Introduction:

Although the concept of "non-traditional" security remains outside the mainstream in Western security studies, it enjoys considerable popularity in China. Both scholars and policy-makers in the PRC quickly embraced the key tenet that defining national security primarily in military terms is potentially misleading, and could, over the long term, serve to increase global insecurity.[1] One recent example of China's warmer reception of non-traditional security is the announcement, following the Third Plenary session of the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2013, that China plans to establish a "National Security Committee" (*Guojia anquan weiyuanhui*) in order to coordinate national security efforts across a full spectrum of both traditional and non-traditional security issues. Although the idea of creating such a body was initially floated at least fifteen years earlier under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, resistance from within the bureaucracy as well as the Chinese military slowed implementation. In the interim, coordination and decision-making have been overseen since September 2000 by the Party Central Committee's National Security Leading Small Group (*Guojia anquan lingdao xiaozu*).[2] However, the appearance of new multifaceted challenges in more recent times has served to highlight the need for a centralized formal advisory body at the upper echelons of the Party-state with manpower and resources sufficient to formulate, coordinate and execute national security policy, particularly with non-traditional security threats currently on the rise. In explaining the Party Congress's resolution to establish the committee, current Party General Secretary Xi Jinping observed, "Our nation is facing pressures both to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and development interests externally, and to uphold its political security and social stability internally, and a rising number of dangers of all sorts that are foreseeable as well as some that are difficult to anticipate".[3] Accordingly, unlike the National Security Council, the Washington, D.C. counterpart after which it is partially modeled, the new Chinese organization is tasked with broadly defined responsibilities over both foreign policy and domestic security, including relations with Tibet and unrest in non-Han majority areas like Xinjiang Province; however, like the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. agency created after the September 2001 attacks, China's new National Security Committee will also coordinate antiterrorism efforts and monitor cybersecurity threats, calling in the Public Security Bureau to participate on the committee when it discusses matters of domestic stability.[4] As Major General Li Shengquan of China's National Defense University explained in *Study Times*, the official journal of the Central Party School, insofar as national integration remains incompletely realized in the People's Republic, the new committee would of necessity draw no distinction between traditional and non-traditional threats in the protection of Chinese political security, territorial sovereignty, and social stability against the three rising dangers of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.[5] Indeed, in his address at the initial meeting of China's National Security Committee, Xi emphasized that the newly formed group would "pay attention not only to external security, but to internal security" and "emphasize not only traditional security, but non-traditional security," and would view "political, territorial, military, economic, cultural, social, technological, information, ecological, natural resource, nuclear and other forms of security equally within the overall system of national security."[6] The resulting decision-making body thus represents an ambitious new organizational hybrid designed

to redress China's persistent problems with inter-agency cooperation in the security sector, including bureaucratic "stove-piping" and jurisdictional conflicts characteristic of policy-making within a "fragmented authoritarian" system,[7] with an expansive remit with respect to national security.

What accounts for the relatively higher resonance of the concept of "non-traditional security" in China? Dali Yang recently observed that the implementation of significant governance reforms in post-Deng China has been driven largely by the response of the leadership to a series of non-military crises that began with the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the rise of new sectarian groups against which the state cracked down in 1999, all against the background rising levels of social unrest that continued through the next decade. Within three years, Chinese leaders scrambled to cope with the outbreak and spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2002-03. In 2004, the so-called "Color Revolutions" that swept Eastern Europe raised alarms for the Hu-Wen regime, and, only four years later, the disastrous Wenchuan earthquake struck, followed by a national scandal over adulterated milk powder that poisoned a staggering 94,000 infants across the country, and the global financial meltdown. Violent demonstrations likewise ignited in Tibet, followed by unrest in Xinjiang the following year, with separatists carrying out knife and bomb attacks and a failed plane hijacking in 2010 and 2011, respectively. Later that year, the so-called Arab Spring ignited a brief flurry of urban protests from would-be Jasmine revolutionaries in the PRC, which met with a swift and overwhelming response from police. Yet, surprising both critics and skeptics, Yang points out that the post-Dengist leadership not only weathered these challenges, but rose above them, by increasing intra-government discipline, heeding constitutional constraints, and largely honoring its international engagements and obligations.[8] "Crisis," Yang concluded, "has been the midwife of reform. Faced with multiple challenges, the country's leaders have been on a perpetual drive since the late 1980s to improve governance and rebuild the fiscal prowess and institutional sinews of the central state." In Yang's view, the post-Deng leadership has succeeded in producing a "more efficient, more service-oriented, more disciplined" bureaucracy in responding to a full range of "non-traditional" challenges to China's security, "often themselves invoking the rhetoric of crisis in the process".[9]

