REVOLUTIONIZING THE PARTY-STATE: THE 1975 CHINESE STATE CONSTITUTION

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that state constitutions reflect and temporarily freeze ongoing and haphazard interactions unfolding amongst actors and institutions. To investigate this claim, I examine China's 1975 State Constitution. A remnant of the turbulent Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), the 1975 State Constitution has evaded all but a few scholars. Adopting elements from institutionalism, I show that the 1967 January Revolution as a "critical juncture" produced four separate results: (1) the "Revolutionary Committees" as a new form of revolutionary institution; (2) the organizational dominance of the military; (3) the importance of "revolution" as ideology and as a way to structure institutions; and (4) the Party as a new type of organization. Themselves emerging from seemingly random choices, these four sequences interacted and changed each other, leading to unintended consequences and eventually producing the 1975 State Constitution as a by-product.

My contribution is then three-fold: first, I advance a new reading of the GPCR that rejects interpretations based on the leadership having a master plan. Instead, I show that decision-makers were heavily constrained and more reactive than active. My argument then shows the dominance of structural over individual factors. Second, institutional actors are not rational. Actors are often unable to anticipate the consequences of their choices. Likewise, against the intentions of their creators, institutions often produce outcomes that reinforce or worsen problems instead of resolving them. Here, short-term fixes undermine long-term aims. Third, I provide a new understanding of how state constitutions work. Rejecting functionalist interpretations, I show how they are the result of unforeseen consequences resulting from decisions made in highly contingent situations. Given the recent constitutional amendments in China under Xi Jinping, this dissertation then enables us to rethink and reconsider current and ongoing trends.

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Introduction

In mid-March 2018, the nearly 3,000 delegates of China's parliament, the National People's Congress (NPC), voted to approve sweeping amendments to the State Constitution. They not only abolished presidential term limits but also enshrined Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping's ruling "Thought" of "Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era," and the "leadership of the CCP" in the State Constitution.

However, arguably more important than changes to the text was the restructuring of the Party and state bureaucracy that redefined the state's role. Framed as a result of Xi Jinping's "Thought," the NPC formally restructured the entire state system by establishing a Supervision Commission parallel to the State Council, the judiciary, and the procuratorate. The Commission formally integrated the work of the Party and state's anti-corruption organs. While it was nominally a merger among equals, in practice the Party's anti-graft body absorbed the state's agencies. Further, the NPC installed Yang Xiaodu, a member of the Politburo, deputy head of the Party's anti-corruption body, and a subordinate of Politburo Standing Committee member and anti-graft czar Zhao Leji as the Commission's director. The Party had therefore not only taken over all anti-corruption work and united it under its roof but also extended its reach over the state and non-Party organs to cover all state employees. The formation of the Supervision Commission therefore recalibrated the Party-state relationship in a fundamental way and greatly enhanced the Party's power over the state. Another result of the newfound superiority of the CCP and "Xi Jinping Thought" were the "Methods on Deepening the Reform of Party and State Organs".[1] If the Supervision Commission established a new state organ, the

[1] "《中共中央关于深化党和国家机构改革的决定》和《深化党和国家机构改革方案》诞生记 ["Decisions of the CCP's Central Committee on Deepening the Reform of the Party and State Institutions" and "Method for Deepening the Party and State Organ Reform" Drafting Record] ", 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [Central Government of the People's Republic of China], updated 22 March 2018, 2018, accessed 27 September 2019, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-03/22/content_5276718.htm.

"Methods" restructured the Party-state's organs and departments on the sub-national levels to attain organizational uniformity with the aim of strengthening Party control over the state.[2] Constitutional changes therefore signified a shift toward greater Party control, thereby effectively redefining the border between the Party, the state, and the people. This recalibration has significant implications for understanding Chinese politics, shifting the analytical focus from understanding state organs and society as isolated entities to examining them from the ideological and organizational position of the Party.

However, these changes did not come out of nowhere. In fact, the constitutional amendments were preceded by years of experiments and a plethora of documents and announcements. Thus, the Supervision Commission is a late result of the anti-corruption campaign started in 2012 against "tigers and flies" and the overhaul of the Party-state bureaucracy was already preliminarily outlined in 2013 at the Party's Third Plenum.[3] In 2016, the Party Centre decided to establish pilots of supervision commissions in Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang.[4] After their evaluation in 2017 this new organ was inserted into the State Constitution. Likewise, the CCP Central Committee's "Decision on Deepening the Reform of the Party and State Institutions" preceded the detailed "Methods" and standardized Party control over the state. It was then after these pilots had been successful, documents drafted, and a consensus forged that they were theorized and entered the State Constitution in the form of "Xi Jinping Thought," the CCP's "leadership," and the National Supervision Commission. However, it was just after the NPC formally passed the amended State Constitution that supervision commissions were installed

[2] "深化党和国家机构改革方案 [Methods on Deepening the Reform of Party and State Organs]," 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [Central Government of the People's Republic of China], updated 21 March 2018, accessed 8 October 2019, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-03/21/content_5276191.htm#1.

[3] "The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in Brief," China Daily, updated 16 November 2013, 2013, accessed 27 September 2019, http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736.htm.

[4] Jinting Deng, "The National Supervision Commission: A New Anti-Corruption Model in China," *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 52 (2018).

throughout China and local governments and Party organs down to the county-level started revamping their organization and further entrenching Party structures. Hence, the amendments led to a flurry of institution-building activity throughout the country.

There are then three aspects to the constitutional amendments. First, on a personal level, Xi Jinping succeeded in adding his "Thought" and abolishing the term limits, thereby tightening "his grip"[5] and affirming his position as the "core" leader,[6] thereby arguably putting China on "the road to totalitarianism".[7] Second, recently trialled institutions commensurate with this "Thought" entered the State Constitution. The State Constitution, as a document, then is a by-product of both elite struggle[8] and a snapshot of the unfolding institutional change. Finally, and this is key, the process preceding the amendment of the state constitution is more important than the document itself. In this view, elite struggles, institutional development, and the drafting process are more critical than the state constitution that merely is a punctual reflection of a status quo and the power configurations found within.[9]

In this dissertation, I advance a simple argument. In their text, Chinese state constitutions reflect and temporarily freeze ongoing and haphazard interactions unfolding amongst actors

[5] "China Allows Xi to Remain President Indefinitely, Tightening His Grip on Power," Reuters, updated 11 March 2018, 2018, accessed 27 September 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament/china-allows-xi-to-remain-president-indefinitely-tightening-his-grip-on-power-idUSKCN1GN07E.

[6] On Xi assuming this status, see "Xi Jinping Assuming New Status as China's 'Core' Leader," New York Times, updated 4 February 2016, 2016, accessed 27 September 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/world/asia/china-president-xi-jinping-core.html..

[7] "China's New "Xi Jinping Constitution": The Road to Totalitarianism," Nippon, updated 27 November 2018, 2018, accessed 27 September 2019, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a05803/china%E2%80%99s-new-xi-jinping-constitution-the-road-to-totalitarianism.html.

[8] For a good examination of elite politics and examination of Xi's leadership team, see Cheng Li, *Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2016).

[9] For this final argument see for example Renbo Wang, "被创造的公共仪式——对七五宪法的阅读与解释 [Constructed Public Ritual - a Reading and Explanation of the 1975 Constitution]," *比较法研究 [Journal of Comparative Law]*, no. 3 (2005).

and institutions.[10] This conceptualization understands state constitutions as resulting from a process akin to a spiral:[11]

1. Different institutional configurations co-exist and interact.
2. Actors use the process of drafting a state constitution to further freeze an institutional arrangement, leading to the emergence (or amendment) of a state constitution.
3. Different institutional configurations continue to co-exist and interact.
4. Actors again use the process of drafting a state constitution to further freeze an institutional arrangement, leading to the emergence (or amendment) of a state constitution.

This is very different from how state constitutions are usually characterized in the literature in two ways: it rejects a functionalist interpretation of state constitutions and I dismiss the rationality of actors in the decision-making process.

First, in liberal democratic countries, state constitutions as foundational documents are commonly understood as incorporating some form of individual rights and meaningful constraints on government.[12] A high threshold for change is part of their nature as stable and foundational documents.[13] This seems to be different in authoritarian countries where state

[10] I take up a broad conception of "institution" as "*building-blocks of social order*" that "represent socially sanctioned" and "collectively enforced expectations with respect to the behaviour of specific categories of actors or to the performance of certain activities" that "involve *mutually related rights and obligations* for actors, distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate, 'right' and 'wrong,' 'possible' and 'impossible' actions" and thereby organize "behaviour into predictable and reliable patterns" (italics in the original). See Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," in *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, ed. Kathleen Thelen and Wolfgang Streeck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9.

[11] While this might seem like a Hegelian dialectic, I argue that it is "haphazard" and distinctively irrational and so there is no inherent logic to this process.

[12] Giovanni Sartori, "Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion," *The American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (1962); Gerald Stourzh, "Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early Seventeenth to the Late Eighteenth Century," in *Conceptual Change and the Constitution*, ed. Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 1988). Classic accounts include Karl Loewenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). Herbert J. Spiro, *Government by Constitution: The Political System of Democracy* (New York: Random House, 1959).

[13] This does not mean they cannot change at all. Rather, for example the US Constitution is periodically reinterpreted by the US Supreme Court. Here I'm merely pointing out the difficulty in inducing substantial change. See David A. Strauss, *The Living Constitution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

constitutions neither necessarily enshrine rights nor produce meaningful limits on government.[14] From a comparative constitutional studies perspective, authoritarian state constitutions are the "exception" to the "normal". Since these state constitutions technically should not exist but for some reason do, they must fulfil a purpose. Hence, most scholars adopt a functionalist method in analysing them. While there is no inherent problem with this approach, it is incomplete. Relying on rational choice theories, they do a good job at describing what these state constitutions mean.[15] However, they cannot explain how they emerge.[16]

This is where the literature on constitutional drafting comes in that assumes the rationality of a state constitution's drafters.[17] Here, actors involved in the drafting channel distinct political interests, have different worldviews, ideologies, or policy preferences.[18] The act of putting together a document to coordinate relations between governing institutions and the people makes the design of state constitutions an inherently political act during which scarce political resources are reallocated. Winners and losers emerge. Drafters therefore channel a particular interest since they want the state constitution to serve a particular end: political elites want the constitution to *do something*. To this extent, the political scientist Ran Hirschl pointed out that a state constitution is "a form of politics by other means".[19] However, as Hirschl, Russell

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[14] A classic accounts is Ernst Faenkel, *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941). See also Guillermo O'Donnell, "Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America: A Partial Conclusion," in *The (Un)Rule of Law & the Underprivileged in Latin America*, ed. Juan E. Méndez, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro (Notre Dame: Indiana University Press, 1999). David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, "Sham Constitutions," *California Law Review* 101, no. 4 (2013).

[15] See for example Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," *Journal of Political Economy* 96 (1988).

[16] Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 47.

[17] While in 1997, Jon Elster could complain that "there is no body of literature that deals with the constitution-making process," this has been remedied in recent years. See Elster, "Ways of Constitution-Making," in *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). See for example Laurel E. Miller, ed., *Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010); Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg, eds., *Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[18] Todd A. Eisenstadt, A. Carl LeVan, and Tofigh Maboudi, *Constituents before Assembly* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Jon Elster, "Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process," *Duke Law Journal* 45 (1995).

[19] Ran Hirschl, "The Strategic Foundations of Constitutions," in *Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions*, ed. Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Hardin, and Laurel E. Miller have identified, both ways are rooted in a functional analytical framework.[20] Here, the state constitution is either assumed to fulfil a particular "function," or the rational drafters want it to serve a particular end.

I distance myself from functionalist and rational actor approaches. Instead, we should, in the words of Paul Pierson, "go back and look"[21] at the history of the state constitution's inception. Indeed, remembering their roots in political science, some constitutional scholars brought back a political approach to studying state constitutions.[22] Thus, state constitutions often follow war or revolution.[23] As Burgess noted over a century ago, "historical and revolutionary forces are the more prominent and important factors" in the drafting of state constitutions.[24] Historical forces therefore matter.

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[20] *Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also Russell Hardin, "Why a Constitution?," in *Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions*, ed. Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Laurel E. Miller, "Designing Constitution-Making Processes: Lessons from the Past, Questions for the Future," in *Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making*, ed. Laurel E. Miller (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010).

[21] Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, 47.

[22] For classic accounts of state constitutions as a result of political processes, see for example William W. Crane and Bernard Moses, *Politics: An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Constitutional Law* (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1889). Jonathan O'Neill, "Carl J Friedrich's Legacy: Understanding Constitutionalism as a Political System," *The European Legacy* 14 (2009). For recent accounts, see Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, eds., *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Robert Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Nathan J. Brown, *Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*. Saïd Amir Arjomand, "Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order: A Study in the Modernization of Political Traditions," *European Journal of Sociology* 33, no. 1 (1992).

[23] Karl Loewenstein, *Political Reconstruction* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1946). 212 See also Jon Elster, "Ways of Constitution-Making," in *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). "Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process." Andreas Sajo, *Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999). Quanxi Gao, "战争、革命与宪法 [War, Revolution and Constitutions]," *华东政法大学学报 [Huadong University of Political Science and Law Journal]*, no. 1 (2011). Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (London: Penguin Books, 1990). For a comparison and critique, see William E. Scheuerman, "Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt's Challenge to Carl Schmitt," *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence* 10, no. 1 (1997).

[24] John William Burgess, *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law: Sovereignty and Liberty* (Boston and London: Ginn & Company, 1890). Cited in A. E. Dick Howard, "A Traveler from an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative Constitutionalism," *Virginia Journal of International Law* 50 (2009): 8.

As I argue, state constitutions are the by-product of ongoing and haphazard interactions between various institutions and actors. This means to understand them, their text, and the institutional configuration they set out we have to analyse who these actors are, how they emerge, and how they experience change and impact each other. This view rejects a functionalist understanding of the state constitution that would see it as rooted in the "rationality"[25] of actors that establishes an institutional "equilibrium".[26] For example, Ghandi and Brownlee conceptualize institutions' existence in order to "shape the rules of the game".[27] Accordingly, China's state constitutions would exist to provide actors and their changing coalitions a tool they can manipulate. In her study of authoritarian regimes Geddes' shows how factions compete for power and seek to become dominant.[28] Here, actors would vie for power in a game of thrones that produces winners and losers in a zero-sum game. The winning faction would then freeze their worldview, institutions, and ideas in a state constitution. According to this logic, one would have to trace the emergence, struggle, and changing balance of power among factions to understand "whom" the state constitutions represents. This is misleading in four ways: first, the concept of "faction" is usually either too broad to be analytically meaningful or too narrow to become an identifier for collective action. Second, it neglects the

[25] This is the school of "rational choice institutionalism" that originated in the study of US congressional behaviour and economic institutions. See for example Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *The American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984). Also see Hall and Taylor's excellent review. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism," *Political Studies* 44 (1996). The work of Kenneth A. Shepsle in particular is worth mentioning, see for example Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, no. 2 (1989).

[26] As in game theory approaches. DiMaggio and Powell for example observe that "most public-choice theorists and economists who study institutions view them as provisional, temporary resting places on the way to an efficient equilibrium solution". See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, ed. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 10. Fritz W. Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).

[27] Jennifer Ghandi, *Political Insitutions under Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Thomas Pepinsky, "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism," *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (2013).

[28] Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

fluidity and changing nature of coalitions, especially in times of rapid change. Third, it assumes the strategic nature of decision-making. Fourth, most importantly it assumes the rational construction and design of institutions.

This dissertation goes against the idea of institutions as a product of rational actor-centered[29] and societal functionalism[30]. Rather, to understand them, the school of historical institutionalism and theories of institutional change are more promising. According to Kathleen Thelen, historical institutionalism sees institutions as the "legacy of concrete historical processes."[31] This invokes questions regarding timing, temporality, and sequence.[32] In other words, institutions are "the product of concrete temporal processes" and "emerge from and are sustained by features of the broader political and social context".[33] Hence, while I accept the idea of historical institutionalism that "conflict among rival groups"[34] lies at the heart of politics, I understand these "groups" as different streams forming institutions or "sequences" as James Mahoney explains.[35] Sequences are broadly conceptualized as incorporating

[29] That is that institutions exist because they serve the interests of those who created it. See for example Barry R. Weingast, "Rational Choice Institutionalism," in *The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002). Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." Weingast and Marshall, "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." Keith Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). Geoffrey Garrett, "The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union," *International Organization* 49 (1995).

[30] Here, institutions serve to resolve some form of societal problem. See for example Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Randall L. Calvert, "Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions," in *Explaining Social Institutions*, ed. Jack Night and Itai Sened (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). Gary Miller, "Rational Choice and Dysfunctional Institutions," *Governance* 13, no. 4 (2000).

[31] Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science,* 2 (1999).

[32] Karen Orren and Stepehn Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a "New Institutionalism"," in *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations*, ed. Lawrence D. Dodd and Calvin Jillson (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1994).

[33] Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics."

[34] Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism." For other treatments of historical institutionalism, see Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." Junko Kato, "Review Article: Institutions and Rationality in Politics - Three Varieties of Neo-Institutionalists," *British Journal of Political Science* 26, no. 4 (1996); Karen L. Remmer, "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis," *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (1997); Ellen M. Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," *Politics & Society* 26, no. 1 (1998); Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[35] James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," *Theory and Society* 29, no. 4 (2000).

institutions, but also single individuals or ideologies. Accordingly, institutions are subject to change and interact with each other by, for example, cooperating or engaging in struggle. However, these interactions happen not all the time, are multi-faceted, and often random. Here, actors would be compelled by "what they believe to be appropriate" rather than what would be effective.[36] More importantly actors often do not know what they are doing. Pierson argues that "time constraints, scarcities of information, and the need to delegate decisions may promote unanticipated effects".[37] The state constitution is then not an outcome of factional struggle or rational choice/design but a by-product of separate, yet intertwined sequences of *haphazard* institutional development. Their often random and unanticipated interactions can not only explain why the state constitution exists but also why it came into existence at that particular time.

The 1975 State Constitution of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) is well-suited to test this claim.[38] This is for two reasons. First, the 1967 January Revolution was a break with the pre-GPCR period. Given widespread Party and state paralysis, during the January Revolution monumental decisions were made that reverberated until the end of the GPCR.[39]

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[36] Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, 110. For example, Hall and Taylor argue that institutions should be more seen as "culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many societies…" See Hall and Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism."

[37] Pierson calls this the "most significant" limitation in the design of institutions. In Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, 115. Jervis also argued that people are unable to anticipate all the consequences of their actions. See Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[38] The literature on the 1975 State Constitution is spurious at best. See John Gardner, "The Chinese Constitution of 1975," *Government and Opposition* 11, no. 2 (1976); Jerome A. Cohen, "China's Changing Constitution," *China Quarterly*, no. 76 (1978); Changchang Wu, "Debates on Constitutionalism and the Legacies of the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* 227 (2016); Shiping Hua, "Zhang Chunqiao and the Politics of the 1975 People's Republic of China Constitution," *East Asia* 31 (2014); M.D. Fletcher, "Politics and Constitution in China," *Government and Opposition* 16, no. 3 (1981). Winberg Chai, "Introduction," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 4, no. 1 (1971). Even histories of that time just mention the 1975 State constitution just in passing. See for example Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The End of the Maoist Era : Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976* (New York: Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 2007). The best analysis of its drafting process and text is in Chongde Xu, *中华人民共和国宪法史 [Constitutional History of the People's Republic of China]* (Fuzhou: 福建人民出版社 [Fujian People's Publishing Press], 2005); Chongde Xu and Huahui He, "略论我国一九七五年的宪法 [Discussing the 1975 Constitution]," *法学研究资料 [Materials for Research on Legal Studies]*, no. 6 (1980).

[39] This is not to say that the GPCR provided an entirely blank slate and that there was no continuity whatsoever.

What is interesting about these choices is that they were highly contextual and effectively "random," solving problems that decision-makers saw as important *at that time*. Leaders were under time pressure and faced a shortage of information, channels that could provide them, and different interests at the Centre. This led to decisions being taken that were *right in the particular moment* but did not serve the best interests of the leadership. Worse, a few years later, these decisions led to the transformation of the GPCR. Indeed, far from being the evil genius with a long-term plan, Mao settled on choices that would undermine the GPCR in the years that followed. This narrative dismisses Mao's power plays and conspiracies to oust his rivals and recreate China.[40] While Mao's stature is a compelling and simple explanation for the outbreak and conduct of the GPCR, I show that the interactions between sequences emerging from the January Revolution are more important. Here, four sequences surfaced: the military; revolutionary forces; the Party; and the revolutionary committees (RCs).[41] These sequences interacted in unexpected ways, changing and transforming each other, with the top leadership most of the time unable to change course and being demoted to being onlookers. Neither the initial choices resulting in these sequences nor the interactions between them were rational or in the leadership's long-term interest. Rather they just "happened".

Second, while the interactions between sequences produced one formal state constitution (that of 1975) it created two constitutional texts (1970 and 1975). Originally drafted in summer 1970, a mere couple of weeks away from promulgation, the draft was shelved until 1975. This means that we can first analyse the chaotic emergence of the four sequences and their haphazard interactions until 1970 and see *how* and *why* they create *what* draft. Afterwards, we

[40] Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2006).

[41] Harvey Nelsen, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* 51 (1972). Andrew G. Walder, *Chang Ch'un-Ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1978). Winberg Chai, "The Reorganization of the Chinese Communist Party, 1966-1968," *Asian Survey* 8, no. 11 (1968); Peijie Wang, *Revolutionary Committees in the Cultural Revolution Era of China: Exploring a Mode of Governance in Historical and Future Perspectives* (eBook: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

can look at institutional development and the sequences' interrelation until 1975 and again cross-check with the final version of 1975. As I will argue, both the 1970 constitutional draft and the final 1975 State Constitution reflected the ongoing interactions between the military, revolutionaries, the RCs, and the Party both during their drafting process and in its text.

There are then three ways my argument is tied into the theoretical literature on state constitutions and institutions.

1. State constitutions are not the result of meticulous design and planning rather than being based on the interactions of institutional sequences. Here I go against the literature on constitutional drafting and design that is based on rational actors with clearly defined aims.
2. Actors do not act in their best interests when creating institutions. Rather, they act based on short-term interest, and a lack of information and understanding. This goes against rationalism in the creation of institutions.
3. Once faced with an institution, actors are unsure about what they are doing and unable to anticipate the consequences of their choices. Hence, institutions produce unintentional outcomes and efforts to fix problems often further reinforce or worsen them.

With respect to the 1975 State Constitution as a case study, my argument shows the dominance of structural over individual factors. There was no grand plan by the leadership—I show that the interactions between sequences constrain actors to the extent that they react rather than act. At the same time, the interactions are often the unintended consequences of seemingly random choices. In a nutshell, out of the *chaotic* January Revolution, the GPCR then produced *chaotic* institutions engaging in *chaotic* interactions, producing a *chaotic* 1975 State Constitution as a

by-product. If this is correct, then—and this might be the biggest takeaway—chaotic institutions can work.[42]

There are then two methodological challenges. First, the emergence and reinforcement of sequences. This involves, in the words of Ikenberry, "critical junctures and developmental pathways".[43] Second, the interactions between the sequences that result in a state constitution as a by-product. This involves theories of institutional change. I will examine both facets below.

Critical Junctures and Path-dependent Processes

The emergence of institutions is often associated with a critical juncture initiating a series of path-dependent processes.[44] These processes comprise three phases: first, the initial "critical juncture".[45] In the literature, critical junctures are often big, exogeneous shocks, such as war or revolution.[46] Capoccia and Kelemen define them as "*relatively* short periods of time during which there is a *substantially* heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the

[42] For a similar argument see for example Lynn T. White, *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
[43] Cited in Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics."
[44] As Thelen and Streeck argue, path-dependence is a response to understanding institution-building as "a matter of constructing efficient incentive structures on a more or less 'clean slate'". Streeck and Thelen, "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," 6. Arguments involving "path-dependence" have been a fixture in political science for half a century. See for example Seymour Marin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, ed. Seymour Marin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967). Paul David, "Clio and the Economics of Qwerty," *American Economic Review* 75, no. May (1985); Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[45] Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Stephen Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," in *The Elusive State: Internatinoal and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. James A. Caporaso (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989).
[46] See for example Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For another narrative of how the collapse of the Eastern bloc was far from sharp, see Jerzy Hausner, Bob Jessop, and Klaus Nielsen, eds., *Strategic Choice and Path-Dependency in Post-Socialism: Institutional Dynamics in the Tansformation Process* (Hants, UK: Edward Elgar, 1995).

outcome of interest".[47] Based on this definition, I want to highlight two points about critical junctures:

- Relative to the period preceding and following them, critical junctures open up spaces where potentially far-reaching decisions can be made.[48] They present open spaces of contention that enable multiple actors to vie for the right course of action. According to Capoccia, during a critical juncture "the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous".[49] The actors are no longer constrained by institutional shackles but free to choose between different alternatives. In James Mahoney's words, critical junctures "are characterized by the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives".[50] As he recognizes, in this period actors "shape outcomes in a more voluntaristic fashion than normal circumstances permit".[51] Thus, a critical juncture denotes the sudden change from an "unfree" to a "free" state and the appearance of options from which actors can choose. What characterizes a critical juncture then is the actors' freedom of choice relative to the period before and after the juncture.[52]
- Because of this, critical junctures denote episodes of "high uncertainty and unpredictability".[53] Initial conditions do not determine the institutional outcome of the critical juncture. Actors scramble to make decisions without necessarily considering

[47] Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," *World Politics* 59, no. 3 (2007).
[48] It is important to note that although critical junctures are associated with change, there is no requirement for change to actually manifest itself. See ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology."
[51] *The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 7.
[52] Ann Swidler here distinguishes between "settled" and "unsettled" times. See Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 2 (1986).
[53] Capoccia and Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism."

long-term consequences. In Capoccia's words, critical junctures trigger a period of "political uncertainty in which different options for radical institutional change are viable; antecedent conditions define the range of institutional alternative available to decision makers but do not determine the alternative chosen; one of these options is selected".[54] For example, in his investigation of liberal presidents decision-making in critical junctures, Mahoney observed that they were influenced by "immediate political situations".[55] In the absence of institutional constraints, political actors thus can make decisions that further their own interests and aims. They then demonstrate the power of agency.[56]

Second, critical junctures are followed by path-dependent processes that reinforce the trajectory of the first phase.[57] For Margaret Levi "path dependence," if anything, means "that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice".[58] As Pierson points out, the "probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path".[59] This means two things: first, it indicates that decisions taken during the critical juncture "matter more" than later decisions. If critical junctures are akin to open spaces, the path-dependent process can be likened to the gradual occupation of this space. In Douglass North's words, "Path dependence is a way to

[54] Giovanni Capoccia, "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change," in *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 151.
[55] Mahoney, *The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America*, 42.
[56] As Mahoney argues, decisions "demonstrate the power of agency by revealing how long-term development patterns can hinge on distant actor decisions of the past". See ibid., 7.
[57] Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, 51. As Pierson notes, even though critical junctures usually focus on large scale events, small "causes" might also be sufficient to initiate path-dependent dynamics.
[58] Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, ed. Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[59] Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2000).

narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making through time."[60] Decisions taken during junctures close off alternative paths, thereby narrowing the space. Thus, Pierson has observed that critical junctures are "critical" because "they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter"[61]. He argues that once established, institutions become sticky and "locked in" because they are subject to "positive feedback". Second, steps further down a particular path render it "sticky" and harder to change. Similarly, Mahoney emphasizes how once, in a critical juncture, "a particular option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available."[62] The point here is that subsequent decisions make it harder to change the sequence.[63] This is because, as Pierson notes, the sequence is subject to "increasing returns" that reinforce the path already taken. This does not just apply to institutions but also "basic outlooks on politics" such as "ideologies" or "understandings of particular aspects of governments or orientations toward political groups".[64] Once an ideology or institution is decided on and proliferated, it becomes gradually more costly to change it.[65]

Hence, critical junctures and path-dependent processes can explain both the existence and persistence of the four sequences of the RC, Party, Military, and revolution. However, this literature cannot explain how they interact and together produce the 1970 constitutional draft and the 1975 State Constitution—this requires theories of institutional change that I will outline below.

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[60] North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. 98-99
[61] Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, 135.
[62] Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology."
[63] Mahoney identifies three features of path-dependent analyses: first, they involve the study of causal processes that are "highly sensitive to events that take place in the early stages of an overall historical sequence". Second, "early historical events are contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior event". Third, they are "marked by relatively deterministic causal patterns". See ibid.
[64] Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics."
[65] Typically, characterizations of path-dependence also end with, third, a description of the dislodgment of "a long-lasting equilibrium". However, as I have noted before, I reject the notion of equilibrium in favour of a more dynamic explanation. See "Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes," *Studies in American Political Development* 14, no. Spring (2000).

"Conversion" as Institutional Change

It would be misleading that changes can just be instigated by exogenous shocks rather than endogenous variables. Institutions, once established, are not inert but continue to experience change. [66] Mahoney and Thelen identify four modes of gradual institutional change: displacement, layering, drift, and conversion.[67] Of the four, I show in this dissertation that after the 1967 January Revolution, the main driver of institutional change was conversion. It is key to explaining the interactions between the four path-dependent sequences initiated by the January Revolution.[68]

"Conversion" means to strategically redeploy existing rules to produce different effects. As Thelen summarizes, conversion "provides an analytic point of departure for understanding how institutions created for one set of purposes come, in time, to be turned to wholly new ends".[69]

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[66] The argument that institutions, once established, are relatively inert, is still widespread. See for example Walter W. Powell, "Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, ed. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Ronald L. Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, ed. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[67] Displacement denotes the abolishment of existing rules and introduction of new ones. It involves the breakdown of existing and building of entirely new institutions that often accompanies revolutions. However, it can also be a slow-moving process, whereby the "losers" of a system introduce new institutions to compete against the old order. Layering means the promulgation of new rules atop of existing ones or alongside them. In comparison with displacement, layering involves "amendments, revisions, or additions" to the existing corpus of rules and institutions. Thus, a new rule might have long-lasting consequences and change the institution from the ground-up. Drift signifies a situation where shifts in the environment lead to changes in the impact of existing rules. For example, an institution might benefit from neglecting changes in the environment. See James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 15-16.
These four seem to be accepted in the literature, see for example John Hogan, "Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 3 (2006). Pierson just distinguishes between "layering," "functional conversion," and "diffusion" whereby diffusion refers to the "institutional isomorphism" developed by DiMaggio and Powell. See Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, 137-39. Streeck and Thelen also add "exhaustion" in a 2005 book chapter. To them, "exhaustion" is "a process in which behaviors invoked or allowed under existing rules operate to undermine these". See Streeck and Thelen, "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," 29-30.

[68] As Thelen citing Skocpol argues, functional conversion is "genuinely historical" since it looks at social processes "as they unfold over time and in relation to other processes". See Kathleen Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37. Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1992).

[69] Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*, 36.

As Streeck and Thelen outline, it has four characteristics:[70] first, cognitive limits of institutions' builders. Complexity means that builders of institutions are not all seeing, make mistakes, and cannot anticipate all the consequences of their decisions.[71] Hence, the building of institutions often leads to unintended effects.[72] Second, institution building requires compromise. Compromise however often leads to the ambiguity of different rules that characterize behaviour – and provide spaces for political contestation. The ambiguity and the abstract nature of organizational rules means that actors can interpret them in different ways and deploy them to serve their own interests. Here, a high level of discretion for interpretation and enforcement is paired with authorities' weak veto responsibilities.[73] For example, in her investigation into poverty and employment programs, Margaret Weir discovered how the civil rights movement in the United States influenced their use.[74] Coinciding with substantial unrest, President Johnson used them to funnel money to black communities. As a result, this changed their initially non-racial character and the programs became associated with minority constituencies. In this example, actors exploited "the inherent ambiguities of the institutions" that did not forbid a change of focus.[75] Third, actors are strategic. This means that even those not involved in the institution building process will aim at interpreting, circumventing, or subverting rules that clash with their own interests. This could lead to their integration into the institution and reinforce this change. Thus, the introduction of new supporters who were previously excluded or at the margins could change an institution's goals and functions.[76] Fourth, as Pierson does

[70] The four points are taken from Streeck and Thelen, "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies," 26-28.
[71] Ibid., 26. See also James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscorvering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*.
[72] Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, 116.
[73] This is a point made in Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 19.
[74] Margaret Weir, "Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation," in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[75] Mahoney and Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," 16-18.
[76] For examples of conversion see Edward L. Gibson and Tulia Falleti, "Unity by the Stick: Regional Conflict and the Origins of Argentine Federalism," in *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Edward L. Gibson (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). Also, Weir looked at poverty and employment

not grow tired to emphasize, time matters.[77] In the long life of institutions, they outlive their designers and face changing external environments, leading to their conversion. An example of this is the vocational training system in German first established in the late 19th century to combat social democracy. In over one hundred years, it was gradually converted into a pillar of organized labour and a key link between politics, business, and workers that it is now.[78] Thus, changes in the social and political environment can shift an institution's functions to address new issues or "in the service of new goals".[79] In its core, conversion then means that institutions initially created for one purpose over time become instruments to fulfil other aims. However, while the literature conceptualizes conversion as a form of "compromise," I also emphasize the possibility of conflict and struggle in historical institutionalism.[80] Here I argue both with Orren and Skowronek[81] (who posit that institutions embodying different political settlements continuously clash) and Dobbin[82] (who argues that institutions are culturally determined and constrain each other).[83] Moreover, as I mentioned above, I do not accept the strategic nature of actors' decision-making. Rather, a situation can compel institutions to convert themselves or it can be an unintended side effect of decisions.

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to illustrate the logic of conversion. See Weir, "Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation." Shonfeld and Vogel have investigated conversion in the political economy of industrial countries. See Andrew Shonfeld, *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Steven K. Vogel, *Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). Conversion has also been used with respect to unions that are turned on their head. Here, see for example Kathleen Thelen, *Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Nelson Lichtenstein, "The Union's Early Days: Shop Stewards and Seniority Rights," in *Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept*, ed. Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter (Boston: South End Books, 1988).

[77] Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*.

[78] One example of this is Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*.

[79] "How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis," in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 228.

[80] I follow here Moe, who has observed the importance of "power" in institutional analysis. Terry M. Moe, "Power and Political Institutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 2 (2005). See also Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict*.

[81] Orren and Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a "New Institutionalism"."

[82] Frank Dobbin, *Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain and France in the Railway Age* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[83] Thelen takes a middle ground as well. See Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*, 37.

Conversion is the main way to understanding the unfolding interactions between the four sequences that produced the 1970 constitutional draft and, five years later, the 1975 State Constitution. Indeed, conversion can explain how interactions amongst the RC, Party, military, and revolution sequences produced two radically different documents in 1970 and 1975. I outline this below.

Overview of the argument

The January Revolution was a critical juncture that initiated four path-dependent and intertwined sequences that together haphazardly produced the state constitution as a by-product. I argue that the 1967 January Revolution ended with four decisions that placed the GPCR on a path-dependent trajectory. First, Mao's decision in favour of the RCs. Second, the decision to give the military an outstanding role in the formation of RCs. Third, Mao's decision to keep the Party; and fourth, the establishment of the "Shanghai model" of bottom-up revolution and an accompanying ideology of revolutionary change.

Not one of these decisions was inevitable. The choices were not strategic and thought-through. Rather, they were time-sensitive, pragmatic and short-term, and based on incomplete information. Decisions were not actively taken rather than being forced upon actors. For example, there was nothing "strategic" about choosing the RC as a governance organ. Likewise, Shanghai's "bottom-up" revolution and its selection as a model was not planned either. The contingency of decision-making means that the January Revolution produced fields of interest—"sequences". There, actors can shift or support two or more sequences at the same time. For example, it is fair to say that Mao and the top leadership supported all of them. It is also sensible to say that given the military controlled most RCs in the beginning, they supported

both the "military" and "RC" sequence. Before I briefly describe the four sequences and how they interact with each other through conversion.[84]

"Revolutionary Committee" Sequence: The RC was the primary and most significant institutional innovation of the January Revolution and the revolutionary upheaval it unleashed. From 1967, it underwent three main conversions. First, as a "revolutionary" organ, it was to implement the policies of the GPCR. After January 1967, it came to be effectively run by the military for the sole reason that cadres had been discredited, rebels had no administrative experience, and the military was the only game in town. The military's takeover of the RCs was thus a direct, yet unintended result of the revolutionary sequence that unleashed mayhem in the country. Given the need for governance, this had another consequence: it converted the RCs from "revolutionary" into "administrative" organs and led to a sprawling bureaucracy. This was reinforced in the years thereafter. In the 1970 constitutional draft and the 1975 State Constitution, the RC was for all means and purposes an administrative organ. Second, originally, it combined Party and state organs. However, with the gradual restoration of the Party in the late 1960s, the RC became inferior to it. Eventually, this led to the RC's substitution through the Party by 1975. Third, initially the RC was comprised of a "three-in-one-combination" of soldiers, cadres, and revolutionaries. However, after the January Revolution, it came to be led by the military, with cadres discredited and revolutionaries unable to administer. As a military-led organ, its leaders became to be represented at the 9th Party Congress in 1969. Being actively pushed out afterwards, the military was slowly replaced by capable people who knew how to lead an administrative organ: cadres. Hence here, the RC underwent a conversion from "three-in-one" to "military-led," to "cadre-led".

[84] When I highlight "conversion," this is not to say that there were no other factors. For example, "drift" plays a role, too. The lack of governing institutions led to a demand for effective governance among the people. While RCs did not have to respond to that, many did, resulting in a burgeoning bureaucracy. However, "conversion" was the main engine of institutional change.

"Revolution" Sequence: The adoption of the "Shanghai model" of revolution over other models during the January Revolution and the formulation of the "continuous revolution" theory was a high point of bottom-up revolution against governing structures. Afterwards, "revolution" underwent three major conversions. First, while in 1966 and 1967 revolution was fought from the bottom-up against the established Party-state, by the 9th Party Congress in 1969, it had moved into the Party. Here, revolution was converted from being "outside" *against* structures into "inside" *for* structures. As part of the Party's institutional corset, it had a stake in sustaining existing Party organizations. This became evident in the 1970 constitutional draft. Until 1975 then, it became synonymous with Party structures. Not just housed inside it, the Party appropriated it and came to direct it. This turned revolution into a tool of governance. The two other conversions contribute and reinforce this trend. Thus, while revolution was *against* cadres in 1967, revolutionaries *became* cadres by 1969, and then *were* cadres by 1975. This means they became the very "thing" they initially fought against. Another conversion aligned with this was where revolution was situated: while it was first part of the RC, when the Party was reconstituted, revolution as both "theory" and "individuals" moved into the Party. Rather than converting the Party into a "revolutionary" Party, the Party converted revolution to support its own structures. It was this "revolution" that entered the 1975 State Constitution.

"Military" Sequence: The military's heightened importance was an unintended result of the January Revolution. Meant to stabilize the RCs and ensure rebel takeover of the former government and Party structures, it was the military that often ended up in charge of them. This was especially so at the sub-provincial level where the grand majority of RCs were headed by soldiers. As this heralded the conversion of the RC from a "revolutionary" into an "administrative" organ, at the same time this signified the military's conversion from a "fighting" to an "administrative" force. It was this military that entered the 1970 constitutional draft. It was also this kind of military that entered the Party and contributed to converting the

Party from a "revolutionary" into an "administrative" Party. With bureaucracy growing and combined with events at the 9th Party Congress and its Second Plenum in 1970, the military was slowly ejected from governance institutions and converted back from an "administrative" into a "fighting" force. This then was evident in the 1975 State Constitution.

"Party" Sequence: Surviving the January Revolution due to Mao's intervention, the Party kept a low profile. After it gradually re-emerged at the end of 1967 it underwent two major conversions. First, from being part of the RC that ostensibly combined Party and state, by 1970 it had positioned itself as hierarchically superior to the RC. As early as 1973, it had come to substitute the RC. This was just possible because of the second conversion it underwent: from a "revolutionary" into an "administrative" organ. By 1970, the Party had been converted from a "revolutionary" organ into a quasi-administrative Party. Both the revolutionaries and the leaders of the military-led administrative RCs became members of the Central Committee at the 9th Party Congress. At the same time, Party structures were reinvigorated. This means that revolution was converted from against structures to supporting them, thereby neutering the revolutionaries. This was helped by the military leaders who introduced their administrative style into the Party. By 1970, this led to the creation of a Party that was less revolutionary than bureaucratic. However, in 1975, the Party's usurpation of the RCs converted it into a fully-fledged administrative organ. In the 1975 State Constitution, both the RCs and revolution emerged from the institutional structure of the Party itself.

As I will show in this dissertation, apart from the random occurrence of the sequences themselves during the January Revolution, conversion was almost always the unintentional consequence of processes or decisions made. For example, the military did not plan to take over the RCs—rather, this was the unintentional consequence of revolution at the grassroots. The military takeover again led to the unintentional result of turning the RCs from revolutionary into administrative organs—and so on. Hence, we have several processes that

happen simultaneously and are results of the arbitrary and random choices made, ultimately, during the January Revolution. The process of conversion is summarized in the table below.

Table 1: Sequence conversion during the GPCR

		Function in January 1967	**Conversion**	
			1970	*1975*
Sequence	**RC**	Revolutionary	Administrative	Administrative
		Combined Party and State	Hierarchically inferior to the Party	Substituted by the Party
		"Three-in-one-combination" of cadres, soldiers, mass representatives	Military-led	Cadre-led
	Revolution	Against Party-state structures	Becomes part of Party structures	Synonymous with Party structures
		Against cadres	Becomes cadre	Is cadre
		RC	Party	Party
	Military	Fighting force	Administrative force	Fighting force
	Party	RC combined Party and state	Hierarchically superior to the RC	Substituting the RC
		Survived	Revolutionary/ Administrative	Administrative

Here, the critical juncture of the January Revolution resulted in the creation of four path-dependent intertwined sequences that were subject to institutional change by conversion and

interacted with each other. A by-product of this were the draft of the state constitution of 1970 and its final version in 1975. Both reflected the interactions amongst the sequences in their texts and were, as such, a by-product of institutional change. The documents produced were therefore snapshots of the institutional setup and power balance between the four different sequences at that particular time.

Every chapter of this dissertation contains one field of interaction: the formation of RCs (Chapter 2), revolutionary succession (Chapter 3), the re-emergence of the Party (Chapter 4), the drafting and text of the state constitution in 1970 (Chapter 5), the 9th Party Congress and its Second Plenum (Chapter 6), institutional developments from 1970-1975 (Chapter 7), and the 10th Party Congress and the 1975 State Constitution (Chapter 8).

Broader Implications

Understanding the state constitution as a by-product of ongoing separate yet haphazardly interacting institutional sequences has broader implications for understanding state constitutions and constitutionalism in China because this substantiates a different paradigm of *what* Chinese state constitutions are, *where* they come from, and *how* they are. Given that the entire state and all law and the legal system derive their position from the state constitution, these implications are far-reaching. According to my framework based on critical junctures and the formation of sequences, their random interactions, and their by-product in the form of a state constitution, there are three main implications.

First, institutional change and interactions between sequences produce the state constitution. Here, the process of change that aligns and posits organizational forms and actors against each other and the drafting ritual reflects the power structure between different actors inasmuch as the state constitution's eventual text. It is then the state constitution that reflects the balance of

power amongst them in this moment.[85] To understand the role of the state and law, it is then more important to keep an eye on institutional changes within Party, state organs, and society and their interactions than the state constitution's text.

Second, this means that once promulgated, the state constitution's text is unstable. Since institutional change in all its forms is never-ending, the text's stability depends on the number of sequences. Even in the extreme case of one sequence, the state constitution's meaning is subject to both endogenous and exogenous change. For example, laws and regulations modify its meaning; new institutions and interests enter the fray; or wars or revolutions break out. With more sequences, the difference between provisions in the state constitution and reality opens a space exploited by actors. Thus, the state constitution and its meaning are subject to the same process of institutional change that creates it in the first place. Political actors in the Party and the state exploit the differences between the state constitution and other normative documents of the state and Party, leading to an accumulation in differences of implementation and focus. In this, the state constitution as an institution is subject to the same gradual changes that other institutions are. Under Xi Jinping, struggles among the elite and institutions are still ongoing. The State Constitution did not signify the end of elite struggle or institutional change rather than a temporary and punctual victory for a political line that has to be continuously defended against elite and institutional encroachment. In a zero-sum game, even small changes to vocabulary or the position of people in photos are considered as having implications for the structure of power.

Third, this poses the question whether the state constitution sets forth normative values or not. Indeed, normative values are accorded to by the (temporary) "winners". "Winners" *in this moment* exist to the extent that the institutional setup as set down in the state constitution

[85] This idea is in Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*, 37.

prescribes a balance of power. Likewise, it depends on "who" the winner is. Clearly, if "society" or "state" have the upper hand, normative value might wander. For example, if society were to gain a more influential voice in today's China, the emphasis on the CCP might be dulled and individual rights strengthened. It is unlikely that this will be the case, since it was an institutional overweight of the CCP that resulted in the 2018 amendments in the first place. Rather than a focus on individual rights, it is the "Party's leadership" and, for example, "socialist core values" that form important clauses and have therefore normative value. However, since institutional change is never-ending, so our interpretation of the state constitution and its meaning must continuously track changes within institutions and the interactions between them. In this, the normative power of the State Constitution must be evaluated against ongoing sequences. Here, if change to their position is minimal, the normative meaning of provisions is stable. Thus, as long as the CCP maintains its enhanced power over other sequences, it would be sensible to interpret the state constitution through it and its documents. Likewise, if change is high, the meaning and important provisions are different. The point is simple enough: not all values in the state constitution have normative value. What values have value and how must be evaluated through an analysis of the actors (sequences) that have the power to determine this.

By extension, this means that the role of institutions such as the "state" and "law" is constantly being renegotiated. Thus, the importance of law for governing society must be periodically re-evaluated with respect to the dynamic interactions between institutions and the balance of power between institutions in this particular moment in time. The role and importance of law then is but one of the many outcomes of institutional change. Under Xi Jinping, the state constitution and the laws that are based on it have become more important relative to other governing instruments, reflected by the importance attached to "governing according to law". Yet, the institutional weight of the Party relative to the state translates into a heightened

importance for the Party's instruments vis-à-vis the state and law. Thus, the anti-poverty campaign, social stability maintenance and ideological education are more important than "law". Regarding the state constitution as an outcome of sequences then means that law is highly context-dependent, used to different degrees, in different places, and sectors, resulting in a fractured and highly fragmented "law"[86] that works together with other governance tools.[87]

But there is another takeaway: the randomness of human action. While institutions are created with ideas in mind, constitutional drafters or institutional designers have great difficulties to grasp the complexity of reality. More so, they are unlikely to be able to anticipate how an institution or state constitution will be used in the future. Hence, observed consequences might be inasmuch intended as they are unintentional. To determine what they are, we have to engage in historical inquiry. This also shows that even though institutions are built on chaos, they somehow can *work*—which is both surprising and entirely unsurprising.

However, the history of random institutional change and struggle preceding, during, and following the 2018 constitutional amendments cannot be written. Aside from a dearth of materials such as internal notes or summaries of meetings and organizational materials to trace institutional change, there is no critical juncture that could provide a starting point. Likewise, without enough time elapsed between now and then, it is difficult to identify the various institutions and actors. We do not have this problem with the 1975 State Constitution, the January Revolution of 1967, and the four sequences it established. This dissertation tells its story.

[86] At this low level of abstraction, it is very difficult to talk about "law" rather than regulations, rules, or norms. That is why I use it here in quotation marks and for reasons of consistency.

[87] Harold J. Berman describes the same mechanism in his analysis of Soviet legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis's thinking in the 1930s. Berman writes, "Law, for him and for Soviet jurisprudence generally, is only one of the possible means of social control. Social control in itself is not synonymous with law." Thus, it is not "illogical" that lawyers, judges and prosecutors "actively anticipated and fostered the withering away of law". While one could argue that this was the case in China during the GPCR, this is clearly not true in the 21st century. See Harold J. Berman, *Justice in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Random House, 1963), 43-44.

Plan and Overview

As the graphic above indicated, Chapter I starts with the "critical juncture" of the January Revolution that launched the four sequences. I show how the January Revolution opened up a contingent political space wherein actors had enormous freedom to make far-ranging decisions and develop different forms of political organization. The decision of the central leadership to form RCs was far from predetermined, with different forms of organization vying for central acknowledgement. Likewise, the decisions to affirm the Shanghai model of revolution, use the military to stabilize ailing revolutionaries, and retain the Party were highly contextual decisions taken in high-pressure situations. However, while beneficial in the moment, they had unintended consequences, putting the GPCR on a long-term path of chaotic political development, institutional rivalry, and widespread chaos.

Focusing on the "Revolutionary Committee" sequence, Chapter II then deploys a dataset to look at their development throughout China and interaction with the "military" and "revolution" sequences. It was Shanghai's call that inspired revolutionaries all over China to paralyze Party and government organs. As a result of this, the military was compelled to take over RCs at the provincial and sub-provincial levels. As I demonstrate, the insertion of the military initiates the RCs' gradual conversion from revolutionary into administrative organs.

In Chapter III, I treat ideology and personnel at the elite-level. This chapter tells the story of the "revolutionary" sequence, the reemergence of the Party, and Lin Biao's accession. Here, "continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" aside from instilling a new consciousness in the populace, denoted limited government and justified revolution against authority. The slow rebuilding of Party organizations and the absorption of revolutionary personnel supplements this theory. This already indicates a shift of revolution from RCs to Party organs and the conversion of the Party from administration- to revolution-based. I also show how the military sequence further reinforced itself at the top with Lin Biao in charge.

In Chapter IV, all four sequences come together for the first time. I examine the conversion of the RCs from revolutionary to administrative organs using quantitative data. Analyzing bureaucratic development of the military-led RCs, the Party, and their personnel at the national and sub-national levels, I show that the consequences of this "revolutionary" reorganization meant substantial bureaucratic reductions of up to 90%. Recovering until 1970, RCs took up more governance tasks, while the Party's reconstitution diluted the military-led local organs. Chapter IV therefore shows the constitution of revolutionary governance, and the conversion of the RC and Party through the shift of revolutionary action from the former to the latter.

It was this balance of power that would produce frictions between the four sequences. They became evident during the drafting of the state constitution in 1970. Chapter V treats this process that exhibited enormous tensions. I also examine the document's text and show how it reflected the institutional changes until 1970 and froze an institutional setup and balance of power between the four sequences. The hallmark of the draft was the seeming irrelevance of the RCs because of the expanding Party organs. While exhibiting and incorporating revolutionary ideology, it neutered their organization and diminished the military's role. At this shift's root was the restoration of Party organs that exerted supremacy over the RCs and the military and the general trend towards greater bureaucratization.

Chapter VI treats this conundrum between Party, military, and revolutionary organs by looking at the 9th Party Congress and the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee. Both events further reinforced the conversion process of the Party and the RCs. The Party Congress both sidelined the leftist radicals while consolidating the Party's conversion from a pre-GPCR bureaucratic Party into a "revolutionary" Party. At the same time, the military drew Mao's ire. The Second Plenum then shut down the military and hastened their ejection from both Party and RCs, thereby quickening the RCs' conversion from revolutionary to administrative state organ.

While by 1970 these trends were obvious, they were yet reversible due to continuing institutional weakness. This changed in the years thereafter, treated in Chapter VII and VIII where I bridge the gap between 1970 and the promulgation of the 1975 State Constitution and analyze the final step in the demise of the RC.

With the RC gradually shrouding into irrelevance and the military on its way out, between 1970 and 1975 the main sequences actors were the "revolutionaries" and the "Party". Chapter VII is both qualitative and quantitative, analyzing organizational and personnel changes until 1975. The Party reinserted itself and revolution shifted from the state's RCs to the Party for good. With the liberation of cadres, a "new" social group entered the Party and converted the Party and RCs. The military was ousted from the Party and the RCs in 1972. At the same time, Zhou Enlai took advantage of the vacuum and put a focus on administration and the building of a corpus of economic rules, thereby hastening (but not starting) the conversion of the Party and RC. The last gasp of the revolutionaries came with the 1974 campaign aimed at Zhou. Petering out after a few months, with Mao's erstwhile successor Wang Hongwen marginalized, and new mass organizations established, the Party was the last sequence standing.

The 1975 State Constitution captured this new balance. RCs were completely marginalized, the Party and its cadres had taken over the state, the military had become irrelevant, and the revolutionaries were marginally represented with their ideology (that had moved from outside "against" the Party-state apparatus to inside of it, and from antagonism to cooperation). Finally, in the Conclusion I recap the key issues, expand several of the main arguments, and show what lessons we can learn from this analysis for understanding the institutional change, the relationship between political change and law, and the role and value of state constitutions in China.

Chapter I: The January Revolution

Introduction

The "January Revolution" of 1967 is critical to understanding institutional development in the GPCR. In roughly over one month, the January Revolution set China's development on a path that would define it until the late 1970s. It created four sequences of the "RC," "Party," "military," and "revolution" which haphazard and often random interactions amongst each other informed the GPCR until its end and produced the 1970 constitutional draft and the 1975 State Constitution as by-products.

Within the short period of six weeks, the January Revolution produced four sequences that would determine the GPCR and its eventual failure. At the end of January 1967, the Centre affirmed a new type of political organization in the form of the RC. Based on the "three-in-one-combination" comprising representatives from the military, cadres, and the masses, this organ came to define governance at the provincial level and below for the remainder of the GPCR and until 1979. A second result of this process was the involvement of the military to stabilize the RCs. The affirmation of the military's role to balance revolutionary cadres and rebels and restore order put it in a key position once widespread chaos broke out at the sub-provincial level. The movement of rebels comprising Red Guard students and workers were a third outcome of the January Revolution. Launched in late 1966, Shanghai became the model for bottom-up, worker-associated revolutionary action that sparked the theory of "continuous revolution". Lastly, the fourth result of the January Revolution was the survival of the Party apparatus. While the RC should have integrated both Party and state under one roof, Mao decided to keep the Party as an institution alive in mid-February.

The January Revolution took on different forms in Shanghai, Shanxi, Shandong, Guizhou, and Heilongjiang. Shanghai's revolution became an indispensable element of official and popular discourse for legitimizing the GPCR by providing the inspirational basis for a frame of working class-led bottom-up revolution. Its significance was paralleled by advancements in other provinces.[1] Rebel organizations in Shanxi were the first to seize power in a province and frame it as such. The leadership credited Shanxi for establishing a "grand alliance" that included revolutionary cadres and the military and providing an early case for the success of military intervention. Shandong advanced these experiences. The role of the military, the early support of cadres, and the relationship with mass organizations working together in unison became even more pertinent. Guizhou then formed a temporary power organ providing an institutional "guarantee" for a grand alliance and built a political program for action that included suggestions for handling rival mass organizations, disposed cadres, and political organization. Finally, Heilongjiang was the first province to establish a RC as a governing organ that supplanted both Party and government by replacing their work departments. The diffusion of experiences among the different provinces and between them and the Centre and their adaptation to the differing "local situations" played a pivotal role in establishing the four sequences of "RC," "Party," "military," and "revolution".

The January Revolution was a "critical juncture". Because of its key position relative to the path-dependent process it initiates, in a critical juncture, "time expands". Given the importance and weight of decisions in this critical moment, decision-makers are ill-placed to evaluate the consequences of their choices. Why did an actor take a particular decision and not another? As Capoccia argues this is important "not only to rule out alternative explanations for specific

[1] There is a discussion regarding whether or not Shanghai influenced the other provinces or vice versa. The former is part of the official discourse, see for example Chunming Jin, *文化大革命史稿 [Historical Manuscripts of the Cultural Revolution]* (Chengdu: 四川人民出版社 [Sichuan People's Publishing Press], 1995), Chapter 9. Yiching Wu, *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 138.

cases but also…to provide a compelling account of the exact mechanisms that give rise to the path-dependent legacy".[2] To answer this question then requires a fine-grained analysis of actors involved, their motivations, and a consideration of counterfactuals. We must analyse this "through the study of historical sources, establish who were the key decision makers, what choices were available to them…. How close actors came to selecting an alternative option, and what likely consequences the choice of an alternative option would have had for the institutional outcome of interest".[3]

To do this, tracing narratives of events is important.[4] As Capoccia and Kelemen argue, "because heightened contingency is a core characteristic of critical junctures, counterfactual analysis and narrative process tracing are particularly important and must be explicitly employed to study them".[5] As philosopher Isaiah Berlin contends, contingency is the study "of what occurred…in the context of what could have happened".[6] This chapter takes their advice to heart. There was nothing inevitable about the four paths that emerged from the January Revolution. Neither the RC, the Party's survival, the military's involvement, nor "bottom-up" revolution was part of official policy. The Centre's decision to endorse Shanghai's revolution paradoxically resulted in the central support without which power seizure there and elsewhere would have failed. Likewise, the decision in favor of Heilongjiang's RC and against Shanghai's "Commune" was linked to the military's ability to stabilize governance. It was a haphazard decision rather than a thought-through plan. Similarly, Mao's decision for the Party to survive was a choice against Shanghai's model of revolution and for continuity. In sum, the January Revolution was a time wherein actors were no longer constrained by institutional shackles.

[2] Capoccia, "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change," 155.
[3] Ibid., 159.
[4] See for example Robert H. Bates et al., eds., *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998).
[5] Capoccia and Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism."
[6] Isaiah Berlin, "Historical Inevitability," in *Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty*, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 121.

This resulted in a space for decision-makers to choose between different alternatives. In this, the different provinces provided the models, concepts, and precedents from which the leadership could choose. Decisions were taken haphazardly, based on incomplete information, proximity to key decision-makers, or sheer time pressure. I try to trace not just the four pathways that evolved from the January Revolution – rather, it is important to look at paths and decisions that were plausible but not taken. This means "reconstructing not only what the consequences of actual decisions were but also what plausible consequences might have resulted from other, viable choices".[7] It is this story spanning over roughly six weeks that transformed the GPCR and that I recount below.

Shanghai

Shanghai became the poster child for bottom-up and working-class led revolution. This was partly the result of two events that preceded the January Revolution in late 1966. In early November, workers established a city-wide workers organization, the Shanghai Worker Rebel's General Headquarters (WGH), with Wang Hongwen as one of the key figures. During a meeting on Cultural Plaza three days later, the organization demanded recognition from the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee as a legitimate revolutionary mass organization but was rejected by Mayor Cai Diqiu.[8] After the rejection, the WGH appealed to the central leadership in Beijing, but an order from the Shanghai Party Committee stopped the trains in their tracks, leaving 2,000 workers stuck at Anting station, and resulting in a serious disruption of the Beijing-Shanghai train connection. Yet, the entire leadership in Beijing agreed not to give in

[7] Capoccia and Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism."

[8] He rejected the request with support from the Party Centre, arguing that the WGH's members and motives were impure and that it was not beneficial for production. See Xun Li, *革命造反年代——上海文革运动史稿 (I) [the Age of Revolutionary Rebellion: The History of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai (Part One)]* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2015), 289.

to the workers' demands.[9] The Centre dispatched Zhang Chunqiao, who had helped to spark the GPCR and had been stationed in Shanghai before, to settle the conflict.[10] In a bind and against both the Centre and Shanghai's Party organization, he accepted the workers' group as an official "revolutionary" mass organization. Mao happily approved retroactively. After the Anting incident in November 1966, workers replaced Red Guards as revolutionary forces,[11] leading to the formation of workers' movements all over China and the rise of the working class as the second revolutionary power after the Red Guards.[12] However, at the same time the aim of revolutionaries was to criticize the leadership and not to replace them. The shift from criticism to power seizure was a result of a radicalization of discourse during the Kangping Road clash between the WGH and allied organizations and the Scarlet Guards, the second major worker mass organization, that left 91 people injured. From then on the rebels could no longer use "burn" or "drag out" as slogans for criticism—now it had to be the "overthrow" of the Shanghai Party Committee.[13]

In fact, the seizure of the Wenhui Daily's offices on 4 January was the first time a power seizure occurred in Shanghai (Shanxi's first seizure had happened on 1 January), to the surprise of Beijing, the Shanghai Party Committee, and Zhang Chunqiao.[14] Upon receiving the information, Zhang reacted with unhappiness but did not oppose it.[15] Indeed, Zhang and Yao

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[9] Li Wang, *王力反思录 [Wang Li's Reflections]* (Hong Kong: 香港北星出版社 [Hong Kong North Star Press], 2001), 653.

