

Conceptual history, contingency and the politics of time

ABSTRACT *Over the past two decades or so there has been a fruitful collaboration between conceptual historians and theorists of political ideologies concerning ways of better understanding the contingency of conceptual meaning and the relationship between language and historical experience. Often neglected by both fields, however, is the relationship between language and the contingency of a specifically temporal experience about which Reinhart Koselleck, conceptual history's most well known advocate, wrote a great deal. In revisiting his writings on contingency, experience and time, this article argues that ideology theorists can benefit from his remarks on these topics in an effort to establish the contingency of temporal experience and the broader contestation of time as a core feature of political thinking. Following its discussion on the relevance of Koselleck's empirical and theoretical observations, this article then draws attention to three common areas of contingent-temporal contestation—on the framing of time, the movement of time and the meaning of historical moments—upon which ideologies frequently attempt to influence political action.*

Introduction

Among the varied interests in political theory, a core feature of the concept of politics, what it means to 'act politically', is one that contemporary theorists spend surprisingly little time thinking and writing about. Conceptualising politics, nowadays an undersubscribed activity in itself, usually concerns its space and scope—politics and the political as a particular domain for social interaction or mode of human experience—as opposed to a temporal examination of the action component and performativity of politics as contingent practice.¹ In broadly neglecting the contingency of political practice,² and the issues of context, horizons of possibility, conditionality and uncertainty it brings with it, political theorists tend to reserve an interest in contingency, if they do at all, mainly as a reminder of the ephemerality of stabilised ideas, orders and systems—found in arguments about 'detraditionalization',³ 'dislocation',⁴ 'falling out of history'⁵ and time being 'out of joint', to borrow Hamlet's phrase.⁶ Even still, the most prominently advertised remedies to our situational predicaments often continue to eschew considerations of time, and even space, altogether.⁷ For instance, a great deal of normative political theorising, and in particular the dominant approaches to philosophical liberalism (and the disagreements they produce), still remain meditations on timeless ethical universals.⁸ The drawbacks to the preference for detemporalisation and this 'anti-political reductivism' have not gone unnoticed.⁹ Of late, there has been a purposeful interest in a newly re-established 'political realism', designed to urge the normatively inclined to alter their approach to reflect on the unavoidable power dynamics and contestations in the political sphere that may call the applicability of various ideal theories into question.¹⁰ But even among political realists, the boundaries and limitations of politics are sold as second-order considerations—trying to reconcile contingency with metaethical conviction.¹¹

Still, there are a few emergent exceptions to this prescriptive trend, found most prominently at the intersection between conceptual history and the linguistic turn in the study of political ideologies, which in the tradition of a Weberian *Verstehen* are reinvigorating a primary interest in theorising the everyday practice of politics for its own sake. We can split these efforts into three strands, spearheaded in particular by the work of Kari Palonen and Michael Freeden, who both propose, in their respective ways,¹² that we can better theorise what it means to 'act politically' by analysing the semantic complexity of localised political discourse and the language used to describe political activity. In this, their work shows similarities to contextual approaches to understanding political language employed by many historians of political thought, where synchronic meaning and contingency are core themes.¹³ To an even larger degree, though, they owe a great deal to Reinhart Koselleck's work in conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*) and his historical study of the changing meaning of

political concepts (both synchronically and diachronically) and his adjacent theorising on the relationship between historical experience and linguistic representation.¹⁴

To explain the three strands briefly, the first refers to Palonen's Koselleck-inspired conceptual history of the concept of politics as an 'activity concept', which traces various linguistic references to the experience and practice of politics or 'politicking'.¹⁵ He categorises this activity conceptualisation through different historical descriptions of prominent *topoi*, or themes of the concept of politics, by studying historical references to its routinised moves—e.g. politics described as judgement, deliberation, policy-making and the use of the temporal metaphoric of politics as play.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the second strand emphasises a particular dimension to the activity conceptualisation of politics, reminding us that we understand political practice not only through describing politics and the common actions it comprises of, but also, as Freedman shows in a recent book, by investigating the language indicative of a distinct and more widespread capacity for thinking politically—e.g. the human capacity to formulate goals, appeal to emotion and channel wills to power in order to influence how we devise plans and ways of organising.¹⁷ Third, and finally, language is also the means by which ideologies, as a more sophisticated type of political thinking, come to reflect and influence practice.¹⁸ They are discursive suppliers of meaning, images and slogans that mainly operate through contesting the meaning and relationships between well-worn political concepts like 'liberty', 'equality' and 'community' that are familiar mainstays in intellectual and vernacular political discourse. We therefore come to understand ideologies as contingent linguistic systems that undergo changes in meaning and organisation in synchronic and diachronic time and space.¹⁹

Yet along these three strands, the recent work on political action, thinking and ideological discourse still has more to say about a related dimension of the contingency of politics (and Koselleck's thinking),²⁰ which involves how politics relates to contingency-as-experience—that is, how politics interacts with and harnesses contingency (in its various conceptual dimensions)—and the broader politics of time that stems from it.²¹ Put in another way, there is scope to investigate how political thinking serves as one among many possible responses to the contingency of temporal experience—in terms of its open-endedness, unpredictability and contestability. Indeed everyday politics is replete with temporal indicators and roadmaps of varying sophistication. Politics is about 'staying the course',²² sticking to a 'long-term economic plan',²³ 'change we can believe in',²⁴ or to 'make America great again'.²⁵ All these examples relate to a common temporal move of mapping present situationality and directionality in relation to the past and future.

The purpose of this article is to claim that this linguistically mediated politics of temporality, of which the above are a particular type, is a core component of political thinking. And by revisiting Koselleck's under-utilised theorising of the relationship between political language and temporal experience, we can begin to categorise how the semantic representations of political thinking contest temporal contingency as a means to influence political practice.²⁶ To do so is to return to, but expand upon, a recent essay by Palonen,²⁷ where he considers Koselleck's main contribution to political theory to be his understanding of the 'contingency of political activity', along similar lines to the historian J. G. A. Pocock's remark that 'politics is the dealing with the contingent event'.²⁸ Palonen reckons that throughout his varied writings, Koselleck offers us three categorisations of contingency relevant to political theory: as chance (*Zufall*), as opportunity (similar to Max Weber's concept of *Chancen*) and especially in reference to the experiential horizon of an open future (*Offene Zukunft*). I will revisit these conceptualisations, but want to make a slightly different emphasis, by first, interpreting Koselleck to argue that political practice is not simply a contingent activity but rather a much broader contestation over the contingency of temporal experience; and second, I want to stress the relevance of his thinking to the ideological dimension of the politics of contingency. Pursuing this argument aims to push the linguistic turn in the study of ideologies in a new direction. Building on Koselleck's theorising, I propose that we should look beyond ideologies in terms of the aforementioned contestation of

the definitional meaning of concepts to identify other discursively mediated contestations going on—the contingency of temporal experience being one such possibility.²⁹

The article consists of two sections. The first revisits Koselleck's approach to *Begriffsgeschichte* in relation to his theory of historical time (*eine Theorie der Geschichtlichen Zeiten*) to suggest that political theorists can appropriate and reformulate several elements of his thinking to better conceptualise the intersection between political concepts and temporal experience.³⁰ From this, the second section thematises elements of Koselleck's thinking to propose a set of three common temporal 'plays' or 'moves' in political thinking—on the framing of time, contesting the perception of time's movement and the meaning of historical moments—in which ideologies often attempt to influence political practice.

