# Clientelistic Dynamics in Programmatic Settings. Evidence From Chile




**Gonzalo Contreras Aguirre**

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Supervisors: Ezequiel González-Ocantos & Timothy Power

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# Clientelistic Dynamics in Programmatic Settings. Evidence from Chile

## Abstract

What explains that programmatic parties sometimes combine their policy offers with clientelistic dispensation, relying on a hybrid linkage strategy? Prevailing knowledge suggests that parties diversify linkages, targeting their program at wealthier voters while providing particularistic inducements to poorer ones. However, these theories fail to explain the variety of strategies used by politicians to connect with voters at the more micro-municipal level, where voters' socioeconomic status is less likely to vary, and levels of electoral competition are constant. I argue that programmatic parties engage in clientelism at the municipal level as a result of a demand-driven process. Leveraging evidence from 97 in-depth interviews across 73 different local groups, participant observation, and shadowing conducted during multi-year fieldwork in three Chilean municipalities governed by parties of different ideological persuasions, this dissertation explains why and how programmatic parties outsource the cost of clientelism to neighbourhood associations in exchange for targeted distribution.

First, I explain how, at the municipal level, politicians and leaders of local groups share mutually beneficial interests that drive clientelism. Politicians require the organizational capacity of local associations to mobilize voters, while local leaders depend on municipal resources to address the demands of their group members. Second, I explain why politicians are only inclined to engage in clientelism with certain local associations. I provide evidence that local authorities cultivate a quid-pro-quo relationship with neighbourhood associations possessing a vertically integrated structure, originally designed for collecting neighbours' demands. By contrast, groups like sports clubs, seniors' clubs, and mothers' clubs lack this type of organizational capacity due to their distinct community purposes. Without this organizational capacity, these groups are less likely to be involved in clientelism with local politicians. Third, I show that while some neighbourhood leaders solve members' problems through clientelistic deals, others avoid such exchanges. The thesis therefore also explains why despite sharing the same organizational capacity and urgent needs, some leaders reject clientelism and instead diversify their sources of assistance. By doing so, local groups reduce their dependency on municipal resources, avoiding cooptation by local politicians.

The dissertation makes three key contributions. By demonstrating that clientelism in programmatic-oriented settings is demand-driven, the study highlights associativity as an unexplored factor that accounts for the variety of strategies parties employ to connect with voters. Furthermore, I argue that class alone does not explain why parties rely on a mix of linkages. Instead, I suggest that the interaction of demand-making and organizational capacity explains why programmatic parties include clientelism as an electoral strategy. Finally, I challenge the prevailing assumption that parties exclusively segment linkage strategies due to top-down party elite commands. I show that, in programmatic settings, clientelism is propelled by the heterogeneity of citizens' demands.

# Chapter 1. Clientelism in Programmatic Settings

The Municipality of Recoleta, a low-middle income *comuna* in Santiago de Chile, inaugurated the first so-called "popular drugstore" in October 2015.[1] This was the flagship policy of the administration of the Communist Party (PC) mayor, and it sought to provide citizens with medicines at affordable prices. When presenting this initiative, the mayor declared: "In Chile, unfortunately, health and medicines are still a business. The pharmaceutical industry for years was deceiving us with high prices for the medicines that we must pay monthly[...]"[2] In the four years following the inauguration of the municipal drugstore in Recoleta, 80 municipalities throughout Chile replicated the initiative.[3] Due to the success of this local policy, the municipality decided to implement a series of other progressive policies. Since 2015, for example, local authorities opened an optician, a bookstore called *Recoletras*, the municipal record store *RecoMúsica*, the Open University of Recoleta (defined by the authorities as "pluriversity"), and even a public real estate company. Through these programmes, the municipality of Recoleta increased its intervention in the local market of goods and services.

However, in parallel to its distinguishable policy-based offer, the PC routinely engages in clientelistic relationships with local groups to mobilize voters. In an interview with Noelia, the leader of a longstanding neighbourhood association in the north of the comuna, she explains the typical relationship forged between municipal authorities and local leaders:

> "The point is that we need things for our communities. You need green areas; for the municipality come to cut the trees so that they do not reach the electricity cables, and to improve and repair roads and streets, which is one of the main problems in Recoleta. *I don't care who governs. I do not care if it is a PC or UDI mayor* [right-wing party]*; what I need is to help the people in the neighbourhood. If they give me, I help them; you give me, I will give you back.*"[4]

In an interview with Lorena, the leader of another neighbourhood association located in a different part of Recoleta, I asked her:

> Interviewer: "How is the relationship with municipal authorities? What do you expect from them?"

[1] Recoleta is a municipality located in the northern centre of Santiago, capital of Chile. According to official socioeconomic estimations reported by the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM), Recoleta is considered a low-to-middle-income municipality in the context of the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, with 13.24% of its inhabitants living in conditions of poverty.
[2] Statement pronounced by the Mayor during the inauguration of the first "popular drugstore" in Recoleta. Available on the website: https://www.recoleta.cl/farmacia-popular/.
[3] Chilean Association of Popular Drugstores (Asociación Chilena de Farmacias Populares). Information provided on May 12, 2019.
[4] Noelia. Neighbourhood association leader in Recoleta. 16 December 2018.

> Lorena: "The relationship with the municipality is "*I give you and you give me back*". If you want us to support you [the mayor] or mobilize people, you must give me something. Obviously, nothing is free."[5]

Both interview excerpts reflect a widely observable interaction between municipal authorities and local association leaders at the municipal level in Chile. Leaders of these groups need to respond to members' demands and address everyday problems in their communities. For this reason, they approach the municipal building seeking to obtain public resources to address both individual and group requirements. When the Communist administration distributes resources *in exchange* for political support, a clientelistic bond is forged.

Political authorities in Recoleta implement policies with a clear ideological content, following a strictly programmatic mode of distribution: public, formalized, and universalistic rules govern the distribution of benefits (Kitschelt, 2000; Stokes et al. 2013). Simultaneously, the PC engages in clientelistic relationships with local associations. What we observe in the case of Recoleta, therefore, is a programmatic party deploying clientelistic strategies at the local level.

The case of the PC in Recoleta is by no means exceptional. The comparative politics literature reports that programmatic parties rely on this kind of quid-pro-quo in a variety of contexts. In Brazil, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), the most programmatic party in the Brazilian party system, employs clientelism at the local level (Nichter, 2018; Johannessen, 2020; Borges, 2023). Similarly, the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan uses different forms of non-programmatic distribution when allocating municipal resources to local groups (Catalinac and Muraoka, 2023). Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) show that a clientelistic form of accountability is also observed in developed European countries where electoral competition revolves around distinguishable policy offers, such as Spain or Belgium. Kopecký and colleagues (2012) delve into the dynamics of patronage in wealthy European countries such as Germany, Denmark, or the Netherlands. Likewise, Mares and Young (2019) present a compelling argument that in Hungary and Romania, parties incorporate forms of clientelism aligned with the policy preferences of their constituencies.

Prevailing frameworks classify parties' linkage strategies dichotomously.[6] Kitschelt's (2000) linkage model and various theories of distributive politics (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and

[5] Lorena. Neighbourhood association leader in Recoleta. 14 December 2018.

[6] This is a broad distinction made in the literature on party-voters linkages and distributive politics (Shefter, 1994; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Kitschelt et al., 2010; Stokes et al. 2013; Calvo and Murillo, 2019). There are other party-voters linkages, such as charismatic (Kitshelt, 2000) or personalistic appeals (Roberts, 2002); as well as different forms of non-programmatic politics (e.g. patronage (Oliveros, 2021); vote-buying (Stokes, 2005); or turnout buying (Nichter, 2018).

Londregan, 1996), contend that parties face a *trade-off* between investing in either programmatic[7] or clientelistic[8] linkages, making the combination of both unlikely to succeed.[9] In practice, however, parties rarely use a unique strategy to secure votes. Instead, parties such as the Chilean PC, the Brazilian PT, the Spanish PSOE, and the LDP in Japan *emphasise* one strategy over others (Coppedge, 1998; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). According to more nuanced approaches, parties diversify their linkage strategies based on the socioeconomic background of voters: displaying a programmatic portfolio in front of wealthier constituencies and engaging in quid-pro-quo or other non-programmatic strategies with poor voters. Rather than specialize (Kitschelt, 2000), parties diversify (Magaloni et al., 2007), segmenting appeals by class status (Luna, 2014).

One important limitation of this scholarship is that it fails to account for the multiple linkages observed at the local level, where voters are less likely to vary in terms of socioeconomic conditions. First, such theories focus exclusively on the national or district level, where parties face much more diverse electorates and can segment accordingly. Local party-voter linkages, in contrast, remain largely unexplored. The literature does not explain the micro-logic of party-voter linkages even though multiple types are observable at this level. Second, if a variety of linkages remains observable *within* municipal boundaries holding relatively constant class composition and institutional features, additional factors must drive the variation. Third, the literature explains diversification exclusively from the perspective of parties – *top-down* strategies – (Magaloni et al., 2007; Thachil, 2014; Luna, 2014), neglecting the active role that voters and local organizations have in shaping the dynamics of clientelism at the subnational level (Auyero, 2000; Johannessen, 2020; Calvo and Murillo, 2019; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Auerbach, 2017).

This dissertation provides an explanation for parties that rely simultaneously on different linkages, deploying what I call *hybrid linkage strategies*. I address this question in settings where parties exhibit a programmatic portfolio at the national level but use clientelistic strategies at the municipal level. Three main questions guide my research: What explains that programmatic parties combine their policy offers with clientelistic dispensation, relying on a hybrid linkage strategy? How do programmatic parties overcome the lack of dense organizational capacity required to activate clientelism? And, with regards to mechanisms, what are the dynamics of clientelism and the incentives of local actors that trigger quid-pro-quo relationships at the local level?

[7] Programmatic politics is understood as policy-based offer parties make to the electorate (Kitschelt, 2000). Stokes et al. (2013), added that a programmatic portfolio must follow a formal, transparent, and public implementation.
[8] Clientelism is the exchange of particularistic benefits – goods, services, favours – for political support (Kitschelt, 2000; Hicken, 2011).
[9] Kitschelt (2000:854) refers directly to this point. I discuss this point in more detail in a further section of this chapter and in Chapter 3.

Much of the literature focuses on top-down elite strategies of diversification across territories based on socioeconomic conditions. Instead, I address hybrid linkages from the perspective of voters and local groups. I argue that *bottom-up* demands create the conditions that allow politicians from programmatic parties to ask for retribution in exchange for targeted favours, services, and goods allocated to local associations. Particularly, I explore how variation in the organizational capacity of local groups explains why some local associations are targeted with clientelism while other are not. Some groups, such as the one led by Noelia in Recoleta, have a vertically integrated structure, strongly rooted in the territory, that connects individuals with neighbourhood leaders. Territorial intermediaries are responsible for collecting individual demands and inform the leaders who, in turn, approach to municipal authorities for solutions. Because municipal authorities can distribute public resources in a discretionary manner, they address local leaders' demands contingent on them mobilizing voters and electoral support. This is how programmatic parties, which tend to lack the infrastructure required to engage in clientelism (Kitschelt, 2000), outsource organizational costs to deeply rooted local groups. Local leaders are willing to assume the costs of clientelism in exchange for finding solutions for neighbours' demands. In contrast, other local groups unrooted territorially and without the organizational capacity to credibly assume the cost of mobilizing voters, are less likely to engage in clientelism.

The argument introduced in this dissertation explains *why* and *how* programmatically-oriented parties incorporate clientelism, relying thus on hybrid linkages. To address this question, I leverage evidence from multiyear fieldwork in the Chilean municipalities of Recoleta, La Pintana, and La Florida, which represent diverse socioeconomic and party-political settings. These three comunas are governed by Mayors from parties with longstanding ideological commitments that inspire a clear policy-based portfolio displayed at the municipal level: The Communist Party (PC), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). I contend that the claim-making process explains why, at the local level of government, where the socioeconomic conditions of voters are relatively homogenous and electoral competition is constant, parties and local groups discover mutually beneficial incentives that create the conditions for clientelism. This also helps explain why parties with limited capacity to overcome the organizational challenges posed by clientelism can still diversify. Parties outsource this task to the local associations that make demands. In particular, they delegate responsibility to grassroots groups characterized by high levels of associativity and vertically integrated control of members, and which are deeply ingrained in the local community.

Before presenting the argument in detail, discussing alternative frameworks, and contributions, the next section distinguishes conceptually between programmatic politics and clientelism, discussing

their attributes and empirical expressions. In the rest of this thesis, I draw upon these conceptual definitions to elucidate how programmatic parties can include clientelism as a complementary strategy for electoral mobilization.

## 1.1 Conceptual Foundations: Programmatic, Clientelistic, and Hybrid Linkages

A theory concerning how parties engage in multiple linkages with voters requires conceptual clarification. I rely on widely accepted definitions of programmatic/clientelistic (Kitschlet, 2000; Dixit and Londregan, 1996) or programmatic/non-programmatic distribution (Stokes et al., 2013). One the one hand, parties may seek to represent people's interests through a clear programmatic agenda (Hagopian, 2014; Kitschelt, 2000; Levitsky, 2003) and distribute resources in a public, formal, and transparent manner (Stokes et al. 2013). Other parties, in contrast, use personalistic endowments, relying on quid-pro-quo practices such as vote buying, turnout buying, and patronage, which are all different expressions of non-programmatic politics. The former are defined as programmatic parties, while the latter are considered clientelistic.

Yet few parties are purely programmatic or purely clientelistic. Recent scholarship has theorized that parties are better understood as falling somewhere in between on a broader spectrum. For instance, programmatic parties may also employ clientelistic strategies, pork barrel politics, patronage, or be led by populist leaders. What the literature does expect is that parties *emphasize* some strategies over others (Coppedge, 1998; Levitsky, 2003; Calvo and Murillo, 2019; Hicken and Nathan, 2020). Scholars have reported that European parties supplement their policy portfolios with patronage (Kopecký et al., 2016). In South America, parties in Chile and Argentina employ a range of non-policy endowments (Calvo and Murillo, 2019), to some extent resembling the patterns of diversification observed in Mexico (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2016) and Brazil (Frey, 2022).

Following the literature on party linkages, I define programmatic parties as those that offer a clear, coherent, structured, and relatively stable program to citizens (Kitschelt, 2000; Cheeseman et al., 2014; Roberts, 2002; Stokes et al., 2013). These programs can be distinguished by voters based on the policies the parties would implement once in power. Importantly, programmatic parties use their policy portfolio as a means to differentiate themselves from other parties (Lupu, 2016; Kitschelt et al., 2010) and engage with voters (Kitschelt, 2000). Therefore, these parties primarily promote and eventually implement policies inspired by the ideas or philosophies of party elites. Examples of programmatic parties are more frequently found in advanced democracies such as Australia, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, to name just a few.

Clientelism, on the other hand, is a more contested concept. In its standard definition, it is understood as the contingent exchange of specific benefits – goods, services, jobs – for political support (Stokes, 2005; Hicken, 2011). Clientelism requires the involvement of multiple agents – patrons, intermediaries, and voters – that activate the quid-pro-quo. It can take various forms, including vote buying (Stokes, 2005), turnout buying (Nichter, 2008), patronage (Stokes et al., 2013; Oliveros, 2016), or a combination of these (Gans-Morse et al., 2014; Aspinall et al., 2022).[10] Researchers have extensively discussed the challenges posed by clientelism, particularly the issues of contingency and iteration (Stokes, 2005; Hicken and Nathan, 2020). How can patrons and voters be certain that reciprocation will occur if the transaction is non- simultaneous? Both patrons and clients require credibility to guarantee that they will fulfil their part of the exchange, which raises problems of commitment and monitoring (Brusco et al., 2004; Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008; Robinson and Verdier, 2013; Finan and Schechter, 2012).

Recent scholarship, however, has shown how clientelism is observable even with partial solutions to commitment problems. In fact, Hicken and Nathan (2020: 280), while discussing the dimensions of clientelism, observe that "very few recent studies, if any, document full contingency, with the commitment problem perfectly resolved and no chance for defection by voters." Indeed, a new strand of empirical research often finds different expressions of non-programmatic politics that seem a lot like clientelism but do not entirely align with the classic definitions, especially concerning monitoring and enforcement assumptions (Stokes, 2005; Hicken, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013).

After a review of the literature on clientelism from 2008 to 2018, Hicken and Nathan (2020) found that only 13% of the literature empirically shows evidence of monitoring of the quid-pro-quo. Similarly, there is little empirical evidence of the enforcement component of clientelism. Only 11 studies report concrete evidence of politicians cutting off benefits from renegade voters. Hence, as a political strategy, clientelism is still viable even without certainty about its efficiency. Several authors have shown that sometimes collective monitoring through aggregate electoral results (Cruz, 2019), feelings of reciprocity (Finan and Schechter, 2012), or even ignoring the monitoring

[10] The causes, logic and implication of clientelism has extensively been discussed by scholarship. For structural explanations of clientelism see Scott (1972), Shefter, (1994), Kitschelt (2000), Kitschelt and Singer (2011), and Roberts (2002). Distributive politics literature address the puzzle of programmatic/non-programmatic type of distribution (see Stokes et al. 2013; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; 2001; Dixit and Londregan, 1996, Calvo and Murillo, 2019). Political ethnography literature offer a perspective from the demand-side of clientelism (Auyero, 2000; Gay, 1998; for a Meta-Analysis of ethnographic literature, consider Pellicer et al. 2020).

problem might be a better alternative than not investing in clientelistic exchanges at all (Hicken and Nathan, 2020).

In this regard, I agree with Pellicer et al. (2020), Hicken and Nathan (2020), and González-Ocantos and Oliveros (2019) on a more flexible and loose understanding of the commitment problem inherent to clientelism. I assume that the rationale behind clientelistic practices is the expectation of reciprocity, where neither monitoring nor enforcement are completely guaranteed (Pellicer et al., 2020, p. 3). Politicians cannot be certain that voters or brokers will fulfil their part of the deal, but they may still use clientelism as a strategy to connect with voters. Even as a sub-optimal and imperfect strategy, clientelism can still be sufficiently effective and a "worthwhile bet relative to other electoral strategies" (Hicken and Nathan, 2020, p. 286).

Having clarified the attributes of the concept, I define clientelism as the exchange of targeted benefits – goods, services, or favours – for political support. Clientelism can take various forms, including vote-buying, turnout-buying, and patronage. Moreover, the level of exchange can either be individual voters or groups of voters. Clientelistic transactions can be iterated – as in relational clientelism (Nichter, 2018), single-shot spot transactions (Stokes, 2005), or mixed. Regarding the assumption of monitoring and enforcement, I assert that it is not a necessary condition for clientelism. This is in line with empirical research that consistently reports clientelistic practices despite no evidence of monitoring or enforcement (Corstange, 2016; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Gallego, 2014; Ravanilla et al., 2022; Muñoz, 2018; Kramon, 2018).

After providing the conceptual definitions of programmatic and clientelistic politics, I proceed to define the observable implications of both types of linkages. Table 1 lays out my classification of programmatic or clientelistic practices at the local level. I highlight three dimensions that collectively provide the empirical criteria for characterizing and differentiating both types of strategies. The first dimension concerns the distribution of policies. Are they universal and accessible to any neighbour? Or is the distribution discretionary and limited to specific voters or groups of voters? Second, is the presence of programs with formal, public, and transparent procedures noticeable? Or, by contrast, are municipal programs deployed in exchange for political support? Finally, in terms of temporality, programmatic politics tends to be relatively stable over time, characterized by durable programs like national initiatives such as Bolsa de Familia in Brazil, popular pharmacies in Chile, or PROGRESA in Mexico. In contrast, clientelism can be observable either sporadically during elections or through ongoing exchange relationships over time.

**TABLE 1.** *Classification of programmatic politics and clientelism at the local level*

| Linkage strategy | Programmatic | Clientelism |
|---|---|---|
| **To whom?** | Population defined in advance as beneficiaries of a local policy. No observable quid-pro-quo. | Targeting individuals or groups of voters in exchange for political support. |
| **How are policies displayed?** | In the form of programs offered to the community with formal, public, and transparent procedures for application and adjudication. Policies are based on the programmatic guidelines either defined by the party or developed by municipal staff. | Targeted policies, favours, goods, services, or public jobs deployed by the local government or private entities in exchange for votes, turnout, campaigning, and/or attendance at rallies. |
| **Episodic or stable?** | Programmatic policies are relatively stable over time. | Iterated political exchange (relational clientelism) or single-shot contingent exchange. |

Programmatic politics are observed when the local government distributes policies through programs with clear definitions of who the beneficiaries are, along with formal, public, and transparent allocation criteria (Stokes et al., 2013). In contrast, clientelism is observed when the local government targets individual voters or groups in exchange for political support. This can take the form of targeted municipal policies, favours, goods, services, municipal jobs, and/or money delivered by municipal authorities. The retribution by voters can be in the form of votes, turnout, campaigning, attendance at rallies, or a combination of these. Lastly, the *quid pro quo* is visible as either a single-shot or an iterated political exchange.

The following example illustrates the difference between programmatic and clientelistic distribution. Consider the case of La Pintana, a low-income municipality in south Santiago, Chile, which is one of my case studies. Among the numerous programmatic policies implemented by the local government, the incumbent offers support programs for elderly adults in vulnerable conditions. Municipal handouts such as food baskets, medications, adult diapers, nutritional supplements, and construction materials, among others, are provided to the community according to a formal socioeconomic classification using a clear procedure. It is transparent and public in the sense that anyone can find out the distribution criteria by reaching out to the *Oficina de Protección de Derechos del Adulto Mayor* (OPDAM), a municipal office in charge of elderly adult programs. All inhabitants of La Pintana have access to this municipal program if they meet the formal criteria of the program. No distinctions are made between applicants. Hence, according to the previous classification of linkages, this corresponds to a programmatic form of distribution.

In contrast, municipal resources are also deployed in exchange for political support. The Social Services municipal officer delivers goods such as food, medications, and building materials, and provides privileged access to services like street cleaning, maintenance of green spaces, and hospital

appointments to local associations contingent on the promise of electoral mobilization in support for the incumbent. Targeting access to goods, favours, and services to local groups in *exchange* for political support represents a clientelistic linkage strategy.

With this conceptual clarification, I define hybrid political linkages as the simultaneous use of programmatic politics alongside clientelistic practices. When both types of linkages are observed at the local level, a hybrid strategy is activated. As illustrated by the case of La Pintana, the Mayor displays formal, public, and transparent programs while concurrently engaging in clientelistic dynamics with local groups. Throughout this research, I will explore within-case evidence to uncover the mechanisms behind the hybrid strategy, revealing the actors, their motivations, and the specific actions that trigger the incorporation of clientelism by programmatic mayors.

## 1.2. The Argument

Programmatic politics sometimes overlap with clientelistic strategies (Coppedge, 1998; Magaloni et al., 2007; Luna, 2014; Calvo and Murillo, 2019). Parties and politicians often diversify their portfolios, offering programmatic appeals while simultaneously investing in clientelistic linkages by building relationships with voters and brokers at the municipal level (Zarazaga, 2014; Stokes et al., 2013; Larreguy et al., 2016; Larreguy et al., 2017; Auerbach and Thachil, 2023). Parties employ various strategies – some clientelistic, some programmatic – to attract voters, maintain loyalties, and improve their electoral performance. Scholarship has shown that parties purposely tailor their electoral strategies based on the socioeconomic conditions of the electorate (Magaloni et al., 2007; Luna, 2014; Calvo and Murillo, 2019; Thachil, 2014). Nevertheless, these approaches cannot fully account for why programmatic parties may include clientelism at the local level because they exclusively focus on the supply-side perspective, reducing the explanation to socioeconomic variations across districts. Instead, I explore the hybrid portfolio from an agent-based perspective, presenting evidence of how the motivations, actions, and incentives of local organizations and municipal authorities interact within the municipal environment, triggering clientelistic dynamics.

Mayors, I contend, have incentives to deploy resources using both programmatic and clientelistic appeals concurrently. When politicians come from programmatic parties, the policy-based offer stem from party guidelines, party ideology, and the Mayor's personal beliefs about how best allocate public money. The political content of the programmatic side might be established either at party headquarters (HQ) or defined by the mayor and her political advisors. Mayors and party members at the municipal level operationalise their party's general programmatic guidelines when

deploying resources. They use universalistic, public and formal criteria to target the policy offer to various groups within their constituency. When Mayors effectively implement the partisan portfolio in the municipal territory, the programmatic side of the hybirid linkage strategy is activated.

I agree with scholars who note that this universalistic form of distribution does not preclude clientelistic dynamics. In contrast to extant approaches, however, I claim that in settings where national parties are not machines, clienltelism is explained by *bottom-up* demands by local groups, not by top-down strategies of portfolio diversification. Neighbourhood leaders know that municipalities have the discretion to allocate public resources to solve a variety of specific problems. For this reason, these leaders, under pressure to address the day-to-day essential needs of their followers, directly request funds from the local government. From the point of view of incumbent politicians, these *bottom-up* demands force a choice: because the budget is limited, Mayors must respond selectively to some local groups and ignore others. On the one hand, municipal authorities are compelled to respond to groups' demands to show responsiveness to local leaders and to the electorate. On the other, politicians know that they can only maximise the chances of obtaining electoral returns from these investments if they allocate resources to some groups. Specifically, local authorities distribute goods or services to local leaders contingent on their capacity mobilize voters and offer other types of political services, such as canvassing, organising rallies, displaying campaign advertisements, etc. Politicians from primarily programmatic parties thus outsource the organizational cost of clientelism, which their own organisations are ill-equipped to meet, to well organised local groups and engage in a quid-pro-quo. Put simply, programmatic parties may incorporate clientelism because local politicians often encounter mutually beneficial incentives when dealing with certain local groups that demand the particularistic distribution of public resources.

The main contention of my theory is that the organizational capacity of demanding local groups is crucial to explaining clientelism in programmatic settings. I probe my argument by exploiting within-municipal variation in the organizational capacity of a variety of local associations. Drawing on the Chilean context, I present evidence that neighbourhood associations,[11] characterized by a vertically integrated structure,[12] are more prone to engaging in clientelism than other groups. Neighbourhood leaders invest in infrastructure for collecting neighbours' demands more efficiently. The vertical structure enables them to establish direct connections with neighbours and

[11] A group of residents organized around common interests within a municipal or district territory.
[12] A vertically-integrated local group possesses a hierarchical organization in which leaders act as representatives of a larger community. Within this structure, each participant has a specialized role (Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005).

to stay well-informed about their demands. It is precisely this organizational capacity that politicians, lacking direct territorial structures, aim to leverage for incorporating clientelism into their electoral strategies.

In contrast to neighbourhood associations, other local groups, such as sports clubs, cooperatives, seniors' associations, and mothers' centres, lack the organizational capacity that appeals to politicians. The leaders of these groups do not invest in infrastructure because they do not receive a constant flow of demands that make it necessary. Associations such as sports clubs or seniors' groups do not make claims on behalf of members. It is not part of their ethos. Therefore, their leaders invest in a more horizontal and simpler organizational structures. The lack of control over and detailed information about members renders the offer these groups can make to politicians less appealing and credible.

Organizational capacity is a critical asset that local leaders can exchange to obtain targeted distribution. However, my fieldwork also revealed that some neighbourhood association leaders, living under the same socioeconomic conditions and using the same vertical structure to collect demands, choose not to engage in clientelism. These leaders avoid quid-pro-quo relationships because they aim to reduce their dependence on municipal public resources for solving their members' problems. Instead of exclusively turning to municipal offices seeking solutions, these leaders reach out to a variety of institutions, such as private organizations, NGOs, and business conglomerates. I argue that this contrast is mostly driven by a distinct ideational understanding of their role as local leaders, how to address members' demands, and to whom they turn to find solutions.

### 1.3. Why Local Associations? Difference Between Mediated and Unmediated Demands

In developing countries, people demand resources because they remain vulnerable to poverty and lack access to essential goods or services. Despite the significant reduction of poverty levels in some countries, people are still exposed to external shocks, unemployment risks, or low average income (Naude et al., 2009; Naude et al., 2012; Ligon and Schechter, 2003).

Research in comparative politics has shown how vulnerability triggers mechanisms that explain why people approach the authorities to remedy or at least alleviate everyday necessities. In Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, demanding redistribution is reported to initiate a dynamic of relational clientelism driven by voters (Nichter, 2018; Auyero, 2000; Borges,

2019). Similarly, in urban slums in India, scholarship shows how some vulnerable communities are able to demand development and improve local conditions. Those groups with larger party networks across the settlements have disproportionately more capacity to claim resources and fulfil their requirements (Auerbach, 2017; Auerbach and Thachil, 2023).

Chile, a developing country that has significantly reduced poverty since the end of the dictatorship in the late '80s, still has a considerable portion of the population living in vulnerable conditions. According to the World Bank, 30% of the population is economically vulnerable.[13] Similarly, the OECD reported that "53% of households are classified as economically vulnerable, meaning they have no financial cushion to protect against a sudden drop in income, compared to an OECD average of 39%."[14] As a result, it is not surprising that people approach local government offices to demand resources for individual benefit or to improve community conditions (Arriagada, 2013; Barozet, 2003).

People approach local authorities with demands either as individual citizens or through organized groups. For analytical purposes, I distinguish between *mediated* and *unmediated* demands. The former refer to people bringing their solicitations to the local offices on their own, without the support or endorsement of a local association. For instance, as described more extensively in the following chapters, it is common to encounter crowds of neighbours seeking particularistic distribution in social assistance municipal offices. Unmediated demands could indeed be addressed by municipal authorities using a non-programmatic form of distribution, such as pork or patronage. However, since there is no way for politicians to guarantee reciprocation by these individuals in the form political support in exchange for the handouts, clientelism is unlikely to result from these unmediated demands.

Alternatively, demands may also be brought forward by local groups representing citizens. I classify these as *mediated* demands: local associations pushing for club goods, improvement of their neighbours' conditions, or specific demands of their members. In contrast to individuals approaching the municipal offices, local associations can more credibly offer something in exchange for these resources. In fact, the leaders of neighbourhood associations can put their organizational structures at the disposal of incumbents during electoral times, mobilizing members

[13] The World Bank. Report on Chile. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chile/overview#1
[14] OECD. Chile: focus on reducing inequality to strengthen social and economic recovery from COVID-19 https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/chile-focus-on-reducing-inequality-to-strengthen-social-and-economic-recovery-from-covid-19.htm

to attend incumbent rallies, displaying political ads in the neighbourhood, and engaging in other types of campaign activities.

While many local groups demand municipal support to fulfil members' requirements, only some of them possess organizational characteristics that are attractive to local politicians. Other local groups, by contrast, cannot engage in clientelism simply because they lack the organizational structure and everyday connection with citizens in the territory. Hence, they cannot credibly offer to mobilize voters in exchange for targeted distribution.

Let's assume that municipal authorities decide to engage in non-programmatic distribution in response to demands from local associations. Now imagine a scenario with two local groups requesting targeted distribution to fulfil members' requirements and obtain club goods. Group A possesses an organization with a vertically integrated structure, maintaining permanent control over the constant flow of demands by neighbours. Moreover, its leadership is willing to negotiate municipal resources in exchange for political support. On the other hand, Group B lacks a hierarchical structure and has neither control nor information about its members' urgent needs. While leaders of Group B might still be eager to negotiate with local authorities and offer their organization in exchange for municipal resources, they have no infrastructure to offer a compelling exchange. Groups such as B may not invest in organizational capacity because their purpose is not to collect demands. Sports clubs, mother centres, and cooperatives, for example, are driven by specific interests – e.g., promoting sporting activities, local business, etc. – and therefore do not need to create a vertical structure or have street intermediaries. And this is precisely what politicians need from local groups.

Since Mayors from programmatic parties have no partisan structure nor a political machine to assume the cost of clientelism, they expect to outsource this job to local associations with the organizational capacity and incentives to incur in the exchange. Consequently, for politicians, local associations like Group A are more attractive than those similar to Group B. One of the main empirical implications of my argument is therefore that local associations with organizational capacity readily available to be used by politicians for electoral goals are more likely to engage in quid-pro-quo than those that lack it.

### 1.4. A Definition of Local Associations

Local associations at the municipal level vary significantly in the types of leadership, organizational capacity (Palmer-Rubin, 2019), strategies for claim-making (Auerbach, 2017; Garay et al., 2020),

and their ability to provide local residents with services and support from the state (Dosh, 2010). Moreover, local groups also differ in their composition, size, and purposes (Auerbach, 2017). Some groups, such as neighbourhood associations, are organized with the goal of representing neighbours' claims and fostering development within their territorial boundaries. In contrast, other groups such as mothers' centres, sports clubs, unions, or churches unite their members around common interests, identities, or specific programmatic goals.

Scholarship and international institutions use various criteria to classify civil society organizations (CSOs).[15] I follow the distinction made by the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem), which states that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) include "interest groups, labour unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It excludes, in contrast, any business groups, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO is, at least nominally, independent of government and economic institutions" (V-Dem, codebook, March 2022). I use the V-Dem classification of civil society organizations as a framework to select the local associations at the Chilean municipal level. I am interested in studying local groups that are autonomous, with no explicit partisan connections, and show no apparent dependence on government institutions.

While there is no official information available regarding the number, types, and characteristics of civil society groups in Chile, the project "*Sociedad en Acción*," from *Centro de Políticas Públicas UC*, has compiled data from public sources, offering a national map of organizations throughout the country. After compiling, refining, and merging 15 different datasets, the result is an original classification of the 214,064 legally registered CSOs with activity during the last five years. Out of this total, 72% corresponds to non-profit community organizations (154,126), primarily composed of neighbourhood associations, communal unions, mothers' centres, non-professional sports clubs, security committees, senior centres, and housing committees (Centro UC Políticas Públicas, 2020).[16]

Although the dataset does not include additional variables of the non-profit organisations – and unfortunately is not possible to use it for statistical analysis –, it still includes valuable descriptive information. First, it is noticeable that non-profit CSOs are consistently present across the territory

[15] See, for instance, Rainey et al. 2017. Another definition is provided by DGS Civil Society Unit from the United Nations and surveys such as World Values Survey.
[16] Irarrázaval, I., P., Streeter. 2020. Mapa de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil 2020. Santiago: Centro de Políticas Públicas UC, Fundación Chile+Hoy.

and the magnitude of these groups vary across municipalities.[17] Second, the dataset provides information about the different types and ubiquity of non-profit associations. In short, I use the V-Dem framework to identify non-profit CSOs detailed by *Sociedad en Acción*. In doing so, and regarding the demand-side, I study local associations including neighbourhood associations, mothers' centres, sports clubs, cooperatives,[18] and senior centres at the Chilean municipal level.[19]

I carried out semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and shadowing of local leaders' activities. On the one hand, I studied the actions, incentives, and motivations of neighbourhood associations engaging in clientelistic linkages with local authorities in the municipalities of Recoleta, La Pintana, and La Florida. These municipalities are all governed by programmatic parties in Chile, but they vary in socioeconomic status. To capture variation among CSOs that do not receive targeted distribution in exchange for political support, I also studied other local groups such as sports clubs, seniors' groups, and cooperatives. I traced the trajectories of several local groups to identify mechanisms that may plausibly explain how politicians engage in clientelism with some groups and not others. Additionally, I also collected the narratives from local politicians, public workers, and key directives to broaden the sources of information.

### 1.5. Alternative Explanations

While the next chapter will extensively address alternative explanations and their corresponding observable implications, it is worth briefly mentioning them in this introduction. My theory, which explains how programmatic parties can include clientelist linkages, departs from Kitschelt's stringent assumptions regarding how parties specialize in a particular type of linkage. Additionally, my research differs from diversification theories (Magaloni et al., 2007; Díaz Cayeros et al., 2016; Thachil, 2014; Luna, 2014). I argue that these frameworks do not fully account for variation observed at the local level in the strategies politicians use to connect with voters. In programmatic settings, political parties engage in non-programmatic linkages at the local level because local organizations and voters demand targeted distribution. This creates an opportunity for local politicians to distribute resources in a non-programmatic fashion in exchange for voters'

[17] This dataset, in fact, should be the first step to design surveys that permit evaluating the empirical implications of my theory.

[18] Small business associations in Chilean Municipalities. The invention of "cooperativas populares" is based on the cooperative model of development and was firstly implemented in the municipality of Recoleta. Cooperatives are defined as "a concrete way to reduce the inequality […] [where] the decisions are taken collectively, all the integrants are part of the labour force, and the utilities are distributed equally among their participants". Seminar of "cooperativas populares" in Recoleta. 26 October 2017.

[19] Cooperatives are the only exception to the non-profit criterion. By definition, cooperatives are profit oriented. They seek to divide the utilities they produce among the members of the organisation.

mobilization, thereby incorporating clientelism into their repertoire. In simple terms, the possibility for programmatic parties to rely on hybrid linkage strategies emerges at the local level.

The literature offers alternative explanations to account for mixed linkage strategies. The trade-off models (Kitschelt, 2000; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Shefter, 1994; Kitschelt and Singer, 2011), for example, expect that programmatic parties can hardly engage in particularistic distribution. Conversely, machine parties deploy resources in a hierarchical and non-programmatic form almost exclusively. This dichotomous model, therefore, posits that both types of parties – programmatic and clientelistic – possess markedly different organizational structures and specializations, making the combination of linkages implausible.[20]

However, parties do indeed employ different strategies to connect with voters, especially in developing countries (Kitschelt and Singer, 2011; Hicken and Nathan, 2020). Magaloni et al. (2007) introduced the first explanation for understanding why parties use multiple strategies. The authors emphasize that the diversification of the political portfolio is a function of the interaction between the dynamics of electoral competition and socioeconomic status. The key insight from this body of literature is that parties use different linkages, programmatic, clientelistic, personalistic, to reach out to voters from different socioeconomic backgrounds. They expect parties to target clientelism in municipalities with high levels of electoral competition and where parties perceive electoral risks. Socioeconomic status is the critical factor, however. Clientelism should decline as the main electoral strategy in wealthier municipalities simply because it is too expensive (Magaloni et al., 2007: 203).

Similarly, Luna's (2014) framework assumes that a party may diversify across and within municipal units. His research finds that cases like Chile and Uruguay represent examples of segmented representation strategies. This means that parties allocate programmatic resources in wealthy districts, while relying on clientelistic distribution amongst poor people. Luna states that diversification is top-down, directed by the party elites moving resources from one municipality to another in order to maximize electoral returns. In India, Thachil (2014) observes a similar pattern in how the BJP targets different constituencies. While the programmatic orientation of the party was designed to appeal to the wealthiest constituencies, poor people were also targeted but using

[20] Kitschelt (2000:854) refers directly to this question: "Why might clientelism and programmatic linkages be hard to combine?". He posits: […] "For one thing, programmatic focal points that permit solutions to social choice problems in existing democracies are typically grounded in universalistic principles that militate against particularistic, informal practices of resource allocation […] For another thing, once politicians have secured their political office through clientelist exchanges, they may have expended their resources and/or lost their incentives to address the challenge of the collective choice problem. Consequently, empirical research should find a negative association between clientelist linkage building and programmatic cohesion inside parties". Similar argument may be found in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) and Kitschelt and Singer (2011).

private associations which addressed their health and education concerns. Following both frameworks, I should observe socioeconomic variation in the reliance on different linkages by parties. Additionally, evidence of political coordination from the top to distribute resources across municipalities should be detected, e.g., coordination between mayors and party leaders.

