Book section icon

Book section

Learning Dynamics, Lock-in, and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games.

Abstract:

This paper compares the leading theoretical approaches to equilibrium selection, both traditional and adaptive, in the light of recent experiments by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (henceforth "VHBB") in which subjects repeatedly played coordination games, uncertain only about each other's strategy choices. The large strategy spaces of VHBB's designs and the variety of interaction patterns they considered yielded rich dynamics, with systematic differences in limiting outcomes across treatments...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


Vincent P. Crawford More by this author

Contributors

Role:
Editor
Host title:
The Evolution of Economic Diversity
URN:
uuid:bd72a513-cf24-4aa0-9374-734f8f2bac45
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14878
Language:
English

Metrics



If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP