EDWARD I'S WARS AND THEIR FINANCING, 1294-1307

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

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ABSTRACT

The period from 1294 until 1307 saw England engaged in wars with the French, the Welsh and the Scotch. In only three years, 1299, 1302, and 1305 was there no campaign. The object of this dissertation is to examine the ways in which the country was mobilised for this exceptional military effort, and to investigate the means by which the wars were financed. Various aspects of both the military and administrative history of this period have been dealt with by Tout, Morris and others, but much of the surviving evidence has not been fully used, and no historian has attempted to treat the subject as a whole.

The main purpose of the Introduction is to set out the chronology of the wars, necessary since the main body of the thesis is organised analytically. The composition of the cavalry forces is the first subject to be investigated. Conventionally, a contrast is made between the paid forces and the feudal elements in Edwardian armies, but a study of the available records listing the men who served in Scotland in 1298, 1300 and 1304 reveals that a large proportion of the cavalry did not fit either of these categories. Heraldic lists can be compared with records of feudal service and with pay lists, and prove that many of the soldiers were neither paid nor feudal. Various suggestions

are made to explain why it was that in many cases the magnates chose to serve in Edward's were at their own expense - enthusiasm, fanned by propaganda, combined with sanctions that the crown might bring to bear against those who did not fight. The way in which men were summoned is examined, and it appears that Edward I was forced by the end of the reign to abandon the novel expedients that had been tried out earlier, notably in 1297.

In the field the cavalry forces were organised in retinues, in a way familiar to students of the 'bastard feudalism' of the later middle ages. The evidence of protection rolls shows that there was much continuity from year to year in the personnel of a magnate's retinue. An exception to this rule was the royal household. The household knights were an important body of men, notably in war, though they might be used on administrative as well as military tasks. These men provided the king with a solid core of reliable and trusted soldiers. The total number of the cavalry in Edward's campaigns is hard to calculate: in 1300 the household put some 850 men into the field, and the magnates' contingents brought the total force up to more than 2,000.

Large numbers of infantry were assembled for some of Edward's campaigns: some 30,000 for the Welsh war of 1294-1295, and about

25,000 for Scotland in 1298. These men were recruited by means of commissions of array, and legal records provide indications of how this system worked. Once the men were in the field, the problem was to keep them there. Desertion was a serious problem, but the Welsh were not as unreliable in this respect as the English. It is not clear that the infantry were of very much use to Edward in his wars. The novel tactics, much praised by historians, of combining horse and foot in a single line of battle, have been over-emphasized: the evidence is scanty and dubious. By the end of the reign, in the campaigns against Robert Bruce, Edward was not assembling such huge concentrations of infantry as in the earlier expeditions. The reasons for this were probably partly financial and partly tactical, in that these huge armies had proved of little value.

In Wales Edward I secured his conquest by building impressive castles. Financial factors made this impossible in Scotland. But use was made of existing castles there, such as Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Lochmaban. Substantial garrison forces were maintained, under the command of seasoned professional soldiers, some of them household knights. Many accounts of the English occupation forces in Scotland survive, and it is possible to work out in some detail how many men were thus employed.

The problem of paying and feeding the armies and garrisons was a

very considerable one. Special paymasters had to be appointed, notably in the period 1294-1298, for the Wardrobe administration could not organise war on more than one front. For the Scotch wars, permanent officials were stationed at Berwick and Carlisle. Large quantities of supplies were needed by all the English armies of this period. They were collected by compulsory purchase, an unpopular procedure which earned the government much hostility in 1297. Legal records provide evidence of the kinds of corruption that were common. Full victualling accounts survive for the Flanders campaign of 1297, and for Scotland after 1299, and it is possible to trace out the process of ordering, collecting and distributing the supplies.

A navy was needed both for the defence of England against the French, and for the transport of men and supplies. In the early stages of the war with France the English emulated their enemies by building a fleet of galleys, but these vessels do not appear to have been of much use: not that they were ever really put to the test, as no large-scale invasion ever materialised. In its more humble transport rôle the navy was composed of merchant ships requisitioned by the government. The accounts provide details of the number of vessels employed in 1297, and in the campaigns in Scotland later in the reign. The real importance of the navy was of course in the years 1294-1298, with the need to keep the army in Gascony supplied and reinforced,

and with the French fleet threatening. In the later years of the reign the proportion of the military budget that went on the navy was very much lower.

An attempt is made to discover how much the wars cost. That with France was the most expensive. Subsidies to foreign allies alone cost over £165,000, and some £128,000 was sent out in cash to Gascony. In all, the war cost roughly £615,000. Further expenses were incurred between 1294 and 1298 in Wales and Scotland, bringing the total bill for the period from the outbreak of the French war to the king's return from Flanders to about £730,000. The format of the accounts for the rest of the reign make it hard to isolate military expenditure, but it is clear that the crown had to meet an annual bill of the order of £60,000, most of it resulting from the war in Scotland.

Taxation was the most obvious means of raising the money needed to pay for the wars. Ley taxes, the most important being those granted in parliament, produced roughly £265,000 between 1294 and 1307. Ecclesiastical taxation took two forms: directly negotiated grants from the English clergy, and taxes imposed by the papacy, of which part of the proceeds went to the crown. By these means almost £220,000 was collected. From the accounts it is possible to work out how efficiently the taxes were collected, and it appears that the

administration's expertise in this task increased with experience during this period.

It was possible to profit from trade. In the period of heaviest financial need, 1294-1297, the government tried two techniques. Wool could be confiscated and sold at a profit, and a heavy duty might be imposed on exports. The latter policy was much more successful than the former, yielding about £116,000 before the opposition forced Edward to abandon the levy of forty shillings on each sack of wool in 1297. An examination of the problems facing the English currency shows that the years of war with France were difficult in that much English bullion was being exported by the government in pursuit of the war aims. The resultant shortage of coin in England coincided with high prices, as harvests were bad: circumstances which aggravated the political crisis of 1297. In the later years of the reign the situation improved. After the currency had been reformed in 1300, the volume of bullion imported increased rapidly, and high liquidity coincided with good harvests. The crown profited from the activity of the mints by some £17,000 in the last seven years of the reign.

The revenues of the government were not sufficient to meet its needs, and methods of anticipating income had to be used. Exchequer tallies were not used at this time on any scale as an instrument of

credit, but the use of Wardrobe letters, bills and debentures provided another means of achieving the same end. Money could be borrowed, notably from Italian merchants. The Frescobaldi of Florence lent some £150,000 to the English government between 1294 and their expulsion from England in 1311. Loans were also important in Gascony, where about £50,000 was borrowed from local merchants by the English commanders there.

The chaotic state of the Wardrobe accounts for the last part of Edward I's reign makes it difficult to draw up any convincing balance sheets. The process of accounting continued into the 1320's, and was never completed. It is clear that the financial situation was critical, and petitions in parliament for the payment of debts show that the scale of the crown's indebtedness was something of a political issue. The concentration of the government on war had further deleterious effects, notably on the maintainance of law and order in the country. But some attempts at administrative reform were made, and the king displayed great political skill in preventing the outbreak of a major crisis. It was Edward II who was left to face the reckoning for the way in which the country had been exhausted by the demands that his father had made upon it.

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following list gives the most common abbreviations used in this dissertation: some other titles have been slightly abbreviated, but are given in full in the bibliography.

Brit. Mus.	British Museum.
Cal. Close Rolls.	Calendar of Close Rolls.
Cal. Docs. Scot.	Calendar of Documents relating to Scotland, ed. J. Bain.
Cal. Pat. Rolls.	Calendar of Patent Rolls.
Econ. Hist. Rev.	Economic History Review.
Eng. Hist. Rev.	English Historical Review.
Parl. Writs.	Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons, ed. F. Palgrave.
Rot. Parl.	Rotuli Parliamentorum.
Trans Royal Hist Soc.	Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.

The titles of many works have been abbreviated or contracted after the initial reference. In particular, chronicles have been cited in shortened form, as Chron. Guisborough for The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, and Chron. Cotton for Bartholomaei de Cotton, Historia Anglicana.

INTRODUCTION

The history of war is much more than a study of strategy and tactics, a story of victories and defeats. In recent times the organisation of war has demanded not simply the mobilisation of armies, but that of entire economies. Modern historians need no reminding of the impact of the World Wars on society. In the seventeenth century the rôle that war can play in the development of a country is well exemplified by the history of Sweden. Medievalists have long recognised that the structure of government and society in their period owed much to the way in which wars were fought, and have needed no prompting from sociologists who have produced elaborate theories about the precise inter-relationships of social and military institutions.[1]

The latter years of the reign of Edward I, while they cannot offer obvious and lasting achievements like the great legal reforms of the earlier part of the reign, do provide an opportunity to examine the impact of war in one period, because of the extent of military operations and the abundance of surviving records. They were years of relative failure, but the failures of governments can be quite as interesting and illuminating as the successes. The years after

1. In particular S. Andrzejewski, Military Organisation and Society (1954).

1294 were years of crisis, dominated by war and the demands it created. New problems faced the government, which had to find effective means of mobilising the resources of the country on a massive scale. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the various ways in which the wars of Edward I during the period from 1294 until the end of the reign were organised and financed, and the effects on the country of the methods adopted. But before embarking on this investigation it is necessary to provide a brief summary of the course of events, in order to indicate the scope, frequency and chronology of the wars.

The difficulties which faced Edward I in the 1290's were not entirely of his own making. Edward's contemporary, Philip IV of France, was an ambitious man, determined to strengthen the position of his monarchy. The ambiguous position of Gascony, ruled by a duke who was also king of England, was an obvious hindrance to Philip. But the immediate cause of hostilities between France and England, which broke out in 1294, was the situation in the English Channel in the preceding years. Friction between the sailors of Normandy and those of the Cinque Ports and Bayonne, said to have begun with a row between a few men over a drinking fountain, soon escalated into a full scale naval war. Initial French successes were countered

by the English in the early summer of 1293 with a raid up the Seine and a victory over the enemy fleet. This was followed up by an attack on a French wine fleet by a combined force of English and Gascon ships off Cap St. Mathieu in Brittany.[1]

The participation of the Gascons in these events provided Philip IV with the opportunity to summon Edward I to appear before the parlement of Paris to answer for the activities of his subjects. Generous English offers failed to divert Philip from his course. What the king of England wanted from Philip was not war, but a wife, and in 1294 Edmund of Lancaster was sent to Paris to negotiate peace and a marriage treaty. A formal agreement for the marriage of Edward with the French king's sister Margaret was actually drawn up.[2] To satisfy Philip's honour, arrangements were made for much of the duchy of Aquitaine to be handed over to the French for a nominal period, at the end of which it was to be regranted to Edward. The summons to the parlement was to be withdrawn. It was generally believed in England that it was Edward's passion

1. C. de la Roncière, Histoire de la marine française (1899), i. 323 et seq.
2. T. Rymer, Foedera (Record Commission, 1816), I. ii. 795-6. Two chronicles, Bartholomaei de Cotton, Historia Anglicana, ed. H. R. Luard (1859), p. 232, and The Chronicle of Pierre de Langtoft, ed. T. Wright (1868), ii. 197, name Philip's other sister, Blanche, as the object of Edward's desires. Blanche later married Albrecht of Habsburg, and possible evidence of Edward's emotional involvement with her may be found in a letter he wrote on hearing of her death in 1305, printed by P. Chaplais, 'Some Private Letters of Edward I', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxxvii (1962), 85. Edward stated bitterly 'Et verraiement nous passons cel duel molt leger pur ce qe nous la tenions a morte et perdue le houre que ele feut primes espousee'.

for the French princess, of whom he had seen no more than a full length portrait,[1] that led to the propounding of this remarkable plan. That seems unlikely, but it is understandable that contemporaries should have preferred to interpret so foolish a scheme as the result of lust rather than of a carefully worked out policy. For while the English kept their part of the bargain, orders for the transfer of seisin to the French being issued on 3 February 1294, Philip IV renewed the summons to Edward I, and when he did not appear before the parlement, condemned him as a defaulter and the duchy as confiscate.[2]

Philip's actions forced Edward I into war with France for the next four years. Active hostilities were confined to Gascony, where the English barely succeeded in holding their own. The first expeditionary force sailed in October 1294, under John of Brittany. Some reinforcements were sent in 1295, but the next main force, commanded by Edmund of Lancaster and the earl of Lincoln, did not set out until early in 1296.[3] But Edward's strategy was based on much more than a defensive war in Gascony. To achieve victory, the war had to be fought nearer home, and on a larger scale.

1. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 196-98.
2. F.M. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century (2nd. edn, 1962), pp. 646-48.
3. Ibid., p. 649.

Possibly taking inspiration from the plans which had failed king John at Bouvines, Edward I decided to attack Philip IV in northern France, with the aid of a coalition of continental rulers. According to one chronicle, it was Anthony Bek, bishop of Durham, who put the plan for a grand alliance before the council, and this seems plausible, for it was he who was put in charge of the embassy sent abroad in June 1294.[1] A treaty of alliance was quickly concluded with Adolf of Nassau, King of the Romans, who had his own reasons for wanting war with France, as Philip had been attempting, with some success, to expand his territories into the Empire. Agreement was also reached with Siegfried, archbishop of Cologne, who promised to serve against the French with a force of 1,000 horse, of whom 350 were to be knights. Various Germans of lesser status were brought into the alliance, all men closely connected with the king and the archbishop. Wicbold von Holte was dean of Cologne, while his counterpart at Bonn was Siegfried's brother. His nephew Conrad was also in English pay. Hartrad von Merenbergh, who with Wicbold negotiated the treaty for Adolf, was one of the archbishop's most important vassals. Eberhard, count of Katzenelenbogen, the king's uncle, was brought into the alliance at a cost of £500.[2]

1. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 202-04.
2. F. Trautz, Die Könige von England und das Reich, 1272-1377 (Heidelberg, 1961), pp. 130-33; A. Bock,'Englands Beziehungen zum Reich unter Adolf von Nassau', Mitteilungen des Inst. f. Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, erg. bd. xii (1932-33), 235-36. Details of the payments made to Edward's foreign allies are given infra, pp. 445-54.

The extensive revolt in Wales which broke out in the autumn of 1294 made it necessary to divert many of the troops intended for Gascony, and claimed Edward's own presence until July 1295.[1] There was therefore no possibility of mounting a campaign in Flanders until 1296 at the earliest. But the diplomatic efforts on the continent continued. It was obviously important to find allies in the Low Countries, a task simplified by the strong commercial links that existed with England. Alliance with Floris V, count of Holland, whose son John was a member of Edward I's household and was betrothed to the king's daughter Elizabeth, was encouraged by the English policy of directing all merchants to take their wool to Dordrecht, and was cemented with cash payments.[2] But unfortunately for the Dutch, Edward felt the need to extend the system of alliances further during 1295. In 1290 his daughter Margaret had married the eldest son of John I, duke of Brabant. He had been sent to the English court for his education and had stayed there for ten years. In 1294 his father was killed in a tournament, and the new duke made a formal alliance with the English in Anglesey in April 1295, in which he promised to provide a force of 2,000 men-at-arms for six months in return for a subsidy of 160,000 livres tournois. Further grants were made to him at the same time. Brabant was also favoured by the action of the English

1. J.E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I (1901), pp. 240-66; Book of Prests of the King's Wardrobe for 1294-5, ed. E.B. Fryde (1962), pp. xxvi-xlv.
2. Bock, op. cit., 214-15; J. de Sturler, Les relations politiques et les échanges commerciaux entre le duché de Brabant et l'Angleterre au moyen âge (Paris, 1936), pp. 181-86.

government in transferring what Tout termed the 'preferential staple' from Dordrecht to Mechelen, a move completed by 7 August 1295.[1]

This transfer inevitably had an adverse effect on English relations with the count of Holland, who opened negotiations with the French. By 6 January 1296 Philip IV had paid him 12,500 livres tournois, and on that day a treaty was signed, in which the count was promised a fee of 4,000 livres for life, and a lump sum of 25,000 livres, the payment already made being a part of this sum.[2] Edward I's immediate reaction was to impose a trade embargo on Holland on 24 January, ordering all merchants 'ke desormes ne se treent ne voyent nule part denz le poer le counte de Hoylaunde',[3] Partly as a result of this measure, and probably encouraged by more positive inducements offered by Edward, a plot was organised to kidnap Floris V and bring him to England. The abduction was carried out successfully, but instead of being taken to England the unfortunate count was murdered by some of his household knights. He was then succeeded by his anglophile son John, whose marriage to Edward I's daughter Elizabeth took place in January 1297. As usual, the alliance was reinforced with cash, at least £1,500 being paid out by the English officials.[4]

1. Ibid., 146-48, 186-8; B.D. Lyon, 'Un compte de l'échiquier relatif aux relations d'Edouard I d'Angleterre avec le duc Jean II de Brabant', Bull. de la comm. royale d'histoire, cxx (1955), 70-72.
2. Acta Imperii Angliae et Franciae, 1267-1313, ed. F. Kern (Tübingen, 1911), pp. 279-80, no. 309.
3. Chron. Cotton, p. 303.
4. Trautz, op. cit., p. 135; Acta Imperii Angliae et Franciae, 1267-1313, pp. 76-77, nos. 111-12; see also infra, p. 449.

Considerable as the efforts made by the English to establish an elaborate system of alliances had been, Edward I showed no wish to start a campaign in the Low countries in 1296. The succession dispute in Scotland that had occurred on the death of Margaret of Norway in 1290 had provided Edward with a splendid opportunity to extend English influence in the northern kingdom. The new ruler of Scotland, John Balliol, was chosen under English supervision, and did homage to Edward, accepting his suzerainty. Appeals against judgements made by Balliol were heard in English courts. In 1294 Edward went so far as to demand military service from the Scotch king and his magnates. Natural baronial resentment against this situation culminated in 1295 with the appointment of a council of twelve to take charge of the government. Allies were needed against the English, and in October 1295 the Scotch made a treaty with Philip IV. Edward I's reaction was predictable. Writs summoning the feudal host for a campaign in Scotland were sent out in December. The English expedition was a triumph. After Berwick was taken, and most of its inhabitants massacred, Earl Warenne won a decisive victory at Dunbar at the end of April 1296. Balliol and the Scotch magnates soon submitted to Edward. That symbol of Scotch monarchy, the stone of Scone, was brought to London, and English government established.[1]

1. Narrative of events in Scotland here, and later, is largely based on G.W.S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland (1965).

With royal attention devoted to Scotland in 1296, the English diplomatic effort on the continent in that year was largely in support of the peace initiative of Boniface VIII, who had appointed the cardinals of Albano and Preneste to try to end the Anglo-French dispute.[1] But the negotiations were unsuccessful, and by the end of the year the English government was trying once more to strengthen the alliance against Philip IV. In addition to those allies already mentioned, Henry III, count of Bar, yet another of Edward I's sons-in-law, who had married Eleanor in 1293, was a staunch supporter of the English cause. He had promised to serve Edward with 1,000 horse in return for 30,000 marks.[2] From the beginning of the war the English had been seeking other allies who could attack Philip from the east, and in May 1297 agreement was reached at Brussels with a group of Burgundian noblemen from the Franche-Comté, headed by Jean de Châlon-Arlay. They had their own grievances against Philip and his ally Otto count of Burgundy, who in 1295 had been granted 10,000 livres tournois by the French king. Edward I promised the league 60,000 livres for the first year of the alliance, with 30,000 for each subsequent year. They were also granted a gift of 12,000, and in return promised the service of 500 cavalry against the French.[3]

1. M. Salt, 'Embassies to France, 1272-1307', Eng. Hist. Rev., xlix (1929), 270-78.
2. Bock, op. cit., 227-28.
3. F. Funck-Brentano, 'Philippe le Bel et la noblesse franc-comtoise', Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes, xlix (1888), 5-40; J. de Sturler, 'Le paiement à Bruxelles des alliés franc-comtois d'Edouard Ier, roi d'Angleterre (Mai 1297)', Cahiers Bruxellois, v (1960), 18-37; see also infra, pp. 273-74, 453.

The major failing of the system of alliances as it stood in 1296 was that any English expedition to the Low Countries would either have had to make a difficult landing in hostile territory, or else disembark a long way north, in Holland, and face a long march south before meeting the French armies. To avoid those prospects, an alliance with Flanders was clearly essential. As early as 1293 discussions had begun for a marriage of Edward I's eldest son with Philippa, daughter of Guy, count of Flanders, but this plan was foiled by Philip IV, who forced the count to leave his daughter in Paris as a hostage, and to cancel the proposed alliance. But early in January 1297 the count was finally won over to the English side. The main reason for his decision appears to have been the favour shown by Philip to his great rival John of Avesnes, count of Hainsult, whose daughter married the Constable of France in 1296. The effects of the English embargo on trade with Flanders were also important in putting pressure on the count. As ever, the new alliance was backed up with promises of English silver: 100,000 livres tournois for the first year, with 200,000 more to come.[1]

So, with the acquisition of the Burgundian and Flemish allies in 1297, the great coalition was finally ready to move. But although Edward I did not regard his domestic difficulties in 1297 as being serious enough to warrant delaying the projected campaign, the fact

1. Bock, op. cit., 221-24; Trautz, Die Könige von England und das Reich, 1272-1377, p.136.

that he had to face a major constitutional crisis, one of the major causes of which was opposition to a continental campaign, did mean that the army which set out for Flanders on 22 August was a small one. A great deal depended on the contribution of the allies if the campaign was to be a success. Things began well, with the assembly of a combined Flemish and German force under the command of William of Jülich the elder, a nephew of the count of Flanders. The count of Katzenelnbogen was in this force, as was Waleran of Valkenburg, who had been granted a fee of 300 livres tournois in 1295. It seems probable that some of the Germans present were sent by the Archbishop of Cologne in accordance with his treaty obligations. But before this army was able to combine with the English expeditionary force it was defeated at Veurne on 20 August.[1] The Burgundian league kept to their agreement, and on 9 October wrote in triumph to Edward that they had captured the castle of Ornans.[2] Henry count of Bar was loyal to his father-in-law, but his forces were inadequate, and he was eventually captured by Gaucher de Châtillon.[3]

The one notable omission from the list of the allies who took up arms against the French in 1297 is of course Adolf of Nassau, king of the Romans. The theory that he was bought off by Philip IV with

1. Ibid., pp. 144, 172; Bock, op. cit., 217-18.
2. Acta Imperii Anglicae et Francicae, 1267-1313, pp. 85-86, nos. 127-28.
3. F. Funck-Brentano, 'Document pour servir à l'histoire des relations de la France avec l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne sous le règne de Philippe le Bel', Revue Historique, xxxix (1889), 329, n. 6.

bribes paid over by the Italian merchant Musciatto dei Francesi has won wide acceptance. But the only direct evidence of this is a curious document, a French memorandum on the conduct and financing of the war against the English. This is so inaccurate in many particulars that it seems it must have been written long after the events discussed in it, and it seems most likely that its author was confused between Adolf of Nassau and his successor, Albrecht of Habsburg, and that it was the latter, who in 1297 was duke of Bavaria, who was paid subsidies by the French.[1] But bribed or not, the German king failed to support Edward I as he had promised, and so the sums paid out to him by the English were in vain.

But it can be argued that Edward acted in quite as much bad faith as Adolf, if not more. On October 15 the German king was still expressing his willingness to fight, although he did not appear to be making many preparations.[2] But six days earlier Edward had agreed to a truce with the French. All that the English army had done was to advance as far as Ghent. The only military activity that had taken place was rioting between the ill-disciplined English troops and the Flemings: no attempt had been made to join battle with the French. The English chroniclers tried to explain the failure of the campaign

1. The problem of the alleged bribery of Adolf of Nassau is discussed more fully in the note at the end of this introduction, infra, pp. 23-25.
2. Acta Imperii Angliae et Franciae, 1267-1313, p. 87, no. 130.

in terms of the timidity of the count of Flanders and the fear felt by the French, but it seems clear that it was the English who had no desire to fight, and who were glad to seize any chance of ending hostilities, even if it meant leaving their allies still at war.[1] Admittedly, Edward did not abandon his allies completely. On 16 October he expressed his intention of paying the sums still owed as subsidies to the king of Germany and the duke of Brabant, while on 5 February 1298 he sent William of Gainsborough and John Lovel back to England from Flanders with instructions to get money to pay off the Burgundian league, as until this was done the king could not return home.[2] But payments were no substitute for military action, and the allies cannot have been best pleased with Edward's selfish action.

With the truce of October 1297 Edward I effectively achieved his main war aim, that of saving Gascony. For although none of the points at issue between England and France were properly settled, neither country was prepared for a resumption of hostilities. War was succeeded by a lengthy series of negotiations, with pope Boniface VIII acting as an arbitrator. Peace was finally made in 1303, and that Philip IV was prepared to agree to this was largely due to the action of the Flemings who had been so shamefully deserted by

1. The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, ed. H. Rothwell (Camden Soc., 3rd Ser., lxxxix, 1957), pp. 315-7; Willelmi Rishanger, Chronica et Annales, ed. H.T. Riley (1865), p. 178.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/71, mm. 7d, 21. All manuscripts are in the Public Record Office, unless otherwise stated.

Edward I in 1297. For it was their victory at Courtrai in 1302 that meant that Philip had to turn his full attention to the Low Countries, and he was prepared to concede Edward full authority in Gascony in return for his benevolent neutrality in Flanders, which went to the lengths of granting the French king the service of a squadron of twenty ships in 1304.[1]

Just as the French difficulties in Flanders prevented Philip IV from reopening the conflict with the English, so Edward I was prevented by his problems in Scotland from engaging in any further continental wars. For successful as the English show of force had seemed to be in 1296, it was not long before the Scotch rebelled against their new rulers. The rising of 1297, whose most picturesque leader was William Wallace, culminated in the great Scotch victory at Stirling Bridge over John de Warrenne, earl of Surrey, the king's lieutenant in Scotland. The achievement of 1296 was most forcibly shown to have been superficial: Scotland could not be conquered in a single campaign.

Despite the absence of the king and much of the administrative staff in Flanders, a limited counter offensive was mounted in the winter following the disaster of Stirling Bridge. When Edward I

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-07, p. 205. The peace negotiations are discussed by Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, pp. 650-54.

returned from abroad in the spring of 1298 to a country exhausted by the demands he had made on it for the French war, he immediately began to plan a major campaign in Scotland. The army he assembled was one of the largest of the reign, and the administrative efforts that went into its creation were crowned with success. At Falkirk the Scotch under Wallace were so soundly defeated that it was not until Bannockburn that they willingly risked their whole army in battle with the English host. None of the encounters that took place during the rest of Edward I's reign was much more than a skirmish.

Great success as it was, the battle of Falkirk did not win the war for Edward. The English only had effective control of the areas where they held castles, and had no foothold north of Stirling. Even that castle they lost to the enemy in 1299. The next major English campaign took place in the summer of 1300. An impressive army mustered at Carlisle, but faced with the Scotch tactics of withdrawing and refusing battle, little more was achieved than the capture of the castle of Caerlaverock, rather unfairly termed by Langtoft 'un povere chastelet'.[1] The following year saw Edward adopt a more ambitious plan. One army, under the King himself, mustered at Berwick and advanced across Scotland toward the Clyde, while another army, nominally commanded by the prince of Wales, advanced from Carlisle round the coast of Galloway. But the two arms of the pincer movement never met, and as in 1300 the main tangible achievement was the capture of one castle, that of Bothwell.

1. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 326.

Despite the comparative lack of success on these campaigns, the English hold over southern Scotland was increasing during these years, through the possession of important groups of castles, one to the north of the Border, one to the south of the Firth of Forth, and a third in the south-west. A new departure in 1301 was that at the close of the campaign was that the king stayed in Scotland over the winter. Lack of unity among the Scotch leaders assisted the English cause, and in 1302 the patriotic side was deserted by so important a figure as Robert Bruce, earl of Carrick and future king of Scotland. Victory for the English seemed to be in sight.

Another large army was marched north in 1303. Again the enemy refused to give battle, but their delaying tactics were not so successful as in earlier years. Edward was able, for the first time since 1296, to take the step he regarded as essential before the country could be conquered, of taking his army north of the Firth of Forth. Virtually repeating the route he had taken in his first campaign in Scotland, he got as far north as Elgin. For the second time the English king wintered in Scotland, and in May 1304 the task of besieging Stirling was begun. This was the last really important castle held by the Scotch, and once the garrison yielded, Scotland was unable to offer any serious resistance to Edward. The

capture of William Wallace in 1305 was the culmination of the English triumph.

The settlement reached after the campaign of 1304, which created effective English rule in southern Scotland and left the north in the hands of apparently obedient Scotch magnates, did not last long. The story of the murder of John Comyn by Robert Bruce in the church at Dumfries, and of Bruce's subsequent seizure of the throne is well known. The English were completely unprepared for such a move, and the castle garrisons that formed the occupation force were wholly inadequate for dealing with the situation. But forces were quickly raised. Aymer de Valence, appointed royal lieutenant to deal with the revolt, defeated Bruce at the battle of Methven outside Perth in June 1306. Less than three months after his coronation, the king of Scotland became a hunted fugitive.

The mystery of where Bruce spent the winter of 1306-7 has yet to be elucidated. He either hid in the Isles, or took refuge in Norwegian territory. On his return to Scotland early in 1307, Bruce demonstrated his outstanding gifts as a guerilla leader. Methven was avenged at Loudoun Hill, where Valence was defeated. The English were unable to defeat Bruce in battle, nor could they counter the wave of enthusiasm for the cause he represented. In July Edward I

himself advanced from Lanercost priory, where he had spent the winter in ill-health, but before he had even reached the border the old king died at Burgh-by-Sands. Deprived of his forceful personality, the English were incapable of continuing the struggle with the same determination that they had shown up to 1307. Seven years were to pass before the Scotch triumph at Bannockburn, but the English cause was doomed long before that disastrous engagement.

In the light of this brief narrative of the wars of Edward I from 1294 until his death in 1307 it is possible to see something of the scope of the problems that faced the English government. Only in 1299, 1302 and 1305 was there no substantial army in the field in Gascony, Flanders, or Scotland. The actual events of these wars have received reasonably full attention from historians,[1] but the methods used by the government to mobilise the country for war on the scale that was needed have not been so fully examined.

The first question to be asked is how large were the forces that the English put into the field during this period, and how were they recruited. The cavalry were organised on a completely different

1. In addition to the works of Powicke, Barrow and Morris noted above, the following especially deserve mention. For the Welsh war of 1294-5, J.G. Edwards, 'The Battle of Maes Madog and the Welsh campaign of 1294-5', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxix (1924), 1-12. For Gascony, Rôles Gascons, iii (1906), ed. Ch. Bémont. For Scotland, E.M. Barron, The Scottish War of Independence (2nd. edn, 1934); J. Bain, The Edwards in Scotland 1296-1377 (1901).

system from the infantry, and it is necessary not only to examine the way in which they were summoned, but also to look at the way in which retinues were composed, if a true picture of the army is to emerge. In the case of the footsoldiers, the way in which local communities met the demands of the government for men needs to be investigated as well as the pay rolls of the armies that were kept once the men had mustered. Castle garrisons need to be treated separately from the field armies. Investigation of the composition of military forces leads to the question of wages and victualling. The country had to bear far more than the burden of supplying the manpower for the campaigns, for in most cases the government had the responsibility of paying the men's wages, and had to ensure that they were provided with sufficient food. The armies could not simply live off the land, so supplies had to be collected in England and sent to Gascony, Flanders or Scotland. This task was one of the most considerable of those that faced the administration in this period, involving as it did the central government, the sheriffs and their officials, and special victuallers appointed to take charge of the supplies when they reached their destination. The navy had an important part to play in transporting men and supplies.

Edward I did not confine himself to purely military methods in his war against Philip IV. The diplomatic offensive had to be backed up

with the payment of substantial subsidies. English trade could be manipulated to serve the interests of Edward's diplomacy, while the weapon of an embargo was available against the French and their allies. These techniques of warfare inevitably affected the English economy, and this impact must be investigated. In particular, the outflow of large sums of money from England, combined with the effects of a severe debasement of the French coinage, affected the domestic coinage. A reduction in the scale of English foreign trade did not help the government in its desire to keep the coinage at its pre-war standard.

Perhaps the most difficult task the government had to face was that of finding sufficient money to pay for the wars. There was no chance of increasing the ordinary revenue of the crown to meet the demand for funds. Taxation was the obvious answer. The laity could be taxed by means of grants in parliament of subsidies assessed on the basis of moveable property. The crown also had a right to tallage and the old feudal dues. Taxation of the clergy could be achieved either by approaching the English church for grants, or by reaching agreement with the Papacy for a division of the spoils of papal taxes. This period saw both methods employed by Edward I. In addition, it was possible to raise substantial sums by the imposition of customs duties. But these various methods of taxing the country were not

enough. The main government spending department, the Wardrobe, was constantly incurring expenditure far in excess of receipts. In order to try to meet its obligations, the government was forced to borrow money. Italian merchants were the main source of loans, while in Gascony the English commanders raised a substantial amount from local traders. In order to find out the importance of credit finance in this period it is necessary to discover not only how much in all was borrowed, but also at what level the debt was running, and how far repayment was made.

Finally, some examination of the political repercussions of the wars is necessary. Edward I, the man who had done so much to restore political stability after the crises of his father's reign, was himself faced with a severe constitutional crisis in 1297. The connection of this with the demands made by the King for men, money and supplies for the French war is clear and well known. Less obvious are the political effects of the campaigns in Scotland. Did the policies of Edward I help to stave off the crisis that broke out so swiftly on the accession of Edward II, by diverting the attention of the magnates toward a popular war, or did the measures needed to keep the war going create an intolerable situation in England? Did the single-minded concentration of Edward I's government on war in the last years of the reign mean that Edward II received an impossible legacy from his father?

Inevitably, discussion of these various problems is conditioned by the fact that not all of the records have survived. There is little documentation for the war in Gascony, and the Scotch campaign of 1296 has left little trace in the archives. For the years up to 1298 the Wardrobe accounts are enrolled on the Pipe roll,[1] but apart from a complete account book for 1297,[2] few of the documents subsidiery to these survive. Material for the last ten years of the reign is fuller, but some years, such as 1300 and 1301, are more fully documented than others. This has meant that the wars in Scotland receive rather more attention than those in France. The Exchequer evidence is less patchy than the Wardrobe material, though it too has its deficiencies. Discussion of the way in which the wars were financed is therefore less biased toward the years after 1297 than is the analysis of the ways in which the armies were recruited, paid, fed and organised.

1. Pipe Roll, E. 372/144.
2. Wardrobe book for 25 Edward I, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965.

Note on the Alleged Bribery of Adolf of Nassau (see supra, p. 12).

The main piece of evidence for the theory that Adolf was bribed by the French to leave the English alliance is contained in a French memorandum on the conduct and financing of the war against the English, printed by F. Funck-Brentano, 'Document pour servir à l'histoire des relations de la France avec l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne sous le règne de Philippe le Bel', Revue Historique, xxxix (1889), 328-34, and also in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Constitutiones, iii. 632-35. The chronology of this account of the war is odd, for the winning of the German king to the French cause is placed before the English alliance with Flanders. This suits the argument of the author, who is trying to show that by the end of 1296 the whole system of English alliances was broken, but it does not fit the facts, since if the bribery of Adolf did take place, it must have been sometime in the course of 1297. The list of the English allies is not accurate. Perhaps this is not surprising in a French source, but it is curious that Albrecht of Habsburg, duke of Bavaria, should be omitted from the list of the French supporters. There are several odd mistakes, such as the fact that the dauphin of Vienne is called Robert, whereas he should be Humbert. Godfrey of Brabant is made the brother of the duke, not the uncle.

The only evidence of payment made to the various French allies, including the king of Germany, is that in the document there are arabic figures interlineated above certain names, written in a different ink to the main text. When dealing with the negotiations of the Italian merchant Musciatto dei Francesi in Germany the figures 30, 20, and again 30 are written in at various points, which has led historians to suppose that Adolf was paid 80,000 livres tournois. But where the interlineated figures can be checked against other evidence, they do not tally. For example, the count of Holland was promised 4,000 livres p.a. for life, and a lump sum of 25,000 livres, of which 12,500 livres was definitely paid (Acta Imperii Angliae et Franciae, 1267-1313, pp. 279-80, no. 309). But in the document the figure 9 is written above the count's name, indicating 9,000 livres.

Such difficulties might be safely ignored if it could be shown that the memorandum was more or less contemporaneous with the events it describes. It was clearly written by an official who had access to official records, for, when discussing French finances, he refers to les escriz du tresor, from which he drew his evidence. The one internal evidence of date is a refer nce to Philip IV advancing 'sus les Flamens, ou premier ost de Lille' in 1297, which suggests that it

was written after a second French army had besieged Lille, which it did in 1304 (Trautz, Die Könige von England und das Reich, 1272-1377, p. 156). It is hard to see what reason there can have been in the early years of the fourteenth century for producing this document, but it does make sense if it was written in the late 1330's, when France was once again threatened by a coalition of the same type as that created by Edward I. A later date for the document would help to explain how an obviously well informed author could have made the mistakes he did.

The corroborative evidence, such as it is, for the bribery theory is not very convining. It is fully discussed by Trautz, op. cit., pp. 149-172; G. Barraclough, 'Edward I and Adolf of Nassau', Cambridge Historical Journal, vi (1940), 225-62; F. Kern, 'Analekten zur Geschichte des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts, ii, die Bestechung König Adolfs von Nassau', Mitteilungen des Inst. f. Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, xxx (1909), 423-43; V. Samanek, 'Der angebliche Verrat Adolfs von Nassau', Hist. Vierteljahrschrift, xxix (1935), 302-41. Adolf was certainly in negotiation with the French. On 30 July a commission was set up to try to settle the Franco-German frontier dispute, and on 31 August Adolf wrote to the count of Flanders mentioning the possibility of making peace with France. But this letter concluded on a different note, discussing the possible arrival of Edward I: 'Que sive veniat, quod multum nobis desideriis arrideret, sive non, quod satis esset contrarium votis nostris, de adiutorio tamen nostro certitudinem omnimodum volumus te habere'. Adolf's explanation for not being able to come at once was that he had to deal with the 'rebellio aliquorum precipuorum imperii principum' (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Constitutiones, iii. 540, no. 577.). Contemporary German chroniclers agreed with this explanation of Adolf's inactivity (Barraclough, op. cit., 234; V. Samanek, 'Studien zur Geschichte König Adolfs', Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaft in Wien, Phil-Hist. Klasse, ccvii (1930), 219, quotes Hermann von Altaich and an anonymous Rhenish chronicler). So Philip IV had little reason for bribing Adolf, who was in no position to start a major campaign in 1297. And if Adolf did accept such bribes, then he kept the matter remarkably secret, rather surprisingly in view of the fact that he was prepared to discuss the possibility of making peace with Philip quite openly.

The alternative theory to that of Adolf's bribery was put forward by Samanek, who suggested that the author of the French document was confused between Adolf and his successor, Albrecht duke of Bavaria. This is suggested by the fact that no mention of Albrecht is made, and by the fact that the king of Germany is not actually named. The document refers to an embassy sent to the king by the French,

consisting of the bishop of Bethlehem and the Dominican prior of Paris. There is no evidence to suggest that these two ever were sent to Adolf, but in 1295 they certainly did go as envoys to Albrecht. One chronicler reports Albrecht as saying in 1296 'si dominus meus Romanorum princeps stipendarius est Anglii effectus, et ego minori dedecore stipendarius ero Franci' (Trautz, op. cit., p. 164). That a researcher in the French archives in the 1330's should get muddled between Adolf and Albrecht is easy to understand: a letter about the marriage alliance between the duke of Bavaria and the French is endorsed 'Lettera regis Alamanie super matrimonio contrehendo', even though it was written in 1295, and Albrecht only gained the throne in 1298 (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Constitutiones, iii. 626, no. 642). The one real difficulty in the theory that the writer of the French memorandum was confused between the two men is the statement he makes that the Franco-German treaty was confirmed at Lille between the Italian representative of Philip IV, Musciatto dei Francesi, and the brother of the German ruler. For Albrecht had no brother, whereas Adolf had. Admittedly, in 1297 this brother was only a Dominican friar, and there is no indication elsewhere that he played an active rôle in diplomacy (Funck-Brentano, op. cit., 330 n. 2). Various suggestions have been made to get round this problem. It seems highly improbable that it is the brother of the French king who is intended, but it is conceivable that the reference is to Boemund, archbishop of Trier, and that he was confused with Adolf's brother Dieter, who succeeded him as archbishop. It is perhaps more probable that Albrecht's uncle, Otto von Ochsenstein, who was an envoy to France in 1295, was the man referred to: after all, in the case of Godfrey of Brabant the author of the document did get confused between a brother and an uncle. (Trautz, op. cit., p. 165).

In conclusion, it appears that the French memorandum on the war is not a sufficiently reliable document to be given credence without adequate corroborative evidence. And what evidence there is suggests that French policy was to try and defeat the English plans by winning Albrecht of Habsburg to their cause, and using him to tie down Adolf of Nassau in Germany, rather than attempting to bribe the German king to leave the English alliance.

I

THE CAVALRY FORCES

The reign of Edward I is generally believed to have seen the transformation of the army from an ill organised, badly disciplined body into an efficient and almost professional force. J.E. Morris saw the systematic use of pay as the means with which the king was transforming the incoherent feudal host into the kind of army which was to prove so successful in the Hundred Years War.[1] Following him, Sir Maurice Powicke wrote that 'in Edward's time, the feudal levy became subsidiary to the paid forces, or was not summoned at all'.[2] Only Miss Chew produced a different verdict, writing of Edward that 'the feudal levy formed the nucleus of every army he led into Wales or Scotland'.[3] The prevailing view is summarised by Michael Powicke, who regards the reign as having witnessed 'the triumph of the paid retinue over the feudal quota'.[4] The argument is that Edward found the cavalry forces raised by the summons for the traditional forty days of unpaid service inadequate, and that he developed a system of paying his troops as a more attractive alternative.

1. J.E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 68.
2. F.M. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, p. 554.
3. H.M. Chew, The English Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief and Knight Service (1932), p. 71.
4. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England (1962), p. 103.

One way of testing this hypothesis is to examine the composition of the cavalry forces that Edward I was putting into the field toward the end of the reign. The evidence is fullest for three years, 1298, 1300 and 1304. For the 1298 campaign there is a source entirely independent of the royal administration. The Falkirk Roll of Arms is a heraldic document, probably drawn up for Henry de Percy, which lists all the most important men who took part in the battle of Falkirk.[1] The army is shown to have been divided into four battalions, and the roll lists 110 bannerets who commanded the retinues that made them up. The other main source is two horse lists. These give descriptions and valuations of the horses of those paid wages by the crown, drawn up to facilitate the payment of money in compensation should a horse be killed on the campaign. One list, containing just under 800 names, is of members of the royal household, and the other of 564 men who were retained on a temporary basis.[2] Morris noticed that only forty-eight of the men mentioned in the roll of arms also appear in the horse lists, and he drew the obvious conclusion, that the other sixty-~~eight~~ two bannerets of the 110 were not paid wages by the crown.[3] If the composition of the individual battalions is examined, it appears that, as would be expected, most of ~~these~~ the bannerets in the one led by the king himself were paid: of the forty-six ~~bannerets~~ in it only eight do not appear in the horse inventories.

1. N. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry 1254 to 1310 (1965), p. 105. The roll is printed by H. Gough, Scotland in 1298 (1888).
2. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 142, nn. 2, 3. These lists are also printed by Gough, op. cit.
3. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 314.

Morris assumed that the majority of the cavalry, those who do not appear on the horse lists, were unpaid feudal troops, but Denholm-Young, aware that there was no feudal summons in 1298, produced a different theory. Unjustly accusing Morris of having left out of account 'about a quarter or even a third of the heavy cavalry', he suggested that the troops who appear on the roll of arms and not on the horse lists were serving under contract agreements made with the king.[1] He cited in support of this contention a contract made by Henry Percy and four earls for an entirely different campaign, the winter expedition mounted in retaliation for the defeat of Stirling Bridge, which began in December 1297 and ended in early March 1298. This contract was clearly stated to be for a period of three months only, and was not renewed for the summer campaign.[2] It was a highly exceptional arrangement, entered into for a winter campaign at a time when the normal army pay office, the Wardrobe, was out of the country on the Flanders expedition.

The most plausible interpretation of this evidence of the composition of the cavalry forces at Falkirk is that while there were many paid troops present, nearly all in the household battalion, the majority of the cavalry, although not serving under a strict feudal obligation, were not paid by the crown. Their commanders must have been fighting at their

1. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 104.
2. The contract is printed by Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 64-65. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 139 and n. 1, suggested that the contract was for the winter campaign of 1299-1300, but the hesitation he indicated about this was wholly justified: the document is clearly dated, and can only apply to the winter campaign of 1297-1298.

own expense. But it may be objected that the horse inventories are not the most reliable evidence of the number of paid troops present: not everyone may have taken the trouble to have their horses enrolled, and the lists may be incomplete. But a study of the documents dealing with the Caerlaverock campaign, with better evidence of the cavalry who were paid wages by the crown, confirm that much of the army was neither paid nor feudal.

The famous Song of Caerlaverock,[1] composed by a herald, provides a list of the most important men present on the 1300 campaign in much the same way as the Falkirk Roll of Arms gives such a list for 1298. In it eighty-seven bannerets are named, and of these only twenty-three served for pay. The Song does not in fact give an absolutely complete list of all the bannerets on the campaign, for four who were paid royal wages are omitted, while the author excuses himself for being unable to remember the names of all those with the earl of Lincoln.[2] Evidence of the paid troops is provided by the account of the Wardrobe.[3] Tout calculated from this document that there were roughly 750 cavalrymen on the campaign, but this estimate should be increased by 100, as he excluded the troops who joined the army from the castle garrisons of Berwick, Lochmaban, Jedburgh and

1. The Siege of Carlaverock, ed. N.H. Nicolas (1828).
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Liber Quotidianus Contrarotulatoris Garderobae (1787), published by the Society of Antiquaries.

Roxburgh.[1] There is also a horse list, but this gives only the names of 522 men who were in pay.[2] But the fact that this document does not list all those who were in receipt of wages is not a reflection of the inadequacy of this type of evidence, for the list is simply of the cavalry who were counted as members of the household. There was presumably another list, as in 1298, of those temporarily retained in royal service, and termed in the Wardrobe account 'forinsec soldiers',[3] but unfortunately this has not survived. It is not possible to argue that the records of the paid troops are incomplete, and that the sixty-four bannerets named in the Song who do not appear as being paid were in fact receiving wages from some other department of the government than the Wardrobe. For the liberate rolls, and the issue and receipt rolls of the Exchequer make it quite plain that there was no other department being issued with funds to pay for the war in Scotland.[4] There is no record of the appointment of any paymasters for the campaign who were not responsible to the Wardrobe, nor any references to contracts of the type entered into by Percy and the earls in the winter of 1297-1298.

But the situation in 1300 was not quite the same as in 1298, for

1. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 140 & n. 1. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 220-221, makes it quite clear that the garrison troops listed in the account of cavalry wages did join the main army.
2. Household horse list, Exchequer Accounts Various, E.101/8/23.
3. Liber Quotidianus, p. 188.
4. Exchequer Issue Rolls, E. 403/106, 107; Chancery liberate rolls, C. 62/67.

there was a formal feudal summons issued for the Caerlaverock campaign, the magnates being asked to come 'cum equis et armis et toto servicio nobis debito'.[1] Did this mean that the unpaid men were all doing feudal service? The roll of the constable, which records details of the performance of the servicia debita in 1300 shows that only about 400 men actually were doing strict service. Of the men named in the Song of Caerlaverock only the earl of Gloucester, Hugh le Despencer and John Hastings served in person. The other bannerets on the campaign who owed service as tenants-in-chief merely detached members of their retinues to go through the formalities, and it is these men who made up the feudal quotas recorded on the roll.[2]

For most of the campaigns of Edward I's reign there are full details recorded only of those men who were serving for pay, or who were doing strict feudal service. But for 1304 there are lists of the men present in the army[3] which can be compared with the pay records of the Wardrobe.[4] The same picture appears as for 1298 and 1300, with many magnates serving at their own expence. There is one list of the bannerets and knights who were in the army in the early months of the year, when Edward was in his winter quarters in Dunfermline abbey. About 140 men are named, and at least 100 of them are not

1. The Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons, ed. F. Palgrave (1827), i. 327.
2. Documents and Records Illustrative of the History of Scotland, ed. F. Palgrave (1837), pp. 208-31. The question of feudal service is discussed more fully infra, pp. 40-46.
3. Palgrave, Documents, pp. 262-74.
4. Wardrobe account for 32 Edward I, British Museum Additional MSS. 8835, ff. 55v-68v.

included in the Wardrobe account as being in receipt of wages. The other list splits up the cavalry into twenty-eight companies, and out of all the troop leaders named only Robert FitzPayn, William de Rithre, William Latimer the younger and Hugh Bardolf appear on the pay lists of the household. Of the seven earls on the campaign, only Richard de Burgh, earl of Ulster, accepted wages, and as an Irishman he was in a rather special position.

How usual was it for there to be large numbers of cavalry serving neither for pay, nor under a feudal obligation? Is it likely that 1298, 1300 and 1304 were exceptional years, and that the armies raised for all the other campaigns of the reign fitted the conventional picture drawn by historians? For the first Welsh war there is evidence suggestive of unpaid, non-feudal service. The men of Cheshire were thanked for they 'fecerunt regi servicium suum regi debitum in exercitu predicto et plus quam idem servitium ad rogatum regis',[1] and the knights and others of the counties of Shropshire and Hereford were thanked for fighting 'non racione alicuius servicii nobis ad presens debiti set sponte et graciose', and were promised that this would not be turned into a precedent.[2] Such letters were hardly normal, and it seems highly probable that they referred to unpaid voluntary service. Although the earls of Warwick and Lincoln

1. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 119.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 196.

commanded paid squadrons, the earl of Hereford fought what admittedly was to him virtually a private war with his own resources.[1] Morris considered it very unlikely that the magnates would have been content, when performing their feudal service of forty days, with appearing with the very small retinues of the formal quotas. He assumed, and there is no reason to doubt that he was correct, that they brought many more knights and troopers with them than they actually registerd with the Marshal and Constable.[2] Such extra men would not have been paid by the crown, nor were they truly feudal. It is also probable that after the end of the forty days some of the unpaid contingents remained on campaign without accepting the king's wages.[3]

The second Welsh war did see Edward attempt to conduct a campaign with an army entirely at royal wages. In April 1282 the King invited six earls and 152 others to serve for pay.[4] But this move clearly aroused opposition, and towards the end of May formal feudal demands for service were substituted for these summonses. The original commander appointed in west Wales, the household knight Robert Tiptoft, was replaced by the earl of Gloucester.[5] It is not clear what the baronial objections to paid service were. It may be that if the whole army was paid wages, then the king would have a right to

1. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, pp. 118-23.
2. Ibid., p. 65.
3. Ibid., p. 132.
4. Parl. Writs, i. 222-224.
5. Ibid., 224-227.

all the lands and castles captured, and could do what he wished with them, whereas if they were taken by a feudal army, they would be allocated to the man with the best claim. The explanation may be a simpler one, that men of the stature of the earls of Hereford and Gloucester resented the degree of subordination implied in accepting royal pay. An earl could not with dignity accept orders from such a man as Tiptoft.

Whatever the causes of resistance to Edward's desire to create an army entirely of paid men, the results were clear enough. The earl of Lincoln who had twice accepted pay before 1282 never did so again, except on his campaigns in Gascony.[1] In 1287 the earls of Warwick, Surrey and Norfolk do appear to have accepted wages, but those of Cornwall, Hereford and Gloucester did not.[2] In the final Welsh war, that of 1294-1295, none of the earls can be proved to have taken pay. The army in south Wales commanded by Hereford, which won a battle by the ruse of feeding the Welsh with false information,[3] did not contain any troops in royal pay. Warwick's army which, when based on Oswestry,[4] won the battle of Maes Moydog, was a paid force, but the name of the earl does not appear on the pay roll. Nor does that of the earl of

1. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 158.
2. Ibid., p. 210.
3. The Hagneby chronicle, Brit. Mus., Cottonian MSS. Vesp. B. xi, f. 37.
4. Ibid., f. 37. This chronicle contains a hitherto unnoticed newsletter about the battle of Maes Moydog, which confirms the suggestion made in the Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. xxxvi, that the English army marched on the Welsh from Oswestry.

Arundel, who later joined up with Warwick.[1] No pay rolls survive for the rest of the campaign, but the Book of Prests contains no mention of wages being paid to any of the earls.[2]

The evidence already discussed has shown that none of the English earls received pay for the Scotch campaigns of 1298, 1300, or 1304. Nor is there any evidence of ~~them~~ their taking wages for any other of Edward's summer campaigns in the north.[3] But curiously their compunctions do not appear to have extended to winter campaigns, when they were prepared to accept pay. The contract for the expedition which set out at the very end of 1297 was for the earls of Surrey, Norfolk, Hereford, Gloucester and Warwick to serve along with Henry Percy for three months with a total of 500 horse, in return for £7,691, 16s. 8d.[4] In addition the earl of Arundel with thirty-nine horse served for wages.[5] A similar contract scheme was envisaged in 1301, but there is no evidence that it was put into effect. That year the king decided to winter in Scotland, in the hope of being able to finish off the Scotch war the next summer. On 9 October Edward sent a letter to the Exchequer asking them to send money immediately, and to emphasise the extremity of his need an estimate

1. J.G. Edwards, 'The Battle of Maes Madog and the Welsh Campaign of 1294-5', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxix (1924), 1-12.
2. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. 81, shows that like Warwick, Pembroke and Lancaster commanded troops in royal pay, but there is no evidence that the earls themselves were paid.
3. A possible exception is Thomas of Lancaster, who was paid wages in 1298, and did homage for his lands on 8 September. He may well have only been paid up to, and not after, that date.
4. Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 64-65.
5. Account of Walter of Amersham, paymaster, E. 101/7/8, f. 12.

of the cost of supporting the army and the castle garrisons was enclosed. This concluded with the statement that cash was needed to pay the magnates who had promised to stay with the king. The list of these was headed by the earls of Surrey and Warwick, and included twelve other important men. But definite agreements had only been reached with John of Brittany, Aymer de Valence, Eustace Poer and Patrick earl of Dunbar.[1] There is no evidence that contracts were made with the other men, and in view of the fact that in November the earl of Surrey was lending money to the crown,[2] it seems unlikely that the king was in any position to make the payments promised. An exception to the general rule that the earls were unwilling to accept royal pay must be made in the case of the Scotch and Irish: the earls of Dunbar and Ulster in particular had no hesitation in serving for wages.

The armies that were sent to fight in Gascony and Flanders do not fit into the same pattern as those that campaigned in Scotland. Men who were prepared to serve at their own expense north of the Border in a cause they approved of had no desire to join in unpopular campaigns abroad. Opposition to service on the continent had been common since the reign of Richard I. It had been one of the elements in the struggle of the baronage against King John, and it was to be one of the grievances of the Marshal and Constable in 1297 that Edward I wished them to fight overseas. In 1294 Edward issued a

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, ff. 5d.-6. The estimate is calendared in Bain, Cal. Docs Scot., ii. no. 1241.
2. Subsidiary household account, E. 101/360/24, m. 1.

strictly feudal summons to raise an army for Gascony.[1] It was the inclusion of the king of Scotland and several Scotch magnates in this that did much to provoke the revolt against English suzerainty in the following year, but surprisingly there is no direct evidence of the English baronage resenting the summons. Morris assumed that, although couched in feudal terms, the writs 'cannot but have been mere invitations to professional soldiers to raise cavalry for the king's pay'.[2] This seems highly unlikely. Certainly the abbot of Ramsey did not interpret his summons in this way, for he actually sent men to the muster to perform his servicium debitum.[3] The Treasurer was appointed to accept fines from those ecclesiastics and women who preferred to commute their service.[4] There were clearly difficulties in enforcing the demand for service, for on 17 August the muster which had been ordered for 1 September was postponed until the end of the month.[5] It looks very much as if it never actually took place. Miss Chew assumed that it was cancelled because of the news of the Welsh revolt,[6] but as it was not until 19 October that the seriousness of the situation in Wales became apparent to the government,[7] this argument is not convincing. It is much more likely that opposition to such a feudal levy involving service abroad had

1. Parl. Writs, i. 259-63.
2. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 276.
3. Chew, English Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief, p. 45.
4. Rôles Gascons, iii., ed. Bémont, 213-14, no. 3298.
5. Ibid., 272-3, no. 3682.
6. Chew, op. cit., p. 99.
7. Morris, op. cit., p. 242.

compelled Edward to abandon his plans before the news of the Welsh revolt came through.

The army that was sent to Gascony in October 1294 was composed entirely of paid men. Fourteen magnates, headed by the king's brother Edmund of Lancaster, were granted on 10 October a liberate writ of £1,983. 6s. 8d., as a loan with which to prepare themselves and their men for the expedition.[1] Such advances were not normally accepted by men not serving for pay, and this case was no exception. Edmund contracted with the government to serve for a year with 140 men-at-arms in return for 4,000 marks. The earl of Lincoln was to get 2,000 marks.[2] Later in the war, different rates were in force. By 1298 Lincoln was getting £1,000 a year for sixty men-at-arms, or twenty-five marks per man, while Edmund of Cornwall with 140 men was contracted at a rate of £2,000 a year, which works out at twenty marks per man.[3] Other troops in Gascony were paid wages on a daily basis, and it appears that even the Gascons recruited locally were all paid wages.

There was some opposition among the English baronage to fighting in Gascony, but it was the proposed double campaign in Flanders and

1. Liberate Rolls, C. 62/71.
2. E. 101/353/2, f. 1, part of an account book of John Sandale and Thomas of Cambridge, royal paymasters in Gascony.
3. E. 101/377/20, f. 1, part of an account of Roger Northburgh, Keeper of the Wardrobe, for 1319-20. The date of this account provides a good example of the length of time it took to settle some of the accounts of Edward I's reign.

south-west France that really aroused resentment. At the Salisbury parliament early in the year the king appears to have proposed a feudal summons, with the Marshal and Constable taking one army to the south, while Edward himself launched the attack in the Low Countries. The proposal was opposed on two grounds. Firstly it was claimed that the Marshal and Constable should accompany the king on campaign. Secondly, the familiar argument that there was no obligation to serve overseas was revived.[1] The story of the subsequent struggle is a well known one, and need not be repeated here. Although the council felt that Edward was putting himself in considerable danger by going abroad without sufficient funds,[2] the king did set sail from Winchelsea on 22 August. But as a result of the constitutional crisis he had no feudal host with him, merely a small army composed mainly of paid troops, mostly loyal members of his household. Even if promotions made during the campaign are included, Edward had with him in 1297 less bannerets in the whole army than he was to have in the household battalion alone in 1298.[3] But, rather surprisingly, there were a few unpaid cavalry troops even on the Flanders campaign. Anthony Bek, one of Edward's staunchest supporters at this time,[4] had about thirty men-at-arms with him. William Hotham, archbishop-

1. Chron. Cotton, p. 325; Chron. Guisborough, pp. 289-90.
2. This is indicated in a letter sent by Edward to the Gascons, in which he announced his intention of going to Flanders: Rôles Gascons, iii. ed. Bémont, p. 357, no. 4392.
3. N.B. Lewis, 'The English Forces in Flanders', Studies in Medieval History Presented to F.M. Powicke (1949), pp. 310-18, provides a full analysis of the composition of the Flanders army.
4. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 290-92, stresses the importance of Bek's rôle in 1297.

elect of Dublin, the earl of Athol, Hugh le Despencer, Bartholemew Badlesmere, Robert de Mohaut and John de Hastings all served voluntarily with smaller retinues. The Treasurer, Walter Langton, does not appear to have been paid for the followers he brought with him.[1] Ralph de Monthermer, who had secretly married Joan, daughter of Edward I and widow of the earl of Gloucester, was released from prison, where this act had placed him, on condition that he served in Flanders with fifty knights.[2] But as he was campaigning in Scotland in the winter of 1297-1298, it appears that he must have found some way of evading this obligation.

It is the men who came to the musters in answer to the formal feudal summonses that were issued in 1300, 1303 and 1306 who are the most familiar part of the unpaid cavalry in Edward I's armies. The number of those who performed the feudal military service owed by all tenants-in-chief was not very impressive. During the thirteenth century the old quotas had been severely reduced on a piecemeal basis.[3] By the time of Edward I this process had been completed, and the first summons of the reign produced a total service of 228 knights and

1. Lewis, op. cit., p. 312, n. 4.
2. Willelmi Rishanger, Chronica et Annales, ed. H.T. Riley (1865), p. 173.
3. This process is described and analysed by R.F. Walker, 'The Anglo Welsh Wars, 1217-1277' (Oxford Univ. D.Phil thesis, 1953), pp. 40-66, and by I.J. Sanders, Feudal Military Service in England (1956), pp. 59-90.

294 serjeants, two of the latter being considered as equivalent to one knight. For the second Welsh war the marshal's roll lists only 123 knights and 190 serjeants, but there may well have been other musters not recorded in the main roll.[1] The Caerlaverock campaign saw the tendency for service to be done by serjeants rather than by knights go further, and as already shown,[2] most of the tenants-in-chief preferred to have their feudal service done by deputies even if they themselves were present on the campaign. The roll of service records forty knights and 366 serjeants.[3] The rolls for 1303 show a smaller total service, composed of fifteen knights and 267 serjeants, along with about twenty lightly armed horsemen.[4] But as in 1282 it is very likely that records of subsidiary musters have not survived. For the next campaign for which there was a feudal summons, that of 1306, two small muster rolls show service done by about twelve knights and eighty serjeants.[5] There was more commutation that year than before, but writs issued between 1314 and 1316, allowing those who had served in 1306 to levy scutage on their own lands, show that almost a hundred tenants-in-chief either served in person, or made arrangements for others to do their service for them.[6] Accusations were brought late in 1306 against fifteen men, who the government claimed

1. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 45.
2. Supra, p. 31.
3. Palgrave, Documents, pp. 208-31.
4. There are two copies of the main roll, E. 101/612/29, and Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/5/6. E. 101/612/10 is the record of a subsidiary muster.
5. Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/5/7.
6. Cal. Chancery Rolls Various, 1277-1326, pp. 384-92.

had not done their service. Four of them stated that they had appeared,[1] and it is probable that full records of the feudal service done in 1306 were never properly drawn up. In some cases evidence that men had served in the army was given to Edward II by the chancellor, rather than by the constable or marshal, whose duty it was to keep records of the performance of military service. Certainly in the next reign records of feudal levies were not kept up correctly. In the case of the futile campaign of 1311 not all those who owed service bothered to register their quotas, and simple evidence that they had been present on the expedition was regarded as sufficient evidence for writs pro scutagio habendo to be granted.[2]

Although Edward I went on issuing formal feudal summonses almost up to the very end of the reign, the forces of the strict servicia debita were of no great importance. The problem was that the feudal quotas were quite unrealistic, being unrelated to the wealth of the men who produced them. An important royal knight like Adam de Welles owed service for only one half of a serjeanty.[3] In 1300 William de Cantilupe, banneret, was on campaign with three knights and eight serjeants for sixty days , for which he was paid. His feudal service was for one tenth of a knight's fee, so he detached one of his men for eight days to perform it.[4] Different tenants found different ways

1. Rotuli Parliamentorum, (1767)
2. Cal. Chancery Rolls Various, 1277-1326, p. 395.
3. Palgrave, Documents, p. 229.
4. Liber Quotidianus, p. 198; Palgrave, op. cit., p. 223.

of meeting their obligations. For the second Welsh war the abbot of St. Augustine's, Canterbury, simply paid Henry de Cobham £20 to do his service for him.[1] In 1300 the bishop of Hereford arranged that William de Grandson should perform his feudal service for a sum of 120 marks. When the forty days of service came to an end, the leader of the contingent representing the bishop, Thomas de Birmingham, joined Grandson's paid retinue.[2] In some cases the connection between the tenants-in-chief and the soldiers performing their service is clear. In 1300 one of the knights sent by Walter Langton to the muster was his brother, Robert Peverel.[3] Of the four men doing service for Robert Chandos, two bore his surname.[4] In 1303 Peter Maulay was accompanied by John Maulay.[5] But usually there is no indication as to whether the soldiers were tenants of the men they were representing, or were simply mercenaries hired to do the job. Sometimes the same men turned up in 1303 as had come in 1300: on both occasions Robert Achard did his service in company with Robert of Tunderlee.[6] But more usually, as in the case of the abbot of Evesham's feudal service, different men appeared on the two occasions.[7]

Feudal levies always produced their comedy turns. In 1282 one

1. Historiae Anglicanae Scriptores Decem (1652), ed. R. Twysden, p. 1939 (William Thorne's chronicle).
2. Registrum Ricardi de Swinfeld, ed. W. W. Capes (1909), pp. 375-76; Palgrave, Documents, p. 214; Liber Quotidianus, p. 192.
3. Palgrave, Documents, p. 210.
4. Ibid., p. 214.
5. Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/5/6.
6. Ibid., Palgrave, Documents, p. 211.
7. Ibid., p. 223; Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/5/6.

man came to the muster carrying a side of bacon, which he ate and promptly departed.[1] In 1300 there was an archer, who came with a bow and one arrow, which he fired off on first seeing the enemy and immediately set off home. John de Langford, whose tenure committed him to serve on a horse worth 5s., bearing a sack and a wooden beam, cannot have been much use to the army. In 1300 he was ordered to make fine, but in 1303 he appeared in person.[2] Such men were hardly the normal type of those doing feudal service, however, and were probably regarded with equal amusement then as now. But even if the musters did for the most part produce reasonably competent soldiers, the system of feudal service hardly produced an army. Morris estimated the cavalry strength of the Caerlaverock army at 2,000:[3] less than a quarter of these were feudal, and the campaign lasted considerably longer than the forty days of the traditional service. The men performing servicia debita probably did not serve as a separate brigade, but were assimilated into the normal structure of the army. In 1300 Hugh of St. Philibert even managed to have himself registered as performing feudal service at the same time that he was in receipt of household pay, which was wholly improper.[4] The incident shows that he was not made to leave the household battalion during the time that he was performing his service.

1. Parl. Writs, i. 208.
2. Palgrave, Documents, pp. 218-20; E. 101/612/29.
3. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 300.
4. Palgrave, Documents, p. 225; Liber Quotidianus, p. 202.

If the feudal levy was of no great military significance, was it financially rewarding? The forty days free service did represent something of a financial saving, perhaps, but it seems doubtful if the government would have considered it worth paying wages to such troops. There is certainly little evidence from the end of the reign of the feudal levies being taken into pay once the forty days was over, although this had happened in the Welsh wars.[1] Issue of a feudal summons entitled the government to demand a scutage, but during this period it was more trouble to try to collect it than it was worth. The Exchequer was fighting a losing battle to collect scutage on the old assessment of fees, rather than on the new reduced quotas. It seems unlikely that any appreciable sums were raised.[2] The same is not true of the fines, sums paid on the new quotas in lieu of performing service. These were collected in 1300 at the very high rate of £40 a fee, which was far more than the cost of hiring a knight to perform the service. Yet enough people were willing to pay these fines for the exchequer to receive almost £2,000, almost enough to pay the wages of the banderets and knights in household pay.[3] In 1303 fines were collected at half the rate of 1300, but for more people commuted their service, so that £1,777 was taken by the exchequer from fines, though the sum was hardly promptly paid.[4] In 1306 the rate was reduced still further, to

1. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 132.
2. Chew, English Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief, p. 60; 'Scutage under Edward I', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxvii (1922), 321-36.
3. Chew, op. cit., 332; roll of receipts from fines, E. 370/1/13.
4. Chew, op. cit., 333; E. 370/1/13.

20 marks, but there were still more commutations, so that the yield from fines came to £1,881. A memorandum noted that the king had decided on the low rate in view of the short time that had elapsed since the last two feudal summonses, after consultation with the Treasurer, the barons of the Exchequer, and others of the council.[1]

A feudal summons was of considerable financial benefit to the tenants-in-chief, for they were entitled to collect scutage on their own lands. Though they refused to pay the Exchequer scutage levied on the old servicium debitum, it was on this obsolete basis that they collected it for their own benefit. So the earl of Lincoln received from the honour of Pontefract, assessed at nearly sixty-three fees, £125. 18s. 2½d. in 1305 for the scutage of the Coerlaverock campaign.[2] The number of writs issued to enable men to levy scutage on their own sub-tenants was very large, and the sums raised must have been considerable. It must have aggrieved Simon de Montague to find that since he was serving in Gascony in 1303, he was not entitled to collect the scutage for the Scotch campaign of that year. His petition asking for this was curtly endorsed 'de scutagio nichil'.[3]

1. E. 370/1/13.
2. Account of Lacy's estates and household, D.L. 29/1/2.
3. Chancery Warrants, C. 81/1733/30.

Although the crown had a definite and well established right to feudal service for forty days, the troops raised under the system were not particularly impressive or important, nor were the sums raised in commutation of service large. The rest of the cavalry, the paid household troops and the unpaid men who emerge from the Falkirk Roll of Arms and the Song of Caerlaverock, were of far more use. What right did the crown have to expect them to serve in the wars, and how were they summoned?

The obligation incumbent upon all tenants-in-chief to produce knight service was consequent upon the act of homage. But Edward I could also appeal to the far more general obligation to bear arms in the defence of the realm, part of the fealty all his subjects owed to him. The duty of all men to possess the arms and military equipment appropriate to their status and wealth had been set out by Henry II in the Assize of Arms.[1] This legislation was brought up to date in 1242,[2] and reenacted by Edward I in the Statute of Winchester.[3] The old rule was that anyone who held a knight's fee should be a knight, but in the thirteenth century the possession of land of a certain value was made the qualification. Initially the level was set at twenty librates, and there were frequent attempts to get men of this standing to take up knighthood, sometimes in

1. W. Stubbs, Select Charters (9th. edn, 1913), p. 183.
2. Ibid., p. 363.
3. Ibid., p. 466.

order to increase the military potential of the country, and sometimes for the sake of the substantial fines that could be paid for respite or exemption. Certain classes, such as those holding their land in burgage, and those under twenty-one, were excused the obligation of becoming knights by the Statutum de Militibus, probably dating from 1278.[1]

Quite early in the reign Edward I began to try and enforce an obligation to do military service on all those with sufficient wealth to afford the equipment needed. It made no difference whether or not they had taken up knighthood, nor whether they held their land in chief or as subtenants. In November 1282 all with at least twenty librates who were not serving in the Welsh war were summoned to appear at Northampton early in the next year, along with shire and borough representatives. The object was probably to get them to pay monetary compensation in lieu of the service they were not doing, but not surprisingly no such grant was forthcoming.[2] In 1285 Edward rewarded the class of twenty librate landholders for their part in the Welsh wars by raising the qualification for compulsory knighthood to £100, 'ob bonum et gratuitum servicium nobis a communitate eiusdem regni in expedicionibus nostris Wallie benivole impensum'.[3] But in 1292 the level was brought down again, this time

1. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England, pp. 73-81, 106-07; F.M. Nichols, 'On Feudal and Obligatory Knighthood', Archaeologia, xxxix (1863), 189-244.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 10.
3. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 76; Powicke, op. cit., p. 109.

to forty librates.[1]

The period of almost constant war after 1294 naturally saw the crown attempting to take advantage of these precedents to get men to serve in the campaigns. On 10 February 1295 the king ordered the Treasurer to get the sheriffs to hold inquests into the number of men holding more than forty librates of land. Such men were ordered to be ready to set out on campaign at royal wages, equipped with horses and arms, at only three weeks notice. In March the inquisition was duly carried out, and the measure appears to have been successful in providing Edward with needed reinforcements in Wales.[2] That the magnates did not approve of this type of appeal is perhaps suggested by the method used later in the year by the bishop of Durham and earl Warenne for raising troops to defend the north of England. They were given power to compel all men to assist them, but chose not to use the forty librate qualification for service, instead simply requesting the sheriffs of the northern counties to send all knights, along with two men from each vill, to a muster at York on 2 November 1295.[3]

But the crown stuck to the new system. In 1296 the forty librate landholders were still requested to be prepared to set out at three weeks notice. In January the earl of Arundel was appointed to check

1. Ibid., p. 109.
2. Ibid., p. 110; Parl. Writs, i. 267-68; Morris, op. cit., pp. 77, 262.
3. Parl. Writs, i. 270.

on the organisation of the system in Shropshire and Staffordshire.[1] Presumably many of the troops who served in Scotland for pay in 1296 came as a result of this obligation incumbent on the forty librate class, but unfortunately no writ of summons to these men has survived. The writ to the magnates was enrolled. It was not feudal in form, but used the formula 'vobis mandamus rogantes in fide et dilectione quibus nobis tenemini firmiter injungendo' to ask them to appear 'cum equis et armis quanto decencius et honorabilius poteritis'. No promise of pay was made.[2]

As already seen, Edward I's initial plan in 1297 was to demand feudal service, but it appears that the strong opposition at the Salisbury parliament, led by Roger Bigod, forced him to abandon this idea.[3] But the king persisted in his intention of a campaign abroad, and after ordering the sheriffs on 5 May to draw up lists of all those holding twenty librates or more, he issued a summons to appear at a muster at London on 7 July. Ecclesiastics and women were asked to send their _servicia debita_,[4] and roughly 130 magnates received individual summonses. These latter did not take the usual form of the demands for non-feudal service. Instead of asking them to come _in fide et dilectione_, the phraseology was 'vos affectuose requirimus

1. _Parl. Writs_, i. 278.
2. _Ibid._, 275.
3. _Supra_, p. 39.
4. _Parl. Writs_, i. 281.

et roganus quatenus attendentes quod vos opportet et condecet circa salvacionem et communem utilitatem dicti regni manus apponere adjutrices'.[1] It looks as if the writ was deliberately vague, as there was no well established obligation that Edward could appeal to for service overseas.

