REVOLUTIONARIES OR TECHNOCRATS? COMMUNISTS AND

TOWN PLANNING IN LE HAVRE, 1965-1980

A thesis submitted by Andrew Francis Knapp, of Lincoln College, to the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies at the University of Oxford for the degree of D.Phil, October 1983. '

'Revolutionaries or Technocrats? Communists and Town Planning in Le Havre, 1965-1980'. Abstract of a thesis submitted by Andrew Francis Rnapp, of Lincoln College, to the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies at the University of Oxford for the degree of D.Phil, October 1983.

The thesis concerns the administration of a major French city by a Communist municipality working under the conservative governments of the Fifth Republic from 1965 to 1980. It tries to answer two main questions: how far French municipalities were free to produce their own policy out-puts independently of central government, and what the French Communist Party (PCF) sought to gain from its successes in local government during the 1960s and 1970s. Particular (though not exclusive) attention is given to urban and regional planning because it shows the long-run effects of Communist municipal policy; the extent to which the municipality established an ongoing working relationship with its partners, including the State authorities; and the extent to which the PCF managed to integrate the urban environment, as a new political issue, into its local strategy.
The official Communist approach to local government is examined
through the Party's press, and compared with the work of the 'French school' of Marxist urban sociology that flourished in the early 1970s. There follows an historical introduction to Le Havre and an analysis of the
PCF's sources of electoral strength; of the municipality's organisation and its relations with the Party apparatus and the public; of municipal
finance under the Communists; and of the other main actors in the planning process. The planning outputs themselves - both structure plans and specific building projects sponsored by the municipality - are then analysed in the context of national legislation, market forces, and official Communist ideology.

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The originality of policy outputs is found to be real but limited.
The limitations are due not only to legal and financial constraints but to the Communists' use of local office to prove their governmental credentials more than their revolutionary ones.

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Acknowle dgement s

When I chose .to study a Communist municipality in France, I was
warned that I might have to overcome the obstructiveness said to be characteristic of the French bureaucracy in general, and the suspicion
of 'bourgeois' researchers said to be characteristic of the French Communists in particular.
Neither obstacle has come in the way of my research. All the elected officials and municipal employees whom I asked for interviews agreed readily: their names will be found at the end of the bibliography. Daniel Colliard, who plays a central role in this thesis, saw me five times, and deserves special thanks. Moreoever, the municipal services I consulted, in particular the Archives, the Budget Office, the Elections Bureau, and the City Planning Office, allowed me easy access to the documents I required: they also took the time to provide patient explanations for a researcher who was at first wholly uninitiated in Le Havre's history, in local finances, or in the technique of French city planning. This co-operativeness extended to other bodies concerned with Le Havre's planning.
>

In particular, the Agence d'Urbanisme de la Region du Havre gave me extensive facilities to borrow and to photocopy its many useful studies.
'*'"»'* "*

The Port, the Chamber of Commerce, the Societe d Amenagement de la Region
- * -*

du Havre, and the Office Public d'Habitations a Loyer Modere all provided valuable assistance with interviews and documentation. Without the helpful-ness I found in the Town Hall and in the other agencies, this thesis would have been impossible.' Without the friends I encountered during my research, Le Havre would have been a grey and lonely place to work in. That my assessment of the municipality's record is at times unfavourable in no way diminishes my debt to its elected representatives and civil servants.
The Social Science Research Council offered financial conditions for

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my work that must be the envy of students the world over; my travel expenses were also subsidised by Lincoln College and by the Zaharoff
Fund of Oxford University. The University of Paris-Ill, the Ecole Superieure du Commerce of Le Havre, and the Ecole Nationale de la Marine Marchande of Ste-Adresse, all gave me the opportunity to earn money while leaving me time to complete the thesis.
David Goldey has supervised me with humour, erudition and innumerable meals. Vincent Wright, A. Nicollet, Alain Yon and Jean-Philippe Damais all helped me define what kind of thesis I was trying to do. My parents have given me both material assistance at difficult points along the way and the constant reassurance that I was doing something worthwhile.
I cannot yet know either where the errors are in this thesis, or
whether they originated in my sources or in my own treatment of them. But the responsibility for knowing, and thus the responsibility for the errors themselves, is entirely mine.

A.F. Knapp
Oxford
July 1983

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation

AN AH

ANECR

APL
ASSEDIC

AURH
BETURE
CC
CCIH
CDC
CDS
CFDT
CGT
CGTU
CIAT

GIL
CIR
CLAU
CLEG
CODER
COS
CRS
DATAR

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Full Form

Agence Nationale pour 1 'Amelioration de
1 'Habitat
Association Nationale des Elus Communistes et Republic a ins
Aide Personnalise" au Logement
Association pour 1'Emploi dans 1' Industrie et le Commerce

Agence d'Urbanisme de la Region du Havre
Bureau d'Etudes pour 1'Urbanisme et 1'Equipement Cahiers du Communisme
Chambre de Commerce et d' Industrie du Havre Caisse de D£p6ts et de Consignations
Centre De'mocrate et Social
Confederation Francaise D£mocratique du Travail Confederation Generale du Travail Confederation Generale du Travail Unitaire Comite Interministeriel pour 1 ' Amenagement du Territoire
Comite Interprof essionnel du Logement Convention des Institutions Republicaines Commission Locale d' Amenagement et d'Urbanisme Centre de Loisirs et d'Echanges Culturels Commission du Developpement Economique Regional Coefficient d'Occupation des Sols
Compagnies Republicaines de Securite Delegation a 1 'Amenagement du Territoire et a 1'Action Regionale

XI

DDE
DGF
DIA
DUP
EMO
EPBS
FAU
FGDS
GAM
GEP
HLM
HLMO
HVS
IFOP
ILM
ILN
INSEE

LOF
LOPOFA
LOGECO
MCH
MEBS

MRG
MRP
OAS
OGAH
OMO

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Direction Departementale de 1'Equipement Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement Declaration d'lntention d'Aliener Declaration d'Utilite Publique
Education en Milieu Ouverte

s

Etablissement Publique de la Basse-Seine Fonds d f Amenagement Urbain
Federation de la Gauche Deraocrate et Sociale Groupe d' Action Municipale
Groupe d' Etudes et de Progr animation Habitation a Loyer Modere
Habitation a Loyer Modere Ordinaire
Habitat et Vie Sociale
Institut Francais de 1 'Opinion Publique Immeuble a Loyer Modere
Immeuble £l Loyer Normal
Institut National des Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques
Loi d'Orientation Fonciere
Logement Populaire Familial
Logement Economique
Maison de la Culture du Havre
Mission d'Etudes de la Basse Valle"e de la Seine

Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche
Mouvement Republicain Populaire
Organisation Armee Secrete
Operation Groupee d' Amelioration de 1'Habitat Observation en Milieu Ouverte

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OPAC
OPAH
OPHLM
OPHLMVDH
OREAM

PAH
PAP
PAZ
PC
PCF
PFN
PIC
PLA
PLD
PLR
POS
PR
PSI
PS
PSR
PSU
RI
RPA
RPF
RPR
RU
SAHLM
SARH

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Office Public d 'Amenagement et de Constructio: Operation Programmed d' Amelioration de 1'Habi Office Public d'Habitations ^ Loyer Mode're' OPHLM de la Ville du Havre
Organisme d'Etudes de I'Ame'nagement des Aires Me"tropolitaines
Port Autonome du Havre
Pr&t a 1'Accession a la Proprie"te"
Plan d' Amdnagement de la Zone
Pr£t Convent ionne"
Parti Communiste Francais Proprie*te" Familiale de Normandie Pr£t Immobilier H la Construction Pr<§t Locatif Aid£
Plafond Le'gal de Densite*
Programme & Loyer Re'duit
Plan d 'Occupation des Sol.< Proportional Representation Frets Speciaux Immediates
Parti Socialiste
Programme Social de Relogement Parti Socialiste Unifi^
Re'publicains Ind^pendants
Residence pour Personnes Age"es Rassemblement du Peuple Francais Rassemblement pour la R£publique
Renovation Urbaine
Socie'te' Anonyme d'Habitations a Loyer Mode^re* Soci^t^ d'Ame'nagement de la Region Havraise

X11L

SCET
SCIC

SDAU

SEM
SERH

SFIO
SHLE
SIRNUR

SIVOM
SMC
SNCF
SORETUR

SUVH
TLE
UDF
UDR
UNR
UOC
VDH
VRTS

WTC
ZAC

ZAD

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Socie'te' Centrale pour 1 'Equipement du Territoi Socie"t£ Centrale Immobilie're de la Caisse des De"p6ts
Schema Directeur d ' Ame'nagement et d'Urbanisme

Socie'te' d'Economie Mixte
Socie'te' d'Etudes et de Recherches Urbaines de
\

la Region Havraise
Section Francaise de 1 ' Internationale Ouvriere Socie*t^ Havraise des Logements Economiques Socie"te* Immobili&re de la Re*gie Nationale des Usines Renault
Syndicat Inter communal a Vocations Multiples State Monopoly Capitalism
Socie'te" Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais Socie'te' de Recherches et d'Etudes Urbaines Rouennaises

Service d'Urbanisme de la Ville du Havre ..... Taxe Locale d' Equipement
Union pour la De'mocratie Francaise
Union des De*mocrates pour la Re"publique Union pour la Nouvelle Re'publique (Gaullists) Urbanisme Ope"rationnel et Construction Ville du Havre
Versement Repre*sentatif de la Taxe sur les Salaires
World Trade Centre
Zone d' Ame'nagement Concert^

Zone d' Ame'nagement Diffe"re*

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ZIF V/2A5, Zone d'Intervention Fonciere
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ZIP V/249 Zone Industrialo-Portuaire

ZPIU Map 39, Zone de Peuplement Industriel et Urbain
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Chapter I: Introduction

From its conception, this study has been situated firmly at the
boundary of two very large fields of research, the French Communist Party (PCF) and French local government.
The PCF has been the subject of a positively industrial quantity of literature since its entry into government began to seem a real possibility in the early 1970s. A party that stands a chance of returning to power

! after a generation in opposition is bound to arouse interest in any case.

Such interest was reinforced in the case of the PCF because its commitment to Western representative democracy was suspect for many, and of recent date; because it continued to proclaim its revolutionary aims; and because it maintained close links with the USSR, a power which, even in the period of detente, most people perceived as France's most likely future enemy.
In addition, a new spate of publications followed the debacle of the 1978 elections as the PCF's 'dissidents', many of them articulate intellectuals,

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supplied the 'bourgeois' press with their unflattering .accounts of internal Party life.
Despite the tedium of much of its own literature, the PCF remains an interesting and exasperating subject of research. For a student who sets out neither to justify every historical twist of the Party line nor to prove that its every action is part of a conspiracy run from Moscow, the exasperation begins at an emotional level: as a permanent tension between a profound distaste for many of the PCF's policies and practices and a respect for the goals that many of its activists spend their lives striving for. Philip Williams' judgement of a generation ago - 'The French working class, and the many devoted and self-sacrificing party militants, deserved better leadership than the Communist party could give them' - translates

a sense of unease that has lost none of its acuity
Closer study does not, of course, resolve such a paradox but reveals
more. The first concerns the mere fact of the PCF's existence and longevity. Few other Communist parties outside the USSR, and none of any size in Western Europe, have 'enjoyed 1 an almost continuous legal existence since 1920, as the PCF has. During this period it has never ceased to proclaim its 'revolutionary' credentials. Yet not only has it failed, inside or outside government, to make a revolution: it has arguably held it back. True, the PCF's 'failure to act' in 1944 or 1968 was probably based on a realistic assessment of the non-revolutionary situations of
those years (and thus may have avoided a bloodbath and a vicious right-wing backlash in the prevailing international context). Yet the daily evidence of PCF practice, of its entrenchment within French society, of its social conservatism, of its ritualisation of class struggle, suggests that it would not act should such a situation arise (hard as that may be to imagine), but would positively try to head it off for fear of not being able to master events.

This was not always the case. The PCF did take its revolutionary pretensions very seriously until the Popular Front period, and did not formally alter the Leninist eschatology of revolution for a generation after. So the PCF has 'changed'. This brings us to our second paradox,
of the party that 'changes' but remains recognisably the same. The aftermath of 1978, and the decade's end with Marchais' broadcast from Moscow approving the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were a reminder to those who had grown up with Eurocommunism and the Union of the Left of how

(1) Philip M. Williams, Crisis and Compromise (London: Longman's Paperback Edition, 1973), 87.

limited the changes effected in the liberal 1970s really were. The consequence, for the student of the PCF, is the need for constant analysis of which elements of PCF policy are fundamental' (or reflect characteristics of the Party the abandonment of which would change it out of recognition); which are 'durable accretions' (to which several generations of PCF supporters have become thoroughly accustomed); and which are 'tactical superimpositions' (to be discarded as the situation demands). Such analysis is rendered more complex by the need to define what
level of the Party we are talking about. This may seem surprising. The PCF possesses a far greater number of formal and informal full-time activists - the permanents - than any other French party, and exerts a vastly greater discipline over its members. We are accustomed to thinking of a distinguishing characteristic of the PCF as being its ability to execute dazzling about-turns in policy while keeping its troops behind it. About-turns there have been, in plenty, but not always without loss of support - as the experiences of 1928-32, 1947 and 1977-81 showed. Turning round the whole Party apparatus has probably become mo're rather than less difficult in the past 25 years. Waldeck Rochet's hesitancy in attempting to destaliiiise the PCF, and Marchais' concern to cover his flanks on the Central Committee (with his secret L'Union est un Combat speech after he signed the Common Programme x^ith the Socialists in 1972), are clear indications that policy is not merely decided by the Secretary-General's fiat. More strikingly, the PCF's behaviour after the first ballot of the 1981 presidential elections, and its subsequent entry into government, showed the Party being led, for perhaps the first time in its history, by its voters. 'Democratic centralism', then, may conceal but cannot wholly suppress differences of opinion among leaders, members and electors. In addition, however, even where there is no substantive dissent on policy

questions, the PCF may use different elements of its wide-ranging organisation to say and do different, and not always obviously consistent, things. A definition of what PCF policy really was on any given issue at a given time is thus more difficult than the continuing reality of democratic centralism would lead us to imagine.
Our final paradox concerns the nationalism and internationalism of the
PCF. The Section Francaise de 1'Internationale Communiste (as it was known in the early years) was defined by its acceptance of Lenin's Twenty-One Conditions, and its organisation built by Maurice Thorez, Stalin's nominee for its leadership. For more than a generation the PCF's subordination
to Moscow was its highest boast. If subordination has been replaced by less precise links, the Party's affiliation to the USSR remains in no doubt. Yet ever since the calculated decision, taken in 1934, to include the Marseillaise and the Tricolour as well as the Internationale and the Hammer

(2) and Sickle in its symbolic repertoire , the PCF has presented itself as

the most 'national' of French parties, occasionally outdoing even the Gaullists' chauvinism. At times the two loyalties have been consistent, for example in the PCF's approval of De Gaulle's foreign policy or its suspicion of the EEC: more often they coexist uneasily.
Between the paradoxes, it is worth defining a basic approach to the
PCF. A good starting-point is Tiersky's synthesis of the roles into which the Party has been cast - those of 'revolutionary vanguard' and 'party of government' (both part of the PCF's own self-image); of 'counter-society 1
(a concept of Annie Kriegel); and of 'tribune party' (a theme well
developed by Georges Lavau). Tiersky argues that as the PCF has oscillated between its 'hard' and 'soft' poles, so it has played its 'hard*

(2) A speech by Maurice Thorez, reprinted in La Nouvelle Critique, 76 (257), August-September 1974, 11, is instructive on this point.

(revolutionary vanguard/counter-society) and 'soft' (party of government/

(3) tribune party) roles with greater or lesser intensity . If this is a

useful approach to the first half-century of the PCF's history, it needs some qualifications to be applied to the PCF's behaviour under the Fifth Republic".
In the first place, the Communists' denials that they intend to
reproduce the Bolshevik revolution in France should be taken, more or less, at face value. To see the PCF's open, legal action as a smokescreen for a clandestine, illegal, Soviet-led conspiracy is, as Lavau points out, nonsense (even if it has not always been so): over a period of decades,

(4) traces would have been found and avidly used by the authorities

While the PCF's links with Moscow distinguish it from other parties, they cannot now be seen as definitely fixing its fundamental strategy. The Leninist eschatology has been officially and effectively abandoned.
That the PCF leadership still talks about 'revolution' (and seldom
more so than in the mini-ice age that followed 1978) is still significant
It indicates a continued attachment to what Isaac Aviv calls the
'revolutionary myth'. This, Aviv argues, draws inspiration from the French revolutionary tradition, and firmly fixes the PCF as the Party of the
working class. The working class is presented by the Party as 'the

(3) Ronald Tiersky, French Communism, 1920-1972 (London, New York: Columbia UP, 1972), chs. 7-11: Annie Kriegel, The French Communists (London, Chic-
ago UP , 1972) ch.6: Georges Lavau, 'The PCF, the State and the Revolution',
in Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney M. Tarrow (eds.), Communism in Italy
and France (Princeton UP, Paperback Edition, 1977), 87-139.
(4) Lavau, A Quoi Sert le Parti Communiste Francais? (Paris, Fayard, 1981), 34.

(5) Marchais' speech to young Communists in L'Humanite, 4 February 1980, is a most eloquent example. The Party's two magazines for 'intellectuals', France Nouvelle and La Nouvelle Critique, were replaced late in 1979
by a single weekly title - Revolution.

inheritor of the rationalistic and scientific traditions of the French culture of the eighteenth century, and therefore it is the working
class, together with its "allies" (meaning in Communist terminology people or social groups accepting the Communist analysis of French society and history), which incarnates the whole of the French nation'. The PCF's proletarian credentials are fundamental to its identity, but its use
of the 'revolutionary myth 1, as Aviv goes on to say, 'enabled working people to regain their self-esteem vis-^-vis the established social
order 1 . Of course there was more than that to the PCF's revolutionary self-image. Its identity as the party of the working class was also fixed in the context of Marxist-Leninist theory: the PCF saw itself as the correct interpreter of this theory in France, the working class as the motor of its realisation, and the Russian revolution as the model of its achievement. But as France's Communists began to distance themselves from the Russian model, so the French tradition came to dominate their revolutionary claims - and insofar as these claims merely helped people to gain self-respect within existing society, they merged with the 'tribune' function of the PCF, to which we shall return shortly.
The PCF's 'revolutionary' pretensions also, of course, help to distinguish it from the 'reformist' Socialists. Yet the differences between 'revolution' and 'reform', insofar as they concern a programme, often look quantitative rather than qualitative, as the negotiations with the Socialists on the 'updating' of the Common Programme in 1977 showed. The Communists wanted, more nationalisations; more low-cost housing; a

(6) Isaac Aviv, 'The French Communist Party under the Fifth Republic: a Political Party or an Ideological Community?', in Richard Kindersley (ed.), In Search of Eurocommunism (London, Macmillan, 1981), 80-104:
pp. 84-85..

higher minimum wage; and 'democracy, always more democracy 1 - meaning that the working class should have its 'full place' in running the country
But since Communist parties everywhere are taken by the PCF to be the working class's true representatives, the aim of 'democratising society 1 effectively means giving the PCF a leading role in running it. Does
this approximate to what 'ordinary' political parties want - simply to
be in government?
Clearly the PCF has been concerned with electoral results under the
Fifth Republic (this is nothing new). Communists also had an increasing number of opportunities to show administrative competence at local level,
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and apparently enjoyed this . More important, from 1964 the PCF presented serious governmental projects and made real concessions to join a serious alliance aimed at getting into government with the only possible partners under the circumstances, the Socialists (SFIO to 1971, then PS): it had done none of these things before 1958. However, this willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of office was scarcely spontaneous: it was almost a necessity of survival for any party under the Fifth Republic. Moreover, it was highly conditional. The PCF leadership did not want office on any terms, and especially not on the terms they eventually had to accept in 1981 (the electorate was much less choosy). For the Communists, a position as a minority, and not even strictly necessary, partner in a left-wing coalition, involved the obvious danger (especially clear in the post-1973 crisis) of being unable to deliver the goods and being outflanked on the left, by the PS, or both. In addition, they had

(7) Marchais' speech to the PCF's 23rd Congress, in Cahiers du Communisme, June-July 1979, 24.
(8) Sidney Tarrox^, 'Party Activists in Local Office: Communists at the Local Level in Italy and France', in Blackmer and Tarrow (eds.), Communism, 164-5.

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some difficulty in shaking off the ingrained habit of opposition. As Olivier Mongin has observed,

'II [_the PCFJ est si bien installe, psychologiquement,
dans cette inexperience du pouvoir, que lorsqu'il
parle du 'socialisme' - celui de 1'URSS ou celui qu'il
, veut instaurer - il fait corame 1'adolescent qui parle fc.^
de 1'amour: il y projette ses reves et ses frustrations .

The Party's role of 'counter-society' probably reinforced the habit
of opposition. Like the Party as a whole, it has 'hard' and 'soft 1 poles. The importance of the 'hard' one, meaning Kriegel's group of committed revolutionaries, living, breathing and dreaming the Party, has declined: the rise of television and the break-up of many old working class communities have made it harder to isolate a section of the population from outside influences. The 'soft' pole, meaning the network through which the Party member can find friends, services, cheap food and wine, and possibly a home and a job, is still very much alive. The counter-society is of French society as well as in it: where other than at the F£te de 1'Humanite would a political rally be combined with an orgy of eating and drinking, with each stand providing a regional gastronomic speciality?
At the same time, for many Communist members and sympathisers, the 'counter-society' offers a sense of community and self-respect that French society as a whole may not
This is closely linked to the PCF's role of 'tribune' party. Lavau argues that the fragmented nature of French society prevented the working

(9) Olivier Mongin, 'Le Stalinisme du PCF', Esprit, 5, May 1979, 130-140 133.

(10) On the 'counter-society', cf. Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du Parti Communiste Francais (Paris, Fayard, 1977), 405-408: R.W. Johnson,
The Long~March of the French Left (London, Macmillan, 1981), 37-39, 43-45: Kriegel, French Communists, chs. 6-8: Philippe Robrieux,
Histoire Interieure du Parti Communiste Francais, vol.11 (Paris,
Fayard, 1981), 374-379.

class from accepting the largely middle-class leadership of a party of 'loyal opposition 1, or even of government, on the social-democratic
model. The Party to which (until 1981) the workers gave their strongest support continuously threatened the overthrow of the political system in their name. It was powerful enough, at least under the Fourth Republic,
to perform a blocking role, but no more. And it thus tended, in practice, to confine its action to the 'defence' of its supporters. The PCF has played its tribune role both in its 'soft' periods (for example through the 'Ministere des Masses' under the Popular Front) and its 'hard' ones (most obviously after 1947). It has done so in a context of rules (no class violence from the PCF; no attack by the State on the PCF's freedom to express itself) that in fact represent at least a partial incorporation
of the working class into the political game: thus * le PCF le'gitime le systeme tout en criant constamment ll son ille'gitimite'' - and may have become content with, or at least resigned to, this role
From 1958, though, merely to play the tribune role became a less
viable strategy for the PCF, because the emergence and persistence in power of a consistent presidential majority and the demise of proportional representation (PR) 'forged a link between electoral choice and executive

(12) outcomes which had not hitherto existed' . Both put a large premium

on parties with alliances and governmental programmes and led the PCF to start presenting itself again, with caution and great difficulty, as a
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'party of government'. There are plenty of interpretations of the PCF's stagnation and decline since 1958 - the sociological decline of its main

(11) Lavau, A Quoi Sert, 36-44: 'The PCF', in Blackmer and Tarrow (eds.), Communism, 96-104. There is also a good development of the tribune argument in Johnson, The Long March, 148-152.
(12) Johnson, The Long March, 150.

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bases of support; its failure to cut the umbilical cord that links Marchais to Thorez to Stalin; its failure to take on board the new political issues that surfaced in 1968. One of the most important, however, is the difficulty the PCF had in assuming a party of government role for which neither its psychological habits nor its position in the political spectrum prepared it. To deny the legitimacy of a system (as against opposing government policy) is irreconcilable with a claim to be able
to run that system, or even to transform it progressively. It is thus not surprising that the PCF's only major successes between 1958 and 1981 were in the one area where Communists could play the roles of tribune and of party of government with a modicum of consistency - that is, in local government. Here, at least, they could show administrative ability while 'defending 1 their supporters against 'le pouvoir' and denouncing its interference in local affairs. Indeed, the curbed powers of Fifth-Republic parliaments left the Town Halls as the only major bases from which this could be done.
Local government is our second major field,on the other side of our boundary. Since the mid-1960s the traditional juridical model of 'local administration' - which supposes that local institutions are transparent to the directives of central government and of its local representatives - has been replaced by several more complex alternatives. Vincent Wright's synopsis of central-local relations in France provides the best summary
of recent research findings. The old model, he argues, is peopled by unrepresentative local elites managing archaic and ill-adapted institutions under the total domination of State representatives - chiefly prefects - who enjoy a near-monopoly of technical expertise, an armoury of legal controls, and the power of the purse. While little of this is wholly false, Wright emphasises that many French mayors are major notables,

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either because of the size of their towns, or through national office
and the direct access to Paris it bestows, or both; and that many mayors are able to exploit divisions within a vast and unwieldy civil service
in which the Prefect is not all-powerful and in which some officials are more responsive to local needs than to national directives: moreover,
the dependence of many State projects on local finance and co-operation balances that of local projects on State subsidies and constitutes the
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basis of 'an intrinsic mutual independence 1 . It follows that local elus are more powerful than the old model suggests, and thus that people attach considerable importance to which ones they choose. The new approach summarised by Wright thus better explains both the e"lus' successful resistance to earlier government attempts to consolidate local authorities and so to reduce their numbers, and the relatively high turn-out in French local elections.

Opinions vary, however, both about the effectiveness of the 'local politico-administrative system' (as more recent researchers have called it) and about how much power it leaves the periphery. Wright argues that it works well, allowing local notables to produce radically different policy outputs but tempering their potentially dictatorial authority (in socially homogeneous communes with no viable opposition) with the x^ider view of
(14) the State's field services . Researchers from the Centre de la Sociologie des Organisations (CSO) like Jean-Claude Thoenig and Pierre Gremion are more negative. For Gre"mion, the mayor pays a price for penetrating the bureaucracy:

(13) Vincent Wright, The Government and Politics of France (London, Hutchinson, 1978), 148-152.
(14) Ibid., 222-225.

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'Le maire est 1'homme du contact et de la
part du feu qui cherche £ tirer le maximum de 1'Etat tout en defendant une identite locale ou regionale.
'Mais par cette action, le notable s'int£gre
peu a peu £ 1'Etat. Sa representativite" croissante
alourdit ses capacites de representation. II se laisse prendre au jeu'05).

Thoenig notes a 'yawning gap' between the transformation of French national

government and administration from 1958 and the stability of local institutions, and argues that the government's policy of confiding the execution of local reforms to the local institutions themselves (and thus guaranteeing their failure) was the result of a private bargain with the notables:

'It is as if the Fifth Republic, and in particular
President Pompidou, had reached agreement with the
local notables on the following terms: "I will leave
your local power intact but give me a free hand to
industrialise the country"'('").

This, however, leaves little indication as to the content of local

'power 1, or of the criteria we should use to decide how much autonomy a given local authority has and how it uses it. For Thoenig the local

politico-administrative system is one where 'access to decision-making
and to the centre is the monopoly of a few notables who acquire personal advantage from it . But if the power of local notables consists merely in controlling access to decision-makers, it seems a disappointing intellectual prize for the demolition of the old centralised model. It

(15) Pierre Gremion, Le Pouvoir Peripherique (Paris, Seuil 1976), 343.

(16) Jean-Claude Thoenig, 'Local Government Institutions and the Contemporary Evolution of French Society', in Jacques Lagroye and Vincent Wright
(eds.), Local Government in Britain and France, 74-104 :p.95. This
statement could have been lifted from Pompidou's views on regionali-
sation, local government and industrialisation given in Alain Peyrefitte,
Le Mal Francais (Paris, Plon, 1976), 452-453.
(17) Thoenig, 'Local Government', 92.

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is not clear whose access to decision-makers the notables control: few people in any system act consistently on the assumption that such access is open to them. It is as if the CSO researchers, having noticed that bureaucrats and notables spend most of their time with each other, had concluded in advance that the best way to study them would be as part
of an entirely closed system. As Jeanette Becquart-Leclercq observes,
in focussing their attention on routines they arrive too easily at a

_ u e • u-i O8) theory of immobilisme
Interdependence between bureaucrats and notables there certainly is.
It has three main dimensions. First, local authorities have been (even since the 1982 Decentralisation Act, and certainly before it) hedged about with rules governing both their range of competence and the conditions under which they can receive State subsidies. State field services like the Direction Dcpartementale de 1'Equipement (DDE) will tend to try and apply these rules impartially by their lights, like good civil servants. Second, this impartiality is not necessarily shared by the prefect. As
the State's principal representative in each de*partement, with the
official power to accept or refuse most local authority decisions, he may
be required to reward the government's friends or to penalise its enemies. However, his ability to do so (and particularly to penalise enemies) is limited by the extent to which the municipality concerned has established
a close working relationship with services like the DDE; by the opportunities open to local notables to exploit their direct access to Paris, short-circuiting the prefect; and by the prefect's need to manage by consent as the nominated executive of the elected conseil general - a dilemma eased

(18) Jeanette Becquart-Leclerq, Paradoxes du Poivoir Local (Paris, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976), Introduction.

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by the 1982 reforms. Third, both the prefect and the other field services, like any bureaucrats, have an interest in attracting resources to their own department (or to their own d^partement) . There is thus potential
for a certain complicity between the State's representatives and the local authorities they are supposed to supervise.
This may have led to a certain bureaucratic immobility, helping to sabotage regional reforms and attempts to consolidate local authorities (though it did not prevent the 1982 Act, which will represent a very considerable change once it is applied). It is unclear, however, what effect it had on local policy outputs. The idea that different policy outputs may be used as a measure of local autonomy is largely absent from Gremion's and Thoenig's work. Insofar as they assume that such outputs are in face more responsive to State policies than to local ones, we are back with a 'neo-centralist' model. Such a model may correspond to the reality, but until we know more about outputs we cannot say if the high turnout in local elections results from a perceived 'link between electoral choice and executive outcomes' or from some other function performed by local institutions in French society.
The Marxists do talk about outputs - about particular local develop-
ment programmes - but unhelpfully in this context, since they are interested in the workings of State Monopoly Capitalism (SMC) more than
in centre-periphery relations. Thus for Castells, the State apparatus attempts to ensure 'at the same time the interests of the dominant classes [under SMC presumably the monopolist fraction of the capitalist class] and

(19) the coherence of the system thus constituted' . This leaves little room for independent peripheral power structures that fall outside the

(19) Manuel Castells and Francis Godard, Monopolville; L'Entreprise, 1'Etat, 1'Urbain (Paris and the Hague, Mouton, 1974), 345.

parameters of class struggle. And indeed, Castells sees the reform of local institutions in Dunkirk as the State's attempt to disorganise the dominated classes by creating supra-communal bodies in which their interests were represented indirectly or not at all . It would follow that local government could, in its previous unreformed state,
be used by the dominated classes to block State policies. But in Marxist terms this requires a congruence between the State and the dominant classes on the one hand - a truism for Marxists in any case - and between local institutions and the dominated classes on the other - a congruence which is much less easy to assert. We shall return to the 'French school 1

of Marxist urban sociology, and to its relations with the PCF, in Chapter \
II.D, pp.61-71. What is important here is that their main explanation for the political importance of French local institutions and their resistance to reform - an explanation in terms of class struggle - says little about France's specificity in this respect.
We shall assume that even before 1982 local institutions did have
some autonomy and that looking at policy outputs and at the way local e"lus and State officials produced them is a good way of finding out how much. That will be part of the empirical purpose of this study. If the answer is 'quite a lot' it will help explain high electoral turn-outs and vice versa. But it will not give a complete explanation of the function of local institutions in French society.
In Britain, local institutions have proved highly vulnerable to reform
and consolidation from the centre, for they arouse so little interest that, as the Economist pointed out, 'most citizens do not know the name of

(20) Ibid., 347-348.

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(21) their local council's leader except when he is cuckoo' and only a

third of the electorate normally vote for their councillors. French big-city elections are universally seen as serious political contests and attract a turnout of nearly 70 per cent - about twice as high as in Britain. Moreover, in villages, where elections are, overtly at least, less politicised (at times to the point where there is only one candidate

(22) for each seat to be filled), the turnout often reaches 75 per cent

And the persistence of more local authorities than in the whole of the rest of the EEC testifies to their resistance to consolidation.
It seems absurd to assume that French mayors and councillors attract twice as many votes as their British counterparts because they are twice as powerful. Even if the old centralised model of French institutions
is ready for the scrap-heap of sociology, British local authorities still, on the face of it, have wider powers than French ones: they administer (even if they do not always control) a higher proportion of total public expenditure, command more professional expertise, and have endured less direct intervention from central government - at least until Heseltine. However, L.J. Sharpe has argued convincingly that it is precisely this seemingly greater functional autonomy that has led to British local government's loss of political authority: British electors judge their councils functionally and (sometimes x^ith the encouragement of central

(23) government) find them wanting . For French voters, the functional

element - judging councils on outputs - has been less central than in

(21) The Economist, 10-16 July 1982, 17.
(22) Mark Kesselman, The Ambiguous Consensus (New York, Knopf, 1967), ch. 1
(23) L.J. Sharpe, 'Modernising the Localities: Local Government in Britain and some Comparisons with France', in Wright and Lagroye (eds.),
Local Government ..., 42-73: pp.45-46.

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Britain. This is both because the direct functional intervention of the State has been greater, or at least much more visible, and because local notables and the Senate (which is elected by them and cannot be reformed against its will) have successfully resisted local authority consolidation. French voters have thus had lower expectations of what their local authorities can do, but a higher estimation - because of the fragmentation of local authorities - of their elus' closeness to their own aspirations. The post-war generation has certainly done something to change the French outlook. Since 1945, millions of French people have moved from villages and small towns, which levied low rates and built no sewers, to cities which have had to face (with a greater or lesser degree of success) the problems of urbanisation. Voters' concern with local authority outputs has thus grown. But in addition to this, the French still look to their local authorities for protection against a centralised State in a way that the British do not.
This contrast is linked to differences in British and French attitudes
to the State. Sharpe also argues the existence in Britain of an assumption that 'society is prior, and even superior to the State* and its

(24) absence in France . The continuity of British constitutional history

since 1688; Britain's relative regional homogeneity, welded by an early industrial revolution and the urbanisation that went with it; and the security from foreign invasion provided by the Channel, have all worked
in favour of the British seeing their government as a natural emanation
of a society that is in itself a community. In France, on the other hand, consensus on the regime itself was absent or shaky for most of the 175 years after 1789. Regional diversities, which were probably greater than in

(24) Ibid., p.48.

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Britain even in the eighteenth century, were left far more intact by an industrial revolution that was only half complete by 1940. And France's geographical position exposed it to three German invasions in a single lifetime. The Bonapartist tradition in French politics responded to this internal fragmentation and external vulnerability by arguing the 'primacy of the State over society' - that is, that a strong State is necessary
for the very existence of a national community. An obvious practical expression of this was the creation of the prefects under Napoleon. At the same time the mirror image of'Bonapartism - provincial distrust of Parisian government - has persisted throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and even since the 1958 referendum that gave France a 'neo-Bonapartisfc1 constitution. The French, then, do not love their State, but tend to view it ambiguously - as something that is necessary in principle (to keep other people in line) but as something apart, and even hostile,
in practice - and certainly disagreeable to be at the sharp end of.
Hence there is a greater inclination than in Britain to see local authorities as a shield against central government, while British local government has increasingly been organised as the functional agent which administers local policies decided in Whitehall.
In addition, as twentieth-century French society has been more
politically fragmented than British society, so its social and economic

(25) cleavages have been even more flagrant . That meant that a greater

proportion of the French public, at least until the 1970s, had every reason to feel excluded from the national community, and to see the State only as a function of its sharp end. Moreover, the link between the

(25) Inequality in France is well described in Johnson, The Long March ..., 116-124: and Michel Verret, L'Espace Ouvrier (Paris, Armand Colin,
1979), Part II (the latter chiefly on housing conditions).

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individual and the community forged in Anglo-Saxon societies by associa-tions has traditionally been very weak in France. It is less weak than it was. But, as Henry Ehrmann notes, 'it remains correct that neither interest groups nor other associations, numerous though they are, play
as significant a role in the socialisation of the citizen as they do in other countries'. This is partly because associations, and especially pressure-groups, tend to be split by national political cleavages, and thus to be organised, not horizontally, but vertically, like the State. Thus Wright argues that they 'reflect and also perpetuate the lack of social cohesion and instability' and that 'fragmentation weakens the

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groups in their relations with the government'
In a society in which the State is seen as something apart and at
times highly repressive; from which many more people see themselves as excluded than in Britain; where associations and pressure groups have been weak and divided, but where political dissent is vigorous; where are the safety-valves to prevent the violent expression of political demands, and the cement that binds the individual to the community? It is probable that there are less of either in France than in Britain, and that mass class struggle, and even class violence (as compared to mere strikes) are nearer the surface of French society. Still, the French State has avoided overthrow, and potentially insurrectionary moments like 1947 and 1968 were exceptions to the rule. One institution that has helped to prevent instability and fragmentation from leading to anarchy or revolution has been the PCF, through its function as a safety-valve (as 'tribune of the people') which, intentionally or not, legitimates the

(26) Henry W. Ehrmann, Politics in France, 3rd edition (Little, Brown: Boston .and Toronto, 1976), 75. Wright, Government and Politics
188. *

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political system.

Another such instrument of the French population's political sociali-

sation is the local State. This is clearly true for the politicians them-

selves; if local office is no longer an indispensable step in the cursus

honorum, it remains a very useful base for a political career. It is also

true for the electorate. France has some 475,000 mayors or local

councillors. Most of them are from small rural communes, but they are

still thicker on the ground, even in cities, than in Anglo-Saxon countries.

Their contacts with the public - for example surgeries, which are generally

well attended by people who look to their e*lu_s_ to solve their problems -

are frequent. They thus perform an important political function - performed

by other institutions elsewhere: that of persuading people that there is a

part of the political system that truly 'represents' them. This is done,

in part, by manipulating a deliberately apolitical rhetoric to distinguish

local representatives from national politicians. The results, in terms of

the trust the French still feel for local representatives, was well

indicated in a recent opinion poll:

Table I.I: Popular Confidence in France's Institutions, 1982.

Question: 'Avez-vous plutQt confiance ou plutflt pas confiance dans ...'

confiance

Les maires
Les conseils municipaux
Le president de la Re"publique
Les institutions de la Rdpublique
Les conseils re"gionaux
L' administration
Le Premier Minis tre
Le Conseil Constitutionnel

Les deputes
Les minis tre s

Les hommes politiques en general Les partis politiques en ge'ne'ral

75%
72%
60%
57%
56%
56%
54%
50%
50%
48%
29%
22%

pas
confiance

12%
12%
28%
17%
15%
28%
33%
18%
27%
32%
50%
53%

sans

opinion

13%
16%
12%
26%
29%
16%
13%
32%
23%
20%
21%
25%

confiance :
rapport a
janvier 1981

+2%

(a)
(a)
+8%
(a)
+ 12%
(a)
(a)
5%
+ 13%
=

—

(a) ne figurait pas en 1981

Source: Le Nouvel Observateur, 30 Oct. - 6 Nov., 1982, p.67

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The figures show a mistrust of politicians and of parties in general
that is particularly strong in (though not confined to) France. However, rather more than half the electorate trusted the institutions of .the Republic, and this trust carried over to politicians when they were identified with the institutions, as deputies or ministers. The President, as an office-holder but also a symbolic head of State, received the highest trust of any national politician. What is really striking, though, is that mayors and councillors came 12 and 15 points ahead of the President, and some 20 points ahead of any other national politician. Even the relatively unimportant regional and departmental councils were more trusted than the Prime Minister. This suggests that the French combined a high degree of mistrust of politicians with great trust of those politicians whom they could see as 'their' representatives. Moreover, the available comparisons with January 1981 show an even greater central-local gap at the end of the Giscard presidency, with not only deputies and ministers but also the institutions and the administration receiving the confidence of fewer than half the respondents. This should be partly ascribed to M'usure du pouvoir 1 that contributed to Giscard's defeat: in addition, a consensus around the institutions of the Republic was probably helped when the institutions showed their capacity to accommodate a change of government.
It is thus likely that for the first generation of the Fifth Republic only about half the French actively identified with their State, and rather fewer with the people (except the President) who ran it; and that a large minority actively distrusted it - except at local level. Local government has therefore performed a necessary function of political socialisation and legitimation in a potentially unstable society: perhaps the best symbol of this is the thoroughly French spectacle of the mayor,

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with tricolour sash, leading a demonstration. It seems to me that a reluctance to reform this political function out of existence has been a major reason for the failure of governments to undertake a major consolidation of local institutions that are, from a technocratic (and
in many ways from a common-sense) point of view, irrational.
But if the local State helps people who distrust the national State
to feel that some part of the system 'represents' them, it follows that local e"lus must present themselves as different from, and even opposed to, the central government. This is often what happens. To play such a role is, of course, easiest for opposition parties - and hardest for, say, a Minister of the Interior who, like Defferre or Marcellin, is also a mayor. Yet the repeated resolutions, passed at annual conferences of the (generally conservative) Association of French Mayors, denouncing the government's responsibility for the crisis in local finances, indicate a general tendency for all local e^lus, and not just those of the opposition, to regard central government as interfering, even sometimes predatory, but always a convenient scapegoat. At the same time most mayors, even those of the opposition, know that sooner or later they will need the State's help for their projects. So in practice, they are obliged to maintain a working relationship with central government that legitimates it as a partner - at times, indeed, boasting of their influence with the State authorities in practice while opposing their supervisory powers in principle, and blaming the State when things go wrong or for resisting what they know to be impossible demands. Here is the heart of Gremion's complicity between notables and prefects.
There are striking parallels between the 'tribune role' of local government and that of the PCF. Lavau has rightly stressed the emphasis in PCF propaganda on the 'defence 1 of people's interests - of employment, of

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public services, or purchasing power, of the most disadvantaged groups,

(27) and so on . Similarly the classic list of candidates in a municipal

election will (even if it has clear political loyalites) be called 'Liste pour la Defense des Interets Communaux 1. There are differences too, of course. The Communists have tended to denounce right-wing governments in a highly systematic and political way, arguing not only that they have bad policies but that they represent a tiny capitalist clique whose interests are opposed to those of ordinary French people. Mayors, by contrast, seldom assert the illegitimacy of the State as such - only of its interference in local affairs. And they tend to use a deliberately apolitical (even aggressively apolitical) rhetoric to present themselves as the 'defenders' of the whole local community against the Parisian 'politicians' (a very mistrusted group, as our poll shows). But insofar as the rhetoric converges, it reflects a common function that the PCF
and local institutions share. Both articulate the mistrust of a large number of French people for 'the system' - thus mobilising them politically for the benefit of the critics; while at the same time reassuring citizens that there is a part of the 'system' that represents them, and thus helping to legitimate the authority they "denounce.
Research at the boundary I have selected should, then, show something about the PCF, about French local government, and about the way they interact. Have continuity or change characterised the evolution of

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Communist local government policy since 1945? Has the PCF used its successes in local politics under the Fifth Republic to show 'the truly oppressive nature of the central State' or its own administrative capabilities? If the latter is the case, do Communists at local level

(27) Cf. Johnson, The Long March ..., 151.

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emphasise the originality of their policy outputs, or simply the ability
of 'workers' to run things as well as other groups?
Answering this kind of question implies an assessment of how much
real autonomy French municipalities have. We shall assume that a good
way to find out how much is to examine the policy outputs at local level of the PCF, a party that was in opposition to central government for thirty-four years. Such an examination requires a multiple framework.
In particular, we need to define what the PCF says it sets out to do with local office; the central government policies and legislation that affect the outputs concerned; and the specificity of the locality studied. Within this framework, a local study should both indicate how far government rules before the 1982 Act did in fact restrict local autonomy, and how far the PCF's municipal performance justifies the claims it makes. This is not, of course, the first study of the PCF at local level -
though such studies are still not very common. We may divide the secondary material that deals directly with our boundary into two categories. The first type of study is exclusively 'political', dealing with political attitudes and relationships rather than outputs. This is true of Francois Platone's work on the PCF in the Paris region, which is particularly useful in its approach to local government in the inter-war years. Sidney Tarrow's comparison of the political attitudes of French and Italian mayors, including some Communists, is a good supplement to the official PCF approach to local office. And Denis Lacorne's account of the execution at local level of the national alliance strategy worked out with the Socialists for the municipal elections of 1971 and 1977 is especially revealing on the extent to which Party orders to local candidates to seek binding alliances with the Socialists did not alter (in fact, should be understood in the context of) the deep distrust of

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'Social Democracy 1 that has been a constant in the PCF world-view since C2&\
the two parties split in 1920 . We shall refer to all these studies: they are not, however, directly addressed to the questions I shall try
to answer.

The second category of secondary material is specifically concerned
with Communist performance in local office. Jean-Pierre Hoss's book
on Argenteuil and Bezons, two of the earliest Communist municipalities, gives a convincing account of Communistelus' attempts to face the problems of two poor and working-class dormitory communes near the capital. Jean-Claude Ducros has compared the finances of another Communist suburb of Paris, Villejuif, with a conservative one, Montrouge, and found that despite restrictions the Communists did manage to spend significantly

(29) more on social facilities . The most thorough case study in the field,

however, is Jerome Milch T s comparison of conservative Montpellier and Communist Nimes. Milch concludes that the system does allow different municipalities to produce radically different policy outputs in a wide range of fields: moreover, he argues that the only satisfactory
explanation for these differences lies in the opposed 'operational principles' of the two municipal teams, which are politically determined. The main study is a doctoral thesis, but Milch has since used his material

(28) Francois Platone, 'L'Implantation du PC dans la Seine et sa Conception de 1'Administration Locale' - unpublished memoire, Paris, Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, 1967. Sidney Tarrow, Between Centre
and Periphery (London, Yale University Press, 1977); 'Party
Activists]..', Blackmer and Tarrow, Communism ..., 143-172. Denis Lacorne, 'Left-Wing Unity at the Grass Roots: Picardy and Languedoc',
in ibid., 305-339} Les Notables Rouges (Paris, FNSP, 1980),
especially 108-109.
(29) Jean-Pierre Hoss, Communes en Banlieue: Argenteuil et Bezons (Paris, Armand Colin, 1969). Jean-Claude Ducros, 'Politique et Finances
Locales', Analyse et Prevision, July-August 1966.

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for articles on French local government and on the PCF's approach to it. Finally, Raymond Pronier's survey of French Communist municipalities appeared as I was completing this thesis. While at times more anecdotal than analytical, Pronier's book is perceptive and comprehensive. The
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evidence for the 'municipalisation' of the PCF, which I found to be particularly strong for Le Havre, is confirmed by the case histories and arguments he offers
The present thesis was originally meant to be a study on the same
lines as Milch's. Milch himself notes that Nimes was an untypical Communist municipality, notably in its socio-economic composition (it
was lost by the Party after 18 years in 1983) and it seemed reasonable to see if his findings are confirmed elsewhere. In fact my field of research has proved to be rather different. The vast bulk of it concerns only one city. Le Havre seemed a good choice for four reasons. Firstly, with a population of over 200,000 it is the biggest Communist municipality in France (Saint-Etienne, which had a Communist mayor from 1977 to 1983, has a few thousand more inhabitants) . Thus Communist e*lus are effectively running a whole urban system in Le Havre, not (as in a Paris suburb) a territorial division of one. Secondly, Le Havre is a 'complete' city but also a very working-class city, and its population is thus broadly representative of the PCF's nationwide support. Thirdly, the Communists have been in power in Le Havre continuously since 1965 (as well as from

(30) Jerome Milch, 'Paris is Not France: Policy Outputs and Political Values in Two French Cities' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, MIT 1973);
'The PCF and Local Government: Continuity and Change' in Blackmer
and Tarrow (eds.) Communism ..., 340-369; 'Influence as Poxver: French Local Government Reconsidered', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.4, no.2, 1974. Raymond Pronier, Les Municipalites Communistes: Bilan de 30 Annees de Gestion (Paris, Balland, 1983).

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1956 to 1959): we thus have enough time to include the gestation period of longer-term municipal policies. Fourthly, the sources seemed ideal. The secondary material has been very useful without directly infringing on my subject. It includes one thesis on the industrialisation and urbanisation of the Le Havre region which, as a study within the perspectives of the French Marxist school, gives rather little attention to the municipality as an actor; another thesis on Le Havre's electoral sociology, written by a top Communist municipal employee; a geographer's study of the city from census returns; a sociological study of Le Havre's working class; and a history of the city (the third volume of which,

(31) dealing with the twentieth century, has yet to appear) . Primary

sources are both profuse and accessible.
Indeed the amount of material on Le Havre was a major reason for my failure to introduce the comparative dimension that Milch exploited so successfully. There was another. Milch's winning combination - a pair of cities, one Communist and one conservative, close to each other and
of comparable socio-economic composition - is rare. After four years'
study in Le Bavre I can think of no other French city where the different variables - geographical position, population, economic, social and institutional structures - could be sufficiently controlled. The obvious choice for a comparison, Rouen, is a large neighbouring conservative

(31) Alain Yon, 'Industrialisation et Urbanisation dans la Region Havraise', unpublished doctoral thesis, Paris 1976. Jean-Pierre Lousse,
'Sociologie Electorale du Havre', unpublished doctoral thesis, Rouen
1978. Jean-Philippe Damais and A. Nicollet, L'Urbanisme au Havre
(2 volumes, Rouen 1968 and 1978). J.N. Chopart, Vivre pour Travailler, Travailler pour Vivre (Paris, Centre de Sociologie Urbaine, 1978).
Jean Legoy, Histoire du Havre et de Son Peuple (2 volumes, Le Havre, 1978 and 1982)^

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city, and a port like Le Havre. But the Rouen that Jean Lecanuet is mayor of is a middle-class conservative commune, with a little over half Le Havre's population, at the centre of France's most fragmented conurbation, which includes some 400,000 people and 40 communes, some
of them Communist. The difficulty of incorporating such a mosaic into
a comparison with Le Havre, as well as the time necessary, seemed to me too great for this thesis.
This is therefore a case study without systematic controls, though
a number of its conclusions are borne out by Pronier's more wide-ranging research. I have tried to see where the opportunities for original local outputs are and how the Communist municipality of Le Havre used them, and to relate these findings to the municipality's political legitimacy and electoral success. This supposes a general overview of municipal power and policy. Within the range of outputs, though, 1 have given special attention to urban and regional planning. This is a broad field that includes industrial development policy, housing policy, relations with the State, the internal organisation of municipal decision-making, cultural policy and relations with the public. But it is not the whole
of municipal policy, and other areas have received more superficial treatment. This is especially true of the municipal budget, which was a major source for the comparative studies of Milch and Ducros.
My reasons for this choise were partly subjective - a wish to
understand the environment in which I found myself. There are more serious justifications. Firstly, analysing local budgets is of limited use with-out a comparative, and thus controlled, dimension. While we can compare Le Havre's finances with national averages for cities of comparable size, and we can trace the evolution of Le Havre's budget over sixteen years under the Communists, such exercises will necessarily remain approximate

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as the controls will be insufficient. I would argue that the same is less true of urban and regional planning. Planning outputs are partially, but only partially, quantifiable. They have a substance that can be appreciated at the level of one city - though this does not exclude an attempt to analyse the local constraints that have affected them and to compare them with nationally-observed tendencies of urban development. The planning outputs of a Communist municipality can also be compared with the PCF's critique of capitalist urbanisation and its claims for what its local e*lu s can achieve in this field. If Le Havre does not lend itself to a Nimes-Montpellier type of comparison, it does present the advantage of being one of the few large (and thus relatively independent) French cities where the Communists have been in power long enough to assess the long-run effect of their planning policies.
A second reason for concentrating on planning arises from a methodo-logical point noted by Milch - that budget analysis cannot tell us every-thing about the extent of a municipality's freedom to decide its own

(32) policies and how it uses that freedom . This is particularly true in

France, where municipalities participate in decision-making in policy areas over which their formal control is very limited: for example, French municipalities cannot build low-income housing directly, but they can affect how much of it is built and where. Urban and regional planning
is perhaps the most important of these 'non-fiscal distributional outputs', If a municipality can play a major role in deciding how a city develops, economically and spatially, that is a very substantial measure indeed of local autonomy, greater than that enjoyed by many English towns. If it can not, it may be condemned to running a machine the main levers of which

(32) Milch, 'Paris ...', pp.34-35.

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escape its control.
Thirdly, urban and regional planning is a relatively new area of
policy. The first national planning office was set up under Vichy. Municipal concern with planning is about a generation old. The late 1960s saw both the rise of 'the environment 1, including the urban environ-ment, as a political issue and the growth of the 'French school' of Marxist urban sociology. For a party interested in some form of aggiornamento, in moving onto new and less class-bound political terrain in order to compete effectively within the system, this was a major opportunity. But it is not always easy to reconcile the PCF's traditional municipal objectives - 'defending the working class* and building its own organisation at local local level - with attempts to create an original urban environment accessible to a wide range of social groups.
A fourth reason for my interest in Le Havre's planning lies in what
it can show about centre-periphery relations. Of course, any area of municipal policy shows something insofar as it is affected by national legislation. But urban and regional planning also involves a constant exchange between the municipality and its 'partners' - the State and
other local actors. It thus provides an opportunity to study central-local relations not only in terms of central constraints and local freedoms but as a continuing working relationship.
Finally, the available sources amply repay an interest in Le Havre's planning. Some, and notably the major structure plans, are open by law to the public. However, I have also been able to consult a large number of problem studies carried out by the local City Planning Agency; the minutes of the City Planning Committee; and minutes of meetings, preliminary and final plans, and correspondence relating both to structure plans and to major building projects. These form the bulk of my primary

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material, though I have also made selective use of classical sources for local studies - the minutes of council meetings, budgets, and the local press - and of interviews.
The 'core' section of this thesis, then, deals with the planning
options that were available, the outputs that were reached, and how the municipality and its partners arrived at major decisions. I have found
it necessary, however, to precede this by three chapters.
Chapter II is a survey of official PCF attitudes to local government.
The subject has been treated before, notably by Platone (whose study is

(33) very useful for the early period but now somewhat out of date) and Milch

I have drawn on both of these (as well as on Party policy statements, notably in the Cahiers du Communisme), but have given more attention to planning questions. Chapter III gives a brief historical sketch of Le Havre and of the local constraints and problems the municipality faced when it was elected in 1965. It also considers the municipality's continuing electoral strength; its relations with the public and with the Party apparatus; its internal organisation; and the broad evolution of the city budget since 1965. Chapter IV then presents the other main actors in Le Havre's planning process and the municipality's relations with them. The 'core' section, which occupies roughly the second half of the
thesis, concerns two kinds of planning output. The two main structure plans, the Schema Directeur d'Amenagement et d'Urbanisme, or SDAU, and the Plan d'Occupation des Sols, or POS, and their elaboration are dealt with in Chapter V. The second type of output, the 'operational planning' of major building projects, needs to be studied within a framework not only of national legislation but also of market forces: this provides the

(33) Platone, 'L'Implantation ...'. Milch, 'The PCF ...', in Blackmer and Tarrow (eds.) Communism ...

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material for Chapter VI. Finally, Chapter VII examines the operational outputs themselves - chiefly housing developments, but also social and educational facilities. Throughout my study of the local material, I have tried to assess the extent of municipal freedoms and to relate Communist municipal performance both to the PCF's national and local public image and to the municipality's long-standing electoral support. One of Le Havre's major building projects, conceived in 1968 and
still not started, was the subject of some concern in September 1982 when a section of the cliffs a few hundred yards from the proposed site disappeared into the sea - leading one of the technicians concerned to remark that building work ought to start quickly if fourteen years of studies were not to be wasted (Ch.VII.A.4, VII, p348). A few postscripts aside, this thesis stops at 1980, the year the municipality celebrated fifteen years in office and I completed the bulk of my fieldwork. Since then the electoral landslide of the Socialist victory has transformed Le Havre's landscape a good deal more than the physical landslide on the cliffs. It has ended the convenient identification of central government with the Right that students of French centre-periphery relations were able to work with for a generation (or almost ever since the systematic study of them as political relations began). It has opened new prospects of local autonomy with the 1982 Decentralisation Act (though the Mitterand government's new-found concern to control public expenditure suggests that 'decentralisation' will fall far short of allowing the local authorities to tax and spend as they like). Changes in the electoral law have allowed the election of opposition councillors into big-city municipalities for the first time since 1965. In Le Havre itself, 1981 ended the Communists' unchallenged hegemony on the Left, putting the Socialists into a seriously competitive position for the first time. And 1983 saw the municipality

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suffer its first drop in electoral support since 1965. A big new extension to the Town Hall and major changes in its organisation will be undertaken in the mid-1980s. Very little of this could be foreseen as
I began to write my first draft.
Is what follows, then, the testimony of an epoch that vanished into
the sea as I turned away to record it? If the past imperviousness to change both of the PCF and of the 'local politico-administrative system1 is anything to go by, perhaps not.

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Chapter II: The French Communists and Local Government

II.A: Introduction

The PCF's faith in 'scientific socialism, as founded by Marx and
Engels and then developed by Lenin and other leaders and theoreticians
of the workers* movement 1 is still enshrined in the Party statutes . The central Marxist-Leninist proposition - that capitalism is unreform-able, doomed to a terminal crisis in which it will be replaced by a socialist system through the actions of a workers' party wielding power from the centre - remains the official eschatology. Within it, local institutions have no clear role to play. Unlike the workplace, they offer no framework for working-class organisation. For a hard-line Marxist, they share the ideological characteristics of any other 'bourgeois democratic' institution: that is, they give the workers the illusion that they can affect the decisions that determine their lives. Moreover, local welfare expenditure helps to perpetuate the ability of the workforce to work, and local infrastructure provides the necessary environment for production and distribution to take place - both vital functions for the capitalist economy. In any case, in France the tutelage of the central State over local institutions has always been highly visible. The communes elect the municipal councils which, since 1884, have chosen the mayor: but the councils, classically, are circum-scribed by the mayor's obligations as an executive officer of the State, by their financial dependence on the State for major projects, and by the need to get prefectoral approval for their decisions. As for the

(1) Statuts du Parti Communiste Francais, adopters au XXIIIeme Congre's du PCF, mai 1979, pr^ambule.

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conseils generaux of the departements, they were (until 1982) chaired by the prefects. At least from a theoretical point of view, integrating French local institutions into the revolutionary design poses considerable difficulties.
This has not prevented the PCF from holding local office since its
creation in 1920. Its Guesdist predecessors won several cities (notably Lille and Roubaix) in the 1890s and rapidly found good practical uses
for municipal positions. Guesdist councils set up a few elementary social services like public baths and school canteens: Guesdist mayors provided soup-kitchens for strikers while prefects called out troops to repress them. The Communists soon found further advantages. They used local election campaigns to publicise their national policies, such as their
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opposition to the Rif war in 1925. The municipal.[Lies (chiefly in the Paris suburbs) that they inherited in 1920 or won later provided opportunities for 'liaison with the population'. Municipal patronage helped the Party to finance its organisational base by putting its permanents on the municipal payroll. Communist communes were used to establish such key Party institutions as the Ecole des Cadres in Bobigny and the Mus£e Revolutionnaire (the curator of which was the Comintern's emissary Eugen Fried) in Montreuil. On the other hand, as early as 1929 Communist municipal candidates were prepared to point to their municipal record, including their financial soundness, as an indication of their administrative capabilities

(2) Maurice Moissonier, 'Les Guesdistes et la Bataille Municipale, 1891- 1900', in Cahiers d'Histoire de 1'lnstitut Maurice Thorez no.19,
pp.25-42. Francois Platone, 'L'Implantation du Parti Communiste
Francais dans la Seine et sa Conception de 1'Administration Locale', - memoire pour le diplbme superieure d'etudes c;t de recherches politiques (unpublished) - Paris, Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques,
1967, 19. Bobigny, Ivry, Malakoff, Vitry and Villejuif have remained in PCF hands since 1920, except under the Occupation.

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Like the Guesdists, the PCF has not wholly avoided drawing extravagant
or incompatible conclusions from the real but limited possibilities for municipal action. Guesdist propaganda veered from announcing 'the dictatorship of the proletariat established in a region of France 1 (Lille) to denouncing the constraints on local authorities of 'a legality made
in the image and for the use of the enemy class 1 (although their local allies included the Royalists on one occasion). The early Communists were not, in practice, immune from such inconsistencies. They moved from illegally running women candidates in 1925, to vaunting their administrative capability (at least in some localities) in 1929, to insisting that they were 'not in local office to show they could run things as well as the bourgeois or the social-bourgeois' the following year. The success of Jacques Doriot in constituting a personal local fief-and in taking St-Denis with him when he defected from the PCF - is another indication that in the early years the Communists had not achieved a practical integration of

(3) local with national strategy .

At the same time they did attempt to define a consistent theoretical approach, and there is a measure of consistency between the early Party line on local office and the present one. The Communists have always rejected as 'municipal cretinism' any illusion that local positions can be used to create 'islands of socialism' or that their accumulation can
lead to power at national level. Equally, however they have always
argued that Communist municipalities can make a significant though
limited contribution both to the revolutionary design and to the
protection of workers from the worst ravages of capitalism, as well as
that of their Party from the persecution of the bourgeois State. Within

(3) Moissonier, 'Les Guesdistes ...', 25-42. Platone, 'L'Implantation ...', 20-23, 103.

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this framework a variety of interpretations are possible, concerning the nature and extent of local autonomy; the correct relationship between
the administrative and propaganda functions of Communist municipalities; and the relationship between Communist local e"lus and the Party apparatus. The first major change in the PCF approach came when the Party embraced the French revolutionary tradition - tricolour, Marseillaise and all - and extended its municipal bases in the Popular Front period. Henceforth local institutions were no longer considered merely as elements of the bourgeois State: the 'defence of communal liberties' thus became an element of the class struggle.
The period of the Fifth Republic has seen more far-reaching changes.
The Communists have gained notable local successes, adding a number of big-city municipalities to their traditional strongholds in working-class suburbs. Their interest in local government has increased: the Cahiers du Communisme, the Central Committee's monthly, devoted a mere half-dozen or so articles to it from 1947 to 1958 - and over fifty between 1961 and 1980. These articles constitute the authoritative source of Party policy statements. They are fleshed out in publications for local office-holders: L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui (the monthly of the Association Nationale des Elus Communistes et Republicains (ANECR)) and La Gestion Communale dans 1'Action (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1977), written by Marcel Rosette, ANECR's president and a PCF senator for Val-de-Marne. !
To place these statements in their context we need to examine the two factors that shaped the change in the PCF approach - the transformation, under the Fifth Republic, both of national Communist strategy and of the structures and stakes of French local government. A third section prior to the discussion of the Cahiers will consider briefly the work of the French Marxist urban sociologists who, without invariably being Party members, have contributed to the PCF analysis of the city under advanced

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capitalism.

II.B; The Transformation of PCF Strategy

Table II.1; Communist and Socialist Scores in Parliamentary Elections, 1945-1981.

Communists (PCF)
Year

1945
1946 June
1946 Nov.
1951
1956
1958
1962
1967
1968
1973
1978
1981

Sources :

no. votes

(millions)
5.02
5.15
5.43
5.05
5.51
3.91
3.99
5.03
4.44
5.20
5.87
4.00

% votes seats in
cast parliament
26.2
25.9
28.2
26.9
25.9
19.2
21.7
22.5
20.0
21.2
20.6
16. 1

1945-68: Philip M. Williams,

159
153
182
103
150
10
41
73
34
73
86
44

Socialists (SFIO-FGDS-PS/MRG (a))
no. votes

(millions)
4.49
4.19
3.43
2.74
3.25
3.19
2.32
4.21
3.66
4.9
7.0
9,38

French Politicians and

% votes seats
cast

23.4
21.1
17.8
14.6
15.2
15.7
12.6
18.8
16.5
20.8
25.0
37.8

146
128
102
107
94
44
66
116
57
101
107
270

Elections, 1951-
1969 (Cambridge University Press, 1970), 292-293. 1973-78: J.R.
the

Frears and Jean-Luc Parodi, War Will
French Parliamentary Elections of 1978

Not Take
(London,

Place :

C. Hurst, 1979), 64.

1981: Le Monde, 16 and 23 June 1981.

Voting figures are for metropolitan France, at first ballot since 1958.

(a) Socialist figures are for SFIO to 1962: Fe*de*ration de la Gauche

De*mocrate et Sociale (FGDS), or Socialists plus Left Radicals, in 1967

and 1968: and for PS plus . Left Radicals from 1973.

The elections of 1958 and the coming of the Fifth Republic faced the

PCF with three problems. Firstly, it had lost some 30 per cent of its

electorate. Secondly, the change from PR to the two-ballot single-member

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constituency system made a second-ballot withdrawal agreement with another party - which could only be the Socialists - a necessary condition for translating votes into a respectable number of seats. Thirdly, such an agreement had to be more than tactical: the emergence of a clear presidential majority on the right obliged the left to present an equally clear governmental alternative to retain its electoral credibility. The PCF could not longer merely play the role of tribune party that it had enjoyed between 1947 and 1958. Its long-term political survival depended on its being able to present itself as a party of government in a coherent left-xving alliance.
To do this, the PCF would at the very least have to adopt the image
of a French party rather than that of the French branch of a Moscow-led international. Maurice Thorez, however, was not the man to embark on a crash programme of destalinisation. He had been hand-picked as PCF Secretary-General by Stalin himself, and his reaction to Khrushchev's 'secret' 20th Congress speech was one of shock and alarm for the position of the PCF leadership. Destalinisation had to await the appearance of a few timely fissures in the international Communist monolith, and the replacement of Thorez (who died in 1964) by the more liberal Waldeck Rochet. It remained a slow, hesitant, discontinuous and incomplete process.
The Section Francaise de 1'Internationale Ouvri&re (SFIO) was an
equally unlikely partner for the Union of the Left. Despite the formal commitment of the SFIO statutes to the fundamental transformation of society, the Socialists were typically anticlerical, but reformist - if that - on most questions of policy; they feared the stronger Communist Party as an alliance partner. A centrist alliance strategy, as practised under the Fourth Republic, was still alive and well at local level. It took the abject failure of Defferre's second presidential candidacy in

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1969, which contrasted with Mitterrand's impressive performance as candidate of the United Left in 1965, to demonstrate its national ineffectiveness. And it took the unification of the ageing SFIO with other groups of the non-Communist left (notably Mitterrand's Convention des Institutions Republicaines) in the new Parti Socialiste (PS), accompanied by a whole-sale renewal of membership and then of cadres, for the Socialists to feel strong enough to sign the Common Programme of 1972 with the PCF.
The Union of the Left created as many problems as it solved for the
PCF. The PS was clearly better placed to absorb the centre votes the left needed to win. Moreover, Mitterrand had stated (in 1972, to the Socialist International) his ambition to poach three million Communist votes. The fate of becoming an accessory to a social-democratic government was something the Communists wanted to avoid, and Waldeck Rochet's successor Georges Marchais was worried enough to expose his fears to the Central Committee - confidentially - the same year (his report was published as L'Union est un Combat in 1975). Henceforth the PCF fought on three fronts. The public one was the battle for the victory of the united left - at local as at national level (this meant, among other things, replacing
the remaining PS-centrist municipal alliances with PS-PCF ones). The others were the struggles to broaden its electorate to compensate for Socialist gains at the centre; and to defend the Communist working-class core from contamination by the PS. Their fundamental incompatability explains the PCF's varying degrees of ardour for the Union between 1972
and 1977 (it generally, blew hot during election campaigns, cold in between). The choice to give absolute priority to protecting the core rather than winning power as a junior partner to the Socialists explains the break-up of 1977-78 and the period of 'restalinisation' that followed. The Communist electorate's refusal to follow this choice explains Marchais' rally to Mitterrand at the second ballot in 1981 and the Communists'

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subsequent entry into the Mauroy government - their ten years' nightmare fulfilled (4).
The succession of abrupt tactical reversals of policy undertaken by
the Communists since 1958 should not obscure the real transformations that have taken place. It has been forced to adapt to a changed international environment, in which no Western Communist party can present itself simply as the defender of the Motherland of Socialism without facing catastrophic decline. It has tried to take on board some of the new social issues, like the environment and women's rights, that surfaced in the 1960s. And it has had to face the problems of how to retain, and then to regain,
the ascendancy in an alliance with the Socialists to which no long-term alternative exists. These adaptations have all been reluctant and incomplete, but they have all had some impact on the Party's approach to local government.
The Communists have manifestly not ended their attachment to the USSR,
as the caution of their criticisms during the 1970s and the enthusiasm of Marchais' approval of the invasion of Afghanistan illustrate. But they have stopped - even in 1978-81 - presenting it as blueprint for socialism, and they have abandoned the Leninist model of revolution. They have dropped the dictatorship of the proletariat as a goal, proposed 'Advanced Democracy 1 as a 'transition 1 to socialism and accepted 'alternation in power 1. The constitution of the Fifth Republic, initially denounced as a neo-fascist innovation, is now accepted in its essentials, even if the PCF insists on the need for mass support 'at the base 1 to back up any left-wing electoral success and calls for the revision of electoral arrangements that do not suit it. In short, while criticising their

(4) Cf. D.B. Goldey and A.F. Knapp, 'Time for a Change: The French Elections of 1981. I: The Presidency', Electoral Studies, Vol.1,
no.1, 3-42: p.34.

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insufficiences, the PCF has publicly embraced the institutions of 'bourgeois democracy*.
To compete in the bourgeois-democratic market-place, the PCF has
attempted to reconcile a broad electoral appeal with the specific legitimacy it has always claimed as a 'revolutionary' party of the working class. This involves arguing that while the workers are the truly revolutionary class, practically all other social groups are its objective allies as victims of the existing economic system. The theory of State Monopoly Capitalism (SMC), common to several Communist parties but particularly developed by PCF economists like Paul Boccara and Philippe Herzog, provides the main justification for this inter-class alliance.
SMC theory analyses three major characteristics of advanced capitalism -
the concentration of capital, government intervention in the economy, and the welfare State. The first is explained in terms of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall: cartels, by cornering enough of the market, can counteract this tendency by fixing prices - at the expense of their non-monopoly rivals. Ultimately the monopolies have to acquire direct control of the State apparatus (the PCF dates this at 1958 for France), to ensure their own 'super-profits' through fiscal policies and through manipulation of State-controlled markets like arms programmes or public works projects. At the same time, however, the welfare State has grown, both because of capitalism's increasingly sophisticated needs regarding the 'reproduction of the workforce' (that is, for a steady supply of ever healthier and better-educated workers) and as a result of class struggle on social questions, to which the State has periodically had to yield. Providing an.ever-greater volume of 'direct aid to monopoly capital 1 comes increasingly into contradiction with the State's 'welfare' function, which governments have thus tended to reduce to the bare minimum necessary for

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capitalism to function

While this analysis does not call into question the revolutionary

role of the working class, it does supply it with the allies the PCF

wanted in order to justify its broader appeal. These include both people

who benefit from State education, public housing and transport, or social

security, all welfare services that the State must cut to provide ever

more 'direct aid to the monopolies'- and 'non-monopoly' capitalists, whose

survival is threatened by the 'unfair' rules of competition fixed by SMC.

As Francois Hincker wrote in 1974,

'... la lutte sociale et politique n'oppose pas la
moitie des Francais a 1'autre moitie", elle oppose
les hommes du grand capital, une poigne"e, quelques
pour cent, a la quasi-totalite" de notre

On the one hand there was a 'handful' of capitalists - reminiscent of

the '200 families' of the Popular Front era: on the other, what the PCF

started to call the 'Union of the People of France'. The Party's

enthusiasm for this goal predictably diminished after the 1977 municipal

elections; in May 1979, the 23rd Congress stressed that the attraction of

middle-class groups to the workers' cause 'will not occur spontaneously,

(5) The two key Party works on SMC are Paul Boccara, Etudes sur le Capitalisme Monopoliste d'Etat, sa Crise et son Issu (Paris, Editions Sociales, 3rd edition 1974) and Philippe Herzog, Politique Economique
et Planification en Re'gime Capitaliste (Editions Sociales, 1972).
Shorter summaries of SMC theory are to be found in Martin Rhodes, 'The
PCF and the Union of the Left' (MA thesis, University of Canterbury,
New Zealand, 1978), chapter 3; Manuel Caste 11s, City, Class and Power (London, Macmillan, 1978), 43-58; and Manuel Castells and Francis Godard, Monopolville (Paris and the Hague: Mouton, 1974), 34-36.

(6) Francois Hincker, 'L'Union du Peuple de France', La Nouvelle Critique, 76 (257) August-September 1974, 6-8. As a committed exponent of
this union, Hincker fell foul of the Party hierarchy after 1978, and
is now a member of Henri Fiszbin's Recontres Communistes Hebdo group,
and thus excluded from the PCF.

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but will be fraught with more or less serious problems' . But in the long term, if thrown back on its working-class core (as it increasingly had been in the early 1960s), the PCF would decline: ultimately, some form of class alliance strategy had to remain on the agenda.
This had clear implications for the Party's approach to local
government. Excluded from national office for over a generation, the Communists could only give practical demonstrations of their capacity to govern in the interests of a wide spectrum of the population at local level. The role of 'disinterested administrators on behalf of the whole population', which had attracted some Communist local e*lus as early as 1929, was now highly consistent with the national goals that the PCF had been obliged to fix under the Fifth Republic.
Equally important have been the repercussions on the PCF approach of
the greater political stake that local government had come to represent under the Fifth Republic. This politicisation has been fourfold. Firstly, the administration of France's increasingly large and socially heterogeneous cities has more and more become a matter of distributing finite resources in a rapidly-changing social and economic context - in other words, of making political choices, often in the face of increasingly articulate demands from local pressure groups. At times these associations (notably when grouped into the Croupes d'Action Municipale, or GAMs, of the 1960s) have represented a direct electoral challenge to the incumbent municipality. Even where they have not gone this far, municipalities have been obliged to devote more attention to the problem of public consultation on major
issues. They have also had to define their response to individual protest movements as they appear - whether to try and discredit them, to co-operate with (and perhaps co-opt) them, or to canalise their energies for national

(7) Resolution of the PCF f s 23rd Congress, in Cahiers du Communisme (hence-CC), June-July 1979, p.379.

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political ends.
Secondly, France's industrialisation and urbanisation have eroded
the territorial politics characteristic of the Third and Fourth Republics. Political issues and party support have become nationalised. The single-party monopolies that still exist in a few cities have become the exception: most municipal elections are now more seriously contested, giving more choice for the voters and raising their expectations of local government. Thirdly, the emergence of the presidential majority and the decline
of the power and influence that the Assembly had enjoyed under the Fourth Republic threw all deputies back onto their local bases. Government back-benchers wanted both to have something interesting to do and to consolidate their political positions, while the opposition depended on local power
not only for these reasons but because it increasingly relied on municipal office both for party organisation and patronage and to demonstrate its capacity to govern. Municipal elections, held nationwide every six years, were thus a test not only of government support but also of the opposition's capacity to survive at local level. If it lost here, France risked becoming a de-facto one-party State. Thus from 1959 local elections were fought with ever-greater intensity by both sides, for more than just local power was at stake; and they were fought on national political as well as strictly municipal issues.
Fourthly, this evolution in French city politics was deliberately
favoured by changes in the electoral law. The Gaullists, largely without local office in 1958, wanted both to ensure their future by putting down local roots, and to remove the opposition from its last redoubts. Since the opposition Third-Force coalitions that ran most of France's cities were in no hurry to accept Gaullist take-over bids, the government replaced the existing PR system with a two-ballot majority system which, they

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reckoned, would favour them at local level as it had done nationally, by splitting the Third-Force vote to their advantage, leaving only a small left-wing rump as allies for an otherwise isolated PCF.
After the failure of a first attempt for the 1959 elections, the government, in 1964, passed a new law that applied, in its essentials, in 1965, 1971 and 1977. In cities of over 30,000 inhabitants, electors voted en bloc for a list of candidates. A list with over half the votes on the first ballot won all the seats on the council. If there was no absolute majority a second ballot was held a week later, at which the list with the most votes won all the seats. Lists could withdraw between ballots - and had to if their share of the first-ballot vote was under
10 per cent (this was increased to 12.5 per cent of the electorate for 1977). But they could not re-form by combining with other lists - and so the monopoly of council seats went to just one of the lists present at
the first ballot. The presence of a municipal opposition was only possible in those big cities - Lyon, Marseille, Toulouse and Nice - which (like Paris) were divided into wards.
The new law had an official rationale - giving 'coherent government 1
to France's cities - and a political purpose - obliging the Third Force to choose sides. It was intended to embarrass De Gaulle's potential presidential rival, Gaston Defferre, and defeat him in Marseille. More generally, it was meant to polarise the Third Force to the advantage of
the Gaullists. As long as the PCF maintained its lists at the second ballot, the Third Force would be stuck between it and the UNR. The alliance that the Communists would demand as the price of co-operation would be unacceptable to all of the Third Force except the left of the SFIO, and broad Gaullist-led lists would be assured of victory in most cities. The Communists' response to the new law was to propose the creation

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of United Left lists (excluding MRP and right-wing Radicals) in all cities of over 30,000 inhabitants as early as November 1964. Their reasons were threefold. Firstly, they too were out to destroy Defferre. He was their most dangerous opponent in Marseille. Nationally, if his Third Force presidential candidacy succeeded, the PCF's nascent alliance strategy with the SFIO was doomed and the PCF would be driven back to its shrinking ghettos. Secondly, joint lists with the SFIO would get Communists into a number of big-city town halls from which they had hitherto (except for 1945-47) been excluded. Thirdly, they would irrevocably bind the Socialists to the Union of the Left by making their local e"lus dependent (as their national ones increasingly were from 1962) on Communist and not centrist votes. The Communists had a large autonomous organisation of their own, and control of the major trade union confederation. The SFIO had neither. Local office was the essential foundation of its organisation and support: by the end of the 1960s two-thirds of its members were local dlus. . Once the Socialists' bridges with the centre were burnt, the Communists would have the SFIO organisation at their mercy. For any break-up of the Union of the Left at local level, while hurting the PCF, would cripple the SFIO. Or so it seemed in 1964.
The Socialists, understandably, did not leap at this offer. And the Third Force survived the 1964 law rather well. Getting elected with Communist votes at national elections and centrist support at local ones was common practice among Socialist de'pute's-maires, including Defferre in Marseille, Guy Mollet in Arras, and Mitterrand in Chateau-Chinon. At the same time, several factors lured the Socialists towards the Communist embrace. The SFIO's old anti-Communist municipal elites progressively declined (especially after Defferre's 1969 debacle) and the influence of old and new left-wingers in the PS grew in proportion. Local Third Force

(8) Vincent Wright and Howard Machin, 'The French Socialist Party in 1973 Performance and Prospects', Government and Opposition, Vol.9, no.2 (Spring 1974), p.133.

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alliances were increasingly inconsistent with the national credibility

of the Union of the Left and with the national right-leaning stance of

centre voters. The Socialists' growing strength in some places reduced

their fears of strangulation by the PCF, while elsewhere they had no

choice. "The SFIO, then the PS thus moved from purely local alliances

with the PCF in 1965 (largely confined to the Paris region, where they

were weak) to the 'indicative line' of 1971 (when left-wing alliances

were generally encouraged but exceptions made in a third of France's

cities, including Marseille), to the binding national agreement of 1977

(to which Mitterrand and Defferre still remained exceptions).

The Union of the Left won several cities in 1965 and 1971; the 1977

alliance was crowned with a major success (Table II.2). Significantly,

Table II.2; Communist and Socialist Performance at the 1977 Municipal Elections

Population of Town

6,000 - 9,000
9,000 - 30,000
over 30,000
Total

Gains
PCF

34
64
21

119

PS

33
98
39

170

Losses
PCF

3
1

-

4

PS

7
18
4

29

Net Gains
PCF

31
63
21

115

PS

26
80
35

141

Total 1977
PCF

81
156
72

309

PS

108
193
83

384

France

403
605
221

1229

Source: Jack Hayward and Vincent Wright, 'Governing from the Centre: the 1977 French Local Elections', Government and Opposition, Vol.12, no.4, pp.447-448.

the PCF waited for this result before beginning their attack on the PS over

the 'updating' of the Common Programme. This was partly because the

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elections were a last opportunity before 1978 to judge whether the Socialists were doing better out of the Union of the Left than the PCF. The Communists' fears were confirmed.
The PCF approach to local government from 1964 to 1978 was
thus structured by two main political goals. The first was to gain more local positions to show their capacity to govern - a necessity to prove the credibility both of the Union of the Left as a whole and of the PCF as against the PS. The second was to bind the Socialists to the Union
of the Left in such a way that they would depend on its maintenance more than the PCF would, and thus be subject to Communist control.
On the first count their success was considerable. In 1965, thanks
in part to local Socialists splitting off from their Third-Force alliances, the PCF won the mairies of Le Havre and Nimes. Aries, Calais, Amiens and St-Dizier followed in 1971: Reims, Le Mans, Be"ziers, Saint-Etienne and many others in 1977. These were not working-class suburbs but socially varied cities, with plenty of scope for proving governmental capacity. Nine million people now lived under Communist municipalities. The PCF lost no opportunity to present its local performance as an earnest of what it could do nationally, and local office tended to bring it dividends in national elections. And it lost no mairie of a city of over 30,000 inhabitants from 1965 to 1977.
The second goal, that of getting a stranglehold on the Socialist organisation, was not really achieved. From 1962 over half the SFIO deputies, and from 1977 most PS mayors, depended on Communist votes for their jobs. But in the presidentialised party system of the Fifth Republic, no Communist could hope to win the highest national office, while a Socialist could. The membership of the PS, at 170,000 in the late 1970s, was nearly three times that of the old SFIO; the Socialists had successfully

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diversified their organisational base, and had even tried setting up sections on the shop floor, traditionally the PCF's reserved domain (though these attempts probably led more to irritation for the Communists than to real organisational gains for the PS). Conversely, the Communists' dependence on local office had increased (if to nothing like the extent of the SFIO). Their very success in winning cities, and the use they made of them to prove their credibility, ensured this in the area of propaganda - especially given the decline of the CGT. The Communists
also moderated their opposition to the cumul des mandats (the accumulation of elected offices by one person). Their parliamentary candidates in March 1978 included an unprecedented proportion of mayors and local councillors, selected from a pool that the Union of the Left had greatly helped to enlarge.
This helps to explain why the national rupture of the Union after 1977
had more limited repercussions in the municipalities than it did, for example, in the union movement. True, the first congress of ANECR in 1979 saw some unflattering comments on PS municipal practices. Communist councillors also made life difficult for Socialist mayors at times, and got their positions as assistant-mayors (adjoints) withdrawn in Dreux, Brest, Angers and other cities. Yet the official Party line was that national differences should not be carried onto the local stage, and the number of splits was small compared with the number of municipalities that

(9) stayed more or less united . Neither the PCF nor the PS had decided on an approach to the 1983 municipal elections before May 1981 changed the political landscape. But had the Communists decided to break up the

(9) L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, December 1979, 13-14. A good survey of agreement and dissent in Left-wing councils three years after 1977 appeared in
Le Monde, 8-14 April 1980.