As Yang suggests, periodic crises have thus played a dual role in shaping China's response to non-traditional security issues, both in the sense of spurring policy-learning and institutional reform from within the bureaucracy.[10] Institution building and governance reforms in response to particular crises is much in evidence in the field of non-traditional security studies in China. As one noted scholar at of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies observed,

> China's vulnerability to non-traditional threats may be attributable to its insufficient institutional and physical preparedness. Since the 1990s, China has been frequently hit by non-traditional security threats; in particular those effecting economic security (for instance, the East Asian financial crisis), health security (for example, SARS, bird flu, AIDS), environmental security threat (for instance,

> floods, sand storms, droughts). Terrorism and transnational crime have already damaged China's security, and the degree of damage will only increase. Disease and environmental degradation are not new for China, but they have increased remarkably as a result of globalization and economic liberalization.[11]

However, as others have pointed out, the dynamics of crisis have a particularly utility to political leaders as well, often in terms of providing windows of opportunity for Party leaders to redefine issues, strike at political opponents, and further particularistic agendas.[12] A key driver behind the relatively more enthusiastic adoption of the concept of non-traditional security in China is likely the utility of a broader conception of security in supporting the Party-state's interest in suppressing domestic political rivals, preventing social opposition, and controlling potentially restive segments of the domestic population. As Ayoob points out, "the security predicament" faced by countries undergoing rapid development stems in large part from the pressing need to telescope the state-making process into a single "mammoth state-building enterprise" to meet simultaneous internal and external challenges.[13]

Thus, although the detection and surveillance of internal threats likewise play a role in the development of non-traditional security measures in liberal democracies,[14] security in nations still undergoing development is usually "inextricably intertwined with domestic issues of state making, state breaking, and regime legitimacy".[15] Crisis has proved a key driver of the Chinese state-making process in recent decades, triggering capacity-building not only in response to non-traditional security threats, but also in honing the ability of the state's repressive apparatus in order to identify and defend against potential challengers.[16] Perhaps unsurprisingly, whereas most Chinese scholars and policy-makers either reject outright or downplay elements of the United Nations-defined concept of "human security" as an attempt to impose liberal values on China's domestic governance agenda, they embrace non-traditional security concerns in other realms, frequently linking these to broader "social management" measures pursued domestically.[17] Chinese scholarly and policy discussions of non-traditional security issues emphasize the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, while steering clear of human rights, humanitarian intervention and democracy. Another noteworthy difference is the embrace of "soft power" as a part of "comprehensive national power" in Chinese security discourse. Non-traditional security issues have therefore emerged largely as a vehicle for strengthening state interests and maintaining social stability in China nominally unassociated with the concept of universal human rights.

China and the concept of Non-traditional security

Non-traditional security studies challenge the undergirding propositions of the neorealist orthodoxy in security studies in the Western tradition, including its privileging of a rational, state-centric worldview based upon the primacy of military power in an anarchic environment, and the supposition of international politics as fundamentally ahistorical, recurrent, and non-contextual. Advocates of broadening traditional security studies have argued that the analysis of threats to security should not be confined to statist, military challenges, but should be extended to include economic, societal,

environmental, and human security challenges. Scholars associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute and, later, the Copenhagen School, have been particularly influential in bringing discussions of societal and human security into the field. Buzan, in his landmark book, made the case that the security of society—defined as the cultural and linguistic survival of a social identity group—should be regarded as a logical extension of state security; Buzan's erstwhile coauthor Wæver defines societal security as "the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom" (1993: 23).[18] In addition, Buzan and Wæver have argued the post-Cold War global security order is increasingly defined by regional dynamics, and comprehensive and cooperative security arrangements that do not target any third power, many of which are oriented around non-traditional security concerns such as pollution, food safety, piracy, and natural disaster preparedness and response (2003).[19]

The interest of Chinese scholars and policy-makers in non-traditional security dates back at least as far back as 1994, when Wang Yong of Beijing University's Department of International Relations addressed the importance of expanding Chinese cooperation with other international organizations, particularly on issues pertaining to the environment, illegal drugs, and refugees.[20] Two years later, in 1996, then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen introduced China's so-called "new security concept" (NSC), which incorporated both traditional and non-traditional elements, at the Asian Regional Forum meeting. Qian described the NSC as a comprehensive approach to security emphasizing non-interference, abstention from the use of force, peace through dialogue and cooperation, and economic development as integral aspects of security. The concept was subsequently incorporated into China's 1997 Defense White Paper.[21] A 1998 article on the related concept of "comprehensive security" (*zonghe anquan*) by Wang Yizhou of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences enumerated a series of non-traditional security concerns including economic, information, cultural, and ecological threats that demanded new response measures. Wang concluded that "the concept of comprehensive security demands that we take traditional security interests, which have the military as their center, and place them alongside those of human, collective, global and other forms of non-traditional security and interests, and maintain them in a state of balance".[22] Writing on China's "new security concept" less than a year later, Beijing University's Wang Yong returned to some of the ground covered in his earlier article, but also invoked the case of the 1997 Asian financial crisis to argue that in an era of globalisation, "a non-traditional security problem is capable of causing as much damage as a traditional security issue: it can take [a country's] wealth accumulated over a very long period of time and, through currency devaluation and a stock market crash, destroy it as utterly and completely as a war might" (1999: 45).[23]

The impact of the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001 brought an enhanced level of urgency to the discussions surrounding non-traditional security issues in China. Having signed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000, and The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism in June 2011, in May 2002, China issued a further position

paper on enhanced cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues. The 2002 position paper, while calling for an expansion of transnational cooperation and closer coordination of regional cooperation in combating non-traditional security threats, reasserted the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs; the paper also appealed for what it called a shared "new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination".[24] Two months later, in July 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a position paper further elaborating China's new approach to security, emphasizing "non-traditional security areas such as combating terrorism and transnational crimes, in addition to the traditional security areas like preventing foreign invasion and safeguarding territorial integrity".[25] At the 6th ASEAN-China Summit in Phnom Penh in November, the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues was released, calling for the strengthening of both practical cooperation and joint research on non-traditional security issues among member states, particularly targeting illegal drug and human trafficking, piracy, terrorism, arms-smuggling, money-laundering, and international economic and cyber crime.[26] After the outbreak of the SARS epidemic the following year, China and ASEAN organized a special summit in Bangkok to discuss cooperation on SARS issue, and other public health threats—an issue that had been overlooked during the previous summit—and saw the agreement of member nations to hold scheduled meetings every three years specifically to address collective non-traditional security concerns. In addition, annual ministerial meetings were scheduled to discuss financial, public health and environmental challenges, and a special working group of experts and high-ranking officials was formed in order to advise on matters of nontraditional security policy implementation within the ASEAN bloc.[27] As Aris (has argued, in recent years, ASEAN members are increasingly relying upon the ASEAN Way in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)— a high-level mode of international exchange that takes principles of mutual non-interference and non-intervention as its heart in which decisions are taken by consensus rather than by majority vote—in order to "constitute an informal regional security community." Inter-sessional meetings, which generate proposals for the superordinate inter-governmental level and culminate in agreements at the ARF ministerial meetings, focus on a wide range of non-traditional security measures, like Confidence Building and Preventive Diplomacy, Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Disaster Relief, Maritime Security, ad Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The 2003 China-ASEAN summit produced a Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity that included formal provisions for cooperation in the realm of non-traditional security targeting counter-terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, illegal migration, sea piracy, and international economic crimes, and to enhance competence in criminal technology, forensic sciences, immigration, road transport management, and investigation into cyber crimes.[28]

Northeast Asia has likewise emerged as a site of extensive regional cooperation, particularly on environmental concerns. Since the foundation in 1999 of the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) between China, Japan and South Korea, which institutionalized trilateral cooperation among the three nations to combat pollution, stem environmental degradation, and foster joint action to protect both air quality and the

marine environment regionally. The Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Concerns (NEAC), the Northeast Asia Subregional Program on Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC), and the Asian Development Bank's Global Environment Facility project on the prevention and control of yellow dust and sandstorms have likewise become important fora for the dissemination of ecological research, and the promotion of collaboration on non-traditional security concerns in northeast Asia (Cui 2013, 870-72).

