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Authenticity and Co-Design

On Responsibly Creating Relational Robots for Children

Marion Boulicault and Milo Phillips-Brown
with Jacqueline M. Kory-Westlund, Stephanie Nguyen, and
Cynthia Breazeal

Introduction

Meet Tega. Blue, fluffy, and AI enabled, Tega is a *relational robot*: a robot designed to form relationships with humans (figure 7.1 shows Tega interacting with a child). Created to aid in early childhood education, Tega talks with children, plays educational games with them, solves puzzles, and participates in creative activities like making up stories and drawing. Powered by AI algorithms, Tega adapts to each child's social, emotional, and curricular needs, thereby building a relationship that keeps them engaged and improves how they learn. For example, one of Tega's algorithms uses assessments of a child's language abilities to match the child with books to read that are at just the right language difficulty level to help build their vocabulary (Park et al., 2019).

For the past eight years, we at the Personal Robots Group at the MIT Media Lab have been developing and studying robots like Tega. Relational robots have the potential to play a part in addressing urgent social issues, such as ensuring access to high-quality early childhood education. We emphasize both *potential* and *play a part*. There is no guarantee that using relational robots will be either



Figure 7.1
A child with Tega.

effective or ethically sound, as is illustrated by analyses of recent proposals to use social robots for delivering therapy to children living with autism (McBride, 2020). And, like any technology, relational robots cannot address social issues on their own; they are sociotechnical tools that have the potential, under certain conditions, to contribute positively to broader interventions.

Our vision is for Tega to support parents, teachers, communities, and governments in helping children learn. So far, the results are promising. In working with over 400 preschool and kindergarten children (ages 4 to 6 years) in diverse public schools, we've found that children readily learn new words from robots like Tega (Kory-Westlund, Dickens, et al., 2017); emulate the robot's phrases and vocabulary during storytelling activities (Kory-Westlund, Jeong, et al. 2017; Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019a); show more curiosity in response to a more curious robot (Gordon et al., 2015); and exhibit more creativity when the robot models creative behavior (Ali et al., 2019). Tega's relational nature has its own impact; the closer the relationships between child and robot, the more effectively the child learns (Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019b). In one of

our studies, for example, 49 children played one-on-one language-learning games with Tega once a week for eight weeks: the children who reported a closer relationship with Tega showed higher scores on language-learning metrics, such as vocabulary tests and ability to recall stories they'd heard or read (Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019c; Kory-Westlund et al., 2018; Kory-Westlund, 2019).

Yet using relational robots for early childhood education raises pressing social and ethical issues. In designing relational robots for children, we are, in a sense, *designing relationships* between children and robots. If we are to design relational robots responsibly, then we must ask the questions: Should we be creating relationships between children and robots at all? And if so, what kinds of child-robot relationships should we design? That is, what should the relationship between a child and a robot like Tega be like? Or, what (if anything) makes a good child-robot relationship?

These questions have prompted discussion among our research participants and academics, and in the media (e.g., Turkle, 2007; Sparrow & Sparrow, 2006). Some of this discussion has centered on the concept of *authenticity*: good relationships are authentic relationships. A prominent concern is that child-robot relationships are inevitably inauthentic. That is, there is something inevitably inauthentic about *any* relationship that a child forms with a robot. If this is right, perhaps there is no way to responsibly design relational robots for children; perhaps we shouldn't be designing them at all (or, if we do, there must be *significant* benefit to outweigh the problem of inauthenticity). Here we explore this concern of authenticity.

It's important to emphasize that authenticity is far from the only salient ethical issue when it comes to relational robots. Others include concerns about data collection and ownership; privacy and security; social injustices concerning access to technology, corporate power, and the future of work; and aforementioned concerns about technological solutionism, to name just a few. Determining whether and how to design relational robots for use in children's

education will require grappling with all these issues (and their intersections) in tandem.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. We begin in the next section by explaining what we mean by a “relational robot” and expand on the motivations for building relational robots to use in early childhood education. In the third section, we analyze two different concerns about authenticity. Our analysis draws on our group’s empirical research as well as on insights from philosophy and disability studies. In the fourth section, we suggest a way forward. We argue that in order to design relational robots responsibly, it is ethically imperative that designers employ what is known as *co-design*, a framework that enlists stakeholders such as parents, teachers, and children themselves in answering the question: “What kinds of child–robot relationships should we design?” Using examples from our own research, we illustrate the significance of co-design for creating relational robots for children.

What Are Relational Robots? And Why Build Them?

What Are Relational Robots?

Relational robots, as we’ve said, are robots designed to form relationships with humans. They belong to a broader class of *relational technologies*, technologies that are designed to build relationships with humans. This use of the term *relational technology* dates back at least as far as Bickmore and Picard (2005).

The idea that humans have relationships with technologies like robots is based on an understanding of a relationship—endorsed by various scholars¹—on which humans can form relationships with both humans and nonhumans (with pets, for example). This understanding of a relationship can be made clearer by considering a related concept, that of a *social interaction*. A social interaction is commonly understood as an interaction between two agents whose

behaviors are interdependent; the actions of one agent are responsive to the actions of the other (Berscheid & Reis, 1998). Social interactions include behaviors such as conversing, meeting another's gaze, taking turns, displaying emotion, gesturing, and performing what's known as behavior mirroring—matching one's behavior to that of the other. (The behaviors that make up social interactions are known as *social behaviors*.) Many modern technologies engage in social interactions with humans—for example, entertainment robots like Aibo; personal home robots like Buddy, Jibo, and Mabu; and digital assistants like Alexa and Siri.²

Tega, too, socially interacts with humans—indeed, Tega is programmed to engage in a wide range of social behaviors. For example, Tega converses (using automatic speech recognition and by playing back recorded speech); meets the gaze of humans (e.g., Tega will “look” at the child's face when the child looks at it); and mirrors behavior (e.g., Tega will match the cadence of a child's speech or mirror a child's facial expressions). In our research, we've found that children tend to respond in kind. They readily converse with robots like Tega; mirror their behavior (e.g., mimic a robot's facial expressions); take turns; share information about themselves; and help robots during joint activities (e.g., they turn the pages of a digital storybook for the robot and help the robot “practice” storytelling by retelling stories) (Kanda et al., 2007; Kory-Westlund, 2019; Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019a; Kory-Westlund et al., 2018; Park & Howard, 2015; Park et al., 2019; Serholt & Barendregt, 2016; Singh, 2018) (see figure 7.2 for an image of a child with Tega).

It takes more than just having a social interaction to be in a relationship, according to the understanding we are adopting. For example, if you meet the gaze of someone you pass on the street, you do not thereby have a relationship with them; or if you ask Alexa what the weather will be tomorrow and you get a response, you do not thereby have a relationship with Alexa. Rather, relationships require a series of repeated, personalized social interactions



Figure 7.2
School child posing with Tega.

that can elicit feelings of *responsiveness* and *commitment*, as they're known in the literature.

Relationships unfold over time: in a relationship, repeated social interactions inform future social interactions. Think of how your social interactions with a longtime friend differ from those with a stranger; this difference is partly due to a store of shared experiences. In a relationship, you can refer back to activities shared in the past. Or, when you respond to someone, or *something*, with whom you have a relationship, you can in a sense *personalize* your response based on what you know from past interactions. As we noted in the introduction, this is precisely what Tega does. That is, Tega uses AI technology to tailor its future social interactions with a child based on past interactions—for example, by picking books to read with children based on what it has learned about the child's literacy skills.

Feelings of responsiveness and commitment are umbrella terms that include positive feelings such as rapport, closeness, and attachment. Robots, of course, do not have feelings of responsiveness and commitment toward children; they do not have feelings at all. But children do. We've found in our studies that, for example, children report feeling as close to the robots as they feel to pets and favorite toys (Kory-Westlund et al., 2018). They readily say the robots are their friends (e.g., Kory, 2014) and frequently smile, laugh, and display various positive facial expressions when learning and playing with the robots (e.g., Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019a; Kory-Westlund, 2019).

Perhaps you are still skeptical that the word *relationship* aptly describes the connections between children and relational robots. We explore skepticism of this kind in the subsection "Inauthenticity as Unreality?" Ultimately, though, it is not essential to our purposes that child-robot relationships deserve the name. What is important is that children interact with robots in certain ways, and conceive of them in certain ways, that are similar in some respects to how they interact with and conceive of humans. It is the ethical dimensions of these connections—not the label *relationship*—that is our concern.

Why Build Relational Robots for Early Childhood Education?

Improving the quality and equity of early childhood education for all children is an issue of US national educational importance (Hart & Risley, 1995; Garcia & Weiss, 2017). Early childhood is a critical time. It is when learning is most malleable and investments are most cost effective for spurring long-term benefits to cognitive, academic, behavioral, and socioemotional outcomes (Heckman et al., 2010). A child who cannot read adequately in the first grade has a 90 percent probability of reading poorly in the fourth grade and a 75 percent probability of reading poorly in high school (Torgesen, 2004). Tragically, about one-third of US children do not have

access to high enough quality early childhood education programs to prepare them to meet standards for kindergarten entry (Torgesen, 2004).

We at the MIT Personal Robots Group are experimenting with technologies like Tega in the hopes of helping to address some of these pressing social and educational issues facing our youngest learners. As we mentioned in the introduction, Tega is designed to help young children develop language and literacy skills and improve key learning attitudes, such as curiosity, creativity, and the development of a growth mindset (the idea that one can develop talents and abilities through perseverance and effort [Dweck, 2008; Park et al., 2017]). Some evidence suggests that using AI technology to facilitate relationship-building between Tega and individual children makes Tega more effective at meeting these goals when compared to nonrelational technologies.³ As such, Tega may be well positioned to support teachers in the classroom. For example, Boston-area preschool and kindergarten teachers from both private and public schools tell us that they would be excited to use robots like Tega during what they call “choice time”—a special time each day when children pick from a menu of different learning activities (Kory-Westlund et al., 2016).

Tega may also be effective at supporting parents and guardians with at-home learning (which became particularly urgent during the COVID-19 pandemic). For example, research shows that children benefit from responding to dialogic questions—that is, open-ended questions without clear right or wrong answers (Hargrave & Sénéchal, 2000; Valdez-Menchaca & Whitehurst, 1992; Whitehurst et al., 1988). Tega is programmed to ask dialogic, reciprocal questions as a parent reads a book to a child, supporting the parent in teaching their child (Boteanu et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2012; King, 1990; Nuñez, 2015).

Of course, issues concerning underfunding, support for teachers, and equitable access to high-quality early childhood education are complex social issues that will never have a purely technical

solution. Indeed, a simplistic vision of “technological solutionism” diverts attention from the social dimensions of a problem and, more fundamentally, fails to recognize how the social and technical are inevitably intertwined (Šabanović, 2010; Winner, 1980; Morozov, 2013; Ames, 2019; McBride, 2020). However, when conceptualized, designed, and implemented responsibly as parts of broader sociotechnical interventions (as we discuss later), social robots have the potential to serve as tools for addressing urgent social problems.

Concerns about Authenticity

To design relational robots for children is to design relationships between robots and children. Therefore, responsibly designing relational robots requires us to address the ethically weighty question: “What kinds of relationships should we design?”

As noted in the introduction, one widely held answer to this question is based on authenticity: good relationships are (among other things) *authentic* relationships, so it is important that we design technologies for children that help create authentic relationships. During our studies, parents and teachers frequently raised the concern, in some form, that it’s not possible for children to form authentic relationships with robots. This concern is echoed in the academic literature on relational robots: sociologist Sherry Turkle, for example, insists that, in contrast to authentic human-human relationships, human-robot relationships are “superficial,” “pretend,” and “inauthentic” (Turkle, 2007). Philosophers Robert Sparrow and Linda Sparrow (2006) contrast human-robot relationships with “genuine” human-human relationships.⁴

In this section, we analyze these concerns about authenticity. Our analysis reveals that there is no *one* unique authenticity concern; different ethical concerns go under the banner of “authenticity.” We focus on two such concerns: the first is that child-robot

relationships are *not real relationships*, and the second is that these relationships are *deceptive*.

A note on the scope of our ambitions. First, we aren't aiming to analyze all possible concerns about authenticity. Others don't relate to either reality or deception. For example, Turkle (2007) argues that another reason that human-robot relationships are ethically alarming is that they may, in time, lead children to form inauthentic *human-human* relationships. Second, we are not advancing an analysis of what authenticity is *per se*. Rather, we aim to analyze two often-voiced concerns about child-robot relationships—concerns that have been stated in terms of authenticity—to better understand how to responsibly design relational robots. And finally, as already emphasized, authenticity is but one of many complex, interconnected social and ethical issues that must be addressed in designing and using social robots in early childhood education.

On Theorizing about Authentic Connections

Before investigating concerns about the authenticity of child-robot relationships, we'd like to step back and comment on theorizing about the authenticity of connections between humans and non-humans more broadly.⁵ It is strikingly easy to make unjustified and potentially harmful assumptions about the inauthenticity of such connections—a fact that comes into relief with an example from disability studies.

Theologian Julia Watts Belser (2016) highlights a common assumption about the connections between persons with disabilities and assistive technologies, like wheelchairs: they are thought of as a burdensome reliance, detracting from quality of life. Watts Belser illustrates this by pointing to the widely used phrase “wheelchair-bound,” which evokes the idea of a wheelchair as something that “binds, traps, and constrains the human within its medicalized embrace” (2016, p. 6). In this view, people with disabilities would be better off if they didn't have to rely on assistive devices.

Watts Belser's own experience as a wheelchair user challenges this conventional thought. Rather than a burdensome reliance, she sees her connection with her wheelchair as one of "intimate engagement between wheel and flesh that is central to my own embodied experience" (p. 7). The blogger Wheelchair Dancer echoes Watts Belser in describing her own connection with assistive devices: "My crutches are part of my arms—when I use them to make a dance line—and extra spines when I use them to support me and when I shift all of my weight on to the conjunction of arm and crutch." Wheelchair Dancer argues that we should conceptualize "disabled anatomy not as a set of functioning and failed body parts, bits that have partially been replaced by technology, but as a body that is extended and expanded by its technology" (Watts Belser, p. 12). The connection between Wheelchair Dancer and her assistive technology is extensive, expansive, and empowering.

Once we consider Watts Belser's and Wheelchair Dancer's perspectives, it's hard to think of an adequate definition of authenticity that would label their connections with their wheelchairs and crutches as inauthentic. And yet this is the opposite of what we would expect if we adopted the conventional—and, to many, seemingly obvious—understanding of how persons with disabilities relate to assistive technologies, an understanding that is based on problematic ableist assumptions.

Of course, the relationships between children and robots are both practically and ethically different in significant ways from the connections between persons living with disabilities and assistive devices. Children don't, for example, usually think of robots as extensions of their bodies. And while child-robot relationships may face a certain stigma, that stigma cannot be compared to the ableist oppression that persons with disabilities face. Nonetheless, a lesson can be drawn from scholars working in disability studies: if we're theorizing about what counts as an authentic connection or relationship, we must be epistemically humble, which is to say that

we cannot put too much weight behind our own thoughts and intuitions. We must look to those who have direct knowledge—or what’s known as “lived experience”—of the connection or relationship. The judgments that may come easily must be carefully critiqued and interrogated. We ought to take extra caution with new types of relationships, like relationships between children and AI-enabled relational robots, where conventional wisdom may not apply.

Inauthenticity as Unreality?

With that in mind, let us turn to the concerns raised about the authenticity of child–robot relationships. In our research, we’ve found that when some study participants—such as teachers and parents—express concerns about authenticity, they sometimes seem to be expressing a concern that the relationship a child forms with a robot is somehow *unreal*, or at least *less real*, than the relationship a child forms with a teacher or friend. One could reconstruct this concern as follows. Human–human relationships are real; indeed, human–human relationships set the ideal for what a real relationship is. Any relationship that lacks the qualities of human–human relationships is a mere approximation of a real relationship. It is less than real, and therefore inauthentic.