[10] Li, *革命造反年代——上海文革运动史稿 (I) [the Age of Revolutionary Rebellion: The History of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai (Part One)]*, 313.

[11] Nianyi Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]* (Zhengzhou: 河南人民出版社 [Henan People's Publishing Press], 1996), 131.

[12] Li, *革命造反年代——上海文革运动史稿 (I) [the Age of Revolutionary Rebellion: The History of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai (Part One)]*, 378-80.

[13] Jingxian Xu, *十年一梦：前上海市委书记徐景贤文革回忆录 [a Dream of Ten Years: A Cultural Revolution Memoir of Xu Jingxian, Former Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee]* (Hong Kong: 时代国际出版社 [Times International Press], 2005), 15.

[14] Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 180.

[15] Zhong Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]* (Hong Kong: 香港中文大学出版社 [The Chinese University Press], 2017), 308.

had just arrived in Shanghai on 4 January. On the same day, the Wenhui Daily published the "Letter to the Readers" that stated: "After a period of arduous struggle, from today on, our "Xinhuo Liaoyuan" rebel general headquarters took over the "Wenhui Daily".[16] Contrary to the rhetoric, on the eve of toppling the Shanghai leadership, Zhang and Yao had formed no concept of power seizure. Scholar Zheng Zhong argues that by framing it as the rebels wanting to overthrow the leaders and themselves not take a prominent role, Zhang and Yao could make it seem that it was a bottom-up movement and not their doing. Even the rebels themselves did not want to replace the Party Committee in its entirety. For them, seizing power was related to the "leadership" rather than "Party, government, finance, and literature" and the administrative apparatus. Thus, they were still at the point of criticizing the capitalist line and expelling the top leadership.[17]

On 6 January, on Shanghai People's Square, the WGH and other rebel organizations staged a mass meeting to criticize and oust the leadership. Not speaking themselves, Zhang and Yao nonetheless drafted the speeches.[18] The rebels dragged Chen Pixian, Cao Diqiu, and other high-level cadres outside and struggled against them. The meeting promulgated three circulars. The "First Circular" stipulated three points: first, from 6 January 1967, Shanghai's revolutionary rebel faction and revolutionary masses ceased to acknowledge the counter-revolutionary revisionist elements Cao Diqiu as Shanghai Party Committee Secretariat Secretary and Shanghai mayor. Second, Chairman Mao and the Party Centre were asked to abolish Cao Diqiu's Party positions and to allow public criticism of him. Third, Cao Diqiu was to engage in labor under the supervision of the Shanghai revolutionary rebel groups and instructed to confess his crimes in opposing the Party, socialism, Mao Zedong Thought, and destroying the

[16] Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 180-81.

[17] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 307.

[18] Xu, *十年一梦：前上海市委书记徐景贤文革回忆录 [a Dream of Ten Years: A Cultural Revolution Memoir of Xu Jingxian, Former Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee]*, 30-31.

GPCR. The “Second Circular” stipulated that Chen Pixian must, within seven days, confess navigating and directing Cao Diqiu and the Shanghai Party Committee in opposing Chairman Mao, resisting the Party Centre, and destroying the GCPR. The “Third Circular” stated that “the Shanghai Party Committee with Chen Pixian and Cao Diqiu at their helm, must be overthrown”.

Mao was as surprised of Shanghai’s developments as everybody else. However, since it confirmed his preferences, he extolled it.[19] He argued that this is “one class overthrowing another class, this is a great revolution.” With the rise of Shanghai’s revolutionary power, the country had hope and this would influence “the whole East, influence the whole nation, every province, and city”.[20] Shanghai’s actions became a model for bottom-up revolution led by workers. On 9 January, the People’s Daily published the “Emergency Letter to the People,” adding an editorial comment noting that it responded to Mao’s “grasp revolution, promote production” slogan, and asks key questions in the GPCR. It added that these questions were not just relevant for Shanghai but for the entire country.[21] A congratulatory telegram also reaffirmed Shanghai’s situation and issued a call to study Shanghai’s experiences.[22] Neither of these articles however mentioned “power seizure”. Together, these documents not only sanctioned a specific narrative of the January revolution as a bottom-up workers’ revolution but also, by using it as an example and heaping praise on it, seeing it as a model for the entire country. A Red Flag commentary article published in the People’s Daily on 16 January codified

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[19] Cited in Guang Cheng, "1970 年庐山会议背景的研究 [Research on the Background of the Lushan Conference in 1970]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 599 (2007).

[20] Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 183.

[21] "抓革命，促生产彻底粉碎资产阶级反动路线的新反扑——告上海全市人民书 [Graspring Revolution, Promoting Production, Thoroughly Crushing the Capitalist Reactionary Line’s New Counterattack—Letter to the People of Shanghai]," *人民日报 [People’s Daily]*, 9 January 1967.

[22] Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 186. See also CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, ed., *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]* (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 2013), 30.

this, arguing that Shanghai had "created the experience of seizing power from a handful of capitalist factions within the Party under the dictatorship of the proletariat and provided correct principles, policies, forms of organization and methods of struggle".[23] This was the first time "seizure of power" was mentioned together with "model experience". Mao's utopian dream was fulfilled: a bottom-up revolution throughout the entire country that did not rely on leadership from the Party or work teams.[24] Thus, a 22 January People's Daily editorial calling for a national bottom-up seizure of power through a grand alliance "shook China".[25] Finally, a 3 February Red Flag editorial invented the "January Revolution" idea, asserting that "the great storm of revolution started in Shanghai".[26] Thus, the "January Revolution" became synonymous with "Shanghai's" revolution and a model for other regions. Its single most important contribution was the formation of a model for bottom-up and working-class led revolution. These ideas would then be theorized and summarized in the theory of "continuous revolution".

A second, but at that time seemingly minor, result was the survival of the Party. Indeed, unsanctioned by Mao, Zhang Chunqiao and the rebels established the "Shanghai People's Commune" on 5 February. The formation of a Commune was not their idea. Rather, on 27 January, a "Revolutionary Rebel Commune" was created in Beijing. Upon hearing this, Chen Boda called Shanghai to tell them they should consider a Commune.[27] However, upon

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[23] "无产阶级革命派联合起来 [Proletarian Revolutionary Factions Unite]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 16 January 1967.

[24] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 331.

[25] "无产阶级革命派大联合，夺走资本主义道路当权派的权！[the Grand Alliance of Proletarian Revolutionaries Has Seized the Power of Capitalist Roaders and Power-Holders!]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 22 January 1967.

[26] People's Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily, "论无产阶级革命派的夺权斗争 [on the Power Seizure Struggle of the Proletarian Revolutionary Factions]," *红旗文稿 [Red Flag Manuscripts]*, 3 February 1967.

[27] Cited in Shu He, "毛泽东制造的文革样板"上海一月革命" [Mao Zedong Created the "January Revolution" Model of the Cultural Revolution]," *当代中国研究 [Contemporary China Research]*, no. 2 (2001).

establishment, Zhang was recalled to Beijing. Indeed, in this model, the Party would have been subsumed in the Commune, ceasing to exist as an independent entity. As a result, Mao asked him "Where is the Party," arguing that "a commune must always have a Party".[28] To Mao, there would always have to be a "core," that would be lost. It was this sentence that ultimately preserved the Party in China.

There is no rational explanation for Mao preferring Shanghai's revolution over other places. After all, power seizures were occurring all over China, and big-character posters being hung every day. As I will show below, other places were far ahead of Shanghai. Rather, it is likely he was more aware of what was happening in Shanghai than anywhere else and that news from other places and their significance did not reach him timely. In this chaos, regarding Shanghai, this would have been different, lest because important proponents, notably Jiang Qing and Chen Boda, had Mao's ear and he had been following Shanghai's worker movement since late 1966 already. Indeed, the Party Centre's role was critical. Wang Dongxing for example said it was "the Chairman, premier, and [Chen] Boda" who had "commanded" Shanghai's revolution.[29] Likewise, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and others played critical roles in directing the revolution.[30] Thus, there was both a direct channel apprising him of developments, and he was inclined towards taking a deeper interest in Shanghai. The strength of the "Shanghai group" and Mao's interest meant that Shanghai had now become key to the success of the GPCR and its developments tied to the achievements of Shanghai's movement. Shanghai's mythical importance as a symbol for bottom-up revolution was to reverberate

[28] "张春桥二月二十四日传达毛泽东接见张春桥、姚文元时的谈话 [Discussion between Mao Zedong, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan Transmitted by Zhang Chunqiao on February 24]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, February 1967.

[29] "历史不可信，真理谁人知——评《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》 [Who Knows the Truth If History Is Not Credible --- Comments on "Mao Zedong's Struggle with Lin Biao's Anti-Revolutionary Group"]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 453, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_3e23c26c0100rno1.html.

[30] Elizabeth J. Perry and Xun Li, *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution* (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 19. See also Walder, *Chang Ch'un-Ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution*.

throughout the entire nation and become synonymous with the "January Revolution" and, to a lesser extent, the GPCR.[31] At the same time, he rejected the Shanghai People's Commune. This was not a decision against a "commune-style" of governance rather than a choice against an organ without military participation of the kind that had already emerged in Heilongjiang. This was curious since the RC developed in Harbin did not fashion a separate Party organ either. Hence, Mao's intervention was more about what kind of governance organ could be reliably replicated throughout China. Clearly, the experiences of Shanxi, Shandong, Guizhou, and Heilongjiang are here more indicative and generalizable than that of Shanghai. At the same time, Mao rejected their model by preserving the Party. While the Party had thus effectively vanished, it still survived the critical juncture of the January Revolution. Shanghai's contribution therefore was not a revolutionary form of governance in the RC and the involvement of the military but the bottom-up and working-class led type of revolution that would later emerge as the theory of "continuous revolution". It thus launched the "revolution" sequence and preserved later re-emerging "Party" pathway. "Revolution" later led to unforeseen chaos at the grassroots. With the unintentional consequence of the military stepping in, the Party would then be used to balance it. In this sense, Shanghai paradoxically is the root of chaos and its end.

Shanxi

If Shanghai started the "Party" and "revolution," the experiences of Shanxi, Shandong, Guizhou, and Heilongjiang launched the "military" and "RC" sequences. The 12 January 1967 power seizure of Shanxi's Party and government meant that it was the first provincial-level

[31] See for example Jin, *文化大革命史稿 [Historical Manuscripts of the Cultural Revolution]*, Chapter 9. It stipulates that the January revolution started from Shanghai, which became model that influenced the entire country.

jurisdiction to experience an event described as a "power seizure" instigated by an alliance of Party committee cadres, rebel organizations, and with the support of the military.[32] It was Shanxi's experience that prompted Mao's move from criticizing and overthrowing the leadership to seizing power over the entire bureaucracy and in all forms. This was the precondition for the formation of the RCs. Further, it was also a model for the involvement of the military in power seizure, establishing the military's role in stabilizing the emerging governing organs. Shandong, Guizhou, and Heilongjiang would base their actions on Shanxi's experiences and combine them with Shanghai's bottom-up revolution. Hence, Shanxi had a great impact on how Mao and the central leadership conceptualized the evolving power seizures all over China.[33]

On 1 January, internal rebel factions took over the Taiyuan Broadcasting Station renamed it and published a congratulatory address stating that they had seized power from "a handful of capitalist roaders," calling for people in the entire province to rebel.[34] This was the first power seizure in a government organ in China. Wang Li writes that Mao has always attached great importance to Shanxi since it was the old revolutionary base. On 4 January, the Central Cultural Revolution Small Group's (CCRSG) Wang Li and Guan Feng met Shanxi's deputy governor Liu Geping 刘格平 in Beijing. They were to interview Liu and have him return to Shanxi to unite the mass organizations and seize power. Mao had chosen Liu very early in 1966 already for his credentials as having been imprisoned under the Nationalist government and his handling of ethnic relations in Xinjiang. Hence, Mao designated Liu Geping to "take care" of

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[32] Ruxin Yu and Ming Zeng, "文革"全国第一夺"—山西 1.12 夺权概述（上）[the Cultural Revolution's "First National Power Seizure" — Summary of Shanxi's 12 January Power Seizure (First Part)]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 514 (2006).

[33] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, Xianzhi Pang, and Chongji Jin, eds., *毛泽东传: 1893-1976（第六卷）[Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1976 (Volume Six)]* (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 2010), 2438.

[34] Minggang Shi, "山西"一·一二"夺权 [Shanxi's 12 January Power Seizure]," *昨天 [Yesterday]* 22 (2013).

the situation in Shanxi.[35] Wang Li also told Liu to attain support from Zhang Riqing, who was the second political commissar of the Shanxi military district.

Just as Liu Geping returned to Taiyuan on 6 January,[36] the first grassroots power seizure in Shanxi took place when a Red Guard faction expelled "a handful of capitalist roaders" from their school.[37] Meanwhile, on Liu's request, Liu Guanyi, the second provincial deputy governor, contacted Zhang Riqing and told him that "Shanxi's leadership power was in the hands of the capitalist roaders" and stressed that there were several leading cadres ready to stand up to "revolt together with the masses".[38] However, there was no need to convince Zhang to join the rebels. In fact, Mao had already praised Zhang as the only military cadre in Shanxi to support the left, which Wang Li saw as evidence that the military had entered the GPCR.[39] It was thus no surprise that Zhang affirmed his participation and that of the military personnel under him. Having united cadres and the military, Zhang, Liu Guanyi, and Liu Geping planned the power seizure together. Since they were about to set a precedent, Zhang Riqing on 7 January sent a telegram to Mao and Lin Biao and the Central Military Commission to ask for instructions regarding military support while reaffirming his commitment to seize power from the "handful of capitalist roaders".[40] On 8 January in the Shanxi military district guest house, the "CCP Shanxi Core Small Group" was established, comprising Liu Geping, Zhang Riqing, Yuan Zhen 袁振,[41] Liu Guanyi, and Chen Shouzhong.[42] One day later, the group denounced

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[35] Wang, *王力反思录 [Wang Li's Reflections]*, 549.

[36] Shanxi Province Institute for Historical Records, *中国共产党山西历史纪事 [Historical Records of the Party in Shanxi Province]* (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 1999), 413. Wang, *王力反思录 [Wang Li's Reflections]*, 551.

[37] Shi, "山西"一·一二"夺权 [Shanxi's 12 January Power Seizure]."

[38] Liu Guanyi spoke specifically with He Yingcai, the Party secretary of the provincial CPPCC and Chen Shouzhong, the secretary of the Party committee's secretariat in Taiyuan. Both voiced their support.

[39] Wang, *王力反思录 [Wang Li's Reflections]*, 551.

[40] Shi, "山西"一·一二"夺权 [Shanxi's 12 January Power Seizure]."

[41] Taiyuan Party Committee First Secretary

[42] Chen Shouzhong was a member of the Taiyuan Party Committee's Standing Committee.

Shanxi's leadership as counter-revolutionary, accusing them having "abnormal" relations with Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, and An Ziwen. They took it further the next day, when a poster charged the provincial Party leadership with being "revisionists who were anti-Party, anti-socialist, and anti-Mao Zedong Thought".[43] It was signed by Liu Geping, Liu Guanyi, Yuan Zhen, He Yingcai,[44] and Chen Shouzhong and made clear their determination to topple the leadership. For the journalist Li Pu this poster was enough to understand that their attitude was irreconcilable with the Party Committee's and implied a fight to death.[45] The poster stated that the fracture was not about the reexamination of mistakes and struggle anymore rather than about the "capitalist power-holders". Their signing also meant that the provincial leadership in Shanxi was now openly fractured, setting the stage for struggle and power seizure. Put up by provincial Party leaders rebelling against their own Party committee, the big-character poster was the first of its kind. It thus had a model function for power seizures in other places in China that compares to a "magnitude eight earthquake, leading to the necessity for all mass organization to position themselves".[46] This poster was more critical for the development of the RCs than Shanghai's experience because it exposed the rebels, shifted the aim to destroying the local Party leadership and thus represented a significant escalation towards comprehensive power seizure.

Escalation was complemented by central support. In Beijing, Wang Li and Guan Feng met representatives from Shanxi's rebel faction in Beijing, telling them they should support Liu

[43] Shanxi Province Institute for Historical Records, *中国共产党山西历史纪事 [Historical Records of the Party in Shanxi Province]*, 415.

[44] Member of the Provincial Party Committee's Standing Committee

[45] Pu Li, "“在山西文革的“震中”——山西省委机关文革亲历 ["the Epicenter of Shanxi Cultural Revolution": Experience of Shanxi's Cultural Revolution in Shanxi's Provincial Party Committee Organs]," *昨天 [Yesterday]* 19 (2013).

[46] Shi, "山西“一·一二”夺权 [Shanxi's 12 January Power Seizure]."

Geping since he was a selected and tested cadre.[47] They also told them to inform Liu that the Centre had already supported Shanghai's revolutionary faction's power seizure and that Shanxi should study Shanghai's experience.[48] This show of support by the Centre was crucial for Liu's ability to unite the rebels. On 12 January in the early evening, Liu Geping, Zhang Riqing, Liu Guanyi, Chen Shouzhong, Liu Zhilan,[49] Ding Lei,[50] and others held a meeting of the "United Left Faction Organizational Presidium" together with representatives of 23 rebel organizations. In his speech, Liu Geping said the purpose of this meeting was to analyse power seizure. He argued that the aim of power seizure was not only to attain "leadership power" but also to "seize power over the Party, government, finance, and culture".[51] This was the first time that the aim of power seizure was conceptualized as gaining control over both Party and government leadership and work itself. Again, military cadre Zhang Riqing affirmed his support for power seizure.[52] The meeting also discussed materials suggesting crimes committed by the Party leadership, leading to various rebel organizations raiding homes and putting them under house arrest. Liu Geping also argued that all organizations should unite and form a general organization that would be named "General Headquarters of the Shanxi Revolutionary Rebels" and that was to provide a transitory power organ post-seizure. This General Headquarters should adopt the principles of the Paris Commune, elect its own leaders and take over Party and government work. The CCP Shanxi Core Small Group was to guide and implement the GPCR and lead the General Headquarters. The members of these groups

[47] Ruxin Yu and Ming Zeng, "文革"全国第一夺"—山西 1.12 夺权概述（下）[the Cultural Revolution's "First National Power Seizure" — Summary of Shanxi's 12 January Power Seizure (Second Part)]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 517 (2006).

[48] Shanxi Province Institute for Historical Records, *中国共产党山西历史纪事 [Historical Records of the Party in Shanxi Province]*, 416.

[49] Deputy chief of the countryside political department, Chen Shouzhong's wife

[50] Liu Geping's wife.

[51] Yu and Zeng, "文革"全国第一夺"—山西 1.12 夺权概述（下）[the Cultural Revolution's "First National Power Seizure" — Summary of Shanxi's 12 January Power Seizure (Second Part)]."

[52] Ibid.

did not overlap. Revolutionary cadres and military representatives comprised the Small Group, while representatives from mass organizations staffed the General Headquarters, with Yang Chengxiao, a front-line worker (unlike Wang Hongwen, who was a factory grassroots cadre), at its helm.[53] The model combined the Paris Commune that integrated the masses with a more classic Party supervision and administrative state type of governance.

In that moment however Zhang Riqing and the others had to act quickly and not consider the implications of this model for revolutionary governance. That evening, with Zhang having instructed the security guards to withdraw, 10,000 people raided the offices of Shanxi's Party Committee and government.[54] Destroying the offices with metal rods, they took seals and entire cabinets with documents encountering no resistance.[55] Power seizure until that time had just consisted of confiscating official seals. As Nie Yuanzi argues, the question always was: what then?[56] The next day, Zhang Zhide of the poor and lower-middle peasant association said Party, government, finance, and cultural power were seized.[57] The "First Announcement" from 14 January thus proclaimed that "all leadership power" was seized and was to be "taken over by the Headquarters" and that "all power belonged to the revolutionary rebel factions".[58] These phrases had a more profound meaning than Shanghai's pronouncements since they required

[53] Head: Yang Chengxiao was a worker at the Thirteenth Zhijin Construction Company
Deputy: Zhu Yonggeng was a university student dispatched from Beijing to Shanxi
Deputy: Song Jie was a student at the Taiyuan Engineering College
Deputy: Zhang Jianguo was a worker. Because of a difference of opinion after the power seizure he was later arrested and imprisoned.

[54] Shanxi Province Institute for Historical Records, *中国共产党山西历史纪事 [Historical Records of the Party in Shanxi Province]*, 417.

[55] Li, ""在山西文革的"震中"——山西省委机关文革亲历 ["the Epicenter of Shanxi Cultural Revolution": Experience of Shanxi's Cultural Revolution in Shanxi's Provincial Party Committee Organs]."

[56] Yuanzi Nie, "聂元梓文革回忆（节选二）[Nie Yuanzi's Memoirs from the Cultural Revolution (Selections Two)]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 558 (2007).

[57] Li, ""在山西文革的"震中"——山西省委机关文革亲历 ["the Epicenter of Shanxi Cultural Revolution": Experience of Shanxi's Cultural Revolution in Shanxi's Provincial Party Committee Organs]."

[58] Full text in Shi, "山西"一·一二"夺权 [Shanxi's 12 January Power Seizure]." Also in "山西革命造反总指挥部第一号通告 [First Circular of the Shanxi Revoluitonary Rebels General Headquarter]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 25 January 1967.

the entire Party and government and their subsidiary work units to hand over the reins to the rebels and did not just denote a change of leadership from a "handful of capitalist roaders". Likewise, power was rooted in the rebel factions organized in the General Headquarters according to the principles of the Paris Commune. This organization however was under the leadership of the Core Small Group that included revolutionary cadres and the military, thus foreshadowing Mao's criticism of Zhang Chunqiao in mid-February regarding Shanghai's institutional arrangement. While giving the rebel factions power in government affairs, real power was to reside in the hands of the cadres and the military.

Hence, by seizing leadership, Shanxi was not only the first but proved to be a precedent and substantive model for power seizures all over China.[59] Indeterminate power seizure then became national policy. Regarding military support, Mao remarked on 16 January that "before the military had fought for control over territory, now the workers and peasants themselves fight and the military helps them."[60] Likewise, defending Zhang Riqing against criticism, Wang Li insisted on 17 January that the military and public security should all support the revolutionary faction.[61] Finally, official articles highlighting Shanxi's experiences focused on the alliance between the mass organizations, revolutionary cadres, and the military.[62] One article cited representatives from Shanghai saying that Shanxi further developed their experience, enhancing and widening their own "grand alliance" to include revolutionary cadres

[59] Shanxi Province Institute for Historical Records, *中国共产党山西历史纪事 [Historical Records of the Party in Shanxi Province]*, 418.

[60] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, Pang, and Jin, *毛泽东传：1893-1976（第六卷）[Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1976 (Volume Six)]*, 2435.

[61] Li Wang and Feng Guan, "接见山西革命群众时的讲话 [Speech at a Meeting with Shanxi's Revolutionary Masses]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 17 January 1967.

[62] "山西无产阶级文化大革命的伟大胜利 [the Great Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Shanxi]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 25 January 1967.

and the military.[63] Thus, Shanxi's experience regarding power seizure, the role of the military, and the inclusion of mass organizations was precedent-setting for the conduct of the GPCR.

It is interesting to note that Shanxi's model united the new GPCR-mode of governance with the stability of a tested Party-state like relationship. On paper and in reality, this was a model reflecting the priorities of the GPCR and superior to the RC. However, Shanxi's model was not picked up by the central leadership. If the Centre had picked it, the Party would not have practically vanished, the relationship between rebels, cadres, and military would have been different and the GPCR would have played out differently. Rather, the Centre focused on Shanxi's experiences regarding power seizure and the role of the military. Thus, while on 16 January, Mao said rebels should supervise government work[64] meaning to seize control over the GPCR without managing actual work, a few days later he argued that power should be seized first without distinction.[65] Around 20 January, Zhou Enlai passed on the new instructions, pointing out that whatever and wherever power was seized (including government work), first it should be seized and only then should the details be ironed out.[66] While Shanxi was ahead in terms of forming a new form political organization, it was a week or two too early. At the time of its inception, governance was not as important as the question of power seizure. Thus, it is possible that the novelty and importance of their organization was not apparent to the rebels or even the Centre. A second reason might be that it did not use the name

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[63] "学习山西经验实现无产阶级革命派大联合　上下结合内外夹攻猛烈开展全面夺权斗争 [Studying the Experience of Shanxi to Realize the Grand Alliance of the Proletarian Revolutionary Group Combining Upper and Lower Attacks with Internal and External Attacks to Vigorously Launch the Struggle for Comprehensive Power Seizure]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 27 January 1967.

[64] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]* (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 2007), 113.

[65] Cited in Sima Qingyang and Ouyang Longmen, *新发现的周恩来 [Newly Discovered Zhou Enlai]* (Hong Kong: 香港明镜出版社 [Hong Kong Mirror Publishing House], 2011), 133.

[66] Weihua Bu, *砸烂旧世界：文化大革命的动乱与浩劫 [Smashing the Old World: The Unrest and Catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution]* (Hong Kong: 中文大学出版社 [Chinese University Publishing Press], 2008), 356.

of "revolutionary committee" that featured prominently in the Sixteen Points of August 1966—here it failed to grab the Centre's attention. Another possibility is that given that the situation was very much in flux all over China, it was hard to distinguish between valuable and worthless ideas and experiments. Hence, looking at Shanxi in that particular moment would have exposed nothing worth studying—this would change by the time Guizhou developed its model.

Shandong

Shandong became the first successful model for military intervention and a further iteration of the "three-in-one-combination" that formed the foundation for the emerging RCs.

The first power seizure in Shandong occurred on 10 January 1967 at the "Public Daily" newspaper that was a direct subsidiary of the Shandong Party Committee in Jinan. Under the influence of takeovers at the Wenhui Daily and Liberation Daily in Shanghai, its employees took over the paper and gained the support from other rebel organizations.[67] Thereafter, they dispatched representatives to Qingdao to gain assistance from former Qingdao deputy mayor Wang Xiaoyu 王效禹, who was a rebel cadre backed by Mao.[68] One day later the Qingdao Daily and the Qingdao People's Broadcasting Station were seized and came under the leadership of Wang Xiaoyu.[69] On 19 January, Kang Sheng in a speech to representatives from Shandong voiced his support for power seizure in Qingdao, and Wang Xiaoyu in particular.[70]

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[67] Shandong Province Local History Annals Compilation Committee, *山东省志—大事记（中册）[Shandong Provincial Annals - Events (Middle Part)]* (Jinan: 山东人民出版社 [Shandong People's Publishing Press], 2000), 869.

[68] Longjia Ding, "山东省夺权的"三结合"及其潜伏下的危机 [the "Three-in-One-Combination" of Seizing Power in Shandong Province and Its Potential Crisis]," *记忆 [Remembrance]*, no. 9 (2010).

[69] *中共青岛党史大事记（1966-1989）【征求意见稿】[Events in the History of the CCP in Qingdao (1966-1989 (Draft)]*, (1993), 17.

[70] Sheng Kang, "对青岛市造反派谈两条路线斗争 [Discussing the Two Line Struggle with Qingdao Rebel Factions]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 19 January 1967.

On 22 January, Wang had united 23 mass rebel organizations, held a meeting involving tens of thousands and seized power from the Party committee in Qingdao, establishing the "Qingdao Revolutionary Rebel Committee"[71] recognized in a People's Daily article eight days later.[72] He was bolstered by Chen Boda and the CCRSG, who proclaimed Wang Xiaoyu as reliable, dispatching him to Shandong's provincial capital of Jinan.[73] Further, Lin Biao had also praised him.[74] These central endorsements gave him an enormous advantage when facing and convincing mass organizations and when vying for local support.

In Jinan, the situation was different. Two massive rebel camps formed, with the "Shandong University Red Guard Rebel Faction" and the "Shandong Normal University Cultural Revolution Red Guards" staging mass protests on the 13 and 15 of January and uniting 162 mass organizations and 120,000 people.[75] Thus, the two organizations vied for recognition from the Centre and Mao. Discussions regarding power seizure between the two main camps that had now allied themselves with workers associations ended in a stalemate. Attempting to gain the upper hand, the "Shandong Normal University Red Guards," the "Shandong Workers Headquarters," and 17 other rebel groups rushed to seize power for their own faction. In the afternoon of the 24 January, both camps moved towards seizing power from the provincial Party committee, the Jinan city Party committee and all their subsidiary work units, leading to armed clashes.[76] With the support of the city government the "Shandong Normal University Red Guards" and their allied workers seized power from the Jinan Party Committee,

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[71] Shandong Province Local History Annals Compilation Committee, *山东省志—大事记（中册）[Shandong Provincial Annals - Events (Middle Part)]*, 869.

[72] "关键在于大联合 [Key Is the Grand Alliance]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 30 January 1967.

[73] Ding, "山东省夺权的"三结合"及其潜伏下的危机 [the "Three-in-One-Combination" of Seizing Power in Shandong Province and Its Potential Crisis]."

[74] Shengping Yuan, "袁升平文革回忆录（节选二）[Yuan Shengping's Memoirs from the Cultural Revolution (Selection Two)]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 591 (2007).

[75] Ding, "山东省夺权的"三结合"及其潜伏下的危机 [the "Three-in-One-Combination" of Seizing Power in Shandong Province and Its Potential Crisis]."

[76] Ibid.

establishing the “Jinan Proletarian Rebel Faction United Revolutionary Committee” and forming the “Preparatory Committee for a Grand alliance”. Afterwards in the evening, the Shandong Workers Headquarters organized over 10,000 people to attack the rival workers’ organization, destroying their offices and kidnapping their leadership.[77] Compromise and negotiations were dismissed and the opposing rebel factions were not integrated into the committee. Hence, this RC did not enact a “grand alliance” or the “three-in-one combination” rather than being the RC of a particular group of rebels. This foreshadowed a problem in the future and is part of the RCs’ birth defect. In the absence of a towering figure with central endorsement who could enforce an agreement amongst rivaling factions, the struggle between mass organizations would resemble a zero-sum game. Losers were marginalized and brutally suppressed by the winners in power. In these cases, the formation of RCs then marked the suppression rather than the unification of different factions.

After the 23 January central instruction to support the left, the military established a “Command Center to Support the Left” and an “Office for Supporting the Left” and implemented military training and management.[78] Further, a few days later, the military held a meeting pledging to support the left.[79] Guan Feng again voiced support for Wang Xiaoyu’s power seizure in Qingdao and called for the general suppression of counter-revolutionary elements.[80] This statement was channeled into a People’s Daily article showing the continued endorsement for Wang at the Centre.[81] Impressed by his credentials and eager to receive recognition by the

[77] Ibid.

[78] Jinan Municipal Party Committee Party History Research Office and Jinan Municipal Archives, *中共济南党史大事记（1949.10-1992.12）[Events in the History of the CCP in Jinan (October 1949-December 1992)]* (Jinan: 济南出版社 [Jinan Publishing Press], 1998), 254-5.

[79] Ding, "山东省夺权的“三结合”及其潜伏下的危机 [the "Three-in-One-Combination“ of Seizing Power in Shandong Province and Its Potential Crisis]."

[80] *中共青岛党史大事记（1966-1989）【征求意见稿】[Events in the History of the CCP in Qingdao (1966-1989 (Draft)]*, 18.

[81] "关键在于大联合 [Key Is the Grand Alliance]."

central leadership, Jinan's Preparatory Committee invited Wang and his allies to the provincial capital. In the meantime, the Qingdao Revolutionary Rebel Committee issued a call for all revolutionary organizations to unite and seize power from the provincial Party and government. On the day of their arrival, the formerly defeated and enraged rebel camp demanded the release of their leaders and members from police custody, raiding public security offices, cutting phone line, and getting into open conflict with the military. Facing this situation, Wang lost no time and allied himself with the military. Under attack, it was clear for the military whom they should assist: Wang had the support of the Centre that had dispatched him to Jinan. This again demonstrated the importance of central support. Likewise, power had already been seized by a worker and Red Guard alliance. Hence, the military on-the-spot designated both the attack and the rebel organizations involved as counter-revolutionary, arresting over 200 people. Isolated, the opposing rebels dissolved under the pressure.[82] With the opposition being out of the way thanks to the military, a Red Guard, worker, and revolutionary cadre alliance could now move to seize power. On 2 February, the "Shandong Proletarian Rebel Alliance Revolutionary Committee" was proclaimed and the "Public Daily" published an editorial denouncing the oppositional rebels as "destroying the grand alliance of the revolutionary factions" and attempting to "exact hegemony".[83] On 3 February, 26 mass organizations proclaimed at a mass meeting that the Party, government, financial, and cultural power of the provincial Party committee had been seized, thereby formally establishing the RC. The Jinan military district also published an instruction for "the four supports": supporting Wang Xiaoyu; the RC with him at its helm; the "three-in-one-combination"; and the "three big leftist organizations".[84]

[82] Ding, "山东省夺权的"三结合"及其潜伏下的危机 [the "Three-in-One-Combination" of Seizing Power in Shandong Province and Its Potential Crisis]."
[83] Ibid.
[84] Yuan, "袁升平文革回忆录（节选二）[Yuan Shengping's Memoirs from the Cultural Revolution (Selection Two)]."

The power seizure in Shandong had two main characteristics. First, the clear insertion of the military into the power seizure, that according to Wang Xiaoyu "had a decisive effect" and without which the power seizure could not have happened so smoothly.[85] Second, while forming an alliance between cadres, rebels that included students and workers, and the military, this alliance was exclusive. Hence, the new power organ was the RC of a specific rebel faction that, through the support of the military, could dominate and monopolize power. The RC was then built on the oppression of the opposition and their forces and systematically excluded them from power. According to the People's Daily, Shandong provided a model for the "three-in-one-combination".[86] Even as the intervention of the military worked to bring a leftist organization into power and thus confirmed the 23 January order to support the left, it also meant that a substantial part of the rebels was arrested, disgruntled, and disenfranchised, which would cause conflicts later on. As part of the RCs as an institution, the inclusion of some and exclusion of other mass groups depended on their success in the struggle for power and the implied suppression of the opposition.

Given that for mass organizations this implied the need to fight to the death, this also necessitated a greater role for the military. This is because with the masses battling themselves to exhaustion and many cadres discredited, the relative power of the military in any three-in-one-combination would increase by default. Indeed, this is what happened at the grassroots as I will show in the next chapter.

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[85] In Luzhou Shui, "《无产阶级文化大革命简论》连载二十——1966—1969 年炮打刘少奇的资产阶级司令部（14）[a Brief Comment on the Great Revolution of the Proletarian Culture, Serial 20 - the Bourgeois Command Centre of Liu Shaoqi, 1966-1969 (14)]," (2006).

[86] Longjia Ding, "山东夺权的"三结合"经验 [Shandong's Experience with the "Three-in-One-Combination" of Power Seizure]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 757 (2010). "革命的'三结合'是夺权斗争胜利的保证 [the Revolutionary "Three-in-One-Combination" Is the Guarantee for Victory in Power Seizure Struggle]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 3 February 1967.)

Guizhou

Shanghai brought the theory of bottom-up revolution involving workers and mass organizations, Shanxi the practice of comprehensive power seizure involving the military, while Shandong cemented the military's role in a new governing structure channeling leftist forces. Similar to Shandong, one faction in Guizhou gained victory and seized power. However, close guidance from the Centre avoided a fate similar to that of Shandong by championing a way to manage opposing mass organizations. By drafting a political program, Guizhou gave power seizure a political and institutional program all the while cementing the experience of the "three-in-one-combination" and further developing and enhancing the emerging RCs.

In January 1967, a stalemate between two factions headed by Li Tienai[87] and Li Zaihan[88] characterized the situation in Guizhou. At the end of December, the former had established the "Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionary Factions United Committee" that comprised 74 organizations.[89] Li Zaihan was the head of the "Red Army Rebel Contact Station" established on 3 January 1967. Initially, Li Zaihan had supported Li Tienai because his revolutionary direction was correct, but later distanced himself. As Zhou Enlai pointed out, Li Tienai had five secretaries (as did Zhou himself)[90] and he had provoked various incidents that led a journalist to liken him to a "mafia boss".[91] This contrasted with the Mao-supported Li Zaihan, who had impeccable credentials and, as a deputy political commissar of the Guizhou military

[87] Buyer for the Repair Plant of Guiyang Transportation Company

[88] Member of Guizhou Military Region Deputy Political Committee and Provincial Cultural Revolution Leading Group

[89] Gezi Yu, "贵州文革大事记 [Events in Guizhou During the Cultural Revolution]," *昨天 [Yesterday]* 111 (2018).

[90] Zhou Enlai et al., "接见贵州革命派代表座谈纪要 [Summary of a Meeting with Representatives from Guizhou's Revolutionary Factions]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 28 January 1967.

[91] Yunxun Zhang, "贵州夺权前后（《飞鸣镝》选读）[before and after the Power Seizure in Guizhou (Selected Readings of "the Flying Arrow")]," *昨天 [Yesterday]* 111 (2018).

district. For example, he often proactively reported the situation in Guizhou and criticized the Provincial Committee's actions. Thus, as early as 10 December 1966, Li Zaihan's telegrams were circulated in the top leadership to Lin Biao arguing that the Guizhou Party Committee already was paralyzed and failing.[92] Being an early supporter of the GPCR and rooted in the military, Mao thus thought having Li Zaihan in Guizhou was "enough"[93] to effect power seizure, with Wang Li saying the persona of Li was a source of Mao's decision to order the military to support the left.[94]

From 15 until 19 January, various factories, schools, departments, and the provincial public security bureau experienced power seizures ending with the takeover of the "Guizhou Daily" that was reestablished as the "New Guizhou Paper".[95] The situation however escalated when on 20 January, Li Zaihan wrote to the General Political Department of the PLA and the CCRSG that Li Tienai was directing the struggle towards the military, kidnapping soldiers, and stealing weapons. This telegram prompted Mao to invite Li Zaihan, military commanders, and provincial revolutionary cadres to Beijing to analyze the situation and decide on the next steps.[96] When four days later 13 people including Li Zaihan arrived in Beijing for deliberations with the CCRSG, Li in the evening called Guiyang's rebel groups and told them that "Guizhou should also seize power".[97] It is thus likely he knew that one day later Zhou Enlai would designate Li Tienai as "counter-revolutionary," ordering both his arrest and that of the heads

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[92] Guizhou Provincial Party Committee Party History Research Office, *中国共产党贵州历史 第二卷 (1949-1978）[the History of the CCP in Guizhou Province, Volume Two (1949-1978)]* (Guiyang: 贵州人民出版社 [Guizhou People's Publishing Press], 2017), 319.

[93] Wang, *王力反思录 [Wang Li's Reflections]*, 536.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Yu, "贵州文革大事记 [Events in Guizhou During the Cultural Revolution]."

[96] Mao Zedong, "关于将贵州各方代表找到北京研究问题的批语 [Comments on the Issue of Finding and Requesting Guizhou Representatives from All Parties to Come to Beijing to Research Problems]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 21 January 1967.

[97] Guizhou Provincial Party Committee Party History Research Office, *中国共产党贵州历史 第二卷 (1949-1978）[the History of the CCP in Guizhou Province, Volume Two (1949-1978)]*, 320.

of his rebel organization.[98] Since Li resided in Beijing he was arrested at once, both beheading and denouncing the major rival mass organization in Guizhou. Coupled with Mao's, Zhou's and the military district's[99] support, power seizure in Guizhou could thus start. As in Shanxi and Shandong, central support was then crucial.

On the evening of 25 January, forty mass organizations under the banner of the "General Headquarters of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionary Rebels" entered Party and government buildings in Guiyang without resistance,[100] holding a massive meeting in front of the post office building.[101] Their announcement proclaimed the power seizure of Guizhou and Guiyang's Party committees and the total leadership power over Party, government, finance, and culture.[102] It also laid down a political program for action: all power was to return to the proletarian revolutionary rebel faction, "revolution grasped" and "production promoted," economism to be opposed, and the dictatorship of the proletariat strengthened. It ended with a call for implementation and punishment in case of non-compliance.[103] The General Headquarters further established a core small group comprising seven people, with Li Zaihan as group leader (although he was absent) uniting workers, cadres, student representatives, and

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[98] Zhou Enlai et al., "接见贵州省军区司令员何光宇、副政委李再含的讲话 [Speeches at a Meeting with He Guangyu, Commander of Guizhou Military Region and Li Zaihan, Deputy Political Commissioner]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 25 January 1967.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Guiyang Municipal Committee Party History Research Office, *中国共产党贵阳市历史大事记（1934-2003）[Events in the History of the CCP in Guiyang City (1934-2003)]* (Guiyang: 贵州人民出版社 [Guizhou People's Publishing Press], 2005), 222.

[101] Zhang, "贵州夺权前后（《飞鸣镝》选读）[before and after the Power Seizure in Guizhou (Selected Readings of "the Flying Arrow")]."

[102] Guizhou Provincial Party Committee Party History Research Office, *中国共产党贵州历史 第二卷（1949-1978）[the History of the CCP in Guizhou Province, Volume Two (1949-1978)]*, 320.

[103] General Rebel Command of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionaries, "贵州无产阶级革命造反总指挥部通告 [Circular of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionary Rebels General Command]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 25 January 1967.

the military.[104] The “Ten Orders” stipulated that post-power seizure a RC was to be installed and its members were to be elected. More importantly, the RC was to “exert the function of the state machine” by establishing “executive organs” and a “new revolutionary order”.[105] This leap of rhetoric enshrined in a text was highly significant and established Guizhou as a separate model to be emulated.

This was compounded by the ways that mass organizations were dealt with. While they were repressed in Shandong, Li Tienai and the mass organizations under him were dealt with differently. Zhou Enlai had stressed that after Li’s arrest, Li Zaihan should strive for a united front.[106] Jiang Qing argued that it was not the organization that was bad, but its head.[107] Kang Sheng also cautioned the representatives to handle well the cadre problem and not to succumb to a fracturing left.[108] Li Zaihan agreed. Based on Zhou Enlai’s discussion with Guizhou representatives, they developed a program to deal with the rivaling mass organizations.[109] Published in the People’s Daily on 5 February, it was a political plan that laid down the principles for dealing with cadres and people associated with the opposing groups under Li Tienai. In six points they elaborated that leaders were to be arrested; normal members who confessed should be treated with tolerance; members with minor responsibility should never be detained or humiliated if they show themselves; and the deceived masses were to be educated and united with; other counter-revolutionary groups who engaged in economic

[104] Li Zaihan, group leader. Members: Geng Tie (worker), Yuan Changfu (worker), Li Chengzong (student), Cai Xiuchen (cadre at the Geochemistry Institute), Qixiu (reporter of Xinhua News Agency in Guizhou). No peasant representatives. See Yu, "贵州文革大事记 [Events in Guizhou During the Cultural Revolution]."

[105] General Rebel Command of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionaries, "十项通令 [Ten General Order]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 3 February 1967.

[106] Zhou Enlai, "周恩来接见贵州革命派代表时座谈纪要 [Summary of Zhou Enlai's Interview with the Representatives of Guizhou Revolutionary Factions]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 26 January 1967.

[107] Zhou et al., "接见贵州革命派代表座谈纪要 [Summary of a Meeting with Representatives from Guizhou’s Revolutionary Factions]."

[108] Ibid.

[109] Zhou, "周恩来接见贵州革命派代表时座谈纪要 [Summary of Zhou Enlai's Interview with the Representatives of Guizhou Revolutionary Factions]."

struggle or band together were to be suppressed.[110] Hence, at the exact time two factions in Shandong engaged in a protracted struggle for power that saw one rise to power and the other obliterated, the Centre pushed for allying opposing factions in Guizhou. This provided a potent model for resolving conflicts between mass organizations later on.

Students did not play an important part in Guizhou; rather, the power seizure movement emerged from workers and grassroots cadres.[111] The handling of rival mass organizations and together with military support, this model seemed to lead to a relative calm after the power seizure when compared to other provinces. This resulted in widespread praise for the "Guizhou model".[112] The People's Daily published Guizhou's revolutionary experience on 1 February: first, Guizhou established a temporary power organ for the masses to lead the coalition of revolutionaries. This provided an institutional "guarantee". Second, it was an alliance of revolutionary cadres and the masses that drew up a political program and seized power.[113] In a report to Mao, Chen Boda commented that Guizhou was an example of the "three-in-one-combination".[114] Guizhou also promised a way out of struggle among mass organizations and the towards the institutionalization of RCs. Subsequently, other provinces and localities were instructed to study Guizhou's treatment of the opposition.[115]

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[110] "贵州无产阶级革命造反总指挥部十项通令 [Ten Commands from Guizhou's Proletarian Rebel General Comman Centre]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 5 February 1967.

[111] Zhang, "贵州夺权前后（《飞鸣镝》选读）[before and after the Power Seizure in Guizhou (Selected Readings of "the Flying Arrow")]."

[112] Ibid.

[113] People's Daily, "西南的春雷 [Spring Thunder in Southwest China]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 1 February 1967.

[114] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *建国以来毛泽东文稿（第13册）[Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic (Volume 12)]* (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 1998), 238.

[115] General Rebel Command of the Guizhou Proletarian Revolutionaries, "关于被社会上的牛鬼蛇神打入和篡夺领导权的群众组织的若干规定 [Several Regulations Concerning Mass Organizations That Have Been Invaded and Taken over by Cows, Ghosts, Snakes, and Spirits of Society]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 5 February 1967.

However, it is curious to note that there was nothing inevitable about how Guizhou's power seizure played out. If Li Tienai had not been in Beijing, his arrest and the neutering of his organization would probably have involved significant fighting. In that case, the program for dealing with rivaling mass organization might have never existed. Hence, as in the other provinces, the Centre derived lessons from an experience that was based on a sequence of coincidences. It is interesting to note that the RC in Guizhou was to be a "state organ" guided by a Party-like small group. Structurally, this would become the arrangement after the Party's restoration later. Yet, in contrast to Shanxi, even though Guizhou's model was hold up for emulation, this experience was overshadowed by other, more potent innovations that seemed to answer more pressing questions.

Heilongjiang

All of the experiences of Shanghai, Shanxi, Shandong, and Guizhou resulted in the establishment of the first provincial-level RC in Heilongjiang. The leader of the Harbin Normal College rebels and one of the most prominent and prolific rebels in Heilongjiang, Fan Zhengmei 范正美, wrote that Heilongjiang's rebels should study the revolutionary spirit of Shanghai, their proletarian outlook and method but should not copy their precise tactics. Rather, they should discover, innovate, and create themselves.[116] Heilongjiang was the first province to build on the experiences made in Shanghai, Shanxi, Shandong, and Guizhou to establish China's first provincial RC. The "Heilongjiang Red Rebels Revolutionary Committee" was the first of its kind to leverage the combined experiences and establish a governing organ was to become the principal way and model of structuring government until 1979 and found its way into the State Constitution of 1975.

[116] Zhengmei Fan, *秋梦追思 [Autumn Dream]* (Beijing: 高等教育出版社 [Higher Education Press], 2007).

On 10 January 1967, the rebel organizations of Harbin Military Engineering College, Harbin Industrial University, Heilongjiang University and Harbin Normal College took over the "Heilongjiang Daily" and "Harbin Daily" and the provincial and city broadcasting station and the public security bureau, announcing that "all power belongs to the Red Rebels".[117] Responding to the Centre's Congratulatory Telegram to Shanghai from 11 January, two days later the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee, People's Committee, and military district urged all workers, peasants, revolutionaries, revolutionary intellectuals, cadres, and masses to study Shanghai's materials and its revolutionary situation.[118] On the same day, they denounced economism. On 16 January, Harbin's "Red Rebels" and 32 general departments and over 340 groups formed the "Harbin Red Rebels United General Headquarters" announcing that they had taken over most of Harbin's newspapers, broadcasting stations, long-distance telegram and post, banking, finance departments, multiple schools and universities, factories, and enterprise work units.[119] They were supported by Pan Fusheng, who had become First Party Secretary in October 1965, after which he was ill for a long time.[120] As a result, Wang Li wrote that he was not associated with the problems in Heilongjiang and was the only cadre without crimes, thus providing him a clean slate and the luxury of having no enemies.[121] He also had an excellent relationship with and support of the military. Pan thus became famous as the earliest first

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[117] Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee Party History Research Office, *中共黑龙江党史大事记（1949.10-1989.12）[Events in the History of the CCP in Heilongjiang (October 1949-December 1989)]* (Harbin: 黑龙江人民出版社 [Heilongjiang People's Publishing Press], 1991), 379-80.

[118] Ibid., 379.

[119] Harbin Municipal Archives, *哈尔滨大事记（1966-1985）[Events in Harbin (1966-1985)]* (Harbin, 1988), 10.

[120] Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee Organization Department, Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee Party History Research Office, and Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, *中国共产党黑龙江省组织史资料（1923—1987）[Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Heilongjiang Province (1923-1987)]* (Harbin: 黑龙江人民出版社 [Heilongjiang People's Publishing Press], 1992), 269.

[121] Wang, *王力反思录 [Wang Li's Reflections]*, 542. 542 See also Xiaosheng Liang, *一个红卫兵的自由 [the Freedom of a Red Guard]* (Chengdu: 四川文艺出版社 [Sichuan Literature and Art Publishing Press], 1988), 403.

secretary of a provincial Party committee to openly support the rebels.[122] On 18 January, the Central Committee ordered the arrest of 10 leaders of opposing mass organizations in Heilongjiang, leading to an incident when Pan and the provincial military commander Wang Jiadao dispatched troops.[123] This event led to the dissolution of most rivaling worker and student mass organizations. More importantly, this incident showcased the military's intervention in favor of the revolutionary left that Pan Fusheng represented and did not go unnoticed by the Centre.

Events accelerated. Commenting on the incident, the "Heilongjiang Daily" published a commentary denouncing all other rebel groups in Heilongjiang as "conservative" and "the remnants of the capitalist reactionary line".[124] At the Centre, Zhou Enlai clarified that the "Red Rebels" are to be supported,[125] thus sanctioning military intervention and the suppression of oppositional mass organizations and codifying central support for Pan Fusheng. This encouraged the "Red Rebels," who took over the provincial Party committee's GPCR office in Harbin. They required all decisions and instructions to go through them first; that work was to continue like normal, but they were to support the "Red Rebels" in their actions; and that nobody was to leave their post.[126] The demands they made were symptomatic of comparable power seizures (except for Shanxi). Rather than sending the cadres home and doing the work themselves, they took a supervision role.

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[122] Guangyu Zhang, "复生不易——潘复生 [Resurrection Is Not Easy—Pan Fusheng]," *昨天 [Yesterday]* 42 (2014).

[123] Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee Party History Research Office, *中共黑龙江党史大事记（1949.10-1989.12）[Events in the History of the CCP in Heilongjiang (October 1949-December 1989)]*, 380.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Zhou Enlai, "对哈尔滨公安局和《黑龙江日报》赴京代表的讲话 [Speech to the Representatives of Harbin Public Security Bureau and Heilongjiang Daily in Beijing]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 21 January 1967.

[126] Heilongjiang Provincial Party Committee Party History Research Office, *中共黑龙江党史大事记（1949.10-1989.12）[Events in the History of the CCP in Heilongjiang (October 1949-December 1989)]*, 380.

This changed on 23 January, when with the support of Pan Fusheng and Wang Jiadao, the rebel groups of 23 work units established the United General Headquarters and published the "Announcement Regarding the Red Rebels' United Takeover of the Province's and City's Party, Government, Finance, and Cultural Power".[127] This announcement further declared that the "leadership power" of the provincial Party committee and government was over and that all power now belonged to the "Red Rebel Revolutionary Committee". It highlighted the help attained from the military during the power seizure and argued that rebels, military, and cadres "implemented Chairman Mao's revolutionary line" together and consulted on establishing the RC.[128] At a mass meeting on 31 January, the "Heilongjiang Red Rebels Revolutionary Committee" was declared, with the main representative of the rebels, Fan Zhengmei, as the core small group's leader and Pan Fusheng and Wang Jiadao as members. The "First Announcement" proclaimed that all power belonged to the RC. As Fan Zhengmei notes, the name of "revolutionary committee" came directly from the "Sixteen Points" of August 1966.[129] In his speech, Pan Fusheng vowed to "resolutely fight together with the red rebel comrades" to "achieve victory".[130] Similar to Shandong, the RC was established and administered by a particular faction, the "Red Rebels". Promising to launch power seizures all over the province, Pan further pledged to turn Heilongjiang into a Mao Zedong Thought School and implement the GPCR until the end. They lost no time: on 8 February, the RC announced that the departments of the old Party committee and government were to be dissolved and replaced by

[127] Luzhou Shui, "《无产阶级文化大革命简论》连载十九——1966—1969 年炮打刘少奇的资产阶级司令部（13）[a Brief Comment on the Great Revolution of the Proletarian Culture, Serial 19 - the Bourgeois Command Centre of Liu Shaoqi, 1966-1969 (13)]," (2007).

[128] Heilongjiang Red Rebel Revolutionary Committee, "第一号通告 [the First Circular]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 2 February 1967.

[129] Fan, *秋梦追思 [Autumn Dream]*.

[130] Shui, "《无产阶级文化大革命简论》连载十九——1966—1969 年炮打刘少奇的资产阶级司令部（13）[a Brief Comment on the Great Revolution of the Proletarian Culture, Serial 19 - the Bourgeois Command Centre of Liu Shaoqi, 1966-1969 (13)]."

a new governance structure comprising three committees (political, production, and mass) and one office that established a variety of subsidiary "groups" under them.[131] Thus, the first provincial-level RC in the final sense of "governing power organ" took shape.

An editorial on 2 February praised Heilongjiang, arguing that its experience of uniting the leaders of mass organization, the military and local revolutionary cadres in a "three-in-one-combination" to form a "temporary power organ" was the key to victory.[132] According to the editorial, this showed that the "overthrow everything" attitude some rebels had exhibited in their attacks on Party-state structures was "completely wrong". Rather, destruction had to be combined with institution-building. Hence, the way forward was the "three-in-one combination". This marked the first time the "three-in-one-combination" was officially used and put into the context of both restoring order and forming a governing institution. At its core was the distinction between the minority of reactionary cadres and good cadres who formed the majority. The implication was significant. The power shift from students and Red Guards to workers that characterized the revolution in Shanghai emboldened cadres. Given that most of them were "good", they could engineer power seizures themselves—and they did.[133] Another article further elaborates Heilongjiang's experience.[134] First, the unity between revolutionary cadres, the masses, and the military was critical. The military and Pan Fusheng had a "revolutionary friendship forged in a life-and-death struggle" that had made an alliance "natural". Then they reached out to the mass organizations, who afterwards "proactively" asked him and the military district commander Wang Jiadao to take part. Second, power seizures in

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[131] Heilongjiang Local Annals Compilation Committee, *黑龙江省志—政权志 [Heilongjiang Province Annals—Governance Annal]* (Harbin: 黑龙江人民出版社 [Heilongjiang People's Publishing Press], 2003), 525.

[132] "东北的新曙光 [New Dawn in the Northeast]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 2 February 1967.

[133] Andrew G. Walder, "Rebellion of the Cadres: The 1967 Implosion of the Chinese Party-State," *The China Journal*, no. 75 (2015).

[134] "黑龙江省红色造反者夺权斗争的基本经验 [the Basic Experience of Heilongjiang Province's Red Rebels Power Seizure Struggle]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 10 February 1967.

the news agency, in broadcasting, and the public security bureau prepared the discourse for an eventual power seizure of the provincial committee and government. Third, Heilongjiang showed how revolutionary organizations united with revolutionaries within organs and departments. Summing it up, the editorial argued that leftist troops "used Mao Zedong Thought to guide the power-seizure struggle," redefining and enriching Mao Zedong Thought. Fan Zhengmei argued that the phenomena of "overthrowing all" and "anarchism" had been severe, but Heilongjiang's experiences provided a way out of this dilemma.[135] He elaborated four points: first, the "three-in-one-combination"; second, the correct handling of cadres; third, the rebel organization that educated itself by reading Mao's works and developing revolutionary awareness; fourth, Heilongjiang was the first to resolve the question of what happens after power seizure and how to name this new institution. He points out that Shanghai, Shanxi, and Guizhou lacked a stabilizing mechanism to establish revolutionary authority. By establishing the military-cadre-mass unity within the RC, Heilongjiang had resolved this problem.[136] As a result Wang Li relegated Mao's opinion on the new power organ to Zhang and Yao and told them to take part as representatives of revolutionary cadres.[137]

Central support for Pan Fusheng played an important role in achieving victory. As in Shandong, Heilongjiang's new power organ was exclusive, representing a single alliance of rebel organizations, cadres, and the military, and thus breeding the seed of future conflict. The Centre did not perceive this as a problem. As Mao had said, the overriding concern was power seizure without distinction.[138] Like the situations in Shanxi, Guizhou, and Shandong the military's intervention was thought to have stabilized a volatile and chaotic revolutionary situation.

[135] Fan, *秋梦追思 [Autumn Dream]*.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 356.

[138] Cited in Qingyang and Longmen, *新发现的周恩来 [Newly Discovered Zhou Enlai]*, 133.

Heilongjiang took the final step towards establishing the RC as a governing organ by overhauling the Party and government's organization.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to re-examine the January Revolution as a critical juncture. Four sequences emerged from it:

- The "Revolutionary Committee" sequence was based on the accumulated experiences of all provinces and Shanghai. Moreover, the experiences gradually reinforced each other and at the end of January the RC as it was organized in Heilongjiang became the only way to organize politics. This might also explain why Shanxi's superior model was rejected: it was simply too early (mid-January) to receive endorsement. Likewise, Guizhou's model was studied but not endorsed for emulation. However, by the end of January, other provinces' experiences had all produced variations of the "three-in-one-combination". When Heilongjiang created the RC, this then seemed like the natural way to move forward. What this shows is not merely that "timing matters" but also that the RC was far from inevitable.
- This is mirrored in the "military" sequence. Clearly, in the early provincial experiences the military played a pivotal role in supporting rebels and establishing control. Except in Shanghai where it was entirely absent, the military seemed like a safe bet to swiftly help rebels gain control over government and Party bodies. Its involvement therefore was a pragmatic decision based on evidence. Based on the situation in mid-February 1967, it is doubtful that the leadership foresaw the military's effective takeover of most provincial and sub-provincial RCs and the massive role it would play in the years to come. Indeed, this is one of the characteristics of critical junctures wherein leaders make choices that often have unforeseen consequences.

- The January Revolution also resulted in the survival of the "Party". While with the affirmation of the RC at the end of January, the Party was effectively neutered, Mao's decision to keep it alive in mid-February was crucial. While it would not play a significant role for over a year, its continued existence already foreshadowed its restoration. The decision for the Party however was taken irrespective of affirmation for the RCs. Here again, while its continued existence precipitates the coming institutional conflict with the RCs and the meaning of "revolution," this was far from obvious when the decision was taken.
- The "revolution" sequence was primarily established and based in Shanghai and featured, amongst its main actors Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the working-class led bottom-up revolution that would morph into the theory of "continuous revolution" later in 1967. The affirmation of Shanghai's experience was critical for the meaning and conduct of revolution until the GPCR's end. It influenced other provinces and provided a justification for rebellion at the grassroots and established "continuous revolution" as the main doctrine of the GPCR, thereby institutionalizing revolution. Together with the reemergence of the Party and serving as the theoretical backbone of the RCs, "revolution" would be gradually institutionalized. As the 9th Party Congress was prepared and revolution institutionalized, the question emerged where it belonged: in the RCs or the reemerging Party.

These sequences were far from inevitable. During critical junctures, decisions "are likely to be directly influenced by multiple and contradictory *political pressures* of varying strength, which, given the generalized uncertainty, are likely to be ambiguous and to change rapidly."[139] The four sequences that emerged from the January Revolution were thus not predetermined. Far from it, decisions for or against a course of action were taken in a space of high uncertainty

[139] Capoccia, "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change," 159.

regarding consequences. Some models were rejected because they came to late (as with the Shanghai People's Commune), too early (Shanxi), or were overshadowed (Guizhou). Clearly, Mao was at the apex of decision-making. This however does not mean that all his decisions were taken in a rational and farsighted manner. His choice for the RCs instead of the Shanghai Commune or the Shanxi and Guizhou models did not necessarily reflect the best interests of the revolutionaries whose champion Mao was. At the same time, Mao's support for the RCs meant he promoted an institution that resolved a crisis of his own making.[140]

Unsurprisingly, the decisions taken had unforeseen consequences. The RC, the military's involvement, the Party's survival, and the affirmation of Shanghai's revolutionary experience, while seemingly independent of each other, become intertwined. This was far from obvious in January and early February 1967. Here, the decisions for or against a model were pragmatic, based on objective evidence and, as far as the leadership was concerned, produced good results. He could not know that these choices meant that by 1973 an administrative Party and state would have emerged that surpassed its pre-GPCR predecessor in institutional strength. There was then no grand plan rather than chaotic and haphazard reactions to rapidly evolving developments.

