Russia's Emerging Margins – the 'Transition' in the north of Perm' oblast.

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Thesis submitted to the University of Oxford
for the Degree of D.Phil, Michaelmas Term 1999.

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This thesis is concerned with the geographical impact of the post-Soviet transition on the north of Perm' oblast, Russian Federation; a forested area which is marginal in terms of agriculture and economic development, where harsh climate and marshy soils preclude profitable agriculture, and where very poor infrastructure and low levels of investment have contributed to the decline of the forestry industry, which was developed during the Soviet period outside of the market system under which such development might have been regarded as non-viable. This thesis discusses marginality and poverty against the background of the process of 'transition' in Russia, and also outlines the theory of transition itself. The historical context is also considered; the processes through which the north of Perm' oblast arrived at the position in which it found itself by 1991 are examined, and changes up to the present day are analyzed. Historically, the processes of settlement and development of forestry in the study area are central. The political situation in the Russian Federation is also brought into the argument; the struggle for power between the centre and the periphery, and the weakening of the centre in recent months all have a bearing upon the view taken of marginal areas by the Moscow administration, and the policies undertaken which affect them. The thesis describes the responses of rural inhabitants to the processes of marginalisation; through out-migration, bifurcation of households, and the ways in which they utilise their domestic and environmental resources to effect subsistence. It also describes the importance of cash sources, of social capital, and of the forestry enterprises in the villages, as survival strategies. The conditions in the study region are shown to owe much to the context of Soviet development policy, and its impact on post-Soviet Russia.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

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1.4 Overview of the Thesis

> *The reconfiguration of economic and political systems occurs in concrete social and cultural milieux, and these milieux provide the context within which institutional reform, economic liberalisation and political democratisation are reworked. Post-communist reform is about the reworking of modernity and the reconfiguration of the economic and political institutions and practices put in place (or adapted from pre-communist days) by state socialism. It is also, at the same time, a restructuring of the social relations of actors, the construction of new identities and the mobilisation of existing cultural resources to new ends.*[1]

The principal concern of this thesis is the geographical impact of the post-Soviet transition. The transition has differential geographical impact, and within this area, this project looks at the north of Perm' oblast, and the processes taking place there. It seeks to identify processes and the formations to which they give rise.

In post-Soviet geography, attention has largely been focussed upon macro-scale economic and political change, and urban areas, and when attention has been given to rural areas, it has largely concentrated upon agricultural regions, the 'Red Belt'. This thesis looks at forested areas which are marginal in terms of agriculture and economic development, where harsh climate and marshy soils preclude profitable agriculture, and where very poor infrastructure and low levels of investment have contributed to the decline of the forestry industry, which was developed during the

Soviet period outside of the market system under which such development might have been regarded as non-viable. This thesis discusses marginality and poverty against the background of the process of 'transition' in Russia. The historical context is also considered; the processes through which the north of Perm' oblast arrived at the position in which it found itself by 1991 are examined, and changes up to the present day are analyzed. The political situation in the Russian Federation is also brought into the argument; the struggle for power between the centre and the periphery, and the weakening of the centre in recent months all have a bearing upon the view taken of marginal areas by the Moscow administration, and the policies undertaken which affect them.

The thesis argues that there is a qualitative difference between life in marginal areas and in areas closer to centres of development; the geographical margins intersect with the process of social marginalisation, in that as the young and able-bodied leave the marginal villages, rural poverty becomes pensioners' poverty.

The research contributes to the debate about the geographical impact of transition in the Russian Federation; it aims to discuss the process of rural depopulation, and also the issue that despite the poor conditions in the marginal villages, industrial decline and to a certain extent, the abandonment of the villages to their fate by various levels of government, some villages continue to survive. This thesis investigates the survival strategies used by the inhabitants of such villages to effect subsistence; dependence upon personal farming, exchange relationships and social capital, their relationship with the forestry enterprises, reliance on state subsidy

[1] Smith & Pickles (1998) p12

and benefits, and the use of environmental resources such as wild food, for subsistence and exchange.

1.2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The term 'post-Soviet transition' is widely used in geographical literature, and its meaning is currently under discussion. As Bradshaw[2] points out, Western academics' and policy makers' attention has tended to become focussed upon the economic transition in the former Soviet Union, while the reality is that the economic transition is just one component of a more complex process often termed 'systemic transformation'. This process encompasses at least three fundamental challenges to the post-Soviet Republics; a political transition, involving the creation of independent states, the establishment of state identity and the formation of foreign policy; an economic transition that involves the liberalisation of prices, the stabilisation of government expenditure, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and the internationalisation of the economy; and a social transition, involving the establishment of democratic institutions and the development of civil society. Yergin and Gustafson[3] write of the "triple transition" from dictatorship to democracy, from command economy to free market, and from empire to nation-state. In reality, the real process of transformation is far more chaotic; the complex workings of the planned administrative economy were never fully understood, and there is no clear blueprint for transition to the market. But the scheme is useful in that it provides a framework linking systemic change to patterns of regional development. Bradshaw[4]

[2] Bradshaw, 1997 p4
[3] Yergin & Gustafson, 1994 p4-6
[4] Bradshaw, 1997 p2-8

also writes that these various aspects of transition are intimately linked, and that at times they exert contradictory influences upon the process of systemic transformation. He gives the examples of the need for co-operative action to manage inherited dependencies, and thus smooth economic transition, being undermined by the state-centred policies being pursued by the former Soviet Republics to establish an independent political identity, and the overthrow of democratic institutions being justified by the need to protect the progress of economic reform. The dynamics of the dimensions of transition differ also; in Russia the progress of economic reform has been hampered by political stalemate between parliament and president.

In order to appreciate the scale of change in the former Soviet Union, it is necessary to attempt to understand something of the nature of the planned economy[5]. Many terms have been used to describe the nature of the economic system that evolved in the USSR; for example, 'centrally planned economy', 'command economy' and 'administered economy'. Given the guiding role of the Communist Party (CPSU) and state ownership of the means of production, the Soviet system is best seen as a political-economic system. The centrally planned economy was a system of great complexity; the state owned and controlled the vast majority of economic activity, including foreign trade, and it determined the direction and strategy of economic development. The State Planning Committee *(GosPlan)* was responsible for the creation of the economic plans that guided development.

The Soviet political system exercised a high degree of control over the economy, and it is because of this centralised control that the economy was known as

[5] Bradshaw, 1996 'The prospects for the post-socialist economies' p263-288 in Daniels & Lever (Eds.) The Global Economy in Transition (1996)

'command-administrative'. Economic development stategy entailed a highly centralised economy and an economy geared to rapid growth, which in turn necessitated the development of a bureaucratic planning structure. The highest organs of the CPSU and the state made the planning decisions, the interpretation and implementation of which fell to the economic planners, primarily those in the central bodies such as *Gosplan USSR* and the State Committee for Wages. *Gosplan* and the other bodies allocated production targets to ministries and large enterprises, which in turn passed on targets to their constituent enterprises. Throughout most of the Soviet period, these ministries were the main agents of control over the various sectors of the economy, but there was an interlude between 1957 and 1965 when the industrial ministries were replaced by regional authorities or *sovnarkhozy*. The planning of the economy took place in the context of five-year and fifteen-year plans. The plans passed down to the enterprises, however, covered shorter periods, such as a year, a quarter, or a month. Plan construction was a complex undertaking, and there were problems regarding the provision of adequate information for the planners, of unwieldy bureaucracy, of quality control and of wastage, with ministries being unconscious of the potential uses of waste products from other branches of the economy.[6]

Of particular interest in terms of the research carried out for this thesis, is the Soviet approach to regional planning, which will be discussed further in the following section.

[6] Pallot and Shaw, 1981 : 34-41

1.2.1 Soviet Planning and the regions

Under the Soviet system, marginality was not part of the plan. Soviet planning was committed to helping to foster a society of unparalleled production and wealth, of social and spatial equality. The Soviet government had a commitment to eliminating disproportion in levels of development between regions of the country, an aim that related to the economic structure of the regions and to a number of social and cultural indices. In pursuing the aim of equalising regional economic development, various strategies were followed, including, in the 1930s and 1940s, the even distribution of all elements of production between regions, and at other times, through developing economic specialisation in the regions.

Through central planning, the Soviet Union had at its disposal means not available to planners in the capitalist West; in the USSR, investment resources, and sometimes labour, could be transferred between different regions of the country, and the unified state budget allowed central planners to redistribute income between regions as an aid to development[7]. As Schiffer (1989) writes, the regional economic policy of the USSR advocated the equalisation of economic development between republic and regions, and the location of production in such a way as to eliminate the social and economic differences between rural and urban spheres.

Having established that despite the aims of Soviet regional development, spatial inequality in economic development was in existence in the USSR, the post-Soviet transition raises the question of whether we can predict the

[7] Pallot & Shaw, 1981, p34-41

future change in the regions under a market system. There are two major approaches to understanding the economic landscape in terms of the differential economic conditions of different regions or other spatial units: neo-classical economic/liberal models, and the structuralist models that originated as critiques of the former, both rooted in market capitalism. The first type, neo-classical/liberal models, assume that differences in economic development between regions are due to short-term disequilibrium between supply and demand within each region. Ultimately, however, growth will shift, spread or 'trickle-down' from the more developed regions to the less developed ones, as long as 'market forces' are unimpeded (neo-classical) or government acts (liberal). However, empirical work and the observed lack of 'trickle-down' in the world economy has led to the view that neo-classical/liberal models are based on a critique of welfare, spatial equilibrium, that is impossible to achieve, either through the market or through government intervention. The second type is the mirror image of the first. Regional disequilibrium is viewed as a structural feature of the capitalist market, the development of one region presupposing the non-development or underdevelopment of others. Therefore, rather than an equalisation between regions, or long-term equilibrium, structuralism expects a permanent imbalance between regions in terms of economic growth. Regional economic change, therefore, must always involve a perpetuation rather than a mitigation of regional imbalance.[8]

The response to this critique of neo-classical/liberal models was the appearance of literature criticising the 'stages' approach to development, and the use of historical experience as models with universal validity. It was argued that

[8] For a general discussion of development theory, see Leys, 1996 Chapters 1 and 2.

development and prosperity in the developed core were seen as being based on underdevelopment in the periphery, with underdeveloped areas becoming increasingly impoverished. The development of the core thus depends upon the systemic underdevelopment of the periphery, as a structural necessity.

Although Soviet regional development policy advocated the equalisation of economic activity between regions, differences still remained. In the early years of Soviet power, differences between the developed core of European Russia and peripheral regions were striking, highlighting a national economy with significant disparities in regional development. Policies and programmes of action were put in place to effect change in the distribution of economic activity. Regional economic specialisation was promoted, on the basis that if specialisation in industrial output on a regional basis could be combined with some degree of regional self-sufficiency owing to the utilisation of local or regional resources, then the whole national economy was assumed to benefit. This led to the creation of a number of sub-optimal, highly subsidised production facilities. A more even distribution of economic activity was desired, in line with many western countries in the post-war era. In the Soviet case, reduction of regional disparity involved fostering urban-industrialisation in economically less developed areas, with the objective of eradicating the differences between city and countryside, under the central tenet of Marxist ideology that under socialism there is minimal difference in the quality of life between town and village. The conditions of uneven development in the former Soviet Union are therefore a combination of inherited spatial inequality from the Soviet period, economic hardships associated with the transition itself, and the increased polarisation associated with the emergence of the market economy.

With regard to agricultural land, during the Soviet period, a dominant feature of agricultural policy was the extension of the margin of cultivation into areas that had previously had little or no agricultural activity. According to Soviet arguments this development was possible because the economics of land utilisation before the Revolution meant that a sizeable amount of land that could produce crops was not in use. Farming frontiers were expanded beyond the limit that might be considered economically sound under an alternative system, leading on occasion to the use of land that was ecologically marginal. This trend was begun by Stalin, with the first Five-Year Plan calling for 15 million hectares to be added to the existing farmland of the USSR. In 1954, Khrushchev launched the Virgin Lands and Idle Lands campaign, to plough up millions of hectares in West Siberia, northern Kazakhstan and the Southern Urals, adding 40.5 million hectares to the sown area of the USSR, and increasing the total by 25%. The extremely marginal conditions of the Virgin Lands, in terms of low annual precipitation levels, inferior soils and unseasonable frosts meant that damage done to the land in the first few years of cultivation was still being felt forty years later. Much marginal land was withdrawn from use under Brezhnev[9].

The problem for marginal areas such as those brought under the plough as part of Soviet agricultural policy, or those in which heavy industry was expanded regardless of the inefficiency of production or the costs of long-distance transportation, appears to be that of their long-term viability and sustainability through systemic transformation, and in the event of their collapse, the consequences

[9] Pallot & Shaw, 1981

for the inhabitants of the areas in which they were located. Areas of environmental or economic marginality (or both) have problems in attracting investment in the market system (for reasons that will be discussed later); they are not the most obvious sites for economic development to take place. The processes of transition in the former Soviet Union, liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation, act to exacerbate the problems of marginal areas, as state subsidies are cut, and enterprises have to pay the real costs of production.

1.2.2 The Process of Transition.

To take the neoliberal approach, as is often the case in the literature, it is assumed that the former Soviet Union must make a transition from its former planned economy to capitalism; four bases of policy are defined in the literature, where it is argued that they should lead to the development of liberal democracy; liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisation and internationalisation.

Liberalisation involves the abolition of regulations and restrictions on economic activity. In the post-Soviet context, the freeing of prices is an example. In the Soviet Union prices had minimal function in controlling supply and demand. They did not reflect market value, even within the USSR. As a result the structure of the economy was vastly distorted, with producer goods prioritised over consumer goods, and the defence industry playing an unusually large role. Large sectors of the economy were involved in 'purely socialist' production[10], which added little to the welfare of the people. Freeing prices dramatically reduced the subsidies available to

[10] Hanson, 1994, cited in Stenning, 1997, p147-162

enterprises, theoretically inflicting harsh market logic on to enterprises and their managers. The need to pay attention to prices and costs necessitates a restructuring of capacity, and enterprises may realise that not only are their products not competitive in terms of quality, but that the extensive mode of industrialisation that was pursued in the USSR is unsustainable as wastage of labour, capital and raw materials begin to make their cost felt.

Since price increases could lead to a price-wage-price inflationary spiral which would undermine the currency, a programme of rapid liberalisation must be linked to one of macroeconomic stabilisation[11]. Budget deficits must be decreased; subsidies cut and credit supply tightened, all at a time when enterprises face increased competitive pressures. There is a need to bring the economy into balance, in terms of level of money incomes and the supply of goods, and in terms of the difference between government expenditures and revenues[12].

A further complication is the simultaneous process of privatisation. Connected to stabilisation and the reduction of state subsidy and support for enterprises, the explicit aim of a policy of privatisation is not only to shift ownership, and therefore responsibility, to the private sector, but also to specifically promote efficiency and restructuring. Privatised firms in a liberalised economy should be acting according to profit motives and aiming to maximise income and minimise costs.

[11] Stenning, 1997, p149
[12] Bradshaw, 1996

Internationalisation, the fourth basis of policy for liberal democracy, impinges on all of the other three, making their effects more severe in many ways. Not only must prices be freed domestically, but they must also conform to international levels as the Russian economy opens up. Stabilisation must be carried out with the help and hindrance of the international community, especially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Russia is attempting not only transition to a market economy, but to a market economy during a period of speculative capitalism, which threatens to endanger further attempts at stabilisation. Privatised firms face competition from domestic producers, and also from imports and direct investment, from more dynamic, flexible and advanced Western producers[13].

However, as Bradshaw (1997) points out,

> The complexities of systemic transformation defy the imposition of any single approach to their analysis.

