


**An Uncommon Community:
France and the European Defence Community,
1950-1954**

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St. Anne's College
October 1996



Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of D.Phil in International Relations in the Faculty of Social Studies at the University of Oxford.

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Abstract

This thesis examines French policy towards the European Defence Community from 1950-1954. In October 1950 the French government proposed the creation of a European defence community (EDC), modelled on the European Coal and Steel Community plan, in response to US pressure for West German rearmament. After two years of negotiation a treaty establishing this force was signed between France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux on 27 May 1952. It took a further two years before the project collapsed, the result of the French National Assembly's failure to ratify the treaty in August 1954. The thesis traces this tortuous path and argues that, despite the apparent inconsistency, the preoccupation which prompted France to introduce the EDC proposal was the same one that led to the rejection of the project four years later. The concern throughout was with securing a position of leadership in the Western Alliance.

The principal factor facilitating French EDC policy continuity, this study contends, was the small circle of individuals that dominated French EDC policymaking. The thesis identifies two principal groups involved in the formulation and management of French EDC policy throughout the four year project: senior administrative officials in the Foreign Ministry and the small transatlantic network of Jean Monnet, the original framer of the EDC proposal. Their perceptions, preoccupations and activities are the key to explaining the paradox of continuity in French EDC policy.

Primary sources form the basis of this study: French, US and British government papers and private papers are used extensively to draw together the complex story of this important episode in the construction of the Western Alliance framework.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Anne Deighton, for her help and support throughout this project which I dedicate to my parents with appreciation and much love.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	i
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Chapter Two: A history of plans: The origins of the Pleven Plan of 24 October 1950.....	17
French plans for the Western Alliance.....	17
A new French initiative - the Schuman Plan, May 1950	24
Reactions to Korea.....	28
The New York conferences, 12-18 September 1950	35
Chapter Three: A Plan without plan? October - December 1950	46
Monnet's strategy to sell EDC.....	47
The NATO partners refuse to buy	50
French and US officials attempt to compromise.....	55
The French Cabinet gives way.....	62
NATO agreement at Brussels, 18-19 December 1950.....	66
Chapter Four: First Steps: January - August 1951	69
Mending fences at home and abroad	69
The Paris Conference for a European Army, February 1951	74
Discussion at Petersberg and Palais Rose, January - June, 1951	77
The revision of US EDC policy, July - August 1951	80
French policy revision	85
Chapter Five: Plans and progress: September 1951 - May 1952.....	93
The Washington and Ottawa conferences, September 1951.....	93
Action at the Paris Conference, Autumn 1951	98
EDC Foreign Ministers' meetings, December 1951 - January 1952	100
France seeks assurances.....	102
Franco-German disputes	106
The US umpires: the London and Lisbon conferences, February 1952.....	110
Final French obstacles	113
Chapter Six: Progress of a different sort: May 1952 - January 1953	119
The EDC Treaty.....	119
Opinion in the French government and parliament	123
The project for a European political authority	127
The Quai d'Orsay campaign to renew the NATO link	131
The Truman administration's last efforts.....	135
A new French government.....	140

Chapter Seven: Remodelling EDC, January - July 1953.....	145
The Quai's revolt	146
The additional protocols	152
The <i>ad hoc</i> Assembly report.....	156
British association to EDC.....	159
US support - and its limitations	161
International changes	165
Chapter Eight: Preparing a new plan, June 1953 - June 1954.....	170
The Washington meetings, 10-14 July 1953	171
Existing EDC conditions: EPC, the Saar and UK association.....	174
The Bermuda and Paris NAC conferences, December 1953	178
French alternatives	184
French government preoccupations	187
Acrimonious resolution - the US declaration, UK association and the Saar	191
The beginning of the end	194
Chapter Nine: Discarding the old plan, June - August 1954.....	198
Mendès France and his programme for government	199
Initiatives outside France	201
Preparations at the Quai	205
Mendès France turns to EDC.....	210
Confrontation at Brussels.....	213
Chartwell - 23 August 1954.....	219
Loose ends in Paris	220
Chapter Ten: Conclusion.....	225
Appendix I.....	237
Appendix II.....	245
Bibliography	246

Abbreviations

CDU	<i>Christlich-Demokratische Union</i> (Ger)
CGP	<i>Commissariat Général du Plan</i>
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EPC	European Political Community
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (US)
MDAP	Mutual Defence Assistance Pact
MRP	<i>Mouvement du Républicain Populaire</i> (Fr)
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	National Security Council (US)
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
RPF	<i>Rassemblement du Peuple Français</i> (Fr)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SPD	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (Ger)
TCC	Temporary Council Committee ('Wise Men')
UDSR	<i>Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance</i> (Fr)
WU	Western Union (The five signatories of the Brussels Treaty)

Chapter One

Introduction

The crowds that lined the leafy length of the Champs-Élysées on 14 July 1994 cheered as formations of French airforce jets shot past overhead, streaming trails of red, blue and white smoke behind them. The traditional military parade on Bastille Day had a special resonance in a year marking the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of France from Nazi occupation. Enthusiastic applause greeted the veterans of World War II who led the parade from the Arc de Triomphe to the Concorde and the Charles de Gaulle Etoile. Among those participating in the celebration of France's military past and present was a unit from the Franco-German Eurocorps. In their modest uniforms, with neither horses, armour, nor machinery, the presence of the Eurocorps reflected the fundamental change that had taken place in the Franco-German relationship since 1945. It offered a symbol too of France's military future. What was easy to forget, in Paris that day, was that this integrated unit also had a history, for which summer 1994 held its own particular resonances. August 1994 marked the fortieth anniversary of the collapse, after four long years of planning and discussions, of the attempt to create an integrated European army between France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux - the European Defence Community (EDC).¹ Moreover, it was in Paris itself that the European Army project was launched by the French government in October 1950 and in that same city that the EDC treaty was finally rejected by the French parliament.

Part of the reason for the relative lack of attention which the history of the first attempt to create an institutionalised European defence force has received lies in the centrality of France's role in the project. In the abundant literature on the subject of Western defence, Western Alliance relations and European integration in the 1950s the EDC has come to be identified with the history of the French Fourth Republic itself.² The story of the European Army is presented as a testament of France's

¹The proposal to create a European Army was launched initially as the Plevin Plan, after the French Prime Minister, René Plevin. Not until Summer 1951 did the European Defence Community (EDC) become the phrase used to describe the European Army. In this thesis, I use Germany and West Germany interchangeably.

²The only detailed study of the EDC itself is Edward Fursdon's *The European Defence Community: A History* (London, 1980), written before the opening of national archives. A key contemporary account is Raymond Aron and Daniel Lerner (eds.) *France Defeats EDC* (New York, 1957) which emphasises the crisis-ridden French political system. Jules Moch's *Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950*

external and domestic weakness: French fear of Germany and German rearmament led to the introduction of a proposal for an integrated Army and, as the story goes, accounted for its protracted and difficult negotiation. Its death at the hands of the French parliament is taken as evidence of the fundamental and intractable divisions in the political system of the Fourth Republic, a portent of its collapse a mere four years later. Raymond Aron's 1956 description of the EDC episode as 'the greatest ideological and political debate France has known since the Dreyfus affair' has provided a convenient and longstanding label.³ While this standard approach highlights (and sometimes, overdramatises) the difficult domestic political environment in which EDC policy was made, it fails to locate the principal forces dominating that process and, crucially, ignores the degree of coherence in French EDC policymaking.

Accounts of the European Defence Community that emphasise the episode as a part of the early history of European integration - the other principal theme in the historiography and one particularly dominant in the memoirs of many participants - do not seek to challenge the basic EDC orthodoxy.⁴ Setting EDC in the context of the

(Paris, 1965) is a broad account by one of the participants (and important opponent) in the episode. Accounts of the Fourth Republic that deal with the EDC in some depth include, Georgette Elgey, *La République des Contradictions 1951-54* (Paris, 1968); Alfred Grosser, *La IVe République et sa politique extérieure* (Paris, 1961); Guy de Carmoy, *Les politiques étrangères de la France, 1944-66* (Paris, 1967); Edgar Furniss, *France, Troubled Ally* (New York, 1960); Frank Giles, *The Locust Years* (London, 1991). More recent studies of the period have concentrated on social and economic aspects of the Fourth Republic and the challenges of post-war reconstruction, the most authoritative of which is Jean-Pierre Rioux, *La France de la IVe République*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1980, 1983). Studies of US-French relations that explore EDC in this national context include, Irwin Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France 1945-54* (Cambridge, 1991); more generally, Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II*, (Boston, 1994). In a recent article Richard Kuisel identifies 'clusters' of US academic writing on France and describes the earliest one, covering the 1940s and 1950s as the 'Sick Man of Europe' cluster, 'American Historians in Search of France: Perceptions and Misperceptions', *French Historical Studies*, 19, no. 2, Fall 1995. I would argue that a similar characterisation is evident in French writing especially from the perspective of the early Fifth Republic.

³Raymond Aron, 'Historical Sketch of the Great Debate', Aron and Lerner (eds.) *France Defeats EDC*, 2-21. It is unclear whether Aron actually coined the phrase. Michel Debré, the most virulent anti-EDC opponent in the French parliament and whose memoirs treat the episode in detail, suggests it was his particular analogy, *Trois républiques pour une France*, ii, *Agir, 1946-58* (Paris, 1988).

⁴The proliferation of memoirs from politicians and officials involved in post-war Western reconstruction testifies to their shared perception of the historical significance of the task. Memoirs of European activists include, Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Mayne, (London, 1978); Paul-Henri Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1969); Etienne Hirsch, *Ainsi va la vie* (Lausanne, 1988); Robert Marjolin, *Architect of European Unity: Memoirs, 1911-86* (London, 1989); Pierre Uri, *Penser pour l'action: un fondateur de l'Europe* (Paris, 1991); George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York, 1982); Hervé Alphand, *L'Etonnement d'être* (Paris, 1979). The memoirs of René Massigli, *Une Comédie des Erreurs, 1943-1956: Souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la*

attempt to overcome the weakness of European nation states through the building of a united Europe is, rather, an amplification and a detailing of the link between the European Army history and the story of France's weakness between 1950-54. The European integrative approach stresses the revolutionary nature of the EDC initiative: how, like the plan to integrate Europe's coal and steel resources, the European Army marked a fundamental break with the past and the national rivalries that had previously defined continental foreign policies. This theme rightly identifies the political nature of the EDC project but it has tended to subordinate the episode to the more successful examples of European building. Not surprisingly, the focus of this literature centres on the roles played by the nascent European organisations and the actors in the EDC project. One of the most immediate consequences of this has been a tendency to underplay the horrendous complexity of the EDC story and the intricate weave of political, economic and military dimensions that were involved. As a result, EDC's failure has been characterised in terms of the wider European integration experiment: the claim that British non-participation rendered EDC impossible; the neo-functional argument that successful integration can only take place as a gradual, spillover effect beginning with issues of low political salience; the debate whether defence can ever be part of that process.⁵

construction européenne (Paris, 1978) provides a detailed account of the episode from the perspective of an opponent to supranational European integration. Other important personal accounts of the EDC project include, Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969), Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 2 vols. (London and Stuttgart, 1966), Anthony Eden *Full Circle* (London, 1960).

⁵Arnold Zurcher, *The Struggle to Unite Europe, 1940-58* (Washington Square, 1958); Jaques van Helmont, *Options européennes, 1945-1985* (Brussels, 1986); Pierre Gerbert, *La Construction de l'Europe* (Paris, 1983); Dirk Spierenberg and Raymond Poidevin, *The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community* (London, 1994); On UK non-participation as a cause of EDC's collapse, Anthony Nutting, *Europe Will Not Wait*, (London 1960), Richard Mayne, *The Recovery of Europe* (London, 1970). On theories of integration see Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation State* (Stanford, 1964); Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (eds.) *Regional Integration: theory and research* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971). More recent studies have challenged the extent to which European integration was motivated by the desire to create a new supranational entity. The most important proponent of this argument, which concentrates on economic integration, is Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (London, 1984); *The European Rescue of the Nation State* (London, 1992); in this revisionist vein see John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-55*, (Cambridge, 1991) and John W. Young, *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-1954* (Leicester, 1984); for a French-based approach, Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944-1954* 2 vols. (Paris, 1992). Recent important biographies, however, continue to emphasise the revolutionary and idealistic nature of the project, Raymond Poidevin, *Robert Schuman: Homme d'Etat* (Paris, 1986); François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York, 1994); Eric Roussel, *Jean Monnet* (Paris, 1996).

The renewed interest in European defence projects that has followed the recent fundamental changes in the international order has seen a return to the period of the late 1940s and early 1950s during which the bipolar order was created.⁶ The end of the Cold War, the redrawing of the European map and the related drive towards the completion and the expansion of the European Union have necessitated a fundamental reassessment of the purpose, the nature and the organisation of the Western Alliance. In exploring future frameworks for regional and international order attention has inevitably turned to the only previous institutional experiment to create an integrated European defence. This process has been facilitated by the opening of state and private archives for the period in Europe and the United States. The possibility of multi-archival research, as well as increased interaction between Anglo-American and (for want of a better word) continental scholars, makes a comprehensive exploration of the origins and the development of the European Army project within the context of the creation and emergence of the Western Alliance possible for the first time.⁷

This thesis seeks to contribute to this process by addressing the dominant story of France's role in the European Defence Community. Two basic questions drive this study: why did France introduce a proposal for the European Army in October 1950? Why did it reject its own initiative four years later? The answers that emerge shed new light on French policy toward the European Defence Community project, both on the preoccupations that motivated it and the processes in which it was elaborated and practiced. The study of French policy in EDC from 1950-1954 strikes at the heart of

⁶The best archival-based studies of the origins and early development of the Western Alliance which have recently emerged are, with the exception of Kaplan, edited collections, Lawrence Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years*, (Lexington, 1984); Olav Riste (ed.) *Western Security: The Formative Years*, (Oslo, 1985); Francis Heller and John Gillingham (eds.) *NATO*, (London, 1992); Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds.) *Securing Peace In Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era* (Basingstoke, 1992); Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster (eds.) *The Western Security Community: Common Problems and Conflicting National Interests during the Foundation Phase of the NAC* (Oxford, 1993); David Reynolds (ed.) *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven, 1994); Maurice Vaisse, Pierre Mélandri, and Frédéric Bozo (eds.) *La France et l'OTAN* (Paris, 1996).

⁷A number of studies have appeared which place EDC within the context of national foreign and defence policies, notably, Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament: 1950-55* (Cambridge, 1991); Jan van der Harst, *The Netherlands and the EDC* (Florence, 1986); Antonio Varsori, 'Italy between the Atlantic Alliance and EDC, 1948-55' in Ennio di Nolfo (ed.) *Power in Europe?* Vol. II, (Berlin, 1992) 260-99; Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956*, ii, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich, 1990).

France's European and alliance policies in the early Cold War and reveals the roots of the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic.⁸

A primary theme of my thesis is that it was the search for a leading position in the post-war Western Alliance that was the central preoccupation driving French policy throughout the four years. This policy remained remarkably consistent between 1950-1954. Chapter one outlines why a position of leadership within the Atlantic Alliance was regarded as fundamental for French decision-makers and how the active pursuit of leadership through the newly emerging institutions of the West was the policy of the French government, even before the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 1949. The acceleration of Western defence efforts against potential Soviet aggression after the invasion of South Korea by forces from the Communist North in June 1950 and the United States' demand that the newly established Federal Republic of Germany should participate militarily in this collective enterprise reinforced France's leadership drive. Far from representing a fundamental departure from previous policy, the French government's proposal to create a permanent supranational European force within the developing NATO defence framework reflected the continuity of French policy objectives and methods.

The principal variable defining French strategies for institutionalised Western leadership was the attitude of the United States. Policy-makers in Paris recognised that only with the approbation and active assistance of the principal Western power could France hope to achieve its leadership goals. The European Army project that emerged was not merely a response to Washington's demands for German rearmament but a way of ensuring the enthusiastic support of the pro-European federation Truman administration. Chapters two and three of the thesis explore the importance of US reactions for the French European Army initiative. It was the United States, rather than its European allies, that Paris sought to convince of the merits of the proposal and it was Washington's commitment to and involvement in the

⁸No comprehensive study of France and the EDC has been published and in this absence a number of key articles based on French archives (some of which remain unopened), as well as reviving the question, have become principal reference points. The two most important are Pierre Guillen, 'Les chefs militaires français, le réarmement de l'Allemagne et la CED', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 129, Jan. 1983, 3-33 and Raymond Poidevin, 'La France devant le problème de la CED: incidences nationales et internationales (été 1951 à été 1953)' in the same issue, 35-57.

project that was regarded as central. France used that support, once it had been given, as a bargaining-tool to secure the massive US financial, military and political assistance it so desperately required for its domestic and international recovery, a rehabilitation which would, in turn, ensure France a position of permanent leadership in the Alliance. This thesis illustrates the degree to which Paris pursued a Franco-American joint approach to the negotiation and supervision of the European Army proposal, which was reflected at the level of individual decision-makers by the intimate involvement of US officials in the elaboration of the EDC treaty between the six European states from 1951-52. The extent of US involvement in the construction and elaboration of the EDC treaty is one of the principal conclusions to emerge from the opening of national archives, especially through biographical studies of leading US officials.⁹

Preoccupation with US partnership in the Western Alliance took precedence over the detailed elaboration of the European Army project itself. Only after the EDC treaty was signed, as Chapters four and five demonstrate, did French policy-makers give serious consideration to the content and the consequences of the European Defence Community. The implications of membership in a collective European organisation for France's western leadership goals lay at the core of French reassessment of the EDC project between 1952-54. Chapter six examines the way in which Paris attempted to remodel the European Army treaty to assist, rather than constrain, French institutionalised leadership in the West. Once again, the assistance of the United States was identified as the principal means by which this would be achieved. Only when it became clear that this support would not be forthcoming did policymakers start to question France's wider leadership strategy, of which EDC was a part. Chapters seven and eight show how the conclusions reached by French EDC policy-makers led to the deliberate, managed, rejection of the European Defence

⁹In particular, Thomas Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1991); Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy and the Making of the American Establishment*, (New York, 1992); Nelson Lankford, *The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of David K.E. Bruce* (New York, 1996); My 1993 Oxford M.Phil thesis, 'The United States and the EDC, 1950-52' examines US EDC policy up until the signing of the treaty. More generally, Pierre Melandri, *Les Etats-Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe, 1945-1954* (Paris, 1980) and an older, but highly perceptive account, Ernst van der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy* (Amsterdam, 1966).

Community in August 1954. Consistency of objective marked French policy throughout.

This thesis demonstrates how the EDC episode is, above all, a story about intra-Western relations in the early Cold War. In the EDC story that emerges from the archives the USSR plays a comparatively minor role: indeed the degree to which French policymakers appear not to have been preoccupied with the Soviet threat is one of its most striking aspects. What it does illustrate is how complex and relatively lengthy a process the development of the Western Alliance actually was. As an exercise in alliance-building, the EDC project demonstrates that the construction of formal institutions was the fundamental tool in this endeavour. The study of French policy toward the EDC reveals the challenge alliance-building presented for its participants. Above all, it strikes at the core question of how to organise leadership within a collective institutional framework.

The second strand running through this thesis focuses on the small and highly-personalised nature of French EDC policy-making. I argue that the key to understanding both the consistency of France's leadership objectives and the way in which their pursuit led French policy-makers first to and then away from the European army initiative lies in the identification of the influential actors - and their dominant concerns - in French EDC policy-making. The study of EDC confirms how the weak and divided nature of the French political system hampered the establishment of a unified, cohesive government. Domestic divisions served to distract politicians from giving consistent attention to foreign policy questions while French public opinion remained largely untouched by the game of parliamentary charades that so successfully obscured the issues of the day. As a result, the elaboration and management of foreign policy issues centred on the French administrative services, a responsibility encouraged and legitimated by a respected tradition, dating from Napoleon, of a specialised civil service elite.¹⁰ Bureaucrats provided not merely

¹⁰No account of the Fourth Republic fails to mention this central feature of policymaking in all fields, as do the numerous memoirs produced by the participants. The classic study of the institutions of the Fourth Republic remains Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London, 1964); on French administrative elites see Jolyon Howorth and Philip G. Cerny (eds.) *Elites in France* (London, 1981); Ezra N. Suleiman, *Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival* (Princeton, 1978); John A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite* (Princeton, 1973).

expertise but stability and consistency for a system in which government collapse was a dominant feature. Their common educational and training backgrounds facilitated a degree of unity and consensus that was so sorely lacking in the political environment.

At the same time, the political system of the Fourth Republic left it remarkably open to penetration from individuals or groups outside the formal administration. Each government minister could and did appoint a personal staff (*cabinet*), which acted both as policy advisor and principal conduit to the minister. In the politically contested climate of the Fourth Republic, ministerial *cabinets* provided one of the few non-combative arenas for the discussion and formulation of policy. Between the minister and his department, his party and his government, therefore, lay a small team of individuals, not necessarily elected nor drawn from the civil service. The closeness and the success of the relationship between the *cabinet* and the bureaucracy was open to significant variation.

Yet it was not only the structure and the weakness of the domestic political system that encouraged a pattern of reliance on administrative and personal officials. The sheer range of competing issues and pressures facing all governments of the 1950s; the challenge of national and international recovery in unstable and frequently hostile internal and external environments; and the very unfamiliarity of the post-war European landscape moved political leaders to lean heavily on established policy practitioners and practices at the same time as they searched for and responded to new actors and new ideas. This thesis identifies two particular groups within the French administration as the principal forces in French EDC policy-making: Jean Monnet and his team at the French National Planning offices (*Commissariat du Plan*) and the senior leadership of the French Foreign Ministry (Quai d'Orsay). These officials dominated the formulation, the development and the practice of French EDC policy from 1950-1954. Their perceptions, their ideas and their actions are the key to the paradox of consistency in the French EDC experience.

The singular domestic and international position occupied by Jean Monnet in the 1950s has been the subject of frequent comment and recent research.¹¹ Monnet's

¹¹ Apart from the Duchêne and Roussel biographies see, Pascaline Winand, *Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe* (New York, 1993); Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (eds.) *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (London, 1991); W. W. Rostow, 'Jean Monnet: The Innovator as

extensive range of personal contacts with political and business elites in France, Europe and, above all, the United States dating from the 1920s were widened and deepened, to use a suitably European phrase, during the common Allied effort in World War II. As the French government representative on the British Supply Council in Washington, Monnet worked intimately with US officials and, by the end of the war, enjoyed unparalleled access to top-levels of decision-making both there and in his own country. The creation of a French national planning agency under the direct responsibility of the French Prime Minister in 1946 formally authorised Monnet to the role he had already begun to carve out as the modernising director of French post-war recovery. It made him and his small hand-picked team of economic planners - Etienne Hirsch, Robert Marjolin, Pierre Uri, Jaques van Helmont - both part of the administrative system and yet free to bypass the bureaucracy. It gave him specific responsibility for policy innovation. Above all, it brought Monnet's influential transatlantic network of contacts into the service of the nascent Fourth Republic.

In this context, Monnet's initiation, through Prime Minister Plevin, of the European Army proposal in October 1950 is not surprising and has long been established.¹² This thesis also confirms Monnet's role in winning vital US support for the French proposal, illustrating his use of personal contacts and both official and unofficial channels to convince US officials, first in Europe, then in Washington, that EDC represented the best institutional framework for the organisation of European defence. Monnet, in turn, used this international support to secure domestic political and administrative commitment to the EDC project, a 'double-edged' strategy that is sometimes overlooked in the study of Monnet's operating methods.¹³ My research also sheds new light on Monnet's continuing involvement in the EDC and French

Diplomat' in Gordon Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.) *The Diplomats, 1939-79* (Princeton, 1994).

¹²The most detailed recent account is Philippe Vial, 'Jean Monnet: un père pour la CED?' in René Girault and Gérard Bossuat (eds.) *Europe brisée, Europe retrouvée: Nouvelles réflexions sur l'unité européenne au XXe siècle* (Paris, 1994).

¹³Robert Putnam in his important article, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', *International Organization*, 42, no. 3, Summer 1988 explores the entanglement between domestic and international issues and how, particularly in situations of domestic cleavage, policymakers may use international coalitions to achieve policy objectives at home. A weak domestic situation may also be used, conversely, as a bargaining tool in international negotiations. Monnet's tactics offer a good example of the two-level approach in action. On transnational relations in general, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (eds.) *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972).

policy towards it throughout the four year period. Even after summer 1952, when the EDC treaty was signed and Monnet had taken up the Presidency of the newly-established Coal and Steel High Authority in Luxembourg, *l'Inspirateur* (as de Gaulle less than affectionately called him) continued to act as the principal influence shaping the ongoing development of the defence project, using his formidable range of contacts in a powerful multiple advocacy campaign.¹⁴ Tracing this involvement reveals how much conceptions of the EDC developed throughout the four years of the EDC negotiations. As Monnet and his colleagues' vision of an integrated defence community expanded, the character of the EDC project was fundamentally altered. In the absence of a European Army blueprint, the ideas and actions of Monnet and his network are central to an understanding of its development.

This strand of the EDC story, moreover, highlights the transatlantic character of the network of EDC activists.¹⁵ Monnet's cooption of the most senior US officials in Europe into the project - High Commissioner in Germany John J. McCloy, David Bruce, Ambassador in Paris and later, the newly-appointed NATO Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower - forged the nucleus for a small, cohesive group of individuals who worked closely together throughout the EDC. Centred around Monnet's team at *rue de Martignac*, the French EDC delegation led by Hervé Alphand, and the US Paris Embassy during the course of the treaty negotiations, the core of this EDC 'elite' remained active throughout the EDC ratification period. The creation of the post of US Special Representative to the European Communities, to which Bruce was immediately appointed, provided the new locus for the EDC network. Up until August 1954, the Monnet-Alphand-Bruce nexus constituted the most powerful and active force behind the EDC negotiations, US policy towards the project and the effort to secure EDC ratification in Paris.

Monnet's dominance and influence within the French government certainly encouraged the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy to accept his initiative and his participation in the formation of French EDC policy in 1950. Yet this is not a story of

¹⁴Part of the reason for the relative neglect of this involvement lies undoubtedly in Monnet's own reticence. He claims in his memoirs that he was primarily an 'outside observer', *Memoirs*, 361.

¹⁵I address this dimension of the EDC story in more detail in 'The European Defence Community and the role of French-American Elite Relations, 1950-1954', in Michel Dumoulin (ed.) *La sécurité en Europe, 40 ans après l'échec de la CED* (forthcoming).

a bureaucratic struggle for control of a new strand in French foreign policy.¹⁶ The majority of staff at the top of the Foreign Ministry initially supported the European Army proposal as a solution to the problem of German rearmament. Senior officials such as Alexandre Parodi, the Secretary General of the ministry, Hervé Alphand, its director of Economic Affairs, Ambassadors René Massigli in London and Henri Bonnet in Washington knew Monnet well and were familiar with his ideas, having worked closely together during the war in Charles de Gaulle's Free French government. The introduction of the Schuman Plan in May 1950, Monnet's brainchild for the integration of Europe's coal and steel resources had already brought Monnet, his team and his integration projects firmly into the realm of the foreign ministry.¹⁷

Undoubtedly, there were some who resented this encroachment into the domain of the Quai d'Orsay. Yet it was only one among a series of administrative and personnel changes that was bringing to an end the traditional exclusivity of the French diplomatic corps: neither Parodi nor Alphand came from its ranks, but from the prestigious *Conseil d'Etat* and the *Inspection des Finances* corps respectively.¹⁸ Some officials undoubtedly regarded supranational integration initiatives with little enthusiasm but this was conceived fundamentally, however, as a disagreement about the means, rather than the ends, of French foreign policy.¹⁹ What senior career diplomats shared with their fellow administrative officials in 1950 was a common

¹⁶Bureaucratic politics approaches (which often include both organisational processes and governmental politics models) characterise national foreign policy as the outcome of bargaining games between players in the national government and suggest that policy preferences are a function of the individual's bureaucratic position in the governmental structure. The classic study is Graham D. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, 1971), for a more recent overview, David A. Welch, 'The Organisational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect', *International Security*, 17, no. 2, Fall 1992.

¹⁷For wartime cooperation see, André Kaspi, *La Mission de Jean Monnet à Alger, mars-octobre 1943* (Paris, 1971) and, in addition to the memoirs above, Jean Chauvel, *Commentaire: ii, D'Alger à Berne, 1944-52* (Paris, 1972), François Seydoux, *Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin* (Paris, 1975). For the development of the Schuman Plan in Paris see Poidevin, *Schuman: Homme d'Etat* and Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the European Community*.

¹⁸The short post-Vichy purge of the civil service and the access granted to members of the Résistance marked a first step, which was reinforced by the creation of *l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration* in 1945. This grande école, with its highly competitive entry procedure, centralised education, training and recruitment into the (non-technical) corps that staff the French administration. Previously, each corps had its own competition and recruitment system, see Pierre Escoube, *Les Grands Corps de l'Etat* (Paris, 1971).

¹⁹Massigli was the most vocal, *Comédie*; James W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance* (Leicester, 1990) highlights the degree to which diplomats prior to 1950 shared a common pro-Alliance, pro-German rehabilitation perspective.

understanding that the goal of French policy was permanent leadership in the emerging Western Alliance. Monnet's European Army proposal was defined and accepted as an element in that pursuit, and, as Alphand's leadership of the EDC delegation illustrated, incorporated ministry personnel and expertise.

It was the gradual development of Monnet's conception of the EDC as an engine for the rapid establishment of a European political framework that led to a serious divergence of views between the dominant policy-makers in Paris. Increasing disagreement with the EDC activists over the development of the project forced the administrative leadership of the Foreign Ministry to collectively reassess the impact of the emerging defence community for French foreign policy objectives. Only when the project was perceived to challenge French leadership goals did the Quai d'Orsay come together to assert control of French EDC policy away from the transatlantic network centred around Monnet, Alphand and Bruce. The cohesive, hierarchial structure of the ministry facilitated this: as one of its former staff commented of the period, '*Au Quai d'Orsay, les grandes affaires restent du domaine de quelques initiés: le ministre, le secrétaire général, les directeurs généraux et les trois au quatres fonctionnaires qui tiennent les dossiers.*'²⁰ The new directors of French EDC policy used their formal position as senior foreign policy administrators as well as their informal contacts and influence within the French government and administrative system to recast French EDC policy. They benefited from Monnet's movement to the High Authority in Luxembourg and to the governmental changes that removed his two closest political contacts, Robert Schuman and René Pleven, from power. It was above all the commitment of the foreign ministry leadership which, coalesced into action, constituted the most potent force behind the gradual distancing of successive French governments from EDC. This group of policymakers, in the end, supervised the rejection of the French project.

Ironically, although the views of different sectors of the French political system towards EDC has begun to receive greater attention in the literature, no systematic study of the role of the French foreign ministry has yet taken place.²¹ The

²⁰Bernard Destremau, *Quai d'Orsay: Derrière la façade* (Paris, 1994), 97-8.

²¹Philippe Vial is currently preparing a doctoral thesis on the French military and EDC, see, 'Le politique et le militaire: le Maréchal Juin et le Général Ely face à la CED', in Dumoulin (ed.) *La sécurité en Europe, 40 ans après l'échec de la CED*; Madeleine Singer, 'Le groupe d'études politiques

tortured French debate on ratification, a process that is, by definition, public and political, focused attention on the institutions and the actors ultimately responsible for the final decision, namely the French parliament and its politicians, both during and after the lifetime of the EDC. The image of a disinterested, non-partisan administrative bureaucracy, and its particular potency in the realm of national foreign policy, has also contributed to the neglect of the foreign ministry's role from 1950-1954. Moreover, lack of access to the deliberations and the activities of the administrative services provided a formidable disincentive to any examination. It is only with the opening of the records of the Foreign Ministry itself that the perceptions, the debates and the actions of its senior officials in the EDC episode can begin to be explored and their significance for French EDC policy demonstrated.

The chapters that follow, therefore, trace chronologically the development of French policy towards the European Defence Community from the origin of the proposal to the collapse of the project. This approach captures some sense of the complex environment in which policymaking took place and demonstrates the continuous interaction between external and domestic forces and events throughout the four year period. It also reveals the consistent dominance of the principal players throughout EDC. Foreign and domestic government ministers, political parties, military leaders, administrative officials and public opinion exercised significant, if sporadic, influence in the formulation and practice of French EDC policy and these are identified in the course of the narrative. The focus, however, remains centred on the two groups exercising the greatest impact on French EDC policy.

A chronological treatment also has the benefit of demonstrating the way in which ideas about EDC and French policy towards it took shape gradually and, in turn, percolated through the French political system. It shows how this process was the ultimate force behind the emergence of two hostile and competing networks of actors dominating EDC policymaking in Paris. This thesis does not, however, aim to trace the origins of the ideas that motivated these actors. Nor is it a study in the

“Reconstruction” et la CED’, *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 43, no. 1, 1996 looks at the involvement of a political pressure group.

dynamics of collective action in the foreign policy process.²² Nonetheless, I have benefited from foreign policy analysis approaches that explore the conditions and the processes by which individual actors coalesce and operate as an identifiable group with a common agenda to influence the foreign policy process. The EDC episode in France is illustrative of the way in which two groups with different membership, structures, patterns of cohesion and operating methods developed and dominated within the context of a particular policy issue. It not only serves to remind the international relations scholar of the importance of empirical testing but offers a potentially rich seam for future exploration of the role of ideas, actors and the relationship between both in the maelstrom of foreign policymaking.²³

²²Once the 'black box' of the state has been opened, the central issue of foreign policy analysis is the identification and examination of the actors involved in the process. The bureaucratic politics model, which identified both institutional structures and their cultures as important elements in the creation of a policy group heralded the start of an extensive literature, which quickly moved away from the paradigm of competing interest groups, see Richard Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) to concentrate on non-structural factors, such as shared belief systems in foreign policy-making. One of the most influential early works was Alexander George, 'The "operational code": a neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making', *International Studies*, 13, June 1969, which encouraged the development of more explicit psychological models; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976); Deborah Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, 1985); Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford, 1990). On the emphasis on crisis decision-making, G. W. Hoppole, *Political Psychology and Bio-politics: Assessing and Predicting Elite Behaviour in Foreign Policy Crises* (Boulder, Co., 1980). The significance of crisis management encouraged an important strand emphasising how policymakers look to commonly perceived historical events as guides, see Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, *Thinking in Time* (New York, 1986). This in turn has led to the exploration of the significance of 'learning' for policymakers, see Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, 1992) and more critically, Jack S. Levy, 'Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield', *International Organization*, 48, 2, Spring 1994. This has prompted a growing interest in the role of ideas in foreign policy generally which has been particularly dominant in studies of Gorbachev and the former USSR, see Jeff Checkel, 'Ideas, Institutions and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution', *World Politics*, 45, Jan. 1993. One of the features of this new literature is its emphasis on the transnational nature of ideas, technical knowledge and expertise, see Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.) *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY, 1993). On knowledge-based transnational networks of actors see, Peter Haas (ed.) *Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination*, special issue, *International Organisation*, 46, Winter 1992 and generally, Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.) *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, (Cambridge, 1995). By moving away from individual cognitive processes, this more recent work offers greater potential for the study of group formation, beliefs and action. It is, in addition, less US-centric in perspective.

²³Interestingly, France and French policy-making has received comparatively little attention in international relations literature, compared to US, British or German cases. This is undoubtedly, in part, a language problem, and also a function of the relative slow development of international relations as an academic discipline in France. Thomas Risse-Kappen in *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1995) marks a start by exploring the way in which British, German and French attitudes and behaviour have influenced the

Archival material forms the basis of this study. French, United States' and British archives, both government and private, published and unpublished provide the principal sources, supplemented by interviews (principally those collected by various archives), memoirs and newspapers from the period. A multi-archival approach is, I would argue, essential to the study of an international institutional organisation where the boundaries between 'national', 'international' and 'transnational' are rendered more opaque than ever. This is particularly true of the complex and wide-ranging European Defence Community project. At the same time, the plurality of perspectives revealed in multi-archival research can significantly benefit the examination of the policies of a particular state. It is useful not simply in terms of measuring the way in which other states reacted to French policy in the European Defence Community but in offering insights into the making of that policy.

This is particularly the case in the divided and often contested atmosphere of the Fourth Republic. External observers were occasionally privy to information, opinion and policy deliberation not openly discussed or formally recorded within the French administration. For this very reason, personal papers and diaries provide a vital supplement to government documents. Private archives shed light, in particular, on the principal actors involved in policy-making and on the relationships between them. Moreover they illuminate the way in which particular groups of actors communicated and discussed policy issues. They also demonstrate how shared perceptions were translated into policy actions.

At the same time, multi-archival research throws up its own difficulties. For one thing, the sheer wealth of available material that emerges makes the job of sifting through it much more complex. The fact that there are important differences of approach in the way national archives are established and rendered accessible raises the question of how various perspectives should be balanced. Equally, the significance of cultural variation in administrative structure, communication methods and documentation styles constrains the degree to which conclusions can be drawn, either from what is said or what is not said. The more explicitly subjective perspective of private papers acts as an even stronger constraint. These very considerations, however,

US through the development of a collective alliance identity which facilitated transnational and transgovernmental coalitions that influenced the domestic policy process in Washington.

serve to demonstrate the importance of returning to the debates of the 1950s in order to explore and challenge the accounts of the European Defence Community that have dominated our perceptions of the project and France's role within it. At a time when Europe's security architecture is being recast, excavating some of its skeletons, as well as being intrinsically important, may prove an instructive exercise. And, like all good ghost stories, it makes for a gripping tale.

Chapter Two

A history of plans:

The origins of the Pleven Plan of 24 October 1950

The perceived threat of Soviet aggression against its former wartime allies represented a new security challenge for the United States and Western European states, demanding a new and powerful response. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in April 1949 appeared precisely that. However, the invasion of South Korea by Communist forces from the North, just over one year later, seemed both to challenge the Western effort and signal a new, more lethal threat of a Soviet-led Communist direct attack on Western Europe. In the context of this threat, the members of the nascent Western Alliance agreed that the immediate reinforcement of the collective military strength of the West was crucial. It was a decision that forced the US and its European partners to confront a far older threat, the threat of German militarism to European security.

France's proposal for the creation of a European Army was a response to the dilemma of responding to a new threat without releasing the old one. The sense of urgency surrounding the Western deliberations, the suddenness of the French announcement and the breadth of its conception all appeared to suggest a fundamental and decisive break with the European past. Yet for all its apparent innovation, the French European Army proposal was firmly rooted in the foreign policy of the Fourth Republic, both in terms of its objectives and the officials who devised it. In French perceptions, new threats accentuated, rather than replaced, old concerns.

French plans for the Western Alliance

The signing of the North Atlantic treaty in April 1949 marked the climax and the fusion of the two principal themes that dominated French foreign policy since the end of World War II. The first was a US commitment to the security and defence of Europe, the second was the pursuit of western defence through collective strategies and institutionalised mechanisms. The realisation of these objectives was the direct result of the growing perception of a Soviet threat to Western Europe and US

acknowledgement that post-war military, economic and political continental weakness would make it impossible to resist a Soviet attack.¹ French military and political leaders shared these apprehensions: by the end of 1947 the administration in Paris had abandoned its attempts to maintain a policy of neutrality in the face of the deepening schism between the US and the USSR. Quite apart from the military feasibility, the French economy could not afford it.² The creation of the Western Union, the commitment to collective security against aggression between the UK, France and the Benelux nations enshrined in the Brussels Pact of March 1948 was the first step, the French foreign ministry pointed out, on the path of close association with the United States. As early as January 1948, General Billotte, of the French Chiefs of Staff, met with senior British and US military figures to discuss the establishment of a common defence strategy to resist a Soviet offensive.³

The Soviet danger competed with, but did not overshadow, the permanent threat which Germany posed for the French. The 1947 Dunkirk Treaty of mutual defence between Britain and France and its subsequent extension to the Benelux in the Brussels Pact, originated in the French desire for a specific guarantee against German aggression. Nor did the start of Western Union military planning against a potential Soviet attack force the French to revise their double-threat perception.⁴ For Paris, the German threat was inextricably bound to the growing Soviet one: the failure of the former Allies to establish cooperative post-war relations raised first, the spectre of a

¹The explosion of the first Soviet atom bomb in August 1949 increased the sense of danger and the US military calculated a possible Soviet attack as early as 1952, Christian Greiner, 'The Defence of Western Europe and the Rearmament of West Germany, 1947-50', in Olav Riste (ed.) *Western Security: The Formative Years* (Oslo, 1985), 150-77.

²George-Henri Soutou, 'La sécurité de la France dans l'après-guerre', in Maurice Vaisse, Pierre Mélandri and Frédéric Bozo (eds.) *La France et l'OTAN, 1949-96* (Paris, 1996), 21-52; Cyril Buffet, 'The Berlin Crises, France and the Atlantic Alliance, 1947-62: From Integration to Disintegration', in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds.) *Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era* (Basingstoke, 1992), 84-104; John Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949*, (Leicester, 1990).

³Secretariat Général note on the Brussels Pact, 4 September 1948, Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), Papiers de Georges Bidault, (457 AP) 25; Pierre Guillen, 'Les chefs militaires français, le réarmement de l'Allemagne et la CED, 1950-54; *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 129, 1983, 3-33; Maurice Vaisse, 'L'échec d'une Europe Franco-Britannique ou comment le pacte de Bruxelles fut créé et délaissé', in Raymond Poidevin (ed.) *Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne, mars 1948-mai 1950* (Brussels, 1986), 369-89.

⁴Although no plans were made for a German attack, see Wolfgang Krieger, 'Foundation and History of the Treaty of Brussels, 1948-1950', in Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster (eds.) *The Western Security Community: Common Problems and Conflicting National Interests during the Foundation Phase of the North Atlantic Alliance* (Oxford, 1993), 229-49.

possible German-Soviet alliance - a second Rapallo. The gradual evolution of French German policy toward the integration and rehabilitation of West Germany into the Western Alliance was motivated by the perceived need to prevent Germany turning East. Yet the division of Germany created new fears: French policymakers regarded the division as inherently unstable, inviting a conflict between West and East Germany that could quickly explode into international war.⁵ US participation in the collective European defence strategy being initiated through the Western Union offered the means of addressing the German, the Soviet and the German-Soviet threat simultaneously. Jean Chauvel, Secretary General of the French foreign ministry in April 1948 summed up the French view succinctly: '*Le souci de la garantie contre les Russes ne nous fait pas perdre de vue l'opportunité d'une garantie contre l'Allemagne.*'⁶

French decision-makers had clear objectives as to the specific nature of this US commitment. The most immediate requirement was US support to extend the defence of Western Europe to the east of the Rhine, a decision which would imply the revision of Washington's peripheral defence strategy and the commitment of US troops on the Continent.⁷ The provision of substantial financial and military assistance to European rearmament programmes was no less vital. French military leaders argued that the lack of progress in military planning in the Brussels Pact illustrated how inadequate any collective security effort would be without US aid.⁸ An important step in this direction was taken in March 1949 when, at the conclusion of the NATO negotiations, the US agreed to the principle of a military assistance pact with its European partners. The French decision, of July 1949 to establish a modern force of twenty and a half divisions at an estimated cost of Frfr 2,347,000 million by the end of 1951 illustrated the significance with which US aid was perceived in Paris.⁹ There

⁵Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-54*, iii, 1949 (Paris, 1977), 457; French High Commission report (undated) on Germany, AN, Papiers de Vincent Auriol (4 AU) 55; Young, *France, the Cold War*, 190-92.

⁶Chauvel to Bonnet, 22 April 1948, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris (MAE), Papiers de René Massigli (PA-AP 217) 79.

⁷Briefing notes for Bidault-General Marshall talks, early 1948 (undated), AN, 457 AP 25; Soutou, 'La sécurité de la France', 37-38; Irwin Wall, 'France and the North Atlantic Alliance', in Francis Heller and John Gillingham (eds.) *NATO* (London, 1992), 45-56.

⁸Note by General Humbert (French Chiefs of Staff), 31 Jan. 1949, AN, 457 AP 26.

⁹Jean Doise and Maurice Vaisse, *Diplomatie et outil militaire, 1871-1991* (Paris, 1987), 513. In 1951 the exchange rate was 1\$=398fr.

was enormous disappointment, therefore, when the Mutual Defence Act finally came into being in October, for, although France was assigned \$500 million in US aid, Washington insisted this would be provided in terms of military hardware rather than dollars. Even before the US end-items arrived, Paris submitted a new request for \$100 million more in military assistance while stepping up its demands for greater coordination of national defence programmes in NATO.¹⁰

French pursuit of a cohesive Western Alliance also had a global dimension. From the outset of the NATO negotiations the French government stressed the importance of a global strategy: the establishment of a tripartite Standing Group in NATO in September 1949 was the direct result of French efforts. Paris continued to press for closer political coordination to accompany and help accelerate the military and economic measures gradually taking place. In February 1950 this took the form of an Atlantic Union, proposed by Hervé Alphand, the young Director of Economic Affairs at the Quai. Alphand argued that cooperation at the Atlantic level was the only means of resolving the vast problems currently facing the West and suggested a joint French-British proposal for a three power conference to examine closer association between NATO members.¹¹ By April, this initiative had developed into a 'High Atlantic Council for Peace': Prime Minister Georges Bidault proposed the extension of NATO beyond the military realm to economic and political activities under the leadership of a tripartite directorship by France, the United States and Britain.¹² The idea, however, received little support from Washington: 'We consider high level coordination between France, the United Kingdom and the United States of major importance but do not favour the establishment of anything comparable to a Standing Group....We believe such three power coordination can effectively be achieved through intensification of contacts through existing channels.'¹³

¹⁰Philippe Vial, 'L'aide américaine au réarmement français (1948-56)', in Vaisse, Mélandri & Bozo (eds.) *La France et l'OTAN*, 169-87.

¹¹Note by Alphand, 21 Feb. 1950, AN, 457 AP 148.

¹²*Cette suggestion répondait à une nécessité: un grand nombre de problèmes européens de toute nature demandent une solution qui ne peut être trouvée qu'avec l'aide des Etats-Unis. Il est également indispensable de procéder à une réunion et à une simplification des organismes internationaux actuellement existants*'. MAE press statement, MAE, Europe 1944-60 (EU44-60)/Généralités/110.

¹³Washington to Paris, 21 April 1950, *The Foreign Relations of the United States*, (FRUS) 1950 3, *Western Europe* (Washington, 1977), 59-60.

The determination to assert a leading global role was further motivated by France's non-European interests, namely French overseas territories in North Africa and South-east Asia. The conflict in Indochina between the French and Vietnamese nationalist forces, led by Ho Chi Minh, was rapidly escalating and exacting an increasingly intolerable economic and military burden. By 1 January 1950 162,400 French soldiers out of a total force of 651,330 were serving there: by the autumn the Chiefs of Staff calculated that one third of total French personnel and matériel resources was being absorbed by the conflict.¹⁴ The impossibility of sustaining this commitment simultaneously with an ambitious European rearmament plan and the economic reconstruction of the country was evident. The French government began approaching Washington for assistance to Indochina in early 1950, arguing that the battle against the Communist Vietminh forces was not a colonial conflict but a vital front in the deepening Cold War. France could not maintain its presence as a barrier against the spread of Communism to South Asia unless Washington participated in the cost of the effort. The US agreed to allocate military supplies and to establish military advisory groups in Indochina.¹⁵

Emphasising the global nature of its interests was, moreover, an important way of supporting France's claim to a leading position in the Western Alliance. Paris was determined to ensure that Anglo-American direction of the alliance, at the exclusion of France, did not take place. The post-war continuation of an Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, and US-UK financial talks in September 1949 to manage the British sterling crisis gave the French grounds for suspicion that its two partners might be tempted to exclude France from the military and economic organisation of the alliance and construct a separate Anglo-Saxon bloc.¹⁶ Participation in all negotiations was crucial if France's continental interests were to be protected. It was not simply the perception that French security could only be guaranteed by the French themselves: there was a feeling in the French foreign ministry, in particular, that a

¹⁴ Antoine Daveau, 'Le poids de la guerre Indochine', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 107, no. 4, 1993, 333-357.

¹⁵ *FRUS* 1950 3: 1360-62, 20 Feb; *FRUS*, 1950 6, *East Asia and the Pacific* (Washington, 1976), 787-9, 792.

¹⁶ *FRUS*, 1949 4, *Western Europe* (Washington, 1975), 661-65. Alex Danchev illustrates how there was some justification to French fears, 'In the back room: Anglo-American defence cooperation, 1945-51', in Richard Aldrich (ed.) *British Intelligence Strategy and the Cold War* (London, 1992).

French presence at the head of the alliance could act as a restraining force on the occasionally provocative tendency of US policies towards the USSR.¹⁷

Above all, however, the insistence on institutionalised tripartite direction of the alliance was a response to the ongoing integration of West Germany. The Petersberg Agreement of November 1949 signed between the three Allied High Commissioners and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, included the commitment to promote the participation of Germany 'in all those international organisations through which German experience and support could contribute to the general welfare'.¹⁸ If Germany's presence and resources were to be used to strengthen Western European economic, military and political defences against the actual Soviet threat while at the same time providing a mechanism to contain the potential threat Germany itself posed, this participation would have to be carefully controlled and managed. Institutionalised French leadership in the collective organisations of the West was a vital way of ensuring the permanent subordination, and containment, of Germany. The creation of NATO, an organisation with an explicitly military dimension, only served to redouble French determination to achieve an institutionalised hierarchy within the collective Western alliance.

The signing of the NATO treaty fuelled public speculation of a possible German contribution to the new organisation, particularly in France, where Robert Schuman, Minister for Foreign Affairs since July 1948, took pains to reject the notion that NATO inherently implied German rearmament. He argued, during the parliamentary debate to ratify the treaty on 25 July 1949, that Germany would not be a participant in the Atlantic Pact: '*La question ne peut se poser. Il n'y a pas de traité de paix: l'Allemagne n'a pas d'armée et ne peut en avoir: elle n'a pas d'armements et elle n'en aura pas*'.¹⁹ However, it was hard to avoid public consideration of what had already been explicitly acknowledged by French military figures, namely, the unlikelihood that Germans would remain permanent spectators in the collective western defence of their own territory.²⁰ Chancellor Adenauer himself raised the

¹⁷MAE Directeur Général des Affaires Politiques memo, May 1948, AN, 457 AP 25.

¹⁸Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53* trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen, (London, 1966), 221.

¹⁹In Jaques Fauvet, *La IVe République* (Paris, 1959), 145 and André Fontaine, *Histoire de la Guerre Froide*, ii, (Paris, 1967), 46.

²⁰René Massigli, *Une Comédie des Erreurs, 1943-56: Souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne* (Paris, 1978), 239-40.

possibility of German military participation in a common defence effort in December 1949, noting in a press interview that while he was opposed to the creation of German armed forces, he would be prepared to consider the possibility of 'a German contingent in the framework of a European federation', a comment that solicited a formal rebuke from the Allied High Commissioners and Schuman's parliamentary affirmation that there could be no question of the rearmament of Germany '*même pas sous la forme d'une armée européenne dont nous sommes encore très loin*'.²¹

In discussions with its partners, the French government firmly maintained that the question of German participation in Western defence efforts could not be examined until, first, the rearmament of the NATO partners themselves had taken place and second, West Germany had been effectively integrated into the European system.²² It was a position that seemed to be shared by both the British and the US governments. In April 1950 London still advocated a total prohibition of German rearmament for a stated period even while concluding that, as an ultimate aim, rearmament within Western European forces was correct.²³ The US was even firmer and declared publicly its commitment to German disarmament. Privately, Washington identified the European defence problem as 'the determination of ways and means to obtain from the Germans a contribution to Western defensive strength without the risk of providing the Germans with means of aggression' and was itself divided over whether the constitution of German troops was a necessary part of this effort.²⁴ For the moment, the administration continued to urge that the process of 'demilitarisation, decartelisation and democratisation' in Germany be maintained.²⁵

The establishment of an East German police force (*Volkspolizei*) in Spring 1950 and West German requests for greater security assurances in response did not sway French or US determination to avoid creating the potential for German remilitarisation. The Quai maintained that the best guarantee for the Federal Republic was the maintenance of occupation troops on German territory and opposed the idea

²¹In Raymond Poidevin, *Robert Schuman: Homme d'Etat* (Paris, 1986), 308; Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 267.

²²Massigli memo on German rearmament, 14 April 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/ 70.

²³'The Future of Germany', 19 April 1950, UK Public Records Office (PRO), PREM 8 1203/PUSC (49) 62.

²⁴Office of Mutual Security, memo on Germany and MDAP, 30 May 1950, in US National Archives Records Administration (NARA) *Declassified Documents Series*, 20, no. 2, 1994, microfiche 001061.

²⁵UK Cabinet report on the tripartite London Conference, May 1950, PRO, CAB 129 CP(50)115.

of a matching West German police force.²⁶ The US leadership took a similar line, criticising suggestions developing in Britain for the creation of an armed gendarmerie in the Federal Republic. President Truman complained in June that 'the British are doing everything possible to break up western European unity and, of course, one of their approaches would be to advocate the rearmament of Germany. France would immediately get a severe case of the jitters if the subject is ever seriously considered. A German police force could not be allowed to develop into a training ground for a military machine that can combine with Russia and ruin the rest of the world.'²⁷ French awareness of the strength of US feeling encouraged the Foreign Ministry to recommend that France take no action on the question of German military participation until the US posed the question.²⁸

A new French initiative - the Schuman Plan, May 1950

The surprise initiative which France did take on the eve of the London meetings of the three Foreign Ministers addressed the entire complex interweave of issues - economic, military and political - involved in German integration into the Western Alliance. Schuman announced, on 9 May 1950, that his government proposed to pool West European coal and steel production, a step that would 'immediately assure the establishment of common bases for economic development...and change the destiny of these regions which have long been devoted to the production of arms....The community of production...will clearly show that any war between France and Germany becomes not only unthinkable but in actual fact impossible...this proposal will create the first concrete foundation for a European federation.'²⁹ The call for the integration of key European economic resources in a collective, institutionalised body was not new: where the Schuman Plan did depart from previous French projects was that it proposed to address German integration in a specific European, rather than a

²⁶Direction d'Europe note on West German security, 18 April 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/ 70.

²⁷Truman memo to Acheson, 16 June 1950, PSF: 178, Subject File, Truman Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

²⁸Direction d'Europe note, 18 April 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/70; Bonnet despatch on US views, 13 April 1950, MAE, B Amérique 1944-52 (AM44-52)/ Etats-Unis/182.

²⁹Statement issued by Schuman in London, 9 May 1950, Department of State *Bulletin*, 22, no. 571, 12 June 1950, 936-37.

general Western context. According to Jean Monnet, who, as head of the French *Commissariat du Plan* responsible for national economic reconstruction programmes had introduced the idea to Schuman, German integration had to take place through a European organisation if it was to avoid provoking the Soviet Union and the question of German rearmament.³⁰

More significantly, Monnet claimed that German integration, if not first channelled through a European framework, would fast threaten France's continued economic recovery. German industrial strength had to be tapped to ensure France's own growth - Franco-German tensions over France's attempts to maintain control of the resource rich Saar region illustrated how this could only be done in collaboration with the Germans.³¹ Ultimately, continued French dynamism was essential if the US was going to continue to acknowledge France as a leading partner in the West. France thus had to take up the role of leader of Europe to maintain its position in the Western alliance. French diplomats had already been recommending a similar step. Former Secretary General Chauvel, recently appointed as the French representative at the UN, noted that in the undecided and somewhat confused state of US foreign policy the slogan of European integration was the only issue which received unanimous support. A French initiative in the field would be therefore welcomed and could enable France to influence favourably the US.³² The extent to which the Schuman Plan addressed Franco-American relations above all was clearly illustrated in the way the French introduced the proposal. The US was given prior indication of the announcement, two days before, in a secret meeting between Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Schuman - an approach that produced a diplomatic thunderstorm in London when

³⁰Note de réflexion, 3 May 1950, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne (FJM), AMI 4/1/1; unsigned memo on arguments for the establishment of ECSC, 3 May 1950, AN, Papiers de René Mayer (363 AP) 17.

³¹On the importance of the Saar for French plans see Francis Lynch, *French Reconstruction in a European Context* (Florence, 1984); and, more generally, Rainer Hudemann and Raymond Poidevin (eds.) *Die Saar 1945-55: Ein Problem der Europäische Geschichte* (Munich, 1992).

³²Letter to Parodi, 21 Feb. 1950; Chauvel sent a copy to Massigli noting few in the Quai really thought the idea of integration possible, 23 Feb. 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/ 95. Bonnet warned how the US Congress wanted concrete steps in the direction of economic and financial integration and might well reduce Marshall aid if no such measures were forthcoming, Auriol, *Journal*, 1949, 330, 336.

Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin found out and accused his two partners of plotting behind Britain's back.³³

The enthusiastic US reaction to the Schuman Plan appeared to confirm the French strategy. Washington, which had consistently supported the concept of European integration as the solution to the past hostilities and current weakness of the continent, applauded the initiative, declaring it represented 'new vigour in European life and European leadership'.³⁴ By the conclusion of the London conference, France's Ambassador in Washington, Henri Bonnet, a well-connected figure in the US administration, was already confirming the benefits of France's latest initiative: '*modestement peut-être mais sûrement, la Communauté atlantique préconçue par les Ministres français était en train de naître avec l'encouragement implicite du Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis.*'³⁵ The US response facilitated, in turn, the acceptance of Monnet's initiative in Paris, where the project had come as just as much of a last-minute surprise for some in the Cabinet and most in the administration.³⁶ Monnet and his team of officials at the *Commissariat* (CGP) began preparations immediately for the opening of international negotiations between all the interested European partners to establish a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): US officials in the Paris Embassy, led by Ambassador David Bruce, and the High Commission in Frankfurt, under the direction of US High Commissioner, John J. McCloy - many of whom were personal contacts of Monnet since the war - soon became intimately involved in the drafting of a treaty for the project at the CGP headquarters in a townhouse in *rue de Martignac*, only a few streets away from the Quai d'Orsay and the Prime Minister's office, the Matignon.³⁷

³³Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969), 382-83; Massigli, *Comédie*, 187-88. Monnet had notified Adenauer just before the announcement, Eric Roussel, *Jean Monnet* (Paris, 1996), 525-26.

³⁴Acheson address to the Senate, 31 May 1950, in Ernest Van der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership: European Integration as a Concern of American Policy* (Amsterdam, 1966), 216-20.

³⁵Despatch no. 2492, 26 May 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/115.

³⁶Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine, et la construction européenne, 1944-54*, ii, (Paris, 1992) 750-54.

³⁷30 March 1950, Diaries of David Bruce, Richmond Historical Society Virginia; Robert Bowie interview with the author, 4 Jan. 1995. With the formation of the Federal Republic, the Allied military governors became High Commissioners. For a recent account of Monnet's CGP offices see François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York, 1994), ch. 5.

Indeed the most apparent indication that the Schuman Plan constituted a new direction for French foreign policy occurred within the structure of the Foreign Ministry itself. The day after Schuman's announcement, responsibility for German affairs was transferred from the previously distinct General Commissioner's department to the Minister himself.³⁸ Management of German affairs now took place within Schuman's personal *Cabinet*, the director of which was Bernard Clappier. It was through this channel that Monnet maintained direct contact with the Foreign Minister.³⁹ The absence of institutionalised planning bodies within the Foreign Ministry facilitated this rather unorthodox pattern of policymaking and corresponded to Monnet's own preferences for working with a small, informal team, just like the one he had created at the CGP, the total staff of which remained under a hundred.⁴⁰ While the style of the new initiative may have upset some in the Quai - notably Ambassador René Massigli in London, Secretary General of the Ministry under de Gaulle - the substance of the policy accorded well with many of the senior personnel Schuman had appointed since his arrival to the Quai: Secretary General Alexandre Parodi, who met religiously with the Minister every evening to discuss the day's events; French High Commissioner (and pre-war Ambassador) to Germany, André François-Poncet; Director of Political Affairs, Guy de la Tournelle and his deputy, Roland de Margerie.⁴¹ As a former diplomat recollected, "*L'équipe*" *Schuman est dès lors homogène et disposée à suivre, sans états d'âme, celui qui personnifie une nouvelle politique.*⁴² French efforts to introduce institutionalised collaborative policies that would provide the political, economic and military basis for French

³⁸Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), *Les Affaires Etrangères et le corps diplomatique français*, ii, 1870-1980, (Paris, 1984) 611; Poidevin, *Schuman*, 202.

³⁹Clappier was not a member of the diplomatic corps, having moved with Schuman from the Finance Ministry to the Quai. He returned there at the end of 1950, replaced by his deputy Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, a career diplomat. CNRS, *Les Affaires Etrangères*, 624.

⁴⁰Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, 'L'élaboration de la politique étrangère française' in *Revue française de science politique*, 6, 1956. On Monnet's working patterns see François Duchêne 'Jean Monnet's Methods' in Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (eds.) *Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity* (Basingstoke, 1991); W. W. Rostow, 'Jean Monnet: The Innovator as Diplomat' in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.) *The Diplomats, 1939-79* (Princeton, 1994).

⁴¹Massigli was particularly vocal in his disapproval, letter to Parodi, 6 June 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/101; François Seydoux, *Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin* (Paris, 1975), 134. John Young argues that Quai officials had already developed many elements of a policy for Franco-German reconciliation even before Schuman's accession to the Quai, *France, the Cold War*, 200.

⁴²Bernard Destremau, *Quai d'Orsay: Derrière la façade* (Paris, 1994), 120.

leadership in the West finally appeared to be working. A coordinated, committed team in Paris was in place to manage the effort.

Reactions to Korea

The invasion of South Korea by forces from the North on 25 June 1950 proved as much as a shock for France as for every other government of the Western Alliance.⁴³ Moreover, a swift French response looked unlikely, given the collapse of Bidault's cabinet over the question of civil servants' salaries three days earlier. It was not until early July that a compromise was reached between the parties of the (non-Communist) Left and the Right, none of which had a sufficient parliamentary majority to govern alone, and René Pleven, leader of the small UDSR party, assumed the premiership. The new coalition government included the two largest parties, the Socialists and the MRP, as well as Radical and Conservative representatives from the right of the Assembly. Governmental paralysis was not the only obstacle to the development of French policy: according to Roland de Margerie, diplomacy was also at a standstill. There had not been a single departmental meeting to discuss the international consequences of the hostilities and, apart from a few cables to Jean Chauvel at the UN, no officials abroad had received any instructions. Chauvel had merely been instructed to support the US initiative for a UN condemnation of the invasion.⁴⁴ De Margerie, writing to Massigli, blamed the inertia on the lack of professional diplomats at the head of the Quai, a jibe, no doubt, at Parodi (who apparently rarely gave time to his subordinates) and alleged that the only person through whom action could be initiated - Clappier, Schuman's *Cabinet* director - was completely absorbed by the ECSC project. De Margerie asked the Ambassador in London to transmit his own views of the international situation in the hope that this might initiate some action.

It was a US request, however, that finally prompted Paris to address the significance of hostilities in Korea for future Western defence efforts. On 22 July Washington sent a note to its NATO partners, asking them to indicate separately, by 5

⁴³See, for example, Jean Chauvel, *Commentaire: ii, D'Alger à Berne* (Paris, 1972), 245; Fontaine, *Histoire de la guerre froide*, ii, 13.

⁴⁴Letter to Massigli, 13 July 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/100; Chauvel, *Commentaire*, ii, 247.

August, how they intended to accelerate the rearmament measures already begun in NATO. Responsibility for drafting a reply was given to the newly appointed North Atlantic Council (NAC) representative, Hervé Alphand, but it was from the offices of Prime Minister Pleven, rather than the Foreign Ministry, that Alphand began defining France's response to Korea.⁴⁵ His principal collaborator was Monnet, whose contact with Pleven dated back to the 1920s and, unsurprisingly, the French reply reflected the preoccupation of both men with the economic aspects of alliance rearmament. Monnet and Alphand supported an immediate intensification of NATO defence efforts but stressed the need to avoid destabilisation of national economies. A collective approach was necessary and they proposed an international organisation to establish the military requirements for West European defence as well as a common fund for a European rearmament programme, which would be raised by contributions from all NATO members. Germany, the French memorandum noted, could be permitted to participate materially.⁴⁶ Alphand also emphasised the need for greater centralised political direction, returning to the earlier French call for a common policy between the three Allies: Monnet, in agreement, claimed the collective effort had to extend beyond the military domain if it was to be seen by the European public as directed towards the maintenance of peace, rather than preparation for war.⁴⁷

Both men were emphatic that the Atlantic Pact was the framework which would best permit a complete cohesion of forces and equitable division of charges. According to Monnet, only through a policy coordinated by the US, the UK and France, leaders of the three diverse poles - '*les Etats-Unis, l'Empire Britannique, l'Europe continentale de l'Ouest, fédérés autour d'un Plan Schuman développé*' - that constituted the free Atlantic world, could the West replace the policy of containment which currently placed the initiative in Moscow's hands.⁴⁸ However unorthodox its formulation, this French response articulated perfectly the preoccupations of the French government and administration. William Tomlinson (Financial Attaché at the

⁴⁵Poidevin suggests Schuman's lack of involvement was due to his preoccupation with the current Council of Europe debates on the ECSC plan, *Schuman*, 310.