The summonses to the muster at London naturally aroused suspicion. According to Langtoft, many barons were inclined to refuse to come as they suspected that the king was trying to create a new form of military service, and 'fere novele service saunz condicioun serrait pur coustoume desheretisoun'.[2] In the petition presented to the king known as the Monstrounces, the opposition put their case over the summons cautiously, pointing out that it was not stated where the service was to be done, and that if it was to be Flanders as was rumoured, there was no precedent for it.[3] Edward then conceded that no one was bound to go to Flanders with him, save at royal wages.[4] But the earls of Norfolk and Hereford and their followers were not content with this, and refused to have anything to do with the campaign. The quarrel over service was a very important element in the crisis of 1297, but it was an issue over which the opposition were not very sure of their rights. The final settlement, the Confirmatio Cartarum, made no mention of the question, but simply dealt with the other

1. Parl. Writs, i. 282.
2. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 286-88.
3. J.G. Edwards, 'Confirmatio Cartarum and Baronial Grievances in 1297', Eng. Hist. Rev., lviii (1943), 153, 170.
4. Chron. Cotton, p. 327.

matters of prices and the maltolt.[1] The pardon granted on 5 November, guaranteed in advance by letters of the king's son Edward and his council on 10 October, forgave the members of the opposition their failure to answer the summons, but there was no statement won from the crown declaring that the demand for service had been unconstitutional. And very little attention seems to have been paid to the question of the twenty librate landholders. The only document that mentions them is the De Tallagio non Concedendo, of questionable authenticity, but most probably representing the baronial demands in September and October 1297. Even this makes no challenge to the royal claim to the service of this class of men, but simply promises them pardon for not responding to the summons.[2] That few of them had done so is shown by the fact that of the 713 men named in the surviving returns, which cover thirteen counties, only seventy-six appear in the roll of those who received protections to go on the Flanders campaign.[3]

The threat of civil war in the autumn of 1297 saw a new expedient adopted for recruiting cavalry, with commissions being set up to select loyal knights and squires to come to a muster at London,[4] but for the Scotch wars more normal methods were reverted to. Writs issued on 21 October to 180 individuals to serve in Scotland used a formula

1. Stubbs, Select Charters, pp. 490-91.
2. Edwards, op. cit., p. 166; H. Rothwell, 'The Confirmation of the Charters, 1297', Eng. Hist. Rev., lx (1945), 311-13.
3. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England, p. 111.
4. Parl. Writs, i. 299-300.

very like that employed to ask the magnates to come to the muster on 7 July 1297, with no appeal to fealty.[1] But it is significant that the next summons, sent out on 26 October and asking for reinforcements for the army in Flanders, reverted to the old type of phraseology with 'vos rogamus ex corde in fide et dilectione quibus nobis tenemini nichilominus injungentes.....'[2]. Variations in the formulae of military summonses cannot be regarded as insignificant. The writs sent out on 15 May 1297 demanding attendance at London on 7 July had been hotly resented, and it was not the royal concession that wages would be paid in Flanders, but the full reversion to the old style of summons at the end of October that marked the baronial victory over the question of military service.

For the Falkirk campaign Edward I attempted no innovations in the method of summoning the cavalry. The formula 'vobis mandamus rogantes in fide et dilectione quibus nobis tenemini firmiter injungentes....'[3] was similar to that used for a non-feudal summons in 1287.[4] There was no demand made for the service of the twenty or forty libate class, and no mention was made of whether the troops were to be paid royal wages. For this campaign the roll of arms and the horse lists provide a means of finding out whether all those who were summoned did appear, and whether all the more important men in the army were sent individual

1. Ibid., 302-04.
2. Ibid., 304.
3. Ibid., 309-12.
4. Ibid., 250.

writs. Of the 111 bannerets in the heraldic roll, only twenty-nine had received direct summonses for the expedition, while a further twelve had been asked to muster for the winter campaign that immediately preceded the Falkirk one, on the conclusion of which they presumably remained in the north, so making it unnecessary for any further summons to be issued. Taking a list of sixty-eight men summoned on 30 March 1298, there is no evidence in thirty-two cases to show that they appeared at the muster on 25 May. Seventeen men do appear on the horse lists, and eleven on the roll of arms, while eight more did get protections to go on the campaign, though this cannot be taken as definite evidence that they in fact went.[1]

A new list of magnates was used for summonses sent out at the end of September 1298, requesting service in Scotland the following year: a campaign which never took place.[2] But although this army never mustered, the list was not abandoned. It provided an authoritative record of the hundred or so most important and reliable military leaders, whose status also entitled them to a leading part in the deliberations of the nation, and it was accordingly the basis of all the military and parliamentary summonses of the rest of the reign of Edward I.[3] For the Caerlaverock campaign the summons took strict feudal form, the magnates being asked to come 'cum equis et

1. Gough, Scotland in 1298, passim; Parl. Writs, i. 310-11.
2. Ibid., 317-18.
3. J.E.A. Joliffe, The Constitutional History of Medieval England (2nd. edn, 1948), p. 348.

armis et toto servicio quod nobis debetis', but in addition to the feudal quotas they were asked to bring men-at-arms 'quanto potencius honorabilius seu decencius poteritis'.[1] It was this second half of the writ of summons that produced the non-feudal unpaid troops who formed the majority of the cavalry present on the campaign. The response to the summonses in 1300 was better than in 1298, with sixty out of the eighty-seven bannerets named in the Song of Carlaverock receiving individual demands for their service.

Along with the feudal summons Edward I in 1300 revived the conception of a wealth qualification for service. He set up commissions to draw up lists of all men holding at least forty librates, and to summon them to serve at royal wages in Scotland.[2] This was reminiscent of 1297, and naturally provoked opposition. In a statement of grievances it was requested that the summons be withdrawn on the grounds 'lur est avis qe lur tenements sunt defendus par ceus de ky il tenent; e ceus ke tenent en chef du roy funt les services pur eus e pur lur tenanz en tus lues ou il services deyvent'. In other words, the only form of service that the opposition was prepared to recognise was the strictly feudal one of tenants-in-chief. They did not recognise any more general obligation to serve.[3] The king was unwilling to accept these arguments, and the opposition was

1. Parl. Writs, i.327.
2. Ibid., 330.
3. Sixth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (1877), appendix, p. 344.

not strong enough to force the king to revoke his claims in the Articuli super Cartas issued on 6 March 1300.[1] The lists of forty librate landholders were drawn up, so it does not appear that the summons was revoked. But there is equally no evidence to show that pressure was brought on those named in these lists to make them go on the campaign. The absence of complete lists of those present in Scotland makes it impossible to estimate the efficacy of the measure, but the success of the opposition is amply demonstrated by the fact that Edward did not dare repeat the summons of men of a specified landed wealth. The next one was in 1316, when the qualification was set at fifty librates.[2]

But Edward did not admit complete defeat. In 1301 the magnates were asked to muster for the new campaign in Scotland with a style of writ much like that used in 1297, with no reference to fealty and allegiance.[3] In place of a summons of forty librate landholders, inexpedient in view of the previous year's row, some 935 men were sent individual requests to serve. Unlike the writs to the magnates, these promised pay, but like them made no reference to fealty.[4] Once again, there is no way of finding out how many of the men who were summoned actually came to Scotland. The precedents of 1301 were not followed up in the rest of the reign. The summonses issued for 1303

1. Statutes of the Realm, i. 137-9.
2. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England, pp. 143-44.
3. Parl. Writs, i. 347.
4. Ibid., 349-56.

and 1306 were feudal in form, that for 1306 not even including the clause that had featured in 1298 asking for more men-at-arms than the strict quotas allowed for.[1] No summons of any sort went to the class of forty librate men. In 1304 and 1307 there was no need of general summonses, as in both cases the army was already in Scotland having wintered there. The last years of the reign saw only one request for non-feudal service, with the formula employed being 'vos affectuose rogamus nichilominus in fide et dilectione quibus nobis tenemini injungendo mandantes...'. This was in January 1303, and the summons was only sent to twenty-seven northern magnates.[2] An unusual arrangement was negotiated with the men of Northumberland by Walter Langton at the end of 1302, by which they were to serve for eight days at their own cost, but this was an entirely exceptional case, resulting from the particular responsibilities of the northern counties to protect the border.[3]

Why did Edward I at the end of his reign virtually give up non-feudal summonses and requests for the service of the twenty or forty librate class? The evidence of the composition of the armies of the Scotch wars suggests that the army in the field was much the same, no matter how it was summoned, and it might be that the king found that there was little point in experimenting with novel methods of

1. Parl. Writs, i. 366, 377.
2. Ibid., 369-70.
3. Ibid., 369; Michael Powicke, op. cit., p. 115.

recruiting. But it seems much more probable that Edward was forced to abandon the methods that he had been developing and revert to straightforward summonses in feudal form as a result of political opposition. Innovations in the form of summonses were objected to for fear that acceptance of them might be considered a precedent, enabling the crown to demand additional service as of right in the future. The final baronial victory on this point must have been won at some point between the 1301 campaign and the issue of the feudal summons for 1303, and it is tempting to assume that the king abandoned his claims to non-feudal service at the October parliament in 1302. According to the Hagneby chronicle there was then a major crisis, with a committee of thirty-five being set up in parliament. The relevant passage runs as follows:

> 'Item post festum sancti Michaelis rex tenuit concilium apud London' in quo de multis multa loquntur.[1] Tandem ex consensu regis et regni actum est ut ex Anglie xxxv eligerentur, quorum primus et primas archiepiscopus Cantuariensis erat, de quorum consilio atque assensu status ecclesie et regni secundum consilium et utilitatem regni ordinaretur.'[2]

No other chronicle records anything of the sort, but plausibility is given to the story by the fact that there was a precedent for the setting up of such a committee dating from the previous year, when at the Lincoln parliament the complaints of the opposition were placed before a commission of twenty-six.[3] It may be the case, as argued by Rothwell, that during the latter years of the reign Edward I was generally successful in going back on the concessions formally

1. M.S. reads locuntur.
2. Brit. Mus., Cotton MSS. Vesp. B. xi, f. 53.
3. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 330-32.

granted in 1297,[1] but although the opposition never got a written condemnation of the attempt to enforce a wider, more general military obligation out of the king, yet on this issue they did win a clear victory. No later medieval monarch was able to enforce any general obligation to cavalry service in England. There were some abortive attempts under Edward II and in the early years of Edward III, but in general reliance was placed on a limited number of magnates to provide adequate cavalry forces under a contract system.

If the only type of military obligation which was fully accepted by the men who provided Edward I with his cavalry forces was the strict feudal duty of tenants-in-chief to provide the servicium debitum, then why did large numbers of men serve Edward in Wales, Gascony, Flanders and Scotland? It must be stressed that the refusal to accept the claims of the crown was on constitutional grounds, and not from opposition to the wars that Edward was engaged in, though in the case of Flanders the two were intermingled. But in the wars in Wales and Scotland there was general support for Edward's aims, and there was no objection to fighting as long as it did not appear that the king was using service in the wars as a means to increase the power of the crown over its subjects.

1. H. Rothwell, 'Edward I and the Struggle for the Charters, 1297-1305', Studies in Medieval History presented to F.M. Powicke, pp. 319-332.

During this period war was the normal occupation of the upper class, and this was one reason why Edward had no great difficulty in raising sufficient cavalry forces. When war was not available, men turned to tournaments as the nearest substitute, though on one occasion the substitute proved more attractive than the real thing, when in 1306 the tedium of the occupation of Scotland proved too much for several important members of the entourage of the prince of Wales, and they departed to take part in tournaments abroad.[1] There must have been many men in Edward's armies who fought simply because it was their way of life and they enjoyed it.

Patriotism had its part to play. The Scotch were hated, as many popular songs testify. One quoted by Langtoft puts English feeling very succinctly:

> 'For Scottes
> Telle I for sottes
> And wrecches unwar'.[2]

That the enemy 'gentem esse instabilem et fallacem, et ad omne scelus paratam'[3] was so familiar a fact as to be hardly worth repeating. William Wallace and the traitor Simon Fraser were the objects of an almost hysterical hatred. Atrocity stories such as that about the burning of 200 schoolboys in Corbridge[4] and the report that after the

1. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 127, n. 2. In addition to the references cited there, see Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 216; Parl. Writs, i. 378-79.
2. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 252.
3. Chron. Rishanger, p. 445.
4. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 100, n. 2.

battle of Stirling Bridge the body of Hugh Cressingham was skinned[1] assisted in the creation of an atmosphere of enthusiasm for the war. There was no need of propaganda among the inhabitants of the north of England who suffered from Scotch raids. The accounts of the lands that had been confiscated from John Balliol are, for the years 1298 and 1299, full of references to the devastation wrought in Northumberland by enemy raids. Several manors are reported to have been entirely deserted as a result of the war.[2]

Beside the warlike ethos of the period and the hatred of the enemy, there were more concrete factors which encouraged men to go on campaign. By providing those who served in his wars with writs of protection, Edward was able to do much to safeguard their domestic interests during their absence in the field. The king was even prepared to suspend novel disseisin

> 'pur garder de domage countes, barons, chevalers e touz autres qe veinit en propre persone en host ov nous en ceste presente guerre, pur salvacioun de nous e de nostre reaume e de la corone Dengleterre contre les Escoz nos rebels e enemis'.[3]

In a more positive direction, there was the hope of grants of land in Scotland if the war went successfully. Edward I ~~[illegible]~~ on occasion made ~~[illegible]~~ grants before conquest had actually taken place. ~~[illegible]~~, ~~[illegible]~~ Bothwell was ~~[illegible]~~y promised

1. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 300.
2. Pipe Roll, E. 372/146, m. 23.
3. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/8/4, m. 2. This memorandum dates from 1300.
4. ~~Bodleian Library, Dodsworth 138, f. 64.~~

to Aymer de Valence shortly before it fell in 1301.[1] Service in war was the surest way of winning the royal favour. Robert FitzRoger was one of the men who appeared at the Exchequer in 1297 to protest against the levying of the tax of the eighth for which proper consent had not been obtained. By good service in Scotland he soon undid the harm which this must have done his standing with the king. In 1300 he was appointed royal lieutenant in Northumberland,[2] and two years later was pardoned his debts at the Exchequer in recognition of his services.[3] In 1306 he was formally thanked for his rôle in protecting the marches against Robert Bruce.[4] Royal favour was extended to FitzRoger's bloodthirsty family. As a result of his part in the Scotch wars one of his sons was pardoned for murdering his own brother,[5] and a little later the victim's wife was herself pardoned at Robert's instance for committing a murder.[6]

Hope of rewards was matched by fear of the action that Edward might take if his wishes were not carried out. In 1295 nineteen barons were ordered to go to Gascony at royal wages.[7] Several of them proved unco-operative, so Edward in a vicious letter ordered the Exchequer to 'faciez destreindre asprement' these men,

1. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1214.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 491.
3. Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 368/73, m. 10d.
4. Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-07, pp. 432-33.
5. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 430.
6. Ibid., p. 469.
7. Parl. Writs, i. 269.

> 'parmy touz les countez ou il ont terres ou tenementz, biens ou chateus, tant quil nous cent parpaez totes les dettes quil nous deivent, selonc ceo qe vous trouvez par roules e par remembrances del escheker avauntdit, e qe vous grevez eux e touz ceus de lour acord par totes les voies qe vous porrez par coleur de reeson, issint quil ne ioyssent de nule manere de grace ne de nuhet quil cent a purchacier vers nous de chose qe lour touche.'[1]

The debts that these men owed were impressive, the list being headed by the earl of Arundel with £5,232, and William de Vescy with £1,019. In the normal way, such debts at the Exchequer were allowed to run on for years. £4,496 of Arundel's was the residue of a relief of 10,000 marks that had last appeared on the Pipe Roll in 1249. The threat of collecting the debts was sufficient to force the dissident barons to abandon their stand, and they dutifully set off for Gascony.[2]

Most of the important men in England owed money to the Exchequer in this way, and so were potentially vulnerable to royal pressure. Even the wealthy Edmund of Cornwall had debts of £1,205.[3] In 1293 Bigod's debts stood at £2,232,[4] though by 1302 he was only being

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 65. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. xlviii, has an account of this incident. The men involved were the earl of Arundel, Roger de Mohaut, Henry de Grey, John de Montfort, William Martin, Robert FitzRoger, Richard de Sutton, William de Vescy, Philip de Kyme, Walter de Hunter-combe, Hugo Pointz, Peter Maulay, Edmund Mortimer and William Mortimer.
2. Ibid., King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, mm. 65-66.
3. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/17/40.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/67, m. 19. Bigod requested in parliament that he be excused his debts, and ibid., m. 13, shos that it was agreed that £1,432 of them were to be paid off at the rate of £100 p.a.

charged with £1,811.[1] Earl Warenne in 1307 owed £6,693.[2] Humphrey de Bohun had debts adding up to at least £4,000,[3] but in 1304 he was excused further payment.[4] Of lesser barons, Henry de Grey's debts at the end of the reign stood at £412,[5] while Reginald de Grey owed £351.[6] John de Sudely's debts were £1,372.[7] It was standard procedure at the beginning of every campaign for writs granting respite of debts to be issued to cover the period that the men were in the army. In November 1303 Edward sent a writ to the Exchequer reminding them that those serving in Scotland had in many cases received 'atterminement des dettes a nostre volunte e as autres respites des dettes iusqes a la pasch procheinement avenire'. But some men had departed from the campaign without royal permission, and the writ went on :

> 'Savoir vous fesons qe nostre volunte est qe sur touz ceux qe vous purrez savoir qe ensint se serront partiz e qui dettes nous deivent sicome est avauntdit, facer isser brefs e mandement especialy de meismes les dettes lever, e paier en tutes les hastives maneres qe vous savez e purrez, santz faire savoir malice ou despite a nuly de quel par estat ou condicioun qil soit tant qe vous en eiez autre mandement de nous. E a ceuz qe vous purrez savoir e entendre qui sont devers nous demorrez volons qe vous en eiez auxi gracious e auxi favourables come vous serres en bone manere en tutes les bosoignes qil auront a faire par devant vous. Ceste mesme chose facez especialement de par nous a nos justices del un baunk e lautre e a touz nos autres mynistres la ou vous venez qil sont a faire.'[8]

1. Pipe Roll, E. 372/149, item Norf' et Suff'
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/80, m. 12; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, pp. 492, 496-97.
3. Pipe Roll, E. 372/209.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/77, m. 11d.
5. Ibid., E. 159/79, m. 9d.
6. Ibid., E. 159/80, m. 8d.
7. Ibid., E. 159/78, m. 13.
8. Ibid., E. 159/77, m. 4.

That the granting of writs of protection was no mere formality, meaning little in practice, is apparent from one application for such a writ sent to John Langton, the chancellor, probably in 1297. It ran as follows:

> 'Moun seigneur moun frere le counte de Warewyk qe passera ove le roy a ceo passage si est destreynt pur diverses dettes durement greve, par quey vous prioms qe il eyt sa protection, e la remedie qe appent.'[1]

There is no evidence that the Exchequer was putting any pressure on Warwick at this time: it was probably relief from the claims of his private creditors that the earl wanted. Since he did not go on the Flanders campaign, he presumably did not get it.

This system of financial rewards and penalties, promises and threats, was quite as important as the propaganda methods used by Edward to popularise his wars. The splendour of the Arthurian revival, culminating in 1306 with the Feast of the Swans to celebrate the knighting of nearly 300 young men, and the oath to revenge the murder of the Comyn, sworn on the swans, made a splendid appeal to the emotions,[2] but beside the desire for glory and the enjoyment of the martial life must be set the tangible advantages of fighting for Edward. Brian FitzAlan may have gained a romantic enthusiasm for war by reading his copy of the grail romance Perlesvaus,[3] but this volume ought to be seen side by side with the

1. Chancery Warrants, C. 81/1699/102.
2. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, pp. 514-6.
3. N. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 23.

writs of respite of debts, and the letters of protection that he received. Alan la Zouche's desire to show off his wealth in war, attested by the author of the Song of Caerlaverock,[1] was facilitated by the obstacles that the crown was prepared to put in the way of his creditors while he was on campaign. But the final credit in any explanation of why men fought must go to the king himself. Tough and irascible, Edward I had very considerable gifts of leadership, and men would fight for him as they would not for less inspiring monarchs of the calibre of Henry III or Edward II.

1. The Siege of Carlaverock, ed. Nicolas, p. 51.

II

HOUSEHOLDS AND RETINUES

A study of the methods by which men were summoned and persuaded to fight for Edward I does little to reveal the way in which armies in the field were organised. The success of the opposition in the constitutional arguments over service, and Edward's failure to enforce a general obligation on all those wealthy enough to afford horses and arms, did not affect the way in which most of the cavalry were raised by means of a system of retinues of the same type as that familiar from the evidence of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Beside the formal feudalism of the campaigns of 1300, 1303 and 1306 there already existed the unfortunately named bastard feudalism of the later middle ages.[1] The constable's roll for 1300 records the performance of the obsolescent servicia debita,[2] but it is not this record, but the Song of Caerlaverock which gives a true picture of the organisation of the cavalry forces. It shows the army divided into four battalions, each composed of retinues led by banderets.[3]

1. N.B. Lewis, 'The Organisation of Indentured Retinues in Fourteenth Century England', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 4th ser. xvii (1945), 29-39; K.B. McFarlane, 'Bastard Feudalism', Bull. Inst. Hist. Res., xx (1943-5), 161-80.
2. Palgrave, Documents, pp. 208-31.
3. Siege of Carlaverock, ed. Nicolas.

Horse lists and pay records show the cavalry formed into troops, each led by a banneret or knight. How were these retinues made up, and what kind of agreements were there between the leaders and their men?

The number of actual contracts that survive from the reign of Edward I is small, but since these were private documents, of little permanent value, this is hardly surprising. Many arrangements were probably never put down in writing. The earliest written contract so far discovered dates from the end of Henry III's reign, and was made between the young Edward and Adam of Jesmond in 1270. Adam promised to accompany the future king on his crusade with four knights in return for 600 marks.[1] From the Welsh wars there is an indenture providing for Peter Maulay to serve with ten men-at-arms under Edmund Stafford.[2] Another indenture is from Ireland, and was made in 1296. In it John de Neville promised to accompany Theobald Butler with three barded horses in the Irish contingent serving in Scotland that year. He was paid 40 marks and promised further reward.[3] 1297 provides the well-known indenture for life between Roger Bigod and John Segrave, in which the latter promised to provide five knights and ten troopers when required.[4] The Flemish campaign of the same year yields a notification by Philip de Hartshill, in which he stated that he made an agreement to serve in

1. H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to the Great Charter (1963), pp. 463-65.
2. N.B. Lewis, 'An Early Indenture of Military Service, 27 July 1287', Bull. Inst. Hist. Res., xiii (1935), 85-89.
3. The Red Book of Ormond, ed. N.B. White (Irish Historical MSS. Commission, 1932), p. 103, no. 53.
4. N. Denholm-Young, Seignorial Administration in England (1937), pp. 167-68.

the retinue of Edmund de Stafford, for the duration of the campaign. This could not be more than a temporary arrangement, as Philip was a permanent retainer of his brother, William de Hartshill. Like the Adam of Jesmond document, this is in the form of a letter patent, not the familiar indenture of the later period.[1] But the agreement made between Aymer de Valence and Thomas Berkeley, also in 1297, was an indenture. It was not for life, but involved Berkeley in providing a force of twenty-four men-at-arms to serve in Valence's comitiva at pay. Two further indentures provide information as to how the agreement was carried out, and how payment was made.[2] Another indenture made by Valence during the reign of Edward I dates from 1303. It was made with Robert FitzPayn, and in return for £100 he was to serve in tournaments and attend parliament with a small troop for rather more than a year.[3] From the very last year of Edward I's reign there survives an indenture between Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford, and Sir Bartholemew de Enfield. This was for life, and specified service with eight horses in time of war or tournament.[4]

No other indentures and agreements for military service between private individuals are known from the reign of Edward I. But the

1. G. Barraclough, The Earldom and County Palatinate of Chester (1953), p. 36.
2. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. nos. 905, 981, 1004.
3. Ibid., no. 1407.
4. Ibid., no. 1899.

surviving ones are sufficiently uniform in phraseology and content to suggest that there was nothing particularly novel or abnormal in the system of magnate retinues during the reign of Edward I. It has been remarked that 'most aspects of bastard feudalism, in both temporary and permanent forms, were already developed in the reign of Edward II, and any appearance that they were very much more developed at the end of the century is largely a documentary illusion.'[1] The statement applies equally well to the reign of Edward I.

The indentures illustrate the normal conditions under which men were taken into the service of a magnate. They and their servants would be provided with meals. Valence, Bigod and Bohun all provided robes for their men, the latter giving them saddles in addition. Permanent retainers were usually granted lands as fees. John Segrave received the manor and advowson of Lodden in Norfolk, while Bartholomew de Enfield got land in Annendale worth forty marks a year. Temporary retainers were given fees in money, not land. Thomas de Berkeley was to get £50 a year if he served in England, and 100 marks if abroad. In time of war he was to get wages at the normal rates. Just as the King promised to recompense those who served him for any horses they lost while on campaign, so did Valence make a similar promise to those in his retinue. As a guarantee that payment would actually be made, Aymer de Valence gave Berkeley a

1. G.A. Holmes, The Estates of the Higher Nobility in XIV Century England (1957), p. 60.

bond for a hundred marks, which was to be restored when the arrangement came to an end. It appears that Valence was not able to pay Berkeley all that he had promised. His lack of funds is indicated by the fact that Berkeley lent him £15. 6s. 8d. before they left for Flanders. It was agreed that no fee should be paid for the Scotch campaign of 1298, and that no further wages should be paid after 16 August that year. Thereafter Berkeley was simply to receive food for his men, and payment for any incidental expenses incurred.[1]

The evidence of the later middle ages suggests that the permanent retainers provided no more than a nucleus for the contingent that a magnate was expected to provide.[2] For the reign of Edward I the rolls of writs of protection provide lists of the retinues that were taken on campaign, while the applications for such writs, sent to the chancery, are also a valuable source. But it should be noted that, as Morris pointed out, usually only about a third of the men-at-arms in a given retinue had protections enrolled.[3] The evidence is fullest for the earl of Lincoln. Taking the fifty-two men who received protections to go to Scotland with him in 1307, only eighteen appear in other years as being with him. Of these, only two men, William de Stopham and Nicholas de Leyburn, had been given protections to go with the earl to Gascony in 1294. Of the twenty-four men who had protections to

1. Dehholm-Young, op. cit., pp. 167-68; Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., nos. 905, 981, 1004, 1407, 1899.
2. Holmes, op. cit., p. 80.
3. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 246.

accompany Lincoln on the Caerlaverock campaign, no less than fourteen were with him at some other date. Eight had had protections for Gascony, and the same number went with him to Scotland in 1307.[1] The surviving account rolls for the earl's estates provide further information on his household and retinue. Fees and robes for his steward and constable came out of the proceeds of the manor of Accrington: £13. 6s. 8d. in the first case, £7. 10s. in the second.[2] The household account for 1305 shows that seven sumpter horses and eight hackneys, lost in the earl's service, were paid for. Four of the men who benefited from this are included on the protection lists. John de Stapleton was clearly retained on a short-term basis, for he was paid £20, and appears in 1306 and 1307 with protections to accompany Lincoln. Richard of Arundel appears in the same lists, but, as a member of another comital family, was very well treated, with tunics bought for him, and his expenses in going to tournaments paid for.[3] Those more permanently in the earl's service were paid money charged on the estates; Nicholas de Leyburn and his brother Robert each received ten pounds a year from the manor of Halton.[4]

The total size of Lincoln's retinue is suggested by the amount spent on robes. In 1305 seventeen cloths were bought for the earl and his knights at Whitsun, and a further eighteen for his men-at-arms.

1. Rôles Gascons, ed. Bémont, iii, 96 seq.; Supplementary Patent Rolls, C. 67/14,15,16; Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 14-51; Chancery Warrants, C. 81/1731/48.
2. P.A. Lyons, 'Two "Compoti" of the Lancashire and Cheshire manors of Henry de Lacy, Earl of Lincoln', Chetham Soc., cxii (1884), p. 15.
3. Duchy of Lancaster, D.L. 29/1/2, m. 16.
4. Lyons, op. cit., p. 67.

Now the robes of the bannerets of the royal household cost eight marks each, and those of the knights four marks. If those that Lincoln issued to his men were of equal value, then the £79 spent on them would imply about twenty-five knights and two bannerets. The robes of the men-at-arms cost £60, suggesting a force of between forty-five and sixty men. Obviously, such calculations must be treated extremely cautiously, but the size of retinue that they indicate is not implausible. Issues of hay and oats to the army awaiting embarkation at Portsmouth in 1294 show that he had with him no less than 228 horses, which must mean at least 100 cavalrymen,[2] although when he actually got to Gascony in 1296 he had only contracted for a force of sixty men-at-arms.[3]

Unfortunately there are no other household accounts like those of Henry Lacy. But the size of retinues can be determined from other sources. The contract for service in Scotland in the winter of 1297-98 between the government and the five earls, together with Henry Percy, shows that Norfolk was to have no less than 150 men-at-arms with him. The smallest retinue was that of Warwick, with only

1. Duchy of Lancaster, D.L. 29/1/2, m. 16. J.H. Baldwin, 'The Household Administration of Henry Lacy and Thomas of Lancaster', Eng. Hist. Rev., xlii (1927),192, calculates the size of the retinue of Thomas of Lancaster on the basis of one cloth making three robes. This method would give a larger total than mine.
2. Account of John de Maidstone, E. 101/4/30.
3. Part of account of John Sandale and Thomas Cambridge, E. 101/353/2, f. 1.

thirty. A list of those with Roger Bigod in 1295, presumably in Wales, shows that he was accompanied by Hugh le Despencer with ten knights, presumably under a short term contract, and by Thomas de Berkeley with his son Maurice and six men. The list continues with the names of fourteen knights, twenty-three men-at-arms, and five valets. There were seven clerks in the household, which was of a total strength of about sixty cavalry.[1] Another list of Bigod's following almost certainly dates from 1297. Robert FitzRoger, John de Segrave, Alan la Zouche, John Lovel, and Gilbert de Umfraville are all named as bannerets in his company: all but the last named are known to have taken a prominent part in the opposition movement in that year. Three 'maiores clerici' are named, and nine knights, but the document is partly damaged, and there appear to have been more. Seventeen men-at-arms are included.[2] The five bannerets would each have had a retinue of their own, and the document shows that Bigod did have an appreciable military force behind him in his struggle with the crown, even if it is unlikely that the opposition was able to raise 1,500 men-at-arms, as Walter of Guisborough claimed.[3]

Aymer de Valence was the most important magnate who was prepared to accept royal pay. In 1298 he had fifty cavalry with him, according to the horse lists,[4] of whom twenty-five had protections.[5] In 1306-7

1. Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/2/10/8.
2. Chancery Warrants, C. 81/1698/130.
3. Chron. Guisborough, p. 290.
4. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 288.
5. Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 14-51.

no less than forty-six men had protections to go to Scotland with Valence.[1] In the campaigns of those years, he was the commander of an army, and as such it was natural that he should attract many men to his banner who did not usually serve under him. John Sandale's account book for the campaign shows that from May to July 1306 he had a comitiva of two bannerets, fifteen knights, and thirty-seven men-at-arms. During the winter he served under contract with 100 horse for £1,000.[2] The fact that Valence always served for pay suggests that he was not wealthy enough to afford a large permanent retinue. The evidence of the protection lists certainly supports this hypothesis. Only Sir Roger Inkpen and his son appear regularly in Valence's following. Their close association with him is indicated by Inkpen going in 1297 to the Exchequer to draw the annual pension due to his lord.[3] He was almost certainly Valence's steward, for he had earlier been employed in this capacity to look after the Cornish estates of Edmund of Cornwall,[4] and his financial expertise is suggested by his appointment along with Hugh Cressingham to audit the accounts of Amesbury priory.[5] He was a Berkshire man,[6] but his employment in Cornwall led to his becoming sheriff of that county.[7] Inkpen was of an unruly disposition: he was

1. Supplementary Patent Rolls, C. 67/13, 16.
2. E. 101/13/16, f. 4.
3. Jornalia Rolls, E. 405/1/11, sub. 1 Aug.
4. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 560.
5. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 82.
6. Parl. Writs, i. 290.
7. Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-1307, p. 381.

indicted for a series of crimes, which he was pardoned for in 1303 at Valence's request.[1] His most notable victim was an even more criminal fellow steward, Adam de Stratton.[2]

The rolls of protections reveal that a lack of continuity in personnel was common in the retinues of most magnates. The tendency for men to serve under different lords in several campaigns is well illustrated by Baldwin Manners, who appeared in 1300 with John Botetourt, in 1306 with Lincoln, and in the last year of the reign with the prince of Wales.[3] No names appear in the retinue of Henry Percy more than once, according to these rolls, but that other great figure of the northern marches, Robert Clifford, obviously had the power of inspiring loyalty. His reputation is attested in the Song of Caerlaverock.[4] Of the men who had protections to go with him in 1301, all but one served with him at some other time.[5] The most notable of Clifford's knights was Bartholomew Badlesmere, who served with him in 1303, and again at the end of the reign. When Clifford died in 1314 Badlesmere, along with Warwick and Percy, became an administrator of his property.[6]

As there are no complete lists of all the cavalry for any of

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-7, p. 122.
2. Ibid., p. 212; for Stratton's career, see Denholm-Young, Seignorial Administration, pp. 77-85.
3. Supplementary Patent Rolls, C. 67/14-16.
4. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, pp. 114-15.
5. Chancery Warrants, C. 81/1722/74; Supplementary Patent Rolls, C. 67/14-16.
6. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 142, n. 1.

the campaigns of Edward I, save for the atypical Flemish expedition, the only way to gain some idea of how large the cavalry forces available to Edward were is to work from the heraldic lists of the bannerets present in 1298 and 1300. Although complete accuracy cannot be claimed for these, they do provide a reasonable idea of the number of bannerets likely to be present on a major campaign. The problem is to find out how many men each banneret would have with him. Denholm-Young suggested a troop of thirty to fifty men-at-arms,[1] but Morris found from the horse rolls of the Caerlaverock campaign that, on average, each retinue was thirteen strong.[2] These two statements are not as irreconcilable as they seem. The full Wardrobe account for 1300, which Morris did not know of, confirms that the average size of a banneret's retinue was thirteen,[3] while the Falkirk horse lists provide the similar figure of fifteen.[4] But by no means all the cavalry served in the personal retinue of a banneret, as Morris was well aware. The household squires and serjeants-at-arms, and the men from the castle garrisons were among those who featured separately from the bannerets in the account, which shows that the proportion of the latter to the whole of the paid cavalry was roughly one to thirty.[5] The Falkirk horse lists confirm that this was a normal proportion, for they show that there was one banneret to twenty-seven

1. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 112.
2. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 299.
3. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 195 seqq.
4. Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 161-205.
5. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 195-240.

others who had their horses enrolled.[1]

These calculations of the number of cavalrymen to every banneret in the army are based on the evidence of the paid forces. How likely is it that similar proportions obtained among the unpaid troops? There is no clear evidence to go on. The two horse lists for the 1298 campaign, the one for the household troops, and the other of 'forinsec' cavalry retained temporarily, reveal no significant differences, which suggests that there was nothing unusual in the proportion of bannerets in the household. But it can be argued that the bannerets in crown pay were not such notable men as those who served at their own expense, and that the latter would have larger retinues. The earls would certainly have far larger followings than any member of the household would. On the other hand, it would seem likely that those men who were not attached to any particular retinue would be more likely to accept crown pay than join the following of a great magnate, and in any calculation this would offset the fact that the unpaid bannerets would probably have larger retinues than the paid. Further, it seems improbable that the king would have been satisfied had the troops in his pay included a lower proportion of bannerets, men of rank and experience, than the unpaid forces.

1. Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 161-205.

Morris considered that a reasonable average was twenty-two men per banneret,[1] though in an appendix he adopted the lower figure of eighteen.[2] But it seems that these estimates are probably on the low side: all the evidence goes to suggest that there were about twenty-five to thirty cavalrymen to every banneret in Edward I's armies. In 1301 the proportion in the paid forces was about twenty-seven to one, and in the autumn of 1303 roughly twenty-five to one.[3] Assuming such figures to be typical, there must have been some 3,000 cavalrymen present in the Falkirk army. The Caerlaverock campaign probably did not see so large a concentration: the paid forces were much smaller, only 850 as against the 1,390 of 1298 indicated by the horse lists.[4] But there was probably not much difference in the size of the unpaid contingent, and the estimate of the author of the Song that there were 3,000 men present cannot have been an exaggeration by much.[5] The list of those present at the siege of Stirling in 1304 does not permit of any precise calculations, but to judge from the number of men of rank present, there were probably about 2,000 cavalrymen in the field.[6] Such figures are a considerable contrast to the size of the army that Edward took to Flanders in 1297, when the number of the cavalry never rose above 900.[7] Unfortunately, without information

1. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 300.
2. Ibid., p. 314.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 91 seqq: Add. MSS. 8835, f. 33 seqq.
4. Supra, p. 29; Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 142, nn. 2, 3.
5. Siege of Carlaverock, ed. Nicolas, p. 62.
6. Palgrave, Documents, pp. 267-75.
7. F.B. Lewis, 'The English Forces in Flanders', Studies in Mediaeval History presented to F.M. Powicke, p. 313.

on the numbers of those who served without accepting pay there is no way of producing similar estimates of the size of the cavalry forces in the other campaigns of the period.

The crown took advantage of the system of retinues in making contracts with military leaders for service in the winter and for garrisoning castles.[1] Edmund of Lancaster, Edmund of Cornwall and the earl of Lincoln served under contract in Gascony.[2] But it was not until the Hundred Years War that it became normal to recruit all the cavalry in this way. Edward I never used the method for a summer campaign. But he did take advantage of the system of contract and retinue in a different, and very important, way in every campaign he undertook. The royal household was formed in very much the same way as the households of the great nobles, and by far the most important retinue present in Edward's armies was that of the king himself.

Tout pointed out that the needs of wartime demanded a more flexible system of administration than the ordinary machinery of Exchequer and Chancery could supply. The household provided this flexibility, through the department of the wardrobe. But war needs soldiers as well as administrators, and the contribution of the household was equally important in both capacities. Tout was not really concerned with the

1. Supra, pp. 28, 35 ; infra, pp. 70-71.
2. Supra, p. 38.

lay elements in the household: his interest lay 'primarily with the wardrobe clerks'.[1] He referred to the existance of 'a certain number of "bannerets" and knights', but regarded their rôle as primarily administrative. More stress was laid on the military duties of the 'little standing force of cavalry', the servientes ad arma, who numbered twenty in 1279. Tout found modest origins for the household as a military force in the mention of foot serjeants-at-arms in the Constitutio Domus Regis of Henry I,[2] but clearly regarded the process by which a 'little company of peace time guards' was enlarged for the needs of campaigns into 'the dimensions of a small army' as an innovation of Edward I's reign.[3]

But it has recently been pointed out that the household of Henry I was far more like the developed military household of Edward I than Tout would have allowed. Just as Edward's household provided one out of the four divisions of the army which won the battle of Falkirk, so did that of Henry I form one of the three battalions at Brémule. The career of Robert Tipotoft in the household of Edward I can be paralleled by that of Brian FitzCount under Henry.[4] Later, even so unwarlike a king as Henry III could usually put at least 100 household knights into the field in an emergency, and there was a permanent core of thirty or more knights in receipt of annual fees from the Exchequer.[5]

1. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 31.
2. Ibid., 135-36.
3. Ibid., 138.
4. J.O. Prestwich, 'Anglo Norman Feudalism and the Problem of Continuity', Past and Present, 26 (1963), 50-52.
5. R.F. Walker, 'The Anglo Welsh Wars, 1217-1277' (Oxford Univ. D.Phil Thesis, 1953), pp. 66-67. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England, p. 64.

There was therefore nothing novel in the fact that Edward I's household was more a small army than a domestic establishment. In addition to the serjeants-at-arms, whose numbers had risen from the twenty of 1279 to over twenty-five in 1300, and who received £2. 6s. 8d. a year in robes, the military element consisted of bannerets, paid £24 in fees and robes, knights who were given half as much, and squires who had only £2 a year in robes.[1] Grants of fees and robes were common in the agreements between magnates and their retainers, and this suggests that the crown was retaining its household troops on a similar basis. Unfortunately, no actual agreements for service in the royal household survive, though there are two ordinances for the diet, robes, and allowances for horses and servants of two magnates' sons, John de Warenne and Roger Mortimer, both of whom were squires in the household at the end of the reign of Edward I.[2] These certainly do not suggest that there was anything different in the way that the king retained men and the methods of men like Bigod or Valence. At times additional men might be recruited to increase the size of the household for campaigns, but it was the men on the permanent strength who were of real importance in providing the king with a nucleus of reliable and experienced soldiers, men whose ability and loyalty might prove valuable in more than a strictly fighting capacity.

1. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 188-95, 310-31.
2. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/371/8/97, E. 101/370/19.

It was the bannerets and the knights who were the most important of the men permanently retained by the crown. The earliest document from the reign of Edward I which gives a list of the royal household dates from 1284-5, and shows that fourteen bannerets and eighty-seven knights were in receipt of robes.[1] Eight men are named as comilitones, a term which Denholm-Young tentatively suggested meant that they were 'more equal' than their fellows,[2] but the account makes it clear that the word was simply used of a class of knights who served with a companion. So although only eight men in this category are actually named, it is stated that there were sixteen in all. A wardrobe book of the next two years shows that fees were being paid to over eighty knights and bannerets,[3] but by 1289 numbers had fallen to about fifty knights, and ten bannerets.[4] The period of almost continuous warfare after 1294 did not see the expansion of the force of household knights that might have been expected. In 1297 ten bannerets and twenty-six knights are listed as being in receipt of fees, but in that year an attempt was made to build up numbers, probably in view of the Flemish campaign, and the exceptional number of twenty-two knights were admitted to the household. Of these, only two appear in the fees section of the wardrobe account.[5] By 1306 the number of

1. E. 101/351/17, an account of the issue of robes.
2. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, pp. 31-2.
3. C. 47/4/3, Controller's book for 1285-7.
4. E. 101/4/24, account of fees for 1288-9.
5. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 7965, ff. 60-62.

bannerets had risen to thirty, but there were only fifty knights.[1] Although there was a campaign in Scotland in the following year, the number of household knights was cut sharply, to eighteen bannerets and thirty-six knights. As a result, the amount spent on fees was reduced from £990 to £350.[2] For the remainder of the reign, numbers continued at much the same level. In 1303 there were twenty-three bannerets and thirty-one knights,[3] and in 1306 seventeen bannerets and twenty-eight knights.[4] The only change that the documents reveal is that in the 1290's the class of _commilitones_ disappeared, and that at the end of the reign the proportion of bannerets to knights rose. There is nothing to suggest that the size of the military establishment of the household was increased during the last years of the reign: rather, the contrary is indicated. Unfortunately there are no lists of the household for the Welsh wars that can be compared with those of the Scotch campaigns, but in 1277 Edward had a corps of some forty household knights immediately available to him to fight in Wales.[5] In view of the fact that his father had had some seventy knights in his household in the late 1220's,[6] it can hardly be argued that the development of the household as a military force was a novelty in the reign of Edward I.

1. _Liber quotidianus_, pp. 188-95.
2. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 7966a, ff. 78-79.
3. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 8835, ff. 52-55.
4. E. 101/369/11, ff. 102, 106-7, final wardrobe account for 1306.
5. Morris, _Welsh Wars of Edward I_, p. 119.
6. Walker, 'The Anglo Welsh wars'(Oxford.Univ. D.Phil. thesis), p. 51.

The lists of the household knights show that there was a higher degree of continuity of personnel in their number from year to year than there was in the retinues of the great magnates. There are almost 150 named in some 300 entries in lists of the royal household during the period between 1297 and 1306. About 100 of these occur more than once, while of the other fifty some were men whose service in the household ended in 1297, while eleven were knights newly admitted in 1306. There were a few men who departed from the service of the crown after a very short period. Of the twenty-two admitted in 1297, seven never appeared in later lists. Four of them were Gascons, which makes their failure very explicable. Of the hundred names that do recur in the lists, most do so frequently, even though no one could match the record of service of Eustace de l'Hacche, who first appeared as a serjeant-at-arms in 1276.[1] He was a knight by 1285, a banneret by 1300, and was still in receipt of fees within two years of his death in 1306.[2] His devotion to Edward's service had brought honour and promotion, but not riches, according to his executors. For they petitioned for payment of what was due to him for robes, wages and loss of horses, stating that unless this was made, the many legacies made by Eustace to the Holy Land and to his dependents could not be paid.[3] Some attempt to meet this request was made, for the king got John Sandale to discover

1. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 51.
2. E. 101/351/17, an account of the issue of robes; Liber Quotidianus, p. 188; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 54.
3. Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 199a.

how much was owing to Eustace for the time he had spent in Gascony between 1296 and 1298. The answer was the appreciable sum of £435. 2s. 6d.[1] But even if life service in the household was not common, men such as John Botetourt,* a household knight from the 1280's to the end of the reign, William de Leyburn, whose service lasted as long, or Hugh Audley, still a household knight in 1312,[2] were certainly retained by the crown with the grant of fees and robes for by far the greater part of their active lives.

Although it was usual for men to remain in the household for several years, there is a striking lack of continuity between the lists of household knights of the 1280's and those of the later years of the reign. Only twenty-one of the eighty men in the household in 1285-6[3] reappear in the later lists, while only ten of those who were in receipt of fees in 1288-9 feature in later accounts.[4] The reason for this changeover of personnel is simple. Taking the fifty-three men out of the eighty household knights of the mid 1280's whose biographies have been worked out by Moor,[5] no less than thirty died in the late 1280's or the 1290's. One man, Simon de Grey, abjured the realm for felony,[6] fourteen did serve as household knights in 1297 or later, and otherwise

1. Ancient Petitions, S.C. 8, 15556, 15557.
2. E. 101/375/8, account of fees, 1312-13. Audley first appeared in 1285-6, in C. 47/4/3.
3. C. 47/4/3.
4. E. 101/4/24.
5. C. Moor, Knights of Edward I, Harleian Society, lxxx-lxxxiv (1929-32)
6. Ibid, lxxxi, 55.

* The evidence on which the statement in Handbook of British Chronology, 2nd edn. p35, that Botetourt was an illegitimate son of Edward I is not convincing, and leads to confusion.

there were only eight men out of the fifty-three still alive after 1297 who were no longer household knights. One of these, Roger le Strange, who had served Edward valiantly in the Welsh wars, was too ill to take any part in public affairs after 1298.[1] The household knights of the early years of Edward's reign had been very much of one generation, and by the 1290's death had inevitably thinned that generation severely. During the Welsh wars, Edward had been able to rely on the services of men of roughly his own age and sympathies, many of whom had been on crusade with him. The Scotch wars were largely fought by a younger body of men, who must have lacked the sense of being the king's comrades in arms that his contemporaries in age had possessed.

There was a considerable hereditary element among the household knights. A John le Strange had been one of Henry III's knights,[2] and two members of the family, Roger and his nephew John were household knights of Edward I. One of the most notable of Edward's knights was Sir Robert Clifford, whose grandfather had served in the household, and had accompanied Edward on crusade.[3] Among the names familiar in the household of Edward I that are also th be found in his father's are those of Rivers, Tregoz, Beauchamp, Grey, Oddingseles,

1. H. Le Strange, Le Strange Records, 1100-1310 (1916), p. 243.
2. Walker,'The Anglo Welsh Wars' (Oxford D.Phil Thesis), p. 75.
3. Ibid, p. 77.

Turberville and Gorges.[1] It was common for both father and son to serve in the household. Walter Beauchamp as steward was in command of his son Walter,[2] while Edward Charles's father was a former steward.[3] Three members of the Gascon family of Ferre were household knights: Guy senior, Guy junior, and Reginald.[4] There were two Champvents, Peter and John, presumably father and son.[5] In 1300 there were two Latimers, both holding the rank of banneret.[6] In the same year there were two Russels in the household, John a veteran Montfortian,[7] and William.[8] Examples could be multiplied, with the families of Badlesmere, Bikenore, le Brun, Cantilupe, Felton, Hausted, Knoville, Leyburn, Maulay, Morham, Segrave, Sulleye and Wellen each providing two household knights during the period from 1297 to 1306.

The majority of this tightly knit body of knights were English, but Spain and Gascony provided some men. In 1297 four Gascons and one Aragonese were admitted to the household.[9] Arnold de Caveston,

1. Ibid, pp. 74-5.
2. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 324-5.
3. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 36.
4. Guy Ferre senior is first listed in 1269-6, in C. 47/4/3, and last in 1301, in Brit. Mus. Add. MSS., 7966a, f. 79; Guy junior first in 1300, Liber Quotidianus, p. 193, and last in 1306, E. 101/369/11, f. 106v. Reginald only appears in 1297, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 7965, f 61
5. Peter was a household knight from at least 1285 until 1300, E. 101/351/17, Liber Quotidianus, p. 324. John was admitted in 1297, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 7965, f. 60, and continued until the end of the reign, E. 101/369/11, f. 102.
6. Liber Quotidianus, p. 193.
7. Moor, Knights of Edward I, Harleian Soc., lxxxiii (1931), 159.
8. Liber Quotidianus, p. 326.

father of the notorious Piers, was a household knight in 1301.[1] The Gascon Arnold de Cavepenna's household career lasted from at least 1285, when he was a squire, until 1301.[2] Aragon provided James de la Ryke and Pascasius Valentin, who was known as Ladalil.[3] These men were full members of the household, in a different category from the handful of foreigners who appear in the wardrobe accounts up to 1297 as receiving annual pensions, but who were not expected to be constantly present at court.[4]

Often, men were brought straight into the household as knights, but there were some, like Eustace de l'Hocche, who were promoted from the lower ranks of the household hierarchy. John le Strange, Alexander Freville, Thomas de Bikenore, Robert de Dures and William de Felton, to name only a few, all began their careers as squires.[5] This class was quite numerous, with the sons of nobles at its head, but also comprising men who might never even attain knighthood. In the winter of 1296-7 there were almost 100 squires in receipt of robes, but by the following summer there were about thirty less.[6] In 1300 there were about sixty in all,[7]

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 78v.
2. E. 101/351/17; Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 79.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 60; 7966a, f. 79, 8835, f. 52.
4. Enrolled wardrobe accounts for 22-25 Edward I, in Pipe roll, E. 372/144.
5. These men were all squires in 1285, E. 101/351/17.
6. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, ff. 126-27, 131-32.

and the same number in 1304.[1] By 1306 numbers had fallen to fifty. This decline in the size of the household at the end of the reign, already noticed in the case of the bannerets and knights, went as far as the serjeants-at-arms. In 1306 there were only fifteen of them: less than the twenty of 1279.[2] It may be that with the apparently successful subjugation of Scotland in 1304, Edward felt that there was no need to maintain the household at the same level, but it must also be suspected that financial stringency was not without its effect.

The main activity of the military establishment of the household during the period 1294-1307 was, of course, fighting. The household put far larger forces into the field than the lists of knights and squires suggest at first. Each knight and banneret would bring his own personal following with him, while some men who were not in receipt of fees and robes were retained for the duration of campaigns. In the autumn of 1294 prests, or advances on wages, were paid to a force of some 220 cavalry, mostly household knights and their men, setting out for Gascony.[3] There is not enough evidence to provide any definite figure of the number of cavalry in household pay in the Welsh war that started that same autumn. The only full account that survives is for the

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 114.
2. Final Wardrobe account, E. 101/369/11, ff. 157, 159.
3. Enrolled Wardrobe account, 22 Edward 1, Pipe roll, E. 372/144.

small army led by Warwick which won the battle of Maes Moydog.[1] Nor are there any accounts of the household troops in the Scotch expedition of 1296. For the Flanders campaign in the next year Edward set sail on 22 August with 670 cavalry. By the end of September, reinforcements had brought numbers up to a maximum of 895. Of these, only 527 were strictly speaking members of the household, the others being forinsec troops, retained and paid by the crown for the duration of the campaign only.[2] Numbers at Falkirk were more impressive, the horse liste showing the household strength as just short of 800, with the non-household paid contingents totalling 564.[3] The documents of the Caerlaverock campaign reveal that 522 men had their horses valued and enrolled on the household horse list, while there in all about 850 cavalry paid by the Wardrobe.[4] No stress should be laid on this distinction between true household troops and the forinsec element, which appears to have been virtually abandoned by the end of the reign.

During the first years of the fourteenth century the household

1. The evidence for the armies in Wales in 1294-95 is well summarized in the Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. xxvi-xlv; see also Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, pp. 240-65; Edwards, 'The Battle of Maes Madog and the Welsh campaign of 1294-5', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxix (1924), 1-12.
2. Lewis, 'The English Forces in Flanders', in Studies in Medieval History presented to F.M. Powicke, pp. 313-14.
3. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 142, nn. 2,3
4. Ibid, 139-41; supra, pp. 29-30.

continued to put quite appreciable forces into the field, though never again on quite the scale of 1298. 1301 was the year of the ambitious double campaign, with Edward advancing from Berwick, and his son from Carlisle. The armies were of roughly similar size: the horse roll for Edward I's shows a total of 385 cavalry by the end of July, and his son's one of 313. But later reinforcements joined the royal force, and by the end of September 430 horses had been valued by the Wardrobe clerks accompanying the king, whereas the prince's army received no increase in numbers after July.[1] Taking both armies together, the Wardrobe account shows that by 11 July there were 700 fully equipped cavalrymen in pay. By the 20th this number had risen to 760. The beginning of the next month saw the Wardrobe paying 937 men. Forces then remained at much the same level, reaching a peak of 978 in mid September. Many of those who had been with the prince in Galloway came to join Edward I, and even as late as 20 November there were still 488 cavalrymen with him. In addition to the heavy armed cavalry, there was a force of lightly armed Irish horsemen, known as hobelars, in pay during most of the campaigning season.[2]

There is unfortunately no full account for the year 1303, which saw the next expedition to Scotland. But the Wardrobe account for the next year begins on 20 November 1303, at which date there were 588 heavily armed cavalry in pay, ninety of them knights and

1. E. 101/9/23, 24, horse lists for 1301.
2. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 91-113, the final Wardrobe account for the year; <u>infra</u>, p.93.

bannerets. There were also 149 Irish hobelars.[1] Numbers had been higher in the summer, for the horse list for 1303, which does not include the substantial Irish contingent, shows 542 men in the royal household and 182 in that of the Prince of Wales,[2] who, following his failure as a military leader in 1301, had not been given an important independant command again.[3] During 1304 the cavalry was maintained at roughly the same strength as during the previous winter. Few men returned home, and there were few reinforcements. In June there were 570 cavalrymen in royal pay, but the number of hobelars had dropped to only 34.[4]

The contribution of the Irish to Edward's military strength in Scotland in 1303-4 was an impressive one. The king asked for 300 men-at-arms, 400 hobelars and 2,000 foot. Discussions were held late in 1302 with the Irish magnates, many of whom wished to have their debts at the Irish exchequer cancelled in return for service. The earl of Ulster stated that he would only come if he were allowed to bring 100 men-at-arms, the same number of hobelars and 600 foot as his retinue - an interesting indication of what was felt to be commensurate with comital dignity. Eight other men agreed to provide a total of eighty-seven men-at-arms, 200 hobelars, and 460 foot.[5] Accounts show that there were not quite as many Irish in the army in

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 55-68.
2. Horse list, E. 101/612/11.
3. H. Johnstone, Edward of Caernarven, 1284-1307 (1946), pp. 72-95, gives a narrative of the prince's activities on these campaigns.
4. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 55-68.
5. Sweetman, Cal. Docs. Ireland, v, no. 151.

November 1303 as had been negotiated for. The contingent was composed of eight bannerets, eighteen knights, 149 squires, the same number of hobelars, and 145 footsoldiers.[1] This was not the first time that the Irish had sent a considerable force to Scotland. In 1296 the earl of Ulster brought some 300 men-at-arms, 260 hobelars and 2,500 foot with him.[2] An Irish contingent of ninety-six men served in Flanders in 1297. To Edward's annoyance, they had succeeded in negotiating higher rates of pay than were normal, their knights receiving 2s. 9d. a day.[3] No Irish were summoned in 1298 or 1300, but in 1301 there were 260 men-at-arms, 390 hobelars, and 1,600 foot from Ireland in English service in Scotland. As in 1303, many of the men were serving to pay off debts to the crown.[4] No Irish troops were used in the last campaigns of the reign, against Robert Bruce: there was enough fighting in Ireland to occupy them.

In the campaigns of the last two years of the reign, Edward I abandoned his strategy of sending huge armies north to subdue the Scotch by a show of strength. The hosts of 1300, 1301 and 1303 had been hard to manoeuvre, expensive, and above all they had

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 56v.
2. J.F. Lydon, 'An Irish Army in Scotland, 1296', The Irish Sword, v (1962), 184-90.
3. Lewis, 'The English Forces in Flanders', in Studies in Medieval History presented to F.M. Powicke, p. 313.
4. J.F. Lydon, 'Irish Levies in the Scottish Wars, 1296-1302', The Irish Sword, v (1962), 207-17. Curiously, Edward never offered his English subjects the opportunity to pay off their debts by service as the Irish did.

failed to engage the enemy in battle. Faced by the guerilla tactics of Bruce, the English forces at the end of the reign were split up into smaller, more mobile units, much as had been done in Wales in 1294-95. This, combined with the fact that full accounts were never properly drawn up, makes it hard to work out how large the forces put into the field by the household were in these campaigns.

News of the murder of John Comyn had reached Edward by 24 February 1306,[1] but the first sign of the government taking any action to deal with the situation came on 1 March, when orders were issued for the purveyance of supplies.[2] On 10 May a feudal summons was issued for a muster at Carlisle on 8 July.[3] This was clearly too long to wait to start the campaign, and on 5 April Aymer de Valence, Henry Percy, and Robert Clifford were given commissions to levy troops in the north of England to lead against Bruce.[4] These forces can hardly be described as household troops. Valence's men, numbering by July almost 300 horse and 1,500 foot, were paid wages by the chamberlain of Scotland, John Sandale. Of his eight bannerets, only two, Gilbert Pecche and Matthew de Mont Martin, were retained by the household.[5] This force was strikingly successful, killing prisoners and burning the lands of traitors, as the Scotch patriots were termed.[6] On 19 June

1. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1747.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, pp. 417-19.
3. Parl. Writs, i. 377.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 426.
5. Sandale's account, E. 101/13/16.
6. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. nos. 1782, 1790.

Valence won what appeared to be a decisive victory over Bruce at Methven, outside Perth.[1] All that is known of Percy and Clifford's men is that the former had a troop of thirty cavalry with him,[2] and that the latter received a grant of £100 as an advance on his wages. Robert Felton, John de St. John and Thomas Paignel all got smaller sums.[3] On 3 March they captured the castle of Dunfries from the Scotch.[4]

The King's original intention had been to lead an army in person against the Scotch, but by 24 May he had decided to send his son with the main force, and to follow in person later.[5] True to his oath at the Feast of the Swans the prince set out. No account rolls of his army survive, but it cannot have been large, for Walter Reynolds, Keeper of the prince's wardrobe, only paid out £629. 2s. 0d. to the knights and bannerets, and £296. 2s. 4d. to the squires and serjeants, both surprisingly small sums.[6] A list of liveries of food made at Perth and Aberdeen includes the names of only about twenty bannerets and knights, of whom three were members of the royal household.[7] Those of the royal household knights not already engaged in the war came north with Edward I

1. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 216.
2. Wardrobe account for 1306, E. 101/369/11, f. 59.
3. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot.,ii. no. 1762.
4. E. 101/369/11, f. 69.
5. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot. ii, no. 1775.
6. E. 101/369/11, ff. 109, 183.
7. E. 101/369/10, accounts of the prince's household.

later in the year, but this was no large army either: a horse list shows a total strength of eighty-eight cavalry.[1] In the military operations of the next year, 1307, the household knights did not all serve in one unit, but were divided between the various forces sent against the Scotch. Valence was serving under contract with 100 horse until Easter, but he had additional men serving under him for pay, bringing the total strength up to 160 in mid-March.[2] In February John Botetourt led a small force of some forty horse against Bruce, and towards the end of March he made a raid, lasting a month, up the Erth valley with fifty-seven cavalry. Another small force was sent into Clentrool in mid-April.[3] No accounts survive for the armies commanded by Gloucester and Percy, though the latter almost certainly was paid wages, as he had been in the previous year. In late May a new force was organised under John St.John, with William de Rue as paymaster. It was intended that there should be forty men-at-arms in pay, along with 1,000 infantry,[4] but the account shows that it was in fact composed of forty hobelars, eight constables of foot, and 826 infantry, the number of these rising to roughly 1,700 in mid-June. Clearly the heavy cavalry were all fully engaged in the other armies, so that there were none to spare for this force. The earl of Hereford was also on campaign, but the one

1. E. 101/612/19.
2. Sandale's account, E. 101/13/16.
3. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot. ii, no. 1925; there is a horse list for Botetourt's men in E.101/612/21.
4. Wardrobe journal, E. 101/370/16, f. 13v.
4. Rue's account, E. 101/931/11.

payment to men under his command that is recorded is one of about £70 on 19 June.[1] It seems likely that he was serving at his own expense with a mounted retinue, only accepting wages for the infantry accompanying him.

Although the royal household was present in Scotland during these campaigns, and although its knights took a prominent part in much of the fighting, it was no longer the impressive body that had been capable of forming a whole battalion at Falkirk and at Caerlaverock. Reduced in size, split up under separate commands, the army at the end of the reign was in no sense virtually 'the household in arms'. The obvious explanation for the small size of the English forces in Scotland during these years is financial stringency, combined with a failure to realise the scale of the opposition to English rule. The result was that the English simply did not have enough troops to contain Bruce. The Glentrool raid was ambushed and driven back with heavy losses. Only three days after Valence was defeated at Loudoun Hill Gloucester was also vanquished.[2] It is hardly surprising that on 15 May an ally of the English wrote from Forfar a well known letter informing the administration of the general support that Bruce was getting, 'Men say openly that.....victory will go to Bruce.'[3]

1. Wardrobe Journal, E. 101/370/16, f. 15v.
2. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 244.
3. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 1962.

How was the household organised to fight, in those campaigns when it did serve as one body? One interesting document, probably dating from 1301, lists the household cavalry divided into constabularia, each of ten men as far as possible. Over sixty men, headed by John Botetourt, are designated as being de camera regis. This does not mean that they were paid by the chamber: the very fact of their inclusion in what is obviously a wardrobe document shows this. But it does suggest that these men had some special status in the household, possibly being more closely associated with the king. They do not appear to have been under the control of the steward, Walter Beauchamp, for his is the first name of the 280 that the document continues with. Where a retinue numbered more than ten men, such as that of William de Cantilupe with fourteen, it was not split up, but served as one unit. The serjeants-at-arms were not divided between the various constabularia, but formed distinct platoons of their own. They were not even given knights to command their units.[1]

But although the household knights generally did all fight together until the final campaigns of the reign, some of them might be detached from the main body and given individual responsibilities. Several were made constables of castles.[2] The raids or chevauchées

1. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/13/35/11. This document cannot be later than 1303, as it mentions Ralph Manton, killed at Roslin in that year, and it lists several men who first appeared as household knights in 1301.
2. Infra, pp. 164-66.

used to harry the Scotch were very frequently commanded by household knights. In addition to his raid up the Nith in 1307, John Botetourt led a force of about 130 horse and 1,770 foot ~~into~~ from Annandale into Nithsdale early in 1304,[1] and at about the same time John Segrave was joined by two household bannerets, Clifford and Latimer, in a similar expedition into Selkirk Forest. The composition of this force was strictly laid down by indenture, and instructions given that no one not included in the document was to be allowed to go, as a precaution against infiltration by Scotch spies.[2] In 1301 William Latimer was given a general commission to make raids on the Scotch.[3] Naval command often went to household knights. In 1294 William de Leyburne was Captian of the Fleet, with John Botetourt as his second in command.[4] In 1297 Leyburne was described as admiral. Edward Charles, who held this office in 1306, had been a household knight up to 1300.[5]

During the Welsh wars the household knights were often used to assist in the task of recruiting troops and organising the

1. Figures calculated from Dalilegh's account, E. 101/11/19, ff. 2-3. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 1437 is a notification by Botetourt of the strength of the force, in general tallying with Dalilegh's account, but giving the infantry as 2,736 strong.
2. Ibid., ii, no. 1432. E. 101/371/8/56 is a list of men who turned up for a similar raid, probably in 1300 or 1301, on which is noted whether or not they were included in the indenture.
3. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 1321. See infra, pp.168-9, for details of raids made by castle garrisons.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 126.
5. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, pp. 36-37. Charles's last appearance as a household knight is in Liber Quotidianus, p. 194.

preparatory stages of campaigns. Richard du Bois, Hugh de Turberville and Grimbald Pauncefoot were employed in this way in 1282, as were Roger le Strange and Bogo de Knoville.[1] Later in the reign these administrative tasks were left to royal justices, local magnates, and royal clerks. But many miscellaneous tasks were performed by the household knights during the second half of the reign in addition to their purely military duties. John Botetourt was frequently employed as a justice. Robert Clifford was given custody of the palatinate of Durham in 1302, and was justice of the Forest south of the Trent.[2] Included in the commission appointed in 1298 to enquire into the misdemeanours of the forest officials was William Latimer the elder.[3] They might be used on more menial tasks. In 1300 William Felton bought the lances from which the banners of the army were to be flown: two with the arms of England, one with the cross of St. George, one with the arms of St. Edmund and a fifth with those of St. Edward.[4] Before the campaign began that year, Thomas de Bikenore was sent to Berwick in advance of the main army to make preperations for the arrival of the household.[5] Both in 1304 and in 1306 household knights were employed in escorting Scotch prisoners to England. The conduct of negotiations with foreign powers was usually the preserve of

1. Parl. Writs, i. 247.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07 , pp. 49, 87.
3. Parl. Writs, i. 397.
4. Liber Quotidianus, p. 64.
5. Ibid., p. 74.

such experts as Amedeus of Savoy, Otto de Grandeon, or John of Berwick, but late in 1300 Arnold de Cava Pensa was sent to his native Gascony to discuss various matters with some members of Philip IV's council,[1] and in 1304 another household knight, John de Bokland, was sent to negotiate with the king of France.[2] But such tasks as these were not part of the normal rôle of the household knights, and appointments of this type were at least as much due to the qualities and abilities of the individuals as to their status in the household.

The military household provided Edward I with a solid and generally reliable corps of men, whose main duties were military, but who could be useful in other ways. Thomas Turberville was a notable exception to the general loyalty of the group in going over to the French following his capture in Gascony,[3] while his treachery was more excusably paralleled in 1300 or early 1301 by Simon Fraser, who rejoined his own countrymen.[4] But there were no other such cases. The loyalty of the household knights perhaps provided an element of political stability in the régime of Edward I. None of them were involved in the opposition during the crisis of 1297. But they cannot be shown to have taken an active part in

1. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 49v.
2. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 8835, f. 19v.
3. See J.G. Edwards, 'The Treason of Thomas Turberville', in Studies in Mediaeval History presented to F.M. Powicke, pp. 289-309. Brit. Mus. Cotton. MSS. Vesp. B. xi, the Rageby chronicle, contains a contemporary newsletter on Turberville's treachery on f. 38.
4. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 171 n.2.

the political activity of parliament on any appreciable scale in the king's interest. The only household knights to sit as county members were Bartholomew Badlesmere and Thomas Chaucecombe for Kent and Cheshire respectively in the Carlisle parliament of 1307.[1] Some of the more important and wealthy of the bannerets of the household received summonses to the upper house, but Walter Beauchamp, the steward, never got one. Service in the household was certainly no guarantee of this recognition of status, but it is probably true that it was only through the royal household that a man like Eustace de l'Hacche could rise from the rank of a _serviens_ to that of a lord of parliament. The only household banneret to become a member of the council on a reasonably permanent basis was John Botetourt, summoned to parliament in this capacity in 1305,[2] presumably more as a result of his services as a judge than on the field of battle.

Important as they were in war, even here the rôle of the household knights should not be exaggerated. The major military commands were rarely entrusted to them: in 1306 Gloucester, Valence and Percy all led more important forces than did John Botetourt. The Falkirk Roll of Arms and the _Song of Caerlaverock_ show that the household played no part in the leadership or organisation of three of the four battalions that composed the armies of 1298 and 1300. There was considerable and natural magnate opposition to any attempt by Edward I to put his _familiares_ in positions of high

1. _Parl. Writs_, i. 188-9.
2. _Ibid_, i. 160.

military authority, the arguments centring on the rights and duties of the hereditary officials, the marshal and the constable. To them belonged such tasks as organising the army in the field, arranging billets and dispensing justice. It is not clear when these anachronistic offices had last been exercised in full, and Edward I was clearly anxious that Bigod and Bohun should not revive old claims. But the two earls were not men to stand by and see their hereditary rights usurped, as they saw it, by the crown. The first crisis came with the Welsh campaign of 1282, with the opposition to Edward's intention that the army should be a purely paid force. Accordingly, Bohun demanded from the king the emoluments of his office of constable. The demand was clearly unusual, since these rights were sufficiently obscure for it to be necessary to search the records to discover what they were.[1]

The next row concerning the hereditary offices came in 1294, when Bigod, the marshal, was ordered to command the army in South Wales, and Roger de Molis was appointed marshal of the force.[2] It appears from the wardrobe account that the king himself was receiving the fees due to the marshal, until the officials were ordered to cease levying them 'propter caristiam in illo exercitu'.[3]

1. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 155.
2. Ibid., p. 250.
3. Enrolled Wardrobe account, 23 Edward I, Pipe Roll, E. 372/144.

After protests, Bigod was promised that no precedent would be made of his being ordered away from his rightful place at the king's side. As Morris pointed out, these incidents had a clear bearing on the crisis of 1297.[1] At the Salisbury parliament that year Edward requested the marshal and constable to go to Gascony without him. Bigod absolutely refused, and left the assembly without permission.[2] Edward appears to have yielded on this point, and the writs of summons sent out on 15 May make no mention of service apart from the king.[3] When the troops summoned to be in London on 7 July arrived, Edward ordered the marshal and constable to draw up lists of how many horses they had. It looks as if the king, furious at the recalcitrance shown by the earls, decided to burden them with all the tasks that could conceivably be considered part of their offices. Naturally, Bigod and Bohun refused to make out the lists, sending Robert Turny to inform the king that this was the task of a household official. Edward promised them that no precedent would be made of it, but they were adamant. Accordingly, Edward appointed Thomas de Berkelay as Constable and Geoffrey de Geneville as Marshal.[4]

1. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, pp. 290-1.
2. Chron. Guisborough, p. 290.
3. Parl. Writs, 1. 262.
4. Chron. Cotton, p. 531.

These incidents are well known. But although it is clear that the rôles of the marshal and constable were a matter for controversy, which did much to aggravate the crisis of 1297, it is not entirely clear what these rôles were. In October 1298 Edward I wrote to the Exchequer asking them to look up the rights and duties of the two officers. In reply, he got a purely financial statement, a summary of the fees due to them as contained in a version of the Constitutio Domus Regis dating from Henry II's reign. The marshal was to get 2s. a day when away from court, and 1s. 2d. when present in the household. He was also entitled to tips out of the gifts and payments made out of the treasury and chamber. The constable was to have 5s. a day out of court, along with some provisions, and 3s. 6d. if he dined in the household.[1] In 1300 Bohun was paid his fees exactly as this letter stated them. For the length of the campaign they totalled a mere £17. 5s. 9d.[2] The constable and marshal both took their fees on this basis in 1307, and probably did so in other years.[3]

A document probably drawn up shortly after Bigod's death gives an account of the fees and perquisites claimed by the marshal. There was a graduated scale of payments due from those who did homage to the king, and the sums due from those incarcerated in the marshal's custody similarly varied with rank. In wartime the marshal was

1. Lord Treasurer's Memoranda Roll, E. 368/70, m. 22d.
2. Liber Quotidianus, p. 201.
3. Wardrobe book, 1 Edward II, E. 101/373/15, f. 10v. This is misdated by Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 121, n. 2, to 1306.

entitled to the fines paid in his court by all except for those in receipt of royal robes, and also to all particoloured beasts taken as booty.[1] In 1301 John Benstead, controller of the wardrobe, was sent in May to discuss the office of the marshal.[2] The result of these negotiations was almost certainly an agreement that John Segrave, who acted as marshal's deputy in that year's campaign, should receive £100 as commutation of this 'fie du veierage'.[3] Bigod only agreed to this on condition that 'pur ceo ne deit estre alleggez le dit mareschal ne son lieu tenaunt qil ne facent lour devoir parmy les oustz nostre seignour le rei'.[4] Another right of the marshal was to 2d. in the pound on wages paid to the infantry.[5] Curiously, this fee was attributed to the constable by the Exchequer in 1282, but this was clearly an error, for Bigod's father had received it as marshal in 1255,[6] and he himself acknowleged receipt of £50 of it in 1296.[7] In Gascony, where the office of marshal was exercised by a royal nominee, the fees went to the crown, as in Wales in 1294. For the period from October 1294 until June 1295 they totalled £131. 5s. 0d., but at some time during the next year a royal prohibition was placed on further collection, possibly because Bigod objected to the appropriation by the crown of his perquisites.[8] A further claim of the marshal was

1. Select Pleas in the Court of King's Bench, i., ed. G.O. Sayles (Selden Soc, lv, 1936), cxlix-cl.
2. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 49.
3. Privy seal warrant authorising payment, E. 101/371/21/31.
4. Letter patent of John de Segrave, E. 101/20/17.
5. Select Pleas in the Court of King's Bench, i. cxlix-cl.
6. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 121, n. 4.
7. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/684/50/1.
8. Fragmentary Wardrobe books, E. 101/624/51, p. 14.

that, after the king and constable had made their choice, he was entitled to the best jewel in any castle captured.[1] But an undated note of this period makes the more lavish claim that the marshal should have the money and armour of the commander of any garrison that surrendered, and that he should get two tuns of wine and a length of the best cloth, along with a quantity of wax, from a captured town.[2]

A later statement of the rights and duties of the constable and marshal as claimed by Thomas of Brotherton, and probably drawn up at the time of Richard II's coronation,[3] confirms many of these details, and provides additional ones. The constable was entitled to all beasts without horns, pigs, and unshod horses. He was to be paid 4d. a week by all merchants following the army, and the same sum by whores. But more important than these curious rights were the duties of the two officers. They had to organise billeting and the setting up of camp, and were responsible for organising sentry duty. They had to keep a list of all the men in the army, and allocate them to their battalions. The marshal, along with a wardrobe clerk, was to take the proffers of feudal service. He had a a right to attend councils of war, and to him was allocated the task of maintaining law and order in the army.[4] Evidence of these

1. Select Pleas in the Court of King's Bench, i. cl.
2. Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/3/21/23.
3. M.H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, p. 152, n. 1. Mr. Keen is mistaken in thinking that the marshal had a right to all gelded beasts: he has mistranslated verrez, which means piebald.
4. Brit. Mus., Cotton. MSS. Nero D. vi, f. 85.

activities from the reign of Edward I is sufficient to indicate that the rôle of the marshal and constable in the organisation of the army was a very considerable one. The Song of Caerlaverock states that the marshal and his staff were responsibility for arranging lodgings and organising the pitching of tents.[1] The two officers seem to have shared the responsibility of taking the feudal muster. In 1277 and 1282 both men were present,[2] though the roll for 1300 is the constable's alone.[3] In 1306 proffers were made before Walter Bedwin, a wardrobe clerk, with the assistance of Hugo Duket acting for the constable and John de Kerlingstoke for the marshal.[4] In 1296 a proclamation was issued to the effect that no one was to go in advance of the banners of the constable and marshal, which illustrates their authority over the army in the field.[5] When Stirling castle finally surrendered in 1304 the garrison was handed over to the deputy constable, while the marshal's deputy had the task of guarding the prisoners.[6] Military discipline during this period seems to have been the sole responsibility of the marshal. It was the severity of Ralph Gorges' judgements as marshal in Gascony that caused the mutiny at Rioms,[7] and the one surviving army plea roll, for the 1296 campaign in Scotland, is that of the marshal, John Lovel. Cases heard

1. Siege of Carlaverock, ed. Nicolas, p. 14.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 197, 228.
3. Palgrave, Documents, p. 209.
4. Roll of feudal service, C. 47/5/7.
5. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 822.
6. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 123.
7. Chron. Guisborough, p. 246.

ranged from simple theft to the embezzlement of wages.[1] The absence of the constable from judicial proceedings ties in with the statement of the Thomas of Brotherton document, that the constable is not to meddle in pleas, but it is curious in view of the incident in 1254, when the king's brother's punished some Welsh troops, and it was the constable who protested that this was in prejudice of his ancient rights, and contrary to the laws and customs of the army.[2] In the reign of Edward II the two officers appear to have shared judicial responsibility. The creation of the Court of Chivalry later gave the constable considerable rights of jurisdiction,[3] but all the evidence for Edward I's reign is that the marshal was much the more important of the two men. Their powers were exercised on all campaigns, not only those for which a feudal summons was issued. After the crisis of 1297 the king abandoned his attempts to appoint royal nominees to these offices, as he had done in Wales and in Gascony. In all the later campaigns of the reign the earls of Norfolk and Hereford, and the deputies they appointed, performed the tasks they claimed by hereditary right. Edward was in no position to oppose them, and it did mean that the crown's control over the army was less than absolute

1. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 822; Exchequer Scottish Documents, E. 39/93/15 is the original plea roll, of which Bain only gives extracts.
2. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 122; Matthew Paris, Chronic Majora, v, ed. H.R. Luard (1880), p. 442.
3. M.H. Keen, 'Treason Trials under the Law of Arms', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 5th. ser. xii (1962), pp. 98-99.