There has been discussion centring on the validity of the neoliberal approach. It has been argued that this approach sees transition as a reworked form of modernisation, and criticisms have been levelled at its unilinear approach, which assumes that the only direction of change is that of 'progress' towards a market economy. The following quote from Derrida is a pointer;

> There is today in the world a dominant discourse... To the rhythm of a candenced march, it proclaims; Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead, and along with its hopes, its discourses, its theories and its practices. It says: long live capitalism, long live the market, here's to the survival of economic and political liberalism[14]

Smith and Pickles (1998) criticise the neoliberal approach in that

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[13] ibid.
[14] Derrida, J. (1994)

> The conventional, neoliberal view of transition wielded by western multilateral agencies and advisors to governments in East and Central Europe that transition is a relatively unproblematic implementation of a set of policies involving economic liberalisation and marketisation alongside democratisation, enabling the creation of a market economy and a liberal polity, relies on an under-theorised understanding of change in post-communism[15]

Their contention is that transition is not the one-way process of change from one hegemonic system to another, as implied by neoliberalism, but rather that it constitutes a complex reworking of old social relations in the light of processes distinct to what they describe as

> ...one of the boldest projects in contemporary history – the attempt to construct a form of capitalism on and with the ruins of the communist system.[16]

The very pre-eminence of the neoliberal model raises questions about the impact of market-led development on local contexts and the role of the 'local' in constituting the process of change.

As the work of Bradshaw demonstrates, the first questions raised by the transition are those of spatial impact, and the causes of regional variation. Stenning (1997) points out that the processes of change and transformation described by Bradshaw have attracted attention at the national and macroeconomic level, where debate has also been centred, thus drawing attention away from the spatial aspects of systemic transformation.

> Many of the processes of transformation are inherently geographical - the reconfiguration of centre-province relations, mass migrations, the (re)construction of new state formations, the (re)defining of identities and citizenship, for example, and many more are inevitable

[15] Smith & Pickles, (1998) p2
[16] ibid.

> mediated by spatial contingencies - yet, economic transformation has all too frequently been represented as a homogeneous and homogenising process.[17]

Looking at local and regional development in Eastern Europe as a whole, Tykkylainen (1995) writes that the socio-economic transformation is taking place heterogeneously in various ex-socialist countries. The speed of transformation, diffusion of the new economic activities and intensity of development vary from country to country. Some underdeveloped and peripheral regions are transforming more gradually than others. Much, he argues, is dependent upon how the individual farms, factories and institutions cope with the restructuring,

> ... within each country, every locality is facing the turmoil in a different way.

Bradshaw, Stenning and Sutherland (1998 : 167-168) summarise the position when they criticise the neoliberal unilinear approach.

> ...the orthodox view that the imposition of capitalist structures and institutions (such as private property, the competitive imperative and a monetised accounting system) will force the universal development of free-market rationality, and if it does not, it is simply necessary to wait, tinker with the system, and delete any irrationalities. That those so-called irrationalities are embedded within local economic practice is not a view which is frequently countenanced.
>
> ... Each region faces a choice of futures, constituted as much through social, political and cultural practice as through the purely 'economic'. Thus, any attempt to understand the path and process of economic transformation and differentiation in the Russian regions must take account of this.

1.2.3 Regional Impact

The post-socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the former USSR are thus in the throes of transition, and Bradshaw (1996) argues that the emergence of

[17] Stenning 1997, p147

new market economies is bringing increased polarisation. Like Tykkylainen (1995), Bradshaw draws attention to the increased disparities between the individual post-socialist states, and he goes on to speculate that economic transition is also leading to polarisation and increased spatial inequality within the individual states. If capitalism generates uneven development, he argues, then successful transition to the market brings with it increased inequality.

> If one combines the increased polarisation associated with the market economy with the economic hardships associated with the collapse of the Soviet system, it is likely that issues of spatial inequality will soon dominate the political agenda in many of the post-socialist states[18].

For example, Bater (1996) writes that regions dominated by heavy industry and especially those regions with a narrow resource base, have been particularly badly affected by transition.

An example of the effect of the transition, or of systemic transformation, on the regional scale in Russia is that of the Russian North. There, the basic theme is that of competition between pressures for resource development (driven by national economic priorities) and the interests of local groups in maintaining environmentally sustainable lifestyles. In the Soviet period, a desire for economic self-sufficiency promoted the development of mineral resources in remote northern regions, with little regard for the real economic, social and environmental costs of high-latitude industrialisation. It is now evident that the Soviet system promoted a scale and a pattern of development in the North that was neither economically nor environmentally sustainable. The processes of political, economic and social transition in Russia have revealed the true costs of the extensive development strategy. As the economy is transformed and the real costs of

development and transportation become apparent, much of the economic activity in the Russian North is no longer viable. This is leading to a downscaling of the level of economic activity in the area[19].

In the late 1990s, the situation in the Russian North is that the transition in the Russian economy away from centralised controls has led to a number of processes which have weakened the country's capacity to sustain past levels of northern development, and, as Heleniak (1999) argues, population. One of the factors impacting on the North has been the liberalisation of prices. After price liberalisation in January 1992, true costs of factors such as transportation and energy began to be reflected in the prices of consumer and other goods throughout the country. In the Northern regions, which had been recipients of Northern subsidies and benefits, this had an especially severe impact, as *relative* prices increased considerably in comparison to those in other regions, located nearer to the centre. Also, the responsibility for financing many of the benefits which had previously been provided by the state has been devolved to enterprises and local governments in the North, a process which took place originally as part of the early stages of transition, when many federal responsibilities were transferred to local governments. In the unfavourable economic circumstances of the North, many of these benefits now go unpaid, further accentuating the problem of increased relative prices.[20]

Regional effects are also apparent in terms of the political aspects of systemic transformation. The post-Soviet transition has involved a rapid devolution of power from Moscow to regional and local governments, leading to various regions

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[18] Bradshaw, 1996
[19] Bradshaw, 1995, p200-201

and communities struggling to redefine their constitutional place within the newly emerging political order. Through devolution the centre has had to cede some degree of autonomy to regional and local governments, and the processes of increasing jurisdiction span, autonomy, and structural definition of public government (constitutional development) are underway. In the Russian North, for example, constitutional development has proven to be complex and dynamic, involving attempts to define the division of power between the centre and the regional governments, and among the various levels of government. However, the complexity of systemic transformation, and the close ties between the different aspects of transition mean that political transformation does not take place independent of the economic or social context. For instance, political development in the Russian North is constrained by severe social and economic crises. In the past, the Soviet State strongly promoted and massively subsidised northern development, but the present Russian state does not have the resources to sustain that commitment. As a result, conditions in the North are deteriorating more rapidly than those in European Russia, leading to sharp declines in industrial production, and resource development, sharp rises in transportation and energy costs, and failure to maintain the social and economic infrastructure. Devolution itself has led to a breakdown of delivery supplies as the centre's capacity to intervene in the development of the North has been reduced[21]. These regional effects are, as Tykkylainen (1995) pointed out, mediated by regional variability in the capacities of the different regions to cope with the problems of systemic transformation.

At a smaller spatial scale, Pallot (1997) has drawn attention to the active creation of a peasantry in the environmentally marginal farming regions of the

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[20] Heleniak, 1999, p156
[21] Poetzer, 1995, p201-214

Russian countryside. She identifies the dual processes of 'repeasantisation' (the process whereby people are turning to semi-subsistence forms of farming as an insurance against the risks of the post-communist transition) and accumulation (where some individuals are gaining a disproportionate share of rural economic and political resources, and seem destined to continue to acquire in the future). She gives examples of these processes occurring in both the 'large-farm' and independent farm sectors, to illustrate the accumulation process in contemporary rural Russia. Pallot concludes that 'peasantisation' and 'differentiation' will combine differently to produce distinctive agricultural landscapes in different areas, and that one important determinant of the shape of these landscapes will be the extent to which global capitalism penetrates the post-Soviet countryside. It is clear that regional variations in economic development in post-Soviet Russia are affected not only by the primarily internal processes of liberalisation, stabilisation, and privatisation, but also by the internationalisation of economic activity.

Stenning (1997:147) argues that post-Soviet regional development is

> ...a complex interplay of a number of forces acting at a number of scales, and that economic transformation cannot be separated from changes in social, political and cultural realms, and therefore must be examined within its regional, national and international context. Local structures and institutions, contingencies, she writes, exist to mediate international and national processes of change and constrain or expand the choice of futures.

One such contingency, or rather, one set of contingencies could be argued to be the marginality of a particular region in terms of its prospects for economic development.

Therefore, local social, economic, political and cultural realities have significance in that they challenge any unilinear approach which treats post-Soviet

Russia as a homogenous whole. There are divergent regional and local trajectories, even multiple transitions, within the broader process of post-Soviet transition.


1.2.4 Regional Autonomy

Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, the two study areas of this thesis, located in Perm' oblast in the Urals, lie on the bottom rung of the administrative ladder of the Russian Federation; local government. Above them are the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug (in the case of Kosinskii *raion*), and Perm' oblast, the regional government, and ultimately the Federal government in Moscow. When discussing the economic profile of the two *raioni* and the okrug, it is important to bear in mind that one fundamental characteristic of Russia's subnational financial structure is the lack of local autonomy. Local budget outcomes are determined by games of 'tug-of war' between regions and the centre, without the regions having much autonomy in the determination of their own tax bases and tax rates. They do have some autonomy, however, in the control of the so-called extrabudgetary funds, which have by tradition been outside of the control of elected councils, and have been built up in some secrecy by local administrations in collusion with their own local allies in the management *nomenklatura*. The size of these off-budget funds, and therefore the scale of any real local budgetary autonomy is typically unknown to outsiders.

The central government has developed a habit of striking *ad hoc* deals with regions. This generates a leap-frogging of claims by various regions against the centre. According to the Ministry of Finance, in 1993 every federal subject had by the

end of the year secured a budget deal that differed from the allocation originally set by the centre. A common complaint is that the regions which make the most fuss or which have the most political leverage get the most, to the detriment of equitable treatment across regions. In particular, it was argued in 1993 that the republics within the Russian Federation were using their special status to obtain unduly large net redistributions to themselves, at the expense of a core of net contributors to the federal budget, Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Urals region, Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, Krasnodar, Tyumen and Krasnoyarsk (Hanson, 1996).

STRUCTURE OF THE STATE BUDGET OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION



During the period of transition, local government in Russia has begun to set policy agendas according to its own perceived social and political requirements. A new balance is being drawn up between national and local priorities at every level of government. Local governments have little control over the formation of their budgetary revenues and the composition of their budgetary expenditures, thus limiting local independence. Revenue and expenditure plans are still formed and approved at higher levels of government, but there is evidence of growing independence in the

areas of local tax and expenditure policies, and mounting initiative by local government within the informal budgeting system and within local legislation.

Local government's formal political and economic responsibilities are in the area of supporting and maintaining social and economic infrastructure, as during the Soviet period. The formal areas of authority were carried over into the Russian structure of local government in the post-Soviet period as evidenced by the distribution of state property during 1992.

City and district governments retained property and enterprises involved in the communal economy and the retail system while the oblast, the immediately higher level of government, received property belonging to the productive or industrial sector of the economy. This gave the oblast access to higher tax revenue levels because theoretically the industrial sector would be income generating. (However, this does not take into account the problems associated with tax collection during periods of economic shock when production declined or ceased such that little revenue was generated).[22]

Also in 1992, the central government of the Russian Federation transferred responsibility for social protection and price subsidies (previously financed with direct transfers from the federal government) to subnational governments, in an apparent attempt to balance the budget. However, Wallich (1996) argues that the government has not estimated the cost of financing this social protection, or considered whether it can be met with available revenues in each oblast. This new

[22] Mitchneck, 1997, p153-155

design of the intergovernmental fiscal system, she argues, will influence the differentiation (regional and interpersonal) that emerges in the Russian Federation.

In 1994-95, new laws on local government were enacted, with tax reforms as part of the decentralisation of intragovernmental fiscal relations favouring regional (oblast) governments, while changing hardly anything for local budgets. The share of local governments' own guaranteed income has reportedly accounted for 6-8% of total budgetary revenues in recent years. As a share of total federal budgetary income, local tax revenues amounted to only 4.4%, and another 6.5% of total budgetary income in 1994.

Against this backdrop of a 'battle' between the centre and the regions, the area of the north of Perm' oblast carries out its business. Knowledge of the local realities of this region is, therefore, essential to an understanding of its experience of transition. In the following section, the economic conditions in the area are considered.

1.2.5 Methodology

The fieldwork on which this thesis is based took place during three research trips to the Russian Federation (February-May 1996, June-September 1997, and May-June 1998). During the first visit, I lived in the village of Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, (population 287 in 1997[23]) for three months, during the second I returned to Solym, and also lived in the village of Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, (population 701

[23] *Kosinskogo Otdela Statistiki, 1997*

in 1997[24]) as well as carrying out some research work in the town of Kudymkar and the city of Perm', and on the last I carried out research again in Perm', and also in Moscow.

The sources of information presented are diverse and numerous. In the villages themselves I carried out questionnaire surveys, further details of which are offered in Chapter 6. In the *raion* centres of Kosa and Krasnovishersk I collected information from the administration centres (such as the offices for Employment, Pensions and Policy) and the *raion* archive (in Kosa), and also interviewed local policy makers. In Perm' I worked at various departments of the oblast administration, including Forestry, Education, Nature Protection, Planning and Labour, again collecting data and conducting interviews. In Perm' I also carried out archival searches in the Perm' State Archive, researching the history of forestry and settlement in the northern part of the oblast. In addition, I worked in the Gorky Library in Perm', searching local and regional newspaper collections. In Moscow, I visited the Institute for Systems Analysis, the Moscow Carnegie Centre, and the Centre for Credit Rating, to obtain information regarding the administrative North, and federal legislation toward marginal areas, and I also interviewed senior personnel at those institutions. I also spoke with Dr. Agranat at the Moscow Academy of Sciences (Geography) about policy toward the North.

Apart from the data collected in the Russian Federation, I was also able to access some resources in Oxford, such as the holdings of *Lesnaya Promishlennost'* at the Plant Sciences Library of the University of Oxford, and the Bodleian Library's

[24] Vaya sel'soviet, July 1997.

holdings of the Duma Sessions Papers. I also utilised the holdings of *Pravda, Izvestiya,* and other Russian national newspapers at the Widener Library of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

All but two of the interviews were carried out in Russian, and all of the text data collected was in Russian. I translated all the documents myself.

1.3 Context; a profile of Perm' oblast.

The study area is the northern part of Perm' oblast. The oblast itself is part of the Urals Region, which comprises the Republics of Bashkortostan and Udmurtia, the Kurgan, and Orenburg, Perm', Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk oblasts. The region's territory is 824 thousand square kilometres, and its population is 20.3 million. The Ural Region is the second most important economic region in Russia, accounting for 10% of the country's industrial production. Figure 1.1 shows the study area as a part of the Russian Federation.

Perm' oblast occupies the western part of the Russian Ural Region, in a position between Sverdlovsk and Kirovsk oblasts, Bashkortostan and Udmurtia. It is located at the junction of the Russian Plain and the Ural Mountains, and covers over 160,000 square kilometres. It population is over 3 million. The city of Perm' is located in the south of the oblast, at the crossing of the Kama River, the Siberian highway, and the main railway line of Sverdlovsk Railways.[25]

[25] http://www.eastern-centres.de/ec_perm.html 16.3.1998




Figure 1.1 Map of the Russian Federation, showing Perm' oblast and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, and of Perm' oblast, showing the study *raioni*, and the study villages.




Figure 1.2

Map of North Perm' showing the northern raions of the Oblast

The study area comprises the northern part of the oblast, and of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, which constitutes its northwestern area. The *raion*s of the north of the oblast are; Cherdinskii, Krasnovisherskii and Solikamskii *raion*s, and also Gaiinskii, Kosinskii and Kochevskii *raion*s of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug. The dividing line between north and south, therefore, approximates to the line between Kochevo (Kochevskii *raion*) and Solikamsk (Solikamskii *raion*). Figure 1.2 shows the study area, and Figure 1.3[26] shows the area around Krasnovishersk and Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*. The research carried out for this study concentrated primarily upon Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, although data relating to others are noted. Because of Kosinskii *raion*'s status as part of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, some all-Okrug data are presented. The village studies carried out focus on the settlements of Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, and Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion* (Plates 1.1 and 1.2).

The north of Perm' oblast is heavily forested, with mixed forest, consisting primarily of conifers and birch. The climatic climax vegetation is coniferous forest, however, felling of trees, and the largely uncontrolled natural reafforestation of the area has led to the growth of birch as part of the vegetation succession. (Figure 1.4 shows the vegetation of Perm' oblast as a part of that of the Russian Federation.) The area has extensive marshes, and is mountainous in the east, where it forms part of the foothills of the Urals. The climate is cold; the annual average temperature is between –1 and +1 degrees Celsius, with winter minima as low as –50 degrees. Snow begins to fall in early autumn, usually reaching depths of around two metres, and only begins to thaw in late April. The summers are short, but

[26] Tactical Pilotage Chart TPC D-4B USSR. Defense Mapping Agency, Aerospace Center, St. Louis, Missouri, USA. January 1987.