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municipal Union of the Left they had worked for for nearly twenty years, they would have done enormous damage to their own Party as well as to
the PS. By the late 1970s the PCF had thus become 'municipalised' compared with its position twenty years earlier. And in the same period, as we shall see, the nature of local administration had been transformed.

II.C: Urbanisation and its Consequences

Table II.3: The Employed Population of France by Sector, 1936-1968 (percentages)
1936 1954 1962 1968
Mining, Agriculture 37 28 21 16
Manufacturing 30 36 38 39
Services 33 36 41 45
100 100 100 100

Source: Marceau, Class and Status in France (Oxford, 1977) quoted in
R.W. Johnson, The Long March of the French Left (London: Macmillan, 1981), p.124.

In the post-war generation, France both completed her industrial revolution and began the tertiarisation characteristic of other Western economies in the same period (Table II.3). By 1974, 81 per cent of the active population earned wages or salaries, against 62.3 per cent twenty years earlier. After half a century of stagnation, the population grew fast, and more and more of it came to live in cities (Table II.4).
The population of Paris intra-muros fell steadily from its 1926 peak
of 2.9 million; that of the Paris region rose, but was perhaps limited by official policy; that of France's provincial cities grew by 12 million. France's simultaneous industrialisation and tertiarisation entailed a

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Table II.4: The Growth of France's Total Population, France's Urban Population, and the Population of the Paris Region 1946-1975

France total (millions)
Urban Population
(millions and % of total)
Paris Region
(millions and % of total)

1946
40.5

23.0 (56.8)

6.7 (16.5)

1962
46.5

29.2 (62.8)

8.6 (18.5)

1975
52.6

38.4 (73.0)

9.8 (18.5)

Sources: Henry W. Ehrmann, Politics in France, 3rd edition (Little, Brown),
26. Daniel Huault, 'La Crise du Logement en France', Metropolis, Vol.V, no.40, 6.

simultaneous urban and suburban development. Population increased spectacularly where there was big new industrial growth: Toulouse grew
by 20 per cent between 1962 and 1968, Dunkirk by 4 per cent per annum in the early 1970s. Most of Dunkirk's new inhabitants were steelworkers
who went to dormitory communes like Grande-Synthe
France was wholly unprepared for this kind of growth. Only 1.6
million housing units had been built between 1919 and 1939. Half a million were destroyed during the war, and the construction rate only overtook
the inter-war average in 1952 (Table C.9, p.416). Thus in 1954 a fifth
of the population lived in conditions of acute overcrowding, and as late as 1973, 39 per cent of the housing stock lacked one or more basic amenities. Many cities also lacked such utilities as piped gas and water

(10) Castells and Godard, Monopolville, 102, 194-195. Jack Hayward, The One and Indivisible French Republic (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), 33. Michel Laurent, A 1'Ecoute des Villes de
France, (Paris, 1976), 172-175.

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and mains sewage disposal . These were classic problems of nineteenth-

(12) century urbanisation, as observed by Engels and others . But on top

of them were superimposed newer difficulties. Inner cities and older industries have decayed. In working-class suburbs like Grande-Synthe, or Communist-controlled communes of the Paris region like Sarcelles, Argenteuil or Bezons, low-cost housing estates have begun to crumble almost as soon as they are built, and for two decades after have remained without adequate social services or shops. Particularly in the Paris suburbs, residents suffer both from the choking of arterial roads by day-long traffic and from long journeys to work on a notoriously poor inter-suburban transport system. Official schooling norms (thirty to a primary school class) have regularly been exceeded in neighbourhoods that have seen a rapid influx of young (sometimes foreign immigrant) families. Spiralling property values have prevented local authorities from controlling land use. In short, post-war France has experienced not only urbanisation

(13) but urban crisis, particularly in the older industrial urban areas

Local authorities have faced not only this unmanageable volume of
new social needs but also greater economic instability. The self-financing local family firm has lost the commanding role it enjoyed in
the pre-war French economy. Of the world's 150 largest corporations in

(11) Huault, 'La Crise ...', p.4. Roger H. Duclaud-Williams, The Politics of Housing in Britain and France (London, Heinemann, 1978), p.124. Commissariat General du Plan, Rapport de la Commission Habitat, Vile
Plan (Paris, Documentation Francaise, 1976), p.19.
(12) Friedrich Engels, The Housing Question (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975), 7-8.
(13) Jean-Pierre Hoss, Communes en Banlieue: Argenteuil et Bezons (Paris, Armand Colin, 1969), chapters 1-2. Henri Canacos, Sarcelles ou le Beton Apprivoise (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1979), 29-40. Laurent,
A 1'Ecoute, 172-175.

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1959, just two were French: a decade later there were ten French firms
in the first hundred; in 1973, companies with over 2,000 employees produced 46.7 per cent of France's industrial output. In 1970, foreign businesses employed 10.7 per cent of the French workforce. Companies have concentrated economically, and head offices spatially: two-thirds
of France's major head offices were in Paris even in 1962. French capital has thus become more mobile, and industrial development more (or even more) spatially unbalanced: two-thirds of France's ddpartements have lost inhabitants since 1950. Local authorities in these areas have struggled against the haemorrhage of people and jobs experienced by many medium-sized towns - and with the onset of the recession every municipality has had to face a local unemployment problem. Their capacities in this respect are in fact rather limited, but insofar as it is effective, attracting jobs involves competition between different
(14)

communes

We have already seen (pp.43B-44) that the rapid development of France's cities helped to politicise the choices and the stakes involved in running them. The traditional French image of the mayor as 'father of the commune' and of local government as the 'administration of a patrimony' applied even less to France's big cities than it had before the war. In addition, by the mid-1970s the urban crisis, in France as in Britain and the USA, had become a financial crisis for many cities. In all three countries, the big investments of the post-war generation in housing, education, and welfare facilities were made on the assumption of continued economic growth

(14) Ehrmann, Politics, 26. Michel d'Ornano, 'Le Gachis Industriel',
Le Monde, 14 Oct. 1982. D.L. Hanley, A.P. Kerr and N.H. Waites, Contemporary France: Politics and Society Since 1945 (London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 55-59.Manuel Castells, The Urban Question (London, Arnold, 1977), 29.

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and low inflation. Slower growth and higher inflation meant that interest rates on capital investments rose and running costs (and especially fuel costs) increased while the personal and industrial tax base stagnated
or declined. In the USA, this was compounded by the flight of businesses and wealthy taxpayers from inner cities, in Britain by the decay of Victorian utilities. Clearly the speed of economic change and the sheer volume of new social needs were among the specific factors that helped to shape the French case. Another was the system of local finance, which despite recent reforms remains antiquated, regressive and inflexible.
A French municipality's 'ordinary receipts' come from four main
sources. It levies rates - the 'centime' on land and households; and a business tax, called the patente up to 1974 and the taxe professionnelle since then. It charges for certain services like rubbish collection.
It may charge an infrastructure tax on new property developments, and a public transport levy on employers. And it receives a form of rate support grant, called the Versement Rep re's en tat if de la Taxe sur les Salaires (VRTS) from 1966-79, the Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement (DGF) since 1979. These suffice for a city's running costs and a little more. However, the investment budget, which finances the construction of utilities and social and educational facilities (but not housing, which is built by separate public offices), depends heavily on subsidies (chiefly from the State, but also from the ddpartements and regions) and on loans from public credit institutions like the Caisse des Depots et Consignations (CDC) and its subsidiaries. The allocation of subsidies and loans generally requires the approval of the project concerned by one or more ministerial field services and by the prefect.
Cities exercise real but limited freedom in structuring their budgets They can, for example, give more or less weight to the centime as against

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payments for services in their current receipts. They can decide - within limits - how far to 'self-finance' investments from the surplus on the current budget and how much to borrow. Fixed capital formation represented 40 per cent of current revenue for France's communes in the mid-1970s - against 20 per cent for industry and 5 per cent for central government. While much of this is spent on obligatory items like utilities and schools, there remains significant scope for municipal innovation. At the same time, municipalities have rather little leeway in weighting the elements of the centime (for example, the business tax against the tax on house-holds) as they wish. The tax on households is regressive because assessed on the basis of the 'weighted surface' (surface corrigee) of the housing unit in question rather than on the resources of its occupants. Neither the VRTS nor the DGF have sufficiently compensated poor dormitory communes for their lack of an industrial tax base. The allocation of subsidies on the basis of ministerial norms and prefectoral approval means that it may be difficult to get outside help for an innovative project. What brought on the fiscal crisis was the simultaneous increase in running costs and deterioration in the conditions of outside financial help. In many cases, the State failed to take account of inflation in its assessment of subsidies; it transferred certain financial responsibilities (for example, for the construction of secondary schools and the maintenance of hospital buildings) to the communes; and from
1966 it charged 17.6 per cent VAT on municipal investments, enough to produce a 'negative subsidy' in some cases (though reimbursement of VAT was started in 1978). Thus between 1964 and 1974, despite a real increase in local taxation of over a third, the self-financing of local investments fell from 16 per cent to 7, the share of subsidies dropped from 26 per cent to 22 - and that of loans rose from 58 per cent to 68. In the same

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period, communal debts tripled, reaching 61 billion francs. Since those of the State remained constant, this was politically convenient for financially conservative governments - but the result was that more and more local tax revenues were eaten away by debt repayments. The realisation by most French communes, in the mid-1970s, that 'the party was over', led to a partial reversal of these tendencies. Investments fell, and in 1979, 31 per cent of them were self-financed and 49 per cent paid for by loans. The late 1970s thus saw a measure of cuts in local government expenditure - which were not, however, sufficient to prevent both taxation and debts from creeping up
Faced with the growth of France's cities and their dangerous fiscal evolution, Communist local elus could pursue four possible objectives, which were only partially compatible with one another. They could attempt to 'faire payer les riches' by taxing businesses to the hilt to finance the municipal programmes their electorate so badly needed. There are, however, legal limits on such a policy as well as market constraints (the danger of driving businesses away). They could use local office as a showcase for their prudent financial administration - and thus their capacity to govern - but in the claime of the late 1970s that might mean cuts in services. They could denounce the State for their woes - a sound political device but one which would conflict with the fourth possible

(15) Laurent, A 1'Ecoute, 257, 272-274. Centre National de Recherche Scientifique, L'Influence des Finances Municipales sur le Processus
de Croissance Urbaine (Paris, CNRS, 1976), 5. Association des Maires
des Grandes Villes de France, Les Grandes Villes devant 1'Avenir;
Livre Blanc sur les Finances Locales (Arpajon, 1977), 25-27, 81.
Douglas Ashford, T La Tutelle Financiere: New Wine in Old Bottles?', European Studies Newsletter, VIII.3, December 1978, 6. Francois Giquel, La Commune, Son Budget, Ses Comptes (Paris, Editions Ouvrieres, 1977), 172.Le Monde, 26 June~T980, 9. I use 'billion' here and throughout in its American, but now commonly-used, sense of a thousand million.

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goal, that of establishing a good working relationship with the State authorities in order to get the maximum possible financial help. In any case, central-local relations were inevitably altered by the legal and administrative changes that constituted the Fifth Republic's response
to the vast urban upheaval we have described.
It is often easier to see these changes as the result of rivalries
in the French 'local politico-administrative system', rather than of a consistent plan; that does not diminish their importance for a local £lu's day-to-day job. In the first place, there have been innovations in the State apparatus itself. A 1964 decree established the hierarchical superiority of the prefects over the whole corps of ministerial field services. That reform, however, was somewhat contradicted by three others. 1963 saw the creation of the De'le'gation h_ l f Amgnagement du Territoire et
a 1'Action Regionale (DATAR), directly attached to the Prime Minister's office. Though somewhat eclipsed ten years later, DATAR played a key role in big new industrial operations like Fos and inspired the formation of the Organismes d'Etudes d'Amenagement d'Aires Me"tropolitaines (OREAMs) , multi-disciplinary planning teams working in ten key metropolitan areas. At the same time, the Ministry of Public Works (Ministere de I'Equipement) became a super-ministry grouping housing, urban and regional planning,
the environment and for a brief period even leisure and tourism. Its
field services, the Directions Ddpartementales de I'Equipement (DDEs)
thus grew in importance and were reorganised, notably to include structural planning divisions, the Groupes d'Etudes et de Programmation (GEPs).
Finally, in 32 cities the State has helped to finance the Agences d'Urbanisme d'Agglomeration, which carry out joint planning studies with the local authorities.
Secondly, France acquired a new territorial level of administration

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with the regional reform of 1964. A certain timidity of conception, plus political opposition from inside and outside the administrative apparatus, severely restrained the political importance of France's twenty-two regions: the most far-reaching reform proposals before 1981 were defeated in the 1969 referendum that ousted De Gaulle. Until 1984, the regions thus remained without directly-elected assemblies, while regional budgets were no greater than those of medium-sized cities. However, they do constitute a significant stage in the allocation of certain State funds by a process of competitive bargaining between de"partements and cities. Thirdly, there is now a significantly greater measure of coordination between France's communes. Wholesale compulsory regrouping has been avoided. Fusions have been encouraged (notably by the Marcellin Act of 1971), but with negligible results: in 1979 there were still 36,375 communes - more local authorities than in the rest of the EEC put together. However, the Syndicats Intercommunaux a Vocations Multiples (SIVOMs), Urban Districts (both dating from 1959) and Urban Communities, which group progressively more of the communes' statutory functions under a supra-communal authority composed of their delegated local elus, have fared better. Apart from the four Urban Communities created by law in Lille, Bordeaux, Strasbourg, and Lyon in 1966, they are all voluntary (requiring the consent of half of the communes representing two-thirds
of the population concerned or vice versa), but initially encouraged by financial inducements from the State. They now group over half the communes, and over half the population of France (Table II.5).
Fourthly, cities have a greater juridical armoury with which to
tackle planning problems. Since the Loi d T Orientation Fonciere (LOF)
of 1967, communes of over 10,000 inhabitants have had to produce long-term structure plans (Sche'mas Directeurs d'Ame'nagement et d'Urbanisme or SDAUs)

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Table II.5: French Supra-Communal Institutions, 1978

Institution
SIVOM
Urban District
Urban Community

Number
1,893
155
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Communes Included
18,437
1,319
252

Population Included
20,822,988
5,641,316
4,149,843

Source: MinisteTe de 1'Environment et du Cadre de Vie: Direction de 1'Urbanisme et des Paysages, Receuil d T Informations Statistiques sur 1'Urbanisme, 1979, 16-17.

and detailed local land use regulations (Plans d'Occupation des Sols, or POSs). The 'joint elaboration 1 of SDAUs and POSs by local and State authorities may become a forum for fruitful collaboration - or for political conflict. The Zones a Urbaniser en Priorite* (ZUPs) , dating from 1958 and the Zones d'Ame'nagement Concert^ (ZACs) , established by
the LOF, have widened the communes' powers to expropriate land for municipal projects (especially housing estates) and to organise the operational phase of such projects. Since 1962 the communes have also been able to freeze land speculation for up to thirteen years in the Zones d'Ame'nagement Differ^ (ZADs): while the Galley Act of 1975 has given communes of over 10,000 inhabitants the right of pre-emption on any property for sale in the Zones d'Intervention Fonciere (ZIFs) , which correspond to urban areas as designated in approved POSs.
The Fourth Republic model of centre-periphery relations, though
highly complex as it was worked out in practice, is relatively easy to conceptualise. It chiefly concerned the distribution of funds from Paris to the provinces. This was effected officially on the basis of a complex system of ministerial norms and procedures; in practice it was often strongly affected by the ability of powerful mayors to manipulate

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a 'parallel network* of decision-makers - that is, to exploit both their own influence in Paris and the conflicts at local level between different elements of the State bureaucracy. Neither the ministerial norms nor the parallel network have disappeared under the Fifth Republic: indeed, a major characteristic of the institutional changes since 1958 has been the superimposition of new structures on old ones. But the complexity of the model has greatly increased. Municipalities now have to enter into a wider range of contacts, both with each other and with the State authorities, to realise their projects. In particular, the new planning measures have given new powers to local authorities (for example, to expropriate), but have also obliged them to place major projects within the framework of long-term planning options decided in conjunction with the State.

The growth of France's cities and its legislative and financial
results have thus had contradictory implications for the PCF's approach to local government. On the one hand, the main 'victims' of this evolution have generally been the working class. Communists have thus had the opportunity both to construct an impressive array of municipal facilities for their working-class clients and to denounce the State for it lack of financial help. Since other classes have also suffered from unmet social needs, such policies could also be extended to broaden the PCF's basis of support. There are, however, fiscal limits to a too generous social programme, while the maintenance over time of an overtly hostile relationship with the whole of the State apparatus will tend ultimately not only to be financially disadvantageous but to paralyse certain new municipal functions such as planning. These tendencies thus tend to lead the PCF in the same direction as its national alliance strategy - towards responsible, cross-class government.

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Before considering the solutions to these problems suggested in the Cahiers du Communisme, we shall briefly examine the work of the 'French school' of urban sociologists. Their importance lies partly in the fact that they give a wider interpretation of the French city than that supplied in the Cahiers. In addition, however, they provide a maximalist argument for the potential of 'urban social movements' for the revolutionary design that illustrates a Gramscian extreme to which the official Communists have not been prepared to go.

II.D: Marxists and the City

The emergence of the 'French school' in the late 1960s represented
the first major systematic attempt at a Marxist approach to urban studies. Its members have thus given rather little direct attention to the questions that concern liberal urban sociologists, such as the legitimacy of local power elites, their ability to distribute scarce resources, and their politico-administrative relations with the central authorities. Instead, their main interest focusses on the functions the city fulfils for advanced capitalism; on the way these functions have structured modern cities; and on the potential for class struggle of capitalist urban development. Some, but not all, of the French authors are Party members. Their analysis of the State varies somewhat, between that of instrumentalists like Jean Lojkine and structuralists like Manuel Castells However, they all broadly share the SMC economic framework formulated by the PCF economists (cf. pp.42-43). In return, the PCF has given them considerable attention, especially during the honeymoon period of the Union of the Left. It has published some of their work, both in theoretical reviews like Economie et Politique and (in popularised form) in the Editions Sociales; and it organised two major colloquia on the

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city in 1973 and 1974 (16).

The Marxists see urban change under the Fifth Republic not as the

'natural' result of industrial progress mediated by planning, but as

the remodelling of the urban structure to suit the needs of SMC. 'Urban

planning', argues Christian Topalov, 'is neither indicative nor

authoritarian, but simply monopolist . This 'monopolism' has four

main aspects. Firstly, despite official rhetoric about correcting

regional imbalances, the fundamental purpose of government industrial

policy has been to favour monopoly profits. The most spectacular examples

of this are Dunkirk and Fos, where 'devalorised capital' (capital that

earns no direct profit, in other words public money) has financed the

infrastructure necessary for the functioning of vast monopoly-dominated

(16) The two colloquia are recorded in Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Marxistes, Urbanisme Monopoliste, Urbanisme De'mocratique (Paris,
GERM 1974) La Nouvelle Critique, no.78 bis, 'Pour un Urbanisme ...' - Grenoble colloquium, 1974. The main works touched on here are:
Francois Ascher and Jean Giard, Demain la Ville? (Paris, Editions
Sociales, 1975); Francois Ascher and Chantal Lucas, 'L'Industrie
du Batiment: des Forces Productives & Libe'rer' , Economic et Politique, March 1974, 59-75; Manuel Castells, City, Class and Power (London, Macmillan, 1978); Manuel Castells, The Urban Question (London,
Edward Arnold, 1977); Manuel Castells and Francis Godard, Monopolville (Paris and The Hague, Mouton, 1977); Jean Lojkine and Edmond Pr&teceille, 'Politique Urbaine et Strategic de Classe', Espaces et Socie'te's, 1, Nov. 1974, 70-84', Jean Lojkine, La Politique Urbaine dans la Region Parisienne (Paris and The Hague, Mouton, 1972)',
Jean Lojkine, Le Marxisme, L'Etat et la Question Urbaine (Paris, PUF, 1977); Edmond Preteceille, La Production des Grands Ensembles (Paris and The Hague, Mouton, 1972); Claude Pettier, La Logique du Finance-ment Public de 1'Urbanisation (Paris and The Hague, Mouton, 1975); Christian Topalov, Capital et Proprie'te' Fonciere (Paris, Centre de Sociologie Urbaine, 1973); Christian Topalov, Les Promoteurs Immobiliers (Paris and The Hague, Mouton, 1974); Christian Topalov, Expropriation et Pre'-Emption Publique en France, 1950-1973 (Paris, Centre de Sociologie Urbaine, 1974); Christian Topalov, Se Loger
en Liberte (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1978); Michel Verret, L'Espace Ouvrier (Paris, Armand Colin, 1979) - the only one that is not particularly linked to SMC theory. This is by no means a complete bibliography of the 'French school'. A more thorough critique of the Castells view than I have space for here may be found in Peter
Saunders, Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation (Penguin
Books, 1979), 113-127.

(17) Topalov, Promoteurs, 316.

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industrial complexes. This costs the ordinary taxpayer much more than it costs the monopolies, since, according to Claude Pettier, businesses contributed less than 10 per cent of central government tax receipts in the 1960s (18).

Secondly, the volume of needs for 'collective consumption' (housing, education and welfare) has vastly increased with urbanisation. Nineteenth-century governments were able largely to ignore these needs. Governments since 1945 have been far less so, both because collective consumption has become a focus of political demands and because capitalism in a period of unprecedented growth needed a growing supply of relatively healthy,
(19) relatively well-educated workers and technicians . At the same time such spending on the 'reproduction of the workforce', while necessary for the functioning of advanced capitalism, does not directly assure profits or speed up the rotation of capital. It thus enters into contradiction with the main purpose of the State under SMC, that of direct aid to the monopolies. The result is that expenditure on collective consumption is undertaken but is progressively restraimd. For example, the malaise of France's grands ensembles (the big housing estates of the post-war generation) is interpreted in this light rather than put down simply to scarce resources or misguided planning. Their poor locations; the shoddiness of their construction; the tendency for densities envisaged in initial projects to be revised upwards, while programmes of social facilities are revised downwards, and for shopping facilities to consist of a single (monopolist) hypermarket; are explained by EdmondPreteceille and others as the product of 'profound social determinations', and in

(18) Pettier, La Logique, 16.
(19) Verret, L'Espace, 43-44.

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particular capitalism's need for a maximum of workers to be housed as fast as possible at minimum cost
Thirdly, certain items of social expenditure, and in particular
public transport, contribute directly to the circulation of capital and are undertaken with this criterion in mind. Thus Lojkine notes that the new regional metro network in Paris has connected affluent suburbs to the central business districts (helping financial contacts) but not

(2 1) working-class dormitory suburbs to industrial ones

Fourthly, the monopolies have increasingly turned to the urban
property market as a direct source of profits. Big financial groups like Paribas and the Banque de Suez have been active in T pre-financing 1 major building operations - that is, in providing the initial capital that the building industry lacks - since the early 1960s. Far from discouraging property speculation, State planning measures have actively fuelled it. The chief obstacle in the way of the realisation of monopoly profits in property development, Topalov argues, is that 'urban land remains for the most part split up among social groups other than the class seeking

(22) to invest its capital' . The State's policies have thus aimed at

avoiding the necessity for the monopolies to share their profits with such small landowners while simultaneously avoiding a direct assault on small landed property and the loss of political support that would result The ZAC, in particular, is the ideal tool for this purpose. It can be used for redevelopment projects of any kind (as well as for peripheral

(20) Castells, Urban Question, 166. Preteceille, Grands Ensembles, 5-7, 105-107, 122-127.
(21) Lojkine, Le Marxisme, 208-234.
(22) Topalov, Promoteurs, 16.

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grands ensembles); its expropriation rights can be conceded to private developers; it permits the maximum density allowed in the POS to be exceeded - thus institutionalising the breaking of building regulations for the benefit of the monopolies; and because it applies only to selected sites, the illusion of respect for private landed property is maintained. Big developers have, of course, been especially active in Paris. Their preference for high-density, high-profit schemes (in particular offices and luxury flats) has been a major cause of the gentrification and de-industrialisation of the capital since 1958 and its conversion into a 'symbolic centre' of the 'avant-garde of advanced

. T .(23) capitalism

The argument that France's urban evolution is dominated by the needs

(24) of 'twenty-five industrial and financial feudalities' corresponds

to the slogan of the 'Union of the People of France', but raises several political questions. How far can the 'dominated classes' resist the general tendency by winning control of local institutions? How far can public protest on urban issues be incorporated into the class struggle? Marxist authors generally give rather little attention to the power of left-wing municipalities to obstruct monopoly projects. Jean Lojkine's book on urban politics in the Paris region, for example, almost manages to conceal the existence of the 'red belt' of Communist suburbs. Statements remain of a general order, and different authors have different views. Lojkine and Preteceille, for example, were relatively sanguine in 1974:

(23) Topalov, Promoteurs, 230-235, 300-315; Expropriation, 176-205. Castells, Urban Question, 308-330.
(24) Topalov, Se Loger, 91.

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'la politique de nombre de municipality's, en particulier les municipality's ouvrie"res, est en contradiction totale avec cette strategic monopoliste, car elles mettent
1' accent sur les equipements collectifs, le logement
social ... c'est-a-dire les amenagements utiles pour la
population. Elles ont ainsi une fonction politique
essentielle, en revelant la veritable nature de la
politique urbaine de I

Topalov, however, despite having sat on the Housing Group of the PCF

Central Committee, was less complimentary about Communist local e*lus when

L T Information Municipale interviewed him in 1979:

'les communes ont ... cru faire 1'urbanisme. Elles se sont trompees: elles n'ont pas fait d'urbanisme, elles
ont ete un rouage de la machine d T ensemble, et le seront
toujours tant que la societe aura la caractere qu'elle
a. Une commune, quelque soit sa direction politique,
est un element d'une machine d'Etat dont le fonctionne-
ment d'ensemble lui echappe totalement. ... L'espace
pour une contestation de ce systeme n'a jamais ete ouvert'

More detailed discussion of the potential for municipal power is left

to the official Communist press. The Marxist authors give greater

attention to the relation between urban protests and class struggle, but

they have not succeeded in producing a wholly consistent theoretical

approach. There is general agreement that while urban struggles are

secondary to the major contradiction between labour and capital, they

offer valuable possibilities for .the extension of the revolutionary cause

beyond the working class. This is the case for struggles on questions

of collective consumption; the greater dependence of a wide range of

social groups on some provision or other of the welfare state, plus the

growing inability of governments to meet such needs, 'globalises and

(25) Lojkine and Preteceille, 'Politique Urbaine', 83.

(26) Topalov, interview in L T Information Municipale, Jan. 1979, p.52.

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politicises the conflicts which emerge in this sphere 1 ' '. And Lojkine

argues that the only alternative to the monopolies' increasing domination

over the whole range of urban functions, concerning production as much

as consumption, is 'a direct political clash with the dominant fraction

(28^ of a class 1 . Castells goes rather further, and his view of the

revolutionary potential of 'urban social movements', which appeared in

English in 1978, is worth quoting at some length:

'once the smoke had lifted from the Winter Palace, the
revolutionary project must find new ways to emancipate
itself from the alternative between the political ghetto
and ideological Utopia. Unable to seize the state apparatus, it must then penetrate it, dissolve and transform it. For such an operation not to be one of pure integration into the system, it must be based on the radical transformation of relations of forces outside state institutions, i.e. in civil society, in the practices of the masses and in the last analysis in the heads of the people themselves. But now, if as we have shown, ideological change arises essentially from' a practice in economic and political struggle, protest movements then become the source of ideological and political innovation from which a new society will progressively emerge from the practice of struggle and structural reform. Such a strategy means that the political Left must enlarge its mass support.and go beyond its traditional hold in the working-class movement, and this not only because the revolutionary project must count upon a large non-silent majority
in order to impose its hegemony on the state apparatus of the dominant classes, but also because the socialis-ation of labour and the social production of value in advanced capitalism has not only enlarged and diversi-fied the sources of exploitation, but also those of revolt.

Within this new perspective, urban movements are those which most unify the interests of various classes and strata against the dominant structural logic, and which lead them to confront a state apparatus which has become the principal manager of collective goods' (29)^

(27) Castells, City, Class and Power, 43.

(28) Lojkine, Le Marxisme, 311.

(29) Castells, City, Class and Power, 150-151.

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There are three major objections to this argument. Firstly, we may
doubt the capacity of urban social movements to transcend class barriers, or indeed such differences of interest as those between tenants and owner-occupiers, most of the time. Secondly, it is not clear that such movements would in practice galvanise their participants into a wider revolutionary commitment. Castells argues elsewhere that such politicised urban protest requires the present of 'an organisation imported from other practices', in other words a left-wing party. Yet he also agrees that to politicise urban demands effectively, such a party must have local roots - and that it stands the most chance of putting down local roots in socially (and ethnically) homogeneous French working-class communities. It would thus appear that the social conditions required for the politicisation of an urban protest movement tend to be those which would minimise its potential for forging an anti-monopoly alliance. And Castells certainly does not give an example of a politicised urban social movement grouping, for example, working-class and middle-class tenants, owner-occupiers, small and medium landlords and shopkeepers

. -, . (30) against monopoly capitalists

The third objection to the Castells argument concerns the readiness
of the only major party with any revolutionary pretensions, the PCF, to play the role Castells would like to assign to it. The PCF has, it is true, participated in urban protest. Speakers at the Grenoble colloquium gave two examples. At Malakoff the municipality used both negotiation through normal administrative channels and a petition campaign to scale down a major road plan backed by the Paris prefecture and to get a new extension to the metro built underground rather than at bedroom-window

(30) Castells, Urban Question, 272j City, Class and Power, 122.

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level. At Villejuif, municipally-led protests - including direct action - led to the modification of another scheme, also backed by the prefecture,

(31) to build high-density luxury housing on a (rare) local patch of woodland Yet these two examples illustrate the limits of the way the PCF
has involved itself in urban protests. The Communists inherited both
the municipalities concerned in 1920; Villejuif is part of Marchais 1 Val-de-Marne constituency, and Communist-led lists won over 75 per cent
of the vote in both communes in 1977. The protests were against highly visible and obviously damaging projects emanating from Paris; the Communist 6*1 us were in full control both of any direct action that took place and
of the negotiations that followed. To move from this to welding objective class alliances based on environmental issues, to the wider purpose of
the Union of the People of France would be a considerable step. And for the PCF to adopt such practices as the centrepiece of its political strategy would entail far more profound changes than any since 1920. For however much the PCF has abandoned revolutionary practices it still holds to revolutionary myths as the major distinction between itself and a social-democratic party. At the core of the Party's doctrine is the claim that the working-class is the revolutionary class - not because workers are poor but because of their position in the capitalist process of production; that the working-class has created the Communist Party to achieve the ends for which the economic and social evolution of humanity has destined it; and that the Party, as authorised interpreter of the Marxist-Leninist science of society and avant-garde of the revolutionary class, is the only legitimate judge of what the correct tactics of the

(31) Antoinette Marchand, discussion in Pour un Urbanisme, 217-218. Dominique Cordesse, 'L'Etat et les Collectivites Locales', ibid., 185-186.

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revolutionary movement are at any given moment. 'Correct tactics', of course, include alliance policy. While Communists individually have entered movements not led by the Party, and while the PCF has collaborated with other parties and movements, such alliances remain
in principle subject to the Party's estimation of their tactical useful-ness and thus of its ability to control them. Hence the trauma of the period since 1972, when an alliance into which the PCF was forced by the political context escaped its control and established its own dynamic.
Hence too the PCF's circumspect adoption of urban protests. SMC
theory left the working class's primary revolutionary role substantially intact. A Castellsian theory of urban struggle left workers as merely one group of underprivileged people fighting battles over collective consumption. If such struggles might be a temporary asset in the period of the Union of the People of France, the PCF made it clear that they were not central to its strategy, and did its best to control its own involvement. Thus while the Communists' official statements on urban movements are (like any other official statements) placed in the overall context of Party policy, general discussions of strategy seldom give much emphasis to such movements. They did not, for example, appear in
the articles on the foundations of PCF policy that took up the whole of the December 1969 issue of the Cahiers du Communisme. The last major speech at a Party Congress to be devoted to local questions was given by Jacques Duclos at the- 14th Congress in 1956: since then they have been
the subject of one or two interventions by delegates, but no more.
The PCF's interest in urban questions, which reached a well-publicised zenith at the Grenoble colloquium in April 1974, was thus tactical and vulnerable to changes in the Party's national strategy. There is no

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sense in which the 'French school' determined PCF policy to any significant extent (PCF policy is not decided by Marxist intellectuals), despite the appearance of some of its arguments in the official discourse in the 1972-77 period. There is little evidence that it had a significant influence on the way Communist local e*lus approach their job. And after 1977, both the output of the 'French school' and its links with the PCF declined dramatically. Of the PCF's urban sociologists, at least one (Francois Ascher) has left the Party, while another (Topalov) joined the dissident Union dans les Luttes movement in 1980, and a third (Lojkine) has stopped working on urban questions. The kind of anti-immigrant 'urban protest' undertaken in two Paris suburbs during the 1981 election campaign obviously had far more to do with the Party's estimation of its interests at a given moment than with any intellectual breakthrough on

(32) the urban question . It is fundamentally in this light that the

official discourse, as it appears in the Cahiers, should be considered.

II.E: Local Government: The PCF Approach and its Evolution

Jerome Milch starts his essay on the PCF and local government with
a comparison between the Party line of 1925 and that of 1971. In 1925, the 'municipal system of bourgeois democracy' is described as 'a trickery which is ten times more odious than the parliamentary system'. The 1971 article (by Georges Valbon, in the Cahiers du Communisme) claims that
'the sector concerning the life of the communes ... can be a field of the most democratic experiences, despite the constraints imposed by the

(33) State' . Despite the dramatic contrast, there has also been a measure

(32) Cf. Goldey and Knapp, 'Time for a Change: The Presidency', 17.
(33) Jerome Milch, 'The PCF and Local Government', in Blackmer and Tarrow, Communism in Italy and France, 340.

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of continuity between the early period and the Fifth Republic. The Communists of the 1920s found substantial advantages in occupying the local offices for which they expressed such contempt; the Valbon article falls far short of any assertion of the possibility of 'municipal socialism1. The Janus-like character of local institutions - as part
of the State apparatus, but useful in many ways for the workers 1 movement - has been, albeit with changes of emphasis, a constant of the PCF approach. The integration of French traditions with Bolshevik revolutionary
rhetoric after the Popular Front period made it easier for the PCF to present its municipal role as part of its national strategy. In 1935 Thorez went so far as to describe the acquisition of a municipality by
the PCF as an element in the class struggle that allowed workers to pursue their own class policies at local level. In the 1940s and 1950s, Andre" Marty, Jacques Duclos and Waldeck L'Huillier (depute"-maire of the Paris suburb of Gennevilliers, and the PCF's chief local government spokesman
of the post-war generation) all emphasised both the contributions Communist municipalities could make to workers' needs and to the Party's struggle, and the dangers of municipal 'opportunism'. Articles written under the Fifth Republic have tended to argue that the communes' freedom has been more and more circumscribed by the institutional and financial constraints imposed by the State - but that this very assault from central government is a proof of the communes' importance as centres of democratic resistance. Perhaps the most thorough expose of the Janus face was made' by Andre* Beckouche in November 1976. He pointed out that the various welfare functions of the communes represent a contribution to the 'reproduction of the workforce', while their financing of infrastructure and industrial zones directly assists capital accumulation. They thus help to perpetuate the existing system of social relations, but they may attack this system

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and question the role assigned to them, for despite their integration into the State apparatus they retain a measure of autonomy - and until 1982 were the only Fifth Republic assemblies to choose their own executive. Beckouche also argues that the contradiction between capitalism's need to plan, control, and thus ultimately socialise, the production process, and the continuing private appropriation of the means of production, appears more clearly in the communes than at any other
(34) level of the State v .
While this ambiguity has appeared throughout the PCF literature over decades, the importance of the evolution noted by Milch should not be minimised. The changes of approach caused by 1958 were at least as great as those caused by the Popular Front. The PCF's more consensual line under the Fifth Republic results from the transformation both of Party strategy and of French society. They were justified by SMC theory, which permeates the official Communist analysis of local government as it does of most other policy areas. This analysis, while useful for an understanding of the Fifth Republic line, does not go far to illustrate how the Party expects its £lus to act in every circumstance. We shall therefore supplement the more theoretical articles of the Cahiers with references both to the Party literature for local £lus, and to Communist practice at local level. The discussion will centre on three major themes

(34) Thorez, qhoted in Henri Chauveau, T Le Role de Plus en Plus Important des Municipalites', Cahiers du Communisme (hereafter CC), Feb. 1965,
12. Andre" Marty, 'Les Elus Municipaux dans la Grande Bataille pour
le Pain et al Liberte', CC, December 1947, 1245-1268. Jacques
Duclos, 'Les Municipalites au Service des Masses', speech at PCF 14th Congress, CC, July-August 1956, 69-107. Waldeck L'Huillier, 'Le
Parti et le Travail Municipal 1, CC, Jan. 1953, 56. Camille Vallin, 'Liberty's Communales, Besoins Sociaux', CC, Nov. 1964, 39. Central Committee Resolution, Drancy, May 1970, C£, June 1970, 119. Marcel Trigon, 'Monopoles, Collectivite's Locales, et Luttes Populaires', CC, March 1974, 34-35 and 42-43. Andre* Beckouche, 'Vers une Commune De*mocratique' , CC, Nov. 1976, 31-40.

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of the Communist approach - how the PCF relates local to national policy, how it expects its elus to behave towards the State, and how it expects local office to reinforce its image as a 'Party of Government'.

II.E.I: National Strategy and Local Tactics

Strictly speaking, the PCF's national strategy permeates every aspect
of its approach to local government. What interests us here is the explicit link made by Communist commentators between local and national
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objectives. Such a link has been drawn throughout the PCF's history,
for mere 'apolitical administration' has never been a Communist slogan.
It has always been particularly strong during municipal election campaigns - in 1947, 1953, 1959, 1965, 1971, 1977 and 1983. The PCF has always tried to maintain the maximum possible presence in local, as in national, elections, and nearly half the articles on local government that have appeared since 1945 in the Cahiers are bunched into election years. National themes have been stressed throughout: but the themes have changed, and the new ones are better related to local questions than the old.
In 1953, indeed, international objectives were as important as
national ones. Etienne Fajon laid down two main aims for the campaign. One was to attack both the central government and the SFIO leadership's division of the working-class opposition. The other was to publicise the thoughts of Stalin and to '-deal a blow to the enemy|s preparations for war, reaction and misery'. Leo Figueres and Henri Chaveau stressed that the 1965 elections would be an opinion poll on the Gaullist regime, and related the communes' financial difficulties to the cost of the force
de frappe. The 'Contrat Communal' drawn up by the Central Committee in 1970 told the voters that in supporting the PCF
'vous ne vous prononcerez pas seulement pour une gestion
municipale qui r£pondra a vos inte"r<§ts; vous vous

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prononcerez en m<§me temps pour 1 T union de 1? immense
majorit^ de la population'.

Similarly, Jacques le Dauphin wrote of the 1976 'Nouveau Contrat

Communal 1

'Dans cet esprit, cette union de combat a laquelle
nous oeuvrons au plan national, "L 1 Union du Peuple
de France", le Contrat Communal la prefigure au plan
local'(35 >.

The difference is that while in 1953 Fajon chose precisely the issues

that most distinguished the PCF from all other parties - foreign policy

and personal loyalty to the memory of Stalin - those that appeared in

the Contrats Communaux were consistent with the consensual rhetoric of

French local politics and with the PCF's national goals. This difference

was also reflected in instructions on the selection of Party candidates.

Fajon in 1953 was chiefly concerned that the PCF should run plenty of

workers with solid Party records though he did mention the need for an

age balance and for knowledge of local government. Articles preceding

Fifth Republic elections have given more emphasis to the need for a

balanced ticket - more recent Party members, more young people, more

women, and even, in 1976, 'Homines et femmes devoue's et connus' , a phrase
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that the Gaullists could have used

The chief national goal to which the Fifth Republic articles on

(35) Etienne Fajon, 'Pour la Victoire aux Elections Municipales', CC, March 1953, 375-6, 386. L£o Figueres, 'Une Politique Claire eT
Loyale 1, CC, March 1965, 6. Contrat Communal Propose' par le PCF pour
une Gestion Sociale, Moderne et De"mocratiquc, CC, Nov. 1970, 31.
Jacques le Dauphin, 'Contrat Communal: Demarche et Contenu De"mo-cratique', CC, Sept. 1976, 43.

(36) Fajon, 'Pour la Victoire', 380 ff. Central Committee resolutions: CC, Nov. 1964, 153-155, and June 1970, 116-117. Gaston Plissonier, 'L'Aspiration au Changement, les Luttes et la Preparation des
Elections Municipales', CC, Nov. 1976, 11.

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municipal elections referred was that of the alliance with the Socialists. Calls for union had been made before 1958, but they had always referred to 'union at the base' - which was the PCF's way of referring to an attempt to turn Socialist activists against their leadership. (It is hard to interpret Andre Marty's use of the slogan in December 1947 other-wise, given the relations between the two parties at the time, despite the Cahiers editorial of May 1953 which complained that 'plumer les socialistes' was a bourgeois falsification of the PCF's aims). Fajon's direction to PCF federations to constitute Communist-led lists in all communes where they were strong enough to do so illustrates the Communists' conception of who should be in charge of any local alliances. Despite a growing number of dissident Socialists (especially after the 1956 Mollet government), 'union at the base' achieved rather meagre results - united

(37) PCF-Socialist lists in just fifty communes in 1959

The difference between 1959 and 1965 is the difference between more
or less ritual calls for 'union at the base' and a serious attempt to
get 'union at the summit' as well. The intervening years saw a growing number of contacts with the non-Communist Left at municipal level. In
1961, L'Huillier joined Mitterrand and a number of Socialists and Radicals at a Journe'e d'Etude sur I'Autonomie Municipale. In 1963 Jack Ralite (Health Minister from 1981 to 1983) managed to co-opt some local
Socialists onto municipal committees in the Parisian suburb of Aubervilliers, where he was adjoint. In 1964 came the call for a national left-wing
pact for the municipal elections of the following year. Since then, the

(37) 'Les Elections Municipales et la Lutte pour le Front Unique',
unsigned editorial, CC, May 1953, 563-571. Marty, 'Les Elus', 1265.
L'Annde Politique, Economique, Sociale et Diplomatique en France,
1959 (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), 29-36.

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Communists have consistently seen municipal office generally, and elections in particular, as opportunities to reinforce the Union of the Left and
the PCF within it (38).
Many statements along these lines are of a general order. Gaston Plissonier, for example, stressed in November 1976 that 'La bataille des municipales impulsera le combat ge'ne'ral de 1'unite* et fera grandir 1'aspiration au changement'. Where they are more specific, the Communists' views on the national potential of local alliances are revealing. One possible argument, that the daily co-operation involved in running a city provides the best possible proof of the ability of left-wing parties to govern together nationally, is conspicuous by its absence from the Cahiers. The Socialists are seen primarily as unwilling partners who must be bound to the alliance if they are not to relapse into their bad old social-democratic ways. It follows that any alternative alliance policies - and any alternative allies - are vigorously criticised and that the prospect of the PS doing better locally than the PCF is viewed with some alarm.
This was particularly clear in the 1965 campaign. Like most SFIO
mayors, Gaston Defferre relied on a Third-Force coalition to run Marseille. His attempt, as a presidential candidate, to reproduce this coalition nationally provoked fierce opposition from the Communists. In declaring the PCF's determination to prevent the formation of any opposition alliance from which it was excluded, Andre Vieuget explicitly linked the municipal contest with the Stop-Defferre campaign. Defferre survived as mayor by relying on conservative support to surmount Communist and Gaullist

(38) Maurice Bourjol, 'Le District de la Region de Paris', C£, Feb. 1962,
145. Jack Ralite, 'Le Mandat Municipal, Atout De"mocratique' , CC,
Oct. 1963, 89.

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(39) opposition; but that scuttled his presidential candidacy

If the national stakes for the PCF were less obvious in 1971 and
1977, the pressure on the Socialists was kept up. Even at the 22nd Congress, which more than any other tried to affirm the PCF's commitment to the Union of the Left and to the 'French Road to Socialism 1, Marcel Trigon said that Socialist mayors 'often run the crisis to the detriment of popular interests' and that 'democratic life' in Socialist-run cities was 'generally non-existent' . Andre" Lajoinie considered that the national pact for the 1977 elections had been achieved because the PCF had 'brought the debate before the masses'. Just after the 1977 result - and thus just before the break-up of the Union - Maxime Gremetz ominously remarked that a condition for the Left's progress was the equality of both parties' gains
The PCF thus remained acutely suspicious of the PS at local as at national level. And it proclaimed its open opposition to two other potential partners in a broad left-wing alliance, the GAMs and the PSU, especially in 1971 (though less so in 1977 and 1983). There were two main reasons for this. Like the Third Force, they constituted alternative allies for the Socialists; and their emphasis on the possibility of resolving local questions locally was anathema to the Communists' constant

(39) Gaston Plissonier, 'L'Aspiration au Changement, les Luttes, et la Preparation des Elections Municipales', CC, Nov. 1976, 11. Andre*
Vieuget, 'Communistes-Socialistes: Vers de Nouveaux Progr&s de
1'Unite*', CC, Dec. 1964, 13-20. P.M. Williams, 'Party, Presidency
and Parish Pump.: the 1965 Municipal Elections', in French Politicians
and Elections, 1951-1969 (Cambridge UP, 1970), 183-184^
(40) Marcel Trigon, 'L'Action Municipale et la Lutte De*mocratique' , intervention at the 22nd Congress of the PCF, CC, Feb-March 1976,
338-340. ~

(41) Andre* Lajoinie, 'Les Garants d'Union pour un Veritable Changement', CC, March 1977, 4-9. Maxime Gremetz, 'Elections Municipales:
Prolonger la Volontd du Changement', CC, April 1977, 6-11.

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linkage of f the municipal battle 1 with national goals. The imprecations of Marcel Rosette, mayor of Vitry, senator for Val-de-Marne (Marchais 1 departement) and L'Huillier's successor as the chief PCF spokesman on local government questions, are typical. On the GAMs,

'leur refus d f un choix politique clair les conduit a
rechercher des solutions techniques et pedagogiques,
creant la confusion et dans la determination des causes
reels des difficultes des communes et dans la
definition des solutions veritablement democratiques'.

The PSU, as the major small party to have supported the students in 1968, received the full contempt of the PCF for any group tainted with gauchi sme'

'Apres le "pouvoir etudiant", c'est aujourd'hui
le "pouvoir municipal", contestant une fois encore
le role des partis democratiques et jetant la
confusion reformiste sur le role des municipalites
atijourd'hui' v.^2) t

The difference between the PSU's claim that municipalities were 'centres de la lutte reVolutionnaire' (which Rosette ridiculed) and that of a Cahiers contributor two months earlier that they were Jpoints d'appui de la lutte re*volutionnaire? is more than academic; for the Communists

(43) subordinated local to national strategy in a way that the PSU did not This subordination of local to national goals was clear and
unambiguous in the Cahiers: the local policies of the non-Communist left were judged on the basis of their contribution to the national Union of the Left. On the ground things were much more complex. The PCF's two main municipal objectives - gaining entry into more Town Halls and binding the Socialists to the national Union - depended on getting elected,

(42) Marcel Rosette, 'Pourquoi un Contrat Communal? 1, CC, Jan. 1971,
22-23.

(43) ibid., 23: Pierre Sotura, 'Municipales: L'Activite" Communiste 3. 1'Entreprise, Pourquoi? 1, CC, Nov. 1970, 39.

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with whatever Socialist allies were to hand in each municipality. On occasion this involved the intervention of national leaders to enforce 'opportunist' alignments on recalcitrant local candidates. In 1971 it
took a visit from Leroy and Duclos to persuade the PCF's Toulouse federation to support the ageing conservative SFIO mayor Bazerque - against a resolute opposition from both PSU and CIR which ultimately led

(44) to his downfall . Lacorne's study of the negotiations that led to

United Left lists for 1977 in Picardy and Languedoc shows that a multitude of local factors came into play in deciding the composition of the lists and that at times the PCF found strange bedfellows. The local factors which modified the national agreement to share out places on lists according to the parties' average electoral strengths since 1972 in each commune, included favours done by one or other party in the past, the presence of a Communist or Socialist notable, and the degree of unity in the PS. The strange bedfellows included 'des personnalite's
apolitiques d'un apolitisme incontestable' (a turn of phrase more commonly used by the Right) on the PCF list in Beziers, among them an international rugby player previously known for his anti-Communist views. The Socialist-led list in Montpellier fielded a former OAS member and a former UDR departmental secretary. The narrow victory of the Left in both cities probably owed something to the two main parties' ability to broaden

(45) their appeal by co-opting such candidates

Such practices should not be regarded as local 'irrationalities'.
They were flesh on the bones of general directives that could not be precisely satisfied in every case, the compromises necessary to achieve

(44) Le Monde, 18 March 1971.
(45) Denis Lacorne, Les Notables Rouges (Paris, Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, 1980), 153-179, 187-190.

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a major national objective. Local unity did not necessarily imply a meeting of minds between PCF and PS candidates. We have seen that the Cahiers counselled extreme vigilance towards the PS throughout the period of the Union of the Left. The mutual mistrust shown by Lacorne's sample of left-wing local elus (admittedly in areas where the two parties have traditionally been at daggers drawn) indicates that in some localities
at least vigilance did not need to be encouraged by national directives This combination of profound suspicion of the non-Communist left
with great tactical flexibility in executing the national objective of union, might lead us to consider that local alliances would break as soon as the national policy had changed. Officially, and generally in practice, this did not happen. The Party line on this point in 1978 was clear:
'Les elus communistes n'entendent pas transferer au
plan local les divergences serieuses existant au niveau
national. Nous respecterons les accords de 1977 et
continuerons a lutter pour appliquer le programme
municipal 1 ^''.

It is true that the second sentence supplies a potential justification
for splitting a left-wing council. Given the economic climate after 1977, few local programmes were likely to be applied to the letter. Marchais told the first ANECR congress in November 1979 that PS elus were not keeping their promises and that the Communists' first commitment should
be to their programme rather than to their allies . But open municipal splits, as opposed to tensions, remained the exception from 1978 to 1981. If local politics could contribute substantially to the construction of the Union of the Left, it was less easy to use in the context of the new

(46) Ibid., 108-109.
(47) L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, Dec. 1979, 13.
(48) Ibid., 13-14, 23-24.

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sectarian strategy. This helps to explain why municipal matters practically disappeared from the Cahiers during this period. Insofar as the PCF had
a municipal strategy at all, it was one of testing its local strength as compared with that of the PS, with the 1983 elections in mind. But there is no evidence that this was done systematically.
To have set about splitting some 700 councils down the middle would
have cast the PCF too openly as an aggressor, and provoked the incomprehension and hostility of Communist electors - as well as some glus. For the left to go into the 1983 elections (under the old electoral law) on separate lists would have spelt disaster for the PCF in most cities - a massive loss of office, and with it of opportunities for patronage and for contact with the electorate. At the same time the combination of national vituperation and local unity would have been increasingly difficult to sustain in a year when local and national elections were due to coincide. Mitterrand's victory, the renaissance of the Union of the Left, and the revision of the municipal electoral law (to allow a dose of PR and the merging of lists between ballots), saved the PCF from some agonising choices for 1983.

II.E.2; Administrators against the State

Throughout the PCF's exclusion from government between 1947 and
1981, the Cahiers predictably described the relationship between Communist local elus and the central State as one of fierce struggle. What has changed is the analysis of the reasons for this struggle. Earlier articles claim that the State is attacking local interests and liberties, but interpret this attack in terms of general statements about an authoritarian tradition going back to Louis XIV, or the 'fascisation 1 of powers wielded by prefects and field services, or the Americans' influence

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(49) in the government . Under the Fifth Republic the PCF's treatment of

central-local relations, like so much else, has been permeated by SMC theory. The 'attack on communal liberties' is interpreted as a result
of the State's attempts to reduce collective consumption to a minimum;
to give direct financial aid to the monopolies; to provide opportunities for monopoly profits; and to transfer the unpopularity caused by its anti-social policies onto the communes.
The PCF was not alone in drawing attention to the financial
difficulties of the communes: indeed, as late as December 1978, the Communists in the Association des Maires de France voted with the right-wing majority for a resolution deploring this crisis . Like right-wing mayors, the Communists have protested against the transfer of financial responsibilities to the communes (the transferts des charges), against the VAT levied on municipal expenditure, and against the inflexibility
of the local tax system and the falling real value of subsidies. But Communist spokesmen, from Duclos to Rosette, consistently see these as
part of a deliberate policy of compressing collective consumption, forcing the communes to 'run the crisis', and using taxpayers' money to subsidise the monopolies. This, they argue, applies as much to other local institutions (especially the Offices Publics d'Habitations a Loyer Modere, or HLM offices) as to the communes themselves

(49) Waldeck L'Huillier, 'Le Parti et le Travail Municipal', CC_, Jan. 1953, 53-54. "L'Offensive Gaullists centre les Libertes Communales et Departementales', CC, April 1963, 117-119.
(50) L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, Dec. 1978, 13.
(51) Jacques Duclos, 'Les Municipalites Communistes au Service des Populations', CC, Sept. 1965, 99. Marcel Rosette, 'Une Gestion
Municipale au Service des Travailleurs', CC, July-August 1972, 35-36. Edmond Pr&teceille, 'L'Urbanisation Capitaliste: Theorie et Politique 1,
CC, March 1975, 61.

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Similarly, Marcel Trigon sees the communes' obligation to place their 'disponibilites' (chiefly money raised for building projects but not yet spent) with the central treasury at zero interest as a means of subsidising monopoly profits with municipal funds. He also argues that one function of the State's field services is to favour those municipal schemes that

(52) most directly contribute to such profits

For the Communist authors, the communes have provided the State with
a useful financial scapegoat. The central government in the 1960s
managed to avoid the financial crisis made inevitable by the contradictions

(53) of SMC by 'decentralising the deficit . This, however, was only a

prelude to a further objective, the reform of local government. For the monopolist State, such reform has become necessary for two main reasons. Firstly, the communes have come to control a steadily greater proportion of the national income, which the State wishes to put to work for the monopolies. Secondly, while under the Third and Fourth Republic municipalities were run by petty-bourgeois elites whose interests did not fundamentally conflict with those of the ruling class, the advent of SMC and thus the concentration of State power in the hands of a monopolist 'fraction of a class' have transformed them into 'centres of democratic

- . ,(54) opposition

It is in this light that the Communists analyse the institutional

(52) Marcel Trigon, 'Monopoles, Collectivity's Locales, et Luttes Politiques', CC, March 1974, 37, 40-41.
(53) Camille Vallin, 'La Lutte pour les Liberty's Comraunales', CC, Jan. 1967, 40.
(54) L'Huillier, 'L'Offensive Gaulliste', 117-119, 122-123. Trigon, 'Monopoles', 35-36. Marcel Rosette and Jean Lojkine, 'Democratic et Urbanisme: R61e de 1'Etat et des Collectivites Locales, 1'Inter-
vention des Masses: Introduction', Nouvelie C r iti que, 'Pour un Urbanisme', 173.

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changes in central-local relations since 1958. The 1964 reform has
made the prefects into 'veritable proconsuls' bent on the subordination
of communal policies to State priorities. Supra-communal institutions from SIVOMs to Urban Communities are devices to transfer local decisions
to indirectly-elected (and thus more easily manipulated) assemblies.
The Marcellin Act is an 'authoritarian' attempt to break local opposition to the harnessing of municipal expenditure to monopoly profits by regrouping the communes. DATAR and the regions have usurped the powers of the departements, diverted the communes from the struggle with the State by obliging them to compete for funds, and accentuated regional imbalances by accelerating the concentration of capital. The 'joint elaboration' procedures set up by the LOF are designed to give the illusion of local participation while manoeuvring the communes into accepting monopolist development priorities. City planning agencies
'are used to "put through" directives from above, while obliging local authorities to foot most of the bill for planning studies'
There are plenty of objections to these arguments. The PCF tends
to see authoritarian dictats where other observers see hesitant tinkerings (it would argue that any hesitancy, for example in regrouping communes,
is entirely due to the solidity of the 'democratic' opposition). Some institutions, like SIVOMs and Districts, were anathematised on their

(55) Trigon, 'L'Action Municipale' (22nd Congress intervention), 339. Bourjol, 'Le District', 127. Vallin, 'Libertes Communales, Besoins Sociaux', 49. Camille Vallin, 'La Loi Marcellin: Realites et Perspectives Communales', CC, Nov. 1971, 57-58. Camille Vallin,
'La Regionalisation, les Libertes des Collectivites Locales et les Communistes', CC, Feb. 1969, 37-48. L'Huillier, 'L'Offensive Gaulliste', 125ff. Michel Gresillon and Jacques Scheibling, 'Le PCF et la Question Regionale', CC, October 1975, 28-35. Marcel Rosette, La Gestion Communale dans 1'Action (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1977: hereafter referred to as GCA), 134.

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appearance but rehabilitated ten years later, when they had ceased to be new and controversial and when the Communists had learned to work them to their own advantage . Other criticisms - for example, that local administrative reform without local fiscal reform will not solve the communes' financial crisis - are more valid . The point, however, lies less in specific arguments as in the generally manichean tone of the Communist interpretation, and in the presentation of the communes as the innocent and democratic victims of a predatory and autocratic State,
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'islands of democracy in a sea of authoritarianism . Two consequences follow. Firstly, there is no question of loyal partnership with the State since 'the realisation of each project requires a class battle against

(59) government policy' . Secondly, any local solutions can only be

partial: to imagine otherwise amounts to 'municipal cretinism'. Thus every struggle on a municipal question was, until 1981, merely part of
a wider battle to overthrow the central government:

'Mettre a vue la situation dans laquelle le
gouvernement maintient les finances communales,
c'est un moyen efficace de faire eclater la
politique de classe du regime actuel'^ '.

To fight the government, Communist elus must rely on popular support.
As Rosette graphically puts it,
'Like Anteus, the giant of antiquity, who could

(56) Bourjol, 'Le District', 126-149. Vallin, 'La Lutte', 40. Vallin, 'La Loi Marcellin', 57-68. Rosette, 'Une Gestion' (CC, July-August 1972), 35.
(57) L'Huillier, 'L'Offensive', 124-125. Vallin, 'La Loi Marcellin', 62
(58) Rosette, GCA, 66.
(59) Central Committee resolution, CC, June 1970, 124.
(60) Rosette, 'Pourquoi?', 24. Preteceille, 'L'Urbanisation', 62.

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only restore his strength through contact with his mother Earth, the Communist elu will never be able
to surmount the constraints of the central govern-
ment unless he relies permanently on the support of the people'(61).

Rosette and other PCF spokesmen have defined the relationship between Party elus and the electorate as a triad - information, consultation, action. The first involves not only the normal French practice of distributing a bulletin describing the activities of the municipality, but also its use to denounce the central government's responsibility for local difficulties. Similarly, 'consultation' should encourage the expression of local needs and thus lead to 'the constitution of multiple
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points of struggle, defined and directed by local people'
Using these bases of popular support, the Communist mayor can proceed
to 'action' on certain key issues. The typical forms that 'action' may take include demonstrations in front of the Prefecture, petitions, special council meetings at trouble spots, or occupations of buildings (wrecking an immigrant hostel at Vitry was a rather exceptional form of 'action'). For the Communists, such activities fulfil three main roles.
Firstly, they are a substitute for the Communists' inability (till
1981) to use the 'parallel network' of decision-making (cf. II, p.60) to facilitate the bending of rules or the allocation of subsidies. Jean Lecanuet, as mayor of Rouen and leader of one party in the Giscardian coalition, could get an uncooperative prefect (named by Chirac) moved elsewhere by telephoning his Giscardian successor as Minister of the Interior. For Communist elus, who are denied such openings, 'action' is a means to improve their bargaining position with the State authorities

(61) Rosette, GCA, 64.
(62) Rosette, speech to ANECR, L'Elu d'Auhourd'hui, Dec. 1979, 11

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and thus to 'unblock* subsidies. Secondly, 'action' can affect government policy. The Communists ascribe the failure of the Marcellin Act and the reimbursement of VAT paid by municipalities to campaigns in which Communist elus played a prominent role. Thirdly, while this kind of 'Action' cannot lead directly to a national left-wing victory, it may convince people of its necessity by showing the limitations of local solutions:

'associer, malgre les obstables, la population a la
gestion des affaires communales, conduit a 1'organisation
des luttes, sur des revendications precises, centre
les consequences de la politique reactionnaire du
Pouvoir: mais c'est, en meme temps, contribuer a faire
prendre conscience aux masses de la malfaisance de
1'Etat et du regime'(63).

This is as close as the PCF gets to Castells' estimate of the
potential of 'urban struggles' for the overthrow of capitalism. It is true that Communist spokesmen on local affairs have become less exclusive in their emphasis on the working class as protagonists in the municipal context, referring to 'les elus et la population' more often than to 'les elus et les travailleurs'. But Rosette is quite clear that

'Une gestion democratique implique un effort prioritaire en direction de la classe ouvriere parce qu'elle est la plus nombreuse, la plus exploitee, parce qu'elle devra prendre toute sa
place dans la direction des affaires du pays'

and that it is up to other classes, whose interests converge with those of the workers, to rally to their side . That was the line in the 'liberal' era of the Union of the Left, and in 1979, Marchais told elus assembled
at the ANECR congress to link all municipal struggles with those of local

(63) Ibid., 31-32. Rosette, GCA, 66, 82-83: 'Pourquoi?', 26
(64) Rosette, GCA, 84.

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factory workers . 'Information, Consultation and Action' are thus
forms of political attack on the State which may help to solidify support around the PCF but which were secondary to the main class struggle even
in the PCF's 'softest 1 period.
As techniques of municipal politics, they are, up to a point, normal
French practice. Gremion and Worms have noted that in their negotiations with State officials, local elus typically try to rally a consensus
behind them and to use this consensus to suggest possible civil disturbance if their requests are not met. Their responsibility for public order may make prefects very sensitive to such threats . There are, however, differences between the Gremion-Worms model and the Communist policy.
PCF elus do resort to 'action', rather than to the threat of it, more readily than non-Communists. They do politicise it more: a struggle that fails to achieve its declared objective may nonetheless be deemed to have succeeded if it fulfils a consciousness-raising role and attracts sympathisers to the PCF. Finally, while Gremion and Worms argue that most mayors not only use their local representativity to improve their bargaining position with State officials, but also manipulate contacts within the State apparatus, the Communists exclude any reference to the 'parallel network'. Indeed, the insistence of the official PCF press that the only card in a Communist mayor's hand in dealing with the State is the support of the population leaves us in some doubt about how PCF elus really run their day-to-day relationship with central government officials.

(65) L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui , December 1979, 23.
(66) Pierre Gremion and Jean-Pierre Worms, 'L'Etat et les Collectivites Locales', Esprit, Jan. 1970.

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Empirical evidence on such a question is not always easy to find, as both sides tend to draw a veil over the subject. What sources there are, however, suggest that while Communist mayors do regard 'action 1 as necessary at times, their relationship with State officials is far more complex than the confrontational rhetoric of the Cahiers would imply. This is as we would expect. French Communist mayors tend to see their job as offering a chance, despite the obstacles, to implement projects that will be useful for the public. While at crucial moments such projects may be helped along by 'struggle', they also depend on a day-to-day contact in which confrontation is formalised, and weak points within the administration exploited
Two books written by Communist mayors of Paris suburbs, Fernand
Dupuy in Choisy-le-Roi and Henry Canacos in Sarcelles, tend to confirm
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this . Both mayors stress the importance of 'action': Canacos, for example, claims to have stopped an eviction by personally occupying the flat in question. They also, however, emphasise the need for technical competence in facing the administration, as well as the Party's capacity to assist elus in this respect. Canacos, indeed, claims that his command of his dossiers dumbfounded well-educated civil servants, and this his persuasive powers in arguing for a rescheduling of the municipal debt (left by his predecessors) so impressed the sub-prefect that 'he became almost an ally and did everything to ensure that th° matter was properly settled'. On the other hand, he is prepared to give the credit for

(67) Sidney Tarrow, 'Local Activists in Public Office', in Blackmer and Tarrow, Communism, 164-167.
(68) Fernand Dupuy, Etre Maire Communiste (Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1975). Henry Canacos, Sarcelles, ou le Beton Apprivoise (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1979).

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conceiving the Sarcelles bus service to an Ingenieur d e s Fonts et Chau s s ees, the local representative of the Paris transport authority .
Equally, Communist municipalities were happy (until 1980) to accommodate immigrants, both for reasons of international solidarity and because the CGT was quick to mobilise them on the shop floor. This was doing a favour to the prefects, since right-wing mayors generally
rejected suggestions for the construction of immigrant hostels on their communal territory.
There is thus evidence of partnership as well as confrontation. Moreover, there are indications that Communist elus are not entirely excluded from the 'parallel network', and that they are ready to exploit weaknesses in the bureaucracy where they appear. Dupuy hints that the administration is not without its Communist sympathisers, and Canacos cites the top civil servant Michel Bloch-Laine as a referee for his municipal achievements. Jerome Milch also notes that while the mayor of Nimes had fewer friends in Paris than his non-Communist counterparts,
he made regular trips there (even before becoming a deputy) and that his office ensured him an audience. Canacos' description of his relations with the SCIC (Societe Centrale Immobiliere de la Caisse des Depots, the CDC's property development subsidiary, which built most of Sarcelles) shows that he was able to exploit its weak point, the fact that it had suffered from the abysmal consumer image of Sarcelles, to win a number of concessions on the provision of social facilities. Again, Milch's findings confirm this: the municipality used the threat of publicising secret communications from the Prefecture as a bargaining counter. Milch

(69) Dupuy, Etre Maire, 71. Canacos, Sarcelles, 132, 140, 200, 213, 244-246.

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adds that the Communists' PSU partners were dissatisfied with the limited scope of mass mobilisation campaigns compared with such negotiating tactics . Privately, Communist mayors and councillors claim that their competence and mass support compel approval by the authorities for their projects; that relations are correct, but depend on the balance of power. As Dupuy said in an interview,
'La lutte revolutionnaire, ce n'est pas seulement Octobre, le Grand Soir et les defiles lyriques.
Jour apres jour, a Choisy, je cherche a montrer
que le communiste est un homme qui veut ameliorer
concretement la condition des homines, et que
1'administration d'une ville, c'est avant tout un
combat centre le systems'^' ' .
The difficulty, in a non-revolutionary situation, is that Dupuy's
two aims may not coincide. In order to win or retain the support of the electorate for the 'revolutionary' party, Communist elus must show results. To get results, mass mobilisation may well help, and this is the theme that appears almost exclusively in the 'official' treatment of how Communist elus should behave towards the State bureaucracy. But Dupuy's and Canacos' books show that results also depend on working through the bureaucratic system. In other words, to win mass support for the 'revolutionary' Party, Communist elus risk losing their revolutionary credentials. This risk is exacerbated by the Communists' increasing tendency (of which the two books are a manifestation) to use local government as a showcase for the Party's technical competence and democratic commitment.

(70) Dupuy, Etre Maire, 93-94. Canacos, Sarcelles, 194-195, 242-243, Milch, 'Paris is Not France', 227-233.
(71) Dupuy, interview in Le Nouvel Observateur, 20-28 Sept. 1975, 29

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II.E.3; Municipal Socialism with a Human Face

Thus far we have emphasised certain elements of continuity in the
PCF's municipal policy. The Communists entered the municipal Union of
the Left for reasons of national strategy, and remained highly suspicious of their Socialist allies. Officially, they saw their elus as irreconcilable adversaries of the State (until 1981), and interpreted their relationship with the State in a context of class struggle. However, the evidence suggests that the relationship on the ground between PCF
elus and the administration is more subtle, and even more collaborative, than the rhetoric of the official texts suggests. Moreover, when we turn to how the PCF thinks its elus should run municipalities, even the official texts show a major discontinuity between the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Throughout its history, the PCF has used municipalities as a showcase for its policies. What is new is that it now sees them as a way to allay popular suspicions of the Party by showing its elus' 'human' qualities

(72) and administrative competence . This change can be discerned in the

Communist attitude to local institutions themselves: to local democracy
and administration; and to the relations between the Party apparatus and local elus .
The Comintern view of local institutions, to which the PCF officially subscribed in 1920, was simple. There was 'no theoretical opposition' between the local and national 'mechanisms of the bourgeoisie': all were

(73) to be 'destroyed by the revolutionary proletariat and replaced by Soviets'

The PCF now behaves very much as if this 'theoretical opposition' did

(72) Dupuy, Etre Maire, 107 (Dupuy's statement is typical, though more explicit than most).
(73) Resolution of the Comintern's 2nd Congress, quoted in Platone, 'L'Implantation du PCF', p.86.

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exist, and is very attached to the 'bourgeois' communal system. 'N'est-ce pas une chance', wrote Rosette in 1977, 'pour notre pays de disposer de 36,000 foyers de democratic?' . Part of the distance between the two positions was covered in the Popular Front period, but the increasing importance of local institutions under the Fifth Republic led the PCF
to define its position more precisely.
We have seen that the PCF has fiercely opposed governmental attempts
to reform local institutions under the Fifth Republic. At times this systematic rejection has led it into inconsistencies. It opposed PR in French towns in 1947 (when it stood to gain more from a majority system), but Rosette later claimed that the PCF had always advocated PR for all assemblies, local and national. Similarly, the Communists' initial rejection of supra-communal institutions was moderated after a few years. At the same time, to avoid giving the impression of a merely negative attitude to the Gaullists' reforms, the PCF formulated counter-propositions of its own. These include the 'democratisation' of the commune. Under the PCF scheme, the prefects (bogeymer..' of long standing) are to be abolished; PR is to be restored for elections to all local assemblies; better pay for leading councillors, and more in-service training for municipal employees, will improve the competence of local elus and reduce their dependence on ministerial technical services; and 'freely-agreed intercommunal cooperation' will be 'encouraged'. Regions and departements, as well as having assemblies elected by PR, will elect their own executives. Each level of administration will have its own tax base and its own area of competence and an overall rate support grant

(74) Rosette, GCA, 50.

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will replace the system of subsidies
Some of these policies resemble those of other left-wing advocates
of decentralisation, and passed into law in 1982. However, the Communists always insisted that their success would depend on the application of the Common Programme's measures to increase social expenditure (thus giving local authorities more money) and to reduce the working week (thus giving ordinary people more time to 'participate'). This argument was used to justify the PCF's opposition to the Giscardian scheme for a globalised investment grant to communes - although such a grant was among the Party's own propositions. For the Communist writers argue that their policy, far from being a series of isolated measures, adds up to a 'decentralised conception of sovereignty', to be opposed to the 'centralised conception'

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of the 'dominant ideology' . Given the emphasis placed by Leninist parties on seizing power at the centre, as well as the PCF's traditional image of a 'Jacobin' party, the Communists' decentralising zeal was something of a departure. There were three main reasons for it.
Firstly, the PCF was jumping onto the decentralising bandwagon. It
was rather slow to do this, as it was slow to take positions on many 'new' issues not directly related to class struggle. The commitment to

(75) Rosette, 'Pourquoi?', 22-25. Rosette, GCA, 48-62. Central Committee resolution, in CC, June 1970, 121-122. Camille Vallin, 'Les Regions,
les Collectivites Locales et les Communistes', CC, Feb. 1969, 37-48. Jean-Louis Sanchez, 'Democratic, Liberte: pour Mettre Fin a la Crise
des Collectivites Locales', CC, Feb. 1977, 30-40. Felix Damette,
'Une Necessite: La Decentralisation', CC, Sept. 1977, 16-23. Georges Valbon, 'Pour une Avancee de la Democratie Representative', CC, Jan.
1978, 36-47. Dupuy (Etre Maire, 173), argues that the mayor's mandate should be revocable at any time by a majority on the council, but
this position is not taken up by other Communist authors.
(76) Rosette, GCA, 60-61. Damette, 'Une Necessite', 23. Interview with Maryvonne Rioual, adjoint Le Havre, June 1980.

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decentralisation that the Communists began to proclaim in the early 1970s had the advantage of showing the Party's respect not only for 'communal liberties' but also for democracy and pluralism. Such a commitment was vital both to the credibility of the Union of the Left as a whole and to any hopes the PCF had of seducing PS supporters.
Secondly, if a 'Jacobin' outlook implies a commitment to the
'revolutionary' capital against the 'reactionary' provinces, it has little relevance when the Parisian reformers are conservatives and the recalcitrant provincials include 'revolutionaries'. Insofar as it has any meaning, the PCF's Jacobinism consists in a commitment to defend the 'popular gains'
of the French revolutionary tradition. The Communists have identified
with this tradition since the Popular Front, and see the 'defence of local liberties' as part of it. In addition, it is natural for a party that
has been excluded from national power for a generation to seek the rein-forcement of the local institutions where it has a strong foothold..
This brings us to our third reason, the role of decentralised local institutions under a national Left-wing government. The dismantling of the Leninist model of revolution, and especially the dropping of the dictatorship of the proletariat, faced the PCF with the question of how its 'revolution' would amount to more than a (possibly pyrrhic) parliamentary victory. The Communists' answer was that the defence of the revolution (or, initially, Advanced Democracy) against a bourgeoisie eager to return to power would depend on the thorough 'democratisation' of society at all levels. The removal of central tutelage on local authorities, PR, and the shortening of the working week and of people's journeys to work, would all allow ordinary people to participate more effectively in public affairs, and so (it was implied) rally round the government. The result of democratisation would be to give the working

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class (and thus, of course, its Party) its 'full place' in running the country. Decentralisation thus played a major part in Communist plans to safeguard their positions once in government, and it is significant that the PCF laid claim to a new Local Government Ministry, split off from the Ministry of the Interior and under its control, in the event of a Left victory in 1978. It is in this context that Rosette's statement, that right-wing municipalities would enjoy the same increased powers as any other municipalities after a Left victory, should be interpreted. Rosette adds that greater popular participation would ensure that mayors who 'reneged on their commitments' or 'neglected popular interests' would soon be voted out of office. The Communists' decentralisation proposals can thus be seen both as a declaration of pluralist credentials and as a Grarascian project for the penetration of civil society
There are similar ambiguities in the PCF's commitment to the demo-
cratic administration of municipalities under the capitalist regime. The fact that the Communists have increasingly stressed this theme, and their tendency to cast doubt on the democratic credentials of the Right and even of the Socialists, are equally significant. Rosette argues that Communist municipalities are distinguished 'above all by the high level of democracy they have achieved'. This democracy, he claims, consists in a more collective style of decision-making than is envisaged by the hegemonic role assigned to the mayor by the legal texts; a full confrontation of ideas on committees, with equal access to information for all members;
the encouragement of local associations, 'in the image of the plurality of French society', and their representation on municipal working-parties;

(77) Rosette, GCA, 60-61. Valbon, 'Pour une Avancee', Jan. 1978,
43-44.

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and the full consultation of the public on questions like the POS or the

(78) next municipal programme . The Central Committee in 1970 claimed that

Communist municipalities allowed 'Socialist and other allies to participate fully in municipal activities', while Georges Valbon pointed out that
even right-wing councillors were included on committees in the Communist

(79) bastion of Seine-St Denis . At the same time, the PCF has always
viewed the 'Public Town-Planning Workshops' sponsored by the Socialists and the GAMs with suspicion, and attacked them as an 'elitist pseudo-concertation' in 1979. Marcel Trigon denounced the lack of 'democratic life' in Socialist municipalities in 1976 (cf. p.78). And the Central Committee asserted that only the PCF and its allies can offer genuine participation since the Right invariably acts in the interests of a tiny

. (80) minority

The stress on 'participation' has elements of continuity with the
older Communist view of municipalities as a means of 'liaison with the masses'. This goes back to the 1920s, and was repeated by L'Huillier and Duclos in 1953 and 1956 . Henri Chauveau, in 1965, said that 'elaborating their future programme with the population' would create 'a lever in relation not only to local, but also to national interests'. Similarly, Rosette stresses that 'consultation' must culminate in

(78) Rosette, GCA, 76-87.
(79) Central Committee resolutions, CC, June 1970, 123. Georges Valbon, 'La Democratie dans la Commune', Feb. 1971, 32.
(80) Valbon, 'La Democratic', 26-27. Central Committee resolutions, CC, June 1970, 121. 'A propos des "Ateliers Publics d'Urbanisme 1 " ,
L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, Dec. 1979, 36-37.
(81) L'Huillier, 'Le Parti', CC, Jan. 1953, 58-59. Duclos, 'Les Municipalites', CC, July-August, 1956, 71-80.

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'showing the obstacles to the realisation of each project'
In proclaiming their attachment to democratic municipal administration, however, the Communists were also - as was the case with their reform proposals - responding to an ideology of 'participation' that was shared by other parties from the Gaullists to the PSU. In the context of the 1960s and 1970s, the PCF would have branded itself as an even.more archaic and Stalinist party had it made no reference to such new political issues. In addition, Georges Valbon argued that the Party's 'democratic orientation' was 'the image of our behaviour tomorrow, in a France where

(83) advanced democracy has triumphed, and then in a Socialist France'

More than any other party trying to attain national office by electoral means, the PCF needed to reassure wavering electors of its democratic habits and its administrative competence.
The PCF has taken a more consensual line on a number of other questions
of local administration. Firstly, the Communists have gone out of their way to present themselves as 'administrators on behalf of the whole population'. Rosette repeatedly insists that Communist elus ensure equal access to social services, to consultation processes, and to the hire of halls to everyone regardless of race, political or religious belief, or social class. It is true that he adds that priority should be given to
the needy, which means the working class: discrimination, for Rosette,
can only be positive . If the PCF continues to stress its special links with the workers, the line of the 1970s had still evolved from that of

(82) Henri Chauveau, 'Le Role de Plus en Plus Important des Municipalites', CC, Feb. 1965, 18. Rosette, GCA, 83.
(83) Valbon, 'La Democratic', 31.
(84) Rosette, GCA, 66, 72, 84.

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the 14th Congress, when Duclos defined the support of workers' struggles as the first priority of a Communist elu. The concern for impartiality
at municipal level parallels the PCF's national attempts to reassure a wide range of classes that .they had a place in the Union of the People
of France. Both would have seemed meaningless to the Communists of the

(85) 1920s . An area where the PCF is especially anxious to show its

even-handedness is that of municipal jobs, which it is often accused of reserving for Party members. Rosette claims that Communist elus assure good working conditions, security and career prospects to all employees, with no discrimination at any level. Dupuy, more pragmatically, points out that in Choisy it would be hard to find enough Party members with the
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necessary qualifications to fill all the jobs
The Communists have also become more concerned about their e"lus'
technical competence. This is not wholly new: Etienne Fajon in 1953
saw it as an essential means to counter the technical arguments of civil

(87) servants . But the Party does more to encourage such competence. Two-

thirds of Rosette's Gestion Communal dans 1'Action is devoted to technical matters, as is the bulk of both L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui and L'Information Municipale (a broad left-wing monthly in which Communists participate). Despite their mistrust of the 'joint elaboration' process, Communist elus may use it as an opportunity to wrest concessions from the prefect and

(85) Duclos, 'Les Municipalites', CC, July-August 1956, 70-79.
(86) Rosette, speech to ANECR congress, L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, December, 1979, 12. Dupuy in Le Nouvel Observateur, 20-28 Se^pTT 1975. He
also remarks that his secretaire-general (the head of the municipal bureaucracy) is not a Party member ("it is, however, frequent Communist practice to appoint a Secre taire-Gene'ral-Adjoint, a Party member, to handle politically sensitive questions).
(87) Fajon, 'Pour la Victoire 1, 381.