There is no simple way of categorising the cavalry forces in the armies of Edward I's reign: they can ot with justice be termed either mercenary, feudal, or contractual. The royal household did provide a very substantial and important paid element, but in the major campaigns this was outnumbered by the contingents of the magnates who refused to accept pay. Whether novel techniques of summons, based on wealth rather than on traditional obligations, were used, or obsolete feudal methods forced on the crown by the opposition, the armies as they assembled in the field were much the same. The majority of the cavalry were organised in retinues, built up by means of formal agreements and indentures, yet in general the government scarcely recognised the existence of this system in its methods of recruiting. In none of the summer campaigns in Scotland did the crown enter into contracts with the army captains. Modernity of organisation was matched by the conscious archaism with which the marshal and constable pursued their claims. But for all these vagaries, Edward I did succeed in welding together the miscellaneous cavalry forces available to him into a coherent and well organised military weapon.

III

THE INFANTRY

The importance of infantry in the armies of Edward I's reign is a familiar theme among historians. Morris laid stress on the innovation of using a combination of mounted men-at-arms and archers, and pointed out the increasing tendency to rely on the bow rather than the pike as a weapon. He saw in the developments of this reign the foundations of the victory of Halidon Hill and the great triumphs of the Hundred Years War.[1] Michael Powicke has written that 'the revolution by which foot troops came to share the place of honour with the cavalry was the work of Edward I'.[2] Barrow has suggested that the numbers of footsoldiers employed were very considerable, since 'in 1296 as many as 60,000 infantry were in pay at Newcastle ready for the campaign against Balliol'.[3] The part played by the infantry at the battles of Orewin Bridge and Maes Moydog appears to have been decisive.[4] At Falkirk the cavalry alone failed to break the Scotch schiltroms: they could only do so after the infantry had devastated the formations with a hail of arrows and stones.[5]

1. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, pp. 99-104.
2. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England, p. 118.
3. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 294. It should be noted that on p. 96, n.4, it is merely stated that '60,000 foot were to be in pay at Newcastle at the beginning of March', and not that they actually all appeared. See infra, p. 114.
4. Morris, op. cit., pp. 183-84, 256-57; Edwards, 'The Battle of Maes Madog and the Welsh Campaign of 1284-5', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxix (1924), 1-12.
5. Chron. Guisborough, p. 328.

Unfortunately the paucity of actual engagements with the enemy during the period 1294-1307, and the inadequacy of the chronicle accounts of them makes it hard to determine the true importance of the infantry. But the accounts that do survive make it possible to discover the size of the armies that Edward I put into the field. The Welsh war of 1294-1295 saw some very appreciable forces assembled. Early in December there were 15,909 footsoldiers at Chester,[1] and on the 19th there were 10,704 under Warwick's command in Montgomery. Reginald de Grey at Rhuddlan may have commanded as many as 5,000, and in late 1294 there were probably some 4,000 infantry in pay in South Wales.[2] But these large concentrations were not maintained for very long. Warwick's army reached a maximum strength early in January of some 14,500 infantry, yet by the time of the battle of Maes Moydog on 5 March it numbered a mere 2,489.[3]

Detailed accounts of the infantry forces involved in the Gascon campaigns have not survived. Some English and Welsh were sent, but probably not in very large numbers. The enrolled account for the war reveals that they, together with Spanish footsoldiers, were only paid £17,928 over the four years,[4] which compares with the total cost of the serjeants-at-arms and infantry in Wales in 1294-1295 which came to £26,388.[5] Wages of the Gascon infantry were included in the

1. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. xxix, 55-57.
2. Ibid., pp. xxix-xi.
3. Ibid., pp. xxxvi-vii.
4. Enrolled account of John Saddale and Thomas of Cambridge, paymasters in Gascony, Pipe Roll, E. 372/160. See infra, p.
5. Enrolled Wardrobe account for 1294-95, Pipe Roll, E. 372/144, calendared in appendix i, infra, p. 436.

£174,646 paid to Gascon troops of all ranks. For instead of the infantry being recruited and organised independently of the cavalry, as in England, it appears that the Gascon lords themselves provided footsoldiers, as part of their retinues. When in May 1297 Pascasius Valentini requested that he be promoted to the rank of banneret, in view of the size of his following, he also informed the authorities that several of his comrades-in-arms had offered to provide 200 or 300 footsoldiers, should they be needed.[1] The Gascon infantry were crossbowmen, superior to the ordinary English or Welsh foot, and they were paid proportionately more, one shilling a day in local money, as against the eight shillings of a knight,[2] whereas the English infantry were only paid one twelfth of a knight's wages.

Edward I's intentions in Scotland in all but the last campaigns of the reign appear to have been to try to crush the enemy by sheer weight of numbers. According to the Guisborough chronicler he assembled a huge army for his 1296 campaign, with 4,000 horse and 30,000 foot from England, to which were later added 400 cavalry and a further 30,000 foot from Ireland.[3] But chronicler's figures are notoriously inaccurate, and it can easily be shown that there were in fact only about 2,500 Irish infantry present.[4] Guisborough's figures are, however, no more

1. Rôles Gascons, iii, ed. Bémont, 371, nos. 4478, 4479.
2. Enrolled Account of Sandale and Cambridge, Pipe Roll, E. 372/160.
3. Chron. Guisborough, pp. 272, 279.
4. Supra, p. 93.

extraordinary than the total of 60,000 quoted by Barrow,[1] which comes from a demand made by Edward that the Exchequer should supply him with £5,000 a week for the wages of 1,000 men-at-arms and 60,000 footsoldiers, together with the expenses of the household.[2] But this is better evidence of the ambitiousness of Edward's plans than of the size of the army in 1296. In fact only £21,443 was spent on the infantry for the campaign, which was nothing like enough to pay for the force originally envisaged.[3] A reasonable estimate would be that the army was roughly the same size as that which won the battle of Falkirk later, some 25,000 strong in infantry,[4] but unfortunately no pay rolls survive to confirm this.

There is no such lack of evidence for the later expeditions of the reign. In the Flanders expedition Edward I had with him in the middle of October roughly 7,810 infantry,[5] of whom almost 5,300 were Welsh.[5] Numbers declined only slightly during the rest of the king's stay abroad: by February 25 the army was some 7,300 strong.[6] The Welsh

1. Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 96, n. 4, 294.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/69, m. 11d. This is transcribed by Stevenson, Documents, ii. 20-21, no. cccxlvi, but regrettably the sum required is there given as £1,000 a week, not £5,000. This mistake led J.H. Ramsay to point out in 'The Strength of English Armies in the Middle Ages', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxix (1914), 222, that the sum specified was not sufficient to pay for the force required, whereas in fact the sum of £5,000 was quite adequate.
3. Enrolled wardrobe account, Pipe Roll, E. 372/144. See also Appendix i, infra, p. 437.
4. Infra, p. 116.
5. Lewis, 'The English forces in Flanders', Studies in Medieval History presented to F.M. Powicke, p. 311.
6. Infantry pay rolls, Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/2/20.

troops were then allowed to leave the Low Countries and return home.[1] During that same winter an expedition was sent to Scotland under the command of Warenne. The writs of summons requested some 29,000 foot from Wales, Chester, and nine English counties to muster at Newcastle on 6 December 1297.[2] The date was as optimistic as the number. By the beginning of February roughly 9,700 men had arrived, and by the fourteenth numbers had built up to 18,500. This was the peak: three days later there were 1,000 less men, and the total dropped rapidly during late February and March.[3]

For the campaign which culminated in the victory of Falkirk commissions to array 10,500 Welsh troops and 2,000 men from Lancashire and Cheshire were enrolled on the patent rolls.[4] The number of Welsh who served actually exceeded the demand, for at the beginning of the expedition they totalled 10,900. By early September, after rather more than two months in the field, their number had only dropped by about 400. Not all the writs of summons asking for English infantry were enrolled. Large numbers were recruited: on 20 July there were 14,800 in pay, including some Irish, but a week later numbers had fallen to 12,600. Unfortunately there are no accounts for the English footsoldiers in the rest of the campaign, so it is impossible to say

1. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/45/113-15.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 304-05.
3. Account of Walter of Amersham, E. 101/7/8. The account of his controller, Robert Heron, E. 101/6/35 is a duplicate. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 285, makes the maximum strength of this force 21,500: I have preferred my own addition.
4. Morris, op. cit., p. 287; Parl. Writs, i. 312-16.

how far numbers were thinned by desertion as the summer proceeded. But the rolls do show that at the time of Falkirk, fought on 22 July, Edward had some 25,700 with him, a very impressive number.[1]

To discover what use was made of these infantry levies it is necessary to turn from account rolls to chronicles. One incident that has received a great deal of attention is the battle of Maes Moydog. There are difficulties in the account of the engagement given by Trivet. He states that Warwick's force was composed of cavalry, crossbowmen and archers, and that in the battle the horse were combined in one line with t e crossbowmen.[2] But the account roll indicates that there were only thirteen crossbowmen and archers present,[3] and in order to make sense of the passage in Trivet it is necessary to assume that some of the other infantry were armed with bows, as is quite likely, and that the chronicler was mistaken in singling out the crossbowmen as having been combined with the cavalry. A much more authoritative account of the fight makes no mention of the use of unusual tactics. A newsletter reports the casualties as one squire of Robert FitzWalter's, and six infantrymen, and adds that ten horses were lost. Far from the Welsh having taken up a defensive attitude throughout, the author noted that they

1. Infantry pay rolls, E. 101/12/17.
2. Trivet, Annales, ed. T. Hog (1845), p. 335.
3. Edwards, 'The Battle of Maes Madog and the Welsh campaign of 1294-5', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxix (1924), 11.

'alerent a nos genz tut de front, e furent les plus beaus Walois e les plus hardix qe oncqe nul homme veist.'[1] What intermingling of infantry and cavalry that did take place was more probably the result of the confusion of battle than of deliberately adopted tactics. This is also true of the earlier battle of Orewin Bridge, when during the ascent of the English to the Welsh position the archers and cavalry were mixed up, although it was the latter that reached the top first.[2]

In his account of the battle of Falkirk Walter of Guisborough gave the infantry the vital rôle of breaking up the strong Scotch defensive formations, the schiltroms. The fact that they attacked by throwing stones, fortunately found in abundance on the battlefield, as well as with archery, suggests that they were considerably worse armed than the highly skilled archers of the Hundred Years War.[3] Another version of the events of the battle allowed the infantry no prominence, but credited the breaking of the schiltroms to a flanking movement by some of the English, who attacked them from behind.[4] Not all of the available infantry were in fact used in the battle, for a few days before the Welsh had been given wine on empty stomachs . In the inevitable brawl, several men were killed, and the cavalry drove the Welsh off. When it was pointed out to Edward that they might choose to join up with the

1. Hagneby chronicle, Brit. Mus, Cotton. MSS. Vesp. B. xi, f. 37.
2. Chron. Guisborough, pp. 220-21.
3. Ibid., p. 328.
4. Chron. Rishanger, p. 415.

Scotch, the king declared that he could not care less, as both were his enemies, and both could be defeated. But they did not desert, remaining instead at a discreet distance from the main army.[1] For the most part they stayed away from the battle.[2] The pay rolls suggest that their casualties were minimal, those of the English infantry being perhaps as high as 2,000.[3]

In none of the other campaigns between 1294 and 1298 do the infantry appear to have played a decisive part. In Gascony they were worse than useless. The disaster at Rioms at Easter 1295 when several English knights, including the treacherous Turberville, were captured, was the direct result of the mutiny of the foot-soldiers, who objected to the harsh justice of Ralph de Gorges, marshal of the army.[4] In an engagement about a year later, the English were ambushed, the cavalry escaping, but the Welsh infantry suffering heavy casualties.[5] When the English suffered their second major defeat of the war early in 1297, near Bellegarde, the infantry took no part in the battle, but remained in cover of the woods.[6] In Scotland in 1296 there was some trouble between the Welsh and the English at Edinburgh which had to be settled by the marshal, who had his charger wounded in the affray.[7] The one

1. Chron. Guisborough, pp. 325-28.
2. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 316.
3. Infantry pay rolls, E.101/12/17.
4. Chron. Guisborough, pp. 246-47.
5. Hagneby chronicle, Brit. Mus., Cotton. MSS. Vesp. B. xi, f. 40.
6. Chron. Guisborough, p. 263.
7. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 822, p. 190.

battle of the campaign, that of Dunbar, was won by Warenne's cavalry with swords and lances, not by infantry with arrows.[1] At Irvine in the next year a Scotch army under Wishart and Douglas surrendered to an English force containing far fewer infantry than their own, but which was stronger in cavalry.[2] The disaster later in 1297 at Stirling Bridge cannot be blamed on the inadequacy of either cavalry or infantry: both suffered equally from Warenne's appalling generalship. In Flanders there was no fighting with the enemy, only skirmishes between the unruly Welsh and Edward's Flemish allies. The only occasion on which the footsoldiers proved worth the money spent on them when they were sent forward carrying banners to deceive the French into thinking that the inadequate English army was an immense host.[3] From this evidence, it does not seem likely that the 'French had learnt by experience a wholesome fear of the English and Welsh archers', as Tout thought.[4] That lesson was to be taught them by Edward III and the Black Prince.

Although the value of huge concentrations of what must have been ill-armed and inexperienced troops seems questionable, the English government continued to summon large numbers for some years to go to Scotland. 16,000 were called for a winter expedition in 1299-1300, which proved abortive, as only 2,500 came, only to desert en masse.[5]

1. Chron. Guisborough, p. 278.
2. Ibid., p. 298.
3. The Chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds, 1212-1301, ed. A. Granaden (1963) pp. 143, 146.
4. T.F. Tout, The History of England from the Accession of Henry III to the Death of Edward III (1905), p. 211.
5. Morris. Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 298; Liber Quotidianus, pp. 241-4

FIGURE I

The Infantry Forces in 1300



The summer campaign was taken more seriously. In accordance with the decision taken for the expedition planned for the previous year, which never took place, no Welsh were summoned by Edward . They were to stay at home 'qar nous les avoms done conge de y demorer pur les grantz traveux qil ount en avaunt ces houres en nostre servise'.[1] But they were expected to provide financial assistance. 16,000 English foot were demanded from Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and the four most northerly counties.[2] By no means this number actually mustered, the maximum strength of the army being no more than 9,000. As figure 1 shows, this level was not maintained, numbers falling away rapidly after the siege of Caerlaverock. By early September Edward had only about 500 foot with him, along with rather less than 100 workmen. A month later there were none of the former, but as result of the needs of the building operations at Dumfries the workmen had increased to 140.[3]

Edward I was not best pleased by the desertions of the infantry in 1300. On 15 July he wrote to John Droxford, the keeper of the Wardrobe, complaining of the behaviour of the Yorkshire levies, saying that 'pur ce meismes les gentz nous ont malvoesement deceu, e nous ont treiterousement failli a nostre busoign' they were to be immediately imprisoned and their lands and chattels seized.

1. King's remembrancer's memoranda roll, E.159/73, m. 16.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 342-43.
3. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 243-70.

The local officials were not to be trusted to perform this task.

> 'Et pur ce qe nous avoms entendu qe viscontes e baillifs sont lowiz e abettours e meintenours aucune fois de chose par quoi nous sumes malement serviz meintefoiz, vous mandoms qe vous ne fiez mie en eux a faire execution des avantdites chouses, einz assignez certaines gents e fiables qui mettent diligeaument leur entente a perfourmir nostre mandement en ceste partie en tous point, en tieu manere qe gentz qui sont demore en nostre oust es parties Descoce ou nous sumes, e autres ausint peustent prendre ensample du chastiment e du punyssement qe hom aura fait a les avantdites gents qui si bien lent deservi.'[1]

A list of the defaulters was enclosed with this letter.[2] Twelve days later the king wrote to the Treasurer, the Chancellor, and the keeper of the Wardrobe, asking for reinforcements.

> 'Pur ce qe nos busoignes es parties Descoce ou nous sumes sont molt arrieres par defaute de bone pietaille, vous mandoms e chargeoms fermement enoignantz qe vous ordenez ensi e facez qe en les procheins contes de la marche Descoce outre le nombre des gentz a pie qui sont ovesque nous es parties ou nous sumes, facez eslire iusques a dys mil hommes de pie deq plus suffisants e plus vigoreus e du mieux triez qe hom porra.'[3]

The result of this request can hardly have met the king's expectations. On 19 August 643 men set off for Scotland, but only 407 arrived. Another contingent, numbering only 207, came shortly afterwards.[4] Yet, for all Edward's complaints, the infantry did not acquit themselves badly in the one engagement with the enemy of the campaign, which took place early in August. At low tide they crossed an estuary and engaged the Scotch on the other side, showing more courage than the king, who wished to avoid battle. He sent Hereford to order them to

1. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/61/63.
2. Possibly the list of over 100 Yorkshire defaulters in C. 47/3/21/17.
3. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/61/65.
4. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 253-4.

withdrew, but the English knights thought that the earl was going to the assistance of the foot, and charged. The king was forced to follow, and the Scotch were driven back in confusion. There is no suggestion that there was any combination of horse and foot used, and though the infantry fought well, it was the intervention of the heavily armed knights that was decisive. But the battle was not a complete victory, for having no Welsh troops, experienced in guerilla warfare in rough country, Edward was unable to pursue the fleeing enemy.[1]

Edward's patience was wearing thin by the autumn of 1300. After conversation with the Scotch envoys, with whom a truce was arranged, he swore that he would lay waste the whole of Scotland and force its people into submission.[2] With this intent, large numbers of infantry were summoned for the double campaign of the next year. 12,000 troops were requested to go to Berwick from Shropshire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire, Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Yorkshire and Westmorland. The infantry of the prince's army, to muster at Carlisle, was drawn from Wales and Lancashire, but unfortunately the number of those summoned is not known.[3] Detailed accounts survive only for the royal army, and show that after the men had been arriving for four days, there were almost

1. Chron. Rishanger, pp. 441-42; H. Johnstone, Edward of Caernarvon, pp. 52-3. She is mistaken in thinking that the Welsh had deserted Edward: there were none on the campaign.
2. Chron. Rishanger, p. 447.
3. Parl. Writs, i. 358-59.

FIGURE II

The Infantry Forces in the Royal Army in 1301



4,200 present on 12 July. By 9 August there were just over 7,500 infantry in the army.[1] The decline then began. The royal officials estimated that there were 3,500 in the first week of September,[2] but the accounts show that there were in fact only about 2,500. By mid November, as figure 2 shows, there were less than 400. The cost of this force was roughly £4,500. In contrast, there was £11,273 spent on the infantry in the Carlisle army.[3] This suggests that, since 100 men cost roughly £1 a day in wages, the total strength may have been roughly 12,500. Since few of the men were raised from the northern counties of England, it is unlikely that there was a high desertion rate. The large sum incurred in wages itself suggests that the strength was well maintained.

The large concentrations of infantry mustered in 1301 shows that Edward had in no way changed his military policy. A large army which had done little more than make a show of strength in 1296 had brought the Scotch to heel, and the king was slow to appreciate that the enemy were growing accustomed to this strategy, and so less frightened of it. But in 1303 the commissions of array for the Scotch expedition were not requested to produce quite so many men as in the past - only 9,500, all from the north of England. No Welsh were required to come.[4] The men mustered in May, for once at

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 116-128.
2. King's remembrancer's memoranda roll, E. 159/75, m. 6.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 116-128.
4. Parl. Writs, i. 370-71.

FIGURE III

The Infantry Forces in 1303



the time for which they had been summoned. By the 12th there were about 3,700 in pay, and five days later 6,600. The maximum was reached at the end of the month, when there were roughly 7,420 infantry in the army. The inevitable tailing away then began, as figure 3 shows, but it was more gradual than in previous years: in early September there were still 1,300 men.[1] The number of men in the field had approached the number summoned far more closely than in any of the previous Scotch campaigns.

The operations of 1303 having been inconclusive, Edward remained in the north with his troops over the winter, and in May 1304 began the siege of Stirling castle. No further commissions of array were set up, and Edward remained content with the 1,000 infantrymen he had with him at Dunfermline in January. At the time of the siege their numbers were down to about 950, and by early September, when the army had gone south to Newcastle, 750. In addition there were workmen, essential for siege work. From a total of just over 100 of these in early February, numbers rose to 385 in mid June, reaching 445 by the time the siege ended on 20 July. The largest corps of workmen, five masters and fifty men, had been engaged on the construction of an elaborate siege engine, known as the Warwolf,[2] but just as it was ready to be tried out, the Scotch offered to

1. Brit. Mus.,Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 72-90.
2. Account rolls of infantry and workmen, E. 101/11/15,

surrender. Callously and unchivalrously, Edward refused to accept their submission until the machine had been tried out on the castle for a day.[1] Success over the Scotch had been achieved with an army whose infantry arm was minute in comparison with the great hosts mustered for earlier campaigns. The one victory in the field was won by a mounted force at Happrew, when Segrave, Clifford and Latimer, unencumbered by infantry, were able to bring Fraser and Wallace to battle and rout them.[2] Experience was showing that large numbers of footsoldiers were of little value in a war where the great problem was becoming that of achieving sufficient mobility to catch an elusive enemy.

Small as the cavalry forces put into the field against Bruce were, the number of infantry was even more strikingly reduced. In 1306 Valence had some 1,500 foot with him in July,[3] but his victory at Methven owed little to them, being won by an old fashioned cavalry charge. The number of infantry in the army that came north with the Prince is not known, but as wages only totalled £1,142 there cannot have been many.[4] No commissions of array had been set up, and the only power to recruit infantry would appear to have been that entailed in the authority given to Valence and Percy over the Marches.[5]

1. Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 181-82.
2. Ibid., p. 179.
3. Sandale's account book, E. 101/13/16.
4. Wardrobe account book, E. 101/369/11, f. 136.
5. Parl. Writs, i. 374.

Commissions of array were set up early in 1307, but desertion rendered an attempt to recruit troops in February futile. Three men were appointed to deal with the defaulters. No more attempts to raise infantry were made until 19 March, when writs were issued for 1,000 men to be selected in Lancashire. They were needed to pursue Bruce in the moors and marches where he was supposed to be hiding, and which cavalry could not penetrate. Eight days later a further 1,200 footsoldiers from various northern liberties were requested. In June 1,500 Welsh were summoned, in equal numbers from Glamorgan, West Wales and North Wales.[1] From these writs, it is clear that nothing on the scale of the earlier campaigns in Scotland was planned, and the accounts confirm this. In June St. John had 1,700 foot with him,[2] and at the beginning of the next month Valence was sent 200 marks to pay the wages of 2,000 infantry in Argyll.[3] For the period after 23 July a full account of the infantry survives. There were exactly 500 men from North Wales, and 848 from the rest of that country. But numbers were considerably increased by the presence of contingents from the lands of the marcher lords. Arundel's provided 150 men, Warenne's 200, and those of Lancaster, Lincoln and Hereford roughly 100 each. From the Grey estates came 265. The total strength of the

1. Parl. Writs, i. 379-80; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 529.
2. Account of William de Rue, E. 101/531/11.
3. Wardrobe journal, E. 101/370/16, f. 17v.

infantry thus came to just over 2,900 men. By the beginning of September numbers had dropped to 2,660.[1] As would be expected, with a small army, easy to organise and discipline, there was less of a problem of desertion than there had been in the past. Even so, on 24 June a letter was sent to Walter Langton, the Treasurer, complaining of the desertion of footsoldiers from Lancashire, Northumberland, Cumberland, and Westmorland.[2]

The chroniclers in their ignorance give no impression that the armies assembled to oppose Bruce at the end of the reign of Edward I were any smaller than those of previous years. Guisborough talks of the king assembling an 'exercitus copiosum' in 1307, while Trivet and the Lanercost chronicler go so far as to invent a feudal summons in that year, when in fact there was none.[3] Conditions of warfare had changed. In the early stages of the war the Scotch had put very large armies in the field, with an impressively numerous infantry. It was reported, with apparent precision, that no less than 10,034 were slain at Dunbar in 1296,[4] and the technique of fighting in schiltroms, as at Falkirk, needed very many men. With Bruce fighting a guerilla war with a small experienced band of men, a change in the composition of the English

1. Wardrobe account book, E. 101/373/15.
2. Ancient Correspondence, S.c. 1/63/68.
3. Chron. Guisborough, p. 378; Trivet, Annales, p. 413; Chron. Lanercost, p. 207.
4. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 246.

armies was called for. Strategy demanded the use of small manoeverable units. In addition, the change in policy was also partly due to the financial difficulties of the government, which can hardly have encouraged Edward to try to repeat the massive call-up of infantry that had created the army that won the battle of Falkirk.

The normal method of recruiting footsoldiers was to use commissions of array to organise the collection of troops. From at least 1282 such commissions had been used in the Welsh wars,[1] and the system was developed and elaborated during the later years of the reign. In 1282 household knights were employed,[2] but in 1294, for the Welsh campaign, important councillors and justices were appointed. Hugh Cressingham, Roger Brabazon and Peter Malory, for example, were to select troops in six northern counties.[3] But it was obviously inconvenient to use such important men as these on a task which others could do as well. For the arraying of infantry to be sent to Gascony in the following year Cressingham was again employed, as was John of Berwick, but with them were associated laymen with military experience such as Robert FitzPayn and William Mortimer. One group of commissioners was given four counties to deal with, but none had so considerable a task as that of Cressingham and his colleagues in the previous year.[4] To collect the Welsh troops

1. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 92.
2. Supra, p.100.
3. Parl. Writs, i. 245.
4. Ibid, 270.

needed for the Flanders campaign Edward relied on the services of local magnates and their officials, but in the following year, for the Falkirk expedition, along with such men a prominent rôle was given to royal officials, notably John de Havering, Justice of North Wales, Reginald de Grey, Justice of Cheshire, and William Felton, the constable of Beaumaris castle.[1] No record has survived of the methods used to recruit the English infantry in 1298.

This technique of making full use of the local knowlege of important laymen, initiated in Wales, was followed up during the rest of the reign. For the abortive winter campaign of 1299-1300 local men were combined with royal clerks, with a separate commission set up for each county, though it was possible for one clerk to assist two lay commissioners.[2] The clerks were not used again, and the commissions were increasingly dominated by professional soldiers: in 1303, for example, Richard le Brun and John de Hudlestone were appointed in Cumberland, and Robert FitzRoger with Walter de Huntercombe in Northumberland.[3] As time went on, the area allocated to each commission was reduced. In 1300 and 1301 three men were appointed for the whole of Yorkshire, but in 1303 three were commissioned for each riding.[4] In 1307 even more specialised commissions were set up for raising troops

1. Parl. Writs, i. 294, 312-15.
2. Ibid., 325.
3. Ibid., 371.
4. Ibid., 342, 358, 370.

in the north of England, with a separate one for each liberty. By now four men were being commissioned to chose 140 foot in Eskdale and Gillesland,[1] a considerable contrast to the appointment of two men in 1295 to levy 4,000 to go to Gascony.[2] But even at the end of the reign, commissions in Wales followed the earlier pattern. The men from Glamorgan were to be chosen by Walter of Gloucester, escheator north of the Trent, acting together with the sheriff,[3] while those in the north and west of the country each consisted of a household knight of the Prince of Wales and a royal clerk.[4]

Evidence for the activities of these commissions is not as full for this period as it is later, perhaps because as the system became better established and more familiar in its operation, so opportunities for abuse multiplied. The abuses of administration leave more traces in the records than the successes. The one chronicle account of the operation of a commission of array refers to the collection of infantry from the southern counties for service in Gascony in 1295. According to Cotton, Hugh Cressinghem and William Mortimer came into Norfolk and assembled from towns and villages a large number of footsoldiers at Newmarket. The men were there inspected, and all those not up to standard sent back, but shortly afterwards the whole muster was abandoned, and all returned

1. Parl. Writs, i. 379.
2. Ibid., 270.
3. Ibid., 380.
4. Cal. Close Rolls, 1301-07, p. 505.

to their homes. Equipment consisted of white tunics, knives and swords, and was provided at the expense of the localities.[1] This was a considerable burden. The hundred of Launditch produced 187 men for the array, their equipment and expenses costing £52. 10s. 8½d. This compares with tax assessments of £241. 19s. 6d. for the tenth of 1294, and £97. 5s. 7d. for the ninth of 1297.[2] Cancellation of the plan to take the men to Gascony meant that some profiteers at Newmarket tried to make off with the tunics, popularly termed blanchecotes, and worth three shillings each, but legal action was successful in recovering at least some of them for the villagers who had paid for them.[3]

The commissioners of array generally appear to have left the hundreds and villages the task of selecting a specified number of men. The word always used to describe the process by which men were chosen is *electus*. Michael Powicke denies that this means that the men were literally elected by the village communities,[4] but the evidence is clear that it was the villagers who made the choice, and not any specially appointed deputy arrayors. They even selected their own army officers. For the Welsh war of 1294 the Nottinghamshire hundred of Bassetlaw made John de Veer their centenar, or man in charge of a unit of 100 men.[5] There were ample

1. Chron. Cotton, p. 307.
2. Exchequer receipt rolls, E. 401/1656. This document is not a receipt roll, but a record of the financial burdens placed on the hundred between 1294 and 1297.
3. Norfolk plea roll of 1298, J.I. 1/587, mm. 6d, 7.
4. Powicke, Military Obligation in Mediaeval England, pp. 129-30.
5. Notts. plea roll, J.I. 1/672, m. 7d.

opportunities for corruption in the system. In the East Riding village of South Cave a man chosen for service by the villagers was offered protection by the bailiff and two other men, in return for ten shillings.[1] A hayward was had up in the bishop of Ely's court for falsely informing a bondman that he had been selected to go to Scotland, and taking two shillings in return for protection he hardly needed.[2] In the Yorkshire village of Etton the local constable was assigned, presumably by the arrayers, the task of raising money to pay the expenses of a centenar going to Scotland. But the community of the village appointed one Adam of Boulton to collect the money, which was then to be paid to the constable. The latter appropriated three shillings to his own use, for which he was imprisoned and fined 3s. 4d.[3] It was possible for those chosen for service to hire substitutes, and one ingenious rogue called Thomas Mill was found in the court at Helesowen to have gone round to each of the men selected to serve in Wales and taken payment from each to go as their substitute. He then vanished.[4] The whole community of a village might decide to hire soldiers from elsewhere to go to the muster on their behalf. This is illustrated by a court case in which it was claimed that Nicholas de Stillingfleet had

1. Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, ed. H. Jenkinson and Beryl Formoy, Selden Soc., xlviii (1932), 196-8.
2. The Court Baron, ed. F.W. Maitland and W.P. Baildon, Selden Soc., iv (1891), 141.
3. Yorkshire plea roll, J.I. 1/1105, m. 3.
4. C.G. Homans, The English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century (1941), pp. 329-30.

agreed to find twenty men to go with him to Scotland as the contingent from a group of Yorkshire villages. He took over £3 from them, and failed to provide any soldiers.[1]

In the process of getting the men to the allocated muster point the arrayers were given much assistance by the sheriffs and other royal officials in the counties.[2] In the Welsh wars the responsibility of the county to pay the men continued until they had reached the point from which the whole army was to set out,[3] but in the Scotch wars it was normal practice for the Crown to take over financial liability from the county muster point. It is not known whether this was the case in 1296, but in 1298 three royal clerks were appointed to pay the wages of the troops on their way north,[4] and this precedent was followed thereafter. Even in the case of the grant of military service negotiated by the Treasurer late in 1302 with the community of the county of Northumberland the infantry were to be paid by the crown once they crossed the county boundary.[5] Michael Powicke's statement that for the Caerlaverock campaign no payment of royal wages is recorded before the men reached Carlisle is not in accordance with the facts:[6] they were paid on their way from the counties, and the accounts were

1. Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, 194-95.
2. A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, ed. W.C. Thompson, (Lincoln Record Soc., 1944) nos. 269, 428; Notts. pleas roll, J.I. 1/672, m7d.
3. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Mediaeval England, p. 124.
4. King's remembrancer's memoranda roll, E. 159/71, mm. 105-6.
5. Parl. Writs, i. 369.
6. Michael Powicke, op. cit., p. 129.

included in the wardrobe book.[1]

The country did not bear the burden of the commissions of array on an equal basis. It was obviously much easier to recruit men from the areas nearest to the point where the campaigns began. This had been the practice in the Welsh wars,[2] and the shift of the scene of the fighting to Scotland moved the main burden of providing troops from Gloucestershire, Shropshire, Herefordshire and the neighbouring counties to Yorkshire, Cumberland, Northumberland and Westmorland. The men of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire had been regularly called upon for the Welsh wars, and they attended the campaigns in Scotland as consistently, their virtue being experience rather than proximity to the muster points. The south of England was hardly affected by Edward's need for manpower. Some infantry were raised in Lincolnshire to go to Wales in 1294,[3] and an undated portion of a pay roll which probably refers to the army collected to go to Gascony in the following year has payments to just over 1,400 men collected from the counties of Wiltshire, Kent, Oxford, Buckingham, Leicester, Warwick and Northampton.[4] In 1296 the coastal shires of the south-east were organised to provide infantry to meet the threat of a possible French invasion,[5] but during the rest of the reign there was hardly any recruiting done in the south.

1. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 243-44.
2. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 93.
3. A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, ed. Thompson, p. xxvi.
4. E. 101/13/34/30.
5. Parl. Writs, i. 270-75.

Outside England, the great recruiting ground was of course Wales; Welsh friendlies had been used by Edward during the Welsh wars, but it was for the campaigns in Gascony, Flanders and Scotland that they were mustered on a substantial scale. There was no question of their being used because they lived near the campaigning areas: their value was that they were experienced soldiers, much less prone to desert then the English were, though on occasion their unruly disposition might lead to trouble, as in Flanders and before the battle of Falkirk.

Not all of Edward's infantry were raised by royal commissions of array, though this was the general system, and sufficiently successful for the government to attempt to try ~~to~~ raise cavalry by similar means when civil war threatened in 1297.[1] During Bek's rule as bishop of Durham, no commissions were sent into the palatinate. For the winter campaign of 1299-1300, the king simply asked him to provide 5,000 or 6,000 men, sending a royal clerk to assist the local administration in collecting them.[2] The demand for service from Durham was conspicuously unsuccessful on this occasion, the military tenants absolutely refusing to fight in Scotland.[3] Later, when the palatinate was in royal hands Edward

1. Parl. Writs, i. 299. A similar commission to levy horse and foot in Notts and Derby was given to Thomas de Furnival late in 1298, ibid, 320. E. 101/14/11 is probably the return of such a commission set up in Sussex, perhaps for coastal defence in 1295.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 326.
3. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 298.

set up a normal commission for the palatinate, sensibly putting local men, John FitzMarmaduke and Robert Hansard, in charge of it.[1] The former of these had been a ringleader of the mutiny three years before. No other liberties received such privileged treatment, for the normal commissions of array were also given powers to recruit tam infra libertates quam extra, but the appointment of separate commissions for the various liberties in the north of England in 1307 may well indicate a concession to local susceptibilities on the part of the government.[2]

An important element in the infantry forces assembled for the Scotch campaigns was the stiffening of regular troops seconded from the castle garrisons. In 1300 the army was joined by 500 archers from Lochmaban castle. Roxburgh provided 100, and during the campaign 400 foot arrived from Berwick.[3] In the next year Berwick produced 100 men, and a similar number from Roxburgh and Jedburgh. A further 100 were detached from their post in Selkirk forest to join the main army.[4] Other special infantry units were the small force regularly assigned to guard the Wardrobe,[5] and the royal bodyguard, normally about twenty strong. Specialised corps of crossbowmen were used, generally Gascons. In 1301 there

1. Parl. Writs, i. 371.
2. Ibid., 379-80.
3. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 247-57.
4. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 18-19, 124v.
5. As for example Liber Quotidianus, p. 250.

was a group of twenty-five of these, in addition to those retained on a more permanent basis in the household as part of the body of serjeants-at-arms.[1] In 1303 the Prince of Wales had with him eight crossbowmen and eight Spanish footsoldiers armed with lances.[2]

In 1294 some infantrymen were recruited for Gascony following a general proclamation stating that the king was willing to grant pardons to felons in return for service. Two justices, Brabazon and Bereford, were appointed to issue these, and some three hundred or more were granted.[3] The expedient was repeated in 1296, when Brabazon alone was appointed. The pardons were not absolute: it was possible for the criminals to be appealed on their return from campaign.[4] The patent rolls record only about ninety pardons granted in 1296,[5] and it does not seem that the country's prisons were an important source of infantry. The men thus levied may have proved unsatisfactory: the expedient was not repeated on any scale later in the reign. In the accounts of the infantry in 1303 there are only nine men designated as outlaws.[6]

There was surprisingly little resistance to the activities of

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966c, ff. 118-26.
2. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 75v.
3. Rôles Gascons, iii, ed. Bémont, 183-4, nos. 3032, 3033; Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, p. 648 n. 2.
4. Stevenson, Documents, ii. 38-39, no. cccIvii; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 186.
5. Ibid., pp. 190-207.
6. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 82.

the commissioners of array. On one occasion the men of the Durham village of Puttingden were each fined two shillings 'quia non satisfecerant sociis suis pro eis servicia fac' in gwerra',[1] but the great majority of cases that came to court concerned abuse of the system, notably financial extortion, rather than refusal to accept its workings. The arrayers clearly did not arouse the degree of resentment that purveyors of foodstuffs did.[2] It was not until the reign of Edward III that grievances about their operations became a political issue.[3] During Edward I's reign dislike of military service was expressed in a much more basic way by the infantry, by simply deserting in large numbers.

The problem of desertion was most serious in the winter campaign of 1299-1300, which was virtually abandoned as a result of the mass withdrawals of the infantry as well as of the mutiny of the Durham tenants. Sheriffs, along with some of the commissioners who had selected the infantry, were commissioned to punish the defaulters.[4] The legal right of the crown to punish men for simple desertion appears to have been questionable. What they were fined and imprisoned for was fraudulently appropriating to their own use the wages

1. Halmota Prioratus Dunelmensis, ed. J. Booth (Surtees Soc., ii, 1886), p. 1.
2. Infra, pp. 230-31.
3. Michael Powicke, Military Obligation in Mediaeval England, pp. 159-61.
4. Parl. Writs, i. 339-40.

paid to them by the crown and their own localities.[1] Desertion was a problem even before the armies mustered. In 1301 600 men were collected together at Hereford on 21 June ,[2] but only 351 were still in pay when the contingent reached Berwick on 8 July,[3] which made a mockery of the initial success of the arrayers in getting precisely the number of men asked of them.[4] Once the men were on campaign, the accounts indicate that it was the men who lived nearest to Scotland who were the most likely to desert, rather than those drawn from the Welsh marches, who had to face a much longer return journey. No effective solution was found to the problem, though the abandonment of the huge armies in favour of smaller more easily disciplined forces at the end of the reign did provide some amelioration. In 1303 a harsh ordinance for the punishment of deserters was drawn up. Those suspected of leaving the army without permission were to be imprisoned, and the wages paid them recovered by distraint on their lands. If found guilty, they were to find guarantors to ensure that they served on some future occasion in Scotland at their own cost. Severe measures were to be taken against bailiffs found to have accepted bribes to let men selected for service stay at home.[5] Such threats may have deterred some

1. Parl. Writs, i. 339-40.
2. Account of infantry pay, E.101/9/17.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 117.
4. Parl. Writs, i. 358.
5. Palgrave, Documents, pp. 204-5. This can be dated by the commissions set out on pp. 206-08, which refer to the Yorkshiremen going to Roxburgh to muster; Parl. Writs, i. 370 shows that it was in 1303 that they were ordered to do so.

potential deserters, but there is little evidence of legal action actually taken against infantrymen who left the army without permission. The fines of 3s. 4d. levied on two men at Warenne's court at Wakefield in 1296, and the varying sums ranging up to ten shillings that were demanded of other deserters as security until the earl should return to hear their cases, hardly seem to present a very effective deterrent.[1]

In the field the infantry were organised in basic units of twenty men, the ordinary soldiers being paid two pence a day, and their commander, the vintenar, twice as much. Five such platoons of twenty men were combined under the command of a constable, who was a fully armed cavalryman with a barded horse. John Sandale's account roll for the Welsh war of 1294-1295 shows that a still larger unit of a thousand men was used then,[2] but later pay rolls give no indications that such an arrangement was repeated. The men were usually grouped together according to the county they came from, while some infantrymen might serve together as they all came from a single estate. In 1300 the footsoldiers drawn from the earl of Lincoln's estates of Pontefract and Blackburnesse formed one body during the campaign.[3] It seems reasonable to suppose that the 500 men of the earl of Hereford

1. Wakefield Court Rolls, i. ed. W.P. Baildon (Yorks. Arch. Soc. Record Ser., xxix, 1900), 253, 257.
2. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 96.
3. Liber Quotidianus, p. 245.

who were given a safe conduct in 1296 for their return from Scotland to Wales all served as one unit.[1] But it was not until 1307 that the accounts drawn up by the royal officials revealed most of the infantry organised in terms of the lordships they came from.[2] Previously, accounts had merely categorised the men by counties or regions. As with the cavalry, the ultimate disciplinary authority was the marshal. It was in his court in 1296 that six men were fined for insubordination toward their constable, and that several others were punished for fighting amongst themselves.[3] What the chain of command in the field was is not clear, but it seems possible that the marshal and constable may have had much to do with the organisation of the infantry in battle. Certainly in 1301 it was the constable, Bohun, and not a household official who was sent across the estuary by Edward to order the footsoldiers to withdraw.[4]

The crown did not greatly concern itself with the arms of the infantry. The writs appointing the commissions of array did not go into further detail than 'homines pedites ad arma potentes', save on very rare occasions, as in 1295 when archers or crossbowmen were demanded.[5] The pay rolls for the Scotch wars nearly always

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 191.
2. Wardrobe account book, 1 Edward II, E. 101/373/15, ff. 13-17.
3. Army Plea Roll, E. 39/93/15, mm. 1, 9d.
4. Chron. Rishanger, pp. 441-2.
5. Parl. Writs, i. 270.

term the infantry sagittarii: the lanceati who figured in the Welsh war of 1277 had disappeared.[1] But though classed as archers, the infantry of the latter years of Edward I's reign were not supplied with weapons on the same scale as their successors under Edward III were to be. During the Hundred Years War huge quantities of bows, arrows and arrowheads were supplied to the government by sheriffs, and stored in the Tower of London.[2] In contrast, Edward I's footsoldiers rarely received weapons other than those provided by their localities. An archer would have had no more than one quiver of arrows with him; which helps to explain why the infantry hurled stones at the enemy at Falkirk. Normally the only weapons that the government concerned itself with were crossbows and the heavy machines used for siege work and the defense of castles.[3] Bows were occasionally issued to castle garrisons: the Wardrobe account for 1300 mentions fifty sent to Stirling. In that year ten Welshmen were each given two shillings to have their robes made up, and to buy bows and arrows, but as members of the household they hardly qualify as ordinary infantrymen.[4] The one incident in

1. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 99.
2. H.J. Hewitt, The Organisation of War under Edward III (1966), pp. 65-71.
3. Typical documents dealing with the supply of arms are: Liber Quotidianus, p. 129, account of balistas for Dumfries and Lochmaben; E. 101/379/6, account of springalds sent from Northumberland; King's remembrancer's memoranda roll, E. 159/75, m. 19 d, request to the Exchequer that crossbows be sent to Linlithgow from York or London, 1301.
4. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 59, 143.

the Scotch wars that did create a substantial need for the government to provide bows and arrows was the siege of Stirling in 1304. This was partly because the infantry had been in Scotland for a long time, and so had probably exhausted the ammunition they brought with them, and also because this siege was by far the longest drawn out engagement the English armies were ever involved in, therefore creating an unprecedented need for arms. The sheriffs of London provided 130 bows and 200 quivers of arrows. From Lincolnshire came 206 bows and 1,200 arrows. Fifty-nine bows were sent from Newcastle, while Simon de Ayno, sheriff of Yorkshire, provided 320, along with other equipment. During June and July four men were employed in the siege army to make arrows.[1] On no other occasion did the government make any efforts to see that the infantry were well supplied with arms during the campaign, though obviously when the men mustered before the commissioners of array before they set out some form of inspection must have taken place. The most surprisingly armed contingent of infantry to fight for Edward I was a select corps from Sherwood forest in 1303, who were not equipped with the bow traditional to that area, but with slings.[2]

The overall impression of the infantry forces in Edward I's

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 8v, 9, 21v, 26v.
2. Ibid., f. 73.

armies is not particularly impressive. The evidence for the much vaunted tactics of combining infantry and cavalry in one line of battle is not strong, coming in any case from only two engagements involving small numbers of troops in Wales. Such sophistication was impossible with the large and ill disciplined armies sent to Scotland, which after Falkirk never succeeded in bringing the enemy to fight at close quarters. The employment of Welsh troops on occasion gave rise to trouble, for they were as willing to fight their English comrades as the enemy. No effective solution was found for the problem of desertion, and in the last years of the reign the Scotch dictated the pattern of warfare with their guerilla tactics, which helped to force the English to abandon the huge armies that they had previously used. Much remained to be done before the armies that were to win such great English victories in the Hundred Years War could appear. It was the mounted archers who were to play the decisive rôle then, and the only precedent for such men in Edward I's armies were the Irish hobelars.[1] The tactics that were to win the battles of Crécy and Poitiers were worked out in the Scotch wars of the early years of Edward III's reign, and not in the campaigns of Edward I.

But despite all this, the raising of the infantry forces of

1. J.E. Morris, 'Mounted Infantry in Mediaeval Warfare', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 3rd. ser. viii (1914), p. 84.

Edward I's reign did represent a considerable administrative achievement. In December 1294 there were probably over 31,000 infantry in pay in the various armies in Wales,[1] while the 25,700 infantry and 3,000 or more cavalry present at Falkirk was probably the largest single army that had been raised up to that time by an English government. It was only exceeded during the middle ages by that assembled for the siege of Calais in 1347, which totalled about 32,000 men.[2] The second largest army raised in Edward III's reign was only about 15,000 strong.[3] In comparison with a still later period, 1585-1603, the size of Edward I's armies appears still more impressive, for the largest force that Elizabeth's government raised in these years was one of 12,620 men sent to Ireland in 1601.[4] It was only in the middle of the seventeenth century that the size of armies greatly exceeded those of the reign of Edward I, with the 60,000 or 70,000 men under parliamentary command in 1642. At the end of the Protectorate, the army totalled some 42,000 men.[5] Edward I may not have been able to deal with the problem of desertion effectively, but despite greater severity of punishment, extending to execution, the Elizabethan government found the question equally impossible.[6]

1. J.G. Edwards, 'The Battle of Maes Madog and the Welsh Campaign of 1294-5', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxix (1924), p. 3.
2. Morris, op. cit., p. 97.
3. A.E. Prince, 'The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III', Eng. Hist. Rev., xlvi (1931), p. 356.
4. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (2nd. edn, 1966), p. 290.
5. C.H. Firth, Cromwell's Army (3rd. edn, 1921), pp. 34-5.
6. Cruickshank, op. cit., pp. 165-68.

Mobilisation on the scale achieved by Edward I's government must have had a considerable impact on the country. In a year such as 1298, some five per cent of the adult male population was probably called to arms, and in view of the policy of recruiting in certain areas only, the drain on the northern counties and on Wales must have been considerably in excess of this figure. It has been suggested, by Hilton, that service in the wars was far from a social evil, that it served to provide an alternative to starving in the village.[1] But in view of the abundant evidence that men were prepared to pay substantial bribes to avoid service, and given their propensity to desert if the arrayers were successful in getting them to join the army, this hypothesis seems unreasonable. The financial burden on a village of buying equipment and paying the expenses of footsoldiers going to the muster must have outweighed any benefit from wages brought back by soldiers from the war. The effect of the drain on manpower is hard to estimate, but it was probably not very serious, for it was only at harvest time that the full labour force was required. Only in the year 1297 with the campaign in Flanders and the battle of Stirling Bridge both making their demands in late summer and early autumn was there a really appreciable number of men withdrawn from harvest duties. The Welsh war of 1294 began later, the Scotch campaign of 1296 ended

1. R.H. Hilton, A Medieval Society(1966), p. 166.

before the harvest. In 1298, the king was back at Carlisle by 25 September,[1] and many of the infantry had probably preceded him. For the other great armies assembled during the period, those of 1300, 1301 and 1303, by harvest time most of the infantry had either deserted or been given leave to depart. There is no economic evidence to suggest that Edward's large scale recruitment of infantry had a particularly deleterious effect. A far greater burden was placed on the country by the financial demands of the wars than by the need for men to fight them.

1. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 147.

IV

CASTLES AND GARRISONS

Edward I's intention in his Welsh wars was the conquest of the country, and in Scotland his aim was the same once it was clear that John Balliol would not be an obedient puppet monarch. Conquest could not be achieved simply by defeat of the enemy field armies: occupation was necessary, and could only be made effective by the use of castles. In Wales the English position was consolidated by the construction of that splendid chain of castles stretching round the coasts of the north, while in Scotland much of Edward's strategy was based on the control of castles. It was not with the defeat of the enemy in a pitched battle that anything like victory was achieved, but with the capture of Stirling castle in 1304.

By 1294 most of the programme of castle building in Wales was reasonably complete. The most magnificent of the castles, Caernarvon, was however only half finished, and was captured by the rebels in that year. The events of the Welsh rising convinced Edward that a further castle was needed, and Beaumaris in Anglesey was started in 1295. The next few years saw much work done on these two castles. Late in January 1296 John Droxford, Keeper of the

Wardrobe, was instructed to inform the Exchequer that, among other things, all building operations should be halted with the exception of the Welsh castles and the painting of the royal chambers at Westminster, which shows that considerable priority was given to the works in Wales.[1] Between 1295 and 1300 at least £11,400 was spent on Beaumaris,[2] while up to 1299 an annual average of almost £1,100 was paid out to workmen at Caernarvon.[3] But by 1300 the danger of further risings in Wales appeared remote. In that year Beaumaris had a garrison of only one knight, two squires, one chaplain and twenty-five crossbowmen.[4] In the early years of the fourteenth century manpower and money were directed to Scotland, and it was not until after the fall of Stirling that building on any scale was restarted in Wales, with roughly £700 a year being spent on Caernarvon between 1304 and 1306.[5] From Michaelmas 1305 until Michaelmas 1307 £2,040 was expended by the chamberlain of North Wales on the castles.[6]

Although there are no great monuments like Caernarvon to the military ambitions of Edward I in Scotland, the maintenance of a chain of English castles there was one of the most essential

1. R. Allen Brown, H.M. Colvin, A.J. Taylor, The History of the King's Works (1963), i. 379-80.
2. Ibid., i. 402.
3. Ibid., i. 382.
4. Liber Quotidianus, p. 137.
5. History of the King's Works, i. 382, 384.
6. Ibid., i. 404. On castle building in Wales see also J.G. Edwards, 'Edward I's Castle-Building in Wales', Proc. Brit. Acad, xxxii (1946, published 1951), 15-81.

parts of the English war effort. Unlike North Wales, Scotland was a country already well provided with castles. Some were of very recent origin at the time of Edward's first invasion. Dirleton, Bothwell and Caerlaverock were all late thirteenth century stone castles, while Stirling was extremely well fortified. But, fortunately for the English, the speedy submission of the Scotch in 1296 meant that Edward was spared the task of slowly besieging castle after castle. Once Berwick and Dunbar had fallen, only Edinburgh presented any opposition, and there the garrison treated for peace after five days bombardment by three siege engines. The garrison of Stirling fled at Edward's approach, leaving only the porter, who surrendered the castle.[1]

Unfortunately there are few surviving documents that deal with the organisation of the English occupation of Scotland between the triumph of 1296 and the revival of Scotch power with Wallace's successes in 1297. Many records must have been lost in the raid on the English court held at Scone by the Justicier, William Ormesby, and perhaps more at the disastrous defeat at Stirling Bridge. As a result, there are few details about which castles were kept in royal hands, and which placed in the hands of trusted Scotch nobles. When during the hearing of the Great Cause in 1291 Edward ~~took~~ had taken seisin

1. Stevenson, Documents, ii. 27-8.

of the royal castles in Scotland twenty-three in all were handed over to him,[1] and it is very likely that in 1296 he took charge of the same ones. But the appointment of castellans is only recorded for nine castles, while in addition four were entrusted to Henry Percy as Warden of Galloway.[2] Details of the garrisons are lacking, but is clear that few were strong enough to withstand the onslaught inspired by Andrew Murray and William Wallace in the following year. ~~Barrow [illegible] the Scotch only with the capture of [illegible],~~[5] ~~but~~ No castles north of the Firth of Forth remained in English hands after the events of 1297. To the south, Lochmaban was taken,[3] while the burgh of Roxburgh ~~may have fallen~~ fell into the hands of the Scotch, for the burgesses were forced to flee to Berwick and Newcastle, where they received a cold welcome.[4] Only Edinburgh, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Berwick definitely held out.

It is only after the reestablishment of English authority south of the Firth of Forth after the battle of Falkirk in 1298 that much information is available about the castles held by Edward I in Scotland. They fall into three main geographical groups. Firstly, there were those in command of the Border. Apart from Berwick on

1. D.W. Hunter Marshall, 'Two Early English Occupations of Scotland', Scottish Hist. Rev., xxv (1928), 33.
2. Rotuli Scotiae (1814-19), i. 23; Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 853.
~~3. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 130.~~
3. Chron. Guisborough, p. 298, shows that Lochmaban was in English hands early in 1297, and Chron. Rishanger, p. 188, refers to its recapture by the English in 1298.
4. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 958.

the coast, the most important was Roxburgh, appositely known as Marchmount, of which the earl of Hereford remarked in 1545 that 'yt ys one of the strongest seates of a fortresse that I have seen'.[1] Sited on an impressive rock, the castle dominates the junction of the rivers Teviot and Tweed. With the nearby castles of Selkirk and Jedburgh the English held a triangle of fortifications which were a substantial obstacle to any Scotch attempts to repeat such raids into England as that of Wallace in 1297 which had done so much damage. The line of the Tweed down from Roxburgh to Berwick was not defended by royal castles, but Wark and Norham, the pride of bishop Bek of Durham, controlled the valley. In 1300 Wark was lent to the king for a year for the greater security of the March.[2]

The second important group of castles was that commanding the southern shore of the Firth of Forth and the heart of the Lowlands. Dirleton controlled the coastal road from Berwick to Edinburgh, and halted Edward's advance in 1298 until it, and two lesser castles in the neighbourhood, were taken.[3] Edinburgh was in an obviously commanding position, and was one of the most important castles held by the English. Moving westwards, Linlithgow was a traditional residence of the Scotch monarchy: Edward I spent the winter of

1. Royal Commission on Ancient and Historical Monuments and Constructions of Scotland, 14th report, Roxburghshire (1956), ii. 409.
2. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1161.
3. Chron. Guisborough, pp. 324-5.

1301-02 there, and the next year saw improvements made to the fortifications under the direction of the King's great expert on military architecture, James of St. George, at a cost of £903. 8s. 10½d.[1] On a small promontory jutting into the loch, the site was easily defensible, and aesthetically pleasing, even if it was of no great strategic importance. Stirling, in contrast, was in a very commanding site, controlling the lowest crossing of the Forth. The fact that the castle was in the hands of the Scotch from 1299 until 1304 was a very great hindrance to Edward I. In 1303 he went to the lengths of bringing three elaborate prefabricated bridges with him, in order to cross the river some way below the bridge at Stirling. The exercise demanded a great deal of ingenuity, took time, and cost nearly £1,000.[2]

In the south-west the crown held two castles, Dumfries and Lochmaban. These commanded the entry into Scotland from Carlisle, and in addition served as centres to control Nithsdale and Annandale. In the autumn of 1300 considerable works were undertaken at Dumfries, with the moats being enlarged and a new timber gatehouse being constructed.[3] A new peel had already been erected at Lochmaban after its capture by the English in 1298. Like Linlithgow, the castle was on a promontory in a lake. It was clearly a

1. The History of the King's Works, i. 412-14.
2. Ibid., i. 416; infra, p. 257.
3. The History of the King's Works, i. 411.

reasonably substantial castle, since it had a 'great tower', presumably of stone, on which the head of the constable of Caerlaverock was placed after he was captured in a raid in 1300.[1]

These three groups comprised the main castles held by the crown, but there were others, such as Kirkintilloch, west of Stirling, and Carstairs to the south of Edinburgh, held by small garrisons. Ayr was also in royal hands. After the apparent English victory in 1304, the pattern of the occupation was rather altered. A memorandum of writs to be issued listed the most important royal castles as follows: Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Edinburgh, Stirling, Dumfries and Ayr; but the same document also announced the king's intention to follow the practice of the Welsh wars, and cement the conquest with the construction of new castles.[2] They were to be three in number, all to strengthen the English hold on the central zone of Scotland, around the head of the Firth of Forth. One was to be at Polmaise, not far east of Stirling, with one at Tullibody on the north side of the Firth. and one at Inverkeithing, ~~on the north side of the Firth~~. At those last two sites some work was definitely done,[3] though those at Tullibody were completed by the Scotch.[4] During the last two years of Edward's reign, garrisons were placed by royal officials in several castles north of the line of the Forth. Forfar, ~~Elgin~~ Aboyne,

1. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 1101.
2. Ibid., no. 1722.
3. The History of the King's Works, i. 418-19.
4. Sandale's account book, E. 101/13/16, f. 15v.

Aberdeen, Dundee and Panmure were all in English hands.[1] The one castle further south that was newly acquired at the end of the reign was ~~Cowenegh~~ Cumnock, which lay between Lanark and Ayr, and was borrowed from earl Patrick of Dunbar through the offices of Walter Langton.[2]

Not all the castles held by the English in Scotland were in royal hands. As a rule, Edward only kept castles that were possessions of the Scots crown ; his [redacted] contest. That of Caerlaverock had been granted two years before its capture in 1300 to Robert Clifford.[3] The castle, which almost certainly stood on the same site and followed the same plan as the present magnificent fifteenth century building, was in 1307 in the hands of the Scot John Maxwell, a supporter of the English, in the ownership of whose family the castle remained until recently.[4] That most splendid of all thirteenth-century Scotch castles, Bothwell, with its fine donjon closely modelled on that of Coucy, was captured by Edward I in 1301, after a siege of over a month. Entry was finally effected by means of an engine called Le Berefroi, a moveable wooden tower which was taken up to the walls of the castle on a specially prepared road, with a bridge over the moat. Carpenters had worked on the huge machine for almost two months, and it took thirty carts to bring it on the two day journey from Glasgow.[5] Before its capture,

1. Ibid., ff. 13-15.
2. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, nos. 1931, 1933; iv, no. 1829.
3. Bodleian Library MSS., Dodsworth 70, f. 64.
4. Royal Commission on Ancient and Historical Monuments and Constructions of Scotland, 7th. report, County of Dumfries (1920), pp. 10-24; B.H. St. J. O'Neil, Caerlaverock Castle, Dumfriesshire, Official Guide (1952).
5. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 39v, 115; Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., iv.451-52.

the castle was granted to Aymer de Valence,[1] and during the rest of the reign he provided its garrison. Over the winter of 1301-02 he was assisted by the crown, which paid the wages of eighteen men-at-arms in the castle,[2] but thereafter he maintained castle and garrison out of his own resources. The earl of Lincoln was another ~~recipient of a grant of a castle before it had been taken from the Scotch~~ who maintained a castle similarly. Edward I's intention in 1301 was to move on from the siege of Bothwell to take Inverkip, on the southern shore of the Firth of Clyde. Lincoln was with the army of the Prince of Wales, which never got as far north as that, while the siege of Bothwell lasted too long, and Edward had to retire into winter quarters before he could invest Inverkip.[3] But by 1304 the castle was Lincoln's, with Robert Leyburn as constable and warden of the earl's lands in Scotland.[4] There is no evidence that royal troops participated in the siege, nor any that they contributed to the garrisoning of the castle.

Besides the castles in royal hands, and those in the possession of important English magnates, there were of course some left in the charge of Edward I's Scotch allies. The castle of Dunbar was in the hands of the trustworthy earl Patrick. It had only presented a barrier to the English in 1296 as result of the treachery of the

1. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1214.
2. Ibid., no. 1266.
3. Ibid., nos. 1224, 1235.
4. Ibid., no. 1519.

earl's wife, who put the castle into the hands of Balliol's men, emphatically against the wishes of her husband.[1] Tibbers castle, in Dumfriesshire, was built by Richard Siward in 1298, and was held by him until the revolt of Bruce who captured it in 1306. In 1300 the garrison, or at least part of it, was in royal pay, but it was not until the recapture of the castle at the very end of the reign that the crown took full responsibility for it.[2] The Border fortress of Hermitage, ~~which had been in the possession of John Wake in the early 1290's,~~ was put in the charge of Simon Lindsay, along with the castle of Liddel. The only record of a payment to Lindsay is one of £20 in 1300, out of which he was to strengthen the fortifications.[3] North of the line of the Forth Edward was forced to depend to a much greater extent on the services of the Scotch who supported him. After the settlement of 1304 such castles as Urquhart, Tarradale, Aboyne and Kildrummy, essential for the control of the north, were left in the hands of men of dubious loyalty such as the earl of Atholl, John Comyn and Robert Bruce.

Although Edward undertook no elaborate building programme in Scotland on the Welsh scale, most of the works being merely of earth and timber, not stone, the English did hold a considerable number

1. Chron. Guisborough, p. 277.
2. Royal Commission on Ancient and Historical Monuments and Constructions of Scotland, 7th. report, County of Dumfries (1920), p. 65;
3. Ibid, 14th report, Roxburghshire (1956), i. 82. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. nos. 1165, ~~1166~~ 1173.

of castles. They needed to be manned and victualled, and a considerable effort went toward their maintainance. The garrisons were very large at times. In October 1298 the king and council ordered that there should be a permanent force of sixty men-at-arms and 1,000 foot at Berwick.[1] This level was not achieved, but accounts show that the ordinance was not grossly over-optimistic, since in June 1298 the town and castle had contained four knights, thirty-six men-at-arms, 204 crossbowmen and 780 archers, and this level was more or less maintained over the next year.[2] An order for Roxburgh made in October 1298 specified a garrison of eighteen men-at-arms, each with two grooms, twenty crossbowmen, ninety-two archers, with in addition five workmen. Jedburgh was to have twelve men-at-arms again each with two grooms, forty crossbowmen and twenty archers. The castle was clearly not in such good repair as Roxburgh, as there were to be seventeen workmen. Dumfries held a total number of seventy-six men in the same period.[3]

Garrisons fluctuated considerably in strength, and it is impossible, without undue detail, to give more than an impression of the numbers of Edward I's soldiers employed in this way. Berwick never again had so large a garrison as that ordained in 1298. In the winter of 1300-01

1. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1022.
2. Accounts of Berwick garrison, E. 101/7/8.
3. Memoranda of castle garrisons and victualling, E. 101/7/10.

it contained sixty crossbowmen and 160 archers, but in the summer the strength was increased to four knights, twenty men-at-arms, 100 crossbowmen and 398 archers.[1] In December 1303 there were sixty crossbowmen in the town, and in the castle four knights, eight crossbowmen and the same number of archers.[2] In 1300 Edinburgh had a very substantial garrison, totalling 325 men, of whom no less than sixty-four were cavalrymen. Dirleton, a stronghold of minor importance in comparison, was guarded by twenty men-at-arms and fifty footsoldiers.[3] In the winter of 1301-02 a very large number of men were employed on garrison duty. A total number of 508 cavalrymen were assigned to the various castles held by the crown. An intriguing experiment was made by demanding military service from those English magnates who had been granted lands in Scotland, and 113 men were to be provided for the garrisons in this way, but thirty-two of them failed to turn up. Unfortunately, the documents do not give full details of the number of infantrymen deployed in the castles that winter, but it must have been a considerable force.[4] Ordinances made two years later by Walter Langton for Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Edinburgh were much less lavish, providing only for thirty-four cavalrymen and 131 footsoldiers in the four places.[5] This is a striking contrast with the situation in the summer of 1301, when

1. Account of wages paid by John Weston, E. 101/9/9.
2. Ordinances for garrisons made by Langton, E. 101/12/10.
3. Victualling memorandum, E. 101/531/7.
4. Garrisoning memoranda, E. 101/10/5, 10.
5. E. 101/12/10.

the garrison of Roxburgh alone was composed of forty cavalry, thirty crossbowmen and seventy archers, with four workmen.[1] A list of garrisons made a little later, in May 1304, shows surprisingly large forces in Linlithgow and Kirkintilloch, with thirty-eight cavalry, the same number of archers and sixty crossbowmen in the two castles. Roxburgh, Jedburgh, and Edinburgh only mustered thirty-two cavalry, forty crossbowmen and nineteen archers between them.[2] Not so much information is available for the castles of the south-west, Dumfries and Lochmaben, but in the winter of 1301-2 there were twenty cavalry and 100 foot, of whom forty had crossbows, in the garrisons,[3] and later in 1304 the garrisons comprised seventy-three cavalry, twenty-four crossbowmen and eighty archers.[4]

At the end of the reign the crown had to find garrisons for more castles than before. Large forces were not installed in the newly acquired castles in the north. John Weston had only six cavalrymen, ten crossbowmen and five archers under him in Forfar. Aberdeen had a reasonably substantial troop of twenty-four cavalry, but it was the town of Perth that had the largest garrison north of the Forth, with roughly thirty horse and a fluctuating number of infantry, at times over a hundred strong. The castles further south held garrisons of much the same size as during the previous years. Jedburgh during

1. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 60.
2. Garrisoning memorandum, E. 101/12/20.
3. Garrisoning memoranda, E. 101/9/16.
4. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 8835, f. 37d.

the early months of 1306 held twelve heavy cavalry, eleven hobelars and twelve archers, while Roxburgh had twenty-six cavalry, fourteen crossbowmen and twenty-one archers. Stirling, surprisingly for a place of such obvious strategic importance, only held fourteen heavy cavalry, three hobelars, seventeen crossbowmen and twelve archers. The scale of the investment of English manpower in castle garrisons at this time is indicated by the fact that in July 1306, a reasonably typical month, there were some 200 cavalry, twenty-two hobelars, 180 crossbowmen and 429 archers in royal pay serving in garrisons, a very substantial force, considerably more than had been similarly employed earlier in the reign.[1]

Just how the castle garrisons were recruited is not clear, but it is apparent that they differed considerably from the huge field armies in character, in that they were composed of regular soldiers, who stayed on duty for long periods. Desertion was no problem with these men, whose conditions of service inside fortifications were of course much more congenial than those in the field. The constables of the castles were as professional as the men they commanded. Many were household knights. John Kingston, who was admitted to the household in 1297,[2] was constable of Edinburgh from 1298 until the end of the reign, save for a short period in 1303 when his subordinate

1. Sandale's account, E. 101/13/15, ff. 11-15; final Wardrobe account, E. 101/369/11, f. 89.
2. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 60.

in the garrison, Eble dou Mont, also a household knight, took over.[1] Kingston was a veteran of the Welsh wars, and had served in 1277 and in 1282, so his military career spanned some thirty years. It was on men like him that the success of Edward's Scotch enterprise rested to a considerable extent. Long residence in Edinburgh provided him with the experience and expertise that men who only came north for the summer campaigns lacked. Kingston was sufficiently important to be appointed along with John Sandale and two Scotchmen as a temporary keeper of Scotland in 1305 until the arrival of John of Brittany the king's lieutenant.[2] His career did not last long after the death of the king he had served so faithfully: the last mention of him in the records is in 1308, when he was still active in Scotland.[3] William de Felton entered the household earlier than Kingston, for he was a squire in 1285.[4] He was employed as constable of Beaumaris,[5] and was then transferred to Linlithgow, where he

1. Stevenson, Documents, ii, no. 546; Sandale's account, E. 101/13/16, f. 13; E. 101/12/10.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 205, 211, 213, 232, 242; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-7, p. 415.
3. Parl. Writs, II. i. 372, 375. The reference to him , ibid. p. 56, terming him a sheriff, and dated 1311, is probably a mistake for his brother Nicholas, sheriff for Gloucestershire in that year (Public Record Office, Lists and Indexes, ix. 49). For a discussion of the Kingston family see K.B. McFarlane, 'An Indenture of Agreement between two English Knights for Mutual Aid and Counsel in Peace and War, 5 December 1298', Bull. Inst. Hist. Res., xxxviii (1965), 200-210.
4. Account of household robes, E. 101/531/17.
5. Liber Quotidianus, p. 137.

remained in command until 1305.[1] Other constables who were at one time in their careers household knights included John de la Doline in Dumfries,[2] Walter Huntercombe who preceded Kingston in Edinburgh,[3] William Latimer who held Berwick for a time,[4] Gilbert Peccha in Aberdeen at the end of the reign,[5] and William Francis in Kirkintilloch, very probably the father of the man whose youthful experience in climbing out of Edinburgh castle in search of amorous adventure served him in good stead when he led the assault of Bruce's troops on the castle in 1314.[6]

But there were important constables of castles who had no close connections with the household. The most notable were the Hastang brothers, who commanded the adjacent castles of Roxburgh and Jedburgh respectively. Both men held office continually from 1299 until they were replaced in 1305.[7] Robert's services to Edward I in Scotland did not end there, for in April 1306 the government made use of his military expertise by employing him as marshal of the fortifications of Berwick.[8] In the same year he received a grant of

1. He is first mentioned as constable in 1299, Stevenson, Documents, ii, no. 582, and last in 1305, ibid, ii. no. 652.
2. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 7965, f. 60; Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot ii, no. 1154.
3. Book of prests for 1301, E. 101/359/6, f. 8v; Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot. ii, no. 853.
4. Garrisoning memoranda, E. 101/13/34/18.
5. Liber Quotidianus, p. 189; Sandale's account, E. 101/13/16, f. 13v.
6. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 53; garrisoning memoranda, E. 101/11/11, 12/20; Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 278.
7. Garrisoning memorandum, E. 101/7/10; Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 1707. The fact that they were brothers is shown by Ancient Correspondence, S.C.1/18/86, and by a book of prests for 1304, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 35,293, f. 53.
8. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 1760.

lands in Cowton, Yorkshire, in recognition of his good services,[1] and when he requested the lands of Thomas Randolf and some other of the king's enemies, the following additonal clause was added to the conventional reply, serving to demonstrate further the value Edward placed on his services:'et sachez qe endroit de vostre demande ou en autre chose, feroms nos voluntes per vous par ce qe vous l'avez bien deserviz ore et autre foiz.'[2] Neither Mestang brother played a significant rôle in the service of Edward II: as in many other cases, the new monarch was either unable, or did not wish, to retain the loyalty of his father's most useful supporters.

For the most part the Scotch allies of Edward I, men such as Richard Siward in Tibbers, or John de Vaux, who took over Dirleton from Robert de Maulay in 1300,[3] and who went over to the enemy in 1306,[4] were not paid wages by the English. There were some exceptions: Alexander de Livingstone, the sheriff of Linlithgow, was one,[5] and Alexander de Abernethy, who was perhaps more an inveterate opponent of Robert Bruce than an ally of Edward I,[6] requested some allowance for the expense he had gone to in maintaining a force of sixty men-at-arms and a suitable number of infantry between Michaelmas 1303 and September 1305.[7] Edward was suspicious

1. G.E.C., The Complete Peerage, vi.
2. Palgrave, Documents, p. 304.
3. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii.no.1164.
4. Palgrave, Documents, p. 356.
5. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. nos. 1286, 1321.
6. He had been on the Scotch side in 1301, Stevenson, Documents, ii, no. 611.
7. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1694.

of Alexander Balliol of Cavers, the constable of Selkirk, when the castle, on which £1,372. 13s. 10d. had been spent in the previous year, was captured by the Scotch in 1303. All Balliol's lands were seized by the crown, and it was only when he swore to serve the king faithfully, and gave up his son as a hostage, that they were restored to him. He was not re-employed as a constable.[1]

The activities of the constables and their garrisons were not simply confined to holding their castles against the attacks of the Scotch. This was of course important. In 1299 the military efforts of the Scotch were absorbed by the sieges of Bothwell and Stirling, the latter holding out for a year and nine weeks before it eventually yielded.[2] Linlithgow successfully withstood a siege early in 1303,[3] and in 1301 Turnberry and Ayr held out, even though the constable of Ayr thought that the enemy could not be withstood.[4] Lochmaban was unsuccessfully attacked by the Scotch in the same year.[5] But the main rôle of the castles was to provide the bases essential for the harassing raids into enemy country that formed an important part of English strategy. One such chevauchée was organised in November 1298. Careful enquiries were to be made by the English

1. The History of the King's Works, i. 415; Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot, ii, nos. 1344, 1349.
2. Ibid, ii, no. 1867.
3. The History of the King's Works, i. 415.
4. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1236.
5. Stevenson, Documents, ii, no. 612.

spies as to the whereabouts of the Scotch. Baggage horses, up to 300 in number, were to be provided by the sheriff of Northumberland, while the cavalry was largely drawn from the castles. Roxburgh was asked for forty, Berwick and Edinburgh thirty each, Jedburgh and Selkirk ten each. Simon Fraser was to produce twenty men, Walter Huntercombe thrity, and the earl of Dunbar ten. A request was to be made to the garrison of Norham for twenty cavalrymen, making a total of 200. The foray was to be commanded by John Kingston, and was to set out from his castle of Edinburgh towards Stirling.[1] In 1301 John de St. John was ordered to have a force of 120 men-at-arms constantly arrayed to make forays from the castles of Lochmaban and Dumfries during the winter.[2] A much smaller chevauchée was made by Kingston in the same year, with only twenty-five cavalry, lasting ten days.[3] It must have been on such a foray from his castle of Roxburgh that Robert Hastang and one of his knights had their horses captured by the Scotch in December, 1301.[4] Often men who were not castle constables were appointed to take charge of raiding parties: in 1302 William Latimer was based on Roxburgh, and John Segrave in Berwick with substantial retinues for this purpose.[5]

The castles held by the English were used as centres of administratio

1. Garrisoning memoranda, E. 101/7/10; Stevenson, Documents, ii, no. 545
2. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 1257.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 62.
4. Ibid, f. 60.
5. Garrisoning memorandum, E. 101/10/5.

as well as for military purposes. Most of the constables were also sheriffs of the areas under their command. But the receipts that the English were able to extract from the lands under their control were so meagre as to do little to offset the cost of maintaining the garrisons. An account of John Kingston's for 1300 shows that only £114. 4s. 1d. came in from estates in Scotland.[1] A slightly later account has a total of £101. 17s. 0d. The farm of Edinburgh was only £4. 3s. 0d. a year, and that of the lands of the abbeys of Dunfermline and Musselburgh a mere £10.[2] In 1304 James Dalilegh and John de Weston were appointed to make extents of all royal lands in Scotland, and their account lists receipts of only £1,393. 16s. 7½d. from them.[3] Their military preoccupations can have left the constables of the castles little time to devote to administration, and for much of the period they were hampered by the existence of rival sheriffs, appointed by the Scotch.