⁴⁶Draft notes for 5 Aug. memo, FJM, AMI 4/2/3-5.

⁴⁷Alphand note, 12 July 1950, FJM, AMI 4/2/1; Monnet comments on draft note, 15 Aug. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/2/9.

⁴⁸Draft for second French memo, 12 Aug. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/2/8; Letter to Pleven, 3 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/3/6.

US Embassy in Paris and closely involved with Monnet in the Schuman Plan negotiations) noted the ‘astonishing unanimity in the views of French government officials on the need and reasons for a “collective” approach’.⁴⁹ The collective strategy was not only necessary to soften the burden increased defence spending would have on the economy: it was also the only way France could ensure that increased US involvement in Asia would not affect Washington’s military and financial commitment to European defence. The fact that any discussion of a reinforced Western defence programme would inevitably raise the question of German participation underlined the significance of securing US agreement to a common approach. French ministers, having already begun conversations with US officials about increased financial assistance, did not shy away from the link. According to the Socialist Defence Minister, Jules Moch, the common approach was the only formula through which French opinion could be brought to accept German participation in the NATO defence effort. He considered it ‘absolutely essential for both military and psychological reasons’ that additional US and UK troops be stationed on the continent.⁵⁰ In the interim, agreement to pursue a collective policy would enable the German question to be set aside, as the Quai d’Orsay implicitly acknowledged. In a press statement of 26 July the Ministry declared that while German participation might be necessary for West European security in the long term, adequate provisions for security could be established without the participation of German industry or manpower.⁵¹

First US indications appeared to correspond to French thinking. Washington appeared equally anxious to build up Europe’s defence capabilities and on 1 August Truman asked Congress for a supplementary appropriation of \$4 billion for foreign military assistance. The US also appeared cogniscent of France’s global responsibilities: two days after the North Korean attack Truman declared his administration’s commitment to defend not only South Korea but Formosa and Indochina from Communist aggression and promised to accelerate US military aid to

⁴⁹FRUS 1950 3, 152; Vincent Auriol, *Mon Septennat, 1947-54* (Paris, 1970), 281.

⁵⁰FRUS 1950 3, 171.

⁵¹MAE circular, 26 July 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/182.

the French effort against the Communist Vietminh.⁵² Ambassador Bonnet noted, meanwhile, that US interest in European integration would be unaffected by events in Korea - indeed progress in this domain was essential for the future of inter-allied cooperation.⁵³ Moreover, even if the Administration appeared willing, as Congressional support for additional aid had demanded, to consider some German industrial participation in European defence, State Department officials agreed that actual rearmament was not possible in the near future.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, it was clear that Korea had propelled Washington to a comprehensive re-examination of its entire defence strategies, the final results of which had yet to emerge. Within the Administration debate centred around the nature and the extent of US leadership in the Atlantic Alliance, specifically, on the degree of commitment the US should undertake in European security efforts. State Department officials in Europe argued that the US now had to accept the 'onerous burden of leadership' and provide the military assistance, troops and command necessary if Europe's current weakness was to be overcome.⁵⁵ Although the Pentagon agreed that continental vulnerability could well encourage the Europeans to capitulate to future Soviet demands or turn to neutralism, the Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that to deploy additional troops and establish the unified command the Europeans requested would only let the NATO partners off the hook. The provision of US leadership, therefore, should be made contingent on the degree of effort made by the Europeans themselves, including the acceptance of German rearmament.⁵⁶

The Pentagon's case was strengthened by German demands for increased security assurances, including the reinforcement of allied occupation troops. The parallels with Korea had terrified German leaders, and Adenauer, conscious of his government's exclusion from all plans for its defence, pressed the High Commissioners to give Germans an opportunity to defend their territory.⁵⁷ It was this

⁵²Department of State *Bulletin*, 3 July 1950, 23, no. 574, 5; Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power* (Stanford, 1992), 380-83.

⁵³Bonnet tels, June-July 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/121.

⁵⁴Bonnet to Quai, 27 July 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/182; US Ambassador Lew Douglas confirmed the US position to Attlee on 6 July 1950, PRO, PREM 8 1209.

⁵⁵*FRUS* 1950 3, 130-32.

⁵⁶*FRUS* 1950 1, *National Security Affairs: Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington, 1977), 356-57; *FRUS* 1950 3, 167-68.

⁵⁷Thomas Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 126-27.

request that prompted High Commissioner McCloy to search for some form of compromise that would enable German industrial and manpower resources to be incorporated into the common defence effort without risking the rise of German militarism. On 3 August he proposed the creation of a 'genuine European army' with a unified command and coordinated resources, to which the US and the British could also contribute.⁵⁸ McCloy was quick to point out that 'in addition to defence against Russia, this action would contribute to our own basic objectives in Western Europe and be the best possible insurance against further German aggression. This dramatic move toward European federation would also fulfill the deep urge in France, Germany and Benelux for a real European community.'

McCloy's proposal was enthusiastically received in the State Department, which immediately set to work on developing the idea. Ambassador Bruce offered his support, although he stressed the length of time it would take before actual German participation was feasible. He was keen, therefore, that progress be made on the proposals for a collective NATO approach that France, 'the key to continental defence' had already put forward.⁵⁹ At the same time, the idea of a European army was being voiced within the continent itself. At the Council of Europe on 11 August, the British Conservative leader, Winston Churchill, proposed the creation of a unified European force 'under the authority of a European Minister of Defence, subject to proper European democratic control and acting in full cooperation with the United States and Canada' which was adopted by the Council by 89 votes to 27.⁶⁰

Although interdepartmental discussions continued in Washington, the debate no longer centred on whether German manpower should be utilised but rather how this participation could best be organised. On 26 August Truman instructed the State and Defence Departments to formulate a joint position on German rearmament for September's meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers in New York. Even before the President was presented with the State-Defence proposals (later circulated as NSC 82), Acheson was able to give his British and French colleagues some indication of what was in store. On 2 September he instructed Bruce to inform Schuman of US

⁵⁸FRUS 1950 3: 180-82.

⁵⁹FRUS 1950 3: 194-95.

⁶⁰Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 280; Churchill to Attlee, 6 Aug. 1950, PRO, FO 800/456.

interest in 'suggestions made in Europe for speeding up the creation of the defences of Europe by the creation of a unified Force for the Defence of Europe...if such a Force were created it would be necessary to establish a Supreme Commander with a Combined Staff, and that in this event, it should be possible to integrate into such a Force German units in a controlled status without thereby creating a German National Army...if these steps are to be effective larger participation by the US both in troops in Europe and in the direction of the unified Force might be required'.⁶¹ The US intended to raise these proposals at the tripartite meetings and hoped that Schuman would come prepared to discuss them before their extension for NATO Council consideration.

Schuman was aghast. His ministry officials had belatedly acknowledged that, despite their efforts, NATO discussion of a German contribution to a collective defence effort was inevitable and had only just begun to set out the basic principles of a French position. According to the Quai, the preconditions for any consideration remained the prior reconstitution of allied military forces and the examination of Western industrial potential to assess whether the raising of a German contingent was even affordable.⁶² Only if the Soviet threat appeared urgent could the issue of German troops be considered, in which case the possibility of individual German volunteers participating in the collective allied effort might have to be raised. Any move towards German participation would require, in exchange, a formal assurance from the US and UK to maintain their troops in Germany indefinitely. This thinking was far removed from Washington's plans for a European force and Schuman informed Bruce that his government would not agree to their discussion at the NATO conference. The most Schuman was willing to do was to explore the proposals at a tripartite level but, even then, he warned there would be a divergence of views.⁶³ Washington, unmoved, responded that the issue was too important to permit indefinite postponement, reserving the right to raise the question at the Council meeting itself.⁶⁴

⁶¹ *FRUS* 1950 3: 261-62.

⁶² Memo of Acheson-Bonnet meeting, 23 Aug. 1950, NARA, RG 59, Office of the Bureau of European Affairs, Lot 55 D 258/1; Direction d'Europe paper, 29 Aug. 1950 & note by Seydoux, 4 Sept. 1950, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/134.

⁶³ *FRUS* 1950 3: 267, 5 Sept.

⁶⁴ *FRUS* 1950 3: 268-69, 6 Sept.

Foreign Ministry officials suspected a US-German plot lay behind Washington's insistence, pointing to High Commissioner McCloy's public remarks during the summer that Germany had the right to defend itself and Adenauer's recent scaling down of his request for a federal police force to match the *Volkspolizei* to one destined only for internal security enforcement. '*Si la police devait se consacrer à la sécurité intérieure, une autre force allemande était prévue qui aurait, elle, à contribuer à la protection de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest contre une invasion venue de dehors; nul doute que McCloy n'ait entretenu Adenauer de la création de l'armée européenne avant que Bruce ne nous en ait informés.*'⁶⁵ The significance of a German contribution to a European Army for the future status of the Federal Republic was obvious: as the Director for Political Affairs de la Tournelle pointed out, it would imply the end of the Occupation Statute and Germany's recovery of equal sovereign rights.⁶⁶ It was imperative, therefore, that French opposition to both the US and German proposals remained firm; the Quai, if anything, became even less willing to explore the possibility of a federal German police force which could provide the basis for a future German military unit: regionally organised police forces and the creation of supplementary volunteers for service in Allied forces stationed in Germany was the most that could be permitted. Officials were under no illusion as to the hostility this would produce in the Federal Republic and suggested the Germans should be reminded that relaxation of occupation controls was dependent on their displaying a willingness to participate in the organisation of a common Western defence along these lines.⁶⁷

The most the Quai appeared willing to concede to the US proposals was that a future European army - or preferably Western - incorporating a German contingent by as yet undetermined means was conceivable. Aware of the tensions this would provoke at the NATO meeting, Paris strove to demonstrate its commitment to increased collective defence efforts: this was the best way, affirmed Ambassador Bonnet, for France '*de prendre un rôle de tout premier plan parmi ses alliés*'.⁶⁸ The government announced the extension of French military service from twelve to

⁶⁵Seydoux note, 5 Sept. 1950, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/134.

⁶⁶Note on German rearmament, 6 Sept. 1950, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/134.

⁶⁷Seydoux note, 7 Sept. 1950, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/134.

⁶⁸Tel. 3631, 5 Sept. 1950, MAE EU44-60/Gén/110.

eighteen months and its intention to establish fifteen new army divisions. Ministers and officials warned the US Embassy of the likely parliamentary attacks they would face for having undertaken increased commitments before agreement on further US financial and military assistance had been reached and complained at Washington's lack of response to the Monnet-Alphand memoranda.⁶⁹ Alphand proposed that in order to set the European defence programme rapidly into motion, the UK, US and French NAC representatives should meet secretly and informally in Washington immediately after the NATO meeting to translate the recommendations made there into specific drafts for common procedures. Even before the NATO Conference opened in New York, therefore, the French administration was working to contain the expected conflict over European defence.

The New York meetings, 12-18 September 1950

In one important respect the US proposal presented at the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 12 September differed from Acheson's initial outline to the French. The 'European defence force' was mentioned only as a concept and not an actual organisation. Absence of any mention of a federal dimension or of the political implications of a European force was evidence of the US military's refusal to adopt a more comprehensive vision of collective defence. The US proposal also insisted that German participation in NATO should take place as soon as possible.⁷⁰ The firmness and indivisibility of Washington's conditions for military assistance, as well as the proposed time-frame, shook the French delegation. At his first private meeting with Acheson, Schuman tried to avoid an outright rejection, stressing that the difficulty lay with French parliamentary and public opinion and that publicity should not, therefore, be given to the plan too soon. If French agreement was given, it would initially have to remain secret.⁷¹

As discussions extended first to the three ministers and then, at US insistence, to the full NAC Council, Schuman's arguments against German rearmament grew

⁶⁹FRUS 1950 3: 270, 7 Sept.

⁷⁰FRUS 1950 3: 273-78, 8 Sept.

⁷¹FRUS 1950 3: 285-88, 12 Sept.

firmer. With uncharacteristic fervour he warned of the dangers for Germany's European partners who were not yet armed, for the democratisation process still underway in Germany, for the reactions it would provoke in the USSR and the eastern satellite states and for the movement towards European integration. The French maintained it would be necessary to create a collective European force before German units could be established. Thus, the proposed NATO Standing Group should make a military study of how a contribution from non-NAT signatories (i.e. Germany) might be organised on the basis of supranational contingents.⁷² A strong NAT army with sufficient supplies in an equipment pool were, Schuman stressed to the NAC Council session of 15-16 September, fundamental prerequisites.

Schuman's fellow foreign ministers had also been taken aback by the US proposal and shared France's fears of the potential dangers of German rearmament. Yet the military and economic benefits that would be accrued by agreeing to Washington's conditions were too important to be ignored. A US continental commitment could act both as a cure for and an inoculation against the German threat and was therefore worth the risk of German rehabilitation and the sacrifice of a national rearmament programme.⁷³ The Italian foreign minister, Count Sforza, urged the French to forget the past and face the situation as it presented itself: his colleagues had already begun to signal their preliminary agreement to Washington's demands, even as they warned against over-hasty actions. By the close of the meeting, with tensions running high, Acheson warned the French they could not simply criticise the US proposal without making some constructive suggestions.⁷⁴

Monnet's portentous telegram to Schuman, on 16 September, proposing that German participation be organised in '*le cadre européen supranational d'un Plan Schuman elargi*' was not, however, designed expressly to soothe Washington. The real impetus for Monnet's foray into the rearmament debate was his fear that the issue would scupper the Schuman Plan negotiations. He had already warned Schuman that

⁷²Text of speech, 16 Sept. 1950, MAE, Secrétariat Général (SG) 12. Acheson rejected the suggestion of an international army as impracticable, UK summary of meeting, 13 Sept. 1950, PRO FO800/449.

⁷³FRUS 1950 3: 308-14, 15-16 Sept; for the Dutch view see Jan Van der Harst, *The Netherlands and the EDC*, (Florence, 1986), 3-5; the Italian view, Antonio Varsori, 'Italy between the Atlantic Alliance and EDC, 1948-55' in Ennio Di Nolfo (ed.) *Power in Europe? II*, (Berlin, 1992), 260-300; Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-51* (London, 1983) and Saki Dockrill, *Britain's policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-55* (Cambridge, 1991) explore British reactions.

⁷⁴FRUS 1950 3: 313, 16 Sept.

if the Germans got the rehabilitation they wanted through rearmament, they would have little further interest in the coal and steel plan and claimed that signs of a less cooperative German attitude were now becoming evident in the negotiations in Paris.⁷⁵ The Schuman Plan, Monnet insisted, marked the start of the creation of a French-initiated West European organisation which provided the only possible settlement of the German problem by its political and material contribution into a supranational community. Only on this basis could a future defence body be established and only through this European pole could Germany come to participate in the wider Atlantic Community.⁷⁶

Monnet's appeals were greeted receptively by the French delegation. Jacques de Bourbon-Busset (deputy director of Schuman's *Cabinet*), de Margerie, Bonnet and Alphand were, like their Minister, committed to the concept of integration as the best solution to both the specific problem of Germany and the general rearmament of the Atlantic Alliance. Influenced by Monnet's approach, the delegation in New York tentatively suggested to the French Cabinet on 18 September that, as France could no longer delay discussion of German rearmament, the government should take the initiative by proposing to lead discussions with its European partners on the integration of Germany in defence efforts.⁷⁷ Such a step would maintain France's position as leader on the continent: '*Elle nous permettrait de mesurer nous-mêmes dans une conversation directe avec l'Allemagne la valeur des solutions possibles. Elle confirmerait aux yeux des Allemands que, sans l'accord de la France, l'Europe ne peut se faire...*' Schuman admitted he did not know how his colleagues in New York would respond to this but suggested it would at least stop France appearing totally negative and would be likely to receive support from the US public and Congress.⁷⁸ Limited though it was, the French Cabinet nevertheless rejected the suggestion and reiterated that German participation could only occur at the level of a financial contribution to the costs of Allied occupation troops, with the possibility of some

⁷⁵ Monnet to Schuman, 14 & 16 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/4/2-3.

⁷⁶ Tel. to Schuman, 16 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/4/3 (copies to Pleven, Parodi and Clappier).

⁷⁷ Schuman to Cabinet, 18 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/5/1 & Monnet draft notes FJM, AMI 4/3/2.

⁷⁸ The telegram noted that the British would, in any case, strenuously oppose it.

military production in the future. The ministers remained hostile even to a declaration of principle on German rearmament.⁷⁹

The oblique nature of Schuman's suggestion left some in the Cabinet suspicious that the Foreign Minister might not be making his position, nor the full content of his negotiations in New York, entirely clear.⁸⁰ These fears intensified when Acheson issued an invitation to Defence Minister Moch to join the discussions. Determined not to revise its position on Germany, the Cabinet initially declined the invitation: only after two restricted sessions and further requests from Schuman did it finally agree to permit Moch to attend, insisting he would only discuss general security questions.⁸¹ There were some grounds for Cabinet suspicion. Acheson was sure Schuman personally wished to help devise an acceptable formula for German rearmament and considered the root of French intransigence lay in Paris 'and specifically in the Socialist Party and even more specifically with Moch', a view with which the other European ministers concurred.⁸² Confronting Moch with the combined force of the NAC Council would hopefully accelerate French policy revision. But the minister was not to be swayed. When the meetings reconvened on 22 September, Moch declared that only after the establishment of the ten additional French divisions estimated for July or September 1951 would his government be prepared to examine the question of German troop creation.⁸³ The closing communiqué of the NAC Council four days later acknowledged the impasse, referring the question of a German contribution to the NAC Defence Committee for consideration. This meeting was rescheduled for 28 October to enable the French government to consult its National Assembly.⁸⁴

⁷⁹Tel. to Schuman, 20 Sept. 1950, FJM AMI 4/5/2; Moch summary of meeting, 10 Oct. 1950, AN, 4 AU 56. According to Moch, ministers were divided on the question of ultimate German rearmament.

⁸⁰Moch to Auriol, 10 Oct. 1950, AN 4 AU 56; Auriol reminded Schuman of the President's constitutional right to receive copies of all incoming telegrams from the Quai, *Mon Septennat*, 289.

⁸¹Jules Moch, *Histoire du Réarmement Allemand depuis 1950* (Paris, 1965) 51-2; 18 Sept. 1950, Bruce Diaries.

⁸²FRUS 1950 3: 301 & 306, 14 & 20 Sept.; Acheson, *Creation*, 444.

⁸³Tel. 10.302, 25 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/5/4 (this date would appear to be wrong, as it is a continuation of a 23 Sept. cable, AMI 4/5/3).

⁸⁴The communiqué of 19 September did note NAC agreement to establish a defence force in Europe under a Supreme Commander. The tripartite statement also announced the Allies' intention to end the state of war with Germany and increase the number of Occupation forces in the Federal Republic, RIIA, *Documents on International Affairs, 1949-50* (London, 1953), 333-36.

France's isolation in NAC was accentuated after this second series of meetings. Nor were the French under any illusions as to their ability to marshal continental support against the US demand. Yet there was little attempt to make common cause with their European colleagues and Schuman made no effort to adopt a joint position with Bevin, who had at first expressed reservations towards the US proposal.⁸⁵ French opposition to the British plan for a centrally-organised German police force made unity between the two difficult and a residual coldness after May's Schuman Plan controversy between Britain and France may have contributed to a lack of cooperation between the two Foreign Ministers. The difficulties were also heightened by Monnet's insistence to Schumann and Plevin that German rearmament had to be resolved in a continental context.⁸⁶ Above all, the lack of coordination illustrated how neither Britain nor France regarded close entente as a serious alternative option to US partnership: rivalry for the post of the United States's alliance lieutenant merely increased the distance between them. Schuman continued to express the belief that France and Germany should come 'to some sort of agreement'. He was, he said, considering how he could lead this development and mentioned to Acheson the possibility of a Common Defence Budget between France and Germany, 'with the idea that the other six Ministers in Europe would eventually join him'.⁸⁷

The French Foreign Ministry openly acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and the lack of real options facing France.⁸⁸ If a solution was not rapidly found, the US could simply pass over French opposition and, if not question the principle of a unified force or the reinforcement of aid to Europe, then at the very least cut its financial assistance to the French national rearmament programme. Nor could the government leave the task of defining policy to the parliament: its highly-charged, divisive debates would only make matters worse. Some sort of solution had to be found, therefore, before 28 October and, as the Quai saw it, France's tactic should be

⁸⁵Bevin expressed the British view that the US was rushing the issue of German participation (it preferred its own concept of a German police force of 100,000 volunteers). He had difficulty initially in securing government support for the package. The Cabinet felt it was being pushed to make firm commitments without a clear indication of what the US was prepared to undertake and noted it was important not to provoke a Russian reaction, PRO, CAB 128, CM(50)49.

⁸⁶*L'Angleterre n'acceptera pas de se fusionner avec le Continent. L'Europe occidentale fusionnera si elle doit se faire, elle ne peut se faire sous forme fédérative que sans l'Angleterre*, m.s. Monnet notes, 23 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/4/8.

⁸⁷FRUS 1950 3: 358, 26 Sept.

⁸⁸De Margerie memo to Schuman, 28 Sept. 1950, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/134.

to achieve as many of its original security objectives in return for a conditional agreement to the US proposals. Securing US financial assistance was the first of these: in the forthcoming US-French financial talks Washington should be pushed into giving *'les informations et les assurances sans lesquelles nous ne pouvons mettre en application nôtre programme de fabrication prioritaire, ni équilibrer le budget de 1951'*. Quai officials were flexible towards the Plevin-Monnet-Alphand idea of a common budget, suggesting France could continue to encourage the concept while remaining open to alternative suggestions from its partners.

Recognition of France's role in Indochina, however, was non-negotiable: if the US could establish a link between increased US commitment to Europe and a German contribution then, de Margerie told Schuman, *'nous sommes en droit d'appliquer le même raisonnement à l'Indochine si l'on veut que, dans un avenir plus ou moins éloigné, nous acceptions les vues américaines sur la coopération de l'Allemagne, problème qui se présenterait pour nous sous un tout autre aspect si nous disposions dans l'Est des contingents actuellement retenus en Indochine'*.⁸⁹ Future German rearmament, inevitable in any case, should become the basis for intensified US-French cooperation to re-establish French military and economic strength.

Technical assurances would also be necessary to ensure that German military potential would be permanently contained: no German military institutions; German troops to be organised in regiments rather than divisions; no such units to be stationed along the East-West German border. The European force proposed by Washington would have to be more than an amalgamation of national armies if the possibility of independent German action were to be permanently ruled out. What the Quai recognised was that French continental preponderance and French control of the execution of German rearmament could only be achieved through close collaboration with Washington *'dont l'accord, l'approbation et l'appui nous sont indispensables'*: Paris had to convince the US to allow France to play a leading role in any discussions with Germany. The Schuman Plan may have given France the right to claim this part

⁸⁹Although the US had agreed at the London Conference in May to supply financial and military aid to the French effort in Indochina, the modalities of this association were not settled until 23 December in a treaty between France, the US and the Associated States, *FRUS* 1950 6: 954.

but, for the Quai, it did not provide a model on which to basis European rearmament plans.

It was Monnet who pressed Schuman not to give in to the US proposal. Monnet echoed the well-established French argument that Washington's entire approach to Western defence, mirrored in its German rearmament proposal, was centred solely on the Soviet threat. Perceiving war as inevitable, Washington's attitude threatened to precipitate the conflict.⁹⁰ France therefore had to reject the US proposal even if it produced a crisis in Franco-American relations: indeed such a watershed might be necessary so as to enable a joint review of the entire line of western policy and to reaffirm France as the leader of Europe. Monnet continued to advocate his idea for a European integrated approach to German rearmament, based on the Schuman Plan. The Cabinet's rejection of the idea encouraged him to look to Washington for support and possible help in convincing the French government. Monnet's contacts with US officials enabled him to use the Paris Embassy as a conduit: Bruce recommended that Acheson propose to Schuman and Moch in New York 'that Mr Schuman who had evolved the revolutionary and admirable scheme for pooling of Western European coal, iron and steel resources might turn his attention to a constructive French suggestion as to how German manpower could be utilised in a military sense to contribute the troops essential to protect Western Europe against possible aggression...I believe that Schuman, although unable or unwilling to advance such an idea as his own might recommend it if it were offered by the US.'⁹¹

Acheson's reaction was unenthusiastic, however, forcing Monnet to concentrate his efforts on winning over Pleven personally to the European Army proposal while his staff established concrete elements of a European Army plan. The first draft was written during 28-29 September by Paul Reuter and Jaques Rabier, who had already assisted on the text of the Schuman Plan, and was closely modelled on the coal and steel pool.⁹² The Pleven plan, as it was called, proposed the organisation of a conference in Paris to direct '*une transposition et un élargissement des solutions*

⁹⁰ Monnet notes, 23 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/4/7-8; Moch and Auriol shared this fear, Moch, *Histoire*, 57-8; Auriol, *Mon Septennat*, 288.

⁹¹ *FRUS* 1950 3: 337-38, 22 Sept.

⁹² FJM, interview with Paul Reuter, 7 August 1980; Philippe Vial, 'Jean Monnet, un père pour la CED?', in René Girault and Gérard Bossuat (eds.) *Europe brisée, Europe retrouvée* (Paris, 1994), 197-253.

retenues pour le Plan Schuman'. This conference would first define the political institutions required by the creation of a European Army before progressing to the necessary technical studies. Emphasis was firmly placed on the progressive constitution of European units, only after which could the incorporation of German contingents be considered. According to the draft, the tripolar Atlantic Pact would be reinforced by a European Army.⁹³ Nevertheless, when Pleven outlined the idea to the Cabinet ministers were taken aback and agreed that no further mention should be made of the idea until it was carefully studied.⁹⁴ Monnet and his staff stepped up their efforts to complete a draft plan before the Cabinet reconvened, lobbying individual politicians with successive memoranda and personal appeals and even going so far as to begin drafting a government declaration for the proposal.⁹⁵

Discussion of German rearmament at the next Cabinet meeting on 6 October, however, was overshadowed by the hostilities in Indochina where French forces were being forced to evacuate the Cao Bang garrison near the Chinese border.⁹⁶ But this does not account wholly for the resolution to postpone a decision on the European Army proposal. Schuman's presentation was tepid in the extreme: a decision did not have to be taken immediately and he counselled the government to use the delay obtained in New York to also explore any other solutions that might be found.⁹⁷ It was the Justice Minister, René Mayer, who pressed for adoption of the Monnet proposal on the basis of the additional time it would give France: *'Il faut publiquement faire effort pour replacer la question sur l'organisation du pool. Cela prendra deux ans. A ce moment-là, la situation sera différente. Il faut donc transplanter le débat sur un autre terrain au lieu de répondre oui ou non.'*⁹⁸ Cabinet ministers were clearly

⁹³ Reuter draft project, 28-29 September 1950, FJM, AMI 4/4/11.

⁹⁴ Moch, *Histoire*, 97.

⁹⁵ Draft government declarations, 4 & 10 Oct. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/4/12-13; memo on the German problem (undated), FJM, AMI 4/4/15; a copy of this, 4 Oct. 1950, is in MAE, Papiers du Henri Bonnet (PA-AP 271) 1.

⁹⁶ The Cao Bang garrison, surrounded by Viet Minh-controlled territory, had been accessible only by air since early 1950 and some in the military, notably General Revers, had recommended its evacuation from mid-1949, Dalloz, *La guerre d'Indochine*, 172. This was a turning point in the conflict and was the principal reason behind the National Defence committee's (CDN) decision in October to give absolute priority to the Indochinese conflict, despite possible repercussions for European rearmament, Doise and Vaïsse, *Diplomatie et outil militaire*, 502.

⁹⁷ Cabinet meeting, 6 Oct. 1950, AN, 4 AU 41.

⁹⁸ Two days later Mayer made a public speech in support of European rearmament along the lines of the Schuman Plan, extract, FJM, AMI 4/4/14.

establishment of a European army to be attached to the new political institutions of Europe. All the free countries of Western Europe were invited to join: participants would contribute units from their national armies and these units would be merged at the lowest possible level. Germany should contribute to this force but, because of the dangers to Europe and to the Germans themselves, no German national army or Defence Minister would be permitted.¹⁰⁴ In the debate that followed deputies were united in one single objective - to contain the development of German military potential to a minimum. The final resolution, passed by 348 votes to 224, approved the government declaration '*et notamment sa volonté de ne pas permettre que soient recréés une armée et un état-major allemand*'. This was a common army of uncommon distinctions.¹⁰⁵

The text of the government's proposal concentrated on the European institutions that would be created. Pleven called for a complete fusion of human and material components under a single political and military European authority. A European Minister of Defence, responsible to a European Assembly, a European Defence Council comprising ministers of participating states and a single defence budget was envisaged.¹⁰⁶ Yet the European integrative aspect of the project received scant attention in the parliamentary debate. Only the Gaullist, René Capitant, concentrated on it to deliver a blistering attack of both Schuman and the Council of Europe projects for a united Europe.¹⁰⁷ It was precisely this feature that lay at the heart of Monnet's preoccupations. His campaign for a European Army had been launched to protect the Schuman Plan - the Pleven Plan stressed that action on the European Army could not begin before signature of the latter. But Monnet also recognised that 'difficulties have this advantage; they can be used as a lever' and it

¹⁰⁴ *Journal Officiel: Débats: Assemblée (JO)*, 20, 1950, 7117-244.

¹⁰⁵ Many observers believed deputies lagged behind public opinion on German rearmament: 'It is very unlikely that a decision to rearm Germany would meet with any very strong public opposition here', UK Paris Embassy, Political Summary No. 19, 10-24 Oct. 1950, PRO FO 371/89167.

¹⁰⁶ The European Assembly would be either the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe or some body to emerge from it, or some other new body to be specially elected in accordance with an electoral law to be thereafter devised, Peter Calvorcoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1949-50* (London, 1953), 163.

¹⁰⁷ *JO*, 20: 25 Oct. 1950.

was difficult not to conclude that in his plan for European defence integration he was sowing the seeds for potential accelerated progress in European integration.¹⁰⁸

The preoccupation of the French government, however, remained wholly concentrated on the United States. Pleven admitted that consideration of European defence integration was due to international events beyond France's control. He assured the parliament that the progressive integration of European troops would take place and be an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance. In the ensuing debate Pleven even claimed the European army could be the first move towards a United Nations army. He called particularly upon the American people to give active sympathy to the French proposal, without which the European Army could not succeed. Neither the French government, nor the parliament, approved the European Army project for the merit of establishing a European defence organisation or forging a new relationship with Germany. For all its European finery, the Pleven Plan was, underneath, part of the same cloth that defined French foreign policy: the search for French leadership through the cooperation and assistance of the United States. Monnet had provided the design but, in his dogged determination to have it adopted, he had incorporated the services of Schuman and his senior Quai staff, Prime Minister Pleven and his *cabinet*, and his personal contacts with French politicians and officials. The European Army proposal thus brought together the most dominant players in French foreign policymaking in a common campaign on the United States.

¹⁰⁸Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Mayne, (London: 1978), 399; George Ball thought 'it almost certain that, had the Korean War not accelerated the push for German rearmament, Monnet would soon have pressed the leaders of France, West Germany and the other members of the Six to create a political community', *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York, 1982), 91. According to Alphan, Monnet's unreserved approval for EDC was due to its implications for the rapid establishment of a political community, FJM, Interview with Hervé Alphan, 17 June 1981.

Chapter Three

A Plan without plan?

October - December 1950.

With only four days left before a second encounter with its NATO partners, France had come up with an alternative proposal for the organisation of European defence. The Pleven Plan was not intended to replace the US proposal made in New York but rather to revise one of its central elements, namely the immediate creation of German troops to participate in a common NATO force under US command. In proposing an integrated European army the French government sought to thwart US plans for Germany, secure US military aid to Europe and win US approval for French supervision of European defence arrangements. This was an ambitious task for a single proposal the strongest weapon of which was the parliamentary support it had enabled the French government to secure for the principle of German rearmament.

The hasty way in which the policy was formulated by Monnet and adopted by the government illustrated the extent to which the European Army proposal was a response to an immediate foreign policy crisis. Yet the unanimity with which French policy-makers reacted to the US proposal for German rearmament illustrated the degree to which Germany's participation in Western defence was perceived as a threat to every aspect of French foreign policy. The very generality of the Pleven Plan served, in turn, to encourage a sense of its potential to fulfill France's multiple policy goals, European and global, short and long-term. What the European Army proposal did not offer was a detailed blueprint as to how precisely these objectives would be pursued or how France would secure the approval and participation of its NATO partners so vital to the plan.

The fragility of the Cabinet and the lack of institutionalised planning bodies within the French foreign policy structure did not facilitate this process. Little discussion of the Pleven Plan took place within the French administration. The priority for Paris in October 1950 was to secure immediate international support for the concept of a European army and responsibility for the elaboration of a strategy to achieve this rested firmly in the hands of Monnet. His attention, like the government in Paris, remained wholly on the United States. Not surprisingly, therefore, he focused

on the feature that had proved so successful in securing US support in the past: the theme of European integration.

Monnet's strategy to sell EDC

Even as the deputies of the National Assembly deliberated the Pleven Plan, the first international reactions to the French proposal for an integrated European Army began to reach Paris. There was little to indicate that the announcement had fulfilled its primary goal of ending France's isolation in NATO. Most crucially for the French administration, the US response was distinctly muted. A brief press statement by Acheson simply welcomed the French government's initiative as 'a further approach toward the objective of bringing the common interests of the free nations of Europe more closely together within the framework of the North Atlantic Community' and noted that his government would give it further study.¹

In private, Acheson was less complementary. He considered Pleven's proposal 'hopeless' and advised President Truman not to make any mention of it to the press.² Nor did he conceal his opinion from Ambassador Bonnet, reminding the French representative of the necessity for compromise. 'If the French insisted that all the suggestions they had raised must be fulfilled before progress could be made, we were in a hopeless situation.'³ McCloy, from Germany, was even more reticent: 'Their phasing beginning only after [the] Schuman Plan [is] adopted together with considerable period for interim national army forces, and interjection [of the] problem of political union UK and Europe in the Council of Ministers raises suspicions of delaying tactics with no reality in terms of prompt or practical action.'⁴ Emphasis on prior agreement of the Schuman Plan only played into the hands of those in Germany (most notably, the leader of the SPD opposition, Kurt Schumacher) who opposed rearmament. McCloy felt it was 'unwise for the French to attempt this *quid-pro-quo*

¹Department of State *Bulletin*, 23, no. 593, 13 Nov. 1950, 777.

²Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969) 459; memo for the President, 25 Oct. 1950, University Publications of America Inc. microfilm project (UPA), *President Harry S. Truman's Office Files, 1945-53*, Pt. 3, *Subject File*, Reel 14.

³*Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) 1950, 3, (Washington, 1977): 404, 3 Nov.

⁴Tel. 3497, 26 Oct. 1950, NARA, RG 84, France, Paris Embassy, Top Secret General Records, US Deputy North Atlantic Council 1950-52 (D), Box 4.

approach which risks losing both birds'. He noted that the discriminatory tone of the proposal was already producing hostile responses in Germany.

In light of these attitudes, Bonnet advised the Quai that the best way of overcoming the negative reaction of those within US political and military circles who wanted to proceed immediately with the rearmament of Germany was to stress the advantages of the Plevin plan for European integration. *'Il conviendrait notamment de faire ressortir que les résultats recherchés par les Etats-Unis seront finalement obtenus d'une manière plus sûre si nos propositions sont adoptées en même temps que s'accroîtra la force politique d'une Europe unie.'* He also underlined the significance that support from other European states would have in Washington. *'On ne saurait trop souligner à ce propos qu'un appui de quelques-uns au moins de nos partenaires européens serait précieux.'*⁵ French diplomats had little other advice to go on. The text of the 24 October declaration produced by the Monnet team had been circulated to all posts by the Quai without any accompanying instructions or guidelines. Clearly, the foreign ministry was going to have as little hand in formulating a defence of the French proposal as it had had in drafting it.

Monnet continued to direct operations as a less than grey eminence behind Plevin, his attention completely focused on securing US support for his plan. In contrast to Bonnet's recommended tactic however, he directed his efforts directly at the Americans rather than the Europeans. Monnet had already spoken with Bruce in Washington by telephone, who had indicated his personal enthusiasm for the integrative approach.⁶ News from the French High Commissioner in Bonn, André François-Poncet, that neither Adenauer, Ivone Kirkpatrick (the UK High Commissioner) nor McCloy were favourable to the project prompted Monnet to invite the latter to his country home in Houajarray on 27 October to convince his wartime friend and collaborator personally of the merits of the proposal.⁷ When McCloy arrived at the house he was surprised to find Plevin and Schuman also present. The

⁵Tel. 10.853, 25 Oct. 1950, AN, 4 AU 58.

⁶Bruce Diaries, 24 Oct. 1950.

⁷Note from Bonn, 26 Oct. 1950, AN, 4 AU 58; François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York, 1994), 230. Monnet and McCloy knew each other from before 1930 but became close during Monnet's time in Washington with the British Supply Council. McCloy was then Assistant Secretary of War, Thomas Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Harvard, 1991), 97-8.

three Frenchmen addressed McCloy's criticisms directly, stressing the sincerity of their proposal. No discrimination against Germany was intended other than that which was currently the case, given the actual existence of national armies in France and other countries and the need for forces in states with overseas commitments. Schuman was 'whole-heartedly convinced that there would be no solid European defence without German participation'.⁸ All three insisted that, as soon as the Schuman Plan was signed, preparatory talks on the elaboration of the French plan could commence. The first step would be the designation of a European Minister of Defence whose initially limited powers would gradually develop. Once participating states were agreed on his identity as well as the principles for establishing national troop contributions, a common budget and recruitment procedures, then progress could begin immediately. *'Loin d'être une complication, l'unité de Direction sera une garantie de rapidité et d'uniformité dans l'exécution des directives données par Nato.'*⁹

In Monnet's strategy, winning McCloy over to the French project was the key not only to support in Washington but also in Bonn. German agreement to the plan, McCloy was told, rested on Allied unity and thus US support was vital to convince the Germans that there was no hope of Allied division on this issue. The French were also conscious of McCloy's personal influence with Adenauer and his potential use as a Franco-German mediator in communicating the details of the Pleven Plan to the German government. Upon his return to Frankfurt, McCloy did indeed communicate the substance of the meeting to the Chancellor, including Schuman's suggestion that Adenauer send a German correspondent to Paris so that the Foreign Minister could explain the background of French proposals and eliminate the note of discrimination which the original statement contained.¹⁰ Although McCloy still remained critical of the link between the Schuman and Pleven Plans and considered German support for the latest European project far from certain, he was hopeful that the situation might improve as a result of his unofficial French visit. This first lobbying effort by Monnet, Pleven and Schuman was revealing. It illustrated how consciously the European Army

⁸Tel. 3572, 28 Oct. 1950, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: D, Box 4.

⁹Monnet draft of Pleven tel. to Moch, 28 Oct. 1950, FJM, AMI 5/2/4-5.

¹⁰Tel. 3572, 28 Oct. 1950, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: D, Box 4.

proposal was addressed to the United States and how anxious France's leaders were to avert a possible Franco-American crisis over German rearmament. The significance of the relationship was not simply a consequence of French economic and military dependency on the United States. The American relationship was the conduit through which France addressed its European partners and the centrepiece on which it based its European leadership claim. President Auriol's confirmation to the Cabinet that it was sufficient for France to be in agreement with the US for everyone else to follow articulated Monnet's thinking succinctly.¹¹ As French policymakers were all too aware, the road from Paris to Bonn went via Washington.

The NATO partners refuse to buy

Monnet's defence of the European Army to McCloy formed the basis of the French presentation at the NAC Defence Ministers' meeting in Washington the next day. Moch sought to assure his colleagues that there was no incompatibility between the European Army and NATO, paraphrasing the telegram he had received from Monnet and Plevin that France intended to create a truly European army, 'tied to a new organisation of Europe, really promoting a united Europe' which would then be placed at the disposition of the Atlantic Command.¹² What counted, Moch insisted, was the principle of political control: details relating to the scale of the experiment and the actual political structure could be worked out by the relevant experts later. The French delegation had little else on which to base its case. General Stehlin, assistant Chief of Staff at the Defence Ministry, and his staff had attempted, in the few hours before their departure for Washington, to draw out some of the military implications of the plan before advising Moch not to present the 'monstrous' project to his fellow Defence Ministers.¹³ The General was convinced that, either with or without France, Germany's rearmament was already decided, and the only realistic option for the

¹¹Cabinet meeting, 8 Nov. 1950, AN, 4 AU 41.

¹²*FRUS* 1950 3: 415-18, 28 Oct.

¹³Georgette Elgey, *La République des Contradictions, 1951-54* (Paris, 1968), 238.

government was to reach a compromise with its NATO partners, a view apparently shared by other members of the French delegation.¹⁴

Emphasis on the European federative aspect of the proposal, however, merely intensified the unanimously critical response of France's allies. British Defence Secretary Emmanuel Shinwell led the attack, posing a series of precise questions clearly designed to illustrate the vagueness of the French proposal and succeeding in their undoubted aim of embarrassing Moch. The delay that would accompany the creation of a European force was the principal objection of all France's partners. Ministers pointed out that the stipulation that the Schuman Plan be signed before European Army negotiations began would be regarded by Germans as a device to force the coal and steel pool on them and make them hostile to the entire military scheme. Allegations that the Plevin Plan constituted unacceptable discrimination were already being articulated in Germany.¹⁵ The idea that troops should be integrated at the battalion, rather than the divisional, level was attacked as militarily impracticable and delegates were also sceptical of the key political concept of a European Defence minister, claiming its constitutional responsibilities and functions were insufficiently defined.¹⁶ Moch, humiliated and angry at the force of these criticisms, retaliated by refusing to discuss the German contribution question on any other grounds apart from the French plan. The presence of his wife at each meeting, dressed completely in black in mourning for their son killed during the war, offered a potent symbol of Moch's determination.¹⁷ By the close of the session on 1 November Moch had dropped his initial positive emphasis and called a press conference to set out once again the French position of total opposition to the creation of German divisions, a German ministry of defence or a German general staff.¹⁸ The only agreement reached by the NATO Defence Ministers was to recommend further consideration of the issue. In the

¹⁴Letter to Massigli, 10 Oct. 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/70. Moch believed that apart from the Secretary General of the Defence Ministry, Louis Kahn, the entire French delegation supported German rearmament and showed little real determination to oppose the US proposals, Jules Moch, *Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950* (Paris, 1965), 189-90.

¹⁵Rolf Steininger, *Wiederbewaffnung: Die Entscheidung für einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag: Adenauer und die Westmächte, 1950* (Bonn, 1989), 392-93.

¹⁶FRUS 1950 3: 416, 28 Oct.

¹⁷FRUS 1950 3: 427-28, 3 Nov.

¹⁸Moch, *Histoire*, 222.

meantime, all decisions on the structure and organisation of European defence would be postponed.

France's isolation within NATO had only worsened with the introduction of the Pleven Plan and the preparatory efforts to secure US support for the project appeared to have had little success. US Defence Secretary General Marshall, as chair of the session, resolutely abstained from joining in either discussion of the French plan or elucidation of the US proposal, despite Moch's private visit to him before the meeting. Subsequent French efforts to meet with the General after the session and secure US help *vis-à-vis* the Europeans failed.¹⁹ Although Marshall refrained from any public comment about the plan, he was not afraid to express his attitude privately, telling Shinwell that the more his staff examined the French plan the more vacuous it appeared.²⁰ Washington's public non-committal stance reflected its desire to avoid any appearance of pressurising the French either directly or via its European partners. If the shortcomings of the Pleven Plan meant it had to be rejected then this should 'be done by as many other NAT members as possible', as Ambassador Douglas advised from London.²¹

But the Truman administration was also worried about the effect an international row over German participation might have on French domestic politics. If Moch, evidently its most bitter opponent in the Cabinet, led a Socialist departure from the government a stable replacement coalition would prove difficult to establish and future consideration of the German question made even more problematic. Embassy officials in Paris pointed out that within the bureaucratic circles of the French foreign office there was sufficient realisation 'of the necessity of a German contribution and the catastrophic effects for France and Europe of French intransigence and isolation on this point'.²² British and Benelux ministers placed similar stress on the need to avoid putting too much pressure on the fragile French government, further encouraging the US view that the best thing NATO could do for now was to wait until French internal politics permitted an inevitable capitulation on

¹⁹Moch memo to Auriol, 29 Oct. 1950, AN, 4 AU 58.

²⁰Shinwell tel. 20.378, 28 Oct. 1950, PRO, PREM 8 1429.

²¹FRUS 1950 3: 415, 27 Oct.

²²Tel. 2283, 27 Oct. 1950, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: D, Box 4.

German rearmament.²³ In the meantime, Washington was determined that the French should be under no misperception as to the acceptability of the Pleven Plan. Acheson refused to take any initiatives that might signal US compromise, telling the US NAC representative Charles Spofford that it would be a mistake to formulate any specific or detailed proposals 'which might result in France grasping some complicated device which at best might be extremely difficult to work out'.²⁴ No new solutions were established for the discussions between the NAC Deputies beginning in London on 13 November.

Indications from Pleven and Schuman appeared to confirm the wisdom of this approach. The Prime Minister assured Washington that the Pleven Plan had accomplished its task of securing domestic acceptance for a proposition approving a German contribution to Western defence and he did not intend to be stubborn on the details. Schuman, he promised, would smooth over the negative impression left by Moch with a press statement clarifying the French intention not to practice discrimination against German armed forces in the project.²⁵ The only point Pleven continued to stress was that the final solution agreed by the NATO partners should incorporate the idea of a further step in European integration and a closer *rapprochement* between France and Germany: French government and parliamentary approval would be doubtful without it. Schuman was even more flexible on the military and political nature of the European Army. He told Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker that the proposed European Minister of Defence would act as a kind of super civil servant who might take orders from the NATO Council and might, in fact, be known merely as a High Commissioner. Nor did he appear to exclude the possibility of expanding the minimum unit size to a division.²⁶ In marked contrast to the Prime Minister, Schuman even seemed uncertain about making agreement on the Schuman Plan a precondition for consideration of German rearmament.²⁷

²³The Foreign Office warned US Embassy officials of the difficult parliamentary situation that would result from a government fall, Depto 134, 25 Oct. 1950, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: D, Box 4; Spaak made a similar point to Bruce, *FRUS* 1950 3: 441, 10 Nov; Van Zeeland also expressed his worry, *FRUS* 1950 3: 439, 9 Nov.

²⁴*FRUS* 1950 3: 440, 10 Nov.

²⁵*FRUS* 1950 3: 433-34, 4 Nov; Paris to Moch, 5 Nov. 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/70.

²⁶Stikker reported the conversation to UK Ambassador Nichols in The Hague, Nichols to Bevin, 31 Oct. 1950, PRO, PREM 8 1429.

²⁷Frankfurt tel. 3572, 28 Oct. 1950, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: D, Box 4.

Both ministers were anxious to demonstrate willingness to make concessions in order to prevent further rupture within NATO. Yet the two were equally conscious of the frailty of domestic French support for German rearmament and the need to proceed carefully both in the Cabinet and parliament. There was only so far that the government could be seen to yield from its original position and US support would continue to be the touchstone in any consideration of concession. Pleven reassured the Cabinet on 31 October that France's firm position on a European integrative approach to rearmament was the correct one - '*la France doit conserver sa volonté de faire l'Europe*' - and skirted over the degree of current NATO opposition to the plan. McCloy, he noted, had persuaded General Marshall of France's sincerity and its refusal to compromise and the latter now understood that '*on ne pouvait passer outre, car pour avoir l'Allemagne, il ne veut pas qu'on perde la France*'.²⁸ Without more comprehensive briefing it was difficult for substantial discussion of France's situation to take place in the Cabinet, while Schuman's hesitant comments on the French project revealed just how secondary a role his department and personal *Cabinet* were playing in the drama.²⁹ The Quai d'Orsay merely instructed its officials to transmit the criticisms of the Pleven Plan they encountered '*afin que le service compétent leur fournisse les éléments de réponses valables*'.³⁰ It was Pleven's office that remained the central source of policy in the current NATO impasse, as Monnet indeed intended. Working through the Prime Minister gave Monnet the most immediate access to and potential influence over the French Cabinet. It also lent extra authority to his already well-established dominance within the Foreign Ministry.

French strategy continued to aim at securing US support and attention was drawn to internal divergences of opinion between State and Defence Departments over the extent to which US aid to Europe should be delayed until German rearmament was agreed. French policymakers knew that US officials in Europe and the State Department took a more conciliatory view towards the French proposal and hoped these views would eventually prevail in Washington.³¹ To assist the process,

²⁸Cabinet meeting, 31 Oct. 1950, AN, 4 AU 41.

²⁹Schuman was not even in Paris, having travelled to Rome for the Council of Europe meeting.

³⁰Moch, *Histoire*, 217.

³¹Pierre Melandri suggests that contact with US officials in Europe prevented decision-makers in Paris from grasping the full hostility of the US to the plan, *Les Etats-Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe* (Paris, 1980), 305.

Paris took an increasingly conciliatory approach towards Germany. Schuman's 6 November press statement promising that discrimination against German forces would not be permanent was followed by a message to Adenauer, delivered personally by the French High Commissioner, André François-Poncet, stressing that the French government continued to see Franco-German understanding as the basis for the solution of Europe's problems.³² Pleven went so far as to tell Bruce that 'if this matter could only be dealt with by the French, the US and the Germans, the three could reach an agreement in fairly short order that would have met the approval of the other members of NATO'.³³ Adenauer's declaration of support for the Pleven Plan before the Bundestag on 8 November thus came as a huge relief. The Chancellor claimed it was reasonable for Germans to make a contribution to their own defence, in sharp contrast to the Socialist leader Kurt Schumacher who continued to lead a virulent campaign against rearmament. But Adenauer also made the terms of German agreement quite clear, announcing that the Federal Government would expect equal rights and the creation of a united front strong enough to deter Russian aggression in return for a German contribution in a European force.³⁴ For now, however, Adenauer's speech represented the clearance of one of the biggest obstacles to US support of the Pleven Plan, as the French prepared for the next round of NATO discussions in London.

French and US officials attempt compromise

Monnet's instructions to the French delegation for this next set of talks sought to appease the NATO members and to counter criticisms that the project was militarily and politically unfeasible. This involved a number of compromises: rather than the initial unspecified battalion, the French now proposed that the basic European Army unit should be a combat team of 4-5,000 men, about one third of a division.³⁵ Certain

³²Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs 1945-53*, trans. Beate Rhum von Oppen, (London, 1966), 297.

³³Shinwell's attack on the plan in Washington had created huge resentment in Paris: Pleven complained to Bruce of the 'chronic British objections to any plan to bring about the closer unification of Europe', *FRUS* 1950 3: 434, 4 Nov.

³⁴Extract from Adenauer Bundestag speech on the Pleven Plan, 8 Nov. 1950, Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA), *Documents on International Affairs 1949-50* (London, 1953), 344.

³⁵Moch had apparently suggested in Washington a battalion size of 1,000 men, Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 141.

interim measures such as the preparation of recruiting lists and physical accommodation could be permitted to begin immediately although the French remained resolute that no training of German soldiers could proceed before the European Army was formed. The latest proposal also contained an assurance that the political institutions of the Army would not have the same breadth as those in the Schuman Plan and could, therefore, be quickly established. France also agreed to accept the guarantees of the original US proposal in relation to the percentage of effectives and prohibited industries in Germany.³⁶

Monnet's starting point, however, remained unchanged: negotiations on a European force could not begin before the signature of the Schuman Plan.³⁷ Deadlock in the coal and steel negotiations during November over the deconcentration of the Ruhr only spurred him further to emphasise the link between the two: the French criticised their NATO partners at Washington for failing to grasp the importance of the relationship.³⁸ Parodi and Alphand, in presenting these latest French proposals secretly to the US Embassy (the day before the London meeting opened) warned they were the furthest the government could go in conceding to US objections without threatening political and public support. Paris hoped that an agreement in principle could be reached between the two countries before Alphand made his presentation to the NAC Deputies, a request to which Washington showed little signs of agreeing.³⁹

Notwithstanding this impasse and the fact that the NATO military committee had submitted its unanimous opinion of the French plan as being military impractical the day before, Alphand's 13 November speech to the NAC went considerably better than the previous French presentation in Washington. The Monnet-written text emphasised again the political dimensions of European construction inherent in the plan and offered a vision of future Western organisation. Of the three communities that formed the free world - Western Europe, the US and the Commonwealth - Alphand declared that *'un jour viendra sans doute où leur union devra comporter une série d'institutions politiques, économiques et militaires, correspondant à leur degré*

³⁶Instructions to Alphand (unsigned) & text of presentation, 11 Nov. 1950, MAE, SG 12.

³⁷*Projet d'instructions au représentant français au Conseil des Suppléants* (two drafts), 6 & 9 Nov. 1950, FJM, AMI 5/2/9-10; *FRUS* 1950 3: 448-9, 13 Nov.

³⁸French delegation in Washington tel., 1 Nov. 1950, FJM, AMI 5/2/8.

³⁹*FRUS* 1950 3: 445, 12 Nov.

*plus ou moins étroit d'intégration. Lorsqu'il s'agit d'assurer la défense de l'Occident, nous ne pouvons pas délibérément ignorer de pareilles réalités.*⁴⁰ Alphanth's insistence that he was prepared to discuss any proposals on the question of German contribution, to answer any questions and to do everything in his power to bring about an agreed solution set a more conciliatory tone from the outset. Delegates appreciated signs of greater French flexibility, most significantly in Alphanth's use of the word 'High Commissioner of Defence' in place of the written 'European Defence Minister' and his recognition that Britain would probably be unable to participate in the project.⁴¹

External events were also contributing to a better atmosphere within NATO. There was growing apprehension at the political situation in Germany, where public approval for the Socialist opposition had risen to almost 40 percent and was manifested in Land election gains in November. Widespread antipathy towards rearmament was seen as the principal reason for this: even Adenauer's Cabinet appeared split on the issue following the resignation of the Interior Minister, Gustav Heinemann, in protest.⁴² Adenauer attempted to steal the fire of the Socialist call that German troops should not be used simply as 'cannon-fodder' by the West and on 16 November presented the High Commissioners with a memorandum requesting the end of the Occupation Statute as well as concessions in the economic, legal and financial spheres. The Chancellor claimed that the changes were necessary to alter the defeatist attitude of the Germans and to maintain the will for Franco-German understanding.⁴³ Although the allies were conscious of Adenauer's genuine domestic difficulties, trepidation towards Germany was deeply and widely shared. The three occupation powers were determined to prevent the issue of a German contribution becoming a bargaining tool with which the Chancellor could exploit NATO divisions and bring about the speedy restoration of German sovereignty.⁴⁴

The search for a compromise was also furthered by Soviet actions. On 20 October 1950 the USSR and its Eastern satellite states had proposed a quadripartite

⁴⁰Alphanth presentation, 11 Nov. 1950, MAE, SG 12.

⁴¹*FRUS* 1950 3: 448, 13 Nov. The British Government declared in the Commons on 13 November that the UK would not participate in the European Army, House of Commons, *Debates*, Vol. 480.

⁴²Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 146.

⁴³Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 302.

⁴⁴Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 149.

conference on the demilitarisation of Germany which was followed, on 3 November, by a Soviet note formally proposing such talks. Many in the West were convinced this was an attempt to exploit the divisions within NATO. The recommended creation of an 'All-German Constitutional Council' seemed to be a manoeuvre directed both at those in Germany, such as Pastor Martin Niemoeller, who argued that rearmament would prevent reunification and at those outside the country, who worried that a rearmed Germany would pursue reunification through military means. In France Schuman advised the Cabinet that while the Allies needed to avoid any Soviet tactic to split them, agreement in principle to a four-power conference should be given and France should thus propose preliminary talks among the three allies to establish a joint position.⁴⁵ In the National Assembly on 15 November he announced the government's desire for a positive response to the Soviet invitation, a declaration which deputies greeted with widespread approval.⁴⁶ The government certainly believed that domestic support for German rearmament was unobtainable without some effort at negotiation with the USSR being made but the fact that such negotiations would also encourage efforts to re-establish Allied unity may not have been outside of French calculations either.

The US finally began to respond to French efforts. The State Department's most senior officials in Europe, Bruce, McCloy, Douglas, Spofford, Bohlen and Julius Homes (Minister at the London Embassy) gathered in London to confer on the German rearmament question and agreed that the dilemma confronting NATO governments was 'fundamentally political rather than military in nature'.⁴⁷ It was the continuing French insistence on a political superstructure that was the problem: in military terms the only substantial divergence between the French and US positions was on the proposed unit size for a European force.⁴⁸ Although they accepted Washington's view that the French proposal did not offer a basis for agreement, the officials suggested that the administration take 'a benevolent attitude' and accept the concept of political institutions in a European force, only insisting that any solution be completely within the NATO framework. In return, the French should agree to

⁴⁵Cabinet meeting, 8 Nov. 1950, AN, 4 AU 41.

⁴⁶Moch, *Histoire*, 230.

⁴⁷FRUS 1950 3: 460, 16 Nov.

⁴⁸FRUS 1950 3: 457, 16 Nov.

immediate first steps in the recruitment and training of German forces beyond purely planning activities and should accept whatever size military units NATO authorities considered genuinely effective.

The State Department welcomed this initiative, one which offered a way out of the current deadlock without delaying the start of the military preparations set out in the original US proposal. After consultation with the Pentagon it was agreed that the Ambassadors' recommendations should form the basis of a US compromise proposal in London.⁴⁹ When Spofford presented orally what immediately became known as the Spofford Proposals to the Deputies on 20 November, Alphand responded positively and suggested personally that France might accept the idea of an interim period during which measures for the formation of German units would be developed.⁵⁰ The Deputies agreed that supervision of this process could be undertaken by the Allied High Commissioners, as the NATO military committee had recommended. Alphand was forced to recant, however, on receipt of French government instructions. Paris remained resolute that the explicit relation between German troop creation and a European army could not be abandoned. The link was the only way of ensuring that controls on Germany were not relinquished before the European force was up and running.⁵¹ No matter how much Alphand stressed that this interim arrangement would be replaced once a European High Commission was set up the government refused to yield.⁵²

Alphand returned to Paris to discuss the proposals personally with Pleven and Schuman and urge them to secure Cabinet agreement to the US terms. Washington was now prepared to support a conference in Paris and to revise interim arrangements for Germany as results of the conference appeared. Alphand noted how France's partners had agreed to its proposed unit size of a combat-team, which, at 5,000 men, was small enough to ensure that German units could not be autonomous but would have to be attached to allied divisions even in the interim period before permanent European divisions were established. Finally, French insistence on linking progress in

⁴⁹FRUS 1950 3: 450-52, 470-72: 18 Nov.

⁵⁰Tel 10.371 to Paris, 20 Nov. 1950, AN, 4 AU 58.

⁵¹FRUS 1950 3: 493-94, 28 Nov; Alphand had received government instructions underlining this on 15 November, Moch, *Histoire*, 235.

⁵²Tel. 10.456 to Paris, 26 Nov. 1950, AN, 363 AP 28; FRUS 1950 3: 494.

European institutions with gradual relaxation of controls in Germany had been acknowledged in London: '*Nous disposerions ainsi le moyens de pression dans la négociation*'.⁵³ A refusal now, insisted Alphant, would lead to serious consequences for France's relations with the West.

This new sense of urgency reflected the deteriorating situation in Korea, where General MacArthur's crossing of the 38th parallel on 24 November had prompted the Chinese to enter the conflict, forcing UN forces into a hasty retreat. Spofford quickly convinced Acheson to support Alphant's efforts in Paris with a personal message to Schuman, in which the Secretary emphasised that adoption of the Spofford Proposals was only a starting point for allied defence plans and that the US would continue to support the integration process.⁵⁴ While Schuman himself was keen to reach agreement, the French Cabinet was still reluctant: Moch and Mollet, in particular, maintained that an interim period and the relegation of decisions on the size and employment of European combat-teams to NATO Supreme Command would imply the renunciation of a European army.⁵⁵ Monnet too signalled his opposition, warning Plevin that the US proposal relating to the combat-team would allow for the possibility of German divisions. He insisted that the US commit itself publicly to the European Army: Acheson's private message was merely a bait to secure French agreement.⁵⁶ Not surprisingly, Alphant returned empty-handed to London on 2 December.

He was accompanied this time, however, by Plevin and Schuman, who travelled to discuss Truman's shock statement of 30 November that he was considering the use of atomic weapons in Korea with their British counterparts. Notwithstanding alarm in French circles that the US might be contemplating a preventative war with the USSR, Paris was reluctant to engage in direct consultations with the US, aware of the pressures it would inevitably face in Washington as a result of the European impasse.⁵⁷ As Prime Minister Attlee prepared to travel to Washington

⁵³ *Note pour le Président*, 28 Nov. 1950, FJM, AMI 5/2/14.

⁵⁴ *FRUS* 1950 3: 497-98, 29 Nov; Bonnet reported US alarm at the situation in Paris, 29 Nov. 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/121.

⁵⁵ Elgey, *La République des Contradictions*, 238.

⁵⁶ Note for Plevin, 4 Dec. 1950, FJM, AMI 5/2/17.

⁵⁷ Chauvel at the UN urged Schuman for a separate French representation, 2-3 Dec. 1950, MAE, SG 53; Schuman had already advised the Cabinet against US-French talks on Indochina while France was still not agreed on its military policy, 18 Nov. 1950, AN, 4 AU 41.

to plead for US restraint, the imperative for settlement in Europe mounted.⁵⁸ Bevin and Attlee, determined to accelerate the appointment of a NATO Supreme Commander and the establishment of alliance forces in Europe, declared themselves prepared to accept the French plan on the condition that France accept the Spofford compromise.⁵⁹ Schuman and Plevin, however, saw the link the other way round: if the Supreme Command was in place the French government would be in a better position to return to the parliament, '*et de lui demander si l'on ne pourrait pas faire un pas de plus selon une formule nouvelle*', although Plevin was quick to add he had no such idea at hand.⁶⁰

Although Bevin and Attlee made no attempt to disguise their dislike of the French plan Foreign Office officials were surprised at the French ministers' lack of emphasis on the European Army idea and the points which Alphand had been stressing in the NAC negotiations.⁶¹ The Americans were even more taken aback later that day when Plevin and Schuman, accompanied by Massigli and Parodi, met with Spofford. The two ministers suggested dropping the French plan in favour of a proposal for a NATO High Commissioner which the Dutch had been floating.⁶² This would involve international control over German forces through NATO, although Schuman and Plevin thought that the European army and political superstructure idea could be retained as a longer range objective.⁶³ They stressed that no one in London or Paris had been consulted on this idea and sought a US opinion before taking it any further.

Washington was nonplussed by such a complete *volte-face*, not least when agreement on many aspects of the existing French proposal was being hammered out in London. Bruce, certainly, was not pleased: 'it points up once more the bad liaison

⁵⁸See Rosemary Foot, 'Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to Avert an Expanded War, December 1950-January 1951', *Diplomatic History*, 10, Winter 1986, 43-57.

⁵⁹Minutes of discussion, 2 Dec. 1950, PRO PREM 8 1206.

⁶⁰Minutes of French-US talks, 2 Dec. 1950, MAE, SG 53.

⁶¹FRUS 1950 3: 514-15, 3 Dec.; Bevin thought French policy was 'antipathetic' towards NATO, to which he was particularly committed given the important role he had played in its creation, Memo to the Cabinet Defence Committee, 24 Nov. 1950, PRO, PREM 8 1429, DO (50) 100.

⁶²Stikker had discussed his proposal with Acheson on 4 November and the Ambassador in Washington, Jean Van Roijen, reported that Moch was prepared to work out a formula along the Dutch lines, Memo by Freeman Matthews, 6 Nov. 1950, NARA, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Lot 55 D 258, Box 4; Moch had recommended Paris to examine the idea, *Histoire*, 210.

⁶³FRUS 1950 3: 512, 2 Dec.

between the French Government and the Embassy which comes I think, not from any lack of confidence in the Embassy, but from the individualistic and careless way in which the French make presentations on matters of importance.⁶⁴ He met Schuman, Alphand and Monnet separately to discuss the issue the very next day. The US administration moved swiftly to put a halt to the initiative before NAC Deputies could begin study of the Dutch proposal, claiming the idea would have far-reaching implications which had not even been considered in Washington.⁶⁵ Concern with time delay was undoubtedly a factor in this curt rejection but the State Department was also influenced by the advice of McCloy and Bruce. Both men continued to stress that the framework of a European defence structure set out in the original French plan would have to be retained if German rearmament was to be made acceptable to German and French opinion.⁶⁶ Bruce pressed Washington to send another letter of support for the Paris Conference to Schuman which could be published by the French at a later date and, with the help of McCloy's staff in Frankfurt, drafted the text.⁶⁷ The letter repeated Acheson's earlier message of 29 November, adding that the US would agree to send observers to the Paris Conference. 'If your Government, in close consultation with the German and other European Governments who wish to participate can evolve the main outlines of a plan for bringing the free nations of Europe more closely together in the spirit so well represented by the Schuman Plan, we can reasonably hope for long term solutions of many of our problems, be they political, military or economic.'⁶⁸ For the US, the main object of the letter was to achieve agreement on the Spofford proposals: in the process, however, Washington saved the French plan from immediate extinction.⁶⁹

The French Cabinet gives way

⁶⁴Bruce Diaries, 3 Dec. 1950.

