitude to hierarchy and figures of authority is consistent throughout his writing. He produces, for example, lengthy physical descriptions of both the Sultan and the German Kaiser. The psychohistorian Peter Loewenberg argues: "Whereas Herzl's defense against his awe toward men of power was to reduce their stature so he could cope with them, his attitude towards his subordinates and followers was fatherly."¹⁹⁶ And while there is symbiosis between his upward and downward views of hierarchy, there seems to be more to his upward view than the need to reduce their stature. While Löwenberg emphasises Herzl's view of the Kaiser's deformed arm, it is his "wirklich kaiserliche Augen" (BT:II:664) that Herzl most consistently focuses on, and he imagines the Kaiser thinking of him:

Du, der du von aussen aus einer Welt kommst, die mich nur aus Bildern kennt, oder nur im Sturm prächtiger Hofaufzüge vorüberziehen sieht, bist du nicht enttäuscht, einen Kaiser vor Dir zu haben, der einen kürzern Arm hat, als alle übrigen Menschen. (BT:II:664)

Returning to his physical description of the Sultan, while less than kind, Herzl places much emphasis on his uniform and ceremonial trappings, which he admires far more than his appearance. Herzl does not bring these figures down to earth simply to spare his ego, but to humanise them, and to reconcile their person, with whom he may disagree, with their office, which he strongly admires. A culture he dislikes, and a state he already has a strong dispute with, such as the case of Turkey, pushes him to focus on negative traits, while his admiration for Germany spreads to his view of the Kaiser: his appearance and office both reflected in piercing blue eyes. Where Herzl admires a leader, humanisation allows him to unify person and office. When dealing with the Sultan, he can just as easily distinguish the two.

But as his awe for royal office and eye for a man in uniform show, Herzl's views of existing

196 Peter Loewenberg, "Theodor Herzl", in *Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1985), p125

countries and plans for his future one are consistently characterised by an instinctive political conservatism, which he often strongly defended. When Saul Rafael Landau spoke from a socialist position at the second Zionist Congress in 1898, Herzl's reaction was dismissive, even aggressive:

Ich beging den Fehler, den dritten Tag als Schlußtag zu forcieren. Daher kamen die Aufregungen der letzten Nacht und die gelungenen Lumpereien der galizischen Schuffte Kohn (der kleine Kohn) Landau, Salz und Malz. Landau war der lauteste u. dümmste. (BT.II:601)

Indeed 'der kleine Kohn' implies that he sees these Jews as figures like 'Mauschel', clinging to diaspora, and therefore Socialist resistance to hierarchy as resistance to Jewish nationhood itself. This attitude to anti-hierarchical or egalitarian movements among Jews is constantly present. Thus he reports telling the Austrian politician Koerber:

„In Galizien gibt es eine grosse Menge Juden, auf die man Einfluss nehmen könnte.“

„Ja, aber sind denn die net socialistisch?“ fragte er.

„Da könnte man einen Keil hineintreiben“, sagte ich, ohne den Zionismus zu nennen. „Ich könnte Ihnen da vielleicht behilflich sein, Excellenz!... Ueberhaupt würde es sich darum handeln, mit der Bevölkerung über die Köpfe der Berufspolitiker hinweg sich in Verbindung zu setzen. (BT.III:103)

Herzl is charmed by the grandeur of the Sultan's ceremony, imagines his own hierarchical, aristocratic parades, and associates hierarchy with legitimacy. His admiration for hierarchy applies to religion as much as to politics, and closer to the origins of the word in the structure of the Catholic and Orthodox churches: Rabbis "werden die Leute aneifern, auf den Schiffen belehren, sie drüben aufklären. Zum Lohn werden sie in eine schöne, stolze Hierarchie gegliedert, die freilich immer dem Staat unterworfen bleibt" (BT.III:130). In earlier entries Herzl had already considered this hierarchy, writing: "Wunderrabbi von Sadagora ausführen u. eine Art Bischof einer Provinz machen. Ueberhaupt ganzen Clerus gewinnen" (BT.II:70) (His then friend and later adversary Rabbi Moritz Güdemann would be "ersten Bischof der Hauptstadt" (BT.II:73)). Given that Sadagora, home to a major Hasidic dynasty and a 'Palace of the

Wunderrabbi', was nicknamed the 'Jewish Vatican', this seems consistent. It is clear that he wants, as well as statehood for the Jewish people, similar validity for their faith and its institutions. At least initially, this hierarchy should use terms directly derived from Christianity and, while Herzl never writes on Catholic hierarchies, like in Constantinople, in Rome he is most impressed by the ranks and trappings of the court-like Vatican:

Das Warten – eine Stunde – war mir dennoch nicht langweilig. Das Kommen u. Gehen der Wachen, Kämmerer, Prälaten u der Lakaien in der roth damascirten Seidenlivrée amüsirte. Alle Farben grossartig gestimmt. Da haben die grössten Maler der Erde mitgewirkt.[...]

Es kamen Damen in Schwarz u. Herren im Frack u. mit Orden aus dem zweiten Vorsaal dessen rothen Teppich ich sah hervor. Sie kamen vom Papst. Das Ganze gatte sicher etwas Hofmässiges. (BT.III:646)

The Jewish religion, as well as people, is given a political function. As mentioned before, he links mediocrity and lack of hierarchy directly to antisemitism, and validity as a nation and religion depends on vertical stratification.

Herzl attacks capitalism as well as social democracy for undermining shared interests between workers and industry. He argues that it is a deficient consciousness of this shared interest, particularly on the part of the workers, that brings about social division:

Ich beging aber durchaus keine Couardise u. schmeichelte ihnen [NFP editors] puncto Socialdemocratie nicht, sondern sagte, dass ich niemals einen rüden kapitalistischen Ton gegen die Arbeiter anschlagen würde. Vielmehr würde ich die Discussion über sociale Fragen in conciliantem Tone, mit überlegener Liebenswürdigkeit zu führen versuchen, um die Arbeiter über ihre wahre Interessen aufzuklären, die ja mit dem Gedeihen der Industrie innig verwandt seien. (BT.III:202)

What is fascinating about Herzl's emphasis on hierarchy is that he is committed to both halves of this equation. While the Jews already possess the self-recognition, they must become horizontally stratified, and officially so. Following from Gellner's analysis, the structure of the nation-state can, if only through economic necessity, admit horizontal economic stratification.

Vertical stratification, however, in the form of variation in the form of regional cultural and linguistic variation, is antithetical to its structure. It is not just the case that “every high culture now wants a state”,¹⁹⁷ rather, every state must have a high culture. The lower strata, Eastern, religious and impoverished Jews, are indispensable to both the motives and future economy of Herzlian Zionism. Conversely, and as shown in the previous chapter, their culture is all too easily dispensed with. Herzl and Nordau reimagine the vast differences that are inevitable in a diasporic people as distinctions of class, that is, division of labour. This in turn imagines a stratification for feelings of national solidarity to transcend.

Nationhood and High Culture

It is true that, where Herzl borrows political and cultural practices from other existing nations, they tend to be Britain, France, Germany or America, with well-established states. This is not because these structures are useful to a condition of statehood, but because of the associations with it through these countries. His Zionism is far more conceptual than political, with less to do with transforming Jewish political status than reforming the ‘Jew’ as a concept:

Das Gelobte Land, wo wir krumme Nasen, schwarze oder rote Bärthe und gebogene Beine haben dürfen ohne darum schon verächtlich zu sein. [...]

So, dass der Spottruf „Jude!“ zu einem Ehrenworte wird, wie Deutscher, Engländer, Franzose, kurz wie die Massen aller Culturvölker. (BTII:128-9)

The Jew himself can theoretically remain intact. As is a constant theme throughout Herzl’s writing, the transition to fully paid-up *Culturvolk* is centred on an idea far more than any real change.

Transformation of the Jewish people is to be in both the mould, and the perception of

197 Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p98

existing nations. This is perhaps unsurprising, since it is those nations' antisemites who need to be won over. The establishment of a high culture is central to nationhood, and Gellner notes how many sub-Saharan cultures do not elevate a low culture but borrow an established European one.¹⁹⁸ Herzl is no exception, simply broader in his tastes, and is quite content to import a variety of high cultures and associated languages from the diaspora (though, as with Yiddish, he avoids borrowing from low cultures). Borrowing ideas is partly necessary within the limits of human imagination, but Herzl goes further in representation of the Jewish character. His vision for a buffer state whose capital is the extraterritorial centre of the Abrahamic faiths reflects this neutral, cosmopolitan character throughout its very structure. Meanwhile status of a nation within a monarch's multiethnic Empire not only creates the need, but the opportunity to demonstrate Jewish honour. Herzl's constant sideward glances at existing nations, both for inspiration and approval, show that as a conceptual, rather than a political project, reliance on others' conceptions of nationhood fully permeates his visions of Jewish nationhood. Herzl's is not a community that comes into being through its members' imagination, as in Anderson's famous coinage.¹⁹⁹ The tendency it shows seems especially pronounced among Zionists, but is arguably an intrinsic part of the process of forming national identities: Herzl's community exists in the imaginations of other communities or, rather, it imagines the imaginations of other communities and how they imagine Jews.

Herzl's is starkly different to how we understand Zionism now, where both Palestine, the national and religious mythology associated with it and a form of statehood identical to any other country are seen as indispensable. He wrote in an age where, even in Europe, the nation-state was still a novelty, not a ubiquity, and a world where jurisdictions of colonial states enveloped tribes and peoples while still gladly acknowledging them as such. Statehood was the

198 Ibid., p79

199 Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), pp6-7

preferred, not only goal for a nationalist movement. While Nordau took it as read that possession of a territory was a natural, indispensable part of a dignified national existence for Herzl, it sits alongside an international role and a contribution to a better world as a means to the end of perceived legitimacy in the eyes of other nations. In his dealings with the Sultan and the Kaiser, Herzl was quite willing to compromise ownership of the land, both political and military autonomy and even ancestral connections, should Argentina prove more feasible. Though he rarely drew on them directly as models for a Jewish State, Herzl lived most of his life negotiating the identities of a multinational empire and freely recognises nations within political entities, from Poles and Germans within Austria-Hungary to Arabs and Kurds within the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, from his first journey to Constantinople onwards, this is the very model of nationhood he aspires to, and with seemingly little bitterness in accepting it. 'Political Zionism' is, then, a misnomer, since for Herzl, the political structure of the state, either in terms of official status or state power, is flexible if not immaterial. For this reason, the next chapter will examine precisely how statehood, as the relationship between people, land and political borders, is understood in Herzl's Zionist writing.

IV. Grosse Dinge schweben in der Luft: People, Land and Zionism without Zion

In *Der Judenstaat*, Theodor Herzl considers two prospective locations: Argentina and Palestine. While he genuinely seems to entertain Argentina as a workable proposition, if not slightly favour it, he writes that “Palästina ist unsere unvergessliche historische Heimat. Dieser Name allein wäre ein gewaltig ergreifender Sammelruf für unser Volk.” (GZWI:45-6). Shapira observes that “His choice of a land for the Jews was not affected by historical considerations, but rather by utilitarian ones.”²⁰⁰ Herzl’s principal argument is not his own attraction to Palestine for historical or religious reasons, but the pull of its mythical status for Jews keen on joining the movement. His diaries show his reactions when (normally short-lived) possibilities arise of a homeland elsewhere. Though he ultimately rejects Mesopotamia, (BT.III:408) and Britain’s offer in the Sinai Peninsula is quickly rescinded, his reasons for considering them are intriguing. In 1899, when convinced that, unlike Palestine, “Mesopotamien sei erreichbar”, Herzl mused that “es sei die Urheimat Israels. Abraham kam aus Mesopotamien. Wir könnten da auch an das Mystische anknüpfen” (BT.III:79). Negotiating with the British Empire, Herzl, who had previously asked for Cyprus, El-Arish and the Sinai Peninsula (BT.III:463-4) recounts a meeting in 1902 with Joseph Chamberlain:

200 Shapira, ‘Herzl, Ahad Ha-‘Am, and Berdichevsky’, p60.

Dabei sagte er: „In Egypten hätten wir ja dieselbe Schwierigkeit mit den Ansässigen.“

„No“, sagte ich, „we will not go to Egypt. We have been there.“

Da lachte er wieder, diesmal tief auf das Buch gebeugt. Jetzt erst verstand er mich ganz, meinen Wunsch einen Versammlungspunkt für das jüdische Volk in der Nähe Palästinas zu bekommen.

(*BT.III:465*)

Based on Chamberlain's reaction, the biblical associations with Egypt are not a particularly strong motive for Herzl, and serve more as a shared reference as he exchanges pleasantries with an important diplomat. Rather, it is Herzl's interest in a point of assembly in the vicinity of Palestine. We see here that Herzl is neither fully committed to the specific myth of Palestine, nor to directly inhabiting it when there is land available nearby (*BT.III:184*). So long as a myth can be referred to or constructed, which unites the Jewish people with their new, rather than historic, homeland, Herzl is willing to compromise. It is interesting to imagine the alternative narratives that could be developed whereby the children of Abraham, after passing through Palestine as well as Egypt, Babylon and the entire globe, finally return to the land of their patriarch. Furthermore, as a passage in his diaries from 1896 implies, a solid foundation is not indispensable to his project:

Grosse Dinge brauchen kein festes Fundament. Einen Apfel muss man auf den Tisch legen, damit er nicht falle. Die Erde schwebt in der Luft.

So kann ich den Judenstaat vielleicht ohne jeden sicheren Halt gründen und befestigen.

Das Geheimniss liegt in der Bewegung. (Ich glaube dahinaus wird auch irgendwo das lenkbare Luftschiff gefunden werden. Die Schwere überwunden durch die Bewegung, und nicht das Schiff, sondern dessen Bewegung ist zu lenken). (*BT.II:341*)

This passage shows Herzl's understanding of his nation-building project, and the role of the land, be it Palestine or elsewhere, was far more complicated than a simple matter of ownership and declaration of statehood.

Returning to the passage in *Der Judenstaat*, already, as is characteristic of Herzl, he imagines the vital roles a Jewish state will play in both regional and international politics, both in the abstract field of culture and the concrete finances of the Turkish crown:

Wenn Seine Majestät der Sultan uns Palästina gäbe, könnten wir uns dafür anheischig machen, die Finanzen der Türkei gänzlich zu regeln. Für Europa würden wir dort ein Stück des Walles gegen Asien bilden, wir würden den Vorpostendienst der Cultur gegen die Barbarei besorgen. Wir würden als neutraler Staat im Zusammenhange bleiben mit ganz Europa, das unsere Existenz garantiren müsste. Für die heiligen Stätten der Christenheit liesse sich eine völkerrechtliche Form der Exterritorialisirung finden. Wir würden die Ehrenwache um die heiligen Stätten bilden, und mit unserer Existenz für die Erfüllung dieser Pflicht haften. Diese Ehrenwacht wäre das grosse Symbol für die Lösung der Judenfrage nach achtzehn für uns qualvollen Jahrhunderten. (GZWI:45-6)

When he proposes that Jews protect Palestine's holy sites, their very existence there guarantees fulfilment of this task, which in turn will symbolise their emancipation. Herzl is quite explicit that the holy sites to be guarded are those of Christianity. Notably then, this passage contains more reference to the Christian than the Jewish religion. Palestine, here, is not a Promised Land, or a Holy Land, it is a historic one.

The relationship between people and homeland is in this and most cases a complicated concept. The Oxford English Dictionary's definition of 'indigenous', for example includes both 'native' and 'belonging naturally to'. Even a strict dictionary definition of 'autochthon' allows autochthony by descent, unspecified natural belonging, or simply traditional supposition.²⁰¹ As a Habsburg subject born in Budapest, both proudly German and proudly Jewish, 'ein echter Wiener',²⁰² a quintessential Austrian despite ridiculing the concept, and in all of this tangle of identities unremarkable for the Habsburg Empire, Herzl identifies Palestine as his historic homeland. Even individual homelands become complex, one person claiming more than one and

201 "A person indigenous to a particular country or region and traditionally supposed to have been born out of the earth, or to have descended from ancestors born in this way"

202 Theodor Herzl, *Ein echter Wiener: Feuilletons*, ed. André Heller (Vienna: J&V Edition, 1986).

feel affinity to many more and the answer to the question “where are you from?” varying according to context. In turn, a collective homeland is as liable to shift as populations, political and cultural borders, and perceptions of historic peoples. Gans argues that “the Jews have a historical right to the Land of Israel, not because they were the first among contemporary peoples to occupy it, but rather because it was of primary importance in the formation of their identity”²⁰³ and that Zionism “views the historical right not as a basis for rights to territorial sovereignty, but rather as grounds for selecting the geographical site for realizing the right to self-determination”.²⁰⁴ This right raises a further question however: what, precisely was the vital role in this burgeoning identity played by this geographical site? This chapter will examine how Zionism understood the concept of ‘Heimat’, and how attempts to develop the concept of a Jewish home were able to function, despite a minimal Jewish presence in Palestine and next to no foreseeable chance of statehood. Herzl’s almost crude intention in *Der Judenstaat* to simply request, even just buy Palestine was, as Dieckhoff describes Pinsker’s, “a patrimonial notion of politics, in which the establishment of a centre for Jewish settlement was reduced to a simple real estate operation”.²⁰⁵ Particularly after ownership becomes unachievable, the links between Jews, Palestine and national myth that he recognises or envisages are far more complex and symbolic than a simple matter of ownership and a draw to new supporters, and many aspects of the Zionist programme could work independently, even in the absence of, a national territory.

The Land as Invented Tradition

While Shlomo Sand’s work is a questionable resource for the history of the Biblical Middle East and Jewish people, and especially controversial within Israel’s internal debates on its past and future as a modern state, *The Invention of the Land of Israel* is nonetheless useful for

203 Gans, *A Just Zionism*, pp33-4

204 Ibid., p44

205 Dieckhoff, *The Invention of a Nation*, pp27.

understanding the concept of autochthony in relation to the Jews and Palestine. The way Sand calls into question the idea of a Biblical state equivalent to and rebuilt as modern-day Israel is, for the purposes of this chapter, less important than the many ways he identifies in which the concept of a national homeland was, indeed had to be, constructed. ‘The Land of Israel’, a term only used after Christianisation began in the early fourth century,²⁰⁶ shifted in the early twentieth century from ‘a theological concept’ to a ‘clearly geonational’ one.²⁰⁷ He outlines significant differences between the concept of ‘homeland’ today and in the time of Palestine’s earlier Jewish inhabitants,²⁰⁸ and that “a united kingdom encompassing ancient Judea and Israel never existed”, i.e. that a singular Jewish state has no precedent as we today would imagine it. Sand claims that Heinrich Graetz, whose *Geschichte der Juden* was among the first comprehensive histories of the Jews as a nation, and very popular among Zionists and others attempting to understand their Jewish identity, was unsure of any clear boundaries, as was the Russian-Jewish colonist movement *Hovevei Zion*.²⁰⁹ Most importantly, he argues that pre-Zionist Jewish sentiment towards Palestine as a homeland differed widely from the nationalist understanding of the concept; sentiment that “did not translate into an urge to connect concretely with the Land – to tread upon its soil, to travel within it, or to learn its geography”,²¹⁰ which would be “a spiritual connection to the place though lacking any concrete claim to it”²¹¹ and which reflected a “need for a holy place in which perfect cosmic order existed [but] never equated to a human desire to actually live in it or to always be in close proximity to it.”²¹² Longings for the Land of Israel, Sand argues, were present in religious forms for centuries, but in the pre-modern era, before anyone had a national territory anyway, “a longing to settle in the Land never truly existed”.²¹³

206 Sand, *The Invention of the Land of Israel*, p28

207 Ibid., p28

208 Ibid., pp44-6

209 Ibid., p215

210 Ibid., p123

211 Ibid., p30

212 Ibid., p108

213 Ibid., p117

As briefly mentioned earlier, Sand particularly isolates the role of evangelical Christianity in the codification of both Jews and Palestine in these terms. Just as Jews in the Middle Ages had been seen as a ‘witness people’ whose conversion would confirm revelation,²¹⁴ in the Christian imagination the physical locations in Palestine “serve to reaffirm the veracity of everything recounted: the existence of the land gives validity to divine truth and offers decisive evidence of reality.”²¹⁵ The Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, was an early Restorationist, or Christian Zionist. David S. Katz observes that even in the seventeenth century

The belief that the Jews had an important role to play in bringing about the Second Coming was, as we have seen, a respectable facet of millenarian thinking, which was itself entrenched in English religious thought. ²¹⁶ This millenarianism often involved the return of the Jews to Palestine, almost invariably alongside their conversion to Christianity. Katz even details John Robins and Thomas Tany’s “bizarre plan to gather the Jews personally and lead them back to the Holy Land.”²¹⁷

However millenarianism is not the sole motive at work. Shaftesbury’s position is especially indicative:

This aristocratic lord viewed the “children of Israel” not simply as believers in the Jewish religion but as descendants of an ancient race that, once converted to Christianity, would again become a modern nation in natural alliance with Great Britain. It was precisely because he did not conceive of Judaism as a legitimate religion that could remain in existence alongside the true faith that he chose to regard the Jews as a people unto themselves. However, just as he did not support the right of Jews to be elected to the British parliament, he also did not believe that this rehabilitated people deserved a state of its own, rather, the obedient Jews would have to make do with being the patrons of Britain’s Christianity.²¹⁸

While Sand does not specify what the newly restored Jews would have in place of a state (presumably the status of a colony or protectorate within Her Majesty’s Empire), this tendency is

214 Stephen R. Haynes, *Jews and the Christian Imagination: Reluctant Witnesses* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p152

215 Sand, *The Invention of the Land of Israel*, p136

216 David S. Katz, *Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603-1655* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p120

217 *Ibid.*, p120

218 Sand, *The Invention of the Land of Israel*, p151

still notable in that it inverts the religious arguments for Cromwell's readmission of the Jews. As Sand observes, the Jews were to be scattered among all peoples before their return to the Promised Land,²¹⁹ and therefore "the English kingdom's refusal to allow the settlement of the children of Israel on the western edge of Europe was seen as a factor that delayed the coming of redemption".²²⁰ Nonetheless, this demonstrates a starting point for attempts within English Protestantism to accelerate Christian eschatology through policies on the Jews' treatment which could be expected to encourage and enable their migration. In a broader sense, support for Jewish rights in Palestine but not in Britain – antisemitism at home and philosemitism from a comfortable distance – seems to have been commonplace in nineteenth and early twentieth-century Britain. Efron notes the 'British-Israelites', who theorised that many or all English people were descended from the ancient Hebrews, felt no affinity for modern Jews,²²¹ while Arthur Balfour's speech to the Commons in support of the Aliens Act 1905, during his term as Prime Minister and twelve years before his famous declaration, is especially indicative of this tendency:

It would not be to the advantage of the civilization of the country that there should be an immense body of persons who, however patriotic, able, and industrious, however much they threw themselves into the national life, still by their own action, remained a people apart and not merely held a religion differing from the vast majority of their fellow country-men, but only inter-married among themselves. ²²²

It is especially notable that Balfour's objection to the faith and culture of these mysteriously unspecified aliens is not based on any specific qualities he attributes to them, but on the potential for their differences and social habits to be (in Pinsker's terminology) a heterogeneous element within the population. While Balfour is quite obviously referring to Jewish refugees, from the Russian Pale of Settlement, he studiously avoids naming the particular aliens in

219 Deuteronomy 28:64

220 Ibid., p147

221 Efron, *Defenders of the Race*, p39

222 Hansard, 10th July 1905

question in order to phrase his objections in general terms of migration and religious or cultural minorities. Just as Zionism attempted to remedy and assimilate the position of Jews within the structures of the nation-state, Balfour's antisemitism attacks the Jews, not for presumed Jewish qualities, but simply as an ethnic and religious minority, living within Britain's borders as 'a people apart'.

Not only did Zionists such as Herzl and British supporters such as Balfour share this emphasis on minority status over presumed character, the expectation that a Jewish state in Palestine will serve British interests was also reciprocal. Herzl writes in December 1896:

Nun gibt es ein Mittel, die türkischen Finanzen zu regeln, somit den status quo noch einige Zeit zu erhalten und gleichzeitig für England einen neuen Weg nach Indien, den kürzesten zu schaffen. Und das Alles, ohne dass England einen Penny auszulegen oder sich irgendwie sichtbar zu engagiren hätte. Das Mittel ist die Herstellung eines autonomen jüdischen Vasallenstaates in Palästina, ähnlich wie Egypten unter der Suzeränität des Sultans. (BT.II:469-70)

As well as the benefits from the geographical situation of Palestine, Herzl expects Britain to benefit from an improved public image, as well as the aforementioned global Jewish loyalty. As well as the international politics of his time and foreign interests of the British and German empires, Herzl expected a Jewish state to fulfil broader, more abstract Orientalist desires to bring European influence to a region imagined by default in terms of Biblical Judaism. So too did Hess, who, though characteristically vague, envisaged a Jewish role in the community of nations that explicitly drew on (and cited) French ambitions in the region and potential instrumentalisation of any future Jewish state.