LEGEND

RELIEF PORTRAYAL

ELEVATION CONVERSION

ELEVATION TINTS

Figure 1.3 Map showing Krasnovishersk and Vaya, Krasnovisherskii raion.
Scale 1 : 500,000




Plate 1.1 The Village of Solym, Kosinskii Raion, August 1997



Plate 1.2 The Village of Vaya, Krasnovisherskii Raion, July 1997

Figure 1.4

The Distribution of Major Vegetation Zones of the Former Soviet Union, showing the location of Perm' oblast.



Adapted from Knystautas, A. (1987) The Natural History of the USSR Century : London. Page 32.

warm, with temperatures in the high 20s Celsius. The rivers and roads are frozen solid during the winter, but they thaw in spring, and the deep mud makes the dirt roads impassable until the summer sun has baked them dry. As summer draws to a close and rain begins, the roads again become deep in mud. The growing season is therefore short. Wildlife in the area includes snowy owls, wolves and bears.[27]

One of the impacts of transition on the north of Perm' oblast has been to expose weaknesses in the local economy. Liberalisation of economic activity has imposed real costs upon local industries, most notably the forestry industry, leading to problems of unprofitability. Privatisation of the industry, in connection with the dismantling of *PermLesProm*, the overarching state enterprise, led to the setting up of numerous smaller companies, which have subsequently struggled to avoid bankruptcy. The internationalisation of economic activity has located the north of Perm' oblast and its products in the global economy. The inefficiencies of production have put the area at a disadvantage in the context of world market prices. Macroeconomic stabilisation, the search for balance between governmental expenditures and revenues, has called for budgetary cuts, and reductions in state subsidies that could be used to bolster the local forestry industry. In order to understand the effect of transition in the north of Perm' oblast, it is necessary first to begin with a profile of the oblast as a whole.

Perm' oblast is located in the easternmost part of Europe, where the Russian Plain meets the Ural Mountains, and it occupies about one fifth of the entire

[27] *Ministerstvo Obshchego; Professional'nogo Obrazovaniya Rossiskoi Federatsii (1997)* Permskaya Oblasti: Otrasli, Regioni, Goroda p10-17

Ural area, sharing borders with Sverdlovsk and Kirov oblasts, as well as with the Republics of Bashkortostan, Komi, and Udmurtiya. The oblast centre, the city of Perm' was founded by Catherine the Great in the late 18th century, and soon became an important administrative centre, and the largest port in the Kama river basin. It was also one of the country's largest industrial centres; in the 19th century, the city housed over 130 industrial enterprises.

The territory of the oblast is rich in mineral resources, including natural gas and oil, and there are deposits of iron ore, chromium, copper, lead, zinc, aluminium, titanium, nickel, manganese, platinum and diamond. In addition, the oblast has reserves of salt, potassium, magnesium, and large amounts of limestone, marble, dolomite, gypsum, anhydride, sand and gravel. It also houses 25% of the entire coal resources of the Urals economic region, and is one of the richest timber areas in Europe. Trees cover 12 million hectares, more than 60% of the territory of the oblast, of which 10 million hectares were designated as being of national importance. 70% of the forest is of the most valuable type in economic terms, coniferous.

Perm' is now one of the three most industrially developed regions in the Ural area, and is ranked 14th among the country's 89 regions according to volume of industrial production. Over a third of the oblast GDP comes from the fuel and energy sector, followed by raw materials processing (20%), and machine building

(16.1%). The latter is mostly concerned with manufacturing military equipment and equipment for the oil, gas, mining, chemical and timberworking industries[28].

In terms of agricultural production, the whole of Perm' oblast is considered to be a 'risky' area. The total agricultural area of the region is 2.8 million hectares, (19% of the total area of the oblast) of which arable land constitutes 2.1 million hectares (13%). Arable land is farmed in the most southerly *raioni* of the oblast, where it makes up 90% of the total cultivated area, whereas in the harsher climate and more densely forested land of the north of the oblast, cultivated and natural pasture predominate, although arable farming is still attempted. The soils of the oblast are primarily podsolic, and require liming in order to increase fertility. The oblast cannot meet its own food requirements from its arable farming, even though it is concentrated in the area with the least extreme climate. Meat, milk and vegetables seldom top 70% of requirements, cereals only 45%. Requirements in eggs and potatoes are fulfilled[29].

The problems of the economy of the oblast, as identified by its administration, include poor infrastructure, a lack of balance between the industrial and non-industrial spheres of production, a shortage of highly skilled labour, insufficient provision of services and amenities to the population, and a number of environmental problems. Various indices comparing Perm' oblast with a Russian national average show it to be lacking in a number of areas. For example, the percentage of the population with higher education is 8.0%, whereas the Russian

[28] Division of International and Foreign Economic Relations (IFERD) of Perm' Oblast Administration, and Chief Division of Joint Social-economic Planning and Resources of Perm' Oblast Administration (1994) Passport of the Perm Region Perm, Russia, p8
[29] ibid., p34-35

average is 11.3% (according to the 1989 census). The number of telephones per 100 families in 1993 was 29.3 in the city (41.5 was the Russian average), and 14.2 in villages (17.2). The average personal income index in July 1995 was 90, less than the 100 Russian average, and the price basket index in the same month was 106 (100), showing that Perm's inhabitants brought in less money, and had to spend more on food, than the Russian average[30].

Privatisation has been one of the most important elements of the structural reorganisation of the economy of the oblast. During 1992 and 1993, 1948 industrial enterprises, comprising 238 heavy industrial, 38 transport, 133 construction, 844 trade, 183 food, and 324 consumer service industries, were denationalised. In all cases, more than 50% of the total number of enterprises in each branch were privatised, making the share of the private sector in the oblast economy more than half.[31]

1.4 Overview of the Thesis

Chapter 2, Marginality and the Russian North, sets the study area, the northern part of Perm' oblast, in the context of the Russian North, and puts the case for its being regarded as a marginal area. It focuses on the problems of defining marginality, applying the term to the north of Perm' oblast, and intersections between the concept of marginality and the construct of the Russian North. This chapter also discusses the static indices which indicate that the north of Perm' oblast may be undergoing marginalisation.

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[30] ibid.

Chapter 3, Settling the Margin: The north of Perm' oblast in Context deals with the forced and voluntary settlement of the study area from the pre-revolutionary era through the Soviet period to the present day, placing it in the context of the Russian and Soviet settlement of the North. The importance of forced labour in 'special settlements' is also discussed.

Chapter 4, Developing the Margin; Forestry in the north of Perm' oblast traces the history of the development of forestry in the area from Tsarist times to the post-Soviet collapse of the industry, through study of the history of two of the local level forestry enterprises of particular importance for the study villages.

Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to coping mechanisms. Chapter 5, The Disappearing Village focusses on the process of rural depopulation taking place throughout the Russian North, and compares the case of the north of Perm' oblast oblast to the general trend, discussing out-migration as a response to the decline of the forestry industry.

Chapter 6, Those who stay behind, describes and analyses the strategies being implemented by the inhabitants of marginal settlements, particularly their agricultural resources and use of the natural environment, reliance on state support and exchange networks.

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[31] ibid.

Chapter 7, Policy for the Margin; Federal, Regional, Local deals with policy at three levels, in the context of the current climate of uncertainty and flux in Russian politics. It tackles the question of the relative significance of decision making at different levels of government.

Chapter 8, Conclusions, discusses the intersections between ideas of poverty and of marginality and their consequences in the north of Perm' oblast, with reference to theories of exclusion and marginalisation within globalisation and post-Soviet transition.

This thesis is concerned with the geographical impact of transition within the north of Perm' oblast. Specifically, it attempts to address the question of the role being played by this area – whether it is part of the transition process, or whether it is isolated by its marginality. The north of Perm' oblast can be thought of as an example of one of the 'problem regions' of the Russian Federation – as will be discussed in the following chapter, it is not part of the peripheral Far North, but neither is it part of the 'core' – it is this middle status which makes the area interesting.

Chapter 2 Marginality and the Russian North; the north of Perm' oblast

2.1 Towards a definition of marginality
2.2 Definition and delineation of the Russian North
2.3 The north of Perm' oblast as a marginal area
2.4 The north of Perm' oblast: Conditions in Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii raioni
2.4.1 Forestry
2.4.2 Agriculture and Food
2.4.3 Debt
2.5 Economic Marginalisation

2 Marginality and the Russian North; the north of Perm' oblast.

2.1 Towards a definition of marginality
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2.4.1 Forestry
2.4.2 Agriculture and Food
2.4.3 Debt
2.5 Economic Marginalisation
2.6 Summary

2.1 Towards a definition of marginality.

Marginal land is defined to be land that is difficult to farm, and which yields little profit. The uses to which people put land reflect, in part, differences in physical factors, such as soil fertility, and climate. The differences were recognised by David Ricardo when he attributed variations in land use to comparative advantages from natural resource endowments. However, even on a homogeneous plain, where there are no physical differences between locations, the efforts of farmers to maximise their returns produce systematic land use patterns, as described by Von Thunen. At a particular distance from the market, there is a balance between shipment cost and excess yield. Beyond that distance, shipment costs become too great for commercial agricultural production to take place, and even if the land is fertile, it will not be cultivated because an external margin of cultivation will be established beyond which it will not be profitable to cultivate. Land at all distances less than the external margin of cultivation yields a surplus return over the subsistence or necessary income and the differential increases, so that the

excess is greater for a piece of land closer to the market than for a piece of land further away[32]. Although regional economies are more complex now than in Von Thunen's time, the basic principles still apply. As the global economy has evolved, two processes have guided land use. When accessibility differences were substantial, "Thunenisation" produced a broad zonation of land use from the world's urban-industrial core regions out toward the periphery. As transport costs have become less important in the global economy, "Ricardian development" has guided increasing differentiation based upon both natural resource endowments ('basic factors') and the endowments created by culture and technology ('advanced factors')[33]. Ricardo wrote about the theory of economic rent, considered to be the payment for the use of things that could not be produced. The rent yield of a unit of land is equal to the excess returns of using that land over the least fertile land. Land only barely worth cultivating yields zero rent; it is therefore marginal land, since land less fertile is left uncultivated, and land more fertile is all cultivated. As we move to more and more fertile land, the economic rent (excess profits or returns) will be greater and greater[34].

Despite this definition, in current literature, the concept of marginality, especially when applied to an economic margin, lacks precision in at least two senses; the sense of what constitutes marginality, and the drawing of the boundary of such an area, even if the meaning itself could be clearly defined. A justification for the use of such a term, then, is that the phrase is in common use, and is found scattered throughout the literature, both as a topic of enquiry,

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[32] Thomas & Corbin, 1974
[33] Berry et al , 1997
[34] Thomas & Corbin, 1974

> ...and as an aside which need not be defined, since everyone may be expected to know its meaning[35].

The concept of marginality need not necessarily imply a locational dimension; there are three broad categories of use of the term. It is possible, firstly, to think of marginal persons on the periphery of society, and secondly, marginality has also been defined in terms which, although they do contain a spatial element, are essentially political or social. Thus, the core or centre of a country may be thought of as that part which imposes its values on the people living on the margin; the values and beliefs of the centre gradually extend over the peripheral societies as an agreed basis of government[36]. An example is that of the classical world thinking of itself as a central area of refined civilisation (Babylonia, Italy, Sicily), surrounded by a larger outer zone (from the Ganges to the Atlantic) of assimilated 'barbaric' kingdoms, which illustrates the idea of the marginal as backward, poor and uncivilised. In this second category of use of the term, the political-cultural elements dominate, but there is also, thirdly, an economic context in the relationship of centre to periphery, and it is based upon largely the same criteria as the first two.

Germani (1980) provides a more detailed discussion of the concept of marginality. The term was used in the 1970s principally in reference to urban ecological characteristics; that is, to the sector of the population segregated into areas of shantytowns, squatter settlements, and other illegally occupied land. The term was then extended to the working conditions and the standards of living of this sector of the population, their marginality being perceived in relation both to the socio-economic system of production and the socio-economic system of consumption of goods and services. It was realised that

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[35] Pollard, 1997, p9

marginality took in other essential aspects of life, such as political and union participation, especially the exclusion from community-level decision-making, or at a broader level, state and national institutions. Observations were not confined only to urban populations. A rural marginality was also recognised, and was considered to be more pronounced than urban marginality, and also, it was recognised that other features could be found within it, such as the lack of belonging or participation in the money economy, and a total or near-total exclusion from the national market and from contemporary consumption. At the same time, archaic forms of institutions, attitudes, interpersonal behaviour, and so on, could be included in the concept of marginality, in the economic as well as in other spheres.

This extension of the concept of the marginal from the urban to the rural is related to another meaning of the term marginality; to the distinction between centre and periphery, within the nation state. The differentiation between developed or central areas and underdeveloped or peripheral areas is related to the term marginality. Consideration of this situation as an asymmetric interdependence through which the central areas exercise a dominant and exploitative role while the peripheral areas occupy the position of internal colonies leads to the interpretation of the situation as the process of underdevelopment, with consequent marginality of some areas being the precondition for the development of others.

However, the phenomena of poverty and marginality have been differentiated, since although they can be associated, they should be considered separately because marginality can exist without poverty. This way of conceiving marginality is

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[36] ibid. p9.

usually associated with the idea that marginality should be placed on a different level than social stratification, as the behaviour, lifestyle, and particularly the political consciousness of the marginal sector, it has been argued, are different from those of the established 'lower class'.

This process of differentiating marginality from poverty, and the perception of the marginal sector as placed outside of the system of stratification, gives the marginal situation a different character from that of the rest of society. However, this approach can be contrasted with others, which consider the phenomenon of marginality to be multidimensional. This means that within marginality, a series of types can be distinguished, and that only when all of its possible forms coexist simultaneously in one social sector can 'absolute marginality' exist. In reality, this cannot exist outside of theory, since absolute marginality implies that a group or individual finds itself completely separated and deprived of any sort of participation in, or communication or relationship with, the global society. The multidimensional conception of marginality, implicitly accepted whenever different forms of marginality (such as economic, political, cultural) are discussed, admits different dimensions of marginality. For example, groups, social categories or individuals can be marginal in respect to one or more dimensions, but participating in others. This formulation is not problem-free, however. If marginality is considered to be a lack of participation, and if participation is the exercise of roles, than it is clear that no individual in a given society can simultaneously or successively play all the roles within their society. In reality, what is usually assumed in any definition of marginality is not the lack of participation in either a general or a specific area, but the lack of participation in those spheres within the radius of action of a group or individual.

Germani (1980 : 10-21) identifies various factors within marginality.

Economic and social factors

Marginality is generated fundamentally by the inherent characteristics of the economic-social order, or by determined policies within the order, or by both. In both cases, severe limits are created for the absorption of the whole of the population into the economic and social system of the country. Total or partial unemployment, underemployment, or disguised unemployment, or any other form of redundancy of the available workforce (and of the segment of the total population depending upon it for subsistence) creates marginality with all its consequences relating to consumption, standards of living, access to goods and services, and so on.

Political factors

Very simply, there is an interrelationship and interdependence between the political and the socio-economic spheres. As a generalisation, it can be said that many of the economic factors considered to be acting are related to political forces and institutions.

Demographic factors

The assumption of a mono-factorial causality based on population explosion is one-sided, and can lead to misunderstandings. However, it must be recognised that a region experiencing massive population growth, or decline, may also experience demands on the economy that would be difficult to meet.

Cultural factors

The role of cultural differentiation with the existence of distinct ethnic groups in the origins and maintenance of marginality is widely accepted. In the case of a forced superposition of culture, as opposed to pluralism, the domination of one cultural group by another can lead to marginality.

Psychosocial factors

The imputation of marginality to the psychosocial characteristics of groups of individuals is related to cultural differences, but the causal role is different. Ethnic differences, for example, may or may not reinforce the situation of psychosocial difference.