The contract system of raising troops was widely used in organising the castle garrisons. The constables would reach agreement with the royal officials by which they would remain at their posts with a given number of men in return for a lump sum, rather than receive daily wages. For example, on 18 October 1297 an indenture

1. E. 101/9/3.
2. E. 101/9/2.
3. E. 101/331/13.

was drawn up with Robert Hastang for the custody of Roxburgh, in the presence of Robert FitzWalter, Hugh le Despencer, Walter Beauchamp the steward, and John Droxford the keeper of the Wardrobe. For a force of eighteen men-at-arms, twenty crossbowmen and ninety-two archers, along with the usual non-combatants, Hastang was to receive £130 for the period up to Whitsun.[1] Since the daily wage bill of this garrison would have worked out at roughly £1. 15s., the crown was effecting a considerable saving by the arrangement. There are very many other examples of such contracts,[2] and the crown invariably did better out of such bargains than if daily wages had been paid in the conventional way. It was normal for the English constables to be rather better treated in their contracts than the Scotch. For example, John de Kingeton contracted to keep Edinburgh castle with a force of ten men-at-arms from the beginning of September 1302 until Christmas for £40. Archibald Livingstone consented to remain in Linlithgow as constable for exactly the same period with a force of similar strength, yet he received only £30.[3] Often, the contract system was only used to supply the cavalry forces for the garrisons, the infantry being paid on a daily wage system, while there were periods, especially in the summer, when the whole garrison would be paid wages.

1. Garrisoning memoranda, E. 101/7/10.
2. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, nos. 1170-74, 1286, 1287, 1321; E. 101/13/34/25, 9/15, 9/16, 7/10, 10/15, 369/11, f. 90.
3. E. 369/11, f. 90.

The whole English policy of relying on castles as the means to conquer and hold Scotland has recently been questioned by H.G. Richardson, who wrote of Edward I, 'Both his lack of money and the help castles would have given him may well be doubted. What he lacked was military ability. However good a tactician he may have been, he was a pitiable strategist.'[1] Edward's strategy was certainly not very sophisticated, but it was based on sound principles. He aimed at establishing a firm control of the Lowlands before embarking on the conquest of the north of Scotland, and he took over the best situated of the existing castles in the country. The experience of the Scotch revival after the success of 1296 had shown that it was essential that there be an adequate occupation force left in the country, and it was only possible to do this by using castles as a base. To say, as Richardson does, that the decay of castles in England during the later middle ages indicates their fundamental uselessness is to compare conditions of peace with the occupation of a half conquered country. It was not necessary for the English monarchy to maintain garrisons in castles in England, but it was vital that they did so in Scotland. The danger that these castles presented to the cause of Scotch independance was well appreciated by Robert Bruce. All the castles that he took in the Lowlands were at once destroyed, since they might, if left in a defensible state,

1. H.G. Richardson, reviewing The History of the King's Works, Eng. Hist. Rev., lxxx (1965), 553-56.

provide the English with valuable bases should a reconquest be attempted. Edward's lack of money in the last years of the reign had meant that he had been able to do little to reinforce the fortifications of the castles he held in Scotland: had James of St. George been able to do the same in Scotland as in Wales, the achievement of Edward in Scotland might well have been a lasting conquest. What military success he did achieve owed much to the castles and their garrisons. The money spent on them yielded much better results than did the sums spent on the huge armies of the summer campaigns.

V

PAY AND VICTUALLING

It required very considerable administrative efforts to keep the armies in Wales, Gascony, Flanders and Scotland well supplied with food and regularly paid. The way in which the Wardrobe expanded to meet these demands of war has been pointed out by Tout. It was through this office that the Welsh wars were organised, and the system was continued in most of the later campaigns of the reign, with paymasters and victuallers acting under the direction of the Wardrobe officials. The bureaucratic system and the details of the methods of accounting have been ably described, but more with the intention of explaining administrative practice than of examining the way in which the troops were actually paid and fed.[1]

No great administrative problems were posed by the payment of armies when the Wardrobe and its staff were actually present on campaign, as in Flanders and the main expeditions in Scotland. The official with the main responsibility for making payments was the Clerk, and he or his clerks would make payments at intervals of a week or more to the infantry constables, for distribution to their

1. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 131-45; C. Johnson, 'The System of Account in the Wardrobe of Edward I', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 4th ser., vi (1923), 50-72; J.H. Johnson, 'The System of Account in the Wardrobe of Edward II', ibid, xii (1929), 75-104; Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. ix-xxvi.

men, at the rate of 4d. a day for each vintenar, the man in charge of a body of twenty men, and 2d. a day for every ordinary foot-soldier. When money was short, payment might well take place some time after the period of service to which it related. So, on 21 March 1304 at St. Andrews wages were paid to the infantry for the period from 9 September until 23 September 1303. Payment for the next period, up to 20 October 1303, was made on 24 April 1304.[1] Sometimes wages would be paid in kind, in the form of food, in which case responsibility for payment would devolve on a victualling officer. Issues of food in lieu of wages were made by Richard de Bromsgrove, receiver of victuals at Berwick, in June and August 1304.[2]

The cavalry were paid their wages on a rather different system. The leader of each contingent was naturally responsible for the distribution of pay to his men, at the standard rates. A banneret received 4s. a day, a knight 2s. and squires and serjeants 1s. Whereas the royal paymasters issued wages to the infantry at regular intervals, accounts with the cavalry were only drawn up at or after the end of their period of service with the army. But the men were not expected to finance themselves until account was made with the Wardrobe officials, for advances of money, known as prests, could be made to them, which were subtracted from the

1. Accounts of infantry wages, E. 101/11/15/17, 18.
2. Accounts of infantry wages, E. 101/11/15/1,2.

total amount due to them as wages in the final reckoning. Any other sums owing, notably payments in recompense for horses lost on campaign, were also included in the account. In 1300 most of the cavalry made their accounts with the Wardrobe in September or October. Several were settled at the Lincoln parliament in 1301, but it was not until March 1304 that Roger de la Mare made his account.[1] A document made up in the autumn of 1300 recording the amounts found to be owing to the cavalry and the sums that had actually been paid over shows that there was expenditure of roughly £8,200 incurred on wages and on restoration of horses. About £3,600 had not been paid off by the winter of 1300. Of the sums paid out, most were in cash, but virtually every man had at some time been issued with victuals, which were counted as part of his wages.

The system is perhaps best illustrated by a specific example. John Botetourt served in the campaign with a troop varying in number from six to eight. His knight Robert Bovent made account with the Wardrobe at Holm on 12 September for the period from 4 July. Wages due to Botetourt totalled £61. 14s. 0d. Offsetting this was a letter assigning him £30 of the farm of St. Briavel, and he had been issued with two tuns of wine, half a tun of flour, and forty-six quarters of oats, worth £13. 4s. 8d. He was therefore still owed £18. 9s. 4d.,

1. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 195-210.

which was carried over to the next account Botetourt made. This was for wages up to 3 November, which totalled £26. In addition, he claimed £134. 13s. 4d. for loss of horses on the Falkirk campaign, and £30. 5s. 1d. for arrears of the fees he was owed as a banneret of the household. Against these debts were set prests he had received of £98, which made the total sum owed to him £111. 7s. 9d., for which he received a Wardrobe bill, or acknowlegement of the debt, which he could try to exchange for cash with any receiver of crown revenue, such as a sheriff.[1]

Naturally, there were many occasions when it was not possible for the Wardrobe to be present to make payments to the troops directly, and special paymasters had to be appointed. In Wales in 1294-5 the English troops were split up into several different armies. The Wardrobe remained with the King, while John Sandale paid out wages to Warwick's army. Roger de l'Isle paid some troops at Chester, as did Hugh de Cressingham. Valence's army in the south was allocated Nicholas de Okham as paymaster, and Hugh de Leominster performed the same function for the earl of Lincoln at Rhuddlan.[2] These paymasters were not ordinary Wardrobe clerks, detached from headquarters to meet the needs of the campaign. Roger de l'Isle

1. Cavalry pay roll, E. 101/7/11.
2. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. 57-60.

was keeper of the Great Wardrobe,[1] and Sandale probably a subordinate of his.[2] Cressingham, fat and unpopular, was a royal justice and had been steward of the queen's lands.[3] Nicholas de Ockham was a treasurer's clerk, an exchequer official whose main responsibility was the writing of tallies.[4] Hugh de Leominster's position in the royal bureaucracy is not clear, but he certainly was not a Wardrobe clerk. After the end of the Welsh war he was appointed chamberlain of North Wales, where he already had connections, for he had been appointed to the church of Caernarvon.[5] Some of the money paid out by these men as wages was sent to them direct from the Exchequer, but most was distributed to them from Chester, where Richard of Bromsgrove was acting as a central paymaster.[6] All of these men were responsible to the Exchequer, and their accounts incorporated in the general account for the department.

The rôle of the Wardrobe in the financing of Edward I's wars was nevertheless not quite so all-embracing as Tout thought. Obviously, the war in Gascony required the appointment of special paymasters, who, because of the problems of communication, were acting

1. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, iv. 392 n. 3, 394 n. 2.
2. The Registers of John de Sandale and Rigaud de Asserio, Bishops of Winchester, 1316-23, ed. F.J. Baigent (Hants. Record Soc. 1897), p. xx.
3. Chron. Guisborough, pp. 294, 303; Tout, op. cit., v. 238-9.
4. T. Madox, The History and Antiquities of the Exchequer (2nd. edn, 1769), i. 270 n. b, ii. 304-05.
5. Tout, op. cit., vi. 61; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1281-92, p. 190.
6. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. 226-7, 1-3, 5, 9-11, 19-21, 59, 61, 79, 120.

in virtual isolation. Peter de Aylesford was appointed in 1294, with Thomas of Cambridge as his controller. Instructions were given that they were not to make any payments without the advice of the veteran of the Welsh wars, Robert Tiptoft.[1] With Edmund of Lancaster in 1296 sailed John Sandale. Having proved his administrative ability in Wales, Sandale took the place of Aylesford who had died, with Cambridge remaining controller.[2] Subsidiary paymasters were needed to pay the men in the garrisons of Bourg and Blaye. Initially, Humphrey de Clare was employed on this task,[3] but in 1297 Nicholas Baret with John of Gloucester as his controller was assigned to the garrisons.[4] Up to the effective end of hostilities in 1297, these clerks in Gascony had received a total of almost £8,800 from the Wardrobe, a small sum in comparison with the £120,000 issued to them in lump sums by the Exchequer.[5] Sandale and Cambridge accounted directly with the Exchequer for the money they spent, and no supervision was exercised by the staff of the Wardrobe. Only Sandale of all the clerks involved in financing the war in Gascony appears to have had any form of Wardrobe training.

1. Rôles Gascons, iii. ed. Bémont, no. 2938.
2. Ibid., no. 4374.
3. Letter patent of Edmund of Lancaster, E. 101/6/2/3.
4. Rôles Gascons, iii, ed. Bémont, no. 4375.
5. See infra, p. 268.

The successful campaign in Scotland in 1296 was financed and organised by the Wardrobe, but on its completion a separate administration was set up in that country. Earl Warenne was made royal lieutenant, Hugh Cressingham treasurer, and Walter of Amersham, a chancery clerk of considerable seniority and much judicial experience, chancellor.[1] These men were appointed to rule a conquered land, but Edward I had miscalculated, for Scotland was far from conquered, and the resources that his officials there could muster were soon proved inadequate. Cressingham had some initial success in raising money in Scotland, for late in May 1297 £5,188. 6s. 8d. was sent south to the English Exchequer, to be paid as a subsidy to the Count of Bar.[2] But by June it had become clear that the money could have been better spent in Scotland. A liberate writ authorising £2,000 to be sent to Cressingham was made out on 10 June,[3] and on 25 June the money was sent north.[4] As a result of the activity of Wallace and his supporters, the English were rapidly losing control of Scotland. Cressingham considered that only the shires of Roxburgh and Berwick were under proper control. Elsewhere, the Scotch were setting up their own rival administration.[5] On 12 July arrangements were made to strengthen the English position. Ralph FitzWilliam, Robert Clifford and Brian FitzAlan were given command of the border counties. The

1. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 106; Amersham was a king's clerk as early as 1279, Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1277-81, p. 321.
2. Jornalia Roll, E. 405/1/11, 1 June.
3. Stevenson, Documents, ii, no. ccccxxiii.
4. Jornalia Roll, E. 405/1/11, 25 June.
5. Stevenson, Documents, ii, no. ccccly.

responsibility of financing the forces operating from Northumberland was given to Walter of Amersham, with Robert Heron as his controller. In Cumberland, equivalent positions were gven to Richard of Abingdon and Robert de Barton.[1] Abingdon was a king's clerk, who had earlier been employed as Chamberlain of Wales. Like the other men appointed on 12 July, he had no connection with the Wardrobe, but was probably employed in the Exchequer. In 1299 he was to be appointed a baron of that department.[2]

Much has been made of the appointment of these paymasters, who were also termed receivers of revenue, by Professor A.Z. Freeman, who sees in the measure an important stage in the development of military administration, an advance on the ad hoc methods previously used. He considers that 'the Wardrobe expanded and split to accomodate the expanded nature of warfare in Scotland.'[3] In fact, the situation was quite different. The Wardrobe, the department normally used to organise and pay armies, was fully occupied in 1297 with the preparations for the campaign in Flanders. The administration that had been set up in Scotland was proving incapable of dealing with the situation, so as a purely temporary expedient, military commands with appropriate pay departments were set up on the borders. Amersham and Abingdon had no connection with the Wardrobe, although the latter did eventually

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 315; Stevenson, Documents, ii. no. ccccxlviii.
2. A.B. Emden, A Biographical Dictionary of Members of the University of Oxford from A.D. 1176 to 1500, i (1957), 4-5.
3. A.Z. Freeman, 'The King's Penny: the Headquarters Paymasters under Edward I, 1295-1307', Journal of British Studies, vi (1966), 19.

make his account with that department.[1] Amersham's account, in contrast, was made directly with the Exchequer, and enrolled on a roll of 'foreign accounts'.[2] The rôle played by these men in the war with Scotland was considerably greater than originally intended, for with the defeat at Stirling Bridge and the death of Cressingham in that battle, the English administration in Scotland completely collapsed. It was clear that a campaign was needed as soon as possible, to preserve what little was left of the English occupation forces, and with the Wardrobe in Flanders, the responsibility of paying the army its wages fell upon Amersham. As there was little military activity in the west, Abingdon's duties were less onerous. Both men received their money locally, from sheriffs and tax collectors: the Exchequer had none to spare. £10,828. 19s. 9d. was raised by Amersham,[3] whereas Abingdon in contrast only received £909. 3s. 8d. The latter does not appear to have made any payments until 17 December 1297:[4] in October the bishop of Carlisle had made at least one payment to Henry Percy for the defense of Carlisle, out of some royal funds in his keeping.[5] At its peak, the army paid by Amersham at the beginning of 1298 numbered 18,500 men, an immensely impressive number for a winter campaign. But, despite this fine administrative achievement, little

1. Abingdon's account, E. 101/6/30.
2. Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 265-68. E. 101/7/8 is Amersham's original account, and E. 101/6/35 his controller's book.
3. Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 266-67.
4. Abingdon's account, E. 101/6/30.
5. Stevenson, Documents, ii., no. ccccixxvii.

was done. Warenne, the commander, arrived late and led the army no further than Roxburgh. He had clearly lost confidence after his defeat in the previous year. In the west Clifford only achieved a minor success with a raid into Annandale.[1]

The major attempt to avenge the defeat of Stirling bridge came later in 1298, with the Falkirk campaign. The king, his army and his officials had returned from Flanders, and the government was able to turn its full attention to the problem of Scotland. The Exchequer was moved from London to York, an act symbolising the new seriousness with which Edward I was regarding the conquest of Scotland.[2] There was now no need for the temporary administration that had been created in the previous year. It was this, and not the difficulty of keeping Amersham and Abingdon supplied with cash, as Freeman suggests,[3] that caused the abandonment of the system of local paymasters on the borders. Amersham retired from the scene, and Abingdon's rôle was changed from that of a receiver of money into that of a receiver of victuals. From 1298 until 1304 it was to be the Wardrobe and its officials who controlled the vast business of keeping the troops in Scotland paid and fed.

The main armies that were sent north presented no great administrative problems, for they could be paid by the Wardrobe officials in the way already described. Even in 1301, with two armies in

1. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 135.
2. Ibid., p. 139.
3. Freeman, 'The King's Penny: the Headquarters Paymasters under Edward I, 1295-1307', Journal of British Studies, vi (1966), 13.

Scotland, there was no need for the Wardrobe to divide its resources, for the prince's wardrobe, headed by Walter Reynolds, the keeper, was quite capable of taking on the task of paying the western army. Subsidiary paymasters did have to be employed to pay the troops on their way north from their counties to the main muster. The Wardrobe officials were too important to be used on this task, which was generally performed by chancery clerks.[1] In 1303, for example, six men, John of Derby, Henry de Craystock, Robert de Beaufoy, Hugo de Burgh, Robert de Barton and John de Poveray, were assigned the duty of paying the wages of the 10,000 men requested for the campaign on their way north. Strict instructions were given as to how long the various contingents should take to reach Roxburgh.[2] It was sometimes necessary to appoint clerks to take charge of paying the wages of detachments operating separately from the main armies. In 1303 Ralph Benton, who had been a clerk of John Kingston's,[3] was responsible for payments to the force led by Aymer de Valence.[4] In the same year, Alexander Bikenore, member of a family which provided Edward with two household knights,[5] paid the Irish contingents in the army.[6]

1. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 144, n. 2.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 570-71.
3. Book of Prects, 29 Edward I, E. 101/359/6, f. 6.
4. Infantry pay rolls, E. 101/11/15/21.
5. Thomas de Bikenore, admitted in 1297, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 60, last in receipt of fees in 1300, Liber Quotidianus, p. 194; John de Bikenore, first appearing in 1300, ibid., p. 190, last in 1306, E. 101/369/11, f. 107.
6. Book of Prects, 31 Edward I, E. 101/364/13, f. 5v.

Although the Wardrobe could cope with the administrative problems of making payments to the armies employed on the summer campaigns in Scotland with very little need to expand its personnel and create new paymasterships, it was necessary to set up a more permanent organisation to deal with the difficulties of supplying the garrison forces with money and food throughout the year. Permanent officials were needed at Berwick and Carlisle. In 1298 responsibility for paying the wages of the garrison in Berwick was given to John de Weston, a clerk who had not previously been in crown employment.[1] The wages of the other garrisons in central and eastern Scotland appear to have been paid by the castle constables, but Weston must have had a considerable part in forwarding cash to them, as in 1299 when he and Robert Heron, Amersham's former controller, sent £5 to Robert Maulay, constable of Dirleton, to pay for the provisioning of his castle.[2] By 1301 he was directly responsible for paying the wages of the men in Edinburgh, Roxburgh and Jedburgh, as well as Berwick.[3] In 1303 Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow were added to the list.[4] Weston was employed by the Wardrobe, and his accounts were incorporated in the account books drawn up under the direction of John Droxford, the Keeper, and his controller John Benstead. He therefore occupied a

1. His earliest account for Berwick starts in June 1298: E. 101/7/8.
2. Stevenson, Documents, ii. no. dlxxxv.
3. Weston's account for 1301, E. 101/9/9.
4. Weston's account for 1303, E. 101/11/1. He paid the same castles in the following year, as is shown by his next account, E. 101/12/18.

quite different place in the administrative hierarchy to that of Amersham earlier, with his sole responsibility to the Exchequer.

Though he accounted with the Wardrobe, Weston received hardly any funds directly from that department. His income was largely raised from the sheriffs of the northern counties, and from the revenues that the English managed to collect in Scotland. In 1298-99 receipts, all at this stage from English sources, came to £5,979. 16s. 10d. Payments only added up to £4,711. 11s. 6d., a very satisfactory balance.[1] By 1301 the situation was not quite so good, with receipts of £2,467. 0s. 2¼d. and outgoings of £2,804. 5s. 7½d. Over the past few years Weston had accumulated an adverse balance of £1,244. 7s. 4d.[2] By 1303 the situation was far more critical, with Weston incurring expenditure of £10,368. 3s.10d., and receipts, according to his account, only amounting to £590. 17s. 6¾d., all by now from lands in Scotland.[3] But his account does omit a payment made to him for the garrison of Berwick by Richard de Bromsgrove, receiver of victuals there, of £1,456. 14s. 7¼d.[4] In 1304 Weston's receipts were down to only £73. 15s. 1½d., but the charge on the account had also diminished, to £2,697. 10s. 6d.[5] This meant that Weston was unable to make the payments of wages that he was appointed to do. Something could be done by having the victualler at Berwick distribute supplies to

1. Account for wages of the Berwick garrison, E. 101/7/8.
2. Weston's account for 1301, E. 101/9/9, f. 1.
3. Weston's account for 1303, E. 101/11/1, f. 34 and back cover. His receipts from lands in Scotland from 1301-1304, totalling £1,134. 12s. 2d. are detailed in Stevenson, Documents, ii. no. dcix.
4. Bromsgrove's account for 1303, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 17360, f. 54.
5. Weston's account for 1304, E. 101/12/18, f. 9.

the men in lieu of wages, but for the most part all Weston could do in 1303 and 1304 was to give the soldiers bills, stating the amount that they were owed, which, if they were fortunate, they might succeed in exchanging for cash at some later date.[1] It is hardly surprising to find the garrisons of Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow presenting petitions in 1305 for the payment of arrears of their wages.[2]

John de Weston was the only man employed purely as a paymaster in Scotland between 1298 and 1304.[3] The English military investment in the south-west of the country was not large enough to warrant employing anyone in a similar position in Carlisle and Berwick were regarded as the 'capital' & headquarters of English held Scotland. In 1298 Richard of Abingdon had taken on the duties of a receiver of victuals in Carlisle in addition to acting as paymaster. The sums he had to handle were not so impressive as Weston's. In 1299 he paid out £1,121. 12s. 11d. in wages,[4] and in the next year £1,628. 2s. 11d.[5] In the middle of 1300 he was replaced by James de Dalilegh, whose origins are obscure ~~Nothing is known to judge by the name~~, although he appeared in 1295 in Surrey to be presented to a living.[6] £1,426. 16s. 11d. was paid out by Dalilegh in 1300,[7] a year of heavy expenditure with a royal campaign starting out from Carlisle.

1. One such file of bills, mostly for 1303, is in E. 101/9/4. The fact that they are in the Wardrobe archives shows that some at least were redeemed.
2. Memoranda de Parliamento, ed. F.W. Maitland, (1893), pp. 169-70.
3. A fact which makes A.C. Freeman's failure to discuss his role in 'The King's Penny: the Headquarters Paymasters under Edward I', Journal of British Studies, vi (1966), rather curious.
4. Abingdon's account for 1299, E. 101/7/20, f. 1v.
5. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 139-40.
6. Registrum Johannis de Pontissara, ed. C. Deedes, i (1915), 78.
7. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 140-42.

The fact that he was both paymaster and victualler made Dalilegh's task in Carlisle simpler than that of Weston in Berwick, for sales of victuals ensured an adequate supply of cash, even though very little came in from lands in Scotland: only £668. 4s. 2¾d. in 1303.[1] The following table shows how close he came to balancing his books.

	Receipts	Issues
1303	£2,605, 18s. 0¾d.	£3,127. 5s. 2d.
1304	£1,339. 17s. 10d.	£1,350. 2s. 1d.
1305	£ 189. 9s. 7½d.	£ 171. 15s. 1d.[2]

The main castles whose garrisons were paid from Carlisle were Lochmaban, Dumfries and Ayr, and with Bruce's revolt in 1306 their importance for the English revived. Unlike Weston, Dalilegh continued in office until the end of the reign, and although no full accounts of his activities survive, the Wardrobe book for 1306 shows that in that year he paid out wages of at least £1,054. 9s. 2d.[3]

With the fall of Stirling and the surrender of the major Scotch nobles in 1304 Edward was in a position to set up a puppet administration in Scotland as he had done in 1296. There was a considerable Scotch element in the government, but the real power

1. Dalilegh's account book, 1303-5, E. 101/11/19, f. 1v.
2. Ibid., ff. 6, 10v, 11v.
3. Wardrobe Account book, E. 101/369/11, f. 89.

was of course in English hands. John of Brittany, the king's nephew, was appointed lieutenant, and William of Bevercotes chancellor. Justices were nominated, and the financial administration put in the charge of John Sandale, made chamberlain of Scotland.[1] One of the ablest of the officials who served Edward in his later years, Sandale was a Yorkshireman like so many other clerks in the royal service.[2] After his experience as a paymaster in Wales and Gascony he was put in charge of the royal mints from 1298 until 1303. His success story did not end in 1307, for Edward II continued to favour him, and he ended his days as bishop of Winchester and Chancellor of England.[3] It was clearly intended that Sandale should finance the occupation of Scotland out of the revenues of that country, and be entirely independent of the English Exchequer and Wardrobe. He took over responsibility for paying the wages of the garrisons of all the royal castles, save for those in the south-west still paid and victualled by Dalilegh.

The revolt of Robert Bruce dashed all hopes that the English occupation of Scotland might pay for itself. In the last two years

1. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 190.
2. The way in which many members of the administration were recruited from one region has been pointed out at length by J.L. Grassi, 'The Clerical Dynasties from Howdenshire, Nottinghamshire and Lindsey in the Royal Administration' (Oxford Univ. D.Phil thesis). Others beside Sandale include William de Bevercotes, William Thorntoft, William Greenfield, Philip Willoughby, John Husthwayt, William Melton, Robert Woodhouse, Robert Cottingham, and John Swanland.
3. The Registers of John de Sandale and Rigaud de Asserio, Bishops of Winchester, 1316-23, ed. F.J. Baigent (Hants Record Soc., 1897), pp. xvii-xlvii.

of the reign of Edward I John Sandale continued to hold the office of chamberlain, but receipts from lands in Scotland were not forthcoming, and in practice he became no more than the most important of the English paymasters. Besides being responsible for most of the garrisons, he paid the troops serving under Aymer de Valence. Effectively, he formed part of the Wardrobe organisation, for most of his supplies were forwarded by Droxford and his officials. But Sandale's accounts were never incorporated into the main Wardrobe account books, and he did get some funds from other sources, as £349. 3s. 1½d. from the Italian banking firm of the Bellardi, out of the receipts of the customs that they had been granted.[1] Dalilegh in the south-west was the second most important of the paymasters operating at the end of the reign, being in charge of the castles of that region, and also responsible for making payments to Henry Percy.[2] William of Routh, paymaster to the troops under John de St. John, was active from May 1307,[3] and there were other minor paymasters whose names are not known, responsible for such forces as that headed by Adam de Swinton, issued with £118. 5s. 6½d. early in June 1307, and that going with the earl of Hereford to Moffat later in the same month, given £70.[4] The Wardrobe itself naturally paid the troops present in the royal household, while the

1. John Sandale's account, E. 101/13/16.
2. Payments to Dalilegh for wages to be paid by him are noted in the Wardrobe journal, E. 101/370/16, ff. 8v, 10, 11, 13, 15.
3. Routh's account, E. 101/531/11.
4. Wardrobe journal, E. 101/370/16, ff. 14v, 15v.

forces with the prince were paid their wages by his household officials.

The great difficulty facing all the paymasters was of course lack of funds. That this might have drastic effects was shown by an incident at the end of August 1301, when a sum of £200 arrived at Berwick for the payment of wages. This was both later and less than was expected. The garrison was already a month in arrears, and this sum was not paid to them complete, but was split between the forces in Roxburgh and Jedburgh in addition. The result was mutiny, mostly by the crossbowmen and archers, but the mutineers did have the support of a few men-at-arms, and even of a household knight, Walter de Teye. Claiming that the letters accompanying the money did not state that it was to be divided between the three garrisons, he seized £36 in place of his rightful £14. 10s., to pay to the discontented soldiers.[1] The outbreak of violence makes this incident exceptional, but delays in payment were common. In 1303 Alexander de Bikenore and Ralph Benton wrote that the Irish troops had received no pay for nine weeks, and were extremely discontented at hearing that funds had reached Berwick, and were not paid to them. There was a danger that they would start robbing those Scotch who were loyal to Edward, or that they would simply desert.[2] In 1297 two troops of infantry, one of eighty-five men and the other 132 strong, who had been serving in

1. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii., no. 1223.
2. E. 101/13/36/26.

Gascony, came to Edward to protest that they had not been paid the wages they were due. All that they were able to obtain from the king was sufficient funds to pay for their journey home.[1] It was not only the infantry who suffered from non-payment of wages: several leaders of cavalry troops, such as John de la Dolyne and Eble des Montz even thought it worth while to petition in parliament for the arrears owed them.[2]

Failure to pay wages was almost always the result of inadequate supplies of money, rather than of the incompetence of corruption of the paymasters. The evidence suggests that these men did their task extremely efficiently and conscientiously. All the surviving pay rolls show the numbers of troops fluctuating from week to week, which suggests that proper checks were made to ensure that pay was only issued in respect of men who were actually present on the campaign. In contrast, the accounts for Edward III's army in Scotland in 1334 show no drop in the size of the contingents over three months winter campaigning, which suggests that they must conceal considerable peculation.[3] In the sixteenth century, with responsibility for paying wages largely in the hands of the captains of contingents, corruption was virtually unchecked.[4] In 1294 one constable of troops from Shropshire received £4. 13s. from the Wardrobe to pay to his

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 52, 54.
2. Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 162, 192, 199; Memoranda de Parliamento, 1305, ed. Maitland, nos. 58, 270, 358.
3. R. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, the Formative Years of a Military Career, 1327-1335 (1965), p. 181.
4. C.G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, pp. 143-158.

men, and then deserted, taking the money with him.[1] In 1296 a case came up in the marshal's court concerning the misappropriation of infantry wages, but the sum was only £2. 10s., and the matter was easily cleared up.[2] Such incidents were rare, and with all the complaints about non-payment of wages, it is striking that corruption of officials was not alleged as a cause.

Wages were not simply intended as a reward for service in the army: they were also meant to provide the soldier with a means of supporting himself. In 1299 Robert Clifford asked for his men to be paid 3d. a day instead of the normal 2d., because of the high cost of food in the neighbourhood of Lochmaban,[3] which indicates the connection between wages and subsistence. Garrisons were often kept *ad victualia* rather than *ad vadia*, the cost to the crown being the same in either case. In theory, if soldiers were paid their wages in cash, the crown had no responsibility to see that they had enough to eat. This view was expressed in the *Articuli super Cartas*, in the section on compulsory purchase of supplies where it is stated 'E qe riens ne preignent pur ceus qe sont a gages'.[4] But in practice, if the wars were to be successful, the government had to ensure that the soldiers had enough to eat, whether the food was issued to them in lieu of

1. *Book of Prests*, ed. Fryde, p. 214, n. 3.
2. Army plea roll, E. 39/93/15, m. 3.
3. Bain, *Cal. Docs. Scot.*, ii. no. 1057.
4. *Statutes of the Realm*, i. 137.

wages, or whether they bought it with the money paid them.

The simplest way for an army to feed itself was off the land. This technique was used with success by the English in their chevaucheées during the Hundred Years War, and developed with great skill much later by the generals of the Thirty Years War. In his Welsh wars Edward I had taken advantage of the Anglesey grain fields to feed his troops. But the circumstances of the Gascon, Flemish and Scotch campaigns were not suited to such methods. In all three cases, Edward was anxious not to alienate the local population. In Gascony the English were fighting a defensive war on land which was rightly theirs, in Flanders Edward was campaigning in the country of his allies, and in Scotland he was careful not to stir up more opposition than already faced him. The letter from Bikenore and Benton in 1303 had stressed the need to pay the Irish their arrears for fear 'si ils ne robassent les gentz qe sount a la foi le Roy'.[1] It was only at the very end of the reign that the English, under the command of the prince of Wales, began to burn and pillage mercilessly. According to Rishanger, the king was furious when he heard of his son's activities.[2] He was careful to order Valence to 'honour the loyal and spare them',[3] an attitude which did not accord well with living off the land.

1. E. 101/13/36/26.
2. Chron. Rishanger, p. 230.
3. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, no. 1782.

It was of course impossible to prevent the ill-disciplined troops of the period from pillaging altogether. In 1296 Hugh Torold, bailiff of the earl marshal, drove off 119 sheep that belonged to Robert of Bamborough. Later in the same campaign Walter de Huntercombe was accused of seizing sixteen oxen and ten cows from a moor near Aberdeen.[1] At about the turn of the century the abbey of Sweetheart put the cost of the war damage it had suffered at over £5,000, and Drumdraynan abbey made an estimate of £8,000, but these are hardly figures to be taken literally.[2] In 1301 the bishop of Carlisle petitioned for a reduction in the farm of £10 a year that he paid for the parks and grazings of Carlisle castle, on the grounds that they had been eaten up and consumed by armies going to and returning from Scotland.[3] One leader of Welsh troops sought a pardon for himself as a protection against prosecution on the grounds that his countrymen committed so many murders, robberies and arsons on their way to the war.[4] It is clear that theft, though contrary to royal policy, must have provided the army with substantial rations.

The demands of the armies for food offered openings to private entrepreneurs, who were encouraged by the crown. It was customary to request merchants to come to the army camps with their goods. In 1301 a whole series of writs was issued with this intention: even

1. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 822.
2. Ibid., no. 1123.
3. Ibid., no. 1187.
4. Ibid., no. 1410.

merchants from Cornwall were asked to come north.[1] On occasion, the presence of merchants following the army saved a difficult situation. In 1298 when Edward arrived with his army at Stirling he found that his supplies both of food and of cash had run out. Victuals were therefore bought on credit from the merchants present there, payment at the Exchequer being promised them. Twenty-eight bills survive, mostly dated between August and September, showing that Edward bought just over £380 worth of food and drink. The total was probably still larger, as the file may not be complete. Payment was reasonably prompt, most of the merchants receiving their money within a year.[2] Similarly, when the army arrived in Aberdeen in 1303 there were no royal stores to be found, so Edward had to rely on 'chevisaunce de marchands, qui avoient leur biens menez a vendre en ayde de la sustenance des gents de nostre oust. Pur quoi nous e touz ceux qui nostre profit e nostre honeur ayment de nous bien veler qe les marchands de qui hom ad les choses prises a nostre oeps en tieu manere soient hastivement paez'.[3] It was only in emergency that the royal household had to turn to the merchants for food, but the crown did not attempt to guarantee regular supplies for the whole army, so that the infantry and the cavalry who were not in the household must have obtained much from these private victuallers. All that the crown had to do was th encourage the merchants to come,

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, pp. 487-490.
2. Exchequer warrants for issue, E. 404/1/2.
3. Receipt for flour worth £21, made out to John de Gore, 28 Aug. 1303, E. 101/371/21/96.

and to issue them with letters of protection.[1]

Another way in which the army was fed without reliance on the government was by the men bringing their own supplies. The last man obliged to do this by his feudal tenure appeared at the muster in 1277, carrying a side of bacon. Having eaten it, he departed from the campaign.[2] But even though no one later was forced by the vagaries of feudal tenure to bring food with him, many men must have done so. But more important than the supplies that the ordinary infantrymen brought with them were the arrangements that the magnates made to keep themselves and their men properly supplied. The indentures of service usually included the clause that keep was to be supplied. Unfortunately, owing to the dearth of private records, evidence is scanty on this subject. In 1300 Hugh de Courtenay complained that as his men were carrying supplies to him in Scotland they were assaulted by a gang in Berkshire.[3] In 1301 when the town of Poole was approached to provide ships for the crown the reply was that they only had two vessels, both of which had been taken by the earl of Lincoln to carry his victuals north to Scotland.[4] Two years later John Lovel of Titchmarsh was using a ship to have his supplies taken north. To his great annoyance it was arrested and held for eleven days in Scarborough.[5] The earl of Warwick sent supplies

1. As in Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1145; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 352, 521, 605.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 208.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 553.
4. File concerning shipping, E. 101/9/7/2.
5. Exchequer Plea Roll, E. 13/26, m. 28.

across to Flanders in 1297, even though he himself did not go on the campaign. They were presumably intended for members of his family and retinue who did.[1] Even royal officials brought their own supplies on campaign. Henry de Bluntesdon, the king's almoner, took eighty-eight cheeses from God's House, Southampton, where he was warden, when he went to Flanders in 1297.[2] On one occasion Ralph Manton wrote to the sheriff of Lincoln asking him have his own grain from Badington sent north with the royal supplies.[3] John Droxford once sent a servant of his south to York to buy over 70,000 herrings.[4] Such evidence is sufficient to suggest that magnates and others went to considerable trouble to ensure that they had adequate supplies of victuals.

But reliance on local supplies, the activities of private merchants, and the initiative of the magnates and others in providing their own victuals was hardly sufficient to meet the demands of Edward I's armies for food. The government had to take action itself to ensure adequate supplies. Machinery had to be set up to enable compulsory purchases to be made with the minimum of difficulty, at prices which were not inflated by the abnormal demands of war. Stores had to be set up in the main campaign centres, and clerks appointed to supervise them. The task was a considerable one, and of all the administrative problems which were involved in putting an army into the field, this is the one that bulks largest in contemporary records.

1. Indentures of goods taken to Flanders, E. 101/6/18/27.
2. Hist. MSS Comm, 6th Report, (1877) Appendix, p. 556.
3. E. 101/10/18/97.
4. Exchequer Plea Roll, E. 13/25, m. 31.

The royal household had always obtained much of its food supplies by exercising the right of prise, or compulsory purchase. An example of how this was done is provided by the royal visit to Lenton, near Nottingham, at Easter 1303. As early as February orders were issued to the sheriff that 100 quarters of wheat and 600 of oats should be purveyed. At the beginning of March a royal clerk, William Barton, was sent to collect the grain. During the month further orders were issued, for ten live oxen and thirty carcases, twenty live sheep and eighty carcases, thirty live and sixty dead pigs, and 1,000 pots and 700 baskets. Peter of Chichester was sent in advance of the household to obtain forty tuns of ale.[1] This sort of purveyance was liable to abuse, and attempts to restrict the activities of royal officials who seized goods without paying for them had been made in Magna Carta,[2] reflecting a reforming ordinance of Henry I's.[3] In Henry III's reign the Petition of the Barons complained that Henry's officials were keeping back for their own use the greater part of the goods they purveyed, and that many merchants were impoverished, because payment was inadequate.[4] As in many other respects, the early legislation of Edward I on prises followed up ideas of the baronial opposition to his father. In the First Statute of Westminster it was stated that prises should not

1. File concerning purveyance, E. 101/12/4.
2. Stubbs, Charters, pp. 296-97
3. Willelmi Malmesbiriensis Monachi, De Gestis Regum Anglorum, ed. Stubbs, ii (1889), 487.
4. Stubbs, Charters, p. 376.

be taken without the consent of the man whose goods were being removed. But Edward was careful to reserve his ancient rights, and the clause appears to have remained a dead letter.[1] Payment for goods taken by the household remained dilatory, and became more so in the difficult financial situation of the latter years of the reign. Robert Hood of London had also taken from him in 1298 and in 1300: his son eventually received payment for it in the last year of Edward II's reign.[2]

It was possible to extend this unpopular system of prise, normally used simply to provide the household with its supplies, to obtain victuals for the army. Part of the army, after all, was the household in arms. This was nothing new under Edward I. For his Irish expedition Henry II purveyed supplies from most of the English counties. He took 6,424½ quarters of wheat, 2,000 of oats, and 584 of beans. In addition, there were 4,106 carcases of salt pork, 160 quarters of salt and 840 weys of cheese. These supplies were all taken by the sheriffs, who answered for them in the Pipe Roll.[3] Similar prises were taken during the Baron's Wars in the next century: requisitions to feed the army besieging Kenilworth were so heavy as to exhaust the revenues of ten counties.[4] Prises were of course used

1. Statutes of the Realm, i. 27-28.
2. Exchequer Warrants for issue, E. 404/481/1/4.
3. Pipe Rolls, 17 and 18 Henry II, Pipe Roll Society, xvi, xviii (1893, 1894), passim. I owe this information to J.O. Prestwich.
4. H.M. Cam, The Hundred and the Hundred Rolls (1930), p. 101.

by Edward I during his Welsh wars. For the campaign of 1294-5 supplies came from Gloucestershire, Lancashire and Ireland, but no overall figures of the quantities collected can be calculated, as detailed accounts are only preserved of the victualling by sea of the castles of Criccieth, Harlech, and Aberystwyth.[1] For the army that assembled in the autumn of 1294 to go to Gascony William Panetarius, the household pantler, John de Maidstone, clerk of the marshalsea, and Richard de Bromsgrove, a more junior household clerk, used the right of prise to buy up 972 qu. 6 bu. of wheat, 2,686 qu. 6 bu. of oats, and 50 qu. of beans.[2] These men presumably had writs under the privy seal authorising them to take supplies for the army, just as those making prises for the royal household did.

In 1296, with a campaign in Scotland and an urgent need to send supplies to the army in Gascony, the methods normally used to provide the household with food were inadequate to meet the demand. The Wardrobe and household staff dealt with the Scotch problem, and the Exchequer took over the responsibility for getting grain to Gascony. In March and April writs were sent out under the Exchequer seal to the sheriffs of twelve southern counties, ordering them to purvey

1. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. xxxiv-xxxv; J. Griffiths, 'Documents relating to the Rebellion of Madoc, 1294-5', Bull. Bd. of Celt. St. viii. 147 sqqq.
2. Account of Panetarius and Bromsgrove, E. 101/5/4; account of Maidstone, E. 101/4/30; Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 160.

a total of 15,500 qu. of wheat and 13,000 qu. of oats. The operation appears to have been carried out thoroughly, for after receipt of a querela, or complaint, it was found necessary for orders to be issued on 24 May to the effect that people should be left with enough corn for them to live on.[1] There were further prises of victuals in the same year. In June the Exchequer appointed commissions, each of two men, to take corn in nine counties, four of which had been included in the previous order.[2] Then on 17 September Richard of Louth arrived at the Exchequer with instructions from the King, the first of which was that 100,000 qu. of grain should be purveyed for Gascony.[3] Complaints had been received earlier in the year from the army there, stating that they were in great distress for want of food and money.[4] But the Exchequer protested that the quantity demanded was unreasonable, and Edward replied, showing a touch of humour, that he had not meant to be taken so literally:

> 'E de ce qe vous avez merveille de la somme de cent mile quartiers de ble qui Richard de Lue vous noma de par nous pur enveer en Gascoigne apres ceste seint Michel sicome nous avoms entendu, vous feisoms a savoir qe nous entendoms bien qe nous ly nomassmes meisme la somme, e par avienture tot le ble de Angleterre, mais totes voyes nostre entencion feust qe vous y feissez purveer tant de ble come vous peussiez bonement sans trop grever les gentz e la poeple de nostre Roiaume. E uncore est nostre entencion e nostre volunte

77d.

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/69, m. 76d. The counties were Hants, Somerset, Dorset, Bucks, Beds, Cambs, Hunts, Berks, Wilts, Surrey, Sussex, Glouces., Leics.
2. Ibid., m. 80d. The counties were Rutland, Northants, Bucks, Beds, Essex, Herts, Cambs, Hunts.
3. Ibid., m. 85d.
4. Ibid., m. 19d.

tot y celo. E vous mandoms qe vous y mettez tot le bon consail qe vous porrez .....'[1]

The result was that at the end of November orders went to most of the counties of England for the collection of a total of 33,800 qu. of wheat, 20,400 qu. of oats, 5,800 qu. of barley and 3,200 qu. of beans and beas.[2] There was one more prise on a national scale organised by the Exchequer before the departure of the king for Flanders in 1297. In June of that year the taking of 3,100 carcases of salt pork and 1,500 of beef was authorised.[3]

Much of the business of collecting victuals was done by the sheriffs, but some royal clerks were appointed to assist them. To get supplies for the Flemish expeditions John de Maidstone assisted the sheriffs of Kent and Sussex, while John of London exercised a similar supervisory rôle in East Anglia. Walter of Cluny was appointed to receive corn in the bishopric of Ely. Peter of Chichester was made receiver of victuals at Winchelsea, the port selected for departure, but at the other ports at which supplies were collected, such as Boston, Hull, Grimsby, Wainfleet and various towns in the Thames estuary there were no royal officials, and the administrative burden was taken on by the sheriffs and their men.[4] John Rottenherring, ancestor of the de la Poles, was one of those acting on behalf of the sheriff of Yorkshire at Hull.[5]

1. E. 159/70, m. 5; Lord Treasurer's Memoranda Roll, E. 368/68, m. 10.
2. E. 159/70, mm. 119-20.
3. Ibid., m. 121.
4. Indentures of goods taken to Flanders, E. 101/6/18; Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 7965, f. 44.
5. E. 101/6/18/4.

In November 1296 an Exchequer ordinance laid down the way in which the prise of grain should be conducted. There was considerable worry lest the poorer classes, who could least afford to have their food supplies taken without immediate payment, should suffer unduly, so it was laid down that the sheriff and the royal clerk assisting him should consult with the taxers of the twelfth, whose records of assessments would give a good idea of how much each man could afford to have taken. An indenture was to be drawn up between the taxers and the sheriff, showing the quantities to be purveyed. Tallies were to be issued as receipts. Further instructions provided an additional safeguard, stating that a record should be kept of all tallies issued in each hundred or wapentake, one copy to be preserved locally, and the other kept by the sheriff. This latter copy was to be presented at the Exchequer, where arrangements for payment were to be made. The government even went to the lengths of specifying the prices to be paid. These were startlingly high: wheat at 12s., barley, peas and beans and 9s. a quarter.[1] In the years up to 1295 prices had been rising steadily, until they reached a maximum level in that year of, according to the most reliable calculations, 9s. 2¾d. for wheat. But the harvest of 1296 was much better, with prices dropping to 4s. 10d., though they rose in the following year to 6s. 4d.[2] When orders for the massive prise of November 1296 were issued, the Exchequer was clearly calculating in terms of the previous year's prices.

1. E. 159/70, mm. 119-20.
2. D.L. Farmer, 'Some Grain Price Movements in Thirteenth Century England', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd. ser., x (1957), 212. A graph of prices worked out from Farmer's figures is infra, p. 364.

It is not possible to give any definite figure of the total quantity of victuals seized by the crown in 1296 and 1297, but a good impression of the scale of operations is provided by the records of shipments to Gascony and Flanders in 1297. Thirty-eight ships were used on the run to Gascony, leaving on different dates from ports in the south of England, carrying a total of 6,470 qu. of wheat, 10,542 qu. of oats, 954 qu. of beans, 2,500 stockfish and 571 tuns of flour, the equivalent of roughly 2,855 qu. of wheat.[1] For Flanders, 4,893 qu. of wheat was brought over from England, and 3,165 qu. bought in Bruges and elsewhere. Of a total of 6,680 qu. of oats, barley and dredge, 3,831 qu. came from England.[2] A further indication of the burden placed on the country is provided by the accounts of individual counties. Richard of Hetherington and the sheriff of Lincolnshire took charge of 2,741 qu. ½ bu. of cereals, all from the one county.[3] Yorkshire provided thirty-four tuns of flour, 1,194 qu. 3 bu. of wheat, and 763 qu. 3½ bu. of oats for Flanders.[4] From Wiltshire and Hampshire 2,120 qu. of wheat, 500 qu. of barley, 1,724½ qu. of oats and 172 tuns of flour were sent to Gascony.[5] In 1296 and 1297 the sheriff of Kent collected together 2,221 qu. 4 bu. of wheat, 1,542 qu. 4 bu. of oats, and 1,121 qu. of barley.[6]

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, ff. 89, 93, 96-7. I have assumed 5 qu. of flour to each tun, as indicated ibid., f. 93.
2. Ibid., ff. 44-50; indentures with many of the shipmasters are in E. 101/6/18.
3. A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, ed. W.S. Thompson (Lincoln Rec. Soc. 1944), p. lxi.
4. Brit. Mus.,Add. MSS. 7965, f. 50.
5. Liberate Roll, C. 62/74, 28 Jan.
6. Ibid., 14 Dec.

Grain supplies were not all that was sent across the North Sea to support the English army in Flanders. While most of their drink was bought abroad, the strange taste of Rhine wine was perhaps balanced by fifty-two tuns of ale brewed at Ely.[1] Some Gascon wine was also sent from England.[2] The meat supplies were largely acquired locally, but at least fifty-four carcases of beef and 240 of pork were from England. Essex provided at least 20,300 horseshoes.[3] Most of the supplies assembled by the receivers of victuals in Flanders, Robert de Segre at Antwerp and Peter of Chichester at Ghent, were used up by the household. The infantry were only issued with just over 356 qu. of wheat, and also 95 lbs of bread in lieu of four days wages on their return home. But they were also able to benefit from royal victualling activities, in that they were able to buy some of the 2,655 qu. 1 bu. of wheat sold by the crown in Flanders. A substantial quantity of the victuals so carefully collected was lost through carelessness or bad luck. 2,251 qu. of wheat, 249 qu. of beans and peas, 1,097 qu. ½ bu. of oats, 19½ carcases of beef and 189 of pork were left behind when the army left Bruges in a hurry. A ship sank going from Bruges to Ghent, and some supplies were allowed to go bad.[4]

Despite the safeguards laid down by the Exchequer, insisting on

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, ff. 44, 49v.
2. Ibid., f. 46v.
3. E. 101/6/18.
4. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 50.

proper tallies being issued and records kept, and despite the high recommended prices, there were inevitably complaints against these prises, which had been on an unprecedented scale. In the Monstrounces presented to Edward by the opposition on 30 June 1297 prises were high in the list of grievances. It was pointed out that military service could not be performed, as the country was so impoverished by Edward's demands for supplies, and his failure to make payment for what had been taken. Many were said to be forced below subsistence level.[1] The De Tallagio suggested a solution to the problems presented by prises in terms which echoed Edward's own legislation in the first Statute of Westminster; 'Nullus minister noster vel hæredum nostrorum capiat blada, lanas,coria, aut alia bona cujuscunque, sine voluntate et assensu illius cujus fuerint hujusmodi bona.'[2] It was clear that much had gone wrong with the conduct of the prises, and in his attempt during 1298 to conciliate the opposition of the previous year Edward set up an elaborate commission in April to enquire into all 'grievances inflicted on the people in the king's name', in particular the seizure of goods for royal use. Pairs of justices were sent out to hold inquisitions by jury, and punish those found guilty of improper conduct. Sheriffs and other ministers were to answer for the misdeeds of their subordinates, if the latter should prove to have insufficient means to make amends.[3]

1. Chron. Guisborough, p. 292.
2. Stubbs, Charters, p. 494.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 338-9.

The complaints revealed by the judicial enquiries were very much what would be expected. Bailiffs often took more grain from villagers than they gave up to the sheriffs. Tallies might not be given, and officials might collect goods for which they had no warrant. In Lincolnshire one man had been particularly corrupt: Thomas Easton, bailiff of Hose, who appeared more often than anyone else in cases concerning prises.[1] The intention that people should be left with enough supplies for their own livlihood was not always observed. In one case one John Everard bought three quarters of malt from Adam Besaunt, having earlier forced him to buy it. He also took a quarter of salt meat, turned Adam out of his house, and sealed up the doors.[2] In a Norfolk case the parson of Knavering complained that the local bailiff had unjustly taken seven quarters of wheat and two of barley, so that he had no food for his beasts, and could not sow for six weeks. He also accused the bailiff of keeping back one quarter of grain for his own use, and of taking £1. 3s. unjustly. The official admitted taking the grain and the money, for which he had due warrant, and the jurors found that the parson had sufferred no damage.[3] There were also complaints about the way in which horses and carts were requisitioned by sheriffs in order to transport the supplies collected. One unfortunate man refused to let the sheriff of Yorkshire take his horse, since he had no other on his farm, and he needed it to get in his harvest. His

1. A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, ed. Thompson, nos. 237, 240, 305, 314, 317, 370, 371.
2. Ibid., no. 241.
3. Norfolk Assize Roll, J.I. 1/587, m. 3d.

recalcitrance involved him in a fine of one mark when the case was brought up in the Exchequer court.[1]

Obviously, in spite of the many complaints, Edward I could not afford to abandon the system of prises. Not only did it provide him with valuable supplies, but also with a means of anticipating his income. Food was sold off to the armies long before it was paid for, so prises can be regarded as being in a sense forced loans in kind. The slowness of payment is illustrated by a general petition put forward in parliament in 1304, asking for payment of arrears of all sorts, including prises that had been made before 1297.[2] But after the constitutional crisis of that year the system was changed in various ways, probably with the intention of pacifying public opinion. The Exchequer was deprived of its rôle of administering prises. No longer did Edward issue such vague instructions as those when he asked for 100,000 quarters of grain to Gascony, leaving all the detailed work to be done by the Exchequer officials. Now, specific instructions were sent under the privy seal to the Chancery, setting out precisely how much was to be demanded from each county.[3] The writs sent to the sheriffs were nearly always letters patent under the Great Seal after 1297, though on occasion a simple privy seal writ might be used for small quantities. It is hard to see that this administrative change

1. Exchequer Plea Roll, E. 13/22, m. 5.
2. Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 165.
3. One draft schedule of arrangements for purveyance in 1306 survives i E. 101/16/13, showing exactly how much each country was to provide, and indicating that demands were worked out in detail before the Cahncery was approached to send writs to the sheriffs.

can have made very much difference in practice. Supplies were still collected by sheriffs, with the assistance of royal clerks, and it cannot have mattered much whether they received their orders under the Exchequer seal or the great seal. But clearly the Exchequer had come under criticism for its part in the prises, seizures and taxes that had dominated financial policy in the years leading up to the crisis of 1297. It made good sense for the crown to make a minor administrative adjustment to satisfy the feelings of the public.

Much more trouble was taken after 1297 to explain the reasons for the royal need of victuals. The king pointed out that in order to 'refrenir e ennentir la malice e la rebelte de nos enemys' he and his 'bones gentz' had need of 'graunt foison des blez e des autres vitailles'.[1] Another writ explained the need to 'mettre a fyn, se dieu plest, les griefs e les grantz damages qe les Escotz ont faitz meintefoiz e uncore purchacent de faire a nous, e a vous, e a tot nostre Roiaume.'[2] It was pointed out that 'les grantz seigneurs e les bones gentz d'armes' were contributing directly to the war effort with their service, and that the lesser people could contribute food supplies.[2] The use of the actual word prise became far less common: the writs tended to talk instead of purveyance. But the opposition was not to be bought off by mere forms of words, and in the Articuli super Cartas of 1300

1. Letter patent to the sheriff of Somerset and Dorset, E. 101/585/5. This writ is briefly calendared in Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, p. 126.
2. Letter patent to the men of Huntingdonshire, E. 101/552/4/8. This writ is calendared in Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 578.

the system of prise was attacked. The crown was only to exercise the right to keep the household supplied with food: 'Ordene est qe de ci en avaunt nul ne preign prises parmi le Roiaume, fors qe les prenours le Roi e ses purveours pur lostel le Roi. E qe ceus prenours le Roi e purveours pur soen hostel, ne preignent riens fors qe pur meisme lostel'. The terms of the passage on prise clearly excluded purveyance for the army on the scale that had been seen in the years since 1294.[1] As a result of the Articuli, writs for purveyance were not sent straight to the sheriffs in 1301, as was normal practice. Instead, writs were directed to the communities of the various counties, asking them to aid the king by granting him victuals. Payment was promised out of the fifteenth provisionally granted at Lincoln earlier in the year, and commissioners were sent out to conduct the negotiations with the counties.[2] It was only when agreement was reached that writs were sent to the sheriffs appointing them, along with the usual clerks, to collect the supplies and send them north.[3] The Wardrobe accounts specifically describe this purveyance as a loan, and the voluntary air of the proceedings is emphasized by the way that the victuals in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire were collected by men selected by the county communities to do the job, rather than by the sheriff.[4] The government was much more conscientious than it had been before 1297

1. Statutes of the Realm, i. 137.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 578-79. E. 101/552/4/8, one of the originals, makes the voluntary element clearer than does the calendar.
3. One such writ, to Notts and Derby, dated 19 April 1301, is in E. 101/580/8/1.
4. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 53.

in trying to ensure that payment was made. In January 1303 firm writs were sent out under the privy seal to the tax collectors,[1] whose accounts do show that some money was paid to those who provided victuals, though not necessarily all that was owed.[2] In 1304 the men of Cumberland complained in parliament that they had received nothing from the collectors, who were at once ordered to make payment.[3]

Although in 1301 purveyance was genuinely negotiated with the counties, it is noticeable that in all cases it was agreed to provide precisely the quantities of victuals suggested in the original chancery writs. In later years this technique of direct negotiation was not repeated on such a scale: it was probably realised on both sides that it did little more than waste time. But the precedent was not entirely abandoned. In 1304 Walter Langton in person requested a loan of victuals from the town of Barton-on-Humber, and obtained 100 qu. of wheat and 200 qu. of malt.[4] The order issued on 1 January of the same year to the effect that the town of Lynn should send 500 qu. of wheat and the same quantity of barley, with 1,000 qu. of oats, was probably the result of similar discussions.[5] In the last years of the reign the government continued to try to ensure adequate payment

1. One of these writs, to Westmoreland, is in E. 101/592/1/2; another, to Northumberland, in E. 101/10/18/39.
2. As for example King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/77, m. 67, view of account for Derbyshire. Fuller details are in Subsidy Rolls, E. 179/91/1.
3. Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 164.
4. Writ to Richard de Bromsgrove, E. 101/10/18/83.
5. Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-1307, pp. 120-21.

for purveyance. Late in 1302 the aid due to be collected for the marriage of the king's eldest daughter was assigned to pay for the victuals needed for the campaign in Scotland in the following year.[1] But lack of cash meant that the government could not fulfil its intentions, and purveyance continued to be a major grievance. In the Ordinances of Edward II's reign it was altogether forbidden.[2]

For the Scotch wars there were two main victualling bases, where stores were collected together before being sent on to the army and to the castle garrisons. One was at Berwick, where Peter of Dunwich was acting as receiver of victuals in 1297,[3] but who was shortly replaced by Richard de Bromsgrove, who held the office until the end of the reign. As far as supplies from England were concerned, this was the most important base. Prevailing winds being as they are, it was much easier to take supplies up the east coast than the west, and the main grain producing areas of England were in the east. The majority of expeditions advanced north on the eastern route, through Newcastle and Berwick. The other supply centre was at Carlisle, with its port at Skinburness. In those years when the army did advance up the western route the position of receiver of victuals there, held first by Abingdon and then by Dolilegh, became extremely important, but otherwise it was mainly used as a convenient place for the collection

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-7, p. 68.
2. Statutes of the Realm, i. 159.
3. Stevenson, Documents, ii. no. ccccxiii.

of supplies from Ireland, and for the victualling of the castles of Dumfries and Lochmaben. On occasion, supplies might be sent straight to the army, bypassing the victualling bases and delivered direct to the household officials, but this was rare, and large quantities were always sent through the main centres.

For the Falkirk campaign, accounts do not survive. It does not appear that any very elaborate arrangements were made for victualling the army. Early in November 1297 fifty counties had been asked to provide 8,500 qu. of wheat and 9,550 qu. of oats for the winter campaign,[1] but the only quantities specified for the summer expedition were 2,000 qu. of wheat and 3,050 of oats requested in April 1298 from Yorkshire and Lincolnshire. In addition, men were appointed to collect victuals from Lancashire, the west country, and Ireland,[2] but these cannot have been intended for the main army, which advanced north up the eastern route to Scotland. Walter of Guisborough states that the army suffered from want of food supplies,[3] and for the projected campaign in the following year arrangements to assemble victuals were started much earlier, in December 1298, which suggests that an attempt was being made to improve on previous performance. In fact no campaign did take place, and it seems certain that the orders must have been countermanded in part, as the accounts do not mention receipts of

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 314.
2. Ibid., p. 344.
3. Chron. Guisborough, p. 325.

supplies from eight counties mentioned in them. The following table compares the quantities demanded from Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk and Yorkshire, which sent supplies to Berwick, and Ireland which sent them to Carlisle, with the actual receipts and with the amounts issued to the troops. The accounts run from November 1298 until November 1299.

Victualling, 1299.

Berwick[1]

	Ordered[2]	Receipts	Issues
Flour		380½ tuns (=c. 1,900 qu.)	188½ tuns (=c. 940 qu.)
Wheat	3,000 qu.	342½ qu.	342½ qu.
Malt	3,000 qu.	2,458 qu.	2,300½ qu.
Oats	3,000 qu.	3,523 qu. 6 bu.	1,758½ qu.
Beans[3]		663 qu. 2 bu.	254 qu. 2 bu.
Salt		367 qu.	168 qu. 2 bu.
Wine		373 tuns	171 tuns
Beef[4]		6 carcases	-
Pork[4]		5½ carcases	-
Salmon		797	797

Carlisle[5]

Flour	6,000 qu.	708½ tuns (=c. 3,700 qu.)	51 tuns (=c. 295 qu.)
Wheat	2,000 qu.	3,113 qu.	2,176½ qu.
Malt	2,000 qu.	1,408 qu. 1½ bu.	947 qu. 2½ bu
Oats	10,000 qu.	6,964 qu. 2½ bu.	1,539 qu. 3 bu
Wine	1,000 tuns	551 tuns	53 tuns
Beef	500 carcases	176¾ carcases	115¾ carcases
Pork	1,000 carcases	669 carcases	117½ carcases
Stockfish	20,000	24 tuns, 1,156	5 tuns, 1,113

In most cases, the quantities supplied fell short of the demand, but more oats were sent from England than had been requested, and the justiciar of Ireland sent across more wheat in grain, and less in the form of flour than was suggested in the writ

1. Bromsgrove's account, Brit. Mus., Add. Mss. 37624.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 386-89.
3. In this and the subsequent tables peas are included with beans.
4. I have assumed that beco means a pork carcase, not a side of bacon: c.f. H.J. Hewitt, The Organization of War under Edward III, p. 51.
5. Abingdon's account, E. 101/7/20.

sent him. But there was no sense of urgency in providing supplies, and the quantities collected were more than ample for the limited forces operating in Scotland in 1299.

The government's task in 1300 was simplified by the appreciable supplies left over from the previous year. Additional and substantial quantities were ordered in January from eleven English counties and Ireland. Again, a table is the easiest way of showing how much was provided for the army to eat.

	Ordered[2]	Berwick[1] Receipts	Issues
Flour		291½ tuns (=c. 1,460 qu.)	250½ tuns (= c. 1,260qu.)
Wheat	7,000 qu.	2,716 qu. 2½ bu.	2,140 qu. 2 bu.
Barley		99½ qu.	30½ qu.
Malt	4,300 qu.	2,668 qu. 7½ bu.	1,915 qu. 7½ bu.
Oats	8,000 qu.	4,739 qu.	3,114 qu. 2 bu.
Beans	1,000 qu.	973 qu. 6 bu.	656 qu. 2 bu.
Wine		734.17 tuns	316.17 tuns
Beef		50½ carcases	50½ carcases
Pork		14½ carcases	14½ carcases
Mutton		60 carcases	60 carcases
Herrings		28,500	28,500
Stockfish		14,336	6,568
Salt		418 qu. 6 bu.	31½ qu.
		Carlisle	
Flour		272½ qu. 657½ tuns (= c. 3,290 qu.)	272½ qu. 657½ tuns (= c. 3,290 qu.)
Wheat	3,000 qu.	4,508 qu. 7 bu.	3,555 qu. 2 bu.
Malt		1,129 qu. 7 bu.	1,052 qu. 1 bu.
Oats	2,300 qu.	7,769 qu. 5½ bu.	7,462 qu. 3½ bu.
Beans		52 qu. 5 bu.	41 qu. 2 bu.
Wine	300 tuns	623 tuns	611.8 tuns
Beef		101½ carcases	101½ carcases
Pork		521½ carcases	521½ carcases
Herrings		9,500	9,500
Stockfish	10,000	21 tuns, 23 fish	21 tuns, 263 fi
Salt		22 qu. 5 bu.	22 qu. 5 bu.

1. Calculations from Liber Quotidianus, pp. 113-129. The original account for Berwick is Brit Mus, Harl. MSS. 626.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 487-8.

The figures for receipts here include supplies left over from the previous year, so that the table does not give an accurate picture of the response of the sheriffs to the orders sent them. So, although the royal victuallers had almost 12,000 qu. of wheat and flour at their disposal during 1300, only about 6,600 qu. was actually collected during that year, whereas 10,000 qu. had been requested.[1] The sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk only sent north 735 qu. of wheat and 1,000 qu. of oats, not the 1,500 of the former and 1,200 of the latter that was demanded. On the other hand, he did meet the target exactly for malt, beans and peas,[2] while in providing 1,030 qu. 7 bu. of wheat the sheriff of Lincolnshire exceeded the figure of 1,000 qu. he was asked for.[3] The most incompetent was the sheriff of Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire, who in response to an order for 500 qu. of wheat and 300 qu. of oats and the same quantity of malt only produced 133 qu. 7 bu. of wheat.[4] But there appear to have been no complaints of an insufficiency of victuals, though there was anger with the quality of some of the grain sent from Ireland. A sample was sent back to Dublin, where a jury declared that it had come from the demesne lands of the vacant archbishopric of that city.[5]

Evidence on victualling for the next campaign in Scotland, that of

1. Calculated from the figures *supra*, pp. 215-16.
2. *Liber Quotidianus*, pp. 107-8; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301*, p. 487.
3. *Liber Quotidianus*, p. 110; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301*, p. 487.
4. *Liber Quotidianus*, p. 109; *Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301*, p. 487.
5. E. 101/547/14.

1301, is not so complete as for the Caerlaverock expedition. The account for the Carlisle establishment is included in the Wardrobe book, but none survives for Berwick. The following table gives most of the receipts of victuals from the English counties, compared with the quantities specified by the chancery in the writs to the counties.

1301[1]

	Ordered[2]	Received
Wheat	8,200 qu.	5,081 qu. 5 bu.
Oats	9,500 qu.	3,647 qu. 2½ bu.
Malt	4,200 qu.	2,158 qu. 1½ bu.
Barley		73 qu. 2 bu.
Beans	1,000 qu.	992 qu. 6 bu.

These supplies were mostly sent to Berwick, while Carlisle got most of its from Ireland, as in the next table.

Carlisle victualling, 1301.[3]

	Ordered[4]	Received
Wheat	3,000 qu.	2,066 qu, 119 tuns (= c. 595 qu.)
Oats	3,000 qu.	1,827 qu.
Malt	2,000 qu.	691 qu. 6 bu.
Beans	500 qu.	303½ qu.
Wine	200 tuns	285.3 tuns.
Salt	500 qu.	99 qu. 1 bu.
Beef		102 carcases
Pork		126 carcases
Mutton		27 carcases
Stockfish	10,000	2,618

In the previous year the whole campaign had been based on Carlisle, but in 1301 it was only the army of the prince that was operating in the south-west of Scotland, which explains why the figures are lower than in 1300. The next campaign, that of 1303, was largely

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 52-59.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 578-9.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 58v-59.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 585.

dependant on Berwick as a supply base. Operations in the south-west were very limited in scope, so the importance of Carlisle declined. The next table shows the quantities ordered from the English counties, and the amount of supplies actually available, including those left over from the previous year.

Victualling, 1303

	Ordered[1]	Berwick[2]	Carlisle[3]	Total
Flour	1,250 qu.	290 tuns (= c. 1,450 qu.) 422 qu.		c. 1,872 qu.
Wheat	7,250 qu.	5,745 qu. 1 bu.	686 qu. 6 bu.	6,431 qu. 7 bu.
Rye etc.		276 qu. 5 bu.		276 qu. 5 bu.
Barley		143 qu. 5 bu.		143 qu. 5 bu.
Malt	3,800 qu.	1,050 qu. 6 bu.	275 qu. 6 bu.	1,326 qu. 4 bu.
Oats	8,000 qu.	5,155 qu. 5½ bu.	818 qu. 3½ bu.	5,974 qu. 1 bu.
Beans	2,700 qu.	1,279 qu. ½ bu.	26 qu. 6 bu.	1,306 qu. 6½ bu.
Vetch		275 qu. 4 bu.		275 qu. 4 bu.
Wine		1,263.5 tuns	102.6 tuns	1,366.1 tuns.
Salt	500 qu.	680 qu. 4 bu.		680 qu. 4 bu.
Cattle		44		44
Pork		447 carcases		447 carcases
Mutton		8 carcases		8 carcases
Venison		73 carcases		73 carcases
Stockfish		1,720	298, 21 qu.	2,018, 21 qu.
Salmon		380		380
Cod		45		45

The figures show that the sheriffs were on the whole efficient in providing supplies: it was only over malt that they fell down badly, collecting less than half the quantity demanded. With the campaign continuing over the winter into 1304, further supplies were needed. In September 1303 nine counties were asked for 2,600 qu. of wheat, 2,400 qu. of oats, 1,900 qu. of malt and 700 qu. of beans and peas. In November three more counties were asked to provide 1,000 qu. of

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, pp. 98-9, 126.
2. Bromsgrove's account, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 17360.
3. Dolliegh's account, E. 101/11/19.

wheat and the same quantity of oats and malt,[1] but of these counties only Northamptonshire in fact sent any supplies, so it appears that the orders to the other two, Somerset and Devon, must have been countermanded. They were perhaps replaced by Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, both of which sent victuals north, although no writ of purveyance to them was enrolled. The next table compares the quantities requested, this being given in the top line of each entry, with the amounts actually supplied, given immediately below the first figure.

Victualling, 1304[2]

County	Wheat	Malt	Oats	Beans	Barley
Yorks	500 qu.	500 qu.	500 qu.	200 qu.	
	575 qu.	448 qu.	491 qu.	218 qu.	
Cambs & Hunts	500 qu.	400 qu.	400 qu.	100 qu.	
	562 qu.	180 qu.	275 qu.	63 qu.	
Essex & Herts	300 qu.	300 qu.	300 qu.		
	518 qu.	-	309 qu.		
Norfolk & Suffolk	500 qu.	400 qu.	400 qu.	200 qu.	
	477 qu.	435 qu.	367 qu.	144 qu.	
Lincs	500 qu.		400 qu.	200 qu.	
	451 qu.		496 qu.	174 qu.	
Northants	500 qu.	500 qu.	500 qu.		
	300 qu.	-	223 qu.		
Northumbr.	300 qu.	300 qu.	400 qu.		
	89 qu.	-	139 qu.		5 qu.
Barton-on-Humber	100 qu.	200 qu.			
	105 qu.	210 qu.			
Lynn	500 qu.		1,000 qu.		500 qu.
	300 qu.		1,000 qu.		300 qu.

Further purveyances and purchases of victuals provided the army in Scotland with an additional 3,680 qu. of wheat, 3,834 qu. of oats,

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, pp. 159, 201.
2. Quantities requested from ibid., pp. 159, 201; Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-1307, pp. 120-21; E. 101/10/18/83. Supplies from Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 25-31.

1,038 qu. of malt, 937 qu. of barley and 354 qu. of beans and peas. Much of this came from Hampshire, the Isle of Wight and Holderness in a conventional way, but clearly in this year the normal methods of purveying food had not provided sufficient supplies, and so the customs collectors at Hartlepools were employed to buy up provisions, as were the collectors of tallage at Ravenser and Hull. Richard Dalton was employed to collect substantial quantities that Walter Langton had negotiated for as loans to the crown, and some supplies were bought from individuals. John Droxford's chaplain sold twenty quarters of wheat and sixty quarters of beans. But the insufficiency of normal purveyance was not due to any incompetence on the part of the local officials: as the table shows, they did remarkably well, in most cases collecting almost exactly the quantity ordered. The one exception was Northumberland, while in the case of the counties asked to provide malt that produced none, it is most likely that the orders were subsequently modified to exclude malt. The total quantities available to the army in 1304, according to the Wardrobe book, were 7,057 qu. of wheat, 7,204 qu. of oats, 2,311 qu. of malt, 1,242 qu. of barley and 953 qu. of beans and peas.[1]

The resumption of warfare on a large scale in Scotland following Bruce's revolt in 1306 naturally meant that it was once again necessary for the crown to arrange for large quantities of victuals to be sent north. In 1305 the Carlisle victualling establishment

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 25-35.

had almost ceased to operate. Receipts of wheat only amounted to 356 qu. 2 bu.[1] But for 1306 the figures are as impressive as they had been in 1301.

Carlisle Victualling, 1306[2]

	Receipts	Issues
Wheat	2,787 qu. 7 bu.	2,448 qu.
Flour	77 tuns (= c. 385 qu.)	35 tuns (= c. 175 qu.)
Oats	2,796 qu. 7 bu.	2,274 qu. 1½ bu.
Malt	570 qu. 2½ bu.	44 qu.
Wine	529 tuns, 8 barrels	494 tuns, 4 barrels
Honey	2 tuns	2 tuns
Beef	126 carcases, 2 pieces	76¼ carcases
Pork	303 carcases	106 carcases
Live oxen	97	28

Unfortunately, there is again no account for Berwick, nor are the accounts for Lincolnshire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire or Somerset, all counties from which victuals were requested,[3] included in the Wardrobe book. But the following table compares, for those counties whose accounts survive, the quantities ordered with those actually sent, in the same way as the table for 1304.