Another key regional organization designed to address non-traditional security issues is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which originated in the 1990s as a framework designed to facilitate the settlement of border issues between China and the Central Asian Republics with Russian involvement. At the initial 1996 and 1997 meetings of its precursor, the Shanghai Five, representatives of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed treaties to demilitarize the border regions and foster cooperation between member states. Subsequent meetings deepened economic integration in the region, and took steps to revive "Silk Road" trade. In 2001, when the organization admitted Uzbekistan as its sixth member, it renamed itself the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Mongolia was granted observer status in 2004, and Iran, Pakistan, and India likewise became observers the following year. While the current focus of the SCO covers both traditional and non-traditional security cooperation, ongoing efforts to combat the "three evils" of terrorism, extremism and separatism in the region have emerged as the centerpiece of contemporary collaboration, with the SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) taking the lead in facilitating the collection of information and, theoretically, the coordination of joint action.[29]

However, since the mid-1990s, China's deepening engagement with non-traditional security issues on an international level has been paired with strenuous internal measures aiming to safeguard domestic stability. The CCP's powerful Central Political-Legal Committee, reestablished in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, resumed and progressively tightened central control over the Ministries of Public Security and the State Security, the Procuratorate and the courts, the people's militia and the People's Armed Police over the course of the 1990s. By the middle of the decade, domestic capacities of detection, surveillance and repression targeting particular ethnic or socioeconomic groups that are viewed as problematic for the maintenance of social stability, and particularly those seen as potential challengers to the continued rule of the Party-state. Central spending on internal security is substantial and continues to escalate: Ministry of Finance figures reveal that in 2010 spending on public security outpaced the official national defense budget for the first time, a trend that has continued for three years.[30] Chief among the externalities of economic reform is the mounting "security predicament" for the Party-state, which in scaling back somewhat on centralized economic control to boost production and innovation has undermined some of its traditional levers of social control. New sources of instability have emerged from within society and relative inequality levels have soared, fueling social conflict. So-called "mass incidents" of social protest have notably risen from 8,700 in 1994 to 90,000 in 2006,[31] prompting a recent admission by the chairman of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo that "it is possible that the state could sink into the abyss of internal disorder".[32]

As Tanner has noted, the official response to rising social unrest and crime has been "campaign-style policing": "concentrated, fixed-term, special targeting of particular categories of crime for arrest and severe punishment" featuring sporadic but intense mobilizations of vast police and public security personnel to carry out "stern blows" against particular targets. Despite widespread criticism of this approach, "campaign-style policing" survives in large part as an organizational response to relatively low police/citizen ratios, forcing Chinese police to rely heavily on the active participation of grassroots volunteers, Party activists and ordinary citizens to maintain social order.[33] In addition, local authorities frequently blend national "strike hard" targets with their own local security agendas.[34] In practice, in part due to the persistence of "campaign-style policing" over the course of the reform era, new institutional building to address non-traditional security issues on a transnational level has been combined with domestic "strike hard" campaigns designed to weaken social opposition, repress potential political rivals, or increase control over potentially restive groups.

China's "security predicament"

