Loyalty and Liberation: The political life of Zephaniah Moyo

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Southern African liberation movements in and out of power have been bedeviled by a politics in which loyalties are uncertain and histories of division cannot easily be shed. I use the story of Zephaniah Moyo, who was over his lifetime both loyal to and accused of treachery by all three armed adversaries in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, to argue that the disruptive power of histories of division cannot be reduced to the binaries of loyalty and betrayal, heroes and traitors. Its enduring disruptiveness is rooted in contestations over the purposes of political lives and the complex content of loyalties that are sedimented in institutions, ideas and individual agendas over time and across space. Moyo's narrative allows a deep excavation of these histories. He locates his loyalty in a vision of political order, founded in an unlikely embrace of Rhodesian bureaucracy and professionalism, and reified in the governance of the military camps in Zambia and in the violent state-making of 1980s Zimbabwe. While his is an individual story, its telling is situated in a collective critique of arbitrary rule and the claims of a heroic nationalism, and it describes a specifically Zimbabwean history of bureaucracy as political ideal. This biographical excavation allows a reevaluation of the possibilities – often foreclosed – of the political project of liberation.

Introduction

It has become commonplace to question the heroic claims of nationalism, and to offer alternative stories of exclusion and complex engagements with state and nation.[1] In southern Africa, scholars of liberation movements have questioned triumphant official narratives by focusing attention on the violent practices of resistance and exile politics, and tracing their legacies in intolerant post-independence modes of rule.[2] In these histories, the binary language of loyalty and betrayal looms large, and serves a multitude of purposes. As Sharika Thiranagama and Tobias Kelly stress, when the order of things is contested and divisions flourish, accusations of treachery become a potent means of policing a 'permissible politics' between and among authorities and political subjects.[3] Contests over the delineation of betrayal and loyalty within liberation movements concerned the very purposes of political action, and remained stubbornly unresolved long after movements became ruling parties.[4] They also took distinct forms across movements, shaped by the histories of parties and armies in and out of exile, as well as the states against which they fought.[5] Exploring these complex histories is an essential element of understanding the production of political possibilities – realized and unrealized, and within and beyond these movements.

The life stories of political actors who engaged in liberation struggles offer a unique window on this politics. They allow a deep excavation of practices and ideas over time and across geographical and institutional boundaries, providing us with closely observed views on the development of ideas of liberation and rule.[6] That critical stories are increasingly being told in the memoirs of southern African political elites is an indication of the frailty of dominant heroic narratives in the present, as well as the past existence of divided loyalties and unrealized political projects.[7] Oral historical narratives that

challenge dominant stories do so in somewhat distinct ways: they are often constructed and shared within marginal political communities intent on imagining alternative pasts as well as different futures.[8] In order to demonstrate the entanglement of loyalty and betrayal in political regimes as they were made and unmade over decades and across continents, I focus on one particularly complex life, that of Zephaniah Moyo.

Moyo's narrative reflects the divisions of the past as well as the authorisations of the present. In particular, his membership of a political movement that did not come to power means his account is shaped neither by a victorious nationalism nor a process of disillusionment from within it, but is critically addressed to it from the outside. Moyo had become a leading figure in the intelligence wing of ZAPU, placing him on the wrong side of the party that came to power – ZANU(PF) – in 1980.[9] His story exists as memory and conversation, an interactive record shared for decades among colleagues, comrades and friends, where it forms part of a powerful alternative to dominant modes of political belonging, and interacts with local efforts to record ZAPU's history and make political claims in the public sphere.[10] His story is further complicated by his history of service as a policeman in the Rhodesian state prior to joining ZAPU in exile, and his post-independence interval membership of ZANU(PF), sandwiched in between a period of severe political persecution at the hands of ZANU(PF) in the early 1980s and a return to a revived ZAPU in 2008.

I first interviewed Moyo in 1991, but got to know him and many of his colleagues better while conducting research on the history of Matabeleland, the western region of Zimbabwe that became ZAPU's heartland, in the mid-1990s.[11] The interviews I rely on here were conducted in Bulawayo between 2008 and 2015, a time of political and economic turmoil in which popular anger over ZANU(PF) rule was widespread. In 2015, I went through the narrative presented below with Moyo, asking for criticism and elaboration. He made two points: the first was that the suffering undergone by his elderly mother when he was imprisoned by the ZANU(PF) government in the 1980s should be noted, in effect a marker of the still raw anger over the abuses of that period. The second was to re-emphasise that his primary identity was forged in the nationalist struggle and that his loyalty remained with ZAPU. Moyo stressed that he will "die ZAPU," that he is "ZAPU in his heart". Much of what follows is the story of why that is so. But to rest there would be to oversimplify the history of Moyo's "motivations and mobilisations," as Luise White and Miles Larmer put it, and to miss the foundation of political loyalty in ideas of political order and personal aspiration.[12] Moyo's narrative guides the account that follows, but I also seek to provide a wider picture, drawing on several decades of research among Moyo's colleagues and on the contexts that his story traverses, in order to make sense of a story in which it was possible for Moyo to hold an allegiance to all three of the armed adversaries in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, and for each of them, at different moments, to accept his loyalty and to accuse him of betrayal.

In exploring Moyo's account I focus on three passages in three different countries under three different political regimes: his experience as a policeman in settler-ruled Rhodesia, of ZAPU governance in the camps in Zambia, and of ZANU(PF) rule in newly independent Zimbabwe. These passages together illustrate the deep entanglements of histories of loyalty across time and space,

their perennial disruptiveness, and their enduring link to a political project born of 1950s Rhodesia.

The Rhodesian Policeman

How best do we understand Zephaniah Moyo's decision to become a policeman in Rhodesia and why did he ultimately decide to change sides? Addressing these questions requires exploring the nature of his relationship with the state in more capacious terms than can be contained in ideas of complicity or collaboration, categories that presume oppositional binaries and that erase cross-cutting purposes. An historical literature on African colonial contexts has in fact long sought to complicate the idea of the 'collaborator', in part through a focus on the vexed position of black policemen. This work sees them as more than simply tools of the state, acting to oppress and exploit the racial community of which they formed a part, though that was almost always a central element of colonial police work. John McCracken's study of police in Nyasaland made an early contribution to this genre, stressing the changing roles of police over time, and the concomitant shifts in their qualifications, duties and social aspirations. He noted both quite ordinary parallels with other forms of wage labour and the high stakes of their often divided loyalties. Police worked for wages but they also invested in social and political projects that were at times abetted by the state and at others proved incompatible with its demands.[13] Recent studies, such as Michelle Moyd's history of the Askari – black police and soldiers – in German East Africa, have developed these points, arguing that loyalty to the colonial state was negotiated through the making of social hierarchies, mutual obligations, and economic utilities, and that it had definite limits.[14]

The motives behind such acts of 'collaboration', and the content and fixity of the loyalties they produced, need to be closely examined with an eye to the political order of which they formed a part. In Southern Rhodesia, the demands of policing took a new form after World War II when police were increasingly professionalized on the one hand and faced with an explosion of nationalism on the other. This created deep tensions among an educated, aspirant black constituency seeking middle-class respectability and expecting the rights and dignity promised but never delivered by the multi-racial politics of the 1950s, the hallmark of the Central African Federation. This political regime made demands of loyalty that could not be reduced to service to white oppression, though it did so in ways that only ever uncertainly convinced, and which wobbled, eventually fatally, in the face of the hardening of both white and black nationalism.