Perhaps the clearest example of this process can be found in *Rom und Jerusalem*, where Hess describes his grandfather's 'leuchtende Blicke' as he shows the young boy olives and dates from Eretz-Israel (AS:237). Despite the obvious fondness expressed in the passage, Hess is at

odds with the beaming grandfather of his memories. While Hess's book sets out Palestine as a homeland, to be physically inhabited, his grandfather's connection to Palestine is one of emotion and memory. There is a strong connection to the soil and its produce, felt deeply by any pious Jew, but this is one of memory and so dependent on absence. While this yearning for the Holy Land clearly predates even Hess's proto-Zionism, it must be changed from a bittersweet religious desire to a national one which, crucially, can expect to be fulfilled.

As detailed in earlier chapters, even in calls for emancipation, non-Jews frequently codified Jews as a separate nation within or among other nations, for as long as the modern concept of 'nation' has existed. Similarly, Sand makes it explicit that the understanding of the Holy Land in Christian terms is intrinsically linked with nationalism, saying "It was the nationalization of God, not his death, that lifted the sacred veil from the land, transforming it into the soil on which the new nation began to tread and build as it saw fit".²²³ The stories of Jewish scripture cease to be sacred texts, and become secular in function, serving the narratives that support the nation. Sand further notes that Evangelism and Zionism had more in common than 'Jewish nationalism' and 'historic Judaism'.²²⁴ The heroes of the Book of Judges, Bar Kochba and the Maccabees are recoded as national heroes, "exalted models, worthy of emulation",²²⁵ and the Bible begins to serve less religious and more national purposes, whereby "for a mythos to be credible and sturdy, its foundation had to have a layer of 'ancient' images."²²⁶ This transformation of the religious into the national reflects what Sand calls "the project of collective assimilation into modernity".²²⁷ Jewish identity, the land of Palestine, and the ties felt between them are all modernised by being reimagined in national terms.

223 Sand, *The Invention of the Land of Israel*, p29

224 *Ibid.*, p177

225 *Ibid.*, p143

226 *Ibid.*, p163

227 *Ibid.*, p184

Parallel Transformation

However central the invention of a homeland is to the Zionist project of transforming the scattered Jewish people into a nation-state, it is nonetheless only one of many aspects of a diverse process. Indeed, many Zionists were ambivalent at best about Palestine. Herzl was always ready to consider alternative destinations and *Der Judenstaat* leant slightly towards Argentina. The Territorialist branch of the movement, prompted by the British offer of Uganda in 1903, defined itself specifically by a willingness to consider territory anywhere in the world, and of course before and even after the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the possibility of full, mass colonisation would have seemed near-impossible. Indeed, not just Territorialists but notable Palestine-centred Zionists often did consider it unfeasible. The destination needed altering, and the Zionist movement is a parallel transformation of both Palestine and the Jews, and these twin processes frequently reinforce each other.

The utopian qualities of *Altneuland* are treated in specifically Jewish – more specifically Biblical – terms. The plenty of an advanced agricultural society is frequently described as milk and honey, and the green and blooming penal colony which so impresses the two travellers is referred to by both, first a joking Kingscourt, then a breathless Löwenberg, as “the Garden of Eden” (*GZWV*:283). The world-beating hi-tech industries of the New Society are in part centred around the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea, including, most notably for what is also an agricultural pioneer, artificial fertiliser (*GZWV*:289). When the Biblical heroes who provide national symbols and a model for a New Jew are mentioned, it is through the landscape:

Das waren die Felsen mit den abenteuerlichen Höhlenlöchern, in denen sich einst in verschollenen bösen Tagen die Verteidiger des jüdischen Landes vor ihren Feinden bis zum letzten Kampfe verborgen hatten. (*GZWV*:280)

Löwenberg’s exploration of Palestine and the locations of events in Jewish history, in this case the

Bar Kochba revolt, becomes a pilgrimage of sorts, but a national, not a religious one, visiting the hiding places used not by defenders of the faith but defenders of the land.

Not only do the transformations of Jews and Palestine happen simultaneously, David Littwak, Löwenberg's guide and Herzl's spokesman for the New Society, directly compares the change in the Jewish character to that of plants.

Einst waren die Judenkinder bleich, schwach und scheu. Sehen Sie sie heute an! Die Erklärung dieser wunderbar scheinenden Verwandlung ist die einfachste von der Welt. Wir haben sie aus dumpfen Kellerlöchern, Elendhütten, Proletarierstuben an das Licht gebracht. Pflanzen gehen ohne Sonne zugrunde, Menschen auch. Pflanzen kann man retten, wenn man sie in den von ihrer eigenen Art geforderten Boden setzt, Menschen auch. So ist es geschehen! (GZV:203-4)

Faintly echoing Herder and Hess's comparison of the Jews to a parasitic plant, Herzl shows soil as instrumental in the transformation, though how the soil of the Holy Land is better suited to Jewish plants is not specified. While the transformation of Palestine by the Jews occurs through clear, material processes of investment, technology, construction and modern agriculture, the change Palestine brings about in the Jews is much vaguer, a mixture of sunshine and metaphor. This vague abstraction, however, is lent enough weight to be plausible by its currency within nationalist rhetoric and imagery. While Herzl gives no specific explanation why a people needs its own soil to enjoy a healthy national life, or why Jews and Palestinian soil make for such a good match, he considers both statements uncontroversial enough not to need elaboration, and the metaphor to suffice as explanation in itself. As with Hess and Herder's image of the parasitic plant, the logic and scientific basis of these organic metaphors is largely unimportant, instead individual organisms and human collectives are presumed to behave identically and reference to a well-established and current set of imagery – in this case the necessity of a people's native soil – serves as an accepted premise for the argument in and of itself.

The diversity and cultural heterogeneity of *Altneuland*'s utopia is more theoretical than practical. While its Kantian cosmopolitanism promises the stranger all the hospitality and openness the New Society has to offer, he is not very strange. Strangers are rare, and conflicts caused by their strangeness even rarer. The majority of characters are, in cultural terms at least, unremarkable middle-class Western Jews. Indeed, the character most culturally alien to the heroes is the uncouth, chauvinistic, Yiddish-speaking farmer Mendel, who with Littwak's victory finds himself squarely on the wrong side of history. Nevertheless, Herzl remains insistent throughout that internal diversity is a defining quality of the New Society, and this, again, is mirrored by the land itself:

Es fand hier offenbar ein Verkehr aller Völker statt, denn man sah die buntesten Trachten des Morgenlandes zwischen den Gewändern des Okzidents. Chinesen, Perser, Araber wandelten durch die geschäftige Menge. Vorherrschend war freilich die Kleidung des Abendlandes, wie diese Stadt ja überhaupt einen durchaus europäischen Eindruck machte. (GZVV:185-6)

Inhabited by a people who have learned to celebrate their own diversity, Palestine becomes a bustling international crossroads, which despite its cosmopolitanism retains a non-threatening Western feel and dress-sense. Again, diversity is asserted far more than it is depicted, and toned down heavily for Western reader's comfort, but it remains a persistent shared quality of both people and land, developed to utopian levels by their unification.

Palestine and the Jewish people are characterised reciprocally, Palestine as belonging to the Jews and the Jews as belonging in Palestine. This is done both in reference to their perfectibility in utopia and the problems this utopia remedies. As he and Kingscourt pass through Palestine on their way to the South Sea, Löwenberg looks over the dusty, barren land and its impoverished inhabitants and says gloomily: "Wenn das unser Land ist, [...] so ist es ebenso heruntergekommen wie unser Volk." (GZVV:166). This matches Herzl's statements in his

aforementioned article 'Der ewige Jude', written, five years before *Altneuland* in 1897, and asserting the role of 'eines Staatsmannes im großen Stile' in remedying both 'Judenfrage' and 'ein Stück der Orientfrage' (GZWI:237).

While, as is to be expected, Herzl was primarily concerned with changing the condition of the Jewish people, he seems consistently concerned, in both his factual and fictional writing, with the ability of Zionism to effect a change in Palestine, as a Jewish role in and contribution to world affairs. This process also takes place on an individual level with Löwenberg, as shown when Kingscourt observes:

Wenn ich denke, was Sie für'n grüner Judenjunge mit eingesunkenem Brustkasten waren, als ich Sie mitnahm. Heute sind Sie 'n Baum von einem Menschen. Mir scheint, Sie können jetzt den Weibern gefährlich werden. (GZWV:178)

Though Kingscourt tends to exaggerate, he still implies a noticeable amount of change in Löwenberg's physique. This, however, was not from a twenty-year stay in Palestine, but on a South Sea island. It is, at least here, not entrance to Palestine but exit from Europe that reinvigorates *Altneuland's* Jewish traveller.

A Crossroads between East and West

We see another microcosm of this transformation in David Littwak's house in Haifa, "ein helles, hohes Schloß maurischen Stils, umgeben von Gärten", with stone lions by the steps, which Herzl explicitly links to Littwak's statement as a child: "Was Juda gehabt hat, kann es wieder haben. Unser aller Gott lebt ja noch!" (GZWV:194). Inside, the house is decorated with fine art, bright silk, English furniture, a shimmering gold and crystal electric chandelier, and "siebenarmige Leuchter von Manneshöhe aus Silber". Mirrors and windows fill the house with light, and provide a view out onto the soft lawn, flowerbeds, marble balustrade and in the distance, the sea (GZWV:195). On one hand, the building is Moorish in style, its interior walls given an oriental

flavour by the rosy silks. On the other, the furniture is explicitly Western and the lighting, garden and painting seem from the description to be so too. As such the house functions as the occidental contained within the oriental. We see this too in the landscape that greets Löwenberg and Kingscourt as sail towards Haifa, to Löwenberg's cry of "Wie verändert! [...] Da ist ein Wunder geschehen."

An der Nordspitze Akko in alter orientalischer Bauschönheit, graue Festungsmauern, dicke Kuppeln und schlanke Minarets, die sich vom Morgenhimmel reizend abhoben. An diesen Umrissen war nicht viel anders geworden. Aber südwärts unterhalb der ruhmreich schwergeprüften Stadt, am Bogen des Uferbandes, war eine Pracht entstanden. Tausende weißer Villen tauchten, leuchteten aus dem Grün üppiger Gärten heraus. Von Akko bis an den Karmel schien da ein großer Garten angelegt zu sein, und der Berg selbst war auch gekrönt mit schimmernden Bauten. (GZVV:182)

The minarets and domes both serve to evoke this 'orientaler Bauschönheit', although the domes serve a further purpose, as a shared feature of mosques, churches and synagogues, evoking something generally universal to the Abrahamic religions alongside the minarets specific to Islam. Beneath this, however, we see pleasant villas with gardens. As with Friedrichsheim, the Orient is represented through buildings with public, symbolic or aesthetic functions, and Western architecture is displayed in functional but pleasant-looking individual homes, the everyday West contained within an Eastern skyline. The Orient is projected to the public, the Occident lived in privately. Given Herzl's awe at the Constantinople skyline and discomfort with Turkish customs described in the previous chapter, this is easily understandable. The landscape and lifestyle of his utopia reflect what he did and did not want to import. The positive diversity of both the modernised Jewish people and the modernised Orient is consistently either stated rather than depicted, or works chiefly in the realm of the symbolic.

Simply the fact of being in Palestine makes Löwenberg a better Jew, as evidenced by his experience of the Passover feast and the exchange with Kingscourt which follows:

Einer war an dem Sedertische, der sprach die hebräischen Worte der Hagadah mit der Inbrunst eines Heimgekehrten. Ihm war es ein Wiederfinden und manchmal schnürte ihm Rührung die Kehle zu, daß er sich zusammennehmen mußte, um nicht laut aufzuschluchzen. Bald dreißig Jahre waren es her, daß er selbst als Knabe das „Mah nischtaneh“ gefragt hatte. Dann war die „Aufklärung“ gekommen, die Loslösung von allem Jüdischen und endlich logisch der Sprung ins Leere, da er gar keinen Halt mehr im Leben besaß. An diesem Seder kam er sich vor wie der verlorene Sohn.

Als der erste Teil der Feier vorüber war und die Speisen aufgetragen wurden, rief ihm Kingscourt über den Tisch zu:

„Fritz, ich wußte gar nicht, daß Sie ein so perfekter Hebräer sind.“

„Offen gestanden, ich wußte es selbst nicht!“ war seine Antwort. „Aber es scheint, daß man das aus der Jugend her nicht vergißt.“ (GZVV:310)

A return to the Holy Land brings about a return to Judaism, and does so very much on an emotional level, and, as with the pilgrimage to the Bar Kochba caves, Kingscourt does not mention Löwenberg's piety, but his status as a 'perfekter Hebräer'. Being present in the Holy Land and experiencing its landscape serve to confirm and rejuvenate Jewish identity, in stark opposition to the slow dissolution of Judaism during the "Enlightenment". Furthermore, this process recodifies Jewishness in explicitly national-geographic and ethno-linguistic terms. The cultivation of Palestine by Jews and into a Jewish land, alongside the reinvigoration of the Jews by return to Palestine, not only creates commonalities between the two, it is itself a commonality creating strong associations in the minds of characters and readers alike.

The New Jew

Altneuland's David Littwak, the titular character in Nordau's *Doktor Kohn* and, despite predating his Zionism, Jakob Samuel in Herzl's *Das neue Ghetto* are all presented as future models of Jewishness, in stark contrast to their contemporaries. In the first book of *Altneuland*, Löwenberg

and the young Littwak stand out starkly against both the bourgeois dilettantes Löwenberg meets at the dinner party and Littwak's impoverished father, while Littwak's later successes contrast with the poverty of his roots and Löwenberg's dead-end career. Samuel too differs from the materialistic, uncultured Jews around him and the over-cautious, even cowardly Rabbi Friedheimer, and Leo Kohn differs from the hyperassimilated Moser and his own meekly pious father. All three characters, too, mark themselves out against their Jewish peers, on the one hand ambitious men of action and on the other fiercely proud Jews. These contrasts are of course structural, standing out not just against the timid, bourgeois, self-hating or self-ironising Jews of their surroundings, but against these traits in Jews in general, while Littwak's career escapes both the proletarianisation lamented by Nordau, and the Jewish mediocrity Löwenberg suffers. These New Jews always address specific concerns.

The prominence of duelling in these models for a new Jew is significant. Herzl himself, before Zionism, daydreamed of fighting prominent antisemites for the honour of the Jewish people, namely the Christian Socialist leader Karl Lueger, the same party's noted aristocratic supporter the "Red Prince" Alois von Liechtenstein, and the head of the Austrian pan-German movement, Georg von Schönerer. If he lost, "So möge mein Tod wenigstens die Köpfe und Herzen der Menschen bessern". If he won, he would magnanimously decline subsequent offers of power, refusing to enter Parliament over a person's dead body (*BT.II:113*). Herzl maintains this interest in Jewish honour later, indeed when he first considers a Zionist novel in 1895 he has the hero give a speech on the subject (*BT.II:120*). This lack of honour affects the Jewish character. Referring to stereotypes of Jewish parvenus so common in his fiction, he writes "Wir sind nur eitel, weil uns die Ehre nicht zugänglich ist. Haben wir erst wieder unsere Ehre, werden wir nicht eitel, sondern ehrgeizig sein" (*BT.II:125*) and ventures other explanations based rather more on a Jewish essence:

Wir sind schlechte Soldaten, weil wir ehrlos sind, weil uns nichts hinter den Tod gelegt wird. Und dennoch fehlt es nicht an Beispielen, dass wir gut zu sterben verstehen (Rede Nacquets). Aber wir können nicht Führer werden, und die Staaten haben darin recht; sonst wären wir innerhalb zwei Generationen überall die Brigadegenerale, besonders da der Krieg eine gelehrte Übung geworden ist.²²⁸

While Jews, for Herzl, possess the intelligence to be great military leaders and courage enough to die well, they are not leaders due to this lack of honour. Jews are no longer mediocre, and Jewish intelligence and potential are no longer going to waste solely from antisemitism, but also through a characteristic of Jewish culture. What Herzl's statement that "uns nichts hinter den Tod gelegt wird" refers to is unclear: while it probably draws on the vagueness of Judaism about the afterlife, it is reminiscent of Fichte's reasoning:

Der Glaube des edlen Menschen an die ewige Fortdauer seiner Wirksamkeit auch auf dieser Erde gründet sich demnach auf die Hofnung der ewigen Fortdauer des Volks [...] aber diese Dauer, verspricht ihm allein die selbständige Fortdauer seiner Nation; um diese zu retten, mus er sogar sterben wollen, damit diese lebe[.]²²⁹

However, the very existence of Zionism gives Jews a homeland to fight for long before setting foot in Palestine.

Physical exercise, particularly gymnastics, were central to German liberal nationalism, popularised by 'Turnvater' Friedrich Ludwig Jahn from the 1810s onwards. Herzl too envisages sport as central to his planned regeneration. As well as sun and suitable soil, the pale, weak, shy Jewish children of diaspora are transformed into hardy members of the New Society at least partly by competitive sport:

Wir bilden wie den Geist so den Leib unserer Jugend. Turn- und Schützenvereine genügen uns für diesen Zweck, wie sie in der Schweiz genügten. Auch haben wir Wettspiele nach englischem Muster:

228 BTII:103. "Rede Nacquets" refers to the French-Jewish politician Alfred Joseph Nacquet, but what was said in this speech and why Herzl considers it important is unspecified.

229 Johann Gottlieb Fichte. *Gesamtausgabe*, edited by Reinhard Lauth, 10 volumes. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1962), vol. X, p201

Kricket, Fußball, Rudern. Auch diese bewährten Dinge haben wir übernommen, und sie bewähren sich nun bei uns. (GZVV:203)

For Nordau however, the role of sport is even more central. He diagnoses the problem of the Jewish physique as such:

In der Enge der Judenstraße verlernten unsere armen Glieder, sich fröhlich zu regen, im Dämmer ihrer sonnenlosen Häuser gewöhnten unsere Augen sich ein scheues Blicke an; in der Angst der beständigen Verfolgung erlosch die Kraft unserer Stimme zu einem bangen Flüstern, das nur dann zu einem mächtigen Jauchzen anzuschwellen pflegte, wenn unsere Blutzeugen auf dem Scheiterhaufen das Sterbegebet ihren Henkern ins Gesicht schriegen. Aber jetzt ist ja der Zwang gebrochen, man gönnt uns den Raum, uns wenigstens körperlich auszuleben. Knüpfen wir wieder an unseren ältesten Ueberlieferungen an, werden wir wieder tiefbrüstige, strammgliedrige, kühnblickende Männer. (ZS:424-5)

It is important to distinguish this from the eugenic arguments put forward by the Zionist sociologist and eugenicist Arthur Ruppin, who argues, for example, that while physical beauty was important for the bride as well as education and social standing, with the groom only learning was important. He notes a tendency to marry off all children wherever possible, and to see two “Epileptik[er], Halbidioten, Blinden und Taubstummen” as an ideal pairing, with the result that “schwächliche Jünglinge oder solche mit konstitutionellen Krankheiten oder mit körperlichen Gebrechen in die Ehe traten und ihre körperliche Minderwertigkeit auf ihre Kinder vererbten.” “Die Gebrechen der Väter”, he argues “erbten sich, oft noch in verstärktem Maße, auf die Kinder fort.”²³⁰ Nordau agrees this weakness has been passed down the generations, but at no point implies it is inherent or genetic. He sees it simply as simply stemming from the Jewish way of life. Unlike Herzl however, Nordau does stress the role of gymnastics in this regeneration, saying “Bei keinem Volksstamme hat das Turnen eine so wichtige erzieherische Aufgabe wie bei uns Juden. Es soll uns körperlich und im Charakter aufrichten” (ZS:425). And while Herzl has the

230 Arthur Ruppin, *Soziologie der Juden*, 2 volumes (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1930), vol. II, pp94-5

children in *Altneuland* learn football, Nordau is less than polite about the sport:

Ich kenne keinen einzigen Sport, es wäre denn vielleicht der rohe und geistlose Fußball, wo der klobige, brutale Tolpatsch dem pantherähnlich blitzgewandten Geistesmenschen überlegen wäre oder auch nur gleichkäme. (ZS:431)

Though this initially seems to be a disagreement, there is more harmony between the two positions than it might seem. Herzl and Nordau disagree on which sports are a matter of brute force and which engage the mind, but both writers demand both qualities. Nordau in particular dismisses simple “Bärenstärke” in favour of

[E]rstens rücksichtslose Kühnheit, zweitens vollkommene Beherrschung aller Muskelgruppen, deren genaues, harmonisches Zusammenwirken bei der Ausführung einer verwickelten Bewegung erforderlich ist, drittens rasche und scharfe Ausarbeitung des Bildes der auszuführenden Bewegung in der Vorstellung unter energischer Ausschließung aller Hemmungsvorstellungen banger oder zweifelnder Natur. (ZS:431)

Determination, muscular control and swift, unhesitating and precise execution of clear goals define the New Jew far more than strength, and whereas Herzl stresses honourable competition, both men dismiss simple muscle in favour of deliberately cultivated bourgeois fitness. In addition to the physical and the mental, Nordau sees the ultimate goal of this transformation as economic, “ein Städtervolk, ein Volk von Händlern, Krämern und Kopfarbeitern in ein Bauernvolk zu verwandeln” (ZS:277), which struggles against the economic state of the Jews and makes this model for a future people a mix of peasant physique and bourgeois mentality. Dismissive of the pale, frail Jewish bodies created by petit-bourgeois economy, but equally disdainful of unsophisticated, village-blacksmith brute strength, Nordau and, to a lesser extent, Herzl envisage a regenerated national identity, dispelling anxieties over the perceived failings of both classes, most notably the inauthenticity of the middle class that both men belonged to, and attempts to unite the two. Nationalism, here, involves anxiety both about the bodily differences

between classes, and also the specific types of body it ascribes to those classes. While, as shown in previous chapters, differences in roles and quality of life within the nation are acceptable, even desirable, differences in personal traits must still be remedied.

This perceived inauthenticity, though broadly an urban middle class concern, is also applicable to any sections of society not reliant on the land or manual labour. Like the fascination with duelling culture, it is rooted in gender. Matti Bunzl treats Zionist duelling as gendered, putting Herzl's ideas in the context of popular discourses which figured contemporary Jewry as a morally weak and emasculated social entity" and observing that they were "specifically directed at effecting an affirmative transvaluation of Jewry's gendered identity." Zionism, Bunzl argues, works within a bourgeois binary conception of gender, asserts Jewish masculinity by rejecting the aspects of Jewishness stereotyped as feminine, and in this way

not only presupposed but sustained a gender system whose alignment with contemporary conceptions of racial distinction rendered it a culturally privileged arena for the political and ideological work undertaken under the aegis of the Zionist project.²³¹

Bunzl describes the function of sport in *Altneuland* and duelling in *Das neue Ghetto* as "the collective transcendence of Jewish emasculation". Despite the ways *Altneuland* "raised women to a position of ostensible equality", they still relied on a "rather conventional, late-nineteenth-century, bourgeois gender model".²³² However, Herzl's visions of an emasculated Jewish male regenerated through competitive sport is complicated in his diaries, when he notes that "Spielen dürfen nur Kinder und Alte. Das Spiel der Kinder muss aber der körperlichen Ausbildung dienen: Lauf und Ballspiele, für Jünglinge Cricket, für Mädchen Tennis."²³³ Herzl here, certainly, is adamant that play should be not only functional, but forbidden to adults. Indeed, since he goes on to describe how gambling will be forbidden and playing cards not just taxed heavily but

231 Matti Bunzl, 'Theodor Herzl's Zionism as Gendered Discourse', *Austrian Studies* 8 (1997), 74-86, p83

232 Ibid., p82

233 BT.II:100-1. Notably Herzl chooses tennis over the perhaps more obvious schoolgirl sport of field hockey.

forbidden to the under-40s, it is a rather joyless society that he envisions.

Though both Herzl and Nordau seems to buy into narratives of Jewish feminisation, Herzl seems to see this as a general devaluation rather than an erosion of masculinity, and this is reflected in his remedies. Herzl is also adamant that trivial games will end in adulthood. While, as detailed in a previous chapter, he borrows childhood, developmental concepts of bourgeois and aristocratic masculinity from the English public school, his conception of fully-fledged adult masculinity draws on France,²³⁴ Herzl's reformed, manly Jew who turns his cosmopolitanism into a strength can take the best of masculine ritual throughout his life.