Finally, Calvo and Murillo (2019)'s model includes voter's expectations to explain the puzzle of a mixed form of distribution. This is relevant since models that explain linkage strategies often neglect voter preferences. This framework expects that non-policy endowments offered by parties depend on people's evaluation of them. Both parties and voter's utility should vary according to socioeconomic status. Three observations would provide evidence in favour of the explanatory capacity of this model. First, the presence of different non-policy endowments across parties. Second, voters' appreciation of 'non-policy politics' according to their socioeconomic condition. Finally, parties effectively distribute resources depending on the perception, demands and preferences of voters.

### 1.6. Contributions

The dissertation makes several contributions to the literature on parties and clientelism. First, I provide an explanation that identifies the conditions under which politicians from programmatic parties include clientelistic tactics in their electioneering portfolio, relying on hybrid linkages at the local level. Departing from prevailing accounts that explore top-down party strategies across socio-economically diverse territories, I show how the demands of local groups in municipal environments shape the conditions that make clientelism possible. My account therefore contributes to an emerging literature that highlights the agency of voters and civil society groups to understand the complexities of political representation (Wolkenstein and Wratil, 2021), the logic of distributive politics (Calvo and Murillo, 2019), and the demand-side of clientelism (Nichter, 2018; Borges, 2023; Palmer-Rubin, 2022).

Secondly, my findings contribute to a body of literature showing that clientelism does not necessarily require a partisan organizational structure. Recent research has shown that parties may use private organizations to link with poor voters in unequal societies (Thachil, 2014). Similarly, in weakly organized party systems, candidates may turn to party substitutes (Hale, 2010) to signal electoral viability (Muñoz, 2018) or to demonstrate future distributive responsiveness (Kramon, 2018). My dissertation shows that in contexts where electoral competition revolves around clear

and distinguishable programmatic portfolios, parties can outsource the cost of clientelism to groups with organizational capacity to mobilize voters.

Third, my research also contributes to the literature on associativity and local development. The literature on the topic has emphasized that local organizations have incentives to participate and articulate demands for redistribution (Holland and Palmer Rubin, 2015; Auerbach, 2017; Garay et al., 2020; Palmer-Rubin, 2022; Auerbach and Thachil, 2023). Yet, at the local level, myriad types of associations coexist that vary in their structure, composition, and capacity to negotiate with political authorities and claim resources. In a study in Mexico, Palmer-Rubin (2019) shows that the characteristics of civil society organizations determine their ability to make demands, either engaging in patronage or evading it. I extend this reasoning by providing evidence that organizational capacity is also a factor considered by politicians when deciding which type of organization to engage with in quid-pro-quo relationships. My evidence suggests that clientelism in programmatic settings is explained by the interaction between local demands and the organizational capacity of local groups that approach politicians seeking targeted distribution.

Fourth, my findings shed light on how clientelism is still possible even with an imperfect capacity to monitor and enforce voting behaviour. In line with literature that relaxes assumptions about the contingency problem of clientelism (Hicken and Nathan, 2020; Aspinall et al., 2022; González-Ocantos and Oliveros, 2019), I present evidence that politicians can opt for clientelism as a supplementary strategy for electoral mobilization. Particularly in settings where clientelism is fuelled by the use of public resources (in contrast to contexts where politicians have to use private funds), politicians have little to lose by engaging in clientelism. They can use the municipal apparatus for it, and therefore, it does not imply a cost for party organizations.

Fifth, I also contribute to understanding the logic of clientelism from the demand-side perspective. While the importance of individual voters' demands in understanding the dynamics of clientelism is well-documented (Nichter, 2018; Johannessen, 2020; Borges, 2022), I emphasize the crucial role of local groups. Leaders of local associations can negotiate targeted distribution because they possess organizational capacity as a credible asset.

## 1.7. Roadmap

In the next chapter, I present the research design and the institutional setting where I evaluate my argument. I address the case selection strategy, data collection tools, and the use of process tracing as the methodological approach. I also provide context of the longstanding ideological foundations

of the three parties governing the municipalities selected for this research. Then, in Chapter 3, I introduce an original framework for understanding how, in programmatic local contexts, parties can incorporate clientelism as a supplementary strategy to increase their vote share. I also explore existing theoretical accounts that offer alternative explanations for my research questions. For both my model and alternative theories, I provide observable implications.

Subsequent chapters present the evidence collected during multi-year fieldwork in Recoleta, La Florida, and La Pintana. In Chapter 4, I explain that in programmatic local settings, clientelism is triggered when politicians and local associations share mutual incentives for a quid-pro-quo relationship. Local leaders seek resources from municipal authorities to address members' needs. Politicians view certain local groups as a source of organizational capacity that their party structure lacks. Clientelism occurs when targeted distribution addresses leaders' demands, and, in exchange, infrastructure from these groups is used for voter mobilization.

In Chapter 5, I examine variation in the organizational capacity of local groups. Neighbourhood leaders engage in clientelism because they have a vertical structure entrenched in their territories, which is appealing to politicians. In contrast, I present evidence that when locals lack this rootedness, clientelism is less likely to occur.

Chapter 6 delves into another type of variation between local groups. I observed that some neighbourhood associations, despite facing the same socioeconomic conditions and territorial context, avoid clientelism. I argue that this is possible because these autonomous leaders diversify their sources of assistance to address members' needs. In doing so, these leaders reduce their dependence on the allocation of municipal resources and, consequently, their incentives to engage in clientelism with local politicians. In the conclusion, I summarize the findings and frame their contribution to the literature on party politics, clientelism, and the involvement of civil society local groups in politics. I also discuss the main limitations and future research questions that emerge from this research.

# Chapter 2. Institutional Setting and Research Strategy


This chapter describes the research strategy and the institutional setting in which I evaluate my argument. I begin by explaining the selection of the Chilean programmatic setting within the context of Latin American party systems and the rationale behind choosing La Pintana, Recoleta, and La Florida as municipal environments for in-depth study. Subsequently, I offer a historical overview of the parties governing these comunas – the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Chilean Communist Party (PC), and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) – and show how their long-standing ideological foundations are concretely manifested in the way they govern at the municipal level.

After detailing the case selection and the historical development of the parties, I turn to address the methodological decisions guiding this research. First, I make the case for using a qualitative approach for data collection, which includes conducting interviews with a variety of actors, engaging in participant observation in local association venues and municipal buildings, and shadowing local leaders' activities. Next, I explain how selecting municipalities with distinct socioeconomic backgrounds allows us to evaluate alternative frameworks and highlight the relevance of local groups' demands in diverse contexts. I conclude the chapter by introducing the methodological approach for evaluating within-case observations. I use process tracing to track the drivers of hybrid linkages within the Chilean programmatic party system.

## 2.1. Case selection: Chile as a Programmatic Setting

My research is about politicians from programmatic parties who also rely on clientelistic strategies. Since my focus is at the municipal level, the natural environment to collect observations are local governments ruled by programmatic parties. To empirically generate theory and adjudicate between alternative accounts, I draw on evidence from Chile, a country where parties are structured predominantly around programmatic platforms. Chilean parties possess ideological brands that are clearly distinguishable from each other (Kitschelt et al., 2010; Mainwaring, 2017). Recent expert surveys support this characterisation.

**FIGURE 2.1.** *Programmatic score in Latin American countries. Chile is highlighted in red on the map*





**Data source:** PREPPS for Latin American Countries. Eschmeyer, Nina, Matthew Singer, and Saskia Ruth-Lovell (2021).

On the one hand, *The Political Representation, Executives, and Political Parties Survey* (PREPPS) provides data to evaluate linkage strategies displayed by parties in 18 Latin American Countries.[21] The questionnaire addresses different dimensions about linkage mechanisms and party organizations such as social policies, redistribution, general left-right dimension, and privatization, among others. In addition, it includes questions about targeting particularistic distribution of goods and services and voter monitoring. Using this expert survey, one can see where the Chilean party system stands relative to others in the region. Experts rated the programmatic orientation of every party using a scale that ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 is "Not at all" and 4 is "To a great extent". I calculated the mean of programmatic linkages by country, and sorted the cases from the higher to lower scores.[22] The boxplot below shows the result (Figure 2.2.). The mean of programmatic linkages for the Chilean party system is 3.33, almost identical than the Uruguayan party system (3.35), the most programmatic of the region according to this dataset.

[21] Wiesehomeier, Nina, Matthew Singer, and Saskia Ruth-Lovell (2021). Political Representation, Executives, and Political Parties Survey: Data from Expert Surveys in 18 Latin American Countries, 2018-2019. IE University, University of Connecticut and GIGA.
Institute Hamburg. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JLOYIJ.

[22] I followed Wiesehomeier et al. (2021) suggestion to exclude all the observations (parties) with less than 4 valid ratings. In doing so, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua and Guatemala were automatically excluded from the graph.

**FIGURE 2.2** *Boxplot of programmatic score by Latin American countries*




Quite similar to PREPPS dataset, *The Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project* (DALP) surveyed experts from 95 democracies around the world.[23] The dataset includes questions about the organization of political parties; exchange mechanisms; organizational efforts; local intermediaries who organize and distribute benefits to voters; and party policy positions. A subset of Latin American countries' linkages classification exhibits similar patterns to those found using PREPPS. The 2014 version reports that Chile has an average "programmatic linkages" score of 3.07 (where 1 = Not at all; and 4 = To a great extent[24]), while the regional mean is 2.97. In sum, survey data shows that Chile represents a case where parties are predominantly programmatic. This is consistent with what scholarship on Latin American party systems has shown continuously after the onset of the third wave of democratization (Kitschelt et al., 2010; Mainwaring; 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Kitschelt and Altamirano, 2015).

While in Chile there are no parties with the characteristics of party machines, such as the PRI in Mexico or AKP in Turkey,[25] Chilean scholars have shown that programmatic ties are not as strong

[23] Information and further details about the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project is available on https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/

[24] The question about programmatic linkages is the following: "Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party's positions on policy issues."

[25] The exception is the authoritarian successor party Independent Democratic Union (UDI, in Spanish). Scholarship shows that party elites have designed a strategy at headquarters to reach out to low-income constituencies using non-programmatic strategies (Luna, 2014; Loxton, 2016; Barozet, 2003)

as they used to be (Luna and Altman, 2011). Clientelistic dynamics are in fact routinely observed at the municipal level (Barozet, 2003; Arriagada, 2013; Pérez, 2020; Espinoza and Madrid, 2010; Álvarez, 2016). Moreover, Chilean experts have pointed out the exchange of influence, favours, and biased distribution of central government resources to partisan mayors, crafting a brokerage network between local politicians and the central government (Valenzuela, 1977; Corvalán et al. 2018; Luna and Mardones, 2017).

Summing up, drawing on expert survey data about party-voter linkages made available by PREPPS and DALP, parties in Chile might reasonably be classified as predominantly programmatic relative other countries in the region. Ethnographic research, however, reports that clientelistic dynamics are still visible and displayed specially by municipal authorities. Hence, Chile is a suitable case to explore the question of why and how politicians from programmatic parties include clientelistic strategies in their political portfolio at the municipal level.

## 2.2. Selection of Municipalities

The first municipality I selected to generate hypotheses, identify causes, and theorize about mechanisms was the comuna of Recoleta.[26] The Mayor is a prominent national figure affiliated with the ideologically strong Chilean Communist Party (PC). This municipality constitutes a *least-likely* case (Gerring, 2017) for observing clientelism. According to prevailing theories, it is not expected that in a setting where the Mayor implements a strong ideological portfolio, as I will illustrate below, clientelism would be among the strategies used by local authorities to link with voters.

I undertook fieldwork in Recoleta to learn about the interactions between different actors. On the one hand, I interviewed municipal officers such as key directors, municipal workers, and councillors. On the other hand, following previous findings (Arriagada, 2013; Barozet, 2003; Auerbach and Thachil, 2023; Cornell and Grimes, 2023), I contacted leaders of local associations – e.g., neighbourhood associations, sports clubs, senior clubs – to understand the logic of the local interaction between local politicians and organized local groups. As Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) and Palmer-Rubin (2022) suggest, civil society groups are key actors to explain the dynamics of clientelism in developing countries.

[26] Recoleta's mayor, up to the date this document was written, has governed by three consecutive periods displaying a highly programmatic agenda in the territory.

As socioeconomic conditions of voters are a crucial factor identified by alternative frameworks for explaining hybrid linkages, I decided to select two additional municipalities based on this criterion. In doing so, I evaluate whether the findings in the case of Recoleta apply in different contexts (Beach and Pederson, 2019; Beach, 2020). Furthermore, this design allows me to evaluate alternative theories that predict different linkages according to the class composition of the electorate. To maximize variation in both socio-economic and partisan conditions, I selected municipalities governed by different parties.

The selection of two additional settings for intense field research thus followed a *diverse-case* strategy (George and Bennett, 2015; Gerring, 2017). I operationalised socioeconomic background using the municipal poverty index,[27] which I recoded into three levels: high, middle, and low average poverty.[28] With regards to the partisan selection criteria, I classified municipalities based on the coalition of the mayor. I identified whether potential cases were governed by one of two main Chilean coalitions, *Nueva Mayoría* (centre-left) and *Chile Vamos* (right-wing), or by mayors with no political affiliation (independents). As a result, both variables have three values, leading to the classification of the 41 municipalities in the sample into nine groups.[29] The resulting classification of the universe of cases is presented in Table 2.1.

[27] Index of poverty was obtained from the National Socioeconomic Survey (CASEN) 2017. Data recovered from the National System of Municipal Information (SINIM, in Spanish). Available on http://www.sinim.cl/.

[28] I decided to classify socioeconomic status of the Municipalities according to the level of municipal poverty. To be sure, this index is highly correlated with similar indicators as average level of income. On the other hand, Mayors' political affiliation was grouped by coalition to reduce the potential categories in the typology.

[29] The 41 municipalities correspond to all the comunas of the Province of Santiago plus nine municipalities in the Metropolitan Region, the capital of Chile, each with more than 70,000 inhabitants. The criteria for including municipalities are based on size (a large population) and urban conditions. Several authors report evidence that rural clientelism in Chile operates very differently from urban locations (see Durston, 2005; 2007; and Gundermann, 2007).

**TABLE 2.1.** *Socioeconomic classification and Mayor's party in 41 municipalities of the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Chile*

| | | Mayors' political coalition | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | ***Nueva Mayoría*** | ***Chile Vamos*** | ***Independent*** |
| **Poverty Index** | *High* | La Pintana (PDC)<br>El Bosque (PS)<br>Independencia (PS)<br>Pudahuel (PS)<br>Cerro Navia (IND)<br>Recoleta (PC)<br>La Cisterna (PPD)<br>Cerrillos (PS) | San Bernardo (UDI)<br>Buin (UDI)<br>Puente Alto (RN)<br>Lo Espejo (PPD) | Macul<br>Conchalí |
| | *Medium* | Lo Prado (PPD)<br>Huechuraba (PPD)<br>San Joaquín (PPD)<br>Peñaflor (PDC)<br>La Granja (PDC)<br>San Ramón (PS)<br>Peñalolén (PDC)<br>Quinta Normal (PDC)<br>Renca (PDC) | Colina (UDI)<br>Estación Central (UDI)<br>Melipilla (RN)<br>San Miguel (RN)<br>La Florida (IND)<br>Paine (RN)<br>Santiago (RN)<br>Talagante (PS)<br>Lampa (RN)<br>Lo Barnechea (UDI)<br>Maipú (IND) | Pedro Aguirre Cerda<br>Quilicura |
| | *Low* | | La Reina (UDI)<br>Ñuñoa (IND)<br>Providencia (UDI)<br>Las Condes (UDI)<br>Vitacura (RN) | |

Note: Index of poverty obtained from the National Socioeconomic Survey (CASEN) 2017. Mayors' political coalition provided by the Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL). In parenthesis, the Mayor's party. PDC=Christian Democratic Party; PS=Socialist Party; PPD=Party for Democracy; PC=Communist Party; UDI=Democratic Union Independent; RN=National Renovation.


A typology of municipalities is useful for distinguishing different contextual conditions for the activation of hybrid linkage strategies. Since alternative theories are class-based, I selected cases to purposefully control for alternative theories. The goal, therefore, is evaluate whether the explanation identified in Recoleta travels to other contexts where mayors represent different ideologies, and where voters face different socioeconomic conditions as competing explanations claim (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2017). Table 2.1. shows that there are two cells without cases. Neither *Nueva Mayoría* nor independent candidates were elected in rich municipalities in the municipal elections of 2016. In turn, the case of Recoleta belongs to the group of low-middle income comunas governed by *Nueva Mayoría*, the leftist coalition of which the Communist Party is a member. I excluded municipalities where the mayor is independent simply because they do not allow me to probe the implications of the mayor's programmatic orientation.

Even though it would be ideal to select cases from each cluster (Gerring, 2004; 2017; and George and Bennett, 2005), this is not feasible due to the intensive nature of the fieldwork required for in-

depth qualitative projects (Small and Calarco, 2022). Consequently, I chose La Pintana, the poorest comuna in Santiago, which is governed by a Christian Democratic mayor (PDC), also considered a programmatic party according to the PREPPS survey. The third municipality is La Florida, an upper-middle class comuna with one of the largest population in Santiago,[30]governed by a mayor elected as a candidate from the right-wing elite party UDI.

Figure 2.3. displays the locations of the three municipalities in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Chile. The three parties currently in office, the PC, PDC, and UDI, have historically presented a clear policy offer grounded in their programmatic foundations. As I turn to detail now, this is reflected in the local policies offered by their Mayors at the local level.

**FIGURE 2.3.** *Municipal case selection. Metropolitan Region, Chile*




## 2.3. A Historical Overview of the Political Parties in the Three Case Studies

In this section, I provide historical context for the Communist Party (PC), Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) to understand their long-standing ideological foundations. I then investigate the propagation of programmatic ideas from party

[30] According to the Census of population and housing of the National Statistics Institute (INE), the population of La Florida is 366,916.

headquarters to the municipal level using two sources of information. First, I analyse the Municipal Development Plans (PLADECO)[31] to explore the policy-based offerings of programmatic local authorities in the three municipalities included in this research. Second, I present evidence that mayors implement policies consistent with their party manifestos, establishing linkages with citizens through programmatic appeals at the municipal level.

### *1) The Christian Democratic Party and the Programmatic Portfolio of La Pintana*

The Chilean PDC traces its origins back to the historical Conservative Party, which has been a part of the Chilean political landscape since the establishment of the party system in the mid-nineteenth century. However, starting from 1930, groups of young dissident members, who were sensitive to social justice and the "social question," began to distance themselves from the traditional elite's guidelines. These factions introduced progressive ideas and social reforms aimed at benefiting broader segments of the population. This departure from the traditional conservative leadership and their pro-elite narrative challenged the underlying principles of the party (Scully, 1992). The formation of the PDC took shape in 1957 when various groups coalesced around their shared Social-Christian values, ultimately emerging as an independent party.[32]

The irruption of the PDC had a significant impact on the alignment of the Chilean party system. The party positioned itself at the center of the left-right spectrum, appealing to constituencies such as mobilized peasants, agricultural workers, and urban slum dwellers, while maintaining its religious component (Scully, 1992). The PDC's commitment to social communitarianism and social justice resonated with a Chilean society undergoing significant social changes, increasing levels of social mobilization, and rural-urban migration. Additionally, the party developed an innovative party brand that set it apart from other political alternatives. These factors contributed to the rapid success of the PDC in electoral processes, with the presidential election of Eduardo Frei Montalva in 1964 solidifying its position. Despite being banned for 17 years during the authoritarian regime, the PDC maintained a clear programmatic-policy portfolio and ideological foundations (Walker, 1999; PDC, 1993), which served as the guiding principles for the two presidents elected after Pinochet's dictatorship, Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (son of Frei Montalva).

[31] The function and objective of PLADECO is described in the organic constitutional law of municipalities, law 18.695. The article 7° states that "It is guiding instrument for development in the municipality, will contemplate actions aimed at satisfying the needs of the local community and promoting its social, economic and cultural progress."
[32] For a summarized story of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party, see the timeline provided by the Chilean National Congress Library:
https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/partidos_politicos/wiki/Partido_Dem%C3%B3crata_Cristiano

The policy-based programs implemented during PDC government can be tracked since the very origin of the party. The Chilean Congress National Library provide access to party agreements, party elites speeches, and Ideological Congresses since 1959. The documents demonstrate the party's consistency over time in its discussions on topics such as unions and collective action rights (PDC, 1959), international politics (PDC, 1959), and the role of the state in the market (PDC, 1962).[33] For example, about this latter point, the document titled "The A-B-C of the Christian Democracy" describes the "duty" of the state to play a proactive role in promoting individual and social development:

> "The State, therefore, has the right, and at the same time the duty, to act in all things that have a bearing on the common good. The State takes care of those matters in which the individual human person, families or intermediate entities are not capable of dealing with on their own, or require the power of authority, and organises the cooperation of them, so that individuals, cooperatives, trade unions, municipalities and regions achieve their development and expansion (PDC, 1959: 8)."[34]

Public archives also cast light on the policy programs for presidential candidates. Consider, for instance, the iconic program of the president Frei Montalva.[35] The document "Evolution and revolutionary will for the revolution in freedom: the program of the revolution in freedom and its fulfilment" expresses concretely the policy-based actions that the party wanted to undertake. Probably the most important policy was related to the deepening of reform of property rights, specifically the so-called "Agrarian Reform" and "Urban Development." Naturally, and especially the former, these reforms faced strong resistance from conservatives sectors and landowners. Yet this did not impede that the PDC president Frei Montalva promulged the law "Reforma Agraria N° 16.640" in 1967.[36] The reform, however, was derogated in 1989 just before Pinochet ceded the power to the historical PDC leader and democratically elected Patricio Aylwin.

With the return to democracy in 1990, the PDC kept programmatic commitments with the same foundations in Christian humanism and social justice. Although with several restriction due to authoritarian deadlocks inherited from the dictatorship (e.g. the binominal electoral system)

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[33] A canonical disagreement was about the position of the party in the political crisis that ended up with Pinochet's military coup in 1973. The official position of the party, embodied by their main leaders Frei Montalva and Patricio Aylwin, was to support the *golpe*. In contrast, two days after military took over the state control, a group of 13 high-profile members (deputies and intellectuals mainly) write a letter to condemn the democracy's breakdown. It is important to highlight, however, that the differences among party leaders was about the *polity* process, not about the *policy* portfolio.

[34] Partido Demócrata Cristiano (1962) El A.B.C. de la Democracia Cristiana. Editorial Del Pacifico, Santiago, Chile. Disponible en http://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=documentos/10221.1/13139/1/194271.pdf

[35] Partido Demócrata Cristiano (1966) Evolución y voluntad revolucionaria para la revolución en libertad: el programa de la revolución en libertad y su cumplimiento. Available on: http://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=documentos/10221.1/11893/1/193336.pdf

[36] The history of the law is available on the National Archive of the Chilean Congress Library. Available on: https://obtienearchivo.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/45903/1/HL16640.pdf

(Garreton, 2003) and a pronounced decline in its electoral support (SERVEL)[37], the party showed continuity around a party identity and partisan commitment with its original principles (Valenzuela et al, 2017). Archives reporting the ideological agreements of PDC members in democracy support this idea. The document "Agreements of the 5th Ideological and Programmatic Congress: Christian Democracy" reaffirm the commitment with Christian roots. Discussing values topics, such as abortion, family composition, the party expresses a heavy attachment to catholic principles. Parallelly, the party manifesto appeals to poor citizens, equality of opportunities, and a strong state presence in the distribution of essentials goods. Consider the following excerpt:

> "We want an integral development for Chile, enlightened by the concept of social justice, which allows each person to develop fully in accordance with their human dignity and to realise their life project, with their personal effort and their commitment to the community, and we have a preferential option for the poorest."[38]

Recently, the PDC has embarked on a more progressive policy campaign to compete in presidential elections of 2021. The program design was strongly influenced by the massive social protests of 2019, in which citizens advocated for changing the status quo and increasing social justice.[39] Yasna Provoste, the PDC's presidential candidate, participated in primaries within a broad centre-left coalition for the nomination in the general election. Although she did not secure the ticket for the general election, her program provides insights into the current policy orientation of the PDC.

Christian Democrats policy offer maintains its historical emphasis on social protection in areas related to health and education while also promoting the inclusion of individuals from poor and middle-income backgrounds.[40] However, in this presidential campaign, the PDC has also incorporated a gender-inclusive language, a strong focus on environmental policies, addressing digital inequalities in society, and advocating for institutional reforms to address the climate

[37] Chilean Electoral Service. Access to electoral results can be consulted on: https://www.servel.cl/centro-de-datos/resultados-electorales-historicos-gw3/

[38] Acuerdos del V Congreso Ideológico y Programático: Democracia Cristiana.

[39] Mobilized citizenship demanded social justice and reduction inequality through a constitutional change. In order to reduce the social malaise, party elites agreed to call for a referendum to decide whether Chileans wanted a new constitution. The process is still ongoing. For a more complete review see Somma et al. (2021).

[40] Consider the following excerpt of the Provoste's program (p. 15) that shows the diagnosis of the PDC about Chilean social situation: "In Chile, access to education, health, work, transport, and everything that is considered normal for the life cycle of any person, reflects inequalities and even violations of the rights associated with our differences as human beings. These inequalities cut across all socio-economic groups, but are concentrated in the most socio-economically vulnerable, because discrimination and exclusion vulnerable, because discrimination and social exclusion drive them into poverty."

emergency.[41] The following excerpt exemplifies the gender perspective proposed to shape the policy-making process:

> "[…] gender equality policies will be aimed at redistribution and recognition, with a special focus on those at the margins of society, so that government action will ensure their visibility and integration."[42]

The document dedicates 47 pages to explain the guidelines of the socioenvironmental model of economic development. It includes initiatives such as pro-employment policies aimed at ensuring dignified work,[43] promoting innovation and entrepreneurship among small and medium-sized companies, [44] protecting the environment,[45] and implementing energy and water plans to sustain responsible economic development.[46]

In summary, archives and party documents support the argument that the PDC, from its origin up to the present day, offers a clear policy-based portfolio at the national level. This is consistent with experts perception in surveys about how PDC links with voters. According to last DALP experts survey, PDC's "programmatic linkage" score is 3.18 (considerably higher than the region mean, 2.88). This classification is similar to the results of other surveys such as PREPPS. Naturally, a clear programmatic offer do not guarantee electoral success. The PDC, in fact, is the party with the most striking decline in post-authoritarian Chilean party system (Herrera et al., 2023). If in 1992 the party elected 38 deputies with 25,99%, in 2021 obtained only 8 with only 4,17% of the total valid votes. The continuous decline, Chilean scholars suggest, could be related to the distance with the grassroots, especially considering the PDC subsided small parties members of the historical left-wing coalition, *Nueva Mayoría* (Del Pozo et al., 2010; Valenzuela et al., 2017).

How do the programmatic portfolio of the PDC travel to the municipal level? What policy-based programs do PDC Mayors concretely implement when they are in office? It is reasonable, yet no obvious, to expect that Mayors will distribute policies aligned to the ideological stands of their parties. One form to evaluate such assumption is diving into the municipal policy offer the Mayor design to be to implemented in the comuna. I draw on reports from the "Municipal Development Plan 2020-2023" (PLADECO) as evidence of the current policy offer deployed by the Christian Democrat Mayor of La Pintana. The document reports the implementation of policy-based programs in several areas, such as economic development, employment, health and educational

[41] See the subsections "Towards a new socioenvironmental model of economic development". Programa de Gobierno 2022-2026, Yasna Provoste. Pp. 24-27.
[42] Candidate Plan 2022-2026, Yasna Provoste. Pp. 14.
[43] Candidate Plan 2022-2026, Yasna Provoste. Pp. 27.
[44] Candidate Plan 2022-2026, Yasna Provoste. Pp. 31-36.
[45] Candidate Plan 2022-2026, Yasna Provoste. Pp. 45-49.
[46] Candidate Plan 2022-2026, Yasna Provoste. Pp. 50-58.

services, to name just a few. The expectation is that some of these policies are coherent with PDC manifestos.

The ten strategic guidelines outlined in La Pintana's PLADECO are consistent with this expectation. One can observe entire sections dedicated to people development, citizen participation, and associativity. Concrete investment in cultural centres, sports centres, technical assistance to support local cooperatives, are some examples of policies aiming to promotes social life. Furthermore, the construction of a centre to gather civil society alongside the multiple programs to promote the communitarian society are clearly influenced by the Mayor's party ideological inclination to communitarianism. Finally, in the same line than the PDC presidential program of 2021, the PDC administration in La Pintana introduced policies to addressing environmental protection, gender-based policies, and the inclusion of the ethnic groups and elderly population. For example, the document report programs for recycling and composting; municipal training programs for the elderly; improvement of the municipal ethnic centre; and the introduction of gender perspective in the policy-making process. Table 2.2. lays out the ten guidelines outlining the programmatic offer in La Pintana.

**TABLE 2.2.** *Excerpt of the policy-based offer in La Pintana, 2020-2023*

| Strategic Guidelines | Number of Initiatives | Example of Initiatives |
|---|---|---|
| Local plan and Urban Planification | 26 | Construction of "La Pintana" park; Construction of a community centre for public and private services; Construction of a municipal multi-sports centre. |
| Connectivity | 20 | Repair of roads in the four sectors of the municipal territory. |
| Public Security | 25 | Plans to reduce gender-based violence; drugs and alcohol dependency; implementation of video cameras in the four sectors of La Pintana. |
| Education and People Development | 17 | Maintenance and conservation program for educational buildings; acquisition of technological equipment for schools. |
| Health Services Access and Life Quality | 17 | Promote community "popular pharmacy"; Construction of medical centres in the north sector of La Pintana; Construction of a Mental Health Centre in the south sector. |
| Citizen Participation, Sports, Culture | 22 | Municipal program to promote sports and physical activities; Promote athletes grants; Expansion of La Pintana's Cultural Centre. |
| Environmental Management | 27 | Implementation of several programs to promote: Responsible Pet Ownership; recycling; composting. |
| Human Development | 47 | Municipal training programs for the elderly; improvement of the municipal ethnic centre; Introduction of gender perspective approaches in |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | the municipal programmatic offer; Development of a municipal fund of youth initiatives. |
| Economic Development and Associativity | 17 | Program of technical assistance for support for local cooperatives. |
| Institutional Modernization | 17 | Program of modernization of the municipal archives; implement a program to measure the quality of municipal services. |

Source: Municipality of La Pintana. PLADECO report. Available online on https://www.pintana.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IF%20PLADECO_2020_2023.pdf

*2) The Chilean Communist Party and the Policy offer in Recoleta*

According to the 2021 PREPPS expert survey, the Chilean Communist Party is not only the most programmatic traditional party in Chile,[47] but also one with the highest programmatic scores in Latin America. In a scale from 1 to 4, where four indicates the maximum programmatic linkage score, the Chilean PC reports a mean of 3,91. To put this in context, other parties with mean score in the first quartile are "Partido dos Trabalhadores" in Brazil, "Frente Amplio" in Uruguay, and "Partido Socialista" in Chile, all of them main contenders in their respective countries.

The strong ideological component of the Chilean PC is not surprising. Founded in 1922, its origin is tied to the diffusion of the socialism in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the international communist organization, the so-called Third International (*Comintern*).[48] At the national level, the party aimed to represent worker's interests over capitalists and conservatives parties (Cruz-Coke, 1984). The local context therefore facilitates its apparition. In the early twentieth century, Chilean society was progressively reactive to the precarious labour conditions of the working class, extreme poverty, and to the social and political indifference of elites regarding the 'social question' (Varas et al., 2010).

Although the PC have always had clear ideological principles based on Marxist principles,[49] party-elites were pragmatic and open to participate in coalitions with centrists and other left-wing parties to compete in national and local elections. Until the Chilean democratic breakdown, the party was part of several governments. For example, the party integrated the "Radicals Governments" – a traditional centrist party– from 1938. In 1946, however, during the presidency of Gabriel Gonzalez

[47] Revolución Democrática (RD), a new left-wing party with foundations in the massive students mobilization in 2011, obtained the maximum score (4) according to experts. Although RD undeniable has a clear ideological position, it is a new party legalized just in 2016 with only 6 local authorities elected in the last municipal elections of 2021. Future electoral cycles will show whether the party consolidates over time and what type of strategies party elites incur to link voters.

[48] See Cruz-Coke (1984), Casals and Riquelme (2010), and the overview of the PC on the Chilean National Congress webpage. Available on www.bcn.cl.

[49] See the reports of the Central Committee of the PC. See, for example, reports of the 1940 and 1958 versions. Both are available respectively on the following webpages: http://bcn.cl/2yjsy and http://bcn.cl/2yjts

Videla, the party was censored for ten years by the so-called "Ley Maldita" (the damned law). Internal coalitional pressures and the international context of the Cold war led to PC's prohibition.[50] Ten years after, the party integrated the "Popular Unity" along with the Socialist Party (PS), Movement of Popular Action (MAPU), and other small parties,[51] winning the presidential race of 1970 with Salvador Allende Gossens as the candidate.[52]

Democratically elected Allende's government was interrupted in September 1973. An economic crisis, high social and political polarization, and international influences ended up with Military taking over the control of the government, closing the National Congress, and suspending political party organizations.[53] The authoritarian regime was responsibly of killing, disappearance, and exile of opposite party members, particularly communists and socialists. Among them, 1.210 arrested persons remained untraceable[54]. Allende's exiled collaborators were persecuted and assassinated – or attempted – in Washington D.C.,[55] Buenos Aires,[56] and Rome.[57] PC members in Chile suffered persecution, illegal arrests, forced disappearances, and death. Even though the harsh context, communists began to reorganise and coordinate as opposition underground.

Once democracy was reinstalled in 1990, It took some time before the party elected legislative representatives in the Chilean Congress. Under the leadership of Glady Marin, the first female president of the party, communist leaders decided not to be part of an electoral coalition with other centrist and leftist parties, the "Concertation of parties for Democracy".[58] Because the electoral system for the low chamber and Senate benefited two largest coalitions, PC remained out of the Congress. A change was possible in 2008, among other reasons, because communist elites inclined to negotiate with the *Concertación* a "pact of omission", agreeing not to field candidates in

[50] Law N° 8.987. For details, refer to: https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/elecciones/detalle_eleccion?handle=10221.1/63010&periodo=1925-1973
[51] Parties such as the Popular Independent Action (API) and Social Democratic Party (PSD).
[52] Salvador Allende (PS) was elected President of Chile after three unsuccessful presidential elections in 1952, 1958, and 1964.
[53] There is extensive literature with historical and social accounts of the democratic breakdown in Chile (Valenzuela, 2003; Huneeus, 2002, Valenzuela, S., 1995, Correa et al., 2001; Joignant and Navia, 2013).
[54] The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, commissioned by the president Patricio Aylwin in 1990, documented the human rights violations during dictatorship. The archive is available on the webpage of the Chilean National Institute of Human Rights. The electronic version of the three volumes can be downloaded from: https://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/handle/123456789/170
[55] Orlando Letelier, Minister of Allende, was killed in a terrorist attack in Washington, D.C. in 1976.
[56] Carlos Pratts was Ministry of Interior and Chilean Vice-President during Allende's government. He and her wife were killed in Buenos Aires in 1974.
[57] Attempted assassination of Bernardo Leighton was intended in 1975 in Rome.
[58] This union of parties was created to compete in the referendum to recover democracy in 1989 and terminate with the seventeen years of dictatorship. The coalition was formed, among others, by Christian Democrats (PDC), Socialist (PS), Radicals (PRSD), and the Party for Democracy (PPD).

specific districts.[59] In this way, communist had freeway to elect deputies for the first time in 35 years.

Throughout its history, the PC has consistently exhibited a strong ideological dimension, which comes as no surprise given its Marxist philosophical inspiration. Although fairly consistent in its main guidelines, party archives demonstrate adaptation to different historical moments. In the forties, the party aimed to increase electoral freedom, end censitary suffrage, raise literacy rates, defend workers' rights, and enhance living conditions for the people.[60] While the underlying principles have remained consistent, the party has adapted and modernized its policy platform. Specifically, during the Programmatic National Congress of 2011,[61] party members established new guidelines in response to the contemporary challenges faced by Chilean society. Alongside a clear ideological stand favouring public education, health system, and pro-workers' rights,[62] the document addresses gender-based demands and environmental issues. About this latter point, the party direction expresses:

> "[…] The recovery of national sovereignty over mineral wealth and water is resolved as a common axis, based on establishing a strong relationship between an environment free of contamination, the rights of indigenous peoples and the rights of workers in a direct relationship."[63]

Also consider the following diagnosis about women's role in society:

> "[…] we declare our conviction that the cultural changes that safeguard equal rights in terms of gender come from a productive structure that incorporates women as active and productive social subjects, without any type of discrimination and increasing rights such as postnatal without making prenatal more flexible."[64]

More recently, in the XXVI PC National Congress of 2020, the discourse reaffirm its traditional critics to capitalist societies and the role of workers' in the present context:

> "[…] In the neoliberal Chile of economic concentration, speculation and the surplus value of capital that excludes the vast majority, work as a right and fair wages must be imposed based on the organized and collective action of workers."[65]

Also highlighting the gender-inclusive position of the party, the national directive contend:

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[59] National press gives details about the pact of omission between the PC and Concertación . Refer to the following link: https://www.latercera.com/noticia/concertacion-y-pc-sellan-pacto-de-omision-sin-acuerdo-por-estacion-central/

[60] See: Corvalán (1958) "Informe del Comité Central al XI Congreso del Partido Comunista de Chile". Pamphlet. Library of the National Congress of Chile. Available at: http://bcn.cl/2yjts Pp. 30

[61] PC (21 December 2011) Resolutions. XXIV National Congress. Available online: http://bcn.cl/2yjpo

[62] PC (21 December 2011) Resolutions. XXIV National Congress, pp. 2-3.

[63] PC (21 December 2011) Resolutions. XXIV National Congress, pp. 10.

[64] PC (21 December 2011) Resolutions. XXIV National Congress, pp. 10-11.

[65] PC, Resolutions XXVI National Congress, pp. 3. Available online: https://pcchile.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Resoluciones-Congreso-PC-Chile-2020-ok.pdf

> "[…] Our congress proposes that the Chilean Communist Party declares itself, within its principles, as an anti-patriarchal class feminist party, which aspires daily to eradicate 'machismo' and patriarchy in all its expressions, including the 'machismo' expressed in our party."

Notably, during the 2011 National Congress, the party leaders explicitly deliberated about strategies to expand its presence within municipal territories. The objective was to delineate a set of guidelines that Mayors, Councillors, and party grassroots should follow in order to coordinate, evaluate, and analyse public policies deployed by local Communist representatives.