Moyo's account of his life places him in the midst of this story. Like many who lived in the rural heartland of Matabeleland after World War II, his family experienced eviction from their land, in his case twice over, in 1949 and then 1953, first within and then from the Matopos area south of Zimbabwe's second city, Bulawayo. His family lost many of their cattle and possessions in these moves, and Moyo "learned under the trees" owing to the lack of schools.[15] After some years, Moyo recounted, he returned to his home area to further his studies. The Matopos was by then a hotbed of ZAPU activity while the city of Bulawayo had been set alight by the unrest known as *Zhii*. Schools were central sites of protest; several of Moyo's teachers were ZAPU political commissars. On one occasion, he recalled, they organized the older students to ambush a visiting

Rhodesia Information Service crew, come to show a propaganda film. Moyo's group stoned the crew's truck, driving it into a Mopani stump. The police arrested and beat them the next day, only releasing them after the Reverend Griffiths, in charge of the Brethren in Christ mission school Moyo attended, intervened. In his first act of loyalty to ZAPU, Moyo described how he and his classmates refused to implicate their teachers. Moyo continued his studies in Bulawayo, completing Form 2 at St Bernard's school, and remained keenly aware that people were "fighting to free the country." Close to home, a ZAPU contingent had been arrested after an armed attack on a farm in the Matopos in 1964, and several of its members made a daring escape from Grey's Street prison in Bulawayo the following year.[16]

When he left school in 1966, Moyo faced a quandary. As he put it, he "wanted to get involved in politics" but he was also "looking for money to make a living." Both were difficult: "by then it was not easy to get some jobs, even to join the liberation movement because it had not reached that height."[17] The detention of many of the nationalist leaders in 1964 and the repression that followed Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain in 1965 had created a political lull. His Form 2 education, which placed him among an educational elite, seemed only to promise "odd jobs." He felt the civil service offered better possibilities, and in 1967 took a job in the veterinary services before moving to the police in late 1968. After nine months training, he started as a constable. It was a profession with prospects for learning skills and promotion; it intrigued and appealed to Moyo, offering a new identity and a new name: 'Batha'. Moyo explained, "As far as I'm concerned I wanted to be a good policeman, to defend my country." To Moyo, that meant something quite specific: it referred to doing things "professionally and treating people according to the rules of the land, as law-abiding citizens." When I pressed Moyo as to the irony of the origins of this idea of policing in the Rhodesia of the late 1960s, and in light of his prior clashes with police, he laughed: "But it's true, it came from Rhodesia! Because the police training it was done by the Rhodesians … sort of like a semi-British style of policing."[18] Moyo's narrative created room for the contradictions of state practice and ideal, allowing him to conjure an appealing political order amidst repression, and to pursue what he saw as a respectable career.

Moyo had in fact joined a police force in the midst of a transition, and not its first. What was to become the Rhodesian police started as a paramilitary force owing allegiance to Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC). The 'native police' of the 1890s were notorious among Africans for their brutality and looting and, in white Rhodesian lore, for their disloyalty: half of the Matabeleland Native Police, mostly made up of men recruited from the recently defeated Ndebele state's soldiers, defected with their guns at the start of the 1896 risings against the BSAC, planting a fear of black perfidy – and of arming black men – deep in the settler psyche.[19] The British South Africa Police (BSAP) had no choice but to recruit black men, but it initially recruited many from outside Rhodesia, hoping they would be more effectively tied to the state, and the BSAP was established as a segregated force with white commanders, and different ranks, duties and conditions of service for whites and blacks. It retained its paramilitary character until 1946 when a series of reforms began to produce a more educated, disciplined body. As Timothy Stapleton has shown, the next fifteen years brought improvements in black policemen's pay, housing, conditions of

service, and training. Black police could independently write reports, take statements, produce crime scene plans, and prepare case dockets. Black recruits were required to have a standard VI education from 1956, making them far better educated than their peers in South Africa, Kenya and elsewhere.[20] Many of these men embraced a middle-class life of sports, socials, church and music. As Stapleton argues, they were often motivated by the material perks of the job and the authority conferred by the uniform. Abuses of position were not uncommon, but many took great pride in policing as a profession and in upholding law and order.[21] Their loyalty was thus often rooted in the status and respectability allowed by their relationship to a particular kind of state.

The professionalizing trend that followed World War II was, however, rapidly overtaken by the rise of nationalism, which posed a distinct challenge to policing on the model Moyo envisaged and to the loyalties of black police. Police involvement in controlling political unrest expanded rapidly in the 1950s, and reached a turning point in October 1960 when security forces shot and killed black protesters for the first time since conquest. Violent confrontations with and attacks on police multiplied and black police were regularly confronted with the epithet 'sell out'. The promise of rights and equality, dear to the black middle classes in and out of the police, rapidly dimmed. The fact that one synonym for 'sell out' used against the police was 'Capricorn', drawn from the name of the prominent liberal and multi-racial group, the Capricorn Africa Society, spoke volumes.[22] With the break up of the Central African Federation in 1963 and the rise of the far right Rhodesian Front in Southern Rhodesia, the promised changes to racial barriers to advancement proved hollow. White anxieties required that "over-educated" black police recruits hide their qualifications if they wanted a job.[23] In the late 1960s, when Moyo joined the force, it was deeply involved in political surveillance and repression, and in the midst of taking on an expanding role in counter-insurgency hand in hand with South African police, thus bringing policing back to its military roots and introducing intelligence as an important function.[24]

I have dwelt on these shifts to underline that what being a policeman meant in terms of loyalty was a moving target, shaped by a wider politics of state-making, social status and nationalist mobilisation. Moyo's story underlines the point. Following his training as a constable, he was selected to undertake Ground Coverage duties, based at Bembesi police station some 40 kilometres east of Bulawayo. This was plainclothes intelligence work in black rural areas, places where police lacked capacity generally and white police could not work effectively. Moyo reported to his white Officer-in-Charge who in turn reported to the Special Branch. He was, he explained, tasked with 'monitoring' nationalists in a locale known for its activism. Moyo remembered tracing movements, visiting homes, reading letters, and identifying meetings held under cover of American Methodist Episcopalian church services. He vividly recalled the names and fates of prominent activists, chiefs, and guerrillas.[25]

I asked Moyo what these men thought of him. He replied that though he was "working against" them, they were his "closest friends": "I was advising them. If there was nothing wrong when they were doing their politics I couldn't just interfere…. Because there was no substance of any … crime."[26] Moyo moved around the villages on his bicycle, having "open discussions." He stressed both the extent of his knowledge of nationalist activity and the discretion he used

when reporting to his superiors: as he put it, "sometimes in intelligence you don't report almost everything."[27] The leaders "were happy to see me even though they were politicians…. But the only problem, they would say, look here, you are young, why do you join the police when you are being oppressed? … [Y]ou're always with a white patrol officer. So you seem to be like you are assisting him." In short, Moyo recounted, they told him, "You are not a policeman."[28] In Moyo's telling, such men questioned his acquiescence to racial subjugation without condemning him outright for his police work.