Altneuland offers a rare insight into the changes Herzl envisaged in Jewish women: Mirjam cuts "keine schlechte Figur neben der hochragenden, blonden Engländerin" (GZW.V:381), while Ernestine Löffler, the object of Löwenberg's unrequited love in Vienna, is revealed to have aged quite badly. Alongside the schadenfreude of an old flame who married a bankrupt *Schlemihl* becoming a "fette, verblühte, in allzu grelle Farben gekleidete Dame" (GZW.V:230), this opposes the excessively ageing female body of diaspora with her youthful daughter, initially mistaken for her by Löwenberg. Notably, neither of these beautiful Jewish women particularly embodies the literary trope of the beautiful Jewess: though Ernestine's decline certainly fits most of the stereotypes of a *nouveau-riche*, over-the-hill Jewish wife.²³⁵ Mirjam is simply described as dark-haired and a little short, Ernestine Löffler's daughter as having the same fine features and delicate figure, and presumably the same blonde hair, as her mother. Both women's beauty is only briefly described, indeed in Mirjam's case it seems to have as much to do with her well-cut clothing. Stereotypical brown eyes or exotic swarthy skin are not mentioned, and the beautiful women of Herzl's utopia are unremarkable compared to the beautiful women of anywhere else.

234 "Ich brauche das Duell, um ordentliche Officiere zu haben und den Ton der guten Gesellschaft französisch zu verfeinern", (BT.II:92)

235 Robertson, *The "Jewish Question"*, p425

This trope was largely deployed for Gentile titillation, and of course for Herzl and his Zionist readership, Jewish women were not especially exotic. As is frequently the case in Herzl, negative Jewish stereotypes are attached to the figures of diaspora but the men and women of the New Society tend to lack starkly distinctive or noticeably Jewish qualities. Among women then, the New Jew is largely defined in terms of youth and generic physical beauty, with stereotypical non-Jewish women as the yardstick. Yet the changes in Jewish women also involve improved performance of masculinity as well as femininity. While Nordau, characteristically for the era, ignores women's sports, Herzl does not. Crucially, and somewhat in contrast to Bunzl's view of *Altneuland*, Herzl has girls play sport too. Girls in the New Society are educated and women work (one of the first characters we meet in Palestine is a female ophthalmologist), showcasing the society's progressive attitude to gender. In practice, however, the women of the New Society almost invariably choose traditional domestic roles. Conversely, however, through sport Jewish women, too, may regain lost masculinity.

In Herzl's case at least then, this anxiety over Jewish and bourgeois inauthenticity, which are strongly linked, is not about inauthentic performance of gender, but inauthentic performance of masculinity by both genders. Ritchie Robertson's historical overview shows an extremely varied tendency to portray Jews as "feminised" in mind, body or both, from the medieval myth of Jewish men menstruating, to the stereotype of Jews being unable to grow proper beards. Robertson observes that racial scientists understood Jews as "deficient in sexual dimorphism",²³⁶ and from the brash and masculine "Jewish mother" to Woody Allen's classic persona, stereotypes of both Jewish men and Jewish women do frequently hang on this supposed deficiency. In this set of stereotypes the masculine is given a dual function: both a gender in its own right and, as Simone de Beauvoir observed, gender-neutral. Men represent the standard and women the

236 Bryan Cheyette and Laura Marcus, eds., *Modernity, Culture and 'the Jew'* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p35

exception. 'Man' refers both to males and all of mankind. Reflecting this, we see that, when sexual dimorphism is supposedly deficient, the Jews are simultaneously characterised as both a feminised people and a people with insufficiently feminine women. Where a Jew's gender is under scrutiny, Jews are androgynous, the men too womanly and the women too manly. Where the specifics of gender are not in question, the Jew being examined is presumed to be male and Jews are seen as effeminate.

In Herzl's reforms of Jewish gender identity, this discourse of masculinity has perhaps less to do with what they aspire to than what they reject: stereotypes of male Jewish femininity (which trump any about female Jewish masculinity), and of Jews as a city people, emasculated and proletarianised. Caught in the double-bind of bourgeois effeminess and proletarian deprivation, their ambitions of escape are equally ambivalent in terms of class and gender and, as ever, these stereotypes must be accepted as truth in order for Herzl and Nordau to imagine a Jew who escapes them.

Zionist Politics as Surrogate Nationhood

These changes in the nature of Jewishness are often brought about together with habitation of Palestine, but, as became apparent in the previous section, Zionists such as Herzl and Nordau envisage a "new Jew" brought into being largely independently of statehood or colonisation. The passage in Herzl's diaries comparing statehood to a dirigible balloon was written a matter of days after learning that Sultan Abdul Hamid II would under no circumstances allow the Jews land in Palestine. In Herzl's understanding of human history and progress, the primacy of ideas was a driving force, as is shown by his reaction to a fellow Zionist, Alex Marmorek, who had the ambition to cure malaria after tuberculosis: "Wer Grosses will, ist in meinen Augen ein grosser

Mensch – nicht, wer Grosses erreicht. Beim Erreichen spielt das Glück mit” (BT.III:124). The force of greatness and ambition to drive human achievement is comparable to the motif of the dirigible balloon, a common one in Herzl’s writing, and one frequently used to represent the Jewish state. His Feuilleton ‘Das lenkbare Luftschiff’, by his account “ziemlich allgemein als eine Allegorie auf den Judenstaat verstanden” (BT.II:351), deals directly with the device, of which one character theorises:

[D]ie Erfindung wird doch früher oder später gemacht werden. Vielleicht lebt der Mann schon, der dem menschlichen Geschlechte diese größte aller Ueberraschungen bereiten soll. Wie dann die Welt aussehen wird, möchte ich errathen.²³⁷

For Herzl, the dirigible balloon, like the Jewish state, is both wildly implausible (the inventor finds himself an inmate of a lunatic asylum) and ultimately inevitable. The apple analogy, riddled with wordplay and repeated approximately in the *Feuilleton*, implies Jewish statehood is a monumental enough concept to perhaps exist without ground beneath its feet. Like the crank inventor’s staple of a dirigible balloon, the momentum of the Zionist movement will overcome the difficulty of gravity. It is not the patch of ground withheld by the Sultan that would sustain Jewish statehood, but Jewish dedication to it. This is a model Herzl has previously extended to all nations in *Der Judenstaat*.

[N]icht die Länderstrecken sind der Staat, sondern die durch eine Souveränität zusammengefassten Menschen sind es.

Das Volk ist die persönliche, das Land die dingliche Grundlage des Staates. Und von diesen beiden Grundlagen ist die persönliche die wichtigere. Es gibt zum Beispiel eine Souveränität ohne dingliche Grundlage, und sie ist sogar die geachtetste der Erde: es ist die Souveränität des Papstes. (GZWI:86)

Herzl quite explicitly sees sovereignty as working in the area of human relationships, potentially independent of any actual ground. This is elaborated on in his diary in 1897:

237 Theodor Herzl, *Philosophische Erzählungen* (Berlin: B. Harz Verlag, 1919), p26

Der Staat ist wesentlich im Staatswillen des Volkes, ja selbst eines genügend mächtigen Einzelnen (l'état c'est moi Ludwig XIV) begründet. Territorium ist nur die concrete Unterlage, der Staat ist selbst wo er Territorium hat immer etwas Abstractes. Der Kirchenstaat besteht auch ohne Territorium, sonst wäre der Papst nicht souverän. (BT.II:539)

As with both royal and Vatican models of statehood, it is not the territory which marks out a state, but the authority vested in it, whether in an individual monarch or pontiff, or the collective entity of the *Volk*. For Herzl, statehood is not political or territorial but conceptual.

Zionism, then, cannot simply be understood in terms of a Jewish homeland – be that a Jewish state, a Jewish presence or both – in Palestine. Many prominent Zionists, particularly before the Balfour Declaration made statehood a realistic possibility, envisaged changes that would take place outside, independently of, or even without such a homeland. Ahad Ha'am's essay 'A Spiritual Centre' proposes the following:

“A centre of our nationality” implies that there is a national circumference, which, like every circumference, is much larger than the centre. That is to say, the speaker sees the majority of his people, in the future as in the past, scattered all over the world, but no longer broken up into a number of disconnected parts, because one part – the one in Palestine – will be a centre for them all and make them all into a single, complete circumference. When all the scattered limbs of the national body feel the beating of the national heart, restored to life in its native home, they too will once again draw near to one another and welcome the inrush of living blood that flows from the heart.²³⁸

Ahad Ha'am makes this assertion after noting that colonisation of Palestine by any more than one percent of world Jewry is utterly unfeasible. This attitude is echoed by Birnbaum and Pinsker, both fellow members of *Hovevei Zion*.

Das jüdische Volk hat kein eigenes Vaterland, wenn auch viele Mutterländer; es hat kein Zentrum, keinen Schwerpunkt, keine eigene Regierung, keine Vertretung. [...] Die Nationen haben es nie mit einer jüdischen Nation, sondern immer nur mit Juden zu tun. Für eine jüdische Nationalität fehlt es

238 Ahad Ha'am, *Selected Essays* (Cleveland: World Pub. Co, 1962), p204

den Juden an einer gewissen, jeder anderen Nation innewohnenden charakterischen Volkstümlichkeit, welche durch das Zusammenwohnen auf einem Staatsgebiete bedingt ist. (AE:7).

Nicht darauf, daß alle Juden in einem Lande vereinigt werden, sondern daß für die Judenheit ein nationales Zentrum geschaffen werde, zielt die jüdische Nationalitätsidee. [...] Ein beträchtlicher Teil des Volkes, der sich naturgemäß zunächst meist aus den Ländern der stärksten Judenbedrückung rekrutiert wird, soll sich auf dem Boden niederlassen, welcher bestimmt ist, die Heimat Israels zu sein. Durch den Ackerbau wird er daselbst jene Liebe zur Scholle gewinnen, welche einem Volk ein Land erhält, und jene körperliche und sittliche Gesundheit finden, welche das eigentliche Ziel aller jüdischen Bestrebungen sein muß.²³⁹

It is notable that both passages are extremely vague about where this land will be. Pinsker diagnoses the problem, not as lack of a place for Jews to live (although he does stress the need for a 'Zufluchtsstätte' (AE:26)), but as a lack of a centre and of political representation. For Birnbaum too, the unity of Jewry in one land is secondary to a centre and the *idea* of a Jewish nationality. The nature of these ties also differs starkly. For Pinsker, a Jewish homeland becomes a centre by other nations perceiving it as such. For Birnbaum, this connection is a love of the people for the soil, and this is developed through farming and, as in *Altneuland*, through the parallel cultivation of a new Jew. In neither case, however, is this connection historical or religious, rather, even partial colonisation changes the facts on the ground and, in doing so, also changes both Jewish self-perceptions and perceptions of them by what are to become their peer nations. This idea then carries through to Herzl's *Der Judenstaat*, where Herzl states:

Der Abfluss ist ein allmäliger, ohne jede Erschütterung, und schon sein Beginn ist das Ende des Antisemitismus. Die Juden scheiden als geachtete Freunde, und wenn Einzelne dann zurückkommen, wird man sie in den civilisirten Ländern genau so wohlwollend aufnehmen und behandeln, wie andere fremde Staatsangehörige. (GZWI:32)

And sure enough, in *Altneuland*, antisemitism has not just been reduced but eradicated entirely

239 Nathan Birnbaum, *Ausgewählte Schriften zur jüdischen Frage* (Czernowitz: Birnbaum & Kohut, 1910), p8

(GZW.V:295). In all three cases, nationhood comes from other nations' perceptions, and in turn, effects a change in these perceptions.

National Movements and The New Jew as Nation

With Nordau in particular we see this process well prior to statehood or settlement, and it is pride in Jewishness, the same that marks out Leo Kohn, which achieves this. He tells the Eighth Zionist Congress in 1907, "Wir Zionisten tragen unser Judentum wie eine Kokarde" (ZS:182), a similar motif to one he uses elsewhere:

Die Judenfeinde werden wahrscheinlich Judenfeinde bleiben, aber die Anständigen unter ihnen werden ihre Feindschaft in ritterlicher Form betätigen, denn nur ein Feigling schämt sich nicht, einem Gegner anders als ritterlich zu begegnen, der mit einer großen Kokarde in weithin sichtbarer Farbe am Hut im Sonnenlicht auf freiem Blachfelde für sein Dasein kämpft. So ändert der Zionismus – nicht später, gleich! – das zweitausendjährige Vorzeichen des Judentums von minus in plus, von passiv in aktiv, und lehrt die Welt, das angebliche Handelsvolk als ein handelndes Volk in einem neuen Sinne zu erkennen. (ZS:154)

He does not imagine an end to antisemitism, or even a decrease, but a change in its methods. Assertion of Jewish honour will cause the Jews' enemies to treat them both honourably and as honourable. The fact of being a Jew becomes a cockade, an invitation to the Jews' enemies to engage them face-to-face. As with Herzl, this operates in the realm of the symbolic, transforming the word, as Herzl puts it, "So, dass der Spotttruf „Jude!“ zu einem Ehrenworte wird, wie Deutscher, Engländer, Franzose, kurz wie die Massen aller Culturvölker" (BT.II:128-9). Gans wonders "Is the nation-state justified because it guarantees the physical security of a persecuted nation, or because it grants a measure of dignity to the victims of persecution?"²⁴⁰ and the fear that Nordau hopes to allay is not low-level harassment or even outright violence, but the indignity and degradation they bring with them. It is worth noting, by comparison, that Alfred

240 Gans, *A Just Zionism*, p75

Dreyfus died an old man, of natural causes, and the shocking images which Herzl himself claimed as the inspiration for his Jewish nationalism²⁴¹ were not of violence or an emaciated, toothless Dreyfus returned from imprisonment on Devil's Island, but his public degradation and the anti-Semitic jeers of the crowd, despite his impotent protests of "Vive la France". Nordau puts the fight against dishonour before the fight against death. As mentioned earlier, he uses the Spartans as a model for Jewish valour, and like with Herzl's comments on Jewish ability to die in battle, pre-Zionist Jews lack courage. Zionism offers them examples, in this case Antiquity's most famous martial race, of how to give their lives in battle.

We see this conceptual pre-state statehood in the realm of collective public politics as well as individual personal development. Herzl required delegates to the First Zionist Congress in 1897 to dress formally, for the stiff, measured tone of a parliament in exile.

Einer meiner ersten Ausführungsgedanken schon vor Monaten war es, dass man im Frack u. weisser Halsbinde zur Eröffnungssitzungen kommen müsse. Das bewährte sich ausgezeichnet. Die Feiertagskleider machen die meisten Menschen steif. Aus dieser Steifheit entstand sofort ein gemessener Ton – den sie in hellen Sommer- u. Reisekleidern vielleicht nicht gehabt hätten – u. ich ermangelte nicht, diesen Ton noch ins Feierliche zu steigern. (BT.II:539)

Nordau too sees the political sphere of Zionism, not just as a call for political recognition of a Jewish nation-state, but as the Jewish nation's political representatives.

Denn bis zum Auftreten des Zionismus wurde der nichtjüdischen Welt von den Personen, die bis dahin allein als die amtlichen Vertreter des Judentums anerkannt waren, immer versichert, daß es keine Judenfrage gibt, daß die Juden glücklich und zufrieden sind. (ZS:143)

Nordau's recognition that there is no proper representation of the Jewish people carries a further implication: nationhood itself is a matter of representation, and the perceptions that can be invited by both hostile and friendly neighbours.

241 "Zum Zionisten hat mich nämlich – der Prozeß Dreyfus gemacht." (GZW.I:374)

This process takes place from both the top down and the bottom up. Sand drily references the “old Yiddish joke that defines a Zionist as a Jew asking another Jew for money to donate to a third Jew in order to make aliyah to the Land of Israel”.²⁴² Yet this joke represents a primary function of Zionist organisational politics: just as *Altneuland* ridicules the Jewish middle class’s lack of solidarity with less fortunate Jews elsewhere, the grassroots networks and especially inter-class solidarity they purported to express serve a function. However the erasure or glossing over of internal diversity, structures of inequality and problems of representation may complicate it, this process of cross-border organisation among Jews shows the same assertion of shared identity and historical experience that Herzl claims in *Der Judenstaat*: it is the hostility of their enemies that have made the Jews into a single people. As well as a movement to establish Jewish nationhood in a world increasingly structured around existing or proposed nation-states, Zionism is, though limited, temporary and incomplete, a performance of belonging to that nation itself, and a functional substitute for the state it wishes to establish.

The Zionist movement’s function as almost a government in exile throws up unusual parallels with contemporaneous nationalist movements. This goes further than the influence on Herzl of Viennese culture (in fact, as literary editor of the *Neue Freie Presse*, Viennese culture was probably rather influenced by him). The influence of German culture is also tangible, though often in less direct ways. Certainly he wrote admiringly to Bismarck, and praised his ability to build the *Kaiserreich* from black, red and gold ribbons. Certainly he had been in the patriotic *Burschenschaft* ‘Albia’ as a student, though Herzl the Zionist treats this as a youthful indiscretion, and the hostility of such *deutschnational* movements to the Austro-Hungarian establishment²⁴³ is the polar opposite of his later attitudes. However, the strongest influence of German nationalism on Zionism may have been the frameworks, functions and organisational strategies of ethnic

242 Sand, *The Invention of the Land of Israel*, p21

243 McGrath, *Student Radicalism in Vienna*, 183-201, p185

politics, rather than their content, and on Herzl's understanding of what was necessary to a successful national movement.

While Dieckhoff claims "In reality it is impossible to establish a link between form and substance in Herzl's thinking",²⁴⁴ this performative aspect of Zionism potentially offers a solution. Paraphrasing Judith Butler, performativity is a "stylized repetition of acts", "public" in nature, which "must be understood to found and consolidate the subject" and articulate it into something "culturally intelligible".²⁴⁵ These very public performances of Zionist solidarity, whether looking up at the press gallery in Basel or shaking a tin on the streets of Odessa, are public performances of a new, national Jewish identity, and as such bring this new identity into being. In Hannah Arendt's analysis of the Pan-Slavic and Pan-Germanic movements, the motion towards their goals becomes a goal in and of itself.

In this stream the difference between ends and means evaporates together with the personality, and the result is the monstrous immorality of ideological politics. All that matters is embodied in the moving movement itself; every value has vanished into a welter of superstitious pseudoscientific immanence.²⁴⁶

Roger Chickering notes that many historians "prefer to speak of a 'feeling and mood', of a 'feeling of discontent that had no clear source or goal', rather than of a systematic view of politics that would justify the label of ideology",²⁴⁷ and that "The basic premise in the Pan-German League's ideology was that German national development was incomplete, that it had not reached its fulfilment in 1871."²⁴⁸ However, this tendency does not seem limited to pan-nationalism or the totalitarianism which Arendt argues grew out of it. For national, and perhaps all identitarian, movements, constructing and cementing the group identity is at least as much the end as the

244 Dieckhoff, *The Invention of a Nation*, pp30.

245 Judith Butler. *Gender Trouble*. (London; New York: Routledge, 2006) , pp191; 201

246 Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, p249

247 Roger Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p75

248 *Ibid.*, p76

demands made for that group. Similarly, Arendt understands the function of pan-nationalist movements as something more than demands for nationhood. After all, a German nation of sorts had existed since 1871, even if it did not meet the impossibly ambitious demands of the Pan-Germans. Rather, reflecting capitalism's constant drive to expand its frontiers and markets, these ambitious demands were the end as much as they were the means. The act of demanding and campaigning, of asserting the discrepancy between what the German nation *was* and what they believed it *should be*, not only defined the movement, but asserted the nationality itself.

This particular tendency of nationalism, amplified by the momentum of the pan-Germans and the direct relevance of their demands to Austrian politics, was unavoidably a large part of the political environment in which Herzl operated. For a Jew it was particularly unavoidable, given the Austrian Pan-German leader Georg von Schönerer was far more outspoken in his antisemitism than his counterparts to the north-west. Nor was Herzl the only Jew to address the Pan-Germans head-on. Birnbaum too, during a phase of non-Zionist nationalism, named one of his theories 'Alljudentum'.²⁴⁹ Of course, this may partly have been a wry parody of *Alldeuschtum* to antagonise antisemites. Yet it nevertheless represents a need to address the movement in its own terms. 'Alljudentum' asserts Jews as a group within Austrian politics on a par with Germans and Slavs. If Pan-Germans and their rejection of Jews as Germans are to be taken seriously, so are Pan-Jews. If *Alljudentum* is laughable, so is *Alldeuschtum*. It challenges those who reject Jews as Germans to accept them as counterparts. Schorske shows that Herzl's Zionism came in answer to Schönerer and Lueger's movements,²⁵⁰ and we see Herzl sharing this perception in his daydreams of duelling with Schönerer. Herzl, it seems, aspired to be a counterpart to Schönerer, representative of a people within the Habsburg Empire and responsible for their public image.

249 Emanuel S. Goldsmith, *Architects of Yiddishism at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: A Study in Jewish Cultural History* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976), p107

250 Schorske, 'Politics in a New Key', p119

One of Zionism's defining qualities at the turn of the century was, as will be explored in detail elsewhere, the ludicrous implausibility of its aims. Herzl, of course, made no attempt to hide it. And it is ultimately in the impossibility of their ends that Zionism and Pan-Germanism cross over. While the relocation of the Jews to found a state in Palestine was a daunting task even without the presence of an existing population, the goals of the Pan-German movement were even more unworkable. As well as the fact that one goal was realised and another not, this is borne out by the internal contradictions of Pan-Germanism's demands. The integration of the entire German diaspora into one unified and German territory requires areas where German speakers exist as a minority, from Bohemia to the river Volga, to be incorporated within the borders of a culturally homogenous nation. It is not, then, simply the fact these demands are impossible that strengthens the movement's momentum, but the nature of their impossibility. Pan-Germanism makes expansionistic demands for the German people to the exclusion of or with disregard to the demands of other peoples, the demand to damage others' interests for the benefit of Germany being an assertion of identity in and of itself. Zionism makes demands for the Jews alongside and directly comparable those of other peoples. While the two differ in this sense, both sets of demands make a people and its ambitions the end in themselves, and all the more strongly for their inachievability.

Returning to the dirigible balloon, the parallels seem stronger: "Das Geheimniss liegt in der Bewegung." His balloon functioning more like an aeroplane than a Zeppelin, Herzl sees the motion towards Palestine, the impassioned demand for the correct state for his people, as the force behind nationhood. Palestine becomes a homeland, not through settlement or UN recognition, but through the existence of a movement to make it into one. The influence of German nationalism on Herzl and the movement as a whole was, as with his image of black, red and gold ribbons, the mode of expression which a nationalist movement must take to have

currency in contemporaneous Central Europe. In the German-speaking world, the major source of antisemitism and challenges to Jews' legitimate citizenship was German nationalism, and this nationalism asserted itself through expansion and motion in the form of highly implausible, impracticable and often contradictory demands. The unusual parallels with the pan-German movement stem not from admiration or conscious desire to mimic them, a strange thing to admire for a man who daydreamed of killing or being killed by Georg von Schönerer. Rather, for a national movement to proceed in terms of excessive and unworkable demands was the perhaps the standard method in Habsburg, Central European, and perhaps to some extent *all* national politics. It is not surprising that, before the clearly delineated, expressly national, borders of 1918, national identities were often as much a matter of assertion through demand as they were power through control of territory. The fantastic goals of Zionism and the various pan-nationalist movements are better suited to this mode of expression than anything workable. By demanding the impossible, a risk is averted: the risk that, once an aim is achieved, the sense of community and assertion of nationhood that the movement helped galvanise will no longer have a purpose.

Utopias of Possibility

Theodor Herzl makes for a rather interesting utopian, in that he imagines two separate societies that are utopian to a certain extent, but neither of which quite fits the genre perfectly. Utopian writing, “a socio-economic sub-genre of that broader literary form” known as Science Fiction, where “the mind takes its satisfaction in the sheer operations of putting together new models of this or that perfect society”,²⁵¹ is difficult to define, and the preponderance of irony as a defining quality in it is an important part of this difficulty. For Robert Burton, perhaps speaking semi-

251 Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions* (London: Verso, 2005), pp.xiv; 35

ironically “Utopian parity is a kind of government, to be wished for, rather than effected [...] witty fictions, but mere chimeras.”²⁵² As mentioned before, the word itself reflects this irony. Thomas More, who originated this pun, and writers who followed on from him such as William Morris (*News from Nowhere*) and Samuel Butler (*Erewhon*) openly and playfully assert the impossibility of their dream societies. More even spells out the pun in a short poem at the end of the text.²⁵³

Fredric Jameson observes the different aspects of utopianism:

It has often been often been observed that we need to distinguish between the Utopian form and the Utopian wish: between the written text or genre and something like a Utopian impulse detectable in daily life and its practices by a specialised hermeneutic or interpretive method. Why not add political practice to this list, inasmuch as whole social movements have tried to realize a Utopian vision, communities have been founded and revolutions waged in its name, and since [...] the term itself is once again current in present-day discursive struggles.²⁵⁴

On a basic level, *Altneuland*, a conscious contribution to the genre of utopian fiction, can be understood as an example of the utopian form. The visions of a future Jewish nation outlined in *Der Judenstaat* and his diaries, and indeed, pushed for by his political efforts, reflect a utopian wish. Due to the tameness of his political visions however, Herzlian Zionism only seems to resemble what Jameson terms utopian politics in the difficulty of its realisation, rather than the political content.