In the next chapter I look at the unfolding interaction between "revolution," "military," and "RC" sequences. I show how the revolution converted the functions of the military, that then transformed initially revolutionary RCs into administrative governance organs. Dealing with this institutional quagmire required bringing back the Party in late 1967. This process of institutional change that was driven from the grassroots as well as from the top would eventually reach its end in the early 1970s. The drafting of a new state constitution in 1970 would both become a by-product and a way to freeze the changing institutional arrangements.

[140] Citing Blyth, Capoccia makes a similar point when he argues that "crises are not simply a reflection of the 'objective' fact of economic dislocation… but also socially constructed by powerful actors to be *crises of a certain type* – the same actors that then promote new institutions to 'solve' the so-defined crisis." See ibid., 164.

Chapter II: Struggle over Revolutionary Committees

Introduction

The 1967 January Revolution as a critical juncture created four sequences: the "RC," "military," "revolution," and "Party". This chapter treats the relationship between the "RC," "military," and "revolution" sequences. I show how Shanghai's model of bottom-up revolution led to a conversion of both the military and RC sequences. The military was forced by circumstance to convert itself from a fighting into an administrative force that led to the eventual takeover of the RCs. In turn, this meant the RCs were transformed from "revolutionary" into "administrative" organs. Eventually the emergence of military-led RCs would convince Mao that there was threat to the Party controlling the "gun". However, in reality the military had reacted to an evolving situation rather than proactively seeking to establish a "military bureaucracy" as Mao would later charge. This either shows that Mao's master plan had failed or—as the January Revolution has shown—that there was no plan to begin with.

After revolutionaries tore down Party and state structures in January and February 1967 throughout the entire country, the breakdown of order led to (heavy) fighting among them. This resulted not only in a power vacuum at the grassroots, but also in the inability to form RCs. The military was compelled to step into this space and built temporary institutions, thereby filling the vacuum, guaranteeing rudimentary economic activity, and implementing GPCR policies.[1] This put the military into a position wherein it was converted from a fighting into an economic and administrative force. In this way, revolution led to the transformation of the military to fulfill functions that it was initially not equipped to handle. Emerging reinforced at

[1] See Schoenhals for an example of the development of the social and productive forces. Michael Schoenhals, *China's Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).

the grassroots, the military naturally took over most of the emerging RCs. However, due to the military's new role as providers of economic and administrative governance, it then also started to convert the RCs from a revolutionary into an administrative organ. Initially, the RC was to resolve the Party's alienation from the people, implement the policies of the GPCR,[2] and render governance more responsive.[3] RCs were thus to be established down to the grassroots, where they would re-educate and remold the populace by forming the institutional bedrock to rebuild the Chinese polity from the ground-up.[4] It was then the military that redefined the RCs. Hence, paradoxically, it was the revolution itself that turned the "revolutionary" organs of the RC onto their head through the conversion of the military that then transformed the RCs.

The unintended consequences of decisions made during the January Revolution became apparent in the formation of RCs and the military's role in it. This chapter thus demonstrates the results of deciding on the RC as a governing organ and the military as one of its pillars. Thus, "conversion" explains both how the military ended up in charge of the RCs and how RCs transformed into administrative agencies. While this was not the intention of the decisions taken during the January Revolution, it was its unfortunate outcome. From an institutional and organizational point of view, this interaction of conversion between the different sequences the stage for the 9th Party Congress in April 1969 and the drafting of a new state constitution in 1970.

[2] While the structure of RC has been described, its institutional history was seldom discussed. Exceptions include Jürgen Domes, "The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Commitees 1967-68," *The China Quarterly* 44 (1970); Ralph L. Powell, "The Party, the Government and the Gun," *Asian Survey* 10, no. 6 (1970). Guoqiang Dong and Andrew G. Walder, "From Truce to Dictatorship: Creating a Revolutionary Committee in Jiangsu," *China Journal* 68, no. 1-32 (2012). However, they mostly focus on singular RCs or on the process of establishing them throughout the country.

[3] Yanhui Guang, "特殊年代的特殊产物--革命委员会 [Revolutionary Committee, a Special Product of the Special Era]," *党史纵览 [Overview of Party History]*, no. 2 (2004).

[4] For a general history of RCs see Wang, *Revolutionary Committees in the Cultural Revolution Era of China: Exploring a Mode of Governance in Historical and Future Perspectives*.

This chapter has three sections. Based on a unique sample of organizational materials, I look at differences in the establishment dates of RCs.[5] Indeed, the establishment of RCs at the district, county, and grassroots levels lagged behind the provincial level.[6] RC formation differed from province to province,[7] with RCs at the grassroots being established significantly later than higher-level RCs. The second section explores the reasons behind the time delay. Here, revolution inspired by the January Revolution led to the conversion of the military into an administrative force. Finally, in section three I examine how the military took over and started to transform the RCs.

Section 1: Mapping Revolutionary Committee Formation

Congratulatory articles in the People's Daily document the establishment of RCs on the provincial level (see Annex).[8] By 8 September 1968, a 20-month process of establishing RCs at the provincial level was complete with RCs forming in Xinjiang and Tibet, and celebrated by a famous People's Daily article proclaiming that all of China was now "red".[9] While this temporal disparity showcases the lack of institutions and governance at the provincial level, this phenomenon is more striking on the sub-provincial level.

In February 1967, few areas at the various sub-provincial levels had established RCs. As early as 30 January 1967, Zhou Enlai noted that if provinces formed RCs first, they could then help

[5] See the Appendix for a description of the data sources used.

[6] Unlike Esherick, I will not dissect grassroots level construction, instead focusing on bureaucratic formation. See Joseph W. Esherick, "Deconstructing the Construction of the Party-State: Gulin County in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region," *The China Quarterly* 140 (1994).

[7] In this Chapter I use the terms "province" and "region" in an administrative sense as "provincial-level" entities. "Provinces" thus always include "autonomous regions".

[8] Ronghui Zhang, ""全国一片红"的来龙去脉 [the Ins and Outs of "the Nation Is Red"]," *党史博采 [Extensive Collection of Party History]* 6 (2004). For an overview, see David S. G. Goodman, "The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 196–1979: An Obituary," *The China Quarterly* 85 (1981).

[9] "欢呼全国山河一片红 [Celebrating the Entire Nation Is Red]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 8 September 1968; "无产阶级文化大革命的全面胜利万岁！[Long Live the Overall Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 7 September 1968.

rebel factions in districts and counties seize power in their localities.[10] RCs were then to "trickle down" from the provinces to eventually reach the grassroots. The problems associated with forming RCs at the provincial level led to vast temporal variations in their establishment but were exacerbated at the sub-provincial level, resulting in enormous variation.

Measuring the gap between the emergence of the first and last RC on the various administrative levels within China's provinces, the chasm is dazzling. As the table below shows, it took Jiangsu and Liaoning over five years (1,953 and 1,949 days) from forming the first to constituting the last RC. Other provinces fared similarly, with Ningxia and Hubei just shy of five and Zhejiang and Henan requiring four and a half years. In Zhejiang, for example, the first RC in my sample was established in the Quanxi People's Commune in November 1967. However, the last RC to be formed was in Xinchang County's Chengjiao District in April 1972, over four years later. On average, it took nearly 2,5 years (954 days) for provinces to establish RCs in all of their administrative districts. Even in the fastest areas to complete RC building, Shaanxi and Guangdong, the entire process took a little over nine months.

Table 2: Maximum length of RC establishment by province and administrative level (in days)

Province/ Region	**Sample size (n)[11]**	**Difference between first and last established RC[12] (1)**	**District (2)**	**County (3)**	**Grassroots (4)**	**Average of (2) + (3) + (4)**
Jiangsu	249	1,953	977	1,031	1,644	1,217
Liaoning	270	1,949	132	254	1,949	778

[10] Zhou Enlai et al., "接见贵州革命派代表的讲话 [Speech at a Meeting with Representatives from Guizhou's Revolutionary Factions]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 30 January 1967.
[11] For a breakdown of sample size according to region and administrative level see the Annex.
[12] Irrespective of administrative level.

Ningxia	90	1,796	35	244	1,773	684
Hubei	316	1,766	244	275	1,735	751
Zhejiang	421	1,613	1,168	1,431	1,613	1,404
Henan	402	1,589	152	949	1,583	895
Shandong	263	1,523	494	669	1,523	895
Jiangxi	113	1,492	121	92	1,401	538
Fujian	218	1,216	580	639	882	700
Shanghai	187	1,096	365	379	1,065	603
Xinjiang	72	1,037	391	484	993	623
Jilin	52	1,035	237	187	1,035	486
Shanxi	203	1,008	609	933	945	829
Hunan	150	943	337	235	914	495
Gansu	224	804	230	274	793	432
Heilongjiang	106	744	470	402	547	473
Sichuan	167	734	643	606	716	655
Tibet	35	696	386	696		541
Inner Mongolia	65	674	390	488	153	344
Guangxi	81	655	527	614	275	472
Hebei	182	642	270	398	335	334
Guizhou	233	612	394	576	580	517
Anhui	251	578	171	199	549	306
Qinghai	91	521	128	473	225	275
Beijing	53	403		150	366	258
Tianjin	18	359	344	116		230

Yunnan	85	306	267	357	306	310
Shaanxi	61	284	215	284	182	227
Guangdong	60	278	95	256	580	310
Difference between fastest and slowest			1,133	1,339	1,793	
AVERAGE[13]		**976**	**370**	**472**	**913**	

Source: author's database and calculations, n=4,734[14], in days

My data shows a similar picture of divergence on the district level. Here, it took Zhejiang's Zhoushan 38 months until March 1971 to emulate Hangzhou's first success in establishing a RC (19 December 1967). Zhoushan is the greatest outlier in my sample, being the last district-level city to establish a RC. Similarly, Jiangsu's last district-level RC was established in late September 1969, a full two years and eight months after Suzhou. However, the real gap is exposed when these "slow" provinces are compared with "faster" ones. Here, Ningxia accomplished the same feat in a little over one month (35 days), while the second fastest province, Guangdong, took roughly three months (95 days). The gap between the quickest and the slowest provinces to establish district-level RCs stands thus at 37 months. The same phenomenon can be witnessed at the county level. Here, Jiangxi and Tianjin (92 and 116 days) are pitted against Zhejiang and Jiangsu (1,431 and 1,031 days). It is however at the grassroots that the differences are the largest. Thus, in my sample Inner Mongolia needed 153 days to form RCs[15] (as the second, Shaanxi comes in at 182 days), while Liaoning and Ningxia are positioned last with 1,949 and 1,773 days. This shows that there are considerable differences for the sub-provincial level in different regions.

[13] Average of all areas in the given administrative level.
[14] Note that this number lacks the 29 provincial-level jurisdictions.
[15] Note that the grassroots level of Inner Mongolia is represented by a mere four People's Communes.

From an administrative viewpoint, the average time to complete one cycle rises from district to grassroots levels. While on average it took provinces 370 days to form RCs at the district level, this number rose to 472 on the county level, and almost doubled to 913 days at the grassroots. This means it took more time to finish building RCs at varying administrative levels, with the countryside taking an average of 2,5 years. Likewise, pitting the fastest and the slowest against each other in every administrative level shows a gradual increase of time with decreasing level. Thus, the difference on the district level between Zhejiang (the slowest at 1,168 days) and Ningxia (fastest at 35 days) amounts to 1,133 days, on the county-level to 1,339 days (Zhejiang and Jiangxi) and 1,796 days at the grassroots (Liaoning and Inner Mongolia).

Perhaps the most striking cases in terms of the average of all administrative levels are the five provinces that provided the blueprint for the GPCR and that were treated in the previous chapter: Shanghai (603), Shanxi (829), Shandong (895), Guizhou (517), and Heilongjiang (473). Speed designates Shandong as the third (together with Henan) and Shanxi as the fourth slowest province. Shanghai, Guizhou, and Heilongjiang are placed in the upper mid-field, but all of them are vastly outpaced by twelve other provinces. This shows that first-movers had no advantage over late-starting provinces. Likewise, late-starting provinces did not benefit because of having learnt valuable lessons from other's mistakes. The establishment of the first district-level RCs in Xinjiang and Tibet (September 1968), Ningxia (20 February 1968), and Yunnan (23 March 1968) have, except for Yunnan, not led to a quicker establishment of RCs. With 1,404 and 1,217 days, Zhejiang and Jiangsu by far are the slowest provinces to establish RCs. This contrasts with Shaanxi and Tianjin that, on average, needed 227 and 230 days to form all RCs in their jurisdictions.

In sum, there are significant variations both among the different provinces and the three administrative sub-provincial levels. Before I delve into what happened in the period post-

revolution but prior to the formation of RCs in section two of this chapter, it is necessary to look at the concentration of RC establishment. With the last provincial-level RCs established in September 1968 in Xinjiang and Tibet and the declaration of a "red" China, the formative institutional phase of the GPCR was over. While true for the provincial level, as the former table had suggested, many RCs were created just well into the early 1970s. In my sample of 4,734 RC establishment dates, roughly 23% of all RCs were formed from 9 September 1968 until the end of 1972.

Table 3: Percentage of RCs established by time and province

			Prior to 8 September 1968			**Post 8 September 1968**		
Unit: %	of Total N	of District N	of County N	of Grassroots N	of Total N	of District N	of County N	of Grassroots N
Anhui	88,05	100	100	85,92	11,95	0	0	14,08
Beijing	98,11	/	100	97,14	1,89	/	0	2,86
Fujian	66,06	77,78	62,69	66,90	33,94	22,22	37,31	33,10
Guangdong	95	100	92,31	94,44	5,00	0	7,69	5,56
Gansu	66,07	100	100	58,01	33,93	0	0	41,99
Guangxi	90,12	100	90,00	87,93	9,88	0	10,00	12,07
Guizhou	99,14	100	95,83	99,50	0,86	0	4,17	0,50
Henan	84,08	100	89,09	82,53	15,92	0	10,91	17,47
Hubei	86,39	100	100	80,63	13,61	0	0	19,37
Hebei	97,80	100	100	97,45	2,20	0	0	2,55
Heilongjiang	94,34	100	100	72,73	5,66	0	0	27,27

Hunan	85,33	76,92	66,67	90,91	14,67	23,08	33,33	9,09
Jilin	96,15	100	100	91,30	3,85	0	0	8,70
Jiangsu	80,72	93,33	96,77	77,34	19,28	6,67	3,23	22,66
Jiangxi	87,61	100	100	81,82	12,39	0	0	18,18
Liaoning	84,44	100	97,22	81,36	15,56	0	2,78	18,64
Inner Mongolia	96,92	100	96,00	100	3,08	0	4,00	0
Ningxia	78,89	100	95,65	71,88	21,11	0	4,35	28,13
Qinghai	100	100	100	100	0	0	0	0
Sichuan	33,52	42,86	40,00	27,88	66,48	57,14	60,00	72,12
Shandong	76,43	100	94,44	69,90	23,57	0	5,56	30,10
Shanghai	78,61	100	100	76,05	21,39	0	0	23,95
Shaanxi	98,36	100	96,77	100	1,64	0	3,23	0
Shanxi	78,82	77,78	79,63	77,91	21,18	22,22	20,37	22,09
Tianjin	100	100	100	/	0	0	0	/
Xinjiang	11,11	7,69	14,29	11,11	88,89	92,31	85,71	88,89
Tibet	42,86	16,67	48,28	/	57,14	83,33	51,72	/
Yunnan	43,53	47,06	26,09	51,11	56,47	52,94	73,91	48,89
Zhejiang	50,36	90,91	41,18	49,62	49,64	9,09	58,82	50,38
% of Total n	**77,44**	**84,87**	**83,89**	**74,85**	**22,56**	**15,13**	**16,11**	**25,15**

Source: author's database and calculations, n=4,734

Was China in fact "red"? Generally, the answer is "yes". By 8 September, 77% of all jurisdictions had established RCs. At the district and county level, 85 and 84% of all

jurisdictions had formed RCs, trailed by 75% at the grassroots. Thus, it is notable that while institutional construction had almost been completed at the district and county level, RCs had not yet entirely penetrated the countryside. Twenty-five percent of grassroots RCs were completed in late 1968 and afterwards, pointing to a sub-provincial division between county and grassroots level. There are also stark regional differences. Broken down according to provinces, we see that except for Tianjin[16] and Qinghai, no other jurisdiction had finished construction of RCs at all levels by 8 September. Thus, all except for one of Chongqing's districts and all of its counties were created after the 8 September article. Similarly, more than half of the RCs in Xinjiang, Sichuan, Tibet, Yunnan, and Zhejiang were constructed after the September article, with other provinces being much faster. Close to 90% of Xinjiang's RCs were set up in late 1968 and 1969. While Xinjiang and Tibet were remote, politically unimportant, and with a small population, this is not the case for Sichuan and Zhejiang. Over 72% of Sichuan's grassroots RCs were formed after the article. Border skirmishes with India in Tibet in 1967 and the specter of a Soviet attack on Xinjiang meant that a "three-in-one-combination" was always to be more symbolic and dependent on security considerations than based on a genuine desire to "revolutionize governance" and "educate the populace". However, Zhejiang was another case. Bordering Shanghai and being a major coastal province, Zhejiang could not follow suit and fell behind, leaving a question mark. Nonetheless, the 8 September editorial left the remaining areas in a rush to form RCs. Thus, from September until the end of December, the total number of jurisdictions having created RCs jumped from 77 to 86%,[17] with for example Chongqing establishing all but one of its RCs in October and November 1968.[18]

[16] Unfortunately, I do not have data on grassroots level RCs in Tianjin.
[17] Own calculation based on the same sample.
[18] Except for Jiangbei County, which followed in February 1969.

The preceding analysis showcased three issues regarding RC formation. First, it showed spatial differences.[19] The divergences in forming RCs at the provincial level were mirrored and exacerbated at the sub-provincial level. While the experience of all provinces differed in terms of time, they needed to create RCs, this variation is even starker at the sub-provincial level. Second, in terms of administrative level, I showed that with a decreasing level the time to establish RCs balloons. Thus, the grassroots not only took the longest to form RCs but were established the latest. In stark contrast to the alleged dynamics of the much vaunted Shanghai model, RC building was a top-down affair, with higher levels preceding lower levels.[20] Third, temporal differences show a break along the 8 September editorial that proclaimed China to be "red," causing the remaining areas to rush. Together, these three conclusions point to a divide between the Centre and the localities by showing how sub-provincial jurisdictions implemented central instructions regarding RC establishment and the "grand alliance". Furthermore, it demonstrates the administrative lag and the time instructions needed to trickle down by illustrating how long it took for the GPCR to reach and penetrate the countryside.[21]

The delay in the formation of RCs is best explained by looking at the interaction between the "revolution" and "military" sequences. It was just after the RC was quite literally forced through that a new state constitution was drafted in early 1970—by which time the RC had already basically completed their conversion from revolutionary to administrative organs. How did "revolution" impact this transformation? The next section looks at how the revolutionary moment launched by the January Revolution played out at the grassroots, converted the military, and put it in a position to eventually overtake and transform the RCs.

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[19] It also shows that neither China nor the different levels are monolithic. See Ben Hillman, "Factions and Spoils: Examining Political Behavior within the Local State in China," *The China Journal*, no. 64 (2010).

[20] There are few examples of lower administrative levels RC establishment preceding that of the next higher level. They are a blatant minority, however.

[21] For a general discussion of the GPCR in the countryside, see Richard Baum, "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Anatomy of a Limited Rebellion," in *The Cultural Revolution in China*, ed. Thomas W. Robinson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). Richard Madsen, *Morality and Power in a Chinese Village* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), Especially Chapter 6.

Section 2: Providing a Semblance of Governance

The last section showed that the establishment of RCs was not as smooth as Mao and the leadership had envisioned. As already illustrated in the last chapter, power seizure in all the five provinces was accompanied by or resulted in the suppression or disenfranchisement of rivaling rebel groups and mass organizations with military support, a process that has been explored for various localities in case studies.[22] However, the relationship between revolution, military, and RC building is far from straightforward—in fact, revolutionary action converted the functions of the military and turned it from a fighting into an administrative force. From mid-1966 onwards, under attacks by Red Guards, many areas already had experienced governance paralysis. Extending the GPCR to the workers, in December 1966, the Central Committee published the "Ten Rules" that allowed workers to set up their own revolutionary organization as long as they continued to promote production.[23] The "Ten Points on Agriculture" then allowed GPCR to move to villages as long as agricultural production was secured,[24] but it was just with the "Shanghai spirit" of open bottom-up revolt that most Party committees and government bureaus in the localities entered complete paralysis and stopped working entirely in January and February 1967. Indeed, this was a result of the call for bottom-up revolution that emanated from the January Revolution.

Out of a sample of 188 county-level jurisdictions, 149 areas report specific dates for full paralysis. Of these, the overwhelming majority of 126 counties entered paralysis in between

[22] Guoqiang Dong and Andrew G. Walder, "Local Politics in the Chinese Cultural Revolution: Nanjing under Military Control," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 70, no. 2 (2011). Shaoguang Wang, *Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[23] "关于抓革命、促生产的十条规定（草案）[Ten Provisions on Grasping Revolution and Promoting Production (Draft)]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 9 December 1966.

[24] "关于农村无产阶级文化大革命的指示（草案）（供讨论和试行用） [Instructions on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Countryside (Draft) (for Discussion and Trial Use)]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 15 December 1966.

January and February 1967, with the rest after February (13 cases) or in the second half of 1966 (13 cases). Paralysis was either accompanied or followed by power seizure. Of the 144 cases that provide dates, 133 experienced power seizures in January or February with the rest taking place throughout 1967. Since Party and government structures had already been weakened throughout the latter half of 1966 and mass organizations had formed earlier already, Shanghai did nothing more than lighting the fuse that led to the collapse of the entire governing structure. Thus, by the end of February 1967, the Party and government had been crippled in almost the entire sample while simultaneously leading to the number of military controlled work units skyrocketing to 6,900, including public security, post, television, newspapers, banks, storages, and prisons.[25] Here the military did something it was not equipped to do: administer. Revolution put the military into a position that required it to take over organizations formerly entrenched in the state and staffed by professional bureaucrats. This was the beginning of the military's conversion into an administrative and governing force.

It is notable that widespread armed conflict had not yet taken place.[26] Of the 188 counties 130 report various degrees of armed struggle starting **before** the establishment of RCs.[27] Of these 130, 36 (28%) took place until June 1967. Between January and February as part of the power seizure 14 cases were reported with three in Zhejiang involving heavy fighting, and two each in Hubei and Inner Mongolia. In Zhejiang's Shaoxing for example, power was seized from the local Party committee's office on 25 January. This was followed by seizures of subsidiary

[25] Ke Li and Shengzhang He, *"文化大革命"中的人民解放军 [the People's Liberation Army in the "Cultural Revolution"]* (Beijing: 中共党史资料出版社 [CCP Party History Materials Publishing Press], 1989), 237.

[26] I am not including references to armed struggle in 1966 rather than bloodshed that is directly connected to bottom-up power seizure and the formation of a new form of governing organ, ideas that, as the former Chapter showed, were formed in January and February 1967.

[27] This number diverts significantly from the sample of 188 for mainly two reasons. First, RCs in counties under Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Guizhou, Shandong, and Shanghai were established very early. Of the 30 cases included, just seven provided indications of armed struggle. The other 23 were established before noticeable armed struggle even had started. Second, it is highly likely that some materials in the sample are incomplete and have omitted references to armed struggle, especially if it occurred on a small scale.

counties which were accompanied by armed strife and the subsequent breakdown of Party and government functions.[28]

While violence occurred sometimes in the aftermath or process of power seizure, most armed conflict however started between June and September 1967.[29] In April, the Centre limited the military's power to declare who was counter-revolutionary,[30] thus also curtailing their power to restore order.[31] 60 counties (46%) first reported significant armed clashes between factions during this time period. This was accompanied by the theft of weaponry and munition from military bases. For example, in Anyi District in Jiangxi in July, rebels stole 494 rifles, 65 sub-machine guns, 48 light and heavy machine guns, six cannons, and 48,188 rounds of ammunition. During the raid, two people were beaten to death.[32] Events were localized and inspired by clashes in other parts of the country. Thus, rebels in Hunan's Zhuzhou began their armed conflict upon hearing of Changsha's clashes.[33]

Few counties in the sample had their first armed struggle after September, in line with the Centre's decision to end armed struggle and restore the PLA's authority.[34] For the time period from September to December 1967, the number drops to 29 counties. Only five counties could maintain relative peace until 1968 but even they eventually experienced wide scale bloodshed. This led to the Centre publishing a Notice in October 1967 requiring all factories, schools,

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[28] Shaoxing Municipal Committee History Office, *中共绍兴党史大事记（1919.5-1990.12）[Zhonggong Shaoxing Dangshi Dashiji (May 1919-December 1990)]* (浙江大学出版社 [Zhejiang University Publishing Press], 1992), 195.

[29] Michael Schoenhals, ""Why Don't We Arm the Left?" Mao's Culpability for the Cultural Revolution's "Great Chaos" of 1967," *The China Quarterly* 182 (2005).

[30] "中央军委十条命令 [Ten Commands of the Central Military Commission]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 6 April 1967.

[31] Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis," in *The Cambridge History of China, the People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution (1966-1982)*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[32] Anyi County Committee Party History Work Office, *中共安义历史大事记（1919 年5 月—2001 年9 月）[Events in the History of the CCP in Anyi (May 1919-September 2001)]* (2001), 80.

[33] Zhuzhou County Party Committee History Liaison Group, *中共株洲县党史大事记（1965—1995）[Events in the History of the CCP in Zhuzhou County (1965-1995)]* (1997), 17.

[34] Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis."

departments, and enterprise work units to implement the "revolutionary grand alliance" to hasten the establishment of the "three-in-one-combination" and the execution of "struggle, criticize, change".[35] In sum, armed strife happened also after the Party and government had been paralyzed, power seized, and the military intervened.

One of the main reasons for the deferment of struggle and armed clashes were preliminary institutions installed in March 1967 all over China. A direct response to the worsening economic situation, at the end of February the Centre commanded the military to support the spring harvest and production.[36] This instruction stipulated that the military should help peasants in their harvest by establishing a team to lead production and restore production organizations. In these organizations, the armed forces and militia provided the backbone. Further, while harvesting, Mao's works were to be "lively studied and used". Two weeks later, the Centre forbade all power seizures during the time of harvest. It also upheld[37] the ban on exchanging of revolutionary experiences and put[38] focus on production and labor discipline. Workers' GPCR activity was relegated to their spare time.[39] Due to power seizures and paralysis at the county level, there was no one to manage production in the countryside, leaving the military to handle it.[40] Except for jurisdictions that had already formed RCs by that time, most areas analyzed in my sample built either "Leading Small Groups for Production,"

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[35] "遵照毛主席的指示，按照系统实行革命大联合 [Follow Chairman Mao's Instructions and Systematically Implement the Grand Revolutionary Alliance]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 19 October 1967.

[36]"关于军队大力支援地方抓好春耕生产的指示 [Instructions for the Military to Vigorously Support Local Efforts to Grasp Spring Farming]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 23 February 1967.

[37]"关于农村生产大队和生产队在春耕期间不要夺权的通知 [Notice on the Non-Seizure of Power by Rural Production Brigades and Production Brigades During Spring Farming]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 7 March 1967.

[38] "关于停止全国大串联的通知 [Notice on Stopping Roaming across the Country to Exchagne Revolutionary Ideas]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 19 March 1967.

[39] "中共中央给全国厂矿企业革命职工、革命干部的信 [Letter from the CCP Central Committee to Revolutionary Workers and Cadres of Factories and Mines across the Country]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 18 March 1967.

[40] Fureng Dong, ed., *中华人民共和国经济史（上）[Economic History of the People's Republic of China (First)]* (Beijing: 经济科学出版社 [Economic science press], 1999), 527.

"Production Command Centers," or other organizations to direct the economy. As Xifeng County in Liaoning reports, their "Command Center" had four tasks. First, holding high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought, organizing and directing the study and use of Chairman Mao's works and transforming the entire county into a Mao Zedong Thought School.[41] Second, to rectify, train, solidify, and improve production leadership teams at all levels; third, to propagate and carry out the policies of the Party and investigate their implementation among the production teams; fourth, to investigate and iron out problems in industrial and agricultural production, the people's lives and in all other areas, summarize them and communicate experiences and resolve issues that departments cannot resolve.[42] The model to be followed throughout the country was Beijing's Huairou County that formed a "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production Front Line Command Center". [43] Zhou Enlai said that the key was to focus on production rather than revolution.[44] He added it was not important whether the military directed it. On 12 March, the People's Daily published an editorial praising Huairou's experience.[45] This institution was established in a "three-in-one-combination" format and hailed as providing a basis for the "grand alliance". According to the editorial, the deputy county head played the pivotal role in orchestrating this new institution and uniting 16 mass

[41] Marianne Bastid, "Economic Necessity and Political Ideals in Educational Reform During the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* 42 (1970).

[42] Xifeng County Party Committee Party History Research Office and Xifeng County Archive Bureau, *中共西丰县党史大事记（1945.11—1987.12）[Events in the History of the CCP in Xifeng County (November 1945-December 1987)]* (1993), 312.

[43] "关于成立 "抓革命、促生产" 第一线指挥部问题的通知 [Notice on Issue of Establishing "Grasping Revolution, Promoting Production" Front Line Command Centres]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 11 March 1967.

[44] Wenqian Gao, *晚年周恩来 [the Late Zhou Enlai]* (Hong Kong: 香港明镜出版社 [Hong Kong Mirror Publishing House], 2003), 81.

[45] "怀柔县委经过同各革命组织充分酝酿协商 成立抓革命促生产第一线指挥部 调动一切积极因素大抓春耕生产 [the Huairou County Committee Has Fully Negotiated with the Revolutionary Organizations to Establish a Front Line Command Centre for Grasping Revolution Promoting Production Mobilizing All Positive Factors to Grasp Spring Harvest Production]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 12 March 1967.

organizations with the support of the military. However, it was mostly the military that had taken up the reins. It therefore not only administered but actually took charge of production. In reality, far from taking the initiative, cadres took the backseat. Of the 188 counties in the sample, 145 established some form of this institution, mostly in March or April 1967.[46] Names varied, from "Production Committee" to "Production Command Centre," "Spring Harvest Production Leading Group," "Grasping Revolution, Promoting Production Command Centre," or "Grasping Revolution, Promoting Production Office" (among others). The official name of "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production Front Line Command Center" (35 cases in the sample) was eclipsed by both "Production Command Center" (45) and "Production Office" (42). Regardless of naming issues, in terms of formation process and leadership they were similar. 109 were formed, led, or had the military at its core rather than participating. Five were created by cadres or led by them, and just one was formed by a mass organization.[47] Unfortunately, it is hard to generalize the prevalence of the "three-in-one-combination" from the dataset. In 23 cases these new organs included both former cadres and representatives of mass organizations. But even of the 23, 13 were established under the helm of the military, with one under cadre leadership.[48] Military leadership was thus the key not only to their establishment, but also formed the core of their operational capacity. The logic provided by Yunnan's Fuyuan County is instructive. Since the local leadership had been criticized and struggled against there, the entire Party and government was paralyzed. Facing this situation, to implement the requirements of the Centre and the provincial leadership and to promote industrial and

[46] Here again, 21 non-relevant counties from Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Guizhou, Shandong, and Shanghai are deducted. Some counties also directly established RC preparatory groups and therefore are not included in the sample. A third category is comprised of counties which materials' do not give any indication of a relevant or comparable institution.

[47] In Liaoning's Shenyang, see Shenyang Municipal Party Committee Party History Research Office, *社会主义时期沈阳地方党史大事记（1948—1987）[Events in the History of the CCP in Shenyang Locality During the Socialist Period (1948-1987)]* (1990). The remainder of the sample could not be confirmed.

[48] The remainder could not be determined.

agricultural production, the institution was to have military cadres at its core (Fuyuan had cadres as well but mass representatives were excluded).[49] In the aftermath of power seizure, the military was not only the sole operable institution but also the single institution that could "build" and "create".[50] Hence, regardless if an actual "three-in-one-combination" had been established, the military was still in the driver's seat because it was the only institution that retained organizational power and authority and that had not been discredited. Hence the military was compelled by outside circumstances to convert from a "fighting" into an "administrative" and "productive" force.

It should thus not come as a surprise that RCs developed an understanding of themselves as "supplanting all former Party and government institutions" (as they are officially described) while maintaining the focus on production and ensuring that Mao Zedong Thought was "vividly studied and used". In terms of organization, several offices or groups were installed, such as a general "Office/Secretariat" and specific departments responsible for specific management tasks such as "Finance and Trade Office" (43 counties), "Politics" (32), "Industry and Transportation" (31), "Agriculture" (27), "Propaganda" (13), or "Organization" (10), among others.[51] The actual organizational structure of these institutions was both diverse and tailored to the jurisdiction. For example, while five counties established an office for animal husbandry, four of them were in Xinjiang. In reality, they did not only organize production, but also cared for the physical health of citizens: after Shuangliu County dealt with an outbreak of meningitis in March, it established a "Leading Small Group for the Prevention of Epidemic

[49] Fuyuan County Party History Annals Work Committee, *中国共产党富源县历史大事记（1935—1990）[Events in the History of the CCP in Fuyuan County (1935-1990)]* (云南民族出版社 [Yunnan Nationalities Publishing Press], 1992), 107.
[50] Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis."
[51] Not all samples provide information on the number and nature of offices formed.

Diseases".[52] While the military-led institution was to guide production and provide stability after power seizure, this did not last long given that armed struggle started soon after and the military promoted a strategy of their adherence to the "four nos" of "being beaten must not beat back," "being insulted must not insult back," "must not lose one's temper," and "must not open fire,"[53] in combination with "not fearing chaos," "not managing," "not feeling urgency," and "not suppressing". Regardless, the military reinforced its administrative capacities, further by adding offices along the way. For example, Jiangxi's Fengxin County organized a "Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Special Group" in January 1968.[54]

This demonstrates several issues. First, it showcases the influence of the military and the local dependence on it.[55] The military was the only organization able to create a resemblance of governance. This also meant that cadres and mass representatives could not do so, lacking both the authority with peasants, the organizational support structure, and support from the leadership. Second, given that the institutions were established within one to two months, there remained an ad hoc aspect to them. This both shows that the military's ability to implement orders was still very much intact and that the participation of cadres and mass representatives was not a precondition. If they conveniently existed, they were included but if not, the process continued without them. Third, the military was heavily overstretched and fractured, responsible for production at the grassroots, stability, supporting the left and implementing other policies of the GPCR.[56] Fourth, it provides another partial answer to the question of why

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[52] Shuangliu County Party Committee Party History Research Office, *中共双流县党史大事记（1923 年—1989 年） [Events in the History of the CCP in Shuangliu County (1923-1989)]* (1991), 106.

[53] Zhou Enlai, Boda Chen, and Sheng Kang, "中央首长在六七年国庆节筹备工作动员大会上的讲话 [Speech by Central Leaders at the Mobilization Conference for the Preparations for National Day 1967]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 20 September 1967.

[54] Fengxin County Historical Annals Work Office, *中国共产党奉新县党史大事记（1919 年5 月—1997 年3 月 [Events in the History of the CCP in Fengxin County (May 1919-March 1997)]* (1997), 83.

[55] As Harding argues, local forces often had "close ties with local Party" and were defenders of local interests. Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis."

[56] Harvey W. Nelsen, "Military Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution," *Asian Survey* 14, no. 4 (1974).

it took so long for RCs to form. Concerned with production and governance, the military often could not implement its original mission and attribute resources to "supporting the left". When large-scale fighting broke out in summer 1967, it caught the military on the wrong foot, with its soldiers deployed in the fields or engaged in other activities. Fifth, it provided the military with an institutional basis of sustenance from which to either end or sustain armed struggle, negotiate the "grand alliance" out of which the RCs would emerge, and surface as the final arbiter. Entrenched within their own institution and having monopolized resources, local military leaders were in no rush to end their privileged position.[57] Accordingly, it is not surprising it took so long to form RCs and that the military later played an outstanding role in staffing and controlling them. Most importantly, this also demonstrates that the January Revolution and its call for nationwide bottom-up rebellion led and reinforced the military's position at the grassroots. If it had not been for them, the military would have never been in a position of such power at the sub-provincial level. Thus, the emergence of the revolutionary sequence at the grassroots led to the conversion of the military's functions and inadvertently to its growth in administrative capacities and strength. The military's secure position as an administrative and economic force then shored up and consolidated the RCs as an institution, while converting its function from "revolutionary" to "administrative". This foreshadowed the military's ejection from the RCs. Indeed, in the years thereafter, they were replaced by the same people whose position they had taken— administrators.

This was a direct result of the Centre's decision during the January Revolution to give the military a prominent role in the formation of RCs. At the grassroots, this gave the military a blank check to intervene in local affairs—or not. Choices made during the January Revolution were thus reinforced in the localities and grassroots. Once this had happened, the military quite

[57] Local commanders therefore acted by themselves. Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention," *The China Quarterly* 55 (1973).

naturally took up a leadership position in the formation of RCs. The military's supreme role in the emerging RCs therefore is a direct result of the sequence that started in January 1967.

Section 3: Forming Revolutionary Committees

Utilizing a sample of 151 counties, it is possible to determine the influences that led to the establishment of the RCs.[58] Based on the materials, the counties were divided into six categories of study, military, central intervention, provincial intervention, takeover by cadres, and local agreement. These categories are, by nature, imperfect and dependent on the quality of the material used. It is difficult to do the complexity in the construction of RCs and the "grand alliance" justice by dividing them into singular categories. Due to these interventions, their effects were qualitatively different. "Study" could never produce the decisive effect that military intervention could, given that the military controlled local institutions down to the grassroots level and the enforcement infrastructure, therefore providing the basis to make study effective. Study then is an important, albeit adjunct and contributing factor based upon and channeling the deployment of the former's resources. Central intervention, for example in the form of a talk by Zhou Enlai to representatives or a visit by Mao, while having an impact often leading to negotiated deals between rival groups, was often insufficient in the long-term. Any agreement struck while attending a study group at the Centre or upon central or provincial intervention had to pass the test of local implementation. Likewise, while "Local Agreement" refers to agreements struck between mass organization that neither involved the use of study classes as a platform nor the participation of the military, even these required the acceptance and support of the military. Hence, intervention could just have an effect if they were both accepted as legitimate and workable, enforceable in a locality, and in a passive or active way

[58] Eight counties that early on established a RC are exempted. Likewise, other county histories that lack the material foundation to make a reasonable judgment are excluded as well.

supported by a military in control of local resources. Practically this means that among the six factors, the "military" is the factor most consequential in leading to the "grand alliance" while providing the basis and the frame for the other types. With that in mind and given that individual results and interpretations are up for debate, trends are clearly observable.

Table 4: Reasons leading to the "grand alliance" and "three-in-one-combination"

Type of Intervention	**Explanation**	**% of Cases[59]**
Study	Consists either of the deployment of Mao Zedong Thought classes to achieve the "grand alliance" within the county or the dispatching of the local leadership to Beijing to attend classes and reach a compromise	26,5
Military	Militia commanders, local military commanders, or Mao Zedong Propaganda Teams dispatched by the military	57
Central	The central leadership intervened, for example by summoning key leaders, urging the local leadership, or simply being present	12
Provincial	Similar to central intervention but on the provincial level	4
Cadre	Local cadres intervening	17,2
Local Agreement	Negotiations between the various factions resulted in an agreement	7,3

Source: author's database, n=151

Based on previous sections, intervention of the military is self-explanatory. Since they provided both the platform, the resources, and the "gun," they acted as power brokers between rival factions on the local level and provided the institutional framework. While one way to do that

[59] The reason for the sum of percentages not adding up to 100 is that in 34 instances a multiplicity of factors contributed to the establishment of the RC.

was direct intervention on the side of a rebel organization, another was the formation of Mao Zedong Thought Classes. Of the entire dataset of 188 counties, 76 instances of Mao Zedong Thought classes are recorded.[60] For the leadership, study classes were often the platform from which representatives of rival groups met and struck agreements. In one example, in June 1968, representatives from three rebel organizations attended a Mao Zedong Thought Study Class organized by the Jilin RC. They struck an agreement to unite at this occasion. However, it took again over one month until 15 August to form a RC.[61] Study classes were not just meant to provide a platform for the elite but to penetrate society and kick-start the "grand alliance" in the entire country. For example, in Guangzhou, 3,000 classes were administered between October 1967 and January 1968, rendering them "universal". The RC was subsequently established in February 1968.[62]

However, while they contributed to RC formation, study classes did not alter the RCs' structure. Given that the only workable institution within the counties had been set up and consolidated by the military beginning in March 1967, it was the military that organized the Mao Zedong Thought classes and provided the institutional framework for any agreement to be borne out. Thus, while the various types of intervention differed, they did not change the underlying institutional setup that was reliant on the military and the organizational support it provided. Hence, it cannot come as a surprise that, upon the formation of RCs, its leaders were soldiers or military cadres.[63] In another sample, I gathered data on the heads of 613 RCs upon establishment. Including all sub-provincial administrative levels, the number of military

[60] Goodman also acknowledges the importance of study classes. See Goodman, "The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 196–1979: An Obituary."

[61] Baicheng District Party Committee Party History Research Office and Baicheng District Archives, *中共白城地区党史大事记 1922-1990 [Events in the History of the CCP in Baicheng District 1922-1990]* (1992), 242-43.

[62] Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee Party History Research Office, *中共广州党史大事记 [Events in the History of the CCP in Guangzhou]* (Guangzhou: 广东人民出版社 [Guangdong People's Publishing Press]), 294.

[63] Nelsen, "Military Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution."

representatives stands at 77,3%, trailed by cadres (19,1%). Mass representatives were thus insignificant. Interestingly, if the grassroots are excluded, the percentage of cadres drops from 19 to 6,7%. Given that the founding of district and county RCs was accompanied by a reorganization and simplification of governance that led to ousted cadres being sent down to the countryside, it is possible they took up positions there. Another explanation would suggest that, based on the discussion in the last section, the grassroots were not all that impacted by institutional changes at the county level and above and saw no real need to dispose of cadres. It is more likely however that this mirrors the traditional isolation of the countryside. Cadres' ties to their fellow villagers were often stronger than their ties to the Party.[64] Many grassroots cadres had strong connections to their local communities and could weather the storm with their help.[65] Walder, for example, found that most of the killings occurred in the cities and not the countryside.[66] This is a possible indicator for the penetration of the GPCR per se where, after the fall of hierarchical authority, villages turned to themselves.[67]

Table 5: Share of sub-provincial RC heads according to military, mass, and cadre categories

	All		**No Grassroots**	
	Sample size (n)	Percentage	Sample size (n)	Percentage
Military	474	77,3	452	91,9
Mass	22	3,6	7	1,4

[64] G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China: Part Iii," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 24, no. 3 (1965).
[65] As Perry notes, "By the end of the first decade of the People's Republic, state-building under socialism - rather than set peasants adrift from the bonds of local society - worked to reinforce traditional kinship and community allegiances". See Elizabeth J. Perry, "Rural Violence in Socialist China," *The China Quarterly* 103 (1985).
[66] Andrew G. Walder, "Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966-1971," *Social Science History* 38 (2014). Walder and Yang Su estimate that there were between 750,000 and 1.5 million deaths and 36 million who suffered some form of political persecution in the countryside. See Andrew G. Walder and Yang Su, "The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact," *The China Quarterly* 173 (2003).
[67] See Jonathan Unger, "Cultural Revolution Conflict in the Villages," *The China Quarterly* 153 (1998). See also the development of religion. See Chen-Yang Kao, "The Cultural Revolution and the Emergence of Pentecostal-Style Protestantism in China," *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 24, no. 2 (2009).

Cadre	117	19,1	33	6,7
Total	613	100	492	100

Source: author's database, n=613

However, an equally important story is the growing gap between the military and the cadres, which grew even more pronounced over time. At the county and district level, 92% of all heads of RCs hailed from the military. The situation is similar at the provincial level where among the 24 provinces that established RCs after the initial four from the last chapter, 20 were directly controlled by the military, with the other four having military political commissars in charge. Military cadres also made up 78% of Beijing, 81 of Guangdong, 84 of Liaoning, 95 of Shanxi, 97 of Yunnan, and 98% of Hubei's RCs above county level.[68]

To recapitulate, revolution at the grassroots not only resulted in the paralysis of Party and government but also the conversion of the military into an administrative and economic force. This put it into a position to take over the RCs, thereby solidifying and reinforcing them. The RCs were then extensions of the organs the military had established in pre-RC.[69] Mao himself, however, did not think the involvement of the military was a problem.[70] However, one side effect was that the RC, initially conceptualized as revolutionary organ, became an administrative and governing institution. The outcomes of the interactions between revolutionary, military, and RC sequences can thus be explained through conversion.

[68] Li and He, *"文化大革命"中的人民解放军 [the People's Liberation Army in the "Cultural Revolution"]*, 244-46.

[69] Joffe therefore argues that power "gravitated to it [the military] in the course of a protracted process, which was neither planned nor predicted by the army high command". Joffe, "The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention."

[70] Shaojie Tang, "南橘北枳味何堪——简论文革与巴黎公社经验之关系 [What Is the Taste of Southern Orange and Northern Trifoliate Orange? Briefly Dicussing the Relationship between the Cultural Revolution and the Experience of the Paris Commune]," *昨天 [Yesterday]* 91 (2017).

While revolution was supposed to produce weak RCs, the military's involvement did the opposite. The RC was bound up in a conundrum: theory determined it to be weak, while in reality it was, quite literally, armed to its teeth. This conundrum would be particularly obvious in the drafting of the 1975 State Constitution in summer 1970 that emphasized revolution and kept the RC weak, but also heavily stressed the role of the military that would occupy a key role as supporting production and forming the RC's institutional backbone. To this extent, the new institutional arrangement depended on the strength of the military[71] while being fundamentally opposed to it.

Conclusion

This chapter dealt with the interactions between the emerging RCs, military, and revolutionary sequences after the January Revolution's critical juncture. The January Revolution's call for nationwide bottom-up revolution resulted in widespread paralysis of Party and government institutions. Mass organizations clashed, and cadres were criticized and dismissed. As the military was supposed to take a key role in forming RCs, this set the stage for its involvement. Thus, the "revolutionary" sequence resulted in the increasing power of the military over RC formation. The military's role in its establishment was pivotal, yet accidental. Given a key role in establishing RCs after the January Revolution, the military had to cope with conflicting requirements. While in the absence of institutions it focused on guaranteeing rudimentary administrative and economic governance, it soon got embroiled in armed struggle. Revolution thus changed the functions of the military and converted it from a fighting into an administrative force.

[71] Chuangchuang Chen, "文革开端的武斗与工作组问题 [the Issue of Fighting and Work Groups at the Beginning of the Cultural Revolution]," *昨天 [Yesterday]* 75 (2016).

With substantial delays, it eventually supported RC formation. However, while during the January Revolution it was a union of three equals, at the sub-provincial level RC formation was often forced by the military. This was not the military's fault. Rather, armed struggle exhausted the different factions, with the military the "last man standing". Its takeover of the RCs was therefore a consequence of "revolution". This also meant that the RC was converted from a revolutionary into an administrative organ. The RCs conversion was then a result of the clash between the "military" and "revolution" sequences. These findings are significant for constitutional development. The widespread formation and consolidation of the RCs had to precede the decision to draft a new state constitution in March 1970. Likewise, the military's conversion foreshadows the eventual inclusion of the RC as an administrative—and not revolutionary—organ in the State Constitution.

This was paradoxical. As revolutionary organizations, the RCs were supposed to unite with the people and be organizationally weak. However, in the end, with the military at its core, this actually meant strengthened organizations that were reinforced and consolidated. With the military entrenched, in charge, and the RCs locked in a loop of continuous self-reinforcement, Mao and the Centre decided to reinstate the Party in late 1967. From autumn 1967 onwards he supported Qinghai's initiative to rebuild the Party organization. Given that the RCs were effectively military-led, a new outlet for concentrating revolutionaries was needed. Moreover, the Party had an institutional precedent—hence, everybody knew what the Party was, how it was supposed to be organized, and where power was located. Given the trouble with RCs, it is therefore no surprise that eventually revolutionaries would shift from the RC to the Party and decrease the military's influence in governance. As Mahoney observed, failure to activate reproductive mechanisms can lead to the overtake of a superior institution.[72] With the Party

[72] Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology."

then asserting is dominance, the RC's conversion was reinforced, as I will demonstrate in Chapter IV.

However, before I look at this, it is necessary to outline how the Party re-emerged and became intertwined with the revolution and military sequences that reinforced themselves by developing an ideology and placing themselves at the apex of political power. This is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter III: Building Revolution

Introduction

With the establishment of the RCs, the military gradually converted them into administrative organs. The push back against this came with the consolidation of the "revolution" sequence. To balance against RCs, a "revolutionary" Party was to be built. This Party would need a revolutionary ideology and staff. The former came with the theory of "continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" that I treat in the first section. This theory is important for two reasons: first, it served as the main theoretical backbone of the GPCR until its end. Second, it was tied into the training of revolutionaries and the rebuilding of the Party. In other words, the theory would ensure that the Party's ideology and its staff were to be "revolutionary".

However, the "revolution" sequence failed to accomplish either. As I showed in the last chapter, revolutionary action had produced a military-led governing institution instead of resulting in a "revolutionary" RC. When the Party was rebuilt, its leaders now entered it and thereby diluted the construction of a "revolutionary" Party. Eventually, this then resulted in the formation of a revolutionary/administrative Party. I will treat this in the second section. The Shanghai revolutionaries were duped, having even supported the reinforcement of the military by supporting the selection of Lin Biao as Mao's successor. This process forms the third section. In short, in this chapter I show how the revolutionary sequences' attempt to convert the military, Party, and RC resulted in the opposite effect of actually reinforcing bureaucracy and administration. As a result, the meaning of revolution was completely inverted.

Section 1: "Continuous Revolution"

The theory of "continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" emerged from the experience of the January Revolution that empowered Mao's wife Jiang Qing and her sidekicks Shanghai theorists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan (who would later form three members of the Gang of Four) at the Centre. Their newly found power manifested itself in taking the lead on the main issue roiling the Centre: succession. For Mao, a major aim of the GPCR was to instil a different worldview affirming "socialist and proletarian" values. The GPCR was to produce a new socialist theory and person that would have a socialist world outlook and be impervious to capitalist temptations, thus establishing an absolute break with capitalism and Soviet revisionism. After the revolution in Shanghai at a meeting in early February that provided a new model for the GPCR, Mao instructed Wang Li to write an article titled "Discussing the Continuous Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat".[1] However, it took until 11 November 1967 that a joint editorial titled "Moving Forward Along the Road Launched by the Socialist Revolution" was published.[2] Penned by Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan (Wang Li had been purged in the meantime), this editorial summarized the theory of "continuous revolution".[3] Based on an understanding regarding the Shanghai revolution that had championed the bottom-up overthrow in official perception, Chen Boda

[1] Cited in Ruoshui Wang, *新发现的毛泽东 [Newly Discovered Mao Zedong]* (Hong Kong: 明镜出版社 [Mirror Publishing House], 2002), 149.

[2] "沿着十月社会主义革命开辟的道路前进 [Advancing Along the Road Opened by the Socialist October Revolution]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 6 November 1967.

[3] The first "proper" mention of it was in the People's Daily on 9 October 1967 Red Flag, "大立毛泽东思想的伟大革命 [the Great Revolution of Mao Zedong Thought]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 9 October 1967. It stated that just if one studies and deeply understands Mao's program of "struggle against selfishness, criticizing revisionism", then one can "master Chairman Mao's theory, line, method, and policy of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat".

believed that by condensing Mao's separate remarks, the study of this text was to lead to a new understanding of the GPCR and overcome "negative attitudes".[4] It included six points:

1. We must observe the socialist society with the law of the unity of opposites of Marxist and Leninist doctrine.
2. Socialist society covers a considerably long historical period. Throughout this historical period, there are classes, class contradictions and class struggle, there is a struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road and there is the danger of capitalist restoration.
3. Class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat in essence still is the problem of governing power. The capitalist classes want to overthrow the proletarian dictatorship; hence the proletariat must fervently solidify the dictatorship of the proletariat.
4. The power holders within the Party taking the capitalist road are the representatives of the capitalist class within the Party. We must resolutely seize the power they have usurped into the hands of the proletariat.
5. The key to continuously implementing revolution under the proletarian dictatorship is the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
6. The fundamental program of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the sphere of thought is "struggle selfishness, criticize revisionism". This achievement was called the "third milestone" in the development of Marxism.

Chen and Yao deliberated this article for a long time. Mao both commented and supported the editorial, declaring that the theory of the GPCR can be summarized and solidified through this article.[5] Hence, even though Mao himself did not summarize his thinking, he still read and approved of Chen and Yao's summary. The article neither introduces new concepts nor did it

[4] Guoquan Zhou and Dehong Guo, *动乱中的陈伯达 [Chen Boda in Turmoil]* (Wuhan: 安徽人民出版社 [Anhui People's Publishing Press], 1993), 136.

[5] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, Pang, and Jin, *毛泽东传：1893-1976（第六卷）[Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1976 (Volume Six)]*, 2477.

propose a systematic approach to the thinking of the GPCR other than being a summary of key points from Mao's speeches that had been developed since 1957 under a new banner term.[6] While the theory of "continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" became the hallmark theoretical development, it formed no theoretical system but remained on the level of a "slogan".[7] Mao never undertook the task to write a theoretical essay on the GPCR himself, leaving it an incomplete theory based on fragments.

The theorization of "continuous revolution" based on the January Revolution then consolidated and reinforced the sequence of "revolution". In other words, the path that was introduced by Shanghai during the January Revolution was now fixed. However, this does not mean that the revolutionary sequence did not undergo change. In fact, "continuous revolution" underwent significant conversion. While it first signified revolution *against* weak institutional structures, with the rebuilding of the Party and then in the early 1970s it began to denote revolution *within* existing organizations. Eventually, both the RCs and recruitment standards reflected this change, as I will discuss in a later chapter. However, after the January Revolution, it initially was to find its expression in all spheres. This meant that it quite naturally was to interact with and influence other sequences. Indeed, this is what it tried to do in re-constructing the Party and designating Lin Biao as Mao's successor, as I discuss below.

Section 2: Creating a Revolutionary Party

This ideology of "continuous revolution" was linked to the recruitment of new Party members that would convert the Party from a "bureaucratic" institution associated with the "Liu Shaoqi line" into a "revolutionary" organization. The 9th Party Congress was to present to the world and the nation the next generation of revolutionaries that would carry on with the construction

[6] Wang, *新发现的毛泽东 [Newly Discovered Mao Zedong]*, 143.

[7] Tu Gu, "文革，其实没理论 [the Cultural Revolution Has in Fact No Theory]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 913 (2013).

of socialism in China after the eventual demise of the old guard. Mao outlined the basic requirements for socialist successors in a speech in June 1964. First, they must understand Marxism-Leninism. Second, they must work for the majority and not for a specific class. Third, they must be able to unite most people. Fourth, they must be able to listen to different opinions and standpoints and should not monopolize opinion. Fifth, if they are wrong, they must be able to engage in self-criticism.[8] Later, he further summarized them. The first was the theory and direction; the second showed the purpose—the most important point. Points three, four, and five were the method.[9] The "Nine Critiques" criticizing Khrushchev's revisionism summarized these requirements, adding that to guarantee that China does not change colour—i.e. turn revisionist—it is not enough to maintain the correct line and policy but necessary, as the article cites Mao, to train millions of "successors of the proletarian revolutionary cause". These successors "emerge from mass struggle and grow up through the training in the great storms of revolution."[10] Lin Biao's "Three Standards" stipulated in a speech in August 1966 complemented Mao's "Five Conditions". They include upholding Mao Zedong Thought; political thought work and being aligned with the GPCR; and having sufficient revolutionary vigor.[11] Hence, Mao wanted a young albeit inexperienced cohort of people with political experience forged in revolution as successors.[12]

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[8] Mao Zedong, "关于备战与接班人问题的谈话（摘录）（一九六四年六月十六日）[Talk on War Readiness and Successors (Excerpt) (16 June 1964)]," in *毛泽东思想胜利万岁 [Long Live the Victory of Mao Zedong Thought]* (1964), especially 38-42.

[9] "同毛远新同志的第二次谈话（一九六四年八月）[Second Talk with Comrade Mao Yuanxin (August 1964)]," in *毛泽东思想万岁（1961-1968 卷）[Long Live Mao Zedong Thought (1961-1968)]* (1964).

[10] "关于赫鲁晓夫的假共产主义及其在世界历史上的教训 [on Khrushchev's Pseudo-Communism and Its Lesson in World History]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 14 July 1964.

[11] Biao Lin, "林彪在中央工作会议上的讲话 [Lin Biao's Speech at the Central Work Meeting]," in *林彪文选 [Selected Works of Lin Biao]*, ed. Shaanxi Normal University Political Education Department Revolutionary Committee (Xian: 陕西师范大学 [Shaanxi Normal University], 1968 [1966]).

[12] Mao Zedong, "在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话 [Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 20 March 1966.

After the start of the GPCR, the leadership linked this mission to the reconstruction of the Party. They continuously reappeared in study materials for Mao Zedong Thought Classes in 1968 and the Little Red Book, also entering the drafting of the Party Constitution and the 9th Party Congress. After the Congress, the focus would shift to constructing Party institutions. During the GPCR, Mao first spoke of the need of the Party and a new band of successors on 12 February 1967. He told Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Li that while the Party should not yet be rebuilt, it should absorb rebels, resulting in a transformed Party.[13] A result of the January Revolution, this both preserved the Party and outlined a vision for its future. Regarding the lack of experience of young people being put into positions of power, Mao said "once they come up they will have experience".[14]

In September 1967, once Mao came back from touring the Northeast, Mid-South, and East, he instructed the leadership to end the "big chaos," enlarge the Central Committee, and absorb "new blood" into the Party.[15] He also mentioned the need to discuss the convening of the 9th Party Congress, which political report and delegate election he and Zhou discussed in mid-October.[16] Finally, he advocated liberating some cadres. It is thus no surprise that Mao jumped on the opportunity presented to him a few days later. On 19 October 1967, the Qinghai province core small group asked to restore the Party's organizational life.[17] One week later, Zhang Chunqiao mentioned this decision's problems, for example regarding how to recover organizational life, how they should handle former Party members, which level of Party

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[13] Cited in Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 351.

[14] "在中央常委、中央文革小组和政治局会议上的讲话（摘录） （一九六七年四、五月）[Speech at the Central Standing Committee, Central Cultural Revolution Small Group and Politburo Meetings (Excerpt) (April, May 1967)]," in *毛泽东思想万岁（1961-1968 卷）[Long Live Mao Zedong Thought (1961-1968)]* (1967).

[15] Cited in Yan Zhen, *毛泽东同志在无产阶级文化大革命中 [Comrade Mao Zedong in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]*.

[16] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 133.

[17] Ibid., 135.

organization to rectify first, what relationship the Party branch should have with the RC, and how to absorb new members.[18] He had a point: in Qingdao the leader of the RC, the worker Yang Baohua, became the Party core group's leader even though he was not a Party member. Upon being asked about it, Wang Xiaoyu, the head of Shandong's RC, responded that who would approve his Party membership if organizational life had not been restored? Reportedly, he said he would approve the application himself.[19]

The situation was thus often backwards, with non-Party members being in charge of Party construction. The relationship between the RC and the Party was key. The RC nominally combined both—how was a Party to be shelled out of this construct and what would it mean for the RC? Clearly, this entailed a power shift away from the RC. This was one of the few key moments that showed the institutional tension between the new organization and the old remnants. The reinvigoration of the Party sequence then foreshadowed the move of revolution from the RC to the Party and the institutional clash between them. It hastened the RC's conversion into an administrative and the Party's into a revolutionary organ, to be manifested in the 1970 constitutional draft and the 1975 State Constitution.