The give and take of this account – its friendliness even – jars with the nationalist notion of the irredeemable 'sellout' and the burgeoning number of attacks on police in this period. But Moyo's story finds an echo in nationalist memoirs in which a paternal tolerance for black civil servants' aspirations, the strivings of the educated young, is often present, thus demarcating a mutually intelligible if not wholly shared political project. Many nationalist leaders were products of the "dashed hopes, unfulfilled dreams, and thwarted ambitions" of the Federation era.[29] They chastised black civil servants for their subservience but they also believed that their professional skills would be needed to construct a new state in future, and that their subversive potential was needed in the present. As nationalists who fell foul of the state knew well, many black police and prison officers used their positions to smuggle food, letters and information to them.[30] In Moyo's narrative such instances are almost pedestrian. The detained president of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo, could note in his memoir, as if it was no contradiction at all, that his black warders in 1974 were "mostly members of ZAPU." He recounted how he had convinced a young policeman, worried of dying a sellout, to stay in uniform rather than join the guerrillas – he was more useful where he was.[31] The possibility of such relationships was, however, subject to timing and location. The fine judgements they required were infinitely more difficult to sustain in the rural war zones of the second half of the 1970s. Those in the state's pay, from dip tank attendants to chiefs, were everywhere targeted for execution by guerrillas, though such practices were always deeply contentious among nationalists precisely because of disagreement over the nature of the political order they were constructing.[32]

What did these negotiations of loyalty look like to black Rhodesian policemen? For what reasons did they come to consider their service to the state an act of disloyalty, and to what? Many of course never rejected their role; others did so early in the nationalist era, though not necessarily for reasons of party allegiance. Central to these shifts were considerations of dignity and shame, and their production in relations among black and white, as Allison Shutt has fascinatingly explored, and as is apparent in Moyo's description of his work in Mbembesi.[33] G. A. Chaza's memoir of his 22-year service as a black policeman is the only one of its kind and is revealing for its focus on the constant humiliations attendant on the coupling of power and race. A self-styled progressive, Chaza fought inequities and insults from inside the force, courting expulsion while rising in the ranks, until 1957 when he by chance joined a Sunday afternoon rally in Mbare township. As he recounted, "One outspoken African nationalist, George Nyandoro, spoke about … how the regime exploited the 'children of the soil.' He pointed out and gibed good naturedly at the poor African police uniform, pointing at some African policemen in uniform, who were on duty at the rally. He drew an uproarious applause when he referred to the pattees [sic] as '*mabandaji*'

(bandages)…. I decided there and then to resign." Chaza's decision astounded his friends and family. He found he "could not tell them that it was what they referred to as the responsible, high ranking post of African station sergeant that I abhorred because it was derogatory to the African dignity."[34]

For Moyo, the issues that so exercised Chaza remained salient 15 years later, specifically in terms of the humiliations of racially based inequality in the service. In 1973, when he was promoted to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Moyo recounted, "we had a lot of misunderstandings." He described one running battle, "where [white] patrol officers were trying to give us instructions that we should clean vehicles. Yet, we were having our cycles. We said, OK, gentlemen, you are driving this vehicle, clean it yourself. I'll clean my bicycle…. I was refusing…."[35] Like Chaza, Moyo described how he constantly challenged white authority, negotiating the terms of his service, and so also the content of his loyalty. His stories of antagonism were tempered by an emphasis on his "maturation" as a policeman during his stint in the CID. Based in Bulawayo, he worked as a plainclothes detective investigating serious crime such as homicide, store-breaking and drugs offences throughout the Matabeleland region. He described this as an education in the skills required for criminal investigation, the production of evidence, and the shepherding of cases through the courts. Moyo recounted with pride his unit's successes.[36] For Moyo, this was what was valuable about being a policeman, and it inspired his allegiance to the Rhodesian state, the wages of race notwithstanding. This moment proved, however, a brief interlude before the spread of war transformed the state's demands on Moyo, and the valence of his loyalties.

In 1975, just a few years after his move to the CID, and as the war rapidly escalated around him, Moyo was attached to that most political of police, the Special Branch. This marked a dramatic change in the sense that Moyo was sent into war zones to do intelligence work and to accompany convoys, at times with military details, in the ZANLA operational areas of Masvingo in southern Zimbabwe. In another sense, it was a return to his first years of service. As Moyo recounted: "You might find that some of the [white] patrol officers or section officers didn't have the background of understanding political issues…. Because I had done Ground Coverage it was easy for me."[37] Moyo described the powers of the Special Branch with some awe, and drew a contrast to both of the guerrilla armies they confronted. In his account, the guerrillas' capacity for mobility, communication, and investigation was inferior. He held that ZANLA guerrillas in Masvingo attacked the less effective but more vulnerable arms of the security forces such as the District Assistants, a hastily trained paramilitary force, and that they killed people identified as sellouts in gruesome fashion, the results of which Moyo described in detail. Moyo's disparaging views of ZANLA echo those of ZAPU cadres very widely and should be seen in a partisan light, but he was also using his depiction of ZANLA to make a point about the conditions necessary for the proper exercise of power: Moyo maintained that the cause of the guerrillas was just, but that they lacked the institutions needed to legitimate their use of violence.[38]

Moyo would soon come to the same judgement regarding the Rhodesian state, but absent the guerrillas' just cause. In Moyo's account, an ultimately intolerable contradiction developed between his understanding of himself as a policeman and the practices of the Special Branch and its military allies in the

war zones of the mid-1970s. He explained that investigations were not being carried out in a "proper manner": "you know when you do interrogation you don't have to brutalise somebody. You use persuasive methods. [Not] you know start killing, beating up a person until you injure him and break his ribs and so forth and so forth."[39] The incident that caused Moyo to leave his life as a policeman occurred on a return helicopter flight after escorting a convoy. He recalled:

> I was with about one pilot and about two SAS. So there was a village … we were looking down and these guys decided to hover, then they landed. Immediately they disembarked. They ran straight towards this village where we could see, when we were up there, that there was an old lady and an old man. I think they were just preparing their breakfast or warming their water to bath. And they started beating those two elderly people. And I said, you guys, why do you beat innocent people? … That's wrong.

It was also, in Moyo's view, a breach of protocol: "I'm in charge of intelligence…. They are not supposed to do anything unless we give them instructions."[40] The soldiers disregarded Moyo's objections, telling him, "if you see us beating these blacks you must join in." He refused.[41]

Subsequently, Moyo was recalled to police headquarters. In his narrative, this is the dramatic moment in which he re-evaluated his loyalties: "On my way I thought twice about my commitment to the Smith regime…. When I got to Bulawayo Central I just collected some forms and made an application to resign." The white Special Branch officers tore up the forms. But Moyo had made up his mind, telling his superiors: "What I've experienced in the operations is beating elderly people for no apparent reasons…. We are not police. They started saying, no you want to be a terrorist."[42] Moyo was, he says, treated as a defector. He explained: "instead of the officers, the white officers, trying to reason with me they became aggressive…. So I was put under surveillance, close surveillance, up until I escaped."[43] In the face of this treatment, Moyo recounted how he had sought to invoke an ideal of citizenship to go along with his view of policing. When his police colleagues encountered him on the Botswana border and accused him of planning to cross, he told them, "that's none of your business. I am a law abiding citizen."[44] But his departure was in an important sense owed to the demise of the possibility of law. Moyo maintained that the police should be bound by "regulations," "instruments," "rules" – that is what made them "the state" – but Rhodesian policing had come to actively require "abusing" the law. Under these circumstances, Moyo drew a stark conclusion: "If I am a bandit then I am not a policeman."[45]

For the Rhodesian Front, the substance of loyalty had become dangerously narrowed, leaving space outside the state not for the law-abiding citizen but for the terrorist, and space within it not for the law-enforcing civil servant, racially subjugated or not, but for the 'bandit'. In Moyo's account, it was the Rhodesian police who had betrayed him by undermining the professional ideal of the policeman: he was no longer, in his view, a "real" policeman – so he left "to go and fight for my country." These loyalties were thus formed and threatened by shifting political orders, and they dramatically remade the choices

of a black policeman in wartime Rhodesia. In this drama, Moyo's choices were neither made nor unmade by a notion of 'collaboration'. They were forged by changing claims to authority and institutional practices, and the social standing and personal aspirations such shifts made or thwarted, an altogether more complex terrain that would go on to shape his understanding of 'the struggle'.