Herzl himself is well aware of this division between form and wish, flatly stating in the accompanying letter sent to Lord Rothschild along with a copy of *Altneuland*

Es wird natürlich dumme Leute geben die weil ich die von Platon u. Thomas Morus u. Anderen gebrauchte Form der Utopie wählte die Sache für eine Utopie erklären. Von Ihnen befürchte ich ein solches Missverständnis nicht. (BT.III:461)

252 Robert Burton. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. (Project Gutenberg, 2004), pp622-3

253 “Wherefore not Utopie, but rather rightley/My name is Eutopie: A place of felicitie”, Thomas More, ‘Utopia’, in *Three Early Modern Utopias: Utopia, New Atlantis, The Isle of Pines*, ed. Susan Bruce (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-148, p128

254 Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, p1

Herzl's concern is that his fictitious and not his prospective Jewish state will be seen as his vision of Utopia, whereas he is simply using the genre to posit his idea. In a similar letter to the Grand Duke of Baden he takes a slightly different angle:

Es ist ein Märchen, das ich gleichsam bei den Lagerfeuern erzähle, um meine armen Leute auf der Wanderung bei gutem Muthe zu erhalten. Ausharren ist Alles.

Von einer neuen Gesellschaft ist in dem Buche die Rede. Ich glaube, dass alle Völker immer auf dem Wege nach einer neuen Gesellschaft sind. Vielleicht wird dieser verborgene Ernst in meinem Märchen die Theilnahme des weisen Fürsten erwecken, den ich so innig u. dankbar verehere. (BT.III:461)

Herzl consistently envisages a dual function for *Altneuland*. It is simultaneously a fairytale and a very real possibility, as his *Nachwort* confirms:

Wenn Ihr aber nicht wollt, so ist es und bleibt es ein Märchen, was ich Euch erzählt habe [...] [D]as Träumen sei immerhin auch eine Ausfüllung der Zeit, die wir auf der Erde verbringen. Traum ist von Tat nicht so verschieden, wie mancher glaubt. Alles Tun der Menschen war vorher Traum und wird später zum Traume. (GZW.V:420)

Furthermore, the self-conscious manner in which he writes in the utopian genre is exemplified in the following speech by David Littwak, which is worth quoting at length:

Es gab auch rosigere Wolken, zum Beispiel die berühmte Wolke des Amerikaners Bellamy, der in seinem „Rückblicke aus dem Jahre 2000 auf das Jahr 1887“ eine' edle kommunistische Gesellschaft darstellt. Dort kann jeder aus der allgemeinen Schüssel so viel essen, als er mag. Der Wolf weidet neben dem Lamm. Schön, sehr schön! Nur sind dann die Wölfe keine Wölfe und die Menschen keine Menschen mehr. Nach Bellamy kam der Staatsromantiker Hertzka und entwarf seine Utopie „Freiland“, ein sehr brillantes Zauberkunststück, vergleichbar dem unerschöpflichen Hute des Taschenspielers. Es sind schöne Träume oder wenn ihr wollt Luftschiffe, aber lenkbar sind sie nicht. Denn diese edlen und menschenfreundliche Erzähler begannen ihre sinnreichen Werke mit einem Beweisfehler. Die Gelehrten unter euch — ich weiß, daß es auch in Neudorf wie vor dreißig Jahren in Katrah gelehrte Bauern gibt — die werden mich verstehen, wenn ich sage, daß die Erzähler jener Utopien eine *petitio principii* begingen. Sie bewiesen mit etwas, das erst zu beweisen war: nämlich,

daß die Menschen bereits die Reife und Freiheit des Urteils hätten, welche zur Einrichtung einer anderen Gesellschaft nötig sind. Oder vielleicht waren sie sich darüber klar, und es fehlte ihnen nur der feste Punkt, an dem Archimedes den Hebel einsetzen wollte. Sie glaubten, die Maschinerie sei das Wichtigste, um etwas Modernes zu schaffen. Nein, die Kraft ist es, nach wie vor die Kraft, immer nur die Kraft.

This 'Kraft' recalls the perpetual drive of Zionism as a national movement referred to earlier. Here, the momentum that serves to assert Jewish nationhood without a territory is shown as a means rather than an end, and a fantastically successful one at that. Harnessing this power and drive for the self-consciously impossible – the utopian society – postpones indefinitely the achievement of the movement's aim which would dissipate its energy, and averts the catastrophe of getting what you wished for. Littwak continues:

Freilich, wenn ich einmal über die Kraft verfüge, dann werde ich sie durch die neuesten Erfindungen im Maschinenwesen aufs höchste ausnützen. Wir aber, wir hatten diese Kraft. Woher hatten wir sie? Aus dem ungeheuren und allseitigen Druck, der auf uns ausgeübt wurde, aus der Verfolgung, aus der Not. Das trieb die Zerstreuten zusammen und machte ihre Vereinigung stark, denn es waren nicht nur Arme, sondern auch Mächtige, nicht nur Junge, sondern auch Weise, nicht nur Enthusiasten, sondern auch Gebildete, nicht nur Hände, sondern auch Köpfe dabei. Ein Volk, ein ganzes Volk fand sich zusammen, nein, fand sich wieder. (GZW.V:268-9)

“Bellamy” and “Hertzka” refer to the authors of two utopian novels which were especially popular at the turn of the century. In Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward: 2000-1897* a Bostonian's attempted cure for insomnia backfires and he awakes in the socialistic and rationally organised America of the year 2000. In the economist Theodor Hertzka's *Freiland* (1893) a high-tech European colony is founded in East Africa based on principles of individual liberty and the abolition of income from property, and rapidly expands as it attracts new citizens from across both Europe and Africa, and the rest of the world. For the guide figure in a utopian novel to reference a brief list of other utopian novels initially seems odd, though in keeping with a genre

far more intended as a satire on existing conditions than as a serious proposal.

Yet Littwak's criticism of these visions is unusual, as the character, and presumably the author too, take Bellamy and Hertzka to task for the implausibility of their utopian visions. Neither the people nor the wolves nor the lambs they lie down with are authentic in Bellamy's society. Returning to a favoured analogy, the magnificent airship Hertzka conjures up cannot be steered. Littwak also elaborates on the specific qualities of the genre: a utopia must assume that humans possess the qualities necessary to live it, and its realisation depends heavily on technology. *Altneuland*, for its characters, differs in by having a driving force, the very Jewish driving force of oppression in diaspora.

Herzl and Genre

This passage also serves as the novel's much-needed acknowledgements section. *Altneuland* does not simply draw on the other novels in the genre it mentions, but quite simply lifts ideas from them. *Looking Backward*, William Morris's arcadian reply called *News from Nowhere*,²⁵⁵ *Freiland* and *Altneuland* all take the form of a romantic narrative, and consciously so, describing both the structure of their society and to some extent its establishment, and the very structure of utopia involves separating the world in which the author is writing from the envisaged perfect society. In Bellamy and many contemporaneous utopian authors, including Morris, we see „die Tendenz zur Integration von Protagonisten in die utopische Welt durch Verheiratung mit Utopiebewohnerinnen“ as a form of „idealen Biographie“.²⁵⁶ Löwenberg marries David Littwak's younger sister Mirjam, reminiscent of how in *Looking Backward* Julian West marries his guide's

255 William Morris, *News from Nowhere, Or, an Epoch of Rest: Being some Chapters from a Utopian Romance*, ed. David Leopold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). While Herzl does not mention or seem to draw on *News from Nowhere*, it is nonetheless an interesting text to reference simply as a contemporaneous example of the genre.

256 Werner Michler, 'Zukunft und Augenblick: Utopien der Jahrhundertwende', in *Das glückliche Leben — und die Schwierigkeit, es darzustellen. Glückskonzeptionen in der österreichischen Literatur. Beiträge des 14. österreichisch-polnischen Germanistentreffens Salzburg 2000*, eds. Eduard Beutner, Hans Höller and Ulrike Tanze (Vienna: Zirkular, 2002), 17-33, p23

daughter. The establishment of Herzl's utopia, however, is a much bigger departure from the conventions of the genre. What Jameson calls "the old anti-Utopian objection that the practical question of implementation is never raised in the standard Utopias"²⁵⁷ is not entirely true: *News from Nowhere* describes the causes and unfolding of the revolution, but only gives it one chapter. However, it is even less true of *Altneuland*. Almost the full fourth book is dedicated to the country's establishment.

There is another notable departure from the narrative conventions of the utopian romance genre: Kingscourt. Most utopian romances depict a traveller from the same background as the reader being shown the society, as a Doctor Watson figure, as ignorant as the reader and so requiring just as much explanation. *Altneuland* has two of these Watsons, one Jewish and one not, one filled with wide-eyed wonder at the new society, the other constantly cynical and ironic (reversing the stereotypes of Jewish emotional detachment and self-ridicule shown by Grün and Blau). Like most traveller characters, Löwenberg is easily impressed, and it is from his perspective that readers experience the novel. Kingscourt, with a brashness almost unheard of for the genre, is very difficult to win over, especially given his casual antisemitism.²⁵⁸ Indeed, while Löwenberg was already in a state of despair at his own life and social circle when they leave Vienna, Kingscourt had already been despairing for twenty years, and at the whole of humanity. The novel uses characters as microcosms for sections of the Jewish population: the Greek-Sephardic Alladino, whose name amalgamates the Arabic definite article 'al' and the Judeo-Spanish language 'Ladino', the Eastern Jewish Littwaks, whose name is simply the normal Yiddish word for a Lithuanian, the very American sounding Joe Levy, and Löwenberg, recalling the Hebrew for 'heart' and implying the name, and German background, of the author. Kingscourt is an even more complicated amalgam: an old-fashioned Prussian *Junker* by birth (a role Herzl "enjoyed at

257 Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, p36

258 Kingscourt, in a rather familiar approach, protests that he is not an antisemite since he hates all human beings regardless of creed. (*GZW.V*:157)

home [...] in the world of letters”,²⁵⁹ imagining himself as one in passages in his diaries), he lost his fortune and set sail for America, changed his name from Königshoff and over twenty years earned another fortune, and Herzl writes him with a mixture of Berlinese pronunciation and brash proletarian affectation. Kingscourt is, of course, so impressed with the utopia the Jews have built that like Löwenberg he stays: the ultimate seal of approval from the traveller and a convention of the genre. The great success of this utopia is that it wins over this arch-misanthrope, something neither Europe, America nor an island paradise had properly been able to do. The figure to whom Herzl’s utopia proves itself is a great amalgam of Europe and America, Aristocrat and entrepreneur, patrician and plebeian, old money and new, in short, all Western non-Jews rolled into one. The utopia serves not just to inspire Jews, but to impress Gentiles.

Looking Backward: 2000-1887 separates its utopia, as the full title clearly announces, by setting it in the future, and *News from Nowhere* does the same. The gulf that separates these utopias is, in this case, temporal. However, *Freiland* and *Altneuland* are both set less than a generation into the future. Their perfect societies are colonial enclaves within an imperfect world (*Freiland*’s colony is founded in ‘das Hochgebirge des Kenia’,²⁶⁰ the same area offered by Britain in 1903, implying interest in the region for European colonisation at least as early as 1890). While the utopia *Freiland* expands at an uncontrollable rate, that of *Altneuland* has an impact which stretches far outside its borders, not only by eradicating antisemitism but through its enormous inspirational and economic impact on the rest of the world. Indeed, the names of the organisations are no less similar than the titles: ‘Free Society’ and ‘Jewish Society’, and both novels’ guides are named David. The lengths of time involved in creating these mighty enclaves are very close: twenty-five years for Hertzka’s and twenty for Herzl’s. Both involve a newspaper advertisement as a key plot device within the first few pages of *Altneuland* and the first few

259 Loewenberg, *Theodor Herzl*, p109

260 Theodor Hertzka, *Freiland: Ein soziales Zukunftsbild* (Dresden; Leipzig: E. Pierson's Verlag, 1890), p6

sentences of *Freiland*. When Herzl borrows the great shopping halls where all commerce takes place,²⁶¹ there are separate German, English, French and American ones to emphasise the cultural diversity of the society (*GZW.V:223*). The separation of English and American implies separation according to nation, rather than language, and places to shop for any Jews from east of Germany, be they Middle Eastern or Eastern European, are conspicuous by their absence. It is easy then to see *Altneuland* as an affectionate Jewish parody of *Freiland* (Indeed Grün's pun, "ende Jud', alles Jud'" (*GZW.V:296*) might as well be the national motto). Having the parody up and running five years quicker than its inspiration stresses the greater drive possessed by the Jewish people, while the unanimously-adopted name of Hertzka's colony, 'Edental', is one Herzl not only has a little more claim to, but stresses openly in Löwenberg's exclamation "Es ist der Garten Eden!"

The fact that the name is chosen unanimously is significant. A utopia built on internal division and controversy, even over something as pleasantly decorative as a name, cannot truly function as a utopia, since utopias are by nature devoid of conflict. For this reason, we see David Littwak elected as President with 363 votes out of 395 cast, (*GZW.V:415*) a majority of over 90%. As well as completing the inspiring tale of a poor peddler's son turned shipping magnate, newspaper proprietor and ultimately president, Littwak demonstrates a tolerant and pluralistic democracy that is ultimately too peacefully unified to need tolerance or pluralism.

As well as plot devices and symbolism, Herzl borrows social structures.²⁶² In *Looking Backward*, newspapers are owned and run by subscribers who elect an editor,²⁶³ a system Herzl borrows almost exactly for *Altneuland* (*GZW.V:210*). In *Freiland*, as in *Altneuland*, the country is at

261 *Ibid.*, p97

262 Peck elaborates in great detail on the similarities *Altneuland* shows to *Freiland* and *Looking Backward*. *Im Labor der Utopie*, pp311-14; 316-22

263 Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward: 2000-1887*, ed. Cecelia Tichi (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), pp130-2

no risk of invasion despite having no army,²⁶⁴ criminals are rehabilitated,²⁶⁵ women are permitted to pursue the career of their choice (Hertzka notes that this has even been known to happen on isolated occasions),²⁶⁶ and one of the few major technological innovations is a car (spring-powered in *Freiland*, unlike *Altneuland*'s petrol-driven charabanc/minibus/'motor-ark').²⁶⁷ Herzl and Hertzka's utopias are achieved with a minimum of scientific progress, indeed *Altneuland* merely applies existing technology more efficiently. It is not just Herzl's utopian fiction which draws inspiration from these works. A working day in *Freiland* lasts from five to ten in the morning, and then from four to six in the afternoon,²⁶⁸ all told, a *Siebenstundentag*. Indeed the only notable different is that the people of *Freiland* have a four-hour break rather than three-and-a-half (by breaking the day up evenly, Herzl allows alternating shifts (*GZWI*:54)). The safety of *Freiland*'s utopia is the deterrent formed by universal 'Leibesübungen',²⁶⁹ with clear parallels to Herzl's (and, for that matter, Nordau's) interest in sport and exercise. Perhaps most interestingly, Herzl's *Arbeitsheer* is an idea directly taken from *Looking Backward*,²⁷⁰ right down to the parallel army for women.²⁷¹ Herzl clearly drew on utopian writing with the expectation that his inspirations would be recognised by a reader, so it is especially noteworthy that he proposes these ideas in utopian sketches which hopes will be carried out, and does so almost as much as he does in *Altneuland*. Given the consistent primacy of ideas in Herzl's writing, the lack of a clear divide between the utopian and the real matches, not only his writing but his sources of inspiration.

Quoting Olaf Stapledon's Chimera analogy: that Homer "only joined into one, animal parts which belonged to different animals; the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent", Frederic Jameson argues our utopian imaginations are just as limited "hostages to our

264 Hertzka, *Freiland*, p196

265 *Ibid.*, p101

266 *Ibid.*, p114

267 *Ibid.*, pp169-70

268 *Ibid.*, p104

269 *Ibid.*, pp196

270 Bellamy, *Looking Backward*, p70

271 *Ibid.*, p185

own mode of production”.²⁷² Of course Herzl was quite willing to stitch together his favourite aspects of existing or historic states in *Der Judenstaat* and his diaries, and this is in part a result of the limits of human imagination. The chimera in *Altneuland* serves a more complicated function however. These fantastic institutions would have been familiar to many readers at the time when the genre was fashionable, making *Altneuland* more plausible. In addition, the desire for a better society inspired by these novels is harnessed by Herzl for the cause of Jewish statehood. Jameson claims:

Utopian space is an imaginary enclave within real social space, in other words, the very possibility of Utopian space is itself a result of spatial and social differentiation [...] dependent on the momentary formation of a kind of eddy or self-contained backwater within the general differentiation process and its seemingly irreversible forward momentum.²⁷³

For most utopias the method of separation between the real world and the fantastic is tame and unexciting. Particularly by the outlandish standards of early modern travel literature, crossing a trench dug by engineers is a rather dull way to arrive in a fantastic society. Other trenches range from the comically absurd – Bellamy’s Julian West, sleeping for a century under faddish hypnosis – to a dismissive, despairing hand-wave – Morris’s William Guest simply dreams his *Epoch of Rest*. For these writers, a traveller’s tale is simply a frame for a social vision for readers to hopelessly wish for. Herzl, by contrast, describes a rather tame social vision so as to tempt his reader with a plan for separation. The actual nature of Herzl’s two utopias is almost immaterial: *Der Judenstaat* states the necessity of a Jewish homeland and *Altneuland* hints at the possibility of a Jewish utopia. Herzl’s utopias emphasise not a utopian system – in each case either shockingly tame for the genre, borrowed from elsewhere, or both – but simply the acquisition of utopian space, uniting the social differentiation of Jews in diaspora with the spatial

272 Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, p.xiii

273 *Ibid.*, p15

differentiation of nationhood, with the temporal differentiation made so small as to be almost irrelevant.

In most utopian writing this differentiating trench provides a space for the satirical and function of the genre, and while it is not the primary aim of *Altneuland*, the novel nevertheless serves this function to a certain extent. Caitríona ní Dhúill provides a description of gender in utopia applicable to most aspects of utopian writing.

Where the imaginary world of utopia dispenses with the gender arrangements and sexual norms in force in reality, the utopian alternatives are a form of commentary on these arrangements and norms.

The depiction of a fantasy matriarchy is a way of commenting critically on patriarchy.²⁷⁴

Herzl's vision of a perfect Jewish society creates a negative image of the problems in diaspora. As well as the freedom, prosperity and redemption to be detailed later, Herzl stresses the diversity and religious freedom of the Jews' society in stark comparison to what they left behind. A noteworthy example of this is the novel's understanding of violence. While (to Kingscourt's mock-consternation) the country has no army (*GZVV*:203), a party guest in chapter two, fearing for his factory, asserts "Wenn das Gesindel nur die Bajonette sieht, hat es schon Respekt" (*GZVV*:140). While the pre-utopian response to antisemitism is military intimidation, the New Society has no need for violence, the universal benefit of their society's work having made them indispensable to the world (*GZVV*:372-3). Herzl envisages a world without a 'Gesindel' to be intimidated: the intolerance of the society is shown only through two objectionable individuals, who nonetheless limit their expressions of hatred to the ballot box and formal debate. This stress on tolerance extends to his more realistic plans:

Selbstverständlich werden wir Andersgläubige achtungsvoll dulden, ihr Eigentum, ihre Ehre und Freiheit mit den härtesten Zwangsmitteln schützen. Auch dann werden wir der ganzen alten Welt ein wunderbares Beispiel geben. (*BT*.II:118)

274 Caitríona Ní Dhúill, *Sex in Imagined Spaces: Gender and Utopia from More to Bloch* (London: Legenda, 2010), p2

Although what these 'Zwangsmittel' involve is unclear, Herzl's utopia of universal tolerance is less a blueprint for a society where intolerance will die out, but a way of highlighting the intolerance in turn-of-the-century Vienna. Ultimately the only driver of Jewish tolerance in the New Society, and admittedly a very effective one, is the sheer will of its citizens to be tolerant. Nor is this reflected intolerance directed at the diaspora in general, as made clear by statements from Reschid Bey detailed in the previous chapter, framing the Islamic world as substantially more tolerant of the Jews than Europe.

Much can be and has been made of the discrepancy between the Muslim characters of *Altneuland* and real, still ongoing conflicts. However Herzl's optimism is partly justified by the Sultan's aforementioned defence of his Jewish 'Unterthane' (BT.II:702). Additionally, in 1902 it was naturally prudent for Herzl to be positive about the Empire he was asking for territory. However, romanticisation of Islamic tolerance, and the persistent elements of oriental fantasy present in his Utopia, have much further significance. Alongside a rallying cry to the Jews, this very Middle Eastern Utopia expresses a scathing indictment of Christian Europe far more than anything about the area's existing inhabitants.

The Orient as Utopian Space

The separation in *Altneuland* is both spatial and temporal. The temporal separation is deliberately short, to show the startling effectiveness of Jewish nation-building, and the spatial separation is equally small, however it is this spatial separation that is most emphasised. The two spaces of the novel are the deeply flawed and wearily familiar Vienna, and the utopian New Society. The utopian space being the Orient is crucial.

While Reschid Bey serves to exemplify the tolerance of this society, he is German-educated, heavily westernised and a beneficiary of colonisation, with no reason for conflict with

the utopian settler society. An easy character for European readers to tolerate. The only other Middle-Eastern character we see in the narrative is his wife Fatma, or rather, her 'schöne, weiße Frauenhand' (GZW.V:240) as she waves her husband off. Indeed this whiteness is repeated, as Herzl describes "ein winkende, weiße Frauenhand hinter dem Holzgitter" (GZW.V:241) a few sentences later. This is perhaps the only incident of a stark difference in culture between Reschid Bey and the majority of the Jewish society, as he leaves his wife alone with the children to travel with his Jewish neighbours. Of course, it in no way leads to conflict: Löwenberg is soon convinced (by the European voice of Mirjam, rather than Reschid Bey or by Fatma herself) that Reschid Bey "führe nicht mit uns, wenn es für sie eine Kränkung wäre" and that "Er und sie sind wahrhaft gute Menschen" (GZW.V:241). The actual site of cultural difference, husband-wife relations, is quite literally shut away, and what little the reader is shown is aesthetically pleasing, European-looking and merely the tip of an iceberg, implying forbidden, potentially erotic Oriental mystery behind the shutters. The religious tolerance which exemplifies the New Society is, as with the diversity, described but not shown, with any potential for conflict or intolerance studiously hidden. When there is cultural conflict, it is with Mendel, the (admittedly Yiddish-accented and probably Eastern European) intolerant Jewish farmer. Herzl's lengthy description of the Sultan's royal parade (BT.II:368-70), as described in a previous chapter, shows that this interest in the Orient was tied to Herzl's methods for creating nationhood in his propositions for a real state as well in his fictional utopia.

Orientalism, like utopianism (and indeed dystopianism), serves, using a space defined by difference to the observer's society, to comment via contrasts on the merits and failings of that society. It presents itself as an image of the fantastical, incomprehensible and fascinating which allows a reader to temporarily step outside of their own cultural and political situation in order to examine it critically. These may serve as a demand for change, as in the case of utopia, or, with its

counterpart dystopia, to reassure in the face of disturbing and frightening similarities, or simply to allow value-neutral reflection on these differences. However this attempt to step outside one's own culture and politics is limited by the fact that, to a greater extent with utopias or a lesser one with the Orient, these fantasies are ultimately part of the same culture and politics. Indeed, as *Utopia* is essentially a travel narrative from a European perspective, the genre itself is tied from its inception to the same processes as Orientalism. Ralph Pordzik argues:

In the era of colonialism this perception of utopia was reinforced by those who left their homes in order to find the promised land overseas, settling in faraway places which they intended to shape into a new world of their own making; the history of colonization and white settlement is inextricably linked to this secularized view of paradise cut to a heavenly pattern of political justice and material wealth.²⁷⁵

The Orient, already a semi-blank canvas and easily emptied of content to make way for European fantasies, is, in addition, filled with the biblical locations that strengthen what is an assertively Jewish-themed utopia. The function of the Orient in *Altneuland* and Herzl's diaries also hinges from time to time on perceived sameness. Reschid Bey's praise for the tolerance of the New Society is somewhat barbed, as he states, "Duldsamkeit habe ich im Abendlande nicht gelernt". While Herzl is clearly drawing sharp contrasts between East and West, he is, here, situating the Jews in the East. Not only are they closer to Muslims than they are to Christians, this attack – a critique of Europe from a utopian or imagined exotic position that is in no way uncommon in either genre – is one made from the outside. It comes from a position which, in *Altneuland* at least, Jews and Muslims share. Again, Jews are coded as simultaneously Eastern and Western: a Semitic people with origins in Palestine when compared to Europe, an outpost of European civilisation when compared to those already living in Palestine. The same process whereby a Jewish self is created through an Othered figure is mirrored by identification with the exotic Orient, where both are imagined in terms of the Old Testament.