This thought has intuitive appeal. Although human–robot relationships have various qualities found in paradigmatic human–human relationships (see previous section, “What Are Relational Robots? And Why Build Them?”), they lack many others. Today’s robots do not empathize with a child who has stubbed her toe; they do not feel joy if a child writes them a thoughtful note; they do not care if they never again see a child with whom they’ve interacted. One would be quick to label “inauthentic” human–human relationships that lack these qualities: imagine someone who claims to be your friend but who doesn’t empathize with you, is not moved by a thoughtful note, or wouldn’t care if they never saw you again; this is *not a real friend*.

But we suggest that it is hasty to leap to the conclusion that *any* kind of relationship—especially human–nonhuman relationships—is fake or unreal if it lacks certain qualities, such as the ability to empathize. Is your relationship with your dog, for example, not real if he is indifferent to a thoughtful note? Presumably not. Human–human relationships don’t set the standard for *all* relationships. Rather, we propose, there are relationships of different kinds, each of which might have different standards of “realness” or authenticity. What makes your relationship with a friend authentic, for example, is not, intuitively, the same as what makes your relationship with your dog authentic.

If this idea is right, then human–robot relationships may constitute “real” relationships—just a different kind of real relationship than human–human relationships. We’ve observed evidence of this in our research. We found that children generally do not conceive of robots as equivalent to their human peers and caregivers, or even as the same as their pets, toys, or computers (Kory-Westlund, 2019; Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019a; Kory-Westlund et al., 2018).

This finding is well illustrated by a study we conducted to gauge how children perceive Tega. We asked children to complete a sorting activity in which we presented pictures of different entities, including a frog, a cat, a baby, a robot from a movie (like R2-D2 from the *Star Wars* films), a mechanical robot arm, Tega, and a computer (Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019c). Children were asked to place these pictures on a spectrum with a human adult on one extreme and a table on the other. Children frequently placed Tega near the middle, between a computer and a cat, indicating that they saw Tega as more humanlike than a computer but less humanlike than a cat (which they generally placed closer to the adult than to Tega). In another study—which we referenced in the subsection “What Are Relational Robots?”—we asked children to talk about how close they felt to Tega in comparison to pets, toys, friends, and parents. On average, children said they felt similarly close to Tega as to their

pets and favorite toys, but less close than how they feel to friends and parents (Kory-Westlund et al., 2018). These data lend credence to the thought that child–robot relationships needn’t be, or needn’t necessarily be, a less real, approximate version of human–human relationships. Child–robot relationships may simply be a different kind of relationship, with their own distinct standards of “realness.”

In other words, we’re suggesting that just because child–robot relationships lack qualities of human–human relationships does not mean—as some have worried—that child–robot relationships are less real and therefore inauthentic. There is evidence, for example, that children consider robots a different kind of entity than humans, suggesting that child–robot relationships may likewise be of a different kind than human–human relationships. Child–robot relationships may have their own distinct standards of realness and authenticity. As such, it does little to simply charge that child–robot relationships are “unreal” without specifying a standard of “realness” or “authenticity” against which to judge the relationships.

Nonetheless, we don’t think that the inauthenticity-as-unreality concern is misguided. The issue is how it has been *expressed*. When theorists and our research participants say they are concerned about unreality, we think they are most charitably understood as giving voice to a different concern: that child–robot relationships are somehow *off* or *not quite right*. In other words, child–robot relationships are—for a reason not so easily articulated by unreality—not the kinds of relationships we should be designing for our children. (It is not only unreal relationships that are problematic. Think, for example, of a child’s relationship with a bully: this isn’t a relationship that a child should be in, but that has nothing to do with unreality. It may be all too real!)

The inauthenticity-as-unreality concern seems to bring us right back where we started: “What kinds of child–robot relationships should we design?” (Or should we even be designing them at all?)

Inauthenticity-as-unreality doesn't help answer this driving question, since it doesn't say what standards of "realness" we should be judging the relationships against. In the section "Responsible Design with Authenticity in Mind: An Argument for Co-Design," we will address this driving question in a way that we argue is more effective than considerations of realness. But before that, we first consider another commonly raised concern about the authenticity of child-robot relationships, this one having to do with deception.

Inauthenticity as Deception?

According to a second authenticity concern, child-robot relationships are inauthentic not because they are unreal, but because they are *deceptive*. Some relational robots are programmed to represent themselves—in some sense or another—as empathetic, curious, or having several emotions or mental states. For example, Tega can mirror children's facial expressions, giving the appearance of an emotional reaction; or, when playing a learning game, Tega can say things like "Ooh!" while leaning forward and opening its eyes wide, giving the appearance of curiosity. Other robots we've designed, such as Green the DragonBot, explicitly ascribe themselves emotions, saying, for example, "I like playing with you!"

The concern is that in behaving in these ways, robots—or, more accurately, the robot's designers and programmers—may lead children to wrongly believe that the robots are capable of emotion (Picard & Klein, 2002; Sparrow & Sparrow, 2006; Turkle, 2007). This *inauthenticity-as-deception* concern can be understood in various ways (see Coeckelbergh, 2012, for a taxonomy of these various ways). Here, we articulate one version of the concern.

The idea that deceptive relationships are inauthentic is familiar from everyday life. If you learned that your partner has lied to you for decades about their real name; pretended to love you when they did not; or only cared about your relationship insofar as it served their professional aims, all of this not only would be hurtful but would

indicate something about the relationship itself, too. A relationship built on deception can rightly be called inauthentic, at least to some extent and in certain cases.

