


CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN GUINEA AND SENEGAL
SINCE INDEPENDENCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is a comparative study of the central government administration in Guinea and Senegal in the light of the contrasting political systems said to operate in the two states since independence. Guinea and Senegal became independent in 1958 and 1960 respectively and according to existing studies of both states, they have developed contrasting political systems. However, until they became independent, both states were French colonies and were administered under a common administrative system established by the French rulers.

On the basis of the existing studies of the two states' political systems which are reviewed in the Introduction, it is postulated that in Senegal, the central government administration would represent an apparent evolution out of the French colonial administration modified and adapted to suit the goals of the government but in accordance with the basic ideas and principles that underlay the French colonial administration. With Guinea, on the other hand, given the way in which independence was achieved, the stated ideology and the goals of the government and the emphasis in academic studies

on the party both as a policy making and, in some cases, as an administrative institution, it might be expected that past colonial experience would have a minimal influence and that the central government administration would have markedly different characteristics; and thus, that this central government administration would present significant contrasts to that in Senegal. The central concern of the thesis is to investigate this general proposition.

To do this, three specific subjects whose choice was dictated by the scope of available research material have been selected. The first is the organization of the administration. This is covered in three chapters dealing with organization at ministerial level, organization at regional and local levels, and the civil service personnel who operate them. The second subject which is examined in one chapter is the relationship between the administration and the representative institutions in each state. And the third subject, also examined in one chapter, is the nature of the administrative arrangements established for development activities in the two states. The study of these different subjects is preceded by two background chapters. The first is devoted to an examination of the nature of the French colonial administrative system in West Africa and the second to an examination of the relationship between the ideology and administration in each state as articulated by their respective leaders.

The examination of the French colonial administrative legacy shows that at independence, both Guinea and Senegal were heirs to administrative institutions whose characteristics

were closely copied from the French metropolitan administrative experience. These included the principle of a unified and centralized administrative structure, the idea of a judicial control of administrative action, the principles of a career system of administration and a policy of associating representative institutions with the work of the administration. The only important difference in the nature of the administrative inheritances of the two states was the different circumstances in which they became independent. In Senegal, there was a smooth transition to independence which allowed proper arrangements to be made for the future of the emerging administration. In Guinea, on the other hand, there was an abrupt break with France and this led to a precipitate withdrawal of French officials leaving the emerging administration in the hands of a poorly trained and inexperienced national personnel.

The second chapter which examines the relationship between ideology and administration reveals a fundamental contrast between the conceptions of administration articulated by the leaders of the two states. In Senegal, the administration is expected to function within the context of a political structure based on a commitment to constitutionalism. In contrast, the administration in Guinea is expected to function within the context of a political structure based on a commitment to the doctrine of party supremacy. The political ideology in Senegal is, on the whole, compatible with the development of the post-independence central government administration as a pragmatic continuation of the

French colonial administration with some modifications and adaptations in the light of the goals of the government. In Guinea, on the other hand, the political ideology suggests that the administration must have developed characteristics that will present significant contrasts to both the colonial and Senegalese administrations. This means that if the evolution of the Guinean administration has been determined by the post-independence ideology the proposition of the study would have been proved.

From the analysis of the different subjects examined in the remaining chapters of the study, the post-independence central government administration in Senegal emerges clearly as a continuation of the French colonial administration with only some modifications and adaptations made in the light of the goals of the government. In Guinea, while the administration shows several characteristics that have been dictated by the established ideology, it also shows some characteristics that have been inspired by the past colonial experience. In other words, the political ideology has not determined the evolution of the administration to the extent that is expected. And consequently, the extent of the contrasts between the post-independence central government administrations in Guinea and Senegal is much less than what is expected.

The two major areas where there are important similarities between the Guinean and Senegalese administrations are the administrative arrangements at ministerial level and the organization of the civil service personnel. In both cases, the two states have preserved the basic principles introduced

by the French colonial administration. The similarities in ministerial organization include the structure of ministries and the central role assigned to ministerial cabinets in the organization of work within the ministries. In regard to the civil service personnel, both states have preserved the principles of a career system of administration such as permanency of tenure, fixed salary, recruitment by qualifications or through competitive examinations, and regular promotions. The only difference between them is that while some significant modifications have been introduced in Guinea the modifications introduced in Senegal mainly deal with matters of detail.

The major contrasts between the two administrations emerge in the accounts of the administrative arrangements established at the regional and local levels and in the analysis of the relationship between the administration and representative institutions. In Senegal, there is, in both cases, an obvious continuity with the past colonial experience with only a few modifications and adaptations. In Guinea, the application of the doctrine of party supremacy to administrative organization at the regional and local levels has produced features which contrast with those of the Senegalese administration. Similarly, while representative institutions have been created in Senegal for the purpose of associating some elected representatives of the people with the work of the administration (as was the case under colonial rule), in Guinea, the institutions created are expected to serve as the means of preparing for the eventual withering

away of the administration - a situation in which all administrative work will be entrusted to elected citizens. Also, the traditional representative institutions created in Senegal - a parliament and a number of local councils (again, as under colonial rule) - contrast with those in Guinea which have been integrated with the party organization in line with the doctrine of party supremacy.

The administrative arrangements created in both states for promoting development activities reflect some of the above similarities and contrasts. At the ministerial level, the central planning machinery which the Guinean regime has tried to establish is similar to that established in Senegal and this recalls the similarity in their ministerial structures. On the other hand, the administrative arrangements created for promoting agricultural production show significant contrasts. While Guinea has created new institutions which take account of the established ideology - the socialist communities and the local revolutionary authorities - Senegal has decided to use the administrative area units established under colonial rule with only some minor modifications.

In the light of the above conclusions which are summed up in the final chapter, the following broad trends of development are indicated. (It is assumed that the current political ideologies of the two states will remain unchanged). In Senegal, the trend is towards a continuation of a French-style administration. The factors that favour this trend of development include the continued presence of some Frenchmen within the Senegalese administration and the France-orientated

nature of the training and experience of the present elite of the administration. In Guinea, the trend is towards a greater involvement of elected citizens in the work of the administration at the lower levels of the administrative organization while at the higher levels, many aspects of traditional administrative arrangements are maintained.

Finally, attention is drawn to the study's contribution to the current academic knowledge of Guinea and Senegal. In the case of Senegal, the study provides confirmatory evidence for the existing academic interpretation of the country. This evidence is significant in that it deals with a subject - the evolution of the post-independence central government administration - that has hitherto received very little academic attention. And in regard to Guinea, the study shows the extent to which some of the characteristics of the central government administration are due to the past colonial experience and some to the post-independence ideology; and thus, it corrects the notion in the existing studies of the country that the evolution of the administration has been determined only by the political ideology.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AOF	AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANCAISE
BPN	NATIONAL POLITICAL BUREAU
CER	CENTRE OF REVOLUTIONARY EDUCATION (Guinea) CENTRE OF RURAL EXPANSION (Senegal)
CINAM	COMPAGNIE D'ETUDES ET D'AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE
CNR	NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE REVOLUTION
CRD	REGIONAL COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENT
ENAS	ECOLE NATIONALE D'ADMINISTRATION DU SENEGAL
ENFOM	ECOLE NATIONALE DE LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER
ESA	ECOLE SUPERIEURE D'ADMINISTRATION
FIDES	FONDS D'INVESTISSEMENT POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL DE LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER
FWA	FRENCH WEST AFRICA
IHEOM	INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES D'OUTRE-MER
IPC	INSTITUT POLTECHNIQUE GAMAL ABDEL NASSER DE CONAKRY
JORG	JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE GUINEE
JORS	JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU SENEGAL
PDG	DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GUINEA
PRL	POUVOIR REVOLUTIONNAIRE LOCAL
SERESA	SOCIETE D'ETUDES ET DE REALISATIONS ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES DANS L'AGRICULTURE
SIP	SOCIETE INDIGENE DE PREVOYANCE
SMDR	MUTUAL SOCIETY FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT
UPS	SENEGALESE PROGRESSIVE UNION

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a comparative study of the central government administrations in Guinea and Senegal in the light of the contrasting political systems said to operate in the two countries since independence. Guinea and Senegal became independent in 1958 and 1960 respectively and according to the existing studies of both countries, they have developed contrasting political systems. However, until they became independent, both countries were French colonies and were administered under a common administrative system established by the French rulers.

The administrative system under which both Guinea and Senegal were ruled during the colonial period covered the other French colonies in West Africa. These colonies were grouped into a federation called French West Africa (Afrique occidentale française)¹ around 1900. In 1958, this federation was abolished and replaced by a Franco-African Community which each colony was free to accept or reject in a referendum; any colony that rejected the Community would automatically become independent. Guinea rejected the Community and became an independent Republic in October 1958. This option for independence led to an abrupt break with France: French administrative personnel were withdrawn within a few weeks and

¹ Although the abbreviation of the French title, AOF, is commonly used, we shall use the English translation's abbreviation, FWA, throughout this study.

this rendered an orderly institutional transfer impossible. Senegal, on the other hand, voted for membership of the Community and her independence in August 1960 was preceded by a progressive institutional transfer including a formal agreement on French personnel assistance for staffing the country's public services.¹ However, in spite of this difference in the circumstances in which the two countries obtained their independence, their administrative inheritances were the same. These consisted of administrative institutions and roles whose underlying principles were based on the metropolitan administrative experience.

In contrast to the similarity in the administrative inheritances of Guinea and Senegal, their post-independence political systems are said to have contrasting characteristics. According to the existing studies of Guinea, the political system is dominated by the ruling and only party, the Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti démocratique de Guinée, PDG). Broadly, the PDG is characterized as a party possessing an ideology which draws heavily on Marxist-Leninist doctrines of political organization and the role of the party in the state but derives its definition of the goals of government and the society from the objective conditions of

¹ This agreement was part of a Franco-Senegalese Convention which became law in Senegal in February 1960; see Journal officiel de la République du Sénégal (JORS), 22 Feb. 1960. The process of institutional transfer is discussed in some detail later in the study.

the country's realities.¹ Some analysts refer to this ideology as 'one-party ideology'; others call it 'socialism'.² We shall refer to it simply as 'PDG ideology'.

It is the aspects of PDG ideology which deal with political organization and the role of the party in the state that have received most attention in the existing studies. The studies of the party's political organization portray it as a 'tightly organized, highly disciplined, hierarchic party'.³ A detailed study is provided by B. Charles in his 'Un Parti politique africain: le Parti démocratique de Guinée'.⁴ Charles explains that the party's organizational structure is due to its acceptance of the principle of 'democratic centralism'. He describes how the party is organized from the village to the national level and stresses the existence of an elected executive of party officials at the different levels of the organizational structure.

In the studies of the role of the party within the Guinean state, it is said that it acts as the policy-making institution for the whole society and that its structures

¹ For a succinct account, see Aimé Césaire, 'The Political Thought of Sékou Touré,' in 'Independent Guinea,' Présence africaine, Special Number (1960), pp. 63-72. 'The political Thought of Sékou Touré' is used here as synonym of PDG ideology because Touré is the leader and secretary general of the PDG as well as the most articulate exponent of the party ideology.

² The expression 'one-party ideology' is used, for example by A. Zolberg in his Creating Political Order, The Party States of West Africa, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 43-47. For the description of PDG ideology as 'socialism', see B. Charles, 'Le Socialisme africain: mythes et réalités,' Revue française de sciences politiques, XV, 5, (1965), pp. 856-884.

³ G. Cowan, 'Guinea,' in G. M. Carter (ed.) African One-Party States, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 149-236 esp. p. 178.

⁴ Published in Revue française de sciences politiques, XII, 2, (June 1962), pp. 312-359.

serve as an administrative institution in certain circumstances. In reference to the latter point, for example, it is claimed that in local administration 'the party has taken over much of what at an earlier period were the regulatory and supervisory functions of the administration.'¹ In regard to the policy-making role of the party, it is said that decisions are made at the meetings and Congresses of the party.² However, all the analysts who have made this point stress that the party's national executive, the National Political Bureau (Bureau politique national, BPN) and its secretary-general who is also at the same time the head of the party and the President of the Republic play the dominant role in the decision-making process.³

Another point made in connection with the dominant position of the party in policy-making is that the cabinet, the legislature, and the administration - that is, all the traditional institutions of government - are subordinated to the party.⁴ The cabinet is dominated by members of the BPN

¹ Cowan, op. cit., p.211. The 'earlier period' referred to here is the period of colonial rule.

² Charles, 'Un Parti politique africain ...' op. cit. p.354.

³ President Sékou Touré has combined these functions since the country became independent in 1958.

⁴ This situation, it is pointed out, exists in spite of the fact that the regime adopted a Western-style constitution at independence. According to this constitution, state powers are shared between an executive, a legislature and a judiciary. See Cowan, op. cit. p. 207 and Charles, 'La Guinée,' in A. Mabileau and J. Meyriat (eds.) Décolonisation et régimes politiques en Afrique noire, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), p.164.

with the party's secretary-general as the head. An analysis of the activities of the legislature carried out shows it as a 'ratifying arm of the party'.¹ In the case of the administration, it is said that administrative structures are based on party structures at regional and local levels in order to enable the elected party officials to direct and control the work of the administration.²

The two major objectives of the Guinean regime which have been examined in some studies are the goals of national unity and of economic and social development. The objective of national unity is defined as the desire to unite the different ethnic groups within the country into a single political community.³ The point made by all analysts who have examined this subject is that the Guinean regime sees the party organization as the best instrument of achieving this objective.⁴ The studies of the regime's efforts to promote the country's economic and social development stress the importance attached to state control of the economy.

¹ Ibid.

² Charles, 'Un Parti politique africain ...' op. cit. and V. Du Bois, 'Guinea,' in J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp.186-215, esp. p.206.

³ In 1967, Government statistics showed that there were three major ethnic groups in Guinea: Peuls (1,400,000), Malinés (800,000), and Soussous (500,000). They constituted 73% of the country's 3,500,000 population with the remaining 27% made up of a number of minor groups. These figures are cited in C. Rivière, Mutations sociales en Guinée (Paris: Editions Marcel Rivière, 1971), p.30.

⁴ Du Bois, op. cit. and Rivière, op. cit. pp. 23-88, 158-276.

J. Suret-Canale spells out the underlying economic policy - the 'non-capitalist way' to development - in his La République de Guinée¹ and sets out the details of the economic activities carried out since independence. He draws attention to how economic decisions are made within the party structure and to how party officials and ordinary members are involved, in varying degrees, in implementing economic policies.²

To sum up, the post-independence political system in Guinea, according to existing studies, is centred on the ruling and only party, the PDG, whose ideology dictates the political organization of the country as well as the goals of the whole society. The party is effectively organized throughout the territory of the state and it serves both as a policy-making and, in some cases, as an administrative institution. The two major goals it has set out to achieve are national unity and the promotion of social and economic development.

Senegal's political system, according to existing studies, is based on the institutions provided for in a Western-style constitution in which state powers are shared between an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary. The French analysts who have examined these institutions conclude that they have evolved in a way that makes it possible to study them within the framework of French public law. This point is

¹ Paris: Editions sociales, 1970.

² Ibid. pp.159-399. See also H. De Decker, Nation et développement en Guinée et au Sénégal, (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), pp.83-103, 124-127.

demonstrated in a recent study by J-C. Gautron and M. Rougevin-Baville with the revealing title of Droit public du Sénégal.¹

In this book, Gautron and Rougevin-Baville examine Senegal's constitutional institutions under the three heads that are traditionally used in the text books on French public law: constitutional law (le droit constitutionnel), administrative law (le droit administratif), and judicial law (le droit judiciaire). In each case, they show that Senegalese institutions have been established on the basis of the principles and ideas that underlay similar institutions in France. In the case of administrative law, for example, they say that 'the Senegalese administrative law is, on the whole, very close to French law in numerous domains: theories (unwritten) of administrative act and of the conflict of abuse of power, codification of law of administrative contracts and of administrative responsibility (not without some adaptations)'.²

However, Gautron and Rougevin-Baville as well as other analysts who have examined these institutions admit that their organization and functioning differ in some ways from what exists in France because of the influence of local Senegalese realities. The three major local influences identified by these analysts are the existence of a de facto

¹ Paris: Pedone, 1970. The greater proportion of the standard texts on the French governmental system have the title 'Droit public'. The opening sentence of Droit public du Sénégal reads as follows: 'It is possible to present the public law of Senegal as pure and simple plagiarism of French law' (Italics added).

² Ibid. p.17.

one party and the government's commitment to the tasks of national unity and the promotion of economic and social development; Gautron and Rougevin-Baville refer to these tasks as 'the social functions of the state'.¹

Although the Senegalese constitution formally allows the establishment of several parties, the country has been ruled by only one party since independence - the Senegalese Progressive Union (Union progressiste sénégalaise, UPS). When, in 1966, the only official opposition party in the country merged with the UPS, the country became a de facto one party state. One example of the influence of the UPS on the functioning of the constitutional institutions described in these studies is connected with a political crisis which occurred within the party in December 1962. This crisis arose when the parliamentary majority in the National Assembly decided to bring about the fall of the Prime Minister and his Government by moving a motion of censure. The Prime Minister decided to prevent the Assembly from meeting and urged that the party executive should be summoned to resolve any differences between the parliament and the Government. (Both the Government and the parliamentary majority - all but one of the 80 deputies - were members of the UPS). In the end, the censure motion was carried and the Government fell.²

¹ Ibid. p.20

² Only the constitutional aspects of this crisis are summarized here. For more details, see P. Thibaud, 'Dia, Senghor et le socialisme africain, Esprit, 9 (Sept. 1963), pp. 332-348 and correspondence and reply on the article in Esprit, 1 (Jan. 1964), pp. 157-174.

Following this crisis, the constitution was revised in 1963 to give full executive powers to the President of the Republic who had hitherto shared these powers with the Prime Minister who was the head of Government. The revised constitution also included a provision requiring the President of the Republic to swear an oath to defend the supremacy of the constitutional institutions. Although this incident resulted in the affirmation of the supremacy of the constitution, it is pointed out that victory for the Prime Minister could have radically affected the importance attached to constitutional institutions.

Analysts also point to the fact that the President of the Republic is the secretary-general of the UPS (President Senghor has combined both functions since independence) as another way in which the party can influence the functioning of the constitutional institutions. The general opinion is that this influence has so far been minimal because President Senghor has consistently preferred to take decisions within the constitutional institutions.¹

A final influence of the UPS is said to derive from its ideology of 'African socialism' which articulates the tasks of national unity and of economic and social development. In regard to the former, the objective is to unite the country's different ethnic groups within a single political community and in regard to the latter, the ideology prescribes a mixed

¹ See, for example, F. Zucarelli, Un Parti politique africain: l'Union progressiste sénégalaise, (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970), p. 201, pp. 261-291, esp. p. 285.

economy as the overall strategy. The details of the policies aimed at achieving these objectives as well as their implementation are left to the government and the administration.¹ Gautron and Rougevin-Baville point out some of the consequences of the commitment to promote development for the administration.² This subject is also examined in a number of studies including a thesis with the title 'Les Structure administratives et le plan de développement du Sénégal',³

The analysis of the constitutional provisions stress that the executive has consistently been placed in a superior position vis-à-vis the parliament. In the current arrangements, the President of the Republic who 'determines the policies of the nation' is not responsible before the Assembly. Although the Assembly can move a motion of censure against the Government which executes the policies of the President, it can only carry the motion at the risk of its own dissolution by the President whose position is unaffected.⁴ All analysts are agreed that the Assembly has been weak both in theory and in practice. It is said to have underutilized its right to control the actions of the executive. This weakness of the Assembly is also said to extend to the other representative

¹ Ibid. and De Decker, op. cit. pp. 236-249

² Gautron and Rougevin-Baville, op. cit. pp. 167-185.

³ By R. De Laforcade, unpublished Thesis for the doctorat en droit, University of Toulouse, 1961.

⁴ The texts of the different constitutional changes analysed in these studies can be found in law no. 60-045 of 26 August 1960, JORS, 11 March 1963; and law no. 70-15 of 26 Feb. 1970, JORS, 28 Feb. 1970.

institutions such as the municipal councils.¹

Clearly, the above summary of Senegal's post-independence political system shows that it is quite different from the Guinean system: the former is centred on traditional constitutional institutions while the latter is centred on a single ruling party. Although the goals of national unity and development are adopted by both countries, there is an important difference in regard to the latter. Guinea's development strategy - a 'non-capitalist way' - envisages a state-controlled economy while Senegal's strategy - 'African socialism' - envisages a mixed economy.

The overall contrast between the two political systems is underlined by the fact that academic attention has been almost exclusively focused on the party in Guinea while the studies of Senegal have concentrated on the evolution of its constitutional institutions including the administration. The studies devoted to the administration in Senegal have all been conducted in French and have been mostly concerned with examining it within the context of the country's public law institutions. This approach has meant that the majority of the existing studies deal with the laws and regulations which govern the organization and functioning of the administration with only a few devoted to examining what has actually happened in practice. In the case of Guinea, the administration has not been studied at all either in French or in English. There is mention in the existing studies that the French

¹ See M. Diop, 'Le Contrôle de l'administration,' unpublished Thesis for the doctorat en droit, University of Dakar, 1970.

left behind something of an administrative apparatus but no one has investigated what has happened to it or what has been done with it. The occasional references to the administration in the existing studies suggests that it is completely overshadowed by the all important party.

In the light of the existing studies of the two states summarized above, it might be reasonable to postulate that in Senegal, the central government administration would represent an apparent evolution out of the French colonial administration modified and adapted to suit the goals of the government but in accordance with the basic ideas and principles that underlay the French colonial administration. With Guinea, on the other hand, given the way in which independence was achieved, the stated ideology and goals of the government and the emphasis in academic studies on the party both as a policy making and, in some cases, as an administrative institution, it might be expected that past colonial experience would have a minimal influence and that the central government administration would have markedly different characteristics; and thus, that this central government administration would present significant contrasts to that in Senegal. The central concern of this thesis is to investigate this general proposition.

The choice of the specific subjects selected for investigating this general proposition was dictated by the scope of the available research material found during the period of field work conducted in both Guinea and Senegal

between August 1970 and April 1971.¹ As used in this study, 'central government administration' means the ministerial departments and other administrative services of the central government whose competence extends throughout the territory of the state. In the case of Guinea, this means the entire administrative system since all administrative tasks are carried out under the direction of the central political authority. In Senegal, on the other hand, there are aspects of local administration which fall outside the direct authority of the central government and these are excluded from the study.

The first subject examined is the organization of the administration. This is covered in three chapters dealing with organization at ministerial level, organization at regional and local levels and the civil service personnel who operate them. Because of the nature of available research material, the study of the administrative structures will not deal in any detail with the internal communications

¹ Field research was conducted in Guinea between November 1970 and March 1971 and in Senegal between August and November 1970 and in March and April 1971. During the period of field research, we were able to consult published and unpublished government and party documents and unpublished theses, dissertations and mémoires. In addition to consulting these documentary sources, the period of field research was also used to carry out some forms of interview and observation. The interviews conducted were sometimes structured and sometimes unstructured; they were used to elicit the opinions of civil servants on the evolution of the administrations they operated. The personal observations of administrative life in both Guinea and Senegal was carried out in both the capital cities and in some regional headquarters. These observations revealed some facts that were either concrete in themselves for use or were useful for interpreting other information obtained from either the documentary sources or the interviews.

within the administrations. The second subject examined is the relationship between the administrative institution and the representative institutions in each state. According to the existing studies of the two states, Guinea's administrative institution will have to deal with bodies elected by the party organization while Senegal's administrative institution will deal with the more traditional representative institutions - a parliament and some local councils. The ways in which both administrations have coped with these institutions will be examined in one chapter. The third subject examined is the nature of the administrative arrangements established for development activities in the two states. These arrangements are likely to be affected by the difference in the economic strategy adopted by each state (as stated in the existing studies of the states) - state-controlled economy in Guinea and a mixed economy in Senegal - as well as by the claim that Guinea's party organization is deeply involved in these activities, a situation that is absent in Senegal. A chapter is devoted to examining the existing administrative arrangements for development activities in the two states.

Two background chapters will precede the study of the above three subjects. The first chapter will examine the nature of the colonial administrative system from which the central government administration in each state has evolved. The chapter will focus on the structures and institutions of the colonial administration and the principles underlying their form of organization and method of operation. These constitute

the colonial administrative legacy whose characteristic features will be compared with those of the post-independence central government administrations in the two states. The second chapter will examine the relationship between the ideology and administration of each state as articulated by their respective leaders - President Touré in Guinea and President Senghor in Senegal. The writings and speeches of both leaders are cited extensively in the current literature and the purpose of the chapter is to find out more details on these leaders' conceptions of administration.

In a concluding chapter, we shall sum up the major conclusions of the study and show the extent to which it has proved or disproved the general proposition of the thesis.

CHAPTER 1

THE FRENCH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE LEGACY

The object to be attained in the Colonies ought to be the creation of real French administrative departments.

P. Dislère¹

Faithful to her traditional mission, France proposes to guide the peoples for whom she has taken responsibility into freedom to administer themselves and conduct their own affairs democratically.²

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the legacy of administrative institution inherited by Guinea and Senegal when they became independent in 1958 and 1960 respectively. To do this, the chapter will concentrate on the organizational structures of the colonial administration, the institutions associated with it and the principles underlying their form of organization and method of operation.³

¹ This was Dislère's teaching at the Ecole coloniale from 1888 to 1932; quoted in R. Delavignette, Freedom and Authority in French West Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1968. (New Impression), p.50.

² Quoted from the Preamble to the constitution of the French Union; extracts from this constitution can be found in Appendix A.

³ An alternative approach would be to give an historical account of the French colonial administration in West Africa. This approach is rejected because it will involve some details that are not only irrelevant for our purpose but are also likely to obscure some of the points we wish to highlight.

As mentioned in the Introduction, Guinea and Senegal were organized with other French colonies in West Africa into a federation called French West Africa (FWA). This federation was formally established in 1904 to constitute a unit within the French Empire.¹ Until its abolition in 1958, the federation's organization structure was as follows (see next page). Because of the important changes introduced in the administrative arrangements of the federation in 1957,² the post-1957 arrangements are examined separately later on in the chapter.

The colonial administration in FWA was organized as a single unit and was placed under the Ministry of Colonies at the metropolitan centre. Because this administration was regarded as an integral part of the metropolitan administration, it was regulated by decrees which were, for the most part, modifications of the existing laws related to the metropolitan administration.³ The decrees were introduced by the Minister of Colonies at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers where they were debated and adopted.

¹ This federation was first created in 1895 but did not assume its definitive form until 1904. For a detailed account of its establishment, see C. Newbury, 'The Formation of the Government General of French West Africa,' Journal of African History, I, 1 (1960), pp.111-128

² These changes were introduced by an enabling law called the loi-cadre passed by the French National Assembly in June 1956.

³ Most of the decisions regulating French colonial administration were taken in the form of decrees because of the Senatus-consulte of 3 May 1854 which stipulated that all matters which were dealt with by law in France should be in the domain of decrees in the colonies. In the few cases where laws were concerned, they were passed by the French National Assembly.

PARIS (The Metropolitan Centre)

DAKAR (The Federal Centre)

Guinea Dahomey Ivory Coast Mauri- Niger Senegal Soudan Upper Volta
(The Territories)

(Cercles)

(Subdivisions)

(Cantons)

(Villages)

The Administrative Organization of French West Africa

They went directly to the Governor-General of FWA (the head of the Government General) who, in his capacity as 'the depository of the powers of the Republic', had the duty of promulgating them throughout the federation. The organization of the administration in FWA was regulated by these decrees. In matters of detail, the Governor-General could issue orders (arrêtés) which must be consistent with the provisions of the decrees. This idea of subordinating the administration to the law meant the extension to FWA of an existing metropolitan administrative principle; it was maintained throughout the colonial period.

Another point to mention in connection with the metropolitan centre is the fact that the colonial administration in FWA was dependent for its effective functioning on the other parts of the French metropolitan administration. This, as will be shown below, resulted in the transplantation of many characteristic features of the French metropolitan administration to FWA. First, let us consider the arrangements made in connection with personnel. There were two categories of officials at the metropolitan centre who were connected with the administration in FWA. One category consisted of established officials seconded from some of the technical services of the metropolitan civil service. Although they were under the authority of the Minister of Colonies during the period of secondment (the special case of some officials from the Ministry of Finance is considered later on), the normal flow of their career continued within their original services. The second category of officials

were recruited directly by the Ministry of Colonies and constituted into a special corps called the corps of colonial administrators. This was based on the existing practice in France where most ministerial departments organized their leading officials into one or more corps.¹ As was the case with the metropolitan corps, the corps of colonial administrators was composed of officials recruited and trained by a specialized training institution, the Ecole coloniale.² Both categories of officials were placed at the disposal of the Governor-General of FWA who was responsible to the Minister of Colonies for their deployment throughout the federation. This arrangement was modified in 1950 when the system of secondment was discontinued and all the senior officials responsible for the administration of FWA were organized into general cadres (cadres généraux) within the Ministry of Overseas France.³ The implication of this personnel situation was that the metropolitan system

¹ For details on this practice in France, see F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp.30-34, 39-41.

² Founded in 1889, its name was changed to the Ecole nationale de la France d'Outre-mer (ENFOM) in 1934. The practice of admitting a few officials who had not passed through this school into the corps was discontinued around 1920. For more details, see M. Cohen, Rulers of Empire: the French Colonial Service in Africa, (California: Hoover Institute Press, 1971) pp.37-56, 84-107, 143-158.

³ The general statute for civil servants established in France in 1946 for the metropolitan civil service was made applicable to the members of these cadres. The secondment of officials continued in the very few cases where the establishment of a general cadre was considered inappropriate. The name of the Ministry of Colonies was changed to the Ministry of Overseas France in 1934.

of personnel administration applicable to senior officials, including the idea of specialized training, was introduced to FWA. It should also be mentioned that some West Africans were free to compete for recruitment into the corps of colonial administrators, to the general cadres (after 1950), and to any service of the metropolitan civil service under the same conditions as Frenchmen.¹

Unlike the officials seconded from the other service of the metropolitan administration, the officials from the inspectorate corps of the Ministry of Finance continued to be responsible to their metropolitan superiors and to the Minister of Finance. This arrangement replicated the existing arrangement in France where the officials responsible for financial inspection throughout the entire administration were responsible only to the Minister of Finance. This was one of the important methods of internal control within the metropolitan administration. It was possible to extend this to FWA because the organization of the financial administration there was based on the metropolitan pattern. A further evidence of this is the fact that the Court of Accounts (Cour des comptes) which acted as the supreme judicial body responsible for the end-of-year audit of all public accounts in France exercised the same authority over financial administration in FWA.²

¹ Until all Africans became citizens of the French Union in 1946, only the few who enjoyed the status of 'French citizen' (about 25,000 in 1930) were able to compete for recruitment to these services. After 1946, the low educational development in FWA meant that the Africans were still at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the metropolitan citizens.

² This arrangement was slightly modified in 1955; see p. 29.

A second judicial institution at the metropolitan centre on which the colonial administration in FWA depended was the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat). This Council served as the supreme institution for settling administrative conflicts both in France and in FWA. Appeals from the administrative law institution created in FWA (infra) came to the Council of State for final judgment and, in addition, some matters related to conflicts on ultra vires came directly before it. The Tribunal of Conflicts (Tribunal de conflicts) in Paris was also responsible for any conflicts of jurisdiction that arose between the judicial courts and the administrative law institution in FWA. The Council of State was rarely used at the beginning of the colonial administration but after 1946, the creation of local Assemblies in FWA with some powers vis-à-vis the colonial administration (infra) gave rise to a number of conflicts that were brought before it.¹

A final point to mention at the metropolitan centre is the fact that some representative institutions were associated

¹ On the under-utilization of the Council of State prior to 1946, see P. Lampué and L. Roland, Précis de droit des pays d'Outre-mer, (Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 1949), pp.506-507 and J.-P. Masseron, Le Pouvoir et la justice en Afrique noire francophone et à Madagascar, (Paris: Pedone, 1966), p.18. Among the cases brought directly before the Council of State after 1946 were those connected with some Assemblies' refusal to vote the administration's budgets. In almost every case, the Council was on the side of the administration and the reason it gave for its judgement was that the Assemblies must not be 'allowed, through lack of experience or political passion, to hinder the economic and financial development of the territories or federations' (sic.). See J. Ravanel, 'Le Conseil d'Etat et les assemblées des territoires d'Outre-mer,' Etudes et documents du Conseil d'Etat, no. IV (1950), p.60.

with the administrative arrangements for FWA. This idea, too, was based on an existing practice in France. First, there was a Superior Council of Colonies created in 1883 with responsibility for all French Colonies including those in FWA. From 1904 onwards, FWA was represented on the Council by four delegates elected by the French citizens in Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Guinea and the Soudan and the member of the French National Assembly elected by the citizens in Senegal. This Council was to be consulted by the Minister of Colonies and, in addition, could act as a court of appeal against the actions of the Governor-General of FWA.

The second representative institution involved with the colonial administration at the metropolitan centre was the French National Assembly. Until the constitution of the French Union of 1946 gave the Assembly wide powers in connection with colonial legislation, its involvement in colonial administration was only marginal.¹ The 1946 constitution stipulated, inter alia, that 'in the Overseas Territories, legislative power shall belong to Parliament in matters of criminal law, the regulation of civil liberties and political and administrative organization' (article 72); and that 'the framework, the extent, the possible regrouping and the organization of the communes and departments, and the Overseas Territories shall be settled by law' (article 36). Because of the Assembly's increased involvement in colonial

¹ See p. 17, fn. 3.

administration it was considered necessary to have the elected representatives of the colonies within it;¹ FWA was represented by about 19 deputies.² Since the colonial legislation decided upon by the Assembly could be influenced by both the Council of the Republic (the Senate) and the French Union Assembly, FWA was also represented within both institutions.³

The above administrative arrangements established for FWA at the metropolitan centre determined the character of the administrative arrangements within West Africa. Its most outstanding features were its unitary character and a high degree of centralization. The unitary character was due to the fact that FWA was considered as single administrative unit and the decrees regulating the organization and functions of the administration were those taken by the Minister of Colonies and promulgated by the Governor-General for the federation. The high degree of centralization was

¹ Prior to 1946, only the citizens in Senegal were represented by one deputy in the National Assembly - a tradition that existed long before FWA was established.

² This figure of West Africans in the National Assembly and subsequent references to the number of African representatives in metropolitan institutions are purely indicative; the figures varied considerably during this period. In general, it will be more appropriate to take all the representatives of the Overseas Territories together since colonial administration legislation and decrees were most often uniformly applied to all of them. In 1951, the Overseas Territories had 43 deputies, 44 senators and about 60 representatives in the French Union Assembly.

³ Africans were represented within the French Senate for the first time after 1946. The French Union Assembly was a new institution created in the 1946 constitution and was to be consulted on colonial legislation, including the decrees taken at the meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers.

due to the concentration of administrative activities at the federal centre and to the existence of a chain of command from the Governor-General at the federal centre, passing through the Lieutenant-Governors at the territorial centres and culminating with the administrative officials placed at the head of the different administrative area units into which every colony was divided. (These area units were called cercles and the officials were known as commandants de cercle).

Three factors favoured the concentration of administrative activities at the federal centre under the Governor-General. First, except for the low-level officials recruited within each colony, the staff of the whole colonial administration in F.A. was administered from the federal centre. (In the case of the senior officials recruited by the Ministry of Colonies, the role of the Governor-General was limited to deciding on their posting). When the general cadres were created in 1950, the officials recruited and administered at the federal centre who performed middle-level functions were organized into common superior cadres (cadres communs supérieurs).¹ In 1952 a general statute for civil servants modelled on the metropolitan statute of 1946 was created for these officials.²

Second, all the major services of F.A. - Health, Education, Finance, Public Works, the Judiciary and so on - had their

¹ See law no. 50-772 of 30 June 1950, Journal officiel de l'Afrique occidentale française, 5 August 1950.

² This statute set out the detailed provisions for operating a career system of administration. See order 305-1 LT of 14 Jan. 1952, Journal officiel de l'Afrique occidentale française, 21 Jan. 1952.

headquarters in Dakar and except for the Attorney-General (title of the head of the Judicial Services), all the other heads of services corresponded with their external services in the colonies through the office of the Governor-General. Also, the institution for the control and supervision of the administration - the General Inspectorate of Administrative Affairs - was based in Dakar.¹ The third factor was the financial position of the Government General. It controlled the revenues that accrued from indirect taxes and for most of the period, its budget was nearly as big as that of all the colonies taken together.²

The Governors³ at the head of the individual colonies were the hierarchical subordinates of the Governor-General. They had the responsibility for ensuring that the decisions taken at the federal centre were applied within their colonies and they supervised the activities of the different services of the federal government located within their areas. In 1950, they were given powers to organize the lower-level agents of the administration working within their territories⁴ into local cadres (cadres locaux) after obtaining

¹ This was from 1933 onwards. Prior to this date, the supervision and control of the administration was the responsibility of the Inspectorate General of Colonial Affairs based in Paris.

² For a discussion of financial administration in F.A. during this period, see C. W. Newbury, 'The Government General and Political Change in French West Africa,' in V. Kirkwood, (ed.) African Affairs Number One, St. Antony's Papers No. 10, (London: Chatto and Windus 1961), pp. 41-59.

³ The title of Governor replaced that of Lieutenant-Governor in 1937; henceforth, the title of Governor will be used in the study.

⁴ After 1946 the title of 'colony' was changed to that of 'territory'; both are used, and used interchangeably in this study

the prior approval of the Governor-General. These local cadre officials (mostly Africans) did not benefit from the provisions of the statute for civil servants introduced in 1952; they were described as auxiliaries of the administration and not as civil servants.¹

Finally, there were the commandants who were the hierarchical subordinates of the Governors. They coordinated the activities of the Government General's external services located within their areas. (The cercles served as the area units within which many of the federal services were organized). In addition, each commandant was in a general manner, responsible for the effective administration of the cantons and villages within the cercle. A commandant's functions included, among others, the maintenance of law and order, the collection of taxes, and the running of the Native Provident Societies for Mutual Agricultural Assistance and Loans (Sociétés indigènes de prévoyance de secours et de prêts mutuels agricoles, SIF)² which were intended to improve the living conditions of the population in the rural areas.

The commandant was assisted in most areas of his

¹ It has been estimated that about 99.8% of this category of officials were Africans in 1956; see B. Crochet, 'La Fonction publique Outre-mer et l'Africanisation des cadres,' Latitudes, 2 (1957), p.8.

² The abbreviation of the French expression, SIF, will be used throughout this study. On how the SIFs functioned, see K; Robinson, 'Les Sociétés de prévoyance in French West Africa,' Journal of African Administration, II, 4 (Oct. 1950), pp.29-33 and A. Ly, L'Etat et la Production paysanne, (Paris: Présence africaine, 1958), passim.

functions, especially in the collection of taxes, by African chiefs who were selected to head the cantons and villages. However, these chiefs were merely auxiliaries of the commandants who had all the powers. The relative position of the commandants and the African chiefs has been put as follows:

They (the chiefs) have no special powers of any kind, because there are not two authorities in the cercle, the French authority and the indigenous authority; there is only one. It is only the commandant of cercle who commands; he is the only person who is responsible. The indigenous chief is only an instrument, an auxiliary.¹

This role of the African chiefs within the cantons and villages constituted an original feature of the colonial administration in FWA. It was different from what existed in France where established civil servants were responsible for a group of cantons and an elected mayor had responsibility for the administration of the villages (called communes).² The reason for this difference will be discussed later on.

¹ In Governor-General Van Vollenhoven's famous Circular of 15 August 1917, quoted by J. Suret-Canale, Afrique noire, l'ère coloniale 1900-1945, (Paris: Editions sociales, 1964), p.110. For a detailed discussion of the position of African chiefs within the French colonial administration in West Africa, see R. Cornevin, 'L'Evolution des chefferies dans l'Afrique noire d'expression française,' Recueil penant, no. 686 (1961), pp.235-250; no.687 (1961), pp.379-388; no. 688 (1961), pp.539-556; and M. Crowder and O. Ikime (eds), West African Chiefs, (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press, 1970), pp.2-13, 24-160.

² For details of the organization of local administration in France, see B. Chapman, The Prefects and Provincial France, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955).

The other features of the administration in FWA were closely related to the characteristics identified with the administrative arrangements for FWA at the metropolitan centre. We have already mentioned the fact that the metropolitan system of personnel administration was also adopted for FWA. This was accompanied, after 1950, by the creation of a number of specialized training institutions for the officials of the administration. These included the Ecole fédérale des postes et télécommunications de l'Afrique occidentale française and the Ecole des assistants d'élevage de l'Afrique occidentale française.

Another feature was the role of the courts. As already mentioned, both the Court of Accounts and the Council of State also had jurisdiction throughout FWA. Because the Council of State was essentially a court of appeal in matters of administrative conflict, a Council of Administrative Conflict was created for FWA.¹ This Council had responsibility for disputes arising from administrative action such as compensation for damages of public work, land concessions and mining rights, and for some categories of disputes connected with ultra vires, especially disputes arising from the statutes of territorial civil servants. In 1955, the Council of Administrative Conflict was empowered to sit as a Chamber of Accounts to judge local public services' accounts (law of 18 November 1955). Appeals could be made from it to the Court of Accounts in Paris (supra). With

¹ It was created on the basis of a decree of 7 September 1881 which had established such Councils in France's older colonies.

regard to the actual working of the Council, available evidence suggests that it was rarely used throughout the period.¹

Finally, as at the metropolitan centre, a number of representative institutions were associated with the work of the administration in FWA. One of the representative institutions at the federal centre was the Council of Government to which the Governor-general presented his programme annually. The Council considered the budgets of the federation and of the individual colonies and was also to be consulted on various subjects like loans and taxation. However, the membership of the Council was hardly representative of the population as most of them were officials of the administration. The official members were: the Secretary General of the Government General, the Governors of the constituent colonies, the Superior Commander of the Armed Forces, the Attorney General and the Directors of the federation's central services. The representative members were the Senegalese deputy, the four members of the Superior Council of Colonies, two representatives of each colony chosen from the Councils of Administration and representatives of the Chambers of Commerce in the Colonies.² The prepon-

¹ See Masseron, op. cit. pp.17-18 and Lampué and Rolland, op. cit. pp.502-508.

² The composition of the Council of Government (as well as that of the Councils of Administration discussed later on) evolved during this period. For example, members of these Councils were all nominated by the administration until 1925 when some kind of election was introduced for a small proportion of the members.

derance of official members ensured that official policies always prevailed. After 1946 the Council's size was reduced to include only the head of the major federal services (such as Education and the Judiciary), the Governors of the constituent territories and the president of a newly created Grand Council. Instead of the previous emphasis on its role as a body to be consulted by the Governor-General, it was henceforth expected to act as a check on the powers of the Governor-General. It had a permanent commission composed of some of its members which met regularly.

Another institution associated with the administration in FWA at the federal level was the Grand Council which was created by a law of 29 August 1947. It was a federal Assembly to which each of the eight territories of FWA sent five elected councillors from their respective local Assemblies. In addition to serving as a representative assembly, the Council was also given certain powers that would enable it to control certain aspects of the administration's work. In matters of administrative regulation, it performed the same role vis-à-vis the Governor-General as that performed by the French Union Assembly vis-à-vis the Head of the French Union in Paris. Articles 74 and 75 of the 1946 constitution stipulated that it must be consulted on matters concerning the internal organization of the constituent territories as well as over any future alteration in their respective statutes. Furthermore, it was to be compulsorily consulted by the Governor-General on a long list of subjects including taxation, education,

public works and agricultural, commercial and industrial credit. It adopted the federal budget which was prepared and presented before it by the Governor-General.

To enable the Council to fulfil these multifarious functions, a permanent committee consisting of one member from each territory was created which met monthly. It was this committee that was consulted by the Government General on the execution of development programmes for FWA. There is evidence that the Grand Council and its permanent committee consistently sought to control the activities of the administration. Indeed, it was the Council of State which limited their effectiveness in certain areas. For example, when the Grand Council decided that French capitalist interests should pay more taxes on their profits in order to make more money available for development, the Council of State upheld the opposition of the administration on the grounds that such an increase in taxation would frighten away investors from FWA and the French Union.¹

The institutions associated with the colonial administration within the territories were as follows. First, there was a Council of Administration which each Governor was to consult with regard to subjects like the colony's budget, direct taxation, loans and the disposal of government property and land. The composition of these Councils was fairly broad-based but was hardly representative of the

¹ Avis 243725, AOF of 20 April 1948 of the Council of State. Quoted by Ravanel, op. cit., p.60.

African population. In Niger and Mauritania, all the non-official members were nominated by the administration itself. In the other colonies, except Senegal, a few members were elected by a special electoral college of African subjects.¹ In all cases, there was a considerable representation of the Chambers of Commerce. The following advice of ex-Governor Annet to his successors throws some light on what happened in practice:

Always co-operate with commerce. That civil servants are satisfied with you or not is of little importance: it is the support of commerce that will constitute your strength at the same time as your eventual support with the Government.²

It should be noted that Governor Annet did not bother to talk of African opinion; and he was right because it counted for nothing.

The situation in Senegal was slightly different from that in the other colonies for historical reasons. Apart from its own equivalent of the Council of Administration, called the Private Council, there was a General Council established in 1879. This Council was established as the equivalent of the Departmental General Councils in France. It had twenty members elected by the citizens of the four

¹ Subject (sujet) in French colonial administrative terminology was used in contrast to citizen (citoyen). The subject had no rights and was subjected to both the indigénat (summary administrative justice) and forced labour. Only a handful of Africans were citizens, 25,000 in 1931 of whom 23,000 were in Senegal. This distinction was abolished in 1946 (infra).

² A. Annet, Je suis gouverneur d'Outre-mer, (Paris: Editions du conquistador, 1957), p.101.

communes. Like its counterparts in France, it could impose taxation and it approved the budget for the non-protectorate part of Senegal. After the merger of the two distinct administrative areas of Senegal in 1920,¹ some representation was accorded to African chiefs on a new council called the Colonial Council - established to replace the existing General Council. However, instead of increasing the representativeness of the Council, the presence of the chiefs merely strengthened the hand of the colonial administration. Chosen by the administration (and many of them became chiefs by its grace),² the chiefs saw themselves as the unconditional supporters of the administration's viewpoints. The Council's role did not change very much throughout the period.

Indeed, the locally elected Assemblies established in these territories in 1947³ virtually replaced the Councils

¹ Until 1920, Senegal was officially divided into two by the colonial administration: the 'pays de protectorat' and the 'territoire d'administration directe' (protectorate country and territory of direct administration). The latter referred to the coastal four communes for whom the General Council was established. The rest of the colony was the protectorate. It should be noted that although this division was in reality artificial, the citizens in the protectorate did not enjoy the same rights as those in the four communes until the 1920 merger.

² The French administrator in Ziguinchor confirmed this point in his report in 1956 when he wrote: 'In Casamance as is often the case in the cercles of Senegal, the genuine traditional chiefs are rare'. Quoted by F. Zucarrelli in his 'L'Arrondissement sénégalais,' Annales africaines (1966), p.264.

³ The locally elected Assemblies were first called General Councils. The law of February 1952 which revised their composition changed their title to Territorial Assemblies. However, the members continued to be called Councillors.

of Administration and the Senegalese Colonial Council as the representative institutions which the Governors were to consult. Unlike the Councils of Administration, a sizable proportion of the population was involved in the elections which determined the composition of the Assemblies. However, the quality of this representation should not be exaggerated. With the exception of Senegal where a common roll was used in the elections, the electorate in each territory was divided into two colleges: the first for citizens of metropolitan status and the second for citizens of local status.

In general, the first college consisted of Frenchmen living in the territories while the African populations made up the second college. The distribution of seats between the two colleges did not obey any demographic or other rational criteria and the least that can be said is that the French colons were excessively over-represented.¹ The half-hearted attempt to maintain some balance in 1952 did not go far enough. (The Table on the next page shows the distribution of seats between the different electoral colleges for the period 1946-1956).

A Territorial Assembly could direct the action of the administration in matters connected with town planning, public works, tourism, co-operatives and low-cost housing unless their deliberation was revoked by the Council of State on the appeal of the Governor. In financial matters, it deliberated on the budget and fixed the taxes. However,

¹ A good illustration was in Guinea where, in 1954, 3,000 Europeans had 16 Councillors while over 2 million Africans had only 24.

TABLE 1

The Distribution of Seats between the Different Electoral College in the Local and Group Assemblies of French West Africa, 1946-1956.

Country	Law of 7 Oct. 1946 & Decrees of Application			Law of 26 Feb. 1952		
	1st.	Colleges 2nd.	Single	1st	Colleges 2nd.	Single
FWA (Grand Council)			40			40
Bahomey	12	18		18	32	
Guinea	16	24		18	32	
Ivory Coast	18	27		18	32	
Mauritania	6	14		8	16	
Niger	10	20		15	35	
Senegal			50			60
Soudan	20	30		20	40	
Upper Volta	10	40		10	40	

Source: Adapted from F. Borella, L'Evolution politique et juridique de l'Union Française depuis 1946 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1958), p.480.

with about 80% of expenditure declared obligatory, its share of initiative in this sphere was very limited. It was to be compulsorily consulted on a number of issues including the Governor's orders, local cadres, religion, and birth, marriage and death registration. Finally, a Territorial Assembly could address any observations directly to the minister of Overseas France. It could also commission its members to investigate any aspects of administrative action within the territory.

Each Assembly had a permanent commission which followed the administrative execution of its deliberations. In most cases, the Councillors in the different Assemblies not only carried out the functions enumerated above but also asked for further increase in their role, especially with regard to controlling the action of the colonial administrators. In the end, some Assemblies were accused of excessive zeal by the colonial administrators who, for their part, felt that the reforms already accomplished had gone too far.¹

Another institution that was created during this period was the Council of Indigenous Notables (commonly referred to as the Council of Notables). It was created by a decree of 21 May 1919 and it provided for the establishment of a Council of Notables by the side of the commandants in cercles

¹ See Ravanel, op. cit. pp. 52-53; R. Adloff and V. Thompson, French West Africa, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 75-76; and P. F. Gonidec, Les Assemblées locales des territoires d'Outre-mer, (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1953), pp. 67-68.

where 'the degree of evolution of the native population permit it'. As it turned out, the reference to 'the degree of the evolution of the native population' as a condition for the establishment of a council proved a very convenient excuse for some commandants who did not bother to establish any councils. And where councils existed, the members were the administrator's nominees, formally appointed by the Governor. Furthermore, the administrator was the president of the council; he summoned its meetings and fixed the agenda. The council was to be consulted on all matters relating to native tax, the rate of native trading licenses, the execution of public works and any other matters submitted to it by the president. In practice, the chiefs and local notables who filled the councils merely adopted the administrator's proposals on these subjects. After 1946, there was some qualitative improvement in the composition of these councils as the territorial and federal Councillors became de jure members of the councils within their areas. In addition, the role of the councils was considerably enlarged as they were allowed to raise taxes called cercle tax which they could use for local projects.

Finally, there was the establishment of some municipal councils which were to serve as forums for some kind of participation by elected representatives of the people in the work of the administration at the lower levels. Here again, Senegal was in a unique position with its four full communes (communes de plein exercice) of Gorée, Saint-Louis, Rufisque and Dakar, operating more or less like

similar institutions in France.¹ A decree of 9 April 1929 reduced the number to three by merging Gorée with Dakar. As early as 1891, a law was passed in Paris providing for the establishment of native communes (communes indigènes) in all of Senegal outside the four full communes. In 1920, this law was modified by a decree which extended the creation of native communes to cover all FWA. By 1940, nothing had been done to implement the provision of both the law and the decree except for a single case at Agone in Dahomey.²

The law of 1891 referred to above also provided for the creation of mixed communes (communes mixtes) all over FWA. A mixed commune was headed by an administrator, called administrator-mayor (administrateur-maire), appointed by the Governor from among the administrators. Upon the recommendation of the Governor, the Governor-General could establish this form of administration in any part of FWA. To qualify, a locality must possess resources which could enable it to balance its budget. A decree of December 1920 distinguished between three categories of mixed communes.

A first degree mixed commune had a municipal commission whose 8-12 members were appointed by the Governor-in-Council. A second degree mixed commune had a municipal commission whose 8-12 members were elected by a restricted suffrage.

¹ These communes were created in the second half of the nineteenth century: Gorée, St. Louis (1872), Rufisque (1880) and Dakar (1887). The law of 5 April 1884 on municipal administration in France also applied to these communes except for a few of its articles.

² Suret-Canale, op. cit. p.416, fn. 2.

All mixed communes, regardless of their degree, had power to deliberate over matters submitted to them by the administrator-mayor; they could also give their opinion on all the questions submitted by the administration through the mayor. By 1939, there were only 23 mixed communes in FWA, none of them of third degree and more than half (14) in Senegal alone.

Very little changed in the state of municipal administration described above until 1956. Thus, in the case of the native communes a new decree of 26 November 1947 which stated that they should be replaced by medium communes (communes de moyen exercice)¹ remained unapplied. Unlike the previous situation when these communes were not created because of sheer administrative inaction, there were some concrete reasons this time. French colons in FWA united to oppose the establishment of medium communes because of the common college they would generate for all the territories. They argued that this would lead to ultra-nationalism among Africans. Furthermore, they argued that the use of a common electoral college would reduce the chances of Frenchmen in the council and this would not correspond to their potential contribution to municipal funds. It was not until a comprehensive municipal reform was undertaken in 1955 that this

¹ A medium commune was to have a municipal council elected by a common college while the Governor was to appoint an administrator as mayor. Its powers were to be roughly the same as those of the Senegalese communes. The decision to create a medium commune was vested in the Governor-General after the advice of the Grand Council and the local Assembly of the individual territories. After five years, a medium commune could become a full commune

opposition was broken. Thus, an institution that was to serve as a forum for African participation in, and control of, colonial administration was effectively blocked by a tiny minority of French colons.

The mixed communes, for their part, increased considerably in number, from 23 in 1939 to 53 in 1955. There was also some qualitative improvement in their composition. 35 of them had elected councils (that is, of third degree) and the remaining 18 had nominated councils (that is, of first degree). However, the administrator-mayor was the veritable executive of the commune and the amount of effective participation of nominated or elected Africans was limited.

African dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in municipal administration was articulated in Paris, especially in the French Union Assembly where two resolutions calling for reform were passed in May 1948. In spite of consistent pressures, nothing was done until 1955 when a law was passed on the re-organization of municipal administration in some parts of the French Union including FWA. According to this law, (loi municipale pour les territoires d'Outre-mer of 18 November, 1955) two kinds of communes could be created: full and medium communes. The law created a total of 26 full communes in FWA and all of them were to be under the 1884 municipal law which had already been made applicable in the Senegalese communes. The procedure for creating medium communes was simplified - the territorial Governor was to decide on their creation after consultation with the local Assembly. Furthermore, promotion from medium commune

status to that of full commune would henceforth be possible within two years instead of five. Finally, it was stipulated that a common electoral college would be used in all municipal elections. The practical effects of these changes are discussed later on.

The above administrative arrangements were, in theory, meant to reflect the changes in the French colonial policy during this period. Officially, France had two colonial policies between 1904 and 1940 (that is, for most of the period covered above): a policy of assimilation¹ and a policy of association. The former was in force up to 1918 when it gave place to the latter which remained in force until the French defeat at the hands of the Germans in 1940.