275 Ralph Pordzik, *The Quest for Postcolonial Utopia: A Comparative Introduction to the Utopian Novel in the New English Literatures* (New York; Oxford: P. Lang, 2001), p55

A commitment to the utopian drives not just Herzl's fiction but his propositions for a real state, and indeed his entire worldview. Indeed, his propositions in his diaries and *Der Judenstaat* are closer to most utopian fiction, in that they outline a society which contrasts with existing social relations while proposing alternatives to strive for. *Altneuland* is, if anything, an odd inversion of the genre: scientifically as well as politically, it is a utopia intended to be believable. As with the ubiquitous metaphor of the dirigible balloon, there is no clear distinction in Herzl's imagination between the world of real action and the world of ideas which he sees as driving it. The New Society takes very little inspiration from Scripture for its structures and institutions, the skylines and façades are Oriental while the lifestyles are European, and the utopianism of the novel is shown more in the trappings of the genre than in radical proposals. These three aspects of Herzl's writing are all symbolic, even tokenistic. Their purpose is not to propose a new way of living, an ancient, fantastic or eastern one, a Jewish one, or even a different way of living. Rather, these are all themes used to carve out an imaginative space where Jews can be seen as a conventional nation. What this nation looks like is irrelevant, provided it is Jewish.

Symbolic Presence

Though his predicted timeframe was often highly realistic (thirty to fifty years in his speeches and diaries, around twenty in the unapologetically fanciful genre of utopian novels), Herzl never expected to see his project realised in his lifetime. While national movements have never found the foundation of nation-states easy or looked on it as a simple project, and while colonial projects always promise hardship and difficulty along with a new life, Zionism nevertheless seems a cut above both in its persistent consciousness of its own impossibility. Herzl's favoured balloon metaphor is, as well as a fervent expression of optimism for the power of ideas and

human dedication, a concession that his project is to be a difficult one (an equivalent analogy today might be cold fusion or martian colonies). Zionism was not simply a nationalist movement for a people without a state of their own, and the claim to be deprived of their rightful state is found among national independence movements and jingoistic expansionists alike. It was also a nationalist movement for a people, the vast majority of whom did not live in their supposed homeland and were unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future. (Indeed the small number of Jews already settled in Palestine before the arrival of the first settlers rarely formed part of the Zionist vision, even where they were not “derided as an obstacle to Jewish sovereignty”).²⁷⁶

For Pinsker, in the aftermath of pogroms, and for Nordau, deeply concerned about the plight of Eastern European Jews, the need for a physical sanctuary was a matter of genuine urgency. Yet for Herzl the actual inhabitation of Palestine seems almost a secondary concern, and Ahad Ha'am simply did not consider it possible. Furthermore, all Zionists, but particularly political Zionists pursuing statehood, faced a similar difficulty, not just of creating a Jewish presence in a prospective homeland, but legitimising it in national terms. The Zionist movement already had two advantages in this daunting project. Firstly, Jews were already linked inextricably with Palestine in the Christian imagination as well as their own sentiments, but, as Sand describes, this connection had to be reimagined as *national*, rather than religious, and one that implied physical habitation as well as cultural nostalgia. Secondly, there was already a well of Christian support for a Jewish return to Palestine of one sort or another, and for precisely those reasons, though this assertion of a homeland there simultaneously undermined Jewish claims to their existing homelands. However, both statehood and Palestine remained an impossible distance away, and it is therefore unsurprising for Zionists especially to envisage nation-building projects besides colonisation.

276 *Orientalism and the Jews*, p109

There are three main ways in which Zionists attempted to create ties to the soil of Palestine without the need to set foot on it. Firstly, assertion by individual Jews of those qualities demanded by nationalism: the physical fitness attributed to the working classes, but with the developed bourgeois mind which this romanticised archetype lacked, and therefore the supposed transcendence of class divisions that nationalism frequently aspires to. This development is frequently associated with agriculture and transformation of the land, drawing on the centrality of soil to the imagery of nationhood (rather explaining Herzl's excitement on seeing Jewish cowboys). Secondly, collective assertion of shared national identity, both by the simple fact of international organisation in the national cause, and by representation in the form of the Zionist Congresses and Herzl himself. (He was after all, treated by such state dignitaries as the Ottoman Sultan and German Kaiser as a legitimate representative able to negotiate on behalf of the Jewish people). The simple act of demanding a state in Palestine may not be enough to create a state or move physical bodies, but it does strengthen any sense of legitimacy for the idea of such a state. Finally, by consciously writing in the utopian genre, Herzl did not posit an ideology, but rather asserted an ideal – even a piecemeal ideal assembled from other works in the same genre, whose content itself was unremarkable – as a Jewish national ideal, centred around Palestine, to be striven for. And it is precisely this striving that constitutes, in the absence of the significant physical presence that typified other nations in theirs, a Jewish claim on Palestine as a homeland. As with the positive figure of 'the Jew' in 'Mauschel', this ideal has little to no character of its own despite being an image of Jewish nationhood, because it is that Jewish nationhood alone which is the goal.

In reference to modern-day Israel, Gans challenges the idea that “without Jewish exclusivity in the signs and symbols of the state and its national anthem, the state would cease to

be a Jewish state and would no longer realize the Jewish right to self-determination”.²⁷⁷ Yet all three of these methods work in the realm of the symbolic. Zionism, and perhaps all nationalism has existed heavily in the realm of the symbolic since its inception. Exclusive control of, or an equal stake in “the signs and symbols of the state” are not just ends in themselves, but means to legitimacy as members of a nation. They are demands for and performances of national legitimacy, and for Zionism this national legitimacy is often as much the goal and statehood the means as the other way around. Not only is this performance of legitimacy a demand for recognition by non-Jews, it is one that works within existing perceptions of the Jews, of Palestine, and of the ties between them. For the Zionist movement, the relationship of people to a land has effects all but independently of that land, as a matter of symbolic associations formed in the shared imagination of both Zionists and non-Jews, characterised in terms that are explicitly nationalist. It is not just a Jewish nation which is imagined, but its habitation of Palestine. Not just communities, but their territories are imagined. What is surprising about Zionists’ anticipated ties between people and land is not their reliance on imagination, but the effectiveness of this approach.

277 Gans, *A Just Zionism*, p141.

V. *Old and New: Modernity*

Jews, in Zionist visions of statehood, are to be tied to their ancient homeland by the process of modernising it. The religion and ancestral myths which bind them together as a people and connect them to Palestine are to be transformed into the rational, material structure of a nation-state based on physical inhabitation and mass politics. The presence of internal contradiction within Zionist historical narratives is something Herzl not only admitted, but at times displayed quite proudly. *Der Judenstaat*, 'eine moderne Lösung zur Judenfrage', opens "Der Gedanke, den ich in dieser Schrift ausführe, ist ein uralter" (GZWI:19). The title *Altneuland* cheerfully avows it. It is easy to see Herzl and Nordau as opposing poles in Zionism's attitude to modernity: the one was a technophile dreamer and literary utopian, prone to imagery of Zeppelins and steam engines, while the other wrote in cool metaphors of natural processes, after making his name with *Entartung*, two volumes railing against what passes for art in 1893. Herzl was willing to recognise many forms of national existence, yet the modern innovation of the nation-state was clearly his preferred form. Even nationalism in general, as Greenfeld argues, is such a successful and widespread form of organisation that it "forms the constitutive element of modernity",²⁷⁸ yet nationalists fulminated against modernity, presenting nationalist sentiments as a way "to solve the problems of the modern age by creating a force that could eliminate the unpalatably capitalist and materialist present."²⁷⁹ This chapter examines the modernism and anti-modernism which

278 Greenfeld, *Five Roads to Modernity*, p18

279 Mosse, *Germans and Jews*, p3

seem to match contradictions within Zionism and typify the divide between Herzl and Nordau (who, it should be noted, remained friends until Herzl's death and had very few open disagreements). It explores the difficulties of clearly delineating modernity from anti-modernity, and how this contradiction in fact typifies not only Zionist attitudes to modernity, but also attitudes to modernity in general.

What Is Modernity?

This is a particularly complicated question. While 'modern' is frequently understood as a time-frame or stage of development, it is perhaps best understood as Marshall Berman does, as a condition rather than a period, and in that spirit it will be approached here as a 'what', rather than a 'when'. Berman identifies three phases of modernity, and even though this approach divides it by historical period, each seems to be typified by human experience of the process. In the first phase, from the start of the sixteenth century, "people are just beginning to experience modern life, they hardly know what has hit them." The second begins after the French Revolution, and "the public shares the feeling of living in a revolutionary age, an age that generates explosive upheavals in every dimension of personal, social and political life"; however, "the nineteenth-century public can remember what it is like to live, materially and spiritually, in worlds that are not modern at all." In the third, the twentieth century, "we find ourselves [...] in the midst of a modern age that has lost touch with the roots of its own modernity."²⁸⁰ But where to place the divide? If modernity is typified by constant upheaval and change, if it is, as Berman characterises, a constant process of melting into air, there will always be a memory of a previous, different stage of modernity. Be it the mill worker who still remembers peasant life, or the web developer who still remembers old Facebook, one condition of every modernity is the memory of the last one, of old solids now melted. Those writers of modernity Berman describes – Goethe,

280 Marshall Berman, *All that Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (London: Verso, 1983), pp16-17

Marx, Baudelaire and others – may have remembered a world before the railway, but not before the printing press, before the French Revolution but not before the discovery of the New World. ‘Modernity’, particularly individual thinkers’ experiences, is therefore better understood, not as a specific epoch, but as the aftermath and reaction to a particular upheaval or set of upheavals, and that which is perceived and treated as such, however vague and shifting this category of ‘modern’ may be, by those who write about it.

“Serious thinking about modern life”, Berman argues, “has polarized itself into two sterile antitheses”, which he refers to as ‘modernolatry’ and ‘cultural despair’. The one imagines

all the personal and social dissonances of modern life can be resolved by technological and administrative means; the means are all at hand, and the only thing needful is leaders with the will to use them.

While, to the other,

all of modern life seems uniformly hollow, sterile, flat, “one dimensional,” empty of human possibilities: anything that looks or feels like freedom or beauty is only a screen for more profound enslavement and horror.²⁸¹

However, Berman warns that not only do the modern and anti-modern camps not fall into neat political slots of left and right, but “many people have clung to both these poles at different points in their lives, and some have even tried to cling to both at once.”²⁸² While Berman paints this position as an absurd or challenging one to hold, the idea that the people of modern times try to cling to both modernism and anti-modernism at once is not as gymnastic as Berman’s image suggests. Indeed, this uncomfortable pose may well be the usual manner of reacting to and understanding modernity, perhaps wholly unavoidable.

Zygmunt Bauman’s “garden” model of modern statecraft elaborates on the fundamental

281 *Ibid.*, pp169-70

282 *Ibid.*, p170

contradiction which enables observers of modernity to cling to both poles.

Those in charge of pre-modern societies could assume the leisurely and confident attitude of gamekeepers: left to its own resources, society would reproduce itself year by year, generation after generation, with scarcely a noticeable change. Not so its modern successor. Here, nothing could be taken for granted any more. Nothing should grow unless planted, and whatever would have grown on its own must have been the wrong thing, and hence a dangerous thing, jeopardizing or confounding the overall plan. The gamekeeper-like complacency would be a luxury one could ill afford. What was needed instead was the posture, and skills, of a gardener; one armed with a detailed design of the lawn, of the borders and of the furrow dividing the lawn from the border; with a vision of harmonious colours and of the difference between pleasing harmony and revolting cacophony; with determination to treat as weeds every self-invited plant which interferes with his plan and his vision of order and harmony; and with machines and poisons adequate to the task of exterminating the weeds and altogether preserve the divisions as required and defined by the overall design.²⁸³

Parks, gardens, hedgerows, fields, farmland, even tropical hothouses in botanical gardens are prized as spaces to enjoy nature. Yet, particularly in towns, this nature requires a great deal of human effort. Besides weeding, planting, fertilising, pruning, the pests attracted to and supported by human settlements must be deterred. Even on the most pristine of beaches or the wildest of hills, either dogs must be artificially excluded, or cleaned up after by humans, or else a domesticated animal accompanying people will leave behind traces. Bauman portrays modernity as a conscious attempt to order human society according to selected principles, but these principles include conscious decisions *not* to order certain aspects of society, be they Montessori schools or laissez-faire economies. Just as a landscape free from human assembly or management is a difficult thing to find (and usually has more nettles than flowers) a human society free from human social forces is by definition impossible. Bauman's analogy then, is especially useful, in that it demonstrates the goal of modernising society to engineer not just a *perfect* or *healthy*

283 Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, p57

society, but a *natural society*. After all, what healthy society clashes directly with the nature of mankind or the world? Even the idea of a state of nature contains its own contradiction: if 'nature' excludes human activity, what is a 'natural' human society?

While consistent and unequivocal critics or proponents of modernity are difficult to find, people are still quite able to pick and choose the sides of modernity that excite them or make their lives easier, and the sides they are distrustful of or outright damaged by. In this respect, 'modernity', however defined, is like most political ideologies, social phenomena and things in general: we like the parts that are consistent with our needs, desires and values and dislike the parts which are not. I will therefore examine how Zionists both critiqued and embraced modernisation, how the internal contradictions of modernity roughly correspond to contradictions in their attitudes, and how interrelations between modernity and Jewishness manifested themselves in Zionist thought.

Bad Modernity

Nordau's Cultural Despair

Any attempt to characterise Nordau as a critic of modernity is complicated by his own wariness of the concept. We see this in his criticism of the term 'fin-de-siècle', chosen as the opening of *Entartung*, and seemingly equally applicable to any concept associated with 'modernity':

Dieser kindische Anthro- oder Zoomorphismus bedenkt nicht einmal, daß die willkürliche Theilung der ewig gleichmäßig dahinrollenden Zeit nicht bei allen gesitteten Menschen die nämlich ist und daß zu derselben Zeit, da das verkörpert gedachte neunzehnte Jahrhundert der Christenheit angeblich in großer Erschöpfung seinem Tode entgegensieht, das vierzehnte Jahrhundert der mohamedanischen Welt noch in den Kinderschuhen seines ersten Jahrzehnts dahinhüpft und das siebenundfünfzigste

Jahrhundert der Juden mit seinem zweiundfünfzigste Jahre gerade auf der Höhe seiner Entwicklung stattlich einherschreitet.²⁸⁴

Nordau attacks the idea that a society's progression through time can be measured like an individual human being's. Yet his objection seems to be that an epoch cannot be consistently applied across different parts of the civilised world, a criticism that still presupposes linear development within Islamic and Christian civilisations, neatly delineated by religion. Judaism seems almost added as an afterthought, that discourses of Christian civilisation forgot to mention, and it is notable that he uses this gentle prod to the reader, not just as a reminder that Jews exist, but to celebrate the levels of progress and development Jewish culture is striding towards. A *fin de siècle* across cultures is rejected, but the culmination of development in modernity within societies is not. This ill-defined mood he also attributes to aristocratic decadence, writing "Die große Mehrheit der mittleren und unteren Klassen ist natürlich nicht „fin-de-siècle“" (E.I:13).

Nordau's diagnosis of Wagner and his work is perhaps the most useful example. Wagner suffers from what Nordau terms 'graphomania', compulsive writing, which causes most of Wagner's faults as a composer and dramatist. However, Nordau's attack on the *Gesamtkunstwerk* reveals aspects of his aesthetic incompatible with an anti-modernist reading of *Entartung*. Referring to the synaesthesia most famously exhibited in Arthur Rimbaud's *Voyelles* (and which he criticises elsewhere (E.I:247-8)), Nordau writes:

Wir haben gesehen, das die französischen Symbolisten mit ihrem Farbenhören den Menschen bis zur undifferenzirten Sinneswahrnehmung der Bohrmuscheln oder Auster hearbwürdigen wollen, Wagners Verschmelzung der Künste ist ein Seitenstück zu diesem Einfall. (E.I:313)

These unusual and seemingly incongruous shellfish analogies can be clarified by comparing them to Nordau's overall impression of Wagner:

284 Max Nordau, *Entartung*, 2 volumes (Berlin: C. Duncker, 1893), vol. I, pp3-4

Wagners Musik, gerade wo sie am Besten ist, möchte ich mit dem Fluge der fliegenden Fische vergleichen. Ein erstaunlicher und blendender Anblick, und doch etwas Unnatürliches, und doch eine Verirrung aus dem eigentlichen in das uneigentliche Element, und namentlich etwas gänzlich Unfruchtbares, was weder den normalen Fischen noch den normalen Vögeln als Lehre dienen kann.
(E.I:362)

Wagner's compositions are arguably no more or less a product of human artifice than any other music or drama. Flying fish, too, are wild animals no more natural or unnatural than most fish or birds. 'Unnatural' for Nordau has less to do with human activity or the effects of modern civilisation, rather it is a failure to conform to the rigid, rational categories pre-supposed by his analysis, be they Linnaean or generic. Conversely, the mixture of senses in synaesthetic poetry and of art forms in Wagner's music is portrayed as a regression, to the level of molluscs, no less. Similarly to Hess's adaptation of Herder's parasite analogy and largely in contrast to natural science, individual organisms – here, bad artists – are presumed to be able to regress along an evolutionary scale. This occurs in criticisms of other areas of culture. In the field of fashion, Nordau bemoans 'Polyphonie des Gesamttoilette' (E.I:15), and 'Die deutschen Nachäffer der Pariser Moden' behind the ludicrous concept of a fin de siècle (E.I:10). In the second case, in particular, the heterogeneity he objects to is not simply aesthetic but national.

Disloyalty to nation, state or bourgeois order in general is also potentially degenerate: "Nach Lombrosos Forschungen wird man auch kaum bezweifeln dürfen, daß den Schriften und Handlungen vieler Umsturz männer und Anarchisten ebenfalls Entartung zu Grunde liegt" (E.I:41). Elsewhere, degeneration is expressed in terms of faulty gender performance, either overt displays of sexual incontinence – "Priapus ist zum Tugend-Sinnbild geworden" (E.I:26) – or lack of potency:

Es gibt in jedem gesitteten Volk mit entwickelter Kunst und Literatur zahlreiche Geisteseunuchen, die zwar nicht fähig sind, aus eigener Kraft eine lebende Geistesthat hervorzubringen, die aber ganz gut

die Gesten des Schaffens nachzuahmen vermögen. (E.I:58)

However contradictory these two poles may seem from a modern perspective, both show a failure to achieve a particular model of masculine sexuality: healthy and natural bodily urges, controlled by upstanding moral instincts. In Nordau's dystopian prognosis for a degenerate world, men begin to suffer specifically from excessive femininity:

Die Sexual-Psychopathien aller Art sind so allgemein und so mächtig geworden, daß die Sitten und Gesetze sich ihnen haben anpassen müssen. Sie treten schon in den Moden zu Tage. Die Masochisten oder Passivisten, welche die Mehrheit aller Männer bilden, kleiden sich in eine Tracht, die in Farbe und Schnitt an die weibliche erinnert. Die Weiber, welche den Männern dieser Gattung gefallen, tragen Männerkleider, Monocle, Sporenstiefel und Reitpeitsche und zeigen sich auf der Straße nur mit dicken Zigarren im Munde. Die Forderung der Leute mit konträrer Sexual-Empfindung, daß Personen des gleichen Geschlechts einen gesetzlichen Ehebund schließen können ist erfüllt, da sie zahlreich genug gewesen sind, um eine Mehrheit von Abgeordneten ihrer Richtung zu wählen. (E.II:525-6)

However amusingly prescient, utopian or downright fun this world of passive men, cigar-smoking women and contrary homosexuals demanding the right to marry might seem to us modern readers, the supposed ubiquity of gender transgression is alarming and pathological to Nordau. Nordau's overall diagnosis sees degeneration as: "eine krankhafte Abweichung von einem ursprünglichen Typus" which

schließt übertragbare Elemente von solcher Beschaffenheit in sich, daß derjenige, der ihren Keim in sich trägt, immer mehr und mehr unfähig wird, seine Aufgabe in der Menschheit zu erfüllen, und daß der geistige Fortschritt, der schon in seiner Person gehemmt ist, sich auch bei seinen Nachkommen bedroht findet. (E.I:31-2)

The *Art* or *genus* from which 'Entartung' or 'degeneration' deviate frequently exposes itself, not as simply a healthy, original biological norm, but also at the point where national culture, gendered behaviour and political allegiance fit the values and categorisations of the existing social order. The 'Aufgabe in der Menschheit' is to serve this order. Indeed, the Anarchists and

*Umsturz*männer represent, not simply a symptom of modernity, but also of anti-modernity: an attack on modern state forms and modes of production. Rather than attacking modern political movements, Nordau is attacking rival anti-modernists, from a point of view which is anti-modern in sentiment, but attached to a modern liberal order. These revolutionaries, too, tend to attack modernity not from a desire to regress or return, but with a rationalised, modernising programme for the future precisely or vaguely laid out.

Rather than the 'Misoneismus' (fear of the new), which Nordau celebrates as something which "schützt den Menschen gegen Aenderungen, deren Plötzlichkeit oder Umfang ihm gefährlich werden würde"(E.II:530-1), and as serious grounds for hope in the struggle against degeneration, the attitude Nordau frequently assumes in *Entartung* is one of advancement and progress. He consistently phrases aesthetic criticisms in terms of cutting-edge scientific developments which improve our understanding and ability to build a rational society, and those genres and art forms which do not fit his rationalised, systematic categories are frequently regressive, to be cured by a society which combines a healthy suspicion of novelty with the latest developments in science and medicine. While Nordau's approval of modernity is conditional, he does not fight against progress, in fact his are ideas of scientific and social progress, where organised civilisation works in harmony with clear, rational systems of taxonomy. Modernity generates its own anti-modern backlash, from the nostalgic and romantic to the revolutionary and futuristic, which in turn generate their own, equally anti-modern conservative and reactionary backlashes. All of these, however, are unable to phrase themselves except as attacks on the failings of a torrid and soulless modern world, and so are forced to rely on the terms and values of this dynamic and logical modern world.

Pinsker and Ambivalence

By way of contrast to Nordau, it is worth examining Pinsker. Brief, and a direct response to pogroms, it is unsurprising that *Autoemazipation!* is far less theoretical, far less cultural, and far more pragmatic in character than Nordau and especially Herzl's writing. Like Nordau, Pinsker was trained as a doctor, and in constructing his analysis of modern antisemitism, wrote in that capacity. Instead of 'antisemitism', however, he uses 'Judaeophobia', since he considers it a mental illness rather than a political movement: "Die Judophobie ist eine Psychose. Als Psychose ist sie hereditär, und als eine seit zweitausend Jahren vererbte Krankheit ist sie unheilbar" (AE:9). He continues by describing Gentile fear of a long-dead nation as 'eine Abart der Dämonopathie', pitting modern, rational understanding of the human psyche against the superstitions and delusions of old. Like Nordau, Pinsker looks for medical causes of social issues, and these medical causes bring with them the implication of temporal regression, if not to the level of molluscs then to an earlier stage of human society. With the metaphor of foreign bodies described in a previous chapter, we see that this pseudo-medical terminology also extends to the portrayal of the Jews' own situation in diaspora. As with Nordau, internal heterogeneity is a cause of the problem and source of anxiety, and variation within what should be rigid categorisations is explicitly made part of his diagnosis.

Here, however, Pinsker's diagnosis is far less biological than it is social. By stating "Die Nationen haben es nie mit einer jüdischen Nation, sondern immer nur mit Juden zu tun" (AE:7), Pinsker already characterises hostility to the Jews in terms of social relations. In his analysis a Jewish nationality so far lacks the "innewohnenden charakterischen Volkstümlichkeit" which other nations have, and which develops through common habitation of the same soil. For Pinsker, while there is an inherent (innewohnende) aspect of nationhood, this is not a product of nature but of politics. Pinsker also shows considerable scepticism towards the utopian,

universalist thinking that often characterises modernisation projects, in favour of current, temporary solutions to problems as they stand:

Jener Messiasstag, an welchem die „Internationale“ verschwinden und die Nationen in der Menschheit aufgehen werden, liegt noch in unsichtbarer Ferne. Bis dahin müssen die Wünsche und Ideale der Völker sich darauf beschränken, einen erträglichen modus vivendi zu schaffen. (AE:6)

To dismiss this kind of modern project in such ancient, irrational terms as messianism would certainly be unusual for a purely modernist outlook: either Pinsker is dismissing modernity in the terms modernisers often use for outdated modes of thought they wish to displace, or, more likely, he is simply not paying attention to a dichotomy between ancient and modern when he identifies and compares the utopian and the messianic. Rather, both express an impossibly and irrelevantly distant future.

In his solutions to this problem, Pinsker cannot but phrase his analysis in modern terms. In order to be treated as a nation by other nations, the Jewish people must be seen as a nation, and

Es fehlen ihm hiezu die Meisten jener Attribute, welche notwendig zur Erkennung einer Nation dienen. Es fehlt ihm jenes eigene Leben, das ohne gemeinsame Sprache und Sitte, ohne räumliche Zusammengehörigkeit nicht denkbar ist (AE:6-7).