Are children wrong about what robots are like? The concern that child–robot relationships are deceptive presupposes that children are indeed mistaken about what robots are like. But are they? Do children mistakenly believe that today’s relational robots—like Tega—have attributes, like a capacity for emotion, that they do not in fact have?

Children *do* ascribe emotions to relational robots. They say things about robots like “She’s kind,” “if you just left him here and nobody came to play with him, he might be sad,” and “he likes sharing stuff, like stories” (Kory-Westlund et al., 2018). One child, when asked what he would do if one of our robots was sad, suggested he would “buy ice cream to make him happy, robot ice cream” (Kory, 2014). But of course these robots lack the capacity to feel kind or sad; they lack the capacity to like; if they were given ice cream—whether robot or human ice cream—it would not make them feel anything at all.

One conclusion to draw is that children are indeed mistaken about what robots are like. We would like to counsel caution about accepting this conclusion too readily. First, as we noted in the subsection “Inauthenticity as Unreality?,” children tell us that they don’t conceive of robots as equivalent to friends, parents, or other humans. This may suggest that while children use words like “sad” to describe robots, they may conceive of the sadness that they ascribe to robots differently than the sadness they would ascribe to a friend or parent. Just as a child conceives of a robot eating “robot ice cream” rather than “human ice cream,” so too might the child think of a robot as having “robot feelings” rather than “human feelings.”

Second and most obviously, it’s uncontroversial that children engage in make-believe games and play activities where they knowingly pretend that things are other than what they are. This is something adults do with children—pretending, for example, that a Winnie the Pooh bear or Furby is alive and has feelings. All of this is

considered an important and positive childhood activity. It's not a stretch to see Tega playing a similar role to these toys. Indeed, we've found in our research that parents and teachers pretend that Tega has feelings. Given that children aren't "deceived" by a Winnie the Pooh bear or Furby, we shouldn't be too quick in concluding they're deceived by Tega.

What do inauthenticity-as-deception concerns mean for the design of relational robots? One could nonetheless argue that Tega and toys like Winnie the Pooh and Furby differ when it comes to deception. Tega does many things that such toys do not, like sustain conversations with children and match their facial expressions and the pace and cadence of their speech. And most distinctively, Tega collects data from children and uses AI technology to personalize and adapt its interactions over time. As this AI technology advances, it is easy to imagine that Tega-like robots of the future will behave in ways that leave children genuinely believing that robots have thoughts and feelings.

If this is the case now or in the future—that is, if child–robot relationships are or will be somehow deceptive—would that be a cause for concern? We'll argue that the answer to this question is not straightforward.

Adults frequently deceive children—or don't disabuse them when they're mistaken about certain things, like whether their pet has died, whether the tooth fairy exists, or whether their dinner contains vegetables. The ethical implications of such deception differ considerably from deception toward adults. Compare a parent sneaking vegetables into a child's dinner and telling them there are no vegetables versus a company doing the same with their employees. We may imagine that in both cases, the deception leads to an outcome that benefits the deceived; with the child and parent, though, the deception has a different moral complexion than with the employee and company.

Using relational robots does not, as we see it, raise some *distinct* or *new* concern over and above those about deception of vegetables

not being in dinner or the existence of imaginary beings. Rather, it seems clear that in general, parents, teachers, and other caretakers can use limited deception for the benefit of children—that is, deception in select cases and to select ends. And using relational robots promises to be of the exact kind that warrants such limited deception: helping the child to develop intellectually and emotionally. As we noted previously, our research indicates that relational robots indeed help children learn.

More generally, deception seems to fall into a broad category of behavior whose moral status depends on whether the recipient is an adult or a child. While in many cases it would be wrong to *control* the lives of adults—for example, deciding what they eat, who they can socialize with, or what their bedtime is—such treatment is not only appropriate for children but also the responsibility of caretakers. Deception is a certain way of controlling a person.

This is not to say that *all* control of children is good; and in particular, not to say that all deception of children is good. Far from it. Our point is rather that the moral import of deceiving children is complex. With children, we cannot simply equate “a deceptive relationship” with “a relationship a child should not have” (nor can we equate it with “a relationship a child *should* have”). To evaluate the ethical import of deceiving a child, we need to know more, as philosophers have argued. In particular, we need to know the *context* in which the deception is taking place. For instance, we need to know *why* the child is being deceived (see, e.g., Pallikkathayil, 2019). Is it to facilitate learning? To eat more vegetables? To spend more money on toys? And *who* is doing the deceiving? (See, e.g., White, 2021.) A parent? Robot? Teacher? Corporation?

Recall that the overarching question that needs an answer is, “What kinds of relationships should we design?” According to the most straightforward understanding of the inauthenticity-as-deception concern, any deceptive relationship is problematic; if child–robot relationships are deceptive, that is automatically cause

for concern. But as this subsection shows, things are not so clear-cut. Some deceptive relationships may be problematic, while others may not be. Simply pointing to deception (just like simply pointing to the notion of unreality) is insufficient for telling us which relationships we should design. To tell whether deception in a child–robot relationship is problematic, we need to know the context—the *who*, *when*, and *why* of the deception. This is all to say that we need to know the context surrounding the child–robot relationship to determine what kinds of relationships we should design.