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the DDE, and accept the principle of long-term structure planning laid down by the LOF. Similarly, Rosette stresses the importance of a
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detailed medium-term budget forecast in big cities
On several specific urban issues, the PCF has joined a moderate
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mainstream. The municipalisation of city land, proposed by Duclos in 1965 as a solution to the housing crisis, was denounced by Topalov (writing for the Party in 1978) as both ineffective and 'an attack on the freedom to create, possess and transmit family property'. Like the PS (which also abandoned municipalisation after a brief flirtation), the Communists were anxious not to alienate small landlords, and in the 1970s proposed more orthodox measures like a municipal right of pre-emption (created by the Galley Act of 1975) and a tax on big property deals. The PCF's eager-ness to 'make the rich pay' has not blinded it to the need to assure local employment, and its fiscal (and possibly electoral) base by providing a favourable environment for business. Dupuy admits that there is a market limit (quite apart from the legal one) which he will not cross in fixing company tax levels. The Nimes municipality was proud to announce the installation of a Bahlsen biscuit factory, providing 350 jobs, on the industrial zone it had set up jointly with the Chamber of Commerce. Canacos is equally pleased to have 'one of the fastest-selling industrial zones in the Paris region', a success he admits owes something to timely prefectoral support

(88) Rene Lamps, on the Amiens SDAU, L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, Feb. 1978, 8-10. 'Montlucon: Plan de Reference, SDAU et PCS', L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui,
May, 1978, 26. Canacos, Sarcelles. Rosette, 'Une Gestion
Municipale', 37-38.
(89) Robert Hanicotte and Bernard Tipp, ! Les Parti Politiques et le Probleme Foncier Urbain', Metropolis, III, 26-27, March-April 1977,
42-48: p.42. Topalov, Se Loger, 116. Dupuy in Le Nouvei Observateur, 20-28 September 1975, '78; Une Annee au Service de la Population
Nlmoise' (municipal bulletin), 1. Canacos, Sarcelles, 235-237.

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Except for the land question, the PCF line on these issues was not
so much a moderation of earlier positions as a fairly conventional reaction to new areas of muncipal activity. On one point, however, a clear revision is observable in the texts: in relation to local elus the Party apparatus under the Fifth Republic has - at least officially - taken a back seat. The old position (exemplified by Marty in 1947) was simple. The elu was 'above all the Party's man', and the Party was 'the directing force'. It is doubtful how far this worked from day to day, but the initial response to any 'opportunism' was a stiffening of the official line. At the 14th Congress in 1956, both Duclos' speech and the final resolution complained of a 'climate of irresponsibility', and of a tendency on the part of the elus to 'substitute themselves for the Party 1, and reaffirmed that 'the Party directs the work of Communist elus, in municipalities as in other elected assemblies' . Fifteen years later, Rosette was equally insistent that 'the Party does not substitute itself for the Communist-led municipal council during the mandate'. This did not represent a complete abdication of Communist control. The Party still controls candidacies, and even in Paris suburbs that have elected the same depute-maire for decades the constitution of personal fiefs is less common than in other parties. Rosette and his colleagues also stress that the Communist elu should keep in close touch with the Party to avoid 'sinking into technical specialisation' and to get a wider perspective on

(91) his job: they add that elus 'often need advice more than criticism'

There was thus a shift from an explicitly hierarchical relationship to a

(90) Marty, 'Les Municipalites', 1267. 14th Congress resolution, CC, July-August 1956, 405. Duclos, 'Les Municipalites', in ibid., 103.
(91) Rosette, 'Pourquoi?', 27. Marcel Trigon, 'Monopoles', CC, March 1974, 44. Rosette, GCA, 73.

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more pedagogical one. This happened partly because hierarchical control was increasingly difficult to work in practice (as the complaints of the 14th Congress show). Moreover, while explicit hierarchy might be accept-able in a solidly Communist Paris suburb, for Communists on a United-Left list in a major city it would be both intolerable to their Socialist allies and an electoral gift to the Right.
These two factors - the Union of the Left and the PCF's entry into big-city politics - were of course fundamental to the new 'democratic' line. It would be impossible to fight an election in close alliance with the Socialists while retaining the old Stalinist, hegemonic pretensions - still less while proclaiming the imminent replacement of communes by Soviets of workers' deputies. The Communists were also highly sensitive to the social diversity of the municipalities they won after 1958. As one Lyon councillor wrote,

'Nous ne gerons plus la partie ouvriere d'ensembles
urbains segregratifs, abandonnant dans un mepris
hautain le centre a la bourgeoisie. Nous arrivons a
la direction d'ensembles urbains complexes a 1'image
de la societe francaise'(92).

At the same time, the proclamation of its democratic and pluralist credentials - the 'softest' aspect of the PCF's local policies under the Fifth Republic - was still formally integrated into a national strategy described as 'revolutionary'. In the Fifth Republic the PCF faces political marginalisation in the long term if it abandons a broad democratic appeal or some form of alliance strategy. However, it is also clear that in circumstances where its immediate political survival was not at stake but where its long-term working-class legitimacy was threatened, the PCF

(92) Jaques Rey, 'L'Avenir du Passe', L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, March 1978,
34.

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might be prepared to revert to its old political ghetto, as in 1978-81. The inevitable question about the change in the Communists' approach to local government - how durable is it? - may therefore also be posed in
the following terms: how important will its recently-acquired local positions be to the PCF in the light of any possible 'revolutionary 1 strategy it may choose? We shall attempt to answer this in our conclusion to this chapter.

II.F; Conclusion: A Municipalised Party?

The PCF approach to local government in the 1970s remained
profoundly ambiguous. Communist elus were encouraged to behave as 'impartial administrators working for the whole population', but to give priority to the special claims of the working class. They were to show competence and flexibility in dealing with local problems, but to use each issue as an arm in a national revolutionary struggle. They were entitled to freedom in the exercise of their office, but expected to pay attention to the 'advice' of the Party. The Party proclaimed its commit-ment to full democratic participation of all political and social groups, while casting doubt on the democratic credentials of both the Right and the non-Communist Left. To separate what is durable from what is reversible in the 'new 1 approach we must return to the core of the Party's identity and to the reasons for the changes of approach under the Fifth Republic, before considering how far the success of the new strategy has created its own dynamic.
The PCF still officially takes its role as 'revolutionary vanguard' seriously. The revolutionary role of the working class, and the unique legitimacy of the Party (organised on Leninist lines) in relation to the working class, are fundamental -to the Communists' self-image, despite

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changes in the model of how the revolution should take place. To abandon this claim to a specific legitimacy would be to become just another party of the left, competing on even more unfavourable terms with the Socialists. At the same time a party cannot win a big-city election by declaring its intention to turn the Town Hall into a local base for revolutionary class struggle. The expansion of the PCF's municipal role has put some pressure on its revolutionary self-identity, but this pressure has been resisted. Key themes like the accountability of PCF elus to the Party, their primary duty to the workers, and the integration of local administration with national strategy, have all been somewhat muted under the Fifth Republic. But they are all still there, and will remain so until the PCF undergoes more fundamental changes than any since 1920.
The Communists' identification with the French revolutionary tradition,
and its defence of the 'bourgeois' representative institutions that arose from it (including communes), are less at the core of the Party's identity, but are a durable accretion. The PCF has not fundamentally reversed this commitment since the Popular Front, and it would require an unimaginable change in the political context (and in the political horizons of most of its members), for it to repeat its calls to replace representative institutions with workers' Soviets.
There remain the new elements in the PCF approach to local government
under the Fifth Republic. These include the presentation of Communist mayors as 'city fathers', and elus generally as 'impartial' administrators, in the tradition of French local politics; the respect for interests (such as those of small landlords) that are not directly linked to those of the working class; the new emphasis on technical competence, long-term planning, and economic development; the establishment (despite the rhetoric) of a working relationships with the State authorities; the importance given to

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broad consultation; and the modification of the elus' hierarchical sub-ordination to the local Party.
These practices will last as long as the PCF seriously aspires to municipal office in major cities (rather than a few working class suburbs). Between 1965 and 1978, they also served a national strategy by showing
the PCF's fitness to govern (with the PS) on behalf of a wide spectrum
of the population. That major municipalities can serve a more sectarian line, for example by 'pursuing municipal struggles in liaison with workers in factories', as Marchais recommended in 1979, is much less evident. A durable return by the PCF to the line of 1978-81 would lead to an increasing conflict between the norms of municipal office and the Party's national strategy. The systematic breaking of local alliances with the PS would, even with the greater flexibility of the new electoral laxv, lead to far more serious municipal losses than those of 1983. The more consensual nature of recent Communist municipal policy is thus dispensable only to the extent that both the Party's recent municipal offices and the alliance strategy that won them are also dispensable.
As we have seen, local office has been the main area of Communist
success under the Fifth Republic. For the PCF, the period 1958-81 began and ended with a major electoral setback. In between, the Communists' leadership of the Left disappeared and the CGT's hegemony in the union movement was challenged, while despite the rejuvenation and expansion of the membership the solidity of Party members' commitment diminished.
Local successes were due in part to the PCF's ability to turn the ambiguity of municipal office under a capitalist regime to its advantage. Local elus could simultaneously show their responsibility, impartiality and competence and mobilise the traditional defence-of-local-interests rhetoric in the wider cause of the Union, of the People of France. The PCF could

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play the role both of 'party of government' and of 'tribune party'. But this combination of municipal success and national stagnation made the
PCF more dependent than ever before on its local positions.
Municipal office is not, of course, as vital to the PCF as it was
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to the SFIO in the 1960s, but it is still much more so than it was to the Party even ten years ago. The working class remains the repository of the bulk of Communist support as it does of the Communists' essential beliefs. But 1981 showed that to fall back on this support and on the rhetoric of class struggle was a major electoral risk. Conceivably, this may change. A wave of working class opposition to the Mitterrand government could provide the PCF with a chance to rebuild its traditional base. But the Communists would have to choose their moment to leave the government very carefully, and would still have difficulty in harnessing proletarian discontent. They would need to be very sure of their ability to do this before accepting the unenviable position of a ghetto party in the political context of the Fifth Republic. Until this happens, the PCF will be unlikely to sacrifice its credentials as a responsible occupant of local as of national office. In this respect, the political dynamic of the Fifth Republic has made of the PCF something closer to 'uii parti comme les autres' .

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Chapter III: Le Havre and its Municipality

III.At The Port and the City
III.A.1: Le Havre to 1939

Francis I founded 'Le Havre de Grace' on a pestilential swamp at
the north-west end of the Seine estuary in 1517, chiefly for strategic reasons: the silting-up of Harfleur during the previous century had left the estuary without an adequate naval port. Despite tax concessions offered by Francis and his successors, few immigrants came to transform this unhealthy spot into a city
The site remains a powerful constraint on today's city planners.
Le Havre is at the end of a peninsula; its hinterland is limited to an angle of 60 degrees defined by the estuary to the south and the coast, curving north-east towards Dieppe. Moreover, the 'Cote', the slope down from the Caux plateau to the water, has constituted a natural barrier to the city's expansion.
Le Havre's recent origins have also shaped its history. The two
pillars of the ancien reg ime, the aristocracy and the Catholic Church, were very weak from the start in this artificial town. A small Protestant community flourished until 1685 among the wealthier inhabitants; among the floating populace of artisans, sailors, fishermen, and embryonic proletarians in the shipbuilding and tobacco industries, a general indifference to religion occasionally gave way to vigorous outbursts of anti-clericalism. In the eighteenth century, Le Havre counted just two churches for some 20,000 inhabitants, and the city had no bishopric until

(1) Jean Legoy, Le Peuple du Havre et Son Histpire : Vol.1, Des Origines a 1800 (Atelier d'Impression de laTTlle du Havr~e~ 1980) , 48"

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1977. There were also repeated bread-riots in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, and 'Le Havre-Marat' enjoyed a brief existence from

1793 to 1795 (2).
Its late foundation and the constraints of its site stunted Le Havre's

initial growth: 200 years after its foundation, the city's main activity was still cod-fishing. The eighteenth century and the extension of France's colonial trade saw a more rapid expansion: the wealthier Havrais

Table III.1: Population of the Commune of Le Havre, 1790-1946

Date

1790
1815
1826
1846
1851
1852
1856
1876
1891
1901
1911
1921
1931
1936
1946

Source: SERH,

Population Observations

19,890
16,231
21,049
31,225
28,594
56,541 after annexation of Ingouville and
., , -, Graville-Leure, 1852.
64 , 1 J /
92,068
112,074
130,196
136,159
163,374 after annexation of Graville-Ste-Honorine ,
165,076 1919 *

164,083
106,884

Ville du Havre, Schema de Secteur: Tome 1, Analyses, pp.4,
18-19.

equipped ships to trade in slaves and in the crops - cotton, sugar, coffee and tobacco - that they produced. But at the eve of the Revolution, Le Havre was still a small port, consisting of the tiny BassJLn du Roi and an

(2) Ibid., 84-88, 130, 197, 208, 222.

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entrance channel; it remained economically and administratively subordinate to its well-established neighbour Rouen, one of France's largest cities only seventy navigable miles up the Seine.
This began to change after 1815 with the addition of the Bass in du Commerce and the Bassin de la Barre to Le Havre's dock area. In the second half of the nineteenth century the rail link with Paris (completed, largely by Irish navvies, in 1848) and France's first industrial revolution led to an unprecedented period of industrial, spatial and demographic expansion for Le Havre (cf. Map 1 (Le Havre street plan), Map 2, and Table III.1). The century after 1815 saw a fivefold increase in the area of Le Havre as the neighbouring communes of Ingouville and part of Graville were annexed and urbanised. The area of the port grew by nearly six times, and the

(3) population by nearly seven

There were three motors to this expansion. The first was the growth
of Le Havre's trade. Between 1825 and 1913 the tonnage passing through the docks grew 25 times, and Le Havre became the world's eighth largest port. The local mercantile bourgeoisie, many of the Protestant immigrants, made fortunes in the transatlantic passenger traffic and in the importation of raw materials - cotton (for the Rouen textile industry), dyes, tobacco, hemp, coffee, cocoa, and (towards the turn of the century) oil. Secondly, basic transformation industries processed some of these imported goods. The most notable examples were Extraits Tinctoriaux (dyes), Le Nickel (nickel from New Caledonia), Desmarais (an oil refinery, which moved to Gonfreville to become the Compagnie Francaise de Raffinage in 1936), and various food-processing plants. Thirdly, the opening of the Chantiers

(3) Ibid., Vol.11, Du Negoce a 1'Industrie, 1800-1914: Le Cadre de Vie (Ville du Havre, 1982), 184.

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Augustin-Nonnand in 1816 began the development of a modern shipbuilding industry. This came to encompass the whole range of port and shipping equipment - ropes, cables, chains, boilers, turbines, propellers, pumps, and cranes: and by the inter-war years it had broadened into associated heavy manufactures such as electrical equipment, arms, and aero-engines. Le Havre's economic diversification was, however, limited. While
a number of imported raw materials were transformed at the port of entry, many more were shipped onwards to Rouen and Paris. Much of the capital for transformation and metallurgical industries came from Paris, the local bourgeoisie sticking to trading and to shipbuilding. Perhaps
most important, Le Havre remained almost without light industry and with a small service sector. By 1886 over sixty per cent of the active population consisted of a proletariat of dockers, sailors and industrial workers v ^
In 1936 Le Havre, with the outlying communes of Sanvic, Bleville
and Ste-Adresse, had a population of over 190,000 (Tables III.1 and A.1, PP 109,404). The rich had built sumptuous villas on the sea-front, in Ste-Adresse, and along the western part of the Cote (Rue Felix Faure).
The working class settled chiefly in the former commune of Graville - first on either side of Cours de la Republique, then in the St-Nicolas (or Eure) and Gustave-Brindeau quarters: following the typical nineteenth-century pattern, workers lived close to their jobs in the port and its dockland industries to the south-east. This pattern was somewhat altered after
the introduction of the funicular railway and of electric trams in the 1890s had facilitated the climb up the Cote. Broadly speaking, Sanvic

(4) Jean-Pierre Lousse, 'Sociologie Electorale du Havre 1, These de Doctorat, Rouen 1978, 4-20.

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and Bleville filled up with mostly lower-middle-class households, while
a number of the more prosperous workers moved up to Aplemont and Frileuse, in the north-east, between the wars; between Sanvic and Frileuse, the Forest of Montgeon has suffered no further diminution since it became municipal property in 1909. Map 2 shows that Le Havre's spatial expansion gathered pace at the moment (1900) that population growth began to ease: the chief explanation is that the new 'upper town' consisted of a sprawl of unplanned low-density individual housing (cf. Map 26).
The old city had been abandoned by the well-off from the early
nineteenth century, and by 1936 constituted Le Havre's most picturesque, but also most squalid, quarters, inhabited chiefly by sailors and fisher-men. Densities in the Notre-Dame and St-Francois quarters exceeded those of the poorest areas of Paris: sanitation was almost non-existent (what drains there were tended to overflow at high tide). Appalling conditions here gave way to merely very bad ones in other working-class areas: in 1906, 53 per cent of Le Havre's dwellings were classed as unhealthy (a French record), and the levels of disease, infant mortality and alcoholism were all among the highest in the country. Jules Siegfried, Andre's father and mayor from 1878 to 1885, had every reason to found France's first Municipal Hygiene Bureau in Le Havre
Under these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that Le Havre's working class not only drank heavily but also acquired a reputation for industrial militancy. The two decades before 1914 saw nine major and

(5) Legoy, Le Pcuple du Havre, II, 108-112, 127, 132-138. Lousse, 'Sociologie Electorale', 32-36. Jean-Philippe Damais and A. Nicollet, L'Urbanisme au Havre, Elements de Differentiation de 1'Espace en
Milieu Urbain, Vol.1 (Academie de Rouen, 1968), 73-81. Andre Siegfried,
Mes souvenirs de la Hie Republique: Mon Fere et Son Temps: Jules Siegfried, 1836-1922 (Paris, Editions du Grand Siecle, 1946), 49.

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often violent strikes; the first sit-in strike of 1936 started at Breguet aero-engines in Le Havre; Daladier's 1938 decree-laws provoked far wider industrial action in Le Havre than elsewhere in France. The fact that
Le Havre's population had grown chiefly by immigration (56 per cent of Havrais had been born elsewhere in 1896), and that many immigrants came from religious and conservative areas like the nearby Pays de Caux or Brittany, did little to dampen this militant syndicalism. Le Havre's irreligious and anticlerical traditions and its inadequate parochial structures helped to ensure that imported popular Catholicism never took root (6).
The avant-garde of the union movement before 1914 was constituted
by the dockers, who formed independent, anarcho-syndicalist unions. The Communist-led CGTU enjoyed considerable support in the metallurgical sector at its formation in 1920, but declined after a wave of violent strikes in 1922. In 1934 the independents, based on the docks and road transport, still had a majority in the Union Locale des Syndicats with 6,700 members; the Socialist-affiliated CGT had 4,000'members, chiefly among the land-based employees of shipping lines; the CGTU's membership, concentrated in the metallurgical sector, the railways, and the building industry, stood at just 1,800. However, the inter-war growth of the metallurgical sector ultimately benefited the Communist-led current. After the CGT-CGTU fusion of 1935 (which the independents also joined), 9,000 new union members were recruited in this sector, giving Communist union leaders a decisive weight in the newly-unified movement which they have not lost since

(6) Lousse, 'Sociologie Electorale', 23-25, 71-73, 84-85.
(7) Ibid., 85-90.

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These developments had a profound effect on Le Havre's electoral evolution. Under the Third Republic the electoral map of Le Havre was roughly divided (by Andre Siegfried) into three main areas. The predominantly middle-class 5th and 6th cantons (cf. Map 3) formed the nucleus of a right-wing constituency (which also included several villages) and elected deputies such as Louis Brindeau (before 1914) and Rene Coty (from 1923). The largely proletarian 3rd and 4th cantons formed part of
a second, left-wing constituency. This also included the 1st and 2nd cantons, which roughly corresponded to the 'sailors' quarters' of Notre-Dame and St-Francois: here abstention rates were particularly high and electoral behaviour opportunist and non-ideological. This tendency carried over into the rest of the city. Turn-out for national elections in Le Havre was generally limited to some 70 per cent: and the working-class cantons elected men of the moderate Left. The obvious explanation is that the anarcho-syndicalist section of the working class held electoral politics in contempt while the poor saw it in a largely instrumental, non-ideological light. This enhanced the appeal of Jules Siegfried (Le Havre's mayor from 1878 to 1885 and deputy till his death in 1923), a paternalist, reforming bourgeois whose contacts in business and government circles helped to develop the Port. As his son Andre wrote, 'Mon pere etait aime pour son devouement a 1'interet general, pour son attachement a la Republique, mais il etait admire pour sa situation sociale'. Similarly, Leon Meyer, a Radical who became conseiller general for the 4th canton in 1900, mayor in 1919 and deputy in 1923, built up a patronage machine that was irresistible for much of

(8) the inter-war period

(8) Ibid., 132-133, 142-145, 159-160, 198-206: Siegfried, Mes Souvenirs, 49, 44-47.

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The effect of the changes in the union movement was to deliver the erstwhile moderate Left vote to the PCF, though the immediate impact of this in seats was limited. After the CGTU upsurge in 1920-22 the 3rd canton elected Andre Marty as conseiller general, but he only lasted one mandate. The crucial realignment came after the Communists' capture of the CGT. In the cantonal election campaign of 1937, Meyer was forced to declare for or against the Popular Front: he declared against, and was beaten by the Communist candidate Rene Cance, a schoolteacher from Cantal. The beginnings of PCF implantation in Le Havre came on the crest of a wave of working-class activity: but the Communists were also the inheritors
of an electorate that was accustomed to a clientelistic style of
politics

III.A.2; War and Reconstruction

The Occupation finished Meyer T s political career and interrupted
Cance T s. Meyer, a Jew, was replaced by a conservative mayor, Pierre Courant, and deported (he survived but played no further public role). Cance left to lead a Resistance network in Correze. The Germans evacuated the Notre-Dame and St-Francois quarters: they also fortified and used the port facilities before destroying them at their departure. But it was the Allies who inflicted the worst damage on Le Havre. The German garrison remained in the Fort de Tourneville well after the liberation of Paris: on the night of 5 September 1944 over 350 British and American aircraft, plus a naval force, attempted to reduce it by bombardment. The old centre - almost everything south and west of a line running roughly along the Rue Frederic Bellanger, Rue Georges Braque,

(9) Lousse, 'Sociologie Electorale f, 163, 194.

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Rue Casimir Perier and Place Jules Ferry, as well as large areas of Sanvic, Bleville, Aplemont and Frileuse, were flattened (cf. Maps 1 and 2). Half of the city's 20,000 buildings, 21,000 of its 48,800 homes
were destroyed: 5,000 Havrais were killed and 47,000 made homeless. Against strong competition, Le Havre acquired the title of Europe's most damaged port. The German garrison remained relatively unscathed, and
it took another week for Allied troops to liberate what was left of the

., (10) city

Le Havre's brief but devastating experience of saturation bombing
had four main consequences. Firstly, while some quarters such as Aplemont and Neiges (the southernmost port quarter) sprung up rapidly again after 1945, reconstruction as a whole took some twenty years: indeed, the completion of the new cultural centre on the Place Gambetta, the site of the old theatre, in 1982 could be said to mark its completion. Le Havre only regained its pre-war population in 1962 (cf. Table A.1, p. 404),
and even then hundreds of families were still living, as they had for over a decade, in Nissen huts left by the Americans in the Forest of Montgeon and the neighbouring commune of Gonfreville. Inevitably, the poorest families had to wait longest for permanent rehousing: it is conceivable that the Communist vote within Le Havre during the 1950s would have been greater if working class families had not had to spend

(10) Damais and Nicollet, L'Urbanisme, Vol.1, 81. Jean-Philippe Damais, La Nouvelle Vi-lle du Havre, Reconstruction et Repopulation, (Paris, Centre de Documentation Cartographique et Geographique, CNRS,
1963), 9-28.

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fifteen years in the outlying communes . Moreover, the over-extension of the centre, which had always been a problem given the position of the old town at the extreme south-west of the city, was accentuated by the period when Le Havre's main commercial and administrative functions
were displaced to the Rond-Point area. The return of the Town Hall and the Chamber of Commerce to their old sites in the late 1950s posed the problem, to shopkeepers and planners alike, of how realistic it was to spread the centre over a distance of more than 2 kilometres.
Secondly, the centre has inevitably undergone a profound physical transformation. The functionalist ideology of the architect-in-chief, Auguste Ferret, combined with the economics of rebuilding quickly with reinforced concrete to replace the shambolic old quarters with an organised rectilinear universe. As architects' architecture the 'Ferret town' probably works. There is an impressive unity (ten feet to a storey throughout) combined with subtle variations of height (generally four
to six storeys with a scattering of towers) and detail: a modest curve is even permitted on the St-Francois quayside. And the drains no longer overflow. But twenty years of industrial pollution have reduced the colours of Ferret's buildings to a uniform drab. They shut the city off from the sea, but channel its winds to every street-corner: the trees
that have managed to grow are often dwarfed by the mass of concrete, and

(11) The population of Gonfreville, where there was a temporary housing camp fell between 1954 and 1962 despite high natural increase as bombed-out families returned to Le Havre (Tables A.1 and A.2, pp.404, 405).
The present (Communist) mayor of Gonfreville, Marcel le Mignot, him-
self an evacuee from the Notre-Dame quarter, claims that Pierre
Courant, as mayor of Le Havre in the early 1950s, tried to ensure that the poorest displaced families stayed in Gonfreville and even moved some there from Le Havre (interview with Le Mignot, 11 May 1980).
I have, however, found it impossible to obtain more precise infor-mation on this point.

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the open spaces seem empty rather than spacious. The few buildings that survived the bombing, like the Church of Notre-Dame, appear out of place. The striking resemblance of the new Le Havre to an Eastern European city has thus faced the Communist municipality (which had nothing to do with Ferret's architecture) with the problem of how to make it into an attractive centre. On the other hand, it has to a great extent been spared one classic problem of post-war city planning: the 'comprehensive redevelopment' undertaken by many European cities in the 1950s and 1960s was largely achieved by Allied bombing.
Thirdly, the social transformation effected by the reconstruction
was as dramatic as the aesthetic one. The programme was managed by the Ministry of Reconstruction, which of course was concerned to provide the new centre with utilities, wider roads, car-parks and green spaces.
The old city was thus not rebuilt square metre for square metre: indeed, the horrendous pre-war population densities (up to 1,600 people per hectare of built-up area) were cut by more than half by 1962, since both the floor-space and the number of people to a room were reduced. Land-lords received war damages from the Ministry which entitled them to a share in the new buildings: those who had had little to start with often did not receive enough for a whole flat, and had to sell their entitle-ments. As for the tenants, the vast majority of the 20,000 or so people evacuated from Notre-Dame and St-Francois by the Germans never returned
I

to their old neighbourhoods. A group of some 500 HLM units in the Perrey area (west of the Boulevard Francois-ler) plus another 150 or so at the Quai Videcoq constituted all the lower-income housing that was built in the new centre. The majority of the new flats were (at least initially) very comfortable and their inhabitants well-off. Most of the former inhabitants were ultimately rehoused on the periphery of the city

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(following the classic 'comprehensive redevelopment' pattern). Sailors and fishermen were, in any case, a fast-diminishing class. St-Francois and Notre-Dame lost their picturesque and raffish character as well as their squalor, and became, by and large, respectable strongholds of the Right 02).
Finally, an indirect result of the bombing was the annexation of
the neighbouring communes of Sanvic and Bleville. They had almost no industry and their fiscal resources were insufficient to finance the reconstruction of the very considerable areas of their territory that
had been destroyed. Against Communist opposition (both communes voted rather more to the Right than Le Havre), Bleville voted its own annexation in 1953, and Sanvic in 1955. This continued the expansion of Le Havre begun by the absorption of Ingouville and Graville-Leure in 1852, and brought the total communal area to 4,126 hectares. It had grown to
4,684 hectares by 1975, notably as a result of the annexation of Rouelles in 1973 (cf. Map 7). This meant that Le Havre's independent suburbs are few and small - unlike Rouen, surrounded by suburban communes ~ (such as Sotteville or Le Grand Quevilly) of over 30,000 inhabitants. Of the total population of the Le Havre 'conurbation' as defined by the national statistical service (INSEE) for the 1968 census, 82 per cent lived in Le Havre itself (cf. Table A.1, p. 404). This figure was only exceeded in six major French cities (the proportion in Rouen is 50 per cent). Le Havre's municipality thus has to run neither simply a mercantile and

(13) industrial centre, nor simply a belt of working class suburbs, but both

(12) Damais, La Nouvelle Ville, 34-35, 45-60, 65-79.
(13) SERH, Ville du Havre, Schema de Secteur, Tome 1, Analyses, 29.
Alain Yon, 'Industrialisation et Urbanisation dans la Region
Havraise', These de Doctorat, Paris 1976, 67. Cf. also Maps 7 and 8.

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III.A.3: Le Havre in the Mid-1960s

Table III.2: Traffic through the Port of Le Havre, 1900-1981

Year

1900
1910
1915
1920
1925
1928

1938
1948
1951
1956
1961
1966
1971
1976
1981

Net Registered Tonnage
inwards (thousand tonnes)

2,875
4,750
3,500
5,500
7,100
8,800

n.a.

8,675
15,217
19,422
23,032
28,243
42,094
61,687
71,368

Passengers
(number)

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

in out
n.a. n.a.

41,093 46,379
74,120 87,113
109,598 119,041
108,071 100,452
182,342 186,236
258,180 257,623
378,163 364,417
521,916 506,230

Goods
(thousand tonnes)

3,450
3,650
4,500
6,180
4,930
4,700
in out
5,000 1,500
7,075 1,811
9,357 3,705
13,395 2,683
16,455 3,620
26,728 4,077
51,061 10,564
65,191 16,560
56,350 17,052

(Source: Port Autonome du Havre, Results of the Year, 1979 and 1981, p. 11).

What kind of city did the Communist municipality take over after

its electoral victory in 1965 (cf. III.B, p.129-130)? On most criteria, Le

Havre had fully recovered from the war. As Table III.2 shows, Port

traffic had returned' to pre-war levels by 1948, and expanded more or less

continuously thereafter. By 1965, Le Havre was the EEC's third port for

volume of traffic handled - behind Rotterdam and Marseille and roughly

equal with Antwerp. However, these overall figures hid two rather

negative factors. Firstly, despite the France's entry into service in

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1962, transatlantic passenger shipping declined after the 1950s, and the cross-channel traffic that replaced it was less profitable to the local economy. Secondly, two-thirds of the tonnage handled by 1965 consisted
of imported crude oil to feed the growing Gonfreville refinery, creating few jobs.
Le Havre's employment structure in the mid-1960s (Tables B.2 - B.4, pp.408-410) was characterised, predictably for a port, by a very large transport sector. This, with building and public works, largely made up for an industrial sector that was rather smaller than the average for French cities. The bulk of the region's industrial jobs were in the heavier branches - the metallurgical sector, oil and chemicals - while textiles, food and 'other industries' were all well below the national average. Within the heavier branches, the emphasis had changed. Le Havre's shipyards had gone through a difficult period which had led to
a comparatively high unemployment rate (over 4 per cent) in 1954: in 1962 the AugustirrNormand yards closed after well over a century's continuous operation. At the same time electrical and mechanical engineering firms like Dresser-France and the Compagnie Electro-Mecanique, as well as the petrochemical sector, had grown. This slow economic mutation was accompanied by a spatial one: new plants were increasingly sited at the far south-east of Le Havre and in the neighbouring communes north of the estuary. The most notable example of this eastward displacement of industry was the Renault factory opened at Sandouville in 1964. It was in great part the very rapid expansion of the automobile sector (Table B.4, p.410.) that led Le Havre's employment distribution to shift towards industry between 1962 and 1968, at a time when the share of industrial jobs in the national total was declining in favour of the tertiary branches.

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This continuing dependence on port activities and heavy industry in
a period of rapid tertiary growth in France as a whole contributed to
Le Havre's rather slow population growth (Table A.2, p.405). After a near-average rate of expansion between 1954 and 1962 (which brought the population back to its pre-war level), both the commune and the conur-bation of Le Havre grew less rapidly than most major French cities between 1962 and 1968. This was in great part due to a fall in the rate of immigration once the exiles of 1944 had returned. Le Havre's slow growth in this period clearly ranks it with heavily industrial cities like St-Etienne and Lille, rather than with expanding tertiary centres like Caen and Grenoble.
Le Havre's economic structure also meant that it remained a very working-class city (Table B.1, p.407). The proportion of workers was significantly higher, and that of managers and white-collar employees lower, than in most other French cities. This proletarian base was not, it is true, as overwhelming as that of some Communist bastions of the Paris suburbs: but it was considerably stronger than in Nimes, the other big city won by the PCF in 1965. Moreover, skilled workers in the metallurgical sector, traditionally among the PCF's most solid supporters, were particularly well represented. And while the proportion of workers was declining in Le Havre as in France, this process was very slow in Le Havre after 1962. j
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There were comparatively few jobs in Le Havre in offices or light industry of the type offered to women, and the rate of female activity (working women, whether measured as a percentage of all women or of all active persons) was several points lower than in most other cities. Despite this, the rate of activity for both sexes remained close to the average. Since Le Havre had an average proportion of adults of working

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age, the explanation is almost certainly that more people started work young. This is also reflected in the generally low level of educational qualification. In 1968, 48.2 per cent of the non-student population
over 17 had no qualification at all, 39.9 per cent had only a primary certificate, 4.8 per cent had the baccalaureat and only 2.2 per cent a degree: over three-quarters had no technical qualification either
It is also probable that, although wage levels in Haute-Normandie were the highest in the French provinces, household incomes in this working class and generally poorly-qualified city were lower than in other urban

centres.

Worse off or not, the Havrais were certainly worse housed than most other French city-dwellers (Tables C.3, C.5, C7, pp.412, 413, 414). Strikingly, the main density indices (persons per room and per home, and rooms per home) of 1926 remained almost unchanged in 1962. The index of discomfort (a percentage defined as a function of homes without bathroom, running water or indoor WC) was also well above the national average. Moreover, general indices fail to take account of the large proportion of post-war (and thus technically 'comfortable') housing in Le Havre, and thus of the presence of very poor localised statistics in unreconstructed sectors. High indices of discomfort appeared chiefly in older working-class quarters that had survived the bombing - the old centre, older parts of Graville, St-Nicolas and Brindeau in the south - or rapidly-reconstructed low-cost areas like the Cite Chauvin and Neiges (Table C.7,

(14) Service d'Urbanisme de la Ville du Havre (SUVH), Laurent Leveque, Recensement de 1975, Traitement des Donnees (1977) - no pagination.
The primary certificate was much more than a certificate of ability
to read and write: it was a selective examination that helped the employment prospects of successful candidates when the school-leaving
age was 14.

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p.4l4,and Map 9). Overcrowding (measured in persons per room) was
high not only in these areas but in new low-cost housing developments
such as the Mare-Rouge, parts of Bleville, and Caucriauville. A municipal study produced just after the PCF victory in 1965 counted 2,020 cases of more than four people living to a room in 1964
If Le Havre's population was growing less rapidly than that of other cities, it was also being housed more slowly. In 1965, there x^ere 24 new housing units building for every 1,000 households in Le Havre, against 55 for all French cities of over 150,000 inhabitants. The bulk of this effort went into low-cost Habitations a Loyer Modere (HLMs), which accounted for some two-thirds of the 9,000 homes built between 1962 and 1968, a very high proportion . The biggest of these, the Office Public d'HLM de la Ville du Havre (OPHLMVDH, or simply OPHLM: cf. IV, p.223), had a waiting-list of over 4,000 in 1965. To handle
this backlog, the OPHLM did two things. Firstly, 3,536 of the 5,803 homes it built from 1947 to 1962 were 'reduced-norm' HLMs, hurriedly-built, rudimentary small flats built with the cheapest possible loans for the lowest income groups. Secondly, both the OPHLMVDH and other
HLM developers looked to the city's periphery for the cheap land they needed. A few hundred HLMs were included in the reconstruction (cf. Ill, p.118), and a comparable number strung out eastwards on either side of the railway. But the upper town was the site for the biggest projects -
700 standard HLMs behind the Fort de Tourneville in the late 1950s;
1,100 reduced-norm units at Mare-Rouge and 776 standard HLMs in upper Graville in the early 1960s. The tenants for these flats were generally

(15) Ville du Havre, Le Livre Noir du Logement, 1966, 25.
(16) SERH, Ville du Havre, Schema de Secteur, I, 32, 64.

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young working-class families, who had left either Nissen huts or cramped accommodation with their parents in Graville or the southern quarters. Their move to the upper town at the same time as the eastward displacement of industry confirmed the dissolution of the traditional nineteenth-century proximity of industry and working-class housing. This tendency was reinforced by the decision taken in 1959 to build a big new Zone & Urbaniser en Priorite" (ZUP) on the north-eastern Caucriauville plateau. The Communists who came to power in 1965 thus inherited a city that
had barely recovered from the war, and which was in the throes both of a profound transformation in land use patterns (as between the new and the old centres and between industry and housing) and of a permanent housing crisis. Economic and demographic growth, if not actually sluggish, lacked the dynamism of some other French cities, and had not altered Le Havre's dependence on transport and on heavy industry. The city's traditional isolation at the end of the Caux plateau had been diminished in 1959 by the completion of the Tancarville bridge, just 40 kilometres up the estuary, in 1959, while work was also in progress in electrifying the railway to Paris. Yet the main recent addition to the region's economy - the Renault factory at Sandouville - pointed to a confirmation of Le Havre's role as a port-industrial complex. The Sandouville site was halfway along a 10,000-hectare alluvial plain which, if provided with the necessary infrastructure, could be transformed into a vast industrial zone that would allow ocean-going ships to sail right up to the factory gates. Its potential was not lost on a government seeking ways to rationalise France's industry. The Mission d'Etudes pour la Basse Vallde de la Seine (MEBS), set up under the authority of the Prefect in Rouen in 1965, started work on a development plan for the Seine valley below Paris with this prospect very much in mind. The conclusions reached by the

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MEBS were to dominate the large-scale planning of Le Havre and its region - and thus one major area of the State's relations with the new municipality - for the next decade and more.

III.B: The Communists and the Town Hall

Le Havre seemed ripe for plucking by the PCF in 1945. The Party's organisational strength at the Liberation owed much to the Communists' success in colonising the previously anarcho-syndicalist union movement, its electoral strength to the attraction of voters whose previous allegiance had been to L£on Meyer's patronage machine. The PCF thus captured a working class that had a long tradition of union militancy but little history of political radicalism. Historically, the Left in Le Havre has tended to concentrate its votes on one political party, and these successes of the 1930s ensured that the commanding formation that succeeded Meyer would be the PCF and not the SFIO. But another twenty years passed before the Communists reached their present ascendancy.
That was because under the Fourth Republic, they remained almost as isolated in Le Havre as at the national level: given their local strength, however, nothing less than a solid alliance from the Socialists to the Vichyssoi^ Right sufficed to keep them out of government in the Town Hall, and so the typical third-force coalition that ruled Le Havre for most of the post-war years was a particularly uncomfortable one.
What enabled the PCF to turn its substantial share of the vote into
its present political hegemony was its brief experience of municipal office in 1956-59, and the opportunity offered by the new electoral law to hold office on a more secure basis, with allies, from 1965. More precisely, the Communists x^ere able to present their municipality as
'La municipality de tous les havrais' and, having split the local SFIO in

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1965, to bring in the whole PS, but very much as a junior partner, in 1971. Municipal consensus is not, however, necessarily translatable into full support for the Party itself. Le Havre offers the paradox of a strong Communist municipality in a working-class city with a very small local Party and a relatively weak CGT. The rest of this chapter examines how the Communists came to power in 1965, where they drew their support from, and how they organised and reinforced their positions once in the Town Hall.

III.B.1: Electoral Politics: the Communist Ascendancy

The Communists had two major assets in post-Liberation Le Havre -
the potential of their pre-war positions and the record of leaders like Rene* Cance, Pierre Naze and Andre" Durome'a in the Resistance. Yet during the two post-war decades there were only eleven years when Communists represented Le Havre in the National Assembly (Ren£ Cance, 1945-51; Cance and Louis Eudier, 1956-58; Cance, 1962-67) - and only three when
Le Havre had a Communist mayor (Cance, 1956-59). The only secure elected offices held by Communists under the Fourth Republic were as conseillers g£ne"raux for the third and fourth cantons. The major national reason for this indifferent record was the PCF's isolation for most of the post-war generation. But four local factors also helped to shape Le Havre's politics in the twenty years after 1945 (cf. Tables III.3 to III.5, pp.137-139).
Firstly, despite their meagre harvest of elected offices, the
Communists retained a share of the vote which, apart from the national disaster of 1958, has never fallen below 35 per cent in parliamentary or municipal elections since 1945. This was well above the national average (Table II.2, p. 38) and the PCF remained at least 15 points ahead of the

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Socialists until 1981. Given their isolation and the suspicion with which they were regarded, they had enough strength to block a left-wing alternative, too much to make an alliance with the Socialists easy, but not enough to win on their own.
Secondly, there was the rapid post-war resurgence of the Right.
Pierre Courant's courage during the air-raids of September 1944 earned him the Legion d'Honneur, and apparently more than enough credit to erase his record as the Germans' mayor under the Occupation. His re-election as mayor in May 1945 was prevented only by a national proscription, rapidly lifted; he was elected deputy in October 1945, and became mayor in December 1947. Courant was appointed Minister of Reconstruction in 1951, and Roger Duclaud-Williams reckoned him 'perhaps the most able Housing Minister of the Fourth Republic' during his brief tenure of that office in 1953 . At least until the advent of the Gaullists in 1958, the Right was thus reasonably united behind a strong and capable leader, and reaped electoral benefits at local and national level.

Thirdly, the third-force parties, squeezed between the Communists
and the Right, were correspondingly weak and divided. They never managed more than a quarter of the vote, or eight of the 37 council seats, after the war, but that sometimes allowed them to hold the balance on the council. Finally, the annexation of Sanvic and Bleville further complicated the situation as new municipal elections followed in both cases, disrupting old alignments.
The result, under the Fourth Republic's PR system, was a particularly

(17) Roger Duclaud-Williams, The Politics of Housing in Britain and France (London, Heinemann, 1978), 49.

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unstable pattern of municipal politics. The PCF was easily the city's largest political party, but since it always ran a single homogeneous
list of its own (as elsewhere in France) it was consistently from one
to five seats short of an absolute majority on the council. At times
it was overtaken by Courant's right-wing coalition - which itself, however, always fell short of the necessary 19 seats. This meant that the election of the mayor - the act which, in principle, defines the municipal majority - was highly unpredictable and depended essentially on which way a handful of Socialist councillors jumped. Owing partly
to the instability of the majority and partly to the annexations three extra municipal elections were called (in December 1947, May 1954 and January 1956). In 1956 the Socialists abstained from the choice of mayor, allowing the election of Rene Cance by the 18 Communist councillors Three years later, however, the Right promised Robert Monguillon, one
of the two Socialist councillors, the post of mayor in return for his alliance. Cance, still at the head of 18 councillors, was brought down by a broad anti-Communist coalition. The election of Monguillon as mayor was a caricatural example of the characteristic nation-wide alliance of the Socialists with the Right at local level, which brought the SFIO, as the essential pivot party, more mairies for less support than other groupings and made it the great municipal party of the Fourth Republic. Monguillon's election also provoked noisy demonstrations from Communist supporters outside Le Havre's Town Hall, which were savagely dispersed by the police.
This instability was ended, ironically, by an electoral law intended
to isolate the PCF (cf. Ch.II, p. 45). The Communists' opponents went into the 1965 municipal elections divided between Monguillon's third-force list and a Gaullist list led by Michel Dubosc, a lawyer and

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conseiller general for the first canton since 1952 - Courant being terminally ill by 1965. Cance, by contrast, managed to win the support
of a number of non-Communist fellow-travellers of the PSU, and of three dissident Socialists who had been alienated by Monguillon's horse-trading with the Right. Non-Communists were given plenty of space on the Cance list (leaving the PCF with a majority of one). This broadening of appeal, plus the divisions of its adversaries, gave Cance's list a narrow victory - but all the seats, under the new law - in the run-off. Under PR, the 1965 elections would have given Le Havre another hung council. The Communists' position in the Town Hall, still relatively
precarious in 1965, was greatly reinforced in 1971 when a full alliance with the Socialists (now purged of Monguillon) led to a straight Left-Right contest. In 1977 the left-wing list, now led by Cance's successor as mayor, Andrd Duromda, exceeded the 60 per cent mark, and managed to secure a fairly comfortable first-ballot re-election even in the difficult circumstances of 1983. These victories owed something to the Right's difficulties in finding a leader of the same popularity as Courant. The choice of Robert Hirsch, an ex-prefect who did not even live in Le Havre, to lead the municipal opposition in 1971 was scarcely inspired. That of Antoine Rufenacht in 1977 was better. A young, personable graduate of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Rufenacht had worked in Olivier Guichard's office before becoming the Gaullist deputy for Le Havre in
the 1975 by-election and junior minister in the 1976 Barre government.
But he suffered from several handicaps. His family roots in Le Havre's wealthy mercantile bourgeoisie were a disadvantage in a city like Le Havre, and a certain lack of skill both in human contacts and in business (his attempt to run his family's coffee-trading firm ended in financial disaster) alienated some of his natural allies at the Chamber of Commerce.

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As his election results show, Rufenacht has been unable to galvanise a united and credible municipal opposition.
Yet the Right's difficulties only complemented two more fundamental factors in ensuring the Left's success. One of these was the social composition of the electorate, which made a majority for the Left as a whole at national elections probable in all but the most unfavourable circumstances (viz. the right-wing landslides of 1958, 1962 and 1968 - cf. Table III.4). Secondly, once installed in the Town Hall, Cance and his colleagues were able to point to their municipal record and to use the confidence that the French tend to place in effective mayors to erode the electorate's mistrust of their party origins.
The Communists' municipal successes clearly helped their performance
in parliamentary elections. They were already strong locally from 1945 on: under the Fourth Republic the PCF's share of the vote in Le Havre was consistently 11 to 14 percentage points higher than its national average (Tables III.4 and II. 1, pp. 138 & 38). From 1962 to 1978 this gap widened to between 17 and 21 points. And in 1981, when the Communist vote in France reached its lowest level since the Popular Front, it remained barely two points below the high-tide mark of 1946 in Le Havre - nearly 24 points ahead of the national average. In the secure, working-class, 7th constituency, that meant that the Communist candidates (Cance to 1967, Duromea thereafter) were forced to a second ballot only in 1958 (when Cance became one of the ten surviving Communist deputies) and
1968 (Table III.5). In the 6th constituency, within boundaries carefully calculated in 1958 to include both the more conservative cantons of Le Havre and the more conservative of the surrounding communes (cf. Map 6), right-wing candidates faced a second ballot every year except 1958 and 1968. Thanks partly - but only partly - to new low-cost housing

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developments in Le Havre, the Communists (Jacques Eberhard, senator and mayor of Gonfreville until 1968, Daniel Colliard from 1973) steadily ate away at the Gaullists' majority. The left-wing candidate who finally reached the second ballot to defeat Rufenacht in 1981 was not a Communist, but the Socialist Joseph Menga; but Colliard still ran ahead of Menga in Le Havre itself and only lost the first ballot because of the big swing from the Right to the PS in the rural communes of the constituency.
This spin-off from local office to national electoral results was
less marked for the PCF itself than it was for Communist candidates with local roots. In presidential elections, both Duclos' result in 1969 and Marchais' in 1981 were under 11 points ahead of their national averages, a gap of the same order as in Fourth Republic parliamentary elections, as if the 'municipal notability factor' had been discounted by the electorate in this supremely national contest. It should be stressed, however, that 'municipal notability' has by and large benefited the municipal team as a whole rather than any one individual. When Duromea, first adjoint in the Cance municipality, took over Cance's constituency
in 1967, the Communist score continued to progress; when Eberhard passed
the Communist banner in the 6th constituency to Colliard in 1973, there
was an advance on 1968 and only a slight drop on 1967.
The transformation of Le Havre's Communists from a very strong, but
still isolated, force in the city's politics into 'fathers of the commune' is very clear in the changing tone of their election propaganda. Nationally, (cf. Ch.II, p. 93) the official Party approach to local office changed substantially between the 1950s and the 1970s; a major element in this change was a new awareness that municipal positions could be used to project the Communists' 'human face'. In Le Havre, this tendency was reinforced by municipal successes.

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The 35-page 'Letter to the Havrais' distributed in support of the
Cance list in 1953 was thoroughly representative of the sectarian line that had been encouraged by Etienne Fajon in the Cahiers (Ch.II, p. 74). It began with Thorez' 1935 statement that the acquisition of a municipality by the PCF was 'an episode in the class struggle 1. It devoted more than half of its space to national and international questions, and much of that to the giant strides made by the USSR under the leader-ship of the recently-deceased Stalin. And it took care to point out that it was the Americans who had been responsible for the bombing of Le Havre - a startling break with the vague references to 'the destructions of war 1
(18 } used customarily by all the parties in Le Havre
The tone began to change in 1959. With a municipal record to point
to, the Communists used more space to remind the electorate of their success in restoring the municipal finances to health than to develop the Party's wider themes - the denunciation of the Algerian war, of De Gaulle and (19) of the Socialists for allowing the return of 'personal power 1 Again, in 1965, while both the rising Seine-Maritime deputy Roland Leroy, and the language of class struggle, were present in the Cance campaign, there was also plenty of traditional municipal rhetoric. The previous Communist majority of 1956-59 were presented as 'competent, serious, honest administrators' who had brought the budget under control and encouraged the implantation of new industries by ensuring generous supplies of cheap water. Stress was also given to the broad base of the list, which included not only workers but 'Laiques, democrates, employes,

(18) Lettre aux Havraises et Havrais, Communist campaign sheet for 1953 municipal elections, 8.
(19) 3 Ans au Service de la Population Havraise, Municipal bulletin, March 1959 (no pagination).

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inge'nieurs et cadres, un avocat, enseignants, commercants', against whom Monguillon was leading a tiny clique, 'la liste du gros patronat havrais The culminating point of this process was the 1977 campaign. The
bulk of the Left's propaganda was carried, not by the Party press, but by two more apparently 'neutral' sources - Le Havre Libre and the municipal bulletin. Le Havre Libre, which has a wider circulation than any local paper, was founded at the Liberation by a committee representing the 'Tripartisme'coalition of 1945-47. Each tendency in the original committee has the right of expression in Le Havre Libre, but with the break-up of Tripartisan in 1947 the paper's editorial policy varied from the ambiguous to the non-existent. From 1971, however, Le Havre Libre came out openly in favour of the reunited Left. Its takeover by the Hersant group shortly afterwards did not change this, as the new owner accepted a contractual obligation to print three pages of political comment edited by the original Committee. Le Havre Libre continues to publicise the activities of the local Left, while its 'rival' Le Havre Presse does the same for the Right: the 'non-political' pages of the two papers are almost identical, not surprisingly since Hersant owns them both. As for the municipal bulletin, Le Havre's municipality has been as willing as any to use it to report
on its own activities in the most favourable light possible.
It is true that the 1977 campaign included, as Gaston Plissonnier
had recommended in the Cahiers (Ch.II, p. 75), attacks on 'the government's austerity policy' and reminders that a Left-wing municipal victory would 'prepare the success of the Common Programme's innovative solutions for

(21) 1978 . There were also, however, a very close attention to local

(20) Rene Cance, interview, Le Havre Libre, 12 March 1965.
(21) Le Havre Libre, 11 March 1977.

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issues, and a patriarchal tone that the Cahiers do not anticipate. Cance, for example, told L'Express 'Les havrais nous font confiance parce que
(22)
nous ggrons cette ville comme un bon pere de famille gere son manage*
Le Havre Libre showed Duromea gazing responsibly over the city from the roof of the Town Hall, or in the kitchen of his modest Sanvic home. The full resources of the Town Hall were brought into play to stress the incumbents' special relationship with the electorate. First a questionnaire on the public's wishes for the future was sent out to every household;
then, on the basis of 35,000 answers received, a detailed programme of new facilities for 1977-83 was produced and publicised through some twenty special editions of the municipal bulletin, one for each quarter. On the eve of the poll, Duromea reiterated an appeal that was above all consensual:

'Nous, adversaires du pouvoir personnel, nous avons
travaille" ensemble. Dans 1'unite*. De plus, nous
avons toujours developpe" la concertation avec la
population et aussi avec nos partenaires e"conomiques
comme le Port Autonome et la Chambre de Commerce',
- while Rufenacht, he added,
'essaie de creer, a la veille des Elections, un
climat de crainte, et tente de couper Le Havre en
deux' (23).

Rufenacht thus had difficulty in claiming that Le Havre was under the control of a totalitarian Party apparatus. The Right's traditional argument, that a Communist municipality would paralyse Le Havre's maritime trade, was visibly negated by the Port's own annual reports (Table III.2, p.120). So Rufenacht fought under the slogan 'Ville Communiste, Ville

(22) L'Express, 17-23 March 1977.
(23) Le Havre Libre, 11 March 1977.

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TrJLste', criticising the lack of night-life in Le Havre - but still opposing municipal plans for a new cultural centre in Place Gambetta on grounds of cost. When he decried the lack of major new industrial developments in the previous five years, the municipality responded that the fault lay with the government of which Rufenacht was a member. The 1977 campaign, then, was characterised by the incumbents' somewhat
complacent consensual appeal and the insistent, but ultimately ineffective shrillness of the opposition. A radio debate between Rufenacht and Duromea took place in February; described by the press as *acharne', it left
Duromea 1 s patriarchal image intact. The subsequent electoral success of
his list was due not only to the national swing left, but also to the effectiveness of a campaign that succeeded in appropriating the traditionally consensual and patriarchic rhetoric of French municipal politics for
Duromea and his colleagues. The success of local Communist parliamentary candidates in avoiding their Party's indifferent national record under the Fifth Republic shows that this tactic has also paid outside the strictly municipal sphere.
By contrast, the mediocre performance of Communist presidential
candidates in Le Havre suggests that, at least for one section of the 'normal' Communist electorate, support for the municipality, and even for Duromea or Colliard in parliamentary elections, does not imply full support for the Party as such. This provokes questions about the nature of current Communist support in Le Havre. Where does it come from? How strong is the Party organisation? Outside election campaigns, how do Communist elus project themselves to the electorate? We shall try to cover these points in the following sections.

Table III.3; Commune of Le Havre; Municipal Election Results, and Council Composition, 1945-83
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(note: these statistics are averages for each list, as preferential voting was allowed: as only lists which succeeded in electing at least one councillor are shown, the percentages do not add up to 100).
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III.B.2: Le Havre's Electoral Geography

Table III.6; Strengths of Left and Right in Le Havre by Canton, 1977.

(cf. Map 4)

No.
Canton

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6
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Total

Municipal Election Results, 1977 Total no.
Electors

8,806
4.686
15,971
40,105
11,660

22,565
25,492

129,285

Valid Votes
Cast as %
Electorate

78.21
77.40
79.00
79.39
78.09

78.39
80.30

79.15

Percenta
vote
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44.00
43.92
73.43
72.00
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52.57
60.53

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Conseiller Ge'ne'ral
(party and date of
election)

A. Dubosc (RPR,1952)
P. Denis (RPR,1955)
M. Rioual (PCF,1976)
G. Reuse* (PCF, 1973)
A. Rufenacht (RPR,
1973)
D. Colliard (PCF, 1976)
M. Schlewitz (PCF,
1976)

Source: Ville du Havre, Bureau des Elections

A very general impression of Le Havre's electoral geography may be obtained by a glance at the political complexion of its seven cantons (Table III.6 and Map 4). Since Siegfried's pre-war description of Le Havre's political map (above, p. 114) the 'sailors' quarters' have dis-appeared, and the three cantons of the city centre (1st, 2nd and 5th) all vote consistently to the Right. The south and east, or the 3rd and 4th cantons, have been PCF strongholds since the Liberation: while the much more socially varied 6th and 7th cantons in the north and west were

conquered by the PCF in 1976 - and lost, after boundary changes, in 1982 (25)

(25) See Map 5 for the new cantonal limits. In 1982, the Right won both the 6th and the 7th: of the new cantons, a Socialist was elected for
the 8th and Communists for the 9th and 10th.

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This social diversity, of course, severely limits the value of any electoral analysis by canton. Especially before 1982, a combination of administrative inertia and political calculation (by the government) had produced cantons that were grossly unequal in size and corresponded hardly at all to the city's real sociological and geographical divisions. Fortunately, the availability of election results by polling station has enabled recent research by J.-P. Lousse and A. Nicollet to achieve greater precision.
Both Lousse and Nicollet find that the relation between social groups
and voting habits is very close indeed. The right-wing vote, as measured in the 1973 parliamentary or the 1974 presidential elections (Maps 13 and 14), coincided very closely with high concentrations of the top social groups and low proportions of workers (Maps 10 and 11). The Right was thus strongest in the new centre, along the seafront, and along the western C6te; the vote then tapers off into the old centre, Sanvic, and the eastern C8te: if the top groups are comparatively rare here, there
is a relatively high proportion of middle managers and white-collar workers (Map 12).
Everywhere else - that is, in a broad arc running from the industrial south-east to the Dollemard area in the north-west - the proportion of workers exceeds 40 per cent, and is much higher in places (reaching over 70 per cent in the Mare-Rouge estate to the north-west and the Neiges quarter in the south). In 1973, 1974 and 1977 the Left as a whole consistently won over half of the vote, and the votes of over 40 per cent of the registered electorate in these areas (Maps 13, 15, 16); in Mare-Rouge and Neiges the Left's share of the vote ran to over 75 per cent.
'A des clivages politiques fortement marques correspondent des

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clivages sociaux non moins tranches', Damais and Nicollet observe
And within the left-wing bloc, the PCF's strength (Maps 17 and 18) corresponds very closely both to that of the Left as a whole and to the proportion of workers in the population. This is far less true of the
PS (Maps 19 and 20), which has consistently been weakest in areas of PCF strength. The Socialists won a majority within the Left as a whole chiefly in Right-wing areas and failed seriously to threaten the PCF's hold on the working class. At their moment of greatest support, in June 1981, the even spread of their share of the vote indicated even more
than at the national level, a 'catch-all' party more than a class-based

one.

Of course, this fit between social class and political behaviour is imperfect. Neither the PCF nor even the Left as a whole have a monopoly of Le Havre's working class vote. Workers living in middle-class areas are less likely to vote Communist than those living in proletarian strong-holds (where, among other factors, the Party's organisation is more
*

active). The white-collar category includes a relatively high proportion of women who may be more or less influenced by the political attitudes of their husbands. The PCF vote in Le Havre still remains firmly anchored to the city's proletarian quarters, even if it has not reached the saturation

(27) point of some other Communist strongholds

There are few other cleavages to compete with class in Le Havre. Religious practice is low throughout the city: according to Lousse, just 7.5 per cent of the population thought of themselves as practising

(26) Damais and Nicollet, L'Urbanisme au Havre, Vol.11, 109.
(27) Lousse, 'Sociologie Electorale', 329-338.

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Catholics in the late 1970s, against a national average of 21 per cent. Among activists, Catholic militants have been at least as common on the Left as on the Right; the post-war worker-priests' movement was comparatively strong in Le Havre, and several Left Catholics have reached responsible positions in the union movement and the PS. But as a mass phenomenon, the rate of Catholic practice is too slight to allow useful

(28^ comparisons with voting habits . Nor, although there are a number of generally 'young 1 left-wing quarters (like Mare-Rouge) and generally 'old' right-wing ones (the new centre), does the average age of the

(29} population show any systematic correlation with political loyalties .
i

Among housing statistics compiled from the 1968 and 1975 censuses, neither age of housing nor its size (when expressed in number of rooms per home, as opposed to surface area) correspond to electoral divisions Nor, perhaps more surprisingly, does the owner-occupier/tenant distinction. The level of owner-occupation is lower than the city's average in the modern centre; it is higher than average in Neiges, the Cite Chauvin, Aplemont and Frileuse, where numerous workers own housing that varies from wooden cabins to modest bungalows. The discomfort index (cf. above, p.123) shows only a partial correspondence: if a high discomfort index and a high Communist vote coincide in much of the industrial south-east, they do so much less closely in the old centre or Sanvic - while Communist strong-holds like Mare-Rouge have a very low discomfort index on the minimal

(28) Lousse, 'Sociologie Electorale', 95. Andre Harris and Alain de Sedouy, Qui n'est pas de Droite? (Paris, Seuil, 1978), 153ff.
(29) Damais and Nicollet, L'Urbanisme au Havre, Vol.11, Map 15.
(30) Agence d'Urbanisme de la Region du Havre (AURH), Dossier Habitat: Volume I: Le Diagnostic (November 1977), 14, 18, 26 and appendix.

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official criteria (cf. Map 9, and Table C.7, p.414).
Two other housing indicators deserve closer attention. One is the proportion of HLMs in the total housing stock (Map 21). The relation
here requires two qualifications. By no means all Left-wing voters live in HLMs - Neiges and the Cite* Chauvin (quarters 21 and 25 on the map) being good examples of high concentrations of other types of low-cost housing. The quarters, as defined by INSEE, which appear on Map 21, are much less socially homogeneous than the polling-station catchment areas used for electoral studies. Quarter 5, for example, includes both the western C6te, where Rufenacht took 62 per cent of the vote in 1977, and the Fort de Tourneville HLMs, where Durome"a took 69 per cent. That said, areas with a high concentration of HLMs do not coincide with high right-wing scores, and the correlation between HLMs and the Communist vote observed throughout France, is confirmed in Le Havre.
The closest correlation of any housing indicator with voting habits, however, is the degree of overcrowding (Map 22). Quarters with a high average number of persons per room invariably produce high left-wing electoral scores. This correlation is as clear as that of social class, which in many ways it merely confirms. Workers live in many different types of housing, but overcrowding is common to all: statistics for France show that they suffer from overcrowding considerably more than other
, (31) classes
The 'typical' supporter of Le Havre's Communist municipality, then,
is likely to be a worker living in HLM or other low-cost housing, in relatively overcrowded conditions, outside the city centre. Before

(31) Michel Verret, L'Espace Ouvrier (Paris, Armand Colin, 1979), 179. Raymond Pronier, Les Municipalit^s Communistes (Paris, Balland,
1983), 239.

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considering the implications of this for the municipality's political strategy, it is worth looking more closely at some of these solid left-wing quarters (cf. Map 26).
i) The south-east. The quarters to the south of the railway constitute Le Havre's old working-class heartland (cf. above, p.111). Over three-quarters of their 400 hectares is covered by docks, railway lines and factories that cut up the 95 hectares of residential land into distinct neighbourhoods. While the concentration of workers is high throughout, types of housing vary considerably. They include the redbrick blocks of small nineteenth-century 'company flats', chiefly in the Brindeau and St-Nicolas (or Eure) quarters (nos. 23 and 24 on Map 9); wooden cabins of greater or lesser insalubrity in the Cite" Chauvin and Neiges; a scattering of HLM blocks, varying from the post-war Champs-Barets estate to the modern Boulevard de Graville group; six out of Le Havre's ten hostels for immigrant workers; and a number of small detached houses dispersed on sundry vacant plots.
Since the mid-1960s, the southern quarters have declined. Old industries have run down, while new ones have often sought land further east (cf. above, p. 125). Younger people have left cramped, uncomfortable housing in Brindeau or St-Nicolas for HLMs. Since lack of land has limited HLM construction in the South (old industries, even if run-down, still take a long time to move), they have gone to other parts of Le Havre. The result was a striking drop in the population between 1968 and 1975 (Map 23) and a rise in the average age of those who remained. If HLM projects like the Boulevard de Graville group have slowed this

. (32) tendency, they have not as yet succeeded in reversing it

(32) Service d'Urbanisme de la Ville du Havre (SUVH), Laurent Leveque, Les Quartiers Sud, 1977, 7, 31-36.

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ii) HLM Estates. Map 25 shows the major HLM developments undertaken in Le Havre since the mid-1950s. Because of the need for cheap land, HLMs have generally been built on sites outside the city centre - to some extent in the south and along the railway line, but chiefly in the upper town. One result has been that in 1975, for the first time, the population of the upper town exceeded that of the lower town (Map 24).
The quality, level of rent, and social character of HLMs varies
enormously according to their location, their financial category (which helps to determine the degree of comfort) and their date of construction. In 1981, the rent for a twenty-year-old 4-room HLM flat of the lowest category was just 340 francs a month, while a brand-new flat of the top

(33) category was nearly four times as expensive . Not surprisingly, the older, reduced-norm groups tend to be the most proletarian. The Mare-Rouge estate consists very largely of reduced-norm units built in the 1960s which, after fifteen years of life, had deteriorated enough to require a major rehabilitation programme. Its inhabitants are almost exclusively working-class and the Communist vote is high - although the level of voter registration is probably rather low. Other older groups with a higher proportion of standard HLMs, for example the Tourneville and Clemenceau estates, do not share Mare-Rouge's spectacular reputation, but are still solidly working-class and left-wing.
The biggest single group of HLMs is the Caucriauville estate, with
some 24,000 inhabitants in 1975. Although it consists almost entirely of standard HLMs built in the 1960s and early 1970s, the concentration of workers was not outstandingly high in 1975, partly because a certain

(33) AURH, Observatoire Permanent des Loyers (March 1982), 45.

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number of young middle-class families rented flats there while saving for

(34) something better . The Rue de la Ligne and Points Cardinaux groups contain a fairly high proportion of upper-range HLMs and show a relatively middle-class social composition; while the big Mont-Gaillard estate
- -v

includes both a large number of modern, upper-range, high-rent HLMs and other, non-HLM types of housing. These groups at the top end of the HLM market show consistent majorities for the Left, but tend to be areas where the Socialists managed their best scores in 1981.
Map 25 does not, of course, show every HLM operation carried out in
Le Havre: smaller estates, either single buildings or groups of two or three, are scattered throughout the city, particularly in the upper town. The uniformity of their design, particularly among the earlier buildings - long off-white slabs of four or five storeys - is one of Le Havre's more depressing architectural features. The transfer of many working-class families from the south to HLMs on the plateau certainly improved their basic conditions of housing: it also, as in similar cases throughout Europe, uprooted them from what had been close communities and put several miles between them and their work.

iii) Workers' bungalows. Le Havre's population is roughly a tenth that of the city of Paris but lives on nearly half the space. A major reason
for this is that between the fairly high-density HLM estates lies an unplanned sprawl of individual housing, most of it built in the first half of this century. As in certain Paris suburbs, a number of working-class families took advantage of the Loucheur Act on subdividing plots to become modest owner-occupiers after the First World War. This happened

(34) Alain Yon, 'Industrialisation et Urbanisation dans la Rdgion Havraise 1, (doctoral thesis in sociology, Paris 1976), 327-330.

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particularly in Aplemont, to the east of the Forest of Montgeon: many of the small bungalows built here in the 1920s were destroyed in 1944, but reappeared shortly afterwards. More recently, workers have built houses on the Dollemard plateau to the north-west. In both Aplemont and Dollemard the indices of discomfort and of overcrowding are mediocre, though the municipality has helped to improve conditions by installing mains drainage. In Le Havre as elsewhere, then, the core of the PCF's support comes
from people at the lower end both of the labour market and - though in a wide range of specific conditions - of the housing market. The broad implication for municipal strategy - 'priorite* aux plus de"f avorisds' -
is a central and obvious element in the Communist approach to local government. In planning terms, however, this can be translated in different ways. One is a 'quantitative' approach to housing problems - meeting pressing housing needs by building as much low-cost housing as possible
on any available sites. Another is a 'qualitative' approach aimed at improving housing conditions as they are found in specific areas. Broadly speaking, national policy on low-cost housing underwent a shift of
emphasis from the first approach to the second in the early 1970s, with clear implications for the range of choices available to municipalities and to HLM organisations.
No municipality can allow considerations of electoral geography to determine its planning policy to the exclusion of all else - but few would decide a policy without taking it into account. A municipality like that of Le Havre could adopt two types of electoralist planning strategies. The first, an 'offensive' strategy, corresponds roughly to the 'quantit-ative' approach to housing problems: if large quantities of low-cost housing must be built, political benefits will result from the siting of as much of it as possible on the adversary's electoral territory. It is

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certain that the Communists' growing share of the second-ballot vote in the 6th Constituency between 1973 and 1978 owed much to the construction of the Mont-Gaillard, Sous-Bretonne and Points Cardinaux estates. A 'defensive' political strategy for planning, on the other hand, corresponds to a 'qualitative' housing approach. It consists in avoiding either popular disaffection or rapid depopulation in run-down areas of working class support by undertaking an improvement programme - which should, however, try to avoid raising property values and thus triggering gentrification. Le Havre's southern quarters are a clear potential target for such a defensive strategy.
These two strategies are not mutually exclusive - though they will be limited by the finite volume both of municipal resources and of working-class supporters. One question we shall ask in the following chapters is how far electoral geography really has affected municipal planning choices. First we shall examine its obverse, by trying to see how much the PCF vote is a clientelistic reward for services rendered, as Meyer's support once was, and how far it is ideological, as was the old anarcho-syndicalist movement. We start with the PCF's local organisation.

III.B.3: Municipality and Party

Gerard Heuze", secretary of the PCF's Comitg de Ville (an intermediate level of Party organisation between the section and the departmental federation), has claimed that there were some 1,600 Party members in Le

(35) Havre and Ste-Adresse in 1979 . Of the four sections covered by the Comite de Ville, the south-east grouped some 710 members and the south-west,

(35) Interview with Gerard Heuz£, secretary of the PCF's Comite" de Ville in Le Havre, 29 May 1980. Subsequent official statistics on local Communist strength are taken from the same interview.

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north-west and north-east about 300 each. 46 of the 83 cells were cellules d'entreprise, of which seven were in schools, two in the Town Hall and the rest mostly in the industrial south-east. According to Heuze", 48 per cent of the members were workers, the fastest-expanding age-group in the Party (as in France's population) was between 25 and 35, and total membership was at its highest since the 1940s.
Far from representing a stranglehold of the Party apparatus on Le
Havre's population, or even on its working class, this official tally of 1,600 members is remarkably low. Official PCF figures indicate that of the first-ballot Communist voters in March 1978 over the whole of France, over 12 per cent were Party members - against slightly more than 5 per cent in Seine-Maritime and under 3.5 per cent in Le Havre. Moreover, official figures generally overstate the number of fully paid-up members, and are always much higher than the number of activists. 'Practising' Communists were estimated at about a third of total Party membership in the 1950s, and in the less militant 1970s this had probably fallen to something nearer a tenth - an estimate shared by at least one Communist municipal employee who put the number of solid Party members in the city at no higher than 160 (36).
These figures have caused some concern to Heuze, who attributes the Party's organisational weakness to a climate of complacency among activists and sympathisers resulting from the PCF's commanding electoral position in Le Havre. To this rather surprising point (that electoral success leads to organisational weakness) we may add another possible reason - the survival of an anarcho-syndicalist tradition among Le Havre's

(36) Philippe Robrieux, Histoire Interieure du Parti Communiste, Vol.11 (Paris, Fayard, 1982), 376.

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workers which has produced a high level of union activism (cf. above, p.113) but a low level of political activity.
The main benefits of municipal office for the Party fall
into two categories - political spin-off among the electorate, and the opportunities for the use of municipal patronage. For Heuze", the political spin-off is the most tangible benefit: the Communist municipality has created a 'brand image' of concerned and competent administration which has improved the Party's electoral results generally (cf .above, p.135) By contrast, the proposition that municipal office can be used to
mobilise the population behind a general challenge to the government on broad policy issues is dismissed as 'municipal cretinism' (cf. II, p.36) both by Heuze" and by top PCF councillors. 'Struggles' concern much more immediate demands on housing, schools and jobs - at the end of which
local elus can do no more than draw a pertinent moral.
The use of patronage can be divided into three main areas. Firstly,
the municipality has some 4,000 jobs and the keys to some 2,250 HLM flats (15 per cent of the OPHLM's stock, by virtue of municipal guarantees on HLM loans) in its gift. If any systematic attempt has been made to use this to recruit new Party members (and there is no evidence that this has been done), it has scarcely been a resounding success. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the distribution of such advantages as a reward for faithful services on a more or less clientelistic basis has helped

(37) to firm up the Communist vote . Secondly, municipal office has clearly helped to anchor committed Party permanents and activists. Both Duromea's salary as depute-maire and payments to the four PCF conseillers gdneraux

(37) Cf. Andre* P. Donneur and Jean C. Padioleau, 'Loci Clientelism in Post-Industrial Society: the Example of the French Communist Party', European Journal of Political Research, 10 (1982), 71-82.

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(Heuze* among them) are, in accordance with Communist tradition, paid into a common Party fund which enabled the PCF to employ Durome'a, Heuze" and
six of the eight PCF adjoints in 1977-83 full-time on political work at a skilled engineering worker's wage. Thirdly, municipal resources have been of direct material benefit to the PCF. At the least, the Party's (quite modest) local headquarters is provided by the municipality at a low rent, as elsewhere in France. Whether there is any direct financial profit to the Party is, of course, a delicate area to research. Raymond Pronier lists a number of more or less legal ways in which funds can be trans-ferred, notably by giving municipal contracts to companies controlled by the Party. He adds, however, that this can be difficult as the rules for tendering on large contracts are strict; that such transfers are much more current in the Communist fiefs of the Paris suburbs, and are rare in provincial municipalities controlled by the Party for less than fifteen years; and that even in the Paris suburbs the sums involved rarely reach 1 per cent of the municipal budget. In Le Havre there has been one clear case of municipal corruption concerning payments for contracts made by
a building firm, Thireau-Morel, but this involved a municipal employee
(who was convicted), not the Party (cf. VII, p.336). There are also rumours - which are wholly impossible to verify - that the local PCF takes a 5 per cent cut of fees paid to architects and building contractors. However, Rufenacht, who would surely have been quick to take advantage of any case of corruption involving the municipality but not himself, has
(38)
recognised the financial probity of the Duromea team as its main quality

(38) Raymond Pronier, Les Municipality's Communistes (Paris, Balland, 1983), 108-116. Interview with Antoine Rufenacht, then deputy and
conseiller general, 18 Jan. 1980. Cf. also Luis Gonzalez-Mata, 'La Fili^re de Bagnolet', Actuel, no.5, March 1980, 66-74 and 112-113.

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An equally obscure area of municipal-Party relations concerns the respective decision-making powers of permanents and £lus_. The Communist councillors meet the Comit£ de Ville to discuss policy once a month, and Heuze* was in daily contact with the Town Hall, in person or by telephone, even before becoming an adjoint in his own right in 1983. At the same time the concentration of permanents inside rather than outside the council makes the traditional Right-wing image of shadowy Party professionals manipulating powerless £lus seem wholly unrealistic. As Pronier points out, ill-judged interventions in municipal affairs by Communist sections in areas where the Party organisation is weak is equivalent to the permanents cutting off the branch that supports them. He argues that the relationship between Party and elus is much more complex and fluid, and will vary from one municipality to another. In Le Havre, both Heuze" and the councillors stick to the official line - that the Party helps and advises, but does not substitute itself for, its e*lus (cf. II, p. 102-103). They are not prepared to mention any form of disagreement between the two sides. Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, a detailed alter-

(39) native model for Le Havre is hard to construct
The Comite de Ville does play a major role at election time - in negotiating the programme and the share-out of council seats with the PCF's allies, and in selecting Communist candidates. Heuze describes the typical Communist e"lu in highly traditional Party terms as a worthy figure who reveals unexpected qualities after being cajoled into office by the Party . The Comite's choice of candidates in 1977 shows more of a concern for a socially balanced ticket than for proletarian credentials.

(39) Pronier, Municipal ite"s Communistes, 70-77.
(40) Denis Lacorne, Les Notables Rouges (Paris, FNSP, 1980), 49.

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Only ten of 26 Communist councillors could be described as workers, and of these three were retired, one was Durome"a, and a fifth, Henri Batard, is head of the local CGT. The rest were a varied group of technicians, teachers, housewives and white-collar workers, with seven women and six people under 30. While avoiding the Socialists' concentration on teachers, the Comite" de Ville is so free of ouvrierisme that no Communist adjoint
is a worker. Pronier has shown that this type of occupational distribution is not unusual in French Communist municipalities, and that workers (who in the early days were expected to carry on their jobs on the shop floor after being elected) have steadily been replaced as mayors and adjoints
by Party bureaucrats, some but not all of whom have a working-class back-,(41) ground
Of equal interest are the Communists who have reached the top at the Town Hall. Rene Cance (1896-1982) was a schoolteacher from Correze who arrived in Le Havre in 1919 and played a key organisational role in the Party's local expansion after 1934. His victory over Le"on Meyer in 1937 and his Resistance record fitted him for the post-war leadership of Le Havre's Communists, as deputy and as mayor. The image of 'Le petit pare Cance' (with all that that implies in the context of French municipal
(42)
rhetoric), a man who summed up his idea of France in the word 'measure' , almost certainly helped to ensure a degree of continuity of support with earlier left-wing leaders. But the PCF in Le Havre has managed not to tie its popularity too closely to any one person, and the transition to Cance's successor Durome'a was effected gradually and effectively. Duromea (b.1917),

(41) Pronier, Municipalites Communistes, 131-133.
(42) Quoted by Roland Leroy in his oration at Cance T s funeral, August
1982.

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a former locksmith, also won credit in the Resistance: as 1st adjoint in 1956 he handled the key sectors of finance and personnel, before taking over Cance's offices as conseiller gdngral (1964), deputy (1967) and finally mayor (1971). If Durome"a's electoral appeal was as patriarchal as Cance's (cf. above, p.135), that of the present 1st adjoint and heir-apparent, Daniel Colliard (b.1930) is rather different. Colliard was the youngest adjoint in the 1956 municipality, and rose to the full-time post of 3rd adjoint in 1965. Since then he has accumulated (often unofficially at first) most of the politically sensitive areas - city planning, land policy, intercommunal cooperation, computers, economy and employment, and finance - within his competence as first adjoint: his electoral reverses in 1981 and 1982 have, however, so far prevented an easy passage into Durome'a's offices. Unlike Cance or Durome'a, his rise has taken place inside rather than outside the municipality, thanks to a capacity for work and a grasp of detail unequalled by his colleagues. If he does succeed Durome'a, the transformation of the French mayor from 'city father' to 'professional manager' will be as complete in Le Havre as in any French city.
What the three men have in common is the lack of any high position in
the Party. While both Duromea and Colliard have achieved office in, and written articles for, Communist associations for local elus, neither has appeared in the Cahiers du Communisme or been appointed to the Central Committee. This is not unusual; a few Paris suburbs aside, the PCF has consistently blocked the promotion of top municipal glus to the Central

(43) Committee, and no such elu has reached the politbureau . In Le Havre,

(43) Pronier, Municipality's Communistes, 47, 56, 59.

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this tendency may have been reinforced by a reluctance on the part of Roland Leroy, the Seine-Maritime Federation's most powerful figure, to improve the chances of possible local ,competitors.
Le Havre may have become a working-class stronghold of the PCF, then,
but it is one where the Party organisation is remarkably weak, and where local elus, holding no national Party office and conforming rather closely to French municipal stereotypes, clearly reject the idea of using municipal positions to mobilise the population behind specifically 'revolutionary* objectives. Their consensual rather than partisan appeal is confirmed by the way in which the municipality projects its image to the electorate.

III.B.4: Municipality and Electorate: The Intermediaries

Eleven of Le Havre's fifteen adjoints see members of the public individually at weekly surgeries, and other adjoints and councillors are available on appointment. What concerns us here is more collective forms of contact, which can be discussed under Rosette's three headings of 'Information' (the municipal bulletin and municipal cultural policy), 'Consultation' (relations with associations) and 'Action' (attempts to mobilise the electorate on local issues).
Like any other French city, Le Havre has a municipal bulletin. 'Le
Havre Information' appears about four times a year: its generally modest format (eight black-and-white pages) is supplemented by more sumptuous issues for elections or anniversaries. The content concerns municipal activities, which are'presented in a uniformly favourable light: there are profuse pictures of ribbons being cut, distinguished local visitors, and new facilities (such as the sewage farm, which won a prize in 1974), general descriptions of budget spending by sector, and long lists of municipal projects completed during each term of office. Durome"a's eulogy

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of himself and his colleagues that appeared in a 1970 editorial is typical of the general tone:

'Us ont ge"r£ les affaires municipales avec honne^tete',
avec prudence et avec sagesse ... s'ils sont fiers, a
plus d'un titre, d'avoir apporte* des ameliorations et
des embellissements & la Ville, ils ont conscience
aussi d'avoir oeuvre* pour son avenir et ne croient pas ///\
avoir manque" d'audace pour construire LE HAVRE de demain' .

The possibility of municipal errors is a wholly alien concept to the bulletin. So is that of differences of opinion within the Council. An issue like the 'Special Nouvelle Mairie' produced in Nimes (where the PCF had a plurality but not a majority on the council from 1971-1983), in which each of the three party groups on the council presented a different

(45) project for a new Town Hall, has never appeared in Le Havre

Explicitly political content, though, tends to take second place to this presentation of a triumphant and united municipality working for the whole population. This is clear, for example, in the bulletin's reaction to the prospect of rapid industrial growth in the mid-1960s. Although Colliard signed an article entitled 'Prosperity pour Qui?' and Cance argued that
no harmonious planning was possible under a system dominated by 'the race for profits and the rivalry of financial groups', industrialisation (whether 'monopolist 1 or not) was more generally welcomed, and municipal support promised, without too many questions about its function for capitalism: 'Notre Ville', wrote Durome*a in 1967, 'doit devenir
un tres grand centre industriel et portuaire, certains

(44) Bulletin Municipal Edite" par la Municipality, Le Havre, June 1970, 1.
(45) Vivre a Nimes: Special Nouvelle Mairie, Spring 1979. The three projects presented a caricatural image of the three parties concerned
the PCF wanting a brand-new concrete-and-glass building, the PS a rehabilitation job on the old one, and the PSU a dozen mini-mairies scattered around the city.

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parlent d'un "Ruhr" francais. Qui ne se r£jouirait
pas d'un tel deVeloppement?'(^6).