Incorporating Koselleck's theory of historical time into the study of ideologies

With the renewed focus on language and political concepts, political theorists interested in ideology have already begun to utilise and benefit from conceptual history, where in particular, Koselleck's tracing of conceptual meaning both synchronically and diachronically makes him a methodological ally of Freedman's study of conceptual morphology.³¹ But apart from a few unelaborated remarks,³² ideology theorists have yet to embark on a substantial attempt to incorporate Koselleck's theory of historical time, the problematic at the heart of his work,³³ for better understanding the dynamics between political concepts and the contestation of temporal contingency. This is a missed opportunity. For it is in the connectivity and (*contra* Heidegger and Gadamer) also the disjunction between language, structure and temporal experience where Koselleck makes his most lasting empirical and theoretical contributions,³⁴ and which relates his work in conceptual history with his writings on *Historik* aimed at developing a transcendental theory of possible histories (*die Theoriebedürftigkeit der Geschichtswissenschaft*).³⁵ Over the course of thirty years or so, he considered historical time from the vantage point of both enterprises: concerning the plural temporal structures in historical representation on one hand and their relationship to the situational experience of historical time on the other—revealing what he calls an 'anthropological given arc linking and relating historical experience with the knowledge of such experience'.³⁶

In surveying his disparate writings on historical time, the philosopher John Zammito calls Koselleck a 'veritable literary "hedgehog"' who 'worries his big idea over and over again'.³⁷ But one way to approach his 'big idea' is to consider it on these representational and experiential levels, both of which explore the relationship 'between language and history in the process of events taking place' (*im Vollzug der Ereignisstiftung*).³⁸ On a representational level, historical time concerns the different ways in which historians structure past experience from the present (the present-past)—using conceptual history, but also event-based or *Longue Durée*—which emphasises the plurality of possible historical times in representations of the past. Discussed in numerous places, he often represents these coexisting time structures with a geologic metaphor, *Zeitschichten*, or the layering of time, along with his frequent use of the idea of the synchronicity of the nonsynchronous (*die Gleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigen*) to explain the synchronic coexistence of different time structures that do not correspond.³⁹ I will return to this concept shortly.

Meanwhile, at the other end of the 'anthropological arc', he considers how language relates to his quasi-Heideggerian interest in the past-future experience of historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*)—'the relation of the acting and suffering people to historical time'⁴⁰—and more specifically, the contingent historicity of human societies (in contrast to Heidegger's individualised *Dasein*).⁴¹ As is well known, in the scope of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, the eight-volume study of which he was one of three editors, *Begriffsgeschichte* records the semantic use of a range of key concepts, which documented not only shifts in meaning, but indicated a new experience of 'temporalisation' (*Verzeitlichung*) taking place that denotes a qualitative 'transformation in temporal experience'⁴² during a so-called saddle period (*Sattelzeit*) between the mid- eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁴³ Punctuated by the French

and Industrial Revolutions, it is, at least according to Koselleck's temporal representation, a period ushering in a specifically modern consciousness of time, a *Neuzeit*,⁴⁴ where descriptive concepts like 'democracy', 'republic' and 'revolution' along with various neologisms, many supporting the suffix '-ism', become temporalised as 'concepts of movement' (*Bewegungsbegriffe*) that related less to past experience and instead operated as transitional concepts oriented towards an open future.⁴⁵ Overlaid on top (and often replacing) structures of rhythmic natural time (*Denaturalisierung*), chronological time (*Abfolge der Ereignisse*) or eschatological prophecy (*Säkularisierung*), and in tandem with a sense of time's acceleration (*Beschleunigung*),⁴⁶ the temporalised language of the *Neuzeit* both reveals and instigates the contestation of a contingent historical time, or perhaps better put, the possibility of pluralised historical *times* moving at various velocities.⁴⁷ He writes that in modernity, 'time is no longer simply the medium in which all histories take place; it gains a historical quality. Consequently, history no longer occurs in, but through, time. Time becomes a dynamic and historical force in its own right'.⁴⁸ In other words, as history, time becomes increasingly malleable. Unlike histories before (as *Historie*), historical time (as *Geschichte*) allows one to, as Koselleck put it, 'deduce conceptually progress, decadence, acceleration, or delay, the "not yet" and the "no longer", the "earlier" or "later than", the "too early" and the "too late", situation and duration—whatever differentiating conditions must enter so that concrete historical motion might be rendered visible'.⁴⁹ Historical time enables a greater sense of temporal contingency—in terms of the unexpected, horizons of possibility, conditionality and an open future.

For Koselleck, the emergence of a subjective historical time showcased a widening break between the experience of past and future in modernity, or as he put it in Gadamerian terms, between the categories of a past-present 'space of experience' (*Erfahrungsraum*) and present-future 'horizon of expectation' (*Erwartungshorizont*).⁵⁰ In other words, instead of a static time of reoccurring experiences, the contingent subjectivity of historical time(s) emphasises a future of plural possibilities, a 'heterogeneity of ends' (*Heterogenie der Zwecke*) that no longer resemble the past.⁵¹ As a consequence, it is the future, not the present or past, that becomes the dominant tense in what the historian François Hartog would later characterise as a modern regime of historicity (*Régime d'Historicité*).⁵²

Conceptual history shows us that this time shift is first evident in historical writing of the period, which no longer considers the past as a purveyor of lessons rooted in experience, recalling Cicero's maxim *Historia Magistra Vitae*, but instead tends to mould the past into a 'collective singular' (*Kollektivsingular*) that is seen as forward moving at variable rates.⁵³ Singularisation is thus a response to the contingent possibility of different historical times. Moreover, the temporalisation and contested singularisation found in historical writing soon proliferates, or 'democratises' (*Demokratisierung*) to use Koselleck's preferred term, within a wider discursive field, including what he calls the combative concepts (*Kampfbegriffe*) of political discourse (*Politisierung*).⁵⁴ In the *Neuzeit*,

there has hardly been a central concept of political theory or social programs which does not contain a coefficient of temporal change, in the absence of which nothing can be recognized, nothing thought or argued, without the loss of conceptual force. Time itself becomes a title of legitimation open to occupation from all sides. Specific legitimizing concepts would no longer be possible without temporal perspective.⁵⁵