Responsible Design with Authenticity in Mind: An Argument for Co-Design

We’ve said that in designing relational robots for children we are, in effect, designing relationships. This is because children will form different kinds of relationships with different kinds of robots. For example, whether a robot says that it feels certain ways, or how it responds to a child asking, “Do you love me?” may affect whether the relationship is deceptive (and thus, according to some, inauthentic).

In the previous section, we argued that the two authenticity concerns we considered don’t take us far enough in determining the kinds of child–robot relationships we should design, or whether we should be designing such relationships at all. In this section, we offer a more promising path forward. Rather than aiming to identify a fixed definition of the kind of child–robot relationship we should be designing (e.g., giving a definition of an authentic relationship), we focus on the *process* by which we answer the question, “What kinds of child–robot relationships should we design?” More specifically, we’ll argue that this question can be answered responsibly only if it is answered collaboratively, using a family of methodologies known as collaborative design, or *co-design*.⁶

“What Is Co-Design?” explains the spirit and methods of co-design. “The Case for Co-Design in Building Relational Robots for Children” argues that co-design is imperative for addressing the question, “What kinds of child–robot relationships should we design?” And “An Example of Co-Designing Relational Robots with Diverse Stakeholders” shows co-design of child–robot relationships in action: we describe how we at the MIT Personal Robots Group have used co-design methods in designing our relational robots.

What Is Co-Design?

Co-design, most simply, is design in *partnership* with the people and communities who are or might be affected by a given technology. As is common, we’ll call these people and communities *stakeholders*. Co-design overlaps with related approaches known as *participatory design*, *human-centered design*, and *inclusive design*; and indeed, it is often used as an umbrella term for these approaches. Costanza-Chock (2020) offers a useful encapsulation of co-design as “the full inclusion of, and accountability to, and control by, people with direct lived experience of the conditions [that] designers . . . are trying to change” (p. 26). And Also Too, a design studio dedicated to co-design, describes their work as “guided by two core beliefs: first, that those who are directly affected by the issues a project aims to address must be at the center of the design process, and second, that absolutely anyone can participate meaningfully in design” (And Also Too, n.d.).

What does it mean to design in partnership with stakeholders? To answer this question, it is helpful to contrast co-design with *user research* methods, which aim to obtain information from stakeholders. For example, a designer creating a meditation phone application might conduct focus groups with potential users to learn what these stakeholders want and how they might interact with such an application. User research methods provide information, but it is up to the designers to determine what they will do with that information. For example, the application designers might use what they

learn to ensure that the app helps users meet their own meditation goals. Or they might use the information to design the application to maximize the time a user spends on it, regardless of the user's goals and values.

Co-design is different. While user research methods might form an important *part* of a co-design approach, these methods alone are not sufficient for co-design. This is because co-design requires that stakeholders be included not only as *sources* of information but also as *decision makers*. If we were using co-design to design a meditation app, stakeholders would not only provide information to the designers; they would also be partners in making design decisions.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to co-design; rather, co-designers use a variety of methods and strategies for including stakeholders as design partners, depending on the nature of the project and on the specific stakeholders. These might include participatory technology assessments (Banta, 2009; Hennen, 2012), citizen juries (Gooberman-Hill et al., 2008; Street et al., 2014), and global interdisciplinary observatories (Hurlbut et al., 2018). (For more details on these methods, see Sample et al., 2019.) There are also co-design methods specifically targeted toward children. Druin (2002), for example, articulates a framework where children can take a variety of roles in the broader design process of new technologies—that of user, tester, informant, or design partner. This framework emphasizes that all partners “must acknowledge that a child has the right to partake and possess an active role” in the design process.

Co-design is not new to the design of relational robots. Researchers like Selma Šabanović have argued for similar participatory approaches (Šabanović, 2010). A research team at the University of California San Diego used co-design methods in designing robots for dementia caregiving. They conducted a six-month community design–research process, built relationships with members of local community centers, and empowered caregivers by collaborating with them in designing physical prototypes (Moharana et al.,

2019). Other research teams have adopted co-design methods in designing relational robots for children. For example, researchers have explored using cooperative inquiry methods with intergenerational teams in designing social robots for children (Arnold et al., 2016). This approach allows groups of children across age ranges, with different levels of knowledge and learning styles, to explore new information together. Researchers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom working on designing robots for children with autism implemented co-creation sessions with children, family members, and professionals affected by autism spectrum disorder (Huijnen et al., 2017). To facilitate collaboration and trust among participants, the sessions were held in environments familiar to participants, who sat in a “U-shape” arrangement (as opposed to rows, for example) so they could look at each other while speaking.

The need for facilitating trust brings up one of the central challenges—and promises—of co-design. We live in a world with extreme social inequities and hierarchical power structures, illustrated forcefully by the growing power divides between the technology sector and the rest of society. It may be difficult to find ways to effectively include stakeholders as partners, especially those who have been historically excluded from design processes, such as those from low-resourced or otherwise marginalized communities. For instance, in the context of relational robots for children, family members from low-resourced communities may not have access to transportation or have the time or resources to attend co-creation sessions or lab meetings. In addition, stakeholders from marginalized groups may not trust the universities or corporations building these technologies. This is why a co-design approach requires accounting for stakeholder histories and power dynamics.

The Case for Co-Design in Building Relational Robots for Children

Why is co-design necessary for designing relational robots responsibly? As we just discussed, co-design says that to responsibly design

any given technology, the design process must include those people and communities who are affected by the technology. The primary motivation behind co-design is a matter of *justice*: those affected by a technology deserve a say in how they will be affected. In other words, stakeholders of any given technology deserve a say in how that technology is designed (see, e.g., Costanza-Chock, 2020). We'll argue for something more specific: that stakeholders of relational robots deserve a say in answering the question, "What kinds of child-robot relationships should we design?"