⁶⁵FRUS 1950 3: 523, 5 Dec.

⁶⁶McCloy cited German opinion polls showing support for participation in a West European Army running at almost 60 percent, Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 154; Acheson reported McCloy's views to the British during Attlee's Washington visit, 6 Dec. 1950, PRO, PREM 8 1200.

⁶⁷Bruce Diaries, 5-6 Dec. 1950.

⁶⁸FRUS 1950 3, 523.

⁶⁹Acheson to Attlee, 6 Dec. 1950, PRO, PREM 8 1200.

Schuman and Pleven made no reference to their offer in London when they reported their visit to the Cabinet. Schuman admitted bluntly that none of France's partners liked its proposal but claimed the US realised it was the only plan capable of securing German agreement and causing least injury to the Soviets and had, therefore, made efforts to compromise.⁷⁰ Washington was now willing to use its authority on the other NATO countries to support a European Army and had taken note of the need to proceed cautiously in negotiations with Germany. For the first time, the Foreign Minister argued strongly for French agreement to the Spofford proposals. The US was unlikely to withdraw from the continent if France continued to reject its offer on German rearmament, but *'elle mettra l'Allemagne en valeur sans nous et même contre nous. Une Allemagne sous le contrôle anglo-saxon ne serait pas rassurante.'*⁷¹ Schuman acknowledged that acceptance would overstep the limits set down in the parliamentary vote on the Pleven Plan but he argued it would be easier to explain this to the Assembly and secure its agreement once the three Allies had made a public presentation of their united proposals to the Federal Republic and secured the latter's acquiescence.

Guy Mollet, Minister for European Affairs, continued to be the principal obstacle and threatened to resign, much to the consternation of his colleagues who pleaded with him that such a move would bring down the government. Only on the condition that the Socialist party's directing committee first ratified the proposed agreement, did Mollet finally capitulate late in the evening of 6 December: his party's leadership followed immediately afterwards.⁷² Notwithstanding this final complication, the most striking aspect of the Cabinet's deliberations was the lack of particular party perspectives on France's policy choices. The trepidation towards German rearmament was shared by all and Mollet's fellow ministers were equally uneasy about the US proposals. What united the Cabinet was the belief that France could no longer say no. The issue confronting the government, as Schuman presented it, was fundamentally political. The principle of German rearmament had already been

⁷⁰Cabinet meeting, 6 Dec. 1950, AN, 4 AU 41.

⁷¹This reflected Bonnet's warnings of a possible slow-down in American economic and military aid programmes to France, *'qui peut...nous faire sentir le poids de son autorité'*, 9 Nov. 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/116.

⁷²Moch, *Histoire*, 240-42.

accepted in the Pleven Plan and Schuman and Pleven stressed that NATO agreement now did not imply immediate action on its realisation. The French military leadership had confirmed as much on 25 November, giving their tentative approval to the concept of a European Defence Commissioner in addition to the proposed size of the combat-team and claiming that nothing needed to be decided before the signature of the ECSC treaty, '*garantie contre la reconstitution d'une industrie allemande d'armements*'.⁷³

External pressures lay at the heart of the Cabinet's deliberations. It was France's continued position in the Western alliance that was perceived to be at stake in December 1950 and the ominous international environment merely contributed to the sense of urgency in Paris. France's relationship with the United States had to be assured and the US military and political commitment to a French-led Europe reinforced. This was the basis for French agreement to the Spofford proposals, a bargain that was graphically illustrated the following day, when Bruce presented Schuman with Acheson's letter committing the US to public support of the European Army project. Only then did Schuman instruct Alphand to notify his NATO colleagues of France's assent to the compromise. The Minister gave his opinion that if settlement was reached in London, then 'the only possibility of obtaining German cooperation in German rearmament is through further European integration approach'.⁷⁴ NAC Deputies and military representatives set to work at once to draft the text of the compromise agreement before the NATO Council met in Brussels on 15 December.

A final condition to French agreement was added by the Foreign Ministry leadership. Parodi, who was meeting with Bruce and British Ambassador, Oliver Harvey, to draft a reply to the Soviet note told Bruce the day after the Cabinet decision that as much as he felt there was no alternative to the action taken by NATO, he was gravely concerned at the possible Soviet reaction to German rearmament.⁷⁵ Pressure for four power talks to accompany the NATO agreement now mounted from the Quai. The Foreign Ministry had initially taken a fairly cautious approach to the

⁷³Quoted in Pierre Guillen 'Les chefs militaires français, le réarmement de l'Allemagne et la CED', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 129 1983, 3-33.

⁷⁴*FRUS* 1950 3: 528, 7 Dec.

⁷⁵Bruce Diaries, 8 Dec. 1950.

Soviet offer, aware of the potential implications a reunified neutral Germany could have for the current status quo: *[est-ce] qu'il est préférable de voir les Russes sur l'Elbe mais l'Allemagne divisée, l'Allemagne de l'Ouest inféodée à l'Occident, et les forces américaines stationnées en Europe, et même renforcées?*⁷⁶ Diplomats agreed that French policy should be limited to the gradual re-establishment of international confidence, through initiatives such as a four power non-aggression pact. However, General MacArthur's action in Korea, coming right in the middle of NATO's discussions on German rearmament prompted French and British policymakers to move towards talks with the USSR.⁷⁷ Paris argued that acceptance of such a meeting, even in principal, would prove the West's good faith and was critical of Washington's claim that talks, in delaying progress in German rearmament, would only play into the hands of the Soviets.⁷⁸ US opposition merely reinforced the Ministry's belief that France had to act as a brake to curb more dangerous US tendencies both in Asia and Europe. With compromise over Germany now reached, the French were in a better position to contest US views of the Soviet Union.⁷⁹

The Quai was under no illusions as to the extent Washington had really conceded its ambition for rapid German rearmament. It deduced correctly that, even though Acheson might not mention it to his fellow NATO Ministers in Brussels, the US did not regard the Spofford Compromise as excluding the possibility of using German combat groups in a NATO force (*le cadre atlantique*) and even combining them to form full German divisions, should the plans for a European army encounter difficulties. Tying French agreement to the compromise with four power talks would serve to remind France's NATO partners that the question of German rearmament could be reexamined and that current decisions were not irreversible.⁸⁰ French commitment to the NATO agreement would be every bit as conditional as that of the United States. Above all, a French initiative for four power talks would serve as a forceful demonstration of the country's claim to international leadership. The NATO

⁷⁶De Margerie memo 'Questions Intempestives', 22 Nov. 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/70.

⁷⁷Melandri suggests the European attitude was partly a reaction to the loss of US prestige in Korea, *Les Etats-Unis face*, 303.

⁷⁸MAE to all posts, 15 Dec. 1950, AN, 4 AU 58.

⁷⁹*Il est certes plus important que jamais de maintenir la solidarité interalliée...mais il importe aussi de ne pas compromettre radicalement, en laissant glisser le monde à un conflit sanglant, l'achèvement de l'oeuvre de paix entreprise*, Bonnet tel. 5323, 15 Dec. 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/105.

⁸⁰MAE to all posts, 16 Dec. 1950, AN, 4 AU 58.

debate over German rearmament had, by the end of 1950, exposed painfully France's domestic, European and international frailties. Never more was Paris in need of a symbol of power.

NATO agreement at Brussels, 18-19 December 1950

At the NAC Council meeting in Brussels on 18-19 December the US agreed to explore the prospect of four power talks with the Soviet Union, reluctantly acknowledging that the widespread European fear of war made it difficult for the French and the British not to be seen to explore a potential peaceful settlement with the USSR.⁸¹ The joint meeting of the NATO Council and the Defence Ministers agreed unanimously on the terms of the Spofford compromise drafted in London. An immediate beginning was to be made both in the rearmament of Germany and the creation of a European army. This force would be organised in combat groups of 5,000-6,000 men and the proportion of German units would not exceed one to five. Recruitment in Germany would take place under allied supervision and German groups, initially limited to 4,000-5,000 men, would be incorporated into larger mixed units while the European Army was being set up. Germany would come at the end of the queue for American supplies and there would be no German ministries of war or equipment. A conference in Paris to discuss the European Army was scheduled to begin in January 1951. The simultaneous US announcement of General Eisenhower as NATO Supreme Commander was received enthusiastically by the Council, which authorised the Supreme Commander to configure and train the forces assigned to him as he deemed necessary. Moch immediately placed three French divisions in Germany under Eisenhower's command.⁸²

The US, UK and French Foreign Ministers, in a separate meeting the following day, also formulated their joint approach to Germany. The allies agreed that caution was needed in order to ensure that the problem of a European defence organisation did not become further overshadowed by debate over the conditions of

⁸¹National Intelligence Estimate, #17, 'Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarisation of Western Germany', 27 Dec. 1950, PSF: Intelligence File, 253, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

⁸²Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power* (Stanford, 1992), 409.

Germany's participation, namely the revision of its occupied status, which Adenauer was publicly demanding.⁸³ The High Commissioners would inform the Federal Republic of NATO's decisions, stressing that they did not imply immediate rearmament and that relations between the Western allies and the German government would be put on a more permanent basis. Discussions between Adenauer and the Commissioners on the proposed terms of German participation and any necessary consequential changes in Allied occupation rights would proceed in the New Year.⁸⁴ Schuman assured his Cabinet that these changes would occur on a gradual contractual basis as rearmament measures were enacted and estimated that, after initial objections, Adenauer would accept this arrangement.⁸⁵

French relief at the outcome of the Brussels meeting was evident. Paris had expected allied consultations on the approach to be taken towards Germany to be more difficult and took US agreement to a cautious approach as proof that French hesitations towards Germany had finally been acknowledged to be correct: *'Les Américains paraissent avoir compris qu'il ne faut pas trop faciliter le chantage allemand en paraissant trop pressés.'*⁸⁶ Indeed, the entire conference was seen to illustrate the importance of France's position and policies for the Western alliance. The Quai identified the French role as being the intermediary between the US, with what the ministry regarded as its occasional rather brutal conceptions, and the smaller secondary states whose interests demanded a more nuanced treatment. The favourable position of the US towards the Schuman Plan and the European Army suggested that Washington would not be hostile to France playing this role, concluded the Quai. *'Ainsi, nous serait fournie l'occasion, dans le cadre atlantique, de servir la cause de cette Europe que nous cherchons, depuis 1948, à mener vers son unité.'*⁸⁷

For all the rhetoric, however, the Spofford compromise was a highly ambiguous settlement. By the end of 1950 there was still no agreement on the form

⁸³FRUS 1950 3: 580, 16 Dec.; Bevin warned against approaching the Germans 'cap in hand', Bevin to Cabinet, 12 Dec. 1950, PRO, CAB 129 CP(50) 311.

⁸⁴Acheson to the NSC, 26 Dec. 1950, PSF: Subject File, 220, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

⁸⁵20 Dec. 1950, AN, 4 AU 41.

⁸⁶Parodi to Bonnet & Massigli, 20 Dec. 1950, MAE PA-AP 271/1.

⁸⁷These small powers still resented the dominant role played by France, the US and the UK in NATO, according to the Quai, MAE memo on Brussels meeting, 27 Dec. 1950, AN, 4 AU 58; Dirk Stikker attests to annoyance felt by the Dutch, the Norwegians and the Canadians in particular, *Men of Responsibility* (London, 1966), 291.

German rearmament should take. The scheduling of a European Army conference for January alongside agreement to begin talks between the High Commissioners and the Federal Republic on the issue of a German contribution offered trenchant illustration that at least two potential methods of realising a German participation were being simultaneously pursued. The decision reflected how the Western allies, despite four months of almost continual discussions, had still not addressed the fundamental issue in the debate, namely the nature and the extent of the German threat in a cold war Europe. The meeting at Brussels showed how reluctant the NATO partners were even to broach the question.

More ambiguous still was France's position in the alliance. Paris concluded that the NAC meeting attested to US agreement and support of its leadership in Europe (which was, ironically, identical to Britain's self-assessment of its place in the alliance after the meeting).⁸⁸ Yet within the Truman administration there were many who regarded the NATO commitments undertaken in Brussels as the start of a long-term US commitment to Europe. Brussels represented, particularly for US officials in Europe, a huge step toward active US leadership on the continent and one which the European partners understood and accepted. Such leadership, according to Acheson, had galvanised the NATO states into action on European defence arrangements.⁸⁹ With such contrasting perceptions, therefore, it was little wonder that discussion of the European Army proposal hardly featured at the NATO conference. The idea had survived: whether it had actually secured the domestic and international support necessary to translate it into reality was an altogether different question.

⁸⁸ Attlee reported that throughout his talks in Washington the UK was lifted out of 'the European queue' and treated as a partner, 10 Dec. 1950, PRO, PREM 8 1200; Bevin told Cabinet that at Brussels 'we were able to reassert our leadership in Europe', 12 Dec. 1950, PRO, CAB 129 CP(51)1.

⁸⁹ Acheson to NSC, 26 Dec. 1950, PSF: Subject File, 220, Truman Papers, Truman Library. McCloy stressed the necessity for vigorous US leadership, Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 154-55 as did Douglas in London, Robert P. Browder and Thomas G. Smith, *Independent: A Biography of Lewis W. Douglas* (New York, 1986), 344.

Chapter Four

First Steps:

January - August 1951

France's proposal for a European Army may have secured formal NATO acknowledgement in December 1950 but there were few signs of elation in Paris. The hostile reception of its partners and the difficult negotiations that had taken place had shaken the French government. The fact that a compromise between the US and the French proposals had been reached only when France agreed to permit the formation of bigger German units than it had envisaged to begin before the European Army was fully established did little to encourage the French government to regard its own proposal with enthusiasm.

The agreement reached in Brussels had, at least, permitted Washington's proposals for the provision of aid and the establishment of US command of the NATO force to be realised. The acceptance of the Pleven Plan had also secured, however limited, a postponement of the German rearmament issue and introduced a more restricted framework for its future creation. How well it had served the protection and promotion of a French-US partnership remained less clear. The French were therefore keen to use the breathing space obtained in December to rebuild close relations with the US administration.

All these factors encouraged the French to place little emphasis on the European Army. For now, at any rate, it had served its function. The government, keen to set the issue aside, delegated management of the European Army conference to a small group of officials in Paris. Without international or domestic political stimulus, progress on the development of a European Army plan looked unlikely.

Mending fences at home and abroad

Perhaps the only unambiguous element of the European Army plan at the end of the year was its paternity. At home and abroad Monnet was universally acknowledged to be responsible for the project and his efforts to win over European and US political leaders to the Pleven Plan had played a vital part in securing its survival in December

1950. This, in turn, increased his dominance within the foreign policy-making structure in Paris. It was he who received Roger Seydoux, head of the Europe desk at the Quai, to reassure him that the new government initiative would restrain, rather than provoke, renewed German aggression.¹ It was Monnet who met with President Auriol on 11 January to convince him that *'Il faut lui offrir de participer à l'Europe pour éviter l'obligation dans laquelle on sera de lui donner la Prusse orientale. Il faut une intégration, pas une juxtaposition.'*²

Some senior officials resented the usurpation of the Foreign Ministry's role. The most vociferous was Massigli in London who complained that the Quai leadership was being informed of plans only as they were being made public and requested Schuman to call a conference of Ambassadors early in the New Year to facilitate greater unity of views and action.³ Secretary General Parodi, however, gave little indication of wanting to exert greater control over the European Army project and actually opposed beginning any departmental study on the question for the time being.⁴ Preoccupied personally with preparations for the four power talks agreed in Brussels, he continued to stress that no permanent or irreversible decisions on Germany should be taken in the unlikely event that the USSR agreed to real concessions when talks opened at the Palais Rose in March.⁵ Many of his subordinates, however, looked on Monnet's project favourably. Officials at the German desk regarded it as a useful method of containing Germany's demands for political sovereignty: *'Ce n'est qu'une fois la République Fédérale, encadrée par sa contribution à la Communauté Européenne de Défense, qu'elle pourra jouir d'une certaine souveraineté compatible avec les institutions supranationales de la Communauté Européenne.'*⁶ The Service des Pactes section, which produced the first departmental paper on the European Army, supported the Pleven Plan's emphasis on the development of an institutional structure for European defence. This was

¹François Seydoux, *Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin* (Paris, 1975), 160.

²Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-54*, v, 1951 (Paris, 1975), 19.

³Letter to Hoppentot, (French Ambassador to Switzerland) 2 Nov. 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/98; letter to Schuman, 28 Dec. 1950, MAE, PA-AP 217/103.

⁴De Margerie to Massigli, 16 Jan. 1951, MAE, PA-AP 217/100.

⁵Tel. 923 to Paris, 1 Feb. 1951, AN, 4 AU 71; Franks tel. 112, 2 Feb. 1951, PRO, FO 371/96054.

⁶Sauvagnargues memo, 9 Dec. 1950, MAE, EU44-60/Allemagne/1030. Geneviève Rouche explores the link between the EDC treaty and the Contractual Accords, 'Le Quai d'Orsay face au problème de la souveraineté allemande: la conjonction des Accords de Bonn et de Paris des 26 et 27 mai 1952', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 104, no. 1-2, 1990, 37-55.

something the ministry itself had been advocating since NATO's inception and the European army plan offered new possibilities for furthering the organisation of the Atlantic Alliance.⁷

Pressure for departmental action on the project came from French officials abroad. The opening of discussions in early January 1951 between the High Commissioners and Adenauer on the terms of German participation in Western defence projects compelled Commissioner François-Poncet to look for policy instructions from Paris. The German delegation at the Petersberg talks was confronting him with questions about German participation in the European Army which he was simply unable to answer.⁸ From Washington Embassy officials reminded the Quai that the recent strains in French-US relations had not been totally obliterated by the Brussels decisions and it was therefore important for France to be seen to make a start on the Paris Conference in order to illustrate the sincerity of its proposal.⁹ Bonnet was particularly eager for progress to begin while Eisenhower undertook his first tour of the NATO capitals as Supreme Commander in January, given the General's domestic standing and influence. A favourable impression was all the more vital as tense congressional debates over the Administration's European commitments began to rage in Washington.¹⁰

Parodi's lack of enthusiasm did not wholly explain the absence of planning in the Quai. This responsibility lay with Schuman and his *Cabinet*. No one in the department knew the views of the Minister and officials seeking to begin preparatory work were informed by *Cabinet* director Clappier that it would be pointless '*car la doctrine du Gouvernement dépendrait largement des idées personnelles de l'homme d'Etat choisi pour présider la conférence; qu'il fallait que ce fût quelqu'un de convaincu*'.¹¹ On the recommendation of Monnet, Schuman appointed Alphand to head the French delegation at the Paris Conference. The selection of a senior Quai

⁷Froment-Meurice memo, 8 Jan. 1951, MAE, SG 12.

⁸De Margerie, 16 Jan. 1951, MAE, PA-AP 217/70.

⁹29 Dec. 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/105.

¹⁰21 Dec. 1950, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/105. The 'Great Debate' began in December when ex-President Hoover, as the Senate began debate on the dispatch of US troops overseas, attacked the European defence effort and proposed that all US aid to the continent should be halted. He argued that US defence policy should be based on alliance with Britain and Japan, a view which Senators Taft and Kennedy supported.

¹¹De Margerie, 16 Jan. 1951, MAE, PA-AP 217/100.

official was not indicative, however, of any intention to incorporate the bureaucracy into European army planning, but rather because Monnet believed Schuman's alternative candidate, MRP deputy Pierre Henri-Teitgen, to be opposed to the project.¹² De Margerie, at the political affairs desk, believed that even if it sought greater involvement, the department's reputed scepticism towards supranational initiatives would prevent it from being given responsibility for the conference. European army policymaking looked set to remain at the top level of government with the Monnet team operating, as in the case of the Schuman Plan, '*comme une espace de commando installé au Quai d'Orsay*'.¹³

Monnet's own attention centred on restoring the French-American partnership back to full health through a prime ministerial visit to the United States.¹⁴ Washington, which had initially poured cold water on the idea, agreed to issue an invitation on Bruce's advice that a trip would strengthen Pleven's ability to persuade French politicians to proceed with rearmament. In light of General de Gaulle's first public attack on the European Army, on 7 January, reconsideration appeared wise.¹⁵ A two-day visit was hastily arranged for 29-31 January after assurances that Pleven did not intend to raise detailed issues. Quai officials were also keen for the trip to take place and as soon as possible after Prime Minister Attlee's visit, in order to demonstrate France's equal claim to be included as a full partner with the US and the UK in any important decisions. Pleven, rather embarrassedly, reminded Truman how 'the French people - and many other Europeans too - are always upset when they see the Atlantic Pact being run as though it were "an Anglo-Saxon show"....We are very nervous when it seems to be a private club we can't get in.'¹⁶

¹²Monnet had asked Paul Reuter, who was friendly with Teitgen, to talk to the deputy in early October and convince him to support the EDC. Reuter's attempts were not successful, FJM, Interview with Paul Reuter, 7 Aug. 1980 (sections of the interview pertaining to the Teitgen-Reuter meeting remain confidential); François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York, 1994), 230.

¹³FJM, Interview with Pierre Uri, 13 Oct. 1980.

¹⁴Paris tel. 4289, 23 Jan. 1951, United Publications of America Inc. microfilm project (UPA), *Confidential US State Department Central Files: France, Foreign Affairs, 1950-54, Pt. 2, Internal Affairs*, Reel 14.

¹⁵He described the EDC project as a '*babel militaire*', Irwin Wall, 'Charles de Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et la Communauté européenne de défense, (1950-1954)', *National Espoir*, no. 76, Sept. 1991, 62-72.

¹⁶Minutes of Pleven-Truman meeting, 30 Jan. 1951, PSF: Subject File, 165, Truman Papers, Truman Library. Pleven was reported to be blushing heavily as he said this.

The French Cabinet, however, had a very different perception of Pleven's trip. Rather than promoting France's projects to further European integration, the visit was intended to plead the French case for increased assistance in Indochina. The forced evacuation of the Cao Bang and Langson garrisons in October had pushed the conflict into the public realm for the first time and highlighted its mounting intensity.¹⁷ The government appointed a new military commander to Indochina, the flamboyant General de Lattre, who immediately launched a massive new military offensive and demanded a matching intensification of reinforcements from Paris. According to the French Chiefs of Staff, this request could only be met if the national rearmament programme were delayed for a year, something that was unacceptable for the government.¹⁸ The Cabinet reluctantly refused de Lattre's demands, arguing that priority had to be given to Europe. In such constrained circumstances, an opportunity to underline the need for a further injection of US assistance was not going to be passed over. De Lattre's Chief of Staff, Colonel Allard, and the head of the French Army, General Juin, accompanied the Prime Minister on his trip and although Pleven did not present a specific request for aid, he made it quite clear to Washington that substantial US military assistance to Indochina would soon be necessary.¹⁹ The US administration, Pleven reassured the Cabinet on his return, had promised to do as much as its legislation permitted to assist France.²⁰

Pleven and his advisors were determined not to let anything obstruct the clearing horizon of Franco-American relations. The Prime Minister assured Truman and Acheson that France would stick to the Spofford compromise and that the European Army project would be pushed as fast as was necessary. He stressed the practical steps already taken by his government: the French Cabinet had issued invitations to the European members of NATO and Germany two days earlier and the Paris Conference was scheduled to open on 6 February 1951. Schuman would lead the French delegation with day-to-day work carried out by Alphand.²¹ Truman was non-

¹⁷Jacques Dalloz, *La guerre d'Indochine* (Paris, 1987), 176.

¹⁸Antoine Daveau, 'Le poids de la guerre indochine', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 107, no. 4 1993, 333-57.

¹⁹Tel. 568 to Paris, 28 Jan. 1951, MAE, SG 53; minutes of Pleven-Eisenhower meeting, 8 Jan. 1951, AN, 4 AU 69.

²⁰Auriol, *Journal*, 1951, 70.

²¹30 Jan. 1951, PSF: Subject File, 165, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

committal, simply reiterating the US desire for swift rearmament in Europe before adding that Ambassador Bruce would act as the US observer at the Paris Conference. Washington had not modified its condition that the French plan would have to be fully sound politically and militarily and not delay the build up of western strength.²² The mutual stand off signaled the desire of both sides to put the tensions of the previous months behind them and the preparatory contacts between Monnet, Pleven and the US Embassy in Paris, along with a careful presentation by the French in Washington, ensured Pleven's visit was a success. As the British Ambassador in Washington noted somewhat sourly, 'the French Government, having decided that close cooperation with the US is essential for French security have a nice touch in playing up to American emotions.'²³

The Paris Conference for a European Army, February 1951

The French-American partnership was the trump card with which the French sought to open the Paris Conference: Pleven had secured US agreement to publish Acheson's letter of support to Schuman on the opening day. The declaration on 6 February failed, however, to generate the slightest enthusiasm in Europe for the project. Of the NATO states only Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg agreed to participate fully. Germany accepted the invitation only after issuing a statement claiming the plan treated it as a second-class nation.²⁴ Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, the US and Canada agreed to send observers. With more audience than cast in this drama, it was little wonder that the French postponed the opening until 15 February, on account of French-Italian talks at Santa Margherita. Schuman pressed his Italian counterpart, Alcide de Gasperi, to support the French initiative but, while their joint communiqué stressed the importance of the Paris Conference as a contribution to Atlantic defence, in private the Italians maintained that priority should be given to organising defence within the framework of the Atlantic Pact.²⁵

²² *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1951 3*, (Washington, 1981), 764.

²³ Despatch 104, 7 Feb. 1951, PRO, FO 371/96055.

²⁴ Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1951* (London, 1954), 107.

²⁵ Antonio Varsori, 'Italy between the Atlantic Alliance and the EDC, 1948-55', in Ennio di Nolfo (ed.) *Power in Europe? II* (Berlin, 1992), 274.

Schuman's opening address to the Conference made two main points. The first was the compatibility between European and Atlantic defence: 'The Atlantic organisation is a coalition system of national armies grouped under a single command. The European Army will be a supranational army being substituted for national armies progressively but definitively' while the second emphasised the project's relation to the coal and steel plan.²⁶ In a memorandum circulated later the French outlined details of the proposals Monnet had first elaborated in November: a force of 10-12 divisions, each consisting of 2-3 national combat teams of 4,000-5,000 men, to be constructed in two stages. During the first eighteen months the various national units would be co-ordinated, to be gradually amalgamated in the second stage. At no time would the German contribution exceed one-fifth of the total.²⁷ The French proposed the appointment of a European Commissioner of Defence to supervise the European units placed under the operational authority of the Atlantic Command. The Commissioner, responsible to a European Assembly, would gradually either be given wider powers or be superseded by a Minister of Defence. A Committee of Ministers would also be established. A final financial section recommended the creation of a common budget through national contributions according to a pre-established scale of charges. Yet for all this, the tone of the memorandum was remarkably hesitant. *'Vouloir demain une armée européenne est certainement une utopie....Les étapes ultérieures ne peuvent être définies actuellement; elles dépendent non seulement des progrès à réaliser dans l'unification technique des différents systèmes militaires des pays participants, mais encore de la réalisation progressive de l'unité européenne sur le plan politique comme sur le plan économique....Il ne paraît pas possible ni même utile de le préciser actuellement. Il suffit d'en avoir indiqué l'objectif final, à savoir la réalisation d'une armée européenne dans le cadre d'une Europe unie.'*²⁸

This inauspicious start set the tenor of the Paris Conference's first weeks. The composition of the national delegations alone spoke volumes about the significance being assigned to the French plan abroad. The French had assembled a broad team: the military leader was General de Larminat from the Chiefs of Staff; Lucien Hubert,

²⁶FRUS 1951 3: 767; French text in MAE, *Communauté Européenne de Défense* files (CED) 158.

²⁷Memo, 15 Feb. 1951, MAE, CED 158.

²⁸cited in Georgette Elgey, *La République des Contradictions, 1951-54* (Paris, 1968), 243-44.

one of the *juriconsultes* of the Quai provided legal expertise; from the Finance Ministry came Jean Sadrin with Etienne Hirsch of the Monnet team to direct financial and logistical issues. In contrast, Adenauer appointed Walter Hallstein to head the German team who was already in Paris negotiating the Schuman Plan. He was soon replaced by Privy Counsellor, Conrad Rödiger, assisted by Albrecht von Kessel from the Consulate in Paris and a junior officer, Ulrich de Maizière, as the military representative.²⁹ The only country to send a General was Italy, whose delegation was led by a parliamentary deputy, Professor Paolo Taviani. All other countries were represented by their ambassadors in Paris. Under the chairmanship of Alphant a series of committees (which in turn were directed by the French representatives therein) was established to deal with military, financial, legal and other technical questions. A Steering Committee (*Comité de Direction*) comprising the permanent Heads of Delegations coordinated the work of the various committees. Below this tier came over thirty sub-committees and working groups to deal with specific issues in detail.³⁰

The cumbersome structure reflected the leaden atmosphere of the conference's opening weeks.³¹ From the outset it was clear that progress in the conference would be dictated by the French and German delegations and the two immediately clashed on the size of the proposed national unit. The Germans rejected France's initial suggestion and proposed a figure over twice as large, 10-12,000 men. The French, in turn, refused to make any concessions and accused the Germans of being concerned solely with the military aspects of the European Army, to the neglect of its political aspects.³² The intransigence of both sides, however, was really a reflection of the lack of serious attention being paid to the conference by both. French delegates received little guidance: '*Je vous donne carte blanche, vous faites ce que vous voulez*' the airforce representative, Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Nicot, was told by his Chief of Staff, General Lechere. Their German opposites, meanwhile, were instructed merely to

²⁹Rödiger took over from Hallstein (who was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) on 1 March, Ulrich de Maizière, *In der Pflicht* (Herford, 1989), 144. De Maizière had begun his army career as a musical officer.

³⁰Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (London, 1980), 111-12.

³¹*FRUS* 1951 3: 771, 23 Feb.

³²Paris Conference plenary sessions, March 1951, MAE, CED 174; French memo *projet de convention*, 7 March 1951, MAE, SG 12.

maintain the position adopted by the team at the Petersberg talks.³³ Washington, disappointed but hardly surprised at the rigidity of the French position, paid little close attention to the details of the Paris Conference as it waited for its probable collapse.³⁴

Discussions at Petersberg and Palais Rose, January - June 1951

International attention was fixed far more firmly on the concurrent discussions between the Germans and the High Commissioners in Petersberg. According to the Brussels Agreement these talks were only intended to represent an exchange of views to provide some indication of the terms under which Germany would be willing to contribute to the defence effort.³⁵ But without any allied proposals, the Deputy High Commissioners, - General Hays for the US, John Ward for Britain and Armand Bérard for France - found themselves plaintiffs before the Germans who quickly set about outlining their own rearmament plans which senior German military men had been developing since October 1950.³⁶ Adenauer and his team declared Germany's willingness to be incorporated into the NATO integrated force under the Supreme Commander as long as this was based, both symbolically and practically, on equality of treatment. The Petersberg delegation, led by Theodor Blank, was openly critical of the Plevin Plan as militarily impractical and discriminatory - 'a flimsy European coat over a German foreign legion'.³⁷ The principle of equality implied the return of German sovereignty and therefore, the replacement of the Occupation statute: Adenauer insisted additionally that immediate measures, such as the revision of the High Commissioners to the status of Ambassadors, were necessary to create a favourable psychological condition in the Federal Republic for rearmament.

³³French Army Historical Service, Interview with General Nicot, 1988, (I am grateful to Philippe Vial for this transcript); de Maizière also refers to the lack of directives, *In der Pflicht*, 147-50; Fursdon cites similar comments from Sadrin and Hirsch, *European Defence Community*, 112-13.

³⁴Acheson memo, 26 March 1951, NARA, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Lot 53 D 444, Box 10; Perkins reply, 27 March 1951, NARA, RG 59, Office of European Regional Affairs, Lot 55 D 115, Box 4.

³⁵*FRUS* 1951 3: 790; Undated report on the Petersberg talks, MAE, SG 13.

³⁶Christian Greiner, 'The defence of Western Europe and the rearmament of West Germany 1947-50', in Olav Riste (ed.) *Western Security: The Formative Years* (Oslo, 1985) 162-69.

³⁷*FRUS* 1951 3: 994-95, 1022-25, 17 Jan., 2 March.

The French High Commission argued energetically that the German plans would bring about the independent national force that the Brussels Agreement was specifically designed to avoid. Officials were alarmed at the favourable attitude being displayed by General Hays, not least towards the German proposal to increase the size of the proposed combat team, and sought assurance from McCloy that the US understood that the terms of the allied agreement involved the revision of Germany's status through negotiated contracts in parallel with, rather than prior to, its participation in Western defence.³⁸ At the same time, the French stressed to the German delegation that while they understood the country's need for psychological and political preparation before rearmament, their own population required just as much confidence-building procedures to permit Germany's rehabilitation.³⁹ The fear that the US would forge ahead with German plans was somewhat abated when Eisenhower returned to Washington in early February to report on his first European trip as Supreme Commander. He referred to the sincerity of France's rearmament effort and its determination to build a strong Western defence in Europe. More importantly, the General emphasised that the political aspects of the German question had to be resolved before actual troops could be raised and put under the command of the new NATO headquarters, SHAPE.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the French remained determined to keep the pace of negotiations at Petersberg under their control.

The British government proved of valuable assistance in this regard. Tension within the ruling Labour party at the direction of the German rearmament discussions was mounting and was to reach a public climax in April when three members of the Cabinet resigned over the issue.⁴¹ Opponents of rearmament shared French fears that the resurgence of German militarism, along with US containment policies in Europe and the Far East, might provoke the USSR to an aggressive response. Attlee was obliged to declare to the Commons on 12 February that the government would not permit the raising of German troops until allied forces were significantly strengthened

³⁸Bonn tels. to Paris, Feb. 1951, AN, 4 AU 71; Washington tel. 1048, 14 Feb. 1951, MAE, B, AM44-52/Etats-Unis/183.

³⁹Unsigned summary of the final Petersberg meeting, 6 June 1951, MAE, SG 13.

⁴⁰Department of State *Bulletin*, 24, no. 606, 12 Feb. 1951, 245-50; *FRUS* 1951 3: 453, 1 Feb.

⁴¹Aneurin Bevan, Minister of Health; Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade; John Freeman, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply.

and agreement reached with the Federal Republic on the level of its contribution.⁴² The Cabinet expressed its anxiety to the US at the way in which German rearmament was moving and instructed its High Commissioner to prolong the military conversations at Petersberg until the simultaneous discussions on Germany's political future between the High Commissioners and Adenauer had been completed.⁴³

The Paris Conference and Petersberg talks were, in essence, parallel discussions on Germany's political and military future and, as such, testified to the ongoing absence of an agreed Western framework. The third series of simultaneous discussions on Germany, the four powers talks at the Palais Rose in Paris, merely underlined this. None of the Western governments held out much hope that an agenda for a future four power conference on Germany could be drawn up - even French Defence Minister Moch assured Eisenhower that the negotiations were primarily a device to win time from the diplomatic point of view while existing European defences were still weak.⁴⁴ Paris, which had pressed hardest for talks with the USSR, would not accept Soviet proposals for German neutralisation and, days before the 5 March opening meeting, increased the conditions for its acceptance of possible German unification, making the likelihood of any progress even more doubtful. The Foreign Ministry stipulated that the guarantee of free elections in both Germanies was no longer sufficient: France demanded additionally that any resulting German government should continue in the process of European integration. The problem of German unity could only be solved in a general European body.⁴⁵ The European integration process, meanwhile, was encountering its own difficulties, with final negotiations on the Schuman Plan being held up over the question of deconcentration of the Ruhr.⁴⁶

The multiple sets of international discussions taking place in Europe took attention away from the Paris Conference. Moreover, the complex interconnections between each series of negotiations actually served to discourage progress being made

⁴²Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament: 1950-55* (Cambridge, 1991), 56-8.

⁴³8 Feb. 1951, PRO, CAB 128/19, CM 12 (51); Bevin memo, 'Policy toward Germany', 9 March 1951, PRO, CAB 129/44, CP (51) 74.

⁴⁴Auriol, *Journal*, 1951, 12-3.

⁴⁵MAE tel. 1042, 1 March 1951, AN, 4 AU 71.

⁴⁶Duchêne, *Jean Monnet*, 215; John Gillingham, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-55* (New York, 1991), 279.

too quickly in any single forum, particularly one which had as reluctant support as the European Army project. But it was not solely international considerations that dictated French government policy at the Paris Conference in early 1951. The collapse of Plevén's government at the end of February and the subsequent announcement by his Radical replacement, Henri Queuille, that elections would be held in June, also shaped the government's approach. Moch refused to accept the joint recommendation of the French delegations in Paris and Petersberg that France adopt a more flexible attitude on the vexed question of army unit size on the grounds that any decisions taken now could inflame public opinion and lead to victories for either the Communists or de Gaulle's RPF in the forthcoming elections.⁴⁷ Neither Deputy High Commissioner Bérard's claim that Adenauer genuinely supported a European army, nor General Ely's arguments from the NATO military committee that French leadership of European military planning would be strengthened by adopting the more practical number proposed by the Germans moved the Minister.⁴⁸ With no parliamentary debate on any of the international conferences and Cabinet reference to the Paris Conference proceedings rare, frustrated French officials were forced to acknowledge the impossibility of anything happening before the elections.⁴⁹ In every encounter with their international colleagues, French politicians made this explicitly clear. All France's partners could do was encourage the rapid start of the elections, hoping in the meanwhile that France's position in the various discussions would not be seriously affected.⁵⁰

The revision of US EDC policy, July - August 1951

Progress could not be held back indefinitely however. In early March the first revisions of the Occupation Statute between the three Allies and Germany were

⁴⁷Minutes of meeting between Moch, Parodi, Alphan, General de Larminat and Bérard, 30 March 1951, MAE SG 12.

⁴⁸Ely tel., 4 April 1951, Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Paris (SHAT), Papiers de Général Ely, 1 K 233/25.

⁴⁹Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London, 1964), 224-25, Appendix IV(a); summaries of cabinet meetings, Auriol, *Journal*, 1951, 34-226; Hervé Alphan, *L'Etonnement d'être* (Paris, 1977), 225.

⁵⁰Memo the French cabinet crisis, 28 Feb. 1951, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, Pt. 2, Reel 14; Bonnet tel. 1895, 24 April 1951, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/183.

signed, reducing the rights of the High Commission over German central and provincial legislation, German foreign trade and exchange and enabling the establishment of a German foreign ministry.⁵¹ On 18 April the treaty instituting the coal and steel community was finally signed in Paris by the six participating states. No progress had emerged from the Palais Rose talks and by the end of May it was clear that the negotiations would soon falter.⁵² Pressure for progress in the European Army negotiations reached a climax in early June, when the Petersberg talks came to an end. The final report of 6 June 1951 set out the German plans for the incorporation of German divisions into a NATO force. Twelve divisions of 15,000 men were proposed, to be increased to 18,000 in wartime.⁵³ It was recommended that tripartite governmental examination of the plans should take place after an initial review by the NATO Standing Group.

Alphand, alarmed, insisted that the Petersberg report could not be considered separately from an account of the proceedings in Paris, a request which the French government made formally to its partners on 23 June.⁵⁴ On the advice of Bruce, Alphand proposed that the Paris Conference produce, by 10 July, an interim report of its progress for tripartite examination.⁵⁵ Washington had little option but to agree to the French proposal: 'Whether we like it or not and even though there is no official connection between the Petersberg talks and the Paris Conference, the natural effects of one upon the other and their mutually retarding influences have been obvious facts for some time....Consequently it would seem to be a waste of time to proceed seriously with the matter of the German contribution to the defence of the West without in one way or the other getting around the practical road block which the Paris Conference represents.'⁵⁶

The US administration continued to regard the rearmament impasse as a serious threat to domestic stability in Germany.⁵⁷ Local elections in May saw gains for radical right-wing parties; public opinion polls showed an almost equal split

⁵¹Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53* trans. Beate Rhum von Oppen, (London, 1965), 360-61.

⁵²MAE tel. to Washington & London, 11 June 1951, AN, 4 AU 71.

⁵³Summary of final meeting, 6 June 1951, MAE, SG 13.

⁵⁴Service des Pactes tel. 50.000, 5 June 1951, AN, 4 AU 71.

⁵⁵Summary of 8th Plenary session, 22 June 1951, MAE, CED 174.

⁵⁶Knight to Martin, 5 June 1951, NARA, RG 59, Lot 55 D 115, Box 2.

⁵⁷As Bonnet noted to Paris, 8 June 1951, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/183.

between support for Western integration and neutralism. Adenauer's non-compromising position in discussions with the Allies did not appear to have borne fruit, with his approval rating below 30 percent and his rearmament policies under continual attack from the Socialist opposition.⁵⁸ McCloy, worried, travelled to Paris on 3 June 1951 to be personally briefed by Alphant on the state of play at the Paris Conference and repeated his belief that if the European Army were to succeed, discrimination towards Germany could not be too apparent.⁵⁹ US High Commission staff, like their French counterparts, were convinced that Adenauer actually preferred the European Army concept to NATO and that German public support for European integration ran high.⁶⁰ The quicker France could be persuaded to give in on the question of equal German unit sizes, therefore, the greater Adenauer's chances of securing domestic acceptance for rearmament.

McCloy was not afraid to make his arguments for German equality publicly. In a US radio broadcast of 26 June he declared that while no decision had yet been taken in Germany with regards to a defence contribution, 'if participation comes, as I think it will, it will come because the German people feel it is their responsibility to participate in the defence of their country as a member of the free community of nations....It is becoming clearer that Germany will be accepted by the Allies as an equal partner in the Western community.'⁶¹ McCloy's 'bomb', as Moch described it, succeeded in provoking discussion of the issue in the French Cabinet where there was widespread agreement that German troops could not be permitted to enter into a NATO force. Were this to happen it would no longer be possible to ensure prior French rearmament and the inevitable question of German membership of NATO would quickly arise. On 29 June Alphant made a press statement repeating France's firm opposition to a NATO solution.⁶² Yet even as international pressure for settlement began to mount, the German rearmament issue did not receive sustained Cabinet attention. The results of the 17 June legislative elections (the first since 1946)

⁵⁸Thomas Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 216-17.

⁵⁹Tel. 50.000, 5 June 1951, AN, 4 AU 71.

⁶⁰Jessup notes of talks in Frankfurt, 26-7 May 1951, NARA, RG 59, Ambassador-at-Large, Lot 53 D 211, Box 2.

⁶¹Department of State *Bulletin*, 9 July 1951, 25, no. 628, 64.

⁶²Jules Moch, *Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950* (Paris, 1965), 277-78. Auriol makes no reference to Cabinet discussion of McCloy's statement, *Journal*, 1951, 243-44.

proved a far more immediate preoccupation, with severe defeats for the two most dominant parties in the Fourth Republic - Moch's Socialist party and Schuman's MRP - and the powerful entry of de Gaulle's RPF group into the Assembly with over 20 percent of the vote.⁶³ Although Ambassador Bonnet reassured Washington that Schuman would remain in the Foreign Ministry it was not until 10 August that a new government finally assumed power, led by Pleven. For the first time since 1946, there was no Socialist representation in the coalition.⁶⁴

Faced with French and German domestic problems, US officials increasingly argued that the time had come for Washington to take a more active stand to break the deadlock in Europe. Some way had be found of reconciling the European Army concept with the NATO solution - for full German entry into NATO and the participation of German divisions in a NATO force - that Washington preferred. For McCloy the way to do this was to separate the military aspects of German rearmament from wider political questions, adopting the Petersberg proposals immediately while enabling the European Army political project for a civilian superstructure to be retained as a long-term objective for continental defence organisation.⁶⁵ Thus a European force would be developed gradually within the NATO army. Bruce and his staff in Paris argued, however, that military and political issues could not be divided so neatly. Sufficient agreement on military questions had been reached at the Paris Conference to interfere substantially with the adoption of any separate course of action based on the Petersberg Report.⁶⁶ Moreover the Embassy claimed that the European Army offered the best means of achieving the short-term US objective of a rapid build-up in Europe as well as long-term integration goals, given the efficiency savings which would be generated by a coordinated rearmament effort.⁶⁷ Bruce suggested close cooperation with SHAPE was the best possible means of overcoming any time delays in the European Army proposals: this would not only benefit

⁶³The MRP lost 2.5 of its 5 million voters, Socialist support fell from 4.5 to 3 million.

⁶⁴Bonnet to Acheson, 28 June 1951, United Publications of America Inc., microfilm project (UPA), *Official Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson (1949-53)*, Reel 5.

⁶⁵FRUS 1951 3: 801-05, 28 June.

⁶⁶FRUS 1951 3: 789-98, 805-12, 3 July.

⁶⁷Tomlinson memo, 'The Role of US Policy in French Rearmament', Aug. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: Records re Paris Conference for EDC 1951-52 (A), Box 5; also in FJM, AMI 8/10/3.

SHAPE's own aims but would make the French far more likely to accept the larger units proposed at Petersberg.

The fundamental problem was to find an arrangement for Germany's political status within a Western defence organisation that was acceptable to both France and Germany. Bruce, in arguing for the European army option, stressed the sincere desire of the Paris Conference delegates to establish a European Army based on the principle of non-discrimination and claimed that one of the main reasons for the lack of progress was the uncertainty at the conference about the real United States' attitude.⁶⁸ He suggested that that if the United States were to base its commitment to the European Army on acceptance of German equality within the force from the outset, the French would accept this and would cooperate with Washington in restoring German sovereignty. Adenauer could then present his domestic constituency with a rearmament package that was both militarily and politically acceptable, as McCloy sought. Before winning over the Europeans, however, the two men had to convince the US military leadership, still highly critical of the European Army plan, of the benefits of greater support for the French project.⁶⁹

They turned to Eisenhower, who had already demonstrated his sensitivity towards the political aspects involved in German rearmament. McCloy informed the General that 'the time has come for you to talk with some of those who are greatly influencing the French position' and he suggested a meeting with Monnet who was 'discreet, informal and in the centre of things despite appearances'.⁷⁰ In turn McCloy briefed Monnet that in order to expect any US support he would have to convince Eisenhower that the French were not using the European Army project to delay German rearmament and that the scheme made military sense, which meant, in US opinion, conceding on the question of unit size. At lunch on 27 June, Monnet defended the European Army plan to Eisenhower, General Gruenther, Averell Harriman and Douglas MacArthur on the basis that any short-term plan to raise a few German divisions on a national basis at the cost of reviving enmity of peoples would

⁶⁸FRUS 1951 3: 807, 3 July.

⁶⁹General Gruenther to Acheson, 2 Aug. 1951, NARA, RG 59, Lot 53 D 444, Box 14.

⁷⁰Letter to Eisenhower, 21 June 1951, Box 75, Principal File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers, Eisenhower Library, Kansas (DDEL). According to Robert Bowie, it was he who first suggested to McCloy that the meeting take place, Interview with the author, 4 Jan. 1995.

be completely counter-productive for European security. Above all, he stressed that Europe's independent will to resist would only recover when there were common resources to exploit and defend.⁷¹

For a man who maintained that Europe must, in the long-run, provide for its own defence this argument was convincing.⁷² Eisenhower agreed with Monnet that European unity was the key to the whole German problem as well as to ending lavish US expenditure in Europe. Washington could therefore afford to do 'almost anything' to support the venture.⁷³ Further talks with McCloy and Bruce cemented Eisenhower's determination that the US now had to press vigorously for the 'earliest possible implementation of the European Army concept' and he requested clearance in Washington to send an observer from NATO headquarters to the Paris Conference.⁷⁴

The efforts of these senior US officials in Europe paid off at the Pentagon. After discussions between the State and Defence Department a joint endorsement of the European Army was submitted to Truman. On 2 August the President gave his formal approval to NSC-115, 'Definition of US Policy on Problems of the Defence of Europe and the German Contribution': the United States was now committed to active support of the French plan and to the revision of the political status of the German Federal Republic.

French policy revision

Monnet's diplomatic coup in winning the support of the most senior US military official in Europe may have been executed without the knowledge or involvement of French official channels but its objective was one French diplomats wholeheartedly shared. French officials at home and abroad were convinced of the importance of

⁷¹Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Mayne, (London, 1978), 359.

⁷²Eisenhower letter to Swede Hazlett, 21 June 1951, Box 17, Name Series, Whitman File 1953-61, Presidential Papers, DDEL. Eisenhower told the *New York Times* correspondent, Cyrus Sulzberger, on the day he met Monnet, that the US 'should set a goal for unification within six months of a year and work hard for that immediately - not talk of the vague and distant future', *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs & Diaries, 1934-54* (London, 1969), 565.

⁷³Eisenhower to Harriman, 30 June & 9 July 1951, Box 55, Principal File, Pre-Presidential Papers, DDEL.

⁷⁴FRUS 1951 3: 838, 18 July.

greater US support for the European Army. The High Commission in Bonn argued that the Germans would never agree to the Pleven Plan until pressed by the US and had urged McCloy to get Adenauer to approve the forthcoming European Army report and enter 'resolutely' into the project.⁷⁵ At the same time French officials were terribly conscious of the weakness of the French position in the summer of 1951. They considered it still likely that the US could force a solution on France and the lack of international support for the French proposal merely increased this possibility.⁷⁶ Conceding on the issue of unit size for the European force remained the most obvious way, for French officials, of assuaging international opinion. Blank, who, upon the conclusion of the Petersberg talks, had come to lead the German delegation at Paris, made it abundantly clear that his government had no intention of conceding to the original French proposal of 4,000-5,000 men.⁷⁷

Yet Blank's participation at the conference appeared to indicate that the German government had noted the signals coming from US representatives and was now more willing to explore the French plan. Signs of greater German interest enabled delegates, with the increasingly active assistance of US Paris Embassy and High Commission officials, to negotiate a breakthrough in the Franco-German impasse.⁷⁸ The Interim Report concluded on 24 July recommended the creation, by the start of 1953, of an international force of twenty divisions, placed directly under the commandment of the NATO Supreme Commander.⁷⁹ A German contribution would be furnished along an equal basis with other participants and it was agreed that all forces in Europe would be part of the European Army, while forces in the overseas possessions or assigned to internal security duties would remain national. The Paris Conference agreed to submit the question of unit size to the consideration of the Supreme Commander, a decision designed to enable the French to compromise without making it appear as if it had given in to the German Petersberg proposals and made feasible by Eisenhower's conversion to the European Army. Liaison with

⁷⁵Bonn tel. 4176, 5 July 1951, AN, 4 AU 72; the Embassy in Washington placed similar stress on the importance of US support, tel. 3306, 13 July 1951, MAE, B AM44-52/Etats-Unis/194.

⁷⁶FRUS 1951 3: 780, 17 March.

⁷⁷Schwartz, *America's Germany*, 229.

⁷⁸Blank told US officials that the 'godfather' role of the US would have to persist if Germany's defence contribution was to be swiftly realised, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, ii, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich, 1990), 53.

⁷⁹Interim report of the Paris Conference, MAE, CED 159.

SHAPE on questions of logistics, equipment and the determination of a budget for the European Army was also recommended. Bruce congratulated the six delegations on the report and declared that the US government would continue to emphasise its interest in the work of the conference and give its assistance to the negotiations.⁸⁰

Alphand and his staff had negotiated France's concession to the German stipulation that the principle of equality be the organising tool of the European Army: government approval of the Interim Report now had to be secured. For this French officials sought the same US support they had previously demanded *vis-à-vis* the German leadership. Monnet brought together the French and US officials who had collaborated so successfully on the Schuman Plan - Robert Bowie from the High Commission, Bill Tomlinson, Etienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri from his own team - for three days of discussion with Alphand in early August on the next steps to be taken.⁸¹ The tactic of Monnet and Alphand was, as in October 1950, to secure US assistance in keeping French government discussion of the European Army to a minimum. Alphand, on the approval of Schuman, asked Bonnet to suggest discreetly to General Marshall that he avoid 'certain subjects' at the forthcoming Defence Ministers meeting on 2 August, given that Moch still occupied his post until a government could be formed.⁸² Even after his departure officials reminded their US colleagues that the new Cabinet included 'several men who are at best lukewarm on the closer association of Germany....These men are now being eased along with an occasional gentle nudge by the firm believers in such a closer association.'⁸³ Schuman, apparently, had not even informed the new ministers of Acheson's 9 August letter setting out its current position on Germany. A cautious approach toward the French government would therefore have to be maintained.⁸⁴

Alphand and Monnet then drew the new French government's attention to signs of greater US support. Alphand submitted the Interim Report for Cabinet consideration on 14 August with an accompanying note pointing out how the US attitude had evolved in favour of the French propositions and how this, in turn, had

⁸⁰ Paris Conference plenary session, 24 July 1951, MAE, CED 174.

⁸¹ Duchêne, *Jean Monnet*, 232.

⁸² Letter to Bonnet, 28 July 1951, MAE, PA-AP 271/1.

⁸³ Paris tel. 981, 12 Aug. 1951, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, Pt. 2, Reel 14.

⁸⁴ Auriol, *Journal*, 1951, 401.

influenced the German position in a positive way.⁸⁵ He stressed the advantages of the project for France: as leader from the outset France could demand the post of Chief of Staff of the European force; it would prohibit the possibility of direct links between the German and US military; forbid the creation of a German army in NATO which would 'rapidly become the favourite of the Pentagon' and would prove less provocative towards the USSR.⁸⁶ Alphand also referred to France's continued need for US aid in Indochina and Europe. The implication was clear: if the government approved the Interim Report, and thereby conceded to the principle of equality and SHAPE responsibility for the size and structure of the European Army, it would be in a better position to make demands for greater assistance from the United States.

The Cabinet finally considered Alphand's report at a restricted meeting on 23 August, alongside an assessment of the Interim Report from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁸⁷ The military leadership, who had played little role in military discussions at the Paris Conference, approved the Interim Report subject to a number of conditions.⁸⁸ The generals insisted, first, that Germany should be prohibited from the Ruhr, the basis of its military strength in the past. For this reason, the link with the Schuman Plan was vital: *'Le Plan Schuman et l'armée européenne forment l'un avec l'autre un tout qui ne saurait se maintenir si l'un ou l'autre vient à manquer.'*⁸⁹ All German troops should come under European Army control whereas only French troops assigned to NATO should be incorporated into the European force.⁹⁰ France should also retain the freedom to remove these units in the case of overseas emergencies. French troops should be numerically superior to the German contribution and the European Army commander could only be French. With such institutionalised dominance, the military could afford to be flexible on the question of

⁸⁵Report to the Foreign Minister, 14 Aug. 1951, MAE, SG 12.

⁸⁶Alphand *critique* of the Paris Conference proposed solution, 14 Aug. 1951, AN, Papiers de René Plevin (560 AP) 45.

⁸⁷Present at the meeting were Plevin, Bidault, Mayer, Queuille, Letourneau, Schuman, Jacquinot, Bourges-Maunoury, Schumann, Segalat, Monnet, Alphand, General Stehlin and the Secretary of States for the Army, Navy and Airforce, summary of meeting, 23 Aug. 1951, MAE, SG 12.

⁸⁸'The whole operation has been managed closely and personally by Moch and the French staff has not been brought in', Gruenther to Acheson, 2 Aug. 1951, NARA, RG 59, Lot 53 D 444, Box 14.

⁸⁹Chiefs of Staff memo, 23 Aug. 1951, MAE, SG 12; Minutes of Cabinet Defence Committee (*Comité de Défense Nationale*) meeting, 24 Aug. 1951, AN, 363 AP 20.

⁹⁰French troops serving overseas, their reserves and metropolitan forces would remain under national control. The French navy would also be excluded from European control.

unit size. The Chiefs of Staff approved of SHAPE taking charge of the question: the important thing was that all German units should be under integrated command and not logistically independent. As far as the structure of the European Army institutions, particularly German agencies, was concerned, the generals were willing to leave this to the politicians, although they did note their preference for a collegial directing body in which members' votes would be proportional to the number of troops they had in the force.

The military command did not shy away from what Alphand described as the psychological reactions that would result with the europeanisation of the French army. The government would have to explain the motives and goals behind this step if a grave moral crisis was to be avoided, showing how the European Army would guarantee French security as well as its future place in Europe. *'La place de la France dans cette Europe dépendra pour beaucoup du dévouement avec lequel les participants français à l'Armée Européenne comprendront la grandeur de leur rôle, leurs responsabilités, et en accepteront les servitudes.'*⁹¹ It was on this basis that the Cabinet gave its approval to the European Army project set out in the Interim Report. The government accepted the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff to ensure French military predominance and noted that when the treaty was ultimately submitted for ratification it should expressly show the benefits accruing to France.⁹² Schuman was instructed to indicate clearly to the US that the question of German entry into NATO should not be raised the present time. In addition, the Cabinet noted its desire for British participation in the project and recommended examination of the means of a possible UK association with the European Army.

The French government had managed, in approving the Interim Report, to concede to the principle of equality for Germany while simultaneously setting out the terms for permanent French superiority in the European Army. In a letter of 25 August 1951 notifying the US and UK governments of the French decision - which Monnet had actually drafted twelve days earlier - Schuman underlined his government's insistence on the guarantees for France and the precautions against the Federal Republic that would be necessary if, as the French claimed, the West was to

⁹¹Chiefs of Staff memo, 23 Aug. 1951, MAE, SG 12.

⁹²Minutes of meeting, 23 Aug. 1951, MAE, SG 12.

prevent the reconstruction of a nationalist Germany.⁹³ The degree of equivocation in the government's decisions reflected the efforts French officials had made to minimise the significance of the principle of equality for the European Army in the course of the Cabinet deliberations. Ministers, moreover, were not familiar enough with the terms of the project to be able to explore the question in any depth. At the same time, it was precisely because the government was unequivocal about the primary objective of French policy that the actual details of the European army were able to remain so ambiguous. The US partnership remained the basis of French considerations '*...la décision nécessaire du Gouvernement au sujet de l'armée européenne ne semble pouvoir être prise qu'en liaison avec une négociation franco-américain très importante ou avec des décisions de politique générale fondamentales*'.⁹⁴

French commitment to the establishment of an integrated European defence force was given on the understanding that increased US approval for the project would be translated into assisting French leadership of the European Army. A second letter, sent to the US government alone, set out Monnet's conception of this support.⁹⁵ The most immediate and practical way US backing could be realised, he claimed, was through a substantial increase of US aid to France's overseas commitments in Indochina. Without this France's position in Europe could not be maintained. Monnet also set out his terms for increased US financial and military assistance in Europe, specifying that all aid should be transmitted through a single military equipment programme and that all military conversations between the US and its continental partners should take place through European institutions. Monnet's insistence on a strictly multilateral approach to US aid in Europe alongside increased bilateral assistance to France reflected perfectly the contradictory nature of French European army policy. Nor was it a position supported unanimously throughout the French administration. The Finance Ministry agreed on the necessity of greater bilateral

⁹³Monnet draft, 13 Aug. 1951, FJM, AMI 8/3/7 (final text in MAE, SG 53 & AN, 560 AP 45); see also Raymond Poidevin, 'La France devant le problème de la CED: Incidences nationales et internationales', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 129, 1983, 37-8.

⁹⁴Unsigned memo on the redefinition of France's military efforts - probably from Monnet, 13 Aug. 1951, AN, 363 AP 19.

⁹⁵25 Aug. 1951, MAE, SG 53.

financial aid from the US precisely because of the unsatisfactory obligations a common defence budget would impose on France.⁹⁶

In August 1951, however, it was the influence of Monnet, working through Schuman and Pleven, that dominated the French government's deliberations of European defence arrangements. One important consequence of this was the increased emphasis on the political aspects of the European Army project. The Monnet leitmotif was evident in Alphan's report to the Cabinet: with the European Army the federation of Europe would become a reality '*car il sera impossible de ne pas compléter immédiatement par un projet politique les deux projets économique et militaire qui auront été mis en vigueur*'.⁹⁷ The fundamental basis for federation, as Monnet had agreed with Adenauer in April, was the principle of equality, hence the necessity of securing a French concession on this point.⁹⁸ Monnet also asserted to the Cabinet that US support for the European Army was not only conditional on French acceptance of equality for Germany but on the creation of political institutions from the outset.⁹⁹ In turn, he pressed Washington to give the political project its full support: the Schuman letter of 25 August demanded that the Atlantic nations make a public declaration that the development of a European Federation within a developing Atlantic Community was a major policy goal.¹⁰⁰ At Monnet's instigation, the Interim Report now substituted the term 'European Defence Community' in place of 'European Army'.¹⁰¹ Ironically, as the military blueprints under draft at the Paris Conference moved closer to the proposals outlined originally by the US (and subsequently by the Germans and the NATO Military Committee) for integration with and through NATO structures, the political project of the European army began to expand.

US officials in Europe, who worked closely with Monnet throughout the summer, echoed this broad political concern to promote the movement toward continental political union. Their assistance in France, in Germany and in the US itself

⁹⁶ Finance Ministry memo on the Interim Report, 22 Aug. 1951, AN, 363 AP 20.

⁹⁷ 14 Aug. 1951, MAE, SG 12.

⁹⁸ Memo to Schuman, 8 May 1951, FJM, AMG 28/1/1; Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, 340.

⁹⁹ Monnet memo (undated), FJM, AMI 12/4/1.

¹⁰⁰ Letter to Acheson, FJM, AMI 8/3/8.

¹⁰¹ According to Elgey, *La République des Contradictions*, 255; Alphan had proposed the term 'European Defence Force' to the Paris Conference on 13 July on the grounds that, for Anglo-Saxons, 'army' applied to ground forces only, MAE, CED 164.

helped Monnet's efforts to give European defence planning an increasingly specific direction. This route did not, according to one of them, 'lie "down the NATO road" but only in helping the continentals find for themselves a political goal, namely union, for which their energies can be released and by which a rearmament policy can be made to make political and military sense to them.'¹⁰² The administration in Washington may have stressed that greater support for the French plan was designed to achieve the military goal of rapid European rearmament, rather than any particular political objective, but, nevertheless, the decision was illustrative of a broader political perception of European organisation that was beginning to emerge from the US.¹⁰³ American decision-makers were increasingly coming to believe that in the post-war world France and Germany 'exist as important national entities but are totally incapable of playing power politics in the classic tradition. They can only be components in a new balance of power or a new concert of peace.'¹⁰⁴ The equal weakness of the European states made federation both a desirable and a feasible option for many in the US. It was a unitary, rather than a French-led, Western Europe that would provide the US with its optimal partnership.¹⁰⁵

Nowhere was this more clearly illustrated than in the defence realm and the European army project. Yet this was a vision that had little in common with French conceptions of European integration and the image of the European Army articulated by the French Cabinet in August 1951. Permanent French leadership of the European force was the assumption on which the government's support for the project was based, a leadership which would, in turn, provide the cornerstone of the French-US partnership in the Western alliance. French and US European Army policies, at a cursory glance, may have appeared to have dove-tailed in the summer of 1951. On closer examination, however, it was clear that the two governments were embarked on fundamentally antagonistic and irreconcilable paths.

¹⁰²Cleveland memo, 12 April 1951, NARA, RG 59, Office of European Regional Affairs (Camp Files), Lot 55 D 105, Box 2.

¹⁰³Paul Nitze, 11-13 December 1953, Box 89, Princeton Seminars, Acheson papers, Truman Library. NSC-115 made the conditionality of US support clear, *FRUS* 1951 3: 851-53, 30 July.

¹⁰⁴Frankfurt despatch, 'The problem of Franco-German cooperation in the light of German attitudes', 17 July 1951, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, Pt 1, Reel 3.

¹⁰⁵Melyvn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power* (Stanford, 1992), 500-01.

Chapter Five

Plans and progress:

September 1951 - May 1952

Two international events finally forced progress in the negotiations for a European Army: the conclusion of tripartite talks with Germany in Petersberg and indications that US policy towards the European Army was being oriented in a more supportive direction. The release of the Paris Conference Interim Report in July 1951 forced the French government to deliberate the European Army for the first time since October 1950. The new Cabinet's examination of the project, like its predecessor's, was far from comprehensive. Nevertheless, it did result in conditional approval for the plans outlined in the report, a decision that represented two fundamental concessions from the original French proposal. First, the government gave its explicit agreement to the general principle of equality for Germany. Second, it conceded to specific military recommendations for a larger European force than originally envisaged, the basic structure of which would be determined by the NATO European command rather than the six partners themselves. At the same time, French insistence on the political, military and financial guarantees it would have to receive in return for treating Germany on an equal basis in the European Army belied the very notion of equality. The corollary to French acceptance of Germany's rehabilitation as a 'normal' sovereign state appeared to be an increasing claim to a 'special' status for France in the Western alliance system.