Victualling, 1306[4]

	Wheat	Oats	Malt	Pork	Beef	Wine	Stockfish
Norfolk &	1,000 qu.	1,000 qu.	1,000 qu.	200			10,000
Suffolk	898 qu.	997½ qu.	784 qu.	77			
Salop. &	1,000 qu.	2,000 qu.		300			
Staff.	620½ qu.	1,246 qu.		211			
Essex &	500 qu.	500 qu.		300			
Herts.	336 qu.	525 qu.		25			
Cornwall		1,000 qu.			300	100 tuns	5,000
		350 qu.			-	101 tuns	-

1. Dalilegh's account, E. 101/11/19, f. 12.
2. Wardrobe Account Book, E. 101/369/11, f. 83.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, pp. 418-19.
4. Quantities requested from ibid., pp. 417-19; supplies from E. 101/369/11, ff. 71-76.

victuals than were required by household or castle garrisons, and so sold off much to the army, were not that they always overcalculated needs. It was that experience had shown that it was unsafe to rely to much on the activities of the private victuallers, and that to ensure that the army was well supplied with food the crown itself had to perform the same task as the merchants, and take victuals to Scotland for sale to the troops. A possible motive for a government to act in this way would be to try and keep down prices: the merchants would be prevented from charging exorbitant prices if the authorities had cheaper supplies for sale. But it is improbable that Edward I's officials adopted this policy. In 1300 wheat was purveyed at an average price of 4s. 5d. a quarter, but it was sold off in Scotland at prices between 10s. and 5s., the average being 7s. The highest price paid by the purveyors for oats was 2s. 6d., the lowest 1s. 10d., while sales to the troops were at rates varying from 4s. to 2s.[1] The expense of carrying the grain north to Scotland was not such as to justify the differential in price. It looks as if the victuallers sold supplies to the troops at the highest price they could get for them, a system which proved profitable to the crown. The following table shows the total cost of victualling activities as given in the final Wardrobe accounts, compared with the receipts from sales of victuals.

1. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 8-13, 104-134.

	Expenses	Receipts from Sales
1295[1]	£3,697. 2s. 1d.	£1,291. 18s. 2½d.
1296	£7,202. 2s. 5½d.	£919. 3s. 0d.
1297	£11,741. 17s. 4½d.	£3,592. 12s. 9¾d.
1298	£2,766. 11s. 6½d.	£3,223. 0s. 7½d.[2]
1300	£5,063. 2s. 0½d.	£7,290. 13s. 4¾d.[3]
1301	£7,195. 11s. 7½d.	£4,151. 11s. 6¾d.[4]
1302	£10,817. 14s. 0½d.	£7,381. 8s. 1¾d.
1303	£4,855. 7s. 11½d.	£817. 19s. 5½d.[5]
1304	£6,409. 0s. 9½d.[6]	No figure available
1306	£6,509. 11s. 4d.	£3,741. 0s. 9¼d.[7]

These figures must be regarded as only approximate, for they are derived from overall Wardrobe accounts, and items are often omitted from these, or included in accounts for later years than they should be. The Wardrobe book for 1306 includes details of purveyance from 1298,[8] and probably does not mention all purchases of victuals for the year that it is chiefly concerned with. The figure for receipts from sales of victuals almost certainly does not represent the full total. This is definitely the case for 1303, where the summary of the final Wardrobe account gives the figure of £817. 19s. 5½d., as shown in the table above, although the account of

1. As in the other tables, these are regnal years, the first running from 20 Nov. 1294 to 19 Nov. 1295.
2. Enrolled Wardrobe accounts, Pipe Roll, E. 372/144. The expenses for 1296 include necessary expenditure.
3. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 136, 7-15.
4. Summary of Wardrobe account, drawn up as for enrolment, E.101/360/25.
5. Like document, E. 101/364/14. Expenses for 1304 include the cost of castle garrisons.
6. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 35.
7. Final Wardrobe account, E. 101/369/11, ff. 87d, 18-21.
8. Ibid., f. 77.

Richard de Bromsgrove, drawn up too late for inclusion in the summary account, shows that he received £4,485. 3s. 5¾d. from sales.[1] But although not definitive, the figures in the table indicate that the crown sold considerable quantities of victuals to the armies, and that in this way much of the cost of purveyance was offset.

The way in which English armies were supplied with food during the latter part of the reign of Edward I amply demonstrates the efficiency of the machinery of government during the period. There were occasional complaints, and in 1303 a commission was set up to enquire into the reasons for the incompetence shown by the sheriff of Essex and Hertfordshire,[2] while on one occasion the keeper of the Wardrobe wrote to the sheriff of Somerset and Dorset complaining that he had not sent the supplies he had collected north: 'mout me merveille de vostre graunt folye'.[3] But such letters were rare, and it was equally uncommon for the king's strategy to be hampered by lack of supplies. Commissariat arrangements broke down when he was at Conway early in 1295,[4] and there was a serious lack of victuals before the battle of Falkirk in 1298.[5] In the winter of 1301-02 many horses died for want of fodder,[6] but thereafter all appears to have gone reasonably well. The importance

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 17630, ff. 16-17.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 129.
3. File of accounts etc. for Somerset and Dorset, E. 101/585/5/12.
4. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 255.
5. Chron. Guisborough, pp. 324-25.
6. Chron. Rishanger, p. 210.

attached by Edward to the problem of keeping his troops well supplied with food is shown by the appointment of so important a man as the Treasurer, Walter Langton, to organise the victualling of the English forces in Galloway at the end of the reign.[1]

The chief aim of the government in organising the commissariat system was to ensure that the army was properly supplied. Consideration for the farmers whose produce was taken by royal purveyors was not a priority. With any system of compulsory purchase there is obviously a danger that the government may force producers to sell at abnormally low prices. There were no complaints to this effect, but a comparison between the prices paid by purveyors with the national averages calculated by Farmer reveals that the former were consistently lower. In 1300 the purveyors paid 4s. 5d. a quarter on average for wheat, as against the national figure of 5s. In 1304 the figures were 4s. 10d. and 5s. 6d. respectively, while in 1306 the difference was still more, the purveyors paying on average 3s. 9d., with the national price level standing at 4s. 6d.[2] A further indication that low prices were being paid by the crown is the fact that royal officials got better prices for their produce than other men did. Simon de Kyme, sheriff of Yorkshire,

1. E. 101/13/36/11.
2. Farmer, 'Some Grain Price Movements in Thirteenth-Century England', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd. ser. x (1957), 212; Liber quotidianus, pp. 104-134; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 25-35; E. 101/369/11, ff. 71-76.

paid 5s. a quarter for wheat in 1304 to everybody save John Sandale, who got 6s. Sandale got the same high price from the sheriff of Essex and Hertfordshire, as did John Droxford from the sheriff of Southampton.[1]

Despite the efforts of the government to improve the methods of collecting supplies after the crisis of 1297, purveyances still remained unpopular, and purveyors corrupt. The men of Yorkshire complained that the officials were failing to make out receipts and tallies for the victuals they took in full, so that if five quarters of wheat was taken, the receipt only stated that four had been received, leaving the purveyor to make a private profit of one quarter.[2] One technique that seems to have been commonly used in an attempt to avoid purveyance was to move grain into sanctuary. In Bingham wapentake in Nottinghamshire the purveyors were ordered in 1301 to collect sixty quarters of wheat and forty-five of malt. They took fourteen quarters of wheat and twenty of barley from the house of the parson of Kneeton, where it had presumably been placed in an attempt to escape their attention.[3] A more dramatic case took place in 1304, in Yorkshire. Nicholas Lovel was appointed by the sheriff to collect corn in the village of Bulmer. A local jury decided how much each should contribute, and the parson was to provide a quarter of

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 25v, 26v, 29v.
2. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/31/62.
3. Exchequer Plea Roll, E. 13/25, m. 49d.

wheat and the same quantity of oats. This was duly taken by Lovel, and on the succeeding Sunday he was publicly excommunicated by the person. The defence was that Lovel was not excommunicated by name, and that all had been done was to issue a general condemnation of all who took goods from sanctuary. The eventual result of the case, and of the counter-action brought by the person, is unfortunately not recorded.[1] To be a purveyor was clearly hazardous. In 1303 William of Wetewang was collecting victuals in Sledmere in Yorkshire when he was pursued with drawn sword by one Saer de Collum, and was only able to escape by hiding in the house of the prior of Kirkham.[2]

Evidence of corruption is not frequent in the years after 1297, but this may be partly explained by the fact that there was no enquiry later in the reign like that of 1298, set up with the intention of investigating the wrong-doings of government officials. In 1303 the men of Beverly brought a case against John de Sheffield, alleging that although he had obtained allowance at the Exchequer for goods worth £40 taken from them, he had never paid them the money. As so often in such cases, the plaintiffs failed to turn up in court after an adjournment.[3] In 1303 grievances about the crown's failure to pay for purveyances were running so high in Lincolnshire that it was agreed that none should be made unless immediately paid for.[4]

1. Exchequer Plea Roll, E. 13/26, m. 30.
2. Ibid., m. 36.
3. Ibid., mm. 6, 22.
4. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/27/15, sheriff to the chancellor.

The burden of purveyance was clearly a very considerable one. It did not fall on all parts of the country with equal severity, as the following table shows. This simply indicates how often each county was called upon to provide supplies between 1296 and the end of the reign.

13	times:	Yorks.
12	:	Lincoln, Cambs, Essex.
11	:	Hunts
9	:	Norfolk, Suffolk, Notts.
8	:	Derby, Dorset, Somerset.
7	:	Herts, Sussex.
6	:	Surrey.
5	:	Hants, Glouce, Northumbr.
4.	:	Berks.
3.	:	Bedford, Bucks, Leics, Cornwall, Rutland, Northants, Kent, Lancs, Worcs, Devon.
2	:	Oxon, Warwick, Middlesex, Wilts, Northants, Westmorland.
1	time :	Cheshire, Cumberland, Salop, Staffs, Hereford.

There is no simple explanation as to why some counties were called on so much more often than others. It has been pointed out by Thompson that there is no correlation between these demands for victuals and the amount of land in royal hands in the various counties.[2] But it is clear that one criterion employed by the government in deciding which counties should provide food was ease of transport to the place it was required, and in addition it made sense to draw supplies from the main corn producing areas of England, such as East Anglia. It

E.179/71, m. 64.

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Rolls, E. 159/69, mm. 76d, 80d; E. 159/70, mm. 119, 121; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 224, 314, 344, 487-88, 578-79; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, pp. 3, 35, 98-9, 126, 159, 201, 238, 417-19, 423, 509.
2. A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, ed. Thompson, pp. lxxvii-lxxix.

was policy to try and spread the burden: in asking various southern counties for victuals in December 1301 Edward I pointed out that similar aid had been provided by the northern counties earlier in the same year.[1] But considerations of cost and convenience made it impossible to equalise demands for victuals over the whole country. Land transport was slow and expensive, and long sea journeys bad for the cargoes. 1,125 quarters of wheat, together with appreciable quantities of other victuals, that arrived in the early months of 1304 in seven ships from the Isle of Wight and Southampton were all rotten.[2] One other ship was driven ashore long before it neared its destination.[3] Other consignments from the Isle of Wight in different years did reach Berwick safely,[4] but it was clearly more sensible to take supplies from Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and East Anglia.

Within the counties, the government tried to spread the burden of purveyance as equitably as possible. The evidence of the cases that came to court shows that it was normal practice for hundreds and wapentakes to be informed of exactly how much they were to supply,[5] while one indicates that local jurors decided how much should be taken from each man.[6] Demesne supplies were taken as well as those

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 574.
2. Bromsgrove's receipts, E. 101/561/4/16.
3. S.F. Hockey, 'The Transport of Isle of Wight corn to feed Edward I's army in Scotland', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxxvii (1962), pp. 703-05.
4. As for example in 1300, Liber Quotidianus, pp. 133-34.
5. As in Exchequer Plea Roll, E. 13/25, m. 49d.
6. Ibid, E. 13/26m m. 30.

of villagers,[1] and attempts were made to ensure that the burden did not fall to heavily on those least able to bear it. With taxes on moveables collected only twice in the last ten years of the reign, in 1301 and 1306, the system authorised in 1296 of consultation with the tax assessors was impractical.[2] In 1302 instructions were vague, merely ordering purveyance to be made 'in places where it will least burden the people',[3] but in the following year it was ordered that no corn was to be taken from anyone who did not possess at least £10 worth of goods.[4] There is no way of discovering how far these good intentions were complied with, but it was obviously administratively simpler to take supplies from the relatively wealthy than from the poor, who can have had only small quantities of grain in their possession. It has been argued that one effect of purveyances was to raise prices,[5] and that in this indirect way the poor would be affected by royal demands for victuals, but there is no proof of this. Prices taken between 1294 and 1297 did coincide with a period of high prices, but during the rest of the reign of Edward I they were reasonably low,[6] which suggests that if there was such an effect it can have been only slight.

1. P.D.A. Harvey, A Medieval Oxfordshire Village: Cuxham, 1240 to 1400, (1965), p. 111.
2. See supra, p. 204.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 35.
4. Ibid., p. 159.
5. Farmer, 'An Examination of Price Fluctuations in Certain Articles in the Twelfth, Thirteenth and early Fourteenth Centuries' (Oxford Univ. D.Phil. thesis, 1958), p. 80.
6. Farmer, 'Some Grain Price Movements in Thirteenth Century England', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd. ser. x (1957), 212. See the graph of prices infra, p. 364.

The achievement of Edward I's ministers and officials in organising food supplies for the armies and garrisons was a very considerable one. The main importance of their efforts is self-evident: the efficiency of victualling arrangements made possible the military successes of the English during this period. These arrangements did not involve the setting up of any very elaborate administrative machinery, beyond the creation of the victualling bases at Berwick and Carlisle. In the counties the sheriffs and their men, with some assistance from royal clerks, amply demonstrated the flexibility of the normal administrative system, coping remarkably well with the enormous burden imposed on them by the crown's demands for food. A comparison with the victualling arrangements of the sixteenth century shows quite clearly the superiority of Edward I's administration. Even during the most efficiently organised expedition of Henry VIII's reign, that of 1544, the council of Boulogne noted that 'we thinke surely that many people have dide amongst us in their sikeines for lack of socour of freshe meates'.[1] Men such as William Paulett and Stephen Gardiner, who hold a high place in the estimation of sixteenth century historians, were less successful in dealing with the problem of keeping large armies adequately provisioned than the corrupt but extremely competent Walter Langton. With officials of the calibre of Bromsgrove and Dalilegh in charge of the victualling bases, Edward I never found that lack of victuals compelled him to

1. C.S.L. Davies, 'Provisions for Armies, 1509-50', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd. ser., xvii (1964), 242.

abandon a campaign after only six days campaigning on the borders, as happened in 1542.[1] The development of a contractual system of victualling in the later sixteenth century allowed much greater opportunities for corruption than had existed at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[2] Though hardly spectacular, the achievement of Edward I's servants in building up so efficient and successful a victualling service must rank as one of the most notable successes of his government.

1. Ibid., 245.
2. Cruikshank, Elizabeth's Army, pp. 76-90.

VI

THE ENGLISH NAVY

Transport of the huge quantities of supplies needed by Edward I's armies could best be achieved by sea. The huge and cumbersome siege engines needed for the investment of Stirling and other castles were much more easily loaded onto ships than into carts, and could be taken to the places where they were needed with greater speed by water. In the war with France the navy assumed more than a mere logistic importance: control of the sea was essential if the enemy plans for invasion were to be thwarted. There was of course nothing novel in the use of the navy in the wars of the latter part of the reign of Edward I. Ships had been used in the Welsh wars. In 1277 twenty-six were provided by the Cinque Ports, while Bayonne and Southampton each provided one. In 1282 the fleet was larger, totalling forty-two vessels.[1] Naval expenditure on that campaign came to £1,404. 9s. 10½d.[2] The navy played an important part in the war of 1294-5 in victualling the army at Conway and the castles of Criccieth, Harlech and Aberystwyth,[3] and in transporting troops into Anglesey in April 1295.[4]

Valuable as the navy was in Wales, its services were obviously of

1. Morris, Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 106.
2. N.H. Nicolas, History of the Royal Navy, i (1847), 291.
3. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.
4. Ibid., p. xl.

much greater importance in the war with France. The immediate occasion of that war was the rivalry of the Cinque Ports with the Norman sailors, which erupted into hostilities in 1293.[1] Once the war became official with Philip IV's attempt to take over Gascony in 1294, the English and French governments turned their attention to the problem of defending their coasts against attack, and of gaining control of the sea. Philip IV made elaborate preparations for the war at sea. Skilled shipbuilders were brought from Genoa to France to build galleys, some in Marseilles and some in Normandy. In April 1295 a squadron of thirty galleys sailed from the Mediterranean for service in the struggle with the English. Fifty such vessels were based on Harfleur and Rouen, and in addition the French had the use of some 220 merchant ships requisitioned for the war. This fleet did not achieve what was hoped of it, and in November 1295 French plans received a severe setback with the destruction of many vessels in a storm. ~~[illegible] preparing for an attack on Berwick~~. But Philip did not abandon hopes of launching an invasion fleet against England, and in 1297 recruited the greatest naval expert of the time, Benedetto Zaccaria, the Genoese admiral, to assist him. But fortunately for the English the truce was agreed before Zaccaria's plans could be carried out.[2]

1. Supra, pp. 2-3.
2. C. Jourdain, 'Mémoire sur les commencements de la marine militaire sous Philippe le Bel', Mémoires de l'académie des inscriptions et belles lettres, xxx (1881), 377-418; C. de la Roncière, Histoire de la marine française, i. 333-365.

Edward I began taking measures to combat the French naval threat in November 1294. Orders were then sent out to various important ports for the construction of thirty galleys, substantial vessels of 120 oars each, to be ready by Christmas.[1] This date was grossly optimistic. Grimsby and Hull were slow to start work, and writs to hasten building there were sent out on 17 December. To ease the task the size of the ships was reduced to 100 oars.[2] At Newcastle work began early in December 1294, but the galley was not ready for service until September of the following year.[3] Work at London proceeded faster: one galley only took twelve weeks to build,[4] but fitting out took time, and it was not until 19 March 1295 that a captain was appointed and authorised to collect a crew.[5] The cheapest of the galleys was that built at Lyme, which cost £116,[6] but was of only fifty oars. Most cost between £200 and £300, with the second galley built in London the most expensive at £355.[7] Unlike the French, the English made no efforts to get expert advice on building this type of ship which was uncommon in northern waters. The result was that the first of the two galleys built at London had to put back for repairs after its first voyage,[8] while the Newcastle galley needed a refit after less than six months in service.[9] Not much is known about the use and effectiveness of this

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 77.
2. Ibid., m. 79.
3. R.J. Whitwell and C. Johnson, 'The "Newcastle" Galley, A.D. 1294', Archaeologia Aeliana, 4th. ser., ii (1926), 149, 159.
4. C. Johnson, 'London Shipbuilding, A.D. 1295', Antiquaries Journal, vii (1927), 426.
5. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 80.
6. Whitwell and Johnson, op. cit., 145.
7. Johnson, op. cit., 427.
8. Whitwell and Johnson, op. cit., 160. For the construction of the galleys see also R.C. Anderson, 'English Galleys in 1295', Mariner's Mirror, xiv (1928), 220-41.

fleet. In January 1297 the Southampton galley, which in 1295 had a crew of master, four constables and 116 men,[1] captured five French ships,[2] but such incidents were not common. Later in the same year the Lyme and Southampton galleys were used to escort ships carrying money to Gascony. The fleet taking the king's daughter Margaret, duchess of Brabant, across the North Sea early in 1297 was accompanied by the galleys from King's Lynn and Ipswich.[3] After the end of the war with France the galleys were of little use, and decayed with lack of use. The Newcastle vessel was sold back to the town, together with the barge and cock-boat that had been built at the same time, for a mere £40. Surprisingly, a new barge was built at Newcastle in 1304, at a cost of £22. 1s. 1d., but it was disposed of in the same year, by being granted to two shipmasters from Yarmouth in payment of arrears of wages.[4]

The English government did not have to rely for the defence of the coasts solely on ships built specially for the purpose. Merchant ships could be requisitioned for the war. The earliest indication that this was being done is a writ of protection issued on 24 November 1294 for the sailors of Great Yarmouth who were serving with William de Leyburne, Captain of the fleet, and his subordinate, John Botetourt.[5]

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 80d.
2. Exchequer Miscellanea, E. 163/2/4.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, ff. 89, 90.
4. Whitwell and Johnson, op. cit., 160; W. Stanford Reid, 'Sea Power in the Anglo-Scottish War, 1296-1328', Mariner's Mirror, lx (1960), 11; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 10; Nicolas, History of the Royal Navy, i, 305.
5. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 126.

In 1295 efforts to defend England against the French were on a larger scale. News came in the spring that a large enemy fleet was assembling for the purpose of invasion. On 12 April, therefore, commissions were issued to the sheriffs of the coastal counties asking them to collect ships together, those from the south coast to go to Portsmouth, those from eastern England to Harwich and Orewell, and those from the north-east to Ravenser.[1] Accounts survive for one squadron of eight ships, including the Grimsby and Newcastle galleys, which were guarding the coast from Lynn to Berwick in the late summer and autumn of 1295.[2] Other ships were kept in harbour, in readiness for the expected attack. This was a considerable nuisance to the shipowners, and in July some vessels left their stations in Harwich and Yarmouth and returned home without licence.[3]

Arrangements were also made to defend the coasts with land forces against the threatened invasion. The Treasurer was ordered in December 1294 to make sure that this was done, and William de Leyburne and the constable of Dover were made responsible for organising a guard system. Sheriffs were ordered to make public proclamations asking for all to be ready and armed to repel the enemy.[4] At the end of August 1295 appointments of various magnates and knights to guard the coasts were made, with the royal clerk Peter of Dunwich responsible for co-ordinating

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 80.
2. Account of Osbert de Spaldington, E. 101/5/11. This document has been misdated by Stanford Reid, op. cit., 10, to 1296.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 81d.
4. Ibid., m. 79.

arrangements in eastern England.[1] Most of the cost of these measures were born by the localities which supplied the ships and men. Writs were sent out to ensure that those who held land in Yarmouth and the Cinque Ports, but did not actually live there, made their proper contributions. As part compensation for the expenditure on defence, collection of the parliamentary subsidy of a tenth and sixth was suspended in Yarmouth, while the Cinque Ports were acquitted payment of ship-money.[2]

It is hard to assess the effectiveness of these defensive measures, for the threatened large-scale invasion never materialised. At the beginning of August 1295 the French made a raid on Dover. They managed to land, but were soon driven off, the only English casualties being fourteen men, one a monk.[3] At the end of the month an attempt on Winchelsea was thwarted by a squadron of ships from Yarmouth.[4] A further raid, this time on Hyde with seventeen ships and one galley, resulted in the French losing their galley.[5] A blow of a different kind to the French plans was the discovery of the treachery of Thomas Turberville. He had been captured at Rioms, and while in captivity was

1. A.E. Freeman, 'A Moat Defensive: The Coast Defense Scheme of 1295', Speculum, xlii (1967), 446-47; Parl. Writs, i. 268-69.
2. Cal. Close Rolls, 1288-96, pp. 458, 460.
3. Chron. Guisborough, p. 254; Chron. Langtoft, ii. 224, gives the number of casualties as thirteen.
4. Freeman, op. cit., 446.
5. Chron. Cotton, p. 296; Flores Historiarum, ii. 280. The fullest account of this incident is given in the Bagneby chronicle, Brit. Mus., Cotton MSS. Vesp. B. xi, f. 38.

persuaded to serve the French cause. He was allowed to escape to England, leaving his two sons behind as hostages, and busied himself with trying to organise Welsh and Scotch resistance to Edward I. He also tried to obtain command of the fleet and the coastal defences, in order to facilitate the projected invasion. According to one account the clerk employed by Turberville to write a letter to the Provost of Paris deleted to a close confidant of the King's.[1] Sir Goronwy Edwards has shown that a man who later appears as a household messenger, Robert de Crouland, played an important part in the discovery of Turberville's activities, and he makes the plausible hypothesis that this was the man employed by the traitor who informed the government of what was happening.[2] But there were clearly several people involved in Turberville's capture, for on 22 September Nicholas de Lovetot, a clerk closely connected with Walter Langton,[3] was paid a mark to seek him out 'pro quibusdam negociis Regem specialiter tangentibus',[4] and on the following day another clerk, Walter Wither, was paid a pound to go to Gloucestershire to spy on Turberville.[5] The unfortunate man was soon taken, tried and executed, which ended French hopes that their invasion would be aided by a high-placed quisling.

1. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 228. The letter is printed in Chron. Cotton, pp. 304-06.
2. J.G. Edwards, 'The Treason of Thomas Turberville, 1295', in Studies in Medieval History presented to F.M. Powicke, pp. 305-07.
3. A. Beardwood, 'The Trial of Walter Langton, Bishop of Lichfield, 1307-1312', Trans. American Phil. Soc., n. s. liv, part 3, 7.
4. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. 94.
5. Jornalia Roll, E. 405/1/5.

The English took ample revenge for the raids on their coasts during 1295 with the burning of Cherbourg by the men of Yarmouth. Instead of killing a monk as the French had done at Dover, they brought back an aged canon as a prize. Further success was achieved by some ships from Portsmouth, which captured fifteen Spanish vessels.[1] But the government was not satisfied with the year's record, and evidence of musters of the coast defence forces suggests that their organisation was being overhauled and made more efficient. Villages and hundreds were assessed to find out how many soldiers could be raised, and officers were put in charge of each unit of ten men.[2] The city of London provided a force of twenty men-at-arms for four weeks in Kent, each man being paid a lavish twenty marks.[3] Elaborate as the preparations were, the numbers of men actually enrolled for the defence of the coasts were not impressive. The ninety cavalrymen in the Isle of Wight in the spring of 1296 were a force sufficient to deal with raids, but hardly with a full-scale invasion. 504 infantry was not a large number for the defence of Hampshire.[4]

Naval forces appear to have been larger in 1296 than in the

1. Chron. Rishanger, pp. 150-51.
2. Parl. Writs, i. 272-75. These musters are fully discussed by Freeman, op. cit., 447-58, but he does not make it clear that they took place in 1296, not 1295.
3. Parl. Writs, i. 278-79. Freeman, op. cit., 451-52, incorrectly implies that this force was formed in 1295.
4. Freeman, op. cit., 457-58, gives these figures, but considers that the forces were formidable.

previous year. On 3 January Osbert de Spaldington was authorised to raise a fleet of 100 ships from the ports between Lynn and Berwick.[1] No account for this survives, but there is one for the next command to the south, that of John Betetourt, who had a fleet of ninety-four vessels drawn from ports between Norwich and Lynn, with a total complement of 3,578 men. No less than fifty-three of the ships came from Yarmouth.[2] Unfortunately no details survive of the fleets guarding the coasts further south. The navy succeeded in preventing any French raids in 1296. In July the master of the Templars in England reported that the enemy were preparing to descend on Yarmouth in ships disguised as shipping vessels,[3] but this raid does not seem to have materialised. French activities were confined to the harassment of English merchant shipping at sea.[4]

In 1297, the last year of hostilities with France, the English government could not afford to divert so much of its naval resources to the defence of the shores, as ships were needed for transporting the expedition to Flanders. On 25 March William de Leyburne, Stephen de Pencester, constable of Dover, and John le Savage were commissioned to provide ten well-armed ships to watch the French coast,[5] and on 10 July writs of aid were made out for

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 180.
2. Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/2/11. This document is undated, but as the payments it records start on 7 March, and preparations in 1296 were begun early in the year, it seems that it must date from then.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/69, m. 26.
4. Chron. Cotton, p. 313.
5. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 245.

commissions to organise two squadrons to guard the English coast, one of six ships north of the Thames estuary and one of twelve to the south of it.[1] The end of the war with France in the autumn of 1297 meant the end of schemes for coastal defence, for the Scotch had no navy to present the threat of attack that Philip IV's vessels had done.

Defence was only one part of the navy's rôle during this period. Of greater importance was the activity of English shipping in taking men and supplies to Gascony, Flanders and Scotland. No details for 1295 survive, but the enrolled Wardrobe account shows that the impressive sum of £12,852. 6s. 1d. was spent on sailors' wages in the attack on Anglesey and in the fleets sent to Gascony. In the following year the account combines naval expenditure with the expense of maintaining the prisoners taken in Scotland that summer, the two items coming to £18,278. 11s. 6d.[2] According to the chroniclers Rishanger and Guisborough the fleet used on the east coast of Scotland was only twenty-four strong.[3] In contrast, 134 ships were used to transport the Irish troops to Furnese, and a squadron of thirty was then sent north to the Isles.[4] But the main expense that year must have been the fleet which carried Edmund of Lancaster and the earl of Lincoln to Gascony. Details survive of a part of this, fifty ships from the Cinque Ports whose wages from 7 March until 3 May came to £1,519. 15s. 0d.[5]

1. Ibid., p. 291.
2. Pipe Rolls, E. 372/144. See infra, appendix i, p. 436.
3. Chron. Rishanger, p. 157; Chron. Guisborough, p. 274.
4. Accounts of Thomas de Saiterby, E. 101/5/26, mm. 4, 5.
5. Account of the Barons of the Cinque Ports, E. 101/5/28.

In 1297 the bill for sailors' wages was much lower than it had been in the previous two years, coming to £5,506. 19s. 3d. The main reason for the drop was that no large fleets were sent on the long and expensive haul to Gascony. Thirty-eight vessels took victuals there, and in addition a small convoy of six vessels took 11,000 marks to the English paymasters there. The chief task facing the English navy in 1297 was to provide transport for the king's Flemish venture. Early in the year a fleet of eighteen English and twelve Zeeland ships carried Edward I's daughter, the duchess of Brabant, abroad. In May seventeen ships were employed in taking money to the count of Flanders and John de Bar. On their return they sailed down the French coast as far as Normandy destroying enemy shipping.[1] Arrangements to collect the ships needed to transport the main royal expedition to Flanders began surprisingly late in the year. On 27 April writs were sent to every important seaport in the country, including those in Wales, requesting that all ships of over forty tons burthen should assemble at Winchelsea at Midsummer. In addition the Cinque Ports were asked for their traditional service of fifty-seven ships for a fortnight.[2] This general summons of ships was not based on any ancient royal right, save in the special case of the service of the Cinque Ports. The writs emphasized that this expedient was to set no precedent,

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, ff. 89v, 90v-92, 96-97, 105v.
2. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, pp. 99-102; T.F.T. Murray, The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports (1935), p. 213.

and the king relied on the usual mixture of patriotism and threats in order to get the towns to do as he wished. On 12 July writs were sent to the sheriffs of five northerly counties ordering each of them to see that the ships were sent 'as he loves himself and his goods, and as he would wish to avoid the king's wrath'.[1] No very elaborate arrangements were made to collect the ships together, reliance being placed on the sheriffs and town bailiffs, with the Warden of the Cinque Ports and the captain of the King's sailors, William de Leyburne and his sub-captain, John Botetourt, also playing their part.[2] An additional appointment was made on 2 August, when William de Toulouse was allocated the task of hastening the arrival at Winchelsea of the ships from the south coast.[3]

As the army was not so large as Edward I had intended, the problem of raising sufficient ships was not so great as originally visualised. The account shows that there were thirty-two ships used simply to transport supplies and some horses,[4] while the main expedition, sailing on 22 August, was taken across in 273 ships. Of these, seventy-three were provided by the Cinque Ports, and fifty-nine by their great rival, Yarmouth. The king himself sailed in the Cog St. Edward, the largest of the Cinque Ports vessels, which was commanded by Gervase Alard. But this ship, with its crew of forty-nine men,

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 41.
2. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 301.
4. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, ff. 91-93.

was not the largest of the fleet. That place was taken by the Sainte Marie from Bayonne, with a complement of 100 men. Three ships had to wait ten days before leaving, as a contingent sent by the earl of Warwick had not arrived in time. Another fleet, consisting of thirty-four ships, was needed to take Robert FitzPayn and his men to Flanders in October. The total number of sailors needed to transport the army abroad was about 5,800[1]; a large number in view of the fact that there were not many more than 9,000 men taken to Flanders.[2] Some ships were retained for service after their duty as transports was done: a small fleet of fifteen ships, with a total complement of 274 men, was kept in Flanders for a fortnight in October, presumably to guard the harbour of Swyn and to keep communications with England open.[3] Two days after they were dismissed, Edward sent a privy seal writ to the government in England asking for fifty ships and two galleys, 'pur garder le port de Swyne ou pur autre chose faire selonc ce qe nous verroms qe mieux soit.'[4] But there is no mention in the accounts of such a fleet, which the truce with France presumably rendered unnecessary.

There are few details of the fleet that brought Edward I and his army back from Flanders in 1298. In January it was estimated that

1. Ibid., ff. 98-104v.
2. Supra, pp. 90. 114.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 105.
4. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/45/89.

100 English ships would be required for the main contingent. The men of Yarmouth stated that they could only provide twenty,[1] presumably because they had lost so many vessels in the one naval engagement that did take place in 1297, which, ironically, took place in the port of Swyn between the sailors from Yarmouth and those from the Cinque Ports. One Yarmouth source put the damage at thirty-seven ships lost, 171 men killed, and a financial loss of £15,356. The assize roll, probably more reliable, states that seventeen ships were burnt, twelve more looted, 165 men killed, and damages are assessed at £5,000.[2] The wardrobe and all its equipment which was aboard the Bayard of Yarmouth was only saved from destruction in the fight by the quick-minded action of one Philip de Hales, who cut the mooring cable enabling the ship to escape.[3] As the Yarmouth men had suffered such loss, the Cinque Ports were asked to make up the required number of ships by providing eighty vessels.[4] But either the Ports proved uncco-operative, or it was decided that more than 100 ships were needed, for on 4 February 1298 the deputy Warden of the Ports was ordered to collect vessels together not only from the confederation, but also from Portsmouth and Southampton.[5] On the same date a commission was issued to Henry Rose and William Fastolf, two local men, to take all the ships in Norfolk and Suffolk suitable for

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 196.
2. F.W. Brooks, 'The Cinque Ports Feud with Yarmouth', Mariner's Mirror, xix (1933), p. 44.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 57.
4. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 196.
5. Ibid., p. 194.

carrying men and horses, and to get them to Ships by the first Sunday in Lent.[1] On 16 April further appointments were made, of John de Botham and Gilbert de Ardern, both clerks, to collect all ships from the Thames to Hampshire. Portsmouth and Winchelsea were excluded from this demand, presumably since they were covered by the earlier orders.[2] Sufficient ships were assembled, and by the middle of Lent Edward was back in England, ready to prepare for the Scotch campaign.

Ships for the Scotch campaigns were collected in much the same way as they had been for Flanders and Gascony. The only right that the government had was to call on the service of the Cinque Ports. Traditionally this consisted of fifty-seven ships serving for two weeks at the expense of the Ports. This was demanded for the projected campaign of 1299, which never took place,[3] but for the following year the king stated that he would be content with half the usual number of ships, on condition that they were manned by the same number of sailors as the full quota, which came to 1,254 men.[4] In fact they provided thirty ships, with a total complement of 1,106.[5] Once they had completed their brief period of service, these men were paid wages, just like the men of all the other ports, at the

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 328.
2. Ibid., p. 331.
3. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, pp. 290, 307, 313.
4. Ibid., p. 348; Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, p. 655.
5. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 275-77.

standard rate of 3d. a day for the ordinary sailors and 6d. for the shipmasters. The next year, 1301, saw no demand made for service from the Cinque Ports, presumably because there was no formal feudal summons that year, and it was felt to be too much to ask the Ports for service when no one else was similarly burdened. But they were asked to send twelve ships to Ireland at royal wages to assist in transporting men and supplies to Scotland.[1] No mention is made of these vessels in the Wardrobe accounts, so it appears likely that the Ports did not comply with the royal request.

At this time relations between the crown and the Cinque Ports were not good. In one account they presented they claimed that they were owed a total of £2,467. 6s. 8d., largely for the Gascon war, but a note at the foot of the document, written by a royal clerk, pointed out that they had not paid any of the taxes levied between 1294 and 1297, nor had they accounted for 600 marks received from the Treasurer of Ireland. In addition, it was claimed that they had impeded the justices making inquiries about foreign coin circulating in England, and damages were put at £1,000. The barons of the Ports claimed that these debts were offset by the payment of 2,000 marks for the tax of a fifteenth levied in 1301. The eventual conclusion of the arguments appears to have been that the crown agreed that it owed the Ports £500 for their contribution to the Scotch wars, and that the rest

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, pp. 486-87.

of the claims should be allowed to cancel each other out.[1]

In view of these arguments it is not surprising to find that in 1301 there were only three ships from the Cinque Ports on the Wardrobe pay roll.[2] But in 1303, with a feudal summons, the Ports were asked for their service. As in 1300, the full number of ships was not demanded: twenty-five was suggested as a sufficient number.[3] No account for the contingent survives, but it is known that the king was not satisfied with their performance, as on 1 December 1303 a commission was set up to enquire into the desertion of men from the Cinque Ports and other Kentish seaports during the campaign.[4] The Ports' service was again demanded in 1306, twenty-seven ships being requested.[5] In fact, they only brought twenty-four, with a total complement of 990 men. The ships from Hythe arrived in Scotland on 3 July, and most of the others two days later. Instead of doing their unpaid service at once, they were at wages until 17 September, and then did fifteen days at their own cost. Most then returned home, but a squadron of twelve ships remained in the north at wages. The Cinque Ports flagship was the Cog St. Edward, the same ship that had taken the king to Flanders ten years before. The total cost to the crown of the fleet was £1,276. 14s. 0d. In October 1306 £86. 13s. 4d. was

1. Account of the Cinque Ports, E. 101/5/30.
2. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 130-31.
3. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 612.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 203.
5. Ibid., p. 431.

paid them by the Wardrobe, but the rest remained outstanding.[1]

To get the other ports to send ships to assist in the Scotch wars the crown might either appoint commissions to negotiate with the towns, or simply send writs to the mayors and bailiffs demanding that they send a specific number of vessels. It is not clear which method was used in 1300, a year in which few ships from outside the Cinque Ports were employed. In December 1299 and January 1300 Richard de Bromsgrove was using a few ships, never more than nine at any one time, on the job of taking food to the castles for which he was responsible.[2] During the summer some fifteen smallish ships were occupied in keeping the army in Galloway supplied with victuals. There were also two substantial galleys, each with a crew of about fifty, which were provided by their owner, Simon de Montague. Besides these English vessels, eight Irish ships were used.[3]

In 1301 with the ambitious plan for a double campaign in Scotland and no service requested from the Cinque Ports Edward I had to make much more extensive demands on the naval capacity of the country. On 14 February orders were sent to various towns, asking for a total of fifty-eight ships from England and ten from Ireland.[4] In fact, more were provided. On the east coast over fifty were employed in carrying

1. Account of the Cinque Ports, E. 101/13/8.
2. Brit. Mus., Harleian MSS. 626, ff. 12-13, Bromsgrove's account for 130
3. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 271-79.
4. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, pp. 482-83.

supplies, but they were small vessels, mostly with crews of ten men or less. There were only about ten ships equal in size to those that had been used on the Flemish expedition. The cost of all these ships, few of which remained on station for very long, was only £567. 10s. 10d.[1] The fleet assembled to support the operations of the prince's army in the west had one major task: it had to transport the Irish troops across to Skinburness. Forty-seven ships in all were needed for this, of which over twenty were Irish. No details are given in the Wardrobe account of the number of sailors employed, but the tonnage of the various ships is given. The largest was the Margaret of Shoreham, of 195 tuns, while there were ten other vessels over 100 tons burthen. Payment to the shipmasters was calculated on the unusual system of a negotiated sum, in most cases seven shillings, being paid for each tun of the ship. The total cost of the fleet came to £867, which included payments made to six ships which sailed from Waterford to Dublin, only to find that their services were not required.[2]

Although more ships were used by the government in 1301 than had originally been ordered from the seaports, Edward I was not pleased with the year's naval record, as twelve towns on the south coast, including Southampton, Portsmouth and Bridgewater, had not supplied the ships that had been promised. On 10 August Thomas de Warbleton

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, ff. 130-1.
2. Ibid., ff. 102-3.

and Peter of Dunwich were appointed to punish these towns. The task obviously proved too much for two men, and on 30 August revised commissions were issued. Dunwich was joined by Richard de Aston and Peter de Chalons, and Warbleton's place was taken by Nicholas Fermbaud.[1] It was discovered that there were ships in Bridgewater and Weymouth that could have been sent to Scotland, but the men of Poole stated that the only two ships that they had had both been taken to Scotland in the service of the earl of Lincoln, the lord of the town. In Portsmouth harbour there were no suitable vessels, while the two Seaford ships were found to have been in Gascony for six months.[2]

Similar difficulties in collecting ships for Scotland continued in the next years. On 10 November 1302 orders were issued for twenty-five ships from various south coast ports to appear together with the Cinque Ports fleet at Ayr by 15 August of the following year.[3] Peter of Dunwich was responsible for negotiating with the towns. In Bristol the burgesses agreed to send two ships, but Dunwich found it impossible to obtain crews for the vessels, and Nicholas Fermbaud, constable of Bristol Castle had to be asked to use all possible means, including distraint, in order to get men to serve. The responsibility of selecting fifty ships from the coastal towns from Essex to Northumberland was given to Walter Bacon. He was ordered to adopt the exceptional step

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, pp. 52-53, 61; original commissions in E. 101/10/21/1, 5, 6.
2. Records of the commissions, E. 101/9/7/2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
3. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 612.

of taking security from the towns that did agree to send ships, to ensure that they fulfilled their promises. The men of the liberty of Durham refused to send the ships that were selected, and Bacon had to get the assistance of Robert Clifford, guardian of the palatinate, to force the ports of Hartlepool, Wearmouth and Jarrow to co-operate. The towns of York, Beverly, Lincoln, Ely, Norwich and Cambridge did consent to provide ships, but then found that the burden was too great for them, and had to apply for royal assistance to get the men of the surrounding areas to help them.[1]

In May 1303 there was a fleet of sixteen ships at Berwick which, to judge from the size of their crews, were fully equipped for war, the smallest having eighteen men and the largest forty-seven.[2] But most of the ships in service on the eastern coast were much smaller. Richard de Bromsgrove's victualling account shows that sixty-five transport vessels, mostly with crews of less than ten men, were used in taking food and weapons to such Scotch ports as Aberdeen, Perth, Montrose and Blackness.[3] Thirty-one ships were needed to act first as transports and then as pontoons for the elaborate prefabricated bridges which Edward I had [redacted] constructed for the crossing of the Forth. This enterprise cost in all £938. 9s. 6d.,[4] and according to Langtoft was found to be quite unnecessary, as the river was crossed without

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-07, p. 76.
2. Book of Prests, 31 Edward I, E. 101/364/13; ff. 89; Bromsgrove's account, Brit. Mus., Add. Mss. 7965; ff. 21-27.
4. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1375.

using the bridges.[1] As in 1301, a substantial fleet was needed on the opposite side of Scotland to bring the Irish contingents over. It consisted of thirty-seven English and Welsh vessels, and twenty-three Irish ones, and the total wages bill for them came to £998. 15s. 4d., rather more than it need have been, for the ships were assembled too early and had to wait a month or more for the arrival of the soldiers they were to transport.[2] An account of the cost of preparing the ships to carry horses shows that one vessel might take from ten to thirty-two animals. Fifty ships carried 820 horses between them.[3] In the same year, 1303, six ships with a crew between them of 140 men, ranging from one of 110 tons to one of 200 tons, the latter being manned by thirty-four men, were employed in taking home various Gascons who had served Edward I in England and Scotland.[4] The draft final Wardrobe account for the year shows that the total cost of the government's maritime activities came to £1,657. 14s. 6d.[5]

The military operations of the following year, 1304, were largely devoted to consolidating the gains made in 1303, and above all to capturing Stirling. No large fleet was needed, and no special commissioners were appointed to select vessels for service in Scotland. The Wardrobe account reveals that just over fifty ships were employed,

1. Chron. Langtoft, p. 348.
2. Account of Alexander de Bikenore, E. 101/11/2, ff. 2, 5v., 7-10.
3. Account of John of Dores and William de Caterham, E. 101/10/29.
4. Indenture of agreement for transport to Gascony, E. 101/371/8/39.
5. Draft Wardrobe account, E. 101/364/14.

mostly small transport vessels. They were used for collecting supplies from Newcastle and Berwick, and taking them to Stirling. There were also tasks such as transporting the lead required for the counterweights of the great engines used in the siege that could only be performed by ships. In the second half of March the Margaret of Ravenser was used to take the king's tent from St. Andrews to Stirling, and once the siege was over the Rose of Dromwich took it south to Newcastle. The total cost of the naval activities of 1304 only came to £307. 16s. 8d.[1]

The campaigns against Robert Bruce at the end of the reign of Edward I saw, as far as can be determined from the incomplete accounts, a smaller transport fleet than ever. None of the usual commissions to collect troops from the ports were employed, and there were no Irish troops to be ferried across to Scotland. The small size of the English forces in Scotland presumably meant that there was not such a need as in former years for ships. John Sandale's account reveals that only £532. 15s. 5d. was spent on twenty-five ships.[2] But in these last campaigns ships were not needed solely for transport. There are indications that the Scotch were using ships to harass the English in a new way. Early in 1306 orders were issued ordering English ships not to approach the coasts of Ayr or Galloway.[3] In that

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 99-112.
2. Sandale's account, E. 101/13/16, ff. 9-13.
3. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii, nos. 1753, 1763.

year Edward had only the Cinque Ports fleet with which to oppose the Scotch at sea. Though admirals were appointed for fleets from the south and east coasts of England,[1] there is no indication in the Wardrobe accounts that any such ships were employed, save for the few transport vessels already mentioned.[2] In the next year the English did not even have the Ports fleet, and Edward had to rely on the support of his Scotch allies and the Irish. Robert Bruce was thought, probably correctly, to be in hiding in the Western Isles,[3] and on 29 January a letter was sent to the Treasurer of Ireland in the following terms:

> 'Por ce qe nous avoms mandez a mons' Hugh Byset quil face hastivement apparailler tote sa navie e touz les vesseaux covenables quil porra porchacer devers celes parties, por venir od mesme la navie sur la costere descoce a mons' Johan de Meneteth por porsivre en la compaignie du dit Johan Robert de Brus iadys Conte de Carrik, e noz autres enemis qui ont lour refuit por meer devers les Isles, e por destruire lour navie, e por faire sur eux lexploit quil porrent: vous mandoms fermement enjoignantz en la foi qe vous nouz devez qe au dit Hugh soiez aidant e conseillant en totes les bones maneres qe vous porrez de purveer vesseux covenables devers celes parties a la plus grant foison qe vous porrez, e de faire eskiper meismes les vesseux bien et suffisaument de gentz vigoureuses e dofensables, e de vitailles por aler sur noz enemis avantditz en la manere avantdite.'[4]

That Edward was correct in assuming the enemy to have a reasonable naval strength was demonstrated in February 1307 when Thomas and

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 438.
2. The section of sailor's wages in the 1306 Wardrobe book, E. 101/369/11, ff. 139-40, is a transcript of the Cinque Ports account in E. 101/13/8. The book of presta, E. 101/368/27, f. 37, has presta to thirteen ships from the ports, and mentions no other ships.
3. Barrow, Robert Bruce, pp. 237-42, is the best discussion of the problem of where Bruce sought refuge.
4. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/547/13.

Alexander Bruce landed in Galloway with a fleet of eighteen ships, only to be defeated by Dungal Macdouall.[1] No Irish ships can have arrived by then to assist the English, for the letter quoted above did not reach the hands of the Treasurer until 23 February, as an endorsement on it notes. John Menteith was a former patriot who had turned staunch supporter of Edward I in about 1304:[2] the trust that the king had in him is testified by his being given command of the naval activity directed against Bruce. Hugh Bisset on whom the English were also relying was Lord of Antrim in Ireland, and a man with a considerable interest in the Isle of Arran, which he had taken in 1298. It is plausibly pointed out by Barrow that Bisset's interest in capturing Bruce may have been only half-hearted, as he was a bitter opponent of Bruce's enemy Macdouall.[3] Whether for this reason, or through sheer bad luck, English naval action against Bruce in 1307 was not successful. After the Scotch King's return to the mainland a fleet was still kept in being off Galloway, probably under the command of Simon de Montague, who had provided galleys for the fleet in 1300. On 16 June John Bisset, cousin of Hugh Bisset, agreed with Montague to guard the coast near Kintyre with four barges manned by 100 men in return for fifty marks.[4] Unfortunately there are no accounts surviving to provide full details of the ships operating in Scotland at the very close of Edward I's reign.

1. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p. 240.
2. Ibid., p. 193.
3. Ibid., p. 239.
4. Bain, Cal. Docs. Scot., ii. no. 1940.

The one exceptional feature of the naval efforts of the latter years of Edward I's reign was the attempt to build up a fleet of royal galleys, and that appears to have been of little value and was soon abandoned. There was nothing particularly notable about the size of the fleets that were assembled by the government at this time. Richard I had formed a large navy to take him on crusade. In 1230 Henry III crossed to France with 288 ships, while 161 others were allowed to return from Portsmouth to their home ports as they were not required.[1] One of the largest fleets ever collected in the middle ages was that which took Edward III's army to France for the siege of Calais in 1347. The army was roughly 32,000 strong, and almost 750 ships were needed, with over 15,000 sailors to man them.[2]

But unexceptional though Edward I's calls on the naval resources of England may have been, they nevertheless imposed a considerable burden on the country. Although the crews of the ships were paid reasonable wages, in the case of the Scotch campaign the seaports had to bear the cost of the voyage to the north and home again, and in 1303 there was some trouble when they refused to do this.[3] While the crown would normally pay the cost of converting ships to carry horses, the rest of the expense of preparing them for the campaigns

1. F.W. Brooks, The English Naval Forces, 1199-1272 (1932), pp. 187-88.
2. These figures are taken from a sixteenth century summary of a contemporary account, Bodleian MSS. Rawl. c. 846, pp. 19-36.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 203.

had to be borne by the towns. There are unfortunately no urban accounts that indicate how considerable these burdens were, but they were sufficient for the Cinque Ports and Yarmouth to get crown assistance in 1295 to ensure that those men who owned lands inside the towns, but lived outside, made their contributions, and for various east coast towns in 1303 to get assistance from surrounding neighbourhoods, as did Looe and two other Cornish ports.[1] Seaports might also suffer when ships were lost while in the king's service. But naval battles were rare, and such losses few, save in the internecine fight between the Cinque Ports and Yarmouth in 1297, which could hardly be blamed on the government. The only ships lost in military action in Scotland were three vessels which entered the harbour of Berwick in 1296 in the initial attack on the town.[2] In 1304 the men of Dunwich petitioned in parliament for compensation for the loss in war of ten ships, whose value they put at £1,000.[3] But the accounts reveal few such losses, and the townsmen were probably exaggerating.

The demands of war on the shipping of the nation must have affected trade and the fishing industry, but it is impossible to calculate to what extent. It is doubtful that the great fleets that sailed for Gascony between 1294 and 1297 can have had a very adverse effect. They were following a normal trade route, and the fact that they were

1. Supra, p. 242 ; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 131.
2. Chron. Guisborough, p. 274.
3. Maitland, Memoranda de Parliamento, no. 217; Rot. Parl. i, p. 167.

transporting grain purveyed by the crown rather than grain purchased by merchants can have made little difference to the shipowners' profits. In 1297 the ships going to Gascony were not paid wages, like most of the fleets employed by Edward I, but were paid freightage rates, a tun of flour generally costing 5s. 6d. to transport, and a quarter of wheat a shilling.[1] This was presumably the normal mercantile system of charging. The ships, having taken men and victuals to Gascony, were able to revert to their normal function on the return voyage of importing huge quantities of wine into England. The call for ships to transport the army to Flanders must have interrupted normal trading patterns far more than did the Gascon fleets, since ships from all over the southern and eastern coasts were removed from their normal activities, and since transport of the army could not be combined with normal trade. But it is very doubtful that such demands for ships can have provided a greater hindrance to trade in the Channel and North Sea than did the embargo placed on Anglo-French trade and the high customs duties of the years between 1294 and 1297. Furthermore, comparison with the great fleet of 1347 suggests that Edward I's demands on the nation's ships were not all that heavy. It does not appear that there were many objections to Edward's commandeering of ships until 1301. By that time trade with the continent had revived after the French war, and the long voyage north to Scotland for which they were not paid was resented, particularly by the men of the south coast ports. But the numbers of ships

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, ff. 96-97.

involved in the Scotch wars were not such that their commandeering was a considerable disadvantage to the economy.

Much money was spent on the navy during the period from 1294 until 1297, but thereafter it was only a minor item in the campaign accounts. Though expensive for a time in financial terms, it never presented a great administrative burden. Few professional soldiers were employed to command the fleets. William de Leyburne and John Botetourt were given important commands in the early stages of the French war, and in 1306 another household knight, Edward Charles, was given command of the ships from the east coast. Appointed at the same time to the south coast fleet was Gervase Alard of Winchelsea, by far the most important professional sailor entrusted with major commands by the king.[1] The assembly of fleets posed much more of a problem than did the command, but the government managed to achieve this task with a remarkably small corps of men. Osbert de Spaldington, a royal justice, was employed in organising naval activity in 1295 and 1296,[2] but usually men of lesser status were used. Royal clerks such as Alexander de Convers[3] and Walter Bacon[4] were appointed on occasion to collect ships together, while Peter of Dunwich, another royal clerk, was something of an expert in naval administration.[5] Local

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 438.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 180; Spaldington's account, E. 101/5/11.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 455.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-07, p. 75.
5. Ibid., pp. 52-53, 61, 75, 128.

men might be employed on the commissions, and of course the services of the Warden of the Cinque Ports could always be relied on.

The navy formed an integral part of the war effort under Edward I. Without it, none of the campaigns between 1294 and 1307 would have been possible. Its rôle was not a spectacular one, being largely confined to that of providing transport. But the important tasks in war are not necessarily the flamboyant ones, and it was by careful attention to the problems of transport and supply that Edward's government was able to achieve what military success it did, rather than by any brilliant feats of arms. Much credit is due to the officials whose organising ability ensured that sufficient vessels were available, but the last words of praise must go to the ships themselves, the Blithes, Garlaundes, Godales and Marioles, and even more to the men who sailed such primitive craft, sometimes in the depths of winter, in support of the war effort.

VII

THE COSTS OF WAR

Warfare in the middle ages was rarely cheap, and Edward I's strategy of attempting to crush his enemies by weight of numbers and superiority of organisation was scarcely economical. In addition, he adopted an expensive policy against the French of purchasing allies to fight on his behalf. Sufficient accounts survive from the period of almost incessant warfare from 1294 until the end of the reign for it to be possible to produce some estimates of the costs incurred in most of the campaigns - costs which it was not always possible to meet from the financial resources available to the government.

The needs of the war with France dominated the policies of the English government from 1294 until 1297. Much the most expensive aspect of that war was the defensive struggle of the English troops in Gascony. The first English paymaster there was Peter de Aylesford, appointed in 1294. £26,666. 13s. 4d. was paid out to him in cash by the Exchequer. He never made account for this sum, for he died, and his position was taken over by John Sandale, who was assisted by Thomas of Cambridge. In 1314 these men did account at the Exchequer for their expenditure in the period of wartime, reckoned as from

11 November 1294, when they took over, until 24 March 1298, and for payments due in the period of truce up to 14 August 1299.[1] The total of expenses shown in the account totalled £359,288. 0s. 5d. Of this sum, wages paid to English cavalry amounted to £37,051. 16s. 7½d., and to Gascon forces, horse and foot, £137,595. 2s. 9d. Money paid in compensation for horses lost on royal service came to £25,816. Sailors' wages were £16,869. 6s. 6d., and the pay of English and Spanish infantry amounted to £17,928. 1s. 9d. The items of Necessaria and Dona in the account covered mainly military expenditure, such as payments to spies, bribes to win mercenaries over from the enemy, the cost of siege engines and defensive fortifications, and gifts to soldiers, totalling £41,940. 15s. 1d. Payments during the period of truce came to £30,690. 12s. 6d., which mostly went to pay Gascons who had been expelled from their lands by the French.

As usual, receipts did not match expenditure. Sandale and Cambridge took over £7,240. 13s. 4d. that was left of Peter de Aylesford's funds. During the years of warfare the Exchequer sent out £119,934 in cash to Gascony, and in 1299 the paymasters received a further £1,333. 13s. 4d. from the same source. Victuals sent from England worth £11,149. 16s. 4d. were accounted as receipts. In the period up to 1298 £8,779. 14s. 7d. was sent out by the Wardrobe. The largest

1. Powicke's alteration of this date in The Thirteenth Century, p. 650, n.2, to 1303 is not justified by the M.S., Pipe Roll E. 372/160.

sum raised locally was £45,763. 14s. 1½d., borrowed from merchants of Bayonne. Minor receipts brought the sum directly available to Sandale and Cambridge during the period that they were acting as paymasters in Gascony to £196,603. 12s. 5d. This was a long way short of the total of expenditure incurred, and during the years up to 1314 efforts were made to pay off the deficit. According to the two paymasters sums paid out by the Exchequer and Wardrobe in minutis particulis in the years before the account was finally drawn up brought the total of receipts up to £300,148. 19s. 1½d., leaving a deficit of £59,139. 1s. 3½d. This, they claimed, was owed by those who had been paid prests and advances in wartime, which had not been repaid or accounted for by the recipients. But the Exchequer was not satisfied with the evidence produced by the paymasters, and only accepted payment of debts to military captains which totalled £154,570. 4s. 4½d. up to a value of £56,580. 10s. 8½d., leaving Sandale and Cambridge charged with £97,989. 13s. 8d. But these accounting technicalities should not be taken too seriously. The claims of the paymasters probably give a clearer impression of the real state of the finances than do the doubts and quibbles of the Exchequer officials.[1]

1. Sandale and Cambridge's enrolled account, Pipe Roll, E. 372/160. This is summarised and quoted in part by Bémont, Rôles Gascons iii, clxviii-clxix. Part of an account book used in the compilation of the account survives in E. 101/353/21. An account of some prests made by Sandale and Cambridge between 1294 and 1299 was drawn up in the Wardrobe as late as 1319-20, in E. 101/377/20.

The account of Sandale and Cambridge does not give a complete picture of the costs of the Gascon war. Not only does it not include the costs incurred by Peter de Aylesford, probably about £20,000 to judge by his receipts, but also there was considerable expenditure in England in support of the war. Soldiers had to be paid while awaiting embarcation, victuals purveyed had to be paid for, sailors had to be paid their wages. Unfortunately the Wardrobe accounts are not broken down in sufficient detail to make any accurate calculations of the total spent in this way. In 1295, for example, it is stated that £12,852. 6s. 1d. was spent on paying sailors both for going to Gascony and for transporting men and supplies to Anglesey. But a rough estimate would be that the Wardrobe spent about £80,000 from 1294 until 1297 on the war in Gascony. [1] In addition, in October 1295 Edmund of Lancaster and several other magnates were advanced almost £2,000 directly from the Exchequer in order to assist their preparations for the expedition to Gascony.[2] In all, the cost of saving Gascony, excluding the payments made in time of the truce, works out at roughly £400,000.

The cost of organising the alliance against Philip IV was very much less than the expense of fighting a war in south-western France. The agreement with Adolf of Nassau appears to have been that he

1. Enrolled Wardrobe accounts, E. 372/144, summarised in Appendix I, infra, pp. 435-38.
2. Liberate Roll, C. 62/71; Issue Roll, E. 403/99.

should receive £40,000 by Christmas 1294, and a further £20,000 when Edward I actually began his campaign in Flanders, though this latter payment was never actually made.[1] The archbishop of Cologne was initially promised 10,000 marks with a further £2,000 as a gift, but it seems that this agreement was altered, as in all £12,000 was paid out to him. Unfortunately some of the funds destined for the archbishop failed to reach him, as they were seized in transit by some subjects of the duke of Brabant. To the minor German allies was promised £1,760, all of which they received.[2] The first payment to the Germans was made by a royal clerk, Robert de Segre, who was sent abroad from 22 July until 10 October 1294 with £22,000 entrusted to him by the Exchequer. In November he was sent off again, this time with John Botetourt, and nearly £25,000 from the Exchequer to pay out to the allies. In addition, payments were made to the Germans by Elias Russel and Gilbert Chesterton, two English merchants appointed to receive customs duties paid abroad, and to sell wool seized by the English government.[3]

Lavish promises of payment were made by Edward I to his allies in the Low Countries. Agreements made with John duke of Brabant in Anglesey in the spring of 1295 were for the payment of 200,000 livres tournois, or £50,000 at the rate of exchange then current. In addition, the duke was promised £4,000 out of the new custom of forty shillings

1. Trautz, Die Könige von England und das Reich, 1272-1377, p. 147, nn. 225, 231.
2. See infra, appendix ii, pp. 445-47.
3. See infra, pp. 336, 445-47.

on each sack of wool exported, a grant intended to compensate the Brabantines for the damage that this measure would do to their economy by increasing the cost of English wool. In 1297 a further grant was made to the duke, this time in the form of a loan of £25,000 to be paid out of the customs. John, lord of Cuijk, who acted as the duke's agent in England on several occasions, and was extremely active on the continent in the English cause, was granted a fee of 200 livres tournois in 1295, and promised a gift of £1,000 in 1297. Floris V, count of Holland, was owed 80,000 livres tournois by the English in return for his support. His son John was due to receive a substantial marriage portion from Edward I, his father-in-law, but the precise sum is not specified in the records. In addition, he was granted 5,000 livres tournois. The great English success in winning over the count of Flanders early in 1297 was expensive, with 100,000 livres tournois owed for the first year of the alliance, and an additional 70,000 livres granted to the count.

Substantial payments were also due to Edward's allies in eastern France. The obligations to Henry count of Bar are hard to disentangle, but he was certainly owed 30,000 marks in return for service with 1,000 horse for six months. In 1297 a liberate writ of 10,000 livres tournois was made out to him, and this was probably a separate grant. Also, his brother John de Bar was due to receive £500, for serving with fifty

horse. The league of Burgundian nobles from the Franche-Comté was promised 60,000 livres tournois in the first year of the alliance, 1297, with 30,000 in each subsequent year. They were also to get £2,000 as a gift. In addition, 2,000 livres tournois was due to be paid over to Aymo de Faucoigny, a Burgundian with whom Otto de Grandson had arranged an alliance. In all, the English diplomatic offensive between 1294 and 1297 imposed obligations on the English government to pay subsidies totalling some £250,000 to the allies in Germany, the Low Countries and Burgundy, of which only £25,000 due to the duke of Brabant was expressed as being a loan rather than an outright grant.

It has already been shown that Edward I went a long way toward meeting his obligations to the Germans, only the final sum due to Adolf of Nassau not being paid. But the other allies did not do quite so well. Payment was made in various ways. De Segre, in addition to handing over subsidies to the German allies, paid 3,700 marks to the count of Bar. Russel and Chesterton paid £3,880 to the duke of Brabant.[1] Further payments were made abroad by Walter Langton, who from June 1296 until November 1297 was on an embassy organising the alliance. He disposed of £36,872. 4s. 4d., most of it to the count of Flanders and to the Burgundian league.[2]

1. Fuller details and references to payments made to foreign allies are to be found infra, appendix ii, pp. 445-54.
2. G.P. Cuttino, 'Bishop Langton's mission for Edward I, 1296-1297', in 'Studies in British History', Univ. of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences, xi, no. 2 (1941), 149, 154-55.

Langton made account with the Wardrobe for the payments that he made, and that department was responsible in 1297 and early 1298 for other payments to the allies. £11,000 in cash was advanced to the count of Flanders, and in March 1298 the final payment to the Burgundians was made by the Italian banking firm of the Frescobaldi acting under the instructions of the Wardrobe. Many other payments during the period of war with France were made in England by the Exchequer to representatives of the allies, John duke of Brabant in particular being mainly paid in this way. The counts of Holland also received funds directly from the Exchequer in England, so making it unecessary for the English government to take the trouble of transferring the money abroad.[1] That this might be a considerable operation is shown by the fact that it took ten ships, manned by 654 sailors, to take roughly £25,000 across to Robert de Segre in Holland.[2] In view of the incompleteness of the Exchequer records during these years, it is probable that evidence of some minor payments to the allies has not survived. But £165,784. 8s. 9d. was definitely paid out to them between 1294 and 1298, and it is very unlikely that the full figure was much higher than this.[3]

The campaign in Flanders in 1297 was very cheap in comparison with

1. Fuller details and references are in appendix ii, infra, pp. 445-54.
2. J. de Sturler, 'Deux comptes enrôlés de Robert de Segre, receveur et agent payeur d'Edouard Ier, roi d'Angleterre, aux Pays-Bas (1294-1296)', Bull. de la comm. royale d'histoire, cxxv (1959), 601.
3. E.B. Fryde, 'Financial Resources of Edward I in the Netherlands, 1294-98', Revue Belge, xl (1962), 1170-1185, calculates the total of subsidies as only £142,026. My reasons for disagreeing with this figure are given infra, p. 454.

the cost of the war in Gascony and the expense of the foreign alliances. Transport costs were not high, and the army was a small one. The Wardrobe account book gives details of the cost of the expedition up to 19 November. The strictly military headings of wages and victualling total just over £25,000, but there are some items relevant to the war in the section of Necessaria.[1] Unfortunately there is no similar account book for the succeeding year, and for the period from 20 November 1297 until the king's return in the spring of the next year the only evidence of that of the enrolled account, which does not differentiate between expenditure in Flanders and that on the Falkirk campaign in Scotland.[2] So no accurate calculation of costs in Flanders is possible, but it would seem unlikely that they can have been more than about £50,000. Such figures can only be approximate, but it would seem that the overall cost of the war with France in alliances and in direct military intervention was the impressive figure of roughly £615,000.

The cost of the war with France was not of course the total of the government's military expenditure in the period from 1294 until the king's return from Flanders early in 1298. The Welsh revolt of 1294 was a considerable blow to Edward I: even his finest castle, Caernarvon, still in process of completion, was taken by the rebels. Considerable resources were diverted to the putting down of the

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965.
2. Enrolled Wardrobe account, Pipe Roll, E. 372/144. This, like the other Wardrobe accounts, is summarised in appendix i, infra, pp. 435-44.

rising. Cavalry fees and wages for the year from November 1294 came to £2,843, while those of the serjeants-at-arms and footsoldiers came to £26,388.[1] At the start of the rising over £55,000 was sent to Wales in cash, and the costs of the campaign were quite sufficient to consume this sum.[2] The next year, 1296, saw a major campaign in Scotland. The expenditure of £3,243 on cavalry wages must have been largely incurred there, as must the £2,603 due to the serjeants-at-arms. Wages of footsoldiers in Scotland came to £21,443, and £2,598 went to the Irish troops serving there. But the accounts are not detailed enough to give any more accurate indications of the cost of the campaign.[3] There are no details of the cost of the military operations in Scotland in the next year: it is not clear how the army which was defeated at Stirling Bridge was ~~paid~~ financed ~~out of Scotch revenues~~. But this was hardly possible in the case of the expedition that went north in the winter of 1297-98 to avenge that defeat. It was arranged that £7,691. 16s. 8d. of the money raised in a subsidy granted by the southern province of the English church should pay for 500 horse for three months.[4] In addition, Walter of Amersham incurred expenditure in his rôle of paymaster totalling £10,445. 5s. 9½d.,[5] and his companion Richard of Abingdon £747. 1s. 6d.,[6] bringing the

1. Ibid.
2. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. l, liii.
3. Appendix i, infra, p. 437.
4. Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 64-65.
5. Amersham's enrolled account, printed ibid., pp. 265-68.
6. Abingdon's account, E. 101/6/30. The total of expenditure on this account was £907. 1s. 6d., but of that sum £160 was simply paid over to Amersham, and has therefore been subtracted for the purpose of this calculation.

wages total for the campaign to £18,884. 3s. 11½d.

To provide an accurate figure for the cost of Edward I's wars from the opening of hostilities with France until the king's return from Flanders is impossible. But an approximation can be attempted. With the war with France costing about £615,000, that in Wales £55,000, and the campaigns in Scotland in the summer of 1296 and the winter of 1297-98 probably about £60,000, the total reaches £730,000. This expense was not all incurred by the Wardrobe, as the costs of the earlier Welsh wars had been. The Exchequer was responsible for much of the payment of the foreign allies, and Sandale and Cambridge in Gascony were not part of the Wardrobe organisation, but accounted directly with the Exchequer. Also, with the Wardrobe in Flanders, the Exchequer had to take charge of the winter campaign in Scotland that began late in 1297. Even so, this period saw the highest Wardrobe expenditure of the reign. For the regnal year from November 1294 until the same date in 1295 it totalled £138,255. In the next year it was £83,648, and in the year of the Flanders campaign the figure was £119,519. The Wardrobe accounts did of course cover some normal expenditure, notably the cost of running the royal household, which came to some £11,000 a year, but by far the greater part of the costs incurred by the department in this period were on the war.[1]

1. The Wardrobe accounts are summarised in appendix i, infra, pp. 435-44.

The wars in Scotland with which Edward I was concerned after his return from Flanders until the end of the reign were very much cheaper than the conflict with France. With war now being fought on only one front the Wardrobe was able to appropriate to itself all the business of making payments for the campaigns, so the administrative structure was simplified. The evidence of the cost of the Falkirk campaign of 1298 is not very satisfactory, as no detailed account survives. There is simply the summary provided by the enrolled account of the Wardrobe, which does not adequately distinguish between expenditure in Flanders and Scotland. Cavalry wages in the year from November 1297 until November 1298 came to £11,805, while men-at-arms and crossbowmen cost £1,749. Infantry wages totalled £22,453. Victuals bought for Scotland came to only £2,766. The full total of Wardrobe expenditure in the year was £78,549, and a reasonable estimate would be that £45,000 of this went on the Scotch campaign.[1]

No overall accounts of the Wardrobe survive for 1299, a year which saw no major military activity in Scotland, but the costs of the Caerlaverock campaign of 1300 are fully detailed in the Controller's book of the Wardrobe. The one really costly item was the castle garrisons, on which £13,574 was spent. Victuals came to £5,063. The wages of the bannerets and knights amounted to £3,077, those of

1. Ibid.

the serjeants-at-arms and crossbowmen to £1,038, and those of the infantry to £4,446: the latter figure being a remarkable reduction on previous years, and probably more an indication of a high desertion rate than of any decision to economise. Nearly £2,000 went in payments in compensation for horses lost on the campaign. The total of Wardrobe expenditure in the year was £64,105, and the cost of the military operations in Scotland was very much the same as on the Falkirk campaign of 1298.[1]

In 1301 expenditure in Scotland was rather higher, because of the ambitious double campaign. The big increase over the previous year was in infantry wages, which amounted to £15,746, while the wages of the rest of the soldiers came to £10,050. Less was spent on castle garrisons and victualling than in the previous year, these sections of the account totalling £8,195. The overall total of Wardrobe expenditure for the year was £77,291, which indicates that the campaign cost £10,000 or £15,000 more than that of the year before.[2] And, of course, the figures do not include the cost of Edward's stay in Scotland over the winter of 1301-2, as the account ended in November. These expenses are included in the Wardrobe account for the next year, which shows cavalry wages of £4,346, infantry wages of £437, and those of the sailors as only £178. Castle garrisons and victualling cost £10,817. These figures are

1. Ibid.; Liber Quotidianus, passim.
2. Appendix i, infra, pp. 440-41 ; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a.

taken from a summary account, as the full version does not survive. From the form of the document it appears to have been drawn up preparatory to entering it in the Pipe roll. But the Exchequer was probably not satisfied with it, as no enrolled version exists. The total of expenditure it shows was £61,949.[1]

A similar document exists for the next year, 1303, when Edward I again invaded Scotland. Total expenditure is shown as being £64,026. But no figure for infantry wages is given, as this was included in the next year's account. The wages of the cavalry and crossbowmen amounted to £12,308, and those of the sailors £1,658. £2,868 went on castle garrisons and £4,855 on victuals.[2] For the following year, 1304, a complete Wardrobe book survives, which provides full details of expenditure. It shows that infantry wages over the two years 1303-1304 came to £8,881, while from November 1303 until the end of the campaign in 1304 the wages of the cavalry and the crossbowmen amounted to the high figure of £13,576. Victuals are shown as costing £6,409, and castle garrisons £1,805,[3] but these are not the full totals, as the accounts of Bromsgrove and Weston at Berwick were not included in the Wardrobe book, probably as they were not completed in time. Weston's expenditure on castles came to £2,697. 10s. 6d.[4]

1. Draft final Wardrobe account, E. 101/360/25; infra, appendix i, pp. 441-42.
2. Draft final Wardrobe account, E. 101/364/14; infra, appendix i, pp. 442-43.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835; infra, appendix i, p. 443.
4. Weston's account, E. 101/12/18, f. 9.

It is not really possible with these accounts to isolate military expenditure from the normal costs of the royal household, but it would seem that the campaigns of 1303 and 1304 must have cost something in the region of £75,000 or £80,000.

For the last two years of the reign, with the campaigns against Bruce, the accounts are in a condition that makes an attempt to estimate the overall cost of the struggle impossible. The Wardrobe book for 1306 does not give an adequate version of the year's expenditure. It includes the cost of the wages of some men for campaigns as far back as 1300, but has very incomplete figures for the year to which it is supposed to relate. Virtually no details are given of the infantry forces, the only statement for 1306 being that Walter Reynolds, keeper of the prince's wardrobe, paid out £1,142 on footsoldiers. The one section of the whole account that deals with military expenditure and is reasonably full is the victualling one, which shows a total of £6,909. But this figure is inflated by the inclusion of the account of purveyances in Lancashire and Cheshire for 1298, and Bromsgrove's accounts for 1303 and 1304.[1] For 1307 there is no complete wardrobe account, and the documents that survive do not make it possible to calculate how much expenditure was incurred by the department. But from the cost of the infantry after the death of Edward I, which for the period 23 July to 5

1. E. 101/369/11. The unreliability of this account is pointed out by Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 129, n. 1.

September came to only £1,442. 2s. 4d., it is reasonable to deduce that expenses were not on the scale of the earlier campaigns in Scotland.[1] As already shown, the Wardrobe was not the only department responsible for paying and organising the troops in Scotland at the end of the reign of Edward I. The account of the English chamberlain of Scotland, John Sandale, which covers the period from Bruce's murder of the Comyn until the death of Edward I, shows the cost of the force headed by Aymer de Valence, and of the castles held by the English with the exception of those in the south-west of Scotland. The total came to £15,206, the largest item being the cost of the castle garrisons which came to £5,873, and the next the wages of the knights at £4,310. Wages of the squires came to only £640, but an additional expense incurred on the cavalry was the £2,022 owed them in recompense for horses lost on campaign.[2]

The format of the accounts for the years from 1298 until the end of the reign of Edward I is such that it is impossible to work out the precise cost of the wars in Scotland. But they do show roughly what the annual total of expenses was in many of these years, ranging from almost £62,000 in 1302, when there was no full campaign in Scotland, to over £77,000 in 1301 and 1306, though in the case of the latter year the figure must be regarded with more than usual scepticism. The Wardrobe accounts indicate that although expenditure

1. Wardrobe book, 1 Edward II, E. 101/373/15, f. 17v.
2. Sandale's account book, E. 101/13/16.

was not on the same scale as that during the period from 1294 to 1298, a campaign in Scotland would add something of the order of £40,000 to a year's total. Although the numbers of troops involved in the struggle against Bruce at the end of the reign were not so large as those in the massive campaigns that had been launched against the Scotch earlier, the length of the conflict made it expensive. And Edward's government did not have only the expense of the major campaigns to meet: the castle garrisons which formed an occupation force all the year round in Scotland had to be fed and financed.[1] It must be emphasised that these figures of expenditure are not calculations of the amount of cash actually paid out by the government. The evidence adduced so far indicates that from 1294 until the end of the reign the English government was faced by the need to find huge sums of money, but it gives little indication of how successful it was.

Who were the men primarily responsible for organising the expenditure on Edward's wars? Part of the answer to this question has been given, as the rôle of the army paymasters has been examined,[2] but that of the Wardrobe clerks deserves a little more attention, even though the subject has been very fully treated by Tout.[3] Keeper of the Wardrobe in 1294 was Walter Langton. He had held this office since 1290, and had served in the department since 1282, previously having been a clerk of Robert Burnell's. A man of considerable

1. See the table of Wardrobe expenditure in appendix i, infra, pp. 440-44.
2. See supra, pp. 177-93.
3. Tout, Chapters in Mediæval Administrative History, ii. 10-145.

ability and energy, if not of integrity, he replaced the unpopular William March as Treasurer, taking office in September 1295.[1] Langton's tenure of the keepership of the Wardrobe, though not long, was very important. When the king, later, wrote on behalf of Langton to Boniface VIII he attributed his minister's unpopularity in part to his action in reforming the royal household by dismissing useless personnel.[2] It also appears that it was during Langton's term of office that the system of drawing up the accounts was reorganised on a more efficient basis.[3]

When Langton was promoted from the Wardrobe in 1295 and as Treasurer came to play what was virtually the rôle of prime minister in the last ten years of Edward I's reign, the keepership of the Wardrobe was held by John Droxford. A man of importance, though not of Langton's calibre, surprisingly little is known of him personally. He had only come into royal service in 1288, and within three years rose to be controller of the Wardrobe. As keeper he was a regular member of the council, one of the small group of men who determined royal policy, replacing Langton at the Exchequer when the Treasurer was abroad defending his dubious personal character. Droxford's

1. A. Beardwood, 'The Trial of Walter Langton, Bishop of Lichfield, 1307-1312', Trans. American Phil. Soc., n.s. liv, part 3 (1964), 6 and passim. March redeemed the unpopularity he had gained as a result of the financial measures he had introduced in 1294 and 1295 in his episcopal career, gaining something of a reputation for sanctity: Tout, Chapters in Medieval Administrative History, ii. 13, 17 n. 5.
2. Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-07, p. 81.
3. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. xii-xiv.

activities were too multifarious for it to be possible to provide a comprehensive sketch, but a good indication of his rôle is provided by the account of a journey he undertook in the summer of 1304. Leaving the court at Stirling on 17 June he went first to York, where the Exchequer was, to hasten the despatch of money for the army, then went to Boston in Lincolnshire to hurry up overdue supplies. Next he toured southern England collecting funds from papal taxation, going to such monastic houses as Oseney, Reading and Hyde, ending up at Canterbury. Then he went to Amesbury to see the king's daughter Mary, who was a nun there, and escorted her to Windsor. Moving to London, Droxford met Langton to discuss various affairs of state. By 3 September he was back at court in the neighbourhood of Newcastle.[1] Such energy was typical of the man. Though Droxford was not as blatantly corrupt as Langton, he was not above using his official position to obtain what he wanted, as the cofferer of the Wardrobe, Walter Bedwin, discovered in 1307 when his superior was trying 'par force de sa seigneurie' to get a prebend for his brother Roger which Bedwin claimed as an appurtenance of his office of Treasurer of York. Bedwin was assured by a correspondent that Langton supported him, and that he had no reason to fear 'nulle malice qe le dit Johan vous porra porchacer': an incident which reveals that the relations between Edward I's officials might be far from amicable.[2]

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, f. 13v.
2. Anonymous letter in E. 101/368/18/61; The Register of William Greenfield, Lord Archbishop of York, 1306-1315, ed. W. Brown and A.H. Thompson, i. (Surtees Soc, cxlv, 1931), 16.

Next to Droxford in importance in the official hierarchy, and probably closer to the King, was John Benstead, controller of the Wardrobe from 1295 until 1305. In this capacity his most important duty was the custody of the privy seal. He was virtually Edward I's secretary, and was on one occasion termed by the king 'our clerk who stays continually by our side'. He was also employed as a diplomat, and in 1305 was transferred from the Wardrobe to the Exchequer, where he was chancellor. Not long after Edward I's death Benstead resigned his clerical orders, married, and became a royal justice.[1] His successor at the Wardrobe was one of his subordinates, Robert Cottingham, a Yorkshireman. The paucity of information about him suggests that he was by no means so important a man as Benstead in the administration.[2]

The main concern of the controllers of the Wardrobe was with clerical business. More important on the financial side was the office of cofferer. From 1297 until 1303 this post was held by Ralph Manton,[3] and it was he, if any one man can be singled out, who was the chief army paymaster. He frequently acted as Droxford's deputy, in particular often taking over the chore of accounting from the keeper. In March 1301, for example, he went from Lincoln to London 'pro particulis

1. G.J. Kingsford, 'John de Benstede and his missions for Edward I', Essays in History presented to R.L. Poole, ed. H.W.C. Davis (1927), pp. 332-59.
2. J.L. Grassi, 'The Clerical Dynasties from Bowdenshire, Nottinghamshire, and Lindsey in the Royal Administration, 1280-1340', (Oxford Univ. D.Phil thesis) pp. 292-93.
3. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, vi. 30.

comp' eiusdem Gerderobe intendendis, et compotis diversorum audiendis et rectifiendis', a task which took about three weeks.[1] At the end of January 1303 Manton was sent to inspect the English castles in Scotland, to recruit men-at-arms for them, and to pay the wages of the garrisons. For this, he was entrusted with £400.[2] In the company of John de Segrave he was surprised by the enemy at Roslin, south of Edinburgh, on 24 February. According to the chronicler Langtoft he tried to buy his safety from his captor, the former household knight Simon Fraser. But Fraser rebuked him, saying 'Tu as le roy trahy ke tresorier to fist, et moy et mulz des altres, dunt nes est quit des gages ke tu doit par tayle et par escrit', and pointing out that his military garb was hardly suitable for a cleric. The unfortunate man was then executed on the spot.[3] Fraser's accusation was not without point. As the administration frequently did not have the cash to pay wages, the Wardrobe had to issue creditors with bills or debentures in lieu, and Manton's seal appears very frequently on these. Fraser himself had been issued with one, to a value of £20, which he had evidently found difficulty in cashing, as a special mandate was issued ordering payment to be made to him.[4] And Manton certainly had a retinue more fitting for a knight than for a clerk, consisting in 1300 of five squires.[5]

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 43v.
2. Book of prects for 31 Edward I, E. 101/364/13, f. 46.
3. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 344-46.
4. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/61/62a.
5. Liber Quotidianus, p. 245.

Manton was succeeded as cofferer by Walter Bedwin, one of his subordinates, and a man eminently qualified for the office, as he had been playing an active rôle in the Wardrobe during the period of the wars in Scotland. As early as 1300 he had been appointed to hear Abingdon's account of victualling at Carlisle.[1] On the accession of Edward II Bedwin left the Wardrobe, and in 1308 became King's remembrancer at the Exchequer.[2]

These men, Droxford, Benstead, Manton and Bedwin were the chief figures in the Wardrobe in the later years of Edward I's reign. But there were many other men who did much to organise the expenditure of so much money on the wars that characterised the period. At the highest level the Treasurer obviously took an extremely active interest in the expenditure incurred by the Wardrobe, while the Steward of the Household shared much of the responsibility of the Keeper. In the parliament of 1305 the King's clerk John of Berwick was linked with Droxford and Benstead, all three being described as 'discreet men', presumably particularly closely connected with the king.[3] There were many clerks who might on occasion be entrusted with important functions. In the Wardrobe there were such men as Peter of Collingbourne, Peter of Bramber, John of Ockham and several others.[4] There was no high degree of specialisation in the Edwardian

1. Liber Quotidianus, p. 99.
2. J. Conway Davies, The Baronial Opposition to Edward II, its Character and Policy (1918), p. 267.
3. Memoranda de Parliamento, ed Maitland, pp. xliii, 300.
4. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 24.

administration: officials were allocated as they became available to whatever tasks were of the greatest importance. A chamberlain of the Exchequer might find himself employed on Wardrobe business,[1] and a Wardrobe clerk might find himself engaged on the task of assigning revenue to foreign merchants, normally a duty of Exchequer officials.[2]

This flexibility of the administration, which was one of its greatest strengths, also made for difficulties, in that the lack of supervision it entailed meant that there was no proper means of ensuring that expenditure was kept in line with receipts. The pressure of the wars in Scotland on Droxford and his colleagues was such that the accounts were not properly kept up to date, and Wardrobe bills and debentures were issued without any knowlege of whether the funds to meet them were available, and when they might be paid off. It is now time, having examined the way in which the Edwardian war effort was organised, and the costs that the government incurred, to turn to the means that were adopted to try to pay for it all.

1. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 51v.
2. Ibid., f. 42.

VIII

TAXATION

The problem of raising the money needed to pay for the wars with France, Wales and Scotland was a very considerable one. It was not possible to increase the traditional royal income from lands, profits of justice, forests, escheats and wardships to any very great extent. Such sources only brought in some £20,000 or £30,000 a year. Nor was it possible after 1290 to turn to that favourite standby of impoverished monarchs, the Jews. But there were many other opportunities available. The traditional feudal aids of the knighting of the king's eldest son and the marriage of his eldest daughter could be collected. The royal right to collect tallage on crown demesnes might be put into effect. Compulsory purchase of merchandise through the use of the right of prise could yield profits. Trade could be tapped by means of customs duties. The currency might be manipulated to the advantage of the government. If necessary, loans could be negotiated with English and foreign merchants. But Edward's first and most obvious method was that of taxation.

The most important form of taxation in this period was the series of taxes on moveable property. There was nothing novel about this method of raising money, which had been used by Henry III and went

back to the thirteenth collected by king John in 1207. Each of these taxes had to be separately negotiated with parliament, for there was no prerogative right to this form of taxation. This had obvious political implications, but during the early stages of the war with France Edward I's demands do not seem to have aroused much opposition. In November 1294 the magnates agreed to the payment of a tenth, with the towns and ancient demesne paying a sixth. As no burgesses were present in the parliament, separate negotiations were held with the towns, a procedure again adopted in 1297.[1] This grant in 1294 was followed by one of an eleventh and seventh in the next year, and by a twelfth and eighth in 1296. Cotton mentions that the laity made some slight objections to the grant in 1295, but states that they soon agreed to it.[2] The chroniclers were of course far more interested in the question of clerical taxation, but the impression they give of a generally acquiescent laity does not seem far from the truth. As Langtoft pointed out, it was better to pay harsh taxes than to be conquered by the French. 'Donk vaut melz doner le tant cum home l'ayt, Ke vivre cum chaitif en payne si estrayt'.[3] There is not even evidence that the reduction of the rates at which the taxes were levied was the result of political opposition: it is just as likely to have been

1. J.F. Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, 1290 to 1334, (1934), p. 15.
2. Chron. Cotton, p. 299.
3. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 214.

the result of royal policy. A popular song, admittedly of a slightly later period, pointed to one reason for the ease with which the crown obtained grants: 'Ceux que grauntent ne paient ren, est male constitutum. Nam concedentes nil dant regi, sed egentes'.[1]

In the year of political crisis, 1297, the situation was aggravated by controversy about the grant of taxation. The arguments were not so much about the weight of the burden as about the way in which taxes should be negotiated. Edward could hardly approach the Salisbury parliament in February for a new tax, for it was less than three months since the grant of the twelfth and eighth.[2] But by July the financial situation was such that a further tax was clearly needed. As no parliament could be summoned in a short time, and as such an assembly would almost certainly have been disinclined to make grants, Edward obtained agreement to the collection of an eighth 'de plebe in sua camera circumstante'.[3] The Exchequer promptly prepared the administrative machinery for levying the tax, and by 14 August the officials were claiming that all was ready.[4] But these plans were thwarted by Bigod and Bohun, who with their supporters appeared at the Exchequer on 22 August and requested the abandonment of the tax. Bohun acted as spokesman, and the main point he made was that the tax had not been properly negotiated, but arbitrarily imposed. He

1. Political Songs, ed. T. Wright (Camden Soc., 1839), p. 184. See infra, p. 329, n. 1, on the date of this song.
2. Handbook of British Chronology, ed. F.M. Powicke and E.B. Fryde (2nd. edn, 1961), p. 511.
3. Flores Historiarum, iii. 102.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/70, m. 36. The original of this letter is in Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/17/36.

emphasized that to pay such a levy to which due assent had not been given was to admit to being a condition of servitude.[1] This fear that taxation might become a servile obligation is also expressed in the Confirmatio Cartarum.[2] When the need for a tax became even more pressing, with the news of the defeat of Warenne at Stirling Bridge, the opposition were determined not to authorise the collection of this infamous eighth. Instead, a new tax of a ninth was granted in parliament in the conventional way.

Although the formal issue concerning taxation in 1297 was over the way in which taxes were granted, and not the burden imposed on the country, the propaganda of the opposition had stressed the hardships involved in frequent levies, and it was clearly unwise for Edward to ask for another tax in the following year. In fact, it was not until 1300 that parliament was approached on this subject. In March a subsidy of a twentieth was granted, but no attempt was made to levy the tax. The opposition had realised that grants of aid might be made conditional upon redress of grievances, and although the king was prepared to assent to the Articuli Super Cartas he was not prepared to agree that the royal forests should be perambulated, and that the findings of the commission set up to do this should be enforced.[3]

1. 'Extracts from the Memoranda Rolls (L.T.R.) of the Exchequer: I. The Negotiations Preceding the Confirmatio Cartarum (1297 A.D.), Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., N.S. iii (1886), 284; J.G. Edwards, 'Confirmatio Cartarum and Baronial Grievances in 1297', Eng. Hist. Rev., lviii (1943), 155-57.
2. 'Poussent tourner en servage a eux', Stubbs, Select Charters, p.491.
3. Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 702-03; Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, p. 122.

But in the following year, after the expense of the Caerlaverock campaign, the king had to swallow his pride. With a further expedition planned, a subsidy was essential. At the Lincoln parliament early in 1301 the demands of the opposition were expressed in a bill presented by Henry of Keighley, who was to suffer imprisonment in five years' time for his action.[1] The perambulation of the forests was requested, and, to ensure that Edward did not go back on his word, a fifteenth was granted with the proviso that it should not be collected until Michaelmas, by which time it would be possible to see if the government was meeting the conditions imposed. Early in October the grant was officially confirmed, by the magnates in the royal army at Glasgow, and by those in the company of the prince of Wales at Ayr.[2] Edward I considered that Keighley and the rest of the opposition were acting at the instigation of archbishop Winchelsey,[3] and it is very probable that he was right. According to Thorn, the St. Augustine's chronicler, it was on account of his intrigues in the Lincoln parliament that Edward forbad Winchelsey to return to England in 1306.[4]

It was probably in order to avoid any similar constitutional concessions or political difficulties that the government chose not to seek any more parliamentary subsidies until 1306. In that year

1. Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p. 704. The bill is printed in Parl. Writs, i. 104-05.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 59d. Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, p. 24, has mistaken Newcastle-on-Ayr for Newcastle-on-Tyne.
3. Madox, History and Antiquities of the Exchequer, ii. 108; King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/79, m. 40d.
4. Twysden, Historiae Anglicanae Scriptores Decem, p. 2005.

Edward was faced with the revolt of Robert Bruce, but he did not use that alone as a reason for requesting aid. In May his eldest son, the Prince of Wales was knighted. For this occasion the king was entitled to demand a feudal aid, but this was not a form of taxation that brought in much money,[1] and in place of such a levy Edward persuaded the parliament that met at Westminster in the spring to grant a twentieth and a thirtieth for the double expense of knighting his son and putting down the revolt in Scotland. There is no indication that the low rate of taxation was the result of political pressure, though so ill-informed were the chroniclers at the end of the reign that it is possible that this was the case.

In fact, the rates at which these taxes were ordered to be levied bore little relation to the amounts they actually yielded. The ninth of 1297 was the heaviest of the whole reign in terms of the rate at which it was levied, yet the total assessment was lower by £358. 11s. 6¼d. ~~lower~~ than that of the twentieth and thirtieth of nine years later. The variations are best shown in tabular form.

Table of total tax assessments.

1275	15th.	£81,054. 2s. 8¼d.
1283	30th.	£42,754. 1s. 7d.
1290	15th.	£116,346. 12s. 11½d.
1294	10th & 6th.	£81,838. 9s. 4¾d.
1295	11th & 7th.	£52,870. 2s. 6¾d.
1296	12th & 8th.	£38,485. 18s. 0½d.

1. See *infra*, pp. 309-10.

1297	9th.	£34,419. 2s. 2½d.
1301	15th.	£49,755. 7s. 3½d.
1306	30th & 20th.	£34,777. 13s. 8¾d.[1]

In contrast to the period after 1334, there was at this time no standard assessment. Nor were the arrangements made for each tax the same. In 1297 and 1301 the chief taxers of each county, appointed by the Exchequer, were ordered to have either four or two men elected in each vill or township to do the job of calculating the value of everyone's moveable property, whereas in the other years the task was done by a jury of twelve men from each hundred with the assistance of the reeve and four men from each vill.[2] Not all moveables were taxed, but the list of exemptions was not always the same. The upper classes did not have to pay on their armour, riding horses, jewels and robes, or vessels of gold, silver and brass. In 1301 this clause was accidentally omitted, but further instructions sent to the taxers saw it reinserted.[3] Burgesses were allowed one robe for a man and one for his wife, together with one bed, one ring, one buckle, a silk girdle and a silver cup, but in 1306 no exemption was allowed for these items.[4] Treasure in the form of coin was included for the first time as a taxable item in 1295.[5] The very poor were always exempted from the payment of taxes. The principle usually adopted was that if, for example, a ninth was levied,

1. Willard, 'The taxes upon Moveables in the Reign of Edward I', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxviii (1913), 519; Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, p. 344.
2. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
3. Ibid., p. 25.
4. J.A.C. Vincent, Lancashire Lay Subsidies (Lancashire and Cheshire Record Soc., xxvii, 1893), p. 257.
5. Ibid., p. 192.

then those whose property was not worth nine shillings would not be taxed. With the low rate of taxation in 1306 this system could hardly be used, and the level was set at ten shillings.[1] During the period 1294-1297 the clergy did not have pay on their spiritualities or on posessions annexed to churches, as they were paying separate clerical taxes. In 1296 the concession was reduced, and villeins of ecclesiastics were taxed. But in the last two taxes of the reign the clergy were more severely treated, and had to pay on all their temporalities.[2] A further reason for the low tax assessments in the years of the war with France was that some of the magnates serving in Gascony were pardoned payment of taxes.[3]

The differences in methods of assessment and in liability to tax are not sufficient to explain the wide variations between the totals of the various taxes. Nor is it likely that the succession of taxes from 1294 to 1297 impoverished the country to the extent that the figures suggest. A more plausible explanation is suggested by the records of the Oxfordshire village of Cuxham. The highest assessment of this village during the period 1290-1307 was that of 1294, which came to £60. 11s. 8d. For the next year, the villagers took care to get the valuation lowered. They spent lavishly on entertaining the assessors, with the result that the figure dropped to £12. 18s. 0d.

1. Ibid., p. 258.
2. Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, pp. 96-101.
3. Ibid., pp. 111-14.

From 1297 direct bribery by the reeve in addition to entertainment became the rule: in 1301 payment to the chief assessor was authorised by the sub-warden of Merton.[1] Cuxham is a striking example of what was common in the whole country, and with taxes levied so frequently further forms of tax evasion, which have failed to find their way into the records, must have been developed.

What efforts were made by the government to deal with the problem of under-assessment? The memoranda rolls for 1293-1294 record fines on many of the sub-collectors of taxes in Surrey, for failing to make full assessments and other transgressions. Fifteen places were concerned, and the fines totalled £67. 16s. 8d.[2] But there are no such entries on these rolls later in the reign. The enquiry into administrative malpractices held in 1298 revealed much corruption,[3] and the memory of it may have spurred the taxers of 1301 and 1306 to greater rectitude. A more positive incentive was that in 1301 the collectors were given a much more lavish allowance for expenses than in former years: those for Berkshire got £30 as against £5 in 1297, and those for Oxfordshire £27 as against £5 in the earlier year. This was partly due to greater cost of the journey to York, where the Exchequer moved in 1298, while there were three collectors for each county in 1301, not two as before. But the increase in allowances may have reduced the temptation to take bribes.[4] Occasionally legal action was taken by

1. P.D.A. Harvey, A Mediaeval Oxfordshire Village, Cuxham 1240 to 1400 (1965), pp. 105-08.
2. Surrey Taxation Returns. 15ths and 10ths. Part A - the 1332 assessment (Surrey Record Society, xviii, 1922), pp. xxx-xxxiv.
3. Thompson, A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, passim.
4. Willard. Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, p. 202.

the crown. In about 1300 one of the taxers of the tenth and sixth for Derbyshire was accused of not taxing the men of three villages, and of failing to assess some of his own tenants.[1] At the very end of the reign the collectors of the 1301 fifteenth for Swinesford in Lincolnshire were accused of appropriating the proceeds of the tax.[2] It clearly took a long time to bring cases to court, and in neither of those two is any conclusion recorded. So many people were concerned on the local level with the business of tax assessment and collection that it was wholly impracticable for the government to attempt any detailed supervision It was not until 1334, when the system of assessing each tax separately was abandoned, that some of these problems were successfully avoided.

Once the assessments were made the money had to be collected. Precise calculations for all the taxes are not possible, but rough calculations of yield can be made. In addition, it is possible by examining the process of accounting for the various taxes to gain some idea of how efficiently the crown's finances were run at this period. The taxes from 1294 to 1297 were all intended to be paid in within a very short time from the grant. There were two instalments for each tax, and both for the tenth and sixth and the eleventh and seventh they were due in February and May of the year succeeding the grant. For the next tax the second instalment was delayed until early June, while the ninth was due half in December 1297 and half in February of the next year.[3]

1. Exchequer Plea Roll, E. 13/24, m. 19.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/80, m. 55.
3. Vincent, Lancashire Lay Subsidies, pp. 180, 188, 192, 197.

There are two sources from which calculations of the yield of the taxes can be made; the final accounts and the receipt rolls which recorded the payments as they were made. Orders to the collectors of the tenth and sixth of 1294 asking them to come and make their account at the Exchequer were sent out in February 1298, and writs were sent out over the next couple of years for the collection of arrears. These were generally larger than the arrears shown in the final account, which suggests that this was not drawn up before 1301 at the earliest. It is attached to the pipe roll for 1306, like the accounts for the taxes of 1295 and 1296, so it appears certain that it was not made up until the last few years of the reign of Edward I. This late date of compilation makes use of the final account as evidence difficult, especially as, like all such accounts, it gives no indication of the date at which payments were made.[1] Nevertheless, E.B. Fryde has calculated from it that after the main payments in had been made by the autumn of 1295, arrears stood at roughly £7,000.[2] The receipt rolls provide a more accurate indication of the speed with which the money was collected. By late May 1295, by which time all should have been paid, only about £45,000 had actually come in. Ten months later the Exchequer had received in all about £72,820.[3] This means that arrears may have been slightly higher than Fryde's estimate, but allowance must be made for the fact that not all of

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Rolls, E. 159/71, m. 104d; E. 159/72, m. 95; E. 159/73, m. 64d; Pipe Roll, E. 372/151.
2. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. li.
3. One of the relevant rolls is summarised by Vincent, Lancashire Lay Subsidies, pp. 184-85. The others are E. 401/132 and E. 401/1644.

the money collected was paid into the Exchequer. The galleys ordered from Dartmouth, Lynn, Grimsby, Dunwich, Southampton and Lyme were all to be partly paid for out of the proceeds of the tax.[1] Although no such writ of assignment was sent to the Somerset collectors, when late in May 1295 they arrived at the Exchequer they found it shut, and instead of waiting till it opened they paid the money over to the bailiffs of Southampton to help pay for the galley building there.[2] So the sum concerned does not appear in the receipt rolls, although due allowance for it would have been made in the final account.

There are no receipt rolls for the tax granted in 1295, but calculations of the yield from the final account suggest a figure in the region of £46,000, roughly £7,000 below the assessment. Not all of this sum was arrears, for some was pardoned in the case of men serving in Gascony, and some went in allowances to the collectors. The account was probably drawn up at the same time as that for the tenth and sixth, together with the twelfth and eighth of the following year, for orders to the collectors of all three taxes were sent out at the same time, and all three accounts are to be found in the same pipe roll.[3] One receipt roll survives for the twelfth and eighth, for the period from late April until mid-September 1297. During this time £17,070 was paid into the Exchequer, all but £2,444 of it before

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 75.
2. Ibid., m. 80d.
3. Pipe Roll, E. 372/151; King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/71, m. 104d.

7 June. As half of the tax was due to be paid by 2 June, amounting to roughly £19,000, this roll suggests that the collectors were doing their job very efficiently.[1] This impression is confirmed by the final account, which shows much smaller arrears than in the previous years.

The ninth granted in 1297 was the most efficiently organised of all the taxes since the war with France began. The final account for it is attached to the Pipe roll for the year 1297-98, and from the fact that it mentions a debt owed by the collectors for Cornwall that was outstanding after they had made their account, for which they satisfied the barons of the Exchequer in the county membrane for Cornwall in the very same Pipe roll, it is apparent that the account was drawn up very soon after the tax was collected. The Memoranda rolls show that most of the views of account, which were a necessary preliminary in the making of the final account, were taken during the spring and summer of 1298.[3] A yield of roughly £32,000 is indicated.

In this series of taxes from 1294 to 1297 the burden of each new tax reduced the chances of collecting the arrears of the last, so that the earlier taxes were the more inefficient. One indication of this

1. Vincent, Lancashire Lay Subsidies, p. 195.
2. Pipe Roll, E. 372/143.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/71, mm. 97-98.

is given by the writs of fieri facias sent to the sheriffs ordering them to extract arrears of taxes from the collectors. In November 1298 arrears on the tenth and sixth demanded in such orders amounted to £230, and those on the next tax to £52. On the more recent twelfth and eighth more was owing: about £270, while there was £46 to be collected from men who had served as taxers in both 1295 and 1296.[1] By October 1300 the job of collecting outstanding arrears on the twelfth and eighth was largely complete: the collectors for Somerset being the only ones still under pressure from the Exchequer to pay up. But there were still arrears of £100 due to be paid from the tenth and sixth, and £30 from the eleventh and seventh.[2] These figures are not definitive, for the Exchequer was by no means methodical in enrolling the writs it issued. But they do show that far from the burden of administering the taxes being such as to cause increasing difficulties toward 1297, the supervision of the collectors became increasingly effective.

Payment of the fifteenth authorised in 1301 was requested in three instalments, the first in November 1301 and the other two in May and July of the following year. But the evidence of the receipt rolls shows that this timetable was hardly adhered to. They show a total of £36,150 paid in,[3] but the roll for Michaelmas term 1301 is

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/72, m. 95.
2. Ibid., E. 159/73, m. 64d.
3. Exchequer Receipt Rolls, E. 401/1661, 1664, 1668, 1678, 1685, 1690, 1694, 1695, 1703.

missing. A reasonable estimate would be that about £6,000 came in then. In the early stages of the tax, before it had even been ratified by the magnates in the army in Scotland, considerable efforts were made to get the money in speedily. Officials equipped with details of the yield of the last fifteenth were sent to approach fifty-seven towns and persuade them to compound for the tax by making an early payment of a lump sum.[1] At least fifteen agreed to this,[2] though four were amerced for failing to pay up in time.[3] In addition, the Cinque Ports promised 2,000 marks to cover the tax,[4] and the Templars and Hospitallers each paid 700 marks.[5] But despite this initial show of activity, it is doubtful whether more than £15,000 can have been paid into the Exchequer by August 1302, by which date payment should have been complete. A year later £20,000 more had come in, after which receipts dropped rapidly. But in the year starting from Michaelmas 1304 greater efforts were made to collect the arrears, and some £5,500 was paid in.[6]

One reason why the money flowed slowly was that much of the proceeds

1. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, pp. 461-63.
2. Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, p. 2, lists London, Lincoln, Oxford, Hull, Scarborough, Newcastle, Northampton, Barton-on-Humber, and King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 68, adds Canterbury, Portsmouth, Wells, Andover, Somerton, Winchester and Rochester.
3. Ibid. These were Andover, Somerton, Winchester and Rochester.
4. Cal. Close Rolls, 1301-07, p. 278. Payment was dilatory, and in 1305 money owed by the crown was set against the fine, leaving the Ports £594. 6s. 8d. to pay: King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Rolls, E. 159/79, mm. 37d, 61d.
5. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 600, 606.
6. Figures derived from the receipt rolls cited supra, p. 303 n. 3.

of the tax had been assigned away in advance. In October 1301 Edward I wrote two stern letters to the Exchequer, stressing his urgent need of cash, and suggesting that with the receipts of the fifteenth, combined with those of the clerical taxes and of the normal Michaelmas profer by the sheriffs, there should be no lack of money.[1] In their reply the Exchequer pointed out that the Treasurer[2] had promised £6,000 of the receipts of the fifteenth to the Frescobaldi in repayment of loans, £2,000 to be paid from each of the instalments of the tax. £1,789. 16s. 5d. was to be paid to certain Gascon merchants for money that had been improperly seized by Wardrobe officials in London that summer. £4,000 was to be paid to the Welsh troops in the prince of Wales' army in Scotland, and all of this was to come from the first instalment. £4,000 was assigned out of the first two terms to some Gascons for wine taken from them, and in addition they were due to receive 500 marks from the fifteenth in Cornwall. It was estimated that £9,789. 16s. 5d. of the first instalment due of the tax had been promised to these various creditors.[3] Nor were these the only assignments, for in March and April Edward had ordered payment for the victuals needed for the campaign to be made out of the fifteenth.[4] This caused some difficulties, as the collectors and taxers to whom the writs of assignment were sent had not yet been elected. There were protests from Essex, and an order was sent out to hold the writs over until the taxers were appointed.[5]

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, mm. 5d., 7.
2. Presumably Langton's lieutenant Droxford, as Langton was on his way to Rome to defend his moral character.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 10.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 596.
5. Ibid., p. 589. Several documents relating to this assignment are printed by H. Hall, Formula Book of Legal Records (1909), pp. 48-52.

In the case of the Welsh troops, orders were issued early in 1302 for the collectors in Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire to pay all their receipts over to them.[1] The assessments of the four counties amounted to about £4,100,[2] but not all of this went to the Welsh. In January 1303 a tough letter from the Treasurer to the Exchequer requested that the sheriffs be asked to bring the collectors of the counties concerned to answer for their 'pluribus contemptis et defectibus'. Imprisonment was threatened if the collectors did not comply with their orders.[3] By Michaelmas 1303 £272. 2s. 11d. of the receipts of the tax in Derbyshire had been paid to the soldiers, out of an assessment of £430. 19s. 5¾d.[4] It was impossible for the whole sum to go to the Welsh, since £52. 4s. 8¾d. had already been paid out to those had provided victuals for the 1301 campaign.[5] From the other three counties £2,543. 5s. 4½d. was paid to the clerks entrusted with the duty of paying the troops, who also received £912. 0s. 11d. from Herefordshire out of the fifteenth.[6] The Welsh did better than the Gascon wine merchants, who received little if any of the money assigned to them: they pestered the king, who ordered the Exchequer 'to cause issues to be assigned anew to the merchants in places where the Treasurer and Barons shall see fit without delay.'[7]

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, mm. 72, 79.
2. Willard, 'The Taxes upon Moveables of the Reign of Edward I', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxviii (1913), 521.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/76, m. 6.
4. Ibid., E. 159/77, m. 67d.
5. Subsidy rolls, E. 179/91/1.
6. Droxford's Onus for 1-16 Edward II.
7. Cal. Close Rolls, 1302-07, p. 12.

Despite the muddles and delays in the collection of the fifteenth, with incidents such as the distraint of the collectors of fifteen counties in July 1302 following their failure to appear at the Exchequer being far more frequent than in previous years,[1] the final account shows outstanding arrears of only about £3,000. This was drawn up early in the reign of Edward II,[2] and in the case of at least two counties gives an unecceserily pessimistic view. It shows only £355 from the collectors in Nottinghamshire, and £100 from those in Derbyshire actually paid in, but Wardrobe records show receipts of £456 and £325 respectively.[3]

The practice of widespread assignment of tax receipts was abandoned for the thirtieth and twentieth of 1306. Although this tax was collected at a time when, according to Tout, 'tamely and ingloriously the great king's reign came to an end with broken-down finances',[4] it was probably the most efficiently organised of all the lay subsidies of the period. As in 1301 payment was requested in three instalments, the first due in February 1307.[5] The Memoranda Roll has a record of this initial payment, which amounted to £10,364. 16s. 10d., almost exactly a third of the total assessment. The collectors of nine counties

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Rolls, E. 159/75, m. 78; E. 159/76, mm. 29d., 34, 73d.
2. Pipe Roll, E. 372/152b. Arrears from this account appear in the first Pipe Roll of Edward II's reign, E. 372/153, which indicates that it must have been made in 1307 or 1308.
3. Wardrobe receipt book, E. 101/360/25.
4. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 129.
5. Vincent, Lancashire Lay Subsidies, p. 255.

were to be distrained for failing to produce all that was expected, but in two cases Wardrobe accounts show that they had actually paid the money over to that department.[1] The receipt rolls for the tax are complete, and show that by December 1307, just over a month after the last instalment was due, a total of £26,500 had been paid in. By the next August this figure had risen to £30,150.[2] The final account, drawn up in 1312 or 1313, shows that some £640 went to the collectors as expenses, while about £670 was charged to them as arrears.[3]

Because of the difficulty of discovering exactly how much of the arrears of the various taxes was paid off, it is impossible to provide definitive figures of the yield of the parliamentary subsidies in this period. A reasonable approximation of the crown's income from this source is that roughly £255,000 came in between 1294 and 1307. During the period of crisis from the start of the French war until the King's departure for Flanders receipts were probably in the region of £150,000. Some work remained to be done in clearing up the accounts and collecting arrears in Edward II's reign. In the years after 1311 debts owed by the collectors for these taxes start appearing on the county membranes of the Pipe Rolls, the tenth and sixth of 1294 being the most prominent. An extreme example is Northumberland, a county in

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/80, mm. 41, 42; Wardrobe receipt book, E. 101/368/7, f. 31v.
2. Exchequer Receipt Rolls, E. 401/1708, 1713, 1716, 1728.
3. The final account is in Pipe Roll, E. 372/155b. Its date is indicated by a reference in the Dorset section to the Memoranda Roll of 5 Edward II, written in the same hand as the rest of the account, whereas in the Staffordshire section a reference to the Pipe Roll of 7 Edward II is in a later hand.

which it was always hard to collect taxes in view of the state of the Border. Arrears of £68. 15s. 8d. for the tenth and sixth, £40. 9s. 8¾d. for the eleventh and seventh, and £10. 7s. 9½d. for the twelfth and eighth appear in the Pipe rolls for 1311 and 1312. As they were not paid off, these sums were subsequently transferred to the Exannual roll.[1]

The Pipe rolls and exannual rolls of Edward II's time contain surprisingly few entries concerning arrears of Edward I's parliamentary taxes, in relation to the lengthy lists of debts that were owed as a result of non-payment of the two prerogative taxes imposed by Edward I in the latter years of his reign. The first of these was the aid for the marriage of the king's daughter. Collection of this at a rate of forty shillings on each knight's fee was authorised in parliament as far back as 1290, but as a fifteenth was granted very shortly afterwards, Edward did not trouble to collect this antiquated due.[2] But in 1303, with the financial position very different, this feudal aid was remembered, and the machinery for it set in motion. It must have appeared an attractive alternative to the business of approaching parliament for a subsidy, for which unattractive political demands would be the price, as in 1300 and 1301. But receipts from the aid were disappointing, with £3,762 coming in during 1303, £1,948 in 1304, and £1,122 in the rest of the reign.[3] Discussions at a council

1. Pipe Rolls, E. 372/158, 159; Exannual Rolls, E. 363/1, 2.
2. Handbook of British Chronology, ed. Powicke and Fryde, p. 509.
3. Receipt Rolls, E. 401/1667, 1670, 1676, 1678.

meeting at York early in 1303 were evidently inconclusive on one item on the agenda, namely the problem of hastening payment of the aid.[1] Clearly further sources of revenue were needed, and the Exchequer produced the idea of reviving tallage. John Droxford, the Keeper of the Wardrobe, reported back from the king to the council on this idea on 26 July 1303 in favourable terms.[2] This royal right to tax crown demesnes and towns at will had been exercised fourteen times by Henry III, but never by Edward I,[3] although the higher rate of taxation often applied to the towns and demesnes in the normal lay subsidies was a reflection of the right the king had to tallage. The revival of this tax in its original form is an indication of the lengths that the government was prepared to go to avoid the political conflicts of a demand for a normal subsidy, and in this case the lengths did not prove worthwhile, for the tallage did not even raise as much as £3,000.[4] In November 1304 the government, exhausting the possible revivals of old sources of revenue, ordered the collection of scutage for the army of 1300: a form of taxation which produced negligible receipts at this time.[5]

Far more important than these minor taxes, and second only to the

1. Memoranda of council business, Parl. and Council proceedings, E. 175/1/12.
2. Droxford's credence, printed by J.F. Baldwin, The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages (1913), p. 466.
3. S.K. Mitchell, Taxation in Medieval England (1951), p. 358.
4. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, p. 534, n. 2.
5. Supra, p. 45.

parliamentary lay subsidies in the amount they raised were the taxes paid by the clergy. There were two main ways in which the crown could tap the substantial wealth of the church. One was to reach agreement with the papacy, and take over part of the proceeds of the taxes imposed by Rome and primarily intended for religious purposes, such as crusades, and the other was to negotiate directly with the clergy in England for an aid. By 1294 Edward I had used both methods. The king had received more than the pope from the crusading aid imposed by the latter in 1274,[1] and each ecclesiastical province had granted three aids, the last being a tenth in 1290.[2] Nicholas IV imposed a further crusading tenth in 1291 to finance Edward's intention of returning to Palestine.[3]

These taxes on the clergy were assessed on a totally different basis to the lay taxes on moveables. They were income taxes, but the assessments were based on the rental value of estates rather than on actual revenues.[4] The imposition of the new tenth in 1291 was the occasion of a new valuation, to be taken iuxta verum valorem. This provoked a loud outcry from the clergy who hankered after the lenient days of the low assessment made under the guidance of the bishop of Norwich in 1254. Bartholemew Cotton claimed that the

1. W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 (1939), p. 346.
2. H.S. Deighton, 'Clerical Taxation by Consent, 1279-1301', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxviii (1953), 168, n. 8.
3. Lunt, op. cit., p. 340.
4. Rose Graham, English Ecclesiastical Studies (1929), p. 294.

the assessors frequently doubled, trebled, or even quadrupled the verdicts of juries.[1] Many valuations were revised only a few months after they had been made.[2] But the complaints were clearly based on a comparison with earlier assessments, not with the actual revenues of clerical estates. Rose Graham has shown that actual income bore little or no relation to the valuations, which did not even take account of wool sales as a source of income. Durham with an annual income of over £3,500 had its temporalities assessed at £620 and its spiritualities at under £700.[3] Verum valorem was capable of curious interpretations.

The first direct grant to the king on this new assessment was made in 1294, in response to the royal plea for money to support the French war. An assembly of clergy from both provinces was summoned for 21 September, and made the offer of two tenths in reply to the demand for a half. Furious, the King threatened to put the clergy out of his protection unless they did as he wished. This was enough for the prelates, who lacked any real leader as Winchelsey was abroad, and the Archbishop of York owed so much money to the crown that he could not afford to resist. Some of the lower clergy held out a little longer, but a few sharp words from a royal knight, John of Havering, soon persuaded them that obedience was the best course.[4] Letters of

1. Chron. Cotton, pp. 198-99.
2. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327, p. 350.
3. Graham, English Ecclesiastical Studies, p. 259.
4. Chron. Cotton, pp. 247-50; Chron. Guisborough, pp. 249-50; Flores Historiarum, iii. 90.

protection were soon issued,[1] and on 30 September collectors were appointed, mostly heads of religious houses. Payment was to be in three instalments, the final one to come in early July 1295.[2] The timetable was an exacting one for so large a tax, calculated by the St. Edmunds chronicler to be due to yield £101,000.[3]

There was some difficulty in the early stages of the collection of the tax. As early as 6 November sheriffs were appointed to assist in the task. In Norfolk and Hereford there was trouble with parsons who hoped to avoid payment either by selling all their goods, or by taking them off their lands. The Exchequer found it difficult to organise the receipt of the money, since they had no copies of the assessment, and had no idea of how much money was due. In December they sent writs to the bishops of Winchester and Lincoln asking for the relevant documents. There was also a muddle about the interpretation of the exemption allowed to those assessed at less than ten marks. But during 1295 collection seems to have gone more smoothly. After the third payment was made a view of account was held in mid August, which showed that receipts totalled £18,193. The figure does not include the arrears for Carlisle, Durham, or the Welsh dioceses.[4]

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 89-95, 117-24.
2. Ibid., p. 89.
3. The Chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds, 1212-1301, ed. A. Grandsen (1964), p. 124. This seems a reasonably accurate figure: a more recent estimate of the total value of the assessment is £210,644, Deighton, 'Clerical Taxation by Consent', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxviii., 175.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, mm. 68-70. Deighton, op. cit., 175, gives the slightly different figure of £18,005. 6s. 0d.

Receipt rolls show that by Michaelmas 1295 roughly £66,000 had come in from the clerical moiety.[1]

So severe a tax as the moiety was inevitably unpopular. Bishop Sutton of Lincoln sent no less than three lists of clergy to Edward I with the request that those named in them be arrested, as they had remained obdurate for forty days after being excommunicated for refusing to pay the tax.[2] The prelates assembled in parliament in November 1295 cannot have been sympathetic when Edward appeared in person to demand a new aid from them. Winchelsey, after taking advice, offered a tenth. The king, wanting more, employed the judges to threaten the clergy, but they made no impact, and the offer had to be accepted, the archbishop promising a further tenth a year later if the war continued.[3] According to the St. Edmunds chronicler the king conceded that the clergy should administer the tax themselves, and repealed the Statute of Mortmain.[4] There certainly was surprisingly little interference from royal officials in the collection of the tax: only the abbot of Oseney received shrieval assistance.[5] But the second concession was either a dead letter, or wishful thinking on the part of the chronicler. Two dates were set for payment of the

1. Exchequer Receipt Rolls, E. 401/1629, 1635, 1638. E.B. Fryde, in Book of Prests, p. li, has calculated from the final account in the Pipe Roll, E. 372/155b, that the yield of the tax, less arrears, was £68,900.
2. The Rolls and Registers of Bishop Oliver Sutton, 1280-1299, V, ed. Rosalind M.T. Hill(Lincoln Record Soc., lx, 1965), 149, 154.
3. Annales Monastici, iv. 524.
4. Chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds, p. 129.
5. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/69, m. 63.

tax, 1 March and 1 July.[1] By the latter date the Exchequer had received slightly less than £5,000, though by late September the figure had risen to £11,243.[2] This was less than the fifth of the receipts of the moiety that should have come in, even though the exemption limit was lowered from ten to six marks.[3] Clearly the lack of royal supervision had had its desired effect.

The next royal demand for a subsidy came at the parliament held at Bury St. Edmunds in November 1296. Edward had every right to expect a further tenth, as this had been promised. But Archbishop Winchelsey in a speech to the assembled clergy made four points. Two were in the king's favour: the promise of aid made a year before, and the danger from France. But against this he was able to refer to the recent papal prohibition of such grants, made in the bull Clericis Laicos, and to the poverty of the church.[4] A further argument was that since the assembly was summoned by the king, rather than by ecclesiastical authorities, it was constitutionally improper to make a grant.[5] The outcome was that the clergy postponed their answer until next Hilary, when a synod of the whole English clergy met at St. Paul's. On that occasion Winchelsey came out strongly against the royal demand, reading out the papal bull to the assembled clergy in the

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 172.
2. Exchequer Receipt Rolls, E. 401/1643, 1647.
3. Deighton, 'Clerical Taxation by Consent', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxviii, 177.
4. Chron. Cotton, p. 314.
5. The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury, ii, ed. W. Stubbs (1880), 315.

presence of the royal emissaries, Hugh le Despencer and John of Berwick. They repeated the threat used in 1294, that if no grant were forthcoming the king would place the clergy out of his protection, and this time the threat was carried out.[1]

The royal demand had been for a fifth, and Edward made it known that payment of the equivalent sum as a fine would buy back his protection. On 10 February the archbishop pronounced excommunication on all those who obeyed the king in this,[2] but was ignored by those clerks in royal service, and by those of the northern province, who had throughout been willing to make a grant, and who accordingly received royal protection on 18 February.[3] Severe pressure was put on those who did not buy protections: Cotton complains in particular of the seizure of horses,[4] while the archbishop's lands and valuables were taken by the crown.[5] In Lent Winchelsey summoned a convocation of the southern province, and, yielding to Edward, decided that individuals should be allowed to follow their own consciences, with the inevitable result that almost all paid up and obtained protections.[6] The total that was raised in this way was £22,810,[7] just over double the proceeds of the tenth of the previous year. Curiously,

1. The best accounts of these events are in Chron. Cotton, pp. 314-18, and in Chron. Guisborough, pp. 286-88.
2. Chron. Cotton, p. 320.
3. Chron. Langtoft, ii. 278; Annales Monastici, iii. 466; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 235-37.
4. Chron. Cotton, p. 322.
5. Chron. Guisborough, p. 288.
6. These protections are listed in Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 261-66. In Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/21/1 is a bundle of original receipts for the money paid for them.
7. Exchequer Receipt Roll, E. 401/1653.

among those appointed along with the sheriffs to obtain recognisances from the clergy were John Lovel, John de Segrave, Robert FitzRoger and Henry Tieys, all of whom were to appear later in the year at the Exchequer with Bohun and Bigod to object to the levy of the eighth imposed on the laity.[1]

The lack of cohesion between the lay and clerical oppositions in 1297 was further illustrated when in July king and archbishop were formally reconciled. Part of the understanding between the two was that if the clergy who had been summoned for a convocation on 10 August made a grant, then Edward would confirm Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest. Winchelsey was to negotiate a settlement between the king and the earls. But the latter refused any overtures from the king, and Edward determined to carry out his plans for the Flemish campaign without their support. To do this he needed money. On the one hand he demanded the eighth from the laity, and on the other approached convocation for a clerical tax.[2] The king hoped for a moiety,[3] but although the clergy were reasonably sympathetic, they insisted on getting permission from Rome before making a grant. This was similar to the situation in France. That the English clergy were aware of what was happening across the Channel is shown by the

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 239-40; 'Extracts from the Memoranda Rolls of the Exchequer', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., N.S. iii (1886), 284.
2. Rothwell, 'The Confirmation of the Charters, 1297', Eng. Hist. Rev., lx (1945), 24-35, has the fullest account of these events.
3. Chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds, p. 140.

inclusion of correspondence between the French bishops and the papacy in the registers of Winchelsey[1] and the bishop of Carlisle.[2] The king's reaction to this reasonable demand was typical. He at once imposed a tax of a third on all the temporalities of the church, with the option of paying a fifth on all ecclesiastical property. The chief reason for the tax was stated in a proclamation to be that as the clergy were forbidden to defend the country by force of arms, then they should do it by paying money.[3] Orders for the collection of this tax were issued immediately before Edward's departure for Flanders,[4] but it seems to have suffered the same fate as the eighth: there is no evidence of the collection of substantial sums.

Like the lay tax of the eighth, the third or fifth was superseded by other taxes voted in autumn, following the news of the battle of Stirling Bridge. The province of Canterbury meeting in London granted a tenth: the northern clergy, as usual more co-operative, produced a fifth.[5] This time, with the clergy fully realising the need for money, there was no suggestion that the permission of Rome was needed. But Winchelsey did insist that in accordance with the bull Etsi de Statu which had been issued in July, there should be no secular interference in the collection of the tax. He agreed to pay

1. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, p. 676, n. 2.
2. Historical Letters and Papers from the Northern Registers, ed. J. Raine (1873), pp. 124-30.
3. Parl. Writs, i. 396; Deighton, 'Clerical Taxation by Consent', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxviii, 185-86.
4. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 56.
5. Deighton, op. cit., 190.

for 500 horse in the campaign against the Scotch, the bill coming to £7,691. 16s. 8d. for three months.[1] The money was to be paid at the New Temple, not the Exchequer, and Winchelsey took the line that the tax was for the specific emergency only. When in 1305 he was summoned to the Exchequer to answer for 6,000 marks that had not been paid to the crown from this tax, he refused to appear, taking the line that the crisis was over.[2] There was some difficulty in collecting the money: early in December 1297 Winchelsey wrote to the bishop of London complaining of shortage of funds, and explaining that he was borrowing money to meet the first term of payment. Later he complained that no bishops had followed his example in doing this to meet their obligations.[3]

The northern clergy were not afflicted with the same scruples as was Winchelsey. The fifth that they granted was collected with the help of royal officials, and a final account was drawn up at the Exchequer.[4] But because of the urgent need of cash on the Border, most of the money was paid to royal officials there, not sent to London. £6,696. 13s. 4d. went to John Byron, the sheriff of Yorkshire,[5] £252. 13s. 4d. to Percy and Clifford, and smaller sums totalling £274. 18s. 7d. to three royal clerks, Ralph Dalton, John of Sheffield and Walter of Amersham.[6] The final account shows that the assessment came to roughly £10,800

1. Gough, Scotland in 1298, pp. 64-5.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/78, m. 38d.
3. Deighton, op.cit., 90-91; Graham, English Ecclesiastical Studies, pp. 317-23, has a full discussion of the Canterbury tenth.
4. Pipe Roll, E. 372/155b.
5. Pipe Roll, E. 372/159, Yorkshire membrane.
6. Pipe Roll, E. 372/155b; Gough, op. cit., pp. 265-67.

and that arrears totalled about £2,600.[1] In January 1298 a letter was sent to the archbishop of York requesting the collection of all the arrears, as there was a great shortage of money, owing to the expenses multiplices of the war in France and the Scotch rebellion.[2] But the clergy were themselves short of cash, and were permitted to make their payments in kind, rather than in coin.[3]

Although the way in which Edward I extracted money from the clergy by direct grant between 1294 and 1298 almost proved politically disastrous in 1297, it was financially rewarding. The problem in finding out exactly how much was paid out by the clergy in taxation is that it is not clear how successful the collection of arrears was. In February 1296 commissions were issued to such Exchequer officials as John de l'Isle, Peter of Leicester and William of Pershore for the collection of the arrears due on all taxes, lay and clerical, and orders were issued for the extraction of sums due on the moiety from the worst defaulters.[4] The next year saw an immense effort made to collect arrears of all kinds, with elaborate commissions set up early in July to check on the activities of sheriffs and bailiffs who were thought to have been slovenly in the execution of these duties.[5] In May

1. Pipe Roll, E. 372/155b.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/71, m.111.
3. Councils and Synods with Other Documents relating to the English Church, ii, ed. F.M. Powicke and C.R. Cheney, (1964), 1186.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/69, m. 75. Those singled out were the abbots of Burton, Glastonbury, Tavistock, Faversham and Colchester
5. Ibid., E. 159/70, mm. 108-09.

the lands of the abbot of Furness had been taken into royal hands, since he owed roughly £2,700 in arrears of clerical taxes.[1] But after the crisis year of 1297 there was no concerted effort to secure full payment, and it was not until the reign of Edward II that those collectors who were not quit in their final accounts were brought before the Exchequer to account for their arrears, which in many cases were found to be irrecoverable and found their way into the exannual rolls.[2] But excluding the arrears, it appears from the receipt rolls of the Exchequer that during the period of hostilities with France these direct clerical taxes produced roughly £100,000, as against £150,000 from the lay taxes in the same period. In addition there were the taxes granted by the clergy in the autumn of 1297, which produced about £16,000.[3]

The taxes granted in 1297 were the last subsidies that Edward I was to receive as a result of direct negotiation with the English clergy. It seems probable that some attempts were made in 1300 and 1301 to obtain further grants, but the bill presented by Henry of Keighley firmly stated in its final clause that the prelates would not assent to any subsidy without papal consent.[4] Ironically, their flank was turned by the very man they hoped would protect them from taxation, for in a bull issued on 26 February 1301 Boniface VIII

1. Ibid., m. 114.
2. Pipe Roll, E. 372/155b; Exannual Rolls, E. 363/1,2,
3. Exchequer Receipt Rolls, E. 401/1629, 1635, 1638, 1643, 1647, 1653. This figure included the fines for protection levied in 1297 in lieu of the fifth demanded by the government.
4. Parl. Writs, i. 105.

imposed a tenth on the English church for three years, half the proceeds of which were to go to the king.[1] Edward I had already profited from papal taxation, for although none of the tenth imposed in 1291 was intended for the government, in 1293 £10,000 was borrowed from the collectors, who were never repaid, to cover expenditure in Gascony. Then in June 1294 all the receipts from the tax that were deposited in England were forcibly seized. What was not taken then was doubtless found during the scrutiny of all deposits of money in churches made on 4 July. The collectors stated that the total of the tenth thus appropriated by the government in 1294 was £33,033. 6s. 8d. The probable yield of the tax, which was only collected for four years, was less than £82,000, so that the king obtained at least half of it.[2]

To those present at the Lincoln parliament early in 1301 relations between England and the papacy appeared to be at a low ebb. In 1300 Winchelsey had brought to Edward at Sweetheart Abbey in Galloway a letter from Boniface strongly criticising the English claims and actions in Scotland, and in reply to this the famous Barons' Letter was drawn up at Lincoln, while Edward sent a detailed historical justification of his policies to Rome.[3] But the attitude of Boniface was transformed by his quarrel with Philip IV, initiated by the

1. Lunt, Financial Relations of England with the Papacy to 1327, p. 366.
2. Ibid., pp. 361-65.
3. These events are summarised by Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, pp. 693, 702, 705-06.

latter's trial of the bishop of Pamiers. Edward I became a favoured ally, and it is not surprising that when the news of the grant of the tenth reached France, it was considered that Boniface had imposed it in order to enable Edward to reopen the war with France.[1]

The papal bulls ordering the collection of the tax and appointing the bishop of London and Bartholemew of Ferentino as collectors were published in July, and the first instalment duly paid by the end of November. But then the king intervened, suspending collection. There was apparently some difficulty and doubt over the question of the grant of half the tax to Edward, but a papal mandate issued on 12 March, 1302 settled the matter until the death of Boniface in October 1303. The king then tried to secure the entire proceeds of the tax, claiming that Boniface had orally granted it to him, but this, resting on the testimony of Otto de Grandson and Bartholemew de Ferentino, was neither believed by Benedict IX nor by many of the English clergy.[2] A letter to the Chancellor complained that the collectors were demanding a new mandate from Benedict, which made it hard to persuade them to give up the 10,000 marks that the Treasurer, Langton, was demanding.[3] The chief collectors remained obdurate, and it was only possible for the government to collect the tax by approaching the deputy collectors directly.[4] There was no one

1. Lunt, Financial Relations of England with the Papacy to 1327, p.366.
2. Ibid., pp. 367-77.
3. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/32/37.
4. Lunt, op. cit., p. 374.

single office appointed to receive the proceeds of the papal tenth. Most of the money went into the Wardrobe, but some was paid to the Exchequer.[1] In view of the incomplete nature of the Wardrobe records, it is difficult to provide a definitive figure of the crown's receipts from this tax, but the best calculation is Lunt's, that a minimum of £42,898 came in between 1301 and 1313. Of this, £41,690 was paid over during Edward I's reign.[2]

The election of a Gascon in June 1305 as Pope Clement V was rapidly taken advantage of by Edward I. Very soon after the election a delegation including Bartholomew de Ferentino and Otto de Grandson set out for the Curia, and on 1 August a compliant Clement ordered the English church to pay an annual tenth for the next seven years. The receipts were intended to be used for the recovery of the Holy Land, and those of the first year were to go to Edward I, those of the second to the Prince of Wales, and the rest to Edward again. Queen Margaret was to get £2,000 a year from all but the second and last years of the tax. There was no attempt to get Edward to take a a new pledge to go on crusade, and it seems unlikely that Clement really thought that he would go, but the pretence made the grant of the tenths to a lay power look more respectable. In January 1307 the grant was modified, for Edward consented to Clement's request

1. Exchequer Receipt Roll, E. 401/1684.
2. Lunt, Financial Relations of England with the Papacy to 1327, p. 676. The one source not used in this table of receipts drawn up by Lunt is E. 401/1684, but the payments mentioned in it also appear in the sources that he has used.

that a quarter of the receipts be paid to the Curia. The procedure of payment was slightly different from that adopted for the tenths imposed by Boniface VIII, for although the bishops of Lincoln and London as chief collectors were officially responsible for paying the money to Edward, it was found to be easier if the deputy collectors paid their receipts straight into the Exchequer. In accordance with the tendency at the end of the reign for the Exchequer to reassert its administrative primacy in financial matters, no money appears to have been paid into the Wardrobe. By the end of Hilary term 1307 £25,502 had come in, with £2,996 more received during the next term.[1]

During the last five years of the reign, Edward I obtained some £70,000 from the clergy by means of these tenths imposed by the papacy. Faced with the need to pay for the wars in Scotland, and desiring to keep the political opposition quiescent, it was very convenient that he should have been in a position to receive the proceeds of taxes which he had not imposed. There was surprisingly little hostility to the papal income taxes: not even at the Carlisle parliament in 1307, when there was bitter criticism of papal procurations and other exactions, did they come under much attack.[2] Of the chroniclers, it was only the Westminster author who indulged

1. Ibid., 382-91.
2. W.E. Lunt, 'William Testa and the Parliament of Carlisle', Eng. Hist. Rev., xli (1926), 332-57; H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, 'The Parliament of Carlisle, 1307 - Some New Documents', ibid., liii (1938), 425-37.

in a tirade against papal taxation.[1]

Another means of raising money from the church was the exercise of the traditional regalian right that the crown had to the issue of vacant bishoprics. But Edward did not make great efforts to keep sees vacant during the latter part of his reign. After Winchelsey had taken charge of the archbishopric of Canterbury early in 1295, after the revenues of the see had been in royal hands for a little over two years, the longest vacancy in the rest of the reign was that at York between October 1304 and March 1306. But even though sees were not kept empty for long, the government did receive some £16,500 from this source between 1295 and 1307. Almost £7,500 of this came from the rich bishopric of Ely, which suffered two vacancies in the period.[2]

Such sums from vacancies are unimpressive in comparison with the total raised from the clergy in taxation. Over the whole period from 1294 to 1307 Edward I's finances benefited from clerical contributions in taxes totalling at least £219,000, made up of £33,000 seized from the collectors of the papal tenths imposed in 1291, £70,000 from the tenths levied after 1301, and £116,000 from the subsidies granted by the English clergy. During the period of crisis from 1294 until August 1297 the government received roughly £133,000 from the church.[3] These

1. Flores Historiarum, iii. 110.
2. Margaret Howell, Regalian Right in Medieval England (1962), pp.242-3
3. Supra, pp. 321-22.

figures compare with a total raised from all lay taxes, including the tallage and the aid, of about £265,000 between 1294 and 1307, of which about £150,000 had come in by the time that the king went to Flanders.[1]

The one earlier period that bears comparison for weight of taxation with these later years of Edward I's reign is that a century earlier. The tremendous effort required to meet the demand for £100,000 as Richard I's ransom saw the imposition of a fourth on moveables, the heaviest rate at which such a tax was ever levied, together with an aid of twenty shillings a fee, a carucage and a tallage levied on those assessed at over ten shillings. Even this was not enough, and monastic wool and church plate was seized. There is little indication of the yield of all these taxes, save that the whole ransom was never paid. Following these measures of 1193 and 1194 were the taxes intended to pay for the defence and recovery of English possessions on the continent, notably the thirteenth of 1207, which yielded the impressive sum of about £60,000.[2] The rest of the thirteenth century did not see particularly heavy taxation. It is impossible to produce an overall figure of tax yields under Henry III. The fifteenth of 1225 produced almost £40,000,[3] while the fortieth of 1232 raised nearly £13,000.[4] There were only four taxes on moveables in the reign: the tallages, aids and carucages collected more frequently produced much less than

1. Supra, pp. 308-10.
2. A.L. Poole, From Domesday Book to Magna Carta, 1087-1216 (2nd. edn, 1955), pp. 364-66, 420.
3. Fred A. Cazel, Jr, 'The Fifteenth of 1225', Bull. Inst. Hist. Res., xxxiv (1961), 70.
4. Mitchell, Taxation in Medieval England, p. 21.

they did.[1] Clerical taxation during the reign was relatively higher, but again it is not possible to produce a realistic estimate of yield.[2] Taxation in the earlier years of Edward I's reign was much less severe than in the years after 1294: the assessments of lay subsidies in the twenty-two years from 1272 to 1294 totalling some £240,000 as against approximately £255,000 in the thirteen years from 1294 to 1307.[3]

How was the burden of taxation that Edward I's financial needs imposed on the country shared out? As the lay taxes were assessed and collected on the basis of the possessions of individuals rather than on land or income, there is little statistical evidence of the weight of incidence of these subsidies. Manorial accounts show only small payments, as there were not many moveables liable to tax on most demesnes. In the year 1296-1297 the earl of Cornwall's important manor of Berkhampstead was charged with only £2. 6s. 9d. for the twelfth, a trivial sum in relation to receipts which totalled £160. 7s. 4d.[4] The burden of taxation fell not on the lay landlords, but on the villeins and free tenants. A popular song of this period expressed the opinion that the burden of royal exactions was reducing farmers to a state of misery, 'For ever the furthe peni not to the kynge'. Even seed corn had to be sold to meet the demand for silver,

1. Ibid., p. 358.
2. Lunt, Financial Relations of England with the Papacy to 1327, pp. 175-310.
3. Willard, 'The Taxes upon Moveables of the reign of Edward I', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxviii (1913), 519-21.
4. Earldom of Cornwall Ministers' Accounts, 1296-1297, ed. L. Margaret Midgely (Camden Soc, 3rd. ser., lxvi, 1942), pp. 17, 21.

and as a result land had to lie fallow. Even if the song exaggerates, and few peasants in fact reduced to beggary, it is interesting that economic woes should be blamed largely on taxation, rather than on landlords.[1] Oppressive as the taxes must have been, there was no such popular reaction as that provoked by the third poll tax of Richard II's reign. The legal records reveal plenty of examples of corrupt practice by tax collectors, notably levying money from those who should have been exempt, collecting expenses where these were not justified, and taking more money than was warranted by the assessment.[2] But they do not show many examples of resistance to the tax collectors, whose task seems to have much easier in this respect than was that of the purveyors of victuals. But there is one striking example of strong feeling over taxation, that of a Sussex man, William de Freninghom, who in order to avoid being tallaged broke down the dykes that protected his land from the sea.[3]

There is more evidence of the burden of taxation from ecclesiastical estates than from lay, largely because the clerical taxes were assessed on the income of landlords, rather than on the property of individuals.

1. Political Songs, ed. Wright, pp. 149-52. The other song in this volume that appears relevant to this point, that on the king's taxes on pp. 182-187, in fact dates from Edward III's reign, as the reference to the king being a jeovene bachiler and to his having a queen at the time of his expedition abroad shows.
2. A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, ed. Thompson, p. xlix.
3. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/28/143.

In order to pay what was demanded for the moiety of 1294 the monks of Dunstable had to farm tithes and sell corrodies and property to a value of roughly a hundred marks.[1] The hospital of God's House, Southampton, had to pay £25 as one instalment of the same tax, and because they failed to do so, eighteen oxen from the house's manor of Heckley were taken as pledges. Payment was eventually made, but the cost of getting the beasts released and of taking the money to London was almost a pound.[2] The abbey of Ramsey was in severe financial difficulties during the later years of the reign of Edward I, and the letters of Abbot Sawtrey make it clear that the burden of taxation was one of the main reasons. He had to borrow money from friends to raise £1,000 for the papal tenths imposed in 1301, and in 1303 he was finding it difficult to raise a mere twenty marks. His monks, who clearly considered him a financial incompetent, had threatened strike action in 1300, saying that they would not sing services unless he signed a bond releasing them from liability for debts he incurred. In 1303 he begged to be allowed to delay paying taxes, pointing out that only shortly before he had had to pay a fine of £400 for military service.[3] In the very north of England the difficulties of the clergy were aggravated by the damage that had been done to their estates by the marauding Scotch. A special

1. Annales Monastici, iii. 387-88.
2. Queen's College, Oxford, MSS., Rolls, 181 (Deposited in the Bodleian Library).
3. Chronicle of the Abbey of Ramsey, ed. W.D. Macray (1886), pp. 379, 380-81, 387, 393, 399-400.

proctor was appointed to plead in Rome for a reduction of the assessment in the diocese of Carlisle, with Bishop Halton firmly asserting the inability of the clergy to pay the sums demanded of them.[1] It is not surprising that the canon of Barnwell should have written in the bitterest terms of the extortions suffered by the church, the despoliation of the poor and the withdrawal of alms in the reign of Edward I.[2] The king whose piety was stressed by Powicke[3] never let this attribute interfere with political realities: in the later years of his reign he showed quite clearly that he valued the financial aid of the church much more than any spiritual assistance the clergy could provide.

The demands of the crown for taxation had their effect on the economic changes of this period, in particular forcing ecclesiastical landlords to try to increase their cash receipts.[4] In politics, taxation was one of the most prominent issues. The weight of the burden that was being placed on the country was one of the grievances of the opposition in 1297, and in the subsequent years Edward's ambitions were hampered by the opposition's realisation that the parliamentary power of granting taxes might be used as a means of obtaining

1. Historical Letters and Papers from the Northern Registers, pp. 145, 151.
2. Liber Memorandorum Ecclesie de Bernewelle, ed. J.W. Clark (1907), p.191.
3. Powicke, Henry III and the Lord Edward, ii. 720-24.
4. R.H. Hilton, The Economic Development of some Leicestershire Estates in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, (1947), p. 83; E. Miller, The Abbey and Bishopric of Ely, (1951), p. 110.

concessions from the crown. But despite these difficulties, the taxes on the laity and on the clergy provided Edward with a substantial income, without which the wars of the period could not have been financed.

IX

TRADE AND CURRENCY

Direct taxation was by no means the only method by which a medieval ruler could tap the wealth of his country effectively. It was probably in 1294 that an anonymous merchant presented Edward I with advice on the best way to raise money for war. Heavy customs duties on aliens were suggested, at the rate of five marks on each sack of wool exported, and at a shilling in the pound on all other merchandise taken in or out of the country. These measures were to be backed up by the more ambitious ones of a purchase tax of two pence in the pound and elaborate sumptuary laws intended to reduce domestic expenditure and so free revenue for military purposes. The main item of this memorandum, the heavy export tax on wool, was adopted by the government, which was doubtless attracted by the author's calculations that this would yield 110,000 marks in six months.[1]

In France Philip IV was presented with conflicting advice. The merchant Musciatto dei Francesi advocated raising money by means of loans, to be paid for out of the proceeds of taxation. After this was tried for a year the alternative policy of severely debasing

1. The document is printed by W.H. Blaauw, The Barons' War (1843), appendix, pp. 1-2. He dates it to the period 1258-65, but the advocacy of a trade blockade against France and the heavy tax on wool make this implausible, and imply a date between the opening of war with France and the introduction of such a duty. The document suggests a thirty librate qualification for heavy cavalrymen, which argues against a date early in thirteenth century. 1294 therefore seems the one real possibility.

the coinage was adopted, allowing the French government to make huge profits. In the first year of the new coinage receipts were not high, probably being only about 65,000 livres tournois,[1] but in Michaelmas term 1296 81,149 livres were paid by the mints to the crown. Christmas term 1298 saw the enormous total receipt of 555,097 livres from coinage, as high a percentage as 64.6 of the total revenue.[2] These policies of the rival monarchs, the English interfering with trade, the French with the currency, not only raised much revenue, but also had a very considerable effect on the economies of their countries and of those regions with which they had commercial links.

Levying heavy customs duties on wool was not the only method available to the government by which it could profit from the most valuable English export trade. On 12 July 1294 writs were sent out to all sheriffs, ordering them to take two knights and arrest all the wool, fells and hides in their counties, and have them put into safe custody. Rolls were drawn up of the quantities so taken. The ostensible purpose of this elaborate exercise, which appears to have been efficiently carried out, was to prevent any wool being exported to France. But the real reason for the operation was that the government was planning to take all the wool in the country, save for quantities of less than half a sack, as a forced loan. This had

1. Funck-Brentano, 'Document pour servir a l'histoire des relations de la France aved l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne sous le règne de Philippe le Bel', Revue Historique, xxxix (1889), 333-34; Cambridge Economic History, iii. 481-82.
2. H. Miskimin, 'Money, Prices and Foreign Exchange in Fourteenth Century France (1963), p. 43.

the approval of the magnates, on condition that adequate security was given to the owners of the wool. But the merchants were naturally bitterly opposed to the plan, and on receiving their complaints and advice, almost certainly including the memorandum already mentioned, the king and his council agreed that in lieu of the forced loan, the merchants should pay heavily increased customs duties. In view of the wide variations in wool prices it was initially proposed that these should be five marks for the best wool, and three marks for lower quality, but the differential was soon abandoned, and the lower rate adopted. On 29 July officials were appointed to collect the new custom.[1]

The burden of paying the whole duty of forty shillings a sack at the time of export was too much for many merchants. At the beginning of November it was decided to allow them to take their wool abroad before duty was paid, provided that some security was left in England, and that when they arrived in Holland they paid their customs to the English officials there.[2] Robert de Segre, a royal clerk, had been abroad from 22 July until 10 October 1294 with £22,000 entrusted to him by the Exchequer for payment to the German allies.[3] Then in November he was given a new commission along with John Botetourt to make payments to the allies totalling almost £25,000, which was

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 82.
2. Ibid., m. 82d; E.B. Fryde, 'Financial Resources of Edward I in the Netherlands, 1294-1298', Revue Belge, xl (1962), 1180.
3. J. de Sturler, 'Deux comptes 'enrôlés de Robert de Segre', Bull. de la comm. royale d'hist., cxxv (1959), 578-80; King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 78.

received from the Exchequer and taken to Dordrecht in ten large ships.[1] De Segre was also appointed along with two notable wool merchants, Laurence of Ludlow and Roger of Lincoln, to pay 10,000 marks to the archbishop of Cologne and the count of Bar 'de deniers des leynes'.[2] These funds were partly the receipts from sales of wool seized by the crown from foreign merchants, but also comprised the proceeds of customs duties paid abroad. De Segre's account shows receipts of about £3,850 from this latter source, paid between November 1294 and November 1296.[3] More was paid to two English merchants, Elias Russel and Gilbert Chesterton, who from September 1295 held appointments to assist de Segre and to receive and pay out royal revenue in the Low Countries.[4] The total received by royal agents abroad from customs paid there appears to have been slightly over £10,000,[5] mostly handed over before October 1296, when a privy seal writ to the Exchequer stated that it was better not to allow merchants to delay payment of duty in this way, as the system was liable to abuse.

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 78; F. Bock, 'Englands Beziehungen zum Reich unter Adolf von Nassau', Mitteilungen des Inst. f. österreichische Geschichtsforschung, erg. bd. xii (1932-3), 209-10.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 78.
3. De Sturler, op. cit., 585-97.
4. The conditions of their appointment are set out in detail by de Sturler, Les relations politiques et les échanges commerciaux entre le duché de Brabant et l'Angleterre au moyen âge, p. 198, n. 117. Their account is in Pipe Roll, E. 372/146, m. 54.
5. Fryde, 'Financial Resources of Edward I in the Netherlands, 1294-1298', Revue Belge, xl (1962), 1181.
6. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/70, m. 5.

By far the greater part of the customs receipts was paid in English ports. In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war with France exports had been at the very considerable level of 30,000 to 40,000 woolsacks a year, with customs duties from £10,000 to £12,000.[1] The effect of the war, with the prohibition of trade with France and the attempt to canalise exports to Dordrecht, combined with the maltolt of forty shillings a sack, was to reduce exports sharply, while customs revenue shot up. Unfortunately the customs accounts for the wartime period are not complete, as none survive for Southampton, but taking the rest, namely Boston, Hull, Ipswich, London, Newcastle, Sandwich and Yarmouth, it can be shown that in the period from the opening of the war to Michaelmas 1295 some 16,728 sacks were exported, bringing in over £33,800 in customs dues. In the next year trade declined, with 14,874 sacks exported and about £29,500 paid in duty. From Michaelmas 1296 until the same date in the following year 21,253 sacks were charged with over £43,000 in duty. Estimating from the level of Southampton trade after 1298, it appears likely that receipts from that port in the three years from 1294 would have been about £10,000, and the graph in figure 4 is adjusted on this basis. It therefore appears that customs revenue from 1294 until the end of September 1297 was about £116,000, or rather more than the yield of the lay subsidies in the same period.[2]

1. Precise figures of exports cannot be given for 1290-1294, as the accounts only provide overall figures of customs receipts. But from these, printed in E.M. Carus-Wilson and Olive Coleman, England's Export Trade, 1275-1547 (1963), p. 38, rough calculations of exports are possible.
2. Wool export figures from ibid., p. 39; customs receipts from Pipe Rolls, E. 372/145, mm. 30-31; E. 372/146, m. 36; E. 372/149, mm. 38-41; Exchequer Customs Accounts; E. 122/124/2,3.

The government did not completely abandon its initial plan of profiting from English trade by itself acquiring wool in England and selling it abroad. Not all of the wool arrested in 1294 was returned to its owners. That belonging to merchants suspected of trading with France was held by the crown, as was that belonging to the Italian firm of the Riccardi, which had failed to meet its obligations and went bankrupt. It seems that it was at first intended to sell all the wool belonging to Italian merchants, and lists were drawn up of how much they possessed.[1] In the wool fleet sent to Dordrecht in December 1294 under the command of Laurence of Ludlow and Roger of Lincoln were sent 277 sacks of wool seized from the Riccardi. Much of this was lost in the shipwreck in which Laurance was drowned, but enough was salvaged for £1,046. 4s. 11d. to be entered in de Segre's account as the profit of sales of wool.[2] But the wool belonging to the other Italian firms was returned to them, on condition that they made a loan to the crown. In November 1294 export licenses were issued to them for some 2,700 sacks, while further licences were issued in the succeeding months.[3] Edward I's fear that the Italians would export their wool to France proved to be justified, for Philip IV gave permission for them to import 2,000 sacks, despite the embargo that he had placed on

1. These lists are summarized by G. Bigwood, 'Un marché de matières premières: laines d'Angleterre et marchands Italiens vers la fin du xiiie siècle', Annales, vi (1930), 201-2.
2. De Sturler, Les Relations politiques et les échanges commerciaux entre le duché de Brabant et l'Angleterre au moyen âge, pp. 184-85; 'Deux comptes 'enrôlés' de Robert de Segre', Bull. de la Comm. Roy. d'Hist., cxxv (1959), 593.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, mm. 82-84.

