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Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets

Abstract:

Some European constitutions give cabinets great discretion to manage their own demise, whereas others limit their choices and insert the head of state into decisions about government termination. In this article, we map the tremendous variation in the constitutional rules that govern cabinet termination and test existing expectations about its effects on a government's survival and mode of termination. In doing so, we use the most extensive government survival data set available to date, the ...

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Politics and Int Relations
Edward Morgan Jones More by this author
Publication date:
2009
URN:
uuid:bb51f387-7698-4224-b487-4b114e199fde
Source identifiers:
21
Local pid:
daisy:21

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