The continued absence of any detailed logistical plans for the European Army and the multiple, interlinked international negotiations simultaneously taking place helped obscure the contradictions in France's European Army policy. It also precluded sustained attention of the French administration to the Paris Conference. Approval of the Interim Report, for the moment, enabled progress on the European project to proceed. Over the next nine months, however, as the complex framework of a European defence force was erected, the tensions between equality and leadership in France's European defence policies were increasingly revealed.

The Washington and Ottawa Conferences, September 1951

Schuman was determined that the forthcoming tripartite and NATO Council meetings in Washington and Ottawa would not repeat the débâcle of the previous September conference and that France would emerge successfully from these first international discussions of the European army at a ministerial level. Avoiding close domestic scrutiny and potentially divisive debate was considered a prerequisite to this, as the careful orchestration of the Cabinet's Interim Report illustrated.¹ The post-election wranglings had delayed the normal parliamentary timetable and the government was quick to use this opportunity as a way of cancelling the normal foreign policy debate after the summer recess. Schuman requested instead that, on the eve of the international conferences, '*Je demande à mes collègues de me faire ce crédit, un crédit nécessaire pour des négociateurs*'.² He assured the Assembly that the government's foreign policy would continue along the same lines and promised no *fait accompli* would be presented afterwards. Steps taken in the economic and military domain were preparing the way for '*la communauté politique européenne où la France jouera le rôle de tout premier ordre qui lui assigne sa vocation traditionnelle*'.

These efforts paid off when the three Foreign Ministers met in Washington on 12 September 1951. Schuman outlined the progress of the European army conference, pointing out that the German government had now taken a position of firm support for the project.³ Acheson confirmed that with all US doubts now dissipated, Washington intended to back the effort 'with enthusiasm'. The British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, who had replaced the seriously-ill Bevin in March, announced that the UK would also give its full support to the European defence force. Britain had already noted the US shift in policy and was keen to re-establish tripartite unity on the German issue.⁴ Moreover, like Washington, London believed that the European force might well provide 'a useful half-way house to eventual German membership of NATO'.⁵ In pursuit of these two objectives the British were prepared 'to establish the

¹President Auriol who, by virtue of his position, stood outside the fray, complained bitterly at the foreign ministry's lack of communication, having failed to receive the text of the Monnet-drafted letter to Acheson, Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-54*, v, 1951, (Paris, 1975), 408.

²30 Aug. 1951, *Journal Officiel: Débats, Assemblée (JO)* 19, 1951, 6664.

³Minutes of 3rd meeting, 12 Sept. 1951, MAE, CM/Cabinet Schuman/11.

⁴Cabinet memo on Washington and Ottawa talks, 22 Oct. 1951, PRO, CAB 129/47, CP(51)266.

⁵Memo on West Germany's contribution to defence, 24 July 1951, PRO, CAB 129/47, CP(51)233.

closest possible association with the European continental community'; a statement modelled on the government's approach to the ECSC the year before.⁶

The new-found tripartite consensus was reflected in discussions on Germany. The ministers instructed their High Commissioners 'to proceed to negotiations with the Federal Government, which will, it is hoped, culminate in early agreements between the four Governments to enter into effect together with the agreement for German participation in Western Defence through the proposed European Defence Community, whose forces would form part of the joint defence forces under the North Atlantic Supreme Command.'⁷ Nevertheless, Acheson remained firm that US support for EDC was not unconditional: Washington, he warned, would look for another solution if progress stalled, noting his satisfaction at indications from Schuman that it might be possible to make a start on German troop recruitment before the EDC structure was completely in place.⁸

The ever-conciliatory Schuman had indeed made some vague comments as to the possibility of France conceding to this established US demand. It was immediately followed, however, by a clarificatory statement from the Quai stressing that no recruitment of German troops could begin until a European army treaty had been signed.⁹ Privately, many officials believed their Minister was too concerned with the maintenance of the US-French relationship to the detriment of France's position *vis-à-vis* an emerging Germany. As one of them quipped: '*il ne savait qu'un seul mot d'anglais, qui était "yes"*'.¹⁰ For the Quai staff, their energies directed on the discussions between the High Commissioners and Adenauer rather than the Paris Conference proceedings, the importance of the Washington meeting lay in the decisions being taken on the next step in the contractual negotiations on the future of Germany.¹¹ The ministry continued to insist that, in order to ensure Germany did not exploit Western rearmament plans as a bargaining tool to secure concessions in the talks, a political contract between the Federal Republic and the three Allies could

⁶The policy of association, according to Roger Bullen, had a dual purpose; to minimise any damage to British interests and equally to suggest a special status for Britain: "of" but not "in" Europe, 'Britain and Europe, 1950-57', Ennio Di Nolfo (ed). *Power in Europe? II* (Berlin, 1992), 499-505.

⁷Department of State *Bulletin*, 25, no. 639, 24 Sept. 1951, 486.

⁸Minutes of meeting, 12 Sept. 1951, MAE, CM/Cabinet Schuman/11.

⁹Auriol, *Journal*, 1951, 460-62.

¹⁰Quoted in Jean Chauvel, *Commentaire: ii, D'Alger à Berne* (Paris, 1972), 254.

¹¹Europe desk memo, 24 Aug. 1951, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/141.

come into force only with a parallel agreement fully integrating the German contribution into the European defence force.¹² The European Army offered a guarantee against Germany's rapid political re-emergence which could not be negotiated away to assuage US impatience, even at the cost of embarrassing the Minister.

Schuman faced different, if equally strong, demands from Monnet for greater emphasis on the political integrative aspects of the EDC project at Washington. Monnet, keen to maintain the momentum of progress made in both ECSC and EDC, sought a tripartite declaration supporting the principle of European political unity.¹³ His efforts to convince Schuman were assisted by Bruce who proposed that Acheson call a meeting with Schuman (only Alphand and Bonnet from the French delegation should attend) to ask whether the French government had a specific plan for political federation.¹⁴ The purpose of the move was to 'bolster Schuman's apparently weakening resolve to carry through with the Schuman Plan and EDF, as well as to exercise further French leadership in the realm of European Federation'.¹⁵ Pleven, who had just received a visit from Hallstein declaring Adenauer's desire for political federation, was said to be ready to answer positively to any request for instructions from Washington.¹⁶ Bruce claimed conditions were now favourable for the French to consider calling a conference in early 1952 to draw up a constitution for a Western European political federation.

A private meeting did take place on 12 September, at which Schuman assured Acheson that France indeed planned to establish a 'real political set-up with wider powers' than those of either the Schuman Plan or the EDC 'and perhaps with membership which differed from that of either of the two Plans or the two Plans combined'.¹⁷ Preparations would begin when the French parliament had approved the Schuman Plan: in the meanwhile, the French government would try to get the EDC

¹²Génévieve Rouché, 'Le Quai d'Orsay face au problème de la souveraineté allemande', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 104, no. 1-2, 1990, 37-55.

¹³Cleveland memo to Tomlinson, 7 Sept. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 25.

¹⁴Letter to Acheson (undated), NARA, RG 59, Lot 55 D 115, Box 4.

¹⁵Jessup memo to Battle (transmitting Bruce's letter), 6 Sept. 1951, RG 59, Lot 55 D 115, Box 4.

¹⁶The timing of the meeting, attended by Monnet, Bidault and Parodi, raises the question whether Monnet had instigated it. Pleven told Hallstein that while he agreed with Adenauer, any initiative would have to come from France and would depend on the evolution of the domestic political situation. Paris tel. 9768 to Schuman, 7 Sept. 1951, MAE, EU 44-60/Gén/141.

¹⁷Perkins memo of conversation, 12 Sept. 1951, NARA, RG 59, Lot 53 D 444, Box 14.

treaty signed by the end of the year for ratification in early 1952.¹⁸ France intended to release a declaration on European political unity while this was taking place. As to its content, however, the foreign minister was remarkably unspecific, mentioning merely the possibility of a call for talks 'perhaps in the Council of Europe or by other means not yet decided'. At the NATO Council meeting in Ottawa, moreover, Schuman took a markedly different approach toward the development of EDC, emphasising the force would only be '*une cellule*' of the total Atlantic body aimed at reinforcing the common security and prosperity of Europe.¹⁹ Schuman's alternating emphases undoubtedly reflected the wide range of competing domestic and international interests and issues involved in EDC. It also revealed his own ambivalence towards the project. Above all, the various views on EDC being voiced by government ministers, the foreign ministry and the Monnet team at the conferences illustrated the complete absence of any clear French vision of a European Defence Community.

Nevertheless, French assessment of the meetings was positive overall. Ambassador Bonnet considered the Foreign Ministers' agreement on EDC a victory for the French position: '*Nous n'avons été l'objet d'aucune pression tendant à nous à mener à composition sur tel ou tel élément du notre projet [i.e. EDC] et partout, nous n'avons eu à faire aucune concession.*'²⁰ According to the Quai the conferences had reinforced three-power direction of the Atlantic Alliance - '*comme nous l'avons toujours souhaité, et malgré une certaine résistance des petites nations*'.²¹ The establishment of a tripartite NATO committee - the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) - to examine the national defence budgets of NATO members and establish an equitable division of Western defence charges fulfilled France's longstanding call for greater financial coordination. Bidault, the new Defence Minister, reported that the US was now willing to increase its financial assistance: the TCC findings, he asserted, would merely reinforce France's claims for aid.²² Monnet was appointed as the French

¹⁸Schuman tel. 6335 to Plevin & MAE, 13 Sept. 1951, MAE, SG 53.

¹⁹Minutes of NAC session 2(I), 15 Sept. 1951, MAE, CM/Cabinet Schuman/13. Massigli believed Schuman had little inclination for political unity and suspected the pressure came from his advisors, *Une Comédie des Erreurs: souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne* (Paris, 1978), 286-87, 300-01; Bruce concluded that Schuman had not thought the idea through and was undecided as to what should be done, Memo to Tomlinson, 26 Oct. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 24.

²⁰Washington tel. 6450, 15 Sept. 1951, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/141.

²¹Circular tel. 187, 29 Sept. 1951, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/141.

²²Cabinet meeting, 26 Sept. 1951, Auriol, *Journal*, 1951, 485.

representative on the TCC and, with his US and British colleagues, Averell Harriman and Edwin Plowden, agreed to complete their survey before the February NAC Council session in Lisbon.²³

In reality, however, both the US and Britain continued to resist French desires for permanent three-power NATO coordination over an expanded agenda. Agreement on EDC was not indicative of any move in this direction. On the contrary, the British considered Allied unity a necessary consequence of French weakness, 'although we do not admit the principle of Anglo-US-French direction in global strategy...we must carry the French in most of the major political issues with which we are confronted'.²⁴ French policy success remained contingent upon the willingness of its Western partners to adopt and support French leadership claims.

Action at the Paris Conference, Autumn 1951

The new sense of energy that marked the resumption of the Paris Conference was, similarly, not a function French leadership but the consequence of revised US support for EDC. US officials had already begun campaigns in each of the six European capitals for greater support to be given to the Paris Conference. The Italians, who had hitherto operated 'on the assumption that they [the Paris discussions] would never lead anywhere', were encouraged to adopt a more constructive attitude by the US Ambassador, James Dunn and his staff.²⁵ The preoccupation of De Gasperi's government with US economic assistance coupled with its desire to secure equality with the other European nations gave the US substantial leverage in pressing home its views. When the Conference reopened on 3 October the Italian delegation was far

²³Monnet makes clear that securing a US financial commitment was the reason he agreed to participate in the TCC. The project, he argued, represented the first time the US was being questioned on its intentions and real possibilities, Monnet's report to the government on TCC, 26 Oct. 1951, FJM, AMI 10/10/2. Alphand's determination to get Monnet as French representative and the subsequent way in which Finance Ministry officials were kept away from the deliberations by Monnet, Uri and Hirsch suggests the Monnet team perceived the task as part of the wider project to secure American support for EDC, Alphand to Acheson, 21 Sept. 1951, UPA, *Acheson Conversations*, Reel 5; Finance ministry memos to Mayer, 15 & 19 Nov. 1951, 363 AP 20.

²⁴PM memo on the Washington and Ottawa talks, 30 Aug. 1951, PRO, CAB 129/47, CP(51)239.

²⁵Paris Embassy officials advocated Acheson 'give the works' to De Gasperi at Ottawa, Cleveland to Tomlinson, 7 Sept. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 24.

more active in the negotiations, particularly in support of political integrative measures.²⁶

The Dutch role at Paris was revised from observer to participant on 9 October, alongside a warning that the relinquishment of sovereignty involved in EDC be kept to a minimum.²⁷ The new delegation quickly signalled its position, calling for clarification of the NATO-EDC link and objecting to the common budget, the post of European Defence Minister and other supranational features of the project.²⁸ On 25 October the Dutch called a secret meeting between the Benelux heads of delegations, a move which Alphand feared was an attempt to form a united front against the plan, given Belgian complaints that France was trying to push them into federation.²⁹ US officials noted with relief that the French and German delegations appeared determined not to yield to objections to the institutional arrangements contained in the Interim Report.³⁰ US-French backstage cooperation at the conference now intensified, as Tomlinson, Cleveland and Bowie focused their collective energy and expertise on the EDC project in the hope of getting a draft treaty completed by the end of November.³¹ To that end a steady stream of memoranda, notes and proposals on the various problems confronting the conference passed between the Embassy officials and the offices of Alphand and Monnet. This transnational network, just as it dominated US and French EDC policymaking, constituted the principal driving force behind the Paris negotiations throughout the winter.

The military details of the European force offered the best hope for progress with SHAPE now involved in the discussions: acceptance of its recommendations on unit size broke the principal technical impasse. The European Army would be organised in basic units of 12-13,000 men, known as *groupements*, which SHAPE

²⁶French deleg. tel. 193, 18 Oct. 1951, MAE, SG 12; Antonio Varsori, 'Italy between the Atlantic Alliance and EDC, 1948-55', Di Nolfo (ed.) *Power in Europe?* II, 278-79.

²⁷*Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, 1951 Vol. 3, (Washington, 1981), 873-4; Jan van der Harst, *The Netherlands and the EDC* (Florence, 1986), 11.

²⁸*FRUS* 1951 3: 885-86, 905; Van der Harst asserts the Dutch move was an attempt to form a united front with the Belgian and Italian delegations to thwart the French plan, *The Netherlands*, 14.

²⁹Bruce to Tomlinson, 26 Oct. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 24. Belgian delegates argued this would involve changes to the Belgian constitution.

³⁰*FRUS* 1951 3: 902, 27 Oct; French deleg tel. 1278 to Brussels, 26 Oct. 1951, MAE, SG 12.

³¹Tel. 502, 23 Oct. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: Records pertaining to the EDC and related international organisations, 1951-55 (C), Box 51.

described the compromise between a combat team and a division.³² In practical terms, SHAPE's participation in the logistical planning at Paris cemented the EDC within the Alliance defence structure under NATO command, a move which was actively welcomed by the French military delegate, General de Larminat, who claimed it would ensure that no interim national bodies emerged before the EDC institutions were established.³³ At the same time, French officials continued to resist the logical conclusion of this institutional relationship, namely eventual German entry into NATO. Alphand insisted that the question was responsible for many complications in the EDC-NATO relationship and should be left aside for the present.³⁴ The Quai was even more explicit: any provision for German membership of NATO would lead to parliamentary rejection of EDC in France.³⁵

EDC Foreign Ministers' meetings, December 1951 - January 1952

Benelux opposition to any degree of supranational control over political and financial arrangements obscured, for the moment, the military implications of the EDC negotiations. The common budget and procurement, the use of EDC forces, the transitional arrangements, the composition of the executive and the political institutions of the defence community all remained in suspense. In response to requests from Monnet and Alphand, US officials publicly stressed the need for European political unity and put increased pressure on the Benelux to concede supranational control over national troop and financial contributions to EDC.³⁶ Nevertheless, Washington was critical of France's leadership of the Paris Conference

³²SHAPE recommendations to the Military Committee, 13 Sept. 1951, MAE, CED 178.

³³French deleg. memo on EDC, 26 Sept. 1951, MAE, CM/Cabinet Schuman/13; French Chiefs of Staff saw NATO playing an important role in the recruitment, training and arming of EDF troops. De Larminat was under direct instructions from the Chiefs of Staff rather than Alphand at the EDC negotiations, Pierre Guillen, 'Les chefs militaires français, le réarmement d'Allemagne et la CED', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 129, 1983, 13-4.

³⁴Spofford tel. 502, 23 Oct. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 51.

³⁵Memo of Herz-Sauvagnargues meeting, 24 Oct. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 51.

³⁶Eisenhower, after a request from Monnet, made a strongly pro-political integration speech at the NAC meeting in Rome, Robert Ferrell (ed.) *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York, 1981), 206; *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 1952-4 Vol. 5, (Washington, 1983): 576, 3 Jan. Alphand reported to the Cabinet that Bruce had asked Washington to examine the extent to which US legislation could permit the transmission of all aid to EDC rather than to each national defence effort, Annexe 2 to MAE memo, 6 Dec. 1951, FJM, AMI 14/1/14b.

and French inability to overcome Benelux opposition singlehandedly.³⁷ US officials claimed the weakness was due to differences over German policy within the French administration as well as the opposition to the European Army developing in both right and left-wing political parties. The government itself was reportedly drastically split on the question.³⁸

The only way to make progress, Washington concluded, was to continue EDC negotiations at the ministerial level in the hope that the active personal participation and interest of ministers would encourage compromise and, in addition, leave Schuman freer to negotiate agreement with his German and Benelux counterparts.³⁹ Yet the first meeting of the six foreign ministers on 11 December produced nothing except the resignation of Paul-Henri Spaak from the presidency of the Council of Europe Assembly in protest at the lack of European governmental support for political integration.⁴⁰ Exasperated, Washington took an increasingly active stand, warning the ministers after their second meeting on 27-30 December that continued obstructionist behaviour in the EDC negotiations threatened US military and financial aid to Europe. The best way to assure a continued US European presence was to proceed rapidly with the European force.⁴¹

US officials in Europe saw the deadlock not merely in terms of EDC delay: they were committed to the supranational principle so strongly contested and hoped the French government, far from giving way to the Benelux, would begin steps in the direction of a supranational authority proposed by Monnet. Schuman's continued hesitance on the question led Bruce and Eisenhower to centre their efforts increasingly on Pleven. They urged him to issue an immediate invitation to the other European countries to create a Constituent Assembly for the establishment of a complete European federation.⁴² Although Pleven assured them both that the Cabinet was

³⁷FRUS 1951 3, (Washington, 1981), 948, 29 Nov.

³⁸Rome tel. 338, 29 Nov. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: Records pertaining to the EDC, 1950-52 (B), Box 1.

³⁹Tel. 3353 to Paris, 6 Dec. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 2; Bruce and his staff consistently stressed the importance of working 'with Schuman and his European-minded subordinates...helping them to ease France into position', FRUS 1951 3: 901, 27 Oct.

⁴⁰Paul-Henri Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, ii, (Paris, 1969), 48-50.

⁴¹FRUS 1952-54 5: 574, 3 Jan.

⁴²Bruce had a number of meetings with Pleven on the theme, Eisenhower wrote a secret letter to Pleven proposing the move, 24 Dec. 1951, Box 93, Principal File, Pre-Presidential Papers, DDEL.

unanimously receptive to the idea, no French invitation for a constitutional convention was issued before his government fell on 6 January 1952.⁴³

It was the Italians who finally proposed a solution to the issue of political control in the European Army. De Gasperi (who was also Foreign Minister) suggested a provision in the EDC treaty authorising the future EDC Assembly to study and report on a bicameral parliament which would form the basis of a European federation and eventually take the place of the organisation envisaged in the draft treaty.⁴⁴ The compromise thus consigned the supranational aspect to the long term. It took several sessions of the Paris Conference's steering committee and another Foreign Ministers' meeting on 26-27 January 1952 before agreement was finally reached on a suitable institutional structure for EDC. The High Authority would now comprise a nine-member executive, to be named by unanimous agreement of the governments, of which no more than two could be of the same nationality.⁴⁵ Agreement was also reached on the voting procedures within the Council of Ministers.

The breakthrough enabled further progress on the common financial arrangements for EDC. The principle of a common budget was approved and through this, the guarantee of a balanced build-up of national contributions from the outset. The six Foreign, Finance and Defence ministers agreed that, in the interim period at least, national contributions should be made according to NATO procedures, although how these funds would eventually be transferred to the common budget remained unclear. The Council would, in the interim period, approve the budget by qualified majority and would also rule on the permissibility of any deduction in contributions.⁴⁶ Many details were still unclear but by January 1952 a basis had been provided, largely the result of US pressure, on which the provisions of the draft treaty could be worked out by the Paris Conference delegates.

France seeks assurances

⁴³'Conversations on European Federation' (undated), NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 23.

⁴⁴Paolo Emilio Taviani, 'La Comunità europea di difesa: una occasione perduta', *Civitas*, no. 3-4, 1979, 5-6.

⁴⁵This represented a significant concession to the Benelux. The French-German-Italian position had been for a three member executive, independent of Council of Ministers. Monnet's initial plan had proposed a single individual executive.

⁴⁶French deleg. proposal for the common budget, 30 Dec. 1951, AN 363 AP 20.

Each laborious step forward that the European Army negotiations made was accompanied, within the French administration, by calls for guarantees against Germany. The Cabinet remained preoccupied with the short-term aspects of EDC and cautioned against any transition arrangements that might give Germany the means to act autonomously. The government still insisted on an explicit linkage between France's financial and military responsibilities in Indochina and the settlement of Germany's EDC contribution based on strict parity with that of France, despite administrative and military warnings that this would constrain France's own financial autonomy.⁴⁷

The Quai was particularly cogniscent of the implications of Franco-German financial equality. The EDC common budget mechanism provided a valuable means of maintaining control over a future German defence budget but only at the cost of forcing France to commit itself to a fixed sum commensurate with the total German contribution. With the Indochinese conflict limiting the portion of the French defence budget destined for Europe, this arrangement threatened to make Germany the preponderant financial force in EDC.⁴⁸ The only way out of this, the foreign ministry believed, was to insist that Germany take on additional, non-EDC expenses in the form of costs for Allied occupation forces and infrastructure expenses. The precise levels of these charges should be left open so that they could be altered to mirror fluctuations in France's expenses overseas.⁴⁹ This arrangement would also underlie the continued link between the revision of Germany's political status and its Western military participation.⁵⁰

The Germans firmly resisted this French demand at the contractual negotiations, arguing that according to the principle of equality, all Germany's financial contributions should be administered through the EDC common budget. The

⁴⁷Paris Conference deleg. notes for 3 Dec. 1951 Cabinet meeting, FJM, AMI 14/1/9-12; Summary of interministerial meeting, 19 Dec. 1951, AN, 363 AP 20. The government was particularly insistent that a deduction to France's contribution in lieu of its Indochinese commitments be specified in the transitory convention; Guillen, 'Les chefs militaires françaises', 16-7.

⁴⁸The preliminary Allied estimate of Germany's contributory capacity was DM 12 million: the French estimated their own EDC contribution at no more than DM 6 million, MAE instructions to Alphand, 9 Oct. 1951, AN, 363 AP 20.

⁴⁹Joint finance and foreign ministry memo on the German contribution to defence, 20 Nov. 1951, AN, 363 AP 20.

⁵⁰MAE tel. 333 to Bonn, 13 Jan. 1952, MAE, SG 13.

US and the UK, mindful of Adenauer's warning of the strong domestic opposition he would face if the concept of occupation costs was retained, also pressed their French counterparts to rely on the common budget and procurement frameworks of the EDC to contain Germany rather than the Contractual Accords.⁵¹ This extended beyond financial issues to the question of controls on German military and heavy industry production, where again, the non-discriminatory basis of EDC limited the restrictions that could be imposed on Germany while simultaneously threatening to constrict France's own capacities.⁵² With the contractual negotiations proving less than successful for French objectives, the only option open to the foreign ministry was to incorporate British and US cooperation into the EDC framework itself. It was this effort that led the Quai into the arena of EDC negotiations.

On 30 January 1952, France sent a letter to its two Allied partners demanding that they formally guarantee to maintain the limits on Germany's defence contribution enshrined in the Brussels Agreement of December 1950. British and US assurances to EDC were an integral part of this guarantee, in order to ensure German adherence to its treaty obligations.⁵³ Ministry officials defended these demands on the basis of French parliamentary constraints: the Assembly would not be won over to EDC without being confident that substantial restrictions on German arms production existed.⁵⁴ It was a good tactic, for there were some grounds to this claim. The parliamentary debate of the ECSC treaty in December 1951 highlighted the apprehension with which many French politicians still viewed Germany. Although the treaty was successfully ratified (376 votes to 230), it was clear that passage of a European army treaty would not be an easy task. At a press conference on 21 December, de Gaulle launched the RPF's campaign against the EDC, claiming France

⁵¹Direction d'Europe centrale memo, 9 Jan. 1952, MAE, SG 13; Paris tels 3478 & 3560, 13-14 Dec. 1951, NARA RG 84, Paris Embassy: B, Box 1.

⁵²The Quai proposed the inclusion of 'security controls' to limit German production but, despite a series of talks, failed to secure US and UK support, Sauvagnargues memo on security controls, 20 Nov. 1951, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/142.

⁵³Seydoux note on German participation in EDC, 7 Jan. 1952, MAE SG 12; Parodi note on UK and US association, 16 Feb. 1952, MAE SG 12.

⁵⁴Paris tel. 3464, 10 Dec. 1951 & memo of Herz-Sauvagnargues conversation, 13 Dec. 1951, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: B, Box 1.

could never give up its own army nor place responsibility for its defence questions with external powers.⁵⁵

Parliamentary concern had already prompted French ministers to raise the issue of British association to EDC with the new UK government when Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Paris on 17-18 December. The Conservatives' election victory had prompted international speculation about British EDC policy, given Churchill's support for a European Army at the Council of Europe in August 1950. Nor did the government's declaration that it would maintain the policy of 'closest possible association' set out by its predecessor quell discussion, particularly after comments by the head of the UK delegation to the Council of Europe, David Maxwell-Fyfe, suggesting Britain might go further in its relationship with EDC.⁵⁶ Eden felt obliged to clarify that 'association' did not mean British troop participation in the European Army, although he conceded that some other form of association might be possible.

Criticism of the British stance was widespread among French politicians and the press: the veteran French conservative, Paul Reynaud, warned the Strasbourg Assembly that the French parliament would refuse to ratify the project without British participation: '*ce sera la fin de l'armée européenne, sinon celle de l'Europe*'.⁵⁷ Yet no one involved in French EDC policymaking regarded full UK membership as a real option, indeed Monnet had been resolutely opposed to it: '*L'Angleterre n'acceptera pas de se fusionner avec le Continent. L'Europe occidentale fusionnera si elle doit se faire, elle ne peut se faire sous forme fédérative que sans l'Angleterre*'.⁵⁸ Schuman rejected Massigli's solitary appeals for bilateral UK-French discussion of association on the grounds that the British position was fixed: the Ambassador's colleagues at the Quai agreed '*qu'il est ou beaucoup trop tard ou un peu trop tôt*' for any negotiations on the extension of Britain's commitments.⁵⁹ What the French leadership did want,

⁵⁵Irwin Wall, 'Charles de Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et la Communauté européenne de défense', *National Espoir*, no. 76, Sept. 1991, 68.

⁵⁶Declarations to the Commons, 12 & 19 Nov. 1951, in Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1951-55* (Cambridge, 1991), 85.

⁵⁷In Raymond Poidevin, *Schuman, Homme d'Etat* (Paris, 1986), 322; Reynaud letter to Churchill, 29 Nov. 1951, AN, Papiers de Paul Reynaud (74 AP) 54.

⁵⁸m.s. Monnet notes, 23 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/4/8.

⁵⁹Massigli, *Comédie*, 286-8; London tel. 4926, 21 Nov. 1951 & Seydoux to Massigli, 30 Nov. 1951, MAE PA-AP 217/77. Massigli alleged Alphand had advised Eden to maintain the current UK position, letter to Parodi, 8 Dec. 1951, MAE, PA-AP 217/101.

however, was indication of a positive stance which could be used in parliamentary discussions. What the French foreign ministry sought was UK (and US) assistance in keeping Germany contained in EDC with minimal sacrifice to France's own freedom.

Notwithstanding a similar US request, in the form of a personal plea from Eisenhower, that the UK make a public statement of EDC approval, the British remained unmoved by warnings of the significance of UK policy for French parliamentary opinion.⁶⁰ Churchill made little effort to disguise his opinion of the 'metaphysical' nature of the supranational project.⁶¹ The only new element to appear by the end of 1951 was an indication of British willingness to become involved in 'a technical association' with EDC, involving some links between British and EDC forces for training, supply and operations by land, sea and air.⁶²

Franco-German disputes, January - February 1952

With the Quai's effort to construct a framework for containing Germany around the EDC and the Contractual Accords enjoying little success, the foreign ministry took an increasingly critical view of the EDC project: *'On avait pensé que la CED représenterait une formule qui fournirait précisément les apaisements nécessaires, limiterait les risques du réarmement allemand et serait considérée à Moscou avec des appréhensions moindres que d'autres solutions. La question peut se poser de savoir si ces objectifs ont été atteints.'*⁶³ A new, less benign, tone towards Germany began to emerge from the Quai, the first indication of which was the announcement, on 27 January 1952, that the French High Commissioner to the Saar, Gilbert Grandval, had been re-appointed with the status of ambassador. This mineral-rich region had been the focus of Franco-German dispute since 1945 when the French took provisional control over it and was currently the subject of Council of Europe discussion over

⁶⁰Eisenhower to Eden, 8 Dec. 1951, Avon Papers, University of Birmingham, AP 20/15/1. Eisenhower repeated his request directly to Churchill on 14 & 19 Dec. 1951, Box 22, Principal File, Pre-Presidential Papers, DDEL.

⁶¹Summary of the French-UK meeting, 18 Dec. 1951, AN, 363 AP 20; Churchill described EDC as a 'sludgy amalgam' to the Cabinet, 29 Nov. 1951, PRO, CAB 129/48, C(51)32.

⁶²29 Dec. 1951, PRO, CAB 129/48, C(51)32.

⁶³Europe desk (Seydoux) memo on German participation in EDC, 7 Jan. 1952, MAE, SG 12.

possible 'europeanisation' of the region. Germany was outraged at the French action and immediately protested to Paris.⁶⁴

Schuman, having kept his place as Foreign Minister in the new Cabinet formed by the Radical, Edgar Faure, on 17 January 1952, defended the move on the grounds that it had long been in preparation. He underlined France's longstanding demand for an economic union with the Saar as essential to internal equilibrium in the European community.⁶⁵ But there were other factors at work. The *Bundestag* was about to begin debate on the progress of the EDC negotiations and, unlike France, the Saar question occupied an important place in German public opinion. The Quai's manoeuvre was designed to provoke a German reaction, while simultaneously signalling rejection of Adenauer's 'europeanisation' approach to the dispute.⁶⁶ McCloy, whose assistance Adenauer immediately invoked, warned the Chancellor that there were powerful groups in the French foreign ministry seeking an opportunity to torpedo the European project and urged him not to take retaliatory action.⁶⁷ Privately the Quai's Europe desk admitted this was its intention, '*il vaudrait mieux que ce fut le Bundestag qui refusat le traité en se déclarant incapable, pour faire l'Europe, d'accepter sur le plan de la sécurité un régime quelque peu discriminatoire, auquel il a bien fini par consentir sur le plan politique*'.⁶⁸ The *Bundestag*'s EDC debate went ahead, as scheduled, on 7 February and produced a vote of 204 to 156 in support of the government's policy. However, as the US High Commission noted grimly, when compared to the ratification of the Schuman Plan three weeks earlier (232 to 143) it was clear that the Saar episode was having an adverse effect on German support for the European army project.⁶⁹

⁶⁴The news took Bonn by complete surprise, Winfried Schumacher, 'Konrad Adenauer und die Saar' in Rainer Hudemann, Raymond Poidevin and Annette Maas (eds.) *Die Saar 1945-55: Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte* (Munich, 1992), 53.

⁶⁵Letter from Schuman to Acheson, copy to Hayter, 30 Jan. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/68.

⁶⁶Poidevin asserts that French public opinion was little exercised by the Saar issue, 'Robert Schuman et la Sarre', Hudemann et al., *Die Saar 1945-55*, 42.

⁶⁷McCloy added that Monnet and François-Poncet both believed it a mistake to put the Saar question on the agenda until the peace treaty was settled, Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs 1945-53* trans. Beate Rhum van Oppen, (London, 1966), 405; Ambassador Harvey offered a similar explanation, despatch 18 Feb. 1952, PRO, CAB 129/49 C(52)47.

⁶⁸Seydoux note, 7 Jan. 1952, MAE, SG 12.

⁶⁹FRUS 1952-54 5: 611-12, 9 Feb.

Germany was equally capable of pinpointing French sensitivities to assert its position as an equal participant in the European project. At the Foreign Ministers' meeting on 26-27 January, Hallstein announced that any arrangement excluding Germany totally from NATO membership would be unacceptable. As a temporary measure, the Federal Republic proposed two alternatives: EDC corporate membership in NATO would either replace individual NATO memberships or be added alongside the present membership of those EDC states in NATO.⁷⁰ Until this point France had managed to prevent the issue from being raised for international discussion, even though none of its partners disguised their belief that Germany's participation in NATO was an inevitable element of Western defence policies.⁷¹ Paris fought back hard, declaring German membership of NATO would involve a radical modification of the Alliance's defensive character and reminding Washington that French parliamentary opinion would simply not accept EDC if this was to be the outcome.

A sharp and divisive tone in the Franco-German relationship had thus been introduced before the French National Assembly began its first debate of EDC since its introduction in October 1950. In his opening address to the parliament on 11 February 1952, Schuman stressed the continuity of the EDC initiative for French policy - '*C'est ce qui fait que nous sommes, à la fois, le pays le plus traditionnaliste et le plus révolutionnaire d'Europe*' - and the guarantees provided in the project, among them German non-participation in NATO.⁷² The lack of foreign policy consideration within parliamentary circles and the poor job done by the government in preparing opinion for the occasion seriously hampered the debate. Discussion revolved principally on the continued fear of a revival of German military might. No new arguments were presented on either side: the RPF denounced '*la trahison des clercs*' that threatened the independence of the French Army; the Socialists called for British participation; the Communists attacked US war-mongering. Prime Minister Faure put the vote to a question of confidence with a plea for the Assembly to set aside the

⁷⁰Summary of Alphand-Blank talk, 15 Feb. 1952, AN, 4 AU 91; *FRUS* 1952-54 5: 604.

⁷¹The French had successfully prevented the Dutch from raising the subject in discussions of the six Foreign Ministers, appealing for US and UK support in the effort, Schuman to Massigli, 9 Jan. 1952, MAE, SG 12. Both Washington and London made the point that while they would not presently insist on German membership, the step was a logical one, Washington tel. 764, 29 Jan. 1952, MAE, SG 12.

⁷²*Journal Officiel: Débats, Assemblée (JO)*, 14, 11 Feb. 1952, 572.

French inferiority complex that led to fear of Germany and desire for British involvement.⁷³

One notable aspect of the debate was the broad support European integration received from all sides of the Assembly. Just below the surface however, the character of this 'Europe' continued to bubble. Schuman offered little governmental vision - the EDC was '*une étape préliminaire conduisant vers une Europe fédérée ou confédérale*' - and details of the actual project itself were in no greater evidence. Significantly, deputies made little of the links between the government's policy to Indochina or the Saar. The connection, repeatedly stressed by all sides, was US support for EDC. Inevitably this resulted in argument over the potential US reaction in the event of the project's collapse, a debate which saw, ironically, the pro-EDC side warn of the consequences for France: US policy would most likely opt either for a German-US alliance or a peripheral defence strategy in Europe.⁷⁴

The final motion bore every sign of the compromises needed to produce the eventual majority of 327 to 287 votes (12 abstentions) on 19 February 1952. The Assembly approved the government's policy in the EDC, stipulating the need for adequate limitations in Germany's arms production, troop size and financial contribution to EDC, stressing, moreover, that no state with territorial claims could enter NATO.⁷⁵ Guarantees from Britain and the US to EDC as well as the desirability of British participation were also expressed. The Quai's search for guarantees could not have been better bolstered: the weakness of the motion left the way open for multiple additional French demands. Moreover, with Plevin's departure from government, the domestic balance of pro and anti-EDC forces looked much more fragile, making the chances of active government leadership towards EDC even more unlikely.⁷⁶ Socialist leader, Guy Mollet, warned US officials against optimistic assessments of the situation from their pro-EDC contacts: 'I know Alphant and I

⁷³Paris tel 4018, 5 Jan. 1952, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, Pt. 2, Reel 14; Cleveland to Bruce, 14 Feb. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: B, Box 9.

⁷⁴Opponents such as General Billotte, General Aumeran and the more moderate Edouard Daladier all denied that EDC failure would lead to a US withdrawal from Europe. Such threats, according to Billotte, '*peuvent être des hypothèses de diplomates un peu impressionables*', *JO*, 650-54.

⁷⁵Raymond Aron 'Historical Sketch of the Great Debate' in Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.) *France Defeats EDC* (New York, 1957), 7.

⁷⁶De Margerie reported his gloom to Bonsal, tel 1380, 14 Feb. 1952, NARA RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 3; Ambassador Harvey despatch, 12 Feb. 1952, PRO, CAB 129/49 C(52)47.

know Monnet intimately, and I know they are stubborn people who occasionally delude themselves by their stubbornness. I fear they may think that the Assembly is now a problem of the past and of the dim future which can be ignored for the moment. Nothing would be a worse mistake.⁷⁷

The US umpires: the London and Lisbon Conferences, February 1952

The parliamentary debates in both countries certainly heightened tensions in Franco-German relations. At a personal level, however, both Adenauer and Schuman appeared keen to compromise on the most contentious aspects of German rearmament - the security controls on military production, its financial contribution and its membership of NATO.⁷⁸ The funeral of King George VI in London from 14-19 February 1952 provided an opportunity for the two men to discuss the issues: Acheson and Eden, keen to achieve a breakthrough before the NATO Conference opened in Lisbon, hoped that top-level meetings between Adenauer and the Foreign Ministers would provide the opportunity.

With active US mediation Adenauer and Schuman made substantial progress in London on resolving their differences. The Chancellor enabled a breakthrough on the thorny question of security controls by offering to declare that Germany would voluntarily abstain from production of certain listed war materials (the precise enumeration of which remained in contention as the French wanted to include civil aircraft, propellants and gunbarrels). He also agreed to the US suggestion that a clause be added to the EDC treaty restricting arms production in 'strategically forward' areas.⁷⁹ Adenauer further conceded that Germany would not press for immediate membership of NATO and accepted an arrangement whereby German liaison with NATO would be coordinated through joint meetings of the EDC and NATO councils. Schuman, in return, agreed that France would not request a specific prohibition of Germany joining the alliance.⁸⁰ In securing German agreement to set the question

⁷⁷Mollet to Bonsal, tel. 5126, 21 Feb. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: B, Box 9.

⁷⁸Adenauer felt the Bundestag resolutions were sufficiently vague to enable him to enter 'true negotiations', *FRUS*, 1952-54 5: 81, 21 Feb.

⁷⁹*FRUS* 1952-54 5: 56-7, 82.

⁸⁰*FRUS* 1952-54 5: 82.

aside for the moment, Schuman was implicitly acknowledging the inevitability of Germany's future direct participation in NATO, even as his parliament stipulated against this. For now, however, a compromise had been found. Under pressure from Acheson and Eden, Schuman and Adenauer also agreed to postpone settlement of the Saar issue for future bilateral talks.⁸¹

Schuman, however, was less willing to compromise French demands for a US-UK guarantee to EDC. He insisted that a joint pledge to maintain British and US forces on the continent was a vital guarantee against unilateral secession by any member of EDC. Acheson, aware that this was a thinly-veiled measure against Germany, maintained it was politically impossible for Washington to commit US troops indefinitely at this time and suggested, as an alternative, that Truman make a statement as to US interest in EDC when the German agreements were submitted for Congressional approval. Eden, however, was conscious that the French government would be unable to back down on this issue in light of the Assembly debate and, moreover, that London could be criticised for being anti-European if it refused French requests.⁸² He had already discussed with the Cabinet the possibility of making an additional separate security guarantee on non-secession to EDC as a gesture to help the defence project while making clear Britain's policy of non-participation.⁸³ Yet when Eden presented the proposed declaration to the French in Lisbon, Faure and Schuman rejected the offer, warning that any public statement at this time might, by its very explicitness, create additional difficulties in parliament.⁸⁴ The Assembly's recommendations made a more ambitious - and French - initiative necessary: the two men indicated to Eden that the UK would, some time in the future, be formally invited to join EDC.⁸⁵

⁸¹MAE circular no. 27, 4 March 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/143. Given that Adenauer had pressed the US and UK to make a substantive proposal on the Saar, the decision came as a relief to the French. Winfried Schumacher argues, however, that the agreement to hold bilateral talks in March was a victory for Adenauer's Saar policy, given that the French had refused such discussions until then, 'Konrad Adenauer und die Saar', Hudemann et al., *Die Saar 1945-55*, 53.

⁸²Dockrill notes that Eden was anxious to lessen the anti-British statements in Europe and the US resulting from its position on EDC, *Britain's policy*, 96-7.

⁸³Cabinet approved Eden making a declaration of support for EDC but remained divided on whether this should be a unilateral guarantee, PRO, CAB 128/24, CC(52) 17 & 18.

⁸⁴FRUS 1952-54 5: 131, 22 Feb.

⁸⁵Massigli, *Comédie*, 313; Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London, 1960), 42. Acheson reported Faure saying there were some things 'the Government must go through with, but they may or may not be able to do anything about them', and thought UK participation one of these, FRUS 1952-54 5: 132.

Nevertheless, the Lisbon Conference did produce some breakthrough on security assurances. The NATO council agreed to the adoption of reciprocal security undertakings between EDC and NATO so that an armed attack on one would be regarded as an equal attack on the other. The agreement went some way towards France's claims for allied guarantees while satisfying Adenauer's non-discriminatory criteria. The final communiqué referred, additionally, to the 'abiding interest' of the US and UK in the 'establishment and integrity of the EDC', and noted that the ministers had studied the means by which the US and the UK could 'support and cooperate' with EDC.⁸⁶

The financial aspects of Germany's participation in Western defence was the final deadlock to be broken. Having pressed for NATO's Temporary Council Committee (TCC) to consider Germany's financial contribution, Adenauer now refused, as too high, the TCC's conclusion that Germany should contribute DM 11.25 billion annually. Only after Acheson sent a personal appeal to the Chancellor and suggested a ten percent cut in occupation costs for the following year did the Germans finally concede to the figure, although Adenauer signalled his continued belief that the EDC framework should provide the sole basis for Germany's financial contribution. Nevertheless, the 27 February settlement marked a concession to the French insistence for a division in Germany's Western contribution.⁸⁷ France's flexibility towards the precise sum of this amount was considerably furthered at the Lisbon Conference, where, as a result of the TCC's findings, the French secured \$600 million in US economic aid, \$130 million of which was earmarked for Indochina.⁸⁸

The London and Lisbon meetings marked the climax of months of complex and arduous negotiations on Europe's defence arrangements. An end to the multitude of committees scattered throughout the continent appeared in sight, as the various strands of the most difficult problem, the question of Germany's political, military and financial place in these arrangements, were brought together. The agreements reached outside the EDC forum provided the basis for further progress at the European Army negotiations. The Paris Conference's report to the Lisbon meeting

⁸⁶FRUS 1952-54 5: 105, 19 Feb.

⁸⁷FRUS 1952-54 5: 172; Washington tel. 1261, 27 Feb. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/66.

⁸⁸US aid to France, 1951-2, totaled \$501.5mn, Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne*, ii, (Paris, 1992), 815, 829.

announced that general agreement on most points had now been reached. It now seemed possible to envisage the final drafting and signature of the EDC within the near future. When the Steering Committee resumed work in Paris, delegates agreed secretly on a deadline of 6 April for completion of the treaty and its military protocol. Chairman Alphan's statement that the French would make some new suggestions to implement February's parliamentary recommendations seemed a minor detail. He assured his fellow delegates that he did not expect these to raise any difficulties.⁸⁹

Final French obstacles

For all Alphan's optimism, much remained to be done at the Paris Conference. February's multiple meetings had produced agreement on the principles of Germany's position in the western defence structure: the specific details of how German troops were to be established, organised and financed during the period of transition to EDC, the rights and authority that would remain with Allied troops in the Federal Republic and the modalities of future guarantees to EDC still had to be worked out. Settlement of each issue at the Paris Conference depended on the extent to which France was prepared to accept the consequences of equal German participation and provide the leadership necessary for a swift and successful conclusion of the treaty.

There was little hope that the Cabinet itself would provide the lead. With the economy lurching through a series of financial crises, threatening the collapse of the franc and a spiraling inflation cycle, Faure's government collapsed on 29 February 1952 over proposals to raise taxes. In the investiture debate of its successor, nominated by the Independent, Antoine Pinay, Schuman himself came under severe attack, and retained his position as Foreign Minister only on the insistence of his party, the MRP.⁹⁰ Although the criticisms focused principally on the mounting unrest in Tunisia, deputies alleged that the tensions in North Africa were the consequence of Schuman's over-preoccupation with European issues. More generally, there was a feeling in parliament that Schuman was deliberately keeping foreign policy issues out of deputies' reach: the influence of Monnet and others 'who are not responsible before

⁸⁹Paris Conference plenary session, 6 March 1952, MAE, CED 167.

⁹⁰Memo of Herz-de Beaumont conversation, 13 April 1952, NARA RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 1.

Parliament' was particularly attacked.⁹¹ The more Schuman's domestic authority weakened, the less likely a positive government approach to EDC appeared.

The arrival, on 10 March 1952, of a Soviet note addressed to the three Western occupation powers quickly made this apparent. In it, the USSR offered free elections for a reunified Germany in return for the permanent neutralisation of Germany and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory within one year. While the French foreign ministry considered agreement with the USSR unlikely and certainly not on the terms proposed by the Soviets, powerful voices, such as President Auriol, argued that domestic public and international opinion necessitated some form of exploration of the Soviet offer.⁹² Conscious of Auriol's warning, the government proposed that the USSR should be probed as to its sincerity, to which Washington, convinced that the Soviet action was an attempt to torpedo the EDC, only reluctantly conceded.⁹³ Even as a series of notes between the three Allies and the USSR began, however, Schuman took pains to warn the Germans that if the Soviet offer of unity was accepted, new four power controls over Germany would inevitably follow.⁹⁴ The ambiguity of French policy towards negotiations with the USSR illustrated the extent to which the issue was perceived less as an end in itself, rather than in relation to France's European and Western policies. But it also testified to the indecisiveness of the Cabinet's approach towards EDC.

Parliamentary opinion continued to form the basis of France's ongoing demand for British and US guarantees to EDC, threatening further delay.⁹⁵ The French administration strengthened its case in London, however, by avoiding a repeat of its earlier unilateral campaign: the 14 March 1952 invitation to Britain to enter into a treaty arrangement with the EDC was issued formally by the Paris Conference, even

⁹¹ Paris tel. 5434, 9 March 1952, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, Pt 2, Reel 14; Harvey report on the French political situation, 28 March 1952, PRO, CAB 129/50 C(52)90.

⁹² Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-54*, vi, 1952 (Paris, 1978), 201, 211-12; memo on the French attitude, 14 March 1952, PRO, FO 371/9787; Pierre Guillen, 'The Role of the Soviet Union as a Factor in the French Debates on the European Defence Community', *Journal of European Integration History*, 2, no. 1, 1996, 71-83.

⁹³ Washington tel, 12 March 1952 & MAE circulars on the French response to the Soviet note, 13 & 17 March 1952, AN 4 AU 91.

⁹⁴ Thomas Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 265.

⁹⁵ The Socialists were the main source of pressure, less from the desire to counteract a conservative, Christian-democratic Europe, rather than a basic anti-German feeling that led many to fear German rearmament, Byron Criddle, *Socialists and European Integration* (London, 1969), 58-61.

though, to all intents and purposes, the dialogue was an Anglo-French one.⁹⁶ The Six sought a commitment to EDC identical to the reciprocal automatic guarantee of fifty years Britain had made in the Brussels Treaty Organisation - essentially the extension of the BTO agreement to Germany and Italy.⁹⁷ Additionally, France sought stronger guarantees against EDC secession from the US and the UK than the tripartite declaration of the previous month, proposing an exchange letters of commitment to the EDC from Britain and the UK.⁹⁸ French frailty actually worked to benefit EDC progress in this case: Eden recommended to the Cabinet that the UK enter into a formal arrangement with the EDC claiming that French weakness made EDC unlikely without it. A similar commitment from the US, he declared, was also likely.⁹⁹ On 4 April 1952 Eden announced British willingness to establish a separate Anglo-EDC treaty, on the condition that this would be limited to the twenty year duration of NATO. He insisted that this was as far as the British would go.

Alphand, worried at his government's increasing demands for guarantees, turned again to his US contacts for help in bringing the Paris Conference to a conclusion.¹⁰⁰ On the advice of the Paris Embassy, Washington set a deadline of 9 May for the signing of the EDC and German contractual treaties in order to push both negotiations to finish. Alphand urged the Paris Conference committees to submit all treaty articles by 3 May and, on the day of the US deadline, the EDC treaty was finally initialled. Provisions for the establishment of an Interim Committee to interpret the treaty into workable details and oversee its implementation were included in the treaty. Notwithstanding the existing mass of detail, it was clear that much elaboration remained to be done.

A simultaneous round of gruelling talks between the High Commissioners and McCloy to finalise the Contractual Agreements took place in Bonn. But the French delegation here reacted sourly to US pressure, alleging that concern for speed

⁹⁶Massigli had sought to open French-US talks on the subject but the Quai advised waiting until the Six had agreed on a definite proposal to present to London, London tel. 1164, 11 March & MAE tel. 4753, 13 March 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/68.

⁹⁷Given Germany's own claims for security guarantees and its delicate relationship with NATO, it strongly supported the arrangement, *FRUS* 1952-54 5: 627-31, 22 March.

⁹⁸Alphand paper on UK association for Schuman-Eden meeting, 27 March 1952, MAE, SG 12.

⁹⁹Memo on EDC, 28 March 1952, PRO, CAB 129/50, C(52)92. The Dutch were particularly adamant that EDC would collapse without the treaty, van der Harst, *The Netherlands*, 25-6.

¹⁰⁰US officials commented on Alphand's sense of discouragement, Gehrels to Tomlinson, 17 March 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: B, Box 1.

was encouraging US officials to make ever more concessions to German demands.¹⁰¹ In the wake of Schuman's weakened position, his foreign ministry staff showed increasing willingness to take independent initiatives: the problem for the officials was that they had no means of slowing proceedings down apart from the continued pursuit of additional guarantees to ensure a system of complete German dependency on the EDC framework. The Quai insisted, therefore, that the Allies abandon the security guarantees previously given to the Federal Republic and vociferously opposed Dutch attempts to reduce the fifty year duration of EDC to the twenty year length in NATO.¹⁰² Yet, as much as the EDC system was pushed, French officials negotiating with Germany criticised the framework as too weak. '*En vertu du principe de non-discrimination...et en l'absence de la garantie d'une fédération politique, il est évident que le Traité favorise la reconstitution d'une armée allemande libre de tout contrôle...*'¹⁰³ The linkage between the two treaties that the French foreign ministry had continually insisted upon now appeared to Quai eyes only to weaken both.

In an effort to offset further French demands, Alphand sought guarantees from SHAPE that the German EDC contribution would be sufficiently regulated. Officials at NATO's European headquarters promised Alphand privately that no EDC *groupements* of single nationality would form a corps in NATO forces and specified the scattered territorial placement of German *groupements* in Europe.¹⁰⁴ For all his efforts, however, Alphand could not prevent his government's final hour demand for a stronger US-UK guarantee against EDC secession. The tripartite declaration affirming British, French and US interest in the integrity of EDC had already been drafted and the text, which also announced the retention of British and US forces in Europe 'as they deem necessary and appropriate', was approved by Schuman on 19 May.¹⁰⁵ On the eve of the signing of the Contractual Agreements in Bonn Schuman, 'obviously tired, nervous and depressed', announced that the French Cabinet would not authorise

¹⁰¹ Paris tel. 6409, 18 April 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 5; Schuman to Washington, 21 April 1952, AN, 4 AU 91.

¹⁰² Pactes desk to London, 1 May 1952, AN, 4 AU 92. The crisis was resolved only when an article was inserted into the treaty stipulating that if NATO terminated, the EDC would be reexamined.

¹⁰³ Europe desk note on the EDC treaty, 15 May 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/69.

¹⁰⁴ Letter from SHAPE to Alphand, 21 April 1952, MAE, SG 12.

¹⁰⁵ FRUS 1952-54 5: 677-9, 26 May.

him to sign the treaties until a stronger US-UK guarantee was given.¹⁰⁶ Paris demanded, once again, a permanent commitment of troops on the continent and the provision of additional military forces to EDC in the case of secession by any member.

However sudden this final crisis appeared, the fact remained that references to the French desire for greater US assurances had been circulating well before the final meeting of the Foreign Ministers: Washington had hoped that its frequent warnings of the risk involved in asking Congress to give further assurances to EDC would prevent the French from going ahead with their demand.¹⁰⁷ But the French administration was prepared to gamble that the US legislature would not cut back on its financial and military assistance and would make a step in support of the EDC, partly because the Congress had, for all its supposed reticence, supported the Truman administration's efforts in Europe to date, partly because Paris realised how desperate the US government was, in an election year, to bring a settlement back from Europe. Moreover, the French government could defend its action on the basis of its own parliamentary pressures.¹⁰⁸ French assumptions were proved correct. Although the US and the UK still refused to commit troops permanently, Acheson and Eden agreed to include a statement in the tripartite declaration committing them to regard any threat 'from whatever quarter' to the integrity of the defence community as a threat to their own security.¹⁰⁹ After an all-night debate in Paris the French Cabinet finally accepted the declaration and on 26 May 1952 the Contractual Agreements with the Federal Republic were signed in Bonn.

The last-minute demand for additional guarantees may have occurred within the Cabinet but the campaign was led by the Quai. It was the Secretary of State Maurice Schumann who drew the attention of the ministers to the tripartite declaration and on his personal suggestion that alterations to the text were proposed. Dissatisfaction at the emerging framework for Germany had made the Quai

¹⁰⁶ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969), 644; Paris tel. 3194 to Bonn, 24 May 1952, MAE, SG 12.

¹⁰⁷ *FRUS* 1952-54 5: 634, 31 March.

¹⁰⁸ US officials had had several indications of Quai opinions of EDC's parliamentary chances, Achilles memo to Ambassador Dunn, 30 April 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 20.

¹⁰⁹ Acheson pointed out that this change had 'no particular significance' but was designed to placate the French Cabinet, *FRUS* 1952-54 5: 686-88.

increasingly ambivalent toward the success of the European defence community that was an integral part of this structure. By the time Acheson, Eden, Schuman and Adenauer arrived in Paris to sign the EDC treaty on 27 May 1952, the Quai's unease was well on its way to overt hostility. Secretary General Parodi declared his bitterness the same day: his colleague, La Tournelle, had already assured the US Embassy that there was no chance of France ratifying the treaty.¹¹⁰

The final fraught deliberations of the Cabinet and the range of fears identified by ministers revealed the extent of French hesitations at the proposed arrangements for European defence.¹¹¹ But they also illustrated how removed the government was from the details of either the Paris or the Bonn treaties. Preoccupied essentially with France's economic weakness 'the Cabinet seemed to have discovered the treaty only when they had to authorise its signature' and its emphasis therefore remained wholly concerned with the place that France, rather than Germany, would occupy in the new system.¹¹² The morning after the ceremony President Auriol, along with Prime Minister Pinay, Schuman, Queuille and Plevin, took pains to drive home to Acheson the intensity of French feeling. Ratification, as the Cabinet outlined it, would be subordinated to the conclusion of negotiations with the US on off-shore purchases, financial aid to Indochina and support for French policy in North Africa.¹¹³ Almost two years after the question of German rearmament had first been raised, the only thing that had appeared to change was the length of French demands in return for EDC.

¹¹⁰Hervé Alphand, *L'Étonnement d'être* (Paris, 1977), 229; Achilles to Dunn, 30 April 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 20.

¹¹¹The only comprehensive record of the French Cabinet's final meetings is in Auriol, *Journal*, 1952, 342-61. Ministers raised questions for France's commitments in Indochina and its position in North Africa, comparative levels of arms production between France and Germany, the issue of German reunification, negotiations with the USSR, financial assistance and off-shore purchases, as well as the question of Anglo-American guarantees to EDC against secession.

¹¹²Jaques Fauvet suggests this was because the texts of the EDC treaty had been kept secret too long but confidentiality has never been a feature of the Paris Conference's work, 'Birth and Death of a Treaty', Lerner and Aron (eds.) *France Defeats EDC*, 128-64.

¹¹³Acheson, *Creation*, 646-48; Auriol, *Journal*, 1952, 353, 365-67.

Chapter Six

Progress of a different sort:

May 1952 - January 1953

The story of the European Defence Community from October 1950 to May 1952 tells the tale of a plan; from the germ of an idea, translated into a proposal and shaped into a project. Its last forty-eight hours were fitting climax to eighteen months of tortured negotiations. The signing of the treaty on 27 May 1952 heralded the start of a new episode in the European Defence Community drama, the translation of the project into an objective reality. In Paris this second stage of treaty ratification marked the beginning of a more comprehensive examination of the EDC project by French foreign policy experts. Only then did the consequences of French participation in a European defence force begin to be fully explored. The basis for all measurement remained the degree to which EDC facilitated French recovery and leadership within the Western alliance and the bargains struck with the United States remained, therefore central. Preliminary indications of this assessment, as the final EDC negotiations illustrated, did not look positive.

Yet concurrent with the start of institutional appraisal of the EDC, another new European project was introduced in Paris. Monnet, his attention fixed on the opening of the European coal and steel community institutions, launched a campaign for the immediate development of EDC's political structures to supplement and reinforce the nascent European framework. The decision to pursue greater political integration through the European Army, at the moment when the EDC began to receive formal government, parliamentary and administrative attention, was momentous. Paris was confronted not only with the detailed agreements of the EDC treaty itself but with a striking example of how it could be developed. The most immediate consequence of this was the start of a battle for control of French EDC policy between the leadership of the Foreign Ministry and the Monnet-Alphand nexus. The principal casualty in this conflict was the fragile French EDC policy which began to look increasingly duplicitous.

The EDC Treaty

One immediate consequence of the twelfth hour drama in Paris was that it drew attention away from the substance of the treaty itself. Yet even a cursory examination could not fail to identify the most arresting feature of EDC, namely its enormous and complex framework. No antecedent existed in international defence agreements for the sheer scope of the arrangements: a treaty with a preamble, six chapters and 132 articles; ten protocols designed to interpret and detail various treaty articles dealing with military, jurisdictional, financial and administrative provisions as well as the guarantees between EDC and NATO; a common declaration by EDC states on the duration of the treaty; a treaty of guarantee between Britain and the EDC; a tripartite declaration on the treaties with Germany; an exchange of letters between Germany and its EDC partners agreeing to prohibit certain arms production in strategically exposed areas; and a related set of letters between Germany and its former occupiers concerning control of atomic energy and the manufacture of civilian aircraft.¹

The opening preamble of the treaty declared its collective security foundations in the principle of automatic response to an aggressive attack on any member. The originality of the treaty as a collective defence alliance lay in its stress on the principle of integration of resources within a supranational organisation. This concept, the treaty stated, was a new and essential step to ensure Western defence, assist the creation of a United Europe and provide the basis for lasting peace. To this end the maintenance of national armed forces other than those required for overseas defence, the fulfilment of international missions, protection of Heads of State and national police was prohibited. Any European country was entitled to become a member, subject to unanimous approval from the EDC Council of Ministers. The framework of a common European defence - the constitution and the organisation of the proposed force, the institutions that would administer it, as well as the political, financial and legal regulations to be applied - was set out in subsequent articles. The treaty was to last for fifty years but member states had the right to re-examine this if NATO either

¹For English text see Royal International Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1952* (London, 1955), 116-69; The most comprehensive examination of the treaty is in Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community* (London, 1980), 150-88.

ceased to exist or had its membership significantly changed before the European federation or confederation came into being.

The protocols spelt out various articles of the treaty. The military protocols, for example, detailed the size of the basic infantry, armoured and mechanised units as well as the structure of command, logistical and training provisions and the language to be used in each.² But the protocols did not represent simply the nuts and bolts of the treaty: their significance stemmed from the fact that they could be modified without the national constitutional procedures necessary for any revision of the treaty itself. Unsurprisingly then, the issues which had proved the most contentious at Paris appeared in the associated texts, from the financial and administrative details of the common budget to the EDC-NATO relationship and, most significantly, the discrimination which Germany, as an equal member of the community, was prepared to accept.³

Yet for all its massive size the treaty texts were remarkably uneven in detail. Some articles fixed questions such as traffic regulations applicable to EDC forces in host countries while others left enormous subjects, such as the financial accounting and regulation of all common budget operations, to be determined between the proposed EDC body and the relevant national authorities.⁴ Additional questions for which no common decision even in principle had been reached still remained, one of which was the duration of conscription applicable to members. The need for continued detailing of the proposed EDC institutions, as well as the national preparatory measures to be taken by member states before common bodies were in place was thus acknowledged in the protocol establishing the EDC Interim Committee. This body was to be made up of the same delegates who had negotiated the Paris Conference - essentially an extension of the latter.

²The infantry *groupement* was to have a peace-time size of 13,000 rising to 15,600 in war, while armoured and mechanised units would stand at 12,700, rising to 14,600 and 14,700 respectively.

³Art. 107 prohibited the production, import and export of war materials from or to third countries. This ban could only be removed if the EDC Board of Commissioners granted a permit to a member State - guidelines were laid down for the Board's decision-making procedures. Annex II listed specific items for which manufacturing permits could not be granted in strategically exposed areas (except by unanimous decision) - atomic, chemical and biological weapons together with the associated equipment and raw materials, long-range and guided missiles, submarines, large warships and naval mines, all military aircraft and components. This was the prohibition Germany had accepted.

⁴Protocol relating to the Status of the European Defence Forces and the Commercial and Fiscal Administration of the EDC, Part I, Articles 6-7; Financial Protocol, Part VIII - Accounting.

Not surprisingly, few of the government ministers who signed the agreements on 27 May had a firm grasp of the contents the EDC treaty. Even the normally confident Acheson confessed to being lost. The EDC 'cult', as he described the small group in Paris around Alphant, Tomlinson and Bruce, were the only people who understood the project.⁵ Without doubt, the daunting nature of the EDC treaty discouraged European press and parliaments from embarking on detailed analyses of its provisions. At the same time, it enabled supporters and enemies alike to draw attention to particular points in the texts, often at the expense of accurate representation of the overall treaty. Nowhere was this more obvious than in France. Even after the treaty was signed the question of EDC was still presented in the press, if at all, as a debate on the merits of German rearmament.⁶ It took time for French political parties to identify particular treaty articles in support of positions they had already established on EDC, as de Gaulle himself illustrated in launching his campaign against ratification on 6 June 1952. His attack on the treaty was as unspecific as it was ferocious - the EDC would make France a sort of protectorate of a so-called European army under American command.⁷

There was some suspicion that the complexity of the treaty might be deliberate. Criticism that the 'technicians' of the Paris Conference, left alone to devise the European Army, had gone too far was not confined to French parliamentary debates. The Benelux delegations had complained that in the technical complexity of EDC, Monnet and his coterie were attempting to achieve their personal objectives of European unity and even Acheson and Eden agreed that the EDC negotiations had been restricted to too small a circle.⁸ Politicians were less keen to acknowledge that the sprawling detail was, above all, a consequence of their own fundamental lack of commitment and involvement in the negotiations to date. Yet political direction was an essential prerequisite for a coherent defence framework. The decision to leave the

⁵Acheson, 11-13 Dec. 1953, Box 89, Princeton seminars, Acheson Papers, Truman Library.

⁶Jean José Marchand's survey of the French press concludes that public opinion was not made aware of the military, economic or European integrative aspects of EDC. Parisian papers took a more definitive stand towards EDC than the provincial journals, nevertheless, the French press appeared as divided and scantily informed as their readers, 'A Tableau of the French Press', in Raymond Aron and Daniel Lerner (eds.) *France Defeats EDC* (New York, 1957), 102-23.

⁷Jean Charlot, *Le gaullisme d'opposition 1946-58* (Paris, 1983), 282.

⁸*Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-4* Vol. 5, (Washington, 1983), 588, 747.

Paris Conference staff to continue the detailing of the EDC treaty suggested that Europe's political leaders were still reluctant to take on this collective responsibility.

