

Title: The role of religious experience in the knowledge transfer process.

Author:

Dr. Michael Fascia
Faculty Member
School of Management
Edinburgh Napier University
Business School
Edinburgh, Scotland

Co-author:

Wendy Elizabeth Ann Hisbent
Researcher
School of Management
Edinburgh Napier University
Business School
Edinburgh, Scotland

ABSTRACT

The importance given to knowledge in relation to business success has never been so great as it is today and there is a substantive amount of important and informed studies reflecting this. Nonetheless, informed approaches by prominent authors generally focus on knowledge transfer mechanisms and the efficiency of these mechanisms to support and deliver competitive advantage (Nonaka, 1994; Grant, 1996; Argote and Ingram, 2000; Alavi and Leidner, 2001). An overarching objective of understanding efficient knowledge transfer is therefore a central caveat for businesses wishing to achieve success and maintain competitive advantage since it is clear that any significant degradation of efficiency will directly affect this objective. Many studies do recognised the creation of knowledge as a significant factor in determining how effectively a business develops, and knowledge creation, theorised by (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), is used as a baseline for numerous historic and current studies. To date however, there have been few studies which denote the affect of socio-cultural or religious phenomena within a transfer scenario as significant, and how this interaction may affect the outcome of the knowledge shared or exchanged in a business context. This paper therefore examines how, in a business context, knowledge transfer is influenced by perspectives given to the knowledge. This rationale is deliberate since the transfer of knowledge is rarely a simple unproblematic event, (Argote et al., 2000). In this regards, we look at a significant amount of literature and research which has been constructed in a bid to understand both the problematic nature surrounding the mechanics of the transfer sequence and definition of the term 'knowledge' to support the establishment of meaningful baselines. The paper then summarises these theoretical baselines into segmented contexts with deliberate intention.

Purpose: Theoretical perspective

Keywords: Knowledge, Knowledge transfer, success, competitive advantage

Corresponding Author(s) Email:

INTRODUCTION.

The ability to transfer knowledge from one organisation to another has been concluded from many notable studies (Galbraith, 1990; Darr, Argote, and Epple, 1995; Epple, Argote, and Murphy, 1996; Baum and Ingram, 1998; Dougherty, 1999; Argote, Ingram, Levine and Moreland, 2000), most of which agree on the benefits of knowledge transfer; however, the reported effectiveness of knowledge transferred fluctuates considerably between organisations and definitions (Szulanski, 1996; Argote, 1999). What is constantly maintained in the literature is the theme of difficulty of the transfer mechanism (Argote, 1999; Szulanski, 2000). Szulanski states there are several reasons for the transfer mechanism to fail, notably that “the transfer may fail for reasons ranging from the quality of the relationship between donor and recipient groups to the characteristics of the knowledge to be transferred” (Szulanski, 2000). From current literature, one can see why the study of knowledge transfer is focused on the process of transferring information from one individual to another and the effectiveness and efficiency, or non-efficiency of the transfer mechanism. This gap between transferors and transferees of knowledge is explained by the divergent ways in which the two groups understand the knowledge, principally ignoring the possibility that their basic and central belief system is different and therefore their interpretation of the knowledge structure will be different at the onset. It is clear why knowledge transfer theory is based in psychology and should therefore substantiate the difficulties surrounding knowledge transfer study (Argote, Ingram, Levine and Moreland, 2000). Argyris (1996) further defines

the difficulties related to the usage of conventional empirical research in the development of actionable knowledge. Understanding of knowledge criteria – that is, central to what is understood to be knowledge, from the perspective of the sender of the knowledge and the receiver of the knowledge - has not been defined by any precise description and subsequent literature relies on broad base statements such as ‘knowledge transfer’ and ‘knowledge exchange’. Clarification is therefore required in defining what knowledge is, from both an organisation and socio-cultural group context. This view can be assimilated or segmented into contextual divisions of congruent reality.