Outside the context of relational robots, the question of what kinds of relationships children should have is the province of parents, teachers, children themselves, caregivers, communities, and so on—or rather it is their province within certain bounds. It is not the province, or not the sole province, of traditional designers of technologies. Why would things be any different with the question of which relationships children should have with relational robots? As co-design dictates, a broad range of stakeholders—not just product designers and researchers—need power over decisions about the kinds of child-robot relationships that children have.

To make the point more concrete, think about one of the authenticity concerns we examined earlier in "Concerns about Authenticity"—specifically, that child-robot relationships are deceptive (and thereby inauthentic). We argued that simply knowing that a child-robot relationship is deceptive (if it's deceptive at all) isn't enough to determine whether it's a relationship that children should or should not have. Deception may be problematic in certain contexts but not in others. One determining factor in whether deception is problematic is *who decides* to deceive the child. Imagine that a food corporation creates a snack for children without disclosing to the public that it contains vegetables. Imagine further that your child buys this snack and eats it. She has been deceived, and, it seems, in a problematic way. The problem is not that it's never okay to deceive children about the contents of their food. It could be fine for *you* (the parent) to

trick your child into eating vegetables. Rather, the problem—or at least part of the problem—is that it is not the place of a corporation to decide on its own whether to deceive children. As a parent, you deserve to have a say in whether your child is deceived. A similar thing goes, we maintain, for if and when child–robot relationships should be deceptive. It is not the place of traditional designers to decide this matter alone; parents and other stakeholders deserve a say, too.

We don't mean to suggest that if parents, teachers, or other stakeholders think it's appropriate to deceive a child, then they are thereby correct. There are, as we've said, simply cases where children should not be deceived (for example, if parents deceive their children without regard to their interests). More generally, there are certain kinds of relationships—for example, abusive or oppressive relationships—that children should *never* have, regardless of whether parents, teachers, a community, or anyone else thinks they should. This sets a certain boundary on what child–robot relationships we should be designing. But within this boundary, the question remains: “What kinds of child–robot relationships should we design?” This question, we've argued, is for co-design to answer.

An Example of Co-Designing Relational Robots with Diverse Stakeholders

We have outlined the concept of co-design, and we have argued that co-design methods are imperative for the responsible design of relational robots for children. In this subsection, we offer an example, based on our work designing Tega and Green the DragonBot, of what it looks like in practice to apply co-design methods to the design of relational robots for children (see figure 7.3 for early Tega design sketches).

First, some background on our stakeholders and our co-design methods. The stakeholders with whom we engaged included




Figure 7.3

Concept sketches from the early design phase of Tega.

parents, teachers, school administrators, early childhood development experts, and children from Boston-area public schools that serve households from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds. We made special efforts to include stakeholders from ethnically and linguistically diverse backgrounds, including bilingual and English-language-learning children and families. We used a variety of methods, including meetings, surveys, interviews, and focus groups, to learn about stakeholders' values and perspectives on using relational robots in early childhood education. Our co-design methods were iterative: we would have discussions with stakeholders, go back to our lab to integrate their perspectives and values into our design work, come back to the stakeholders for more discussion and feedback, and so on.

We also developed co-design methods specifically aimed at children. We brought children and parents *together* into the lab to interact with lower-fidelity relational robot prototypes (i.e., prototypes that did not include all the features we might deploy in a robot in a school). These were often remotely controlled by a person (as opposed to being autonomous)—this method is known as *Wizard of Oz*.⁷ This prototyping method helped us understand the types of emotional interactions children would want to have with a robot, and crucially, it helped us do so *before* we built any AI algorithms that powered child-robot interactions completely autonomously. We also developed simple games and picture-based questionnaires for children, like the sorting activity discussed in the subsection “Inauthenticity as Unreality?” In one questionnaire, we asked children about their perceptions of Tega's social and relational attributes (e.g., “Let's pretend Tega didn't have any friends. Would Tega not mind or would Tega feel sad?” and “Does Tega really like you, or is Tega just pretending?”); children could point to pictures of Tega in their responses as well as explain their thinking. We invited children to draw pictures to different prompts, including many about

potential relationships they might form with Tega, such as, “Draw a picture of your dream robot and what you do together.”

Co-design approaches had material impacts on how we built robots like Tega. In our early discussions with stakeholders, we identified a widely held assumption: parents and teachers frequently assumed that robots like Tega would take the role of a teacher—that is, that Tega would relate to children as a source of authority and expertise. (This is not surprising given that many research labs and companies are developing intelligent expert tutoring systems, like Squirrel Ai and COLit.⁸) However, when we talked with parents, teachers, and children about how they *wanted* Tega to relate to children, we heard a different message. Many believed that children’s educational needs would be better served if relational robots were to take the role of a *peer-like learning companion* as opposed to an expert teacher (e.g., Chen et al., 2020).