The ideal of the policy of assimilation with regard to administration² was 'the creation of real French administrative departments in the colonies'.³ This means that each colony was to be treated as one or more French departments. The organization and structure of the administrations in all colonies were to be integrated into the metropolitan system and their operation was to follow the same procedures. According to pure administrative assimilation, then, there

¹ Assimilation was sanctioned as official colonial policy at the Congrès national colonial in 1890.

² Only administrative assimilation is discussed here. A lot has been written on French assimilation policy in general and interested readers can consult a concise treatment of the subject in M. D. Lewis, 'The Assimilation Theory in French Colonial Policy,' Comparative Studies in Society and History, IV, 2 (Jan. 1962), pp.129-153

³ See p. 16, fn. 1.

was to be a generalized applicability of French administrative doctrine and practices throughout French West Africa. While administrative assimilation sought to transplant hook, line, and sinker, the metropolitan administrative system into the colonies, the policy of association accepted the need for taking local realities into consideration in making such a transplantation.¹

It is difficult to explain the organizational structures and institutions described above in terms of the policies of assimilation and association. If pure administrative assimilation means the establishment of 'real French administrative departments' in FWA, this did not happen. Neither FWA nor its component territories were organized like French departments: although the Governor-General was described as 'the depository of the powers of the Republic' like the Prefect in France, their functions were not the same.² However, the fact that the Court of Accounts, the Council of State and the Tribunal of Conflicts were expected to perform the same functions in FWA as they performed in France can be cited as examples of institutional assimilation. But the fact that these institutions, especially the Council of State, were rarely used shows that this point must not be exaggerated. Also, the municipal systems introduced to FWA, except the four communes of Senegal, were quite different from the metropolitan system to which they were often compared.

¹ Deschamps, op. cit. p.149.

² On French departments and the function of the prefects, see Chapman, op. cit.

With regard to the policy of association, the use of African chiefs within the colonial administration is often cited as its supreme illustration. But this assertion is difficult to sustain because French colonial administrators started to use African chiefs before the policy of association was formally declared in 1918. African chiefs were used at the lower levels of the colonial administrative structure because it was the most practical way of effectively administering the extensive areas that became FWA at the turn of the century. Furthermore, the practice of selecting as chiefs only those who were favourably disposed to French presence (whether they were authentic traditional rulers or ordinary individuals) was the rule both before and after the proclamation of association policy. Also, the Councils of Notables created in 1919 are sometimes cited as an illustration of the policy of association which was formally adopted the previous year. As already shown above, these councils largely functioned under the thumb of the commandants and its African members were rarely associated with administrative work in any meaningful sense.

Finally, there were some features of the colonial administration during this period which are difficult to explain either in terms of the policy of assimilation or that of association. For example, the fact that African subjects were regularly recruited for forced labour (travaux forcés) and compulsory labour (prestations) to supplement the limited financial resources of the administration cannot be explained in terms of either of the two policies

Similarly, it is difficult to interpret in terms of these policies the system of summary justice (indigénat) which empowered administrators to imprison recalcitrant African subjects (that is, those who protested against either forced or compulsory labour or those who failed to pay their taxes) for 15 days with a fine of 100 francs without reference to the courts.¹

In all, it appears that the organizational structures and institutions of the French colonial administration in West Africa between 1904 and 1940 were not in strict accordance with the stated official policies. Although there were certain features that could be described as 'assimilationist' and 'associational', neither policy was consistently followed. What happened in practice was that France established administrative structures and institutions that best ensured her effective control over FWA and inevitably, some of these were copied from metropolitan models (those with 'assimilationist' character) while others were dictated by the realities in FWA (those with 'associational' character).

Although the 1946 constitution did not formally reject the policies of assimilation and association,² its Preamble contained the following clause which could be taken as

¹ This system of justice was imported from Algeria, an older French colony where it was believed to have worked. The penalty was reduced to five days imprisonment and 15 francs fine in 1924.

² There was no official policy under the Vichy regime; the administration of FWA continued as before during this period.

announcing a new colonial policy:

France proposes to guide the peoples for whom she has taken responsibility into freedom to administer themselves and conduct their own affairs democratically; rejecting any system of colonial rule based upon arbitrary power, she shall guarantee equal access to public office ...

In spite of this new policy, practically all the institutions with 'assimilationist' character (for example, the Court of Accounts and the Council of State) as well as those with 'associational' character (for example, the chiefs and the Council of Notables) were preserved. In other words, the new policy did not mean the abolition of the previous policies.

However, the new policy specifically referred to France's desire 'to guide the people for whom she has taken responsibility into freedom to administer themselves and and conduct their own affairs democratically' (italics added). The obvious result of this aspect of the new policy was the greater attention paid to the representative institutions associated with the work of the colonial administration. This, as shown in the account given above, resulted in some African representation in the French National Assembly and in the Council of the Republic and a substantial representation in the French Union Assembly. Perhaps the most important step taken in this direction was the creation of local Assemblies in the territories including a Grand Council in the federal centre which were associated with the work of the colonial administration at the local and federal levels respectively. The increase in the number of

communes can also be interpreted as a step in the same direction. However, the study of these institutions shows that for various reasons, their democratic nature should not be exaggerated.

Another aspect of the policy contained in the 1946 constitution referred to France's desire to 'guarantee equal access to public office'. Since this principle had in fact existed in theory from the beginning of the colonial administration in FWA (supra), the reference here is to the new extension of the status of citizen of the French Union to all Africans which would enable them to compete for public office. In practice, the disparity in the level of educational development in France and in FWA meant that no real equality was established. Thus, by 1956, the senior and middle-level cadres which were staffed by officials recruited on the basis of competitive examinations was dominated by Frenchmen: Africans held only 1.4% of the senior-level posts and 56.7% of the middle-level posts.¹

Finally, the 1946 constitution referred to a need to increase the 'well-being' of the peoples within the French Union. The practical step taken in this regard was the passing of a law in April 1946 which asked the Ministry of Overseas France to prepare ten-year equipment plans for France's overseas territories. To this end, the Investment Fund for the Economic and Social Development of Overseas France (Fonds d'investissement pour le développement

¹ Crochet, op. cit.

économique et social de la France d'Outre-mer, FIDES)¹ was set up and its motive was stated as meeting the needs of the indigenous peoples by priority within the general context of promoting the development of the economy of the French Union as a whole. This fund was provided in part by annual subventions in the metropolitan budget and in part by contributions from the territories, either by use of surplus revenues or by long-term loans provided by the Central Bank of Overseas France. The fund was controlled by a Management Committee presided over by the Minister of Overseas France; it included both senior officials and representatives of the Council of the Republic and of the French Union Assembly.

In FWA, the first FIDES plan launched in 1947 was followed by a second which turned out to be the last in 1954. On the whole, the achievements of FIDES in socio-economic development were substantial. Transport infrastructure was improved and extended, social services, especially health and education were expanded, commerce was stimulated, productive activities were encouraged and some extractive and manufacturing industries were established. All this had the effect of increasing the scope of the cash economy in FWA.

Although the FIDES programme was, on the whole, aimed at improving the well-being of the people of FWA, it was marked by a number of important shortcomings. First, there

¹ The abbreviation of the French expression, FIDES, will be used in this study.

was very little African involvement in the preparation and execution of the plans. The Territorial Assemblies voted their contributions to the fund but had no influence on the activities of FIDES. All the decisions were taken in Paris and the Governor-General of FWA who was responsible for the execution of the programmes only had to present them before the Grand Council which rarely succeeded in making amendments. The Consultative Planning Commissions that were established to supervise the local execution of the activities of FIDES within the territories consisted almost exclusively of French civil servants. Another shortcoming of FIDES was the over-emphasis placed on transport infrastructure with very little attention to social development and much less on productive investments. For example, the amount spent on transport infrastructure in Senegal under the first plan was almost double all other expenditure taken together. Finally, there was some inequality in the distribution of funds among the territories. Over 25% of the investments in the first plan went to Senegal alone while none of the other territories received half as much. The bulk of the second plan was shared between Senegal and the Ivory Coast with about 17 and 20 respectively. The result was a very uneven development of FWA territories on the eve of their accession to independence.

On the whole, the changes in the French colonial policy did not exactly dictate the character of the colonial administration in FWA even though some of its features can be explained in terms of these policies. Before examining the changes introduced by the loi-cadre reform - which marked the next

change in the colonial policy - let us briefly sum up the characteristic features of the existing administrative system it was intended to re-organize.

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of the colonial administration in FWA was its high degree of centralization. This, as mentioned above, was due to the concentration of administrative activities at the federal centre and to the existence of a chain of command from the Governor-General at the federal centre down to the commandants de cercle in the interior of every territory, passing through the Governors at the territorial centres. These officials constituted the principal functionaries of the colonial administration in FWA. A second feature was the fact that its organization was subordinated to the law in accordance with the practice in metropolitan France. The laws made applicable to FWA (most often in the form of decrees) were for the most part modifications of the metropolitan laws. A third feature connected to the second is the role of courts in the administrative set up. The metropolitan idea of a judicial control of administration was introduced and this resulted in the creation of a Council of Administrative Conflict. In addition, the metropolitan Court of Account and the Council of State had jurisdiction over FWA. As in France, too, the idea of a judicial control of administrative action was accompanied by an emphasis on the internal control and supervision of the administration. Financial control was ensured by the Inspectorate corps of the metropolitan Ministry of Finance while the General Inspectorate of Administrative Affairs was responsible for supervising and controlling the other aspects of administrative

work.

Fifth, the personnel operating the administration was administered under regulations and procedures that were copied from metropolitan practice - recruitment on the basis of competitive examinations, creation of specialized training institutions and the rules and regulations of a career system of administration. Sixth, a number of representative institutions were associated with the work of the administration as was the practice in France. These included a representative Assembly at the federal centre and in each territory, and a number of municipal councils within the territories. Finally, after the Second World War, the colonial administration started to undertake activities aimed at promoting the economic and social development of the populations of F.A. In the following section, we shall find out what changes were introduced to these characteristics as a result of the loi-cadre reform.

From the loi-Cadre to Independence

The following discussion of the changes introduced to the French colonial administration in West Africa by the loi-cadre reform of 23 June 1956 will be carried out with special reference to Guinea and Senegal, the two countries with which this study is concerned. After examining the general provisions of the loi-cadre, we shall follow their application in each country.

The Provisions of the Loi-Cadre and its Decrees of Application

The first article of the loi-cadre shows that it did not enunciate a new policy but simply continued the 1946 policy.

It states inter alia, that:

...in order to associate more closely the populations of the Overseas with the administration of their own interests, some measures of administrative decentralization and deconcentration will take place in the Territories, the groups of Territories, and in the central services under the authority of the Ministry of Overseas France.¹

What is new is that this reform states clearly how it hopes to achieve the 1946 policy which it is committed to pursuing. The remaining articles of the loi-cadre set out the outlines of the reform leaving the details to be filled by government decrees.²

The most important innovation of the loi-cadre was the establishment of Government Councils in each of the territories of FWA. The territorial Governor was to serve as the Council's President while its Vice-President and other members (minimum of 5 and maximum of 11) were to be elected by a majority vote of the Territorial Assembly. The function of the Government Council was 'the administration of territorial services'.

The definition of 'territorial services' leads to the second important innovation of the reform, namely the distinction between 'territorial' and 'state' services. While the former came under the responsibility of the new Government

¹ The text of the loi-cadre as well as that of the decrees of application were published in the Journal officiel of the federation and of each individual territory. We have consulted the text in the Journal officiel de la Guinée française, 16 July 1956. The relevant portions of the law can be found in Appendix B.

² The loi-cadre was a kind of enabling law which allowed certain measures which the constitution reserved for the domain of law to be decided upon by decree. Its decrees of application were not completed until April 1957.

Council in each territory, the latter was the responsibility of the metropolitan government. Territorial services were defined as those activities of the colonial administration which were not attributed to the state. As set out by a decree of 3 December 1956, modified by another of 4 April 1957, state services covered six different areas: external affairs, external communications, defence and security, civil liberties (especially the judiciary), solidarity and economic, social and cultural expansion, and, finally, the representation of the central power.

From the above list, it is clear that the bulk of administrative activity was reserved for the state. In particular, the 'solidarity and economic, social and cultural expansion' functions are so vague that they were susceptible to wide interpretations. Even in the limitative definition provided by the decrees, they covered such wide and important areas as the treasury, financial supervision, supervision of state companies and mixed-economy companies, central development projects financed by FIDES, university education, broadcasting and television stations and so on. However, in spite of the limited scope of activity left to the territorial administrations, their very existence was an important development. Each territory was left to organize and manage the personnel that took charge of what remained as territorial services.

Another important innovation as a result of the reform was that it established a common roll and universal suffrage for all elections in every territory. This removed the undemocratic practice whereby a few thousand Frenchmen had more

elected representatives than a million or more Africans (supra). Furthermore, the reform provided for an increase in the number of Africans recruited to all levels of the administration. According to the relevant decree of application, 66% of all vacancies in the state services were to be reserved for Africans¹ and conditions for admission to the ENFOM were to be waived in order that more Africans might be admitted.²

To underpin these reforms, the loi-cadre increased the role of the Territorial Assemblies by giving them 'extended deliberative power for the organization and management of territorial services'. The Assemblies were also empowered 'to determine the conditions for the creation and working, as well as the functions of the councils of administrative divisions and of rural collectivities.' They were to have increased control over the budgets with the 'obligatory' expenditure reduced to about 50%, compared to 80% prior to the reform. It should also be emphasized that the powers given to them with regard to the territorial services were genuine legislative powers and this covered agriculture, forestry, fisheries, health, customary law, internal trade, town planning, primary and secondary education.

In contrast to the expansion of administrative functions

¹ Although the decree of application referred to 'people with at least ten years of uninterrupted residence', the measure was essentially aimed at Africans; the phraseology was no more than a bow to the prohibition of racial discrimination in the colonies.

² This provision represented an acknowledgment of the unreality of the 1946 constitutional guarantee of 'equal access to public office' in a situation where access to educational training was unequal.

at the territorial level, the functions of the federal administration were drastically reduced. The High Commissioner (new title for the Governor-General) was restricted to the role of co-ordinating state services and a number of inter-territorial services such as financial services and the problems of economic development. In the view of one observer, 'the High Commissioner became more of an ambassador than an administrator.'¹

In addition to these institutional reforms, article 4 of the loi-cadre re-stated the colonial administration's intention to pursue the programme for economic and social development embarked upon since 1946:

The Government could...without any contradiction to the law of 30 April 1946 and to the legislative provisions which refer to it, take all measures that tend to raise the standard of living in the Territories under the authority of the Ministry of Overseas France, to favour economic development and social progress there and to facilitate economic and financial co-operation between the metropolitan country and these Territories...

Below are the accounts of the changes brought about by these reforms in Guinea and Senegal.

Guinea

The most important change introduced in Guinea by the loi-cadre provisions was the establishment of a territorial administration under a local executive, the Council of Government, responsible for certain specific functions among those previously performed by the common colonial administration for the whole of FWA. In organisational terms, this change which was shared by all the territories, resulted in the establishment of ministries headed by the members of the Government

¹ Newbury, 'The Government General and Political Change in French West Africa,' op.cit., p.57.

Council of each territory. This introduction of ministries meant a radical departure from the existing administrative arrangements in FWA. The major administrative services of the colonial administration in FWA with the exception of those classified as 'state' services were henceforth organized at the territorial centres within ministries. The existing external services of the old federal services were transferred to the relevant territorial ministries. In contrast to the old federal services which were regulated from the metropolitan centre, the territorial ministries consisted of autonomous services placed under the authority of political heads.

The position of the political heads of the territorial ministries was similar in some ways to that of the political heads of the metropolitan ministries. This similarity was further underlined by the fact that the organization of individual ministries in the territories was closely based on the metropolitan model. In particular, the institution of the ministerial cabinet which occupies a central position in the organization of work within ministerial departments in France was transplanted into every territory.¹ There were, however, some important differences. First, unlike the situation in the metropolitan centre where the political head of a ministerial department had authority over all his staff, the political heads of the territorial ministries did not have authority over most

¹ A ministerial cabinet is the private secretariat of a French Minister. Its members assist the Minister in his task as head of his ministry. In many cases, ministerial cabinets become the effective instruments for controlling and co-ordinating the work within ministries. For a good account of ministerial cabinets in France, see A. Dutheillet de Lamoignon, 'Ministerial Cabinets in France,' Public Administration, vol.43, (Winter 1965), pp.365-81.

of the senior officials (those in the general cadres) who were under the authority of the Governor. Second, the supreme authority over the affairs of each territory was still the responsibility of the metropolitan power which continued to be represented by a High Commissioner at the federal centre and a Governor at the territorial centre.¹

Besides these changes at the territorial centre which were common to all the territories,² the loi-cadre left each Government free to organize the work of the administration within its territory. In Guinea, the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) which had won the elections to the Territorial Assembly held in March 1957³ had committed itself to changing the organization of administrative work within the territory. It promised the abolition of the chiefs who headed the cantons and villages within the existing administrative structure. The argument of the PDG was that the chiefs had oppressed their fellow Africans in their enthusiasm to serve the colonial administration. One explanation for the behaviour of the chiefs

¹ In every territory the Governor was the President of the Council of Government until July 1958 when he relinquished the post to the African Vice-President as a result of tensions between the holders of the two posts in several territories. However, this did not affect the overall authority of the Governor.

² The only important choice open to individual territories was in regard to the number of ministries - a minimum of five and a maximum of eleven. Guinea chose the maximum and established the following ministries: Finance, Technical Education and Professional Training, Commerce, Industry and Mines, Health and Population, Civil Service, Cooperatives and Peasantry, Public Works, Transport and Town Planning, Education, Interior, Labour and Social Affairs and Production.

³ According to the provisions of the loi-cadre, the members of the Council of Government were to be elected by a majority vote of this Assembly; as the majority party, the PDG took control of the Government.

is the fact that they worked under pressure: according to a colonial administrator in Guinea, 'the chief must collect taxes and provide labourers for public works...without which he will be broken like a glass.'¹ In the circumstances, it is likely that some chiefs might have transferred this pressure to the people under them. It is, of course, also possible that some chiefs, hiding under the protection of the colonial administration, saw nothing wrong in exploiting their fellow Africans.

In keeping with its promise, the Guinean Government summoned a meeting of all commandants and other senior government officials in July 1957 to discuss its intention to abolish the chieftaincy institution and to create 4,200 elected village councils headed by elected village chiefs as the new administrative order at the base.² The Government's proposals were carried and a ministerial order of 31 December 1957 formally abolished 'the chieftaincy of cantons, called "traditional chieftaincy" all over the territory of French Guinea'.³ Considering the importance attached to the chieftaincy institution by the French, this abolition amounted to a significant reversal of policy. Indeed, as late as 1956, the French Governor in Guinea still declared that:

Traditional chieftaincy constitutes one of the

¹ Administrator Narot, quoted by A. Arcin in his Histoire de la Guinée française, (Paris, Challamel, 1907), p.592.

² The meeting was held from 25-27 July 1957. For the proceedings of this meeting, see Guinée: Prélude à l'indépendance (Paris: Présence africaine, 1959).

³ Journal officiel de la Guinée française, 15 Jan. 1958.

most authentic values and the essential support of the social structure of Africa, and any policy which does not support this chieftaincy, help it in the fulfilment of its duties as well as in the defense of its interests, would be a policy that is both aberrant and unworthy of the principles stated by France and its representatives.¹

The second change made was at the level of the cantons. The Guinean Government described them as arbitrary geographical areas and decided to replace them by new units corresponding to economic, geographical and human realities called administrative posts (postes administratifs).² The essentially economic mission of the administrative posts called for a new kind of officials - men with some specialized training in promoting economic development. To solve this problem, the government created a School of Administration - the École territoriale d'administration - to provide a crash training course for prospective chiefs of administrative posts. Of the 95 posts the Government planned to create, less than half were established immediately due to manpower shortage. Finally, the cercles were merged with the subdivisions to constitute 25 circonscriptions (there were previously 20 cercles and 10 subdivisions). However, the functions of the circonscription chiefs (new title for the commandants) remained virtually unchanged and all but

¹ Quoted by L. Maka in 'Le PDG de 1947 à 1958', Roroya-hebdo, no.33, 30 Aug. - 5 Sept. 1969. It is interesting to note that it was another French Governor, in his capacity as President of the Government Council, who presided over the meeting whose decision amounted to what his predecessor had described as 'both aberrant and unworthy of the principles stated by France and its representatives'! Furthermore, all the commandants were French.

² Le Ministère de l'Intérieur, Territoire de la Guinée, Nouvelle structure administrative (Conakry: Imprimerie du gouvernement, 1958).

one of them were Frenchmen.¹

Having pointed out the changes that occurred, it should also be stressed that several features of the pre-1957 colonial administration remained unchanged. At the metropolitan centre, the Ministry of Overseas France continued to have overall responsibility for the administration of the territory; the long list of 'state' services enumerated above were under its control and supervision. Also, at the metropolitan centre, the jurisdiction of the following institutions still covered Guinea: the French National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, the French Union Assembly, the Council of State and the Court of Accounts. At the federal centre, the activities of both the Grand Council and the Council of Administrative Conflict also continued to be relevant to Guinea.

At the local level, the Government maintained the policy of associating elected citizens with the work of the administration. Also, the policy of using the administration to promote economic and social development was preserved. In regard to the former, the Territorial Assembly was preserved and the 1955 legislation on municipal administration was implemented. In addition, the Government took advantage of the loi-cadre provision which authorized the establishment of rural authorities in FWA and created, at the level of the circonscriptions, rural authorities known as Circonscription Councils; elections were held to these councils in May 1958 and the PEG won 98% of all the seats. The Government's strategy, in respect of

¹The only African chief of circonscription in Guinea prior to the country's independence was from the Soudan.

economic and social development, was to re-organize the economy within the context of the new administrative structure. Thus, in September 1958, it established a Mutual Society for Rural Development (Société mutuelle de développement rural, SMDR)¹ in every circonscription. Each SMDR was to promote the establishment of cooperatives within its area. The ultimate aim was that the SMDRs would fade away once the cooperatives had been effectively established. The 'state' administration continued, as before, to be responsible for FIDES programme. One final feature of the pre-1957 colonial administration that was preserved was the system of career administration for officials. The 1952 general statute for civil servants remained in force for officials in the territorial administration. However, some of the officials who belonged to the old general cadres were transferred to the metropolitan statute and were therefore not under the control of the Guinean Government.

These arrangements had not started to function properly when Guinea became an independent Republic on 2 October 1958. This followed the rejection by PDG leaders, supported by the vast majority of Guineans (about 96%), of the Franco-African Community established by France to replace FWA in 1958. This Community was put to the territories of FWA (among others) in a referendum on 28 September 1958 and each was free to vote 'Yes' or 'No'. Guinea's vote for independence (the automatic consequence of voting 'No') led to an abrupt break with France. Because of the precipitate withdrawal of French officials

¹ The abbreviation of the French expression, SMDR, will be used in this study.

that accompanied this break, an orderly institutional transfer was impossible. In all, about 500 French officials were withdrawn within two months and since they dominated the senior and middle-level posts in the various administrative services (both 'state' and 'territorial'), this meant that the emerging Guinean administration was suddenly decapitated and faced with an acute manpower shortage. Out of the 10,943 Guinean officials available to operate the administrative services, only 3,977 were occupying established posts (that is, covered by the statute for civil servants) and of these, only about 30 were in senior-level posts.¹

The Guinean officials who took over from the French officials were faced with additional difficulties because the two-month period for withdrawal proved inadequate for a proper handing over of services.² The situation was made worse in some cases where the departing French officials are said to have destroyed vital files and, in some cases, taking them as part of their baggage.³ How the post-independence regime coped with this problem and what it made of the colonial administrative

¹ Sources: Ministère de la Fonction Publique et du Travail, Etat des fonctionnaires en service avant l'indépendance, Conakry, Aug. 1964, mimeo; and Assemblée nationale, Exposé fait le 25 octobre 1963 par le Ministre de la Fonction Publique et du Travail, Conakry, mimeo.

² A. S. Touré, Expérience guinéenne et unité africaine (re-edition of L'Action politique du Parti démocratique de Guinée pour l'émancipation africaine, Vols. I & II), (Paris: Présence africaine, 1962) pp. 329-30.

³ Cowan, op.cit., p. 171. It is generally believed that these actions reflected the feeling of injured pride felt by President De Gaulle (and apparently shared by these officials) at Guinea's option for independence (All the other territories of FWA voted 'Yes').

inheritance as a whole are examined in subsequent chapters of the study.

Senegal

Unlike the situation in Guinea, the period of transition from the loi-cadre to independence was much longer in Senegal; it lasted from 1957 until 1960. During this transitional period, Senegal became a member-state of the Franco-African Community (unlike Guinea, she had voted 'Yes' in the referendum) and was involved in an abortive federal experiment with the Soudan (the Mali Federation).¹ However, reference will only be made to these constitutional changes in as much as they impinged on the evolution of the Senegalese administration.

As in Guinea, the first change that took place following the loi-cadre was the establishment of a territorial administration under a local executive called the Government Council. As in Guinea, too, this change resulted in the establishment of ministries headed by the members of the Government Council. The following ten ministries were established: Interior, Civil Service, Finance, General Economy, Production and Cooperatives, Rural Economy, Public Works and Transport, Education and Culture, Health and Population, Labour and Social Affairs. In spite of the constitutional changes referred to above, the number of ministries remained virtually unchanged until the country became independent in 1960. Although the arrangements within the Community left member-states to 'enjoy' autonomy and 'administer themselves democratically and freely',²

¹The Mali Federation was established in January 1959 and collapsed in August 1960.

²Article 77 of France's Fifth Republic Constitution.

the Community (meaning the French Government in practice) still performed some functions on behalf of Senegal, notably in the fields of external affairs, defence and justice, and exercised some broad control over economic and financial affairs.¹ Since these functions were roughly the same as those classified as 'state' services by the loi-cadre, there was no need for Senegal to establish new ministries. The only change was that instead of a Governor of Senegal and a High Commissioner of FWA watching over the interests of the metropolitan power as provided for by the loi-cadre, there was only a High Commissioner of the Community based in the country with responsibility for the Community's functions.

Outside the ministries, the various administrative services of the Government were represented by external services within the country, as in Guinea. Although the loi-cadre left the Government free to organize the work of the administration within the country, no re-organization was carried out until a few months before independence in 1960. This re-organization was initiated in October 1958 when a Committee for Administrative Reorganization was set up to make recommendations on administrative reform. As the work of the Committee progressed, it was discovered that it had to work in co-operation with the Committee for Economic Studies which had also been set up at the same time 'to study the question posed by the development

¹ To ensure that the economic policies of the metropolitan government took account of the interests of the member-states of the Community, each of them was represented within an Economic and Social Council established to serve as a consultative body to the Government in economic and social affairs.

of the economy of Senegal'.¹ In January 1959, the work of both Committees was combined in a single contract and entrusted to two French research societies: the Compagnie d'études et d'aménagement du territoire (CINAM) and the Société d'études et de réalisations économiques et sociales dans l'agriculture (SERESA). The CINAM-SERESA team was placed under the overall supervision of Professor Lebret who had been appointed Economic Adviser to the Senegalese Government in November 1958. Their recommendations on administrative reform served as the basis for the reform announced by the government in January 1960.²

The major feature of the reform was the creation of seven regions as a new level of central government administration above the cercles. The seven regions, according to the CINAM-SERESA team, broadly correspond to the country's natural economic regions.³ However, the role of the region was not

¹ The announcement of the establishment of both the Administrative and Economic Committees was published in Paris-Dakar, 11 Oct. 1958.

² Although the CINAM-SERESA Report was not submitted to the Government until July 1960, its recommendations on administrative reform became available towards the end of 1959. For the text of the reform, see law no. 60-015 of 13 Jan. 1960, Journal officiel de la République du Sénégal (JORS), 29 Jan. 1960. It is important to mention that this administrative reform was conceived of with the eventual independence of the country in view.

³ It is said that Prime Minister Dia (the President of the Senegalese Government Council became Prime Minister in 1959) had, for political reasons, insisted on seven regions instead of the six originally recommended by the CINAM-SERESA team (Cape Verde, Casamance, Eastern Senegal, Rivers, Fatick, and Thiès). The seventh region, Diourbel, was regarded as the Prime Minister's political 'fief'. However, all seven regions were presented as 'natural' economic regions and Dia's subsequent political fall in December 1962 has not affected Diourbel. (See J. Coste, 'Problèmes et perspectives de l'administration du Sénégal,' unpublished thesis for the doctorat en droit, University of Bordeaux, 1965, p.246.

limited to the economic field;¹ it was to serve as an area unit for all the activities of the central government.

This was made clear in the description of the role of the governor (title of the senior civil servant appointed by decree to head the region) who was to act as the Government's delegate and

has authority over all civil servants and civil agents of the State serving in the Region and co-ordinates the administrative, economic and social activities of the different services of the Region. He ensures the co-ordination of the technical services whose scope covers several cercles.²

The regional governor was also the representative of the Government (with the title of Government Commissioner) with the newly created regional assembly whose meetings he could attend.³

Below the regions came the cercles whose number rose from 13 to 27.⁴ The commandant preserved his original functions but was henceforth the hierarchical subordinate of the governor. Furthermore, he assumed responsibility for two newly created institutions within the cercle: the Local

¹ Each region's economic mission was to be facilitated by the establishment of a Regional Committee for Development (Comité régional du développement, CRD) consisting of regional civil servants, party leaders, and representatives of other regional interests.

² Law no. 60-015 of 13 Jan. 1960, op. cit.

³ Regional assemblies were created as local representative institutions for the citizens within the regions who lived outside the communes.

⁴ Except for a few boundary changes, every existing subdivision became a cercle, meaning that subdivisions were abolished.

Committee for Development¹ over which he presided and the Centre of Rural Expansion (Centre d'expansion rural, CER)² whose activities he controlled.

The existing 139 cantons were abolished and replaced by 84 arrondissements placed under civil servants (called chiefs of arrondissements) who were to act as the representatives of the central government. The establishment of these arrondissements was, in the words of the Minister of Interior, 'a means of real integration in the nation of a section of the population which, until now was leading a marginal existence' (sic).³ The arrondissement chiefs within a cercle were the subordinate collaborators of the commandant in matters of general administration (keeping the civil register, maintenance of public order) and in his task of directing and controlling the newly created institutions for promoting economic development - to supervise the CER within the arrondissement and to watch over the functioning of the co-operatives. According to the Minister of Interior, the arrondissement chief was to see himself as propagandist for economic development and to impregnate the rural masses with the 'myth'

¹ This Committee was to have responsibility for preparing the programme for the cercle's development; it was to consist of local representatives and the heads of the administrative and technical services within the cercle; for more details, see Chapter 7.

² This institution was established to promote economic development within the cercle; for more details, see Chapter 7.

³ Communication du Ministre de l'Intérieur sur la réforme administrative et discours prononcé à l'occasion de la réunion des chefs d'arrondissements à Dakar, (Saint-Louis: Imprimerie de la République du Sénégal, 1960, 1960), p. 16.

of development.¹ Finally, arrondissement chiefs were to supervise the collection of taxes in the villages within their areas.

At the village level, central government representation was entrusted to village chiefs appointed by the Minister of Interior on the proposition of the commandants. Because of the large number of villages in the country (13,000) provision was made for the eventual grouping of villages to constitute rural communities. Finally, the reform brought the development of municipal administration to its logical conclusion by raising all medium and mixed communes (created after the 1955 municipal reform law) to the status of full communes, bringing the total number to 33.

On the eve of Senegalese independence, then, the pre-1957 colonial administration had changed in some important respects. The most important change was the emergence of a Senegalese administration organized into ministries at the centre and represented at different levels within the country: the region, the cercle, the arrondissement, and the village. The creation of the regions as new economic cum administrative units above the cercles also constituted an important change. Finally, cantons headed by selected chiefs were replaced by arrondissements placed under appointed officials.

However, as in the case of Guinea, several features of the pre-1957 colonial administration were preserved.² Although

¹ Ibid. p. 28.

² It is interesting to note the similarities in the Guinean and Senegalese administrative reforms in spite of the fact that the former was carried out under full colonial rule while the latter was carried out with independence in view.

Senegal became an autonomous Republic within the Community before her independence, some important areas of government work were still administered in France (supra). Also, until independence was actually achieved in August 1960, the French Council of State and the Court of Accounts still had jurisdiction over the country.¹ Furthermore, the Government maintained the policy of associating elected citizens with the work of the administration by preserving the Territorial Assembly (renamed the National Assembly in 1959), by creating regional assemblies and by increasing the number of communes.

The policy of using the administration to promote economic and social development was preserved and it was a crucial factor in the administrative reorganization that was carried out. The importance attached to it was reflected both in the creation of the regions and in the creation of some specific structures (CRD, CER, and Local Development Committees) for the development within the overall administrative framework. The SIPS were abolished and replaced by SMDRs (as in Guinea) within the cercles. They were to promote the establishment of co-operatives in their respective areas. Finally, as in Guinea, Senegal preserved the career system of administration that characterized the pre-1957 colonial administration. The general statute for civil servants remained in force for the officials in the country's administration.

¹ All the metropolitan and federal institutions whose jurisdiction remained valid in Guinea until September 1958 also had jurisdiction over Senegal.

Unlike the situation in Guinea where independence brought serious problems for the administration - problems that were caused by the precipitate departure of French officials (supra) - the emerging Senegalese administration experienced no similar upheavals at independence. The major explanation for this contrast was the fact that prior to Senegalese independence, the Government had reached an agreement with France on the continued presence of French officials in the Senegalese administration: 'the Convention between the Republic of France and the Republic of Senegal for the functioning of public services of the Republic of Senegal'.¹ As a result of this Convention, there were 1,700 French officials in the Senegalese administration after independence in 1960.

A second explanation was the fact that the taking over by Senegalese officials of certain senior and middle-level posts from French officials was spread over a period of two years instead of the two-month period in Guinea. This made a proper transfer of responsibilities possible. For example, most of the Senegalese officials who became commandants de cercle between 1959 and 1960 were first appointed as assistants to French commandants for periods varying from six to eighteen months.² The period of apprenticeship was used to familiarize them with their jobs and was followed by a proper handing over

¹ The text of this Convention became law in Senegal in February 1960; see, JORS, 22 Feb. 1960.

² Information obtained from the issues of the Journal officiel for this period.

of files and other administrative equipment. (No files were destroyed or taken away as in Guinea). This system of apprenticeship was also practised in the ministerial departments. This, however, was only on a small scale as there was no intention of replacing all the French officials before independence. At independence French officials were holding most of the key posts except within the ministerial cabinets where they had been replaced by Senegalese officials.¹

To sum up, the transitional period between 1957 and 1960 witnessed the emergence of a Senegalese administration from the existing colonial administrative system for the whole of FEA. Although some aspects of this administration were new, it also carried over several features of the colonial administration. The continued presence of many French officials in the emerging administration together with the way in which Senegalese officials took over from their French predecessors in several posts after a period of apprenticeship suggest that many of the features of the colonial administration might be preserved after independence.

¹ By 1960, most of the French officials who previously held the posts of Director of Cabinet (the highest post within a cabinet) had been replaced by Senegalese officials. Also, the posts of conseiller technique hitherto dominated by French officials were shared with Senegalese officials who constituted the majority in most cabinets. The decree regulating ministerial cabinets in Senegal is closely based on the metropolitan model and creates the same basic posts as are found in French cabinets: a Director of cabinet, a Chief of cabinet, Conseillers techniques (technical advisers) and Attachés; see decree no. 59-082/SG of 10 April 1959, JORS, 25 May 1959

Conclusion

As a conclusion to this chapter, we should like to stress the similarity in the nature of the administrative inheritances of Guinea and Senegal. As a result of the loi-cadre reform, each state inherited from France an administrative institution whose structures covered the entire territory of the state. Each administration was organized in the state capital within ministries placed under political heads and outside the capital, the work of the administration was organized within area units placed under officials who acted as agents of the state government.

The administrative organization at ministerial level in both countries was based on the pattern of organization that existed in France and this resulted in the introduction of the characteristic features of French ministerial organization, notably the institution of ministerial cabinets. Although there was an increase in the number of area units within each state, the pattern of organization was as centralized as the situation under the pre-1957 arrangements. The emphasis was on a strict hierarchical relationship between the field agents of the state government with the most superior agent directly responsible to the central authority represented by the different ministries.

The emerging administrations in Guinea and Senegal also preserved the French-inspired features of administrative organ-

ization that characterized the pre-1957 colonial administration. These were the idea of subordinating the administration to the law, the idea of a judicial control of administrative action, an emphasis on internal control and supervision within the administration, the principles of a career system of administration and the policy of associating representative institutions with the work of the administration. Both administrations, too, were to be used for promoting economic and social development as was the case with the colonial administration after the Second World War.

The only difference in the nature of the administrative inheritances of the two states was due to the different circumstances in which they became independent. In Guinea, there was an abrupt break with the metropolitan country which led to a precipitate withdrawal of French officials leaving the emerging administration in the hands of a poorly trained and inexperienced national personnel. In Senegal, on the other hand, there was a smooth transition to independence and proper arrangements were made for the future of the emerging administration. These included the handing over of some administrative responsibilities to Senegalese officials by their French predecessors after a period of apprenticeship and the signing of an agreement whereby about 1,700 French officials continued to serve within the administration.

In the next chapter, we shall find out how far the conceptions of administration adopted by the post-independence regimes in the two states reflect the similarity in their administrative inheritances.

CHAPTER 2

IDEOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATION

The study of the relationship between ideology and administration does not only have a speculative interest. The doctrines proclaimed by a regime have - or ought to have - consequences for its administration.

B. Gournay¹

Since independence, both Guinea and Senegal have had dominant political leaders - Presidents Touré and Senghor respectively - who have articulated ideologies which are consistent with the general interpretation given to the character of the political societies in the two states. These ideologies are considered significant for this study to the extent that they express a theory about the form of the state, because they explain the goals of the government and society, and because therefore they assign a particular place and function to the administration.

Guinea

The basic feature of the Guinean conception of the state

¹ L'Administration, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1965), p. 88

is its subordination to the country's ruling and only party, the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG). This is because the Guinean regime has adopted the doctrine of party supremacy which proclaims that the party is the supreme authority in the country: 'it is the Party which determines and directs the action of the nation'.¹ The following is President Touré's explanation for the subordination of the state to the party:

The State does not possess the omnipotence which characterizes certain regimes, nor the absolute powers which the State holds in certain Nations, where the notions of the reasons of State only in reality cover the reason of interest for the safeguard of the man or group of men who hold all or part of State powers. We intend that the reason of State, the State interest should be determined in a constant manner by the interests of the People of Guinea. Thus, the organs of the State and the nature of their powers are constantly conditioned by the interests and aspirations of the People whose initiatives and capacities are favoured by a complete liberty which is expressed and translated through the intermediary and activities of the Democratic Party of Guinea.²

All this has been neatly summed up as follows: 'the State is the instrument of the People and the People is the Party'.³

The practical meaning of this subordination of the state to the party is illustrated by the regime's rejection of the separation of powers written into the constitution it adopted

¹ A. S. Touré, La Lutte du Parti démocratique de Guinée pour l'émancipation africaine, Vol. IV, (Conakry: Imprimerie nationale, 1959), p.63. The volume number here refers to the works of the Democratic Party of Guinea which are signed by President Touré who is also the Secretary General of the Party. Subsequent references to the volumes of these works (which run into eighteen volumes) will be given as: Touré, Vol p. . The details on each volume are supplied in the bibliography.

² Touré, Extraits du discours tenu lors de la première session de la Conférence nationale de Labé, (1961), mimeo. p.17.

³ Touré, Vol. XIV, p.28.

at independence.¹ According to this Western-style constitution, state powers are shared between the executive (the President of the Republic and the Government), a parliament and a judiciary. The President of the Republic appoints the members of his Government and is responsible before parliament for the Government's policies. The President and the parliament alone may initiate laws whose constitutionality is controlled by the judiciary. Under this arrangement, the administration is an arm of the executive whose policies it implements. Contrary to these provisions of the constitution (which have not been formally amended), the Guinean regime asserts that the party 'disposes of all the powers of the Nation: the political, judicial, administrative, economic and technical powers are in the hands of the Democratic Party of Guinea'.² And President Touré gives the reason for rejecting the separation of powers as follows:

In reality, the separation of powers has no other result than to dispossess the people of its prerogatives by making superior to its interests, either those of the State, of the army, of justice or, in parliamentary democracy, of the parliament. By opposing to the power of the sovereign people the powers of the state apparatus, the sovereignty of which it is the legitimate and unique depository is purely and simply confiscated. Conscious of the fact that democracy cannot preserve its progressive content unless it is effectively exercised and placed under the control of the people, we have given up the faked forms (that is, the principle of the separation of powers) which falsify it in order to preserve for it, without any sharing, its popular nature (sic).³

¹ Extracts of this constitution can be found in Appendix C .

² Touré, Vol. IV, p.60. It is interesting to note that the word 'party' is not mentioned in the Guinean constitution.

³ Touré, Vol. XII, p.30.

The consequences of the concentration of all state powers in the hands of the party are summed up by President Touré as follows:

In order that the power of the party should not exist only in the domain of theory, the Guinean state structures have been copied on, and harmoniously adapted to, the structures of the PDG (sic.), and this concretely confers on the village committee, the steering committee of the section, the federation bureau and the National Political bureau, the power to stimulate and control respectively the administrative authorities of the village, of the arrondissement, of the region and of the Nation.¹

One illustration of the above is the decision of the party's eighth Congress in 1967 which constituted the party executive, the National Political Bureau (Bureau politique national, BPN) into the cabinet² of the Government.³ The continuance of the BPN members in office (at least in theory) depends on their re-election at future party Congresses.

The other significant feature of the Guinean conception of the state is the belief that it will eventually wither away. According to President Touré, this means that:

the state will cease to be an entity separated from the political and social reality of the people. The withering away of the State, at our level, is the incarnation of the entire organic structures of the state, of the entire attributes of the state, by the

¹ Ibid. p.35. The village committee, the steering committee, the federal bureau, and the National Political Bureau are the party executive bodies at the village, arrondissement, regional and national levels respectively.

² 'Cabinet' is used here to refer to the Ministers within a government who have responsibility for the major areas of government work. The decision of the Congress was that government work should be shared between the seven members of the BPN.

³ The President of the Republic who is also the Secretary General of the party (and leader of the BPN), appoints a number of Ministers Delegate and Secretaries of State to assist the BPN members; together, they constitute the Government. However, it is not stated whether he has this right by virtue of his constitutional position as President of the Republic or by virtue of his position as the leading member of the BPN. The regime's open disregard for the constitution suggests that it is the latter.

organized People, which corresponds, in a word to the existence of the power of the People allowing them at every level of their organization to solve the problems posed at that level, the State no longer being an apparatus separate from the People. In the withering away of the State, it is the People who seize the power of State to exercise it at all levels.¹

The administration, as part of the state apparatus is destined to wither away too:

We consider our administration as an element of transition, for a time which history will fix, between an inferior state of social and political organization and a superior state which the nation will reach thanks to the progress which she will fully achieve in all domains.²

The regime claims to be preparing for this eventual withering away of the administration by a policy of associating the people with the work of the administration with a view to progressively leaving administrative work in the hands of elected representatives of the people.³

The parts of the Guinean ideology which deal with the goals of government and society identify two major tasks. According to President Touré, one of these tasks is 'nation

¹ In Horoya-hebdo, no.96, 14-20 Nov. 1970. The Guinean belief in the ultimate withering away of the state has been strongly influenced by marxist theory on the subject. However, the process envisaged in Guinea differs substantially from the orthodox marxist formulation as set out by Lenin in The State and Revolution. For an attempt to reconcile the Guinean schema with the orthodox marxist formulation, see M. Douno, 'Le Rapport du parti avec l'Etat guinéen,' mémoire de fin d'études supérieures, Institut polytechnique de Conakry (IPC), Ecole supérieure d'administration (ESA), 1969/70.

² Touré, Vol.IV, pp.83-84.

³ See Touré, Vol. IX, p.198; Horoya-hebdo, no.7, 15-21 Mar. 1969; and presidential Circulars no.004/71/PRG/SG of 30 Jan. 1971 and no.005/73/PRG of 30 Jan. 1971.

building'. When Guinea became an independent Republic in 1958, President Touré explained, it was only a 'juridically constituted state without historical entity'.¹ This situation, according to him, makes it necessary to build a nation 'on to the framework of a state'.² In this task of nation building, the administration as part of the state apparatus has a role to play: 'it (the state) is the means by which a Nation has for governing itself, defending its interests and ensuring its perennality'.³ However, this would be a subsidiary role as the major role belongs to the party (again, the doctrine of party supremacy comes in):

...because the transformation of man can only be achieved radically and effectively within a political organization; it is the party which can achieve this revolution, in a satisfactory manner, by educating the people and organizing its creative action.⁴

The second major task identified by the Guinean regime is the economic and social development of the country which it is committed to achieve in 'a non-capitalist way'. The involvement of the administration in this task is put by President Touré as follows: '...multifarious duties of ever-growing importance fall to our administration in connection with the

¹ Touré, Vol. XII, p.44.

² Ibid. President Touré defines 'nation-building' more clearly in other parts of his work as meaning the unity of the diverse ethnic, social and religious groups within the country (with the emphasis on the first) under a central political authority. See for example, Touré, Vol. XVI, pp.5-10.

³ President Touré in a speech before the Guinean National Assembly on 21 October 1963; see Bulletin du compte-rendu des activités du BPN, no.22 (1963), p.31.

⁴ Touré, Vol. XII, p.32.

economic and social development of the nation.'¹ The following summary of what the regime means by a 'non-capitalist way' of development shows what the administration's contribution might consist of. In his report to the sixth Congress of the party in 1962, President Touré explained this doctrine as follows:

Our way is a non-capitalist way. It will remain so because this way is the only one which safeguards the interests of the community while freeing every individual from the injustice which characterizes all relations of exploitation of man by man.²

This doctrine demands that economic development should be planned. The formal decision to plan the Guinean economy was taken at the party's fifth Congress in 1959; in application of this policy, the country has had two development plans: the Three-Year Plan, 1960-1962 and the Seven-Year Plan, 1964-1970. A second emphasis in the doctrine is the need to create a large public sector economy while keeping the private sector to the minimum. The third area of emphasis in the doctrine is the broad field of rural development where the objective of the regime is to establish co-operatives with a view to improving the quality of agricultural production and the social structure of the masses.³ All this means that the Guinean administration

¹Touré, Vol. IX, p.46. It should be mentioned that the Guinean regime sees the ultimate objective of development in the conventional sense of improving the standard of living of the people; see Touré, Vol.III, pp.346-7; Vol.IV, pp.167-77; and Vol.XIV, *passim*.

²Quoted in 'Rapport présenté par Ismael Touré, ministre du développement économique au CNR du 16 avril 1964,' in Touré, Vol. XIV, p.96.

³See Touré, Vol.V, pp.294-5. The Guinean regime believes that the spread of cooperatives in rural areas would bring with it an improvement in the social structure of the masses.

would be involved in some aspects of economic planning, in the management of public enterprises, and in the promotion of rural development.

In all, the Guinean conception of administration that emerges from the above analysis of the established ideology has two characteristics. First, it is an instrument of a party which decides and controls its activities and whose structures determine its own. Its major role is to assist the party in the task of nation building and to contribute to the promotion of economic and social development. Second, it is a transitional institution whose eventual withering away (with the state) is being prepared by the progressive association of the people with its action.

Senegal

The post-independence ideology in Senegal is referred to as 'African socialism'.¹ The theory of state that is developed in this ideology is in part influenced by a special concept of 'nation'. The 'nation' according to President Senghor, groups 'fatherlands' in order to transcend them. And by 'fatherland' he means the various ethnic groups that are found within the country.² The 'nation' is contrasted with the 'fatherland'

¹ The following references between them provide a good exposition of this ideology: L.S. Senghor, Nation et voie africaine du socialisme (Paris: Présence africaine, 1961); Senghor, 'Negritude and African Socialism', in K. Kirkwood (ed.), African Affairs Number Two, St. Antony's Papers no.15 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963), pp.9-22; and Senghor, Théorie et pratique du socialisme sénégalais (Dakar, n.p. 1964).

² Senghor, Nation et voie africaine du socialisme, op.cit., pp. 22-3. Senegal with a population of just over 3 ½ million people has five 'fatherlands' with between 200,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants: the Wolofs, the Serères, the Fulanis, the Toucouleurs and the Diolas, in descending order of size.

and then given its specific definition:

It is not like the fatherland, a natural determination and therefore the expression of an environment, but of a determination to construct, or better still, to reconstruct. Objectively, it is a reconstruction in the likeness of an exemplary model, an archetype. But in order to achieve its object, the Nation must, above and beyond the fatherlands, animate all its members, every individual with its faith. It must turn individuals into persons, that is to say, conscious wills; it must turn them into souls. Far from denying the realities of the fatherland, the Nation will rely upon them; more specifically, it will rely upon their virtues, their character of realities, and thereby on their emotional force. It will unite the virtues of the fatherlands, or, more often, will choose among them those which, by reason of climate, history, and race have a common denominator, or those which have a value of universality. When its achievement is complete the Nation makes the different provinces into a harmonious whole: a single country for a single people animated by the same faith and striving towards the same goal.

In the light of the above definition of the nation, President Senghor defines the state as follows:

If the nation is the conscious will to reconstruct, the State is the major means of reconstruction. The State is to the Nation what the contractor is to the architect. It is incarnate in the institutions of government, parliament, public services. The officials are its workmen. It is the State which fulfills the Nation's will and ensures its permanence. Internally, it welds the fatherlands and recasts the individual in the mould of the archetype. Externally, it defends the integrity of the Nation which it protects against the encroachment of the foreigner.²

The above definition of the state contains two distinct ideas: the first deals with its role and the second refers to its organization. The role of the state mentioned is in connection with the stated objective of constituting the different 'fatherlands' (more commonly referred to as ethnic groups) within Senegal into a single political community - 'a single

¹ Ibid., p.23.

² Ibid., p.24.

country for a single people'. The state is to serve as the 'major means' of achieving this objective. In regard to the organization of the state, it is spelt out clearly as follows: 'It is incarnate in the institutions of government, parliament, public services.'

In the immediate years after independence there was an important hesitation on the pattern of state organization within which 'the institutions of government, parliament, public services' were to function. On the one hand, Senegalese leaders adopted a Western-style constitution according to which state powers were shared between an executive, a parliament and a judiciary. The constitution set out the functioning of these institutions and the relationships between them.¹ On the other hand, they proclaimed the doctrine of party supremacy according to which the ruling party, the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) has primacy over the state institutions. As President Senghor (who has been the secretary general of the UPS since 1960) put it:

The Party has as role, the organization of the general policy of the Nation by rationalizing it... The role of the Party is therefore of conception, direction, organization and control. This means its primacy over the other political, economic, social, cultural institutions... (*italics added*).²

In December 1962, a crisis within the UPS led to a situation in which the Prime Minister invoked the doctrine of party supremacy to prevent the National Assembly (one of the constitutional institutions) from voting a motion of censure that

¹ See law no. 60-045 of 26 August 1960, JORS, 31 Aug. 1960.

² In Senghor, Rapport de politique générale au deuxième Congrès de l'UPS à Saint-Louis, mimeo. July 2 1960.

might cause him to resign from office. The argument of the Prime Minister was that since the majority of the deputies were UPS members (only one member of the Assembly was not a UPS member), any conflict between the Government (of which he was the head) and the Assembly should be resolved within the party institution. In the end, a majority of the UPS members in the Assembly carried the motion of censure and invited the President of the Republic who had hitherto shared executive powers with the Prime Minister (the latter was in a stronger position since he was the head of the Government) to assume full executive powers. Since the President of the Republic who accepted this offer was also the secretary general of the UPS, his decision amounted to an abandonment of the doctrine of party supremacy as he had previously defined it (supra). He then declared the following as the official policy: 'the primacy of the party can never be invoked against the constitution...the constitution is above the party.'¹ As a means of emphasizing this commitment to constitutionalism, the President of the Republic has since been obliged, on taking office, to swear to uphold and defend the constitution. Part of the oath reads as

¹ Senghor, in Planification et tension morale: Rapport sur la politique générale, IVe Congrès national de l'UPS, les 10, 11 et 12 Octobre 1963. This new policy suggests that President Senghor probably did not expect that the doctrine of party supremacy would ever be invoked to prevent the normal working of a constitutional institution. A different interpretation advanced by the supporters of Prime Minister Dia is that President Senghor deliberately changed his opinion because of the increased powers that the new policy enabled him to exercise. However, what is important for this study is that Senegal has since remained committed to constitutionalism. For more details on this crisis, see Thibaud, 'Dia, Senghor et le socialisme africain', op.cit.

follows:

In the presence of God and before the Senegalese Nation, I swear...to scrupulously observe and make people observe the provisions of the Constitution and the laws, to devote all my energy to the defence of the constitutional institutions...¹

Although the constitution adopted at independence has been modified several times after the 1962 crisis, its essential characteristic which has remained unchanged is the acceptance of the principle of the separation of powers between an executive, a parliament, and a judiciary. Prior to the 1962 crisis, the executive consisted of a President of the Republic who was the Head of State, a Prime Minister, and a Government headed by the latter. Following the crisis, executive power was vested in the President of the Republic assisted by a Government responsible to him. A final change occurred in February 1970 when executive power was entrusted to a President of the Republic who 'determines the policies of the nation' and a Government headed by a Prime Minister which 'executes these policies.'²

The dominant feature of the relationships between the three separate powers in all the post-1962 constitutional texts is the preponderance of the executive. In particular, parliament lost the power of censure under the 1963 constitution. This was restored in the 1970 constitution but it can only be used against the Government at the risk of parliament's dissolution by the President of the Republic whose position is unaffected. However, parliament shares the initiative of laws

¹Article 31 of the Senegalese constitution of which extracts can be found in Appendix D.

²For the details of these constitutional changes, see JORS, 31 Aug. 1960, 11 March 1963, and 28 Feb. 1970.

with the executive and has certain methods for controlling its activities. The judiciary is responsible for controlling the constitutionality of all laws and settles any conflict of competence between the executive and the parliament. It is also the judge of the excess of powers of the executive. The administration is formally fitted into this arrangement as an arm of the executive.

The state institutions, as already mentioned, are expected to assume responsibility for 'national construction'. Another task assigned to them by the ideology of 'African socialism' is the promotion of economic and social development. The two features of this task are planning and the establishment of cooperatives.¹ The economic strategy adopted in these plans is that of a mixed economy and this, according to President Senghor is what a 'realistic' view of the country's economy dictates.² The overall economic framework will have three sectors: a socialized agricultural sector, a mixed sector of public enterprises and mixed-economy enterprises, and a free sector of banking, commerce and industry. The major national objectives in all sectors will be set out in the development plans.³ Senegal's first plan was launched in 1961 and this has been followed by two others.

With regard to cooperatives, the objective is twofold.

¹ Senghor, 'Negritude and African Socialism', op.cit., pp.17-19.