Of particular interest are the abstracted forward-looking concepts he charts as being incorporated into a number of newly emergent political ideologies (*Ideologisierung*) aimed at mass appeal.⁵⁶ This is true not only in terms of the various '-isms' themselves, but also relates to their use of a number of temporal concepts like 'development' (*Entwicklung*) 'progress' (*Fortschritt*) and 'revolution'. As such, the abstraction and future-oriented temporalisation of ideological concepts speak to both sides of the relationship between politics and contingency: on one hand these concepts are no longer contingent in terms of their locality, while on the other hand they speak to the open-endedness of the contingency of temporal experience. Koselleck writes that in this period, 'the experiential substance of many

concepts was thus reduced, while their claim to realisation increased in proportion’;⁵⁷ and elsewhere that ‘such terms...have the advantage of being general and ambiguous. These qualities facilitate open-ended, unspecified expressions that can be understood in different, contradictory senses depending on the class or interest of the person using them’.⁵⁸ To offer two examples, he discusses how the Aristotelian concepts of republic and democracy, both previously referential to specific instances, become more ambiguous and inherit a coefficient of future change. Republic became republicanism and democracy sees its specific historical reference diminish to become a term fused with hope and action (Koselleck mentions the concept of democratism (*Demokratismus*), though today we often talk of this in terms of democratisation).⁵⁹

Ideology analysis has much to gain from these empirical findings, most significantly in order to help establish the contestation of temporality as a core feature of political thinking. One can rightly quibble with his *Sattelzeit* as crude periodisation,⁶⁰ and question his insistence on the extent to which there is a divergence between future expectation and past experience. Indeed many ideologies continue to promote threads of connectivity between the possible future and the memories, myths and traditions of the past. Still, we can nonetheless appreciate that around the end of the seventeenth century the erosion of dominant experiential and eschatological temporal frameworks marked an increasing prominence of socio-political responses to the contingency and malleability of time upon which ideologies gain traction.

The temporal category of expectation is of particular importance. For all ideologies share a vision of the ‘to be’ either as something desired, possible or even as a hope for the improbable to varying degrees of sophistication. But expectation occurs in different ways. Alexandre Escudier has made an important distinction in the ‘modes of expectation’ in Koselleck’s theorising between ‘cognitive predictive elements’ and ‘normative expectational elements’. One particular move is bringing a detached and detemporalised ideal or vision into the realm of temporal possibility, whereby a future-present is brought into the present-future.⁶¹ Koselleck describes this as a process of the futureisation of utopia, where the utopian ideal moves from the spatial to a feature of temporal expectation.⁶² Koselleck’s use of ‘horizon’ (as opposed to a static experiential space) functions as a metaphor for the present-future’s situational contingency. The unpredictability of expectation is a source of hope but also anxiety and potential disappointment. Indeed in reaction to this he remarks on the proliferation of a number of counter-concepts, such as counter-revolution, order, fall, decline and decay. Koselleck was fond of telling a Soviet political joke:

“Communism is already visible on the horizon,” declared Khrushchev in a speech.

Question from the floor: “Comrade Khrushchev, what is a ‘horizon’?”

“Look it up in a dictionary,” replied Nikita Sergeevich.

At home the questioner found the following explanation in a reference work:

“Horizon, an apparent line separating the sky from the earth, which retreats as one approaches it.”⁶³

With this scepticism in mind, it is important to note that Koselleck’s temporalisation thesis also lies in the background of his broader theorising on *Historik*, which was in many ways a reaction to the twentieth century dangers of temporal singularisation—including ideological grand narratives—felt most poignantly in his first book, *Kritik und Krise*.⁶⁴ In many ways his *Historik* is a theoretical call for preserving room for ‘diachronic synchronicity’.⁶⁵ Yet despite his own reservations about the ideological singularisation of time, in many ways the idea of the synchronicity and the nonsynchronous provides one of his richest theoretical contributions for studying the political use of temporality. It does so in at least four ways. The first concerns his instance on the simultaneity of the dimensions of past and future extending ‘Janus-faced’ from a concept in a particular point in time (*Zustand*).⁶⁶ That is, we must always consider the temporalisations extending outwards from concepts. For all ‘concepts contain past experience, present reality, and expectations for the future’.⁶⁷ Second, and related to this, Koselleck also claims that all concepts have an internalised

temporal structure (*Temporale Binnenstruktur*) that contain meanings gained across different points in diachronic time, and which, given their degree of sedimentation, have varying degrees of permanence.⁶⁸ Put in another way, the internal components of a concept change at varying rates. Take the concept of liberalism, for instance, which contains different internal meanings and emphasis—such as notions of non-interference and emancipation—that entered the concept at different points in its evolution and which have varying degrees of importance and permanence.⁶⁹ The third influence is in relation to the ideologisation of historical events, where a moment that is chronologically static—a war, election or market turmoil—may exist in different places in a historical narrative, and is given varied meaning and importance. Fourth, and finally, the term is also relevant to the various accounts of the rate of historical change that intersect the same synchronic moment. That is, diachronic time is moving past a particular *Zustand* at different rates and in varying directions, whereby the same chronological event has a different impact on rates of historical change. What accelerates historical change in one narrative may have less of an impact in others.

With this being said, it is important to note that for political theorists there are certain limitations or rather opportunities for refinement to Koselleck's temporal thesis and broader theorisation. First, it is important to remember that we need not rely on his empirical findings and temporalisation thesis in order to benefit from many aspects of his theory of historical time. Rather, from this work, we can begin to assemble different tools and locate reoccurring areas of temporal contestation—from the internal temporality of political concepts, contesting the speed of temporal change, to employing the categories of experience and expectation—in order to help reveal different forms of temporal politics going on. Second, a more fundamental question concerns the intersection of time both internal and external to ideological concepts. While some concepts have clear internal temporal coordinates—such as revolution in Marxism or progress in liberalism—other concepts lack an explicit internal temporal quality. Instead, concepts are often attached to external time structures—e.g. equality in terms of the narrative process of emancipation or tradition as a type of organic change.⁷⁰ Thus, temporalisation includes not only concepts of movement, but temporal horizons attached to concepts with no explicit temporalisation. Concepts are given 'coefficients of movement', to use a Koselleck term.⁷¹ Finally, it is important to remember, contrary to many of Koselleck's remarks, that synchronicity need not necessitate nonsynchronicity. In political thinking the layers of time and diachronicity often interact. To offer two examples: ideologies may harmonise layers as in the combination of classic republicanism and communitarianism in contemporary liberalism; and times may also collide, as is often the case, for instance, when in the interests of globalisation, open markets impose rapid 'structural adjustment' upon economies at a different point and moving at a different pace in economic development.⁷²