> "We assume the municipalities as the basic territorial unit where we must display our objectives and develop the policy that allows us to advance towards the conquest of a new type of government […] [we propose] permanent coordination between current and future councillors that allow the exchange and empowerment of local territorial experiences […] [Also] it is proposed to hold meetings of communist mayors and councillors for the evaluation and analysis of local management."[66]

The communist party strategy can be clearly observed in the case of Recoleta. The PLADECO 2020-2026 (Municipal Development Plan) offer countless examples. Let me illustrate how the ideological portfolio travel local in specific areas where the Mayor has stamped the idea of a "popular municipality". First, municipal authorities decidedly participate in the distribution of goods and local services. The so-called "popular services" aim to promote "a model of development with a "social rights approach" that could be replicated at the national level."[67] Some of this services includes a "popular recycling plan", "popular school", "popular university", "popular school of acting", or the "popular energy program". The "popular" adjective is also present in the "popular optician", and operated under the same idea when inaugurating the "Open University of Recoleta."[68] However, one of the Recoleta flagship initiatives had national repercussion. The "popular pharmacy", inaugurated in 2015,[69] was created to offer medicines at lower price as response to a case of price collusion of the three nation-wide drugstore companies.[70] With the slogan, "same medicine, lower prices" communist authorities in Recoleta became a new competitor in the medicine and drugs markets. The municipal idea was successful in the sense that has been implemented in more than 80 municipalities throughout the country.[71]

Besides the concrete policies implemented around social, health, and cultural areas, the municipality also promote iconic programs which seek to promote an "innovative model of

[66] PC (21 December 2011) Resolutions. XXIV National Congress, pp. 8-9.
[67] PLADECO 2020-2026. Municipality of Recoleta, vol. 3, pp 66. Available online: http://www.recoletatransparente.cl/archivos_2021/pladeco/Tomo%20III-Planificacion%20Estrategica.pdf
[68] For more details, see the University webpage: https://www.uar.cl/estudiaenlauar/
[69] For more details, see: https://cooperativa.cl/noticias/pais/salud/recoleta-inauguro-la-primera-farmacia-municipal-del-pais/2015-10-15/111918.html
[70] For more information of "the pharmacy collusion case", please refer to: https://radio.uchile.cl/2010/07/08/colusion-de-farmacias-un-escandalo-dormido/
[71] For more information, please visit the "Association of Municipalities with Popular Pharmacies" webpage, available on: http://www.achifarpchile.cl

economic and social development". Two policies stand out. First, local authorities foster a "cooperative" model that gives autonomy to small local groups of entrepreneurs and creates new sources of employment. The municipal office of innovation declares that with this model "[…] our objective is to promote and strengthen cooperatives, associativity and entrepreneurship in all its forms on a basis that promotes a social and solidarity economy."[72] Another prominent program is the "popular real estate of Recoleta," which constructs apartments for rent at a "fair price" for selected inhabitants of the comuna. The first building, inaugurated in 2020, was aptly named "Justicia Social" (Social Justice). Currently, two additional buildings are under construction. The project, as declared by the Mayor, aims to "combat overcrowding by providing decent housing and fostering an integrated community."[73] The active involvement of Recoleta's authorities in the housing market, along with the promotion of a local model of development, illustrates how the PC's programmatic guidelines extends to the municipal level through tangible policy-based projects.

*3) The Independent Democratic Union and its programmatic offer in La Florida*

The UDI is a right-wing conservative party that was established in 1983 during the military regime of Pinochet. The party traces its roots back to the "Gremialismo" movement, which emerged in the mid-1960s at the Pontifical Catholic University (PUC) and espoused a Catholic, neoconservative, and anti-party ideology.[74] This movement was formed by a group of young activists who opposed the reforms proposed by the PDC Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970) and the later Socialist government of Allende. The patriotic[75] and anti-communist[76] discourse of UDI members aligned closely with the military regime's aversion to political parties, particularly those rooted in communist ideologies.[77]

[72] For additional information about the programs offer by the Municipal office of innovations and Economic and Social Development, visit: https://web.innovarecoleta.cl/que-hacemos/#emprendimiento-y-desarrollo-coop.
[73] More information is available on: visit: https://web.innovarecoleta.cl
[74] Principles Declaration of the "Movement Democratic Independent Union" in 1983, pp. 14. Available on: https://archivojaimeguzman.cl/index.php/documento-udi-23
[75] Principles Declaration of the "Movement Democratic Independent Union" in 1983. The archives are available on the Jaime Guzman Foundation: https://archivojaimeguzman.cl/index.php/documento-udi-23
[76] The anti-Communism, as a political principle, is present in three documents where the UDI manifests the party's principles. See the following Declaration Principles written and diffused in 1983 and 1988. For the document of 1983: https://archivojaimeguzman.cl/index.php/documento-udi-23; for the declaration of 1988, see: https://archivojaimeguzman.cl/uploads/r/archivo-jaime-guzman-e-3/0/f/a/0faaa6f599f8d944fa0675e68ece2a1bd2a8044756c726ce764b6e5d1ae51ba5/UDI.88.1.11_UDI_Documento_Folleto_Declaraci_n_de_Pincipios_Uni_n_Dem_crata_Independiente_1988.pdf
[77] National Congress Library: Political History of the UDI. Available on: https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/partidos_politicos/wiki/Partido_Uni%C3%B3n_Dem%C3%B3crata_Independiente.

When the *golpe militar* took control of Chilean political institutions in 1973, the *gremialistas* provided unwavering support to the new political authorities (Hunneus, 2002). Their leader, Jaime Guzman, played a crucial intellectual role within the military government, serving on the commission responsible for drafting the Constitution of 1980. Additionally, numerous UDI members were appointed to positions in local governments, ministries, subsecretaries, and prominent public institutions during the military regime.[78]

The UDI has held strong ideological principles since its foundation. In addition to its conservatism and traditionalist view of society, along with its strong alignment with the most orthodox wing of the Catholic Church, the party's manifestos clearly demonstrates how party elites have embraced a neoliberal economic model of development centred around private property, individual capacity, and a subsidiary state.[79] In the Declaration of principles of 1988, the document asserts:

> "The UDI supports an economic model based on the private ownership of the means of production and advocates for an open market economy, where market forces play a central role in allocating productive resources. Additionally, the UDI emphasizes the significance of small and medium-sized companies, as they contribute to economic diversification and employment generation, thereby promoting social stability."

The subsidiary role of the State is explicitly addressed in the same document, which states that:

> "The UDI upholds the principle of subsidiarity as a fundamental tenet of a free society, emphasizing the respect for individual freedom. According to subsidiarity, the State should undertake essential activities such as security, international affairs, and ensuring equality of opportunities. These are matters that inherently affect individuals though cannot be adequately addressed at an individual level. The role of the State as a substitute should be exercised in a manner that encourages individual actions and initiatives."[80]

The principle of a free-market economy is accompanied by ideologically conservative principles. The declaration itself expresses an understanding of a "natural moral order" in its very first paragraph.

> "There exists an objective moral order inherent to human nature, which forms the foundation of Western and Christian civilizations. It is essential for social organizations, as well as any social, institutional, and economic development, to align with this moral order."[81]

Moreover, when discussing the role of women in society, the texts asserts:

> "[…] The UDI aims to enable women to balance their societal roles with their inherent functions, particularly those related to maternity, raising children, and family care."[82]

While over time new party leaders have soften their extreme conservatist discourse, they are still guided by a clear pro-market advocacy, no state intervention, and individual merit. UDI's

[78] See Huneeus 2002, Table 11 and 12 (pp. 42-43) for a complete list of the positions that UDI members during the Chilean military regime.
[79] Declaration of Principles of UDI, 1988, pp. 11 and 16.
[80] Declaration of Principles of UDI, 1988. pp. 2.
[81] Declaration of Principles of UDI, 1988. pp. 2.
[82] Declaration of Principles of UDI, 1988. pp. 3.

programmatic principles, as many Chilean scholars have shown, demonstrate significant continuity (Morales y Bugueño, 2001; Huneeus; 2002; Loxton, 2016). Since the party electorate was mostly wealthy voters and traditional segments of Chilean society, party elites implemented a segmented strategy to reach out poor constituencies (Luna, 2014). They did so using the territorial organization inherited from the authoritarian regime (Loxton, 2016; Hunneus, 2002) along with the allocation of private resources to mobilize voters through non-programmatic strategies (Luna, 2014). In this way, the UDI adopted various linkage strategies to transform into a multiclass authoritarian-successor party (Loxton, 2021).

Even though non-programmatic strategies are deployed by UDI members at the local level (Arriagada, 2013; Barozet, 2003; Hunneus, 2002), the party still implements programmatic local policies based on its political ideology. As it has been argued by Coppedge (1998) and Greene (2016), even the most clientelistic parties implement programmatic policies according to party's principles. In fact, according to the expert PREPPS survey, the UDI holds a strong and distinguishable ideological position with a score of 3.54 in the variable of "programmatic linkages". This score is significantly higher than the Latin American parties' average of 2.88 on the scale of programmatic party structure.

The policy-based initiatives deployed by the Mayor in La Florida, similar to those in Recoleta and La Pintana, can be traced back to the Communitarian Development Plan (PLADECO). In contrast to the more ideologically progressive programs of the other cases, in La Florida the policies accentuates individual capacity, stimulates entrepreneurial ventures, and nurtures individual businesses, all core principles that historically have guided the ideological principles of the UDI. Table 2.3. shows a summary of the main strategic dimensions, number of initiatives, and policies to illustrate the guidelines. In the topic "Economic Development", the municipal planning introduces promotion of local entrepreneurs and individual small business. The document, for instance, asserts:

> "[…] Promote and strengthen neighbourhood ventures, through fairs for entrepreneurs and/or permanent spaces to offer their products and their relationship with public organizations related to productive development."[83]

In a similar manner, local authorities have implemented business training courses for small local companies and initiated programs to support startup ventures. A specific project within the scope of productive development states:

[83] PLADECO 2017-2022, La Florida, pp. 192. Document available on: www.laflorida.cl

> "Prepare a productive development plan that allows strengthening the entrepreneurs of the municipality over time […]"[84]

In addition to the pro-market policy-based initiatives, the municipal plan also includes social initiatives aimed at providing local services. These include the construction of a theatre, the provision of school buses for kids' transportation, the establishment of a municipal pool, and the organization of workshops for senior citizens, as well as diverse learning programs for the community.

**TABLE 2.3.** *Excerpt of the policy-based offer in La Florida*

| Strategic Guidelines | Number of Initiatives | Example of Initiatives |
|---|---|---|
| Environment and Infrastructure | 119 | Construction of the municipal theatre; Acquisition of school buses; Improvement and repairing of public green areas (e.g., parks, squares) along the municipal territory; Construction of a temperate municipal pool for the elderly; Construction of "Tobalaba" park. |
| Sociodemographic, Cultural, Health, and Education | 52 | Adults learning programs; Promotion of older adults preferential health services; Program "Culture in your neighbourhood." |
| Economic Productivity | 12 | Creation of cluster strategy by business area; Promotion of local entrepreneurship, through fairs for entrepreneurs and/or permanent spaces to offer their products. |
| Municipal Management | 15 | Generate strategic alliances with other municipalities; Updating the Manual of Functions, Organisational Chart, and Internal Municipal Regulations; Create an IT security policy and internal communication policy. |

Source: Municipality of La Florida. PLADECO report. Available online on www.laflorida.cl

From the analysis of the three municipalities, I highlight two main findings. First, I show that the three Mayors present clear, formalized, and transparent policy-plans, which constitutes the programmatic side of a hybrid model of linkages. As expected, the PC and PDC exhibit a tendency to introduce progressive policies, focusing on local development through cooperatives, support for local associations, and, particularly in the case of Recoleta, an increased role of the state in the distribution of goods and services. In contrast, the right-wing Mayor of La Florida leans towards pro-market policies, promoting individual entrepreneurship, supporting local start-ups, and providing training to small and medium-sized local companies.

[84] PLADECO 2017-2022, La Florida, pp. 192. Document available on: www.laflorida.cl

Secondly, the evidence reveals that the portfolios of the examined mayors largely align with their respective parties' programmatic guidelines.[85] For instance, the right-wing mayor in La Florida has implemented policies in line with the historical UDI's principles of individual development and limited state intervention. Conversely, the communist policies in Recoleta aim to provide goods or services traditionally allocated by the market, such as popular pharmacies, opticians, real estate, or an "open university." As a result, by presenting clear, formal, and distinguishable programs, parties at the local level compete through programmatic strategies. In the next sections, I will outline the empirical strategy to examine the circumstances under which these parties may include clientelistic exchange as a supplementary electoral strategy.

## 2.4. Empirical Strategy and Methodological Framework

### *1) Data Collection Process*

This is a research project aimed at generating an explanation for why and how parties diversify at the local level. The project was not designed to probe correlational hypotheses, as other studies do. Rather, I was intrigued by the micro dynamics of party-citizen interactions in programmatic contexts, and why do these sometimes lead them to engage in a type of quid-pro-quo we normally associate with clientelistic settings. Moreover, I was interested in identifying the crucial actors, their actions, and how supply and demand reach an equilibrium in which clientelism is seen as mutually beneficial by all those involved. Particularly, I was attentive to observing how voters approach politicians, often overlooked in accounts of linkage diversification.

There was no available data to undertake the sort of research I was interested in at the beginning of the project. In fact, the empirical study of linkages has usually been explored through cross-national surveys (such as DALP, PREPPS, V-DEM) and by evaluating cross-district evidence in case studies (e.g., Mexico, Chile, Japan, Turkey, to name a few). Hence, since my research focused on a relatively unexplained social phenomenon, I decided to engage in an in-depth qualitative study. I thus sought to uncover unattended causes and potential mechanisms that might explain the use of clientelistic strategies by programmatic parties (Gerson and Damaske, 2020; Small and Calarco, 2022).

[85] This evidence should not be taken for granted. Case studies have demonstrated that it is by no means guaranteed that parties with a clear programmatic offer at the national level will mechanically proceed to implement programmatic policies at the local level. Some parties engage in "linkage switching" in Brazil (Johannessen, 2019; Borges, 2023; Nichter, 2018), "electoral division of labour" in India (Thachil, 2014), and use "ad-hoc local machines," as seen in the Philippines (Aspinall et al., 2022). The evidence presented here suggests that policy packages developed in party caucuses extend to the municipal level.

I employed a qualitative design with extensive fieldwork, which is better suited for identifying omitted variables as an initial inquiry stage. My data collections strategy included semi-structured interviews, participant observation in the municipal territories, and shadowing[86] neighbourhood leaders activities. Interview-based research enables the generation of thick empirical insights as well as participants interpretations and motivations that other methods simply cannot provide (Gerson and Damaske, 2020; Lareau, 2020; Small and Calarco, 2022). Using participant observation and shadowing allowed me to contextualize the environment where interviews were conducted, provide additional information, and contrast the evidence with material collected in interviews (Small and Calarco, 2022). In summary, I triangulate diverse qualitative data collection tools to identify causes and develop theories about the causal process, which constitutes the primary objective of my project (Beach and Pederson, 2019; Hall, 2013; Waldner, 2016; McKeown, 2004).

The fieldwork was conducted in three stages. The first stage took place from December 2, 2018, to January 10, 2019. During this initial round, I interviewed 16 individuals, including presidents of neighbourhood associations (7), presidents of three of the most important unions in Recoleta (3), councillors (2), key actors of the municipality (2), and presidents of social organizations (2). The interviews lasted an average of 90 minutes. While the respondents preferred not to be recorded, they all allowed me to take notes of the conversations. One interviewee decided to withdraw from the study, and another one expressly asked me not to report his/her answer to one of the questions.

The data collected, including quotes and other meta-data (e.g., expressions and reactions during the interviews), was recorded in my personal laptop. All the interviews were conducted in locations that respondents considered appropriate. For councillors and key actors of the local government, I conducted the interviews in the municipal building. In the case of the leaders of neighbourhood associations and social organizations, the interviews were conducted usually in their houses or groups' venues.

I travelled to Chile for a second round of fieldwork between December 18, 2020, and April 18, 2021. This stage was particularly challenging due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. In the first few months of my stay, the health situation was relatively normal and I was able to conduct face-to-face interviews (28) as planned. However, in late March, as restrictions increased and the

[86] For a simple explanation about shadowing methods, see McDonald (2005).

Chilean authorities imposed quarantine measures, I had to adapt and conduct interviews via videocalls (15) and telephone (7) instead of in-person.

I conducted the final stage of the field research between August 2022 and January 2023. During this phase, I conducted 31 interviews in the three municipalities that were part of the study. By this point, I had already identified heterogeneity of linkages according to groups' organizational characteristics. Therefore, I focused my efforts on engaging with local leaders from sports clubs, seniors clubs, and cooperatives. In total, throughout the three stages from 2019 to 2022, I conducted a total of 96 interviews.

Interviewees were divided into two groups to enhance the variation of sources. On one hand, I conducted interviews with different types of local association leaders, including neighbourhood associations, sports clubs, seniors' clubs, and cooperatives. On the other hand, I conducted interviews with local authorities, directors of key municipal departments, and party elites. Both groups have little incentive to acknowledge clientelistic exchanges, so any information indicating their presence will update our understanding of how clientelism occurs (Beach and Pederson, 2019). Since the goal of the article is to generate and evaluate new hypotheses about omitted variables that might play a causal role in explaining the outcome, social-desirability bias (González-Ocantos et al., 2012) is not particularly problematic. Nonetheless, ensuring the reliability of sources (non-systematic measurement error) and addressing respondents' biases (systematic measurement error) pose significant challenges. I address both aspects in the Appendix.

*2) Selecting cases with variation in class and partisanship of the mayors*

Selecting cases that offer variation in socioeconomic and political characteristics serves several purposes. First, to control for alternative hypotheses "by design." Finding evidence that despite different socioeconomic contexts, a hybrid portfolio is still observable across cases should increase the plausibility of my theory over alternative explanations. While diversification theories would predict clientelism in La Pintana due to its levels of poverty, it would be surprising to find similar mechanisms triggering clientelism in La Florida.[87] Yet the evidence presented throughout this research shows that clientelism is at least partially driven by a bottom-up mechanism present in the three municipalities, regardless of their average socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, multiple linkage strategies are observed *within* municipalities even though the three municipalities are

[87] Segmentation theories would predict only top-down strategies undertook by UDI party elites.

internally homogeneous in terms of socioeconomic conditions (Candia et al., 2021).[88] This lends credibility to the argument that heterogeneous demands, beyond class alone, can plausibly cause hybridity at the subnational level. This evidence also undermines theories that exclusively explain hybrid linkages as a top-down party strategy crafted by party elites.

Third, I aim to overcome potential endogeneity problems. Since reverse causality is plausible (i.e., parties display clientelistic strategies that produce demand for municipal resources), I test my theory in settings where alternative explanations do not expect municipal politicians to distribute resources in exchange for political support. Concretely, I use the case of La Florida, an upper-middle class comuna[89] where alternative frameworks do not predict clientelistic strategies since they are simply too expensive to afford quid-pro-quo with wealthy citizens (Magaloni et al., 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). By transforming the potential endogeneity into a potential omitted variable problem (KKV, 1994: 193), I can provide some evidence that demands from organized local groups play a causal role. Finally, testing the evidence in municipalities with different features contributes to increasing the scope of the argument. The presence of the *bottom-up* mechanism under various contextual conditions – not only in poor municipalities but also in affluent ones and in municipalities governed by different parties – would give credibility to the role of neighbourhood associations demands to explain clientelism.

*3) Theory-Building Process Tracing Strategy*

I collected empirical data on the process that enables programmatic local authorities to rely on clientelism. I investigated how certain actors at the local level activate specific mechanisms that result in different observable linkages. Process tracing, a powerful tool in qualitative research, allows investigators to causally explain outcomes by analysing detailed within-case observations (Collier, 2011; George and Bennett, 2005; Mahoney, 2012; Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Beach and Pedersen, 2019; Waldner, 2015). This method requires a clear identification of hypotheses and observable implications that could plausibly explain the outcome of interest (Van Evera, 1997; Bennett, 2010; Mahoney, 2015; Collier, 2011). Once all relevant data is collected, the researcher can empirically evaluate alternative narratives and assess their explanatory power and plausibility (Waldner, 2015; 2019; Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Collier, 2011; Rohlfing, 2014).

[88] Candia et al., 2021 show that La Pintana, La Florida, and Recoleta have a Gini index of 0.37, 0.43, and 0.44, respectively. The three municipalities are therefore below the average municipal mean of 0.46 reported in the same study for 78 comunas in Chile.

[89] La Florida falls within the last quartile of household average poverty in the Metropolitan Region, with a rate of 8.04%, while the mean for Santiago is 9.52%.

I followed a mechanistic-based approach to causality in order to identify causes, mechanisms, and sequences to understand a hybrid linkage strategy. My research design relied on within-case observations to theory-building. Accordingly, the first stage of my field research was strongly benefited from in-depth study of the selected cases unveiling the relevance of local groups demands as a trigger of clientelistic dynamics. Since a mechanistic approach to causality implies the identification of *entities* and observe in what *activities* they engage to produce the outcome (Beach, 2016; Runhardt, 2016; Waldner, 2015, 2016), it was crucial to identify the local actors with a relevant role in the political relationship between municipal authorities and voters.

Process tracing scholars have discussed extensively about the best strategies to evaluate observations and contrast them with alternative hypotheses to determine which one is more plausible. While some researchers use process tracing either in an informal way (Bennett and Checkel, 2015) or as a supplementary method to increase internal validity of quantitative evidence (Ziblatt, 2009), others advocate for more explicit and systematic analysis. David Waldner (2015, 2019) propose the *complete standard*, a sort of causal graphs that express the causes, mechanisms, and outcomes. Similarly, Derek Beach (2016) and Beach and Pedersen (2019) propose a system understanding of mechanism describing the activities undertook by actors to transmit causal energy and produce the outcome. Runhardt (2016) relies on the *productive continuity* framework and the extended use of counterfactual logic to unveil causal processes. Lastly, Fairfield (2013) and Fairfield and Charman (2017; 2019) have postulated an explicit Bayesian analysis to evaluate theoretical plausibility in light of empirical evidence (see also Bennett, 2010; Mahoney, 2016; Zaks, 2021). In this dissertation, I evaluate the collected data using a system understanding of mechanisms (Beach and Pederson, 2019). In doing so, I identify actors' incentives and motivations for the activities they engage in to transfer causal energy and produce hybrid linkages in municipal environments.

# Chapter 3. A Demand-Side Theory of Hybrid Linkages

Political parties worldwide rely on various linkage strategies to attract heterogeneous constituencies. The Mexican PRI targeted its programmatic portfolio at wealthy voters while courting poor ones through the provision of excludable private and public goods (Magaloni et al., 2007; Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). The right-wing Chilean UDI also segments the electorate, deploying a conservative programmatic offer to their traditional core electorate while employing non-programmatic strategies in low-income districts (Luna, 2014). Beyond Latin America, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India offers a programmatic portfolio to wealthier voters while providing primary services to poor constituencies through a non-electoral organization affiliated with the party (Thachil, 2014). Evidence from diverse settings with varying institutional environments and levels of economic development demonstrates that parties routinely diversify their portfolios to link with heterogeneous constituencies.

Scholars have extensively theorized about political linkages between parties and citizens (Shefter, 1994; Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt et al., 2010). The "trade-off approach" posits a negative correlation between the implementation of different linkage strategies (Magaloni et al., 2007; Kitschelt and Singer, 2011).[90] Several theoretical factors constrain this possibility. Firstly, the organizational structure required for clientelism differs significantly from that needed for programmatic politics (Kitschelt and Singer, 2011; Shefter, 1994; Roberts, 2002). Employing a combined linkage strategy increases the costs associated with party organization structure since parties would have to *diversify* rather than *specialize* in their voter linkage strategies. Parties, in short, need distinct capacities to distribute programmatic policies compared to engaging in quid-pro-quo.

Second, party systems operate within legal and institutional frameworks that constrain politicians' actions. As Kitschelt and Singer (2011: 3) note, "Clientelism relies on vague legislation with lots of discretion concerning resource allocation at the operational level of disbursement. Programmatic politics works through highly codified, universalistic conditional programs [...] It is thus likely to be difficult to run both types of governance in the same party regime."

Thirdly, parties must make deliberate decisions on how to allocate their limited resources, whether through programmatic or non-programmatic appeals (Shefter, 1994; Dixit and Londregan, 1996).

[90] Kitschelt and Singer (2011) found a negative correlation (-.44) between programmatic and clientelistic appeals. They derived this value from the data collected for 506 parties in the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) dataset.

How should the party allocate the scarce resources at its disposal? How can a party harmonize programmatic offers with particularistic dispensation? (Luna, 2014; Magaloni et al., 2007). How do parties balance the heterogeneous preferences of voters, especially given that some constituencies despise clientelistic practices? (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014). As Kitschelt and Singer (2011: 3) state, "parties will often have to choose whether to invest in clientelistic or programmatic politics."

However, the fact that parties often face trade-offs does not prevent them from combining programmatic and non-programmatic distribution. Some parties are willing to embrace this challenge. These parties are often called "catch-all" parties (Piattoni, 2001; Calvo and Murillo, 2019), Intermediate mix strategies parties, or "Do Everything Parties" (DoE) (Kitschelt and Singer, 2011).[91] In this regard, Piattoni (2001: 30) argues that "no polity is uniquely characterized by one system of interest representation only; in all countries, different systems coexist in varying proportions, accessible and sometimes simultaneously used by every citizen." Stokes et al. (2013: 43) also recognize the coexistence of multiple types of linkages. For example, in the Venezuelan case, they note that "Both parties [COPEI and AD] were fractionalized, and both competed with a mix of programmatic appeals, patronage, and clientelism."

Scholars have observed that even strong programmatic parties, like the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil, employ clientelistic strategies at the local level (Johannessen, 2020). Catalinac and Muraoka (2023) show that in developed settings like Japan, incumbents combine programmatic policies with targeted benefits for some constituents through discretionary fund allocation. Party machines, on the other hand, may also be responsive to programmatic concerns, such as the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Bulut, 2020) or Indonesian parties (Fossati et al., 2020). In essence, parties rely on a mix of strategies to appeal to different voters. Nevertheless, this literature does not delve into the causes and mechanisms behind these hybrid strategies, leaving us with limited understanding of why and how parties combine linkage strategies in diverse political settings.

While some scholars do not attempt to explain hybrid party strategies, others do. Recent research examines why parties adopt different linkage strategies to connect with voters (Luna, 2014; Magaloni et al., 2007; Calvo and Murillo, 2019; Kitschelt and Singer, 2011; Borges, 2019). Magaloni and her colleagues (2007) introduced a portfolio diversification model of electoral investment based on their study of the Mexican program PRONASOL. They argue that the balance between clientelism and public goods as strategies is influenced by factors such as socioeconomic status,

[91] In Kitschelt and Singer analysis (2011: 17), DoE parties tend to be large, with an extensive party organization, centralized control of nominations, and leaded by charismatic leaderships.

perceived electoral competition, and electoral risk. Clientelism is used by the hegemonic Mexican party PRI to retain voters and obtain an electoral advantage. Programmatic policies become preferable as municipalities develop because parties find it unaffordable to provide clientelism to wealthier voters. Simply put, the PRI directed its investments towards public goods, particularly in areas with greater electoral competition, and focused on targeted policy distribution in localities where the party anticipated a higher risk of electoral defeat. Magaloni et al. (2007) note that the majority of municipalities in their study received both programmatic and targeted distribution of goods (p. 194). However, they do not delve into the mechanisms or drivers of diversification at the within-municipality level.

The portfolio diversification framework introduced by Magaloni and colleagues (2007) and Díaz Cayeros et al. (2016) raises a seldom-discussed puzzle regarding party-voter linkages: parties employ various strategies to attract votes. Acknowledging this possibility, Kitschelt and Singer (2011) re-examined the classic "trade-off" party-linkage model and conceded that, under certain economic and institutional conditions, parties may invest in multiple types of linkages simultaneously. They conducted a descriptive analysis of these parties to identify the variables that account for the diversification of strategies. However, they acknowledged that "the exact causal mechanism underlying these relations [among the variables tested in their model] remains opaque [...] we have not found the elegant simple formula that captures it all, both in terms of spelling out the substantive causal logic and generating a statistically significant effect" (p. 17). Put simply, they do not report an explanation to clarify the existence of hybrid linkages party strategies.

Other scholars have found evidence consistent with the diversification of strategies being mediated by the socioeconomic status of voters. Luna (2014) introduced a more flexible party-voter linkage framework that recognizes parties may combine their linkage strategies. In settings with high levels of income inequality, such as Chile and Uruguay, parties indeed segment the electorate based on the socioeconomic and territorial characteristics of districts. Similarly, in India, Thachil (2014) demonstrated that the BJP party employs a "division of labour" strategy to appeal to different voters. The explanation for why poor people support a party like the BJP, which is conservative and opposed to their class interests, lies in the fact that party elites address their needs by providing private educational and health services through non-electoral organizations affiliated with the party. Both Thachil (2014) and Luna (2014) present compelling models explaining how elite parties can reach out to both rich and poor voters by diversifying their linkage strategies and harmonizing different class interests.

The Non-Policy Politics framework, introduced by Calvo and Murillo (2019), begins with the assumption that parties engage in various forms of distribution. Their framework asserts that parties possess a range of resources, including programmatic offers and non-policy endowments such as valence, organization, and targeted distribution. In contrast to diversification and segmentation models, however, they assign a crucial role to voter demands. Parties face the challenge of deciding how to allocate their resources among heterogeneous constituencies with diverse policy preferences. Calvo and Murillo explore this variation through socioeconomic conditions, considering it "a crucial category used to organize electoral preferences" (p. 31; 46; 66). Theoretically, the allocation of resources is expected to vary by municipality, depending on the socioeconomic makeup of the local constituency. The framework emphasizes the agency of both the supply and demand sides, a crucial aspect since the demand side is neglected in Luna and Magaloni et al.'s approaches to explaining diversification. The empirical analysis of how parties and voters interact to maximize their utility represents a significant contribution to the literature on distributive politics.

Although more flexible in their assumptions, this branch of scholarship has narrowed the analysis to structural characteristics of voters across districts. Indeed, diversification of political portfolios has been studied at the national level (Kitschelt and Singer, 2011), district level (Luna, 2014), and across municipalities (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Magaloni et al., 2007; Calvo and Murillo, 2019; Thachil, 2014), finding evidence that parties use strategies to link voters according to class status. However, cross-sectional district or municipal studies hide the internal variance and mechanisms that lead parties to segment their political linkages at a more micro-level, where many of these variables remain constant. Focusing exclusively on socio-economic and dynamics of electoral competition across districts, as diversification models do, is not entirely satisfactory at the municipal level.

My research addresses the largely overlooked puzzle in political representation literature regarding party-voter linkages at the local level. I argue that conventional theoretical approaches, which assume that parties deploy diverse strategies across territories in a top-down manner, fail to explain the observation of multiple linkage strategies in the microcosm of local governments. A within-case study, therefore, will contribute to identifying variables, causal mechanisms, and evaluating existing theories to explain the diversification of political strategies within municipalities. Accordingly, I propose to delve into the micro-foundations of local dynamics to uncover the primary drivers of linkage diversification. I contend that local interactions among municipal authorities, local organizations, and voters are fundamental to any explanation of why parties deploy a hybrid political portfolio. In simple terms, my research offers a demand-side explanation

of hybrid portfolios in settings governed by programmatic authorities. Before introducing my theory and its observable implications, I will first introduce the assumptions that serve as the underpinnings of my framework.

### 3.1. Assumptions For a Demand-Side Theory of Hybrid Linkages

This research focuses on the various forms of accountability observed at the municipal level. I do this by studying the interactions between politicians, neighbours, and local associations. It was quite logical to begin my inquiry at the local level since my theory was inductively developed from preliminary observations in different Chilean municipalities. I started in Recoleta, a lower-middle-income municipality in the centre-north of Santiago governed by the Communist Party (PC), which promotes a clear policy agenda in the comuna. However, municipal authorities vary in how they engage with organized local associations. While they offer a programmatic portfolio rooted in strong ideological positions, they also nurture clientelistic relations with some groups of voters. Certain interactions between citizens and politicians in Recoleta caught my attention, in part because they deviated sharply from the ruling's party ideological brand. Why does a Mayor from one of the most programmatic parties in Chile relate to some neighbourhood associations in an overtly clientelistic fashion? Why do municipal authorities use quid-pro-quo strategies with some local groups and programmatic approaches with others? Where does the programmatic portfolio originate? Is the programme implemented in Recoleta derived from Communist policy ideas formulated at party headquarters, or is the portfolio created by the Mayor and other key personnel? Most puzzling for me was this: how does the Mayor combine programmatic and clientelistic strategies efficiently, given the absence of a clientelistic party machine?

Scholarship has explored the structural conditions correlated with diversification across municipalities or districts. Instead, I was intrigued by the municipal context, where politicians rely heavily on different strategies to connect with voters in situations where variation in socioeconomic conditions is reduced, and electoral competition is constant for all voters in the municipal territory. I therefore decided to start by interviewing various actors, attending local association events, and conversing with people in the municipal building. Initially, I explored the characteristics of local organizations, their motivations, needs, urgencies, and demands, as well as how they negotiate with the municipality. I also visited the municipal building to speak with councillors, key officials from the Social Aid department, and PC party members to understand their perspectives on and discussions about interactions with Recoleta residents. I will extensively discuss my findings in the empirical chapters. At this point, I would like to explain the relevance

of the study of local linkages and why this investigation holds theoretical significance. Here, I will outline the assumptions that provide the logical framework for empirically evaluating my model.

1. **The 'Head' and the 'Tail' of Parties**: Local-level politicians have substantive differences in their roles compared to national party elites. The former interact daily with voters, meet with neighbours in the municipal building, and engage with their organizations' leaders. In short, they listen to people's demands and urgent needs. Top party elites do not experience this type of interactions. Elites based at party HQs define party strategies, enforce party discipline in Congress or Parliament, nominate national and local candidates, and handle much more at the central level. Therefore, I assume that parties are heterogeneous in their composition, and argue that local and central politicians have different roles and operate in distinct environments.[92] The 'head' of the party organization – the party elites – and its "tail" – local activists and authorities – are fundamentally distinct from each other. Consequently, I suggest that to understand hybrid linkage strategies, one should observe the interactions, motivations, and actions of local actors that makes clientelism possible within municipalities.

   This assumption is indeed supported by the information provided by party elites in my fieldwork. In an interview with a former President of the Chilean Socialist Party (PS), he declared:

   > "[…] The municipal level is a completely different world [*es otro mundo*]. Every Mayor makes their own decisions and acts according to whatever happens at the local level. Obviously, they are Socialist, so they implement progressive policies. However, I have no control over the strategies Mayors and councillors use to mobilize voters. I know some of them have created their "*maquinaria"* [machine], but it is difficult to know precisely how they compete in elections."[93]

   This is also aligned with the declaration of a party official of the Christian Democratic Party, revealed in interviews conducted in 2013 and 2017.[94] Moreover, a former Mayor from the Socialist Party, who held office for more than 20 years in a popular comuna of Santiago, also endorsed that narrative. In an interview carried out in 2022, I asked about his role with party elites at the Headquarters. He expressed:

[92] How political dynamics differ at different levels of governments has been discussed in party building literature (Holland, 2016) and recent scholarship on clientelism (Muñoz, 2018; Aspinall et al. 2022).
[93] Interview with former President of the PS. 22 September, 2022.
[94] The first interview with this party official was carried out in October 2011 at PDC headquarters. The second was an informal conversation that took place in June 2017, in *La Moneda* Palace (presidential building).

"They [party directive] have no power over Mayors. They are only interested in you winning the election for the total count of elected party candidates. How you do it is up to you."[95]

2. **Local Politicians as the Unit of Analysis:** As I delve into the supply-side, my focus is on *local politicians from programmatic parties* working at the municipal level. As mentioned earlier, parties at different levels of government exhibit distinct behaviours due to the varying roles and incentives. I draw on this analytical distinction between the "party" as a unitary organization and the "politician member of a partisan structure." It is important to note that local authorities are still part of a party structure. In the case of programmatic parties, politicians are socialized within the party organizations, maintain contact with the headquarters, negotiate voter mobilization, participate in party ideological congresses, and actively implement the programmatic portfolio of the party through policies delivered to voters. Regardless of this, they come along with mutual interests with local groups that produce the conditions for quid-pro-quo.

3. **Agency of Actors in the Local Arena:** The literature has shown the relevance of structural determinants to explain why parties attract different constituencies using diverse strategies. Without neglecting the importance of these factors, I state that local partisan authorities indeed have agency in their interactions with voters. They decide who gets what, with which people or local groups the party should interact, and which policies to implement. Mayors and councillors are not merely passive actors obeying the decisions made by those at HQ. Instead, they decide how much and to whom to distribute scarce resources because they have their own interests which may or may not be aligned with party elites. Politicians are not the only actor with agency in this story, however. Local association leaders also have agency to organize people, push for distribution, and negotiate with municipal authorities (Dosh, 2010; Auerbach, 2017; Garay et al., 2020). Therefore, in municipal environments one observes multiple interactions between diverse political agents.

4. **Hybrid Linkages do not Necessarily Stem from Top-down Coordination**. Conventional models are based on the stringent assumption that parties design a top-down strategy, which is then applied in territories according to class composition. This may be a compelling explanation for elite parties that incorporate non-programmatic strategies, as the case of the BJP in India or the UDI in Chile. Nonetheless, not all parties have a clear

[95] Interview with a former Mayor of the PS. 04 October, 2022.

plan to reach socioeconomically diverse voters. The absence of a national *top-down* strategy, in fact, does not mean that parties cannot rely on different linkage strategies. In a similar vein than the former PS president, a former general secretary of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) explained to me the lack of coordination with the municipal level:

"Look, Here in the headquarters we make the list of candidates and negotiate with other parties of our coalition (the centre-left wing *Nueva Mayoría*) the final list of candidates. Yet, I cannot coordinate strategies with local members. They sometimes even find allies in candidates of other parties."[96]

The lack of coordination is explicit in Brazil, where the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) Mayors switch to clientelism due to people's pressure for targeted distribution (Johannessen, 2020). Likewise, patterns of independence among levels of governments are evident in Perú (Muñoz and Dargent, 2016); Colombia and El Salvador (Holland, 2016), or Indonesia and Philippines (Aspinall et al., 2022). I claim that hybrid linkages in programmatic settings are a product of the different incentives and pressures observed at the municipal level. Hence, to explain the determinants of hybrid strategies, I observe the local level where these interactions take place. This assumption aligns with recent literature that highlight the relevance of subnational party strategies, emphasizing the role of local authorities (Johannessen, 2020; Munoz, 2018) and local organizations advocating for redistribution (Nichter, 2018; Calvo and Murillo, 2019; Garay et al., 2020; Palmer-Rubin, 2022; Cornell and Grimmes, 2023).