² Senghor, Nation et voie africaine du socialisme, op.cit., p.125 and Senghor, Théorie et pratique du socialisme sénégalais, op.cit., p.60.

³ Senghor, Nation et voie africaine..., op.cit., pp.81-82.

First, to raise the standard of living of the rural masses who constitute more than 70% of the entire population by encouraging them to carry out their predominantly agricultural activities within cooperatives in order that they might benefit from the introduction of modern agricultural techniques and improved seeds. Second, it is hoped that the cooperatives would eventually assume total responsibility for their own affairs thereby turning the rural areas into self-governing societies.¹

The above analysis has two implications for the Senegalese administration. First, its place is clearly fixed as one of the institutions that 'incarnate' the state. In the discussion of the state organization set down in the country's constitution, we saw that it is expected to serve as an arm of the executive. In this position, the constitutional relationships between the parliament, the judiciary and the executive are likely to have consequences for it. Second the administration, as one of the state institutions would be expected to play a role in the two tasks of national construction and of development identified by the country's ideology. President Senghor has put the case for the involvement of the administration in the task of development as follows: 'Economic and social development relies on a stable and secure Civil Service. There is no development without a state apparatus in the service of development.'²

¹ See 'Senegal "an 2" par lui-même,' numéro spécial, Développement et civilisation (1962), passim.

² In Discours de M. L.S. Senghor, chef du Gouvernement à l'Assemblée nationale, vendredi, 9 avril 1963 (Rufisque: Imprimerie nationale, n.d.), p.50.

Comparison and Conclusion

If the post-independence central government administrations in Guinea and Senegal have been developed in a manner consistent with the conceptions analysed above, they should show markedly different characteristics. In Guinea, as we have seen, the administration is regarded as the instrument of the ruling party which decides and controls its activities and whose structures determine its own. In Senegal, on the other hand, the administration is expected to be the arm of a constitutional executive and it is only to be affected by the established constitutional relationships between the parliament, the judiciary and the executive.

This difference between the conceptions of administration in the two states has important implications for the different subjects examined in this study. First, in regard to administrative organization, the Guinean administration is expected to have structures based on those of the party. Any effects that the pursuit of the goals of national integration¹ and development might have on administrative structures are therefore likely to be accommodated within the context of the pattern of organization prescribed by the party. And with the emphasis on party control, there is likely to be little or no attention paid to the internal checks and balances within the administration. Also, it will be reasonable to expect that the system of personnel administration would be based on some

¹ 'National integration' is henceforth used as synonym for what is referred to as 'nation building' in Guinea and as 'national construction' in Senegal.

new party criteria. If all these changes have actually taken place, it will mean that there has been a radical departure from the colonial administrative legacy whose characteristics were examined in the previous chapter. In contrast, there is no mention of similar changes in Senegal. Considering the way in which power was transferred and the fact that a large number of French personnel remained in the country, after independence (supra), it is likely that the inherited colonial administrative organization has been preserved with only some modifications to take account of the tasks of national integration and development.

Second, there is a clear contrast between the nature of the representative institutions with which both the Guinean and the Senegalese administrations have to cope. In the case of Guinea, these will be party institutions which are said to have been created at every level of the administrative structure. In Senegal, the administration will have to cope with a parliament and a number of local councils established for 'the free administration of local collectivities'.¹ In addition to this contrast between the nature of the representative institutions established, there is also an important difference in their mission. In Guinea, the institutions are expected to progressively assume full responsibility for all administrative work thereby producing a kind of popular administration - administration by the elected representatives of the people. This objective, as shown above, is connected with the regime's belief in the eventual withering away of the administration.

¹Article 56 of the Senegalese constitution.

The idea of a popular administration is absent in Senegal where the objective is the more traditional idea of associating elected representatives of the people with the work of the administration. Thus, the parliament shares the initiative of laws with the executive and has certain methods for controlling its actions. Here, again, the Senegalese idea is close to what we saw in Chapter 1 in respect of the representative institutions established by the colonial administration¹ while the Guinean idea constitutes an innovation.

Third, the administrative arrangements established for promoting development activities in the two states are likely to show some differences. Although the ideologies of the two states emphasize the same areas of activity for the administration - aspects of economic planning, the management of public enterprises and the promotion of rural development - the Guinean commitment to a state-controlled economy and the Senegalese commitment to a mixed economy is likely to be reflected in the administrative arrangements in each state. Another source of difference is the fact that the Guinean administrative arrangements are expected to take account of the dominant role assigned to the party by the established ideology. Such a consideration does not exist in Senegal.

In all, the analysis in this chapter shows that the conceptions of administration in Guinea and Senegal support the general proposition advanced in this study. On the one hand,

¹The local councils recall the municipal councils while the parliament appears as the successor of the Territorial Assembly.

the Senegalese central government administration should have characteristics that are consistent with the basic ideas and principles which underlay the French colonial administration even though some adaptations and modifications would have been introduced in the light of the post-independence goals of the government. In Guinea, on the other hand, the emphasis on the party in the established ideology together with the goals identified for the government should have resulted in a central government administration with characteristics that are markedly different from those of both the colonial and Senegalese administrations. The remaining chapters of this study examine the extent to which the post-independence administrative developments in the two states have proved or disproved this proposition.

CHAPTER 3

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL

We have transformed our institutions, we have adapted them, but we remain within a tradition.¹

This first chapter on administrative organization is focused on the arrangements at the ministerial level. According to the general proposition of this thesis, the arrangements in Senegal should be an apparent evolution of the French colonial administration with some modifications and adaptations. In the case of Guinea, on the other hand, the colonial experience should have had only a minimal influence and the arrangements should have markedly different characteristics from both the colonial and the Senegalese administrations. To what extent do the administrative arrangements in the two countries reflect these contrasting positions?

Senegal

Since independence, government work has been organized within ministries placed under political heads as was the case when ministries were created towards the end of the colonial period. One important change noticeable in the

¹ Communication du Ministre de l'Intérieur sur la réforme administrative, op. cit. p. 12.

post-independence arrangements is an increase in the number of departments and ministries. This is a result of an increase in the volume of government work after independence. First, some functions hitherto performed by the imperial power-external affairs, defence and security, justice - became the responsibility of the state after independence. Second, the scope of some of the activities performed by the ministries established in 1957 increased, especially those concerned with economic and social development, and this has necessitated the creation of new departments and ministries. It appears that the ideological commitment of the government to promote development might have been responsible for the latter development. The following figures of the size of the civil service between 1957 and 1967 gives an idea of this expansion in the scope of government work: 1957, 25,308; 1961, 30,080, and 1967, 36024.

A new dimension which the increase in government work introduced to ministerial organization was a concern over how best to allocate functions between the ministries and departments. The method adopted shortly after independence and which has been consistently used since then seeks to allocate functions between ministries by grouping related functions under the same ministry. It was believed that this would limit the number of ministries and make efficient administration possible.¹ One positive result of this

¹ This functional approach was recommended in a report submitted by a French study group, the Compagnie générale d'études et de recherches pour l'Afrique (GOGERAF), in December 1960: Rapport sur les structures des administrations centrales de la République du Sénégal, Paris: December 1960, mimeo. A Senegalese commission Commission sur le coût et le rendement des administrations centrales - which commented on the report recommended that the number of ministries should be limited to between 10 and 12.

approach is that Senegal had between 1960 and 1970, the following ten well-established ministries: External Affairs, Justice, Interior, Finance and Economic Affairs, Civil Service and Labour, Education, Rural Development, Public Works, Town Planning and Transport, Health and Social Affairs, and Technical Education and Professional Training. It is interesting to note that all but two of these ministries (External Affairs and Justice) were among the ten established by the loi-cadre Government in 1957.

However, the effort to limit the number of ministries (the target fixed was between 10 and 12) has failed because the number of ministries has averaged 16 since independence. The services which were not regularly organized into ministries were constituted into either Secretariats of State, Commissariats or Delegations General, and attached to the services under the head of government.¹ The Secretariats of State were placed under political heads called Secretaries of State while the Commissariats and Delegations were placed either under political heads or under senior civil servants called Commissioners General and Delegates General respectively.

Until 1964, the structure of ministries varied from ministry to ministry and the designation of administrative units and of officials varied widely. A presidential Circular of 9 November 1964 established a standard pattern of structure

¹ Most of the services attached to the heads of government in Senegal since independence are concerned with the co-ordination and control of government services entrusted to a Secretariat General. The February 1970 constitutional arrangement produced a situation where these services were shared between two Secretariats General: the Secretariat General at the Presidency and the Secretariat General of Government attached to the Prime Minister's Office.


and a common vocabulary which all ministries were obliged to adopt¹ (see chart on next page). The highest unit of administrative work within a ministry is either a division (direction) under a Director or a service under a Chief of Service. Both the service and the division are subdivided into bureaux under Chiefs of Bureaux. Depending on the volume of work, a division may first be subdivided into subdivision before the bureaux. Finally, the bureaux are subdivided into sections which constitute the common basic units within the ministries. This standard pattern of structure for all ministries was introduced with the hope of removing existing structural and terminological confusion; it was also hoped that it would promote efficiency.²

One interesting feature of the administrative units within the ministries is that they are supposed to correspond to a prescribed number set out in the Journal officiel - a metropolitan practice introduced during the post-1957 phase of the colonial administration. And like the situation in France,³ the number of units effectively established rarely correspond to the prescribed number. Visits to several ministries in Dakar in October and November 1970 and in March and April 1971

¹ Circular 120/PR/LG/JUR of 9 November 1964.

² Ibid.

³ Comparative references made to the organization and working of central government administration at ministerial level in France, unless otherwise stated, are based on the account in Ridley and Blondel, Public Administration in France, op. cit.



Standard Organisation of a Ministry

Source: Circular no. 120 of 9 November, 1964.

revealed that several subdivisions, bureaux and sections existed only on the pages of the Journal. However, the comparison with the French situation should not be exaggerated as the Senegalese case is certainly made worse by a real shortage of personnel. This is in spite of the considerable assistance in personnel received from France - a total of 1,474 in 1966.¹ The total number of officials in the Senegalese administration in the same year was 36,863 of whom only 8.5% had received more than secondary education (the minimum requirement for middle and senior-level officials).² This works out at less than 100 middle and senior-level officials for each of the 16 large administrative units.

As shown in the chart of the standard organization of a ministry (page 96), there is a ministerial cabinet between the Minister and the different units within the ministry. This institution which was transplanted to Senegal during the post-1957 phase of the colonial administration has been preserved and has continued to occupy a central position in the organization of work within each ministry. Although the organization and working of the ministerial cabinets still resemble the French model in many ways,³ there are some

¹ The break down was as follows: 820 Teachers, 89 Doctors, 43 employed in General Administration and the rest were employed as specialists in other ministerial departments. Source: La Documentation française, Notes et études documentaires, No. 3330, La Coopération entre la France, l'Afrique noire d'expression française et Madagascar, Paris, 1966, p.20

² Source: Diop, op cit. p.404. Senior and middle-level officials are classified within hierarchies A and B respectively of the civil service structure; for more details, see Chapter 5.

³ For details on the organization and working of ministerial cabinets in France, see De Lamothe, op. cit.

important differences. For example, the Minister's liberty in recruiting the members of his cabinet is highly circumscribed. According to a presidential Instruction of March 1968, it is not sufficient for members of cabinets to 'enjoy their civic and political rights' as stipulated by the 1959 basic legislation on ministerial cabinets,¹ they must also be 'of perfect respectability and possess the competences and training necessary for collaborating at the highest level of ministerial function.' The Instruction further states that Directors of cabinets and the Conseillers techniques (technical specialists within cabinets) must possess a higher education diploma or belong to the hierarchy of the civil service. All the Directors of cabinet must be of Senegalese nationality. More exceptionally, the Instruction states that the choice of members of cabinets must be limited to the civil service except in very exceptional circumstances. Above all, the President would henceforth exercise a personal control on the nomination of members of cabinets 'given the importance of their functions in the life of the nation².'

¹ The basic legislation on ministerial cabinets in Senegal is decree no. 59-082/SG of 10 April 1959, JORS, 25 May 1959. According to this decree, a Minister's cabinet should have five members (one Director of cabinet, one Chief of cabinet, two Conseillers techniques, and one Attaché) and a Secretary of State's cabinet is limited to three members (one Director of Cabinet, one Chief of cabinet, and one Attacheé). Decree no. 68-236 of 1 March 1968, JORS 16 March 1968 modified the composition of a Secretary of State's cabinet as follows: one Director of cabinet and two Conseillers techniques.

² Instruction no. 16/PR relative to Ministerial Cabinets 1 March 1968, published in République du Sénégal, Textes relatifs à l'organisation des pouvoirs publics (Rufisque: Imprimerie nationale, July 1968), pp.151-154. The provision

The Director of cabinet is the head of the cabinet and has overall responsibility for the activities of the cabinet. He has a delegation of the Minister's signature over some specific matters. The Chief of cabinet assists the Director and can be given a variety of assignments by the Minister, including matters connected with the Minister's political career. The Conseillers techniques are specialists in the different areas of the ministry's work and they assist the Minister in the conception and formulation of policy for these activities. The Attaché performs a multiplicity of functions ranging from para-administrative activities to running some personal errands for the Minister. One important area of his functions is the handling of the Minister's relations with radio and the press.

In general, each cabinet works as a team and plays a central role within its ministry. In addition to the members' role as policy advisers to the Minister, they have responsibility for co-ordinating the activities of the different divisions within the ministry. This work of co-ordination is accompanied by a close and constant supervision in order to ensure that the policies of the Minister

2 (cont'd.) of this Instruction has been declared official policy through circulars in 1963 and 1964; the significance of the Instruction was that it brought together the points in these circulars. See Circulars no. 111 of 10 December 1963, no. 118 of 26 December 1963, and no. 47 of 11 May 1964. Following the reorganization of government work in February 1970, the Prime Minister issued Circular no. 9/PM/LGG/ADI of 7 March 1970 reminding Ministers of the provisions of the 1968 Instruction on the organization of ministerial cabinets.

It requires very little imagination to guess that this large number of circulars was necessitated by the failure of Ministers to keep to the rules governing the organization of their cabinets. However, since 1968, virtually all cabinets are organized according to the rules.

are correctly executed. Any affairs of the ministry which do not fall within a division, subdivision, or service are directly managed by the cabinet. Furthermore, the cabinet is largely responsible for all external contacts with the ministry - at least in the first instance - both with other ministries and with the public. In particular, the work of interministerial co-ordination is carried out at the level of cabinets. This has been formally institutionalized in what is known as the interministerial council which is a meeting of some Ministers assisted by members of their cabinets under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.¹

The internal working of ministerial cabinets vary from ministry to ministry but each holds periodic meetings (usually fortnightly) to which senior officials within the ministry - especially the Directors of divisions - are invited, under the chairmanship of the Minister.² The activities of the ministry are discussed in these meetings and the decisions taken are communicated to the different units. While the heads of the administrative units have responsibility for the execution of these decisions, overall control and supervision is the work of the cabinet.

¹ Interministerial council meetings are held fairly regularly - either fortnightly or weekly and sometimes, twice a week. Members of ministerial cabinets also play a leading role in other meetings summoned for co-ordinating interministerial activities. All these meetings are attended by senior officials within the divisions when matters that interest them are discussed.

² A Minister also holds meetings with the individual heads of the divisions - very often in the presence of the Director of cabinet. In many ministries each head of division is received by the Minister once a week. The members of cabinets see the Minister every time the need arises.

On the whole, ministerial cabinets play a crucial role in the work of the ministries.¹ This role, as shown above, is clearly more administrative than political and this is perhaps the justification for the great emphasis on the competence and administrative experience of the senior members.² To a great extent, this French institution has been effectively adapted and fitted into the structure of ministerial organisation in Senegal.³

At the level of the head of government, the organization of work is affected by the important position occupied by the Secretariat General of Government which co-ordinates government work. The cabinet of the head of government and

¹ The recognition of the important role performed by members of ministerial cabinets has resulted in a functional allowance for their members, ranging from about 25,000 francs CFA per month for Directors of Cabinet to about 10,000 francs CFA per month for Attaché's of cabinet.

² This is the unanimous opinion of the members of several cabinets interviewed in October and November 1970 and in March and April 1971. Many of them cited the case of the Ministry of External Affairs where the attempt to maintain a Secretary General in charge of intraministerial administrative co-ordination side by side with a cabinet whose role would be largely political was abandoned after a few years' trial in 1969 - it did not work satisfactorily. The de-emphasization of the political trust criterion in the appointment of senior members of cabinets did not appear to have adversely affected relations between them and the Ministers. This is perhaps due to the bureaucratic origin of most of the Ministers appointed since the late sixties; see 'Ladipo Adamolekun, 'Bureaucrats and the Senegalese Political Process,' Journal of Modern African Studies, 9, 4. (Dec. 1971), p.547.

³ For a different view, see J. Coste, op. cit., pp.224-226. Coste argues that the size of ministries in Senegal and the scope of their work does not justify the existence of ministerial cabinets. In our opinion, any ministerial organization à la française requires some means of ensuring co-ordination. In Senegal, it is precisely this aspect of a cabinet's work that is emphasized.

the officials of the Secretariat General share the work under the head of government between them. Unlike the cabinet of Ministers, there is no limit to the number of members in a head of government's cabinet: in 1962, Prime Minister Dia's cabinet had 16 members, there were 18 members in President Senghor's cabinet in 1968 and the current Prime Minister's cabinet has 11 members. Usually, the head of government's cabinet includes one, two or more military members and a few of the members bear the title of Chargés de mission - a title that is absent in the cabinets of Ministers. These are experts in some fields of administration who the head of government charge with specific missions. In spite of its large size, the cabinet of a head of government has never played the same role vis-à-vis the activities under the head of government as the cabinet of a Minister plays vis-à-vis the activities under the Minister. This is because of the central position occupied by the Secretariat General, especially during the period of executive presidential system. Under this arrangement, the Secretary General acted as the co-ordinator and supervisor of all activities at the Presidency, having at his disposal both the officials of his Secretariat and the Conseillers techniques and Chargés de mission in the President's cabinet. The cabinet in effect became amputated to include only the Director of cabinet, the Chief of cabinet, the military members and the Attachés who acted as the 'eyes and ears' of the President with regard to all the activities of the government. In other words, the President's cabinet acted more as a political body than as

an administrative institution.

Since the February 1970 reorganization of government work, this arrangement has only been preserved at the presidency. At the Prime Minister's Office, the role of the Secretariat General of Government is limited to the services that are either specifically under it or are attached to it. It is the Prime Minister's cabinet which co-ordinates, supervises, and controls the other services at the Office. The cabinet also takes charge of the political activities of the Prime Minister. However, the division of labour is not as clear-cut and in most administrative matters, the cabinet and the Secretariat General work together. But in contrast to the situation at the presidency, the effective boss is the Prime Minister himself who uses both the members of his cabinet and the officials of the Secretariat General as he likes.¹

The broad lines of government policies are determined during the weekly meetings of the cabinet council (conseil de cabinet) which is the meeting of all members of Government under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic.² During the meetings of the interministerial councils, these

¹ He presides over the periodic meeting which groups the members of his cabinet, the officials of the Secretariat General and other senior officials involved in the services under him. At the end of each meeting, he entrusts the follow-up of decisions taken to both the members of his cabinet and the Secretariat General officials. This account of how the work at the Prime Minister's Office is done is owed to a Conseiller technique member of the prime ministerial cabinet interviewed in November 1970.

² In addition, the President has a brief working session with each Minister, including the Prime Minister, once a week. This practice makes for coherence in government work and enhances co-ordination; it also ensures the President's close watch over government activities.

policies are further elaborated upon. It is the Secretary General of the Government who acts as secretary to both meetings.

The work of control and supervision of the entire civil service is the responsibility of the Inspectorate General of State which is attached to the Secretariat General at the Presidency.¹ This inspectorate has twelve members and no hindrance may be placed in the way of their investigations by any service. Their reports are sent directly to the president of the Republic. The Service of Financial Control which is also attached to the Secretariat General at the Presidency controls the financial operations of the civil service and addresses annual reports to the President. These arrangements for the control and supervision of the civil service are a continuation of the practice established under colonial rule. It is also interesting to note that the idea of separating financial control from the other aspects of administrative work has been preserved. In all, both institutions have not achieved much. In the case of the Inspectorate General, the problem has been the extensive nature of its competence which contrasts sharply with the limited human and financial resources at its disposal.² The

¹ Until 1964, this inspectorate was called the Inspectorate General of Administrative Affairs. The 1964 reorganization extended the inspectorate's role to cover 'societies, associations, groups and enterprises "of all nature" which benefit from State financial support or from financial support from local collectivities and public enterprise, the administration of the army and the control of the administrative and financial management of the judicial services'; see decree 64-157 of 28 Feb. 1964, JORS, 21 March 1964.

² Interview with an Inspector of State, April, 1971

only recorded activity of the Service of Financial Control is the report it published in 1963 covering the period of Prime Minister Dia's rule.

In addition to the functions of control and supervision performed by these specific institutions (internal control and supervision are ensured along the normal hierarchical units within the ministries), the Government set up a Permanent Committee for the Animation of Public Administrations in December 1966.¹ The work of the Committee is 'to propose measures likely to increase the output of civil servants and other agents of the State.'

In 1970, the Committee was working hand-in-hand with the Bureau of Organization and Methods whose mission is also to recommend how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Senegalese administration.² The concrete achievement of the Committee by 1970 was the controlled access it had introduced to administrative buildings thereby keeping off unnecessary visitors and ensuring greater punctuality on the part of officials. The Bureau of Organization and Methods for its part had submitted its studies of six ministries to the Government each of which included proposals for reform. The Government has been acting on these proposals.³

¹ Presidential Circular no. 120/PR/PD/ARR of 9 December 1966.

² The Bureau of Organization and Methods was created by decree no. 65-615 of 9 September 1965, JORS, 9 March 1965. However, it did not start to function until 1969 after the Government had obtained financial and personnel assistance from the United Nations.

³ Information obtained during interview with the UN expert in the Bureau, April 1971. The Bureau's studies are kept as official secrets and it is therefore difficult to know how much of its proposals for reform the Government is adopting.

Finally, there are two sets of institutions whose involvement in the work of the administration we should like to mention. First there is the use of advisory bodies with a view to associating some members of the public with administrative work in order to secure public co-operation or compliance with administrative decisions. Second, a number of institutions have been created for the judicial control of administrative action. In both cases, these institutions continue a tradition established under colonial rule: the former came with the establishment of ministries after 1957 while the latter were part of the characteristic features of the colonial administration in FWA from its very beginning.

Among Senegal's advisory bodies are the General Assembly of the Supreme Court and the Economic and Social Council which advise the Government as a whole. The former which groups all the magistrates of the Supreme Court and the conseillers en service extraordinaires (about twenty 'individuals qualified in the different domains of national life' appointed by decree for a period of one year) considers the projects of laws and decrees submitted to it by the Government.¹ The Government is not bound to accept the Assembly's opinions although it has accepted virtually all the amendments it has so far proposed. However, these amendments affected the form rather than the substance of the texts.²

The latter was inspired by the French institution of the same name and there was, in fact, a direct experience since

¹ See République du Sénégal, La Justice au Sénégal, (Rufisque: Imprimerie nationale, 1969), pp.41-42

² See Gautron and Rougevin-Baville, op. cit. pp.165-166

Senegal was represented within the French Economic and Social Council between 1959 and 1960 (Supra). The Government seeks the opinion of the Economic and Social Council on economic and social matters. The Council's members are drawn from interest groups and individuals who play a prominent role in the economic and social life of the nation. The 51 members in 1970 were drawn from the following five categories of people: workers in the public and private sectors (9); commercial, bank, crafts, and transport professions (9); industrial and mining professions (9); rural economy institutions (9); and nominated members on the grounds of their economic, social, scientific and cultural competence (15).¹ The Council is regularly consulted by the Government and its members played an important role in the preparation of the country's second and third development plans. The Government often requests the Council's members to carry out some studies of an economic and social character - and they sometimes initiate some studies on their own - whose findings were taken into consideration when policies were being formulated in the fields covered.²

¹ For the lists of members since 1964, see République du Sénégal, Le Conseil économique social, (Rufisque: Imprimerie nationale, n.d.), pp.41-83. Members are nominated for a period of six years with one-third of total membership renewed every two years.

² Between 1964 and 1970, the studies conducted by the Council covered a variety of subjects including 'Study on the Policy and Structures of Tourism in Senegal' (1964), 'Study on Fishing' (1967), 'Study on the Employment for University Graduates' (1968), and 'Study on the Simplification of the Rules for Granting Credit by Foreign Organizations' (1970). The Chief of Cabinet of the Council's President confirmed the influence of the Council's studies on Government policies during interview in March 1971.

The other councils relate to the functions of ministries or to those of divisions within ministries. Education has two: the Superior Council of Education and Training and the Council of Higher Education. The Ministry of Civil Service and Labour also has two: the Superior Council of the Civil Service and the National Committee of Labour and Social Security. Others include the National Council of Town Planning, the Superior Council of Planning, and the National Council of Health. In general, each council is composed of government representatives and the representatives of the relevant interest groups. For example, the National Committee of Labour and Social Security is composed of representatives of workers' trade unions, employers' associations, and the government. The regularity of meetings vary considerably from one council to the other but, on the whole, they are not frequent. Similarly, their influence vary. Those councils which are best placed to supply useful information to the Government (for example, the Economic and Social Council) and those which help either to diffuse the decision taken (for example the National Committee of Labour and Social Security) or to secure compliance (the General Assembly of the Supreme Court)¹ have had more influence than the others.

Three institutions have responsibility for the judicial control of administration: the Tribunals of First Instance, the Supreme Court, and the Court of Budgetary Discipline.

¹ The General Assembly of the Supreme Court helps to secure compliance by declaring that the Government's laws and decrees conform to the law and are thereby binding on all citizens.

First, it should be mentioned that there is no special administrative jurisdiction as the French tradition of a dual legal system - one judicial and the other administrative - was abandoned at independence. Senegal opted for a unified system which was officially presented as an original approach.¹ In reality, this arrangement has proved to be less significant than it was made to appear. As will be shown below, the basic doctrines applied are still those set out in French jurisprudence. The actual significance of the new arrangement lies in the economy achieved both in terms of finance and staff.²

In all cases where a citizen wants to proceed against the administration for damages either because of failure to fulfil the obligation of a contract or because of a liability in tort, he goes before the Tribunal of First Instance which is also responsible for civil and commercial matters. Civil servants who may wish to introduce litigations concerning their statute can also go before these tribunals. However, with regard to contracts, the procedure followed is slightly different from that of the common law; it is regulated by the code des obligations de l'administration which was elaborated on the lines of French jurisprudence on the subject.³ In general, it appears that the Tribunals of First

¹ See G. D'Arboussier, 'La Primauté du droit dans les nouvelles institutions de la République du Sénégal,' Recueil Penant, (Jan.-March 1961), pp.11-16. D'Arboussier was Minister of Justice at the time of the reform.

² M. Diop, 'L'Expérience Sénégalaise du contrôle juridictionnel de l'administration,' Revue Sénégalaise du droit, 4, (Dec. 1968), p.25.

³ See law no. 65-51 of 19 July 1965, JORS, 23 Aug. 1965.

Instance (located in the regional headquarters) have been used regularly to settle administrative conflicts and the establishment of the special procedure for cases concerning administrative contracts in 1965 was in response to demand.¹

Another category of cases which individuals can bring against the administration is when they want an administrative decision or regulation annulled: such cases are referred to as recours pour excès de pouvoir (cases of abuse of power). The existence of this kind of challenge is regarded as a guarantee of individual freedom and is written into the constitution which gives the exclusive competence over the subject to the Supreme Court.² Cases of abuse of power can be introduced, as in France, both when an authority takes a decision which it is not empowered to take (ultra vires) or when legal powers are used in a distorted manner (détournement de pouvoir).

A section of the Supreme Court (the second section) is responsible for all recours. Since independence, it has been headed by a member of the French Council of State. The president is assisted by at least two councillors (magistrates) with considerable experience in Senegalese administration. As shown in the Table on the next page, very few recours have been introduced before the Supreme Court since independence. The table also shows that the number of rejected cases is more than thrice that of the successful ones.

¹ Lavroff La République du Sénégal, op. cit. p.6

² See article 82 of the Senegalese constitution, Appendix D.

TABLE 2

Cases of Abuse of Power in Senegal, 1961-1968

Year	No. of cases	Judged cases	Rejected cases	Successful cases
1961	10 ^(a)	6	6	-
1962	2	3	3	-
1963	1	2	1	1
1964	7	-	-	-
1965	7	5	4	1
1966	3	10	7	3
1967	1	4	-	-
1968	0	3	1	2

Note: (a) 5 of these cases were brought forward from the Council of Administrative Conflict of the colonial period.

Source: Diop, 'Le controle de l'administration,' op.cit., p.573.

The chief reason for the limited use made of this institution is the onerous and complicated method of introducing a case of recours. The plaintiff has to get a barrister or the President of the Republic to sign his case and, in addition, pay a cautionary fee of 5,000 francs which fall to the state if the case fails. The justification for these two requirements is that they will help ensure that only genuine cases are brought forward. In practice, it frightens off citizens from introducing cases. For example, a case introduced against a governor of the Cape Verde region in 1961 was not considered because the plaintiff had not paid the cautionary fee. And in 1962, a case introduced against the Director of the Postal and Telecommunication Office was not considered because the plaintiff had not got a barrister to sign.¹

With regard to the high proportion of rejected cases, it appears that the second section of the Supreme Court has shown great leniency towards the government. For example, when a civil servant prevented from going for an in-service training course because of his political activity introduced a case of recours on the basis of ultra vires, the Court upheld the government's decision on the grounds that the civil servant concerned had not shown enough 'reserve' in his political activity. (The general statute of civil servants allows full participation in politics to civil servants, infra).

¹ Diop, op. cit. p.12

Among the cases that resulted in annulment was that of a civil servant in the Ministry of Transport who was dismissed for involvement in subversive activities against the state in March 1963. The supreme Court upheld his challenge on the grounds that the government's case was not sufficiently proved. Another successful case was introduced by a group of local politicians who claimed that the Special Delegation established by the government to replace an elected municipal council had lasted for more than necessary. The Supreme Court upheld their challenge and the decree establishing the Special Delegation was annulled.

Although only a limited use is made of recours, it is nevertheless an important guarantee for freedom from administrative arbitrariness. Its effectiveness which has hitherto been limited by the complicated procedures regulating its use can be increased when these procedures are simplified; the payment of a cautionary fee can be abolished and Justices of the Peace could be empowered to sign cases that are to be introduced. The institution will also perform its constitutional role more satisfactorily if the members of the Supreme Court concerned would show more leniency towards plaintiffs than towards the government.

The Supreme Court also judges à posteriori the accounts of public accountants in Senegal. The section of the upreme Court responsible for this function can be assisted by civil servants with considerable experience in public accounting; they make their technical expertise available but do not participate in the decisions taken. The court sends a

provisional judgment to each accounting officer who has two months to reply to questions raised. It is after this that a definitive judgment is issued. The decision of the court is final although the accounting officer can ask for review if he finds new evidences in his support; a state prosecutor can also ask for review if new irregularities are discovered after the initial judgment.

The second role of the Supreme Court in the judicial control of public finance is to publish an annual report on public accounts 'in which it points out the most important irregularities and eventually proposes reforms and ameliorations'.¹ Although the role of controlling the regularity of the accounts of public accounting officers has so far been constantly performed, only one annual report has been issued - in 1963.² This means that the Supreme Court has so far failed to propose reforms and ameliorations for the management of public accounts.³

The Court of Budgetary Discipline was created in 1963⁴ on the model of the French court of the same name created in 1948. Its role is to judge all violations of financial

¹ Diop, 'L'Expérience Sénégalaise du contrôle juridictionnel de l'administration,' op. cit., p.30.

² This report was published in JORS, 3 Aug. 1963; it covered the period from Jan. 1959 to June 1962.

³ The fact that the report presented in 1963 coincided with a change in government (Dia was succeeded by Senghor in December 1962) indicates that it is probably the government which does not encourage the publication of annual reports.

⁴ Decree no. 63-20 of 5 February 1963, JORS, 18 March 1963.

regulations including 'waste'¹ and bribery. Only the President of the Republic or the president of the Supreme Court section which deals with public accounts can bring cases before it.

The court is headed by a magistrate of the Supreme Court and the two other members are the General Treasurer of State and a regional governor. The investigation of affairs brought before the court is conducted by civil servants with long experience in financial administration or by magistrates. No obstacles can be opposed to their inquiries. The court's sessions are held within the building of the Supreme Court which also provides accommodation for its secretariat work. In fact, considering its organization and functioning, it can be described as a section of the Supreme Court.²

Civil servants brought before the court are allowed to defend themselves and if found guilty can be asked to pay fines that can be as high as a whole year's salary and not less than 10,000 francs. In addition to the measures taken by the court, a guilty civil servant can still be disciplined according to civil service disciplinary procedures and, if necessary, be made to face a penal proceeding. Appeals against the court's decision can be made before the Supreme Court.

This court was specifically created as an instrument for

¹ Financial management acts that are described as 'waste' include: 'failure to pursue a debtor', 'transactions that are very heavy for the collectivity concerned', and 'expenses beyond available funds'. Source: Decree no. 62-20 of 5 February 1963, op. cit.

² Diop, op. cit., p.25.

fighting embezzlement of public funds and other financial irregularities. Its sanctions have been very severe, 22 condemnations out of 45 cases within four years (see Table on next page). The condemnations include a fine of over 1 million francs in 1964, one of 500,000 in 1965 and another of 600,000 in 1966¹. These severe condemnations not only punish offenders, they are also intended to serve as deterrents to other civil servants.

To a great extent, the above account shows the administrative arrangements at ministerial level in post-independence Senegal as a clear continuation of the metropolitan arrangements introduced towards the end of the colonial period. This continuity is evident in the structure of ministries, the role of ministerial cabinets, the arrangements for the control and supervision of administrative work, the use of advisory bodies, and the creation of institutions for the judicial control of administrative action. It is only in the details of the arrangements established that some modifications and adaptations have been made.

Thus, for example, the number of ministries has been increased in order to take account of the expansion in the scope of government work. Another example is the case of ministerial cabinets whose composition and functions have been substantially adapted to suit local realities. Furthermore, there is the arrangement whereby the institutions responsible for the judicial control of administrative action form part

¹ Ibid., p.30.

TABLE 3

**Cases Brought Before the Court of Budgetary
Discipline in Senegal, 1963-1967**

Year	Old Cases	New Cases	Cases Judged	No. of Condemn- ations
1963	-	2	-	-
1964	2	7	5	4
1965	4	10	6	6
1966	8	12	7	6
1967	13	12	4	?

Source: Diop, 'L'Expérience sénégalaise
du contrôle juridictionnel de
l'administration,' op.cit., p.30

of a unified legal system instead of the colonial tradition of a separate administrative jurisdiction. This, as already mentioned, was done for reasons of economy of finance and personnel.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the strong evidence of continuity in the administrative arrangements at ministerial level has been greatly influenced by the presence of Frenchmen within the Senegalese administration. This is particularly noticeable in the case of the institutions for the judicial control of administrative action. Since independence, both the section of the Supreme Court dealing with cases of abuse of power and the Court of Budgetary Discipline have been headed by Frenchmen. In fact, out of 69 senior-level judicial officials in 1966, 37 of them were Frenchmen.

Guinea

Contrary to what one might expect as a result of the claim that the party organization determines the organization of the administration in Guinea, the pattern of administrative organization at ministerial level in the country is, like the situation in Senegal, a continuation of the metropolitan-inspired arrangement - government work organized within ministries placed under political heads. As in Senegal, too, the most important change noticeable is an increase in the number of departments and ministries - and this for the same reasons. First, the functions hitherto performed by the metropolitan power became the responsibility of the state and second, the ideological commitment to promote development

(which both countries share) has led to an increase in the scope of the activities performed by the ministries concerned with economic and social development. The following figures of the size of the civil service between 1957 and 1967 give an idea of this expansion in the scope of government work: 1957, 11,443; 1958, 10,943¹; 1963, 20,579; and 1967, 23,414.

Until 1967, the allocation of functions between the ministries and departments was characterized by a great instability in ministerial structure which reflected the frequent reshuffles in government personnel.² This was in turn reflected in changes in the title and responsibility of Ministers. The result was that there were very few well-established ministries; instead, there were several departments,³ few of which regularly served as the nuclei of ministries (Education, Civil Service, Health) while the majority were frequently transferred between the Presidency⁴ and the nuclei departments. Some of the nuclei departments

¹ This figure is lower than that for 1957 because of the departure of French officials estimated at about 500 shortly after Guinean independence in October 1958.

² Between 1958 and 1967, there was at least one major government reshuffle each year except in 1966 when there was none.

³ 'Department' is used here to refer to a permanent group of government services. When a department is placed under a Minister, we refer to it as a ministry. We also refer to two or more departments placed under a Minister as a ministry.

³ Some government services were managed under the direct supervision of the President. The composition of these services varied from time to time but most of them had to do with security, economic and financial questions and culture. Also, the Secretariat General of the Government responsible for co-ordinating government work was attached to the Presidency.

and a few of the transferable ones were occasionally upgraded to constitute autonomous ministries (Education, Civil Service, Finance, Transport). The following lists of government for 1960, 1963, and 1967 illustrate this point.

The Government in 1960

President

Minister:

Interior and Public Collectivities
Justice
Finance
Public Works, Transport and Telecommunications
Rural Economy, Co-operatives and Peasantry
Health
Labour and Social Laws
General Economy
Education
Planning
Civil Service
National Defence and Security
Information and Tourism
Central Bank

The Government in 1963

President

Minister of State:

Justice and Control of Administration and Finance

Ministers:

External Affairs
Education, Culture and Youth
Economic Development, Public Works, Industry,
Mines and Energy
Health and Social Affairs
Finance
Transport
Defence and Security
Planning
Rural Economy
Posts, Telecommunications and Information
Commerce
Civil Service and Labour
Central Bank

Secretaries of State:

Housing (President)

Control of Administration and Finance (Justice,

Control of Administration and Finance)

Social Affairs (Health and Social Affairs)

The Government in 1967**President****Minister of State:**

Finance and Planning

Ministers:

External Affairs

Economic Development

Post, Telecommunications and Information

Education, Culture and Arts

Rural Economy

Transport

Justice

Civil Service

Public Works

Financial Control

Labour and Social Laws

Popular Army and Civic Service

Health and Population

Central Bank

Ministers Delegate:¹

i/c Presidency Affairs

i/c Maritime Guinea

i/c Middle Guinea

i/c Forest Guinea

i/c Upper Guinea

Secretaries of State:

Interior and Security (President)

Youth and Popular Culture (President)

Information and Tourism (President)

Planning and Finance (Planning and Finance)

Health and Population (Health and Population)

¹ The title of 'Minister Delegate' was created in November 1964 for the political heads of a newly created level of central government administration in the interior called the ministerial delegation (*infra*). They were ranked as Ministers until the January 1968 reorganization. In the post-1968 ranking order, they come after the Ministers of *domaine*. The post of Minister Delegate at the presidency existed for only a few months until 1967; since then, the title of 'Minister Delegate' has been reserved for the heads of the ministerial delegations.

In 1968, the above method was changed following the regime's announcement of its desire to secure a more rational and efficient arrangement.¹ The new method adopted established a ministerial structure in which related functions were grouped under six large ministries (later called domaines). As in the past, some government services continued to be managed at the Presidency. The Ministers of domaine and the President were assisted by Secretaries of State who, in some cases, headed distinct services within the domaines; in other cases, Secretaries of State served as general assistants to the Ministers. Although the allocation of functions among the domaines changed between 1968 and 1970, the basic arrangement has remained unchanged. The following list of Government in December 1970 shows how the functions were distributed.

The Government in December 1970

President

Ministers of State of domaine:

External Affairs
Economy

Ministers of domaine:

Finance
Social Affairs
Interior and Security
Trade

¹ The regime's determination to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration was affirmed at the eighth Congress of the PDG in 1967; see Republique de Guinée Huitieme congres national du parti democratique de Guinee (RDA), tenu a Conakry du 25 Septembre au 2 Octobre 1967, (Conakry: Imprimerie nationale Patrice Lumumba, n.d.), passim, esp. pp.61-82. The 1968 ministerial reorganization was the follow-up of this decision.

Ministers Delegate:

i/c Maritime Guinea
i/c Middle Guinea
i/c Forest Guinea
i/c Upper Guinea

Secretaries of State:


Army and Civic Service (President)
Ideology, Extra-Mural Education and Literacy
Campaign (President)
Co-ordination of Presidency Affairs (President)
External Affairs (External Affairs)
Industry and Mines (Economy)
Power (Economy)
Planning and Statistics (Economy)
Public Works and Land (Economy)
Rural Economy (Economy)
Budgets (Finance)
Banks and Insurance (Finance)
Financial Control (Finance)
Education (Social Affairs)
Health (Social Affairs)
Social Affairs (Social Affairs)
Youth and Popular Culture (Social Affairs)
Civil Service and Labour (Social Affairs)
Information and Tourism (Social Affairs)
Scientific Research (Interior and Security)
Interior and Security (Interior and Security)
Justice (Interior and Security)
Internal Commerce (Trade)
External Trade (Trade)
Transport (Trade)
Post, Telegraph and Telecommunication (Trade)

An important aspect of this new arrangement is that it was influenced by the leadership structure of the party decided upon at the eighth Congress in 1967: the Ministers of domaine and the President also constituted the party executive, the BPN. This, as pointed out in Chapter 2, represents an illustration of the influence of the doctrine of party supremacy on administrative organization and constitutes a departure from the French model.

Since the adoption of the new ministerial structure, the organization of work within the ministries is as follows. The work of government is shared between the President and

six Ministers of domaine assisted by a number of Secretaries of State. The Minister has overall responsibility for the different services within his domaine. The policies executed by these services are determined or adopted at BPN meetings which he attends. As shown in the chart on the next page, there is a ministerial cabinet between the Minister and his Secretaries of State each of whom also has his own cabinet. The members of these cabinets are the immediate collaborators of both the Minister and his Secretaries of State. While a Minister's cabinet has two members - a Director and a Chief of cabinet - the cabinet of a Secretary of State has only one - the Chief of cabinet.¹ The Director of a Minister's cabinet is the Minister's confidant and although appointed by decree, he is usually the nominee of the Minister. He assists the Minister both in planning the work of the domaine and in supervising its execution. He has a delegation of signature over certain specified matters. All communications to and from the Minister pass through him. The Chiefs of cabinet both for a Minister and for a Secretary of State are senior administrators with considerable experience in the services under their respective political heads. They are appointed by decree, usually without consultation with the politicians. They tend to remain in the same post for a considerable length of time and are very rarely affected by

¹ A few Secretaries of State - those with small services - are sometimes temporarily without Chiefs of cabinet, usually because of shortage of personnel. For example, only ten of the fourteen Secretaries of State appointed in January 1968 had Chiefs of cabinet; see Journal officiel de la République de Guinée, (JORG), 15 March 1968.



The Organization of a Typical Domaine

the changing fortunes of the political heads.¹

The Minister's Chief of cabinet has responsibility for the day-to-day co-ordination of activities within the domaine and for this purpose, he has regular contacts with the other Chiefs of cabinet within the domaine. The Secretary of State's Chief of cabinet is the effective head and co-ordinator of the activities under the authority of his political head. Taken together, the Minister and the Secretaries of State and their immediate collaborators within the cabinets constitute a kind of team leadership which makes it possible for political heads who may be administratively ineffective either because of frequent transfers (at the level of the Secretaries of State) or because of little understanding of the work under them, to be ably supported by experienced and qualified civil servants.²

The practice in all domaines is to hold a weekly or a fortnightly meeting of all Secretaries of State, members of the ministerial cabinets, and a few senior officials - especially the heads of services whose affairs are on the agenda - with the Minister as chairman. The agenda for these

¹ For example, the Chief of cabinet to the Secretary of State for Civil Service and Labour in 1971 was in his eleventh year in the affairs of that Secretariat and had been Chief of cabinet since 1965. Another example was the Chief of cabinet to the Secretary of State for Budgets who had been a senior civil servant in financial administration since 1959 and has been Chief of cabinet since 1960 except for a break between 1964 and 1968 when he served as Director of Budgets.

² In recognition of their duties, Directors of cabinet receive an extra allowance of 25,000 francs (Guinean francs) per month (30,000 for the Director of the President's cabinet) and Chiefs of cabinet receive 20,000 francs per month.

meetings usually include a review of past activities and a discussion of problems to which solutions are sought. Above all decisions are taken on how to achieve the targets fixed for the different services of the domaine by the regime.¹ The decisions taken are followed up during the intervals between the meetings by the hierarchically organized administrative units of the different services.

There is no uniformity of organization below the level of the Secretary of State's cabinet. The major unit within each Secretariat of State is either a general division (direction générale) headed by a Director or a division headed by a Chief of division. When the major unit is a general division, it is usually subdivided into divisions. In all cases, a division can be designated as a service or a bureau. A division, service or bureau is, in many cases, subdivided into sections which constitute the common basic administrative unit. Any services of a domaine which are not organized within these units are directly attached to the cabinet of the Minister. On the whole, the structural arrangement of administrative units within ministries is characterized by a confusion of terminology and variations in organizational pattern - two features that are hardly conducive to the realization of the regime's desire for an efficient administration.

In addition to these administrative units, there are about fifteen inspectorates which group either the services

¹ The Guinean regime has adopted the Russian style of fixing annual and periodic targets for the various services of the state.

of a domaine (the Inspectorate General of Trade for the domaine of Trade) or some services within a domaine has one or more inspectorates. The Inspectorate of Administrative and Financial Affairs which belongs jointly to the domaines of Interior and Security and Finance, is the most prestigious because it has authority over the general administrative and financial management of all services including the diplomatic missions abroad.¹ These inspectorates are staffed by senior civil servants and they are responsible for the representation of their respective services at the level of the ministerial delegations. They control and supervise the work of their services during their tours of inspection. Their work is supplemented by the Court of Accounts (Cour des comptes) which controls the accounts of all public accountants in the last resort (infra).

A decree of 30 July 1964 which set out the organization of work within the ministries is still in force.² The decree recommends that there should be an organizational chart in each ministry in which hierarchies and functions are clearly defined. It emphasizes punctuality, forbids the admission of visitors to all officials below the level of a Chief of

¹ The prestige of this inspectorate is partly due to the fact that it is the oldest - it dates back to the later part of the colonial administration.

² Decree no. 307/PRG of 30 July 1964, JORG, 1 September 1964. And in circular no 28/PRG/SG of 22 December 1970, the President ordered this decree to be re-circulated within the ministries. The writer saw both the circular and the text of the decree displayed on notice-boards in the ministries visited in February 1971.

service, and stresses the importance of 'collective responsibility' within every service. None of the several services visited in February 1971 had an organizational chart and only a few officials behaved in any way resembling the injunctions of the decree. Finally, all the services were suffering from the problem of shortage of manpower. The leading officials in these services admitted that many divisions and sections existed only on the pages of the Journal officiel because there were no available personnel to staff them. The following personnel figures for 1967 give an idea of the seriousness of this problem. The senior and middle-level personnel in some of the major services were distributed as follows:¹

<u>Administrative Services</u>	<u>Senior-level Personnel</u>	<u>Middle-level Personnel</u>
Education	486	667
General Administration	63	176
Health	44	425
Public Works	51	184
Rural Economy	50	198
Total for all Services	744	1,904

The operation of the services at the Presidency differs markedly from that of the domaines. Because of the multifarious duties of the President, he cannot himself co-ordinate

¹ Source: République de Guinée, Statistique du travail au 15 - 12 - 67, Conakry, mimeo. The total establishment of the civil service was 23,414, including 778 contract officials mostly from East European countries distributed as follows: 58 Doctors, 621 Teachers, 39 Engineers and 60 others. Of the total establishment, only 6.3% had received secondary education and above - the official educational requirement for senior and middle-level posts.

and supervise all the services under him; hence the creation of a Secretariat of State for co-ordinating presidency affairs. It co-ordinates the work of the different Secretariats of State attached to the Presidency as well as that of the specialized bureaux which manage the other activities there. In addition, there is the Secretariat General of Government which is also attached to the Presidency and has responsibility for co-ordinating the work of the Government as a whole.¹

Although the President has both a civil and military cabinet, their members' roles are not clearly defined; they act more like Chargés de mission in the French cabinets: each is assigned specific missions from time to time.² The civil cabinet consists of only a Director and a Chief of cabinet and the military cabinet has two to three members. The outstanding feature of the organization of work at the Presidency is the absence of any apparent order: lines of communication criss-cross and hierarchical relationships are not fixed beyond the general recognition of the President as the superior authority. Closely connected with this style of operation is the regularity with which most officials are transferred between functions both within and outside the Presidency.³

¹ It shares this function with the BPN secretariat.

² On ministerial cabinets in France, see De Lamothe, op. cit.

³ The few exceptions to this general instability appear to be the men on whom the President relies for the overall supervision and co-ordination of Presidency affairs, regardless of their stated functions. This conclusion is based on observations during visits in July and August 1968 and between November 1970 and March 1971 and on discussions with diplomatic officials who deal regularly with the Presidency.

Most of the above account of the organization of work within the ministries is, in fact, a continuation of the practices introduced under the loi-cadre Government. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the organization of the ministries established in all the territories as a result of the loi-cadre reform was based on the pattern of ministerial organization in the metropolitan country. The most important illustration of this continuity is the central position occupied by the ministerial cabinet. Although this institution has survived only in a skeletal form (due largely to the acute shortage of personnel), it has nevertheless continued to occupy the central position in the organization of work within the ministries. Another example of continuity is that Guinea, like Senegal, has maintained the metropolitan-inspired idea of setting out in the Journal officiel a prescribed number of administrative units for the different ministries which rarely corresponds to what the available personnel can staff and run.

This point about continuity is further underlined by the fact that Guinea, like Senegal, associates advisory bodies with the work of the administration (for the same reasons) and has established some institutions for the judicial control of administrative action. The advisory bodies used in the work of the administration are consultative groups variously designated as councils, committees, or commissions.¹ In the early sixties, the councils were composed of both senior civil servants, representatives of

¹ These bodies fulfill the same functions irrespective of their titles; 'council' appears to be the most favoured designation.

interest groups and nominees of the National Assembly. Thus, for example, the Consultative Commission of Labour established in 1960 was composed of a senior civil servant (who acted as chairman), four deputies elected by the National Assembly eight representatives of workers' associations, and eight representatives of employers' associations. Since 1965, all advisory councils are composed entirely of party leaders (who constitute the majority on each body) and a few senior officials of the services concerned.¹

In all, only a few of the councils established have functioned for any length of time: the majority were never summoned and some only held an inaugural meeting.² One important exception is the National Economic Commission established in 1964 and which now advises both the domaines of Finance and Trade on matters connected with contracts and agreements, annual imports and exports, the granting of import and export licenses and the distribution of goods and food supplies within the country. This Commission meets regularly and its deliberations influence the activities of the two domaines concerned. In a special category are the Superior Council of Education and the National Literacy Council, both of which

¹ This followed the regime's decision to make the PDG the only formally organized institution within the country; the associations of workers, women and youth became 'parallel' institutions of the party while other associations were abolished.

² The advisory councils established were mostly in connection with the social and economic functions of the government and included a National Economic Commission, a Superior Council of Planning and Development, a Health Council, and a Labour Consultative Commission. With regard to functioning, the National Planning Council created in 1960 was never summoned and the Labour Consultative Commission created in 1967 has only held its inaugural meeting.

are headed by the President of the Republic: they act more like high-level organs issuing directives than as advisory councils giving advice to some government services.¹

A Court of Accounts was created in Guinea in January 1967 and given responsibility for 'a judicial control on the accounts of all public accountants'.² Initially, the Court was attached to the Presidency but was transferred to the Ministry of Financial domaine in June 1969. At the head of the Court is a president assisted by a secretary general who is responsible for the Court's secretarial duties. The Court is divided into five chambers: one for each of the four ministerial delegations and the fifth for the operations connected with the national general budget. At the head of each chamber is a councillor who is named by decree. In principle, a councillor must belong to the hierarchy B of the civil service but two hierarchy C officials have been appointed.³ Each councillor is assisted by two accountants and a number of accounting clerks.

The Court started to function effectively in 1970. According to its secretary general, the accounts of public

¹ A good example of their directives was the fixing of the school calendar which was decided upon at the second meeting of the Superior Council of Education in November 1968. The Guinean school year since then consists of two semesters of five months each - October to February and mid-March to mid-August with one short vacation, 1-15 March and one long vacation, mid-August to the end of September.

² Decree no. 18/PRG of 16 January 1967, JORG, 15 Jan. 1967.

³ Hierarchies B and C of the civil service are the local designations for senior and middle-level officials.

accountants came in regularly to the five chambers in 1970 and this made constant control possible.¹ The other aspect of the Court's function - the preparation of an annual report on financial management and public accounting - has so far been neglected.² Considering the facilities put at the disposal of the Court in 1970, it appears that the Government is determined to make it effective.³ It is likely that the alarming rate at which public money is embezzled in the country partly explains the attention paid by the Government to the Court of Accounts.⁴ But it remains to be seen how effective the Court will be in solving this problem.

Until 1964, there was no text on how administrative conflicts were resolved in Guinea.⁵ In November 1964, an Administrative Tribunal was created and directly attached to the Presidency. Its definitive organization was set out in a

¹ Interview, Conakry, February 1971.

² According to the secretary general of the Court, the report for 1970 was under preparation.

³ In terms of both accommodation and personnel, the Court has received a better deal than most ministerial departments.

⁴ Between January 1964 and December 1967, 42 of all cases brought before the country's Cour d'assises dealt with embezzlement (the 11 other categories of cases include murder, rape and armed robbery): 30 in 1964, 19 in 1965, 23 in 1966, and 16 in 1967. Source: K.R. Kourouma, 'L'Evolution des institutions judiciaires en Guinée,' Mémoire de fin d'études supérieures, IPC (ESA), 1967/68, p.135.

⁵ As already mentioned, Guinea remained under the jurisdiction of both the Council of Administrative Conflict for FWA and the Council of State in Paris until her independence in 1958. It has been stated that such conflicts as existed were settled by the common law tribunals; see Kourouma, op.cit., p.130.

decree of April 1965.¹ In that year, the Tribunal was headed by a professional magistrate and had four other members, all of them senior civil servants. The Government was represented before the Tribunal by the secretary general to the Tribunal who had the title of Government Commissioner. The membership of the Tribunal is for an unlimited period but it can be revoked by the President of the Republic who appoints each of them.

The Tribunal has power to settle all administrative conflicts that may be brought before it either by civil servants or by users of the administration whose rights may have been violated by administrative action. It acts as a court of first and last resort and only the President's veto can alter its verdict.