Three common moves in the ideological politics of time

Building on these remarks, I now want to begin to suggest various moves in the politics of time, all of which stem from the idea of the contingency of temporal experience. In doing so, I also want to emphasise that it is ideologies, as a type of political thinking, that often serve as the primary agents in making them, or at least lurk in the background. To associate a so-called ideological politics of time with the politics of contingency is to push against decades of mischaracterisation. Even today, it is usual to hear of a so-called 'ideological politics' to describe a separate activity or even the antithesis of 'practical politics'. The philosopher Michael Oakeshott, for instance, has been interpreted to understand politics as an art of contingency,⁷³ where, as he put it, political activity is a temporally present 'attending to the general arrangements of a collection of people'—nothing more than the 'pursuit of intimations'.⁷⁴ Or to use his oft-quoted metaphor: the contingency of political activity is to 'sail a boundless and bottomless sea'.⁷⁵ By contrast, ideology is often misconceived as an attempted transcendence of contingency—as antecedent or a non-negotiable course. Indeed, Oakeshott believes the problem with the 'Rationalist' thinking is that it bases

recommendations on exercises in reason that have no connection to the contingency of practice.⁷⁶ In Arendt's account, ideology is 'the idea', a premise applied to history, a combination of a 'scientific approach with results of philosophic relevance [which] pretend to be scientific philosophy'.⁷⁷ It is immune to deliberation. Weber too frequently refers to the virtue of realism or 'matter-of-factness' (*Sachlichkeit*) and shows scorn for so-called 'Literati' ideologists wilfully ignorant of the real world.⁷⁸ For Weber, rule (*Herrschaft*) as a contingent activity consists of the freedom (*Freiheit*) of chance (*Chancen*); that is, the range of possible choices of action extending from a present situation.⁷⁹

But theorising the ideology-influenced politics of time argues precisely the opposite. Though ideological concepts are often ambiguous and multipurpose, they are articulated and applicable in different time and space, through agents and discourse operating within a particular socio-political milieu. Thus, ideologies are, by nature, contingent—in terms of their production, language and application—and at the same time can be seen to harness contingency in terms of temporal experience, especially in relation to the elements of temporal uncertainty, contestability and openness. While this occurs in innumerable ways, here I want to offer three contestations—on the framing of time, the movement of time and the meaning of historical events—that are common in political thinking.

Framing time

My first claim is that it is a common practice of politics to slice and frame the perceived wholeness of time along different planes and axes of experience that exist but do not always interact simultaneously with other social time structures. Politics contests a crowded temporal space, as we experience time on different individual and group levels, which Hartmut Rosa separates into our routinised everyday times, the experienced lifetime associated with *Dasein* and an epochal time encompassing the long-term structures and rhythms of historical time.⁸⁰ Politics tends to prefer inhabiting the last category, and often orders it from a designated point of origin, tapping in to what Edward Said calls 'the aboriginal human need to point out or locate a beginning'.⁸¹ In Freedman's aforementioned work on political thinking, he argues along similar lines, referring to what he calls an 'inaugural act of social creation' (e.g. social contracts or founding documents), which effectively cements authority and power, and dictates action possibilities going forward through time. Indeed, concepts like 'founding', 'Founders' [or Framers'] intent' and 'In the beginning' are commonplace.⁸² From Hobbes onwards there is an increased move to replace mythological or natural origins with beginnings attributed to human action. Arendt explains this as the victory of *Homo Faber*, the science inspired 'making and fabricating present' where nature is transformed from a Divinely created being to a process of temporal becoming. Human affairs become linked to 'making'. Hobbes tells us that it is by art that man devises 'a Commonwealth, or State...which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural'.⁸³ For Hobbes, the state is fashioned in his preferred realm of human doing, what Arendt describes as Hobbes' vision of the 'creation of the "automatic" life of that "artificial man" who is "the great Leviathan"'.⁸⁴ As Koselleck discusses in the context of 'revolution',⁸⁵ from these beginnings or fulcrum points, politics can then contest the demarcated horizons of possibility of the present-future, either as the 'realisable' possibilities of *Realpolitik*, which for Bismarck was 'the art of the possible' (*Kunst des Möglichen*)⁸⁶ or alternatively in the normative encouragement for the potentially unrealisable to, in the end, achieve the best of the possible. We are reminded that in *Politics as a Vocation* Weber writes that 'politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective. Certainly all historical experience confirms the truth – that man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had reached out for the impossible'.⁸⁷

Yet temporal pathways of possibility do not necessitate a time *de novo*. Temporal boundaries are set to various heights and levels of impregnability. Some allow us to move freely up Mill's tree of individual flourishing, while others are the forced time marches ordered by new calendars and five-year plans. The well-worn political use of 'change', what Oakeshott describes as the inescapable feature of practical life, is not to deny connectivity

with the past, but to use the past for present use. As an alternative to a political starting anew, others try to reconcile time as inheritance with the artistic time of human action. Burke, for instance, employs a time structure of historicised and layered experience, but one that is not completely divorced from the transcendent morality or natural or Divine law. As Rodney Kilcup explains, ‘What Burke exhibits in [his] particular configuration of beliefs is the tension between the continuing need to anchor morality in something more than mere human devising and a modern view of reason that denies its capacity for rational understanding of a world beyond sense and time’.⁸⁸

Nor does the artistic mode only concentrate on beginnings. Time demarcation can equally rely on its opposite bookend, the possible goals or an unrealisable yet aspirational present-future temporalisation in the form of what Eric Voegelin would describe as gnostic dream worlds—the politics of an attempted ‘immanentization of the Christian eschaton’.⁸⁹ Ernest Bloch also presents another variation if this in the allure of the possibility of realising or returning to a mythologised past. His own reflection on *die Gleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigen* refers to different modes of being within a society, different places of ‘now’, that in Germany differentiated the simultaneity of the respective peasant and proletariat understandings of time. It was the sense of loss felt by the former that allowed Fascism to profit from its offer of a utopian ‘not yet’ in the form of a reintroduced mythology of a past *Völkisch* community (a future-past).⁹⁰ In other instances, political choice may also turn on ‘present ends’ through the proclamation of closing a so-called ‘era of one-party domination’ or proclaiming ‘an end to the politics of corruption’. This argument also applies to the end-of-ideology thesis itself. In the wake of totalitarianism, the likes of Daniel Bell and Robert Lane announced in the post-war period an end to a theorised approach to political order in favour of promoting scientific certainty into politics.⁹¹ Indeed, ends and beginnings are often coupled in this way. As T. S. Eliot reminds us in ‘Journey of the Magi’, a birth is often matched with a death – ‘I had seen birth and death, he writes, ‘but I had thought they were different’.⁹²

This is not to suggest that framed time is simply the contestation of epochal durations. Ideology influenced time structures can also encourage different temporal points of focus by encouraging past or present and long- or short-term views. If the *Neuzeit* is marked by expectations of future, the post-modern is often demarcated by the obsession with the present. David Harvey diagnoses this as time-space compression, not only the annihilation of space through increased speed of transportation and communication, but also the compression of time where the future oriented time-as-becoming is increasingly replaced by a presentist time-as-being.⁹³ As such, there is a collapsing of time horizons—‘the future has come to be discounted into the present’.⁹⁴ In response to present compression there exist common moves to counter the volatility brought by presentism through a clamouring for a politics of nostalgia and promoting school curricula that teach national values. This sense of abandonment is the politics of ruins and war memorials, and the search for solace in stasis and the cyclical temporality of decay. It was Georg Simmel who wrote that ‘between the not-yet and the no-longer lies an affirmation of the spirit whose path, it is true, now no longer ascends to its peak but, satisfied by the peak’s riches, descends to its home’.⁹⁵ From valuing the natural past, environmental politics also clings to this larger picture and longer view, imploring us to make sacrifices in the present for the sake of future generations. Barbara Adam and Christopher Groves call this a futurity of care, where our awareness of our present carbon footprints leads to an understanding of our future-oriented ‘timeprint’ in order to better comprehend the temporal reach of our actions.⁹⁶