The ZAPU Intelligence Officer

If the idea of collaboration cannot easily explain Zephaniah Moyo's career as a policeman, its binary simplifications had nonetheless come to pervade the wartime politics of loyalty. "Escaping" the Special Branch made a dangerous enemy of the Rhodesian state but did not create allies in ZAPU in exile. Moyo knew that he was "coming from an enemy side," that individuals identified as having worked for the state in far more benign roles than his were treated as sellouts.[46] As he crossed the Botswana border in 1976 he was, he said, keenly aware that he did so as a traitor in the eyes of all sides of the struggle, and that he would need to challenge the making of that category, and so the political order that underlay it, to survive.

This was a tall order. I asked Moyo if there were any black police other than himself whose loyalty to ZAPU had been accepted in the camps in Zambia. He could think of just one, an officer who had been based near the Botswana border: "There's one guy who left, he opened the police cells and took all the political prisoners into a Land Rover and took all these police guns and drove straight to Shashi [river], towards Botswana. He left the vehicle stuck in the sand and then crossed with the political leadership." The daring escape, the weapons, and the testimony of the ZAPU men in his company had established his credentials.[47] Moyo had no such calling cards. On his arrival in Botswana, he recounted, "I surrendered myself to the Botswana police. Immediately I was detained, blindfolded the whole night. The following day, senior guerrillas who were present in Botswana, they came to harass me. They beat me. I said, you guys, I … actually joined the struggle before you joined. I want to go and fight for my country." He told them he was Special Branch and that he had valuable intelligence. After a few days he was taken, at the behest of Dumiso Dabengwa, the head of ZAPU's intelligence wing, to Zambia, a choice that was far from universally popular. At Nampundwe transit camp, Moyo recalled, the "guerrillas wanted to kill me;" they "used to boo at me and do all sorts of things."[48]

Moyo was finally ferried to a meeting with Dabengwa and other senior intelligence cadres in Lusaka. Moyo remembered, "We discussed quite a lot. And then they said, OK, we'd like to give you the whole day. Give us a write up of the enemy strength … and the enemy structure…. Then I actually took my time and made the structures, police, army, yah, everything." One measure of Moyo was to be made in light of his delivery of intelligence. He considered his description of the workings of the most elite of Rhodesia's counter-insurgency units – the Selous Scouts – as particularly valuable. The Scouts made use of captured guerrillas who had been, in that euphemistic phrase, 'turned', i.e. coerced into serving the enemy side, a tactic used throughout the region and more widely.[49] In describing this unit, Moyo was not only navigating the sensitive question of his own loyalties but also that of guerrillas generally, a move that, he said, incurred the enmity of ZAPU's military commanders who did not want to countenance the possibility of 'turning' and the unstable nature of loyalty it

implied.[50] This was dangerous territory of one kind. Moyo recounted how he entered dangerous territory of another, more intimate, kind by choosing to reveal what he knew of Dabengwa himself. As he explained, "I had to indicate that you, Dabengwa, I knew before I came here. I knew that you were born, you had relatives in Ntabazinduna, your father had a farm in Gwatemba, you had a house in Mpopoma. We used to open even your letters…. [H]e had a sister called Zodwa in the UK. So I didn't want to … hide because one day he was going to know."[51]

Moyo considered that he had made a calculated gamble, hoping that his account would underline his worth to ZAPU rather than condemn him for his history of complicity. He was vindicated – in part: his report convinced Dabengwa of his utility, but not of his loyalty. Dabengwa did not, however, believe Moyo to be "fixed" in a "political position," as did the guerrillas who had condemned him in Botswana and Nampundwe.[52] He felt, Moyo believed, "that I should go and further my studies in the Soviet Union…, thinking that I have to get an ideology so that I can be … a better policeman. Otherwise I'm still Rhodesian."[53] Moyo adopted a new name, as all guerrillas did, 'Jaconiah' and also 'Zulu' (joined as 'Jaconiah Zulu' on the British passport he was issued to attend the negotiations that would end the war), and spent nine months in the Soviet Union in 1977. Moyo recounted how his new identity had involved embracing a version of socialism, which he described as communal and cooperative production and a state devoted to ensuring an egalitarian and meritocratic society. This was distinctly un-Rhodesian, though not, in Moyo's view, un-African. Moyo did not, however, consider his Soviet training as starkly different to what he already understood as intelligence work: while he attained new skills and technical knowledge, he held that Soviet military intelligence was essentially "the same" as its Rhodesian and British counterparts.[54] His notion of "proper policing" and his commitment to it remained firmly intact.

Moyo's return to Zambia at the end of 1977 coincided with the establishment of an overarching intelligence unit, the National Security Organisation or NSO, with Dabengwa at its head. It was in this institution that Moyo said he was able to find a home for his ideas about 'the state' and policing. The NSO's remit was to run from the camps in Zambia to the war zones in Rhodesia. Moyo described his role: "I became director of security responsible for all the camps and all the personnel trained in police and customs, immigration, border guarding. And my sole responsibility was to take full charge of all detention pits." The 'pits' were where the movement's prisoners were held, until then under the aegis of Military Intelligence, a hierarchy distinct from and often in tension with the NSO.[55] This latter task was to place him at the heart of a violently contentious politics of loyalty that reflected deep divisions over the construction of political order.

The use of detention pits – dank, deep holes of varying sizes – as a means of punishment, notably of those accused of treachery, was common to all southern African liberation movements in exile. The pits were born of the challenges to making political order posed by exile generally and, specifically, by the institution of the 'camp', in which guerrillas, refugees and others lived for years.[56] These conditions produced a particularly charged version of the instability Thiranagama and Kelly associate with a proliferation of accusations of treason. Camps were subject to the demands and strictures of host states as well

as the states-in-the-making of the liberation movements. They were peopled by guerrillas, refugees, and politicians, organized in parallel hierarchies, and divided by social, ideological and other differences. These unstable orders were riven by accusations of abuses of power from repression to corruption, and they were constantly under mortal threat, sometimes imagined but also real, including from infiltration by spies. In these circumstances, the disciplinary effects of accusations of disloyalty took on an exaggerated role, often hand in hand with the rise of powerful intelligence departments.[57] Like other movements, ZAPU had suffered devastating instances of large-scale mutiny as well as a profusion of everyday accusation.[58] When Moyo arrived in the camps, ZAPU's presence in Zambia had expanded to many thousands of guerrillas and refugees, creating huge logistical and institutional pressures, while the recent arrival of a powerful group of senior ZAPU politicians, released from a decade in Rhodesian detention at the end of 1974, had created new frictions among military and political leaders.[59] The NSO was in part intended to help mediate these and other tensions, as well as to meet the new demands of this vast military movement.[60] It was thus a central player in the battles over the purposes and means of struggle.