China's increasing attention to non-traditional security issues has therefore coincided with a heightened sense among central elites of looming crises, both at home and abroad; official responses have frequently combined international institution-building with domestic "strike-hard" measures against internal targets. For example, early discussion of non-traditional security in China took place against the backdrop of the still unfolding Asian Financial crisis. The 15th Party Congress decision in September 1997 to deepen state-owned enterprise reform, furloughing of some six million workers in 1997, more than seven million in 1998, and almost eight million by 1999.[35] By 1998, the real unemployment rate had skyrocketed to between 7.9 and 8.5%, the highest in the history of the People's Republic.[36] In addition, economic growth stalled: whereas exports in 1997 had increased 17.3% over the previous year, 1998 saw a mere 0.5 per cent increase, due to market contraction in Japan and South Korea. At the same time, Chinese exports lost their competitive advantage due to currency devaluation in Southeast Asia, fueling further economic malaise. Sporadic and uncoordinated instances of social unrest increased in 1998 and 1999, largely in response to proposed plant closures or enterprises merges, unpaid welfare payments due to laid-off workers, unpaid pension benefits from shuttered or loss-making enterprises, and against widespread popular suspicion that official corruption was at least partially to blame.[37] April 1999 saw by far the largest public demonstration in the capital since the suppression of the student protests in Tiananmen Square a decade before, when more than ten thousand followers of a spiritual group known as Falun Dafa staged a nonviolent sit-in before the gates of Zhongnanhai, the central leadership compound in downtown Beijing, which the participants had planned in part on the internet. Although the group's popularity and discipline had taken both the central leadership and the police by surprise, the rise of new spiritual and charitable groups as well as alternative health care practices in fact represented a natural response to mounting economic pressures and the disappearance of a social welfare net in China's major cities. The earlier dismantling of the commune system and privatization of state-owned enterprises had seriously compromised the access of many reform-era citizens to reliable health care and other services; and newly relaxed restrictions on rural-

urban migration had given rise to a new underclass with an urgent need for social services.[38]

In his 1999 work addressing non-traditional security threats in the People's Republic, Fu called attention to the interrelated nature of the danger posed by the Asian Financial crisis to China's economic security, and the "ethnic and religious conflicts" liable to arise in periods of social unrest. One consequence of globalization, Fu warned, was the escalating influence of non-state actors, with which the existing security system was ill-equipped to deal.[39] As Yang noted, to safeguard economic security in the wake of the Asian Financial crisis, the central government undertook a wave of institution-building, moving quickly to secure its regulatory control over stock markets and securities, promulgating a new and unified legal framework for the domestic securities market, reformed the IPO process and strengthened supervision under share underwriting, corporate governance and disclosure and to delimit the scope for insider trading and other wrong-doing. Under the guise of ensuring market order and national economic security, central authorities undertook ambitious and sweeping regulatory reforms, reorganizing the State Administrations of Quality and Technical Supervision, Environmental Protection and Drug Administration. Armed with new administrative muscle, stiffer punishments for infractions, and bold legislative mandates, China's new regulatory agencies began a widely-publicised nationwide quality inspection drive that ultimately folded into a unified national campaign-style effort in 2001 to "rectify market economic order" that mobilized local and municipal police to engage in broad sweeps targeting counterfeit and substandard goods, fake and pirated products, and unsafe places of business. However, also targeted in the large-scale raids were popular points of access for low-income consumers, including street stalls, market fairs, and internet cafes. In 2001, authorities closed half a million workshops for producing fake products, confiscated 158 million illegal publications, and 4.2 million copies of pirated software. Over the next few months, during the first half of 2002, central authorities likewise closed a total of 36,424 street stalls for selling fake or substandard products; and, in the summer of 2002, Beijing municipal authorities suspended the operation of all internet cafes.[40]

Central authorities likewise moved to increase control over domestic social order in the wake of increasing mobilization at the social grassroots, particularly targeting social and civic groups with possible international links. The provisional regulations adopted in the aftermath of the Tiananmen student demonstrations that required all social organizations to locate official sponsors were strengthened. Nearly a decade later, the 1998 "Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations" specifically required official sponsors to first determine that the social organization seeking affiliation corresponded to an actual social need of some sort, and to ascertain that the organization in question is not in some way redundant, overlapping in function with a pre-existing group. Sponsoring government departments or official arms of the Party-state were furthermore deemed responsible for ensuring the legal compliance of subordinate social organization, and were held legally responsible for any infractions of law. One popular strategy for circumventing the new regulations had social organizations registering as businesses under relevant commercial or industrial bureaus. In addition, in