Mao criticized Zhang's caution.[20] Earlier that year, he had already berated Zhang when he wanted to abolish the Party in Shanghai. Mao would have none of it. On 27 October 1967, he wrote that since Qinghai had established a RC, it should restore the Party's organizational life. He reiterated that the Centre thought this should be done everywhere and mandated that the new Party organization should comprise "advanced elements of the proletariat" that would make up a "vigorous vanguard organization" to "lead the classes and masses in their fight

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[18] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 502-03.

[19] In Feng Jin, "王洪文、王效禹采访追记 [Interview with Wang Hongwen and Wang Xiaoyu]," *炎黄春秋 [Yanhuang Chunqiu]*, no. 5 (2006).

[20] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 135.

against class enemies".[21] He warned that the Party organization should exclude traitors, spies, and those who misbehaved during the GPCR and never regretted their actions. This determination entered an instruction by the Central Committee regarding restoring the Party organization.[22] Termed "Fifty-Characters Party-Building Policy" they later entered the Party Constitution and were the basis of "establishing Mao Zedong Thought and Chairman Mao's proletarian Party-building line" and destroying Liu Shaoqi's erroneous line. This became the policy of the Centre, with Kang Sheng reiterating Mao by saying that the key question now was what kind of Party to construct.[23] The reconstruction of the Party organization thus followed RC formation. Cadres were selected according to their performance during the GPCR. The Party should thus be rebuilt within China, with new standards for Party members and cadres entering the preparation for the 9th Party Congress that started that autumn. As Zhang Chunqiao put it, the drafting of the new Party Constitution and the convening of the 9th Party Congress were linked to the current struggle and the reinvigoration of the Party's organizational life.[24] This would shift power from the RCs to the Party, with the Party organizations placing themselves to take over RCs. At the same time, by absorbing new strata forged by revolution, the Party itself was converted from a bureaucratic into a revolutionary organization.

With the decisions to rebuild the Party and to convene the 9th Party Congress made, standards set, the process of formalization and implementation could start. In a first step, the "Notice

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[21] Ibid., 136.

[22] "关于已经成立革命委员会的单位恢复党的组织生活的指示（1967 年 10 月 27 日）[Directives on the Restoration of the Party's Organizational Life by Work Units That Have Established Revolutionary Committees (27 October 1967)]," in *("文化大革命"研究资料（上册）["Cultural Revolution" Research Materials (First Volume)]*, ed. People's Liberation Army, National Defense University, and Party History Party Building Political Work Research Office (1988).

[23] Sheng Kang, "康生谈准备中共"九大"新党纲 [Kang Sheng Discusses the Preparation for the 9th Party Congress' New Party Program]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 13 November 1967.

[24] Chunqiao Zhang, "张春桥在上海市委扩大会议上谈准备九大党章草稿 [Zhang Chunqiao Discusses the Preparations for the Draft of the 9th Party Congress' Party Charter at an Enlarged Meeting of the Shanghai Party Committee]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 25 November 1967.

Regarding the Consultation on Opinions on 'the Ninth Party Congress' Issue" suggested convening the Party Congress in autumn 1968. It also put forward several suggestions regarding how to deal and elect representatives.[25] According to the Party Constitution, grassroots Party groups elect their representatives.[26] For the 9th Party Congress, a different procedure was proposed. The Notice advocates for "consultation" instead of election, with representatives hailing from the workers and Red Guards, further stating that in Shanghai good cadres had already "entered the leadership" of the RC and that some excellent revolutionary mass representatives were taking on the function as a Party member without having entered the organization. Later at the 9th Party Congress, Wu Faxian confirmed as much.[27] Thus, Zhang elaborated that the progressive elements were the proactive elements such as workers, the poor and lower-middle class peasants, and Red Guards.[28] Revolutionaries and those trained through and by the GPCR were to be absorbed into the Party through consultations on the local levels. Kang Sheng in a speech reiterated this, arguing that the Cultural Revolution provided the Party with new cadres that "lively studied and used" Chairman Mao's works and could link them with revolution and production.[29] The Centre believed the Party organizations had to comprise the progressive elements of the proletariat and thus forms the high-spirited vanguard organization that should be able to lead the proletariat and the masses in their struggle against the enemies. As such, they should also be in charge of the RCs.

[25] "关于征询对"九大"问题意见的同志（1967 年 10 月 21 日）[Comrades Inquiring for Opinions on the 9th National Party Congress (21 October 1967)]."

[26] This was the Party Constitution that was passed at the 8th Party Congress in 1956.

[27] Faxian Wu, *岁月艰难：吴法宪回忆录（下卷）[Hard Years: Wu Faxian's Memoirs (Third Volume)]* (Hong Kong: 香港北星出版社 [Hong Kong North Star Press], 2006), 742.

[28] Zhang, "张春桥在上海市委扩大会议上谈准备九大党章草稿 [Zhang Chunqiao Discusses the Preparations for the Draft of the 9th Party Congress' Party Charter at an Enlarged Meeting of the Shanghai Party Committee]."

[29] Kang, "康生谈准备中共"九大"新党纲 [Kang Sheng Discusses the Preparation for the 9th Party Congress' New Party Program]."

After the publication of Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan's summary of "continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat," Mao said after one year of fighting, many "bad people" had been dealt with but now it was time to "build a Party" out of this chaos.[30] However, he admitted that it would be impossible to complete Party building and rectification before the 9th Party Congress and it would have to continue afterwards.[31] He lamented that the Party had been already "dead" before the GPCR and that Party secretaries never practiced democracy rather than deciding by themselves.[32] Hence, the Party had to "spit out the old and absorb the new": absorb the progressive parts of the workers, poor peasants, and red guards while getting rid of the old, "dead" parts, which would take the form of the "cleaning up of class ranks". The Party's restoration would therefore break with the old organization. Mao then instructed the leadership to draft articles and collect opinions on how to rectify the Party, to be sent to the localities in November.[33] While delegates for the Party Congress would still have to be Party members, their admission depended on having the right thinking and class background and having played an important part in the GPCR. This set the stage for selecting delegates based on both a quota system and a normative idea of what "positive" and "advanced" meant.[34] In summarizing the opinions of the masses Kang and Zhang pointed out that "new blood" in the form excellent workers, the poor and lower-middle class peasants, and revolutionary soldiers

[30] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 137-38.
[31] Ibid., 138. This then took on the form of the "struggle, criticize, change" campaign.
[32] Mao Zedong, "关于"九大"和整党问题的谈话 [Discussion Regarding the "9th Party Congress" and the Party Rectification Issue]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 5 November 1967.
[33] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 138.
[34] See for example Guoguang Wu, "文革中的选举：基于中共全国代表大会的研究 [Elections in the Cultural Revolution: A Study Based on the National Congress of the Communist Party of China]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 1049 (2016).

and revolutionary intellectuals should join the Party.[35] Zhang also mentioned that some Party members were “useless” and that some of them had already written reports to leave the Party.[36] In December 1967, the Party Centre published opinions regarding the rectification, restoration, and reconstruction of the Party organization.[37] According to them, Mao Zedong Thought should build the basis of the new Party organization while the Dengist and Liuist line should be rejected and their method of absorbing Party members based on obedience, good production, and good business thoroughly criticized. Regarding the new type of Party member, “progressive elements” should be prominent. It further placed enormous weight on ideological education and the linkage of studying and using Mao Zedong Thought. Mao and Lin’s “Five Conditions” and “Three Standards” form the basis for absorbing new Party members. Those tested and loyal to the rebels, high-spirited and progressive elements among the proletarian class, workers, poor and middle-class peasants, and Red Guards with revolutionary spirit were to join the Party.

The New Year editorial in the People’s Daily in 1968 argued that in 1967 a “decisive” victory had been won, but also pointed out that the new year was to bring the “comprehensive” victory of the great struggle.[38] Apart from the final thrust to establish RCs in China, the editorial was

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[35] CCP Central Committee Party School Group for the Study of the Party Constitution, "中共九大党章——充满“左”的严重错误，突出强调“以阶级斗争为纲” [Party Constitution of the 9th Central Committee - Filled with the Serious Mistake of the "Left", Prominently Emphasizing the "Program for Class Struggle"]," in *中国共产党章程编介（从一大到十八大）[Chinese Communist Party Constitution Series (from the First to the Eighteenth Central Committee)]* (Beijing: 党建读物出版社 [Party-building Reading Materials Publishing Press], 2016), 74. The full text of this is in "关于征询召开“九大”的意见的通报（1967 年 11 月 27 日） [Briefing on Consulting Opinions for Convening the “9th National Party Congress” (27 November 1967)]."

[36] Zhang, "张春桥在上海市委扩大会议上谈准备九大党章草稿 [Zhang Chunqiao Discusses the Preparations for the Draft of the 9th Party Congress' Party Charter at an Enlarged Meeting of the Shanghai Party Committee]."

[37] "关于整顿、恢复、重建党的组织的意见和问题 [Opinions and Questions on Rectifying, Restoring, and Rebuilding the Party Organization]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 2 December 1967.

[38] People's Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily, "迎接无产阶级文化大革命的全面胜利 一九六八年元旦社论 [Welcoming the All-Round Victory of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1968 New Year’s Editorial]," *人民日报 [People’s Daily]*, 1 January 1968. Mao attempted to take a lower profile. See CCP Central

the first official document to extol and popularize the "Fifty-Characters Party-Building Policy". This set out the terms for selecting new Party members. The Centre designated Shanghai as the model. Already at the end of November 1967, the Centre had sent a Notice to Shanghai giving them the task to prepare a draft for the Party Constitution.[39] Thus, in a speech on the draft amendment, Shanghai's Xu Jingxian described Party member admission standards in greater detail.[40] He specifically mentioned seven issues proposed by the Shanghai No.7 Radio Factory that includes opposition to anarchism and slavery; a Party member's vanguard function and ability to be a "primary school student"; ability to report to higher levels and the relationship with the masses; production, listening to orders and giving prominence to politics; good mass relations and struggle against bad phenomenon; relationship between strong rebel spirit and organizational discipline; ability to distinguish between "inside and outside" and its relationship with encouraging Party democracy. Mao and Lin's "Five Conditions" and "Three Standards" therefore saw a specification and elaboration based on Shanghai's experiences in dealing and managing revolutionary forces.

In April 1968, in a speech to Jiangxi's RC that had sent a study team to Shanghai, Zhang Chunqiao said amending the Party Constitution is of great importance to the rebel factions.[41] This sentence gains importance since earlier in January 1968, Zhang had argued that rebel organizations can replace the Party.[42] They also argued that if there was to be a "preparation

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Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 148.

[39] Zhang, "张春桥在上海市委扩大会议上谈准备九大党章草稿 [Zhang Chunqiao Discusses the Preparations for the Draft of the 9th Party Congress' Party Charter at an Enlarged Meeting of the Shanghai Party Committee]."

[40] Jingxian Xu, "关于修改党章的报告 [Report on Revising the Party Constitution]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 16 December 1967.

[41] Shanghai "Cultural Revolution" Historical Materials Group, *上海"文化大革命"史话（送审稿）（二）[History of Shanghai's "Cultural Revolution" (for Review) (Two)]*, 601.

[42] Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Organization Department et al., *中国共产党上海市组织史资料（1920.8—1987.10）[Shanghai Municipal Party Organizational History Materials (August 1920-October 1987)]* (Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 [Shanghai People's Publishing Press], 1991), 521.

period" to enter the Party, this would violate their right to be delegates at the Congress, warning that any attempt to insert it into the new Party Constitution would lead to protests.[43] Hence, according to Zhang, the rebels should be in charge of the Party – and not cadres and based on this it was the time to bring in "new blood" into the Party. Jiang Qing's ideas regarding who should join the new Central Committee during the 9th Party Congress reflect this. Since the main force of the GPCR were the revolutionary rebel factions, they should hold power. For her, how the rebel groups were treated at the 9th Party Congress and in the elections for the Central Committee therefore symbolized either agreement or disagreement with Mao and the GPCR's line.[44]

Indeed, this foreshadows an institutional conflict. Revolution was to move from RCs to the Party—it was there where the real power was located. This both quickened the conversion of the RCs to become administrative organs and transformed the Party. Here, "revolutionaries" were to be in charge of the RCs and supervise administration. Later, this shift would show itself in the 1970 constitutional draft and the 1975 State Constitution, to varying degrees.

However, the limits to absorbing rebels were noted in a 22 September 1968 report of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee.[45] With admission to the Party depending on a functioning intra-Party organizational life, the report showed that while revolutionaries had entered the Party, in reality 85% of the Party members in June 1968 in Shanghai had yet to restore their organizational life. This severely limited the ability to admit new Party members from among

[43]Shanghai "Cultural Revolution" Historical Materials Group, *上海"文化大革命"史话（送审稿）（二）[History of Shanghai's "Cultural Revolution" (for Review) (Two)]*, 601.

[44] Huizuo Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]* (Hong Kong: 新世纪出版社 [New Century Publishing House], 2011), 641.

[45] "关于在产业工人中有步骤地发展新党员的请示报告 [Report Request on the Gradual Development of New Party Members from among Industrial Workers]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 29 September 1968.

the “progressive forces”.[46] Naturally, those organs that had restored organizational life had already played significant roles during the January Revolution. These people had undergone the January revolution and become part of the Shanghai revolution and thus would not have to pass the preparation period. However, it said afterwards this period should still exist. Mao read and approved this note whereupon it was circulated nationwide.[47] On the ground in Shanghai, Yao Wenyuan cautioned that among the new Party members, rebels and the most outstanding amongst them should be absorbed first. As Zhang noted, these newly recruited rebels were then to become officials 官.[48] Hence, Wang Hongwen rejoiced: “we can all join the Party!”[49] On 14 October, an editorial penned by Yao Wenyuan detailed Mao’s instructions regarding “spitting out the old and absorbing the new,” arguing that election was “conservative thinking,” therefore paving the way for a wide scale selection of “new blood” based on the Shanghai model.[50] It further criticized the old Party-building line based on the “Six black theories”. Published as a booklet later, it was regarded as the discursive preparation for the 9th Party Congress and the rebuilding of the Party machinery.[51] Reading the proposed table of contents, Mao moved the article from the fourth spot to the first, thus showing its great importance.[52] A direct consequence of these developments was the phenomenon of “crash admission into the

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[46] Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Organization Department et al., *中国共产党上海市组织史资料（1920.8—1987.10）[Shanghai Municipal Party Organizational History Materials (August 1920-October 1987)]*, 521.

[47] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 198.

[48] Yuzhen Guo, "中共“九大”轶事 [Anecdotes from the Party’s “9th National Party Congress”]," *党史纵览 [Overview of Party History]*, no. 5 (2008).

[49] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 507.

[50] "吸收无产阶级的新鲜血液——政党工作中的一个重要问题 [Absorbing the Fresh Blood of the Proletariat - an Important Issue in the Work of Political Parties]," *红旗文稿 [Red Flag Manuscripts]*, 14 October 1968.

[51] Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 343.

[52] Zhen, *毛泽东同志在无产阶级文化大革命中 [Comrade Mao Zedong in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]*, 109.

Party" that signified a rushed process for joining the Party.[53] There are many examples for this. Thus, to let Chen A'da (a worker)[54] enter the Party, the Party expedited the process: Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan themselves went to his factory and convened a Party rectification and building meeting to galvanize support for Chen A'da to enter the Party.[55] The whole process from writing the Party application to entering it took less than ten days.[56] The problem was that he did not know how to write, with his application document full of incorrectly written characters.[57] It was also reported that some cadres filled out the documents for entering the Party on the train to Beijing to take part in the Congress.[58]

There is one main problem of rebuilding the Party as a converted "revolutionary" organization: the interaction between "revolution" and "military" sequences detailed in the last chapter. Here, revolution converted the military and, by extension, the RCs. Revolution at the grassroots and the power vacuum thrust the military into a position to take over the emerging RCs. This in turn resulted in the RCs' conversion from revolutionary into administrative organs. The ambivalent position of the military that was torn between supporting revolutionaries and establishing revolutionary RCs and guaranteeing a rudimentary form of governance led to a problem. Since delegates were selected from the RCs from all over China, most of them were soldiers. This drew the ire of Zhang Chunqiao, who wanted to keep them down and promote "pure" revolutionaries. And he did—this meant that most revolutionaries in fact originated from Shanghai rather than other places. Others were selected by Mao. Likewise, Zhou Enlai

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[53] Guo, "中共"九大"轶事 [Anecdotes from the Party's "9th National Party Congress"]."

[54] Fei Xia, "陈阿大沉浮录 [Record of Chen A'da's Rise and Fall]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 607 (2007).

[55] Guo, "中共"九大"轶事 [Anecdotes from the Party's "9th National Party Congress"]."

[56] Ibid.

[57] Xia, "陈阿大沉浮录 [Record of Chen A'da's Rise and Fall]."

[58] CCP Central Committee Party School Group of the Teaching and Research Department of Party History, *中国共产党历次重要会议集（下）[Major Meetings of the Communist Party of China (Part Two)]* (Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 [Shanghai People's Publishing Press], 1983), 240.

attempted to save and "liberate" as many old cadres and bring them in position for the Congressby preparing a name list with prospective delegates.[59]

What this means is that in the sequence of revolution, it converted itself. It no longer merely included rebels, Red Guards, and revolutionary workers, but also military personnel. While the former was intentional, the latter was an unintended result of events at the grassroots where revolution resulted in a converted military and RC. Both military personnel and revolutionaries became Party members, thereby diluting the aim to create a revolutionary Party. Hence, the attempt to rebuild the Party as a "pure" revolutionary organ led to the conversion of what "revolution" was about. However, even with this caveat, the Party was more "purely" revolutionary than the RC. After all it was the Party that pulled in rebels—not the RC (where they were excluded or marginalized). In another way, this interaction between revolution and military sequences is also evident in the selection of Lin Biao as Mao's successor.

Section 3: Lin Biao as Mao's Successor

Mao's own succession was a pertinent problem. The reliance on the Party (and not the RC) to implement standards of succession meant the effective capture of the RC by the Party. Given the strong structural position of the military in the localities outlined in the last chapter, Mao was compelled to use him to guarantee China's functioning. As such, the conversion that led to the takeover of the RCs through the military is at work in Lin's selection, too. The demands of revolution discredited (the bureaucrat) Liu Shaoqi and converted the position of Vice-Chairman. Its functions were not inasmuch administrative but to implement the GPCR. As the

[59] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office and Chongji Jin, eds., *周恩来传（四）[Biography of Zhou Enlai: Volume Four]* (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 2010), 1765.

military was compelled to take over at the grassroots level, so was Lin Biao at the elite level.[60] Paradoxically, as opposed to the grassroots level where the military was compelled to take over RCs *against* revolution, in the selection of Lin Biao revolution and military worked *together*. This led to the opposite results: whilst at the grassroots the interaction between revolution and military led to the imposition of (military-imposed) administrative stability, at the elite level it led to a focus on (military-imposed) revolution. Hence, the rise of Lin Biao and his explicit inclusion as Mao's successor in the 1970 constitutional draft is not merely attributable to structural trends but also to Lin's upholding of a revolutionary line. Lin's rise then reinforced the military's position in China and its administrative role at the grassroots, while leaving the relationship between the two sequences in a bind between cooperation and antagonism.

It is then curious to note that Lin's designation as Mao's successor precedes the January Revolution. After politically destroying Liu Shaoqi in summer 1966, Mao asked Zhou what he thought of the other deputy chairmen. For Zhou, it was clear what this meant. With Zhu De too old, Chen Yun frequently sick, Liu and Deng under criticism, and Zhou himself reiterating that he was a "helper" and not a "helmsman," there was just Lin Biao left. Zhou thus responded that the Party should recall Lin from Dalian.[61] A happy Mao told him to make the arrangements. In August 1966 the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee, passed the "Sixteen Points" and increased the number of PBSC members from seven to eleven.[62] Notable was the order: while Mao was first, Lin Biao followed him, degrading Liu Shaoqi from the second rank to the eighth.[63] The plenum also designated Lin Biao as the sole deputy chairman

[60] As I will show later, the selection of Wang Hongwen as Mao's successor in 1973 reflects the conversion of the sequences as well.

[61] Gao, *晚年周恩来 [the Late Zhou Enlai]*, 48. 48 see also Wu, *岁月艰难：吴法宪回忆录（下卷）[Hard Years: Wu Faxian's Memoirs (Third Volume)]*, 515.

[62] Added were Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Li Fuchun.

[63] The entire order was: Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Deng Xiaoping, Kang Sheng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Li Fuchun, and Chen Yun.

and deputy commander-in-chief and the "closest comrade-in-arms," with Lin Biao internally being called "successor".[64]

After having observed Liu Shaoqi for so many years, it is noteworthy that Mao decided on Lin Biao so quickly. In fact, in his famous letter to Jiang Qing from July 1966, Mao criticized him for the personal worship that had gone out of hand and therefore implied hesitation in choosing him.[65] Mao was wary of making the same mistake as Stalin, who had first groomed Georgy Malenkov. Nine days after assuming control, Khrushchev forced him out.[66] Given Chen Boda's comment that Malenkov was "not good" and that "successors are naturally formed," Lin Biao's succession appears as irregular.[67] The decision to elevate Lin Biao predates the GPCR and cannot be separated from Lin Biao's previous conduct as a "revolutionary" that had put him in the position of deputy chairman.[68] Liu Shaoqi had his own power base within the bureaucracy Mao loathed. Additionally, Liu's thinking slowly diverged from Mao's, becoming plainly visible during the 1962 "Seven Thousand People Meeting". In contrast, Lin Biao had his power base in the military and, since 1959, had worked to "uphold Mao Zedong Thought". Lin was both outside of the bureaucracy and aligned with Mao's thinking.[69] Additionally, the military was the key institution building the RCs and the Party organization in the localities.

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[64] Jingqing Zhou, "毛泽东对林彪接班人地位的确立和废黜(上) [Mao Zedong's Establishment and Destruction of Lin Biao's Successor Status (First Part)]," *党史纵览 [Overview of Party History]*, no. 11 (2003).

[65] Mao Zedong, "1966 年 7 月 8 日毛泽东给江青的信 [Letter Mao Zedong Sent to Jiang Qing on 8 July 1966]," in *建国以来毛泽东文稿（第 13 册）[Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic (Volume 12)]*, ed. CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 1998 [1966]), 71.

[66] Jin, *文化大革命史稿 [Historical Manuscripts of the Cultural Revolution]*, 112.

[67] Mao, "在中央政治局扩大会议上的讲话 [Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Politburo]."

[68] Houwen Peng, "文革初期毛泽东为何选择林彪为接班人 [Why Did Mao Zedong Choose Lin Biao as the Successor Early During the Cultural Revolution?]," *武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版) [Journal of Wuhan University of Technology (Social Science Edition)]* 16, no. 6 (2003).

[69] Shihua Zhu, *反思录——从当代历次重大冤案中，探索真实的毛泽东（上）[Reflections on Mao Zedong: Exploring the Truth of Mao Zedong from Major Injustice Cases in Contemporary Times (Part One)]* (2008).

Mao's new successor thus had the opposite characteristics, the most important of which that he "closely shadowed" Mao.[70] This way, Mao could ensure that the GPCR and its policies would continue after his death.[71] This created the impression that there was not a shred of paper between Lin and Mao. Indeed, during the GPCR there was no difference in the position of Lin Biao and Mao Zedong on big issues.[72] In a conversation with his secretary, Lin said: "we must closely shadow Chairman Mao. Actually, I have no skills, I learned all my abilities from Chairman Mao. As my secretaries, you must remember this".[73] Hence, Lin Biao made sure he never deviated from Mao. Lin adhered to his "three no-isms" of not criticizing Mao, not raking responsibility, and not transmitting any bad news to him and the "three musts" of must respond, praise, and report good news.[74] This was both to protect himself and the root of his "closely shadowing". Seen against Liu Shaoqi's demise and deviations in opinion between him and Mao, Lin Biao's promotion thus was a way to restore the unity of Mao with his successor to ban the danger of revisionism at the Centre. Mao himself told Zhou Enlai and others on 24 September 1967 that his "successor obviously is Lin Biao".[75]

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[70] Ibid.

[71] Given Lin Biao's poor health, this also meant that Lin's own successorship would have to be scrutinized.

[72] Yunsheng Zhang, *毛家湾纪实：林彪秘书回忆录 [Records from Maojiawan: Lin Biao's Secretary Remembers]* (Beijing: 春秋出版社 [Spring and Autumn Publishing Press], 1988), 233. cited in Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 386.

[73] *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 227.

[74] In "《林彪日记》正式出版，还原一个真实、可信的林彪 [the Lin Biao Diary Was Officially Published, Restoring a True and Credible Lin Biao]," accessed 30 March 2019, http://www.mailer.cn/box/LB/%A1%B6%C1%D6%B1%EB%C8%D5%BC%C7%A1%B7%D5%FD%CA%BD%B3%F6%B0%E6%A3%AC%BB%B9%D4%AD%D2%BB%B8%F6%D5%E6%CA%B5%B5%C4%C1%D6%B1%EB.doc.

[75] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976（下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 191. This is also in *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 127.

The January Revolution showcased Lin's loyalty to Mao. This, however, was mistaken by Jiang Qing, who proposed to insert Lin Biao into the Party Constitution[76] for adherence to leftist positions. General Qiu Huizuo describes how Jiang Qing gave a speech explaining that Lin Biao as a successor has resulted from a process.[77] She explained that one day Mao asked her if she had any ideas regarding who could do Liu Shaoqi's work. She responded to Mao that this person should fulfill three conditions: first, have never violated the line; second, have a close cooperation with Mao; third, the person also must have a certain level of understanding of Marxism-Leninism. Mao laughed. They then each wrote a name on a piece of paper and exchanged it. This is how Lin Biao came to be the successor. Whether true or not, this exposes Jiang's attitude towards Lin, who "owed" her both for becoming successor and being written into the Party Constitution. Lin, however, would not support her. He had stumbled through life because he was loyal to Mao and nobody else. This does not mean he did not see Mao critically. Privately he contended that Mao was not a "perfect" person and had committed several mistakes.[78] For example, he loathed Mao's works for being confusing, and he also criticized his "personality cult" (even though he helped foster it). In a comment, Lin also called Zhang Chunqiao a blind follower of Mao.[79] He was wary of Jiang Qing, Zhang, and Yao's influence, arguing that if "they" had "a market within the military, this would be the beginning of the Party and nation's demise".[80] There is no doubt that Mao himself designated Lin Biao as his successor. However, it was just at the 9th Party Congress, that Lin Biao was written into the Party Constitution in the phrase "Lin Biao is the brother-in-arms and successor of Comrade

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[76] Yaoci Zhang, *中央警卫团团长张耀祠回忆毛泽东 [Central Head of Security Zhang Yaoci Remembers Mao Zedong]* (Beijing: 群众出版社 [Mass Publishing Press], 2001), 169.

[77] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 638.

[78] Genqing Li, "林彪"散记"中对毛泽东的思考 [Lin Biao's Reflections on Mao Zedong in His "Scattered Notes"]," *炎黄春秋 [Yanhuang Chunqiu]*, no. 11 (2014).

[79] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 523.

[80] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 610.

Mao Zedong," while deleting the phrase of the honorary chairman. This meant that succession could just happen through Mao's death.

Lin Biao was therefore both personally and structurally critical to the success of the GPCR. As I showed in the last chapter, the military took up a pivotal role in the construction of RCs and would continue to help rebuilding the Party organizations. This meant that without military support the revolutionization of the Party-state could not take off. However, together with the requirements for cadres, the position of Vice-Chairman had also undergone conversion. What was important was not to be a bureaucrat but a staunch revolutionary. His office and behaviour ensured that he would always be aligned with Mao. While Lin was personally critical some of the GPCR's outgrowths, his support for revolution and the revolutionaries was then as crucial for his designation as Mao's successor as structural factors.

It is then curious to note that this would be his downfall. At the grassroots, the military was compelled to take over, whereas at the elite level, Lin Biao was agreed upon by all. His position as a consensual outcome between revolutionaries and the military thus stood in contrast with the RCs that were the result of an antagonistic interaction. It was the latter that would later lead to his destruction after the 9th Party Congress and its Second Plenum.

Conclusion

Conversion explains the interactions between "revolution," "military," and the re-emerging "Party". "Continuous revolution" consolidated the revolution on a theoretical level and reinforced the sequence. It was to have two main effects: first, it was to transform RCs and the

Party into “revolutionary” organs[81] and its staff into “revolutionaries”.[82] Second, at the elite level, with the ouster of Liu Shaoqi, the position of successor underwent the same change, with requirements converted from “administrative” to “revolutionary”.

The result was the very opposite of what was intended. As I showed in the last chapter, at the grassroots, revolution had converted the military from a fighting into an administrative and economic force and the transformation of RCs from revolutionary into governing organs. This turned the meaning of revolution on its head. Revolution at the grassroots then, instead of upsetting, solidified bureaucracy in the long-term. This paradox again played out when the Party was rebuilt. Initially it was to be transformed into a “revolutionary” Party from the “bureaucratic” Party associated with the “Liu Shaoqi line”. However, the actual outcome was the opposite: the military cadres heading the RCs entered the Party en masse. While rebels from Shanghai were absorbed into the Party[83] the vast bulk of new recruits came from the military-controlled RCs. This was exacerbated by Lin Biao’s accession to become Vice-Chairman and the revolutionaries’ open support for him. In a curious way then, the “revolutionary” sequence implicitly converted “revolutionary” RCs into “administrative” organs, got a military man who secretly loathed revolution selected as Vice-Chairman, and thereby effectively bureaucratized the Party instead of “revolutionizing” it. The impact of the revolutionary sequence on the military, RC, and Party therefore led to the opposite result of what was originally intended and, even worse, instead of upsetting bureaucracy, it actually

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[81] As Mao put it, the organizational rebuilding of the Party was linked with “consciousness”, the “masses” and “the correct political line”. Mao, "关于“九大”和整党问题的谈话 [Discussion Regarding the "9th Party Congress" and the Party Rectification Issue]."

[82]Sheng Kang, "关于“九大”党章的讲话 [Speech Regarding the “9th Party Congress” Party Constitution]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 18 April 1969.

[83] Because Party organizations throughout the country were still weak or non-existent, it is not surprising that after the 9th Party Congress, Jiang Qing told Zhang Chunqiao that she was happy to see so many people from her “home base” enter the Central Committee. See Shanghai "Cultural Revolution" Historical Materials Group, *上海”文化大革命“史话（送审稿）（二）[History of Shanghai’s "Cultural Revolution" (for Review) (Two)]*, 613-14.

reinforced it in the long-term—as I will show in the next chapter. Paradoxically the conversion that "revolution" was to enact thus ended in itself being converted.

However, in the late 1960s this result was far from obvious. Thus, regardless of these issues, structurally there were more revolutionary forces in the Party than in the RCs. It was the Party that absorbed revolutionary forces, not the RC. Inserting them into the Party was based on the already existing balance of the RC's "three-in-one-combination". This led to a power shift from the RCs to the Party and a move of revolution from the RC into the Party. First, the Party was to *lead* the RCs by forming their core. Including revolutionaries into the Party was more significant than in the RC. Instead of taking part in the governance organ, they were to lead it. It was also safer since the RC housed administrative tasks. The naivete and inexperience of mass representatives was therefore mitigated while their nominal power was enhanced. Second, it was a way to enhance civilian control over the military. Including mass representatives in a hierarchically superior Party pushed back against the military's structural dominance. This puts the interaction between the RCs and the Party sequences at the centre. The next chapter will use quantitative data to analyze the interaction between emerging "revolutionary" Party and "administrative" RC from a grassroots perspective to further substantiate this conclusion.

Chapter IV: Converting Revolution

Introduction

This chapter adds quantitative data from the provincial and sub-provincial levels to analyze the interactions between the emerging "revolutionary" Party, the "administrative" RC, and the role of the military and ideas of revolutionary organization. Here, for the first time, the four sequences come together.

The revolutionary sequence is manifested in the shedding of bureaucracy after the January Revolution and widespread factional clashes. Here, the success or failure of local revolution can be seen directly. The RCs often started from scratch to exact administrative governance over their jurisdictions. It was in March 1968 that Mao summarized the experiences of the RCs, establishing the "three-in-one combination" as their foundation and adding their institutional simplification as a key feature.[1] I demonstrate the reduction of organizational power through the change in the number of administrative bureaus and departments. Revamping the administrative apparatus was nowhere near streamlined. Along the new offices, many "old" departments from before the start of the GPCR were kept or re-established within months. Thus, bureaucratic revamping is an indicator of the thoroughness of revolution and links the "revolution" and "RC" sequences directly.

After their establishment, due to the military's role as administrators, the RCs were gradually converted into administrative organs. The demands for simplification and a cut in personnel clashed with the requirements of the RCs to exert governance. This is then reflected in the burgeoning of bureaucracy. Beginning in 1968, the Party also rebuilt its own organizations that added to the expansion of bureaucracy. More importantly, the military converted the RCs into

[1] "革命委员会好 [Revolutionary Committees Are Good]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 30 March 1968.

administrative organs. When they were tasked to rebuild the Party, initially this process resembled the creation of RCs in their bureaucratic vigor. The reconstruction pitted the further development of the RCs and the Party organizations against each other and signaled the takeover of the RC through the Party and the changing role of the RC. This is examined in section two that pits the "RC" and "Party" sequences against each other.

In the third section, all sequences come together in the analysis of personnel changes in RCs and the Party. With most superfluous cadres sent to the countryside, I will provide an in-depth case study of 2,000 leading personnel in four areas to determine the extent of the process of personnel revamping. Given the RC was transformed into an administrative organ and revolution had moved to the Party, I look at changes in staffing, including the role and inclusion of the military and revolutionaries. Here, I show that with the expansion of the bureaucracy, both Party and RC were gradually taken over by skilled administrators. This shows that the organizational enlargement reinforced itself and slowly ejected military and revolutionaries. The initial meaning of revolution as creating a RC and Party close to the people and thereby restructuring governance was thus gradually inverted—instead the January Revolution by 1970 had resulted in the reinforcement of a bureaucratic path. This confirms the conclusions of the last chapters.

Section 1: Organization of Revolutionary Committees

The power seizure movement and the subsequent establishment of RCs destroyed the traditional hierarchy and structure of the Party and the state and its "complex bureaucratic patterns of social stratification".[2] Thus, with the takeover from the original Party committee

[2] A. Doak Barnett and Ezra F. Vogel, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967), 433.

and government, the entire government apparatus was abolished.[3] Since the Centre had not published organizational regulations for the developing organs, RCs built their own structures.[4] Comparing the initial organizational setups in Heilongjiang, Shandong, Guizhou, Shanghai, and Shanxi, the names, number, and functions of administrative groups established were different. For example, when the Shanghai RC formed its work departments in March 1967, it established six new groups all the while keeping 14 previous departments, amounting to a 70% reduction.[5] Guizhou formed a "Secretariat," a "Security Committee," and a "Production Leadership Small Group" upon RC completion on 13 February.[6] To them, a "Political Work Leading Small Group" and "Reception Station" were added.[7] With nine department being kept, the total number reached 14—a cut of 80%.[8] In terms of reduction, Shanghai and Guizhou fared comparatively well. Both Shanxi and Heilongjiang experienced a cutback of the administrative apparatus of 91,5%. However, they were "out-simplified" by Shandong. When Shandong's RC took up work on 1 March 1967, it established a "Production Command Center" and a "Cultural Revolution Small Group" each with its own secretariat and sub-groups.[9] This

[3] One could wade into Mao's objectives. Bureaucratic destruction and the sending down of staff was painfully evident. Hong Yung Lee, "Mao's Strategy for Revolutionary Change: A Case Study of the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly* 77 (1979).

[4] For a similar argument see Goodman, "The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 196–1979: An Obituary."

[5] Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Organization Department, Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Information Collection Committee, and Shanghai Municipal Archives, *上海市政权系统 统一战线系统 地方军事系统 群众团体系统 组织史资料 （1949.5-1987.10）[Shanghai Municipality Governance, United Front, Local Military, Mass Organization, Organizational History Materials (May 1949-October1987)]* (1991), 151-56.

[6] Guizhou Provincial Party Committee Organization Department, Guizhou Provincial Party Committee Party History Research Office, and Guizhou Provincial Archives, *中国共产党贵州省组织史资料贵州省政军统群组织史资料（1927-1987）[Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party, Guizhou Province, History of the Organization of the Governance, Military, United Front, Mass Organizations of Guizhou Province (1927-1987)]* (Guiyang: 贵州教育出版社 [Guizhou Education Publishing Press]), 448-50.

[7] Ibid., 169.

[8] This does not include Party organizations.

[9] All of these had several offices and departments under them. See Shandong Province Local History Annals Compilation Committee, *山东省志·政权志（上册）[Shandong Province Annals: Governance Annal (First Part)]* (Jinan: 山东人民出版社 [Shandong People's Publishing Press], 1995), 336-37.

equals a total contraction of 95%. While radical, the five provinces were not outliers. As the following table shows, looking at data of the provincial level, this situation appears to be rather normal:

Table 6: Organization of provincial level RCs pre-GPCR and post-RC formation[10]

	Total 5/66	**Total post-RC**	**Of which…**		**% change pre- to post-**	**% of new of total post-RC**	**% of old of total post-RC**
			New	Kept/re-instated			
Anhui	46	8	6	2	-82,61	75,00	25,00
Beijing	68	49	4	45	-27,94	8,16	91,84
Fujian	46	3	3		-93,48	100,00	
Guangdong	60	4	4		-93,33	100,00	
Gansu	47	7	3	4	-85,11	42,86	57,14
Guangxi	43	4	4		-90,70	100,00	
Guizhou	70	14	5	9	-80,00	35,71	64,29
Henan	46	4	4		-91,30	100,00	
Hubei	45	4	4		-91,11	100,00	
Hebei	55	4	4		-92,73	100,00	
Heilongjiang	46	4	4		-91,30	100,00	
Hunan	45	12	4	8	-73,33	33,33	66,67
Jilin	51	4	4		-92,16	100,00	
Jiangsu	58	4	4		-93,10	100,00	
Jiangxi	42	9	4	5	-78,57	44,44	55,56
Liaoning	54	6	4	2	-88,89	66,67	33,33

[10] Total numbers for 5/66 do not include Party organizations.

Inner Mongolia	42	20	4	16	-52,38	20,00	80,00
Ningxia	32	4	4		-87,50	100,00	
Qinghai	18	4	4		-77,78	100,00	
Sichuan	51	4	3	1	-92,16	75,00	25,00
Shandong	38	2	2		-94,74	100,00	
Shanghai	67	20	6	14	-70,15	30,00	70,00
Shaanxi	40	17	4	13	-57,50	23,53	76,47
Shanxi	59	5	5		-91,53	100,00	
Tianjin	55	41	8	33	-25,45	19,51	80,49
Xinjiang	46	15	4	11	-67,39	26,67	73,33
Tibet	21	4	4		-80,95	100,00	
Yunnan	48	10	4	6	-79,17	40,00	60,00
Zhejiang	35	10	4	6	-71,43	40,00	60,00
Average	47	10	4	12	-79,10	68,31	31,69
Median					-85,11	75,00	25,00

Source: author's database and calculations, n=29

On average, the 29 provincial level jurisdictions had 47 departments pre-1965, topped by Guizhou (70), Beijing (68) and Shanghai (67). When plotting the ranking according to the post-RC development number of departments, Beijing (49), Tianjin (41) lead the list, with Shanghai (20) a distant third. While 12 provinces experienced reductions of over 90% regarding the number of administrative departments, Tianjin and Beijing experienced the smallest post-RC reduction, with 25,45 and 27,94%. With the sample revealing a median of 85,1%, this means they are vast outliers. At the bottom end, Qinghai, Tibet, and Ningxia's government at the beginning of the GPCR comprised 18, 21, and 32 departments. Reduced to a mere four in all

three provinces, this amounted to reductions of 78, 81, and 88%. Of the 29 provincial-level jurisdictions in the sample, 16 kept or reinstated old departments after forming their RCs. With a percentage of over 75 old departments of the overall total and given a median of 25%, Beijing, Tianjin, Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi are crass outliers. In contrast, looking at the adoption of new administrative organs as a percentage of the total number of departments, 14 provinces show 100%, meaning they carried no old departments on into their RC. Here again, Beijing did the bare minimum by establishing four new groups. Since it kept many old departments, the percentage hovers just at 8%. Shandong however, created just two, while, on the other end of the ranking, Tianjin created a full eight.

The analysis of the provincial level shows the diversity in revamping and simplifying government. "Revolution" was to simplify governance and enable the population to rebel against them by building a weak bureaucratic apparatus. However, the converted military focused on the enhancement of governance and administrative capabilities, thereby retaining more bureaucracy. This was even more the case at the sub-provincial level that received less scrutiny from the Centre. Averaged by province, I summarized the results in the table below.

Table 7: Organization of sub-provincial level RCs pre-GPCR and post-RC formation

	Total 5/66	**Total post-RC**	**Of which…**		**% change pre- to post-**	**% of new of total post-RC**	**% of old of total post-RC**	**Sample Size**
			New	**Kept/re-instated**				
Anhui	27	13	5	8	-52,34	41,18	58,82	8
Beijing	26	17	3	14	-33,33	17,65	82,35	2
Fujian	22	4	4	2	-81,03	87,88	48,48	8
Guangdong	33	7	4	10	-78,00	54,55	136,36	3

Gansu	23	6	4	4	-72,16	57,75	58,10	11
Guangxi	33	5	4	4	-85,50	75,86	72,41	6
Guizhou	25	12	3	11	-52,04	27,66	96,45	6
Henan	30	10	4	7	-67,94	46,15	76,52	27
Hubei	33	6	4	3	-83,18	71,43	57,14	10
Hebei	25	6	4	6	-74,86	59,09	95,45	7
Heilongjiang	31	6	6		-80,65	100,00		1
Hunan	32	5	4	2	-83,33	78,13	32,81	6
Jiangsu	30	9	4	14	-69,17	44,59	147,75	8
Jiangxi	31	14	4	10	-53,66	28,07	71,93	4
Liaoning	25	8	4	8	-66,43	50,54	90,68	11
Inner Mongolia	33	13	3	10	-61,07	25,49	74,51	4
Ningxia	21	10	4	6	-52,94	40,00	60,00	4
Qinghai	19	11	5	8	-43,36	50,00	75,00	6
Sichuan	34	7	4	4	-80,17	65,96	59,57	7
Shandong	30	13	4	12	-56,94	30,60	91,11	15
Shanghai	27	16	6	14	-40,32	37,84	87,03	7
Shaanxi	26	8	5	4	-68,57	54,55	45,45	4
Shanxi	27	11	4	8	-59,69	36,36	74,24	7
Xinjiang	16	7	5	5	-55,32	64,29	71,43	6
Tibet	15	7	6	1	-53,33	85,71	14,29	1
Yunnan	22	11	4	7	-49,07	36,36	63,64	5
Zhejiang	22	9	4	7	-59,32	41,67	77,78	8

Average[11]	27	9	4	7	-64,54	62,75	37,25	

Source: author's database and calculations, n=192[12]

In the sample, sub-provincial entities on average had 27 government departments.[13] While Tibet, Xinjiang, and Qinghai (15, 16, and 19) make up the bottom of the list, localities in Guangxi, Guangdong, Hubei, Sichuan, and Inner Mongolia have the most divisions (all 33). The average number of the departments falls from 27 to 9 after RC-establishment (-64,54%), with, on average, four new departments being installed and seven kept. Beijing, Shanghai, and Jiangsu's districts and counties top the list with 14 retained departments, while Hunan, and Fujian stand both at two (Tibet and Heilongjiang are left out for lacking samples). Curiously, China's capital and seat of the central Party and government, Beijing, and the source of the January Revolution, Shanghai, on both provincial and sub-provincial levels retained the most departments after RC formation.[14] However, they are eclipsed by Guangdong and Jiangsu's localities that on average retained or re-instated more departments than established new ones. Comparing provincial and sub-provincial levels, two issues become clear. First, the average number of established organs is the same (4). This means that central demands regarding the organization of RCs were implemented fully at both levels. Second, the sub-provincial level eliminated a lower percentage of divisions with RC establishment. The average change of departments pre-GPCR versus post is significantly lower on the sub-provincial (-64,5%) than on the provincial level (-78,7%). The finding gains significance because, unlike on the provincial level, all sub-provincial samples have opted to keep or revive pre-GPCR

[11] This average is based on the entirety of the sample and not the average of the averages in the table. This means that while the fall from 27 to 9 departments equals a decrease of 66,2%, the average number of 64,54% is calculated as the average of the single jurisdictions and not their averages.
[12] No data for Tianjin and Jilin.
[13] Numbers of departments are rounded for convenience.
[14] As Ho shows, contrary to prevailing policies, Shanghai even protected historic sites and cultural objects. Denise Y. Ho, "Revolutionizing Antiquity: The Shanghai Cultural Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1968," *The China Quarterly* 207 (2011).

departments and bureaus.[15] While the average number of departments kept at the sub-provincial level is lower (7) than at the provincial level (12), it makes up a higher percentage of the overall (37,3 versus 31,7%) and also corresponds to a lower percentage of new departments in the RCs.

The data suggest that sub-provincial bureaucracies were "stickier" and exhibited greater organizational continuity than their counterparts at the provincial level. As Zhou Enlai had said, power should be seized first in the provinces and from there further down.[16] This mirrored the military-led takeover of the RCs. Here, the military converted the RCs into governance organs. Hence, at the lower levels where administration came in contact with the people, more departments were retained.

This divide between provincial and sub-provincial levels, the proliferation of old departments, and the (re-)swelling of bureaucracy was not lost on the Centre. In early 1968, it struck back at the overflowing bureaucracy by shifting focus to the simplification of bureaucratic organs. Before the Centre in July 1968 announced an organizational blueprint, sub-provincial RCs followed two models. The "Two Departments, One Office" structure that derived from pre-RC forms of military organization outlined in the last part.[17] The second model was the "Eight Groups, Two Offices".[18] Since this was rarely enough, many areas however also kept old bureaus established pre-GPCR that continued to exist separately. Aiming to contain the bureaucratic mess, the model of the "Four Big Groups" became the standard organizational

[15] Except for Heilongjiang that is just represented by one sample.

[16] Zhou et al., "接见贵州革命派代表的讲话 [Speech at a Meeting with Representatives from Guizhou's Revolutionary Factions]."

[17] This model inherited the "Office," a "Political Department" and the "Grasping Revolution and Promoting Production First Line Command Department" and became the natural default organizational model in many jurisdictions. While the latter department guaranteed a functioning economy, the Office was to take care of the daily operations of the area such as administration, archives, official documents, and the receiving of guests. The Political Department administered the GPCR's mass movements, the arrangement, assessment, education, and rectification of cadres and the re-emerging Party groups and other related tasks. It was also to promote the propagation of Mao's works within the county and manage mass organizations.

[18] This model comprised political propaganda, organization, countryside, internal affairs, finance and trade, industry and transportation, culture and health, statistics, and RC and GPCR offices.

form for RCs from the summer of 1968 onwards. They were a response to an article detailing the experience of Lingbao County.[19] After it had established its RC in January 1968, it formed the "Eight Groups, Two Offices," staffed by nearly 100 people. The article describes how they were then reorganized into four groups, reducing the staff to just 30.[20] While Mao dismissed RC establishment at the State Council level, the central government under Zhou Enlai followed suit in June 1970, with a report stipulating that the number of cadres should be reduced by 82%, with all remaining departments and committees establishing RCs with 50% of mass representatives.[21] Eventually, a reduction from 79 departments (in 1965) to 32 in 1970 was enacted and staff reduced from 50,000 to 10,000.[22]

The implications of these findings are significant and correspond to the argument outlined in the last chapters. Accordingly, institutional conversion led to military to transform the revolutionary RC into an administrative one. This suggests that governance issues retained importance. Indeed, at the lower levels where institutions came into contact with the people, a higher level of bureaucracy was retained. Yet, administration was weak. This is not surprising: the military was overstretched, being burdened with power seizure, the support of production

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[19] "灵宝县革委会实行领导班子革命化——精兵简政，密切联系群众 [the Lingbao County Revolutionary Committee Implements the Revolutionization of the Leading Group - Fine Soldiers and Simple Administration and Close Contact with the Masses]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 11 July 1968.

[20] Ibid. The four groups were: "Political Work Group," "Grasping Revolution and Promoting Production Command Group," "Security Group," and a "Work Group". Another example of this is Chun'an County in Zhejiang that had maintained a "Two Departments, One Office" organization with multiple subsidiary groups and 84 staff. By reorganizing them into three groups ("Work Group", "Political Work" and "Production Command Centre"), it reduced the staff to a mere 34, sending superfluous cadres to the countryside for reeducation. "打破旧习惯势力影响 彻底改变领导作风 [Breaking the Influence of Old Habits, Thoroughly Changing the Leadership Style]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 3 August 1968.

[21] "Request Report on the Establishment of Party Core Groups and Revolutionary Committees by State Council Departments" see Fei Xia, "革命委员会始末 [the Beginning and End of the Revolutionary Committees]," *党史博览 [General Review of Party History]*, no. 2 (2005).

[22] Shangyao Su and Wenwei Han, eds., *中华人民共和国中央政府机构（1949-1990）[Central Government of the People's Republic of China (1949-1990)]* (Beijing: 经济科学出版社 [Economic science press], 1993), 135. Defu Song, ed., *中国政府管理与改革 [Management and Reform of the Chinese Government]* (Beijing: 中国法制出版社 [China Legal System Publishing Press], 2001), 345.

at the grassroots, and the maintenance of order.[23] Crucially, the continued importance of the old departments in the new organizational structure meant that the power and authority of cadres increased relative to military cadres and representatives from mass organizations.[24] Qualified personnel was very much still needed to conduct everyday governance operations.[25] Unsurprisingly, governance was also not in the hands of revolutionary rebels. Thus, Shanghai's Xu Jingxian pointed out that even though they seized power, they could not "be relied upon to wield it".[26] Hence, the bureaucracy was reduced, but key personnel remained, foreshadowing the RCs' eventual demotion to become an administrative organ once the Party took charge.

Section 2: Bureaucratic Changes Until the End of 1970

This was manifested in the clash between the re-emerging Party sequence and the RC. As early as the end of 1967, Party core small groups (PCSG) were formed throughout China.[27] The emergence of the Party meant three things: first, the Party organizations exerted organizational leadership over the RCs. Since power was located in the Party rather than RCs, the rebuilding of Party organizations thus further demoted RCs to become administrative organs. Second, the

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[23] Zhiming Zhang, *走出迷谷：1967-1979 年中国政体变革的历程与思考 [out of the Valley: Course and Reflection on the Reform of the Chinese Political System from 1967-1979]* (Nanchang: 江西高校出版社 [Jiangxi University Press], 2000), 87.

[24] In addition, Nelsen argues "most of the military bureaucracy in the provinces still identified itself and its interests with those of the Party apparatus". Nelsen, "Military Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution."

[25] As to why they would do that, Tsai argues that "local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups." The villages' turn to themselves coupled with a lack of authority on upper levels resulted in the reconstitution of local norms and informal groupings. See Lily L. Tsai, "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China," *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 2 (2007). *Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
This is not an old phenomenon. Rather, the historical attempts of the CCP to penetrate the grassroots and break up local ties have continuously run into steep opposition. Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Ben Hillman, *Patronage and Power: Local State Networks and Party-State Resilience in Rural China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).

[26] Xu, *十年一梦：前上海市委书记徐景贤文革回忆录 [a Dream of Ten Years: A Cultural Revolution Memoir of Xu Jingxian, Former Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee]*, 92-93. In Guizhou a journalist argued that the quality of the new leadership comprising mass representatives was even worse than the old one. Zhang, "贵州夺权前后（《飞鸣镝》选读）[before and after the Power Seizure in Guizhou (Selected Readings of "the Flying Arrow")]."

[27] See Annex.

Party started to exert political power over the RC. Revolutionaries were to be absorbed into the Party, who would then lead the RCs through the Party. However, as I pointed out, this was not extremely successful, with many military cadres entering the Party. Third, all the while, by 1970, Party organizations were still weak. Thus, the real shift wherein the Party takes over completely, while already visible in 1968, would just occur in the early 1970s. However, these three points would be reflected in the 1970 constitutional draft, and to a different extent in the 1975 State Constitution in the form of two different power configurations.

Table 8: Sub-provincial formation of PCSGs in percent of total number

	Sample size	**1967**	**1968**	**1969**	**1970**
Anhui	32		0,00	90,63	100,00
Beijing	17	35,29	100,00		
Fujian	85		2,35	27,06	100,00
Gansu	100		14,00	90,00	98,00
Guangdong	13		69,23	92,31	100,00
Guangxi	33		3,03	6,06	100,00
Guizhou	54	1,85	37,04	37,04	59,26
Hebei	55		80,00	90,91	98,18
Heilongjiang	87	24,14	40,23	96,55	100,00
Henan	331		0,91	7,55	99,40
Hubei	51		1,96	5,88	86,27
Hunan	76		5,26	64,47	86,84
Inner Mongolia	32	3,13	75,00	84,38	96,88
Jiangsu	141		2,13	90,07	100,00

Jiangxi	25		36,00	92,00	100,00
Jilin	10			10,00	100,00
Liaoning	23		21,74	30,43	95,65
Ningxia	12		16,67	50,00	91,67
Qinghai	91	17,58	97,80	100,00	
Shaanxi	60	1,67	53,33	93,33	100,00
Shandong	86		1,16	46,51	100,00
Shanghai	83		2,41	62,65	100,00
Shanxi	189	84,66	84,66	97,35	100,00
Sichuan	69		13,04	60,87	100,00
Tianjin	17		5,88	17,65	100,00
Tibet	27		3,70	14,81	85,19
Xinjiang	26		3,85	57,69	100,00
Yunnan	69		1,45	46,38	69,57
Zhejiang	211			11,85	89,10
Accumulative percentage at the end of the year of total		9,79	23,28	54,11	95,49

Source: author's database and calculations, n=2105[28]

As the table shows, by the end of 1969, more than half of the areas in the sample had formed PCSGs. Beijing and Qinghai had already reached full coverage, while Hubei, Guangxi, and Henan were still in the single digits. This total number jumped to over 95% at the end of 1970. The only outliers are Guizhou and Yunnan where 59 and 70% of areas had formed PCSGs.

[28] Data was taken only for the jurisdictions where both PCSG and Party committee data was available to avoid confusion in a later Chapter where the latter will be used.

While there were significant regional differences, the process to establish PCSGs was swift and straightforward, starting with the decision to re-start organizational life in Qinghai and accelerating after the 9th Party Congress in April 1969. Growth in 1969 totaled 31%, further speeding up to 41% in 1970.

Regarding governance, RCs and PCSGs followed the same pattern. Mao instructed them to take the "road of simplified administration" and "cleanse class ranks".[29] Hence, the revolution of the cadre team and their thinking and simplified administration were emphasized.[30] Just as during the land revolution, the simplification of organs was to strengthen the unity of Party, government, and people, with the liberation of the people through class struggle at the core.[31] A commentary on 23 March 1968 in the People's Daily titled "Never Forget Class Struggle" argued that RCs emerged from class struggle and were the "battle center" that leads the revolutionary masses to attack class enemies.[32] According to the article, RCs had three main tasks: first, establishing Mao Zedong Thought classes and promoting "vividly studying and using" Mao Zedong Thought and implementing the "fight selfishness and criticize revisionism" movement that would revolutionize thinking; second, launching the great criticism, the cleaning up of class ranks, struggle, criticism, and change as a method of living; third, using the "Program of Class Struggle" to manage society, economy, culture, and people's lives. This left the military-led RCs in a bind. Mao demanded simplification; but instructions required the administrative expansion. Unsurprisingly the converted military and RCs took the second route.

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[29] "灵宝县革委会实行领导班子革命化——精兵简政，密切联系群众 [the Lingbao County Revolutionary Committee Implements the Revolutionization of the Leading Group - Fine Soldiers and Simple Administration and Close Contact with the Masses]."

[30] As late as 8 November 1974, the People's Daily published an article reiterating the need to simplify structures. See "来自灵宝的新经验 [the New Experience from Lingbao]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 8 November 1974.

[31] Guang, "特殊年代的特殊产物--革命委员会 [Revolutionary Committee, a Special Product of the Special Era]."

[32] "念念不忘阶级斗争 [Never Forget Class Struggle]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 23 March 1968.

Indeed, the local military-led RCs continued to add functional groups and bureaucracy wherever and whenever they saw fit.[33] Until 1970 the total of departments exploded, especially so since with the thrust to rebuild Party organizations in 1968 and 1969. These did not merely exist on a central bureaucratic level but in the various departments within the RC. For example, while the RC of Anhui province had a PCSG, its human resources department would also form one dedicated to it.[34] The table below shows the expansion of Party organizations and RC departments until the end of 1970 at the provincial level.

Table 9: Provincial-level development of departments in RC and Party, 1968-1970

	1968	**1969**	**1970**
Anhui	11	20	40
Beijing	71	75	69
Fujian	5	15	20
Gansu	2	2	18
Guangdong	10	21	27
Guangxi[35]			
Guizhou	19	25	39
Hebei[36]			
Heilongjiang[37]			
Henan	8	20	21

[33] Zhang, *走出迷谷：1967-1979 年中国政体变革的历程与思考 [out of the Valley: Course and Reflection on the Reform of the Chinese Political System from 1967-1979]*, 163.
[34] Anhui Provincial Party Committee Organization Department, Anhui Provincial Party Committee Party History Work Committee, and Anhui Provincial Archives, *中国共产党安徽省组织史资料（1921.7—1987.11）[Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Anhui Province (July 1921-November 1987)]* (Hefei: 安徽人民出版社 [Anhui People's Publishing Press], 1996), 551.
[35] No data for departments in RCs.
[36] No data for departments in RCs.
[37] No data for departments in RCs.

Hubei	8	9	24
Hunan	8	17	28
Inner Mongolia	9	10	17
Jiangsu	7	28	38
Jiangxi	12	24	32
Jilin	9	8	11
Liaoning	3	25	32
Ningxia	4	5	18
Qinghai	14	8	27
Shaanxi	24	31	57
Shandong[38]			
Shanghai	60	77	95
Shanxi		11	25
Sichuan	10	15	26
Tianjin	35	43	58
Tibet	11	16	17
Xinjiang	12	22	56
Yunnan	16	20	34
Zhejiang	17	19	60
ALL	385	566	889

Source: author's database and calculations

Accompanying RC establishment, from the first in January 1967 in Heilongjiang and the two last in Tibet and Xinjiang in October 1968, the number of departments more than tripled from

[38] No data for departments in RCs.

126 to 385. From 1968 onward, the reconstruction of the Party paralleled RC expansion. They continued to expand, reaching a combined 889 departments at the end of 1970. Compared with the number of government bureaucracy (not including Party organizations) in the provinces in May 1966 (1,374),[39] this number is significantly lower.

The total tally of departments and organizations varies. However, the main point here is that the process of expansion was linear amongst all provinces. There is just one way and this way is up. Hence, as I indicated in the last chapter, the process of revolution, through the conversion of the military, the RC, and the Party in fact led to the affirmation and reinforcement of bureaucratic trends. This in reflected in the growth of governance organs. For example, the number of divisions and Party bodies in Zhejiang grew from three in 1967 to 17 at the end of 1968 (470%), leveling off in 1969 and again expanding by over 200% in 1970. The highest growth however was witnessed in Gansu that increased the number of divisions from two in 1969 to 18 in 1970 (800%). While the total number from 1967 to 1968 grew by 205%, this number is flawed because of the lack of RCs and Party organizations covering the entirety of China. Rather, most of the growth happened from 1969 to 1970 (57%) as opposed to the year before (47%). Apart from the initial birth blurb, the institutional expansion of 1970 is the greatest during the GPCR. Some of these organizations survived the turmoil of the early GPCR and continued to operate within the provincial administration. Most, however, were created starting in 1968, with the main growth period in 1969 and 1970. Much of this growth can be traced to the rebuilding of the Party. Hence, one would expect Party department growth to overtake RC department growth to slowly catch up. This is indeed what happened. The table below summarizes the formation of Party organizations on the provincial level until 1970.

[39] This number is the sum of all governance departments 5/66 from the "Organization of provincial level RCs pre-GPCR and post-RC formation" table.