According to the law, cases should only come before the Tribunal after two other channels of seeking redress have been tried: first, the aggrieved citizen should try to settle directly with whoever has violated his rights or caused him any damage; second, he should take the matter before the hierarchical superiors of the official concerned starting from the lowest superior to the highest. This order of procedure has not encouraged people to bring cases before the Tribunal; the alternatives to exhaust, especially the second which may involve several individuals, have made the whole enterprise unattractive. Indeed, between 1965 and 1967, the majority of cases settled by the Tribunal dealt with accidents caused by

¹ Decree no. 90/PRG of 5 April 1965, JORG, 1 May 1965.

government drivers. These are cases that are easy to establish and which the hierarchical superiors of the drivers concerned are clearly unable to settle. On the other hand, there are no records of civil servants bringing forward cases connected with their careers or of individual citizens alleging violation of their rights or complaining of damages caused by administrative action.¹

On the whole, this institution has been very little used. This is partly because of the difficult hurdles to clear before being able to come before the Tribunal. A second reason is that the Tribunal, like other judicial institutions in Guinea, is not an independent body: 'Judicial independence is for him [the Guinean magistrate] a retrograde institution which cannot respond to the policy of our regime.'² A presidential Circular of July 1963 states clearly this absence of judicial independence in Guinea: '...in order to harmonise the various aspects of social justice, they [magistrates] must inform, before judgment is rendered, these officials [administrative and political leaders] about all cases likely, by virtue of the circumstances, to have an unwelcome repercussion on the political climate or on public opinion.'³ It is likely that many consider futile any attempt to institute cases against protected administrators before dependent magistrates. A third reason is that the institution has not been very well

¹ Kourouma, op.cit., pp.120-132.

² Ibid., p.97

³ Circular no. 016/PRG of 2 July 1963 in JORG, 1 Sept. 1963. It should be noted that all officials of the Guinean judiciary are civil servants; see decree no. 67/PG of 3 March 1960, JORG, 1 May 1960.

organized.¹ Since its creation, all its members have been men who occupy other posts which take most of their time with the result that very little attention has been paid to the affairs of the Tribunal. For example, during a visit in February 1971, only two clerical officers were found in the Tribunal's offices while the senior officials were busy with other engagements: the president had been away for several weeks on his private plantation and the secretary general was engaged in party work.

In practice, then, Guinea has only effectively preserved the idea of a judicial control of administrative action in relation to financial administration. As will be shown later in the study,² the only means of securing redress against administrative action and of challenging administrative decisions lies within the party organization. This constitutes a significant departure from the colonial administrative experience. However, considering the emphasis on party control of the administration in both the existing studies of the country and in the established ideology, the creation of an independent judicial institution for financial control based on the model that was established under colonial rule is perhaps more significant.

In all, the general conclusion that emerges from the above account of the various aspects of administrative arrange-

¹The organization on paper was quite complete and it included a provision for the establishment of a Tribunal of Conflict to settle any conflict of jurisdiction between the Administrative Tribunal and the judicial tribunals. The Tribunal of Conflict has never had occasion to meet.

²See pp. 240 - 243.

ments at ministerial level in post-independence Guinea is that they have been more influenced by the colonial experience than one would have expected from the claims made in the name of the party ideology. Although the party ideology accounts for the fact that the executive of the party is also the cabinet of the government, this has not led to a fundamentally different approach to ministerial organization. Thus, the important subject of the organization of work within the ministries is completely unaffected by party ideology. As in Senegal, the ministerial cabinets - even though they have only survived in a skeletal form - have continued to occupy the central position within the ministries. Also, the details of the working arrangements within the ministries spelt out in the decree of 30 July 1964 with the emphasis on administrative efficiency is similar to what exists in Senegal and both are a continuation of the colonial administrative tradition. The only difference is that while Senegal has taken some concrete steps in the pursuit of administrative efficiency - the adoption of a standard ministerial organization and a uniform terminology, the establishment of a Bureau of Organization and Methods and the creation of a Committee for the Animation of the Public Administrations - nothing substantial has been done in Guinea. Another proof of the continuing influence of the colonial administrative legacy which Guinea shares with Senegal is the existence of a blue print for the administration (spelt out on the pages of the Journal officiel) which goes beyond what the country can staff and run.

Against all this, there are only two important modifications that are due to the influence of the established ideology.

First, the metropolitan-inspired idea of associating advisory bodies with the work of the administration which was preserved for some years after independence has been abandoned and replaced by some kind of party consultative bodies. This contrasts with the situation in Senegal where the metropolitan idea has been preserved with the country's Economic and Social Council functioning in a way that is very similar to that of its counterpart in France. Second, the Administrative Tribunal established to provide a judicial check on administrative action has been rendered ineffective because the ideology of the regime rejects the judicial value - the idea of independent magistrates - on which its proper functioning depends. In contrast, Senegal has effectively established institutions which provide a judicial check on administrative action.

On the whole, despite the way in which power was transferred, the absence of French officials in the administration, and the nature of the established ideology, the post-independence administrative organisation at ministerial level in Guinea has preserved many characteristics that were inherited from the colonial administration. The only significant contrast with the situation in Senegal is the abandonment of the idea of a judicial check on administrative action outside the field of financial administration.

CHAPTER 4

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AT REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS

Political history teaches that the lack of state organization is a weakness that brings about the fatal disintegration of the nation.

L.S. Senghor¹

There is an intimate liaison between the political structures and the administrative structures; however, in most cases, the first determine the second.

A.S. Touré²

Following the account of the administrative organization at ministerial level in the previous chapter, this chapter describes administrative organization at regional and local levels. As in the previous chapter, we shall be finding out how far the post-independence administrative arrangements at regional and local levels in the two states reflect the contrasting positions postulated in the thesis's general proposition.

Senegal

The administrative reorganization carried out on the eve of Senegal's independence in 1960 which was described in Chapter 1 was maintained for the first few years after independence. In fact, many of its provisions were not carried out until after independence. As was pointed out in Chapter 1, the

¹ Nation et voie africaine du socialisme, op.cit., p.41.

² Touré, Vol. XVI, p.17.

reorganization was consistent with the basic principles of the French colonial administration. As the Minister of the Interior responsible for the reorganization put it, 'we have transformed our institutions, we have adapted them, but we remain within a tradition'.¹

In 1964, a new reform of the administrative structures at regional and local levels was announced² because, as the President of the Republic put it, 'the state is not organized at the regional and local levels, it has no effective method.'³ In other words, the 1960 structures had not functioned satisfactorily. Although the new reform preserved the outline of the structures established in 1960 (see chart on next page), the roles and relationships of the central government representatives at the head of the area units were re-defined. (In addition, the cercle's title was changed to department and its head became known as a Prefect instead of the former title of Commandant). These 1964 arrangements have since remained unchanged except for a few unimportant modifications.

The Regions


In the new reform, the regional governor is 'the delegate of the President of the Republic' and 'the representative of each of the ministries.'⁴ In this capacity, his respon-

¹Communication du Ministre de l'intérieur sur la réforme administrative... op.cit., p.12.

²Decree no. 64-282 of 3 April 1964, JORS, 2 May 1964.

³Senghor, Planification et tension morale, op.cit.

⁴The designation of the regional governor as 'the delegate of the President of the Republic' reflected the constitutional revision of March 1963 in which an Executive President became the head of government.




The Organization of Central Government Administration
at Regional and Local Levels

sibility for the co-ordination and supervision of all the activities of the central government within the region remain the same as in the 1960 reform. However, his hierarchical superiority has been more precisely defined. Thus, it was clearly stated that the Regional Governor has under his authority all the prefects and civil servants and civil agents of the State and of the public enterprises serving in the region and he can suspend any of them 'if he is guilty of a serious mistake and if urgency demands recourse to such a measure with the proviso that he, the governor, reports without delay to the President of the Republic, the Minister of Civil Service and the Minister on whom the civil servant or agent depends.'¹ This hierarchical superiority of the governor is strengthened by the provision that 'he is the only one entitled to correspond directly with the President of the Republic and the Ministers. Consequently, all correspondence of all kinds addressed by these authorities to regional or local services, and by these services to the said authorities can only be transmitted through the Governor.' In Circular no. 82 of 31 July 1964, a diagram of the movement of correspondence was drawn up and circulated to all the authorities and services concerned (see diagram on next page).

Similarly, the responsibility of the governor vis-à-vis the government services within the region was very clearly stated: 'the Regional Governor...receives from the President

¹ The regional governor's disciplinary power over his subordinates was affected by the changes in disciplinary matters; see Chapter 5, pp. 196 - 197.



Movement of Correspondence

Note: (a) This refers to the non-technical services of the central ministerial departments.

Source: Circular no. 82 of 31 July, 1964.

and the Ministers directives concerning national policy. He transmits to the secondary levels these directives and instructions and specifies the spirit in which they should be applied.' The governor performs this function by issuing instructions to the regional and local services. In the process, 'he could, especially in an emergency case, suspend the execution of any measure if he judges it contrary to government policy with the proviso that he reports immediately to the President of the Republic and the Ministers concerned'. Furthermore, 'he could equally directly order, if there is an emergency, all conservatory measures in conformity with the laws and regulations at the regional level, in order that the regional execution of national policy is not compromised...' Above all, 'the Governor is responsible for the entire measures for maintaining and re-establishing order in the region, when the problems of the maintenance of public order cover more than one department or has consequences for other departments.' In accomplishing this task, 'he has the right to requisition the armed forces'.

The governor's role as Government commissioner with the regional assembly was re-defined as that of a veritable chief executive and not simply a representative who could attend meetings as in the 1960 reform (supra). As chief executive, he prepares and executes the regional budget and all the personnel involved in the work of the assembly are central government agents placed under his authority. Governors have also become the chief executives of the communes in the regional headquarters and the tutelage authorities for those outside

the headquarters.¹ However, their executive functions are not as extensive as in the case of the regional assemblies. For example, the municipal councils still employ their own personnel and a portion of the municipal budget is executed by council officials.²

Regional governors are appointed by decree and must belong to the hierarchy A of the civil service. They are assisted by two assistants appointed in the same form and under the same conditions as themselves. 'He determines their functions and can consent to them delegations of signature whose limits he fixes'. In the governor's absence, the first assistant replaces him in full rights and for the duration of his absence. Each governor has a chief of cabinet who is usually one of the senior civil servants serving within the region. He acts as the immediate collaborator of the governor and co-ordinates those activities which do not come under either of his two assistants.

Regional governors discharge their duty of co-ordination and control through monthly meetings attended by all the representatives of the services within the region. 'On this occasion, he comments on the instructions received from the superior authorities, informs himself of the difficulties encountered [by these services] and gives special instructions within the

¹This is part of the tutelage authority which regional governors exercise on behalf of Ministers 'on moral persons of public law installed in the regions'.

²The relationship of regional governors with the regional assemblies and the municipal councils are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

framework of the general instructions received from the different competent authorities'. Furthermore, the governor can also carry out his functions of control and supervision during his periodic tours within the region: 'the Regional Governor can undertake, on his own initiative and without any special mission, all verifications which he judges useful and all tours necessary for the accomplishment of his mission.' Finally, he has some sanctions to back his extensive powers. First, there is the disciplinary power over all civil servants and state agents to which reference has already been made. He can also make his own comments on the mark sheet of any civil servant or state agent as it passes through him to the Ministry of Civil Service. And he can suspend the actions of any accountant whose work he judges irregular.

The main aim of the 1964 reform was, as mentioned above, to ensure that the state was effectively organized at the regional and local levels. The details of the measures introduced at the regional level show clearly that this was indeed the major pre-occupation of the Government. While the 1960 reform emphasized the economic mission of the region, the 1964 reform placed the emphasis on the establishment of an effective state organization at the regional level.¹ This regional

¹As early as in 1961, it had been realized that an effective organisation was necessary in order that the region might be able to pursue its economic mission. Thus, decree no. 61-432 of 20 Dec. 1961, JOR 6 Jan. 1962 established the regional governor as the hierarchical superior of all civil servants and state agents within the region. Some of the other measures in the 1964 reform had similarly been introduced - though in a less detailed manner - in instructions, circulars, and decrees. Therefore, the 1964 reform was not a radical departure; it continued an existing trend.

organization was to help ensure that the authority and policies (including the economic) of the central government were effective throughout the country. The regions, then, constitute key units for the two major goals of the government: a framework for ensuring national integration and a framework within which the policies for promoting economic and social development can be carried out.

It is generally admitted in Senegal that the 1964 reform measures have worked reasonably well. Some of the rigidities introduced by the emphasis on hierarchical relationships, especially the question of the movement of correspondence, have been removed by the tacit agreement of the officials concerned to bend the rules to suit practical realities.¹ However, the clear emergence of governors as veritable regional executives without either popular mandate or effective accountability (the regional assemblies are considered as inadequate) has been causing some concern and discussions are going on about what measures to take.² Finally, the dyarchical executive

¹For example, the official policy that technical officials should communicate with their central technical services through the governor in all matters, 'having or not having a technical character' (Circular no. 149 of 17 Dec. 1964) is not followed in practice: technical officials in the regions communicate directly with their central services in most of their activities: interviews with several officials in three regional headquarters in November 1970 and in March and April 1971.

²This was the view of several officials interviewed in regional headquarters in November 1970, March and April 1971. The major reason why the Government has not agreed to give real powers to the regional assemblies to enable them to counterbalance the power of the governors is, according to some of these officials, its fear that strong regional assemblies may become a threat to national integration: one or more regions might decide to secede.

leadership introduced by the February 1970 constitution has complicated the chain of command between the governors and the central government. Instead of the single chain of commands between the governors and the Presidency that existed between 1963 and 1970, the governors are now responsible both to the Presidency and to the Government Secretariat General at the Prime Minister's Office. This concurrent authority is likely to cause delays in central-regional relations.

The Departments

The role of the prefect within the department is similar to that of the governor within the region: 'he is the delegate of the President of the Republic and the representative of each of the ministries'. Just as the prefect's hierarchical subordination to the governor has been strengthened, so has his hierarchical superiority over all central government agents within his department (including the arrondissement chiefs) become strengthened (see diagram on p.144).

Prefectoral duties cover the entire range of central government administration in the same way as those of the governor. One additional function which has no equivalent at the regional level is his police power over the arrondissements within the department.¹ The prefect exercises his police power through orders which regulate public peace, sanitation, highways and traffic and other matters which affect the domestic interests of the citizens. However, he immediately addresses such orders through

¹The prefect also assumes the police powers for the communes within his department when the responsible mayors fail to discharge their duty after the prefect's reminder; see article 98 of the 'Code de l'administration communale', JORS, 30 June 1966.

through the governor to the Minister of Interior who can nullify them or suspend their execution.

All the major services of central ministries are represented within the departments, headed by hierarchy A, B, or C officials who are in regular contact with the more senior representatives based in the regional headquarters. The departmental services supervise, and in some cases, take charge of, the activities of their ministries within the arrondissements.¹ All this means a considerable amount of co-ordination work for the prefect. This is done through a monthly meeting between him and the heads of the different services.

The prefect is appointed by decree and must belong to either the corps of civil administrators or to the corps of administrative attachés. He has two assistants appointed in the same form and under the same conditions. The first assistant deputises for him with full rights in his absence. One of them is specifically expected to assist him in the functions concerned with economic and social development.

The major organizational problems at the level of the departments to date are the presence of prefects with inadequate training, instability in posting, and inadequacy of supporting secretarial staff. In 1968, only 14 out of 27 prefects possessed

¹ Many ministries which the Journal officiel show with services at the arrondissement level are only represented within the departments largely because of shortage of personnel and inadequate material resources. This was particularly true of the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs and Public Works and Transport at the time of the writer's visit to some regional headquarters in 1970 and 1971.

the required qualifications specified in the 1964 reform¹ and there was no prefect with two assistants; the only assistant appointed for each prefect belonged to a lower corps than that specified in the reform. Although it is recognized that prefects need at least one full year to become effective in their departments, many of them averaged about 14 months at each posting between 1960 and 1968.² Finally, many of the functions of the prefect are either neglected or badly performed because of the inadequacy of both the human and material resources put at his disposal.³

The Arrondissements

The 1960 arrangements at the arrondissement level have more or less remained unchanged.⁴ However, in place of the vague definition of the arrondissement chief's role as that of a propagandist of the 'myth' of development, the 1964 reform states clearly that 'the chief of arrondissement helps the representatives of the technical services in the accomplishment

¹ An exceptional situation exists in the Casamance region and two border departments where military officers were serving as prefects in 1971 for security reasons. There were five prefects in the Casamance region where the population was subjected to periodic attacks from Portuguese colonial soldiers fighting African nationalists in neighbouring Portuguese Guinea.

² The idea of prefects needing at least one year to understand their job is contained in Circular 6.195/M.INT/APA of 22 August 1963. The calculation of the average duration of prefects' postings was made by Lucarelli in 'Administration territoriale du Sénégal,' unpublished cours at the Ecole nationale d'administration du Sénégal, Dakar, mimeo. 1968/69, pp.55-56.

³ Ibid.

⁴ The creation of three new ones has brought the total number to 87.

of their task for the purpose of the economic and social development of the country.' For this purpose, it is stated that arrondissement chiefs should be appointed from among hierarchy C civil servants.¹ In practice, only few of the technical services of the central ministries are represented in the arrondissements (notably Education and Rural Development); the others cover the arrondissements by means of periodic tours from the departmental headquarters (for example, Public Works, Transport and Finance).

In many cases arrondissement chiefs have proved unable to assist the technical services as envisaged largely because only a few of them have the basic training to enable them to do so. In 1965, only three arrondissement chiefs belonged to the hierarchy C of the civil service; 40 were former chiefs of canton and their average age was 45.² And in 1967, 80% of the arrondissement chiefs in the Casamance region had no more than primary education, far below the qualification required of hierarchy C civil servants.³ The hope for the future is that the current arrondissement chiefs will be progressively replaced by better trained personnel produced by the country's middle-level training institutions.

The Villages

At the village level, the method of appointing the village

¹ Hierarchy C Civil Servants are lower middle-level officials; for details on the structure of the Civil Service, see pp. 186, 193.

² Lucarelli, 'L'Arrondissement sénégalais,' op.cit., pp. 269, 271.

³ X. Guèye, 'Les Obstacles au développement économiques dans la région de la Casamance,' mémoire de fin de stage, ENAS, 1968, p. 172.

chief was slightly modified. According to the reform, it is the governor who appoints the village chiefs within his region on the proposition of the prefects; final approval still rests with the Minister of Interior. The idea of grouping villages to constitute rural communities though absent in the 1964 reform reappeared subsequently in connection with the establishment of the service for land development (aménagement du territoire) following the adoption of a law on national land in 1964.¹ The aim of the government is to group the existing 13,000 villages into 200 or 300 rural communities of 2,500 to 4,000 inhabitants each. By 1970, only seven experimental rural communities had been established and there was no clear official policy on what will happen to arrondissements and villages when rural communities are generalized for the whole country. The view of some of the officials involved with the establishment of these communities is that they will become real local government units. There will be an elected rural council whose president will be the chief executive. The council will have its own budget and personnel executing locally initiated projects and the prefect will serve as tutelage authority on behalf of the central government. However, these officials could not say what would happen to the arrondissements and villages if and when the rural communities are organized along these lines.²

The Communes

Finally, the 1964 reform introduced some significant changes into the representation of the central government within

¹ Law no. 64-46 of 17 June 1964, JORF, 11 July 1964.

² Interviews, October 1970, March and April 1971.

the communes. As already mentioned, the regional governors have become the chief executives of the seven major communes in which the regional headquarters are located.¹ In the remaining communes, the governor has replaced the prefect as the representative of the central tutelage authority, the Minister of Interior and the prefects have been given rights to attend all meetings of the municipal councils. We have also seen that in one of the important functions where the mayor represents the central government - the function of administrative police - the prefect has been empowered to take over the function if a mayor neglects his duty after due reminder by the prefect. Above all, all municipal treasurers have become civil servants and are therefore no longer responsible to the mayor and the council but to the prefect and the regional governor. In sum, the central government has reduced its reliance on the locally elected mayors and entrusted its interests to its own agents. The consequences of this development for the desire to associate representative institutions with the work of the administration are discussed in a later chapter

Guinea

Again, contrary to what might be expected from the claim that the party organization determines the administrative organization, the pattern of administrative organization at


¹ This measure was limited to Dakar in the 1964 reform but before 1970 it had been extended to the other communes located in regional headquarters.

regional and local levels established under the loi-cadre government has been preserved. This was based on common area units for all government work and provided for the post of local chief executives with general responsibility for the units. The 1957 arrangements have been modified in two ways. First the different area units have been renamed as follows: the circonscriptions (cercles until 1957) became regions in 1959; the administrative posts became arrondissements in 1963; and the villages were baptized local revolutionary authorities (pouvoirs révolutionnaires locaux, PRLs) in 1967. Second, in 1964 a new area unit was created above the region and called the ministerial delegation. (The present arrangements are shown in the diagram on the next page.) Besides these two modifications, the other significant changes that have occurred concern the number and functions of the area units. The former has been influenced by the policy of 'an intimate liaison between the political structures and the administrative structures' and the latter by the implications of the tasks of national integration and development. The details of the arrangements at the different levels are examined below.

Ministerial Delegations

The four ministerial delegations in Guinea share the 29 regions between them as follows: Maritime Guinea, 8; Middle Guinea, 8; Upper Guinea, 7; and Forest Guinea, 6.¹ According

¹The ministerial delegations correspond to distinct geographical and economic realities; they are also roughly ethnically homogeneous. However, some of the boundary regions were attached to two or more different ministerial delegations at different times between 1964 and 1970. The divisions set out here is the current arrangement.



The Organization of Central Government Administration at Regional and Local levels

to the decree of November 1964 which established them, the role of the ministerial delegations is twofold: 'to ensure the co-ordination of the activities of the regions in the political, economic and administrative fields', and 'to ensure the effective control of the working of the administrative and political institutions within their area'.¹

The decree setting out the details of these two broad functions of the Ministers Delegate specifically requires them

'to apply within their respective areas the policy of the Government concerning the economic development of the Nation'.

'to animate and stimulate the national services whose services cover several regions and escape for this reason the hierarchical control of the regional governors', and

'to ensure with the regional governors, in case of necessity, the maintenance of public order and the security of persons and property'.²

To carry out these functions, the Ministers Delegate have an hierarchical power over the governors and all civil servants serving in their areas and the regional governors and heads of region-based services are obliged to address to them (Ministers Delegate) all the documents, reports, studies and information meant for the Minister concerned at the centre.³ A decree of August 1965 increased the administrative role of the ministerial delegations by locating in their headquarters a number of inspectorates grouping all the major services of the central ministries. The aim of the decree was to make possible the 'collective study of problems, the pooling and rational use

¹ Decree no. 486/PRG of 17 Nov. 1964, JORG, 1 Dec. 1964.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

of the personnel and material of the different services previously autonomous'.¹ It was hoped that this would lead to 'greater efficiency in their working'.² In 1970, all the activities of the central government were represented by about 15 inspectorates at each ministerial delegation's headquarters. These inspectorates include: Administration and Financial Affairs, Education, Labour, Security, Customs, Taxation, Rural Development, Trade, and Posts and Telecommunications.³

The Ministers Delegate are appointed by the President and are members of the Government.⁴ They receive directives from the President to whom they report regularly on their activities and findings. According to the 1964 decree,

The Ministers Delegate are assisted by an Administrative Conference held under their chairmanship and composed of:

- The Regional Governors concerned
- The Chiefs and Divisional Directors of national services functioning within the Delegation
- The Federal Secretaries of the PRG.

This Conference can deal with all problems posed in the Delegation whether they are special to one Administrative Region or common to all Regions composing the Ministerial Delegation.

It has power to take decisions in the domains where it is competent and to give opinions on questions relative to the promotion of economic and social development of the Regions.

It is obliged to meet in ordinary session at least two times a year.

It can be summoned in an extra-ordinary session every time the Chief of the Ministerial Delegation considers it necessary.

¹ Decree no. 206/PRG of 21 Aug. 1965, JORG, 1 Sept. 1965.

² Ibid.

³ The number of inspectorates has varied between 15 and 18, depending on changes made in the allocation of functions between ministries; interviews at the headquarters of two ministerial delegations, Kindia and Labé, Feb. 1971.

⁴ See page 121, fn. 1.

In practice, an administrative conference is held annually and since 1968 it is usually presided over by a Minister of domaine. On most occasions, instead of reviewing the activities of all the government services within the delegation, the Minister simply concentrates on the activities of his own domaine.¹

The work at the delegation headquarters is carried out by the Minister Delegate assisted by a cabinet with the heads of the inspectorates acting as his technical advisers.² The Director of the Minister's cabinet (the other members are a couple of secretaries and one or two messengers) is an experienced civil servant, usually belonging to hierarchy B or C (that is, a senior or middle-level official) appointed by decree and whose career does not depend on his Minister's fortunes.³ He is the general assistant to the Minister and the effective co-ordinator of the activities of the different inspectorates. When the Minister is on tour outside the headquarters, the Director of cabinet deputizes for him and can use his delegation of signature over current matters to keep the administration going.

The inspectorates are headed by inspectors who spend most of their time outside the delegation headquarters on tours of

¹ This information is based on reports of administrative conferences published in issues of Horoya and Horoya-hebdo, 1968-70. Of the six domaines (the large ministerial departments which share most of government work between them) only the domaine of External Affairs is not involved in these conferences.

² What follows on the methods of work at the ministerial delegation is based on discussions with senior officials in Kindia and Labé in February 1971.

³ Their functions and career are very similar to those of a Secretary of State's Chief of cabinet; see Chapter 3, pp. 24 and 126.

inspection. Sometimes they accompany the Minister, at other times they go on their own. Although they still depend on their respective central ministries and can communicate directly with them, the Minister Delegate is usually kept informed whenever policy matters are involved. Each inspectorate has a small secretarial staff to assist the inspectors.

The political role of ministerial delegations is within the context of the party structure. Each Minister Delegate is expected to control the working of the party institutions within his area. Between 1964 and 1967, Ministers Delegate were members of the party's national executive, the BPN. They reported the political problems and other demands of their areas to the BPN and in return had responsibility for issuing instructions based on BPN decisions to the party institutions within their areas. Party officials were obliged to carry out these instructions. Although they ceased to be members of the BPN in 1967, their role as the link between the BPN and the party institutions within their areas has remained virtually unchanged.¹ One important function they perform in this connection is their participation in the BPN-sponsored annual inspection of party institutions either within their own delegations or outside.²

¹ The decision that Ministers Delegate should cease to be BPN members was not intended to reduce their political standing; it was dictated by the upgrading of the BPN into the Government cabinet which would necessitate very frequent meetings (at least once a week) that Ministers Delegate will find it inconvenient to attend.

² Accounts of such inspection missions can be found in Bulletin d'information du BPN, issues available for the period 1962-1970.

When ministerial delegations were created in November 1964, the Guinean regime saw them as the answer to what it described as the ineffectiveness of the administration and a general absence of leadership at regional and local levels. According to one account,

Social and political instability was spreading everywhere because of the behaviour of certain cadres, then there was the traditional resistance to the changes due to the fact that Bourgeois tendency was under attack. Everywhere, one began to realize the absence of political maturity and everywhere there was total lack of an understanding of the nature and importance of national objectives.¹

The functions of the ministerial delegations described above confirm the view that they were established to provide both administrative and political leadership for the central government at regional and local levels. By 1970, the regime was convinced that the ministerial delegations had fully justified its hopes and President Touré described the results so far obtained as of 'an unparalleled quality'.²

Although the achievement of the ministerial delegations may not be as remarkable as President Touré has suggested, it is nevertheless impressive considering the difficult conditions under which the officials have worked. Only a small minority among them have received adequate training for the high-level functions to which they have been appointed: most have simply built on the experience acquired at the lower echelons of the colonial administration. Most administrative units within the

¹A.I. Diallo, 'L'Evolution des institutions administratives de la République de Guinée de 1958 à 1968, 'Mémoire de fin d'études supérieures, IPC (ESA), 1967/68, p.50. See also Douno, op.cit. p.176.

²In Horoya-hebdo, no.86, 12-18 Sept. 1970.

delegations have a smaller staff than they need; inspectorates which should, in theory, have five or six members may have only two or three. Transport is a serious problem because the administrative vehicles are only irregularly in running order and only a few officials can afford their own means of transport. Finally, there is a great instability of postings at all levels which often prevent officials from understanding the local realities of the areas where they operate.¹

The Regions

The 25 circonscriptions of the loi-cadre Government's reorganization became 29 regions in 1959. Until 1959, the regions were common area units where the governor co-ordinated and supervised the work of the central government officials within the region.² In October 1959, all the communes in the country were abolished (the commune of Conakry was abolished in January 1960) and their property transferred to the regions and the municipal councillors became members of the general councils (new name for the circonscription councils established in 1958) within their area. This transfer of the activities hitherto performed by the communes to the regions transformed the regions into areas of both deconcentrated and decentralised administration. As deconcentrated administrative units, the regional governors and other agents of the central government

¹ For example, each of the ministerial delegations had four different ministers delegate between January 1968 and March 1971, that is, an average of 9 months in each post.

² In October 1959, the title of circonscription chief was changed to that of commandant de région which was in turn changed to gouverneur de région in 1963; the title of governor will be used henceforth.

within the region carry out the functions of the central ministries in the region; as decentralised administrative units, the regions inherited a part of the autonomous powers previously enjoyed by the communes.

The basic text on the regions states that the governor is 'the depository of the powers of the State in the Region, he is the delegate of the Government and by this title the representative of each of the Ministers with whom he corresponds directly for the affairs concerning their Departments'.¹ This 1959 text was significantly modified by the appointment of Ministers Delegate as superior authorities between the regional governor and the Ministers. Before the establishment of the ministerial delegations, the regions were the major common area units where the work of the central ministries were carried out outside the national headquarters. Since their establishment, three important changes have occurred.

First, the activities of the heads of region-based services can be inspected and co-ordinated by the officials of the delegation who are directly responsible to the central ministries. Second, the powers given to Ministers Delegate 'to apply within their respective areas the policy of the Government concerning the economic development of the Nation' means that the directions to the governors in this field of activity will come from the delegation headquarters and not from Conakry. Third, the effects of the preceding two points together with the general power of co-ordination and control given to Ministers Delegate over

¹ Decree no. 0046/PRG of 29 Sept. 1959, JORG, 15 Oct. 1959.

the regional governors add up to some reduction in the authority of the governors.

As decentralized administrative units, regions have their own budgets.¹ They can also establish regional enterprises through loans raised either from the central government or from any of its financial institutions. The regional governor, assisted by the central government officials within the region, executes the budget and manages the enterprises.² It was hoped that if the governor exercised these powers under the control and supervision of the regional assembly (the representative institution at the regional level), the region would function as a veritable decentralized administrative unit. These high hopes were not fulfilled and the creation of ministerial delegations in 1964 has led to new central government control through the Minister Delegate and the inspectorates under him.³

The major explanation for the failure of this experiment

¹Regional budgets were created by ordinance no. 63/PRG of 31 Dec. 1959, JORG, 1 Feb. 1960. This budget consisted of transfer of funds from the national budget. Since 1963, regional budgets consist of the personal tax of people within the region.

²Until the category of auxiliary staff were made civil servants in 1969, part of the decentralized functions of the regional governor was the power to recruit and manage all the auxiliary staff needed by the regional services and who were paid from the regional budget. Since 1969, the governor is only left with the powers associated with his hierarchical superiority over the civil servants within the region.

³The abuses of regional governors during this period were most conspicuous in the field of financial administration and in personnel management: financial embezzlement was rampant and there was considerable favouritism and arbitrariness in recruitments, promotion, and transfers. For some examples, see Bulletin du compte-rendu des activités du BPN no.10 (1963), passim and Horoya, 7 August 1968. On the role of the regional assemblies see Chapter 6, pp. 231-235.

with decentralization is the fact that the majority of the governors appointed between 1959 and 1970 were old party militants with little or no basic administrative training. They were appointed in the name of the doctrine of party supremacy which demands that political militancy should be the criterion for appointment.¹ Having been appointed solely on the basis of their political militancy, they were expected to act as 'agriculture engineers, road engineers, economic planners, accountants, managers, etc.'² Needless to say, they were unable to act in these roles and President Touré admitted this in 1970 when he said that 'certain Governors do not understand their role'.³ In the circumstances, the regional officials with the relevant training who find themselves subordinated to these governors experience difficulties in collaborating effectively with them and some who resent their subordinate positions work with very little enthusiasm.⁴

In all, there are two major developments in the administrative arrangements at the regional level since independence. First, there is the importance attached to the appointment of party militants as governors - a policy which President Touré claims to have consistently applied.

¹ President Touré who makes these appointments claims to have always followed this principle: 'I have never appointed a Governor on the basis of his diplomas...The Governors have always been chosen among the tested militants'. Touré, Vol. XVI, p.223.

² President Touré in La RDA-PDG, no. 24 (n.d.), p.22.

³ President Touré in Horoya-hebdo, no.86, 12-18 sept. 1970.

⁴ For example, ESA graduates who are posted to the regions are subordinates of these governors. The point made about the low morale of the qualified staff in the regions is based on the views expressed by some ESA graduates interviewed in February 1971.

The application of this policy which is in line with the doctrine of party supremacy constitutes an important departure from the practice under the colonial administration when the predecessors of the regions, the cercles, were placed under administrators called commandants. The second development is the fact that because of the regime's desire to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration within the regions, it was decided in 1965 to entrust the co-ordination, control and supervision of administrative work to a group of administrators within the inspectorates of the ministerial delegations. This emphasis on administrative efficiency and control is similar to what existed under colonial rule and the only difference is that while the commandants performed these functions under the colonial rule, they are now performed by a group of administrative officials.

The obvious conclusion from the above is that the colonial experience still exercises some influence on the established administrative arrangements at the regional level in Guinea. Although the commandants have been replaced by political governors (with four Ministers Delegate as political overlords), some of the key functions performed by the commandants are still performed by administrative officials occupying the same position vis-à-vis the central authority as was the case with the commandants under colonial rule.

The Arrondissements

Only the 1957 administrative reorganization text exists on the organization and working of arrondissements. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the administrative posts (which became known as

arrondissements in 1963) were created by the Guinean loi-cadre Government to serve as area units within which to promote social and economic development.¹ Although all post-independence official statements on arrondissements have confirmed this economic role assigned to them at that time,² there have been changes which have significantly affected their suitability for this role. Until 1963, the government genuinely tried to organize the central government services concerned with social and economic development within the arrondissements. The five major departments that were represented in most arrondissements were Education, Justice, Health, Public Works and Rural Economy. Since 1964, there has been an explosion in the number of arrondissements: from 67 in 1963 the number rose to 175 in 1965 and to 210 in 1970. This development followed the decision of the regime to make the number of arrondissements correspond to that of the party organ at that level - the section.³

¹ They were described as units corresponding to economic, geographical and human realities and contrasted with the colonial cantons (about 247) which were described as arbitrary geographical units. See Ministère de l'Intérieur, Territoire de la Guinée, Nouvelle structure administrative, op.cit.

² The arrondissements' role as area units for promoting social and economic development has been reaffirmed in Bulletin d'information du BPN, no.94 (1970), p.61 and in Horoya-hebdo, no.23, 21-27 June 1969.

³ Although there were 150 party sections in 1962, only the 106 arrondissements created in 1957 existed on paper among which about 67 were functioning in 1963. See Campbell et al. The Structure of Local Government in West Africa (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p.144. When the decision was taken to make the number of arrondissements correspond to that of the party sections in 1964, there were already 175 sections. The reason for the 1964 reorganization was to provide effective central government leadership in rural areas and the 1957 aim to make these area units correspond to economic, geographical and human realities became a secondary consideration.

The immediate result of this development was that the central services concerned found it difficult to establish their services in every arrondissement; instead, they concentrated their resources on what have become known as the central arrondissements¹ and a few others where they had already been represented before 1964; these numbered about 100 in 1970.² However, the government has continued to assume that arrondissements could be treated on an equal basis, and in 1970 all central services concerned with social and economic development were officially expected to be formally represented within each of the 210 arrondissements in the country. To prove the government's concern with using arrondissements as area units for promoting development, arrondissement budgets were established in 1967 to be financed from the regional tax.³ In practice, all that arrondissements have in common are the title and a commandant (new title for chief of administrative post from 1963). In 1970, many of the services supposedly organized within every arrondissement (including the party-sponsored civic service under the Ministry of Defence)⁴ existed only on paper in many

¹ A central arrondissement is one which is centred on a regional headquarters and includes the immediate rural area extending to a radius of about two to three miles.

² This estimate is based on periodic progress reports on rural areas published in Horo-ya-hebdo, 1969 through 1971 issues and on interviews in four regional headquarters visited in February 1971.

³ Circular no. 628/ME/CAB of 16 June 1967 and presidential Circular no. 25 of 23 August 1968. At the time the arrondissement budgets were created, the government decreed that the party's section executives (called steering committees) should act as arrondissement councils to deliberate on the arrondissement budgets.

⁴ Every arrondissement was asked to create a civic service in collaboration with the party section in 1966. The civic services were given the dual role of 'defence of the revolution' and 'economic production'; see La RDA-PDG, no. 8 (August 1966), pp. 127-130.

of them. The only administrative service represented in every arrondissement is that of Justice which is administered by the party executive (see Chapter 6). The services which have no agents in several arrondissements simply ignore the arrondissement organization and operate on the basis of the regions, directing their staff and efforts to wherever it makes sense to go in terms of the region. The citizens in the non-functioning arrondissements who feel neglected - especially in regard to Health and Education - seek to benefit from the services provided in any functioning arrondissement nearby.

The commandant who is the local executive is appointed by presidential decree on the proposition of local party leaders.¹ He is the hierarchical subordinate of the regional governor who coordinates the work of all the arrondissements within his region. Prior to 1964, the government tried to appoint trained middle-level administrators who could act as development agents within the arrondissements. The new emphasis on the need for effective leadership in rural areas has led to the appointment of local party leaders' nominees, many of whom are simply not equipped to act as development agents. To give evidence of effective leadership, commandants resort to concentrating their attention on the major issues that the central leadership is emphasizing at any given time to the detriment of the others. The only constant activity since 1966 has been the 'defence

¹ This became the practice after 1964; interview with the Director of cabinet, domaine of Interior, February 1971. There are likely to have been some exceptions especially in the case of the central arrondissements where the effective organization of some central government work would need the appointment of officials with some basic training.

of the Revolution'.¹ (The 'defence of the revolution' is the euphemism for maintaining 'law and order' and both in practice amount to regime maintenance).

On the whole, the arrondissements have undergone drastic changes both in terms of area and personnel and these have rendered them unsuitable as units within which essential government work can be carried out. The refusal of the Guinean regime to accept the result of the changes it has introduced by continuing to assume that essential government work can still be organized within the arrondissements amounts to recognizing some merit in the colonial arrangement it has abolished.

The Villages

Finally, at the village level, the PRL president is the central government's representative. However, unlike the representatives at the regional and arrondissement levels, he is not a civil servant, he is elected locally. He is the successor of the village mayor, a post created in 1957 by the loi-cadre Government on the model of the mayor of a commune in metropolitan France. Apart from the change of title, the PRL president is also different from the old village mayor in that he is also the President of the party's local executive. This change occurred in 1963 when the party's base committees were substituted for the 4,200 villages which served as the lowest administrative units and party's base committee executives replaced the

¹ Based on the periodic progress reports on rural areas published in Horoya-hebdo, 1969 through 1971 issues and on interviews in four regional headquarters visited in February 1971.

village councils.¹ The number of the basic administrative units immediately rose to about 7,000 and was estimated at about 8,000 in 1970.

In spite of the rise in number, the functions assigned to these basic units have remained unchanged: the keeping of a civil register, some aspects of the administration of justice, the maintenance of law and order (now called 'the defence of the revolution') and the mobilization of the citizens for locally initiated projects for promoting social and economic development. Since 1967, each PRL has been expected to organize its various activities in the form of brigades which correspond to the major central ministerial services.² Thus, every PRL is expected to have Brigades for Health, Public works, Education, Production, Defence of the Revolution and so on. Each Brigade is headed by a member of the PRL executive and they can associate ordinary PRL members with their work as well as appeal to central government agents within the arrondissement and the region for guidance and assistance.

In performing some of his functions, the PRL president acts as the hierarchical subordinate of the commandant (Justice and Defence especially); otherwise, his subordination to other superior authorities of the state is within the context of the

¹ This arrangement followed a decision of the party's sixth congress held in December 1962. The reason for this decision, according to the party leaders, was the need to avoid conflicts between the elected village communes and the party officials in the village base committees. These conflicts 'were dangerously compromising the unitary character of the State one of whose preoccupations is to cause to disappear any idea of a functional partition or barrier between the different organs of the administration and those of the party'. In Compte rendu d'activités du BPN, no. 11 (1963), pp.123-124.

² The PRLs were launched in Guinea in 1967 at the time of the cultural revolution and they are expected to function like the village communes in the People's Republic of China. For more details, see La RDA-PDG, no. 24 (n.d.) pp.5-26.

party's principle of democratic centralism which makes his unit both an initiator and an executor of national policies. The PRLs are effectively organized as decentralized administrative units and there is some truth in President Touré's claim that:

The PRL constitutes in each Base Committee in rural zone, the Government of the village allowing progressively to this village collectivity, through the exercise, on the local plane, of all the attributes of national sovereignty, to resolve correctly all the problems conditioning the harmonious development of the village in all domains ... political, economic, social and cultural ... By creating the PRL, the Party is applying the historical solution valid at least for Guinea, of the withering away of the State within the Revolution, a withering away which is in reality the reinforcement of the State of the Revolution by the concrete, direct, total and coherent exercise of the body of State powers by the People at the level of each cell which constitutes it.¹

However, the working of these PRLs has not been entirely satisfactory. Although PRL budgets were established in 1969, the sum attributed is generally admitted to be too small to serve any effective purpose.² Perhaps a more serious problem is the failure of the commandants and governors to provide leadership and guidance leading to such disastrous consequences as 'the tendency of many PRL presidents to behave as a village chief or as a canton chief or, in any case, to put on the toga of the ancient magistrate of the colonial regime.'³ This tendency, according to President Touré,

¹ In La RDA-PDG, no.41, (Aug. 1970), pp.101-102.

² This consists of 200 francs quota of the 1,800 francs regional tax per head collected in each PRL.

³ S. Touré in Horoya-hebdo, no.86, 12-18 Sept. 1970.

results in 'the most cynical, the most arbitrary judgments' which tend to 'compromise the moral equilibrium of the People'.¹ This same lack of leadership has meant that marriage is organized 'in a thousand and one ways, in any case, not in the way described in the code.'²

Comparison and Conclusion


The above accounts show that there are significant contrasts in the evolution of the similar pattern of administrative arrangements at regional and local levels which Guinea and Senegal inherited at independence. First, the unitary and centralized character of these arrangements has been further strengthened in Guinea because of the introduction of a new principle to administrative organization. As a result of the doctrine of party supremacy, administrative structures in Guinea have been reorganized on the principle of democratic centralism which governs the organization of the party structures. In accordance with this principle, the administrative structures, like those of the party, must cover the whole territory of the state. This accounts for the fact that villages are incorporated within the administrative structures in contrast to the situation in Senegal where they have been excluded from the administrative structures as was the case under the colonial administration.

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid. The PRIs are examined in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7 as representative institutions and as area units for development activities respectively.

Another aspect of the application of the doctrine of party supremacy to administrative organization is that administrative area units have been adjusted to match the party organization. This has produced a situation where administrative and party structures merge at two levels while a strict correspondence in area unit exists at the remaining two levels. (See diagram on next page). The most crucial adjustment that has occurred is at the level of the arrondissements where the increase in the number of units (from 106 at independence to 210 in 1970) has meant that they can no longer pursue the economic mission assigned to them by the loi-cadre Government. This situation is particularly striking in view of the fact that the promotion of economic development is one of the tasks emphasized by the regime. This idea of adjusting administrative units to match the party organization constitutes another important modification of the arrangements inherited at independence. In contrast, Senegal has had no similar experience and the administrative units established during the transitional period to independence have remained unchanged.

In addition to its effects on administrative structures, the Guinean doctrine of party supremacy has also affected the appointment of the personnel who operate them. In the name of this doctrine, loyalty to the party is declared as the criterion for appointing the chief agents of the central government at the different levels - they must be 'tested militants'. The application of this principle has meant that the leading representatives of the central government are

PartyAdministration

—————> Party hierarchy

—————> Administrative hierarchy

Note: (a) Administrative regions existed (1958) before Party Federations were created (1963); in this case, it was the party unit that was based on an administrative unit. (The capital, Conakry, constitutes a single administrative unit but has two Federations).

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regarded as politicians rather than as administrators. This constitutes a significant innovation and contrasts with the situation in Senegal where the colonial practice of appointing administrators has been maintained.

However, as was pointed out in the chapter, the combined effects of these Guinean innovations have not been found entirely satisfactory in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration. And it is significant that the only way in which the Guinean regime has sought to correct this situation is by introducing a practice which is obviously inspired by the colonial experience. This refers to the arrangement whereby a group of administrators who constitute the inspectorates of the ministerial delegations are assigned the responsibility for ensuring the co-ordination, control, and supervision of administrative work within the regions - a function that was an integral part of the duties of the commandants whom the political governors are supposed to have replaced. It is also important to mention that these officials occupy the same position vis-à-vis the central authority as was the case with the commandants of the colonial administration.

There is also an interesting similarity between the roles of the chief agents of the central government in Guinea and Senegal on the one hand and the commandant of the colonial administration on the other. In all cases, each represents the central authority outside the capital and has overall responsibility for the affairs of the central government throughout the area under him. Post-independence Guinea and

Senegal also share one motive in common with the colonial administration in appointing powerful officials to represent the central authority outside the capital. This is the need to secure the population's allegiance to the central authority. However, while this allegiance was to an imperial power under colonial rule, it is now to an independent central government and constitutes part of what the Guinean and Senegalese ideologies refer to as national integration.¹

In addition to their responsibility for promoting national integration, the chief agents of the central government in both Guinea and Senegal are also expected to translate into practice both countries' ideological commitment to use the administration to promote development. As we saw in the chapter, the Guinean regime's emphasis on the political militancy of these officials has led to a disregard for the qualifications that would have enabled them to cope with the task of development.

The basic approach of successive Senegalese governments is markedly different from the Guinean approach. Each government stated the specific civil service hierarchies to which the leading central government representatives at the different levels should belong. The levels stated imply that the officials appointed were likely to possess adequate training and experience for the task of promoting development

¹ As pointed out in Chapter 2, the overall objective of national integration in both states is to constitute the entire territory of the state into a single political community which accepts the authority of the central government. In practice, this objective is confused with regime maintainance.

while the executive's constitutional prerogative in making the appointments saw to their suitability for the second task of maintaining the authority of the central government in their respective areas.¹ In two circumstances where this approach has been abandoned, the result has been similar to that of the Guinean approach: priority for the task of national integration over the task of development. First, successive governments have refused to appoint as arrondissement chiefs officials who belonged to the required civil service hierarchy. Instead, they have kept many of the canton chiefs of the colonial period who, as we have pointed out, proved incapable of promoting development. On the other hand, the governments have, on the whole, expressed satisfaction with their performance in helping to maintain their authority in the rural areas.² The second case is the appointment of military prefects in the Casamance and in two border departments. Although it is correct to invoke concern for national integration in making these appointments - the need to defend parts of the territory of the state against possible

¹ In practice, those appointed were invariably the confidants of the government in power.

² See Zucarelli, 'L'Arrondissement sénégalais,' op. cit. There is an interesting sociological explanation for this situation. Since many of the former canton chiefs are old (average age was 45 in 1965) and some of them still hold traditional chieftaincy titles, the rural populations' traditional respect for both their age and title is easily transferred to the central authority they represent. In contrast, the trained middle-level officials are invariably younger and have no chieftaincy titles thereby losing the two grounds for traditional respect. Of course, it is arguable that strong government support for the trained officials is likely to enable them secure respect for the central authority in rural areas. So far, no government has tried this alternative.

attack¹ - they have nevertheless resulted in the neglect of the task of development because the military officers lack the relevant training.²

In all, the administrative arrangements at regional and local levels inherited by Senegal at independence have only been modified in a limited way to take account of the tasks of national integration and development. In contrast, radical innovations have been introduced in Guinea as a result of the application of the doctrine of party supremacy to administrative organization. This has resulted in the systematic replacement of administrators by politicians in key posts and the adjustment of administrative units and organization to match party organization (both of them based on the principle of democratic centralism). All this add up to a significant departure from the practices established under colonial rule. However, this departure is not yet total as the Guinean regime still shows a willingness to fall back on aspects of the colonial experience where the results of the innovations are considered unsatisfactory.

¹ The fact that military prefects possess no special powers different from those of the other prefects makes many people feel that their presence only provides a psychological protection for the population. This view was widely shared among officials interviewed in the Ministry of Interior and in Ziguinchor, April 1971.

² See Guèye, op. cit. This view was confirmed by senior administrators during interviews in Ziguinchor, April 1971

CHAPTER 5

THE CIVIL SERVICE PERSONNEL

Personnel is the sovereign factor in public administration.

H. Finer¹

This chapter completes the account of the post-independence administrative organization in Guinea and Senegal by focusing on a crucial aspect to which we have only made a few references: personnel. We saw in Chapter 1 that the important legacy of the colonial administration here was the introduction of a career system of administration which was preserved in both countries during the transitional period to independence. According to the proposition of this study, the basic principles of the legacy should have been preserved in Senegal with only limited modifications while in Guinea radical changes ought to have taken place. The purpose of this chapter is to find out what has actually happened in the two states.

The administration of personnel in both Guinea and Senegal is based on a general statute for civil servants.² It is by

¹ Theory and Practice of Modern Government, (London: Methuen, 1950), p.723.

² For the text of the Guinean statute, see Ordinance no. 48/PRG of 8 Oct. 1959 in JORG, 10 Oct. 1959 and decree no. 146/PRG of 4 June 1965, published by the Ministère de la fonction publique et du travail as Statut particulier des divers cadres uniques, (Conakry: Imprimerie nationale Patrice Lumumba, n.d); and for the Senegalese statute, see law no. 61-33 of 15 June 1961 in JORS, 22 June 1961, published by the government after some amendments in 1968 as Statut général de la fonction publique, (Rufisque: Imprimerie nationale, 1968).

examining the major provisions of this statute and their application that we shall be able to find out what each state has made of the colonial legacy of a career system of administration.

The Civil Servants

The definition of the status of civil servant is important because it makes clear those who enjoy permanency of tenure and other career guarantees. The colonial statute limited the status of civil servant to officials established in a rank of the hierarchy of the cadres of the administration. It excluded two categories of officials: a category consisting of non-established officials (known as auxiliaries) who worked with the civil servants (usually in subordinate positions) and a second category consisting of soldiers and the officials involved in services with an industrial or commercial character. While special provisions were made for the career of the latter category, the former had no career guarantees: they were 'in a temporary and essentially precarious situation'.¹

Senegal's post-independence statute for civil servants has maintained the restrictive definition of the colonial statute. It defines civil servants as:

. . . persons who, having been appointed to a permanent post have been established in a rank of the corps of Senegal. It does not apply either to judges of the judicial order or to military personnel, or to the personnel of

¹ As already pointed out in Chapter 1, the majority of Africans in the colonial administration were in the category of auxiliaries: about 7,000 of the 10,943 officials of the colonial administration in Guinea in 1958 were auxiliaries (supra).

offices, régies¹ and public enterprises of the State which have an industrial or commercial character when they are placed under a special statute.

The other officials of the state who are excluded from the statute fall into three groups. First, there are the judicial and military personnel whose career guarantees are provided for in special statutes. Second, there are the personnel of offices, régies and public enterprises of 'an industrial or commercial character' whose special statute was yet to be applied by 1971.² Third, there is a miscellaneous group who work alongside the civil servants and consists of auxiliaries (most of them inherited from the colonial administration) and those recruited on a contract basis (contractuels) or by a simple decision of the Minister of Civil Service (désionnaires). Their conditions of employment are determined by the Labour Code.³ This miscellaneous group constituted more than half of the total number of officials in the Senegalese civil service in 1966: 20,442 out of a total of 35,016.⁴

¹ A régie is a public service operated by a government department or a local authority.

² Law no. 66-68 of 4 July 1966, JORS 16 July 1966, fixed a general statute for the middle- and senior-level officials of public enterprises of an industrial or commercial character. The writer was informed that some senior officials of public enterprises whose current salaries would be adversely affected by the application of the statute are responsible for its non-application. Source: Interview at the Centre des établissements publics, April 1971.

³ The details are set out in République du Sénégal, Cinquantiennaire de l'O.I.T. - Salaires au Sénégal, (Dakar: Editions clair-afrique, 1969), pp.50-53.

⁴ This means that the total number of established staff was 14,574. Source: Secrétariat d'Etat aux affaires étrangères chargés de la coopération (Paris), Etude de programmation pour l'ENA du

(cont. over)

The basic statute for civil servants in Guinea adopted in 1959 introduced a slight modification in the definition of civil servants. They were defined as:

those who, having been appointed to a permanent post have been established in a rank of the hierarchy of the cadres of an Administration of the State and the services that depend on it or the national public enterprises, to the exclusion, however, of the Gendarmes and the soldiers.

In practice, the extension of the status of civil servants to officials of the national enterprises was limited to the Directors, Assistant Directors, and Chief Accountants of the enterprises.¹

A radical change occurred in 1969 when the regime decided to extend the status of civil servant to the following categories of officials. First, all the permanent employees of public enterprises became civil servants. Second, the Gendarmes and soldiers who were formally excluded in the 1959 statute were also given the status of civil servant with the additional provision that they could apply for admission to civil posts just as civil officials could apply to join the military ranks.² Third, the large number of officials known as auxiliaries of the

(cont.)

Sénégal et le Centre de formation et de perfectionnement administratifs (Paris, 1966), Vol.1, p.3. This study (published in three volumes) was conducted by P. Franjou and J. Gérard of the IDET-CEGOS. The Senegalese Ministry of Civil Service was unable to provide any post-1966 figures when the writer interviewed officials in the Division of Civil Service in October 1970.

²It was first extended to the Directors and Assistant Directors of enterprises by decree no. 175/PRG of 27 June 1960, JORG, 15 July 1960, and later to the Chief Accountants by decree no.123/PRG of 12 March 1963, JORG, 1 April 1963.

³Decree no.293/PRG of 23 June 1969, JORG, 1 November 1969; the soldiers were baptized 'workers in uniform'.

administration and whose career was hitherto regulated by a special statute, also became civil servants.¹

The result of all this was that by 1970, practically everybody appointed to any post in all the administrative services of the state was a civil servant, giving a total of about 55,000.² The general explanation given for this extension of the general statute to all state officials is that there is no justification for the existence of different conditions of service for the different categories of officials employed by the state. The application of the statute for civil servants to all permanent officials of the public enterprises was described as a measure of harmonisation and uniformity. Until 1969, there were numerous discrepancies in the personnel policies of the public enterprises, notwithstanding the attempts made to achieve some amount of harmonisation in 1965.³

The case of the auxiliaries who lacked many of the career guarantees of established civil servants was described as an

¹ Until 1969 the career of the auxiliaries was regulated by decree no.074/PRG of 16 Feb. 1962, JORG, 15 March 1962. Although this decree extended some of the rights of established civil servants to them (duration and conditions of leave, family allowance, and right of defence before a disciplinary council), they still remained 'in a temporary and essentially precarious position' as under the colonial administration. The number of auxiliaries in the Guinean administration in 1967 was almost as large as that of the established civil servants: 10,630 compared to 11,598. Source: Statistique du travail au 15.12.67, op.cit.