Within a context of primarily municipal and civic propaganda, the bulletin does not, however, hide its political loyalties. Before May 1981, the municipality's financial difficulties were blamed on the government. High fuel costs (for public transport and for heating municipal buildings) were put down to the regime's links with multinational oil companies; the levying of VAT on municipal investment projects was denounced; and rate demands were accompanied by an article on 'Le Dossier Noir de vos Feuilles Jaunes'. The July 1977 issue argued that the application of the Common Programme would bring 3,000 new jobs to Le Havre; that of March 1978 encouraged the electorate to vote 'for change'. On the other hand, one of the first issues after May 1981 showed Durome"a shaking hands with President Mitterrand. If the rhetoric of the bulletin is at times populist and left-wing, though, it is not explicitly partisan: the Association des Maircs de France, not ANECR, is cited as the authority on the communes' financial crisis, and there is no coverage of, for example, the PCF's proposals for
(47) local government reform
To attempt such a partisan appeal would be to detract from the 'tribunitian consensus' that it is the bulletin's main aim to reinforce. The assumption of such a consensus allows the deflection of criticisms as unnatural attacks on the whole community: thus opponents of a new road plan for Sanvic were denounced as 'politically-motivated rumour-mongers', and an article entitled 'Les.Verrous du Havre' published in the Nouvel Observateur

(46) Le Havre a 450 Ans, municipal bulletin, 1967, 13, 15. Le Havre, Bulletin Municipal (?early 1970), 1.
(47) Le Havre, Bulletin Municipal, June 1970. Le Havre Information, no.24 (supplement), 1976. Le Havre Information, Jan-Feb. 1978.

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dismissed as a 'tissue of untruths, false quotations and personal attacks' that libelled the city . Political points, then, are veiled behind a general presentation of the municipality as a group of dedicated, competent and combative individuals who are the only legitimate representatives of the whole city: that this group has a PCF majority is a conclusion that readers are left to draw for themselves.

The municipality has also pursued an active cultural policy which, involving as it does in part the presentation of a municipal self-image, may be grouped under the heading 'information'. France's first Maison de la Culture (the Maison de la Culture du Havre, or MCH) was opened in a wing of the Town Hall in 1962, and moved to a new building designed by Oscar Niemeyer (architect of Brasilia and of the PCF's Paris headquarters) in 1982. The MCH, though independent in principle, receives heavy municipal subsidies and runs a municipal cultural season. In addition, and with no more than token help from the State, the municipality has built ten Centres de
Loisirs et d'Echanges Culturels (CLECs) in different quarters of the city. The CLECs play a major role in the preparation of an annual summer festival, Juin dans la Rue, which was much applauded in the national press in its early years (1974-75).

There are obvious political elements in the organisation and the running
of both the MCH and the CLECs. Groups from Eastern Europe perform more frequently in Le Havre than in other French cities. Eight out of ten of the CLECs are on the strongly Communist 3rd and 4th cantons (pre-1982 boundaries), and while their boards are chosen by the membership, full-time animateurs

(48) Le Havre Information, Jan-Feb. 1978. The original article (Nouvel Observateur, 6-12 Feb. 1978) contained much hearsay but was less
abusive than the municipal bulletin claimed. It had been torn out
of the copy of the Nouvel Observateur in the city library when I
looked for it in 1980.

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are appointed by the municipality - and many are PCF members: Pronier
thus argues that one purpose of the CLECs is to compensate for the Party's (49)
own organisational weakness . One local show that toured the CLECs
in 1980, 'La Tentative d'Assassinat de Louise Michel au Havre en 1884* portrayed the heroine of the Commune as a noble but idealistic predecessor of scientific socialism. Michel Sardou, a popular singer with a certain nostalgia for Alge'rie Francaise, has performed in Le Havre, but never on municipal premises. To the extent that it has a political line from day to day, however, municipal cultural policy is not overtly partisan, and left-wing critics of the PCF have not been excluded from municipal stages. The activities and the target consumers of the MCH and the CLECs
differ. Just after the opening of the Niemeyer centre, the MCH offered heavily-subsidised performances by the Dresden Opera, Dizzy Gillespie, Lionel Hampton, Ravi Shankar and the French National Orchestra. The audiences consisted chiefly of middle-class voters who have no commitment to the PCF but who are likely to judge the municipality partly on the range of cultural activities available in the city. The CLECs, by contrast, are mostly situated in working-class quarters far from the city centre: their programmes involve more public participation than those of the MCH, and include community-centre activities like pottery or painting as well as music, theatre and cinema. But if the CLECs represent an attempt to 'bring culture to the masses' (albeit in response to local initiatives), their success has been partial. Among some 2,350 adult members of CLECs in 1979 (there were also about' as many members under 20), workers were under-

(49) Pronier, Municipalities Communistes, 300. The impression of an endless round of the Red Army Choir and Cossack dancers given by Jean Montaldo
(La France Communiste: Paris, Albin Michel, 1978, 195-196) is a gross distortion.

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represented and the middle classes over-represented . The Mare-Rouge CLEG was closed for two years after being vandalised by local youths. Despite such setbacks, both the MCH (especially on its new premises) and the CLECs have helped to create a 'brand image' of a municipality committed to subsidised culture and prepared to experiment with new ideas. That 'marginal' electoral categories have been more ready to respond than the solid Communist base is perhaps no great cause for regret in the municipality.
We have already seen that one form of 'consultation' practised in Le
Havre is the pre-election questionnaire on the municipal programme (above, p.135). In addition, however, the municipality tries to keep in touch with its electors from day to day through its relations with local associations. These include parents' groups, over-65s clubs, amateur sports associations, youth clubs, and the CLECs themselves. In addition, the 34 Comites de Quartier - associations organised chiefly by local shop-keepers to raise money for charities and to organise 'Fetes du quartier' that boost retail trade - group a number of Havrais on a neighbourhood basis, though without official powers.
The municipality shares out subsidies widely and with little dis-crimination among the Comites de Quartier and other associations. Adjoints and councillors are delegated to liaise with particular groups. And Le Havre's elus cite this liberal policy as a major electoral asset, which at once shows the municipality's even-handedness and allows it to keep in touch with the grass roots: they rarely move ahead on a major local project

(50) J.Y. Cle"ach, 'Les CLEG: Sociologie des Adherents', Encrages, no.6,
27-32.

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without using associations as a forum of consultation first . Such openness corresponds to Milch's account of the Nimes Communists, which he contrasts with the refusal of Montpellier's conservative mayor Francois

(52) Delmas to have any contact with associations . Yet it seems probable

that Delmas was missing an opportunity, for contact with associations also helps to anticipate and to head off criticism. Associations outside the approved network in Le Havre can be looked on with suspicion. One group, for example, which drew up a plan to improve the Place de Bleville area, was practically ignored for a year: the meeting that finally took place ended with the municipality promising to pursue the plan further, and then filing it. As to groups formed to fight municipal projects, they are sometimes treated with open hostility (cf. above,p. 1 58). There is dis-crimination, in other words, but not on the basis of party political loyalties. More important appears to be the extent to which the association in question accepts the 'tribunitian consensus' and avoids public criticism of the municipality's leadership.
Of overwhelming importance among local associations are trade unions,
which the municipality subsidises generously, notably by paying the over-heads and the recent renovation costs of the Bourse du Travail, the inter-union headquarters at the Cercle Franklin. The CGT is much the strongest union in the Le Havre area: in 1980, it claimed 21,000 active members (against under 5,000 for all other unions) and took 55 per cent of the

(51) Interviews with: Daniel Colliard, 1st adjoint and conseiller general, Le Havre, 2 Apr. 1979; Maryvonne Rioual, 5th adjoint and conseiller general, Le Havre, 2 June 1980; Michel Barrier, 13th adjoint, Le
Havre, 6 May 1980; Jacques Leblond, councillor, Le Havre, 10 November 1979. (All four are Communists).
(52) Jerome Milch, 'Paris is Not France', MIT Doctoral thesis, 1973, 243-
247. Cf, also P. Dressayre, 'Suburbanisation et Pouvoir Local',
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Revue Francaise de Science Politique, Vol.30, no.3, June 1980, 554-

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votes at elections for union delegates. CGT strongholds include the Town Hall, the power station, the chemical industry, Renault, and the docks, where it operates a closed shop. Links with both the PCF and the municipality are close. The tradition that a non-Communist should be the secretary-general of the CGT's union locale was allowed to lapse in 1960, and both the incumbents of the office since then, Louis Eudier and Henri Batard, have been PCF councillors. Henri Batard (who of course has an interest in stressing the independence of the CGT from the Party) claims that two major non-Communist currents - worker-priests and anarcho-syndicalists - still play a major role at the top of the union locale. Some of this, however, may be put down to the cultivation of tame fellow-travellers: it is certainly clear that the PCF has a controlling position in the CGT leadership. What is less certain is how far the union can control its members. The anarcho-syndicalists still have a near-monopoly among the dockers, and in the strained period of 1980-81 some 10,000 CGT members abstained in elections of union delegates, while both merchant marine officers and Sandouville workers joined the movement led by Marseille

(53) CGT activists against the sectarianism of the Marchais campaign

Municipal links with the CGT are particularly strong during strikes
and demonstrations - in other words in 'action'. Such actions have to have union approval: an unofficial stoppage by packers at Caucriauville's Lipton's Tea warehouse in 1977 was broken by the CGT, and the overall strike

(54) rate is no higher in Le Havre than elsewhere . Provided they are

official, though, strikes always attract the sympathetic attention of the

(53) Interview with Henri Batard, Secre'taire-Ge'ne'ral, Union Locale CGT Le Havre, 12 May 1981. Le Monde, 21 February and 2 April 1981.
(54) Pronier, Municipalites Communistes, 282-283.

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municipality, and union processions through the city centre always stop
at the Town Hall to hear a speech from Durome"a or an adjoint. It is over-whelmingly likely that.this systematic, if often symbolic, support from the Town Hall for official CGT activities has helped to solidify the working-class base of the municipality and thus, indirectly, of the PCF. 'Action' is not confined to support for the CGT, however; it has also
been used to pursue municipal goals, and particularly (before May 1981) subsidies. The municipal bulletin has frequently printed photographs of adjoints leading demonstrations of parents for government money to build schools - and of the champagne receptions with the parents that followed the release of the subsidies. When the future of the Niemeyer centre was in doubt in 1977, the municipality collected 11,000 signatures for a petition to save the project. While demonstrations have also happened on wider issues, such as VAT payments on communal investments (cf. II, p.55), 'action' has generally been firmly anchored to local issues and makes no direct attempt to mobilise support behind national Party aims. That does not, of course, mean that it does not receive the Party's encouragment. Pronier argues that throughout the 1970s both the permanents who liaised with municipalities and the 'militants' on the councils themselves persistently prodded the more 'technocratic' Communist glus to show more 'visibility' and 'awareness of the potential for mass action 1. These attempts were naturally redoubled as the PCF stressed its 'revolutionary'

u j J i ^(55) image at the decade s end

Almost all the elements in the intermediary structure between the municipality and the electorate - the bulletin, relations with associations and with the CGT, and 'Action' - came into play in the struggles over the

(55) Ibid., 53-56, 142-146.

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future of the France between 1974 and 1979. As a luxury transatlantic liner, the France was obsolescent when she was launched in 1960: but she was also a beautiful ship in an unbeautiful city, and thus a focus of civic pride - besides accounting for some 3,000 jobs on board and on shore.
When the France was withdrawn from service in 1974, the municipal bulletin demanded that the State pay for its refit as a cruise ship and cover its running losses thereafter . The 'Association for the Defence of the France' (with its headquarters in the Town Hall) rapidly became the largest association in Le Havre. The ship herself, however, remained tied up at
the 'Quai de I'Oubli' for five years before being sold to a Norwegian cruise operator. The new owner renamed her Norway and contracted for a refit, not in Le Havre but in Bremerhaven. In August 1979 CGT dockers and tugmen closed the exits to the Port, and the final act of the drama was the inter-vention of riot police to remove several hundred demonstrators, Daniel Colliard at their head, from the last bridge blocking the France's exit. The action over the France failed to achieve its declared objectives,
then, though Le Havre's elus subsequently (and questionably) claimed that by drax^ing attention to the plight of the city's shipyards they prompted the release of subsidies for the new floating dock installed in 1982. More important was the reinforcement of links between the municipality and the electorate. Le Havre's Communist e~lus have rarely used their position as a platform for direct Party propaganda. Rather, they have presented them-selves as the representatives of the whole population, concerned to defend local industry, jobs and prestige and ready to face the CRS to prove it.
The convergence of this with Party rallying-calls (Produisons francais, Halte au gachis industriel) is implicit not explicit. No episode illustrates

(56) Le Havre, Bulletin Municipal, June 1974, 1.

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better than the France the attempt of the elus to weld popular support for municipality and - through it - the Party through the creation of a 'tribunitian consensus 1. Le Havre may thus be a case where the Party is less important for the mairie than the Town Hall is for the Party.

III.C: Administration and Finance

III.C.1; Municipal Organisation: the Town Hall

Motions were not debated in Le Havre's monthly public council meetings between 1965 and 1983: they merely went through 'on the nod' at the rate of one a minute. This was due partly to an agenda of 100-200 items per meeting, and partly to the absence of a municipal opposition during the period concerned, which apparently rendered the private dress rehearsals
for council meetings equally unanimous . While recognising the impotence of council meetings, Milch contrasts the personal decision-making of Delmas

(58) in Montpellier with the collective style of Emile Jourdan's team in Nimes

This section will attempt to discover where decisions are reached in the municipality of Le Havre, and how the elus make use of the bureaucracy. Solitary decision-making has not been a practice either of Durome"a
or of Cance. As deputies (unlike Delmas in Montpellier), both have in any case spent three days a week in the National Assembly for much of the year - too long to keep a detailed grip on every municipal dossier. Moreover,
the Party in Le Havre appears to have guarded against relying on any single individual to defend its position in the city (c f. above, pp.155-156).

(57) Council meetings before 1965 were more lively. They have also been slightly more so since the election of 12 opposition councillors in
March 1983.

(58) Milch, 'Paris', 171-201.

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The Conseil des Adjoints meets on Thursday evenings, on the mayor's
return from Paris during parliamentary sessions. Adjoints T positions are important enough to be a key point of negotiation between coalition partners in the run-up to municipal elections. In the Le Havre conseil
of 17 elus between 1977 and 1983 (including Durome'a but excluding Cance,
the Honorary Mayor), ten were Communists, and Bernard Robinet raised this figure to eleven by defecting to the PCF from the MRG in 1979. The Communists appear to have appropriated a number of adjoints proportional to their majority in the Council - but to have taken sensitive positions (those with most responsibility and most contact with the public) in proportion to

(59) their superior negotiating position (cf. Table III.7, p. 168). . Moreover,

within the Conseil des Adjoints an inner circle of full-time dlus, the Conseil Restreint des Adjoints, meets on Monday mornings. Thanks to the Communists' redistribution of their elus' pay (cf: above, p.152). The PCF in 1977-83 had eight full-time elus to the Socialists' one. It is highly probable that the Conseil Restreint is the scene of more real debate than the full Conseil.
The single most powerful figure on the Council (including the mayor)
is almost certainly Daniel Colliard, the 1st adjoint. His attention to detail and capacity for work - his is more an administrative than a creative intellect - have allowed him to achieve a hold over the municipal bureaucracy that none of his colleagues have equalled. His capabilities have been reflected in his rapid promotion (3rd adjoint, working full-time, from 1965) and his unofficial responsibilities (town planning from 1965-71 and finance from 1977-83). Colliard's influence over town planning since 1971 (when he took over the job officially) and indeed since 1965 has been paramount.

(59) Prohier (Municipalites Communistes, 127) makes the same general point about the party distribution of adjoint-ships in Le Havre, but gets
his facts wrong, seeing Town Planning as a 'technical 1 area that the
PCF conceded to the Socialists.

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Table III.7: Le Havre's Conseil des Adjoints, 1977-1983

Position, Name, Party

Hon. mayor
Mayor
1st Adjoint
(cons.ge'n.)

2nd Adjoint
3rd Adjoint
4th Adjoint
(cons . ge*n.)
5th Adjoint
(cons. gen.)
6th Adjoint
7th Adjoint
8th Adjoint
9th Adjoint

10th Adjoint
11th Adjoint

12th Adjoint

13th Adjoint

14th Adjoint
(deputy, 1981)
15th Adjoint
Rouelles

R. Cance
A. Durome'a
D. Colliard

J. Rube
B. Robinet
M. Schlewitz

M. Rioual

PCF
PCF
PCF

PS
MRG^-PCF
PCF

PCF

A. Heudron (Personality)
R. Ricouard PCF
R. Joly PCF
G. Lechevallier PS

P. Bisch
E. Delegue

S. Duval

M. Barrier

J. Menga

D. Paul
J. Defrene

PCF
PS

PCF

PCF

PS

PCF
PS

Main Area of Competence

General admin., finance
Town planning: Economy: Employment Intercommunal cooperation: Computers: Land policy.
Health: Hygiene: Pollution. Tourism.
Personnel: Public Relations: BleVille.
Children: Young people: CLECs: Graville.
Culture.
Architecture.
Green spaces: Environment. Traffic: Parking: Retail Trade: Public Transport: Abattoirs. Sport.
Crdches: Secondary education: Sanvic.
School canteens: Municipal holiday camps: Registration of Births, Deaths, Marriages: Electoral Roll. Roads: Water: Sewage: Rubbish:
Comite's de Quartier.
Senior Citizens: Fire: Social
Assistance.
Primary and Higher Education.
Rouelles affairs.

Source: Ville du Havre, Attribution du Maire et des Adjoints, 1977 (59)

Do the municipal committees confirm the adjoints' decisions or (as the

official flow charts would have it) reach decisions of their own for

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submission to the Council? The Le Havre Town Hall has eleven committees, one (finance) chaired by the Mayor and the rest by adjoints. Each committee is composed of ten or twelve adjoints and councillors: the Communists hold seven of the chairmanships and the majority on every committee. They meet unevenly: the Public Relations Committee has gone for years without a full meeting, without halting publication of the municipal bulletin. The example that concerns us most directly, however, is Town Planning.
The Commission d'Urbanisme, a direct successor of the post-war
Commission de Reconstruction, met about six times a year, for about two hours per meeting, in the 1970s. Courant and Monguillon, as mayors, both took the chair themselves, but both Cance and Durome'a have delegated the job to an adjoint - a fact which appears to confirm Milch's remarks about the Communists' collective style of decision-making. Since 1971 this adjoint has been Colliard (who holds no other chairmanships): in fact, he also led the Committee's most important discussions between 1965 and 1971. Other members included six adjoints (Defrene, Robinet, Ricouard, Joly, Lechevallier and Barrier from 1977-83) and six councillors: the minority has been represented both before 1965 and since 1983 (Courant sat from 1956-59, and Louis Eudier under Courant and Monguillon). Technicians are co-opted as and when needed, but the formula of the 'C omm is s i o n Mu n i c i p a1e Elargie' including users' representatives, favoured by the Socialists (and by some Communists, including Canacos in Sarcelles) has never been tried in Le Havre
Neither before nor since 1965 has the Committee divided along party lines. But a number of factors have prevented it from playing the role of

(60) For Sarcelles under Canacos, cf. Pronier, Municipalities Communites,
328.

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a real decision-making body. Firstly, it has not discussed all town planning questions. Reconstruction plans (other than the design of the Town Hall) were almost entirely in government hands: more recently, the
Loi d'Orientation Fonci&re of 1967 (cf. Ch.II, 5^60 and Ch.V, p.238) requires that key city planning documents should be jointly produced by a few e*lus and the State's services. Moreover, many major operational decisions are taken in fact at meetings between adjoints and representatives of different agencies outside the Town Hall (cf. Ch.IV, passim), and merely confirmed
in Committee.

Secondly, most Committee members, through lack of time or expertise
or both, have taken a wholly passive role. Only half are likely to be present at any one meeting, and only two or three come every time. At times there are complaints (especially from Socialists) that members are insufficiently informed, or are suddenly invited to discuss bulky dossiers they have had no chance to look through. But no committee member has ever taken the initiative of visiting the technical services to get more

(fa 1 ^ information on specific questions . Thirdly, this passivity has left

Colliard, with his long full-time experience in the job, almost wholly dominant. Only once in the 1970s (in 1976) was a motion from the chair defeated. Interestingly, this occurred as a result not of Socialist opposition but of three councillors opposing the adjoints: of the three,
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the two Communists were dropped from the Council in 1977 . This isolated occasion aside, Colliard has managed to apply Churchill's concept of Cabinet procedure - 'agreement with my wishes after reasonable discussion' - every

(61) Interviews with Jean Defrene, Maire-Det legue', Rouelles, 14 June 1980. Rene Lahousse, chief draftsman, SUVH, 28 July 1982.
(62) Ville du Havre, Commission d'Urbanisme, compte-rendu, 22 April 1976, 10 June 1976. For more detail of this episode, cf. VII, p.360.

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time: in effect, the Committee does no more than confirm decisions taken elsewhere, and Colliard's right of final regard over the minutes allows reserves expressed during meetings to be toned down.
'Elsewhere' often means in meetings with technicians inside and
outside the Town Hall - which raises the question of the PCF's control of the municipal bureaucracy. Numerically speaking, this penetration is fairly slight. The Town Hall counts just two workplace cells, with about fifty members (not all of whom are active) for 4,000 or so employees - to which another fifty or so in neighbourhood cells may perhaps be added. Traditionally, the top job of Secretaire-General has been held by a non-Communist, as in many other PCF mairies. However, there has generally been at least one Communist Secre'taire-Ge'ne'ral-Adjoint, and in 1983 Jean-Pierre Lousse, who rose rapidly in the bureaucracy partly on the strength of a doctoral thesis on Le Havre's electoral sociology produced on the Town Hall's time, became the city's first Communist Secrgtaire-Gdne'ral. In addition, young Communist high-fliers people several of the more sensitive services, such as the mayor's secretariat and the economic planning office. That said, Party membership does not appear to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for rising in the hierarchy. Equally important are success in the regionally-based competitive examinations for entry to each grade (though the municipality can choose which of its employees get extra time off work to prepare for these examinations), and loyalty to the bureaucracy as much as to the Party. As Pronier points out, the hierarchical relationship that Communist elus seek to establish with the personnel may be
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complicated and even disrupted among employees who are also comrades

(63) Pronier, jMunicipalite's Communistes_, 320. Lousse's thesis 'Sociologie Electorale du Havre r was accepted by the University of Rouen in 1978.

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By contrast, the CGT's influence in the bureaucracy is very great,
with membership exceeding half of the municipal workforce. A major reason for this appears to be, not so much that a CGT card helps career prospects, but that the CGT is the recognised channel to express grievances. The

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CFDT's hundred or so members, by contrast, do not enjoy such a channel - and their strike over job grading in June 1979 met with little sympathy from the authorities. How well the CGT works from the employees 1 point of view is uncertain. The municipality does provide the vast majority with job security (titularisation), only rarely using contractual employees. However, the CGT in Le Havre's Town Hall is quite literally a bosses' union (Henri Batard being on the council). Members' energies have often been diverted, especially before May 1981, into somewhat ineffective 'days of action' on such issues as Social Security contributions or 'the government's austerity policies', during which they have been allowed off work on full pay to fill out the crowds in front of the sub-prefecture. High CGT membership in the Town Hall has thus probably helped to deflect some at least of the employees' grievances away from the municipality while releasing manpower for the union's more symbolic activities. At the same time the municipal workforce could not be mobilised for the CGT's (and ultimately the PCF's) purposes so easily if the municipal CGT paid no attention at all to its members' demands. That means that the union can be of real use for employees to express grievances, without ever leading to open confrontation. For the PCF, the CGT provides a 'window' onto the municipal personnel, but without leading to massive Communist recruitment The main technical division concerned with town planning is the
Service d'Urbanisme de la Ville du Havre (SUVH) - though an architecture

(64) Ibid., 316-319.

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service and a properties service also exist separately. The SUVH is a 'service hors division' in the municipal organisation chart and is thus directly responsible to the Council - in practice to Colliard. For a
city of over 200,000 inhabitants, the SUVH is remarkably small: it has some twenty employees, of whom the vast majority are occupied with the routine drafting of plans and processing of building permits. Moreover,. its chief from 1970 to 1982, Edmond Beyazian, was a contractual employee who also kept up a private architect's office in Le Havre. His main characteristics, at least in the later years, were the rarity with which he appeared at the Town Hall and his ineffectiveness when he was present. Beyazian had a PCF card for reasons of expediency (he also took out membership of the PS in June 1981): two other SUVH employees are PCF members but neither are active - although the CCT is solidly implanted in the service. The SUVH has thus constituted neither an outpost of the PCF organisation in the planning apparatus nor (owing to its lack of man-power) a regular technical service capable of proposing several choices to the e"lus on a wide range of planning questions. Much to the dis-satisfaction of its members, it has rarely played a creative role, concentrating more on studying the application of decisions already taken by Colliard. The technical input for these decisions often comes, not
from the SUVH, but from private consultants (such as the PCF's favoured study bureau ORGECO) or from the local agencies described in Chapter IV Insofar as considerable powers are delegated from the mayor and a

(65) This assessment of the SUVH is based largely on conversations with its employees between 1980 and 1983. In September 1982 Beyazian left
after the non-renewal of his contract, and a new post of Directeur d'Ame*nagement Urbain was created in the context of a general re-organisation of the Town Hall. Beyazian's career suffered a further setback in December 1982 when he was severely stabbed by one of his mistresses (Le Havre Presse, 4 December 1982).

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committee system exists (at least on paper), the organisation of decision-making in Le Havre appears to correspond more to the 'collective' style of Nimes under Jourdan than to the 'solitary' style of Montpellier under Delmas. However, 'collective' decision-making certainly does not include all the councillors, and the workings of the Commission d'Urbanisme suggest that the committee system does not, in fact, provide a real forum for the confrontation of policy alternatives. Moreover, while the Conseil des Adjoints probably does have a role to play, it is significant that its business is prepared by the inner circle of full-time e"lus - and that the Communists' predominance is more marked with each step up the decision-making hierarchy. This predominance is not very obviously reflected in
the municipal bureaucracy, though it seems probable that special trust is placed in a fairly small number of Communist high-fliers. The closest approximation in Le Havre to a solitary style of decision-making is provided by Colliard. Without extending over the whole range of municipal administration, his area of competence is very wide indeed, and there is little indication that he seeks alternative opinions either in Committee
or within the SUVH. A large number of Colliard's decisions are prepared
at meetings between himself and agencies outside the Town Hall. These
will be described in the next chapter. However, we must first consider the financial constraints within which the municipality has to operate.

III.C.2: The Finances of the City of Le Havre

We have already noted the absence of a second city that would permit
the kind of controlled budgetary comparisons made in Milch's work on Nimes and Montpellier (Ch.I, p.2/)- In the absence of such possibilities, the purpose of this section will be threefold. Firstly, since financial constraints have repeatedly been invoked by Colliard and other e"lus in their

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approach to operational city planning, it seems necessary to allow the chapter on operational planning (Ch.VII) to be placed in the context of the city's overall financial situation. Secondly, the Communists' long run in office allows us to ask one question which Milch, dealing with a
fairly short time-span, could not - has the municipality transformed the structure of the city's finances in the course of the sixteen budgets considered? Thirdly, we shall use approximate comparisons both with
Milch's work and with big-city averages to see if Le Havre tends to confirm or disprove Milch's argument that a Communist municipality can produce recognisably left-wing results through the budget (Tables III.8-15, pp.182-188) Local government spending has risen rapidly throughout France since
the mid-1960s, and Le Havre is no exception to the rule. The total volume
of the budget grew at more than twice the speed of inflation, and much
faster than the population between 1965 and 1980 (Table III.8). In
the earlier years much of this growth was concentrated in the investment budget, which expanded considerably faster than the current budget and
thus took a larger share of the total. From 1974, however, this tendency was checked and then reversed as current spending, fed by inflation and
the cost of running new facilities, accelerated fast enough to account
for some two-thirds of the total by 1980 - a greater proportion than in

1965.

In this respect Le Havre has reproduced the typical evolution of French municipal budgets (cf. Ch.II, pp. 55-56). There is one divergence: while most cities' investments fell in the late 1970s, Le Havre's merely increased more slowly, keeping slightly ahead of inflation. This did not, however, amount to a prodigal spree of investment on borrowed money. The communal debt progressed less rapidly than the total volume of the budget: and the survey of endebtedness in France's cities published by Le Point in 1979

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put Le Havre in 20th position out of 39 cities of over 100,000 inhabitants. Le Havre's debt amounted to 2,091 francs per head of population - more than any other Communist municipality except St-Etienne, but less than many Socialist and right-wing cities such as Rouen, Marseille, Nice, and
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Grenoble

The composition of the current budget reveals modest but distinct left-wing policy outputs of the kind noted by Milch. The total volume of current spending was slightly higher than the average for cities of comparable size by 1980 (Table III. 15). The municipality did not transform the structure of current receipts during the sixteen budgets considered: when it arrived in office this structure already resembled that of Nimes (with nearly 40 per cent of receipts coming from direct taxation) more than that of Montpellier (Table III.9) 7 . But between 1965 and 1980 the share of direct taxation increased slightly and that of payments by users of municipal services fell. Moreover, when a new way to tax businesses appeared, the municipality made full use of it. An Act of 1973 allowed
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big-city municipalities to levy a tax of up to 1 per cent on the wage bills of local companies to subsidise public transport; in Le Havre, the level of the Versement Transport was fixed at 0.75 per cent in 1975 and at the maximum level of 1 per cent in 1977: its product was a significant addition to the current budget - and made a major difference to the bus service. There are also substantial differences between the structure of Le
Havre's current receipts and that of other cities of comparable size, as measured in 1980 (Tables III.14-15). In two respects, Le Havre

(66) Le Point, no.374, 19 Nov. 1979, 91-95.
(67) Milch, 'Paris', 59-60. Milch's chapter on the budgets of Nimes and Montpellier makes a number of useful general points on French municipal finances which have been omitted from this more rapid overview.

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is a slightly underprivileged commune. The tax base, or potential fiscal, is rather lower than the average. This was not fully compensated by the Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement (DGF), the rate support grant which, initially as the Versement Repre*sentatif de la Taxe sur les Salaires (VRTS) replaced the old local sales tax in 1967 and has taken a diminishing share of the current budget ever since. The current budget, which is slightly larger than the average, has thus depended more heavily than most on local taxpayers, and the levels both of direct taxation and of taxes paid by ordinary households (the Taxe d'Habitation plus payments for services like rubbish collection and water) are relatively high. However, there is evidence to suggest that, within this context, the municipality of Le Havre has used its (limited) freedom to decide the weighting between business and other taxes and its (rather greater) freedom to fix the prices of services to lighten the burden on ordinary rate-payers. Taxes paid by households provide a lower proportion of Le Havre's total fiscal receipts than average. In 1981, the products of the Taxe Professionnelle and the Foncier B3ti (paid by businesses and landlords) were both substantially higher than in most other big cities x^hile that of the Taxe d'Habitation (paid by all households) was lower.
Current spending can be analysed in two ways, by considering the type
of service or goods bought (for example, paper-clips or man-hours) and by considering the municipal services (such as roads or social assistance) for which such purchases are made. In the first categorisation (Table III.10) we find'two constants and two major changes in Le Havre since 1965. Spending on personnel accounted for over 40 per cent of the current budget in 1965: the tendency has been towards a modest diminution in percentage terms, though the proportion in 1980 was still a little higher than that in other cities of comparable size (Table III.15).

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There is very little, then, to suggest that the Communist municipality has set about inflating the local bureaucracy to provide jobs en masse for
Party workers. The second constant was spending on 'Denre'es et Fournitures' , or day-to-day supplies, which varies little from one municipality to
/£ o \

another and increases at a comparable rate to that of the total budget
The two main changes in spending were related to each other. After 1970, the proportion of the current budget available for the self-financing of investments dropped below 10 per cent and went on falling. At the same time the share taken up by interest payments on investment loans rose to exceed 10 per cent - reaching a level slightly, but only slightly, above the average in 1980 (Table III. 15). This increase clearly limits the extent to which big future investments can be financed by loans.
The other categorisation of the current budget involves sharing out
costs such as personnel, energy or interest among the different municipal services, and is therefore imprecise. Equally imprecise is Milch's separation of the 'economic' from the 'social' services, since the categorisation will vary from city to city. With these reservations in mind, Le Havre's current spending by sector has changed rather little since 1965 (Table III.11). There has certainly been no spectacular redirection of funds away from 'economic' services as Milch's account might lead us to expect, and the amount spent per head of population on road maintenance in the late 1960s was considerably higher in Le Havre (for a comparable road network) than in Nimes . The changes have been three-fold. Firstly, the share of the most 'social' heads of expenditure - social assistance and school canteens - has slightly diminished since 1965.

(68) Milch, 'Paris', 98.
(69) Milch, 'Paris', 96-97.

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Secondly, there has been a significant increase in the proportion allocated to education, culture and sport. Thirdly, the municipality has apparently been sure enough of its image to allow spending on public relations to increase no faster than the rate of inflation.
Tables for the current budget give figures for 1965, 1970, 1975 and
1980 to show the evolution over the whole period. This is possible because annual variations are fairly small. By contrast, they can be very large in the investment budget: one big subsidy can alter the structure of receipts, one major project can change the division of expenditure by sector. The figures for the investment budget (Tables III.12, III. 13)
are therefore given for every year, with a cumulative total.
Despite some violent annual cyclical variations, several secular
tendencies can be observed. Firstly, the volume of State subsidies wholly failed to keep pace with the overall growth of the investment budget. It is true that 1965 appears to have been an unusually good year for subsidies and is thus not a very good year to use as a base: but even if the much more modest figure for 1966 is taken as base, the same general comment holds good. Secondly, self-financing was already at a very modest level in 1965. Taken over the whole period, its share of total investment remained just under 17 per cent, though with substantial variations. Thirdly, the municipality depended more and more on loans for its investments - their share in 1965 was nearly 44 per cent, the average for the whole period nearly
When we turn to investment expenditure, it is therefore not surprising that financial costs (chiefly capital repayments) took up an increasing share of this part of the budget just as interest payments accounted for a greater proportion of current spending. The separation between 'economic' investments such as municipal buildings, water and sewage, and 'social'

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ones, is as subjective as in the current budget. A very approximate comparison with Milch, however, shows that 'economic' spending, at roughly a third of the total over the whole period, was closer to the level in Ntmes (a quarter) than to Montpellier (over a half) . Education, culture, health and social facilities took an increasing (though not a steadily increasing) share of the total: and investments in public transport (through subsidies to Le Havre's bus company) grew substantially after
1975, fed by transfers of part of the Versement Transport from the current budget. The very slow increase in spending on 'supplies' (such as office furniture and vehicles) can probably be explained by the classification
of an increasing proportion of such items under specific departments. Finally, investments in city planning are included under two headings - City Planning and Housing, and Programmes for other bodies (the State, the Departe^ment, HLM Builders and the Chamber of Commerce among others) . They group a wide variety of expenditure - from long-term land purchases,
to subsidies on HLM operations, to contributions for major projects such
as the World Trade Centre and the floating dock. Annual variations have been as great as under any other heading, but the share of these sections
in the total investment budget over the whole period has been under 10
per cent. As we shall see, this modest share has meant that the municipality has invested in such operations selectively, rather than, for example, pursuing a systematic policy of subsidising all cheap housing projects.
This very cursory examination of Le Havre's finances broadly confirms Milch's claim that the political colour (or 'operational principles') of
a municipality can have a discernible effect on its budgetary outputs.
This is shown by the municipality's preference for direct taxation as

(70) Milch, 'Paris', 112-113.

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opposed to payments for services as a source of revenue; by its willing-ness to make the fullest possible use of taxes on businesses, and notably the Versement Transport; by the increases in social and educational spending noted since 1965; and by its concern to keep up a high level of investment, even at the price of tying up an increasing proportion of expenditure in debt repayments.
The problem of debt repayments meant that in a sense, despite an apparently growing opulence (both current and investment spending being more than twice as great in real terms in 1980 as in 1965), the financial context was also one of increasing constraint. The municipality could
use the annual adoption of the budget to make political points about this problem. It produced a hypothetical budget 'in the context of the application of the Common Programme' in 1973, and in 1974 and 1975 added extra receipts from the State - for VAT reimbursement and 'in compensation for price rises' - that were rejected by the prefect. But the municipality could not behave as if the constraints did not exist. Thus the deviations from averages and the changes in the structure of receipts and spending, while perceptible, have been moderate and in particular, the growth of the debt has been kept within limits. To endebt itself to the hilt would have exposed the municipality to an unwelcome dependence on the goodwill of the prefect and the ministerial field services from year to year. It x^ould also have rendered it vulnerable to charges of financial profligacy. Since the PCF in the 1960s and 1970s perceived one of the main benefits of local office as the chance to prove its responsibility and its eligibility for national office, this was something it wished to avoid.

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Taole }_•_ Le Havre, Current Budget; Receipts, Excluding Previous Year's Surplus, 1965-1960

Receipt

Subsidies
from State,
le"parteinent ,
and other
sources

Payments by
users of
municipal
services

Taxe Locale,

VRTS,

DGF (a)

Direct

Taxation

Other
receipts

Veraejnent
Trans oort

TOTAL

Amount

(000 F)
As per
cent to^al
Index
(1 965*100)
Amount

(000 F)
As per cent
total
Index
(1965*100)
AJnoun^
(000 F)
As per cent
total
Index
(1965-100)

Amount

(000 F)
As per cent
total
Index
(1965*100)
Amount

(000 F)
As per cent
total
Index
(1 9t>5 = 100)
Amount
(000 F)
As per cent
total

Amount

(000 F)
Index
(1965^100)

1965

3,278

4.6

100

14,880
20.9

100

21,852
30.7

100

28,366
39-9

100

2,799
3.9

100

-

-

71,125

100

1970

5,360

4.5

164

25,666

21.5

172

34,597

28.8

157

52,618

44.1

185

1,227

1.0

45

—

-

119,268

168

1975

12,480

4.5

381

52,444
18.9

353

75,131
27.1

344

111,611
40.1

391

15,866

5-7

577

9,925
3.6

276,907

392

1980

30,838

5.6

941

99,255
17.9

667

144,293

26.0

660

239,409

43.1

844

14,387

2.6

523

26,964

4.9

555,146
781

Source: Ville du Havre, Comptes Aoministratifs (including Water anu Sewage),

Kote: Previous year's surplus, an important but highly variable source of revenue, is gene redly exciuaed from French budgetary analysis.
The Taxe 1,00 ale, a local business tax, disappeared witri tne introauctic
of VAT in 196? am has been replaced by a form 01 State rate support
grant, called the Versement Repre-spnt t i f H i n
S), 1967-78, aT^hlT^t
de Fonctionement since 1979.

Table III.10: Le Havre; Proportion of Current Receipts Spent on Personnel, Interest Payments, and Transfers to Investment Budget, 1965-80.
T f\^C T f*7f\ 1 rt'TC 1 f\f\f\

Interest

Payments

^

Personnel
Costs

Transfers
to
Investment

Budget

Amount

(000 F)
Aa per cent
of total
Index
(1965-100)
Amount

(OOOF)
Aa per cent
of total
Index
(1965^100)

Amount

(000 F)
As per cent
of total-
Index
(1965=100)

1965

5,390
7.0
100

32,827
42.5
100

6,071
7.9
100

1970

9,709
7.5
180

54,579
42.0
166

13,591
10.5
224

1975

28,140
9.8
522

112,780
39.2
344

23,856
8.3
393

1980

59,783
10.3

1,109

227,646
39.3
693

*

35,494
6.1
585

Source; Ville du Havrei Comptes Adrainlstratifs, 1965-1980.

Table III.11: Le Havre, Proportion of Real Current Spending1 by Sector,
1965-1980.
Sector,
Muni be r of
Budget ^^
Chapter
School
Canteens,
Social
Services

(941,951,955)

Education,
Culture,
oport

(945,945)

Roads, Water,
Sewage , Ind-
ustrial and
Commercial
Services
(936,937,961,
964,965,967,
Water /Sewage)

Justice,
Security,
Police,
Hygiene
(941,942,953)

Public

Relation..

(940)

Total

Date 1965
~^——- ^_

(000 F)
Per cent
of total
Index

(1965'100)

Amount

(000 F)
i-er cent
of total
Index

(1965=100)

amount

(000 F)
Per cent
of tolal
Index

(1965=100)

Amount

(000 F)
Per cent
of total
Index

(1965-- 100)

Amount

(000 F)
Per cent
of total
Index

(1905:100)

Amount
(000 F)
Index

(i 965-- 100)

12,051

19.2

100

14,970

2J.8

100

29,100

40.3

100

3,394

5.4

100

3,298

5.3

100

62,813

100

1970

21,745

18.8

180

33,148

28.6

221

51,238

44.2

176

6,366

5.5

185

3,458

3-0

lOp

113,957

185

1975

41,983

16.6

348

70,359

27.8

470

121,786

48.1

419

12,803

5.1

377

6,101

2.4

185

253,052

40;>

1980

88,066

16.6

731

157,175

29.6

1,050

248,830

, 46.8

855

25,803

4.9

760

11,365

2.2

353

531,509

84o

bource: Ville du Havre, Comptes Aa,,jinistratifs, 1965-19"'-'

Table III. 12: Le Havre; Receipts for Investment 'Budget, 1965-1980 'Cexcluding previous

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tt«l

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Wnl

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loo) [COO F)

Per

Ho)

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Cent

T.W (CO

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11,131 IDO IOD H3 100 10.1 ICO

mt 1077] no 177 Ift
14-1
11-3

I7A
IPL H3 1*7
10,844 IK? 17 U7 4-3201
17 ZU 5C1 HZ I4.f 17T
1*17 Z11 40717 Z7? II. C 217 22;

mi 111 42?
1175 7.1 fer US Uf/47 Hi
20,010 l.f 10.3 10?
II HI 20.6 1474^ 4i D
7D7 47.1 31,3^5 ZI.1
11-1 711 438
1118 11/JZ 511 Ml 205 '7^46 47P
S.I I7.7 41 .
17 171,117 ft.i

Tor/it li.l IU

Source; Ville du Havre, Gomptes Administratifs, 1965-19BO
'Other' receipts include reimbursement or loans made by the municipality
to other bodies, ana various payments made tu tne water service.

Titl : u «i Utw{r fe/ Ccct.r, WIT '11 gQ

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10,241 3U 100 II 100 7, HI loo 6.3 3.1 IDP 4,014- 13-6 100 IZA 166
7,11? 7? iO 13 1 4.1

11,45* [21 32 371 in 4,0 tf

J7

tig

3001 75- 13.1
7.1 IZ7

18.1 131 3«.0 2Z1 ft* 16 3,151 71 UZ3 13.1 no
13 41? 13J 418 0.1 13,583 nj 4,571 a itf, 5.0 tl Z37
2111? 0.1 tl into Z1.J n? 4123 3.1 157 47 66 ltd
Ull 31,713 UJ u 317 10.1 114 21 12^5 13.1 334
mi

1115

16,731 31.0 IU 1,343 10.1 70 333
£4100 Hi 1.3 111 Z4.7 1 4 581 12.0 781 111 17 14 71 47?

1115

36, 103 55; 100 0.1 4^0 1,103
3817 3.0 17 21 If

Jl
114

15 15.0
124 427

37.111 11.1 M
415

£3
4.1

31.1 tfl 73 507 711
174 5? I to t.ill

4_[
4.1

IS.4I5
H,«4

14.1

U.571 27.7 10,77? 7.0 1,371 41.0 802 5,807 II 827 71 4.1
Z3.I 7,701 4.3 111 3.7 3ft. 6614 803? 4.5 200
17,110 U H.I 7111 It 130 4.1 111 118
51353* III 3.1 107117 n 10 70,^ 4.4 135111
^ou.rce; Kille An Havre

TaCle III. 14: Le Havre, Product per Head of Population of Comparison with trance's 24 Largest Cities
unities and Urban Districts (in Francs per

Total Product

Taxe d 'Habit-
ation

Foncier Bati

Taxe Profess-
ionnelle

Le Havre

1,215.50

262.60

258.52

692.74

Average for
24 Cities

1,196.02

358.65

201.79

631.70

Direct Taxes, 1981:
Outside Urban Comm-
person) .

Le Havre ' s Rank
in 24 Cities

llth

19th

5th

8th

'Source: Ville du Havre, Service du Budget, December 1982.

Table III.15; Le Havre, Some Budgetary Ratios, 1980; Comparison with Average Ratios for French Cities of between

Number and Description of
Ratio

54: Total Spending
(Francs per inhabitant)

02: Total Current Spending
(Francs per inhabitant)

03: Personnel Costs (as per
cent current spending)

04: Interest Payments (as per
cent current spending)

17: Direct Taxation
(Francs per inhabitant)

11 : DGF receipts
(Francs ,.er inhacitant)

21: Tax Base (Potential Fiscal;
Francs per inha^itrurt)

18: Taxes on Households
(Fxancs per innauitant)

20 : Taa.es on Households (as
per cent fiscal receipts)

32: Investment Spending
(Francs per inhabitant)

L& Havre

2,850.52

2,026.31

48.25

10.37

1,045.12

625.30

863.14

548.15

41.12

824.21

200,000 and 300,000 Inhab-
itants.

Average Cities
of 200,000-
300,000 Inhabitants

2,770.39

1,997.82

47.36

10.16

936.96

738.17

886.26

522.81

4^.49

772.57

Source; Ville du Havre, Service du Budget (national ratios are established by the Ministry of the Interior).
Note: The Taxe d'Habitation is /ayaUe by all households, the Foncier Bati only by landlords. 'Taxes on households' include both the .Taxe d'Hab-it ation and payments for municipal services. The DGF is the Dotation £lobale de FonctionneLient, tne State subsidy paid int<
budget. TLe U K. fr,fatioiihltlt_ fl f^ (plj (, M,- K€U ^

into the current

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III.D: Le Havre and its Municipality: Conclusion

Since their municipal victory in 1965, the Communists have established
a local fief in Le Havre. There remain, however, significant points of difference from the PCF's classic bastions of the Paris region. Le Havre is a city, not a suburb: indeed, the communal limits enclose a greater proportion of the whole conurbation than those of most French urban centres. While the population's social composition is less middle-class than that of Ntmes, it is more varied than that of a proletarian ghetto like

St-Denis.

The Communists' strength in Le Havre is founded above all on the
city's workers, a high proportion of whom are organised in the CGT. But this allegiance is comparatively recent and its antecedents rather different from those in the PCF's older strongholds. The condition for the wave of working-class support that elected Cance in 1937 was the expansion of the metallurgical sector, the occasion the Popular Front. Before 1920 the influence both of the SFIO and of the CGT had been slight. Le Havre's workers had joined anarcho-syndicalist unions and given their electoral support to men of the moderate Left like Siegfried and Meyer. If Batard is to be believed, the CGT's leadership of the local union movement has been achieved at the price of concessions to anarcho-syndicalist militants, whose influence has survived in a few branches at least.
This rather less than unconditional working-class support for the PCF,
as well as the socially varied composition of the population, have meant that Le Havre has never become a Party fief in the fullest sense. The penetration of the PCF's organisation has been weak. Membership is low; Communists have not achieved a systematic colonisation either of local associations or of the municipal bureaucracy. There is little evidence to suggest that outside permanents dictate to local £lus. National Party

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events, such as the 14th Congress in 1956 or a two-day conference of Communist e*lus in 1980, have been held in Le Havre, but rarely. The Federation's headquarters are, of course, in Rouen, and no Havrais has ever reached a position of national responsibility in the PCF. Le Havre thus tends to confirm Pronier's argument that 'Dans les villes qu 'il dirige, le parti se re*duit de plus en plus au "municipal", la mairie devient la rgalite* tangible du parti' . Le Havre's Communists have not sewn up the city for their Party's apparatus. Their electoral success
has increased in proportion to their willingness and ability to abandon their sectarian, partisan appeal of the 1950s, to win over both the local Socialist leadership and the small but strategic group of Socialist voters, and to present themselves as competent administrators in the best traditions of French municipal rhetoric. At the same time, while their explicitly partisan line has been dropped, general and more or less oblique references to Communist policies and goals remain part of the self-image that the municipality has projected to the electorate.
We have called the relationship that the municipality has sought to establish with its voters a tribunitian consensus, a marriage between one type of role - that of tribune party - that the PCF has played in French society, and the apolitical local consensus that French mayors have traditionally attempted to forge. The traditional paradigm of the 'apolitical' French mayor has three main elements. He is a patriarchal, impartial and competent administrator with the interests of the whole population at heart. He uses his privileged access to decision-makers in the State apparatus to defend the population from an administration that is generally held to be hostile, and even to manipulate that administration

(71) Pronier, Municipalities Communistes, 409.

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to attract resources from central government to his city. For insofar as he can rally a broad local consensus behind him, he uses it to reinforce his position in his dealings with the State apparatus (cf. Ch.I, pp.19-20, 22).
There are clearly similarities between this paradigm and the specific
case of the Communists in Le Havre. Cance and Duromea have both been assiduous in building their own patriarchal image and in presenting them-selves as the leaders of a local consensus extending well beyond the limits of the PCF, and even of the Left as a whole, to such local partners as the Port and the Chamber of Commerce. This fully corresponds to one of the PCF's main local government aims - that of proving its administrative competence and responsibility. But Le Havre also shows significant points of divergence from the paradigm. If local partners of whatever political hue have been accepted, the central State was generally presented (before May 1981) not merely as an insensitive and interfering bureaucracy but as a political enemy. Le Havre's elus did not, therefore, claim to be able
to manipulate the bureaucracy but underlined the need for struggle in
order to get the State to release the resources to which the population was entitled. They could claim that some struggles, such as demonstrations for subsidies to build schools or the petition for the Maison de la Culture, had succeeded, though others, such as the mobilisation for the France, clearly did not. But even where the stated objectives were not achieved,
i

they all had the advantage, for the elus, of showing that the constraints on municipal action resulted from the policies of right-wing governments. While the political content of such actions was at times fairly clear (for example in the case of the 'Common Programme Budget' of 1973), it was never overtly partisan. Municipal struggles on local issues, however, reached
a wider audience than most actions led by the PCF as such. They therefore

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provided an opportunity to win broad popular support for Communist policies, even if these policies were implicitly rather than explicitly expressed. Unlike the traditional paradigm, then, the tribunician consensus is
not a closed system, since it is related to the national goals of the PCF. The image of competent, patriarchal administration is necessary to ensure a broad basis of support, to reinforce the PCF's image as a party of government, and to make mobilisation on local issues possible. Where such mobilisation succeeded, it reinforced the image of Communist e~lus as people capable of achieving their goals by resolute action with the population. Where it failed, it pointed to the need for change at the national level, and to the key role of the PCF in fighting for such change.
These two elements of the PCF's municipal role - as Party of govern-
ment and as Party of struggle - are not fully compatible. The municipality of Le Havre has not stressed its tribunician role to the point of opening itself to accusations of irresponsibility and thus damaging its govern-mental credentials. This is clear from the examination of the city's budgets. The municipality has been able to apply several left-wing priorities to Le Havre's finances, and has on occasion written in receipts from the government that it knew would be taken up and rejected by the prefect. It has not, however, indulged in fiscal profligacy in order to provide an opportunity for struggle for government funds to bale the city out of potential bankruptcy. The municipality has thus limited its freedom of action in the present, in order to preserve some leeway in the future. To that extent at least, it has effectively accepted the constraints of the present system.
The following chapters will consider which of the two facets of the PCF's municipal image appeared more strongly in the definition of Le Havre's planning policy. They will also examine two related questions -

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the extent to which recognisably Communist, or at least left-wing, policy outputs appeared in this area, and the role that considerations of electoral geography played in planning decisions. As we have seen, city planning took a relatively modest share of Le Havre's budget, and planners an equally modest position in the municipal bureaucracy. At the same time planning was a major element in the very considerable brief of the most powerful adjoint in the Town Hall, Daniel Colliard. The explanation of this apparent paradox appears to be that while it involves municipal choices and expenditure, planning also requires a greater measure of negotiation with organisations outside the Town Hall than other areas of municipal activity. These organisations include not only the State field services but also a variety of local bodies. Colliard's position in the Town Hall is founded partly on his long full-time experience of municipal office, but also on his very close relations with the municipality's local partners, to whom we shall now turn.

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Chapter IV: The Municipality's Partners

IV.A: Le Havre's Neighbours

Despite the suspicion of the PCF at national level towards government attempts to encourage communal fusions, Le Havre's Communist £lus have
not halted the tendency of their commune to expand. Parts of Harfleur, Octeville, Rouelles and Fontaine-la-Mallet have been absorbed into Le Havre at various times, included in plans for the grands ensembles of Caucriauville and Mont-Gaillard. And in 1973 what remained of Rouelles
was fused with Le Havre (Map 7).
By 1971 Rouelles was facing the typical problem of a village in the process of becoming a peripheral dormitory zone. The commune's only 'industry' was the Compagnie Ge'ne'rale Transatlantique's laundry. The population, although little more than 2,000, was growing very fast, and new residents were demanding an increasing range of urban services that the municipality's fiscal base had difficulty in supplying. This meant that fusion became an important issue in the 1971 election campaign, although the new mayor, Jean Defre"ne (a PSU member who went over to the PS with Michel Rocard in 1974) did not make up his own mind until better acquainted with his municipality's failing finances. Some hostility might have been expected from the State towards this buttressing of Le Havre's Communist majority by the addition of another left-wing commune, albeit a small one. That none materialised was in great part due to the passage of the Marcellin Act in July 1971. Denounced by the PCF as an 'authoritarian' attempt to force communal fusions (Ch.II, p.85), the Act was ineffective throughout France, and particularly in Seine-Maritime. The modest propositions of the prefectoral commission on fusions (which included Duromea, Lecanuet, and 1e other e"lus) provoked a 'fundamental hostility of almost all the communes

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to any idea of fusion', and the total number of communes was only reduced from 751 to 741 . Under these circumstances, any move towards fusion was encouraged by the authorities: after a favourable referendum and unanimous votes by both councils, Le Havre and Rouelles were joined in 1973, Like Sanvic, Bleville and Graville, Rouelles retains a mairie-annexe. It has also gained a few jobs from the construction of a small hospital. Further urbanisation, however, will be limited as the bulk of the former commune's territory is reserved for two somewhat contradictory projects -
a by-pass and a large park (Ch.V, pp.284-285).
Three other neighbouring communes, Fontaine-la-Mallet, Harfleur and Gonfreville, have joined Le Havre in the Syndicat Intercommunal a Vocations Multiples (SIVOM) de la Region Havraise. Fontaine-la-Mallet, which lies to the north of Le Havre (Map 8), had a population of 1,503
in 1975, and was growing fast as new residents, generally from upper income brackets, arrived to join the hitherto agricultural population. Although it is not a rich commune, Fontaine-la-Mallet has not undergone the financial crisis of Rouelles and there is no question of fusion with Le Havre: its Socialist mayor, Jean Ferbourg, plays little role in the local planning process. Harfleur and Gonfreville, however, are of greater importance and resemble Le Havre more closely. Each commune had some 10,100 inhabitants in 1975. The vast majority of the active population consisted of workers (nearly 60 per cent in Harfleur, nearly 70 per cent in Gonfreville), and the Communist vote has been correspondingly strong: Harfleur has had a Communist municipality since 1965, and Gonfreville since 1953. Both communes have had to meet a growing volume of needs for social,

(1) G. Guillaume, 'Les Fusions et Regroupements des Communes en Seine-Maritime: Bilan de 1'Application de la Loi du 16 juillet 1971', Revue Administrative, 167, Sept.-Oct., 1975, 469-483. Interview with Jean Defr£ne, maire-de'le'gue', Rouelles, 14 June 1980.

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medical and educational facilities. In addition, Harfleur has a medieval centre that is badly in need of rehabilitation, and Gonfreville has to spend heavily on school buses to pick up children from the outlying residential areas of Mayville and Gournay where half its population lives. It is in the differences between Harfleur and Gonfreville that we see
one function of the SIVOM. Harfleur's territory stops just short of the industries of the alluvial plain. The commune offers 2,500 jobs for an active population of 4,000, and has no businesses big enough to constitute a solid tax base. When the municipality came to power in 1965 it raised taxes by 50 per cent in one year, and more than one major project has been cancelled owing to lack of funds. The southern part of Gonfreville, on
the other hand, is chiefly occupied by the Compagnie Francaise de Raffinage. This largely accounted for receipts of 26.5 MF from the Taxe Professionnelle in 1979 (compared with Harfleur's total budget of some 15 MF), and kept ratepayers' contributions down to about 300 F per household.
Table IV.1; Contributions by Commune to the SIVOM de la Region Havraise, 1980 Commune Official Population Budget Contribution (%)
Le Havre 219,583 78.50 Gonfreville-1'Orcher 10,175 19.96
Harfleur 10,104 1.36 Fontaine-la-Mallet 2,139 0.18
Source: SIVOM de la Region Havraise, Budget 1980, 1. I

Table IV.1 shows that the SIVOM's budget does serve in some degree to distribute Gonfreville's largesse among its less fortunate neighbours. The total size of the budget, at some 18 MF in 1980, is , however, insufficient to do this on a very large scale. This limits the real importance of the apparently impressive list of the SIVOM's areas of

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competence, which include planning studies; the purchase of land reserves; holiday and leisure facilities; public transport; studies for the creation of a university; and hygiene, public health, water, sewage and rubbish disposal services. Clearly 18 MF cannot cover all of this for all of the communes, and in fact services are only provided and investments made insofar as they concern the whole area. The SIVOM has, it is true, acquired long-term land reserves for major projects in Le Havre, Harfleur and Gonfreville; but is main importance for planning is probably the definition of a common approach. Although all three Communist communes have used the PCF's own study bureau, ORGECO, for some jobs, the SUVH remains the basic town planning office for all of them. On the bureau of ten municipal delegates which runs the SIVOM (and which reproduces the Communist pre-dominance in the municipalities concerned), Colliard is, not surprisingly, entrusted with planning questions (as well as being Le Havre's adjoint in charge of intercommunal cooperation). This does not mean that he necessarily enjoys the same control over his neighbours' planning as he does over Le Havre's; final decisions on major projects remain with the mayors of Harfleur and Gonfreville, neither of whom are lightweights. It does mean that the SIVOM has allowed the coordination of planning policy in certain areas, and that Colliard has been at the centre of this coordination.

There would be obvious political and financial advantages in a greater measure of integration between Le Havre and its eastern neighbours. The Communists' electoral position in Le Havre would be reinforced by the annexation of Harfleur and Gonfreville: the burden on Le Havre's and Harfleur r s ratepayers would be lessened by the sharing of the refinery's riches. There are several reasons why fusion has not taken place and financial redistribution remains limited to the SIVOM and an equally limited

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Syndicat d'Equipement between Harfleur and Gonfreville. The Communists have nowhere been eager to merge their own bastions, which would reduce the number of their e"lus. And the annexation of Gonfreville by Le Havre would dilute the personal fief of Jacques Eberhard, conseiller general, senator, and mayor of Gonfreville until he stood down to become a European MP in 1979. Moreover, it is probable that Eberhard and his successor, Marcel
le Mignot, having enjoyed a generation of big budgets but low rates, are reluctant to diminish their wealth by sharing it with neighbours or even comrades. Certainly Le Mignot has more reserves about the possibility of an eventual Harfleur-Gonfreville fusion than Gerard Eude, the mayor of Harfleur. It is therefore probable that Le Havre's historic tendency to

(2) absorb neighbouring communes has been at least temporarily halted

Two other syndicates, of lesser importance, complete Le Havre's commitments to intercommunal cooperation. The Syndicat Intercommunal pour la Gestion et le De'veloppement d'un Centre Informatique grouped the major Communist municipalities of Seine-Maritime - LeHavre, Harfleur, Gonfreville, Dieppe, Le Petit Quevilly, Le Grand Couronne, and St-Etienne-du-Rouvray. Colliard, whose portfolio includes computers as well as intercommunal cooperation, is responsible for the Le Havre end of it. The sinister interpretation put on this syndicate by Jean Montaldo is hard to credit, however. It was formed in 1972 as a counter-project to prefectoral proposals to centre Seine-Maritime's municipal computers in Rouen, but advances in computer technology have reduced the advantages of pooling and

(2) Interviews with Ge"rard Eude, mayor of Harfleur, 25 April 1980, and Marcel le Mignot, mayor of Gonfreville, 11 May 1980.

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(3) the four non-Havrais communes have now withdrawn . Finally, the SIVOM communes plus Montivilliers and Octeville form a Syndicat Intercommunal d'Hygi£ne whose modest budget has allowed the study - though not so far
the solution - of the area's sewage and drainage problems.
Among Le Havre's other neighbours, Octeville, the village to the
north-west (Map 7), has handed over a small parcel of its land to Le Havre for the Mont-Gaillard project. Its fairly modest rate of expansion has been limited by the presence of the Le Havre-Octeville airport on the communal borders. Montivilliers, until recently a small market town up the Le"zarde river from Harfleur, was earmarked in 1974 as a site for major urbanisation (Ch.V, p.260): its expansion and the growth of the Socialist vote in Rufenacht's constituency outside Le Havre were related phenomena. Ste-Adresse, finally, is a right-wing enclave well within the
conurbation, surrounded on two-thirds of its perimeter by Le Havre and on the other third by the sea. To its nucleus of smart nineteenth-century villas in the Ignauville valley and on the seafront (the latter having been destroyed in 1944 and reconstructed since) have been added two HLM buildings, several blocks of expensive flats, and a number of bungalows. Both the present mayor and his predecessor have taken an overtly traditional attitude to their office ('Ici on ne fait pas de politique') and have claimed a wish to preserve the commune's 'village' atmosphere - although Ste-Adresse is very much a suburb of Le Havre whoe residents use their neighbour's cultural, educational, and social facilities. Although less 'aristocratic' than some authors have suggested (some 30 per cent of the active population are workers), Ste-Adresse has eschewed all official contacts with Le Havre

(3) Jean Montaldo, La France Communiste, (Paris, Albin Michel, 1978), 185-
186. D. Colliard, 'Pourquoi un schema Directeur du Traitement de 1'Information?' L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, Dec. 1982, 138-139. Interview
with Daniel Colliard, 1st adjoint, Le Havre, 25 Jan. 1983.

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except on technical issues like drainage, and its role in the area's planning has been minimal

IV.B; The Agence d'Urbanisme de la Region du Havre (AURH)

City Planning Agencies (Agences d'Urbanisme d'Agglomeration) occupy
a somewhat anomalous place in the generally uniform and pyramidal structure of French local administration. They have been set up piecemeal, in most but not all of France's major cities, at various times since 1963: they have no uniform legal status: and there is no fixed relation between an agency's size and budget and the size of the conurbation covered by its

studies.

Typically, however, a City Planning Agency is a multidisciplinary
team (including, for example, planners, architects, economists and sociologists) that produces both the technical input for major structural planning documents and a greater or lesser range of operational studies. The first agency, the Socie'te' de Recherches et d'Etudes Urbaines Rouennaise (SORETUR) was set up under prefectoral initiative in 1963, and formed a local equivalent to the Mission d'Etudes Basse-Seine (MEBS). The Towns Committee for the 6th Plan (1970-75) recommended that the State should encourage the creation of agencies and subsidise their budgets while leaving a majority on their administrative boards to local e"lus; this has, to a considerable extent, been implemented. Of the 21 agencies set up in the 1970s (bringing the total number to 31 by 1980), most share the legal status of Associations Loi 1901, receive State subsidies, and allow local e"lus to play a leading role. As well as producing studies, the agencies

(4) Interview with Jean-Louis Pesle, mayor of Sainte-Adresse, 18 April
1980.

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have thus also been described as 'neutral meeting grounds' for e*lus, technicians, State field services, and other bodies such as Chambers of Commerce. A city that goes without an agency (Nice, Montpellier and Mulhouse still had none by 1980) risks either having to spend more on unsubsidised Town Hall services or relying on the local Direction Departementale d'Equipement (DDE) .
As we have noted, the PCF is officially hostile to City Planning
Agencies, regarding them as means to get local elus both to pay the bulk of local planning study costs and to adopt the government's development priorities (Ch.II, p. 85). The very close career links between the agencies' personnel and State organisations such as the Socie'te' Centrale pour 1'Equipement du Territoire (SCET) and the DDEs help to reinforce arguments that their technical expertise is likely to be heavily impreg-nated with the official ideology of urban development as it evolved in the first two decades of the Fifth Republic. At the same time, despite un-doubted financial incentives, no municipality is obliged to use an agency for its planning studies or to take the advice of the agencies' experts. Agencies cannot, then, draw municipalities into a government-led process of technocratic planning without the full and relatively free collaboration of the elus themselves.
The Socie'te' d'Etudes et de Recherches Urbaines de la Region Havraise (SERH), as it was initially called, was, like SORETUR, very much a
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prefectoral inspiration at its creation in 1965. Its legal status was that

(5) 'Les Agences d'Urbanisme', Urbanisme, 132, May 1972, 6-7.
Commissariat Ge"ne"ral du Plan, Rapport du Comite* Villes sur les Orien-tations Souhaitables au Cours du Vie Plan (Paris, Documentation
Francaise, 1971), Vol.1, 25. Yves-Maxime Danan, Les Agences d'Urbanisme d'Agglomeration (Paris, Centre de Recherches Urbaines, 1976), 3, 18-35,
42, 49, 65-67, 164-165, 170.

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of a Socie'te' Civile and its board chaired by the sub-prefect: the municipality of Le Havre initially viewed it with some suspicion. However, the SERH's work on the Schema Directeur d'Ame'nagement et d'Urbanisme (SDAU) de la Region du Havre (cf. Ch.V.C, pp.25r265)received the cooperation of all the communes in the SDAU area, stretching from Le Havre to Tancarville (Map 27). On the approval of the SDAU in 1974, the SERH, in accordance with 6th Plan policy, became the AURH, an Association Loi 1901 with a majority of e"lus on its board and Duromea as its president. The board, whose main function is to approve the study programme and budget, consists of eleven e"lus - two Socialists and four Communists from the SIVOM of Le Havre, the Socialist mayor of Montivilliers, three right-wing mayors from the rest of the SDAU area, and Rufenacht; and nine representatives from the State services, the Port and the Chamber of Commerce. It x^as thus possible for the right-wing e*lus to join forces with other board members to out-vote the left-wing e*lus, but there is no evidence that the board has habitually divided in this way.
In 1980 the AURH worked to a budget of 3,885,000 F, of which 70 per
cent was spent on the salaries of the 23 full-time staff. Table IV.2 shows that the AURH presented significant financial advantages for the communes. Their contribution was doubled up by the State, help also came from the region, the departement, and other local institutions, and the AURH's
legal status is flexible enough for it to increase its revenue with contract
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assignments.
This money has bought five main types of work. Firstly, the AURH has produced the technical studies for major planning documents. After the completion of the SDAU in 1973, a considerable part of the AURH's efforts was spent in producing a Plan d'Occupation des Sols (POS: cf. Ch.V.D, p.273) for each of the communes of the SDAU area (this would have been done

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Table IV.2: The AURH: Budget Receipts, 1980

Source Sum (Francs) As per cent total
State (Direction de 1'Amgnagement 1,150,000 29.6
Fonder et Urbain)
Departement 625,000 16.1
Communes 1,150,000 29.6
(of which: SIVOM de la Region Havraise) (956,000) (24.6)
Port Autonome du Havre 150,000 3.9
Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie 193,000 5.0
Region : 82,000 2.1
Special Contracts for Clients 535,000 13.7
TOTAL 3,885,000 100.0

Source: AURH, Programme d'Etudes et Previsions Budge^taires, 1980, 53.

by the DDE had the AURH not existed). Secondly, several regular studies monitor elements of the planning context such as rents, the housing market, or rural land use, once or twice a year. Thirdly, the AURH produces one-off studies on local urban questions. These may concern general problems (like the Dossier Habitat of 1977), particular areas of the city, or the application of specific planning decisions. Fourthly, it tries to gauge the effectiveness of decisions taken several years earlier, for example in the 1981 progress report on the SDAU. Finally, as a 'neutral meeting-ground' the AURH has a number of committees including board members - of which the most active is the Economic, Demographic and Employment Developments Committee (chaired by Colliard) - which present occasional reports with the help of the AURH's technicians.
Colliard's relations with the AURH do not suggest that he shares his
Party's suspicion of City Planning Agencies. He has played an active role on the economic committee (and claimed that Rufenacht and the prefecture were hostile to it): he argues that the SERH allox^ed the municipality a considerable measure of independence from the State during the elaboration of the

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SDAU; and he has repeatedly defended the municipality's close links with and subsidies to the AURH against his more doubtful colleagues on the
City Planning Committee . The-AURH's most vigorous opponent on the Committee was Edmond Beyazian, who once referred to its employees as 'technocratic representatives of the State', and some members of the SUVH resent Colliard's trust in the AUR1T . This trust is not, however, fully returned by the AURH staff. They see their influence limited because they are not Party members and, more significantly, feel frustrated by what they see as Colliard's unwillingness to make clear choices in the planning of
Le Havre and thus to give a direction to their work. The division of labour between the AURH and the SUVH is ill-defined, although the SUVH tends to work in a more clearly operational context. Colliard may have benefited from a 'creative tension' between them in cases where their studies have reached different conclusions on the same subject, for example the southern quarters. Such cases have, however, been rare: they have not led to the confrontation of opposed policies on the Planning Committee; while the relative lack of coordination between the two groups of technicians has done little to give a sense of purpose and consistency to their work. It is probable, on the other hand, that Colliard's position as almost the sole regular point of contact between the AURH and the SUVH has enhanced his
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authority with his colleagues on the City Planning Committee
Three possible conclusions may be drawn from the divergence between

(6) Interview with Colliard, 10 April 1980. Ville du Havre, Commission d'Urbanisme, Comptes-Rendus, 20 March 1974, 15 June 1978, 15 Jan7T979,
1 Oct. 1979.

(7) Le Havre, Commission d'Urbanisme, 15 Jan. 1979. Interview with Rene Lahousse, SUVH, 28 July 1982^
(8) Interview with Jean-Paul Beauvais, 28 Feb. 1980. Alain Yon, 'Industrial! sation et Urbanisation dans la Rdgion Havraise', doctoral thesis,
Paris 1976, 421.

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Colliard's attitude to the AURH and the official Party line. The AURH
may be less of an instrument of the State than Rosette (and Beyazian) have argued; Colliard may have reinforced his personal position in the Town Hall at the price of being co-opted into a State-led planning policy; or there may have been a convergence between the planning priorities of the municipality, the AURH and the State. A related point is that if the municipality of Le Havre has enjoyed good relations with the AURH, that has not always been true of the rural communes. Alain Yon's interviews with country mayors from the SDAU area revealed considerable discontent with what was seen as the technicians' arrogant assumption that they could determine the villages' future with their maps and figures. It is true that on questions that only affect their communes, village mayors are no more obliged to accept the AURH's propositions than Colliard is. The AURH sketch for the POS of La Remue'e, for example, suggested (in good planners' fashion) modest growth concentric with the existing village: it was rejected by the mayor and councillors who wanted to avoid spending money on new roads by allowing ribbon development along the existing Route Departementale. Less certain, however, is the extent to which country mayors' views are taken into account in decisions affecting the whole region
The relations between the State, the AURH, and the municipalities of
the SDAU area as they developed in the 1970s will be dealt with in the following chapters. A final point concerning the AURH is that it has proved an invaluable source of information for this thesis. The fact that it has not only done the technical work for Le Havre's major planning

(9) Yon, 'Industrialisation 1, 411-413. AURH, POS de la Remue'e, Groupe de Travail, compte-rendu, 13 May 1980.

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documents but also produced a steady stream of operational and pre-operational studies has (at least apparently) diminished the role that the State's local services have played in the planning process.

IV.C: The State's Local Antennae

We have seen that well before the Socialist government set about demolishing the legal structure of centralisation in France, researchers had gone a long way to demolishing, it as a model of how centre-periphery relations really worked, and had replaced it with a range of more complex alternatives. Three elements were more or less common to these alternatives; that 'super-notables', especially ddputds-maires, were powerful figures whose direct access to Paris allowed them to by-pass the local State bureaucracy; that this bureaucracy was prone to divisions which 'super-notables' could exploit; and thus that the space existed for different municipalities to produce a wide and varied range of policy outputs
(Ch.I, 10-11, 22). This is not to deny the importance of central government policy: the provisions for the elaboration of SDAUs and POSs, for example, or the volume of credits available for housing or for specific types of publicly-sponsored project, defined the parameters of municipal choice, and will be considered in detail when we examine Le Havre's structural and operational planning. But insofar as the relationship between local elus and the State's field services involved a process of political negotiation rather than the mere application of national legislation at local level, we need to ask what sort of political relationship was established between Communist elus and the local servants of a conservative central government. Both the official Communist press and Le Havre's municipal bulletin emphasised the need for 'struggle' to get anything out of the State, and some struggles have indeed taken place in Le Havre. On the negotiating

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process itself, however, both sides tend to be more reticent, though we have argued that the techniques used by Communist e"lus have not always been radically different from those of elus of other parties (Ch. II, pp. 90-91) . This section, without going into detail on the negotiating process itself in Le Havre, will present the municipality's partners in the State administration and will consider how much scope existed for their political opposition to determine their relationship.
Largely for historical reasons, especially its late foundation and
slow growth until 1815, Le Havre has no prefecture. The prefect is in Rouen, his authority and staff reinforced by the 1964 reform that made Rouen the regional prefecture of Haute-Normandie (which includes Seine-Maritime and Eure) . Le Havre's politicians of all persuasions, though particularly the conservatives, have found this unsatisfactory: there is a relative shortage of administrative jobs in Le Havre, certain bureau-cratic chores require a trip to Rouen, and there is evidence that Rouen has starved its neighbour of facilities - such as a university - to which its size would normally entitle it. In 1945 Le Havre's council voted for the division of the de~partement into two (Seine-Inf erieure and Seine-Maritime), a project already espoused by Jules Siegfried in the 1880s: more recently, Rufenacht has argued for the creation of a post of pre*f et- (with prefectoral rank and authority, albeit still subordinate to
the regional prefect in Rouen) in Le Havre. Neither solution has been adopted: nor, for that matter, have projects to merge the two Norman regions, despite repeated discussions on both sides
The immediate State antennae in Le Havre, then, are the sub-prefecture

(10) Interview with Antoine Rufenacht, depty, 18 Jan. 1980. Le Havre Libre, 7 March and 21-22 May 1945. Le Monde, 22-23 Nov. 1981.

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(France's biggest) and the local branch of the DDE. Since the completion of Le Havre's reconstruction, which it largely ran, the local DDE has declined dramatically in size - from some 250 employees to about 25. Only two divisions of the DDE, the Groupe d'Etudes et de Programmation (GEP), which deals with planning documents, and Urbanisme Opdrationnel et Construction (UOC), which handles specific building projects, are present in Le Havre; Administration Ge'ne'rale and the Fonts et Chausse*es (engineering and public works) are in Rouen only. This means that while more or less routine negotiations may take place between Le Havre's e"lus and Le Havre's DDE, most questions of major importance are referred to Rouen.
DDE representatives in Le Havre describe their role in modest and
wholly technical terms, arguing that their main job has been to advise the sub-prefect, or at times the prefect, on the legality of municipal decisions and their consistency with planning documents, especially the SDAU. They add that the municipality of Le Havre has always had the technical means to produce competent dossiers for its projects, and to participate on equal terms with the State's services in the joint elaboration of planning documents. Partly because of this, the Communists have always had a clear awareness of the rules and have been easy to work with, unlike some rural mayors who, whatever their sympathy with right-wing governments, found it harder to accept or to understand the constraints of the DDE and the prefecture. Colliard tends to confirm this: he emphasises the care taken in the preparation of Le Havre's projects and the impartiality with which the State services, even before 1981, applied the law and accepted well-produced dossiers. He does, it is true, add that where blockages have occurred the Communists used struggle and not telephone calls to Rouen or

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Paris to get the desired result
The municipality's apparently close and businesslike relationship with
the State field services seems to contradict both the adversary relation-ship officially described by the PCF and the common rumour in Le Havre that sub-prefects were appointed to lose elections for the Communists - hence their rapid turnover rate as they failed one after another. We cannot be certain of how far the opposition between the PCF and the State was projected onto the local scene in Le Havre, but there appear to be three possible areas of conflict.
One concerns building permits. These (until the application of the
1982 Decentralisation Act) require the final approval of the prefect or sub-prefect after scrutiny both by the municipal services and by the DDE. Where disputes have occurred between the municipality and the DDE, the prefect has tended to decide in favour of the DDE. This is not, however,
a very powerful means for the State to interfere with municipal planning policy. The POS, negotiated jointly between the DDE and the municipality, is a document of some precision, and in the vast majority of cases it defines building rights unambiguously. It is true that the DDE has accepted a few applications that the municipality would have preferred to reject
but this has been a rare occurrence with no apparent political implications.
Secondly, municipal projects do, up to a point, require negotiation. Routine applications for subsidies - for example, for a single primary school - may go through without too much difficulty: the same is less likely to be true of proposals for major operations involving new housing or redevelopment with a wide range of subsidisable items. The municipality

(11) Interview with M. Ge'rat, DDE Le Havre, 18 April 1980. Interview with Colliard, 3 April 1979.

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of Le Havre does not produce a complete dossier for such complex projects and then submit it to the DDE: like any other municipality, it enters into consultation with the DDE in Le Havre and Rouen, and even the MinisteTe
d 1'Equipement in Paris, almost from the project's conception. The purpose of this contact is to know from the outset what sort of dossier is likely to be accepted and to turn the often cumbersome procedure of submission into a formality. The DDE probably did not give wholly impartial treatment to Le Havre in such informal consultations. Besides questioning the financial 'realism' of some municipal projects, it was probably at least as sensitive as the municipality to considerations of electoral geography: and it has not allowed Le Havre definite acceptance before formal submission, as it did for some other municipalities.
Thirdly, like any other democratic institution a municipality will
plan its actions in relation to election dates. The announcement, or better still the completion, of a popular project is best done not long before polling day, the tax increase necessary to meet its running costs well after. Giving too much publicity to a POS at election time is also risky since it defines - and therefore restricts - building rights. The pre-1981 State administration, if it could not always block municipal projects, could at least decide how fast it was going to accept them, and there is some indication that this prerogative of timing was used to political effect in Le Havre.
In general, however, the framework of the State's legislation was a
bigger constraint on municipal activities than the actions of its local representatives. Relations with the prefecture and the DDE were, within limits, cooperative from day to day and Colliard's competence was respected by the administrative authorities. One local body with very close links to the State had a much more direct influence on the local planning process,

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however: for it was the Port's development policy which, more than that of any other local institution, structured the city's economy.

IV.D: The Port Autonome du Havre (PAH)

'Autonome' is something of a misnomer for the six new Port Authorities (Marseille, Le Havre, Nantes-St-Nazaire, Rouen, Bordeaux, and Dunkirk)

(12) created by an Act of June 1965 . Before 1965 the ports had been run by

the local Chambers of Commerce. After the Act, the government was entitled to appoint half of their board members and their land was nationalised and then conceded back to them. In return the State paid for the maintenance
of basic structures (such as entrance channels or breakwaters) and subsidised new investments at rates of between 60 and 80 per cent. The new Ports Autonomes, on the other hand, were to maintain and expand their 'super-structure' (such as cranes) with finance from port dues and manage the development and eventual sale of industrial sites on their territory. The purpose of the reform was twofold. While the Chambers of Commerce expected some return on their port investments, and fixed their dues accordingly, the State did not. Big investment subsidies were essential if French ports were to compete on equal terms x^ith Antwerp or Rotterdam. Secondly, the presence of government nominees on the boards was aimed at harnessing the the ports' policies to national industrial development strategy. Writers like Castells have thus seen the Ports Autonomes as a crucial channel for

(13) 'direct State aid to the monopolies'
The territory of the PAH includes the whole of Le Havre's port zone,

(12) Loi no.65-491 du 29 juin 1965, Journal Officiel, 30 June 1965.
(13) Manuel Castells and Francis Godard, Monopolville (Mouton, Paris and The Hague, 1974), 54-55.

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the bulk of the alluvial plain, the Antifer tanker terminal 20 kilometres up the coast towards Etretat, and the Le Havre-Octeville airport (cf. 'Le Havre, Ocean Metropolis 1; Map 28). Investments since 1965 have included
a new mineral dock; the Antifer terminal, which can receive tankers of up to 500,000 tons; France's biggest container depot; the Francois-ler lock, which allows ships of up to 250,000 tons into the non-tidal inner port; several new docks in the industrial zone; and a 1,450-megawatt power station, Most of these projects fell into the context of the government's 'industrial imperative' policy of the 1960s and were aimed at the creation of a huge industrial zone on the alluvial plain that would allow ocean-going ships
to steam up to the factory gates, with lox^ port dues and energy costs (cf. Ch.III, p.125). This meant that in its contacts with the municipality,
and particularly in negotiations on the POS, the PAH had one major priority: to be left the freest possible hand to develop the industrial south with the minimum of interference from the municipality on environmental or any other grounds.
The Port is not, however, a foreign body in Le Havre's political
community. Its chairman is the former chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, which also has eight representatives on the Board; Paul Denis, the RPR conseiller general, and Colliard are also directors. The PAH is one of
Le Havre's biggest employers, with a staff of 2,000 plus the 3,500 dockers employed by manpower agencies; its development policy, however tainted with State Monopoly Capitalism, was far from anathema to the municipality, as Durome"a r s editorial in the municipal bulletin shows (Ch.III, p. 157).
'We have always played the card of dialogue', Colliard said in a
recent interview . 'Dialogue' takes place in monthly meetings between

(14) Colliard, interviewed in Le Monde, 18 Nov. 1981.