He asks, too, “Nationales Selbstgefühl! Wo dieses hernehmen?” (AE:15-16). While his aim is not modernisation, but treatment as a nation, the neatly defined commonalities of the modern nation-state are a necessary means to this end, and these sentiments must be somehow acquired or instilled. When he writes “Die großen Ideen des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts sind auch an unserem Volke nicht spurlos vorübergegangen” (AE:27), Pinsker certainly seems aware of nationalism as a recent invention of the post-Enlightenment world, and one whose influence was inescapable. His method of statecraft is also just as modern as Herzl’s. Of unspecified Jewish

'Alliancen' he writes "Sie müssen eine *Nationalkongreß* ausschreiben, dessen Zentrum sie selbst bilden sollen." He adds that they must also build a 'Direktorium', a national institute, "das jene uns fehlende Einheit zu vertreten hätte, ohne welche ein Gedeihen unserer Bestrebungen nicht denkbar ist" (AE:29). Antisemitism among other nations is to be combated by bringing the Jewish people to the modern form of the nation-state, "um sie vaterlandsfähig, vaterlandswürdig zu machen" (AE:23), a change in the Jews themselves to be achieved through centralisation in national institutions.

Neither Pinsker and Nordau embrace modernity as a concept: it meets resistance from Nordau and indifference from Pinsker. Yet their reservations about modern phenomena, both aesthetic and political, are expressed in very modern terms. Objections manifest themselves as anxieties over heterogeneity, or failure to adhere to neatly delineated categories. However, while for Nordau these categories are natural and pre-supposed, for Pinsker these categories are simply current political conditions, to be understood, tackled and ultimately adhered to reactively. His anxieties are chiefly a recognition that to transgress these boundaries, or fail to adapt as these boundaries are drawn around you, means danger. Both men, nonetheless, whether they distrust, resist or simply attempt to ignore modernity, cannot avoid anxieties provoked by transgression of these rigid categories, or the need to understand and solve them with modern, rational methods.

Good Modernity

Herzl's Balloon

Herzl's metaphor for statehood bluntly expresses one of the oddest contradictions of modernisation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, his short story on the dirigible balloon was received as an allegory for the Jewish State, and Herzl clearly carried the idea across. Beginning

“Ich weiß nur so viel, daß Joseph Müller von einem Apfel ausging.” he gives an almost identical explanation, expanding it slightly with the conclusion that “Die Bewegung ersetzt also die Stützen, und ein Körper kann sich beliebig lang in der Luft halten, wenn seine Bewegung und Drehung in einem gewissen Verhältnisse zu seinem Gewichte ist.”²⁸⁵ In some places Herzl’s scientific basis for the balloon is shaky at best, in others he is deliberately reticent on the subject (as is the prerogative of science-fiction authors, particularly social science fiction, which this *feuilleton* undoubtedly is). Of course he was a dramatist not a physicist, and writing *feuilletons* not patents. However, like stories of fantastic devices and discoveries, Herzl’s story emphasises, not the possibility of the dirigible balloon, but its implausibility, and the scepticism, ridicule and moral dilemmas which meet its inventor. Indeed, for Herzl, since great things float in the air, it is the *magnitude* of the idea keeps it afloat. The strength of the movement in conjunction with the weight of the idea. The implied contradiction is frustratingly irreconcilable: like the dirigible balloon, a Jewish state is so impossible as to be inevitable. Yet the era that followed the French and Industrial Revolutions was one filled with attempts, frequently successful, to achieve the impossible in both science and politics. A forward-looking thinker might well believe six impossible things to be inevitable before breakfast. And, of course both dirigible balloons and the State of Israel did materialise. A person in this era of upheaval should be realistic and expect the impossible. Herzl wrote about naysayers in an era when naysayers were proven wrong on a regular basis. Technology made for a particularly persuasive metaphor for politics, since it referred to startling and unexpected developments where this ubiquitous modern process – the achievement of the seemingly impossible – is often immediate and tangible.

New Societies

However, Herzl’s modernism was not simple technophilia. The responsibilities with which he

285 Herzl, *Philosophische Erzählungen*, p27

charged the World Zionist Organisation, Derek Penslar observes, “included not only directing the colonization of Palestine but also ensuring that the new Jewish society would incorporate the latest advances in European social policy.”²⁸⁶ Palestine, the Jewish people and their state were to be the guinea pigs, and first beneficiaries, of new, effective methods of organisation and governance, a chance to build a new and better society along new and better lines. Building on his definition of ‘technocracy’: “a society administered by expert technicians and managers”²⁸⁷.

Penslar continues:

Technocracy is often associated with a distancing from ideology, following a purely instrumental as opposed to substantive reality. Similarly, technocrats are seen as quintessentially apolitical. Such concepts distort reality. Technocrats in any society may support as well as serve ideological and political interests; this century has known revolutionary and reactionary technocrats as well as apolitical ones. Dealing solely with the Zionist movement, nationalism, agrarian romanticism, and social utopianism are only some of the ideologies from which Zionist technocrats drew in order to construct their worldviews.²⁸⁸

Expanding on this, the principle that people are to be administered, and that it is experts who are best placed to decide the manner of this administration, rather than people themselves, their collectively chosen representatives, God’s monarch elect or any other system, is itself an extremely political principle. As with any technocrat, Herzl left plenty of room for democracy, tradition and individual freedom, including *Altneuland’s* happy ending, but even a partial tendency towards expert governance transcending politics remains a political one. As with nationalism, which claims a particular form of cultural-geographical identity to be the optimum unit of political administration, to advocate technocracy is an *extremely* political position, one which claims not only to be apolitical itself, but to be a rational and modern way of transcending

286 Derek Jonathan Penslar, *Zionism and Technocracy: The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870-1918* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p42

287 *Ibid.*, p6

288 *Ibid.*, p8

politics in favour of a common interest beyond dispute. Both technocracy and nationalism present themselves, not just as apolitical, but anti- or post-political, while being very much the opposite.

Herzl addresses the idea of a theocratic Jewish state with the unambiguous statement “Werden wir also am Ende eine Theokratie haben? Nein! Der Glaube hält uns zusammen, die Wissenschaft macht uns frei” (GZW.I:95). The system of government must be modern and rational, with the religious component of Jewish identity consigned either to the past or to secular roles promoting social cohesion where it belongs. He continues

Wir haben die Toleranz in Europa gelernt. Ich sage das nicht einmal spöttisch. Den jetzigen Antisemitismus kann man nur an vereinzelt Orten für die alte religiöse Intoleranz halten. Zumeist ist er bei den Kulturvölkern eine Bewegung, mit der sie ein Gespenst ihrer eigenen Vergangenheit abwehren möchten.

Antisemitism, here, is seen in far more complicated terms than religion. Living in the Vienna of Karl Lueger and Georg von Schönerer, Herzl would naturally have perceived the modern character of a new, resurgent antisemitism which was post-Enlightenment and increasingly pseudoscientific. Yet in driving out the spectre of Europe’s past this seems to be a modernising force. Like many problems in industrialised, capitalist Europe, antisemitism is simply an objectionable form of modernity which, as Herzl observes in his review of Dühring’s book, nonetheless retains and transforms medieval superstitions.

Herzl’s army will have ‘sämtliche moderne Kriegsmittel’ (GZW.I:96). Meanwhile, the struggle at home against Zionism’s Jewish opponents is described as an ‘Aufklärungs-Feldzug’ (GZW.I:102), mixing the militaristic with the modernising. Herzl’s ideas of transforming Palestine involve the most up-to-date and efficient farming methods, and he dismisses of the romanticised Hebrew peasant, saying “Den historischen Bauer züchten, hiesse ein modernes Heer mit

Armbrust oder Pfeilbogen bewaffnen" (BT.II:69). The classic nationalist trope of a relationship between people and soil is therefore facilitated through modernisation. It seems uncharacteristic for Herzl, generally pacifistic in his outlook, to use such military imagery, but there is an internal consistency to it. For example, he muses on the subject of duelling in his diaries

Da nur Ehrenmänner im Zweikampf stehen können, wäre der Geschädigte jedenfalls der Staat, der noch lange jeden tüchtigen Mann brauchen wird.

Darum werden diese Duellanten auf lebensgefährliche Missionen ausgeschiedt, die der Staat eben braucht. Einmal kann es Choleraimpfung sein, andermal die Bekämpfung eines Volksfeindes. So bleibt die Lebenswette des Duells erhalten, und wir ziehen daraus herrlichen Nutzen. (BT.II:92)

He identifies one of the chief failings of the military duel: honourable officers getting maimed and killed. He therefore imagines an alternative which, although flawed for resolving disputes, retains the all-important test of honour while, in the case of cholera inoculations at least, serves the common good. For Herzl, modernisation is an undertaking as honourable for Jews as a military campaign and far less violent, and this honour can itself be modernised.

Herzl's modernisation involves the same kind of upheaval as we see in Berman's characterisation:

Aber vor der Einrichtung einer Verfassung und beim Entstehen eines neuen Staates sind diese Grundsätze auch praktisch wichtig. Daß neue Staaten noch immer entstehen können, wissen wir ja, sehen wir ja. Colonien fallen vom Mutterlande ab, Vasallen reißen sich vom Suzerän los, neuerschlossene Territorien werden gleich als freie Staaten gegründet. Der Judenstaat ist allerdings als eine ganz eigentümliche Neubildung auf noch unbestimmtem Territorium gedacht. Aber nicht die Länderstrecken sind der Staat, sondern die durch eine Souveränität zusammengefassten Menschen sind es. (GZWI:85-6)

Yet it is also a natural, almost Darwinian-sounding process, as "Der Staat entsteht durch den Daseinskampf eines Volkes" (GZWI:87). Since, as he continues, "Das Judenvolk ist gegenwärtig

durch die Diaspora verhindert, seine politische Geschäfte selbst zu führen” (GZWI:88), it is the job of Zionism to rectify this hindrance, by ending diaspora through technology and human organisation. In doing so it will enable this natural condition to take root. Indeed, in *Altneuland*, we see a way this process might unfold:

Wenn wir Menschen haben, haben wir alles. Die Menschen aber bringen wir selber hin, erziehen sie, wie wir sie brauchen und benützen sie, wie es uns und ihnen, das heißt der Gemeinschaft, frommt. Es ist das einfachste Raisonement von der Welt. Man macht es im kleinsten Ländchen, bei den unbedeutendsten Völkern. Nur die Juden hatten dieses ABC des Volkstums verlernt. (GZWV:316)

The rational and organised use of human resources, the simplest thing in the world, is both central to the success of this utopia and entirely natural. Meanwhile the Jews, like many who suffer the symptoms of modernity and forget their pre-modern past, have lost touch with this part of their nature.

Herzl’s flagship policies are the seven-hour day, a state monopoly on the stock market, and the joint role of the Jewish Society and Colonial Bank in the creation of this state. Certainly in the case of the bank, he was quite successful in achieving this. All institutions reveal a characteristic ambivalence towards modernity. While the seven-hour day and the *Börsenmonopol* represent new forms of social organisation and attempts to remould a flawed society, both respond to conditions of modernity: the exploitative hours of the new manufacturing industry, and the powerful, impersonal, scandalously wealthy finance industry. Yet, in planning the colonial bank, Herzl is aware of a need to use the same industry in service of his colonial project. While Herzl’s anti-modernity will be detailed later, it is notable at this stage that the modernisation project which frequently characterises his imaginary statecraft is often motivated by dissatisfaction with and scepticism towards modernity.

Even discounting the antisemitism that often came with these movements and sentiments,

the financial market had a particularly strong place in anti-modern and anti-capitalist movements, which “fulminated against all capitalism, but meant to destroy merely finance capitalism.”²⁸⁹ Herzl’s attitude to this part of capitalism is ambivalent. In *Der Judenstaat* the Jewish Company is to be ‘eine jüdische Chartered Company’ and an ‘Aktiengesellschaft’, and he is rather proud of the Jewish ‘Finanzkünstler’ whose expertise will drive these efforts. (GZW:I:48). In *Altneuland* we see a more specific position:

Tatsächlich gehörten wir Juden schon seit langer Zeit zu den findigsten Unternehmern. Nur auf unsere eigene Zukunft hatten wir früher nie wirtschaftliche Hoffnungen gebaut. Warum? Weil die Sicherheiten fehlten. Wenn die Sicherheiten aber geschaffen wurden, mußten wir in diesem Lande mindestens dieselbe Unternehmungskraft betätigen wie in anderen Ländern. (GZWV:317)

Finance capital in *Altneuland* is no longer the honeytrap for Jews it was in *Das neue Ghetto*. Rather, as Kingscourt puts it, “Eine Aktiengesellschaft ist 'n Jefaß, da kann man Jutes und Schlechtes hineintun” (GZWV:321). Good, here, means serving the Jewish national interest rather than that of other nations. Where Herzl claims that the Jews never had the opportunity to use finance in their own interest, antisemites must have scratched their heads in disbelief. Herzl inverts the accusation that Jewish financiers serve the interests of international Jewry instead of their host nation. In diaspora, Jewish fiscal power still fails to serve the interest of the nation as it should, but the nation it should be serving is their own. Empowered with the collateral and institutions of a fully-functioning modern state, Herzl anticipates finance righting itself to serve the common weal as part of a fully developed, uncomplicated national community, as it should, and can realistically be expected to. For Herzl the problem of the finance industry is not that the interests of capital and any putative national interest diverge, but that it can only be made to serve the interests of a nation once the ambiguities of that nation are resolved.

Herzl’s ambivalent stance becomes more precise when he discusses workers’ housing:

289 Mosse, *Germans and Jews*, p5

Die Arbeiterwohnungen (worunter die Wohnungen aller Handarbeiter begriffen sind) sollen in eigener Regie hergestellt werden. Ich denke keineswegs an die traurigen Arbeiterkasernen der europäischen Städte und nicht an die kümmerlichen Hütten, die um Fabriken herum in Reih' und Glied stehen. Unsere Arbeiterhäuser müssen zwar auch einförmig aussehen – weil die Company nur billig bauen kann, wenn sie die Baubestandtheile in grossen Massen herstellt – aber diese einzelnen Häuser mit ihren Gärtchen sollen an jedem Orte zu schönen Gesamtkörpern vereinigt werden. (GZWI:52)

Existing accommodation consists of methodically ordered slums and efficient barracks. Yet Herzl objects, quite reasonably, to the quality of the housing, not the uniformity. Provided it is comfortable, with some greenery in the garden, Herzl is happy to see workers in the homogenised pre-fab metropolis other anti-modernists might eye with scepticism, indeed 'schöne Gesamtkörper' shows admiration for this ordered uniformity. Herzl's borrowings from other countries, in this case, uncharacteristically, from the USA, also display the character of a modernisation project:

Die Farmer in Amerika haben das System, einander gegenseitig bei ihren Hausbauten zu helfen. Dieses kindlich gutmüthige System – plump wie die Blockhäuser, die so entstehen – kann sehr verfeinert werden. (GZWI:52-3)

While this example is a product of childish goodwill rather than modern rationality, it is still a singular system which can be adapted. Herzl modernises by correcting and refining modern construction and informal systems of cooperation, and his is a project of rationalisation and uniform systems.

Herzl introduces what seems to be his favourite innovation by writing "Der Normalarbeitstag ist der Siebensturentag!" (GZWI:54) This statement carries a double meaning: the seven-hour day is the normal working day, in the sense of the amount of work a pre-social human being can be expected to perform outside the abnormal conditions of modernity. However, this also seems to be a declaration of intent: the seven-hour day will be

established as the norm in his society. Herzl explains more precisely:

Dreieinhalb Stunden hindurch kann ein gesunder Mann sehr viel concentrirte Arbeit hergeben. Nach dreieinhalb Stunden Pause – die er seiner Ruhe, seiner Familie, seiner geleiteten Fortbildung widmet – ist er wieder ganz frisch. Solche Arbeitskräfte können Wunder wirken.

Miracles, for Herzl, can be achieved if efficient organisation matches the natural tendencies of the human mind and body. The limitations of nature can be overcome by rational policy which reflects human nature. However the primary beneficiary is not the workers themselves, saved from unreasonably long hours, but the efficiency of this organisation, which will in turn contribute to the prestige of the Jewish state, both on the world stage:

Die Society of Jews und die Jewish Company werden ja darin reiche neue Erfahrungen sammeln – die den übrigen Völkern der Erde auch zu Gute kommen werden – und wenn sich zeigt, dass der Siebenstundentag praktisch möglich ist, so wird ihn unser künftiger Staat als gesetzlichen Normaltag einführen.[...]

and among these workers' fellow Jews, who will flock to the new land:

Den Siebenstundentag aber brauchen wir als Weltsammelruf für unsere Leute, die ja frei herankommen sollen. Es muss wirklich das gelobte Land sein...

For Herzl, these forms of social organisation are experiments, to be national contributions to the entire world's development and modernisation. The importance of risk and tentative experimentation is also central to his vision of state-building effort driven by public companies: "Die Korrelation von Gefahr und Prämie enthält die finanzielle Sittlichkeit" (GZWI:51). Through this supremely modern form of financing, where, for Herzl, the Jews count artists among their numbers, the Jews use their state to perform experiments in modernisation for the benefit and progression of all mankind.

This rationalisation project is to be backed by a large-scale data collection project (which

did in fact materialise in Ruppin's work).

Die Society of Jews wird insbesondere den Umfang der neuen Judenbewegung genau erforscht haben und den Gründern der Company auf eine vollkommen verlässliche Weise mittheilen können, mit welcher Betheiligung diese rechnen darf. Durch die Herstellung der Alles umfassenden modernen Judenstatistik wird die Society für die Company die Arbeiten einer société d'études besorgen, wie man diese in Frankreich zu machen pflegt, bevor man an die Financirung eines sehr grossen Unternehmens herangeht. (GZWI:70)

Finally, characteristic of a free-market Austro-Liberal, for Herzl these financial methods allow everyone involved to vote with their feet or wallets. The Jewish Company's stocks and shares, available both to poor Jews and antisemites keen to see the back of them, raise money independently of large banking syndicates, creating "eine eigenthümliche und neue Form des Plebiszits" (GZWI:71). Supporters of Herzl's nation-building publicly express their opinion through investment. Herzl was consistently adamant that emigration would be entirely voluntary, indeed that this freedom would legitimise Jews who chose to stay behind as loyal citizens. But, ever the ambitious moderniser, Herzl sees this, not just as a reasonable way to preserve individual choice, but a grand democratic experiment.

The social experiments envisioned in *Der Judenstaat* (and they are just that, experiments) can easily be imagined benefiting the Jewish colonists and workers, who now have limited working days, three-and-a-half-hour lunchbreaks and pleasant, green living quarters. And of course, the advantages of reasonable hours and decent housing to workers and tenants are so obvious not to need mentioning. Yet the benefits Herzl anticipates from policies are, as much as anything else, phrased as appeals to an abstract progress, to a series of experiments in modernisation appealing to the world as a whole, and to the collective pride of the Jews who will flock to participate in this great endeavour. Modernity is an opportunity to improve living conditions, but improved living conditions are also an opportunity to display, and enter

modernity.

Altneuland's Cautious Utopia

It is particularly remarkable that the utopian society of *Altneuland* and the more everyday setting of 'Das lenkbare Luftschiff' have roughly the same level of technology. The inventor of the balloon, Joseph Müller, has already invented a motor vehicle and advanced gas lights. Though admittedly *Altneuland's* 'Motorarche' seats more people, and the lights are electric and hung from palm trees, Herzl's high-tech future is surprisingly tame compared to, say, the miraculous device in *Looking Backward* which receives transmissions of music from the other side of the country (anticipating radio by under a decade). In fact, rather as Bellamy's technological wonders are far behind the actual year 2000 of Napster and minidisks, Herzl's utopian 1923 lags slightly behind that of the real world. In terms of social organisation, too, the New Society lacks any especially revolutionary ideas, and most were borrowed from elsewhere. It is perhaps because of this uncharacteristic plausibility that Herzl could afford to subtitle his utopia 'Wenn ihr wollt, ist es kein Märchen'. It is modern technology, far more than modern social organisation, which drives *Altneuland*, distinguishing it in many ways from other works in the genre, although his is exclusively technology known to Herzl's readers already rather than miraculous gadgets of the future. The 'Mosaic mosaic' of the society simply means this technology can be used effectively (GZW.V:395). And as David Littwak tells Löwenberg, "Die wahren Gründer von Altneuland [...] waren die Wasserbautechniker. Drainage der Sümpfe, Berieselung der verdorrten Strecken und dazu das System der Kraftanlagen — darin lag alles" (GZW.V:360).

As mentioned elsewhere, most of the fourth and penultimate book of *Altneuland* is given over to how the society came about, mostly thanks to the world-famous Joe Levy. So famous, in fact, Löwenberg and Kingscourt are laughed at for never having heard of him. Levy is a master of

Weberian bureaucratic efficiency, who not only maximises output while minimising input, but takes it to heroic extremes. “Joe hat die merkwürdigsten Dinge mit den geringsten Mitteln vollbracht.” Yet his talent stems from ‘Einfacher, gesunder Menschenverstand’ (*GZVV:310-11*), spectacular efficiency, derived from a solid grasp of human nature. We hear of Joe’s achievements as part of the Passover *Seder*, not from him himself, but on a state-of-the-art phonograph (unlike the real 1920s, this is not enjoyed on vinyl but on wax rolls). These rolls are sent out to schools across the country, for particular use on Passover: as David says, “Wieder gab es ein Mizrajim und wieder einen glückhaften Auszug” (*GZVV:313*). The New Society has already integrated celebration of great technological developments into its national calendar: the ‘Stockton-Darlington Jubiläum’ (*GZVV:385*) celebrates the first public steam-powered railway, quaintly reminiscent of the cult of Henry Ford in Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World*. It unites the shared calendar characterising both nation and faith, with an annual celebration of technology, and one intimately connected to reshaping the landscape. What we see in Levy’s recording, however, is not only a modernisation, and modern-day repetition, of Judaism’s inaugural tradition, but something recalling one of the most impressive pieces of tech in *Looking Backward*. The utopian and hi-tech aspects of the New Society are now integral to religious practice.

The form of Levy’s campaign is supremely modern. Rather than a romantic national struggle through barricaded streets, it uses the proper channels: “Unsere Gesellschaft war unter dem Titel „Neue Gesellschaft für die Kolonisierung von Palastina“ gegründet worden. Sie hatte mit der türkischen Regierung einen Besiedlungsvertrag geschlossen” (*GZVV:315*). A true technocrat, Levy assembles a team of experts in a centralised London office. Everything is ‘einfach und stramm zentralisiert’, thanks to his systemic overview, which Herzl outlines in almost as much painstaking detail as if he were doing it himself:

Ich ließ mir Stecknadeln mit verschiedenfarbigen Glasköpfen machen. Dunkelblau, lichtblau, gelb,

rot, grün, schwarz, weiß. Diese Nadeln steckte ich in die auf Bretter gespannten großen Landkarten der einzelnen Staaten. Jede Farbe bedeutete den Vorbereitungsstatus einer Ortsgruppe. [...] Dann gab es auch gemischtfarbige Köpfe an meinen Stecknadeln, grün-rot, lichtblau-gelb und so weiter. Das sind geringe Details, die mir aber die Mühe sehr vereinfachten. (*GZVV*:325)

As well as top-down bureaucratic expertise, this relies on systematised, detailed categorisation. The economic model has also been overhauled. Rather than 'Syndikatshyänen' it is led by upstanding and respectable businessmen who turn upstanding and respectable profits. Relations between capital and labour become "gerecht getroffen", and citizens enjoy freedom without overproduction and order without coercion (*GZVV*:319; 342). Indeed, Levy/Herzl's economic system is that most utopian of modern ideals: "responsible capitalism", without any significant structural changes except an increase in virtue. High finance redeems itself in the same manner as the Jewish people: "Es war ursprünglich eine Aktiengesellschaft und ist heute eine Genossenschaft. Die Genossenschaft ist vermögensrechtlich die Erbin der Aktiengesellschaft" (*GZVV*:318). Modernisation involves transition from the stock market to cooperatives, the latter the heir to the former, yet still needs the structure of a public company as the means to achieve this transition.

When a disappointed Löwenberg voices a classic anti-modern complaint, "was nützt all die sinnreiche ökonomische Einrichtung, wenn die Menschen dabei nicht glücklicher werden?", and is told that the 'Musterwirtschaft' he is visiting is in fact a penal colony, he ceases to worry (*GZVV*:361). Granted, in the humorous dig at existing conditions which characterises the utopian genre, Löwenberg observes that prisoners here look happier and healthier than workers back home. What we see, however, is concerns of anti-modernity raised largely in order to be allayed by the revelation of a progressive and effective policy. This brief scene, though more concerned with hydroelectricity than serene landscapes, is a brief foray from the utopian to the

arcadian. The electricity

lief in die Drähte und durcheilte das Land, das altneue Land, und machte es aufblühen, daß es ein Garten und eine Heimat wurde für Menschen, die ehemals arm, schwach, hoffnungslos, heimatlos gewesen. (GZW.V:366)

This garden, though, as in Bauman's analogy, must be created by human effort, and that effort co-ordinated (and coerced) by the New Society's penal system. How, precisely, electricity makes the land bloom, presumably by powering irrigation and fertilisation processes, is unspecified, but this is largely a symbolic function. For Herzl, Arcadia is not unspoilt nature but the human, utopian ability to create natural paradise.

The process is best revealed when Levy addresses the problems of Eastern European Jewish immigrants to the US.

Auf dieses Bevölkerungselement legte ich das größte Gewicht. Es waren Leute, die sich schon einmal mit Energie aus elenden Verhältnissen losgerissen und nachher die gute amerikanische Schule des Lebenskampfes durchgemacht hatten. Newyork war zu Ende des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts die größte Judenstadt der Welt. Freilich konnten sich diese osteuropäischen Flüchtlinge in solchen Massen dort nicht halten. Sie drückten einander entsetzlich wie in einem Pferch und waren aus einer Misere in die andere gekommen. (GZW.V:323-4)

America, once perceived as the prosperous society of the future, has been superseded by the new Jewish state. The tiredness, hunger and poverty of modern Jewish life in America is remedied by an efficient new life in Palestine, simultaneously pastoral and hi-tech. Herzl's modernisation project is one of efficiently organised and technologically advanced development, using the forms and methods of modernity, even those as dubious as finance capital, to remedy the problems and faults of modernity. In doing so, Herzl not only transforms and regenerates the Jewish people, but gives financial institutions a chance to redeem themselves.

While Herzl the excited technophile and modernist may seem miles away from the culturally conservative Nordau, both frequently pit modernity against modernity. Herzl is not, for all his daydreams, particularly interested in his own innovations. The seven-hour day is borrowed from *Freiland*, the technology of *Altneuland* mostly existed already in 1902 and was simply refined or given Jewish themes, the utopian structures are admiringly lifted from other utopian novels and even his *Börsenmonopol* was simply nationalisation of an industry that needed reform. Herzl's Zionism is not characterised by modernising innovations themselves, but simply the application of modern, cutting-edge innovations to the task of nation-building. These modernisations are in turn reactions and solutions to very modern problems, caused in turn by further, less desirable modernisation, sometimes using problematic modern structures as vehicles to remedy themselves. For Herzl as for Nordau, the only imaginable solution to modernity is more, or better, modernity.

Jewish Modernity

Returning to *Entartung*, there is more to Nordau's cultural despair than knee-jerk conservatism. It is clear his scathing passages on Wagner are not just healthy *Misoneismus*. As you might expect, he is quick to condemn the composer's notorious antisemitism, and diagnoses it medically:

Die deutsche Hysterie gibt sich im Antisemitismus kund, dieser gefährlichsten Form des Verfolgungswahnsinns, in welcher der sich für verfolgt Haltende zum wilden, jedes Verbrechens fähigen Verfolger wird („persécuté persécuteur“ der französischer Irrenheilkunde). (E.I:370)

Sufferers of the persecution complex become alarmingly capable of persecution themselves. This reversal is continued in Nordau's descriptions of Wagner's art. Through its narrative and

pseudolinguistic function, the technique of the *Leitmotif* attempts to appeal to memory and reason, not emotion, and is typical of Wagner's supposed graphomania: The *Leitmotiv* regulates and rationalises music into "eine nüchterne Sprache" (E.I:349-50), and Nordau compares Wagner to a student who taught his dog to say "papa", saying Wagner wants to make his music say "Schulze" and "Müller" for the audience (E.I:352). Wagner's operas are a novelty, a bastardisation of music which fails to appeal to strong artistic passions.

Nordau's aim becomes even clearer when this passage is read in conjunction with Wagner's own objections to Jewish 'Lautausdruck':

Nie erregt sich der Jude im gemeinsamen Austausch der Empfindungen mit uns, sondern, uns gegenüber, nur im ganz besonderen egotischen Interesse seiner Eitelkeit oder seines Vortheils, was solcher Erregtheit, bei dem entstellenden Ausdruck seiner Sprechweise überhaupt, dann immer den Charakter des Lächerlichen giebt, und uns Alles, nur nicht Sympathie, für des Redenden Interesse zu erwecken vermag.²⁹⁰

Elsewhere, Nordau attacks Wagner's adaptations of old Germanic mythology in oddly familiar terms:

Während der gesunde Dichter der chlorophyllhaltigen Pflanze gleicht, die in den Erdboden taucht und mit ehrlicher Wurzelarbeit sich die Nährstoffe verschafft, aus denen sie sich und ihre Blüthe und Frucht aufbaut, hat der Entartete die Beschaffenheit der Schmarotzerpflanze, die nur auf einem Wirth fortkommt und sich ausschließlich von dessen fertig ausgearbeiteten Säften nährt. (E.I:341)

Later in the same paragraph, Nordau attacks the 'mysticism' of the 'Wandering Jew' myth, drawn on in both *Der fliegende Holländer* and *Parsifal*, before stating of Wagner

Er ist ein Trödler, der aus zweiter Hand die abgelegten Märchengewänder erstanden hat und sie mit manchmal nicht ungeschickter Flickschneiderei zu neuen Trachten zusammenstellt, in denen man die Lappen der alten Prachtstoffe und die Stücke der damaszirten Rüstungen wunderlich durcheinander

290 Richard Wagner, *Das Judenthum in der Musik* (Leipzig: J.J. Weber, 1869), p16

gewürfelt und an einander geheftet wiedererkennt. (E.I:342)

While 'graphomania' sounds rather more scientific than Wagner's derogatory 'Gelabber', for Nordau to call Wagner a cultural parasite, rag-dealer, verbose dilettante and passionless novelty-peddler with an overblown persecution complex reveals unmistakably the purpose of the chapter, albeit also its odd approach. Indeed, this may be one motive for the entirety of *Entartung*: to turn Wagner's arguments against him. Nordau takes accusations from a prominent antisemite, and argues, calmly and scientifically, that they apply, not to the Jews, but to both Wagner and the antisemitic society which worships him. Similarly, *Entartung* addresses cultural changes for which Jews were scapegoated, and provides alternative explanations for their origins.²⁹¹ Indeed his prescription for this social phenomenon is rather measured:

Das ist die Behandlung der Zeitkrankheit, die ich für wirksam halte: Kennzeichnung der führenden Entarteten und Hysteriker als Kranke, Entlarvung und Brandmarkung der Nachäffer als Gesellschaftsfeinde, Warnung des Publikums vor den Lügen dieser Schmarotzer. (E.II:561)

While identifying the enemies of society and warning the public about the lies of parasites would not look out of place in any Edouard Drumont article, diagnosing these cultural phenomena as a product of illness, rather than Jewish influence, allows Nordau to get Jews off the hook (and, given the immense influence of the book, he may have succeeded to some extent). Even if Nordau's sympathy for the hapless degenerate often seems insincere or tokenistic, his theory nonetheless allows a little more space than antisemitism for the scapegoats to be treated, not with contempt, but with compassion.

Herzl, the Jewish Bourgeoisie and the Stock Market

Herzl, however, takes a different approach. As well as the desire to contribute a new form of

291 "The first impact of modernity on the situation of European Jews was their selection as *the prime target of anti-modernist resistance*. The first modern antisemites were spokesmen for anti-modernity, people like Fourier, Proudhon, Toussenel – united in their implacable hostility to the power of money, capitalism, technology and the industrial system." Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, p46

economy to the community of nations, Herzl's Börsenmonopol demonstrates a very common aspect of anti-modernity: rejection of stock trading and finance capital, and, particularly, Jewish finance capital, at least as it exists in diaspora. He writes in June 1895 "Ich glaube nicht an die Börsenlust unsere Leute. Unsere Leute sind gute Familienväter. Und der besorgte Familienvater geht mit Bangen an die Börse. Aber wohin soll er im bisherigen Leben sonst gehen?" (BT.II:130). Since his father, Jakob Herzl, was a successful businessman, it is possible this comment draws on bitter personal experience, and were this not the case Herzl may draw on that of friends and colleagues. He had already written, in his review of Eugen Dühring's *Die Judenfrage*, that "Die Juden waren bis in die neueste Zeit eine indirekte Steuer, die dem Volke aufgezwungen war, das lässt sich nicht leugnen" (BT.I:613), and it is clear Herzl had already thought that Jews were exploited by the finance system, and not the other way around.

In both *Altneuland* and *Das neue Ghetto* the scathing portraits of diaspora Jewry, particularly Jewish women, not only draw on antisemitic tropes, but also anti-modern ones. The pale coffee-house denizens of *Altneuland's* opening paragraphs, the superficial materialism of Jewish women in both plays, Wasserstein adding up money out loud with his mouth full, (GZW.V:25) and especially the simplistic, dilettantish humour of Grün and Blau, are all perceived failings of modernity frequently attributed to Jews and their influence. However, it is Grün and Blau's ironisation of their own Jewishness, along with Rheinberg and Frau Laschner's indifference to antisemitism, which link Herzl's fiction to Nordau's. Returning to *Doktor Kohn*, the focus of the play is not on the Jews' cultural or intellectual depth: Moser is a highly cultured man, and Kohn a gifted mathematician with far more potential than he is allowed to realise. Rather, it is on self-hatred. Hostility and contempt by Jews for Jews is portrayed in both Herzl and Nordau's work, displaying a failure to fit the neatly rational categories of modern intercommunal politics. By failing to be authentically Jewish, Jews in diaspora fail to be correctly modern.

In addition to the cultural problems of modernity, *Das neue Ghetto* in particular contains a great deal of economic criticism compared to Herzl's Zionist phase. The villain of the play, Rittmeister von Schramm, is not a Jewish financier, but an aristocratic mine-owner exploiting workers in dire working conditions. The Jewish financiers Wasserstein and Rheinberg do not behave immorally or actively oppose the hero, but hold him back, discourage him, and fail to take his side. In a previous chapter we saw that, unlike Rheinberg, and despite his misfortunes on the stock market being played for laughs, Wasserstein invokes a little pathos. Both comedy and pathos are intensified when we see him trapped in his industry, so indebted from his losses that he has no choice but to return to the trading floor. Even in their most absurdly comical moment, where Wasserstein and Rheinberg accidentally trade coal with each other, the pair fall foul of a world where *Gesellschaft*, a formalised and impersonal society, takes the place of *Gemeinschaft*, a community where economic activity involves direct personal relationships.²⁹² In *Das neue Ghetto*, pointlessly shuffling a commodity back and forth nonetheless counts as economic activity. Comparable to Nordau's attacks on Wagner, the Jewish financier and Shylock figure is himself entrapped in debt. The stereotypes are inverted, and aimed squarely at the Jews' enemies, which, in this context, include the stock market. Jews, and the finance industry they represent whether they like it or not, do not cause the troubles of modernity – in fact they are one of its principal victims – but they perpetuate and support it when they fail to act authentically as Jews. Rather than Jews being a cause of 'Bad Modernity', it is a force independent of them which they have not adapted to.

Biblical Modernity

The driving force for Herzl's utopia is the will of the Jews to build it, and simply needs to be rationally harnessed:

292 First coined in Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Civil Society*, eds. José Harris and Margaret Hollis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Die Abenteuerlust, welche die Jungen gerade in diesen sonderbaren Flegeljahren zu befallen pflegt, wurde da nicht nur gebändigt, sondern geradezu bewirtschaftet und zu einem weiteren Vorwärtskommen ausgenützt, gleich den kleinen Explosionen, die das Automobil treiben. (GZVV:358)

As in Herzl's steam metaphor, the success of the Zionist project depends on directing existing forces. Comparably, *Altneuland* shows, not a continuation, revival or fulfilment of Jewish biblical history, but its rational application. Landscapes shaped by cutting-edge technology frequently involve biblical locations, for example one of the New Society's first and proudest achievements:

Es war einer der glücklichsten Momente, in denen einem der Kulturfortschritt fühlbar wird. Denn schon das hielten wir damals für eine kolossale Errungenschaft. Sie war es auch. Wir hatten damals noch nicht die Wasserkraft des Toten-Meer-Kanals. Heute brauchen wir ja nicht mehr die englische Kohle, um den Boden von Palästina zu pflügen. Auch das Lokomobil, das am Feldrande stand, ist für uns eine altertümliche Erscheinung geworden. Wir haben jetzt unsere Drähte, in denen die Kraft vom Jordangefälle, vom Toten-Meer-Kanal oder von den Bächen des Libanon und Hermon weit übers ganze Land den Pflügen zugeleitet wird. Statt der Kohle haben wir das Wasser. (GZVV:333-4)

In this passage we see, simultaneously, cultural progress, impressive modern achievements in the form of hydroelectric power and the Dead Sea Canal (presumably leading to the Mediterranean, as proposed in 1855). Canals are a feat of modern engineering in themselves, and in Herzl's 'Selbstbiographie' he claims to have been fascinated them from the age of ten, inspired by Suez, imagining one cutting through Panama (GZWI:11). Modern canals in a recognisably biblical setting. As well as rationalising a natural landscape intimately connected to ancient Jewish mythology for the benefit of modern Jews, it removes dependence on British coal and achieves energy self-sufficiency.

The ways this utopia characterises itself as Jewish are unusual. Though it fortunately gives the New Society a chance to show off its phonographs, the reason for Joe Levy's absence from the Passover meal is interesting:

Es wurde ihm gemeldet, daß ein Fabrikant in Lyon eine neuartige Maschine hergestellt habe. 'Das muß man sich ansehen,' sagte Joe und fuhr noch am selben Tage nach Europa hinüber. Da die Blätter dort von seiner bevorstehenden Ankunft telegraphisch verständigt wurden, so hat er zur Stunde wahrscheinlich eine Belagerung von Fabriken, Maschinenagenten und Ingenieuren auszuhalten. So ist es immer, wenn Joe nach Europa geht. (GZVV:311)

A national hero missing Passover to see a new machine is shocking enough, but it is also a stark declaration of the society's priorities: the new Jewish identity is held together, not by shared Jewish past but by a shared Jewish future, no traditions but aspirations. However, there is less of a clash between Passover and exciting new technology than it would initially appear: the great organiser and technophile Joe Levy is credited, in the same passage, with his own ultra-modern escape from Mizraim. By investigating new technology, and indeed by using his fame and presence to raise the New Society's presence abroad, Joe is not missing, but continuing the tradition of the Passover: a celebration which now unites the most ancient part of Judaism's past with the most exciting new aspects of its future. Contradicting Ahad Ha'am's accusation that there is "Nirgends eine besondere jüdische Spur"²⁹³ in *Altneuland*, there is a great deal that is Jewish in Herzl's utopia, if we understand that Herzl presents the modernity of *Altneuland* as a Jewish creation. The achievements of the Jews in modernising Palestine, something only Jews could do, and only *as* Jews, make this unprecedented modernisation Jewish. Modernity, in *Altneuland*, is *verjudet*, and as a result achieves a prosperous, harmonious and universally-admired society. In a proper, national context, a modernity shaped by Jewish influence is just lovely.

The modernised Passover is part of a consistent pattern in *Altneuland*, where the biblical past is juxtaposed directly with futuristic technology, half implying, half creating a national narrative which bookends but, crucially, does not include, the modernity which Herzl wrote both

293 Ahad Ha'am, „Altneuland“, *Ost und West*, 4 (1903), 227-244, p234

from and against. This, of course, is most explicit in the title. As well as colonialist connotations of virgin territory, 'Neuland' invokes land reclamation, human activity to create territory. *Altneuland* evokes a historic land combined with both discovery and outright creation. Though this to some extent resembles the fall from greatness common to narratives of national revival, it is seldom made explicit. Rather than restoring past glory, *Altneuland* tends to only mention these ancient figures and places in passing, as settings or themes for displays of technological and social advancement. So, in the arcadian penal colony, we are told about further hydroelectric power:

Großartige Talsperren, namentlich zwischen den Bergen der Ostseite, ermöglichten die volle Ausnützung aller Wasserkräfte des gesegneten Landes. In den traurigen Zeiten der Vernachlässigung war der Regenreichtum fruchtlos versickert. Durch das einfache, in Kulturländern so wohlbekanntes System der Talsperren wurde sozusagen jeder vom Himmel fallende Tropfen für die allgemeine Wohlfahrt verwendet. Und so geschah es, daß wieder Milch und Honig in der alten neuen Heimat der Juden floß, und es war, was es gewesen: das gelobte Land! (GZWI:363)

The landscape is biblical, the ends are described through biblical metaphor, but the means to this end is the technological manipulation of nature. This function of biblical locations, imagery and concepts is shown particularly starkly when, after millennia, the New Society resurrects the jubilee year:

And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubilee unto you; and ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man unto his family.²⁹⁴

David Littwak (in many ways a modernised, democratic King David) explains:

Das Jubeljahr [...] ist keine neue, sondern eine sehr alte Einrichtung unseres Lehrers Moses. Nach siebenmal sieben Jahren, also in jedem fünfzigsten Jahre, fielen die verkauften Grundstücke wieder an den ursprünglichen Besitzer ohne Entschädigung zurück. Wir haben das allerdings ein bißchen anders

294 *Leviticus*, 25:10

gemacht. Bei uns fallen die Grundstücke an die neue Gesellschaft. Schon Moses wollte dadurch der sozialen Gerechtigkeit in der Bodenverteilung dienen. Sie werden einsehen, daß unsere Methode diesem Zwecke nicht schlechter dient. Die Wertvermehrung des Boden kommt nicht einzelnen, sondern der Gesamtheit zustatten. (GZVV:246)

Herzl has found (and updated) a biblical solution to a modern problem: the oppressive and unequal state of property relations. Notably this is the primary problem addressed by *Freiland*, where income from property is abolished and every man owns the fruits of his own labour. However, since the New Society itself cannot be twenty years old, they are not even halfway to trying this biblical solution. *Altneuland's* utopia addresses new, modern problems, using new, modern means, and the old biblical structures and practices do little to shape the New Society except thematically. Unlike most national leaders and poets, Herzl had no need to create a national mythology for his proposed society and could simply rely on the world's most famous national mythology. In *Altneuland*, the past exists to make the future Jewish.

Utopia as Performance of Modernity

In his scathing review of *Altneuland*, Ahad Ha'am is wrong that Herzl "glaubt wirklich an die Möglichkeit, dieses Vorhaben durchzuführen, und dass es genau 20 Jahre dauern müsste. Was ihm früher zweifelhaft gewesen, wurde ihm jetzt zur Gewissheit..."²⁹⁵ The countries in *Der Judenstaat* and *Altneuland* are surprisingly different, and it is these discrepancies that reveal Herzl's purpose. He is no more serious than any other author in the genre (one far more joke than blueprint). It is only the style of Herzl's unseriousness that differs from More's or Bellamy's. The precise structure of the society is not important, hence its timidity. Herzl is not saying that a better society along these lines *should* be built, or even that one along these lines *could* be built, but that a better society along *some* lines could be built, and could be Jewish in character.

295 Ibid., p228

Similarly, Ahad Ha'am attributes motives to the toleration in Herzl's society that are inconsistent with his declared aims and anxieties:

Und da alles, was sich in Palästina vorfindet, nicht ursprünglich dort, sondern in England, Amerika, Frankreich und Deutschland entstanden ist, so ist auch all das nicht ausschliesslicher Besitz des jüdischen Volkes, sondern aller Völker zusammen, das Grundprinzip der Neuen Gesellschaft lautet: „Ohne Unterschied der Nationalität und der Konfession!“ Das ist der belebende Geist der ganzen Erzählung und wird in fast jedem Kapitel mit solcher Ausführlichkeit und Nachdruck betont, dass es den Anschein gewinnt, als lag dem Verfasser hauptsächlich daran, „draussen“ die Ueberzeugung von der vollständigen Harmlosigkeit dieses Zionismus zu erwecken[.]²⁹⁶

Herzl anticipates very few non-Jewish reservations about Zionism; his anxiety and anger are, as in the case of 'Mauschel' and other texts, reserved for Jewish anti-Zionists. To promise non-Jews respect within the New Society is not typical of Herzl. It is more likely that he is reassuring a Jewish readership that the society they build will be different, and morally superior, to what they leave behind, a pleasantly charitable variant of Scott's "paper-thin" false consciousness, where "The expectation that one will eventually be able to exercise the domination is a strong incentive serving to legitimate patterns of domination."²⁹⁷ Herzl – who arguably has a right to be hostile if his people are being persecuted – does what many have done and accepts the nationalist principle, not just in the hope that Jews will be in a position to exercise domination, but in the explicit hope that they will exercise it justly. He demonstrates, not that Zionism is harmless, but that it is so revolutionary as to perform modern liberal statehood correctly, in a far more modern and liberal manner than its predecessors. *Altneuland's* utopian critique on existing conditions is a call for modernity to achieve all that it promises, and a proud assertion that the Jews can make it.

Herzl's utopia is in part then, as Ahad Ha'am charges, a public demonstration for a global audience, Jew and Gentile alike. However it demonstrates, not harmlessness, but modernity and

296 Ibid., p231

297 Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p74

normality. Herzl is writing within the context of ‘invented traditions’ and half- or entirely fictionalised histories, arising within many burgeoning and established, national and non-national cultures. Eric Hobsbawm characterises these as “responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition.”²⁹⁸ While Herzl’s largely decorative biblical imagery is a fictional device rather than a collective tradition, there are obvious parallels: *Altneuland* is very much a response to a novel situation, and very much a reference to old situations. Hobsbawm continues:

It is the contrast between the constant change and innovation of the modern world and the attempt to structure at least some parts of social life within it as unchanging and invariant, that makes the ‘invention of tradition’ so interesting for historians of the past two centuries.

However *Altneuland* is not a response to a state of flux, so much as a response to this response. As was already explored earlier, Herzl saw the German Reich as built from invented traditions, ‘Träumereien, Lieder, Phantasien und schwarzrotgoldene Bänder’, himself inventing several future traditions for his imagined state. Not averse to mimicking the processes by which other nations became nations (as Benedict Anderson notes, nationalism is a concept which can be and frequently is exported elsewhere),²⁹⁹ Herzl uses a central function, visible in most national traditions and mythologies, to include Jewish themes in a society based on modernisation.

If little in *Altneuland* seemed specifically Jewish to Ahad Ha’am, it may be because the particular character of the New Society’s Jewishness is not left out, but left vague. The broadly secular and assimilated Herzl was perhaps reluctant to imagine a structurally, rather than superficially, Jewish society, as well as far more keen on modern technology and social policy. However, where Herzl and Nordau address problems of modernity, rather than proposing modernising solutions, a putative Jewish character to modernity is always key to their arguments,

298 E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p2

299 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p156

at the very least as an assumption of their enemies to be addressed. Where Nordau addresses antisemitic charges by finding explanations other than Jewish influence, Herzl's approach is more complex. Herzl's Jewish characters are frequently the victims of modernity at the same time as its perpetrators, and this duality frequently stems from insufficiently Jewish existence. By transforming Jewishness through the modern structure of the nation-state, Herzl not only cures Jews of the maladies of modernity, but cures modernity through exposure to a healthily national Jewish identity. Just as the cure for Bad Modernity is more Good Modernity, the cure for Bad Modern Jews and Bad Jewish Modernity is the creation of a Good Modernity which is not only thematically Jewish, but gives the advantages of modernity an indelible and celebratory Jewish character.

National Narratives as Rationalised History

While it would be both excessive and reductive to read Zionism as a reaction to modernity, its clear awareness of something 'modern', for good or ill, was a constant contemporary presence (and is to this day). New technologies and industries, new, efficient systems of human organisation and the Linnaean systems of rational categorisation they depended on, all contributed, not only to teleological narratives of progress and development, but to very real changes in people's lives. These, if not always pure improvements, tended to involve material advances and increased complexity, and a sense that a return to the previous state was impossible.

For almost everyone, and like almost everything, this modernity was a mixture of positive and negative and experienced as such. While for some there was more of one than the other, and benefits and downsides were more or less material, there were both good and bad results of

modernity and it was not uncommon, or indeed irrational, for those who perceived these changes to rail against the modern world one minute and enjoy aspects of it the next, or to excitedly envisage solutions which continued modern processes, in the hope of solving problems caused by similar processes. Jews not only found themselves associated with and scapegoated for the bad sides of modernity, but also, such as with the cutting-edge innovation of nation-states, found themselves incompatible with its structures and definitions. This relationship between modernity and Jews was particularly pertinent for Zionists. While much of their passion for a Jewish state and a revival of Jewish culture was genuine and heartfelt, much was pragmatic, not just to address the physical and moral effects of antisemitism, but to address modernity in and of itself. Ultimately, modernity is inescapable. There is no way to rebuild the society that preceded this rationalisation, categorisation and planning and return to the landscape and human interaction as nature intended, unless it involves further planning and rationalisation. Resistance to modernity *can* only come through better modernity, and a crucial part of this better modernity, particularly for nationalists and particularly for Jewish nationalists, is to create a modern system which is rational by merit of fitting and creating 'natural' categories.