1999 the Ministry of Public Security promulgated a series of "Regulations on public order in mass cultural and sport activities" stipulating that groups sponsoring cultural or sports activities involving more than 200 people file a written application with the local public security office.[41] Falun Dafa, the spiritual group that had organized the April 1999 demonstration near Tiananmen, was officially branded a "heretical and superstition cult" and banned in July; the organization's assets were confiscated, its offices and practice sites—including 39 branches nationwide, 1,900 subunits, and some 23,000 places where it purportedly held gatherings—were sealed and placed under heavy police surveillance. a measure that was likewise repeated with similar groups that had likewise fallen under suspicion, often because of alleged links to "hostile forces both inside and outside the country" intent on endangering national security by conspiring with "pro-democratic" and "anti-China" forces overseas.[42] The resources of the powerful Political-Legal Committee, which oversees the work of the Ministries of Public Security and of State Security, the Procuratorate, the courts, the people's militia and the People's Armed Police, were substantially beefed up in 1999 in order to cope with the campaign against "evil heretical sects" like Falun Dafa. In 2002, the leader of that *xitong* (Zhou Yongkang, now under attack) was for the first time given a chair on the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition, a new organization was established at the center-- the Leading Small Group for Stability Maintenance Work (*Zhongyang weiwen gongzuo lingdao xiaozu*)-- was established, with subordinate offices to oversee "stability maintenance" (*weiwen*) at every level of the Party-state, all the way down to the level of the township.[43]

The crisis triggered by the SARS outbreak of 2002-03, characterized by Fidler as a "political pathology of the first post-Westphalian pathogen" by virtue of the challenge it posed to a global health policy environment still defined by state-centric institutions, [44] unfolded against the backdrop of a power succession within the Party. Outgoing General Secretary Jiang Zemin's efforts to "strengthen the ruling capacity" of the Party had long been laced with dire warnings and repeated exhortations that cadres remain vigilant against impending threats to both internal and external security. Yet, whereas most epidemiologists agree that the earliest case of SARS probably occurred in mid-November 2002 in Foshan, a city in Guangdong Province, Chinese officials attempted to suppress information regarding the scale of the epidemic. Although the World Health Organization's Global Network had been alerted to the outbreak in the PRC via unofficial sources by the end of November 2002, it's first official approach to the Chinese government apparently occurred on February 10, 2003, when two unrelated sources reported that the disease was raging through southern China.[45] The following day, Guangdong health officials finally admitted during a brief press conference that a total of 305 cases had been reported in the province, five of which had proved fatal. Following a series of similarly terse announcements that aimed to reassure the public and quell panic, official silence resumed on 23 February on the orders of the Guangdong Party secretary, and continued through the meeting of National People's Congress in March that oversaw the official transfer of political power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. During the NPC meeting, the WHO issued its first global warning about SARS. After dispatching a team of experts to China on 22 March, the WHO issued the first travel advisory in its history. By mid-April, newly installed Premier Wen Jiabao was warning officials that the situation was "extremely grave," and the new Hu-Wen team hastily established a new

task force involving top military and civilian officials to oversee the struggle against SARS.[46]

Invoking a biopolitical discourse of national security, the new Hu–Wen administration put in place a series of emergency measures that centralized political power while disproportionately targeting already disadvantaged groups in society for enhanced surveillance and control, in hopes of minimizing resistance from potentially unruly social forces. Calling for a "people's war" against SARS, the propaganda machine ramped up to extol the nation's efforts against SARS, and to laud Chinese health personnel as new "SARS heroes" and "angels in white," the less fortunate substrata of the citizenry were targeted for special handling. Fearing that migrant laborers in China's major cities might return home and spread SARS into the hinterland, China's vast "floating population" was put under travel restrictions. Known Falun Dafa practitioners were likewise arrested and accused of spreading rumors that the epidemic was a form of divine retribution against the Communist Party. Itinerant peddlers and street vendors were subject to close monitoring and heavy-handed repression because of their mobility and the potentially substandard quality of the goods they might hawk as prophylactics or cures. Large numbers of poor peasant farmers in Beijing to petition the central government for redress on any number of issues were also rounded up by police and either threatened with arrest or quarantined.[47]