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representatives of the municipality (sometimes Duromea, generally Colliard), the PAH and the Chamber of Commerce which provide a chance for regular consultation on the projects of the three organisations. Colliard himself is much appreciated at the Port for his technical competence, his open-ness to negotiation, and his ability to get his municipal colleagues to stick to his agreements. Local elus may have had misgivings about the Port's 'objective 1 role in the economy, and they have on occasion (most notably during the 'France' affair) countenanced the open disruption of
the Port's business. On neither side, however, have ideological differences or real but limited conflicts of interest threatened an ongoing and mutually profitable relationship

IV.E; The Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Havre (CCIH)
Unlike their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, French Chambers of Commerce
(or, in larger cities, Chambers of Commerce and Industry) are compulsory corporate bodies. They have constituents - all businesses in a given area that pay the taxe professionnelle. They have democratic elections to the Board in which all constituents may vote. And they have independent tax revenues in the form of 'additional centimes' charged on the taxe professionnelie (at a rate rarely exceeding 10 per cent) that allow them to finance a wide range of investments, services and training facilities. Because the Chambers of Commerce, since their creation by Napoleon, have represented all local businesses and command considerable resources, they have always constituted considerably more than freely associated pressure-

groups.

The constituency of the CCIH covers Le Havre and its immediate

(15) Interview with Mme. Denel, PAH, 8 April 1980.

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hinterland, some forty kilometres up the coast towards Fe'camp and up the estuary towards Lillebonne. The 1978 budget ran to some 82.5 MF, including tax revenue, returns on investments and loans. Over half of this sum was spent on investments. Since the official brief of the CCIH is 'furthering the region's economic development' its range of activities is very wide. The CCIH's investments have gone most consistently into improving the region's infrastructure, especially roads. The most spectacular example of this was the Tancarville bridge, which the CCIH financed in return for a lucrative right to tolls. But the CCIH has also contributed towards a large number of road improvements both in Le Havre itself and as far afield as Eure or Rouen, as well as helping the Port to keep the loss-making Le Havre-Octeville airport open. At present (1983) it is also leading the movement for the construction of a second estuary bridge linking Oudalle xtfith Honfleur.
As well as infrastructure, the CCIH also provides services for
businesses. The major recent investment in this area has been Le Havre's World Trade Centre (completed in 1982) which aims to furnish centralised banking, insurance, marketing and shipping facilities to French and foreign businessmen. In addition, the CCIH has its own documentation service and runs the Ecole Superieure de Commerce, the Institut Consulaire de Perfectionnement and the Institut Superieur de Techniques d'Outre-Mer. Writing in 1975, Colliard emphasised the community of interest between
the municipality and the CCIH, arguing that that CCIH represented 'non-monopoly capitalists' who wanted to reassert local control of Le Havre's development against the monopolies (represented notably by the Port)
The incestuous relationship between the boards of the Port and the CCIH,

(16) Colliard, 'Les Documents d'Urbanisme au Havre', Communes et Ddpartemcnts d'Aujourd'hui, April 1975, 36-37.

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and the close collaboration between the two bodies on projects like the World Trade Centre or the development of the port-industrial zone (the CCIH owns a small patch of this, and has helped to build an inter-company restaurant), show the limitations of Colliard's point. It is true, however, that the CCIH, representing as it does a very wide range of businesses, did not share the single-mindedness of the Port's concern with heavy
industrial development during the 1970s.
Like the Port, the CCIH has participated in the production of the SDAU
and the POS and the monthly tripartite meetings with the municipality.
Its relations with the Town Hall are particularly close on any questions of town planning where retail trade is involved. These have included the Mont-Gaillard estate (where a hypermarket x\ras built before most of the homes) and the boutiques around the Niemeyer cultural centre, as well as the renovation projects (which have so far come to very little) for the Rond-Point and Rene-Coty shopping areas. There have, it is true, been differences with the Town Hall. The municipality, unlike the CCIH, was very much against the opening of a second hypermarket between Montivilliers and Harfleur: and elus have occasionally led CGT demonstrations up to the Palais de la Bourse. But representatives of the CCIH, like those of the Port, minimise the importance of such conflicts and see their relations with the Town Hall as aimed at 'finding technical solutions to technical problems'. Not surprisingly, therefore, they appreciate the technical grasp of the CCIH's main municipal interlocutor, Daniel Colliard

(17) Interview with M. Reinhart, CCIH, 2 April 1980.

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IV.F: The Societe d'Amenagement de la Region du Havre (SARH)

The legal status of France's Socie'tes d'Economie Mixte (SEMs) was
defined by an Act of 1954 and a set of model statutes produced in 1960. They are non-profit-making companies that exist primarily to manage the execution of publicly-backed building projects. Part of their capital comes from the Societe* Centrale pour 1'Equipement du Territoire (SCET), the CDC subsidiary created for the purpose which also supplies loans and the technical services of its study bureau, BETURE (Bureau d'Etudes Techniques pour 1'Urbanisme et 1'Equipement). Within this very general framework, however, the structure and functions of the 424 SEMs created up to 1980 vary widely. The capital may come in varying proportions from the SCET, local authorities, corporate bodies like the Chambers of Commerce, and the private banking sector. Initially the main purpose of the SEMs was to coordinate the construction of grands ensembles - to buy land and equip it with basic utilities before selling it to public and private developers. They have thus frequently enjoyed compulsory purchase rights in Zones a Urbaniser en Priorite (ZUPs) and Zones d'Amenagement Concert^ (ZACs). But a SEM may also manage industrial zones and the construction of municipal buildings, and even build and rehabilitate lox^-cost housing.
No municipality is obliged to use a SEM for its projects: the ZUP

(1 8^ built in Nlmes, for example, was managed directly from the Town Hall

SEMs do, however, present considerable advantages of flexibility. A municipality's freedom to borrow on private markets is very limited, while loans from public credit organisations like the CDC generally depend on prefectoral approval of the project concerned. A SEM suffers far less from

(18) Jerome Milch, 'Paris is Not France', (MIT doctoral thesis, 1973), 133-138.

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this kind of financial constraint, and can also use BETURE's technical facilities and employees as and when it needs them rather than having to invest in costly equipment and full-time staff for a limited job. It was no doubt for these reasons that of the 173 ZUPs under construction in 1966, 109 were being operated by subsidiaries of the SCET
These features of the SEMs have drawn criticisms from the Marxist
urban sociologists. Two main arguments are worth noting. First, they claim that the structure of the SEMs - boards resembling those of private companies, handling both private and public capital - has led to public funds being used both to provide public facilities at minimum short-term cost and to furnish the conditions for profitable private investment. Secondly, it is argued that their dependence on BETURE and the SCET (the SEMs' career structures are as closely linked with the SCET as those of the City Planning Agencies) have led to a control from Paris as tight as that of the ministries over French municipalities - hence the uniformity of France's grands ensembles . Communist e"lus tend to be unsure as to whether SEMs are 'useful operational tools' or 'elements of State control over local authorities': they tend to agree, though, on the desirability

(21) of municipalities having a controlling share

The SARH was set up by the Prefect (Robert Hirsch, the right-wing
candidate for mayor in 1971) and the CCIH in 1959: it acquired the status of a SEM when the departement and the City of Le Havre bought shares in 1962

(19) Sylvie Biarez, One Politique d'Urbanisme: Les ZUP (Grenoble, Centre de Recherches de 1'Institut d'Etudes Politiques, 1971), 40-45.
(20) Biarez, Les ZUP, 81-83. Claude Pettier, La Logique du Financement Publique de 1'Urbanisation (Mouton, Paris and The Hague, 1975), 234-
236.

(21) L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, June 1978, 34: July-August 1978, 33. Marcel Rosette, La Gestion Communale dans 1'Action (Editions Sociales, 1977),
146-147.

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In 1979, its capital of 1 MF was divided as shown in Table IV.3. The composition of the board resembled that of the AURH: local authorities had
a majority, but the five £lus of the SIVOM (Duromea, Colliard, Lechevallier, and the mayors of Harfleur and Gonfreville) could technically be outvoted
by one RPR conseiller ge*n(gral (Michel Dubosc) plus the five representatives of State-affiliated bodies. As in the case of the AURH, there is no evidence that the Board habitually divided along these lines.

Table IV.3; Capital of the SARH, 1979

Organisation Number of shares
at 100 F each

Dtgpartement 1,720
SIVOM of Le Havre 2,700
Commune of Le Havre 600
Commune of Bolbec 286
Commune of Montivilliers 194
Commune of Fdcamp 100
SCET 368
CDC ~ . 2,086
CCIH 702

Office Public d'Ame'iiagernGnt et de
Construction de la Seine-Maritime 222
Comite" Interprofessiormel du Logement, Le Havre 218
OPHLM Ville du Havre 100
M. Dessart (SARH president) 2
Total 10,000
Source: SARH, 'Au Service de 1'Arrondissement du Havre, 1959-1979'.

That the municipality shares rather little of the PCF's mistrust of
the SEMs is shown by the amount of work it has given the SARH. The SARH has run not only the Caucriauville ZUP (started under Monguillon) but the Mont-Gaillard ZAC, the Mare-Rouge estate, and even the Niemeyer cultural centre, while future projects include the Dollemard ZAC and the Rend-Coty

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renovation. Outside Le Havre, it has managed the Belle-Etoile ZAC and the Mammouth hypermarket in Montivilliers, the CCIH's two patches of the industrial-port zone, a housing estate in Fecamp and an industrial estate in Bolbec, and is likely to take charge of two rehabilitation operations in Harfleur. The work done by the SARH's 17 full-time employees, with occasional help from BETURE, is essentially threefold. Firstly the SARH carries out operational studies - on the technical problems of installing utilities, on the density levels and type of facilities required, and on possible sources of finance: these form the basis both for dossiers
submitted to State services and for architects' specifications. Secondly,
it acquires land - by expropriation if necessary - and installs the necessary infrastructure before selling it back to developers. Thirdly, it monitors the financial progress of operations and advises its client on the action
to take where initial estimates of costs or receipts are overrun.
The role of the SARH, then, is not to conceive urban development
projects, still less to provide analyses of specific urban problems. It
is to execute urban projects on behalf of its clients (of which the most important has been the municipality) in a spirit of financial rectitude. Much of the detail of Le Havre's major operations has thus been worked out in discussions between SARH representatives and the adjoint in charge, who has generally been Colliard. At least some of the SARH's officials respect Colliard as a business partner even more than do those of the Port and the CCIH. While much of what passes between them consists of relatively unimportant matters of detail, their negotiations may also deal with how
to balance an operation - for example, by selling land dearer, by increasing densities, or by counting in a municipal subsidy. The final complexion of major municipal projects may thus be affected at least as much by meetings between Colliard and the SARH as by meetings of municipal bodies like the

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(22) City Planning Committee

IV.G: The Developers

Throughout Western Europe public housing subsidies have been an
accepted part of government policy at least since 1945, and have affected a much larger proportion of the population than just the poorest groups dependent on welfare. As Duclaud-Williams has observed, 'The income level at which it is necessary to introduce a housing subsidy will almost always

(23) be different from and higher than the nationally defined poverty level'

The reasons why the~market could not supply the needs of a country like France are fairly clear. Despite big productivity gains in the building industry in the two post-war decades (114 per cent, according to official

(9/ "\ figures) , housing was in short supply owing to the war and a poor

inter-war building record, while the demand for urban housing, and thus land, rose sharply - with a. corresponding effect on prices - as France completed her industrial revolution (Ch.II, pp.50-51).
The forms of subsidy, however, vary from one country to another. In Britain they have been roughly twofold. The government offers tax concessions on mortgages (which themselves represent a channelling of private savings into construction through the building societies); and
local councils build and let housing directly. While their autonomy in this respect has declined since 1965, and especially since 1979, the leading

(22) Interviews with M. Perrot, SARH, 1 April 1980, 25 July 1980.
(23) Roger Duclaud-Williams, The Politics of Housing in Britain and France (London, Heinemann, 1978), 113.
(24) Ministere de 1'Environment et du Cadre de Vie, Tendances et Politiques Actuelles dans la Domaine de 1'Habitation (Paris, Documentation
Francaise, 1978), 45.

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role of local authorities in low-cost housing provision has only recently been questioned.
The French system is better characterised as a continuum than as a
dual structure. At the lower end of the market, the State, through the
CDC, allocates credits to the Caisse des Pr§ts aux Organismes d'Habitations £ Loyer Moddre' (HLMs), which then distributes them as loans through its offices in the ddpartements to some 1,150 public and private HLM developers. While the bulk of these loans is spent on building the standard HLM Ordinaires (HLMO) both inferior categories (HLM Economiques; Logements Populaires et Familiaux, or LOPOFAs; Programmes Sociaux de Relogement, or PSRs; and Programmes a Loyer Re"duit, or PLRs) and higher categories (Immeubles a Loyer Modere, or ILMs; and Immeubles a Loyer Normal, or ILNs) have existed. Each category is defined by the interest payable on loans;
by norms governing their surface area and maximum land and construction costs; and by maximum income levels fixed for tenants. HLM builders can also build for sale, a category oddly named HLM en Accession a la Propriete*. Loans from the Caisse des Prets cover no more than 95 per cent of real costs, and sometimes no more than 80 per cent: other sources must therefore be sought for the rest. French local authorities, then, do not build housing directly but intervene at the margins of a low-cost housing system that has always been highly structured from Paris.
France has no building societies, and State savings schemes like the Comptes de 1'Ecureuil have only been a partial substitute. More than the English, therefore, French home buyers have sought loans from the private banking sector. As well as tax concessions, the State has offered cheap loans to cover part of the purchase cost (generally through the Credit Foncier de France) and at times subsidies. These packages, which are generally related to income levels and norms on the type of housing built,

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have included Primes et Pr6ts and LOGECOs in the 1950s and 1960s; Pr6ts Spe*ciaux Immediats (PSI), Prets Immobiliers a la Construction (PIC) and Pr£ts Convent ionne's (PC), in the 1970s; and Pr£ts £ 1'Accession h la Pjroprie'te' (PAP) since 1978.
The continuum has been further complicated by the housing reform of 1976-78. This reduced the money available to build HLMs, instituting a single, high-quality HLM category (Pr£ts Locatifs Aide's, or PLA) but also creating a new rent subsidy (Aide Personnalise" au Logement, or APL) . A fuller assessment of French housing policy since 1945, including the reform, will follow in Chapter VI.
This section concerns the municipality's relationship with local developers, and in particular, given the context of Le Havre, with HLM developers. Despite their inability to build directly, and the crucial influence of the State on the structure of HLM finances, French municipali-ties can affect the production of low-cost housing in three ways. Firstly, they can put their views on housing priorities to developers both through joint meetings and through their representatives on the boards of public HLM organisations. Secondly, they can guarantee the loans not only of the public organisations (which every municipality does) but of private ones as well. Thirdly, they can soften the constraints of national norms by offering tax concessions, and land free or at below-market prices, to HLM developers. If these means of intervention do lie at the margins of the housing market, as an AURH study argued in 1979, their use still varies

(25) considerably from one municipality to another

(25) AURH, Les Moyens d'Intervention a la Disposition des Villes pour une Politique Sociale de 1'Habitat, note technique 85/79/HB/NP, July 1979,
1. Milch, 'Paris', 123-125.

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IV.G.1: The Office Public d'HLM de la Ville du Havre (OPHLMVDH)

The main legal difference between the Offices Publics d'HLM and the
private HLM developers is that the former have public nominees on their boards. In 1979, four of the OPHLMVDH's sixteen board members were chosen by the prefect (Dubosc and Rufenacht among them); one each by the local Caisse d'Epargne, the Caisse d'Allocations Familiales, the Union Departement-ale des Associations Familiales, and housing improvement associations; six (three adjoints and three councillors) by the municipality; and two by the tenants (whose main pressure group, the Confederation Nationale des Locataires is under strong Communist influence). The nominees of the Town Hall and the tenants generally voted against the rest, with Dubosc's casting vote as Chairman assuring a precarious right-wing majority. This was reversed in 1982 when Colliard, who had not previously been on the Board, replaced Dubosc as its Chairman.
The OPHLMVDH also differs from other local HLM organisations in its
size and in the type of housing it has built. Its 15,000 or so rented homes in 1979 represented some 20 per cent of the city's total housing stock and nearly three times as many units as the total built by any other developer (Table IV.4, p.225). The OPHLM has also been alone in building sub-HLM units and Cites de Transit ('temporary' low-cost accommodation for 'unsocial' families), which account for more than a third of its stock.
It thus houses all the poorest tenants in the public sector. However, since the OPHLM began serious activity in the mid-1950s the distribution by category of units constructed has changed, owing to the evolution both of the types of credits available and of the local housing market. In the first decade (to 1965) sub-HLM categories accounted for over half the total number of units built. From 1965 to 1979, HLMO units were dominant, though there were also moves into rehabilitation and into HLM en Accession.

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This second period ended with the housing reform. After 1978 the OPHLM was able to build considerably less, and all rented units build were in

(26^ the comfortable PLA category . The vast bulk of the rented stock lies

on the commune of Le Havre, though some units are in Harfleur and other outlying communes: all homes built for sale are in neighbouring villages. In 1979 the OPHLM's current budget ran to some 122 MF, of which 75.5 MF came from rents. Investments totalled nearly 120 MF, of which over 80 MF was for new building: of investment receipts, 71.4 MF came from the Caisse des Frets aux Organismes HLM, and the OPHLM also had to seek loans from other sources - 9.6 MF from the local Caisse d'Epargne and 1 MF from the
'1 pour cent patronal' - the compulsory contribution from businesses towards
(27) housing construction
Both in 1978 and 1979, the OPHLM had recourse to short-term CDC loans
to cover liquidity problems. This reflected a deteriorating financial position that inevitably affected its tenants, and which had three separate but related causes - inflation, recession and the poor quality of the older buildings in the stock. Inflation pushed interest rates up (to 9.5 per cent for a PLA loan, for example). The OPHLM raised rents roughly in line with the retail price index, but auxiliary housing charges, especially heating, rose far more rapidly. At the same time as they were required to pay more, many tenants found their ability to pay reduced. This was particularly true because of the high proportion of tenants from the lowest social groups who were the most vulnerable to unemployment. As a

(26) Centre de Recherches et d f Etudes pour la Planification, 1 'Ame'nagement et 1'Habitat (CREPAH), Etude Prdalable au Conventionnement, OPHLMVDH, March 1980, 10.

(27) OPHLM de la Ville du Havre, Rapport a 1'Appui du Compte Financier de l'Ann£e 1979, 132-135, 152-158.

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result the proportion of rent left unpaid rose to 5 per cent in 1978 and

to 5.85 per cent in 1979. The OPHLM has evicted tenants with rent arrears

very rarely indeed. But it has often cut its losses by rehousing 'unsocial'

families in the cheapest, and thus often the oldest and poorest-quality,

flats - the sub-HLM units of the late 1950s and early 1960s, or the more

recent City's de Transit. These flats had been little better than concrete

rabbit-hutches when they were built, and had started to deteriorate almost

immediately. As 'unsocial families' were concentrated in them, sub-HLM

groups became ghettos whose decline proceeded apace as many tenants

vandalised them and paid little or no rent while the OPHLM saw no reason to

carry out repairs. The major example of this infernal cycle was the Mare-

Rouge estate, but there were smaller, and at times more lurid cases through-

(28) out the stock

(28) Interview with MM. Sayaret and Lecalvez, OPHLMVDH, 19 Aug. 1980. CREPAH, Etude Prdalable, 18. OPHLMVDH, Rapport a 1'Appui, 270-280. Jeannine Lessaud and Marie-Claude Delesque, 'Etude Faite au Havre dans
la Cite" Balzac', project report, Rouen University, 1978. This last
study deals with the two LOPOFA blocks of the Cite Balzac in Aplemont, which were probably the worst in the OPHLM's stock. From the mid-
1960s the OPHLM concentrated its most 'unsocial' and financially un-reliable tenants there - including families it had removed from the Mare-Rouge estate. A high proportion of the Cite* Balzac's tenants were thus people who had fallen on hard times which their new environ-ment helped to perpetuate - alcoholics and families who were often heavily in debt, who could not or would not pay rent, and who were in some cases under the financial supervision of social workers. Lack of maintenance of these blocks, poorly constructed at the start, led to toilets emptying into the cellars and other horrors. In September and December 1974, rifle shots were fired from one of the buildings onto the basketball ground of the neighbouring secondary school, wounding two children. The common reaction of the headmistress and of Durome*a - to reinforce police presence and to avoid publicity - prevented the story from reaching the papers, but failed to reveal who among the numerous tenants possessing a firearm had fired the shots. Renewed shots in 1977 were reported in the papers (Le Havre Libre,
26 Oct. 1977), and led to the allocation of a team of social workers to the Cite Balzac. The social workers, and Jacqueline Rube", the adjoint in charge, helped to dispel some of the Cite Balzac's most squalid features but also kept the estate in quarantine and discouraged access to independent observers like Lessaud and Delesque. In 1982 the buildings were demolished.

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The rapid deterioration of the sub-HLM groups was, however, the tip
of a much larger iceberg. By 1980, major repairs on 1,500 units (chiefly in Mare-Rouge) had been decided - but it was estimated that a further 7,550 pre-1970 units would require similar treatment within ten years.
The general perspective when Colliard took over as chairman, then, was of a decrease in new building, more repairs and improvements, and generally higher rents. At the same time, 706 of the 1,828 families on the OPHLM's waiting-list in 1979 could afford nothing better than a PLR flat . Given this situation, the Left's minority position on the pre-1982
Board probably suited it quite well in some respects. Unpopular decisions, particularly rent increases, were rejected by the minority in carefully-prepared speeches, and the creation of 'ghettos' denounced as a sacrifice of the OPHLM's social role to short-term financial constraints. Colliard's absence from the Board till shortly before he became its President surely indicates the limited substance of what the municipality thought its representatives could accomplish in that forum . For the Board had little to do with the real relationship between the municipality and the OPHLM. Aside from the Communists' general ideological support for HLM organisations, this relationship has been one of mutual interdependence. The OPHLM cannot function without municipal guarantees and land provision; the municipality needs the OPHLM to house its working-class voters. Day-to-day cooperation was ensured by Colliard f s regular meetings with the OPHLM's General Manager, Jean-Claude Metayer. Agreements covered three main areas.

Firstly, the municipality has guaranteed the OPHLM's loans - and has

(29) OPHLMVDH, Rapport £ I'Appui, 69-70: CREPAH, Etude Prelalable, 2.
(30) Interview with MM. Lecalvez and Sayaret, 19 August 1980.

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acquired a say in the choice of 15 per cent of its tenants as a result. There is nothing unusual about this as a principle, but the municipality of Le Havre has encouraged the OPHLM to build as much as possible and to move into new areas like rehabilitation or HLM en Accession. Secondly, the municipality's - very partial - control of the land market has been used to the benefit of the OPHLM. It has not only proposed land on the Caucriauville ZUP and on municipal ZACs but has also used its right of pre-emption on urban zones within the POS (cf. Ch.V, p.245) to offer sites within the city as they come up for sale. This has meant that the municipality has been consulted on the details of each operation - on the size of homes and financial categories - before final decisions are taken. Finally, the municipality has softened the constraints of the official norms by direct subsidy. This has been done selectively: for a Communist municipality, systematic subsidies - for example to allow the OPHLM to acquire better land - would have amounted to a politically and financially unacceptable palliative for the State's refusal to allocate adequate funds for HLM building. But the City of Le Havre, even under Monguillon, has given land free for most PSR and PLR programmes, in particular the Mare-Rouge estate. In the Massillon-Bourdaloue redevelopment (Ch.VII.B.1.b, pp.356-358) it helped the OPHLM to buy a site that was reasonably close to the city centre, unlike the cheap land on the periphery where it is generally obliged to build. And the municipality has regularly allocated modest subsidies for (31) the upkeep of green spaces around OPHLM buildings Like other HLM builders, then, the OPHLMVDH has remained a prisoner
of its financial constraints - or, in the last resort, of how much money the State was prepared to allocate to low-cost housing construction and the

(31) Ibid.

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conditions it attached. Through a policy of close collaboration, generally executed by Colliard, the municipality encouraged its activities. It did not, however, seek to palliate financial constraints on a local basis, which would have smacked of 'municipal cretinism'. And Colliard the adjoint was incapable of preventing Colliard the Chairman from facing a gloomy financial outlook when he took over in 1982.

IV.G.2; Other HLM Developers
Brief mention should be made of the OPHLM de la Seine-Maritime, the departmental office which played a leading role in local HLM construction up to 1955. In the 1960s and 1970s, reincarnated as the Office Public d'Ame'nagement et de Construction (OPAC) de la Seine-Maritime, its activity in Le Havre was more limited, though it did build in Caucriauville and Mont-Gaillard. However, most HLM building apart from the share of the OPHLMVDH is done by the Socidtds Anonymes d'HLM (SAHLM). These use the same loan sources as the OPHLM under the same conditions, but their initial capital comes from mutual insurance groups and even private banks, and their boards resemble those of other businesses. The SAHLMs operating in Le Havre include the SAHLM de la Basse-Seine; the SAHLM de 1'Estuaire de la Seine; the Socidtd Havraise de Logements Economiques (SHLE); Le Foyer Havrais; and Propriete Familiale de Normandie (PFN).
All are much smaller than the OPHLM; the biggest, the Basse-Seine,
had built some 5,400 homes in the area by 1980, of which 4,300 were for rent. Unlike the OPHLM, the SAHLMs have not built any units in the sub-HLM categories. Their clients thus come from the 'solvent sector of the social market 1, people who can afford at least an HLMO rent. The SAHLMs have thus built a large number of ILM/ILN units as well as HLMOs; they have increasingly moved into the HLM en Accession market; and they have

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increasingly chosen sites outside the commune of Le Havre.
A further distinction between the SAHLMs and the OPHLM is the proportionately greater access of the SAHLMs to the '1 pour cent patronal'. This is a compulsory contribution to housing construction paid by employers in proportion to their total wage bill. Employers may, however, choose between roughly four ways to pay. Firstly, they may offer low-interest home purchase loans to their employees. Secondly, they may make payments, either as loans or as grants, to HLM developers. The HIM organisations use these to top up loans from the Caisse de Pr£ts aux Organismes d'HLM; in return, the employers may reserve a certain proportion of homes in a given operation, in the same way as the municipality can, in return for its guarantees. Thirdly, national companies can pay their 1 per cent into a central fund to be redistributed around the country. Thus Renault's contribution goes to the company's own Socidtg Immobiliere (SIRNUR) in Paris, and rather little of it has come back to the Le Havre area. Fourthly, employers can let an organisme c.ollecteur handle their contri-butions. Since 1975 the sole organisme collecteur in the Le Havre area has been the Comite" Interprofessionel du Logement (GIL) . Even in 1974, before it absorbed the rival Groupement Interprofessionel du Logement, the GIL collected some 8.5 MF, or 60 per cent of the total 1 per cent product, which it then redistributed to developers according to the wishes of member companies.
Given this range of choice, employers' strategies for payment may vary considerably. Smaller businesses often pay the 1 per cent as if it were a tax, to the GIL. Bigger firms, however, may use it to reserve flats or houses and thus to attract or to retain employees who are rare on the labour market - especially skilled workers. For this type of strategy, payments to HLM developers or to the GIL have clear advantages over home

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purchase loans: a greater number of homes, and thus of employees, can be 'controlled' for less money. The CIL has the advantage of being a professional service in close touch with all HLM operations. By contrast, semi-skilled and unskilled workers (other than immigrants, who have been entitled to 0.2 per cent of the 1 per cent by law since 1975) are generally neglected in the distribution of employers' contributions: only under pressure from strong unions such as the CGT dockers have these categories received a share proportional to their numbers. The fairly small input
of SIRNUR in Le Havre is explicable in this context, given Renault's comparative lack of skilled workers. Renault has not tried to fix its employees in 'company housing' in Le Havre; instead, it has built up the biggest bus fleet in Seine-Maritime to collect them from villages as much as 100 kilometres from the Sandouville factory. In theory this discourages
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union organisation and strikes. It also explains why so few Renault workers live in Le Havre itself (cf. 1975-76 statistics in Tables B.2 and B.3, pp.408-409).
Three factors have led employers and the CIL to give rather little
(seldom much more than 1 MF annually) to the OPHLM and far more to the SAHLMs. Firstly, the SAHLMs cater for the categories many employers want to reach with their 1 per cent contributions - the 'aristocracy of labour'. Secondly, the OPHLM, unlike the SAHLMs, has preferred to receive contributions not as loans (which are recycled into housing construction as they are repaid, allowing an increasing number of reservations), but as straight grants. Thirdly, three of the SAHLMs (the Estuaire de la Seine, Le Foyer Havrais, and the SHLE, of which the first is the biggest) are subsidiaries of the CIL. Of the 6,133 rented homes that the CIL had helped to finance by 1975, over a quarter had been built by the Estuaire de la Seine, and Le Foyer Havrais' share of the 2,281 units for sale was rather

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higher.
The Marxist sociologist Henri Going, writing for the AURH, has thus
argued that a division of labour exists between the SAHLMs, which build for the better-off workers and get help from employers to do so, and the OPHLM,

(32) which is left to deal with the poorest social groups . This is rather

schematic, but it is true that 'priorite* aux plus de'favorise's' is not a policy of the SAHLMs, still less of the employers. And as the composition of their boards indicates, they are more commercially-minded organisations than the OPHLM: they are less squeamish, for example, about evicting bad tenants. Moreover, at least one of them, the Basse-Seine, has links with monopoly capital: its parent organisation, the Foyer du Fonctionnaire et de

(33) sa Famille, has been heavily financed by the Paribas banking group

None of this has prevented the SAHLMs from enjoying good relations with the municipality, and particularly with Colliard. Municipalities can choose whether to guarantee the SAHLMs' loans: Le Havre, like Nimes under the PCF, has rarely if ever said no. Like the OPHLM, the SAHLMs are exempt from the Taxe Locale d'Equipement, the local tax to cover the cost of installing municipal utilities which is fixed at 3 per cent of the cost of new building operations for other developers. The SAHLMs have thus built
in every major operation undertaken in Le Havre, and particularly Mont-Gaillard and Caucriauville; they also formed a consortium with the Seine-Maritime HLM office and the SARH to build the Points Cardinaux estate in
the north-west. In addition to this, the Basse-Seine has received

(32) AURH (Henri Going), Le Suivi Social d'une Operation Menee par un Office Public d'HLM: Le Gas du Havre, Vol.11, 40-93, 99, provides the infor-mation on the employers' 1 per cent.
(33) Yon, 'Industrialisation et Urbanisation', 286. Christian Topalov in Centre de Recherches et d'Etudes Marxistes, Urbanisme Monopoliste,
Urbanisme Democratique, 102-104.

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selective land subsidies from the municipality. This will be considered
in more detail in Chapter VII.B.I, pp. 353-360.

IV.G.3; Private Developers

Like HLM housing, private housing for sale splits into a number of financial sectors, ranging from PSI units, just one step above HLM en Accession, through the more expensive PIC and PC categories to the open-ended Non Aide" sector at the top of the market (cf. above, p.221). Among the biggest groups building medium-price units in Le Havre itself have been
the Socidtd Centrale Immobiliere de la Caisse des De*p6ts (SCIC) , a CDC subsidiary, and the Caisse de Retraite des Ingenieurs et Cadres (CRIC), both of which built on Mont-Gaillard. The Societe Francaise Ge'ne'rale Immobiliere (SFGI) has also made a big contribution to the non-assisted sector with the Residence de France development, which consists of some 960 luxury (or at least expensive) flats built on the seafront site of the Augustin-Normand shipyards since their closure in 1962.
Speculative pressures have been relatively weak in Le Havre, and have
not led to a wholesale replacement of low-income inner-city areas by smart flats or offices. This may have resulted partly from municipal policy (Ch.VI.B, pp.313-315) but the main reason was that the city centre had already been 'redeveloped' once since 1944. While minor redevelopments have taken place in the old centre, up-market building operations have generally concentrated on traditionally prestigious areas - the seafront, the C6te, and Ste-Adresse: they have, however, been less spacious than the substantial villas they have often replaced. The fairly slow sales of the Residence de France indicate that this market has been fairly limited

in Le Havre.

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The major expansion in the private sector in the 1970s, however, was
in individual homes in the communes surrounding Le Havre. This attracted numerous nationally-based developers specialised in this kind of work - Maisons Phenix, Etienne Renard, PROMOGIM, Bruno Petit, European Homes, Tradifrance, and others. Aside from a handful of expensive units built to clients' specifications (often by Tradifrance in Fontaine-la-Mallet) most of these operations have been in the middle-price PSI or PIC categories. Buyers tend to be young, and to come from middle-income groups (4,500- 7,000 francs a month in 1979): about a third were middle managers, a third white-collar workers, and a quarter manual workers. This social profile resembles that of the better HLM blocks - whence many of the buyers had come. The expansion of this market resulted in part from the extension
of car ownership. It also depended on the developers' ability to use cheap industrial building techniques, to find cheap land (thus generally outside Le Havre), and to put together an attractive financial package for their clients (with down payments of as little as 1,000 F for a house costing 200,000 F in 1979).
While they have no objections in principle to building on ZACs like Mont-Gaillard or Belle-Etoile in Montivilliers, such developers prefer two other formulas, the 1otissement (subdividing a plot, installing utilities, and selling individual sites to clients); and the groupe d'habitations (a full housing estate built by a single developer). These are administratively quicker than ZACs, and developers do not have to go through the SARH to
get infrastructure installed, or to contribute to the cost of social and educational facilities as many ZAC contracts require them to do. It was partly because of this that the proportion of homes built in the Le Havre area on ZACs diminished in the late 1970s. In the course of the decade,
the character of these village developments changed somewhat. Before about

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1974, they tended to be small (ten to fifty units); to be lotissements;
and to be scattered throughout the SDAU area. From 1975, they were often large (400 units in 'Les Lombards' at Montivilliers, 292 in PROMOGIM's
'Vert Village' at Epouville); they were generally groupes d'habitations;

(34) and they were concentrated in the communes around Montivilliers

This spread of squat white reinforced-concrete boxes across the Caux plateau was slowing down by 1980. Land, always at a premium given the
60 degree angle of Le Havre's hinterland, rapidly became more expensive as the AURH and the municipalities worked on restrictive POSs. Rising interest rates also made it more difficult for developers to offer a cheap credit package. Not surprisingly, developers have sought good relationships with municipalities in the hope of getting POSs to suit them. The municipality of Le Havre has maintained polite but not close relations with private developers: perhaps it is more significant that the most rapidly-expanding

(35) sector of the housing market in the 1970s lay quite outside its control

The municipality's inability to intervene directly on the housing
market by undertaking building operations itself, and the tight national framework within which developers at the lower end of the continuum have
had to operate, have seriously limited the scope for a municipal housing policy. At the same time the apparent lack of links with private developers, contrasted with the active collaboration it sought to establish with HLM builders, indicate the kind of housing policy the municipality tried to establish within these limits. Its application will be considered in more detail in Chapter VII.

(34) Articles by AURH, in Etudes Normandes, no.1, 1980: 'L'Habitat Individuel Peri-Urbain, L'Example de la Region du Havre', 19-32.
'Les Nouveaux Villageois et Leur Genre de Vie', 33-38.
(35) Interview with Denis Aubas, Maisons Bruno-Petit, 23 July 1980.

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IV.H: The Municipality and its Partners; Conclusion
Five main points should be made about the Town Hall's relations with
the other local actors.described in this chapter.
The first concerns the mayor-prefect dualism used by traditional and revisionist observers alike as a paradigm of local and State authorities in France. Le Havre's planning process cannot be interpreted as a function of such a dualistic structure. Personal interventions by Cance or Duromea to get local problems heard in Paris, or by the prefect or sub-prefect to embarrass the municipality politically, have taken place, but their importance has been limited and tactical. Of course the role of the State has been crucial: it is by far the most important source of external funds for the municipality. But the local planning process is a great deal more complex than a municipal-State dialogue, and involves a wide range of

local actors.

Secondly, the municipality's relations which other local actors are
not merely a projection of national PCF policy. At times the links between national policy and local practice have been close. The municipality has occasionally resorted to 'action' in its dealings with the State authorities. It supports HLM offices generally while criticising the conditions under which they operate - very much within the Party line (cf. Ch.II, p. 83).
But it has also enjoyed good relations with organisations towards which national PCF literature encourages suspicion (the AURH and the SARH); and with bodies like the CCIH and the PAH which clearly represented the capitalist class. The municipality's regular consultation of the DDE before the submission of major projects, and the DDK's respect for the municipality's technical thoroughness, have been more important to their relationship than the 'struggles' with State services advocated by the PCF. It seems highly probable that this close cooperation between the Town Hall and the State's

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technical services effectively protected the municipality from politically-motivated attempts at sabotage by the prefect.
Thirdly, far from concealing practices that smacked of class
collaboration, the municipality was proud of 'playing the card of dialogue 1, especially with the PAH and the CCIH. This publicity served to show Communist voters that 'their' e*lus were representing their interests to
the bosses' organisations. It also reassured centre voters of the municipality's responsibility by visibly disproving the Right's old argument that Communists in the Town Hall would turn Le Havre into an 'economic desert' .

Fourthly, this network of partnerships converged, in the Town Hall,
on the person of Daniel Colliard. This was justifiable in terms of his impressive accumulation of responsibilities - town planning, economic affairs, and intercommunal cooperation. However, Colliard's wide range
of external contacts greatly enhanced his authority in the Town Hall, while his ability to get his agreements ratified by his colleagues confirmed his credibility x\dth his external partners. Hence the relatively slight importance of the City Planning Committee as a decision-making body and
the considerable importance of negotiations between Colliard and the municipality's partners.
Fifthly, these negotiations, vital though they were, took place within
a changing but ever-present framework of national legislation and of a capitalist market economy. This framework will be considered in more detail as we turn to the planning process as it took place in Le Havre from 1965

to 1980.

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Chapter V: Regional to City Planning

The structural planning documents for the Le Havre area - the Schema Directeur d'Amenagement et d'Urbanisme (SDAU) and the Plan d'Occupation des Sols (POS) - were 'jointly elaborated' in the 1970s by representatives of the State, the local authorities, and other local actors. To understand the specific case of Le Havre, however, it is necessary to examine the legal framework for the SDAU and the POS - the Loi d'Orientation Fonciere (LOF) of 1967 - and the context in which it was produced.

V.A: Managing Urban Growth; the Loi d'Orientation Fonciere (LOF)
of 1967

Three main elements defined the context of the LOF.
Firstly, in the late 1960s France achieved growth rates of 5 or 6 per
cent. Since 1945, the population had also risen very rapidly, especially in the cities (Ch.II, p. 51). The indefinite continuation of these tendencies was considered to be desirable and, given the right policies, possible.
Secondly, French industry was increasingly exposed to competition
from abroad, owing to the internationalisation of world trade and especially to the lowering of tariff barriers within the EEC. The French family firm was ill-equipped to face this competition, and the concentration of capital that took place in the 1960s (Ch.II, p. 53) was actively encouraged by the government, especially in basic industries. At the same time, the steady exhaustion of old sources of raw materials in northern and eastern France, plus new developments in transport technology (especially bigger ships that cut costs), led to a policy of siting big new heavy industrial plants on the coast, using cheaper imported raw materials and oil. Hence the so-called 'operations marquantes' of Dunkirk and Fos-sur-Mer. This priority

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given to the economic and physical restructuring of France's basic industries represented the 'hard pole' of regional planning. For the Communists, of course, it represented 'direct aid to the monopolies' par excellence. Thirdly, growth was, as always, unevenly distributed between regions
and severely strained existing urban systems. Regional imbalances led to a combination of government carrots (the 'metropoles d'dquilibre' and regional development subsidies) and sticks (tax penalties for new firms setting up in the Paris region) to try and assure a more 'harmonious' growth. Official reaction to the urban problem was well expressed by the 6th Plan's Towns Committee in 1970:

'on voit peu a peu se multiplier dans nos villes les
phe'nomenes de pathologie ou d'andmie sociale qui de"bouchent de plus en plus sur la contestation ge'ne'ralise'e et sur la violence'.
It was thus necessary to improve '1'acceuil des
nouveaux habitants que les transformations £conomiques
poussent a la mobilite*, au moindre codt ou plutot aux
meilleurs conditions compatibles avec les capacite"s
ge'ndrales de 1 'dconomie ' > ^ ' .

The government's concern to balance growth between regions and to
solve, or at least to manage, the urban question in order to head off the political threat from social groups who had not benefited from rapid growth, constituted the 'soft pole' of urban and regional planning. It was, of course, only partially compatible with the priority of industrial profita-bility contained in the 'hard' pole.
Within this context, the LOF set out to create the tools - the SDAU
and the POS - for the-planning of France's cities to the year 2000. The involvement of local elus provided for by the joint elaboration process had

(0 Commissariat G£ne"ral du Plan, Commission Villes, Orientations Sou-

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haitables au Cours du Vie Plan, (Paris, Documentation Francaise, 1970), __

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two main purposes. First, the mobilisation of local fiscal resources would clearly be required to provide the necessary urban infrastructure and social facilities, and it was thus desirable to bind local e"lus to a long-term strategy. Secondly, joint elaboration would help to diffuse the political responsibility for any urban 'disfunctions' that subsequently appeared, without, however, throwing open national industrial development options to local debate.
SDAUs are structure plans intended to plot the economic, demographic,
and spatial growth of urban regions to 2000. They include a volume of text, and three maps giving the situation in 1970 and projections for (roughly) 1985 and 2000. The inclusion of 1985 was important. Rather than merely describing an ideal future, SDAUs were supposed to define a desirable and realistic evolution for a region over the whole period, and to say how it was to be achieved and how progress was to be monitored.
The meaning of an 'urban region' was left very vague in the LOF, but
it was generally taken to mean a town or city of over 10,000 inhabitants
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plus the surrounding communes with which it had clear economic ties or which would be affected by future urbanisation. The perimeters were fixed by the Ministry of the Interior on prefectoral advice, after consultation with the communes. By 1978, some 400 SDAUs were completed or in progress, covering 38M people but only 29 per cent of French territory: Seine-Maritime 's 5 SDAUs covered 70 per cent of the de*partement' s population (835,000 people) but under 20 per cent of its surface. Both nationally

(2) and in the de"partement, then, SDAUs were primarily big-city plans

The joint elaboration of the SDAUs was to be done by the Commissions

(2) Minist&re de 1'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie, Receuil des Infor-mations Statistiques sur 1'Urbanisme, 1978 (Paris, Documentation Francaise, 1979), 35.

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Locales d'Am^nagement et d'Urbanisme (CLAUs) , including local glus, State field services, and representatives from other local bodies like Chambers of Commerce. The CLAUs were to use the technical assistance either of the local City Planning Agency (where one existed) or the Groupe d'Etudes et
de Programmation (GEP) of the Direction Departmentale d T Equipment (DDE) in other cases. The CLAUs' draft projects were to go to the State services not represented on the CLAU, and to the municipalities concerned, for consultation before their final approval by the prefect. The same procedure was laid down for the revision of a SDAU. In case of deadlock in the joint elaboration process, provision was made for the Conseil d'Etat to approve SDAUs on prefectoral request. Officially, an approved SDAU was binding,
not on private individuals, but only on the administration, and thus in practice on e~lus: where a SDAU existed, the POS and all major planning

(3) operations were to be compatible with it .

In the decree and circulars on SDAUs that followed the LOF, the 'hard'
and 'soft' poles of State policy were very mixed. On the one hand the May 1969 Decree laid down that the CLAUs' work should take place 'dans le cadre des directives nationales de 1' ame'nagement du territoire et eVentuellement des directives donne~es par le pre"fet de region' . Moreover, the circular
of the following December emphasised the need to open up vast new areas for building in order to keep land prices down, and added
'nous demandons aux pre"fets et aux chefs des services
exte"rieurs de 1'equipement d'accorder la priorite" aux
preoccupations economiques et de rentabilite qui doivent
inspirer la realisation des schdmas directeurs''^' (original
italics).

(3) LOF (Loi no.67-1253 du 30 ddcembre 1967), Journal Officiel, 3 and 12 Jan. 1968, Articles 11, 12, 14. Ddcret no.69-551 du 28 mai 1969 (JO,
8 June 1969) articles 1, 2, 5, 8, 12, 13, 20.
(4) D£cret du 28 mai 1969, art. 1. Circulaire du 4 decembre 1969, JO,
25 Jan. 1970.

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However, the same circular also recommended that an £lu should chair the CLAU and that the public should be widely informed. This was taken up in a second circular of May 1971, which stressed that an e*lu should be chair-man wherever possible, that a spirit of 'very broad consultation' should prevail within the CLAU, and that the Conseil d'Etat procedure should only be used as a last resort. Finally, Ministre de 1'Equipement Alb in Chalandon emphasised 'polycentrism' and 'green belts' (coupures vertes, or couloirs verts) as governing principles for SDAUs - meaning that urban sprawl should be avoided by grouping new urbanisation around several compact and separate centres in each region
The real elaboration of many SDAUs, however, was often affected by
rather different considerations. Firstly, SDAUs were slow to appear, both because the ministries were slow to produce the circular and decrees and because technicians in the GEPs and the planning agencies were slow to learn the new rules. The aim of Francois-Xavier Ortoli, Ministre ' de
1 'Equipement in 1967, to get completed SDAUs in all cities of over 50,000 inhabitants by 1970, was not achieved; by 1978 only 129 SDAUs had been approved. Thus by the time many SDAUs were produced, the high-growth assumptions of 1967 had disappeared. Secondly, many elus did not take the SDAUs entirely seriously - they were not, after all, binding on the electorate. The projection, however, of high growth levels might usefully justify subsequent requests for State funds, and in some cases local DDEs connived in this exercise. The result was that many SDAUs became catalogues of pious wishes that appeared steadily less realistic as the

(5) Circulaire du 11 mai 1971 (Chalandon/Marcellin), JO, 28 May 1971. Minist&re de 1'Equipement et du Logement, Direction de 1'Amdnagement Foncier et Urbain (DAFU), Elements pour 1'Elaboration d'un SDAU, March 1972, 15-16.

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economic context deteriorated

An optional document, the Schema de Secteur, may give details of the SDAU's provisions as they affect specific parts of the SDAU area. The POS, on the other hand, is compulsory in all communes of over 10,000 inhabitants; generally covers a single commune; and is elaborated by an even more complex procedure than the SDAUs. The draft is produced by a working-party (groupe de travail), convened by the Prefect, including State and local representatives and working with the technical support of the GEP or a City Planning Agency. The draft POS is submitted to State services not represented on the working-party, returned for a further meeting of the working-party, passed on to the municipal council, and published by the Prefect. From this moment is provisions are binding on private and public individuals for a maximum of three years even before passing through its subsequent stages. Publication is followed by a public inquiry super-vised by three commissaires-enqueteurs (local worthies nominated by the municipality and the prefecture), a further meeting of the working-party to consider the enquiry's findings, and a second submission to the municipal council, before the (revised) POS's final approval by the prefect all within the three years.
From the date of publication (provided final approval follows within
the three-year limit), the POS constitutes the framework for the distribution of local building permits. Applications for permits are processed by the DDE as well as the Town Hall, and require prefectoral

(6) Articles in Metropolis: Martin Sabria, 'Ou en sont les Documents d'Urbanisme?', 1, Nov. 1973, 43-46. Y-M. Danan, 'La Force Juridique des SDAU: sont-ils Opposables au Tiers?', Ill, 21: 62-69. Georges Meyer-Heine, 'De'che'ance des POS et Rehabilitation des SDAU', III,
26-27: 30-35.

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approval, but a well-drawn POS leaves little room for ambiguity . More precisely, a complete POS has four parts. First, a presentation report outlines the intended evolution of each main quarter in the medium term (generally till 1985). Secondly, land reserves for all public building projects over a ten-year period are listed and shown on maps: the POS freezes all new building or property transactions on these sites pending their purchase by State or local authorities. Thirdly, environmental restrictions on building (owing to ancient monuments, electric pylons, airport flight-paths, etc.) are listed and mapped. Fourthly, zoning and density rules are defined by maps and a fifteen-article Reglement d'Urbanisme. The nine most important articles are 1 and 2, which define the type of building allowed (housing, shops, industry, offices, or none) as well as restrictions on pollution; 6 and 7, which fix the distance of new buildings from the road and from adjacent sites; 9 and 12, which fix the maximum possible built-up surface, and the minimum possible unbuilt surface, as a proportion of total site area; 10, giving the maximum height of new buildings; 14, which fixes the ratio of floor-space to site area, called the Coefficient d'Occupation des Sols or COS (on a site of 1,000 square metres, 1,000 square metres of floor-space give a COS of 1, and 500 square metres of floor-space a COS of 0.5); and 15, which defines the (often limited) conditions in which the COS can be exceeded on payment of a special tax. The other articles concern architectural dispositions (whose stringency will obviously depend on the area concerned) and rules on connections to roads and public utilities; the minimum area of sites where building may take place; and the minimum number of on-site parking

(7) This will change when a de*cr£t d'application of the 1982 Decentrali-sation Act gives the final right of approval to the mayor, but the
decree has not yet appeared (June 1983).

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places to accompany each new building project. Since the 'Galley Act'
of 1975, all zones classed as 'Urban' in towns with completed POSs are defined as Zones d'Intervention Fonci&re (ZIFs), on which the municipality has the right of first refusal on all sites offered for sale. The only areas to fall outside the provisions of a POS are the Zones d'Amgnagement Concerte" (ZACs) , which have their own internal regulations.
A POS thus has two main functions. First, it is a 'machine to
distribute (or to refuse) building permits', and as such limits the right of private individuals to build within the commune. Secondly, it is a list of the medium-term compulsory land purchase plans of the State and the municipality. While the presentation report may be controversial at times, it is above all these limitations on property rights that make a POS, at least potentially, a politically charged document. Many local e"lus have thus felt a greater sense of involvement on POS working-parties than on the CLAUs.

A POS is, however, an essentially restrictive document that is applied
in a more or less free-market context. A municipality can use it to regulate building volumes: it cannot use it to require the redevelopment or rehabilitation of a given area, or to earmark a site for low-cost housing (other than by using its pre-emption right under the ZIF to buy land that comes up for sale) . The market clearly has to be taken into account in fixing zoning rules, and a wide range of choices is possible. A working-party may choose, for example, to allow high densities every-where (in order to lower land prices in central districts); to maintain existing building rights; to group new urbanisation around existing social and educational facilities; to encourage new urbanisation by allowing new building on agricultural land; or to establish a green belt around the existing urban area. All will affect the land market. All will also have

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political repercussions. Since the people most likely to object to a POS are people who own land, a Communist municipality's reaction to opposition from social groups who lie somewhat outside the PCF's traditional constituency will provide one indication of the 'consensual' or 'sectarian' nature of the municipality's approach to relations with its electorate.
The Communists have been predictably suspicious of the LOF since it required a degree of open cooperation between local e*lus and State officials that risked damaging their credibility as a tribune party. They have thus argued that because the prefect defines the SDAU perimeter (in accordance with 'les inte're'ts e'conomiques et politiques de 1'argent' , according to Rosette); because local elus are 'en minorite* et compl£tement noye"s' on the CLAU and the POS working-party; and because the GEPs do the technical work 'in most cases', the joint elaboration procedure conceals a State-dominated and technocratic reality beneath a consensual general-interest ideology. They also criticise the exemption of ZACs from the provisions of the POS on the ground that it allows monopolist developers to make super-profits by making their own rules within 'private' ZACs (cf. Ch.II, 64-65). Colliard thus claims that the uniform approach of the POS to building land ignores the social difference betx^een small ox-mer-occupiers hedged about by restrictions and big property speculators who can generally bend the rules to their own advantage. Also predictably, Rosette exhorts Communist mayors to approach the joint elaboration process as a 'moment in the political struggle' and to rely on the support of the

(8) population against the State authorities

(8) A. Stephens, 'SDAU et Autonomie Communale', L'Information Municipale, 26 (4), April 1975, 42-48. D. Colliard, 'Les Documents d'Urbanisnie~au Havre 1, Communes et De"partements d'Aujourd'hui, April 1975, 36-37.
M. Rosette, La Gestion Communale dans 1'Action, (Editions Sociales,
1977), 132-138, 143.

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Some of the Communists' criticisms are justified. Given the official emphasis on 'directives nationales d'ame'nagement du territoire' , it is clear that the CLAUs were not intended to debate the fundamental options of economic development. And the dangers of exempting ZACs from the POS

(9) are emphasised by plenty of sources outside the PCF . At the same time the claims that local e*lus are smothered by State representatives on the i

CLAUs and the POS working-parties, and that the main choices are pre-determined by the technical work of the GEPs, seem harder to sustain. But the PCF line on joint elaboration was above all a political attempt to cover the twin roles - as Party of government and as tribune party - that its e"lus played. As responsible elected officials they could not refuse their role in the joint elaboration process, even if its limits were defined by the State. But as 'revolutionaries', they needed to make clear that collaboration with the State authorities could not be confused with class collaboration, and to escape responsibility for the unpopular or politically inconsistent priorities in the common planning documents through caveats
as to the limitations of their real powers. The rest of this chapter will consider in more detail how Colliard and his colleagues handled their ambiguous role in the elaboration of Le Havre's SDAU and POS.

V.B: A 'National Directive 1; The Schema Basse-Seine

A 'directive nationale d'amenagement du territoire', applying very specifically to the Le Havre area, did exist in the shape of the Schema d'Amenagernent de la Basse-Seine. The Schema Basse-Seine was drafted by the Rouen Prefect's Mission d'Etudes Basse-Seine (MEBS) in 1966 and

(9) C. Sorbets, 'Control of Urban Development in France', Vincent Wright and Jean Lagroye, Local Government in Britain and France, 158.

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submitted to local actors (such as municipalities and Chambers of Commerce)

the following year. It was then redrafted and. finally accepted in December

1969 by the Comite Interministeriel pour 1'Amenagement du Territoire (the

CIAT, a cabinet-level body chaired by Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas

that included Finance Minister Valery Giscard d'Estaing; Junior Finance

Minister Jacques Chirac; Industry Minister Francois-Xavier Ortoli; Education

Minister Olivier Guichard; Justice Minister Rene Plevenp.

Ministre de 1'Equipement Albin Chalandon; Regional Planning Minister Andre"

Bettencourt; Interior Minister Raymond Marcellin; and Jerome Monod, the

head of DATAR). Its aim was to plan the development of the lower Seine

valley, from the Paris suburbs to Le Havre, to the year 2000.

The importance of the 'hard pole' of planning in the Schema Basse-

Seine is hard to over-estimate. As the introduction argued:

'L'Industrie de 1'Europe du Nord-Ouest est puissamment
marquee par deux phe"nomenes actuels . D'une part,
1'e"puisement progressif des gisements de matieres
premieres continentaux, et la diminution rapide des
couts du transport maritime grace 5. la mise en service
de navires specialises de fort tonnage rendent de plus en plus interessante 1'utilisation de matieres premieres importees, de sorte que les industries lourdes ont tendance ^ venir s'installer "au bord de 1'eau" dans les ports accessibles aux grands navires. D'autre part, 1'ouverture des frontieres, 1'accroissement rapide des ^changes internationaux, les efforts des entreprises ame'ricaines pour s'implanter sur le marche^ europden bouleversent les conditions de fonctionnement des
entreprises industrielles. Celles-ci, soumises & une
concurrence de plus en plus dure, doivent changer
d'e"chelle, se regrouper, attaquer des marches nouveaux,
crder de nouvelles unite's de production judicieusement
implante'es, developper leurs exportations ' (10) .

The Schema Basse-Seine also assumed that France's population would

grow by 80 per cent, and the lower Seine's considerably faster, by 2000.

All this, of course, fitted with Pompidou's priorities of rapid

(10) MEBS, Schema Basse-Seine, 1,8.

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industrialisation and population growth. In addition, the MEBS was concerned with the dangers of 'anarchic' industrial expansion and of continuous suburbanisation from Paris to Rouen

Table V.1; Schema Basse-Seine: Population and Employment Estimates to 2000 (in thousands)

Year

1962
1985
2000

Total
population
1,050
1,800
2,500

Active
population
425
710
950

of which
Agriculture
50
30
30

employed
Industry
178
320
425

in
Tertiary
197
360
495

Source: MEBS, Schema Basse-Seine, February 1971: Vol.1, 45.

The MEBS applied these three considerations to the lower Seine valley as it found it in the mid-1960s - dominated by two cities, Rouen with its established administrative and tertiary functions (though also a consider-able port with a number of industries) and Le Havre, an industrial and maritime centre at the end of an 11,000-hectare alluvial plain. This was clearly an attractive site for the type of industrial-port zone (ZIP) already under way in Dunkirk and Fos. By way of comparison, the total area of industrial zones equipped and delivered annually to companies in
(12) the whole of France during the early 1970s was some 4,000 hectares
The central planning dispositions of the Schema Basse-Seine were
thus twofold. Firstly, the estuary area - which for the hinterland of
a major European port was sparsely populated - was to grow rather faster than the whole lower Seine, from 330,000 inhabitants in 1962 to 625,000

(11) MEBS, Schema Basse-Seine, I, 56.
(12) Jerome Monod and Philippe de Castelbajac, L'Amenagement du Territoire, (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 3rd Edition 1978), 54.

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in 1985 and 895,000 by 2000. Of this, the Le Havre area was to have 430,000 in 1985 and 540,000 in 2000; by contrast, growth above Rouen was to be slower than the average for the lower Seine. More important, however, was the division of labour between the region's two main cities. Le Havre was earmarked as the site of 'large heavy industrial complexes', and the Schema underlined that 'L'importance de 1'atout qul constituent pour la France ces zones industrielles justifie cette priorite" donnde aux considerations e*conomiques' . In short, a third 'operation marquante'
was planned for Le Havre. Rouen, on the other hand, was expected to expand its existing tertiary base to keep pace with the overall economic growth of the lower Seine - failing which Paris would exercise a fatal economic

(13) and demographic attraction

This division of roles between Le Havre and Rouen was received with considerable reserve by the 450 or so representatives of the local 'forces vives r to whom it was suggested in 1967. The Port of Le Havre (PAH) was reasonably happy, but the vast majority of other bodies, both in Le Havre and in Rouen, wanted to see a more balanced development between the two

. . . . (14) cities and more guarantees of tertiary decentralisation from Paris
The discussions in Haute-Normandie's CODER (Commission du DeVeloppement Economique Regional) that followed in 1968 gave these ideas more precision. Le Havre's attractiveness as a regional centre was to be reinforced with four major projects: the new Maison de la Culture; a university, which the Education sub-committee said should be a 'complete ensemble' by 1985; a
4fr World Trade Centre (WTC); and a second estuary bridge, connecting Oudalle with Honfleur. The final version of the Schema Basse-Seine also argued

(13) MEBS, Schema Basse-Seine, I, 57.
(U) MEBS, La Basse-Seine au D£but du XXIe Siecle, Rapport de I'Enqu^te-Consultation, June 1967, 13-38.

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that Rouen's tertiary expansion should be balanced by industrial and port-based growth; that new urbanisation should be grouped around existing centres - the two cities, but also 'secondary poles' like Le Vaudreuil, Elbeuf, Pont-Audemer and Lillebonne; that green belts between urban centres should be respected (a proposition that the PAH saw as threatening the Schema's fundamental industrial priority); that pollution controls should be improved; and that Caen (in Calvados, Basse-Normandie) should ultimately be integrated into the Sche'ma. The political inputs at this stage, as notables sought special provisions for their own localities, are very clear. Finally, the Schema pointed out the need to finance the very considerable land purchases that its propositions would require, and the CIAT meeting of 1969 did indeed approve the creation of the Etablissement Public de la Basse-Seine (EPBS) to meet this purpose x^ith the help both of cheap loans and of its own tax revenues (a share of the Taxe Locale d'Equipement)
These ideas clearly belong to the 'soft' rather than to the 'hard'
pole of French planning, and were particularly strongly expressed in the final 'synthesis' of the Schema. 'Synthesis', in fact', was what the Schema was not. The 'soft' proposals did not alter the basic options of the
Sche'ma but were added to it piecemeal, and, the EPBS aside, had few guarantees of being realised. Moreover, the Schema was wholly unclear
about which industries were expected to come to Le Havre, and when. The 'synthesis' spoke of the ZIP filling up at the rate of 200 hectares a
year by 1973 - yet even Rotterdam, with its vastly greater port facilities and hinterland, was only managing 280. A separate MEBS study on industriali-sation to 1985 considered the implantation of a steel mill in Le Havre's

(15) MEBS, Schema Basse-Seine, I, 75, 156-159, 193-197, 210-211, 221, 229- 234, 238-239: II, 49-50, 163, 172-173: Rapport de Synthese, 65-66.

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ZIP for 1985-1990 to be a possibility, but no more. Finally, while the Schema referred to Le Havre's 'vocation pe"troli£re', it made no mention of the Antifer oil terminal (between Le Havre and Etretat), although Antifer received government approval just two days after the CIAT meeting of December 1969 (16).
Despite hopes expressed in the 'synthesis' and the 'soft' accretions added since the first draft, the Schema Basse-Seine was not seen by local actors as an 'ardent obligation' . True, Durome'a waxed enthusiastic about the prospects for a 'French Ruhr' (cf. Ch.III, p.158). Yet Colliard found the division of labour between Le Havre and Rouen 'caricatural' and the MEBS's growth projections 'utopian', and his views were to some extent
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shared by the Chamber of Commerce (CCIH), if not by the PAH . One left-wing author has argued that the Schema also had a political purpose - to isolate the Communist contagion by concentrating industry in Le Havre, leaving Rouen as a safe middle-class stronghold of the Right or Centre-

09) Right . While such ulterior motives cannot be excluded (and in some

ways they suited Le Havre's Communists rather well), the Schema Basse-Seine was primarily an industrial strategy x^hich risked spreading the red infection at least up the estuary to Tancarville.
It was a strategy that failed. Le Havre has seen no major new
industrial deployment since 1974: its university remains confined to an Institut Universitaire de Technologie and a small International Business

(16) MEBS, Schema Basse-Seine, Synthese, 16: I, 69-70, 234: II, 143-152. 'SDAU du Havre: Un Nouveau Havre £ la Dimension de 1'Estuaire',
article (unsigned) in Agir 199, 2 Oct. 1973, 6-7.
(17) MEBS, Schema Basse-Seine, Synthese, 47 ff.
(18) Interviews with Daniel Colliard, 20 April 1980: M. Reinhart, CCIH, 2 April 1980: Mme Denel, PAH, 8 April 1980.
(19) B. Archer, 'Un Example de la Production du Discours Ideologique: la Planification Urbaine a" Rouen, 1960-1970', Espaces et Socie'te's, 12,
May 1974, 123.

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faculty. The failure of general economic and demographic growth projections was partly responsible. There were also, however, three errors that were more specific to the Schema Basse-Seine's conception. First, plants in Brazil, South Korea and Japan made even the 'ship-in-the-factory' formula for France's basic transformation industries an uncompetitive one: in 1975, blast-furnaces in Dunkirk and Fos closed months after coming into service. Second, the assumption that capital-intensive heavy industries would trigger the creation of more varied labour-intensive industries and of services in the same region - so as to ensure the Schema's growth projections for the Estuary - was questionable from the start. Third, the Schema lacked the teeth to direct growth towards the estuary. Just after its publication, BP put a refinery in the 'green belt' between Mantes and Vernon. Annual population growth subsequently averaged 1 per cent below Rouen, and 2 per cent above it. Yet it was in the framework of these projections that Le Havre's SDAU was produced

V.C; The SDAU de la Region du Havre
This section will use the case of Le Havre to try and answer two
main questions. Firstly, how justified is the Communists' claim that
joint elaboration is a sham, and how far a political cover? Secondly,
what was the approach of Communist elus on a CLAU working in the framework of a 'monopolist' document like the Schema Basse-Seine, and what were their relations with their partners - both other elus and State representatives?

(20) Jean-Paul Lacaze, Introduction a la Planification Urbaine (Paris, Editions du Montieur, 1979), 188-189. Jean-Claude Caillat, 'L'lnvasion Reussie: La Haute-Normandie, Boulevard Industrie! de Paris', CNPF-
Patronat, March 1977, 10, 13. Le Monde, 16 Sept. 1975, quoted in
Alain Yon, 'Industrialisation et Urbanisation dans la Region Havraise', doctoral thesis, Paris 1976, 147.

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V.C.1: Organisation and Approaches

The SDAU covers 33 communes and some 356 square kilometres: it is
some 30 kilometres from east to west, and 15 from north to south (Table A.1, p.404, Maps 27, 28). This area is dominated by Le Havre and its immediate neighbours - Montivilliers, Harfleur and Gonfreville. Of the communes outside the Le Havre conurbation, St-Romain had some 3,000 inhabitants and Octeville-sur-Mer 2,000 in 1968. All the others had fewer than 1,000. Most of these 'peripheral' communes had grown more slowly than Le Havre between 1962 and 1968, and had suffered from a negative migratory balance (Table A.2, p.405).
The provisional SDAU perimeter was decided by the prefect in July
1969 and included 23 communes: the other ten (Mane"glise, Le Fontenay, St Gilles, Gainneville, Etainhus, Les Trois Pierres, Gommerville, Craim-bouville, Rolleville and Notre-Dame-du-Bec) joined on their own request before the final delimitation in June 1973. The SDAU's northern frontier, then, was somewhat flexible: what was more important was to get the whole of the alluvial plain as far as Tancarville (where it stops, and the Seine is bridged) into the plan, in line with the importance given to the ZIP in the Schema Basse-Seine. A bigger perimeter might have been possible. Bolbec, Lillebonne and the Notre-Dame-du-Gravenchon oil refinery could have been included, and even a SDAU covering both sides of the estuary would not have been outrageously large. An estuary SDAU may have been rejected by the State authorities owing to the risk of its domination by Le Havre; the perimeter that was chosen limited the size of the Communists' hinterland. But the chosen area also corresponded to that covered by the Socie'te' d'Etudes Urbaines de la Region du Havre (SERH, becoming the
Agence d'Urbanisme de la Region du Havre, or AURH, in 1974). In either case, Rosette's argument that SDAU perimeters are decided by high financial

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interests (above p.246) seems exaggerated.
Rather more plausibly, Colliard has claimed that although studies for
the SDAU started as early as 1968, the prefect waited till 1972 to convene the CLAU, in the vain hope of a Communist defeat in the 1971 municipal

(21) elections . Once assembled, however, the CLAU appears to have been a model of democracy. Chaired by Durome"a, it included representatives from the Prefecture, the Finance Ministry, the DDE and other State services, as well as from bodies like the CCIH and the PAH; over half the CLAU's members were local e"lus. And as recommended by ministerial circular, it worked initially through sub-committees, each chaired by an £lu, as follows:
1) Regional Framework - M. Odievre (Right), Mayor of Saint-Romain.
2) Economic and Demographic Development - Daniel Colliard (PCF), adjoint Le Havre, conseiller ge*ne*ral.
3) Environment - Jean Defrfine (PS), Mayor of Rouelles.
4) Transport - Georges Lechevallier (PS), adjoint Le Havre.
5) City Centre, Major Urban Projects - Maurice Schlewitz (PCF), adjoint

Le Havre.

6) Future Urban Sites - Jules Collet (PS), Mayor of Montivilliers.
7) Water and Drainage - M. Ferbourg (PS), Mayor of Fontaine-la-Mallet.
8) Finance and Land Policy - Jacques Eberhard (PCF), Mayor of Gonfreville,

(22) conseiller ge'ne'ral, senator

All elus were on at least one sub-committee (the right-wing mayor of Octeville was on five and Collet of Montivilliers on seven), and thus in principle had the chance to participate in smaller groups than the unwieldy

(21) Colliard, 'Les Documents', 36-37.
(22) SDAU de la Rdgion du Havre, Rapport de Presentation (1974), 4-5. Circulaire du 4 d£cembre 1969, JO, 25 Jan. 1970.

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CLAU (whose eighty members only met five times in plenary session). Sub-committee reports, prepared with the help of the SERH (not the DDE) were submitted to the CLAU's bureau (which again had a majority of e*lus and included all the sub-committee chairmen) in 1972-73. A plenary meeting
of the CLAU in May 1973 approved the eight reports plus a synthesis, and passed them on to the municipal councils and ministerial field services for consultation. The public was also informed in an outdoor mobile exhibition ('Le SDAU au Mur') which, despite rain and 'repeated depredations by vandals', reached some 35,000 people in February 1974. After minor, non-contentious changes, the final document received

(23) prefectoral approval in May 1974

El us were thus neither 'minoritaires' nor 'completement noye"s', and
the CLAU's structure was apparently designed to allow dialogue between different interests. Differences certainly existed between participants. The PAH was still concerned above all with industrialisation, though the State's field services were less single-minded in their interpretation
of the Schema Basse-Seine's perspectives. The CCIH took a somewhat detached line, seeing the SDAU as a catalogue of the measures that would be necessary if certain growth levels were achieved, rather than as a programme to be realised by a certain date; it did, however, support certain projects, like the WTC and the second estuary bridge, particularly strongly. Colliard says he wanted to 'balance' and 'moderate' the Schema Basse-Seine' s proposals, but it is also clear that the e*lus of the Le Havre SIVOM wanted to perpetuate their predominance in the region and thus welcomed considerable expansion for their communes. The elus of the

(23) SERH, Elaboration et Mise en Oeuvre d'un SDAU: le Gas du Havre, Sept. 1973, .13-20: Action d'Information et de Sensibilisation aupr£s des Habitants de la Region du Havre, 1974, 43, 80.

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Montivilliers area, if not always enthusiastic about the Schema's scenario, accepted or were resigned to a certain measure of urbanisation: those of St-Romain, however, 'seemed unable to accommodate major urban development
(24) in the near future' . In general, the attitude of the country mayors was slightly ambiguous. Jean-Paul Beauvais, of the AURH, says they had little idea of what was going on, but Yon, who interviewed all the SDAU mayors, found those of small communes more hostile than uncomprehending. They were worried about the relative, or even absolute, decline undergone by their villages since 1945; they were prepared to accept an expansion, up to a doubling, of their populations - while at the same time being (rightly) concerned that such expansion might alter their communes' social and political character. They also felt, not wholly unreasonably, that their presence on the CLAU was meaningless because the SERH technicians

(25) only listened to e"lus from the big communes
In this light, Colliard's argument that the interests of all the
local £lu_s_ on the CLAU, as well as those of other local actors like the CCIH, converged into a consensus led by the municipality of Le Havre that stood up for local interests against those of the monopolies and the State, seems unconvincing. The approaches of local actors seem to have been much more diverse and the degree of confrontation with the State authorities far less acute. Colliard's statement also looks particularly odd given another claim, in the same article, that the CLAU's 'pouvoir d'initiative se reduit a un peu souvent derisoire, meme si certains n'en ont pas toujours

(24) SERH, Elaboration d'un SDAU, 10-11, 26.
(25) Interview with Jean-Paul Beauvais, AURH, 28 Feb. 1980. Yon, 'Industrialisation 1, 390-396'. This is Yon's general assessment of
village mayors' preferences, though he makes it clear that individual cases varied considerably.

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,(26) conscience
Clearly, if the organisation of the CLAU did leave considerable scope
for local actors to participate, the argument remains that the CLAU's brief was too rigidly predetermined, by the Schema Basse-Seine and by preliminary studies, for it to take a major decision-making role. What was remarkable in the case of Le Havre, however, was that the preliminary studies were not done by the MEBS and the DDE in isolation from local elus, but by the SERH with the full support of Le Havre's municipality. By 1970 the SERH had completed a draft SDAU, and the municipality had contributed some 290,000 francs to the cost; it then went on to produce a draft Sche'ma de Secteur. In 1970-71 Colliard and Beyazian met representatives of the DDE and the GEP several times to discuss the two drafts. It is true that they remained no more than proposals, that Beyazian was not happy with the SERH's work, and that Colliard had reserves about some of the sites suggested for urbanisation. What was just as important, however, was that the SERH had 'worked closely with the MEBS throughout' and that Colliard did not question the Sche'ma Basse-Seine as a framework for the SDAU. Well before the CLAU met, in short, the 6*1 us of Le Havre (but not of the other conmunes) had participated in the preliminary studies and had accepted the
(27) main lines of the Schema Basse-Seine as the basis of the future document

(26) Colliard, T Les Documents', 36-37.
(27) SERH, Region du Havre, Projet de SDAU (Rapport provisoire) June 1970, and compte-rendu de la reunion du 16 novembre 1971. Sche'ma de Secteur, 1971, and reunions des 16 sept, et 17 novT 1970, et du 22 oct. T9TT,
note du 1 juin 1971 . Beyazian to Colliard, 17 May and 2 Nov. 1971,
in SUVH, Sche'ma de Secteur file. LOF article 12, in JO, 3 Jan. 1968.
Ville du Havre, reunions: Commission d'Urbanisme, 27 April 1970:
Conseil Municipal, 11 May 1970.

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V.C.2: The SDAU's 'Decisions'

The main task of the CLAU was thus to define the details of a
development project, the main lines of which had already been fixed: that was clear from the work of sub-committees 1 and 2. The first sub-committee

Table V.2: Le Havre's SDAU: Final Population and Employment Projections, compared with MEBS Hypotheses for Le Havre area (thousands)
Year 1962 1965 1968 1972 1975 1985 1985 2000 2000 Source census MEBS census SDAU MEBS SDAU MEBS SDAU MEBS Population 236 267 261 280 335 403 430 580 540 Jobs 93 103 104 115 138 165 185 225 248

Sources: SERH, Sche'ma Directeur de Structures de la Region du Havre, Etude des Infrastructures de ^Transport , note provisoire, 25 Sept. 1967.
SDAU de la Region du Havre, Rapport de Presentation, 1974, 17.

reproduced the Sche'ma Basse-Seine's maps and lifted whole chunks (including the passage quoted above, p. 248) from its text . The second, chaired by Colliard, projected population and employment growth up to 2000 in the light of economic development projections. The occupation of a further 6,000 hectares of the ZIP by a steelworks, petrochemicals, and 'other heavy industry' was expected to create roughly 50,000 new jobs directly. 20,000 more would result indirectly, in the building and maintenance sectors, and lighter industries taking advantage of the proximity of the ZIP might employ another 10,000 people. Tertiary jobs could be reckoned at between 50 and 90 per cent of industrial ones. Rounding these figures down rather, the sub-committee arrived at a total

(28) SDAU de la Region du Havre, Rapport de la Sous-Commission no.1, 9-11. ——————————————

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of 110,000 new jobs, of which 70,000 would be in industry and 40,000 in the service sector: this would bring total employment to 225,000 by 2000, and the population, at a level of economic activity of 38 per cent, to 580,000. To reach the 1985 figure of 403,000 inhabitants would require an annual growth rate of 2.85 per cent, as against an average of some 1.75

(29) per cent since 1962 . Table V.2 shows how close these totals were to

the projections established by the MEBS in 1967. That the SDAU's figures for 1985 were less ambitious than those of the MEBS was natural, as five years of relatively slow growth had elapsed, and even here the gap between the estimates was of no more than 12.5 per cent; in general, the SDAU's projections corresponded to those of the MEBS to within 6 or 7 per cent either way. The overwhelming weight given to industrial rather than tertiary jobs also reproduces the ScheVna Basse-Seine's industrial option for the area. It is thus hard to justify Colliard's claim that the CLAU 'moderated' and 'balanced' the MEBS's 'utopian' initial figures
Within this framework the CLAU played a real but limited decision-
making role. The draft SDAU saw future urban development outside Le Havre itself (which could take a maximum of 100,000 new inhabitants) occurring first in Montivilliers and the Lezarde Valley and then (given that pollution and spatial constraints prevented urbanisation along the estuary) along
the plateau more or less continuously to St-Romain. Colliard had always found this 'parallel urbanisation' abhorrent and the 6th sub-committee (of which he was a member) examined several possibilities and chose a more considered alternative. The first phase would concentrate growth in Le Havre, the Lezarde, and Montivilliers, diversifying employment with a

(29) SDAU, Sous-Commission 2, 16-33.
(30) Interview with Daniel Colliard, 20 April 1980.

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tertiary centre in the Lezarde valley and three small urban industrial zones, and allowing only moderate growth in St-Romain and the villages. After 1985, further rapid growth of Montivilliers and Epouville would be matched by an expansion of St-Romain and (to some extent) of the villages, with further small industrial zones: green belts would be kept between
Le Havre and Montivilliers (as the Rouelles Park) and Montivilliers and St-Romain (as agricultural land). This, according to the SERH, was the CLAU's major political decision. It conformed both to ministerial directives on 'polycentrism' and to the reluctance of mayors in the Saint-Romain area to see immediate rapid urbanisation - though in the immediate term it was not a radical departure either from the draft SDAU (31)
or from what might well have happened anyway (cf. Maps 29-31)
In addition, the 4th sub-committee, after a nod in the direction of environmentalists, established a road plan (Maps 29-31). This included the second Seine bridge and its continuation direct to St-Romain; Le Havre's northern by-pass, continuing as an expressway (the 'pe'ne'trante nord-ouest') into the city centre; and the Jenner-Marceau link from the Forest of Montgeon to Le Havre's industrial south. These were to be of

(32) great importance in the planning of Le Havre's POS

The rest of the CLAU's work consisted of technical studies, the confirmation of decisions already taken, or the expression of wishes and fears. Thus the 7th sub-committee planned the water and sewage networks
to meet future needs. The 5th noted the slight regional attraction of Le Havre's centre, and listed the WTC, the Maison de la Culture, the University

(31) SDAU, Presentation, 25-27: Sous-Commission 6, 36-47. SERH, Elaboration d'un SDAU, 24-25. Interview with Beauvais, 28 Feb. 1980.
(32) SDAU, Sous-Commission 4, 13-25.

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and the Rene Coty redevelopment project (cf. Ch.VII, p.361) as future rejuvenating elements: it also hoped for extensive redevelopment and rehabilitation in the old centre, more space for offices and specialised and luxury shops, and the installation of company headquarters in a future Central Business District. The 3rd sub-committee pointed out the environmental risks of the SDAU. These included the pollution of the plateau by new higher chimneys on the ZIP, and that of the Seine estuary, which risked being unfit even as a source of industrial water by 2000 (the 7th sub-committee also said that water pollution in the lower Seine basin might reach 'catastrophic' levels by 2000). The 3rd sub-committee thus went on to call for tougher anti-pollution controls and more green

(33) spaces

The completed SDAU was, as Maps 29-31 show, a vast programme of industrialisation and urbanisation, spreading over nearly 13,000 hectares, or a third of the total SDAU area. Despite green belts, by 2000 no point in the SDAU area would be over 4 kilometres from an urban or industrial zone. Clearly, the SDAU is vulnerable to the same criticisms as the Schema Basse-Seine, but there are more. Firstly, village mayors were to see more than a doubling of their populations by 2000, and thus arguably saw their interests sacrificed to an industrial programme that would turn their villages into dormitory suburbs, with all the fiscal and social problems that implies. Secondly, the SDAU left no fall-back plan to control urban evolution should its high-growth assumptions prove un-justified. The 'rurbanisation' of the plateau conformed to the SDAU but was a very questionable use of land in a low-growth context.
Moreover, even within its high-growth assumptions, the SDAU left

(33) SDAU, Sous-Commission 3, 14, 16, 23-24, 43; _5_, 16, 20, 32; 7_, 75.

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numerous questions unanswered. Many were, it is true, pertinently asked by the 8th sub-committee. How would industrial activity be diversified and tertiary jobs attracted? How would ribbon development across the plateau be stopped? Could local budgets manage an annual growth of the rate product of some 15 per cent (more for a fast-growing commune like Montivilliers) ? Could the municipalities coordinate their land policies sufficiently to ensure sites for 41,000 new housing units (half of them HLMs) by 1985, plus hundreds of hectares of industrial zones, public facilities, and green belts? The answers to these questions depended
at least partly on the elus themselves: the completion of the SDAU was
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supposed to begin a phase of decision-making as opposed to wish-mongering
It did not. As the SERH remarked,

'II s'est rapidement avdrd que les membres de la CLAU
ne se sont pas, & proprement parler, engage's ni
de'termine's , ni sur les moyens ni sur la strategic a
mettre en oeuvre . Us se sont contente*s de retran-
scrire, au niveau du rapport de presentation, les
suggestions faites par les techniciens sans en
privildgier

The municipality of Le Havre was ambiguous in the degree of its commitment. Duromea signed a glowing introduction to the presentation report. Colliard told his fellow-dins that the Communists' role on the CLAU had 'given their Party the image of a Party of government', and was proud that the MEBS, 'outil privilegie du pouvoir dans la region', had refused to comment on the SDAU (this was probably because it did not include the left bank of the estuary). He added, however, that the SDAU would remain a set of good intentions without the application of the

(34) SDAU, Presentation, 53-59; Sous-Commission 8, 20-35.
(35) SERH, Elaboration d'un SDAU, 29.

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Common Programme . The public was informed of the SDAU by Le SDAU
au Mur but not consulted during its elaboration. And the municipal bulletin was finally very lukewarm - covering the municipality against possible charges of class collaboration, and reminding the electorate of the need for change at national level:

'Le conseil municipal, qui a donne" un avis favorable
a ce projet, tout en considdrant avoir fait oeuvre
utile n'estime pas pour autant avoir fait oeuvre rdvolutionnaire .

'Les provisions en cet'te matiere ne peuvent rSgler
tous les problemes ni escamoter les contradictions
inh£rentes a la socie'te' a laquelle nous

Two alternatives to the approach taken by the municipality were
possible. One - rejecting participation in the CLAU as 'class collabor-ation' - would have been in order in the 1920s, but would have done little to win the wider audience sought by the PCF in the 1970s. The other alternative would have been to use the time spent on preliminary studies with the SERH (1968-71) producing a counter-project, in the light of local needs and (possibly) Party policies, with the electorate. Municipal delegates would have declared their intention to fight for this in the CLAU, even against the 'national directive' of the Schema Basse-Seine.
They could then either have emerged claiming a victorious compromise,
or withdrawn from the CLAU claiming an intransigent attachment to an unworkable scheme on the part of the State. That did not happen, and relations with the electorate were limited to the 'information' of 'Le
SDAU au Mur ' , with no 'consultation' and no 'action'. That the municipality did not seek to use the SDAU to mobilise the electorate around the Party's

(36) Colliard, 'Les Documents', 36-37.
(37) Le Havre Informations, December 1973, 2.

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policies does not indicate that Le Havre's £lus were dissidents, but simply that they approached the CLAU with other Party aims in mind.
Fighting for a counter-project against the Schema Basse-Seine, a plan with the status of a national directive that offered a big expansion in local employment opportunities, would have reinforced the PCF's image as a party of opposition and protest - which in 1972-74 it wanted to jettison-and might also have alienated some of the Communists' working-class supporters. By contrast, joining partners that were not immediately identifiable with the State (the CCIH and the PAH) to produce a document that had softer edges than the Schdma Basse-Seine, but offered the same kind of expansion, contributed to a major Party goal in that it presented the PCF as a responsible 'Party of government', looking after its working-class clients and capable of running a major city as well as anyone else (Colliard was quite explicit about this). Moreover, the MEBS's refusal
to give its blessing to the SDAU helped the municipality to cover itself against charges of class collaboration. The tribunician consensus remained intact. One might add, finally, that the fulfilment of the SDAU, with the industrial role it assigned to Le Havre and the promise of engendering more 'gravediggers of capitalism', would not wholly have displeased the municipality.

V.C.3: The Non-Fulfilment of the SDAU

I

As Le Havre's council debated the SDAU in November 1973, the Yom
Kippur war was preparing the oil crisis that would destroy any real chances of its growth projections being achieved. This section shows the difference between the SDAU figures and what really happened: it also examines in more detail the evolution of Le Havre's economy in the 1970s.
We have noted (Ch.III, pp.120-126) tnat Le Havre's economy in the mid-

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1960s depended heavily on transport and on the heavier branches of industry, and that the proportion of workers in the active population was high. The following decade saw some evolution but no change in these basic conditions,

(38^ and the SDAU itself noted 'des de'se'quilibres a mattriser' . The

enormous share of transport in the employment structure shrank, thanks to productivity improvements such as containerisation (Tables B.2-B.3, pp. 408- 409). Le Havre's dependence on industry, however, was increasing at a period when it was diminishing in other French cities. Much the fastest-growing industry was automobiles - Renault, which accounted for nearly half the total overall jobs growth in the period (Table B.4, p.410).
Substantial expansion also took place in oil and chemicals. Jobs in textiles, never numerous in Le Havre, diminished as everywhere in France; the food processing industry also shrank. 'Other industries' ('industries diverses') grew, but more slowly than in the rest of France. The concentration of expansion in industry meant that the tertiary sector (less transport) grew, but less rapidly than in other French cities.
Le Havre's labour force thus retained its working-class character.
The proportion of workers altered very little between 1962 and 1975, although it fell by nearly six points in other French cities (Table B.1, p.407); independent businessmen, upper and middle executives and even (just) white-collar workers were all under-represented in Le Havre. Between 1968 and 1975 Le Havre's social composition thus pulled further away from the 'average' and closer to that of a 'typical' PCF Paris suburb, St-Denis. The proportion of people over 17 with no more than a primary school certificate, at roughly two-thirds in 1975, was also some

. . (39) three points higher than in comparable French cities

(38) SDAU, Presentation, 21.
(39) AURH, 1975: Etude de la Population, 1978, 9.

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Finally, the proportion of jobs occupied by women, or of women working, while increasing in Le Havre, was still below the French average (Tables B.1 and B.3, pp.407 & 409).
Clearly these 'imbalances' could not be 'corrected' overnight. In general", the power of local £lus to affect the local economy is limited - one recent study considered it to be 'slight, even derisory . This is perhaps particularly the case in a city like Le Havre, whose economy is dominated by large companies. Out of 36,863 industrial jobs in the SDAU area in 1976, 61.2 per cent depended on just 15 companies with over 500 employees, and two-thirds on companies with head offices in Paris. Between 1968 and 1978 the number of companies in the Le Havre conurbation fell by nearly a third. Parisian head offices, indeed, ran just over half of
all the companies in the SDAU area, local firms only dominating in the building and public works and distribution sectors .
Even aside from Renault, concentration was the hallmark of the
companies that had settled on the ZIP by 1975. The Total refinery at Gonfreville was the centre of a very large chemical r.id petrochemical complex, integrated by a close financial as well as technical inter-dependence (Total-Chinlie and the Union Chimique Elf-Aquitaine, for example, owned controlling interests in most of the petrochemical plants). In other industries, Thann et Mulhouse (which makes powder for the manufacture of paints) and Trefimetaux were subsidiaries of Pe"chiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann; the Lafarge cement works of St-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson; the Societe Normande

(40) Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique, L'Influence des Finances Communales sur le Processus de Croissance Urbaine (Paris,
1976), 92.
(41) AURH, Schdma d'Aptitudes et d'Utilisations de la Her, Estuaire de la Seine, Vol.3: Actions Secondaires et Tertiares, March 1979, 43-48.
AURH, Commission du Developpement Economique et de 1'Emploi: le
Point de la Situation, 1979, 34. ~

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(42) de Produits Chimiques of Rh6ne-Poulenc

These, of course, were the'monopolies', and their power over the local economy was far greater than that of elus laying out small industrial zones in Mont-Gaillard or Caucriauville. Colliard, addressing himself to other Communist e~lus, showed he knew as much:

'Ce qui est exemplaire dans le cas du Havre, c'est la
presence d'un site sur lequel les monopoles et leur
pouvoir ont jete leur deVolu et d'une agglomeration laborieuse qui s'est donne*e tout naturellement des
e*lus communistes pour 1' admin istrer.
'Rien d'e"tonnant a cela. Ce n'est que 1'illustration,
un bon si^cle passe", de la prophdtie de la Manifeste
de 1848 sur le capitalisme, p£re nourricier de ses
propres fossoyeurs'^3) f

Reference to the Communist Manifesto, however, could do little to
solve the problem of achieving balanced, self-sustaining growth in Le Havre in a capitalist context, and Colliard does not look a very convincing gravedigger of capitalism.
Two documents trace the SDAU's non-fulfilment. The first is the
minutes of a meeting between representatives of municipalities and the PAH, the AURH, the DDE, the CCIH, and the MEBS held in 1977. This noted the completion of some capital projects - Antifer and the Francois-ler lock - with approval. The CCIH reiterated its view that the SDAU represented a hypothesis not a programme - a realistic point perhaps, but not really
in the spirit of the LOF or of the SDAU itself. Colliard noted the absence of any substantial tertiary development and accounted for it partly in terms of a comparison with Fos, claiming that nothing was less certain

(42) Yon, 'Industrialisation et Urbanisation', 135-136, describes the financial links between plants on the ZIP as they stood in 1973
with great precision.
(43) Colliard, 'Les Documents', 35-36.

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than a spin-off from heavy industry into tertiary growth - an argument that went against much of his own sub-committee's work in 1972-73. The meeting also noted that the spread of housing across the plateau was not reinforcing the 'poles' forseen in the SDAU, and concluded, rather limply, that the SDAU's basic choices remained sound but that 'qualitative rather than quantitative factors' deserved more emphasis

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in Table V.3 are eloquent: some 19,200 new inhabitants by 1980, against

The second document, the AURH's balance-sheet on the SDAU produced
in 1981, concentrated on the quantitative with a vengeance. The figures
in

the SDAU's estimate of 80,000, and 7,000 new jobs, against the SDAU's projection of 25,000. This represented a diminution on the 1962-72 rate
of increase on both fronts. Clearly, the main reason was the failure of the ZIP to take off: only 120 hectares have been added to it since 1972, and one of the companies to set up there, Le Nickel, had merely moved from Le Havre's southern quarters. Smaller industrial zones in Mont-Gaillard and elsewhere covered an extra 22 hectares, not 120 as planned. Tertiary expansion was slightly more encouraging - 49,000 square metres of office space, against 130,000 planned. Both the Maison de la Culture and the WTC opened in 1982. However, much of the new office space resulted from
public, not private initiatives (the WTC and a new Social Security building); company headquarters remained as thin on the ground as ever, and the
Lezarde site saw almost no development. Moreover, part of the increase in tertiary jobs in the 1970s was due to the growth of manpower agencies -

(45) in other words to 'concealed' temporary industrial jobs

(44) PAH, 'Le SDAU du Havre est-il en Cours de Realisation?', reunion du
8 juin 1977, in Ville du Havre (VDH), SDAU general file.
(45) AURH, note agence no. 1862/81/SH/NP: 'Le SDAU de la Rdgion du Havre, un Premier Bilan sur la P^riode 1972-80', 5-8.

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The straight lines of Table V.3 are, of course, misleading. Employ-
ment in Le Havre proved particularly vulnerable to the crises of 1973-74 and 1978-82. 1973-74 saw the withdrawal from service of the France, a
big reduction in the activity of the refinery complex, and a major crisis in the building industry including the closure of a major local firm, Thireau-Morel (which led to the disclosure of the only known case of Town Hall corruption, in which a municipal employee was convicted of taking bribes in return for municipal contracts). The modest recovery of 1975-77 was almost entirely due to Renault mopping up other firms' lost jobs. In 1978, however, Renault sacked 425 workers, the Luterma plywood factory closed with 744 redundancies, and Le Havre's shipyards shed 478 jobs. By September 1979 Le Havre counted 12,174 registered unemployed, or 11 per cent of the workforce - against a national total of 5.7 per cent in the previous June. A further drop in activity in 1981 led to the only available year-on-year statistics (Table B.3, p.409) counting fewer jobs at the year's end than there had been in 1973
Table V.4 shows how the modest population increase that took place
was distributed, on 1981 estimates. As the SDAU had hoped, growth was much stronger in the communes adjoining Le Havre - especially Montivilliers, where the number of housing units grew by 60 per cent - than in the St-Romain area. However, the population of the St-Romain area also grew by 20 per cent while that of Le Havre itself actually declined. The 1982 census recorded a population of 198,742 for the commune of Le Havre,

(46) AURH, Elaboration du Flan d'Agglomeration pour 1976-80: Commission Developpements Economique et Demographique: (1) Le Point de la Situation (Dec. 1975), 39-40, 49-52; (2) Les Objectifs d'une
Politique pour le Vile Plan, May 1976, 29-30. AURH, Commission De'veloppement Economique, 1979, 20-23.

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Table V.4; Le Havre's SDAU: Population Projections by Area, and

Estimated Real Growth, 1972-81

Le Havre plus
Sainte-Adresse

Harfleur,
Gonf reville,
Montivilliers,
Octeville,
Fontaine-la-
Mallet,
Le Fontenay,
Epouville,
St-Martin,
St-Laurent ,
Gainneville

St-Romain and
rest of SDAU
area

Total SDAU

SDAU
est.
popu-
lation
1 Jan.
1972

223,000

36,300

14,500

273,800

SDAU objectives
for 1 Jan. 1981

Projec-
ted
popu-
lation

261,000

73,500

22,500

357,000

change
1972-
1981

+38,000

+37,200

+8,000

+83,200

AURH estimates
at 1 Jan. 1981

est.
popu-
lation

222,300

53,300

17,400

293,000

change
1972-
1981

- 700

+17,000

+2,900

+19,200

Real
growth
as per
cent of
SDAU

objective

negative

46%

36%

23%

Source: AURH, Premier Bilan sur le SDAU, September 1981, 8.

against (47) 217,881 in 1975. This was an unreliable figure , but substantial

real decline certainly took place. It would be an exaggeration to say that any resemblance of real demographic growth to the SDAU's objectives was a coincidence: Montivilliers' expansion certainly had the SDAU's blessing. But the objective of reinforcing Le Havre's role as the estuary's metro-polis was manifestly not achieved in demographic terms. And the sprawl of

(47) In 1982, Le Havre's census agents managed to leave out whole streets, which indubitably exist. Until these 'errors' are rectified it will be impossible to use figures for 1982.

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urbanisation across the plateau, if not all-pervasive, justifies the assertion that the SDAU was a very poor tool to control the growth that really happened (cf. also Table C.1, p.411).
In 1980 Beauvais, of the AURH, argued that the SDAU needed to be
>-v

completely reworked. Colliard went further, claiming that even medium-term planning was impossible in the present crisis of capitalism
Yet for Communists , the economic crisis, far from beginning in 1973, is endemic to capitalism. Moreover, the Schema Basse-Seine's proposals - to replace French sources of basic raw materials by foreign ones and to induce a population expansion that would require considerable immigration both from France and abroad - was contrary to two central PCF policies: 'produisons francais' and 'vivre et travaillcr au pays'. The SDAU was not a 'good programme that needed a left-wing government to make it work 1.
It was a 'monopolist' programme that was wholly incompatible with national PCF policy.

V.D: The POS de la Ville du Havre

If a SDAU is often a set of wishes to which the people who produced
it feel varying degrees of commitment, a POS engages a municipality far more closely: it is not fundamentally a programme (though the Presentation Report does trace the commune's intended development) but a set of rules. Colliard has said that the most positive thing to emerge from the
CLAU was the 'habit of consultation' with bodies like the CCIH and the PAH,

(49) for example on the Economic Development committee of the AURH . The

joint elaboration procedure both on the CLAU and on the POS working-party

(48) Interviews with Colliard, 20 April 1980: Beauvais (AURH), 28 Feb.
1980.

(49) Interview with Colliard, 20 April 1980.

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encouraged such collaboration, especially with the DDE, not least because
it was so cumbersome (cf.above, p.243) that considerable cooperation was necessary to achieve anything at all. This section considers these relation-ships as they developed in the POS working-party - a smaller group than the CLAU - as well as the municipality's relationship with the public, which, given the legal provision for a public inquiry, was necessarily more significant than in the case of the CLAU.

V.D.1; Decoding the POS

Since Le Havre's POS is essentially a technical document, it is
necessary to make a brief excursion into the coded product of the working-party's decisions to understand what they were before considering how they were arrived at (Map 33 and Table V.5, 276-279 give a general overview of the POS's density rulings).
Le Havre's residential and business zones (UA to UF) are lettered, roughly, in decreasing order of density, from a COS of 2.5 in the central UA zone to one of 0.2 at the edge of Rouelles, in UF. Within this scheme, the sections (UAe, UEd, etc.) allow a considerable degree of fine-tuning. Thus UDa and UEa combine the 'central' characteristics of articles 6 and 7 (building up to the road and up to the next site) with low, 'peripheral' rules on height and the COS: the purpose is to preserve the centres of Sanvic and Bleville as local shopping areas. Premises with a shop on the ground floor are also encouraged, in these and other areas, by a higher COS. Both incentives (in articles 13 and 14) and disincentives (article 9) may be used to regulate construction on large sites of 3,000 metres or more; offices may exclude all else (as in UAa) or be discouraged by a lower COS (as in UAb); UAd and UAe, which cover the reconstructed centre, both contain architectural rules in article 11 to preserve Perret's plan; UEe,

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which runs along much of the Cote, has several tough rules aimed at preserving its wooded character while allowing a limited amount of building; and UAw and UBw, in the Rene* Coty and Brindeau quarters (cf. Ch.VII, pp. 361 and 367) effectively freeze building, requiring it to be integrated into a - future - municipal project.
Aside from small estates covered by the separate rulings for Mont-
Gaillard and Caucriauville, Le Havre's industrial zones are all south of the railway. National legislation divided all industrial and commercial premises, from chemical works to charcuteries into classes 1 to 3 according to their dangerous or unpleasant effects on their surroundings. Zones UX, UY and UZ are thus differentiated by the amount of noise and pollution permitted. UZ is the closest to residential zones and thus the most restrictive. UYa and UZa both incorporate special rules owing to their proximity to other key zones - the beach for UYa and the office district for UZa.
There are also special zones for the beach, the marina and the old
docks (UL) and for the railway, its station and marshalling yards (UJ). All U zones are included in the ZIF (cf. above, p.245).
Of the two N zones, NA reserves land for subsequent building pro-hibiting most building in the meantime: it includes the proposed Dollemard ZAC and the extension to the Mont-Gaillard industrial estate, both in the North-West POS. ND, on the other hand, prohibits building for the forsee-able future, either to preserve a site's natural beauty (NDb for the Forest of Montgeon and the Rouelles park), or for very different reasons like the Octeville airport flight-path or the Brecque road intersection at the far east.

Map 33 does not show the POS's land reserves. Most of them are quite small - enough for a school and perhaps a sports ground. More potentially

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Table V.5 iv 279

JY, UZ,

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. tea; no art-

>mall houses.

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to be built;
free spaces.

apt cranes
llations

15rn.

lay 'build upto
.. , but with

• landscape

/ 20ft of site
arnental rules

iicates wood-

al /environment

article no./
type of
, , control

Table V.5 (iv)

POS Le Havre; Key to non-rciic/fui <*(zones (UJ. UL. UK. TJY, UZ, NA •——/ " " - T "~" "•-—-- - r - _ _———__———!_,___——.———*-.——.-. — - ———*————————l

UJa

. 1-2: type of install-
ation permitted / pro-
hibited

Ko buildings except those
necessary for c>NCF activity
and personnel; homes for gar-
diens only.*

as UJ but more provision
for SNCF employees' homes.

restrictions in other articles

minimal rules on distance from
road and adjoining sites; no art-icles 8-15.

minimal rules for small houses.

UJc as UJ but depots for
SNGF's industrial clients
allowed.

as UJ

UL

UX

only buildings for 'tour-
ism and leisure 1 use,'and
necessary homes and offices,
allowed.

max. height 6 m. except for
diving-boards.

industries allowed if not
classes 1- or 2 due to toxic
or unpleasant fumes. Homes,
offices, shops only as necess
ary to industrial functioning

50$ maximum of site to be built;
rules on planting of free spaces.

UXa as UX plus ruling against
dust emission

as UX

UY as UX plus prohioition of
industries classified due to

fire/explosion risk. Sports
fields allowed.

essentially as UX

UYa as UY but all industrial
installations must be nec-
essary to Port functioning:
'leisure and tourism 1 instal-
lations as UL"permitted

max. height 6m. except cranes
and other Port installations

UZ no industry if 1st or 2nd
class, or 3^ class if toxic
or unpleasant fumes. Minimum
of homes/offices/shops as UX.

as UX, plus max. height 15m.

UZa as UZ, but offices allowed
and industries classed due
to noise prohibited

as UZ, but offices may 'build upto 60% of site, upto 25m. , but with COS of 2.5

NA no building of any kind
except small extensions

no activity to alter landscape

NAa as NA but barracks extens-
ions allowed.

as MA

ND as NA but farm/airport/
tourism/sports installations
^remitted according to positic

max. height 6m, only 20^ of site
may be built. Environmental rules
a on planting etc._______________
NDa
NDb

as ND; worksnaps permittee
as NT): camp-sites permittee as ND: 'TO 1 suffix indicates wood-
land to be preserved._____________
MOc as ND: no snorts .rounds tighter architectural/environment rols to "rotect 5te

as .2) but :;;ajcr road install-
ations permitced as ND

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controversial are reserves for roads: these include major projects included in the SDAU - the northern by-pass, the north-west entry road, and the Jenner-Marceau link - as well as several widening schemes, especially in the narrow streets of Sanvic. The rest of this section will examine the political issues that arose from the road plans and other provisions of
the POS.

V.D.2; Producing the POS

Officially, the working-party was chaired by Durome"a and included Colliard and one councillor plus representatives from the Prefecture, the technical services of the State and the Town Hall, the SERH, the PAH,
and the CCIH. Its working nucleus, hox\rever, consisted of Colliard, who generally took the chair, Beyazian, and one or two representatives from the SERH, the PAH and the DDE. Other members, generally technicians or delegates from other interested bodies like the CCIH, appeared as the need arose. Ad hoc sub-committees considered the future of the C6te , the sea-
•

front, and the reconstructed centre as well as the problems of industrial pollution and the north-west entry road. But the massive sub-committee structure of the CLAU was lacking, and the working-party was small enough and flexible enough to be a real forum for negotiation. Colliard, while often the only elu present, was never ' sxtfamped' by the technicians - but nor did he dominate the group as he dominated the Town Planning Committee The working-party divided its task into six geographical sectors,
which it dealt with more or less consecutively, as follows:

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Sector

Rouelles
Station

Work

started Publication Approval

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Quartier de 1'Eure)
ast

Feb.
Aug.
Aug.
March
March
March

72
72
72
73
74
75

June
May
May
Dec.
Sept
Dec.

76
76
76
78
. 77
78

June
Feb.
Feb.
Oct.
Sept
Oct.

79
82
79
80
. 80
80

(for divisions by sector cf. Map 32).

This was not standard procedure in big cities, but it gave the working-

party the chance to consider the most urgent areas (the Station, which

included the University, WTC and Jenner-Marceau projects and the North-

West, which would take the biggest population growth) first.

Four general planning documents for Le Havre had preceded the POS.

The first, the 1951 Plan d'Urbanisme, was the framework for building

permits for over two decades and laid out fairly simple distinctions

between a port zone, an industrial zone, and high- and low-density resi-

dential zones. In 1967 a private architect and planner, M. Wiener, who

had been hired by the Monguillon municipality in 1964, presented a revised

plan to the municipality. The 'Wiener Plan' expected a population of

300,000 for Le Havre by 1975, and proposed the shifting of the central

business district to the Cours de la Republique plus a vast programme of

redevelopment and urban expressways. The Council discussed it very freely

in full session, and expressed some reservations, on social and financial

grounds, regarding the size of the scheme: it was shelved following the

passage of the LOF .

(50) VDH, Rapport sur le Nouveau Plan Directeur d'Urbanisme, 1966, 9.

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When it first met in 1972 the working-party also had the draft SDAU
and Schema de Secteur to work with. These assumed that Le Havre's population would grow by 60,000 up to 1985; planned a growth of about 20,000 each in the north-west and the north-east; and noted the major projects required to achieve the reinforcement of Le Havre as a regional centre - the University, the WTC, the Maison de la Culture, and the shopping redevelopment around Rue Rene* Coty. Finally, they recommended the grouping of improved social and educational facilities around existing neighbourhood centres, and some general density levels . Within this general perspective, however, the working-party had a fairly wide brief.
The municipality (or, in practice, Colliard) approached its meetings
with five main priorities. The first was to accomodate the new inhabitants expected in the SDAU. This would mean density increases, chiefly in areas characterised by very dispersed housing, like Sanvic, Bldville and Aplemont. Thus the North-East POS (apart from Caucriauville) was expected to take some 9,000 new inhabitants, and the North-West some 39,000, of whom some 24,000 were to go to the Mont-Gaillard and Dollemard ZACs. This accounts for the UC in Aplemont and the swathe of UB and UC across the North-West: here COSs of between 0.8 and 1.5 were applied to areas with existing

(52) densities of as little as 0.2 and 0.3 (cf. Maps 26 and 33)

There is, however, little evidence that the increases in the North-
West were the result of a crudely offensive Communist planning policy designed to invest the right-wing 6th constituency with HLMs (cf. Ch.III, pp. 148-149). At the first meeting of the working-party the SERH suggested

(51) SERH, VDH, Schema de Secteur, Vol.Ill, 34-36: Vol.IV, 3, 10-11: Vol.V, 5.
(52) VDH, POS, Rapports de Presentation; Secteur Nord-Est, 47-65: Secteur Nord-Ouest, 64-69.

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three growth hypotheses for the North-West of 30,000, 50,000 and 80,000 inhabitants; the final, quite low, figure, of 39,000 had Colliard's full approval. If this many extra inhabitants had been present in 1973, and
if 19,000 of them had registered to vote, then at an 80 per cent turnout at the second ballot, 60 per cent of the 'new' electors would have had to vote for the Left (against 20 per cent for the Right) to elect Colliard for the 6th Constituency. 39,000 new inhabitants in HLMs, then, would have made the 6th Constituency winnable for the Communists, but by no means a guaranteed seat when extrapolating from 1973 figures (cf. Table III.5, p.139,and Map 13) .
The second municipal priority was to reorganise the distribution of housing and industry in the South. A better definition was clearly needed than the 1951 Plan, which merely stated that the prefect 'might, on the advice of the building permits service, refuse a permit to particularly polluting industries' . The difficulty was rhat by 1972 the South was beginning to lose both industries (chiefly to the ZIP) and residents (to new HLM developers in the upper town). The municipality clearly had no interest in regulating industry - and thus jobs and tax revenues - out of Le Havre altogether; nor had it an interest in allowing polluting industries everywhere and thus accelerating the demographic decline of its old electoral heartland (Ch.III, pp.145-146). If there was every reason to adopt a 'defensive' policy in the South, the priority between industrial and electoral defence was unclear when negotiations with other interested parties (such as the PAH) started.
Thirdly, the municipality shared the SDAU's aim of 'reinforcing the

(53) VDH, POS Nord Quest, Reunion Preparatoire, 31 May 1972: Croupe de Travail, 15 Jan. 1973.
(54) VDH, Plan de Reconstruction et d'Urbanisme, 1951, 11.

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attractiveness of Le Havre's centre', especially in the Station area.
Both the WTC and the University buildings were to be located there, though mostly on land in the public domain (the former gasworks, the SNCF goods depot, the Place des Expositions, plus a site reclaimed from the Bassin Vauban; the Maison de la Culture's Place Gambetta site was also municipal land). The Station area also contained some of the city's most run-down housing. The POS could do little positive about this, but the COS of 3 in UAa and UAb represented an encouragement to high-density redevelopments. Colliard played a moderating role, getting the UAb COS reduced from 3.5
to 3, but shared the general perspective, making a somewhat unhelpful reply to a worried letter from the president of the CCIH about the 'crisis' of the area

Fourthly, the municipality wanted to reorganise the road system.
The road plan included three major projects - the northern by-pass, the Jenner-Marceau link, and the north-west entry road, of which the last two could not avoid passing through built-up land and thus incurring expense and opposition. It also involved widening some of the narroxv, unplanned streets of Sanvic - and particularly extending Rue de la Sous-Bretonne and Rue Ir&ne Joliot-Curie and transforming them into 20-metre-wide east-west and north-south expressways, a particularly unpopular proposal

r u- t. (56) in an area of high owner-occupancy

(55) VDH, POS Gare: Rapport de Presentation, 39-52: Croupe de Travail, 18 Jan. 1974: 26 Feb 7 1974: 19 March 1974: 8 June 1977: Consultation dcs Services, avis de la CCIH, 7 Oct. 1974, and Colliard's reply, 20 Dec.
1974. A preliminary meeting in Oct. 1972 concluded that land prices
were too high to build any quantity of lower-income housing, and that redevelopment would almost invariably result in the departure of the existing population. The theme was not pursued at further meetings.
(56) VDH, POS Gare, Groupe de Travail, 26 Feb. 1974: 8 June 1977. VDH, POS Nord-Ouest, Rapport de Presentation, 87: Groupe de Travail, 19
March 1973, 13 April 1973.VDH, PQS~Sud-Ouest, Groupe de Travail,
21 Jan. 1975, 23 June 1975.

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Finally, there was a clear need for more social, educational and
shopping facilities - and thus for the necessary land - for both present and future inhabitants of Le Havre. Major projects included the Rene Coty shopping centre, and the Rouelles park - but there are also a multitude
of reserves for schools, clinics and youth clubs. It was Colliard's policy to try and group these around 'centres de quartier', especially in Sanvic and BleVille. Clearly not all of these priorities were controversial, and the last was generally accepted after a brief technical discussion in the working-party . Others however, engendered more conflict.
The only set-piece negotiation on the working-party concerned the
future of the South. We have seen that the South's residential quarters were dispersed around a predominantly industrial zone. The most flagrant example was Meiges, surrounded by the EDF power station, the abattoirs,
the sewage treatment plant, and the Graville shipyards; but the Cite Chauvin, Champs-Barets, St-Nicolas and Brindeau quarters are all more or less interspersed with industry, and the municipality wished to improve their environmental protection. The pollution sub-committee, headed by Jacqueline Rube and Dr. Rosevegue of the municipal hygiene bureau, strongly recommended a very strict ruling with UZ throughout the western part of the sector and no UX anywhere. This view was not shared by the PAH, which had the interests of its industrial clients in the South at heart and had seen the reconstruction of Neiges as a thorn in its side since 1951: the PAH representative initially proposed a slum clearance scheme to get rid of Neiges, a proposition ill received by Duromea at one of his rare appearances on the working-party. The situation was further complicated by the CCIH, which wanted to shield its UAa business zone with a buffer

(57) VDH, POS Nord-Ouest, 19 March 1973, 13 April 1973.

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area of non-polluting industries (UZ) in the St-Nicolas quarter.
The PAH's arguments were reinforced by the municipality's unwilling-
ness to see a flight of industry from the South. As Colliard rather ironically put it to the working-party:

'II parait important toutefois de conserver au Havre
un certain nombre de fonctions secondaires: Le Havre
doit pas &tre uniquement le centre tertiaire de
1'Estuaire 1.

The compromise thus gave the PAH much of what it wanted. The CCIH accepted UY next to its office zone after reassurances from the PAH, and the municipality accepted UX south of the Tancarville canal apart from a cordon sanitaire of UXa and UY around Neiges. The presentation report envisaged a population increase of 3,000 (to 27,000) people by 1985,
chiefly in St-Nicolas and Brindeau; a demographic freeze in Champs-Barets, Cite* Chauvin and Neiges, and the ultimate demolition of Cite" Chauvin;
and better social and educational facilities, especially in Neiges. The site of the old Le Nickel site was given a UBw classification pending a municipal ZAC
This solution was clearly an improvement on the 1951 Plan, particularly
in its consolidation of a residential and light industrial zone around St-Nicolas and Brindeau. At the same time it left residential islands in the industrial sea, and these have been reinforced by the municipality: Champs-Barets has its swimming-pool, Cite* Chauvin its mains drainage, and Neiges its CLEG. Rube has called this an example of the Communists' demagogic approach to planning, and it is certain that the Town Hall saw

(58) Cf. also SERH, Les Quartiers Sud, 2 Vols., Aug. 1973. SUVH (Laurent Leveque), Les Quartiers Sud, July 1977. VDH, POS Sud, Rapport de Presentation, 53-73: Groupe de Travail, 30 April 1974, 21 May 1974:
15 Oct. 1974: Sous-Groupe Pollution et Etablissements Classics, 16
Sept. 1974, 7 Oct. 1974.

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no interest in demolishing valuable pockets of electoral support. But uprooting people who in many cases could not afford to pay an HLM rent elsewhere is scarcely acceptable strategy for a Communist municipality, while getting industry to move elsewhere - for example, to the far south-east of the commune - was bound to be a delicate and slow business. The Southern POS thus represented an uneasy compromise between the municipality's dependence on its working-class electorate and on its inevitable partner, thePAH (59).

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Relations with the DDE and the Prefecture were generally smoother
than the writings of Communist authors would suggest, and the SERH/AURH
did most of the technical work. The main conflict came when the State authorities went back on their commitment to finance the reserve for the Jenner-Marceau link, in February 1979, just three months before the provisional validity of the Station POS expired. Durome'a denounced this 'unilateral reversal of a decision, made without consultation' (which is what it Xi7as), but to no avail; the provisional validity expired, and the working party had to restart a procedure that only reached the stage of approval in 1982, with the Jenner-Marceau area removed from the POS 'for further study'. The similar removal of a sector from the South-West POS for further study because the working-party could not find a satisfactory way to take the north-west entry road through the St-Vincent quarter meant that the POS failed to solve the problem of siting the two main urban expressways programmed in the SDAU
The Jenner-Marceau affair was the only occasion on which the

(59) Interview with Jacqueline Rube, 2nd adjoint Le Havre, 23 April 1980. The SDAU maps (30-31) clearly envisage the long-term preservation of Neiges, though no reference is made to it in the text.
(60) VDH, PQS Gare, Groupe de Travail, 2 July 1979. Interview with
M. G£rat, DDE Le Havre, 18 April 1980.

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municipality and the State crossed swords openly, but political under-

currents were present throughout the elaboration of the POS. More than

once the Prefecture sent back a draft POS for minor technical rectifications:

more than once it sat on a POS for a very long time before allowing it to

continue to the next stage of the elaboration process. The result was that

three out of the six POSs (Rouelles, the Station and the North-West) were

submitted to public inquiry less than a year before the 1977 municipal

elections. Colliard's awareness of the dangers of allowing the State

administration to profit from the ineptitude of his technicians is clearly

illustrated by the letter he sent to Beyazian in March 1976:

'J'ai de*ja exprime* plusieurs fois mon ine'contentement
sur la maniere dont est conduite 1'Instruction des
plans d'occupation des sols.

'Avec la me'thode que vous me proposez, il n'y a aucune
raison pour que nous n'dgrenions pas encore un chapelet
de deliberations qui a chaque fois modifieront ou completeront un point. Nous perdons dans cette affaire toute autorite et il devient Evident que la tutelle veut susciter artificiellement des difficulty's a la municip-alite" a quelques mois des elections. J'ai de"j& eu 1'occasion d'attirer votre attention sur ce point mais vous ne semblez pas y attacher grande importance ...

'Je vous demande de veiller a ce que avant 2 mois les POS
etudies, c'est a dire: Nord-Ouest, Rouelles Gare soient mis a 1'enqueue publique. Ces affaires deviennent
grotesques et dangereuses pour la municipality. Votre
responsabilite" personnelle y est engagde ' (6 O .

It is probable, then, that the prefecture, while not blocking municipal

preferences systematically on the working-party, used it prerogative of

timing to cause maximum embarrassment to the Town Hall.

It was partly for this reason, no doubt, that the municipality prepared

the public inquiries carefully, sending a 'POS bus', with the plans and

technicians to explain them, around the neighbourhoods concerned. This

(61) Colliard to Beyazian, 23 March 1976, in VDH, POS, Dossier

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failed to head off all opposition, however. Public protests concerned restrictions on building rights (in the NA and ND zones on Dollemard), density increases (in Sanvic, the Station area, and Aplemont), and road plans (in Sanvic and to a much lesser extent Rouelles). At least two of the opposition groups, the Comite" Environnement et Urbanisme du Quartier Ste-Anne and the Association pour la Sauvegarde de 1'Environnement de Sanvic-Bldville had clear links with the Right that were well demonstrated in their literature:

t T Mr L* "information"' , as the Comite* Ste-Anne argued, f ne
suffit pas pour faire une veritable democratic vivante:
tout au plus peut-elle faire une ddmocratie "autoritaire",
dite "populaire", amende par un vent de l'est'(62).

The Association Sanvic-Ble'ville was similarly vociferous, claiming in effect that the municipality planned to replace tranquil neighbourhoods by a universe of HLMs and expressways, and the municipality did not hesitate
/ f o \
to denounce its 'political motivations'
What is interesting, however, is where the municipality made concessions
In general, it stood firm where opposition demands compromised the density increases required to achieve population growth: the Comitc Ste-Anne's
call for a COS of 2 west of Cours de la Rdpublique, and the Aplemont petition against the DC zone, were both rejected. On the other hand, Dollemard residents got a moderation of the N rulings to allow them to extend their homes; the Sanvic road plan was scaled down, widths of roads reduced, and their courses altered to demolish fewer homes. These

(62) Comite Environnement et Urbanisme Ste-Anne, hand-out on the POS, 28 March 1975.Le Havre Presse, 8 April 1975. Le Havre Libre, 23
Sept. 1975. The criticism of the lack of consultation cannot be justified in legal terms, the POS bus being strictly surplus to the requirements of the LOF. Colliard was proud of it, though extra publicity for the POS was not exceptional in French cities (Colliard,
'Les Documents d'Urbanisme', 35-36).
(63) Le Havre Information, 24, supplement, spring 1976.

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concessions were decided in May 1977, and thus not in a pre-electoral panic. It is, however, clear that insofar as the municipality had a strategy to capture the 6th Constituency, it was tempered by prudence towards the social categories (white-collar workers, owner-occupiers)
who lived in Sanvic and who constituted one of the targets of the PCF's attempts to broaden its electorate in the 1970s. Since 1977 the municipality has moved forward very slowly with its road plans, preferring to buy land as it becomes available rather than engaging in a politically and financially costly programme of compulsory purchase

V.D.4: The On-^Going POS

Insofar as Le Havre now has a detailed set of building regulations
the POS has, by definition, been 'fulfilled'. However, the plans laid out in the Presentation reports are unlikely to be realised. The main reason, of course, is that the POS's population growth projections (37,800 for
the north-west; 4,000 for the station; 3,000 each for the south-east and the south; 9,000 for the north-east; and 400 for Rouelles) correspond to the expectations of the SDAU. The diminishing credibility of these figures has led the working-party, in 1983, to reconvene in order to jettison some of the reserves for schools and social facilities intended for people who are unlikely ever to come.
A further task of the working-party will be to produce a 'synthesis'
of the six POS sectors. That one has not yet appeared is symptomatic of the technicians' objections to the POS as it stands - that it does not constitute a coherently-planned whole. True, the nature of a POS severely

(64) VDH, Conseil Municipal, 20 June 1977. VDH, POS Gare, Rapport de 1'Enque-te Public, Oct-Nov. 1976. VDH, POS Nord-Est, Groupe de
Travail, 24 Feb. 1977, 18 Oct. 1979.

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limits its use as a tool for positive planning, rather than as a set
of restrictions that apply precisely to individual cases; and the technicians do not always agree on what the municipality's reserves and zoning policy should have been. They are, however, consistent in arguing that short-term factors, such as a wish to respect the Port's preferences or, as far as possible, existing densities, prevailed over a consistent overall conception of the city's future in the elaboration of the POS, and especially in Colliard's approaches
There is no apparent guiding political conception either. The POS carries no references to PCF goals such as an end to 'social segregation' between classes. Nor can an offensive electoral strategy of packing high-density HLMs into any available space be considered as the key to
the POS. The municipality was, however, willing to respect the SDAU - as the LOF required. Within this framework a variety of factors - the city's dependence on the Port and on its industrial clients, the municipality's concern to stop the decline of its electoral heartland, a wish to avoid direct confrontation with opposition groups xvhere possible - all influenced the working-party's final decisions.
While the POS bus, according to Colliard, gave a chance to 'give
body' to the PCF's 'struggles' for a better quality of life , the POS was certainly not used primarily as an opportunity to mobilise the elector-ate behind national Party goals or against the government. Open conflict with the State authorities, and still more with the PAH or the CCIH, was thus very rare. At the same time Colliard's note to Beyazian shows that

(65) Interviews with Rene Lahousse, SUVH, 30 July 1982: Beauvais, AURH,
24 Feb. 1980.
(66) Colliard, 'Les Documents', 36-37.

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he saw his relations with 'les autorites de tutelle' in a highly political light. This dual role of the State - as a day-to-day negotiating partner against which the municipality had nonetheless to guard its political flanks - will be considered more closely in our conclusion to this chapter.

V.E: Regional to City Planning; Conclusion

Our examination of Le Havre's planning documents may help to answer
to sets of questions.
The first concerns the LOF and the State's power over local authori-
ties. Was the 'joint elaboration' procedure a charade that concealed the imposition of central government policies on local communities? Did the conservative government inspire the administration to treat the Communist municipality unfavourably? And if so, did the municipality try to confront

to

or collaborate with the State? The second concerns the PCF and local A. government. How did the municipality react to the opportunities and pit-falls offered by joint elaboration? Did the municipal line reflect national Party policies or local priorities? Did it incorporate anything distinctively Communist into the final documents?
Clearly, if the State could impose nuclear power stations on
recalcitrant local communities it could impose its priorities on planning documents. The means were there in the LOF. The SDAU must respect 'national directives 1, the POS must respect the SDAU - and a wholly unco-operative local authority may be overridden by the Conseil d'Etat. Had the projections of the Schema Basse-Seine (high growth and the profita-bility of processing imported raw materials on seaboard sites) persisted, something like the SDAU would have been realised in Le Havre whatever the local opposition, given its importance for government economic strategy.

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The point of the LOF was that the government found it useful to mobilise local opinion behind its priorities, and expedient to diffuse political responsibility. This, however, could not be done without throwing some choices open to negotiation. Thus tertiary projects like the WTC and the University were almost certainly incorporated into the final version of the Schema Basse-Seine, and thus the SDAU, under pressure from local bodies - but did not alter the fundamentally industrial option decided for the city by the central government.
Joint elaboration then, was a sham insofar as the major decisions
were taken by the government and were not negotiable. Within this frame-work, however, the CLAU and the POS working-party were democratically organised and the State's services did not monopolise the technical work. If anyone was by-passed by the decision-making process, it was not the delegates from Le Havre, who played a full role both in the preliminary work and in the official negotiations, but the country mayors on the CLAU. Even they, however, were able to refuse the AIJRH's suggestions for their individual POSs.
The State did not openly seek to discredit the Communist municipality through the joint elaboration process. Its use of timing - delaying the formation of the CLAU till the confirmation of the Communists' position
in the 1971 municipal elections, and trying to ensure maximum visibility for the POS in 1977 - indicates an underlying opposition that belies the consensual language of joint elaboration. There is little evidence, however, that its efforts had much political impact.
The Communists' attitude was ambiguous to the point of schizophrenia -
or at least, they presented two very different sides of the question to the Council and public and to their fellow-PCF e"lus. Colliard's speech
to the Council when the North-West POS was introduced, for example, could

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have been made by an e*lu of any party:

'Le Port affirme sa vocation industrielle en ge"ne"rant la grande zone qui progressivement gagne la plaine alluviale jusqu'a" Tancarville. Ainsi se de*finit la
vocation du Havre me'tropole de 1'Estuaire, celui-ci
pouvant £tre envisaged moins comme une barrieTe que
comme un lien entre ses deux rivages. Enfin, au-del^
de sa dimension re"gionale, Le Havre affirme sa vocation e'conomique nationale et Internationale' (•"') .

In L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, on the other hand, he was more partisan:

'Tout commande que Le Havre soit le si£ge d'un puissant deVeloppement portuaire, industriel et urbain. Mais ce ddploiement e'quilibre', dont le SDAU donne 1'idde, ne
peut re^sulter que d'une maltrise des forces productives essentielles par les travailleurs euxm<§mes. Loin de
contredire les batailles du Parti, le Sche'ma Directeur,
par son Elaboration et son contenu, atteste de la preoccupation des communistes de lutter pour le present
et pour 1'avenir'(°8) <

We have argued that if the municipality had really wished to be

consistent with national Party policy, it would have used the CLAU as an

opportunity to oppose the monopolist proposals of the Sche'ma Basse-Seine

and of the PAH in particular. That it did not was due to the fact that in

this context the municipality had a more important job to do: that of

protecting its own proletarian base and of presenting the PCF as a Party

of Government, capable of planning the city's long-term future in

responsible partnership with the PAH and the CCIH. Any attempt to confront

the State with a counter-project would have detracted from this purpose.

Thus there was little that was specifically Communist about the elaboration

process or the final documents. 'Information' took place, in the 'SDAU au

Mur'' and the POS bus - but right-wing municipalities gave similar

publicity to their plans. 'Consultation' and 'action' were absent.

(67) VDH, Conseil Municipal, 9 Dec. 1974.

(68) Colliard, 'Les Documents', 36-37.

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Neither the SDAU nor the POS showed evidence of official PCF goals beyond the wish to preserve electoral territory. The 'ambiguity' in the municipality's assessment of its own role lies in the fact that, while
in this context the 'party of government' image was dominant, it could
not allow its traditional constituency to forget its other image as a 'Party of struggle'.
It is uncertain that this happened in every Communist municipality.
Rene" Lamps, mayor of Amiens, claims to have won a set-piece confrontation with the DDE to alter his SDAU - though only further research can verify this . In Le Havre, however, the municipality often appears to have reacted rather than acted. As Yon, a Socialist councillor since 1983, wrote

'on a 1'impression que la politique du PC revient a
dire: en aucun cas nous n'avons et£ un frein au
developpement de la region, et on est pret a tout
accepter'(70) .

One reason why the municipality did not pick a fight over Le Havre's planning documents was that the terrain was so unfavourable. Mobilising the electorate against the Schema Basse-Seine would have been difficult and the battle impossible to win; including a few useful additions to it in the SDAU was thus in some ways the most 'realistic' policy. Similarly, the POS, as an essentially restrictive document, offers few openings to attack the State or to publicise the municipality's positive goals. Inso-far as the municipality had such positive goals, then, we may be more likely to find them in the sphere of operational planning.

(69) L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, Feb. 1978, 8-10.
(70) Yon, 'Industrialisation et Urbanisation', 422.

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Chapter VI: The Context of Operational Planning

France's urbanisation, and the construction of at least 300,000 new dwellings a year for over two decades (cf. Table C.9,416), have necessitated administrative structures to manage the development of new sites. At the same time, the decay of built-up areas in cities has led to attempts to organise their redevelopment and, more recently, their rehabilitation.
The main obstacle in the way of such management has been the continued private ownership of land and the frequently colos • rises in property values as a result of increased demand. The warnings of successive committees for the Plan that such rises ran the risk of sabotaging any effective urban policy indicate that the problem was not fully tackled at national level . The legislation that did appear, then, represented
a partial adjustment to a situation that was still powerfully structured by market forces. This chapter deals with the legislative framework of operational planning and with the evolution of the housing market, in France and Le Havre. Both had a profound effect on the operational out-puts we shall consider in Chapter VII.

VI.A: The Legislative Framework

VI.A.1: Extending France's Cities: ZUPs and ZACs

Municipalities have had the right to expropriate land for subsequent resale as Zones d'Habitation since 1950. The institution of the Zones a Urbaniser en Priorite (ZUPs) was a further step in the same direction.

(1) Successive quotations from committees of the IVth, Vth and Vlth Plans on this subject are given in C. Topalov, Expropriation et Pre'-Emption Publique en France, 1950-1973 (Paris, CSU, 1974), 173-174.

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The ZUPs' purpose was to make land on the periphery of cities available for housing development in large enough quantities to permit industrialised building techniques as well as the integration of municipal facilities on the residential site, and to oblige HLM developers to build there.
Within the perimeter (defined by a prefectoral decision), a Declaration d'Utilite Publique (DUP) gave the public authorities (generally the municipality) rights of first option and, ultimately, of compulsory purchase. These rights could be conceded to a Societe d'Economie Mixte (SEM), which would then manage the installation of utilities and the sale of land to developers (cf. Ch.IV, p.216). All HLM operations of over 100 units on the commune had to be located there for a certain period, and developers had to respect a rigid architectural layout (plan-masse) and to contribute to infrastructure and at times superstructure costs.
The ZUPs began the era of grands ensembles, those clusters of slab-
like residential blocks (generally HLMs) placed either on their sides or on end ('tours et barres'); their image, and often their fabric, have sharply deteriorated since 1958. They are associated with poor building; segregation of workers from other social groups; poor communication with the outside world; a lack of social facilities, and often of schools;
and high delinquency rates, characteristic of many over-large council estates in Britain and America too. Some of these characteristics resulted from HLM cost ceilings, but others were due to the conception of ZUPs. The legislation provided a cumbersome expropriation procedure, and thus led to the removal of hundreds of hectares of land from the market for years at a time; and a highly constraining plan-masse. This led to high land prices, slow building (especially of public facilities, which the State tended to subsidise only on the basis of the population already installed), and a preference on the part of developers for less tightly-

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controlled sites. In addition, while municipalities could influence the

final outcome of ZUPs in several ways, it has been argued that their

frequent concession to SEMs, and the SEMs' dpendence on the Societe

Centrale pour I'Equipement du Territoire (SCET) and its technical bureau,

the BETURE, led to an unhealthy degree of standardisation. Permits for

new ZUPs were slowed down in 1965, and the Loi d'Orientation Fonciere

(LOF) of 1967 introduced the Zone d'Amenagement Concerte (ZAC) as a more

(2) flexible alternative

There were four aspects to the ZACs' greater flexibility. Firstly,

they may cover not only new sites for urbanisation but also redevelopment

land (the ZAC-Renovation Urbaine, or ZAC-RUs), industrial zones and office

areas. Secondly, a wide range of public bodies - including Chambers of

Commerce and Ports - may be granted expropriation rights, and they may be

conceded not only to SEMs but also to private developers. Thirdly, while

master plans may indicate general density levels, plans-masse are confined

to small key sectors. Fourthly, developers' contributions for infra-

structure and for public buildings are to some extent open for negotiation

with developers. In addition, a ZAC has its own Plan d'Amenagement do la

(3) Zone (PAZ) and is exempt from the surrounding POS

At a time of inflation, many ZACs also demonstrated a certain

financial flexibility. A ZAC concessionaire may use several tactics to

sell land dearer in order to match rising costs. HLM developers, with

their land price ceilings, may be replaced by private ones; densities may

be increased; the programme of social and educational facilities may be

cut, releasing sites for more lucrative developments; or a 'motor' for the

ZAC - for example, a major retail distributor - may be persuaded to pay a

(2) Milch, 'Paris is Not France' (MIT doctoral thesis, 1973), 134-138.
S. Biarez, Une Politique d'Urbanisation: Les ZUP (Grenoble, IEP 1971), 13-15, 24-26, 53-54, 81-82.

(3) Ministere de 1'Equipement, Les ZAC: Textes Applicables et Commentairos (Paris, 1977), 5-9, 13-14, 41-43.

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high price for a site in return for advantages such as a captive market. The main alternative to these methods is to get the public authorities - especially the local ones - to subsidise the ZAC. Whether this is done will, of course, depend on municipal policy.
Many writers, including the Communists, have argued that ZACs have
given big, or 'monopolist 1 private developers the chance to use the public clout of conceded expropriation powers to make huge profits without even being held to public rules (the POS) that apply to other landlords. They have also accused governments of alternating between regret for the lack of social facilities available on many 'social' ZACs and insistence on the need for financial 'realism' in planning them. Rosette, writing for the PCF, concludes that ZACs may be 'the best or the worst' framework
for major development operations, depending on the degree of municipal

(4) control exercised

VI.A.2: Redevelopment and Rehabilitation

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The initial legislation on publicly-sponsored redevelopment (Rdno-
vation Urbaine, or RU) x-/as passed in 1956-58. It gave municipalities both the right to expropriate for redevelopment purposes and, crucially, access to considerable State subsidies. These sometimes bridged the gap between HLM land price ceilings and real urban land values, and thus permitted a certain number of 'social' redevelopment operations. From the mid-1960s, however, the number of subsidised projects was reduced and finally

(4) C. Sorbets, 'Control of Urban Development in France', in Jacques Lagroye and Vincent Wright, Local Government in Britain and France, (London, Alien and Unwin, 1979), 157, 159. C. Topalov, Les Promoteurs Immobiliers (Paris and The Hague, Mouton, 1974), 233. E. Preteceille,
La Production des Grands Ensembles (Mouton, 1972), 111. M. Rosette,

La Gestion Communale dans 1'Action (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1977), ___

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curtailed completely. This period coincided with the entry of private banking capital-which until then had been largely absent from the property market outside Paris - into redevelopment, and the beginning of the ZAC-RU. With the withdrawal of State subsidies, the redevelopment of urban sites for low-cost housing has become almost impossible without big injections
of municipal money. The main exception to this rule was the provision
for slum-clearance operations (Re'sorption de 1'Habitat Insalubre) , which were financed partly by cash penalties inflicted on slum landlords.
The first legislative framework for the improvement of existing
housing was the Malraux Act of 1962, but this only applied to historic quarters like the centre of Rouen or Paris'5 Marais. Legislative and administrative provisions made in 1973 began a more comprehensive strategy. They allowed the Agence Nationale pour 1'Amelioration de 1'Habitat (ANAH) to collect a percentage of rents paid on pre-1948 dwellings and to re-distribute it as improvement aids. They also permitted municipalities to decide the perimeters for Operations Groupies de 1'Amelioration de
1 'Habitat (OGAHs), within which they had the power to oblige landlords either to improve or to sell their property to the organisation in charge of the OGAH. This organisation might be a SEM, or even an HLM office.
The trend towards rehabilitation - and even towards 'social' rehabilitation seemed to be reinforced by the Nora Report of 1975, which recommended it
as an alternative, in some cases, to new building. However, the following year the OGAHs were replaced by Operations Programmees (OPAHs), which lacked the teeth to oblige landlords to improve. Rehabilitation policy therefore came to offer a number of carrots (ANAH subsidies were bigger
in OPAHs than in individual operations, and exterior spaces were eligible for State subsidies through the Fonds d'Ame'nagement Urbain (FAU)) but no sticks - not surprisingly, perhaps, from a conservative government. A

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municipality's ability to improve a given area therefore depends on its ability to dominate the market (by buying the properties concerned) or to channel it (by giving landlords incentives to improve). Neither is easy, particularly as owner-occupiers, often the motor of improvement schemes
in Britain, are not entitled to any major subsidies in France. A large number of the rehabilitation projects started by 1978 were thus minor additions to existing redevelopment operations .
A final element in the legal framework for rehabilitation is the
Habitat et Vie Sociale circular released by the Environment Ministry shortly before the 1977 municipal elections. This announced major subsidies for the improvement of France's worst grands ensembles and for teams of social workers to encourage the 'reinsertion 1 of their inhabitants into society. The expense of HVS programmes meant that only a handful were adopted between 1977 and 1980.

VI.A.3; Controls on the Land Market

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The price at which a municipality, armed with a DUP, can expropriate
is normally decided by the Finance Ministry's Service des Domaines. Under normal conditions, however, it corresponds to market values, which in inner cities are very high, and which on urban peripheries tend to rocket at the first rumour of a major housing project . The concern of Fifth-Republic governments for the scandalous state of French housing, with all

(5) Interview with Yves Cressent, architect, Le Havre, 10 March 1983. Roger Duclaud-Williams, The Politics of Housing in Britain and France (London, Heinemann, 1978), 201-204. Guy Loinger, Marie-Alice
Lallemand, 'Le Tournant de la Politique de Renovation Urbaine a la Politique de Rehabilitation de 1'Habitat 1, Metropolis, IV, no.33-34,
14-20.

(6) This is nothing new. Speculators made very big profits in the 1830s and 1840s when Le Havre broke out of its original city walls (J. Legoy, LePeuple du Havre et Son Histoire, II, 50-51).

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its political consequences, (cf. p.296), without leading to radical solutions, did produce some partial constraints on the free market on a medium- to long-term basis, as well as in the operational context described above.

The first of these measures created the Zones d'Amenagement Diffe're
(ZADs) in 1962. Within the perimeter of a ZAD land prices are frozen at their level of one year prior to the declaration of the ZAD, with increments for inflation but no more, for up to fourteen years. During
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this period notice of all property sales must be given in a Declaration d'Intention d'Aligner (DIA) to the public authority with the right of pre-emption - either the State or a municipality. Three main legal restrictions limit the possible use of ZADs. They must be compatible with the SDAU if one exists. They must be used in a pre-operational context, and not just to limit land prices in general. And a landlord may, at any time, require the pre-empting authority to buy his property within two years, failing which the land concerned passes out of the ZAD. Considerable care is thus necessary for a municipality to run a
ZAD effectively, whether on the periphery or in a city centre. It must have a definite plan for an operation to be started within fifteen years. The perimeter of the ZAD must be larger than the operational perimeter so as not to release speculative pressure on sites adjacent to the operation. Too large a ZAD, however, runs the risk of removing too much land from the market and thus affecting land prices elsewhere; in inner cities it will also dissuade landlords from improving their property, and may thus accelerate decay. Moreover, there is always the risk that landlords may collectively demand that the municipality buy their property, thus facing it with a choice between a sudden surge of expenditure or the ZAD's effective destruction. If this does not happen, a judicious municipality

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will buy one or two sites shortly after declaring the ZAD, to establish 'reference prices', and will then leave most purchases to the last two years of the ZAD's life, immediately prior to the operational phase.
This kind of constraint has led some Communist authors to argue that
ZADs were primarily intended, not to help municipalities manage the land market better but to allow the State to offer cheap land to its monopolist clients: hence the fact that the State held 72 per cent of the pre-emption rights on ZADs in 1971 . It remains true that, despite their limitations, ZADs are potentially useful pre-operational tools for municipalities.
We have already noted (Ch.V, p.245) that the POS provides municipalities with two further means of intervention on the land market. The sites of future municipal buildings are reserved in the POS, and since the Galley
Act of 1975 all urban zones in an approved POS constitute a Zone d'Intervention Fonciere (ZIP) in which the municipality has the right of first option on all property transactions. In both cases public purchase
is at market prices and thus real control is limited. The ZIP does, however, theoretically allow a municipality to build up a register of the DIAs landlords must make before selling their property, and thus to monitor the market while occasionally exercising its right of pre-emption on selected sites.
These zones are thus fairly minor adjustments to market forces. The legal power of a municipality to determine how land should be used and who should occupy it, limited in the POS, is only slightly extended by ZADs and ZIFs. The main way for a municipality to control land use fully is thus to buy land - at prices that still have some relation to those of the market. While municipalities do have three new fiscal resources to deal

(7) C. Topalov, Expropriation, 216.

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with town planning needs, none is of a measure to permit a major land purchase policy.
The first of these, the Taxe Locale d'Equipement (TIE) is a percentage
of total construction costs levied on developers to cover the installation of municipal utilities. The municipality of Le Havre has fixed a rate
of 3 per cent, but has exempted HLM builders. The TLE, however, is not intended to pay for operational land purchases, still less land reserves. Secondly, developers may under certain circumstances exceed the Coefficient d'Occupation des Sols (COS: cf. Ch.V, p.244), but must pay the municipality the price of the land they would have had to buy in order to keep within the limits of the COS. Thirdly, this principle was generalised by the Galley Act of 1975, which instituted the Plafond lAgal de Densitd (PLD), corresponding to a COS of 1.5 in Paris and 1 in the provinces: developers exceeding the PLD have to pay the municipality the same sum as if they had exceeded the COS. But the amounts raised by these taxes are insufficient. As Table VI.1 shows, they are small in comparison with municipal budgets. Table VI.1; Sums Raised by French Urban Planning Taxes, U)78 (in 000 F) Tax Product: France Seine-Maritime Le Havre
TLE 721,730 10,037 640
De'passement COS 26,825 308
Depassement PLD 302,428 3,510 120
Sources: Ministere de 1'Environnement, Receuil de Statistiques sur rUrbanisme, 1979, 180, 184, 186: Ville du Havre, Compte Administrati'f, 1978.

They are also small compared with a fiscal resource like the Versement Transport (cf. Table III.9, p.183). This does much to explain why Le Havre has an excellent bus fleet but, as we shall see, a less than

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ambitious land policy - depending as it does on the rest of the budget
and on occasional State subsidies.

VLB: The Housing Market in France and Le Havre

The previous section, and Chapter IV.G, shox^ that a municipality can intervene in the local housing market, but partially and indirectly. It follows that an examination of Le Havre's housing market since 1965 will both incorporate some of the results of municipal action and serve as an 'external' context for the direct municipal interventions described in Chapter VII. The factors outside the Town Hall that affect the market are many. Within the Le Havre area they include the population, its rate of growth, its social composition, and the availability of land. Beyond that, however, the repercussions of public policy, the amount of money allocated for HLMs and subsidised housing for sale, the entry of the banks into property development, and the housing reform of 1976-78, have all pro-foundly affected housing markets throughout the country. We therefore begin this section with France's post-war housing record.

VI.B.1; Housing Construction in France
We have noted (Ch.II, pp. 51-52) that France's inter-war housing
record was poor, and that many homes were destroyed between 1940 and 1945. Post-war building started slowly: the annual total of completed units only exceeded 100,000 from 1953 (Table C.9, p.416). Thereafter, total construction increased rapidly from year to year, peaking at over half a million (the total that the Wilson government failed to reach in England in 1964-70) in the early 1970s. By 1975, France's housing crisis was thus attenuated. The total housing stock had grown faster than the population since 1962 (Table C.1, p.411). The size of homes had grown, while the

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number of persons to a room had fallen (Table C.3, p.413). 70 per cent
of households had hot water, an indoor bathroom and toilet: 52 per cent had central heating. The growth of the subsidised private sector also
led to an increase in the proportion of owner-occupiers, to well over a third even in the cities (Table C.2, p.412). Within the HLM sector,
which represented between a quarter and a third of the total from the late

(8) 1950s, norms on space and amenities were consistently improved

The State's financial contribution to this record was considerable:
over 78 per cent of the units built from 1953 to 1976 received some form of subsidy. Individual families also made a considerable effort, however, after decades of paying rather little by English standards. Starting from an index of 100 in 1953, average rent levels rose to 810 by 1976 - against 396 for building costs and 335 for retail prices. Thus a French working-class household spent some 10 per cent of its weekly budget on housing in

(9) 1951, and 18 per cent in 1975 . Aside from the cost, however, there are

three main negative elements to set beside France's post-war housing achievement.

Firstly, even in 1973, 39 per cent of French housing units lacked one
or more basic amenities. Over a fifth were classed as overcrowded and
4.7 per cent of these were severely overcrowded (figures were 31 per cent and 8.6 per cent respectively for working-class households). Elementary 'quantitative' needs thus remained considerable. Moreover, the life of many of the HLM units that had 'solved' the housing crisis was limited: in 1976 Robert Lion, spokesman for the Association of HLM organisations,

(8) Michel Verret, L'Espace Ouvrier (Paris, Armand Colin, 1979), 23-26, 32-33.

(9) INSEE, Donne'es Sociales, 1978 (Paris, 1978), 189. Verret, L'Espace Ouvrier, 28.

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claimed that some 2 million HLM units would require demolition or full-scale rehabilitation by 200CT 10 .
Secondly, the rate of construction looks increasingly unable to meet
such needs. Impressive as it was in the early 1970s, it did not reach the Economic and Social Council's recommendation of 700,000 units a year, nor the VIIth Plan's more modest target of 500,000 for 1976-80. Instead, the overall total tailed off, falling below 400,000 in 1980 for the first time since 1964.
Thirdly, the housing effort did not necessarily benefit those in
greatest need. By the mid-1970s the share of the non-subsidised sector in the total was growing fast, while the proportion of HLMs was diminishing. The former tendency was partly due to the private banking sector's move into property: banks supplied 20 per cent of home loans in 1965, but over 40 per cent from 1970. Moreover, the HLM sector had become too expensive for the poorest social groups. INSEE's 1973 housing survey found that households living on less than 850 francs a month accounted for 14.7 per cent of the French total, but only 5.9 per cent of HLM tenants, while middle-income groups (with 1,700 to 5,000 francs a month) were over-represented in the HLM stock (11 \
That public housing subsidies were not reaching the people who needed
them most was stressed in the Barre Report of 1976, which laid the foundations for the housing reform of 1978 (cf. Ch.IV, p.222). The main feature of the reform was the curtailment of subsidies for building ('aide ji la pierre') and the creation of a means-tested rent subsidy, Aide Personnalise* au Logement (APL), payable to landlords (including HLM offices)

(10) Interview with Robert Lion, Metropolis, III, no.22, Oct. 1972, 62.
(11) Ibid., 62. Duclaud-Williams, The Politics, 134-136.

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who sign an agreement (conventionnement) on rent levels and tenancy conditions with the State. Underlying both this reform and the greater subsidies for rehabilitation was a 'shift from a policy of quantity to one

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of quality' in housing. With quantitative needs attenuated, fewer but better HLMs could be built, the existing stock improved, and rents allowed to rise - with big subsidies to the neediest tenants. The Marxists interpret the reform rather differently, arguing that conventionnement leads to steep rent rises both in HLM units and in the pre-1948 stock, which had been subjected to very tight rent controls. The reform, they claim, is thus
aimed at 'unifying' the housing market and at removing the two main low-cost sectors that competed with private capitalist developers.
What is certain is that since the reform fewer new HLMs have been built, both nationally and in Le Havre. At the same time the institution of APL has opened several new options for makers of local housing policy. We shall now consider how far Le Havre's market has reflected national tendencies, and what specific difficulties the municipality has had to face.

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VLB. 2: Housing Construction in the Le Havre Area

In the mid-1960s, despite great and persistent housing needs, Le Havre suffered from one of the lowest rates of building, in relation to the number of existing homes, of any major French city (cf. Ch.III, p.124). Towards the end of the decade, however, construction both in Le Havre itself and in the SDAU area speeded up (Table C.10, p.417), and, apart from two poor years in 1970-71, shared in -the national boom of the early to mid-1970s. The peak, of 3,384 new units in the SDAU area, was reached in 1975: of these 2,590 were in the city of Le Havre, many of them on the fast-growing Mont-Gaillard ZAC. This meant that the total number of new units built in 1971- 75 was, at 13,143, nudging the Vlth Plan's target figure of 14,000. And

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since the population grew less rapidly than the Vlth Plan had expected, this achievement meant above all a widening of housing choices for people already living in the area. By contrast, the total for 1976-80, 9,271,
was far from achieving the Vllth Plan's more modest target of 12,000; as at the national level, building fell off sharply after 1975-76.
As we would expect given the size of the working-class population, the importance of the OPHLM, and the municipality's preferences, the share of HLMs in the total number of new units was considerably higher in the Le Havre area than in France as a whole (Table C.12, p.419). The proportion of HLMs to rent never fell below 30 per cent in the 1970s, while in France it never exceeded 25 per cent after 1971. If HLM units for sale are included, the proportion is over a half for most years in the Le Havre area. The share of HLMs tends to be higher in years when the total number of units built is greatest: the Mont-Gaillard ZAC, which accounted for much of the 1975 figure, was predominantly an HLM operation (cf. Ch.VII, p.342). This phenomenon is also noticeable in the commune of Le Havre, where HLMs accounted for as much as two-thirds of the total number of units completed in some years (Table C.15, p.421).
Clearly, the statistics can vary considerably from one year to the next according to which major operation is being completed: Mont-Gaillard tipped the balance towards HLMs in 1975, and it was probably the completion of successive stages of the prestigious Residence de France that led to a strong showing for the private sector in 1972, 1974 and 1979. It seems fairly clear, however,, that in the late 1970s not only the total number of homes completed but also the share of HLMs in the total were tending to diminish. In this Le Havre reproduced the tendency at national level. However, the pure private sector did not come to dominate construction in the Le Havre area as it did nationally: a fair part of the share of the

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total lost by HLMs was picked up by the subsidised sector for sale.
Three other tendencies complete the picture. First, the proportion of
new building in the SDAU area sited on the commune of Le Havre, after running at levels of from 68 to 85 per cent up to 1975, fell sharply thereafter, dropping below half in 1978 and 1980 (Table C.10, p.417). The proportion sited on Harfleur and Gonfreville also diminished (Table C.11, p.418). By contrast, the Montivilliers area, with the Belle-Etoile ZAC and the neigh-bouring Lombards development, as well as numerous other projects, took a much increased share in the late 1970s - exceeding that of Le Havre in 1978. As we have already remarked, if the expansion of Montivilliers was consistent with the SDAU, the much slower growth rate of Le Havre, Harfleur and Gonfreville was not (Ch.V, p. 272). Secondly, the late 1970s saw a drop in the proportion of flats built in the SDAU area and a corresponding growth in the proportion of houses, which exceeded half in 1978 and 1980 (Table C.13, p.419). Thirdly, as no ZAC followed either Mont-Gaillard in Le Havre or Belle-Etoile in Montivilliers, the proportion of building sited on publicly-sponsored operations fell from over half in 1971-75 to under a fifth by 1979-80 (Table C.14, p.420).
Taken together, these characteristics of the market's evolution repre-
sent a replacement of one housing model, HLM flats built on publicly-sponsored sites in Le Havre itself, by another, houses built for sale on less controlled sites across the plateau. As Table C.15 (p.421) shows, this was no more
than a tendency: in 1980, over 900 homes were built in Le Havre, and over
half of them were HLMs; It was also a tendency which the proliferation of tighter POSs in the villages from 1979 has slowed or even reversed. None-theless, in the long term, the era of high-density HLM building on grands ensembles ended with Mont-Gaillard. In the short term, the alternative form of housing that was built allowed a suburban haven for several thousand home

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buyers, but used up much valuable agricultural land and led to a number of financial difficulties for relatively small and impecunious municipalities on the plateau.
The obvious general reason for this change in the pattern of con-
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struction - greater affluence and a higher level of car ownership among consumers - is only a partial explanation. These developments did not, after all, accelerate in the mid- to late-1970s. In part there was a 'natural' continuation of the earlier sprawl of the old commune of Le Havre into Sanvic, Bleville and Aplemont: the land to continue big new operations within Le Havre itself was not there. In addition, however, individual houses for
sale presented a more credible competition to HLMs than in earlier years.
For the consumer, HLMs represented a big improvement on old, cramped flats
in the centre or south of Le Havre, but by the 1970s the brand image of the grands ensembles was deteriorating and there was a clear market for a more individualistic alternative for those who could afford it. Affording it was easier when private developers could offer an industrialised, and thus relatively cheap, product, on cheap land outside the city, on easy credit terms. It was also relatively advantageous. Fewer HLMs were being built because there were fewer credits for them: their rents had reached a far from 'social' level - up to 1,240 F for a four-roomed flat in Mont-Gaillard in 1981 - against which the extra effort to buy a house, with its tax advantages, looked comparatively slight.
For the municipality of Le Havre, the result was clear. In the 1960s
and early 1970s, its interventions in the housing market had consisted chiefly in making large areas of unbuilt land available to HLM developers. By 1980, it could only continue this to a limited extent. Any further action therefore implied a much more difficult proposition - the replacement or improvement of the existing stock.

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VLB.3; Le Havre's Housing Stock

The construction effort of the late 1960s and early 1970s meant that,
as in France as a whole, the housing crisis faced by the municipality at its election in 1965 had been much attenuated a decade later. The total housing stock grew by 28.5 per cent between 1962 and 1975, against a popu-lation increase of 16.9 per cent (Tables A.1, C.6). The waiting list of
the OPHLM fell from some 4,000 applicants to roughly 2,000. The discomfort index fell throughout the city of Le Havre, dramatically in places (Table C.7, p.414). The average number of people living to a room fell below 1 for the first time in 1975, marking a definitive break with levels of the inter-war years, although it remained higher than in most French cities (Table C.3, p.412); the proportion of households living in overcrowded conditions, however, moved very close to the national average (Table C.4, p.412). By 1975, well over half of Le Havre's housing stock had been built since 1949, although the proportion built since 1968 was below the national level (Table C.5, p.413).
As we might expect from the statistics on construction, the proportion
of HLM units in the total stock grew steadily, from some 18 per cent in 1968 to over 24 per cent in 1980 (Table C.6, p.413). Conversely, the proportion of owner-occupiers rose less fast than in other French cities, standing at just under a third in 1975, against nearly two-thirds for Ste-Adresse, and 46.7 per cent for Montivilliers. Between 1968 and 1975 the housing stock in Montivilliers grew proportionally (though not numerically) faster than in Le Havre, and this tendency certainly continued after 1975, giving a rather greater increase in owner-occupation in the SDAU area as a whole than in Le

Havre.

Despite the overall improvement in Le Havre's housing stock from the mid-1960s, two major and related 'disfunctions' remained. They concerned,

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firstly, the state of the city's older stock, and, secondly, the satisfaction of demand for housing.
The 1968 census revealed a total of some 17,000 homes - a quarter of
the city's total stock - that were in need either of replacement or of extensive rehabilitation in the short to medium term. The vast majority of these were pre-1914 units in the lower town. Most were concentrated in three main areas: the St-Vincent quarter, north of the sea-front (1,200 units);
the southern quarters, in particular St-Nicolas, Gustave-Brindeau, Neiges
and Cite Chauvin (4,500 units); and the 'old centre' - a sector stretching from the west of the Cours de la Republique eastwards on either side of the Rue Aristide Briand (4,800 units). At the same time, figures for construction between 1962 and 1968 showed that only 3,300 or so old units had been replaced. The replacement of all 17,000 units at this rate would thus take a further thirty years, and one priority for the VIth Plan was thus a faster rate of urban renewal. This was not achieved. Of some 5,700 units vacated by their owners or tenants between 1968 and 1975, fewer than 10 per cent were demolished or transformed into business premises (the proportion was 53 per cent in other major French cities) : a high proportion of the rest simply remained vacant

Thus despite slow population growth, the bulk of the new housing units
built in Le Havre served to accommodate 'new' households - immigrants to the city, young families moving out of their in-laws' homes, or simply people
who had left their earlier dwelling vacant. Rather few new units replaced
old, decaying homes. This meant that the general improvement in the discomfort

(12) SERH, Elements pour 1'Elaboration d'une Politique de l f Habitat Ancien dans la Region du Havre, August 1973, Vol.1, 13, 18. SERH and VDH,
Schema de Secteur, 1971, Vol.1: Analyses, 33. AURH, Elaboration du
Plan d'Agglomeration pour 1976-1980: Commission Logemcnt; Le Point de
la Situation, Dec. 1975, 26-27.

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index (Table C.7, p.414) was due to the construction of new buildings that lowered the overall average rather than to the improvement or replacement of existing ones.
An alternative solution to redevelopment for many units, after the 1973 legislation, was rehabilitation. Carried out on an individual basis, however, this was not sufficient to deal with the problem. The record of individual projects subsidised by ANAH from 1973 to 1980 (Table C.16, p.422, Map 34) shows that, while they were concentrated in the sectors that needed attention (the centre, Graville and the south), their total number was small. Moreover, of the 850 operations undertaken, 576 cost over 10,000 francs,
and only 163 over 40,000.
The overall result is that the majority of the 17,000 homes in need
of treatment remain standing, unimproved and sinking slowly into dereliction. At the same time the increasing availability of HLMs encouraged many of the families living in the pre-1914 stock to move out. Since demolition did not often follow, the proportion of empty units rose steadily during the 1970s and may have reached a total of as much as 10 per cent of the total stock
by the end of the decade; the bulk of this was, of course, located in the most decayed areas (Table C.8, p.415 and Map 35). The families who moved out were those that could afford an HLM rent. Those who could pay no more than the - often very low - rents demanded in old, uncomfortable flats, stayed. Thus the older quarters contain rather few young families, but a high percentage of old people and of immigrants.
The second 'disfunction' concerns demand for housing. This is clearly harder to define statistically than supply. Any expression of demand, especially for a product as complex and expensive as housing, will involve
a number of compromises: people will ask for what they think they can afford, and their perception of the alternatives available may be limited by a lack

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of transparency in the market as well as by a really restricted supply. However, the main single indicator of demand, the OPHLM's waiting list,
does indicate a number of points (Tables C.17-C.18, pp.423-424).
Firstly, not only is the 1979 waiting list, at 1,828 applicants (though rising again by 1980), shorter than that of 1965: the length of time that people had had to wait also appears short (Table C.18, p.424). Only 364 applications had been made before 1978. This suggests a high rate of satisfaction of demand by the OPHLM, though the figures may conceal large numbers of people who, for lack of a stable income or some other reason,
did not think it worth their while to apply. Certainly, the low proportion (1 "\ ^
of fiances or recently-constituted households on the lists is surprising Secondly, it does appear that some categories of applicants would be harder to satisfy than others. Over a fifth had incomes below the minimum wage (Table C.17, p.423); over a third fell below the income ceiling for a PLR
flat (the smallest and cheapest type of HLM unit). Such groups would have
to rely either on an increasingly decaying sub-HLM stock, or on the
relatively few flats that gave tenants the right to APL. It would also be hard to find large enough flats for the 65 families of six or more people: only 324 flats in the OPHLM's stock had six rooms, and only 3 had seven.
The third, and perhaps the most interesting, point concerns the preferred location of applicants to the OPHLM (Table C.19, p.424). A narrow majority (1,126 out of the 2,217 applicants registered in the middle of the year) preferred sites in the lower town - Centre-Ville Quest, Les Neiges, Graville, and Eure. By far the -biggest group showed a clear preference for the 600
or so flats the OPHLM has in the reconstructed centre; no individual site

(13) The OPHLM commissioned the AURH toproduce a detailed analysis of its list in 1980, but unfortunately both organisations refused to let me
see a copy. My own interpretations therefore remain somewhat
conjectural.

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in the upper town, although many have more flats to offer, gets over 10
per cent of preferences. These figures are confirmed by Yon's questionnaire carried out among 300 families living in Caucriauville, the majority of whom also expressed a preference for living in the centre. When asked 'Do you think you will stay much longer in Caucriauville?', 130 of these families answered No - despite a relative satisfaction with the interior
(14) comfort of their flats
These statistics are of particular interest when set beside figures
on the state of the housing stock. Clearly the number of modern, reasonably-priced homes in the city centre is limited. At the same time there is a sizeable stock of more or less uncomfortable and decaying homes, in or near the centre, which would, if replaced or rehabilitated at reasonable cost, respond rather well to the expression of demand that we find in the statistics. Such replacement and rehabilitation have been slox\7, however.
The two main features of the housing market in the past 20 years have been the multiplication of big HLM developments in the upper town, followed by the spread of individual housing - the symbolic opposite of HLMs, at least apparently - across the plateau. The AURH has tended to see the attraction of individual housing as a reaction against HLMs, skilfully manipulated by private developers, and thus to suggest that it masks a more 'natural' wish to remain in the city . This is an exaggeration that tends to take planners' preferences for consumers' 'real' desires: after all, HLM tenants and applicants do not represent the whole of housing demand. It remains true,

(14) Alain, 'Industrialisation et Urbanisation dans la Region Havraise', Paris doctoral thesis, 1976, 346-348.
(15) AURH, Dossier Habitat, Vol.1, Nov. 1977, 60, 64. AURH, 'Aspirations, Exigences et Contraintes des Nouveaux Villageois', Etudes Normandes,
no.1, 1980, 46-57.

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however, that a substantial demand for housing in the centre exists, for reasons that are easy to understand (good access to shops, services, and above all to jobs, the vast majority of which are in the lower town). At the same time, housing on many sites close to the centre was effectively amputated from the market because it failed to meet minimum expectations of comfort. This inability of the market to meet at least one section of expressed demand has represented both a limitation of the range of options open to the consumer and, from a planner's point of view, a huge waste of land resources both within the city and on the plateau.

VI.C: The Context of Operational Planning: Conclusion

As in many other French cities, the municipality of Le Havre and its partners (particularly the OPHLiM and the SARH) faced a housing problem in the mid-1960s that was essentially posed in numerical terms - the number of families living in unacceptable conditions of discomfort and overcrowding. Their main solution, building as many HLMs as possible on the most readily
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available sites, which tended to be on the periphery of the upper town, led to considerable improvements in the overall housing situation. However, by the early 1970s several factors indicated the need for a new approach. People's interpretation of their 'needs' had become more demanding. They encompassed not only a minimum level of amenities within each housing unit, but also a greater concern for the external environment, including such elements as green spaces and access to services. In the context of this perception of needs, HLM developments on the plateau acquired an increasingly poor consumer image, particularly as many buildings deteriorated rapidly
and visibly. In any case, the limited availability of land in the commune of Le Havre made their indefinite continuation impossible. At the same time much of the city's older housing stock, in the lower town, was deteriorating

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and, in the face of competition from the more comfortable (if less well-situated) HLM units, was losing inhabitants. This posed a political problem for the municipality: the depopulated areas included the Communists' electoral heartland in the south. It was also a planning problem. After the completion of Mont-Gaillard, the bulk of housing needs within the commune of Le Havre would have to be satisfied by operations within the existing urban tissue. A fall in the supply of housing in Le Havre would confirm the tendency of consumers to look elsewhere. At the same time the decaying
older quarters in themselves represented a negation of municipal claims to have an effective planning policy.
This was a complex and interrelated set of problems that was more intractable than the earlier shortage, but moderated by the relative lack
of speculative pressure - much of the centre had, after all, been 're-developed' from 1944, and population growth was slow. On the other hand, Le Havre's 60-degree hinterland, with its consequent effect on land prices, was a permanent, unchangeable constraint. The means available to the municipality to apply a new approach to the housing market were real but limited. Juridicially, the Acts of 1967 and 1975 opened new possibilities to reserve and expropriate land. They were not, however, intended to let municipalities control the 'commanding heights' of the land market, and the lack of new sources of finance made wholesale land purchase an impracticable proposition. The following chapter shows how, within these constraints,
the municipality first addressed itself to the initial housing shortage and then attempted to define a new approach.

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Chapter VII: The Municipality of Le Havre and Operational Planning

The Communists' critique of capitalist urbanisation in the 1970s
centred on two main ideas - the eviction of lower-income groups from city centres, in order to allow monopoly companies to make profits from property development there; and the environmental and social poverty (ox^ing to the State's cuts in social expenditure, themselves essential to finance monopoly profits) of the urban periphery into which these lower-income groups were rejected . On their own estimation, we would expect Communist £lus to fight these tendencies by discouraging speculation and thus the eviction of poor people from the centre; by controlling publicly-sponsored building operations closely, either directly or through a municipally-funded Socidtd d'Economie Mixte; by spending heavily to ensure sufficient social and educational facilities on new developments; and by enlisting public backing to support municipal projects or to resist those of the State or of private developers where they conflicted with the 'interests of the whole popu-

(2) lation' . How far are the municipality's priorities in Le Havre governed

by this official Party approach, and how far by local considerations - including electoral ones?
Secondly, how far has the municipality been able to apply its own
policies despite local and national constraints? Milch finds that the PCF municipality in Mimes was indeed able to discourage speculation by both official and unofficial methods, to get a good level of facilities in low-

(1) The Marxist literature on the subject is, of course, profuse (cf. Ch.II, n.16). A short expression of the PCF line may be found in Francois
Ascher and Jean Giard, Demain la Ville? (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1975), 73-119. .
(2) Marcel Rosette, La Gestion Communale dans 1'Action (Editions Sociales, 1977), 145-159: Ascher and Giard, Demain?, 116.

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cost housing projects, and to involve the inhabitants - and that these
were definite policies that contrasted with those of neighbouring

(3) conservative Montpellier . What was Le Havre's record?
Thirdly, can we talk of a 'successful' operational planning policy?
Has the municipality, for example, risen to the challenge of the more complex set of planning problems that were posed from the early 1970s? If it has not succeeded in planning terms, has operational planning been a success in electoral terms, and can it be related to an offensive or defensive strategy of manipulating electoral geography (Ch.III, pp.148-149)? The case studies of which this chapter is composed consider success-
ively new building on the periphery; operations in the existing urban tissue; and attempts to apply a long-term strategy of land purchase.

VILA: Le Havre's Grands Ensembles

Le Havre's Communist municipality has had a hand in three completed
grands ensembles - Caucriauville, Mare-Rouge and Mont-Galllard. Of these, Mont-Gaillard was both conceived and realised by the present municipality, and thus deserves special attention. We shall also consider the current municipal project to put a fourth grand ensemble on the Dollemard plateau.