From the hydroelectric arcadia of *Altneuland* down to the discerning and scientifically aware consumer of art, forewarned and forearmed against degeneration, the utopian vision is the extreme form of this process. The tension between past and future implied in 'Altneuland' is one created by modern changes: a memory, living or inherited, of a world long since melted into air, the realistic expectation of more changes to come, and the sensible urge to ensure they will be positive. These future changes may even hold opportunities to recoup a lost past. We therefore have tensions between old and new where not just national glory, but secure, authentic, dignified living was lost, and can be won back through human effort. Tension between past and future is arranged into a rational, neatly categorised, linear narrative. History itself is modernised by

nationalism. Herzl's hi-tech biblical-themed utopia is the perfect vehicle for this teleological narrative, but the teleological narrative is also itself a vehicle. Anyone objecting to the losses, dangers and suffering of modernity will inevitably be asked to suggest an alternative. Utopian writers write utopias to criticise existing conditions because going back is not only impossible, but also near-impossible to imagine. Like the double-bind of Good Jew and Bad Jew caused by assimilation and antisemitism, 'modernity' was an inescapable and contradictory condition that Zionists found themselves in.

Afterword: Presumption, Pragmatism, Performance

Herzl acknowledged unequivocally that both state and nation are constructions, products of patriotic movements, not inspirations. His vision of modernising Jewish identity to fit the nation-state involved constructing an identity in exactly the same way. Like Nordau and many others, when he envisaged the development of Judaism into a national identity, he did not consider statehood necessary to begin this process. Zionism had far less to do with inhabitation of a specific territory than with perception as a nation by other nations, and invited this perception by performing the behaviour of a national movement. This performance won substantial Gentile approval, and in fact was frequently pre-empted by Christian Zionists. Understandably so, since a nation belonging in and yearning for a home in Palestine was the Christian understanding of Jews long before Zionism. At the time of its inception, Austro-German political Zionism was less a resurrection of an ancient, dormant nationality than a case of Jews recognising what a world of nation-states and national movements expected of them, and making efforts to fulfil those expectations.

Zionism presents a complex mixture of performance, pragmatism and wholehearted enthusiasm. Although nationalism is hostile to diasporic Jews, and, I would argue, this hostility extends to its very structure, to see Jewish embrace of this ideology as some sort of delusion is reductive. For Hess, national liberation was a means to an end, a step along a narrow historical

path to the liberation of all mankind. Herzl was well aware that national sentiments are a popular fiction. *Autoemanzipation!* merely argued that a Jewish State was necessary in 1882, and for the time being. What far-fetched messianic utopia, if any, might eradicate antisemitism, Pinsker would wonder later. The Zionist embrace of nationalism is frequently tentative, conditional and aimed at self-preservation. It was a response to the way ideologies police their margins, to the punitive treatment and anxieties experienced by those whose existence cannot be reconciled with a framework of understanding and managing the world, to the unacceptability of diasporic identities to the very structure of nationalism. Returning to Scott's terms, this is a very 'thin' identification with nationalism, if that. Attempts to understand how far, and indeed how Zionism identified with nationalism can be condensed into three questions: What conditions created by nationalism did Zionists believe to be inevitable or inescapable? What presumptions of nationalism did they believe wholeheartedly? And what, in their pragmatic efforts to guarantee Jewish safety, did they want to be seen to accept?

The Inevitable and the Inescapable

Although Herzl identified the Jewish question as a national problem – antisemitism stemming from the Jews' lack of a homeland – he seemed unable to explain precisely *why* a diasporic people was a magnet for this hostility. Hess treats rejection of Jews as Germans as the normal way nations separate their countrymen and foreigners. Pinsker, reaching the same conclusion and diagnosing Judeophobia as a disease of the mind, also failed to find a sociopolitical explanation, and was not particularly interested in looking. Zionism, then, often sees antisemitism as a curable disease, but only by transforming its target. For some, such as Nordau, and Herzl on occasion, animosity towards Jews cannot be ended, but it can be *changed*, from paranoid, irrational hatred to honourable disputes between nations. Yet prejudice against diasporic Jews, rejection by their countrymen, and perception of them as economic competitors, seemed

inevitable. Antisemitism, in much of Zionist discourse, is almost a force of nature, not a phenomenon with systemic causes which can be addressed and fought.

Western Zionists often seem to accept antisemitic stereotypes of both assimilated Western and Eastern *shtetl* Jews. The former have tried and inevitably failed to abandon their national community, while the latter, although supposedly true to their national roots, are associated with self-seclusion and rootlessness. The second path is anathema to the image of bourgeois nationalism, the first to its basic principles. While Western Zionists reimagine some, particularly eastern Jewish stereotypes as positive qualities, and to see both groups as ultimately redeemable, they seem consistently aware that the double-bind obstructing assimilation, and the need to take one or the other path in diaspora, is inescapable. Modernity too is irreversible. The stock market, cultural decline, social inequality and of course, antisemitism, are all perceived as either modern injustices or ancient injustices in modern forms, part of an ongoing process whose motion can neither be slowed nor reversed. Since modernity can only be solved with more modernity, nationhood is the solution to nationalism.

Accepted Presumptions

Zionists seldom interrogated either the truth of the stereotypes of diaspora Jews, or the association between nation and modernity. Nationalism is rarely portrayed by Zionists as atavistic or tribalism. Where peoples outside the 'Kulturwelt' are portrayed as nations, the presumption is that this is the normal way people arrange themselves and most either do or should exist that way. Though it may not be a wholly natural structure of identity, it is the *most* natural. Nationalism, in this worldview, does not encourage, legitimate and arm the most primitive of tribal passions, as many internationalist critiques would see it. Rather, it rationalises a society, using natural drives towards association. Like attracts like, and the likeness here is

national identification.

Dieckhoff, similarly to Kornberg, argues that the forerunners of Zionism “did not seek to do away with or replace Emancipation but to bring it to its ultimate conclusion by taking it beyond the individual stage of breaking up to the collective stage of aggregation.”³⁰⁰ Just as Arendt and Buber charge that Zionism is an extension of assimilation, and just as Herzl extends Dohm’s diagnosis of Jewish faults to a collective level, Zionism is the conclusion of the principles of Jewish emancipation. Zionism, it seems, does not break the link between the promise of rights and the demand for sameness, it simply applies them to nations, rather than individuals. The movement itself works wholly within the principle – and, in a world where the highest sovereignty is national government, the fact of life – that the right to claim rights depends on being unambiguously identifiable as part of a homogeneous national community. Though Herzl and Pinsker seem resigned to the idea that, however much a Jew may try to assimilate, he will always be seen as a Jew, Hess and Nordau’s angles are slightly different. For Nordau both Jewish identity and the necessity of a national territory for a dignified existence are a given and not need of examination. For Hess, embarrassed rather than enraged at his rejection as a German, he will always *be* a Jew. While Hess happily imagines individuals choosing a different nation, and so accepts nationhood as flexible, he consistently presumes nations to be internally heterogeneous and the prime movers of progress, and the nation he requires to take part in this destiny is the Jewish one. Though Hess sees national liberation as a means to an end, he does not question how necessary the means is to achieve the end. Whether Zionists accept nationhood uncritically, or simply as the most modern kind of identity, basic precepts of being a nation-state are usually left unexamined.

300 Dieckhoff, *The Invention of a Nation*, pp15.

Performance and Pragmatism

For this reason, there seem to be two sides to Zionist rhetoric. On one hand, they can be pragmatic, pessimistic and calmly factual, as the genuine hazards, horrors and insults of diasporic life that call for a modern, national solution are carefully set out. On the other, biblical analogies and romantic dreams of the Promised Land are usually close at hand, and often with a starkly different tone. Part of this is simple. It is easier to be matter-of-fact about the present than the future. However, the one aspect serves the other. The pragmatic need for a nation-state includes a pragmatic need for a national myth, and for nationalistic sentiments. Zionists dreamt of living in Palestine because these dreams were necessary to be seen as a nation. For Herzl, these dreams tend to be rather tame: the Biblical, Palestinian and Oriental aspects of his future state are largely symbolic. It is the fact of creating a national myth which counts, not the content of the myth itself.

Whether the elaborate ceremonies of Herzl's diaries, or the fact of founding a movement to demand a state in Palestine, Zionists achieved nationhood before statehood, simply by behaving like any other turn-of-the-century nationalists. Though this performance served positive functions among the Jews, it was heavily intended for Gentile consumption. This aim, of course, is understandable, since it was not the Jews' own self-perception but Gentile views of them which caused very material threats to Jewish well-being. The more far-fetched the public demands of Zionism, the better, since the demands themselves, not their realisation, served many Zionist aims. Through a call for a Jewish state in Palestine, their perceived rootlessness was repurposed from a collective flaw into a historic injustice. Rather than dissolving, or centring the diaspora, as statehood was supposed to do, the function of Zionism as a *demand* was to change the diaspora in the eyes of the rest of the world. The Jews were no longer past inhabitants of Biblical Israel, scattered as foreigners in other nations. They were future inhabitants of a restored

Jewish State, scattered *among* foreigners. Herzl saw himself as a dramatist of real people. In 1897 he succeeded in founding an imaginary Jewish State. Since imagination is the fabric of nationhood, this performance for an antisemitic world did achieve many of Herzl's aims. Even the geographical space of Palestine itself, through Jewish yearning and efforts to return to it, has a role in this international act of performance politics.

The Post-Political is the Most Political³⁰¹

Zionism's pragmatic, conditional acceptance of nationalism, a mixture of principles taken for granted, social phenomena that seem unwise to resist and prudent public declarations, a mixture of thick, thin and laid-on-thick false consciousness, do not seem exceptional for a nationalist movement. Many, if not most nationalists argue for the practical uses of nationhood, while nationalism thrives on routine, ritualised declarations of national pride. Similarly, this Jewish embrace of nationalism does not seem exceptional for the validation of oppressive ideologies by their victims. Rather than the singular model of "false consciousness" – either thick or thin – or the alternately nervous and facetious game of lip-service and dissimulation identified by Scott, ideologies are accepted piecemeal, not wholesale. What makes Zionism notable among nationalisms is how far the balance leans towards the performance and pragmatic reluctance to fight the inevitable, as opposed to unquestioning acceptance of its presumptions.

Examining the early Political Zionist approach to the nation-state, the most useful aspect for understanding nationalism as a whole is its ability to transcend politics. The social, political and religious hierarchies within a hypothetical Jewish State anticipate a nation encompassing and uniting all classes. Herzl disdained parliamentary squabbles and career politicians, despite his own political career. He hoped his project would provide a less radical outlet for Jewish revolutionaries. And the virtuous Jew in 'Mauschel' was both loyal and a dissident, conducting

301 The Deterritorial Support Group, *The Post-Political is the Most Political*, Poster (Online, 2011).

himself honourably in either case. These three examples show Herzl's Zionism to be above ideological debate. Hess's historic nations are internally homogeneous. Even where Zionism performs the political principles of nationalism, even where the rise of this political ideology is seen as inevitable, and even where Herzl accepts nations as political constructions, the presumption that nationhood, once established, is *outside* politics is left unchallenged.

The State as envisaged by Weber does not simply claim a monopoly on legitimate violence. It also claims a monopoly on legitimate politics. Debates, beliefs, principles, interest groups and so on are legitimated and adopted as policy. Political practices with aims beyond shaping policy are either personal, apolitical or the politics of the street. In the close relationship between nation and state, both sit outside the scope of political debate. The liberal-democratic models of statehood and nationalism resolve political disputes through state institutions, while a unified national interest is expected to both to transcend ideological disputes, and to be the end these ideologies struggle for. Of course, the ability of states to put policy into action, and its confinement within national borders, make the value of state institutions and the unity of national interest a political reality as well as an ideological position. Nationalism "provides the framework and language for almost all political discussion."³⁰² Nonetheless, this makes the structure of the nation-state *effective* politics, rather than *outside* politics. In the framework of nationalism, just as much as states are constructed for the benefit of a nation, nations are constructed with a view to composing a state. When proposed, this structure is a radical suggestion. When established, it is banal, a simple fact of political life. Nationalists may accept nationhood as socially constructed and as a political goal, but perform it as natural and apolitical. While the state sets itself up as the most effective and only legitimate vector for policy, its counterpart, the nation, is set outside political debate. The nation is presumed to have no

302 Nigel Harris. *National Liberation*. (London: I.B. Taurus, 1990), p269

political content of its own.

Butler observes that “[Hannah Arendt’s] critique of German fascism and nationalism led her to a politics centred not on a Jewish homeland but on the rights of the stateless”,³⁰³ and this raises a rather frightening prospect: For all the far-fetched, pie-in-the-sky impossibility Zionists like Herzl acknowledged for their project, it remained, for them, more plausible than a world where European nations coexisted with stateless people and peoples. It is easy and, especially in 1897, an accurate expectation, to see an increasingly inflexible global system of nation-states as an inevitable fact of the present or future. There are, as the history of the Jews attests, very real social consequences for failing to perform nationhood satisfactorily. It is this combination of seeming inescapability and sharp incentives to play along that cemented the rise of nationalism and guaranteed its present near-ubiquity.

303 *Deconstructing Zionism*, p51

Bibliography

Primary Texts

Ahad Ha'am. (1903). „Altneuland“. *Ost und West*, 4, 227-244.

———. *Selected Essays*. (Cleveland: World Pub. Co, 1962).

Bellamy, Edward. *Looking Backward: 2000-1887*, edited by Cecelia Tichi. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982).

Birnbaum, Nathan. *Ausgewählte Schriften zur jüdischen Frage*. (Czernowitz: Birnbaum & Kohut, 1910).

Buber, Martin. *An der Wende; Reden über das Judentum*. (Cologne: J. Hegner, 1952).

Dohm, Christian Wilhelm von. *Ueber die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden*, 2 volumes. (Berlin; Stettin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1781-2).

Dühring, Eugen. *Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Culturfrage*. (Karlsruhe; Leipzig: H. Reuther, 1881).

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *Gesamtausgabe*, edited by Reinhard Lauth, 10 volumes. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1962)

- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Werke*, edited by Eva Moldenhauer, Karl Markus Michel and Helmut Reinicke, 20 volumes. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996).
- Heine, Heinrich. *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, edited by Manfred Windfuhr, 16 volumes. (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1973-97).
- Herder, Johann Gottfried. *Werke*, edited by Günter Arnold, others, 10 volumes. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985-2000).
- Herzl, Theodor. *Briefe und Tagebücher*, edited by Alex Bein, 7 volumes. (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen, 1996).
- . *Ein echter Wiener: Feuilletons*, edited by André Heller. (Vienna: J&V Edition, 1986).
- . *Gesammelte zionistische Werke*, 5 volumes. (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1934).
- . *Philosophische Erzählungen*. (Berlin: B. Harz Verlag, 1919).
- Hertzka, Theodor. *Freiland: Ein soziales Zukunftsbild*. (Dresden; Leipzig: E. Pierson's Verlag, 1890).
- Hess, Moses. *Ausgewählte Schriften*, edited by Horst Lademacher. (Cologne: Joseph Melzer Verlag, 1962).
- Marx, Karl. *Werke, Schriften, Briefe*, edited by Hans-Joachim Lieber. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1971).
- Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat Baron de. *Œuvres complètes*, edited by Roger Caillois, 2 volumes. (Paris: Gallimard, 1951).
- More, Thomas. 'Utopia'. In *Three Early Modern Utopias: Utopia, New Atlantis, The Isle of Pines*, edited by Susan Bruce (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1-148.

Morris, William. *News from Nowhere, Or, an Epoch of Rest: Being some Chapters from a Utopian Romance*, edited by David Leopold. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Nordau, Max. *Doktor Kohn*. (Berlin: E. Hofmann & Co, 1902).

———. *Entartung*, 2 volumes. (Berlin: C. Duncker, 1893).

———. *Zionistische Schriften*. (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1923).

Pinsker, Leo. *Autoemanzipation!: Mahnruf an seine Stammesgenossen von einem russischen Juden*. (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1936).

Rathenau, Walter. 'Höre, Israel!'. In *Deutschtum und Judentum: Ein Disput unter Juden aus Deutschland*, edited by Christoph Schulte (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1993), 28-39.

Renan, Ernest. *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?: Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882*. (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1882).

Ruppin, Arthur. *Soziologie der Juden*, 2 volumes. (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1930).

Tönnies, Ferdinand. *Community and Civil Society*, edited by José Harris, Margaret Hollis. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Wagner, Richard. *Das Judentum in der Musik*. (Leipzig: J.J. Weber, 1869).

Weber, Max. *Gesammelte politische Schriften*. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1988).

Secondary Texts

Der grosse Brockhaus: Handbuch des Wissens, 20 volumes. (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1928).

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of*

Nationalism. (London: Verso, 2006).

Anderson, M. L. "Down in Turkey, far away": Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany'. *The Journal of Modern History*, 79, no. 1 (2007), 80-111.

Arendt, Hannah. *The Jewish Writings*, edited by Jerome Kohn, Ron H. Feldman. (New York: Schocken, 2007).

———. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).

Avineri, Shlomo. *Moses Hess: Prophet of Communism and Zionism*. (New York: New York University Press, 1985).

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Modernity and the Holocaust*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

Bein, Alex. 'The Jewish Parasite: Notes on the Semantics of the Jewish Problem, with Special Reference to Germany'. *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 9, (1964): 3-40.

———. 'The Origin of the Term and Concept Zionism'. *Herzl Year Book: Essays in Zionist History and Thought* 2, (1959): 1-27.

———. *Theodor Herzl: Biographie, Mit 63 Bildern und einer Ahnentafel*. (Vienna: Fiba-Verlag, 1934).

Bering, Dietz. *Der Name als Stigma: Antisemitismus im deutschen Alltag 1812-1933*. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988).

Berlin, Isaiah. *The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess*. (Cambridge: Published for the Jewish Historical Society of England by W. Heffer, 1959).

———. 'The Origins of Israel'. In *The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History*,

edited by Walter Laqueur (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), 204-221.

Berman, Marshall. *All that Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. (London: Verso, 1983).

Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. (London: Sage, 1995).

Boehlich, Walter. *Der berliner Antisemitismusstreit*. (Frankfurt am Main: Insel-Verlag, 1965).

Boyarin, Daniel. *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

Bunzl, Matti. 'Theodor Herzl's Zionism as Gendered Discourse'. *Austrian Studies* 8 (1997): 74-86.

Burton, Robert. *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. (Project Gutenberg, 2004).

Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble*. (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).

Cheyette, Bryan and Laura Marcus, eds. *Modernity, Culture and 'the Jew'*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

Chickering, Roger. *We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914*. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

Dahbour, Omar and Micheline Ishay, eds. *The Nationalism Reader*. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Books, 1995).

The Deterritorial Support Group, *The Post-Political is the Most Political*, Poster, (Online, 2011).

Dhúill, Catriona Ní. *Sex in Imagined Spaces: Gender and Utopia from More to Bloch*. (London: Legenda, 2010).

- Dieckhoff, Alain. *The Invention of a Nation: Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Israel*. (London: Hurst, 2003).
- Efron, John M. 'The "Kaftanjude" and the "Kaffeehausjude": Two Models of Jewish Insanity: A Discussion of Causes and Cures among German-Jewish Psychiatrists'. *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 37, (1992): 169-188.
- . *Defenders of the Race: Jewish Doctors and Race Science in Fin-de-Siècle Europe*. (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1994).
- Elon, Amos. *Herzl*. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976).
- Frankel, Jonathan. *The Damascus Affair: 'Ritual Murder,' Politics, and the Jews in 1840*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- Friedman, Isaiah. *Germany, Turkey, Zionism, 1897-1918*. (New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction Publishers, 1997).
- . *The Rise of Israel. Herzl's Political Activity, 1897-1904*. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987).
- Gans, Chaim. *A Just Zionism: On the Morality of the Jewish State*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*, edited by John Breuilly. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006).
- Gilman, Sander L. *Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews*. (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

- Goldsmith, Emanuel S. *Architects of Yiddishism at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: A Study in Jewish Cultural History*. (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1976).
- Greenfeld, Leah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 1992).
- Harris, Nigel. *National Liberation*. (London: I.B. Taurus, 1990).
- Haynes, Stephen R. *Jews and the Christian Imagination: Reluctant Witnesses*. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).
- Hobsbawm, E. J. and T. O. Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- Jameson, Fredric. *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*. (London: Verso, 2005).
- Kant, Emmanuel. *Werke*, ed. Weischedel, Wilhelm, 12 volumes. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977).
- Katz, David S. *Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603-1655*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
- Koltun-Fromm, Ken. *Moses Hess and Modern Jewish Identity*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).
- Kornberg, Jacques. *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

Leerssen, Joseph Theodoor. *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History*. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

Loewenberg, Peter. 'Theodor Herzl'. In *Decoding the Past: The Psychohistorical Approach*. (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1985).

McGrath, William J. 'Student Radicalism in Vienna'. *Journal of Contemporary History* 2, no. 3 (1967): 183-201.

Michler, Werner. 'Zukunft und Augenblick: Utopien der Jahrhundertwende'. In *Das glückliche Leben – und die Schwierigkeit, es darzustellen. Glückskonzeptionen in der österreichischen Literatur. Beiträge des 14. österreichisch-polnischen Germanistentreffens Salzburg 2000*, edited by Eduard Beutner, Hans Höller and Ulrike Tanze (Vienna: Zirkular, 2002), 17-33.

Mosse, George. *Germans and Jews*. (London: Orbach & Chambers, 1971).

Muir, Diana. "A Land without a People for a People without a Land". *Middle East Quarterly* 15, no.2 (2008): 55-62

Peck, Clemens. *Im Labor der Utopie: Theodor Herzl und das „Altneuland“-Projekt*. (Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 2012).

Penslar, Derek Jonathan. *Zionism and Technocracy: The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870-1918*. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

Penslar, Derek Jonathan and Ivan Davidson Kalmar, eds. *Orientalism and the Jews*. (Waltham, MA; Hanover: Brandeis University Press; University Press of New England, 2005).

Pordzik, Ralph. *The Quest for Postcolonial Utopia: A Comparative Introduction to the Utopian Novel in the New English Literatures*. (New York; Oxford: P. Lang, 2001).

Reitter, Paul. *The Anti-Journalist: Karl Kraus and Jewish Self-Fashioning in Fin-de-Siècle Europe*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

———. 'The Jewish Self-Hatred Octopus'. *The German Quarterly* 82, no. 3, (2009): 356-372.

Robertson, Ritchie. *The "Jewish Question" in German Literature, 1749-1939: Emancipation and its Discontents*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Röhl, John C. G. 'Herzl and Kaiser Wilhelm II: A German Protectorate in Palestine?'. *Austrian Studies* 8 (1997): 27-38.

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. (London: Penguin, 2003).

Sand, Shlomo. *The Invention of the Land of Israel: From Holy Land to Homeland*. Translated by Forman, Jeremy. (London: Verso, 2013).

Saul, Nicholas. *Gypsies and Orientalism in German Literature and Anthropology of the Long Nineteenth Century*. (London: Legenda, 2007).

Schorske, Carl E. 'Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Trio'. In *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture*. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980).

Scott, James C. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1990).

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. (London: Methuen, 1977).

Shapira, Anita. 'Anti-Semitism and Zionism'. *Modern Judaism* 15, no. 3 (1995): 215-232

———. 'Herzl, Ahad Ha-'Am, and Berdichevsky: Comments on Their Nationalist Concepts'

Jewish History 4, no. 2 (1990): 59-69

Sikka, Sonia. *Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Söder, Hans-Peter. 'Captain Dreyfus in Germany? Max Nordau's *Dr. Kohn* as a "Bourgeois Tragedy"'. *Modern Judaism* 15, no. 1 (1995): 35-47.

Stern-Taeubler, Selma. 'The First Generation of Emancipated Jews'. *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 15, (1970): 3-40.

Taylor, Charles. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Trevor-Roper, Hugh. 'Jewish and Other Nationalisms'. *Commentary* 35, no. 1 (1963): 15-21.

Vattimo, Gianni and Marder, Michael, eds. *Deconstructing Zionism: A Critique of Political Metaphysics*. (New York; London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).

Veit, Philipp F. 'Heine: The Marrano Pose'. *Monatshefte* 66, no. 2 (1974): 145-156.

Vital, David. *Zionism: The Formative Years*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).

Volkov, S. 'Selbstgefälligkeit und Selbsthaß: die deutschen Juden zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts'. *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 37 (1986), 1-13.

Whiteside, Andrew Gladding. *The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

Zudrell, Petra. *Der Kulturkritiker und Schriftsteller Max Nordau: Zwischen Zionismus, Deutschtum und Judentum*. (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003).