² Estimated figure compiled during interviews at the Secretariat of State for Civil Service and Labour, February 1971.

³ A decree of March 1965 in JORG, 15 April 1965 entrusted the management of the personnel of public enterprises to the Ministry of Labour and Social Laws in order to end what a presidential circular of 31 December 1965 described as a state of 'anarchy' in personnel matters.

example of social injustice which the post-independence regime inherited from the colonial administration and has unwittingly perpetuated.¹ As for the military, the need to abolish any discrimination between soldiers and other state officials was officially emphasized² but it was also probably motivated by the regime's desire to weaken the separate identity of the military after the abortive 'military plot' of February through April 1969.

The above account shows that while Senegal has been content with only a slight modification in the definition of the status of civil servant, a very important change has occurred in Guinea where all state officials have become civil servants. The official explanation of this development, as mentioned above, is the desire of the regime to ensure social justice which is claimed to be part of the values implicit in the country's ideology.⁴ The important result of this was that by 1971, the principle of a career system of administration applied to a much larger number of officials in Guinea than in Senegal: 55,000 in the former compared to about 15,000 in the latter.

Another difference worth pointing out between the situation in Guinea and Senegal is the exclusion of judicial officials.

¹ Interview, Secretariat of State for Civil Service and Labour, Feb. 1971. See also Horoya-hebdo, no.70, 14 May 1970.

² See Touré, 'Discours de cloture de la Conférence sur l'armée,' in La RDA-PDG, no.40 (May 1970), pp.216-17.

³ For an official account of the 'plot', see La RDA-PDG, no.38 (April 1970, 2nd edition), pp.27-101.

⁴ See Horoya-hebdo, no.70, 14 May 1970. The fact that this value did not dictate the action taken until 1969 suggests that it probably does not rank high in the regime's scale of values.

from the category of civil servants in Senegal which contrasts with their inclusion in Guinea. The Senegalese arrangement is in line with the fact that the judiciary is recognized as a separate power and its officials are therefore given a special statute to take account of their constitutional position.¹ In Guinea, on the other hand, the fact that the doctrine of party supremacy does not recognize the judiciary as a separate power is reflected in the regime's decision to regard judicial officials as civil servants.²

Recruitment

The conditions for recruitment in Guinea and Senegal - as set out in their respective statutes - are virtually identical with those set out in the colonial statute. After listing five general conditions which all prospective civil servants must fulfil,³ each statute states that the recruitment of candidates to the different entry points that exist is based either on the possession of prescribed certificates (that is, by qualification) or on success in competitive examinations.

The major entry points in Senegal are the hierarchies each

¹ The special statute for the officials of the judiciary is set out in decree no. 63-520 of 17 July 1963, JORS, 10 August, 1963.

² See decree no. 67/PG of 3 March 1960, JORG, 1 May 1960. This does not make much difference to the comparability of the relative sizes of the Guinean and Senegalese civil services as the total number of judicial officials of all ranks in Guinea in 1967 was only 62.

³ They must be nationals; they must possess their civil rights; they must have fulfilled their military obligations; they must not be physically disabled; and they must be between the ages of 18 and 30, with a possible extension to 35 in special circumstances like making allowance for the time spent in military service. These are almost the same general conditions that were laid down in the colonial statute.

of which is divided into classes and échelons. There are five hierarchies numbered from A to E. Except for hierarchy E for which no diploma or examination is formally required,¹ the basic minimum entry requirement for each hierarchy is as follows: a university degree or an equivalent diploma for hierarchy A, the full baccalauréat (equivalent of three 'A' levels) for hierarchy B, the Brevet élémentaire (certificate obtained after three years in the secondary school) for hierarchy C, and the Certificat d'études primaires (the primary school leaving certificate) for hierarchy D.

As in Senegal, the major entry points in Guinea are the hierarchies. In 1971, the number of hierarchies was seven (five until 1965 and six until 1969) numbered from A to G. The conditions of entry to each point are specified as follows. For hierarchies A and B, candidates are recruited by qualification only: doctorate degree or the equivalent for A and a university degree or the equivalent for B. Admission to hierarchy C is either by direct competitive examination for candidates with the full baccalauréat or by qualification for students with specified professional diplomas obtained from specialized institutions which recruit candidates with the Brevet élémentaire. Candidates with the Brevet professionnel or the Brevet d'enseignement

¹ Presidential Circular no. 84/PR of 20 September 1968 has contradicted the general statute by stipulating that hierarchy E civil servants must possess the Certificat d'études primaires élémentaires. According to this Circular, 'it is no more normal to deliver a driving licence to an illiterate, to send a letter through someone who is unable to read the address or the name of the service.' Although this new requirement has not been written into the statute, the large number of unemployed school leavers makes it probable that it is already widely applied.

industriel or an equivalent diploma are recruited by qualification to hierarchy D while candidates with the Brevet élémentaire sit a competitive examination. Candidates with the Certificat d'aptitude professionnel or an equivalent diploma are recruited by qualification to hierarchy E while candidates with the Certificat d'études primaires élémentaires sit a competitive examination. There are no formal diplomas or competitive examinations required for entry to hierarchies F and G.

While the conditions stated above have, on the whole, been observed in Senegal, some important modifications have been introduced in Guinea. According to Guinean leaders, these modifications are due to the application of the doctrine of party supremacy to personnel policy.¹ Available evidence suggests, however, that this doctrine has not been systematically applied to recruitment policy. Until 1969, the leaders of the Guinean regime appeared to have been satisfied with merely asserting that the doctrine of party supremacy required all civil servants to be party militants. No step was taken besides verbal exhortations, to ensure that civil servants were, indeed, militant party members. The obvious reason for this is the difficulty of devising effective methods for testing political militancy. Since virtually every adult Guinean is a member of the party, the membership criterion which is used in the one-party systems of Eastern Europe is unsatisfactory.² In 1969, the

¹ 'Our programme accords supremacy to the political conceptions and attitudes of a man over all his theoretical knowledge or his specialized technical competence': Toure', III, p. 186. Statements similar to this one of Feb. 1959 are regularly made by Guinean leaders.

² The Guinean regime emphasizes the distinction between the mass membership of the PDG and the selective or 'elite' membership of East European one-party system. For example, in 1961, over 50%

need to enforce the militancy yardstick became pressing as a result of the party leaders' fear that civil servants were becoming increasingly involved in the series of 'plots' aimed at overthrowing the regime. It was claimed that many civil servants were involved in the 1969 'military plot' (supra).

The method for testing the political militancy of civil servants devised was the introduction of a compulsory paper on PDG ideology in all competitive examinations for posts in the administrative services of the state. A decree of September 1969 stipulated that 'the establishment of any agent belonging to the hierarchy B will be subordinated to his obtaining an average of at least 12/20 in Ideology, awarded by the School of the Cadres of the Democratic Party of Guinea'.¹ The decree took effect from 1 October 1969. Since 1969, then, the political militancy yardstick has been integrated with the other conditions set out in the statute.

In practice, this 'academicization' of the political militancy yardstick (that is militancy determined by performance in PDG ideology examination) does not seem to have solved the problem; it has been found that those who succeed in ideology examinations are not necessarily the best party militants.² In

(Cont.)

of the entire population (almost all the adult Guineans) were members of the PDG compared to only about 10% in most East European countries. See S. Camara, 'De l'Action à l'idéologie,' in La RDA-PDG, no.27 (n.d.), p.199.

¹ JORG, 15 Feb. 1970. The Party School was established by decree no. 181/PRG of 6 May 1968, JORG, 1 June 1968. Article 1 of the decree reads as follows: 'The Party School functioning under the direct authority of the National Political Bureau has the function of organizing, ensuring and controlling the political, ideological and philosophical formation of the cadres and militants of the Democratic Party of Guinea'.

² Interviews at the Party School, Feb. 1971.

spite of this unsatisfactory result, the regime has decided to maintain the existing recruitment policy: candidates recruited either by qualification or through competitive examinations. This was confirmed in a presidential Circular of 7 November 1970 which said inter alia, '...it is necessary that the rules laid down concerning recruitment be scrupulously observed. The Statut particulier des cadres uniques has, moreover, defined them: recruitment must compulsorily be made either by qualification or through competitive examinations' (sic).¹

Another side to the political militancy yardstick is that it is used to justify the appointment of some civil servants to posts for which they do not possess the educational qualifications. The examples of such appointments recorded in the Journal officiel reveal that some beneficiaries eventually become assimilated to higher hierarchies while others are returned to their normal hierarchy when they fall out of favour. This practice, however, is largely limited to certain appointments (such as the post of regional governor) which would normally come under executive discretion in most states. The only difference is that the head of the executive exercising such discretion is usually obliged to respect some specified educational qualifications. (This, for example, is the practice in France in regard to the appointment of prefects and in Senegal in respect of the appointment of prefects and governors). On the basis of the information available in the Journal officiel, the number of this kind of appointment has been very small; the vast majority of civil

¹ Circular no. 0026/70/PRG of 7 November 1970.

servants are recruited according to the rules and procedures laid down in the statute.¹

In the field of recruitment, then, the fact that political militancy is a criterion for recruitment in Guinea constitutes an important innovation. This has resulted in the introduction of a compulsory paper on PDG ideology in all competitive examinations for posts in the administration and is also used as the justification for a small number of appointments which do not accord with the regulations of the statute. However, the recruitment policy of the country still remains close to the colonial principle - and to that of Senegal - since the militancy yardstick has been assimilated into the examination system central to the colonial principle.

Conditions of Service

The details of the conditions of service set out in both the Guinean and Senegalese statutes confirm both countries' commitment to the career system of administration as defined in the colonial statute. Both statutes guarantee regular promotions based on seniority and merit and a fixed salary to their civil servants. In addition to these provisions, there is a list of the rights and duties of civil servants as in the colonial statute.

In both countries every civil servant can expect promotions of échelon and of class or grade within his hierarchy. Promotion

¹ This conclusion was confirmed by the Chief of cabinet at the Secretariat of State for Civil Service and Labour during interview in February 1971. He gave a copy of the Circular cited above to the writer to support his view.

from one échelon to another is based on seniority and is carried out automatically. It occurs about every two years in the two countries. Promotion from one class or grade to another is exclusively by choice and implies a rise in responsibility. It is decided upon according to a promotion list (tableau d'avancement) drawn up every year and must be submitted for approval to an advisory committee or council. Experience in both countries has revealed that the promotion lists are usually drawn up almost exclusively according to seniority because the marking system which should be used to determine the merit of civil servants has proved unreliable. In 1968 a new law was passed in Senegal which revised the marking system and senior civil servants and responsible ministers were asked to enforce it.¹ In Guinea, the government's reaction has been to decree an 'exceptional promotion which departs from the rules fixed by the general statute of the civil service'.² In practice this serves as a legal cover for the appointments based on the party militancy yardstick.³

The salary of civil servants in both countries is fixed without reference to the functions performed by individual civil servants; it consists of indices of salary corresponding

¹ Law no. 68-01 of 4 Jan. 1968. Following the passing of this law, Ministerial Circular no. 2933/MEPT/CAB/BEI of 6 June 1968 reiterated the complaint that marks were not awarded regularly and urged the officials concerned to cooperate by applying the new law. On the unreliability of the marks awarded to civil servants in Senegal see Gautron and Rougevin-Baville, op.cit., p.240.

² Decree no. 307/PRG of 30 July 1964, JORG, 1 Sept. 1964.

³ Examples of this kind of promotion recorded in the Journal officiel between 1964 and 1969 include a number of regional governors who originally belonged to hierarchy H, D, or C and became integrated into hierarchy B.

to the grades or classes and échelons within each hierarchy. These indices are fixed in reference to the value of the basic index of the grid system for salaries in each country. Tables 4 and 5 on the next two pages show the range of salaries. In addition to these fixed salaries, civil servants in each country receive some social security allowance and a few receive additional allowance for performing certain duties.¹ Besides the apparent similarity in the ranges of salaries in relation to the qualifications, it is difficult to compare actual wages because of the different nature of the economic circumstances in each country. In Guinea, a high level of inflation makes the black market rate of exchange for the independent currency six to eight times the official rate and this adversely affects the real value of wages.² In Senegal, civil servants contribute 5% of their salary towards their pension fund (the state bears the whole burden in Guinea) and they also have to cope with a high cost of living, especially in Dakar where most of them are located. The highest salary in Senegal is fifteen times the lowest compared to Guinea where it is seventeen times.

The rights of civil servants in both countries include state protection for injuries or attacks suffered while on duty, paid holidays, trade union rights, including the right to strike. The right to strike can be exercised by all civil servants in Guinea but in Senegal certain limitations can be imposed on 'the corps of civil servants who are entrusted with functions directly

¹For example, the members of ministerial cabinets (supra).

²Guinea left the franc zone in 1960 and created an independent Guinea franc zone.

TABLE 4

LEVELS OF RECRUITMENT AND RANGE OF SALARIES FOR SENEGALESE
CIVIL SERVANTS

Hier- archy	Level of Recruitment	Indices at start & end of career	Total monthly salary at start & end of career
A	Doctorate degrees & equivalents	1,700-3,580	74,281 - 156,413
	University degrees & certain diplomas of 'grandes ecoles'	1,423-3,350	62,188 - 146,361
	University degrees only & equivalents	1,423-2,989	62,188 - 130,558
B	Full <u>baccalauréat</u> and 2-3 years further studies	1,141-2,806	49,826 - 122,602
	Full <u>baccalauréat</u> and 1 year further studies	982 - 2,186	42,893 - 95,512
	Full <u>baccalauréat</u> only	821 - 1,765	35,850 - 77,130
C	<u>Brevet élémentaire</u> and 1-2 years further studies	646 - 1,515	28,219 - 67,165
	<u>Brevet élémentaire</u> only	560 - 1,010	24,456 - 44,128
D	<u>Certificat d'études primaires</u> and 1-2 years further studies	436 - 891	20,854 - 38,914
	<u>Certificat d'études primaires</u> only	399 - 766	17,415 - 33,486
E	No diploma is formally required. Posts largely reserved for Ex-Service men	262 - 477	11,340 - 20,854

Source: Civil Service Division, October 1970.

TABLE 5

LEVELS OF RECRUITMENT AND RANGE OF SALARIES FOR GUINEAN
CIVIL SERVANTS

Hier- archy	Level of Recruitment	Indices at start & end of career	Total monthly salary at start & end of career
A	Doctorate degrees and equivalents	1,050-1,400	105,000 - 140,000
B	University degrees, Dip- lomas of the Advanced School of Administration, of Polytechnics and all higher education diplomas obtained after at least 4 years of post-secondary education	580-1,200	58,000 - 120,000
C	Direct entry for students from specified National Schools for professional training; entry by compet- itive examinations for <u>baccalaureat graduates</u>	380- 700	38,000 - 70,000
D	Direct entry for holders of specified professional qualifications; entry by competitive examinations for holders of <u>Brevet élémentaire</u>	265- 460	26,500 - 46,000
E	Direct entry for holders of specified professional qualifications; entry by competitive examinations for holders of the <u>Certifi- cat d'études primaires élémentaires</u>	185- 340	18,500 - 34,000
F	No diploma formally req.	120- 280	12,000 - 28,000
G	No diploma formally req.	80- 130	8,000 - 13,000

Source: Statut particulier des divers cadres uniques, op.cit.
pp.43-46.

related to public security and order.'¹ Furthermore, the right to take part in political activities is recognized to all civil servants in both countries. In order 'to exercise an elective public office', any civil servant in both countries can ask to be detached (détaché) from the civil service; he can return to active service after losing his elective office without any loss of his civil service rights: he retains both his seniority and pension rights.

To balance the rights and other career advantages that civil servants enjoy, they also have duties and they can be disciplined. Civil servants in both countries are forbidden to engage in any private lucrative activity. They must declare any lucrative activity of their spouse to their Minister. They are bound by the rules of hierarchical obedience and professional secrecy and discretion. The experience in both countries is that most of these duties have not been observed, especially the the prohibition concerning private lucrative activity.²

¹Statut général de la fonction publique, op.cit., p.27 (article 99) Law no. 59-01 of 9 January 1959 modified by decree no. 68-597 of 30 May 1968 set out how such civil servants can be requisitioned. Another limitation on the right to strike in Senegal is that the government can declare any strike illegal. In May 1968, both limitations were invoked when a general strike was declared. Considering the readiness of the government to declare any strike illegal and the heavy penalties that go with participation in an illegal strike, it is probably no exaggeration to say that the right of civil servants to strike is merely a paper right. The absence of limitations on the right to strike in Guinea should not be interpreted to mean unlimited liberalism; when teachers went on strike in 1961, their action was called a 'plot' and their leaders condemned to long terms of imprisonment.

²In Senegal, circular 037/PC/MFE of 4 June 1962 issued by the Prime Minister condemned the involvement of some civil servants in private lucrative activities. The provisions of the statute prohibiting such activities were recalled and civil servants

The original general statute in each country sets out nine sanctions which could be applied by the appointing authority against civil servants guilty of disciplinary offences.¹ Only the lightest of these sanctions (warning and blame) could be pronounced without the opinion of a council of discipline. It was found in both countries that hardly any disciplinary sanctions were applied. The provisions which were intended to serve as guarantees against arbitrary sanctions (communication of file to offending civil servant, summoning of a meeting of the disciplinary council) effectively bogged down procedures and hindered action.

In Senegal, the articles of the 1961 statute on disciplinary sanctions and procedures were amended by a law of January 1968.² The existing disciplinary sanctions were increased to ten and divided into three degrees. The first degree sanctions (warning and blame) and the second degree sanctions (transfer and lowering of échelon seniority) could be pronounced either by the appointing authority or his delegate and in either case, there is no need to consult the disciplinary council. The third

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were reminded that 'the only authorized activities are the production of literary, scientific or artistic works, and works of a general interest, especially teaching, education and charity'. In Guinea, the resolution passed at the end of the PDG's National Revolutionary Council (CNR) meeting of August 1965 included a decision 'on the withdrawal of all Administrative Cadres from every commercial activity, direct or indirect'; see Parti démocratique de Guinée-RDA, Bureau politique nationale, 20ème anniversaire du Parti démocratique de Guinée, 14 mai 1967, points de repère, Conakry mimeo. 1967, p.242.

¹ The sanctions were: warning, blame, automatic transfer, lowering of échelon, lowering of grade or class, dismissal without loss of pension rights, and dismissal with loss of pension rights.

² Law no. 68-01 of 4 Jan. 1968, JORS, 20 Jan. 1968.

degree sanctions (removal from the promotion list, lowering of échelon, temporary exclusion from post for a maximum period of six months, dismissal without suspension of pension rights, dismissal with suspension of pension rights) can only be pronounced by the appointing authority and after consultation with the council of discipline. The civil servant's file must also still be communicated to him, including all the relevant documents on the offence. The effect of this amendment has been to reduce the guarantee against arbitrary sanctions. In 1970, officials in the Ministry of Civil Service were unable to say if disciplinary offences were being more regularly punished than in the past.¹

In Guinea, a decree of July 1964 which made no reference to the statute set out eight sanctions divided into three categories.² The three lightest sanctions (warning, blame and suspension for eight days) which constitute the first category could be applied by the chief of service. The second category consists of suspension for up to 15 days and could be pronounced by the responsible Minister on the proposition of the chief of service. Finally, a third category of sanctions, consisting of removal from the promotion list, lowering of échelon, lowering of class,

¹ Interviews, Ministry of Civil Service and Labour, October 1970. An indication of a negative answer was given in Circular no. 40/PM/ MFPT/DEP of 2 October 1970 issued by the Prime Minister in which it was stated that delays still occurred in apply disciplinary sanctions and both the Ministers and senior civil servants were urged to enforce the 1968 law more strictly.

² Decree no. 307/PRG of 30 July 1964, op.cit.

dismissal with or without suspension of rights to pension, could be pronounced by the Minister of Civil Service on the proposition of the interested Minister and after the opinion of the council of discipline. What this has meant in practice is that, as in Senegal, the guarantees against arbitrary sanctions have been reduced. It is also interesting to note that it is the disciplinary sanctions and procedures in the 1964 decree that have been in force since that date.

Besides the point already made about the clear commitment of both countries to a career system of administration, the above account reveals how each country has preserved certain rules and procedures concerning promotion and discipline inspired by the colonial statute in spite of the difficulties encountered in implementing them. What emerges clearly here is the total absence of any innovation (the few adaptations that have occurred have proved inadequate) in both countries. It is also remarkable that apart from some 'exceptional' promotions, Guinea's political militancy yardstick has not introduced any significant changes.

Administrative Training

The need to provide both pre-service and in-service training for civil servants is written into the Guinean and Senegalese statutes - as in the colonial statute - as part of the conditions of service.¹ This subject is discussed separately from the other

¹ Each statute promises facilities for professional training to serving officials while candidates recruited to the specially created administrative training institutions are regarded as probationary civil servants. See articles 22 and 25 of Guinea's 1959 statute and articles 23 and 26 of the Senegalese statute (1968 version).

points in the preceding section because of the special importance attached to it in both countries.

First, it should be pointed out that the colonial administration also attached great importance to administrative training. As mentioned in Chapter 1, only graduates of the École nationale de la France d'Outre-mer (ENFOM) were appointed as colonial administrators who dominated the senior ranks of the colonial administration. This resulted in the virtual exclusion of Africans from these senior posts until the loi-cadre reform introduced measures to facilitate their admission to the institution (supra). Because Guinea became independent shortly after this reform, the country did not benefit from the new training facilities to the same extent as Senegal which had a longer transitional period to independence. Thus, while only 13 Guineans graduated from the ENFOM before the country's independence,¹ Senegal had a total of 73 graduates and, in addition, many middle-level officials attended crash training courses provided by the ENFOM's successor, the Institut des hautes études d'Outre-mer (IHEOM) between 1958 and 1960.² The following account concentrates on the content and method of training and in both cases attention is drawn to the extent to which the programmes in each country have been influenced by the colonial legacy and

¹ In Etat des fonctionnaires guinéens en service avant l'indépendance, op.cit.

² This figure represents the number trained after the Second World War; a few more had probably qualified before the war. Source: Interview at the Institut international d'administration publique, (IIAP, successor to the ENFOM and the IHEOM), Paris, April 1970.

the post-independence ideology.

Senegal

In October 1960 the Ecole nationale d'administration du Sénégal (ENAS) was created to recruit and train administrators for the hierarchy A of the country's civil service.¹ Two categories of students are recruited to the ENAS: hierarchy B civil servants who are recruited through a competitive examination and holders of a university degree in Law or Economics (or any other diploma recognized as equivalent) who are recruited on the basis of their qualification. The duration of training for the civil service recruits is three years while those recruited by qualification spend two years. The training programme for both categories consists of theoretical courses and periods of internship in the different services of the Senegalese administration. All this is rounded up with a four-month internship in France.²

The courses at the ENAS focus on three major areas: the legal basis of administration, administrative techniques, and the problems of social and economic development. Until 1968 the first two areas predominated; since then courses on the problems of development became predominant in order, as the school's authorities put it, to reflect the importance the government

¹ Decree no. 60-341 of 13 October 1960, JORS, 15 Oct. 1960. The ENAS was the successor to the Ecole fédérale d'administration created in January 1960 by the Mali Federation. The collapse of the Federation in August 1960 led to the creation of the ENAS a few months later.

² Until 1968, the internship in France lasted for six months. The reduction of the duration by two months may be a concession to those who argued that it was unnecessary. Source: Interview with the Director of Internship, October 1970.

attaches to the administrators' role in promoting development.¹ In spite of this re-orientation, the overall impression is that the content and method of training at the ENAS still preserves many of the characteristics of the ENFOM and the IHEOM programmes. This is largely due to the fact that the majority of the teaching staff (80% including the Director and Deputy Director in 1968) are Frenchmen many of whom had passed through the ENFOM.² The post-graduation internship in France is carried out under the guidance of the IIAP, the successor of the IHEOM.

Besides the ENAS, there are two other administrative training institutions in Senegal: the Centre de formation et de perfectionnement administratifs (CFPA) and the Ecole nationale d'économie appliquée (ENEA). Between them, they do for the non-technical hierarchy B civil servants what the ENAS does for hierarchy A administrators. The ENEA specializes in the training of agents for planning, rural development, and statistics while the CFPA trains generalist administrative secretaries and special staff for the Ministries of Justice (Court Clerks), Labour (Labour Controllers), and Finance (Tax, Customs and Treasury Controllers). By 1970, both the ENEA and the CFPA had proved their worth as training grounds for the supporting staff that hierarchy A officials need to be effective, especially those of them engaged

¹ Interviews at the ENAS, October 1970. The 1969/70 programme, for example, had more study hours devoted to courses on the problems of development than to either administrative techniques or the legal basis of administration. For a detailed study of the ENAS up to 1968, see 'Ladipo Adamolekun, 'Administrative Science in Francophone West Africa,' unpublished M.Phil. Dissertation, Institute of Administration, University of Ife, Nigeria, 1970, pp.40-65.

² Ibid., p.58. The first Senegalese Director was appointed in December 1970.

in the external services of the central government administration.¹ However, the cost of maintaining three specialized training institutions and the growing problem of underemployment for their graduates have already led to some rethinking of the structure of administrative training in the country.²

In spite of the considerable development in local administrative training programmes, there is still some reliance on French institutions especially for the training of middle and senior-level technical civil servants. Senegal also takes advantage of several training scholarships provided by friendly foreign countries, notably Canada and the United States. Refresher training for all civil servants is provided at the Centre national de formation et d'action. This centre is also used to provide orientation courses for the French technical assistance personnel who come to serve in Senegal.

Guinea

Between 1958 and 1963, the administrative training programmes available in Guinea were for middle-level general administrators. This training was provided at the Ecole territoriale d'adminis-

¹ A government publication in 1969 referred in glowing terms to the ENEA's role in training 'the middle-level cadres of development'. See République du Sénégal, La Participation populaire au développement national, Report presented in application of Resolution no. 4/TANA of the Conference of Heads of State of the Organisation commune africaine et malgache held at Tananarive, 25-27 June 1966, Dakar, Feb. 1969, mimeo. p.152. At the end of 1970, the ENEA had produced 226 graduates and the CPPA 172.

² The task of re-thinking Senegal's administrative training programmes has been entrusted to the Comité permanent pour l'animation des administrations publiques; see presidential Circular no. 39/PR/SQ/CAAP of 10 May 1969. Essentially, the Committee's task is to establish co-ordination between the different training institutions which, in the words of the circular, were functioning 'in a state of reciprocal ignorance'.

tration in 1958, at the Ecole nationale d'administration between 1959 and 1960, and at the Collège préparatoire d'administration between 1962 and 1963. In 1963, high-level administrative training was provided for the first time when the Ecole nationale d'administration was resuscitated and by 1965, the structure of high-level training had become well established at the Ecole supérieure d'administration (ESA).¹

The ESA now functions as a faculty within the Institut polytechnique Gamal Abdel Nasser de Conakry (IPC) and students are recruited to it after obtaining their full baccalauréat. Until 1965, the aim of administrative training was to familiarize prospective administrators with certain basic principles of administration (mostly through legal courses) and to initiate them into administrative techniques and practices through periods of internship within the administration.² Between 1965 and 1970, the basic orientation of the training programme at the ESA was altered in two important directions. First, instead of the emphasis on legal courses, emphasis was shifted to management courses such as Accounting, Banking, Statistics and Planning; the last three courses are grouped as 'Economy and Finance'. These courses are considered as the necessary preparation for the trainees' future role in promoting economic development.

¹ For a detailed study of administrative training in Guinea/ see Adamolekun, op.cit., pp.66-100. up to 1968,

² Ibid. See also B. Weinstein, 'Guinea's School of Public Administration', Journal of Local Administration Overseas, IV, 4 (Oct. 1965), pp.239-243. The programme was modelled closely on that used at the INFOM. In addition to legal courses, there were also courses on general culture, diplomacy, economic, financial and social affairs.

The following Table showing the distribution of ESA students by section of specialization during the 1970/71 academic session underlines this point.

TABLE 6

The Ecole Supérieure D'Administration: Distribution of Students by Year of Study and by Section of Specialization, December 1970.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Economy & Finance</u>	<u>Legal Studies</u>	<u>Account- ing</u>	<u>Police & Security</u>
First	83	19	26	38	-
Second	66	17	18	31	-
Third	51	36	15	-	-
Fourth	51	35	16	-	-
Fifth	43	28	5	-	10
<u>Total</u>	<u>294</u>	<u>135</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>10</u>

The second important new dimension to training was the emphasis on the teaching of PDG ideology in the curriculum of the ESA. The history and policies of the party are taught to all students during every year of their training (it does not matter if the same material is repeated year after year) and some practical training of an ideological nature has been introduced: military training for all and one month manual labour every summer for three years. To underline the importance of ideological training, the ESA graduate cannot become an established civil servant until he has successfully completed an ideological seminar of five to eight weeks and an internship of one month in the PRLs. The official explanation for the emphasis on party ideology is that it will ensure the commitment of ESA graduates to the party's

objectives.¹ As a result of a 'cultural revolution' launched by the party in 1967, every ESA student now learns one of the eight national languages in the country in addition to his mother tongue. It is hoped that this will facilitate their task as administrators as they will be able to communicate more easily with the people.

The ESA is the only specialized institution for training administrators in Guinea. Candidates are recruited to the technical services from the relevant faculties of the IPC (for the senior posts), and from professional training institutions for the middle-level posts. In areas where the specialized training required is not available locally, Guineans with the required basic qualifications are sent to any friendly foreign country that provides such training facilities. To minimize the effect of 'differential socialization' that may result from sending Guineans to countries with varying approaches to administrative training,² the trainees are brought home annually during their summer holidays. And when they return home qualified, they are not appointed to established posts in the administration until they have successfully attended an ideological seminar and have spent three months in the PRLs.

Finally, refresher courses, both of a technical and of an ideological nature are given at the Centre national d'organisation des entreprises de formation et de perfectionnement des cadres (OPEC) whose activities cover both the public and private sectors.

¹ Interview at the Party School, Feb. 1971.

² These countries include Algeria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, China, Cuba, East Germany, Egypt, Italy, USA, USSR, and Western Germany.

By December 1970 the following refresher programmes had been carried out at the OFEC: four sets of Chief Accountants, two sets of Agents of Labour Administration, two sets of Stocking Agents, two sets of Supply Officers, and three sets of Store Keepers.¹

The dominant feature of the post-independence training programmes summarized above is the emphasis on party ideology which is systematically taught to all prospective administrators. This constitutes a significant innovation and contrasts sharply with the situation in Senegal where the post-independence training programmes still preserve many of the characteristic features of the colonial ENPOM and IHEOM. Another important contrast is that while the Guinean regime attaches great importance to familiarizing its prospective administrators with the country's local conditions (the period of compulsory internship within the PRIs), Senegal's prospective administrators are sent on a compulsory internship in France, thereby remaining close to the original source of inspiration.

Conclusion

In all, the above account shows that the post-independence system of personnel administration in Senegal confirms the proposition advanced in the introduction to the chapter: it is in accordance with the principles established by the colonial administration with only a few modifications made in response to local circumstances. In the case of Guinea, the findings in the chapter do not correspond exactly to the proposition advanced:

¹Source: *Noroya-hebdo*, no.83, 22-28 Aug. 1970.

the essential principles of a career system of administration established by the colonial administration have been maintained even though some significant modifications and innovations have been introduced.

As was shown in the chapter, the basic principles of a career system of administration that have been preserved in both countries are permanency of tenure, fixed salary, recruitment by qualifications or through competitive examinations and regular promotions. While in Senegal all these principles have only been modified in such matters of detail as the procedures governing the discipline of civil servants, in Guinea, there has been a radical re-definition of the status of civil servant (that is, those to whom these principles apply) and some innovations in regard to the recruitment of civil servants. Also, the significant innovations introduced in the training programmes for prospective administrators in Guinea contrast with the programmes in Senegal which have preserved the basic characteristics of the colonial training programmes used at the ENFOM and INEOM with only minor modifications.

CHAPTER 6

ADMINISTRATION AND REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

At present, the Governor is named by the central authority like the Commandant, like the Attorney, like all Magistrates. Later, all administrative posts will be filled through elections.

S. Toure¹

The principle of the Republic is: government of the people by the people and for the people.²

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contrast which is said to exist between the nature of the representative institutions with which the Guinean and Senegalese administrations have to cope. On the one hand, the Senegalese administration is said to have to deal with traditional representative institutions - a parliament and a number of local councils - whose elected members are expected to be associated with the work of the administration in order to ensure some degree of public participation and control. On the other hand, the Guinean administration is said to have to cope with party institutions whose elected members are expected to progressively assume full responsibility for the entire work of the administration. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the Senegalese approach represents

¹In Horoya-hebdo, no. 7, 15-21 March 1969.

²Article 1 of the Senegalese constitutions.

something close to what existed under colonial rule while the Guinean approach constitutes an innovation. The experiences of both states since independence are examined below.

Senegal

As we saw in Chapter 2, there are two ways in which elected representatives of the people are said to be associated with the work of the administration in Senegal. The first approach is through a parliament which, according to the constitution, shares with the executive the right to initiate laws (which the administration executes) and can control the work of the executive (largely carried out by the administration) through oral and written questions and by setting up commissions of inquiry. The second approach is through what is described in the constitution as 'the free administration of local collectivities' which refers to the three institutions involved in the administration of the country's local collectivities: municipal councils, regional assemblies and rural councils. We shall examine all the institutions in turn starting with the local councils.

The Municipal Councils

The principle governing municipal administration in post-independence Senegal is the same as that which governed the full communes that existed under colonial rule: to enable elected mayors and councillors to administer the affairs of their areas. In fact, the major post-independence legislation on municipal administration - the code of communal administration (code de l'administration communale) which became law in 1966¹ -

¹ See law no. 66-64 of 30 June 1966, JORS, 30 June 1966.

specifically refers to the French municipal law of 4 April 1884 in which this principle was first stated. According to the 1966 code, 'the commune is the grouping of the inhabitants of the same locality united by a solidarity resulting from nearness, desirous of dealing with their own interests and capable of finding the necessary resources for a common action which is special to them within the national community and in the direction of national interests.'¹ As the Minister of Interior explained in July 1966, this means that 'the State abandons a part of its powers of decision to the communes by virtue of the principle of decentralization.'²

At independence, the Senegalese government maintained the 33 full communes it inherited from the colonial administration (25 of these were created during the transitional period to independence). Although the universal adult suffrage introduced towards the end of the colonial period has been maintained, the existence of a de facto one party has meant that no choice of candidates is allowed to the citizens.³ Apart from this reservation, elections have been held regularly (every four years) and in 1970 the 33 communes elected 907 councillors. If 'free administration' as defined by the principle of municipal administration mentioned above exists in all these councils, this would amount to a considerable degree of participation by elected representatives

¹ Ibid.

² See Conférence des préfets, July 1966, mimeo, consulted at the Archives nationales du Sénégal.

³ A few opposition candidates contested the 1966 municipal elections without success and in the 1970 elections there was no single opposition list.

of the people in administrative work. In order to find out the extent to which this popular participation exists in practice, we shall examine two issues: the financial resources of the councils and the nature and extent of central government control over municipal administration.

With regard to the financial resources of the communes, the overall impression is the small size of communal budgets. This phenomenon, which greatly limited the effectiveness of the full communes under colonial rule has persisted with all post-independence communes. Communal budgets are in most cases only adequate for current expenditure, especially the salaries of municipal employees. For example, in 1964/65, out of 32 communes (excluding the commune of Great Dakar), only two spent less than 40% of their budget on personnel, nine spent 42-48% and twenty-one spent 55-80%. The nature of overall expenditures for that year was as follows

	Ordinary Budget	Extraordinary Budget (State grant)
Personnel	68%	-
Material	30%	-
Miscellaneous (including social expenditure)	2%	-
Investment	-	35%
	100%	35%

Source: Rapport du gouvernement au Conseil national 25 avril, 1965, Dakar, mimeo. Consulted at the Archives nationales du Sénégal.

The source of revenue for the ordinary budget is a small percentage (ranging from 5-10%) of state direct tax allotted to

each commune. The additional sources of revenue are state grants and loans and treasury advances. The above statement of accounts shows that the only amount spent on investment came from state grants. Because of the small amount of money available for investment, the participation of Senegalese communes in development activities is very limited. In 1968/69, more than half of the communal budgets were less than 20 million francs.¹ In the circumstances, most communes limit their activities to the keeping of the civil register, the maintenance of municipal roads and cemetery, the construction and maintenance of markets. Some of them manage to have funds for certain social services such as assistance to old people and people hit by natural disasters and the award of some scholarships for secondary education. It is only the commune of Great Dakar and those of five other regional headquarters that undertake significant projects connected with education, public health and hygiene, and road construction.²

The control exercised by the central government on the activities of the majority of municipal councils are those commonly found in most countries: the need for a central government tutelary authority—in this case the Minister of the Interior — to approve both the budget and certain

¹ See Ordre chronologique de création des communes et enseignements sur populations et budgets communaux, Dakar, 1970, mimeo, consulted at the Archives nationales du Sénégal.

² These communes have the advantages of larger populations and bigger budgets: Dakar, 661,000 inhabitants, 3,103,630,150 francs CFA; Diourbel, 37,974 inhabitants, 57,574,178 francs CFA; Kaolack, 95,352 inhabitants, 358,542,068 francs; Saint-Louis, 61,444 inhabitants, 178,192,452 francs; Thies, 84,357 inhabitants, 258,069,288 francs; and Ziguinchor, 40,000 inhabitants, 101,256,435 francs. All figures are for 1968/69: Ordre chronologique de création des communes..., op.cit.

deliberations before they are implemented. Here, attention is focused on a number of uncommon methods of control. First, the municipal treasurer in Senegalese communes is a civil servant, appointed and paid by the central government. Although this measure was dictated by the poor financial management in the communes, it does mean that a key official of the council owes considerable loyalty to the central government. Second, prefects (who are central government officials) have the power to substitute themselves for mayors who may fail in discharging the law and order functions delegated to them by the central government.¹ Third, and most important of all, regional governors exercise extensive executive powers in the communes in which the regional headquarters are located. Starting with Dakar in 1964, a method of control was devised whereby effective executive powers within the communes are exercised by the regional governor and not by the mayor (known as president since 1966) of the council. By 1970, this measure had been extended to all the seven major communes: Saint-Louis (1965), Thiès (1966), Kaolack (1969), Diourbel, Tambacounda and Ziguinchor (1970). Under this arrangement, the power of the purse belongs to the governor. The objective of the arrangement is that the governor should be able to limit the amount spent on personnel and thereby make funds available for development activities. It is claimed that this experiment has been successful (hence its generalization)² but it is also true that it has reduced the scope of local control of

¹The functions performed by mayors on behalf of the central government administration have already been enumerated in Chapter 4; see pp.

²Interviews, Ministry of Interior, November 1970 and April 1971.

communal affairs.

As a result of the opposition of these communes to the new arrangements, the government agreed in 1970 to share financial power between the governor and an inner executive of each council, called the syndic (the president of the council and his three vice-presidents). While the governor implements the budget for personnel and development projects, the syndic has responsibility for the budget for material, councillors' allowances, and salary for quarter heads. In all, then, the inadequate resources of most communes and the extensive nature of the control of the central government add up to a great limitation on the degree of 'free administration' that exists within them.

Regional Assemblies

Regional Assemblies were created in the January 1960 administrative reform to give citizens living outside the communes a means of participating in the work of the government as well as to enable them to initiate projects of local interest. As stated in the document on the first plan, 'Regional assemblies allow the taking charge of, by the representatives of the population, the management of activities of regional interest within the framework of the plan.'¹

As in the case of the municipal councils, elections to the regional assemblies are held every four years by universal adult suffrage. And like the municipal councils, too, they are filled with only UPS councillors - 295 councillors were elected in the last elections held in 1970. Until 1965, all the six regional

¹ République du Sénégal, Plan quadriennal du développement, 1961-1964, Dakar, (n.d.), mimeo, p.11.

assemblies¹ were allowed to initiate and finance local projects which were implemented on their behalf by the officials of the central government administration within the area. Each assembly's source of revenue was the regional tax fixed annually by it within limits fixed by the National Assembly. What happened in practice was that after meeting the 'obligatory' expenditure - rebates for village chiefs who collected the taxes, 40% of total revenue as contribution for financing the Regional Development Committee - most regional assemblies spent what was left on current expenses: the acquisition of material (especially vehicles) which were regularly replaced because of over-use, payment of salaries to an excessive number of officials needed only for the day-to-day running of the assembly's activities. There were only a few regions where any development projects were carried out.

In 1965, the 'autonomy' phase of regional assemblies was replaced by a 'dependence' phase. Under the new phase, the governor became the chief executive while the assembly became a deliberative body to vote the budget and deliberate on and approve the regional projects which the governor implements. The power of the purse belongs exclusively to the governor who pays the small staff that keeps the assembly's secretariat and pays the monthly allowance of the president and the sitting allowance of the councillors.

In spite of the improved financial management that resulted from this new arrangement, the funds available for regional

¹The Dakar region has no regional assembly as its area coincides with that of the commune of Dakar.

projects have remained small. Because taxes are not paid at one hundred per cent, what is left after the payment of the obligatory expenditure is only adequate for minor construction and repair projects, especially roads and bridges. The result is that regional assemblies are summoned only once a year - to vote the regional budget and deliberate on any list of regional projects proposed by the governor.

On the whole, there has been very little evidence of regional councillors 'taking charge of the management of activities of regional interest'. The few regional activities that exist are effectively managed by the regional governors assisted by other central government administrative officials. The general view held by a number of senior civil servants and two presidents of regional assemblies interviewed in 1970 and 1971 is that regional assemblies will disappear unless they are reformed to constitute veritable legislative assemblies occupying the same position vis-à-vis the central government administration in the regions as that occupied by the national assembly vis-à-vis the central government administration at the national level. However, the unanimous opinion of the interviewees was that the regional assemblies would not be strengthened because of the government's fear that strong regional loyalties might develop and constitute a danger to national integration.

The Rural Councils

Rural councils constitute the third way in which successive Senegalese governments have sought to achieve the 'free administration of local collectivities'. The plan is to group villages together to constitute rural communities each of which is to have

an elected council whose members will freely administer the affairs of their areas. Nothing concrete was done about these councils until in 1964 when the government's plan for establishing rural communities was linked with a new service of land development. According to this plan, the country's 13,000 villages are to be grouped into 200 to 300 rural communities of between 2,500 and 4,000 inhabitants each. Each community is to be administered by a rural council. However, by 1970, only seven communities had been established on an experimental basis and none of them had a council.

The major explanation for this failure appears to be the reluctance of Bengalese villages to accept being merged to constitute larger communities. The hope of the government is that this reluctance will disappear eventually when the success of the experimental communities is known. When and if rural councils are established, the government will have to tackle the problem of duplication which will emerge as both the rural councils and the regional assemblies will be representing the interests of the same areas. (Regional assemblies are expected to manage the affairs of those who live outside the towns and cities, that is in the villages.)

The National Assembly

As in the case of the municipal councils and the regional assemblies, the elections to the National Assembly (held every five years) are by universal adult suffrage. As in these two cases, too, the deputies (members of the Assembly) are all UPC members.

The role of the National Assembly, as mentioned above, is

to enable elected representatives of the people to share with the executive the initiative of legislation and to control the work of the executive through certain methods set out in the constitution. The Assembly's initiative in law-making since independence has been very limited (see Table 7 on next page). Instead of a joint initiative, there has been a virtual abandonment of initiative to the executive leaving the Assembly with the role of rejecting or amending the government's projects of law. There were, however, both cases of rejection and amendment of government's projects of law, including the rejection of a project of law to introduce preventive detention for offences against state security in 1964. Another case of rejection was the project of law asking for an extension of the state of emergency declared in June 1968 following a strike by students and workers. Thus, although the Assembly's power to initiate laws has been under-utilized, it has succeeded in preventing the passing of some laws detrimental to public interest. It should also be mentioned that the government's virtual monopoly of law-making is due largely to a number of advantages it has over the Assembly: it has more information at its disposal; it receives the assistance of civil servants in preparing its projects of law in a way to satisfy the necessary juridical conditions; and, above all, the most influential members of the dominant party (to which all deputies belong), including its Secretary General [who is also the President of the Republic], are in the government thereby giving government initiative the stamp of party authority.¹

¹The extent to which party institutions are used to control government work is examined below.

TABLE 7

Laws Passed by the Senegalese National Assembly, 1960-1970

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Laws</u>	<u>Propositions of Law¹</u>	<u>Projects of Law²</u>
1960	55	3	52
1961	67	3	64
1962	65	4	61
1963	61	3	58
1964	61	1	60
1965	62	0	62
1966	58	0	58
1967	54	1	53
1968	56	1	55
1969	69	2	67
1970	56	0	56

Notes: 1. National Assembly's initiative

2. Government's initiative.

According to the constitution, legislative control of the work of the administration can be carried out through oral and written questions. The Assembly can also set up commissions of inquiry to investigate any particular aspects of administrative work. Since independence, none of these methods has been used except on one occasion when a deputy asked a written question concerning his personal tax.¹ Although not formally described as a method of legislative control of administrative work, the work of the permanent commissions of the Assembly amounts to a kind of control. There are nine commissions with 21 to 28 members which cover between them the activities of all the ministerial departments. The most important commissions are: Finance, Economic Affairs, External Affairs, and Development and Planning. It is before these commissions that the detailed consideration of the government's projects of law takes place. The debates within some of them are lively from time to time and most of the amendments to the government's projects of law take place at this stage. Occasionally, a commission can reject a project of law which no longer reaches the full assembly.²

It appears that both the assembly and the government take the work of the commissions seriously. Two commissions, Finance and External Affairs, have developed a de facto specialization because of the virtual permanence of their leading members. It is said that both commissions insist on having the Minister

¹Interview with the Secretary General of the National Assembly, April 1971. He kindly made available the Assembly's documents on which this section is based.

²For example, the Commission of Transport rejected a project of law on compulsory insurance brought before it in 1967; see Lucarelli, Un Parti politique africain, op.cit., p.275, fn.15.

before them during their sessions in addition to any civil servants whose presence may be needed and meetings of both have been suspended because the Minister was absent. A proof of the importance attached to the commissions' work was the decision in 1965 to give a Minister the responsibility for 'Relations with the Assembly'.¹ In the same year, a presidential Circular urged Ministers to be present before the assembly's commissions as well as to make their civil servants available whenever they are needed. But it emphasized that 'in principle, it is the Minister who is responsible and not his technicians'.²

Besides the work of the commissions, deputies have some informal methods of influencing administrative work. For example, the president of a commission may meet the Minister with responsibility for his commission's work, sometimes with a few civil servants in attendance. The discussion that takes place at such meetings may either influence the projects of law subsequently submitted by the government or influence the way in which the adopted legislation is implemented. Deputies make personal representations or write letters to Ministers to get certain matters settled with the administration for their constituents or for themselves.³

¹ Usually, in addition to responsibility for a department; in 1970 it was the Minister of Information who was charged with this responsibility. The Minister attends the conference of presidents of commissions at the beginning of each session during which he makes known the government's priorities. In return, he keeps his colleagues in the government informed of the conference's decisions, especially its agenda.

² Circular no. 005/PR/SG of 15 January 1965.

³ Unfortunately, it must be admitted that this informal method is more used for personal purposes than in the interest of constituents: Source: Interview with the Secretary General of the National Assembly, April 1971.

In all, although the Senegalese western-style constitution makes available several methods of legislative control of administrative work, many of these methods are not used and the few that have been used have a very limited effectiveness. It is significant that the government itself recently appealed to deputies to use their powers of control more effectively:

You have the right to control us: we hope that you will do it. You have the right to be kept informed: we shall act in such a way that you will be. Everybody will gain thereby, with the condition, of course, that we stick to the essential and stay above the consciousness of our common and solidary responsibility before our party and people.¹

The Dominant Party and the Administration

Although the party cannot interfere with the constitutional institutions, the dominant party which has ruled the country since independence formally requires its elective institutions at national and regional levels to be associated with, as well as to control the work of, the administration.²

At the regional level, the party's regional union (union régionale) is expected to perform both functions. In practice, its activity consists of organizing periodic seminars (journées d'études) which are attended by both the party officials and the civil servants within the region. The objective of these seminars is to achieve a dialogue between party officials and the civil servants - a dialogue in which the former are expected to learn what the administration is doing and to make suggestions

¹ Prime Minister Abdou Diouf in his investiture speech before the National Assembly; see Dakar Matin, 11 March 1970.

² See Senghor, Planification et tension morale, op.cit.

for the improvement of services while the latter are expected to appeal for the cooperation of party members through the party officials. What happens in practice is very often no more than speech-making by both party and administrative officials on what has been achieved and the need to make more efforts in whatever field is being discussed. This, at least, was the writer's conclusion from the reports of the seminars held between September and November 1970.¹

At the national level, the party's institutions - the National Congress, the National Council, and the Political Bureau (bureau politique) - are not associated with government work in a systematic manner. The only specific statement on this question is article 13 of the party's internal regulations which states that 'the projects of the Government such as the propositions of law to the National Assembly, when they are of an important nature, must first, be approved in their outline by the Political Bureau.'² (italics added). The fact that only important projects need be approved in outline shows that the members of the Political Bureau have no effective participation in the elaboration of government decisions. In fact, the practice has been for the Political Bureau to 'leave untouched the affairs that are under the competence of the government'.³ The association of the National Congress and the National Council with government

¹ Reports of these seminars were published in issues of Le Soleil for the period. See also Lucarelli, op.cit. pp.146-147 on the earlier seminars which do not appear to have amounted to anything more than speech-making.

² Union progressiste sénégalaise: Règlement intérieur, Dakar, n.d. mimeo.

³ Lucarelli, op.cit., p.199.

work is through the reports presented to them by the President of the Republic and his Ministers. These reports are generally approved with only occasional modifications of detail.¹

On the whole, the party institutions' involvement in administrative work is very limited. They are neither effectively associated with the work of the administration nor do they control what civil servants do. This overall ineffectiveness of the dominant party is admitted in a recent official publication which states that:

The Party interests itself little by little in local development and in the actions which seek to ensure the participation of the populations. It demands to be informed of economic problems both at the local and national levels.²

Guinea

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Guinean regime believes in the eventual withering away of the administration which requires that all administrative work should be entrusted to the elected representatives of the people. President Touré confirmed this objective in 1969 when he said: 'At present, the Governor is named by the central authority like the commandant, like the Attorney, like all Magistrates. Later, all administrative posts will be filled through elections' (italics added).³ While the regime is preparing for the achievement of this ultimate objective, it stresses the necessity of popular control of administrative action. President Touré has explained the importance of this

¹ Ibid.

² La Participation populaire au développement national, op.cit., p.121.

³ In Horoya-hebdo, no.7, 15-21 March 1969.

emphasis as follows:

Bureaucratism, infantile malady of young revolutions, is an historical fact which finds a favourable ground in our States which are inadequately structured...If we do not exercise a constant vigilance on the working of the apparatus of the State, the people will quickly become the object of the Administration.¹

How much popular control of administration exists in Guinea and to what extent are elected representatives of the people involved in the work of the administration?


In application of the doctrine of party supremacy, the representative institutions through which the regime seeks to achieve these objectives are closely linked with the party structures (see diagram on next page). These institutions, as will be shown below, are quite different from those inherited from the colonial administration at independence.²

The PRLs

Starting from the base, the PRL executive, which consists of 13 members, is elected annually by all the members of the party's base committee. Only party members who have held a membership card for three years are eligible for a place on the executive. This new arrangements was introduced in 1963 when the party base committees were substituted for the village councils elected by universal adult suffrage in 1958. In 1970 there

¹ In a speech of 2 Oct. 1965, quoted in Marchés tropicaux, 16 Oct. 1965.

² The representative institutions in Guinea at independence were the village councils, the municipal councils, the general councils and the Territorial Assembly. Since independence, the municipal councils and the general councils have completely disappeared while the Territorial Assembly (baptized the National Assembly after independence) and the village councils have been transformed into party institutions (infra).



- I. Administrative Structure
 - > Chain of command for the execution of policies
- II. Party Structure
 - ———> Flow of Information for decision-making.
- III. Representative Institutions

were about 8,000 PRLs each of which had a 13-member executive.

It has already been pointed out (in Chapter 4) that the PRL executive effectively runs the village administration under the leadership of its president (the candidate with the largest number of votes) who also acts as the central government administration's representative. It was also mentioned that the different brigades of the PRL are led by members of the executive who are free to associate ordinary members of the PRL with their work.¹ A good illustration of the direct involvement of PRL executives in the work of central government administration is in the field of judicial administration. The president and four members of the executive constitute a popular tribunal of first degree with competence over disputes concerned with birth, marriage, death, divorce, public fights, minor thefts, succession problems and land disputes.² In all these areas, the popular tribunal of the PRL is expected to achieve a settlement through conciliation. Failure at this level means that the matter will go to the popular tribunal of second degree at the party section. Other activities performed by the PRL executive on behalf of the central government administration include the keeping of a civil register and the maintenance of law and order. Another

¹ See pp. 170-172. It is important to recall the following remark of President Touré in connection with the creation of the PRLs: 'By creating the PRL, the Party is applying the historical solution valid at least for Guinea, of the withering away of the State within the Revolution, a withering away which is in reality the reinforcement of the State of the Revolution by the concrete, direct, total and coherent exercise of the body of state powers by the People at the level of each cell which constitutes it.' (See La RDA-PRG, no.41 (Aug.1970), pp.101-102.

² See Law no. 58/AN/62 of 14 April 1962, JORG, 1 July 1962 and BPN Circular no. 009/PRG of 11 Feb. 1964 in Bulletin du compte-rendu des activités du BPN, no.18 (1964), p.4.

aspect of the PRL's involvement in administrative work is the freedom left to it to carry out locally initiated projects. In order to make this aspect of their function more effective, the government decided in 1969 that a 200 francs quota of the 1,800 francs regional tax per head collected in each PRL should constitute a PRL budget. Although the budget needs the approval of all the superior administrative authorities from the commandant of the arrondissement to the President of the Republic, it is the general assembly of the PRL which votes it while the PRL executive implements it. However, the experience of the first year (1969/70) suggests that the central government does not leave full initiative to the PRLs. Many PRLs voted to use their budgets to build schools and dispensaries but the President of the Republic issued a communiqué to all of them stating that the budgets should be used to build stores for stocking agricultural products.¹

To sum up, although the PRLs constitute a framework within which many citizens are involved in administrative work, their effectiveness should not be exaggerated. It has already been pointed out that they are not autonomous local authorities but decentralized agencies of the central government. Not even the local budget created has escaped the central authority. Furthermore, not all the 8,000 PRLs function normally; at the end of 1970 there were still many PRLs whose involvement in administrative work was minimal.² Finally, some of the PRLs'

¹Published in Horoya-hebdo, no.75, 20-26 June 1970.

²Reports in Horoya-hebdo for 1969 and 1970 and interview with the Administrative Secretary of the PDG, Conakry, February 1971.

functions are performed unsatisfactorily because of lack of guidance and assistance from the central government administration officials within the arrondissements and the regions (supra). However, notwithstanding these shortcomings, the very existence of numerous PRIs and the activities that many of them carry out confirm the ruling regime's commitment to involving elected citizens in the work of the administration. It is possible that these PRIs may become as effective as the village communes in the People's Republic of China in whose image they were established.