It is argued that full participation in contemporary society depends at least partially upon the acquisition of contemporary features. Differences in values may be reinforced, and there may be an inability to adopt new patterns. It has also been argued that the situation of marginality is capable of generating self-sustaining mechanisms which tend to maintain and reinforce attitudes and behaviour which make it difficult to adopt the patterns considered necessary for full participation in the wider society.

With regard to a description of marginal areas, their alleged political and cultural weakness is often put down to their geographical remoteness, deriving from their sheer distance from the centre, or from physical barriers, or both. In contemporary terms, the literature asserts that regions far from the political centre also lack markets and infrastructure, and tend to be fobbed off with branch activities, whereas the central areas house company headquarters, research and marketing, and above all, decision-making power, and the capital to back it, giving rise to notions of economic development of nations being identical with the development of core regions[37].

In the past, Pollard (1997 : 12) argues, economic marginality has turned less upon location than on the natural features of a region, and that the three main types of characteristics which have made regions marginal in the past are mountains, forests, and fens and marshlands, where any region deficient in the production of food was likely to

become marginal. Forests are thought to have presented themselves to primitive humanity as barriers; 'the forest appeared to Neolithic man as an enemy'[38]. It had to be cut down to make settlement possible, and civilisation was where forest was not, and vice versa. The forest formed the edge, or boundary, of civilisation. The point in time at which forests ceased to be an obstacle to progress, and came to be valued, differed greatly in different regions across the globe, but the literature suggests that in Russia the forest has long been valued, and indeed that it is considered the home of the Russian people.

Marginal areas do not have clear boundaries, and there is no *a priori* size range that qualifies a region as marginal. It is possible to think of units of very different orders of magnitude, for example, villages could have marginal land on their edges, or a whole section of a country could be considered marginal, such as the conception of the part of Britain north of the Humber-Severn line as being marginal, a view held in the Middle Ages[39]. And as a final step, Wallerstein's world picture had a core and a periphery, broadly covering Europe and North America, and the Third World respectively, with a semi-periphery in between. On the subject of the definition of the term, it is worthwhile to note that whilst this definition is spatial and locational, it is not immobile. The boundary of any given marginal area may change, and the degree of marginality is mutable.

The nature of marginal regions has been widely described and discussed.

> 'Without exception, all scholars present cores as advantaged and peripheries as disadvantaged ... without exception [in their view] peripheries are poorly developed, primary economies with low technology and high labour intensive activities....'[40]

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[37] Friedmann, Smith, in Pollard, 1997
[38] Pollard, 1997, p13
[39] Wellhofer, 1989:342 in Pollard, 1997, p51

The marginality of a region may be derived not only from its natural location and resources, but also from the way these have influenced their populations. Ricardo's 'natural fertility' and remoteness are his two criteria of undesirability. Three types of 'remoteness' can be distinguished - namely, distance, poor quality of transport and communication linkage with the outside world, and poor communications within the area. Marginal areas are seen to be defective in all three. From an economic point of view, the most important are the outward transport facilities of an area's potential export goods, though the facilities for imports are also significant. In present-day discussions about the economic disadvantages of peripheral or marginal areas, it is the distance from the market which features largely; the periphery, it has been held, is poor because it is outlying and handicapped by greater costs of transport to the centre, and greater cost of access to services, in part because of the lack of adequate means of transport to connect it to the rest of the world. It is isolated from other peripheral areas, with which it can communicate only via the centre, and it lacks the 'agglomeration economies' from which firms in central locations benefit. The cost of distance, it had been held, is hostility to innovation.

Byron (1995) elaborates a little further, arguing that the problems of marginal regions are associated with natural and human resources, and infrastructure, but that remoteness is a crucial factor in terms of communications and costs. With reference to natural resources, he holds, people living in marginal areas tend to be employed in primary activities, agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining, with few employed in processing, and fewer still in services. The human population of marginal areas tends to be low in density, dispersed, static or declining in numbers and ageing, or disproportionately aged. Often there is a high rate of out-migration, or an objective standard of living lower than that of

[40] Wellhofer, 1989, in Pollard, 1997, p51

metropolitan areas, and frequently both. The aspirations of young people for a better education, where there are no local opportunities to deploy their skills, will further erode the numbers of inhabitants. For new initiatives in local development, no already-skilled labour pool is likely to be available. Local people will need to be retrained, or outsiders brought in, for whom facilities may have to be provided. In both cases, additional costs are incurred. In terms of infrastructure, characteristically, marginal regions suffer from a lack of infrastructural provision. Given a low population density, there is strictly little economic justification for investment in capital-intensive improvements such as roads, bridges, hospitals etc. Shopping and social facilities may be widely scattered. The lack of services, amenities and communication traps remote localities in a situation which limits their future growth; initiatives requiring a certain level of infrastructure or civic amenity will not be attracted to areas which lack their requirements, but investment in infrastructural improvements by public authorities and private entrepreneurs is unlikely to happen unless development has already occurred. In all events, the scarce and scattered nature of the facilities available to people in these areas implies an added margin in time and expense merely to transact normal business. Regarding distance from markets, generally the more remote the region, the more limited it is by its distance from the market for its products. The higher transport costs of getting products to market may cancel out any advantage in labour costs or land values if the product is not unique. Specialised equipment, and any commodities that cannot be produced locally, need to be transported, adding further to the costs of production and depreciating the value of human labour to household incomes.

With regard to post-Soviet Russia, Germani's description of events that can follow from a process of modernisation can be applied.

> ...the concept of marginality ... is closely related to the notion (and the actual process) of modernisation, conceived of in a broad sense, including economic development, social and political modernisation, on the structural as well as the psychosocial level...
>
> The fundamental fact, which creates marginality..., is the asynchronous, or uneven, nature of the transition ... this process takes place at an unequal rate and following unequal sequences. These asynchronies create the coexistence of institutions, values, attitudes, models of behaviour, partial structure, groups or social categories, and regions in the interior of a country which at one given time achieve very different degrees of modernisation and development.[41]

If, for the moment, we consider the post-Soviet transition to be a process of modernisation, following Germani's argument, we can see that economic circumstances such as those outlined earlier, i.e. the new economic-social order, and the policies enacted within it, could have caused marginalisation such as that which could be considered to be taking place in the north of Perm' oblast'. The collapse of the forestry industry following the introduction of real prices for fuel and transport, and the collapse of the export markets, under the new economic rationale have led, it could be argued, to a process of marginalisation in which these areas are experiencing transition at a slower pace, or in a different manner, from 'central' areas.

Germani goes on to argue that

> Sectors of the population, sometimes concentrated in determined geographical areas, emerge as being 'backward' in relation to the rest, or even excluded from the process, although certain consequences will impinge upon them, such as progressing underdevelopment. From this point of view, groups, social categories, and geographical areas become marginal when in a situation of such 'backwardness' and exclusion.[42]

Whilst it would be difficult to argue that the north of Perm' oblast is totally excluded from the post-Soviet transition, the work of authors such as Moltz (1996) does

[41] Germani, 1980:27-28
[42] Germani, 1980:28-29

tend to support the idea of their experiencing the transition in a different manner from other regions.

Moltz (1996 : 175) sees Russia's marginal/peripheral areas as 'post-colonial peripheries', facing the same problems encountered by post-colonial peripheries elsewhere in the history of the world economy (isolation from central markets, high prices for fuel, transportation and consumer goods, and a lack of ready investment capital for overdue infrastructure development). Moscow, he claims, has behaved like a classic 'imperialist' power, claiming to have 'freed' the regions, while retaining power over key natural resources, import-export tariffs, and often substantial regional industries constructed during the Soviet period. This, he holds, leads to 'knock-on marginalisation', where as a result, many once pro-reform areas have elected conservative leaders, seen to be better able to extract subsidies from the central budget. In so doing, most have abandoned forward-looking strategies of attempting to create new mini-hubs of development with neighbouring regions.

Some areas face potentially chronic underdevelopment unless local leaders can develop ways of revitalising their economies, but 'dependency' literature (Frank, Wallerstein etc) predicts a continued syndrome of underdevelopment as long as these regions remain linked to an exploitative core economy, in this case Moscow. In Russia's post-Soviet peripheries, the renewed dominance of old-style industrialists and communists in positions of power suggests that the relations between centre and region are unlikely to be replaced by inter-regional economic relationships.

But, Moltz continues, seen through the 'industrial policy' literature of the 1980s and early 1990s, Russia's peripheries may be in a better position than those of the post-colonial Third World. He argues that for some regions, ideology, politics, and foreign policy may have created 'artificial' peripheries that do not share all of the impediments facing traditional ones. For example, the high education levels, relatively well-developed technological infrastructure and small populations of the southern regions of the Russian Far East, could be seen as providing certain preconditions which might allow their rapid turnaround. It is possible, he writes, that such areas may shed their old peripheral status.

2.2 Defining and delineating the Russian North

When discussing the Russian North, it is necessary to define exactly what is meant by the term. Slavin (1972) offers a definition, with four criteria for the Soviet North.

(1) Location to the north of the long-standing settled and economically developed areas of the country, and remoteness from large industrial centres from which development of natural resources of the northern regions could be initiated.

(2) Harsh climatic conditions, inimical to the expansion of agricultural activity, which also make general development of the area more difficult as a result of long winters, widespread permafrost and marshiness.

(3) Extremely low density of population, and a less developed industrial base, transport network and general economy in comparison with long-settled areas.


(4) A greater expenditure of man-hours in the exploitation of natural resources than would be required for the exploitation of similar resources located further south.

Based on these criteria, Slavin identified the Soviet North as, in European Russia; Murmansk and Archangel'sk oblasts and the Karelian and Komi Republics, and in Asiatic Russia, the North encompassed the Yamal-Nenets and Khanti-Mansi autonomous *okrugi* of Tyumen oblasts, the northern *raioni* of Tomsk oblasts, the Taymyr, and Evenki autonomous *okrugi*, and Turukhansk and Igarka *raioni* of Krasnoyarsk *krai*, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Magadan and Kamchatka oblasts, and the northern *raioni* of the Buryat Republic, Irkutsk, Amursk and Sakhalin oblasts, and Khabarovsk *krai*. Slavin's North was based on economic rather than physical indicators, so emphasis was placed more upon remoteness than on latitude, with the result that much of Eastern Siberia and the Far East was included in the North, which Slavin further subdivided into Near and Far North, based on the additional cost of operating at high latitudes. Delineating the North according to economic indicators is difficult because although the boundary of the North may lie between the *raioni* of an oblast, in general, economic indices are only available at the oblast level.

Slavin's North is by no means the only definition. A publication on the Russian North produced by the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering at Novosibirsk included the northern *raioni* of Vologda, Perm' and Sverdlovsk oblasts[43], and Figure 2.1 shows 13 different delineations of the North.[44] There are various different delineations; 1 is the 1998 border of the administrative North, 2 and 3 are the border of the North according to the Russian scholars Slavin, and Agranat (Moscow Academy of Sciences). Numbers 4 and 7, the borders of the construction-

[43] Bradshaw, 1995 p195-203

Figure 2.1 Delineation of the Russian North



Border of the Russian Federation

Borders of administrative areas

1 Border of the North (Far North and areas comparable to it)

2 Slavin's North

3 Agranat's North

4 Border of the first construction-climate zone

5 Border of the Zone of Cold Climate (1971)

6 Southern border of the Zone of Temporary Permafrost

7 Transport-Geographical North

8 Border of the North according to the Proposal put before the Duma, June 1998

9 Border of the Zone of Cold Climate according to the Commission for Problems of the North of the USSR (1967)

10 Astronomical border of the Arctic

11 Climatic Border of the Arctic

12 Physical-Geographical border of the Arctic

13 Border of the Arctic according to the Commission for Problems of the Nort

[44] Y.E. Andreeva, Institute for Systems Analysis, Moscow. 9.6.1998 pers comm. This figure was provided by the Institute for Systems Analysis, without any referencing, hence the sources for Slavin and Agranat's Norths are not presented.

climate zone and of the Transport-Geographical North are indications of the regions considered northern in terms of those two economic sectors. 5, 6, 10, 11 and 12 are physical geographical delineations, and 9 and 13 are the borders of the Zone of Cold Climate and of the arctic respectively, drawn up by the Commision for Problems of the North, a body which informs Duma debates about the North. The bold red line is delineation 8, the border of the North according to the proposal put before the Duma in June 1998, which included the *raioni* of the north of Perm' oblast. Delineation of the Russian North has considerable importance in policy making, in terms of subsidies and regional coefficients, which will be discussed later.

Towards the end of the first Five-Year Plan (1928-1932), when the planned development of the Russian North really began, the government undertook the precise definition of the region. The 'Far North' *(krainii sever)*, henceforth a specific concept, was described by a decree of September 8th 1931 as consisting of the following units;

Murmansk Oblast'; the Northern portions of the Archangel'sk Oblast', including the Nenets National *Okrug*; Northern parts of the Komi ASSR; Tyumen Oblast', including Yamalo-Nenets and Khanti-Mansi National *Okrugi*; Northern parts of Tomsk Oblast'; all of Krasnoyarsk *krai* north of 57°N including Taymirskii (Dolgano-Nenetski) and Evenk National *Okrugi*; the Yakut ASSR, Northern parts of Irkutsk and Chitinskaya Oblasts, and all of the Buryat Mongolskaya Oblast'; virtually all of Khabarovsk *krai*, south to and including the northern parts of Amurskaya

Oblast'; Primorskii *krai*, north of the Khor and Samarga Rivers, and all of the islands of the Arctic Ocean, and of the Okhotsk, Bering and Kamchatka Seas.[45]

After the first Five-Year Plan, the delineation of the Russian and Soviet North has varied, with the inclusion of more areas in the Far North category, and of others in that of regions 'comparable to' the Far North. In recent years, with the attempted economic stabilisation which has been part of the process of transition, the government of the Russian Federation is attempting to cut its budgetary expenditure on subsidy to the North, partly by contracting the area currently defined as 'Northern'. This trend will be discussed later, in Chapter 7 under the heading of policy for the margin.

[45] Webster, (1951 : 29)

2.3 The north of Perm' oblast as a northern marginal area.

As discussed earlier, marginality is a multi-faceted concept, encompassing ecoomic marginality, and also social, political and cultural marginality. In discussing the marginality of the north of Perm' oblast, it is necessary to study all of these areas.

It is possible to draw out the similarities between Byron's (1995) 'checklist' of marginality signallers, and the conditions of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, as indicators of the general state of the north of Perm' oblast. To summarise Byron's identifiers, he singled out employment in primary industry, low population density, static or declining population, an ageing or aged population, a high rate of emigration, low standards of living, outmigration of the young, and a lack of infrastructure, and of services, amenities, and communications, factors which relate to different types of marginality.

Taking first the employment structure of the *raioni*, statistics show that the vast majority of those of working age in both *raioni* were employed in the forestry industry, until its collapse, which left them to constitute either the hidden unemployed or the officially unemployed, as described by Germani (1980). When the timber industry was operational, processing played a minor role, especially in Kosinskii *raion*. Krasnovisherskii *raion* has a paper plant, 'Visherabumprom', located in the *raion* town of Krasnovishersk, which since 1991 has gone the way of many others in Russia, into debt and non-productivity.[46]

[46] For occupation statistics, see Chapter 3, Figures 1 & 2

The populations of both the *raioni* exhibit almost all of the demographic characteristics described by Byron, in terms of population density, the age balance of the population, and levels of out migration, all of which will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

In terms of lack of infrastructure, Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* exhibit all the characteristics identified by Byron (1995). Local roads are unmetalled, and of extremely poor quality, impassable during the *'rasputitsi'*, the seasons of bad roads i.e. any time there is rain, or in early spring when the snow cover melts. The bridge over the Vishera river between Vaya and Krasnovishersk, part of the main road between the two settlements, and the only one connecting Vaya with a higher order settlement, was washed away in the floods of 1993, and to date has still not been rebuilt. The lack of a bridge means that during all seasons when the river is flowing, communication with Vaya is limited to either vehicles which can drive through the fairly shallow river, or those willing to take a long and very time consuming detour in order to use the hand-winched toll 'punt' across the stream. There is a similar situation in Kosinskii *raion*. The road between Solym and Kosa crosses the river Lolog. In the same floods, which washed away the bridge in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the Lolog bridge was also destroyed. A new bridge had been under construction for 2 years by August 1997, and was still far from completion. In the meantime, vehicles and pedestrians wishing to cross the river had either to drive through the water (rather deeper than the wide Vishera) or use the rickety wooden pontoon bridge, resting on empty metal canisters. Plate 2.1 shows the temporary bridge, and 2.2 shows winter conditions in the village. Solym is part of the Svetlichanskii sel'soviet, meaning that its immediate administrative centre is in the village of Svetlitsa, and the two villages lie on opposite sides of the Kosa river. There is no bridge, so easy communications between the two are possible only when the river is frozen hard enough to drive across.



Plate 2.1 Temporary Bridge across the River Lolog, Kosinskii Raion, August 1997



Plate 2.2 Winter in Solym, Kosinskii Raion, February 1996

These physical difficulties also contribute to other limitations in terms of services, amenities, and communications, and in turn, to different types of marginality. There are two bus services per week from Solym to Kosa, the administrative centre of the *raion*, and the village from which buses leave to travel south to Kudymkar, and then on to Perm'. The journey to Kosa from Solym by motor vehicle takes at least 40 minutes in dry weather, or when the roads are frozen hard, much longer when they are wet. Post comes to the village with the bus, and there is no postal office in Solym. There is a similar arrangement in Vaya, with the difference that buses run once weekly. The lack of a daily newspaper delivery means that people are isolated from some political debate and national issues. The social clubs in both settlements are either partially closed (i.e. only half the building being used because of problems with the heating systems, as in Vaya), or closed for certain days or weeks of the year. There is very little organised entertainment; in fact, in Solym, the most intensive use of the club in recent times has been as a substitute school, when the school building's heating system broke down in winter 1996-97. The only regular use made of the club was for twice weekly discos for the children. The decline of the village clubs, which used to be used for dances, and performances by travelling artists and inhabitants of the village, contributes to cultural marginalisation. The schools themselves have the advantage of very small classes, usually no more than twelve per class, sometimes as few as two pupils, but in terms of resources, both material and human, they are disadvantaged. The schools cannot afford to provide exercise books and pencils, so the children's families must buy them. Many children come to school with no pencils, and have only the insides of paper packets and cartons on which to write their lessons. Due to outmigration, and to the difficulty of attracting teachers to work in small villages, the schools in both Vaya and Solym are lacking in specialist teachers. With regard to communications, the transport problems limit the accessibility of both settlements, and the

very small number of cars in both settlements increases the reliance on the buses. The infrequent postal services limit the ability to communicate by mail. Telephones are rare. There are a few telephone sets in Vaya, but the telephone line to the village is more often damaged than functioning, and the village does not have a central telephone station for the use of those people unable to afford their own telephone. Conditions in Solym are similar, with people who do have telephones taking messages for those who do not. Of the many TV channels available in the city of Perm' (at least 6), only two are clearly received in Solym (three if weather conditions are good), and one in Vaya. Radio reception is better, but there is silence on the FM dial, on which most of the Perm' stations broadcast. This lack of telecommunications means that people are marginalised from even local issues, and that they may not participate fully in local affairs.

Related to one of the indicators of marginality described by Germani (1980), and associated with the lack of access to goods and services, is the costs of goods available locally. Table 2.1 shows the differences in prices of various foodstuffs in shops at different places in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, and in the city of Perm', in mid-July 1997.

Table 2.1 Prices of foodstuffs in shops in Vaya, Krasnovishersk, and Perm', July 1997 (in rubles).[47]

Product	Vaya	Krasnovishersk	City of Perm'
Bread (loaf)	3.4	2.8	2.5
Flour (kg)	3.9	2.9	2.7
Margarine (250g)	3.5	3.0	2.9
Tinned milk (small)	5.5	5.2	5.0
Fresh milk (l)	N/A	3.0	2.4
Apples (kg)	N/A	12.0	11.0
Bananas (kg)	N/A	11.0	10.0
Fruit juice (l)	N/A	8.2	7.5

Source : fieldwork – personal observation

Data from Kosinskii *raion* and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* show that this trend has been relatively long term. For example, in March 1995, the following price differences were recorded.

[47] All prices have been converted into 'new'rubles, ie divided by 1000.

Table 2.2 Prices of foodstuffs in Kosa, Kudymkar, and the city of Perm'

March 1995 (in rubles)

Product	Kosa	Kudymkar	Perm'
Salt (kg)	0.847	0.600	0.499
Sugar (kg)	3.483	2.800	2.833
Sausage (kg)	22.000	16.900	16.937
Margarine (kg)	14.700	10.600	11.024
Eggs (ten)	4.750	3.600	3.752
Vodka (l)	11.310	10.000	10.360
Vegetable oil (l)	8.400	6.300	6.780

Source : *Kosinskoye Upravleniye Statistiki Sektor Nablyudeniya i Registratsii Tsen*

The average difference in prices between Krasnovishersk and Vaya in 1997 was +19,75%, and between Perm and Vaya it was +27.75%. Similarly, the average difference in prices between Kosa (which represents the Kosinskii *raion* average prices) and Kudymkar (the administrative centre of the KPAO) was +30%, and that between Kosa and Perm' was +23.7%. Therefore, it can be seen that the 'friction of distance' principle is, and has been, in operation in the two *raioni*, in that the prices of food products which cannot be produced at home, and therefore must be purchased, tend to increase with distance from the major city, and with distance from the nearest higher order settlement. Remoteness has led to a reduced ability to purchase goods not only because they are available in a smaller variety (see Table 2.1), but also because they are more expensive. An additional problem is a reduction in outlets, such as that caused by the closure of one of Vaya's bakeries (Plate 2.3).



Plate 2.3 A closed Bakery in Vaya, Krasnovisherskii Raion

It is clear that the north of Perm' oblast is not part of the extreme north, like Chukotka and the Arctic Circle, but because of the history it shares with areas such as these, there is much to be gained in terms of understanding of the context of the region by viewing it as part of the north. (The three *raioni* of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* which, for the purposes of this thesis, have been included in 'the north of Perm' oblast', Kosinskii, Gaiinskii and Kochevskii, were designated as 'Northern' by Presidential Decree 1085 of September 16th 1992.) In terms of its climate, the north of Perm' oblast is harsher than that of the south of the oblast, and winter temperatures of minus forty degrees celsius and below certainly indicate the severity of the weather. However, the region lies at the margin of the North, just as it lies at the margin of the economic centre of Russia. Much attention has been given to the problems of rural agricultural areas, in the more central regions of Russia which are suitable for commercial farming, and also to the problems of the North 'proper', particularly with regard to the Numerically Small Peoples of the North, but very little attention has been focussed on the region between the two, which has similarities to both but is identical to neither. The complex history of his area, as the southern boundary of the Far North, and therefore the northern margin of the (by default) 'southern' or 'core' area of Russia, makes it particularly significant. Its history of forced settlement, and later incentive-led settlement, and of raw material extraction, in the form of forestry, puts it into the category of the former Soviet North by virtue of the experience and history it shares with areas lying nearer to the Arctic. Therefore, although the north of Perm' oblast lies at the southern boundary of the North proper, in order to understand the context to the condition in which the region found itself at the time of the collapse of Soviet power, it is necessary to understand the history of settlement and development of the region as part of that of the North as a whole.

The following section discusses the north of Perm' oblast as it undergoes post-Soviet transition, and offers a description of the conditions within the region. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the context for these conditions, discussing the settlement of the area and the development of forestry within it, both of which contributed to the legacy of state socialism for the north of Perm' oblast, and therefore to the 'start conditions' for transition.

2.4 The north of Perm' oblast: Conditions in Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii raioni.

This section concentrates more closely on factors contributing to economic marginalisation, and the extent to which this process is underway in the north of Perm' oblast.

Slavin's 'Soviet North' is an accurate description of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*. Their location is to the north of the longstanding settled and economically developed areas of the country, and remote from large industrial centres. They experience harsh climatic conditions, inimical to the expansion of agricultural activity, which also make general development of the area difficult as a result of long winters, marshiness and so on. They have an extremely low population density and a less developed industrial base, transport network, and general economy in comparison with long-settled areas, and the exploitation of natural resources requires a greater expenditure of man hours than would be necessary for the exploitation of similar resources located further south. These are the problems posed to those wishing to develop the region, identified as a high cost, remote area relative

to those more accessible and lower cost areas further south. Remoteness from the developed core is crucial, and it contributes to the marginality of the area.

Soviet development strategy and its pricing system did not incorporate the real costs of transportation, which meant that the northern regions were unable to develop large-scale processing industries linked to their industrial resource base, or to retain the profits extracted from their regions. The role of freight rates was crucial. Soviet freight rates did not distinguish between shipping 10 tonnes of roundwood (tree trunks) and 10 tonnes of lumber, although the former loses almost half its weight during conversion into lumber. Approximately two-thirds of the weight of roundwood is lost in the conversion to plywood, and 84% in the conversion to chemical pulp. The rate for shipment of roundwood, however, was only 14% cheaper per tonne than shipping plywood, but was virtually the same as shipping chemical pulp. The freight rates were indicating to the Soviet producers of roundwood that locations minimizing the shipment of eventual waste, ie by facilitating waste, and therefore weight, loss as close as possible to the harvest site, were desirable economically. However, the railways, the major transporters of timber apart from the waterways, always received the same revenue whether roundwood or lumber was transported, and the shippers' and consumers' profitability was not affected by the transport costs. This meant that the loser was the national economy as a whole. The tariff structure of freight rates emitted strong signals of spatial preference for the location of wood processing, but these messages were aimed at an abstract entity rather than at the profit margins of specific enterprises. Therefore, Barr and Braden (1988) concluded, Soviet freight rates did not have an independent influence on the location of production or the shipment of commodities. Once planners had

established the output, shipment, and consumption of roundwood, and directives had been issued to various enterprises, the freight rates had no further meaning. Locational inertia in the form of existing investment, and administered economic relations instead of market-dictated operational profitability, ensured that processing sites remained in place long after their initial raw material locations had been exhausted. Barr and Braden concluded that the most important industrial goal in Soviet forestry was to achieve production targets consistently. The economic system, not the transport systems, thus subsidised locational inefficiencies by permitting uneconomic linkages to exist among suppliers and consumers. The freight rate structure was an example of how the planners favoured a raw-material orientation for primary processing (in other words, involving initial conversion of roundwood before transportation), but were forced nevertheless to permit continuing flows of roundwood over long distances in the name of pragmatism or expediency[48]. The bias towards resource extraction is evident in the industrial structure of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, which were very heavily weighted towards primary production; only Krasnovisherskii *raion* had a processing plant. Given the nature of Soviet economic policy, ever-increasing resource production was demanded, regardless of its social or economic impact. It is now evident that the Soviet system promoted a scale and pattern of development in the north of Perm' oblast that was not economically sustainable[49].

The processes of political, economic and social transition in Russia have revealed the costs of this Soviet development strategy. As transformation of the economy takes place, what might now be considered to be the market costs of

[48] Barr & Braden 1988, p136-137

development and transportation have become apparent, and much of the economic activity of the north is no longer viable. A cost-price squeeze has taken place, wherein the liberalisation of prices has seen raw material prices relatively depressed, while the costs of inputs (machinery, fuel, supplies infrastructure etc.) have risen steeply[50].

As a result of these circumstances, the economic climates of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* are characterised by falling production levels, rising debt, rising unemployment and increasing economic marginalisation. Low and falling levels of production, and high levels of debt, a large proportion of which has been owed for three months or more, are exhibited in both the budgetary and the business spheres, and are evident almost across the board amongst branches of the economy. Difficult financial conditions have led to non-payment of wages, loss of employment, as well as to hidden unemployment, and to falling standards of services, while prices continue to rise.

Both Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* lie in the north of Perm' oblast. Kosinskii *raion* is one of the six constituent parts of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* (KPAO), the first national *okrug* of the RSFSR, founded in 1925. The KPAO has an area of 32,900 square kilometres, occupied by its *raioni*, (Gai'inskii, Kosinskii, Kochevskii, Kudymkarskii, Yurlinskii and Yus'vinskii). There is one urban settlement, the administrative centre of Kudymkar, three large villages, Gai'ini, Maikov and Pozhva, seventy-six smaller villages, and 750 less populated sites. Kosinskii *raion* lies to the north of Kudymkar, in the north-east of the *okrug*,

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[49] Bradshaw, 1995, p199-200

and has a population of 10,200, employed in agriculture (28%), industry (including forestry) (32%), construction (6%), transport (2%) and infrastructure (32%) (percentages are of the workforce). The *raion* is divided into nine sel'soviets, Kosinskii, Levichanskii, Poroshevskii, Pyatigorskii, Puksibskii, Svetlichanskii, Sosnovskii, Chazevskii, and Churakovskii.[51] The poor economic conditions of the *okrug* were highlighted in January 1998, when the second working session of the Legislative Assembly of the KPAO began. The Assembly agreed that the inhabitants of the *okrug*, one of the most underdeveloped regions of European Russia, needed greater governmental assistance. The *okrug* has an under-performing agricultural sector, and its timber industry is dying. Even during the Soviet period, the average salary in the *okrug* was lower than elsewhere in the country, in line with the region's critical economic condition. The provision of healthcare, education and social services is also below that of other regions. Life expectancies are 10-11 years lower in the *okrug* than Russia's average, and the level of education amongst its rural residents is 2.5-3 years less than the average for Perm' oblast. The population of the KPAO has been in decline for the previous several decades. Following market reforms, the region has slid into deeper depression. Timber enterprises have practically ceased operations due to low levels of efficiency and a lack of investment, and collective farms have generated massive debts and reduced production levels. Many enterprises have not paid their employees for three years, and most, if not already bankrupt, are on the brink. Official unemployment reached 19% by the end of 1997, but the real figures are likely to be much higher. Over 20% of the *okrug*'s

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[50] ibid., p199-200

[51] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki. Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Komi-Permyatskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga za Yanvar'-Dekabr' 1996 goda g.Kudymkar* p38

population are retired, as a large number of working-age adults have left the area. Therefore, 82% of the *okrug*'s budget comes from federal subsidies.[52]

The *raion* centre of Kosa, (population 2575)[53] founded in 1623, administers the sel'soviets. The dominant industrial enterprise in Kosinskii *raion* in recent years has been the Kosinskii Lespromkhoz, which produces pinewood and spruce goods of many kinds (sawtimber, pulpwood etc.). In Kosa, there is 'Agroremtekhnika' (an agricultural machinery repair shop), a butter manufacturing firm, a bakery, and a very small range of shops. Electricity is received from the artery Kudymkar-Yukse'evo-Ga'ini through a branch circuit Yukse'evo-Kosa-Puksib. Agricultural land occupies 6% of the territory of the *raion* (22,000 ha), of which ploughed fields make up 4% (14,000 ha). There are six large agricultural enterprises in operation, whose sown area is divided between grain (53%), potatoes (4%) fodder (42%) and vegetables (less than 1%). The agricultural specialities of the *raion* are meat and milk; grain production is of little economic importance.[54] The major industrial activities have traditionally been forestry, metallurgy, light industry and food processing. 32% of the population of the *raion* is nominally employed in industry, and of those people, 86% are nominally employed in forestry; the extent of hidden unemployment is such that employment figures are variable in their reliability, but the general picture is that most of the people 'employed' in industry in Kosinskii *raion* are foresters. (Figure 2.2).

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[52] Russian Regional Report 13.2.1998, data from *Parma* 29.1.1998

[53] Kosinskii *raion* Administration, Department of Statistics, *Chislennost' Naseleniya po naselennim punktam po Kosinskomu raionu na 1 yanvarya 1997 goda* V.I.Kuznetsova (*Nachal'nik)*

Figure 2.2
Kosinskii Raion Industrial Employment Structure 1997




Figure 2.3
Employment Structure of Krasnovisherskii Raion, 1995





Figure 2.4
Krasnovisherskii Raion Employment Structure 1995



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[54] *Goskomstat Rossii. Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1997) *Pokazateli funktsionirovaniya sel'skokhozyaistvennikh predpriyatii Komi-Permyatskogo avtonominogo okruga za 1990-1996 godi. g.Kudymkar* p4

Krasnovisherskii *raion* lies in the north east of Perm' oblast, with a territory of 15,400 km², and a population of 30,900. The administrative centre is the town of Krasnovishersk, which is responsible for the 13 sel'soviets, and 73 settlements. Its distance from Perm' is 524km. The majority of the populated settlements of the *raion* are located within 50-70km of the town, with the most remote being 150-170km away. Krasnovisherskii *raion* lies to the southeast of the KPAO. It is bordered to the northwest by Cherdinskii *raion*, to the south by Solikamskii, and to the east by Sverdlovsk oblast. About half the territory of the *raion* is designated as being of primary importance for the development of timber cutting and wood processing; untapped forest resources occupy one third of the territory, which on the whole is 87% forested. This high level of forestation has provided large reserves of timber (204 million cubic metres), but there are also valuable deposits of oil, gas, diamonds, gold, titanium ore, marble and other minerals.[55]

Industrial production of the enterprises of Krasnovisherskii *raion* constitutes 0.6% of that of the oblast. More than 80% of production has traditionally originated in the forestry sector, but there is also a diamond mine 'Uralalmaz', and exploratory drilling by 'Perm'neft' oil company is taking place. The occupational structure of the *raion* is as shown in figures 2.3[56] and 2.4[57]. Agricultural enterprises in the *raion* produce potatoes, vegetables, meat and milk. As the figures show, the

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[55] *Ministerstvo Obshchego I Professional'nogo Obrazovaniya Rossiiskoi Federatsiya, Permskii Gosudarstvennii Universitet.*(1997) *Permskaya Oblast': Otrasli, Regioni, Goroda. Perm'* p173-176

[56] *Permskii Oblastnoi Tsentr Zanyatosti Naseleniya* (1995) *Spravka o sotsial'no-ekonomicheskom polozhenii i situatsii na rink'ye truda v Krasnovisherskom raionye Permskoi Oblasti.* p1-4

overwhelming majority of the workforce of the *raion* is, or was, employed in primary industry, one of Byron's (1995) indicators of marginality.

[57] ibid., p1-4

2.4.1 Forestry.[58]

One of the major characteristics of the economies of Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the KPAO, and Kosinskii *raion* has been the fall in levels of production, in industry and agriculture (which was developed during the Soviet period with little regard for the difficult conditions for farming in the area) in particular. For example, published data suggest that in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, in the first six months of 1997, the total volume of industrial production was 135,508 million rubles, an increase on the same period of 1996, but, disregarding the increase in prices over the year, the physical volume of production was just 91.7% of that of 1996, a decline of 8.3%.[59] Within the category of industry, forestry has suffered the greatest decline in production in both *raioni*.

The realisation of the potential of forest resources takes place through processing activities, which begin with timbercutting. Through felling, solid wood raw material is generated, which can be used to support the manufacture of higher value-added products, such as lumber, pulp, or reconstituted panel products. Since 1989, the degree to which the timber potentially accessible to the Russian forestry industry has been utilised has been falling. From nearly complete utilisation in 1989 (a harvest of 439 million cubic metres), only 251 million cubic metres were harvested

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[58] The data that follow, relating to the local economies of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, are those produced by the local administrations, and published by Goskomstat. Corroboration by crosschecking and personal observation suggests that the data are reliable.

[59] *Krasnovisherskii raion Administration, Department of Statistics (10.7.1997)* *Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Krasnovisherskom raiona v pervom polugoda 1997 goda.* L.I. Zhuravlevich, *Nachal'nik*p1-7

in 1993, representing a utilisation of 60% of the Russian resource believed available in the short to medium term[60].

The Russian forest sector has relied on export markets as well as the domestic demand for timber generated through industrial activity. Between 1989 and 1993 the proportion used by the domestic industry rose slightly sinced export opportunities decreased, especially in East Europe and the former Republics of the USSR. In 1989, 85% of the domestic commercial volume was either used in domestic consumption of unprocessed wood or in the manufacture of timber products in Russia. By 1992, however, domestic consumption in both processed and unprocessed form had increased to more than 90% of the harvest, as export markets collapsed more rapidly than those inside Russia. By 1993, the export markets had begun to stabilise, but decline continued in the domestic markets, although domestic consumption still accounted for 90% of the domestically produced timber (151 million cubic metres). In 1989 Russia exported 39 million cubic metres of roundwood, 13% of the entire commercial harvest, but by 1992 exports had fallen to 17 million, less than 8% of the commercial harvest, and the decline continued into 1993, with only 14 million cubic metres of a commercial harvest of 165 million being exported. Roundwood exports to countries known as the 'Far Abroad' (i.e. outside the borders of the former Soviet Union) fell by a third between 1989 and 1993, from 19 million cubic metres to 12, and the export markets in the 'Near Abroad' (within the former Soviet Union) have collapsed, from 20 million cubic metres in 1989 to 2.9 million in 1993. Russia also exports manufactured wood products, but opportunities presented by the export of these products have declined as well. Export opportunities for the whole of the

[60] Backman, 1995, p454

Russian forest sector are a fraction of what they once were. More recent data for the Russian Federation shows that the harvesting of timber has declined by more than two thirds, from 304 million cubic metres in 1990 to just 96.8 million in 1996[61]. One reason for the decline of harvesting of timber was the dismantling of the central and regional logging and woodprocessing organisations, (e.g. *Minlesprom*). The forestry sectors of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* did not escape the consequences of this collapse in markets, along with the cost-price squeeze outlined earlier.

In 1995 in Krasnovisherskii *raion* there were many timbercutting enterprises in operation; 'Visherogorsk', 'Taiga', 'Vayales', 'Mutikhales', 'Visherales' and 'Ust' Yazvinskii Splavnoi Raid', with a total workforce of about 3000. Although there were many firms, the forestry sector was in deep crisis; at the end of the 1980s, total timbercutting in the *raion* amounted to more than 1 million cubic metres per year. Local economic statistics show that in 1993 it fell to 292,000, and in 1994 to 175,000. In 1995 the decline continued - in the first 5 months of the year the total was just 77,800. Forest resources allowed for the removal of 1,300,000 cubic metres a year, but the total for 1995 did not exceed 150,000. (In percentage terms, the total decline in timbercutting in the *raion* 1990-1996 amounted to a reduction of 85%, compared to the Russian national reduction of 61.84%.[62]) In connection with this situation, the production of wood-processing goods also fell; in 1994 'Visherabumprom' produced 11,000 tonnes of paper, just 29.5% of its 1990 total, and between January and June 1995, production reached just 7,500 tonnes. By July 1997 the forestry sector was almost inactive. In the previous six months

[61] *Goskomstat Rossii* (1997) *Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik Ofitsial'noye Izdaniye 1997. Moskva* p362

timbercutting had amounted to just 48,700 cubic metres, and the volume of production of 'Visherabumprom' was still decreasing. In the first half of the year 3774 tonnes of paper and 4560 tonnes of cellulose were produced, compared to 1996, with 7236 and 7837 tonnes respectively; a decline of almost 50%. In 1995 there had already been reports of severe problems in rural areas associated with the slump in forestry; in Krasnovisherskii *raion* a considerable proportion of the population is concentrated in forest villages, and involved in timbercutting and its infrastructure; by 1995 there were already concerns for the future of all 18 such forest villages. The extent of the decline of forestry and the associated paper processing industry is shown in Figures 2.5-2.7[63].

In Kosinskii *raion* the trend mirrors that of Krasnovisherskii. In the KPAO as a whole, the removal of timber fell from 3,380,500 cubic metres in 1990 to 860,900 in 1996, a decline of 75%, and in Kosinskii *raion*, the corresponding fall was from 314,400 cubic metres to 46,400, a decline of 85%. This trend is illustrated in Figures 2.8 and 2.9[64]. The latest data, that for 1996, shown in Figure 2.8, suggest that the fall may have 'bottomed out' in the mid-1990s – unfortunately no data is available for the following years. The dominant enterprise in Kosinskii *raion* was the Kosinskii Lespromkhoz, a forestry enterprise. The workforce of this firm fell from 637 in 1995 to 593 in 1996. Table 2.3 shows the summary of data for the forestry industry of the KPAO.

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[62] *Goskomstat Rossii (1997) Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik Ofitsial'noye Izdaniye 1997 Moskva 1997* p362

[63] *Permskoi Oblastnoi Tsentr Zanyatosti Naseleniya* (1995) *Spravka o Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskom Polozhenii I Situatsii na rinkye truda v Krasnovisherskom raionye Permskoi Oblasti.* p1-4

[64] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1997) *Osnovniye pokazateli deyatel'nosti predpriyatii lesnoi promishlennosti Komi-Permyatskogo avtonomnogo okruga za 1990-1996 godi. g.Kudymkar* p1-7

Figure 2.5
Timbercutting in Krasnovisherskii raion, 1993-July 1997




Figure 2.6
Production of paper in Krasnovisherskii raion, 1985-92




Figure 2.7
Indices of the forestry industry, Krasnovisherskii Raion, 1985-1992




Figure 2.8
Removal of Timber, Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1990-1996




Figure 2.9
Carting-out (harvesting) of timber, and production of worked timber, Kosinskii Raion, 1990-1996




Table 2.3 Harvesting of timber, KPAO 1990-1996 (Thousand cubic metres)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
***Okrug* Total**	3380.5	2896.8	2546.7	1762	890.7	1076.5	860.9
of which							
town of Kudymkar	14.3	5.0	6.9	4.0	6.9	7.4	6.0
Gai'inskii *raion*	1648.2	1390.5	1180.7	809.4	376.2	500.6	433.4
Kosinskii *raion*	314.4	270.5	235.8	180.4	78.5	72.0	46.4
Kochevskii *raion*	403.7	374.1	355.5	234.0	162.1	212.7	178.2
Kudymkarskii *rn*	327.0	297.4	258.0	189.8	130.5	145.5	100.3
Yurlinskii *raion*	357.2	308.0	267.6	160.9	45.5	64.2	26.0
Yus'vinskii *raion*	315.7	251.3	242.2	183.5	91.0	74.1	70.6

Source : *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudardstvennoi Statistiki (1997) Osnoviye pokazateli deyatel'nosti predpriyatii lesnoi promishlennosti Komi-Permyatskogo avtonomnogo okruga za 1990-1996 godi.g. Kudymkar,* p6

The withdrawal of state support for the timber industry has had far reaching consequences for Kosinskii *raion.* Timber cutting has declined partly because of low levels of investment through state policy. During winter, forestry enterprises cut timber and stockpile it. In spring, logs are floated downstream to processing plants. In the past, the Soviet State gave good credits to the forestry enterprises, to enable them to pay their workers through the winter. In spring, the logs went to the processors, which paid the timbercutting firms, which in turn paid back their debt to the state. Interest on the loans was around 10%. Today, the state does not give credit, and enterprises must borrow from commercial banks. Because of the weakness of the timber industry, banks charge interest of up to 200%, further crippling the industry. The outlawing of *molevoi splav*, the floating of logs on waterways, has caused another problem for timbercutting. The law changes began in 1990, and in Kosinskii *raion* their culmination was the closing of the main Kama

stream for free floating in 1994. It is now possible to float timber only on the Lolog and the Kosa rivers, and only for a brief period in the year[65].

Plates 2.4 – 2.7 show the condition of the forestry base in Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, and the process of timbercutting in the surrounding forest. The forestry base is run down, and the buildings in a state of disrepair.

[65] *pers comm* A.N.Dyagilev, Senior Representative of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* at Perm' Oblast Administration, and former CPSU Head for the *Okrug*. 23.7.1997,





Plates 2.4 & 2.5

The Forestry Base in Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997





Plates 2.6 & 2.7

Timbercutting outside of the village of Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, March 1996

2.4.2 *Agriculture and Food*

In this sector, the general trend of decline in output is shared by both the *raioni*. Published data show that agricultural enterprises of the KPAO suffered a loss of 28.3 bn R in 1996. Of the 63 agricultural enterprises in the *okrug*, only one (Kirov Kolkhoz, Kudymkarskii *raion*) produced a profit. Creditor debt of agricultural enterprises stood at 52.2 bn R (of which 85%, was overdue), and debitor debt at 8 bn R (70%, overdue). On the whole, throughout the *okrug*, creditor debt exceeded debitor debt by 44.2 bn R.[66] General economic indices of agriculture in the KPAO are shown in Table 2.4. The sown area of the *okrug* fell from 196,677 ha in 1990 to 144,453 ha in 1996, having reached a low point of 133,024 ha in 1995 (Figure 2.10)[67]. The total decline 1990-1996 was 26.6%, compared to the Russian national decline of 15.4% over the same period[68]. Milk production also fell, from 507,970 quintals in 1990 to 257,514q in 1996 (Figure 2.11) a fall of almost 50%[69]. Likewise live weight of slaughtered animals fell by 72% (Figure 2.12)[70]. In addition to a decline in the physical volume of agricultural production in agricultural enterprises, productivity also fell. The productivity of grain and vegetable crops fell from 1990 to 1996, and the average daily weight gain of cattle and pigs declined (Figures 2.13 and 2.14)[71].

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[66] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1997) *Pokazateli funktsionirovaniya sel'skokhozyaistvennikh predpriyatii Komi-Permyatskogo avtonomnogo okruga za 1990-1996 godi. g.Kudymkar*p29-32

[67] ibid., p9-10

[68] *Goskomstat Rossii (1997) Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik Ofitsial'noye Izdaniye 1997 Moskva 1997*

[69] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1997) *Pokazateli funktsionirovaniya sel'skokhozyaistvennikh predpriyatii Komi-Permyatskogo avtonomnogo okruga za 1990-1996 godi. g.Kudymkar* p19

[70] ibid., p16

[71] ibid., p18

Figure 2.10
Sown Area in Agricultural Enterprises of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1990-1996




Figure 2.11
Milk Production in Agricultural Enterprises of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug 1990-1996




Figure 2.12
Live weight of animals slaughtered in Agricultural Enterprises of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1990-1996




Figure 2.13
Yield of Arable Crops in Agricultural Enterprises of the KPAO, 1990-1996




Figure 2.14
Average Daily Weight Gain of Cattle and Pigs in Agricultural Enterprises of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1990-1996




Figure 2.15
Sown Area under Grain Crops in Agricultural Enterprises of Kosinskii Raion, 1990-1996




Table 2.4 General Economic Indices of Agriculture in the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, 1996-1997.

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
No. of kolkhozi, sovkhozi, new formations	57	57	59	61	61	64	63
No. of private farms	0	77	262	298	310	304	263
Sown area in Agriculture (ha) TOTAL	196677	199242	185671	175574	160500	133024	144453
Sown area in agriculture; total grain (ha)	97582	106792	89556	91708	83736	62611	73666
Winter rye (ha)	34435	31854	29096	31109	23122	7228	18835
Spring grain (ha)	63147	74938	60460	60599	60614	55383	54831
Potatoes (ha)	1654	1513.5	910	545	194	83	119
Vegetables (ha)	95.1	89.2	60	28.4	20	12	6
Fodder (ha)	98155	92730	95049	83141	73394	70101	70561
Gross Yield (Q) Grain	1417931	956215	971170	830597	643738	663089	669300
Gross Yield (Q) Potatoes	87850	123889	60679	14120	5327	7514	5484
Gross Yield (Q) Vegetables	4632	7268	2812	964	95	472	110
Yield (Q/ha) Grain	14.5	8.9	10.8	9.1	7.9	10.6	9.1
Yield (Q/ha) Potatoes	53.1	82	66.7	25.9	27.6	91.1	46.1
Yield (Q/ha) Vegetables	48.6	81	46.9	33.9	8.1	39.3	18.3
Animals slaughtered in live weight (Q)	122648	106800	91012	65818	64853	38058	34418
Average daily weight gain (g) Cattle	436	417	341	372	281	331	350
Average daily weight gain (g) Pigs	328	305	323	288	300	273	266
Milk Production (Q)	507970	521446	431479	374961	289144	259917	25714
Average milk yield per cow (kg)	2068	2141	1795	1704	1403	1646	1759
Number of Cattle	78412	76108	66468	59730	44557	40308	38213
Number of Cows	24357	24163	22005	20604	16421	14844	14102
Number of Pigs	6931	5850	5228	4211	2830	3177	3412
Number of Sheep	786	664	179	84	31	0	0
Number of Horses	3601	3419	3038	2856	2205	2048	1874
Purchase of animals (tonnes)	12739	10657	8264	6057	6391	3663	4104
Purchase of milk (tonnes)	47555	45467	32759	29398	22873	20128	19954

Source : *Goskamstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki (1997) Pokazateli funktsionirovaniya sel'skokhozyaistvennikh predpriyatii Komi-Permyatskogo avtonomnogo okruga za 1990-1996 godi g. Kudymkar*, p1-30

In Kosinskii *raion* all indices of production in agricultural enterprises demonstrate a slump in yield. The sown area under potatoes, vegetables, grain and fodder all fell steeply between 1990 and 1996 (Figures 2.15 and 2.16), the number of

Figure 2.16
Sown Area under Potatoes and Vegetables in Agricultural Enterprises of Kosinskii Raion, 1990-1996




Figure 2.17
Animals in Agricultural Enterprises of Kosinskii Raion, 1990-1996




Figure 2.18
Gross Yield of Milk in Agricultural Enterprises of Kosinskii raion, 1990-1996




Figure 2.19
Gross Yield of Milk per cow in Agricultural Enterprises of Kosinskii Raion, 1990-1996





Figure 2.20
Yield of arable crops in Agricultural Enterprises of Kosinskii Raion, 1990-1996



livestock (pigs, sheep, cattle and horses) in enterprises also showed a decline (Figure 2.17)[72]. In accordance with the fall in the number of cows in the *raion*, the gross yield of milk fell (Figure 2.18), but the gross yield of milk per cow, productivity per unit, also almost halved (Figure 2.19)[73]. In arable cultivation, productivity also decreased (Figure 2.20)[74]. To summarise, it can be said that the agricultural enterprises of Kosinskii *raion* and the *okrug* as a whole were operating with greatly reduced levels of both production volume and per hectare productivity.

The sovkhoz centred on Kosa is in a difficult position.

> It has no financial support, and the prices for its products are low. The main products are meat and milk, and the prices for both are bad. The farm can only afford to buy a few, very simple implements. The Kosa sovkhoz was always weak because the soil, and the weather, are so bad for growing crops. The state used to give good credits under the Soviet system, and the sovkhoz could buy good implements. But now, the sovkhoz is ineffective. It isn't the fault of the regional administration. We tried to replace the sovkhoz with small farmers, but after 3 years, the new farms folded. Production will continue to be poor unless the state (the Moscow administration) changes its policy. It has to change! One kilogram of meat costs the sovkhoz 30,000 rubles to produce, but the state tries to buy it at 9,000. The balance between buying and selling prices has to change if we are to produce economically. The state buys one litre of milk at 1,100 rubles, but it costs 20,000 to produce.[75]

The harsh climatic and environmental conditions of Kosinskii *raion* make agricultural production costly, and cause goods to be priced out of the range of state purchasing.

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[72] ibid., p20-21
[73] ibid., p19
[74] ibid., p12
[75] *pers comm* A.N.Dyagilev, Senior Representative of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* in Perm' Oblast Administration. 23.7.1997. Prices are in old rubles.

Figure 2.21
Dynamics of Food Production in Krasnovisherskii *raion* ,
1985-1992





Figure 2.22
Yield of Potatoes and Vegetables in agricultural enterprises of
Krasnovisherskii *raion* , 1995-1997



Figures 2.21 and 2.22 show the trend of decline in agricultural production in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, which is taking place for very similar reasons[76].

2.4.3 Debt

Recent tax reforms as part of the 1994-5 new law on local self-government in Russia, involved in the decentralisation of intragovernmental fiscal relations, favoured regional governments while doing little for local budgets. This was characteristic of the ceding of federal power to the regions in the early- to mid-1990s, prior to the more recent trend of attempted reassertion of federal power from Moscow. A lack of revenue-expenditure balance is evident at the local level (exhibited by the KPAO and Krasnovisherskii *raion*), due, to some extent, to the low efficiency of local tax collection systems, but more to the very small local tax base, and the lack of tax-setting authority for local governments to provide adequate revenue to cover current costs for local services.

Following the 1994-5 law on local self-government, local administrations remained heavily dependent upon budgetary transfers, subsidies and soft credits from both higher offices and local enterprises, mainly because Russian authorities continued to share revenues upwards from the local to the regional and

[76] Krasnovisherskii *raion* Administration Department of Statistics (10.7.1997) *Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Krasnovisherskom raiona v pervom polugoda 1997 goda*
L.I.Zhuravlevich *(Nachal'nik)*, p2
*Goskomstat Rossi. Permskii oblastnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki (1998) Osnoviye Pokazateli Razvitiya gorodov i raionov Permskoi oblasti.*Perm' 1998

then to the national budget. The budget deficits exhibited by the KPAO and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* are testimony to the effect of this law. Additionally, the taxes collected by local administrations are often no more than nuisance taxes, while revenues from profit and income taxes, excise duties, and transport and land taxes (which could have a substantial impact on territorial development) are reserved for regional governments.

Russian tax legislation includes provision for 23 local taxes and duties, the rates of which are normally set in Moscow, but local governments sometimes have the right to define local taxes up to a certain upper limit. As a generalisation, it can be said that local self-government in Russia is still in flux since institutional arrangements remain blurred, no significant tax assignments are provided, and no clear division between federal, regional and local taxes and property has been drawn[77].

The second major feature of the economies of Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the KPAO and Kosinskii *raion*, closely associated with their falling production levels, is deficit and debt, which is evident at the level of the *raion* budget, and at almost all levels of the business community. Published data suggest that the consolidated budget of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* in 1996 had a deficit of 38.1 billion rubles (bn R). The total revenue was 186.9 bn R, of which 39% came from transfers, and 35% from taxes (Figure 2.23)[78]. (In 1995, the KPAO received 56.3% of its revenue from the federal budget, and was then considered a "Highly-subsidised

[77] Kirkow,1997, p43-58

Subject of the Russian Federation", the most extreme classification.[79] By 1998 the figure had risen to 82%). Budgetary expenditure in 1996 was 225 bn R, therefore the deficit was 38.1 bn R (Figure 2.24)[80]. 76% of expenditure went to the socio-cultural sphere, and 24% to the economy. Of the expenditure on the socio-cultural sphere, public education received 86.4 bn R public healthcare 45.2 bn R and culture 8.9 bn R. Allocation to branches of the economy of the *okrug* was split between industry, which received 4.5 bn R, agriculture, 12.7 bn R, and the municipal economy, 17.2 bn R[81].

The situation for 1997, indicated by the half-yearly figures from July 1st, was similar. Total budgetary income for the first six months of the year was 94.6 bn R (of which transfers 52%, taxes 36%, Figure 2.25), and total expenditure was 109.1 bn R, leaving a deficit of 14.5 bn R by the end of June (Figure 2.26). Budgetary expenditure for January-July 1997 was much the same as that for 1996, in terms of the relative weighting of various directions of funds. 80% of spending was on the socio-cultural sphere, 20% on the economy. Public education (52.4 bn R), public healthcare (21.5 bn R) and culture (4.1 bn R) were again the main recipients in the socio-cultural sphere, and industry (0.6 bn R), agriculture (4.2 bn R), and the municipal economy (7.5 bn R) shared the portion of the budget designated for the economy, which this time also funded transport (0.9 bn R). These trends are illustrated in Figures 2.27-2.29[82]

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[78] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1996) *Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Komi-Permyatskogo Avtonomnogo okruga za Yanvar'-Dekabr 1996 goda. g.Kudymkar*, p4

[79] McAuley, 1997

[80] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1996), p4

[81] ibid., p4

Figure 2.23
Sources of revenue of the budget of the KPAO, 1996





Figure 2.24
Budget of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1996



[82] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1997) *Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoye polozheniye Komi-Permyatskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga za yanvar'-iyun' 1997 goda g.Kudymkar*, p4

Figure 2.25
Sources of Revenue of the budget of the KPAO, January-June 1997




Figure 2.26
Budget of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, January-June 1997




Figure 2.27
General Budgetary Expenditure of the KPAO,
1996-June 1997




Figure 2,28
Budgetary Expenditure of the KPAO, Socio-Cultural Sphere.





Figure 2.29
Budgetary Expenditure of the KPAO, National Economy



The consolidated budget of Krasnovisherskii *raion* in 1995 displayed revenue amounting to a third of expenditure (19.5 bn R and 61.5 bn R respectively) (Figure 2.30)[83]

In enterprises and organisations the picture of indebtedness is much the same. In 1996 industrial, transport, and construction enterprises and organisations in the KPAO made a combined loss of 13.3 bn R, and out of the 51 firms in operation, 34 were making a net loss[84]. In the first six months of the following year, the trend continued, with a combined loss of 5839 million rubles[85]. The proportion of the loss suffered by various sectors of the economy, however, altered, as displayed in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Proportion of enterprise loss made by various branches of the economy of the KPAO 1996-July 1997

	1996	**Jan-July 1997**
TOTAL (rubles)	13.3 billion	5839 million
of which (percentage)		
Industry	52	44
Transport	14	53
Construction	34	3

Source : *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki (1996 : 80) and (1997 : 85)*

Within the various sectors of the economy, the proportion of firms making net losses changed little

[83] *Permskoi Oblastnoi Tsentr Zanyatosti Naseleniya* (1995) *Spravka o Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskom Polozhenii I Situatsii na rinkye truda v Krasnovisherskom raionye Permskoi Oblasti* L.I.Zhuravlevich *(Nachal'nik).*, p1-4

[84] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1996), p27-29

[85] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1997), p27-29

Table 2.6 Proportion of firms making losses, as a percentage of the total.

	1996	Jan-July 1997
Industry	56%	58%
Transport	100%	100%
Construction	79%	54%

Source : *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki (1996 : 80) and (1997 : 85)*

At the end of 1996, debts owed by enterprises and organisations of the KPAO to creditors amounted to 176.2 bn R, of which 78% was overdue (i.e. had been owed for three months or more). By July 1997 the total debt obligations had risen to 273 bn R, of which 70% was overdue. The breakdown of overdue debt by creditor remained fairly constant through 1996 and 1997 (Table 2.7)

Table 2.7 Dimensions and structure of overdue debts of enterprises and organisations of industry, transport, construction and agriculture of the KPAO, 1996-July 1997

	1996 bn R	1996 Percentage	Jan-July 1997 bn R	Jan-July 1997 Percentage
Total	159.5	100	191	100
of which				
Debts to suppliers and to the budget	138.1	86.6	168.6	88.3
Debts to creditors and for loans	21.4	13.4	22.4	11.7

Source : *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki (1996 : 28) and (1997 : 29).*

In 1996, the largest proportion of business debt in the KPAO was owed to suppliers (34% or 60.2 bn R), of which 71% was overdue. Of the total sum of debts to suppliers, more than half was owed by industrial enterprises, amongst them forestry firms. Overdue debt continued to grow month by month[86].

[86] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1996), p27-29

The sum of debts owed by businesses to the budget in July 1997 stood at 39.7 bn R, of which 84% was overdue, an increase on 1996 when the sum was 32.6 bn R, with 80% overdue. In 1996 the largest proportion of overdue debts again came from forestry and other industrial enterprises[87]. Additional debts owed to the extrabudgetary fund and to banks are shown in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8 Overdue Creditor debt of the most important branches of the economy of KPAO, 1996 (bn R)

	Overdue Creditor Debt	*of which*		
		to suppliers	to the budget	to the extrabudge -tary fund
TOTAL	138.1	42.6	26	42.6
of which				
INDUSTRY	76	22.6	17.4	21.3
AGRICULTURE	44.8	13.4	4.3	18.0
TRANSPORT	3.7	0.8	1	0.8
CONSTRUCTION	13.6	5.8	3.3	2.5

Source : *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki 1996, p29*

By July 1997 the main volume of overdue debt to the budget was still concentrated in industrial enterprises (19.6 bn R, or 59%), and debt to the other creditors continued to grow[88].

Although enterprises of the KPAO were submerged in debt during 1996 and 1997, they were themselves creditors. Debitor debt, i.e. debt owed *to* the enterprises rather than *by* them stood at 62.2 bn R in December 1996, (65% overdue).

[87] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1997), p27-31
[88] *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki* (1997), p27-31

By June 1997 this debt had grown to 64.4 bn R. The structure of the debt is shown in Table 2.9.

Table 2.9 Overdue debitor debt owed to enterprises of the KPAO 1996-July 1997 (bn R).

	Overdue debitor debt	of which debt for the purchase of goods, labour and services
Total 1996	40.7	36.7
Total Jan-July 1997	**49.1**	**44.5**
of which		
Industry 1996	20.3	18.2
Industry Jan-July 1997	**23.4**	**20.5**
Agriculture 1996	6.7	5.4
Agriculture Jan-July 97	**6.4**	**5.3**
Transport 1996	1.6	1.5
Transport Jan-July 1997	**1.8**	**1.7**
Construction 1996	11.8	11.3
Construction Jan-July 1997	**17.5**	**17.0**
Mining 1996	0.3	0.3

Source : *Goskomstat Rossii Komi-Permyatskii Okruzhnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki (1996 : 27-31) and (1997 : 27-31)*

Although the enterprises were themselves creditors, their creditor debt remained in excess of the debitor debt shown in Table 2.9. Despite debts owed *to* them, they were still deep in the red.

Figures for Kosinskii *raion* show a similar pattern;

Table 2.10 Indebtedness of enterprises in Kosinskii *raion*, 1997

Debitor Debt (million rubles)	Creditor Debt (million rubles)	Balance (million rubles)
1690	16569	2782

Source : *Goskomstat Rossii Permskii Oblastnoi Komitet GosudarstvennoiStatistiki. (1998) Osnoviye Pokazateli Razvitiya gorodov i raionov Permskoi oblasti. Perm' 1998, p71-72*

In Krasnovisherskii *raion* in 1994, 35% of the enterprises of the *raion* were operating at a net loss, with debts amounting to 13.2 bn R by June 1st 1995. By

1997 there were 14 enterprises of industry, construction, transport and agriculture in the *raion*, and by July 1st, 11 of the enterprises had made a total combined loss of 5.6 bn R.[89]

The total sum of creditor debt in the *raion* was 195 bn R, the structure of which is shown in Table 2.11.

Table 2.11 Creditor debt of enterprises in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997

Debt	Billion Rubles
TOTAL	195
to the budget	70 (36%)
to suppliers	69 (35%)
to the extrabudgetary fund	39 (20%)
other	17 (9%)

Source : Krasnovisherskii *raion* Administration, Department of Statistics (10.7.1997) *Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Krasnovisherskogo raiona v pervom polugoda 1997 goda. L.I. Zhuravlevich, Nachal'nik.* p4-6

Of the total sum of creditor debt, the paper firm 'Visherabumprom' owed half.

Debitor debt of enterprises and organisations in Krasnovisherskii *raion* came to 55 bn R, the main part being owed by buyers. Creditor debt exceeded debitor debt by a factor of 3.5, with enterprises owing far more than was owed to them. A considerable part of both creditor and debitor debt was overdue. Figures 2.31 and 2.32 illustrate the magnitude of these debts.[90]

[89] Krasnovisherskii *raion* Administration Department of Statistics (10.7.1997) *Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Krasnovisherskogo raiona v pervom polugoda 1997 goda.* L.I. Zhuravlevich, *(Nachal'nik)*, p4-6

[90] ibid., p4-6

Figure 2.30
Budget of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1995




Figure 2.31
Excess of creditor debt over debitor debt in enterprises of Krasnovisherskii Raion, 1996





Figure 2.32
Excess of creditor debt over debitor debt in enterprises of Krasnovisherskii Raion, January-July 1997



2.5 Economic Marginalisation

The economic profiles of Krasnovisherskii *raion*, and the KPAO and Kosinskii *raion* share the major characteristics of huge debt, and falling production, and the inevitable consequences of such conditions include the non-payment of wages, hidden unemployment, and rising registered unemployment. Bankruptcy and debt of enterprises reduces their capacity to pay employees, who in turn are faced with rising prices for commodities. In conjunction with reduced levels of services to the population, these factors combine to lower living standards for the inhabitants of these areas, and to accentuate the process of economic marginalisation.