Opinions in the French government and parliament

Earliest indications from the French Cabinet testified to this. The French government's signing of the EDC treaty had been dominated by the search for greater US financial assistance, of which Acheson had been left in no doubt during his meetings with Cabinet members at the Quai on 28 May. Ministers present repeated the demand for further US aid to Indochina with such insistence that Acheson was reminded of a nursery song with a basis theme and new animals being added with each verse.⁹ The Secretary pointed out that, following the decisions taken at Lisbon, the US would be bearing one-third of the total operation costs in Indochina for the rest of 1952: in terms of equipment it was second in priority only to Korea. In response to the additional French demand of support for French policy in North Africa, Acheson insisted that while the US administration must back the French position, it could not produce a favourable attitude on the part of the US public or in the UN General Assembly unless the French produced a programme - it did not even have to be a very good one - which the US could get behind.¹⁰

As long as ministers made the outcome of French colonial policies - and increased US assistance therein - the basis for French European policy, ratification delay was inevitable. Schuman reminded his colleagues that the link between the Contractual Accords and the EDC treaties prevented any return of German sovereignty before the EDC was established. Furthermore, no one seriously expected the French to take any step until the Germans had first proved their own sincerity through prompt parliamentary approval: there was, therefore, no reason to rush EDC ratification.¹¹ The Cabinet was undaunted by Washington's efforts to encourage

⁹The presence of so many ministers was interpreted by commentators as evidence of the lack of Cabinet confidence in Schuman, Memo of Acheson conversation with US correspondants, 29 May 1952, NARA, RG 59, Lot 53 D 444, Box 14. Eden was disgusted at the French 'virtually trying to blackmail the Americans and to a lesser extent ourselves', Memo on tripartite conversations at the Quai, 28 May 1952, PRO, FO 800/758.

¹⁰Acheson said that he and Truman, having nothing to lose between now and January (when the new Administration would come in), could afford to and would defy public opinion if necessary.

¹¹29 May 1952, Vincent Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-54*, vi, 1952, (Paris, 1978), 368.

progress through example. Truman presented the Bonn and Paris agreements for ratification to the Senate on 2 June - accompanied by a declaration establishing the US commitment to EDC - and the treaties were approved overwhelmingly by the Senate on 1 July.¹² If anything, US ratification was in danger of being depicted as evidence that the US was foisting EDC upon France, prompting the new US Ambassador in Paris, James Dunn, to recommend that Washington avoid expressing too much interest in EDC.¹³

Try as US officials did, it was impossible to stem the flow of French demands, all of which were explicitly linked to EDC. French-US relations reached a nadir in the summer of 1952 when the question of US aid through off-shore procurement orders was introduced. Prime Minister Pinay claimed that his efforts to reduce and balance the French budget while retaining France's rearmament programme would fail unless the US committed itself to \$1,000 million in off-shore purchases. When the US refused to make commitments for the forthcoming year, Defence Minister Pleven charged that it was impossible for France to set its own defence budgets without knowledge of US aid amounts.¹⁴ Washington considered the pressure for unfettered aid intolerable. Capitulation would give the impression of the US buying French ratification of EDC and the Paris Embassy was instructed to make this point absolutely clear to the Quai.¹⁵ Tensions were revived later in October, however, when the US handed its formal reply to the government. Pinay, after consultation with his Cabinet, announced that the note contained 'inadmissible expressions' and although the offending papers were removed by the US, the exchange did nothing to help perceptions of US-French relations. Many observers regarded Pinay's action as an attempt to stoke anti-American sentiment to bolster his own domestic position and use the US as a convenient scapegoat for France's financial weakness: as the British Ambassador in Paris commented 'it has become an obsession with the French people to blame [the

¹²Department of State *Bulletin*, 23, 16 June 1952, 947-9.

¹³*FRUS* 1952-4 5: 689, 20 June.

¹⁴US orders would also inflate the French arms production industry, ensuring dominance in a common European effort. France was critical of Washington's refusal to enter into longer-term commitments and blamed this reluctance on the US Treasury. US diplomats in Paris and the State Department in general were thought to be supportive of French requests for additional off-shore procurement aid, Unsigned memo, 'The Political Situation', (secret service) 29 July 1952, AN 4 AU 86.

¹⁵Washington tel. 1305, 6 Sept. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

Americans] for everything which goes wrong'.¹⁶ France's subsequent announcement, in early November, that it would not be able to increase its military contribution from 12 to 15 divisions as the Lisbon force goals had established came, therefore, as no great surprise.

The French government's efforts to delay EDC ratification were assisted by indications that German ratification would be a similarly lengthy and difficult process. The SPD opposition had already appealed to the Constitutional Court to rule whether a German contribution to Western defence was compatible with the constitution and hearings on this began in June. Adenauer's hopes of quick ratification were further thwarted when the *Bundesrat* rejected the government's claim that the approval of the upper house was required only for certain sections of the treaties, unanimously resolving that the entire texts needed its approval and complaining it had not been kept adequately informed of the Paris and Bonn negotiations.¹⁷ This domestic turbulence, taken as evidence of revived German nationalism, played straight into the hands of those in France who argued that every possible guarantee had to be explored before entering into a permanent partnership with Germany. On 11 June, following a meeting of the Cabinet, Paris declared its support for new four power discussions on Germany, as the last Soviet note of 24 May had proposed. Schuman insisted to Acheson that European opinion wanted contact to be maintained with the USSR but as to the modalities of this relationship French policy appeared decidedly unclear.¹⁸ After a series of desultory exchanges on likely terms of all-German elections between the three Allies and Moscow the French initiative quietly collapsed, much to the relief of Washington, who considered the French so conscious of the German menace as to be almost completely unaware of the Soviet threat.¹⁹

Guarantee against Germany was indeed the dominant consideration behind the French parliament's reaction to the EDC signature, a position which the government was able to exploit in postponing EDC ratification steps. Schuman admitted to the

¹⁶Harvey despatch no. 582 on French-US relations, 5 Nov. 1952, PRO, FO 371/101740; Embassy fortnightly summary, no. 21, 9-23 Oct. 1952, PRO, FO 371/101729.

¹⁷Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1952* (London, 1955), 70, 119-20.

¹⁸Foreign Ministers' meeting, 27-28 June 1952, MAE, CM/Cabinet Schuman/21.

¹⁹Acheson to journalists, 29 May 1952, NARA, RG 59, Lot 53 D 444, Box 14; the French thought the US position was influenced by Adenauer's warnings of the consequences direct contact with the USSR would have on opinion in Germany, Bonn to Paris, 21 June 1952, AN, 4 AU 92.

Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee that France had not managed to secure from its British and US partners the permanent, binding commitment to EDC it had sought. He insisted, nevertheless, that it was no longer possible for Germany to ever return to its pre-war expansionist policies.²⁰ The Council of the Republic debated the EDC treaty on 12 June during which the Gaullist, Michel Debré, the most vocal opponent of the project, claimed EDC would make Germany more powerful than France. Although the conservative upper house finally approved the treaty, the vote was accompanied by a recommendation that the government begin new negotiations with Britain and the US to obtain a treaty of mutual assistance and guarantee.²¹

In general, however, parliament was slow to tackle EDC.²² No debate on the treaty took place in the Assembly before the summer recess and, as the autumn round of party congresses began, politicians took their cues from positions already signposted by the government during the summer. Thus President Auriol, in a speech on 25 October, warned against policies that treated France without due recognition of its recent sufferings *'comme si le vaincu devait bénéficier de toutes les attentions vigilantes sous prétexte qu'il reconquiert la force, comme si l'agresseur méritait plus d'encouragement que la victime!'*²³ The President of the National Assembly, Edouard Herriot, joined forces with his arch-rival Edouard Daladier at the Radical-Socialist party conference to condemn the lack of reciprocal advantages for France and Germany in EDC, a denunciation that received widespread attention.²⁴ Faure's speech there stressed Indochina and a European political authority as conditions; Mayer emphasised resolution of the Saar question. Support from Pleven's small UDSR party was accompanied by calls for further British participation and the establishment of a

²⁰Raymond Poidevin, 'La France devant le problème de la CED: incidences nationales et internationales', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 129, 1983, 46.

²¹Debré's attack marked the start of an obsessive campaign against EDC. He travelled tirelessly throughout the country speaking against the treaty for the entire period. Michel Debré, *Trois républiques pour une France: Mémoires*, ii, *Agir, 1946-58* (Paris, 1988), 163-66.

²²Debré records the isolation he felt throughout the first months of his anti-EDC campaign, *Trois républiques*, ii, 203.

²³Auriol, *Journal*, 1952, 659-64.

²⁴Herriot's outburst was provoked by allegations from a junior Quai official, Jaques Bouchacourt, who had participated in the Paris Conference negotiations, that a secret military treaty had been agreed between the EDC states. In reality, this was the unpublished section of the military protocol which set the numbers of troops each state would contribute. The affair was widely commented on and Bouchacourt disciplined, for a more detailed account see Georgette Elgey, *La République des Contradictions, 1951-54* (London, 1965), 290-300.

supranational authority, echoing the well-established Socialist agenda defined by Mollet as well as the Independent conservative, Paul Reynaud.

The fear of German militarism behind the calls for guarantees was nothing new; the emphasis on the terms of the bargain which France had struck with its Western partners, however, was.²⁵ Disputes over US assistance, when accompanied by the resumption of difficult negotiations on the status of the Saar with Germany, led many to wonder if France had not negotiated itself into a conundrum - German domination in EDC or US-German alliance domination out of it. As the party congresses illustrated, however, there was neither intra nor inter-party unanimity as to how this should be resolved and no conclusion as to the implications this might have for the EDC itself. The only concerted parliamentary opposition to EDC ratification, based on complete opposition to German rearmament, came from the Communist Party which made little effort to coordinate its actions with other parliamentary groups. The Gaullists, the only other party united in opposition to EDC, were too preoccupied with their own internal splits over the issue of parliamentary support for Pinay's government to launch a cohesive anti-ratification campaign.²⁶ Yet the government made no effort to take advantage of the situation. On 22 November, only after pressure from the solidly pro-EDC MRP, Pinay announced that the EDC treaty would be submitted to the Assembly for ratification after a text of the government's '*exposé des motifs*' was drawn up and studied by the relevant parliamentary committees. No indications were given as to when this would take place.²⁷ The retardation of EDC ratification was thus assured, giving EDC's political opponents ample time to prepare a campaign against the current treaty.

The project for a European political authority

²⁵US officials remarked that general recognition of the inevitability of German rearmament was being accompanied by increased opposition to EDC, Paris tel. 3408, 11 Dec. 1952, NARA RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 20; UK officials thought only a small minority of politicians party opposed rearmament in any form, Despatch, no. 631, 28 Nov. 1952, PRO, FO 371/101738.

²⁶Dispute began when some RPF deputies voted Pinay's investiture. In July de Gaulle imposed new disciplinary rules, at which point a quarter of RPF deputies resigned to form a new group, ARS, Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London, 1964), 135-36.

²⁷Auriol, *Journal*, 1952, 645-53; memo of Pinay-Pleven-Dunn meeting, 20 Oct. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

Alphand was under few illusions as to the difficulties he faced, both as chair of the Interim Committee and the EDC's principal defendant to the French government. He alleged (as did Monnet) that an anti-EDC press campaign under the aegis of 'nearly everyone of consequence, except Schuman and Schumann' had already begun in the Quai and insisted that, as a condition to accepting the task of chair, the Quai be made to adopt French EDC policy without reservation.²⁸ He also demanded that General de Larminat, the French military delegate on the Interim Committee be put completely under his authority, something the French Chiefs of Staff refused to countenance.²⁹ Without active government support, Alphand's domestic obstacles showed little signs of disappearing. Although the Interim Committee began work immediately, establishing military, juridical, financial, statute, armament and press committees to direct the multitude of sub-groups that would be necessary to give shape and detail to the defence community framework, Alphand had to press the Cabinet repeatedly to give some instructions to the French delegation.³⁰

The fears expressed publicly by politicians such as Herriot, when coupled with potential administrative opposition in Paris, made Alphand concerned with the need for the government to address French opinion vigorously on the EDC project. He himself drafted Schuman's presentations to the Assembly's Foreign Affairs committee in October, stressing EDC as the best (and only) option for controlling Germany. Alphand was not afraid of highlighting the gravity of the step which signature of the EDC treaty represented and warned the government beforehand that opposition would be inevitable. One of the best ways to counteract this, he believed, was to proceed swiftly with the creation of a supranational political authority, as the February debates in the Assembly had recommended. *'Il faut...que la formation d'une force européenne ne constitue un objectif en soi, mais qu'elle se place dans le cadre d'une entreprise plus large de création de l'Europe sur le plan économique et politique'*. This was the purpose of Article 38 of the treaty, *'qui prévoit que l'Assemblée sera chargée de mettre au point un plan de Fédération ou de*

²⁸Memo of Tomlinson-Hirsch conversation, 27 May 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 23.

²⁹Tomlinson letter to Bowie, 6 June 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 23; Pierre Guillen, 'Les chefs militaires français, le réarmement d'Allemagne et la CED, 1950-54', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 129 1983, 18-9.

³⁰Paris tel. 2237, 11 Oct. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

Confédération européenne auquel des institutions de la Communauté de Défense devront être adaptées'.³¹

The most active pressure for progress in the political domain came, however, from Monnet. His team drafted a declaration of government approval for an immediate beginning to be made on EDC's political structures, emphasising the democratic nature of the future ECSC/EDC Assembly and making explicit reference to the goal of European federation. Although the Cabinet approved the text on 25 June, it omitted Monnet's preamble that the government considered it essential to put these political authorities in place.³² When no further action followed Monnet pushed harder, sending a copy of the text to Adenauer, François-Poncet and McCloy (unofficially), before reporting to Schuman that both the Chancellor and Hallstein had confirmed Germany's desire to pursue this. He had also spoken to de Gasperi about Italian support. The time had come, Monnet argued, for the government to move beyond the stage of intergovernmental negotiations to secure direct elections to a common parliament from 1953.³³

Monnet's motivation for a supranational authority lay less with winning support for EDC ratification, however, than with the newly created ECSC and its principal institutions, the Assembly and the High Authority. With preparations for ECSC's formal inauguration underway, the incoming President of the High Authority was determined to cement the institutional authority of the new organisation. The recent British proposal for an institutional merger between the Council of Europe and the future Community of Six, known as the Eden Plan, appeared as a direct challenge to this authority. It was in response to this initiative that Monnet began to develop plans for a 'completion of the union' already begun by the Six. To convince Schuman, he stressed how strongly the US supported the endeavour, linking it to the continued US aid on which the government placed such priority. The Six, Monnet claimed, should continue to develop a political authority project, inviting the British and US to

³¹Alphand preface to the EDC treaty submitted to the government, 10 May 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Allemagne/1067.

³²Monnet draft declaration & Cabinet final text, FJM, AMJ 2/2/1-3.

³³Letter to Schuman, 9 July 1952, FJM, AMJ 2/3/18. Contemporaries of Monnet noted his optimism that political federation could be achieved: Cyrus Sulzberger recorded a bet between Monnet and Montgomery that it would take place within three years, *A Long Row of Candles* (London, 1969), 593.

attend as observers: enthusiastic US support would ensure Britain dropped its current alternative position.³⁴

Monnet maintained pressure on the hesitant Schuman throughout the summer, drafting his communications with the British and drawing upon German and US support for his initiative to win over the Foreign Minister.³⁵ These multiple advocacy tactics, when combined with the relative inattention of the government, paid off and enabled Monnet to direct Schuman's approach. Once isolated Britain quickly dropped the Eden Plan and, when the ECSC Assembly met in Strasbourg in September, one of its first tasks, at Monnet's instigation, was to create an *ad hoc* Constitutional Committee charged with drawing up a constitution for the future federal structure of the European Political Authority. The Belgian president of the Assembly, Paul-Henri Spaak, an enthusiastic pro-European who had been close to Monnet since the war, was elected to lead the work of this Committee, which was to be submitted to the six governments in March 1953.

Monnet certainly defended the political project as a way of encouraging the rapid ratification of the EDC treaty, claiming that a suitable political framework would substantially improve both the ECSC and the EDC treaties: 'The idea of setting up popular control over the "Technocrats" in Luxembourg and the "Generals" in Paris will have great appeal to the public and to parliament'.³⁶ Yet for all his assurances about the strength of pro-European feeling amongst the European publics and his recommendation that widespread government publicity campaigns for EDC be launched, Monnet remained remarkably unconcerned with winning public opinion. It was the sense of possibility that existed in the first heady days of the High Authority, rather than specific EDC ratification strategies, that dictated Monnet's actions.³⁷ The degree to which the creation of a defence community implied the rapid establishment of a European political community was the principal reason for Monnet's renewed

³⁴Letter to Schuman, 9 July 1952, FJM, AMJ 2/3/18.

³⁵Meetings with Adenauer and Hallstein were organised prior to the meeting of the Six on 23 July, Tomlinson advised the British of US support for a political authority, Paris tel. 305, 12 July 1952, NARA RG 84, Paris Embassy: B, 1950-52, Box 8.

³⁶Luxembourg tel. 2021, 2 Oct. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: B, Box 8.

³⁷Thus although he ignores Monnet's summer 1952 campaign for democratic control of the European institutions and Schuman's marked hesitation toward the political project, Alan Milward correctly emphasises that Monnet's preoccupation centred on the administrative machinery of European integration, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London, 1992), 326-37.

involvement with EDC both during and after the pre-signature battles in Paris.³⁸ In the summer of 1952, rapid European federation was a seductive goal for this self-defined pragmatist.

The Quai's campaign to renew the NATO link

The Quai's lack of enthusiasm for EDC remained undisguised. Suspicion that the treaty would accelerate the economic and political recovery already underway in Germany was the primary concern of the ministry and senior staff made little attempt to align themselves with French EDC policy. De Margerie commented wryly that EDC was regarded in France not so much as a French initiative but as the Foreign Minister's - the epitome of Schuman's "soft" policy toward Germany.³⁹ Diplomats warned their foreign counterparts of growing French unease at the dynamic pace of German growth and used public opinion as the basis for continued efforts to secure further guarantees from the US. Bitterly dissatisfied with the final tripartite declaration to EDC, Parodi and his staff maintained pressure on Washington with continued requests for details as to how the US intended to demonstrate its commitment to EDC.⁴⁰

At the same time, these men were acutely aware that the successful containment of Germany in a French-led Europe depended on US cooperation. Germany's opposition to French proposals for europeanisation of the Saar in August was a case in point: officials acknowledged that Bonn would give way only if the French suggestion was presented as part of a united Anglo-American-French front.⁴¹ But US support, as Bonnet and François-Poncet never failed to remind Paris, rested

³⁸FJM, Interview with Hervé Alphand, 17 June 1981. Monnet's memoirs make no reference to his involvement in the final drama. Alphand records, however, that it was Monnet, above all, who played a part in the final solution of the Cabinet crisis, *L'étonnement d'être*, (Paris, 1977), 230. Tomlinson noted to Bowie that Monnet's activities had once again turned to ECSC, 'from where, in my opinion, they should never have departed', 6 June 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 23.

³⁹Paris tel. 1538, 11 Sept. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

⁴⁰Parodi to Washington, 8 June 1952, MAE, SG 12; Paris tel. 1216, 26 Aug. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

⁴¹The French proposal in August took up Adenauer's call for a 'european' solution to the question of control of the Saar. France agreed to renounce all special prerogatives in the political domain in return for the maintenance of economic privileges in the region; Sarre desk memo, 18 Aug. 1952, AN, 4 AU 92; Paris to Bonn, tel. 4942, 12 Nov. 1952, AN, 4 AU 93.

solidly on continued rapid European integration and the EDC, therefore, could not be too stridently attacked, nor allowed to become a source of US-French contention. Long-term consideration of the political balance in Europe could not be sacrificed for short-term political expediency. The more strained relations between the Pinay government and Washington grew, therefore, the more restraint Quai officials displayed in their contacts with US representatives. Additional demands for guarantees and aids were, according to De Margerie, the consequence of politicians, 'never satisfied with anything more than three months old': the Quai knew that the tripartite declaration 'was all it could get'.⁴² His superior, La Tournelle, assured the US Embassy in November that the ministry expected ratification to be completed by the end of February 1953.

Another fear militating against EDC repudiation was the growing prospect of successful German ratification, following the death of Socialist opposition leader Schumacher in August. If France were to hesitate on EDC Germany would be quick to capitalise on the opportunity to present itself as the 'good European' to the US: Adenauer had reportedly launched such a campaign already, urging the US High Commissioner to threaten France with a German national force. Prolonged ratification would leave France as the 'resigned spectator' before an emerging US-German alliance and rejection of the EDC treaty would add a military dimension to the partnership.⁴³ Recognition that a national army was the only alternative answer to German rearmament led the French High Commission in Bonn to conclude that France had to go ahead with the EDC project.⁴⁴ In the stark absence of any alternative arrangement that would secure French predominance in Europe the Quai was obliged to uphold the EDC treaty. Such a resigned approach to EDC did little to challenge the government's desire to set the question of ratification aside, nor did it encourage closer working relations between Quai staff and Alphand or the Monnet team.

⁴²This point is not made in the French minutes of the Achilles-De Margerie meeting, memo to the minister, 11 Sept. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Allemagne/1139.

⁴³Bonn tel. 8890, 21 Oct. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Allemagne/1139; Europe desk note on West Germany, 5-6 Sept. 1952, AN, 4 AU 86; Bonn tel 9276, 15 Nov. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/69.

⁴⁴François-Poncet warned that the hostility of French politicians like Herriot played into the hands of those in Germany, especially among the military, who did not like the European Army idea, tel. 9039, 31 Oct. 1952 & Despatch no. 2832, 10 Oct. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/69.

It took the launch of Monnet's political authority project in Strasbourg to catapult the ministry into direct confrontation with French EDC policy. The prospect of a supranational organisation directing the activities of the European Army through a common foreign policy horrified Quai officials. Amongst themselves they finally admitted '*que sur un certain nombre des sujets essentiels nous sommes coincés entre des positions incompatibles*'.⁴⁵ There was more at stake here than German dominance of a European authority and even German entry into NATO: a European political body threatened France's very existence as an independent Western power.⁴⁶ Massigli, in particular, was incensed and directed his fire explicitly at Monnet. He warned Schuman that Monnet's efforts to reject the Eden Plan went directly against the cooperative British position France had sought to encourage and that the studies of the Strasbourg *ad hoc* Committee would be completely dominated by Monnet.⁴⁷ Indications of a comprehensive examination of the substance of the EDC now began to emerge from the Quai. One of the first signs of this was a renewed call for the coordination of global strategy and planning by the three powers. Alphanth, as NAC permanent representative, directed his conversations with US officials to the necessity for better institutional links to facilitate tripartite planning. The drive to improve NATO's framework extended to its financial arrangements, with modifications to the budgetary structure being proposed in September.⁴⁸ The appointment of Burin des Roziers (formerly Alphanth's deputy) as diplomatic Counselor in the French delegation to the NAC Permanent Group in Washington indicated the Quai's determination to place emphasis on political cooperation in NATO.⁴⁹ These efforts to retip the EDC balance towards NATO were backed by independent calls from the French military for NATO's Standing Group to give leadership in peace-time as well as war through the elaboration of a global strategy.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Chauvel to Massigli, 8 Nov. 1952, MAE, PA-AP 217/95.

⁴⁶ Tomlinson, the US representative to ECSC, acknowledged EPC's implications for France, memo to Dunn, 20 Sept. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 1.

⁴⁷ Letter to Schuman, 3 Sept. 1952, MAE, PA-AP 217/103. Massigli quotes an unnamed French politician: '*pendant deux ans, le véritable ministre des Affaires Etrangères a été Jean Monnet*', *Une Comédie des Erreurs, 1943-56, Souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne* (Paris, 1978), 331.

⁴⁸ NAC delegation memo, 16 Sept. 1952, AN, 4 AU 86; Tomlinson memo, 10 Nov. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 42.

⁴⁹ Polto 546, 29 Oct. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 19.

⁵⁰ Memo by General Vernoux from the combined forces, 18 July 1952, SHAT, 1 K233/33.

The Foreign Ministry was also quick to identify the threat a federal European Constitution would pose for French autonomy over its overseas territories. Similar alarm bells had begun to ring at the Ministry for Overseas Territories and officials at the Quai's Africa-Levant desk, stressing the global nature of France's interests, aspirations and destiny, supported calls for interministerial examination of the consequences of a European political authority for France. The Quai insisted that political cooperation could not be contemplated unless provisions were made to accommodate France's non-continental interests and, by the end of October, meetings had already taken place between Schuman and Overseas Minister Jacquinot to affirm this position.⁵¹ The French military leadership echoed this concern. The Chiefs of Staff drew attention to EDC treaty articles, such as Article 107, which, in forbidding national manufacture and exportation of armaments without the permission of EDC Commissioners, promised to restrict France's own arms industry as much as it did Germany's. The consequences for arms exports to French overseas territories were grave and the Chiefs of Staff wanted separate assurances to France that off-shore commands would not come under the treaty's jurisdiction.⁵²

French military leaders were not adverse to the principle of supranational control of EDC and indeed regarded it as the best way of ensuring Germany's permanent containment. Theirs was a specific concept however: a political authority meant centralised administration of the European Army under French leadership. Permanent leadership was feasible only if and when France had resolved the Indochinese and North African conflicts that were proving militarily and economically exhausting. Full autonomy over its troops was vital in this pursuit: the French military had already begun discussions on revisions to EDC treaty articles regulating the maintenance of separate national forces and the right of withdrawal of national contingents from the EDC.⁵³ In the meanwhile, EDC implementation and the development of its political structure would have to wait.⁵⁴

⁵¹Memos, 14 & 24 Oct. 1952, AN, 4 AU 79; Schuman to Jacquinot, 11 Oct. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/78. The *ad hoc* Committee in Strasbourg had not yet begun to address the question.

⁵²Chiefs of Staff memo for the Defence Minister, 7 Aug. 1952, SHAT, 1K233/25.

⁵³Paradis to Tomlinsion, 19 Aug. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 42.

⁵⁴Guillen, 'Les chefs militaires français', 19.

Quai officials did not share the military's vision of a possible future European political framework and their determination to halt the supranational project encouraged them to turn again to the question of British association in EDC. As Massigli repeatedly pointed out, the current EDC treaty absolutely excluded British participation. If modifications along confederal lines could be made, he claimed, the UK could well change its position and he urged that the moment had now come for France to take the initiative and approach Britain with new proposals for its relationship to EDC.⁵⁵ Massigli had made this argument before: what drew Paris to it now was that it provided a potential way of revising the supranational aspects of the treaty that Monnet had so quickly exploited in Strasbourg. Some in the department were keen to develop this tactic even further. François Seydoux, at the Europe desk, suggested French European policy be shifted along the lines envisaged earlier in Britain's Eden plan. He suggested an expanded community - a sort of Commonwealth of Europe - encouraging understanding and equilibrium between member states. Only in passing did he note how this would mean an end to plans of complete integration and the EDC itself.⁵⁶

The Truman administration's last efforts

The Quai realised that no matter how sympathetic Pinay's Cabinet would be to proposals to negotiate a better deal for France in EDC, no new initiatives would be permitted until the results of the US presidential election on 4 November emerged. The ministry, therefore, continued to explore options for EDC revision to present as soon as the dust settled in Washington.⁵⁷ There was no great speculation as to the likely US policy towards EDC following Eisenhower's victory at the polls: the French expected few surprises from a president who had been such a vocal supporter of the project and indeed EDC featured remarkably little throughout the election campaign. The Embassy in Washington expected current ratification efforts to provide the basis for a new endeavour by the Republican administration. John Foster Dulles's

⁵⁵London tels. 4434 & 4797, 24 Oct. & 22 Nov. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/69.

⁵⁶Memo from the Director General, 21 Oct. 1952, MAE, PA-AP 217/70.

⁵⁷Chauvel advised Massigli to cultivate his relationship with Pinay, 8 Nov. 1952, MAE, PA-AP 217/95.

appointment as Secretary of State on 20 November was entirely expected and his enthusiastically pro-European federation views well-known.⁵⁸

Cooperation between the incoming and outgoing US administrations was good and, in transitional talks, both sides agreed that EDC remained central for the NATO defence programme. French ratification was seen as the key to success and the uncertainty of a positive outcome was openly admitted.⁵⁹ US officials were sympathetic to French fears of German resurgence, having themselves noted recent signs of growing German strength. It was precisely because of this that Washington wanted to bring Germany into NATO, and under allied control, as quickly as possible. EDC ratification was the necessary prerequisite before the question could even be broached within the Alliance. Ultimately, US officials believed that the lack of any EDC alternative would produce a favourable French result.⁶⁰ The outgoing administration therefore advocated a firm but restrained approach to the ratification issue, taking care to avoid allegations of US interference.⁶¹

Nevertheless, consideration of alternatives in the event of EDC's collapse had been taking place in the State Department.⁶² The Policy Planning Staff produced a number of drafts for a final 30-page study in December 1952 exploring various alternatives to EDC including German NATO membership, NATO association, rearmament outside NATO, a non-military contribution, and a US peripheral defence strategy. The paper concluded that the US might well have to offer the French further wide-ranging inducements to 'salvage a dangerous situation' and secure the EDC ratification officials believed to be the best overall option.⁶³ The Second Secretary in Paris, Martin Herz, acknowledging the discouraging lack of progress in France,

⁵⁸ Washington tel. 5055, 12 Nov. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/69. For a general overview of Dulles's involvement see Rolf Steininger, 'John Foster Dulles, the European Defence Community and the German Question' in Richard Immerman (ed.) *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton, 1990), 79-108; Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (London, 1974) explores the dominance of Europe in Dulles's belief system.

⁵⁹ State memo on US policy towards EDC (undated), UPA, *Truman's Office Files*, Pt. 2: *Correspondence File*, Reel 7.

⁶⁰ Minutes, US Ambassadors London meeting, 24 Sept. 1952, NARA, RG 59, Office of the Asst. Secretary of State for European Affairs, Lot 59 D 233, Box 31.

⁶¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1952-4 Vol. 1, (Washington, 1983), 11-2, 18 Nov.

⁶² Paris Embassy officials recommended study of the feasibility of bilateral US dealings with Germany as early as 9 Sept. 1952, tel. 1520, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: B, Box 8.

⁶³ *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 693-94, ed. note; Moore comments, 17 Oct. 1952, NARA, RG 59, Lot 55 D 105, Box 1.

suggested that even if the EDC treaty failed in the French parliament, no alternative moves towards German rearmament should be made. Instead the US 'should so exacerbate the ensuing French mood of truculence and negativism that something positive might yet come out of it, namely a renewed try to ratify EDC as a means to prevent US designs in Germany and in general to foil American "predominance" in Europe.'⁶⁴ Ironically, the more France's divisions and weaknesses were revealed in the EDC debate, the greater the necessity for a common European defence appeared. Moreover, the US had already vested a wide range of its European policy objectives in EDC - military, economic and political covering short and long term objectives - each of which would prove difficult to disentangle. The outgoing administration was reluctant to even attempt the process.

Thus even while Acheson confessed that he had no ideas as to what might be done to improve the EDC situation, the US Secretary of State showed little interest in Eden's claim in November that the Foreign Office had also begun to consider an alternative plan, 'half-way between EDC and German entry into NATO', as he described it.⁶⁵ Instead, Acheson suggested a concerted final effort, at the tenth NAC session in Paris on 15 December, to urge the European states to ratify EDC. London, which had every interest in diverting a part of Germany's growing economic activity away from competition and into rearmament, was quite willing to support the attempt.⁶⁶ Truman issued a strong press statement supporting the Bundestag's 6 December decision to proceed with a second reading of the treaties, declaring his confidence that all concerned would act, 'conscious of the serious political and other consequences to the position of Germany and to the defence of the free world if ratification is long delayed or not accomplished'.⁶⁷ Acheson's briefing papers adopted a similar line, suggesting he inform the French in private of the 'tragic dilemma' that

⁶⁴Herz draft memo, 10 Dec. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 1; Comments by Wolf, 15 Dec. 1952, NARA, RG 59, Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons files), Lot 55 D 115, Box 2.

⁶⁵Eden tel. 787, 12 Nov. 1952, PRO, FO 800/789; Frank Roberts, at the FO's German desk, commented on Harvey's 28 Nov. despatch that 'we are preparing an alternative plan but it it will not, I think, appeal to the French more than the present EDC plan'. He and Harvey hoped that with careful handling of the new US administration the present treaties would eventually get through, PRO, FO 371/101738; Frank Roberts, *Dealing with Dictators* (London, 1991), 158-9.

⁶⁶Eden to Dulles (reported to Eisenhower), 14 Nov. 1952, Box 60, Vol. 1, Correspondence, Dulles Personal Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton.

⁶⁷Department of State *Bulletin*, 23, no. 704, 22 Dec. 1952, 985.

would face the US, should the impetus to European political and military integration falter or fail.⁶⁸

In Paris, however, the US position was much more cautious. The NAC made its most explicit statement of support to date for Indochina, in a resolution that expressed whole-hearted admiration for the 'valiant and long-continued struggle' by France and the Associated States.⁶⁹ Acheson's address to the meeting emphasised the political benefits of EDC - it was not merely a method to enable a German military contribution, but an 'essential step' towards European unification the progress of which would be 'an ever growing attraction to your British, Canadian and American friends'.⁷⁰ This restraint was inspired directly by Alphant and Monnet and it was upon their advice that Acheson reformulated his position. Alphant made a personal appeal to the US for the adoption of a NAC resolution on Indochina and insisted that a resolution on EDC, however welcome, should not point the finger at any nation.⁷¹ Monnet meanwhile, met Acheson twice before the Secretary's speech to bring him up to date on European integration, especially political, developments. Monnet insisted that EDC ratification in the German and French parliaments depended on political unification proceeding simultaneously. He advised Acheson against singling out EDC in any declaration or treating it solely as a military problem, assuring him that while the ratification process would take time in both countries 'it probably would come out all right in the end'.⁷²

Yet, for all Monnet's confident assertions, no one attending the NATO session in Paris could have failed to observe the lack of hopeful indications coming from the French administration. The ailing Pinay government, through the medium of a US press interview with Pleven on 26 November, left no doubts as to the inevitability of EDC treaty modifications. In promising that the parliamentary debate would begin on schedule, Pleven indicated his government's willingness to leave the way open for the Assembly to propose its own conditions.⁷³ Alphant, conscious that this could provoke

⁶⁸FRUS 1952-4 5, 698-99, ed. note.

⁶⁹Department of State *Bulletin*, 24, 5 Jan. 1953, 4-5.

⁷⁰Message to NAC meeting, 18 Dec. 1952, UPA, *Acheson Conversations*, Reel 4.

⁷¹Polto 948, 9 Dec. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 3.

⁷²Memos of Acheson-Monnet meetings, 14 & 15 Dec. 1952, UPA, *Acheson Conversations*, Reel 4.

⁷³Paris tel. 3147, 26 Nov. 1952, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 20; Alphant's anxious requests for instructions to the Interim Committee delegation was further evidence, Note to Defence Minister, 5 Dec. 1952, AN, 457 AP 34.

the re-opening of the entire EDC treaty, energetically opposed this tactic. He argued that the government should set out in advance the reforms it sought and begin immediate negotiations with the Six, the UK and SHAPE before handing the treaty over for parliamentary consideration. On his own initiative he sent ministers a detailed compilation of the principal problems identified in various French quarters to facilitate the process of modification to the existing treaty.⁷⁴ The government appeared unconcerned by warnings that France's partners would not consent to changes to the EDC treaty: a Foreign Ministry official in Pleven's *Cabinet* confirmed the general belief that the other EDC states would come round to French conditions when they eventually appeared.⁷⁵

The administration was willing to take the lead in identifying at least one condition for French ratification, namely Britain's relationship to EDC. On 5 December Schuman instructed Massigli to impress upon London the significance of close technical cooperation between EDC and UK forces and the political links that would logically follow from a firm continental troop commitment.⁷⁶ Although Schuman assured Eden personally ten days later that France did not seek additional guarantees from Britain other than possible 'purely technical' military specifications, every signal from Paris indicated otherwise.⁷⁷ President Auriol was much more explicit with Eden: if Germany was to be permanently contained in Europe, Britain had to be a participant, and a confederal Europe would make that feasible.⁷⁸ Massigli, who had told Schuman that the British would be sympathetic to French attempts to secure greater autonomous control of its EDC troops, continued to push for a far more comprehensive arrangement with the UK government.⁷⁹ In contrast, Paris appeared to put little priority on building closer relationships with its EDC partners. The Quai lost little time in shooting down Adenauer's suggestion that regular consultation to develop a European security policy should begin between the leaders of the EDC

⁷⁴'*Rectification du Traité du Paris*', 1 Dec. 1952, AN, 363 AP 21.

⁷⁵Paradis memo to Tomlinson, 26 Nov. 1952, NARA RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

⁷⁶Tel. 19938, 5 Dec. 1952, MAE, PA-AP 217/70.

⁷⁷Tel. 633, 16 Dec. 1952, PRO, FO 800/758.

⁷⁸Summary of conversation, 16 Dec. 1952, MAE, PA-AP 217/70, Auriol, *Journal*, 1952, 804-08: FO despatch no. 1181, 22 Dec. 1952, PRO, FO 800/758.

⁷⁹London tel. 21012, 12 Dec. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/69.

states. The only common policy that existed, the Quai tartly noted, was that defined in the Atlantic Pact.⁸⁰

A new French government

The collapse of Pinay's government on 23 December 1952 removed the final obstacle to the official launch of France's campaign for revisions to the EDC treaty. The immediate cause of the fall was the Assembly's rejection of Cabinet proposals for financial law reform but judgement of the government's foreign policy performance was a factor in the end of Pinay's Cabinet.⁸¹ Schuman himself acknowledged his own parliamentary unpopularity and there was general awareness that the most significant change to the next government would occur in the Foreign Ministry.⁸² Schuman faced hostility from other powerful quarters: President Auriol had made little secret of his opposition to Schuman while Pinay had been consistently restrained in his support of his Foreign Minister.⁸³ Reports of a campaign against Schuman within his own MRP party were linked to Bidault, whose desire to return to either the Quai or the Hôtel Matignon was well-known.⁸⁴ Even the Quai was implicated in the plot and indeed there was little evidence that officials mourned the departure of their long-serving Minister.⁸⁵ It was a sad dénouement for the man who had striven to orient French foreign policy in a positive European direction but by the end of 1952 Schuman, who had never wholeheartedly embraced EDC nor played the same central role he had had in the ECSC project, was more of a liability than an asset to the continuation of French integration policies.

⁸⁰MAE circular, 14 Dec. 1952, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/69.

⁸¹Paris tel 3622, 23 Dec. 1952, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, Pt. 2, Reel 14.

⁸²Schuman reportedly told Moch that he would not even get 150 votes in the Assembly, Auriol, *Journal*, 1952, 858. US Embassy staff had been predicting since the summer that Schuman would not be in the next government, tel. 287, 11 July 1952, NARA RG 84, Paris Embassy: A, Box 3.

⁸³Auriol had suggested Schuman's replacement in January and March 1952. He grew more bitter after a dispute over the appointment of Bourbon-Busset as head of Cultural Affairs in the ministry - Schuman threatened to resign if Auriol did not back down, Auriol, *Journal*, 1952, 77, 181, 590-98.

⁸⁴Raymond Poidevin, *Schuman: Homme d'Etat* (Paris, 1986), 363-64; Auriol was reluctant to see Bidault in the Quai, having noted his 'strange character' and suspecting he preferred the US over the UK, *Journal*, 1952, 77, 879-84; *Journal du Septennat, 1947-54*, vii, 1953-4, (Paris, 1971), 16.

⁸⁵Schumann later recorded that the anti-Schuman plot had been long in the making: '*Schuman se savait condamné et traqué*', Auriol, *Journal*, 1952, 1075, fn 32; Massigli to Eden, FO tel. 50, 19 Jan. 1953, PRO, FO 800/789.

Efforts by the Radical, René Mayer, to secure a parliamentary majority for a new Cabinet necessitated an appeal to Gaullist deputies for their support.⁸⁶ RPF representatives, led by General Koenig, were quick to make EDC modification their condition for support, demanding treaty revisions to protect both the 'national' character and unity of the French army and the French Union. Mayer claimed a compromise with the RPF over EDC modification would force the party to accept that the treaty as a whole could not be called into question.⁸⁷ The EDC activists were less sure. Monnet warned of the dangerous implications of such demands and appealed to the pro-European views of his recent ECSC collaborator: '*En entrant dans cette voie, on abandonnerait les garanties qu'apporte la Communauté de Défense contre une renaissance de militarisme et le renouvellement des ambitions du passé....Il n'y a pas d'Europe sans transfert des souverainetés nationales à des institutions communes, sans mise en commun des ressources et des hommes.*'⁸⁸ Alphanand was more realistic, acknowledging that some changes would be necessary but emphasising that the essential problems behind French ratification difficulties were financial. Further assistance in Indochina and better repartition of Atlantic Alliance charges, rather than modification of French integration policies, were the key and he recommended that fundamental talks take place with the new US administration. Any changes made to the EDC should take place through interpretative and applicatory protocols rather than re-negotiation of the treaty, if serious international consequences were to be avoided.⁸⁹

Mayer's investiture speech to the Assembly on 6 January 1953 echoed Alphanand's advice. He announced that the government would begin negotiations with its EDC partners for additional protocols designed to safeguard the French Army and Union and to make more precise certain clauses, such as the methods of cooperation with Britain, at the same time as the parliamentary committees considered the treaty. He stressed this did not represent any abandonment of France's European policy.⁹⁰

⁸⁶Socialist support, the only alternative to RPF backing, was unlikely given their opposition to Mayer's economic proposals for government spending cuts and financial reform.

⁸⁷Letter from Diethelm (RPF) to Mayer, 5 Jan. 1953, AN, 363 AP 21.

⁸⁸Monnet letter to Mayer, 29 Dec. 1952, AN, 363 AP 28.

⁸⁹Note of 27 Dec. given to Mayer by Schumann on 3 Jan. 1953, AN, 363 AP 23.

⁹⁰Poidevin suggests Schuman recommended Mayer for premier in the hope of safeguarding French European policy, *Schuman*, 365.

Yet Mayer, who had coveted the foreign ministry post, was also capable of independent initiatives, declaring that discussions with Germany on the Saar would also be re-opened before final ratification.⁹¹ The new Prime Minister's determination to participate in foreign policymaking was thus evident from the outset.

The only surprise in Bidault's appointment as Foreign Minister was the alacrity with which the RPF supported it, a move that led some to speculate whether Bidault had made a deal with the Gaullists on EDC.⁹² Secret communications had indeed taken place between the General and his former minister in which the latter defended the idea of a three-power directorate in the Atlantic Alliance and declared his sympathy for the intergovernmental European political authority demanded by the Gaullists.⁹³ Senior diplomats were certainly happy to welcome Bidault back to the Quai and not just because of their familiarity with and affection for him. They preferred Bidault's administrative style: his *Cabinet* was staffed in the main by diplomats and contact between it and the bureaucracy was more frequent than under Schuman. Bidault had shown little interest in working through detailed dossiers, preferring to rely on the advice of his senior staff: meetings were frequent and informal and discussion open.⁹⁴ Officials at the Quai had good reason to anticipate a closer involvement in top-level decision making.

The consequences of this for Monnet and his team were immense. Under Schuman they had enjoyed unfettered access to the Minister and his government, while the partnership with Schuman's personal *Cabinet* protected the Monnet team from any Quai interference.⁹⁵ No such comparable relationship existed with Bidault. Ironically, this decline came at the very time when Monnet's star seemed set to rise higher than ever in Washington. His friendship with Foster Dulles, dating back to the

⁹¹Mayer's preoccupation with economic issues and his previous experience working on the deconcentration of the Ruhr made him particularly conscious of the significance of the Saar, Raymond Poidevin, 'René Mayer et la politique extérieure de la France, 1943-53', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 134 1984, 73-97.

⁹²Paris tel 3850, 8 Jan. 1953, UPA, *State Department Central Files, France*, Pt. 2, Reel 14.

⁹³Georges-Henri Soutou, 'Georges Bidault et la construction européenne, 1944-54' in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 105, 3-4, 1991, 296-7; Elgey, *La République des Contradictions*, 286-87.

⁹⁴François Seydoux, *Mémoires d'OutreRhin* (Paris, 1975), 172-73; Bernard Destremau, *Quai d'Orsay: derrière la façade* (Paris, 1994), 102; Pierre-Louis Falaize, Bidault's previous *Cabinet* director, was reappointed to the post, Alfred Grosser, *La IVème République et sa politique extérieure* (Paris, 1961), 65-6.

⁹⁵FJM, Interview with Stanley Cleveland, 12 June 1981.

1920s, brought an added intimacy to Monnet's US links.⁹⁶ He lost little time in making use of these contacts. Before inauguration had even taken place Monnet requested Eisenhower to make a declaration of support for European political integration. He warned the incoming Administration against mounting French proposals supporting simultaneously European unity and the French national army: 'By creating false hopes, these proposals will cause confusion, discredit the movement for real integration and lose precious time...it is essential that Eisenhower should make clear that the US supports a truly federal European integration.'⁹⁷ Washington was initially reluctant but in the end Eisenhower sent a brief New Year's message to General Ridgway in SHAPE reiterating his support for EDC. Monnet immediately began another campaign for the appointment of a roving US Ambassador to Europe to supply the necessary boost for EDC.⁹⁸ Monnet's speed at reading the changes in Paris were only matched by his ability to shift his efforts completely towards the US.

The profound institutional shift that was taking place within the domain of French foreign policymaking was not immediately obvious to France's partners, partly because of the increasingly routine nature of Cabinet collapse, partly because of the familiarity of the principal political actors. There was even a sense of relief that ratification procedures were finally underway after months of drift.⁹⁹ Yet some signs of change were already discernable. It was Parodi who now briefed US officials on the government's EDC position, assuring them, rather disingenuously, that 'integrity of the French Union and unity of the Army' were political euphemisms. All the EDC

⁹⁶Dulles's staff attested to the closeness of the Dulles-Monnet link: no matter how busy his schedule, Dulles always saw Monnet privately for an hour or so when in Paris, Interviews with Livingston Merchant, 13 March, 17 April 1965 & Roderic O'Connor, 2 April 1966, Dulles Oral History Collection, Dulles Papers, Mudd Library.

⁹⁷Letter to McCloy, 31 Dec. 1952, Box 62, Vol. 1, Correspondence, Dulles Private Papers, Mudd Library.

⁹⁸Monnet employed his usual tactic of multiple advocacy, securing Adenauer's help to convince Washington, Adenauer letter to McCloy, 1 Dec. 1952, Box 62, Vol. 1, Correspondence, Dulles Private Papers, Mudd Library. General Gruenther passed the idea to Eisenhower, letter to Eisenhower, 21 Dec. 1952, University Publications of America Inc., microfilm project, (UPA) *President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Office Files, 1953-61*, Pt. 1, *Administration Series*, Reel 13.

⁹⁹Paris tel. 3829, 12 Jan. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 13; Washington tel. 183, 9 Jan. 1953, MAE, *Amérique 1952-63 (AM52-63)/Etats-Unis/328*.

treaty required was 'clarification and perhaps correction on minor mistakes' through supplementary protocols which were being prepared in the Quai.¹⁰⁰

French EDC policy was now firmly in the hands of the Quai hierarchy and Bidault showed every intention of marching in step with his department. His former Secretary General, Jean Chauvel, now Ambassador to Switzerland, immediately began to advise the minister, recommending Bidault explore the internal scope for EDC change before starting discussions with France's partners.¹⁰¹ Alphan's argument that the government make its intentions quickly known met with little response. Increasingly isolated within his own department, Alphan vainly demanded that his fellow officials be made to conform strictly to the government's EDC policies once they were defined.¹⁰² By the start of 1953 it was too late for such a call. He could no longer turn to Monnet for assistance in bypassing the Quai to establish that policy. It was the Foreign Ministry which was now responsible for the definition of French EDC policy, the effects of which would soon become apparent.

¹⁰⁰Paris tel. 3930, 13 Jan. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 2.

¹⁰¹Chauvel to Bidault, 21 Jan. 1953, AN, 457 AP 44. This marked the beginning of a regular series of letters advising Bidault on policy questions.

¹⁰²Note to Bidault, 12 Jan. 1953, MAE, SG 14.

Chapter Seven

Remodelling EDC

January - July 1953

A New Year, a new French Cabinet: René Mayer's efforts to form a government in the first days of 1953 was stark symbol of the recurrent pattern of politics in the Fourth Republic. The foreign policy administrative changes which the new Cabinet ushered in, however, represented a significant new departure in the European policy developed by France since 1948. This centred around and was made manifest in the European Defence Community, the very existence of which was illustrative of the influence Jean Monnet had enjoyed during Schuman's tenure as Foreign Minister. The new power constellation of French foreign policymaking, centred at the heart of the Quai d'Orsay, shared the belief that France's security, prosperity and influence could only be guaranteed through extensive collaboration in Europe. It had less faith that the path of supranational integration in EDC pursued increasingly aggressively by Monnet was the best route to this achievement. Indeed many policymakers there questioned whether the expanding EDC project might not actually constitute a danger to France's leadership aims.

Yet the Foreign Ministry did not completely reject EDC in January 1953. The pressures that had led to its initial introduction remained: French military, economic and financial weakness confronted with US-led pressure for German rearmament in the face of a tense international environment. The potential military, economic and political benefits that leadership of an integrated European security system could bring were still acknowledged. Nor could the government's public commitment to present the EDC Treaty to the National Assembly be ignored. In the first half of 1953 therefore, France pursued a two-pronged approach, seeking, on the one hand, to reshape the EDC project into a better fit for French foreign policy aims and at the same time downplaying its European policy as merely one element in a globally-engaged agenda. The challenge facing the Quai was to convince the US, and thereby its other Western partners, to agree to this route. Domestic battles for control over EDC policy in Paris now became a struggle for influence in shaping Washington's EDC policy and the project itself.

The Quai's revolt

Mayer's assurance that French negotiation of additional treaty protocols with its EDC partners would be accompanied simultaneously by the presentation of the treaty texts for parliamentary examination was designed to meet the objection that revisions would lead to interminable delay for EDC ratification. The approach, both in style and content, followed the line advocated by Alphand, whose EDC expertise made him indispensable despite his links with Monnet, and he continued to play a dominant role in French EDC policymaking. It was under his coordination that drafting suggestions from the French delegations on the Interim Committee and the North Atlantic Council, the military and the Quai were to be established into specific protocol texts.¹

Alphand set out the proposed revisions at a meeting of the Prime and Foreign Ministers, the French ambassadors in Europe and chiefs of bureaux at the Quai on 16 January 1953 specially convened to discuss the EDC issue.² A protocol assuring France's right to withdraw its EDC contingents for overseas emergencies (article 13), was a principal demand, as was an explicit commitment to the 'integrity' of French forces, which would give France freedom to transfer individuals and units at will.³ The government would look for an extension of the Council of Ministers' weighted voting procedure (article 43), so as to provide Franco-German parity regardless of the size of national troop contributions in EDC. Explicit recognition of French freedom to produce and export arms overseas (article 107) and the continuation of the privileges of French occupation troops in Germany after EDC was established formed further protocols. France, he noted, would also request further negotiations with the UK government both on the technical arrangements to be established between British and

¹Fursdon describes Schumann as the architect of the protocols, *The European Defence Community: A History* (London, 1980), 208, a view which does not appear to be substantiated by the archives. Alphand reported that the preliminary protocol draft had been drawn up by the NAC delegation; Burin des Roziers told Mayer the protocol relating to the integrity of French forces had been written by the military, Note on EDC, 26 Jan. 1953, AN, 363 AP 23.

²Minutes of meeting, 16 Jan. 1953, MAE, PA-AP 217/70.

³Article 13 permitted a state to transfer forces out of EDC with the prior consent of the Board of Commissioners and agreement by the NATO Supreme Commander. 'Integrity' of French forces related in particular to article 10 which set out the specific circumstances in which a member state could maintain national forces other than those destined for EDC service.

EDC forces as well as the institutional links to be made between the UK and the political institutions of the EDC.

Alphand was quite explicit that the purpose of these additional texts was to maintain French preponderance in EDC indefinitely. Yet he was also insistent that the demands were compatible with the substance of the EDC treaty and could, therefore, be secured without re-negotiation of the entire project. Alphand's arguments were bolstered by François-Poncet and the Ambassadors to Belgium and the Netherlands, Jean Rivière and Garnier, who warned that any fundamental changes to the treaty would provoke severe criticism as well as delaying ratification among France's partners. Jacques Fouques-Duparc, Ambassador in Rome, recommended that discussion of the protocols take place entirely within the EDC Interim Committee while Rivière advised that the whole issue be minimised as much as possible. There were few signs of affection for EDC among France's senior foreign representatives: rather, ambassadors recognised Alphand's claim that if the EDC were to collapse as a result of the protocols, France's dominant position in continental integration would be shattered.⁴ Bonnet articulated succinctly the similar lack of manoeuvrability with regard to the US: the new Republican leaders might be sensitive to French difficulties but the Congress was not and would almost certainly restrict aid appropriation to Europe if the EDC were further delayed. If EDC collapsed, the Administration would insist on German entrance into NATO. Every international signal, therefore, enforced pressure for a swift handling of EDC revision.⁵

For the Quai's most hostile EDC opponents - Massigli, Chauvel, Parodi and de la Tournelle - all this was less than satisfactory. The government might have opened new margins of negotiation but if these were to be quickly and rapidly pursued, then the possibilities for fundamental alteration of EDC were dim. A Cabinet committee had already been established to consider and monitor the EDC protocols and Mayer assured the diplomats it would not make additional demands.⁶ By 24 January the committee had approved the text of the '*exposé des motifs*' to be

⁴Fouques-Duparc, along with Chauvel, strongly backed Massigli's call for an end to the multiplication of European 'pools' at the meeting.

⁵Joseph Bech, Luxembourg Foreign Minister, whom the French regarded as a good source of information, confirmed the US determination to bring Germany into NATO if EDC failed, Luxembourg tel no. 6, 9 Jan. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/70.

⁶Summary of Cabinet meeting, 14 Jan. 1953, MAE, CM/Cabinet Bidault 1953-4/23.

presented to parliament and had begun examination of the draft protocols. There was little, once the full Cabinet gave its assent four days later, that now stood in the way of some start being made on parliamentary consideration of the EDC treaty.⁷ Moreover, Mayer claimed that with the RPF in government, Gaullist deputies were less free to maintain their virulent opposition to the project.⁸ The possibility of additional protocols satisfying the majority of parliamentarians who gave EDC only sporadic attention was, therefore, a very real possibility.

The Quai leadership moved quickly. On 29 January the head of Political Affairs, de la Tournelle, presented Bidault with a personal paper on behalf of himself and a number of his most senior staff - André Gros, head of the ministry's legal section, Seydoux from the Europe desk, Pierre de Leusse, head of the Press department and Jean-Marc Boegner, director of the *Service des Pactes* bureau - setting out their objections to EDC.⁹ It was a ferocious attack on the treaty. A European army would not prevent the practical establishment of a German army, the very objective for which it been created. But it would mark the end of a national French army and with it, France's ability to defend its overseas territories. By destroying the French Union, European military integration removed the very basis of France's Great Power status and its ability to balance the re-emergent Germany. The political dimension of EDC would ensure the end of an independent French foreign policy and with this, France's place on the Permanent Group of the Atlantic Alliance - '*nous ne pourrons à la fois entrer dans le Six et demeurer aux côtés des deux grands*'.¹⁰

The men admitted that complete abandonment of the treaty, however desirable, was not possible, given the grave repercussions this would have for French-US relations. Germany's entry into NATO would almost certainly follow a French fall from US grace. Treaty modification was the option France was obliged to pursue. What separated the Quai officials from Alphand and other defenders of the additional protocols was the degree of revision they demanded. La Tournelle and his colleagues sought to limit the treaty to a series of provisions for the collaboration and

⁷18 Jan. 1953, MAE, CM/Cabinet Bidault 1953-4/24; Paris tel. 4133, 24 Jan. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 2.

⁸Mayer's access to Gaullist thinking was assisted by having Burin des Rozières, reputedly close to de Gaulle, in his *Cabinet*, Georgette Elgey, *La République des Contradictions, 1951-54* (Paris, 1968), 307.

⁹Memo to Bidault, 29 Jan. 1953, AN, 457 AP 34.

¹⁰Accompanying note, 28 Jan. 1953, AN, 457 AP 34.

coordination of European armies. The only comprehensive integration contemplated was a common armaments programme, which would incorporate the regulation and division of US military and financial assistance on a collective basis.¹¹ This arrangement - a European Union of Defence - would ensure France derived maximum assistance for its national defence programmes while imposing few, if any, conditions on the ways and means in which they were carried out. In addition, the diplomats demanded the renewable extension of the pre-EDC transitional period: the French government would thus be free to choose its optimal moment to enter a European defence organisation.

Pressing Britain for a closer association to EDC was vital if this limited European defence community was to be brought about. The officials agreed with Massigli that greater British involvement would be conditional on the extent to which EDC was revised to ensure national sovereign independence for its participants. Pursuing the British to give precise details of the terms under which they might be prepared to participate in EDC would therefore help to propel France's revision programme forward. Given the consistent support of all France's partners for greater British involvement in the EDC, it would be very difficult for any state to reject a treaty that would bring British participation about, no matter how substantial the revisions.¹² Paris could thereby avoid the international recriminations that preoccupied the French ambassadors.

The fundamental objective of these officials, just as for the supporters of EDC, remained the non-participation of Germany in NATO. The greatest benefit of a European defence system was the extent to which it precluded this and hence the reluctance of EDC's opponents to renounce completely a mechanism guaranteeing France some degree of permanent control over German forces. For all the rhetoric about the dangers of Germany's territorial claims in the East, it was not the potential of a German-inspired war with the USSR that really exercised the foreign policy establishment in Paris. The consequence of German NATO membership for France's

¹¹A Europe desk memo highlighted these potential advantages, Europe centrale note, 31 Jan. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/70. The memo also recommended common military schools as well as a centralised commission to administer the remaining integrated programmes.

¹²The French ambassadors confirmed continued Dutch and Belgian desire for a UK presence in EDC. Adenauer was also reported to support full UK participation, 16 Jan. 1953, MAE, PA-AP 217/70.

position as one of the three leaders of the Western Alliance was the crux of the matter. France was already hard-pressed to maintain this place: Germany, once a member, would waste no time securing US help to contest the French leadership claim. Institutionalised European defence arrangements, as Burin de Roziers pointed out, were the only means of interposing a screen between Germany, the US and their military forces.¹³

What the Quai mutineers were demanding, in essence, was a return to the original French conception of the European Army. Permanent leadership of a militarily integrated Europe would not only ensure the indefinite containment of Germany, but would provide the counterbalance to French global weakness. EDC offered the potential - as increased US assistance in Indochina, Anglo-American guarantees against Germany and a tripartite NATO global strategy also did - to solidify France's leading position in the Atlantic Alliance. The European project had to serve French global policy, not endanger it.¹⁴ What the Quai leadership failed to do was provide concrete proposals for the radical overhaul of the existing treaty. Indeed there was little unanimity within La Tournelle's group as to the direction French policy should pursue. The Europe desk, its gaze always fixed on Germany, favoured the retention of some institutionalised coordinating body in a revised EDC, something the Pactes desk explicitly opposed. The latter's emphasis on developing Atlantic institutions was shared by Gros, the *Juriconsulate*. He went so far as to argue that any step toward the security of the Six would actually loosen, rather than reinforce, the North Atlantic Community.¹⁵ Massigli, who was in close contact with the Paris bureaucrats, preferred the revival of a close Franco-British alliance to continued international institution-building.

The multiplicity of opinions on specific alterations to EDC blunted the group's overall attack. Alphand responded by launching a counter-charge on Bidault against the changes proposed by his Quai colleagues. How did they intend to control German

¹³Burin de Roziers to Mayer, 26 Jan. 1953, AN 363 AP 23.

¹⁴General Ely warned France could not let slip the opportunity of EDC 'de devenir vraiment les leaders de l'Europe et d'asseoir définitivement notre position dans le monde', note to Bidault, (undated), AN, 457 AP 44.

¹⁵Europe centrale note, 31 Jan. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/70; Europe centrale note on French rights reserved in Germany (undated), AN, 457 AP 34; Service des Pactes memo on EDC, 9 Feb. 1953, AN 457 AP 34; Juriconsulate summary of meeting (unspecified), 24 Jan. 1953, MAE, SG 14.

rearmament during the extended pre-EDC interim they so strongly advocated? Where had they come across an alternative British plan? No mention of it had been made by any British official he encountered, no matter what Massigli might have suggested. Alphanand clearly shared the view of Maurice Schumann, currently developing the proposals for British EDC association, that Britain would never enter a contractual commitment with a European organisation. As for the preferred option of greater integration in NATO: France had pursued this by every available means since July 1950 and every effort had so far failed. *'L'Alliance Atlantique est en effet une Alliance classique et risque de le demeurer. Elle ne peut comporter, faute d'un organisme supra-national, ni plan commun d'armement, ni standardisation de matériels, ni budget commun, ni contrôle. C'est tout cela aussi qu'apporte le Traité de Communauté européenne et qu'on a oublié de mentionner.'*¹⁶ Alphanand's ultimate defence of the existing EDC treaty rested on the position that there was no alternative solution to the weakness that had forced France into the project in the first place.

There was a hint behind Alphanand's arguments that the Quai opponents were deliberately proposing impossible measures to destroy the EDC project altogether. The very breadth and number of their demands, not to mention the timing of their attack, did suggest a more comprehensive hidden agenda. None of the papers with which Bidault was swamped used the need to secure parliamentary ratification as a justification for EDC revision. Indeed the joint paper submitted by La Tournelle concluded that a weak majority vote for the treaty would not be enough: such a profound change of policy necessitated the agreement of all strata of French opinion. Voting tallies in the legislature were not, strictly speaking, the remit of the Quai bureaucracy and it prompts consideration whether ministry staff were engaged in activities to influence French opinion.¹⁷ La Tournelle assured Alphanand that the departmental negotiations had remained confidential and the disagreement would not pass outside the Quai.¹⁸ Yet the policies proposed by the departmental opponents

¹⁶Alphanand note to Bidault on the La Tournelle memo, 10 Feb. 1953, AN, 457 AP 34.

¹⁷Michel Debré, the EDC's most active political opponent is suggestive, *'A l'égard des diplomates...j'entends demeurer discret'* but is explicit about his contact with Massigli and Seydoux, given their own published memoirs. He does admit that some officials who participated in various aspects of the negotiations revealed to him *'les secrets de la honte'*. *Trois républiques pour une France: Mémoires*, ii, (Paris, 1988), 167, 212-13.

¹⁸La Tournelle note to Alphanand, 16 Feb. 1953, MAE, SG 67.

suggested, if not explicit cooperation, then remarkably parallel thinking with actors outside the ministry. General Juin wrote personally to Defence Minister Pleven on 30 January pressing for an additional protocol to extend indefinitely the EDC treaty's interim period, a proposal mirroring the demand of the La Tournelle group.¹⁹

The temptation to take such arguments to the National Assembly was undoubtedly enhanced when the six parliamentary committees who were to examine the EDC treaty elected their *rapporteurs*. Jules Moch, by now a veteran anti-EDCer, was elected to report for the Foreign Affairs Committee. The same position on the National Defence Committee went to one of the most senior Gaullists, General Koenig, who had established close relations with diplomats such as Seydoux in the pre-1949 occupied Germany.²⁰ It was not difficult for the Quai's criticisms to be passed to these parliamentarians under the guise of bureaucratic obedience to the legislature: even before the additional protocols were made public a copy of these texts found its way to the RPF deputy, General Billotte.²¹ Given that the head of the ministry's press desk was a member of the La Tournelle group, the possibility of the Quai's EDC dispute extending beyond the ministry was very real.

The additional protocols

Although the department's battle-lines were now clearly drawn, Bidault himself avoided taking a position on either side. His attention, for one thing, was on the imminent arrival of John Foster Dulles and the Director for Mutual Security, Harold Stassen, on their whirlwind tour of the European capitals designed to boost EDC's progress.²² The government was keen to use the visit to draw the attention of the new

¹⁹Proposals (undated), SHAT, Juin papers (238 K) 5; Letter to Pleven, 30 Jan. 1953 AN, 363 AP 23.

²⁰Jules Moch, *Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950* (Paris, 1965), 303; François Seydoux, *Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin* (Paris, 1975), 130-31. Although the *rapporteur* did not hold great power in the committee, the holder had the potential advantage of greater knowledge of the proposed project, see, on committee structure, Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London, 1964), ch. 18.

²¹Bidault's papers contain a memo on the protocols from Billotte and a handwritten note asking how he could have got hold of the texts, AN 457 AP 34; a Gros memo, 21 Feb. 1953, arguing that the EDC treaty would necessitate revision of the French Constitution was passed on to Koenig, SHAT, Koenig papers (1K237), 6; Debré began to raise this issue in the Senate from early 1953, copies of his formal motion proposing constitutional revision in May are located in MAE, SG 14.