5. **Partisan Infrastructure is not a Requirement for Clientelism**: Recent research shows that in weakly organized party systems, clientelism is not solely reliant on party structures. In various settings, such as Peru (Muñoz, 2018; Levitsky and Zavaleta, 2016), India (Auerbach and Thachil, 2023), Kenya (Kramon, 2018), and Colombia (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015), office-seekers employ clientelism through party substitutes (Hale, 2010), such as external non-partisan organizations, private entities, or local associations' networks (Cornell and Grimmes, 2023). Hence, when electoral competition is not animated by party machines, politicians seek the organizational capacity required for clientelism through alternative social structures or independent brokers (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Muñoz, 2018).

[96] Interview with former General Secretary of the PDC. 27 October, 2011.

In summary, the argument advanced in this thesis is grounded in different assumptions from those that underpin "trade-off" party linkage theories. First, I assert that parties are not monolithic entities coordinated across different levels of government. Mayors and councillors, for instance, have different roles within the party structure than central-level party members. Accordingly, I focus on municipal authorities who are members of programmatic parties. Second, linkage strategies are not exclusively determined by structural variables, such as the socioeconomic background of specific constituencies. Political authorities at the local level have the agency to decide which strategies to use to connect with different voters. Third, in my framework, the top-down pressures from party elites converge with bottom-up demands. Mayors do not merely mechanically execute party HQ orders and strategies; they also have strong incentives to distribute resources in a non-programmatic way because people demand targeted distribution. Therefore, a Mayor's linkage strategy is explained by the policy-based portfolio of their party and, simultaneously, by the myriad demands they encounter in the local environment. Table 3.1. presents a summary of the contrasts between the assumptions made by alternative frameworks and my own assumptions.

**TABLE 3.1.** *Assumptions to understand hybrid linkages*

| Model | Demand-Theory of Hybrid Linkages | Trade-off models (Kitschelt, 2000; Dixit and Londregan, 1996: Cox and McCubbins, 1986) | Diversification (Magaloni et al., 2007), segmentation (Luna, 2014) and division of labour (Thachil, 2014) models |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Unit of Analysis** | Local politicians embedded in party structures | Parties as units | Parties as units |
| **Does the model permit the hybrid linkage strategy?** | Linkages are usually combined by politicians at the local level because they do not require the party structure to do so. Politicians at the local level outsource the organizational costs to local associations. | Linkages are difficult to combine because different types of linkages require different organizational structures (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Magaloni et al., 2007; Luna, 2014). | Parties appeal to different voters using different strategies. They offer a programmatic portfolio to wealthier voters while resorting to clientelism in poorer districts. They do so by outsourcing organizational costs through private organizations or by employing targeted policies. |
| **Top-down/bottom-up direction of the dynamics of political linkages?** | Linkages between parties and voters are not unidirectional. Linkages at the local level result from the interaction between different pressures: a) from the party HQ to maximize electoral utility, b) from local groups and voters pushing for municipal resources. | Parties are assumed to be the organizations linking voters in a top-down fashion. | Parties are assumed to be the organizations linking voters in a top-down fashion. |
| **Is party coordination necessary to implement a hybrid linkage strategy?** | Parties may coordinate linkage strategies from the top, but their capacity is limited. I assume that intraparty coordination is not necessary to invest in hybrid strategies at the local level. I start from the premise that party elites not necessarily know about how local | Parties are defined as coordinated entities. These models assume that parties work as cohesive and homogeneous units from the head of the partisan structure (HQ) to the tail (Mayors). | These theories assume that parties have high levels of coordination to distribute programs in some districts while simultaneously relying on clientelistic strategies in others. Diversified distribution across districts or municipalities requires |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | authorities link voters at the local level. Hence, I understand the hybrid strategy as a result of different pressures that local politicians face in the local environment. | From this perspective, hybrid strategies are deemed too costly and inefficient. | intraparty coordination and political discipline along the partisan structure. |

## 3.2. Theory: A Demand-Side Theory of Hybrid Linkages

What explains that programmatic parties may incorporate clientelism, thus activating a hybrid linkage strategy? How can parties at the local level afford the organizational costs of clientelism when they lack the party structure to do so? What are the incentives and motivations for the diverse local actors that trigger clientelism in programmatic settings? This section outlines my theoretical framework for addressing these questions. I start by discussing the supply of programmatic local policies. Then, I present a theory of how claim making of local groups produce the conditions for clientelism. I finish by introducing an explanation to hybrid linkages observed at the municipal level.

*1) Programmatic Portfolio at the Municipal Level*


When mayors and their staff come from programmatic parties, they implement a political portfolio in the territory based on the ideas socialized at the central level by party elites. They do so because they have a commitment to party guidelines, were originally nominated by the party, and ultimately there are costs associated with defecting. Alternatively, politicians can also create their own programs to distribute among voters. Indeed, politicians and officials at the municipal level design solutions to address everyday people's problems. Either way, when politicians publicly and formally display local policies, they are presenting their programmatic offer and linking with people programmatically.

Politicians at the local level are responsible for implementing the party's political portfolio in the territory. They do so through programmatic policies aimed at all citizens living in the comuna. For instance, municipal authorities may implement community improvements such as green areas, street lights, road and street repairs, and offer subsidies and transport, all using formal and transparent criteria. Simultaneously, politicians and their staff must also respond to the requirements of local groups, such as sports clubs, and neighbourhood associations, among others, who demand support for their activities. Municipal authorities may respond to these demands by presenting a programmatic offer to meet the needs of local organizations and promote community development. For example, the municipal government may offer grants to support the operations

of local groups, obtain club goods, or provide handouts to group members, such as improving housing conditions and organizing workshops for senior adults, and so on.

Whether distributing programmatic policies to individual voters or local organizations, Mayors serve as suppliers of the party's portfolio at the municipal level. Indeed, authorities concretely implement the party guidelines in the territory, thereby activating the programmatic side observable at the local level. Figure 3.1. lays out a graphical scheme to explain how the programmatic component travels from the supply side (party headquarters or municipal offices) to voters and local groups. Party elites define a programmatic portfolio at headquarters. The guidelines that define party strategies, including their positions on various topics of social interest, ideological stances, and core political values, are, of course, a long-term endeavour (Cheeseman, et al., 2014; Kitschelt et al., 2000; Goren, 2005). Party core positions are established over time and are thus subject to ongoing revision. As illustrated in Chapter 2, party structure serves as an ideological framework for organizing the party's ideas to be implemented at the municipal level. Therefore, once Mayors of the party are elected, they (1) become vehicles carrying the programmatic portfolio and transform it into concrete local policies and (2) design their own programmatic offers and specific policies to address the needs of people in the microcosm of municipal reality. Once the programmatic offer has been defined by authorities, directors, and key workers, they proceed to implement it through specific policies, distributing resources formally, transparently, and publicly to neighbours and local groups.

**FIGURE 3.1.** *Sequence of the supply-side. Implementing the programmatic portfolio from parties to the local arena*




*2) Clienltelistic Dynamics: Outsourcing Machines to Local Groups*

The fact that a local government is ruled by a politician from a programmatic party, with a clear policy-based offer and without the infrastructure of a party machine, does not imply the absence of clientelistic dynamics. Precisely for that reason, and because quid-pro-quo in programmatic local

settings is puzzling, I delve into different levels of variation to inquire *why* and *how* clientelistic dynamics are observable.


Figure 3.2. below lays out the theorized causal sequence. It begins with people demanding resources from municipal authorities. What people require from politicians are solutions to everyday neighbourhood problems – some of them essential, such as food and medicines, while others include club goods like the improvement of public spaces in the neighbourhood. When local politicians receive these demands, their responses vary depending on the characteristics of *who* claims. The first level of variation is whether demands are approached by individual citizens or mediated by local groups. Politicians do not have the ability to engage in clientelism at the individual level, as they cannot enforce or monitor whether citizens comply with their part of the exchange. Essentially, incumbents from programmatic parties do not have the organizational structure to guarantee that the deployed resources will be reciprocated in the form of political support. At most, politicians may resort to pork-barrel politics by allocating resources with the expectation that they could receive electoral support in return.

In contrast, when demands are made by local associations, municipal authorities assess what can be offered by these local groups in exchange for targeted distribution. When local associations have a vertically-integrated structure rooted in the territory and direct connections with neighbours to offer in exchange for targeted distribution, they are more likely to engage in clientelistic dynamics. Local associations provide the organizational infrastructure quid-pro-quo public resources to address neighbours' demands. Their leaders may demand improvements to public spaces, such as sports courts, the group venue, green areas, as well as ensuring the welfare of neighbours, including preferential access to health services, handouts, or monetary grants. From the politician's perspective, authorities screen the mobilization capacity of these local associations. I contend that when both the demand and supply sides mutually benefit from the exchange, both politicians and local leaders have strong incentives to cooperate with each other, thereby making quid-pro-quo visible at the local level.

By contrast, local associations without an appealing structure capable of mobilizing voters are less likely to engage in clientelistic dynamics. First and foremost, local associations such as sports clubs, senior groups, cooperatives, and mothers' centres do not invest in organizational capacity because they are not in the business of addressing people's demands. Without members demanding solutions, leaders of these groups have no need to establish hierarchical infrastructure connecting their members. Consequently, lacking organizational capacity, the *bottom-up* mechanism breaks down (Beach and Pedersen, 2019) because there are no mutual incentives to cooperate. In short,

no demands imply no organizational investments. Without organizations, there is no credible quid-pro-quo. I contend that the variation in organizational capacity observed at the local level allows us to infer that the demand process is at least part of the explanation for clientelism in programmatic settings.

**FIGURE 3.2**. *Unpacking the causal mechanism. Clientelism at the local level in programmatic settings*




**Source**: Author's elaboration

Additionally, my fieldwork has reported that some local associations, which also possess appealing organizational characteristics, choose to refuse the clientelistic exchange with local authorities. These types of local groups have very similar characteristics to those engaging in clientelistic practices – similar socioeconomic background, size, and number of members – but their leaders opt for a different approach to address members' requirements: They rely on multiple connections with actors outside the municipality, such as private entities, NGOs, and university student federations. The result is the avoidance of clientelistic relationships because these groups exhibit low dependency on municipal resources to satisfy internal demands.

In sum, I contend that the *bottom-up* demands for targeted distribution trigger the possibility of observing clientelism in settings governed by programmatic authorities. Who approaches these demands is crucial, though. When requirements are presented by individual neighbours – unmediated –, clientelism is not sustainable because municipal authorities have no guarantee of

an electoral pay-off. Politicians lack a structure to enforce and monitor voters, making the contingency problem difficult to overcome. In contrast, clientelistic dynamics become observable when people's demands are mediated by local organizations with the capacity to negotiate public resources contingent on political support. The clientelistic exchange is credible because these local groups possess a clear and hierarchical structure with intermediaries and communication channels ready to be used by politicians to obtain political support. Hence, politicians capitalize on this advantage and outsource the organizational cost of clientelism to these groups. By contrast, I contend that local groups lacking these organizational characteristics should be less likely to engage in clientelism.

*3) Hybrid linkages in programmatic settings*


I contend that hybrid linkages may be explained by the convergence of a programmatic orientation implemented in a *top-down* fashion and a clientelistic dynamic triggered by local groups' demands in the municipal territory (Figure 3.3.) Programmatic parties are organized around an ideological portfolio that defines the policies they intend to implement (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). The programmatic component therefore is developed at the party's headquarters by political elites in a *top-down* fashion before it trickles down to a local level of representation. On the other hand, local party agents – mayors and councillors – simultaneously have strong incentives to engage in clientelistic exchanges. Municipal authorities possess resources that can be discretely distributed by politicians. When mayors deploy municipal resources in exchange for political support provided by local leaders using local association structures, clientelism is activated.

Local politicians, therefore, face a dual influence: one from the top, where the party elite promotes a programmatic portfolio, and the other from the bottom, particularly from local associations demanding specific resource allocation to meet their members' needs. Local politicians may adhere to their party's ideological principles by implementing policies and allocating resources accordingly. They can also challenge their party's ideological foundations and engage with citizens in clientelist terms. Fortunately for them, politicians at the local level have the flexibility to employ both programmatic and clientelist strategies simultaneously. This flexibility exists for three reasons.

First, mayors do not require the party apparatus and, therefore, do not need to invest additional resources in running clientelistic deals. Instead, municipal authorities use public resources at their disposal to target various constituencies without depending on partisan or private funds. In exchange for targeted distribution, politicians leverage the organizational structures of certain local

associations, outsourcing the costs of clientelist exchange to local groups. Secondly, relying on clientelist linkages does not necessitate the abandonment of programmatic ambitions. Mayors and key actors within the municipality implement and put into action the party's political discourse at the micro-level. Finally, since the micro-level dynamics of clientelism incur minimal costs for party organizations, party elites do not penalize the clientelistic actions undertaken by mayors and councillors within their territory. In summary, I claim that hybrid linkages are primarily explained at the local level, which is the most proximate to voters, implying few costs to party organizations.

**FIGURE 3.3.** *Hybrid linkage strategies at the local level in programmatic settings*




## 3.3. Observable Implications and Alternative Theories

The theory introduced in this research has several empirical implications. Here I formalise some of them, which will be scrutinised extensively in the following chapters through the in-depth study of the case of Chile, a setting where parties are predominantly programmatic and consequently do not possess organisational capacities to credibly rely on clientelistic exchanges (Kitschelt et al. 2010; PREPPS, 2021; DALP, 2014).

When parties neglect a party structure to assume the cost of clientelism, e.g. brokers, intermediaries, informal channels for monitoring and enforcing, they outsource the organisational capacity to local associations eager to see their demands sorted out. When group leaders provide political support in exchange for municipal resources, clientelistic dynamics occur. Hence, the first empirical implication of my account is the following: *Political parties with a clear and distinguishable*

*policy offer deploy programmatic policies and simultaneously may engage in quid-pro-quo with local groups that provide political support contingent on targeted distribution at the municipal level.*

Secondly, if my theory is plausible, I expect to observe *within* variation in the types of linkages present in the same municipal territory. Regardless of the same socioeconomic background and contextual conditions, variation in the types of linkages should be visible when local politicians use multiple strategies to link different constituencies. My framework anticipates that the Mayor and her staff will link local associations based on their organizational characteristics. Concretely, a second empirical implication states that *local groups with vertically-integrated structure should be more likely to engage in clientelism than local groups that lack this feature.*

Unlike local groups that exchange their organizational structure to obtain solutions to demands, I also detected local associations with the same organizational resources appealing to politicians that, nevertheless, do not engage in clientelism with authorities. In theory, these local groups have the same strong incentives for quid-pro-quo exchanges since they operate in the same environment as those that do engage in clientelism. However, my fieldwork revealed that some leaders refuse such exchanges. Why do some local associations, with very similar organizational structures and socioeconomic conditions, engage in quid-pro-quo while others do not? I contend that *some local associations refrain from clientelism because their leaders seek assistance from private entities, NGOs, student volunteer groups, and non-municipal authorities to address their members' demands. This approach reduces their dependency on municipal discretion in the allocation of public resources.*

Crucially, If local groups with very similar socioeconomic backgrounds vary in the type of linkage *vis-a-vis* municipal authorities depending on their organizational features, this implies that socioeconomic status does not explain all the variation in linkages. I assert that hybrid strategies are more precisely explained by the level of demands and the associative capacity of local groups at the municipal level. Simply put, it is not only class that determines the display of programmatic and clientelistic linkages by the same party. *Clientelism, in local environments where parties display a programmatic offer, is at least partially accounted by the interaction of demands and associativity.*

To assess the theoretical implications and plausibility of my theory, I will critically examine the alternative theories discussed earlier in this chapter. Throughout the data collection process and research design, I have incorporated questions designed to address these alternative models. Table 3.2. provides a summary of the theoretical accounts discussed in this chapter, outlining their observable implications and the orientation (top-down/bottom-up) of the different approaches explaining political linkages.

Top-down models, on one hand, posit that parties establish clientelistic linkages with voters in a centralized, structured, and hierarchical manner (Kitschelt, 2000; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Stokes, 2005; Magaloni et al., 2007; Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014). Conversely, my framework suggests that citizens approach politicians to obtain resources, allowing parties to include clientelism as a supplementary strategy alongside their policy-based offer.

**TABLE 3.2.** *Alternative explanations and their observable implications*

| Frameworks | Dimensions studied | Explanation | Observable Implications | Author(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Trade-off party-voters' models** | Socioeconomic status | From parties to voters (top-down). Parties can be programmatic or clientelistic. The combination is unlikely. | In municipalities where programmatic politics are observed, clientelistic exchange should not be observed. | Kitschelt (2000); Dixit and Londregan (1996); Cox and McCubbins (1986) |
| **Diversification of portfolios** | Socioeconomic status, electoral competition, and perceived electoral risks. | From parties to voters (top-down). Parties use different strategies to link voters' according to socioeconomic status. | Extrapolating the cross-sectional analysis to the municipal level, the type of linkage should be a factor of class and electoral competition. | Magaloni et al., (2007); Diaz-Cayeros et al., (2016) |
| **Segmented Representation** | Socioeconomic status and territorial divisions | From parties to voters (top-down). Parties use different strategies to link voters' according to socioeconomic status. | Segmentation of linkages is driven by socioeconomic condition within/across territories. | Luna (2014) |
| **Electoral Division of Labour** | Socioeconomic status | From parties to voters (top-down). Parties use different strategies to link voters' according to socioeconomic status. | Parties diversify their labour relying on non-programmatic tactics to attract poor voters' whilst offering programmatic portfolios to favour elite supporters. | Thachil (2014) |
| **Non-Policy Politics** | Socioeconomic status | Parties allocate different policy and non-policy endowments according to socioeconomic conditions of voters'. | Supply and demand sides are relevant. Parties offer a battery of policy/non-policy according to voters' heterogeneous evaluations. | Calvo and Murillo (2019) |
| **Hybrid Linkages** | Local demands and organizational features of local associations. | Parties implement a policy-based offer *top-down*, whilst engaging in clientelism due to *bottom-up* local pressures for redistribution. | Programmatic parties can rely on hybrid linkages by outsourcing the cost of clientelism to local groups with vertically-integrated structures. | Contreras (2023) |

**Source:** Author's elaboration.

## 3.4. Summary

Scholarship on party-voters linkage explains diversification of portfolio around the socioeconomic condition of voters. However, how can we explain the variation in the types of linkages displayed by local authorities in municipal settings, where socioeconomic and contextual conditions remain relatively stable? In this chapter, I depart from conventional knowledge and provide an alternative explanation to account for the coexistence of policy-based distribution and clientelistic dynamics, in contexts where programmatic parties govern. I contend that the ideological portfolio is deployed by Mayors according to their commitment to programmatic ideas. Simultaneously, local authorities engage in clientelistic dynamics when addressing the demands of local groups, contingent on political support. Since programmatic parties, by definition (Kitschelt, 2000), do not prioritize an

organizational structure that makes clientelistic strategies a profitable option, politicians outsource this task to local associations with hierarchical, vertically-integrated structures. Local groups possessing this feature engage disproportionately more in quid-pro-quo exchanges than those without it.

In the upcoming chapters, I will empirically test my framework using evidence from fieldwork conducted in three Chilean municipalities governed by programmatic parties in localities with varying socioeconomic conditions. I have organized the evidence around the empirical implications stated in this chapter. Chapter 4 shows that neighbourhood associations in Chile, which possess vertically-integrated structures, engage in targeted distribution of municipal resources through quid-pro-quo arrangements. Chapter 5 explores the variation in the organizational capacity of local groups. I present evidence that groups lacking vertically-rooted infrastructure are less likely to engage in clientelism, providing suggestive evidence that the demand-side mechanism is at least part of the explanation for clientelism in programmatic-oriented settings. In Chapter 6, I explain how certain neighbourhood groups avoid quid-pro-quo by reducing their dependency on municipal funds. Consequently, they no longer need to engage in clientelistic dynamics to address their members' demands.

# Chapter 4. Outsourcing Machines. How Programmatic Parties Include Clientelstic Strategies

In Chapter 2, I presented a summary of the programmatic local policies implemented in the three municipalities part of this study. In all of them, mayors deploy a clear policy-based plan, aligned with the ideological guidelines of their parties. In Recoleta, for instance, local policies such as the "popular pharmacy" or the "popular real estate", illustrate how the communist ideological principles are concretely implemented by the municipal authorities. In contrast to Recoleta's progressive portfolio, in La Florida the Mayor design pro-market and individual-oriented policies to promote start-ups and communal local business, which are congruent with the foundational principles of the right-wing UDI.

Conventional accounts does not expect to observe clientelism in these programmatic contexts. Expert surveys indicate that both parties are considered highly programmatic not only in Chile but also in Latin America. Furthermore, as demonstrated earlier, both parties implement local policies in line with their ideological orientation. Specifically, in the case of the UDI, scholarly analysis suggests that party elites would employ segmented strategies based on class (Luna, 2014). However, La Florida is an upper-middle-income municipality where linkages should predominantly be programmatic due to the high cost of clientelism (Magaloni et al., 2007) and even despised by middle class citizens (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014).

What explains clientelistic dynamics in municipalities ruled by politicians who are members of program-oriented parties? In this chapter, I provide evidence that when local associations make demands to solve people's problems, politicians may respond by using targeted distribution. In this scenario, local authorities ask for political support in return, activating clientelistic exchanges. If my theory is plausible, I should observe that organized groups reach out to local authorities to make claims for particularistic distribution. Once politicians receive these demands, they solve those coming from local groups in exchange for any type of electoral support for the incumbent, such as voting, canvassing, or rallies. According to my theory, the presence of demands made by organized local groups with vertical structures is crucial in explaining why clientelism is observed in settings where programmatic parties rule.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the empirical implications of the theorized causal path of how the claim making process explains clientelistic dynamics in programmatic municipal settings. Then, I present empirical material collected in Chilean urban municipalities that support my theoretical expectations. To evaluate plausibility, I contrast the evidence against alternative

explanations. I conclude with the contributions to the literature on party-voters linkages and clientelism.

### 4.1. Causal Sequence of Clientelism in Programmatic Settings

I contend that clientelistic dynamics are driven by demands made by local associations with organisational structures ready to offer to politicians in exchange for targeted distribution. When politicians provide solutions to people's requirements in return for political support, clientelism is then observable. In the previous chapter, I presented the causal sequence in Figure 3.2., which I will evaluate in this chapter.

Local associations constantly demand resources from municipal officers to sort out people's requirements. What local leaders need are solutions to every day's problems faced by members of their organisations. They may request essential goods such as food, clothing, materials to repair people's houses. Moreover, leaders may request assistance to some municipal services e.g. to get a medical appointment in the hospital for some neighbour; an audience with Mayors or key municipal directors to obtain public goods or improvement of local spaces. Whatever leaders need, either individual goods for neighbours or club goods for the organisation, they recur first to the political contact they have in the municipal building.

The theorised causal sequence, therefore, start off with leaders from local associations demanding targeted distribution to municipal officers.[97] Concretely, one should observe people from local organisations contacting local politicians – Mayors, councillors, party members – or municipal workers in order to request resources they need to solve neighbours problems. Three observable implications might be observed if this part of the causal process is plausible. First, local leaders attend municipal offices to formal or informal meetings to demand some specific requirements for their communities. A second alternative is find evidence that local leaders contact the Mayor, councillors, or any municipal worker that helps them out with their requirements. In fact, it may be the case that local leaders have a close relationship with municipal officers being able to make requirements directly through a phone call or meeting up to raise the issue needed to be sorted out. A third possibility is that leaders make their requirements through political intermediaries displayed in the territory by the Mayor's party or the municipal apparatus. Political intermediaries may result in the "eyes of the politicians" in the territory to learn about people's problems and to

[97] It is important to stand out that local associations have myriad activities in the territory and responsibilities with their members. In this chapter, I only focus the analysis on the activities leaders undertake to obtain resources to fulfil members necessities.

interact with peoples' representatives. Evidence of any of these three forms of approaching municipal officers will increase the confidence on the presence of a bottom-up mechanism.

Local associations vary in their organisational capacities, however. This implies some groups have endowments to offer to politicians to obtain what they need while others do not. In the Chilean case, some local groups possess a large number of members, vast knowledge of the territory, and extensive networks with residents such as municipal workers, neighbours, local vendors, and much more. This is the case of many neighbourhood associations. In contrast, other associations are small, leaders do not know about members preferences, or simply the group is guided by specific interests of their members. Sports clubs, mothers' groups, and cooperatives – people-centred small business – are representative of these latter groups. Depending on the nature of organizational characteristics, therefore, these groups could be more or less appealing to local incumbents. The better the organisation, the knowledge about people's problems and needs, the credibility of leaders among neighbours, the more attractive to politicians.

What politicians need from local groups is precisely the organisational structure they lack to rely on clientelism. As a matter of fact, local authorities from programmatic parties have no organisational structure to invest in clientelistic strategies efficiently (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). They can target municipal resources, indeed, but they cannot enforce nor monitor individual voters' electoral preferences. A good example is provided by voters approaching individual demands at municipal offices. Municipalities received countless requirements every day for particular distribution. Some of these requirements are easily solved by municipal workers, directors, even directly by Mayors. Municipal authorities may indeed ask for political support in return for the goods or services given. However, since local politicians do not own a structure to enforce the political support, they can't really know whether benefitted voters will comply with their part of the deal. This implies that the quid-pro-quo is not guaranteed (Stokes, 2005; 2007). At most, politicians may suggest to benefit voters to vote for them, "to remember who helps you when you cast your vote in upcoming elections."[98] At the end of the day, however, it is unknown whether those who received resources will support the incumbent. Hence, The commitment problem of clientelism precludes clientelistic exchange at the individual level.

What politicians members of programmatic parties do, I theorise, is cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship with local associations with strong roots in the territory and knowledge of people's needs. On the one hand, politicians have municipal resources at their disposal and have a large margin to allocate resources arbitrarily. Since local leaders constantly need to cover neighbours'

[98] Luis. Key municipal director in La Pintana. 18 March 2021.

demands, municipal resources are a precious asset leaders can use to solve people's problems. On the other hand, neighbourhood associations have a hierarchical organisational structure with capacity to know about neighbours' necessities, the particularities of the territory, and direct information on neighbours' electoral preferences. Both authorities and local associations have something the other precludes. Therefore, I suggest that strong incentives to solve local actors' problems trigger the possibility to engage in clientelistic dynamics. Put simply, my argument is that in settings where programmatic authorities rule, clientelism is explained by bottom-up demands from local associations.

Table 4.1. presents a summary of what local leaders and politicians may *offer* in exchange for what they *need*. Municipal politicians count on municipal resources to arbitrarily target some constituencies over others. They can, indeed, allocate resources to solve problems, such as distributing essential goods or services to some groups. In addition, the mayor and her staff manage the local bureaucracy and have extensive contact with authorities providing crucial services in the field of health, social assistance, housing services, and public works departments, just to name a few.

Local leaders know perfectly well that municipal authorities have the resources they need to fulfil people's demands. Thus, they claim to authorities to allocate municipal resources to solve *their* members' requirements. Because all leaders of local associations are exactly in the same position of demanding municipal resources, politicians have to decide to whom they will target. At this point, what local associations may offer in exchange is crucial. I argue that those leaders with a hierarchical organisation that could be used by politicians to mobilise political support are more likely to engage in clientelistic dynamics. Since politicians do not have a partisan organisation to deal with the commitment problem of clientelism, they outsource its organisational cost using people's groups to get an electoral profit from non-programmatic distribution of municipal resources.

**TABLE 4.1.** *What local actors "offer" and "need" from each other*

| | **Leaders of local associations** | **Municipal politicians** |
|---|---|---|
| **What is offered?** | Hierarchical organisational structure ready to be activated to provide political support. | Targeted distribution of municipal resources to deal with neighbours' demands |
| **What is needed?** | Resources to solve neighbours' demands | An organisation structure to outsource the costs of clientelism. |

When leaders and local politicians have mutual incentives to cooperate with each other, then clientelistic dynamics might be observable. The causal mechanism that activates clientelistic

linkages is the allocation of municipal resources to local groups which in exchange supply organisational backup to politicians. Two empirical implications should be observable if quid-pro-quo exists. First, local politicians allocate resources to those associations willing to use their organisational endowments to obtain political support in form of canvassing, attendance to rallies, campaign aids, or vote-buying. Second, local leaders make their association structure available to politicians which aim to increase their electoral support. Local leaders are expected to support incumbents – either during elections or the entire electoral cycle – mobilising members to provide electoral support for the Mayor.

In summary, I will evaluate whether local leaders' demands for municipal resources are plausibly related to clientelistic dynamics in the municipalities included in this research. First, I will assess if local leaders make requests to municipal authorities and examine the mechanism they use to claim for particular distribution. Secondly, I will investigate how local politicians respond to leaders' demands and determine if they are responsive to those associations that possess organizational endowments to offer in exchange. If this occurs and authorities indeed allocate municipal resources to organisations in a quid-pro-quo manner, then clientelism might be plausibly explained by the interaction of the local demands and associativity. In the next section, I present representative excerpts as evidence which are organized around the three key observable implications of my theory.

## 4.2. Evaluating Evidence

***Implication 1.*** *Neighbours Making Demands to Local Authorities*

In a municipal office of La Pintana, the poorest municipality of Santiago de Chile, I had the first meeting with one of the key directors of the municipality, led by a Mayor from a traditional programmatic party, the Christian Democratic (PDC). Just arriving at the building and walking all the way down to her dispatch, I saw dozens of neighbours waiting for an appointment with municipal workers. This is not surprising since I was at the Direction of Municipal Development[99] (DIDECO in Spanish), a municipal department whose main function is to assist neighbours and

[99] The DIDECO is a crucial municipal direction in local administration in Chile. According to the Organic Law of Municipalities (18.695), the role of this office is to improve life's conditions of inhabitants of the municipal territory. Moreover, DIDECO office promotes and encourages neighbours organisations and contribute to solve people's problems providing social care and specific policies in diverse areas such as employment promotion or development of the local economy.

provide help to solve their problems. Hence, the interaction with individual neighbours and local representatives is a substantive part of the municipal workers' job.

> –"Are there always so many people waiting for audiences in this municipal office?", I asked shortly after I was received.
>
> –"Yes. It is always full of people all day making requirements to the Municipality. By law, the DIDECO has to be in permanent contact with the community to canalise their demands. Same with neighbourhood associations. We are in touch with their leaders because it is indicated by the municipal law. Overall, people push for municipal response to their demands. People know that we can solve some problems. If they have no response by a municipal worker, they turn directly to directors or authorities to obtain solutions."[100]

This excerpt reflects a very common situation in local politics when citizens have essential or club goods requirements: They look up to solve their every days' problems going to municipal office.[101] Indeed, people push constantly for targeted distribution to resolve their problems using their contacts or influence in the municipality to obtain what they need. After all, people know that the local government has resources and therefore the possibility to distribute them arbitrarily. The testimony of different directors and municipal workers is illustrative of the constant flow of demands they receive to distribute resources targeting some neighbours. A key director of the municipality expressed it as follows:

> "They [association leaders] feel themselves genuine representatives of their neighbours […] They know who they must talk to in the municipality, what resources they need and how 'to hurt' authorities [in political terms]. They know when they have to come to the offices and how to pressure the political authorities to obtain municipal resources."[102]

In the same line, another director states:

> "Here in this municipal direction we receive everyday requirements to repair streets, marking crossroads, speed bumps, and more. The leaders of neighbourhood associations are empowered and sometimes overbearingly claim for the services we can provide."[103]

[100] Ramon. Key municipal director. 01. February 2021.
[101] Certainly, local governments have formal procedures to provide help to the neighbours with needs. In the case of Chile, municipalities have a clear structure to assist citizens through the directions of social assistance, housing direction, transport, or the just cited municipal development division. Therefore, many people's demands are canalised through the municipal bureaucracy using formal criteria to distribute resources. Neighbours apply to programs, public funding to carry out their projects, and municipal assistance to solve essential problems.
[102] Luis. Key municipal director. 18 March 2021.
[103] Rodrigo. Key municipal director. 18 March 2021.

Yet another municipal worker declared : "We receive a high flux of demands. We prioritise those aligned with the political orientation of the Mayor."[104] What is clear from these excerpts is that municipal directors are constantly exposed to demands made by local leaders.

Importantly, interviews reflect a distinction between individual demands – those approached to municipal workers or authorities by a neighbour – and those made by leaders of local associations. Consider the following interview with Luis, a key director in La Pintana, which illustrates why clientelistic dynamics at the individual level are unlikely to be observed:

> "Every day I meet people looking for money for food, building materials, to buy medicines, to pay Higher Education's fee, and everything you imagine. I had this guy coming over a couple of times a month to ask for help. Sometimes I actually give him a *canasta básica de alimentos* [basic food basket] or some money. I tell him, obviously, that hopefully he remembers the next election that the municipal administration helped him when he needed it. But we can never know whether he voted for us or not."[105]

This excerpt reflects the incapability of directors and municipal workers to engage in clientelistic strategies vis-à-vis individual voters. When municipal authorities do not have a structure to monitor the electoral behaviour of individuals, then clientelistic dynamics are not sustainable. To be sure, when people go by themselves to some municipal office requesting help, they are either redirected to the social service offices – using a programmatic form of distribution – or could be offered targeted distribution. If the latter is the case, though, municipal workers and politicians cannot guarantee political support in return. In contrast to settings where politicians find out the way to enforce the quid-pro-quo and sort out the commitment problem using the party machine (Szwarcberg, 2015; Stokes et al. 2013; Wang and Kurzman, 2007; Aspinall et al. 2022), an indirect mechanism such as buying audiences (Peru, Muñoz. 2018), or outsourcing the organisational costs to private organisations (Thachil, 2014), politicians members of programmatic parties cannot ensure that good or services will return any electoral support because they have no the organisational structure to control people's electoral behaviour. Politicians might use other non-programmatic strategies such as pork-barrel or credit claiming, but electoral clientelism is unlikely to be neither fruitful nor efficient.

While individual clientelism is unlikely in these settings, local politicians still may rely on the relationship they can cultivate with leaders of local associations. In fact, leaders' demands-claiming activates a bottom-up mechanism that allows politicians to negotiate targeted distribution in exchange for political support. What distinguishes collective from individual demands is that

[104] Fabiola. Key municipal director. 19 March 2021.
[105] Luis. Key municipal director. 18 March 2021.

monitoring each individual's requests incurs high organizational costs that politicians are unable to afford. Collective demands, in contrast, reduce this cost because the organizational capacity and monitoring role is provided by local leaders. Otherwise stated, quid-pro-quo with local associations is credible because it is easier and low-cost for politicians to deal with neighbours representatives – who represents a large portion of voters – rather than individual citizens.

On the other hand, local leaders need the targeted distribution of municipal resources because they want to show themselves responsive to their members.[106] Thus, they demand goods, services, and favours to local politicians to satisfy neighbours' requirements. Carla, a neighbourhood association leader from La Pintana, declared:

> "This neighbourhood association represents roughly a thousand households. You need to know what every household needs. You also need to know everything is happening in the neighbourhood. We take people's demands to the municipal offices. We need resources for collective purposes such as street lights or to solve particular problems. It is crucial to have contact in the municipality, especially with directors or *territoriales*."[107]

In a similar vein, Carlos from La Pintana declared:

> "My role as a leader is to represent neighbours' interests. People focalize all their individual demands around the neighbourhood association. It is like a "*mini-muni*" [mini-municipality]. I help people with paperwork and to take both individual and collective demands to the *muni*. I attend to all the people's needs. We need help to remove rubbish from the streets, medical attention, and coordinate whatever neighbour's need."
>
> How do you approach these demands for municipal offices? I asked.
>
> "'Tienes que saber hacerla' [You have to know how to make it]. To avoid bureaucracy, you call your contacts in the *muni*. Direct contact is more important… you must get their phone number, know the directors or people in charge. I call and say something like 'Hi, I am *tal* (some) neighbours' leader and we need certain stuff. We must respond to the people."[108]

In a different sector of La Pintana, Ambar explains why she takes people's demands to municipal authorities and reaffirm the relevance of contact with key municipal directors:

> "My role is to represent the community in front of the municipality. I represent 1.640 neighbours and I am the one that pushes to get solutions to their problems. I am constantly in touch with neighbours to know what they are living and what they need. Of course, to solve some people's problems, I have contacts in the municipal office. I have no good relationship with the Mayor because I do not like him having "favourite" leaders. Then, it is important to have good relations with someone from the *muni* to solve people's necessities."[109]

[106] In the case of Chile, for instance, the article 43 of Law 19.418 on local community organizations defines their functions and attributions. Full text available on https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=70040.
[107] Carla. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 04 March 2021.
[108] Carlos. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 February 2021.
[109] Ambar. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 05 March 2021.

Two aspects stand out from the extracts of these interviews: what local leaders demand and who they contact. Regarding the types of requirements, local leaders demand both individual and collective goods, services, and favours for the group members'. In the case of individual requirements, leaders receive a myriad of demands for health services appointments, administrative paperwork, jobs, and essential goods such as food or building materials. "We are a 'mini-municipality' receiving all kinds of demands to help out our neighbours", Carlos declared. Other leaders, such as Rosa, added "groceries for elderly neighbours is very common in my neighbourhood," "When people need urgent health attention, I give a call to my contacts in the '*consultorio'* [primary health attention department] or to workers in the municipal health direction to get an appointment."[110]

Local leaders also declared they push for collective demands in municipal offices. Club goods such as improvements of their venues, green spaces, sports courts, light streets, and removing micro-landfills are some examples. Yasna, from La Florida recounted, "We seek to solve collective necessities such as community alarms and street lights"[111], while Carola, from La Pintana declared "[…] I made a requirement to improve our sports court recently."[112] Lastly, in Recoleta, Noelia clearly stated the types of collective demands they claim to municipal authorities:

> "My responsibility is to represent demands, necessities, and concerns from my community and lobby with authorities to solve them. We have both particular [people essential needs] and collective requirements, such as to clean up micro-landfills, street lights, green spaces, and security problems. I make our request directly with municipal workers in the municipality."[113]

A second aspect revealed by interviews is that leaders routinely turn to municipal authorities, directors, and public workers to look up responses for people's requirements. Leaders highlight constantly the importance of having *linea directa* [direct contact] with directors who can use the municipal apparatus to sort out urgent neighbours' problems. In the following excerpt, Ismael illustrates the point:

> "Poor people cannot wait. I demand resources from the municipality. I knock any door to be heard and do whatever is needed to get a response. It is crucial to have a good relationship and know the people in the municipality. 'Se casan mas mosca con miel que con vinagre' ['More flies are caught with honey than with vinegar']."[114]

[110] Rosa. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 07 October 2022.
[111] Yasna. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 06 April 2021.
[112] Carola. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 November 2022.
[113] Noelia. Neighbourhood association leader in Recoleta. 16 December 2018.
[114] Ismael . Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 16 February 2021.

Ismael continued:

> "I make requirements directly with directors. Not with secretaries. You must bond with directors and be strategic to make requests".