The Arrondissement Councils

Although the party's steering committee (the executive of the section) was not formally described as a representative institution until 1967 when it was given the title of arrondissement council, its involvement with judicial administration began in 1962.¹ The president of the steering committee and four of its members constitute the popular tribunal of second degree which hears appeals from the popular tribunal of first degree. This tribunal is also expected to achieve settlement through conciliation. Since 1964, appeals go from it to the popular tribunal of third degree at the federation level of the party structure. In practice, it has been shown that the popular tribunals of second degree rarely succeed in resolving conflicts brought before them in accordance with the common law they are expected to apply; instead, their successes have been due to the application of customary laws which have been officially

¹ Law no. 58/AN/62 of 14 April 1962, op.cit. The BPR Circular of 11 Feb. 1964, op.cit. also applies.

abolished.¹

In addition to the steering committee's role in judicial administration, its members are also expected to control the action of administrative officials within their respective areas as required by the doctrine of political supremacy. Only in very few cases do the steering committees exercise any effective control over administrative action; in most cases the arrondissement commandants who are de jure members of the committees succeed in dominating them and no control is exercised over the actions of the administration.²

When, in 1967, steering committees were given the title of arrondissement councils and the task of voting the arrondissement budget, no change was made in their composition. They remained party institutions to which only members of three years' standing on one of the constituent PRL executives are eligible every two years during the congress of the section.³ An arrondissement

¹After independence Guinea abolished the tribunals of local law established by the French colonial administration and introduced a uniform common law system for the whole country. The difficulty experienced in applying this uniform legal system has been shown in a recent study where the author states that 'It is however, necessary to emphasize that the influence of customary justice is still preponderant in many of our arrondissements': Kourouma, 'L'évolution des institutions judiciaires en Guinée', op.cit., p.153.

²According to Touré, this failure has led to cases of abuse of authority on the part of civil servants: 'If political pre-eminence had been honestly asserted, we would not have witnessed the abuses of authority by certain dishonest and incompetent civil servants... It is our sections which are responsible for these deeds because they have not been able to impose on these unworthy civil servants the principles of the party.' See Touré, Vol. IX, p.42.

³Only 10 of the 13-member executive are elected during the section congress. The sections' youth and women's organizations are compulsorily represented by their respective leaders; the 13th member is the arrondissement commandant. The statutory members of the
(cont. over)

council effectively participates in the preparation and implementation of the arrondissement budget. At the preparation stage, a few of its members are drafted into the small team of officials led by the commandant which prepares the budget. It is within this team that some debate takes place as the full council usually adopts the budget presented to it by unanimous vote. At the implementation stage, no expenditure can be made without the counter-signature of the council's secretary general.

However, it should be noted that the sum of money available to many arrondissements is not enough to finance any significant projects. An arrondissement budget consists of a rebate of 300 francs on every 1,800 francs regional tax collected within the arrondissement. Each arrondissement can add to this sum any revenue from agricultural projects financed and exploited by it. The funds available to the majority of arrondissements from these sources have proved inadequate for financing the brigades of civic service which was set as the priority objective between 1967 and 1971 (supra). All this means that there are very few locally initiated projects which arrondissement councils may help to manage.

The Regional Assemblies

Above the arrondissement councils are the regional assemblies which serve as the representative institutions within the regions. They were established in 1963 as the successors to the

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section congress are the members of the incumbent steering committee, the members of PRL executives, and the presidents of the party committees of production units. Members of youth and women's organization executives are invited and administrative officials working within the arrondissement 'may be invited'. See La RDA-PDG, no.39, pp.138-139, 142-143.

no single case of a regional assembly formally condemning the mismanagement and embezzlement that characterized these enterprises. Instead, the general impression is that many regional deputies joined hands with administrative officials to embezzle the funds of these enterprises.¹

The party federal bureau whose members belong to the regional assembly (except the federal secretary and the governor)² is also expected to apply the principle of party supremacy by controlling the activities of administrative officials within the region. Furthermore, since 1964, it shared responsibility with the regional administrative officials for the implementation of the Seven-Year Plan. These two functions have created a situation where it is the federal bureau rather than the regional assembly that is effectively involved in the administrative action at the regional level.³

The activity of the federal bureaux in controlling the work of regional administrative officials is limited to reporting their behaviour to higher party instances.⁴ As for their responsibility for plan implementation, it appears that they have

¹See BPN Circular no. 043/BPN/PN/63, op.cit.

²The governor is member by right of the federal bureau but is excluded from the regional assembly; the federal secretary is a national deputy and does not formally belong to the regional assembly though everything done within it must be to his knowledge as the chief political leader of the region.

³In practice, the federal bureau constitutes a kind of executive of the regional assembly.

⁴For example, the reports presented by federations to the meeting of the National Council of the Revolution of June 1965 included a section on 'the political behaviour of civil servants'; see Bulletin du compte-rendu des activités du B.N., no. 40, (1965), passim. There is no clear indication of the actions taken on these reports.

non-French borrowings might become evident in the future.¹

In conclusion, we should like to mention the contribution of this study to the current academic knowledge of Guinea and Senegal. In regard to Senegal, the study provides confirmatory evidence for the existing academic interpretation of the country. This evidence is significant in that it relates to a subject - the evolution of the post-independence central government administration - that has hitherto received very little academic attention. In the case of Guinea, the study shows the extent to which some of the characteristics of the central government administration are due to the past colonial administrative experience and some to the post-independence political ideology; and thus, it corrects the notion in the existing studies of the country that the evolution of the administration has been determined only by the political ideology.

¹ Although French is the official language in Guinea (as in Senegal), the literature on administrative matters found in the country is not limited to the French experience; French translations of the Russian, Chinese, and North Vietnamese experiences (among others) are also available. In addition, serving Guinean officials are becoming familiar with these experiences as a result of regular contacts.

APPENDIX A

EXTRACTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

OF 28 OCTOBER 1946¹

PREAMBLE

. . . France together with the overseas peoples shall form a Union founded upon equality of rights and duties, without distinction of race or religion.

The French Union shall consist of nations and peoples who pool or co-ordinate their resources and their efforts to develop their respective civilizations, increase their well-being and ensure their security.

Faithful to her traditional mission, France proposes to guide the peoples for whom she has taken responsibility into freedom to administer themselves and conduct their own affairs democratically; rejecting any system of colonial rule based upon arbitrary power, she shall guarantee equal access to public office . . .

CHAPTER 1. SOVEREIGNTY

1. France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.

CHAPTER 2. PARLIAMENT

13. The National Assembly alone shall vote the law. It cannot delegate this right.

CHAPTER 8. THE FRENCH UNION: I. PRINCIPLES

60. The French Union shall be composed, on the one hand of the French Republic which comprises metropolitan France, the overseas departments and Territories, and on the other hand, of the Associated Territories and States.

¹The translation is that of P.M. Williams in Crisis and Compromise (London: Longmans, 1964) Appendix I, pp.478-492.

62. The members of the French Union shall pool all their resources in order to guarantee the defence of the whole Union. The Government of the Republic shall undertake the co-ordination of these resources and the direction of the policy appropriate to prepare and ensure this defence.

II Organisation

63. The central organs of the French Union shall be the Presidency, the High Council and the Assembly.

64. The President of the French Republic shall be president of the French Union, whose permanent interests he shall represent.

65. The High Council of the French Union shall consist of the President of the Union as chairman, a delegation of the French Government, and the representatives that each of the Associated States shall be entitled to accredit to the President of the Union.

Its function shall be to assist the Government in the general direction of the Union.

66. The Assembly of the French Union shall consist, half of members representing metropolitan France, and half of members representing the overseas departments and Territories and the Associated States.

An organic law will decide the conditions under which the different sections of the population may be represented.

67. The members of the Assembly of the Union shall be elected, for the overseas departments and Territories, by the territorial assemblies...

71. The Assembly of the French Union shall be cognizant of the bills or proposals which are submitted to it for its opinion

decision which you all joined in taking'.¹ The budget was adopted without debate.² Also, none of the methods for following and controlling the work of the government specified in the constitution has ever been used.³ It was in recognition of all this that the seventh party Congress held in August 1963 decided to abolish the payment of salaries to deputies; instead, each deputy was to receive 3,000 francs sitting allowance.⁴

The Party Congress, the National Political Bureau, the National Council of the Revolution, and the Central Committee.

The party institutions at the national level - the Congress, the National Political Bureau (BPN), the National Council of the Revolution (CNR), and the Central Committee - constitute the summit of the regime's structures for involving elected citizens in the work of the administration. The chief emphasis at this level is on the need for popular participation in taking the decisions which the administration carries out. The composition and functions of each of these institutions are as follows.⁵ First the party Congress which is described as the highest party institution, has about 700 members. According to the party statute, 'its sovereignty

¹Bulletin du compte-rendu des activités du BPN, no.13 (1963), p.107.

²Horoya, 1 December 1964.

³These include oral and written questions, interpellation, hearing by a commission and the setting up of commissions of inquiry. See article 19 of the constitution.

⁴In 1968, the allowance was modified as follows: 2,000 francs for deputies resident in Conakry and 4,000 francs for those resident outside Conakry; see decree no.9/PRG of 18 January 1968, JORG, 15 Jan. 1968. The only exception is the president of the Assembly who receives a Minister's salary and since 1970, the incumbent president cumulates this function with that of a Minister of domaine.

⁵The information contained here is based on the 1969 statute of the party published in La RDA-PDG, no.39 (n.d.), pp.131-163.

is unlimited'.¹ Its membership is made up of BPN members and delegates from the federal bureaux, the steering committees, and the national executives of youth, women and workers' organizations. It fixes the political line of the party and sets out the national objectives for the period between its sessions. The National Council of the Revolution (CNR) established in 1963, groups delegates from the same party instances as the Congress and includes three members of the National Assembly. The total membership is about 150. It meets at least once a year to act as the supreme instance between the sessions of the party Congress. The Central Committee, created in 1967, has 45 members. These are the seven BPN members, the 30 federal secretaries, the national leaders of the youth, women's and workers' organizations, the President of the National Assembly and the Ministers Delegate. It meets quarterly to follow up the decisions of the party Congress and the CNR. Finally, the BPN which is elected by the party Congress is the national executive of the party charged with overall conception and orientation. It dominated the government until 1967 when its membership was reduced to seven and constituted the government cabinet (supra).

Although it is true that major national decisions are taken within these institutions, a close study of the decision-making process reveals the preponderant role of the BPN whose reports to the meetings of these institutions, especially those of the Congress, usually contain the decisions that are eventually adopted.² However, the existence of these institutions contribute

¹ Ibid.

² This and other observations on the decision-making process in Guinea are based on information contained in the following sources:

to popular participation in two important ways. First, the adoption of major policies by over 700 delegates has the advantage of associating a large number of citizens with these policies. The fact that these delegates usually report back to the lower party institutions they represent helps to familiarize a large proportion of the population with these policies. Among the major policies adopted by the party Congress since independence are the option for a planned economy in 1959 and the option for a socialist society in 1967. Second, the proceedings within the CNR and the Central Committee are not always like those of the Congress where the decisions contained in BPN reports are simply adopted by delegates. Although the BPN still plays a dominant role, real debate takes place within both institutions before decisions are arrived at. The debates are sometimes around the reports and recommendations submitted by the federal secretaries in the name of their respective federations. Most of the decisions concerning educational, economic and administrative reforms since independence were taken during the meetings of the CNR and the Central Committee.¹

Like the lower party institutions, the CNR and the Central Committee are also involved in judicial administration. The permanent revolutionary committee of the Central Committee² has

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(a) Bulletin d'information du BPN (1962-1970); (b) Horoya (1961-1972); and (c) Horoya-hebdo (1969-1972). The Bulletin d'information du BPN which is purely for circulation within the party institutions is the most useful of these sources as many of its issues contain verbatim reports of CNR and Central Committee meetings.

¹ A summary of the activities of these institutions (including the Congress) since independence can be found in Horoya-hebdo, no.20, 31 May - 6 June 1969.

² This committee was created within the BPN in 1965 but transferred to the Central Committee in 1967 when BPN membership was reduced from 15 to 7.

investigated all the alleged plots against the regime since 1965, a role formally assigned to the juge d'instruction (investigating magistrate) in the judicial system. In May 1969, the CNR was constituted into a revolutionary tribunal to judge people accused of plotting to overthrow the regime. The decision in 1971 to assign a similar function to the National Assembly instead of the CNR (this time, in connection with the trial of those allegedly involved in the abortive invasion of November 1970) may mean that the CNR will cease to have a judicial role.¹

The Open Tribunals

Because of the unsatisfactory performance of the elective institutions in controlling the work of administrative officials (supra), the Guinean regime has devised an original method of supplementing this aspect of their function. This method consists of a series of confrontations - called Open Tribunals or Conferences of Truth - in which ordinary citizens are invited to state in public before the national leaders any grievances they (the citizens) may have against both the civil servants and the party officials in their areas. These Tribunals are held periodically in the different regional headquarters. Every village within each region is represented by a delegation which acts as its spokesman. All civil servants and party officials within the region must be present.

¹ The emphasis placed by the regime on the constitutionality of the National Assembly in this case was an implicit acceptance of the criticism - largely expressed in the French press - that party institutions should not exercise the power of life and death. (Both the verdicts of 1969 and 1971 included death sentences). However, the fact that 45 of the 75 members of the National Assembly are also members of the CNR means that very little is changed. And in any case, the National Assembly's verdict was expected to take account of those already given by the PRLs, the sections, the federations, (cont.)

The following extracts from President Touré's opening speeches at two open tribunals in 1961 and 1968 summarize the purpose of these tribunals:

Whether it is the Commandant of the Region, the Chief of Administrative post, the Commissioner of Police or any other agent of the civil service, or whether it is a member of the Steering Committee or the whole of a Steering Committee or the whole of your Regional Leadership, or whether it is the village Mayor or the JRDA, whoever has made you to suffer, say it in all honesty, on the spot. This is the essential reason why we are here.¹

Have the agents of the State and of the Party, in their professional behaviour, violated your dignity? your rights or your liberty? When and how? Have you been the victim of any injustice or discrimination? When? In what conditions? Be afraid of lying but have no fear to say the truth. Say the truth. It is the turn of the people to speak.²

The results of these tribunals are very interesting. In some cases disciplinary measures were taken on the spot while in others these measures were announced later. For example, after presiding over an open tribunal in Kissidougou in December 1961, the President dismissed the chief of administrative post from his functions and ordered him to be put under arrest because of the exactions he had made on the people in his area.³ In two

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the youth, women's and workers' organizations which were constituted into special popular tribunals for the occasion. The International Court of Justice has described the whole procedure as a 'judicial comedy'; see Le Monde, 6 Jan. 1972.

¹Horoya, 5-7 December 1961. JRDA is the abbreviation of the name of the party's youth wing - the Jeunesse de la révolution démocratique africaine (the Youth of the Democratic African Revolution).

²In Horoya, 15 November 1968.

³He was described as 'the hangman of the people he administered' and was alleged to have imprisoned some people in the company of a python for failing to pay their taxes: in Horoya, 9 December 1961.

other regional headquarters, the President declared null and void the verdicts already passed by some Justices of the Peace because they failed to answer satisfactorily the objections of the people they had previously condemned. Similar measures were taken in some other regions.¹ The general result of the open tribunals conducted in 1965 was summed up as 'a sensible reduction in arbitrariness'.² In 1968, the President presided over open tribunals in Labé, Pita and Balaba for two consecutive days. This resulted in the dismissal of one governor and one arrondissement commandant while two governors and several arrondissement commandants were transferred. Similar measures were taken in other parts of the country.³ Finally, in 1970, the open tribunals conducted throughout the country led to the suspension of one governor, the downgrading of a second and the transfer of three others. The disciplinary measures taken against other administrative and party officials included transfer, demotion and suspension.⁴

Perhaps the greatest merit of these tribunals is the open dialogue they promote between the national leaders and the people. They reassure the people that the leaders care for them and provide an opportunity for the people to bring their criticisms and demands before the national leaders. Furthermore, the knowledge that these tribunals exist may serve as a kind of permanent check

¹ See Horoya, 5-7, 9 December 1961.

² In La RDA-PDA, no.8 (August 1966), p.81.

³ See Horoya, 30 November 1968.

⁴ Reports in Horoya-hebdo, nos. 86, 87, and 88, 12 Sept. - 2 Oct. 1970

on civil servants who are likely to avoid such actions that may earn them public rebuke and punishment. However, it should be mentioned that this approach also has its disadvantages. Whether civil servants 'convicted' by the people are punished on the spot or later on, in neither case is the disciplinary procedure laid down in the civil service statute followed. This violates their right to a proper hearing and may adversely affect the morale of others. Also, the fact that the verdicts of the President and the other national leaders do not follow any stated rules means that one either accepts that their sense of good judgment is very high or that this constitutes another kind of arbitrariness. All this means that the democratic element in this method of administrative control should not be exaggerated although its existence does underline the importance the regime attaches to the need to prevent the people from becoming 'the object of the administration'.

Comparison and Conclusion

The above accounts of the relationship between representative institutions and the central government administrations in Guinea and Senegal reflect the contrast mentioned in the introduction to the chapter in regard to both the nature of the institutions established and the objectives they are supposed to achieve. One additional point that emerges from these accounts is the similarity in the composition of the representative institutions established in both states. Each state has introduced an electoral method which ensures that only citizens who are loyal to the central authority are elected into the established institutions.

In Guinea, this has been achieved by the substitution of

party electoral rules for the universal suffrage introduced by the loi-cadre reform towards the end of colonial rule. The justification for this action, according to President Touré, is that 'the people is the party'.¹ The element of truth in this assertion is the large proportion of Guineans who are members of the PDG. From 800,000 in 1958, the number rose to 1,650,000 in 1961, represent^{ing}/over 50% of the entire population and roughly the entire adult population.² It is generally claimed that this large membership has been maintained.³ Compared to other countries where a ruling single party with a membership of about 10% of the population claims to represent the entire population (this is the case, for example, in the USSR and in most East European countries), the claim of the Guinean regime has something to be said in its favour within the context of the system it operates. However, whatever the popular base of the PDG's membership, it remains true that the party's electoral rules introduce restrictions on universal suffrage and this ensures that only party loyalists are elected as members of the representative institutions.

¹ See Touré, Vol. XIV, p.28. The claim that the PDG is the same as the people of Guinea is a common assertion in the writings and speeches of Guinean leaders. President Touré put it as follows in a recent speech: 'the party is the entire People of Guinea'; see Moroya-hebdo, no.88 26 Sept. - 2 Oct. 1970.

² Source: Camara, 'De l'action à l'idéologie,' la RDA-PDG, no. 27 (n.d.), p.199.

³ The figures available for the ministerial delegation of Forest Guinea in 1966 shows that out of a total population of 783,942, 422,361 (about 52 %) were card-carrying members of the PDG; see la RDA-PDG, no.8 (Aug. 1966). If this very high proportion is maintained in the other ministerial delegations, it would mean that this claim is true.

To ensure that only citizens loyal to the central authority are elected into Senegal's representative institutions, the country's leaders have not found it necessary to abandon the principle of election by universal suffrage. What has happened is that an electoral reform of 1963 replaced the electoral constituencies in the country by a single national list. This meant that any party interested in parliamentary elections must present a full national list. This electoral device has helped to eliminate all the opposition parties leaving the UPS as a de facto one party without any electoral challenge.¹ Thus, only UPS members are elected to all the country's representative institutions.

What this common concern in Guinea and Senegal with the loyalty of elected citizens to the central authority shows is that both see the maintenance of the central government's authority (an aspect of national integration which, as already pointed out, is confused with regime maintenance) as a more urgent task than the objectives they have set for their respective representative institutions.

Apart from this similar limitation imposed on the composition of the representative institutions in both states, the other major points in the chapter relate to the important difference in the degree of popular participation and control achieved in Guinea and Senegal. First, there are the local revolutionary authorities in Guinea where the task of administering the affairs

¹In 1963, all the country's opposition parties joined together to challenge the UPS but failed woefully (they obtained about 69,000 votes compared to about 1,133,000 votes obtained by the UPS). After this, each party started to negotiate a merger with the UPS and by 1966, no single opposition party remained.

of each PRL is the responsibility of an elected executive which associates with itself the ordinary members of the PRL within brigades having responsibility for specific tasks such as production, health, public works, and so on. Although not all the 8,000 PRLs in the country are functioning smoothly, the amount of activities carried out within the successful ones add up to an impressive degree of popular participation in administrative work.

The success achieved in Senegal in this regard is not as spectacular. The rural councils which are expected to bring local self-government to the rural areas are yet to be established. Also, the regional assemblies which were initially given responsibility for managing the affairs of rural areas have lost real control to the officials of the central government administration only to become deliberative bodies with little effectiveness. It is only within the communes that elected citizens have some responsibility for managing the affairs of their areas. This popular participation is, however, limited by the small financial resources of most communes and the extensive nature of central government control.

It is important to point out that the official explanation for this limited degree of popular participation in Senegal is the importance attached by the government to the task of development. Thus, the management of the activities of regional interest was taken from the hands of regional assemblies and entrusted to regional governors assisted by other central government administration officials in order to achieve better financial administration which would make money available for activities

of regional interest. Similarly, the government's dissatisfaction with the fact that most communes used almost all their budget to pay their personnel led to the introduction of extensive central government control of communal budgets especially in the case of the communes based in the regional headquarters where the regional governors are expected to ensure that part of the budgets is used to finance development projects. Although the results of this emphasis on development activities within the regions and the communes has not been investigated in this study, it is fair to conclude that the conflict between the imperatives of development and of popular participation has been resolved in favour of the former in Senegal. All this means that the central government administration at arrondissement, departmental and regional levels operate free of any formal influence from elected citizens.¹

In Guinea, there are two other representative institutions besides the PRIs which are involved in varying degrees in the work of the administration: the arrondissement councils and the regional assemblies. In both cases, elected citizens effectively participate in the preparation and implementation of their local budgets. However, their involvement in the implementation of the national development plans have not produced any positive results.² Also, they have not succeeded in exercising an effective control over the civil servants in their areas. This lack of effective admini-

¹There are informal influences which come from both elected citizens and other individuals with special interests to pursue. However, with the exception of those who can invoke the support of a national deputy or better still, of a Minister, civil servants can disregard these pressures. Source: Interviews with senior civil servants and presidents of regional assemblies in Saint-Louis and Ziguinchor, November 1970 and April 1971 respectively.

²This point is discussed in more detail in the next chapter; see pp. 287, 289 - 290.

strative control is due to the fact that the official who is responsible for the actions of the civil servants within each administrative unit is himself a member of the institution expected to carry out the function of control - the regional governor is a member of the federal bureau and the commandant is a member of the steering committee which is the arrondissement council. Furthermore, some of the civil servants under them are also members of these institutions.¹ All this means, in effect, that many of those under control act as 'controllers'. It appears that the kind of systematic administrative control aimed at can only become a reality if and when there is a party personnel distinct from the civil service personnel.²

At the national level, the Guinean regime seeks to achieve popular participation through the party institutions while in Senegal it is the role of the National Assembly that is emphasized. This contrast is underlined by the fact that Guinea's National Assembly has only survived as a chamber of codification and Senegal's party institutions hardly make any contribution to the country's efforts to achieve public participation in the work of the administration. On the whole, Guinea's party institutions allow some degree of popular participation in decision-making, notably within the CNR and the Central Committee. However, this

¹This is due to the fact that the party has no staff of its own and the vast majority of the party officials who fill both the arrondissement councils and the regional assemblies are civil servants who cumulate party duties with their civil service functions. The only permanent officials in the service of the party in 1971 were the 30 Federal Secretaries who headed the federal bureaux. However, 21 of them were civil servants 'detached' from the civil service with their promotion and pension rights intact.

²The acute manpower shortage from which the country is suffering means that this will take a long time to achieve.

is a far cry from a Guinean leader's claim that:

In Guinea, more than everywhere else, the fundamental rule of democracy finds a perfect application, because everything that touches near or far the People, is determined by the People themselves, during Conferences and Congresses, and other meetings of the Democratic Party of Guinea.¹

The preponderant position of the BPN (which is roughly equivalent to the Senegalese executive)² within these institutions shows that this claim is an exaggeration. In Senegal, the executive occupies a dominant position both in relation to the National Assembly and in relation to the party institutions. Nevertheless, the deputies play some part in the decision-making process and they achieve some measure of legislative control of administrative action through the work of their permanent commissions.

A special case of popular participation in Guinea is the systematic involvement of elected citizens in judicial administration from the *cells* to the national party institutions. The initial reason for this popular involvement in judicial administration (commonly referred to a 'popular justice') was the limited personnel resources available for administering the common law system established by the regime after independence. In 1958, the country had only 9 magistrates and this number rose to only 17 in 1967. The entire staff available for the administration of justice in 1967 was 62.³ It was because of the congestion that resulted from this acute manpower shortage that the

¹S. Diallo (member of the BPN), in La RDA-FDG, no.31 (1969), p.45.

²The similarity emphasized here is the dominant position of a few individuals in both countries whether these individuals are responsible before a ruling party (Guinea) or before an elected parliament (Senegal)

³Sources: Etat des fonctionnaires guinéens en service avant l'indépendance, op.cit. and Statistique du travail au 15 - 12-67, op. cit.

government decided from 1962 onwards to entrust to the party institutions at the PRL, arrondissement and regional levels the responsibility to settle a number of civil cases by conciliation. The extension of this system of 'popular justice' to criminal matters such as the trial of those allegedly involved in the abortive invasion of November 1970 was an innovation and it seems to be an extreme reaction by the regime to a foreign-sponsored attempt to overthrow it.

Although it is true that the masses of the people attended meetings where they were expected to give their 'verdicts' (the writer attended a series of these meetings in January 1971), the fact that no single accused person was present at any of the stages (except through recorded tape statements relayed over the radio) meant that no real 'trial' took place and the severity of the sentences passed (death sentences, imprisonment for life and hard labour, and confiscation of property) makes the whole exercise look more like a travesty of justice or a 'judicial comedy' as the International Court of Justice has put it,¹ than a veritable case of involving citizens in judicial administration. However, disapproval of this style of 'popular justice' should not be allowed to conceal the former aspect where elected citizens are usefully involved in resolving judicial conflicts through conciliation. There is nothing in Senegal to compare with Guinea's popular justice either in its positive or negative form. To solve the problem of inadequate judicial personnel, successive Senegalese governments have relied on French technical assistance; in 1966, more than half of the 69 hierarchy A judicial

¹ See Le Monde, 6 Jan. 1972.

officials in the country were Frenchmen.¹

On the whole, the analysis in this chapter confirms the expected contrast between the nature and objective of the representative institutions with which the post-independence Guinean and Senegalese administrations have had to cope. It is interesting to mention that this contrast is, so far, the closest demonstration of the proposition advanced in this study. In Senegal, the nature and purpose of representative institutions are essentially the same as those established under colonial rule with only some modifications. In Guinea, on the other hand, the past colonial experience has had no influence on either the nature of the institutions established or their purpose.

¹Source: La Coopération entre la France, l'Afrique noire d'expression française et Madagascar, op. cit.

CHAPTER 7

ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Economic and social development relies on a stable and secure civil service. There is no development without a state apparatus in the service of development.

L.S. Senghor¹

In the Republic of Guinea, we do not operate the politics of our economy but, on the contrary, we operate an economy in conformity with our political options. In this perspective, reluctantly . . . our economy remains an under-developed or undeveloped economy.

S. Touré²

This chapter examines the administrative arrangements that have been created in Guinea and Senegal for promoting development activities. As mentioned in Chapter 2, both countries have identified the same three areas of development activity in which their administrations will be involved: economic planning, rural development, and public enterprises. However, because of the difference in the overall strategy of the two countries - a 'non-capitalist way' in Guinea and 'African socialism' in Senegal - and the emphasis on the role of the party in development activities in Guinea, the administrative arrangements created for each activity are expected to show some contrasts. The situation in both countries are examined below.

Administration and Economic Planning

The following discussion of the role of the Guinean and Senegalese administrations in the field of economic planning focuses on each country's administrative machinery for planning.

¹Discours de M. L.S. Senghor . . . vendredi, 19 avril 1963, op. cit.
p. 50.

²Touré, Vol. XIV, p.156

We describe their structures and assess their performance. There is, however, no attempt to assess what the plans in each country have achieved in general terms: no reference to such indices for determining total economic performance as the rate of growth, gross national product, gross domestic product, capital investment, and so on.

Guinea

As already mentioned, Guinea has had two development plans since independence: the Three-Year Plan launched in 1960 and the Seven-Year Plan launched in 1964. In recognition of the lack of national cadres with adequate knowledge of planning,¹ the Guinean Government entrusted the detailed preparation of its first plan to a French team of planning experts led by Professor Charles Bettelheim. One of the activities of the French team was to send a questionnaire to Guinean villages in order to find out the state of agricultural production whose development was to be the plan's priority.² The team also fixed the total estimate of investments at 38 billion francs and worked out the proportions for the different sectors including the details of the activities to be carried out within each sector.

¹For the staffing situation in the Guinean administration at independence, see Chapter 1, p. 62. In particular, there were only 13 engineers in the different technical services - Public Works, Agriculture, Rivers and Forests, and Meteorology. Source: Etat des fonctionnaires guinéens en service avant l'indépendance, op. cit.

²For the text of this questionnaire, see M. Gaud, Les Premières expériences de planification en Afrique noire, (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1967), Annexe V, pp. 460-462. Another survey of agricultural development problems carried out by the French expert, René Dumont was never considered because of disagreement between Guinean authorities and the expert; see R. Dumont, Afrique noire: développement agricole: reconversion de l'économie agricole: Guinée, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962), pp. 7-23.

Besides these specific activities of the French team, the two other major stages in the preparation of the first plan were initiated by the party. First, a Preparatory Economic Conference was summoned at Dalaba in February 1960 to discuss the financing of the plan. The Conference was attended by a few leading ministers, some senior civil servants especially from the Ministries of General Economy and Finance and members of the French team of experts. In addition to working out details of the plan's finance, the conference recommended the creation of an independent Guinean monetary zone. This recommendation was accepted by the Government which announced the creation of the independent Guinea franc on 1 March 1960.

The last stage in the preparation of the plan was the National Conference summoned at Kankan in April 1960 to adopt it. Those who attended the Conference included the members of Government, leading party officials, and senior civil servants. Although the Conference was divided into working commissions which examined the different aspects of the plan, the initial proposals of the French team and the financial decisions taken at the Dalaba Conference were adopted without any significant changes. It was perhaps because the Conference appeared too clearly as a rubber stamp for decisions already taken by foreign experts that Touré made a speech at the end of the Conference on the political nature of Guinea's planning policy; he said inter alia:

The economic action which we wish to carry out cannot separate us from the political orientation which is ours for, the economic domain constitutes one of the aspects of political problem. we shall therefore have the economy of our politics and not the politics of our economy (sic.)¹

¹Touré, Vol. V, p.309

Although the Guinean administration provided some assistance for the French team during its investigations, (the central ministerial departments supplied the information they had concerning their different services while the regional and local officials supervised the filling of the questionnaires sent to the villages), all evidences suggest that their contribution was very limited. This was largely because no administrative machinery for planning had been established - a Ministry of Planning was only created in March 1960. Furthermore, the services within the Ministry of General Economy which were mostly concerned with planning and should therefore have been able to make positive contributions during the preparation stage, either merely existed on paper or were inadequately staffed. According to the Minister of General Economy himself, the staffing situation of the Ministry prior to independence was much better than it was during the period of plan preparation and what he said of the Division of Mines, Geology and Industry was true of many others: 'the service suddenly found itself without any technical cadres but with increased functions',¹

As already mentioned, the contribution of the Kankan Conference to the preparation of the plan was insignificant. In contrast, the financial decisions taken at the Dalaba Conference were very important especially its recommendation for the creation of an independent Guinean franc which one writer has described as the 'central part' of the plan.² And for many writers, it is the

¹L. Beavogui, 'Rapport du ministre de l'économie nationale,' in Touré, Vol. V, pp.211-212.

²Suret-Canale, La République de Guinée, (Paris: Editions sociales, 1970), p.181.

chief criterion for describing the plan as 'socialist'.¹ However, it is difficult to assess the role of the civil servants present during this Conference in the work done there. As far as the crucial decision on monetary reform was concerned, it appears that it was forced on the Government more by circumstances than by any of the groups present at Dalaba.² In all, then, the contribution of the Guinean administration to the preparation of the first plan was very small.

If the administration's role in the elaboration stage was almost insignificant, it was called upon to play a central role in the Plan's implementation. As already mentioned, a Ministry of Planning was established in March 1960. Its functions were defined as follows:

It is specifically charged, in the framework of the general policy of Government, to co-ordinate, orient, with a view to a harmonious development of the country, the activities of ministerial departments, public collectivities, cooperative organizations and public and private enterprises.

It orients private capital investments in the light of planning imperatives.

It is charged with preparing long-term economic plans, and the consolidation of the methodological and statistical bases necessary for the realisation of all actions of the plan.³

¹ Among them, Gaud, op. cit. p.138 and Y. Bénét, 'L'Afrique en mouvement: La Guinée à l'heure du plan,' La pensée, no. 94 (Nov.-Dec. 1960), pp.3-36.

² Guinea remained within the French franc zone after her independence. Because of the political tension between Conakry and Paris, the French-controlled financial institutions continuously created problems for the Guinean Government, especially through the flight of capital out of Conakry. Awareness of this problem had, in fact, led the Government to think of creating an independent monetary zone since 1959: see Bénét, op. cit. p.4. The significance of the Dalaba Conference's recommendation, in the circumstances, was that it removed any doubts the Government might still have had on the subject.

³ Decree no. 78 of 8 March 1960, JORF, 22 March 1960.

The ministry faced two major problems in its task of orienting and co-ordinating the implementation of the plan. First, the plan budget which was created in August 1960 was placed within the Ministry of Finance which was not involved in the discussions on projects until the finance stage. Because of the need to be satisfied that the projects were worthwhile, the Ministry of Finance often asked for time to reconsider the projects brought before it and this inevitably led to delays. This problem would have been minimized if the National Planning Council provided for in the March 1960 decree had been effectively established. It would have served as a useful forum where ministers and leading civil servants concerned with planning would have cleared projects thereby facilitating the decision of the Ministry of Finance in making funds available. This situation was further complicated in January 1963 when a new Ministry of Economic Development was created. This new ministry was also given powers to take decisions on development projects. This meant that planning decisions henceforth involved three distinct ministries: Planning, Finance and Economic Development. This only added to the delay that already existed.

Second, the ministry continued to be seriously affected by the general manpower shortage - especially at the high and middle levels - that had affected post-independence Guinean administration. For example, there was only a handful of statisticians to staff the General Division of Statistics that was created in February 1961 within the Ministry of Planning. The other divisions of the ministry were also seriously under-staffed in spite of some personnel assistance from East European countries. This problem of lack of qualified administrative and technical staff was also acute within the other ministries and this adversely affected the

quality of information on plan matters that they fed to the Ministry of Planning. The overall result was that hardly any serious studies were carried out before projects were embarked upon and there were not enough qualified staff to follow up the projects that were established.¹ This problem has been acknowledged in an official publication where it is stated that 'the First Guinean Plan lacked rigour because of difficulties connected with the lack of cadres as well as the absence of prior deep studies. . .'.² The consequences of these and other problems faced by the plan's administrative machinery during the implementation stage are considered in two important areas later on.

Although the 1960 decree charged the Ministry of Planning with 'preparing long-term plans', the Ministry had done nothing along these lines by the time the first plan came to an end in December 1963. When, in April 1964, the party summoned a meeting of the National Council of the Revolution (CNR) to adopt the second plan - the Seven-Year Plan, 1964-1971 - what was presented to the meeting as plan was a list of economic and social projects to be carried out during the period covered by the plan. This list was compiled from proposals put forward by both the party institutions (base committees, sections and federations) and the central government ministries, all of which were centralized at the Ministry of Economic Development. The plan proposals compiled by the ministry was considered and adopted by the BPN in whose name it was presented to the CNR meeting by the Minister of Economic Develop-

¹However, foreign-sponsored projects benefited from studies conducted by experts recruited from the countries concerned.

²In République de Guinée, Revue du développement économique, no. 1 (Jan. 1964), p.3

ment.¹ These proposals bore no evidence of the use of the techniques of economic analysis as they consisted essentially of targets to be achieved in the specified areas of social and economic activity. There was no mention of any quantitative goals for the growth of the entire economy or for any of the individual sectors (except for the declaration of the industrial sector as the priority of the plan),² nor was there any analysis of the inter-relationships among the various sectors. At the end of the CNR's three-day meeting, the plan was adopted. It was launched in a public speech by the President of the Republic on 1 May 1964.

The important point that emerges from the above is that when the plan administrative machinery failed to carry out the function of plan preparation assigned to it, the party structures took over. Although civil servants from the economic and other related services were present at the CNR meeting, it is clear that no technical considerations were brought to bear upon the plan at that stage. It is not without significance that no mention was made of the financing of the plan in the document adopted at the CNR meeting - clearly a technical matter over which a party meeting was unable to pronounce. As it turned out, the Ministry of Economic Development's calculations on plan finance was purely tentative, fixing the proportion of domestic and foreign financing at 33.6% and 66.4% if total investment was 77 billion francs and at 18% and 82% if total investment was 142 billion francs.³

¹ 'Rapport présenté par Ismael Touré, ministre du développement économique au CNR du 16 avril 1964,' in Touré, Vol. V, pp.77-130.

² 'The Seven-Year Plan must mark the entry of the Guinean economy into its industrialization phase,' *ibid.* p.105.

³ Interview, Secretariat of State for Budgets, February 1971.

Not only was the latter estimate tentative but it was also unrealistic considering the fact that foreign sources accounted for only 41.2% of the first plan's investments.

Aware of the weakness of the administrative machinery for planning, the Government seems to have decided that the party structure should share responsibility with the administration in implementing the second plan. The method adopted was the announcement at the April CNR meeting that the performance of each party federation in achieving the plan's targets would henceforth count as criterion number one in the annual party classification, representing 75% of total points.¹ It was also announced that the failure of a federation to achieve its targets would result in the dissolution of the federal bureau and the steering committees within it as well as the transfer of the administrative officials serving there.²

This decision was followed up by four economic conferences grouping the federations within the same natural region (maritime, forest, middle, and upper Guinea) between May and August 1964. It was during these conferences that plan targets were fixed for each federation. It is important to note that although both civil servants and party officials were present at these meetings, the targets were fixed in the name of the federations not the regions.

¹Touré, Vol. XIV, p.145. The idea of establishing a ranking order for the party's federations was a carry-over of a practice introduced at the section level in 1959. The aim was to make party institutions more effective by encouraging competition among them in a variety of activities. This competition was transferred to the federation level in 1963. Until the new 1964 announcement, the first four criteria concerned the state of party organisation while production was last in the ninth position; ibid.

²Ibid. p.146.

However, the decision to use the party structure for plan implementation did not mean an abandonment of the effort to build up an effective administrative machinery for planning. One of the steps taken in this direction was the abolition of the Ministry of Planning which was replaced by a Ministry of State for Finance and Planning. This combination of the functions of two former ministries was carried out in order, as the Minister of State in charge put it, to achieve 'a better co-ordination of finance and a more effective control of investments.'¹

In practice, the advantage of the new arrangement over the old was very small. It effectively removed the separation between the authority that took decisions on investments and that which made the funds available. But it did not remove the delay caused by dealings with the Ministry of Economic Development. More important still, there was only a slight improvement in the staffing position and this meant that projects were still either badly studied or not studied at all.

It was not until 1969 that major changes were made to improve the administrative machinery for planning. Planning and Statistics were combined in a Secretariat of State and placed under the Ministry of the domaine of Economic Development. It was also decided that a Service of Planning and Statistics should be established within every Secretariat of State concerned with economic and social affairs, in all the ministerial delegations, in the regions, and within every state enterprise. The functions of the New Secretariat of State were the same as those of the

¹S. Diallo, Minister of State for Finance and Planning in La RDA-PDG, no. 31 (n.d.) p.55. The fact that the Minister of State counts as the second personality of the regime is a further indication of the increased attention paid to the planning machinery.

previous ministries responsible for planning: the preparation of the projects of development plans and their directions, coordination and control. Another new development was the creation of a Superior Council of Planning and Development which was to group the Ministers, Secretaries of State and some senior civil servants of the services in the different domaines directly concerned with planning.

At the end of 1970, there was very little evidence of the effectiveness of the new arrangements. With less than a year of the normal life of the plan left, no comprehensive statement of plan performance had been prepared nor had the economic domaine begun work for the next plan. In fact, the post-1969 structures had simply not started to function. For example, the General Division of Planning - the major planning unit - which was expected to have seven technical subdivisions had a staff of only 10 members who only managed to establish a few subdivisions. Only a few Secretariats of State had established a service for Planning and Statistics, and the majority of the state enterprises as well as all the ministerial delegations and regions were yet to establish their own services. Finally, the Superior Council of Planning and Development was yet to hold its inaugural meeting.

To sum up, Guinea was still in search of an effective administrative machinery for planning by 1970. Although the regime recognized that its commitment to a planned economy meant that there should be an administrative machinery with responsibility for plan preparation and implementation, it has nevertheless failed in this task. The decision to involve the party structures

in the planning process did not help to solve the problem. This is not surprising in view of the point already made that both the party and administrative structures rely on virtually the same personnel. The crucial problem was clearly the shortage of qualified manpower. Although the administrative and technical training programmes embarked upon (both locally and abroad) since independence did produce some qualified personnel, supply was still very much below demand. For example, the Ecole supérieure d'administration (ESA) had produced only 56 graduates by 1970 and these were distributed between the different parts of the administration and the large number of public enterprises.

In the circumstances, it appears rather curious that the Guinean regime had not made more use of foreign experts. Throughout the period, only a small number of East European and United Nations experts were associated with the central government administration. The total number of these experts in fields outside teaching and medicine was 99 in 1967.¹ The only explanation one can find for this is the government's refusal to recognize any aspect of the planning process as specifically technical. This refusal relates to the regime's interpretation of the doctrine of party supremacy as meaning the supremacy of politics over economics² - the 1960 declaration that Guinea 'operates the economy of its politics and not the politics of its economy' (supra).

¹ In Statistique du travail au 15 - 12 - 67, op. cit.

² One corollary of the principle of the supremacy of politics is national independence and in the opinion of Guinean leaders, the employment of many technical experts in the administration is incompatible with this imperative. Countries which employ a large number of foreign technical experts are described as 'neo-colonial' by Guinean leaders. Considering the very small size of the national manpower strength, the leaders of the Guinean regime probably fear that the employment of a large number of foreign experts would virtually take the control of the economy from their hands. The principle of the supremacy of politics over economics is perhaps no more than a convenient rationalization of this situation.

The régime's failure to establish an effective administrative machinery for planning described above is, therefore, no more than part of an anticipated result which the régime, according to President Touré, accepts: 'In this perspective (of the supremacy of politics over economics), reluctantly . . . our economy remains an under-developed or undeveloped economy.'¹ This point is discussed again when two other areas of development activity are examined later on in the chapter.

Senegal

The preparation of Senegal's first development plan predated the country's independence. It was carried out simultaneously with the administrative reform mentioned in Chapter 1. The task for preparing this plan was entrusted to two French societies, CINAM and SERESA, which worked under the overall supervision of Professor Lebret, a French planning expert who had been appointed Economic Adviser to the Government in November 1958. The CINAM-SERESA team undertook a detailed economic survey of Senegal and submitted a report to the Government in July 1960.² In August 1960, the Prime Minister sent out directives to the various central government ministries on the elaboration of the first development plan. And in September, he created a General Commission for Planning whose duty was to 'assist the Minister of Planning in the elaboration of the Four-Year Development plan.'³

¹Touré, Vol. XIV, p.156.

²This report consists of two volumes of general report, ten volumes of regional analysis, three volumes of appendices, one volume of diagrams and an atlas of 40 maps of Senegal. The written text runs to about 2,000 typed pages. It is a serious study of the prospects of the Senegalese economy for the period 1960-1980 with detailed recommendations on the first Four-Year Plan.

³Decree no. 60-319 of 14 September 1960, JRS, 24 Sept. 1960.

The General Commission subdivided itself into six commissions and completed its work within a few months. In May 1961, the Government secured the adoption by the National Assembly of the country's first Four-Year Development Plan. What exactly was the role of the Senegalese administration in the elaboration of this plan?

First of all, it should be emphasized that the real elaboration of the plan was the work of the CINAM-SERESA team. What was left for the Ministry of Planning, the General Commission for Planning and the other central government ministries was the supply of some details and the actual writing of the plan.¹ However, some Senegalese civil servants were associated with the work of the CINAM-SERESA team. But this was more as apprentices than as partners. And the purpose of the apprenticeship was 'to ensure the formation within the framework of the study of a qualified personnel for future tasks of inquiries and studies concerning planning and its implementation.'²

At the time the plan was presented to the National Assembly in May 1961, no stable administrative machinery had been established. The first step was taken in June 1958 when a Ministry of Planning was created. In April 1959, this ministry was transferred to the Prime Minister's Office and put under a Minister Delegate directly responsible to the Prime Minister. In

¹ Although the plan was not presented to the National Assembly until May 1961, the Government had started to implement it by January. This means that only five months were spent on the elaboration - an indication of the extent to which the CINAM-SERESA study was used.

² CINAM-SERESA, Rapport général, p.C

September 1960, a separate Ministry of Planning re-appeared only to disappear in May 1961 when its functions were taken over by a Commissariat General attached to the Prime Minister's Office. Thus, in the crucial years when the plan was being prepared, there was constant hesitation over the location of the central planning institution: was it to constitute an autonomous ministry or was it to be placed under the head of government?¹ This absence of a stable administrative machinery is likely to have reduced the administration's contribution to the elaboration of the plan. However, the major explanation for the reliance on foreign experts appears to have been the absence of planning experts within the administration.

The administration's real involvement with the first plan was the actual writing up of the plan. It played a leading role in the work of the National Commission for Planning - dominating all its commissions² - and was responsible for its final presentation. In all, the Senegalese administration's role in the preparation of the country's first plan was not very significant.

Unlike the situation during the elaboration stage, the administration was given full responsibility for the implementation of the plan and this included a plan revision in 1963.


¹This hesitation was, in part, caused by the personal desire of Prime Minister Dia to have direct responsibility for planning. This reflects his keen interest in economic matters, a subject on which he had written three widely respected books: Réflexions sur l'économie de l'Afrique, (Paris: Editions africaines, 1953); L'Economie africaine, études et problèmes nouveaux, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1957); and Contribution à l'étude du mouvement coopératif en Afrique noire, (Paris: Présence africaine, 1958).

²Out of the 96 members of the commissions, 59 were civil servants. It should be mentioned that nearly half of this number were members of French technical assistance programme.

Detailed administrative structures were established for the implementation of the plan (see diagram on next page).¹ At the national level, there was a Commissariat General attached to the Prime Minister's Office and placed under a senior civil servant with the title of Commissioner General. The Commissariat was given responsibility for the direction and co-ordination of the development plan. This task involved relations with three sets of services in particular: the central government ministries, their external services, and a number of newly created institutions. One of the new institutions was an agricultural marketing office (Office de commercialisation agricole, OCA) and another was a development bank (Banque sénégalaise du développement, BDS).² The OCA and the BDS were to be represented within each region by a new institution called the Regional Centre of Assistance for Development (Centre regional d'assistance au développement, CRAD). The CRADs, in turn, were to be represented within every arrondissement by an agent belonging to a new institution called the Centre of Rural Education (Centre d'enseignement rural, CER). These institutions were responsible for the aspects of the plan concerning agricultural production: the OCA for marketing and the BSD for finance. The marketing and financial facilities provided

¹For a detailed study of these structures, see R. De Laforcade, 'Les Structures administratives et le plan de développement du Senegal.' Unpublished thesels for the doctorat en droit, University of Toulouse, 1961.

²The OCA was created as a public enterprise with civil personality and financial autonomy while the BSD was created as a mixed-economy enterprise with majority government participation. The BSD was under the tutelage of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs while the OCA was under the tutelage of the Minister of Commerce and Industry.



———— Hierarchical Subordination
 - - - - Plan Relationships

The Administrative Machinery for Planning in Senegal

by the OCA and the BSD respectively were to reach the farmers (directly responsible for agricultural production) through the CRADs and the CRRs. The farmers were expected to be organized within Associations of Rural Interest (Associations d'intérêt rural, AIR) and Cooperatives.

Furthermore, the Commissioner General was to keep watch over the activities within the regions and the cercles, especially with regards to the functioning of the Regional Development Committee (Comité régional de développement, CRD), the Local Development Committee (Comité local de développement), and the rural animation service. The development committees were to co-ordinate the development activities within the region and the cercle while the rural animation service was to familiarize farmers with modern agricultural techniques. Finally, a Superior Planning Council was created in June 1961 to facilitate the Commissariat's work of co-ordinating and supervising the implementation of the plan at the national level.

How did these structures function? Before the end of the plan, the nature of the central planning organ changed thrice: first, the Commissariat was replaced by a separate Ministry of Planning in November 1962; second this ministry was transformed into a Secretariat of State a month later and attached to the presidency; and third, it was reconstituted into an autonomous ministry in December 1963. These changes at the top level of the planning machinery were largely caused by a political crisis the country experienced during the period and it adversely affected the machinery's effectiveness.¹

¹ The reference here is to the political crisis of November and December 1962 which led to the downfall of Prime Minister Dia. The downfall of Dia not only led to that of his Minister of Planning (the former Commissioner General promoted Minister in November)

From all accounts, the plan's administrative machinery did not function satisfactorily in spite of considerable over-expenditure for installing the machinery (by December 1962, spending on administrative infrastructure had exceeded plan target by 270%).¹ Three major administrative problems emerged at the national level during the execution of the plan. First, many ministries were slow in preparing projects which were to be studied by external financial assistance (40% of the plan's total investments was to be financed in this way) and some studies submitted were considered unsatisfactory.² Second, there were cases where ministries failed or forgot to follow up the implementation of a plan for which money had been granted: 400 million francs of the fund granted by the French fond d'aide et de coopération (FAC) during the first plan was not spent.³ Third, there was a general lack of co-ordination of plan activities. The Superior Council of Planning was rarely summoned and the central planning organ - Commissariat, Ministry, Secretariat of State, and Ministry in succession - was never able to effectively co-ordinate and supervise planning activities. All these problems can be summed up as lack of qualified and competent cadres and poor organization.

(cont'd) but also led to the departure of a considerable number of French planning experts recruited to different levels of the planning machinery by Dia. Although the new head of government was able to replace the French experts, the new arrivals (also French) needed some time to familiarize themselves with local conditions before they could become effective.

¹ Présidence de la République, Bilan d'exécution matérielle et financière des investissements publics au 31 décembre 1962, Dakar, June 1963, mimeo.

² D. N'Daw, Le Financement extérieur dans l'exécution des deux plans du Sénégal, Dakar, November 1967, mimeo. p.76.

³ Ibid. pp. 89-90.

Two illustrations of these problems were provided at the time of the plan's revision in 1963. First, the Commission of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of the National Assembly which considered the revised plan's section dealing with employment noted:

A lack of co-ordination in matters of employment and labour between the three ministerial departments (responsible for the subject), a lack of co-ordination that can retard or even hinder certain solutions to be brought to the problems of employment.¹

At the same time, the National Assembly's Commission of Finance stated that:

The Commission of Finance regrets to be without precise and statistical documents on the state of the Plan implementation at the moment when a re-adjustment is considered necessary. It would have wished to possess precise tables indicating for each operation, the results which ought to have been achieved at a certain stage to conform to the Plan, the results really achieved and the reasons for a delay or an eventual advance.²

The implementation of the plan at the regional and local levels was equally unsatisfactory. The most serious problem at these levels was the failure to effectively establish the structures that were created on paper. Thus, the CDRs which were expected to carry out an à posteriori regionalization of the plan did nothing of the kind. The Local Development Committees were never established. However, the CRADs, a few CDRs, the rural animation service and the AIRs and cooperatives directly concerned with agricultural production were effectively established and their performance is examined in detail in a later section.

¹Unclassified National Assembly Documents, 1959-1970, Archives nationales de la République du Sénégal, Dakar.

²Ibid.

The administration played an important role in the preparation of the second and third plans. Each plan, like the first, was for a four-year period: the second for 1965-1968 and the third for 1969-1973. Both plans were elaborated by commissions on which civil servants played a leading role.¹ For example, Senegalese civil servants served either as President or as secretary of each of the 13 commissions established for elaborating the second plan.² However, it should be emphasized that the plans produced had nothing definitive about them because of the considerable reliance on external finance - both public and private - for most of the investments: the percentage of external finance rose from 40% in the first plan to 60% in the second and to 65% in the third.

Although the Government took account of this situation by involving representatives of private foreign investors in the work of the commissions, foreign investors rarely respected the priorities of the plans. This led an observer to conclude in 1968 that 'as long as no new relationship between Government and expatriate firms develops, it might be realistic for national planners to exclude industry from their plans.'³ It is this limited control over plan implementation that was chiefly

¹ There was a commission for each major sector of economic and social activity and also a commission of synthesis. The final writing up of each plan was the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning.

² Although the Senegalese Government continued to benefit from the assistance of French planning experts, they were in fewer numbers than in 1960 and there was, in 1964, a clear desire to emphasize the role of nationals in plan preparation.

³ G. Pfeiffermann, Industrial Labour in the Republic of Senegal, (New York: Praeger, 1968), p.242.

responsible for the revision of each plan (the second was revised in 1967 and the third in 1971). Although the administration cannot be blamed for this situation, it is important to stress the point that its ability to prepare plans has not meant, in the circumstances of the country, that the plan's priorities would be respected.¹ Worse still, the need to readjust the plans mid-way has meant a diversion of the energy that would have been concentrated on plan implementation. The country's Economic and Social Council summed it all up in 1967 when it noted that 'Senegalese planning is, in fact, only a sectoral programming, subject to both internal and external constraints, which render rather artificial its inscription within the narrow framework of a quadrennial'.²

Although some improvements were made in the organization of the planning machinery after 1964, the old problems of inadequate studies, unsatisfactory co-ordination and shortage of trained manpower persisted. Thus, for example, the Minister of Planning and Development said in 1967 that the major problems of planning were 'the poverty of our methods of studies and of implementation' both of which he attributed to the shortage of qualified cadres.³

¹ A detailed study of the external finance for development available between 1961 and 1967 concluded that most of the aid received were often 'oriented towards branches or sectors whose development though desired, was not our priority, which tended to modify the decided structure and to cause serious distortions'. Source: N'Daw, op.cit., p.63.

² Avis no. 67-06 - sur l'affaire no. 6/67: projet de loi modifiant la loi no. 65-50 du 1er juillet 1965 instituant un deuxième plan quadriennal de développement pour la période 1965-1969, document found in the unclassified documents of the Economic and Social Council, 1964-1970, Archives nationales de la République du Sénégal, Dakar.

³ See L'Unité africaine, 27 July 1967.