VII.A.1; The Continuity of Caucriauville

It was under the Monguillon municipality, in January 1960, that a site
on the Caucriauville plateau (in the north-east of Le Havre, spilling over the then communal limits into Rouelles and Harfleur), became one of France's first ZUPs. The project had been discussed as early as 1954: while the

(3) J. Milch, 'Paris is Not France' (MIT doctoral thesis, 1973), 126-132, 139-143, 500-508.

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Communists had expressed reserves about its distance from the city centre, they were reluctant to oppose a major housing project at a time of extreme shortage. Although the ZUP's siting was consistent with the national tendency to put lower-income groups on urban peripheries, it is unlikely that considerations of electoral geography determined the attitudes either of the State authorities, the municipality, or the Communists: land was simply plentiful and cheap in Caucriauville.
A classic first-generation grand ensemble, Caucriauville was planned
with great rigidity. Developers had to conform to a plan-masse, specifying the volume, height and position of each building, drawn up by the architects, Sonrel and Loisel. Work on infrastructure, supervised by the Socie'te' d'Ame'nagement de la Region du Havre (SARH) , was started on the whole site at once in 1962, thus giving the aspect of building-site to all 160 hectares
of the ZUP for the whole length of the operation. It lasted over a decade; only by 1971 had 6,000 of the projected 6,500 housing units been completed, and it took longer for schools and other facilities to appear. As elsewhere, the private sector largely shunned the ZUP; 68 per cent of the units were standard HLM (HLMO) flats, and a further 14.5 per cent were slightly more expensive ILN flats: only 355 units in Caucriauville are houses
The high percentage of HLMs owes little to the Communist municipality,
and much to the initial plan and to the reactions of private developers. Arriving in power in 1965, when just 2,000 units had been completed, the

(4) Ville du Havre, Commission d'Urbanisme, 10 Feb. 1958. The April 1957 number of the municipal bulletin (p.5) stressed the need to build low-income housing close to the centre to avoid excessive time spent travell-ing to and from work. The relatively small proportion of workers in the city centre in 1975 (Map 10) testifies to the limited fulfilment of this aim.

(5) AURH, Dossier Habitat: Etude Sectorielle no.1, ZAC/Lotisscment, March 1978, 23.

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Communists engaged in none of the persistent struggles over the financing
and planning of new buildings that were launched by the PCF municipality elected to the much bigger grand ensemble of Sarcelles the same year .
Nor did they try to take the day-to-day running of operations from the SARH. They did, on the other hand, add a 3-hectare industrial zone to the ZUP,
which now provides a few dozen jobs, chiefly for women in the Lipton's Tea plant. And a combination of fairly high municipal spending and the occasional mobilisation of residents to release State subsidies has given Caucriauville a fair complement of schools, a health centre, a post-office and a CLEG. Caucriauville is now a complete grand ensemble, relatively x^ell-executed in its style, with mature trees and green spaces that help to break up the monotony of its buildings. Yon's questionnaire among the inhabitants showed general satisfaction with the flats themselves, but discontent about social facilities that total two bars, a swimming-pool and a CLEG for 25,000 people. This discontent, however, received no strong electoral expression. Duromea received 52 per cent of the first-ballot vote in the 1978 legislative elections in Caucriauville, and 53 per cent in 1981. This did not represent unquestioning loyalty to the PCF: Marchais took only 33 per cent in the 1981 presidential elections. But the municipal policy of modest improvements to its predecessors' plans seems to have done it little political damage.

VII.A.2: Mare-Rouge and its Rehabilitation

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I Mare-Rouge, a Zone d'Habitation in Le Havre's north-west, on either

side of the Avenue du Bois au Coq, is contemporary with Caucriauville but of a very different character. It was started with the construction of 300 Logements Populaires Familiaux (LOPOFAs) under the first Cance municipality

(6) H. Canacos, Sarcelles ou le Beton Apprivoise* (Editions Sociales, 1979), passim.

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in 1958; under Monguillon the zone was conceded to the SARH and a plan for 1,100 Programme Social de Relogement (PSR) units announced. Both LOPOFAs and PSRs are among the sub-HLM categories. The long-term low-interest
loans that finance them keep rents down, but they were built to Spartan specifications (small rooms, little insulation of any kind, no lifts, and
in the case of LOPOFAs, heating from coal stoves in the kitchen). Many tenants had spent up to 20 years in wartime Nissen huts in Gonfreville or the Forest of Montgeon; both the Monguillon municipality and the Communists subsidised land purchases for Mare-Rouge (a total of some 7 MF) to help rehouse them.

The Communist municipality cut the estate into two by widening the
Avenue du Bois au Coq into an expressway to allow better access to the Mont-Gaillard ZAC, and only a single footbridge now connects the two sides. It also had two more positive priorities. One was to avoid the creation of
a sub-HLM ghetto; in the last two stages, 725 HLMO flats and 216 ILMs, all fairly high-quality units built by SAHLMs, brought Mare-Rouge to a total
of 2,337 homes. Secondly, the municipality improved public facilities: Mare-Rouge now has a CLEC, an indoor swimming pool, a small shopping centre, and a clinic as well as one secondary and two primary schools
This did not prevent much of the estate from becoming a slum by 1975.
It was not just that 84 per cent of the active population were workers, mostly unskilled; or that the level of female activity (with the effect it had on household incomes) was below Le Havre's average; or that 59 per cent of the residents were under 18; or that a quarter of all families had only one parent; or that, on an estate where there were almost no pensioners,
19 per cent of all households had no wage income. More important was that

(7) Ville du Havre, Commission d'Urbanisme, 18 May 1971.

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the poor quality of the buildings themselves and the OPHLM's strategy for filling them led both the estate and its tenants into a series of inter-locking vicious circles.
Many of the initial tenants, who had never paid rent in their Nissen
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huts, were in no hurry to start in Mare-Rouge. The OPHLM increasingly used the estate to put its 'unsocial' tenants, especially those with rent arrears (by 1978 nearly two-thirds of the LOPOFA tenants were behind with their rent). That discourage the OPHLM from maintaining the buildings, and so stairways, electric wires, cellars and lights that were vandalised stayed vandalised. The general problem of delinquency was very great, as is shown by the concentration of juveniles under supervision from social workers (Education en Milieu Ouvcrte or Observation en Milieu Ouverte) in the Mare-Rouge area (Map 36). Lack of maintenance discouraged people from paying rent, but non-payment of rent often led to the withdrawal of assistance
like the Allocation-Logement, and thus even less possibility of paying. The combination of these elements had thus made a depressed sub-proletarian
(8) ghetto of Mare-Rouge inside a decade
The municipality was slow to take direct action: spending money on
an area where one school suffered over 100 broken windows in the single month of September 1978, and where the CLEG closed after repeated attacks, was not a financially attractive proposition. The Service d'Urbanismo (SUVH) did, however, produce a study of the problem (on which much of the above paragraph is based). This clearly blamed the OPHLM's policy of concentrating 'unsocial' families for.the deterioration of Mare-Rouge. It also hinted that the general level of political commitment was low, and that the CLEG should

(8) SUVH, La Mare-Rouge: Enqugte Sociale, May 1976, passim. SUVH, Rehab 111- tation du Quartier de la Mare-Rouge, Dossier Adressd au Comite Habitat
et Vie Sociale, Oct. 1978, 1-33, 57-77, 84-95.

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help residents to 'clarify ideas', to 'reduce the effects of cultural segregation', and to 'reach a higher level of social responsibility (the level of turnout at elections is a good indicator of the latter)' . On
the face of it, Mare-Rouge's voting record should have given the municipality little to worry about. At the first ballot in 1978 Durom£a, for the PCF, received some 70 per cent of the votes cast there, representing some 56.5
per cent of the registered electorate or, on a rough comparison with 1975 census figures, about half of the population over 18. The proportion was even higher in the 1977 municipal elections. It is possible, however, that the municipality saw a danger of future electoral apathy in the conduct of the estate's juvenile residents.
But beyond suggesting the demolition of the L'OPOFA blocks, and
expressing the need for improvement in general terms, the SUVH study made no specific proposals, and no immediate action was taken. The next development, the Habitat et Vie Sociale (HVS) circular of March 1977 (Ch.VI, p.301), which made available a combination of subsidies for physical improvements
to France's worst grands ensembles plus social assistance for their inhabitants, might have been tailor-made for Mare-Rouge. The municipality seized this chance and a dossier was submitted within eighteen months.
The programme, which was accepted by the government's HVS committee,
concerned the 1,400 PSR and LOPOFA units and the surrounding spaces. The buildings were to be gutted, many partition walls knocked down, and insulation and central heating added. Existing social facilities were to get the same treatment, and new ones (such as a Martial Arts centre to help young people work off their aggression) added. A mixed team from the OPHLM (which is
doing the building work) and the SUVH was set up on site to consult residents

(9) SUVH, Mare-Rouge, Enqueue, 23.

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about the changes they wanted to see, and social workers brought in to monitor the estate's 'social progress'. The cost, estimated in 1979, was 128.5 MF, or roughly 100,000 francs per home. Of this, 29.3 MF was due
as a straight subsidy from the State, and a further 18.5 MF in subsidies from the de"partement, the region, and (chiefly) the municipality. The
72.1 MF of loans contracted on various terms would naturally mean rent increases, but these would also be subsidised by Aide Personnalise'e au Logement (APL). The whole operation was expected to take until 1986, with tenants being temporarily rehoused in other flats in the OPHLM's stock during work on each building
By the end of 1982 a pilot building of 24 units had been completed and decorated in several shades of peach, and APL meant lower rents for over half the tenants; a further 310 homes were nearing completion. Doubts remain on whether enough government money will be available for each successive stage (new HVS dossiers were not accepted after 1980) and on the extent to which the public consultation process involved the residents enough to prevent the old vicious circle from starting again. But in the immediate term, Mare-Rouge has seen a major improvement
The forceful expression of Communist priorities is found only to a
limited extent in the construction and rehabilitation of Mare-Rouge. The concern to improve social facilities and to avoid a sub-proletarian ghetto (whose residents might tend not to see the Communists as the natural defenders of their class) did produce concrete results, but not sufficiently to prevent the deterioration that began from the early 1970s. When this

(10) SUVH, Rehabilitation du Quartier de la Mare-Rouge, Dossier Complcment-aire Adresse" au Comite HVS, Aug. 1979, 12-13, 33-34.
(11) Interviews with Laurent LeV^que, SUVH, 22 July 1983, and Yves Cressent (municipal architect), 10 March 1983.

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deterioration took place, the municipality found no means to mobilise the population in order to claim the resources for the necessary improvements. Instead, it awaited the release of the HVS circular, and the consultation that did take place with residents was no more than the official texts

(12) required . While the municipality produced an impressively prompt

application to take advantage of the new subsidies, the striking character-istic of the steps taken to improve Mare-Rouge was the temporary convergence between the aims of the municipality and those of the central government. Mare-Rouge represented a political liability to the municipality for
three reasons. It was a strongly proletarian enclave which showed signs - albeit very obliquely - of refusing the leadership of the municipality and the PCF. It detracted from the municipality's claim to be able to create a decent social environment for poorer social groups. And, particularly insofar as delinquency impinged on adjoining neighbourhoods, it was a caricature for the electorate as a whole of Communist planning policy and of its results. The reasons why the government decided to allocate sub-sidies to improve the living conditions of people who were unlikely to give it electoral support are harder to define. Possibly the IIVS subsidies were an experiment, to see how far a shift from a 'quantitative' to a 'quali-tative' approach to housing, from 'aide & la pierre' to 'aide a la personne', would suffice to correct the severe social 'disfunctions' to which the earlier policy of grands ensembles had contributed. Perhaps also, a few days before the 1977 municipal elections (though the circular had been in preparation for three years), HVS was intended to show the government's concern with the problem of 'security', which affected grands ensembles in

(12) Cf. Arrete du 3 mars 1977 crdant le Groupe Interministe'riel Habitat et Vie Sociale, Journal Officiel, 10 March 1977.

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some right-wing municipalities as much as it did Mare-Rouge, and which was already an electoral issue (if less so than in 1983). Whatever the reasons for the HVS procedure, the municipality was clearly more ready to use it to solve the problem of Mare-Rouge than to use the problem of Mare-Rouge
as a means to show the destructiveness of capitalist urbanisation and its own willingness to struggle against it.

VII.A.3: A 'New Conception of Planning'; Mont-Gaillard
The need for a new ZUP to follow Caucriauville was discussed as early
as 1963, but the formal decision only came four years later. Colliard claims that a political battle took place over the estate's siting between the State's local representatives, who wanted to put it in Fontaine-la-Mallet or Montivilliers (to avoid reinforcing the Communist majority in Le Havre), and the municipality, which wanted to put it on the Mont-Gaillard site at the north-west end of the Avenue du Bois au Coq. If there was a battle, it was short: the planning arguments (continuity with existing urbanisation, better access to the city centre) were on the municipality's side, and by January 1966 Mont-Gaillard had the support of the Minis tore de

(13) la Construction . Colliard, who effectively directed the municipal side

of the project even before his promotion to 1st adjoint in 1971, was a strong supporter both of the ZUP and of an adjoining industrial zone to provide more jobs in the upper town. Hence his very warm response to the prefect's approval of both projects:
'la municipalite se rejouit vivement de ces decisions,
qui re"pondent aux voeux qu'elle a maintes fois exprimds,
ainsi que de la confirmation qui lui est dgalement faite
de la reservation d'une zone pour 1'implantation des

(13) VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 11 Jan. 1966. Interview with Daniel Colliard, 25 Jan. 1983.

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industries le"geres

The municipal decision to create a 166-hectare ZUP on Morit-Gaillard received formal prefectoral approval on 8 January 1968 - barely a week after the Loi d'Orientation Fonciere had inaugurated the ZAC. While Mont-Gaillard remained, officially, a ZUP, it received the flexible treatment of a ZAC from the start (there was no comprehensive plan-masse), and was referred to as a ZAC from about 1973.
There were clear elements of continuity with Caucriauville. Mont-
Gaillard was conceded to the SARH, and the architect-in-chief was Sonrel.
At the same time the municipality and the Direction De"partementale d'Equipement (DDE) shared a number of priorities that were clearly intended to make Mont-Gaillard a different kind of grand ensemble.
Firstly, there was to be a balanced social mix. The Planning Committee agreed that houses as well as flats should be built on Mont-Gaillard, and that all financial sectors should be represented: Colliard repeatedly stressed the need to avoid 'social segregation' within the ZUP, and between the ZUP and its surroundings. True, the municipality wanted 50 per cent of HLMs against 35 per cent envisaged by the DDE, but this was left only provisionally defined, at 1,400 HLMs, or 36 per cent of a total of 3,900 units, in the initial programme (Table VII.1, p.342): there were no serious disagreements on this point. It is easy to see why the State wanted to 'pair' HLM flats with private-sector units: an all-HLM ZUP would not only reinforce the Communists in Le Havre, but might overturn the right-wing 6th Constituency. That the municipality chose to share this general perspective rather than fighting an 'offensive' electoral strategy, to get as many HLMs as possible,

(14) SUVH, Mont-Gaillard, Dossier Ge'ne'ral; Corrcspondance avec la DDE et la Sous-Prefecture: Colliard to Sub-Prefect, 4 Aug. 1967.

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was probably due to four factors. It did not wish to create a ghetto like Mare-Rouge; it did want to show its impartiality, its concern for the housing needs of 'the whole population' rather than just of the traditional Communist electorate; and it probably hoped thereby to sensitise a wider range of social groups to the PCF. Finally, since the 1970 Plan d'Amgnage-ment de la Zone (PAZ) did not fix the distribution of housing units by financial sector definitively, it was hardly worth risking open conflict
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with the DDE at this stage v .
The second priority was to avoid the monotony of the Caucriauville
style by breaking up the ZUP into three or four quarters (Ilflts), separated from one another by green belts. Each would have the minimum of basic services, especially shops and schools, needed by residents. An additional advantage was that the successive construction of the quarters would spare new residents the experience of living on a building-site for a decade.
It was this division into quarters that the municipality called a 'new conception of planning' in a 1973 number of the municipal bulletin . Thirdly, a generous provision of social facilities was planned for Mont-Gaillard. The list established by the SARH in 1970 included seven primary and three secondary schools; a main social centre grouping a clinic, a creche, meeting halls and a library; two secondary social centres, plus
a post office, a skating rink and two youth clubs; and 5.5 hectares of
sports grounds in addition to the green belts between quarters. Most of these were promised State subsidies for construction during the Vlth Plan

(15) VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 7 Sept. 1967. SUVH, Mont-Gaillard, Dossier Ge'ne'ral: Comptes-Rendus des Reunions Techniques, Reunion du 26 septembre 1968, reunion SARH-promoteurs du 19 fevrier 1968: Correspondence avec
Ta SARH; Colliard to Allais (SARH director), 6 March 1968~and 15 Dec.
1970.

(16) VDH, Mont-Gaillard, Reunions SARH-promoteurs, 19 fevrier et 5 septembre 1968.VDH, Bulletin Municipal, May 1973, 12-13.

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(1971-75). In addition, shopping facilities were programmed not only for the ZUP but for the whole north-west of Le Havre, which badly lacked them. Nothing definite had been decided by 1971, but a hypermarket or supermarket formula on a space as big as 5.4 hectares was clearly envisaged: Colliard hoped that a major shopping centre would finance a very large car park Fourthly, residents would also be offered job opportunities on the adjoining industrial zone. This would reduce the ZUP's main handicap - its distance from jobs in the lower town - and might encourage small industries inappropriately sited in the city centre to move out, allowing a future restructuring of the centre.
These priorities were included, with greater or lesser definition, in
the dossier accepted by the Fonds du DeVeloppement Economique et Social in February 1971. The PAZ divided the 166 hectares of the ZUP (or, practice, the ZAC), into an industrial zone of 33.5 hectares, a road intersection (connecting the future right-bank motorway to Rouen to the urban road net-work) of 39 hectares, and 93.5 hectares of residential space. The resi-dential space was itself divided into a high-density central 'quarter' with 2,100 flats and the shopping centre, and three smaller quarters containing a total of 1,090 flats and 660 houses plus local social facilities and green spaces. While in practice the precise distribution of housing types was left flexible, it was understood on all sides that a social mix would be desirable. In no sense had the ZAC's four main priorities been imposed on the municipality: the Town Hall's approval of the programme was at least as whole-hearted as that of the Prefecture.

We have noted (Ch.VI, p.298) that the ZAC procedure allows considerable

(17) SUVH, Mont-Gaillard, Reunions Techniques: Reunion 'Equipements Commerciaux', 4 feVrier 1969: Correspondance avec la SARH, Colliard to Allais, 10 Oct. 1968.

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financial flexibility. Raising the receipts of land sales to developers in order to balance rising costs may be achieved by bringing in more private developers and reducing the percentage of HLMs; by cutting the programme of social and educational facilities; by increasing densities; or by selling land dear to industrial or commercial developers. The alternative is raising the level of public subsidy. One would not expect a Communist municipality to use any of these methods with enthusiasm, but the first two are the most directly opposed to official Communist priorities. The extent to which the municipality of Le Havre succeeded in keeping a ZAC to its initial programme is thus a good indicator of its ability to pursue its own policies in operational planning.
The SARH produced an initial budget for Mont-Gaillard in 1970. In accordance with government directives on ZACs, this distinguished between 'primary' infrastructure (the road and utilities networks connecting the ZAC to the urban tissue outside), secondary infrastructure (the main networks within the ZAC), tertiary infrastructure (networks within each housing group) and superstructure (social and educational facilities within the ZAC). The site prices paid by developers were to include initial land purchase
and demolition costs, tertiary infrastructure costs, plus a substantial contribution for primary and secondary infrastructure and a small one for superstructure (Tables VII.2 and VII.3, pp.343-344). The budget was revised at the end of 1976, by which time 2,927 housing units had been completed. While the 1976 document does not represent the final balance-sheet (housing construction was only finished in 1981), it does show the main changes made to the programme.
Table VII.2 shows that infrastructure costs rose by 60.1 per cent,
from 103.3 MF to 165.4 MF, between 1970 and 1976. This increase was below inflation (73.8 per cent for the same period), chiefly because some work

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had already been done by 1970. Inevitably price increases were not uniform; they depended on when the work was done, the accuracy of the 1970 estimates, and occasionally on the reclassification of certain items (many roads listed as secondary in 1970, for example, were moved to the tertiary column in 1976) On the receipts side, although the SARH wrote in extra subsidies it had requested from the State and departement (figures in brackets), the real subsidies allocated changed hardly at all between the two budgets. There were, it is true, two windfalls in the shape of VAT reimbursements amounting to 4.4 MF plus 758,000 F in profits from short-term investments, but they were far from covering the increase in costs. The municipality and the SARH thus resorted to a combination of the balancing expedients outlined above. Total receipts from developers therefore rose by two-thirds, a little
more than the overall rate of budget growth. This increase, however, was unevenly spread between different types of development. The budgeted growth in receipts from the sale of housing sites was only 43.6 per cent - or, if the growth of developers' payments for such items of infrastructure as car-parks and central heating installations is included, 57.7 per cent. Receipts from industrial sites rose by the average two-thirds, but those from commercial and public developers more than doubled. That said, the absolute increase in payments from housing developers represented the biggest single element in the overall growth of receipts.
Table VII.1 shows that this increase was not achieved by attracting a
higher proportion of private developers - rather the contrary. The 1970 housing programme included 1,400 HLM flats to rent, or 36 per cent of the total of 3,900. This proportion was nearly two-thirds both in the 1976 programme and at the completion of housing construction in 1981. By contrast, the number of houses (all but a handful of which were for sale) fell from over a thousand in 1970 to 623 in 1981 - or 792, if the 'Hameau

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des Corneilles' lotissement adjoining the ZAC proper is included. The non-subsidised sector for sale was finally unrepresented in Mont-Gaillard, and the total number of units for sale was lower than expected. This was partly due to market forces. Many private developers preferred building on village sites, and in this sense, Mont-Gaillard resembles the low-cost concentration of ZUPs rather than the slide to the private sector often noticed in ZACs. But the high proportion of HLMs also reflected a victory for municipal priorities (and perhaps also for PCF electoral interests) that apparently

(18) required no battles with the DDE or the prefecture

Insofar as it could not be accommodated within HLM land price ceilings,
the increase in receipts from housing developers was achieved by raising the number of homes built. This increase, of about 11 per cent, was low compared

(19) with increases of up to 50 per cent observed on some other grands ensembles

It was also facilitated by the greater availability of land owing to the abandonment of the Rouen motorway project (Table VII.4). Against this should be set the shelving of plans to build 200 flats on the site of five small houses in the Rue Edouard Grieg, whose owners, led by a former PCF councillor successfully protested against their expropriation. The overall result was thus a modest density increase within the available space, and especially in the already very dense Hot 1 (cf. Maps 37 and 38). The SARH's technicians ascribe this partly to the municipality's determination to balance the budget while retaining their social priorities
The cost of industrial land rose in line with total receipts from about
28 F per square metre in 1970 to 43 F in 1976. This figure was less than the

(18) Interviews with M. Dome, SARH, 22 Aug. 1980: Colliard to Allais, 10 Oct. 1968.
(19) E. Pre-teceille, La Production des Grands Ensembles (Mouton, 1972), 108.
(20) Interview with M. Dome, SARH, 22 Aug. 1980.

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average cost of residential sites (61 F) but the maximum compatible with competing against industrial land elsewhere in Seine-Maritime. The industrial zone was thus seen less as a money-spinner than as a social priority. As such it was only a partial success. By late 1978, 20 of its 29 saleable hectares had been occupied - 8 by the municipality for a bus station and a technical school and the rest by a score of small firms that had moved up from sites in the lower town. This may have made the restructuring of Le Havre's old centre easier: but it only brought 150 or so jobs to Mont-Gaillard, and in the short term these were held by people living outside

(21) the ZAC . In addition to industrial land, the municipality bought about

13.2 hectares of land in the ZAC (at purchase price plus inflation) for public buildings. This was more than expected, and accounts for the big increase in land receipts from public authorities.
An increase that was proportionally almost as great, and absolutely
much bigger, came in receipts for commercial land. Communists have criticised hypermarkets as monopolist traders that put small retailers out of business, though Ascher and Giard admit that 'En 1'absence d'autres moyens, de nombreuses municipalites democratiques furent contraintes

(22) d'accepter ces grandes surfaces' . This happened, with rather little

trace of reluctance, in Mont-Gaillard.
Initially, the municipality and the SARH planned to sell land for the shopping centre at a high price (17,000 metres at 300 F) but to encourage competition between two major distributors. This principle was abandoned on the advice of marketing experts called in by the SARH, who argued that

(21) AURH, Zones d'Acceuil pour 1'Activitd Disponibles dans la Rggion du Havre, Etat de la Commercialisation, April 1979, no pagination. SARH, Mont-Gaillard, Bilan Revise au 31 decembre 1976, note de presentation,
TCL Interview with M. Dome, SARH, 2^2 Aug. 1980.
(22) Ascher and Giard, Demain?, 111.

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it would be 'quicker, easier and less risky to sell a single site of 10,000 square metres', and that the site's division into two lots would 'put off the big retail chains'. It was also decided to invite tenders for the site. A jury including representatives of the CCIH, the SARH and the municipality made its choice on the basis of four criteria - the money offered, the company's level of retail prices, the architectural plans, and (on Colliard's suggestion) the 'dynamism' of the company concerned. Auchan, which had offered 7.8 MF for 13,400 square metres (of which 7.700 were to be shopping area, and the rest stocking space and a car park) won the contract, which was signed in 1972. Thireau-Morel, whose managing director was also president of the CCIH, did the building work (one of the firm's last big contracts before its bankruptcy in 1974 and the subsequent conviction of a municipal employee for corruption). When Auchan opened in April 1973,

(23) Duromea was there to give a speech

For Auchan itself, the deal was a success, and the hypermarket is one
of the most profitable in the chain. This is partly because it filled a need for more shopping facilities in the north-west. Auchan has something near a captive market, with over half the shopping surface in the ZAC (the rest consisting of smaller shops in the same building and in the other Hots) and rules in the adjoining UEc zone in the POS restricting competitors.
Its low prices also attract customers from throughout the city, leading to difficulties for a number of smaller retailers, and thus detracting from

(23) SARH, VDH, ZUP du Mont-Gaillard Etude Definissant le Programme
Envisage, Dec. 1970, 39. VDH, Mont-Gaillard, Dossier Centre Commercial, reunions 4 feVrier, 28 avril 1969, 13 fevrier 1970: Reunions du jury
de concours charge de 1'ouverture des offices, 17 et 25 fevrier, 28
juin 1972. Le Havre Libre, 18 April 1973. Alain Yon, 'Industrialisation
et Urbanisation dans la Region Havraise' (Paris, doctoral thesis,
1976), 202-204.

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the SDAU's objective of reinforcing the city centre
Auchan's impact on the ZAC was two-sided. The SARH did not hesitate
to point out how much i.t had helped to balance the budget: Auchan's payment to the SARH (which accounts for the much increased SARH fee in Table VII.3) covered most of the cost of Mont-Gaillard 1 s sports facilities (shown in
the SARH contribution in Table VII.4). On the other hand, the PAZ (Map 38) was substantially reworked to accommodate the hypermarket. The sites allo-cated to the main shopping area and to sports grounds were exchanged, to the profit of the shopping centre. Auchan is now surrounded by car-parks and
a three-lane expressway and flanked by high-rise blocks, giving a particularly bleak impression of Mont-Gaillard at its main points of entry; it took nine years to build a pedestrian footbridge over the expressway. It is thus
hard to escape the conclusion that the price paid for the hypermarket's financial and other benefits was the sacrifice of a number of the ZAC's

• ._. , • ... (25) initial priorities

Rising infrastructure costs, then, were met by higher contributions
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from housing developers, the windfall of VAT reimbursement, and the big increase in receipts from the commercial site: the commune's contribution grew by less than the total infrastructure budget. By contrast, the municipality's share of the superstructure budget more than quadrupled, from 22 MF to 90 MF, between 1970 and 1976 (Table VII.4). The initial superstructure programme had not been completed by 1976: this was partly due to the State's failure to pay more than tx^o-thirds of what it had promised. But the programme, far from being cut back, was enlarged. New

(24) AURH, L'Appareil Commercial Havrais et son Evolution depuis 1970, April 1980, 11. IrTterviewsTwith M. Dome, SARH, 22 Aug. 1980, and Georges Lechevallier, 9th Adjoint Le Havre, 9 June 1980.
(25) SARH, ZUP du Mont-Gaillard, Bilan 1976, 39.

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items that appeared on the 1976 budget included an extra primary school;
a technical school and a school for handicapped children (the former logically, the latter incomprehensibly, on the industrial zone); and the 'Ecole Ouverte 1, which combined a primary school with other facilities
such as a swimming-pool and a play-group centre, all grouped around the
old farm of Mont-Gaillard, now restored. Most of the bill for these new items was picked up by the commune, particularly for the Ecole Ouverte, which received no more than the regular State subsidies for the primary schools it included. The often slow release of State subsidies, plus the fact that the municipal contribution represented over half a year's investment budget, inevitably led to considerable delays in the realisation of the superstructure programme. The Ecole Ouverte opened in September 1980; work on the main social and cultural centre is only just starting in 1983. But there was never any question of curtailing the programme.
The total municipal contribution to the ZAC's infrastructure and superstructure was budgeted at 36.3 MF in 1970-71 and at 110.3 MF in 1976. This increase bears witness to the municipality's determination to keep sight of its social priorities, even at a heavy financial cost. Up to a point this was successful. Both the provision of social facilities and the percentage of HLMs will be greater in the completed ZAC than in the initial programme. Other priorities - employment opportunities in the industrial estate, a break with the rigid planning style of Caucriauville, and social balance - were only partially achieved. As we have seen, the industrial zone, while relocating a number of local companies more rationally, had only a marginal effect on employment in Le Havre's north-west. Mont-Gaillard's 'new conception of planning 1 was vitiated by density increases, roads and Auchan. The overall density of the ZAC less the industrial zone was 37.5 homes per hectare, comparable to Caucriauville 1 s

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40.5. But the land taken up by Auchan, sports grounds, individual houses and roads left just 33 hectares for 3,724 flats, a density of 112, which was considerably higher than at Caucriauville. The SUVH's own survey has called the nucleus of Mont-Gaillard - Auchan, the car-park and the 20-storey (7 6 }
tower-blocks - 'a repulsive element that affects the whole ensemble 1
The sports fields are fenced off for use by schools and clubs, and the
green belts between Hots are often just a few metres wide and crossed by roads. This fairly slight provision of open green space for the density of flats led to complaints both from residents and, in the City

(27) Planning Committee, from the PCF adjoint concerned

Taking the ZAC as a whole, the desired social mix was achieved in part (Table VII.5, p.345). If the top social categories were less well repre-sented than in Le Havre as a whole, Mont-Gaillard is far from being a 'proletarian ghetto': the most over-represented category in 1978 was white-collar workers, while the percentage of blue-collar workers was rather lower than in the city as a whole. Moreover, blue-collar workers constituted a respectable proportion - 38 per cent - of the occupants of houses. Given that Mont-Gaillard's HLM rents are among the highest in Le Havre, it is probable that the working-class families living there are better off than most, thanks either to more skilled jobs or to double incomes: 43 per cent of households had two wage-earners, which helps to explain the high white-collar percentage. Insofar as there is social segregation within the ZAC, it is thus probably not between blue-collar
and white-collar but between relatively prosperous working-class and lower

(26) SUVH, Le Mont-Gaillard, Etude Sociologique, March 1979, 85.
(27) SARH, ZUP du Mont-Gaillard, Bilan 1976, Note de Presentation^ 6-7. SUVH, Le Mont-Gaillard, Etude Sociologique, 101-105. VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 22 April 1976. '

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middle-class households and the small proportion of poor people living in
the ZAC's 200 or so PLR and Cite* de Transit units. The SUVH's study on Mont-Gaillard noted that the PLR units in Hot 4 had passed without transition from a building site to a phase of decay, and argued that they
had benefited little from their integration into a balanced social environ-

(28} ment and that with time they risked becoming a new, if smaller, Mare-Rouge

Negative opinions on Mont-Gaillard have been voiced not only by
technicians from the SUVH and the SARH, but by councillors. Joseph Menga,
now 2nd adjoint and PS depute for the 6th constituency, complained in 1977 'Nous subissons les inconvenients parfois dramatiques
d'une conception urbaine sur laquelle nous aurions
beaucoup a dire. J'habite Mont-Gaillard, qui est
pourtant recent. Je vis la 1'experience d'une citd
completement coupee du monde exterieur. D5s que
quelqu'un proteste, on met en place une structure
pour canaliser le me*contentement' v^9) .

It is hard to give precision to Menga's last sentence, though the
typical municipal response to disconent has been to send Colliard plus one or two uneasy SUVH technicians to hold public meetings, in which Colliard has tended to blame the State for Mont-Gaillard's negative characteristics, and to agree to residents' demands on minor points. Electorally, this seems to have worked. Mont-Gaillard votes overwhelmingly to the Left, and nearly half its residents voted for Colliard as parliamentary candidate in both
1978 and 1981: if it was finally Menga, not Colliard, who benefited from
the Left's victory in 1981, this was due to other voters than those of Mont-Gaillard (Table VII.6, p.345). Unquestioning loyalty to the PCF as expressed in the 1981 vote for Marchais was, as in Caucriauville, less than the

(28) SUVH, Le Mont-Gaillard, Etude Sociologique, 44.
(29) Andre" Harris and Alain de Sddouy, Qui n'est pas de Droite? (Paris, Seuil, 1978), 144.

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support for the local Communists.
It was the growth of Mont-Gaillard plus smaller building operations
such as Point Cardinaux which, just as much as the national swing, helped to tip the 6th Constituency to the Left in 1981. The State authorities' awareness of the growing threat to Rufenacht certainly coloured their attitudes to plans for another grand ensemble on the Dollemard plateau.

VII.A.4: Le Havre's Last Hole: the Dollemard ZAC

In March 1968 the municipality commissioned the PCF's favoured study bureau, ORGECO, to produce a feasibility survey on the urbanisation of Le Havre's north-western corner, the Dollemard plateau. Eighteen months later the City Planning Committee accepted Colliard's proposition for a ZAC incorporating some 1,000 homes on the site. Its urbanisation appears in the SDAU maps (Map 30) as an objective to be achieved by 1985. Yet in mid-1983 the project was still at the stage of a public inquiry. This section will attempt to explain the delay.
As a site, Dollemard has clear disadvantages. It is close both to Cap
de la Heve, Le Havre's windiest spot, and to the Octeville airport flight-path. It is also far from the city centre, and without the proposed north-west entry road, 1,000 new homes there would strain the existing road net-work at rush-hours. Dollemard is certainly not a preferred location for the OPHLM's applicants (Table C.19, p.424). This has not prevented individuals from building houses there, bringing the population to 3,930 in 1975. Over half the active residents were workers in 1975.
For Rufenacht, the Dollemard scheme had clear political disadvantages. Dollemard, far from being a right-wing stronghold, votes similarly to the average for Le Havre (38.5 per cent for the PCF, 13.5 per cent for the PS at the first ballot in 1978, and 55 per cent for Colliard at the second;

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Sources:(all in SUVH, Mont-Gaillard, Dossier General):

1967 (Sept): Ville du Havre, Commission d'Urbanisme, 7 Sept 1967.
1967 (Dec.): VDH and SARH, ZUP du Mont-Gaillard, Dossier-Programme Accept^ par le FDES. 8 Dec. 1967 1.970: SUVH, Mont-Gaillard, dossier, Correspondance avec la SARH; Allais (SARH director) to Colliard, 15 Dec. 1970.

1972: .Correspondance interne, CKef de bureau (SUVH) to head of 3rd administrative division, note, 18 April 1972.
- 975: SARH, ZUP du Mont-Gaillard, Programme des Logements (note, 29 Oct. 1975).
1976: SARH, Mont-Gaillard, Bilan au 31 decembre 1976. p.7.
1978: SUVH, Le Mont-Gaillard, Etude Socioloqique. March 1979, p.11.
1981: SUVH, Le Mont-Gaillard, Repartition des Loqements, plan, Feb. 1981: and information from de ve.\ o/pers.

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Table BI.4-; ZAG Mont -Gall lard; area in hectares, 1970 and 1976.

Type of occupation_________________1970_____________1976 Residential (including shops, schools) 93-5
Industrial 33.5
Main roads 39-0

TOTAL . - 166.0

115.0
36.0
22.0

173^0

(source: 3ARH, VDH, ZUP du Hont-Gaillard, jjilan actualist'an. 31 de"cembre 1976 ~ (December 1977) p.2).

. TableVTT. 5; Distribution of active population by job category; Le .iavre, Ilont- _Gaillard, Gaucriauville, 1973 and 1973-
(Source: SUVH, Le Kont-Gaillard, Enquete Sociologique, March 1979>
P. 43).

Category

Independent industrialists _ or shopkeepers
Liberal professions and
upper management
. addle management
White-collar workers
Blue-collar workers
Office cleaners etc.
Other

No. of active persons (lOO; a)

Women as ~/a workforce

Working women as ; 0 women

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Table W. 6: Communist and Socialist percentages of valid votes cast in Mont-Gaillard (Seine-Maritime, VT constituency, 7th canton, polling
stations l6,U7, 18, 19), 1977-1931. (Source: Le Eavre Libre,
14 March 1977: 13 and 20 March 1973: 27 April, 11 May, 15 and 22
June 1981).

1977 municipals

PCF list (Durorne'a) 71.7,

1981 presidential

1st ballot
Marchais
Mitterrand

31-5

2nd ballot

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1973 parliamentary
1st ballot
PC? (Colliard) 46.5
PS (Vallery) 17.5

2nd ballot

FCF (Colliard) 69.5

1981 parliamentary

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1st ballot
PCF (Colliard) 46.5
Pd (l-.en/ja) 29.5

wr

2nd ballot

PS (nenga) 77

1177.

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55 per cent for Duromea's list in 1977). But as the social and political composition of Mont-Gaillard took shape, any project that would bring in 2,000 or so new voters, many of them HLM residents, constituted a threat
to the Right's position in the 6th Constituency. Hence Rufenacht's active sponsorship of the Association pour 1'Environnement et la Defense des Interests des Habitants du Dollemard, created to oppose the construction of anything other than individual houses on the plateau
Whether the State apparatus also took action to protect 'its' Deputy
is much less clear. In 1971 the ZAP Mont-Gaillard Quest, covering possible future extensions to the industrial zone, was actually extended to include the proposed Dollemard ZAC on the initiative of the DDE. By 1974, after several meetings with Colliard and Beyazian, the DDE had agreed, in principle, to a ZAC of 1,400 homes including 400 HLM and ILN units. The SARH was asked to do more detailed studies: then nothing happened until March 1978. Conceivably the DDE's specific reservations on the scheme - regarding the cost of a proposed secondary school and the traffic problem - had something to do with this delay. A more obvious explanation is that Mont-Gaillard was behind schedule and the municipal budget did not run to

(31) building two ZACs at the same time

The studies that started again in 1978 were complicated by the Galley
Act of 1975, which required an impact study for every new ZAC. Officially motivated by social and environmental concerns, impact studies also provide the central authorities with a subjective criterion for refusing projects - besides requiring more time to prepare a ZAC dossier. The official programme

(30) Ibid., 186.
(31) VDH, Conseil Municipal, 25 Oct. 1971: Commission d'Urbanisme, 16 Sept. 1971.VDH, ZAC Dollemard, Dossier General; Reunions d'Etudes, 18 mai
et 15 novembre 1972, 24 avril et 17 mai 1974.

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for the Dollemard ZAC was thus not submitted until June 1980. It included 977 homes - 467 flats, 310 houses, and 193 'intermediate' units (small blocks of flats), of which about % were to be HLMs; social, educational and shopping facilities; and green spaces including plenty of trees to break the wind. Beyazian's impact study argued that the ZAC would meet the still considerable need for low-cost housing, that it would create an alternative housing supply to that offered by private developers in the villages, and that it would improve services to existing Dollemard residents, While rightly pointing out that housing construction in Le Havre had fallen well below the SDAU's objectives, Beyazian nonetheless took the SDAU's economic and demographic projections to be still valid - a flaw in the dossier's argument that is visible to anyone who has followed Le Havre's

(32) real development since 1974
The prefect's reply, which came in June 1981, contained reservations
on the environmental and traffic questions, but agreed in principle to the project: 'on sent que le.s elections sont intervenues entret.emps' , Colliard

(33) wrote to Beyazian . The dossier received minor alterations plus 69 extra homes (60 of them houses) before its submission to public inquiry in June

1982.

The Association de Defense had not prevented Rufenacht's defeat in the
1981 elections, but the Right's two recently-elected conseillers ge'ne'raux
lent their willing leadership to its efforts to block the ZAC. Public meetings organised by the municipality in June 1982 were generally stormy.

(32) SIVOM de la Region du Havre, AURH: ZAC du Dollemard-Est, Dossier de Cre'ation-Re'alisation, March 1980: Rapport de Presentation (no pagination) Etude d'Impact, 105-108, 116-119.
(33) VDH, ZAC Dollemard, Dossier Ge'ne'ral, Correspondance: Colliard to Beyazian, 25 June 1981.

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1 the SUVH set to work on a more conciliatory project: the recent collapse part of the cliffs a few hundred yards from the site led one SARH repre-

The inquiry's record-book contains references to the threat of a new Mare-Rouge or an invasion of blacks and Arabs, but also more reasonable arguments pointing out the inconsistent treatment of the SDAU's projections and the short-sightedness of programming yet more construction on the periphery when the city centre badly needed renovation. In September 1982 the SARH and the SUVH set to work on a more conciliatory project: the recent collapse of
sentative to reflect that construction would have to start soon if fifteen years' studies were not to be wasted. The new dossier replaced all the
flats in the former project by intermediate units, and called them 'town houses'. The second inquiry started in June 1983.
It would be convenient to argue that the Dollemard project resulted
from the municipality's desire to pack Rufenacht's constituency with HLMs,
and that the Right deliberately used both the State apparatus and the local residents' association to block it. The reality was more complex. The scheme presented electoral advantages for the municipality and the Left, but it
also responded to a real housing need. It was an unimaginative response - building on Le Havre's last hole: but it was also a response prompted by the incapacity of municipal finances to face city land values.
Similarly, there is little sign that the State authorities deliberately stonewalled the Dollemard scheme to save Rufenacht. As it did for any major project, the municipality prepared its ground carefully by consulting the DDE on the dossier long before any formal submission to the Prefecture, and the DDE was generally cooperative, though without arranging for prefectoral assent in advance. The difficulties of setting up an economically viable
and environmentally acceptable project, noted by ORGECO at the outset, were bound to make the elaboration process a long one. The most that can be said of the DDE's tactics is that it used these difficulties to create successive delays, leading to a war of attrition with the DDE presenting one well-

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founded objection after another against a very persistent municipality.
But other factors - the Galley Act and the slow progress of Mont-Gaillard - also led to delay, and Colliard has explicitly refused to blame the DDE for

(34) political motivations . The environmental objections to Dollemard, as

an unattractive site for a ZAC, were shared by individuals within the AURH, the SARH and the SUVH: they constitute a more plausible explanation for the Prefect's and the DDK's continued reservations after the 1981 elections than the revanchism of an unreconstructed civil service.
Even the Association de Defense, for all its links with the Right,
does not seem to have had an exclusively electoral motivation. Given the present tendency of Dollemard residents to vote similarly to Le Havre as a whole, there is little sign that the Association's main demand - continued building of individual houses only - would reinforce the Right in the 6th Constituency. The campaign at the 1982 public inquiry probably owed as much to the Right's wish to associate the municipality with the unfavourable image of grands ensembles generally in viex^ of the 1983 municipal elections; hence also the municipality's readiness to defuse objections by undertaking the revision of the project. We shall consider the relation of grands ensembles to election results in our conclusion to this section.

VII.A.5: Le Havre's Grands Ensembles; Political Will or Electoralist
Drift?

Clearly official PCF priorities have been expressed in Le Havre's
grands ensembles. They all have a high percentage of HLMs, and the munici-pality has been ready to spend heavily to balance the budget while keeping to or expanding the initial programme of social and educational facilities. There are five main qualifications to seeing municipal policy solely

(34) Interview with Colliard, 25 January 1983.

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in this light, however. Firstly, there was a substantial measure of continuity with the Monguillon municipality. The plan-masse for Caucriauville was hardly changed, and the Communist municipality went on using the SARH
and appointed the architect of Caucriauville to work on Mont-Gaillard. Secondly, as Mont-Gaillard shows, the implementation of Communist priorities had a cost that did not only come out of the municipal budget. Auchan's dominant position on the ZAC and the high densities in the blocks around it resulted at least partly from the need to balance the books, and did much
to distort the initial plans for Mont-Gaillard. Thirdly, if municipal
control over the building of a ZAC was therefore partial, its control over
the housing market was far more tenuous. The construction of grands ensembles, in the absence of any adequate alternative lower-income housing supply in
the centre, reinforced the 'deportation of workers onto urban peripheries'
that the PCF's urban sociologists denounced as a typical feature of State Monopoly Capitalism. The contrast with right-wing municipalities like Roueri that have removed workers beyond their (narrow) communal limits is more apparent than real: building the grands ensembles outside Le Havre's very large communal territory would have been electoral folly for the municipality as well as bad planning.
Fourthly, 'priorite aux plus defavorises' has not been a consistent mark
of municipal planning policy. Like Monguillon, the Communists bought land for the Mare-Rouge site: but they certainly failed to spend heavily enough
to prevent the estate from becoming a miserable slum within a decade. The current HVS project resulted more from the municipality's timely grasp at
the new State subsidies than from any long-term commitment to improve Mare-Rouge, if necessary at the expense of other projects.
Fifthly, the Communists' pre-1981 paradigm for relations between their municipalities, the central government and the electorate - local e^us mobilising the population against the State - did not apply to Le Havre's

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grands ensembles any more than it did to its planning documents. If the DDE and the prefecture did the municipality no special favours, planning was still carried on very much with the State rather than against it. Conversely, while 'information' of the population did take place through the municipal bulletin, 'consultation 1 was rare - in the case of the Mare-Rouge rehabilitation it merely conformed to legal prescriptions. 'Action' was confined to campaigns to oblige the State to release subsidies for specific facilities, especially schools.- There are obvious practical reasons for
this. Planning - as opposed to demands for specific facilities - does not readily fit into the Communists' paradigm. It is easier to mobilise people against a project - as in the case of the Dollemard ZAC - than to consult
or to mobilise the 'residents' of a grand ensemble that has not yet been built. And in completed developments, discontent is, on the face of it, more likely to be directed against the municipality, as the elected body most immediately responsible for planning, than against the central government. Despite the municipality's failure to involve the population in the construction phase and the often mediocre results of Le Havre's grands ensembles, discontent among residents, though present, still does not seem to have done the municipality electoral damage. Three partial explanations may be given. Firstly, people do not vote simply on the basis of their
built environment. Secondly, the willingness of small minorities in the grands ensembles to articulate grievances, and of larger numbers to express them through questionnaires or by moving out as soon as possible, may coexist with a relative satisfaction - a belief that the municipality has done as
well as could be expected - among the majority. Thirdly, HLMs are classically seen by the Right as breeding-grounds of Communism, as being both conducive to social dissatisfaction and easy for the Party organisation to penetrate. Clearly the municipality did not build the grands ensembles in order to encourage the kind of dissatisfaction that turns people to Communism: it

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cannot be said too often that grands ensembles were the 'solution' to the housing shortage that both national legislation and the housing market pointed to. Something like Caucriauville and Mont-Gaillard would probably have been built by any municipality of Le Havre. What is important is the use to
which the Communists were able to put them. Without creating an ideal environment, they were able to present themselves as 'social' but responsible (capable of negotiating a programme with a generous supply of social
facilities with the State) while at the same time pointing out to residents that negative elements - such as delays in the programme - were the fault
of the State. In other words, the Communists were playing the twin roles
of Party of government and tribune Party. If this involved direct 'mobilisation' of residents only rarely, it was nonetheless effective electorally - and that, so far as the Communists' position in the Town Hall was concerned, was what mattered.

VII.B: Le Havre's Old Town and its Future

Studies of Le Havre's older quarters tend to be long on descriptions
of the problem of decay (cf. VI, pp.313-314) but short on possible solutions. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, the market for the most economically viable solution - redevelopment involving luxury housing, shops or offices - is uncertain and in any case the municipality has always been against the wholesale deportation of the present, often poor, population. Secondly, any 'social' operation is bound to face the problem of the gap between land costs and HIM price ceilings. In 1982, when the municipality was expecting to buy land for the Dollemard ZAC at 35 francs a square metre, land prices for empty sites were between 100 and 250 francs in the southern quarters, 400 in the Cours de la Rdpublique area,

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(35) and from 550 to 700 close to the reconstructed centre . Values for built-up sites (the vast majority) will vary enormously according to what
is built on them but will always be higher. Thirdly, inner-city redevelop-ment operations generally require a long and expensive phase of studies on
the existing tissue, aimed partly at assessing land values, plus a second long and expensive phase of expropriations, when initial land value assess^ ments are often far overrun. All three considerations have militated against the AURH or any other body suggesting realistic and comprehensive solutions for the problems of Le Havre's old town. All three have, of course, prompted the municipality's recourse to the easier option of building on the periphery. All three, finally, will be found in the following case studies on the redevelopment and rehabilitation work that has taken place in Le Havre.

VII.B.1: The Limits of 'Social' Redevelopment
As soon as the Renovation Urbaine (RU: cf. Ch. VI, p. 299) subsidies
were announced in 1958, the City Planning Committee drew up a list of urban sites suitable for redevelopment. The first two of these were Rue de la Ligne and Boudaloue-Massillon. Of the other operations considered in this section, Fonderies Havraises followed almost by accident, RcntS Coty has a 'social' element but is also an attempt to make Le Havre's centre more attractive, and the Niemeyer Cultural Centre is included as an alternative destination of major municipal planning investments.

VII.B.1(a): Rue de la Ligne

The Rue de la Ligne site covers some five hectares and lies east

(35) Figures furnished for unbuilt sites by the Service des Affaires Immobilieres, VDH, 1982. It is impossible to say whether they are typical, since the day-to-day monitoring of land sales had only just started in 1982.

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of the centre, between Rue de Rivoli, Rue Armand Barbds, Boulevard de Graville and Avenue Jean Jaure"s (Map 1: Rue de la Ligne gave its name to the project but disappeared as a result of it). The City Planning Committee included it on its 1958 list; under Monguillon the SAHLM de la Basse-Seine offered to undertake the project and the preliminary studies were completed. Work began in December 1964 and the last new flats were occupied in 1973. The operation's social objectives were very largely achieved. In 1958
the site was occupied by 20 small businesses and 111 homes, of which 82 were rented. By 1973 the number of businesses had fallen to 8, but there were 540 flats, of which 388 were HLMs for rent, 54 HLMs for sale, and the other 98 in the subsidised sector for sale. Ten former owner-occupiers and 64 former tenants were rehoused on the site; only three families had to be temporarily rehoused during building work. The westward extension of Avenue Jean Jaures improved access to the city centre from the east.
The low density of the buildings occupying the site in 1958, and their generally poor condition, ensured relatively modest land costs (under 250 F per square metre) and thus contributed to the operation's success. Even so, the overall cost was nearly 90 per cent higher than the estimate given in 1964, while retail prices rose by only 53 per cent between 1964 and 1973. Land costs for under five hectares on the Rue de la Ligne site represented 42.5 per cent of those for the whole 173 hectares of Mont-Gaillard, and thus accounted for two-thirds of total costs, against 13 per cent for Mont-Gaillard. Receipts from the Basse-Seine's purchase of land for building covered just 44.5 per cent of total expenditure (Table VII.7). Another
11.5 per cent came from the municipality's purchase of land for the Avenue Jean Jaures extension. The rest came from subsidies, and chiefly from three RU subsidies, amounting to 6.37 MF, paid by the State between 1965 and 1973. The municipality thus had barely 400,000 F to pay in subsidies.

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The reasons for the State's largesse are unclear, especially as the

1968 payment was described as a 'complementary and final subsidy 1. Possibly

the government, having decided to phase out subsidies for new RU schemes,

wished to bring current ones to a rapid conclusion as the 1973 elections

approached. What is clear is that Rue de la Ligne's success, and the modest

burden it placed on the municipality, were due not only to the site's low

initial density but also to the very high level of State subsidy, amounting

to over 40 per cent of the operational budget. Such favourable conditions

(36^ have, of course, been rare in inner-city redevelopment operations .

VII.B.1(b): Bourdaloue-Massillon

The Bourdaloue-Massillon site, covering one hectare between Rue

Bourdaloue, Rue Massillon, Rue Desmallieres and Boulevard de Gravillc, was

also on the 1958 list, and was conceded to the OPHLMVDH in 1961. The DDE

initially recommended the OPHLM to extend the operational perimeter to cover

the block between Rue Massillon and Rue Demidoff in order to have a better

chance of RU subsidies. In 1968, however, the sub-prefect told Cance that no

RU subsidies for new projects would be forthcoming during the Vth Plan (i.e.

before 1970), and in 1975 the DDE confirmed that Bouidaloue-Massillon was

classified as an 'HLM project' and not a real 'development programme' and

(36) SAHLM de la Basse-Seine, Rue de la Ligne,, Bilan Previsionnel, 29 April 1964, in SUVH, Rue de la Ligne, Dossier General. A condition of the
State subsidising the operation was that the Basse-Seine split into
two companies, one to play a role similar to that of the SARH in Mont-Gaillard (land acquisition and preparation for building) and the other
to build homes. The balance-sheet on Table VII.7 concerns only the acquisition and preparation phases: receipts from sales of land to developers thus represent a transfer from the first company to the second. Actual construction costs are, of course, outside municipal control: the municipality can only affect the site chosen and its cost to the developer. Cf. SUVH, Rue de la Ligne, Dossier Ggndral: DDE to Basse-Seine director, 15 October 1965.

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(37) would not be eligible for RU subsidies .

That meant that the municipality had to cover the whole of the gap
between real land costs and HLM price ceilings alone, and had to choose between working on the initial one-hectare perimeter or on the enlarged one. Land costs were bound to be higher than on the Rue de la Ligne site because of a higher initial building density; the expropriation of the southern block, which included the premises of the Lepage Transport Company (valued at 6 MF by the OPHLM in 1970), would push them up still further. Balancing the budget with a very high-density programme was not a real option: the site
is on the 'periphery of the centre', and while the POS was not yet approved in 1973, allowing a COS of, say, 3 here would go against the SDAU's orientation of reinforcing the 'centre of the centre'.
The municipality was consistently in favour of limiting its liabilities.
In 1970 Duromea told the sub-prefect that the municipality would not subsidise the larger perimeter without equivalent contributions from the State; in 1973 Colliard agreed with DDE representatives that the cost of the Lepage land
(-]Q\
was 'unrealistic for an HLM operation' without big State subsidies . The smaller perimeter was thus chosen, with a programme of 80 HLMO units, 76
ILMs, and 60 small flats for old people, plus a nursery school, an old people's community centre and a youth club. The land cost was estimated at 418 F the square metre. A deficit of nearly 1 MF, or some 4,600 F per home, was covered by the municipality, aside from the 800,000 F it paid for land
for municipal buildings.
A comparison between Rue de la Ligne and Bourdaloue-Massillon shows the

(37) SUVH, Bourdaloue-Massillon, Dossier Ge'ne'ral: Note sur 1'Ilot Bourdaloue-Massillon-Demidoff, 6 Feb. 1973: Chef de la Division Urbanisme Operation-
nel et Construction, DDE Seine-Maritime, to Duromea, 20 Aug. 1975.
(38) SUVH, Bourdaloue-Massillon, Dossier General: Duromea to OPHLMVDH director, 17 Sept. 1970: Reunion a la Sous-Pre'fecture du Havre, 14 June
1973.

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enormous difference that the apparently capricious allocation of State subsidies could make to the prospects for 'social' redevelopment on two adjacent sites. Bourdaloue-Massillon also shows something about municipal priorities. The municipal subsidy of 4,600 F per home was broadly comparable to municipal contributions to the Mont-Gaillard infrastructure budget on 1976 estimates (20 MF for 4,500 homes). Building on the larger perimeter
in Bourdaloue-Massillon would, on 1973 estimates, have given a deficit of about 4 MF for 350 homes, or 11,500 F per home. Another municipality might have calculated that this very high short-term cost would be offset by long-term gains, in the lesser requirements for new social and transport facilities of city-centre residents as against peripheral ones. This policy, to be systematic, would have involved renouncing major peripheral developments to reinforce the population of the centre, opening the municipality to high but unpredictable surges of expenditure for land purchase with little assurance of State subsidies. Neither Colliard nor his colleagues were likely to take that kind of risk, and the immediate result, in Bourdaloue-

(39) Massillon, was the sacrifice of nearly 150 HLMs close to the city centre

VII.B.1(c): Fonderies Havraises
When the Fonderies Havraises plant closed in 1968 the SAHLM de la Basse-Seine bought the site, covering 6,817 square metres, at 154 francs per square metre, or just over a million francs all told. The Basse-Seine then approached the municipality with a proposal to redevelop the whole of the block between Rue Demidoff, Rue Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rue Hilaire Colombel, and Rue Labedoyere, representing 17,400 square metres including the Fonderies site. The cheap purchase of this site; the low density and run-down quality

(39) SUVH, Bourdaloue-Massillon, Dossier General: Reunion, 14 June 1973: Bilan PreVisionnel, 16 Sept. 1972.

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of other buildings (principally forty homes) in the block; the small number of landlords (there were eleven); the favourable reception given by tenants to a project of redevelopment with rehousing; and the fact that the Basse-Seine had already undertaken a private redevelopment on the other side of Rue Hilaire Colombel; were all used by the Basse-Seine to argue that this would be a 'renovation sans probleme', even without State subsidies .
It was not. The prefect granted the Declaration d'Utilite Publique to expropriate the rest of the site only in 1973. Meanwhile, costs rose - from the 1972 estimate of 7.8 MF for 348 homes to 12.6 MF in 1973 (with some sites running as high as 900 F the square metre), to 16.5 MF in September 1975.
To recoup these sums, the Basse-Seine increased the number of homes in the programme from 348 to 386 and cut the number of HLM units in favour of the subsidised sector for sale ~ giving a programme, in 1975, of 54 small rented flats for old people (RPA), 16 HLMs - and 316 PSI units. Because PSI units were allowed a land charge nearly twice as high as that for HLMs, they were an obvious way to balance the budget. Even so, the Basse-Seine still expected the municipality to pay 1.83 MF, or 4,750 F per*home, in subsidies; to reimburse the PLD tax; to cede part of Rue Hilaire Colombel free for operational use, but to pay for the land it needed to widen Rue Demidoff; to finance water, drainage and street-lighting connections; and to provide any social and educational facilities that might be necessary outside the operational perimeter, at public expense.
Municipal technicians, including Beyazian, had already criticised this
draft agreement, pointing out that for an operation with under 20 per cent of HLMs (including the RPA units) the subsidy was 'exorbitant'. Colliard thus presented it rather defensively to the Planning Committee in April 1976,

(40) SUVH, Les Fonderies Havraises, Dossier Ge'ne'ral: Dossier Pre"sent£ par la SAHLM a la Ville, 1969, 20.

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arguing that 'the restructuring of the centre is necessary, hence the municipality's contribution', and that 4,750 F per home compared favourably with over 8,000 F per home in Bourdaloue-Massillon (a misleading comparison, since this figure for the Bourdaloue-Massillon subsidy includes the cost of land for municipal buildings). On the project's 'social' character, he claimed
'la Basse-Seine recrute essentiellement sa clientele dans les couches moyennes et il ne faut pas ndgliger cette catdgorie de petits cadres dont la presence est ndcessaire a la vie du quartier. En fin de compte, 1'operation se pre"sente comme un compromis peu facile
mais indispensable'(^1'.

If Colliard's motives may have been partly electoral - showing the munici-pality's responsible concern for middle-income housing close to the centre a year from the 1977 municipal elections - it is also just as likely that, having agreed in principle to a subsidy in 1969, he simply accepted the Basse-Seine's assessment of the programme that unexpectedly high costs dictated. For once, however, Colliard's views failed to get the Committee's unanimous support. Three councillors (two PCF and one RS) opposed such subsidies for such an 'unsocial' programme, and persauded Colliard to ask the Basse-Seine for a revised programme x^ith more HLMs. This appeared, offering a total of 55 HLMs, in time for the Committee's June meeting, where the project was again rejected. Ultimately the Basse-Seine moved towards the more expensive end of the subsidised market for sale, but also included more RPA units: these did receive a municipal subsidy, and part of Rue

(42) Hilaire Colombel was ceded free
The Fonderies Havraises episode confirms the financial unpredictability

(41) VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 22 April 1976.
(42) VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 22 April 1976: interview with Colliard, 25 January 1983.

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of redevelopment operations. Though the Basse-Seine may have deliberately underestimated costs at the beginning to enlist municipal support, the cheapness of the Fonderies site was a major initial advantage for the project, Even so cost estimates rapidly reached the point where no great number of HLMs could be built without massive subsidies, which the municipality was reluctant to give. As in Bourdaloue-Massillon, Colliard was not prepared to go beyond a comparable level of subsidy to that of Mont-Gaillard - even if
it meant an 'unsocial' operation. And it took a rare expression of open opposition in Committee to persuade him that subsidies for middle-class housing the city centre were not acceptable as Communist municipal policy.

VII.B.Kd); The Rene" Coty Project

In April 1970 the City Planning Committee earmarked the blocks
between Avenue Rene" Coty, Rue Anatole France, Rue Marechal Callidni and Rue Casimir Pe"rier, plus a block to the west of Place Thiers, for a 'modern office and business complex'. The site was covered by a municipal ZAD in July 1972, and the project was named in the SDAU as one of four 'key actions' designed to reinvigorate Le Havre's centre (cf. Ch.V, p.262).
The delicacy and complexity of producing a viable scheme were clear
from the start. In the first place, the site's location (alone among re-development projects, it is at the 'centre of the centre'); the high density of buildings (an average COS of 1.7); and the fairly good condition of many of them, meant very high land prices. Figures around 2,000 F per square metre for purchase and demolition were quoted even in 1970: in this context the ZAD could merely stop high prices from becoming astronomical. This was not only much too high for any significant number of low-cost housing units, without vast subsidies: it was also too high for many private housing and commercial developments as well. Any programme that was not to be an expensive flop therefore needed to be sufficiently attractive for the private

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sector - and above all to the retail distributors who were expected to be the project's 'motor' - to be able to command the high selling prices necessary to recoup the initial outlay. At the same time two of the city's major distributors, Printemps and Monoprix, already had premises on the site, and would clearly need to be consulted if they were not to be driven out. Finally, the site occupants also included a number of low-income tenants who could only be rehoused on the spot at some expense, but who would represent a political liability if they were simply turned out.
The simplest solution to the problem was suggested by Larry Smith
Consulting, the firm hired by the municipality in 1973 to make a detailed assessment of the commercial viability of the scheme. Larry Smith proposed a programme including a hypermarket occupying up to 15,000 square metres, on the ground that hypermarket chains could pay up to 1,500 F per square metre of floor space - twice as much as department stores. This suggestion, which would have involved the removal of all the site's present occupants except Printemps and Monoprix and the construction of another Auchan in the city centre, would probably have received the support of the Chamber of Commerce. Colliard, however, rejected it as 'a brutal strategy that goes far beyond
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the present capacity of Le Havre's retail market' . This was probably right. Larry Smith's work was based on the SDAU's growth projections; their non-fulfilment meant that a hypermarket would certainly have driven smaller traders in the centre out of business, and might not have been able to survive even then. Probably, Colliard's choice also had political reasons:
a project that removed a hundred or so families to the periphery and threatened small retailers would have been an electoral gift to the Right, But the rejection of Larry Smith's findings also meant that any possible

(43) SUVH, Rene" Coty, Dossier General: Reunions Techniques, 6 et 26 novembre 1974. VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 17 March 1975^

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project for the Rene* Coty site would have to rely heavily on subsidies.
The attempts of the SARH and the SUVH to produce a viable project were
slow, achieving only a 'Provisional Plan for the Preliminary Study Dossier' by early 1978; serious negotiations with the DDE and the Fonds d'Amenagement Urbain (a coordinating body designed to channel investments from several different ministries into, urban renewal projects) began in 1980 and led to the presentation of a ZAC dossier in 1982. There is no sign that the DDE was obstructive or that the project was politically controversial. But the delay was certainly increased by changing rules for State subsidies. The run-down of RU subsidies in the 1970s was followed, according to Colliard,
by ministerial directives giving incentives for large-scale operations that only the 'monopolies' could afford to buy into. In 1977, however, two circulars promised FAU subsidies for low-cost housing in urban renewal operations, but required a 'softer', more step-by-step operational approach. These changes demanded corresponding changes in the programme, and meant that the 1982 ZAC dossier applied only to a small operational perimeter of 1.3 hectares. Yet the delay was also due to the municipality's own hesitations. As he rejected the Larry Smith scheme in 1974, Colliard told Beyazian 'plus je re'fle'chis a ce dossier plus je suis reserve', which hardly indicated a clear alternative. Six months later the municipality and the SARH agreed not to declare their expropriation plans till after the 1977 elections. Delay, moreover, cost money: 6 MF allocated by the Etablissement Public de la Basse-Seine (EPBS: cf. Ch.V, p.251) for the project during the Vlth Plan was left unspent, and any further contribution from the EPBS will have to be

(44) renegotiated .

(44) VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 14 Oct. 1977. SUVH, Rene" Coty, Dossier General: Reunions Techniques, Reunion VDH-SARH, 9 June 1975: Deliber-ations Commissions d'Urbanisme, Colliard to Beyazian, 23 Dec. 1974.

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The provisional budget established for the operational perimeter in
1980 costed land purchase and demolition at 3,100 francs per square metre. Colliard had consistently wanted some homes on the site, to rehouse tenants and to avoid emptying the quarter at night. The programme thus included 65 PLA (new-style HLM) units. Even at a high density (with a COS of 2.5) the gap between PLA land price ceilings and Rene" Coty's land values required a municipal subsidy of nearly 5 MF, or about 75,500 F per home. A further 62 units in the subsidised sector for sale (30 PAP and 32 PC) needed a further subsidy of 3.87 MF. On top of that, the municipality incorporated its own facilities - a small post office, a mini-creche, meeting rooms and public lavatories - into the programme. The budget, which ran to a total of some 75 MF, thus counted on 27.7 MF in subsidies from the SIVOM of Le Havre (possibly with help from the EPBS, the region and the departement) and 11 MF from the FAU - leaving housing and commercial developers to contribute the other 36 MF.

In effect, then, Colliard's social priorities for the Rene Coty project required a 50 per cent public subsidy for a programme composed chiefly of commercial and office developments. The very high subsidies for the PLA units show that, here at least, the municipality was prepared to spend heavily to get reasonably-priced housing built in the city centre. But the recent cutbacks in FAU subsidies that followed the election of the Mitterrand administration have put their allocation to the Rene Coty project seriously in doubt. Moreover, retail distributors who were interested in the project in the mid-1970s have made other plans, while the new Niemeyer centre has reinforced the Place Gambetta area as an alternative centre of attraction
for shoppers. It may well be that the alternative to Larry Smith's 'bull-dozer redevelopment' of Rene Coty turns out to be no redevelopment at all.

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VII.B.I(e): The Niemeyer Cultural Centre

An examination of operational planning in Le Havre's lower town
requires a brief mention of the most costly municipal project to have been achieved there, the Niemeyer Cultural Centre. This differs from the re-development schemes described above in several respects. It is a municipal building surrounded by a handful of shops, not a housing operation. And, rather than being a redevelopment of a site in Le Havre's old town, it represents the final step in Le Havre's post-war reconstruction - the replace-ment of the old theatre on the (municipally-owned) Place Gambetta site, which had been destroyed in 1944.
As well as being a reconstruction project, aided by war damages, the
Niemeyer Centre gave a definitive home to France's first Maison de la Culture, inaugurated by Andre* Malraux on temporary premises in the Town Hall buildings in 1961. It was also an attempt by the municipality to establish its own visual trademark. This it did by hiring Oscar Niemeyer, the architect of Brasilia and of the PCF's Paris headquarters, to design the new buildings - and by getting 11,000 signatures on a petition in 1977 to release the necessary subsidy. Construction work took place between 1979 and 1982 under the supervision of the SARH. The completed complex includes a main theatre, a cinema and a multi-purpose hall housed in two 'yoghurt pots' (whose curved lines provide a foil for Perret's rectilinear architecture), plus a surrounding sunken shopping arcade. The Maison de la Culture's programme has so far tended to attract a middle-class audience (cf. Ch.III, p.160). Construction costs (leaving aside the very considerable running expenses) were high, running to some 140 MF, of which the municipality contributed about 86 MF (there was also a subsidy of 10 MF from the Ministry of Culture, 12 MF in war damages, 5 MF from the departement, and 27 MF in payments for the centre's shops and car park). The importance of the Niemeyer complex in

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the context of the future of Le Havre's centre lies in the fact that the

municipality was prepared to commit very large sums to a prestige project

that carried few social risks (no-one was evicted from Place Gambetta, and

no speculative pressures were released on the surrounding area, which was

already solidly middle-class) and from which the middle classes, whose support

is necessary to the municipality's cultivation of an impartial image, have

so far benefited the most. The failure of the municipality to spend equally

heavily to face the knottier problem of getting low-cost housing built in

the city centre should be seen in this light.

VII.B.1(f): Social Redevelopment; Conclusion

Two main priorities may govern the choices of a municipality faced

with a decaying city centre. One is to improve the built environment regard-

less of the social consequences, making redevelopment sites available to the bidders

highest private-sector/and assuming the rehousing of lower-income residents

elsewhere. It is a reflection of the political colour of the municipality

of Le Havre that it largely rejected this: even in the Ren£ Coty project,

the main aim of which was meant to be to make Le Havre's centre more

attractive, the most economically viable solution was not adopted and provision

was made for low-cost housing on the site. The second priority is to see

the main purpose of publicly-sponsored redevelopment as the provision of

decent housing both for those lower-income families who already live in the

centre in poor conditions and for those who would like to live there but who

market forces prevent from doing so. The main obstacle to such a policy,

in the French context, is the gap between real land prices and the HLM

ceilings. This gap will be smaller where site values are relatively modest

and where buildings are of low density and in poor repair. In Le Havre,

these conditions are best fulfilled on the 'periphery of the centre', which

is why the three completed redevelopment operations we have considered are all

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east of Cours de la Re'publique. Even here, however, the gap will still exist, and may be higher than initially expected, requiring heavy subsidies. The State provided such subsidies only for Rue de la Ligne, which turned out to be the most successful of the three schemes. The municipality's commitment to the 'social 1 redevelopment policy in Bourdaloue-Massillon and Fonderies Havraises was too weak to have more than a limited impact on these two operations. In part the reasons were financial: it would be wholly impossible for the municipality to subsidise HLM redevelopments throughout Le Havre's
old centre. They also resulted from municipal choices, as the large sums spent on the Niemeyer complex make clear. The same tendencies reappear in the handling of the second possible technical approach to the problems of a decaying centre, rehabilitation.

VII.E.2; Rehabilitation and Municipal Choice

Lacking an 'old' centre that was in any sense historic, Le Havre's municipalities of the 1960s neither undertook a prestige rehabilitation,
like that undertaken in Rouen under the Malraux Act provisions, nor groped their way towards a social concept of rehabilitation (including the rehousing of existing poor residents) as the municipality of Bologna attempted to do. The municipal council's discussions on the Wiener Plan (cf. Ch.V, p.281) included no references to rehabilitation: there were none in the SDAU's Presentation Report passed by the CLAU in May 1973, though a few lines were added before its final approval by the prefect a year later.
For the municipality, then, publicly-sponsored rehabilitation was simply
not an option before the 1973 legislation (cf. Ch.VI, p.300). Great hopes were placed in the new provisions at national level: the Vllth Plan (for 1975-80) announced an annual target of 250,000 home improvements, 100,000

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of them '£ caractere social' . Even from a purely technical point of view this was bound to be difficult, since it involved turning both part of the building industry and administrative organisations like the OPHLMs and the SEMs away from the industrialised building they had been trying to perfect for a generation towards a far more delicate type of work. More-over, since ANAH subsidies were insufficient for landlords to improve with-out big rent increases, the financial sticking-point of a 'social' re-habilitation project was bound to be the same as for 'social' redevelopment projects - the ability of HLM organisations to afford the land. It was no :ious

attitude to rehabilitation. In L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui he claimed that the 1973

projects - the ability of HLM organisations to afford the land. It was : doubt this type of consideration that shaped Colliard's somewhat suspici*

provisions burdened HLM offices with a whole new sector of activity, obliging them to spread their finances even thinner, while at the same time creating new opportunities for monopoly profits through the improvement of prestigious inner-city areas. Such a prestige operation, Colliard considered (with reason) had been carried out in Rouen by the local Association de Restauration Immobiliere (ARIM). The ARIM, he told a meeting at the OPHLM, had acted as a 'landlords' club', leading to very big rent increases in improved buildings and the removal of poorer residents else-where: Colliard was determined that this pattern should not be repeated in
Le Havre (46).
This attitude did not prevent the elaboration of a municipal rehabili-
tation policy, though it did affect its nature quite strongly. Of course,

(45) Ministere de 1'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie, Tendances et Politiques Actuelles dan le Domaine de 1'Habitation, de la Construction et de la Planification (Paris, Documentation Francaise, 1978), 8.
(46) Daniel Colliard, 'Difficultes et Risques de la Rehabilitation', L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, 12, Jan. 1979, 43.

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direct municipal rehabilitation is no more possible than direct municipal building. What a municipality can do, however, is to select sites for coordinated projects (OPAHs or OGAHs - cf. Ch.VI, p.300) and, with the help of the FAU, carry out studies and improvements to exterior spaces. It was
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with this in mind that the municipality commissioned the SERH's study of Le Havre's older housing stock based on 1968 census returns (cf. Ch.VI, pp.312-313). Having pointed out the size of the problem, the SERH argued that in the short term, given limited resources, the municipality had to choose between concentrating on the centre or on the south. The central option would accelerate the south's depopulation and decay, while the southern option would either reinforce the centre's decline or (in the case of a property boom) make it vulnerable to speculative forces. Neither alternative, then, was free of liabilities . The final volume of the SERH study recorded the municipal choice to operate in the south first. Since this volume appeared before the City Planning Committee discussed the matter, it is fair to assume that the decision was Colliard's. His reasons were probably threefold.
Firstly, if the south's problem was numerically less great than the centre's, it still contained plenty of structurally sound and potentially attractive, but insanitary and run-down, nineteenth-century buildings. Discomfort indices (Table C.7, p.414) in 1968 were universally high. In the Gustave-Brindeau quarter, 80 per cent of homes had no shower or bath, 63 per cent no indoor lavatory, and 94 per cent no central heating. At the same time the high proportion of empty homes (coexisting with very high densities in those flats that were occupied) and the low proportion of owner-occupiers lessened some of the administrative constraints on a public rehabilitation

(47) SERH, Elements pour 1'Elaboration d'une Politique de 1'Habitat Ancien dans la Region du Havre, Vol.37~0ct. 1973, 6-9.

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project.

Secondly, the south's position insulated it from heavy speculative pressures. Its distance from the city centre, reinforced by the barriers of the Boulevard Winston Churchill and the railway, as well as the close juxta-position of housing and industry, mean that the south is unlikely under any forseeable circumstances to become a favoured middle-class residential area. The same is less true of the Cours de la RSpublique area, and much less so
of Saint-Vincent, which with its location a hundred yards from the beach and ten minutes 1 walk from the Town Hall is Le Havre's most potentially chic run-down quarter. The danger that public improvements to a given neighbourhood might trigger speculative pressures, leading to a rise in land values and rents nearby, thus vitiating the project's social aims, was therefore more remote

in the south than elsewhere.

Thirdly, the southern quarters constituted an electoral bastion for the
PCF in Le Havre, but one that was declining and ageing and thus in severe
need of reinforcement (cf. Ch.III, pp.145-146: Ch.V, pp.285-286). Colliard's decision was certainly not motivated exclusively by a 'defensive 1 electoral strategy, but such considerations did at least coincide happily with the

other factors.

Within the south, the City Planning Committee decided, in 1974, to give priority to the Brindeau quarter. This choice may have resulted from the particularly bad conditions in Brindeau - as well as from a recent influx of immigrants which, in the view of one AURH study, threatened to 'crystallise the forces of opposition to the municipality' . Work on Brindeau's 550
or so homes was conceived as part of a larger project including the subsequent

(48) AURH, Le Suivi Social d'une Operation de Rdhabilitation Mene*e par un Office Public d''HLM: le Gas du Havre: Vol.3, Rapport de Synthese, Jan.
1977, 38-39.

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rehabilitation of the St-Nicolas quarter further to the south. It was hoped that the vacation of neighbouring industrial sites (notably Le Nickel's factory in Rue de Lodi), plus the transfer of the municipality's bus station to Mont-Gaillard, would release land for HLM developments, tying Brindeau and St-Nicolas together into a single zone of housing and light industry. Preliminary studies were carried out by the AURH, and the work itself
done by the OPHLM under a municipal architect, Yves Cressent. Progress was slow, and work did not start till 1978. By mid-1981 259 units had been rebuilt, giving 207 new flats: of these, 131 had been bought by the OPHLM and 128 had been improved by their landlords; 14 flats had been demolished, and 146 were undergoing work or preliminary studies. Operations in St-Nicolas were about to commence. If this \-7as a big improvement to the Brindeau quarter, it was a relatively modest achievement for seven years of municipal rehabilitation policy, indicating that rehabilitation was no more rapid a solution to the problems of Le Havre's older housing stock than redevelopment. The slowness of the operation cost money: only 54 per cent of the ANAH credits allocated to it were spent in 1979, and 78 per <v>nt in 1980. This resulted in part from municipal policy. Colliard insisted on a full measure of consultation with local residents, involving public meetings at the out-set as well as a regularly staffed office on site before and during building work. Consultation inevitably took time, although according to Cressent it also contributed enormously to the operation's success. In addition, the municipality was concerned not to start work before being certain that enough money was available to mount an operation that would entail no major rent increases, while at the same time being unwilling to provide a heavy subsidy itself. These financial conditions did not exist in the mid-1970s: the poverty of many Brindeau tenants meant that the rent increases resulting from improvements, even when compensated by the Allocation-Logement, would be too

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great for them to pay. Almost certainly, what allowed the Brindeau project to go ahead was the institution of a more generous rent rebate in the form of APL (cf. Ch.VI, p.307). This has permitted the rehousing on site of the vast majority of Brindeau tenants at similar or even lower rents to those paid before improvements: the main exceptions were single immigrants, many of whom had no legal contract of tenure (and none of whom had votes) . Overall, then, the Brindeau operation appears to have been a time-
consuming success. By 1983, progress on the St-Nicolas quarter, the start of two or three HLM developments close to Brindeau, and the declaration of
a ZAC on the former Le Nickel site, made the POS's aims for the area appear practicable - though only in the longer term. Hox^ever, as the SERH study anticipated, rehabilitation in the south has been achieved at the expense
of Le Havre's centre. Here, just nine homes had been improved in a publicly-sponsored operation in the Lemaistre block by the end of 1931; work on the Danton quarter, close to the prison, was still at the stage of uncertain preliminary studies; while improvements by private landlords had reached
the significant, but still ultimately inadequate, proportions shown in
Table C.16 (p.422). On the whole, the continuing decay of the old centre
is more striking than these isolated improvements.

VII.B.3: The Decay of Le Havre's Centre

The centre's decay has resulted in part from the non-fulfilment of the
SDAU, and in particular of its tertiary aims for Le Havre. Small industries, which were expected to leave the centre for an expanding port-industrial

(49) AURH, Donnees Statistiques sur le Marche de 1'Habitat dans la Region du Havre, 7 (June 1980), 78: 9 (June 1981), 85: 10 (Nov. 1981) "93^94".
AURH, Rehabilitation du Quartier Brindeau, Opdration Programmee; Etude D£tailTere"~sur un Ilot, Sept. 1979, 58. Interview with Yves CresTe~nT7~
14 Aug. 198CL

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zone, have seen little incentive to incur the expense involved in moving.
Le Havre's economy is still dominated by companies with headquarters in Paris, and the only major new office developments have been publicly-sponsored (the DDE and Social Security offices on Boulevard de Strasbourg, and the World Trade Centre). The middle-class clientele for possible private-sector operations in the city centre also grew slowly, and the competition from developments in other locations - the C6te, the smarter village operations, or Residence de France - was considerable. In addition, the State's failure to find money for the Jenner-Marceau project (cf. Ch.V, p.287) or for Le Havre's long-expected University (which was expected to be housed in buildings on either side of Cours de la Republique), has condemned large parts of the Cours de la Republique area to planning blight as administrative decisions affecting them were awaited. The same is true of St-Vincent, which lay under the shadow of a possible viaduct for the north-west entry road for over a decade.
The municipality was hardly at all responsible for the non-fulfilment
of the SDAU's main projections, and only slightly more so for the planning blight. None of these factors, of course, prevented a 'social' rehabilitation or redevelopment of the centre: rather, in the absence of such a public initiative, they helped to make the difference between a more or less speculative restructuring of the centre led by the private sector and the decay that in fact took place. Yet the municipality's ambivalence towards
the private sector also shaped the centre's evolution. When the City Planning Committee met to choose a central zone for a future rehabilitation project in 1979, Colliard told his colleagues that
'L'intervention de la Ville du Havre dans ce domaine ne
peut avoir qu'un caractere exemplaire, incitatif et limits',
en raison de la faiblesse des moyens a sa di

(50) VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 12 Feb. 1979.