In sum, people at the local level approach constantly to municipal offices seeking help from the municipal administration to solve their problems. On the one hand, neighbours can turn individually to municipal services and even find out the way to be heard by directors or local authorities. Alternatively to make individual demands, neighbours' may canalise their requirements through neighbourhood associations. According to interviews, the leaders of these associations systematically mediate members' demands by taking them to municipal offices. The mediated route, in fact, turns out to be more efficient and reduce cost associated with the demand-making process. Since local representatives have permanent access to municipal offices and direct contact with key workers and local politicians, they can save neighbours' time and money, and they are more likely to get a response. Simply put, groups' leaders absorb neighbours' requests and try to solve them. To do so, they reach out to local politicians, key directors, and municipal workers with the power and influence to distribute municipal resources.

Local groups pushing for non-programmatic distribution, the first part of the theorised causal sequence, finds empirical support according to the testimony of crucial actors at the local level. Both political authorities and local leaders openly inform that neighbours' push for municipal resources to solve the necessities of their communities. The combined pieces of evidence provided by local actors, therefore, passes a *hoop test* in favour of the theorised bottom-up mechanism of people pushing for particular distribution (Van Evera, 1997; Mahoney, 2012 Bennet, 2010; Collier, 2011). This evidence also somewhat reduce plausibility of alternative hypotheses that state that politicians cultivate political linkages uniquely in a top-down manner. The data suggests that people constantly approach politicians to ask for goods, municipal services, and favours for their communities. It is relevant to highlight that people making requirements is not trivial. To be sure, people's demands are ubiquitous to different political systems and trigger different responses by the authorities (Auerbach and Thachil, 2023; Palmer-Rubin, 2022; Nichter, 2018). Nevertheless, for the overall causal argument explored in this research, it is crucial to learn about how people articulate their demands, to whom they turn, and what is the mechanism activating a clientelistic exchange.

***Implication 2.*** *Municipal Response to Peoples' Demands and Dynamics of Clientelism in the Local Arena*

Locals leaders approach to municipal authorities to demand solutions for individual or collective problems informed by neighbours. How do politicians and municipal workers react to people's requirements? Do they distribute particularistic goods and provide favours to neighbours' as response to local demands? Do they try out to engage in quid-pro-quo in order to get benefits from non-programmatic distribution?

Interviews point out that local politicians from programmatic parties indeed use non-programmatic distribution as response to local people's demands. Municipal authorities do so by allocating essential goods such as food, gas cylinders, or building materials. As Yasna from La Florida explained to me , "The Mayor distributes gas cylinders to the neighbours. We make clear that these handouts were provided by *our* Mayor."[115] People routinely obtain services and favours to benefit their group members' – e.g. medical appointments, monetary handouts, public cleaning, or social assistance.

Local leaders demand directly from key directors who, in turn, use their political influence to force technical departments to allocate municipal services to specific groups. If local leaders need street cleaning or to speed up a health appointment for one of their members, they call municipal contacts to get their demands fulfilled. After leaders' requirements are received, politicians and directors must decide whom they are going to deploy resources. According to the interviews, municipal authorities screen how apt are different local groups at reciprocating with electoral favours. Ramon, a key director in La Pintana, provides valuable insights into the matter:

> "We know which are the bigger local associations. "Si pesa poco, o son chicas" [if groups are small and have no relevance], we do not help them out. We evaluate how many people some group "puede mover" [mobilise], whether or not they turnout, the number of members they have, how representative are the leaders in their neighbourhoods, and if they have credibility."[116]

Interestingly enough, these quotes explain how municipal administrators at the local level balance the potential benefit to target some groups over others according to the characteristics of local associations. Municipal workers know very well that different groups may mobilize more people, whether they turn out or not, and how powerful leaders are in the territory.[117] "Our office knows

[115] Yasna. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 06 April 2021.
[116] Ramon. Key municipal director. 01 February 2021.
[117] The question about the circumstances under which politicians deploy resources to some groups and no others is beyond the scope of this document, however. Future research could explore what are the expectations and preferences of politicians to distribute municipal resources.

who are the leaders that mobilize people, 'quienes pesan en el territorio' [who is credible], and how much each community weighs," key director Luis told me in our interview.

The mechanism to activate the non-programmatic distribution to local groups was reported by several directors from political divisions in the municipalities studied in this research. Once demands are received and after screening which local group will be granted municipal resources, authorities – Mayor, political directors – contact the technical areas to solve leaders' demands. Consider the following excerpt that shows how political directors operate to sort out requirements by calling technical units subordinated to their political control:

> "The technical directors [sanitation direction, social assistance, social programs] are somewhat influenced by our political control. The delivery of resources and funding to some local groups is dependent on us. A direct call by myself, the Mayor, his Chief of the Cabinet [to technical directions] is to solve some petitions right away."[118]

Indeed, in a conversation with a director leading a technical municipal office, she recognized that a call from authorities to give priority or immediate solutions to some demands implies they have to target resources and privilege some groups due to political reasons.

> 'Some technical areas such as mine [environment and sanitation direction] are politicised. If someone from above [authorities or other directors] calls me, I have to provide the service [referring to street cleaning and garbage collection]. The *amiguismo* [cronyism] is a generalised problem in local management. You cannot avoid it. If the municipal administrator calls me, I just obey."[119]

The statements made by directors constitute critical evidence because they were informed by local authorities, who have very few incentives to recognize clientelistic practices. Moreover, in agreement with the authorities' declarations, local leaders confirm the relevance of having a good relationship with municipal workers to get solutions to their demands. Lorena from Recoleta, Carlos from La Pintana, and Yasna from La Florida recounted their experiences regarding this point:

> "It is very important to have a relationship with municipal workers and directors. They help us out to overcome neighbours problems [...] and this is my role as a neighbour's leader. I do not care about the Mayors' party, I have to work with all parties. The important thing is to solve peoples' demands."[120]
>
> "When *my* neighbours need something I demand from the municipality, I make my demands and they respond pretty well."[121]

[118] Ramon. Key municipal director. 21 March 2021.
[119] Fabiola. Key municipal director. 19 March 2021.
[120] Lorena. Neighbourhood association leader in Recoleta. 14 December 2018.
[121] Carlos. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 February 2021.

> "Directors are people of goodwill and good administrators. They satisfy our demands because we have a direct line, we know them, I have their phone numbers. If you need something, you call them."[122]

In the following excerpt, Juana summarizes the process from people making demands to the municipal response:

> "I have a good relationship with the Mayor. He helps to sort out people's requirements. Also having contact is relevant because they [public workers] deliver municipal resources to the people. "*Neighbours make their requirements, I inform municipal authorities, and they provide solutions*."[123]

When does targeted distribution become clientelistic? The clientelistic exchange starts off when politicians ask political support in return for the municipal resources distributed. Data collected suggests that incumbents contact local leaders when elections are coming up. Leaders systematically declare that politicians ask them for political support in form of attendance to municipal events, campaigning, canvassing, and mobilising neighbours to participate in the incumbent's rallies. Below are some interview excerpts that illustrate what politicians require in return for the allocation of municipal resources:

> "The Mayor 'pasa la cuenta' [give us the bill] for the help and favours he gave us during the municipal period. Municipal workers also demand political support for the Mayor 'pa' las elecciones' [for the elections]. They ask me to mobilise people for municipal events, 'puerta a puerta' [canvassing]."[124]

> "They [municipal workers] ask for support during elections for the resources distributed to the community. They asked me to find a venue for a campaign event. They asked me to use our local association venue."[125]

From the previous quotes, it is noticeable that municipal authorities request local leaders to explicitly support the incumbent's electoral goals. Mobilising people to attend municipal campaigns, canvassing, political ads, and using the local groups canals to transmit electoral propaganda are the cost for obtaining municipal resources to solve neighbours' problems. Moreover, local leaders perceive that they can negotiate with the authorities for the support of their members in exchange for public resources.

Local associations become the main gate for politicians to knit a clientelistic dynamic at the local level. Politicians expect that local leaders play the role of intermediaries using the local group structure in order to gain electoral support from neighbours and members. Leaders, on the other

[122] Yasna. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 06 April 2021.
[123] Juana. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 March 2021.
[124] Ismael . Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 16 February 2021.
[125] Raquel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 05 March 2021.

hand, declare that elections are the perfect timing – and sometimes the only – to negotiate municipal resources with municipal authorities.[126]

Indeed, local leaders perceive that electoral times are crucial moments to obtain the resources they need for their communities. "They only come to the *población* [the slum] during elections. It is the only time we can negotiate," a secretary of a neighbourhood association told me during an interview in La Pintana. Another leader declared, "I had a bad relationship with the Mayor. The relationship gets better during elections, though." Thus, elections are the moments when clientelistic exchanges are observed. In different stages of the electoral cycle, particular distributions could trigger patronage strategies or pork-barreling. However, clientelism is observed only when resources are deployed as a condition of political support from local groups. In programmatic settings where politicians do not have partisan structures to sustain clientelism linkages with voters, local associations take advantage of the opportunity and negotiate public resources for electoral support. The following interview excerpt with Noelia from Recoleta and Viviana from La Pintana reflects how leaders perceive elections as the opportunity to obtain resources from the authorities.

> "We negotiated with the mayor. Once we invited him to the social venue for a meal and to give him our recognition. At the end of the day, I told the mayor: 'I want you to put the roof on the football field.' Mayor [name of the Mayor] told me: Well played! What do you give me in return? -The support of the people. Then, for the neighbourhood council elections, he offered to pay me all my campaign expenses. Finally, for the 2016 local elections he called me to collect the favour."[127]

> "[now that elections are coming up], we are negotiating with the *muni* [municipality]. That is what we are discussing now [with municipal workers], what we can obtain if we mobilise people to vote for the Mayor"[128]

Crucially, the quid-pro-quo is recognized by local authorities and key municipal workers. Directors from the three municipalities part of this study declared that they indeed ask for political support from local associations. Consider the following excerpts:

> "We give more resources to some groups than others. You can say we have some sort of clients in the territory. We distribute resources to those who help us. And local associations are important because they know the neighbours. They know the people *al dedillo* [very well].[129]

[126] Local leaders in the three municipalities declared negotiate municipal resources when election were proximate. Leaders are also aware that politicians have no articulated means to mobilise neighbours in the territory. "We are [local leaders] who know the people in the neighbourhood. Directors know pretty well that we mobilise our people."(Noelia, Recoleta, 16 December 2021). She followed up, "There you have Mario (not real name) [she names a leader from another neighbourhood association]. He tells the Mayor, 'I can mobilise a thousand people for you'. Of course people from the *muni* give him what she asks. Check out her neighbourhood associations venue… it is a palace".
[127] Noelia . Neighbourhood association leader in Recoleta. 16 December 2018.
[128] Viviana. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 26 February 2021.
[129] Adolfo. Key Director in La Pintana. 19 March 2021.

> "To the extent you as authority solve people's problems, you nurture a relationship of trust with people. […] Some local leaders offer political support: they say 'if you give me something, I will support the Mayor.' Then, I called them back and said 'look, I solved your problem, now we need your help.'"[130]

> "Local leaders demand the resources they need for their members [neighbours] and offer political support. Local groups have a pattern, they depend 99% on the municipal resources."[131]

These pieces of evidence suggest that politicians claim electoral support from those groups benefited with municipal resources. The fact that the informants were municipal directors gives plausibility to the hypothesis that clientelistic dynamics are observed as a response to leaders' demands. Indeed, directors explicitly assert that they ask for electoral support from those local groups to which the municipality provides solutions for their demands. Moreover, municipal officers also suggest that they are offered quid-pro-quo by local leaders: "If you give me something, I will support the Mayor," one director said, recreating a conversation with a local leader; "they [leaders] offer political support…" Directors' testimonies are in line with leaders' declarations, who assert: "Esto es pasando y pasando. Tú me das y yo te apoyo" ['You give me, and I give you back']. Finally, the evidence provided by directors is consistent with the perception of negotiation declared by local leaders when elections are coming up.

In sum, local leaders declared that authorities request electoral support in exchange for the resources distributed among neighbours. For their part, key directors admit candidly that they demand political support and disproportionally distribute resources to those groups that support the municipal administration thank to their vertically-integrated structure. Both pieces of evidence – testimonies by leaders and directors – represent a *hoop test* proof for the hypothesis that clientelism in a setting ruled by a programmatic party is driven by local demands raised by associations in the local sphere.

***Implication 3.*** *Local leaders supporting incumbents in elections: dynamics of clientelism in the local arena*

Thus far, I have presented evidence that leaders offer support to political authorities in exchange for resources to address neighbours' demands. The specific forms of support that leaders are asked to provide during elections are described by the local leaders themselves. The following excerpts are their responses to the question: 'What activities do you undertake to support the Mayor during elections?'

Josefina, a leader from La Pintana recounted:

[130] Luis. Key Director in La Pintana. 21 March 2021.
[131] Jaime. Key Director in La Pintana. 18 March 2021.

> "Well, I helped the mayor with the votes like other leaders do. Also con 'palomas' [political ads displayed in the streets or people's houses] and explaining to neighbours why we should support him."[132]

Also in La Florida, a municipality where clientelism is not expected, Yasna declared:

> "Mayor asked me to set up a political advertisement to be re-elected. The form I have to help the Mayor [also] is distributing chicken, gas cylinders among the neighbours and 'dejando bien en claro' [being very explicit] that the Mayor was who gave the resources. I also actively inform the people about all the things the *muni* [referring to municipal directors and Mayor] want to inform the people."[133]

According to local leaders, they provide support to the incumbent in various forms. This includes mobilizing people to turn out for events, actively participating in campaigning efforts, attending incumbent's events, and using the neighbourhood association venue to display political ads. Field notes collected during the research corroborate these statements made by local leaders. Indeed, leaders are seen attending incumbent's events and displaying political ads when they support the Mayor.[134] Moreover, municipal directors also reported that leaders actively campaign for the incumbent, as one director stated, "The final campaigning event had a lot of presidents of local associations (he named three leaders that I already interviewed); you can see it on social media."[135] Leaders' testimonies are, therefore, consistent with the evidence reported by directors and field notes collected through participant observation.

The causal sequence studied in this chapter provides evidence that the political support provided by some leaders is conditioned by the resources deployed by authorities to sort out neighbours' demands. To be sure, it is likely that some leaders will support the Mayor's administration for multiple reasons anyways – e.g. spontaneous support, ideological position, and more reasons. However, evidence suggests that leaders supported the campaign *only* because they were either benefited with municipal resources or they negotiated quid-pro-quo with local authorities. The following excerpts illustrate the pragmatic attitude of local leaders in their interaction with municipal authorities.

Recalling the testimony of Noelia from Recoleta presented in the introduction of this thesis:

> "*I don't care who rules. I do not care if it is a PC or UDI mayor*, what I need is to help the people of the neighbourhood. If they give me, I will help them; you give me, I will give you back."[136]

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[132] Josefina. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 25 March 2021.
[133] Yasna. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 06 April 2021.
[134] Graphical evidence such as photos or videos of leaders attending incumbent campaign events are not provided to guarantee the anonymity of the participants in this research. I discuss confidentiality in Appendix 1.
[135] Ramon. Key municipal director. La Pintana. 21 March 2021.
[136] Noelia. Neighbourhood association leader in Recoleta. 16 December 2018.

Similar patterns I found in La Florida and La Pintana. This was explained by Sandra and Yasna, respectively:

> "One as a president of a neighbourhood association must work with all the parties. My role is to respond to neighbours demands."[137]

> "My responsibility is with neighbours ['me debo a mis vecinos'], not to the Mayors' party. I do not care neither the party nor the Mayor, I need to solve peoples' problems […]."[138]

Counterfactual reasoning also allows us to contrast the stages of the causal sequence with the evidence reported in this chapter. If the municipal authorities had not received demands from organised local groups, mutual incentives are not met. The existence of demands articulated by local groups is necessary to arrive at a situation in which both municipal authorities and local associations have incentives to *offer* and to *provide*. The presence of the bottom-up mechanism allows local politicians – with no partisan structures or private organisations capable of absorbing the cost of clientelism – to ask for political support. In doing so, they outsource the cost of clientelism to local groups in exchange for municipal resources. In this manner, local authorities partially solve the problem of lacking organizational capacity. In short, authorities rely on neighbourhood association leaders who possess detailed knowledge of their territory and the ability to use their infrastructure for electoral purposes.

### 4.3. Confounders

Tracing actors and the actions they undertake in their natural environment is a powerful qualitative tool for uncovering new variables and testing causal explanations. However, an inductive theory-building process cannot dismiss the significance of other variables in explaining outcomes (Beach and Pedersen, 2019). In contrast to the quantitative approach that deals with confounders, process tracing is not concerned with estimating the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) as experimental methods do, or controlling for observable confounders as observational studies usually do when running regressions.

Instead, a mechanistic approach evaluates how plausible alternative explanations are (Beach and Pedersen, 2019; Mahoney, 2016; Fairfield and Charman, 2017). To do so, the researcher should

[137] Sandra. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 March 2021.
[138] Yasna. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 06 April 2021.

track every possible empirical implication of each alternative model throughout the process of empirical investigation, from the collection of Causal Process Observations (CPOs) to data analysis (Goertz and Mahoney, 2013; Mahoney, 2015; Bennett and Checkel, 2015). Indeed, since theory-building using process tracing cannot rule out the effect of other variables confounding the causal relationship, testing the alternative theories becomes crucial to evaluate which theoretical model is most likely to explain the outcome (Goertz and Mahoney, 2013; Mahoney, 2016).

Thus, I will contrast different theoretical expectations with evidence collected in my fieldwork to adjudicate the most plausible explanation for the observed clientelistic dynamics in municipalities ruled by a programmatic Mayor.

### 4.4. Evaluating Alternative Theories

The evidence presented thus far provides little empirical support for alternative theories discussed in Chapter 3 (Table 3.2.) Trade-off and distributive models expect that parties with programmatic orientation will not incur in clientelistic dynamics. Accordingly, we should observe that Mayors offer almost exclusively programmatic policies. However, as I showed above, reported evidence suggests that clientelistic dynamics in fact exist alongside the distribution of programmatic policies, and far from being episodic, they are part and parcel of local politics. This is consistent with the role of intermediaries of local civil society groups (Oxhorn, 2009) and their role in clientelistic exchanges reported in other Chilean municipalities – e.g. Santiago (Arriagada, 2013) or Iquique (Barozet, 2003).

In contrast to trade-off approaches, other models do provide an explanation of why it is possible to observe clientelism in programmatic settings. One such account is the diversification model introduced by Magaloni et al. (2007), which states that parties diversify their portfolio according to the socioeconomic and electoral features of districts. Parties offer a programmatic portfolio to wealthier constituencies while relying on non-programmatic distribution to poorer constituencies. Consequently, when testing the diversification theory at the municipal level, one could expect that parties link citizens according to their socioeconomic condition.

Nevertheless, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that parties at the local level engage in clientelistic dynamics as a response to local demands and the organizational characteristics of local groups. Within-case evidence at the municipal level, where electorates tend to be rather similar in terms of socioeconomic conditions, reports that parties engage in clientelistic dynamics as a response to local demands and the characteristics of local groups approaching the municipal

office. Associativity, in fact, is a neglected variable in diversification accounts even when it has been shown to be a crucial determinant of clientelism (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). More precisely, clientelistic exchange in programmatic contexts depends not exclusively on class, but rather on the interaction of local demands and associativity. Moreover, in contrast to Magaloni's and colleagues' approach, my exploratory research identifies that the causal mechanism triggering clientelism is activated by the demand-side, and not as a result of party top-down diversification strategies.

Another approach is the Electoral Division of Labour theory (Thachil, 2014). According to this model, what we should have observed is that programmatic parties use private resources to appeal to disadvantaged constituencies through the distribution of services to poor communities. The evidence collected for this research did not provide support for this model either. The three Mayors, all from different Chilean programmatic parties, did not appeal to private resources to attract poor voters. In fact, collected evidence shows that no private resources were distributed in exchange for votes, services, or favours. To activate the quid-pro-quo Mayors resort to public municipal funds to which authorities have discretion to allocate.

Similarly to Thachil's model, Luna (2014) theory suggests that parties segment their linkage strategies by class to increase their electoral support Evidence collected does not give empirical credit to the argument that politicians offer unilateral clientelism. In fact, data suggest disconnection between party HQ and local levels, making it implausible that mayors follow unrestrictedly a party strategy from party elites. The evidence also reports that clientelism is observable not only by local demands but it is also explained by the level and type of associations of locals, a variable also neglected in Luna's account. While segmented representation models explain clientelism as a function of socioeconomic status, I presented evidence that class and association interact by activating a bottom-up mechanism which explains the clientelistic dynamics observed in settings where Mayors' come from programmatic parties.

The Non-policy model of Calvo and Murillo (2019) offers another alternative explanation. According to this framework, politicians deliver a diversified portfolio to heterogeneous voters. Parties, authors state, are organisations with different capacities to offer both policy and non-policy – valence, targeted distribution, networks – endowments. Voters at the same time, have different preferences and expectations of access to the benefits -policies and non-policies- provided by parties (p. 217). To test empirically their framework, Calvo and Murillo use socioeconomic status for the analysis. In doing so, they show that voters preferences and party allocation of policy and non-policy endowments vary across groups along this category. An empirical implication one

should observe following this approach is that a Mayor from a programmatic party offers both policies and targeted distribution. Indeed, evidence shown in this document is consistent with this prediction. A second empirical implication, however, is that variation on policy and targeted distribution by parties are guided by socioeconomic status. Conversely to the expectation, my evidence suggests that targeted distribution is a factor of local demands and groups' organizational features.

The evidence presented in this chapter does not support observable implications predicted by alternative theories. Trade-off and distributive models simply do not account for clientelistic dynamics undertaken by programmatic parties. In contrast, diversification approaches offer a more flexible explanation: parties may indeed combine different strategies and segment the electorate according to socioeconomic characteristics. However, I presented evidence suggesting that clientelism is not driven exclusively by class. Both the level of demands and associativity interact to drive the variations in the type of linkage observed in municipalities. Since alternative theories neglect the relevance of this interaction, their explanatory power is significantly reduced.

## 4.5. Discussion

In this chapter I laid out a novel explanation of the circumstances under which clientelism is observable in settings where programmatic parties rule. Based on extensive fieldwork in three municipalities with different socioeconomic features in urban areas in Chile, this research inductively builds theory to explain hybrid linkages at the municipal level. I found empirical evidence that Mayors from programmatic parties engage in quid-pro-quo with local association leaders' who push for targeted distribution to solve neighbours' demands. In retribution, politicians ask leaders to mobilise neighbours during elections, attend incumbent events, campaigning, electoral ads, and occasionally to sign up membership to Mayors' party.

In contrast to conventional explanations such as trade off and diversification portfolio models, I showed that clientelism in programmatic local settings is driven not exclusively by socioeconomic status. Crucially, I laid out evidence that clientelism is driven by interaction of locals demands and the organizational capacity of the groups pushing for targeted distribution. The correlation drawn by alternative models therefore might be a reflection of a more fine-grained source of variation which are people's demands and their capacity to offer endowments to politicians in exchange of municipal resources. Moreover, and departing from the alternative theories which state parties link voters in a top-down fashion, this research concedes more plausibility to a bottom-up mechanism triggered by people necessities, which is in line with recent demand-side models explaining

clientelistic dynamics (Nichter, 2018; Palmer Rubin, 2019; Auerbach and Thachil, 2023; Borges, 2019).

The main contribution of this chapter is to provide an explanation of why clientelism is observed in local settings where parties are guided mostly by programmatic portfolios. Many additional questions will require further investigation, though. Future research should inquire about the role of single voters members of local associations and the interaction they have with local leaders. Likewise, how members select their leaders and how they evaluate them in order to get their demands solved is an open question. Another line of research is about how politicians harmonise (Luna, 2014) the programmatic and clientelistic type of linkages at the local level.

Future research could also investigate whether the interaction between associativity and demand-making is present in other contexts. Parties with strong ideological stakes may introduce clientelism through other mechanisms and for different reasons. The mechanisms that parties use in diverse settings such as Japan (Catalinac and Muraoka, 2023), some Eastern-European countries (Mares and Young, 2019), or Latin America (Johannessen, 2020) to include clientelism as a complement to programmatic portfolios, are worth exploring.

From the conclusions drawn along this chapter, a question that naturally comes up is why politicians engage in clientelism with some local associations and not with others. I turn to the investigation of this question in the following chapter.

# Chapter 5. Variation in Subnational Linkages: How Organizational Capacity Shape Clientelistic Dynamics

In the previous chapter, I introduced an explanation for the existence of clientelistic dynamics in local settings where the Mayor's party is guided by programmatic guidelines. I presented evidence that clientelism is triggered by associated voters pushing for targeted municipal resources. Politicians, in turn, activate the quid-pro-quo when municipal resources are provided in exchange for electoral support during elections, in the form of attendance at rallies, canvassing, and displaying political ads. I showed that both sides, leaders and politicians, have strong incentives to cooperate. The former need resources to address neighbours' demands, while local politicians require groups' organizational structures for campaigning and mobilizing voters during elections. When politicians' and social leaders' incentives are aligned, then clientelism is observable. In programmatic environments, such as the Chilean municipal level, clientelistic dynamics are therefore explained by local demands approached by organized local groups.

Local associations, however, vary significantly in their linkages *vis-a-vis* municipal authorities. While some local groups engage in clientelistic dynamics with local notables, others do not. Consider the following examples that illustrate the point in the Chilean context.

In the upper-middle income comuna of La Florida, neighbourhood association leaders explained that their functioning is like a small municipality ["la *muni chica*"], collecting neighbours' demands that will be later approached to authorities in order to be solved. "[We] canalised neighbours' requirements to the municipal office. We are like municipal workers without salary, approaching people's necessities", Yasna commented.[139] In exchange for the municipal handouts, leaders provide political support to Mayors attending rallies and actively performing political campaigns among their members. In a second interview with Yasna, she declared:

> "One way to support him in the campaign is to distribute gas cylinders for free… also chicken […] and make it clear who is giving us all these handouts. I also inform whatever the municipality wants to inform. *We must vote for him because he helps us.*"[140]

In contrast to neighbourhood associations that engage in clientelism, interviews with leaders of cooperatives, seniors clubs, mothers' centres, and sport clubs report these groups do not have a mutually beneficial incentives with politicians. The absence of a vertically-integrated structure

[139] Yasna. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 06 April 2021.
[140] Yasna, second interview. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 27 September 2022.

rooted in the territory and ready to trade in exchange of targeted distribution, makes clientelism less likely to be observed. The following excerpt informs about the relationship of these non-clientelistic groups with municipal authorities.

According to Camilo, a leader of a sports club in the comuna of Recoleta, there is no exchange contingent on political support:

> Researcher: "Do you approach municipal workers or authorities to address members' requirements?"
>
> Camilo: "The thing is, we don't really deal with personal requests. We're one of the largest and oldest amateur football sports clubs here, focused on our local community. Our members don't typically come to us with specific demands."
>
> Researcher: "And how would you describe your relationship with the municipality?"
>
> Camilo: "We have a good relationship with the workers there [municipality]. They can be helpful. Sometimes, we might request access to the football pitch in the neighbourhood through public workers. But in general, we do not *frequently* need things from the *muni* [municipality]."[141]

The two examples presented above illustrate variations in the types of linkages observed at the local level.[142] Yasna's account reflects a clientelistic exchange, whereas Camilo's situation showcases a lack of dependency on municipal resources. This chapter aims to explore the characteristics of local associations and the actions undertaken by their leaders to uncover the factors contributing to the engagement of some local associations in clientelism, while others do not. While the previous chapter elucidates *why* clientelism is observable in programmatic settings, the present chapter explains *how* local groups do so.

I present evidence from interviews and field notes that suggest that differences in the organizational structures of local associations contribute to explaining different outcomes. On one hand, neighbourhood associations have an efficient vertically-integrated structure for collecting residents' demands across the territory. Leaders initially use this apparatus to learn about what people need and afterward demand solutions from municipal authorities. Politicians, on the other hand, seek to use the communication channels of neighbours to display electoral information and mobilize voters.

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[141] Camilo. President of a Sports Club in Recoleta. 28 December 2022.

[142] It is important to note that local associations vary in their purposes, leaderships, number of members, organisational features, and may also be prone to clientelistic exchange or programmatic demands (Palmer-Rubin, 2019; Auerbach, 2017). Moreover, local groups have a myriad of purposes beyond obtaining monetary resources. They organise events for their communities, assist neighbours with bureaucratic paperwork, and much more. Nevertheless, my interest here is focused on learning why politicians engage with some of these groups in clientelistic dynamics and not with others. A complete characterization of local associations is beyond the scope of this thesis.

In sharp contrast, groups such as sports clubs, cooperatives, mothers' clubs, and similar organizations lack a vertically-integrated structure. As Camilo explained, this absence is due to these groups do not experience a constant flow of individual requirements that need to be fulfilled. Thus, there is no need for them to invest in a hierarchical structure like the one neighbourhood associations have. Without this infrastructure, which is crucial for politicians to outsource the cost of clientelism, leaders from these groups cannot negotiate targeted distribution. As a result, these local associations rely almost exclusively on the policy-based offer provided by the Mayor.

This chapter makes three contributions to dissertation's overall argument. First, departing from prevailing accounts, I underscore the role of the demand side. Local associations possessing appealing organizational features are disproportionately more prone to engage in clientelism with municipal authorities. Second, the observed variation in the types of linkages within municipalities lends credibility to the notion that the organizational capacity of local groups partially accounts for explaining hybrid linkages at the local level. This leads to the third contribution. I show that the variation in linkages is driven by the level of demands and their interaction with the organizational characteristics of local groups. Therefore, socioeconomic status alone is not the only factor explaining a diversified portfolio. More precisely, it is the interaction of demands and the characteristics of the local associations that explain clientelism in programmatic settings.

## 5.1. Varieties of Linkages at the Municipal Level in Chile

My account suggests that bottom-up demands and associativity are crucial to understand quid-pro-quo in programmatic settings. It is pertinent, therefore, to ask about what are the organizational features that make some local associations more attractive to politicians than others. In this regard, I turn to the analysis of how local leaders from neighbourhood associations use the group structure to obtain resources in exchange for political support. Understanding the mechanics behind the process will contribute to learn not only why different types of linkages are observable, but also gain clarity on the sequence leading to different outcomes in municipal environments ruled by programmatic parties.

My framework underscores the relevance of the vertically-integrated infrastructure assembled in neighbourhood associations. Neighbours' groups have a myriad of members' requirements to be fulfilled. In order to canalise demands, they have a practical, clear, and expeditious structure which allows leaders to collect demands and claim resources from the municipality. Politicians, in turn, have a monopoly on municipal resources that leaders need to solve people's demands. Municipal authorities see in the organisational capacity of neighbourhood association an opportunity to

distribute political ads and mobilise voters. Clientelistic dynamics thus may be observed when both local notables and community leaders have mutually beneficial interests: One the one side, groups' leaders have strong incentives to find resources if they want to show themselves committed and responsive with their community members; On the other hand, politicians might see clientelistic tactics as a complementary strategy to increase the portion of votes in the next election.

In contrast, other local groups lack an infrastructure that politicians find attractive for outsourcing the cost of clientelism. Sports clubs, mothers' clubs, cooperatives, and local committees do not possess appealing assets to offer in exchange for the targeted allocation of municipal resources. As a result, they do not meet the conditions of mutual incentives – *providing* in order to *receive* – that make clientelism feasible. Three reasons explain why these groups constitute a different type of organization.

First, sports clubs, cooperatives, and local committees, to name a few, do not experience a continuous flow of requirements from neighbours. Leaders of these groups do not receive individual members' demands, and as a result, there is no need to establish a vertically-integrated structure. Unlike neighbourhood groups, they lack the necessity to appoint 'street mediators,' 'intermediaries,' or 'demand collection via chat groups' to stay connected with members, as they do not have individual demands to gather. For instance, a sports club might request equipment or transportation for a sports event by seeking municipal funds from politicians or municipal workers. However, since these resources do not target specific individual needs, the demand process remains centralized solely within the leadership. In other words, without individual demands originating from the grassroots, leaders lack the incentive to establish a hierarchical communication structure for transmitting requirements. In essence, these groups are not focused on resolving everyday people's problems.

As a direct implication, these groups do not possess the hierarchical structure observed in neighbourhood associations, where delegates channel distributional requests from neighbours to leaders in order to obtain solutions from local authorities. The virtuous mediating network of leaders-delegates-voters through which politicians expect to mobilize voters, display political ads, and conduct electoral mobilization is not an option for non-hierarchical groups. The lack of a "double-flow" communicational mechanism, therefore, makes the *offer* these groups can make to engage in quid-pro-quo with local politicians less credible.

The absence of a continuous flow of demands has an additional implication. Clientelistic dynamics are sustainable because neighbourhood associations' leaders and local politicians constantly require assistance from each other. Leaders seek solutions to demands, while incumbents expect political

support to increase their possibility to be re-elected. This mutual benefit and necessity partially overcome the contingency problem of clientelism. Both sides rely on the arrangement because they have funded expectations that they will require assistance from the other in the future. In contrast, organizations such as cooperatives, sports clubs, and senior groups struggle to guarantee a retribution in the form of political support.

I present evidence in the following section that neighbourhood associations are more likely to cultivate clientelistic dynamics because of their particular infrastructure, which politicians can leverage to incorporate clientelism and thereby enhance their electoral performance. By contrast, clientelistic dynamics are unlikely when local associations lack this feature.

## 5.2. Evaluating Evidence

### *1. Neighbourhood Associations and the Centrality of a "Dual-Flow" Communicational Structure*

Do municipal workers ask for something in exchange when they help you with your neighbours' demands? This was the final question of my interview with Isabel, a leader from a neighbourhood association in La Pintana. She recounted:

- "I provide the neighbours with all the information sent to us by the municipal workers; we also participate in the mayor's campaigns. Additionally, we explain to our community all the assistance we have received from the Municipality, how they have supported us, and why it would be beneficial for us if the Mayor's efforts continue."

- Researcher: "How do you manage to do this? How do you effectively communicate all this information to your neighbours? As you mentioned, you represent 306 households [though this number cannot be independently verified]. That's a significant number of people to stay in contact with."

- "Well, we have appointed *delegates* for each block in the neighbourhood [she later explained that there are 14 delegates in total]. They inform us about the needs of the residents. Moreover, we maintain a WhatsApp group with all of them, and these delegates play a crucial role in relaying information to the Municipality."[143]

A few weeks before the interview I just mentioned, during another interview in La Pintana with a neighbourhood leader, she received a call from a municipal worker. After the call, she chuckled and said to me:

- "You see? He called me to share information with the neighbours," she remarked.

- Researcher: "What kind of information?" I inquired further, "Is this a recurring practice?"

[143] Josefina. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 25 March 2021.

- She explained, "We use our delegates to convey the information municipal workers want to inform to neighbours. We have a chat group where we can share the details provided by the municipality."[144]

Both interviews exemplify a systematic feature of neighbourhood associations: a vertically-integrated structure, where leaders act as intermediaries between residents and municipal authorities to address their needs. In return for the municipal resources obtained, leaders deploy the neighbourhood association's machinery to support politicians, thereby enhancing the incumbent's electoral prospects. In the following subsections, I present evidence of how local leaders employ the same communication channel to gather demands and, during electoral periods, provide political backing to incumbent politicians.

### 2. *How Does the Organization is Used to Collect Demands?*

Neighbourhood associations are indeed nurtured by the demands of local residents. As leaders declare, addressing people's needs is the primary reason for their existence. It constitutes a critical and fundamental role of neighbourhood leaders. The standard response to the question about the organization's role was: "To address people's demands and urgencies." Noelia, the local leader from Recoleta, succinctly articulated it as follows:

> "We represent the necessities and concerns of our communities. We advocate for local demands in front of authorities. We visit the municipal building to demand solutions for our neighbours' needs."[145]

The myriad of requirements that leaders make to authorities, however, cannot be collected exclusively by one or two leaders alone. Neighbourhood territories usually encompass very large areas, with hundreds of households. In the three municipalities included in this study, even the smallest neighbourhood association, in La Pintana, consisted of fifty households. To assist with the task of collecting requirements, neighbourhood associations have *delegates* in a second line of hierarchy. Their role is pivotal for the organization. Delegates gather the demands voiced by neighbours and relay the information in a bottom-up fashion to the local leaders. Once the requirements are in the hands of groups' leaders, they claim solutions to public workers or directly to key officials such as the Mayor or councillors. Carla, a neighbourhood leader in a slum in La Pintana, illustrates how their organization is structured.

[144] Carla. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 04 March 2021.
[145] Noelia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 16 December 2018.

> "We represent our community. We have 1.640 neighbours and we have "*todo mapeado*" [a detailed map], with all the necessities and people's demands. [The strategy is] one delegate by block who transmits all the info to us."[146]

The collected demands travels from neighbours to block delegates, who in turn make the requirements available to leaders. Petitions from households progress step by step through this ladder of actors, representing the hierarchical structure that makes neighbourhood associations efficient. Neighbourhood leaders explain how this hierarchical structure works. Viviana, from La Pintana, recounted:

> "The role we play here [as leaders] is to assist our community and protect our village [referring to security problems]. We use chat groups so the people may call or text us. This is also the channel through which we deliver the handouts provided by the municipality. They [municipality] help us a lot."[147]

In the same line, Yasna, a leader from La Florida declared:

> "I intermediate the help municipality brings to our neighbours. We have delegates in every block of the neighbourhood, also we have a WhatsApp chat to keep informed about what people need."[148]

In La Florida as well, Eliana, the leader of a large association that brings together 1,300 households, asserted:

> "Our structure consists of 22 delegates. I inform them of all the things related to the community. We have a chat group where I communicate with each of them. They, in turn, have their own chat groups with the neighbours in their block."[149]

When the structure works properly, individual demands are collected and leaders are informed of what neighbours need. "I do everything. Neighbourhood associations deal with everything. We are a *muni chica* (small municipality), receiving both neighbours' complaints and demands," Yasna from La Florida, followed up.

After collecting demands, leaders have the mission of seeking out how to provide solutions to people's requirements. As explained in Chapter 4, local leaders usually head to the municipal office, call directors and municipal authorities, and mobilize all their contacts in the municipal apparatus to sort out people's demands. Rosa, from La Pintana, summarizes this reality neatly:

> "I must know *my* people's requirements. I also must have contacts in the municipality to solve their problems. I have a close relationship with some directors [she names some directors] in the municipal building, even

[146] Carla. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 04 March 2021.
[147] Viviana. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 26 February 2021.
[148] Yasna. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 06 April 2021.
[149] Eliana. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 20 April 2021.

> when I only partially support the Mayor's administration. But, you know, if you do not have contacts, you cannot help your people. It is absolutely necessary."[150]

Knowledge about whom to turn to in order to obtain resources is therefore crucial. Consider the common situation where neighbours need solutions, such as rushing a medical appointment or acquiring building materials for house repairs. Local leaders explain that they must maintain permanent contact with anyone in the local government who might provide assistance. For essential needs like food, medication, and building materials, they aim to establish connections with directors from the Direction of Municipal Development or social assistance municipal offices. They also forge relationship with municipal public workers of the health department or the public cleaning offices.

Rosa illustrates this point when she needs to obtain a medical appointment for a neighbour:

> "I have a very close relationship with the workers at the *consultorio* [local medical centre]. When one of my neighbours needs to rush an appointment or a home visit doctor, I call them. It is the fastest way to get a response."[151]

Why do people prefer to approach neighbourhood associations for solutions instead of bringing their demands directly to the municipal offices? Intuitively, neighbours neither have the contacts nor the influence to obtain the resources they need from the municipality. I posit three concrete reasons why people have strong incentives to use the mediation offered by neighbourhood associations.

Firstly, neighbours would need to invest time and money to take their requirements to the municipal offices. Even though the personal resources consumed in the process of carrying the petitions to municipal offices may not be excessively high, there is no guarantee that individuals will obtain solutions. In contrast, neighbourhood associations offer an attractive shortcut. Leaders promise to shoulder all the transactional and personal costs that otherwise would have to be borne individually. As showed above, leaders possess an efficient organizational structure for collecting and advocating demands to local authorities. The active communication channels with delegates are efficient, and messaging apps make instant contact possible. Trinidad and Dilma from Recoleta showed me the messaging group while explaining:

[150] Rosa. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 04 March 2021.
[151] Rosa. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 04 March 2021.

> - "Look. This is the way we are in touch with neighbours. We have chat groups where all can inform instantly about whatever they want."
>
> - What do neighbours say in the chat? Can you give me some examples?
>
> - "Usually people demand things they need. Sometimes they use the chat group, sometimes they send me directly a message to my personal number. Neighbours also sell things or raise community problems."[152]

Faced with the choice between approaching demands through the neighbourhood association or individually, it seems reasonable that many neighbours would opt for the former, either by messaging or contacting a block delegate.

Another reason to rely on the mediation of neighbourhood leaders is their extensive network of contacts within the municipality, including directors, key workers, public officials, and sometimes even direct access to political figures like the Mayor and councillors.

> "Of course, I know all the directors. When I need assistance for the neighbours, I simply give them a call. If they don't answer, I go directly to their offices."[153]

As Sandra explains in the excerpt above, neighbourhood leaders have networks that enable them to reach out to a variety of actors within the municipality. This experience is not exceptional. Oscar, a key official in the Recoleta municipality, confirmed this, stating that:

> "Neighbourhood association leaders know everyone in the municipality. If you are working out of the office, they will wait for you to let you know what they need. People are accustomed to resolving community problems this way."[154]

By contrast, individual neighbours lack a network to efficiently obtain solutions from the municipality. Even if they have connections with one or another director, they are unlikely to get as broad connections as local leaders do.

Finally, neighbours have little to offer to local authorities in return for targeted distribution. Even if individuals promise to reciprocate with political support for the goods or services received from the local government, municipal workers do not have the apparatus to monitor or enforce electoral behaviour. Therefore, clientelistic exchange would be neither sustainable nor efficient at the individual level. In contrast, neighbourhood associations have precisely what politicians need. Leaders have at their disposal an organizational structure with constant, direct, and efficient access to neighbours. In the next subsection, I will present suggestive evidence that politicians do indeed

[152] Trinidad and Dilma. Group interview. Neighbourhood association leaders in Recoleta. 03 December 2022.
[153] Sandra. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 March 2021.
[154] Oscar. Key director. 18 December 2018.

engage in quid-pro-quo when deploying resources contingent on the use of neighbours' communication channels to obtain political support.

### *3. How Does the Organization is Used to Provide Political Support*

The structure of a neighbourhood association is fundamentally moulded and adapted to channel people's demands. The entire organization serves as a "demand-collector" at the most microscopic level of society. They have privileged information about what people need, their requirements, and their voting preferences. Undoubtedly, it is the civil society group most closely connected to everyday problems faced by neighbours. To fulfil their representative mission, neighbourhood associations possess a vertical apparatus to collect information about neighbours' preferences and demands. Local groups have a hierarchical structure with clear, simple, and efficient ways to gather people's requests. Hence, individual demands travel from neighbours to delegates and are finally received by leaders who, in turn, use their contacts to obtain solutions. My analysis suggests that this communicational structure is a key factor for understanding clientelistic dynamics in a programmatic setting like Chile's.

Politicians are well aware of the distinct features of various local organizations within municipal boundaries. Such groups as sports clubs, mothers' centres, neighbourhood associations, local unions, cooperatives, and other municipal entities exhibit variations in their organizational structures. Local authorities possess a good understanding of which groups could potentially provide an electoral advantage. In this context, politicians target neighbourhood associations precisely because of their hierarchical vertical organization. Politicians aim to leverage the communication channel held by neighbourhood leaders, allowing them to maintain consistent contact with voters and garner political support.

In simple terms, local authorities seek to outsource the organizational cost of clientelism by using neighbourhood as a conduit to link with neighbours. They harness the credibility of these leaders within their communities, leveraging their influence and ability to mobilize voters and engage in political campaigns within their communities. Crucially, this dynamic is feasible because local leaders possess strong incentives to engage in negotiations with the municipality. Leaders are in need of resources and favours that public officials and politicians can provide to address the demands of the community. As explained in Chapter 4, both politicians and local leaders are incentivized to collaborate. The former screen that local infrastructure of local groups can be used to secure political support, while the local leaders are mobilized by the urgent need to address their neighbours' demands.

How do local authorities leverage the infrastructure of neighbourhood groups to obtain political support? Politicians employ the communicational mechanism inherent in the vertically-integrated structure. The triad of neighbours/delegates/leaders, initially designed to collect demands from the grassroots and funnel them bottom-up, is repurposed by politicians in the opposite direction. They command public officials, directors, and at times even Mayors themselves, to request support for the targeted municipal resources allocated to neighbourhood associations.

The testimony of interviewees illustrates the multiple actions that leaders and delegates concretely do to provide political support to local authorities. The excerpts are informative about how they do it and what type of electoral support they provide. Particularly, leaders facilitate the structure to display municipal information, campaigning, and to mobilise voters during electoral periods.

Francisca, a neighbourhood leader in La Pintana, explained me how she supports politicians. She declared:

> "I mobilise people to vote for him [Mayor] during elections. I keep in touch with neighbours and canalise all the info that municipal workers send to me. Of course, I highlight the good things the municipality has done in the comuna."[155]

Leaders in La Florida reported similar patterns of exchange. Lia, a neighbourhood leader, explained:

> "We use the WhatsApp to send information from the municipality [referring to political campaign]. We also talk directly to our neighbours about support the Mayor. Unfortunately, we cannot hang *palomas* [political ads] because we live in "block" [small public housing buildings]."[156]

As Lia explained, the groups' communicational structures are used to convey "all the information they [municipal workers] send us". This includes details about local authorities' performance, such as what the Mayor has done for the community and promises about what he will do; distribution of handouts as part of electoral campaigns; information about incumbents' rallies; and suggestions regarding which councillor candidates neighbours should vote for.

The information is transmitted by politicians in a top-down manner. Directors or municipal workers – sometimes Mayors directly – send the political information that leaders transmit to neighbours. First, leaders receive and then propagate the political information through the delegates. Channelling the information is quite simple, costless, and efficient for local leaders. They do not have to invest additional resources to transmit the information. They simply receive

[155] Francisca. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 29 March 2021.
[156] Lia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 21 April 2021.

information and instructions from municipal offices and then diffuse it using the infrastructure they possess to collect demands.

The flow of information from the municipality to neighbours is a crucial mechanism to update people about politicians' performance and distribute electoral handouts. Yet, spreading information is not the only expectation politicians have from neighbourhood leaders. Politicians expect much more. Another neighbourhood leader, Josefina from La Pintana, explained to me in detail how they reciprocate with politicians in exchange for the municipal resources her community receives. She recounted:

- "My role is to know people's necessities. We are coordinated with the municipality, with directors and municipal workers. In our *junta* [neighbourhood association] we use WhatsApp, Zoom [...] and have 14 delegates, one for each block, who are crucial to inform what people need to municipal offices."

- "Do you support the Mayor in return for the help she gives to you?" I asked back.

- "I do support the Mayor.. yes… I mobilise neighbours, distribute political ads, and coordinate attendance to municipal events. I deliver the information they send us. We campaign with neighbours in the '*puerta a puerta*' (door-knocking campaign) [...]."[157]

Leaders reciprocate municipal targeted distribution by providing political support to local authorities. The retribution takes various forms. Firstly, leaders mobilize voters from their communities to vote for the Mayor during elections. Additionally, leaders foster attendance at Mayors' rallies and official municipal events to demonstrate support for the administration. Furthermore, leaders facilitate the distribution of political advertisements throughout the neighbourhood, serving as an indication of which candidate the neighbourhood association will endorse in the upcoming election. Leaders emphasized that "hanging a *paloma* [political ad] in front of my house signals to the neighbours who they should support."[158] For neighbours, as some leaders pointed out, knowing which candidate the community endorses holds significance. It serves as a message to the neighbours. Juana expressed:

> "[...] They do help me with favours because I mobilise people and have contacts. I do not tell people to whom they should vote, but I advertise my vote with the paloma… and they [neighbours] believe me. If they do a good job, the people will believe me."

Using the structure of neighbourhood associations, leaders encourage neighbours to showcase incumbents' political advertisements on their own homes. Leaders also employ delegates and chat groups to persuade individuals to actively participate in the Mayor's campaign. While it was not possible to directly interview neighbours to contrast this information, leaders' statements imply

[157] Josefina. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 25 March 2021.
[158] Juana. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 March 2021.

that their efforts to encourage cooperation with the Mayor's electoral campaign could indeed be effective. Given that leaders and delegates control the flow of demands and have discretionary use of their contacts, the potential to withhold specific distribution becomes a credible threat. Leaders reported maintaining a record of those who cooperated in displaying political ads. Leader Francisca elaborated on this practice:

> "I put '*palomas'* [political ads] in my house and convince neighbours to do the same. I write down the names of all neighbours that help us. Last [municipal] election [2016] I listed all the people that lend the front of their houses [for political ads]. They must support the Mayor. How can you demand stuff later? If neighbours are not actively supporting the Mayor, you cannot come here to demand things."[159]

Lastly, neighbourhood leaders use their group's communication apparatus to communicate with and persuade neighbours about who they should vote for in the next municipal elections. Leaders mention using chat groups, delegates, and even visiting neighbours' homes to promote municipal accomplishments and encourage the community to vote for the current officeholder. These campaign efforts carried out by leaders within their communities were consistently highlighted during interviews. A leader in La Florida expressed, "We inform to neighbours' all the things the municipality has provided and how much they have helped us... and why it's important she remains as Mayor."[160] Yasna added, "We should vote for her because this Mayor supports us." Other leaders, like Lia, also mentioned in an interview that she "explains and persuades neighbours" to support the incumbent in the upcoming elections.[161]

### *4. Making Clientelism Possible: The Communicational Mechanism*


Neighbourhood group leaders explained that their primary responsibility is to address the demands of their neighbours. These leaders, elected by the community members themselves, are expected to act as effective and responsive mediators in order to bring resources to the community and resolve their issues. Two key factors play a critical role in their success in this role. Firstly, leaders must establish an efficient infrastructure that allows them to effectively gather demands from neighbours. Additionally, these leaders need to establish influential connections within the municipal offices, which includes local authorities, directors, and key personnel, to obtain municipal resources. Therefore, the ability to gather and address demands emerges as two essential tasks that leaders must excel in to effectively perform their duties.

[159] Francisca. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 29March 2021.
[160] Yasna. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 06 April 2021.
[161] Lia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Florida. 21 April 2021.

I have reported in this chapter how leaders collect demands from the bottom-up. To fulfil this function, neighbourhood associations construct a simple, low-cost, and efficient structure to continuously update people requirements: A hierarchical organisation where leaders rely on delegates to be informed about what people need. In fact, every block in the community has a delegate with the mission to know what people need and to transmit the information to leaders who in turn use their networks to resolve. Also, leaders use social media, texting apps, and constant conversation with delegates to be informed. In simple terms, neighbourhoods' associations use a vertically-integrated structure for demand-collection purposes.

The same hierarchical structure used for collecting neighbours demands is employed by local leaders to extend political support to politicians. Politicians call upon leaders to mobilize the neighbours during elections, showcase political advertisements, engage in campaigning, and disseminate electoral information, all in return for the targeted distribution of resources. The Chilean context illustrates how vertical structures initially established for the purpose of gathering demands transforms into an electoral apparatus at the local level, serving the interests of politicians.

**FIGURE 5.1.** *Double-Flow communicational mechanism. Programmatic parties outsourcing organizational capacity from neighbourhood associations*




Author's elaboration

The organizational structure of neighbourhood groups operates therefore as a "double-flow communicational mechanism" (see Figure 5.1). While it simultaneously reduces informational costs for local leaders and transactional costs for neighbours during the demand process, it also becomes an effective structure for politicians who lack organizational capacity. Local authorities can leverage the infrastructure of these groups to externalize the costs of clientelism. In the following section, I provide evidence that local groups lacking a vertically integrated structure are unable to partake in quid-pro-quo. This further bolsters the argument that the organizational capacities of these groups play a role in explaining the dynamics of clientelism in programmatic contexts.

### *5. Local Associations without Vertical-Integrated Structure*

Not all local associations possess equally appealing organizational features to politicians. While neighbourhood associations present a credible and attractive proposition by virtue of their vertically-integrated structure, other local groups lack this particular organizational capacity. Sports clubs, mothers' clubs, cooperatives, and local committees exhibit significant differences in their organizational capabilities compared to the compelling structure of neighbourhood associations. As a result, these groups do not possess the resources to offer in exchange for targeted distribution.

I use qualitative data to trace the reasons behind this organizational disparity. Firstly, I contend that these groups inherently shoulder distinct responsibilities toward their members. While neighbourhood associations consistently receive demands from neighbours, with the expectation of providing solutions, groups like sports clubs or mothers' centres do not receive individual members' requirements. Consequently, the leaders of these clubs do not need to invest in infrastructure for demand collection. Given their lack of organizational capacity to effectively engage in quid-pro-quo dynamics, these groups lack mutual incentives in relation to politicians. As a result, clientelism between these groups and politicians is less likely, precisely due to the absence of resources that their leaders could offer in exchange for targeted distribution. I detail the theoretical expectations in Table 5.1.

**TABLE 5.1.** *Local groups without organizational capacity. Theoretical expectations*

| Theoretical Expectation | Observable Implications |
|---|---|
| No individual demands | - People do not approach requests to the group leaders' in order to sort them out.<br>- No constant flux of demands |
| No vertically-integrated structure | - Leaders do not make up a vertical structure to collect demands.<br>- Leaders use communicational channels to coordinate activities, not to provide solutions to individual requests |
| No clientelism | - Group leaders' do not provide organizational capacity to politicians in exchange for targeted distribution. |

Author's elaboration

Let me illustrate this part of the argument with a few examples. Consider cooperatives, the small business groups found in various comunas. These groups do not experience internal pressure from their members. Being horizontal in structure, they lack the framework required to negotiate municipal resources in exchange for political support. Imagine now a football sport club in need of pitch lighting, which approaches the Mayor for assistance. Even if the Mayor offers the necessary resources, contingent upon political support, it is still uncertain how leaders of sports club will credibly mobilise people, and will they uphold their end of the bargain in the future.

This scenario sharply contrasts with neighbourhood associations. Politicians can reasonably predict that leaders within these associations will honour their commitments, given the constant need for municipal resources. This reduces the contingency problem to some extent, offering a degree of confidence that both parties will uphold their commitments (Stokes, 2005; Hicken, 2011). By contrary, in the case of groups like sports clubs or cooperatives, their credibility is limited due to the absence of a constant demand flow that would assure politicians of reciprocal retribution (Stokes, 2005).

I inquired with Veronica, the President of a senior's club in Recoleta, regarding whether the members of her group approach the municipality with requests using the group. Here's how she explained it:

- "I do not receive particular demands, actually. That is not the purpose of our group. We get together to chat, to have *once* [Chilean dinner meal], or to play board games.

- Researcher: Then, do you take *any* request to municipal offices?

- "We are a constituted group. We of course know the people of the *muni*. Sometimes we apply to municipal funds or to municipal sponsored trips to the beach coast. But we have a no constant demands to be addressed."[162]

Just as Veronica explains the absence of a constant bottom-up flux of demands, Carla from a large sports clubs in La Pintana, explained:

> "Neighbours do not seek assistance from us. Our role is to organize football matches for kids and young residents, not to solve people's problems. Occasionally, we require assistance from the municipality for transportation, a service they provide at times."[163]

The infrequency of individual demands has implications for the organizational structure that leaders adopt to fulfil their responsibilities. Neighbourhood leaders, driven by the need to collect demands, find it necessary to invest in a vertical organizational setup, including intermediaries and effective communication channels. In contrast, others groups that lack the imperative to collect demands do not need to make such investments.

I asked Carla about the structure of her sports club. She replied:

- "We do not have a structure, properly. I concentrate all the information. I contact kids' parents to inform about the games."

- Researcher: "How do you communicate with them. For instance, neighbours' associations have delegates in every street to collect information from neighbours'. How do you inform about groups' activities?"

- "Well, I have a chat group to inform about the matches on weekends. But we are not like *las juntas* [neighbourhood associations]. We do not need delegates because there is no information to collect."[164]

Without the imperative to collect demands, Carla sets up a simpler structure to communicate with members using social media. This allowed her to forgo the requirement for intermediaries, for instance. Carla does not have to appoint monitors in every block to gather information about people's needs. Similarly, Magdalena, a leader of a group pushing for environmental programs in La Pintana, expressed:

- "We organize meetings using social media. Our focus is on promoting environmental initiatives within the comuna. We stand out as being quite distinct from the neighbourhood associations, in a sense. Our purpose is very specific."

- Researcher: "What makes you different from the neighbourhood associations? Could you elaborate on that?"

[162] Veronica. President of a senior club in Recoleta. 21 December 2022.
[163] Carla. President of Sports Club in La Pintana. 22 November 2022.
[164] Carla. President of Sports Club in La Pintana. 22 November 2022.

- "Well, particularly in this slum area, *La Mónica* [the President of her neighbourhood association] mobilize people in support of the mayor. Everyone knows that. She engages in negotiations with the municipal authorities."[165]

The excerpt highlights two significant points. Firstly, Magdalena indicates that group coordination occurs primarily through social media, specifically for organizing meetings. Her group does not deal with individual demands that would necessitate a more complex structure. What is even more notable is her comparison of her group's structure with that of neighbourhood association leaders. In this regard, she expresses a distinct contrast, stating, "We are different than neighbourhood associations... She [Mónica] negotiates... and mobilizes neighbours to support the Mayor."

When groups have no constant individual demands from members, leaders do not invest in vertically-integrated organizational structures. As a result, these groups cannot offer their organization to mobilize people. Since leaders cannot guarantee reciprocity, the conditions for mutually beneficial incentives are not met, making clientelism less likely.

According to the interviewees, the support of the municipality comes with few strings attached. In other words, the delivery of targeted policies to help the cooperatives, sports clubs, to name a few, is not done with the explicit expectation that its members will deliver votes or perform other campaign-related activities to benefit the Mayor:

> "Our *cooperativa* has never been asked for any kind of political favours. We have just attended either to present our projects at some public events or during certain Mayor's public speeches. But they have not asked us for votes or mobilised people. It may also be because we are a small cooperative [...] There are other large cooperatives where 150 people work. It may be different there […]"[166]

Similarly, Veronica from the senior club, explained:

> "They [municipal authorities] do not request us to campaigning during elections. Maybe a photo for the newspaper when they provide transportation, but nothing else."[167]

Moreover, interviews with non-clientelistic groups report that their interaction with politicians is reduced to apply to the policy-based offer of municipal authorities. Indeed, leaders of non-vertically integrated groups apply for funds, grants, and support from municipal authorities to run their projects in the comuna. When they do obtain funds, politicians and key municipal workers do not ask for political support i.e. they are not requested to mobilise people or distribute

[165] Magdalena. President of an environmental group in La Pintana. 18 March 2021.
[166] Karina, President of a cooperative in Recoleta, 23 December 2018.
[167] Veronica. President of a senior club in Recoleta. 21 December 2022.

information as neighbourhood groups do. Quite differently, leaders of cooperatives declare that they are asked to appear in the local newspaper or municipal events to show off that politicians are making real their commitments. This sort of credit-claiming is useful for local politicians in order to expose to the electorate that the programmatic portfolio of the Mayor is activated. Consider the following interview excerpt with a president of a cooperative in Recoleta:

> "The support they give us is because they [municipality] believe in the individual development of people and give us support. It is because they are communists and believe in communitarian development, it is an ideological position. They only advise us; they do not ask us for more than a picture for the municipal newspaper."[168]

### 5.3. Conclusion

In environments where clientelism is pervasive and machine politics are the norm, parties tend to use brokers, intermediaries, local notables, and party members to monitor and increase the cost for those who renege to comply with their part of the clientelistic deal (Stokes, 2005; Stokes et al. 2013; Hicken, 2011; Zarazaga, 2014; Novaes, 2018). By contrast, In local contexts where programmatic parties rule – and by definition lack of any type of machine –, politicians may seize the organisational structure of civil society associations thereby outsourcing the cost of clientelism. Local groups possess detailed information of their members, what they want, and what they need. The vast and enormous knowledge of neighbours and particularities of the municipal territory is, expectedly, desirable for politicians in order to increase electoral support.

The main contention of this chapter is that the organizational features of local groups shape the dynamics of clientelism in programmatic settings. I contend that variations in the structures of local associations explain why local authorities engage in clientelistic dynamics with certain groups and do not with others. Specifically, neighbourhood associations are more inclined to engage in clientelism compared to other local groups. This is explained by their organizational structure, which effectively facilitates the mediation between neighbours' demands and political solutions. Consequently, politicians harness the organizational capabilities of these neighbourhood groups to outsource the cost of clientelism. In contrast, other types of organizations, such as sports clubs, local committees, seniors' clubs, and cooperatives, do not invest in vertically-integrated structures, as their activities do not necessitate such a scheme. Consequently, these groups lack the organizational capacity to consistently provide political support to politicians. My theory posits

[168] Gaspar. President of a local cooperative in Recoleta. 17 December 2018.

that this differentiation helps shed light on why neighbourhood associations are more prone to engage in clientelism compared to other community organizations.

The findings presented in this chapter contribute in three ways to the argument advanced in this thesis. Firstly, I offer an explanation of how clientelism functions in a programmatic local setting. When local demands are channelled through local groups with appealing structures to politicians, the conditions for clientelistic dynamics emerge. In my analysis, therefore, the organizational characteristics of claim-makers take a central role. This perspective departs from classic accounts such as "trade-off" models and distributional theories that neglect this possibility.

Second, I emphasise the demand-side as the trigger of clientelism in programmatic settings. This goes in line with similar findings in clientelistic settings where people push to obtain targeted distribution providing political support in exchange (Nichter, 2018; Auerbach and Thachil, 2023; Borges, 2019). Both within-case and cross-case comparisons support the argument that a hybrid portfolio is explained by local demands driven by local groups with specific organizational features. In doing so, I complicate alternative theories that presume exclusive top-down party strategies to explain the diversity of linkages. These theories, in light of my evidence, attribute disproportionate relevance to what parties do, neglecting the agency of voters and groups demanding distribution at the municipal environments.

Finally, in my account, the class status of voters is only part of the story. Consistent with recent theories that give a central role to the local associativity to explain clientelism (Palmer Rubin, 2019; Garay et al., 2020; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015), I presented evidence that demands approached by local groups are crucial to understand why clientelism occurs in programmatic local settings. Within-case evidence revealed variations in linkages, even among local organizations belonging to the same socioeconomic backgrounds and coexisting under very similar contextual conditions. Crucially, I showed that neighbourhood associations in La Florida – an upper-middle-class comuna – engage in patterns of clientelism very similar to those I found in the poorest urban municipality of Chile, La Pintana. Hence, cross-municipal comparisons provide additional evidence that class alone is not sufficient to explain a hybrid portfolio.

# Chapter 6. Two Paths to Solve Demands. How Local Groups Reduce Their Exposure to Clientelistic Politics

I have argued that in local contexts governed by programmatic parties, clientelism can operate from the bottom-up. People constantly demand goods, services, and favours to fulfil essential needs. While individuals can make individual requests to municipal officers, they have incentives to do so through neighbourhood associations. Leaders of these groups provide a shortcut by acting as intermediaries with local authorities, reducing the costs involved in the demanding process. Since these leaders have contacts and networks within the municipal building, they are also more likely to obtain resources to address people's problems. Leaders from neighbourhood associations act as "demand collectors," forming a vertically-integrated structure that efficiently channels neighbours' demands to municipal authorities. In exchange for targeted distribution, local politicians use the organizational structure of neighbourhood groups to gain electoral support. By outsourcing organizational capacities to local associations, politicians may incorporate clientelism as a complementary strategy to their policy-based offers.

Francisca, a leader of a neighbourhood group in La Pintana, illustrates how she assists politicians using the organizational structure she manages:

> "I mobilise people to vote for him [the Mayor]. I *keep in touch* with neighbours and *canalise* all the info that municipal workers send to me. Of course, I highlight the good things the municipality has done in the comuna."[169]

In a striking contrast, there are other groups with similar incentives that do not engage in clientelistic dynamics. Marisel, the leader of a neighbourhood group operating just a few miles away from Francisca's territory, explained in the interview:

- Marisel: "[…] We receive multiple demands from the neighbours, every day. But here in this local group, we are active in finding solutions to people's problems. We don't seek assistance from the municipality. We source resources on our own."

- Interviewer: "Where do you obtain resources from?" I asked.

- Marisel: "Well, we are self-managed. We operate autonomously. When someone needs something, we gather the necessary resources among the neighbours. That's how we do it. If we can't manage it ourselves, we have contacts."

- Interviewer: "At the municipal offices?"

[169] Francisca. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 29 March 2021.

- Marisel: "No. We seek assistance from other sources: private individuals, universities, NGOs, and we also collaborate with other neighbourhood associations."[170]

The vignettes above highlight the variation in outcomes between two very similar neighbourhood groups within the same municipal territory. Both local groups are based in La Pintana, situated just a couple of blocks apart from each other. Moreover, they share a fairly similar socioeconomic background. Interestingly, Marisel's local group, which avoids engaging in clientelistic exchanges, possesses organizational capacities similar to the one led by Francisca, who, in contrast, engages in quid-pro-quo interactions with local politicians. What explains that some neighbourhood associations with similar features rely on clientelism, while others do not?

In this chapter, I explore this question using data collected from La Pintana, the poorest municipality in Santiago de Chile. According to the Chilean National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (CASEN), the rate of multidimensional poverty is 32.74%, which is considerably higher than the 20% average for the Metropolitan Region of Santiago.[171] Due to this disparity, it has been ranked in the first place on the index of social prioritization (IPS) by the Ministry of Social Development in Santiago.[172]

La Pintana, one of the most vulnerable urban comunas in Chile, is particularly suitable for investigating variations in subnational linkages for two reasons. First, leaders of neighbourhood associations report having different relationships with local politicians. While some of them engage in clientelistic dynamics with municipal authorities, other groups refuse to provide electoral support in exchange for targeted distribution. A second reason is related to alternative explanations. Since conventional wisdom explains hybrid linkages by voters' social class, it is worthwhile to explore the reasons why similar groups in a homogeneously poor setting respond differently.[173]

I explore the causes and mechanisms that lead neighbourhood groups to eschew clientelistic exchanges. I contend that some leaders do not engage in quid-pro-quo because they *diversify* their

[170] Marisel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 March 2021.
[171] Chilean National Socioeconomic Characterization (CASEN, 2017). See https://www.bcn.cl/siit/reportescomunales/reporpdf.html?anno=2021&idcom=13112. Check out also official municipal data on: https://www.pintana.cl/firmas/Transparencia/Transparencia_Activa/2021/Otros/PADEM/PADEM_2017.pdf
[172] The reported index may be found in the following webpage, from the Ministry of Social Development and Family: https://www.desarrollosocialyfamilia.gob.cl/storage/docs/INDICE-DE-PRIORIDAD-SOCIAL-2022_V2.pdf
[173] Even though no official statistics are available for variation of socioeconomic backgrounds within comunas, reports from municipal authorities highlight how similarly poor La Pintana's inhabitants are in socioeconomic terms. For more information, see the following report: https://www.pintana.cl/firmas/Transparencia/Transparencia_Activa/2021/Otros/PADEM/PADEM_2017.pdf

sources to address their demands. These groups face similar essential necessities as clientelistic neighbourhood groups and, therefore, invest in organizational structures to meet them. However, instead of exclusively relying on public funds, leaders turn to institutions outside the municipality, such as private companies, NGOs, and university students groups, to address the demands of their neighbours.

When this strategy to obtain resources fails and issues remain unresolved, leaders resort to self-management actions to raise resources for addressing neighbours' demands. By doing so, leaders fulfil community requirements independently, without approaching municipal authorities for assistance. In simpler terms, by either addressing demands through non-municipal actors or solving issues internally within their communities, leaders prevent the emergence of clientelism. In contrast, neighbourhood groups that rely exclusively on municipal resources have strong incentives to engage in clientelism. Since these leaders lack alternative sources to fulfil neighbours' demands, they are more likely to request municipal funds contingent on supporting the local incumbent during elections.

To understand why and how some groups evade a clientelistic form of accountability, I draw on data derived from 45 interviews conducted with leaders of neighbourhood associations that share similar features within the same municipal territory. Employing a most-similar research design, I use a theory-building process tracing approach to uncover the mechanisms that lead to different outcomes (e.g., clientelism and non-clientelistic behaviour). I categorized the interviewees into two groups. On one hand, I talk with leaders of neighbourhood groups that exhibit clientelistic dynamics with authorities. On the other hand, I explore those contrasting neighbourhood associations that employ alternative non-municipal sources to obtain resources for addressing neighbours' urgencies. As illustrated below, I conducted interviews across various geographical areas within the municipality to enhance independence from the interviewees. Finding evidence of diversified strategies across different locations in La Pintana, which result in the avoidance of clientelism, strengthens the credibility that within-case evidence is not selectively presented but rather represents a pattern of behaviour by local leaders.

This chapter contributes to the overall argument of this dissertation in three ways. First, by elucidating why certain groups evade clientelism, I demonstrate that the bottom-up mechanism is relevant for explaining quid-pro-quo dynamics in programmatic contexts. I present this argument by showcasing evidence that when leaders' demands are not solved through the municipal apparatus, the occurrence of clientelistic exchanges is less likely. In simple terms, the absence of demands directed at local authorities impedes the mutually-beneficial incentives between

neighbourhood leaders and municipal authorities. Since these leaders are not dependent on targeted municipal resources, politicians do not request electoral support in return.

Second, I present evidence that lends credibility to the proposition that organizational characteristics and leaders' decisions are key to explaining political linkages observed at the subnational level. Indeed, as recent literature on parties and clientelism in Latin America points out, the role of social organizations at the local level have indeed been neglected (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Garay et al. 2020; Palmer-Rubin 2019; 2022; Poertner, 2021). I show that, within the context of programmatic parties, the demands of certain local groups trigger a process that enables politicians to outsource organizational capacity to neighbourhood groups, incorporating clientelism into their electoral repertoire. When there are no demands, clientelism is less likely to be observed.

Lastly, within-case evidence suggests how clientelism might be mitigated in contexts where machine parties are not the norm. In contrast to conventional accounts, such as Programmatic Structuration framework (Kitschelt et al. 2010), which argues that improving the long-term structural socioeconomic conditions of voters would curb clientelism and promote programmatic accountability (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Cheeseman et al., 2014), I propose that more targeted policies could discourage the practice of targeted distribution at the subnational level. Specifically, I argue that limiting neighbourhood groups' dependency on municipal resources could also lead to a reduction in clientelistic accountability. While structural conditions can be slow and difficult to change, decentralizing the economic dependency of neighbourhood groups might be a more feasible action to disrupt clientelistic dynamics. When local leaders diversify their sources to fulfil the needs of their members and reduce reliance on municipal resources, as showed in this chapter, the incentives to engage in quid-pro-quo are reduced.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents the theoretical implications of my framework and briefly recaps those of alternative theories. Following that, I offer additional background information about La Pintana and describe the case selection strategy used to choose various neighbourhood associations across the municipal territory. In the third section, I delve into how neighbourhood groups with autonomous features break their dependency on municipal public resources. Then, I contrast my evidence with alternative theories. Finally, in the conclusion, I summarize the findings and discuss their implications for the overall argument of the dissertation.

## 6.1. Theoretical Implications and Competing Explanations

In Chapter 4, I showed that organizational capacity explains why certain neighbourhood associations engage in clientelism. However, there are still other neighbourhood groups that, while residing in homogeneous socioeconomic conditions and facing urgent needs, refrain from engaging in clientelistic relationships with municipal politicians. Remarkably, these groups also possess vertically-integrated structures, much like those involved in quid-pro-quo interactions. Given their similar organizational capacity and fairly comparable socioeconomic conditions, under what circumstances do these groups avoid engaging in clientelistic exchanges to address their neighbours' demands?

I argue that the reason for this can be found in the strategy that leaders of these neighbourhood groups employ to address the constant demands of their members. Indeed, leaders of these groups face the same challenge of managing the ongoing stream of everyday demands. However, rather than using their vertically-organized structure as currency in exchange for public municipal resources, leaders of non-clientelistic neighbourhood groups *diversify* their sources of support, thereby avoiding – or at least reducing – their dependency on the Mayor's allocation of targeted distribution.

These autonomous leaders achieve independence through two approaches. Firstly, they seek assistance from actors outside the municipal realm, including NGOs, large retail companies, and higher education student federations, among others. Secondly, thanks to their well-developed organizational capacity, these leaders can address neighbours' demands by using the integrated structure to autonomously manage solutions for their own members. Through these activities, leaders of what I term as 'autonomous neighbourhood groups' avoid clientelistic dynamics while still fulfilling the demands of their neighbours.

Two empirical observations need to be present to enhance the plausibility of the argument. First, both types of neighbourhood associations should face constant and diverse demands from their members. This implies that leaders must devise strategies to address a myriad of problems faced by neighbours, such as securing essential goods, medical appointments, or collective requests to improve the neighbourhood, like installing street lights or enhancing public spaces. At this stage, both types of leaders' groups, regardless of their nature, should be confronted with numerous demands from their members. In simpler terms, no distinction should be observed between clientelistic and autonomous neighbourhood groups.

A second observable implication of my theory addresses where leaders turn to in order to have demands resolved. I expect that autonomous groups are not solely reliant on municipal public funds. Their leaders seek solutions from sources outside the municipality. They request resources from private entities such as retailers, banks, or other companies aiming to engage with communities through community relationship strategies or corporate social responsibility initiatives. Additionally, they approach NGOs or non-profit organizations, particularly those dedicated to poverty reduction and providing essential services like housing, basic goods, education, or health services. Alternatively, autonomous leaders manage to be self-sustaining: they use the vertical neighbourhood structure to collectively address issues through individual member donations. These donations could involve contributing small amounts of money or goods to address specific group needs. For example, if a member experiences an accident, loss, or house fire, autonomous leaders strive to address their members' needs internally. While they may request municipal resources – and indeed they do – their dependency is not only tied to whether local authorities provide assistance in the neighbourhood. In other words, these leaders have multiple sources for problem-solving and rely on various actors who may contribute to meeting club members' requirements. Diversification of sources, therefore, emerges as a central characteristic of autonomous groups. Conversely, one would expect that clientelistic neighbourhood groups are primarily dependent on the municipal response to fulfil neighbours' demands.

If both previous implications hold, we should observe distinct types of relationships between different neighbourhood associations and local authorities. On one hand, autonomous groups refrain from engaging in clientelistic dynamics. Since these groups do not rely on the allocation of municipal resources to address community issues, they possess lower incentives to establish clientelistic linkages with local politicians. It is important to note that not depending on quid-pro-quo does not imply they cannot support the Mayor. In fact, many of these leaders and group members might reasonably choose to vote for the local incumbent based on ideological, political, or personal reasons. The absence of clientelistic ties indicates that autonomous groups do not rely on non-programmatic targeted distribution as a form of accountability (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). What these groups illustrate is how, under specific circumstances, the bottom-up mechanism theorized in Chapter 3 can breaks down (Beach and Pedersen, 2019). When this causal mechanism is not operative, one should observe absence of clientelism. In contrast, when demands are exclusively directed to Mayors or key municipal directors, and their resolution is contingent upon electoral support, then clientelism is present.

In contrast to the actor-based approach introduced in this chapter to account for outcome variation, alternative frameworks do not provide a compelling explanation for the range of linkages

observed at the subnational level. Based on correlational evidence, *trade-off* models expect that socioeconomic conditions explain variations across districts or municipalities (Magaloni et al., 2007; Luna, 2014; Thachil, 2014; Calvo and Murillo, 2019). However, these explanations fall short in addressing what drives multiple linkages in areas where voters have similar living conditions.

While socioeconomic conditions do not present a plausible alternative explanation, other theoretical assumptions need to be tested. Deductively derived from more flexible trade-off approaches, one can formulate two observable implications. First, programmatic Mayors do not engage in clientelistic exchanges with leaders holding different ideological positions. Even when these groups possess a vertically-structured organization that could function as a political machine, politicians prefer not to allocate targetable goods, even if it means reducing their electoral performance. In simpler terms, this variation arises because parties opt to allocate resources to their *core* constituencies rather than *swing voters*. Regardless of whether local groups possess the organizational capacity to be harnessed by politicians, programmatic parties only interact with those that are ideologically aligned. In line with the "core voter model" (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Cox, 2010), one would expect that local authorities predominantly target partisan or ideologically aligned neighbourhood groups.

Secondly, models such as Thachil's "division of labour" (2004) and Luna's "segmentation of the electorate" (2014) explain the mechanics of how elite parties address the interests of poor constituencies. In India, the BJP diversifies its portfolio, including both vote-buying and the provision of local services such as education and health services. They achieve the latter by partnering with private organizations to deliver services to vulnerable populations. Similarly, in the case of Chile, Luna (2014) and Loxton (2021) provide detailed insights into how UDI leaders devised a strategy to use private resources for distributing non-programmatic services in economically vulnerable Chilean districts. According to these models, we would expect that programmatic parties use private resources strategically to allocate goods or services to certain neighbourhood groups in exchange for electoral support.

Beyond supply-side models, the literature exploring the demand-side of clientelism offers additional alternative explanations. It is plausible to consider that certain neighbourhood groups refrain from engaging in clientelistic dynamics due to ideological reasons. In essence, some neighbourhood leaders support parties while simultaneously represent the interests of their organizations – a phenomenon that Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) call hybrid brokers. Irrespective of whether these leaders possess the organizational capacity – the political machinery – sought by politicians to secure electoral support, we would expect these neighbourhood leaders

to abstain from participating in quid-pro-quo exchanges due to ideological disparities with local authorities. Rather than relying on a diversification of sources to fulfil their members' needs, as I argue, the discrepancy in ideological positions should explain why neighbourhood groups avoid engaging in clientelistic dynamics with municipal authorities.

Another explanation lies in the organizational capacities of local groups. Palmer-Rubin (2019: 2103) shows that associations with the capacity to "maintain an active membership autonomously […] offering services that incentivize participation" turn their interest to influence programmatic policies. Therefore, resource independence and the ability to internally address membership demands should facilitate "programmatic demand-making." Conversely, organizations that rely on non-programmatic linkages to stimulate membership recruitment and mobilization are susceptible to the "patronage trap." These groups specialize in trading targeted distribution for electoral mobilization. An empirical implication of this theory suggests that autonomous neighbourhood groups evade clientelism by internally addressing neighbours' requirements. Since leaders handle members' problems internally, the demands they present to local authorities should be programmatic. Table 6.1. summarizes the empirical implications of the alternative theories discussed in this section.

**TABLE 6.1.** *Supply-side and demand-side explanations for eschewing clientelism at the subnational level*

| **Supply-side Explanations** | | |
|---|---|---|
| Theory | Empirical Implications | Authors |
| Distributive theories | Parties engage in targeted distribution only with "core local groups". *Autonomous* groups do not evade clientelism, they simply have no access to municipal resources. | Cox and McCubbins (1986); Cox (2010) |
| Division of labour | Parties provide targeted local services using private organizations with some groups (clientelist) while no with others (autonomous) | Thachil (2014) |
| Segmented representation | Parties strategically use private resources to link poor constituencies using non-programmatic politics. In an homogeneous poor setting such as La Pintana, we should observe that clientelistic groups are the norm. | Luna (2014) |
| **Demand-side Explanations** | | |
| Linkage-based Broker Typology | Autonomous groups are instead *hybrid brokers*. They do not engage in clientelism because they support a party different than the Mayor incumbent. | Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) |
| Organizational Capacity | Autonomous neighbours groups sort out members demands internally. They are "resource-independent" and canalize demands within the group. They do not need external sources to fulfil neighbours requirements. | Palmer-Rubin (2019; 2022) |
| **Hybrid Linkages** | Autonomous neighbourhood associations rely on multiple sources to solve members' demands. Leaders seek resources from beyond municipal offices (to NGOs, Universities, privates) while also use their vertical-structure to collectively solve internal demands. | Contreras (2023) |

## 6.2. Background: Autonomous and Clientelistic Neighbourhood Groups in La Pintana

Located in the southern part of the Metropolitan Area of Santiago, La Pintana is a municipality that was created during Pinochet's dictatorship in 1981 as part of an administrative reform of the local political structure in the Chilean capital. The rationale behind this move, as articulated by a military authority,[174] had dual objectives. First, to provide public services more efficiently to communities through local governments; and secondly, to create socioeconomically homogeneous areas aimed at eradicating urban marginality from wealthier municipalities (Guerra, 2009). Thus, La Pintana, like many other suburban comunas of Santiago, originated amidst a massive displacement of thousands of families living in precarious and vulnerable conditions (Álvarez and Cavieres, 2016). These families, originally from slums across Santiago (Morales and Rojas, 1986), were predominantly affected by extreme poverty upon their relocation to La Pintana. According to social and urban indicators reported by Gurovich (1990), during the early 1990s, La Pintana's residents had significantly less access to public services such as health care, education, and housing compared to the majority of Santiago's municipalities.


Forty years after its creation, the reality of La Pintana remains largely unchanged. Despite the country's democratization process that began in the early 1990s and the successful economic performance of the governments under the *Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia*, a centre-left coalition that held in office for the next twenty years, the unequal socioeconomic conditions of Chilean society persisted.[175] The rapid economic growth experienced by the country did not significantly alter the circumstances of the most vulnerable segments of the population.[176] The most recent socioeconomic profile survey (CASEN) reported that La Pintana is the poorest municipality in Greater Santiago, with a poverty rate of 15.31%, whereas the average for the Chilean capital is 9.52%.[177]

Importantly, municipal reports (PLADECO, pp. 220) reveal that the inhabitants of La Pintana exhibit relative socioeconomic homogeneity across all four sectors (as denoted by numbers in

[174] General Roberto Guillard, Ministry-President CONARA (National Commission of Regionalization). Cited by Guerra (1993) from Revista "Qué Pasa". num. 5I9, 1981.
[175] The poverty rates were reduced from 38,6% in 1990 to 10,8% in 2020; People using safely managed sanitation services has raised up to 79% of population; and maternal mortality ratio (modelled estimate, per 100,000 live births) declined from 31% in 2000 to 13% in 2017. Data available in https://data.worldbank.org/country/chile?view=chart
[176] The Index Gini reported by the World Bank places Chile as one of the most unequal countries in Latin America and where a significant share (30%) of the population is economically vulnerable. Moreover, party elites progressively distanced themselves from social concerns having a progressively limited capacity to canalise social demands and political discontent (Luna and Altman, 2011). The lack of vertical integration between parties and civil society along with high levels of inequality were conducive to a severe crisis of representation. Data available in https://data.worldbank.org/country/chile?view=chart
[177] Data available on http://datos.sinim.gov.cl/

Figure 6.1. below): 1. El Roble (north-west), home to 47,098 residents, boasts higher levels of associativity and a greater number of neighbourhood associations; 2. Santo Tomas (north-east), with a population of 37,000 residents, experiences high population density, reported overcrowding, and comparably lower levels of associativity in contrast to other sectors; 3. El Centro (Center), the oldest sector of the municipality, accommodates 51,890 residents and generally displays slightly better socioeconomic conditions than the remaining sectors of La Pintana; 4. El Castillo (south-east) is encompassed within the "priority neighbourhoods" national plan implemented in 2019 by the Chilean government to mitigate crime in critical zones within the Chilean capital. [178]

**FIGURE 6.1.** *Map of the four sectors of La Pintana municipal territory*




**Source**: Map extracted from the interactive graphic platform available on the website of La Pintana Municipality. Available: https://lapintana.maps.arcgis.com/.

[178] Álvarez y Cavieres (2016) for a full review of the identity, individual practices, and social dynamics in El Castillo.

The data collection strategy consisted on semi-structured interviews, informal conversations, and participant observation in neighbourhood groups from all over the four sectors of the municipality. Furthermore, I had formal meetings with key municipal workers and directors. In a period of three years from January 2020 to November 2023, I conducted 45 interviews – some individual, other in groups – with neighbourhood associations leaders; municipal directors; and key municipal workers. Including different sources of data – e.g. politicians key workers, and neighbours leaders – is critical to evaluate reliability and potential bias (Beach and Pedersen, 2019). Moreover, my research strategy involved conducting interviews with neighbourhood leaders across the four areas within the municipal territory. As highlighted by Beach and Pederson (2019), deriving mechanistic evidence from independent sources helps to mitigate systematic bias. By utilizing data from leaders situated in different geographical locations, my research design enhances the credibility of within-case evidence, ensuring it is not systematically biased but instead reflects a consistent pattern of behaviour exhibited by local leaders (Gerson and Damaske, 2020). Moreover, and despite that clientelism inherently involves social desirability bias (González-Ocantos et al. 2012), participants has no strong motivations to declare they engage in clientelistic dynamics.

Conducting fieldwork in La Pintana presented significant logistical and ethical challenges, extensively discussed in the Appendix 1 of this thesis. However, two points merit further elucidation to comprehend the data presented in this chapter. First, certain areas of La Pintana experience elevated levels of crime, drug trafficking, and even instances where stray bullets have become a part of residents' daily lives.[179] Ramón, a key municipal worker remarked, "There are some sectors of the comuna where not even municipal workers venture. You simply don't go there."[180] Indeed, some participants are in constant exposure to illegal activities and criminality. To safeguard their anonymity and mitigate associated risks, I deliberately changed participants' names to maintain the anonymity and only disclosed the geographical sectors in which interviewees reside.

Second, due to restricted access – a result of physical risks compounded by the global pandemic during the fieldwork phase[181] – some of my interviews were only possible with the permission of neighbours or upon receiving contact information from other neighbourhood leaders. A snowball strategy was often the only way to interview leaders in sectors that would otherwise have been

[179] According to some press reports and municipal information, more than 15 families have been victims of this type of crime. Some years ago, in La Pintana was created a local association of families victims of criminal violence. See more information on https://www.pintana.cl/?p=7601

[180] Ramon. Key director in La Pintana. 21 March 2021.

[181] Covid-19 pandemic was indeed challenging for the data collection process. In the Appendix 1, I provide details about the ethical protocol I followed.

inaccessible (Gerson and Damaske, 2020). As these contacts were provided by the interviewees themselves, it is crucial to ensure their anonymity to prevent any potential tracking of participants.

Along the analytical narrative displayed below, I categorize the types of neighbourhood associations between *autonomous* and *clientelistic* groups. Prior to presenting the evidence to evaluate my theory, I will outline the general similarities and differences between these two types of neighbourhood associations.

### *1. Autonomous Local Groups*

In an informal conversation with a municipal worker, I was advised to be careful going to *La maravilla*. She told me the neighbours' venue is at one of the most conflictive zones of La Pintana, where some crimes of great social repercussions have taken place. "Municipal workers avoid going there… and the Mayor is not welcomed" Ramón told me. I had, however, coordinated my visit to *La maravilla* with the president of the neighbourhood association. Because I was her guest, there was little risks involved. She was waiting for me outside the venue while waving to everyone who passed by the street. At first sight, the neighbour was very similar to others sectors of La Pintana. In Figure 6.2. below, I present an image of the La Maravilla sector, along with a picture of Carla's neighbourhood territory called San Reinaldo, which engages in clientelism with the municipality. Superficially, in their respective public spaces, both local territories are very similar.

**FIGURE 6.2.** *"La Maravilla" (Marisel neighbourhood) and "San Reinaldo" (Carla neighbourhood)*



**Note**: Above is La Maravilla, and below is San Reinaldo. Remember that both sector names are fictitious to maintain anonymity.

Perhaps the most notorious difference with respect to other neighbourhood territories was the street art and some layouts displayed on power poles announcing events and services for the community. Marisel's description, field notes, and images of the neighbourhood shades light on the socioeconomic conditions of most residents.

> "We have all types of necessities here. People are in need. If we know a neighbour does not have to eat, we collect basic products such as rice, pasta, or canned food to help them out. Same if someone have some health issue or home fires. There are also a lot of drug addicts and drug trafficking. Those are the kind of problems we have to deal with here in La Maravilla."[182]

[182] Marisel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 March 2021.

While there is no official data to characterize the neighbourhood,[183] it is clear that most of the residents live in poverty condition – some in extreme poverty –, and where factors such as unemployment, social exclusion, drugs abuse, and drug trafficking are common. Currently, in La Maravilla live roughly 3.000 residents in little apartments with more than one family each. Housing overcrowding, insecurity, unemployment, and social exclusion impact heavily on neighbours' daily experiences.

Because of these unfavourable conditions, neighbours' leaders in La Maravilla receive all types of requirements to solve neighbours' problems. As Marisel stated in the quote above, people in the neighbourhood need essentials goods and services e.g. food or health services. As it is impossible for Marisel and others directives to manage such big amount of demands every day, they invest in organizational capacity as almost all of neighbours' groups do. She told me in a second interview one year after the first one:

> "I am the president of this neighbourhood association. But I do not work alone. I have permanent help from other directive members [she described the secretary work]. I also have *delegados* in every street. We work with 16 *delegados* who report whatever happens in their street. If a neighbour need something, she contacts the *delegado* to inform me."[184]

No different from clientelistic neighbours' groups that engage in relational clientelism, these groups have a vertical-structured organization set up to address neighbours' demands. This makes sense, as it would otherwise be impossible to reconcile their roles as leaders with their jobs, families, and personal lives. This is especially relevant since an overwhelming majority of neighbours' leaders are women who consistently declare how challenging and time-consuming it is to fulfil multiple personal, familiar, and community roles.[185]

Despite receiving constant demands to solve neighbours' problems and, moreover, having the same organizational capacity to appeal to local politicians, Marisel's group solves neighbours' problems differently. In sharp contrast to clientelistic groups that offer organizational capacity in exchange for targeted distribution, she *diversifies* the sources that provide solutions to her neighbours. In doing so, the leaders of La Maravilla do not exclusively depend on the public resources distributed discretely by local authorities. They are *autonomous* in the sense that they do

[183] An official qualitative characterizations of the municipal sectors may be found in the PLADECO report (Municipal development Plan). The document is available on https://www.pintana.cl/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IF%20PLADECO_2020_2023.pdf
[184] Marisel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 23 September 2022.
[185] I conducted 45 interviews with local association leaders in La Pintana from 2021 to 2023. Of the total, 86.7% were women (39) and 13.3% were men (6).

not rely solely on interaction and mutual incentives with local authorities to address members' issues.

Marisel's neighbourhood association is not unique. In fact, there are many neighbourhood groups that address neighbours' demands using the same strategy. Throughout La Pintana, across the four sectors observed in Figure 6.1., I found evidence that local leaders with vertically-organized structures and living under adverse economic conditions do not necessarily bring their demands to municipal offices. By autonomously resolving members' demands, these leaders prevent dependence on municipal resources, which, in turn, reduces clientelistic relationships.

*2. Clientelistic Local Groups*

La Pintana is a municipality characterized by high homogeneity, particularly in terms of the socioeconomic backgrounds of its inhabitants. This similarity is evident in at least three areas of the territory, where residents face fairly similar issues that require addressing.[186] The role of neighbourhood leaders is crucial for understanding the needs of the community. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, these leaders invest in organizational infrastructure, establishing a bottom-up communication mechanism that keeps them informed about events, demands, problems, and even the opinions of the residents within their territory. This vertical structure becomes essential for leaders who aim to demonstrate responsiveness to the demands of their members.

In this regard, the agency of local leaders is crucial. How do they handle the demands of their member groups? Whom do they approach to address these demands? In stark contrast to autonomous groups, clientelistic leaders exclusively seek solutions from municipal authorities, thus forming a mutually beneficial relationship with local government. Neighbours' leaders in clientelistic groups urgently require municipal resources to address their members' issues, which aligns with what the authorities can provide. Conversely, local politicians need the organizational capacity of neighbourhood associations to secure electoral support through targeted distribution. Relational clientelism becomes observable when neighbourhood leaders and local politicians exchange organizational capacity for municipal resources.

In the following section, I present evidence to explain *how* neighbourhood leaders avoid becoming exclusively dependent on municipal resources. I argue that the reduction in dependency subsequently diminishes the incentives for some neighbourhood groups to engage in clientelism with programmatic politicians at the subnational level.

[186] The exception is the "Centro" area. The official information reports a comparatively better socioeconomic conditions than remaining sectors (PLADECO 2020-2023).

## 6.3. Evaluating Evidence

***Implication 1.*** *Demanding neighbours' groups assistance*

Similar to Marisel, other leaders of autonomous community groups also indicated that neighbours live in precarious conditions. At times, people lack access to essentials such as food, medication, or baby diapers. Demands to address neighbours' issues are persistent, and as many interviewees mentioned, one of the primary roles of neighbourhood leaders is to resolve them. Lorena, an experienced leader from sector 1, elaborated on the types of demands she frequently receives:

> "'De todo' [Everything]. People demand whatever they need. Frequently, gas cylinders, food, 'canasta basica' [essential food basket], exemption (or reduction) of water bill fees, a wheelchair[…]."[187]

Similarly, Pia, another neighbour leader from sector 2, declared that she receives multiple requirements. "Basically, some essential stuff [*cuestiones basicas*]. We have to limit the demands, though. Otherwise whatever people need, they come to us expecting resolutions."[188]

Significantly, all of the contacted neighbourhood groups encompass a wide geographical area. In fact, each group represents an average of 300 to 3,000 families [self-declared estimation]. Therefore, group leaders grapple with the challenge of managing the myriad demands that members present each day. How do these autonomous leaders stay informed about members' demands? How do they cover such an extensive territory? Local leaders invest in organizational capacity. Just like clientelistic groups, these associations establish a vertically-integrated structure to ensure continuous awareness of people's requirements and events within their community.

The leadership of the association, composed of a directive with at least three full members, is elected by individuals affiliated with the group.[189] While not formally defined by law, leaders typically appoint delegates across the territory.[190] These delegates are usually selected for each street in the neighbourhood and have the role of relaying the demands and issues that club members experience to the leaders. Renata, a popular leader of sector 2, recounted:

> "The role of our delegates is to inform us about the needs of the neighbours. People share their problems or necessities with the delegates. These demands are sometimes individual, such as someone needing food, a job, or assistance in getting a medical appointment. Additionally, the requirements can pertain to the betterment of the entire community, such as garbage collection or improving street lighting."[191]

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[187] Lorena. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 13 October 2022.
[188] Pia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 15 March 2021.
[189] Law 19.418 on neighbourhood associations and other community organizations. Full text available on https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=70040
[190] Because is not mandatory nor regulated, some leaders do not have delegates. Majority of them, however, do have delegates to reduce the organizational cost of demand-collect process.
[191] Group interview with Renata (leader) and 4 group members. La Pintana. 22 November 2022.

Crucially, leaders also use delegates to distribute municipal information to neighbours top-down. In fact, part of the programmatic offerings of the municipality is relayed from municipal authorities to group leaders. In turn, leaders distribute the information using the vertical structure: delegates inform neighbours about services, events, benefits, and more. Rosa, from sector 1, explained:

> "The delegates are also important to circulate the information stem from the municipal offices. They [delegates] deliver information to neighbours coming from the *muni* [municipal authorities]. For example, when authorities open an application process to offer some services like veterinarian for neighbours' pets; some free events in the municipal theatre; or to some activities like the classic 'presents for Christmas' [this a popular local initiative implemented in almost every Chilean municipality]; then we use delegates to inform our neighbours'."[192]

The vertical structure composed of neighbourhood leaders thus works as a dual communication channel. It serves as a bottom-up mechanism for collecting demands, problems, and information from across the group's territory. Eliana, a local leader, stated that "[we] are informed about everything because delegates tell us. They inform us during face-to-face meetings, but more frequently through text messages. We have a group chat where delegates notify us when demands arise."

Simultaneously, she uses the organizational structure top-down to distribute municipal information and its policy-based offerings. Eliana stated:

> "It is impossible to visit every house, and usually, only a few people attend the group's meetings. The most effective way to inform people about the services provided by the municipality is by using group chats. If neighbours have additional questions, they come to our *sede* [groups' venue]."[193]

What these interviews reveal is crucial: Both types of neighbourhood associations, whether autonomous or clientelistic, establish similar structures to gather demands and provide information to their members. However, both vary on *how* they use their organizational capacity. On one hand, clientelistic leaders employ the structure to solve demands exclusively in municipal offices: they utilize delegates to collect neighbours' demands, which are subsequently presented to local authorities for resolution through targeted distribution. In return, these leaders offer their organizational capacity to local politicians to enhance electoral mobilization.

Ismael, a clientelisitc leader, told me:

> "I use the delegates to know what people need. When a neighbour has some issue, I call municipal directors, the Mayor, whoever, in order to find solutions. What people need is for you to respond quickly to their

[192] Rosa. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 07 October 2022.
[193] Eliana. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 07 October 2022.

> needs. Municipal contacts are thus crucial. If you know people at the municipality, it is easier to get solutions."[194]

In contrast, autonomous leaders declared the vertical-structure serves for additional purposes. They use it to create community, identity of *barrio* [neighbourhood], deliberative meetings, and inclusion of as many people as possible. For these groups, thus, the vertical-structure is much more than a group to solve people's demands. While they also activate the leaders-delegates-neighbours chain as communicational shortcut to address more effectively neighbours' demands, these leaders also use the organizational capacity to promote neighbours' participation and collective action. This was reported constantly by autonomous leaders. Marisel illustrates the point:

> "We aim to create community in the *barrio* and promote the neighbours' participation. That's the reason we work with young people – offering workshops of street art and music –; with elderly neighbours; having recurrently groups' meeting to learn what people think, not only what they need."[195]

In Marisel's group venue, I indeed observed posters inviting the community to attend workshops. I also noticed graffiti, mural art, and artistic expressions in her neighbourhood association sector. Figure 6.3. showcases some examples of the outcomes from the community collaboration.

[194] Ismael. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 16 February 2021.
[195] Marisel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 23 September 2022.

**FIGURE 6.3.** *Street Art in Marisel's Groups Sector*



**Source**: Author's photos.

In another interview, in sector (2) Santo Tomas, Pia stated:

> "We don't rely on anyone else to do what's best for the community. Take a look at this venue where the neighbourhood group operates. We built all of this ourselves, through self-management and the cooperation of all the neighbours. Even this couch and that TV were donated by neighbours. Additionally, we place a special focus on children. We're committed to preventing our children from becoming drug addicts. This is crucial for us. It's about our community and our children."[196]

Pia and Marisel's testimonies indicate a variation in leaders' actions that diverges from the behaviour of clientelistic neighbourhood leaders. While some leaders use their organizational capacity exclusively to collect demands, others also use it to strengthen community ties. Both 'ideal types' of groups are *logistically* similar, featuring quite identical structures for reaching out to neighbours. However, they differ in how leaders use their organizational capacity. As a result, these two groups are *operationally* distinct. I argue that autonomous leaders exhibit agency and an ideological commitment that contributes to shaping their normative stance in fostering

[196] Pia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 27 September 2022.

participatory local politics. This latter aspect – a strong commitment to participation and identity with the neighbourhood – is crucial for explaining the second stage of the theorized causal chain. Rather than exclusively relying on municipal resource allocation, these autonomous groups diversify their sources of assistance. In the following subsection, I present mechanistic evidence of how autonomous leaders fulfil neighbours' demands without engaging in clientelistic dynamics.

***Implication 2.*** *How expanding aid sources reduce municipal dependency*

Pia, the senior "autonomous" leader mentioned above, is a member of a sizable neighbours' group comprising approximately 2,100 families. During one of our interviews, I inquired about how they address neighbours' demands. She elaborated:

> "It really depends on the nature of the demands. For instance, to address the issue of high food prices, we have established an arrangement with a cooperative that sells basic food baskets at a lower cost than the supermarket. We also have agreements with universities that help us with health services. We maintain contact with various foundations and NGOs. We do not depend on what the municipality authorities give us."[197]

These activities are by no means exceptional within autonomous groups. In a different sector of La Pintana, I interviewed leader Eliana while she and other members of the leadership were waiting for a delivery of *canastas básicas* [food baskets].

> Researcher: "Who is bringing the food?", I asked her.
>
> Eliana: "The cooperative. We work with them because they offer convenient prices".
>
> Researcher: "Do you typically approach various sources to address neighbours' and community issues?" I followed up.
>
> Eliana: "Yes. We receive assistance from organizations like 'Techo. Un techo para Chile' [An NGO that deals with housing issues for vulnerable people[198]], foundations, university students, and some private entities. We also collaborate with the Amaranta foundation[199] [a feminist NGO that aims to promote gender equality]."[200]

The leaders' approach to multiple aid sources to address neighbours' demands contributes to explaining how they overcome their dependency on the municipality. These leaders employ their organizational capacity to gather neighbours' demands through delegates who convey this information to the leadership. Yet, when it comes to addressing these requirements,

[197] Pia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 27 September 2022.
[198] Currently, "Techo" operates not only in Chile, but also in other Latin American countries. For more information about the NGO visit its webpage: https://cl.techo.org/
[199] More information on NGO Amanda could be obtained on its website: https://amarantas.org/que-es-amaranta/
[200] Eliana. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 07 October 2022.

neighbourhood leaders do not exclusively rely on municipal authorities or key directives, as clientelsitic groups do. Instead, they adopt a distinct strategy: the diversification of aid sources.

Neighbourhood leaders reported two forms of diversification. First, they establish connections with entities outside the municipal territory, such as retail companies, banks, or privates. Additionally, they engage with NGOs, university students' groups, cooperatives, and volunteer groups – for example, medical sciences students who can provide healthcare services to the community. By adopting this approach, leaders are able to address internal demands without the need to involve municipal authorities or key directors at the municipal building. This reliance on non-municipal actors is a critical factor in understanding how these leaders achieve autonomy. Marisel, the leader from La Maravilla neighbourhood, elaborates on her approach:

> Marisel: "We look up for help outside [the municipality]. Ours way is making ties with whoever wants to help us. I have some contacts with public figures, foundations, a gas company, el "Techo", cooperatives, many people."
>
> Researcher: "How do you meet this people? How you have access to these people in the first place?" I asked back.
>
> Marisel: "Because we participate in meetings about the relevance of neighbourhood associations, you start knowing new people. When you explain our life experiences, they want to help. If they can't, they get in touch with some of their contacts that can help."[201]

Secondly, autonomous leaders declare that they use their organizational capacity for internal problem-solving through "*auto-gestión*" – self-management. Instead of seeking assistance from municipal offices, local politicians, or connections with municipal directors, they rely on members' cooperation and self-sufficiency. For example, when a neighbour reports an individual need – such as food, medicines, or a medical appointment – or a collective issue – like improving street conditions, green areas, or security – leaders activate the communication networks within the group to attempt to fulfil these demands on their own. More specifically, leaders coordinate community members to contribute donations for groceries, construction materials, or other individual needs. They can also mobilize neighbours to address collective issues, such as painting public spaces, enhancing green areas, or organizing "*comités de seguridad*" (security committees). Patricia recounted:

> "Self-management is key for us. You stop depending on whether the authorities want to help you out. We generate our own resources that let us invest in "cuestiones sociales" (social needs). For example, we provide the Christmas presents for the children in our community. We do not wait for municipal responses."[202]

[201] Marisel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 23 September 2022.
[202] Patricia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 19 October 2022.

Similarly, Pilar elaborates in a group interview:

> "We do not depend on municipal resources. We are more independent and rely more on what we can do within the community. If we need money, we organize bingos or gather donations from our neighbours to solve the problems."[203]

Both strategies of diversification of aid, turning to external sources and practicing self-management, contribute to breaking the leaders' dependency on municipal resources. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, clientelistic dynamics are made possible by the self-reinforcing cycle of dependency and the mutually beneficial relationship between neighbourhood leaders and local authorities. In contrast, when leaders have the capacity to address members' demands internally or seek assistance from NGOs, private companies, or university student groups, their dependency on the discretion of local authorities is diminished. All else being equal, these leaders do not feel the same urgency to request public resources from municipal authorities. Instead, these group leaders rely on their connections with actors outside the municipality and their ability to manage their needs independently.

What are the motivations of autonomous leaders to diversify the sources of aid? Why do not they approach municipal offices to demand solutions as clientelistic groups do? Interviews with leaders and group members shed light on their motivations.

I raised these questions with Sara and Lisa during an interview held at their group's location, as we delved into their approach to handling demands. Sara, leader from sector 2, explained:

> "Why not [seek out municipal help]? I do not need the *muni*. I told this to other neighbours leaders, we do not need them at all [municipal aid]. Look, I can obtain resources "porque me muevo" [I am proactive] "por fuera" [not from the municipality]. We have contact with "Red de Alimentos" [an food-related NGO],[204] some companies [she didn't specified], and of course, self-management: bingos, selling *completos* [Chilean hot-dogs]. We are social, not political. We don't rely on municipal responses."[205]

Sara emphasized her leadership style as she explained why she avoids seeking assistance from municipal offices. In her own words, she is proactive and does not wait for help; instead, she actively seeks solutions. She reaches out to whoever can meet the neighbours' needs. A second interview with Marisel, the leader from La Maravilla, provide additional insights on what trigger the motivation of these neighbours' groups to seek diversification.

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[203] Group interview with Pilar and three directive members. Neighbourhood association leaders in La Pintana. 11 October 2022.
[204] Information about Red de Alimentos goals are available on https://www.redalimentos.cl/
[205] Group interview with Sara and Lisa. Neighbourhood association leaders in La Pintana. 11 November 2022.

Marisel recounted:

> Marisel: "I attended university and currently work as a teacher. It was important for me to reactivate the neighbourhood association, but under different principles. I believe we have to teach how to be a social leader, not to be personalist. The collective comes before than individuals. The goal of our organizations is to give solutions to the infinite problems faced by the neighbours. To do so, we first try to resolve internally."
>
> Researcher: "How you resolve internally? It must be difficult regarding the huge amount of demands." I replied.
>
> Marisel: "Autogestionando [self-management]. Neighbours donations, 'bingos' [lotteries] and other activities. Then, if it is not possible, we look up for help outside."
>
> Researcher: "What do you mean by outside?" I asked back.
>
> Marisel: "We are in contact with non-profit organizations, like "Techo para Chile". I know Cristian Bowen, a former executive director. We explain them about the neighbourhood problems, exclusion, and necessities in talks. Also, we have received some help from companies like Abastible [a gas company] and from university students, specially from health schools. They have come to the "barrio" to provide health services operatives. The Chilean Chamber of Construction [Camara Chilena de la Construccion, a trade association] also helped our neighbours."[206]

These interviews offer insights on why these leaders take a different path to provide solutions to neighbours' demands. Sara, a senior and historical leader of a large neighbourhood association, heavily relies on her leadership skills to secure resources from private entities, NGOs, and contributions from her own members. Literally in the other side of La Pintana, Marisel attributes her professional background and education as pivotal in shaping her ideas and principles for leading the *La Maravilla* group. I argue that, alongside personal attributes and educational background, the so-called autonomous leaders are driven by an ideational aspect. In fact, their leadership consistently reflects the aim to foster neighbour participation, forge a robust community identity, and reject a dependency-based model.

Pia explains how she interprets her role as a leader:

> "Previous leaders were here to their own benefit. They profited with la "*junta*" [the group]. The venue was used for drug trafficking. After confronting them, we assumed the direction. In contrast to them, we specially focus on our children. We believe they can avoid falling into drug addiction, for example. The municipality do not deal with the structural problem. Authorities have responsibility to provide resources. It is insufficient with all the problems we have here, though. We must to diversify resources to help our neighbours. In this regard, *autogestion,* community activities [she later talks about football or playing games] as well as NGOs collaborations, are crucial."[207]

As the extract suggests, Pia contrasts with clientelist leaders regarding the goals of leading a neighbourhood group. Departing from assistance-oriented leaders, she delineates clear goals –

[206] Marisel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 23 September 2022.
[207] Pia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 27 September 2022.

impede children drug addiction –, use the community network – 'autogestión' and neighbours donations –, to offer activities – football – at the community spaces. Alternatively, she turns to non-municipal actors looking for assistance. Simply put, Pia's interpretation of a leader's role, goals, and community shapes her approach to solving neighbours' problems.

Marisel's understanding of her role as a community leader follows a similar pattern. She recounted:

> "We have principles and teach to neighbours about the community. We have a strong identity here in the *barrio* [neighbourhood] and promote participation in regular meetings. We encourage neighbours' participation. Also, we offer the [group's] venue for art and music workshops, "*tocatas*" [gigs]. You can also see that our "*bloques"* [social housing] with graffities [Figure 6.3]. All these things represent what we want for our *barrio*."[208]

Marisel's interpretation of a leader's role, the 'barrial' identity, and 'fostering neighbours' participation' – through arts demonstrations and autogestion – contributes to explaining why she uses the group's structure – delegates and communication channels – differently than clientelist leaders. She views the group as more than just a structure to collect demands seeking solutions. While she continues to display responsiveness, her approach to solutions diverges. Marisel activates the group's internal capacity while also forming connections with private entities, NGOs, and other external institutions to address neighbours' issues.

Repetitively, the autonomous leaders expressed their disagreement with the assistance-based model they perceive guide local politics. This was highlighted by interviewees of the different municipal sectors. In words of Marisel and Pia, respectively:

> "We try to encourage the people to not be dependent of the *muni*. We are done with the assistance-based model. It is better to help each other in the community."[209]

> "We need to break the assistance-based model that neighbours are accustomed to. We cannot solve all their problems [*no podemos darles todo en bandeja*]."[210]

To be clear, leaders' diversification strategy does not imply that they refrain from seeking public resources from municipal offices. On the contrary, they are fully aware that municipal allocations are part of the responsibilities of the authorities. Eliana confirmed this by stating:

> "We work with cooperatives, non-profit foundations, a lot of autogestion, and cooperate with other neighbourhood groups "*en la misma parada*" [same ideas than us]. Yet we are also in contact with municipal authorities. But we don't depend only on *la muni* to solve our problems."[211]

[208] Marisel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 23 September 2022.
[209] Marisel. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 23 September 2022.
[210] Pia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 27 September 2022.
[211] Eliana. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 07 October 2022.

Likewise, Pia explained me in a second interview:

> Pia: "We have a direct link with the directors and the Mayor. We demand to them as well. For example, we had a problem with the garbage collection. I contact one director and he solved the problem."
>
> Researcher: "And that director asked you something in return?", I replicated
>
> Pia: "We don't owe them votes or favours. For me the key, is that we resolve by ourselves and with the help of foundations and [university] students. The difference with other groups is that we break the logic of exclusive dependence of municipal help. I have different sources to sort out people requirements. Municipal authorities depend on us [neighbours' leaders] if they want to be in touch with neighbours."[212]

The crucial aspect, as Pia clearly explained, lies in the autonomy of leaders who do not *exclusively* rely on what local politicians can provide. Since they are committed with a specific idea on how the group should operate – inclusiveness, identity, and more –, then municipal handouts to deal with their perceived structural problems is insufficient. Autonomous groups, rather than using their vertical structure only as a conduit to address neighbours' demands, leverage their organizational capacity to unify the community, foster programs including childcare, arts, and community initiatives, and concurrently address members' concerns. If these leaders want to succeed, they have to do more activities than simply approach demands to the municipal building. They have to organize the community, facilitate workshops, attract private resources, and cultivate partnerships with foundations, universities, corporations, and other entities. When this happens, diversification strategy is activated. Greater levels of diversification, in turn, contribute to lower the dependence on municipal resources.

### 6.4. Alternative Explanations

The evidence collected in La Pintana does not support alternative explanations. First, distributional theories predict that local politicians would provide targeted distribution exclusively to leaders ideologically aligned. Yet leaders of autonomous groups expressed two aspects that discredit this hypothesis. First, all except two leaders openly declared they sympathized with left-wing principles, same than the Christian Democratic Mayor. Secondly, leaders also declared that they identified themselves as first and foremost as "social workers". Several interviews revealed that leaders do not care the Mayor's party for their role of 'claim-makers'. Consider the following excerpt of my interview with Carlos from sector 3, which is consistent of what Pamela (sector 2) and Marisel (sector 1) declared:

[212] Pia. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 27 September 2022.

> "We represent neighbours' interests, as sort of social workers. I do not care which is the Mayor's party. I will demand what our neighbours need. Our role as leaders is to solve the neighbours' problems."[213]

This also complicates the hypothesis that autonomous leaders are *hybrid brokers* (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015), as they are not members of party organizations. Only one participant declared being a former Communist Party member in sector 1. Unfortunately, it is not possible to contrast participants' version with official data about party affiliates. However, the fact that leaders with similar ideological positions to the Mayor do not approach demands to municipal offices and do not help with campaigning in elections suggests that they are more likely committed to fulfilling neighbours' demands rather than providing electoral support.

Another alternative explanation would suggest that parties with a well-defined programmatic portfolio invest in private organizations to attract vulnerable voters using non-programmatic strategies. However, my evidence did not find any indication that Mayors' parties use any type of private organizations to distribute handouts. This evidence suggests that the concept of "segmentation" (Luna, 2014) or "electoral division of labour" (Thachil, 2014) could be associated with elite parties that might not otherwise appeal to poor voters, as seen with UDI in Chile or BJP in India. Moreover, the evidence I collected points to the relevance of leaders approaching private entities to address neighbours' problems. Gas companies, banks, cooperatives, and university students provide assistance driven by corporate social responsibility initiatives in the case of companies, or a sense of social responsibility towards communities in the case of university students' groups. I did not find any evidence that companies or students provide help due to partisan interests.

This chapter complements Palmer-Rubin's theory (2022), which states that parties with internal capacity to address demands are less likely to engage in clientelism. However, I found differences in the mechanisms local groups use to address internal demands. On the one hand, autonomous local groups resort to self-management to meet demands, conducting activities like bingos and gathering donations from neighbours. On the other hand, leaders seek provisions and assistance from sources outside the municipality. As a result, this chapter contributes to the growing literature suggesting that the characteristics of local groups, civil organizations, and associativity play a role in explaining why some groups engage in clientelism while others do not (Palmer-Rubin, 2022; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015).

[213] Carlos. Neighbourhood association leader in La Pintana. 11 February 2021

## 6.5. Conclusion

In a programmatic local context, clientelism is triggered by bottom-up demands from leaders of neighbours' associations. These groups possess credible endowments, such as organizational capacity, which politicians exploit. Leaders can negotiate municipal resources contingent on political mobilization. However, in certain cases, leaders choose not to engage in clientelistic dynamics. Why do some leaders avoid clientelism, and what actions do they undertake to do so? Focusing on the case of La Pintana, where inhabitants share fairly homogeneous socioeconomic conditions, I argue that non-clientelistic leaders are guided by a distinct ideational understanding of their role, how to address members' demands, and to whom they should turn to find solutions.

Autonomous leaders perceive similar demands from neighbourhoods and face the same dilemma of meeting these requirements. As leaders typically represent larger communities with over 1,000 residents, they establish a vertical structure with intermediaries known as '*delegados*,' who facilitate communication between group leaders and residents. However, in contrast to clientelistic groups that view this structure as a means to achieve targeted distribution, autonomous leaders use it to strengthen community bonds, promote identity, and encourage neighbour participation. While the former exclusively employ the structure to address neighbours' demands, the latter also use it to realize their vision for the community.

Regarding specific activities, autonomous leaders employ diverse strategies to meet members' demands. This approach is a critical factor in explaining how they mitigate their exposure to local clientelistic politics. Instead of relying exclusively on municipal funds distributed by local authorities, autonomous leaders seek support from external actors such as NGOs, local cooperatives, non-profit foundations, university students' groups, and private companies. Additionally, autonomous leaders heavily rely on 'autogestión' (self-management), involving member donations of resources, lotteries, and events such as children's activities, bingos, and *completadas*.

The strategy of diversification employed by autonomous leaders holds a crucial implication: the mutually-beneficial relationship that typically underlies clientelism in local programmatic settings becomes non-operative. Municipal authorities are no longer able to monopolize sources of assistance through the distribution of public funds. Instead, as these autonomous leaders turn to multiple sources of support, they significantly diminish their dependence on the relationship with municipal authorities and their discretion in resource allocation. Therefore, I contend that by reducing dependency, these leaders also mitigate their exposure to clientelistic dynamics.

The evidence presented in this chapter contributes to the overall argument of the dissertation in three complementary ways. First, it provides additional evidence that bottom-up mechanisms are indeed crucial for triggering clientelism at the subnational level. This chapter demonstrates that when demands are not exclusively directed towards municipal offices, the demand-driven mechanism becomes non-operative. Second, leaders' decisions on how to use the organizational capacity and from whom to obtain resources, lend credit to the argument that clientelism is not only explained by structural conditions such as class. The actor-based analysis within this chapter reveals that actors' decisions, ideas, actions, and the organizational characteristics of neighbour groups all contribute to explaining the observed clientelistic dynamics within programmatic local settings.

Lastly, in connection with the previous point, the potential pathways suggested throughout this chapter contribute to policymaking aimed at reducing dependence on clientelistic practices. While efforts to "curb clientelism" are often tied to improving the structural socioeconomic conditions of voters, these solutions inherently take time. Even significant reductions in poverty, as seen in Brazil or Chile, do not guarantee the eradication of clientelism. Vulnerabilities persist, and both individuals and local groups continue to possess essential demands that require engagement with municipal offices and politicians for solutions (Nichter, 2018). In addition to this, I propose that a more feasible and short-term policy approach could be grounded in the actor-based explanation introduced in this chapter. By reducing the dependency of neighbours' leaders on municipal public funds, the promotion and implementation of cooperative instances beyond municipality, encouragement of diversification of sources, and assignation of public resources by non-municipal actors, these actions can contribute to reducing clientelism.

# Conclusions

Parties all over the world use multiple strategies to attract diverse voters and win elections. Programmatic parties, on the one hand, rely more heavily on policy-based offers to connect with the electorate. In contrast, party machines predominantly use targeted distribution contingent on votes, campaigning, attendance at rallies, and voter mobilization. Yet, in reality, parties often combine programmatic and clientelistic strategies in complex ways to appeal to heterogeneous voters. As Coppedge (1998: 552) neatly explained, "clientelism and ideology are not mutually exclusive [...] Many parties are, to some degree, clientelistic, personalistic, and ideological simultaneously; these three qualities vary independently." In fact, the Turkish AKP, recognized as the most clientelistic party in the world (DALP), is still responsive to programmatic concerns (Bulut, 2020), while the strongly programmatic Brazilian PT relies on quid-pro-quo relationships at the municipal level to maintain a power base (Nichter, 2018; Johannessen, 2020).

Scholarship has primarily focused on how party machines make clientelism work, providing infrastructure, brokerage networks, and resources to alleviate the contingency problems that the clientelistic exchange entails (Stokes et al. 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Aspinall et al., 2022). Exemplary studies depict strong partisan machines in Argentina (Szwarcberg, 2015), Mexico (Cantu, 2019), Indonesia (Aspinall et al. 2022), and Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman, 2007), as well as the logic of particularistic distribution as a form of political representation (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

More recently, scholars have shown how clientelism works in inchoate party systems where machines are absent. In Peru, Muñoz (2018) explains that candidates distribute handouts during elections to attract voters and signal electoral viability using independent brokers, while local bureaucrats have connections with civil society organizations (Cornell and Grimes, 2023). Kramon (2018) similarly shows that politicians in Kenya use clientelism to build credibility regarding future responsiveness. In Russia, Hale (2010) explains that candidates use business conglomerates and local agencies as alternative organizational structures to fuel clientelism dynamics.

Nevertheless, this literature does not explain the logic of clientelism in contexts where programmatic parties are the norm. In these contexts, parties lack the organizational capacity of machines that provide infrastructure and brokerage networks. Neither do these candidates use clientelism to demonstrate electoral viability as in loose party systems. What explains how programmatic parties can combine their policy offers with clientelistic dispensation? How do party

candidates overcome the absence of dense organizational networks required to activate clientelism?

My research explores the tactics that programmatic parties use to incorporate clientelism as a supplementary strategy to attract constituencies. To empirically examine the factors and causal mechanisms that enable clientelism in these contexts, I focused on the case of Chile. I conducted multi-year fieldwork in three Chilean municipalities: Recoleta, La Pintana, and La Florida, each with different socioeconomic compositions and governed by Mayors from programmatic parties. Leveraging 96 interviews within 73 different local groups, participant observation, and shadowing, I argue that parties with strong ideological foundations and distinct policy portfolios engage in clientelism at the local level due to the heterogeneity of demands addressed by leaders of local associations.

I present the findings of the dissertation in three empirical chapters. In Chapter 4, I explain the circumstances under which parties engage in clientelism. I demonstrate that parties have mutually beneficial incentives with local associations within municipal environments. On one hand, neighbourhood association leaders perceive constant demands for redistribution from their group members. To address these demands, neighbourhood leaders approach local authorities and key municipal workers. In simple terms, local groups require the resources that municipal authorities can provide. On the other hand, politicians have the discretion to allocate these resources arbitrarily. However, in exchange for the distribution of resources, politicians demand political support from local leaders, mobilizing voters and displaying political advertisements in the groups' territory. Since politicians lack party infrastructure, they request that leaders provide the organizational capacity of neighbourhood associations in return for targeted distribution. In doing so, Mayors from programmatic parties effectively outsource the organizational cost of clientelism to neighbourhood associations.

While neighbourhood associations engage in clientelistic dynamics with local authorities, other local groups do not. In Chapter 5, I argue that the variation in the organizational capacity of these local associations explains why certain groups are more prone to engage in clientelism than others. I present evidence that neighbourhood leaders invest in infrastructure to gather neighbours' demands. This vertically-oriented structure enables a strong connection with neighbours and the rapid transmission of demands. Politicians aim to leverage the local territorial roots and organizational capacity of these groups to include clientelism as part of their repertoire. On the other hand, groups such as sports clubs, cooperatives, or seniors' associations lack this organizational capacity. Leaders in these non-clientelistic groups do not need to invest in

infrastructure as they do not receive a constant flow of demands. Consequently, due to this lack of organizational capacity, these latter groups are less likely to engage in clientelistic dynamics with municipal authorities.

In Chapter 6, I explore the heterogeneity observed among neighbourhood associations. While some neighbourhood leaders obtain public resources through quid-pro-quo electoral mobilization, others avoid the clientelistic dynamic. Despite living in the same socioeconomic context and investing in the same organizational structure to address demands, these leaders evade clientelistic exchanges by diversifying their sources of assistance. Instead of exclusively approaching local authorities, these leaders reduce their dependence on municipal resources. Hence, all else being equal, clientelistic dynamics are less likely to be sustained because these leaders may fulfil their neighbours' requirements through other sources.

The three chapters contribute to the overall argument of this research. The empirical material presented shows that the demand process undertaken by local associations is at least part of the explanation for the hybrid linkages observed at the municipal level. By making this argument, I am highlighting the relevance of two aspects. On the one hand, *bottom-up* demands are critical in explaining neighbourhood leaders' incentives to engage in clientelism. Because demand collection implies an investment in infrastructure capacity, these local leaders may obtain municipal resources in quid-pro-quo for lending their organizational capacity to politicians for electoral mobilization.

On the other hand, I highlight the relevance of associativity. Municipal offices receive hundreds of requests for targeted distribution every day. Individual voters, local associations, and private local companies approach the authorities to address their needs. However, not all municipal resources are allocated in exchange for some form of electoral benefits. Individual voters, for instance, may indeed receive municipal resources to resolve their problems, yet politicians have no means to monitor reciprocity at the individual level. As a key municipal director disclosed, "I obviously tell people to remember the municipal help during upcoming elections […] but we have no way of knowing if this will happen."[214] In contrast, some local associations engage in clientelism by providing the infrastructure politicians need for mobilizing people during elections in exchange for municipal resources.

The main contention of this research is that the organizational capacity of local groups is the key to understanding the logic of clientelism in settings where parties lack their own infrastructure. Mayors from programmatic parties may include clientelism as part of their electoral toolkit because

[214] Luis. Key municipal director in La Pintana. 18 March 2021.

they outsource the organizational cost to neighbourhood groups while using municipal resources to provide solutions to neighbours' demands. Moreover, my evidence reports that variations in groups' organization matter in explaining why some groups engage in clientelism while others do not. This adds credibility to the argument that demands trigger clientelism when they interact with associativity. Finally, by examining why some neighbourhood groups avoid clientelism – despite having similar infrastructure – I focus on the agency of local leadership, a perspective that is often neglected but is crucial to understanding how dependency on clientelistic exchanges may decrease.

In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the contributions of the dissertation to the literature on political parties, clientelism, and local governments. Then, I reflect on the limitations of my study. In particular, I explain how my account could gain external validity by using alternative research designs, such as experimental surveys or shadow cases, to test the theory in different settings. Finally, I conclude by discussing future avenues of inquiry that my findings suggest could be further explored.

## 7.1. Contributions

I make three main contributions to the literature on comparative party politics and clientelism. First, I provide an explanation for why parties with a clear policy offer may still include clientelism as part of their electoral repertoire. While conventional accounts limit the explanation to top-down party elite decisions to strategically link with different constituencies using diverse strategies, I show how bottom-up activities carried out in municipal environments by organized local groups create mutually beneficial incentives for both local politicians and local leaders, which trigger clientelistic dynamics. By showing that hybrid linkages are at least partially produced by the demand-side, I contribute to the recent literature that focuses on the agency of citizens and civil society groups to understand the intricacies of political representation (Wolkenstein and Wratil, 2021), distributive politics (Calvo and Murillo, 2019), clientelism (Borges, 2023; Nichter, 2018; Auerbach and Thachil, 2023), and local development (Auerbach, 2017; Dosh, 2010).

Secondly, my findings contribute to explaining party-voter linkages at the subnational level. When we shift the perspective from party-elite actions to analysing the micro dynamics between local politicians, local leaders, and individual voters, it becomes possible to observe how organized demands have profound effects on the types of distribution – programmatic or clientelistic – that municipal authorities deploy. On the other hand, I "scaled down" the level of analysis (Snyder, 2001) to identify the relevance of local organizations – associativity – and their demand processes, thereby clarifying the causal path that produces hybrid strategies at the municipal level. While

existing theories focus exclusively on the national or district level of variation, where parties face much more diverse electorates and can segment accordingly, local party-voter linkages have remained largely unexplored. My research, therefore, contributes to understanding the micro foundations of hybrid linkages in municipal environments.

Third, my research contributes to the literature on party organizations. According to classic frameworks, such as party-voter linkages and distributive politics, programmatic parties are not expected to engage in clientelism due to their lacking organizational structure to do so. The mix of strategies combining clientelism with a policy-based offer, as Kitschelt asserts, is considered too costly and inefficient. Yet, more recent scholarship has revealed that in weakly organized party systems, without machines in the political landscape, office-seekers may still resort to party substitutes such as local machines (Levitsky and Zavaleta, 2016; Aspinall et al., 2022), independent brokers (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015), or even bureaucrats with connections to civil society groups (Cornell and Grimes, 2023). In doing so, politicians use clientelism to signal future policy responsiveness (Kramon, 2018) or candidate viability (Muñoz, 2018).

My findings contribute to understanding how parties, lacking the organizational capacity of political machines, may still engage in clientelism. While in loose party systems candidates often turn to party substitutes (Hale, 2010; Levitsky et al., 2016; Van Dyck, 2016), I argue that parties primarily competing based on distinguishable policy offers can turn to civil society groups as mobilizing structures (Tarrow, 2012). These civil society groups, such as neighbourhood associations, religious organizations, and social movements, possess the organizational capacity to mobilize their members. Parties without internal organizational capacity can outsource it in exchange for the allocation of public resources. To illustrate this with the case of Chile, mayors leverage the vertical organizational structure that neighbourhood groups have created for the purpose of collecting demands. Local party leaders can use these groups' organizational capacity because they reciprocate with municipal resources to address the demands of these local associations. Programmatic parties find mutual incentives to engage in quid-pro-quo relationships with civil society groups, elucidating the hybrid linkage strategy these parties employ.

I also contribute to the literature on clientelism in three ways. First, I provide additional evidence that parties use clientelism even when monitoring is difficult and commitment problems are only partially solved (Hicken and Nathan, 2020; Aspinall et al., 2022; González-Ocantos and Oliveros, 2019; Oliveros, 2021). In the three cases studied, politicians cannot completely guarantee that leaders will mobilize voters – limited monitoring – and the ability to enforce the deal is restricted to the threat of withdrawing benefits – goods, services, or favours – if leaders do not fulfil their

side of the bargain. Even under these conditions, clientelism remains a sub-optimal and imperfect strategy but is still considered a "worthwhile bet relative to other electoral strategies" (Hicken and Nathan, 2020: 286).

Secondly, my research contributes to understanding the mechanics of the demand-side of clientelism. Recent studies have highlighted the role of organizational brokers (Garay et al., 2020; Auerbach, 2017) and group demands in explaining relational clientelism (Nichter, 2018; Borges, 2023) as well as local development in the developing world (Auerbach, 2017; Dosh, 2010). Using the case of Chile, I highlight the role of local groups, rather than individual voters, in articulating collective demands and negotiating the allocation of municipal goods and services in exchange for political support.

Finally, I align with recent scholarship that show a strong connection between associativity and clientelistic relationships in developing countries (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Borges, 2023). Organizational capacity and group characteristics are essential in understanding why some groups engage in clientelism while others avoid the 'patronage trap' by addressing members' requirements internally (Palmer-Rubin, 2019). To complement these theories, my evidence suggests that clientelism in programmatic settings results from the interaction between local demands and the organizational capacity of groups pushing for targeted distribution.

## 7.2. Limitations of the thesis

I identify three main limitations of my research. First, my study is a within-case study that evaluates data from a single country. Even when the case selection of Chile is justified according to a broader population of cases, e.g., predominantly programmatic settings, it is uncertain whether the findings are applicable to other cases, particularly in developed countries. To enhance external validity, the demand-driven argument presented in this study should be tested using cross-sectional surveys and qualitative case studies in various contexts (Gerring, 2017; Collier and Mahoney, 1996). In particular, conducting building block studies would contribute to what George and Bennett (2005: 112) called the "cumulative refinement of contingent generalizations" to assess whether the causal paths hold in a typology of cases. Lastly, process tracing methodologists would suggest testing the bottom-up mechanism in shadow cases (Soifer, 2020) from the same population of cases to evaluate generalizability (Beach and Pederson, 2019; Waldner, 2019). In the next subsection, I suggest how scholars can evaluate my theory using a variety of methodological approaches.

A second limitation of this research pertains to the representativeness of the collected evidence. I employed various data collection methods, including in-depth interviews, participant observations, shadowing of local leaders' activities, and archival research. The primary objective of these strategies is not to establish representative claims, as survey research does. I present my case using qualitative methodology with the explicit purpose of exploring unattended factors and unveiling causal mechanisms. Thus, instead of evaluating "how representative the evidence is of the population," I address two challenges that could indeed be problematic for the reported evidence: systematic respondent bias and reliability.

In this regard, I adopted strategies similar to those proposed by Bennett and Checkel (2015), Beach and Pederson (2019), Gerson and Damaske (2020), and Small and Calarco (2022). I conducted interviews with local actors from diverse geographical areas across various municipalities in different parts of urban Santiago. These actors are not politically connected and come from dissimilar socioeconomic backgrounds. For example, observing the same patterns in both the poorest comuna of La Pintana and the more affluent La Florida would lend credibility to the hypothesis that demands by organized groups are not the result of *cherry-picking* or a partial access to the empirical record.

Concerning reliability, I start from the assumption that participants have limited incentives to admit their involvement in clientelistic exchanges due to social desirability bias (González-Ocantos et al., 2012). It is unlikely that authorities in different municipal contexts would repeatedly declare their engagement in clientelism with local groups. Furthermore, I supplement participant statements with fieldwork notes and shadowing. A triangulation strategy, involving multiple sources and data collection from various places and diverse actors, increases confidence in the argument that at least part of the explanation for hybridity is explained by the local dynamics reported in this research.

The research design does not permit us to evaluate whether the clientelistic networks established by local-level politicians are used in legislative and national elections by the party candidates. It is reasonable to think that Deputies, Senators, Governors, and even Presidential candidates may seek support from the local connections of their party colleagues at the municipal level. This is, in fact, the networks that Valenzuela (1977) identified in the Chilean party system before the democratic breakdown in 1973. In India, Auerbach and Thachil (2018) have documented a dynamic brokerage network involving local brokers, local authorities, and high-ranking party members, similar to the one found in Southeast Asian countries by Aspinall et al. (2022). Collected evidence suggests that local clientelistic networks may indeed be used by party candidates at the regional and national

levels to increase their share of the vote. Below, I present a receipt book that local leaders in La Pintana provided to me. It reveals that the gubernatorial candidate in 2021, from the same Christian Democratic Party as the Mayor, has records of voter information, polling locations, and detailed personal data, such as personal phone numbers and addresses (Figure 1). Although this material is not systematic, it suggests the idea that mayoral clientelistic connections may be employed for electoral purposes by candidates in regional and national elections.

**FIGURE 1**. *Receipt book with voters' information. The information was blurred to maintain anonymity*




Lastly, my dissertation did not address the historical development of the party system or the foundations of local associativity in Chile. My research design and the empirical material collected primarily focused on explaining the agency of multiple actors and the activities they undertake to trigger clientelistic dynamics in municipal contexts. Simply put, mine is an agent-based explanation. Nevertheless, I do recognize the importance of historical contexts from which clientelistic practices emerge.[215] The historical underpinnings that account for different forms of representation are associated with the level of development (Kitschelt et al., 2010), the control of

[215] Martin Shefter (1994) elaborated a pioneering framework to understand the origins of patronage politics. The key, as Shefter explained, was the historical timing and sequencing of the development of bureaucracies and electoral mobilization. In those countries where independent bureaucracies were established before party electoral mobilization, political elites were impeded from relying on patronage. In contrast, when party efforts for electoral mobilization preceded bureaucratic autonomy, party elites built a constituency for patronage. Drawing on Shefter's approach, the comparative literature on clientelism has inquired about the historical foundations of patronage in Europe (Piattoni, 2001) and Southeast Asian countries (Aspinall et al. 2022).

bureaucracies (Shefter, 1994), and are mediated by the historical configuration of institutions (Piattoni, 2001), such as the electoral system and the dynamics of electoral competition (Hicken, 2020). Although a historical account was not the primary purpose of this research, future studies would greatly benefit from such historical perspective. Now, I turn to discuss future areas of inquiry that would contribute to further enhancing, testing, and expanding upon my theory beyond the scope of this thesis.

### 7.3. Future Research Suggestions

In the Chilean context, parties at the municipal-level outsource the cost of clientelism to local civil society groups with mutual incentives for quid-pro-quo relationships. Building on this theory, future studies could assess whether demands for redistribution create opportunities for programmatic parties to engage in clientelism. Scholars studying parties with clear and distinguishable policy portfolios, such as the PT in Brazil (Samuels and Zucco, 2014; Johannessen, 2020), the PSOE in Spain (Gómez and Verge, 2012), the Frente Amplio in Uruguay (Luna, 2014), and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan (Catalinac and Muraoka, 2023), may leverage the organizational capacities of civil society groups to complement their programmatic distribution with clientelism. While exploring this possibility, researchers should pay particular attention to how local groups address their particularism requirements, where their leaders seek solutions, and whether they are asked to mobilize group members in exchange.

Beyond programmatic settings, researchers could assess whether office-seekers in weakly organized party systems turn to civil society organizations to cover the organizational costs of clientelism. For instance, in India, Thachil (2014) explains that the BJP uses non-profit private organizations to attract voters without party structures. Similarly, in Indonesia, Aspinall et al. (2022) and Hicken et al. (2022) show how, in a patronage democracy, municipal-level politicians rely on local machines for this purpose. In Peru, Muñoz (2018) and Levitsky and Zavaleta (2016) have reported evidence that politicians use independent brokers to signal electoral viability. Therefore, it is plausible that, in the absence of the organizational support of party machines, politicians may alternatively engage in quid-pro-quo relationships with groups capable of mobilizing members.

Third, future research could test the findings of this thesis using alternative methodological approaches. For instance, the consequences of local groups demanding redistribution could be evaluated through surveys. In Latin America, the 2018 version of the LAPOP *AmericaBarometer* includes questions about associativity, socioeconomic conditions, and self-declarations of

clientelism. Additionally, LAPOP allows for controlling potential confounders not explored in my research, such as differences between urban and rural areas (Klaus, Paller, and Wilfahrt, 2023), educational levels, and interpersonal trust and reliability (Finan and Schechter, 2012). Similarly, the Democratic Accountability Linkages Project includes questions on associativity and different types of linkages. Nevertheless, given that the data relies on expert opinions, there is an appreciable increase in concerns related to internal validity.

Yet, surveys often underreport clientelism due to social desirability bias (González-Ocantos et al., 2012). As an alternative to representative and expert surveys, another strategy could involve undertaking experimental survey designs that sample leaders of CSOs. By doing so, it is possible to evaluate the effect of organizational features and personal characteristics of leaders and how likely they are to engage in clientelistic relationships. The literature on clientelism provides excellent examples of designs in this regard. In India, Auerbach and Thachil (2023) used a conjoint experiment to evaluate how patrons integrate local brokers into parties in urban India. Using a list experiment survey, Oliveros (2021) shows that public employees in Argentina provide political support for incumbents because they perceive their work as tied to politicians' fate.

Fourth, an important contribution of my thesis for the literature in party-voters linkages, is that clientelism in programmatic settings is explained by the interaction of demands and associativity. While it is well established the relationship between socioeconomic conditions of voters to explain clientelism (Kitschelt 2000; Kitchelt and Wilkinson, 2007), a recent strand of scholars have argued that associativity is even a stronger predictor (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015) and organizational capacity of civil groups is causally related to patronage (Palmer-Rubin, 2019). My evidence suggests that, in reality, the interaction between both variables is what accounts to explain clientelism in the context of Chilean party system. Since case studies have consistently shown the association of organizational membership with clientelism in Mexico, Colombia, Indonesia, Philippines, it is plausible that the interactive effect of demands and associativity could be associated with clientelism. Further research should explore if the interaction is significant in different party system configurations.

Fifth, Chapter 6 reports on the strategies employed by local leaders to avoid quid-pro-quo relationships with municipal authorities. Although exploratory and requiring further evaluation, the evidence suggests a path through which leaders can reduce incentives for clientelism. Specifically, policymakers can promote cooperation between local groups and other organizations, such as cooperatives, universities, NGOs, and private companies, to meet internal member demands, thereby reducing dependency on municipal resources. While improving structural

conditions to curb clientelism is a long-term endeavour, a more feasible short-term policy, based on actors' incentives, involves fostering the diversification of sources of assistance. This approach could complement structural solutions such as a growing middle-class or increased electoral competition (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014; Magaloni et al., 2007). I contend that an actor-based approach aimed at reducing people's dependency on the targeted allocation of municipal resources could, as a consequence, lead to a reduction in clientelistic relationships.

# Appendix 1
# Supplementary Material for the Qualitative Research Design

This appendix details the methodological decisions and challenges of this research project. I explain how I entered the field, ethical consideration, positionality, data limitation, confidentiality, data protection, and the data collection process.

## 1. Entering the Field

I started my fieldwork in the *least-likely* case of Recoleta. In a municipality like Recoleta, with strong ideological leanings and relatively homogeneous socioeconomic conditions, it is not expected to observe parties engaging in quid-pro-quo. Thus, I chose to adopt an iterative theory-building approach to identify causes and mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen, 2019; Fairfield and Charman, 2019). What explains the routinely observed clientelism in Recoleta, where people do not vary significantly along socioeconomic conditions? I theorized that class alone cannot explain the variation of multiple linkages present in the municipal territory.

I am familiar with the sociodemographic features of Recoleta. Since I was an adolescent, I knew the main streets, public transportation routes, and both the more secure and insecure areas, as my high school was located there. I began by interviewing a local leader of one of the largest markets in the city, called "La Vega". I was able to reach him through previous contacts with stall owners in the market. He was my first contact and the one who provided access to other local leaders. After this initial interview, I obtained the contacts of other union leaders. Simultaneously, I started reaching out to leaders of neighbourhood associations in different parts of Recoleta. I spoke with three local neighbourhood leaders – two from the north-side and one from the south area – who then gave me further contacts to continue the research in other areas and with different types of local associations (for instance, one leader introduced me to the president of communal sports clubs). All of this took place between December 2018 and early January 2019, during which I spent roughly 6 hours a day conducting interviews and attempting to contact more leaders. At the end of each interview, I also requested to be introduced to other local leaders.

Since then, I have been conducting interviews with leaders and members of sports clubs, neighbourhood associations, senior groups, and cooperatives throughout Recoleta. I returned to Recoleta in 2022 to interview some neighbourhood association leaders, but I focused especially on

sports clubs and senior groups. The last stage of the field research took place between August 2022 and January 2023.

In 2021, after the COVID-19 pandemic emergency was partially under control in Chile, I began the second stage of fieldwork, this time in La Pintana and La Florida. For 8 months, I attended various venues to contact leaders of local associations, sports clubs, and seniors groups.

In La Pintana, I obtained contact information on neighbourhood groups covering the four sectors of the municipal territory. This information is available on La Pintana webpage (Number of neighbourhood associations and name of the leader). It is also available the geographic bounds of every group using geographical data (For access: https://geopintana-lapintana.hub.arcgis.com/pages/descargas). Because it is straightforward to track leaders' names and address, I opted to present all interviews excerpts under anonymity.

The strategy was to contact all the leaders of neighbourhood associations in La Pintana. To do so, I went to neighbourhood association venues to talk in-person with their leaders. After a couple of successful interviews, the local leaders provided me with the contact information of other leaders and introduced me to them. Once I obtained phone contacts, I sent them an instant text message introducing myself, explaining the objective of my research, and asking for their availability to have an interview. With those who agreed, we coordinated the most suitable date and time for the interviews to take place. I conducted interviews in 46 out of 76 neighbourhood associations, which represents a rate of participation of 62.2%.

I employed a similar strategy in La Florida. Some early contacts helped me to get in touch with local association leaders. Once the contact and interviews were arranged, we usually met up at the group's venue. In the case of La Florida, I also conducted some interviews remotely (7). Although this was an exception due to the pandemic restrictions in Chile, the interviews followed the same protocol as those conducted in-person. I could not identify any significant differences compared to the interviews carried out in person.

## 2. Ethical Considerations

The research project was approved by the Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) of the University of Oxford. I documented in detail how I planned to obtain participants' consent, evaluate personal risks, guarantee the physical and psychological safety of participants, as well as identify the potential ethical issues that my research entailed. Beyond the formal ethical evaluation from my institution, I worked hard to address potential issues related to

participants' privacy and safety. Since my research involved asking participants about sensitive topics such as clientelism, I took precautions to avoid any negative consequences for them (I discuss this in the confidentiality section below). For instance, I only shared information obtained in interviews when it would not entail any potential risk for participants. All these ethical considerations also meet the APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subject Research.[216]

Importantly, the second stage of my fieldwork was interrupted due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. In early 2020, when my field research began, Chile's sanitary situation was relatively normal. Until late mid-March, I was able to conduct face-to-face interviews. Later, as restrictions increased and quarantine was imposed by Chilean authorities, I conducted interviews through phone calls and video calls. I communicated with the authorities of Oxford University to inform about the additional ethical considerations that my fieldwork entails in the pandemic context. For example, to conduct face-to-face interviews, I followed the guidelines of the Chilean Ministry of Health. I ensured an appropriate distance, met up in open spaces, and used face masks. When these conditions were not possible to meet, I carried out the interviews remotely. Overall, despite my field research faced a challenging situation, I can responsibly say that I undertook the data collection similarly to how it was initially planned in my research design.

### 3. Positionality and Self-awareness

Since I was born and raised in Santiago, Chile, I didn't face the problems other scholars often encounter during fieldwork, such as adjusting to the language, context, or history. On the positive side, this gave me a communicational advantage. As a Spanish native speaker, I am familiar with Chilean people's vocabulary, slang, and gestures, at least in Santiago. Additionally, I have physical features that are quite common among the average male population in Chile – brown skin, black hair, Andean facial features, and brown eyes. I believe this aspect was relevant in approaching some local groups that might have otherwise had reservations. Therefore, I had no issues introducing myself and explaining – as simply as possible – the purpose of the interview. In general, I found that participants understood the questions and the subject of conversation very well.

I also studied the history of the municipalities included in the study. For instance, I examined the displacement of hundreds of families from different parts of Santiago to create what is now known

[216] The guidelines are available on https://www.apsanet.org/Portals/54/diversity%20and%20inclusion%20prgms/Ethics/Final_Principles%20with%20Guidance%20with%20intro.pdf?ver=2020-04-20-211740-153

as La Pintana (Guerra, 2009; Morales and Rojas, 1986; Alvarez and Cavieres, 2016). Additionally, I familiarized myself with the political experiences of some residents in Recoleta during the dictatorship repression. This contextual information allowed me to gain a clearer understanding of the residents, their organizations, and the demand-process mechanism.

On the downside, being considered 'one of them' (an average *santiaguino*), not a foreigner, or expressing in-depth knowledge of the context, also has disadvantages. People could respond to the questions according to either my expectations – producing response bias – or in a way that is subjectively viewed as "desirable" – social desirability bias. Moreover, since the contacts were usually directed by other interviewees, they could put me in contact only with leaders who share similar opinions and experiences, also producing bias. I address both problems in the next section.

## 4. Data Limitations

In qualitative studies, sources of reliability (non-systematic measurement error) and respondents' bias (systematic measurement error) may indeed present serious challenges. I tackle these problems as follows: drawing on interviews from different geographical areas, across various municipalities from different parts of Santiago, non-politically related, and with dissimilar socioeconomic backgrounds, it is plausible to argue that the evidence is loosely representative of the socioeconomic diversity of urban Santiago. For instance, finding the same pattern in the poorest comuna of La Pintana as well as the more affluent La Florida would lend credibility to the hypothesis that demands by organized groups are not the result of partial access to the empirical record. Furthermore, even if systematic bias is produced due to case selection, one might reasonably state that the bias would underestimate the potential causal relationship.

Regarding reliability, I assume that people have little incentives to declare that they are part of quid-pro-quo. It is, in fact, very unlikely that municipal authorities would recognize that they rely on clientelistic strategies. Likewise, local leaders have few incentives to declare that they received benefits contingent on political favours. A triangulation strategy to learn from multiple sources, collecting data from different places and diverse actors, increases confidence in the argument that at least part of the explanation of hybridity is due to the local dynamics reported in this research. With that in mind, I proceeded to learn the version of local authorities, municipal officers, councillors, and local leaders in order to have a broader picture of the phenomenon. In this regard, the information provided by key municipal officers was crucial to corroborate the story declared by local leaders. It was also important to keep all the participants separate from each other – I did

not carry out group interviews with leaders from different territories. Moreover, I provided just the necessary information from previous talks with other participants.

### 5. Confidentiality and Data Protection

The interviews lasted, on average, 90 minutes. Naturally, as is typical when using interviews as a data collection strategy, some interviews extended for hours, while others were more brief. For instance, when local leaders invited me to group activities, I spent hours engaging with them, discussing their experiences, demands, and ideas for addressing neighbours' issues. On the other hand, some respondents were very concise in their answers to my questions.

I ensured complete confidentiality regarding the identity of the participants. Anonymity was a critical aspect of my research for two reasons. First, local associations in Chile are easily traceable, and in some cases, the leaders' contacts are available online. To protect their privacy, I maintained anonymity, especially for key directors and political authorities, as requested by the majority of the participants. Second, in research projects where participants are exposed to sensitive questions or asked to discuss difficult experiences, anonymity fosters a sense of comfort and security, reducing potential reprisals from those involved in the conversation. It also helps mitigate the influence of the "social desirability bias," a major challenge reported in previous studies on clientelism.

The majority of participants preferred not to be recorded, but all of them allowed me to take notes of the conversations. One participant decided to withdraw from the study, and another one asked me expressly not to report their answer to one of the questions. The interviews were carried out in the locations that interviewees considered appropriate. In the case of political authorities and key actors of the local government, I conducted the interviews in the headquarters or municipal buildings. In the case of the president of the neighbourhood associations and social organizations, the interviews were conducted in their group's venues, houses, or at a public space.

Regarding the management of personal data, I followed the General Data Protection Regulation[217] (GDPR) and the ethical guidelines of the University of Oxford.[218] I used a small notebook (passport size) to write down field notes and participants' answers. I did not use a recorder to increase the rate of interview acceptance. After the interviews, I transferred and stored the material and field notes in my personal encrypted and password-protected Nexus 365 OneDrive account. The information provided in the thesis was used with the explicit consent of the participants (I


[217] The full text is available on https://gdpr-info.eu/
[218] Full CUREC guidelines are available on: https://researchsupport.admin.ox.ac.uk/governance/ethics/resources

used a consent form template from my institution).[219] The interview material (notes, transcriptions) was confidential, and only the author has access to it.

### 6. Interviewing Strategy

In the three municipalities that were part of this project, I began contacting leaders of different types of local associations. In some cases, it was easier to obtain contacts as they were partially available on municipal websites. For example, in the case of La Pintana, I used available information to visit different venues in various sectors and explained the interview plan to members of the local associations. I purposely made contact with local groups from different areas of the municipal territory to avoid systematic measurement problems (Gerson and Damaske, 2020), such as only interviewing leaders with the same perspective (see Figure A.1.). By collecting perceptions and motivations from a broader range of local leaders in diverse areas, I reduced systematic bias among participants.

**Figure A.1.** *Access strategy in La Pintana to reduce systematic bias*




**Source**: Author's elaboration with geospatial data provided by the Municipality of La Pintana.

In Recoleta and La Florida, contact information of local groups was not available. In both comunas, I asked municipal workers for an updated list of active local groups. Unfortunately, this

[219] The consent forms template is available on https://researchsupport.admin.ox.ac.uk/clinical-trial-research-governance/documents/consent

information was not provided before my fieldwork started. Consequently, in both cases, I opted to use a snowball strategy to approach neighbourhood associations, sports clubs, and cooperatives leaders. As many scholars have argued, this strategy is appropriate for investigating inaccessible populations that are otherwise difficult to identify or contact (see Cohen and Arieli, 2011). Just as I did in La Pintana, in order to interview unrelated participants, I started making contacts in different sectors (nodes) of Recoleta and La Florida. For instance, in Recoleta, I began by contacting union leaders and two neighbourhood group leaders in the north sector. They provided me with contacts to interview other leaders they knew (also from the north). Simultaneously, I contacted a mother's club in the south of Recoleta. Their leader kindly put me in contact with four neighbourhood association leaders and the president of a sports club. At the end of each interview, I asked participants for the contact information of other local leaders.

### 7. Different Type of Participants

My research involves two main groups of participants. Firstly, I collected experiences, perceptions, and narratives from leaders of local associations. Given the multitude of groups in the local community, my initial approach aimed to capture the broadest diversity of organizations. I sought to understand the heterogeneity of leaders' incentives to engage in clientelism. It became evident that neighbourhood associations have constant demands that they approach local authorities to address. In turn, local politicians ask leaders to participate in electoral campaigning, utilizing the groups' vertically-integrated structure to provide electoral support. When incentives were mutually beneficial, clientelism was observed. On the other hand, some groups do not frequently demand targeted distribution. Consequently, they do not invest equally in organizational structure as neighbourhood groups do. With no constant flow of demands and no structure to offer, quid-pro-quo is less likely to be observed.[220]

In addition to local association leaders, my research also involved interviews with local authorities, key directors, party members, and municipal workers. To approach this group, my strategy was to coordinate interviews by directly reaching out to municipal buildings, party headquarters, and Congress, and requesting meetings with authorities. While this approach was effective in a few instances, it was mostly successful in Recoleta. In the other municipalities, and when dealing with party elites, I relied on previous contacts to introduce myself to key directors, public workers, and party members.

[220] This does not imply that other sorts of non-programmatic distribution could be observed.

## 8. Details of interviews

| Interviewee | Date | Role | Modality | Municipality |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | 05/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **2** | 07/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **3** | 07/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **4** | 09/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **5** | 10/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **6** | 10/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **7** | 13/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **8** | 14/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **9** | 15/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **10** | 15/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **11** | 17/12/2018 | Local leader | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **12** | 19/12/2018 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **13** | 20/12/2018 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **14** | 05/01/2019 | Adviser at Municipality | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **15** | 07/01/2019 | Adviser at Municipality | face-to-face | Recoleta |
| **16** | 01/02/2021 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **17** | 10/02/2021 | Local leader | Phone Call | La Pintana |
| **18** | 11/02/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Pintana |
| **19** | 16/02/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **20** | 16/02/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **21** | 16/02/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **22** | 26/02/2021 | Adviser at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **23** | 26/02/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **24** | 02/03/2021 | Local leader | Phone Call | La Pintana |
| **25** | 03/03/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Pintana |
| **26** | 04/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **27** | 04/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **28** | 04/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **29** | 05/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **30** | 05/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **31** | 05/03/2021 | Adviser at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **32** | 05/03/2021 | Adviser at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **33** | 05/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **34** | 09/03/2021 | Local leader | Phone Call | La Pintana |
| **35** | 11/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **36** | 11/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **37** | 11/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **38** | 11/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **39** | 12/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **40** | 12/03/2021 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **41** | 15/03/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Pintana |
| **42** | 18/03/2021 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **43** | 18/03/2021 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **44** | 18/03/2021 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **45** | 18/03/2021 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **46** | 18/03/2021 | Local leader | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **47** | 19/03/2021 | Mayor | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **48** | 19/03/2021 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **49** | 19/03/2021 | Directive at Municipality | face-to-face | La Pintana |
| **50** | 21/03/2021 | Directive at Municipality | Videocall | La Pintana |
| **51** | 24/03/2021 | Local leader | Phone Call | La Pintana |
| **52** | 24/03/2021 | Local leader | Phone Call | La Pintana |
| **53** | 24/03/2021 | Local leader | Phone Call | La Pintana |
| **54** | 25/03/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Pintana |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **55** | 29/03/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Pintana |
| **56** | 06/04/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Florida |
| **57** | 13/04/2021 | Councillor | Videocall | La Pintana |
| **58** | 13/04/2021 | Local leader | Phone Call | La Pintana |
| **59** | 14/04/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Florida |
| **60** | 16/04/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Florida |
| **61** | 18/04/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Florida |
| **62** | 20/04/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Florida |
| **63** | 20/04/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Florida |
| **64** | 20/04/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Pintana |
| **65** | 21/04/2021 | Local leader | Videocall | La Florida |
| **66** | 23/09/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **67** | 23/09/2022 | Senator | Face-to-Face | National Congress |
| **68** | 27/09/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **69** | 27/09/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Florida |
| **70** | 04/10/2022 | Party directive | Face-to-Face | Socialist Party |
| **71** | 07/10/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **72** | 07/10/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **73** | 11/10/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **74** | 13/10/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **75** | 19/10/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **76** | 29/10/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **77** | 07/11/2022 | Local leader | Call | La Pintana |
| **78** | 07/11/2022 | Local leader | Call | La Pintana |
| **79** | 11/11/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **80** | 11/11/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **81** | 22/11/2022 | Local leader | Call | La Pintana |
| **82** | 22/11/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **83** | 22/11/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **84** | 22/11/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | La Pintana |
| **85** | 03/12/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **86** | 15/12/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **87** | 15/12/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **88** | 15/12/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **89** | 19/12/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **90** | 21/12/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **91** | 27/12/2022 | Local leader | Call | Recoleta |
| **92** | 28/12/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **93** | 28/12/2022 | Local leader | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **94** | 05/01/2023 | Party Elite | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **95** | 05/01/2023 | Municipal Director | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |
| **96** | 06/01/2023 | Party Elite | Face-to-Face | Recoleta |

**Source:** Author's elaboration

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