PHILOSOPHY:

KNOWLEDGE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Knowledge transfer, in an organisational context, is defined by Argote and Ingram (2000) as a process by which one unit of an organization, such as a group or department, is affected by the experience of another. Borrowing from Gilchrist’s (1995) description of community development, knowledge transfer can be said to involve “human horticulture rather than social engineering”. Whilst these descriptions are sufficient in an organizational context, they are limited in the explanation of what the Knowledge consists of before the transfer takes place and what significance the constituent parts, including experience, may have on the transfer or exchange process. The development of philosophical thought from Kant (1724-1804) to G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) serves as a backdrop to these definitions. In his theory of knowledge, Kant divided reality into two types: phenomena and

noumena. We experience phenomena only by the senses in the things we see, hear, taste, touch, etc. The noumena, or the reality behind appearances, the thing-in-itself, can never be known by the senses, and hence cannot be known at all. Noumena may refer to God or the existence of the soul. The significance of duality in establishing the entirety of the universality is remiss in Kantian metaphysics. Thus, misunderstanding the problem of heteronomy leads to the difficulty in some western philosophy in segregating mind and matter from a priori and a posterior reasoning. Von-Mises (1976) attempts to clarify the problem by stating that "Rationalism arises from the impossibility of God-mind-matter interrelationships. Reason is then subjected to the problem of heteronomy and rests on human origins alone. God and the world-systems, thus revelation and reason become dichotomous competing premises of understanding reality". Whilst this is arguably the basis for conceptual misunderstanding between separate or even indigenous cultures, it fails to be specific in the definition of epistemological reasoning in the context of knowledge transfer and exchange (see von-Mises, 1976). Reany (1988), debates these a priori concepts, on which metaphors of new knowledge are originally built. In his theory of human learning, meaning is more fundamental than knowledge, for knowledge is conformed to, and limited by, our ability to project meaning onto the world, and all meaning is ultimately reducible to experience. Therefore, all knowledge must be built on experience. Levin and Cross (2004) develop this and consider the mediating role of trust in knowledge transfer. Their research reveals two important findings: competence- and benevolence-based trust among

individuals in an organisation influences the link between the tie strength of two individuals and receipt of useful knowledge; the researchers find weak ties between dissimilar individuals who do not routinely interact to create any benefit because of the precursive interaction prior to knowledge transfer. This is contrary to the earlier research of Argote and Ingram (2000) which stated the significance of defined ties with the transfer actors may introduce a conflict of interest and therefore result in poor transfer status. The emphasis in this context is the complexity of the interaction in the occupational, organisational and social contexts for Knowledge transfers, and there are many subsequent studies to collaborate this work (Abrams, D., Wetherell, M., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M. A., and Turner, J.C., (1990). Whilst this represents a shift away from event, or sequenced accounts of transfer as described by Argote et al (2000), and it does go beyond simple, process accounts of interpretation of the transfer mechanism, these definitions, though accurate in the definition of the transfer mechanism and the social interaction of the participating actors, fail in the redirection of the analysis towards the relationally constructed nature of Knowledge, specifically through the lens of phenomenological interpretation, and is focused on interpretive styles of analysis of the transfer mechanism

ORGANISATIONAL:

RELATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Various literatures have examined and explained a variety of aspects regarding how to managing and understand knowledge based on the conceptual differences and interactions between

tacit and explicit knowledge; for example, the dissimilarity between tacit and explicit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967; Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Jasimuddin, 2004), the knowledge creation process (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), and social aspects of knowledge (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Spender, 1996). Thus, any attempt to centralise or store a codification of experience will be of little or no practical use to any large organisation (Huber 1991; Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Scarbrough, 1995; Stein and Zwass, 1995). Tacit knowledge and implicit knowing in a transfer context (Szulanski, 1996; Connell et al., 2003; Smith and McKeen, 2003) should not be re-stated as a “resource”, but always as a process of experience and development. Clearly, to acknowledge the codification of the tacit knowledge is correct in an empirical sense, but related literature does not address in any great detail the understanding of faith or trust based on religious experience adjoining the interpretation of the tacit knowledge. Orlikowski (2002) regards these phenomena as an embodiment of continual knowledge and an on-going social development, constituted and reconstituted in everyday experience. This is further developed by research conducted by Almeida and Kogut (1999) and Argot (1999), and summarises very well the position of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) discussion of personnel rotation as a mechanism of effective knowledge transfer within an organisation. However, the gap in the literature reflecting any indication of experience as fundamental or significant to the understanding of the knowledge and the contextual significance attached to it is still apparent. Knowledge transfer in an organizational context is well defined by Argote and Ingram (2000), as a process by which one unit of an

organization, such as a group or department, is affected by the experience of another, but the fundamental argument is in a business or organizational context rather than a socio-cultural context. Argote and Ingram (2000) define the usefulness of this transfer, asserting that “Organisations adept at knowledge transfer have been found to be more productive and more apt to survive than counterparts less adept at knowledge transfer”. However, they stress the importance of the commodity view in that there are financial gains to the efficient transfer. Argote, Becham and Epple (1990), Darr, Argote and Epple (1995), and Baum and Ingram (1998), explain that analyzing small groups of employees provides understanding at a micro level of the social processes through which organisations can create and combine knowledge. However, these studies look at the mechanics of the transfer at its transfer point; this is further clarified by Argote (2004), explaining it from an organisational context within an organization that does not address the fundamental socio-cultural attributes associated with knowledge exchange in social groups. Sveiby (1998) examines the ability of a company’s employees to solve complex problems using knowledge and knowledge transfer, and introduces the concept of exchange to resolve the problems. He focuses on companies such as management consultancies but makes little or no remark as to the underlying socio-cultural experiences, which ultimately affect each scenario. Dixon (2000) explains how this knowledge is transferred using specific management design principles and attempts to simplify complex knowledge scenarios, including several references to cultural issues. However, this refers to business

culture and not socio-cultural practices or experience. She does discuss 'common knowledge', which could be understood to be a social interaction, but attaches no cultural or experience significance to the subject. Orlikowski (2002) regards this phenomenon as an embodiment of continual knowledge and an on-going social development, constituted and reconstituted in everyday experience, but fails to state the significance of the interaction between the two and does not underline the significance of cultural understanding. In this regards, Scarbrough (2009) attributed knowledge, the usefulness of knowledge and the usefulness of organisational learning, social practices and management structures to the evolution and exchange of knowledge between organisations. Similarly, contends that competitive success is seen as dependent on the firm's ability to mobilise all of these different kinds of knowledge, rather than a singular focus in terms of decision or knowledge type. However, Scarbrough only explores this concept in the context of an organisation, not the broader implications of knowledge transfer relationships between the global business community and the understanding of this transfer and exchange to social or ethnic minority groups.

PSYCHOLOGICAL:

SOCIO FACTORS AND NETWORKS.

Singh (2005) extends management research and socio-cultural factors to consider collaborative networks as determinants of knowledge diffusion patterns. Singh (2005) hypothesizes that individuals within an organisation (from either the same region or same

family) possess closer collaborative links, thereby influencing a greater probability of knowledge flows. Social interactions within groups and at various levels within knowledge communities can significantly influence the increase or decrease in their respective social capital; whilst this is relevant from a socio-cultural concept, it does not specifically address the psychological and religious experiences of the groups, only their social interaction. Coleman (1988) states that the dynamic growth of knowledge communities heavily depends upon the social structures of trust, sense of community, commitment, shared vision, and continuous spirit of knowledge creation. This is important for several reasons; however, the main point is that individuals involved in the transfer and reception of Knowledge are generally part of a group or groups. This point is also discussed by Baron and Kenny (1986), and Brewer (1979); however, both sets of observations ignore the experience of the knowledge as significant and infer that knowledge is useful and recognised as such before any transfer takes place. This is a fundamental gap in the observations. Tajfel and Turner (1979) develop this observational position and posit that individuals gain social identity from the groups from which they belong. Kramer (1999), and Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) discuss in detail the important attributes attached to group identity and facilitation opportunities for efficient transfer mechanisms to be accomplished, but stress the importance of the transfer mechanism and again fail to identify the function of experience as a constituent part of the knowledge creation before transfer or exchange takes place. Social practices and inclusion is also discussed by Cohen and

Sproull (1996), who state that social processes are clearly involved at each stage of a learning cycle and are predominant in the learning process; whilst this is also significant, it does not address in specific detail which learning processes effect the development of knowledge understanding and thus the definitions are too wide and generalised to be significantly focused on the transfer and exchange mechanism. Cohen and Sproull (1996) conclude that knowledge transfer takes place on multiple levels of consciousness, which are defined as a moral standard from which to start. Cohen and Sproull (1996) further clarify that learning is a “natural” part of everyday organisational activity, and the ability to manage and facilitate learning, development and change is recognised by some as a crucial, organisational competence. This is a basic and fundamental starting point for the understanding of knowledge before it is transferred, but is not discussed in any significant detail. Nonetheless, research by Van Knippenberg (1999) suggests that the quality of the knowledge from the recipients’ perception is also important. Thus, the social identity of the Knowledge to be transferred is equated as value, and therefore an evaluation of the usefulness of the Knowledge. Although this is clear in its definition, there is still a significant gap in explaining the significance of different experiences on the knowledge perception or what identity the knowledge is given before it is transferred. Several studies do indicate that individuals may make an evaluation of the knowledge to be transferred simply by reviewing the source of the information (Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Mackie, Worth and Asuncion, 1990). These studies, although important, do not clearly

identify significant modes of experience, and do not explicate which experiences are more predominant on the evaluation of the knowledge before or after its transfer or exchange.

CULTURE:

PHENOMENA AND NUMENA.

Hanson (1983) explains that religion, by its nature, is embedded into the very fabric of society and therefore knowledge and knowledge experience derive from it. Religion is acknowledged as part of our fundamental education and a process for development into further education and subsequent personal development (Hanson, 1983). Kant defines this phenomenon as a plausible starting point for education, critical consciousness, morality and judgment. Different kinds of experiences and practices are generally accepted as though they are universal and applicable to all societies and cultures at all periods of our educational and personal development. Moore and Habel (1982) proposed dealing with religious material in the classroom through a mixture of cognitive and non-cognitive methods, which again leads us to the conclusion of religious education being a contributing factor of experience justification. In the definitions given by these explanations there is no clarification of how this education is justified as a contributing factor and to what extent the educational experience influences preceding and proceeding knowledge experiences. Bonhoeffer (1931) expands on Kant’s theory of knowledge and its connection with God, critical consciousness, morality and judgment. He regards God, or religious belief as fundamental to the construction of a truth or knowledge. Bonhoeffer (1931) introduces the idea of

God's self-revelation, in which God comes to man who is incapable of understanding the nature of his knowledge, and therefore this knowledge has to be transferred or exchanged. This is a critical paradox for Bonhoeffer (1931) and significant in the development of any knowledge transfer or exchange hypothesis. Religious experience, in this view, has clear cogency of any proposal, epistemically legitimate or not, and this is fundamental in defining any knowledge to be transferred or exchanged. Hick (1993) discusses the interpretation of religious experience as a development of Kantian lines and advocates pluralism and acceptance of faith as a truth of belief; this in itself is clear as a definition point, but does not clarify the significance of the interaction. Adler (1990) develops and examines the nature of truth as it applies to religion, and this is a clear reflection of the importance of understanding knowledge before it is transferred or exchanged. Adler makes three distinctions about truth in relation to religion. First, that one must distinguish between what he calls "poetical truth" and "logical truth". Second, Adler proposes that one must distinguish between a proposition itself and our judgments about a given proposition. Third, there must be a distinction relevant to our discussion about the nature of truth. The question: "What is truth?" must be distinguished from the question: "How can one ascertain the truthfulness or falsity of a given truth-claim?" In this the acknowledgement of the usefulness or clarification of the type of knowledge to be transferred or exchanged is recognised; however, there is insufficient focus on the actual effectiveness of the transferred or exchanged knowledge and what, if

anything, the recognition of the type of knowledge had on the transfer mechanism. In this context any knowledge generated or developed is based on experience, including, but not limited to, religious experience; therefore, subsequent interpretation of this experience is a product of social interaction and not a direct result of it.

A particular kind of human behaviour cannot always be attributed to a particular kind of understanding of transferred or exchanged knowledge. For example, a doctor will not always understand the cultural significance of understanding the faith of a patient, even though the knowledge exchange has taken place with either the family or other members of staff. In one sense, this can be conducive to positioning the Knowledge to make it more understandable and acceptable to the recipient, however it would lack the validation needed to justify the initial proposition of the Knowledge. Again, as in the previous example, the doctor treating the patient is believed to understand the religious positioning of the patient, simply because he has been informed that the patient is Muslim. The doctor understands the patient is Muslim but does not understand the religious significance of his actions. For example, washing his hands with an alcohol based detergent.

Thus, knowledge that is to be transferred cannot be accepted as correct in the sense that it is understood by the transferor and the transferee in the same way; therefore, any transfer will not be 100% acceptable to both parties. According to Schön (1984; 42), good understanding or reflection-in-action often takes the form of a reflective conversation with the situation and involves "on-the-spot" surfacing,

criticizing, re-structuring and testing of intuitive understanding. Therefore the quality of the Knowledge derived from reflection may be poor and not transfer well, as much of the reflectivity is lost if it is not recognised as significant. Szulanski (1996) states that there is a reluctance to share tacit knowledge due to fear of losing power and status, therefore experience and subsequent associated knowledge will be difficult to interpret if this reluctance is not recognised in a socio-cultural paradigm. In reflecting on these definitions, philosophical and religious caveats can guide this deconstruction and reform any critical rethinking about Knowledge, breaking it down to simple terms and understandings.

CONCLUSION

To declare knowledge as a transferable commodity is a misnomer and arguably inaccurate in that both epistemic and ontological sense; even the statement of what is happening is in itself open to ambiguity: “ Knowledge Transfer, Knowledge Translation, Knowledge Utilisation” (Backer, 2000; Barwick, Boydell and Omrin, 2002; Graham and Logan, 2004; Racher and Annis, 2005). However, the literature makes it clear that multiple processes exist, and many theoretical models are potentially relevant, thus, defining a single hypothesis to prove or disprove a knowledge transfer or exchange scenario would be very limiting. Current research data on knowledge transfer or knowledge exchange is somewhat unclear on its fundamental aims and objectives; this could be because the ethical evaluation of the data involved has been set as a priority for the implementation of the relevant research schemes. Clearly all current methods are

inextricably tangled, despite their diverse approaches in their pursuit for valid knowledge and ability to predict an efficient transfer or exchange paradigm. From the literature reviewed, the predominant theme is a lack a specific focus when defining the type of experience that would affect knowledge transfer or exchange in a significant way. Knowledge transfer or exchanges, created in social environments, follow the ethics and principles of each stakeholder, and their appropriateness for the achievement of the particular knowledge target can lead to opposite results, particularly when the increase of understanding is with one party and not the other. This could be influenced by any type of experience; however, for the purpose of this paper it is suggested that religious experience and understanding is fundamental to the interpretation of the knowledge transferred or exchanged, regardless of the mechanism used to facilitate this exchange.

FUTURE RESEARCH

At present, from the literature reviewed, the dichotomy is that one could not posit from a position of singular inference regarding religion as a caveat for shaping experience on a daily basis. The literature pays only marginal attention to this. However, it is clearly a defining factor in ones interpretation of knowledge and therefore must be implicit as a constituent part of an individual's knowledge base from which to posit from. Overall, the literature reviewed is contradictory and inconclusive as to the value of the supporting fundamental criteria for knowledge, before it is transferred or exchanged. Future research should seek to analyse and critically evaluate the knowledge transfer processes and

human interactions in place at the transfer or exchange point and establish a legitimacy to the hypothesis that religious experience is fundamental in shaping the knowledge transfer and exchange mechanism, as this area has not been extensively researched before.

REFERENCES

- Abrams, D., Wetherall, M., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M. A., and Turner, J. C. (1990). Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, conformity and group polarization. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 29, pp. 97-119.
- Alavi, M. and Leidner, D.E. (2001), "Review: knowledge management and knowledge management systems: conceptual foundations and research issues", *MIS Quarterly*, Vol. 25 No. 1. p 107-136
- Argote, L. (1999). *Organizational learning: Creating, retaining, and transferring knowledge*. Norwell, MA: Kluwer.
- Argote, L., and Ingram, P. (2000). Knowledge transfer: A basis for competitive advantage in firms. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 82, 150–169.
- Argote, L., Ingram, P., Levine, J. M., and Moreland, R. L. (2000). Knowledge Transfer in Organizations: Learning from the Experience of Others. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 82(1), pp. 1-8.
- Backer, J.E. (2000). The failure of success: Challenges of disseminating effective substance abuse prevention programs. *Journal of Community Psychology*, 28(3), 363-373.
- Barwick, M.A., Boydell, K.M. and Omlin, C. (2002) *Knowledge Transfer Infrastructure for Children's Mental Health in Ontario*. Toronto, ON, Hospital for Sick Children.
- Baum, J. A. C., and Ingram, P. (1998). Survival-enhancing learning in the Manhattan hotel industry, 1898–1980. *Management Science*, 44, 996–1016.
- Baron, R. M., and Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 5(1), 1173–1182.
- Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive motivational analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 86, 237–243.
- Brown, J. S., and Duguid, P. (1991). *Organizational Learning and Communities-of-Practice*. *Organization Science*, Vol. 2, pp 40-57.
- Coleman, James. (1988). "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology Supplement*, 94: S95-S120. Wellman, Barry and Scot Wortley.
- Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 3(9), 752–766.
- Darr, E. D., Argote, L., and Eppler, D. (1995). The acquisition, transfer, and depreciation of knowledge in service organizations: Productivity in franchises. *Management Science*, 41, 1750–1762.
- Dixon, N. M. (2000), *How Companies Thrive by Sharing What They Know*, Harvard Business Press: USA.