Stakeholders offered a variety of reasons for preferring a peer-like robot over a teacher-like robot. Teachers explained that they saw value in a robot that could be used as a “motivator or reinforcer,” provide a “non-judgmental safe learning space,” and introduce children to “activities they might not otherwise do” (Kory-Westlund et al., 2016)—all things they believed would be more easily achieved with a robot in a peer-like role. Teachers also expressed concerns that if the robot were to take on a teacher-like role, children would perceive it as competing with human teachers in the classroom. Further, teachers worried that a teacher-like robot might be more likely to “replace” teachers in the future; this, teachers believed, would harm how children learned and could result in teachers losing their jobs. Children, too, expressed a preference for engaging in peer-like relationships with robots. They responded more positively to a robot that asked them to play as another child would (“Do you want to play a story game?”) than a robot that directed the activity in a teacher-like way (“Let’s practice our storytelling

now”). Children also reacted positively and learned more effectively when robots appeared friendly and inviting, like a special kind of pet rather than a distant authority figure. Children favored plush fabrics and bright, contrasting colors, often petting the robot or putting their arm around it as they played games together (see figure 7.4). These preferences are also in line with existing research suggesting that peer-based learning improves educational outcomes and brings motivational, cognitive, social, and emotional benefits for peers involved (Damon, 1984; Hassinger-Das et al., 2016; Topping, 2005 Tudge, 1989).

In light of these preferences, we adjusted our designs: rather than designing the robot as an expert teacher, we cultivated a child-robot relationship by designing Tega to be a peer-like or pet-like learning companion. For example, we programmed Tega to use language that is more child-like (and less teacher-like), such as the language mentioned in the previous paragraph. We also designed



Figure 7.4

A child with Green the DragonBot.

Tega to occasionally make mistakes—for example, Tega sometimes incorrectly answers questions about vocabulary or the content of a story—to make it appear less authoritative (and to allow it to model a growth mindset; see the subsection “Why Build Relational Robots for Early Childhood Education?”). Based on children’s interactions and preferences, we chose bright, soft material and a cute, animal-like design so that the robot would look like a kind of special, friendly pet.

These design choices had the intended effect—children in our studies tended to relate to the robot as a pet or playmate (Kory-Westlund, 2019; Kory-Westlund & Breazeal, 2019a, 2019b; Kory-Westlund et al., 2018; Park et al., 2019). They assumed the robot liked playing with them, too: “I know Green [the robot] likes to play with me, so I know he’s happy!” (Kory, 2014).

When we invited parents and guardians to participate in co-design sessions, we made further discoveries about what kinds of child–robot relationships we should design. We learned that many parents wanted to be involved as their children learned with Tega. We thus designed Tega to engender a *group relationship* among children, robots, and adults. For example, we created a special French-language-learning activity for Tega and asked 16 families to participate so we could hear their feedback and perspectives. As part of the activity, the robots used only French words when conversing with children. Parents participated in the learning activity by pointing out (in English) to the child when the robot was using new words and then prompting the child to repeat or use that word: “How do you say ‘bye’ in French?” (Freed, 2012). The robot facilitated French learning by indirectly prompting the parent to guide and teach their child. Parents told us that they experienced a *socially inclusive* experience, contrasting it with what they saw as socially exclusive experiences they have when their child uses a tablet (like an iPad). It would not have been possible to understand the importance and value of these group relationships without the close collaboration with parents and guardians as co-designers.

Conclusion

In an interview in the *Guardian*, Sherry Turkle warned that “if people start to buy the idea that machines are great companions . . . , as they increasingly seem to do, we are really playing with fire” (Adams, 2015). We agree with Turkle that developing relational robots raises genuine social and ethical concerns. But we also believe that, when designed and implemented responsibly, these technologies have the potential to serve as tools for helping to achieve transformative change. We’ve argued that to responsibly build relationships between children and robots, and to address concerns about authenticity, co-design is required. Stakeholders deserve a say in deciding what kinds of child–robot relationships (if any) we should design. If we want to “avoid playing with fire,” all of us need to be in this together.

Notes

1. See, for example, Berscheid & Reis (1998); Csikszentmihalyi & Halton (1981); Kelley et al. (1983).
2. For more on Buddy, see <http://www.bluefrogrobotics.com/>; on Jibo, see <https://www.jibo.com/>; on Mabu, see <http://www.cataliahealth.com/>; on Alexa, see Sciuto et al. (2018). For academic work on Aibo, see, e.g., Fink et al. (2012); Friedman et al. (2003); Kahn et al. (2002); Weiss et al. (2009).
3. For a representative sample of work, see Breazeal et al. (2016); Chen et al. (2020); Kory-Westlund (2019); Kory-Westlund & Breazeal (2019a, 2019b); Westlund et al. (2017); Park et al. (2017).
4. Other researchers and scholars have also weighed in on the question of authenticity, e.g., Coeckelbergh (2012); Picard & Klein (2002). See also additional work by Turkle (2005, 2017).
5. We’re using *connection* as a general term that encompasses relationships.
6. We don’t mean to suggest that co-design is the only appropriate or useful methodology for the responsible design of relational robots. The responsible design of

any technology requires many complementary approaches, including those related to legal compliance, monitoring and assessment, and data governance. For details of other approaches, see, e.g.: the Montreal Declaration for Responsible AI (n.d.); the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' recommendations on ethically aligned design (IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, 2019); the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies statement on artificial intelligence, robotics, and "autonomous" systems (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 2018); and value-sensitive design (e.g., Friedman & Hendry, 2019).

7. Wizard of Oz is a common technique enabling researchers to explore aspects of interaction not yet backed by autonomous systems. See Riek (2012).
8. For more details on these systems, see squirrelai.com/; Cole et al. (2007); Wise et al. (2005).

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