When Moyo was given charge of the detention pits, the biggest was located at Mboroma, a site that had been used to hold a long sequence of liberation movement dissenters. Among them were ZAPU's mutineers of the early 1970s, some 1,300 members of ZANU held following the assassination of ZANU President Herbert Chitepo in 1975, and over 1,000 SWAPO fighters charged with mutiny in mid-1976. In 1978, Mboroma held between five and six hundred ZAPU prisoners.[61] Moyo recounted how he reviewed what paperwork existed and concluded that there was no way to verify the guilt of Mboroma's inmates to his satisfaction. This was owed, he argued, both to the nature of the camp and to the nature of intelligence. Accusations of treachery, Moyo explained, might arise from petty acts such as selling a blanket to Zambian civilians, personal slights or conflict over women. They might stem from criticizing a senior commander or tensions between (and within) intelligence, military and political hierarchies. They could come from being from the 'wrong' region or having ties to the 'wrong' political leader, being too educated, an admission of having worked for the Rhodesian state in any role, or jealousies and suspicions caused by differences among camps, training and access to equipment and weaponry.[62] Moyo described a particular problem that developed when groups of men recruited for mine work on the South African Rand by the labour agency popularly known as 'Wenela' began to arrive.[63] The men used Wenela to get to South Africa and from there made their way to Botswana and on to Zambia. In Zambia, individuals might face an accusation of disloyalty during screening or in the camps owing to "personal differences" such as a dispute over a girlfriend, a family feud, "even extending from their relatives." And then, Moyo recounted, "When they see the guy in Zambia, they will say this one was a Selous Scout. Then that person would be picked up, he'd be beaten up, to pieces. He will end up actually implicating the whole group which … he came through with from Wenela. That's why the groups [being detained] were going up, up, up, up."[64]

These conditions led to widespread accusations of working for the enemy based on scant evidence. As Moyo put it somewhat delicately, "our intelligence at that time was not as highly sophisticated as one would expect." If one was

accused of being an "enemy agent," he explained, "it was very difficult to prove. One, there was no documentary proof, no equipment which at least the guerrillas or the guys in intelligence, whichever, had actually seized from that guy. And no surveillance … to make sure that person is in contact with the enemy agents in Zimbabwe."[65] Moyo was "fresh from home." He knew about agents, he said, "but none of those people I found in those detention camps [were agents]….. [T]here really was no evidence. Some of the guys who were detained, some of them you couldn't believe their stories."[66] He recounted how he had illustrated the problem to Dabengwa through a personal example:

> I picked on one case where someone had actually implicated me, that I was one of the sellouts, or an informer, and he was supposed to report to me and I report to the regime…. [A]nd I took that file and I said to Dabengwa, are you trying me? This is what I've been telling you. I know this young man, that he was in the RAR in Rhodesia and I'm aware that he escaped but I found him here. So that means a lot of people, they are being brutalized for no apparent reason…. [T]here was a lot of suspicion especially in the camps. You couldn't even greet your own close friend because the day when that fellow was going to be picked, you are going to be picked as well.[67]

For Moyo, the "unbelievable stories" that were extracted by Military Intelligence interrogators served to constitute an illegitimate political order that echoed the lawless violence of the Rhodesian state.[68] Moyo held that he objected to the entire system of jurisprudence and punishment: from the treatment of everything from petty crime to enemy action as traitorous, to the use of coerced confessions as evidence, to the form of punishment, that is the permanent relegation of prisoners to damp, dark, unventilated pits. Moyo recounted: "I said to Dabengwa, it's better we actually kill these people because it is inhuman the way they are living. The way they were kept underground…. If the struggle continues for another 5, 10 years are they going to remain in the pits?"[69] Moyo said he was given the go ahead to screen Mboroma's inmates, and that he rapidly moved the majority out of the pits and let some take part in the defence of the camp.[70] Moyo held that he had the backing of the NSO in this, but that not everyone was pleased, notably those in the military who were invested in the unreformed Mboroma regime. As Moyo recounted, "some of the ZIPRA guys … said, look at this policeman, Smith regime police, he's now taking the camp, and he's now controlling his sellouts."[71] According to Moyo, rumours spread among guerrillas that he was "creating a crack force in Mboroma to kill the commanders." Attempts were made on his life.[72]

The reforms Moyo described at Mboroma can be cast as part of a bigger project intended to introduce a different kind of statecraft and military strategy to ZAPU, and which bore directly on a jurisprudence of loyalty. This project's origins are complex and little explored. The ZAPU political detainees who had arrived in the second half of the 1970s had brought a commitment to an idea of a bureaucratic state, one they had performed in their near decade-long detention in Rhodesia, and which dated to the aspirations of the 1950s.[73] In the last years of the war, ZAPU's military strategy set out to hold territory inside Zimbabwe with conventional forces and to construct civilian administration therein. A

commitment to an idea of 'professionalism' played a powerful role in the imagination of this nascent state, expressed as an aspiration to rule-bound, expert authority.[74] The NSO was important in making these policies, and its own make up reflected such ambitions. Its cadres had a minimum of O-level education: they needed to have a certain "sophistication" to be able to carry out analysis, complete paperwork, and use technical equipment, all in aid of creating an institution "like a state," as Dabengwa put it.[75] Under Moyo's remit, men were trained in Yugoslavia as customs and immigration officials and in the Soviet Union as border guards. In Zambia, some 600 NSO cadres attended Lilayi police college. Moyo emphasized, proudly and proprietorially: "I trained them properly, British style of training, in Lilayi in Zambia and sent them on specialisations. Some of them did forensic science and fingerprinting as experts and so forth and so forth, criminal investigation and the writing of dockets, that real understanding of government, not half-baked."[76]

In Moyo's narrative, ZAPU was building a "proper state" that was incompatible with the political order represented by Mboroma. Under this new regime, punishments involving labour were to be instituted for petty crime; where serious crimes were alleged but could not be proved, rehabilitation through political education was to be prescribed. In this political dispensation, sellouts need not be violently excluded: they could be remade as citizens of the nation-to-be, their loyalty redirected by and to ideas and an institution of rules, a possibility that had saved Moyo himself from condemnation when he crossed the border from Rhodesia.[77] None of this, it should be stressed, was anywhere near fully implemented before the end of the war. Moyo in fact held that ZAPU was nearly "destroyed" by the entrenchment of the logic of sellout accusations. As in other liberation movements, the power of such accusations in the context of camp life proved highly resistant to remedy.

If this period offered a set of possibilities for state-building that might create new kinds of political relations, rooted in diverse histories and experiences including those of the bureaucratic Rhodesian state and Soviet training, it also underlined the enduring instability of these projects, always under challenge and subject to being read as, in their very genealogy, sources of treachery. Thus Moyo's narrative sat comfortably amidst those elements within the liberation movement that emphasised education and expertise, bureaucracy and professionalism. For others, he was irredeemably a traitor, a sellout in charge of the sellouts of Mboroma, men rightly condemned by their confessions and their pasts. Such disparate ideas about loyalty and political order were held in tension within ZAPU.