²²Paris was aware EDC was the primary purpose of the trip, Washington tel 435, 20 Jan. 1953, MAE, AM52-63/Etats-Unis/320.

US administration to non-EDC issues, particularly the need for greater financial assistance to Indochina.²³ If EDC could not be used by the French as a tool to win US approval, at the very least it should not be permitted to provoke tensions between the two governments. There was every reason therefore, to keep internal arguments under wraps and avoid creating international ones by delaying the announcement of EDC reform proposals. Mayer and Bidault assured Dulles and Stassen during the 2-3 February meetings that the forthcoming protocols represented interpretations of, rather than changes to, the treaty and that the government had no alternative policy to EDC. Nevertheless, there was a discernable new tone in the Foreign Minister's warnings that France's world position had to be maintained. Echoing his officials, Bidault declared that strengthening NATO was the basic element in French foreign policy and hinted that further British and US assurances to France as well as long-term tripartite coordination in NATO were two ways in which this would be pursued.²⁴ What Bidault and his staff sought was US help in their efforts to refix EDC firmly in the NATO framework. The French continued to signal their opposition to any intensification of Washington's efforts for EDC ratification either through threats or airy talk about a 'United States of Europe': in complete opposition to the advice Monnet was simultaneously urging upon Washington, the Quai recommended that the administration stress the urgency of a German military contribution rather than the urgency of European unification.²⁵

The publication of French additional protocols continued to be delayed, notwithstanding Alphant's feverish requests to Bidault for instructions on what to present to the Interim Committee. Instead of responding, the government passed over the EDC planning body and presented the ambassadors of its five partners with letters enclosing a commentary of the forthcoming French proposals attesting to their purely

²³De Margerie reported US Embassy officials saying the visit was a good opportunity for the French to 'implant' their ideas in US minds, Notes to Bidault, 15 & 21 Jan. 1953 & Summary of the Cabinet committee meeting, 31 Jan. 1953, AN, 457 AP 44.

²⁴Cabinet du Ministre circular, 23 Jan. 1953, MAE, SG 14; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1952-4 Vol. 5, (Washington, 1983), 1557-60. Georges-Henri Soutou points out the continuity in Bidault's belief that French security depended on the 'fundamental' triangle with London and Washington, 'Georges Bidault et la construction européenne', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 105, no. 3-4, 1991, 267-306.

²⁵Paris tel. 154, 6 Feb. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 3; La Tournelle summary of meeting, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/70.

interpretative character.²⁶ It was not until 11 February that the actual texts of the proposals outlined by Alphand last December were presented to the Interim Committee.²⁷ When discussion finally began on 20 February France's partners united in vocal criticism of the proposals as an effort to institutionalise pro-French discrimination in the European Army. The Germans were particularly upset at attempts to retain special privileges, especially in relation to the status of French forces in the Federal Republic. Adenauer declared publicly that the proposals, as they presently stood, were unacceptable and informed the US High Commission that they would destroy much of the European character of EDC. Dutch and Belgian delegates also warned the US of the substantive changes afoot and of an inevitable French campaign to convince Washington that the other EDC states were being unreasonable in their rejection of them.²⁸

That both sides in the dispute should make such direct appeal to the US was in part a consequence of the way in which France had introduced the additional protocols. Little effort had been made by the government to court the understanding and goodwill of its five partners, attention had only been paid to potential US reaction, and the difficult task of actually negotiating the changes had been left at the door of Alphand and the French EDC delegation whose lack of authority was obvious to all. But the US administration's own behaviour had encouraged this triangular diplomacy, the immediacy of Dulles's trip being taken as evidence of Washington's determination to adopt a stronger role in the ratification business. On 18 February Eisenhower announced the establishment of the post for which Monnet had so assiduously lobbied, US Observer to the Interim Committee of EDC and US Representative to ECSC with ambassadorial status. The position, based in Paris, was explicitly intended to demonstrate that the US was interested in EDC 'as part of a broader six-country development and not solely as a necessary arrangement for our

²⁶Alphand to Bidault, 3 Feb. 1953, AN, 457 AP 44; US officials were informed of this 'unusual procedure' by the Dutch and Belgians, who were 'genuinely disturbed' at the action, Polto 1323, 3 Feb. 1953, NARA RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 2.

²⁷Cabinet approved the protocols on 7 Feb. 1953, AN, 4 AU 97, the texts are in MAE, SG 14.

²⁸Plenary session, MAE, CED/186; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 729-30; Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1953* (London, 1956), 53.

mutual defence'.²⁹ Former Ambassador to France, David Bruce, was immediately appointed to the post, assisted by Tomlinson, the US official closest to Monnet.

The administration's action demonstrated publicly the high stake Washington was placing not just on the success of EDC ratification but on the realisation of a comprehensive politically integrated community. This commitment made it difficult for the US to remain aloof from any European negotiations. However, in indicating US support and understanding for the French position during his visit to Paris and eager to set his administration's relations off to a good start, Dulles was now somewhat constrained in the extent to which he could condemn French actions. Thus despite its worries at the effects the latest French demands might have on the timing and the character of EDC, Washington tried to avoid taking any firm public stance on the protocols and encouraged the other EDC members to follow suit before the six Foreign Ministers met in Rome on 24-26 February to discuss EDC and EPC.³⁰ US officials in Washington and Europe hoped that a restrained approach would help to resolve the protocol issue quickly and in the meantime, the US policy of encouraging swift EDC ratification among France's partners was maintained.³¹

It was Adenauer who led the attack against the protocols in Rome, warning that France's demand for an exclusive prerogative to repatriate its EDC troops as and when it wanted constituted a constitutional change to the treaty. The French were, therefore, risking the entire collapse of EDC. The Chancellor wanted an explicit agreement that national ratifications would not, on any account, be held up by the protocol negotiation. Alphand tried to mediate a compromise by proposing that the French delegation should, without committing its government, revise the protocol texts to take account of the objections raised. His initiative was immediately followed, however, by a press statement in Paris insisting there could be no question of

²⁹Dulles to Eisenhower, 18 Feb. 1953, Box 1, White House Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

³⁰Washington itself was concerned at the protocol concerning freedom of withdrawal of troops (art. 13) as the French desire to have SACEUR give its explicit accord to this threatened to revise the Atlantic treaty too. Embassy officials worked with Alphand on a draft protocol in which NAC would simply take note of any accord reached by the Six. Mayer and Bidault would not allow Alphand submit this to the Interim Committee, much to the annoyance of Dunn and his staff, *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 721-22, 726-28, 732-33; Summary of Dunn-Bidault meeting, 17 Feb. 1953, AN, 457 AP 34.

³¹Coled 63, 9 April 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 2.

renouncing or modifying the protocols.³² The Quai's intra-departmental battle was becoming increasingly public, making Alphand's role as chair of the EDC Interim Committee ever more difficult. Once again, Europe's political leaders dispatched their disagreements to the Interim Committee.³³ With little to guide them, delegates finally reached agreement on the texts of the protocols to be presented to the six governments on 24 March.³⁴ Nevertheless, the breathing space did enable parliamentary readings of the treaty to proceed, above all in Germany where Bundestag approval for EDC was given on 19 March. Parliamentary committee examination was underway in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy and progress, if uneven, was at least discernable.³⁵

The *ad hoc* Assembly report

The controversy over the additional protocols overshadowed the intended purpose of the Rome conference, which was to discuss progress of plans for a European Political Community (EPC). The *ad hoc* Assembly committee in Strasbourg had almost completed its draft constitution and was due to submit its report to the six governments in March. Spaak's committee had come up with a series of proposals to unite the ECSC and EDC within a single political community which would consist of a democratically elected, bicameral legislature, a five-member Executive Council responsible to the parliament, a Council of National Ministers to act as a link between the Executive and national governments and a Court of Justice. The draft report envisaged a gradual expansion of the community's political competences as the sectoral integration begun in ECSC and EDC progressed.³⁶ On the initiative of the Dutch Foreign Minister, Johan Beyen, the *ad hoc* committee also addressed the

³²MAE press declaration, 25 Feb. 1953, AN, 457 AP 38. The French delegation included Parodi, La Tournelle, Seydoux, Sauvagnargues & Wormser, suggesting the Quai's resolve not to leave Alphand a free hand in negotiations.

³³Summary of 24 February meeting in Rome, Rome tel. 169, 26 Feb. 1953, AN, 457 AP 38.

³⁴Coled 38, 16 March 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 2.

³⁵The German Constitutional Court still had to rule on the validity of the treaty. Belgium was still debating whether constitutional revision was necessary; the Dutch had already proceeded with constitutional amendment; the Italian parliament's foreign affairs committee approved the treaty in March; the Luxembourg parliament had begun consideration and ratification looked certain.

³⁶Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, *The History of the High Authority of the ECSC* (London, 1994), 45.

question of economic integration and concluded that the EPC should direct further moves in this realm.³⁷

The Quai's worst fears about the EPC were confirmed by these plans for a federal institutional structure. The proposals to place responsibility for European political and military policies under a common European assembly horrified senior officials, (including Alphand) and there was unanimous agreement that the provisions for integration in the EDC treaty should not be permitted to become the basis for a wider common foreign policy.³⁸ Quai staff confronted France's delegate to the *ad hoc* Assembly (and president of the MRP) Pierre-Henri Teitgen at a meeting in Bidault's office on 11 February. The full ire of the ministry was let loose on the hapless politician who tried to refute the Quai attack that in unifying European foreign policies, EPC destroyed France's national policy. One by one diplomats took up the refrain - what would happen to the overseas territories? What then would happen to France?³⁹

No matter how Teitgen tried to demonstrate otherwise, the Quai bureaucracy concluded, not without justification, that limitation of foreign policy integration to the European army alone would be practically impossible if the framework proposed by the *ad hoc* report came into being. The EDC treaty itself offered manifest evidence of France's inability to successfully manipulate supranational bodies for its own policy objectives: the only solution, therefore, was to prevent the EPC project from making any progress, either in the Strasbourg assembly or in EDC-related discussions. Officials assured Mayer and Bidault that parliament's support for political integration did not commit the government to the *ad hoc* Assembly's report and advised the ministers to instruct French opinion on the dangers it contained. According to Chauvel, manipulation of domestic opinion was the only brake Bidault had - '*vôtre seul instrument de contrôle et votre seul point d'appui...Il faut l'éclairer pleinement.*

³⁷Richard Griffiths and Alan Milward argue that Beyen's proposals were motivated by Dutch attempts to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers and provided the basis for the European customs union of the 1957 Rome Treaty, *The Beyen Plan and the European Political Community* (Florence, 1985), 5-11.

³⁸Europe desk memo on EPC, 5 Jan. 1953 & Juriconsulate memo on French commitments in EPC, 17 Jan. 1953, AN, 457 AP 38; Alphand tel 50.137, 23 Jan. 1953 & Europe desk reply, 26 Jan. 1953, MAE, SG 14.

³⁹Present were Schumann, Parodi, de la Tournelle, Alphand, de Margerie, Gros, Seydoux, Wormser, Sauvagnargues, Brouillet, du Vigneaux, de Folin (the last three from Bidault's *Cabinet*), Summary of meeting, 11 Feb. 1953, AN, 457 AP 38.

*Il faut aussi maintenir une position telle que les réactions à attendre servent vos desseins.*⁴⁰ The new aggression France displayed at the Rome Conference reflected this firmness: determination to scupper EPC was increasingly coming to dictate the Quai's approach to the entire EDC treaty.

US enthusiasm for political integration remained the greatest obstacle. Having failed to persuade Dulles and his staff to tone down their emphasis on the European unitary aspects of EDC, officials realised that an overt attack on EPC might well provoke Washington into revising its position of support for some French reforms to the EDC treaty. When the *ad hoc* report was formally presented to the Six on 10 March, Bidault's response was restrained, pointing out the vast challenge that a European political community presented and recommending caution and prudence be the guiding forces.⁴¹ The French proposed that an intergovernmental examination of the *ad hoc* committee's proposals be made by ministerial representatives which would then be examined by the foreign ministers alongside the *ad hoc* Assembly's report.⁴² He had already told the French Cabinet that the French delegates on the *ad hoc* committee were participating '*à titre personnel*' and did not, therefore, commit the government in any way to the report.⁴³ Bidault's staff explained to US officials that the unenthusiastic reaction was necessary to avoid French parliamentary opposition to the draft European constitution.⁴⁴ Bruce, however, was unconvinced and took the French approach as proof of the 'large majority' in the Quai who were 'violently opposed to EDC'.⁴⁵ Washington's support for the *ad hoc* Assembly's proposals continued unabated as discussion of the EPC project rumbled on in Strasbourg.

⁴⁰Letter to Bidault, 16 March 1953, AN, 457 AP 44; Burin de Roziers memo to Mayer, 16 Feb. 1953, AN, 363 AP 23.

⁴¹Jean Monnet, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1976), 463.

⁴²Note from the Europe desk, 12 March 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/78.

⁴³Cabinet meeting, 14 Jan. 1953, 4 AU 97. In Auriol's records of Cabinet meetings, the state of EPC is, interestingly, reported far more frequently than the progress of EDC.

⁴⁴FRUS 1952-4 5: 766-69, 12 March; 11 March 1953, Bruce Diaries. The Socialists in particular, who had led the demand for political integration as a condition to EDC, were said to oppose the draft. In a press conference of 25 Feb. de Gaulle advocated an EDC alternative based upon a European alliance under a Council of Heads of Government, Fursdon, *European Defence Community*, 211.

⁴⁵11 March 1953, Bruce Diaries; European politicians, like Van Starckenburgh and Van Zeeland, expressed similar views, 5 March 1953, Bruce Diaries, FRUS 1952-4 5: 758, 11 March. The Strasbourg assembly was said to be determined to conduct a strong campaign for acceptance of its report, Coled 31, 12 March 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy:B, Box 8.

British association to EDC

British assistance in reversing the political dimensions of EDC proved similarly difficult to secure. The British government submitted an outline of the technical association it envisaged to the Interim Committee on 24 January, reiterating its refusal to enter a continental European defence organisation.⁴⁶ London suspected that the real motive behind the French proposal for closer UK association through a commitment to maintain British troops at a fixed level on the continent, in return for which the UK would have the right to participate in EDC institutions, was to ensure that any blame for EDC's delay would fall on the UK.⁴⁷ French behaviour fuelled this view: Bidault insisted that the proposal which he and Mayer presented in London on 12 February was intended only as a basis for further discussion between the two governments but this was followed, one week later, with a second French memorandum that was much more categorical in its demand for a formal British commitment incorporating a degree of political involvement.⁴⁸ The French repeated their need for the guaranteed presence of US and UK troops in Europe but when Eden proposed a joint approach to encourage the US to extend its NATO treaty commitment from twenty to fifty years, Bidault showed little interest, later claiming that it would not compensate for a British rejection of the French proposals.⁴⁹

London was therefore even more determined to avoid any revision of its EDC policy and any allegations that it was to blame for EDC's difficulties. On 2 March Britain declared its willingness to establish consultation procedures with the Six through a high ranking mission to the EDC Defence Commission as well as technical military cooperation but refused to commit itself to a fixed level of troops in Europe. This, as Eden told the Cabinet, was as far as Britain could go and he would seek to ensure that all further discussion proceeded on a seven power basis rather than

⁴⁶Discussions between Pleven and Lord Alexander after the treaty signature in May 1952 had formed the basis for the proposed British technical association with the future EDC; text of the UK proposals in PRO, CAB 129/59 C(53) 73.

⁴⁷Eden-Massigli conversation, tel. 348, 20 Jan. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/70; Cabinet memo on UK association, 21 Feb. 1953, PRO, CAB 129/59 C(53)73.

⁴⁸MAE Circular, 19 Feb. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/70.

⁴⁹MAE tel 2622 to all posts, 4 March 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/71.

bilaterally with the French.⁵⁰ Eden also suggested to Dulles that the US and UK work jointly to encourage EDC progress in France, a suggestion which the US Secretary greeted with little enthusiasm. Dulles was more susceptible to French claims, coming at this time from Bonnet, to whom he was personally close, that British inflexibility towards France's moderate suggestions could well provide the fatal blow for EDC. The French were determined that the British should not secure US assistance to wrest control of the association issue out of French hands and reformulate the terms of the UK-EDC relationship: the importance of the British association question was thus repeatedly underlined to Washington.⁵¹ France's 12 March reply to the British memorandum, expressing hope that London might reconsider its position on troop commitment, signalled French insistence on keeping the question open, even as officials acknowledged that no new British modification would occur.⁵²

It would be wrong to suggest, however, that the French approach was a deliberate attempt to separate the UK from the US and entangle it into EDC.⁵³ The issue of British association, in provoking a UK defence of non-participation in terms of its overseas commitments, helped France to justify its own position towards EDC. UK association was thus part of the larger Quai strategy to revise the treaty and to secure explicit guarantees of France's leadership status in the Western alliance. This was the fundamental preoccupation behind Bidault and Mayer's visit to London in February.⁵⁴ Bidault wanted to secure UK support for a joint declaration of three-power coordination in the Atlantic Community before he and Mayer visited Washington on 26-28 March. The project, a clear echo of Bidault's High Atlantic Council for Peace proposal of 1950, called for regular tripartite consultations on all matters affecting the three's global responsibilities and stressed EDC as an

⁵⁰Eden to Cabinet, 26 Feb. 1953, PRO, CAB 128/26, CC(53)15; London tel. 976, 26 Feb. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/70, London tel. 1037, 3 March 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/71, Eden to Cabinet, 23 March 1953, PRO, CAB 129/60 C(53)111.

⁵¹Washington tel. 1581, 4 March 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/71; Political affairs desk memo on UK association, 26 Jan. 1953, AN, 457 AP 35; Saki Dockrill, *Britain's policy for West German rearmament, 1950-55* (Cambridge, 1991), 119. On Dulles's friendship with Bonnet, Interview with Roderic O'Connor, 2 April 1966, Dulles Oral History, Mudd Library.

⁵²Paris tels. 1203 & 1358, 12 & 21 March 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/71; Massigli still maintained the FO had an alternative plan which would be introduced only upon the collapse of EDC, tel. 976, 26 Feb. 1953, MAE EU44-60/Gén/70.

⁵³The view put forward by Dockrill, *Britain's policy*, 119.

⁵⁴Like Auriol, Massigli believed Bidault was not concerned enough with UK-French relations, René Massigli, *Une Comédie des Erreurs, 1943-56* (Paris, 1978), 352-59; Auriol, *Journal*, 1953-4, 15-7.

inseparable element of this Atlantic Community. As the Foreign Minister pointed out, '*Nous venons de faire l'Europe, mais la France doit rester présente dans le monde et continuer à exercer ses responsabilités mondiales.*'⁵⁵ British backing for the initiative would strengthen France's case in the US. Ironically, although London privately acknowledged that tripartite coordination would serve its interests, no joint development of the project took place. The EDC issue illustrated the significance that both France and the UK assigned to their bilateral relationships with the US. European defence projects, far from making them co-plaintiffs to the US, seemed to be encouraging even greater jealousies between them.

US support - and its limitations

Washington too gave little indication of support for Bidault's project. The Republican administration was as reluctant as its Democratic predecessor to any modification of NATO's institutional structure and suspected that this particular initiative was the consequence of Bidault's personal views.⁵⁶ Dulles countered French arguments that EDC's ratification chances would be aided by tripartite action in NATO by stressing that there was no danger of France losing its global role - EDC realisation would actually enhance it.⁵⁷ The new Secretary and his staff were uncomfortably aware of the growing series of linkages being attached to EDC progress and of the possible spiral of US concessions that could result. They were determined, therefore, for all French efforts, to keep the discussions firmly on EDC and to secure assurances from Bidault and Mayer that ratification would be actively pursued by the French government.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Draft presented to Eden on 13 Feb. 1953, AN, 457 AP 45; '*Commentaires de G. Bidault au projet de déclaration tripartite*', forwarded to London & Washington, 16 Feb. 1953, MAE, PA-AP 217/70.

⁵⁶Bruce described Bidault as a 'lone wolf operator', 11 March 1953, Bruce Diaries; De Margerie told US officials this was a particular concern of Bidault, tel. 5089, 16 March 1953, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, pt. 1, Reel 5.

⁵⁷The UK Embassy reported Dulles's attitude to the French proposal, 9 March 1953, PRC, FO800/789; MAE note to Bidault on US position towards Europe, 19 March 1953, AN, 457 AP 45; Political Affairs desk memo on the US position, 9 April 1953, AN, 457 AP 45.

⁵⁸Bruce wrote to Dulles with this advice, 16 March 1953, Bruce Diaries; the State Dept reported Eden and Dulles's agreement that political concessions should be avoided at present in order to prevent the French coming back for more, Note to Bedell Smith, 18 March 1953, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, pt. 1, Reel 5.

US firmness failed, however, to prevent the French from raising the subject of the third French precondition to EDC ratification in Washington, namely the question of the Saar. Franco-Saar discussions on the terms of a future bilateral economic convention had reopened in Paris in February and the French continued to demand the retention of a Franco-Saar economic union. According to Mayer, the Saar represented the 'only advantage in the way of "reparations" gained by France' and any special status for France could not be given up. The French refused to begin talks with Germany on the Saar's political status and its proposed europeanisation under European institutions until France's economic and monetary status in the region was resolved, fuelling Germany's insistence that it had a right to participate in all conversations on the future of the Saar. Mayer, basing his arguments on the importance of the Saar for EDC ratification as well as permanent Franco-German reconciliation, wanted the US to back the French position publicly and to press Adenauer to concede to French demands when the Chancellor visited Washington the following month.⁵⁹

Conscious of Mayer's personal commitment to the Saar issue, the resolve of US officials not to be drawn into further EDC linkages crumbled.⁶⁰ Although Washington refused to state publicly that settlement of the Saar issue was a valid precondition for ratification, Dulles was persuaded that progress was a 'political necessity' if EDC was to succeed in the French parliament. He and his officials thought Franco-German agreement could be reached if Mayer, rather than Bidault, negotiated the issue with Adenauer and were willing, therefore, to assist the Premier by pressing Adenauer to reach a settlement rapidly.⁶¹ Mayer's assurances that he and his Cabinet were determined to achieve EDC ratification made the concession to his request seem worthwhile. Increasingly, US assessments of France's EDC claims were being made in terms of the personalities behind them: Dulles told the NSC how Mayer's dedication to EDC represented 'the last hope of French support for this

⁵⁹Paris tel. 5201, 24 March 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 8; Washington tel. 2242, 28 March 1953, MAE, SG 14.

⁶⁰Bruce tel. (unnumbered), 23 March 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 13; Paris tel. 5201, 24 March 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 8; Raymond Poidevin, 'René Mayer et la politique extérieure de la France', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 134, 1984, 89.

⁶¹Washington tel. 673, 30 March 1953, PRO, FO 371/107443; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 766-69, 786-88, 12 March, 8 April; Paris tel. 5287, 31 March 1953, UPA, *State Department Central Files, France*, pt. 1, Reel 5.

project'.⁶² Washington was more prepared to back the French premier's approach to EDC ratification as the hostility of his foreign ministry became increasingly obvious.⁶³ US officials even raised this matter with Mayer, who confirmed he had already informed Bidault that Quai opposition to government policy - and the Foreign Minister's own reticence - had to stop immediately.⁶⁴

If there were victories for French EDC demands by the spring of 1953, they were not for the particular conditions established by the Quai. By the time of the April NAC meeting in Paris it was clear that attempts to recast France's position in the Western Alliance were having little success. Some agreement on the additional protocols had been reached by the Interim Committee, but not without a partial French climbdown on a number of its special status claims and increased tension between France and its five partners.⁶⁵ The project for a supranational European political authority was still alive and the possibility of it being revised to accommodate greater British participation in EDC was clearly hopeless. Neither the US nor the UK seemed keen to give explicit backing to French leadership in Europe and remained hostile to any French effort to assert its global position. Adaptation of EDC had not fulfilled the intended objectives and, much to the frustration of the Quai, the US was still keeping France at arm's length. As the Pactes desk admitted after the NAC conference: *'L'organisation atlantique tourne ainsi le dos à la direction où nous voulions la voir s'engager.'*⁶⁶

The limitations of the Quai's tactics to manipulate concessions from the US and its five EDC partners through thinly veiled threats of EDC's collapse were also being revealed. As long as there were so many existing French claims for US assistance both at home and overseas linked to EDC, it was impossible for the

⁶²Memo of the 138th NSC meeting, 25 March 1953, NARA, *Declassified Documents Series*, 18, no. 5, 1992, microfiche 002726.

⁶³US officials reported the resignation of Leusse (Quai press desk director) on the grounds of his opposition to EDC and were aware of the La Tournelle et al. memo, tel. 5227, 25 March 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 13. The State Dept subsequently investigated the political affiliations of senior Quai officials but found no 'extremist' links, Vernon memo to Fisher, 5 May 1953, UPA, *State Department Central Files: France*, pt. 2, Reel 15.

⁶⁴Mayer letter to Bidault, 16 March 1953, AN, 363 AP 37; Bruce to Dept, 23 March 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 13.

⁶⁵The French High Commission pointed to the unease still remaining in Germany at French actions, tel. 1164, 3 March 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/71. The Bundestag remained hostile towards the additional protocols, tel. 1465, 19 March 1953, MAE, SG 14.

⁶⁶Pactes desk memo on the NAC meeting and US policy, 30 April 1953, AN, 457 AP 44.

government to sustain uncompromising or coercive positions in the various international negotiations. The US was equally capable of underlining the bargains being made: Dulles warned that French requests for increased aid in Indochina would have to be approved by Congress which would be likely to link all questions of external credit to EDC ratification.⁶⁷ French ministers had little option in this situation but to exhort their determination to push the defence treaty through and to renew the government's commitment to European projects: '*le gouvernement français veut...faire l'Europe sur le plan de la défense et même la faire sur le plan économique et sur le plan politique*'.⁶⁸ Moreover, the short-term financial, military or political benefits obtained through concessions from France's partners actually hampered, in the longer run, French foreign policy objectives. The campaign to revise the EDC to bring greater benefits to France was revealing how weak the grounds were for the French claim to permanent leadership in the Western Alliance.

EDC adaptation had also failed to secure its secondary objective of winning greater domestic support for the existing treaty. The chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, Marshal Juin, whose recommendation for an additional protocol extending the pre-EDC transition period had not been taken up, informed Mayer that, without this important precaution, he could not support treaty ratification: another senior military figure, General Weygand, communicated his opposition to the structure of the proposed Commissariat.⁶⁹ Military antipathy was starting to mount, with individual statements, comments and hints beginning to appear in the press.⁷⁰ The EDC's fiercest parliamentary opponent, the RPF, unanimously condemned the project at its national

⁶⁷Minutes French-US meeting, 26 April 1953, AN, 457 AP 45; *FRUS*, 1952-4 5: 395-96, 27 April. Privately, the Administration had already concluded that Indochina was even more important than Korea 'because the consequences of loss there could not be localised but would spread throughout Asia and Europe', and agreed that a substantial increase would be necessary if the French effort there was not to be reduced, meeting at the White House, 24 March 1953, Box 1, White House Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

⁶⁸Bidault affirmed his personal support for EDC and denied he was a 'bad European', US-French meeting, 26 April 1953, AN 457AP 45; Schuman attested to the sincerity of Mayer, Bidault and Plevén for EDC, Paris tel. 5825, 6 May 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 1.

⁶⁹Juin had studied the additional protocols on behalf of the military staff, Chiefs of Staff memo, 3 March 1953, SHAT, 1 K233 25; Juin letters to Mayer, 23 March & 21 April 1953, SHAT, 238K 5; Auriol, *Journal*, 1953-4, 85-7; Weygand letter to Koenig, 29 March 1953, SHAT, Koenig papers, 1K237 6; Plevén letter to Weygand, 1 April 1953, AN, 4 AU 113.

⁷⁰The military press did not, however, take an openly hostile stand, Claude d'Abzac & Philippe Vial, 'In search of a European consciousness: French military elites and the idea of Europe, 1947-54' in Anne Deighton (ed.) *Building Postwar Europe* (London, 1995), 12-4.

congress on 1 March and there was some suspicion that both Moch and Koenig were using their positions as *rapporteurs* on the parliamentary committees examining the EDC treaty to ensure Assembly consideration was delayed.⁷¹ There was little sign, therefore, that the adaptations in French EDC policy had won over its most important political opponents while public opinion remained overwhelmingly untouched by the entire question. As late as May 1953, 21 percent of the French public had never heard of EDC, while 52 percent did not know if the treaty had already been ratified.⁷²

International changes

The failure to achieve radical reform of the EDC led to a deepening sense of gloom within the administration. Paris was convinced that France's worst-case scenario was now being realised: at every turn signs of a deepening US-German alliance were detected. Adenauer was said to be closer than ever to the US: he had won over Dulles in Bonn, he had former Commissioner McCloy fighting his case in Washington and he had seduced opinion on his recent visit to the US. The Chancellor was allegedly making the most out of the misunderstandings surrounding the additional protocols, presenting Germany as the US's obedient second in Europe.⁷³ Even François-Poncet, Adenauer's most stalwart defender to the Quai, acknowledged that the Chancellor was putting all his energies into the cultivation of US friendship, although the French High Commissioner was not afraid to suggest this was an inevitable consequence of France's recent behaviour.⁷⁴ At the very least the Germans were emphasising that the

⁷¹FRUS 1952-4 5, 768-69, 12 March; m.s. notes by Reynaud on Moch arguments, AN, 74 AP 53.

⁷²Jean Stoetzel, 'The Evolution of French Opinion', in Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.) *France Defeats EDC* (New York, 1957), 85. During the 26 April US-French talks Pleven asserted that the majority of the country favoured a European Army; the head of the EDC Information Committee reportedly shared this opinion, Miller to Tomlinson, 27 May 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 1; Pleven passed an opinion poll to US officials stating 39% believed a European army was the best way to organise European defence (20% favoured a national army, 15% both and 26% had no opinion), Paris tel. 1324, 1 Oct. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 1.

⁷³Bonn tel 709, 7 Feb. 1953, secret service report on the German political situation, AN, 457 AP 47; Washington tel 1561, 16 April 1953, MAE, AM52-63/Etats-Unis/354.

⁷⁴Tel 676, 31 March 1953, AN 457 AP 47. François-Poncet apparently told Adenauer that he did not expect to be staying on in Germany, given he did not get on well with Bidault, UK High Commission tel. 15, 10 Jan. 1953, PRO, FO 371/103919.

EDC delays were not their fault: other reports suggested Bonn was going much further and proposing EDC alternatives to Washington.⁷⁵

There were some grounds to French fears. Before his April visit to the US Adenauer sent Blankenhorn, the German EDC representative, to meet McCloy and sound out a proposal for an immediate start to German troop training. He also suggested that a separation be made between the Paris and Bonn treaties.⁷⁶ Although Dulles pointed out that this could not be done without consulting France and the UK, he promised the Chancellor that once Germany's EDC ratification was complete, Washington would be prepared to approach its partners about expediting German sovereignty.⁷⁷ Adenauer was dealt an even stronger hand with the death of Stalin on 5 March. In speeches at home and in the US the Chancellor was resolute that Germany would continue to pursue its Western integration policies. This firm line was maintained despite indications of a more placatory attitude on the part of the new Soviet leadership, most notably with a declaration of the USSR's peaceful intentions in the UN on 26 March.⁷⁸ Any move towards a détente between the Soviet Union and the West would raise the question of German reunification immediately, as Eisenhower acknowledged in his 16 April speech cautiously welcoming Soviet initiatives. Washington, still determined that any negotiations with the USSR should not delay the completion of EDC, was thus immensely relieved at the position adopted by Adenauer.⁷⁹

French politicians and diplomats were equally suspicious of Soviet intentions. An East-West détente was fraught with dangers for France, for it would inevitably increase the likelihood of a US demobilisation in Europe and the consequent

⁷⁵French secret service memo on Adenauer's US visit, 20 March 1953, AN, 457 AP 45; Washington despatch 1707, 23 April 1953, MAE, AM52-63/Etats-Unis/378.

⁷⁶This would enable restoration of German sovereignty under the terms of the Contractual Arrangements without ratification of the EDC treaty, McCloy memo of Blankenhorn visit, 15 March 1953, Box 8, Subject Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL; Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-56*, ii, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich, 1990) 147-8.

⁷⁷FRUS 1952-4 5: 788, 8 April; Dulles did not approve of Adenauer's unorthodox communication style, as it weakened the position of the new US Commissioner, James Conant, Dulles-McCloy conversation, 27 March 1953, Box 1, Telephone Conversations Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

⁷⁸Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1953* (London, 1956), 17-8.

⁷⁹Royal Institute for International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1953* (London, 1956), 45-50; FRUS 1952-4 5, 375, 23 April; Secret Service political situation memo, 7 April 1953, AN, 4 AU 113.

weakening of NATO.⁸⁰ The prospect of being left alone with Germany on the continent dominated French fears and the fact that détente might revive the possibility of German reunification only served to spur French efforts to advocate caution towards the USSR. Bidault warned US officials that the initiative was an attempt to bloc the development of the Western European community while Mayer supported Eisenhower's restrained approach whole-heartedly, recommending that the Soviets be pushed for settlement on concrete issues rather than engaging them in general dialogue.⁸¹ On the specific question of Germany the French were unequivocal: reunification could not be permitted unless a comprehensive disarmament programme for the country was first achieved. To do otherwise would only tempt the reunited state to deal with the East, and if not to join with the Soviets, then at the very least to play off both sides to its own advantage.⁸²

What unsettled the French was Washington's reluctance to make the same explicit link between reunification and disarmament. Dulles assured the French it was just a question of tactics: in the US the inter-relation between the two problems was not so clearly understood. Making settlement in Asia a condition to any discussions on the German problem would be far better understood and would give the West the necessary time-delay to complete EDC ratification before a four-power meeting occurred.⁸³ Paris was not fully convinced by Dulles's argument, however, and worried that if the Germans themselves began to call for negotiations on reunification, US resoluteness might soon give way. The Social Democrat opposition was already attacking Adenauer's policy of prioritising Western integration and, given the forthcoming German elections, there was every possibility that the US would be moved to help Adenauer defend his commitment to eventual reunification by opening up East-West discussions on the issue.

The alternative scenario envisaged in Paris was no more comforting. Washington might well seek to reward Adenauer's resolve and ensure that the Federal Republic remained firmly integrated in the West by giving it the primary position in

⁸⁰ Chauvel letter to Bidault on recent changes in the USSR, 17 April 1953, AN, 457 AP 44.

⁸¹ Mayer comments on draft of Eisenhower's 16 April speech, Paris tel. 5401, 9 April 1953, UPA, *Eisenhower Office Files*, Pt. 2, *International Series*, Reel 7.

⁸² Memo of meeting between Mayer, Foster Dulles, Dillon and MacArthur, 26 April 1953, AN 457 AP 45; Auriol, *Journal*, 1953-4, 115-16.

⁸³ Mayer-Dulles meeting, 26 April 1953, AN, 457 AP 45.

EDC. The more progress Germany made towards ratification, and the more desperate the US grew for the rapid implementation of EDC, the more possible such an alignment would become.⁸⁴ The changes that appeared to be taking place in the international environment, therefore, only served to accentuate French suspicion that EDC was facilitating the emergence of a deepening US-German relationship. At the same time, external events seemed to illustrate French impotence and, more importantly, helped to obliterate any sense that France's own EDC policy might be playing a part in drawing Germany and the US closer together.

If the Soviet 'peace offensive' revealed France's EDC dilemma, it also illuminated the weakness of its global position. Having encouraged a prudent approach to the Soviets during the April NAC conference, the French were furious at Churchill's call for summit talks on the German problem on 11 May.⁸⁵ The French government suspected that the initiative was an attempt to exploit the opportunity of an East-West conference to shore up Britain's position as a global leader equal to the two superpowers. Notwithstanding US claims of ignorance, Paris realised that Churchill personally hoped the project would be an Anglo-American one only: the Prime Minister's emphasis on personal contacts at the highest level was an uncomfortable reminder of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Mayer, determined that France should not be left out of any talks, proposed to counter the British initiative by calling for a preliminary three-power conference to ensure allied unity of views - '*Si les Etats-Unis acceptent cette suggestion, Churchill sera coincé.*'⁸⁶ Washington was also annoyed at Churchill's sudden unilateral initiative and gave its support to Mayer's proposal, pressing the British Prime Minister to accept a meeting of the three Heads of State the next month in Bermuda.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Secret service memo on 'The Political Situation', 7 April 1953, AN, 4 AU 113. A final conclusion to German ratification could not be secured until the Courts had ruled on the treaty's constitutionality, but with the approval of the Bundesrat in May, a positive outcome looked almost certain.

⁸⁵ John Young notes that neither the FO, the Cabinet nor Britain's allies were forewarned of the initiative, *Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951-55* (Oxford, 1996), 159-60.

⁸⁶ Auriol, *Journal*, 1953-4, 163; Bidault opposed a preliminary tripartite meeting on the grounds that it would illustrate allied divergences to the Soviets, Athens tel. 19 May 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/146; Young, *Churchill's Last Campaign*, 166-68.

⁸⁷ Washington tel. 3770, 20 May 1953, MAE, AM52-63/Etats-Unis/374; Eisenhower to Churchill, 30 May 1953, Box 16, International Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

Ironically Mayer never got the opportunity to participate in his initiative, for on 21 May his government collapsed over a confidence vote on financial reform. The delay in forming a new Cabinet which could participate in the Bermuda talks was partially offset by Churchill's stroke on the eve of the tripartite meeting: the US proposed instead that a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers should take place in Washington in July.⁸⁸ France had held its place in the Western leaders' club through the backing of the US, but with the uncomfortable knowledge that this was a function of Washington's own dislike for the Churchill initiative rather than an explicit recognition of the importance of the US-French partnership. For the moment, broader international preoccupations overshadowed the EDC debate both at home and abroad, much to the relief of the French foreign policy establishment. But while the developments in the international environment gave the Quai a breather from EDC, they starkly illustrated what the framers of France's EDC policy were independently concluding: EDC adaptation could only be brought so far and it was not far enough to satisfy France's foreign policy objectives.

⁸⁸Eisenhower to Churchill, 19 June 1953, Box 16, International Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

Chapter Eight

Preparing a new plan

June 1953 - June 1954

The Quai campaign to remodel EDC along fundamentally different lines had clearly foundered by May 1953. A continental European collective defence with a supranational framework was, although shaken, still the dominant shape and US support for comprehensive European political integration had actually increased. Paris had used up all its credit with its US and European allies: some effort towards the EDC would now have to be made. The British proposal for a four-power conference on Germany offered a reprieve. At the very least, it deflected attention away from EDC and France's dead end position: at most it gave Paris a legitimate way to delay the entire project while French policymakers cast about for alternatives. The significance of Churchill's initiative of 11 May 1953 for the outcome of the EDC cannot be underestimated.

The discussions of summer 1953 marked the start of a series of international negotiations that were to dominate Western foreign policy agendas for the next twelve months - three power talks at Bermuda in December, the Berlin Conference in January 1954, the Geneva Conference in April 1954. Faced with such competing fora, the EDC negotiations stagnated: neither half-hearted discussions of French demands at the ministerial level nor the intricate detailing of treaty texts in the EDC Interim Committee could provide sufficient impetus for the completion, successful or otherwise, of the defence project. The most powerful impulsion for EDC progress remained the US administration and the efforts of its personnel in Europe and Washington. Influenced consistently by the Monnet-Alphand nexus, rather than the French foreign ministry, US policy turned increasingly towards the application of firm pressure on France.

The French pursuit of international discussions throughout 1953-54 was not simply an attempt to avoid EDC ratification. The worsening situation in Indochina could only be resolved at the international level. The divisiveness of domestic politics on practically every issue also served to encourage a weak government to concentrate on the broad appeals of grand summits. Above all, however, it was evidence of an

evolving US defence strategy in Europe, threatening to delegate France to a permanent subordinate role in the alliance, that drove France to pursue international negotiations. It also provided the final impetus for French policy-makers to conclude that EDC had to go. Debate within the foreign policy establishment now revolved around the final obstacle to immediate rejection, the sincerity of US threats, and their very presence introduced an increasingly bitter tone to French-US relations.

The Washington meetings, 10-14 July 1953

The longest ministerial crisis on record that preceded Joseph Laniel's assumption of the premiership on 25 June 1953 did not provide the most auspicious background for the new French Cabinet to assume its international responsibilities.¹ It did, however, enable tripartite discussions between the three Foreign Ministers to finally take place in Washington. In the two months that had elapsed since Churchill's call for a summit between the Western and Soviet leaders, attention had turned towards the subject that would inevitably dominate any four-power discussions - German unification. Although the Independent Laniel's inexperience in foreign affairs and the retention of Bidault as Foreign Minister suggested little change in the orientation of French foreign policy, competing views on the German question and its relationship to EDC were evident.² Massigli warned the interim British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, that France could not even begin to consider EDC ratification until the future of the Federal Republic was clear. Alphand, however, argued that France could not justifiably use four-power talks on Germany as an excuse to hold up EDC progress for the possibility of a united Germany in Europe had been explicitly envisaged by the Western governments when the Bonn and Paris treaties were signed in May 1952.³

French policy had, nevertheless, proceeded on the assumption that Germany's division would continue indefinitely and had quietly come to the conclusion that this arrangement was the best option for France, given that it enabled the maintenance of

¹Three Gaullists (renamed Social Republicans after the RPF's 1952 split) joined MRP, Radical and Conservative representatives for the first time in an uneasy and frequently hostile coalition.

²Paris tel 6671, 28 June 1953, UPA, *State Dept Central Files: France*, pt. 2, reel 5; Harvey to Strang, 26 June 1953, PRO, FO 800/789.

³FO to Paris, tel. 554, 30 June 1953, PRO, FO 800/759; Alphand to Bidault, 1 July 1953, AN, 457 AP 46.

allied forces in West Germany.⁴ In the Quai's opinion, the USSR had just as much reason to fear any change in the German status quo: the likelihood of the Soviet leadership negotiating reunification with the West was extremely doubtful.⁵ Thus French reunification preconditions, such as a general disarmament solution, were designed less to test Soviet sincerity than to ensure that German unity remained practically unachievable. It was Bonn, rather than Moscow, that appeared to challenge the framework of European order in the summer of 1953. The French alleged, notwithstanding the denials of US officials, that German military figures had approached the US with an alternative plan to EDC, one which would bring the Federal Republic into NATO through a bilateral treaty with the US. The uninvited appearance of Blankenhorn in Washington during the Foreign Ministers' meeting and Adenauer's continued assertion that a European security system had to be founded on EDC did little to appease French suspicions of growing German assertiveness.⁶ Fear that EDC was providing the vehicle for Germany's re-emergence encouraged Paris to slow the momentum of the European project through four-power talks.

Both the US and the UK proved less than supportive of this strategy however. Salisbury and Dulles maintained a united position that discussions with the USSR before EDC ratification would represent Allied weakness and encourage the Soviets to re-open the entire rearmament question.⁷ Bidault assured his colleagues that France was not attempting to establish a new precondition to ratification or to re-examine EDC in four-power talks, pointing out that there were still a number of outstanding questions, such as the Saar, which made immediate ratification unfeasible. Some initiative towards the Soviet Union was necessary in the interim, now that European

⁴Briefing paper for Bermuda, 10 June 1953 & Europe desk memo on the Washington talks, 7 July 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/146.

⁵MAE tel. to all posts, 4 July 1953, AN, 457 AP 46.

⁶A delegation, headed by Blank, travelled to the US in June to discuss non-specific military issues. The French secret service reported how an alternative plan had been developing since Blankenhorn's visit to the US in March, Memo, 19 June 1953, AN, 457 AP 46. Although both François-Poncet and Bérard claimed that Adenauer was still committed to EDC, they acknowledged that the Germans were keen to secure US support to begin developing their military structure, Bonn tel. 3296, 21 June 1953, Bérard tel, 25 June 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/71. US officials denied any discussion of alternatives, Riddleburger to de Juniac, 6 July 1953, AN, 457 AP 46.

⁷*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-4* Vol. 5, (Washington, 1983), 1614-15, 1618-21, 11 July; Salisbury and the FO were less than enthusiastic about Churchill's summit proposal, John Young, *Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951-55* (Oxford, 1996), 176; John Colville, *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, ii, 1941-55* (London, 1985), 332.

opinion had been captured by the British proposal.⁸ French arguments were bolstered by Adenauer's claim that his chances of re-election on 6 September would be enhanced if the three ministers publicly invited the USSR to a conference in mid-September.⁹ Reluctantly, Dulles and Salisbury agreed to make this the basis of a tripartite note to the USSR, beginning another series of notes that continued until 26 November, when the USSR finally agreed to a four-power meeting to take place early in the New Year in Berlin.¹⁰

France might have, as the Quai asserted, shown the way for the Western alliance at Washington but the talks were regarded as anything but a success for the French. Bidault was confronted with renewed pressure for progress on EDC from his colleagues and, to the anger of the French delegation, Dulles demanded that the three ministers make a special, separate declaration on European integration including references to ECSC and the European political community project.¹¹ The purpose of the initiative, according to Bruce and Monnet who had recommended it to Dulles, was to commit Bidault publicly to push French European policy forward. The US administration's two principal EDC advisors suspected that Bidault still harboured sympathy for the anti-integration views of his department and claimed, as always, that it was the absence of government leadership and action, rather than a lack of popular support which was the main obstacle to the progress of EDC and EPC in France.¹² Although Bidault rejected Washington's efforts to include an explicit reference to the forthcoming EPC meeting, he was forced to concede to the release of a general tripartite statement on European unity. EDC's political framework was fast becoming a principal source of tension in French-US international encounters.

⁸FRUS 1952-54 5, 1627-28; Schumann to Bidault, Paris tel. 9181, 12 July 1953, AN, 457 AP 46.

⁹Adenauer suspected the Soviet initiative was an attempt to wreck his elections chances, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-56*, ii, *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich, 1990), 154-55.

¹⁰The USSR had been proposing two separate conferences - a five-power meeting on reducing international tension and a four-power summit on Germany. Although eventually agreeing to the Western invitation, the USSR still maintained its call for a conference that included China.

¹¹Schuman to Bidault, 12 July 1953, AN, 457 AP 46; FRUS 1952-4 5: 1622; MAE circular 97, 18 July 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/71; Massigli characterised Salisbury's position on EDC as an attempt to win favour with the US after the tension created by Churchill's proposal. London tel. 3226, 17 July 1953, MAE, EU44-60/ Gén/71.

¹²Monnet sent a letter to Dulles via his old business partner in the US, George Murnane, Bruce sent a similar request to Dulles on the same day, 7 July 1953, Bruce Diaries; FRUS 1952-4 5: 1605; Dulles replied that the letter was very helpful, 15 July 1953, Box 6, General Correspondence and Memoranda, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

Existing EDC conditions: EPC, the Saar and UK association

The French administration showed little intention, however, of revising its approach to European unity. Anglo-American pressure, if anything, served to increase the Quai's determination to pursue a more unilateral European policy in the forthcoming EPC meetings. Adenauer's proposal to his fellow ministers in August that the Six begin steps along the lines of the *ad hoc* Assembly's draft treaty without waiting for the completion of EDC ratification met with a swift French response. The Quai drafted an alternative suggestion that all references to supranational functions in EPC be removed, emphasis being placed instead on the Council of Ministers as the executive force in the European communities.¹³ An enormous row erupted when the French Cabinet was presented with the text of this proposal on 16 September, with the pro-European ministers Reynaud, Teitgen and Pleven fiercely opposing the draft and forcing Bidault (who avoided taking a definitive position) to revise the paper somewhat.¹⁴ The French position now recommended the creation of a specific executive authority based on a council of national ministers and opposed any further extension of the European communities' competences.

Ministers also blocked the Quai's efforts to oust Alphand as head of the French delegation to the Rome meeting in favour of Parodi (with Seydoux as his deputy). To resolve the dispute Bidault finally appointed Ambassador Fouques-Duparc in Rome to lead the team. Nevertheless, the appointment did little to resolve the personal bitterness between Alphand and his senior ministry colleagues, who suspected that the chair of the Interim Committee was working closely with US officials to press the French government into a more conciliatory attitude. The French delegation, for its part, made strenuous efforts to keep British and US observers out of EPC meetings. Frustrated at their lack of leverage over French policy, Bruce and his team could only speculate that the Quai was behind the apparent new intransigence

¹³Coled 42, 6 Aug. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 50; Van Helmont to Monnet, 12 June 1953, FJM, AMI 8/4/3, Jacques Van Helmont, a member of Monnet's team, was active in the Monnet EPC campaign and kept Monnet informed of events.

¹⁴Auriol, *Journal du Septennat, 1947-54*, vii, 1953-4 (Paris, 1971), 424-29; Cabinet meeting, 16 Sept. 1953, AN, 4 AU 97; memo re instructions to French delegation to the Rome Conf., 18 Sept. 1953, AN, 74 AP 54; 17 Sept. 1953, Bruce Diaries.

displayed by the Dutch on European institutional questions.¹⁵ The Quai's efforts paid off however: Adenauer's proposal did not survive September's EPC meeting. The only decision reached by the Six was agreement to continue their discussions at The Hague in November.

Officially, the US continued to declare that political integration was a matter for the Europeans to work out themselves; in private, however, the Bruce Mission worked hard to counteract the Quai's anti-EPC campaign. The effort led US officials to turn increasingly towards Germany and, specifically, Adenauer as the best hope for European political integration. Monnet who, for the first time since 1949 could not claim the French premier as a close confidante, backed this approach entirely. The two men were fast becoming principal advisors to the Chancellor in his encounters with the French government and urged Adenauer not to compromise with Bidault on EPC. Bruce warned the Germans that any new proposal would only add further complications and would be used as an excuse for additional procrastination in Paris. Adenauer agreed to maintain a firm line against any French effort to torpedo the supranational political project.¹⁶ As French diplomats sourly acknowledged, the EDC was becoming a sort of litmus test for US opinion towards European countries, which Adenauer was cultivating with the utmost skill.¹⁷

French defensiveness mounted with Adenauer's triumphant election victory on 6 September, (his party won 45.2 percent of the vote, the highest ever cast for a single party in Germany). Although Bidault claimed that the result provided him with the necessary stimulus to devote his full attention to the EDC question, the French ducked Adenauer's proposals for direct talks on what the Quai defined as the only purely Franco-German problem of importance, namely the Saar.¹⁸ Paris insisted its earlier

¹⁵10 Aug. & 10 Sept. 1953, Bruce Diaries; Coled 42, 6 Aug. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 50; Bidault tel. 1330, 4 Oct. 1953, AN, 74 AP 55; Cleveland to Bruce, 6 Oct. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 24; François Seydoux, *Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin* (Paris, 1975), 182-83.

¹⁶Bruce to Blankenhorn, 23 Sept. 1953, Bruce Diaries; the Monnet team organised a secret meeting between Mollet and Adenauer in an effort to secure common agreement on EPC proposals, Van Helmont to Monnet 12 June 1953, FJM, AMJ 8/4/3. Blankenhorn noted retrospectively that Bonn had depended too much on pro-EDC activists in France for their assessments on the EDC situation there, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Anfänge*, 213.

¹⁷Bonn tels 1691 & 5707, 19 Aug. & 23 Oct. 1953, New York tel 746, 17 Sept. 1953, MAE, AM52-63/Etats-Unis/379.

¹⁸De Margerie to Achilles, 20 Oct. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14; British Embassy fortnightly report, 27 Aug - 9 Sept 1953, PRO, FO 371/107434; Sarre desk memo, 20 Oct. & unsigned memo for Bidault, 21 Oct. 1953, AN, 457 AP 47.

proposal for the europeanisation of the Saar was non-negotiable and would only allow preparatory discussions between Adenauer and François-Poncet to take place.¹⁹ Once again the US stepped into the breach, with Dulles appealing personally to Adenauer to go to the 'extreme limit to reach agreement with the French' on the grounds that Germany was 'in a better position politically to make reasonable concessions than are the French'.²⁰ Although Bidault and Adenauer agreed, when they met at The Hague on 28 November, to have further negotiations on the Saar, the issue remained a constant source of friction between the two. The negative tactics of the French administration after the summer certainly succeeded in delaying EDC but they did little to facilitate France's relationship with its allies.

The only aspect of EDC which the French administration appeared willing to address was the question of UK association. Discussions between British representatives and the military committee of the EDC Interim Committee resulted in agreement at the end of November on a draft text detailing Britain's military association with the European Army. Massigli had already begun a *Quai* charge against the terms of the document, demanding that the British promise to 'consult' with its European allies before removing troops from the continent be set out in a formal exchange of letters rather than a public statement, a commitment the UK Cabinet refused to undertake.²¹ Paris also signalled its unhappiness at the fact that the exact level of the British continental force was left unfixed and that its obligations extended to the twenty years of the NATO treaty rather than the fifty year duration of the EDC. It seemed as if the French foreign ministry was set on undermining what little progress had been made by the European Army delegations and Bidault, with his sights fixed on the French presidential elections in December, the first since 1946, was content to give his officials their head. Further negotiations with the UK would permit him to avoid taking any immediate public action on the controversial EDC issue while increasing his standing among parliamentary deputies.

¹⁹François-Poncet to Bidault, 15 Nov. 1953, AN, 457 AP 47. The Commissioner bitterly lamented the state of Franco-German relations, as also did Bérard, letter to Bidault, 13 Nov. 1953, MAE, SG 14.

²⁰Dulles message to Adenauer, 20 Nov. 1953, Box 8, Subject Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

²¹London tel. 4843, 14 Oct. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/66; Coled 88, 17 Nov. 1953, NARA, RG 84 Paris Embassy: C, Box 23; Eden memo to Cabinet, 26 Nov. 1953, PRO, CAB 129/64, C(53)332.

The divisions within the Laniel government, its domestic unpopularity, and the Premier's own presidential ambitions made the prospect of Cabinet intervention in the Quai's management of EDC policy unlikely.²² The government's resolute avoidance of any initiative towards parliamentary consideration of the treaty (the prerequisite legislative committee hearings had still not begun) indicated it was not adverse to leaving the ministry in charge. The foreign affairs debate that took place in the National Assembly from 17-27 November 1953 was originally scheduled to secure a general endorsement of the government's European policy before The Hague EPC conference: only the announcement that the British, French and US Heads of State would meet in Bermuda from 4-7 December (another Churchill initiative) widened the debate to include EDC.²³

For the first time since February 1952 the French parliament considered a motion of support for EDC and the ensuing bitter debate revealed how unsuccessful the government's additional protocol campaign had proved in its proclaimed goal of winning parliamentary support. Indeed, protocol issues such as the Saar or the details of contested treaty articles hardly featured in the week-long debate which failed to produce a resolution backing the government's EDC policy. The preoccupying theme for the majority of deputies remained the threat of any German rearmament, a clear illustration of how far removed deputies were from French EDC policymaking.²⁴ But the showdown also demonstrated how profoundly EDC divided French political parties: only the Gaullists, the Communists (both against) and the MRP (for) displayed a united position. Internal party tensions reinforced deputies' preoccupations with the domestic, and above all, parliamentary consequences of the question. The Radicals' refusal to support the motion of approval for European integration, for example, was motivated as much by the fact that it was a Socialist proposal as by its support for a political authority and EDC.²⁵

²²US officials, given their suspicions of Bidault, had tried to cultivate contacts with Laniel, suggesting first a visit (which Bidault strongly opposed) and then sending a personal letter from Eisenhower, urging progress on EDC, 21 Sept. 1953, Box 68, Confidential File, Subject Series, WHCF, DDEL; Bedell Smith to Dulles, 18 Sept. 1953, Box 1, Telephone Conversations Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL; Herz to Bruce, 26 Oct. 1953, Bruce Diaries.

²³Embassy despatch no. 470, 30 Nov. 1953, PRO, FO 371/107440.

²⁴The arrival of the Soviet response to the Berlin Conference proposal, on 26 November, encouraged some deputies to demand that another attempt be made to negotiate Germany's continued disarmament with the USSR.

²⁵In its coverage of the debate, *Le Figaro* lamented these narrow preoccupations, 28-29 Nov. 1953.

All this served to underline that no matter how unpopular EDC might be, there was no alternative policy which could secure a majority in the Assembly and still less likelihood of any such proposal being formulated in the parliament. What was also clear was the impossibility of Laniel's centre-right Cabinet, which included the Gaullists, to put together a majority for the project. The government's poor defence of its policy was further weakened when Bidault collapsed after the first half hour, forcing Schumann to read the text of his Minister's speech. After an uninspiring performance, Laniel was finally forced to present a motion of confidence to the House, which succeeded by 31 votes (with more than a hundred abstentions) only after Gaullist deputies made it clear that their votes did not constitute approval of the government's foreign policy.²⁶ The ambivalent and ultimately inconclusive results of the debate influenced the presidential election on 17 December. Conservative senator René Coty won as the candidate who, having been ill for the debate, was able to demonstrate no opinion on EDC.²⁷

The Bermuda conference and the Paris NAC meeting, December 1953

The Assembly debate shook the US administration, its concessionary response to France's EDC demands having been based on the belief that reforms would produce a more favourable parliamentary atmosphere. All that the French government's campaign had appeared to facilitate, however, was the development of increased domestic opposition. Realisation that a major political battle over ratification was inevitable led US officials to argue that the Laniel Cabinet should be pressed to launch the EDC debate immediately.²⁸ Bruce and his staff had been recommending a firmer approach for some time, claiming that unless the US began to warn France of the consequences of non-ratification for US policy both the French foreign office and the military would continue to oppose EDC and block all efforts to convince the

²⁶*Journal Officiel: Débats, Assemblée*, 18, 28 Nov. 1953, 5626-638.

²⁷Debré notes how he and other EDC opponents united in a tactical vote to ensure a pro-EDC candidate would not win, *Trois républiques pour une France*, ii, (Paris, 1988), 212-13.

²⁸Before the debate both Mendès France and Debré had commented on the treaty's improved chances, Mendès France to Dillon, 20 Oct. 1953, Debré to Herz, 9 Nov. 1953, Paris tels. 17 & 26 Nov. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

French public and parliament of its necessity.²⁹ Bruce, and subsequently Monnet, had assured US ambassadors in Europe, when they met in August, that the French parliament would ultimately ratify EDC, 'for there is a sufficient body of influential individuals in the government who can force it to debate and favourable vote'.³⁰

Domestic internal debate in the US encouraged Washington to accept the Bruce-Monnet diagnosis and prescription. The avowed commitment of the Republican administration to a balanced budget and the progressive reduction of US military and economic assistance overseas was being complicated by Europe's lack of rearmament progress. Interdepartmental debate as to how hard the Europeans were really trying to achieve the NATO targets set the year before raged throughout 1953, with the State Department claiming that the Treasury's proposal for major reductions in US aid programmes would threaten Europe's still fragile economic and political recovery. It also did battle with the Pentagon, opposing recommendations that Washington take bilateral steps to prepare the Germans for rearmament in EDC.³¹ Congress had already signalled its frustration in June when the government submitted its annual appropriation proposals. An effort by the House to make half the administration's six-million dollar military aid package conditional upon ratification of the EDC treaty was blocked only when the Senate finally agreed this should be a matter for presidential discretion rather than a binding provision. Both chambers left no doubt, however, of their determination to impose wide ranging cuts in foreign aid over the next two years.³² The culmination of domestic and international imperatives moved the Eisenhower administration to agree that it was now time to force the French into EDC and realise the twelve additional divisions that German rearmament therein would provide.

Paris was more than sensitive to US domestic debates. In fact it was signs of a reassessment of US strategic and military programmes in Washington that

²⁹Tomlinson memo to Dept, 24 March 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C Box 13; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 823-25, 15 Oct.

³⁰Minutes of Euro. Mission Chiefs conf., 27-29 Aug. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy, C, Box 1.

³¹Summary of NSC special meeting, 31 March & 165th NAC meeting, 7 Oct. 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, Whitman File, DDEL; NSC 161 Status of Project Reports, 30 June 1953, Box 3, Status of Projects Subseries, NSC Series, OSANSA, White House Office File, DDEL; Merchant to Bruce, 4 Sept. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 30.

³²*FRUS*, 1952-4 5: 792-94, 796-97, 16 June, 13 July.

preoccupied the Quai at the end of 1953.³³ Dulles had already hinted at April's NAC meeting that a 'New Look' defence strategy was being developed, recommending that the West build its defences on a long-term basis, employing 'new weapons' which would provide maximum security at reduced economic cost for the alliance partners.³⁴ The implicit message was clear: the US would adopt principal responsibility for the increased employment of nuclear force in Western strategy, assigning its non-nuclear partners charge of European ground defence. In mid-October US Defence Secretary, Charles Wilson, alluded publicly to the implications the New Look would have for US troop deployment in Europe.³⁵ Widespread European press coverage and furious protests from the Quai prompted Dulles and Eisenhower to issue statements denying the existence of any such plans. Nevertheless, rumours persisted, forcing Eisenhower to instruct the NSC on 10 December that no public announcements were to be made about US troop deployment until Germany's military contribution had been secured in EDC.³⁶

Solidifying the US continental presence was one of the most fundamental objectives of French EDC policy: suspicion that Washington might be contemplating a future withdrawal made Paris determined, therefore, to secure a formal US commitment at the Bermuda conference. The French maintained that Congressional approval of the NATO treaty's extension to fifty years offered the best form of guarantee, notwithstanding the US administration's refusal to bring the issue before the legislature.³⁷ An explicit confirmation to participate in NATO's 'forward strategy' was a less-than-second best: Bidault spelled out in Bermuda that this would mean 'the

³³De Margerie comment, Paris tel. 511, 25 Nov. 1953, PRO, FO 371/107440; Memo re EDC and Western strategy (unsigned), 7 Oct. 1953, MAE, SG 14; Alphan memo to Bidault, 14 Nov. 1953, AN, 457 AP 35.

³⁴Service des Pactes memo on the NAC session, 30 April 1953, AN, 457 AP 44; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 374-9, 24 April; Saki Dockrill, 'Cooperation and Suspicion: The United States' Alliance Diplomacy for the Security of Western Europe, 1953-54', *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 5, no. 1, March 1994, 138-82; Brian R. Duchin, 'The "Agonizing Reappraisal": Eisenhower, Dulles and the European Defence Community', *Diplomatic History*, 16, no. 2, Spring 1992, 201-21.

³⁵165th NSC meeting, 7 Oct. 1953, Box 4, NSC Series, Whitman File, DDEL; Bonnet to Paris, 20 & 23 October 1953, SHAT, 1K233 32; Dulles to Eisenhower, 21 Oct. 1953, Box 1, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL; Hughes to Dulles, Polto 677, 27 Oct. 1953, Box 68, Subject Series, Confidential Files, WHCF, DDEL; Alphan to Bidault, 26 Oct. 1953, AN, 457 AP 35.

³⁶10 Dec. 1953, Box 1, ACW Diary Series, Whitman File, DDEL; *FRUS*, 1952-4 5: 449-54, 11 Dec.

³⁷Alphan memo, 21 Sept. 1953, MAE, SG 14; Alphan tel. 51.587, 15 Oct. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/72; Briefing paper for Bedell Smith-Alphan meeting, 20 Oct. 1953, NARA, RG 59, Lot 55 D 115, Box 2.

strength of US and UK forces stationed in Europe should represent a definite proportion of total forces and have a definite proportion relationship to the German forces of the *couverture*'.³⁸ The dismal result of the National Assembly debate made Bidault even more resolute that a satisfactory US guarantee had to be given before the government tackled EDC ratification. Alphand promptly drafted the text of a possible US declaration to EDC for Bruce to take to Washington in which the US promised not to abide by the twenty year clause of the NATO treaty but to commit itself to the alliance indefinitely; to consult with its partners on the volume and character of its European troop commitments; and to continue its adherence to the principle of a forward strategy.³⁹

Alphand's unofficial initiative was undoubtedly an attempt to out-manoeuvre his opponents in the foreign ministry who were reluctant to link US assurances to Europe with the EDC. Quai officials had reached the conclusion that the growing emphasis on nuclear weapons, rather than consideration of ground forces, was the real issue at stake for France. The Soviet announcement in August that it had successfully constructed its first hydrogen bomb confirmed that nuclear power was fast becoming the new condition for international power status. If nuclear weaponry was going to occupy a dominant position in future defence strategies, then Western planning would inevitably be in the hands of its two nuclear powers, Britain and the US. It was imperative, therefore, that French participation in all projects relating to NATO's use of nuclear weapons be secured. As Massigli argued, '*Seule une étroite collaboration des trois grandes puissances occidentales serait de nature à nous apporter des apaisements suffisants.*'⁴⁰ This participation would be impossible, Quai officials argued, if Alphand's attempt to secure a US declaration to the EDC succeeded. Boegner of the Service des Pactes desk, who was also a member of the French Atomic Energy Committee (CEA), warned that a US commitment to the collective continental body would compromise French chances of securing tripartite strategic consultations, independently from its five partners.⁴¹ France should instead continue its pursuit of

³⁸FRUS 1952-4 5: 1728-29, 1799-1801, 4-6 Dec; Coled 88, 17 Nov. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 23.