In order to ensure better co-ordination between the ministerial departments, it was decided in 1969 that each department should have a bureau (directed by a senior civil servant) to follow the implementation of the plan at the level of the departments. In 1970, only a few departments had established such a bureau and the Secretariat of State for Planning still complained of experiencing difficulties in co-ordinating plan implementation within the ministries.¹ Another problem for plan implementation has been the difference in approach between the central planning organ and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs which signs the plan financial agreements. While the former accuses the latter of showing interest only in short-term projects, the latter maintains that it signs only the agreements that are worthwhile. The feeling of officials in the central planning organ is that plan finance should be brought under its control. In the meantime, the divergent policies of the two institutions continue to hamper the effectiveness of plan administration.

The major point to make in regard to the planning machinery at regional and local levels under both the second and third plans is the failure of the efforts made to revive regional planning. The chief causes of failure were identified as the concentration of both the human and financial resources for planning at the centre and the lack of sustained interest on the

¹ Interviews at the Secretariat of State for Planning, November 1970. In February 1970, the central planning organ was reduced from the status of an autonomous Ministry into a Secretariat of State in the Prime Minister's Office. This new arrangement, unlike the hesitations and changes between 1959 and 1963, was to ensure continuity: the new Prime Minister has held the portfolio of planning since 1968.

part of members of regional and departmental planning commissions (title given to the development committees enlarged to include a few local notables for the occasion) for the detailed work required for preparing worthwhile projects.¹ As will be shown later, this absence of regional and local involvement during the elaboration stage had adverse consequences on plan implementation.

On the whole, the determination of post-independence Senegalese governments to establish an administrative machinery for planning had become effective by 1970. Although this machinery suffers from some organizational problems and manpower shortage which compromise its effectiveness, the basic commitment to the establishment of 'a state apparatus in the service of development'² has become a reality.

Administration and Rural Development

The emphasis on the promotion of rural development through the establishment of cooperatives in the ideologies of the two countries is essentially due to the fact that more than 70% of the population in both countries live in rural areas and a commitment to the promotion of development within each country simply has to pay attention to the needs of this large proportion of the population.³ The major objective of the emphasis on

¹La Participation populaire au développement national, op.cit. pp.129 and 147.

²Discours de M. L.S. Senghor...vendredi, 19 avril 1963, op.cit. p.50

³The point being made here is that the environmental factor probably dictated the ideological emphasis on rural development.

cooperatives in both countries is to ensure that peasant farmers achieve increased production in their agricultural activities. The achievement of this objective will mean adequate food production for local consumption and a rise in the quantity and quality of export products which will make available to the farmers the money with which to purchase essential goods and services. A satisfactory result in both directions will amount to a sensible rise in the standard of living in rural areas. The focus of the discussion that follows is, therefore, the contribution of each country's administration to the promotion of increased agricultural production.¹

Guinea

Until the Three-Year Plan was launched in 1960, the institution responsible for promoting increased agricultural production in the rural parts of Guinea were the SMDRs created in each administrative division by the loi-cadre Government. In the place of the SMDRs, the plan recommended the establishment of three institutions: National Centres of Agricultural Production (Centres nationaux de production agricole, CNPA), Centres of Rural Modernisation (centres de modernisation rurale, CMR) and Cooperatives of Agricultural Production (Coopératives agricoles de production, CAP). A CNPA was conceived of as a state farm and a few of them were to be established as models of highly mechanized farming.

¹ This means that only agricultural cooperatives will be discussed to the exclusion of the few other cooperatives in both countries which deal with such activities as fishing and crafts. All activities related to the promotion of agricultural production - such as the establishment of a good marketing system for products - will be discussed.

A CMR was to be established in each administrative region to serve as 'model enterprises for the training of peasants, the demonstration of new material and the propagation of modern methods.'¹ The CAPs were to be established at the village level and were expected to involve farmers in the collective use of some new farming materials and, in some cases, to lead to the mechanized cultivation of collective farms. By 1963 none, of the 20 CNPAs envisaged in the plan had been established, the CMRs created were in ruins, and only 291 CAPS were in existence instead of the plan target of 500.² What was the responsibility of the central government administration in this poor performance?

With regard to the CNPA, the administration was not responsible for their non-establishment. The Government approved of the establishment of one but when it was found that the actual cost had been underestimated in the plan, it was abandoned because no additional funds could be raised. And no further attempt was made to establish a state farm throughout the life of the plan. The CMRs were created in August 1960 as public enterprises with 'civil personality and financial autonomy'. (like all public enterprises in Guinea, *infra*). In addition to serving as a model agricultural enterprise, each CMR was 'to help the CAPS to develop the quantity and quality of their production, thanks to the effort and advice of its technicians.'³ The regional governor and the regional director of agriculture were given

¹N'Famara Keita, 'Les Structures du plan triennal de développement économique et social,' in Touré, Vol.V, p.353.

²Puret-Ganala, La République de Guinée, *op.cit.*, p.195.

³Decree no. 223/PG of 11 August 1960, JORG, 1 September 1960.

joint responsibility for the control of the CMR on behalf of the central government tutelage ministry - the Ministry of Rural Economy. Before the end of 1961, the CMRs were transformed into regional enterprises and put under the exclusive authority of regional officials.

The regionalization of the CMRs was accompanied by an end to the supply of funds from the central government which expected each CMR to depend on the amount already invested and the repayment of loans made to the CAPs. Almost every CMR found it impossible to depend on these sources of finance and by the end of 1962, most CMRs had disappeared and some of their property, especially the tractors, were taken over for private use by some of the officials. As one observer has put it,

Some leaders of CMR used the machines put at their disposal either to increase the exploitation of some big farmers in the region, or to create their own large exploitation where they employ salaried workers. At the regionalization of the CMR, these officials hurried to liquidate them in order to take over the material and to strengthen the equipment of the private exploitations thus created.¹

The disappearance of the CMRs compromised the chances of success of the CAPs as it meant the end of technical assistance and financial support. The result was that the number of CAPs fell dramatically from 473 in 1962 to 291 in 1963.²

¹T.N.Diallo, 'Bilan et perspectives de la coopération dans le développement de l'agriculture guinéenne,' Mémoire de fin d'études supérieures,' IPC (ESA) 1967/68, p.98, quoted in Suret-Canale, op.cit., p.201.

²Besides the collapse of the CMRs, there were other factors that adversely affected the development of the CAPs for which the administration was not responsible. These included the mismanagement of cooperative officials and the individualism of many peasant farmers.

In all, the failure of the three institutions created for promoting agricultural production was partly caused by the limited financial resources made available by the central government¹ and partly by the mismanagement of the regional officials. The result of this failure was that plan objectives were not achieved. Instead of bringing an end to the importation of rice - the staple food - 23% of total imports was spent on it in 1962. The production figures for the major export products show a wide gap between plan targets and actual production: Banana, 50,000 instead of 160,000 tons; coffee, 8,700 instead of 16,000 tons; groundnuts, 6,000 instead of 32,000 tons; and palm products, 7,000 instead of 25,000 tons.² (All figures of actual production are for 1963 except the case of groundnuts which is for 1962).

While administrative officials were only required to associate regional and local party officials with their work of promoting agricultural production under the first plan,³ the arrangement under the Seven-Year Plan formally gave both the

¹Of the 10 billion francs earmarked for agricultural production in the plan, only 4385 millions were made available.

²Other non-administrative factors that contributed to low production figures included the over-ambitious targets set, the exodus of French planters after independence (they were responsible for the bulk of the production in the pre-independence days), the inexperience and weak organization of African planters, and the smuggling of a considerable amount of produce to neighbouring countries by farmers and traders in search of scarce consumer goods.

³It is remarkable that this association did not save some of the CMRs from collapse; on the contrary, it seems to have contributed to the liquidation of many. This was acknowledged in a BPN circular in 1963 condemning the behaviour which 'gives the masses the impression that political and administrative authorities are sharing the revenues of the State between them,': BPN circular no. 043/BPN/PN/63 in Bulletin du compte-rendu des activités du BPN, no.13 (1963), p.108.

party structures and the administration joint responsibility for this task. The rationale for this new arrangement, as already mentioned, was the hope that the joint effort of both structures would produce better results than was possible under the first plan. Unfortunately, nothing of the kind happened and the only significant change recorded was the rapidity with which experiments in promoting agricultural production were initiated and abandoned. In 1970, the country imported as much rice as it had imported in 1962 (though not the same percentage of total imports)¹ and very little increase was recorded in the production of export crops.²

First, agricultural production and consumer cooperatives (Coopératives de production agricole et de consommation, COPAC) were established in 1965 at the regional level as successors of the CRRs whose property they inherited (that is, those of the property that had not been confiscated by the officials). Each COPAC was to buy agricultural produce from farmers and sell it to the national export enterprise, Guinexport. In return, it would buy consumer goods from the national enterprises in charge and sell them to the farmers. The responsibility of regional authorities - both party and administration - was to ensure the efficient running of these cooperatives. It was believed that

¹ Between 1964 and 1970, Guinea imported between 20 and 50 thousand tons of rice per year in addition to the substantial quantity supplied under the American PL 480 programme.


² This conclusion is based on the production figures given by Suret-Canale in La République de Guinée, op. cit. pp. 252-259. These are perhaps the most reliable figures as the author used the interview method to correct (as much as was possible) the conflicting figures of the General Division of Statistics and the Secretariat of State for Rural Economy.

with a satisfactory marketing system supplying consumer goods to farmers and selling their produce on their behalf, agricultural production would increase. The need for technical assistance which was emphasized under the first plan was dropped. Although no official explanation was given, it appears that the lack of qualified personnel was responsible for this crucial neglect. Within three years the COPACs disappeared like the CMRs before them largely because they were unable to fulfill the functions assigned to them.

In fact, before the disappearances of the COPACs the function of supplying consumer goods to farmers had been separated (in 1966) from that of selling agricultural produce and entrusted to General Stores established in each of the administrative regions. The General Stores buy from the national commercial enterprises and sell to the Popular Stores within the arrondissements (created in April 1970) which, in turn, resell to the PRLs. (Between 1966 and 1970, goods were sold in rural areas by licenced retail traders who bought from the General Stores). With regard to the marketing of agricultural produce, the COPACs were still used until 1968 when a new agricultural marketing enterprise was created - the Office de commercialisation agricole (OCA) in each region.¹ The OCA buys agricultural produce from the farmers (sent through the PRLs and the Popular Stores) at prices fixed by the government and resells them to the national enterprise responsible for exporting agricultural produce - Guinexport.

In order to ensure satisfactory management, the government

¹ Decree no 96/PRG of 18 March 1968, JORG, 15 March 1968.



—————→ Movement of Agricultural Produce

—————→ Movement of Consumer Goods

Structures for Marketing Agricultural Produce and Consumer Goods in Guinea

decided that any profits made by the OCA should fall to the local budget of the region concerned while any losses were to be recovered from the local budget. This arrangement has not worked out well; of the 2.5 billion francs advanced by the Government to the OCAs in 1968, 'a good part of this sum was diverted from its objective; it was used to favour traffic [black market trade] instead of abolishing it'.¹ In the latest arrangement announced in 1971, the Directors of OCAs have become independent of regional authorities (political and administrative) and are directly subordinated to the Ministers Delegate and the Secretariat of State for Internal Trade. It is hoped that this will lead to better management.² The General Stores, too, have not functioned well. This is due largely to the paucity and irregularity of supplies from the national enterprises. This problem is felt mostly at the level of the farmers as the stores' officials and the administrative and political authorities expected to supervise and control them purchase most of what is available, leaving very little for the farmers.³ This explains, in part, why many farmers in border regions smuggle their products to neighbouring countries to purchase the consumer goods they need.

With regard to the promotion of production - excluded from the functions of the new marketing enterprises - several experiments were embarked upon between 1966 and 1970 as substitutes

¹ Horoya, 3 Nov. 1971.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

for the CNR approach which sought to provide technical assistance for farmers. First, it was decided in 1966 that a civic brigade be created in each arrondissement to help in the 'defence of the revolution' and in 'economic production'.¹ Each arrondissement's civic brigade was to consist of 100 to 150 members recruited for a period of two years from among the youth of between the ages of 17 and 30. This was to add up to a total of 19 to 28 thousands for the whole country. Although an arrondissement budget was created in 1967 for financing these brigades as first priority, by 1970, less than half of the arrondissements had established functioning civic brigades and where they were effective, it was the 'defence of the revolution' function that was in prominence - a trend confirmed in 1971 when all members of civic brigades (8,000 - a figure much less than the 28,000 maximum expected) were incorporated into the Guinean popular army.²

Although there were a few cases where civic brigades successfully ran arrondissement farms on whose produce they fed, the experiment of promoting agricultural production through civic brigades was, on the whole, a failure. If the progressive concentration of attention on defence was largely responsible for this failure, the experiment itself was badly planned. For example, no consideration was taken of arrondissements with unfavourable climatic and soil conditions for agricultural

¹Proposals for the organization of civic brigades were discussed and adopted at the CNR meeting of July 1966; see La RFA-PDG, no. 8 (Aug. 1966), pp. 127-130. Only the contribution of the civic brigades to economic production is discussed here.

²Horoya-hebdo, no. 131, 24-30 July 1971.

activities in the planning of one civic brigade per arrondissement. Also, the absence of agricultural extension workers to provide technical assistance in many of the arrondissements was not taken into consideration.¹ Finally, the selection of arrondissement commandants who were to provide overall leadership was rarely based on their knowledge of, or familiarity with, agricultural problems (supra).

Simultaneously with this experiment, the government embarked upon another which sought to promote agricultural production via education. The plan of the government was to guarantee long-term success in improving agricultural production by introducing formal training for future farmers who were to be trained in modern agricultural techniques, the use of fertilisers and improved seeds. It was decided that each arrondissement should create a college of rural education (Collège d'enseignement rural, CER) where post-primary pupils recruited within the arrondissement would receive both general and agricultural education. It was also planned that each CER would, in future, become a cooperative. In October 1968, the CER system was generalized for all four cycles of education (from primary to university level), with the title changed to Centre d'enseignement révolutionnaire.² This meant that general education and vocational training were to go pari passu at all levels of education. However, only the second cycle CERs which correspond to the 1966 CERs were to

¹In 1967, the total number of middle-level agricultural officials who could serve as extension workers was 148, fewer than the number of arrondissements (about 200).

²In October 1970, the title was further changed to Centre d'éducation révolutionnaire.

develop into cooperatives, with the new title of socialist communities. By 1970, only 165 second cycle CBRs had been established with only 24 functioning as socialist communities.¹ The reasons for this limited success of the CBR system are similar to those of the civic brigades. First, the government generalized for all arrondissements what should have been limited to areas where pupils can successfully engage in production activities.² The result is that the embryo socialist communities (that is every second cycle CBR) are more numerous and more prosperous in Forest Guinea where climatic and soil conditions favour the cultivation of a variety of crops than in middle and upper Guinea with less favourable conditions. Second, the state assistance needed for building accommodation facilities and for tiding the CBRs over the difficult 'take off' stage has been either inadequate or not forthcoming at all. Third, the financial and human resources at the disposal of the regional administrative officials have been inadequate for coping with the demands of the CBRs. For example, a common complaint of three socialist communities visited in Kindia region in February 1971 was that the regional and arrondissement officials have regularly failed to provide advice and assistance: the visits of the agricultural extension worker is irregular and requests for the repair of agricultural machinery are not answered for weeks or months.

¹ See Bulletin d'information du BPN, no. 94 (1970), pp.153-154.

² Although the government allowed a choice between agricultural activities (farming and livestock) and a number of other vocational activities (industry, crafts, wood work, and fishing), the emphasis has been on the former and this is why the majority of the socialist communities have been established in the rich agricultural lands of forest and maritime Guinea (9 each) compared to the relatively poorer upper and middle Guinea (5 and 1 respectively).

And what has been the role of party officials in all this? Their major role has been to hail each experiment at their announcement during the meetings of the competent party instances and to proclaim the ability of their respective federations to achieve success. The decision on these experiments were taken during party meetings and although some regional administrative officials were present, it was the party officials' voices that were heard. The significance of the importance attached to the voice of party officials is that even though most of them are civil servants (supra), they are not at the crucial time the decisions are taken representing the administration and they find nothing wrong in committing the administration to whatever experiment the party leadership puts forward even when they know that the chances of success are remote. There is no single case of a party federation admitting that any of the experiments mentioned above would fail in its area. However, the failure of party federations to achieve their targets were condemned from time to time by the leadership. For example, at the March 1968 CNR meeting, President Touré said: 'There is, at the level of the Federal Bureaux, an unpardonable failure in the application of our own decisions'.¹ But this reprimand did not prevent the federal bureaux from accepting a few months later to create Regional Superior Councils of Cultural Revolution which would supervise the establishment of the new CER system. A similar council was to be established at the arrondissement level - the Arrondissement Council of Cultural Revolution - under the leadership of the party's steering committee. These councils have not been established.²

¹See Horoya, 20 March 1968.

²Interviews in Conakry, Kindia and Labé, February 1971.

The third and last experiment embarked upon in the effort to stimulate agricultural production was the creation of the PRLs in 1967. The ultimate objective of the government is that the PRLs would become multifunctional cooperatives.¹ Although each PRL was expected to create brigades corresponding to the major areas of central government activity, the brigade of production was proclaimed a priority for all. It was in order to stimulate the production activity within the PRLs that 2,226 civil servants (members of hierarchies B and C) led by Ministers and Secretaries of State were dispatched to the different regions for 15 days each between April and June 1969.² These national cadres were distributed into groups of ten to twelve members per arrondissement. Their task was to assist the production brigades of the PRLs in every way possible. This assistance included participation in the harvesting of crops (the programme coincided with the harvest period) during the day and discussions in small groups in the evenings on a variety of subjects including the proper functioning of PRLs, the importance of literacy campaign, and the defence of the revolution.³ This experiment was considered a success and was repeated between June and July 1970. In addition to this annual programme involving the national cadres,⁴ the production brigades of PRLs are also expected to

¹ Their role in the marketing system has already been mentioned.

² See Moroya-hebdo, no. 14, 26 April - 2 May 1969.

³ Ibid.

⁴ It is doubtful if the government's declared intention to make it an annual programme will be maintained because of the considerable disruption it causes in the work of the ministerial departments. Already, it was not organized in 1971 because of the government's preoccupation with purging both state and party officials allegedly involved in the abortive invasion of November 1970.

Receive permanent assistance from the regional and arrondissement administrative officials and periodic help and guidance from the country's polytechnic students during their holidays and during internship periods preceding their appointment to administrative posts.

In spite of the serious efforts so far made to establish effective PRLs, only 10 - 50% of the PRLs have functioning production brigades with the exception of Forest Guinea where the percentage rises to between 75 and 100.¹ One explanation for this limited success, already mentioned in connection with the previous experiments, is that the government generalized for all party base committees an institution that requires certain favourable climatic, soil and social conditions that are not present everywhere. Another problem is that the visits of national cadres and polytechnic students though useful in some regards, especially as a psychological stimulus, is no substitute for the presence of professional agricultural extension workers within the arrondissements. Psychological stimulus is no substitute for the basic knowledge concerning such matters as soil conditions and use, climate and other factors affecting agricultural production. Finally, the regional and arrondissement administrative officials have neither the human nor the material resources to provide effective assistance for the numerous PRLs they are expected to help.

In all, it appears that the collaboration between party and administrative officials in promoting agricultural production has not been successful. What President Touré said in 1967 was

¹See Bulletin d'information du BPN, no.94 (1970), p.123.

still true in 1971: 'If political militancy is improved and enriched continuously, it is not the same in certain sectors of production, which constitutes a non-sense...'¹ It also seems that this collaboration has had the adverse effect of complicating the work of the administration which is not allowed to carry out any studies before new schemes are announced and is unable to refuse new experiments when still battling with old ones.

The positive note on which we should like to end this account is the regime's announcement in 1971 that there would be no further experiments. The socialist communities and the PRLs are to be developed simultaneously and ultimately, each socialist community is expected to absorb the PRLs in its vicinity to constitute a single unit to be known as a socialist community or cooperative. It is stated that the government is prepared to assist the socialist communities in every way possible especially in the construction of accommodation.²

Senegal

The ten volumes of the CINAM-SERESA report devoted to regional analysis provided the detailed information on the state of rural production in the country. It was on the basis of this study that the first Four-Year Plan's programme for promoting agricultural production was drawn up. The administrative structure established for this purpose constitutes part of the national planning machinery (see diagram on page 268). Starting from the

¹ In La RDA-PDG, no.14 (Feb. 1967), p.45.

² See Horoya, 4, 7, and 9 Jan. 1972. The writer can only record these changes and it would probably be another three to five years before performance can be assessed.

base, the aim of the plan was that farmers should be grouped into cooperatives or pre-cooperative institutions called Associations d'intérêts rural (AIR). The CERs and the rural animation service were given direct responsibility for the development of the cooperatives and the AIRs. The CER within each arrondissement was to consist of the leading official of the technical ministries working there - notably Public Works, Health, Education, and Rural Economy. In all cases it included a representative of the CRAD. The CER officials were under the control and supervision of the cercle's technical officials who, in turn, were under the control and supervision of the heads of the regional technical services which were directly responsible to the central ministries.

The rural animation service was specially created and given the mission of educating the farmers in order that they might understand and accept the need to form cooperatives and benefit from the innovations that were being introduced in farming techniques. An animation service was located within each cercle and was directed by a handful of technical civil servants seconded from their normal ministries. Each service was expected to recruit five or more farmers from each of the villages within its area who were to be trained as animators along the lines mentioned above. It was left to the villages to nominate the persons they would later be prepared to accept.

The arrondissement chief was responsible for the supervision and control of the cooperatives, AIRs, the CER, and the animation service within his area. At the cercle level, the commandant was to be assisted by a Local Development Committee in his task of co-ordinating and animating these institutions within the area.

Membership of the Committee consisted of arrondissement chiefs, the heads of the technical services, the leader of the animation service, members of the CER, and a few local politicians. Finally, at the regional level, the governor and his assistant for development were responsible for the overall supervision and control of the new structures. Their work was to be carried out chiefly through the Regional Development Committee on which the regional technical services, the CRAD, and regional politicians were represented. Until 1970, the structures described above - with some modifications - constituted the administrative framework within which the central government was striving to promote agricultural production. How did these structures function?

At the base, about 1,800 agricultural AIRs and cooperatives had been established at the end of 1970.¹ Throughout the period 1961-1970, there was no change of policy with regards to the role of AIRs and cooperatives in promoting agricultural production. In fact, the campaign to get more farmers into cooperatives was intensified in the mid-1960s when village chiefs were made to attend seminars where the virtues of cooperatives were extolled. The belief was that the conversion of a village chief to the cooperative ideal would facilitate the conversion of the village's inhabitants; village chiefs became auxiliary rural animators.

However, it was also quickly realized that the cooperatives were not functioning properly: the presidents and weighing officers virtually excluded members from participating in the cooperatives' affairs, the peasants' allegiance to the cooperatives was tenuous,

¹ A.M. Diop, 'Le Mouvement coopératif sénégalais, Revue française d'études politiques africaines, no. 61 (Jan. 1971), p.54.

and many cooperatives were regularly unable to repay the loans taken from the CRADs.¹ While the cooperatives themselves were partly responsible for this state of affairs, it was also partly the fault of the responsible officials within the CERs who failed to provide the required leadership.

The inability of many CERs to provide effective leadership for the cooperatives largely reflected the problems faced by these institutions. In fact, at the end of 1962 only 17 CERs had been established instead of 84 provided for in the plan, one in every arrondissement.² At first, there was shortage of qualified personnel to staff the CERs and when the Ecole nationale d'economie appliquée (ENEA) was in a position to solve this problem in the late-1960s, the limited financial resources of the government prevented the recruitment of adequate numbers of students. Although it was wise not to train officials whose salary the government could not afford, it also meant that many CERs remained understaffed. The financial problem was also responsible for the government's failure to construct buildings for the CERs in the arrondissement headquarters and this meant that the objective of making CERs function as work groups was not realized. (The first buildings were under construction in 1970!)

The rural animation service at first aroused enthusiasm and succeeded in recruiting many animators (4,000 animators were trained within two years).³ When it was realized that the trained

¹On the problems of cooperatives, see A.M. Diop, op.cit., pp54-57; La Participation populaire au développement national, op.cit., pp. 26-28; and H. De Decker, Nation et développement communautaire en Guinée et au Sénégal (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), pp.369-379.

²See 'Sénégal "an 2" par lui-même,' Numéro spécial, Développement et civilisation (1962), p.13.

³See Discours de M.L.S. Senghor, Chef du Gouvernement à l'Assemblée vendredi, 9 avril 1963, op.cit.

were not to become civil servants general enthusiasm cooled off and some tried to compensate themselves by taking over the seeds and agricultural equipment they were expected to put at the disposal of their villages. However, the service survived - though with fewer recruits than in the early years - and continued to take modern agricultural techniques to rural areas.

In an effort to improve the effectiveness of both the CRADS and the OCA, both were re-organized in 1966: the CRADS were constituted into a single national enterprise named the Office national de coopération et d'assistance pour le développement (ONCAD) and the OCA was renamed the Office de commercialisation agricole du Sénégal (OCAS). Instead of the old arrangement whereby the CRADS represented the OCA at the regional level, only the ONCAD was represented by agents at both regional and arrondissement levels. OCAS was responsible for external marketing of agricultural produce while internal marketing was the responsibility of the ONCAD whose agents served as the field agents of both the OCAS and the BNDS.¹ Although these enterprises shared in the difficulties and mismanagement of the other state enterprises (infra), they enabled the government to effectively replace the colonial trading economy (économie de traite)² by a money economy backed by a modern marketing system. Thus, while

¹ In May 1964, the Banque sénégalaise de développement (BDS) was merged with another credit institution, the Crédit populaire sénégalais to constitute the Banque nationale de développement du Sénégal (BNDS). The BNDS, like the BDS before it, is a mixed enterprise and one of its major functions remains the provision of credit for agricultural production programmes.

² This was a kind of barter system in which Senegalese farmers exchanged their groundnuts for French merchandise.

in 1960/61 the cooperatives marketed only 23% of groundnut produce through the CRADs and OCA, the percentage rose to 65 in 1965/66 and in 1967/68, all groundnuts produced were sold by the cooperatives through the new state marketing system.

In addition to the above structures, the government concluded some agreements with a number of foreign societies and missions which joined in the task of promoting agricultural production in rural areas: these included the Société d'aide technique et de coopération (SATEC) concerned with the cultivation of millet and groundnut, the Compagnie française pour le développement des textiles (CFDT) for promoting the cultivation of cotton, and Chinese (Formosa) and American missions concerned with the promotion of rice cultivation. Although these foreign societies brought with them what the Senegalese lacked - qualified technical staff and adequate finance - they used both resources within their own organizations and, therefore, failed to solve the problems of the Senegalese administration. In fact, they further complicated the task of co-ordinating the activities of the various institutions concerned with agricultural production. However, they helped to spread modern agricultural techniques and the increase in rice production was, in part, due to them: production rose from 77,000 tons in 1962 to 140,000 tons in 1969.¹ The greatest success story was the successful launching of cotton cultivation by ^{the} CFDT - introduced in 1963, production was 11,500 tons in 1969, with the highest yield per hectare in West Africa.²

¹ Total production is still very inadequate for local needs and the country has continued to rely on large imports of rice - an average of 200,000 tons per year in the late 1960s, half of the total for the whole of West Africa.

² Le Soleil, 1 January 1971.

From the above, the outstanding feature of the post-independence efforts to promote agricultural production is the complexity of the structures that were established. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that the central government administration officials experienced considerable difficulties in animating and co-ordinating their activities. The situation was summed up as follows in a Prime Minister's Circular of September 1970:

Our system of agricultural vulgarisation is characterized by duplication due to the existence of a great number of institutions badly co-ordinated and very costly.

The question is how to simplify it in order to spend less and achieve a greater effectiveness.¹

Duplication arose from the activities of the foreign societies and missions which covered the same fields as those of some public enterprises and of some services in the central ministerial departments. For example, in 1970, there was no co-ordination between the efforts of an American mission, a Chinese mission, the SODAICA (a public enterprise) and the agricultural service, aimed at promoting increased rice production in the Casamance region.²

These problems of duplication and bad co-ordination reflect the ineffectiveness of the Regional Development Committees and the Departmental Development Committees (new name for the Local Development Committees from 1964 onwards). In fact, by 1964, no Local Development Committee had been established. Both committees

¹ Circular no. 37/PM of 10 September 1970.

² Interview with the Assistant to the Governor in charge of Development, Casamance region, Ziguinchor, April 1971. The Director of the American project confirmed this point when he said in March 1971: 'A co-ordination committee which we earnestly call for will allow us to avoid duplication'; in Le Soleil, 12 March 1971.

began to meet fairly regularly from 1965 onwards (each is expected to hold a monthly meeting). They jointly run an annual seminar for all central government officials within the same department (introduced in 1965 and called the Seminar for Intermediate Cadres). These seminars are animated by regional officials and the objective is to review the various activities concerned with rural development in the area with a view to finding solutions to any outstanding problems.

At the level of the farmers, the sheer number of the institutions established was confusing. Worse still, some actions of the central government administration have had the effect of undermining their confidence in the institutions. Although the government has effectively abolished the colonial trading economy and substituted a money economy backed by a modern marketing system, the centralization of payment in Dakar has caused field officials to pay farmers with promissory notes which do not become cash until two or three months later. This has had the effect of driving many farmers into the hands of usurers and into smuggling their produce (especially groundnuts) to neighbouring Gambia where they could sell their produce for ready cash.

With regard to the cooperatives, the allegiance of most farmers remain tenuous and there is still need for more systematic education to achieve a greater attachment to these institutions on which the survival of the new marketing system depends. This problem was admitted by the Minister of Rural Development in 1970 when he said: 'without any doubt, we went too fast in creating cooperatives, for cooperative education did not progress at the same rate.'¹ Finally, because of the exceptional droughts since

¹Le Soleil, 6 October 1970.

1967, groundnut farmers who took loans to purchase fertilizers and agricultural implements have found it difficult to pay their debts because of the sharp fall in production - from 1 million tons per year between 1965 and 1967 to less than 600,000 tons a year since 1968. The administrative officials who urged them to take these loans also had responsibility for collecting the debts. Faced with this ambiguous mission, many of them resorted to high-handed methods for collecting these debts and this has resulted in alienating the farmers from administrators.¹ Because of the widespread discontent aroused among farmers (officially baptized the malaise paysan), the government decided in April 1971 to write off all the debt accumulated during the past years. It is hoped that this will help restore cooperation between peasants and administrative officials.²

In the light of the results of the first decade summarized above, the Prime Minister's Circular of September 1970 (supra) laid down the principles to guide governmental work in promoting agricultural production in the 1970s. The chief aim is to reduce the number of institutions involved thereby facilitating the co-ordination action of the central government officials. All the foreign and national enterprises, societies or missions of

¹ According to one account, 'the reaction of the authorities was often very brutal. Debtors were beaten, locked up, themselves or their wives, in groundnut stores, exposed to the sun, sometimes sprinkled with fertilizers or D.D.T., imprisoned, or saw their property seized manu militari'. Source: R. Dumont, 'Le Mouvement coopératif africain: plus d'échecs que de réussites,' Revue française d'étude politique africaines, no.59 (Nov. 1970), p.45.

² If this measure succeeds, then, Dumont's fear that Senegal's 'interesting attempt at agricultural modernisation' has been blocked will be proved wrong; see Dumont, 'Le Mouvement coopératif africain ...', op.cit., p.53.

intervention are henceforth to be regarded as having a temporary mission: they will disappear once their specific tasks are accomplished. The ONCAD and the OCAS, responsible for the marketing system are described as transitional, destined to disappear when the cooperatives are strong enough to do without their assistance.¹

Two measures to be enforced with immediate effect concern the CERs and the animation service. The CER in each arrondissement becomes subordinated to the agricultural service although it retains its old functions of coordinating all functions of agricultural vulgarisation at the arrondissement level. The old mission of the animation service - taking modern agricultural techniques to farmers - is considered accomplished and the new function of the service is to provide middle-level practical agricultural training for educated youths who fail to secure admission to secondary schools.

In all, considerable attention has been devoted to the promotion of agricultural production by the central government administration since independence. Many difficulties were experienced due largely to the complexity of the structures established and the consequent mistakes in their management on the part of administrative officials, both situations resulting in confusion for the farmers for whose benefit the efforts were intended. The 1970 government intention to simplify the structures, avoid duplication and achieve better coordination - if it

¹ Both enterprises will probably be replaced by a national marketing board responsible for both internal and external marketing - something similar to the National Marketing Boards in Nigeria and Ghana.

becomes reality - is likely to remove most of the difficulties experienced in the past. Although the successes recorded fall below the high hopes raised by the government at independence, they are nevertheless a considerable improvement on what existed in 1960: a money economy has become generalized and modern agricultural techniques, fertilizers, fungicides, and improved seeds are now widespread in rural areas.¹

Public Enterprises

While there is little difference in the task assigned to the administration in Guinea and Senegal in regard to the two previous fields of development activity examined, the discussion in Chapter 2 revealed that the situation in the field of public enterprises is not the same. On the one hand, Guinea's 'non-capitalist way' asserts a commitment to the establishment of a large number of public enterprises. On the other hand, Senegal's 'African socialism' stresses the need to determine the number of public enterprises in the light of a 'realistic' consideration of the country's economic situation. The practical meaning of each country's commitment is examined below.²

Guinea

The existence of 71 state enterprises in Guinea at the end

¹ It has been estimated that between 1960 and 1968, Senegalese peasants spent over 9 billion francs CFA on purchasing hundreds of hoes and ploughs, and over 350,000 tons of fertilizers. Source: la Participation populaire au développement national, op.cit. p.117.

² The account in both countries is focused on public enterprises which are wholly owned by the state. The mixed-economy enterprises which involve the participation of private interests are not considered although references are made to them wherever necessary.

of 1970 is a clear indication that the regime's commitment to a policy of creating a large number of public enterprises was being followed.¹ A striking feature of these enterprises is the proportion of their management that is carried out in the same way as the ordinary business of government. From the beginning, the Directors and Deputy Directors of state enterprises were civil servants and since 1969, the status of civil servant has been extended to all their employees (it was extended to Chief Accountants in 1963). In 1965, the management of all the personnel of these enterprises was entrusted to a central government ministry - now the Secretariat of State for Civil Service and Labour - which applies the same rules and regulations as those that exist for ordinary civil servants.

Although the first public enterprises were established in 1959, it was not until 1960 that a statute was drawn up for regulating the activities of public enterprises.² The decree defined a state enterprise as 'an enterprise with an industrial, agricultural or commercial character, granted civil personality and financial autonomy and placed under the tutelage of a Minister'. A recent government publication classified 69 of the public enterprises as follows: 23 industrial and mining, 8 agricultural, 19 commercial, 6 financial, and 13 for general services.³

¹ See B. Bokoum, 'Importance des entreprises d'Etat dans l'économie guinéenne,' *Mémoire de fin d'études supérieures*, IPC (ESA), 1969/70, p.32. This excludes the 29 OCAs which are also national enterprises except that they are based in the regions. A list of the national enterprises is provided in Appendix E. The state was also participating in six mixed economy societies.

² Decree no. 175/PG of 27 June 1960, *JORG*, 15 July 1960.

³ *Secrétariat d'Etat à l'idéologie, au télé-enseignement et à l'alphabétisation, Gestion de l'entreprise. Responsabilité du comptable, Séminaires de surformation pour les cadres du domaine financier, Cours no.11 et 12 (Conakry: Centre de diffusion télé-enseignement, 2ème trimestre, 1970), p.1.*

Both the number and variety of these enterprises confirm the economic policy of the government which, as mentioned above, seeks to create an extensive public sector. Thus, for example, all the activities that are commonly regarded as essential public services are organized into public enterprises: water, electricity, railways, and airways. Also, the important number of industrial and commercial enterprises and the existence of six financial enterprises underline the determination of the government to organise the vital sectors of the economy into public enterprises.¹

If the chief motive for the establishment of public enterprises was ideological, there was also an important practical aspect. The government hoped that the profits made by these enterprises would provide some capital for financing the country's development. In the Three-Year Plan, it was estimated that about 20% of the total investment would be provided by the public enterprises.² Similarly, a considerable proportion of the total investment in the Seven-Year Plan was expected to come from the profits realized by the public enterprises.³ Other motives behind the establishment of numerous public enterprises include

¹ A very important exception is the Fria society run by an international consortium (USA, France, U.K., Switzerland and West Germany) which holds a 75-year concession over part of Guinea's bauxite wealth. No mention was made of it in Guinea's first plan although it was responsible for 40% of the country's total exports in 1963. The Guinean government later tried to obtain some participation but failed. It is likely that Fria's increasing share in total exports (61% in 1966) is responsible for the Government's acquiescence - a case of not tampering (at least, in the meantime) with the goose that lays the golden eggs.

² Barry, op.cit., p.161.

³ No specific figure was given since, as already mentioned, this plan consisted only of a statement of projects without any calculations.

the desire to create employment, to make goods available, and to provide certain social services. To what extent have the public enterprises fulfilled these high hopes?

The area where the performance of Guinea's public enterprises is easiest to measure is their contribution to the financing of the country's development plans. At the end of the first plan, they had contributed less than 10% of the total investments instead of the expected 20%.¹ Under the Seven-Year plan, their estimated 3 billion francs annual profit was much below what they were expected to contribute to the financing of the plan.² This inadequate contribution amounts to a serious failure considering some advantages from which these enterprises benefit. The commercial enterprises can make profits from the margin between the cost of their imports and the higher prices at which they are sold internally. The industrial enterprises can make profits from the valuation of depreciation allowances and the cost of material inputs at the low official rate of exchange. Furthermore, the state enterprises, as a whole, enjoy a monopoly which enables them to fix prices at levels to ensure profits.

Against these advantages are a number of problems which have adversely affected the operation of these enterprises leading to the very limited success mentioned above. One category of problems was the lack of adequate preparation prior to the establishment of enterprises. For example, when the complexe textile de Sanoua was completed in 1966 (with British financial assistance), the local production of cotton which was expected

¹ Barry, op.cit.

² Secrétariat d'Etat à l'idéologie, au télé-enseignement et à l'alphabétisation, Le Phénomène de l'échange, par le camarade N'Famara Keita, BPN member, Minister of Trade Domaine (Conakry: Centre de diffusion télé-enseignement, 1er trimestre, 1970), mimeo, p.39.

to supply one-third of the factory's needs amounted to only 60 tons (the factory needs 10,000 tons per year). This was because no plan for cultivating cotton in areas with favourable soil and climatic conditions was adopted; instead, targets of cotton production were fixed for all party federations irrespective of soil and climatic conditions.¹ While bad planning led to inadequate local supply of raw material, shortage of foreign exchange limited the amount that could be imported. The result is that since 1966, the textile factory has operated at less than 25% of its capacity and it recorded a loss of over 61 million francs in 1966/67.

Another example is the conserverie de Manou constructed with Russian aid in 1963 and expected to produce tinned meat, tinned tomatoes and soft drinks. Because no adequate attention was paid to the cultivation of fresh tomatoes and the supply of cattle, the factory has been unable to function at full capacity. In 1964/65, only 285 tons of fresh tomatoes were available instead of an estimated total of 2,000. The following year, supply rose only to 308 tons. The cattle supplied was so small that tinned meat production was abandoned and this has meant that the ultra-modern abattoir constructed within the factory has lain idle ever since.²

A second category of problems concerns the organization of the public enterprises. ~~According to the 1960 statute on the organization of public enterprises.~~ According to the 1960 statute on the organization of public enterprises, every enterprise of an industrial or commercial character should have a civil personality and financial autonomy. The purpose of

¹ The target fixed for 1965/66 was 1,000 tons and for 1970, 4,000 tons.

² See Suret-Canale, op.cit. pp.316-317.

these arrangements being to allow some freedom of action to the enterprises. This freedom is to be exercised under the overall supervision of a tutelage minister. What has happened in practice is that this freedom of action has been undermined in a most crucial area - personnel management-which is organized along civil service lines and lacks any flexibility that the different enterprises may have wished to adopt to obtain better results. For example, it is possible that if senior posts in the enterprises were not regarded as civil service posts the employment of qualified foreigners might be more acceptable to the regime. If the freedom of action in personnel management was undermined, no control of the financial autonomy of the enterprises was established until in 1967 when a Ministry - now a Secretariat of State - was created to watch over the finances of the state enterprises. It is widely admitted that this lack of financial control cost the enterprises a considerable sum of money. President Touré put the situation dramatically when, in his address to the officials of the newly created service of financial control, he said that the majority of the Directors of state enterprises would accept 'in their hearts of heart' that they all deserved a uniform sentence of 20 years imprisonment for embezzlement without any formal investigations.¹

A third category of problems concerns the personnel who operate these enterprises. The size of the public sector was never related to the availability of trained personnel and this resulted in the appointment of people with inadequate training and experience to senior posts on many enterprises. The most

¹In La RDA-PDG, no. 16, (April 1967), p.124.

notorious case was that of the commercial enterprises which were entrusted to people whose prior experience was in private trade. The following statement of the Minister of State for Justice and Administrative and Financial Control in 1963 shows that Guinean leaders were aware of this problem:

In reality many of our cadres, especially in the State Enterprises and in the financial sector are not incompetent elements, but they are not trained for the work which they have been called upon to do, and for those who desire to learn, nothing is lost. Unfortunately, the majority, once appointed to those posts, sleep in the fallacious tranquillity of the decree of their appointment.¹

President Touré, himself, tells us the consequences of such appointments: 'Our directors of enterprises could not adapt to their new duties overnight, they were ignorant of certain commercial rules . . . Some of them had committed mistakes and, confusing the national interest with their private interests, they have committed malversations and embezzlements' (italics added)².

The ignorance and incompetence of many senior officials aggravated the losses due to financial mismanagement and their inability to distinguish between the national interest and their private interests was largely responsible for the numerous cases of embezzlement.³ The organizational weaknesses of the enterprises were aggravated by the incompetence, ignorance, and corruption of the officials and it is no wonder that the profits they recorded were consistently below the government's expectations.

¹ Horoya, 12 November 1963.

² Touré, Vol. XIV, p.45.

³ The 35 cases of embezzlement recorded in 1969 involved sums ranging from 2 to 106 million francs; reports were published in issues of Horoya-hebdo.

Although steps have been taken in recent years to correct some of the organizational weaknesses, some of the problems still remain. The administrative training programmes (both pre- and in-service) embarked upon since the mid-1960s have reduced the proportion of ignorant officials and increased the effectiveness of many others. However, the supply of qualified personnel is still below demand¹ and the crucial problem of confusing the national interest with private interests continues to be the cause of many embezzlements.² Self-management was experimented in 1964 with the printing enterprise (Imprimerie nationale Patrice Lumumba) but was discontinued in 1966 because the elected management was only concerned with increasing the salary and allowances of the personnel and not with increased productivity.³ Another experiment embarked upon in the mid-1960s sought to ensure control and supervision of the enterprises' activities through party committees created within the enterprises - the Comités d'unité

¹ This problem was further aggravated by two factors. First there was a high rate of turnover among the Directors of enterprises which made effective management difficult: the duration of most Directors' postings between 1959 and 1970 ranged between 6 and 18 months. Second, a number of key officials of public enterprises have been dismissed from their functions (and imprisoned in most cases) because of alleged involvement in the several 'plots' against the regime since independence. The most extensive purge followed the abortive invasion of November 1970; see issues of Horoya-hebdo and Horoya, January through November 1971.

² Although this problem is not peculiar to Guinea, the special economic and monetary situation in the country has increased its intensity.

³ Decree no. 47/PRG of 14 November 1964, JORG, 1 Dec. 1964 introduced self-management allowing the enterprise to spend 60% of its annual profit 'in the interest of the Enterprise and of its personnel'. Decree no. 408/PRG of 29 November 1966, JORG, 15 December 1966 withdrew the right of self management and cancelled all modifications in personnel salary and allowances decided upon during the period of self management.

de production (CUP). A CUP is expected to 'participate in the preparation and watch over the correct implementation of the production plan, the budget and programme of activity of the enterprise'.¹ The reform of the CUPs announced in January 1971 admitted that they had so far failed in their task: 'In the past, the Committees of the Units of Production have not fully fulfilled their role to lead, animate and control the production in the enterprise and in a general manner the life of the enterprise.'²

Instead, many CUPs are alleged to have constituted themselves into 'trade unions of the defenders of dishonest workers condemnable for theft, embezzlement, monetary and good traffic'; others 'have associated themselves with Directors of Enterprises to organize theft and the embezzlement of property belonging to the national patrimony'; and others still 'have done nothing to prevent the installation of absenteeism, anarchy, irresponsibility, and paralysis within the enterprise'.³ To remedy this situation, the Circular states that henceforth, a CUP shares equal responsibility with the director of the enterprise. The crucial decisions of the enterprise concerning 'personnel, promotion, dismissal and holidays must cease to be the domain of the management to become the affair of management and the CUP executive'.⁴

¹See La RDA-PDG, no. 39 (n.d.), p.155.

²Presidential Circular no. 005/71/PRG of 30 January 1971.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

The significance of this circular is that it is an official confirmation of the problems that have confronted Guinea's public enterprises. As to the effectiveness of the new joint responsibility between CUPs and the officials of enterprises, the big doubt is whether CUP officials possess sufficient knowledge and training to enable them to exercise this responsibility. The reform is not likely to bring any fundamental change to the existing situation.

From the above, it is not surprising that Guinea's public enterprises have so far failed to perform satisfactorily the function of supplying goods and services to the public. It is estimated that the majority of the enterprises operate at less than 25% of their full capacity.¹ However, as an instrument for generating employment, Guinean public enterprises have produced tangible results. Taking 1964 as a base with 100¹ salaried workers in the industrial public enterprises, the percentage rose to 258 in 1966 and to 425 in 1970.² Even this achievement needs to be qualified. Part of the reason for transferring the recruitment of personnel in public enterprises to a central government ministerial department in 1965 was that most enterprises systematically recruited more staff than they needed. It is also true that the curve representing the personnel strength of most enterprises only moves upwards, never downwards, regardless of changes in production.³ The fact that every employee became

¹ Rivière, 'Les Conséquences de la réorganisation des circuits commerciaux en Guinée, ' Revue française d'études politiques africaines, no. 66 (June 1971), p.92.

² Bokoum, op. cit., p.86.

³ For the case of the railway, see Suret-Canale, op.cit. p.334: 'the personnel . . . is out of proportion with the services rendered by the railway'.

a civil servant in 1969 has helped to confirm many unnecessary appointments. The result of all this is an excessive growth of the tertiary sector resulting in an increased demand for food production but at the same time taking more people away from that activity.¹

Overall, the above account reveals the limited contribution of Guinea's public enterprises to the country's development. However, the regime's emphasis on the fact that the number and size of these enterprises confirm its 'non-capitalist' option should not be ignored. The inability of these enterprises to generate the necessary capital for financing development is perhaps the chief reason for the recent importance attached to mixed-economy enterprises in the exploitation of the country's mineral resources.² However, the regime still has to take urgent steps to tackle the numerous problems (the most important of which are mentioned above) facing the existing public enterprises in order to ensure a steady improvement in the quantity and quality of the goods and services they provide. Unfortunately, a recent government statement that these problems are due to 'the wish of imperialism to destroy the Guinean regime in the vital sector of Industry' suggests that these problems might be left in abeyance while attention is concentrated on anti-

¹ Rivière, op. cit. p. 94.

² Agreements have already been concluded with Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Russia, and a number of North American and West European firms for the establishment of mixed-economy enterprises for the exploitation of the country's rich bauxite deposits. Similar agreements are under way for the exploitation of the Nimba-Simandou iron ore. The most advanced project is the Boké project which involves a number of North American and West European firms in the exploitation of bauxite around Boké; Guinea's share is 51%. It is expected that production will start in 1972 yielding about 3.6 billion francs to Guinea in foreign exchange.

imperialist rhetoric.¹

Senegal

The establishment of Senegal's earliest public enterprises accompanied the administrative reform of January 1960.² These enterprises were conceived of as specialized institutions for promoting the country's economic and social development within the context of the country's option for a planned economy. By 1970, this policy had resulted in the establishment of eighteen public enterprises.³ An examination of these enterprises reveals the aspects of the country's development programme for which public enterprises are considered suitable. First, some public enterprises have been established for promoting agricultural, commercial, and industrial development in rural areas. Five enterprises are devoted to this objective: the Office de commercialisation agricole du Senegal (OCAS), the Office national de coopération et d'assistance pour le développement (ONCAD), the Société de développement rizicole du Sénégal (SDRS), the Société d'aménagement et d'exploitation des terres de fleuve Senegal (SAED), and the Société de développement agricole et industriel de la Casamance (SODAICA). A second area is the provision of social services like housing, education, arts, ex-servicemen affairs for which five enterprises have been created:

¹ See Horoya, 1 Jan. 1972.

² Prior to this date, Senegal had joined the Soudan (present-day Mali) in creating a few public enterprises - the Port of Dakar, an Office of Posts and Telecommunications, and a Railway régie - within the framework of the Mali Federation. At the collapse of the Federation in August 1960, all three were reconstituted on a national basis.

³ In addition, the State was participating in about twenty mixed-economy societies.

the Office national des anciens combattants et victimes de la guerre, the Centre des oeuvres universitaires, the Société des spectacles nationaux, the Office des habitations à loyer modéré (OHLM), and the Caisse de compensation des prestations familiales et des accidents du travail. Third, there are four enterprises concerned with transport which seek both to promote economic development as well as to provide social services: the Régie des chemins de fer du Sénégal the Régie des transports du Sénégal,¹ the Office des postes et télécommunication du Sénégal (OPTS), and the Port de commerce de Dakar. Fourth, two enterprises are concerned with two specific aspects of economic development: the Institut de technologie alimentaire is concerned with food and the Office sénégalais de l'artisanat is concerned with crafts. Finally, two enterprises - the Radiodiffusion nationale and the Agence de presse sénégalaise (APS) - are concerned with communication between the government and the people on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between the government and the outside world.

Perhaps the most striking point to make with regard to the above list is the limited scope of public enterprises in Senegal. For example, neither water nor electricity, generally considered as essential public services, is organized as a public enterprise. Also, besides the enterprises connected with rural development in general, the important field of trade and industry is virtually untouched.² There are two explanations for this limited role

¹ Was transformed into a mixed-economy enterprise in July 1971.

² The SODAICA which is the most explicitly industrial of the rural development enterprises had by 1970 established no single industry in the Casamance region.

of public enterprises. First, successive Senegalese governments have emphasized the country's need for private investment and have been prepared to leave untouched those areas that interest private investors (trade and industry especially) - at most, the government participates as a minor (in most cases) or a major partner in running some of these activities as mixed economy enterprises.¹

The second explanation is that the government has experienced so many difficulties in running the existing public enterprises that it has been more preoccupied with solving these problems than with creating new ones. The government's decision to transform the régie de transports du Sénégal into a mixed enterprise (which became effective in July 1971) was officially justified in terms of private enterprise helping to solve some of the management problems experienced.² These considerations influenced the government's decision in May 1970 to introduce a measure of 'denationalization' (desétatisation) whereby only very few public enterprises will be preserved. One of three methods could be used to achieve this objective: invite private investors to participate in some of the enterprises thereby transforming them into mixed enterprises (the example of the transport régie),³

¹The following are examples of state participation in mixed enterprises: Phosphates de Taïba (the only mining industry), 5%; the Société africaine de raffinage (oil refining), 10%; and BNDS (the major financial institution), 52%.

²See Le Soleil, 5 May 1970.

³This method raises the problem of how far the government will be prepared to go in sharing with private investors the profits of enterprises on which public funds have been used for the heavy initial investment.

dissolve those enterprises created for specific purposes once those purposes have been achieved;¹ and, finally, constitute some enterprises into ministerial departments.²

The conclusion to draw from the above is that the Senegalese government has not been impressed by the contribution of the public enterprises to the achievement of social and economic progress. In 1969, the outstanding debt of these enterprises was over 6½ billion francs.³ In other words, they were not generating any capital for financing development projects. Although it is not easy to measure public satisfaction with the services provided by the enterprises, the chaos and delays that characterized the transport régie are likely to apply to the railway, the port of Dakar, and the OPTS.

This poor performance of Senegal's public enterprises is due to a variety of factors. First, until 1966, the legislation on public enterprises was characterized by a lack of clear definition of the duties of directors, a muddled personnel policy, inadequate tutelage, and absence of effective methods of control.⁴ Two laws passed in 1966 sought to correct these

¹This method refers in particular to the enterprises concerned with promoting rural development. The success of this approach will be remarkable as it will invalidate the widely accepted view that rather than disappear, an organization would find a new raison d'être.

²This method was first applied to the public enterprise for tourism - the Office du Tourisme, created in 1960 - which, in 1964, became part of the ministry of Information, Tourism and Telecommunication.

³See Senghor, Le Plan de développement ou la participation responsable comme moteur du développement, A Report to the Seventh UPS Congress, Dakar, December 27-30, 1969.

⁴See J.P. Masseron, 'Les Etablissement publics au Sénégal,' Bulletin de l'Institut international d'administration publique, 11 (July-Sept. 1969), 74-83.

weaknesses: a law of 2 May 1966 which focused on tutelage and methods of control¹ and the law of 4 July 1966 on personnel policy.² In 1970, the law on personnel policy was still unapplied and although the methods of tutelage and control had been clearly set out, many irregularities were still traceable to their incorrect application as revealed during a national seminar on the management of public enterprises held in Thiès in December 1969.³ The only reform introduced in 1966 which became effective afterwards concerns the control of financial operations entrusted to a special centre (the Centre des établissements publics) which functions as a service of the Ministry of Finance. This centre collects the statistical and accounting data necessary for controlling the financial operations - both à priori and à posteriori - of the public enterprises. It is claimed that the centre has effectively improved financial management.⁴

Personnel constitutes a second problem. Although it was solved at the legislative level in 1966, the legislation has not been applied. This legislation introduced a general statute for the middle and senior level personnel of all public enterprises. The officials whose existing rights will be adversely affected by the application of this statute have successfully prevented its application. Not only has this meant that a variety of personnel agreements have continued to be used (civil service statute, collective agreement, labour code, contract, temporary

¹ Law no. 66-27 of 2 May 1966, JORS, 28 May 1966.

² Law no. 66-68 of 4 July 1966, JORS, 16 July 1966.

³ Presidential Note no. 14/PR/SG/BOM of 6 January 1970.

⁴ Ibid.

agreements), it has also rendered difficult the government's desire to reduce the staff of the enterprises. Although the government considers the 12,000 staff employed by its 18 public enterprises plethoric, it has been unable to reduce it. This in turn has meant that a considerable proportion of some enterprises' budget goes to personnel salaries: 80% in the case of the railway in 1967, for example.

Another angle to the personnel problem is the inadequacy of the training of a substantial proportion of staff. As already mentioned, the hope that private investors would inject more effective managerial staff partly explains the increasing interest in mixed enterprises. The inadequacy of the training at the highest level was also revealed at the 1969 seminar after which the President of the Republic sent round a list of books on business management as required reading for these officials.¹ It is hoped that the increasing emphasis on training at all levels both locally and abroad will help to solve this problem.²

All this explains why the government has decided to keep the number of its public enterprises as small as possible. However, there is some consolation in the 4,400 houses constructed by the OHLM between 1961 and 1968, and the contribution made by the rural development enterprises to the successes recorded in that field (supra). Besides, regardless of the management problems and persistent deficits, there is probably no other

¹ Ibid.