The movement of time

In relation to understandings of time creation, inheritance or endpoint, time demarcation may also employ mechanisms of movement that propel durational time. For Hobbes it is the ordered time of artistic creation, while for Hegel and Marx it is a process (master/slave, base/superstructure). Between them, Marx and Lenin contest the dynamics of mechanical propulsion, the speed in which time moves and whether groups can play an active role in speeding it up. Koselleck’s *Sattelzeit* thesis relies on revealing continuity and changing of

time based on structures of conceptual-experiential repetition and newness.⁹⁷ Acceleration occurs on different levels.⁹⁸ On one hand it refers to the rapidly changing political dynamics during the French and American revolutions and on the other hand refers to the experience of acceleration ushered in by industrialisation and rapid technological innovation.⁹⁹ For instance the concept of progress is seen to denote a 'succession of ruptures' while the concept of revolution designates sudden upheaval.¹⁰⁰

But as Koselleck showcased, concepts are also reactive to the movement of external time structures. For many, modernity is defined by what Koselleck recounts as the accelerating 'alteration in the rhythm of temporal experience'¹⁰¹ where the rate of change increases geometrically across the same interval of time. From the time it takes to travel to the rapid changes during political crises, modernity seems to slice time in shorter and shorter durations.¹⁰² Hermann Lübbe characterises this experience as a contraction of the present, 'a process whereby the space of time for which we can calculate our living conditions with a degree of constancy is shortened'.¹⁰³ In his 2004 Labour Conference speech, Tony Blair remarked that 'the present is thrown out with scarcely time to become familiar; before a new future emerges to assert itself'.¹⁰⁴ Paul Virilio diagnoses these experiences as part of the 'dromologic revolution' where bodily and spatial experience is overtaken multiple times over by the production of speed. This is a dystopian reply to Marinetti's religion-morality of speed, which claims that futurism 'will defend man from the decay caused by slowness, by memory, by analysis, by repose and habit'.¹⁰⁵ In Virilio's dromological world, distances are eradicated and locality replaced by dromogeneous speed-space (*Espace-vitesse*). We are heading towards living in 'zero time', he mourns; 'we will no longer admire the landscape but only watch our screens and monitor our interactive trajectory – that is, a 'journey' with no distance, a 'travelling time' with no actual passing of time'.¹⁰⁶ The political implication of this, for Virilio, is 'dromocracy' and in particular the military industrial domination of the faster, what he calls 'movement power'.¹⁰⁷ Yet Virilio now seems mistaken to have put the sole blame at militarism's door, in the wake of the financial crisis it is perhaps more apposite to blame, if one wants to, the market speed unleashed by neoliberalism, where democratic and regulatory institutions seem incapable of keeping up with financial innovation and the *Flash Boys* who profit from it.¹⁰⁸ As Shedon Wolin notes, we worry that the 'political time' of legislative democracy as a process of deliberative rule making simply cannot keep up with the rate of innovation and the desire to profit from it, while political success relies more and more on the benchmarks of economic growth.¹⁰⁹

The contestation of movement is thus internal to ideological concepts, in the mechanisms of continuity and change in historical time, and also in their reaction to external temporal structures. The various benchmarks indicating the modern acceleration of change question the relevance of the space of experience from future-oriented expectation, while in the so-called post-modern condition there is also a diminished horizon of expectation. Rosa's depiction of the post-modern is its requirement to run faster simply to remain. We run on the treadmill to avoid falling backwards – living in a timeless existence of going nowhere, corroborating, from an economic point of view this time, Virilio's mid-century diagnosis of *Inertie Polaire*.¹¹⁰

Contesting the meaning of moments

The final move I will discuss here is the temporalisation of the synchronic event or moment, where happenings of various durations and demarcation are given meaning and significance in relation to other moments in time before and after. For Koselleck, the complex temporality found in concepts also applies to historical events and the temporal structuring of historical experiences. On the level of events, meaning is not simply in relation to the synchronic, but to the synchronicity of the nonsynchronous. As Koselleck put it, 'any synchrony is *eo ipso* at the same time diachronic.'¹¹¹ And like concepts, events too express different layers of diachronicity, whereby an event may be given multiple layers of meaning (*Mehrschichtigkeit der Bedeutungen*) in relation to other events. As he writes in a later essay, there are three modes of temporal experience: events are irreversible, repeatable and ordered in relation to

the synchronicity of the nonsynchronous. Events are thus experienced differently, even if they are chronologically uniform.¹¹²

To further understand the temporal contingency of historical experiences we can benefit from a classical distinction between a quantitative understanding of time as *Chronos* and the qualitative category of *Kairós*, which distinguishes notions of ‘any time’ from the right, opportune or critical time.¹¹³ One is a time of measure, the other of action. Put in another way, Karl Löwith has described *Chronos* as indifferent ‘nows’, and Kariological time as significant ‘nows’.¹¹⁴ Take, for instance, Koselleck’s conceptual history of ‘crisis’, which charts its descriptive employment as a concept related to key moments of transition (*Verlaufsbegriff*) to its modern political use for instigating change.¹¹⁵ As such, contingency as *Zufall* not only designates an unpredicted event, but an occasion or moment of contested opportunity and possibility, bringing up Churchill’s apposite phrase that governing should never let a good crisis go to waste. To Lenin’s *What is to be done?* follows *When, then, should we do it?* This critical moment, or ‘now-time’ to use Benjamin’s term (*Jetztzeit*) signifies certain impatience for present change or the future to arrive. Indeed, a critical moment may lie out in the future as ‘the time’ (*o Kairós*), an interpretation hinting at the extensive Biblical usage of the term in regards to the Last Judgement. Here the call to action—what to do in-between—is more ambiguous.¹¹⁶ Conversely, political thinking also includes designating the wrong time for action, or *akairós*.¹¹⁷ This too is a term with great political force, especially when applied retrospectively, and furthermore, the reassessment of a past moment also changes over time.