English goods.[1]

Much of the wool belonging to foreign merchants remained under arrest during 1295. On 17 September the king decided, on the advice of John Droxford and Anthony Bek, that what had been owned by the Riccardi should be sold abroad.[2] Six days later commissions were set up to collect the wool of the Riccardi, the Bardi and the Frescobaldi that had previously been arrested, and have it sent to the coast ready for export. The commissioners were sent detailed lists of the property of these merchants, totalling at least 1,500 sacks. These lists were presumably based on the rolls of the 1294 arrest.[3] But although some 500 sacks of Riccardi wool was sold abroad over the next two years,[4] the other two companies appear to have recovered their property, presumably because they co-operated with the government and provided the loans that were needed.[5]

It was not until 1297 that the policy of profiting from the wool trade by imposing heavy export duties rather than by taking forced loans in wool was reversed. In April an order was issued that all wool and hides should be taken to specified places, to be bought by the crown. The seizure was not efficiently carried out, for

1. Bigwood,'Un marché de matières premières', Annales, vi (1930), 205.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, m. 86d.
3. Ibid., mm. 86-89.
4. Eryde, 'Financial Resources of Edward I in the Netherlands, 1294-1298', Revue Belge, xl (1962), 1182.
5. See infra, pp. 383, 386, 395.

a great deal of wool was hidden or carried into franchises, and instructions had to be issued to prevent this. The original intention appears to have been that only the foreign merchants' wool should be seized, but the scope of the instructions was extended by the Exchequer without the knowlege of the king.[1] Even so, the measure was not effective, and at the end of July a further seizure of wool was ordered, with the stated purpose of producing revenue for the payment of the foreign allies, 30,000 marks for the king of Germany and 25,000 marks for the duke of Brabant. In addition, 20,000 marks was required to cover the cost of taking the army to Flanders. It was calculated that 8,000 sacks would provide enough in sales to meet this demand.[2] By this date opposition to the government had become so considerable that it was hard to put decisions into effect, and this decree provoked so much hostility that very little wool seems to have been collected. Letters patent promising payment to those whose wool was taken show only some 525 sacks collected by nine of the fourteen commissions that were set up.[3] The accounts of royal agents at Yarmouth, Hull, Boston and Southampton, who were charged with collecting wool obtained in the two prises of 1297, and with sending it for sale abroad, detail some 1,470 sacks.[4] Russel and Chesterton's

1. G.O. Sayles, 'The Seizure of Wool at Easter 1297', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxvii (1952), 543-47; King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/70, m. 42d.
2. Ibid., m. 115.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 299-300, 310-11, 321-23, 332, 335.
4. Accounts of royal wool agents, Pipe Roll, E. 372/152b; de Sturler, Les relations politiques et les échanges commerciaux entre le duché de Brabant et l'Angleterre au moyen âge, pp. 193-94. His addition comes to twenty less sacks than mine.

account shows that there were other agents, for example at Newcastle, and so it is impossible to discover exactly how much wool was taken in the two seizures and exported,[1] but clearly it did not approach the 8,000 sacks that the second one alone was supposed to produce.

The government's attempt to profit directly from the wool trade did not prove very effective. Total receipts from the sales of wool in the Netherlands were probably about £25,000:[2] less than a quarter of what was received from the heavy customs duties. Politically both policies proved unpopular. The forced purchase of wool came in for the same criticism in 1297 as did the other prises, while the maltolt, introduced as an alternative to seizure at the request of the merchants, came under heavy attack from the wool producers. This forty shilling duty could either be passed on to the consumers in Flanders in the form of higher prices, or the merchants might force the producers to accept lower prices. The opposition claimed in the Monstraunces that the latter was the case, and that the price of wool had been halved. The duty raised was stated to be a fifth of the value of all the land in England.[3] Such claims were overstated, but it is the case that wool

1. Ibid., p. 194; Pipe Roll, E. 372/146.
2. Fryde, 'Edward I's Financial Resources in the Netherlands, 1294-1298', Revue Belge, xl (1963), 1189.
3. Chron. Guisborough, pp. 292-93.

prices were severely depressed in the period of war with France. Calculations are difficult, as the weights used to measure wool varied in different parts of the country, and the quality of the produce might vary. But the examples collected by Thorold Rogers show that in the years 1294-1296 prices were lower than in any previous period for which figures are available, and that this depression was not paralleled until the years after the Black Death.[1] And even though prices were recovering in 1297, the average of about £5 a sack paid for the wool taken in the July prise was at least £1 less than what would have been paid in a normal year.[2]

The result of the political crisis of 1297 on the taxation of wool was that on November 24 the Maltolt was lifted, to be replaced by the old scale of duties, with a sack of wool being charged half a mark.[3] The immediate effect on the level of exports was not startling with some 26,000 sacks exported in the year from Michaelmas 1297 to the same date in 1298, and falling in the next year to just over 21,000 sacks. Thereafter they rose, only to drop to below 17,000 in 1301-1302, as a result of the war between Philip IV and the Flemings. They then recovered to a level comparable with that of

1. J.E. Thorold Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England, i. (1866), pp. 372, 386-94.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 310-11, 321-23, 332, 335.
3. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 187.

FIGURE 4

Wool Exports and Customs Receipts, 1291-1307.



the years before 1294.[1] The rise in the level of exports that resulted from the abandonment of the maltolt was by no means sufficient to bring the receipts from the customs at the half mark rate anywhere near the level that had been attained with the forty shilling duty, as is shown clearly by figure 4. From Michaelmas 1297 until Michaelmas 1303 only about £53,000 was paid over to the customs officials at the ports,[2] and nearly all of this was assigned by the government in repayment of the loans advanced to it by foreign merchants.[3]

In 1303, with the need to pay for a new campaign in Scotland, and with the memory of 1301 making the king anxious to avoid an appeal to parliament, the government decided to increase the customs revenue. Negotiations were held with representatives of the foreign merchants, who agreed to the imposition of additional duties. They were henceforth to pay an extra 3s. 4d. on each sack of wool, and a similar increase of half the original

1. Carus-Wilson and Coleman, England's Export Trade, pp. 38-41.
2. Calculated from the customs accounts in Pipe Rolls, E. 372/145, mm. 30-31; E. 372/146, m. 36; E. 372/149, mm. 36-41; Enrolled Customs Accounts, E. 356/2.
3. See infra, pp. 387-89, 396-97.

duty on the other commodities on which customs were paid. In addition the suggestion made by thh anonymous merchant in 1294 of an ad valorem duty was taken up,[1] the level being fixed at three pence in the pound. In return, various privileges were granted to the foreign merchants in the Carta Mercatoria. These were intended to give them freedom to come and go, and provide protection against undue interference. A special court was set up in London to hear cases concerning foreigners, while perhaps the most important clause, in view of the activities of the government from 1294 to 1297, was that they were to be free from prise.[2] This new custom produced a revenue of roughly £5,000 a year under Edward I, and resulted in the foreign merchants being put at a disadvantage as compared with their English rivals, who did not have to pay the new duties. But this was not the result of a far-sighted government policy of favouring English traders. The original intention had been that the New Custom should be paid by all merchants, and soundings were taken by Exchequer officials among English merchants, who indicated that they were 'de bone volunte de paier costume por draps ausi come fount marchandz estraunges, issi qil peussent estre quites des prises devers le roy'. It was thought that 'ce serra a graunt profit e avantage du roy si il le face ensi'.[3] Representatives of the towns were accordingly summoned

1. Blaauw, Baron's War, appendix, pp. 1-2.
2. The Carta Mercatoria is well summarised by Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, pp. 630-31.
3. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/31/99. The authorship of this letter is not clear, but it was clearly written by an important Exchequer official. His description of the custom as a 'costume por draps' may seem anachronistic, but there is no doubt that the letter dates from 1303.

to a council at York in June 1303. When they met, the initial soundings were shown to have been over-optimistic, for the assembled merchants refused to make any grant 'unanimi consensu et voluntate'.[1] The reasons for the refusal are not clear: it seems unlikely, in view of their earlier attitude, that it was the unaided decision of the merchants. Influence had probably been brought to bear on them: this was perhaps another shot in Winchelsey's campaign against the monarch he so detested.

The imposition of the New Custom on the foreign merchants was the last change in the structure of the customs duties in Edward I's reign. From Michaelmas 1303 until the end of the reign customs totalled over £72,000, an average of about £18,000 a year. This figure was double the average for the previous six years, the increase being partly the result of the new duty, and partly that of an increased volume of trade.[2] Most of this sum went to the Frescobaldi, in repayment of loans, though some small sums were paid direct to the Wardrobe by the customs officials.[3] The fact that customs revenues were so often assigned away in advance, to Italian and Gascon merchants, did not detract from their importance: it was of the greatest convenience that Edward should have had a source of revenue that could easily be allocated to pay off debts.

1. Parl. Writs, i. 134-35.
2. These figures are calculated from Exchequer Customs Accounts, E. 356/2.
3. Wardrobe Receipt Book, E. 101/365/6, ff. 20, 24-25, 32.

The major place that the customs system held in the financial structure is indicated by the fact that taking the whole period from 1294 until 1307, some £240,000 was paid in duty, more than was raised from the taxation of the clergy.[1]

Trade was not only important to the government as a source of customs revenue. It was through trade that silver was brought into England, and although Edward I did not attempt to make vast profits out of the coinage as Philip IV did, it was nevertheless important that in a period of heavy military expenditure there should be sufficient liquid assets in the country. In conditions of a favourable balance of trade the English mints might expect to make a reasonable profit for the crown, by recoining the foreign silver that was coming into the country. The problems of international finance in the middle ages may not have been so well understood nor so complex as those of today, but they were still important, and have been unduly neglected by historians. In fourteenth century Flanders Louis de Mâle demonstrated, even if unintentionally, the use of devaluation as a solution to the problem of keeping an export industry going in the face of rising costs and increasing competition.[2] Advice given to Philip IV of France in the late 1280's showed that informed opinion was well aware of the dangers to the

1. Supra, pp. 326, 337, 344, 346.
2. H. Van Werveke, 'Currency Manipulation in the Middle Ages: the case of Louis de Mâle, Count of Flanders', Trans. Royal. Hist. Soc., 4th. ser., xxxi (1949), 127.

economy of an exchange rate which was higher than conditions warranted.[1] To judge by the one attempt that has been made to explain the economic impact of currency changes in the reign of Edward I, England in that period saw problems of a different order. For Crump and Hughes calculated that in this one reign the amount of coin in circulation increased roughly four-fold.[2] If this really were the case, then it must have had a considerable effect on the crown's finances, and on the economy of the country. Was this the result of royal policy, and did the monetary changes of the reign facilitate the financing of Edward I's wars?

To maintain a good coinage was one of the traditional obligations incumbent upon a medieval ruler. In 1297 Edward I began a recoinage with the intention of getting rid of the clipped and bad coin current in his kingdom. In the next few years a total of roughly £400,000 worth of new coin was issued by the mints.[3] The crown made an incidental profit from this operation of between £35,000 and £40,000,[4] but to gain revenue was not the government's prime purpose. The new sterling money proved popular, in England and abroad. In France an

1. P. Guilhiermoz, 'Avis sur la question monétaire donnés aux rois Philippe le Hardi, Philippe le Bel, Louis X, et Charles le Bel', Revue Numismatique, 4th. ser., xxvii (1927), 113.
2. C.G. Crump and A. Hughes, 'The English Currency under Edward I', The Economic Journal, v. (1895), 65.
3. Ibid., 65; J.H.M. Craig, The Mint; A History of the London Mint from A.D. 287 to 1948 (1953), pp. 38-39.
4. P. Spufford, 'Assemblies of Estates, Taxation and Control of Coinage in Medieval Europe', XIIe Congrès International des Sciences Historiques; Etudes présentées à la commission internationale pour l'histoire des assemblees d'états, xxxi (Louvain/Paris, 1966), p. 120

Italian merchant, Betin Caucinel, and the maîtres généraux of the mint pointed out to Philip IV in the late 1280's that the mark sterling was current at ten sous more than the official exchange rate, so that in other words the penny sterling was actually worth 3.5 deniers parisis, not the 3.2 that it would have been. This was not because the official rate was based on any miscalculation of the silver content of the two coinages, but was because the English mints were prepared to buy silver at a higher rate than the French. The profit taken by the English government was lower than that of the French, and so sterling was the more attractive currency. In addition, the English government took more care than did the French to prevent the circulation of bad coins which might give the whole currency a bad name.[1]

This situation meant that much foreign silver was attracted into England and converted to sterling: during the 1280's over £400,000 worth of such bullion was coined by English mints.[2] But of this a very considerable amount, unnoticed by Crump and Hughes, found its way back abroad: the maîtres généraux put the value of all sterling circulating in France at £50,000.[3]

This situation posed considerable problems for Philip. A substantial part of his revenue was derived from profits of coinage, and in addition it was obviously inadvisable for simple reasons

1. Guilhiermoz, op. cit., 4th. ser. xxv (1925), 119; xxvii (1927), 113-18.
2. Crump and Hughes, op. cit., 206, 226-28.
3. Guihiermoz, op. cit., 4th. ser. xxvii (1927), 128.

of prestige to have a large quantity of English currency in circulation in France. The solution adopted by the French was the simple one of devaluation. The gros tournois had been worth twelve deniers of Tours, but it was revalued in about 1290 at just over thirteen deniers, so that it was able to compete directly with sterling.[1] The graph in figure 5 shows how effective this move was, with the rate of coining foreign silver in the English mints that had been so high in the 1280's dropping to a trickle, despite the English counter-move of reducing the charge for minting foreign silver from 14½d. to 11½d. in the pound.[2] In 1295 the international monetary situation was again transformed by French policy, this time by the decision to mint heavily debased coin. There was some difficulty in getting the new coin accepted even in France: two ordinances had to be issued to persuade people that the new money, which it was admitted 'forsan aliquantulum decrit de pondere', was valid.[3] The only willing market the debased coins can have found initially would have been among those who had payments to make which were fixed in terms of the money of account, rather than in real value. But once a reasonable number had been put into circulation, then Gresham's law would operate, first in France and then abroad.

1. Cambridge Economic History, iii, p. 587.
2. Crump and Johnson, op. cit., 209.
3. F. de Saulcy, 'Philippe-le-Bel a-t-il mérité le surnom de roi faux-monnayeur?', Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes, xxxvii (1876), 153.

The extent of the French debasement can best be judged by its effect on the exchange rates. Early in 1297 the duke of Brabant was still being paid his subsidy at the old rate of four pennies of Tours to one of sterling money, but by the end of the year the rate was six to one. When the final payments were being made in 1305, discussion between members of Edward's council on the one side and John lord of Cuijk on the other ended in an agreement that a rate of eight to one should be employed.[1] As England was at war with France, with trade embargos imposed by each side on traffic with the other, it was some time before the effect of the debasement was felt there. But with Philip IV paying subsidies to his allies, and with normal trade with the Low Countries, the impact of the new currency soon spread to Flanders and elsewhere. Count Guy of Flanders attempted to prohibit the use of the new money, and minted his own coin in his lands which were held of the Empire rather than France. But Philip IV issued prohibitions on the use of imperial money, and used Tournai as a base to flood Flanders with coins of low value. It was this threat to the commercial prosperity of the county that was probably one of the reasons for the count agreeing to ally himself with England in 1297.[2]

The English government paid little attention to the problems

1. B.D. Lyon, 'Un Compte de l'échiquier relatif aux relations d' Edouard I d'Angleterre avec le duc Jean II de Brabant', Bull. de la Comm. Roy. d'Hist, cxx (1955), 86-7.
2. A. Grunzweig, 'Les incidences internationales des mutations monétaires de Philippe le Bel', Le Moyen Age, lix (1953), 121-23.

of the coinage until 1299. Powicke attempts to justify the seizure in 1294 of over £10,000 that was deposited in churches and monasteries by claiming that the object of the exercise was to withdraw bad money from circulation.[1] But this was not the case. There is nothing to connect the report given by Guisborough of a royal statement that orders had been issued for the strict enforcement of the statutum monete with the seizure.[2] No chronicle or official source suggests monetary reform as an explanation of the government's action,[3] while it is odd, if it were the intention, that the money was paid over to the Exchequer and not to the mints.[4] The mint accounts show quite clearly that nothing like £10,000 worth of silver was coined at this time. During the war years the English mints were at a virtual standstill.[5]

By the turn of the century the English coinage was in a bad state. A good illustration of this is the record of barley prices from Calster in Norfolk in 1299-1300. The quarter was sold at 8s., 6s. 8d., 6s., 4s., and on one occasion for as little as 2s. 8d. Such variations can only be explained in terms of monetary disturbance, and this was appreciated at the time, for in the record the lowest price

1. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, pp. 670-71.
2. Chron. Guisborough, p. 249.
3. Ibid., p. 248; Annales Monastici, iii. 390; Chron. Cotton, pp. 237-38; Flores Historiarum, iii. 274.
4. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. li.
5. C.G. Crump and C. Johnson, 'Tables of Bullion coined under Edward I, II, and III', The Numismatic Chronicle, 4th. ser., xiii (1913), 208-09, 228-29.

is explained: 'et nonplus quia de bono monet' (?-agio)'.[1] In the same year high expenditure on carts in one Winchester manor was explained as 'quia ferrus fuit duplus carius quam solebat et hoc pro mala moneta'.[2] The problem was that mints in the Low Countries had been producing coin with a passing resemblance to the English currency, which, once imported by merchants, circulated freely. These coins were chiefly known as pollards and crockards. From the evidence of the mint accounts, Crump and Hughes came to the conclusion that far from these coins being debased, they were in fact superior to sterling. For they found that £49,525. 11s. 7d. of pollards and crockards, together with £6,057. 19s. 9d. of other foreign silver, made £57,190 sterling.[3] But what they failed to notice is that the mint bought its silver by weight, and not by the face value of the coins. So theirs is evidence that the foreign coins were of relatively pure metal, but it does not show that each contained as much silver as an equivalent sterling coin. An entry in a Wardrobe book shows that in fact £121. 8s. 8d. pollard was actually only worth £109. 5s. 3d. by weight,[4] while in 1297 the official exchange rate in the Low Countries was 22s. crockard to 20s. sterling.[5] Government opinion was that it

1. D.L. Farmer, 'Some Grain Price Movements in Thirteenth Century England', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd. ser., x (1957), 210. He gives the date of this account as 1299, but Thorold Rogers, op. cit., ii. 3, 53, shows that it ran from Michaelmas 1299 to Michaelmas 1300.
2. J. Titow, 'Evidence of Weather in the Account Rolls of the Bishopric of Winchester, 1209-1350', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd. ser., xii (1960), 381 n. 1.
3. Crump and Hughes, 'The English Currency under Edward I', The Economic Journal, v. (1895), 62.
4. Liber Quotidianus, p. 5.
5. Account of Russel and Chesterton, Pipe Roll, E. 372/146, m. 54.

was since the return of the army from Flanders that these foreign coins had begun to flood the country.[1]

The first step toward reform of the coinage was taken in 1299 with the Statute of Stepney, which forbad the export of English coin and plate, and set up an exchange office at Dover, run by the Bellardi, where foreigners could obtain sterling in exchange for their own coinage. Commercial transactions in England could only be made with sterling, hall-marked plate, or of course by barter.[2] A commission was set up, composed of John de Botetourt, John de l'Isle and Roger de Hegham, to ensure that the provisions of the statute were kept.[3] But such measures only dealt with half the problem: something had to be done about the foreign coins that were already circulating in the country. At Christmas 1299 a proclamation was issued, to the effect that from that date until Easter pollards and crockards were to be current at only half their face value, and that after Easter they were to be wholly demonetised. On 29 March 1300 arrangements were made by the king and his council for recoining this money. Over 400 workmen were brought over from France and the Low Countries to reinforce the English labour force.[4] It was not the intention, as it had been in 1279, that the entire currency should be reminted. All that was wanted was that foreign coin current

1. This view is expressed in a privy seal letter of 17 May 1300, in King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/73, m. 17.
2. Statutes of the Realm, i. 131-33.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/73, m. 17.
4. Ibid., E. 159/74, m. 32; Craig, The Mint, p. 55.

FIGURE V

Output of English Mints, 1291-1307.



in England should be converted to sterling.

The operation appears to have been astonishingly successful. The mint accounts show that over £262,000 was recoined between 1300 and 1302, as is shown graphically in figure 5.[1] It should be noted that after the demonetisation of the pollards and crockards these were bought by the mints as English silver, which explains why the proportion of this appears so high in the diagram. Besides the London and Canterbury mints, those at Hull, Newcastle, Bristol, Exeter and Chester were opened to cope with the demand.[2] Initially there was some trouble because many royal officials misunderstood the purpose of calling down the value of the pollards and crockards. Instead of gladly accepting coin whose silver content was much more valuable than their new value as currency, they refused to accept anything other than good sterling. This meant that the crown lost potential profits, and convinced many that the plan to demonetize the foreign coins would not take place. But this was soon put right by Edward I in a letter to the Exchequer,[3] and after the demonetisation the mints were kept extremely busy by people bringing their foreign coins to be exchanged for sterling. So large a recoinage did bring the crown profits, even though this was not its prime purpose. The accounts of John Sandale, Warden of the Mints, show a total gain

1. Calculated from Crump and Johnson, op. cit. , 288 seqq.
2. Craig, op. cit., p. 56.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/73, m. 12, writ of 3 Feb. 1300.

of £10,916. 18s. 3¾d., of which £8,202. 9s. 0½d. went to the Exchequer.[1] Most of the rest was charged to the master of the Canterbury mint, John Porcher, who owed the crown a total of £3,424. 10s. 4¼d. He was imprisoned, owing to his failure to pay this sum. His failings appear to have been those of incompetence, rather than of corruption: he stated that he could not raise the money, as so much silver had been lost in the process of minting.[2]

The effects of the second recoinage of Edward's reign were similar to the first. The English currency once again became popular among foreign merchants, and from 1303 to 1309 large quantities of foreign silver were brought to the London and Canterbury mints to be coined into sterling. Indeed, in 1307 just over £43,000 was minted, almost as much as had been produced in 1300. From May 1304 until the end of Edward I's reign the royal finances benefited by £6,932, obtained by the mints as the crown's profit on these operations.[3] This startling rise in the quantity of silver added to the English currency was attributed by Crump and Hughes to the royal demand for money during these years.[4] Farmer, taking up this suggestion, stated that the influx of foreign silver in the early years of the fourteenth century was due to Edward's need to finance his Scotch campaigns.[5]

1. Sandale's account, drawn up for enrolment, E. 101/288/30.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/74, m. 32.
3. Account of John de Everdon, Pipe Roll, E. 372/152.
4. Crump and Hughes, 'The English Currency under Edward I', The Economic Journal, v. (1895), 64.
5. Farmer, 'An Examination of Price Fluctuations in certain articles in the Twelfth, Thirteenth and early Fourteenth Centuries',(Oxford Univ. D.Phil thesis, 1958), p. 64.

But this hypothesis is impossible to justify. The silver was not brought into the country by any direct action of the government, nor did it go into the royal treasury. The question is whether the crown took any action in the last years of the reign which played a major part in persuading merchants to change their foreign coin into sterling, and whether the crown gained any advantage from the influx of silver.

There was no change in this period in the rates at which the mints bought silver: they were still those which had proved unattractive in the 1290's. 143 pence was still coined from the pound tower, just as was the case in the first recoinage of the reign. But the Statute of Stopney did provide the government with additional weapons to use against merchants who imported or exported silver illegally. The evidence of the accounts shows however that the statute was only enforced vigorously for two or three years after it was enacted. Between 1299 and 1302 John Sandale received £2,131. 7s. 3½d. in pollards and crockards, £606. 1s. 5d. in sterling, and a small amount of other coin, confiscated under the terms of the statute.[1] This was not a very impressive sum. But the evidence of coin hoards is that the quantity of pollards and crockards did drop sharply after 1300, though in Scotland they occur almost as frequently as before.[2] The threat of legal action against those who

1. Account of Sandale's executors, Pipe Roll, E. 372/168, m. 18.
2. H.B. Earle Fox and J.S. Shirley-Fox, 'Numismatic History of Edward I, II, and III', British Numismatic Journal, viii (1908), 147.

evaded the statute, even if not often carried out, must have done something to encourage merchants to bring their money to the exchanges.

Against the theory that it was government action that caused the flow of silver into England in the early fourteenth century can be set the hypothesis put forward by Miskimin, that there was a natural alternation of coinage from one country to another, so that when France stopped minting on a large scale, the silver would be taken by the process of trade either to England or Flanders, and a large scale recoinage instituted there. Unfortunately, there is a complete lack of evidence on the quantity of coinage produced by the French mints between 1301 and 1308, while there is no documentation for the Low Countries mints until 1334.[1] But there are indications of the movement of silver in north-western Europe during this period. It is clear that from 1294 until 1297 England was exporting considerable quantities of bullion, in subsidies to foreign allies and in payments to troops in Gascony and Flanders. Mint accounts show that the French were coining heavily in the late 1290's,[2] while the massive number of pollards and crockards that found their way to England suggest that the mints of the Low Countries must have been very active shortly before 1300. The Count of Flanders' activities in minting on his imperial lands have already been noted.[3] It seems

1. Miskimin, Money, Prices, and Foreign Exchange in Fourteenth Century France, pp. 100-19, 43, 199.
2. Ibid., p. 43.
3. Supra, p. 351.

FIGURE VI

A comparison of wool exports with purchases of foreign silver by English mints, 1280-1320.



probable that from 1300 the main mint activity of north-western Europe was transferred to England, along with many of the workmen who had been working in the continental mints.[1] In France there was a new debasement in 1303, which was oddly combined with an attempt to introduce a new coin of high quality, the denier d'argent. In the absence of figures it is hard to be certain, but this looks very like a French attempt to try and attract some of the silver that was being turned into sterling, by offering to buy it at a higher rate, just as the English had tried to do in 1290. The failure of this denier d'argent indicates that the conditions of the time were still favouring the English coinage.[2]

The mechanism postulated by Miskimin can only operate through the medium of trade, and the figures of English wool exports during this period broadly support the view that it was the movements of trade that caused the influx of silver to England in the early 1300's, with government action doing no more than assist and reinforce a trend. The correlation between exports of wool and purchases of foreign silver by the English mints is best shown graphically, as in figure 6. The scale to which the wool exports is drawn is chosen to indicate the rough value of this trade, and is based on the assumption that the average price of a sack was £6. The peak of silver purchases in 1300 marks the recoinage of the pollards and

1. Supra, p. 354.
2. Guilhermoz, op. cit., 4th. ser., xxviii (1928), 218-19, 223.

crockards: had these continued to be counted as foreign silver after being demonetised, the curve would have risen much higher at that point. The succeeding decline in both exports and silver purchases is of course to be attributed to the Franco-Flemish war, but after 1302 both rates rose sharply, that for silver lagging slightly behind that for wool exports, as would be expected, for it would take some time for the profits of trade to be taken back from Flanders and Brabant and exchanged at the mints. What is striking is how closely the silver receipts correspond with the probable value of the wool trade from 1302 to 1309. The connection of the two rates is closest at this time, but the graph as a whole shows a clear relationship between them over the rest of the period under consideration, with the exception of the years from 1288 to 1295, when for reasons already explained merchants preferred not to take their coin to the English exchanges.[1]

These monetary changes that took place in the reign of Edward I were of considerable significance, for they affected the total amount of currency in circulation in the country. This is not something that can be calculated with any accuracy, but from the fact that in the full-scale recoinage of 1279 only about £400,000 was turned out by the mints it can be seen that the amount of coin actually current was not high. The estimate made by Crump and Hughes that the quantity in circulation quadrupled during the reign of Edward I, with about £1,600,000 by 1307,

1. Supra, p. 350.

is a gross over-estimate, for it is based on the assumption that all the silver coined during the reign remained in England.[1] This ignores the fact that there was much English silver in France in the 1280's, and that large sums were sent abroad by the government between 1294 and 1297 in pursuance of the war with France. Not only was there the £165,000 paid to the foreign allies, but also the impressive sums sent to Gascony. English soldiers going to Flanders probably took more more cash out with them than they brought back. And later in the reign Gascon merchants were paid some £50,000 out of the English customs, in return for money they had lent to the English paymasters in Gascony. What was happening in the 1290's was that there was a massive outflow of bullion from England, while in the early years of the fourteenth century the tendency was reversed, and English silver stocks were built up. This gives the currency question much more significance than the simple fact that increased mint activity meant bigger profits for the crown, for in conditions where there was little money in circulation, the burden of taxation would be felt much more heavily than in a period of ample liquidity.

A different way of approaching the problem of how the amount of currency in circulation during this period varied is to examine prices. The quantity of money circulating is a determinant of price levels, but it is of course only one of several factors. The rate at which

1. Crump and Hughes, 'The English Currency under Edward I', The Economic Journal, v (1895), 65.

FIGURE VII

National Grain Prices, 1280-1320.



it circulates is of equal importance, but it seems reasonable to suppose that this did not vary significantly in the reign of Edward I. The size of the population will also affect prices, for as it increases, so does demand. But there is no evidence of any startling population changes in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth centuries. The final factor effecting prices is of course production: a bad harvest would naturally send prices up sharply. Short-term price changes were generally the result of fluctuations in the harvests, while monetary factors were more important in determining long-term trends, though an exception to this generalisation was the effect of the monetary disturbances of 1299-1300, which had a very marked short-term impact on prices.

Contemporary opinion on weather and harvests was pessimistic. Rishanger contended that following the indifferent harvest of 1289 there was a dearth of corn for the next thirty years. But the evidence of prices and grain yields hardly supports his view. Figure 7 shows the prices of the four main grains as calculated by Farmer in graphical form.[1] This shows that prices rose steadily to a peak in 1295. 1297 was not a good year, but thereafter prices in Edward I's reign remained moderate, suggesting that agricultural conditions were at least reasonable. So the period of the French war, with

1. D.L. Farmer, 'Some Grain Price Movements in Thirteenth Century England', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd. ser., x (1957), 212. A graph of grain prices from 1208 to 1325 is to be found in ibid., 214.

FIGURE VIII

A Comparison of Wheat Yields and Prices on some Winchester Manors, 1280-1320.



taxation at a high level, and coin short as a result of the outflow of bullion from the country, coincided with high prices. Clearly this economic background is of the very greatest importance in explaining the political crisis of 1297. The financing of the Scotch wars must have been eased by the relative abundance of cash in the country combined with reasonable prices.

On purely monetary grounds, prices in the last ten years of the reign should have risen, but a succession of better than average harvests countered the effect of the increase in the amount of currency in circulation. But by comparing grain yields and prices in different periods, it can be shown that the influx of foreign silver was having some inflationary effect. Figure 8 compares these for some Winchester manors, using the figures worked out by Titow. Unfortunately the series of accounts is not quite complete, but it can nevertheless be seen that there was a general tendency for prices to rise in relation to yields, particularly after 1306.[1] This can also be shown statistically, by comparing the ratios between yields and prices, taking eight year periods. As one year's prices are the result of the previous year's harvest, each is calculated for seven years in these periods. The first runs from 1268 to 1275. This was prior to Edward I's first recoinage, so with the currency in a bad state the ratio was high, as the following table shows.

1. Figure 8, like the table which follows in the text, is based on Titow's calculations, in 'Evidence of Weather in the Account Rolls of the Bishopric of Winchester, 1209-1350', Econ. Hist. Rev., 2nd. xii (1960), 373 seqq. Farmer, op. cit., 217, also has a graph of wheat prices and grain yields.

	Average Price	Average Yield	Ratio
1268-75	6.70 s.	3.60	1.86 : 1
1283-90	5.14 s.	3.60	1.44 : 1
1296-1303	5.99 s.	4.12	1.45 : 1
1307-14	7.15 s.	4.15	1.72 : 1

With the average yield the same, the price dropped sharply in the 1280's, with the new currency in circulation. In the next period for which calculations can be made, 1296-1303, the yield improved, keeping prices comparatively low, the ratio being almost identical with the previous one, despite the fact that in 1300 the pollards and crockards set prices artificially high, at 6.42 s. on these Winchester manors, after an average harvest in the previous year, and despite the fact that by 1303 the action of the mints in pouring out coin must have been tending to create an inflationary situation. In the last period, from 1307, the effect of the increase of the volume of coin in circulation can be very clearly seen, for although yields were good, and prices should therefore have been down, they were in fact even higher than they had been between 1268 and 1273.

This evidence may be criticised as being limited to the production of wheat on the Winchester estates. But a comparison of the Winchester prices with the national averages calculated by Farmer shows that the Winchester figures were in no way atypical, and the fluctuations in the prices of other grains paralleled those in wheat closely. Nor is the evidence for inflation in the early fourteenth century confined

 Note — there is no page 369.

to cereals. The prices of other commodities indicate that the imports of foreign silver had their effect. The average price of oxen in the decade 1301-1310 was 1s. 3½d. higher than in the previous ten years, according to Thorold Rogers' calculations.[1] Canvas rose in price from 2s. 2½d. for a dozen ells in the decade up to 1300 to 2s. 8d. in the next.[2] Prices of lead, tin and brass all rose in the period,[3] and such examples could be multiplied.

Obviously, Edward I's monetary policy did not play anything like the major rôle that Philip IV's currency manipulations did in financing warfare. But the English policy of ensuring that the country had a sound currency must have indirectly assisted the war effort, by providing the economy with a good monetary basis. The Italian merchants lending to Edward I had no cause to worry like Musciatto dei Francesi about the economic dislocation caused by frequent and ill-considered debasements. There was little danger of soldiers becoming mutinous as in 1124 because they were not paid in coin of good quality. In the years of the war with France the disruption of trade, combined with heavy government expenditure abroad, resulted in a drain on English stocks of silver. With heavy taxation in England, and high prices for agricultural produce with the exception of wool, the political crisis of 1297 was made the

1. Thorold Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England, i. 361.
2. Ibid., i. 593.
3. Ibid., i. 605.

more acute. Constitutional arguments were backed by more material grievances. After the French war the English government acted with great efficiency in dealing with the threat presented to the currency by the introduction of the low grade pollards and crockards. In the last years of Edward I's reign the high standard of the English coinage, combined with a thriving wool export trade, effected a net gain in the country's stock of currency. In a period of extremely low liquidity, the type of inflation that this produced was of considerable benefit to the economy. It certainly was no hindrance to the government. Wages, the major item in the crown's military budgets, were unaffected, and with more money in circulation there was less likely to be strong opposition to demands for money to pay for the wars.

X

CREDIT FINANCE

Taxation, lay and clerical, together with customs dues, provided Edward I with the bulk of his wartime revenues. These were the only sources of cash specified when he wrote to the barons of the Exchequer in January 1296, ordering them to consult with the Treasurer about the raising of a large sum to be sent to Gascony. They were asked

> 'qe entre vous e li mettez tot le bon conseil qui vous savez coment deners se levent par tot a nostre oes, ausi bon de setyme, del unzime, du dime de la clergie, e de la costume des leynes, come en totes les autres covenables maneres qe vous porrez.'[1]

But important and substantial as these revenues were, they were not sufficient to meet the demands of Edward's wars. At times of crisis, efforts had to be made to find other methods of obtaining cash.

One obvious approach to the problem was to speed up and make more efficient the collection of that portion of the revenue for which the sheriffs were responsible. An estimate of 1284 had put the ordinary revenue of the crown, composed of the county farms

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/69, m. 10.

and various miscellaneous profits of escheats, wardships and justice, at almost £19,000.[1] This sum was not large enough for it to be worth the government's while to overhaul the whole system of local financial administration. But in 1297 an attempt was made to increase this income, by collecting the many unpaid debts that cluttered up the Pipe Roll accounts. In July commissions were set up, before which all sheriffs and bailiffs were instructed to appear and state what debts were due to the crown in their areas. But this plan ran into difficulties, for the officials feared that they would be charged with sums that they could not recover from those who had originally incurred the debts. Faced with the refusal of the local officials to co-operate, new commissions were set up to examine 'les fetz des viscomtes' for the past three years. Local juries were to be set up to declare whether the debts could have been collected, and where responsibility for failure lay.[2] An effective enquiry on such a scale in the conditions of the summer of 1297 was hardly practical, and there is no evidence that much was done. By 1298 it had become politically advisable to hold an enquiry into the malpractices of local officials, and in the judicial inquests of that year it was extortion that was investigated, rather than any failure to collect revenues.[3]

1. M.H. Mills, 'Exchequer Agenda and Estimate of Revenue, Easter Term 1284', Eng. Hist. Rev, xl (1925), 230, 233-34.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/70, mm. 108-09.
3. W.S. Thompson, A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, has the fullest account of the 1298 enquiry.

It was possible to do more to speed up the distribution of local receipts to the men who needed the money than it was possible to increase them. Traditionally, the money was paid into the Exchequer every Michaelmas, but it was obviously sensible to allow sheriffs and farmers of revenue to pay funds directly to Wardrobe officials or crown creditors. Tout saw the means by which this was made possible as being the introduction of dated Exchequer tallies in 1290. He considered that, as was later practice, these were handed over by the Exchequer to the Wardrobe or the creditors. In turn, the tallies were given to the local official as a receipt when the money was paid over. They could then be taken back to the Exchequer, where they provided evidence that the revenue had been correctly allocated.[1] But it has been shown by Jenkinson and Willard that this procedure was hardly normal in the later years of Edward I's reign, there being only one definite reference to its use.[2] The system generally in use was a different one, which gave far more scope to the Wardrobe and less to the Exchequer. Instead of using tallies, the principal instrument was the written receipt or bill of the Wardrobe. So in instructions sent to the collectors of the new custom in 1304 it was laid down that the revenue was to be paid to Wardrobe officials in exchange for such receipts.[3] At the Exchequer tallies were issued in exchange for these Wardrobe documents. Armed with the tallies, the collectors could then proceed to make their final account.

1. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 100-01.
2. H. Jenkinson, 'Mediaeval Tallies', Archaeologia, lxxiv (1925), 289-351; Willard, Parliamentary Taxes on Personal Property, pp. 253-59.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/77, m. 61.

A more detailed illustration of the working of this system may help to explain it. In a book of Wardrobe receipts it is noted that Henry de Cobeham, recently sheriff of Kent, paid £12 to Richard of Montpellier, who was receiving money for the Great Wardrobe. In exchange, he was given a Wardrobe letter of receipt, dated 22 November 1303.[1] Cobeham took this to the Exchequer, and exchanged it for a tally, the normal form of Exchequer receipt, on 16 January 1304. In the entry on the receipt roll it was noted that this sum of £12 was charged to the Wardrobe.[2] With this method the Exchequer did not have the control over determining who was to be paid that the later system of using tallies as a means of assignment provided. But it did have the advantage that the Exchequer was not in a position to issue tallies to creditors which they found could not be exchanged for cash, as there was not enough revenue to meet all demands, which was to happen later.

But like the later system of using tallies of assignment, the technique of using Wardrobe receipts and bill could provide the government with a form of credit. For if the Wardrobe did not have

1. Wardrobe Receipt Book, E. 101/365/6, f. 28v.
2. Exchequer Receipt Roll, E. 401/155. The transaction is also noted in the Issue Roll, E. 403/117.

the cash to meet the demands of all those wanting payment, as was often the case, it could issue them with documents that might be honoured at some future date by a sheriff or other receiver of revenue, or that might be taken direct to the Exchequer for payment. These Wardrobe letters were often not paid off for years, and on occasion might be used as a form of paper money. One such was made out to William de Monteny of Leicester in the sum of £34. 10s. 8d., and sealed by Droxford and his controller Bedwin. It was passed on by William's wife to another Northampton man, Edmund of Winchester, and was given by Edmund in 1317 to two royal clerks in payment for horses and armour.[1] Obviously they had a better chance of exchanging the document for cash than ~~had~~ he.

The date at which it became common for sheriffs and other officials to pay out their revenues locally rather than bringing them in to the Exchequer can be determined by examining the records to discover how much was paid in centrally. This has been done by Miss Mills, and her calculations show that while in 1294 £8,982 came in, receipts

1. Letter patent of Edmund of Winchester, E. 101/363/18.

dropped over the next four years. In 1298 £4,778 was paid in cash to the Exchequer. In the following year receipts fell sharply to £1,873, and in 1300 to £1,239. With the exception of 1301, when £3,006 came in, the level of cash receipts remained very low for the rest of the reign. In 1303 it was as low as £833.[1] There is no evidence that the change to the new system was the result of any consciously directed policy: it appears rather to have been a gradual move in the direction of convenience.

The increase in cash receipts at the Exchequer in 1301 was, in contrast, quite deliberate. Since 1298 money had sometimes been paid in advance by the sheriffs and other officials,[2] and in writs issued on 24 April an attempt was made to regularise this, and get all the farms paid in at the end of June rather than at Michaelmas.[3] The response to this plea does not appear to have been very satisfactory. On 11 October Edward I wrote to the Exchequer expressing

> 'grant merveille de ceo qe vous nous avez enviee si poi de deniers, come vous nous avez enviee avaunt ces houres, et nomement de ceo qe les deniers nous sont venus par si petitees parceles.'[4]

A further letter followed five days later, complaining that had it not been for lack of cash, the war against the Scotch might

1. M.H. Mills, 'Adventus Vicecomitum, 1272-1307', Eng. Hist. Rev., xxxviii (1923), 340.
2. Ibid., 341.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/74, m. 58d. A draft of these writs is in E. 101/5/25.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 5.

have been completed that year.[1] In response to the royal displeasure, the Exchequer stated that they had sent out clerks all over the country to encourage the sheriffs to bring in their money soon, and that writs were being sent out daily to hasten this task. In addition, John Droxford, who was seconded to the Exchequer while Langton was abroad, was sent south to raise money.[2] His journey lasted from 25 October until 20 November,[3] and a number of receipts made out by him during that period survive. He received, for example, £100 from Walter of Gloucester, esceator south of the Trent.[4] £43. 8s. 8d. came from the farm of Odiham and Wickham,[5] while from the sale of beasts in Windsor forest £8. 6s. 8d. was raised. Forest fines produced £1. 15s.[6]

These efforts in 1301 did not produce as much cash revenue as had been hoped, with the Michaelmas sheriff's profer only yielding £3,006.[7] The rest of the reign did not see any repetition of such attempts to hasten the ordinary revenue of the crown, and it seems that in 1301 the government had been forced to adopt these measures as a last resort, since the grant of the fifteenth was not confirmed until the autumn, and the army was needing an

1. Ibid., m. 7.
2. Ibid., m. 10. The Exchequer's reply is dated 28 October.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7966a, f. 43d.
4. Wardrobe debentures, E. 404/481/3/13.
5. E. 404/481/3/16.
6. E. 404/481/3/10.
7. Mills, op. cit., 340.

estimated £750 a week.[1] The difficulties of 1301 illustrate the fact that the normal financial machinery was simply not flexible enough to cope with the suddenly increased demand for cash that Edward's campaigns created.

The solution to temporary financial difficulties was of course to borrow money. At the very beginning of the war with France, early in July 1294,[2] royal commissioners were sent round the country to seize all the private deposits of money in churches as a forced loan. £10,795 was sent in to the Exchequer as a result.[3] The measure was naturally extremely unpopular, though blame was not attached to the king, but to his ministers. William March was specified by one chronicler as being responsible.[4] Demand for repayment of the money was made in parliament in 1304,[5] and one issue roll of the Exchequer shows that at least £2,003 was restored.[6] This was hardly a loan in the normal sense, and the government could not afford to repeat such a measure. In order to meet its obligations, more orthodox methods of borrowing had to be adopted by the administration.

By the late thirteenth century the mechanisms of credit finance

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 6.
2. The chroniclers do not agree on the date. Chron. Cotton, p. 238, has 27 June, Chron. Guisborough, p. 248, has 4 July, while Flores Historiarum, iii. 274, gives 11 July.
3. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. li.
4. Flores Historiarum, iii. 274.
5. Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 165.
6. Exchequer Issue Rolls, E. 403/1322.

were familiar in England. The career of William Cade in the twelfth century is well known, and the rôle of the Jews as money-lenders needs no new emphasis. During the thirteenth century lending to the crown was increasingly dominated by Italian merchants. Henry III borrowed at least £54,000 in Italy for the Sicilian adventure,[1] and his son relied on the Italians for all the major loans he raised in England. During the first four years of the reign of Edward I the Riccardi advanced more than £54,000,[2] and by 1294 the total that he had borrowed from this one company came to at least £392,000.[3] There was therefore ample precedent for the extensive use of credit to support Edward I's war effort from 1294 until the end of the reign.

The reason for the prominence of the Italian merchants as a source of loans was simple: they had extensive resources, and had all the financial expertise of the highly developed Italian economy behind them. It was the prospect of the profits of the English wool trade that attracted them to England, and all the companies that advanced cash to the crown were also fully engaged in trade. Documents made up by the Exchequer at the time of the wool seizure of 1294 provide ample indication of the activities

1. Cambridge Economic History, iii. 454.
2. Tout, Chapters in Medieeval Administrative History, ii. 122.
3. Cambridge Economic History, iii. 456.

of these merchants.[1] Dealings in wool were often closely related to banking: a very typical arrangement being that made in 1287 between the abbot of Meaux and the Riccardi, by which the merchant firm advanced 220 marks, being repaid in the form of sixty sacks of wool, to be handed over between 1290 and 1294.[2] Such transactions can either be regarded as purchases of wool, or as loans made on security of wool. In other cases, the Italians appear simply as bankers, lending money and receiving deposits. Roger Bigod owed the Riccardi over £1,000, and had to grant them two Irish manors in payment.[3] There are several Exchequer documents, probably drawn up in 1294, which record debts owed to Italian companies. One small firm, the Betti of Lucca, was owed £3,312, mostly by laymen. A note suggests that the Riccardi had debts due to them totalling £20,007.[4] The wealthy and corrupt Walter Langton deposited some of his gains with the Italians. The appropriation of his assets by the crown after his fall in 1307 revealed that the Ballardi owed him £2,120, and the Frescobaldi at least 1,000 marks and 2,000 florins.[5] On one occasion the bishop of Winchester had 2,000 marks deposited with the Spini.[6]

1. Bigwood, 'Un marché de matières premières', Annales, vi (1930), 201. In addition, there are further lists of the wool possessed by Italian companies in King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, mm. 86-89. See Supra, p.
2. Bigwood, op. cit., 204.
3. N. Denholm-Young, Seigneurial Administration in England (1937), p.64.
4. E. 101/126/12, 28.
5. A. Beardwood, 'The Trial of Walter Langton, Bishop of Lichfield, 1307-1312', Trans. American Phil. Soc, vol. 54, part 3 (1964), 27.
6. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/71, m. 23.

The operations of the various Italian companies were not confined to England, but were international in character. This made the position of the English crown bankers, the Riccardi of Lucca, peculiarly difficult when war broke out between England and France in 129⅓, for Philip IV immediately singled them out for attack. All their agents and assets in France were arrested, and a heavy fine extracted from the firm. This prompted a mass withdrawal of deposits, and so weakened the company that it could no longer meet its obligations to Edward I. As they were no longer useful to him, the English king followed the example of the French, and confiscated the firm's property.[1] Such action, combined with the wool seizure which was abandoned in favour of the maltolt,[2] can have done little to enhance Edward I's credit in the Italian mercantile community. Although there was ample Italian capital in the country, as the records of the wool seizure show, it is hardly surprising that no company immediately proved willing to take the place of the Riccardi. It was the immense difficulty of raising loans in 129⅓ that made it necessary for the government to make such immense efforts to collect cash by appropriating papal taxes, seizing private deposits in churches, and imposing heavy taxation on clergy and laity.

1. Cambridge Economic History, iii. 457; King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/66, m. 63.
2. Supra, pp. 334-35.

Edward I's need for money in the autumn of 129⅞ was such, primarily as a result of the unexpected Welsh revolt, that, faced with the unwillingness of the merchants to advance him cash, he found it neccessary to compel them to do so. Representatives of eight companies appeared at the Exchequer, and promised to lend a total of £12,000. Presumably they were threatened with expulsion if they did not produce the money, while their consent was rewarded with the grant of export licences for their wool.[1] This loan was followed by others of the same type, described by the Chancery as having been made 'pro urgantissimis negotiis nostris et pro utilitate et defensione regni nostri', and the total raised in this way from eleven companies between the outbreak of the French war and May 1298 is shown by elaborate letters patent to have been £28,966. 13s. 4d.[2] But these were not the only advances received by the government during this period. Shortage of funds, combined with the problems of keeping officials in Flanders well supplied with cash, meant that efforts had to be made to raise loans abroad.

One obvious source of loans was the English merchants trading in

1. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, p. li; King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/68, mm. 64, 84.
2. E.A. Bond, 'Extracts from the Liberate Roll relative to loans supplied by Italian merchants to the Kings of England in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,' Archaeologia, xxviii (1840), 284-90, nos. xcvi-cvii.

the Low Countries. But, faced as they were with having to pay the maltolt, these men cannot have been very flush with funds. From them Robert de Segre raised £1,587. 9s. 4d.,[1] while the account of Elias Russel and Gilbert Chesterton reveals loans from English sources totalling £1,327. 8s. 8d.[2] After the close of that account early in April 1297, at least £487. 10s. more was received by Russel, as surviving receipts show.[3] In addition to these officials, John Botetourt was appointed with two other men to raise a loan of 10,000 livres tournois from English merchants in Antwerp. But unfortunately no account for this survives, simply a receipt for £20, and a claim for repayment of £70.[4] The one other English loan mentioned in the records is one of £180. 7s. 7½d. advanced to de Segre when he was organising victualling in Flanders in 1297.[5] There certainly were other loans, but documentation is not complete. The total raised from English sources in the Low Countries was probably about £4,000.

1. De Sturler, 'Deux comptes 'enrôlés' de Robert de Segre', Bull. de la comm. roy. d'hist., cxxv (1959), 594-97; Fryde, 'Financial Resources of Edward I in the Netherlands, 1294-1298', Revue Belge, xl (1962), 1176, n. 1. Repayment of £118. 16s. 5½d. was made in November 1296: Jornalia Rolls, E. 405/1/10.
2. Russel and Chesterton's account, Pipe Roll E. 372/146; Fryde, op. cit., 1176, n. 1. The Jornalia Roll, E. 405/1/10, records repayment of £1,076. 16s. 8d. in late 1296 and early 1297.
3. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/684/22/7-16; Exchequer Customs Accounts, E. 122/223/16, E. 122/224/15, 24, 279, 288.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/70, m. 105; de Sturler, Les relations politiques et les échanges commerciaux entre le duché de Brabant au moyen âge, p. 208, n. 204.
5. Fryde, op. cit., 1176, n. 1; Wardrobe book of debts, E. 101/354/5, f. 7.

Foreigners proved a more productive source of loans than did Englishmen. At least £510 was received from German merchants in Brabant, the amount they lent being credited against any future payments of customs they might make in England.[1] From Flemish sources came £1,200.[2] Of the Italians it was the Frescobaldi of Florence who did most to assist Edward I, advancing some £7,200 abroad.[3] Of this, £1,290 went to pay off a loan of 4,600 livres tournois, worth roughly £1,150, that had been raised from a group of merchants from Asti on the massive security of jewels worth 7,015 livres.[4] Other loans from Italians came to at least £1,100,[5] making the total raised from foreigners in the Low Countries over £11,000. In relation to the scale of expenditure of the war this is a modest sum. Edward's credit had not yet recovered from the blow dealt it by the fall of the Riccardi. It has been calculated that the total of loans raised abroad by him was less than four per cent of those obtained by his grandson Edward III in similar circumstances.[6]

1. Russel and Chesterton's account, Pipe Roll, E. 372/146; de Sturler, op. cit., p. 205, n. 1; Exchequer Customs accounts, E. 122/55/5. The evidence does not justify the high figure given for German loans by Fryde, op. cit., 1176, n. 4.
2. Ibid., 1176, n. 3.
3. Fryde, ibid., 1176, has a lower figure. Mine is based on Frescobaldi accounts in Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/126/11, E. 101/126/13/3. E. 101/126/15 does not include all the payments made by the firm.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/71, m. 36; Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/127/5/44. Repayment is also noted in the Frescobaldi accounts listed in n. 3, supra.
5. Fryde, op. cit., 1176, n. 1. To the loans listed here should be added one of £300 from the Bellardi, mentioned in Jornalia Rolls, E. 405/1/11.
6. Fryde, op. cit., 1177.

It is not clear why the Frescobaldi decided to advance substantial sums to Edward in the Low Countries. The firm was one of the major Italian companies in England, but in the first half of the reign they did not play a significant rôle in royal finance.[1] Their contribution to the forced loans of £4,666. 13s. 4d. was admittedly the largest of any of the eleven firms involved,[2] but this sum was hardly so great as to compel them to seek the royal favour by making further loans in order to ensure eventual repayment. That they later regarded their decision to lend to Edward in Flanders as a miscalculation is indicated by later claims they made, to the effect that when their connection with the English government became known in 1297, many of their depositors lost confidence and withdrew their funds. In 1302 such losses were put at 200,000 florins, roughly £30,000,[3] and in 1307 at £50,000.[4] After this, the Frescobaldi could hardly withdraw: their best chance of recouping the losses incurred in 1297 was to make substantial profits out of lending to Edward, and to benefit from the royal favour.

1. The most that they had done was to advance money to the Riccardi in 1288, when the latter were acting as royal agents in raising a loan: Bond, 'Extracts from the Liber de rolls', Archaeologia, xxviii (1840), 283, no. lxxxix.
2. Ibid, 284-90, nos. cxvi-cvii.
3. R.J. Whitwell, 'Italian Bankers and the English Crown', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., n.s. xvii (1903), 198. Another version of this petition is in Chancery Miscellanea, C.47/13/1/28.
4. C.Johnson, 'A Financial House in the Fourteenth Century', Trans. St. Albans and Herts Architectural and Archaeological Soc., i. (1901), 332.

In 1302 the Frescobaldi petitioned the King for payment of the debts he owed them. They calculated that they had lent a total of £32,886. 9s. 4d.,[1] the major part of which was advanced during the years of the war with France. Accounts show that in the two years after 1297 the Italian firm paid out roughly £6,700 on Edward I's behalf,[2] while from November 1299 until April 1302 loans totalled £6,555. 3s.[3] But during these years after the close of the war with Philip IV they were being repaid for loans they had made earlier, so that the crown was not benefiting from its relations with the Frescobaldi to quite the extent that these figures indicate. Like the other companies who contributed to the forced loans the Florentine company was allowed to export some wool free of custom, and also were repaid out of the customs once the war was ended.[4] In an account made with the Wardrobe in October 1299 it was found that they had been paid £5,264. 15s. 1d.,[5] while payments from that date until 1302 came to £3,342. 8s. 11d.[6] Not included in these accounts were profits that the Frescobaldi made from the custody of the exchanges of Newcastle, Hull, Dublin and Exeter, and other profits

1. Whitwell, op. cit., 198.
2. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/126/11; E. 101/126/13/3; E. 101/126/15.
3. Indenture of account between the Wardrobe and the Frescobaldi, E. 101/126/21.
4. Bond, op. cit., 284, no. xcvi. The final account of the Frescobaldi, in Pipe Rolls, E. 372/154, gives details of their receipts from the customs.
5. This figure is taken from part of a Wardrobe book in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, Latin MS. no. 229, f. 1v. Accounts subsidiary to that referred to there are E. 101/126/13 and E. 101/126/16, which give a slightly higher total.
6. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/126/21.

from coinage dealings, which they estimated at approaching £3,000 in all.[1] This meant that in 1302 the crown debt to the firm stood at just over £20,000.

Unfortunately no fully detailed accounts of the loans made by the Frescobaldi in the years after 1302 survive. Control over credit finance was gradually taken over from the Wardrobe by the Exchequer, and the best source for the later loans made by the company is the Pipe Roll containing the accounts drawn up by that department with the Italians in 1310. But these were not intended to provide a record of the total sum lent by the Frescobaldi, but were primarily concerned with the money handed over to them in repayment of loans. Although the accounts cover the whole period during which the Italians were lending to the crown, by no means all of their dealings with Edward I are included. Only about £12,000 of all the loans made before 1302 is mentioned.[2]

The most important of the accounts with the Exchequer covers the period from 1294 until April 1309. The Frescobaldi were asked to account for £100,367. 12s. 5¾d. of royal revenue that had been handed over to them. Most of this was from the customs, for in addition to the sums paid them from this source before 1300 they were granted

1. Whitwell, op. cit., 198.
2. Pipe Roll, E. 372/154.

all the receipts of the New Custom in February 1303,[1] to which was added a grant of the Ancient Custom from April 1304.[2] In all, the company received about £85,500 from the customs in England and Ireland. Chief of the lesser items in the receipt section of the account was £7,266 from the clerical tenths. £2,800 came from the Irish Exchequer,[3] following a grant to the firm of the profits of Ireland made in 1299 in return for £11,000.[4] Nearly £2,400 came from the custody of the royal silver mines in Devon granted them in the same year.[5] In the second account, for the period from April 1309 until April 1310 the Frescobaldi were simply charged with receipts of £14,767. 6s. 7¾d. from the customs.[6]

In answering for the receipts detailed in the first account the Frescobaldi were able to provide tallies to a value of £81,972. 11s. 9d., which testified to their having paid out that amount either to or on behalf of the crown. It can be shown that none of these had been issued by the Exchequer before 1304,[7] but unfortunately

1. Cal. Fine Rolls, 1272-1307, p. 470.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, p. 213.
3. Pipe Roll, E. 372/154.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 449.
5. Pipe Roll, E. 372/154; C. Johnson, op. cit., 323.
6. Pipe Roll, E. 372/154.
7. I owe this information to Dr E.B.Fryde, who has traced all the tallies made out to the Frescobaldi in the Issue and Receipt Rolls of the Exchequer, and who very kindly showed me the results.

this is not clear evidence of the date of the loans, for if the Italians paid money to Wardrobe officials or to creditors of the crown it might well be long after the transaction that tallies were cut.[1] In addition to the tallies, the Frescobaldi provided satisfactory evidence for loans totalling roughly £18,500. They were excused a few charges, and into the credit side of the balance was placed £11,533. 6s. 8d. that Edward I had granted to the Italians in compensation for losses that they incurred as a result of lending to the English government. The first account showed an eventual credit balance to the Frescobaldi of £15,629. 3s. 10½d. , while on the second they had a surplus of £4,842. 7s. 1½d. A further credit of £1,163. 14s. 7d. was due to them on their account for the silver mines.[2] The firm had complained that these had been given the farm of these on too harsh terms, particularly in view of the dilapidated state of the equipment, on which they had to spend almost £1,350.[3] The evidence of these accounts, therefore, is that by 1310 the Frescobaldi were owed £21,635. 4s. 6½d. But if the grants made in compensation for losses are excluded, and a strict balance of loans and repayments drawn up, then the merchants were owed a modest

1. That this was the case in many instances is suggested by the fact that in 1309 Edward II ordered the Exchequer to cut tallies for the Italians speedily, so that they might present their accounts: Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1307-13, p.120.
2. Pipe Roll, E. 372/154.
3. C. Johnson, op. cit., 323; King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/76, m. 24; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 625.

£10,102. 17s. 10½d., or roughly half what ~~they~~ to them had been due in 1302.

These figures should not be regarded as definitive. Not only did the accounts drawn up in 1310 not include all the loans made before 1310, they also omitted some of the payments made by the crown to the Frescobaldi. They were not charged with the sums they obtained from the Exchanges, granted them in March 1300.[1] Nor did they account for £6,000 assigned to them out of the receipts of the fifteenth granted in 1301,[2] of which they certainly received £5,700,[3] and for which they were given quittance in 1310.[4] From 1299 until 1308 the Frescobaldi had acted as receivers of revenue in Ponthieu,[5] and under Edward II they were given a similar rôle in Aquitaine. No enrolled account was made for either appointment, although it was intended that one should be drawn up.[6] Further doubt on the value of the 1310 Pipe Roll accounts as a full record of the financial dealings of the Frescobaldi is thrown by the Exannual Roll, which records payment totalling over £35,000 still charged to the Italian firm long after 1310.[7] But a number of items making up that total are identifiably included in the Pipe Roll accounts, for which the Frescobaldi had quittance. Perhaps as a result of the hostile

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 504.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 10.
3. Issue Rolls, E. 403/112, 114, 125, 128, 132.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1307-1313, p. 234.
5. Johnstone, Edward of Caernarvon, p. 65.
6. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1307-1313, pp. 234, 278.
7. Pipe Rolls, E. 372/129. See also E. 363/2.

attitude taken by the Ordainers to the Frescobaldi they were subsequently disallowed.

All this suggests that the Frescobaldi lent some £150,000 over a period of sixteen years to Edward I and his son. They were probably repaid roughly £125,000. But it is in many ways more important to discover at what level the crown's debt to the Italian firm was running than to know how much they lent in all, and this cannot be determined at all accurately for the period after 1302. In October 1305 it was estimated that the Frescobaldi should be satisfied out of the customs receipts by Easter 1307,[1] which implies that what Edward I was doing was in effect to anticipate the customs revenue by about eighteen months. Since full repayment was never achieved, as the Frescobaldi were expelled from England by the Ordainers, in financial terms the government can only be considered to have benefited from its association with the firm.

Although the Frescobaldi did not receive a proper financial return for their investment in the English crown, they did benefit in many ways from the royal favour. It was customary for privileged merchants to be allowed to recover their debts through the Exchequer court, just like the crown itself. The Exchequer Plea Rolls are full of actions brought by the firm against monasteries who failed to

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, p. 395.

meet their obligations.[1] In Edward I's reign one of the heads of the firm in England, Coppuccio Cotenna,[2] is described as a vallettus of the Treasurer.[3] It is not entirely clear what this status entailed, but it certainly allowed the Frescobaldi to receive preferential treatment at the Exchequer. Edward II flaunted his financial dependance on alien merchants far more than his father ever did, and it was in his reign that royal favours were most blatantly bestowed on the Italians. In 1309 Amerigo dei Frescobaldi was granted six manors for the nominal rent of one penny,[4] and in the following year an order was issued that the nominees of the firm to ecclesiastical offices were to be preferred to all others until they were provided with benefices to a value of £300 a year.[5] Elaborate exemptions from tallages, aids and such burdens as jury service were issued.[6] The climax of these favours come with the appointment of Bertus dei Frescobaldi to the king's council in 1310.[7] The same year saw Newgate gaol full of men owing money to the firm.[8]

1. In 1306 the Spini were granted the privilege of collecting their debts by Exchequer distraint, like the Frescobaldi: King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/79, m. 21.
2. He is usually called Coppe Cotenne in English sources. The correct Italian usage is indicated by a reference to him in Les Livres des comptes des Gallerani, ed. G. Bigwood and A. Grunzweig (Acad. Royale de Belgique, Comm. Roy. d'Hist, Bruxelles 1961-2), i. 47.
3. Exchequer Plea Roll, E. 13/25, mm. 27, 47d. The problem of what is meant by a valet of the Treasurer is briefly discussed in Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, ed. Jenkinson and Formoy (Selden Soc., xlviii), pp. xcix,cxii-iii.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1307-13, p. 152.
5. Ibid., p. 294.
6. Ibid., p. 321.
7. Ibid., p. 305.
8. C. Johnson, op. cit., 324.

In contrast to all these lavish favours, Edward I had on occasion treated the Italians with no great respect. When in 1301 a member of the Spini died in slightly suspicious circumstances, royal officials arrested all the members of the firm and seized their goods, which action prompted the intervention of the Pope, who appealed to Edward for their release.[1] In May 1306 the main companies in London, including the Frescobaldi, were brought before the king's council and informed that if they left the country, or exported any of their belongings, then all their assets would be confiscated. Security was demanded as a guarantee of their good behaviour. This was provided for the Frescobaldi by William de Carleton, a baron of the Exchequer, but the other merchants refused to co-operate, and were only persuaded to comply with the request after a period of imprisonment in the Tower.[2]

Such incidents must have been resented by the Italians, but they had less to fear from Edward I's policy than from the generosity of Edward II, which provoked widespread resentment towards the Frescobaldi. The opposition in 1311, naturally suspicious of the influence of a firm one of whose heads was a royal councillor,

1. Sweetman, Cal. Docs Ireland, iv. 372-73, no. 824.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/79, m. 34d.

and anxious to remove any means that Edward II might have of achieving financial independance, made the Italian firm one of their main targets. Expulsion of the Frescobaldi from England by the Ordainers led to the rapid collapse of the company.[1]

No other Italian merchants lent money to the crown during the years after 1294 on so massive a scale as the Frescobaldi. The Bardi were the only other firm whose accounts were enrolled by the Exchequer. Between 1294 and 1309 they lent £3,906. 19s. 9d., of which £2,736 was their contribution to the forced loans. By the end of 1312 they had been paid back all but £431. 5s. 4d. of their advances.[2] An account made by the Spini at about the same time survives in extremely bad condition. The total of loans to Edward I and his son is shown as £7,739. 19s. 8d., while receipts came to £3,832. 9s. 8d.[3] The firm of the Ballardi of Lucca contributed £533. 6s. 8d. to the forced loans,[4] and then became the merchants most regularly used by the Great Wardrobe, while they also lent money to pay off the debts of the Prince of Wales. Advances by this firm between 1298 and 1307 totalled £7,493. 12s. 7d. In repayment they got only £4,021. 15s. 8d., of which 5,000 marks was paid over to them by the Frescobaldi.[5] Evidence on other firms is more scanty,

1. Cambridge Economic History, iii. 458.
2. Pipe Roll, E. 372/156.
3. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/127/23.
4. Bond., op. cit., 289-90, no. cv.
5. Indenture of account drawn up with the Wardrobe: Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/127/7.

although the sums contributed to the forced loans of 1294-1298 are known.[1] Almost £12,000 was paid out of the customs to the companies involved in these between May 1298 and May 1299.[2] In about 1300 an estimate was made of the totals owed to various firms for loans made since 1294. In bad condition, this document shows that the Pulci had lent a total of £2,886. 6s. 8d., the Circuli Nigri £4,350 and the Circuli Albi about £5,800.[3] Repayment was partial and dilatory: it was not until 1309 that a liberate writ was issued for £1,836 to the Circuli Nigri and £1,117 for the Mozi.[4]

There was only one group of lenders who approached the Italians in importance. Much less attention has been paid to the Gascon merchants who lent to the English government, but their rôle in the crucial years between 1294 and 1298 was at least as important. The English commanders in Gascony, the earl of Lincoln and John of Brittany were inadequately supplied with funds from England, as has been shown already.[5] Local merchants were accordingly approached for

1. Bond, 'Extracts from the Liberate Rolls', Archaeologia, xxviii (1840), 284-5, no. xcvi. The figures are as follows. Spini - £3,905; Ammanati - £1,993. 6s. 8d.; Circuli Nigri - £3,817; Circuli Albi - £3,292; Bardi - £736; Pulci and Rembertini - £2,523. 6s. 8d.; Mozi - £3,744; Frescobaldi Albi - £4,606. 13s. 4d.; Frescobaldi Nigri - £1,089. 6s. 8d.; Ballardi - £533. 6s. 8d.; Seni - £666. 13s. 4d.
2. Enrolled account of the Bardi, Pipe Roll E. 372/158.
3. Exchequer Miscellanea, E. 163/2/40.
4. Bond, op. cit., 297, no. cxxxii.
5. See supra, pp. 368-69.

loans. A consortium from Bayonne provided £45,763. 14s. 1½d.[1], and in repayment were granted the receipts from the English customs from Whitsun 1299. In England they advanced a further £4,000 to the Wardrobe and 500 marks to John Sandale, Keeper of the Exchanges. A grant of £1,000 was made to cover their expenses in staying in England, and the chief representative of the merchants was given £34. 19s. 6d. With £574 of other loans allowed to them in their account, the men of Bayonne ended up with a deficit of only £56 owing to them after they had been paid almost £51,700 in England.[2] Other Gascon loans are not so well documented. £4,815. 12s. 4d. borrowed by the earl of Lincoln was repaid out of the Cornish tin mines.[3] The Frescobaldi were ordered to pay £1,753. 0s. 8d. to another group of Gascon merchants in 1300, in repayment of wartime loans.[4] The Issue Rolls record the assignment of 1,000 marks out of the fifteenth in Hampshire to Gaillard Cheval and other Gascons.[5] But the absence of comprehensive accounts makes it impossible to provide a definitive total of the amount borrowed from Gascons. Clearly, however, these merchants made a very important contribution to the shaky finances of the English commanders in the Duchy, with loans probably making up at least a quarter of the receipts.[6]

1. Sandale and Cambridge's account, E. 101/353/21.
2. Enrolled account of the Bayonne merchants, Pipe Roll, E. 372/152b.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/71, m. 49.
4. Bond, op. cit., 291, no. cx.
5. Issue Roll, E. 403/112.
6. See Supra, p. 369.

Edward I did not succeed in tapping any other major sources of loans. Henry Lacy borrowed at least £1,982. 12s. 3d. from Spanish merchants in Gascony,[1] while some funds were advanced by English traders there.[2] In England in 1301, a year of acute shortage of funds, 1,000 marks was borrowed from the executors of the earl of Cornwall.[3] Two years earlier £933. 6s. 8d. had been borrowed from Hanseatic merchants trading in England.[4] During campaigns it was common for small sums to be entered in Wardrobe accounts as loans from magnates and officials,[5] but these transactions were probably more in the nature of book-keeping formalities than true loans. Edward I certainly never borrowed from his own ministers on the scale that his son was to do in the early years of his reign.[6]

What was the importance of credit finance during the period from 1294 until the death of Edward I? Unfortunately the sources do not make it possible to produce any accurate total of the amount borrowed from all sources by the government, but the sum was probably

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 489.
2. Several receipts survive in Exchequer Miscellanea, E. 163/2/9.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 596. There appear to have been earlier loans, for total royal indebtedness to the earl was £6,560. 7s. 6½d.: ibid., p. 603. In November 1301 the Exchequer estimated that the executors were owed 3,000 marks for loans: King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 12.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-301, pp. 450, 479.
5. For example, such entries for the year 1301 are to be found in journals of income and expenditure of the Wardrobe, as E. 101/359/8; E. 101/360/24/4.
6. Wardrobe Receipt Book for 3 Edward II, E. 101/506/16, f. 4; similar accounts for 4-7 Edward II, E. 101/506/18, ff. 1-2.

in the region of £250,000. Impressive though this appears, it must viewed in the perspective of the aggregate debt of £392,000 to the Riccardi,[1] and of the achievement of Edward III in raising over £125,000 in 1338 and the succeeding year from the Bardi and Peruzzi.[2] The relatively low level of borrowing at the end of Edward I's reign was not the result of any deliberate royal policy, but was determined by the merchants, who were often not as co-operative as the King would have wished. In January 1297 Walter Langton and several others were authorised to raise a loan of £7,500,[3] but in fact slightly less than £4,000 was all that appears to have been collected.[4] August 1301 saw letters of credence issued for John Droxford to approach five Italian firms, presumably about loans,[5] though none were forthcoming. In that year it was only the Bayonne merchants who co-operated with an advance of £2,000,[6] and the Frescobaldi with a loan of 400 marks.[7] The low state of royal credit is indicated by the fact that jewels were handed over to the Bayonne merchants as security. In Ireland the Justiciar and Treasurer were ordered to ask for loans to pay for the war in Scotland, but it

1. See supra, p. 380.
2. Cambridge Economic History, iii. 460.
3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 226.
4. Bond, op. cit., 286-290, nos. xcvii-cvii.
5. Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, p. 463.
6. Wardrobe account of some receipts, E. 101/9/20.
7. Indenture of account with the Frescobaldi, E. 101/126/21.

was only possible to get money out of the merchants by seizing it.[1]

The difficulty that the crown found in raising money when it was most needed was again experienced in 1303, when money was short for the Scotch campaign. Once again John Droxford was sent south to negotiate a loan, with a credence directed to all the foreign merchants Italian and French, to the City authorities, and to the collectors of the papal tenths.[2] A large sum was clearly needed, but of all the merchants it was only the Frescobaldi who responded to the appeal, and even they only paid out slightly less than £2,000 in the period from August 1303 until January 1304.[3] From the collectors of the papal taxes came £4,500,[4] but this was scarcely a loan, as it went to make up the king's share of the tax.[5] Merchants of the company of the Spini were approached in Ireland by royal envoys. The merchants demanded full authority of their London branch and guarantees of repayment from them, and were clearly happy that their delaying tactics proved successful.[6] Edward I's credit at this time stood so low that it was virtually impossible for him to borrow large sums.

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 595; Cal. Close Rolls, 1296-1302, pp. 448-49. It is not known how much money was taken.
2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, p. 123.
3. Account sent by the Frescobaldi to Droxford, E. 101/126/23.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, pp. 158, 162-63.
5. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327, p. 676.
6. Memorandum of the two royal envoys' report, E. 101/8/4, m. 3.

It made most sense to borrow money when heavy expenditure was envisaged for a short time, as with a single campaign in Wales in the first half of Edward I's reign. The problem in the years after 1294 was that warfare was more or less continuous. Even though the prospects of a long war with France were slight, it must have been apparent that Scotland was bound to continue to absorb royal revenue for many years, either in the form of constant campaigns, or in the construction of castles and the upkeep of an occupation force. For the potential lender the prospect was not an attractive one, for such future demands on government finance would inevitably diminish repayment. Even the Frescobaldi must have been affected by such considerations in making loans, the more so since much of the money they advanced to the crown was raised by them from other merchants.[1] It is not therefore surprising to find that, urgent as Edward I's need for money was in this period, loans did not play so major a part in the royal finances as at some other periods. But the system of credit finance did something to assist in spreading the heavy financial burdens incurred in the years of war with France over a longer period. In particular, the war in Gascony could not have been carried on without the assistance of the local merchants, while had it not been for the Frescobaldi Edward could not have withdrawn as he did from his continental entanglements, for it was they who paid off both the merchants of Asti and the Burgundian allies.

1. C. Johnson, 'A Financial House in the Fourteenth Century', Trans. St. Albans and Herts Architectural and Archaeological Soc., i. (1901), 332. This petition states that on the loans made between 1302 and 1307 the Frescobaldi had to pay £10,000 or more in interest to other merchants.

The Italian merchants were useful to the government as more than mere suppliers of funds. These companies were the exponents of the most advanced commercial techniques of the period, possessing facilities that the government could take advantage of, and methods from which it might learn. A comparison of the accounting practices of the Wardrobe with those of the merchants shows considerable similarities. Both wrote their accounts in books, not rolls, and the same organisation of receipts in the first section and payments in the second is found.[1] It is very possible that it was from the Riccardi and the Frescobaldi that Edward I's officials derived some of their ideas on this subject.

With their widespread international connections the Italian merchants could make payment in any country or currency by the use of bills of exchange, and these financial skills were taken advantage of by the government. So it was possible for Edward I to have the Frescobaldi pay 1,500 marks in florins to the Burgundian nobles in Florence in 1298.[2] In 1301 Otto de Grandson was in Rome as an envoy of Edward I, and was paid £100 by the Frescobaldi agents there on a letter of credit.[3] The Spini were used a little later to pay the expenses of Cardinal Walter Winterbourn at Rome.[4] Even inside

1. The best example of Italian accounting methods of this period is Les livres des comptes des Gallerani, ed. Bigwood and Grunzweig.
2. Frescobaldi petition of 1302, Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/13/1/28.
3. Indenture of account with the Frescobaldi, E. 101/126/21.
4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, p. 366.