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Being 'incitatif' could only mean encouraging the private sector by spending money to improve the image of certain neighbourhoods. Yet a concern not to do this - not to let municipal investments provoke rises in property values and rents, and thus the eviction of lower-income residents - appears to have shaped much of the municipality's approach to rehabilitation and redevelop-ment. It was, as we have seen, one of the factors that led to the decision to start rehabilitation work in the south and not the centre. In addition, neither the very big investments made in the Niemeyer Centre (which is already in a very middle-class area) nor the Rue de la Ligne and Fonderies Havraises projects (which are both on the 'periphery of the centre') carried much risk of triggering speculative pressures. In fact, the only two municipal projects that do face this kind of risk, Daiiton and Ren£ Coty,
are still on the drawing-board. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the municipality has avoided acting on the centre not just because land prices are high but because of the danger of being too 'incitatif and starting a process that might lead to the removal of lower-income tenants. Arguably, a municipality should be able to control such a process with a clear, comprehensive long-term land policy and a very substantial financial commitment. Le Havre has had neither.

VII.C: A Long-Term Land Policy? The Programme d'Actions Foncieres (PAF)

No actor on the land market in Le Havre had anything like a land
reserves policy before 1972. The municipality spent 32.4 MF on land between 1966 and 1972, but all but 3.1 MF of this was for strictly immediate needs. This rate of expenditure was rather below the average for major French cities and the pattern of buying chiefly for immediate needs was shared by the State and by public and private developers. Although the municipality owned about a tenth of Le Havre's territory (most of it in the Forest of Montgeon) little

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of this was available for future projects. In 1972, however, ZADs broke
out throughout the Le Havre area. They covered 710 hectares of Montivilliers (for the future Belle-Etoile ZAC); 136 ha. of Rouelles (for the future park); 142 ha. of Harfleur and Gonfreville (for another ZAC, now abandoned); and within Le Havre itself, 157 ha. for Mont-Gaillard West (for the industrial zone and the Dollemard ZAC) and 4.6 ha. for the Rend Coty site .
In 1973 a committee including members of the EPBS, the DDE, the
Ministere de 1'Equipement in Paris, the SERH, and the SIVOM of Le Havre (including Colliard, Eberhard and Beyazian) met to produce a coordinated medium-term land reserves programme. Two main considerations prompted the meeting. Firstly, the SDAU's urbanisation objectives were bound to put pressure on the land market, especially given the 60-degree perimeter that constitutes Le Havre's hinterland. Secondly, the EPBS, as well as holding the pre-emption rights on the Montivilliers and Rouelles ZADs, had provisionally allocated 23 MF for land purchases of regional interest in the Le Havre area and the State was also prepared to contribute, either with subsidies or through direct and temporary purchase (selling the land back
to the municipality after ten years, thus avoiding an excessive surge of municipal spending). It was clearly necessary to coordinate these investments

with those of the SIVOM.

The Programme d'Actions Foncieres (PAF: cf. Table VII.8, p.380) planned acquisitions totalling 136 MF to 1980, and set out 45.7 MF of this in a detailed plan for 1974-76. Two ZADs (Mont-Gaillard West and Harfleur-Gonfreville), rather optimistically described as 'operational', were mentioned in the PAF but not included in its financial estimates. The main thrust of the 1974-76 programme was clearly to start on those difficult and

(51) SERH, Programme d'Actions Foncieres (PAF), Feb. 1974: Vol.2, Le Programme SIVQM du Havre, 14: Vol.1, Introduction Gdn^rale, 6-11, 48-50.————————————

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expensive inner-city acquisitions that were essential if the SDAU's

objectives for the reinforcement of Le Havre's centre were to be achieved.

These included the land for the Jenner-Marceau link and the north-west entry

road; the Rene* Coty ZAD and the future university sites; and an extension

to a badly-needed green space in Place Massillon, next to the Bourdaloue-

Massillon redevelopment. Between them these projects accounted for 37.4 MF

of the PAF's total of 45.7 MF. Of the rest, the bulk was to be spent on

green spaces, especially the Rouelles park (4.9 MF) and to a much lesser

extent the conversion of the Fort of Ste-Adresse. Aside from the 'operational'

ZADs, only 3 MF was left for the SDAU's 'secondary poles' in Harfleur and

Gonfreville.

The PAF envisaged big contributions both from the State (14.33 MF) and

from the EPBS (13.5 MF), leaving the municipality with the manageable total

of 10.56 MF. While it emphasised that these figures did not represent a

contract, it added that they seemed 'entirely credible' and might be added

(52) to . Colliard appeared well pleased with the idea of the PAF, and with
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the fact that Le Havre, with Angers, was the first city to have one.

'Le domaine', he wrote in 1977, 'est immense. Sans
parler d'une muiiicipalisation des sols a marche force"e,
une presence des collectivity's locales sur le marche"
foncier et leur intervention plus fr£quente et massive
ddcoulent des responsibility qui sont les leurs
auj ourd'hui''53) t

In fact it was already clear by 1977 that public intervention had been

considerably less 'massive' than the PAF had planned. Almost no money was

spent on the Jenner-Marceau link, the Cours de la Re"publique reserves, Place

Massillon, the Gonfreville ZAD, and the Ste-Adresse fort. Of the two items

(52) SERH, PAF, Vol.2, 18.

(53) Daniel Colliard, 'Politique Contractuelle et Action Fonciere 1, L'Information Municipale, Jan. 1977, 13-14.

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that were more than half achieved, (the Harfleur ZAD and the north-west entry road), the north-west entry road purchase had been prompted by an unexpectedly large offer of land that the State had taken up. In contrast spending
to the 'central' perspectives of the PAF, 78 per cent of/on land reserves went to the periphery - 2.34 MF for the Rouelles park and 1.34 MF for the ZAD
in Harfleur south. In terms of space, 55 hectares of Rouelles were purchased, 0.9 ha. of Harfleur - and (expressways aside) less than 1,000

square metres of central Le Havre.

The non-fulfilment of the PAF for 1974-76 was partly due to the State.
It spent an unexpected 4.72 MF on the north-west entry road, 0.38 MF on Jenner-Marceau, and 0.76 MF on Rene Coty: but the other projects it had agreed to contribute to went without funds. The government failed to commit itself to the early creation of a university, and ultimately repudiated the Jenner-Marceau link (cf. Ch.V, p.287) - hardly an encouragement to other participants to spend heavily. The EPBS, on the other hand, found its contribution to Rene Coty frustrated by the slow elaboration of the programme and by the municipality's concern to put off any compulsory purchases till after the 1977 elections; the 5 MF allocated to the Cours de la Re*publique projects were not spent because the two main landlords, SMCF and Gaz de France, wanted more time to transfer their installations: arid so EPBS money could only be used for the Rouelles park.
The municipality was partly responsible for the PAF's failure, and certainly did not show a spectacularly greater respect for its commitments than the other participants. This was partly due to the inactivity of its partners: we have seen in projects like Bburdaloue-Massillon that Colliard is often unwilling to commit large municipal planning investments without the assurance that they will be matched by other participants, especially the State. At the same time, the SIVOM did invest over twice the sums it

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spent on the PAF in the two 'operational' ZADs during the same period. 'Operational', in fact, is something of a misnomer: the Harfleur-Gonfreville project has been shelved since 1977, while the Dollemard ZAC (on the Mont-Gaillard West ZAD) is only just approaching its operational phase in 1983. These purchases were thus no more certain of leading to an early result or of being matched by the State than were the PAF projects.
The difference is thus not between 'operational' projects, where the municipality was ready to spend, and 'medium-term' ones where it was more cautious, but between the city's periphery, where the municipality was prepared to buy land, and the city centre, where it was much more reluctant to do so. This is confirmed by Colliard's answer to a technician who suggested, in the Planning Committee, preliminary anti-speculative measures for the Danton quarter. Colliard 'stressed the financial impossibility of running a ZAD in the city centre' . The financial arguments are not wholly convincing. In Rene Coty, the only city-centre ZAD that has been tried, twenty properties came on the market between 1972 and 1976, and the municipality bought sight of them at a total cost of under a million francs - not a crushing burden for five years. Moreover, there is no judicial alternative to ZADs: refusing to use them means renouncing any public role in the land market concerned - as well as paying unnecessarily high prices when sites are eventually needed.
Political risks, on the other hand, do pertain to city-centre ZADs.
They do explicitly limit the right to sell property at a profit - a politically important limitation in an area like Le Havre's centre that is owned by many small landlords. It is quite possible that the municipality's 'strategy' for the centre up to now, which has largely consisted in allowing

(54) VDH, Commission d'Urbanisme, 12 Feb. 1979.

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it to rot, has been designed to achieve a ZAD's moderating effect on land values without either the financial costs or the political risks. Landlords' rights have not been limited, and low-income tenants have not been evicted as a result of any municipal decision. Land prices have risen only moderately. While this policy has done nothing to prepare the city centre's long-term future, it was undoubtedly the easiest course in the short run. The municipality's reluctance to 'intervene massively' in the city-
centre land market is confirmed by its slowness to monitor it. By 1978
the whole of Le Havre had a published POS, the U zones of which constitute a ZIF in which the municipality has the right of first refusal on all property transactions. But a filing system to record all such transactions and the prices paid was only created in 1982. This has led to at least one administrative blunder. In 1978 Chauss-Europ, a shoe wholesaler in Rouelles employing 15 people, applied to build an extension on a site earmarked by Defrene, the mairc-delegue, for a gateway between the old village and the park. The municipality refused the permit but was overruled by the DDK's
and the prefect's more liberal interpretation of the POS. Chauss-Europ, however, did not own the land, and only arranged its purchase when the building permit was granted. The landlord then declared his intention to
sell and Colliard, thanks to a complete lack of coordination between the services concerned, failed to exercise his right of first refusal: the 'gateway to the park' is thus the Chauss-Europ extension. If the municipality has complained, reasonably, of the constraints placed on its freedom to plan by the land market and by the paucity of State subsidies, its o\-m failure
to work out a consistent land policy has placed it in an unfavourable position to overcome such obstacles.

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Table VII.8: The Programme d'Actions Foncieres for the SIVOM of Le Havre, 1974-1976: Comparison of Programmed with Real Expenditure, in Millions of Francs, (Source:AURH, Rilan du PAF dans le SIVOM du Havre pour les annees 1974-75-76, December 1977, pp. 24-26)

Table VII.8; The Programme d'Actions Foncieres for the SIVOM of Le Havre, 1974-1976:

Comparison of Programmed with Real Expenditure, in Millions of Francs, (Source:AURH,

Rilan du PAF dans le SIVOM du Havre pour les annees 1974-75-76, December 1977, pp.24-26).

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VII.D: Operational Planning: Conclusion

Every municipal operation described in this chapter, aside from the
Niemeyer Centre, has had to face the constraints of the land market and of national legislation. If Le Havre's relatively slow expansion has helped to contain extreme speculative pressures, the restricted availability of land owing to the city's geographical position has had its effect on prices. The price of inner-city land, including demolition costs and compensation for occupants, may run to as much as a hundred times that of land on the periphery in extreme cases. The land market's incentives to build on empty peripheral sites have been reinforced by the fact that HLM site cost ceilings are invariably well below real inner-city land values. Any low-cost housing operation within the existing urban tissue therefore requires substantial subsidies either from the State or from the municipality. But State subsidies for roads and infrastructure on nexv peripheral operations have generally been more readily available than money for inner-city redevelopment or rehabilitation. The more or less constant possibility of credits for ZUPs and peripheral ZACs contrasts with the introduction and disappearance of RU subsidies; the institution and then the cutting of HVS and other rehabili-tation credits; and the housing reform that created APL and thus enlarged the possibility of rent rebates for tenants whose homes had been improved. The dependence of low-cost inner-city redevelopment projects on the apparently inconsistent distribution of State subsidies is well illustrated by the contrast between Rue de la Ligne and Bourdaloue-Massillon or Fonderies Havraises. For a municipality, operations on the periphery are much simpler to undertake.

The State authorities have at times compounded these uncertainties with administrative delays. These have seldom been motivated by a political desire to frustrate the endeavours of a Communist municipality (though

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political calculation clearly affected the prefect's decision to wait from June 1980 to June 1981 before pronouncing on the Dollemard ZAC). But they have led to planning blight in some areas (especially around Cours de la Republique), and they have meant that local elus who, like Colliard, prefer to assemble all the financial elements for an operation before starting it, have often had to wait a long time.
National legislation has thus helped to define what the municipality
could do at a given moment; a national rehabilitation policy, for example,
was a necessary precondition for a local one. There was still, however, room for the expression of municipal priorities. In this section we will summarise what these priorities were; how far they were informed by 'operational principles' and how far by electoral considerations; who decided how they were to be applied; and how far they result in original outputs that overcome the constraints described above rather than predictable outputs that bend to

them.

Several straightforward Communist priorities are easy to discern in Le Havre's operational planning. A high proportion of low-cost housing was included in every major operation the municipality sponsored - from Mont-Gaillard to Brindeau to Rue de la Ligne. Colliard's attempt to subsidise
a less 'social' operation (Fonderies Havraises) was stopped. Moreover, the municipality has been ready to spend heavily on social and educational facilities in new urban sites - notably on Mont-Gaillard, where the Ecole Ouverte cost over 26 MF and received only a small State subsidy. Finally, the municipality has refused to fuel land speculation by improving the image of run-down neighbourhoods. Brindeau was largely insulated from such speculation by its distance from the centre, and Place Gambetta by its position in the middle-class reconstructed town. No neighbourhood has suffered either gentrification or the replacement of homes by offices since

1965.

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If these planning outputs reflect Communist 'operational principles',
Le Havre's operational planning has not been divorced from electoral calculation. Very crudely, we could classify Mont-Gaillard and Dollemard
as examples of an 'offensive' strategy, aimed at changing the social composition of Rufenacht's constituency, and the Mare-Rouge and Brindeau rehabilitation projects as defensive moves aimed at reinforcing declining Communist strongholds. Clearly such calculations were not the only reason for such projects: substantial local housing needs justified Mont-Gaillard and Dollemard, and the squalor of Mare-Rouge and Brindeau necessitated action there. Although they were likely to have an electoral pay-off, then, none of these operations flew in the face of Le Havre's planning needs.
The operations that the municipality has not undertaken, however, show
as much about its electoral calculations as those that it has. Major municipal investments in operational planning since 1965 may be seen as a tripod, resting on the grands ensembles (especially Mont-Gaillard), the reconstructed centre (especially the Niemeyer Centre) and the south and periphery of the centre (Brindeau and the HLM redevelopments like Rue de la Ligne). The tripod straddles the old centre, which a dearth of public and private investments has condemned to decline for over a decade. Without forcibly ejecting lower-income groups from the city centre, the municipality has presided over a rather similar phenomenon as working-class families who could afford it left old, insanitary flats in search of better conditions, which they generally found in the upper town's grands ensembles. This has led the population of the growing upper town to overtake that of the decaying lower town, and to longer journeys to work for many upper-town residents;
but the municipality's responsibility for the outcome has not been as clear as it would have been had it 'restructured' the old centre in such a way as to evict lower-income groups. Clearly the municipality's reluctance to take

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on the problems of the old centre has been partly dictated by the financial risks involved. But it also has a political significance. Refusal to encourage speculation has meant in practice an unwillingness to involve the municipality in any project that runs the risk of transforming a neighbour-hood's social composition and thus leading to a negative electoral spin-off. Yves Cressent, the architect of the Brindeau project, has argued that
this resulted partly from the municipality's concern to rally local support for its aims before undertaking any improvement project . This may be partly true, but 'consultation with the masses' has still played a smaller part in Le Havre's planning process than the Communists' frequent references to it might lead us to expect. It took place (to very positive effect, in Cressent's opinion) in the Brindeau project, and, less intensively, in Mare-Rouge. But in both these cases people were consulted largely about the details of projects the principle of which the municipality had already decided on. Public discussion of basic planning options has never been encouraged by the municipality, and Communists generally mistrust Socialist experiments like the Ateliers Publics d'Urbanisme . Similarly, 'action' was aimed at the release of specific subsidies (schools for Mont-Gaillard, for example) rather than at breaking the broader constraints that weigh on the planning process. To some extent this is understandable: campaigns are easier to organise around immediate issues (like the construction of a school) than around more remote ones (such as more credits to subsidise HIM building in the centre). Moreover, 'action' in favour of greater means to restructure the centre with lower-income housing would not necessarily have won the support of small landlords, a group the PCF was concerned to reassure by

(55) Interview with Yves Cressent, 10 March 1983.
(56) 'A Propos des Ateliers Publics d'Urbanisme', L'Elu d'Aujourd'hui, Dec. 1979, 36-37.

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the 1970s (cf. Ch.II, p.101). And the Dollemard episode showed that 'action' could be unleashed as easily against the municipality as in its support. While the official response to the Dollemard protests was relatively conciliatory, there was no obvious reason to encourage more of the same

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thing. Public participation in Le Havre's planning process has thus remained largely confined to sections of the population on whose general political support the municipality can count.
Even within the Town Hall the number of people who participate actively
in planning decisions is circumscribed. Colliard's defeat in the Planning Committee over the Fonderies Havraises project was unique. In general he has taken a preponderant role in the elaboration of every major project, and
his colleagues have deferred to his experience and competence. His power is reinforced by his position as the point of contact between three at times insufficiently co-ordinated municipal services - the SUVH, the Service des Affaires Economiques, and the Service des Affaires Immobilieres - and as
the chief municipal negotiator with partners like the DDE, the SAR1I and the OPHLM. Alternative planning propositions tend to be discussed in Colliard's meetings with these groups rather than between o1us on the City Planning Committee.

The generally collaborative relationship that! the municipality
established, chiefly through Colliard, with the State authorities arose from its wish to make the most of any available subsidies (and thus to be sure of presenting an acceptable dossier) and from a concern to head off any attempts at sabotage by the prefect. Hence the succession of meetings with the DDE that preceded projects as varied as Mont-Gaillard, Bourdaloue-Massillon, or Rene Coty. These meetings did not always lead the State to give the municipality what it wanted, however. The smaller perimeter chosen for Bourdaloue-Massillon, and the non-fulfilment of the PAF, were both due in

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great part to a lack of State subsidies that had been promised or at least requested. On selected projects that established a distinctive^and positive municipal trademark - the Niemeyer Centre, the Ecole Ouverte, and the CLECs - the municipality was prepared to spend heavily despite fairly meagre help from the State. More frequently, however, substantial municipal spending without roughly comparable State contributions has been avoided. This has been a major reason for the lack of decisive action in the old centre.
Aside from one or two individual projects, then, the municipality has
bent before the tendencies of capitalist urbanisation that Marxist urban sociologists have denounced rather than mastering them. Planning has also, by and large, been carried out by Colliard and a small group of colleagues inside and outside the Town Hall rather than in constant liaison with the population. It has certainly not been used systematically to mobilise the public against the constraints of a land market that has led to a manifestly irrational use of urban space. Yet the Communists' electoral results do not indicate that electors have voted as a function of any discontent they
might feel about planning outputs. We shall consider the general relation-ship between planning outputs and the Communists' continuing ascendancy in Le Havre in our general conclusion.

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Chapter VIII: Conclusion:
Revolutionaries or Technocrats?

The case of Le Havre confirms Milch's argument that 'Paris is not
France 1, that municipalities do have a number of freedoms to determine policy outputs according to the 'operational principles' of the parties to which they are linked. Le Havre's budget shows a reliance on direct taxation rather than payments for services in current receipts; a willing-ness to tax businesses; an investment budget that continued to grow when those of other municipalities were declining, with a corresponding growth
in the debt; and a consistently high commitment to current and capital spending on education and social services. These characteristics are clearly related to official PCF priorities on local financial policy, and are less likely to be found in the budget of a right-wing municipality. The close links between the CGT and the Town Hall are also typical of the PCF and of its willingness to use municipal office to reinforce its organisational base.
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The municipality of Le Havre was generally concerned to see a high proportion of HLM housing in any major development project it sponsored, and prepared to spend heavily to make sure that Mont-Gaillard's ambitious programme oE social amenities was achieved. Conversely, it was clearly very reluctant
to launch any operation that might lead to the gentrification of the older part of Le Havre's centre and the removal of lower-income inhabitants to the periphery. All of these are examples of choices the municipality made that affected the way people in Le Havre lived in a manner that was fairly consistent with official PCF policy.
Equally, though, the case of Le Havre confirms the Communists' own
claim that no Communist municipality, however well-established, can constitute an 'island of socialism' within a capitalist state. While municipalities

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are certainly not vulnerable to the whim of an all-powerful prefect, they
do have to work within the constraints of national legislation.^ These affect the structure of budget receipts; the conditions under which municipal projects may be subsidised by the State; the land cost ceilings for HLM housing, and the credits available for HLM construction from year to year; the possibilities for municipal intervention in the land and housing markets; and the extent of municipal control of land uso. A municipality's freedom of action is further limited by the constraints of the capitalist market economy. Its power to affect the local employment structure, whether in the secondary or the tertiary sectors, is slight. The level of tax on businesses may be restrained by market forces as well as by the law. While the POS and the various 'Zones' do offer some possibilities of intervention in the property market, they cannot be used to exert an overall control on land values. This means that any low-cost housing project in the city centre requires a consistently high level of public subsidy, the bulk of which
the municipality concerned must generally expect to pay.
These are the legislative and market constraints that make 'islands of socialism' impossible. Le Havre's municipality has not fundamentally altered the structure of the budget, even if it has applied a certain number of left-wing priorities to it. Mont-Gaillard, though likely (ultimately) to be quite generously equipped with social and educational facilities, still suffers from many typical shortcomings of the grands ensembles. The municipality's failure to intervene in the old centre may have avoided a prestige redevelopment involving the mass eviction of lower-income residents: but many such residents (except the very poorest) were ultimately removed to the city's periphery anyway - not by the bulldozer but by the better basic amenities that HLM housing on the periphery offered. The distinctiveness of the left-wing outputs achieved by the PCF in Le Havre is thus limited.

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That different municipalities in France produced different policy out-
puts, and that these outputs are defined (in part) by the municipalities' 'operational principles' but limited by the State and by market forces, has been well established by Milch and others. What is perhaps more interesting is to analyse the processes by which outputs were produced. In the case of
a Communist municipality like Le Havre, working under a conservative govern-ment, we may give two possible models for these processes. One is the 'revolutionary' model. According to this, the Communist municipality will formulate radical policy objectives and press for their achievement, with the active support of the electorate, against the restrictions imposed by the central government and the capitalist market economy. The municipality can expect to win some concessions in this way, but not to break the dynamic of a capitalist system that remains, for the moment, dominant. Policy outputs are thus defined by the point at which municipal mobilisation meets insuperable legislative or market constraints: but the municipality will also encourage the electorate to draw the lessons, at the level of national politics, from the limited opportunities to apply radical policies in a merely local context. Even in the comparatively liberal 1970s, this kind of approach was frequently recommended in the official Party literature, and
the PCF tends to dignify its - fairly small - pressure campaigns in this way, pointing to them as proof that it alone is a real revolutionary party.
We may call the second model 'technocratic'. Here, the main concern of
the Communist municipality is to show that it can run a city more effectively, and more impartially, than municipalities or other parties. It will thus attempt to establish a close, and to some degree confidential, working relationship with its 'partners' in the State services and the business world. It will be prepared to make compromises with them for the sake of conventional municipal aims like attracting jobs, regardless of whether such

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compromises will accelerate the ultimate downfall of capitalism. Such a model does not preclude trying to apply left-wing policy priorities, particularly if, as in Le Havre, many of the municipality's electors are
from the lower-income groups who would benefit the most from such policies. But it does preclude a permanent systematic attempt to mobilise the electorate against the constraints of the capitalist system, insofar as such an attempt would detract from the municipality's reputation as a responsible negotiator and thus damage its good relations with its partners. On this model, then, the municipality is not maximalist; it will take half a loaf, and in private will not even pretend a serious claim to a whole one. Policy outputs are thus defined in a fairly orthodox manner, by the municipality's choice of electorally profitable policies and by its success (which may at times be achieved through popular mobilisation, but more frequently through cultivation of the partners) in attracting resources to apply them. While the Party's press placed a greater emphasis on the 'responsibility' of its local elus under the Fifth Republic than previously (and PCF J^luj^ have acquired a reputation for administrative competence), Communist writers would certainly reject such a conventional interpretation of how Communist municipalities work.
Accommodation with the administration, though, is generally private,
while prefects often take Communist demonstrations for what they sometimes
are: an attempt by the Party to claim exclusive credit with its clientele.
The production of policy outputs in Communist municipalities cannot, there-fore, correspond to one or other of these models as clearly as the models
can be set out theoretically. For within each model we will find both 'instrumental' actions, designed to increase the resources at the municipality's disposal; and 'symbolic' ones, designed to fix the Party's image with its electorate. Of course the two are interrelated. Instrumental actions may

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improve municipal performance and thus electoral support: symbolic ones
may reinforce the municipality's electoral support and thus its negotiating position with its partners. It is useful, however, to separate them for analytical purposes. v
The production of policy outputs in Le Havre was characterised less by
a constant 'revolutionary' pressure on the constraints of the capitalist system than by a 'technocratic' collaboration with State services and with bodies like the Port (PAH) and the Chamber of Commerce (CCIH). Perhaps the clearest example of this was the negotiations on the Schema Directeur d'Amenagement et d'Urbanisme (SDAU). The municipality, with rather little demur, accepted an industrial development plan that was typical of the economic policies the PCF was denouncing nationally. It covered its flank by telling the public that the SDAU was a 'useful' piece of work, but not a 'revolutionary' one: and Colliard told his fellow-elus that Le Havre's municipality had 'given the PCF the image of a Party of government' (Ch.V, p.263). There was no attempt to mobilise the electorate behind a project more in line with national PCF policy.
The example of the SDAU, if particularly flagrant, was consistent with
the general thrust of the municipality's choices and of its presentation of them to the public. Colliard not only 'played the card of dialogue' with the CCIH and the PAH; the municipal bulletin constantly pointed to this relationship as proof of the council's responsibility and far-sightedness. By contrast, popular mobilisation as a means to get municipal policies applied has been rare, -and popular consultation as a decision-making tool almost non-existent. Where popular mobilisation has taken place on municipal issues, it has focussed either on winnable fights to release subsidies for promised amenities or on symbols of civic pride like the Maison de la Culture and the France. While the PCF has used this technique

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more than other parties, it is still a far cry from the systematic use of 'action with the population' to exert pressure on the constraints of the capitalist system. The problem of the city centre, for example, has never been the object of 'action', even for a limited objective like subsidies
for Bourdaloue-Massillon. And when, as in the case of the France, 'action' is seen to fail, the municipality has not drawn any explicitly partisan conclusions about the need to overthrow the capitalist system. It is true that the Party itself, through L'Humanite, did so to a greater extent. But within the municipal context, the Communists did not let 'action' interfere with their efforts to construct a responsible and fundamentally consensual - albeit anti-State - image.
The reasons why the production of policy outputs in Le Havre corresponds more closely to the 'technocratic' than to the 'revolutionary' model are in part instrumental ones, arising from the nature of French local government and of its evolution. Unlike factories, Town Halls offer slight potential
for the direct organisation of working-class struggle. The technical difficulty of running cities, particularly in complex policy areas like planning, has increased, so that political commitment may coexist with, but can never be a. substitute for, administrative capability. Moreover, most municipal projects depend on finance from the State. If a subsidy for, say, a single primary school may be obtained by reading the official specifications carefully and producing a correct application, complex operations like redevelopment projects or ZACs generally require close consultation with the State services concerned, especially the DDE, well before the submission of
a dossier. If the DDE was unlikely to give an opposition municipality an advance guarantee of prefectoral assent (that was a privilege reserved for the administration's political friends), such consultation was still vital for the municipality in order to prevent the prefect from taking political

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advantage of any technical errors on its part. A collaborative relation-ship with the DDE was thus practically a condition for the successful attraction of resources from the State. Similarly, the municipality had a clear interest in establishing a close relationship with partners that
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either had an influence over employment (like the CCIH and the PAH) or helped to execute municipal policy priorities (like the OPHLM or the SARH). The relationship would have suffered in each case from too persistent an emphasis by the municipality on 'revolutionary' practices.
These characteristics of French local government and of the place of opposition municipalities in it (before 1981) also help to explain the crucial personal role played by Daniel Colliard in Le Havre's planning. Colliard is the central figure in the municipality's instrumental strategy for attracting the resources and the cooperation it needs from external bodies. His authority is founded, in the first place, on his administrative capability, reinforced by long experience as a full-time £idj_o_LnJ:_. This has won him the trust of the municipality's partners as a competent negotiator who can get his colleagues in the Town Hall to stick to the agreements he reaches. In turn, his position as the municipality's chief contact with its local partners, plus his long full-time experience and his command of the dossiers, have reinforced his authority with his colleagues in the Town Hall. This means that many decisions have been taken in meetings betx-/een Colliard and the municipality's partners, and that when they have been put to the City Planning Committee the other elus have 'agreed with Colliard's wishes after reasonable discussion' - the one exception being the Fonderies Havraises case. Such a decision-making process does not, of course, corres-pond to the collective style claimed by the official PCF press to be characteristic of the Party's 61us (Ch.II, p.97), and it is not clear how typical it is of Communist municipalities. Milch, for example, argued that

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Nimes had a fully functioning committee system that permitted a collective approach to policy questions. But committees may simply be rubber stamps: 'boards', as Bagehot noted, 'are screens'. The Colliard style indeed seems
to correspond rather closely to that of the work-addicted, authoritarian - and right-wing - mayor Delmas of Montpellier; but it is also wholly consistent with French habits of public administration, shared by the centralised, hierarchical and internally Jacobin PCF .
That the style of policy-making in Le Havre corresponded more closely
to a technocratic than to a revolutionary model was also due to its symbolic function, which was closely related to the Communists' national political position. As we have seen (Ch.II, p. 39), the changed social, economic and political circumstances of the Fifth Republic made it impossible for the PCF merely to continue playing the tribune role into which Fourth Republic politics had largely cast it. This added a new dimension to its perennial problem of being a 'revolutionary' party (at least in its own estimation)
in a non-revolutionary situation. To maintain credibility with its electorate and to compete for new support, it had to present itself as a Party of government with an alliance policy and a political programme. But it also had to distinguish itself from its social-democratic rivals (and particularly from the PS) by insisting on its continued attachment to the revolutionary myth, an attachment which the PCF's history made it hard to jettison in any case. In the long run the two roles are fundamentally irreconcilable. A party that presents itself as the embodiment of a Marxist conception of political legitimacy - as the vanguard of the working class, the only class capable of liberating humanity from the chains of capitalism - suffers an inevitable handicap when competing in a liberal-democratic system, into x^hich

(1) Jerome Milch, 'Paris is Not France' (MIT doctoral thesis, 1973), 408- 419, 450-462.

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the (national) working class is becoming more, rather than less, integrated, and where parties succeed almost in direct proportion to their ability to transcend class barriers. The difficulty was increased by the PCF's continued, albeit at times muted, commitment to the Soviet Union. At the

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same time, as a mass party with positions not only in parliament but in the labour movement and local government as well, the PCF had the possibility of using different elements of its organisation to reinforce different parts of its image.
If the municipality of Le Havre failed, by and large, to 'elaborate

(2) and put into action is own norms' of municipal policy; if it organised

popular 'struggles' rather less than Communist writers like Rosette Xv/ould lead us to expect; and if it had no time at all for Castells' calls to use urban movements as a means to further revolutionary aims directly (Ch.II,
pp. 67-68), it was because these purposes were not the main reasons for
the PCF being in the Town Hall. Drawing their conclusions from the place of provincial municipalities in French politics, they saw local office as a chance to consolidate the Party organisation (as always, since 1920) but also to escape from their previous isolation; to build a wide base of support;
to lock the Socialists into the Union of the Left; and - a condition of as well as a complement to the other 'new 1 objectives - to build the image of a Party of government. That meant being competent administrators, which Communists often are anyway. It also meant settling for the best results
(in terms of attracting resources from outside and distributing them within the commune) that could reasonably be expected in the present, capitalist, context. This in turn implied collaboration with partners like the DDE,
the CCIH and the PAH, and showing a high degree of impartiality in the

(2) Bruno Jobert and Michele Sellier, 'Les Grandes Villes: Autonomie Locale et Innovation Politique', RFSP April 1977, 205-227: p.218.

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distribution of municipal resources. These norms of municipal policy were more important than official Communist aims like 'priority to the most disadvantaged 1 or 'furthering the revolutionary struggle'. And they were important not just for instrumental reasons (cooperating with DDE to ensure the largest possible subsidies) but for symbolic reasons - for the municipality's, and thus the Party's, image. A 'revolutionary' opposition to a plan like the SDAU, for example, which offered tens of thousands of
jobs for the Le Havre area, would have seemed merely perverse and doctrinaire to many electors. Helping to produce it, on the other hand, gave evidence of civic statesmanship and a promise of responsible conduct in national office (while the SDAU could be justified in Marxist terms as increasing Le Havre's quota of gravediggers of capitalism). The Communists' clear wish to reinforce their image as a Party of government thus limited both the specificity of policy outputs and the mobilisation of the public.
In the case of Le Havre, this tendency was reinforced by the weakness
of the Party organisation in the city. That meant, firstly, that frequent mobilisation of the electorate was difficult both to organise and to control: there were no guarantees that it would not be turned against the municipality itself as much as against the central government. Secondly, the Party's supervision of municipal activities, and thus the probability of the Town
Hall being used to further 'revolutionary' aims, were relatively slight.
The vast majority of the permanents are adjoints x^ho have risen through the municipality rather than through the Party and whose priorities are inevitably oriented towards municipal rather than Party work. In Pronier's terms, the balance between 'militants' and 'gestionnaires' in the municipality of Le

(3) Havre is decisively weighted towards the latter . Colliard is the prime

(3) Raymond Pronier, Les Municipality Communistes (Paris, Balland, 1983), 142-143. "

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example of a 'gestionnaire'; when the Comite de Ville of the Party tried to set up a group to discuss planning questions, he smothered it with a long and detailed study programme.
Did the municipality's success with the electorate, then, result
entirely from what D.W. Brogan called 'methods that recall Joseph Chamberlain
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in Birmingham [one might add Jules Siegfried in Le Havre] more than Lenin
in Petrograd' ? Clearly, the success itself was considerable. A high and (until 1983) increasing proportion of the electorate voted for Communist-led municipal lists, and the PCF vote in parliamentary (though not presidential) elections rose locally at a time when it was stagnating or declining nationally. At the same time, while the Communists did win middle-class supporters, especially in municipal elections, they remained very closely anchored to Le Havre's traditional working-class areas and to the new ones they created in the upper town. This obviously owed something to the Communists' record as a Party of municipal government. They provided Le Havre with an administration that was moderate and generally competent. While bold initiatives were rare, and attempts to find local solutions to problems that have been common to almost every city of the industrialised West were non-existent, the municipality gave a reasonable amount of attention to the less well-off (if not always to the poorest categories), and took no direct action to break up established communities in the name
of progressive planning. Policies like Le Havre's cheap bus fares (financed by the Versement Transport) make a daily difference to poorer people, especially those who are now better housed, but on the periphery. The municipality's constant stress on its commitment to responsible dialogue

(4) D.W. Brogan, The Development of Modern France (London, Hamish Hamilton, second edition, 1967), 638.

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with its partners and to the region's economic development probably helped to diffuse middle-class hostility, and its cultural programme to win middle-class support (at least for municipal lists, in alliance with the PS). If these policy outputs were less remarkable than the triumphal tone of the municipal bulletin suggests, as well as being very much at odds with the
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PCF's revolutionary pretensions, they might reasonably be seen by many electors as the best that could be done in the circumstances.
It remains the case, however, that the municipality's - and the PCF's - strongest bases of support are frequently in areas which, like Mare-Rouge or the south before the start of rehabilitation work, could be said to have benefited rather little from municipal policy (with a consequent potential threat to the Party's position). Until the possibility of subsidies appeared (in 1974 for the south, in 1978 for Mare-Rouge), the municipality had allowed such quarters to deteriorate to an often appalling extent. It seems reasonable to suppose that their inhabitants had other reasons for voting Communist than satisfaction with their environment. This was the classic Communist vote of the poor and excluded,' on which the Party had to enlarge if it was to fulfil its wider aims.
These long-standing Communist voters were held in, in part, by the municipality's cultivation of its tribune function. This was a role that the PCF was used to playing: in January 1968 an IFOP poll found that only 18 per cent of Communist voters wanted to see a Communist regime installed in France, while 38 per cent supported the PCF 'to express a general dis-content' and 35 per cent 'because the PCF was a useful opposition' . It is certain that more than 18 per cent wanted Communist ministers (as opposed

(5) R.W. Johnson, The Long March of the French Left (London, Macmillan, 1981), 152.

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to a Communist regime), especially by 1981. Nevertheless, a high proportion of Communist voters did look to their Party, not to accomplish a revolutionary programme, but to express their discontent and to defend and represent their interests against a central government, and against a society, that they
felt to be fundamentally hostile. This probably applied to many of those
who wanted Communist ministers as well. Defending people's interests against a hostile central government, besides being part of the PCF's stock in trade, was part and parcel of the rhetoric of almost any municipality not actually headed by the Minister of the Interior. The Communists were thus well placed to capitalise on it and to convince their traditional working-class
supporters that they were well represented by people of their own kind in
the Town Hall. The demonstrations organised in support of strikes, to release subsidies or to save the France, all of which correspond more closely to our revolutionary model than to the technocratic one, were chiefly designed to maintain and to reinforce this kind of support. They were meant to reassure people, especially those left behind by the prosperity of the new France,
that someone in the State apparatus was on their side and that attempts to prove its governmental credentials had not altered the PCF's identity as the 'revolutionary' defender of the working class. Their instrumental results (nudging industrial negotiations in the right direction, getting subsidies quicker, or - just possibly - persuading the government to finance Le Havre's floating dock) were often meagre. But it was the symbolic importance of such 'actions' that really counted. In this they resemble a wide range of other PCF activities, like the May Day celebrations or the Fete de I'Humanite', which ritualise class struggle and which in the last resort, in the absence of the means to replace capitalist society as the PCF says it would like to do, serve to create a counter-society where Communist supporters feel at home.

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Running a whole city as a counter-society, or simply on the basis of 'supporting workers' struggles', would be difficult even in the most proletarian of Paris suburbs, and impossible anywhere else. Most Communist municipalities have to show that they are not only combative enough but
also responsible enough to attract resources from outside the commune. There

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have to be the civic achievements to establish governmental credentials (ideally, some of them should also be original enough to establish a certain number of municipal trademarks). We have called the relationship the municipality of Le Havre tried to establish with the electorate the 'tribunician consensus'. It was consensual in that the municipality tended to veil, or at least to play down, its partisan affiliation and to emphasise the convergence rather than the divergence of local interests. It also stressed the value of competent, neutral administration. The relationship was tribunician in that the municipality claimed not only to govern in the interests of the whole population, but also to defend those interests against a hostile State, in the best tradition of French municipal politics. The
•

municipality of Le Havre achieved considerable success in establishing such a relationship. It managed both to win the support of social groups outside the working class and to retain the allegiance of voters who had received comparatively little benefit from its policy outputs.
Clearly by playing the tribune role, by reassuring the most dis-
advantaged social groups that their interests were represented within the structure of 'bourgeois democracy', the Communists helped to legitimate the system they denounced (Ch.I, p.9)• If the PCF was consistently faced with the problem of being a 'revolutionary' Party in a non-revolutionary situation, it was also one of the elements that helped to prevent a revolutionary situation from developing. That was the price it paid even for its partial entry into the bourgeois political game under the Third and Fourth Republics.

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Under the Fifth Republic this entry became far more complete: it had to be if the PCF was to survive as a credible Party. Municipal office was one important element in the PCF's attempt to prove its governmental credentials, and thereby its political credibility. But doing nothing more than that,
in Town Halls as in national political campaigns, threatened to blur the
'X

distinction between the PCF and the PS, which, at least after 1971, was in any case a more convincing party of government. Combining the governmental and the tribunician functions thus made good sense at the municipal level but, without more fundamental changes inside the Party and vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, was insufficient to establish the PCF's national credibility as the leading party of the Left. In the bi-polar electoral system of the Fifth Republic that failure meant that it risked ultimate subordination, nationally, to the Socialists.
The 1981 election results should be understood in this light. The
French, of course, could not conceivably vote merely as a function of their appreciation of any party's municipal record. We have seen (Ch.T, p.8) that there is no shortage of explanations for the poor performance of Marchais and the PCF in 1981 - the electoral system, the Communists' sectarianism since 1978, the sociological decline of their main bases of support. The results in Le Havre are still striking. At the first presidential election that was both contested by a Communist candidate and winnable for the Left
as a whole, after 16 years of the Communists trying to prove their govern-mental capacities in the Town Hall, Marchais took just over a quarter of the valid votes in Le Havre.(Table III.4, p.138). That was 11 per cent better than his national average, but compared with nearly 61 per cent for the United Left municipal list in 1977 and 41 per cent for PCF candidates in 1978. He ran barely two points ahead of Mitterrand, in a city where the PCF had always been at least 15 points ahead of the Socialists and often more

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than 25. In June, by contrast, the Communists dropped less than two points on their 1978 score: only the inclusion of the Canton of Kontivilliers in the 6th constituency prevented Colliard from getting through to the second ballot - and thence, probably, to the National Assembly as Le Havre's
second Communist deputy. About 60 per cent of the Havrais, then, wanted a left-wing municipality in 1977 and a left-wing government in 1981. Of these, about two-thirds were prepared to elect Communist deputies to defend their interests in Parliament or even to reinforce the PCF's claims to ministerial office. But fewer than half voted for Marchais, and it is not even certain that all of these really wanted to see him in the Elysee. Even in Le Havre, where conditions for establishing another image were relatively favourable, the PCF could not escape from its tribune function, and so was eligible
for governmental office only as a junior partner with a limited role to play. That, of course, was the position the Communists were manoeuvred into,
to their chagrin, in June 1981. They responded, particularly as the Left's 'State of Grace' evaporated, by trying to play their tribunitian and governmental roles simultaneously at national level. Tims extensive publicity was given to the initiatives of Communist ministers, while opposition to the government's austerity policies was articulated by (or canalised through) the CGT - Le Havre's municipal employees enjoyed their first 'day of action' on full pay under the left-wing government in October 1982 - and, increasingly, by the Party organisation as well. This response was not wholly unsuccessful: there were Communist supporters who, though disappointed with the Left, said 'Heureusement que les communistes sont la, sinon ca serait encore pire' . But if the tribune-government tandem was hard to balance at municipal level, it was much more visibly contradictory nationally: it implied defending people's interests against a government that included the PCF. At local level, this led to repercussions in the 1982

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cantonal elections (which lost Colliard his seat on the conseil general)
and even more so in the 1983 municipals. In Le Havre, Duromea's list dropped 7 points on 1977 (and the Left as a whole 4 points), giving the lowest left-wing vote in a municipal election since 1965. Across the country, many of the major cities that the Communists had spent so much effort winning since 1965 were lost: Nimes, Aries, St-Etienne, Beziers, Reims - though not Le
^x

Mans or Amiens.

The PCF has thus reached an impasse, in which it is weakened at local level, and unable to blame local setbacks on Paris as before; imprisoned, and almost without influence, in a government whose economic and foreign policies are anathema to it; and unable, at least for the moment, to capitalise on its supporters' disillusion with the Left. It is in this position partly because, despite the leadership's attempts to avoid a left-wing victory in 1981, most of its electors wanted to see the PCF in govern-ment on limited terms. It is also there because, in the long term, expressing a 'revolutionary' opposition to the capitalist system while helping to run it - as the Communists have done consistently in local government, and in national government since 1981, is untenable, especially in a recession. Whether the PCF's working-class supporters will draw the same conclusion is, however, an open question.

General Tables

404

A; Le Havre's Population

A' 1: Comnmnes of the Schema Birecteur d 'Amtfnagement et d'Urbanisme • fSDAC')

^Date
Commune" ———————

Le Havre
BleVille
Sanvic
ftouellee

Le Havre (pres-
ent boundaries)

Harfleur
Ste-Adresse
Montivilliers
Gonfreville
Epouville

1936

164,083
5,216
16,307
1,090

186,696

5,028
5,135
6,980
4,496

885
Pont aine-la-Mal let n.a.
Gainneville '
Saint-Laurent- "*
du-Bre've'dent
St-Martin-du- tW
Rolleville
Le Fontenay
Notre-Dame-du-Bec

(rest of INSEE
conurbation)

Total INSEE
conurbation
Rest of SDAU
arena

n.a.
n.a.

r n.a.

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* n.a.

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4,070j ? 131 ^'^MT
17,532 18,975.
1,004 2,020

129,490 160,990

5,103 7,495
4,392 6,822
7,854 8,314
4,476 8,405
1,160 1,168

n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.

n.a. n.a.

1,033 972

n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.

n.a. n.a.

153,508 193,104

n.a. n.a.

1962

1,396'

187,844

9,262
7,807
8,427
8,032
1,193
862
988
883

615
912
316
292

39,589

227,433

13,657

1968

1,914J

207,149 z

9,872*-

8,261
8,910
8,636
1,112
922
1,070.
836

606
910
324
279

41,738

248,887

14,155

1975

117 ««1 /

217,881

10,102
8,754

10,563
10,173
1,092
1,503
1,154
930

678
802
427
292

46,541

264,422

16,406

Total SDAU area n.a. n.a. n.a. 241,090 263,042 280,828

1) Part of Rouelles was annexed by Le Havre in 1962.
2) In 1971, the whole of the Gaucriauville housing estate, which had been split between Le Havre and Harfleur, was included in the commune of Le Havre. I have incorporated the difference of 5,726 inhabitants into the figures for Le Havre and Harfleur ia 1986 (but not in 1962, when Caucriau-ville had barely been started).
3) Communes included in the INSEE conurbation after 1962, but all counted in the total from 1962.

Source a; INSEE: Recensement de 1975; Seine-Maritime; Population Le'gale et Statistiques Communales Comple'mentaires, 6-46, 58. J-P. Damais and A. Nicollet, L'Urbaniame au Havre L Volume 2 Table 1.

A.2; Communes of the Schrfma Directeur d'Ame'nagement et d'Urbanisme (SDAU) de la Region du Havre; Annual Percentage Rates of Population Growth. 1954-1975, with some Comparisons.

Period

Total Change
(%/year)
54-62 62-68 68-75 62-75

Commune
Le Havre (pre-
sent boundaries)t2.01 + 1.64- +0.73 4-1.23 Harfleur
Ste-Adresae
Montivilliers
Gonfreville
Epouville
Fontaine-la-
Mallet
Gainneville
St-Laurent
S-t-Martin
Rolleville
Le Fontenay
Notre-Dame-du- "
Bee

(rest of INSEE
conurbation)
Total INSEE
conurbation)
Rest of SDAU

area

Total SDAU area
France urban un
its of "between
200,000 and
2,000,000 inhab-
itants
Ste-Etienne
St-Nazaire

Mulhouse
Metz
Rouen

v2.62 4-1.07 tO.33 t0 -7°
a. 51 +0.96 <0.80 +0.93
+0.13 '0.94 <2.47 *1.95
-0.77 fl.22 +2.38 *1.62

40.11 -1.17 r-0.26 -0.65

- 1.92 +1.13 47.26 v5.72
-0.31 41.34 4-1.08 +1.29
-0.35 -0.91 ^-1.54 +0.41
-0.04 -0.25 tl.62 '0.79
+0.09 -0.04 -1.79 -0.33
-2.20 *-0.42 f4.04 42.70
-2.78 -0.76 40.66 fO.OO

n.a. *-0.90 H.64 i-1.35

+-1.76 41.57 tO.87 tl.25

n.a. f0.6l 42.27 *1.55

n.a. f-1.52 40.97 KL.27

42.00 >2.13 +1.19 H.62

40.9
fl.l
11.2

+ 1.8
12.1

Change from Natural
Increase (%/year)
54-62 62-68 68-75

+1.07 10.94- <-o.97
+1.32 tl.30 il.87
vl.23 +0.79 *0.60
*1.30 +1.16 -40.78

tl.23 tO.69 40.26

tl.42 tO.70 +0.71
vl.23 4-1.03 +0.60
a. 30 +0.74 vo.44
4-0.41 +0.82 tO.97
1-0.64 +0.95 <-0.35
^0.82 +1.31 ^0.83
+0.66 -0.12 40.10

n.a. 4-1.14 4-1.10

4-1.11 40.97 fO.98

n.a. 41.02 40.47

n.a. 4-0.98 40.99

40.79 fO.84 f-0.80

Change from Imm-
igration (%/yea-
54-62 62-68 68-75

+0.94 +0.70 -0.24
a. 30 -0.25 -1.54
*0.28 +0.17 +0.19
- 1.17 -0.25 4-1.69
-2.22 -0.18 <1.22
- 1.12 -1.86 -0.52

-3.34 f 0.43 4 6. 55
-0.92 (-0.31 *0.48
- 1.65 -1.65 +-1.10
- 1.01 -1.07 +1.22
-0.56 -0.99 -2.14
-3.02 -0.89 43.21
-3.44 -0.64 +0.55

n.a. -0.24 +-0.54

40.65 <-0.54 -0.11

n.a. -0.41 +1.80

n.a. 40.53 -0.02

4-1.22 a. 29 +0.39

INSEE: Recensement de 1975: Seine-Maritime: Population Le"gale, 6-46,58. AURH, Plan, d 'Agglomeration 1976-80, Commission D^veloppements Economique et D^mographique , Le Point de la Sit-uation, 17.
Commissariat du Plaj
Commission Villes, :

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(Tie Plan (Paris,
1970), Vol. II p. 34.
Marseille
Caen
Grenoble
Montpellier

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A.3; Age Structure of Le Havre's Population. 1962-75. Percentage of
j 0-19 20-64
1962:
1962:

1968:
1968:

1975:
1975:

Le Havre (commune)
France

Le Havre (in present limits)

France

Le Havre (commune)
France

34.5
33.1

34.6
53.8

32.8
30.7

Sources: INSEE: Recensement de 1962: Seine-Maritime Recensement de 1975: Seine-Maritime

55.3
55.1

54.1
53.6

54.9
55.0

population aged
65 and ov»r
10.4
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11.5
12.6

12.5
14.5

Total

100.0
100.0

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100.0

Ageing
Index (l)
275
555

527
572

575
465

: Population, Manages, Logements, Immeubles, P.31.
: Population, Manages, Logements, Immeubles, Kesultats du Sondage au I/5e, 113. Ville du Havre, Recensement de 1975» Traitement des Donn^es (no pagination)
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A)

Tables; B; Employment in Le Havre

Table B.I: The Labour Force by W,J G-r.U f , 1954-1975; Le Havre and Some Comparisons.

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Sources: INSEE, Recensement Ge"ne"ral de la Population: Population, Manages, LogementSj Immeubles:
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Rouen, 1975).
Region Langtiedoc-Roussillon, IS
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000-200,000 inhabitants, 1962 and
3 by'INSSB's Rouen office.
. et, L'Urbanisme au Havre, Vol.11,
*s of 100,000-200,000 inhabitants,

Government ' , in Blackmer and
f aud trance, (Princeton 1975),
Nlmes and St-Denis, 1968).

Table tt.2: Le Havre Conurbation and French City Averages; Distribution of Employment by bector, 196Z - 1975, from Census Returns

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Snur^p^' OPEI^ Recensement G^ndral de la Population: Population, linages, Logements, Immeubles : Seine-Maritime: 19^2, 43: 1968, 80-81: 1975 t 54 (Le Havre).
Damais and Nicollet, L'Urbanisme au Havre, Vol. II, Tables 6 and 10 (France, cities 1968).

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2) The only averages available from INSEE were for citJ of 100,000-200,000 inhauitants in 1962 and 1975. Ds and Nicfcllet 's statistics for 1968 are, unfortunate]
for cities of over 200,000 inhabitants. j
INSEE's Rouen office supplied figures for French cities, 19^2 and 1975, directly.
Notes; l) Of the numerous ways of categorising economic sectors, none was used both.in 1962 and 1975. I have therefore given statistics on both the CAE system and the BCN to provide
some fom of transition for 1968.

censuses, and since Renault employs numerous.workers from outside the Le Havre area, these figures show barely half the workers in the local motor industry, cf. Table B.J.

B.3: Le Havre 'Zone de Peuplement Induatriel et Urbain' (ZPIU) and France; Distribution of Employment by Sector, 1^65-81.

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Source -.Association pour 1 'Emploi dans la R«ffion du Havre,, j)ocuiienta aur 1'Epploi
' Havraisa; 19&5-66, 5,13: 1966-6?, 5: 1967-68, 15: 1969-70, 5,

, ,

1971-72. 5 26: 1973-74, 5,22: 1976-77, 24,37: 1977-78, 31,53: 1979, 35, 101: , 1980, 53: 1981, 41.
Le Havre's Zone de Peuslement Induatriel et Urbain includes Kpouville, Fontain*- la-Mallet, Gainnevillei Gonfreville, harileur, Le Havre, Harufclise, Montivillier^ Notre-Dame-du-Bec, Oudalle, xiogerville, Rolleville, Rouelles, St-Aubin, , St-Laurent, dt-Martin, ate-Adreaoe, and bandouville (the latter bein« the
site of the big Renault factory) - cf. map
Notes: (l) Includes primary trans location of metals, electrical and nechanical engineering, shipyards and automobile mamuacture.
(2) Includes the water industry, urban heating, building materials,
glass, rubber, furniture, paper, printing, packaging, plastics.
(3) Includes hotels, bars, restaurants, automobile sales and service,
as well as wholesale and retail distribution.

(4) Major expansion du chiefly due to inclusion of more public employeess»s (in port and administration) in t^e ASSEDIC system.
(5) Henceforth includes aviation - roughly 1 per cent for Le Havre.
(6) Henceforth classed as 'energy 1, thus includes Le Havre power statioHDOn (about 0.8 per cent).
(7) Under new classification glass, rubber, building materials and plastsstico move** from 'Other ' to 'Chemicals' .

(8) 'Intermediate' includes Chemicals and primary transformation of mettfttalsr 'Capital 1 includes Metallurgy less primary transformation: 'Consump^ption 1
includes Textiles, Clothing and Other. Food and Energy are left as:* separat* categories. . \
(9) Under new classification, automobile sales and service moved from 'a1 'distribution to 'other services'.

All statistics for 'France' concern only areas covered by local ASSEDIC«3C» (henc» almost no agriculture). For general comments on limitations of ASSEDIC £ syote»,
cf. Table B.4.

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B.4: Le Havre and France; Evolution of K/**ider »(
by indices and per annum percentage change.

by Sector, 1965-80,

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Llfl/tf: 100)

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110.?

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i' /' ITI -. Iflo)

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Zf f -f 7

, f o.?

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616 - 17

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lore j a i

Source,; ASSEDIC, Documenta aur L'Bnploi dana la Region Havraise, 1965-8! (for details,
of ASSEDIC and of zone covered, of. B.J).
Note: These are the only year-on-year statistics available for the region, and they suffer fron two nain disadvantages.
(a) They concern only employed persons paying national insurance counted at the place 01 work, and exclude many public service employees. A major expansion of the
field covered resulted from the extension of the Social Security systeu in 1967.
Kore minor extensions have occurred since.
(b) The classification of economic branches was changed after 1974 (cf. B.J, notes 5-9), including creation of 'Intermediate','Capital' and 'Consumer' categories. Long-run comparisons are thus strictly impossible for the tertiary sector and should be treated with care for industry. Unreliable indices for the 1965-80 column are put in brackets. The other two-, four-, and five-year periods chosen are reasonably coherent.

Tables C.I, C.2

g Units
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nge
68-75

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'20.01

•12.83

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and
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injnission

per cent)

75

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. 7
. 7

.7

1-25
France

G; Housing

£.1: Communes of the SLAU de la Region du Havre: Number of Housing Units (excluding secondary and empty units), and rate of
number
1962

Le Havre (present limits)
Ste-Adresse
Harfleur and Gonfreville
Schema Secteur Montivilliers
Schema Secteur St-Romain

Total SDAU area
(Le Havre as % SDAU)
France total (thousands)

61
2
5
4
3
76
79
14

,129
,233
,180
,522
,475

,539
. 87%
,565

(l) The area of the Schema de Secteur

1968

66
2
5
4
3
82
80
15

de

,548
,412
,460
,732
,613

,765
. 41%
,842

1975

74,391
2,833
6,098
5,727
4,336

93,385
79.66%
17,124

growth, 1962-75.
% change
62-68

«-8.86
v8.02
4-5.41
^4.64
*3.97

1-8.13

<-8.77

68-75

rf.1
r!7
HI
4-21

^20

112

t- 8

. 79
. 45
. 68
. 03
. 01

. 83

. 09

Montivilliers includes Montivill
Fontaine-la-Mallet, Octeville, Le Fontenay, Cauville, Mannevillette, Notre-Dame-du-Bec, Rolleville, Epouville, St-Martin-du-Manoir, and Mandglise (cf. map .). The Sch6ma de Secteur de Saint-Remain includes the rest of the communes of the SDAU not given above.
Source; AURH, Elaboration du Plan d'Agglomeration pour 1976-80; Commission Logement; Le Point de la Situation (December 1975) 14t 65.

C.2: Proportion of Owner-Occupiers in the Le Havre Area, 1962-75 (per cent).

Le Havre
Harfleur
Gonfreville
Ste-Adresse
Montivilliers
France, cities of over
100,000 inhabitants

1962

29.9
50.5
16.3
50.8
36.1

31.0

1968

31.7

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

35.1

1975

33.1
36.3
3l.o
64.7
46.7

36.7

Source: AURH, Dossier Habitat; 1; Le Diagnostic (November 1977), 24-25 INSEE, Recensement de 1962; Re'sultats du Sondage au l/20e, France Entiere, Logements et "Dnmeubles (Paris 1965), 111.

Tables C.3, C.4 412

srsons/roon

1.12

1,11
1.11
0.93
1.02

1.08
0.81
0>95

0.92
0.75
1.08
0.96
0.88
0.83

£. (1970),

»j launeublea

Manages,

inlta)
1975.

Total

26.0
25.6

, 116.

C.3: Penalty of Home, Occupation

Commune

Le Havre

Le Havre

L« Havre
Ste-Adresse

Bate

1906

1926

1962
1962

Franc*, cities of . • 1^62
over 100,000 inhab-
itants

L« Havre
Ste-Adresse
France, cities
L« Havre
Ste-Adresse
Gonfreville
Harfleur
Montivilliers
France, cities

Sources: Ville

1968
1968
1968

1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
1975

Persons/home

3.. 30

3.03

3.01
3.46
3.06

3.02
3.39
3.04

2.87
3.14
3.52
3.12
3.19
2.89

du Havre, S3BE, Schema de Secteur,

Rooms/hone

2.95

2.73

2.70
3.66
2.97

2.98
3.82
3.12

3.11
4.20
3.25
3.25
3.62
3.48

Persons/room

1.12

1.11

1.11
0.93
1.02

1.08
0.81
0.95

0.92
0.75
1.08
0.96
0.88
0.83

Tome 1: Analyses (1970),
18-19, table 8.

INSEE, Recenseaents, Rrfsultats France Entiere; Logements. Inuneubles; 1962, ill: 1968, 232-233: 1975, 374-378.
INSEE, Recensement de 1975> Seine-MaritJjne: Population, Manages, Logements, Inmeubles, 116.

C.4; Percentage of housing units (excluding secondary and empty units) inhabited in conditions of overcrowding (on INSEE criteria). 1975.

Le Havre (commune)
France, cities of over
100,000 inhabitants

'Moderate
overcrowding '
21.3
21.2

'Acute
overcrowding *

4.7
4.6

Total

26.0
25.6

Source: INSEE, Recensement de 1975: Rtfsultats du Sondage au l/5e; France Entiere, Logements, Icmeubles, 82.
Seine-i'laritijne, Population, Logementa, Imneubles, Il6.

Tables C.5, C.6 413

}

[y and empty

Total

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

100.00

, 100.00

jmneubles, 116.

lecondary and

» as % total

h. 4..

n.a.

. 8.17
. 8.85
9.25
'0.03
'0.62

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

>3.01

24.52

j 1'Habitat
f units in

C.5: Date of Construction of Housing Units (excluding secondary and empty unita) in 2975: Percentages.

Le Havre
Harfleur
Gonfreville
Ste-Adresse
Mont i vi 1 1 i e r a
(canton)
St-Romain
(canton)
France

pre-
1871
4.44
7.56
4.82
9.14

25.67

55.92

19.4

1871-
1914
18.52
14.85
30.86
22.89
19.85

20.10

19.4

1915-
1948
18.19
22.74
31.02
22.07
17.35

13.78

16.2

1949-
1967
44.36
41.33
13.13
33.46
16.74

11.02

27.0

1968-
1975
14.49
13.50
20.15
12.43
22.37

19.76

17.9

Total

100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00

100.00

, 100.00

Sources; AURH, ^Dossier Habitat, Vol.1, 12
INSEE, Recensement 1975> Seine-Maritime, Logementa, Immeubles, 116.

C.6; Commune of Le Havre; Number of Housing Units (including secondary and empty unit s), and Proportion of HLMa, 1962-81.

Date

*

1962 (census)
1968 (census)
31/12/68
31/12/69
31/12/70
31/12/71
31/12/72
31/12/73
31/12/74
1975 (census)
31/12/76
31/12/77
31/12/78
31/12/79
31/12/80
31/12/81

Total Number

61,851
68,105
69,394
71,072
72,224
73,400
75,643
c.77,000^
c.78,OOOC1l
79,485
81,104
82,143
82,796
83,661
84,129
85,056

Sources: INSEE, - Recensement 1975 Ville du Havre, Schema
Other figures furnished

Number HLMs

n.a.
n.a.

12,609
13,396
13,904
14,702
15,559
16,617
17,495

n.a.

18,663
19,292
19,611
20,059
20,375
20,856

, Logenents, 116^
de Secteur, Vol.1,
by Ville du Havre

HLMs as % total

h. a.

n.a.

18.17
18.85
19.25
20.03
20.62

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

23.01
23.49
23.69
23.98
24.22
24.52

58.
, Service de 1 'Habitat
(l) approximate* figures due to uncertainty aa to the number of units in bidonville^ destroyed in these years.

Table C.7 414

, owner-

ccupiers
968 1975

6.1
5.1

w .cL.
K. «L .
K. fl..

2.0

H.d.
K.l*-.

K..CL
k.n.
k-a.
K.d.
1.9

39
28.5
26.7
23.7
30.6
M.I
72
55
I4-.1
12
t4-.1
17.Z
56.6

0.7 11
K.CL. 52
K<a. 16
H-l. 9.1

71.6 60
0.9 12

1.7 33-1

irarily

Statistics, 1968-75- (cf. »ap« °l , *L2-).

INSEE Index of
no. r

(map
14)

W* -WwMHt 1

I 2
"" I 5
0W Ceutr* 4

/ * L c

L. o r f j V- v ^ w' (;
We/PUI|« '8
Nev/Jltvill* 9

• discomfort
1968 1975

22 16.3
l\»*) Z.7
M 4. 2
39.9 29.3
22 11.1
32.8 19
30 15
25.4 10
negligible
Ma.r«-R-«ttit 10 1 negligible

<MU*ur«l 11 fe^sy*2

SO.K /,c 13

*».•» " t^ 14
15

Frill*** 16

OIJL G-r^yllk iy
fiwY (rrnyjlk ^Q

n h Iti^iovr no

C,u,cntv;lU. 20

23.1 10.4
//•v) 3. 0
26 13
14.5 8.3
(Forgt
26 16
53 40
24 12.4

k.*. r.t

zero

W« Citwvii. 21 65.8 37.5
Ctia*i^t*«t 22 35.1 22.8
Gu.W SriH^u 23 43 36
5t-M;wlts(LW^4 51 41

Wei'iH 25 ovtr?0 -^^
26

Ro«fll% 27 25 10
Ctntr!«.uvill< 28 [I "LC-ro

Le Havre [| 2&.4 n.a. -

Persons <

per- loom
1968 M975

0.9 0.8
0.9 0.8
1.0 0.86
MV 0.«*
•i.o 0.8
0.86 0.78
0.«? O.ff
1.06 0.9^
1.23 1.01
i.?2. 1.15
1.20 0.98
1.22 1.04

I.^L o.«y
MX (Mtf
de
». < >7 0.41
'.01- 0.9.I

o.w 0.30

1.18 0.98

(.12. .1 .Of
1.50 1.06
I./7 1.0
I. If 1.0

1,1? 0.97
1,1* 1.12
(do

i,pr o.9i|.
1.17 1,03
1.08 0.92

Rooms per
home
1968 1975

3.1 3.07
3.0 3.1
2.8 2.7
2.. 6 2.7
$.3 3.3
3.1- 3.5
' J.4- 3.5
S.I 3.4
3.8 3.6
3.51 3.51-
3. SI 3.«l
3.5TI 3.64
3.1' 3.3
3.-^ 3.4
Mont ge on
*•** 3.16
2.3 2.4
3.0 3.16
3.3 3.5
3.57 3.5f
2.4 2.9
2.66 2.9
2.4-5- 2.5(
2.3 2.2
3-1-1 3.31-
ks)

K .CL . M -tt .

3.5 3.7
2.98 3.11

% empty
units
1968 1975

4.7 6.6
3.3 8.5
5.6 6.1
5.8 8.9
h.*. 4.5
4.2 5.7
5.0 6.8
8.0(1) 4.6
3.7 5.8
3.5 3.9
3.3 3.2

h.*. Q.9

3.0 5.9
1.5 1.5

2,9
4.6 9.3
6.4(1) 4.0
1.6 3.4
14.0(1) 4.1
U.t.

2.3 7.2
3.8 8.9
2.9 7.7
n..«.. 1.8

k A . M--rt,.

22.6(1) 4.1,
4.6 5.7

96 owner-

occupiers
1968 1975

36.1 39
25.1 28.5
w. a, n f ~l 26. /
•• 23.7

•. 30.6
62.(? 61.1
n.d- 72
.. 55
^•a. 14-. 1
k*. 12
K-tt. C4-.1

^•i- 17 .Z
51.9 56.6
i.a. S"?,|

61 6l S
H.^. 2<f.^
k.A. 7«.?
»• •«-• 4-7.5"
0.7 11
K..L. 52
K,a. 16
*•«.- 9-1
K.H. IS". ^
K-H. H1

71.6 60
0.9 12

31.7 33.1

Source ; ATJRH, Dossier Habitat, Vol.1, 20,28, and Appendix.
(l) High percentage of empty units due to newly-built homes temporarily awaiting occupants at moment of census.

\ Table c.8
—— L 415

Total Le
Havre
no.

%

1,405 2.4
3,206^4.6

4,465^ 5.7
5,626 6.9

5,863 7.1

6,974 8.4
8,786 10.5

8,012 9.5

3,717 4.6
5,261 6.4

ians la Region
le 1981), p.91.
at, Le Point

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h caution.
await ing
j based on
distinction
sets (2)
3 distinction
er, give an

G.8. Commune of Le Havre: E»pty Housing Units, 1962-80 (of. map).

1962 census
1968 census
1975 census
1976 end
1977 end
1978 end
1979 end
1980 end

1976 end (2)
1979 June (2)

Centre

no. %
total
units

747 2.7
1,221 2.9
2,157 7.5

1,769
2,193

Graville

no. %

87 2.1
284 6.3
221 4.0

485
859

North-
West
no. %

367 2.3
686 3.6
UTof" 4.8

631
758

North-
East
no. %

112 2.0

442 3.5

45^
360

no. %

92 1.9
213 2.6
475 6.1

376
1091

Total Le
Havre
no. %

1,405 2.4
3,206^ 4.6
4,46^ 5.7
5,626 6.9
5,863 7.1
6,974 8.4
8,786 10.5
8,012 9.5

3,717 4.6
5,26i 6.4

Sources; AURH, Donne'es Statistiques sur le Marche* de 1'Habitat dans la Rdgion du Havre, no. 6 (October 1979) P»95 and no.9 (June 1981), p.91.
Plan d'Agglomeration, 1976-80, Commission Logement, Le Point
de la Situation, p.23.

Note; Counting empty housing units from year to year is inevitably an im-precise exercise, and these figures should be treated with caution.
Some (l) are certainly inflated by new flats temporarily awaiting
occupants. Moreover, the first eight sets of figures are based on electricity counters showing no consumption, and make no distinction between homes and business premises. Only the last two sets (2)
are based on the AuRH's own estimates, which do make this distinction and are thus substantially lower. The figures do, however, give an idea of the size of the problem and of its growth.

Table C.9 416

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Total
HLM as
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total

5.00
10.14
17.25
20.56
20.17
18.89
23.35
19-75
26.74
30.03
31.49
30.27
28.96
28.87
30.18
31.78
30.23
30.66
32.35
36.10
34.68
34.06 •
34.94
32.27
32.77
36.31
32.96
31.27

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it fell below

Lo^e^.ent en

Table C.9: France^ Housing Units Completed by financial Sector, 1949-76

Financial Reconst-
Sector ruction
X.

Date ^V.

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1953
1959
I960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

20,000

31,000
31,000

29,000
36,000
37,200
34,700
32,600
32,900
24 , 200
17,100
12,700
11 , 800
8,300
3,800
2,400
1,300
700
300
100

-
-
-
-
-
—

-
-

HLM
(Rent)

2,400
5,800
10,100
12,500
15,800
20 , 200
36,000
30,400
54,500
63,700

82 , 800
77,000
70 , 800
63,300
78,900
92,300
95,800
96,900
105,300
116,600
116,800
121,300
127,800
126,900
109,000
121,700
111,500
98,100

HLM
(Sale)

. 500
'1,500
3,700
6,000
8,400
10,400
14,200
15,300
18,700
18,900
18,100
13,600
20 , 700
20 , 900
22,500
24,900
28,600
30,100
31,500
31 , 800
31,300
34,100
33,400
49,400
55,000
60,000
58,000
42,500

Subsid-
ised pri-
vate
sector

-

400

10,700
29,700
44,400
73,000
105,000
130,200
145 , 300

154,400
174,200

176,700

180,600
177,600
191,900
207,300
227,000
201 , 800
193,100
166,800
181,900
199,600
220,000
233,800
173,700
149,500
137,000
113,200

1 Non
Subsid-
ised

35,100
33,300
24,500
12,300
15,400
21 , 200
25,200
22,900
21,300
25,500
28,200
31,300
32,100
33,900

33,900
41,900
58,800
84,700
92,700
85,800
97,000
101,300

104,000
136,200
162,800
169,200
207,800
195,300

Total

58,000
72,000
80,000
90,000
120,000
162,000
215,100
231,400
273,700
291,700
320,400
316,500
316,000
309,000

336,000
368,300
411,500
414,200
422,900
411,100
427,000
456,300
475,700
546,300
500,500
500,400
514,300
443,900

HLM
Rent as

per cent
total

4.14
8.05
12.63
13.89
13.17
12.47
16.74
13.14

19.91
23.55
25.34
24.33

22.41
22.10
23.43
25.03
23.28
23.39
24.90
23.36
27.35
26.58
26.87
23.23
21.78
24-32
21.68
21.85

Total
HLM as
per cerr
total

5.00
10.14
17.25
20.56
20.17
18.89
23.35
19.75
26.74
30.03
31.49
30.27
28.96
28.87
30.18
31.78
30.23
30.66
32.35
36.10
34.68
34.06 •
34.94
32.27
32.77
36.31
32.96
31.27

Detailed statistics are not available for the post-1976 period. .he total number of housing completions has never exceeded 460,000 since 1975, however, and it fell below 400,000 in 19dO.

^ources: IN3EE, Donr.a'es [jocialeg, 1973, 192: Daniel .luault, "La Orise du Lorer.ent en /ranee 7, -10, 5-

Table C.10 417
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g Rouelies

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Tauie U.lU; in me
SDAU area by Year.

Source ; AUKH, Ijonne'es otatistiques sur le I'larche" de 1 'Habitat dans la Region du Havre. no. 9 (June 1981), 21.

1,071 - annual total completed units in JDAU area

•403- < - annual total completed units in S-OAli area except Le Havre

annual total completed units in comiuune oi Le Havre (including Itouelles
ana -arfleur-Caucriauville for all years)

~ year

— annual total target for completed units in 3JJAU area for
Vlth and Vllth Plans.

1,000 •

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v.v
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Xvv

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v.v

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v.v,

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.vvv •Xv* vvv*

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I,1J« •.*.*.*,
.vv, vvv,

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v.v,
vvv. .*.*,

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vvv • • * •
.vvv

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Xvv
.vvv

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.vvv .*.*.*.'
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Table C.ll 418
'1-80

1 878

521

1 603

381

Octeville ; /
?, Saint-

lle,
icent-

Table C.11; Detail of Housing units Completed in oDAU Area leas Le Havre, 1971-80_

800

600

400

200

0

1971-75 (average)
average annual total:
753 s ^

T <

Ji-5

m

«•««•»•••<
».«..«««

800 .. 1978: total 1,087 760

400 •

4-00

100 •

1976: total 1,078

1979: total 846

515

1977: total 878

'47

1980: total 603

TJ

Sche'raa de oecteur de Montivilliers equals Hontivilliera, Fontaine-la-Mallet, Octeville Cauville, Hannevillette, Le Fontenay, I-Iotre-Daine-du-Bec, Rolleville, iipouville, Saint-' Martin-du-Hanoir, Gainneville, Mandglise.

Schema de oecteur de Saint-Romain equals Saint-Homain-de Colbosc, 3t-Laurent-de-Brdv- ^dent, Rogerville, Sainneville, Btainhus, Graimbouillet, dt-Gilles-de-la-Keuville, Epretot, Gommervilie, Les Troia Fierres, Saint-Aubin-ioutot, La Remu^e, St-yincent-de-Cramesnil, Oudalle, Sandouville, 3t-Vigor d'Ymonville, La Cerlangue, Tancarville (cf. map 27).

Source: AURH, Donn^ea Statistiques, no.9. 21.

r. 1971-80
- 1——U——— Table C.12 419

organ-

•.e'diata),
ifi'ered to
"iea norms.

.7t June

1.071

Table C.12; Housing Units Completed in SDAU Area by J'inancial sector, 1971-80

MA Non Aide", the 'pure' private sector
PC Prgts Conventionngs, units financed by loans fror. it._te credit organ-isations at nea.r-co:n:r,ercial rates.

PIC (Prets Immobiliers a la Construction), PSI (Prets o-e'ciuux im.'.-.e'diats), ar.d PAP (Prets a 1'Accession a la rropri^tg) are State loans offered to :io;:ie buyers v/r.ose ii.comes and wnose homes correspond to specifiea nonr.s. (1930 statistics group IILM for sale with PIC, PSI, PA?)
Sources: A'uilti, Dossier xiaoitat, Vol.1, 61: Donn^es Statistiq^ues, no.7. June 1980, 33: no.9, June 1931, 32.
The AURH changed th>. basis of its classification in 1980, and the figures ' for 1980 are thus not strictly comparable with the others.
3.5-00 T

\000

1,500

2, ODD

I.'CO

TOO

Table C.13? Annual Construction of Houses and j'lats in the aDAU Area, 1971-80 (the shaded area corresponds to flats)

source; AUrtH, Dossier Habitat, Vol.1, 60: Donne'es Statistiques, no.9, 20

3,000

1.000

1,000

3,384

2,812

•(74%) 171%

811

I.FOg

711

l.W
(71'i)

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Table G.14; Go-Ordinated and Unstructured Urban Development in the 5DAU Area, 1971-80 (the shaded area corresponds to housing units
built in Zones d'Habitation, ZUPs ana ZACs).

oource; AuRH, Donne'es Statistiques, no.9» 20.

1,000

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- ^sS-? ——————————— ^

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MA i'-on-Aide", the "pure 1 private sector.

PC Frets Gonventionne'a, units financed Dy loans from otate credit organisations at near-commercial
rates.

PIC (Prets Inunobiliers a la Construction), Pol , (Prgts .jpe'ciaux Ii.ime'diats) and jr'AP (Pre'ts a 1 'Acc-ession a. la Proprie'te'J are all type^ of dtate loans offered to home buyers wuose incomes and whose homes conform to certain norms.

oource; Ville du Havre, Service de 1'Habitat. The

1965-69 figures are only available for the conurb-ation, and the sharp drop between 19&9 and 1970 is i^Lrily due to the inclusion of all construction
on tne Caucriauville ZUP (part of wnich was on the -territory of Harfleur till 1971) in 1969 but not 1970. .Discrepancies between the total annual figures anu Table C.10 occur because until 1977 the Service de 1'Habitat counted homes which had found occupants, rather than completed units (as counted by the
AUitH and by the Service de 1'Eaoitat from l';>77).
The 1974 breakdown only snows ELM and other building, no more detailed figures being available for this

year.

1.000

TOO

.'able C.15; Housing Units Completed by r'ir'ancial oector 1965-1981

1965-69: Le Havre conurb-
ation (incl. Ste-Adresse,
Harfleur, Gonfreville, I'-ionti-
villiers, Gainneville, dt-i-lartin,
dt-Laurent, ipouville, ^ontaine-
la-Hallet).

1970-81: Commune of
Le Havre only (exclud-
ing Harfleur-Caucriau-
ville in 1970-71).

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CJ

Table C.l6; Individual Rehabilitation Work in Le Havre Subsidised by the A;-;ence Rationale pour 1 'Amglloration de 1'Habitat (AKAIi) f 1973-1^00, by Coat and Area fcf. J-iap 37).

Table C.l6; Individual Rehabilitation Vork In Le Havre _8ubsidised Tjy__thg. A'-ence National e pour 1 'Amelioration de 1 'Habitat (AFAIi) , 1573-1^00, by
Coat and Area (of.]• ap 37).

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8^6?

Table C.17: The Waiting List of the OPHLMVDH in 1979,
by Income ana oize of Family

^*sw *»t»? ti»e
MOKHrXj <**"V
^'"ffr^SCT1

under 500 (*)
500— 900
900-1 , 300
1,300-1,700
1,700-2,100
2,100-2,500
2,500-2,900
2,900-3,300
3,300-3,700
3,700-4,100
4,100-4,500
4,500-4,900
4,900-5,300
5,300-5,700

5,700-6,100
over 6,100
TOTAL

<PLR ceiling
PLR--HLM
HLM-^ILM

) ILM ceiling
(SMIC(2,10Q)

> *

35
7
33
28
65
79
75
60
28
14
•6
4
4
4

-

2
444
168
115
141
20

168

2

53
8

13
17
28
66
85
75
59
60
50
51
54
46
26
40
731
201
209
275
46
119

3
17
4
5
7
17
30
35
42
35
30
16
14
19
14
17
28
330
124
100
103
3
50

4

9
" 3
2
3
8
12
23
27
18
15
13
12
8
7
3
9
172
92
52
28

-

27

5

1

-

3
5
6
6
4
15
9
15
7
3
2
3
3
4
86
60
24
2

-

15

6

1

-
-
-

3
2
4
4
3
1

-

3
2

-
-

2
25
21
4

-
-

4

over 6

7
1

Total

123
23
2 1 58

-

5
7

60
127
200
233
5 228
5 157
2 137
2 94
87
2
1

-

1
40
40

-
-
-

10

91
75
49
86
1,828
706
504
549
69
393

% total

6.73
1.27
3.23
3.28
6.95
10.94
12.74
12.48
8.59
7.49
5.15
4.75
4.97
4.10
2.68
4.70
100.00
38.62
27.57
30.03
3.78
21.46

Noteji (a): the bracket below 500 francs includes conscript soldiers, students and others of minimal financial independence who expect to be earnir
by the time they move into an HLM flat.
("b) the last five lines show the numbers of potential tenants falling below the income ceilings set by the OPHLM for its different levels
of accommodation, and the number earning less than the minimum wage.
^ource : urriU-iVDH, /apport £, 1'Arrui ^u .Jcxote /ir.d.ncier de I 'Ar.r.rje l,79i -9-

Table C.lSi The waiting list of the OPHLMVDH, 1979» bY length of constitution of households and date of registration on list. (Source: OPiLLKVlill, Rapport, 1979, 74).

year

i9n

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977 .
1978
1979

totals

% of
total

Fiance's

number

0
0
0
0
0
2
8
27
59
9^

%

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.08
8.33
28.13
61.46

100.00

5.25%

Households of under
5 years ' standing

number

0
0
4
6
5
28
36
68
185

332

%

0.00
0.00
1.21
1.81
1.50
8.44
10.84
20.48
55.72

100.00

18.16%

Households of over
5 years ' standing ^ \

number

2
6
12
24
39
72
120
247
878

1,400

#

0.14.
0.43
i

0 86
1.71
2.78
5.14
8.57
17.63
62.74

100.00

76.59%

General totals

number

2
6
16
30
44
102
164
342
1,122

1,828

%

0.11
0.33
0.87

1.64

2.41
5.58
8.97
18.71
61.38

100.00

single persons

Table C.19; Preferred Locations of Applicants at the OPHLKVJJH, 1979 (Source; ALHH, Donn^es Statistiques, no.6, 105).

Prei'errea Area

Centre ville Quest
Dqllemard
Les Neiges
Graville
Eure

Tourneville-Haut Graville-Bois au Coq
Mare Rouge
Mont-Gaillard
Bleville-Henti Dunant
Bois de Bleville
Aplemont
Caucriauville
Harf leur
Gonfreville 1'Orcher
Montivilliers
Banlieue du Havre

TOTAL

Number oi' Applicants

704
2
18
329
75
215
67
180
128
29
112
210
105
21
1 1
11

2.217

i\?umber as Per Cent 01' Total

31,7
0,09
. 0,8
14,8
3,4 '
9,7
3,0
8,1
5,9
1,4
5,0
9,5
4,7
0,9
0,5
0,5

100,0

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CC - Cahiers du Communisme
Esp. & Soc. - Espaces et Socie'te's
FNSP - Fond at ion Nationa'le de Sciences Politiques
RFSP - Revue Francaise de Science Politique
SERH - Soci^td d'Etudes Urbaines de la Region Havraise
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