Consider the ideological temporalisation of the second terrorist attack on the New York World Trade Center. All agree that the attack occurred, chronologically speaking, on the morning of September 11, 2001. But beyond that, there is stark disagreement about its Kariological temporalisation. For many liberals, 9/11 was an event that challenged a particular vision of liberal progress, calling for a recalibration. While for many neoconservatives it justified existing understandings, and prompted an acceleration of democratisation.¹¹⁸ Fifteen years later, after the disappointments of the Arab Spring and intractable troubles in Afghanistan and Iraq, it seemed that in retrospect the significance of 9/11 to liberalism and democratisation must continue to be reevaluated.¹¹⁹

All of this relates to how ideologies play with historical contingencies, which may be experienced as a genuine surprise (e.g. a terrorist attack) or as repetitive moments given unique significance (e.g. it is the most important election of our lifetime). Thus, to again return to Pocock’s claim, political thinking is not simply the dealing with the contingent event, but can be seen to exploit historical happenings by giving them meaning and debating their implications. Events are not only dealt with, but also employed. *Chronos* is turned into *Kairós*. Even Machiavelli, who lies at the heart of Pocock’s theorising on contingency, does not always speak of taming contingency.¹²⁰ Instead his work may be read as an ideological argument for a politics of *Kairós*—the use of contingency for gaining power on one hand and the secondary aim to preserve a status quo state of affairs (*Mantenere lo Stato*) thereafter.¹²¹ He thus proposes that political activity navigates *Fortuna* in two ways. As is well known, in *The Prince* he argues that the stability of the *Politeia* is conditional upon the exercising of *Virtù*—a balancing of morals and practical expediency—to anticipate and cope with *Fortuna* for preserving order. Less acknowledged, however, is that the exercising of *Virtù* itself requires the innovative prince to exploit contingency as opportunity or occasion (*Occasione*) in order to gain and hold power in the first place.¹²²

As a last point, political thinking can also purposefully ignore contingency or designate moments to be irrelevant to their wider framework. In the most extreme cases it claims to ‘break away’ from contingent time altogether. Indeed, the non-time is a favoured move among normative political philosophy, where ends are reasoned via transcendent ethical formulations that purposefully disarticulate with the time-bound. Placing faith in the motivational homogeneity of rational choice based on self-interest is a useful trick, at least in academic circles, for proving resiliency against the peskiness of contingency.¹²³ Rawls and his followers’ use of the veil of ignorance is perhaps the most famous attempt to transcend time

whilst ignoring the contingencies involved in how societies make choices about the fair distribution of wealth. There is nothing inherently wrong with this of course; in fact, it helps the theorising of political thinking better understand their ideological underpinnings.

Conclusion

To sum up, it is without doubt that theorists of ideologies within the linguistic turn have in the last three decades aided us in finally overcoming restrictive understandings of ideology as false consciousness and look past end-of-ideology proclamations to establish a broader field of interest. When studied as expressions of political language, ideologies become more than totalising constructs, but are recognised as a semantic component of political thinking that, obscuring or not, offers meaning to the indeterminate world around us.

The intention behind this essay is to push this project further: to encourage ideology theorists to look beyond the definitional layer of meaning and explore how different conceptions of temporality, as only one possible area of contestation, are imbedded in and attached to various concepts in time and space. Doing so is to begin to reclaim and remap the temporal ground that was in the main conceded by many theorists in reaction to the mid-century portrayal of ideology as disconnected from historical contingency and contrasted with a so-called practical politics of ‘intimations’ or ‘dealing with the contingent event’. On the contrary, ideologies are in fact a response to and help actors navigate the problem and possible opportunities presented by contingent events and the broader contingency of temporal experience. For this, Reinhart Koselleck’s work on the relationship between language and historical time—on both an empirical and theoretical level—offers useful evidence and tools to help establish time as a core element of political thinking. On an empirical level, conceptual history shows us that the temporalisation of language is in part related to the contingency of temporal experience. But we do not need to adhere to his *Neuzeit* thesis in order to profit from his theory of historical time. Building on his theory of the linguistic mediation and representation of temporality, we can show that this is not only true of specific understandings of future time, the thrust of Koselleck’s argument about horizons of expectation and an open future, but also refers, for instance, to the contingent understandings of past time—the different horizons presented in reading the past from the present. On this possibility, it is his work on historicity and *Historik* that proves more valuable.

This article is also a call for future research. As a continuation of the three temporal moves present here, there is scope for theorists to develop a fuller and more nuanced typology of the different temporal moves employed in political thinking. The use of myth and the imaginary are but one possible extension of this project. Inspired by Koselleck’s theory of acceleration, there is also opportunity to better theorise the interface between scholarship on the structural times of politics (election cycles, budgets and speaking allocations) and their relationship with our experiential understanding of time. Theories of acceleration also highlight the important socio-economic and technological influences on our experience of time—from transport timetables to the working day—and the broader relationship between social structures and ideology. Finally, this conclusion opens up space for developing a comparative lexicon of temporal concepts in past and present day political discourse, and to see more clearly how temporalisation continues to motivate how we act politically.

¹ On the meaning of the concept of ‘the political’ as-sphere, see, for instance Emily Hauptmann, ‘A Local History of “The Political”’, *Political Theory*, (32) (2004), pp. 34-60; Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), Kari Palonen, *The Struggle with Time* (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), esp. pp. 33-64, and as a mode of experience, see Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