The Zimbabwean Traitor

In 1980, the unresolved claims to authority within and between liberation movements shaped Zimbabwe's transition to majority rule. The loser in the 1980 elections, ZAPU joined government as a junior partner to ZANU(PF), a position that rapidly proved precarious. That it did so is unsurprising: as Jim Brennan notes, "there was no operative concept of a 'loyal opposition' in most African political systems" of the 1960s and 1970s: power was conceived of as indivisible; political opponents were refused a public stage.[78] As we have seen, amongst liberation movements the intolerance of alternative loyalties was additionally formed by histories of armed struggle and exile. Zimbabwe's politics was further

complicated by the three-sided nature of the conflict. ZANU(PF)'s concerns rapidly focused on ZAPU rather than their shared Rhodesian enemy. The party-state of white minority rule could not claim to represent the nation; its ongoing attacks and plots, alongside those of South Africa, posed security threats but lacked a political base. ZANU(PF) would in fact find this former enemy useful in enforcing its exclusive claims. ZAPU, in contrast, offered a powerful alternative claim to the nation alongside a lengthy history of violent clashes with ZANU(PF). Its existence was anathema to ZANU(PF)'s vision of the nation in the 1980s, as it had long been.[79]

For actors on all sides, the cease-fire of December 1979 did not usher in peace. During the cease-fire and in subsequent months, guerrillas loyal to ZAPU and ZANU were hastily grouped in remote Assembly Points (APs) but remained vulnerable to attack by the Rhodesian Security Forces.[80] Distrust was widespread and guerrillas proved difficult to control. All sides made contingency plans for renewed fighting, including hiding weapons. At first, both guerrilla armies were chastised for breaking the terms of the cease-fire and electioneering, but soon after winning the March 1980 elections, the new ZANU(PF) government focused on what it portrayed as ZAPU's failure to recognise its "sovereignty."[81] ZAPU was cast as an enemy within and its guerrillas as "dissidents." In this context, guerrillas from the two armies clashed in major battles in the townships of Bulawayo and Harare and fought within the newly made battalions of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). Some ZIPRA guerrillas took up arms again, a small group of whom would go on to accept the support of South Africa. Many more simply fled.

In February 1982, ZANU(PF) announced that stores of arms had been found on ZAPU properties and around APs. Joshua Nkomo and most other ZAPU ministers were sacked. Purges of ZIPRA guerrillas occurred in the ZNA and thousands deserted. In March, ZIPRA's most senior commanders were arrested on charges of treason, crippling their ability, along with that of ZAPU's political leadership, to control or protect their followers. Large-scale detention camps were established in the western regions that had voted for ZAPU and, in January 1983, the notoriously partisan 5th Brigade of the ZNA was unleashed. Thousands of civilians were killed and many more were detained and tortured. ZAPU supporters were forced to sing songs and chant slogans evincing their loyalty to ZANU(PF) in a parody of the party's wartime mobilization efforts. Violence declined after a highly punitive period before and after the 1985 elections, but only ended following the political agreement of the Unity Accord of December 1987, under which ZAPU was subsumed into ZANU(PF) and ceased to exist. ZANU(PF)'s goal of near nation-wide acquiescence to its rule was achieved, if only briefly.[82]

It is not my intention here to revisit the politics of this period as a whole. Moyo's narrative highlights just a part of it, but in so doing it casts a light on the power of histories of loyalty and betrayal to shape the making of a new political order. In this, his story has echoes of the convoluted life of Glory Sedibe, both ANC guerrilla and 'Askari' – a 'turned' fighter – in the service of the Apartheid state. Jacob Dlamini chronicles the complexities of this side-switching, arguing that it cannot be understood in the terms of the post-independence binaries of hero and traitor, victim and perpetrator.[83] In Moyo's case, two factors were crucial to his post-independence story: his background in the Rhodesian police

and his involvement in ZAPU's war-time transnational alliances. Moyo recounted how he had remained in Zambia, monitoring the outcome of the ceasefire, until April 1980, and then come in to an AP from where he was called to Harare by his NSO chief, Dumiso Dabengwa. Moyo described this as a chaotic time: "It was ZIPRA versus ZANLA, all over the place there were skirmishes. They would attack our offices, our leaders."[84] Moyo was almost immediately arrested by Detective Inspector Bob Skonken, a white former member of the Rhodesian Special Branch: "They immediately said we're looking for you. It's nice of you, you brought yourself here [to Harare]." Skonken, Moyo explained, "knew me when I was in Special Branch. He had my file. He was very hostile because of that. He said they had problems after I left the country with ZIPRA and he blamed me."[85] For Moyo, this was a reckoning with an unchanged state, intent on punishing an earlier betrayal. He was eventually imprisoned with the most senior group of ZAPU military commanders, including Dabengwa, in Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison.[86]

These Rhodesian echoes were interwoven with the wider history of Rhodesia's decades long collaboration in counterinsurgency operations with South Africa, and ZAPU's equally longstanding alliance with the ANC and the USSR. These histories were linked: it was ZAPU's joint military operations with the ANC in Rhodesia in the late 1960s that brought South African police into Rhodesia in their thousands.[87] After 1980, South Africa sought to prevent an ANC foothold, facilitated by ZAPU, in its suddenly black-ruled neighbour. One way in which it did so was by aiding in the implication of ZAPU in treasonous activities. Key in making the case against ZAPU's senior commanders were former white members of the Rhodesian Special Branch who, though ostensibly working for the ZANU(PF) government, had transferred their loyalty to South Africa.[88] South Africa also provided support to a group of ZIPRA guerrillas, dubbed Super ZAPU. For its part, ZANU(PF) had little interest in an ANC or a Soviet alliance in the early 1980s, considering them compromised by their ZAPU links.[89] In this muddied context, ZANU(PF) was able to portray its violence against ZAPU to the wider world as a battle against South African destabilization, while it at the same time cooperated with South Africa to prevent ZAPU support of the ANC in Zimbabwe.[90] For Moyo, these disconcerting and secretive alliances meant that it was not only his Rhodesian background that played into the charges against him: he was also accused of spying for the USSR. Moreover, for him (and others) accusations related to the caching of arms were complicated by the fact that some of the arms had been intended for ANC military operations.[91]

These histories of transnational entanglements and loyalties were significant in shaping the violence of the 1980s but so too, in Moyo's narrative, were war-time legacies specific to ZANU(PF) and ZAPU. In common with many ZAPU cadres, Moyo maintained that he had fully expected ZANU(PF) to build a partisan political order, rather than upholding the unity of the Patriotic Front, the banner under which ZANU and ZAPU had negotiated independence. He narrated the long history of violent confrontations that had resulted from attempts to unite the two sides in earlier years, and pointed to the contrasting behaviour of ZANU(PF) and ZAPU in 1980. In his telling, ZAPU, despite its electoral defeat and the growing fears of many of its military leaders, had maintained its commitment to the peace. He recounted how Joshua Nkomo had deployed the ZIPRA command to arrest and imprison some 400 rebellious ZIPRA

cadres in June 1980, despite their own misgivings about ZANU(PF) intentions.[92] It was not just ZAPU cadres that drew this conclusion: the judge in the treason trial of ZAPU's senior commanders praised them for their efforts to contain, not foment, division and violence. He dismissed the charges, only for the men to be immediately re-detained.[93]

In Moyo's narrative, ZANU(PF)'s violence in power was rooted in its prosecution of the guerrilla war, and specifically its failure to construct a "proper state" able to control and legitimate the use of violence, a view that was echoed widely among Moyo's ZAPU comrades. ZANU in the 1970s, Moyo held, had "no structures. They just force people…, just butcher people."[94] This was, for Moyo, a cautionary tale about the importance of institution-building, which underlined the importance in his own narrative of the vision of political order propounded by the NSO in Zambia, and rooted for him in his early service to the Rhodesian state. These were simplifying stories: Moyo's vision of political order had not been realized in ZAPU, and there had been similar contestations over political order in ZANU in the 1970s. Moreover, ZANU(PF) would prove fully able to build on the powerful bureaucracy it had inherited from Rhodesia in the 1980s, turning it to the work of delivering development to Zimbabwe's black majority, though only belatedly in Matabeleland. That it did so alongside the use of unrestrained partisan violence against ZAPU was not a contradiction but an illustration of the manifold inheritances of the liberation struggle that shaped both movements.