- Gilchrist, A. (1995), *Community Development and Networking*. Community Development Foundation, London, UK. p. 269).
- Epple, D., Argote, L., and Murphy, K. (1996). An Empirical Investigation of the Microstructure of Knowledge Acquisition and Transfer Through Learning by Doing. *Operations Research*, 44(1), pp. 77-86.
- Graham, I. and Logan, J. (2004). Innovations in knowledge transfer and continuity of care. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 36(2), 89-103.
- Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 17, p 109-122.
- Grant, R. M. (1996a). Prospering in Dynamically-competitive Environments: Organisational Capability as Knowledge Integration. *Organisation Science*, Vol 7, No. 4, pp 375-387.
- Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures. *Organization Science*, 2(1), pp. 88-115.
- Kant, I. (1949). "Idea for a universal history with cosmopolitan content", in Friedrich, C.J. (Ed.), *The Philosophy of Kant*, Modern Library, New York, NY.
- Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. *Annual review of psychology*, 50(1), 569-598.
- Levin, D.Z. and Cross, R. (2004). The strength of weak ties you can trust: the mediating role of trust in effective knowledge transfer. *Management Science*, Vol. 50, No. 11, pp. 1477-90.
- Mackie, D. M., Worth, L. T., and Asuncion, A. G. (1990), Processing of persuasive in-group messages. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58, 812-822.
- Moore, B. and Habel, N. (1982). *When Religion Goes to School*. Adelaide, South Australian College of Advanced Education, Australia.
- Nonaka, I. (1994). "A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation," *Organization Science* (5:1), pp 14-37.
- Nonaka, I. and Takeuchi, H. (1995). *The Knowledge-Creating Company*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Michael D. Cohen., and Sproull, L. (1996). *Organizational learning*. Sage Publications: Original from the University of Michigan
- Orlikowski, W. J. (2002). Knowing in practice: enacting a collective capability in distributed organizing. *Organization Science*, Vol. 13, pp. 249-73.
- Petty, R. E., and Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Vol. 19, pp. 123-205, Orlando, FL: Academic Press
- Racher, F. E. and Annis, R.C. (2005) Community partnerships: Translating research for community development. *Canadian Journal of Nursing Research*, 37(1), 169-175.
- Reany, P. (1988). What is Knowledge? *Arizona Journal of Natural Philosophy*, Vol. 2, pp. 7-14.
- Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., and Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. *Academy of Management Review*, 23, 393-404
- Singh, J. (2005). Collaborative Networks as Determinants of Knowledge Diffusion Patterns. *Management Science*, 51(5): 756-770.
- Spender, J. C. (1996), Making knowledge the basis of a dynamic theory of the firm. *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 17, p . 45-62.
- Szulanski, G. (1996), Exploring internal stickiness – impediments to the transfer of best practice within the firm. *Strategic Management Journal*, Vol. 17, pp. 27-43.
- Szulanski, G. (2000). The process of knowledge transfer: A diachronic analysis of stickiness. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 82, 9-27
- Knippenberg, D. (1999). Social identity and persuasion: Reconsidering the role of group

membership. In D. Abrams and M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social identity and social cognition* (pp. 315–331). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

von-Mises, L. (1976), "The human mind", *The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science*, Sheed Andrews and McMeel, Inc., Kansas City, KS, pp. 11-33.

Connell, N.A.D., Klein, J.H. and Powell, P.L. (2003). "It's tacit knowledge but not as we know it: redirecting the search for knowledge. *Journal of Operational Research Society*, Vol. 54, pp. 140-52.

Polanyi, M. (1967). *The Tacit Dimension*. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London.

Smith, H. and McKeen, J. D. (2003), *Knowledge transfer: can KM make it happen?* WR 03-05, Queen's Centre for Knowledge-Based Enterprises, available at: www.business.queensu.ca/kb

Svieby, K. E. (1998). *Managing intellectual capital in organizations*. In Chatzkell, J. (Ed). *Measuring and valuing intellectual capital: From knowledge management to knowledge measurement*, Conference Review, <http://www.progressivepractices.com>

Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. C. (1979). *An integrative theory of intergroup conflict*. The social psychology of intergroup relations, 33(47), 74

Walsh, J. P., and Ungson, G. R. (1991). *Organizational Memory*, *Academy of Management Review*, 16(1), pp. 57-91