By the end of 2004, the so-called "color revolutions" sweeping Eastern Europe triggered a new sense of urgency as Chinese leaders scrambled to assess the potential threat to regime security. Hu Jintao directed Party-state connected research institutes and think tanks to examine thoroughly the process of political change in formerly socialist countries. As a result, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and several of its provincial equivalents dispatched a series of fact-finding missions and organized at least seven national, cross-departmental conferences and symposia between 2004-2006 addressing the causes and processes behind the color revolutions. The consensus that emerged as a result of these crisis-driven investigations portrayed an ominous scenario of collaboration between liberalizing media, increasingly activist civil society forces and Western agencies for political change. The domestic policy result was, as Chen characterized it, "low-intensity coercion:" intensified campaigns for ideology reinforcement, and enhanced restrictions over liberal media, political activism, public interest advocacy, and Sino-Western civil cooperation. State outlays internal security grew 36% during the 2007 fiscal year: government spending on the police, prosecutor's offices, and the judiciary rose nearly 60%, while spending on the people's armed police grew nearly 51%. A series of new directives attempting to reign in independent journalism and police loyalty among media professionals were quickly implemented in 2005 and 2006; and in March 2005, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which oversees social and civic organizations, issued new directives mandating annual inspections of legally registered NGOs operating in China that paid particular attention to the documentation of sources of NGO funding, and the connections of Chinese NGOs to Western foundations. Control over the internet was likewise tightened: in April 2006, administrators of fourteen major portals in Chinese cyberspace were called upon to cooperate voluntarily with government officials to filter out social and political content deemed inappropriate

for China's internet users.[48] These controls were tightened again in 2011 during the so-called Arab Spring when a group of Chinese activists attempted to use social media and the internet to spark off a homegrown "Jasmine Revolution" in China's major cities: searches for the words "Egypt" and "jasmine" on the micro-blog functions of major Chinese web portals such as Sina.com and Sohu.com, and on Sina Weibo, the Chinese version of Twitter, were quickly blocked, and many mainland Chinese users who rely on virtual private network connections (VPNs) reported that they were unable to access the internet as they had in the past.[49] Cybersecurity has continued to loom large in both scholarly and policy discussions China's non-traditional security agenda, with surveillance and censorship efforts continuing to keep pace with new developments in social media, including the explosion of Chinese social media like microblogging sites (i.e., Sina Weibo) and mobile chat applications (i.e., *Weixin*, or WeChat). For example, recent speculation has traced a March 2014 crackdown on some of the most popular liberal-leaning WeChat public accounts to the workings of another Party Central Committee leading small group also chaired by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, which met for the first time only two weeks before.[50]

In March 2008, a series of peaceful demonstrations took place in Lhasa to mark the anniversary of the Tibetan uprisings against Communist Party rule in 1959. Within about a week's time, the demonstrations turned violent, involving attacks on Han and Hui immigrants, and the looting and destruction of property. The rapid escalation of widespread ethnic violence overlapping with the meeting of the National People's Congress and in the run-up to the Olympics in Beijing signaled a new political crisis for Beijing. The People's Armed Police (PAP) were called in by the local government, and the area was placed under martial law. Just over a year later, in July 2009, violent protests rocked Urumqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in China. These two waves of ethnic uprisings, taking place in borderland regions that are considered core national security interests, were quickly defined by central leaders as threats to China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity, interests secondary only to that of preserving the CCP leadership. A November 2009 *People's Daily* editorial announced that China's sovereignty claims over Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet were within the scope of China's core interests, a message that was repeated in spirit by then-vice President Xi Jinping during a February 2012 visit to Washington, DC, when he stressed the need for the US to demonstrate respect for China's core interests, including Tibet. The 2008 and 2009 waves of ethnic unrest sparked the adoption of "Regulations on Emergency Command in Handling Emergencies by the Armed Forces" in November 2010, which permitted a wider margin for using force without the permission of central authorities, including automatic approval to local governments for the unrestricted use of force in the event of local riots. The *Regulations* placed the collection and dissemination of intelligence the centre of decision making in such cases, and a premium was likewise placed on the cooperation of neighboring states attempts to address insurgency. Over the longer term, since the twin crises of unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet, Chinese leaders have advocated a combination of traditional hard power use of force and non-traditional socio-economic development in order to safeguard stability in the border regions. In 2011, Xinjiang hosted a joint anti-terrorist SCO exercise organized by Chinese intelligence in the Tianshan Mountains, a traditional safe haven for Uighur insurgents, with India,

Pakistan and Mongolia serving as observer states for the drills. In 2013, the first ever PAP joint exercise with foreign counterparts took place in China when the Snow Leopard Commandoes, an elite anti-terrorism force organized under the PAP, took part with Russia in Beijing.[51]