³⁹Alphand tel. 51684, 25 Nov. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/148.

⁴⁰Massigli to Paris, 29 Oct. 1953, SHAT, 1K233 32.

⁴¹Reported in Alphand memo to Bidault, 6 Nov. 1953, AN, 457 AP 35.

explicit recognition of the Standing Group as the Western alliance's principal force: the foreign ministry was thus reluctant to have any discussion of EDC take place in Bermuda.⁴² The impossibility of this was recognised in Paris but, rather than devise a compromise position, French policy-makers reverted to the all-too familiar tack of bringing the two contradictory policies to the conference.

French and US EDC policies were destined for collision; only Churchill's dominance at Bermuda softened their first contact. The Heads of State meeting was the Prime Minister's pet project and it was he who led the attack on the French delegation that the past three years had been 'completely wasted' in getting the 'good strong German army' that was absolutely necessary for Western defence. When Bidault, forced to present the French case after Laniel fell ill, set out the problems still confronting EDC ratification, Churchill refused to accept that 'a few fields in the Saar valley' should be allowed to hold up progress, insisted that Britain was unable to propose additional assistance and reminded the French yet again that EDC was their own invention.⁴³ In the face of Churchill's unconcealed hostility towards the French the restrained appeals of both Dulles and Eisenhower, emphasising Congressional impatience for results, appeared positively benign. Only in private conversation with Laniel did US officials hint at the potential effects further delay could have for European security arrangements and French leadership on the continent.⁴⁴

Nevertheless, the signs of new US firmness were evident. The US delegation avoided discussion of a further commitment to Europe and left the French in no doubt that only when the government announced the start of ratification proceedings would the US consider making an additional declaration.⁴⁵ The US and UK governments abstained from support of the French position in the Saar and the final communiqué merely noted how the French foreign minister explained the problems facing his government in regard to EDC. Crucially, French efforts to reinforce tripartite direction of the alliance through increased cooperation on atomic energy questions were

⁴²Paris tel 1954, 17 Nov. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 4; Alphand tel 51684, 25 November 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/148.

⁴³*FRUS* 1952-4 5, 1780-1, 1802-4; French deleg tel. 51, 8 Dec. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/148; Churchill had arrived in Bermuda 'raring to be rude' to the French, quoted in Young, *Churchill's Last Campaign*, 223.

⁴⁴MacArthur to Laniel & Dulles to Laniel, 4 & 8 Dec. 1953, *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 1740-44, 1843-44.

⁴⁵*FRUS* 1952-4 5, p. 1845, 8 Dec; Auriol, *Journal*, 1953-4, 557-58.

studiously ignored. Although the French presented their two allies with a request to participate in Anglo-American studies on the effects of atomic weapons and exchanges of information on atomic energy matters before departing Bermuda, it was already obvious that the US and the UK had no intention of extending to France membership of the most exclusive Western club of all.⁴⁶

It was at the Paris NAC meeting, one week later, that Dulles drove home the US message to the French. In front of the NATO members and at a press conference immediately afterwards, the Secretary warned that if the EDC did not become effective, 'if France and Germany remain apart so that they will again be potential enemies then there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonising reappraisal of basic US policy.'⁴⁷ The timing and nature of the statement testified to its deliberateness, incorporating the views of officials and Cabinet members - indeed Eisenhower had already given his approval to a draft of the speech.⁴⁸ Above all, the speech bore the unmistakable influence of the Bruce and Monnet teams, both of whom saw Dulles individually before the meeting: even from London Massigli could point the finger at Monnet.⁴⁹ Dulles's speech did produce the desired press effect, so much so that Embassy officials were afraid to communciate the extent of the uproar. In terms of convincing wider French opinion of EDC, however, the value of the 'shock method' was questionable. Those who argued that the speech merely illustrated the reality of the situation, like government ministers Reynaud and Pleven, were supporters of the EDC project anyway, while a number of the most pro-EDC politicians were affronted by the brutal approach.⁵⁰ For opponents of EDC, the warning served to distance France from any sense of responsibility for a project which, they could now allege,

⁴⁶ *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 448-9, 1845-6; Dockrill, 'Cooperation and Suspicion', 163. Washington did agree that more information about atomic weapons would have to be made generally available if NATO states were to support the New Look proposals.

⁴⁷ NATO minutes of the NAC meeting, 14 Dec. 1953, (C-VR(53)54), AN, 457 AP 44.

⁴⁸ Dulles to Eisenhower, 10 Dec. 1953, Box 69, Vol. 1, Correspondence, Dulles Private Papers, Mudd Library; Dulles to Selwyn Lloyd, 15 Dec. 1953, PRO, FO800/698.

⁴⁹ Massigli to Parodi, 10 Dec. 1953, MAE, PA-AP 217/71; Pierre Melandri, *Les Etats-Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe* (Paris, 1980), 427-28.

⁵⁰ Interview with Theodore Achilles, 7 May 1966, Dulles Oral History Collection, Dulles Papers, Mudd Library; Auriol, *Journal*, 1953-4, 559; Paris tel 566, 16 Dec. 1953, PRO, FO 800/789.

was an American 'diktat' and illustrative of the US intention, one way or the other, to pull out of Europe.⁵¹

Ultimately, however, the threat of a complete retreat from continental Europe, made at the very moment when the US administration sought NATO agreement on the 'New Look' strategy by assuring its allies 'that we had no intention of cutting down our striking power to assist Europe and...that we would maintain an appropriate balance between the offence and defence' rang hollow.⁵² EDC remained an 'indispensable step towards present US objectives in Europe: the establishment of a sound basis for a united and self-reliant Western Europe closely allied with the US and the addition of German forces to Western Defence.'⁵³ The administration in Washington continued to believe that a suitable alternative for European defence simply did not exist: officials in Europe were reminded of this point in detailed instructions issued by the Bruce Mission for use in future EDC discussions.⁵⁴ The only new element to US EDC policy was an increasing determination to explore alternative ratification routes. As long as this was the case, France's central role could not be ignored. Thus, for all Dulles's rhetoric at Paris, Washington accepted that ratification would not begin until four-power talks in Berlin (due to open on 25 January) were concluded; held up the carrot of a US declaration to EDC if the French government promised to look for a parliamentary vote immediately afterwards; and coaxed cooperation by giving France a leading role at the forthcoming conference.⁵⁵ In US eyes, France was less a leading partner in Europe than an awkward burden.

French alternatives

The dangers of a continued display of EDC weakness were obvious to the French foreign ministry. The Quai's first effort to adapt EDC in collaboration with the US

⁵¹ Chauvel to Bidault, 13 Jan. 1954, AN, 457 AP 44.

⁵² Dulles to NSC 177th meeting, 24 Dec. 1953, Box 5, NSC Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

⁵³ Moore memo on EDC alternatives, 4 Nov. 1953, NARA, RG 59, Lot 55 D115, Box 2; NSC 5407, Status of projects as of 31 Dec. 1953, Box 3, NSC Series, OSANSA, White House Office File, DDEL; Duchin, 'The "Agonizing Reappraisal"', 212.

⁵⁴ Suggested position for the guidance of US officials in discussions on EDC and related questions (undated), Box 3, NATO Series, Gruenther Papers, DDEL.

⁵⁵ Dulles to Eisenhower, 20 Jan. 1954, Box 8, White House Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL; Alphan-Bruce discussion, 15 Jan. 1954, AN, 457 AP 36.

had failed and Washington had now called time for Paris's second strategy of EDC set-aside. The Bermuda and NAC conferences had confirmed the threat EDC posed to French leadership objectives but they also illustrated the damage that continued wavering was inflicting on France's alliance position. The two showdowns finally spurred the department to take up what some of EDC's parliamentary opponents had already begun, namely the elaboration of a coherent alternative. Individual diplomats, most notably Massigli, had been acting as informal advisors to deputies like Michel Debré and General Billotte, encouraging them to prepare the substitute solution necessary when the 'monstrous' EDC project finally collapsed. *'Le rejet du traité par le Parlement français provoquera de toute manière une crise, cette crise soit grave et dangereuse si nous n'avons rien à mettre à la place.'*⁵⁶ Nor were initiatives confined to the Right: during the summer's Socialist congress Pierre-Olivier Lapie suggested (like Seydoux in January 1953) abandoning EDC in favour of a European armaments community while even pro-EDC figures, like the MRP deputy Guérin de Beaumont, actually criticised the Quai leadership for failing to propose an alternative to a project it so vehemently opposed. On 19 January 1954 de Beaumont publicly announced his own proposal for a compromise solution suspending EDC's supranational features indefinitely so as to enable rearmament to begin.⁵⁷

Parodi finally took the initiative and instructed his senior staff - Gros, Seydoux, Sauvagnargues, Chatenet, Alphand - to draw up suitable alternatives to the EDC treaty before the end of the year. Four possible options were put forth: direct German entrance into NATO; a significantly modified EDC treaty applying the principle of integration to specific issues (there were two variants of this, one suspending supranationality only when it came to personnel questions, the other limiting integration solely to armaments and external aid); a new, enlarged European defence organisation enabling continued German exclusion from NATO (specific membership was not identified but a modified Brussels Treaty was suggested as a likely structure); and a final proposal to link this alternative European organisation

⁵⁶Massigli to Billotte, 27 Oct. 1953 & to Debré, 19 Nov. 1953, MAE, PA-AP 217/71; Billotte memo on European integration, 14 Oct. 1953, MAE, SG 14.

⁵⁷Herz to Achilles, 6 July 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 13; De Beaumont-Herz conversation, 10 Dec. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10; *Le Monde*, 20 Jan. 1954.

with the community of arms envisaged in EDC.⁵⁸ The Quai's central concern was not the prevention or even the limitation of the twelve German divisions established in the 1952 NATO force goals but rather the extent of the political and military sacrifices France had to accept in order to exert control over these forces. The desire to maintain the economic advantages of burden-sharing between national defence industries was the other dominant feature. None of these alternatives was particularly novel. The only new element was the marked absence of any suggestion for a US-French coordinated settlement to European defence organisation. US agreement to a French alternative was the most the diplomats sought, which the retention of some element of the European idea was intended to accomplish.⁵⁹ The broad lines sketched by the ministry indicated that the European body it envisaged was broad in membership, limited in concern and firmly intergovernmental. In these fundamental respects, the Quai's EDC alternatives were a world away from the Pleven Plan.

The first indication that something was afoot came on 31 December, when François-Poncet paid a visit to Adenauer. Referring to EDC's difficulties in France, the High Commissioner raised, in very general terms, the possibility of gradual implementation, a proposal which the Chancellor appeared willing to consider. Foreign Minister Hallstein, who opposed the idea, moved swiftly to counteract any impression that Germany was interested in changes to the EDC Treaty and alerted the US to this latest French initiative.⁶⁰ Bruce and Tomlinson, who warned Hallstein to stand firm against any such proposal, regarded the incident as proof of gathering momentum in the Quai's opposition and indicative of future French action unless a united bloc against treaty changes was presented by the US, UK and the five remaining EDC states. Quai officials had already, for the first time, begun to approach their Dutch and Belgian counterparts, sounding out their positions on piecemeal implementation of an EDC with minimal supranationality, and proposing that the Belgians, rather than themselves, be the ones to raise the question of a new protocol.

⁵⁸Dossier on alternatives to EDC, Dec. 1953, MAE, SG 14.

⁵⁹Thus Massigli, when consulted, recommended that although he preferred the third option, the last was the most suitable alternative, Letter to Parodi, 4 Jan. 1954, MAE, PA-AP 217/101. There is no indication that anyone else was shown the dossier - Massigli sent it back with his letter - and it does not appear in other files.

⁶⁰Bonn tel. 7003, 31 Dec. 1953, MAE, SG 15; Tomlinson to Bowie, 9 Jan. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

French diplomats also suggested the Benelux make a separate advance to the British - and possibly the Americans - on the subject of association.⁶¹ The Embassy in the Hague was confident that France could get the Dutch on its side, reporting that Foreign Minister Beyen would be happy to see the treaty collapse.⁶²

Secretary of State Schumann and Alphand were the only ministry officials who tried to oppose the new policy direction. Gradual implementation, they argued, would only increase the liberty of a German national army and Schumann instead proposed conditional ratification: the government would ask parliament to vote on the EDC treaty immediately but would promise not to submit it for formal presidential ratification until the three conditions of Saar settlement, additional protocols and US/UK declarations, were secured. *'Le principal avantage de cette formule consiste à mettre entre les mains du Gouvernement français un instrument de négociation qui peut être déterminant. Il n'aurait plus désormais la responsabilité d'un échec puisque le dernier mot appartiendrait à ses interlocuteurs.'*⁶³ Officials, like Chauvel, denied such rapid action was necessary, even as they admitted that France would have to come up with something once the four-power conference at Berlin ended.⁶⁴ The Quai's unhurried approach was undoubtedly a function of the hesitation consistently displayed by its political leaders. But Parodi and his staff had still not managed to develop a positive strategy for bringing about an EDC alternative. In the meanwhile, they were willing to let EDC drift, making little attempt to disguise their opinions abroad and aligning themselves with other administrative opponents, principally the Overseas Ministry and the Atomic Energy Committee, both of which bitterly criticised the political and military restrictions the EDC would place upon France.⁶⁵

⁶¹Coled 135, 19 Jan. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11. The idea of getting the Benelux to approach the UK separately was launched by Massigli in November, after Eden complained that it was only France who was raising the demands on UK association, 26 Nov. 1953, MAE, PA-AP 217/71. The Dutch, in response, did raise the question of troop commitment with London and were told that Britain would refuse to inform the French of the size of its continental presence until the French gave a commitment to attach no further demands to treaty ratification. Jan van der Harst, *The Netherlands and the European Defence Community* (Florence, 1986), 43.

⁶²The Hague tel. 115, 25 Jan. 1954, MAE, SG 15; The situation was quite the opposite: with the majority of the Dutch Cabinet regarding EDC as a necessary evil, it was only Beyen who was committed to the principles of the EDC, van der Harst, *The Netherlands and the EDC*, 35.

⁶³Schumann to Bidault, 4 Jan. 1954, MAE, SG 15; Alphand to Bidault, 7 Jan. 1954, AN 457 AP 50.

⁶⁴Chauvel to Bidault, 12 Oct. 1953, AN, 457 AP 44; Unsigned memo on EDC, 20 Jan. 1954, MAE, SG 15.

⁶⁵CEA memo to Bidault, 1 March 1954, MAE, SG 15; Jaques Bariety points to the link between French atomic research and EDC hostility, 'La décision de réarmer l'Allemagne, l'échec de la

Delay gave officials more time to develop a coherent alternative while offering the continued opportunity to secure such benefits as the US, the UK and France's five EDC partners were prepared to concede in order to convince the Laniel government to take ratification action.

French government preoccupations

Alphand's swift assurances to the US and the Interim Committee that the Quai's campaign had been launched without the knowledge or support of Laniel, Bidault and the rest of the government prevented a new EDC crisis erupting publicly and Laniel's 6 January declaration of his government's continued commitment to EDC helped soothe ruffled feathers. Nevertheless, US officials worried about the activities of the 'Parodi clique', not least because of its continued ability to maintain an active press campaign against EDC. Nor were they prepared to remain outside the dispute. Bruce went so far as to warn Parodi personally against pursuit of further alteration of the treaty, while his Mission, along with Embassy officials and General Gruenther and his staff at SHAPE, mounted energetic campaigns to convince political, military and business elites of the benefits of EDC for France.⁶⁶ Full US backing for Laniel and Bidault, despite the government's frustrating weakness and lack of action, was vital if the foreign ministry hierarchy was to be disempowered. Laniel's lack of familiarity with the details of EDC complicated this and made it difficult to assess how he would act on the central issues still to be resolved - the Saar and the specific terms of both the British association and the US declaration to EDC.⁶⁷

Yet as the Berlin Conference began on 25 January 1954 EDC seemed further than ever from French Cabinet preoccupations. The continued deterioration of the situation in Indochina was the source of the government's foreign policy concern. The

Communauté Européenne de Défense et les accords de Paris du 23 octobre 1954 vus du côté français', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, no. 71, 1993, 354-83.

⁶⁶Coled 126 & 127, 7 & 9 Jan. 1954, Paris tel. 2702, 21 Jan. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11; 31 Jan. 1954, Bruce Diaries. Gruenther wrote Eisenhower how SHAPE was organising group visits (around 500 people in total), the main purpose of which was to secure support for EDC, 20 Dec. 1953, UPA, *Eisenhower Office Files* pt. 1, reel 13. Debré describes the US involvement as 'corruption', alleging that huge sums of money were spent in the effort to win politicians over, *Trois républiques*, ii, 191, 214-17.

⁶⁷Alphand reported Laniel still hesitating after having seen himself, Parodi and General Juin individually to discuss EDC, *L'étonnement d'être* (Paris, 1977), 241.

Laniel Cabinet had come to power the previous June only after the defeat by one vote of the young Radical politician, Pierre Mendès France, who had based his candidacy on a demand for immediate negotiations with Ho Chi Minh to permit a French withdrawal. Since then public pressure for an end to the conflict had continued to mount.⁶⁸ Indications of growing nationalism in the Associated States, where the Vietnam national congress voted against remaining in the French Union in its current form, made the enormous military and economic sacrifice even more questionable to metropolitan opinion. The announcement of the Korean armistice in July seemed to point to the feasibility of a similar end to hostilities in Indochina and a widely-reported press interview by Ho Chi Minh in November indicated the Vietminh leader's willingness to engage in international negotiations with the French. Although formally designed to discuss conditions for settlement in Germany, the Berlin Conference offered a potential opportunity for four-power consideration of an Asian peace conference: the Soviets had already tabled a motion proposing five power talks with Chinese participation.⁶⁹

The French Cabinet, however, remained hopelessly divided on how to pursue an end to the war in Indochina - whether to internationalise the conflict to speed its conclusion; to achieve military 'pacification' before negotiations; to deal directly with the Vietminh; or to widen talks to a general peaceful resolution in Asia. This worried the British and US governments, which feared the French might succumb to a potential Soviet offer linking peace in Asia to the rejection of EDC. Bidault's firm defence of EDC at the Berlin Conference against Soviet Foreign Minister Georgi Molotov's attacks was greeted, therefore, with enormous relief by the US and UK governments, not least because it also committed Bidault to EDC in a very public way.⁷⁰ The French Foreign Minister refuted Soviet claims that EDC went against the spirit of European collective security and stressed that the defence project was an integral part of the NATO defence alliance designed to bring about the peace and security of the continent.⁷¹ There was now an even greater impetus, as the four-power

⁶⁸Jacques Dalloz, *La guerre d'Indochine* (Paris, 1987), 224.

⁶⁹Kevin Ruane, 'Anthony Eden, British diplomacy and the origins of the Geneva Conference of 1954', *Historical Journal*, 37, no. 1, 1994, 153-72.

⁷⁰Notes, 1 Feb. 1954, Box 33, CD Jackson log, Jackson Papers, DDEL; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 973, 5 Feb.

⁷¹Bidault tels to Paris, AN, 457 AP 50; MAE memo 'Current tendencies of Soviet policy', 30 Nov. 1953, AN, 4 AU 48; Alphand tel. 10.057, 10 Feb. 1954, AN, 457 AP 36.

talks on German unity dragged on without agreement, for the US and the UK to assist the French government and make a further step to meet its ratification conditions.

Towards the end of the conference in February, therefore, Alphand was called from Paris to brief Dulles and Eden on the current status of ratification, following which Dulles suggested that French and US representatives meet in Washington to work out the details of the US declaration to EDC.⁷² The extent to which the US would commit itself to Europe, Bidault assured Dulles, would effect the adequacy of the British undertaking and the possibility of an eventual agreement with the UK on the maintenance of a fixed number of troops on the continent. The French had indeed made little effort to disguise the fact that British association demands were really part of the strategy to secure the far more crucial US commitment.⁷³ Bidault also pressed the US Secretary to urge Adenauer to concede to French demands in the Saar and Dulles duly visited the Chancellor to ask for a 'strong assurance' that an acceptable agreement would be reached between France and Germany - 'This...was the German contribution to getting EDC ratified, comparable to the US and British assurances to the French.'⁷⁴

Dulles was drawn much more reluctantly to agreement on Bidault's principal interest at Berlin, namely the inclusion of Indochina in the proposed five-power talks on Korea. Neither the US nor the UK favoured a French withdrawal from South-east Asia until a favourable military balance had been achieved and the stability of the newly independent Associated States secured, while Washington's non-recognition of the PRC made the prospect of five-power negotiations a particularly delicate issue. Moreover, the US had continually sought to resist French attempts to make an explicit link between the situation in Indochina and the build up of European defence. At Berlin, however, Dulles and Eden were forced to acknowledge Bidault's insistence that if the French government did not return from Berlin with something to show on Indochina, then its collapse would be certain. The chances of a successor government being committed to ending the Indochinese conflict only on certain terms as well as to

⁷²Alphand, *L'étonnement d'être*, 245; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 1150-52, 17 Feb.

⁷³Memo of Dulles-Bidault talk, 18 Feb. 1954, AN, 457 AP 36; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 875-76; Paris tel. 511, 25 Nov. 1953, PRO, FO 371/107440; Briefing paper on UK association (unsigned), 1 Dec. 1953, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/72.

⁷⁴Dulles to NSC 186th meeting, 26 Feb. 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

EDC ratification would be very faint indeed.⁷⁵ The decision to hold a five power conference on Asian-related issues at Geneva was the only agreement that emerged from the four-power talks at Berlin.

French ratification of EDC, put off until negotiations with the USSR had taken place, was now being linked to another conference (with greater responsibility for French Indochinese policy being assigned to the Quai in the process). Although Bidault promised Dulles and Eden that the ratification debate would not be postponed until Geneva, Parodi assured the Germans that procedural questions in the French parliament would prevent the debate taking place by 26 April, the date scheduled for the opening of the Geneva Conference.⁷⁶ The news that Laniel and Bidault intended to prepare an all-in-one 'package' of protocol agreements and assurances to present to the Assembly alongside the EDC treaty, the content of which would remain secret until the last moment, did little to increase confidence. France's international and domestic weakness impelled its US, British and EDC partners to support the French Cabinet's approach to EDC even as it made that policy less satisfactory in their eyes.

Acrimonious resolution - the US declaration, British association and the Saar

Notwithstanding Bruce's assurances that the proposed US presidential declaration to EDC constituted nothing more than an effort 'to get timid men to overcome their own uncertainties', Eisenhower and his cabinet were profoundly disgruntled at the French insistence on further guarantees.⁷⁷ There was also disagreement between the Bruce Mission and the US Embassy in Paris over the precise commitment that should be demanded from the French government in return for a US reaffirmation of its previous assurances. Bruce and Tomlinson were adamant that Bidault announce a fixed date for the opening of the treaty debate before any further US step could be taken, despite Bidault's warnings of the effects which knowledge of a US timetable would have on

⁷⁵Dulles to Eisenhower, Dulles, 54, 9 Feb. 1954, Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL; Ruane, 'Anthony Eden and Geneva 1954', 168-69; Lawrence S. Kaplan, 'The US, NATO and French Indochina', in Lawrence Kaplan, Denise Artaud & Rubin (eds.) *Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954-55* (Wilmington, 1990), 229-50.

⁷⁶Rome tel. 264, 23 Feb. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11.

⁷⁷FRUS, 1952-4 5, 886-90, 5 March.

the debate in France.⁷⁸ Bidault's refusal to allow Alphand to go to Washington to discuss the issue, not to mention the Quai's rejection of the draft US declaration which Alphand had submitted to the US in December, cast even more doubt on the extent to which Paris was committed to pursuit of its self-defined EDC conditions. Alphand reported that he still did not have Parodi's agreement to begin negotiations in the Interim Committee on the four remaining questions that needed to be settled by the six delegations; the UK-EDC convention, the US-EDC bilateral accord, the interim status of non-German forces and the signature of the additional protocols.⁷⁹

This merely served to deepen the sense of intrigue surrounding EDC in Paris. The US Embassy was the official channel for French-US relations but the locus for all EDC activities remained the Bruce Mission. Bruce's position as Special Representative to the European Communities gave him greater freedom to operate behind the scenes, bypassing the Quai to work closely with Alphand. Yet US officials were always somewhat ambivalent towards the rather highly-strung Alphand and never accorded him anything like the same admiration and faith that Monnet enjoyed.⁸⁰ On 19 February, Schumann approached Bruce with a request, said to come from Laniel, that Bruce be authorised to discuss EDC matters directly and in private with leading French politicians. Bruce became suspicious that it was an effort to corner him and stoke up anti-American feeling when the memorandum setting out a ratification timetable that he had confidentially shown to Schumann, Alphand, Reynaud and Pinay appeared in the press. As a result Washington was forced to temper its demands for an immediate debate date.⁸¹ The text of the US declaration to EDC - restating the US assurances of May 1952, reinforcing its commitment to consult EDC on the level of forces and agreeing to regard NATO as of indefinite duration - was finally presented to the French on 12 March, under the greatest secrecy.

⁷⁸26 Feb. & 3 March 1954, Bruce Diaries; Bidault letter to Dulles 7 March 1954, AN, 457 AP 36; Ambassador Dillon advocated a more cautious approach to the French, correspondence with the author, 9 February 1995.

⁷⁹Paris tel. 264, 23 Feb. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11; Pactes desk memo to Bidault, 9 March 1954, MAE, SG 15; Coled 192, 18 March 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

⁸⁰Dulles was apparently always wary of Alphand, Interviews with Roderic O'Connor, 2 April 1966 & Horace Torbert, 2 Nov. 1965, Dulles Oral History Collection, Dulles Papers, Mudd Library; Bruce identified Monnet as 'the foremost political philosopher of the twentieth century', Nelson Lankford, *The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of David K. E. Bruce* (New York, 1996), 209.

⁸¹Bruce blamed the anti-EDC elements in the Quai and Laniel's entourage, letter to Merchant, 30 March 1954, Bruce Diaries; text of US timetable, 26 Feb. 1954, AN, 74 AP 54.

Bidault, Schumann and Alphand, who promised no other French officials would see it, reported their satisfaction with the guarantee and promised that it would only be released when the date of the EDC ratification debate was announced.⁸²

London followed Washington's lead in giving further assurances to influence the climate for ratification in France. On 9 March 1954 Eden proposed to the cabinet that the British government should agree, for the next few years, to maintain the present fighting capacity of the UK forces on the continent and to allow British forces to operate jointly with EDC units if requested by SACEUR.⁸³ Like the US declaration, this agreement was initially secret and when formally announced on 13 April, was accompanied by an additional British promise to place an armoured division into the European army when EDC was established. In practice, at least for the medium-term, London had fulfilled French demands. Although officials at the Quai continued to accuse both the British and US assurances of avoiding any real commitment to a continental force engagement, their political leaders pronounced themselves satisfied with the declarations. Agreement on the Saar issue was the only remaining condition that stood in the way of EDC's parliamentary submission.⁸⁴

Laniel and Bidault's avowed commitment to EDC resolution was severely challenged, however, when Adenauer arrived in Paris to discuss the question with Bidault. The Chancellor was presented with a new French protocol by the French demanding the immediate europeanisation of the Saar through the Council of Ministers in the Council of Europe rather than the EPC, an action Adenauer interpreted as a manoeuvre by the Quai to create further delay.⁸⁵ When the Germans objected Bidault refused to have any further direct meetings, 'except for the purpose of signing a completed agreement', leaving Maurice Schumann in charge of negotiations.⁸⁶ It was the Gaullist ministers, according to Alphand, who were behind the step, hoping to keep the Saar issue open so as to prevent the start of EDC

⁸²Paris tels. 3342 & 3346, 13 March 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11; 13 March 1954, Bruce Diaries. The US also wanted to keep the document a secret until Congressional consultations on the proposed assurances had taken place.

⁸³PRO, CAB 129/66, C(54)93; Saki Dockrill, *Britain's policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-55* (Cambridge, 1991), 136-37.

⁸⁴Massigli to Parodi, 24 March 1954, MAE, PA-AP 217/92; MAE memos (unsigned), 19 & 20 March 1954, MAE, SG 15; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 912, 24 March.

⁸⁵Bonn tel. 2819 & Coled 179, 11 March 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 8.

⁸⁶*FRUS* 1952-4 5, 906-9, 22 March; Washington tel. 3193, 17 March 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 8.

ratification: Laniel defended his government's action on the grounds that some Gaullists votes would be necessary for an EDC majority in parliament.⁸⁷ No one who had followed the EDC's fortunes for the past three years, however, could accept that an appeal for Gaullist support would ever bear fruit and Washington pressed Laniel not to wait any longer for a Saar settlement before announcing the EDC debate.⁸⁸

French-German relations were further taxed when the Quai added another new condition, on 23 March 1954, demanding that the German government approve the additional protocols formally through the signature of President Heuss, rather than a simple government agreement, so as to give them the same legal force as the treaty itself. The French insisted this had been implicit in the protocols from the outset and argued they were already conceding to time pressures by not demanding a formal *Bundestag* approval of the texts.⁸⁹ It was hard not to conclude that the French action was a deliberate attempt to block the recent ruling by the German Constitutional Court finally enabling the President to sign the Paris and Bonn treaties as the last formal step in German ratification. Adenauer responded by refusing to take any further action towards a Saar settlement and warned the US that his political standing at home was being severely weakened by French actions.⁹⁰ No conclusion on the Saar had been reached when Laniel eventually gave way to US pressure and raised the issue of a ratification debate in the Cabinet on 15 April. Although the government agreed to ask the parliament on 18 May to 'take all action necessary so that the debate will take place immediately thereafter', thereby enabling the public release of the US and UK guarantees, this was still predicated on the conclusion of negotiations for France's prior conditions.⁹¹

The beginning of the end

⁸⁷Coled 192, 18 March 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14; Washington tel. 3323, 25 March 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 8.

⁸⁸Laniel-MacArthur conversation, 14 April 1954, Box 1, White House Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

⁸⁹MAE circular to all posts, 23 March 1954, Seydoux-Rumbold conversation, 25 March 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/73; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 913-16, 24 March.

⁹⁰French opposition capitulated a few days later, after a personal appeal from Dulles, enabling Heuss to sign the two treaties, *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 915-21.

⁹¹*FRUS* 1952-4 5: 939-40, 15 April; Van Helmont reported the debate as stormy, letter to Monnet, 13 April 1954, FJM, AMI 23/3/26.

With the impossibility of Gaullist support finally acknowledged, the French government made a final half-hearted attempt to win Socialist approval of the EDC treaty. Although the party's parliamentary deputies were divided on the issue, its executive and the majority of its members supported EDC and party discipline had so far been upheld.⁹² The centralised political authority which Mollet and his party had consistently demanded in EDC had made Bidault reluctant to negotiate with the Socialists for their support but desperation now forced the government to declare, on 20 April, that it would explore means of reinforcing democratic control of the European communities with its five partners. Laniel and Bidault hoped this would enable Mollet to call a special party congress to vote in favour of EDC.⁹³ However, the administration's consistently anti-EPC campaign and the weak, half-hearted nature of the political project that was emerging in Europe had taken its toll on Socialist support for EDC. An independent campaign to secure direct elections to a European assembly launched by Monnet did little to facilitate the party's widening split: pushing the supranationality project in two directions, if anything, provoked further hostility throughout the French parliament. Monnet now came under direct attack there and even supporters of European integration criticised his 'technocratic' insistence.⁹⁴ The depth of the Socialist division was revealed at the May congress, convened specially to consider the EDC question: 53 out of the total of 105 parliamentary deputies defied the pro-EDC executive to demonstrate their hostility to the treaty. Unified Socialist support in a ratification debate looked highly unlikely.⁹⁵

Opposition outside parliament had also mounted. Marshal Juin, who had been nursing his hostility to the EDC treaty throughout the year, finally declared his opposition publicly in a speech on 28 March. Juin's subsequent refusal to meet the Prime Minister to explain his comments, a snub that received wide press coverage, forced the government to demand the resignation of the Commander-in-Chief of

⁹²Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London, 1964), 90-91; Robert Vandebussche, 'Guy Mollet et le groupe parlementaire socialiste sous les IV et V Républiques', in B Ménager et al., *Guy Mollet: un camarade en république* (Paris, 1987), 263-84.

⁹³22 April 1954, Bruce Diaries; Van Helmont to Monnet, 9 April 1954 & draft memo on democratic control, 9 April 1954, FJM, AMI 23/3/24-25.

⁹⁴De Beaumont to Herz, 9 Dec. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10; Draft of Monnet proposal, 17 Feb. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 24; Van Helmont to Monnet, 9 April 1954.

⁹⁵Jules Moch, *Histoire du réarmement allemand depuis 1950* (Paris, 1965), 316-18.

NATO forces in Central Europe, inflicting further public damage to EDC.⁹⁶ De Gaulle joined in the fray on 7 April, describing the project as a monster and arguing, for the first time, that the EDC prevented France from becoming an atomic power.⁹⁷ Economic interest groups, particularly those representing textile and aircraft manufacturing industries, voiced their fears that the logistical aspects of the treaty would threaten their production capacities.⁹⁸ The Quai leadership had done its part to fuel opposition among French elites, furnishing advice to leading EDC opponents such as Debré, General Billotte, and the veteran politician, Edouard Herriot: Massigli assiduously courted Mendès France, the broadly-acknowledged leader of the government's parliamentary opposition, warning him of his suspicions of the supranational defence project.⁹⁹ Growing hostility among important sectors of the opinion, and the coverage it received within the press - itself divided - was capitalised on through negative press releases and frequent leaks from the Quai.¹⁰⁰ The Cabinet, hardly able to sustain itself, took no steps to curb its diplomatic servants.

Nor was there any chance of the government taking control of the EDC situation. It was crisis in Indochina that forced the Cabinet into its minimal promise to make a future date for parliamentary debate of the treaty. The need for an immediate massive reinforcement of US military and financial aid to assist the defence of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, under siege since mid-March, and the hope of securing increased political aid at the forthcoming five-power talks in Geneva drove the Laniel government into action. But Indochina also circumscribed the degree of attention and effort that the Cabinet could put into EDC. The defeat of Dien Bien Phu, which had become a national symbol of France's entire position in South-east Asia,

⁹⁶ Juin to Laniel, 27 Jan. 1954 & letter to various politicians, 13 April 1954, SHAT, 238 K 5; Gruenther letters to Eisenhower, 7 Feb. & 3 April 1954, UPA, *Eisenhower Office Files*, pt. 1, reel 13; Schumann to Bidault, 28-9 April 1954, MAE, SG 67.

⁹⁷ Published translation of de Gaulle press conf., Box 861, Official File, Central Files, DDEL.

⁹⁸ Jacques Vernant, 'European politics faces French economics', in Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.) *France Defeats EDC* (New York, 1957), 39-54; Paul Pitman, 'The Political Economy of European Defence Integration: French industry, Parisian politics and the rise and fall of the EDC', Michel Dumoulin (ed.) *La Sécurité en Europe, 40 ans après l'échec de la CED*, (forthcoming).

⁹⁹ Letters to Mendès France, 10 June & 28 Oct. 1953, MAE, PA-AP 217/100.

¹⁰⁰ Bruce identified Fontaine of *Le Monde* & Ferro of *Paris-Presse* as regular MAE press outlets, 30 March 1954, Bruce Diaries; an unsigned memo in Reynaud's papers noted that 96 public meetings on EDC had been held around Paris so far this year, 82 of which were against it, 9 April 1954, AN, 74 AP 54; for one such group see, Madeleine Singer, 'Le group d'études politiques "Reconstruction" et la CED', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 43, no. 1, 1996, 35-66.

only days before the 25 April opening of the Geneva Conference revealed the depth of France's international crises. Dulles, attending the NAC meeting in Paris, was forced to acknowledge the severity of the situation: 'France is almost visibly collapsing before our eyes....It does not seem possible to change this situation although we are not giving up hope...'¹⁰¹

The last hope for EDC, Washington now concluded, lay outside France. German ratification had been completed on 19 March and, on 12 March, the Belgian Senate had given its approval by 125 votes to 40. The Upper House in the Netherlands had already passed the treaty on 20 January (36 votes to 4) and on 7 April Luxembourg completed the process with 46 votes to 4. There remained, apart from France, only Italy, but a new coalition government, recommending ratification, had presented the treaty to parliament on 6 April and an adverse vote was not expected. For the first time since the start of the EDC ratification debates two years ago, a collective international effort to secure French ratification was about to begin. France's partners had concluded that the French, far from leading, would have to be led through EDC.

¹⁰¹Dulles to Eisenhower, Dulte 8, 23 April 1954, Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

Chapter Nine

Discarding the old plan

June - August 1954

Doomed since the fall of the Dien Bien Phu garrison on 7 May, the deeply unpopular Laniel government was finally executed on 12 June 1954. Its successor, led by the Radical, Pierre Mendès France, confronted a legacy of foreign policy crises, all of which now clamoured for urgent solution. The rapid unravelling of French policy in Indochina, the violent campaign of unrest in North Africa, the growing menace of international frustration over EDC appeared, collectively, to shake the core of France's domestic stability and cohesion. Mendès France made internal rehabilitation his clarion call but he was conscious that a settlement of these three international questions was the first immediate prerequisite before France's domestic convalescence could even begin.

The determination of Mendès France to actively address and resolve each of the crises in Asia, Africa and Europe marked his government out from those that had gone before, particularly in relation to EDC, the longest-running foreign impasse. Nevertheless by the summer of 1954 collective and energetic Western pressure on France to make a ratificatory step had finally galvanised: no French government could have further withheld action to submit the treaty to parliament. Mendès France may have adopted a highly personalised approach to the resolution of France's foreign policy difficulties but as far as French EDC policy was concerned, the driving force behind its formulation and presentation remained the foreign ministry leadership. The fact that Mendès France shared the views of his officials lent a new sense of unity to French foreign policy.

The central objective for the French administration was to manage the collapse of EDC without causing a rupture in French-US relations. French crises overseas underlined the necessity of limiting a European fall-out. The protracted decline of EDC had given French diplomats the opportunity to draft a programme for its rejection and even to begin reformulating alternatives strategies for French leadership goals. The inglorious lynching of the EDC treaty by the French National Assembly on

30 August 1954 was to provide a suitably chaotic finale to gloss over the fact that the victim was already well and truly dead.

Mendès France and his programme for government

President Coty's summoning of Mendès France to form a new government and his swift investiture in the parliament on 18 June 1954 (with 419 votes of support) was entirely expected. The unofficial opposition leader's calls for clear policy decisions by the government won him large popular support in a country weary of leadership through prevarication. This did not lessen the sense that a profound shift in the political life of the Fourth Republic had been launched. In a style foreshadowing the Fifth, Mendès France appointed his ministers, mainly Radical and Gaullist, more on the basis of their lack of previous governmental participation (only four had served in the last government) and with scant regard to the party balance in the Assembly (where the Socialists and the Communists were in the majority).¹ The redoubtable EDC opponent, General Koenig, was given the post of Defence Minister, while Mendès France retained the direction of the Quai for himself, appointing the pro-EDC former diplomat, Guérin de Beaumont, as his Secretary of State. To further signal the priority he was according to international issues, Mendès France moved into the Quai's offices, bringing with him, to the consternation of some in the ministry, his advisors and prime ministerial *cabinet* to operate alongside his foreign policy team.² For the first time since 1945 the leadership of the foreign ministry had passed out of the hands of the MRP.

It was Mendès France's programme for government that made the greatest immediate impact in France. He presented a three point plan of action to the Assembly, requesting parliamentary support on a contractual basis. Thus a deadline of 20 July was set for the first element in his plan, a settlement in Indochina, failing which he would offer his resignation. He promised to turn immediately afterwards to

¹Jean Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France* (Paris, 1981), 284-97; Philip Williams, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London, 1964), 40, 45-6.

²US officials at SHAPE reported Quai staff complaining of the confusion that resulted, ALO 589, 10 July 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C Box 9; Bernard Destremau, *Quai d'Orsay: derrière la façade* (Paris, 1994), 131-32.

the unrest in North Africa and negotiate an end to the terrorist campaign which Tunisian nationalists had begun in March. Only then would he address EDC, proposing to obtain a parliamentary decision before the Assembly recessed for the summer vacation. The Prime Minister defended his strategy to the worried US administration, arguing that if Indochina were settled the French people would be more willing to proceed with the EDC and he would have greater prestige to employ in a parliamentary confrontation. In the meanwhile, his government would attempt to find a compromise between the pro- and anti-EDC factions, even if this involved some changes in the EDC. Without prior agreement between the two groups, the 'large majority' necessary for such a 'serious decision as EDC' would not be forthcoming in the ratification debate. It was this majority, Mendès France claimed, that would then entitle him to ask France's partners to accept the changes proposed in the Assembly vote. In no case would he negotiate with the five before French ratification had actually taken place, 'as he was sure that the other countries would rightly regard any such attempt...as a new method of delay'.³ If all went according to plan, a decision on EDC was scheduled to occur in the second half of August.

What Mendès France himself thought of EDC was not clear. He certainly claimed to be strongly in favour of the movement for European unity in every field, yet had maintained a decidedly sceptical approach to the defence project throughout his time in parliament.⁴ This made his insistence on a strong EDC majority, in a parliament which was divided on practically every domestic and international issue of the day, appear somewhat questionable.⁵ Yet the new Prime Minister had long acknowledged the necessity for German rearmament, leading US Ambassador Dillon to conclude almost a year earlier that Mendès France preferred the alternative of a German national army in NATO.⁶ For all his famous insistence on 'action' and 'decision', however, Mendès France had no specific project in mind for resolution of the EDC crisis, as his rather vague references to treaty modifications illustrated. Like

³Mendès France-Bedell Smith conversation, Paris tel. 4946, 21 June 1954, Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

⁴Mendès France had voluntarily abstained from voting in the Assembly's November 1953 debate.

⁵Mendès France to Bardoux, 30 June 1954, Archives de l'Institut Pierre Mendès France (DPMF), CED II; Pierre Melandri, 'Faire mentir Machiavel' in François Bédarida and Jean-Pierre Rioux (eds.) *Pierre Mendès France et le mendésisme* (Paris, 1985), 231-43.

⁶Paris tel. 1583, 22 Oct. 1953, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 14.

the majority of French deputies he had little detailed knowledge of foreign policy issues, confessing to Dulles that he was 'a complete neophyte' in the field.⁷ This made the well-established EDC hostility of his small team of close advisors, particularly his long-standing colleague George Boris, '*chef d'état major du gouvernement de PMF*' and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, editor of *L'Express*, even more significant.⁸

Until such time as he addressed the third point of his agenda, however, the Prime Minister did not intend to delve into the complexities of EDC. Negotiations between the pro- and anti-EDC factions were placed in the hands of the two Cabinet ministers most involved in the EDC question, the Radical supporter of EDC, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, and General Koenig, under whose chairmanship the parliamentary National Defence committee had just returned a negative opinion on the EDC treaty.⁹ Although both men agreed to consult deputies and parliamentary groups on their views, Koenig informed the Prime Minister of his dislike for the whole procedure even before the first meeting on 1 July.¹⁰ The only use of the confrontation, thought the pro-EDC team, was the opportunity it gave to prepare minor 'face-saving' proposals which Mendès France could use when presenting the EDC text to the Assembly.¹¹ No one observing the negotiations between the two sides suffered any illusions as to the possibility of an agreed EDC proposal emerging from the encounter.

Initiatives outside France

The crisis that swept Mendès France to power served to catalyse France's partners into concerted action to prevent further postponement of an EDC decision.

⁷*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-4* Vol. 5, (Washington, 1983): 1018-23, 13 July.

⁸The small group of individuals that operated as Mendès France's 'brain-trust' well outside of the administrative bureaucracy strongly resembled Monnet's methods of operation and the editor of *L'Express*, was a central member of this team. Other members included André Pelabon, Léone Georges-Picot, Simon Nora, Jacques Juillet. According to Lacouture, '*le "système PMF", c'est, à partir d'un triple principe du choix, de l'action et de la communication entre le gouvernement et l'opinion, d'abord un groupe d'hommes*'. *Pierre Mendès France*, 287-90;

⁹The Assembly's foreign affairs committee also submitted negative opinion on 9 June 1954, Jules Moch, *Le réarmement allemand depuis 1950* (Paris, 1965), 307; text of decisions in MAE, CED 385.

¹⁰Minutes of first Koenig-Bourgès-Maunoury meeting, 1 July 1954, MAE, SG 16.

¹¹18 June 1954, Bruce Diaries; Herz memo, 9 July & Tomlinson to Moore, 13 July 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10.

Washington was now convinced that France had to be led collectively by its partners and agreed with the Bruce Mission's suggestion that the US publicly announce its intention, jointly with the UK, to begin steps towards the restoration of German sovereignty by the practical application of the Contractual Accords. An interim defence arrangement with Germany was envisaged as a further potential step, providing for the transitional implementation of the EDC treaty and involving the attachment of German training units to US and British forces in Germany.¹² Churchill and Eden, during their visit to Washington from 25-29 June 1954, agreed to initiate a joint study group to work out procedures for this process in the event of further French delay. US and UK officials began work in London one week later on a chronological programme to bring into force those statutes of the Bonn treaty which did not involve the EDC.

This did not represent any wavering of US policy in Europe. Under no circumstance was the joint approach to dissociate the Paris and Bonn treaties to jeopardise the possibility of the National Assembly taking up EDC at a later date and, until such time as parliament recessed, Washington insisted that the US and the UK maintain 'in full force their public and private support of EDC'.¹³ Dulles and his staff actually regarded the proposal as the only step that would buy some additional time for EDC and were therefore keen to secure, as much as possible, French acceptance of US-UK proposals for implementation of the contractals. The French were to be consulted before any formal approach to the Federal Republic was initiated.¹⁴ US members of the study group, for all their insistence on devising a credible joint programme, refused to consider the question of alternatives to EDC. A British paper on restricted German rearmament in NATO, proposing 'as many of the essential EDC safeguards as we can persuade the Germans to accept as the price of joining the leading Western "club"' went undiscussed, notwithstanding domestic pressure from the Pentagon for such planning to begin.¹⁵

¹²Tomlinson memo, 5 May 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 1; European Regional Affairs, 'Program for Dealing with Further Delay on EDC' 26 May 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 3.

¹³*FRUS* 1952-4 5: 988, 28 June.

¹⁴Merchant to Dillon, 2 July 1954, NARA, RG 59, Lot 59 D 233, Box 26.

¹⁵*FRUS* 1952-4 5: 1013, 994-5; Cabinet memo, 13 July 1954, PRO, CAB 129/69 C(54)231.

Suspicion that the British were moving toward an EDC alternative had indeed been a principal motivation behind the US approach to London. Both the Paris Embassy and the Bruce Mission complained that the British were giving France ambiguous signals about the possible existence of an alternative UK plan. Spaak, recently appointed Belgian Foreign Minister, shared these concerns and wanted Britain to make quite clear that the only possible alternative to EDC was direct German participation in NATO.¹⁶ In proposing a joint US-UK approach, Washington hoped to commit London unequivocally to making every effort to achieve EDC.¹⁷ Eden, with his attention focused wholly on the negotiations in Geneva and keen to smooth over tensions provoked by British opposition to the internationalisation of the Indochinese conflict which the US had been considering, readily agreed.¹⁸

When pressed, British Embassy officials in Paris admitted that some consideration of alternatives had taken place in the Foreign Office but that London had now concluded that 'the EDC treaty will in any event have to constitute the basis of anything else that may be done'.¹⁹ British vacillation highlighted its perennial EDC dilemma: if it insisted too forcefully that EDC was the only solution for Europe's defence, London would leave itself open to the French retort that it should then participate in the project. Eden and his officials had to find a way to encourage French entry into EDC, as the US wanted, without incurring the ire of the French government. Nevertheless, pro-EDC activists in Europe remained uneasy at Britain's EDC loyalties. Bruce was particularly suspicious of the recently appointed British Ambassador in Paris, Gladwyn Jebb - 'No man with a vanity so colossal can be depended on' - and with some reason, for Jebb was formulating his own proposal for a 'European solution' alternative to EDC, independently of the Foreign Office.²⁰

¹⁶FRUS 1952-4 5: 975-78, 18 June.

¹⁷Washington was aware that Churchill was far more hostile to the project than Eden, Dulles to NSC 205th meeting, 1 July 1954, Box 5, NSC Series, Whitman File, DDEL.

¹⁸Roger Makins, UK Ambassador in Washington, was desperately trying to smooth relations between Dulles and Eden, Memo to Eden, 18 June 1954, Avon Papers, Birmingham, AP 20/17/19; Geoffrey Warner, 'Britain and the Crisis over Dien Bien Phu, April 1954: The Failure of United Action', in Lawrence Kaplan, Denise Artaud and Mark Rublin (eds.) *Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954-55* (Wilmington, 1990), 55-77.

¹⁹Herz-Anthony Meyer conversation, 25 June 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10.

²⁰29 July 1954, Bruce Diaries; Jebb refers to a 20 August letter to Eden setting out his views on a European solution and admitting it was unpopular in the FO, letter to Eden 23 Aug. 1954, Avon Papers, AP 20/17/22.

The fraught environment of US-UK-French relations encouraged Spaak, who had been so active in the EPC project, to launch his own campaign of pressure on France. As a confidante of the Bruce-Monnet nexus he had already suggested, and won Dulles's support, that the five other EDC members take a more active role and issue, along with the US and the UK, a solemn appeal to France for ratification.²¹ As soon as the possibility of a bilateral US-UK meeting was raised, Spaak moved swiftly to coordinate a corresponding Benelux initiative and, after a well-publicised secret meeting on 22 June, the three Foreign Ministers Spaak, Beyen and Bech, announced their intention to invite the Six to an immediate conference to '*provoquer une explication franche, amicale et ouverte entre le nouveau Gouvernement français et ses cinq partenaires*'.²² Notwithstanding Spaak's well-known commitment to European integration, the French embassies in the Benelux claimed it was the lack of any decision on EDC, rather than its potential rejection, that was creating tensions in France's relations with its partners and propelling them to take collective action for the first time.²³ Paris responded angrily to the Benelux action, informing Spaak that the rigours of Mendès France's timetable made any such conference impossible, although the Premier finally agreed to see Spaak alone on 30 June 1954. Neither Spaak's threats that the Benelux would refuse anything less than '*une vrai CED*' nor his appeals to France's sense of responsibility for the project moved Mendès France to any EDC commitments. Spaak's personal international stature may have forced the new premier to explain his actions but the need to secure Benelux support in EDC seemed no greater a preoccupation for Mendès France than for his predecessor. The most he promised was to keep the Belgians informed of French thinking as it developed and to meet with the five to inform them of the French position before the National Assembly actually voted on the issue.²⁴

At the heart of every EDC conversation, Germany itself remained initially aloof from these collaborative ventures and publicly denied any consideration of

²¹FRUS 1952-4 5: 951-53, 29 April; Spaak had also been in contact with the Monnet team, Van Belmont to Monnet, 13 April 1954, FJM, AMI 23/3/26.

²²Brussels tel. 322, 23 June 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/75; Paul-Henri Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, i, *De l'Indépendance à l'Alliance* (Paris, 1969), 274-76.

²³Luxembourg tel. 65, 23 June 1954 & The Hague tel, 26 June 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/75.

²⁴MAE circular tel, 24 June 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/75; Spaak-Mendès France meeting, 20 June 1954, DPMF, CED II; Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, i, 277-80.

alternative forms of rearmament. Behind the scenes however, Adenauer warned that the French delay was seriously affecting his position and authority as Chancellor and indeed, newspaper coverage reflected a growing public impatience with the lack of progress in Germany's sovereign status. Whether it was through consciousness of this restiveness or, as the French privately alleged, on the advice of the US and Spaak, Adenauer finally took his stand on 2 July 1954, declaring publicly his firm opposition to any further treaty modification before French ratification.²⁵ Mendès France's response was stark illustration of his sensitivity to international pressure: he immediately cancelled a visit to Bonn which de Beaumont had been scheduled to make 'as a gesture of courtesy and to explain the intentions of the French government' and issued a warning to all France's allies that any attempt to place the responsibility for EDC failure on France could carry potentially damaging consequences: '*Ce n'est pas cela servir une cause qui est commune à l'ensemble du monde occidental.*'²⁶ The fact that the French premier took such actions as a personal affront merely increased tensions among the six European capitals.

Preparations at the Quai

Nevertheless, Mendès France was conscious that French prevarication over EDC was placing enormous strains on Western cohesion and feared outright rejection of the treaty would significantly add to this tension.²⁷ Any new proposal that France put forth for EDC would have to secure external support as well as meeting French objectives, a constraint that appeared practically insurmountable as the Prime Minister departed for the Geneva Conference. Mendès France's preoccupation with avoiding international isolation provided the hook Quai officials needed to win the Premier over to their campaign to reject the EDC treaty and staff immediately oriented their proposed alternatives in this direction. Senior staff insisted that the position of

²⁵French officials in Bonn believed Spaak was behind the move, tel. 3387, 8 July 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/75; Massigli reported it being recommended by the US and '*certain milieux politiques français*', tel. 2725, 7 July 1954, MAE, SG 16.

²⁶MAE circular tel, 6 July 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/75; Seydoux to US officials, tel. 38, 3 July 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10.

²⁷Mendès France to Spaak, 30 June 1954, DPMF, CED II; Baudet memo, '*Réarmement d'Allemagne et cohésion occidentale*', 21 July 1954, MAE, SG 16.

France's partners was not as rigid as it appeared and assured Mendès France that room for French manoeuvre did exist: the choice, as Boegner in the *Service des Pactes* put it, was not simply EDC or Germany into NATO. Rather the choice lay in the particular bilateral partnership France chose to pursue, a partnership that would form the foundation stone for the development of an alternative to the EDC treaty and the degree to which elements of the existing European defence framework would be retained. What the Quai was suggesting was that France should think more in terms of its relationship to particular states, rather than with institutions.

For Sauvagnargues and his colleagues at the Europe desk, entente with Germany was the key. Germany was the crux of the problem in Europe and if agreement could be reached with the Federal Republic, then US, British and Benelux accord would follow.²⁸ French officials in Bonn and Paris believed that Adenauer, despite his proclamations, was prepared to allow some further modifications to the EDC treaty. As long as the principal of a united Europe, to which the Chancellor was genuinely committed was maintained, France could convince Germany of the need for a functional, rather than an institutional, approach to its creation.²⁹ The political elements of the treaty could be then rejected, EDC placed firmly within the organisational structure of NATO and the restrictions on German troops and matériel maintained. *Rapprochement* with Germany would further prevent the formation of an independent US-German alliance: as deputy High Commissioner Bérard underlined in agreement, '*en ce qui concerne l'association de l'Allemagne à la défense occidentale, l'avenir restait entre nos mains, mais pour peu de temps*'.³⁰

Boegner and Massigli advocated the option of a parallel continental commitment between the UK and France as the solution to Europe's defence organisation.³¹ This would not involve a renunciation of the concept of Europe, rather its reformulation from a community of six to one of fifteen. It would, however, necessitate the complete renegotiation of the current defence community, a far more extreme prescription than the German desk's proposal. Boegner insisted, however,

²⁸Sauvagnargues memo, '*Coopération franco-allemande*', 10 July 1954, MAE, SG 16.

²⁹Bonn tels. 3345 & 3378, 6 & 7 July 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/75; '*Remarques relatives aux "solutions d'aménagement"*' (unsigned), 29 June 1954, MAE, SG 16.

³⁰Bonn tel. 3014, 19 June 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/75.

³¹Pactes memo, '*Grand-Bretagne et la CED*', 20 July 1954, MAE, SG 16.

that a new confederal arrangement incorporating the British could be concluded swiftly and that the US and Germany would come round to such a solution: it would, after all, give Germany greater sovereign independence than the current EDC treaty. He recommended that France approach the UK secretly with this project and, having secured British agreement, begin negotiations between the UK and the Six for a new defence treaty, the only supranational features of which would be the arms community and the distribution of external aid outlined in original EDC treaty.³²

That this was presented as a feasible strategy illustrates French confidence in British willingness to proceed with an alternative to EDC. Massigli's frequent references to UK pessimism about EDC and his oblique reports of alternative planning in London appeared to overrule the Foreign Office's formal statements of commitment.³³ Pursuit of the Anglo-French entente had long been Massigli's *leitmotif* in the Quai and now, for the first time since EDC's inception, he was one of the Foreign Minister's closest policy advisors.³⁴ Mendès France had few contacts among the Quai and his preference for working with a small team limited his contact with the ministry bureaucracy to Secretary General Parodi and the two diplomats in his *cabinet*, Philippe Baudet and his deputy, Jean-Marie Soutou.³⁵ Massigli's cultivation of his war-time contact with Mendès France placed him in a position of influence that was further increased as the Premier began to work closely with Eden at the Geneva Conference. Both leaders were impressed with each other's handling of the negotiations there and irritated by Dulles's refusal to participate personally in discussions with the Chinese. Massigli did his utmost to further the relationship, assuring Mendès France that Eden was equally drawn to '*une réelle politique d'entente cordiale...il estime cette politique d'autant plus indispensable que certaines imprudences américaines l'inquiètent davantage*'.³⁶

³²'Project Boegner' memo, 31 July 1954, MAE, SG 16.

³³London tel. 2489, 18 June 1954, MAE, PA-AP 217/71; Roberts to Crouy-Chanel, 21 June 1954, PRO, FO371/112781.

³⁴Both US and UK observers agreed that Massigli's influence had strengthened and that he would be 'the most dangerous and effective opponent of the EDC in the French Foreign Service', Reilly to FO, 7 Aug. 1954, PRO, CF/109434.

³⁵Baudet had been French Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Soutou came from the Economic Affairs section and had been French representative on the intergovernmental committee examining EPC.

³⁶Eden-Mendès France conversation, 27 July 1954, tel. 2973, DPMF, CED II; Massigli letter to Eden, 22 July 1954, MAE, PA-AP 217/97.

As much as Massigli evoked the potential of a joint UK-French replacement for EDC, he was forced to admit that Eden gave no indication of this likelihood and indeed the Foreign Secretary consistently maintained his support for EDC in every meeting with the French. Massigli acknowledged that Eden would not take up consideration of an alternative proposal until the EDC project finally collapsed but, far from dissuaded, he used this to argue for complete rejection of the treaty rather than further modification.³⁷ Only then, he reported the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, Ivone Kirkpatrick, as saying, London '*s'accommoderait de la situation devant laquelle il se trouverait placé et s'emploierait pour que le meilleur parti en soit tiré*'.³⁸

The continuity and unanimity of Quai opinion against a supranational EDC meant that the possibility of EDC resolution through coordination with the US was not even raised. The Eisenhower administration's unwavering insistence on the maintenance of a supranational political identity to EDC nullified the possibility for Quai officials of any collaborative strategy with the US. The extreme partisanship of the Bruce Mission, its closeness to Monnet and its pro-EDC activity represented the personification of this policy for the Quai leadership. It was only the threat of a US reaction to EDC's failure that counselled caution and by the summer of 1954 the possibility of a US withdrawal from Europe - never very credible for most diplomats in the first place - was negligible. The ability of the Western alliance to withstand the strains of the Indochinese conflict and its settlement offered further proof of French freedom of manoeuvre. Even Congressional impatience with the EDC situation, manifested by the revival of the Richards amendment in June to withhold military aid in Europe from December 1954 until EDC began was manageable. The Embassy in Washington considered that US public opinion, for all its pro-EDC feeling, would accept an alternative solution for, ultimately, it was the swift rearmament of Germany that Congress sought.³⁹ The Administration's desire for EDC was actually keeping drastic action against France at bay: Paris knew that US-UK consideration of possible

³⁷London tel. 2563, 24 June 1954, MAE, PA-AP 217/71; MAE, *Documents Diplomatiques Français 21 juillet-31 décembre 1954 (DDF)*, (Paris, 1987), 66-7; Koenig alleged that UK Generals were willing to see new UK-French defence links initiated, Letter to Mendès France, 27 July 1954, DPMF, CED II.

³⁸*DDF*, 1954, 94-5; Kirkpatrick's account of the meeting does not contain any such references to UK thinking, Memo to the PM, 6 Aug. 1954, PRO 800/790.

³⁹Washington tels. 4305 & 4329, 23 & 24 July 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/75.

dissociation between the Bonn and Paris treaties did not include the question of German rearmament. Steadfast support of EDC encouraged the Quai's increasingly cavalier attitude towards the US: as long as Washington was committed to a European army, it could not turn its back on France.

By summer 1954 there were few even to plead the case of partnership with the US. French EDC policy was firmly in the hands of the Quai, and for the first time, its vociferously anti-EDC director, Parodi, had the ear of its minister. Mendès France later claimed that it was the Secretary General '*parce qu'il était un technicien que nulle idéologie ne motivait, sinon son patriotisme, qui eut alors sur moi l'influence la plus anticédiste*'.⁴⁰ Senior officials who supported partnership with the US, and hence EDC ratification, had little influence in the decision-making debate: Schumann had been replaced by de Beaumont, Vice-director of Political Affairs de Margerie no longer enjoyed, as under Bidault, a close relationship with the Minister, while Alphand was completely marginalised.⁴¹ The only 'voice of America' that could be said to persist was the very distant sound of Bonnet in Washington with his frequent evocation of the loss of reputation that might well befall France in the US should EDC fail, an argument not destined to strike terror in the hearts of the Quai. This was the essential problem for defenders of the US-French partnership: they wielded only a negative argument and one that appeared increasingly less threatening.

It was difficult for US officials to keep abreast of EDC developments at the top-level of the Quai much less play a part in influencing the process. The entire *modus operandi* of the Bruce Mission, based on contacts outside the Paris administration (forged, in the main, through Monnet's network of contacts) and deliberate stone-walling of the Quai, now began to reap its bitter harvest. Parodi, who had suggested to Bruce six months previously that they meet informally and frequently to exchange views, now maintained contact with the US solely through the formal channel of the Embassy, where he convinced the inexperienced Dillon (to the scepticism of the State Department) that he was 'making it his personal responsibility

⁴⁰In Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, 302; Parodi's increased influence was commented on by both British and US officials in Paris, Reilly to London, 7 & 11 Aug. 1954, PRO, CF/109434, Tomlinson memo, 5 Aug 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11.

⁴¹Hervé Alphand, *L'étonnement d'être* (Paris, 1977), 256.

to see that Franco-American relations continue to be of the closest'.⁴² The weekly *L'Express*, run by Mendès France's closest confidantes, applauded Dillon's commitment to US-French relations before wondering aloud whether his cables actually got to Dulles.⁴³ Bruce and Tomlinson, bereft of Monnet's personal help following his sudden stroke, continued to play a dominant role in the EDC debates outside the Quai, assisting the Bourguès-Maunoury team in its confrontation with Koenig, providing pro-EDC deputies with arguments and tactics to employ and advising France's EDC partners - notably Spaak - on their coordinated approach to the French.⁴⁴ But the Bruce Mission was far removed from the real locus of French decision-making on EDC and had little hope of winning over the Quai, had it even been willing to try.⁴⁵

Mendès France turns to EDC

The final hour conclusion of a settlement at Geneva on 21 July 1954 was a triumphant personal victory for Mendès France and further increased his domestic standing.⁴⁶ With the first task of his agenda accomplished he now turned to address the unrest in Tunisia and, simultaneously, initiated a programme for French economic rehabilitation. He still continued to commit himself to a meeting of the six EDC partners which, if successful, would result in the treaty being sent to the National Assembly before it broke up on 25 August and, now, for the first time, began to give the Quai some indication of his views on possible EDC modification. Mendès France's overwhelming concern was the removal of all supranational features from the treaty and he instructed de Beaumont, Parodi and Gros to begin work on this

⁴²Dillon to Merchant, 1 July & reply, 7 July 1954, NARA, RG 59, Lot 59 D 233, Box 26. Merchant was dubious as to whether the fundamental attitudes of Parodi and company had really changed.

⁴³*L'Express*, 10 July 1954.

⁴⁴Monnet's stroke on 5 June was kept secret but it forced him to take immediate, complete rest. François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (New York, 1994), 255.

⁴⁵Bruce and Tomlinson's agreed tactic continued to be one of maintaining close touch with the pro-EDC advisors of Mendès France, 3 Aug. 1954, Bruce Diaries; Bruce to Reynaud, (undated m.s. notes), AN, 74 AP 53.