Moyo's views on ZANU(PF) did not stop him from following Joshua Nkomo into the party under the Unity Accord, along with the bulk of ZAPU members. It did, however, mean his loyalty to ZANU(PF) lacked a foundation in the ideas about political order that had for decades shaped Moyo's politics. He remained, in his words, "ZAPU in heart," and his allegiance to ZANU(PF) did not stand the test of time. In the upheavals of the post-2000 period, Moyo joined a relaunched ZAPU, led by his one-time commander, Dumiso Dabengwa, while the bulk of ZAPU's former heartland embraced the newly formed Movement for Democratic Change, at least for a time.

Conclusion

Zephaniah Moyo's life story situates the forging of loyalties in a remarkable narrative of youthful nationalism, Rhodesian policing, Soviet training, and the precarious state-making projects of the camps embodied in his service to the NSO. This was not a journey in which Moyo passed sequentially from one identity and allegiance to another: in his telling, past loyalties could not be shed. Instead, they disrupted the present again and again. They did so in part because as political regimes were removed and remade the slate was not wiped clean – past loyalties remained potent even when they had been rejected, or pertained to defunct political orders – and in part because loyalty was much more than a question of choosing sides once and for all. Moyo's story of his allegiances rooted them in a belief in the merits of a particular political order, exemplified by a rule-bound institution, the "proper state," as he imagined it in his years as a policeman. This idea, and the personal aspirations it carried with it, served as the foundation to Moyo's political fealties and fears throughout his life. In his account, it propelled him to make choices that placed him in extraordinary peril, from "escaping" the Rhodesian police to transforming the pits of Mboroma. In

the 1980s, the layered histories of Moyo's loyalties denied him the opportunity to serve the new nation: in his telling, he was rendered a citizen manqué, still in search of an institution based in "reason," keenly aware of what might have been. He became a teller of cautionary tales, echoed among his ZAPU fellows.[95]

The story of Zephaniah Moyo underlines the perennial political productivity of accusations of treachery but locates the disruptive force of such accusations not in complicity or collaboration but in the competing institutions and ideas of settler-ruled Rhodesia, ZAPU's Zambian camps and independent Zimbabwe. Some of the political projects produced in these spaces were ephemeral but others ran deep, rooted in longstanding ideas about liberation and legitimate rule. Allegiances to such projects had a powerful capacity to disrupt claims to power and delineated a "what might have been" that retained a ready audience amongst a community steeped in an alternative historical narrative to that offered by ZANU(PF)'s heroic nationalism. These processes of story-making crossed the boundaries of resistance and rule, shaping the individual life of Zephaniah Moyo and the making of the Zimbabwean polity.

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NOTES

[1] A fascinating, deeply rooted, study in this vein is Giblin's *A History of the Excluded*.
[2] In a large literature, see especially Melber, *Limits to Liberation* and Southall, *Liberation Movements in Power*.
[3] Thiranagama and Kelly, "Introduction: Specters of Treason," 1-23.
[4] A point made by Rich Dorman, "Post-liberation politics in Africa," 1095 and *passim*.
[5] For in depth southern African studies, see Williams, *National Liberation*; White, *The Assassination*, chapter 2; Mazarire, "Discipline and Punishment;" and Dlamini, *Askari*. More broadly, see Sapire and Saunders, *Southern African Liberation Struggles.* For a reminder of how different such contests are in other regions, compare to Branch, "The Enemy within," on Mau Mau.
[6] See Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 19 and *passim*, in which he makes a plea for political history attuned to the "historical context in which concepts emerged, the debates out of which they came, the ways they were deflected and appropriated."
[7] The disputed meanings of liberation struggles are vividly inscribed in a range of Zimbabwean political memoirs, in all of which betrayal is writ large. See Nkomo, *Nkomo*; Nyagumbo, *With the*

People; Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*; Tekere, *A Lifetime of Struggle*; Todd, *Through the Darkness*; Mhanda, *Dzino*; and Smith, *The Great Betrayal*.

[8] The stories that individuals tell about the past are inevitably shaped by the dominant narratives of the present, but they may also find the capacity to tell alternative stories through newly made or alternative political and cultural communities. See discussion in Summerfield, "Culture and Composure." Compare to the ethnographic work on memory of Werbner, "Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun," and Giblin's critical engagement with Subaltern Studies in *A History of the Excluded*, 4-12.

[9] ZAPU is the Zimbabwe African People's Union. It succeeded a sequence of banned parties. Its armed wing was the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). ZANU is the Zimbabwe African National Union. It broke away from ZAPU in 1963 and won the elections of 1980 as ZANU(PF), the PF standing for Patriotic Front, the name of its brief alliance with ZAPU. Its armed wing was the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA).

[10] This is a pervasive feature of the politics of memory in areas dominated by ZAPU after 1980. See Alexander et al, *Violence and Memory*, chapter 11. Compare to Williams on Namibia, *National Liberation*, chapter 7.

[11] This was a collaborative research project: Alexander et al, *Violence and Memory*.

[12] White and Larmer, "Introduction: Mobile Soldiers," 1274.

[13] McCracken, "Coercion and Control."

[14] Moyd, *Violent Intermediaries*, 1-22.

[15] On evictions from this area, see Ranger, *Voices from the Rocks*.

[16] Interview, Moyo, Bulawayo, 2 October 2008. All interviews are by the author and were undertaken in English, unless otherwise noted.

[17] Interview, Moyo, 2008.

[18] Interview, Moyo, Bulawayo, 19 August 2015. Most post-World War II white recruits to the Rhodesian police were from Britain while many of the black police instructors were products of the Central African Federation. See Stapleton, *African Police*, 5, 101.

[19] See Stapleton, *African Police*, 3-4; Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, chapters 2 and 3.

[20] Stapleton, *African Police*, 78-79, and see chapter 6 on the history of segregation and hierarchy. On education levels among South African police in this period, see Goodhew, "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea," 31-34.

[21] See Stapleton, *African Police*, chapter 1, on motivations for joining and staying in the police, and chapter 3 on education and mobility.

[22] See West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class*, chapters 7 and 8; Stapleton, *African Police*, 53-58.

[23] See detailed discussions in Stapleton, *African Police*, chapters 4 and 6.

[24] See Flower, *Serving Secretly*.

[25] Interview, Moyo, 2008.

[26] Interview, Moyo, 2015.

[27] Interview, Moyo, 2008.

[28] Interview, Moyo, 2015; also Moyo, 2008.

[29] West, *The Rise of An African Middle Class*, 201 and chapter 7.

[30] See discussion in Alexander, "Political Prisoners' Memoirs," 403-406, and examples in Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, 76 and *passim*.

[31] Nkomo, *Nkomo*, 144, 141-142.

[32] See Alexander et al., *Violence and Memory*, 166-179.

[33] See Shutt, *Manners Make a Nation*.

[34] Chaza, *Bhurakuwacha*, 125. Also see Stapleton, *African Police*, chapter 6; Shutt, *Manners Make a Nation*, 173.

[35] Interview, Moyo, 2015.

[36] Interview, Moyo, 2008.