Table 10: Provincial-level number of Party organizations

	1967	**1968**	**1969**	**1970**
Anhui		3	11	32
Beijing	11	15	15	16
Fujian[40]				
Gansu		2	2	18
Guangdong		2	8	10
Guangxi[41]	/	/	/	/
Guizhou	1	2	5	12
Hebei[42]	/	/	/	/
Heilongjiang[43]	/	/	/	/
Henan			5	5
Hubei		4	4	5
Hunan			2	2
Inner Mongolia	4	5	5	5
Jiangsu			1	8
Jiangxi	1	2	4	8
Jilin		2	2	2
Liaoning		1	1	1
Ningxia[44]				
Qinghai				3
Shaanxi		2	6	13

[40] First Party organization established in 1971.
[41] Not included for the sake of consistency since there are no data for RC departments.
[42] Not included for the sake of consistency since there are no data for RC departments.
[43] Not included for the sake of consistency since there are no data for RC departments.
[44] First Party organization established in 1971.

Shandong[45]	/	/	/	/
Shanghai	2	3	21	39
Shanxi			4	4
Sichuan		4	4	7
Tianjin	1	2	2	13
Tibet		1	2	4
Xinjiang	5	6	9	24
Yunnan	1	5	5	5
Zhejiang	1	6	7	28
Total Number	27	67	125	264

Source: author's database and calculations

The total number of Party organizations roughly doubled twice from 1968 to 1969 and again in 1970, reaching 264 at the end of 1970. However, placed against the number of RC departments, the data shows that of the 889 departments and Party groups a little less than a third were the Party's (30%), up from 17% in 1968 and 22% in 1969. This shows that the Party, while being less present than the RC, was on its way to catching up at the end of 1970. Even though Party organizations on average outgrew the formation of RC units (115 to 101% annual growth), since RCs had a numerical early starter advantage, the total number came to be much higher, even though the Party was overall catching up, eventually settling within a 10% margin from 1973.[46] This is important for four reasons. First, the "Party" sequence reinforced itself—slowly. Second, it asserted its leadership over the RCs, indicating the move of revolution to the Party. Third, it also shows the gradual descent of the RC into irrelevance relative to the Party. Fourth, more importantly, this shows the impact of the converted and administrative military

[45] Not included for the sake of consistency since there are no data for RC departments.
[46] I will analyse this trend in Chapter VII.

and RCs on Party development. Since military cadres were the only ones who could reestablish the Party, they extended their bureaucratic acumen to it and led it on a path of gradual organizational reinforcement vis-à-vis the RC—with explicit central endorsement in the wake of the 9th Party Congress. However, as I will show below, once reinforced, this enlargement became detached from military personnel.

Setting aside overall growth differences, there are significant regional variations. This illustrates that re-establishing the Party on a regional level was not a straightforward process. Some places did not see the need to rebuild the Party at all, while others did not see it fit to eliminate the Party. This hints to a different set of power relations and mechanics among the various elements in the provincial leadership.[47] Pitting the number of RC departments versus the number of Party organizations, a similar picture of diversity emerges.

Table 11: Provincial-level dominance of RC departments

	1967	**1968**	**1969**	**1970**
Anhui	1	5	-2	-24
Beijing	23	40	45	37
Fujian	0	5	15	20
Gansu	0	-2	-2	-18
Guangdong	1	6	5	7
Guangxi[48]	/	/	/	/
Guizhou	11	15	15	15
Hebei[49]	/	/	/	/

[47] And considerable factional struggle, see Graham Young, "Party Building and the Search for Unity," in *China: The Impact of the Cultural Revolution*, ed. Bill Brugger (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1978), 54.
[48] No data for departments in RCs.
[49] No data for departments in RCs.

Heilongjiang[50]	/	/	/	/
Henan	0	8	10	11
Hubei	0	0	1	14
Hunan	0	8	13	24
Inner Mongolia	-1	-1	0	7
Jiangsu	0	7	26	22
Jiangxi	0	8	16	16
Jilin	0	5	4	7
Liaoning	0	1	23	30
Ningxia	0	4	5	18
Qinghai	9	14	8	21
Shaanxi	0	20	19	31
Shandong[51]	/	/	/	/
Shanghai	26	54	35	17
Shanxi	0	0	3	17
Sichuan	0	2	7	12
Tianjin	4	31	39	32
Tibet	0	9	12	9
Xinjiang	-4	0	4	8
Yunnan	0	6	10	24
Zhejiang	1	5	5	4
ALL	71	250	316	361

Source: author's calculations

[50] No data for departments in RCs.
[51] No data for departments in RCs.

Except for Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Gansu and Anhui, departments in RCs outnumber Party bodies everywhere. From 1968 onward, Gansu and Anhui thrust forward to rebuild the Party. As a result, by the end of 1970, there were 18 and 24 more Party organizations than RC departments. This is a clear sign that organizationally, the Party had taken over. Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang present a different story. They are outliers under military control until 1968. Here, the military did not seem to have many incentives to revamp the administration and instead used their own hierarchy and administrative systems, with the bureaucratic apparatus of the Party (and the RC) lingering on in name rather than substance. However, until 1969 and 1970, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia had caught up with the other provinces in terms of RC development and bureaucratic overhang. In all other provinces, the number of RC departments outnumbered their Party counterparts. This picture however gets more complex when analyzing the growth of Party organizations as opposed to growth of RC departments, as in the table below, showcasing the relative erosion of RCs that are being pushed back by Party organizations.

Table 12: Provincial-level Party versus RC growth, 1967-1970

	67-68	**68-69**	**69-70**
Anhui	4	-7	-22
Beijing	17	5	-8
Fujian			
Gansu		0	-16
Guangdong		-1	2
Guangxi[52]	/	/	/
Guizhou	4	0	0

[52] No data.

Hebei[53]	/	/	/
Heilongjiang[54]	/	/	/
Henan			1
Hubei		1	13
Hunan			11
Inner Mongolia	0	1	7
Jiangsu			-4
Jiangxi	8	8	0
Jilin		-1	3
Liaoning		22	7
Ningxia			
Qinghai			
Shaanxi		-1	12
Shandong[55]	/	/	/
Shanghai	28	-19	-18
Shanxi			14
Sichuan		5	5
Tianjin	27	8	-7
Tibet		3	-3
Xinjiang	4	4	4
Yunnan	6	4	14
Zhejiang	4	0	-1
ALL	179	66	45

[53] No data.
[54] No data.
[55] No data.

Source: author's calculations

This table shows the relationship between divisions in RCs and the established Party institutions. A negative number suggests the relative loss of RC department growth vis-à-vis Party organization growth. Positive numbers indicate a dominance of RC departments while negative numbers show Party organizations' growth outnumbering their counterparts. Thus, from 1967-1968, Shanghai added one Party organization and 29 RC units. The growth of RC departments outstripped the total growth by 28 departments. This trend was reversed in the next year. Shanghai's -19 in 1968-9 shows that until the end of 1969, the growth of Party organizations had a numerical advantage of 19 over that of RC departments. In this year, the number of RC divisions decreased by one, while 18 Party bodies were installed. While this meant that Shanghai in total numbers still had 35 more RC departments at the end of 1969, this number was down from 54 in 1968. The dominance of the RC over the Party was therefore not only eroded but, more importantly, the Party made significant strides in restoring its traditional leadership position. The only two provinces that made strides to implement, restructure, and rebuild the Party were Anhui and Shanghai. Here again, Shanghai stands out as the jurisdiction that implemented central directives once they were issued. Other provinces are seen to move into the opposite direction. For example, in Yunnan growth sped up, however, in favor of the RC departments. Likewise, Shaanxi, Jilin, and Hubei also expanded their RCs as opposed to strengthening Party-building. While there is significant variation, this table shows the increasing thrust toward the installation of Party institutions after 1967. From 1968 to 1969, five provinces (Anhui, Guangdong, Jilin, Shaanxi, and Shanghai) established more Party organizations than RC units. From 1969 until 1970 this number rose to eight. Likewise, whilst from 1969 until 1970, 45 more departments in RCs were created than Party organizations, this number dropped from 179 (1967-8) and 66 (1968-9).

As a general point, notwithstanding calls to simplify administration, the bureaucracy's expansion went forward full throttle. Both the RC and the Party continued to expand, with Party organizations making up an increasing share of the overall bureaucracy and driving growth. Within a short time, RCs went from being revolutionary organizations to marshaling full-blown bureaucracies. This confirms the conclusions from the last chapters wherein the converted military took over RCs and transformed them into governance institutions.

The rebuilding of Party bodies indicates that there was a discernible thrust in favor of rebuilding the Party. Revolutionaries were to enter the Party and not the RC and the focus of "continuous revolution" shifted from the RC to the Party. This precipitated the takeover of the RC through the Party. The newly formed Party organizations fomented the Party's leadership over the RCs. This is also reflected bureaucratically. At the same time, this principle was being eroded by the bureaucratic strengthening of the RCs and the Party. This shifting relationship is key to understanding the role of the Party vis-à-vis the RC and the RCs changing role.

Again, this can be explained through the concept of conversion. As I outlined in the last chapter, it was the military that led the RCs, was instrumental in rebuilding the Party and eventually entered it. Ultimately, this is rooted in the conversion of the military in the wake of the 1967 January Revolution to become an administrative force. The military then rebuilt the Party as it built the RCs: with bureaucracy and governance in mind. Eventually, this process would become reinforcing and divorce itself from military personnel per se as I will show in the next section.

Section 3: Revamping Personnel

Apart from bureaucratic structures, another aspect is the restructuring of personnel of both RC and Party organizations.[56] The absorption of revolutionary elements was one of the main aims in rebuilding the Party. Here, all four sequences of RC, Party, military, and revolution come together. Hence the paradoxical nature of revolution which meaning was converted to affirm bureaucracy must be reflected in the staffing of RC and Party. To analyze this issue, I look at the composition of the leadership for four jurisdictions: Anqing County in Anhui, the key city of Chongqing, Qujing in Yunnan, and Mianyang in Sichuan.[57] Indeed, I find that the military gradually was ejected from the burgeoning bureaucracy.

To grasp the effective overhaul of personnel in a jurisdiction, it is necessary to specify whether the official was active before the start of the GPCR.[58] This opens two ways of exploration important for analyzing the governance system's overhaul: first, whether cadres were in leadership positions before the GPCR. This is an indicator of the severity of revolutionary overhaul. Second, to what extent did the military play a role in administration and the Party's

[56] For a general discussion, see Michel Oksenberg, "Getting Ahead and Along in Communist China: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," in *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, ed. John Wilson Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[57] These four territories were chosen because they clearly distinguished between military and other staff in both the make-up of the RC and Party organization and their subsidiary organs. The entire set comprises roughly 2,000 leading personnel from both from the RC, the Party that was being rebuilt, and all bureaucratic departments and their respective Party bodies. Figures for leading personnel in provincial RC and Party organs are included in 记忆 (except for Shandong, Shanghai, Heilongjiang, Tibet, Guizhou, Qinghai, and Beijing).

[58] This method has its limitations. Some staff would have had a position lower in the bureaucracy that the materials would not consider as "leading". Also, they might not have been in the same jurisdiction but in others. The analysis is complicated by the ubiquitous similarity in names. In fact, some people with the same names have had both military and civilian positions or have served both after the GPCR and in the early revolutionary period, making it difficult to determine if they were in fact the same people. Most crucially however, while the leaders would often be disposed, non-leadership personnel would fill their position. In these cases, they were in the depths of the administration before and would then move up. For all its imperfections, this method however enables us to understand the general trend of revamping the personnel of Party and state during the GPCR.

rebuilding.[59] Given Mao's fear of a military dictatorship (a topic of the 9th Party Congress that I will touch on in a later chapter), a pushback should be expected.

Table 13: New and old personnel in four jurisdictions

		Anqing	**Chongqing**	**Qujing**	**Mianyang**
Total number of leading personnel		429	818	337	475
Of which	Military	61	206	58	64
	Cadre	/	12	32	103
	Mass	34	31	24	35
New (%)	Personnel	59	67	65	62
	Military[60]	75 (18)	98 (36)	57 (15)	84 (37)
Old (%)	Personnel	41	33	35	38
	Military[61]	25 (9)	2 (2)	43 (49)	16 (26)
Military staff politically surviving the GPCR[62] (%)		13	21	53	27
Military staff *not* politically surviving the GPCR[63] (%)		87	79	47	73
Leading personnel politically surviving the GPCR (%)		72	63	63	64

[59] Li and He suggest that 78% of cadres in Beijing, 81% in Guangdong, 84% in Liaoning, 95% in Shanxi, 97% in Yunnan, and 98% in Hubei were military. See Li and He, *"文化大革命"中的人民解放军 [the People's Liberation Army in the "Cultural Revolution"]*, 244-46.
[60] Refers to percentage of all military. The value in the bracket refers to percentage of all *new* leading personnel.
[61] Refers to percentage of all military. The value in the bracket refers to percentage of all *new* leading personnel.
[62] This number includes military staff that had none before the GPCR but after as well as personnel that both had positions before and after the GPCR.
[63] This number includes military staff that had had positions before the GPCR and none after as well as personnel that had neither one before nor after the GPCR.

Leading personnel *not* politically surviving the GPCR (%)		28	37	37	36
Military positions in	Only Party	2	14	1,7	1,6
	Only RC	52	30	32,8	12,5
	Any in Party	48	70	67	87,5
	Any in RC	98,4	86,4	98,3	92,6

Source: author's database and calculations[64]

This table provides several conclusions. Most new leadership personnel had not been in leadership positions prior to the GPCR. For example, in Anqing, 59% of leading personnel during the GPCR came into this position during the GPCR. 62% of Mianyang's leaders were new, and 65% in Qujing. Chongqing reached the highest percentage with 67. Even if we account for inconsistencies, we can conclude that more than half of the leading staff in both Party organizations and RC departments would be "new" and inserted during the GPCR. This can be contrasted with the number and percentage of personnel that had already had leading

[64] Anqing Municipal Party Committee Organization Department, Anqing Municipal Party Committee Party History Office, and Anqing Municipal Archives, *中国共产党安徽省安庆地区组织史资料（1922.4—1988.9）[Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Anqing, Anhui Province (April 1922-September 1988)]* (1993). Qujing Locality Party Committee Organization Department, Qujing Locality Party Committee Party History Annals Committee, and Qujing Locality Archives, *中国共产党云南省曲靖地区组织史资料云南省曲靖地区政权系统军事系统统战系统群团系统组织史资料（1926.7—1987.10）[Organizational History of the Communist Party of China in Qujing, Yunnan Province, Qujing District, Yunnan Province, Governance, Military, United Front, Mass Organization, Organizational Materials (July 1926-October 1987)]* (1991). Chongqing Municipal Party Committee Organization Department, Chongqing Municipal Party Committee Party History Research Office, and Chongqing Municipal Archives, *中国共产党重庆市组织史资料（1926.1—1987.10）[Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party in Chongqing (January 1926-October 1987)]* (Chongqing: 重庆出版社 [Chongqing Publishing Press], 1999). Sichuan Province Mianyang Municipal Party Committee Organization Department, Sichuan Province Mianyang Municipal Party History Research Office, and Sichuan Province Mianyang Municipal Archives, *中国共产党四川省绵阳市组织史资料（1927—1987）[Organizational History of the Chinese Communist Party, Mianyang City, Sichuan Province (1927-1987)]* (Chengdu: 四川人民出版社 [Sichuan People's Publishing Press], 1994).

positions before the GPCR, the figure standing at 41 (Anqing), 33 (Chongqing), 35 (Qujing), and 38% (Mianyang). Hence, notwithstanding the importance of bureaucratic personnel overhaul, the old guard with experience still comprised a significant faction in the administration of Party organizations and RCs throughout the GPCR.

The most important example of this is military staff. Looking at the percentage of members of the military joining the Party bodies and RC departments, it is possible to see the extent of military influence. Among 429 leadership personnel, Anqing boasted a mere 61 military personnel throughout the GPCR. Hence, 14% of Anqing's leadership had a military qualification during the GPCR—far from a majority. This number is similar throughout the sample. Chongqing boasted 818 staff in leading positions throughout the GPCR. Of these, roughly 25% (206) had a military background. Similarly, Qujing's 58 military personnel and Mianyang's 64 military staff just make up 15 and 18% of the total of new leadership personnel during the GPCR. This shows that, while the top leadership might come from the military, a closer analysis reveals the military to be in a minority and declining over the years—I disaggregate the findings in another table below.

Further, military personnel were overwhelmingly new to its leadership positions. In Anqing, 75% joined the county leadership during the GPCR, while 25% had already had a position in departments such as the militia or other military organizations before the GPCR. This number fluctuates in the other jurisdictions. In Chongqing and Mianyang 98% and 84% of military staff were "new," while in Qujing this number stands at just 57%. It was this staff that was propelled into leadership positions after the start of the GPCR and both built the RCs and rebuilt the Party. These numbers gain further significance if pitted against the overall number of new personnel. Here, military people take up a mere 18 (Anqing), 36% (Chongqing), 15% (Qujing), and 37% (Mianyang) of all new arrivals to the leadership. While a significant number, military personnel is are far from constituting a majority.

Going further, a distinction that must be made is between Party organizations and RC bureaus. Isolating Party organizations from RC departments, the number of military personnel with purely Party positions is negligible.[65] Military staff is predominantly located in the RC and its divisions. In Anqing, Qujing, and Mianyang, the percentage of military staff with Party positions stands at a mere 2% with Chongqing being an outlier with 14%. There are considerably more military officials having a position in the RC and its divisions: Chongqing and Qujing boast 30 and 32%, while 12,5% of military leaders in Mianyang occupy a position in the RC. Anqing is an outlier here with 52%. This result is to be expected since RC departments were first established, with Party organizations following later. This also shows that Party organizations were dedicated to non-military people. However, this does not mean that the military was entirely absent from the Party. Looking at the percentage of military officials occupying any post in the Party (besides other posts in the RC), the numbers are significantly higher. Thus, of the 61 military staff in Anqing, 48% (29 people) took up posts in the Party. The percentages are higher for the other jurisdictions: Qujing stands at 67, Chongqing at 70, and Mianyang at 87,5%. This means that while pure Party positions were reserved for non-military staff, there was a lot of overlap between different functions in the Party and the RC. However, military personnel was concentrated within the RC. Analyzing the proportion of military in RC-related functions, Anqing and Qujing reach 98%, with Mianyang trailing them at 93 and Chongqing at 86%. The concentration of military personnel notwithstanding, they made up just a fraction of the overall number of personnel in these categories. As the numbers indicate, most positions within the Party were occupied by non-military personnel. While one fourth of officials in Chongqing hailed from the military, of the 229 people taking up Party positions in Chongqing, just 28 were military (12%). Likewise of

[65] As Domes argues, the military recruited Party officials to work in the Party organization. Jürgen Domes, *China after the Cultural Revolution: Politics between Two Party Congresses* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1977), 53.

the 573 leading personnel with Party and 589 with RC positions, 144 (25%) and 178 (30%) had a military background. This confirms the findings of the last chapter and section: Party institutions were meant to push back against the military.[66] Moreover, it shows the shift from the RC to the Party.

A majority of military staff also took up positions within the Party leadership. This confirms the conclusions from last section and the last chapter. This should not be a surprise. Late establishment of Party institutions meant that military staff "created" Party organizations. The data also show that the administrators of Party bodies tended more likely to be non-military than military. The number of military personnel is also widely exaggerated. Military personnel just made up a minority of all officials throughout the GPCR. This means not just that non-military staff fought back against the military and that they played an ever-increasing role in the pushback against a militarization of the institutions. More mundanely, it also indicates that there was simply a shortage of people with the requisite capabilities in the face a rapidly expanding bureaucracy. This suggests that while they continued to control significant resources, the responsibility for implementation and its aftermath was divided.

Below I chronologically lay out the data and introduce more nuance. After all, one would not expect the number of military personnel to be evenly distributed from 1967 to 1976, rather than being concentrated in the first years. However, even if that is the case, the number of other representatives, including cadres, and mass representatives should surge as well.

Table 14: Leading personnel in four jurisdictions, 1968-1970

	1968	**1969**	**1970**
Anqing			

[66] Byung-joon Ahn, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order," *The China Quarterly* 58 (1974).

Total number of leading personnel		90	108	149
Of which (in %)	Military	38,9	33,3	22,8
	Mass[67]	35,6	29,6	21,5
	Rest	25,6	37	55,7
Qujing				
Total number of leading personnel		130	132	147
Of which (in %)	Military	34,6	28	22,5
	Mass[68]	18,5	18,2	15,7
	Cadre	22,3	15,2	14,3
	Rest	24,6	38,6	47,6
Mianyang				
Total number of leading personnel		65	79	191
Of which (in %)	Military	27,7	31,7	28,3
	Mass[69]	29,2	26,6	16,2
	Cadre	26,2	25,3	22
	Rest	16,9	16,5	33,5
Chongqing				
Total number of leading personnel		133	160	293
Of which (in %)	Military	49,9	53,1	51,9
	Mass[70]	18,1	16,9	8,9

[67] Mass includes peasants, students, and workers.
[68] Exists as own category.
[69] Mass includes peasants, students, teachers, and workers.
[70] Includes peasants, students, and workers.

	Cadre	8,3	7,5	4,1
	Rest	24,8	22,5	35,2

Source: author's database and calculations

First, total number of leading personnel. In all four jurisdictions, an increase in the number of leading personnel is visible. This increase however is of a different magnitude. In Anqing, an increase from 90 to 149 corresponds to a growth of 65%. Qujing dons a growth rate of a mere 13% from 1968 to 1970. In contrast, Chongqing and Mianyang almost triple the number of their leading personnel, pointing to a massive expansion in bureaucracy. This is in line with conclusions drawn in the last section. Second, the relative number of military staff fluctuates. The four samples can be divided into two sets. In Anqing and Qujing the percentage steadily decreases from 1968 until 1970. In Mianyang and Chongqing, it increases in 1969 just to decrease again, but staying above its 1968 number. The key difference is the time it starts decreasing. In the face of an expanding bureaucracy in Anqing and Qujing the percentage of military staff falls significantly from the establishment of RCs in 1969 onwards. In Mianyang as in Chongqing, this trend starts just in 1970. Third, the proportion of mass representatives in the four jurisdictions is notably high with their number rivaling that of the military, except for Chongqing. While not surpassing them at any point, they come close. What unites all four jurisdictions is that the number of mass representatives decreases. In contrast to the numbers of the military, there is no fluctuation. The speed of decrease is notable as well: while in the three areas of Anqing, and Qujing, the number of mass representatives slowly declines, in Chongqing and Mianyang, they are halved from 18 to 9 and from a little over 29 to 16%. Fourth, the number of cadre representatives also decreases slowly from 1968 to 1970, without rebounding, in Chongqing dropping by roughly 50%. There are not just fewer cadre representatives than military, but they are also often outnumbered by mass representatives in

leadership positions. Thus, in Mianyang in all years except 1970, there are more mass representatives than cadres in high positions. Fifth, the balance between military, mass, and cadre representatives. At the end of 1970, relationship between the military, mass, and cadre representatives was far from balanced, with the military possessing more power than the other two parts of the "three-in-one-combination". However, as noted, this power was far from total. It is important to pay attention to the "non-labeled/designated" leading staff. In Anqing and Qujing it roughly doubles from 1968 to 1970, surpassing all other groups by 1969. In contrast, in Mianyang and Chongqing the number of the "rest" decreases slightly from 1968 to 1969 in favor of the military, just to grow significantly until the end of 1970 at the expense of all other groups. In all four jurisdictions the "rest" would eventually make up most leading staff as early 1972 (Qujing and Chongqing) and 1973 (Mianyang). From the data, the "rise of the rest" is the most significant insight.

Table 15: Mapping the "rest" in four jurisdictions

	Anqing	**Chongqing**	**Qujing**	**Mianyang**	**Total**
Total number of personnel	334	140	223	273	911
No/No	41	10	68	87	206
No/Yes	133	82	84	85	384
Yes/No	16	7	16	15	54
Yes/Yes	14	41	55	86	324
"New" personnel (in %)	41,8	65,7	68,2	63	58,5

"Old" personnel (in %)	58,2	34,3	31,8	37	41,5

Source: author's database and calculations

Overall, the number of "new" personnel is higher than the "old" personnel. This means that most of the staff gained their leadership positions during the GPCR. However, standing at 58,5 to 41,5%, the gap is not dramatic. In Chongqing, Qujing, and Mianyang it is roughly in line with the overall arrival of "new personnel," while in Anqing there is more "old personnel" among the "rest". This reinforces the conclusions drawn before. It is these unaffiliated administrators and officials who would, from the late 1960s and early 1970s onward, take over the reins from the military and engage in the administration of their respective jurisdictions.

From the example of four jurisdictions in this section we can draw multiple conclusions regarding the revamping of personnel. First, the military was in a minority position throughout the GPCR, with a pushback against already underway before Lin Biao's fall in September 1971. In some areas, the 9th Party Congress had an impact in the number of military leading cadres, in others the military was already in retreat as soon was the RC was established and the bureaucracy was expanded the following year. This is significant since even though military cadres often were in charge of the RCs and the Party, most of the administrative work was done by non-military affiliated personnel. Second, from the four cases we can deduce that mass representatives were significant, albeit not playing the major roles. However, this should not be expected from them. Here the paradox of Mao's "Fifty-Characters Party-Building Policy" is in full display: the new people atop of the governing pyramid were to be both revolutionaries and apt administrators, with their experiences during the revolution influencing their governing behavior. In reality, this proved impossible. With this phase of the GPCR aiming to re-build of Party and state organs through "struggle, criticism, change," the rebels, used to infighting and

revolution, could not transform themselves into a proper cadre body.[71] Therefore, they slowly lost influence to cadres who, understandably, did not look favorably on the rebels.[72] Third, the "three-in-one-combination" existed at least in numerical terms. Thus, in Qujing and Mianyang the number of representatives from the three "factions" was not far apart from each other. The military occupied the top leadership positions and were all newcomers elevated to their positions during the GPCR but yet they were outnumbered by others. This points to a significant leverage and administrative power of the cadre corps and administrators vis-à-vis the military. Fourth, the most significant development is the "rise of the rest". Non-labeled and non-designated, it was them who benefited the most from the relative decline of military, mass, and cadre representatives that had kicked into full gear by the end of 1969. They would eventually take over the administration and governance of the jurisdictions, leading to the abandonment of the "three-in-one-combination" in 1973, as I will detail in a later chapter.

Together, these points indicate that even upon the construction of Party organizations and RC departments and at a point where the military staff held key positions in the RC and Party organization, in the face of an expanding bureaucracy it did not play that big of a role in the jurisdiction's administration, leaving it to skilled administrators.

Conclusion

This chapter treated the interactions between the four sequences of revolution, Party, RC, and military. Deploying a quantitative dataset, it confirms the conclusions made in the last chapters. Emerging from the 1967 January Revolution, the sequences have undergone a massive process

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[71] Mingming Chen, ""旧制度"与"大革命"——"革命委员会"的权力结构及其演变(1967~1973) ["Old System" and "Great Revolution" - the Power Structure of the "Revolutionary Committee" and Its Evolution (1967~1973)]," *中共历史与理论研究 [CCP History and Theory Research]*, no. 2 (2015).

[72] Drawing their ire, as Blecher and White show. See Marc J. Blecher and Gordon White, *Micropolitics in Contemporary China—a Technical Unit During and after the Cultural Revolution* (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1979), 111.

of mutual conversion. In a nutshell, in 1970, at the moment a new state constitution was to be drafted, the RC had been converted from a revolutionary into an administrative organ while exhibiting a fast-growing bureaucracy, being gradually eclipsed by the Party, and remaining weak in organizational terms and especially compared to pre-GPCR forms of organization. Simultaneously, the military had overtaken and converted the RC, was locked in a structural decline in both the RC and the reemerging Party organs. Furthermore, it was concentrated in the RCs rather than the Party, thus losing out in terms of relative power. All the while, the Party showed a burgeoning bureaucracy that outpaced the growth of the RC, was converted by the military-led RCs that were tasked with rebuilding the Party, was a hotbed for revolutionaries that were concentrated there (rather than military cadres), and started exerting political (through standards of succession) and organizational (through its groups) leadership over the RCs. The revolution sequence moved from the RC into the Party that concentrated both revolutionaries, was stronger at the Centre with prominent revolutionaries and theorists than it was at other levels and was inverted: the initially revolutionary RCs and Party organs were turned into administrative institutions.

We can supplement these conclusions with three general observations. First, the burgeoning bureaucracy in both Party and RC led to an increasing space for administrators that took over during the retreat of the military and organizational expansion. Both the RCs and its departments and the rebuilding of the Party and its subsidiary organization thereby contributed to a sprawling bureaucracy growing at double-digit rates.[73] As Walder showed, the 1970 campaign then became one of the bloodiest episodes in the entire GPCR.[74] This coercive

[73] These are the structural underpinnings of Yang Xiguang's text that classifies the GPCR as a conflict "between a manipulative class of Party officials intent on preserving their power and a powerless mass of ordinary people". See Jonathan Unger, "Whither China?: Yang Xiguang, Red Capitalists, and the Social Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution," *Modern China* 17, no. 1 (1991).
[74] Walder, "Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966-1971."

outburst corelates with an increase in administrative capacity.[75] In the broadest sense, this relationship between coercion and organization is exemplary of the dynamics of state-building.[76] However, the development of the bureaucracy is also related to the provision of basic governance such as sanitation and transport.[77] This signified the reinforcement of a path of administrative expansion. Second, even so, the organization of RC and Party were, in 1970, still weak and the total number of departments in both Party and RC was significantly lower than in the pre-GPCR period—it was this characteristic that underpinned all sequences.[78] Third, yet, the Party had become more much more important than the RC.[79] Thrust into the position as leaders of the RCs, the military both reconstructed and then entered the Party. This means that the military helped convert the Party from the "revolutionary" organization it was supposed to become, into an "administrative" institution—albeit, relative to the RC, endowed with power.

In sum, by 1970 the critical juncture of the January Revolution had led to its conversion. The return of Party organizations precipitates a return to the separation between an administrative (not revolutionary) Party and an administrative state. From the end of 1969 the bureaucracy expanded drastically, Party construction kicked into full gear and the military was pushed back forcefully. At the same time, the Party started to exert power over the RC. The Party-state was

[75] A bigger apparatus leads to greater control over lower-level agents. This is a problem that recurred in the reform and opening era. See Maria Edin, "State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective," *The China Quarterly* 173 (2003).

[76] See for example Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, Ad 990-1992* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990). Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," *European Journal of Sociology* 25, no. 2 (1984).

[77] Such as described by Skinner. See Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China: Part Iii."; "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China: Part Ii," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 24, no. 2 (1965); "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China: Part I," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 24, no. 1 (1964).

[78] MacFarquhar and Schoenhals report that "to be left alone was what many peasants secretly wished for, and when the state's tax collectors failed to show up on time or in force because they were involved in struggles, the peasants were content. In parts of rural China, an unintended by-product of a dysfunctional state bureaucracy was hailed as a great newborn thing." MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 271. As Li Xing argues, "many democratic ideas, consciousness of political, economic and social rights have penetrated into people's way of thinking". See Xing Li, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited," *China Review* 1, no. 1 (2001).

[79] Young argues that 1970 was the crucial year in which the Party's role was re-established. Young, "Party Building and the Search for Unity," 56.

thus set on a path toward structural restoration. In contrast with the pre-GPCR period, however, the Party started to undermine the RC and instigate a slow takeover that would form the key principle of the constitutional order as we will find it in the drafting of the state constitution in 1970: the state's substitution with the Party. The drafting of a state constitution in 1970 was to memorialize this new order and balance of power between the four different sequences.

Chapter V: Drafting a State Constitution

Introduction

The state constitution is a by-product of a process launched by the critical juncture of the January Revolution that resulted in the formation of four sequences that I examined in the last three chapters. As I showed, their interaction between 1967 and 1970 was characterized by conversion. Revolution at the grassroots converted the military from a fighting into an administrative force. After, when RCs were built, the military transformed them from revolutionary into governing organs. Then, as the Party was rebuilt, the military converted the Party from a "revolutionary" into an "administrative" Party by installing Lin Biao at the top and inserting the RCs' leadership at the bottom. This implied a conversion of revolution. As it referred mostly to rebels and mass representatives before, the inclusion of administrative military cadres combined with Party-building diluted its meaning. Henceforth, it implied the support of structures rather than the rebellion against them. Coupled with the marginalization of the RC, this put the Party on a trajectory to replace it as the main administrative organ.

In 1970, leaders got together to draft a new state constitution that would freeze this balance of power between the four sequences. Indeed, this is evident during the drafting process that I cover in the first section. The drafting process is as much a manifestation of the balance of power between the four sequences than the text itself—that I examine more closely in the second section. Hence, the interactions between RC, military, revolution, and the Party were evident in the process of agreeing on a constitutional text. As such, actors representing the four sequences attempted to manipulate the drafting process turning words and phrases of policy into weapons.

There were two main clashes during the drafting process. First, a conflict between the RC and the Party. This was most visible in the interaction between the Party system and the state apparatus over the issue of the "state chairmanship" 国家主席.[1] The military leadership and the revolutionaries joined hands to convince Mao to keep it. However, getting "rid of the President of PRC"[2] was more than his personal choice. Rather, it reflected the institutional balance of power between the Party and the state machinery with the RCs at their core. On a personal level, it also showed a misunderstanding between Lin Biao and Mao. Second, the ambivalent relationship between the revolutionaries and the military. The interactions of these sequences were characterized by struggle and cooperation. While they both agreed the state chairmanship should be kept, a conflict erupted over the inclusion of some key phrases of Lin's. Eventually neither the state chairmanship nor the phrases were included. This showcased the declining influence and clout of the military by 1970 and the balance of power between the different sequences.

Three pillars therefore defined the new constitutional order: first, a rising Party usurping the RCs. Second, the declining influence of the military as opposed to the stability of the revolutionaries. This, third, is underpinned by an administratively "weak" state apparatus. It was this institutional balance of power in mid-1970 that was reflected in a "weak" state constitution.

Section 1: Drafting the State Constitution

After the 9th Party Congress, the political situation settled down with the establishment of a new theory and central leadership institution that shifted power from the CCRG to the Party

[1] Bill Brugger, *China: Radicalism to Revisionism: 1962-1979* (London: Croom Helm, 1981).
[2] Hua, "Zhang Chunqiao and the Politics of the 1975 People's Republic of China Constitution."

bureaucracy.[3] In his memoirs, Mao's chief of security and confidante Wang Dongxing reports that after the 9th Party Congress, Mao considered putting the focus on the work of government, convening the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC), and drafting a new state constitution.[4] Since the GPCR was near its conclusion and most Party organizations and groups slowly recovered, the next step would be to re-build the government organs to have them work correctly and support social and economic development.[5] In early March 1970, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Mao, enclosing a summary of the constitutional draft's amendment.[6] Zhou also added that the Politburo Standing Committee proposed to have a "state chairmanship" and asked him to comment.[7] While agreeing to reform the state system, Mao responded that the state chairmanship was unnecessary—also, he would not be state chairman. Wang Dongxing went to Beijing to transmit Mao's opinion.[8] It was then Zhou Enlai who proposed the drafting of a new constitution together with the "Politburo Standing Committee".[9] Since Mao was in Wuhan and Lin Biao in Suzhou, this meant that Chen Boda and Kang Sheng supported the decision.

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[3] General Office of the NPC Standing Committee Political Research Group, *中国宪法精释 [Interpretation of the Chinese Constitution]* (Beijing: 中国民主法制出版社 [Chinese Democracy and Rule by Law Publishing Press], 1996), 27.

[4] Dongxing Wang, *毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 : 汪东兴回忆 [Mao Zedong's Struggle with the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group: Wang Dongxing Remembers]* (Beijing: 当代中国出版社 [Contemporary China Publishing Press], 2004).

[5] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office and Jin, *周恩来传（四）[Biography of Zhou Enlai: Volume Four]*, 1774.

[6] In Qingyang and Longmen, *新发现的周恩来 [Newly Discovered Zhou Enlai]*, 208. Also in Luzhou Shui, *无产阶级文化大革命简论 [a Brief Comment on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]* (2006). In the third book, Chapter two, section three is titled: 围绕修改宪法的斗争 (The Struggle for Amending the Constitution)

[7] Gang Han, "中共历史研究的若干难点热点问题（下）[Some Difficult Issues in the Study of the History of the Communist Party of China (Two)]," *往事 [HIstory]* 16 (2005).

[8] Dongxing Wang, *汪东兴回忆：毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 [Wang Dongxing Recalls: The Struggle between Mao Zedong and the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group]* (Beijing: 当代中国出版社 [Contemporary China Publishing Press], 2004), 19.

[9] This shows that suggesting to amend the state constitution was not Zhou Enlai's plan but a joint initiative.

On 8 March, Wang Dongxing communicated Mao's wish to convene the Fourth NPC and to amend the state constitution at a Politburo meeting.[10] Mao argued that the GPCR had been going on for "a long time" and that the "restoration of government organs" and the convening of the Fourth NPC should be considered to summarize the experiences, set up and restore government at all levels, and analyse the issues of economic development and war preparedness.[11] Indeed, at this point, the revamping of the Party-state system was complete: all provinces, except for a few holdouts, had all established RCs and the State Council was the only major organ left.[12] A new state constitution could then freeze the balance of power between the different sequences of the RC, Party, revolution, and the military.

At the same time, Mao proposed changing the state organization and abolishing the state chairmanship.[13] However, he said if the Politburo members wanted it, then Lin Biao could do it.[14] The Politburo discussed Mao's opinions and agreed with them, deciding to establish a working group to analyse people's representatives and election work for the Fourth NPC[15] and to form a constitutional drafting small group.[16] This group was to first outline the main points and then finalize a draft until early April. Finally, the Politburo also decided that Zhou Enlai and Yao Wenyuan would coordinate the writing of the political report draft.

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[10] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 283.

[11] Wu, *岁月艰难：吴法宪回忆录（下卷）[Hard Years: Wu Faxian's Memoirs (Third Volume)]*, 775.

[12] Reform was enacted in June 1970. "中共中央同意国务院"关于精简合并各部、委、建立党的核心小组和革命委员会的报告"（概要） [the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Agreed with the State Council's "Report on Streamlining and Merging Ministries and Commissions, Establishing the Party's Core Group and Revolutionary Committee" (Outline)]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 22 June 1970.

[13] He did not specify, why. CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 353.

[14] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 675. This is in line with what Yu Yunshen reports. See "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]," 团结网 [Solidarity Net], updated 17 September 2015, 2015, accessed 30 March 2019, http://www.tuanjiebao.com/lishi/2015-09/17/content_29497.htm.

[15] Group members: Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, Huang Yongsheng, Xie Fuzhi, and Wang Dongxing.

[16] Its members were Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Ji Dengkui.

General Qiu Huizuo believes it was highly unorthodox for Mao to change the state organization and abolish the state chairmanship without consulting Lin, Zhou, or the Politburo.[17] He argues that with Zhou looking displeased, Lin Biao was to take up the state chairmanship, strengthening his position as Mao's successor.[18] In a private meeting with Ye Qun, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo, Wang Dongxing reiterated Mao's position that Lin could take the state chairmanship.[19] The generals were happy since for them this reflected Mao's trust in Lin Biao as his successor.[20] Lin Biao had Ye Qun tell Huang Yongsheng and Wu Faxian on 9 March that "Vice-Chairman Lin agrees to establish a state chairmanship."[21] However, Lin smelled a plot to explore his position toward Mao and the GPCR. Thus, under no circumstances could he take it up himself. Lin was in a bind: he did not want it but equally he could not defy Mao—all the same, being state chairman would lead him into a conflict with Mao (especially given Mao's treatment of Liu Shaoqi). This left Lin in an awkward position. This was not without reason: Mao sent out conflicting signals. For example, when he approved the Politburo's summary of key themes for the state constitution,[22] he signalled the position's abolishment[23] but also suggested Lin should be state chairman.[24] Subsequently a dance between Lin and Mao began that would last half a year, with Lin urging Mao to take up the chairmanship, and Mao rejecting.

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[17] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 675.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., 676. Same in Yu Yunsheng Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

[20] Wu, *岁月艰难：吴法宪回忆录（下卷）[Hard Years: Wu Faxian's Memoirs (Third Volume)]*, 776.

[21] Wang, *毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争：汪东兴回忆 [Mao Zedong's Struggle with the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group: Wang Dongxing Remembers]*.

[22] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 676.

[23] "Request for Amending the State Constitution". See Nianyi Wang and Shu He, ""设国家主席"问题论析 [Discussing and Analyzing the Issue of "Establishing the State Chairmanship"]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 224 (2000).

[24] Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

The state constitution itself was to be simpler and shorter than its 1954 predecessor.[25] Although Kang Sheng was the head of the group, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan completed most of the draft.[26] In mid-March, Kang Sheng laid down the main principles of the new state constitution.[27] As for why a new state constitution was needed, Kang mentioned three dimensions. First, the 1954 State Constitution had been transitionary with a lifespan of fifteen years. Second, the GPCR had won a great victory by fortifying the dictatorship of the proletariat and advancing Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the state. The GPCR had provided the theory and practice of "continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" that was cemented during the 9th Party Congress. Adapting the state constitution to the changed realities would ensure that it was the basis for the guiding thought. He further argued that Mao's speech from 1954 was still valid. Accordingly, a state constitution had to summarize China's historical experiences with a focus on revolution and construction; consult the other countries' state constitutions; unify democratic and socialist principles with flexibility; and adopt the method of unifying the opinions in leading organs and the opinions of the masses. Hence, the state constitution had to reflect the changing institutional nature during the GPCR.

Subsequently, Kang laid down some principles, including not changing the state constitution's structure from its 1954 predecessor and reflecting the current reality. Mao's quotations were to provide the language of the draft.[28] Regarding the armed forces, Kang proposed to add a provision on guarding against subversion and aggression, social imperialism and reactionaries and a citizen militia, and the concept of a "citizen-soldier".[29] A revolutionary innovation, the

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[25] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 676.

[26] Even though Yao Wenyuan was not part of the drafting group, he is still confirmed by several people to have been instrumental in the drafting process. This is separately recollected by Xiaonong Chen, *陈伯达：最后口述回忆 [Chen Boda: The Last Oral Recollections]* (Hong Kong: Sun Global Publishing, 2005), 372.

[27] Xu, *中华人民共和国宪法史 [Constitutional History of the People's Republic of China]*, 423.

[28] Further, it was proposed to insert Lin Biao's "three loyals" into the preamble but Kang said Mao would surely delete them.

[29] On the reinvigoration of the pre-GPCR militias, see Teiwes and Sun, *The End of the Maoist Era : Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976*, 83.

provision of "speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters" was to be added. Likewise, the subject of dictatorship was still necessary for suppressing all counter-revolutionary activities and punishing traitors.[30] The possible consequences of abolishing the state chairmanship[31] also featured in his speech. Names of local people's committees should be aligned with the RC's names. Kang further argued that procuratorates should be abolished but courts kept. Lastly, the right to strike—an expression of worker's power—should be included. Finally, all work units were instructed to finish collecting opinions regarding these fundamental principles before the end of March. Hence, in his principles, Kang Sheng first conceptualized the state constitution as the reflection of reality, which description then had to show the balance of power between the four sequences.

Events were moving fast. At the end of March, since the Fourth NPC was to convene soon, Lin's secretaries were busy preparing his speech. Regarding the state chairmanship, on 11 April, Lin, who was still in Suzhou, had his secretary transmit three opinions to Mao and the Politburo: first, he stood by his proposal that Chairman Mao should serve as state chairman. He argued that this was appropriate for the feeling within and outside the Party, both domestically and internationally. Second, regarding the question of Vice-Chairman, Lin Biao thought one could have it or not, more or fewer, and that it did not matter much. Third, Lin Biao expressed his belief that he was unfit to serve as Vice-Chairman.[32] During a Politburo

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[30] Further he asks if reactionary capitalists, rich peasants and scoundrels 坏分子 should be added to the subject of political rights deprivation 剥夺政治权利的对)? Some say: if we write scoundrels into the constitution, will the policy limits be drawn clearly 政策界限是否划得清楚? For example, rapists, of course are not good people 好分子, they are scoundrels. He proposes to fix the specific limits in a specific explanation.

[31] Indeed, some people at the meeting would want Mao to be state chairman; see Xuan Xi and Chunming Jin, *"文化大革命"简史 [a Brief History of the "Cultural Revolution"]* (Beijing: 中共党史出版社 [CCP History Publishing Press], 1996), 227. Specifically, he asks "If we don't have a chairman, how do we deal with article 42 of the 1954 constitution that says "The Chairman of the People's Republic of China commands the armed forces of the state, and is Chairman of the Council of National Defence"?"

[32] Wang, *毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争：汪东兴回忆 [Mao Zedong's Struggle with the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group: Wang Dongxing Remembers]*. ; also Jian Li, *中共历史转折关头：关键会议亲历实录*

meeting in mid-April, the three points were discussed and most agreed that Mao should be state chairman, including Jiang Qing, who said "as long as Chairman Mao is still alive, Lin Biao serving as state chairman is not good."[33] A confused Chen Boda even asked: "there is no question of Lin Biao wanting to be state chairman, right?"[34] Jiang's opposition to Lin Biao should not be misconstrued as factional fighting. This was a complex decision: everybody agreed with both Mao and Lin Biao. It made sense to centralize the state and Party positions within one person—just as in the RCs.[35] Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao, asking him to be state chairman and transmitting the Politburo's decision that agreed with Lin Biao on establishing the state chairmanship.[36] Hence, here again, the Politburo was unanimously behind the state chairmanship and wanting Mao to serve. It was Mao against the military, revolutionaries, and Zhou Enlai as the representative of the administrative state. While Mao attempted to use the new state constitution to substitute the state—and the RC—with the Party, the military naturally wanted to keep their influence as heads of the RCs. The revolutionaries were in a bind: wary of the military-led RCs they were interested in strengthening Party leadership. However, they could not openly oppose Mao's successor Lin Biao–especially given they had supported his selection. Hence, they went for both: supporting Lin's proposal and rejecting him

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[Turning Points in the History of the CCP: Key Meetings, Experiences, and Records] (Beijing: 中共中央党校出版社 [Central Party School Press], 1998), 750-51. See also Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 676.

[33] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱 : 1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 361. Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 676. Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

[34] "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

[35] Ruxin Yu, "国家政治体制建设史上的一次大倒退——1970 年四届人大的筹备与夭折 [a Great Retrogression in the History of National Political System Construction: Preparations for the 4th National People's Congress in 1970 and Its Abortion]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 597 (2007).

[36] Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

as state chairman. While this positioned them against Mao, it effectively left them in a shroud of ambiguity.

Upon receiving the report, Mao's secretary called Lin's staff and transmitted that Mao had laughed, saying he would not be state chairman but Dong Biwu could.[37] Supposedly, Mao did not think it was a big deal. In November 1968, he had approved a Notice allowing Dong to receive ambassadorial letters of credence.[38] Likewise, Mao said the peasant Chen Yonggui[39] or Gong Chenbing 工晨兵 could do it.[40] Hence, the state chairmanship could be easily dealt with because, unlike during Liu Shaoqi's early days, it had become an empty position without value, especially with the destruction of the state during the GPCR. However, the issue continued to linger on,[41] and eventually two draft versions of the state constitution with and without the "state chairmanship" were written.[42]

In mid-July, a committee for amending the state constitution was formally established.[43] It comprised 57 people with Mao as Chairman and Lin Biao as Vice-Chairman and Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan as main drafters. An inaugural meeting lasting for five days from 17 to 22 July followed the committee's formation.[44] They discussed three issues:

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[37] 291 Li, *中共历史转折关头：关键会议亲历实录 [Turning Points in the History of the CCP: Key Meetings, Experiences, and Records]*; CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 734.

[38] *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 214. See also: Zhen, *毛泽东同志在无产阶级文化大革命中 [Comrade Mao Zedong in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]*.

[39] Chen, *陈伯达：最后口述回忆 [Chen Boda: The Last Oral Recollections]*, 378.

[40] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 677.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Zhang, *毛家湾纪实：林彪秘书回忆录 [Records from Maojiawan: Lin Biao's Secretary Remembers]*, 384.

[43] See Xu, *中华人民共和国宪法史 [Constitutional History of the People's Republic of China]*, 270. Zhang however writes that it was established on July 20. Jinfan Zhang, *中国宪法史 [the History of the Chinese Constitution]* (Beijing: 中国法制出版社 [China Legal System Publishing Press], 2016), 372.

[44] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976（下卷）[Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 380. Fifty-three people attended it at Beijing's Jingxi Hotel. Mao, Lin Biao, Liu Bocheng, and Xie Fuzhi did not attend.

first, the reasons for amending the state constitution, its guiding thought, and the process of amending it. They finished two constitutional drafts, one with and without the "state chairmanship," reflecting the continued confusion within the Politburo.[45]

Zhou Enlai's speech laid out the ideas behind the committee and the meeting. The task was to render the state constitution simple, clear, and short so it was easy to understand, and workers, peasants, and soldiers could memorize it. The new two drafts had 60 articles and 6,000 characters, and 30 articles with 4,000 characters, respectively.[46] The second issue he mentioned was that the old state constitution should be taken to the masses for discussion, and opinions collected.[47] This was to be capped off with convening the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee and the Fourth NPC from 15 to 24 September. Its delegates should be chosen through discussion among the masses. Subsequently, he also mentioned that the delegates could consider not establishing the state chairmanship.[48] Finally, he asked the committee to draft a state constitution with 30 articles to give to Mao and Lin for further deliberation.[49] Kang Sheng also spoke, touching on four issues: first, from March until July, they had already written eight constitutional drafts, of which six did not set up the "state chairmanship". Further, there were many comrades in the localities who wanted to have a state chairman and argued that Mao should take the position. The Politburo agreed. However, when reported to Mao, he said he did not want to be state chairman, and that "people should not be the reason for establishing

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[45] Li, *中共历史转折关头：关键会议亲历实录 [Turning Points in the History of the CCP: Key Meetings, Experiences, and Records]*, 734.

[46] The old state constitution comprised 106 articles, with roughly 9,000 characters.

[47] See for example Shanghai Electronics Factory Party History Editorial Small Group, ed., *中共上海电机厂党史大事记（1949-1989）[Events in the History of the CCP in Shanghai Electronics Factory (1949-1989)]* (Shanghai: 中共上海电机厂委员会 [Shanghai Electronics Factory Party Committee], 1991), 144.

[48] Zhou Enlai's Speech at the Northeast and Southwest Group Meeting of the Plenary Session of the Drafting Committee of the Central Committee for Amending the Constitution, July 18, 1970 cited in CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office and Jin, *周恩来传（四）[Biography of Zhou Enlai: Volume Four]*, 1779.

[49] For example, Zhang Jianglin, deputy head of the Qinghai RC, proposed to not set up a NPC Standing Committee

positions".[50] Second, there would just be two types of ownership of production. Third, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee was to be the commander and deputy-commander-in-chief. Fourth, Mao had asked to insert a provision for allowing workers to "strike" and to oppose "bureaucratism". Since Mao was unwilling to look at a draft of 60 articles, a compressed version was to have 30 articles.

Revolution pervaded the drafting process. First, in terms of content, it was included in the opposition to bureaucratism and inclusion of the right to "strike". Second, it was visible in the draft's short and simple form: even the uneducated and unskilled rebels and peasants were supposed to discuss and understand it. Third, with Kang, Zhang, and Yao in charge, its main drafters were staunch revolutionaries. Up until this point in the drafting, the state constitution was therefore profoundly revolutionary and there was no clash in sight. It neither mirrored the conversion of revolution to become part of the Party's institutional structure nor the Party's substitution of the RC. To this extent, it was a result of "revolution" only and did not attempt to freeze the balance of power between the four sequences of revolution, Party, RC, and military. What did the other actors do? The military and its RCs played no big role in the actual drafting work, instead zooming in on the issue of state chairmanship and key wording.

Indeed, conflict erupted then over specific slogans. Two more problems connected to the preamble erupted. First, it had to mention Mao, which naturally entailed an assessment.[51] While including Mao was a necessity, the question was how. A point of contention was the "three adjectives" of "genius, innovative, comprehensive" and the theory of "genius". This initially came from Lin Biao's Foreword to the Second Edition of the "Quotations of Chairman Mao" and was therefore connected to him; any form of deletion had to be understood as a criticism of his position. Previously included in the drafts for the political report and Party

[50] See also Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 678.

[51] Wang, *汪东兴回忆：毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 [Wang Dongxing Recalls: The Struggle between Mao Zedong and the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group]*, 18.

Constitution at the 9th Party Congress, Mao, however, deleted them. Reflecting on this in September 1971, Mao added that before the Congress, they were "needed". However, after it, they were no longer necessary since unity had been established. Apparently, this had not reached Lin's office. However, General Wu Faxian wanted to add them against the opposition of Kang Sheng and Zhang Chunqiao.[52] He also wanted to insert the sentence "Mao Zedong Thought is the guiding policy of all work of the State Council" into the draft.[53] Wu and Zhang fought over this issue, with Zhang "denying" that Mao was a genius, [54] calling it "sarcasm" and even commenting that Khrushchev had called himself a genius.[55] Chen Boda and Wu Faxian retorted that those who did not want to call Chairman Mao a "genius" were denigrating him, his "Thought,"[56] and Lin Biao.[57] Lin Biao told Wu Faxian that he responded well by "grabbing" Zhang Chunqiao's "tail".[58] They also informed Zhou Enlai.[59] Zhang himself was in a difficult position. If he inserted the three adjectives, Mao would be furious; if he did not insert them, Lin Biao would be angry.[60] Wedged between two powerful people, the current Chairman and his successor, he chose Mao. This put him in opposition to Chen Boda, who tilted towards Lin Biao and Ye Qun after the 9th Party Congress.[61]

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[52] Ibid., 155.

[53] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 535.

[54] Chen, *陈伯达：最后口述回忆 [Chen Boda: The Last Oral Recollections]*, 373.

[55] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 535. Also, Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 684.

[56] Wang, *毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争：汪东兴回忆 [Mao Zedong's Struggle with the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group: Wang Dongxing Remembers]*.

[57] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 684.

[58] Ibid.

[59] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976（下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 385.

[60] Yonglie Ye, *张春桥传 [Biography of Zhang Chunqiao]* (Beijing: 作家出版社 [Writers Publishing House], 1993), 251.

[61] Fei Xia, "陈伯达为什么投靠林彪 [Why Did Chen Boda Turn to Lin Biao?]," *世纪桥 [Century Bridge]*, no. 9 (2005).

The second dispute involved Chen Boda and Zhang Chunqiao who argued over the formulation "The Chinese People's Liberation Army under the direct command of Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Lin, personally created and led by the great leader Chairman Mao Zedong" for an editorial. Chen Boda wanted to delete "Chairman Mao and" since this was a new slogan not aligned with common practice, but Zhang refused. Mao sided with Chen. However, one year later, during his Southern travels, he would rhetorically ask if he, who had created and led the PLA, could not command it?[62] Hence, for various reasons, the generals on the Politburo and Chen Boda were opposed to Zhang Chunqiao, while Zhang quite understood how Mao was feeling regarding the spectre of military control and the "genius".

Zhang's position was aligned with the situation in the provinces and localities. As I showed in the last chapter, the re-establishment of Party organizations led to a retreat of the military. Already in motion, including the "three adjectives" and the "genius" would signal strengthening the military, and going against the trend of marginalizing it by strengthening the Party. Not that they did not apply to Mao; rather, they had to be discarded because they encapsulated military power. Moreover, the Party's organizational and ideological takeover of the RC meant a loss of military power. With the military in retreat in the localities, rhetoric had to follow suit and de-emphasize the military's role in governance. However, for Wu Faxian and others to give up on the "three adjectives" would mean for them to surrender a power they had only just achieved. The most favourable interpretation of the dispute is that Wu Faxian and the others wanted to show their loyalty to Lin Biao and were merely ignorant, whereas the least favourable would paint this dispute as a power grab. Instead of assessing the empirical reality and moving alongside it, they blamed Zhang Chunqiao and elevated this dispute to a question of line, both misreading and upsetting Mao in the process. More importantly, their insistence on the "genius" and the "three adjectives" contradicted the very reason why Mao had chosen

[62] Gao, *晚年周恩来 [The Late Zhou Enlai]*, 162.

Lin Biao as his successor: his obedience. If his subordinates acted against Lin, this not only reflected badly on him but also undermined Mao's confidence in his loyalty because he could never be sure whether Lin manipulated him or not.

In mid-August, the Politburo passed the constitutional draft.[63] Before the meeting, Ye Qun called Chen Boda and Huang Yongsheng and had them prepare for a struggle against Zhang Chunqiao.[64] Zhou read the draft line by line, even telling everyone to "listen closely".[65] However, everybody agreed with the draft.[66] Lin Biao thought the fight was not over—rather, it would continue.[67] The question of genius was then shelved to resurface at the Second Plenum.

A meeting on 22 August[68] represented the final step towards the new state constitution.[69] This meeting signified a change from a "revolutionary" draft to an "administrative" draft that reflected the balance of power between the four sequences. There, Kang Sheng made a speech elaborating what comments from the grassroots were included in the draft.[70] He made four main points.[71] First, the PLA as the "people's power" was inserted in response to a comment by Fujian province.[72] Second, under the banner of making prominent proletarian politics, Article 11 added the "three-in-one-combination"[73] in the form of military, cadre, and mass and

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[63] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976（下卷）[Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 385.

[64] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 685.

[65] Ibid.

[66] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976（下卷）[Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 385.

[67] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 685.

[68] 51 people were present at this meeting, with Xie Fuzhi, Liu Bocheng having asked for leave, Huang Yongsheng and Ji Dengkui having taken over their duty.

[69] This speech is titled: 康生在中央修改宪法起草委员会全体会议上的讲话记录 cited in CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, Pang, and Jin, *毛泽东传：1893-1976（第六卷）[Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1976 (Volume Six)]*, 2538.

[70] Cheng Shiqing 程世清 (Jiangxi revolutionary committee chairman) said that 12 million people in Jiangxi had participated (population of 25 million).

[71] In the discussion below I will just highlight the key changes.

[72] This change was brought forward by Fujian.

[73] This is not in the final constitution of 1975.

old, middle-aged, and young representatives. Further, it inserted opposition to bureaucratism, linking up with workers peasants, and the labouring masses, and the demand to implement the principle of simplification.[74] Article 15 added that "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is at all times a fighting force, and simultaneously a working force, and a production force". Finally, fourth, regarding state organs, the drafters deleted the sentence "the National People's Congress executes the state's legislative power" since legislative power rested with the CCP.[75] It is then curious that the state constitution's key clauses regarding the military were the result of comments. The drafting process was controlled by revolutionaries who would draft it according to their own ideas. Here, theorists Zhang Chungqiao and Yao Wenyuan clearly were in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the military. Likewise, they were simply more qualified than anybody else in the leadership. However, when confronted with the reality of RCs, military-associated ideas were included in the draft. The balance of power in the state constitution's text was then indeed a reflection of the drafting process and the four sequences. Here, Zhang and Yao could not ignore the institutional reality of military-led RCs and the "three-in-one-combination". Likewise, without the collection of comments, the draft would have looked very different. The defiance of structural arrangement at the grassroots was mirrored in another way at the elite level. Here, the Lin's generals' disinterest in the drafting process resulted in their focus on inserting Lin Biao's catchphrases. Hence, while the state constitution lays down a balance of power between the different sequences, this balance was established in the process leading up to defining the arrangement. Here, the military was disaggregated into Lin's people at the top and the RCs at the grassroots, a reality the revolutionaries in control of the drafting process could not disregard.

[74] The demand to insert this clause, as Kang said, came from "all of them". The linkage with workers and peasants and all laboring masses was in the original draft already.
[75] This issue was pointed out by Chen Boda.

It was the issue of state chairmanship that turned out to be contentious however.[76] Here, interesting alliances formed. Here, Zhou said that the masses wanted Chairman Mao to be state chairman, with Lin Biao serving as Vice-Chairman.[77] Instead, Zhou proposed for the head of the NPC's Standing Committee and its deputy to receive diplomatic envoys. Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Zhou, and Lin Biao had proposed this to Mao who had tentatively agreed.[78] Everyone at the meeting and in the top leadership was for it, except Mao himself.[79] There was no factional dispute. It was not a dispute between Lin and Mao but between Mao and everybody else.[80] Indeed, the entire Politburo including Lin Biao's allies and the "Left" surrounding Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao approved of establishing the state chairmanship. Zhou Enlai himself advocated establishing the state chairmanship many times, the latest being on 18 August 1970, a few days before the start of the Second Plenum. During the Second Plenum this resulted in two constitutional drafts: one included it, the other did not. Zhang Chunqiao had prepared both. This again shows the confusion in the top leadership.