⁴⁶Vietnam was partitioned along the 17th parallel, with free elections to be held to decide the future of the country two years after the ceasefire. The Vietminh agreed to respect the independence of the former Associated States, Laos and Cambodia. The French agreed to begin evacuating its troops almost immediately.

immediately. His strategy was to approach each of France's EDC partners individually to explore how such amendments might be incorporated into the existing treaty and, at the same time, begin a vigorous lobbying campaign in Washington and London. The conference of Six proposed by Spaak could then ratify the results of these bilateral negotiations.⁴⁷ The failure of the Bourguès-Maunoury - Koenig confrontation to devise any compromise gave Mendès France perfect justification for insisting both that substantial changes were necessary and that it was up to him and his advisors to draft them. A mini-version of the EDC confrontation was now set up inside the Quai with Parodi responsible for presenting substitute proposals for the anti-EDC side and Philippe de Seynes, one of Mendès France's *cabinet* staff, the possible treaty modifications of the pro-EDC lobby. The Prime Minister intended to formulate the French proposal on the basis of the arguments presented by the two sides.⁴⁸

Attention centred on Mendès France himself. The strength of his current popularity left many convinced that a successful EDC outcome depended entirely on his willingness to fight for it. Domestic and international supporters of EDC accepted that some face-saving modifications were necessary, but claimed that if Mendès France were to really fight for the treaty, then parliamentary hostility could be overcome. The real test of the Premier's EDC's sincerity, according to Martin Herz, the US Embassy's EDC expert, would be his proposals: 'any real change or suspension of the supranational character of the Treaty would deprive Mendès France of more votes on the left than he could gain on the right', an assessment with which veteran EDC campaigners, Schumann and Reynaud, agreed.⁴⁹ There appeared to be some signs of hope. Despite the unprecedented secrecy surrounding Mendès France's deliberations - discussions were taking place at his own home in Marly - the inexhaustible Tomlinson reported that Bourguès-Maunoury and de Beaumont were working closely with the Prime Minister and could well bolster the pro-EDC case put

⁴⁷Baudet note to Parodi on Mendès France's EDC orientation, 26 July 1954, MAE, SG 16.

⁴⁸Tomlinson memo, 5 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11; François Seydoux, *Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin* (Paris, 1975), 186.

⁴⁹Herz to Dillon, 13 July 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 9; Reynaud comments, Paris tel. 4983, 22 June 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10; Schumann opinion, Paris tel. 657, 17 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11; *L'Express* alleged Schumann was leading a bitter campaign against Mendès France in parliament, 10 July 1954.

forward by de Seynes, who was new to the EDC and 'does not fully understand the real objectives of the present European policy'. De Margerie confirmed that Mendès France was 'drifting toward the EDC solution'.⁵⁰

In reality, however, the Mendès France and the French administration had already made its choice: the debate taking place centred on how the EDC treaty could be nullified without a direct French rejection: Parodi's 'anti-EDC team' explicitly recognised that forcing full re-negotiation of a European defence settlement would weaken France's position *vis-à-vis* its allies.⁵¹ Both sides shared the same objective of reformulating Europe's defence organisation into an intergovernmentally directed coalition of national forces - a 'little NATO' as US officials described Parodi's proposals. Where de Seynes's plan differed was that it sought to achieve French objectives through the EDC framework itself, proposing the establishment of an additional application protocol which included a series of articles reserving the rights of national parliaments to be inserted into the EDC ratification law, rather than the separate bilateral agreements with Germany and the UK preferred by the Parodi group. De Seynes and de Beaumont maintained that their project would avoid the reopening of treaty negotiations despite Parodi's scepticism as to the ability of France's partners to accept such fundamental modifications without returning to their national parliaments.⁵²

It was consideration of likely external reaction that finally swung Mendès France in favour of the less radical option proposed by de Seynes.⁵³ He was forcefully reminded of the strength of opposition among France's allies to any new initiatives on 12 August, when he informed Ambassadors Jebb and Dillon of his intention to raise the possibility of another four-power conference on Germany when the parliament discussed EDC. Mendès France was responding to the latest Soviet note of 24 July 1954 in which the USSR revived the proposal for a European Security Conference that it had first introduced in Berlin. Despite his assurances that this would not cause further delay (the conference would take place in the interval after the Assembly had

⁵⁰Tomlinson to Joyce, 5 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11; Paris tel. 527, 6 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10.

⁵¹*Projet Parodi* (undated), MAE, SG 16.

⁵²*Projet de Seynes*, 31 July 1954, second draft, 9 Aug. with m.s. Parodi notes & de Beaumont note for Mendès France, 6 Aug. 1954, MAE, SG 16; memo on EDC (unsigned), 2 Aug. 1954, DPMF, CED II.

⁵³Mendès France to Massigli, 14 Aug. 1954, MAE, PA-AP 217/100.

ratified the EDC treaty and before the Council of the Republic began its consideration) and his insistence that some positive response to the Soviet suggestion was vital to secure additional EDC votes, both the US and the UK forcefully condemned the Prime Minister's proposal. London backed Dulles's insistence that such an initiative, which would be interpreted as further French deferral, would have serious effects in Germany and destroy Western solidarity towards the USSR.⁵⁴ The proposal added further fuel to press speculation, vigorously denied by Mendès France, that he and Molotov had negotiated a deal for the rejection of EDC in return for a neutralised Germany during their private final meeting in Geneva on 21 July.⁵⁵ The incident confirmed Mendès France's belief that the entire EDC business was weakening Western solidarity just as it illustrated the lack of EDC options open to him. If the Premier was undecided about EDC when he assumed power, his entry into EDC policymaking was rapidly turning him to active opposition of the project.

Confrontation at Brussels

Although the proposed application protocol which Mendès France presented to his Cabinet on 12 August and communicated two days later to France's EDC partners followed the format recommended by de Seynes, the essence of the project was that of Parodi.⁵⁶ The protocol proposed to divest EDC institutions of all political decision-making power and give member states the right to veto any Commission decision for the first eight years of the treaty. The Council of Ministers would be the supreme body, in which the UK would be invited to participate whenever questions arising out of its association were raised. Integration of national forces would be limited to German territory - a European army would exist, essentially, only in the Federal Republic. All decisions relating to defence policy would be taken jointly by the

⁵⁴*FRUS* 1952-4 5: 1026-31; Kirkpatrick to PM, 13 Aug. 1954, PRO, FO 800/790; London tel. 11712, 13 Aug. 1954, MAE, SG 16.

⁵⁵The Quai denounced these press reports, 26 July 1954, MAE, SG 16; see René Girault, 'La France dans les rapports Est-Ouest au temps de Pierre Mendès France', in Bédarida & Rioux (eds.) *Pierre Mendès France et le mendésisme*, 251-61 & Giles Cophornic, 'Les interférences entre construction européenne et détente', *Relations Internationales*, no. 71 1992, 257-72.

⁵⁶Bruce and Tomlinson informed Washington that Parodi's anti-EDC group was responsible for the actual drafting of the texts, Coled 19, 15 Aug. 1954, Bruce Diaries & *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 1039-40; Alphand reported the same to Reynaud, m.s. notes of talk, 23 Aug. 1954, AN, 74 AP 54.

NATO and EDC Councils and the headquarters of both would be in one place. National parliaments would determine their own contribution to the common budget and national armies would retain control of their own recruitment, promotion and disciplinary procedures for a minimum period of four years. Control over nuclear fuel production over 500g would apply only to 'strategically exposed' areas (i.e. German territory). Article 38 of the treaty, regarding the future EPC, would not be interpreted as limiting the freedom of action of the member states' governments or parliaments. The protocol further demanded that member states retain the freedom to end their participation in EDC if any change were to occur in US or UK defence policies in Europe or if Germany were reunited.⁵⁷ In one move, the French were proposing a complete change to the integrative nature fundamental to the European defence community.

International suspicion that Mendès France's project was actually intended to be rejected by France's partners did not diminish with the resignation of the three Gaullist ministers, Koenig, Chaban-Delmas and Lemaire, in protest at the proposals. Bruce pointed out that the Gaullists had never indicated any willingness to strike a deal on the treaty while the Premier would now lose the support of the MRP, the Socialists and pro-EDC Independent leaders such as Pinay.⁵⁸ At the same time, the French protocol seemed a deliberate taunt to the clearly-established position of its five partners. Alphand, dropped from all EDC discussions and from the delegation to Brussels, warned the Prime Minister that neither the European states nor the US would accept such modifications, a view which was confirmed by the French embassies in each country.⁵⁹ The most generous explanation of the proposals that Ambassador Dillon and Patrick Reilly, Minister at the UK Embassy, could offer was that they were only intended for bargaining purposes and that Mendès France would actually agree to far less when the conference of the Six began four days later.⁶⁰

⁵⁷Texts of propositions, Paris to Washington & London, 14 Aug. 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/155; Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, i, 286; Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community* (London, 1980), 281-83.

⁵⁸14-15 Aug. 1954, Bruce Diaries.

⁵⁹Alphand's only access to the protocols was through his foreign colleagues on the Interim Committee, letter to Mendès France, 17 Aug. 1954, DPMF, CED II.

⁶⁰Reilly to FO, 15 Aug. 1954, PRO, FO 371/109440; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 1038-39.

Mendès France had suffered no illusions as to the unfavourable reaction of the other EDC states. What he had underestimated, however, was the resolution and the unanimity of this opposition both before and at the opening of the Brussels Conference on 19 August 1954. It was indicative of the Quai's continued lack of regard for its European partners that it judged their opposition dangerous only to the extent that it was coordinated by the US. Even German opinion, regarded as the most likely tone-setter among the five, was not considered too great a threat: the French High Commission commented that, in Adenauer's CDU milieu, any formula in Brussels which had Bruce's approval would be accepted by the Federal Government.⁶¹ Bonnet had already given Washington a precautionary warning that if the US wanted to see the EDC, it should encourage the five to accept the proposals and, as ever, advised the Embassy of the unfavourable reaction US activity would have in France.⁶²

Spaak, meanwhile, pressed the US to do the complete reverse and issue (along with the UK) a formal demarché urging the five not to agree to the protocol.⁶³ He had already begun to plan how France should be approached at Brussels, suggesting that Dutch Foreign Minister Beyen make the first response to the French presentation on behalf of the five, outlining clearly their unanimous refusal to consider anything other than purely technical changes to the treaty and underlining, once again, how EDC was the result of French actions. Knowing that Mendès France wanted to meet privately with Adenauer beforehand, Spaak advised the Chancellor - who himself was reluctant to become involved in any bilateral discussions - to sidestep the encounter by pleading fatigue.⁶⁴ Washington supported this first concerted effort and although it rejected Spaak's demarché suggestion (to the disappointment of Bruce and Tomlinson), a message was sent from Dulles to the Brussels delegates urging immediate ratification. Washington also agreed to Bruce's initiative that he inform the EDC Interim

⁶¹Bonn tel 3935, 17 Aug. 1954 & Sauvagnargues memo, 10 July 1954, MAE, SG 12.

⁶²Washington tel. 4785, 16 Aug. 1954, MAE, SG 16; Dillon continued to advise the US to remain silent, tel 654, 16 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11.

⁶³FRUS 1952-4 5: 1041-42, 16 Aug.

⁶⁴Bonn tel. 3950, 18 Aug. 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/155; Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1953-1955* (Stuttgart, 1966), 275-80; Jan van der Harst, *The Netherlands and the EDC* (Florence, 1986), 47-9; Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, i, 286-89.

Committee that he was no longer authorised to sign any agreement on external aid to EDC until the results of the conference were known.⁶⁵

These feverish last-minute efforts were matched in Paris. Massigli was instructed to request a meeting between Mendès France and Churchill and Eden immediately after Brussels to which the British agreed, Eden cutting short his vacation in Austria to be present.⁶⁶ The Quai's legal and European desks had already begun examination of the inevitable application of the Contractual Accords that would occur once the EDC treaty collapsed to explore how France could best retain a degree of control over the implementation of German political sovereignty. Baudet, Mendès France's *chef de cabinet*, thought an immediate meeting of the three occupation powers might provide a suitable vehicle for this and suggested that the idea be launched during Mendès France's meeting with the British.⁶⁷ Mendès France's advisors outside the Quai focused on the domestic steps to be taken after the Brussels Conference failed: Servan-Schreiber stressed that a way would have to be found to liquidate EDC without bringing parliament to an actual vote on the treaty, as any such vote would end up appearing as a decision on the principle of German rearmament rather than the form it took. This would then pave the way for France to formulate a European solution with the UK '*plutôt que la formule NATO pure et simple*'.⁶⁸ Mendès France maintained a vigorous defence campaign towards the US throughout with instructions to Bonnet, personal letters to Dulles via the intermediary of André Meyer (a French banker in the US) and meetings between French and US officials from the first day in Brussels, all intended to stress the Prime Minister's sincerity and the impossibility of any French climbdown.⁶⁹

The greatest significance of the Brussels Conference of 19-22 August, therefore, was neither the content of the foreign ministers' discussions nor the failure of the Six to reach agreement on EDC modification, but rather the acrimonious

⁶⁵FRUS 1952-4 5: 1044-45, 1058-60, 17 Aug; copy of Dulles's 19 Aug. cable, DPMF, CED II.

⁶⁶René Massigli, *Une Comédie des Erreurs, 1943-56: Souvenirs et réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne* (Paris, 1978), 444.

⁶⁷Baudet memo '*Suggestions en cas d'échec de la Conférence de Bruxelles*', 19 Aug. 1954; Europe Centrale memo '*Rejet de l'Accord de Paris et mise en application de l'Accord de Bonn ou de dispositions analogues*', 18 Aug. 1954; Juridique to Parodi, no. 604, 19 Aug. 1954, MAE, SG 16.

⁶⁸Servan-Schreiber, '*Note pour le Président: après Bruxelles*', 19 Aug. 1954, DPMF, CED II.

⁶⁹Tel to Bonnet, (undated) DPMF, CED II; FRUS 1952-4 5: 1049-50; Brussels tel. 1263, 19 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11; Mayer-Dulles conversation, 18 Aug. 1954, Box 1, General correspondence and memoranda series, Dulles Papers, DDEL.

atmosphere that dominated the talks from the outset and which left bitter personal legacies in the memories of the principal participants.⁷⁰ Undoubtedly, much of the tension was due to the fact that Mendès France took the reactions of his five fellow ministers to the French proposals as a concerted personal attack. When Spaak attempted to facilitate a French backdown through the establishment of a joint declaration defining criteria by which the EDC treaty could be introduced gradually (which itself represented a major concession to the French) Mendès France rejected the project as soon as he read its historical preamble, declaring it an accusation against France.⁷¹ Even French officials acknowledged that the Prime Minister's reaction had led him 'to adopt the attitude that it was useless for him to make any concessions', which, in turn, fuelled other delegations' suspicions that Mendès France was making no real effort to arrive at a compromise. The Prime Minister's lack of familiarity with the EDC treaty itself did not go unnoticed.⁷²

Yet this was far from being a one-man show. Mendès France was supported every step of the way by his own delegation, which never lost sight of its essential objective. Parodi bolstered his Minister's resolve throughout, assuring him he was being put under the strongest, most combined and indiscreet pressure he had ever witnessed as Secretary General and warning him that if he gave in to this intimidation, it would mark the start of France's erosion as an independent state. Integration, once put into motion, was not likely to be reversible.⁷³ Most important, Parodi firmly dismissed Mendès France's fear of a Western alliance crisis arising from the collapse of EDC. *'Les Américains sont réalistes. S'il est acquis que la France ne veut pas de la CED, ils regarderont la situation en face....Les Ministres du Benelux sont en faveur de la CED parce qu'ils ont peur d'une Allemagne laissée à elle-même: c'est à dire qu'eux non plus ne pourront se passer de la France en dehors comme à l'intérieur de la CED.'* A French rejection, accompanied by an explicit commitment to German

⁷⁰See Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, i, 290-95; Seydoux, *Mémoires d'OutreRhin*, 186-88; Jean Chauvel, *Commentaire*, iii, *De Berne à Paris, 1952-1962* (Paris, 1973), 112; Edgar Faure, *Mémoires*, i, *Avoir toujours raison...c'est un grand tort toujours* (Paris, 1982), 610; Adenauer, *Errinerungen*, 279.

⁷¹Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, i, 287.

⁷²Paris tel. 788, 25 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 11; Minutes of meeting between unnamed French official and von Eckhardt (German govt. press service), MAE, EU44-60/Gén/155; the Bruce-Monnet-Alphand nexus was convinced Mendès France set out to reject the treaty deliberately, memo in English, 27 Aug. 1954, FJM, AMI 23/8/20.

⁷³Parodi to Mendès France, 21 Aug. 1954, MAE, SG 67.

rearmament, would actually pave the way for a positive solution to the current alliance tensions, affirmed Parodi.

It was this advice that sustained Mendès France in the face of a final desperate US effort orchestrated by Bruce and Tomlinson. They warned Dulles against giving the impression the US would go along with any acceptable solution and inspired the Secretary's strongly-worded messages to the conference and to Mendès France on 21 August warning against any alteration to the treaty's supranational features which would 'strike at the basic concept of European unity...the best and last hope of Europe'.⁷⁴ US officials maintained a tireless round of talks from one delegation to the next, so much so that Mendès France dropped all pretence of diplomatic nicety and asked to speak to Tomlinson personally at 2 a.m. in the morning (when discussions finally broke up) to put forward his own defence.⁷⁵ Washington now offered to support Spaak's earlier idea for an immediate meeting of the Benelux, Germany, (as the four ratified states) the US and the UK to demonstrate to the French that German rearmament would go ahead without them. Ironically, it was Spaak who decided against any further provocation of Mendès France.⁷⁶ France, in calling the Benelux bluff, managed to avoid having to test the US one.

The final communiqué of 22 August confirmed the failure of the Brussels Conference: the simultaneous publication of both the French protocol text and Spaak's alternative declaration offered ample illustration of the gulf between the two sides.⁷⁷ Yet at the same time, the French were careful to sow the seeds of the only reconciliation they considered important in Brussels. The final statement of the Six affirmed the need to avoid German neutralisation and, in a final, private meeting with Adenauer, Mendès France confirmed French agreement that Germany's sovereignty should not be delayed by the certain (he told Adenauer) rejection of EDC in France.⁷⁸ The Prime Minister, in an altogether different mood than the previous days, stressed

⁷⁴Dulles to Merchant, 20 Aug. 1954, Box 2, Telephone conversations, Dulles Papers, DDEL; *FRUS* 1952-4 5, 1058-60, 21 Aug.

⁷⁵*FRUS* 1952-4 5, 1064-67, 22 Aug.

⁷⁶Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, i, 293-95; the Bruce Diaries entries covering the Brussels Conference are still classified.

⁷⁷Seydoux thought Mendès France was relieved that the five would not give way, *Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin*, 188.

⁷⁸Adenauer to PMF, 21 Aug. 1954, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/155; No MAE records of the meeting exist, *DDF* 1954, 194, fn 1 but Brussels tel. 499 reported Adenauer having been impressed by Mendès France, MAE, EU44-60/Gén/155; Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, 286-89.

his desire for a close Franco-German partnership. Clearly, the French had no intention of permitting their EDC programme to endanger France's German policy: every effort to prevent Germany turning exclusively to the US would be made.

Chartwell - 23 August 1954

The French did not arrive in the UK to negotiate an EDC alternative with the British: the real objective of Mendès France's visit was to secure British cooperation to prevent '*le seul danger qui nous menace gravement: une politique américaine essentiellement centrée sur l'Allemagne*'.⁷⁹ This goal would be achieved if the British gave a commitment not to join with the US in taking steps toward Germany when the EDC fell in France. Mendès France warned Churchill and Eden that any exclusionary action against France, such as the US proposal for a meeting between the ratified states, Britain and the US, would involve the potential hazard of centring European defence on Germany.⁸⁰ The French premier assured the UK that the French were agreed on the need to assist Adenauer in the rapid restoration of German sovereignty through the separate implementation of the Bonn accords.

Only in conclusion did Mendès France bait his counterparts on British thinking about EDC alternatives and the possibility of devising some form of European coalition in which the UK could participate. But Churchill and Eden, having already received a barrage of messages from Adenauer, Dulles and Spaak to maintain pressure on the French, had no intention of breaking ranks with the rest of their alliance partners.⁸¹ The British maintained throughout the private meeting that direct German entry into NATO was the only alternative to EDC and Churchill warned of the dangerous consequences EDC rejection could involve for future US commitment in Europe.

⁷⁹Parodi to Mendès France (undated, at Brussels), MAE, SG 67. Michel Debré records how the normally gentle Parodi was furious at the reaction of the five, *Trois républiques pour une France*, ii, (Paris, 1988), 221.

⁸⁰French minutes in DPMF, CED II & MAE, SG 16.

⁸¹Churchill assured Dulles, 'You and I have never been closer on a live issue', *FRUS*, 1952-4 5: 1070-71, 22 Aug.

The French were wrong to assume British silence was dictated solely out of consideration of relations with Washington.⁸² Eden was genuinely hesitant about French plans for a European sub-group which could launch Britain on the slippery path of commitments to Europe and still believed that a direct German entry into NATO with safeguards to restrict the Federal Republic offered the best option for UK policy. He recognised, however, that this option might not be popular in either Germany, the US or even among the British population.⁸³ However, while London might not have had an agreed alternative to hand, Eden was not prepared to postpone the rejection Mendès France promised and strongly opposed a final US proposal of 25 August that the US and UK governments invite the Six to meet again in their presence before the French parliament debated EDC. Bruce and Monnet, who had returned from convalescence in the Alps to try and save the situation, put the idea forward, claiming it was the only remaining way of underlining to the entire French nation the extent of its international isolation. Eden, by contrast, argued it would encourage the French to shy even further away from EDC. Without British support, Washington was forced to abandon the initiative.⁸⁴ Once again, France had been saved by one of its European allies from testing the US bluff as to the possible consequences of EDC rejection.

Loose ends in Paris

Little further effort was required in Paris to consign the EDC treaty for burial in the National Assembly. Before the Cabinet, the parliamentary committees and the public Mendès France maintained his position that compromise on France's proposals was impossible: *'Si j'avais cédé, j'aurais pris des engagements au nom de la France tout en sachant qu'ils ne seraient pas tenus.'*⁸⁵ He stressed to his domestic audiences that German sovereignty would not be held up by EDC's rejection while avoiding any commitment on the precise consequences this would entail for rearmament.

⁸²Unsigned memo on general impressions of the Chartwell meeting, MAE, SG 16.

⁸³Memorandum on Alternatives to EDC, 27 Aug. 1954, PRO, CAB 129/70 C(54)276.

⁸⁴m.s. memo of the proposed statement, 25 Aug. 1954, FJM, AMI 23/8/16, *Aide-mémoire*, 3 Sept 1954, FJM, AMI 23/8/24; 25 Aug. 1954, Bruce Diaries; Bedell Smith to Eisenhower, 27 Aug. 1954, Box 3, Dulles-Herter Series, Whitman File, DDEL; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 1081-82, 26 Aug.

⁸⁵In Lacouture, *Pierre Mendès France*, 313.

Nevertheless, Mendès France did nothing to discourage the impression that he had received British support for the 'little NATO' alternative: the Quai reportedly had suppressed publication of a British Foreign Office statement denying any such deal and speculation among parliamentary deputies continued unabated.⁸⁶

For the most part, however, the Quai played no role in the final domestic round, being far more occupied with post-EDC scenarios. The persistent effort to discover British thinking paid off: officials at the Embassy in London were able to transmit an outline of Eden's thinking even before his presentation to the UK Cabinet. This information provided useful guidance for Parodi's staff in preparing a French plan to seduce the UK once EDC rejection had taken place.⁸⁷ Quai planning benefited too from the views of the French Chiefs of Staff. The military supported German membership of NATO with safeguards to prevent it supplanting France therein and suggested, on 12 August, that an extension of the Brussels treaty organisation would provide the best way to realise this.⁸⁸ For the present, however, the Quai was not overly anxious to begin precise detailing as to how this would be done: as officials pointed out, since France was rejecting the solution it had originally proposed, 'it was hardly fitting that they should now produce a new rabbit out of the hat'.⁸⁹

The crucial long-term questions of France's relationship with the US, and France's future place in the Western alliance were also, albeit indirectly, discussed in Paris prior to the treaty collapse. No attempt was made to revive the tripartite NATO direction strategies that had been so central to French leadership objectives from 1949-53 and consideration of a future US-French partnership in Europe was notable only by its absence. What did preoccupy the Mendès France *cabinet*, the Quai and the military leadership was the question of nuclear weapons. There was overwhelming agreement that the 'New Look' strategy would make France entirely dependent on US willingness to employ its nuclear weaponry unless, as the French military representative to NAC General Valluy pointed out, the European states constructed their own atomic arsenal, '*qui leur permettra d'intervenir avec leurs moyens propres*

⁸⁶ Paris tels. 777,785 & 813, 25-27 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Boxes 11 & 10; 27 Aug. 1954, Bruce Diaries; *FRUS* 1952-4 5: 1083, fn 4.

⁸⁷ Crouy-Chanel to de Margerie, 24 Aug. 1954, to Parodi, 26 Aug. 1954, MAE, SG 16.

⁸⁸ Pierre Guillen, 'Les chefs militaires, le réarmement d'Allemagne et la CED', *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, no. 129, 1983, 32.

⁸⁹ Soutou comments, Reilly to Roberts, 4 Sept. 1954, PRO, FO 371/109434.

*dans cette guerre nouvelle, et, partant, de reprendre dans la direction de la coalition un rôle de premier plan.*⁹⁰ Boegner, the Quai's atomic issue expert, strongly opposed any European collaborative ventures and pressed instead for a national nuclear force, the feasibility of which was supported by reports submitted to Mendès France in July and August from both the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and the military's *Commandement des Armes Spéciales*.⁹¹ Mendès France needed little urging that the development of French nuclear weapons was incompatible with EDC and requested that a full study of France's nuclear possibilities be undertaken by October. French policymakers were acknowledging that a leading international position could only be guaranteed by possession of the principal power resource that defined the post-war order and that this had to be pursued on a unilateral basis.

Washington, nonplussed by the fact that Paris no longer seemed to be taking any account of the possible US policy consequences of a treaty rejection, was powerless to halt EDC's funereal procession to parliament. Although the 'Gang of Four' - Bruce, Tomlinson, Monnet and Alphand - worked with their parliamentary allies - Schuman, Schumann, Pinay, Reynaud, Mayer - on a potential Cabinet motion to adjourn the debate and resume negotiations with the Six, the effort was clearly doomed from the start. Mendès France would only enter new talks on the basis of his Brussels position, something the pro-EDC group insisted was impossible.⁹² The pro-EDCers had few weapons to fight their corner, being neither members of the government nor particularly close to the Prime Minister.⁹³ Mendès France was, in fact, furious at the pro-EDC deputies, and particularly Schuman, for declaring publicly during the Brussels Conference that they considered Mendès France's proposals unacceptable. With only three pro-EDC ministers in his Cabinet (Bourgès-Maunoury, Petit and Hugues), Mendès France had little need to court the

⁹⁰ Memo to Pélabron, 20 Aug. 1954 & Alphand memo on new conceptions of general strategy, 14 Aug. 1954, DPMF, CED II.

⁹¹ Aline Coutrot, 'La politique atomique sous le gouvernement Pierre Mendès France' in Bédarida and Rioux (eds.) *Pierre Mendès France et le mendésisme*, 309-16; George-Henri Soutou, 'La politique nucléaire de Pierre Mendès France', *Relations Internationales*, no. 59 1989, 317-30; Jacques Bariety, 'La décision de réarmer l'Allemagne, l'échec de la CED et les accords de Paris du 23 octobre 1954 vus du côté français', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 71, 1993, 375-77.

⁹² Paris tel. 852, 29 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10; m.s. notes of Monnet-Reynaud talk, 26 Aug. 1954, AN, 74 AP 53; Alphand memo, 29 Aug. 1954, FJM, AMI 25/10/7.

⁹³ Although Mayer and Mendès France belonged to the same party, the 'electoral cooperative' as Philip Williams described the Radical party, did not necessarily entail close parliamentary relationships.

parliamentarians' support. Personal appeals by Alphand and Monnet were met only with polite letters of acknowledgement.⁹⁴ The fact that pro-EDCers had the backing of Bruce and Tomlinson merely weakened these efforts further. Mendès France had not disguised his hostility to the two since Brussels: there were loud hints in Paris that the government preferred to deal with Ambassador Dillon.⁹⁵ Far from being a source of strength, US assistance now appeared as the kiss of death for EDC.

On 27 August the Cabinet confirmed it would not put the EDC treaty debate to a vote of confidence: two days later the debate in the Assembly opened. The long-awaited culmination of French parliamentary consideration of the treaty proved to be little more than a rehearsal of the summer's arguments and the confrontations: Mendès France's speech centred on a defence of his actions in Brussels and dwelt on the notion that France was somehow insulted by its partners. He did underline that rejection of the treaty would not prevent the return of German sovereignty nor eventual rearmament, but he left the Assembly in no doubt that there existed other forms of bringing this about. The debate in France was no longer about the principle of German rearmament. Nor was it about the creation of an integrated European community, militarily and politically.⁹⁶ Mendès France's speech, and the few subsequent interventions by deputies on both sides of the debate that took place in the National Assembly from 29-30 August 1954, revealed the essence of the EDC question: it was about France, France's place in the world and how best its alliances should be arranged to secure its position.

French deputies, as they did throughout the course of the EDC project, continued, however, to assign the responsibility of working out these questions to French foreign policy administrators. An Independent opponent of EDC, General Aumeran, put forward a '*motion préalable*' - a procedure by which the Assembly could reject an issue without full consideration of it through a vote - in an effort to block a pro-EDC motion to postpone the EDC debate ('*une motion préjudicielle*'). After an initial withdrawal, followed by complex back-room manoeuvring, both

⁹⁴Mendès France to Alphand 18 Aug. & Monnet, 16 & 26 Aug. 1954, DPMF, CED II.

⁹⁵Memo of conversation with Catroux, 25 Aug. 1954, NARA, RG 84, Paris Embassy: C, Box 10; Fauré, *Mémoires*, 620-22; *L'Express* pointedly praised Dillon as the only US official telling Washington the truth about the EDC situation in France, 4 Sept. 1954.

⁹⁶A point noted by Herz in his post-mortem of EDC, 16 Sept. 1954, *FRUS* 1952-4 5, 1094-113 & Servan-Schreiber, memo for Mendès France, 24 Aug. 1954, DPMF, CED II.

motions were re-introduced on 30 August 1954. According to the regulations of the Assembly a '*motion préalable*' had higher priority than a postponement procedure and therefore had to be voted upon first. Mendès France, to the denunciation of pro-EDC deputies, made it perfectly clear that this motion was not a procedural matter but an actual decision on the treaty. He left no doubt where he stood on the question, having refused to support the re-introduction of the pro-EDC postponement motion. He and 23 members of his government abstained in the subsequent vote. The result was unequivocal: 319 votes to 264 in favour of throwing out the EDC treaty debate without further consideration.

The parliament's vote did not reflect the opinion of the public it represented.⁹⁷ Its failure to debate the question of the European defence organisation illustrated how far removed the Assembly was from the perceptions, preoccupations and the decisions of the administration it was mandated to govern. It was an undignified end to the EDC saga, yet it was also particularly apt. The parliament's role in the death of the treaty mirrored perfectly its function at its birth - presiding over an event that had taken place quite independently of it and over which it had little actual power.

⁹⁷Between Sept. 1951 to Feb. 1955, public opinion towards EDC hardly varied: 42-43% in favour, 26-22% against and 32-35% undecided. Even at the height of EDC domestic hostility, in July 1954, 36% were broadly in favour compared to 31% broadly opposed. Jean-Pierre Rioux, *La France de la IVe République*, ii, *L'expansion et l'impuissance, 1952-58* (Paris, 1983), 28.

Chapter Ten

Conclusion

If explaining change is the task of the historian, grappling with reversal, one particular form of change, presents one of its most challenging varieties. Our conception of change is that of a linear process of transformation: reversal, by contrast, suggests a circular path back to the original starting point. In August 1954, this is where the European Defence Community project appeared to have arrived in France. The specific problem of how to incorporate Germany into the Western alliance still confronted Paris. As in September 1950, French opposition to US-sponsored proposals left it isolated from its Western partners. Awareness of the potentially grievous consequences that could result hung heavily over French policymakers. In October 1950 the French had responded to this situation with a proposal for the creation of an integrated European army. The solution France chose four years later was the rejection of this very project. The task of this thesis has been to understand why this reversal took place. In exploring the continuities and the changes that shaped this seemingly circular route, two themes have been highlighted: one, the continuity of French policy ends and second, the small and highly personalised nature of French EDC policymaking. Yet what this thesis has also demonstrated is the inextricable relationship between both themes. The EDC episode powerfully illustrates how exploring the interaction between policymakers, policymaking and policies is crucial to an understanding of the tortuous path of French EDC policy. It provides the key to explaining how France ended its EDC experience in a quite different place from where it had begun. Even starting points do not stand still.

The search for leadership in the post-war Western alliance was the fundamental continuity that marked French EDC policy from 1950-54. Political, military and administrative leaders held it as axiomatic that a permanent leadership position was essential for France's recovery and security. Humiliating defeats by Germany and the difficult aftermaths of two world wars provided powerful incentives. Leadership was the way to strength but leadership could only come through strength: squaring this circle became the *leitmotif* of French post-war foreign policy.

Seen from this perspective, the goal of leadership was not so much a choice of French policymakers as a fundamental imperative. As a result, the objective of leadership was rarely discussed, much less questioned, within the French policy-making environment. Nor was the specific content of that leadership explored. Indeed its very imperative ensured that it was conceived in the broadest of terms, encompassing economic and military strength - what might be called 'hard' power - as well as international dominance through political stature, position, reputation - the 'soft' dimensions of power. If this all-pervasive nature of the concept reinforced its dominance as a principle, it also complicated the process of defining precise policy agendas for the pursuit of French leadership.

Part of this, of course, was a consequence of France's weakness. The inherent tension in the leadership equation was mirrored in the search for strategies to achieve it. International leadership and French reasoning as to its necessity were grounded in a unilateral self-help perception which could only be achieved, given French weakness, with the collaboration and assistance of its partners. In the post-war world that partner was the United States. Only the US could provide the economic and military assistance vital for French recovery and only the US, as the dominant force in the newly established Atlantic Alliance, could enable France to secure a position of political leadership in the West. At a time when France found itself frequently reacting to international events the imperative of leadership demanded a proactive foreign policy if the US was to be convinced to forge this leading partnership.

This was the context in which France's European Army proposal was introduced and the challenge it sought to meet. As Chapter Two illustrated, the US call for German participation in the Western defence effort was perceived as a challenge to France's leadership quest. France had based its claim to international dominance on its primacy in Europe which the accelerated emergence of a sovereign German state, the inevitable consequence of German rearmament, would immediately threaten. The only way to contain Germany was through an alliance framework forged around the US, the British Commonwealth and a French-led Western Europe. The initiative for a European Army, modelled on France's European coal and steel integration plan that had earlier met with US enthusiasm addressed this complex interweave: France's need for collective - and above all US - assistance, French

claims to European leadership and France's position in the Western Alliance. It was, and always remained, an essentially political project: the creation of an uncommon community.

Yet however much the European Army plan reflected the preoccupations and the paradoxes of France's leadership equation, there was no inevitability behind its introduction. This was a function of the French policymaking environment in October 1950. Monnet's dominance and authority within it gave him the opportunity to launch the idea of an integrated European defence force. His influence with Prime Minister Pleven and Foreign Minister Schuman encouraged the French government to give his proposal serious consideration: the sense of urgency and desperation that dominated the Cabinet's deliberations undoubtedly played an important part in the government's decision to adopt the proposal as French policy. Ultimately, however, two factors ensured the success of Monnet's proposal. The very newness of the idea for a common European army was crucially significant: for one thing, there was no standard by which the initiative, so scant in detail, could be examined and compared. The burden of proof of its unworkability rested, therefore, with opponents of the proposal. Moreover, precisely because of its originality and deliberately opaque nature, the idea offered real potential for solving France's leadership dilemma: squaring the circle might just be feasible.

The second factor was one of tactics. Monnet not only addressed the dominant leadership preoccupation of French foreign policy: his personal relationships and influence in Washington embodied the conception of a US-French partnership that France sought. Only Monnet could argue against conceding to US plans for rearmament and claim France's alternative would enhance bilateral relations. Although his prediction proved initially incorrect, Monnet's strenuous efforts to win support from Washington - coopting Bruce and McCloy to assist in the endeavour - were central in securing the survival of the European Army project both at home and abroad (Chapter Three). The determination, singled-mindedness and unity with which this network pursued EDC progress at the level of national and international politics made for a formidably powerful force: an uncommon, transatlantic, 'community'. Finally, *l'Inspirateur* exploited the weakness of the French political system to remarkable effect by offering to handle the problem for harrassed politicians. Rather

than look for instructions, Monnet presented the government with his own written orders. This permitted, and actually encouraged, the Cabinet not to become actively engaged in the new policy initiative.

The combination of French leadership preoccupations and the particular dominance of Monnet and his team continued to shape French EDC policy in the second phase of treaty negotiation. In order to win Washington round to its initiative, French officials put increased emphasis on the European integrative dimension of the Pleven Plan. By contrast, France displayed a cavalier disregard for its five European partners. Throughout the EDC negotiations direct appeal to or close coordination with the continental states was rare: France, if anything, was keen to distance itself from the Benelux, Italy and West Germany in order to demonstrate its claim to Western alliance leadership, alongside Britain and the United States. Yet French primacy in the EDC negotiations could only be asserted with the assistance of the US and, as Chapter Four demonstrated, it was the transatlantic network forged around Monnet which proved the most influential force in convincing Washington to back EDC in summer 1951. As the progress in Paris illustrated, it was Washington's commitment to the project, mirrored in the deep involvement of Bruce and his Embassy staff, that determined both the success of the EDC negotiations and France's dominance therein.

The other dimension to securing US assistance in EDC reflected French recovery needs, the second half of the leadership equation. From the moment of its formulation, EDC policy was linked to France's wider military and economic needs. Increased financial and military assistance for French national reconstruction; massive US assistance in Indochina; political backing for France's position in North Africa; support for French demands in the numerous intra-EDC disputes; active involvement in the Schuman Plan negotiations - the sheer breadth and linkage of French demands to the US revealed the extent of French weakness, just as it demonstrated how much French EDC policy was an integral part of France's Western leadership strategy. Yet once again, it was Monnet who marked out the framework of this approach. He had introduced and established in the Pleven Plan the chain of links between France's economic and military requirements; France's continental and overseas responsibilities; France's European and Western dominance. The fact that there was

no clearly defined agenda as to the specific constituents of French leadership amongst French policymakers ensured that this chain continued to develop.

In the short term, French EDC policy did bring some success. French assessments that Washington's concern for German rearmament and its support for European integration would encourage the US to agree to its demands were correct. The US did concede to the expanding agenda of French claims in EDC and, as Chapter Five showed, US pressure forced France's continental partners into concessions to the French. In the longer term, however, it ensured that the US was brought permanently into the arbitration and management of intra-European relations in the EDC, hardly a presence facilitating French direction. Moreover, multiple French EDC demands on the US actually served to demonstrate the fragility of France's claims to Western leadership. Above all, the tensions in French EDC policy were reflected in the emerging European defence community itself; on the one hand, a force firmly within the framework of the NATO command, on the other, one woven inextricably into the nascent European organisational structure. In military terms, integration was primarily about restriction: the European Army concentrated on the integration of ground forces, lightly armed, serving in one Western theatre of operation; in economic and political terms, ambitious plans for the integration of national defence budgets, arms production, political governance and external policy coordination were envisaged. In principle, the European force was committed to equality, in practice, permanent French command and preponderance were insisted upon. French EDC policy, in both content and conduct, had certainly succeeded in building an uncommon - and unworkable - community.

It was also a community that fell far short of France's leadership goals, as politicians and bureaucrats in Paris realised with some shock after the signing of the EDC treaty in May 1952. The belated recognition of the incongruity between participation in a collective organisation centring on the principle of supranationality and French leadership goals was in part a consequence of the preoccupation with US partnership rather than the European institution being built. Nonetheless, the unprecedented nature of the EDC had made it difficult to envisage a final structure. The undercover construction style of its principal architects and foremen, the Monnet-Alphand-Bruce

nexus, contributed to this as even their supporters noted: ‘Nobody else was told anything about it [EDC]...and every time you asked them for a paper they would say, “Oh well, we are not ready yet”...So you never saw anything’.¹ Above all, however, it was Monnet’s expanding conception of the European Army, traced in Chapter Six, that marked the start of a bitter split within the small environment of French foreign policymaking. French EDC policy had provoked an increasingly uncommon policymaking community in Paris.

Swept up in the heady first days of the European Coal and Steel Assembly and the sense of possibility for an accelerated construction of Europe and conscious too of the weakness and contradictions that French EDC policy had translated into the EDC project itself, it was not surprising, perhaps, that Monnet and his international network would be gradually moved to exploit the political potential of the idea for a European force. It was neither inevitable nor unconscious, however, and encompassed a specific objective, namely the establishment of an institutional framework for a supranational European Union. In 1950 Monnet had campaigned for a European Army to counteract the dangers of US demands for German rearmament: *‘La psychologie créée, le rythme établi, les économies ajustées, l’Allemagne de l’Ouest intégré, non pas, comme nous l’aurions voulu et comme c’est encore possible, par la paix et sous la conduite de la France, mais intégrée par l’armement, rapidement, sous la conduite des militaires....Alors l’inévitable se produira, la France sera détruite, ce que nous voulons préserver, la liberté, la diversité, seront détruites dans la régimentation universelle du vainqueur.’*² Monnet’s final appeal to Mendès France illustrated how far his ideas had developed, *‘La Communauté de défense a été trop souvent confondue avec une création de la guerre froide et avec un réarmement allemand, alors qu’elle soit une étape dans la construction d’une Europe unie et permet de poursuivre celle-ci en prévenant la reconstitution d’une armée nationale allemande.’*³ The EDC’s expanding nature demonstrates how rapidly ideas about the organisation of Europe could develop and disseminate in the early 1950s. Moreover the extent to which pro-EDC activists pursued this maximal vision illustrates how powerful and

¹Acheson comment, 11-13 December 1953, Box 89, Princeton Seminars, Acheson Papers, Truman Library.

²Letter to Pleven, 3 Sept. 1950, FJM, AMI 4/3/6.

³Letter to Mendès France, 12 Aug. 1954, FJM, AMI 26/2/1.

cohesive a force the idea of Europe was, even for 'pragmatic' men of action like Monnet, Bruce and Alphand. It not only brought them together but provided a dynamic agenda for concerted action to shape the emerging EDC structure.

The continued development of EDC proved an equally powerful force for the coalescence of the senior Quai leadership in opposition to the project. The ensuing struggle for control of French EDC policy testified to the gulf that had developed between the Monnet team and the French foreign ministry over the nature and the purpose of the EDC. While Monnet's determination to effect policy remained undiminished, the battle finally revealed the limitations of his tactics. A policymaking dominance based on personal contacts, international influence and the circumvention of French administrative structures was contingent upon the particular constellation of personalities at the head of the government. By the end of 1952, Monnet's patrons no longer occupied this place. Moreover, the deliberately minimal and broad-brush informational approach with which the Monnet-Alphand nexus had won political approval did little to encourage a sense of government commitment or responsibility towards EDC ratification. Nor, in this third stage of the policy process, could the views and the significance of administrative officials be ignored.

Ironically, it was foreign ministry officials who demonstrated the greater political awareness in this struggle for dominance of French EDC policy. Rather than use the weakness and fragility of French political life simply as a way of increasing its policymaking freedom, the Quai leadership exploited these divisions to make common cause with different sectors within the administration and the domestic political system. The foreign ministry leadership was prepared to address the uninformed and often crude views of many French politicians, however much its own thinking may have differed, as the question of four-power talks with the USSR explored in Chapter Eight neatly demonstrated. What the Quai understood was that however international the character of EDC was, implementation involved a series of national, domestic, political procedures. Capitalising on the domestic political concerns of the French government, as well as its permanent position within the administration enabled Quai direction of EDC policy from the end of 1952.

Where the ministry group proved less successful was in devising alternatives to EDC that would protect and promote French leadership in the West. Confronted

with France's perennial constraints, policymakers at the Quai attempted to recast EDC back into its original conception as a vehicle for Western leadership while, simultaneously, reviving French projects for permanent tripartite direction of NATO. Once again, the success of these two inter-related efforts depended entirely on the degree to which the US could be brought to support them. Just as Monnet sought to woo US support in 1950, so the new controllers of EDC, as Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrated, tried to incorporate US assistance in remodelling the EDC project to fulfil its original objective.

It was this attempt that finally revealed the fundamental gap between French and US perceptions of EDC. As Dulles remarked tellingly to Eden: 'we could give assurances to the French that entering into the EDC would not push them down but to say that membership in the EDC would push them up was another matter.'⁴ Indeed, rather than providing assistance and support for institutionalised French dominance in Europe, Washington put increasing emphasis on the wider political implications of European military integration. By 1954 the EDC project had opened out the inherently contradictory and mutually antagonistic nature of US and French conceptions of Western alliance organisation. In the US schema, it was not a tripolar alliance under the directorate of an Anglo-American-French triumvirate that was envisaged but a collective NATO body, strategically managed by the US and regionally coordinated for greater efficacy at lesser cost. It was, essentially, an uncommon community.

That it took four years of tortuous EDC negotiations to reach this conclusion was due not simply to a shortcoming of French policymakers or the inherent paradoxes of French leadership. It illustrated equally how gradually US conceptions about the Western alliance and the hegemonic role it was prepared to play in it evolved. The EDC, in bringing the US permanently into intra-European political, military and economic projects and simultaneously, holding up a vision of an integrated continent, played an important part in shaping and facilitating the emergence of the US Alliance vision. EDC marked, therefore, the most crucial episode after the signing of the NATO treaty in 1949 in the construction of the institutional structure of the Western alliance.

⁴*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Vol. 5, (Washington, 1983), 752.*

Yet to depict EDC as much a vehicle for the articulation of US as for French alliance conceptions does not wholly explain the degree of commitment to the project manifested by the Eisenhower administration, the depth of involvement of US officials and the costs accepted by Washington in the course of the four years. This was the result of the EDC transatlantic network that remained at the helm of US EDC policy throughout the period and for which the European Army represented more than a means to a Western institutional end. In contrast to France, the influence of this group on US policy was institutionalised, through the Bruce Mission.⁵ The continued authority of the Monnet-Bruce-Alphand network in Washington and its unswerving determination to realise EDC ensured the failure of the Quai to win the US over to its conception of the US-French partnership. The EDC network which had produced such close Franco-American individual and group partnerships in the end contributed most significantly to the deterioration in the French-US national partnership by August 1954 giving it a particularly intense, personalised and bitter tone.

French policymakers' recognition of the gulf between the emergent US and French conceptions of Western order finally led to French rejection of the EDC treaty. The experience did not, however, prompt a reassessment of France's leadership objective: if anything the EDC project served to underline the dangers of becoming simply a European power. What it did illustrate was the failure of a leadership strategy based on US partnership. Yet EDC also demonstrated France's continued dependency on US economic, military and political assistance. As Chapter Nine showed, the way in which Paris managed EDC's rejection illustrated how conscious the French were of the need to prevent a rupture in US-French relations. Ironically, the US vision that had emerged through EDC facilitated the avoidance of a serious Alliance crisis by enabling a swift resolution of the German rearmament issue. Commitment to permanent management of the NATO alliance indicated a long-term US presence in Europe, the single-most important guarantee against a potential German threat. More important, if the US rejection of a tripolar alliance precluded a US-French partnership, then equally it ruled out the danger of a US-German one.

⁵As an illustration of the significance of domestic structures for the implementation of policy ideas, this point reinforces the Thomas Risse-Kappen's argument, 'Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures and the end of the cold war', *International Organization*, 48, Spring 1994, 185-214.

Similarly, preoccupation with the US prompted the cultivation of British support and goodwill. Paris recognised the limitations of British power in the post-war alliance and the lack of any comparable benefit that London could offer: cooperation with the UK offered a conduit to, not a replacement of, US assistance. This was manifested, as French policymakers had anticipated, in the British proposal for the creation of the Western European Union in October 1954.

As long as leadership remained an imperative, French policymakers would continue to wrestle with the dilemmas that had threatened to engulf them in EDC: the need for collaboration to achieve primacy; the necessity for a proactive policy to overcome the weakness that constrained any initiative. The decision by the Mendès France government to accelerate France's atomic efforts for the construction of the nuclear bomb was the first manifestation of French determination to plough an independent furrow towards international leadership. The revival of European Community projects at Messina one year later, on the other hand, was testimony to the continued awareness of the impossibility of going it alone. What the EDC marked, above all, was the start of a new French ambivalence towards partnership with the United States - at once the greatest facilitator and obstacle to French international leadership. And as the Western community solidified into a framework far closer to the US conception than the French one, this ambivalence extended to the Atlantic Alliance itself. The lessons of EDC sowed the seeds of France's departure from NATO in 1966: this was Gaullism before de Gaulle.

The continuity of objective threading from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic was mirrored in the personnel changes that followed the EDC rejection. By the end of 1954 Massigli, the longest - and strongest - EDC opponent in the Quai, had been appointed as Secretary General of the Ministry. Parodi, whom he replaced, took over Alphand's position as the French NAC representative. For his crime as '*le Réalisateur*' of EDC, Alphand was offered ambassadorship in either Tokyo or Buenos Aires, the common feature between the two being their distance from France. Couve de Murville was returned to the senior policymaking fold as Ambassador to Washington, succeeding the long-serving, pro-EDC Bonnet. The new head of Embassy

in London was Jean Chauvel. De Gaulle's past team was, as a result of EDC, put firmly into place for the future.

What this account of EDC has made clear is the remarkable consistency of post-war French foreign policy objectives. It challenges, therefore, the dominant characterisation of the project as a study of policy incoherency in France during the 1950s. In the process it identifies and explores for the first time the role of the French foreign ministry in the EDC. Indeed, this new story of EDC raises wider questions about the nature of the Fourth Republic itself. It suggests that the discontinuities in policy objectives and policy practices traditionally emphasised between the Fourth and the Fifth Republics are not only overstated but fundamentally misleading for the study of both.

Yet if this thesis has demonstrated continuity where the emphasis has usually been on disarray, it has also uncovered discontinuity where consistency has generally been portrayed, namely in accounts that depict EDC as a premature effort in the process of European integration. This study, by illuminating the hitherto neglected role Monnet played throughout the EDC project and the particular dominance of the transatlantic EDC network he created, reveals the personalised, *ad hoc* and uncommunal nature of European-building enterprises in the 1950s. There was no inherent model of European defence integration, nor any process to be gradually and inexorably set into motion. Rather EDC was the product of the particular, opaque concept of institutionalised European integration being worked out by a very small group of individuals. The coalescence of a transatlantic group of decisionmakers temporarily endowed, in the aftermath of the breakdown of international order, with enormous power may well have provided the engine for the supranational integration experiments of the 1950s. But what this suggests is that far from being seen as a process, European integration was the product of distinct, discontinuous historical moments.

Ironically, this may also have ensured the survival of European integration efforts. It was, the French foreign ministry believed, the particular model of Europe developed and pursued in EDC, that constituted the mortal challenge to France's leadership imperative. The concept of collective and institutionalised European approaches as a way of addressing France's military, economic and political goals did

not disappear with the rejection of EDC. Once that particular model had been discarded and the US-French officials most committed to the maximal conception of European integration dispersed (particularly Monnet's departure from the ECSC High Authority at the end of 1954), French policymakers were prepared to broach Europe anew.

If examination of the EDC episode contributes to a greater understanding of French post-war history and to an important period in the history of European integration, it provides, equally, important insights into the history of the Western Alliance. Moreover, the EDC project shows how closely intertwined European-building was with the construction of the Western Alliance: national, European and Western histories are inextricably woven in the EDC. This EDC story demonstrates, in the end, the immense challenge that was involved in the creation of a common Western security community: the task of conceiving and constructing multilateral institutions; the implications of membership for national political, economic and military objectives; and the differing and often competing ways in which policymakers perceived these national and international goals. The EDC experience shows that commitment to Western membership in the 1950s did not prevent states from assessing and questioning the benefits and the costs involved in alliance participation. Above all, it highlights how long and haphazard a process the development of multilateral diplomacy and collective policymaking in the alliance was for all participants. In this respect, the uncompromising complexity of the EDC and France's experience within it, reveals a story common to all states.

Appendix I

List of Persons

- ACHESON, DEAN, US Secretary of State, 1949-53.
- ACHILLES, THEODORE, Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy in France, Chief after Sept. 1952.
- ADENAUER, KONRAD, German Chancellor from 1949; Foreign Minister after 1951.
- ALDRICH, WINTHROP, US Ambassador in London, February 1953-57.
- ALPHAND, HERVÉ, French North Atlantic Council Deputy 1950-54; Chairman of the Paris Conference 1951-54.
- ATLEE, CLEMENT, British Prime Minister, 1945-Oct 1951.
- AUMERAN, GENERAL, French Conservative deputy for Algeria.
- AURIOL, VINCENT, French President, 1947-54.
- BATTLE, LUCIUS, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1951-52.
- BAUDET, PHILIPPE, Director of Mendès-France's Foreign Ministry *Cabinet*, June 1954.
- BECH, JOSEPH, Luxembourg Foreign Minister 1928-58.
- BEDELL SMITH, WALTER, General, US Assistant Secretary of State from 1953.
- BÉRARD, ARMAND, French Deputy High Commissioner to Germany, 1949-55.
- BEVIN, ERNEST, British Foreign Secretary, 1945-March 1951.
- BEYEN, JOHAN, Dutch Foreign Minister, (jointly with Joseph Luns), Sept. 1952-55.
- BIDAULT, GEORGES, French Minister of Defence, Aug 1951-Feb 1952; Foreign Minister, Jan 1953-June 1954.
- BLANK, THEODOR, Head of German delegation at Petersberg and at the Paris Conference from July 1951-1952; Unofficial Personal Adviser to Adenauer.
- BLANKENHORN, HERBERT, Director of Political Affairs, German Foreign Ministry after March 1951.

BOEGNER, JEAN-MARC, Director of the French Foreign Ministry's *Service des Pactes* desk.

BOHLEN, CHARLES, Minister at the US Embassy in Paris, 1949-March 1951; Counselor, State Department 1951-1953; Ambassador to the USSR, 1953-57.

BONBRIGHT, JAMES, Special Assistant to the US Permanent Representative in Europe at Paris, April 1954-Jan 1955.

BONNET, HENRI, French Ambassador in Washington, 1945-Jan 1955.

BORIS, GEORGES, Chargé de Mission, Mendès France personal *Cabinet*.

BOURBON-BUSSET, JACQUES DE, Director of Schuman's Foreign Ministry *Cabinet*, 1950-3.

BOURGÈS-MAUNOURY, MAURICE, French Radical Deputy, Minister of Industry, June 1954.

BOWIE, ROBERT, Political Advisor to the US High Commissioner to Germany, 1950-51; Director of the Policy Planning Staff after May 1953.

BRADLEY, OMAR, General, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 1953.

BRUCE, DAVID, US Ambassador in France, 1949-March 1952; Under Secretary of State, 1952-53; US Special Representative to the ECSC/EDC after February 1953.

BYROADE, HENRY, Director of German Affairs, State Departement, 1949-52.

CHABAN-DELMAS, JACQUES, Gaullist, deputy, member of Mendès France cabinet until 14 August 1954.

CHAUVEL, JEAN, French UN representative until 1951; Ambassador in Switserzerland; Head of French delegation at the Geneva Conference, 1954.

CHURCHILL, WINSTON, British Prime Minster, October 1951-55.

CLAPPIER, BERNARD, Director of Schuman's *Cabinet*, 1947-50.

CONANT, JAMES, US High Commissioner in Germany after February 1953.

COTY, RENÉ, French Independent deputy, President after December 1953.

COUVE DE MURVILLE, Director of Political Affairs at the Quai until 1950; Ambassador to Egypt, 1950-54.

CROUY-CHANEL, ETIENNE, First Minister, French Embassy in London.

DALADIER, EDOUARD, Veteran French Radical deputy.

DARIDAN, JEAN, Minister Counsellor, French Embassy in Washington.

DEBRÉ, MICHEL, French RPF Senator.

DE GASPERI, ALCIDE, Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, July 1951-Aug 1953.

DE GAULLE, CHARLES, General, Leader of *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (RPF).

DE LARMINAT, GENERAL, French military delegate to the EDC Conference negotiations, 1950-54.

DE LA TOURNELLE, GUY, Director General of Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.

DE LEUSSE, PIERRE, Director of Quai press section until mid-1953.

DE MARGERIE, ROLAND, Assistant Director for Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.

DE SEYNES, PHILIPPE, Chargé de mission, Mendès France's foreign ministry *Cabinet*.

DILLON, DOUGLAS, US Ambassador in France, March 1953-Jan 1957.

DONNELLY, WALTER, US High Commissioner in Germany, July 1952-Jan 1953.

DOUGLAS, LEWIS, US Ambassador in Britain, 1947-1950.

DREES, WILLEM, Dutch Prime Minister, 1948-58.

DULLES, JOHN FOSTER, US Secretary of State after January 1953.

DUNN, JAMES, US Ambassador in Italy until March 1952; Ambassador in France 1952-3.

EDEN, ANTHONY, British Foreign Secretary, October 1951-55.

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT, General, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, April 1951-May 1952; US President after 1953.

- ELY, PAUL, General, French military representative to NATO from 1950; High Commissioner in Indochina after June 1954.
- FALAIZE, PIERRE-LOUIS, Director of Bidault's *Cabinet*, 1953-1954.
- FAURE, EDGAR, French Prime Minister, Jan-March 1952; Finance Minister after June 1953.
- FOUQUES-DUPARC, JACQUES, French Ambassador to Italy.
- FRANÇOIS-PONCET, ANDRÉ, French High Commissioner to Germany, 1949-55.
- FRANKS, OLIVER, British Ambassador in Washington, 1948-53.
- GARNIER, French Ambassador to the Netherlands.
- GIBSON, WILLIAM, First Secretary, US Embassy in Paris after December 1952.
- GIFFORD, WALTER, US Ambassador in London, December 1950-53.
- GRANDVAL, GILBERT, French High Commissioner, and, after January 1952, Ambassador in the Saar.
- GROS, ANDRÉ, French Foreign Ministry *juriconsulte* (legal expert).
- GRUENTHER, ALFRED, General, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, 1952-1953, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1953-56.
- GUÉRIN DE BEAUMONT, JEAN, French Independent deputy; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs after June 1954.
- HALLSTEIN, WALTER, Head of German delegation to Paris Conference until July 1951; German Foreign Secretary after March 1951.
- HARRIMAN, AVERELL, Director for Mutual Security, 1951-53; US representative on TCC, Sept 1951-March 1952.
- HARVEY, OLIVER, British Ambassador in Paris, 1948-April 1954.
- HAYS, GEORGE, General, US Deputy High Commissioner until 1953.
- HERRIOT, EDOUARD, French Radical, President of the National Assembly, 1947-54.
- HEINEMANN, GUSTAV, German Minister of the Interior in 1950.

HERZ, MARTIN, Consul of the US Embassy in France, 1951-55.

HIRSCH, ÉTIENNE, Member of Monnet's team at *rue de Martignac*; Chairman of the Armaments Committee, Paris Conference.

HO CHI MINH, Leader of the Vietminh.

HOLMES, JULIUS, Minister of US Embassy in London, 1950-54.

ISMAY, LORD, NATO Secretary General from March 1952.

JEBB, GLADWYN, UK Ambassador to France after April 1954.

JESSUP, PHILIP, US Ambassador-at-Large, 1949-53.

JOYCE, ROBERT, Counselor, US Embassy in France from December 1952.

JOXE, LOUIS, French Ambassador to the USSR.

JUIN, ALPHONSE, General, Inspector General of the French Army after 1951; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces and, after June 1953, NATO forces in Central Europe.

JUNIAC, GONTRAN BÉGOUGNE DE, First Counselor, French Embassy in Washington.

KIRKPATRICK, IVONE, British High Commissioner to Germany from 1950, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office after November 1953.

KNIGHT, RIDGWAY, Acting and Deputy Director US State Department Office of European Regional Affairs 1950-54; Deputy High Commissioner to Germany from Jan 1954.

KOENIG, MARIE-PIERRE, General, French RPF Deputy, Defence Minister from June 1954.

LANIEL, JOSEPH, French Independent Deputy, Prime Minister, June 1953-June 1954.

LAUKHUFF, PERRY, Director, Office of German Political Affairs, State Department.

LEMAIRE, MAURICE, Gaullist deputy, member of Mendès France cabinet until 14 August 1954.


- LETOURNEAU, JEAN, French High Commissioner for Indochina after April 1952; Minister for Relations with the Associated States, Jan-May 1953.
- MACARTHUR, DOUGLAS, Counselor, US Embassy in Paris, 1951-52; Counselor, State Department, March 1953-1956.
- MALENKOV, GEORGIY, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers March 1953-1955.
- MAROGER, JEAN, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.
- MARTIN, EDWIN, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs to the Secretary of State, 1952-53.
- MATTHEWS, H. FREEMAN, US Ambassador to the Netherlands from 1953.
- MARSHALL, GEORGE, General, US Secretary of Defence 1950-51.
- MASSIGLI, RENÉ, French Ambassador in Britain 1944-54.
- MAYER, RENÉ, Radical, French Finance Minister, 1951-52; Prime Minister Jan-June 1953.
- MENDÈS-FRANCE, PIERRE, Radical, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister after June 1954.
- MERCHANT, LIVINGSTON, Assistant US Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1953.
- MCCLOY, JOHN, US High Commissioner to Germany, 1949-1952.
- MOCH, JULES, Socialist, French Defence Minister, 1950-Aug 1951; *Rapporteur*, Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1953-54.
- MOLLET, GUY, Leader of the French Socialist Parity; Vice-President of the Council of Europe after March 1951.
- MOLOTOV, VYACHESLAV, USSR Foreign Affairs Minister, 1953-56
- MONNET, JEAN, Chairman of the Schuman Plan Conference; from July 1952 President of the High Authority of ECSC; French representative on TCC, 1951-52.
- MOORE, BEN, Director of State Department European Regional Affairs from Sept. 1952.

- MORRISON, HERBERT, Labour, British Foreign Secretary, 1951.
- MURPHY, ROBERT, US Ambassador in Belgium 1949-March 1952.
- NAVARRE, GENERAL, Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Indochina, 1953-54.
- NUTTING, ANTHONY, British Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs after October 1951.
- PARODI, ALEXANDRE, Secretary General, French Foreign Ministry, 1949-55.
- PERKINS, GEORGE, US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1949-53.
- PETSCHÉ, MAURICE, French Minister of Finance, 1948-51.
- PINAY, ANTOINE, Independent, French Premier and Finance Minister, March 1952-53.
- PLEVEN, RENÉ, French Prime Minister 1950-June 1951, Aug 1951-Jan 1952; Defence Minister March 1952-54.
- FLOWDEN, EDWIN, British representative on TCC, 1951-52.
- QUEUILLE, HENRI, French Radical deputy, Prime Minister, 1948-49.
- REILLY, PATRICK, Minister in British Embassy in France after June 1953.
- REYNAUD, PAUL, French Independent deputy.
- RIVIÈRE, JEAN, French Ambassador to Belgium.
- ROBERTS, FRANK, UK Foreign Office Undersecretary in the German Section.
- SAFFROY, PIERRE, French Minister to Luxembourg.
- SALISBURY, ROBERT, LORD, British Lord Privy Counsellor; Acting Foreign Secretary, June-Oct. 1953.
- SAUVAGNARGUES, JEAN, Director of Central European (German affairs) desk, French Foreign Ministry.
- SCHUMACHER, KURT, Leader of the German Social Democratic Party until August 1952.
- SCHUMAN, ROBERT, MRP, French Foreign Minister 1948-December 1952.
- SCHUMANN, MAURICE, MRP, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951-54.
- SERVAN-SCHREIBER, JACQUES, Editor of *L'Express*, advisor to Mendès France.

- SEYDOUX, FRANÇOIS, Director of European Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.
- SFORZA, CARLO, Italian Foreign Minister, 1947-51.
- SHINWELL, EMMANUEL, Labour, British Defence Secretary, 1945-51.
- SOUTOU, JEAN, Deputy director of Mendès-France's Foreign Ministry *Cabinet*.
- SPAACK, PAUL-HENRI, Belgian Foreign Minister after April 1954; Chair of the *ad hoc* Constitutional Committee of the European Assembly, 1952-53.
- SPOFFORD, CHARLES, US NAC Deputy, 1950-52.
- STASSEN, HAROLD, US Director for Mutual Security after Jan. 1953.
- STIKKER, DIRK, Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister, 1948-52.
- STRANG, WILLIAM, British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1949-53.
- TEITGEN, PIERRE-HENRI, MRP, Deputy Prime Minister in Laniel government 1953-54;
Member of the Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe.
- TOMLINSON, WILLIAM, Finance and Economic Advisor, US Paris Embassy until August 1952; Deputy to the US Special Representative to the ECSC/EDC, 1953-54.
- URI, PIERRE, Member of Monnet's team at *rue de Martignac*.
- VAN HELMONT, JACQUES, Member of Monnet's team at *rue de Martignac*.
- VAN ROIJEN, JEAN HERMAN, Dutch Ambassador in Washington.
- VAN ZEELAND, PAUL, Belgian Foreign Minister, 1949-54.
- WEBB, JAMES, US Under Secretary of State, 1949-1952.
- WORMSER, OLIVIER, Vice-director of Economic and Financial Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.

Appendix II

Relevant Sections of the Quai Administrative Structure 1950-54



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