- ² Kari Palonen has suggested that speaking of contingency is becoming fashionable in political theory, but most of his examples are in fact firmly in the disciplines of history and the history of political thought, certainly not Anglo-
- ³ Paul Heelas, Scott Lash and Paul Morris (eds), *Detraditionalization* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995).
- ⁴ Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London: Verso, 1990).
- ⁵ Wendy Brown, *Politics out of History* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 3-17.
- ⁶ For more in this phrase, see Smita A. Rahman, *Time, Memory and the Politics of Contingency* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015).
- ⁷ See, for instance, Sheldon Wolin, 'The liberal/democratic divide. On Rawl's Political Liberalism', in *Political Theory* 24 (1996), pp. 99-119.
- ⁸ For one critique of 'political moralism', see William Galston, 'Realism in political theory', in *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (2010), pp. 385-411.
- ⁹ This phrase is from Glen Newey, *After Politics* (London: Palgrave, 2001), p. 18.
- ¹⁰ On political realism, see Raymond Geuss, *Philosophy and Real Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2008); Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument*, Geoffrey Hawthorn (ed) (Princeton University Press, 2007); Bonnie Honig and Marc Stears, 'The New Realism', in Jonathan Floyd and Marc Stears (eds), *Political Philosophy versus History?* (Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Mark Philp, 'What is to be done?: Political theory and political realism', in *European Journal of Political Theory* 9(4) (2010), pp. 466-484.
- ¹¹ On the limits of realism, see Esther Abin, 'Political Realism, Contingency and Philosophy', in *Redescriptions: Yearbook of Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory* 16 (2012/2013), pp. 39-60; and Michael Freeden, 'Interpretative realism and prescriptive realism', in *Journal of Political Ideologies* 17(1) (2012), pp. 1-11.
- ¹² On differences in their respective approaches, see Michael Freeden, 'Review: Kari Palonen, Politics and Conceptual History', in *European Journal of Political Theory* 15(1) (2016), pp. 124-130.
- ¹³ On the contextual approach, see Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Regarding Method Vol. 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For remarks on contingency and time, see John G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language, and Time* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); and Quentin Skinner, 'Rhetoric and Conceptual Change', *Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought* 3 (2009), pp. 61-62.
- ¹⁴ On this relationship, see Reinhart Koselleck, 'Linguistic Change and the History of Events', in *The Journal of Modern History* 61(4) (1986), pp. 649-666.
- ¹⁵ On the concept of 'politicking', see Kari Palonen, 'Two Concepts of Politics', in *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory* 7(1) (2006), pp. 11-25.
- ¹⁶ Palonen, *Struggle with Time*, op. cit., Ref. 1, pp. 21-26.
- ¹⁷ See Michael Freeden, *The Political Theory of Political Thinking* (Oxford University Press, 2013), esp. pp. 22-63.
- ¹⁸ On ideology in reference to political thinking, see Freeden, 'Language, Interpretation and Ideology', in *Political Theory: Methods and Approaches*, David Leopold and Marc Stears (eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 196-215.
- ¹⁹ See Michael Freeden, 'Political Concepts and Ideological Morphology', in *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2) (1994), pp. 140-164; and Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- ²⁰ On importance of time to his overall thinking, see Reinhart Koselleck, 'Some Reflections on the Temporal Structure of Conceptual Change', in *Main Trends in Cultural History: Ten Essays*, Willem Melching and Wyger Velema (eds) (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), pp. 7-16.
- ²¹ On the different understandings of the concept of contingency, see Andreas Schedler, 'Mapping Contingency', in *Political Contingency: Studying the Unexpected, the Accidental, and the Unforeseen*, Ian Shapiro and Sonu Bedi (eds) (New York: NYU Press, 2007), pp. 59-78.
- ²² This was a common phrase of George W Bush during the Iraq War. Available at: <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/wariniraq/gwbushiraq41304.htm>.
- ²³ A common phrase used by the UK Conservative Party in 2015. Available at: <https://www.conservatives.com/Plan>.
- ²⁴ A core theme in Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaign. Available at: <https://my.barackobama.com/page/share/cwcbiinvite>
- ²⁵ The campaign slogan of Donald Trump. Available at: <https://www.donaldjtrump.com>.
- ²⁶ See Koselleck, 'Linguistic Change and the History of Events', op. cit., Ref. 14.
- ²⁷ Kari Palonen, 'Contingency, Political Theory and Conceptual History', in *Political Concepts and Time: New Approaches to Conceptual History*, Javier Fernández Sebastián (ed) (Santander: Cantabria University Press, 2011), pp. 179-204.
- ²⁸ J. G. A. Pocock *The Machiavellian Moment* (Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 168.
- ²⁹ For a description of the linguistic turn in the study of ideologies, see Aletta J. Norvel, 'The Things We Do with Words', *British Journal of Political Science*, 30(2) (2000); and Jonathan Leader Maynard, 'A map of the field of ideological analysis', in *Journal of Political Ideologies* 18(3) (2013), esp. pp. 299-327.
- ³⁰ In discussing Koselleck, I will mainly use three translated texts. Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought) Keith Tribe (trans) (New York, Columbia University Press, 2004); Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*. Todd Samuel Presner and Others (trans) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); and Reinhart Koselleck, 'Introduction and Prefaces to the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*' Michaela Richter (trans), in

Contributions to the History of Concepts 6(1) (2007), pp. 1-37. On potential links between contextual approach and conceptual history, see Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Melvin Richter, 'Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte) and Political Theory', in *Political Theory* 14(4) (1986), pp. 604-637; and Kari Palonen, 'The History of Concepts as a Style of Political Theorizing: Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck's Subversion of Normative Political Theory', in *European Journal of Political Theory* 1(1) (2002), pp. 91-106.

³¹ See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 19, pp. 117-123.

³² See Michael Freeden, *Ideology: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 74-75; Michael Freeden, 'Editorial: Ideologies and Conceptual History', in *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2(1) (1997), pp. 5-6; Bo Stråth, 'Ideology and Conceptual History', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 15-17; and Bo Stråth, 'Ideology and History', in *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11(1) (2006), pp. 36-38.

³³ Helge Jordheim makes a similar claim in 'Does Conceptual History Really Need a Theory of Historical Times?', in *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 6(2) (2011), pp. 21-41.

³⁴ See Reinhart Koselleck, 'Begriffsgeschichte and Social History', in *Futures Past* *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, pp. 75-92. On connection and differentiation between language and experience, see Koselleck, 'Linguistic Change and the History of Events', *op. cit.*, Ref. 14, pp. 649-650. On his critique of Heidegger and Gadamer's 'radical hermeneutics', see Reinhart Koselleck and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutik und Historik* (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 1987).

³⁵ See, Reinhart Koselleck, 'One the need for Theory in the Discipline of History', in *Practice of Conceptual History*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, pp. 1-19. On p. 4 the translator uses the phrase 'theory of periodization', when, in fact, a more accurate representation of Koselleck's theorisation would be a theory of historical time or possible historical times. On this, see Helge Jordheim, 'Against Periodization: Koselleck's Theory of Multiple Temporalities', in *History and Theory* 51 (2012), p. 152.

³⁶ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 93; and see Koselleck, 'Some Reflections on Temporal Structure', *op. cit.* Ref. 20, p. 15. On his linking between experience and representation, see Luca Scuccimarra, 'Semantics of Time and Historical Experience: Remarks on Koselleck's *Historik*', in *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 4 (2008), pp. 160-168.

³⁷ John Zammito, 'Koselleck's Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of History', in *History and Theory* 43 (February 2004), p. 126.

³⁸ Reinhart Koselleck, 'Sprachwandel und Ereignisgeschichte', in *Begriffsgeschichten: Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache* (Frankfurt and Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 32f.

³⁹ Reinhart Koselleck, *Zeitschichten: Studien Zur Historik* (MIT Einem Beitrag Von Hans-Georg Gadamer Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), p. 9.

⁴⁰ Reinhart Koselleck, 'The Temporalization of Concepts', in *Redescriptions: Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought* 1, Klaus Sondermann (trans) (1997), p. 16.

⁴¹ This is discussed by Alexandre Escudier in 'Temporalization and Political Modernity', in *Political Concepts and Time*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 27, p. 146.

⁴² Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 39, p. 324.

⁴³ On the idea of a *Sattelzeit*, see Koselleck, *Practice of Conceptual History*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁴ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, pp. 231-266.

⁴⁵ Koselleck, 'Introduction to the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*', *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, pp. 1-19, esp. pp. 2-4.

⁴⁶ See Koselleck, 'Is there and Acceleration of History?', in *High-Speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power and Modernity* Hartmut Rosa and William E. Schulmann (eds) (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), pp. 113-134.

⁴⁷ Koselleck discusses the pluralisation of historical time in reference to Herder's *Metakritik* of Kant's transcendental ascetics. Herder writes that, 'In reality, every mutable thing has within itself the measure of its time; this persists even in the absence of any other; no two worldly things have the same measure of time. . . . There are therefore (to be precise and audacious) at any one time in the Universe infinitely many times'. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1799) (Berlin 1955), p. 68. Quoted in Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 2.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 236.

⁴⁹ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 95. For more on this see Helge Jordheim, 'Thinking in Convergences', in *Ideas in History* 2(3) (2007), pp. 81-82.

⁵⁰ See Koselleck, "'Space of Experience" and "Horizon of Expectation": Two Historical Categories', in Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, pp. 255-275.