Regarding Mao's own thinking, the abolition of the state chairmanship was in line with what was conspiring in the provinces and localities: unifying Party and state in the form of the RCs.[81] However, the RCs did not live up to their promise and were, as the result of a chain of events, taken over by the military. As shown in the last chapter, this was one of the main reasons for

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[76] While the formulation "Mao Zedong Thought is the guiding policy of all work of the State Council" made it into the final draft, the "three adjectives" did not.

[77] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 386-87. The dispute surrounding the state chairmanship was unknown to most delegates, so they could easily advocate for it. Liang Shuming, who was a member of the CPPCC argued that this was inappropriate, and China should have a state chairman. Who should this person be, that was another question. See for example Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 410.

[78] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 678.

[79] This is even mentioned in Zhou Enlai's chronicles. See CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 386-87.

[80] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 676-77.

[81] Yang, "历史不可信，真理谁人知——评《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》 [Who Knows the Truth If History Is Not Credible --- Comments on "Mao Zedong's Struggle with Lin Biao's Anti-Revolutionary Group"]."

the Party's re-establishment. Revolution had moved from the RC to the Party, which had started to engulf and swallow the RC. Thus, the Party absorbed proportionally more revolutionaries than the RCs and represented the "three-in-one-combination" more stringently than the military-dominated RC. Likewise, revolutionaries and mass representatives wanted to join the Party, not the RC because that was where power was located. This resulted in a slow undermining of the RCs. The RCs were weakened, and real power vested in the reformed Party organizations, which controlled the RCs both politically and organizationally. As explained in the last chapter, the results of this were patchy, with military cadres taking up leadership positions within the Party. Given the overlap, this turned the Party organizations into administrative organs and the RCs into governance organs, and converted the meaning of revolution.

Just as with the "three adjectives" and the title of "genius," the repudiation of the state chairmanship meant rejecting the RC's dominance as a state organ with the military as its principal support. At the same time, it acknowledged its uselessness and the Party's supreme dominance. In this situation, the state chairmanship represented the state and reaffirmed the very organ and military-led system that was to be pushed back. Its abolishment therefore signaled a power shift from the state to the Party. While the Party had not formed durable Party committees rather than PCSGs by 1970, uncertainty regarding the Party-RC relationship was still rampant. As the constitutional draft shows, the leadership demoted RCs to administrative organs and shifted power to the Party. However, in the absence of Party committees to exert proper leadership over RCs, the only idea and person that could hold China together was "Mao". The constitutional draft was therefore a flight to stability and an essentially backward-looking document. I outline this below.

Section 2: Analysing the 1970 Constitutional Draft

The version that had come into existence at the end of August 1970 became the final version of a state constitution to be promulgated at the Fourth NPC planned for autumn 1970. Itself and its relationship with its final version has never been explored, arguably because it does not "exist" since it was never formally passed. This however renders it important: the 1970 final constitutional draft arrests the interaction of the four sequences characterized by their mutual conversion until 1970.

The Party's importance pervades the draft. Its presence turns the RCs from a revolutionary organization and an invention of the masses into an administrative organ under its leadership. Likewise, "revolution" shifted from the RC to the Party. This was in line with the leadership's thinking spanning back to the January Revolution. Rebels were unskilled administrators but had to grasp power anyway. Shifting power from RCs to the Party effectively meant giving more power to rebels. It is therefore no surprise that the 1970 constitutional draft and its 1975 final version focus on the Party rather than RCs. In both documents, the Party plays the central role and the RC as an innovation of the masses is relegated to serving it. As the previous chapter and the empirical evidence suggests, with the resurgence of Party organizations the RC was transformed into an administrative organ. The reinstitution of Party upset the results of the 1967 January Revolution and shifted power away from the RC. The constitutional draft mirrors these tensions between the Party and the state, and their relationship with the masses in both its preamble and general program. Underpinned by the military's conversion of the Party from a "revolutionary" into an "administrative" Party and the massive increase in Party departments, the constitutional draft converted revolution and, though bathed in revolutionary rhetoric, signifies a flight to bureaucratic stability.

This starts with a general structure similar to the 1954 State Constitution. Both the constitutional draft and the 1954 State Constitution are divided into the five parts of Preamble,

General Principles, Structure of the State, Rights and Duties of the Citizens, and National Flag, the National Emblem, and the Capital. However, in terms of the number of articles and the relative weight of each part, there are still enormous differences. The preamble is not simply interesting for its content but also for its form. Thus, unlike its 1975 version that can be divided into eight paragraphs, the 1970 draft comprised 18 paragraphs with 933 characters.[82] This is because single sentences are positioned throughout the preamble to highlight key tenets. Forming a new paragraph entirely, these sentences introduce ideas central to the GPCR. The draft (and the 1975 version) comprises 30 articles[83] and has 4,294 characters[84] and therefore present a significant downgrading both in terms of importance and the possibility of establishing meaning and detail. The length of the constitutional draft aligns with ideas regarding simplification to abolish bureaucratic (legal) language and staff reduction, and was therefore a hallmark of "revolution".

In the preamble, the first sentence reads "The Chinese people, under the leadership of the great leader Chairman Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China, after a long period of armed struggle, finally won the great victory of the Great People's Revolution in 1949 and established the People's Republic of China." This sentence clarifies Mao's relationship with the CCP. Mao's appearance in the first sentence is unprecedented. While the CCP's leadership was emphasized in the 1954 State Constitution, this emphasis on Mao being the leader as a "great leader" 伟大领袖 relating to the CCP but not embodied by it, was one core idea of the GPCR. Mao's transcendence of the CCP to become the undisputed leader in China and also establishing himself as the institution that precedes and supersedes the CCP has its roots in the GPCR. The sentence also establishes the superiority of the CCP over the state. Mao *and* the CCP led an armed struggle and built the Chinese state. Mao's leadership and the CCP precede

[82] The 1975 State Constitution's preamble would have 800 characters.
[83] For comparison, the 1954 State Constitution had 106 articles.
[84] The 1975 State Constitution is even shorter with 4,180 characters. The 1954 State Constitution had 9,542 characters.

the Chinese state and are therefore ontologically prior and hierarchically superior. Likewise, in the relationship between "Mao" and the "CCP," Mao is superior. The first sentence sets the tone for the entire constitutional draft in which the position of the Party is constantly emphasized. It encapsulates all issues needed to understand the GPCR: the relationship between Mao and the Party, Mao's and the Party's place in the Chinese political system, and a conception of history that rejects cyclicality in favor of linearity by linking the PRC's establishment in 1949 to the GPCR as a realigning of Party and state.

Party principles are inserted in the later paragraphs. Echoing the "Fifty-Characters on Party-Building Policy" China had become a nation "full of vigor and vitality". This concept echoes the Party's power over staff. It also transforms Mao's words into Party policy and elevates him further. Following this, the constitutional draft lays down the theory of "continuous revolution". The concept builds the foundation of the "revolution" sequence, and the RCs and Party. Resulting in weak institutions, it shifts power from authority to the people. In the struggle against the restoration of capitalism, the preamble states "all positive factors" are mobilized to "overcome all difficulties". In the GPCR, this meant the "sparking" of the masses for socialist construction and production.[85] Mobilization for the sake of production and socialist construction was connected and embedded into the basic understanding of "grasp revolution, promote production".[86] The phrase "overcoming all difficulties" referred to the ability to overcome difficulties in economic and cultural construction to "improve people's material and cultural life" and "suppress all counter-revolutionary elements". In this context, "continuous revolution," class struggle, and mobilization serve the ultimate aim of socialist construction. It refers to the liberation of the people, the engagement in economic construction, and the rooting

[85] See for example "正确对待群众 [Correctly Treating the Masses]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 28 June 1967.

[86] "进一步贯彻毛主席"抓革命，促生产"的伟大方针 [Further Implementing Chairman Mao's Great Policy of "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production"]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 20 September 1967.

out enemies. “Continuous revolution” therefore is the foundational ideological element that structures the preamble and the institutions outlined in the general program.

Mao Zedong as a person and idea is at its core. The next five paragraphs detail the hierarchy of the PRC’s leadership. Naturally, Mao comes first, followed by the CCP. The theories of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought link both (third paragraph). The fourth paragraph further elaborates the role of Mao Zedong Thought. It points out that it becomes the “engine of history’s creation” when the people are “armed” with it. This reflects not only the need to study Mao Zedong Thought, but also stresses the need for a cultural and ideational consensus surrounding a set of principles put forward by the institution of Mao Zedong. It is just in the final paragraph that the importance of the military is stressed. In the draft, the military is understood as the “pillar”. This addition inserts the military directly into the constitutional draft and confirms its position within the RCs, while solidifying the Party’s leadership over the military.

The next paragraph, along with Mao Zedong, inserts Lin Biao as a Vice-Chairman, and, equally important, the CCP Central Committee under which China would uphold the banner of Mao Zedong Thought. This phraseology is aligned with the Party’s. More significant than “Lin Biao” is the addition of the phrase “CCP Central Committee”. Mao and Lin take the lead over China and its people through their position in the Central Committee and not for the reason of being the founder of the PRC or the military. Mao leads because he is part of the institution he so presumptuously transcends. The recalibration and reconstruction of the Party after the 9th Party Congress is therefore acknowledged as key. The unity of state and Party with the Party in the leading position, detached from the larger-than-life figures of Lin Biao and Mao Zedong, is stressed. As I showed in the last chapter, 1970 was the first year in which Party construction kicked into full gear. It was also the year in which the retreat of the military became clear everywhere. At the same time, Mao’s stature is reduced, as evidenced in how he is described.

While earlier in the preamble he is a "great leader," in this paragraph he is Chairman Mao Zedong (and not even Chairman Mao as in paragraph four). This transforms Mao from an idea and institution into a human being that can be placed on par and mentioned together with Lin Biao. There are therefore different "Maos" in the constitutional draft that correspond to different contexts.

With the leadership and the main institutions set, the next paragraph outlined a political plan. This section thus put forward political aims: the "three revolutionary movements" comprising class struggle, production struggle, and scientific experimentation; the solidification and strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship and the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class; the revolutionary united front; being independent, relying on oneself, hard struggle, going all out and aiming high to faster, better, and more economically build socialism. This paragraph therefore reiterates the importance of the mobilization of the masses for production and socialist construction. The preamble ends with an elaboration of the international situation.

Hence, in the preamble we already have all the ingredients of the balance of power between Party, RC, military, and revolution present. The Party towered over the state and its administrative RCs and the military was identified as the state's backbone and "pillar". Revolution showed itself as "continuous revolution" and also provided the vocabulary of the draft as well as determining its length and simplicity.

The general program elaborates the preamble and transforms it into concrete institutions. It continues to solidify the CCP's dominance over the state and diminished the state and its RCs' importance. Article 1 determines the nature of the state, laying it down as a "socialist state of the proletarian dictatorship led by the working class (through the Chinese Communist Party) and based on the alliance of workers and peasants as the foundation". It includes a bracket clarifying the CCP's position as representative of the workers. It spells the CCP out as the

mode through which the working class enacts its leadership. Further, the article also puts forward the idea of "dictatorship of the proletariat". While it appears several times in the preamble, it is within the general program that is being defined. The concept is exclusive, setting workers and poor and lower-middle class peasants as the masters of political power. This provides the rationale for putting the Party in charge of the state, distinguishes the former from the latter, and is linked with Article 12, which states: "The proletariat must exercise all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture." The article pits the proletariat against the capitalist bourgeoisie, extending the struggle into all areas. Culture includes education, literature and the arts, and scientific research. As I showed in the last chapter, the proletariat did not express itself through the RCs that were predominantly military-controlled rather than the Party. Hence, here the article speaks to the Party. Additionally, with Article 15 establishing Party control over the PLA, the "three-in-one-combination" shifted from the RCs to Party organizations.

Article 2 resolves the head of state issue. It states "Chairman Mao Zedong is the great leader of the people of all nationalities, the head of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the supreme commander-in-chief of the whole army. Vice-Chairman Lin Biao is Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor, and deputy commander of the whole army. Mao Zedong Thought is the guideline for all work in the country." Here, Mao again is transformed into an institution and a person by separating the "great leader" from his chairmanship. It describes Mao as the "head" 元首 of the proletarian dictatorship. This expression cannot be confused with "head of state" 国家元首. In the draft, most of the functions that are the head of state's duty are executed by the NPC, including appointing ambassadors and receiving foreign dignitaries. Hence, Mao is the "head" without having a proper constitutional function.[87] The

[87] Yu, "国家政治体制建设史上的一次大倒退——1970 年四届人大的筹备与夭折 [a Great Retrogression in the History of National Political System Construction: Preparations for the 4th National People's Congress in 1970 and Its Abortion]."

insertion of Mao Zedong Thought as the "guiding policy" of all work reiterates the preamble's focus on Mao Zedong Thought as both government structure and a way to conduct work and live life.

For being the principal state organization and result of the January Revolution, stipulations regarding RCs are just found very late in the constitutional draft, in Articles 21 to 23. "The local People's Congresses at various levels are the local organs of state power" (Article 21). Article 21 also stipulates: "The People's Congresses of provinces and municipalities directly under the Central Government are elected for a term of five years. The People's Congresses of prefectures, cities and counties are elected for a term of three years. The People's Congresses of rural people's communes and towns are elected for a term of two years." This article is mainly theoretical. Since 1966, the local People's Congresses had conducted no meetings and therefore did not fulfill their function in the countryside. It was just in October 1977 that the Centre decided to restore them.

In Article 22, RCs are mentioned for the first time, being described as the "permanent organs" of the local People's Congresses and "local governments". The RCs supplanted the former People's Councils, so that local RCs are both the people's government, the executive organ of local People's Congresses, and the administrative organs of the local state. The constitutional draft does not clarify the difference between local People's Congress and RCs' functions. Although theoretical, making RCs subject to other organs further diminished their importance in the revolutionary setup. Article 23 outlines their tasks: local RCs "ensure the execution of laws and decrees in their respective areas; lead the socialist revolution and socialist construction in their respective areas; examine and approve local economic plans, budgets and final accounts; maintain revolutionary order; and safeguard the rights of citizens". Political work was the lifeline of all economic work (Article 10), the state was to "grasp revolution, promote production" as well as promote "war preparedness". In creating RCs, the military had

taken over this task. Setting the PLA as both a "working team" and a "production team" (Article 15), the article differentiates between promoting production and providing an alternative source of administration. RCs under the military are therefore an administrative organ under the leadership of the Party.

Article 11 codifies this organ's function. RC staff was required to "lively study and use Mao Zedong Thought," focus on "proletarian politics," "oppose bureaucratism," and "intimately link workers and peasants with all laboring masses". RCs also had to implement the principle of simple administration, and a three-in-one-combination of "military, cadre, masses" and "old, middle-aged, and young". This is further compounded in Article 13, which stipulates that there must be a "political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness". First used by Mao in 1957, this was to be helpful for the leadership of the Party over the state and consolidating the proletarian dictatorship.[88] The main methods to achieve this were the "Four Great Freedoms" of "speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters" first championed in 1957 by democratic parties.[89] Together, these represented an expression of revolution and "big democracy" superior to electoral representation.

The constitutional draft separates Mao from the Party and outlines the Party's position over the state. Mao is both and agent and the driving force behind the Party.[90] Faced in 1970 with weak administrative capabilities of both Party and RCs, Mao as both person and idea becomes the only institution capable of holding together China. The constitutional draft then freezes the

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[88] In Mao Zedong, "一九五七年夏季的形势 [the Situation in the Summer of 1957]," in *毛泽东选集 第五卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume Five]*, ed. 中共中央毛泽东选集出版委员会 [Committee for Publishing Mao Zedong's Selected Works] (Beijing: 人民出版社 [People's Publishing Press], 1977 [1957]).

[89] Zhiyuan Cui, "毛泽东文革理论的得失与"现代性"的重建 [the Gains and Losses of Mao Zedong's Theory of Cultural Revolution and the Reconstruction of "Modernity"]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 117 (1997).

[90] Apter writes that the CCP is a "state-in-becoming" with Mao as its driving force. See David E. Apter, "Discourse as Power: Yan'an and the Chinese Revolution," in *New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution*, ed. Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).

conversion of the four sequences that emerged out of the January Revolution. It includes revolutionary forces and the military in the state while emphasizing the simplicity of administration. It also outlines the utter neglect of state organs in favour of strong Party leadership and thereby demotes RCs to mere administrative organs serving the "revolutionary" Party. Power was to reside in the Party rather than in the RCs, shifting to the Party organizations that embodied a higher number of mass representatives and were nominally and structurally detached from the military. The constitutional draft did not merely weaken the RCs but also the military while establishing the revolutionary centre in the Party. From an organizational and ideological perspective, the constitutional draft therefore clarifies the Party's dominance over RCs and shows its encroachment over them.

Conclusion

How did the four sequences of Party, RC, military, and revolution launched by the January Revolution onto a path-dependent journey characterized by conversion enter the 1975 State Constitution? Based on an analysis of the 1970 constitutional draft and its drafting process, this chapter showed how the sequences were frozen in the draft.

Two issues come out of this investigation. First, the importance of the drafting process and the idea that the state constitution freezes a balance of power between different sequences of actors and institutions. As I have shown, this is precisely what the drafting process did. While the "revolution" sequence initially controlled the form and content and revolutionaries were in charge of drafting it, in the end they still had to succumb to the dominance of the military-led RCs. This led to the insertion of the military and the "three-in-one-combination" that characterized the RCs. At the elite level, the revolutionaries could hold their ground against Lin Biao's generals, who weaponized slogans to support their commander and enhance his importance. While they locked horns over wording, they supported each other by advocating

for the state chairmanship against Mao's objections. In the drafting process, the interaction between the Party, the military, RCs, and revolution therefore is multi-faceted and includes cooperation, struggle, and co-option.

The draft itself then mirrors the balance of power between the four sequences. The leadership did not accord RCs a particular place in the make-up of the state, even subjecting them to oversight by non-functioning People's Congresses. Their relationship with the RC was conflicting: they were to supervise them but, leaving aside the uncomfortable fact that they were dysfunctional, they would have not been able to do so—because of the Party's role in forming the core of RCs. Why were they then included? Given that RCs were new institutions, including the People's Congresses increased popular acceptance of RCs. However, more importantly, their inclusion showed that the RC moved into a position that resembled ordinary pre-GPCR governing bodies. People would then intuitively equate the RCs with pre-GPRC governing bodies.

However, the key characteristic of the draft is the position of the Party. From 1968 onward, Party organizations came to represent the "three-in-one-combination" better than RCs. The Party's reconstruction altered the relationship between the Party and the military-led RCs, pushing both back and placing them under the Party's leadership. Given the thrust to substitute the RC with the Party, the conversion of both "revolutionary" RCs and Party into "administrative" organs is then the main takeaway from this draft. It was then decidedly "revolutionary" in its frame and content, but not in its substance. Here, revolution had been converted to include the military and support an increasingly strong bureaucracy in the Party and state.

There was one problem however: the development of administrative departments and other bureaucratic divisions was still ongoing and the overall bureaucratic power of Party and state extremely weak. Even though the Party was building itself up organizationally, its leadership

had not yet been fully institutionalized at all levels—for example, by 1970, Party committees had not yet been restored. One result of this was the emphasis on "Mao" as symbol and person. The lack of the Party and RC's authority together with a shift away from the military required a focus on the only institution able to unite the country unopposed: Mao and his "Thought". The individual in this understanding was subject to larger historical forces and institutions united under the banner of Mao Zedong Thought. This was true except for Mao who transcended institutions and became a living symbol. Mao was both a transcendent being and very much alive.[91] The individual was then connected to the collective, elevated and deconstructed, both as a symbol and as a human. By focusing on Mao and the Party and relegating the RC to a statist role, the 1970 constitutional draft therefore turned back the clock to a pre-GPCR time. The draft was then far from being a revolutionary document, opting instead for the safety of a proven system.

Looking back, the "revolutionization of the state" was a failure, rooted in the insistence on the Party's reconstruction.[92] The conversion of revolution from attacking to supporting bureaucracy was a consequence of decisions made during the critical juncture of the January Revolution. While the Party was a useful short-term vehicle for Mao to balance against the military and the RCs, its reconstruction and absorption of military cadres and rebels eventually converted revolution.[93] This path was locked in and made irreversible during the 9th Party Congress in April 1969. The Congress introduced the antagonism between the Party and the RC, Mao's elevation over the Party that would come to fruition in the constitutional draft, and the conversion of revolution. One year later, the Second Plenum in August 1970 led to a

[91] Regarding this, see Stuart R. Schram, "Party Leader or True Ruler? Foundations and Significance of Mao Zedong's Personal Power," in *Foundations and Limits of State Power in China*, ed. Stuart R. Schram (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1987).

[92] As Young argues, the new emphasis on the Party's superiority could not "be reconciled with the attack on them by the masses in the Cultural Revolution" Young, "Party Building and the Search for Unity," 48.

[93] As Zheng argues, the Party was "not much different from what it had been before as far as the Party organization was concerned." Shiping Zheng, *Party Vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 146.

quickening of the military's marginalization. Eventually, these interactions between the different sequences would lead to a 1975 State Constitution that was to be very different from the 1970 draft and reflected a new balance of power. Based on prevailing trends of the sequences one would then expect an even bigger role for the Party, a negligible RC, and the exclusion of the military. The biggest change would happen to the idea of revolution: the reinforcement of its conversion meant it was to be rooted in an increasingly strong Party and state administration. This is exactly what happened in the period until 1975 and this reinforcement then defines the final text of the 1975 State Constitution.

Chapter VI: Reinforcing Sequences – the 9th Party Congress and its Second Plenum

Introduction

This chapter builds on the last chapter's conclusion and examines the growing institutional rivalry between the Party and the RC, the shift of revolution from the RC to the Party's organs, and the conversion of revolution from opposing bureaucracy to incorporating it. The 9th Party Congress and its Second Plenum treated in this chapter consolidated the path-dependent process of the four sequences' conversion.

The 9th Party Congress formalized Party-building as a bulwark against RCs and Mao's own role. It established the Party's power over the state by integrating the revolutionaries into the Central Party's corset and criticizing the military. Even though the Congress affirmed "continuous revolution" and absorbed scores of revolutionaries, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan were sidelined. Indeed, combined with the absorption of the RCs' military leaders it signified the victory of institutions over personalities and the campaign-like style of mass "revolution," and shifted the meaning of "continuous revolution" from denoting revolution *against* institutions to revolution *within* them. Curiously, the inclusion of outsiders then converted both "revolution" (from destroying structures to supporting them) and the "Party" (from "revolutionary" to "administrative"). The 9th Party Congress is therefore critical for understanding the dynamic of the GPCR and the changing relationship between the Party, revolution, the military, and the RCs.

Meanwhile, the Congress thrust the politically unsavvy military into an awkward position of power. At the First Plenum following the Congress, Mao warned against the danger of a military bureaucracy, underscoring the need to push back against the military-controlled state

and its RCs and speeding up the construction of Party organizations. As the Party's rebuilding gathered steam after the Congress, by 1970 the military was already on its way out. However, the Second Plenum showed that it remained a disruptive force. As I demonstrate in this chapter, the large-scale criticism of the essentially powerless revolutionaries showed Mao that the military refused to succumb to the Party's primacy and accept their relative loss of power. Chen Boda's fall, a campaign to study Mao's works to unify thinking, an emphasis on building Party committees at all levels, and a reorganization of the military culminated in Lin Biao's death in September 1971.

If the Party Congress subdued the revolutionaries, the Second Plenum definitively broke the military's power. Mao re-established the primacy of the Party over all other organizations and put his focus on institution-building. The Congress and its plenum therefore had a significant effect on signaling Party-building as the correct political line and turning the revolution's focus from achieving "continuous revolution" to consolidating it. Military and revolutionary forces had to succumb to the Party's organizational corset. However, in 1969 and 1970, this corset did not exist. In this situation of a weakening military and a yet unstable Party organization, Mao both as person and symbol was needed more than ever. He and his "Thought" transcended both the Party and the state and were the only thing that could hold China together in a period of transition as mirrored in the 1970 constitutional draft. The Congress and its Second Plenum therefore consolidated the conversion of "revolution" and the strategic defeat of the "military" sequence and put the Party firmly into the driver's seat. Analyzing the 9th Party Congress (first section) and its Second Plenum (second section), the chapter therefore provides another layer of analysis and complements last chapter's inquiry into the 1970 constitutional draft.

Section 1: the 9th Party Congress

The 9th Party Congress had been postponed multiple times. According to the Party Constitution promulgated at the 8th Party Congress in September 1956, it should be held every five years. However, the anti-rightist struggle, the Great Leap Forward, the first Lushan Plenum, the beginning of the "Four Clean-Ups," and the Socialist Education campaign all postponed it. In August 1965, Mao suggested that it should mark the end of the Socialist Education Campaign.[1] However, the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, and the fall of Liu Shaoqi delayed it yet again. Thus, after the 11th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee in August 1966, Mao indicated that the Congress should convene at an appropriate time in 1967.[2] Then the January Revolution happened, RCs sprung up, and it was again postponed.

Starting with its late convention and preceding violations of custom, the (secret)[3] Party Congress was rife with irregularities. The first example was the election of the Chairman. Seemingly on a whim, Mao asked the assembled delegates "who would serve as Chairman," and suggested that Lin Biao should be elected.[4] Lin Biao at once declared, "Chairman Mao must be Chairman, our great leader Chairman Mao must be Chairman". Mao then countered: "Comrade Lin Biao serves as Chairman, I will be Vice-Chairman, alright?" Lin Biao stood up, insisting "No! No! Our great leader Chairman Mao must be Chairman! Long live Chairman Mao! All those in favor, raise your hand!" All hands went up. Lin thus proclaimed that his motion "passed unanimously," and Mao remained Chairman with Lin as his deputy.

[1] Record of Mao Zedong's Interventions while Listening to Luo Ruiqing's Report on the Problem of Preparing for War, 11 August 1965. Cited in Zhen, *毛泽东同志在无产阶级文化大革命中 [Comrade Mao Zedong in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]*.

[2] Cited in Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 317.

[3] Guo, "中共"九大"轶事 [Anecdotes from the Party's "9th National Party Congress"]."

[4] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 619.

This episode is short but revealing. Casting aside the deficits in even rudimentary democratic procedure,[5] the episode appears like a spontaneous test. Arriving late, Mao went to his seat looking down on the assembled delegates. Since around three-quarters of them hailed from the military,[6] he would have seen a sea of uniformed soldiers gazing at him. Even for Mao, this must have been a rare sight and a strong reminder that the state and its RCs were firmly in the hands of the military. Defying procedure by suggesting Lin Biao serve as Chairman was therefore an implicit way to reveal the delegates', Lin's, and by extension, the state's position toward him, the Party, and revolution. Lin reacted expertly by breaking protocol and proclaiming Mao as the Chairman. This both solidified Mao's superiority over his successor, the Party, the military, and the RCs, while exposing Mao's consternation. As he clarified the difference between the Party and the military in this situation, his opening speech positioned him above the Party. The Party, he stated, had historically overcome differences by shedding itself off traitors and uniting along the correct political line. This line was "Mao Zedong Thought". He further mentioned Yan'an and the 7th Party Congress as a model for unification. Mao's speech marked the GPCR's transformation. The revolutionary period was over, and the time of in-depth Party-building had begun. The reconstruction was both ideological and organizational, having laid the groundwork for rehabilitating capitalist forces before.[7] "Continuous revolution" was therefore to move from the RCs into the Party, thereby reinforcing an already ongoing process. As such, it did not signify revolution against institutions anymore. Rather, it shifted inside the new Party organs where "socialist successors" were to be concentrated and trained and individuals' thinking "rectified". In setting his own "Thought" as a guide and the Yan'an experience as a model, Mao elevated himself over the

[5] Wu, "文革中的选举：基于中共全国代表大会的研究 [Elections in the Cultural Revolution: A Study Based on the National Congress of the Communist Party of China]."
[6] Jürgen Domes, *The Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972* (London: Hurst, 1973), 206.
[7] Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 326.

Party. Ideological unification had become ever more important in the face of institutional weakness. It is this position that was then mirrored in the 1970 state constitution draft discussed in the last chapter.

After Lin Biao read the political report that focused on "continuous revolution" and had been drafted by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the delegates were divided into groups to discuss it and the Party Constitution. The drafting process of the report was fraught with considerable difficulties. Initially, Kang Sheng, Zhang and Yao were charged with it in early 1969.[8] However, Kang recused himself because of illness, leaving the drafting process entirely to them.[9] While Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Chen Boda thought the time had come for economic reconstruction, [10] Zhang and Yao criticized them for advocating the "omnipotence of production theory" and "conciliation" which led to Chen accusing them of "Bernsteinism".[11] Mao sided with Zhang and Yao, driving Chen Boda to Lin Biao.

On 24 April, Lin Biao moderated the closing ceremony. The delegate groups then freely proposed the candidates for members and alternate members of the Central Committee. Recommendations were then gathered, and a draft name list was proposed, which was then given back to the groups until a list of candidates was produced. When Jiang Qing saw it, she was displeased because there were so many old cadres on it. From the start she had advocated for a GPCR faction and revolutionary rebels entering the Central Committee.[12] Afterwards, an election round without names was conducted to pre-select delegates. This happened several times until the final list of names stood. An anonymous formal election was then conducted.

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[8] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 233.

[9] Wang, *汪东兴回忆：毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 [Wang Dongxing Recalls: The Struggle between Mao Zedong and the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group]*, 17.

[10] Gao, *晚年周恩来 [the Late Zhou Enlai]*.

[11] CCP Central Committee, "转发反党分子陈伯达的罪行材料 [Forwarding the Crime Material of the Anti-Party Element Chen Boda]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 26 January 1971.

[12] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 641.

The final Central Committee consisted of 279 people, with 170 permanent and 109 alternate members.[13] Mao said that there were just 53 holdouts from the 8th Central Committee. As for the 9th Central Committee, Mao indicated that over 70% were to be workers and peasants.[14] The reality differed. Of 279 members and alternates, 29% had a peasant/mass organization/worker background. Cadres made up 24%. Compared to that, soldiers and military cadres amounted to 47%, and thus roughly half.[15] Distinguishing between full and alternate members, the percentage of military representatives varies just slightly (48 versus 46%). However, cadres are mostly full (29%) rather than alternate members (16%). A bigger, though reverse, difference is seen regarding members categorized as mass representatives: they make up 22% of full but a staggering 39% of alternate members.

While some old leaders were excluded from the Party, a new force rose into the Central Committee: workers, peasants, and representatives from mass organizations. But even their credentials were overblown. For example, Chen Yonggui of Shanxi's Dazhai, or Wang Jinxi, a model worker at Liaoning's Daqing oilfield, did not enter the Central Committee because of their accomplishments during the GPCR: both had already been famous models before. The main difference was that they were now elevated.[16] The most notable exception to this is Nie Yuanzi, the writer of the first big-character poster at Peking University. But she just became an alternate member. The greatest faction that rose from the GPCR hailed from Shanghai. Most importantly, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan entered the Politburo and Wang Hongwen,

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[13] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 244.

[14] Mao Zedong, "在中共九大秘书处及各大组召集人会上的讲话 [Speech at the Meeting of the Secretariat of the 9th People's Congress and the Convener of the Major Groups]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 23 April 1969.

[15] Own calculations but the precise numbers depend on how one counts single cases. For example, political commissars within the army sometimes fall under "cadre" or "military". Li Ke and He Shengzhang give a number of 45%. Li and He, *"文化大革命"中的人民解放军 [the People's Liberation Army in the "Cultural Revolution"]*, 111.

[16] Domes, *The Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972*, 210.

who would later be designated as Mao's successor, became a member of the Central Committee.[17]

The biggest changes happened to the membership of the Politburo elected on 28 April during the First Plenum. New forces rose into the Politburo with four key military leaders Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and Lin Biao's wife Ye Qun and the revolutionaries Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan. While it had no "electoral" component in that the list of names was approved before and then rubber-stamped, the list itself underwent substantial changes. Qiu Huizuo's account is the only one that recounts the details regarding the selection process of the Politburo and its Standing Committee.[18] According to Qiu, Jiang Qing and Ye Qun were the main problem.[19] Meeting Mao, Zhou Enlai told him that if Jiang Qing was not included in the Politburo, this might have a considerable political impact and produce problems in the future. Mao reluctantly agreed, adding that the responsibility was his, anyway. They asked the same from Lin Biao regarding Ye Qun. Lin Biao agreed as long as Mao was happy. Hence, the Politburo included Jiang Qing and Ye Qun. Regarding the Standing Committee, an initial list included Mao, Lin, Zhou, Chen, Kang, Huang Yongsheng and either Jiang Qing or Zhang Chunqiao. However, Huang took himself out because if he served, Jiang Qing also had to be selected. While Chen Boda had at this point already fallen from grace, his obvious replacement would have been Zhang. Zhang, however, was crossed out because if he served, Jiang Qing would have to enter the Standing Committee. Hence, to minimize controversy, Mao decided himself on the five Standing Committee members, himself, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng.

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[17] Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen became members of the Central Committee and Ma Tianshui, Jin Zumin 金祖敏, Wang Weiguo, and Chen Ganfeng alternates. Shanghai "Cultural Revolution" Historical Materials Group, *上海"文化大革命"史话（送审稿）（二）[History of Shanghai's "Cultural Revolution" (for Review) (Two)]*, 612.

[18] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 648-52.

[19] Ibid., 651.

This episode is important for while Chen Boda was in charge of the CCRG, the real power had been with Jiang Qing.[20] Given Jiang was *the* representative of the GPCR and Mao relied on her and her supporters Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan to first launch and then implement the GPCR, Mao yet felt the need to exclude her from the Politburo. It was unthinkable that Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan could enter the Politburo without Jiang Qing not being on it, especially since the 9th Party Congress had announced the continuation and deepening of the GPCR.[21] With Mao deleting Jiang Qing and adding Ye Qun and Lin Biao striking through Ye Qun but not adding Jiang Qing, Mao and Lin Biao could explore each other's position on both Jiang Qing and the GPCR and expose the paradox of Lin's "closely shadowing" policy. If Lin added Jiang's name to the list again, this would both show support for the continuity of the GPCR and Mao but defy Mao's decision to delete her. Likewise, not adding Jiang would mean to show support for Mao's decision, but not for the overall GPCR. In a bind, the final decision was relegated to Zhou Enlai, who found an elegant solution that saw both Jiang Qing and Ye Qun entering the Politburo. Regardless, this was a dent in the ambitions of Jiang Qing, who had first wanted to be included in the Party Constitution and, in case of failure, at least become a member of the Standing Committee.[22]

The Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, and its alternate members were elected during the First Plenum right after the Congress had concluded. Mao chaired the meeting, with all members and alternate members of the Central Committee and Lin Biao present. Again,

[20] Zhou and Guo, *动乱中的陈伯达 [Chen Boda in Turmoil]*, 165.

[21] For this interpretation, see Changgui Yan, "关于毛泽东不让江青进政治局——读《邱会作回忆录》的一点感想 [on Mao Zedong's Unwillingness to Let Jiang Qing Enter the Politburo - a Reflection on "Qiu Huizuo's Memoirs"]," *记忆 [Remembrance]* 70 (2011).

[22] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 226.

Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan lacked votes. Since one could vote for oneself, there were many with full votes.[23]

The 9th Party Congress led to two main results: first, after the election, Mao held a speech pointing out how the Soviet Union saw China as a military dictatorship with half of the Central Committee hailing from the military and others being "bureaucracy" and warning of a military bureaucracy.[24] A veiled critique of the military branch,[25] Mao hinted at the necessity to dial back the influence of the military.[26] Given that in the provinces, cities, and districts, 82% of the people in charge hailed from the military and roughly half of the members of the Central Committee and of the 25 Politburo members and alternate members, more than half had a military background, this showed the spectre of military dictatorship and violated the Mao's dictum of the Party commanding the gun. It is in this context that his "banter" regarding electing Lin Biao as Chairman at the start of the Congress should be seen. While the military had not taken over the Party in the sense of actually administering and controlling it, the spectre was, in fact, real. At this point, the conversion of the military in the wake of the January Revolution, its conversion of the RC into an administrative organ, and its crucial position in rebuilding the Party resulted in Mao's pushback.[27] The number of military cadres in the Central

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[23] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 653.

[24] Mao Zedong, "在中共九届一中全会上的讲话 [Speech at the First Plenum of the 9th Central Committee]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 28 April 1969.

[25] Zhinan Liu, "九大至九届二中全会前夕毛泽东与林彪的分歧和矛盾 [the Differences and Contradictions between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao on the Eve of the Second Plenum of the 9th National Congress]," in *回首"文革"——中国十年"文革"分析与反思（下）[Looking Back at the "Cultural Revolution"—Analysis and Reflection on China's Ten Years of the "Cultural Revolution" (Part Two)]*, ed. Hua Zhang and Caiqing Su (Beijing: 中共党史出版社 [CCP History Publishing Press], 2000), 998.

[26] As Nelsen puts it, by the end of 1968 the military had massive political powers. Nelsen, "Military Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution."

[27] Mao early on in 1967 had already recognized this possibility. Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 525.
Jiang Qing started criticizing them as well. See CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱 : 1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 367. However, when Huang, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo reported this to Mao, Mao criticized Jiang Qing.

Committee led him to believe that their power was too big and he became busy with weakening the military's power.[28] Thus, he closed the speech with a call to reconstruct the Party, stressing that the revolution had not ended but ought to continue and adding that in some years another revolution might have to be conducted. Unity for Mao was for one purpose only: to consolidate the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and implement it within every factory, the countryside, all organs, and schools.[29] This pushback against the military thus precipitates the Party's takeover of the RCs.

The second major result of the 9th Party Congress was the move of revolution into the Party—quite literally.[30] Initially, Jiang Qing was also to be one of Mao's successors as the helmswoman of the GPCR.[31] This had already failed when, during the 12th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee, Mao deleted the CCRG from a draft of the Party Constitution.[32] Notwithstanding her role in unleashing the GPCR, Jiang Qing failed to become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and even her entry into the Politburo was fraught with difficulties. Considerably less dramatic was the inability to establish a central revolutionary committee[33] and the rift with Chen Boda, who tilted towards Lin Biao. These defeats were compounded by organizational consequences. The 9th Party Congress had a massive impact on the Party's internal governance structure with the abolishment of the CCRG and the "brief

[28] Changgui Yan, "缔造"和"指挥"的风波 [the Storm of "Creating" and "Commanding"]," *往事 [HIstory]* 20 (2005).

[29] "在中国共产党第九届中央委员会第一次全体会议上的讲话(节录)（1969 年 4 月 28 日）[Speech at the First Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee of the CCP (Excerpt)]," in *("文化大革命"研究资料（中册）["Cultural Revolution" Research Materials (Middle Volume)]*, ed. People's Liberation Army, National Defense University, and Party History Party Building Political Work Research Office (1988).

[30] MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 297.

[31] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 639.

[32] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 207.

[33] Jiakang Zhang, "毛泽东心中的 "文革"时间表 [Timetable of the "Cultural Revolution" in Mao Zedong's Mind]," *党史博采 [Extensive Collection of Party History]*, no. 1 (2005).

meetings" that implemented the GPCR and had supplanted the dysfunctional Central Committee.[34] With the election of a new Central Committee, this changed.[35] The assembled Politburo and its Standing Committee now conducted everyday operations. While eight of the twelve members of the "brief meetings" came from the CCRG,[36] seven of the 13 Politburo members were soldiers.[37] With the institutional backing of the new Politburo, power shifted away from the former CCRG members. This manifested itself in three ways. First, while before without Jiang Qing the "brief meeting" could not begin, after the 9th Party Congress, Zhou Enlai started Politburo meetings with or without her. Second, the meeting place changed from the CCRG's seat at Diaoyutai Building 16, to the Fujian Room in the Great Hall of the People. Third, previously, without Jiang Qing's agreement no decision could be taken. After, even if she disagreed, as long as the majority agreed, issues were decided. This was complemented by the good relationship between Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Qiu Huizuo for example says Zhou gave the military "maximum support," leading to Lin Biao's enhanced trust in Zhou Enlai.[38] Policy-wise, they were also in agreement regarding the need for economic construction. In the meantime, there was outspoken contempt amongst the revolutionaries and generals for each other. Thus, Zhang Chunqiao called Huang Yongsheng an "uneducated person," while Huang belittled Zhang as "small journalist" and "short-haired monkey".[39] Similarly, Jiang Qing's

[34] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 656.

[35]Cheng, "1970 年庐山会议背景的研究 [Research on the Background of the Lushan Conference in 1970]."

[36] Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu

[37] Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, LI Desheng, and Xie Fuzhi

[38] 邱会作回忆稿 in Cheng, "1970 年庐山会议背景的研究 [Research on the Background of the Lushan Conference in 1970]."

[39] "毛泽东和林彪是如何决裂的 [How Did Mao Zedong and Lin Biao Break?]," 万维导读 [Wanwei Guide], accessed 30 March 2019, http://digest.creaders.net/articleViewer.php?atid=274422&id=276916.

erratic behavior[40] after the CCRG's abolishment[41] and her demeanor in meetings led to considerable irritation in the Politburo.

This is the background against which disputes between Lin's generals and the revolutionaries would erupt during the Second Plenum in August 1970.[42] The revolutionaries' disillusionment is understandable. On paper the Party Constitution was the "collective result of Shanghai's revolutionary faction,"[43] as Zhang bragged and included the Shanghai-inspired "continuous revolution" as its guiding ideology.[44] They also had elevated many rebels to the Central Committee. As one rebel group said, Party power is the "power of powers" and "without Party power, rebelling would have been meaningless".[45] Likewise, as I showed in the last chapter, they were in charge of drafting the state constitution. However, the revolutionaries surrounding Jiang Qing were side-lined, leaving her in limbo and dreaming of ways to reinvigorate the GPCR.[46]

The 9th Party Congress therefore heralded a paradigm shift and led to the conversion of "revolution" and the "Party". The absorption of revolutionaries into the Party's institutional corset converted revolution. Here, revolution was bound by institutional rules. It had to be conducted within and as a part of the Party and therefore not against established structures. As long as revolution is not aimed against structures, it is transformed into a tool of the Party's institution. Whatever the Party now said revolution was to target—that was what revolution

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[40] Detailed inCheng, "1970 年庐山会议背景的研究 [Research on the Background of the Lushan Conference in 1970]."

[41] It completely ceased operation on 12 September. See MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 297.

[42] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 531.

[43] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 613.

[44] It is notable that the Party Constitution did not reference rights of Party members, there was no attempt to detail structure and powers of Party Committees, there were no procedures for intra-Party discipline, and there was no Secretariat. See Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis."

[45] Shanghai "Cultural Revolution" Historical Materials Group, *上海"文化大革命"史话（送审稿）（二） [History of Shanghai's "Cultural Revolution" (for Review) (Two)]*, 600.

[46] Cheng, "1970 年庐山会议背景的研究 [Research on the Background of the Lushan Conference in 1970]."

should aim at. While this was supposed to herald the emergence of a "revolutionary" Party, it in fact meant the conversion of revolution from opposing structure and organization to supporting it. Even worse, it was now hierarchically inferior to organization. Hence, paradoxically, practicing "revolution" led to the Party's own conversion into an "administrative" Party.

Military cadres entering the Party en masse further reinforced this trend. In charge of the administrative RCs at the grassroots, they headed conservative and bureaucratic organs and imported this thinking into the Party. If "revolution" led to the bureaucratization of the Party, then military cadres further reinforced it. About half of the Central Committee and the Politburo's members were soldiers, giving it an oversized influence on decision-making relative to cadres and revolutionaries. This, however, was not deliberate; rather, as Qiu Huizuo correctly argues, it was the result of the policies following the revolution in January 1967.[47] Revolutionary chaos led to the military's conversion from a fighting into an administrative force that in turn converted RCs from revolutionary into governing organs. It was they who entered the Party and became delegates. Without their support, the GPCR could not be deepened and the Party could not be rebuilt. Paradoxically, without them, the 9th Party Congress where they were criticized for taking over the bureaucracy could not have convened in the first place. Mao was painfully aware of that and thus in highly conflicted territory: he needed the military to rebuild the Party, provide order and governance, but wanted to push it back. Relatively speaking then, the revolutionaries were the losers of the 9th Party Congress and the military ascended.

Rifts soon appeared. Mao's next moves showed dissatisfaction with the power of the army.[48] His fear of a military bureaucracy and the generals' dismissal of the GPCR meant Mao became

[47] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*. 656 and 659.
[48] Ibid., 655.

irritated by Lin Biao's influence.[49] For example, when Mao asked Lin Biao who would succeed them after their deaths and proposed Zhang Chunqiao, an awkward Lin did not respond.[50] By the time of the 9th Party Congress, the structural retreat of the military on the provincial and sub-provincial levels had not stabilized. Compounded by additional signs, the fear of a military bureaucratic takeover was not just real but a matter of fact. The only thing missing was organization, collective action, and the "actual" coup. While the restoration of the Party at all levels would drive out the military and completely relegate the RC to an administrative position, the focus on consolidation transformed the role of the revolutionaries surrounding Jiang Qing who now had to succumb to institutional rules for the first time since the GPCR's start.

With the primacy of the Party organization over the revolutionaries sealed, Mao pushed forward with reconstructing the Party at all levels. As I showed in Chapter IV, the Party-building drive kicked in after the Party Congress, with Party organizations swiftly being established all over China. This built a new Party-RC relationship that then manifested itself in the 1970 constitutional draft. While the military's help was needed to make Party organs viable, many soldiers did not make the leap to become cadres. Party groups therefore over-proportionally comprised of mass representatives and pushed back the military both in terms of organization and staffing. In the absence of revolutionary power, non-existing Party organizations, and great power in the hands of the military, Mao elevated himself to an idea to hold China together. Focusing on Party-building, the structural consolidation of this trend was "continuous revolution". The leadership drafted the 1970 constitutional draft in its spirit, emphasizing Mao, establishing the primacy of the Party over the military and demoting the military-dominated RCs to an administrative role. The 9th Party Congress then locked in the

[49] Zhisui Li, *毛泽东私人医生回忆录 [the Private Life of Chairman Mao]* (Tapei: 时报出版 [China Times], 1994), 137.
[50] Gao, *晚年周恩来 [the Late Zhou Enlai]*, 157.

border between Party and RC: it codified the Party's takeover of the state, foreshadowing the pushback against the military and the state, and formally moved revolution into the Party and its newly built institutions.

Section 2: The Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee

The Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee convened from 23 August until 6 September 1970. Framed as a conflict over formulations and the establishment of the state chairmanship, it was an attack on Zhang Chunqiao. Events at the Second Plenum convinced Mao to speed up Party-building and to accelerate the military's ouster from governance structures. It therefore further reinforced a trend already visible during the 9th Party Congress and at the organizational level, as I showed in Chapter IV.

In a brief meeting right before the Plenum's start, Lin old Mao he would speak. He informed Mao of Wu Faxian's clash with Zhang Chunqiao regarding the "genius" in August and Zhang's opposition to Mao Zedong Thought being the "guiding policy". Mao told him that this "must be criticized," but asked him not to name names, adding that behind Zhang there was Jiang Qing.[51] Lin then explained that his speech would touch on the "theory of the genius" and the drafting of the state constitution.[52] To this extent, Lin's proposed criticism was a rebuke of Zhang's "provocation" during the constitutional drafting phase.[53] However, the criticism was to be mild—and not to devolve into appeals for his ouster, as it eventually would.

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[51] Wu, *岁月艰难：吴法宪回忆录（下卷）[Hard Years: Wu Faxian's Memoirs (Third Volume)]*, 795. See also Ruxin Yu, "未可忽略的"一家之言" 吴法宪回忆录述评 [a "One-of-a-Kind" That Can't Be Ignored: Commentary on Wu Faxian's Memoirs]," (2006).

[52] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 536.

[53] Cheng, "1970 年庐山会议背景的研究 [Research on the Background of the Lushan Conference in 1970]."

In his speech, Lin made two points.[54] First, he acknowledged the importance of the agenda and agreeing with it. Regarding the constitutional amendment, he said the draft makes prominent "Chairman Mao's position as a great leader, head of state 国家元首, and supreme commander, and setting Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology of the entire nation and its people". This was, according to him, the "soul" of the state constitution. Further, he argued that Mao's position resulted from a struggle against enemies and that progression and regression in the Party's work were related to the strength of Mao's position. These experiences, he claimed, must be remembered, and, transformed from a "confused thinking" into a "conscious thinking". This holds true especially for old cadres who have to communicate this thinking to the grassroots. Hence, the last twenty years had proven the function and usefulness of Mao Zedong Thought. The second part of his speech was reserved for Mao's "innovative spirit" and his "genius". He maintained that "Chairman Mao is a genius," whose thinking gradually developed, "touched all kinds of problems," and invented new things. He added that especially comrades from the Centre should ponder on this.[55]

Lin spoke for 90 minutes. During the speech, Zhang Chunqiao was nervous and knew that it was directed at him. Qiu Huizuo reports that when Lin mentioned "confused thinking" that had to be transformed, Zhang started frantically taking notes. After the speech, Zhang for the first

[54] See Biao Lin, "林彪在中国共产党九届二中全会开幕会上的讲话录音 （节录） [Record of Lin Biao's Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee (Excerpt)]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 23 August 1970. and ibid. See also Chen, *陈伯达：最后口述回忆 [Chen Boda: The Last Oral Recollections]*, 374.

[55] According to Wu Faxian, Lin was not that subtle. According to his recollection, Lin directly used the "three adjectives", saying that "some people" now say that the "theory of the genius is incorrect". Further, Lin said that if people at the Centre talk like that, this would impact the entire country and lead to chaos. See Wu, *岁月艰难：吴法宪回忆录（下卷）[Hard Years: Wu Faxian's Memoirs (Third Volume)]*, 791-92.

time ever offered him a cigarette[56] and Qiu noted that Zhang's hands were shaking.[57] Leaving the hall, staffers started whispering. They asked themselves if "head of state" 国家元首 was not the same as "state chairman" 国家主席.[58] This would offend Mao. In fact, Lin Biao did not deviate from the constitutional draft that also referred to Mao as the "head of state" 国家元首 and the phraseology agreed upon by Mao. Unlike the leadership, they were not aware that it was directed at Zhang. Taken at face value, Lin's speech was not a hefty criticism of Zhang. He neither called for his ouster nor for a reversal of key GPCR tenets and he certainly did not mean to attack Mao. Thus, the speech was clear enough to rattle Zhang but not strong enough in its vocabulary to lead to cries for his purge, thus keeping Lin within the parameters agreed to by Mao.

At an evening Politburo meeting Wang Dongxing pointed out that the whole Plenum should listen to Lin's speech.[59] Zhou Enlai sent him to ask for Mao's permission,[60] who agreed.[61] Further, Zhang Chunqiao was to prepare a constitutional draft including the state chairmanship. Zhang curtly responded that he already had.[62] Thus, the agenda of the Plenum was amended. After the entire Central Committee listened to the tapes in the morning, group discussions took

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[56] Even though Qiu Huizuo did not smoke. Yang, "历史不可信，真理谁人知——评《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》 [Who Knows the Truth If History Is Not Credible --- Comments on "Mao Zedong's Struggle with Lin Biao's Anti-Revolutionary Group"]."

[57] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 695.

[58] Fuyun Yang, ""庐山是炸不平的，地球还是照样转"——在中共九届二中全会上围绕不设国家主席的一场斗争（上） ["Lushan Cannot Be Leveled, the Earth Will Still Continue to Revolve" - the Struggle at the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee on Not Establishing the State Chairmanship (Part One)] " *中国人大 [People's Congress of China]* 6, no. 10 (2004).

[59] Cited in Yang, "历史不可信，真理谁人知——评《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》 [Who Knows the Truth If History Is Not Credible --- Comments on "Mao Zedong's Struggle with Lin Biao's Anti-Revolutionary Group"]."

[60] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 697.

[61] Qingyang and Longmen, *新发现的周恩来 [Newly Discovered Zhou Enlai]*.

[62] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 697.

place in the afternoon. The participants were divided into six big groups. The subsequent speeches drastically increased the heat and stood in no comparison to the subdued and measured tone of Lin's speech.

It was the "North China Group Report Number Two" (or "Briefing Number Six") compiled by Chen Boda that had the greatest impact because it was distributed to the whole Plenum. In the group, Chen Boda and Wang Dongxing made the most important speeches. Similar to the others, Chen Boda asserted that the phrase "Mao Zedong Thought is the guiding ideology of the entire nation and people" had undergone serious struggle.[63] He further argued that people who said it was sarcasm to assert Mao was a "genius" were negating the Cultural Revolution and denigrating Mao Zedong Thought. He also said the position of state chairman should be restored, with Mao as state chairman and Lin Biao as his deputy. Chen's speech excited the group's members, who supported it and expressed similar views. After repeatedly being asked by the Central Committee members, Chen Boda implicitly admitted that he was aiming at Zhang Chunqiao, however together with Wang Dongxing.[64] To strike back at the conspirators and their actions, the scientist Qian Xuesen proposed to add Mao as state chairman to the second article of the state constitution and Lin Biao as deputy. In his own remarks, Wang Dongxing praised Lin Biao's speech, saying that in the most important moment "Vice-Chairman Lin's attitude is correct."[65] Wang supported Lin's call for Mao being the "great leader, head of state, and supreme commander". When Wang proposed bringing back the state chairmanship adding that some people were opposing Mao, everybody cheered. Wu De reports

[63] Li, *中共历史转折关头：关键会议亲历实录 [Turning Points in the History of the CCP: Key Meetings, Experiences, and Records]*, 753.

[64] Chen, *陈伯达：最后口述回忆 [Chen Boda: The Last Oral Recollections]*, 375.

[65] Dongxing Wang, "汪东兴在中国共产党九届二中全会华北组的发言 [Wang Dongxing's Speech in the Northern Group at the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database* 1970.

that when Chen Boda spoke, delegates were still sceptical, but everybody knew Wang was very close to Mao, so people believed he channelled Mao's thinking.[66]

The other groups were not nearly as contentious. In fact, many people were confused. For example, Zhou Enlai also agreed with the "genius".[67] Even Shanghai's Wang Hongwen and Xu Jingxian did not understand who Lin Biao was referring to and so they sat in their respective groups and remained silent,[68] with one account even stating that Wang supported the "genius" in his speech.[69] Hence even the politically extremely savvy Zhou Enlai and Zhang's own protégés supported Lin Biao. Zhang Chunqiao himself did not utter a word in the East China Group, smoking one cigarette after another.[70]

The next morning, the "Briefing Number Six" was distributed to the whole Plenum. The report combined both Chen Boda and Wang Dongxing's speeches. Referring to Chen and Wang's speeches, it stated that "genuine counter-revolutionary and revisionist elements, and agents of Liu Shaoqi's reactionary line" should "be dragged out and paraded through the streets, expelled from the Party, struggled against until the end, torn into pieces, and condemned by the whole Party and country".[71] Given the strong language of the report and the fact that Chen Boda and Wang Dongxing were its authors, it is not surprising that when Wang Hongwen saw the report during breakfast, he immediately alerted Zhang Chunqiao, who stormed out to see Jiang Qing.

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[66] De Wu, "庐山会议和林彪事件 [the Lushan Meeting and the Lin Biao Incident]," *当代中国史研究 Research on Contemporary Chinese History*, no. 2 (1995).

[67] Yun Shu, *林彪事件完整调查 [a Complete Investigation of Lin Biao Incident]* (Hong Kong: 明镜出版社 [Mirror Publishing House], 2006), 116. This was omitted from Zhou's official biography and the Chronicles. Also see Gao, *晚年周恩来 [the Late Zhou Enlai]*, 295.

[68] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 538.

[69] See Yonglie Ye, *陈伯达传 [Biography of Chen Boda]* (Beijing: 作家出版社 [Writers Publishing House], 1993), 494.

[70] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 538. See also Yang, "历史不可信，真理谁人知——评《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》 [Who Knows the Truth If History Is Not Credible --- Comments on "Mao Zedong's Struggle with Lin Biao's Anti-Revolutionary Group"]."

[71] See "中国共产党九届二中全会第六号简报（华北组第二号简报） [Briefing No. 6 of the Second Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Briefing No. 2 of the North China Group)]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 24 August 1970.

Together with Yao Wenyuan they first went to see Zhou Enlai who was unavailable. Thus, they directly went to see Mao. Crying, Zhang and Yao each grabbed one of Mao's legs, with Jiang Qing, tears in her eyes, begging that Mao had to protect the guardians of the GPCR's achievements.[72] After they had left, Mao immediately sent for Wang Dongxing, criticizing him and telling him he knew about his wish not to be state chairman. Wang defended himself saying that this was a proposal made in response to Chen Boda's insinuation that some people were happy that Mao would not be state chairman. At the same time, it was also the masses' opinion.[73] Mao retorted by asking rhetorically if he was not state chairman, would he be unable to represent the masses? This made Wang Dongxing feel unwell. Annoyed, Mao told Wang to convene the Politburo and the group leaders for an afternoon meeting.

At this point the Plenum was bound to explode. Within a day, Lin's subtle speech had led to widespread calls for the "dragging out" and the "ouster" of a yet unnamed senior official. This deliberate escalation however showed that Mao's willingness to protect Zhang Chunqiao had been completely underestimated. When Mao called for the afternoon meeting, Ye Qun could not go because she had injured her leg but she nevertheless told Lin to protect Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and Wang Dongxing.[74] Ye wanted to protect Wang in particular because she needed him for intelligence on Mao's ideas to guarantee Lin Biao could always "closely shadow".[75] After Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda and Kang Sheng had arrived, Mao talked to each of them separately. He also spoke to Xu Shiyou, whom he told to take his hand, asking if it was cold. Xu agreed and Mao responded: "would it not be good to let me live some more

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[72] Cited in Yang, "历史不可信，真理谁人知——评《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》 [Who Knows the Truth If History Is Not Credible --- Comments on "Mao Zedong's Struggle with Lin Biao's Anti-Revolutionary Group"]."

[73] Wang, *汪东兴回忆：毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 [Wang Dongxing Recalls: The Struggle between Mao Zedong and the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group]*, 48.

[74] Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

[75] Ibid.

years! Yet, you want me to serve as state chairman!"[76] He was feeling frail which also explained his demeanour during the opening ceremony and his postponing of meals.[77] Mao also sarcastically told off Wang Dongxing, telling him he should be state chairman if he wanted it so badly.[78] Consequently, Mao ordered the withdrawal of "Briefing Number Six". He also noted that the issues discussed disrupted the original agenda.[79] In name, he criticized Chen Boda using stark words, saying they had worked together for over thirty years and that he always "changed his faces". Mao further accused him of a "surprise attack" since "the Politburo agreed not to establish the state chairmanship" in Beijing. He also condemned the wrong behaviour of others in other groups who distributed quotations on the "genius," declaring that this violated the spirit of unity set at the 9th Party Congress.[80] At the meeting Mao again expressed that whoever wanted to hold on to the state chairmanship, whoever should be state chairman.[81] He even threatened to leave Lushan and resign as Party chairman.[82] Again, he told

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[76] Wang, *汪东兴回忆：毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 [Wang Dongxing Recalls: The Struggle between Mao Zedong and the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group]*, 49.

[77] In July 1972, he would tell French Foreign minister Schuman: "我们开了那个庐山会议，1970 年 8 月 23 号一天，24 号一天，25 号半天。第三天下午，我就说不行了，不能干了，下了一滴酒精。一滴酒精下去，细菌就不活动了." See Yuanshi Zhu, ed., *吴德口述：十年风雨纪实——我在北京工作的一些经历 [Wu De's Oral Record: Ten Years of Storms and Troubles - Some Experiences of Working in Beijing]* (Beijing: 当代中国出版社 [Contemporary China Publishing Press], 2004), 117.

[78] Fuyun Yang, ""庐山是炸不平的，地球还是照样转"——在中共九届二中全会上围绕不设国家主席的一场斗争（中） ["Lushan Cannot Be Leveled, the Earth Will Still Continue to Revolve" - the Struggle at the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee on Not Establishing the State Chairmanship (Part Two)] " *中国人大 [People's Congress of China]* 6, no. 25 (2004).