England it was extremely useful for Edward I to have the services of the Italian firms. The Ballardi were one of the main suppliers of goods to the Great Wardrobe,[1] while in 1303 the same firm was used to take money from London to Scotland.[2] The Frescobaldi paid out money to and on behalf of the government all over the country, not solely in London. In 1300 Ralph Manton borrowed 500 marks from them at Newcastle,[3] and in 1303 they were advancing money at York.[4] They were used to pay off royal debtors, thus relieving royal officials who could devote themselves to more important matters. On occasions the Frescobaldi are even found to have been supplying royal victualling officers in Scotland with grain.[5] Examples of the use made of the Italians could easily be multiplied, but these few make it sufficiently clear that the agents of the companies lending to the crown did provide some valuable assistance to the overworked royal administration.

Although the situation of constant campaigns year after year during this period was not ideally suited to the system of credit finance, it is clear that the advantages of the system outweighed the disadvantages. As full payment was not made during Edward's reign to those who advanced money, with only a few exceptions, the crown

1. Up till 1299 they had provided the Great Wardrobe with goods and cash to a value of £3,350: indenture of account with the Ballardi, E. 101/127/7.
2. Book of Prects for 1303, E. 101/364/13, f. 34.
3. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/676/57/4.
4. Account of payments made by the Frescobaldi, E. 101/126/23.
5. Exchequer Accounts Various, E. 101/676/57/5; Chancery Miscellanea, C. 47/35/10/10.

did not lose in the strict financial sense. There was certainly no question of interest payments involving the borrower in an overall loss on the transaction, for no regular lenders made any direct profit from their dealings with the government. At times, notably in 1301, the crown was hampered because important sources of revenue ~~had been~~ had been pledged to repay loans. But Edward I never regarded such grants as those of the customs revenues as inviolable. There were several mandates issued to the Frescobaldi ordering them to make payments out of the customs that they alone were intended to be receiving,[1] and in 1306, when there was urgent need of money for Scotland, the Irish customs were simply removed from the hands of the merchants in order to pay for purveyances.[2]

Potentially far more dangerous than any financial embarrassment that might be caused by excessive borrowing were the possible political repercussions of the government's association with Italian bankers. Aliens had never been popular in England, and, as was shown by the crisis of the Ordinances in the next reign, the Italians were an obvious target for attack. But at the time of the crisis of 1297 no clear replacement had emerged for the Riccardi. Most of the money that had been borrowed from Italians had been taken in forced loans,

1. As for example Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, pp. 399, 433, 459, 536.
2. Ibid., 379.

and there was obviously no sense in making accusations that the merchants had any sinister influence on the king. Later in the reign there were no protests against the rôle of the Frescobaldi, but it seems probable that bitterness against them was building up, to come to a head in 1311. Edward I himself did not suffer the repercussions of his financial policies, but the obligations to the Italians that he involved the government in were to prove a troublesome legacy for his son.

XI

THE RECKONING

The beginning of the war with France saw great efforts made by the government to accumulate sufficient supplies of cash to meet the expected demands. With the tenth, the moiety, the seizure of papal taxes and the scrutiny, a substantial reserve was built up. But the unexpected Welsh revolt consumed some £55,000, and by Michaelmas 1295 roughly the same sum had been sent to Gascony.[1] In addition almost £47,000 was entrusted to Robert de Segre to pay to the foreign allies.[2] In September 1295 there was still £10,968 in the Exchequer, but by 20 October this reserve had fallen to £2,891.[3] In January 1296 the King ordered the Exchequer to take no vacations, such was his need of cash.[4] From this point until the end of the reign the government had to spend revenue as it came in: the demands for money were such that it was impossible to maintain a reserve to meet emergencies.

Lack of cash was a constant difficulty facing Edward in the campaigns of the last ten years of his life. The exceptional instance

1. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. l-li.
2. Supra, p.271.
3. Jornalia Roll, E. 405/1/5.
4. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/69, mm. 10, 11.

of his borrowing in January 1298 £156 that the almoner, Henry of Bluntesdon , had deposited in the Wardrobe for safe-keeping,[1] and the fact that it was the Frescobaldi and not the Exchequer who were able to pay off the Burgundians,[2] testify to the king's financial problems when he was in Flanders. In Scotland lack of money was a constant complaint. In October 1301 Edward complained to the Exchequer that of the soldiers in the army,

> 'le plus se sont ia departiz de nous, et uncore ceux qui sont ovesque nous demoerez, navioms poer de retenir, quil ne segt vont de jour en autre, et tut est par defaute de deniers.'[3]

Five days later a further letter blamed the fact that the campaign had not been brought to a satisfactory conclusion on the lack of cash.[4] Early in the next expedition to Scotland, in August 1303, the king was stressing the importance of having adequate supplies of coin. The Exchequer were instructed that they were to make no payments without special command, and that all available funds were to be sent to Scotland.[5] In the Welsh war of 1294-1295 it had been possible to despatch sums of as much as £5,000 in single consignments to the paymasters.[6] In comparison, the largest sum sent to the army by the Exchequer between July and November 1301 was £1,000, and this was in response to a desperate plea for cash.[7] The Wardrobe journal for the

1. Book of Wardrobe debts, E. 101/354/5b, f. 40.
2. Supra, p. 274.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 5d.
4. Ibid., m. 7.
5. Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 368/73, m. 49.
6. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. 226-27.
7. Payments from Exchequer to Wardrobe in 1301 are listed in E. 101/9/20, p. 4. The £1,000 was brought back to the Wardrobe by the messenger who had taken the second letter demanding cash sent by the king, which was written on 16 October, and is in E. 159/75, m. 7.

last year of Edward I's reign shows that the balance of cash in hand only exceeded £1,000 at Christmas 1306, following the receipt of 2,000 marks. The level was usually much lower.[1]

It is unfortunately not possible to draw up accurate balance sheets for the royal finances in the years 1294-1307. The division of the financial administration into Wardrobe and Exchequer would in any case make it difficult, while the incomplete nature of the records makes it impossible. But the financial position can be indicated in various ways. As the crown rarely had enough cash to pay its creditors, debts were constantly incurred. How considerable were the deficits that were run up in this period? It was the Wardrobe as the department primarily responsible for making payments that ran up most of these debts, and it is therefore the accounts of that office that need to be investigated first.

The final Wardrobe accounts give details of the income of the department, most of it allocated by the Exchequer, but with some revenue collected and accounted for independently. The details of expenditure do not indicate how much money was paid out by the Wardrobe, but rather show what costs were incurred. So a comparison

1. Wardrobe Journal, E. 101/370/16.

between the totals of receipts and expenses is a guide to the size of the debt incurred. For the period up to 1298 the Wardrobe accounts are probably reasonably accurate: they certainly satisfied the Exchequer, which had them enrolled on the Pipe.[1] But for the rest of the reign there are no enrolled accounts, and for some years, those Wardrobe books and accounts that do exist are obviously incomplete. There is no statement of the infantry wages for 1303 in the Wardrobe account for that year:[2] they are to be found in the account book for the following year.[3] Accounts for the royal hunting establishment for the whole period from 1300 are lumped together in the Keeper's book for 1306.[4] This volume includes various miscellaneous payments to soldiers that should have been entered in earlier accounts, while it only has a few details of the military expenditure of the year it is supposed to be dealing with.[5] So the following table should not be regarded as a definitive statement, but more as a rough guide to the finances of the Wardrobe during this period.

1. Pipe Roll, E. 372/144.
2. Draft Wardrobe final account, E. 101/364/14. This document, together with a similar one for the two previous years, E. 101/360/25, is probably the result of an Exchequer attempt to produce an enrolled account. They are very unlikely to have have been drawn up in Edward I's lifetime.
3. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835, ff. 72-90.
4. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 129, n. 1. Further reasons are given there for distrusting totals taken from this particular source.
5. E. 101/369/11. See in particular ff. 77, 109, 136.

Wardrobe Receipts and Expenses

Date[1]	Receipt	Expenditure
1293-4	£65,801. 4s. 1½d.[2]	£67,827. 2s. 11d.
1294-5	£124,792. 9s. 5½d.	£138,255. 12s. 10d.
1295-6	£105,324. 4s. 1d.	£83,648. 0s. 0½d.
1296-7	£106,356. 12s. 6½d.	£119,519. 9s. 4½d.
1297-8	£39,826. 15s. 0½d.	£78,549. 4s. 6d.[3]
1298-9		
1299-1300	£58,155. 16s. 2d.	£64,105. 0s. 5d.[4]
1300-1	£47,550. 12s. 11d.	£77,291. 7s. 7½d.[5]
1301-2	£72,969. 6s. 1¼d.	£61,949. 6s. 5¼d.[6]
1302-3	£52,195. 14s. 0¾d.	£64,036. 11s. 1d.[7]
1303-4		£68,958. 5s. 3d.
1304-5		
1305-6	£64,128. 3s. 1½d.	£77,318. 15s. 10¼d.[8]

Only in two years, 1296 and 1302, did these Wardrobe accounts show a surplus of income over expenditure. Over the whole period there was clearly a substantial deficit. Another source gives more details of the debts run up by the Wardrobe, for account books of

1. The dates of these accounts follow the regnal year, which began on 20 November.
2. The figure of £65,850. 4s. 1½d. given by Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, vi. 80, is a misreading of the account in Pipe Rolls, E. 372/144.
3. Tout, op. cit., vi. 80-81.
4. Liber Quotidianus, pp. 12, 360.
5. Tout, op. cit., vi. 82-83: A small slip of parchment summerising these totals in E. 101/371/21/70 gives receipts as only £46,768. 10s. 10½d. A draft final Wardrobe account for this and the succeeding year shows expenses for 1301 as £77,171. 1s. 9¼d: E. 101/360/25.
6. Ibid.
7. Draft Wardrobe final account, E. 101/364/14.
8. Tout, op. cit., vi. 82-83.

those that remained unpaid were kept. For the first three years of Droxford's keepership of the Wardrobe, from November 1295 until 1298, the enrolled account shows the overall deficit as £30,219. 2s. 3d.[1] No details of this were given in the Pipe roll, but they were stated to be available in the book of debts. Two versions of this survive, and the total given by each roughly corresponds with the figure in the enrolled account. But on a year by year basis there is no correlation between the level of debt and the deficit or surplus indicated by the figures of income and expenditure in the enrolled account, as the following table shows.

Wardrobe Debts, 1295-1298

Date	Debts[2]	Overall Deficit	Overall Surplus[3]
1295-6	£2,233. 5s. 1½d.		£21,676. 4s. ½d.
1296-7	£12,485. 3s. 5½d. (£12,787. 6s. 5½d.)	£13,162. 16s. 10d.	
1297-8	£15,489. 8s. 1d. (£16,071. 13s. 7½d.)	£38,722. 9s. 5½d.	

The reason for this was that t e revenue received in one year might well be used to pay for expenditure incurred in the previous one. There is no cause to doubt that the Wardrobe debt in 1298 stood at about £30,000.

1. Pipe Roll, E. 372/144.
2. Wardrobe books of debts, E. 101/354/5. The figures in brackets are taken from the second version. Both books are in the same folder.
3. These figures of deficit and surplus are calculated from the enrolled Wardrobe accounts, Pipe Roll, E. 372/144.

But there is reason to doubt the statement that at the end of Edward I's reign debts totalled about £60,000.[1] This is drawn from a further book of debts, and shows debts taken from two Libri Compotorum totalling over £38,000, while Walter Reynolds, keeper of the prince's wardrobe, owed £4,217. Added to these sums are Wardrobe debts for the years from 1298 until 1307, which bring the total to £60,109. 7s. 4½d. The total was highest for 1307, with debts adding up to over £5,000. The next largest figure was for 1298-99, just over £2,000. For 1304-05 debts were as low as £437.[2] When compared with the deficits indicated by the overall accounts for the Wardrobe in the same period, these figures are startlingly low. But this book of debts in hardly comparable to that covering the years from 1295 to 1298, which had represented the situation at the time that the enrolled account for the first three years of Droxford's keepership was drawn up, an operation performed at York early in 1300.[3] For no enrolled accounts were ever drawn up for the period from 1298 to 1307, and it was probably only when attempts were being made in the 1320's to settle the accounts that the list of Wardrobe debts was compiled.

1. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 125; May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399, (1959), pp. xix, 14.
2. Wardrobe book of Droxford's debts, E. 101/357/15.
3. Tout, op. cit., ii. 93 n. 1.

It was not normal practice to keep books of debts: it seems that they were only produced as part of the final accounting process.[1] Work on trying to produce Droxford's final accounts for the years from 1298 to 1307 proceeded throughout Edward II's reign. Between 1310 and 1319 £145. 12s. 7½d. was paid to Walter Bedwin to cover his expenses in having the accounts written up.[2] But the book of debts was not produced till even later, for it contains a reference to the Pipe roll of 18 Edward II, which suggests 1325 as the earliest possible date of compilation.[3] Attempts to get Droxford to come to account were still continuing early in Edward III's reign, he and his clerk John Ockham being frequently summoned to the Exchequer, on one occasion being forced to attend by being distrained by the sheriff of Somerset. But although the Michaelmas term of 1328 was spent by Droxford in accounting for his keepership of the Wardrobe, no satisfactory solution was reached before he died early in 1329.[4] It seems improbable that the book of debts can have been written after that, for there was no further purpose to be gained by continuing the accounting process. The crown had succeeded in establishing that Droxford owed large sums of money, and had raised £951. 12s. 4d. from the seizure of corn from his lands.[5]

1. Book of Prests, ed. Fryde, pp. x-xi, 228-29, shows what accounts were normally kept by the Wardrobe, and books of debts are not included.
2. Droxford's Onus, 1-16 Edward II, E.101/373/22.
3. Wardrobe book of Droxford's debts, E. 101/357/15, f. 22.
4. The question of the date of Droxford's accounting at the Exchequer is discussed by Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 128-29. Further information is in King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Rolls, E. 159/103, mm. 185, 192d; E. 159/104, mm. 180d, 181, 239; E. 159/105, m. 183d.
5. Account of the seizure made by John de Clyvedon, E. 101/507/12.

As the book of debts giving the figure of some £60,000 owed was not drawn up until the late 1320's, this means that far from that having been the level of indebtedness in 1307, it was actually the figure of debts still owing on the accounts of Edward I's reign some twenty years after that king's death. This explains why the figures for the debts of the years from 1298 to 1307 are so surprisingly low: many had been paid off in the course of Edward II's reign. There is no way in which an accurate figure of the Wardrobe's indebtedness in 1307 can be calculated. Unfortunately the Libri Compotorum and other documents that were used in the compilation of the book of debts do not survive. In any case the accounts for the years after 1298 defeated the skill of the Exchequer experts in the service of Edward II and Edward III, and no modern historian has a better chance than they had of clearing up the muddle and confusion of the finances of the period. The total of Wardrobe receipts for 1303 was calculated by Tout from a receipt book to have been just over £40,000,[1] yet the draft final account for the year shows that the figure was at least £12,000 higher.[2] Money shown by another receipt book to have been paid over to the Wardrobe was in some cases not charged to the department until 1314.[3]

In theory the Chancery was meant to authorise Wardrobe expenditure in advance by issuing the Exchequer with writs of liberate, but by the last years of Edward I's reign such writs were being issued long after

1. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 109 n. 2.
2. Draft final Wardrobe account, E. 101/364/14.
3. Wardrobe receipt book, E. 101/368/7, ff. 31-32.

the expenditure they were meant to cover had been incurred. Thus a writ of £11,405. 14s. 3½d., dated 1 October 1304 and enrolled under that date, was in actual fact only made out after Walter Bedwin brought a Wardrobe bill requesting such a writ to the Chancery in May 1307.[1] A further inefficiency in the system by which the Wardrobe was charged at the Exchequer with the funds it received was that in many cases tallies were not cut, nor entries made on the Exchequer issue and receipt rolls, until long after payment to the Wardrobe had been made. The Frescobaldi were particularly guilty of this, for in many cases they did not bother to get their tallies until they were making their final account in Edward II's reign. Several customs officials, sheriffs, and farmers of revenue were similarly dilatory. In the early years of Edward II's reign it was found necessary to issue liberate writs totalling £90,000 to Droxford in his rôle of keeper of Edward I's Wardrobe, partly to cover the issue of these tallies, and also to make possible the payment of the debts run up in Edward I's reign.Unfortunately, it is not always possible to distinguish between these two categories of entry in the record, so it cannot be determined with accuracy either how much income received by the Wardrobe in Edward I's reign was only charged to that department in that of his son, or how much money was paid out after 1307 in payment of debts incurred before that date.[2]

1. Liberate Roll, C. 62/80. An example of a bill requesting such a writ is in Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/28/60.
2. Droxford's Onus, 1-16 Edward II, E. 101/373/22.

The accounting procedures of the Exchequer did not break down at the end of Edward I's reign in the same way as did those of the Wardrobe. At this time tallies of assignment were not issued on any scale,[1] so that the Exchequer records of receipts and issues did represent real income and expenditure in a way they did not do later. By means of the jornalia rolls a careful check was kept to ensure that the two kept in pace with each other. These rolls recorded income and outgoings on a daily basis, and provide a reasonable indication of the level of royal income, though of course not including the sums that were paid directly into the Wardrobe entirely independently of the Exchequer. Nor, obviously, did they include payments made into Edward I's Wardrobe and not charged to that department at the Exchequer until after 1307. The following table shows the totals of income derived from these jornalia rolls, and in the last column the forinsec receipts of the Wardrobe are given in brackets, where the figure is known.

Exchequer Income, 1299-1307.[2]

April - August	1299	£13,032. 6s. 2½d.	
April - Sept.	1301	£24,679. 2s. 2d.	
Oct. 1301 - April	1302	£27,658. 7s. 4d.	} =£42,395. 17s. 8½d. (£29,653. 10s. 6¾d.)[3]
May - Sept.	1302	£14,737. 10s. 4½d.	
Oct. 1302 - April	1303	£24,844. 0s. 6½d.	} =£55,722. 4s. 2½d. (£8,605. 17s. 10¾d.)[4]
April - Sept.	1303	£30,879. 3s. 8d.	

1. See supra, pp. 374-76.
2. These figures are taken from Jornalia Rolls, E. 405/1/13, 16, 18, 22, 24, 26, 29, 33, 37, 39, 43, 47, 49.
3. Draft Wardrobe final account, E. 101/360/25.
4. Draft Wardrobe final account. E. 101/364/14.

Oct. 1303 - April	1304	£11,929. 6s. 9d.	} =£29,663. 17s. 4½d.
April - Sept.	1304	£17,734. 10s. 7½d.	
Sept. 1304 - April	1305	£23,362. 4s. 10½d.	} =£51,849. 12s. 7½d.
April - Sept.	1305	£28,487. 7s. 9d.	
Sept 1305 - April	1306	£17,558. 3s. 5d.	} =£48,280. 8s. 2d. (£14,118. 3s. 1½d.)[1]
April - July	1306	£30,722. 4s. 9d.	
Sept. 1306- April	1307	£31,152. 9s. 11½d.	} =£59,089. 13s. 9d.
April - August	1307	£27,937. 3s. 9½d.	

These totals from the _jornalia_ rolls are a much better record of the financial position than are the figures taken by Ramsay from the receipt rolls of the Exchequer, for these did not include the sums that came in from taxation, for which supplementary rolls were kept. But the general picture provided by the receipt rolls is a similar one: in particular, they agree with the _jornalia_ rolls in making the year from Michaelmas 1303 to 1304 one of peculiar financial difficulty[1], with Exchequer revenue standing at less than half the total of expenditure incurred by the Wardrobe. In contrast, in 1302 with no major campaign in Scotland, and with the receipts from the fifteenth coming in, Exchequer receipts taken together with the forinsec revenue of the Wardrobe come to over £72,000, while Wardrobe expenditure was only about £62,000. In the year from Michaelmas 1302 the equivalent figures balanced out, each being about £64,000. In 1306 the situation cannot have been easy, with the Wardrobe book

1. J.H. Ramsay, _A History of the Revenues of the Kings of England, 1066-1399_, ii. (1925), 88-89. Ramsay's figures of Exchequer revenue are taken from the receipt rolls. The figures of Wardrobe revenue for the last five years of Edward I's reign are from Wardrobe receipt books, and Ramsay is mistaken in assuming that this money came in independently from the Exchequer. Most of it would have been included on the receipt rolls. Tout, _op. cit._, ii. 111, n. 2, has some comments on this.

indicating expenditure incurred of over £77,000, and Exchequer revenue takenttogether with Wardrobe forinsec receipts only just over £62,000.[1]

If income, including loans, failed to match expenditure incurred, that simply meant that numbers of men had to go unpaid. In 1300 debts on the Wardrobe accounts for the years 1295-1298 stood at some £30,000. In the rest of the reign debts continued to accumulate, and by the end of the reign were probably into six figures, although no precise calculations are possible. In the late 1320's there was still about £60,000 owing on the accounts of Edward I's Wardrobe.[2] The Wardrobe books of debts do not indicate that any one particular class was victimised. Regular royal officials, men with whom the Wardrobe had only occasional dealings, humble servants and important military captains, all had reason to regret the insolvency of the government. Even a man of the status of Aymer de Valence, who was owed £2,240 for the campaign against Bruce in 1307, had to wait until 1322 to be paid 2,000 marks in part payment of this sum.[3] There were many petitions relating to the government's debts presented in the parliament of 1305. One was of a general nature, from all those owed money, whether for the seizure of funds deposited in churches in 1294, for prises of grain or wool, or for wages owed for military

1. These figures are taken from the tables supra, pp. 410, 416-17.
2. Supra, pp. 412-14.
3. Droxford's Onus, 1-16 Edward II, E. 101/373/22.

service.[1] Many were more specific. The judges asked that their fees, long in arrears, should be paid. They received the unhelpful answer that the Exchequer would pay them when it could.[2] Requests were made that payments overdue for building works at Caernarvon should be made.[3] Wages of the garrisons of Kirkintilloch and Linlithgow, together with sums due to men of Roxburgh who had supplied victuals to Edward's men were among the many debts resulting from the wars in Scotland that were petitioned for.[4] The number of such petitions presented in this parliament suggests that the problem was becoming a political as well as a financial one.

The government did not throw up its hands in despair when faced with adverse balances and an accumulating debt. Expenditure on inessentials throughout the wartime period was kept down. Between 1292 and 1294 just over £14,000 was being spent annually on the royal household, but in the rest of the reign the figure only once rose above £12,000, in 1302, a year when there was no major campaign.[5] When John Droxford brought instructions from the king to the Exchequer in January 1296 they included an order that all crown building operations should cease, with the exception of those in

1. Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 165; Maitland, Memoranda de Parliamento, 1305, pp. 103-04, no. 175.
2. Ibid., pp. 49-50, no. 80; Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench, ed. Sayles, i. (Selden Soc., lv, 1936), lxiii, discusses the fees of the justices, which in the years after 1294 were always paid long after they were due.
3. Maitland, op. cit., pp. 129-30, nos. 208, 209.
4. Ibid., pp. 169-71, nos. 272, 274, 275.
5. Tout, Chapters in Medieval Administrative History, vi. 80-83; appendix i, infra, pp. 435-44.

Wales and the painting of some rooms in Westminster.[1]

The division of the financial organisation into Exchequer and Wardrobe made economy difficult, the latter often incurring expenditure without the knowledge of the former. But there are signs that at the end of the reign the Exchequer was attempting to curb the independence of the household department. In 1299 instructions had been issued to all sheriffs and royal ministers asking them to make all payments direct to the Wardrobe,[2] but on 2 October 1304 this policy was reversed. The Treasurer and barons of the Exchequer announced to the sheriffs, bailiffs and other assembled for the Michaelmas profer that in future no money was to be handed over directly to the Wardrobe, save when specifically ordered in a royal writ. All normal payments were to be made to the Exchequer.[3] This was impractical with the Wardrobe still paying out large sums on military expenses in Scotland, but it is interesting that it was attempted. In March of the next year, 1305, liberate writs were issued to a large number of men owed money for their services in Scotland.[4] This was a novel procedure, for normally such debts would have been paid by the Wardrobe out of the funds allocated to the keeper in the large liberate writs made out to him. But pressure

1. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/69, m. 11d. Supra, p.152.
2. Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/48/6, writ of 25 July 1299.
3. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/78, m. 20.
4. Liberate Roll, C. 62/81.

at the parliament of 1305 had presumably prompted this interference by Chancery and Exchequer in Wardrobe affairs.

The last attempt of the reign to keep household expenditure under control was prompted by the departure of Walter Langton and John Benstead abroad. Droxford took over as Treasurer, and before he did so rules were laid down, in October 1305, stating that each week £250 was to be sent to the royal household, and £43. 13s. 4d. to that of the prince. Payment of £533. 6s. 8d. for fees and robes was also authorised, and a list of debts that were to be paid was also drawn up. This effort to plan expenditure and keep payments on a systematic basis did not outlast the year: by January 1306 payments to the royal household were irregular both in frequency and quantity, and once Langton returned, the old system was fully reestablished.[1] But though the reform was unsuccessful, that such an attempt was made bears witness to the government's sense of responsibility.

Administrative reforms might prune expenditure, but the only real way of cutting it down sharply was to abandon expensive policies. By 1297 the reserves of cash that had been built up in the early stages of the war with France had been exhausted. In his need for funds, the king tried to collect an eighth that had not been properly granted in parliament. In Flanders he did not have the money to

1. J.F. Willard, 'Ordinances for the guidance of a Deputy Treasurer, 22 October 1305', Eng. Hist. Rev., xlviii (1933), 84-89.

redeem jewels that had been deposited with the merchants of Asti as security for a loan, but had to call on the Frescobaldi to make the payment.[1] The inadequate size of the English army, the difficult political situation at home, and the fact that Philip IV seemed willing to settle the question of Gascony by negotiation, all contributed to Edward I's decision in the autumn of 1297 to abandon hostilities in Flanders, but the English king's hand was forced by the simple fact that he simply did not have enough money to continue the conflict.

But in the case of the Scotch wars Edward I could not withdraw as easily as he had done from his continental entanglements at Vyve-St-Bavon. The English war aim was the conquest of Scotland, and no compromise was possible. Financial difficulties did of course affect the way in which the war was fought. By the end of the reign the armies that were being sent north were much smaller than they had been in the early stages of the conflict. In comparison with the achievements in Wales, the castle-building programme was pathetic. But such economies were not sufficient. English policy was to continue the war in the hope of victory, and Edward did not expect resistance to be so long drawn out. In the autumn of 1301 the king considered that the end of the Scotch war was in sight, writing to the Exchequer that 'nos busoignes en les parties ou nous sumes sont ensi comencees,

1. See <u>supra</u>, p.385.

et mesme usqe en ceil la dieu merci qe nous avoms esperance qeles prendront bone issue procheinement[1] a laide de dieu'. But this optimism was qualified by the fear that lack of cash or administrative incompetence might result in failure on that compaign,[2] and, as things turned out, the king's hopes of a rapid victory in Scotland proved mistaken. Expenditure continued to be heavy, and the debts incurred by the government continued to mount.

The effects of the government's single-minded concentration during the years after 1294 on the problems of organising war, and on providing the money needed for it, were obviously considerable, though hard to define with any precision. There were developments in the methods of recruiting armies, while the machinery for keeping them supplied with food was made considerably more efficient. The need for money made the crown more dependent on the grant of taxes, and this period saw the machinery for the collection of taxation more firmly established. But Edward I's officials remained content with improving existing techniques and institutions: this was not an age of rapid change in methods of government. War monopolised the attention of the king and his ministers, so much other business was abandoned, and it seems likely that in these years war did more to hinder than to advance progress.

It was in the legal sphere that the concentration of the government

1. M.S. reads 'par heinement'.
2. King's Remembrancer's Memoranda Roll, E. 159/75, m. 5d.

on war had the most pernicious effects. The great legislative statutes of Edward I were all issued in the years up to 1290. Quo Warranto enquiries ceased in 1294, as a result of the outbreak of war with France. Only two general eyres were held after that date.[1] The neglect of the law in the later years of the reign was not because earlier achievements had left little more to be done. On the contrary, the years after 1294 saw an increasing breakdown in the force of law in the country. In that very year Hugh Cressingham reported that the abuses of champerty and maintenance were so widely practised that justice and truth were choked.[2] Yet it was not until ten years later that any attempt was made to deal with the problem. In November 1304 special judicial commissions were set up to restore order. They were known as trailbaston enquiries, after the popular name for the gangs of men armed with staves who terrorised the country. In an ordinance the king described the situation as being like the start of war, and the records of the commissions show that this was no great overstatement, for theirs is a sorry tale of murders and robberies.[3] A popular song of the time tells of an ex-soldier, who had served the king in Flanders, Scotland and Gascony, and who, persecuted by the justices of trailbaston, was compelled to take refuge from the law

1. D.W. Sutherland, Quo Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Edward I, 1278-1294 (1963), p. 30.
2. G.O. Sayles, 'The Dissolution of a Gild at York in 1306', Eng. Hist. Rev., lv (1940), 85; Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench under Edward II, ed. G.O. Sayles, iv (Selden Soc., lxxiv, 1957), liii-lvi.
3. Ibid., liii-lvi. A typical record of a trailbaston enquiry is to be found in J.I. 1/1107, covering seven counties, mostly in the north.

in the greenwood.[1] It seems very likely that returned soldiers did try to better themselves by the use of arms, and that in this way too Edward's wars encouraged domestic disorder. A further possibility is that the royal attempts to recruit for the army by pardoning criminals also assisted in the breakdown of law and order.[2] This problem of public order was of course nothing new in the years after 1294: the Statute of Winchester in 1285 had been prompted by the prevalence of violent crime.[3] But it does appear that the wars in the last part of Edward I's reign aggravated the problem, notably by distracting the attention of the government from it.

War had its impact on politics. In 1297 the king's determination to carry through the plans he had made for the French war resulted in a major crisis. Both the clergy and an influential section of the baronage were aroused, and in the autumn of that year there was a very real danger of civil war. The solution of that crisis provided by the Confirmatio Cartarum was not a very satisfactory one, and it is clear that it was only the news of the English defeat at Stirling Bridge, which had the effect of recalling their patriotic duty to the opposition, that made it acceptable. Despite the continued emphasis on war, and the mounting debts that were being incurred, political conflict never reached the same peak of bitterness in the rest of the reign that it did in 1297. Constitutional arguments continued, and although Edward had to accept defeat over the issue of military

1. Political Songs, ed. Wright, pp. 231-36.
2. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 126.
3. Stubbs, Select Charters, p. 464.

summonses,[1] overall the king was successful.[2] 1305 saw the Confirmatio annulled by Clement V, and in 1306 Archbishop Winchelsey, Edward's bitterest opponent, was summoned to the Curia to answer charges laid against him by the crown. He was suspended from his office, and did not return to England during Edward I's lifetime.[3] What is the explanation for the king's political success during the difficult years at the end of the reign?

One obvious difference between the years from 1294 to 1297 and the rest of the reign is that while the French war was extremely unpopular, that with Scotland won general public approval. Popular songs attest this,[4] and it is clear that there was no general disagreement with the aims of Edward I's policies after 1297, even though some of the means used to implement them may have been resented. The king himself had great personal prestige. In the Song of Troilbaston, for example, Edward is excepted from a curse on those responsible for the measure, and this was probably more than a conventional mark of respect for the crown.[5] Fear as well as respect contributed to the king's reputation. There was no equivalent personality to lead the opposition: Winchelsey did not command much of a following outside the ranks of the clergy, and

1. See supra, pp. 47-59.
2. Rothwell, 'Edward I and the Struggle for the Charters, 1297-1305', in Studies presented to Powicke, pp. 319-332.
3. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, p. 718.
4. Political Songs, ed. Wright, pp. 160-181, 212-223.
5. Ibid., p. 231.

Bigod, who had been in the forefront in 1297 perhaps more by virtue of his office of marshal than by his qualities of leadership, was no match for the king.

Edward I was careful to make sure that blame for unpopular measures should attach to his ministers, not to himself. One intriguing example of his unwillingness to be associated with unpopular decisions is in a letter sent to Walter Langton after the Treasurer had suggested that Bamborough castle be entrusted to Isabella de Vescy, in which the king wrote:

> 'endreit de bailler le chastel de Bamburgh' a Isabel de Beaumont dame deVescy dont nous vous mandastes e dont nous voudrez saver nostre volunte; sachez qe nous voudroms mieux qe la garde du dit chastel seut baillie a luy qe a autre, mes nous ne voloms en nulle manere qe le dit chastel seit beillie a la dite Isabelle ne a autre pur garder par nostre commandement. Einz voloms qe entre vous e les barons de nostre Eschequere le facez bailler en garde par vostre ordinance e par autorite sicome vous verrez qe mieux seit.'[1]

That this appointment was a political issue is clearly shown by the fact that Isabella and her brother Henry de Beaumont were singled out for attack by the Ordainers in 1311.[2] In the figure of Walter Langton the opposition were provided with an obvious target for attack, a man who might with some justice be blamed for the failings of the government. Though obviously a minister of very considerable administrative skill, his private life did not go uncriticised, and

1. Lord Treasurer's Memoranda Roll, E. 368/75, m. 8. The date of this letter is 19 October 1304.
2. Statutes of the Realm, i. 163.

there can be no doubt that he used his official position for personal advancement. At the beginning of Edward II's reign he owned land worth about £1,300 a year, according to extents made by the sheriffs. Valuables worth almost £5,000 were found during the survey of his manors.[1] This estate had been largely built up by purchase, exchange, usury, and manipulation of legal processes. Late in 1301 Langton had to go to Rome to answer charges brought against him there, and in parliament in 1307 charges of champerty were brought against him by John de Ferrers, which were sufficiently well founded for the king to find it necessary to issue a letter of pardon to his chief minister.[2] Edward I consistently gave Langton his fullest backing, going so far as to exile his own son from court when the prince quarrelled with the Treasurer in 1305.[3] Yet the king somehow managed to avoid the general opprobrium attached to Langton, while ensuring that the minister survived with complete impunity all the attacks launched on him.

One of the main reasons for the fact that there was no really effective opposition to Edward I in the years after 1297 was that the king was, in medieval terms, an old man. Unlike Edward III in the last years of his life, Edward I was an imposing and frightening figure in the final years of his reign. But he was sixty in 1299,

1. Summary of the extents made of Langton's lands, E. 143/9/2.
2. A. Beardwood, 'The Trial of Walter Langton, Bishop of Lichfield, 1307-1312', Trans. American Phil. Soc., n.s. liv, part 3 (1964), passim.
3. H. Johnstone, Edward of Caernarvon, pp. 97-98.

and was possibly something of a hypochondriac.[1] It obviously made good sense for potential opposition leaders to hold their fire until the old king died, to be succeeded by his incompetent son, and so it was in the first years of Edward II's reign that attempts were made to deal with the problems and grievances that had been building up in the last years of Edward I's life.

It was an extremely difficult legacy that Edward I left to his son. The young king's immediate reaction of succeeding to the throne was to dismiss his personal enemy, Walter Langton. Several of the Treasurer's closest associates were also arrested, but were released by 1308.[2] Other changes in the personnel of the government declared Edward II's independence of his father. The men who had headed his household as Prince of Wales were given high office, with Walter Reynolds becoming Treasurer and William Melton controller of the Wardrobe. John Droxford was transferred to the post of chancellor of the Exchequer, while his office of Keeper of the Wardrobe was taken over by the only one of Edward I's top officials who had the confidence of Edward II, John Benstead.[3] Ralph Baldock, the

1. The king's interest in medical matters is indicated by P. Chaplais, 'Some Private Letters of Edward I', Eng. Hist. Rev., lxxvii (1962), 82-85. See also J.R.H. Moorman, 'Edward I at Lanercost Priory, 1306-1307', ibid. lxvii (1952), 161-74.It may be significant that one of the very few similes employed by Edward in his correspondence was a medical one, when he likened the task of the trailbaston justices preceding the eventual arrival of justices in eyre to that of 'beverage devant medecine', in Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/61/36.
2. Beardwood, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
3. T.F. Tout, The Place of Edward II in English History (2nd. edn, 1936), pp. 70-72; Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 191-92.

chancellor, was replaced by a former holder of the office, John Langton, who had been dismissed by Edward I in 1302.[1]

Changes in personnel did not mean radical changes in policy, and far from the dismissal of ministers who had served Edward I faithfully serving to placate potential opposition, thb changes merely increased the numbers of the discontented. The new officials had been trained under the same system as the old, and the financial administration continued to be run on the same lines as under Edward I, with the Wardrobe playing a preponderant rôle, and the Italian bankers much in evidence. There were no further attempts by the Exchequer to curb the Wardrobe, and the one new development of the early years of the reign of Edward II was that the chamber began to increase in importance, with some revenues from land reserved for its use.[2] This was hardly likely to be welcomed by the baronage, whose aim was to ensure that all the revenues of the country were paid directly into the Exchequer. Although he had no heart for it, Edward II could not abandon the war in Scotland, where successive failures can have done little to add to the credibility of the new government. And,added to the problems inherited from Edward I,was one major new one, that of the King's relationship with Piers Gaveston.

1. Tout;ibid. ii. 192 points to this appointment as indicating continuity with the old regime. But Ancient Correspondence, S.C. 1/27/213, indicates that Langton was very unsure of his standing with the king after 1302, while E. 101/368/18/63, a letter from court giving news, makes it clear that he was removed from office rather than voluntarily resigning.
2. Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 314-20.

It did not take long for signs of discontent to appear once Edward II was dead. The first indication of trouble is contained in a curious document issued at Boulogne shortly after the king's marriage there in January 1308. This was in the form of letters patent in the name of Anthony Bek and eight others, including Henry Lacy, John Botetourt and John of Berwick, all three councillors of Edward I. They stressed their loyalty to the crown, agreeing to amend those things that had been done contrary to the royal dignity, also promising to redress 'les oppressions que ount esté feit et uncore se fount de jour en jour a soen poeple',[1] a clear reference to the problems of the previous reign. Throughout the political crises of the next few years it can be seen that the opposition did not direct their attention solely to the question of Edward II's misdemeanours, but concerned themselves with a criticism of the way the country had been governed under Edward I in addition. That the barons should have thought it worth while to have the Articuli super Cartas reissued in the form of the Statute of Stamford in 1309 is an indication that basic grievances in that year were much the same as they had been nine years earlier.

The full extent to which the thinking of the opposition was still

1. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, p. 130. Bodleian Library MSS, Dugdale 18, actually contains two versions of this document, the one quoted here, and another on ff. 1-2, almost identical save for for the addition of a sanctions clause, in which a failure to act in accord with the terms of the agreement is stated to render the individual liable to excommunication by Bek.

dominated by the events of the years 1294 to 1307 can best be seen in the Ordinances of 1311. It was stated there that all the revenues of the country should be paid into the Exchequer, which was an implicit attack on the Wardrobe. Customs dues were not to be paid to alien merchants, and these men were to be arrested and made to account properly for the money that had been paid to them in this way. The New Customs were abolished, and it was declared that the charter to the alien merchants issued in 1303 was contrary to Magna Carta and the franchise of London. The king was not to leave the realm, nor declare war, without the consent of the baronage in parliament, which was a clear reference to the events of 1297. A prohibition was placed on all prises, save those regarded as ancient and rightful. Clauses relating to the forest represented a further stage in the struggle that had been waged with Edward I on this issue. Changes in the monetary system were not to be made arbitrarily, but only after consultation with the barons. As in the Articuli use of the privy seal in common law cases was prohibited. The lavish way in which pardons and writs of protection had been issued also came under criticism. The list could be extended, but these are the main points of the Ordinances that clearly related to the way in which the country had been governed under Edward I.[1] It is evident that the crisis of 1310 and 1311 was not simply about Edward II's misgovernment, as the barons had indicated in their petition for the appointment of the

1. The Ordinances are printed in Statutes of the Realm, i. 157-67, and in Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 281-86.

Ordainers.[1] It is a considerable tribute to the power of the old king's personality that it was not until his son's reign that the next really effective movement of political opposition after that of 1297 took place.

During the years from 1294 to 1307 the obstinate determination of Edward I and the energetic efficiency of his servants at many different levels - Walter Langton, John Droxford, John Botetourt, James Dalilegh, Robert de Segre and many others - mobilised and directed the resources of England in an impressive show of strength. To raise the great subsidies for Edward's allies, to recruit the huge armies needed for the many campaigns, to organise the necessary food supplies, to maintain the garrisons needed to hold down conquered territory, to make the necessary arrangements for transport, all this was an impressive achievement of financial and military organisation. Edward was able to bring together in effective combination very disparate resources: Welsh infantry, Irish hobelars, Italian financiers and papal tax-gatherers all assisted in the English war effort. Yet the king was forced to use these resources for essentially defensive purposes: in Wales in 1294-95 for the retention of what had seemed securely conquered; against France to save Gascony from Philip IV's aggression; and in Scotland to make good by force the supremacy which, at the time of the Great Process, had seemed his by a mixture of chance, strength, diplomatic skill and chicanery.

1. J. Conway Davies, The Baronial Opposition to Edward II (1918), pp. 358-59.

In holding Wales Edward was successful, and in the war with France Gascony was held, though no great glory accrued to the English for their conduct of the war. In Scotland victory was almost achieved in 1304.

Yet the price of Edward's tenacity both to the country and to the monarchy was high. The war with Scotland exposed the north of England to enemy raids; many counties were burdened with the need to supply recruits for the war, and all suffered from taxes and prises. Trade was hit by the maltolt, and from the constant calls on the nation's shipping. The war with France drained the country's supply of silver. The government's indebtedness grew, and lawlessness became widespread. While in 1294 the position of the monarchy had been one of great strength, testified by the victories in Wales, the series of great legislative statutes, and Edward's triumph as an arbiter of rival candidates to the throne in Scotland, in 1307, after one major crisis and a succession of constitutional arguments, it was much weaker. It was not merely in the matter of the household accounts that Edward II was left to face the reckoning.

APPENDIX I

WARDROBE EXPENDITURE, 1294-1306.

22 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1293 - 19 Nov. 1294.

£14,382. 5s. 5½d.	Household.
£1,779. 15s. 7½d.	Alms.
£10,937. 15s. 3½d.	Neceassary expenditure, including that on the army for Gascony.
£4,808. 2s. 3½d.	Gifts.
£3,080. 2s. 8d.	Fees and wages of bannerets and knights of the household, including those going to Gascony.
£2,543. 6s. 0½d.	Wages of serjeants-at-arms, crossbowmen and infantry going to Gascony.
£79. 3s. 5d.	Messengers.
£700. 19s. 10d.	Falconers.
£1,342. 10s. 0d.	Household robes.
£570. 5s. 6d.	Plate and jewels.
£6,989. 14s. 5d.	Great Wardrobe.
£2,301.	Purchases of wine.
£4,411. 6s. 8½d.	Expenses of royal children.
£399. 10s. 4d.	Expenses of John of Brabant.
£73. 13s. 4d.	Miscellaneous fees.
£500.	Chancellor's fee.
£81. 18s. 0½d.	Expenses of the Hanaper.
£6,237. 5s. 8d.	Sailor's wages, going to Gascony.
£6,609. 8s. 3½d.	Advances and presta, mainly to those going to Gascony.
£67,827. 2s. 11d.	Total.

23 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1294 - 19 Nov. 1295.

£11,024. 0s. 3d.	Household.
£1,068. 11s. 1½d.	Alms.
£4,923. 7s. 9d.	Necessary expenditure.
£3,881. 15s. 11½d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses and 500 marks to Bayonne for repairs to the walls.
£2,843. 6s. 11d.	Fees and wages of household knights and bannerets.
£26,388.	Wages of serjeants-at-arms, crossbowmen and foot in Wales.
£84. 3s. 7d.	Messengers.
£254. 14s. 1½d.	Falconers.
£773. 13s. 4d.	Household robes.
£563. 2s. 10d.	Plate.
£4,921. 6s. 9d.	Great Wardrobe.
£3,041. 7s. 10d.	Royal children.
£90.	Miscellaneous fees.
£500.	Chancellor's fee.
£524. 7s. 2d.	Expenses of the Hanaper.
£12,852. 6s. 1d.	Sailors wages for the attack on Anglesey and for Gascony.
£2,576. 3s. 7½d.	Purchase of grain.
£1,120. 18s. 6d.	Purchase of grain to be sent to Gascony.
£1,367. 15s. 2d.	Cost of works on Caernarvon castle.
£6,949. 0s. 1½d.	Cost of works on Beaumaris castle.
£4,817. 12s. 6d.	Prests on wages of Valence's contingent in Wales.
£747. 15s. 0d.	Prests on wages of William de Vescy and William Mortimer in Wales.
£35,868. 4s. 7½d.	To Droxford, for expenses of magnates going to Gascony. He accounts for this in the next year.
£11,082. 19s. 7d.	Miscellaneous payments and prests.
£138,255. 12s. 10d.	Total.

24 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1295-19 Nov. 1296.

£11,586. 1s. 5d.	Household.
£1,391. 19s. 8½d.	Alms.
£7,202. 2s. 5½d.	Necessary Expenditure, including purchase of victuals.
£1,923. 13s. 3½d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses in Scotland.
£3,243. 6s. 10d.	Fees and Wages of bannerets and knights.
£2,603. 18s. 2d.	Wages of serjeants-at-arms, squires and crossbowmen.
£21,443. 12s. 0d.	Wages of infantry.
£18,278. 11s. 6d.	Wages of sailors going to Gascony and expenses of prisoners taken in Scotland.
£102. 16s. 7d.	Messengers.
£212. 14s. 4½d.	Falconers.
£774. 10s. 0d.	Household robes.
£174. 12s. 4d.	Jewels and plate.
£11,352. 9s. 7d.	Great Wardrobe.
£751. 1s. 11d.	Purchase of eighty-two tuns of wine.
£20. 3s. 7d.	Expenses of the King's daughter Margaret returning to England.
£563. 3s. 8d.	Expenses of John Balliol and children of Edmund Lancaster.
£83. 13s. 4d.	Miscellaneous fees.
£500.	Chancellor's fee.
£73. 8s. 3½d.	Expenses of the Hanaper.
£2,598. 12s. 2d.	Wages of those coming from Ireland to the campaign in Scotland.
£83,648. 0s. 0½d.	Total.

25 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1296 - 19 Nov. 1297.

£11,194. 7s. 11½d.	Household.
£1,144. 7s. 4½d.	Alms.
£6,799. 18s. 6½d.	Necessary expenditure, including that on Flanders and Gascony.
£11,741. 17s. 4½d.	Cost of victuals for Flanders.
£2,386. 12s. 1½d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses.
£3,675. 11s. 7d.	Fees and wages of ban erets and knights.
£1,039. 3s. 10d.	Wages of serjeants-at-arms, squires and crossbowmen.
£7,046. 4s. 8d.	Wages of infantry.
£5,586. 19s. 3d.	Wages of sailors going to Flanders and Gascony.
£120	Messengers.
£329. 12s. 11d.	Falconers.
£694. 10s. 0d.	Household robes.
£1,088. 12s. 7½d.	Jewels and plate.
£8,708. 17s. 5d.	Great Wardrobe.
£1,642. 11s. 0½d.	Purchase of 378½ tuns of wine.
£813. 12s. 11d.	Expense of king's daughters.
£82. 8s. 9½d.	Expenses of the count of Holland.
£595. 12s. 3d.	Expenses of John Balliol and children of Edmund of Lancaster.
£43. 6s. 8d.	Miscellaneous fees.
£500	Chancellor's fee.
£86. 1s. 7d.	Expenses of the Hanaper.
£43,778. 5s. 6½d.	Paid out to foreign allies.
£10,420. 14s. 11½d.	Miscellaneous payments and prests.
£119,519. 9s. 4½d.	Total

26 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1297- 19 Nov. 1298.

£12,608. 16s. 0½d.	Household.
£1,007. 16s. 2½d.	Alms.
£4,574. 8s. 2½d.	Necessary expenditure.
£2,766. 11s. 6½d.	Victuals bought for Scotland.
£6,375. 16s. 10½d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses in Flanders and Scotland.
£11,805. 11s. 3½d.	Fees and wages of bannerets and knights.
£1,749. 17s. 9½d.	Wages of serjeants-at-arms, squires and crossbowmen.
£22,453. 14s. 6d.	Wages of infantry.
£1,551. 9s. 5d.	Wages of sailors for Flanders and Scotland.
£116. 14s. 0d.	Messengers.
£231. 2s. 3d.	Falconers.
£684	Household robes.
£383	Plate and jewels.
£1,224. 10s. 4d.	Purchase of wine.
£434. 17s. 7d.	Children of Edmund of Lancaster.
£407. 6s. 0½d.	Expense of John and Edward Balliol in the Tower.
£30	Miscellaneous fees.
£500	Chancellor's fee.
£87. 12s. 5d.	Expenses of the Hanaper.
£3,917. 5s. 0d.	Prest to Sandale and Cambridge for expenses of the army in Gascony.
£3,513. 16s. 0d.	Cost of works on Beaumaris, a° 24.
£2,124. 19s. 0d.	Miscellaneous prests.
£78,549. 4s. 6d.	Total [1]

1. These figures are derived from the enrolled Wardrobe accounts in Pipe Roll, E. 372/144.

28 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1299- 19 Nov. 1300.

£10,926. 5s. 4d.	Household.
£1,166. 14s. 6d.	Alms.
£3,249. 16s. 2d.	Necessary expenditure.
£13,574. 19s. 7½d.	Castle garrisons.
£5,063. 2s. 0½d.	Victualling.
£4,386. 4s. 5d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses.
£3,077. 19s. 0d.	Fees and wages of bannerets and knights.
£1,038. 16s. 7d.	Wages of serjeants-at-arms, squires and crossbowmen.
£4,446. 9s. 11½d.	Infantry wages.
£1,233. 9s. 8d.	Sailors' wages.
£87. 11s. 1d.	Messengers.
£77. 6s. 11½d.	Falconers.
£714. 3s. 4d.	Household robes.
£15,575. 18s. 5½d.	Expenses of great Wardrobe, purchase of wine, Chancery expenses and expenses of the queen.
£64,105. 0s. 5d.	Total.[1]

29 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1300 - 19 Nov. 1301.

£9,570. 7s. 7½d.	Household.
£944. 7s. 3½d.	Alms.
£8,256. 14s. 5¼d.	Necessary expenditure.
£7,195. 11s. 7½d.	Victualling and castle garrisons.
£5,517. 16s. 5d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses.
£4,954. 16s. 8d.	Fees and wages of bannerets and knights.
£3,657. 0s. 6d.	Wages of men-at-arms, hobelars and foot from Ireland.
£364. 10s. 0d.	Wages of crossbowmen and serjeants-at-arms.

1. Liber Quotidianus, passim.

£1,075. 4s. 4½d.	Wages of squires in the king's and in the prince's households.
£15,746. 9s. 4½d.	Wages of infantry.
£567. 10s. 10d.	Sailors' wages.
£83. 8s. 6d.	Messengers.
£127. 2s. 5d.	Falconers.
£617. 10s. 0d.	Household robes.
£554. 4s. 2d.	Plate and jewels.
£4,147. 17s. 0¼d.	Great Wardrobe.
£4,110. 18s. 6½d.	Purchase of wine.
£3,424. 6s. 10d.	Prince's household.
£5,074. 5s. 9½d.	Expenses of the queen and royal children.
£580. 18s. 5d.	Chancellor's fee and chancery robes.
£76,571. 1s. 9¼d.	Total.

30 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1301 - 19 Nov. 1302.

£12,021. 14s. 1d.	Household.
£971. 1s. 10½d.	Alms.
£8,556. 12s. 9½d.	Necessary expenditure.
£10,817. 14s. 0½d.	Victualling and castle garrisons.
£3,932. 5s. 3½d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses.
£3,467. 1s. 0d.	Fees and wages of bannerets and knights.
£877. 14s. 1d.	Wages of squires, serjeants-at-arms and crossbowmen.
£437. 0s. 5d.	Infantry wages.
£118. 4s. 6d.	Sailors' wages.
£81. 0s. 6d.	Messengers.
£179. 13s. 2¼d.	Falconers.
£1,003. 6s. 8d.	Household robes.
£483. 2s. 4d.	Plate and jewels.

£5,977. 6s. 6½d.	Great Wardrobe.
£6,379. 0s. 6½d.	Purchase of wines.
£821. 8s. 3d.	Expenses of the queen, the countess of Holland and Gilbert de Clare at court.
£4,777. 12s. 0d.	Prince's household.
£380.	Miscellaneous fees.
£586. 8s. 4½d.	Chancellor's fee and chancery robes.
£61,949. 6s. 5½d.	Total.[1]

31 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1302 - 19 Nov. 1303.

£10,788. 18s. 0½d.	Household.
£1,018. 17s. 3d.	Alms.
£5,854. 16s. 4¼d.	Necessary expenditure.
£4,855. 7s. 11½d.	Victualling.
£2,968. 2s. 10d.	Garrisons.
£104. 8s. 9d.	Miscellaneous household wages.
£4,474. 7s. 8½d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses.
£10,753. 10s. 9½d.	Fees and wages of bannerets and knights.
£1,555.	Wages of squires, serjeants-at-arms and crossbowmen.
£220. 9s. 4¼d.	Falconers.
£1,657. 14s. 6d.	Sailors' wages.
£75. 6s. 8d.	Messengers.
£600.	Household robes.
£283. 10s. 2d.	Plate and jewels.
£5,287. 10s. 2d.	Great Wardrobe.
£4,789. 7s. 10¼d.	Purchase of wines.
£2,528. 3s. 3¼d.	Expenses of queen, royal family and Gilbert de Clare.

1. Draft final Wardrobe account, E. 101/360/25.

£5,653. 3s. 5½d.	Prince's household.
£83. 6s. 7d.	Fees paid to cardinals.
£584. 9s. 4½d.	Chancellor's fee and chancery robes.
£64,036. 11s. 1d.	Total.[1]

32 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1303 - 19 Nov. 1304.

£8,756. 18s. 7½d.	Household.
£815. 10s. 4½d.	Alms.
£5,788. 7s. 4¾d.	Necessary expenditure.
£6,409. 0s. 9½d.	Victualling.
£1,805. 10s. 9d.	Garrisons.
£98. 7s. 1d.	Miscellaneous household wages.
£4,485. 0s. 5d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses.
£9,872. 17s. 8½d.	Fees and wages of bannerets and knights.
£333. 4s. 4d.	Wages of crossbowmen and serjeants-at-arms.
£1,631. 2s. 1½d.	Wages of squires.
£8,881. 7s. 8d.	Wages of infantry and workmen, for 31 and 32 Edward I.
£247. 18s. 9½d.	Falconers' wages.
£307. 16s. 8d.	Sailors' wages.
£87. 6s. 0d.	Messengers.
£594. 0s. 0d.	Household robes.
£18,251. 1s. 7¼d	Great Wardrobe, wines, royal children etc.
£68,953. 5s. 3d.	Total.[2]

34 Edward I, 20 Nov. 1305 - 19 Nov. 1306.

£11,269. 4s. 6d.	Household.

1. Draft final Wardrobe account, E. 101/364/14.
2. Wardrobe account book, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 8835.

£902. 15s. 7¼d.	Alms.
£7,448. 5s. 7¼d.	Necessary expenditure.
£6,509. 11s. 4d.	Garrisons.
£174. 0s. 10d.	Miscellaneous household wages.
£11,338. 18s. 11½d.	Gifts, including restoration of horses.
£2,602. 1s. 0d.	Fees and wages of knights and bannerets.
£396. 2s. 3d.	Wages of squires.
£1,155. 3s. 1½d.	Falconer's wages.
£393. 7s. 0d.	Wages of crossbowmen.
£2,137. 6s. 4d.	Infantry wages.
£1,368. 19s. 0d.	Sailors' wages.
£203. 8s. 10d.	Messengers.
£744. 11s. 8d.	Household robes.
£2,319. 1s. 6d.	Jewels and plate.
£26,198. 19s. 1½d.	Great Wardrobe, purchase of wines, expenses of the King's children etc.
£3,028. 11s. 8¼d.	Prests.
£80,460. 16s. 4½d.	Total.[1]

1. Wardrobe account book, E. 101/369/11. The totals for all the previous years are those given in the documents, but in this case I have accepted the corrections made by Tout, Chapters in Mediaeval Administrative History, ii. 129, n. 1. In the table given supra, p. 410, the total for 34 Edward I is given without the inclusion of the prests.

APPENDIX II

PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN ALLIES, 1294-1298.

Adolf of Nassau, King of the Romans.

1294. £20,000 paid to Adolf by Robert de Segre, 22 July - 10 October. (J. de Sturler, 'Deux comptes enrôlées de Robert de Segre, receveur et agent payeur d'Edouard Ier, roi d'Angleterre aux Pays-Bas (1294-1296)', Bull. de la comm. royale d'histoire, cxxv (1959), 578).

1294-6. £20,000 paid to Adolf, again by Segre. The sum was due at Christmas, 1294. (Ibid., 597).

1297. A further payment of £20,000 was due to be made when Edward I landed in Flanders (Parl. Writs, i. 344). Nothing was in fact paid.

Total £40,000.

Siegfried, Archbishop of Cologne.

a) Orders to pay.

1294. The archbishop promised to serve against the French for six months with 1,000 horse. (Treaty Rolls, p. 105, no. 247; E. 159/70, m. 101v). For the first term of payment, Christmas 1294, 10,000 marks was due, with an additional £2,000 de dono. (De Sturler, op. cit., 598). On 18 November John Botetourt and de Segre were ordered to pay 6,000 marks, with £1,000 de dono. Laurence of Ludlow, Roger of Lincoln, and de Segre were to pay the remaining 4,000 marks out of the proceeds of the transactions in wool. (E. 159/68, m. 76).

b) Payments made.

1294. 22 July-10 October. £1,000 paid by de Segre. (De Sturler, op. cit., 579).

1294-6. £4,630 paid by de Segre, (Ibid., 598).

1295-7. £6,370 paid by Elias Russel and Gilbert Chesterton. (E. 372/146, m. 54).

1296. By 20 May, de Segre, Russel and Reginald Thunderly had paid out £1,728. 7s. 1½d., for which they received a writ of liberate. This sum is probably to be included in the two previous payments noted. (Liberate roll, C. 62/72).

1297. 7 February. Edward apologised for the delay in payment to the archbishop, and in particular that money destined for him had been seized by some Brabantines. (Treaty Rolls, p. 178, no. 433).

Total £12,000

Minor German Allies.

a) Orders to pay.

1294. 12 November. To Eberhard, count of Katzenelbogen, £500. (Treaty Rolls, p. 104, no. 245).

18 November. To Wicbold von Holte, Dean of Cologne and Provost of Aachen, £250. To Hartrad von Herenbergh, £250. To Reginald, dean of Bonn, the archbishop's brother, £100. To Conrad, the archbishop's nephew, £60. To Dietrich, known as Loef of Cleves, lord of Tomburg, Arcle and Lecke, £600. (E. 159/68, m. 76).

b) Payments made.

1294. 22 July - 10 October. £250 paid by de Segre to Wicbold von Holte, and the same sum to Hartrad von Herenbergh. (De Sturler, op. cit., 579).

1294-6 £250 each to Wicbold and Hartrad, £100 to the dean of Bonn, £60 to Conrad, the archbishop's nephew, and £600 to Loef of Cleves, all paid by de Segre. (Ibid., 598).

Total £1,760.

John II, Duke of Brabant.

a) Orders to pay.

1293. Grant of 160,000 li. tournois in return for service with 2,000 horse for six months. (E. 159/68, m. 80d).
Grant of 40,000 li. tournois made at Llanfaes in the spring. (E.D. Lyon, 'Un compte de l'échiquier relatif aux relations d'Edouard I d'Angleterre avec le duc Jean II de Brabant', Bull. de la comm. royale d'histoire, cxx (1955), 81).
24 April. Liberate writ of £20,000, part of the above 160,000 li. tournois. (C. 62/71).
28 April. Grant of £4,000 out of the new custom paid by Brabantine merchants. (Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 134).

1297. 2 February. Grant of £25,000 as a loan out of the customs. (Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 232; E. 159/70, m. 113v.).
3 February. Liberate writ of £4,000 on customs paid by Brabantine merchants.
6 February. Liberate writ of £10,000, for the 40,000 li. tournois above. (C. 62/73).

b) Payments made.

1295. £23,000 received from the Exchequer in part payment of the 160,000 li. tournois. (E. 159/68, m. 80d. The payments are to be found in Issue Roll, E. 403/93, and Jornalia Roll, E. 405/1/3).

1295-6. £4,000 received from the customs. (45th. report of the Dep.

Keeper of the Public Records, appendix, p. 287, receipt dated 21 Dec. 1295; E. 159/69, m. 21d.; E. 405/1/7; E. 403/99).

1296. 22 July, 2 August. £3,880 paid by Russel and Chesterton, part payment of the 40,000 li. tournois. (Lyon, op. cit., 86-87; Bodleian MSS., Dodsworth 76, no. 47; E. 372/146, m. 54).

1297. 19 February. £1,000, part of the same payment, paid by the Exchequer. (Lyon, op. cit., 86; E. 405/1/10).

16 June. £137. 2s. 10½d.(600 li. tournois), paid over by Ralph Manton in Flanders. One account gives the date as 1298, (Lyon, op. cit., 87), but a draft version has 1297, which is clearly correct. (Bodleian MSS., Dodsworth 76, n. 47).

£237. 10s. 0d. (950 li. tournois), paid by William Eston, clerk of Walter Langton, also part of the 40,000 li. tournois owed. (Lyon, op. cit., 88; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 156). Langton's own account includes 950 li. tournois paid as prests to the duke, which is almost certainly to be indentified with this payment. (G.P. Cuttino, 'Bishop Langton's mission for Edward I, 1297-1297', in 'Studies in British History', Univ. of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences, xi, no. 2 (1941), 155, 160).

8 November. £50 (300 li tournois) paid by Manton, initially entered as a prest (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 156), then as part of the 40,000 li. tournois. (Lyon, op. cit., 87).

1295-97. £779. 15s. 5d. paid out of the Yarmouth customs. (E. 372/145).

1298. 4 December. £1,000 (6,000 li. tournois) paid by Russel, part of the 40,000 li. tournois.(Lyon, op. cit., 87).

Total paid out up to 1298: £34,084. 8s. 3½d.

But in 1305 John of Cuijk came to press the duke's claim to the rest of the 40,000 li. tournois. Arrears were found to total 16,150 li. tournois. £518. 15s. 0d. was paid in cash (4,150 li. tournois), and for the rest John accepted letters obligatory of

the Frescobaldi and theBallardi worth £1,500 (12,000 li. tournois). (Lyon, op. cit., 73;Maitland, Memoranda de Parliamento, 1305, pp. 339-342).

Floris V, Count of Holland.

a) Owed to the count.

1295. Total owed, 80,000 li. tournois. (E. 405/1/5, 3 Sept.). There is no indication of what service Floris was to do. When paid £300 in 1294, it was merely stated that he was to retain knights 'ad stipendia domini regis Anglie'. (De Sturler, op. cit.,580).

b) Payments made.

1294. 22 July-10 October. £300 paid by Segre. (Ibid., 580).

1295. 3 September. £2,500, part of 80,000 li. tournois. (E. 405/1/5; E. 403/96).

Total £2,800.

John I, Count of Holland.

a) Owed to the count.

1297. Unspecified amount on his marriage to Edward's daughter Elizabeth. (Treaty Rolls, p. 178, no. 432).
25 April. Payment of 5,000 li. tournois owed, part of which paid on this date. (E. 405/1/11).

b) Payments made.

1297. 18 January. Acknowlegment of receipt of 5,640 li. tournois, part of marriage portion. (Treaty Rolls, p. 178, no. 432).
£82. 8s. 9½d. paid by the Wardrobe. (Enrolled Wardrobe account, E. 372/144).
25-26 April. £40 paid out of customs, part of 5,000 li. tournois owed. (E. 405/1/11).

Total £1,532. 8s. 9½d.

Guy, Count of Flanders.

a) Orders to pay.

1295. 200,000 livres tournois owed to the count for the projected marriage of his daughter Philippe with Edward I's son Edward. This subsequently abandoned, and no payments made. (Treaty Rolls, pp. 108, 111-12)

1297. 12 February. liberate writ of £6,000, part of 100,000 li. tournois owed for the first year of alliance. (C. 62/73).
17 February. Liberate writ of 100,000 li. tournois (£25,000). (C. 62/73).
15 May. liberate writ of £20,170 to the keeper of the Wardrobe to pay to the count of Flanders and other allies. (C. 62/73).
1 December. Liberate writ of £1,000. (C. 62/74).
A sum of 70,000 li. tournois owed to the count. (E. 405/1/11).

b) Payments made.

1297. £24,300 by the Wardrobe, for the 100,000 li. tournois. (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 156).
£11,000 paid in prests. (Ibid.).
£1,225. 2s. 8d. Prests in the form of victuals, handed over by de Segre. (Ibid.).
8 May. £180 paid by the Exchequer, part of the 70,000 li. tournois. (E. 405/1/11).
28 May. £200 paid likewise. (Ibid.).
The payments mentioned in Langton's account (Cuttino, op. cit., p. 154), and those in various receipts, (45th. report of the Dep. Keeper of the Public Records, appendix, p. 288; E. 101/127/5/9, 10, 11, 23) are probably to be included in the £24,300 mentioned above.

Total £36,905. 2s. 8d.

John, Lord of Cuijk.

a) Orders to pay.

1295. 28 April. Grant of 200 li. tournois, p.s. (C. 62/71).

1297. £1,000 granted in recompense for his services. (E. 405/1/11; Lyon, op. cit., 73).

b) Payments made.

1295. 11 May. £50, for his fee for that year. (E. 405/1/5).

1297. 19 February. £250, part of the £1,000. (E. 405/1/11).

Total paid up to 1297, £300.

But when John came before the council in 1305 to discuss the question of the arrears owing to the duke of Brabant, he also pressed his own claims. Although promised payment of his fee, nothing seems to have been done about this. But the arrears of the £1,000 were paid off, £250 in cash, and £500 in letters obligatory of the Bellardi and Frescobaldi. (Lyon, op. cit., 73-74).

Valeran, Lord of Valkenburg and Nonschau.

1295. Granted fee of 300 li. tournois for life on 28 April. (Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 134). On 11 May he was paid £75 for this by the Exchequer. (E. 405/1/5).

Total £75.

Henry, Count of Bar.

a) Orders to pay.

1294. 18 November. Ludlow, Lincoln and de Segre to pay the count 4,000 marks, part of 10,000 marks owed him. (E. 159/68, m. 78).

1295. 20 April. Liberate writ of 16,000 marks, part of 30,000 marks

owed him for service with 1,000 horse for six months. (C. 62/71).

1296. 12 December. Liberate writ of 10,000 marks. (C. 62/74).

1297. 26 April. Liberate writ of £2,500 in payment of 10,000 li. tournois owed. (C. 62/74).

b) Payments made.

1294-6. £2,466. 13s. 4d. paid by de Segre, part of payment of 10,000 marks owed.

1295. A receipt for 6,000 marks, due to be paid on 20 February, and one for 10,000 marks, payment due on 17 April, handed over to the Exchequer by Ralph Manton on 6 August 1299. It does not appear that the payment made by de Segre was included in these two sums. (De Sturler, op. cit., 601).

1297. 24 January. £366. 13s. 4d. paid by the Exchequer, part of payment of 10,000 marks due. (E. 405/1/10).

1 June. £5,188. 6s. 8d. paid out of the issues of Scotland by the Exchequer, again part of 10,000 marks owed. £716. 13s. 4d. out of the customs paid on the same day, as part of the same sum. (E. 405/1/11). Also on 1 June a receipt for the 10,000 marks was handed in to the Exchequer. (E. 368/68, m. 39d.). Prests totalling £532 paid by the Wardrobe. (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 156).

Total £20,532. This sum is the total of the receipts noted, with the prests paid in 1297 added. There may well have been more paid, and it seems unlikely that it all reached the count, for on 1 October 1295 Edward wrote to Adolf of Nassau, to ask him to restore 12,000 li. tournois that had been seized en route to the count by the count of Luxembourg. (Treaty Rolls, p. 111, no. 262).

John de Bar.

1297. John de Bar paid £500, in return for his service with 50 horse in the company of his brother, the count of Bar. (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 156; Cuttino, op. cit., p. 154).

League of Burgundian Nobles

a) Promises of payment.

1297. 2 August. 30,000 li. tournois to be paid in the autumn, for the first year of the alliance. This in addition to 30,000 li. tournois already agreed on. For each subsequent year of the alliance, a further 30,000 li. tournois to be paid in two instalments, on 1 June and 1 December. (Treaty Rolls, pp. 132-3). A further £2,000 was promised them. (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 156).

b) Payments made.

1297. May. £7,750 paid to Jean de Châlon-Arlay, Jean de Bourgogne, Gautier de Montfuacon, Simon de Montbéliard and other members of the league.

1298. March. £7,045. 9s. 0d. paid to the same group. (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 156). 1,500 marks of this was paid over by the Frescobaldi in florins (Frescobaldi petition, C. 47/13/1/28).

Total £14,795. 9s. 0d.

Aymo de Faucoigny.

1297. £500 paid at Brussels in May, in accordance with the agreement made with him by Otto de Grandson, to pay 2,000 li. tournois. (Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 7965, f. 156.

TOTAL

The total of all the above payments, made between 1294 and 1298, comes to £165,784. 8s. 9d. The list is probably not complete, but it is doubtful if any payments of major importance have left no trace in the surviving records.

Note on E.B. Fryde's calculations.

E.B. Fryde has worked out the total of Edward I's subsidies to his foreign allies during this period as only £142,926. The main reason why this figure is so low is that not all of the allies are considered. There is no mention of the archbishop of Cologne, the minor German allies, John de Cuijk, or Waleran of Valkenburg. (Fryde, 'Financial resources of Edward I in the Netherlands, 1294-98', Revue Belge, xl (1962), 1170-1185). In working out the payments to the count of Bar, Fryde has made the mistake of imagining receipts mentioned in de Segre's account to be in livres tournois, when they are in fact in marks. He has also presumed that the payment of £2,466. 13s. 6d. by de Segre was one of the sums which went to make up the 10,000 marks for which a receipt was handed to the Exchequer on 1 June 1297. This seems unlikely, as de Segre's account mentions a separate receipt for the sum. (Ibid., 1172-73; de Sturler, op. cit., 601). In addition, Fryde did not use all the available sources. The jornalia rolls of this period (E. 405/1) have escaped his attention. For the years 1294-1298 the admittedly incomplete series of these rolls, which record full details of issues in chronological order, are invaluable in filling some of the gaps in the sadly deficient series of issue rolls. (E. 403). Nor did Fryde make use of the account of Elias Russel and Gilbert Chesterton. (E. 372/146,m. 54).

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(A) Manuscript Sources.

Instead of the manuscripts being listed in accordance with their present locations, this section is organised in a way approximating to the departmental structure of the medieval administration. The following lists give, in most cases, only the main categories of record material which have been used: detailed references are given in the footnotes to the dissertation. All documents are in the Public Record Office unless otherwise stated.

(1) Chancery.

<u>Liberate</u> Rolls (C. 62).

Supplementary Patent Rolls (C. 67), which contain protections granted to men going on campaign.

Warrants for the Great Seal, series I (C. 81), especially valuable for demands for protections sent in to the Chancery.

Ancient Correspondence (S.C. 1), contains some Chancery warrants.

Chancery Miscellanea (C. 47).

Exchequer Accounts Various (E. 101/8/4).

(2) Exchequer.

(a) King's Remembrancer.

Accounts Various (E. 101).

Customs Accounts (E. 122).

Memoranda Rolls (E. 159).

Miscellanea of the Exchequer (E. 163).

Subsidy Rolls (E. 179).

(b) Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer and Pipe Office.

Enrolled Customs Accounts (E. 356).

Exannual Roll (E. 363).

Memoranda Rolls (E. 368).

Pipe Rolls (E. 372).

(c) Exchequer of Pleas.

Plea Rolls (E. 13).

(d) Exchequer of Receipt.

Receipt Rolls (E. 401).

Issue Rolls (E. 403).

Warrants for Issue (E. 404).

Jornalia Rolls (E. 405/1).

(3) Wardrobe and Household.[1]

Exchequer Accounts Various (E. 101).

Chancery Miscellanea (C. 47).

1. A list of documents concerning these departments to be found in the Public Record Office has been compiled by P.M. Barnes, List of Documents relating to the Household and Wardrobe, John to Edward I (P.R.P. Handbooks, no. 7, 1964). Though extremely useful, this list does not mention all the documents that survive, and it should be used in conjunction with the List of Various Accounts (Public Record Office Lists and Indexes, no. xxxv, 1912).

Exchequer Miscellanea, (E. 163).

Exchequer Warrants for Issue (S.C. 1).

Ancient Correspondence (S.C. 1).

The following manuscripts are in the British Museum.

Add. MSS. 7965 (Final Wardrobe account for 1297).

Add. MSS. 7966a (Final Wardrobe account for 1301).

Add. MSS. 8835 (Final Wardrobe account for 1304).

Add. MSS. 35292 (Wardrobe Journal, 31-33 Edward I).

Add. MSS. 35293 (Book of Presta, 32 Edward I).

Add. MSS. 37655 (Wardrobe Journal, 34 Edward I).

Harleian MSS. 152 (Book of Presta, 34 Edward I).

Cottonian MSS. Nero C. viii (Wardrobe accounts, Edward II).

Cottonian MSS. Tiberius E. viii, art. 24* (Household roll, 28 Edward I).

Add. MSS. 37654 (Account of Richard de Bromsgrove at Berwick, 27 Edward I).

Harleian MSS. 626 (Bromsgrove's account for 28 Edward I).

Add. MSS. 17630 (Bromsgrove's account for 31 Edward I).

Add. MSS. 22923 (Account of Walter Reynolds for the wardrobe of the prince of Wales).

The following manuscripts are in the John Rylands Library, Manchester.

Latin MSS. 230 (Book of Wardrobe receipts for 22 Edward I).

Latin MSS. 232 (Book of presta for 28 Edward I).

Lat MSS. 229 (Payment of Wardrobe debts, 27 Edward I).

Lat MSS. 231 (Wardrobe receipts from the Exchequer, 28 Edward I. This is the section that is missing from the beginning of the Liber Quotidianus).

(4) Parliament and Council.

Parliamentary and Council proceedings (C. 49; E. 175).

Ancient Petitions (S.C. 8).

(5) Royal Justices.

Assize Rolls (J. I. 1).

(6) The Marshalsea.

Chancery Miscellanea (C. 47/5).

Exchequer Accounts Various (E. 101).

Exchequer Scottish Documents (E. 39/93/15).

British Museum, Cottonian MSS. Nero D. vi.

(7) Duchy of Lancaster.

Account of the estates and household of Henry Lacy, earl of Lincoln (D.L. 29/1/2).

(8) Administration of Scotland.

Exchequer Accounts Various (E. 101).

(9) Chronicles.

British Museum, Cottonian MSS. Vesp. B. xi (The Hagneby Chronicle).

(10) Miscellaneous.

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