[37] Interview, Moyo, 2015; Moyo, 2008.

[38] Interview, Moyo, 2008.

[39] Interview, Moyo, 2015.

[40] Interview, Moyo, 2008.

[41] Interview, Moyo, 2015.

[42] Interview, Moyo, 2008.

[43] Interview, Moyo, 2015.

[44] Interview, Moyo, 2008.

[45] Interview, Moyo, 2015.
[46] Interview, Moyo, 2008.
[47] Interview, Moyo, 2015.
[48] Interview, Moyo, 2008.
[49] For the Rhodesian mythology, see Reid-Daly, *Pamwe Chete*. On 'turned' guerrillas more widely, see Ellis, "The Historical Significance," 267-269.
[50] Interview, Moyo, 2008.
[51] Interview, Moyo, 2015.
[52] See White, *The Assassination*, 32 and *passim*.
[53] Interview, Moyo, 2015. Also Moyo, 2008.
[54] Interview (with JoAnn McGregor), Moyo, Bulawayo, 9 December 2014. On the Soviet experience of ZAPU cadres, see Alexander and McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR."
[55] Interview, Moyo, 2008.
[56] See Williams, *National Liberation.*
[57] A growing literature has begun to explore these issues. See Ellis, "Mbokodo;" Mazarire, "Discipline and Punishment;" White, *The Assassination*; Macmillan, *The Lusaka Years*; and Trewhela, *Inside Quatro*.
[58] The divisions in ZAPU that followed the joint military operations with the ANC in 1967/68 had paralysed ZAPU's war efforts into the early 1970s, with huge strategic costs. See Dabengwa, "ZIPRA," 27-32. On guerrilla views of the ZAPU camps, see Alexander and McGregor, "War Stories," 87-92.
[59] A revealing insider account of this period is Ndlovu, "Some Critical Observations." Also see Interview by Mary Ndlovu with Mtshana Ncube, 23 November 2011, South African History Archive, B11, available at http://www.saha.org.za/zapu/transcript_of_interview_with_mtshana_ncube_2.htm, retrieved 8 July 2016; Interview with NSO officer Zephaniah Nkomo, Bulawayo, 9 April 2012; Brickhill, "Daring to Storm."
[60] Interview, Dumiso Dabengwa, Bulawayo, 10 September 2013. Very little has been written about the NSO. See Brickhill, "Daring to Storm," 54-55 and *passim*. There are parallels with ZANU's creation of, in effect, a civilian intelligence hierarchy allied to the President in 1977, alongside military intelligence. Mazarire, "Discipline and Punishment," 590.
[61] Interview, Moyo, 2008. On Mboroma's past, see SAHA, *ZAPU,* 79; Williams, *National Liberation*, 118-120; Macmillan, *The Lusaka Years*, 115, 307, fn 8; Martin and Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, chapters 9 and 10.
[62] Interview, Moyo, 2008.
[63] Wenela is the South African Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, which recruited mine workers throughout the region. Brickhill, "Daring to Storm," 66, suggests that 10% of ZIPRA recruits came via South Africa, the vast majority in the last years of the war.
[64] Interview, Moyo, 2008.
[65] Interview, Moyo, 2008; Moyo, Bulawayo, 16 September 2013.
[66] Interview, Moyo, 2008; 2015.
[67] Interview, Moyo, 2015.
[68] Interview, Moyo, 2013; 2015. All liberation movements in exile used coerced confessions as evidence of treason (as did both host and enemy governments). The content of the confession need not be convincing. See Hughes on the ANC, *The Lusaka Years*, chapter 10. In the SWAPO pits in Angola confessions were recorded on video and then circulated in Namibia. See Trewhela, "A Namibian Horror," 140-158, and Williams, *National Liberation*, chapter 5. Compare to Wedeen's discussion of "enforced confabulations" in "Acting 'As if'," 514, 516.
[69] Interview, Moyo, 2015.
[70] Interviews, Moyo, 2008; Dabengwa, 2013.
[71] Interview, Moyo, 2015.
[72] Interview, Moyo, 2008.
[73] See Alexander, "Nationalism and Self-government," 556-566. The variable nature of politics across locations in the liberation struggle (camps, prisons, battlefields, townships) was echoed in other movements. On the ANC, see e. g. Buntman, *Robben Island*, and Suttner, "Culture(s) of the African National Congress."
[74] See Dabengwa's views in Sellstrom, *Liberation in Southern Africa*, 212; Dabengwa, "ZIPRA;" and Brickhill, "Daring to Storm." Also see Alexander and McGregor, "War Stories."

[75] Interview, Dabengwa, 2013.
[76] Interview, Moyo, 2008. Zephaniah Nkomo (interview, 2012) vividly remembered training at Lilayi, including accompanying Zambian police on investigations.
[77] Interviews, Dabengwa, 2013; Nkomo, 2012. Reforms were also mooted in ZANU: see Mazarire, "Discipline and Punishment," 582, and White, *The Assassination*, 29-30.
[78] Brennan, "Opposition in exile," 1-2, cited with permission of author.
[79] For a historically detailed, triumphalist case that there are no "pleasant alternatives" to "unity" under ZANU(PF) rule, see Mugabe, "The Unity Accord," 357-59 and *passim*.
[80] For a recent view of this period, see Tendi, "Soldiers contra Diplomats."
[81] The story of ZAPU's fate in the 1980s is far more complex than the summary offered here. See Alexander et al., *Violence and Memory*, chapters 8-11; Alexander, "Dissident Perspectives;" and CCJP/LRF, *Breaking the Silence.*
[82] Edgar Tekere's Zimbabwe Unity Movement won nearly 18% of the vote but only two parliamentary seats in 1990. ZANU-Ndonga won one seat in both 1985 and 1990. For an insider account of the Unity negotiations, in which ZANU(PF)'s quest for ZAPU's total capitulation is clear, see Chiwewe, "Unity Negotiations."
[83] Dlamini, *Askari*, chapter 14.
[84] Interview, Moyo, Bulawayo, 6 August 2010; 2008.
[85] Interview Moyo, 2008, and 2010; 2015.
[86] Interview, Moyo, 2010; 2008; Bulawayo, 9 February 2009.
[87] See Ellis, "The Historical Significance," 267-9, and Rousseau, "Counter-Revolutionary Warfare."
[88] Several defected to South Africa; others were eventually arrested. See Yap, "Uprooting the Weeds," 122-25 and chapter 2.
[89] ZANU(PF) delayed establishing relations with the USSR and then made them contingent on the USSR rejecting its relationship with ZAPU. Shubin, *The Hot 'Cold War'*, 187 and chapter 14.
[90] See Scarnecchia, "Rationalizing Gukurahundi," which draws on South African Department of Foreign Affairs' files to show the extent of diplomatic and intelligence cooperation between Zimbabwe and South Africa.
[91] On ANC/ZAPU relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see Macmillan, "'Past History Has Not Been Forgotten'," and interviews, Moyo, 2010, 2009; Mishek Velapi (the only man actually convicted in the ZAPU treason trial – for arms caching), Bulawayo, 27 February 2009; Zephaniah Nkomo, Bulawayo, 18 August 2010.
[92] Interview, Moyo, 2015. On the steps taken by Nkomo and senior commanders to uphold the peace, see Alexander et al, *Violence and Memory*, 185 and *passim*.
[93] See Yap, "Uprooting the Weeds," chapter 2.
[94] Interview, Moyo, 2010.
[95] Interview, Moyo, 2015.