[79] Wang, *汪东兴回忆：毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 [Wang Dongxing Recalls: The Struggle between Mao Zedong and the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group]*, 49.

[80] Junlun Zhou, ed., *聂荣臻年谱 [Chronicles of Nie Rongzhen]* (Beijing: 人民出版社 [People's Publishing Press], 1999), 1116.

[81] Yang, ""庐山是炸不平的，地球还是照样转"——在中共九届二中全会上围绕不设国家主席的一场斗争（中） ["Lushan Cannot Be Leveled, the Earth Will Still Continue to Revolve" - the Struggle at the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee on Not Establishing the State Chairmanship (Part Two)] ".

[82] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 327.

Lin Biao not to serve as state chairman. Finally, he demanded a stop of all meetings and discussions of Lin Biao's speech. Mao also decided that Chen Boda's speech had violated the policy of the 9th Party Congress. People were not to be "dragged out" but "united with" according to the spirit of the 9th Party Congress.[83] One year later in a conversation with Wang Hongwen in Shanghai, Mao would even call the briefing "counter-revolutionary".[84]

However, in an even more revealing exchange in the afternoon of 30 August, Mao met General Huang Yongsheng. Huang had not participated in the Plenum since he was on duty in Beijing and hence was insulated from the Plenum's events. Asked why they wanted to oust Zhang, Huang said he was not a good person and that the Politburo in fact was not united, with Zhang playing a negative role and always relying on Jiang Qing.[85] He added that Jiang Qing always thought she could win because she had the "trump card" – Mao himself.[86] Mao responded by saying: "Can you [using the plural 你们] not give me three years to watch Zhang Chunqiao?"[87] Huang said he had always protected Mao, but he had objections regarding the CCRG and that he could not agree with rebels that "attack," "seize power," "beat" up people, "destroy," and "use weapons". Mao thus asked him: "You also do not approve of the Cultural Revolution?" Huang asserted: "I firmly support Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Lin!" This rejection would later seal his fate.

With the disapproval of the military being established, it was important for Mao to insulate Lin Biao and thus Chen Boda received most of the brunt. On 31 August, Mao wrote "Some

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[83] Yang, ""庐山是炸不平的，地球还是照样转"——在中共九届二中全会上围绕不设国家主席的一场斗争（中） ["Lushan Cannot Be Leveled, the Earth Will Still Continue to Revolve" - the Struggle at the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee on Not Establishing the State Chairmanship (Part Two)] ".

[84] Wang, *汪东兴回忆：毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 [Wang Dongxing Recalls: The Struggle between Mao Zedong and the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group]*, 169.

[85] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 717-18.

[86] Yang, "历史不可信，真理谁人知——评《毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争》 [Who Knows the Truth If History Is Not Credible --- Comments on "Mao Zedong's Struggle with Lin Biao's Anti-Revolutionary Group"]."

[87] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 717-18.

Opinions of Mine" which argued that Chen had deceived many comrades and blasted his understanding of Marxism-Leninism.[88] In the evening, Zhou Enlai showed it to Zhang Chunqiao and discussed it with him.[89] Crucially, the final document omitted an earlier reference to Lin Biao.[90] While Lin Biao had seen it,[91] in the final version shown to Lin the next morning and to which he agreed,[92] this reference was missing.[93] On the suggestion of Zhou Enlai, Mao also deleted Wu Faxian's name.[94] On the next day, Kang Sheng told Lin Biao that Chen Boda had lighted the fuse and Wu Faxian had lied. Lin Biao again defended Wu.[95] In the afternoon, Mao told Lin Biao that Chen Boda would be purged.[96] This meant that everybody else had to distance themselves from him. Mao's text was distributed to the whole Plenum and studied for the next few days. During one meeting, Zhou Enlai gave a notice to Lin Biao telling him to praise Zhang Chunqiao, but Lin did not oblige.[97]

To bring the Plenum back on track, it was extended.[98] From 4-5 September, the draft of the national economic plan and the constitutional draft were discussed, but in this atmosphere, nobody could contribute—hence rubber stamping them.[99] On 6 September, the Plenum came back together. Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Kang Sheng attended it, with Chen

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[88] See Mao Zedong, "我的一点意见 [Some Opinions of Mine]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 31 August 1970.

[89] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 542.

[90] The handwritten draft included the sentence: "Chen Boda quoted Comrade Lin Biao as many as seven times, like a precious jewel" (should be nine times).

[91] Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

[92] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 542.

[93] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, Pang, and Jin, *毛泽东传：1893-1976（第六卷）[Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1976 (Volume Six)]*, 2547.

[94] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 719.

[95] Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

[96] Ibid.

[97] Ibid.

[98] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 332.

[99] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*, 722.

Boda missing. Lin Biao presided over the meeting on the suggestion of Mao, who said that if he would not, people would have thoughts.[100] Mao held a speech saying that at the Plenum's opening ceremony there was "another person up here who is not here today" alluding to Chen Boda. He further stated that the Centre would investigate him and if there was no problem with his history, he could still be a member of the Central Committee. Mao further highlighted education for cadres and the importance of unity for the Party. He argued that cadres should read Marx, Lenin, and books on the history of Chinese and Western philosophy.[101] He also added that some at the Plenum wanted to raze Lushan to the ground, but he did not listen to them. These people thought one had to be state chairman to represent the people. However, Mao added, for many years he had not been state chairman—did that mean he had not represented the people? Regarding unity in the Party, he said talking about unity was necessary, if one did not talk about it, one could not get the approval of the whole Party and the masses were unhappy, too. However, unity had to be based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and was not an unprincipled unity.[102]

After Mao's speech, the Plenum passed the constitutional amendment and the recommendations to convene the Fourth NPC at the "appropriate time," approved the report on the 1970 national economic plan and agreed on strengthening war preparations. Accordingly, the official Communiqué noted that while the time was "ripe" for the Fourth NPC the time had not been fixed.[103] It further noted that the whole Party had to study Chairman Mao's philosophical works, promote dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and

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[100] Ibid.

[101] Mao Zedong, "在中共九届二中全会闭幕会上的讲话 [Speech at the Closing of the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 6 September 1970.

[102] Wang, *汪东兴回忆：毛泽东与林彪反革命集团的斗争 [Wang Dongxing Recalls: The Struggle between Mao Zedong and the Lin Biao Counter-Revolutionary Group]*, 57-58. Also see Mao, "在中共九届二中全会闭幕会上的讲话 [Speech at the Closing of the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee]."

[103] "中国共产党第九届中央委员会第二次全体会议公报 [Communique of the Second Plenary Meeting of the 9th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 10 September 1970.

oppose idealism and metaphysics. Curiously, the Communiqué did not mention the passage of the constitutional draft. In his closing remarks, Lin Biao said that while during the Plenum there were problems, they were quickly discovered and resolved by Mao. Hence the Plenum was "united" and "successful".[104] Regardless of Lin Biao's final words at the meeting, it was because of this struggle that the Fourth NPC was shelved until an undefined "appropriate time" had arrived and the constitutional draft remained—a draft.

It was also announced that Chen Boda would be investigated.[105] Subsequently, Chen was stripped of his post as the General Editor of the Red Flag Journal. In the evening, Kang Sheng visited Yang Fuyun and the other staffers of the constitutional drafting small group. He praised them for their behaviour during the Plenum but added that the struggle was not over and that while Mao protected him, Lin Biao ultimately was responsible. Finally, he told them to go back to Beijing and collect all the materials and opinions regarding amending the constitutional draft and continue the preparations for the Fourth NPC.[106] The Communiqué glossed over these dynamics and differences since Mao wanted the meeting to end on a united note. However, six days later on 12 September, the Central Committee published a "Notice" to send the constitutional draft to the grassroots work units and to mobilize the masses to discuss and propose changes.[107]

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[104] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, Pang, and Jin, *毛泽东传：1893-1976（第六卷）[Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1976 (Volume Six)]*, 2549.

[105] Wu, "庐山会议和林彪事件 [the Lushan Meeting and the Lin Biao Incident]."

[106] Fuyun Yang, ""庐山是炸不平的，地球还是照样转"——在中共九届二中全会上围绕不设国家主席的一场斗争（下） ["Lushan Cannot Be Leveled, the Earth Will Still Continue to Revolve" - the Struggle at the Second Plenum of the 9th Central Committee on Not Establishing the State Chairmanship (Part Three)] " *中国人大 [People's Congress of China]* 7, no. 10 (2004).

[107] "中共中央颁发"中华人民共和国宪法修改草案" 的通知及附件 [Notice and Annex of the Draft Amendment to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China Issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 12 September 1970.

Yu Yunshen, who was always by Lin Biao's side in Lushan, did not think Lin Biao would encounter any problems, even rejecting the occurrence of a fight. According to him, Lin Biao did nothing wrong and Chen Boda was at fault.[108] Lin's generals colossally misjudged Mao's willingness to prop up Zhang. More importantly, Lin did not seem in control of his own people and they acted out of their own accord. Clearly, the military was not a monolith, with Lin Biao "closely following" Mao and Huang Yongsheng and others opposing the GPCR. Mao's own understanding of their attack as an assault on himself however is fallacious as well.[109] Neither were Lin and his subordinates attacking Mao nor was there a concentrated and planned effort involving Lin Biao to oust Zhang. Rather, the plenum showcased a spiral of escalation that both defies any idea of "factions" or deliberate strategy, with even Huang Yongsheng jumping on the bandwagon.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the reinforcement of the different sequences that together produced the state constitution. There are four main takeaways:

First, the conversion of revolution. "Continuous revolution" was now part of the Party and its institutions. Likewise, key revolutionaries were inserted into the Party leadership. Inclusion however also meant that revolution was converted. This signified a paradigm change: revolution was not waged against the Party-state institutions and its powerholders anymore. Rather, revolution was to take place within existing institutions. Revolutionaries such as Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan now were to use revolution within Party and state

[108] Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

[109] Chu Qin, "陈永贵谈华国锋、江青、张春桥、邓小平、胡耀邦 [Chen Yonggui Discusses Hua Guofeng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang]," *历史研究 [Historical Research]*, no. 4 (2006).

structures and for their benefit, not against it. Second, the military leaders of the administrative RCs entered the Party. In the absence of Party structures throughout the country, the military-controlled RCs were in charge of the state. At the same time, Lin Biao was formally elevated to become Mao's successor, delivered the political report, and written into the Party Constitution. This both increased the importance and the prestige of the military and its leader and further entrenched the military within the Party's system. Given they had already converted the revolutionary RCs into governing bodies, their inclusion into the Party further entrenched its bureaucratic aspects. Third, the military-led RC had to be diminished. The military's power greatly irritated Mao, who stressed the Party's importance as their core. Institution-building therefore took the form of Party-building. This precipitates the substitution of the RCs with Party structures. As shown in Chapter III, a Party-building frenzy followed the Party Congress and Party organizations were built and organs expanded all over China, extending control over RCs, and rebuilding itself in the RCs. Given the Party's growth slowly crowded out the military in 1969 already, Mao did not take any further steps. By the time of the Second Plenum in August 1970, the military clearly was on its way out.[110] Fourth, the conversion of the Party is a key takeaway. Including both revolutionaries and military cadres in its midst converted the Party from a "revolutionary" into an "administrative" institution. At the same time, it was bound to replace the RCs, which importance was fleeting. Here, Mao used the Party as an organizational basis to further push back against the military and the RCs.

This explains the prominent position of Mao in the constitutional draft. Since the revolutionaries had no organizational base except for Shanghai, he could not establish the RC as the foundational basis of the state. Since Party structures were also missing at that time, Mao as man and symbol was the lowest common denominator. Held together by Mao's image, the

[110] The plenum therefore did not enable Mao "to launch an attack on Lin Biao's faction and thus to begin to undermine the role of the military at the apex of the CCP". Rather, this had already been underway for almost two years. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 332.

political line established at the 9th Party Congress therefore highlighted the conversion of revolution and the victory of the Party over the state's military-dominated RC.

The importance of the Second Plenum is then that it was a rebellion against this arrangement. The attack on Zhang Chunqiao obfuscates a deeper conflict between the four sequences. By attacking him, the military questioned the political line that eroded their control over the RCs, thereby opposing the 9th Party Congress and negating the establishment of Party leadership over the RC and the military. More importantly, this defied a structural trend, which reversal would necessitate a coup d'état to gain control of the organization undermining their position. Since this move rendered the constitutional draft as an embodiment of this line worthless, the Fourth NPC was postponed indefinitely and the draft shelved. Here, the interactions between the sequences entirely overtook the balance of power of the drafting process and the draft's text. Given the state constitution is the by-product of the interactions between institutional actors, it had become worthless and had to be adjusted. Needless to say, this could not go unpunished. Mao was furious. Even though Lin was innocent himself, he was responsible. He either had lost control over his people, or he was telling them what to do—it is unclear which is worse. Mao opted for the first possibility. While this meant Lin Biao could stay, his underlings had to be punished, Chen purged, and the marginalization of the military quickened—this further reinforced the conversion of the RC into an administrative organ and accelerated the construction of Party supremacy over the military and the RCs. Already institutionalized within the Party, the revolutionary sequence was further entrenched. Thus, institutional change in the form of reinforcing sequences continued and the trends outlined were further consolidated. Deepening until 1975, they then produced a very different state constitution.

Chapter VII: Reinforcing Sequences – the Interlude from 1970 until 1975

Introduction

In 1970, the period of conversion was factually over: none of the sequences experienced any fundamental change anymore. Rather, I show in this chapter that from 1970 until the Fourth NPC in 1975, the four sequences reinforced their respective trends. Thus, this period has five main hallmarks: first, the further marginalization of the military from the Party and RCs that, by 1972, practically ended the "military" sequence. Second, the shift from people to institutions and Party organs in particular. Third, the continued demotion of RCs that were subsumed under the Party. Fourth, the further development of "revolution" within the Party. Fifth, this happened against the backdrop of a burgeoning bureaucracy. In 1975, these trends would then result in a very different state constitution as a by-product of interactions between sequences than in 1970. This then further confirms the main argument of this dissertation in that the state constitution freezes an interaction between interacting institutional actors.

Looking the military sequence, the failure at the Second Plenum that delayed the Fourth NPC had two immediate results. First, Chen Boda was purged, and Lin Biao's associates had to make self-criticisms. On Wu Faxian's self-criticism, Mao commented that some had forgotten the Party Constitution passed at the 9th Party Congress.[1] Second, Lin Biao did not seem in control of his subordinates. Thus, Mao expected him to take part in criticizing their conduct

[1] Mao Zedong, "对吴宪法检讨信的几条批注 [Some Comments on Wu Faxian's Self-Examination Letter]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 14 October 1970.

and reassert his authority over them.[2] Lin never did. Hence, Mao set out to erode his grip of the military.[3] In December he suggested Lin was not in control over the Beijing military district[4] and reshuffled it.[5] Yet Mao was dissatisfied. As a result, the Central Committee promulgated a Notice asserting the military's arrogance[6] and published materials detailing Chen's crimes. He also appointed new people to the Military Commission[7] and extended the campaign against Chen to the whole Party. The final straw came when Mao understood that Lin's generals had not passed their self-criticisms to the lower levels and he asserted that they were "false".[8]

However eventually, the campaign slowed down, and the leadership felt secure in having re-established unity—evidenced in the leadership welcoming the Fourth NPC and the promulgation of a new state constitution.[9] In mid-August, Mao proposed to hold the Fourth NPC after the national holiday in October. A hastily convened Politburo meeting launched the preparations.[10] The leadership proposed holding the Third Plenum around the national holiday and convene the Fourth NPC afterwards.[11] At the end of August, the Politburo passed a Notice

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[2] Zhang, *中央警卫团团长张耀祠回忆毛泽东 [Central Head of Security Zhang Yaoci Remembers Mao Zedong]*, 147.

[3] By "throwing stones, mixing in sand, and digging up the cornerstone". See MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 332-33.

[4] Mao Zedong, "在三十八军检举陈伯达反党罪行报告上的批语 [Comments on the 38th Army's Report on Chen Boda's Anti-Party Crimes]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 16 December 1970.

[5] Liangxiao Zhou and Juying Gu, eds., *十年文革大事记 [Events in the Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution]* (Hong Kong: 新大陆出版社 [New World Press], 2008), 628.

[6] "关于贯彻执行毛主席一月八日重要批示的通知 [Notice on Implementing Chairman Mao's Important Instructions of January 8]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 11 January 1971.

[7] Zhou and Gu, *十年文革大事记 [Events in the Ten Years of the Cultural Revolution]*, 631.

[8] Ibid., 632.

[9] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 381.

[10] Ibid., 387.

[11] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱 : 1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 475.

to this end.[12] Meanwhile, Mao continued his criticism of Lin to compel him to retire.[13] The plan for an orderly marginalization of the military was shattered when Lin Biao's plane crashed in Mongolia in the night of 12 September. His death shattered the plans to hold the NPC that October and dealt the Party a heavy blow. Lin was both a product and supporter of the GPCR. In official perception, his image was flawless. More importantly, he was Mao's successor and his name was in the Party Constitution. While Lin's death sent shock waves through the uppermost echelons,[14] this view is incomplete. Rather, Mao was happy and even toasted it.[15] Indeed, this event had no discernible influence on institutional development apart from reinforcing already pre-existing sequences.

There were several forces at play. Party-building continued in full force, further pushing back the state and reducing the space for the state and its RCs. This happened against a burgeoning bureaucracy and the hastened ejection of the military from Party and RC organs. The growth of administration at all levels required new regulations, responsibilities, and cadres in charge. Hence, Mao embraced the liberation of cadres that Zhou quickly furthered and that was welcomed at the grassroots. "Revolution" was to back up this process: its redefinition as supporting institutionalization was manifested in the reconfiguration of the "three-in-one-combination". Since it was no longer revolution against structures, masses should no longer rebel and soldiers no longer needed to stabilize the organization—as was the thinking behind the original RC during the January Revolution. What was left was an administrative organ comprising young, middle-aged, and old people united by being "cadres". This then completed the Party's conversion from a "revolutionary" to an "administrative" institution started at the

[12] Ibid., 477.
[13] MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 339.
[14] Teiwes and Sun, *The End of the Maoist Era : Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976*, 31.
[15] Qiu, *邱会作回忆录 [Recollections of Qiu Huizuo]*. 798 and 788.

9th Party Congress that was ultimately based on the haphazard decisions made during the 1967 January Revolution.

I divide this chapter into three sections. First, I look at the establishment of Party committees (PCs) on the sub-provincial level, examine the development of the bureaucracy, and the relationship between the RC and the emerging PCs. I also follow the development in the four jurisdictions of Anqing, Qujing, Chongqing, and Mianyang until 1975 to understand how their personnel changed. The second part of the chapter examines the liberation of cadres that was begun at the end of 1971 by Zhou Enlai, and then accelerated by Mao in the beginning of 1972. In the third section I look at the conversion of the Party signified by a change of the "three-in-one-combination".

Section 1: Organizational and Personnel Changes

Key to understanding the post-1970 period is the swift and widescale formation of PCs. The great majority of jurisdictions had already established RCs by the end of 1969. Party Core Small Groups (PCSGs) formation followed and sometimes accompanied RC establishment. By the end of 1970, over 95% of jurisdictions had built PCSGs. When as part of the pushback against the military the Party Centre urged the localities to construct PCs, they grew out of the existing PCSGs.[16] In late August 1970, a People's Daily editorial summarized the experiences of establishing PCs,[17] arguing that they were the guarantee for the "fulfilment of tasks" of the 9th Party Congress and the "great victory" of Mao's "proletarian Party-building line". The

[16] "关于召开地方各级党代表大会的通知 （概要） [Notice on Holding Party Congresses at Local Levels (Summary)]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 26 October 1970.
[17] "我们党在朝气蓬勃地前进 [Our Party Is Advancing Vigorously]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 27 August 1971.

committees were designed as the Party's leadership organs and key to stabilize the Party's leadership over the RCs.[18]

Table 16: Sub-provincial PCs in percent of total number, 1970-1973

	Sample size	**1970**	**1971**	**1972**	**1973**
Anhui	32	50,00	100,00		
Beijing	17		100,00		
Fujian	85	24,71	80,00	92,94	98,82
Gansu	100	14,00	98,00	99,00	100,00
Guangdong	13	53,85	100,00		
Guangxi	33	57,58	100,00		
Guizhou	54	1,85	46,30	100,00	
Hebei	55	20,00	100,00		
Heilongjiang	87	29,89	40,23	97,70	100,00
Henan	331	7,55	68,58	99,70	99,70
Hubei	51	19,61	100,00		
Hunan	76	36,84	86,84	100,00	
Inner Mongolia	32	3,13	46,88	65,63	100,00
Jiangsu	141	39,01	98,58	100,00	
Jiangxi	25	36,00	100,00		
Jilin	10	20,00	100,00		
Liaoning	23	34,78	91,30	100,00	

[18] Jinling Wang, *中国共产党党章发展史 [Development History of the Chinese Communist Party's Constitution]* (Beijing: 中共党史出版社 [CCP History Publishing Press], 2008), 157.

Ningxia	12	50,00	83,33	100,00	
Qinghai	91	48,35	98,90	100,00	
Shaanxi	60	25,00	100,00		
Shandong	86	4,65	95,35	98,84	98,84
Shanghai	83	81,93	100,00		
Shanxi	189	18,52	99,47	100,00	
Sichuan	69	4,35	81,16	89,86	100,00
Tianjin	17	58,82	100,00		
Tibet	27	3,70	7,41	85,19	100,00
Xinjiang	26	7,69	96,15	96,15	100,00
Yunnan	69		82,61	100,00	
Zhejiang	211	26,54	82,46	88,15	99,05
Accumulative percentage at the end of the year of total		23,6	84,3	97,2	99,8

Source: author's database and calculations, n=2105[19]

By the end of 1973, 99,8% of all jurisdictions in my sample had formed PCs. In the first year in 1970, this number was as low as 23,6%, but jumped to 84,3% in 1971, before reaching near universality in 1972. There were great regional differences, too. In 1970, 82% of Shanghai's sub-city level jurisdictions had formed PCs, while the same number in Guizhou was roughly two, Inner Mongolia three, and Tibet under 4%. Given that the formal Notice to form PCs was promulgated late October, Shanghai was extremely fast.[20] By comparison, Beijing and Yunnan

[19] Data was taken only for the jurisdictions where both PCSG and Party committee data was available to be aligned with Chapter IV, in which I look at the formation of PCSGs.

[20] "关于召开地方各级党代表大会的通知 （概要） [Notice on Holding Party Congresses at Local Levels (Summary)]."

had not established a single PC in 1970. Even the second highest provincial level city, Tianjin, reached a mere 59%, with nine provinces under 10%. The situation changed drastically by the end of 1971. Eleven provincial-level jurisdictions reached 100%, including Beijing. Another seven attained near universal coverage at over 90%, with six others at 80% or above. The province with the fewest PCs was Tibet, merely doubling its percentage from 3,7% in 1970 to 7,4% in 1971. By the end of 1972, just four provinces (Sichuan, Zhejiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia) were below 90%. The increase of "other" PCs, such as in work units, mirrored this growth. The number almost doubled from 2,605 in 1971 to 5,008 in 1972, growing again by over 40% to 7,026 in 1973 and 8,503 in 1975.[21]

This shows that the reconstruction of the Party was a structural feature to enhance the Party's position over the military-led RCs—rather than being a reaction to Lin Biao's death. Given that the grander public only knew of Lin Biao's death and the circumstances of it at the end of 1971, this broader trend of institution building was disconnected from his fall. Jurisdictions also responded extremely quickly. This signified a lot of demand at the sub-provincial level for the reinstitution of Party organs, mirroring the phenomenon described in Chapter IV regarding PCSG establishment. Power was concentrated and associated with the Party, not the RC. Given this fact, PC formation was even quicker and more streamlined. A flurry to build Party branches accompanied PC creation. In March 1970, the Centre promulgated Peking University's experience in rectifying the Party, recruiting new personnel, and Party branch building the grassroots.[22] Many Party organizations on the sub-provincial level picked up this experience resulting in hundreds of Party branches being set up in the following years. Party rectification

[21] CCP Central Committee Organization Department, CCP Central Committee Party History Research Office, and Central Archives, *中国共产党组织史资料 第七卷（下）社会主义事业发展新时期：1976.10-1997.9 [CCP Organizational History Materials Volume 7 (Second) New Period of Socialist Development: October 1976-September 1997]* (Beijing: 中共党史出版社 [CCP History Publishing Press], 2000), 1232.

[22] Bo Zhao and Tianshun Fan, eds., *中国共产党组织工作大事记 [Events in the CCP's Organizational Work]* (Beijing: 中国国际广播出版社 [China International Broadcasting Publishing Press], 1991), 229.

was linked to the formation of new Party branches and accompanied the formation of PCs. For example, Guangxi's Gui County was an experimental model county and built 318 new Party branches (71,1% of the total) from the beginning of 1969 until March 1970.[23] Guizhou's Songtao Miaozu Autonomous Region set up 389 new Party branches from November 1970 until July 1972 and selected 137 new Party branch secretaries.[24] In Sichuan, 93,464 new Party branches had been established by the end of 1971, 8,049 new grassroots Party committees, and 80,000 people were admitted to the Party.[25] Similarly, Tianjin had recruited 14,285 new Party members and established Party organizations in 88% of all work grassroots units.[26] In the year of 1972, Guizhou admitted 128,526 people into the Party, increasing its number of Party members by over 30%.[27]

The formation of PCs and their new supervision function over RCs and the Party's growing breadth and membership all required an expansion of bureaucratic organs and departments to manage their affairs. With the Party thrusting to replace the RCs, it can be expected that even as the RC continues to grow, the Party would outpace it. At the same time, the bureaucracy also expanded at the central government level.[28]

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[23] Office of Leading Group for Party Integration of Guixian County Party Committee, "广西贵县"文革"大事记 [Records of the Great Events of the Cultural Revolution in Guixian County, Guangxi]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, July 1986.

[24] See for example Songtao Miaozu Autonomous County Committee Party History Research Office, *中国共产党贵州省松桃苗族自治县历史大事记（1934 年 6 月——1995 年 12 月）[Events in the History of the CCP in Guizhou Songtao Miaozu Autonomous County (June 1934-December 1995)]* (1999), 169.

[25] Sichuan Provincial Committee Party History Research Office, *中国共产党四川历史大事记（1959—1978）[Events in the History of the CCP in Sichuan (1959-1978)]* (Chengdu: 四川人民出版社 [Sichuan People's Publishing Press], 2000), 387-88.

[26] CCP Central Committee Organization Department, CCP Central Committee Party History Research Office, and Central Archives, *中国共产党组织史资料 : 1921~1997 . 第六卷 , "文化大革命"时期 : 1966.5~1976.10 [CCP Organizational History Materials: 1921-1997. Volume Six, "Great Cultural Revolution" Era: May 1966-October 1976]* (Beijing: 中共党史出版社 [CCP History Publishing Press], 2000), 146.

[27] Ibid., 355.

[28] Yu, "国家政治体制建设史上的一次大倒退——1970 年四届人大的筹备与夭折 [a Great Retrogression in the History of National Political System Construction: Preparations for the 4th National People's Congress in 1970 and Its Abortion]."

Table 17: State Council functional organs, 1970-1975[29]

Year	Departments	Offices	Subordinate organs	Total Number
1970	26	1	5	32
1971	26	2	6	34
1972	26	2	7	35
1973	27	3	12	42
1975	29	4	19	52

As seen from the table, there is a linear progression in terms of bureaucracy added, first increasing slowly and then making a jump by seven from 1972 to 1973 before again adding ten new organs from 1973 to 1975 (none were added in 1974). However, compared to the provincial level analyzed below, the State Council's expansion was rather moderate.

Table 18: Provincial-level development of RC and Party departments, 1970-1975

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Anhui	40	67	45	52	51	106
Beijing	69	105	105	129	120	123
Fujian	20	26	28	33	36	56
Gansu	18	32	37	49	43	51
Guangdong	27	34	104	128	137	145
Guangxi[30]						

[29] Su and Han, *中华人民共和国中央政府机构（1949-1990）[Central Government of the People's Republic of China (1949-1990)]*, 116-20.
[30] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.

Guizhou	39	91	80	112	124	137
Hebei[31]						
Heilongjiang[32]						
Henan	21	32	55	93	85	87
Hubei	24	29	56	50	52	59
Hunan	28	27	30	41	44	46
Inner Mongolia	17	40	61	75	73	73
Jiangsu	38	50	110	78	83	95
Jiangxi	32	50	74	85	84	106
Jilin	11	12	24	62	61	64
Liaoning	32	34	65	102	105	113
Ningxia	18	34	54	81	72	76
Qinghai	27	45	54	71	63	73
Shaanxi	57	81	108	127	122	120
Shandong[33]						
Shanghai	95	108	109	122	119	119
Shanxi	25	46	64	77	76	128
Sichuan	26	24	45	107	112	116
Tianjin	58	73	76	111	113	113
Tibet	17	41	52	61	63	77
Xinjiang	56	69	71	98	97	104
Yunnan	34	36	50	68	65	66
Zhejiang	60	63	66	87	82	88

[31] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.
[32] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.
[33] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.

ALL	889	1249	1623	2099	2082	2341

Source: author's database and calculations

The number of organs at the provincial level exploded. From 1970 to 1971, the number increased by 40% and again by 30% and 29% until the end of 1973. In 1974 it decreased slightly by 1%. Growth picked up steam again until the end of 1975 with an increase of 12,5%, reaching a total number of 2,341. Thus, we can see a total increase of 163% from 1970 until the end of 1975.

There is also significant regional diversity. The highest growth rates were in Jilin, Guangdong, and Shanxi, with 482%, 437%, and 412%. Shanghai showed the lowest growth at 25%, but from a high level. From 1970 to 1971, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Guizhou (141%, 135%, and 133%) witnessed the highest growth, with negative growth registering in Sichuan (-8%) and Hunan (-4%). One year later, the picture had changed. Guangdong (206%), Jiangsu (120%), Jilin (100%), Hubei (93%), and Liaoning (91%) top the list, whereas Anhui (-33%) and Guizhou (-12%) retreated. From 1972 to 1973, the fastest-growing provinces were Jilin (158%) and Sichuan (138%), with the third, Henan, clocking in at 69%. Jiangsu that added a vast number of departments one year before, now slashed 29%, as did Hubei (-11%). Most provinces showed negative growth from 1973 to 1974. Out of the sample, just Fujian, Guangdong, Guizhou, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Sichuan, Tianjin, and Tibet continued to expand their bureaucratic apparatus in throughout 1974. This reversed in 1975 again when just Shaanxi further slashed its bureaucracy. Looking at bureaucratic development, the fall of Lin Biao had no impact. Rather, Party and RC agencies expanded throughout the entire country. The thrust to establish PCs and Party branches throughout China from top to bottom meant a great increase in the number of bureaucratic organizations and depth of control and grassroots penetration. This highlights the underlying trend which, irrespective of top-level

priorities, attached importance to an expanding organization and the provision of governance. It also shows the general trend towards institutionalization and away from personalities that had started at the 9th Party Congress. While institutions expanded, it was the Party that increased its footprint and was accompanied by a relative decline in the importance of RCs. In the 1975 State Constitution, this would manifest itself in a turn away from Mao as a person and a focus on institutions, in particular the Party's. At the same time, the Party extended its dominance over the RCs.

Table 19: Provincial-level dominance of RC departments, 1970-1975

	1970	**1971**	**1972**	**1973**	**1974**	**1975**
Anhui	-24	-51	-29	-36	-35	-6
Beijing	37	7	19	5	4	3
Fujian	20	20	22	27	28	38
Gansu	-18	-28	-33	-45	-43	-51
Guangdong	7	2	4	-2	-5	-11
Guangxi[34]						
Guizhou	15	-15	6	2	4	1
Hebei[35]						
Heilongjiang[36]						
Henan	11	6	5	1	-5	-5
Hubei	14	19	32	32	36	43
Hunan	24	23	26	23	26	26

[34] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.
[35] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.
[36] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.

Inner Mongolia	7	4	-1	-7	-5	-5
Jiangsu	22	8	14	12	5	3
Jiangxi	16	6	8	5	6	-2
Jilin	7	4	2	36	35	34
Liaoning	30	30	35	0	-3	-5
Ningxia	18	10	2	3	0	0
Qinghai	21	9	10	5	-1	-3
Shaanxi	31	19	-4	-1	0	2
Shandong[37]						
Shanghai	17	4	7	0	-3	-3
Shanxi	17	12	16	17	18	4
Sichuan	12	12	9	1	-2	-2
Tianjin	32	5	6	-3	-9	-7
Tibet	9	1	-2	-5	-3	-1
Xinjiang	8	-3	1	0	1	-2
Yunnan	24	26	30	36	41	40
Zhejiang	4	1	2	-1	-4	-2
ALL	361	131	187	105	86	89

Source: author's database and calculations

In the table above, *negative numbers* denote more Party organizations than RC departments while *positive values* signify the opposite. Overall, the relative decline of the RC was explicit, from a high of 361 in 1970 to a low of 86 at the end of 1974 and reaching an equilibrium then.[38]

[37] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.
[38] The 1975 value of 89 remains stable until the end of the GPCR.

Regional differences show that the Party in Anhui and Gansu had always had by far more organizations than its RC, the only two provinces in the sample. What becomes clear from a chronological point of view is that the Party reinserted itself and reintroduced its authority. While in 1970 just two provinces had more Party organizations than RC departments, this number reached five in 1972, eight in 1973, 12 in 1974 and 14 by 1975. With a negative number indicating Party takeover, the by 1975 the Party had replaced the RC in 14 provinces (of 25 in the sample). In other words, the Party was far from being the "core" of RCs rather than replacing them with its own administrative apparatus.

However, the total numbers remain volatile. Even in 1975 there was no clear balance visible between Party and RC, with Hubei having 43 more RC departments and Gansu 51 more Party organizations than RC departments being outliers. Overall, the table shows the marginalization of the RCs relative to the expanding PCs and its organs and the Party's substitution of the RC. This focus on institutions and the Party in particular, while already evident in the 1970 constitutional draft, would then be the hallmark of the 1975 State Constitution. The gradual comeback of the Party was mirrored in its growing strength vis-à-vis the RC, as shown in the table below.

Table 20: Provincial-level Party versus RC growth, 1970-1975

	69-70	**70-71**	**71-72**	**72-73**	**73-74**	**74-75**
Anhui	-22	-27	22	-7	1	29
Beijing	-8	-30	12	-14	-1	-1
Fujian	5	0	2	5	1	10
Gansu	-16	-10	-5	-12	2	-8
Guangdong	2	-5	2	-6	-3	-6

Guangxi[39]						
Guizhou	0	-30	21	-4	2	-3
Hebei[40]						
Heilongjiang[41]						
Henan	1	-5	-1	-4	-6	0
Hubei	13	5	13	0	4	7
Hunan	11	-1	3	-3	3	0
Inner Mongolia	7	-3	-5	-6	2	0
Jiangsu	-4	-14	6	-2	-7	-2
Jiangxi	0	-10	2	-3	1	-8
Jilin	3	-3	-2	34	-1	-1
Liaoning	7	0	5	-35	-3	-2
Ningxia	13	-8	-8	1	-3	0
Qinghai	13	-12	1	-5	-6	-2
Shaanxi	12	-12	-23	3	1	2
Shandong[42]						
Shanghai	-18	-13	3	-7	-3	0
Shanxi	14	-5	4	1	1	-14
Sichuan	5	0	-3	-8	-3	0
Tianjin	-7	-27	1	-9	-6	2
Tibet	-3	-8	-3	-3	2	2
Xinjiang	4	-11	4	-1	1	-3

[39] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.
[40] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.
[41] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.
[42] No data for departments in revolutionary committees.

Yunnan	14	2	4	6	5	-1
Zhejiang	-1	-3	1	-3	-3	2
ALL	45	-230	56	-82	-19	3

Source: author's database and calculations

As the table shows, from 1970 to 1971, the number of Party divisions increased by over 230 over their RC counterparts. At a time when the bureaucracy was expanding significantly, much of this growth belonged to the growth of the Party. Regional differences are vast, with Guizhou (-30), Beijing (-30), and Tianjin (-27), and Anhui (-27) showing the highest growth of their Party organization vis-à-vis the RC. Just Yunnan and Hubei's RCs grew faster than their Party organs. The situation reverses in the year thereafter when Guizhou (21) and Anhui (22) post much higher growth of their RCs than their Party. Overall, the RCs expanded much quicker from 1971 to 1972 than their Party counterparts, a trend reversed from 1972 to 1973, when 82 more Party organizations were built than RC departments. This should not come as a surprise. The high number for the 1970-1 period derives from the vast establishment of Party committees throughout China, reaching 84,3% in 1971 (as shown above). The situation grows also less volatile from 1973 onward when no single area posts a double-digit overhang of either Party or RC organization. This shows that by then, Party and RC building had balanced itself (except for Anhui, Fujian, and Shanxi from 1974 to 1975).

This shows that the Party reasserted itself over the RCs and gradually replaced it. At the same time this did not mean that the RC had become obsolete. Rather, power was over-proportionately concentrated in the "administrative" Party vis-à-vis its "administrative" RC. Bureaucratic growth thus indicates that their conversion was (both overall and regionally) reinforced and even intensified. With the growth of Party structures and the swelling Party and RC bureaucracy, new people took up leadership responsibilities, highlighting some new trends.

Table 21: Leading personnel in four jurisdictions, 1970-1975

		1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Anqing							
Total number of leading personnel		149	203	225	267	255	268
Of which (in %)	Military	22,8	22,17	17,78	14,23	12,16	9,33
	Mass[43]	21,5	14,78	13,78	11,24	10,98	10,45
	Rest	55,7	63,05	68,44	74,53	76,86	80,22
Qujing							
Total number of leading personnel		147	136	157	177	184	206
Of which (in %)	Military	22,5	19,12	16,56	14,69	11,41	9,22
	Mass[44]	15,7	15,44	12,10	10,73	10,33	8,74
	Cadre	14,3	16,18	12,74	11,30	9,78	9,71
	Rest	47,6	49,26	58,60	63,28	68,48	72,33
Mianyang							
Total number of leading personnel		191	224	263	343	299	322
Of which	Military	28,3	21,88	17,49	12,24	7,69	6,52
	Mass[45]	16,2	14,29	12,17	9,33	11,04	10,25
	Cadre	22	23,21	28,52	23,91	27,09	29,19

[43] Mass includes peasants, students, and workers.
[44] Exists as own category.
[45] Mass includes peasants, students, teachers, and workers.

(in %)	Rest	33,5	40,63	41,83	54,52	54,18	54,04
Chongqing							
Total number of leading personnel		293	320	435	462	469	491
Of which (in %)	Military	51,9	48,75	32,64	22,51	18,34	13,03
	Mass[46]	8,9	7,50	5,52	5,19	5,12	4,89
	Cadre	4,1	2,19	1,38	1,52	1,49	1,43
	Rest	35,2	41,56	60,46	70,78	75,05	80,65

Source: author's database and calculations

Most notably, throughout all four jurisdictions, the number of personnel increased drastically from 1970 to 1975. In Anqing, the number rose by 80%, in Qujing by 40%, in Mianyang by 69% and in Chongqing by 68%. In Anqing and Mianyang the number decreased in 1974, which was in line with the decrease in bureaucratic organs throughout China during that time.

When looking at the "three-in-one-combination," we can see drastic changes in its composition. As expected, the percentage of military representatives decreased enormously. In Anqing, it gradually declined from 23% in 1970 to 14% at the time of the 10th Party Congress in 1973 and further to a mere 9% in 1975. In Qujing, the number of military representatives decreased from 22,5% in 1970 to 15% in 1973 and 9% in 1975. More drastically was the change in Mianyang, with 28% in 1970, 12% in 1973 and a mere 6,5% in 1975. The military saw the greatest decline in Chongqing, falling from 52% in 1970 to 22,5% in 1973 before reaching an all-time low of 13% in 1975. This is significant since this shows that the decision to order the military to return to its barracks in August 1972 did not mean a break in the administration of

[46] Includes peasants, students, and workers.

military representatives of RCs and Party organizations.[47] Rather, their number decreased gently instead of manifesting an abrupt break as one would expect. From 1970 until 1975, the military was in steady decline and did not rebound in any of the four samples. This indicates that structural factors have a much higher importance than formerly understood and that the military remained relevant the entire time. This claim needs to be qualified: many soldiers had become part of the administrative Party and were identified (though not in the materials used here) as “cadres” rather than “soldiers”. There is for example no doubt that after the military was sent to its barracks in 1972, it ceased to play the kind of powerful role it had at the 9th Party Congress, especially given support at the top was missing with Lin Biao’s death and the purge of his associates.

Compared to the drastic decline of the military, the number of mass representatives, though low and declining, remained stable. While in 1970, mass representatives made up 21,5% of leading personnel in Anqing, this number was roughly halved by the time of the 10th Party Congress and experienced just a minor further decline until the end of 1975. Regardless, by 1975, the number of mass representatives surpassed the number of military personnel in Anqing’s Party and state organizations. A similar feat occurred in Mianyang. Resisting the steep decline of military personnel, the number of Mianyang’s mass representatives fell by a mere 6% from 1970 to 1975, overtaking the military in 1974 and increasing from 1973 to 1974. While Qujing and Chongqing’s mass representatives among leadership personnel could not claim such a victory, their percentage dropped by 4% in Chongqing and by 7% in Qujing. It is important to note that even though the number of mass representatives as a percentage of the total declined over time, the total number of personnel from the masses increased. Thus, Mianyang had 31 mass representatives in 1970 and 33 in 1975. With the decline of both

[47] "关于征询对三支两军问题的意见的通知（概要）[Notice on Consulting Opinions on the Issue of Three Supports and Two Militaries (Summary)]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 21 August 1972.

military and mass representatives, cadre representatives could not benefit. In Qujing and Chongqing, their meagre 1970 percentages decline, reaching 9,7% and 1,4% in 1975. Mianyang is an exception here, with cadre percentages rising from 22% in 1970 to 29% in 1975. It is important to note that by 1973, mass organizations were reestablished that absorbed the former rebels to the Party and institutionalized them—as during the 9th Party Congress, this introduced "revolution" into the Party and equaled the conversion of "revolution," but on a grander scale.

The most important data point from this table however is the "rest" of non-classified cadres that makes up an increasing number of leadership personnel. In Anqing their number went up from 56% in 1970 to 75% in 1973 and over 80% in 1975. In Chongqing it reached 71% in 1973 and 81% in 1975. Qujing did not boast as many, with 63% in 1973 and a little over 72% in 1975. Mianyang is an outlier with a mere 55% in 1973 and 54% in 1975. Pitted against the rising number of cadre representatives in Mianyang and the relative decline of the others, this shows that many of the "rest" cadres were labeled as "cadre" representatives. All the "rest" thus were cadres and took over most leading posts in 1970 (Anqing), 1972 (Qujing and Chongqing), and 1973 (Mianyang). As already established in Chapter IV, most of the "rest" entered their positions during the GPCR. However, as I have noted before, the gap between the "new" personnel (58,5%) and "old" personnel (41,5%) is not dramatic.

The rise of the "rest" shows a new dynamic in the administration of Party organizations and RC departments. The Party's rising importance coincides with the conversion of "revolution" (both at the 9th Party Congress and through the reestablishment of mass organizations) to reinforce structure rather than oppose it. This taps into one of the main trends: since 1969, but especially with Lin Biao's death, all sequences supported fast bureaucratization, creating a positive feedback loop, where institutional growth led to even more growth. Since revolution involving mass organizations and rebellion against the Party-state was no longer necessary and

the military was being ejected, fewer jurisdictions found it necessary to identify people as military, cadres, and mass representatives—rather, everybody became a cadre.

In the same way, everybody then had a stake in supporting institutional growth. While the sample is not enough to generalize from, it points to a shift in line with slowly adapting recruitment standards. A People's Daily article from July 1973 showed that since the start of the GPCR, 60,000 people in Beijing had entered the Party, of which 76% were workers and poor and lower middle-class peasants; in Shanghai, the Party counted 33,600 new members since the 9th Party Congress. In Tianjin, 16,000 people entered the Party during the GPCR. The report also mentioned that since 1969 Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, Guangxi, Ningxia and other minority areas recruited 143,000 members of minorities into the Party.[48] Combined with the growth of Party organizations and the military's retreat, this shift placed the "rest" in leadership positions and ensured they were in command of the local bureaucracy. This was reflected at the central level in the form of cadre liberation and a change in ideology exemplified by the de-emphasis of the traditional "three-in-one-combination" and its refocusing on seniority that took place in 1973, entered the Party Constitution in 1973 and the State Constitution in 1975, showcasing a major shift in conceptualizing the role of revolution, the Party, and the RC.

The bureaucratic growth in the early 1970s further solidified the conversion of "revolution"[49] and furthered the increase in departments that strengthened both government and Party.[50] This was not lost on the leadership. The reversal in 1974 was because of a revived focus on reducing

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[48] "在毛主席的无产阶级建党路线指引下 北京、上海、天津大批先进分子被吸收入党 新党员在三大革命运动中发挥先锋模范作用 [under the Guidance of Chairman Mao's Proletarian Party Building Line, a Large Number of Advanced Elements from Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin Were Absorbed into the Party. New Party Members Played a Vanguard and Exemplary Role in the Three Revolutionary Movements]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 1 July 1973.

[49] By mid-1970, former Red Guards and revolutionaries had already become disillusioned. See Unger, "Whither China?: Yang Xiguang, Red Capitalists, and the Social Turmoil of the Cultural Revolution."

[50] Teiwes and Sun, *The End of the Maoist Era : Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976*, 75.

bureaucracy following the promulgation of the Lingbao experience (coupled with a campaign aimed at ousting Zhou Enlai).[51] This shift is gradual and compounded by the leadership's focus to establish the Party against the military-controlled RCs as a separate source of power. It was just because PCs had been established that Mao could play with the thought of ousting Lin Biao in the summer of 1971.[52] Likewise, the lack of impact and steadfast continuity following his fall happened because institutions were steady. The shift to cadres and a bigger Party apparatus to exert control over the RCs therefore had a stabilizing function at a time when the military was being revamped and ejected from leadership positions.

Section 2: Administration

The shift from one type of "three-in-one-combination" to another that characterized the rise of skilled administrators (the "rest") in the RCs and PCs was a result of the conversion of the RC and Party into administrative entities and the introduction of "revolution" into the Party. Here, all sequences supported institutional growth.

This manifested itself as a theoretical shift among the top leadership and a changing understanding of how the Party and RCs should operate. Zhou Enlai criticized the ultra-leftist tendencies, reinvigorated the economy, overhauled enterprise management, and liberated old cadres.[53] Meanwhile, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao, while criticizing Zhou Enlai, solidified the position of the GPCR and the elevation of revolutionaries into leadership positions. After Lin's demise, Mao proactively filled the power vacuum and supported Zhou Enlai's attempts to normalize government work and liberate formerly disgraced cadres. This occurred against

[51] "来自灵宝的新经验 [the New Experience from Lingbao]."

[52] Wang, *大动乱的年代 [the Age of Great Turmoil]*, 443.

[53] Dittmer argues that Zhou Enlai "attempted to resuscitate the engineering approach to continuing revolution, which conceived a positive relationship between economic growth and prosperity and the realization of socialism, sequential and well-organized advance under hierarchical leadership" Lowell Dittmer, *China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 125.

the backdrop of an increasingly strong sub-national bureaucracy and a pushback against the military. Lin Biao's fall therefore sped up trends already under way.

After Lin's fall, the question arose regarding whom Mao could trust and rely on in the top leadership. Few people in the leadership knew about Lin's crash in the Mongolian desert. Even Lin's secretary Yu Yunshen reports that, while hearing people trample in the middle of the night at Maojiawan, he did not think too much about it. Rather, he only noticed something was "off" when he was not allowed to leave the next morning.[54] On 29 September, the Centre sacked Lin's allies on the Politburo Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo.[55] Mao had already criticized them before, but now they were purged. New staff had to be found with little preparation. Mao and the leadership thus turned to old and tested cadres and military personnel.

The first step involved a meeting with old cadres that included Chen Yi and Nie Rongzhen. Nie wrote that the meeting fulfilled an important function in "letting people thoroughly understand Lin Biao's character".[56] Even if most of Lin's criticized mistakes were minor and well-known to old cadres, the meeting was important to establish a common understanding and consensus regarding Lin's betrayal. This built the foundation for cadre rectification by giving them a semi-official position. In a criticism session with the Chengdu district, Mao said the "February Counter-current"[57] should not be mentioned again because it was old commanders criticizing Lin Biao, Chen Boda, and others. They wanted to "overthrow everything," including the Premier and the old commanders. He had mentioned earlier that this was not a direct result

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[54] Yu, "于运深口述：我给林彪当秘书的最后一年 [Yu Yunshen's Oral Account: My Last Year as Secretary to Lin Biao]."

[55] "关于黄永胜等人离职反省的通知 [Notice on Huang Yongsheng and Others' Resignation and Introspection]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 29 September 1971.

[56] Zhou, *聂荣臻年谱 [Chronicles of Nie Rongzhen]*, 846-47.

[57] The others include Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu. Needless to say, this is not what it was. Rather, it was mainly a dispute between old cadres and revolutionaries concerning the treatment of the former during the GPCR. If Chen Boda is included in this list, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan should be included, too.

of the GPCR per se but “bad men leading from behind”.[58] Thence, the Centre formed a special group to investigate Lin Biao and Chen Boda and established a new organ for old and tested cadres to resume work.

While by the end of 1971 steps were being taken to prepare the leadership to bring back old cadres, two other trends are worth mentioning: strengthened ideological education, and the reinstitution of rules and regulations in enterprise management. As early as October, Lenin’s articles were being republished in the People’s Daily and emphasis was put on discipline[59] and revolutionary unity.[60] At the same time, various districts held meetings to criticize Lin Biao, the “four greats” praising Mao were banned, and the Centre stopped erecting Mao statues. With respect to enterprise management, the economic plan for 1972 drafted from December 1971 until February 1972 reflected the rectification of industry, rejection of anarchism, and the reinstitution of accounting, management, and a regulatory framework.[61] An outline was drafted to be sent to factories but Zhang Chunqiao opposed it vehemently since it went far in reinstalling a pre-GPCR system.[62] Regardless of Zhang’s opposition, industry underwent an overhaul to institutionalize management techniques and regulations to combat bad quality

[58] Hua Zhang, "九一三事件后毛泽东的思想矛盾及其变化 [Mao Zedong's Ideological Contradictions and Their Changes after the September 13 Incident]," *中共党史研究 [Research on the history of the Communist Party of China]*, no. 2 (1992): 64.

[59]"发扬革命传统　争取更大光荣——人民解放军指战员自觉执行“三大纪律八项注意”的故事 [Carry Forward the Revolutionary Tradition and Strive for Greater Glory - Story of People's Liberation Army Commanders Consciously Implementing the "Three Major Disciplines and Eight Attentions"]," *人民日报 [People’s Daily]*, 28 October 1971.

[60] "唱好两首革命歌曲 [Singing Well Two Revolutionary Songs]," *人民日报 [People’s Daily]*, 28 October 1971. See also "总结加强党的领导的经验 [Summarizing the Experience of Strengthening the Party’s Leadership]," *人民日报 [People’s Daily]*, 1 December 1971.

[61] Dexin Zhao, ed., *中华人民共和国经济专题大事记（1967-1984）[Economic Events of the People's Republic of China (1967-1984]* (Zhengzhou: 河南人民出版社 [Henan People’s Publishing Press], 1989), 55.

[62] Ruoshui Wang, "从批”左“到批右的转折——回忆一九七二年在批林反震上的分歧 [from Criticizing the “Left” to Criticizing the Right — Recalling the Differences in the Anti-Earthquake in Criticizing Lin in 1972]," *百年潮 [Hundred Years Tide]*, no. 5 (1998).

products. For implementation, Mao and Zhou could rely on the PC and Party branch infrastructure established in 1971 and 1972 to circumvent the unreliable RCs and exert authority over them.

By the end of 1971, the Party Centre and the State Council were catching up with the reality. With the absorption of young rebels into the Party, widescale Party-building, and the marginalization of the military, the Party worked on its own institutionalization at the grassroots. With the restoration of the Party having ended, the question was "what comes next". From Zhou Enlai's perspective, the answer was clear: using the new organs to push forward institutionalization. This was not a personal decision, however rather than reinforcing the positive feedback loop of the Party, RC, and revolution that all supported bureaucratic enlargement. At the same time, the line of the 9th Party Congress called for the Party's strengthening over RCs. Zhou's drive toward economic revitalization and the reestablishment of a regulatory framework was less "revisionism" and a "turning back of the clock" than the logical conclusion of a "new" and "reinvigorated" Party that supposedly comprised new elements. These "revolutionary" elements would be locked in as parts of a new governing system. The setting up of new Party branches and the absorption of new Party members at all levels went hand in hand with old cadres' liberation starting in 1972.

It was also in January 1972 when Mao opened the pathway for rectification after he attended Chen Yi's funeral and classified Deng Xiaoping's "problem" as "among the people," thereby opening the pathway for his rehabilitation.[63] Zhou used Mao's action as an opening for the rectification of disgraced cadres by branding Lin Biao and designating them as his victims. He appropriated Mao's language and pushed forward with economic construction and cadre

[63] Mao Zedong, "对陈毅悼词的批语 [Comments on Chen Yi's Mourning Address]," in *建国以来毛泽东文稿（第13册）[Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic (Volume 13)]*, ed. CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office (Beijing: 中央文献出版社 [Central Party Literature Press], 1998 [1972]).

liberation. On 24 April, the People's Daily published an editorial edited by Zhou that reiterated the Party's cadre policies, arguing that over 90% of cadres were good and that even though they had committed mistakes, they could be rectified.[64] It pointed out that the Party's old revolutionaries were its most "valuable treasure" and there ought not to be any "mountain-stronghold-mentality" or "dogmatism" regarding their liberation. Rather, people had to differentiate between contradictions between "enemy and people" and contradictions "among the people". Multiple articles focusing and explaining the cadre problem followed this editorial's publication, producing the discursive framework for liberation.[65] By May, 90% of the altogether "6,627 department-level Beijing cadres" had been liberated.[66]

Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao attacked this new trend and believed it went too far. Shanghai's leadership gave instructions to tone down the emphasis on bringing back old cadres and focus on training new cadres.[67] While, apart from Shanghai, their influence was minuscule and rectification went ahead, this exposed a bigger issue: the relationship between old and young cadres and the role of revolution within the Party. According to Zhang and Yao Wenyuan, the Centre had focused over-proportionally on bringing back old cadres rather than training young people and revolutionaries. There was no problem with the liberation of old cadres per se, but their ability to bring back their networks and entrenched pre-GPCR thinking remained a concern. As the data on the "rise of the rest" showed, the leadership faced the

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[64] "用毛主席的革命路线和政策衡量干部 [Measuring Cadres Using Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line and Policies]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 7 February 1972. See also Yang Lu, "正确理解和处理政治与业务的关系 [Correctly Understanding and Handling the Relationship between Politics and Business]," *红旗文稿 [Red Flag Manuscripts]*, 1 April 1972.

[65] Jianshe An, ""九一三"后周恩来领导的批判极左思潮的斗争 [the Struggle of Criticizing Extreme Leftist Thought Led by Zhou Enlai after "913"]," in *回首"文革"——中国十年"文革"分析与反思（下）[Looking Back at the "Cultural Revolution"—Analysis and Reflection on China's Ten Years of the "Cultural Revolution" (Part Two)]*, ed. Hua Zhang and Caiqing Su (Beijing: 中共党史出版社 [CCP History Publishing Press], 2000), 1077.

[66] MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 341-42.

[67] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 567.

problem of a shifting "three-in-one-combination". The ejection of the military and shift in the conversion of "revolution" meant that mass representatives were no longer needed and soldiers had either become part of the Party or were powerless. Rather, everybody was a cadre now, with "young" cadres classified as "revolutionary" and elevated into leadership positions. It was not important if they were workers, students, or cadres before–rather, being young was a guarantee for having revolutionary experience.

Table 22: New and old leading cadres' number (#) in four jurisdictions, 1970-1975[68]

	1970	**1971**	**1972**	**1973**	**1974**	**1975**
Anqing						
# of "new" leading cadres	97	131	139	162	153	158
# of "old" leading cadres	52	72	86	105	102	110
Qujing						
# of "new" leading cadres	100	88	100	109	117	130
# of "old" leading cadres	47	48	57	68	67	76
Mianyang						
# of "new" leading cadres	131	157	168	190	146	164
# of "old" leading cadres	60	67	95	153	153	158
Chongqing						

[68] "New" cadres attained their leadership positions during the GPCR and had not held any leadership positions in the jurisdiction before. "Old" cadres had had leading positions in this jurisdiction before the GPCR.

# of "new" leading cadres	214	224	261	241	243	258
# of "old" leading cadres	79	96	174	221	226	233

Source: author's database and calculations

Looking at a temporal breakdown of "new" cadres who attained their leadership position during the GPCR, we can see clear trends. Growth differs and starts already from 1970 to 1971 before Lin Biao's fall. In Mianyang and Chongqing, the number of old cadres grew by 42% and 81% from 1971 to 1972. In Qujing the number increased by 19% (from 2%), while in Anqing growth was halved from 38% to 19%. In Mianyang, Qujing, and Anqing the increase gathered further steam, with 61%, 19%, and 22% growth from 1972 to 1973. In Chongqing, growth fell to a still substantial 27%. This ended in 1974 when growth fell to zero (Mianyang) and 2% (Chongqing). Qujing and Anqing showed a decrease by 1,5% and 3%. Hence, Zhou Enlai's recruitment of old cadres in 1972 even extended into 1973 and manifested itself in high growth rates in all jurisdictions. This shows that Zhou's policies reinforced an existing trend and were undisturbed by a stop in advocating them at the end of 1972 (see next section). The stagnation and the slight decrease in 1974 were related to a general stop in the construction of bureaucratic departments. Growth was lower for "new" cadres since their total number was higher from the onset. In 1970, the number of "new" leading cadres was more than double that of old ones, in Chongqing almost triple. The gap slowly closed, with old cadres coming back and their growth outpacing that of new cadres. However, except for 1974 Mianyang, new leading cadres always outnumbered old ones.

While the numbers do not tell us anything about the cadres' age, there was a clear balance between old and new cadres staffing the rebuilt Party organization.[69] Elevated during the GPCR, new cadres were "forged" during it and not necessarily young in terms of age. This was also the backdrop of elite-level disputes. It was in 1972 that Wang Hongwen was transferred to the Party Centre from Shanghai to start his study at the Centre.[70] Wang combined both versions of the "three-in-one-combination" since he was young, a cadre, worker, and former soldier. Living with Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan over the next months, Wang participated in meetings and spoke multiple times with Mao, all the while studying theory and resolving disputes.[71]

Section 3: Revolution and Administration

With the retreat of the military from their positions and exacerbated after the fall of Lin Biao and the liberation of old and disgraced cadres, power was in their hands. In August 1972, the military was ordered to return to its barracks.[72] This ejected them from positions of power altogether. As I showed in part one of this chapter, this led to a substantial reduction in the number of military personnel in the RCs and Party organizations. With the military mostly gone, cadres replaced them in most jurisdictions.[73] The number of mass representatives in

[69] Andors remarks that the GPCR marked an "influx of workers and new cadres into organs of local government". Stephen Andors, *China's Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning and Management, 1949 to the Present* (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), 213. Accordingly, "before the Cultural Revolution, workers made up 23 percent of the total number of government representatives and managerial personnel about 77 percent. After the Cultural Revolution, workers made up about 48 percent and managerial personnel about 52 percent." Ibid., 212.

[70] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *毛泽东年谱（1949-1976）第六卷 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong (1949-1976) Volume Six]*, 448.

[71] Xun Li, "王洪文的升沉 [the Rise and Fall of Wang Hongwen]," *炎黄春秋 [Yanhuang Chunqiu]*, no. 10 (2015).

[72] "关于征询对三支两军问题的意见的通知（概要）[Notice on Consulting Opinions on the Issue of Three Supports and Two Militaries (Summary)]."