² The government has yet to decide whether to create a section of management studies at the Ecole nationale d'administration du Sénégal (ENAS) or to entrust this mission to the Faculty of Economics of Dakar University. In the meantime, trainees are sent abroad, especially to France.

method of running some services like the railway - short of abolishing them - than through a public enterprise. The signs are that the faith put in public enterprises as an effective method of promoting development has been shaken and their role in the years ahead is likely to become more and more limited.

Comparison and Conclusion

In two of the three areas of development activity examined above, there is clearly no difference in the goals pursued in Guinea and Senegal. In regard to economic planning, both countries are seeking to establish an administrative machinery for planning and in respect of rural development, the objective of both countries is to create an administrative framework within which to pursue the task of promoting agricultural production. In each area of activity, however, there are significant differences in the way both countries have sought to achieve these common goals. While in Senegal pragmatic solutions have been sought to the problems encountered in the pursuit of these goals, in Guinea, the regime has consistently sought to take account of the established ideology and to accommodate the official role of the party.

A good illustration of this contrasting approach is the reaction of the two countries to the problem posed by the shortage of planning experts after independence. At first, both countries accepted the need to rely on foreign technical assistance. But while Senegal has maintained this solution, Guinea later rejected it and, instead, decided to involve the party structure in both the elaboration and implementation of the country's plans. Since the trained personnel resources of both

the party and the administration are inadequate, the regime has been unable to establish an effective planning machinery and the second plan it prepared, the Seven-Year Plan, was little more than a shopping list of projects.

In Senegal, on the other hand, the continued reliance on French planning experts together with the larger number of trained national personnel resulted in the establishment of an effective planning machinery and the preparation of better plans. The difference in the size of trained national manpower in the two countries can be judged from the following figures: in 1967, only 6.3% of Guinea's civil service personnel had received secondary education and above compared to 8.5% in Senegal; and by 1970, Guinea had 62 trained senior administrators (ENFOM and ESA graduates) compared to 200 in Senegal (ENFOM, IHDOM, and ENAS graduates). The difference in the extent of reliance on foreign experts was equally considerable. The total number of foreign experts in Guinea outside the teaching and medical professions was 99 in 1967 compared to 348 in Senegal. Finally, while Guinea's Seven-Year Plan was being prepared within the party organization, Senegal's second Four-Year Plan benefitted from the assistance of 106 French experts working within the administration and 33 others from the private sector.¹

As already pointed out, the Guinean regime has refused to employ many foreign experts because it believes that this would make the country 'neo-colonial' and therefore contradict the established ideology. The importance attached to the involvement of the party organization in the planning process accords

¹ Source: Documents on the Second Four-Year Development Plan consulted in the Archives nationales de la République du Sénégal.

with the pre-eminent role assigned to it in all aspects of national life.

Besides the point already made about the existence of a functioning administrative machinery for planning in Senegal and the non-existence of one in Guinea, concrete results are difficult to compare. In Senegal, the planning machinery that exists spends a considerable time re-adjusting plans as a result of the country's great dependence on external finance. In Guinea, on the other hand, the non-existence of an effective planning machinery is rationalized in the name of the supremacy of politics over economics. One comparative index that is available gives the per capita income in Senegal in 1967 as 170 dollars compared to 70 dollars in Guinea.¹ However, the wide difference indicated here is an exaggeration as the presence of about 30,000 Europeans in Senegal compared to only about 3,000 in Guinea is not taken into account in the calculations. It is reasonable to assume that Europeans living in new states in general have a higher per capita income than the nationals.²

The contrasting approach mentioned above has also been adopted in regard to the task of rural development. While Senegal's pragmatic approach has resulted in the establishment of

¹ A Rivkin, Nation Building in Africa (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), p.262. Statistics on overall economic performance in Guinea are rare and this makes it impossible to establish more comparisons. In the circumstances, most people simply join President Touré in describing the Guinean economy as 'underdeveloped or undeveloped'. Some interpret this to mean an admission of economic recession; see, for example, Rivière, Mutations sociales en Guinée, op.cit., pp.396-398.

² This is because the majority of Europeans are technical experts, skilled workers and entrepreneurs while the vast majority of the nationals are peasant farmers.

an institutional framework within which the administration is pursuing the task of promoting agricultural production, the Guinean regime spent the same period trying out a number of experiments in which the party organization was intimately involved. Although the institutional framework established in Senegal turned out to be very complex and the cooperatives created were not functioning properly, some improvement in agricultural production and in the standard of living of the rural masses was noticeable by 1970 over what existed in 1960.¹ The government also promised in 1970 to take steps to simplify the structures, avoid duplication and ensure better co-ordination in order to achieve better results. In Guinea, on the other hand, the quantifiable evidence available suggests that no significant improvement has taken place in agricultural production.² But the PRLs and the socialist communities - the last and final experiment (according to the regime's leaders) - introduced in the late sixties appear to provide a suitable framework within which to promote agricultural production provided the necessary financial and technical assistance is forthcoming.

In the third area of activity considered, the use of public

¹See P. Fougeryrollas, Où va le Sénégal? (Paris: Editions anthropos, 1970), pp.45-115. Fougeryrollas' conclusion is based on a detailed psycho-social survey carried out in the different regions of Senegal in 1968 and 1969. The writer's visits to different parts of Senegal in 1965, 1968, 1970 and 1971 lead him to accept this conclusion.

²Suret-Canale, op.cit., pp.252-259. However, it is difficult to conclude from this that the standard of living of Guineans in rural areas in 1970 was not qualitatively superior to what it was in 1958. In the absence of a survey like that of Fougeryrollas on Senegal (which the regime forbids at present), no valid judgment can be passed.

enterprises for promoting development, the contrast in the ideological position of each country is reflected in practice: Guinea's numerous public enterprises established in conformity with the country's 'non-capitalist way' contrasts with the few public enterprises in Senegal in line with the 'realistic' application of 'African socialism' in determining the size of the public sector. This ideological contrast needs some qualifications in both cases. In Guinea, side by side with the continuous emphasis on the ideological motivation, an increasing importance is being attached to mixed enterprises in the field of mineral exploitation (supra). And in Senegal the 'realism' of the leaders is perhaps no more than a camouflage for hiding their resignation to a situation where private enterprise plays a dominant role in the country's economy. Prime Minister Dia expressed this as follows in 1961:

Private capitalists must accept spontaneously to 'nationalize' themselves, that is to say, to participate in our national construction. We do not, for our part, envisage other process of 'nationalization' beyond this free cooperation.¹

The organ of the French capitalist interests in Senegal, Echos de France, has interpreted 'African socialism' à la Senghor as follows:

African socialism has not got a doctrinaire basis ...In several speeches, President Senghor has expanded on this point and declared in a very clear manner and without any trace of ambiguity that Senegal intended to leave industry and commerce in complete liberty [that is to private capital].²

¹ Déclaration prononcée par M. Dia devant l'Assemblée nationale et les délégations invitées aux fêtes de l'indépendance du Sénégal, (Dakar: n.p. April 1961), p.23.

² Echos de France, May 1964.

Perhaps what should be emphasized is the fact that in neither country have the public enterprises fulfilled the hopes placed in them and for this reason, Guinea is expanding its mixed-economy sector in spite of her continued commitment to a 'non-capitalist way' and in Senegal, the 'realism' of 'African socialism' allows both the private and mixed-economy sectors to expand at the expense of public enterprises.

In all, this chapter has been concerned with examining the ways in which the administrations in Guinea and Senegal have been used to promote development activities. The major point that emerges in regard to Guinea is that the regime has sought to take account of the established ideology as well as to accommodate the official role of the party. The relevant part of the Guinean ideology here is the doctrine of the supremacy of politics over economics. On the whole, the application of this doctrine has had negative effects on the efforts made to establish functioning administrative institutions - the rejection of foreign experts who are clearly needed and the creation of more public enterprises than the available manpower resources can staff and run. The major effect of the considerations for the party role has been the importance attached to popular participation in the planning process and in the management of public enterprises. These features of the Guinean approach contrast with the situation in Senegal where pragmatic and practical solutions have been adopted. And it is significant that the contrasts between the characteristics of the administrative arrangements established for promoting development in the two countries are consistent with those already identified in regard

to the other areas of administrative development examined in this study. For instance, the central planning machinery which the Guinean regime has tried to establish is similar to that established in Senegal and this recalls the similarity in their ministerial structures. Furthermore, the arrangements created at regional and local levels in Guinea, notably the socialist communities and the local revolutionary authorities, take account of the established ideology and contrast with the situation in Senegal where the administrative units established under colonial rule have been used with only some minor modifications. Finally, the emphasis on popular participation in the various development activities in Guinea and the little attention paid to the same in Senegal is in line with the contrasting position taken by the two countries towards popular participation in the work of the administration.

CHAPTER 8

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The problem of administration or bureaucracy in developing countries though conceptually awkward, is crucial, and fully justifies the empirical and theoretical attention of social scientists.

J.P. Nettl¹

Throughout this study we have tried to investigate a general proposition postulated in the light of the existing studies of Guinea and Senegal. According to this proposition, in Senegal the central government administration would represent an apparent evolution out of the French colonial administration modified and adapted to suit the goals of the government but in accordance with the basic ideas and principles that underlay the French colonial administration. With Guinea, on the other hand, given the way in which independence was achieved, the stated ideology and goals of the government and the emphasis in academic studies on the party both as a policy making and, in some cases, as an administrative institution, it might be expected that past colonial experience would have a minimal influence and that the central government administration would have markedly different characteristics; and thus, that this central government administration would present significant contrasts to that in Senegal.

¹Political Mobilization (London, Faber and Faber, 1967), p.361.

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to sum up the results of the investigation carried out in the preceding chapters.

The background chapters to this study (Chapters 1 and 2) reveal that there are two major elements inside the proposition advanced. First, there is the similarity in the nature of the administrative inheritances of Guinea and Senegal at independence and second, there is the difference in the post-independence political ideologies of the two countries. The similar administrative inheritances is due to the fact that both countries were administered under a common administrative system established by the French rulers and at independence their emerging administrative institutions were marked by the characteristics of the French colonial administration.

In contrast, the political ideologies of the two countries are fundamentally different. Senegal's political ideology expresses a commitment to constitutionalism and, as shown in Chapter 2, this does not contradict any of the basic ideas and principles that underlay the French colonial administration. In Guinea, on the other hand, the political ideology suggests that the administration ought to have developed characteristics that will present significant contrasts to both the colonial and Senegalese administrations.

For the proposition advanced in this study to be proved, the evolution of the central government administration in Guinea must have been almost entirely determined by the post-independence political ideology. It is this that will reduce the influence of the past colonial administrative experience to a minimum and ensure that the administration will show characteristics which

are significantly different from those of both the colonial and Senegalese administrations.

The findings of the different subjects examined in the remaining chapters of the study show that the central government administration in Senegal has developed as a clear continuation of the French colonial administration with only some modifications and adaptations made in the light of the new goals of the government. In the case of Guinea, the findings show that while the administration has developed several characteristics that have been dictated by the political ideology, it has nevertheless been far more obviously influenced by the past colonial experience than might have been expected. In other words, political ideology has not determined the evolution of the administration to the extent that is expected.

In Senegal, the continuity with the past colonial administrative experience is evident in the fact that the post-independence administrative organization at ministerial level has preserved the same basic features that characterized the ministerial organization established towards the end of the colonial period. These include the structure of ministries, the central role assigned to ministerial cabinets in the organization of work within the ministries and the importance attached to the idea of a judicial check on administrative action. Also, the administrative organization at regional and local levels has preserved the essential characteristics of the arrangements established under colonial rule. The system of personnel administration adopted, too, is the same as that which was established by the colonial administration - a career system of administration. In

this case, not only have the basic principles of the colonial system been preserved, most of the rules, regulations and procedures which deal with their application have been closely copied from the colonial model.

However, unlike the case of personnel administration where even the details of the post-independence arrangements have been influenced by the colonial experience, some adaptations and modifications have taken place in the administrative arrangements at ministerial level and at regional and local levels. In the ministerial organization, the number of ministries have been increased in order to take account of the expansion in the scope of government work; the composition and functions of the ministerial cabinets have been adapted to suit local realities; and, for reasons of economy of finance and personnel, the institutions responsible for the judicial control of administrative action form part of a unified legal system instead of the colonial tradition of a separate administrative jurisdiction. In the case of administrative organization at regional and local levels special importance is attached to using the established administrative units for promoting economic and social development. Also, the emphasis placed on the need to maintain the authority of the central government throughout the territory of the state (the task of national integration) has become an important factor in the appointment of the chief agents who head the different administrative units.

Because the past colonial experience has continued to influence the evolution of the administrative organization in Guinea contrary to what is suggested by the emphasis on the party in

the official conception of administration as well as in the current academic studies of the country, the characteristic features of the post-independence administrative organization are similar to those in Senegal in some important respects. In ministerial organization, the similarities include the structure of ministries, the role of ministerial cabinets, and the idea of a judicial control of financial administration. And in regard to personnel administration, Guinea has preserved the same principles of a career system of administration as are maintained in Senegal.

On the other hand, the features of administrative organization that have been dictated by the established ideology contrast with those of the Senegalese administration. For instance, the idea of a judicial institution which provides the means of securing redress against administrative action and of challenging administrative decisions has been virtually abandoned. This was a prominent feature of the colonial administration which has been preserved in Senegal. What can be regarded as a substitute for this institution in Guinea is the system of open tribunals which forms part of the party institutions involved in administrative work (Chapter 6) completely outside the ministerial organization. It is interesting to mention that while the drawback of the Guinean open tribunals is the lack of defined rules and procedures which make them open to some arbitrariness, in Senegal, the rigidity of the rules and procedures of the established institutions is the major reason for their limited use. On balance, the Guinean approach appears more suited to its milieu.

In regard to the administrative organization at regional and local levels, the application of the doctrine of party supremacy to administrative organization has produced features which contrast with those of the Senegalese administration. These include the replacement of administrators by politicians in key posts and the adjustment of administrative units and organization to match party organization - both of them based on the principle of democratic centralism. Finally, in applying the principles of a career system of administration, two important modifications have been introduced in response to the established ideology which contrast with the situation in Senegal. First, the principles of a career system of administration are applied to all employees of the state (since 1969) and not just to a restricted category of workers as is the case in Senegal where the colonial practice has been preserved. And, second, while recruitment policy in Senegal has remained as it was under colonial rule - recruitment by qualifications or through competitive examinations - in Guinea, party militancy has been introduced as an additional criterion for recruitment.

The theme of continuity and change which emerges from the above summary of the evolution of the administrative organization in both Guinea and Senegal is also reflected in the relationship between the administration and representative institutions in Senegal. The purpose of creating representative institutions is exactly the same in post-independence Senegal as under colonial rule: the need to associate some elected representatives of the people with the work of the administration in order to ensure some measure of public participation and control. The

nature of the institutions created are also similar to those that were established under colonial rule with the National Assembly as the successor of the Territorial Assembly while the municipal councils have been preserved. The changes that have taken place consist of modifications in the composition and functions of these institutions and the creation of two new institutions - regional assemblies and rural councils.

In complete contrast to Senegal, the past colonial experience has had no influence on either the nature or the purpose of the representative institutions with which the Guinean administration has had to cope. The purpose of these institutions is fixed by the part of the Guinean ideology which expresses the regime's belief in the eventual withering away of the administration (with the state) and this has led to the adoption of a policy which ultimately hopes to entrust the entire work of the administration to elected citizens. This objective clearly differs from that pursued in Senegal. Also, the institutions created are all integral parts of the party organization and this has led to the disappearance of the municipal councils created under colonial rule while the National Assembly (the apparent successor of the Territorial Assembly) has been transformed into a party institution.

The approaches of both countries to the common tasks of national integration and development reflect some of the above similarities and contrasts. Both countries rely chiefly on the unitary and centralized structure of their administrations - a feature inherited from the colonial administration - to take care of the task of national integration. Both countries, too,

see the loyalty of the members of the representative institutions to the central authority as a means of ensuring national integration. The fairly high degree of public participation in administrative work in Guinea - notably the situation within the local revolutionary authorities where the entire work of the administration is in the hands of elected citizens - can be described as an additional effort in this direction. The major similarity in the administrative arrangements created for development activities in the two countries is at the ministerial level. The central planning machinery which the Guinean regime has tried to establish is similar to that established in Senegal and this recalls the similarity in their ministerial structures. On the other hand, the arrangements created at the regional and local levels in Guinea, notably the socialist communities and the local revolutionary authorities, which take account of the established ideology contrast with the situation in Senegal where the administrative units established under colonial rule have been used with only some minor modifications.

What broad trends of development do the above conclusions indicate? Perhaps the most important point to make here is the question of time factor. The period of eleven to thirteen years covered by this study is rather short for drawing any definitive conclusions. An interesting case in this regard is the Guinean approach to promoting agricultural development. Very little was achieved in this field during the period examined in the study largely because the regime spent most of the time trying one experiment after another. But the present situation might be radically changed in future if the new institutions created as

a result of the experiments - the socialist communities and the local revolutionary authorities - begin to function effectively. However, leaving aside specific issues, it is possible to identify a dominant trend in the case of each country. (It is assumed that there will be no change in the political ideologies of the two countries).

In Senegal, the dominant trend is a continuation of the French-style administration. Besides the continued presence of a sizable number of French officials within the Senegalese administration,¹ there are a number of other factors that are favourable to continued French influence in matters of administrative development. First, the old elite of the administration (the pre-independence generation) who have been brought up to look up to France for inspiration in matters of administrative development are not likely to abandon the principles and ideas with which they are familiar. The fact that the new elite (the post-independence generation) are still required to undergo a short period of internship within the French metropolitan administration before being appointed to posts further underlines this point. A second factor connected to the above is the fact that all the literature on administrative matters to which the majority of the Senegalese officials are exposed is French (French is the official language of Senegal). Third, there is no aspect of the present ideology which questions any of the ideas and

¹ In 1970, the total number of French technical assistance personnel in Senegal was 1,242 of whom 355 were working within the administrative services. This represents a slight reduction compared to the preceding years. For instance, the total number of French personnel in 1960 was 1,700 and in 1967, the number of Frenchmen working within the administrative services was 500.

principles of a French-style administration.

In Guinea, the trend is towards a greater involvement of elected citizens in the work of the administration at the lower levels of the administrative organization while at the higher levels, many aspects of traditional administrative arrangements are maintained. It seems likely that the Guinean regime will continue with the policy of entrusting the entire work of the administration to elected citizens within the local revolutionary authorities.¹ On the other hand, there are no signs that the aspects of traditional administrative arrangements found at the higher levels (for example, the ministerial structure and the recruitment of professionally qualified officials) will disappear. This situation is rather similar to that in the Soviet Union where the work of the administration at the lowest level of the administrative organization (the soviets) is entrusted to elected citizens while at the higher levels many aspects of traditional administrative arrangements are maintained.² At present, the traditional aspects of the Guinean administration have a French mark as a result of the continuing influence of the past colonial experience. But the fact that the elite of the administration is being exposed to the administrative experiences of several other countries besides France means that

¹ Since 1967, the country's major national languages are taught in the schools as well as to the adult population. This is regarded as a means of ensuring meaningful dialogue between the appointed officials of the administration (present and potential) and the elected citizens who are involved in administrative work.

² On Russian administration, see P. Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956).

non-French borrowings might become evident in the future.¹

In conclusion, we should like to mention the contribution of this study to the current academic knowledge of Guinea and Senegal. In regard to Senegal, the study provides confirmatory evidence for the existing academic interpretation of the country. This evidence is significant in that it relates to a subject - the evolution of the post-independence central government administration - that has hitherto received very little academic attention. In the case of Guinea, the study shows the extent to which some of the characteristics of the central government administration are due to the past colonial administrative experience and some to the post-independence political ideology; and thus, it corrects the notion in the existing studies of the country that the evolution of the administration has been determined only by the political ideology.

¹ Although French is the official language in Guinea (as in Senegal), the literature on administrative matters found in the country is not limited to the French experience; French translations of the Russian, Chinese, and North Vietnamese experiences (among others) are also available. In addition, serving Guinean officials are becoming familiar with these experiences as a result of regular contacts.

APPENDIX A

EXTRACTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC OF 28 OCTOBER 1946¹

PREAMBLE

. . . France together with the overseas peoples shall form a Union founded upon equality of rights and duties, without distinction of race or religion.

The French Union shall consist of nations and peoples who pool or co-ordinate their resources and their efforts to develop their respective civilizations, increase their well-being and ensure their security.

Faithful to her traditional mission, France proposes to guide the peoples for whom she has taken responsibility into freedom to administer themselves and conduct their own affairs democratically; rejecting any system of colonial rule based upon arbitrary power, she shall guarantee equal access to public office . . .

CHAPTER 1. SOVEREIGNTY

1. France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.

CHAPTER 2. PARLIAMENT

13. The National Assembly alone shall vote the law. It cannot delegate this right.

CHAPTER 8. THE FRENCH UNION: I. PRINCIPLES

60. The French Union shall be composed, on the one hand of the French Republic which comprises metropolitan France, the overseas departments and Territories, and on the other hand, of the Associated Territories and States.

¹The translation is that of P.M. Williams in Crisis and Compromise (London: Longmans, 1964) Appendix I, pp.478-492.

62. The members of the French Union shall pool all their resources in order to guarantee the defence of the whole Union. The Government of the Republic shall undertake the co-ordination of these resources and the direction of the policy appropriate to prepare and ensure this defence.

II Organisation

63. The central organs of the French Union shall be the Presidency, the High Council and the Assembly.

64. The President of the French Republic shall be president of the French Union, whose permanent interests he shall represent.

65. The High Council of the French Union shall consist of the President of the Union as chairman, a delegation of the French Government, and the representatives that each of the Associated States shall be entitled to accredit to the President of the Union.

Its function shall be to assist the Government in the general direction of the Union.

66. The Assembly of the French Union shall consist, half of members representing metropolitan France, and half of members representing the overseas departments and Territories and the Associated States.

An organic law will decide the conditions under which the different sections of the population may be represented.

67. The members of the Assembly of the Union shall be elected, for the overseas departments and Territories, by the territorial assemblies...

71. The Assembly of the French Union shall be cognizant of the bills or proposals which are submitted to it for its opinion

by the National Assembly or the Government of the French Republic or the Governments of the Associated States.

The Assembly shall be entitled to pronounce on motions presented by one of its members, and, if it decides to consider them, to instruct its Bureau to send them to the National Assembly. It may make proposals to the French Government and to the High Council of the French Union.

To be in order, the motions covered by the preceding paragraph must relate to legislation pertaining to the Overseas Territories.

72. In the Overseas Territories, legislative power shall belong to Parliament in matters of criminal law, the regulation of civil liberties and political and administrative organisation.

In all other matters, French laws shall apply in the Overseas Territories only by express provision or if they have been extended by decree to the Overseas Territories after an opinion from the Assembly of the Union.

Further, by derogation from Article 13, special provisions for each territory may be enacted by the President of the Republic in Cabinet after a prior opinion from the Assembly of the Union.

III Overseas Departments and Territories

74 . The Overseas Territories shall be granted a special statute which takes into account their particular interests within the framework of the general interests of the Republic.

This statute and the internal organization of each Overseas Territory or group of territories shall be settled by law, after an opinion from the Assembly of the French Union and consultation with the Territorial Assemblies.

75. The individual statute of a member of the Republic and of

the French Union shall be subject to change.

Alterations of statute and transfers from one category to another, within the framework settled by Article 60, may follow only from a law voted by Parliament, after consultation with the Territorial Assemblies and the Assembly of the Union.

76. The powers of the Republic shall be vested in the representative of the Government in each territory or group of territories. He shall be the head of the territorial administration.

He shall be responsible to the Government for his actions.

77. An elected Assembly shall be instituted in each territory. The electoral system, composition and competence of this Assembly shall be decided by law.

78. In the groups of territories, the management of common interests shall be entrusted to an Assembly consisting of members elected by the Territorial Assemblies.

Its composition and powers shall be settled by law.

79. The Overseas Territories shall elect representatives to the National Assembly and to the Council of the Republic under the conditions prescribed by law.

80. All subjects of the Overseas Territories shall have the status of citizen, by the same right as French nationals of metropolitan France or of the Overseas Territories. Special laws will lay down the conditions under which they exercise their rights as citizens.

81. All French nationals and subjects of the French Union shall have the status of citizen of the French Union which shall ensure for them the enjoyment of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Preamble to the present Constitution.

82. Citizens who are not subject to French civil law shall retain their personal status so long as they do not renounce it. This status in no circumstances constitutes a ground for refusing or restricting the rights and liberties pertaining to the status of French citizen.

CHAPTER 10. TERRITORIAL COLLECTIVITIES

85. The French Republic, one and indivisible, shall recognise the existence of territorial collectivities.

These collectivities shall be the communes and departments and the Overseas Territories.

86. The framework, the extent, the possible regrouping and the organization of the communes and departments, and the Overseas Territories shall be settled by law.

87. The territorial collectivities shall administer themselves freely by councils elected by universal suffrage.

Their mayor or president shall be responsible for carrying out the decisions of these councils.

88. The co-ordination of the activity of civil servants, the representation of the national interest and the administrative supervision of the territorial collectivities shall be ensured within the departmental framework, by Government delegates designated in Cabinet.

APPENDIX B

EXTRACTS FROM THE LOI-CADRE of 23 JUNE 1956¹

Title I: Provisions relative to the reforms of the institutions, administrative structures, economic and social organization.

Article 1 - Without prejudice to the reform expected from Title VIII of the Constitution [of 1946], in order to associate more closely the populations of the Overseas with the administration of their own interests, some measures of administrative decentralization and deconcentration will take place in the Territories, the groups of Territories, and in the central services under the authority of the Ministry of Overseas France.

To this end, the decrees taken in the forms prescribed by article 6 of Law no. 48-1268 of 17 August 1948 on the relationship between the Minister of Overseas France and, eventually, the interested Ministers, could:

1. Modify the role and the powers of the administration and the management of the Government Generals with a view to transforming them into organs of co-ordination, as well as modify the composition and functions of the Grand Councils and the Representative Assemblies of Madagascar;
2. Create in all the Territories Government Councils and, in addition, in Madagascar, Provincial Councils charged especially with the administration of territorial services;
3. Grant an extended deliberative power, especially for organization and management of the territorial services, to the Territorial Assemblies, the Representative and Provincial Assemblies in Madagascar, for the exercise of their functions which will be defined in decrees which

¹Translated by the writer from Journal officiel de l'Afrique occidentale française, 13 July 1956.

will come into force and when the decrees taken by virtue of the present article would have authorized them, the Assemblies could cancel or modify any regulatory text governing the matters which form part of their functions;

4. Determine the conditions for the creation and functioning of the councils of administrative circonscriptions and of rural collectivities and the methods of granting moral personality to these circonscriptions, in such a way that it will not constitute an obstacle to the creation of new municipalities.

The decrees taken by virtue of the present article could modify, abrogate, reproduce in the form of regulations the provisions of existing legislations . . .

Article 3 - The Government could by decree taken in the Council of Ministers on the report of the Minister of Overseas France and, eventually, of the interested Ministers and after the opinion of the Council of State, proceed to a reform of the public services in the Overseas Territories tending to the definition, on the one hand, of the State services responsible for the interests of the State [that is France] and, on the other hand, the territorial services responsible for the management of the interests of the Territories, as well as the division of functions between these services. This reform will have as goal:

On the one hand, to facilitate the admission of functionaries of local origin to all the echelons of the hierarchy;
On the other hand, to create an autonomous regulation of the Overseas civil service with regards to the territorial services.

To this end, it will fix the conditions for the creation of territorial cadres and the determination of their statutes and of their methods of recruitment, especially the basic salaries,

while ensuring for the functionaries and the agents under the statute of the régies presently in service, the maintenance of their existing rights, especially with regards to remunerations, social advantages, pension systems, and the normal flow of career. . . . the general statute of the agents of territorial services is determined by the order of the Chief of Territory in the Council of Government on the deliberation of the Territorial Assembly.

The special statute of the different cadres of these services, the methods and rates of their remuneration, the system of holidays and the social advantages are determined by the order of the Chief of Territory in the Council of Government after the opinion of the Territorial Assembly, such that no harm is done to the rights of the functionaries who would have just been integrated.

Article 4 - The Government could . . . without any contradiction to the Law of 30 April 1946 and to the legislative provisions which refer to it, take all measures that tend to raise the standard of living in the Territories under the authority of the Ministry of Overseas France, to favour economic development and social progress there and to facilitate economic and financial co-operation between the Metropolitan^{Country} and these Territories, especially:

- By the generalization and normalisation of education;
- By the organization and support of the production necessary for the economic equilibrium of the Territories and for the needs of the franc zone;
- By the establishment of modern forms of rural development and the establishment of a cadastral plan respecting the customary rights of the indigenous people;
- By the organization and application of a civil register;
- By the organization of structures appropriate for the domains of credit and saving;

By every modification in matters of legislation and financial regulations likely to favour private investments Overseas, such that no harm is done to the prerogatives of the Territorial Assemblies;

By all measures likely to ensure social realizations.

The Government must take all necessary measures in order to ensure in a permanent manner and at the level of the Presidency of the Council the co-ordination of the economic and financial measures related to the Metropolitan Country - Overseas ensemble:

TITLE III: Provisions relative to the institution of universal suffrage and of a single college.

Article 10 - In the Territories under the Ministry of Overseas France, elections to the National Assembly, the Territorial Assemblies, the Provincial Assemblies of Madagascar, the circonscription councils, and the municipal assemblies, will be by universal suffrage of all citizens of both sexes, whatever their statute, over the age of twenty-one, regularly registered on the electoral list and not being in any case of incapacity provided for by the law.

The punishments involving non-registration on the electoral lists are those fixed by the laws in force in the Metropolitan Country:

Article 12 - The election of members of the National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, the Territorial Assemblies, the Representative and Provincial Assemblies of Madagascar, the councils of circonscription, as well as the municipal assemblies of full, medium, and mixed communes, will be by a single college.

APPENDIX C

EXTRACTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA¹

PREAMBLE

The people of Guinea by their solid vote of 28 September 1958 have rejected domination and, by this fact, have acquired their national independence and constituted a free and sovereign State . . .

It proclaims the equality and solidarity of all its nationals without distinction of race, sex or religion . . .

The principle of the Republic of Guinea is 'Government of the people by the people and for the people'.

SECTION I: SOVEREIGNTY

1. Guinea is a democratic, secular and social Republic . . .
2. National sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it in all matters through their deputies to the National Assembly, these being elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage, or by means of a referendum.

SECTION II: NATIONAL COLLECTIVITIES

3. The Republic of Guinea is composed of territorial collectivities which are: communes, arrondissements and administrative regions.

SECTION III: PARLIAMENT

4. Parliament consists of a single National Assembly whose members, elected on a national list for five years, bear the title of Deputy.
7. The National Assembly meets in two ordinary sessions annually, fixed in the third and tenth months of the budgetary year which

¹ Translated by the writer from Journal officiel de la République de Guinée, 12 Nov. 1958. This translation takes account of the constitutional revision brought about by law no. 1/AN/63 of 22 October 1963.

starts on the 1st October of the current civil year, and ends on the 30th September of the following year. The duration of each session cannot exceed two months.

It can meet in extra-ordinary session upon convocation by its President at the request of the Government or that of two-thirds of its members.

The National Assembly elects within it a Permanent Commission. The Permanent Commission meets during the interval between the sessions of the National Assembly. It pronounces on the projects of law whose urgent character cannot endure delay.

The legislative texts adopted by the Permanent Commission are submitted to the National Assembly for ratification at its next session.

SECTION IV: RELATIONS BETWEEN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT

9. The National Assembly alone votes the law. The domain of law is unlimited.

12. The members of the National Assembly receive, during the sessions, a daily allowance fixed by decree.

The members of the Permanent Commission benefit from the same allowance, during the sessions of the Permanent Commission.

14. The President of the Republic and the deputies of the National Assembly alone may initiate laws.

16. The National Assembly is responsible for consideration of the budget which is voted in form of law by Parliament . . .

17. The deputies of the National Assembly may initiate expenditure. Nevertheless, no proposal tending to increase expenditure may be submitted unless accompanied by a proposal for corresponding receipts to offset it.

18. The National Assembly settles the accounts of the Nation. An account of expenditures is submitted to it at the end of

every half-year for the preceding half-year. The final accounts of the preceding year are examined in the course of the second session and approved by a law.

19. The National Assembly has the following means of obtaining information with regard to government action:

- Oral questions
- Written questions
- Interpellation
- Hearing by commissions
- A commission of enquiry

The law decides in what conditions and according to what procedure these means of obtaining information are put into effect. It also decides the time allowed for the reply.

SECTION V; THE HEAD OF STATE

20. The President of the Republic is the Head of State. He is the head of the armed forces . . .

SECTION VI: THE GOVERNMENT

21. The power of the Government of the Republic is exercised by the President of the Republic assisted by a Cabinet.

22. The President of the Republic is elected for seven years by universal suffrage by absolute majority or by relative majority at second voting. He is reeligible.

23. The President of the Republic appoints the ministers by decree . . .

24. In the exercise of their functions, ministers are responsible for their actions to the President of the Republic, who is himself responsible for the general policy of his Cabinet to the National Assembly.

25. The President of the Republic assures the execution of laws. He nominates to all office of public administration. He nominates to all military posts and offices.

27. The functions of a member of the Government are incompatible with the mandate of deputy and the private exercise of all professional activities.

28. In the case of a vacancy of power the Cabinet remains in office to deal with current business until the election of a new head of State.

29. Ministers have access to sessions of the National Assembly and to those of its commissions; they must be heard at their request.

They may ask to be present or represented in discussions before the National Assembly or in commissions by officials designated for this purpose.

SECTION IX: JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

35. Justice is dispensed in the name of the people of Guinea. The President of the Republic is the guarantor of the independence of the judicial authority.

He exercises the right of pardon.

In the exercise of their judicial functions judges obey only the law.

37. The judicial authority, guardian of individual liberty, assures respect for the rights of citizens within conditions provided for by law.

SECTION X: THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

39. All citizens and persons under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Guinea, without distinction of race, sex or religion, have the right to elect and the right to be elected under conditions provided for by law.

40. The citizens of the Republic of Guinea enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of meeting, of association, of procession

or of demonstration within conditions laid down by law.

41. Freedom of conscience is ensured to citizens by the secularity of the state school.

44. Citizens of the Republic of Guinea all have the same rights to work, to rest, to social assistance and to education.

The exercise of trade union freedom and the right of the worker to strike are recognized.

45. Any act of racial discrimination as well as any propaganda of racist or regionalist character is punished by law.

47. It is the duty of all citizens of the Republic of Guinea to conform to the Constitution and other laws of the Republic, to pay their fiscal contributions and honestly to discharge their social obligations.

48. The defence of the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the Republic of Guinea.

APPENDIX D

EXTRACTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL¹

PREAMBLE

The People of Senegal solemnly proclaim their independence and their adherence to the fundamental rights as defined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and in the Universal Declaration of 10 December 1948.

They proclaim their respect and untouchable guarantee:

- of political liberties;
- of trade union rights;
- of the rights and liberties of the human person, of the family and of local collectivities;
- of philosophical and religious liberties;
- of the right of property
- of economic and social rights

SECTION I: THE STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY

1. The Republic of Senegal is secular, democratic and social. It ensures the equality of all the citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race, sex, religion. She respects all beliefs . . .

The principle of the Republic is: government of the people, by the people and for the people.

2. National sovereignty belongs to the Senegalese People who exercise it through their representatives or through a referendum. No section of the people, or any individual, can arrogate to itself the exercise of sovereignty.

Suffrage can be direct or indirect. It is always universal, equal and secret.

¹Translated by the writer from République du Sénégal, Constitution de la République du Sénégal, (Rufisque: Imprimerie nationale, March 1970).

All Senegalese nationals, of age, male and female, enjoying their civil and political rights, can vote in the conditions determined by law.

3. Political parties and groups compete for the expression of suffrage. They constitute themselves and exercise their activity in conditions determined by the law. They must respect the principles of national sovereignty and of democracy.

4. All acts of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, as well as all regionalist propaganda which could damage the internal security of the State or the territorial integrity of the Republic, are punished by law.

5. The institutions of the Republic are:

- the President of the Republic and the Government;
- the National Assembly
- the Supreme Court and the courts and tribunals.

SECTION II: PUBLIC LIBERTIES AND THE HUMAN PERSON

6. The human person is sacred. The State has the duty to respect and protect it . . .

7. All human beings are equal before the law. All men and women are equal before the law.

There is, in Senegal, no subject, no privilege of place of birth, of person or of family.

8. Each one has the right to express and to diffuse freely his opinions by word, writing and picture. Each one has the right to be educated without hindrance to the sources accessible to all . . .

12. The right to property is guaranteed by the present Constitution. It can only be violated in the case of public necessity legally stated, subject to a just and prior indemnity.

16. The State and public collectivities create the necessary conditions and the public institutions which guarantee the education of children.

18. Private schools can be opened with the authorization and under the control of the State.

19 Religious institutions and communities have the right to develop without hindrance. They are freed from the tutelage of the State. They regulate and administer their affairs in an autonomous manner.

20. Every one has the right to work and the right to aspire to employment. No one can be dismissed from his work because of his origin, his opinions or his beliefs.

The worker can belong to a trade union and defend his rights through trade union action.

The right to strike is recognized. It is exercised in the framework of the laws which regulate it. It cannot, in any case, damage the liberty to work . . .

SECTION III: THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT

21. The President of the Republic is elected by direct universal suffrage and by scrutin majoritaire à deux tours.¹ He can only be re-elected once.

22. The duration of the presidential mandate is five years.

31. The President of the Republic is installed in his functions after taking oath before the Supreme Court. The oath is sworn in the following terms:

¹This means that if no list obtains an absolute majority of the votes cast in the first round a second ballot takes place and the list which obtains a simple majority wins.

In the presence of God and before the Senegalese Nation, I swear to discharge faithfully the duty of the President of the Republic of Senegal, to observe and make people observe scrupulously the provisions of the Constitution and of the laws, to devote all my energy to the defense of the constitutional institutions, the integrity of the territory and the independence of the nation and to spare no effort for the realization of African Unity.

32. The duty of the President of the Republic is incompatible with the exercise of any other function, public or private, even elective.

36. The President of the Republic is the guardian of the Constitution. He determines the policy of the Nation which the Government applies under the direction of the Prime Minister.

37. The President of the Republic signs the ordinances and decrees.

The Prime Minister ensures the execution of the laws and disposes of the regulatory power, without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding paragraph . . .

38. The President of the Republic nominates to all civil posts. The Prime Minister has the administration at his disposal.

39. The President of the Republic is the guarantor of national independence and of territorial integrity.

He is responsible for national defence. He presides over the Superior Council of National Defense.

He is the Chief of the Armed Forces; he nominates to all military posts and has the armed forces at his disposal.

42. The President of the Republic can address messages to the Nation.

43. The President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister. He dismisses him thereby bringing about the immediate and collective resignation of the Government which will be charged with the management of day-to-day affairs until the formation of a new Government.

On the proposition of the Prime Minister, he appoints the other members of the Government and fixes their functions.

He dismisses them.

The Prime Minister and the other members of the Government are responsible before the President of the Republic. The Government is subject to the control of the National Assembly under the conditions specified in articles 74 and 75.

45. The function of member of Government is incompatible with any professional activity, public or private . . .

46. The President of the Republic can, on the proposition of the Prime Minister and after consulting the President of the National Assembly and receiving the opinion of the Supreme Court submit any project of law to referendum.

47. When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the execution of its international engagements are threatened in a serious and immediate manner, and the regular functioning of the public powers is interrupted, the President of the Republic can, after informing the Nation of this by a message, take any measure tending to re-establish the regular functioning of the public powers and to assure the safeguard of the Nation, excluding a constitutional revision.

The National Assembly meets as of right. It is informed, for ratification, within fifteen days of their promulgation, of the measures of a legislative character enforced by the President . . . the National Assembly can amend these measures on the occasion of the vote of the ratification law. It cannot be dissolved during the exercise of special powers . . .

SECTION IV: THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

48. The representative assembly of the Republic of Senegal is called the National Assembly.

Its members have the title of Deputy of the National Assembly.

49. The deputies at the National Assembly are elected by direct universal suffrage. Their mandate is for five years except for the application of the provision of article 75 (repeat).

An organic law fixes the number of the members of the Assembly, their allowances, the conditions of eligibility, the system of ineligibility and incompatibilities.

52. The National Assembly fixes the date of opening and the duration of its ordinary sessions. These are, however, regulated by the following rules:

The National Assembly holds, every year, two ordinary sessions:

- the first opens compulsorily in the first fortnight of the month of April;
- the second opens during the last quarter of the year.

The financial laws of the year are examined during the first ordinary session . . .

The duration of each ordinary session cannot exceed two months.

The National Assembly is, besides, summoned in extraordinary session on a specific agenda:

- either if half and one at least of its members address a written demand to the President;
- or on the initiative of the President of the Republic on the proposition of the Prime Minister;

However, the duration of each extraordinary session cannot exceed fifteen days, except in the case provided for in article 57.

The extraordinary sessions end as soon as the agenda is exhausted.
53 (repeat). The National Assembly can delegate to its commission of delegations the power to take all measures which are of the domain of the law.

This delegation is brought about by a resolution of the National Assembly, of which the President of the Republic is immediately informed . . .

SECTION V: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE LEGISLATIVE POWER

56. The National Assembly holds the legislative power. It alone votes the law.

The law fixes the rules concerning:

- the civic rights and guarantees accorded to citizens for the exercise of public liberties, the obligations imposed by national defense on the person and property of citizens;
- the nationality, the state and the capacity of persons, the matrimonial systems, successions and liberalities;
- the determination of crimes and offences as well as the punishment which is applicable to them, the penal procedure, amnesty, the creation of new orders of jurisdiction and the statute of magistrates;
- the establishment, rate and methods of collection of all impositions of every kind, the system of issuing money;
- the electoral system of the National Assembly and of the local assemblies;
- the creation of public enterprises;
- the fundamental guarantees accorded to the civil and military officials of the State;
- the nationalization of enterprises and the transfer of the property of an enterprise of the public sector to the private sector.

The law determines the fundamental principles:

- of the general organisation of national defense;
- of the free administration of local collectivities, of their powers and their resources;

- of education;
- of the system of property, of real rights and of civil and commercial obligations;
- of the right to work, of trade union right and of social security;
- of the system of remuneration of the agents of the State.

The financial laws determine the resources and the charges of the State in the conditions and under the reserves provided for by an organic law. The creations and transformations of employment cannot be carried out by the financial laws.

The laws of programme determine the objectives of the economic and social action of the State. The plan is approved by law . . .

57. The National Assembly votes the projects of the financial laws in the conditions provided for by an organic law.

The project of the financial law of the year, which includes the budget especially, is placed on the bureau of the National Assembly, latest on the day of the opening of the first ordinary session.

The National Assembly has sixty days at the latest for voting the projects of the financial laws.

If, as a result of an exceptional situation, the President of the Republic fails to put the project of the financial laws of the year in good time for the Assembly to dispose of, before the end of its ordinary session, the delay provided for in the preceding paragraph, this session is, immediately and by full right, followed by an extraordinary session whose duration is at most equal to the time necessary for making up the said delay . . .

The Supreme Court assists the President of the Republic, the Government and the National Assembly in the control of the

execution of the financial laws.

58. Martial law, as well as a state of emergency, is decreed by the President of the Republic. The National Assembly meets then in full right, if it is not in session.

The decree proclaiming martial law or a state of emergency ceases to be in force after twelve days, unless the National Assembly, informed by the President of the Republic, authorizes its extension.

60. After its adoption by the National Assembly, a law is transmitted without delay to the President of the Republic.

61. The President of the Republic promulgates the laws during the fifteen days following their transmission made to him of the law finally adopted. This delay is reduced to five days in case of urgency declared by the National Assembly.

62. Within the delay fixed for the promulgation, the President of the Republic can, by a motivated message, ask the Assembly for a new deliberation which cannot be refused. The law can only be voted in the second reading if three-fifths of the members composing the National Assembly vote in its favour.

63. Within the delay fixed for the promulgation, the President of the Republic can inform the Supreme Court for an appeal seeking to declare the law unconstitutional.

65. The subjects which are not of the legislative domain by virtue of the present Constitution have a regulatory character ...

66. The National Assembly can enable by a law the Government to take measures that are normally of the domain of law.

Within the limits of time and powers fixed by the enabling law the Government takes ordinances which enter into force as soon as they are published but become null and void if the project of law of ratification is not deposited on the bureau of the

National Assembly before the date fixed by the enabling law.

The National Assembly can amend the ordinances at the occasion of the vote of the law of ratification.

67. The laws qualified as organic by the Constitution are voted and modified by an absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly.

They cannot be promulgated if the Supreme Court, compulsorily consulted by the President of the Republic, does not declare that they conform to the Constitution.

Articles 53 (repeat) and 66 are not applicable to organic laws.

68. The President of the Republic communicates with the National Assembly by messages which he reads or gets read and which do not lead to any debate.

69. The initiative of laws belong concurrently to the President of the Republic and the deputies of the National Assembly.

70. The members of the Government can be heard at any time by the National Assembly and by its commissions. They can get the assistance of commissars of the Government.

71. The deputies and the President of the Republic have the right of amendment. The amendments of the President of the Republic are presented by a member of the Government.

The propositions and amendments formulated by the deputies cannot be accepted when their adoption would have as consequence, either a diminution of public resources, or the creation or aggravation of a public charge, except that these propositions or amendments are accompanied by propositions for compensatory receipts.

73. The inscription, by priority, on the agenda of the National Assembly of a project or a proposition of law or of a declaration of general policy is of right if the President of the Republic makes such a demand.

74. The deputies can ask members of the Government, who are bound to reply, written or oral questions with or without debate. The questions or the replies given to them are not followed by a vote.

The National Assembly can appoint within it commissions of enquiry.

A law determines the conditions of organization and functioning as well as the powers of commissions of enquiry.

75. The National Assembly can cause the resignation of the Government by voting a motion of censure. . . .

If the censure motion is adopted, the Prime Minister must submit immediately the collective resignation of the Government to the President of the Republic

75 (repeat). The President of the Republic can pronounce by decree the dissolution of the National Assembly, after seeking the opinion of its President, when it has adopted a censure motion against the Government in the conditions fixed by article 75

SECTION VII: THE JUDICIAL POWER

80. The judicial power is independent of the legislative power and of the executive power. It is exercised by the Supreme Court, the courts and the tribunals.

The judges are only subject to the authority of the law in the exercise of their functions.

The judges are appointed for life. They are appointed after seeking the opinion of the Superior Council of the Magistracy . . .

81. The judicial power is the guardian of the rights and liberties defined by the Constitution and the law.

82. The Supreme Court is judge of the constitutionality of laws

and international engagements as well as the conflict of competence between the executive and the legislative. It is the judge of the excess of power of executive authorities.

SECTION VIII: THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

86. The High Court of Justice is composed of elected members of the National Assembly, within itself, at the beginning of each legislature.

It is presided over by a magistrate . . .

87. The President of the Republic is only responsible for the acts accomplished in the exercise of his functions in case of high treason. He can only be accused by the National Assembly deciding by a secret ballot vote of a majority of three-fifths of its members; he is judged by the High Court of Justice.

The members of the Government are penally responsible for the acts accomplished in the exercise of their functions and qualified as crimes or offences at the time they were committed. The procedure defined above is applicable to them as well as to their accomplices, in case of a plot against the security of the State. In the case provided for in the present paragraph, the High Court is bound by the definition of crimes and offences as well as by the determination of punishment, as they result from the penal laws in force at the time the acts were committed.

SECTION IX: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

88. The Economic and Social Council assists the President of the Republic, the Government and the National Assembly. It gives its opinion on questions which are sent to it by the President of the Republic, the Government or the Assembly.

It is competent to examine the projects and propositions of law as well as the projects of decree of an economic and social character, except the financial laws.

It is compulsorily consulted, for its opinion, on the projects of law of programme of an economic and social character and of the Plan.

It can be informed and consulted on every problem related to the economic and social life of the Nation . . .

SECTION X: REVISION

89. The initiative for the revision of the Constitution belongs concurrently to the President of the Republic on the proposition of the Prime Minister and to the deputies.

The project or the proposition of revision adopted by the National Assembly do not become final until they are approved by a referendum.

However, the project or proposition of revision are not presented to a referendum when the President of the Republic decides to submit them only to the National Assembly; in this case, the project or proposition of revision can only be approved if they secure a majority of three-fifths of the members composing the National Assembly . . .

The republican form of the State cannot be the object of a revision.

APPENDIX E

LIST OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN GUINEA¹

AGRIMA: Import of agricultural material and produce

AIR GUINEE: National airways

ALIMAG: Import of food products

Banque centrale de la République de Guinée (BCRG)

Banque guinéenne du commerce extérieur (BGCE)

Banque nationale de développement agricole (BNDA)

BATIPORT: Import of building material

Bauxites de Kassa

Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale

Compagnie nationale d'assurance

Compagnie nationale des transports routiers

Complexe textile de Sanoya

Conserverie de Mamou

Crédit national

Cycle de Guinée

DIVERMA: Import of miscellaneous goods

Droguerie de Guinée

ELECTRA: Import of electrical goods

ELEGANCE-CONFECTION: Import of ready-made dresses

EMATEC: Import of technical material, cooking utensils, etc.

ENIMOB: Import of furniture

Entrepot frigorifique du port

¹Source: Secrétariat d'Etat à l'idéologie, au télé-enseignement et à l'alphabétisation, Gestion de l'entreprise. Responsabilité du comptable. Seminaires de surformation pour les cadres du domaine financier, Cours no. 11 et 12. (Conakry: Centre de diffusion télé-enseigne ent, 2ème trimestre, 1970).

Entreprise de distribution d'eau en Guinée

Entreprise nationale de recherches et d'exploitation

Entreprise nationale de briqueterie de Kobaya

Entreprise de constructions de batiments industriels

Entreprise nationale de constructions préfabriquées

Entreprise nationale de tabacs et allumettes (ENTTA)

Entreprise nationale de transit, consignation maritime (ENTRAT)

GUINEXPORT: Export of agricultural produce

Hotel Camayenne

Hotel Gbessia

LIBRAPORT: Import of books, stationery, etc.

NAFAYA: Retail store for miscellaneous consumer goods

Nouvelle société des plastiques

Office d'aménagement de Boké (OFAB)

Office du café et des oléagineux

Office des céréales

Office de commercialisation du bétail et des animaux sauvages vivants (OBETAILE)

Office maritime de la direction du port

Office nationale de la banane et des fruits de Guinée (OFFIBANNANE)

Office national des chemins de fer

Office national des hydrocarbures (ONAH)

Office national des pêches maritimes (OFEMA)

Office national des produits agricoles divers (PROVIDA)

Office national des transports publics routiers (ONTPR)

PHARMAGUINÉE: Import, manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical goods

PRODEX: Export of local products except agricultural produce

Quincaillerie de Guinée:

Régie nationale de cinématographie et de photographie

Régie nationale de l'imprimerie de la République de Guinée

SABOUYA:

SELECTION: Industrial import of music and similar articles

SILYPHON: Production and sale of musicals records

Société de montage et de distribution des vehicules automobiles

(SAMOYA)

Société nationale de construction de beton arme

Société nationale d'assurances et de réassurance de Guinée

Société nationale d'électricité (SNE)

Société nationale de gestion immobilière

Société navale guinéenne

SONATEX: Import of textile and clothing articles

SONFONIA: Import and sale of furniture

TRANSMAT: Import and sale of air, land, sea and rail transport material

Transport urbain de Conakry (TUC)

Usine de jus et de concentrés de fruits de Kankan

Usines militaires de Conakry (UMC)

Usine d'Oxygène

Usine de sciage et de contreplaqués de N'Zérékoré.

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The Chief of Cabinet, Secretariat of State for Civil Service and Labour

The Assistant Director, General Division of Labour

The Chief of Cabinet, Secretariat of State for Budgets

The Director of Cabinet, Ministry of the Domaine of Interior

The Dean of the Faculty of the Ecole superieure d'administration and President of the Court of Appeal

The Director of Research, Institut polytechnique Gamel Abdel Nasser de Conakry (IPC)

The Administrator General, IPC, Professor of Philosophy and Ideology

The Director, Horoya-hebdo

The Director General, Imprimerie nationale Patrice Lumumba

The Administrative Secretary, PDG National Headquarters and Librarian of the Party School

The Permanent Secretary, PDG National Headquarters (member of the BPN)

The Secretary General, Court of Accounts

Kindia, Headquarters of Maritime Guinea

The Regional Governor of Kindia

The Secretaries General to the Regional Governor

The Regional Director of Education

The Chief of Schools' Production

The Directors of Three Socialist Communities

The Director of Cabinet to the Minister Delegate

Labé, Headquarters of Middle Guinea

Inspector of Administrative and Financial Affairs, acting as
Director of Cabinet to Minister Delegate

The Inspector of Labour

The Chief of Agricultural Production

The Secretary General to the Regional Governor

Dalaba, Regional Headquarters in Middle Guinea

The Regional Governor

The Secretary General to the Regional Governor

Two Arrondissement Commandants

Dakar, National Capital (Senegal)

The Director, Division of Civil Service, Ministry of Civil
Service and Labour

The Chief of Service, Division of Civil Service, Ministry of
Civil Service and Labour

The Director of Cabinet, Ministry of Civil Service and Labour

The Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Interior

Conseiller technique, Ministry of Interior

The Director, Division of Communal Affairs, Ministry of
Interior

Conseiller technique, Secretariat of State for Planning

The Director of Planning Division, Secretariat of State
for Planning

The Director of Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Conseiller technique, Ministry of Culture and Information

Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Rural Development

The Chief of Rural Animation and Expansion, Ministry of
Rural Development

The Chief of Urban Animation Service at the Secretariat
General of Government

The Assistant Secretary General, Secretariat General at the Presidency

Conseiller technique (Administration), Secretariat General of Government

The Director of stages, Ecole nationale d'administration du Sénégal

The Director, Centre de formation et de perfectionnement administratifs

The Director of Cabinet to the President of the Economic and Social Council

Professor Fougeyrollas, Member of the Economic and Social Council

The Director of the Bureau of Organisation and Methods at the Presidency

The Director of Projects, UN Special Fund, Bureau of Organisation and Methods at the Presidency

Assistant Director, Centre des établissements publics, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

The Secretary General, Commune of Great Dakar

The Secretary General, National Assembly

Saint-Louis, Headquarters of Rivers Region

The Chief of Topographical Division

The Assistant to the Chief of Account Post, Saint-Louis

The Regional Controller of Finance

The Acting Chief of the Customs Division

The Assistant to the Inspector of Public Works

The First Assistant (i/c Administration) to the Governor

The Regional Inspector of Tax

The Assistant Secretary General of the Commune of Saint-Louis

The President of the Regional Assembly

Ziguinchor, Headquarters of the Casamance Region

The First Assistant (i/c Administration) to the Governor

The Second Assistant (i/c Development) to the Governor

The Chief of Customs Services, Casamance Region

The Assistant Inspector of Agricultural Services

The President of the Regional Assembly

The Secretary General of the Commune of Ziguinchor