⁵¹ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 102.

⁵² François Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and the Experiences of Time*, Saskia Brown (trans) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

⁵³ Koselleck shows how the collective singular 'Geschichte' replaces the plural 'Geschichten'. See 'Geschichte', in Reinhart Koselleck et. al. (eds), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* Vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1975), pp. 593-717.

⁵⁴ See Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 39, pp. 177-224.

⁵⁵ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 248.

⁵⁶ Koselleck, 'Introduction to the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*', *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 13.

⁵⁷ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 80.

⁵⁸ Koselleck, 'Introduction to the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*', *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 13.

- ⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 11-12. On 'democratism', see Koselleck, 'The Temporalization of Concepts', *op. cit.*, Ref. 40, p. 21.
- ⁶⁰ See Lynn Hunt, *Measuring Time, Making History* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008), pp. 75-76; and Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde* (London: Verso, 1995), pp. 13-14.
- ⁶¹ Alexandre Escudier, 'Temporalization and Political Modernity', in *Political Concepts and Time*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 27, p. 143.
- ⁶² See Koselleck, "Die Verzeitlichung der Utopie" in *Utopieforschung*, Vol. 3 (Frankfurt and Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), pp. 1-14.
- ⁶³ A. Drozdzyński, *Der politische Witz im Ostblok* (Düsseldorf, 1974), p. 80. Quoted in Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 16, p. 261.
- ⁶⁴ Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1988).
- ⁶⁵ Javier Fernandez Sebastián and Juan Francisco Fuentes, 'Conceptual history, memory, and identity: an interview with Reinhart Koselleck', in *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 2(1) (2006), p. 99.
- ⁶⁶ Koselleck, 'Introduction to the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*', *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 9.
- ⁶⁷ Koselleck, 'Some Reflections on the Temporal Structure', *op. cit.*, Ref. 20, p. 11.
- ⁶⁸ See Koselleck, *Introduction to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 30; and Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 90.
- ⁶⁹ For more on this see Michael Freeden, *Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 38.
- ⁷⁰ This approach is also suggested in Michael Freeden, 'Ideology and conceptual history', in *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2(1) (1997), p. 6.
- ⁷¹ See Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 55.
- ⁷² See, for instance, Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem Press, 2002).
- ⁷³ I borrow this phrase from Suvi Soininen, *From a 'Necessary Evil' to the Art of Contingency: Michael Oakeshott's Conception of Political Activity* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005). For Oakeshott, she says, politics is a type of 'recognised contingency', p. 184.
- ⁷⁴ Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*, Timothy Fuller (ed), revised and expanded edition (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund), p. 60.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ⁷⁶ Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 74, pp. 5-42.
- ⁷⁷ Hannah Arendt, 'Ideology and Terror: A Novel form of Government', in *The Review of Politics* 15:3 (1953), pp. 303-327.
- ⁷⁸ See David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics* (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1974), p. 23.
- ⁷⁹ On this, see Kari Palonen, 'Max Weber's Reconceptualization of Freedom', in *Political Theory* 27:4 (August, 1999), 523-544.
- ⁸⁰ Rosa, *Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 10.
- ⁸¹ Edward W. Said, *Beginnings: Intentions and Method* (London: Granta Books, 1998), p. 5.
- ⁸² See Freeden, 'The Arrogance of Politics', in *The Political Theory of Political Thinking*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 17, pp. 92-109.
- ⁸³ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, in Edwin M Curley ed. *Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), p. 3.
- ⁸⁴ Hannah Arendt, *op. cit.*, Ref. 1, pp. 298-300.
- ⁸⁵ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, pp. 43-57.
- ⁸⁶ Quoted in Palonen, *The Struggle with Time*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 1, p. 217.
- ⁸⁷ Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in *Weber: Political Writings* Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 369.
- ⁸⁸ Rodney Kilcup, 'Reason and the Basis of Morality in Burke', in *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 17(3) (1979), p. 273.
- ⁸⁹ Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 163.
- ⁹⁰ Ernest Bloch, *Heritage of our Times* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
- ⁹¹ See David McLellan, *Ideology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 45-46.
- ⁹² T. S. Elliot, 'Journey of the Magi' (1927), Accessed at: <http://allpoetry.com/The-Journey-Of-The-Magi>
- ⁹³ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Wiley Blackwell, 1981), p. 244.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 291.
- ⁹⁵ Georg Simmel, 'The Ruin', in 'Two Essays' Rudolph H. Weingartner (trans), in *The Hudson Review* 11(3) (1958), p. 382.
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- ⁹⁷ Koselleck, 'History, Histories, and Formal Time Structures', in *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, pp. 93-104.
- ⁹⁸ See Reinhart Koselleck, 'Is There an Acceleration of History?', in Rosa and Schulmann, *High-Speed Society*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 46, pp. 124-125.
- ⁹⁹ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 50.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 47.
- ¹⁰¹ Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 241.
- ¹⁰² Koselleck, 'Is there an acceleration of history?', *op. cit.*, Ref. 46, p. 126.

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- ¹⁰⁵ Filippo Marinetti, *The Futurist Manifesto*, quoted in Rosa and Scheuerman, *High-speed Society*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 46, p. 57.
- ¹⁰⁶ Paul Virilio, 'The State of Emergency', in *The Virilio Reader*, James Der Derian (ed) (Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), p. 76.
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- ¹⁰⁸ Michael Lewis, *Flash Boys* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2014).
- ¹⁰⁹ Shedon Wolin, 'What Time is it?', in *Theory and Event* 1(1) (1997).
- ¹¹⁰ See Paul Virilio, *Ground Zero*, Chris Turner (trans) (London: Verso, 2002).
- ¹¹¹ Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 30.
- ¹¹² Koselleck, *Futures Past*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, 95.
- ¹¹³ On interpretations of Kairós, see John E. Smith, 'Time, Times and the Right Time', in *The Monist* 53(1) (1969), p. 7.
- ¹¹⁴ Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 185.
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- ¹¹⁶ On this see Roland Boer, 'Revolution in the Event: The Problem of Kairós', in *Theory, Culture & Society* 30(2) (2013), p. 118.
- ¹¹⁷ On the right and wrong time see, for instance, Plato's *Republic*, Book I [332-333].
- ¹¹⁸ For instance, see Paul Berman, *Terrorism and Liberalism* (New York and London: WW Norton, 2003); and J. Brenkman, *The Cultural Contradictions of Democracy: Political Thought Since 9/11* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007).
- ¹¹⁹ On a reassessment, see 'Editorial: After Ten Years', in *The New Republic* (September 15, 2011), p. 1.
- ¹²⁰ This is a phrase used by Kari Palonen in 'Contingency in Political Theory', *op. cit.*, Ref. 2, p. 7.
- ¹²¹ See Quentin Skinner, *Machiavelli* (Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 28-30.
- ¹²² See Book VI of *The Prince*. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Harvey C. Mansfield (ed), second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 21-25.
- ¹²³ See Philip Pettit, 'Resilience as the Explanandum of Social Theory', in Shapiro, *Political Contingency*, *op. cit.*, Ref. 21, p. 84.