[73] Haiting Guan, ""革命委员会"始末 [the Beginning and End of the "Revolutionary Committee"]," in *回首"文革"——中国十年"文革"分析与反思（下）[Looking Back at the "Cultural Revolution"—Analysis and*

leading positions remained stable. The focus on cadres coupled with a thrust to absorb young blood resulted in the transformation of the "three-in-one-combination". This in turn was a result of the consolidating conversion of "revolution" that took place within the Party.

By early 1973, this change from one to another type of organization was already entrenched at the national level. The New Year's editorial argued that the unions, the CCP Youth League, the Red Guards, and other organizations should be rectified and gradually rebuilt—this further bound former rebels to the Party, therefore completing the conversion of "revolution". However, this also meant that the very idea of "mass representatives" had become redundant. With the military gone, this left cadres standing as the last part of the original "three-in-one-combination". The editorial rectified this. Accordingly, all leadership organs should use the principle of "old, middle-aged, and young" ("OMY") and well use old cadres while training new cadres, especially from workers, women, and ethnic minorities.[74] Mao mentioned this first as early as 1953 when he said the Party should insert young cadres into the Central Committee and "abundantly trust young people".[75] During the GPCR, the idea was also floated but in other forms. In 1967, the dictum of "OMY" was used, with young (小) denoting revolutionary cadres older than 20. As Mao pointed out, the "three-in-one-combination" needed to include young cadres to train the next generation. He said older cadres should not all be overthrown.[76] Zhou Enlai later specified that "young" meant 20 to 40 years, "middle-aged" 40-50, and 60-70 "old". He added that without young people, there would be no "new blood" and neither bureaucracy

Reflection on China's Ten Years of the "Cultural Revolution" (Part Two)], ed. Hua Zhang and Caiqing Su (Beijing: 中共党史出版社 [CCP History Publishing Press], 2000), 882.

[74] People's Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily, "一九七三年元旦社论 [1973 New Year's Editorial]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 1 January 1973.

[75] Hai Wang, ed., *毛泽东大辞典 [a Great Dictonary of Mao Zedong]* (广西人民出版社漓江出版社 [Guangxi People's Publishing Press Lijiang Publishing Press], 1992), 844.

[76] Mao Zedong, "在"五一"和"五一"的前两天召开的中央常委、文革小组和政治局会议上的讲话（摘要） [Speeches at the "May 1st" and Two Days before "May 1st" Central Standing Committee, Cultural Revolution Group and Politburo Meetings (Summary)]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 29 April-1 May 1967.

nor revisionism could be attacked and rooted out.[77] In another speech in early 1968, Zhou suggested the proportion of old to middle-aged to young should be 1:3:6.[78] In March 1970, Peking University's report on rectification detailed the establishment of grassroots Party organizations and implementing the "old, middle-aged, young" combination as a method to recruit new personnel for the Party. These people, it stated, should be recruited from workers, PLA propaganda troupes, and revolutionary cadres within schools.[79] Apart from Mao's five and Lin Biao's three standards, this idea of recruiting young, middle-aged, and old members complemented the original "three-in-one-combination". Thus, from the beginning, the "three-in-one-combination" included both a functional and age separation that was included in the 1970 constitutional draft and was therefore nothing extraordinary.

This slowly changed thereafter. An editorial in January 1971 mentioned that the election of Party committee members followed the principle of "OMY," stating that many of those elected stemmed from the "first line" of workers, peasants, and soldiers.[80] Likewise, the leadership of Henan used this phrasing.[81] In early 1971, a Red Flag article argued that this combination was beneficial for the establishment of a "centralized and democratic, disciplined and free" Party organization.[82] These however were isolated trial balloons. In August 1971, a People's Daily

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[77] Zhou Enlai and Xiannian Li, "周恩来李先念接见十四个省市夏季粮油征购会议全体人员的谈话记录 [Records of Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian Meeting with All Delegates of the Summer Cereals and Oil Purchase Conference of Fourteen Provinces and Municipalities]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 3 May 1967.

[78] "接见全国卫生工作会议代表的讲话 [Speech When Meeting the Delegates at the National Health Work Meeting]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 3 January 1968.

[79] "中共中央批发北京市革命委员会送来的北大宣传队关于斗、批、改经验总结的三个报告 [CCP Central Committee Publishes Three Reports from the Peking University Propaganda Team Summarized and Sent by the Beijing Revolutionary Committee Regarding the Struggle, Criticize, Change Experience]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 15 March 1970.

[80] "毛主席建党路线的胜利 [the Victory of Chairman Mao's Party-Building Line]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 31 January 1971.

[81] Xin Wang and Jianxun Liu, "在河南省各地市领导同志座谈会上的讲话 [Speech at the Symposium of Leading Comrades in Henan Province]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 28 March 1971.

[82] Writing Group of Hunan Provincial Committee, "进一步加强党的民主集中制 [Further Strengthening the Party's Democratic Centralism]," *红旗文稿 [Red Flag Manuscripts]*, 1 January 1971.

editorial argued that the leadership of the Party at all levels had to implement the OMY combination.[83] In an authoritative editorial, the old version of the "three-in-one-combination" however continued to prevail.[84] Similarly, in the "National Education Work Meeting Summary" the old versions lingered on.[85] After Lin Biao's death, the new phraseology became further entrenched. With the military discredited and the need to continue recruiting new personnel in the Party, military cadres were dropped from the "three-in-one-combination". Now, old cadres were to train new personnel. In a speech at a criticism meeting, Mao's five conditions for successors were highlighted along with the OMY.[86] In July 1972, Mao asserted that the Party had to choose young people of worker or peasant status of 30 to 40 as deputy chairmen and military commission deputies to avoid falling into revisionism after old cadres retire.[87] Wang Hongwen, Chen Yonggui, Wu Guixian 吴桂贤, and Ni Zhifu's 倪志福 inclusion into the Party elite exemplified this change.[88] The same phraseology was then again used at a meeting of "Reform of Criminals Through Labour Work Meeting" in December 1972.[89] Another article even went further. Arguing that the Party had always relied on old cadres to achieve its victories, old and new cadres needed to unite and learn from each other.

[83] "我们党在朝气蓬勃地前进 [Our Party Is Advancing Vigorously]."

[84] People's Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily, "纪念中国共产党五十周年 [Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 1 July 1971.

[85] "中共中央批发《全国教育工作会议纪要》 [CCP Central Committee Publishes the "National Education Work Conference Summary"]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 13 August 1971.

[86] Siyu Zeng, "在河南省委批林整风会议上的讲话 [Speech at the Rectification Meeting to Critcize Lin Biao at the Henan Provincial Committee]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 14 November 1972.

[87] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, Pang, and Jin, *毛泽东传：1893-1976（第六卷） [Biography of Mao Zedong: 1893-1976 (Volume Six)]*, 2623.

[88] Qingyang and Longmen, *新发现的周恩来 [Newly Discovered Zhou Enlai]*, 367.

[89] "第七次全国劳改工作会议纪要 [Summary of the Seventh National Conference on Labor Reform]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 18 December 1972.

It even cites Mao as having declared that the lack of cooperation between old and young cadres would disrupt the Party's mission.[90]

By December 1972 the traditional line of "soldiers, cadres, and mass" representatives therefore was abandoned in favor of a model focusing on seniority, referring to the leadership at grassroots level Party groups and not denoting a general principle.[91] Regardless, this slow dismissal of a "hard standard" regarding functions accompanied the liberation of cadres. The New Year's editorial in 1973 officially put forward this principle.[92] A number of articles then elaborated it. In "Red Flag" an article argued that the principle uses the experience of old cadres to educate and guide the young, while transferring the "high-spirited" attitude of the young cadres to the old.[93] An editorial in the People's Daily also noted that since the beginning of the GPCR, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin had recruited thousands of new members. In all three cases, it stressed the need for the new Party members to unite with old cadres and learn from them.[94] Before the 10th Party Congress at a meeting, Zhou Enlai explained to the assembled Politburo Mao's organizational line of the "old, middle-aged, young" combination and defending Wang Hongwen.[95] At the 10th Party Congress in 1973, Zhou Enlai mentioned that the GPCR created the "experience of the old, middle-aged, young three-in-one-combination"

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[90] Hong Jiang, "不断增强新老干部的革命团结 [Constantly Enhance the Revolutionary Unity of New and Old Cadres]," *红旗文稿 [Red Flag Manuscripts]*, 1 July 1972, 63-67.

[91] Haiting Guan, ""文化大革命"中"三结合"的台前幕后 [Behind the Scenes of the "Three-in-One-Combination" of the "Great Cultural Revolution"]," *华夏文摘 [China News Digest]* 411 (2005).

[92] People's Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily, "一九七三年元旦社论 [1973 New Year's Editorial]."

[93] Tong Yu, "加强干部队伍的建设 [Strengthen the Construction of Cadres]," *红旗文稿 [Red Flag Manuscripts]*, 1 June 1973.

[94] "在毛主席的无产阶级建党路线指引下 北京、上海、天津大批先进分子被吸收入党 新党员在三大革命运动中发挥先锋模范作用 [under the Guidance of Chairman Mao's Proletarian Party Building Line, a Large Number of Advanced Elements from Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin Were Absorbed into the Party. New Party Members Played a Vanguard and Exemplary Role in the Three Revolutionary Movements]."

[95] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱 : 1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 614-15.

to train successors for the GPCR's mission.[96] Likewise, in his report, Wang Hongwen mentioned it as an organizational principle of the CCP and linked it with "socialist succession".[97] The make-up of Party organizations and committees was to mirror the priorities of combining old, middle-aged, and young people. The Central Committee of the 10th Party Congress implemented this principle in its own make-up, however without giving them assignments with "real power".[98] This language then signified a turn away from the model of cadre, military, mass representatives form of political organization. Looking at the numbers, however, the principle did not have a major effect on cadres in Party committees.

Table 23: Age distribution of Party committee personnel, 1972-1975 (% in brackets)

Level	**Year**	**Total**	**Age**			**Average Age**
			<40	41-55	Above 56	
Province	1972	428	43 (11,69)	203 (47,43)	182 (42,52)	53,11
	1973	466	53 (11,37)	191 (40,99)	222 (47,64)	53,08
	1974	463	52 (11,23)	161 (34,77)	250 (54)	53,98
	1975	444	53 (11,93)	126 (28,38)	265 (59,68)	54,32

[96] Zhou Enlai, "在中国共产党第十次全国代表大会上的报告（1973 年 8 月 24 日）[Report at the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (24 August 1973)]," in *("文化大革命"研究资料（下册）["Cultural Revolution" Research Materials (Last Volume)]*, ed. People's Liberation Army, National Defense University, and Party History Party Building Political Work Research Office (1988), 27.

[97] Hongwen Wang, "关于修改党章的报告（1973 年 8 月 24 日）[Report on Amending the Party Constitution (24 August 1973)]," in *("文化大革命"研究资料（下册）["Cultural Revolution" Research Materials (Last Volume)]*, ed. People's Liberation Army, National Defense University, and Party History Party Building Political Work Research Office (1988), 30.

[98] Zheng, *张春桥：1949 及其后 [Zhang Chunqiao: 1949 and after]*, 864.

District	1972	3,946	383 (9,71)	3,180 (80,59)	383 (9,71)	43,36
	1973	4,333	534 (12,32)	3,120 (72,01)	679 (15,67)	48,75
	1974	4,709	623 (13,23)	3,179 (67,51)	907 (19,26)	49,08
	1975	4,746	633 (13,34)	3,027 (63,78)	1,086 (22,88)	49,65
County	1972	22,151	5,797 (26,17)	16,015 (72,3)	339 (1,53)	42,92
	1973	25,699	6,094 (23,72)	19,020 (74,01)	585 (2,28)	43,70
	1974	26,809	6,066 (22,63)	19,937 (74,37)	806 (3,01)	43,89
	1975	27,181	6,207 (22,84)	19,959 (73,43)	1,015 (3,73)	44,25

Source: author's database and calculations[99]

According to the data, the percentage of cadres classified as "young" increases from the upper to the lower levels. This should not be surprising: young cadres traditionally entered the lower levels first and then worked their way up. In terms of total percentages, the provincial level was in the hands of old cadres, while on district and county levels, middle-aged cadres reigned supreme. What is unexpected is that the change in the characterization of the "three-in-one-combination" had no profound impact on the percentage and even total number of young

[99] CCP Central Committee Organization Department, CCP Central Committee Party History Research Office, and Central Archives, *中国共产党组织史资料 第七卷（下）社会主义事业发展新时期：1976.10-1997.9 [CCP Organizational History Materials Volume 7 (Second) New Period of Socialist Development: October 1976-September 1997]*. Various pages.

cadres.[100] While the total number at the provincial level increased from 1972 to 1973, the percentage decreased since it was more than compensated by the increase in old cadres above 56. On both the provincial and district level, the total number and percentage of old cadres exploded from 1972 to 1973, showcasing the success of cadre liberation. The minuscule increase of young cadres at the district level showed the relative failure of central policies. While there were 151 more "young" cadres in 1973 than in 1972 and the percentage jumped by 2,6 points, this paled against the number of old cadres (plus 296 and 6%). However, compared to provincial and county levels, the district level was successful in both recruiting young cadres and liberating old ones. At the county level, this was reversed, with the percentage of young cadres decreasing over time, contrary to central policies. Old cadres played no significant role here either even though they were growing in numbers, it was from a low base. Here, most new recruits were in the mid-range, jumping from 16,000 cadres to almost 20,000 within two years. Thus, on the provincial level the effect of cadre liberation was the most pronounced (42,5% in 1972 to 59,7% in 1975), whereas on the district level both young and old cadre numbers increased, with priority given to the latter. Both policies seem to have had a minuscule impact on the county level. This is borne out by the average age of personnel that rose across the board except for the provincial level from 1972 to 1973 when it decreased by a minuscule 0,03 years. Needless to say, Zhou's 1968 desired proportion of 1:3:6 for old, middle-aged, and young was never attained anywhere.

The two changes in policies from a "soldier-cadre-mass" representative to an OMY "three-in-one-combination" and the liberation of cadres had varying, but overall, negligible effects at the three levels. This both shows the relative power of old cadres behind the scenes and the need for the Party to have them come back. When the Party called, they were ready and re-entered

[100] Teiwes and Sun argue that the new formulation was "sensitive to Mao's concern for new blood in official institutions." For them, it grew out of Zhou's liberation of cadres. See Teiwes and Sun, *The End of the Maoist Era : Chinese Politics During the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976*, 44-45.

it. This general trend did not change when Zhou Enlai's attempts were shut down at the end of 1972. Rather, while high profile liberations discontinued, at the sub-national level they charged forward. Lastly, what is notable is that the number of cadres rose throughout the entire period but stabilized in 1974 (except in 1975 at the provincial level when it fell, because of the impact of a simplification of administration thrust). This is in line with the bureaucratic development in the Party and RCs detailed in part one of this chapter.

Indeed, the conversion of revolution to support organization rather than destroying it, is in full display here. The change from one "three-in-one-combination" to another is mainly cosmetical. This is mainly because when the "revolution" sequence clashed with the Party, "revolution" had already changed. At the 9th Party Congress, this led to unexpected results: when the leaders of the already "administrative" and military-led RCs moved into the Party, they converted the Party into an "administrative" institution—likewise, the few Shanghai revolutionaries were institutionally neutered, and revolution was reconceptualized. Revolution was then based on the administrative and institutional apparatus of the Party. By 1973, the military was out, and mass representatives introduced into the Party through the reestablishment of mass organizations. With everybody a cadre now and revolution happening inside structures, the OMY combination was the next logical step to preserve revolution. Revolution inside the Party then meant young cadres' criticism of old cadres. This was how revisionism was to be prevented. However, it had not worked during the 9th Party Congress that followed a revolutionary mass movement and there was no reason to believe it would work now as part of a top-down process. Indeed, as the data showed, they were crushed by the administrative apparatus.

Conclusion

The four sequences did not experience any conversion in the period between 1970 and 1975. Rather, the existing arrangements were subject to reinforcement. Thus, Lin Biao's fall had no major impact rather than reinforcing already prevailing sequences. The Party's reconstruction was completed in summer 1971 before Lin's death and its bureaucratic expansion ongoing, with the Party reasserting its power over the RC and the military. The military's decreasing relevance in the administration of local levels was clear as early as 1969, with the absorption of new and return of old cadres gaining momentum from 1970. Lin's death did not affect these trends. However, while it had no impact at the lower levels, a major consequence was psychological. Zhang Wentian writes that it signified the GPCR's "failure".[101] An integral part of the line brought forward at the 9th Party Congress, it was impossible that his death would not have any impact at all at the top-level. While the insertion of older cadres with leadership experience preceded Lin's death, it sped up this process. Zhou's liberation of old cadres from autumn 1971 was high-profile and mirrored sub-national changes that had already been ongoing. The military's formal retreat to their barracks complemented this thrust. While symbolically important, it was insignificant given that entrenched military leaders had already become "cadres" rather than "military representatives" and continued to linger on in diminished numbers. Without having immediate effects, Lin Biao's fall nevertheless quickened these processes. Lin death was therefore not a break with previous practices rather than locking them in.[102]

[101] Zhongyuan Cheng, "张闻天传略 [Brief Biography of Zhang Wentian]," in *中共党史资料 [CCP Party History Materials]*, ed. CCP Central Party History Research Office (Beijing: 中共党史资料出版社 [CCP Party History Materials Publishing Press], 1990), 182. See also MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, 338-39.

[102] Patricia M. Thornton, "Crisis and Governance: Sars and the Resilience of the Chinese Body Politic," *The China Journal*, no. 61 (2009).

The military's gradual decline and eventual ejection in 1972 coincided with the continued conversion of "revolution". It had already moved into the Party and categories like "mass representative" and "soldier" lost meaning. Since everybody was a "cadre" now, how was revolution to be enacted? This led to a shift from "military-cadre-mass" to "old, middle-aged, young". While it failed completely, this completed the conversion of "revolution". In theory, this was much like what the old guard had experienced: they participated in the revolution prior to 1949, where they gained administrative experiences in the base areas, before being thrust into a governing position in 1949, which they then consolidated. Ideally, the new generation of "socialist successors" would have experienced the same cycle. However, haphazard choices made early in the January Revolution led to a cycle of conversion that ultimately led to a bureaucracy that reinforced itself. Indeed, while it stabilized its growth by 1974, in 1973 it had reached pre-GPCR levels.[103] Since they were locked in a feedback loop, the "administrative" Party and RC did not stop adding bureaucracy. They *had* to continue since all sequences supported it. The 1975 State Constitution was the by-product of this profoundly anti-revolutionary arrangement. This is the topic of the next chapter.

[103] Tsou argues that the government bureaucracy "survived the Cultural Revolution in much better shape than the Party". As I have showed, this is not true. Tang Tsou, "Marxism, the Leninist Party, the Masses, and the Citizens in the Rebuilding of the Chinese State," in *Foundations and Limits of State Power in China*, ed. Stuart R. Schram (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1987).

Chapter VIII: Freezing an Evolving Institutional Order

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the 1975 State Constitution. With Lin Biao's death in September 1971 and the military's ejection in 1972, of the four sequences, three remain: the RC, Party, and revolution. Here, "revolution" had moved into the Party and, supporting instead of demolishing administration, been consolidated as OMY. At the same time, the Party has positioned itself vis-à-vis the RC as hierarchically superior and as its administrative core. Hence, the Party for all intents and purposes had substituted the RC. With both the Party and RC reconfigured as "administrative" and "revolution" supporting institutional growth, it is no surprise that by 1973, the bureaucracy had surpassed pre-GPCR levels.

The 1975 State Constitution is a by-product of the sequences' interaction. As such, it incorporates the same sequences already visible in the 1970 constitutional draft. However, this time it incorporates the way they have been reinforced since 1970. It freezes the four sequences by postulating the primacy of the Party; the RC's absorption by the Party; the absence of the military; and revolution as part of the Party's institutional apparatus. This happens against the backdrop of an increasingly strong Party and state machinery. For all intents and purposes, this meant that the State Constitution had been supplanted by the Party.

The 10th Party Congress reaffirmed these trends. "Continuous revolution" at the 10th Party Congress was a consolidated version of "revolution" during the 9th Party Congress where it had moved into the Party's structure. By doing so, the 10th Party Congress set revolution inferior to structure and defined both as originating in the Party's institutions.[1] Mao captured

[1] It therefore regularized the political system. See Ahn, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order."

this himself when saying: “when a Party leads a revolution to victory it must rely on its correct political line and the consolidation of its organization”.[2] These new (old) relationships between the Party, revolution, and the RCs were then embodied in the 1975 State Constitution.

The 4th NPC and the 1975 State Constitution

The State Constitution of 1975 mirrors the interactions between the different sequences at that time. This means it is based on a process that started with the January Revolution in 1967 and that has developed since then. Of the four original sequences, by 1975 three were left: “Party,” “RC,” and “revolution”. However, by the time of the 4th NPC, both the “RC” and “revolution” were rooted within the organizational and political structure of the Party—not just that everything emerged from it: rather, they were substituted by it. Likewise, the military was gone and was therefore de-emphasized. Institutional development had surpassed pre-GPCR levels and made “Mao” as a symbol or any other focus on individuals, superfluous. The State Constitution therefore has five main characteristics:

- The supremacy of the Party;
- The lack of any discernible military influence;
- The absorption of the RCs under the Party;
- The rooting of revolution within the Party’s institutional structure;
- A focus on bureaucratic structure.

The State Constitution passed at the 4th NPC froze the interactions between the sequences as they evolved and changed each other between 1970 and 1975. This constructed a state constitution that, while different from the 1970 constitutional draft, was rooted in the process

[2] Cited in Wang, "关于修改党章的报告（1973 年 8 月 24 日）[Report on Amending the Party Constitution (24 August 1973)]." 一个政党要引导革命到胜利，必须依靠自己政治路线的正确和组织上的巩固

set in motion by the critical juncture of the 1967 January Revolution. Thus, "continuous revolution" had properly moved into the Party. Bureaucratic development had surpassed pre-GPCR levels and Mao was de-emphasized and not even mentioned in the 1975 State Constitution—as he was no longer "needed" anymore. Likewise, the Party had substituted the RCs. With a change in "continuous revolution," rebellion was no longer against the institutions of the Party-state, rather than within and connected to ideas of thought "rectification". This is manifested in the changing "three-in-one-combination" that dropped the "military-cadre-mass" class in favor of an age-based criterion. Young "revolutionary" cadres thus transformed the "old cadres" with their vigor, while the latter taught their younglings about administration. Hence, the growing strength of the Party has led to it substituting the RCs. This meant that the State Constitution effectively structured a state that was very small, weak, and subsumed by the Party.

The State Constitution relates to concurrent ideas, issues, and its accompanying documents. Compared to the 1970 constitutional draft that memorialized the experiences leading up to the end of 1969, the 1975 State Constitution reinforced and intensified the trends already visible in the 1970 draft. Unlike the 1970 constitutional draft, organizational and theoretical changes from 1971 onward signified a strong institutional basis as a backup and an even stronger focus on institutions. This means that contrasted with its 1970 predecessor, it had more in common with the 1954 State Constitution, its Party-state dualism, and focus on strong institutions. It contained affirmations of pre-GPCR aims, concepts, and tenets, and affirmed the GPCR's institutional achievements.

Elaborating on the State Constitution's context, Zhang Chunqiao explained that the State Constitution was based on the draft passed at the Second Plenum in 1970. There were four

main changes however:[3] contrary to the 1970 constitutional draft, this draft eliminated references to Mao's name. While some delegates had wanted to restore them, Mao, and the Politburo had agreed to delete them. Zhang mentioned that this was in line with the 1954 State Constitution where his name also was not mentioned. Regarding some delegates' wish to write the sentence "struggling for the realization of communism" into the State Constitution, Zhang responded that among China's 800 million people, a significant number disagreed. He added that this could be discussed at a later time. Further, the meetings of the local People's Congresses were not regulated, with detailed regulations forthcoming from the NPC's Standing Committee. Lastly, on the establishment of Standing Committees in the People's Congresses in the localities, Zhang said that the RCs in the localities were themselves the Standing Committees of the People's Congresses. According to him, this did not merit an inclusion at this time.

While Zhang Chunqiao in his report said the preamble was "written new" for the State Constitution,[4] this was only partially correct. There were many similarities between the 1970 and 1975 preambles and while some was rewritten, key tenets from the 1970 constitutional draft remained. As the report on the constitutional amendment is crucial to understanding the changes, it is the preamble that is the key to unlocking the meaning of the changes and continuities. Apart from the preamble, there were subtle changes to the main text. It is within these differences that the balance of power between the sequences as they interacted from 1970 until 1975, becomes clear. These modifications in priorities, meaning, and phrasing show the changed situation the leadership found itself in and manifests an understanding of institutional development.

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[3] The following four points are based on General Office of the NPC Standing Committee Political Research Group, *中国宪法精释 [Interpretation of the Chinese Constitution]*, 33.

[4] Chunqiao Zhang, "在第四届全国人民代表大会关于修改宪法的报告 [Report on the Amendment of the State Constitution at the 4th National People's Congress]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 13 January 1975.

The State Constitution and its accompanying report are teeming with old vocabulary from the pre-GPCR period. The preamble starts with describing China's history and struggle. However, the narrative was different in 1975. In the 1970 draft, the Chinese people established the PRC under the leadership of "the great leader Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party" and "through long-term armed struggle". In the 1975 State Constitution, the PRC's establishment forms the first part of the sentence. This formation, it states, resulted from "the heroic struggle of the Chinese people for over one hundred years". It was then under the leadership of the CCP that the people used the "people's revolutionary work" to overthrow the "reactionary governance of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism".

There are four issues to note. First, in 1970, the people are emphasized, whereas in 1975 the establishment of the PRC is the focus. This exemplifies the shift from "people" to "institutions". Second, "Mao Zedong" formed the core role in the 1970 draft and his relationship with the people was hierarchically higher than that between the people and the CCP. Third, in the 1975 State Constitution, the "people's revolutionary war" is a method whereas in 1970 and 1954 it was not mentioned. It links the method to the leadership of the CCP that introduced it to the struggling people. The CCP provided the tools to the people to overthrow previous forms of governance and establish the PRC. It thereby gives agency to the people and establishes the CCP's importance as a medium (a vanguard) that was to provide the operational and ideological tools for the revolution to succeed, being in charge of the state machinery. Fourth, "heroic struggle" under the CCP in the 1975 State Constitution comes right from its 1954 predecessor.

More importantly, the preamble shows the creation of new legitimacy by building institutions. With the liberation of cadres, legitimacy had to be recreated by affirming their role but without sacrificing the GPCR's core. This was not the case in 1970. The insertion of 1954 constitutional rhetoric is an immediate result of a perceived need to introduce a language that could mirror a

highly institutionalized situation wherein the Party had taken over the state. The problem was there was no vocabulary that combined the strong institutions of a pre-GPCR period with the GPCR—given that the latter was a reaction to the very strength and embeddedness of the former. Hence, as a result of the growth of bureaucracy we end up with a mishmash of old aims and institutions and GPCR phrases and ideas and a conjoined and complementary rhetoric.

There are four notable differences with the 1970 constitutional draft. None of the ideas in the preamble are original or new. Rather, some concepts do not even originate from the GPCR rather than the 1950s and 1960s.[5] First, "pushing forward on the back of victory" replaces "continuously pushing forward". This idea came up early in 1968 but was properly used only in October 1970. It is therefore a recent development after the Second Plenum and found its way on many books published since then.[6] With the reestablishment of Party institutions and organizations from 1969 onward, the GPCR was institutionally over by 1971. "Continuous revolution" was to be consolidated to enact revolution within institutions and not against them. Notably, in 1975 "continuous revolution" became a "theory," a feat it had not accomplished by 1970. Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan's texts that would elevate it to the standard of a "theory" were only published later in 1975.[7] Likewise, Mao had never published any theoretical article on "continuous revolution". This reflects the changed understanding of "continuous revolution" by 1973 that entered the State Constitution. While it first denoted revolution against the Party-state's institutions, after it had moved into the newly developed Party organs, its development was over, and it could attain the status of "theory"—it is also

[5] Judging from the constitution the GPCR failed to create "a new language of revolution". See Arif Dirlik, "Revolutionary Hegemony and the Language of Revolution: Chinese Socialism between Present and Future," in *Marxism and the Chinese Experience: Issues in Contemporary Chinese Socialism*, ed. Arif Dirlik and Maurice Meisner (Armonk, N.Y and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1989).

[6] People's Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily, "继续革命　乘胜前进——庆祝中华人民共和国成立二十一周年 [Continuing the Revolution and Carrying Forward the Victory — Celebrating the 21st Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 1 October 1970.

[7] Gu, "文革，其实没理论 [the Cultural Revolution Has in Fact No Theory]."

possible that Zhang and Yao's articles were already planned out. In this case, the "theorization" would follow the promulgation of the State Constitution.

Second, the insertion of "correctly handling contradictions among the people and between the people and enemies". This is a nod both to "continuous revolution" and Mao's "Five Philosophical Works" of which "Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People" forms a major part. These works were republished after the Second Plenum in 1970 and highlight Mao's instructions to the elite to study Marxism and his major works. The sentence was introduced to the 1973 Party Constitution and linked to the "three musts and must nots". Including this phrase affirms the GPCR's main theoretical credo and emphasizes the pre-GPCR period, establishing a contradictory grey space. However, it is also important to see what was deleted. Here, the 1970 draft echoes the 1969 Party Constitution with its use of "vigorous and high-spirited" for Party and state personnel. In 1975, this reference was deleted, therefore removing a reference to the unity of the Party and the state. Indeed, it was not needed since institutions had already been developed. This will also be apparent in the main text.

Third, the idea of "building the country with diligence and thrift" was also added to the 1975 State Constitution's preamble. Before the GPCR, Mao had used it in 1955 when educating the Party on practicing austerity.[8] This concept later rose to prominence during the "Let One Hundred Flowers Campaign" in 1957 and became a staple in People's Daily articles.[9] In the

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[8] Mao Zedong, "农业合作化的一场辩论和当前的阶级斗争 [a Debate on Agricultural Cooperation and the Current Class Struggle]," in *毛泽东选集 第五卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume Five]*, ed. 中共中央毛泽东选集出版委员会 [Committee for Publishing Mao Zedong's Selected Works] (Beijing: 人民出版社 [People's Publishing Press], 1977 [1955]), 172.

[9] "我们的行动口号——反对浪费，勤俭建国！[Our Action Slogan - against Waste, Diligently Building the Country!]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 2 February 1958. This article was followed by "鼓起干劲，力争上游！[Encourage Enthusiasm, Strive for the Top!]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 3 February 1958. "高产区能再跃进 低产区也能跃进 [High-Yield Areas Can Leap Again, Low-Yield Areas Also Can Leap]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 4 February 1958. and "发动群众打破陈规 [Mobilize the Masses to Break Outmoded Conventions]," *人民日报 [People's Daily]*, 7 February 1958. All in 1958. Initially, these articles were meant to criticize rightist tendencies.

GPCR, it first came up in a prominent space in February 1968 as an instruction by Mao to stop waste and economism and strengthen management of finance.[10] However, even before that it had its own category in the Little Red Book. In the 1971 New Year's editorial, this phrase came to be used together with "independent and autonomous, self-reliant, struggle hard among difficulties". Accordingly, the editorial instructed the people to further launch the "industry should study from Daqing, agriculture should study from Dazhai, and the whole nation should study from the PLA" to fulfill the national economic plan. Events in the early 1970s then led the concept gaining greater importance in Chinese political discourse. Together with "self-reliant" and "struggle hard among difficulties," the concept was part of the thoughts on socialist economic construction. Again, this highlights the shift towards institutions away from people. This meaning defines it in the 1975 State Constitution since the idea neither entered the 1969 Party Constitution nor the 1970 constitutional draft. However, the phrase entered the 1973 Party Constitution and was adopted by the 1975 State Constitution. Similarly, "prepare for combat, famine, for the people" was first inserted into the 1973 Party Constitution before being adopted in 1975. This was not a new concept either, as it was in use before the GPCR and adopted in economic plans at the provincial and county levels. Regarding foreign policy, a major change is "China will never be a superpower". This idea was developed from the concepts of "dig deep caves, expand grain production, don't seek hegemony" and is an adaption of "prepare for combat, famine, for the people" to the international sphere.[11] Zhang Chunqiao's report echoes this, reiterating that China did not want to be a hegemon and would never be.[12] Mao himself described it as "national policy" in a meeting with Algerian officials in February

[10] In "关于进一步实行节约闹革命，坚决节约开支的紧急通知 [Emergency Notice on Further Implementing Saving and Revolution and Resolutely Saving Expenditures]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 18 February 1968.

[11] Wang, *毛泽东大辞典 [a Great Dictonary of Mao Zedong]*, 764.

[12] Zhang, "在第四届全国人民代表大会关于修改宪法的报告 [Report on the Amendment of the State Constitution at the 4th National People's Congress]."

1974[13] and it was a theme at Deng Xiaoping address to the United Nations in April 1974. Hence, it became a cornerstone of China's foreign policy and was embedded into the State Constitution.

Perhaps the two most important differences between the 1970 draft and the 1975 State Constitution however are the omission of references to Mao and the negligible role of the military. As I argued in Chapter V, these references were to unite Party and state under Mao's banner in the absence of palpable institutions. By 1975 this was different. On the back of a burgeoning bureaucracy and the absence of a military threat, the strength of the Party's "administrative" institutions and their supremacy over the "administrative" RCs were established. The deletion of the military and its subordination under the Party is the outcome of the pushback against the military starting already in 1969, but in earnest after the Second Plenum, ending with the 1972 Decision to send it back to its barracks. Hence, the ending of the "military" sequence is reflected in the 1975 State Constitution.

An analysis of the general program further substantiates this impression. Article 2 eliminates Lin Biao. It also drops Mao's name in favor of the CCP that became the "nation and people's leadership core". The article further states that the working class realizes its leadership over the state through the CCP as a vanguard. As Zhang Chunqiao notes, this sentence is beneficial for forming the unified leadership of the Party over the state.[14] While Mao as a person is de-emphasized, China's institutional achievements are focused on. Mao's name was no longer needed to hold together China since the bureaucracy had even surpassed pre-GPCR levels. The State Constitution thus de-emphasizes Mao while retaining the Party's substitution of state. Combined with the change in "continuous revolution" and the new "three-in-one-

[13] CCP Central Committee Party Materials Research Office, *周恩来年谱：1949~1976 (下卷) [Chronicles of Zhou Enlai: 1949-1976 (Third Book)]*, 654.

[14] Zhang, "在第四届全国人民代表大会关于修改宪法的报告 [Report on the Amendment of the State Constitution at the 4th National People's Congress]."

combination," the institutional landscape was different—as was their strength. Regarding staff, the recruitment of new cadres and Party members to the Party had already taken place, thereby completing the phase of the GPCR's institutionalization. Unification was "done" and had been "achieved," a successor had been installed and Mao's personal cult was no longer needed. The State Constitution therefore moved away from a personalized view of the Chinese body politic to focus on institutions. Thus, Article 15 adds one sentence, establishing the CCP's Central Committee as the organ in command of the PLA.

Article 10 deletes the phrase "political work is the life line of all economic work" from the 1970 constitutional draft without replacing it. Hence, political work is deemphasized, though not eliminated since it is still part of the "grasping revolution, promote production" clause. The phrase "abundantly manifest the initiative of the Centre and the localities" was added. According to Zhou Enlai, this means to better implement the Angang Constitution, and to deepen the movements to study Daqing and Dazhai under the umbrella of the state's national plan.[15] This idea however had come up earlier as a part of Mao's early economic thinking. Already in "Discussing the Ten Relationships" from 1956, Mao used this phrase to describe the relationship between the Centre and the localities to hand down management power while guaranteeing the leadership of the central government.[16] In 1966, he told Liu Shaoqi about the need for the central government to focus on big policies and plans and give more economic autonomy to the localities. However, with the start of the GPCR and widespread chaos, Mao's instructions were never implemented.[17] While the need to reform inadequate regulatory

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[15] Zhou Enlai, "在第四届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的报告 [Report at the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress]," *Song Yongyi Cultural Revolution Database*, 13 January 1975.

[16] Longsheng Gu, ed., *毛泽东经济年谱 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong's Economic Decisions]* (Beijing: 中共中央党校出版社 [Central Party School Press], 1993), 376.

[17] Donglin Chen, ""文化大革命"时期毛泽东的经济思想探析 [an Analysis of Mao Zedong's Economic Thoughts During the "Cultural Revolution"]," in *回首"文革"——中国十年"文革"分析与反思（上）[Looking Back at the "Cultural Revolution"—Analysis and Reflection on China's Ten Years of the "Cultural*

institutions was put forward at the 9th Party Congress, this part did not make it into the 1970 constitutional draft. With the focus being put on the reconstruction of Party power, the economy, and drafting a new state constitution in 1970, the idea was refurbished in a conversation with Edgar Snow in December 1970. Here, Mao elaborated the problem of transporting coal to the South and foodstuffs to the North, arguing that the Centre should not interfere, rather than letting the provinces figure it out.[18] He further said the "Centre has one initiative, the localities have another initiative, [I] have talked about this for ten years but they would not listen, now they are listening".[19] The insertion of this sentence was therefore a way to highlight the relative stability that had emerged since 1970. It also highlighted the importance of power devolution and "transferring authority to a lower level". This sentence is then an important indicator for the bureaucratic and management strength of both the Centre and the localities. It shows the Centre's traditional and newfound weakness while showcasing the downgrading of ideological and personal factors in favor of institutionalization.

This focus on the Party, a growing bureaucracy and institutionalization, the economy, and stability correspond to a broader understanding of what ideology is and what it should do. Article 11 was changed heavily in this direction. Thus, state organ workers must study "Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought" as well as maintaining the "command over the proletariat". Zhang Chunqiao argued that this was included to highlight the importance of socialist revolution in the "grasping of the superstructure". Article 11 then introduces a sea change by redefining the "three-in-one-combination" to comprise the "old, middle-aged, young" combination rather than also including the cadre, military, and mass representatives.

Revolution" (Part One)], ed. Hua Zhang and Caiqing Su (Beijing: 中共党史出版社 [CCP History Publishing Press], 2000).

[18] Gu, *毛泽东经济年谱 [Chronicles of Mao Zedong's Economic Decisions]*, 649.

[19] Zhao, *中华人民共和国经济专题大事记（1967-1984）[Economic Events of the People's Republic of China (1967-1984]*, 12.

This is linked to a clause preceding it that refers to "cadres at all levels" rather than, as in the 1970 constitutional draft, "employees of organs," which could include everybody, including military and mass representatives. These changes mirror the development and changing role of the Party and RCs. This both shows the transition from a radical revolutionary organ born in the January Revolution into an administrative governance organ with a staff that was both "professional" and "revolutionary".

Article 14 then deletes the phrase of "counterrevolutionary elements". There was no need to include it in the State Constitution as a separate part even though it was naturally covered under "other bad elements" and the clause that "all traitors and counter-revolutionary elements" would be punished and suppressed. Finally, Article 27 adds a phrase stating that every citizen may deliver a spoken or written complaint against a state employee who misuses his position or acts illegally. This is a literal quote from the 1954 State Constitution. Regarding the RC's functions, there were no major changes except for Article 22 that added a half-sentence strengthening higher levels' control over lower level RCs. Thus, the selection of a head and deputy head must be confirmed by higher level organs. As in 1970 already, RCs were regarded as administrative organs integrated into the local People's Congresses. This clauses' addition reinforces the People's Congress system's control over the RCs both vertically and horizontally. Further, we must also consider the impact of this "institutional" state constitution on other articles. "Speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big-character posters" was institutionalized within this Party system and had already stopped to be a hallmark of revolution. There was no room for law since these achievements were still regarded as superior to a legal and court system. Even though courts were now functional, they were embedded in an organizationally strong Party and state system. Hence, in effect, law as a

tool had become even more useless than in 1970, leaving little room for actual criticism.[20] Revolution was not to come from the outside rather than the inside and the GPCR was to give birth to a self-revolutionizing Party.

The drafters made a few, but consequential changes to the State Constitution that mirrored the interactions between the sequences as they had evolved since 1970. In his remarks, Zhang Chunqiao stated what the State Constitution signified. He proposed that the 1954 State Constitution was China's "first" "socialist-type" of state constitution, which was not the same as a fundamental law. Rather, a state constitution uses the "form" of a fundamental law to "summarize historical experiences," "consolidate the Chinese people's victorious achievements," and "establish a bright and clear path forward for the people of the country".[21] Since 1954, he argued, China had undergone changes and that the summary of the new experiences is to consolidate the recent victory and to reflect the common hope of the people for "continuous revolution". This, he believed, was the "main task" of the constitutional amendment.

On 17 January 1975, the representatives passed the new State Constitution. On the same day a Communiqué was published arguing the whole people of all ethnicities "seriously implement and courageously safeguard the new [State] Constitution, striving to realize all battle tasks proposed by the meeting, further develop the good trend, consolidate and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, and struggle for the new victory of the socialist revolution and socialist construction." Zhou Enlai was to be premier until his death in January 1976, Deng Xiaoping first vice-premier, followed by Zhang Chunqiao. Of the 12 vice-premiers, just two

[20] Watson notes "there appears to be little in the reconstruction of the Party, education, and career disciplines which indicates a formal channel for the expression of such extensive criticism". See Andrew J. Watson, "A Revolution to Touch Men's Souls: The Family, Interpersonal Relaions and Daily Life," in *Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China*, ed. Stuart R. Schram (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

[21] Zhang, "在第四届全国人民代表大会关于修改宪法的报告 [Report on the Amendment of the State Constitution at the 4th National People's Congress]."

had a working-class background. Peasant Chen Yonggui of the Dazhai brigade even had to be convinced to be vice-premier. While the NPC was restored in January 1975, after the second meeting of the NPC Standing Committee in March 1975 it seized to work again to be restored in November 1976. In the localities the local People's Congresses would just be revived in October 1977 after a hiatus of twelve years.

Conclusion

While the dissertation has been building up to the 1975 State Constitution, this chapter was profoundly anti-climactic. Given that the State Constitution is the haphazard freezing of the interactions between the four path-dependent sequences characterized by conversion and rooted in the critical juncture of the 1967 January Revolution, this had to be so. The actual text of the State Constitution therefore could not come as a surprise. As the 1970 constitutional draft, the 1975 State Constitution is a by-product of the interactions between the sequences of Party, RC, military, and revolution. Hence, we can make four points.

Looking at the Party sequence, the trend pre-1975 has already confirmed the importance of its organizations vis-à-vis all other sequences. First re-established to balance against a military-heavy RC, the RC was soon placed under the Party, thereby significantly reducing military influence. At the same time, revolution was also introduced and institutionalized in the Party. Having undergone a conversion itself, revolution came to support structures instead of destroying them. This then led to the conversion of the Party into an administrative organ that is highlighted in the 1975 State Constitution. Having internalized the RC and revolution and booted out the military, everything flowed from the Party and the state the State Constitution structures, was reduced to a shadow of itself.

The RC was subsumed under the Party. As such, the RC was already declining by the time of the 9th Party Congress, being turned into an administrative rather than revolutionary organ.

Hence, in the 1975 State Constitution, the position of the RC does not undergo any significant change. With its main advocates in the military on their way out, the RC continued to linger on as an organ both politically and organizationally controlled by the Party. Combined with the Party's strength, this meant a factual overtake of the RC through the Party.

One of the great differences between the 1970 constitutional draft and the 1975 State Constitution was the role of the military. Whereas in the former it had an outstanding role as the guardians of the RCs and a production and administrative force at the grassroots, with the expanding Party and bureaucracy in general, this position was gradually eroded. Mistakes made by them during the Second Plenum then furthered their marginalization, leading up to the death of Lin Biao, which effectively deprived them of any power in the administrative Party and RC. When they were sent back to the barracks in summer 1972, they had exited the stage of political organization. Hence in the 1975 State Constitution, the military, while included, is part of the institutional corset of the Party rather than having their own organizational power basis.

Finally, from 1970 until 1975, "revolution" consolidated its conversion to become part of the Party's institutional system. Not only were top revolutionaries included in the Party's organization—the "three-in-one-combination" had also been transformed: not anymore based on functions (cadre, mass, soldier), it was now based on age, with "young people" ostensibly representing the "revolution" and "old people" the experienced cadres. This was not so much a conversion rather than a logical step to internalize revolution within institutional structures: young people were to "rectify" the old people's thinking. The insertion of this phrase and the theory of "continuous revolution" thus denotes not the rebellion against structure but presumes the support for it.

All these sequences had come to support bureaucratization and institutionalization. Due to the conversion of the Party and RC from "revolutionary" to "administrative," the organs were locked into a feedback loop that added a bigger bureaucracy. As a result, by 1973, the number

of departments and agencies had already surpassed pre-GPCR levels. Slowing down in 1974, they rose yet again in 1975. This led to the dilemma that a language had to be found to combine the GPCR's focus on revolution and strong institutions—likewise, another problem was what to do with this strength. The result was an amalgamation of pre-GPCR jargon with GPCR phraseology, leading to a State Constitution that pretended to incorporate the GPCR to reach the very aims and using the very institutions that cadres had been persecuted for pursuing and staffing.

In the final conclusion, the State Constitution is then as chaotic as the chaos out of which it was born: the 1967 January Revolution. The 1975 State Constitution then comes from *chaos* that produced *chaotic* sequences, leading to *chaotic* institutional change and interactions. Paradoxically in the end it does not prescribe *chaos* rather than institutional strength and stability. It truly is Schrödinger's State Constitution.

Conclusion

In the preceding pages, I have argued that Chinese state constitutions "reflect and temporarily freeze ongoing and haphazard interactions unfolding amongst actors and institutions". I have described the political developments surrounding the drafting of the 1970 constitutional draft and the promulgation 1975 State Constitution through a process of "conversion" unfolding between four sequences: the RC, Party, military, and revolution. All of them are rooted in the critical juncture of the 1967 January Revolution. In this moment of extreme contingency, decisions made gave rise to political and juridical consequences that reverberated until the end of the GPCR. Models of political organization, such as in Guizhou or Shanxi, were dismissed in favour of Heilongjiang's RC; Shanghai's bottom-up workers' revolution became a model for the destruction of the Party-state; experiences with the military stabilizing the new "revolutionary" organs were affirmed; and the dismissal of the Shanghai Commune kept the Party alive. None of these decisions was predetermined. Rather, they were quick fixes to problems *at a particular time*. The history of the January Revolution debunks both the depiction of a Machiavellian Mao ruthlessly eliminating his political rivals—as his choices show, his aims were unclear to him even at the time. If he had thought in terms of long-term political and institutional development and foreseen the outcomes of his decisions, he clearly would have chosen differently. Rather, and quite understandably, he wanted quick fixes to problems he faced at that time.

As I showed, the affirmation of these four sequences led to a long process of random conversion amongst them. Thus, Shanghai-inspired revolution in the countryside led to the conversion of the military from a fighting into an administrative force. Here it is necessary to stress the unintended nature of the outcomes of revolution: clashes between rebels were construed as being misunderstandings of central policy. Since they ended up filling the vacuum, the military

then converted the RCs from initially "revolutionary" into "administrative" organs. This went hand in hand with the transformation of the "three-in-one-combination" of three equals (cadres, military, mass representatives) into being practically military-led. However, even as it attained power, the military was on its long way out already before 1969. Facing a trend of a growing bureaucracy that had reinforced, professional administrative staff was on its way back. Here, the erosion of military power precedes Mao's perception of a threat from the military at the 9th Party Congress and Lin Biao's death in 1971. Indeed, from Mao's perspective in 1969, the rational thing would have been to simply wait it out. As we know, he did not do that. Corresponding to the military's role, the RC entered the 1970 constitutional draft as a military-led and the 1975 State Constitution as a cadre-led administrative organ.

Likewise, while revolution was first aimed against the Party-state and its cadres, the takeover of RCs through the military stymied it. By wrecking the cadre-led Party-state, it created an even more conservative military-led bureaucracy in its stead. When the Party was restored slowly from the end of 1967 onwards, revolutionaries moved there. Hence, once it had become clear that they had come to support "administration," revolution moved from the "revolutionary" RCs to the Party. Indeed, quite incidentally, revolution thus is responsible for this. However, revolution would not emerge victoriously. Instead of playing an active part in revolutionizing it, it was instead the Party that bureaucratized revolution. After the 9th Party Congress, this did not change anymore, entered the 1970 constitutional draft, and in a consolidated form, the 1975 State Constitution. Eventually, the incorporation of the revolutionary sequences into the Party led to them becoming synonymous. It was then the Party that, through its structures, enacted revolution. Here again incidentally, former revolutionaries had become cadres supporting the bureaucratization of the very institution they had so vigorously fought in 1967.

The military's role in all this was rather tragic. It did not want to take up the leadership mantle in the RCs throughout the country—rather, circumstances forced them to. As a result, it was not their fault that they were so crassly over-represented at the 9th Party Congress; Mao's criticism was certainly uncalled for: after all, had they not taken over the grassroots, most RCs would have never been established. Calculations at the top were different though: apart from the lack of collective action, the military bureaucracy did exist. Regardless, their position at the Congress belied the trend of a military that was in gradual decline in governing organs. The Congress, its Second Plenum, and Lin Biao's death, sped up their ejection from the RCs and the top leadership. When they were ordered to return to their barracks in summer 1972, they already had no influence anymore. This change is reflected in the difference between the 1970 constitutional draft and the 1975 State Constitution. In the former, the military had a prominent position while in the latter it was blatantly absent.

Rather, it was the Party that eventually came up top as the last sequence "standing" in the 1975 State Constitution. It substituted the RCs, ejected the military, and incorporated revolution. However, to be able to do that, you cannot have a revolutionary Party. Indeed, to push back against the military and absorb revolutionaries, the Party needed strong institutions. However again, it was the insertion of the military cadres during the 9th PC that converted the Party from a "revolutionary" into an "administrative" Party. Here again, the military effectively emboldened the very institution that hastened its ejection from the RCs. The administrative Party then effectively replaced the RCs.

With the seeds already planted during the 1967 January Revolution, the period of conversion roughly ended in 1969 or even before—this means that afterwards, the converted sequences merely reinforced themselves and became more visible. A good example for this is the transformation of the "three-in-one-combination" from incorporating military, cadre, and mass representatives to one based on age in 1973. Indeed, having never really existed except for a

brief time, it was first military-led and then cadre-led. Combined with a resurging bureaucracy in the Party, a cadre-led "three-in-one-combination" was then naturally morphed into one that pitted the young "revolutionary" cadres against the old "administrative" cadres. A monumental change in principle, my investigation shows that this was foreseeable already in 1968-9 when revolutionaries moved into the Party and revolution was institutionalized within it.

Based on these trends, the 1975 State Constitution did not introduce any new institutions or even twists to existing ones. Rather, it was an intensification of the interactions between the sequences that was already visible in the 1970 constitutional draft. It combined the rhetoric of the GPCR with a situation that conveyed the strength of institutions that had long surpassed those of the pre-GPCR period. Hence, it was a contradictory and awkward blend. This investigation leads to a new understanding of the role of Mao in the GPCR. Indeed, he was no evil genius who was the grey eminence behind every decision. Likewise, the idea that the GPCR was full of chaos is faulty as well. Even though the institutions that arose out of chaotic decisions were fully unintentional and had unintended consequences, they were not dysfunctional.

As we reflect on the lasting legacies of the Cultural Revolution today, the recent abolition of term limits rooted the state presidency in the Party itself. Indeed, this indicates that the most important amendment of all during the 2018 NPC meeting was probably the change to Article 1 of the State Constitution. Here, the "leadership of the CCP" was included. The article itself roots the entire State Constitution in the institutional framework of the CCP itself—hence, law, the supervision commissions, and the state presidency are outcomes of interactions between sequences wherein the Party reigned supreme.

If this is true, then the Party's insertion into the State Constitution is preceded by the haphazard interaction of various sequences that left the Party standing as the only remaining sequence. It

is then curious to note that the only Chinese state constitution that had had a similar clause was the 1975 State Constitution. Looking at it, the insertion of the "Party" sequence could have not been a surprise: it had substituted the RCs, ejected the military, absorbed revolution, and surpassed pre-GPCR levels of institutionalization. The main point however is that this happened against the backdrop of institution-building that was the hallmark of the "administrative" Party. Likewise, under Xi Jinping, perhaps the most remarkable achievement of his first seven years can be said to be the institutionalization of the Party and the exertion of its leadership over all other spheres. In fact, this is reflected in the 2017 amendments to the Party's Constitution that says the Party leads "north, south, east and west – the Party leads them all". This is not an empty slogan. From 2013 until 2019, the Party enacted over 180 intra-Party rules. Using another measurement, as of October 2019, 70% of all now valid rules were promulgated under Xi Jinping.[1] These rules structure everything from Party work in state and non-state organs, to cadre education, propaganda work, or the workings of Political-Legal Affairs Committees in charge of coordinating courts, procuratorates, and police. This considerably streamlined Party-building at the grassroots and strengthened the Party's control over all sectors. All these changes could just happen because the Party was put in a position wherein it could enact them. Hence, looking at the sequences that exist prior to the amendment is critical for understanding its meaning.

This leads to another point. Given that during the GPCR, the conversion from revolutionary to administrative Party was unintentional and a result of rapid institutional change, how might it differ under Xi Jinping? Did he have a "master plan" to put China onto the road to totalitarianism, enshrine his Thought in the Party Constitution and the CCP in Article 1 of the State Constitution? As with Mao, portraying Xi Jinping as an evil mastermind while neglecting

[1] "以党内法规建设新成效推动宣传思想工作开创新局面 [Promoting Propaganda and Ideological Work to Create a New Situation with New Achievements in the Construction of Intra-Party Rules]," Guangming Theory, 2019, accessed 7 October 2019, http://theory.gmw.cn/2019-10/05/content_33208813.htm.

structural factors is simplistic—bestowing onto him superhuman-like powers is unlikely to further our understanding of where China moves. Instead we have to form an understanding of the underlying sequences' change as essentially haphazard, random, full of misunderstandings, and producing unintentional outcomes.

Another open question is with regard to the value of state constitutions. Given that institutional change and the interactions between sequences move along after the state constitution temporarily "froze" an arrangement, what does this mean for understanding its meaning? This depends on the volatility of institutional change. Although the Party is the "winner" *in this moment of time*, it does not mean it will always be. Mistakes happen and institutional change grips everything. The 1975 State Constitution was irrelevant because it was a by-product of the Party's institutionalized power. Having supplanted the RC, it was the Party that counted, not the state or any other actor. The 2018 constitutional amendments, while going in this direction, do not go that far. The state is more than well-preserved, and, while clipped, there are far more civil servants than there are Party cadres. Rather than an "administrative" Party substituting the state as had happened during the GPCR, the Party under Xi Jinping "leads" the state—it is a "leadership" Party. This is fundamentally different from the GPCR. What we then must be looking for are changes in the conceptualization and institutionalization of this "leadership" that then change how the Party interacts with the state. Strength of leadership, apart from institutional, can also be ideological. Thus, for example an education campaign reminds people not only where power is located but where the past, present, and future was/is/will be. Similarly, education or the publication of Xi Jinping's works centralizes ideology and strengthens the fabric of the Party's leadership. While, in the words of institutionalism, the leadership of the Party has now been placed on a path-dependent road, this also means that the State Constitution and its clauses would have to continuously be reinterpreted against the growing strength of the Party relative to other sequences. That being said, continued

reinforcement is far from inevitable. Exogenous shocks and endogenous change can both lead to the erosion of the Party's leadership. As the Collier and Collier persuasively argue, some legacies from critical junctures are unstable, resulting in "self-destruction" although "the length of time before this occurs may vary greatly and is influenced by other factors".[2] The Party's leadership during the GPCR blew up when within the period of one year, Zhou Enlai and Mao died, and the Gang of Four was arrested. As the Party had already become an administrative Party, the four revolutionary cadres, even though supportive of structures, were without broad institutional support. All three events together effectively ended the sequences that were frozen within the 1975 State Constitution. Here, as the Colliers argue, the critical juncture already incorporated the seed of the GPCR's end. Hence, to identify today's critical juncture and understand the sequences it produced, is our task.

[2] Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*, 34.

Appendix

Provincial RC Establishment Dates and Leadership[1]

Date	Province	Name of Head	Military?
1967.1.31	Heilongjiang	Pan Fusheng	No
1967.2.3	Shandong	Wang Xiaoyu	No
1967.2.13	Guizhou	Li Zaihan	No[2]
1967.2.23	Shanghai	Zhang Chunqiao	No
1967.3.16	Shanxi	Liu Geping	No[3]
1967.4.20	Beijing	Xie Fuzhi	Yes
1967.8.12	Qinghai	Liu Xianquan	Yes
1967.11.1	Inner Mongolia	Teng Haiqing	Yes
1967.12.6	Tianjin	Jie Xuegong	No
1968.1.5	Jiangxi	Cheng Shiqing	Yes
1968.1.24	Gansu	Xi Henghan	Yes
1968.1.27	Henan	Liu Jianxun	No
1968.2.3	Hebei	Li Xuefeng	No
1968.2.5	Hunan	Zeng Siyu	Yes
1968.2.21	Guangdong	Huang Yongsheng	Yes
1968.3.6	Jilin	Wang Huaixiang	Yes
1968.3.23	Jiangsu	Xu Shiyou	Yes
1968.3.24	Zhejiang	Nan Ping	Yes

[1] Zhang, *走出迷谷：1967-1979 年中国政体变革的历程与思考 [out of the Valley: Course and Reflection on the Reform of the Chinese Political System from 1967-1979]*, 302-03.
[2] Li Zaihan was seen as a military cadre.
[3] Liu Geping was seen as a military cadre.

1968.4.8	Hunan	Li Yuan	Yes
1968.4.10	Ningxia	Kang Jianmin	Yes
1968.4.10	Anhui	Li Desheng	Yes
1968.5.1	Shaanxi	Li Ruishan	No
1968.5.10	Liaoning	Chen Xilian	Yes
1968.5.31	Sichuan	Zhang Guohua	Yes
1968.8.13	Yunnan	Tan Puren	Yes
1968.8.19	Fujian	Han Xianchu	Yes
1968.8.26	Guangxi	Wei Guoqing	Yes
1968.9.5	Tibet	Zeng Yongya	Yes
1968.9.5	Xinjiang	Long Shujin	Yes

Full Database Overview and Main Indicators

		Administrative Level					Sources			
		Total # of units covered	Province	Locality	County	Grassroots (Commune, Street)	# of Organizational materials used	# of Party histories used	Total # of Organizational and Party histories	Internal publications (内部资料 or 内部发行) of Total #
Province or Region	#	4763	29	338	981	3415	252	202	454	177
Anhui	#	252	1	16	22	213	9	5	14	7
Beijing	#	54	1		18	35	3	1	4	3
Fujian	#	219	1	9	67	142	9	2	11	7
Guangdong	#	61	1	11	13	36	6	4	10	1
Gansu	#	225	1	12	31	181	13	7	20	15
Guangxi	#	82	1	13	10	58	8	6	14	6
Guizhou	#	234	1	9	24	200	8	7	15	10
Henan	#	403	1	15	55	332	29	16	45	5

Hubei	#	317	1	10	84	222	11	5	16	9
Hebei	#	183	1	9	16	157	9	7	16	8
Heilongjiang	#	107	1	19	65	22	3	6	9	2
Hunan	#	151	1	13	27	110	10	7	17	8
Jilin	#	53	1	10	19	23	9	6	15	5
Jiangsu	#	250	1	15	31	203	10	9	19	8
Jiangxi	#	114	1	11	25	77	5	9	14	1
Liaoning	#	271	1	14	36	220	13	13	26	13
Inner Mongolia	#	66	1	11	50	4	5	7	12	4
Ningxia	#	91	1	3	23	64	7	5	12	5
Qinghai	#	92	1	7	24	60	7	4	11	6
Sichuan	#	184	1	29	50	104	9	15	24	7
Shandong	#	264	1	13	54	196	20	17	37	6
Shanghai	#	188	1	10	10	167	8	3	11	4
Shaanxi	#	62	1	10	31	20	6	5	11	5

Shanxi	#	204	1	9	108	86	9	3	12	3
Tianjin	#	19	1	13	5		1	1	2	1
Xinjiang	#	73	1	13	14	45	7	10	17	6
Tibet	#	36	1	6	29		2	3	5	3
Yunnan	#	86	1	17	23	45	6	10	16	11
Zhejiang	#	422	1	11	17	393	10	9	19	8

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