Although some observers have emphasized the importance of external developments in generating outbursts of ethnic violence in recent years, it is also clear that Chinese policy has also played a key role in this regard. For example, although the establishment of political, economic, and cultural linkages with Central Asia have been described as vital to the Party-state's strategy of development and integration for Xinjiang, they are simultaneously viewed as a potential source of threat to state security due to the history of trans-border ethno-religious movements. Although China's struggle against those it has labeled "splittists" and "separatists" in border regions pre-dates the events of 9/11, Chinese leaders quickly fastened on to the securitizing potential of the global "war on terror" in order to justify its ongoing repression of Uighur opposition, making avid use of post-9/11 amendments to it's Criminal Law to intensify its crackdown on Uighur dissent and opposition. The widespread human rights violations that took place in Xinjiang throughout the 1990s during the series of 'Strike Hard' campaigns have escalated: Uighur émigré organizations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have voiced their concerns regarding the 'thousands' of Uighurs who were arrested or detained under the new amendments between 2001 and 2005, and Xinjiang's *People's Daily* confirmed in early 2006 that authorities had arrested 18,227 people in Xinjiang for "endangering national security" over the previous twelve months alone.[52] According to some observers, the rapid "securitization" of ethnic tensions and the frequent deployment of crisis governance in handling ethnic unrest in China's border regions into a new "insecurity dilemma," defined as a "self-defeating strategic interaction [in which] insecure states…embark on state-building to mitigate their insecurities" in which the search for national security paradoxically ends in rising insecurity for all parties.[53]

Conclusion

The broad fusion of traditional and non-traditional security concerns in Chinese foreign policy-making practice, as evidenced by the scope of issues to be addressed by its newly created National Security Committee as well as its championing of its "new security concept," is closely linked to its still unfolding state-building process. According to a top Party journal, with the current General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping at its head, the committee will specifically target five types of "unconventional security threats," including extremists, online agitators and the ideological challenges to the Chinese culture posed by Western nations. However, it is unclear whether its ambitious remit, designed to address the "highly intertwined and complicated" nature of contemporary security threats across the broadest possible range of potential challenges to social stability, national unity, and state sovereignty, should be read as a sign of China's increasing strength or weakness in the wake of its continuing rise on the global stage.[54] Some analysts have warned that rising importance of non-traditional security challenges in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US may give rise to a "boomerang effect" in which foreign policy decision-makers, in China

as elsewhere, must engage in a precision balancing act weighing both traditional and non-traditional security issues; yet also remain mindful that an excessive focus on one form of security at the expense of the other might potentially provoke new threats or give rise to new vulnerabilities as a result of the poor balancing of ends and means in a radically changed security environment across the globe.[55]

However, on the other hand, China's increasingly powerful contemporary "security state" apparatus has deep historical roots that can be traced back at least as far back as the early communist movement.[56] Although there is ample evidence of both the institutionalization and professionalisation of the state security apparatus over the course of the reform era, unlike in democratic regimes in which the depoliticisation of security and intelligence functions is ensured through relatively open and transparent legal and institutional means, the contemporary Chinese state continues to shape its security apparatus around an expansive pallet that includes both foreign and domestic, traditional and non-traditional security issue areas that ultimately secure the consolidation of the Party's power and ensure its continued survival. What we may in fact be seeing in the post-Mao security state is "not simply the replacement of an outmoded revolutionary style of politics with a modern technocratic mode, but rather a complex amalgam of the two."[57] The contemporary leadership's increasing attention to the realm of non-traditional security concerns likewise bears the hallmarks of the long arc of its state-making process over time and as its traditional strategic culture, both of which exert some influence on the ways in which security threats are defined today.[58] Yet, as in the past, China's contemporary involvement with the non-traditional security has tended to serve, first and foremost, its internal security agenda; yet the continuing fear of dissent from within constrains its cooperation with non-state actors, as well as its neighbors, perhaps most clearly seen in its responses to recent upsurges in ethnic unrest. Farther afield, whereas non-traditional security discussions at the international level often focus on climate change, water, food, and energy security—arguably where China's influence on the world stage has its greatest impact-- China's decidedly state-centric approach may ultimately undercut the legitimacy of its cooperative and diplomatic efforts, as well as its image as a responsible stakeholder in global politics in the years to come.

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