The consumer market is a good indicator of these problems. Between January and June 1997, the total volume of retail trade (including that amongst enterprises) in Krasnovisherskii *raion* was 36.5 bn R, a decline, in real prices, since 1996 of 2%. Considering the fact that trade prices increased in the first six months of 1997 in comparison with the corresponding period of 1996 by a factor of 1.2, the physical volume of turnover actually fell by 17%. In the structure of retail turnover, the largest sector was that of food products (80%). Between 1995 and 1997 the importance of food products had annually increased by 2%, and the importance of non-food products had fallen accordingly, demonstrating some reduction in purchasing power, and that the population were spending more of their income on food.[91]

[91] ibid., p4-6

In conjunction with rising prices, the income of inhabitants of Krasnovisherskii *raion* was unreliable. The majority of enterprises in the *raion* in 1995 were small-scale, only three had a total annual production of more than one billion rubles (1995 prices), and only 6 had a workforce exceeding 200. Most concerning was the fact that about 80% of the settlements of the *raion* depended upon monopoly employers, especially forestry enterprises[92]. In 1995, a number of villages had become centres of concentrated unemployment, for example, villages of Vaiiskii sel'soviet (8.1% unemployed). By July 1st 1997, the total number of people officially registered unemployed was 854, of whom 46% lived in rural areas.[93]

Even those people officially employed did not necessarily receive wages. Although the average wage of the *raion* in July 1997 was 822,000 rubles per month, 2.2 times higher than the oblast Committee for Statistics Subsistence Wage of 376,500 rubles, in many cases, especially in industrial enterprises, although wages were calculated, they were rarely paid[94].

Debts of enterprises for non-payment of wages were already high in Krasnovisherskii *raion* by 1994, then totalling 929 million rubles. By July 1st 1997 this figure had risen very steeply. Amongst all enterprises, the total non-payment of wages was 10.4 bn R. Especially large, both in sum and duration, were the debts owed to their employees by joint-stock companies 'Visherabumprom' (5.6 bn R), and forestry enterprises 'Taiga' (1.1 bn R). The debt owed by 'Visherabumprom' on

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[92] ibid., p6

[93] ibid., and *Permskii Oblastnoi Tsentr Zanyatosti Naseleniya . Krasnovisherskii raion Tsentr zanyatosti naseleniye.*(1996) *Otchet o deyatel'nosti Tsentra zanyatosti naseleniya Krasnovisherskogo raiona. g.Krasnovishersk*, p1-4

January 1st 1997 was 3.1 bn R; the debt therefore had therefore grown by 2.5 bn R over just six months. In 1996, some enterprises had not paid their employees since 1995. There was resultant tension in the labour market, especially over the issue of hidden unemployment, which was to some degree holding in check the actual liberation of the workforce. Incomplete working days and weeks, and enforced unpaid holidays were both symptomatic and causative of financial difficulties and insolvency in enterprises. In early 1996 the administration of the *raion* began to take a certain degree of control over the activities of industrialists, with the effect of releasing employees. The resultant instability and loss of employment did serve to restock the labour market in 1996, and led to an increase in the number of people seeking work. By July 1996 the employment centre of Krasnovisherskii *raion* had 1194 people registered as unemployed, in comparison with 638 in the same period of 1995.[95]

Table 2.12 shows the average wages paid in Perm' oblast as whole, in the town of Krasnovishersk, and in Kosinskii *raion*, from 1990 to 1997, and the figures show that while the town of Krasnovishersk, which houses the employees in Uralalmaz, the diamond enterprise, has kept pace with the Perm' oblast average figure, Kosinskii *raion* has slipped way behind, with the 1997 figure less than half of the oblast average.

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[94] Krasnovisherskii *raion* Administration Department of Statistics (10.7.1997) *Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Krasnovisherskogo raiona v pervom polugoda 1997 goda* , p1-4

[95] ibid., p3

Table 2.12 Average wages paid in Perm' oblast, the town of Krasnovishersk, and Kosinskii *raion*, 1990-1997, in rubles.

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Perm' oblast	278	541	6393	58762	206157	470356	791071	1023946
Krasnovishersk	261	512	7290	61429	209886	492123	767595	1114961
Kosinskii *raion*	222	371	3149	39179	121406	247138	454659	492174

Source : *Goskomstat Rossii. Permskii oblastnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki (1998) Osnoviye Pokazateli Razvitiya gorodov i raionov Permskoi oblasti. Perm' 1998* p83

2.6 Social, Political and Cultural Marginalisation

Falling service provision is an indicator of economic marginalisation, but it has wider implications. In the north of Perm' oblast as a whole, the level of service provision to the population is low. In Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the number of schools has fallen from 26 in 1991 to 23 in 1997, with all of the school closures occurring in rural areas. In Kosinskii *raion*, one of the 20 schools in the *raion* closed in 1997. There is a similar picture in Cherdinskii and Gainskii *raioni*, where the number of rural schools has also fallen. Table 2.13 illustrates the decrease.

Table 2.13 Decrease in the number of rural schools in four northern *raioni* of Perm' oblast 1991-1997

	Number of Rural Schools						
Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Kosinskii *raion* (KPAO)	20	20	20	20	20	20	19
Gainskii *raion* (KPAO)	28	28	27	27	27	26	26
Krasnovisherskii *raion*	20	19	18	17	17	17	17
Cherdinskii *raion*	44	44	40	38	38	37	37

Source : *Gosudarstvennaya Statisticheskaya Otchetnost' Svodnii Otchet. Dnevnii Obshcheobrazovatel'nikh shkol 1991-1997* Perm' oblast Administration Department of Education, Director Anna Vasilievna Goncharova. Compiled from unpublished annual reports in the Department of Education, Perm' oblast.

Closure of schools, and the loss of specialist teachers, who have the ability to work elsewhere and hence to leave the villages, is a cause of social and cultural marginalisation. Children taught at these schools often do not have the opportunity to learn a foreign language, and are therefore placed at a distinct disadvantage should they wish to apply to University. This limitation of the potential achievements of schoolchildren is a form of social marginalisation. An additional problem is that the complete lack of tuition in music or art, the lack of opportunity to learn to play a musical instrument, for example, and the lack of adequate sports facilities in schools limit the cultural development of children. Another side to the story is that the specialist schoolteachers tend to be the better-educated inhabitants of the villages, who have often travelled to a city to study at University, and who have a broader view of the world outside the village. If they leave, the village as a whole suffers a social and cultural loss, in addition to the problems of outside contacts, detailed in Chapter 6.

In terms of political marginality, the villagers I spoke to described their feelings of isolation, of not being a part of the political changes taking place in Russia. They felt that Moscow and Boris Yeltsin were almost in another world, and that their own opinions carried little weight. Indeed, in terms of the local government of both *raioni*, the personnel in charge have changed hardly at all since Soviet days. It was my distinct impression that the people I spoke with in the north of Perm' oblast did not feel a part of the post-Soviet transition, whatever it is understood to be.

Economic stagnation has brought the closure of a number of village shops, and the bankruptcy and subsequent liquidation of river and air communication, and a sharp curtailment of bus services. The road through Krasnovishersk to Vaya and Vels, and its bridges, has still not been repaired since its closure due to damage in the floods of 1993. Telephone services to the northern villages are at best sporadic.

The static indices described above give an indication of the economic marginalisation of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*. Kosinskii *raion* was a successful timbercutting area until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, its forestry enterprises have suffered falling production levels and large debts. Wages have been left unpaid and living standards have fallen. Although the same can be said of Krasnovisherskii *raion*, there are some very different circumstances. Krasnovisherskii *raion* is very rich in valuable mineral resources; 'Uralalmaz' (Ural Diamonds) is a major source of income for the *raion*. Although the former employees of the forestry sector in both *raioni* are facing similar personal circumstances, it would appear that the *raion*-level prospects are different. For example, in Krasnovisherskii *raion* in 1996 there were 35 independent small businesses, employing a total of 323 people. The total production of these enterprises was 15,809 million rubles in 1996, a profit of 658 million rubles, and their total tax revenue, paid

to the federal, oblast' and local budgets, amounted to 783.4 million rubles[96]. Such conditions of small business growth are not being experienced in Kosinskii *raion.*

Smith and Pickles (1998) write that the turn to formally marketised and democratic systems in the Russian Federation has led to a reworking of the geographies of the region, in the forms of metropolitan growth, the economic collapse of peripheral regions, and an increase in inequality and poverty.

> Uneven development is reworking the sub-national space economies of post-communism. We are witnessing the emergence of regionally differentiated transitions in which the dynamics of regional decline and growth play out in particular time-space contexts. A set of marginalised regional economies is increasingly 'left behind' in the process of capitalist restructuring as enterprise decline and closure pave the way for the emergence of regions of mass unemployment.[97]

The north of Perm' oblast is an area which, under the impact of the processes of transition, has become one of these 'marginalised regional economies'. The static indices presented in this chapter give an indication of the marginalisation taking place, and the following chapters deal with the processes which have led to this situation.

2.6 Summary

The key issues raised in Chapters 1 and 2 are that 'transition' is not a one-way, homogeneous process, and that the processes of economic and social marginalisation discussed in this chapter are central to an understanding of the way in which transition is being experienced in the study area. In the following chapters this

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[96] Krasnovisherskii *raion* Administration Department of Statistics (10.7.1997) *Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoye Polozheniye Krasnovisherskom raiona v pervom polugoda 1997 goda.* , (30.1.1997) *Zemskogo Sobraniya Krasnovisherskogo raiona Permskoi Oblast.* V.I.Polkhovnikov, p1-4, and Krasnovisherskii *raion* Administration Department of Economics Paper *v sootvetstvii s Zakonom*

thesis aims to expand upon these key issues, through research into the conditions in the study region in 1991, and the changes in the post-Soviet period, and following on from this, the responses of the inhabitants of the area, in terms of population movement, and survival strategies in the villags themselves.

The north of Perm' oblast is an example of a region which is not undergoing transition in the same way as areas closer to the 'core' of Russia, and in which it is apparent that the 'contingencies' of Soviet socialism, such as the history of settlement of the area, and the development of forestry, which led to the conditions at the eve of transition, are crucial to the understanding of the experience of transition. I would argue that in this area, transition is by no means a one-way, clearcut, unidirectional change from communism to capitalism – the work of Pickles and Smith (1998) and of Bradshaw (1997), as described in the previous chapter, is of most relevance. This study contributes to the understanding of regional change in the Russian Federation during transition, and is located within the branch of transition theory which contests the assertion that transition is inevitable, one-way and homogeneous.

> The processes of decentralisation and regionalisation, which accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union, are now dominant forces in Russia's political economy. Regions....are themselves increasingly seen as important political and economic actors. Thus, one of the key tasks for post-Soviet geography and economics is to try to explain regional patterns of economic change across the Russian Federation.[98]

Permskoi Oblasti "O gosudarstvennoi podderzhkye malogo predprinimatel'stva na territorii Permskoi oblasti". N.I. Klementev, Economist

[97] Smith & Pickles, 1998, p17

[98] Bradshaw, Stenning & Sutherland, 1998, p147

Chapter 3 Settling the Margin – the north of Perm' oblast in Context

3.1 The Komi-Permyak and the Early population of the north of Perm' oblast

3.2 Pre-Revolutionary settlement of the North

3.3 After the 1917 Revolution: The Russian North and Soviet Planning

3.4 Forced Labour in the Five-Year Plans

3.5 Voluntary Migration to the North

3.6 Soviet Settlement of the North; the north of Perm' oblast

3.7 The ethnic composition of the population of the north of Perm' oblast

3.8 Summary

3 Settling the Margin – the north of Perm' oblast in Context

3.1 The Komi-Permyak and the early population of the north of Perm' oblast.
3.2 Pre-Revolutionary Settlement of the North
3.3 After the 1917 Revolution: The Russian North and Soviet Planning
3.4 Forced labour in the Five-Year Plans
3.5 Voluntary Migration to the North
3.6 Soviet Settlement of the North: the north of Perm' oblast
3.7 The ethnic composition of the population of the north of Perm' oblast.
3.8 Summary

As discussed earlier, in order to understand the conditions upon which the post-Soviet transition is impacting, and, therefore, to understand the process of marginalisation in the north of Perm' oblast, it is necessary to understand the history of settlement and development of the area, and since it lies at the southern margin of the area defined as 'North', and shares a history of forced and incentive-led settlement with this area, it is necessary to present that history with reference to the story of the North as a whole.

The history of the settlement of the north of Perm' oblast is closely tied to the Soviet development of forestry in the area; the people who were moved here were relocated as a labour force for the forestry industry, and therefore this chapter and the one following are two sides of the same story. While this chapter deals with the settlement of the population, the location of their villages, the organisation of the transfer of population and the experience of dekulakisation, the following chapter relates to the organisation of the forestry industry itself, the *lespromkhozi* and the role of the north' of Perm oblast as a part of the Urals Economic Region, although there will inevitably be some overlap between the two.

3.1 The Komi-Permyak and the early population of the north of Perm' oblast.

Whatever the policies of the Soviet government regarding settlement of the north of Perm' oblast, they were not dealing with an uninhabited area[99], particularly in Kosinskii *raion*, where there had long been Komi-Permian people, closely associated with, but different from, the Komi people immediately to the north. In fact, some children in Solym today, ('salty snow' in Komi-Permian) the study village in Kosinskii *raion*, still describe themselves as Komi-Permyak rather than Russian.

The Komi (Zyriane or Zyrian) people have inhabited the European North East of Russia since ancient times. Komi groups first appeared in the Vychegda River basin in the first millennium AD. Over the following centuries, they spread into the Pechora River basin, and the northernmost groups, who adopted reindeer husbandry from the Nentsy, spread with their herds as far as the shores of the Arctic Ocean. At present, the main body of the Komi, numbering about 300,000, occupies the territory of the Komi Republic of the Former USSR. The Komi language belongs to the Finno-Ugric linguistic family[100].

The Komi-Permians, related to the Komi, are inhabitants of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug (KPAO), and occupy a land called *'Parma'*, which in Komi means 'wooded upland'. Villages and small towns in the area bear the names of *Chud'* princes. The *Chud'* people lived in the Ural foothills and alongside the Kama River, and their name is believed to originate from the word used by east Slavs to

[99] The population of Kosinskii *raion* in 1910 was 9,123, that of Krasnovisherskii *raion* 8,095.

describe the Ugro-Finnic people of North Europe. The Slavs called them 'strange' because their customs were different from their own. The word for strange was *'chudnye'*, so the ancestors of contemporary Estonians, Karelians, Udmurts, Komi and Komi-Permians, were the *Chud'*. Originally, Komi-Permian tribes occupied a vast area, from Lake Chusovskoye in the north to the Chusovaya River in the south. The early settlements emerged in the 17th century as centres of ancient tribes. A traditional Komi-Permian story relates

> The Chud' prince, Kudym-Osh, built a new *ker* (settlement), supplied his *uvtyr* (clan) with grain, and armed his fighting troops. On his deathbed, he told his subjects "Don't sit waiting for your fortune, go and find it yourselves...and never go to war with your neighbours, make friends with them".

The 'Great Perm'' area (that inhabited by Komi-Permians), traded with Trans-Urals tribes, the Novgorod Land, and the Volga Bulgarians, and, via Novgorod and Southern neighbours, with the West. It sent furs to the Middle East in return for fabrics, gold and silver.

The banks of the Kama River gradually became inhabited by settlers from the north, Russian peasants, members of the Turkic communities, and Komi-kindred groups such as Udmurts, Mordovians and Mari. Between 1472 and 1505 the Komi-Permyak were converted by force into Russian Orthodoxy, and became subject to the Grand Duchy of Moscow, as the lands of Great Perm' were officially incorporated into the Russian state. An inflow of Russians began in the 16th century, increasing after the accession of the Kazan' Khanate and the opening of convenient routes to the Urals and Siberia, with the Permyak areas becoming the base for the Russian conquest of Siberia and stopover for colonisation. The Permyak themselves

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[100] Konakov, 1993 p92-102

mainly retreated from the pressure of the advancing colonists, although some of them joined the wave of settlers. Ivan the Terrible granted some of the Kama lands to the Stroganovs, the merchants and manufacturers, and the southern Komi-Permians became enserfed, leading to peasant destitution and enforced agricultural and manual labour. In 1861, in In'ven *volost'*, a small rural district, serfs refused to form a convoy to haul barges upstream on the Volga to Nizhniy Novgorod, under the orders of the Stroganovs. The peasant riot was suppressed, some rebels killed, and hundreds of inhabitants of what was later to become a region of exile, were sent to Siberia.[101]

The first recorded settlement in Kosinskii *raion* was Chazevo, centre of Chazevskii *sel'soviet*, founded in the 1560s, and later, the *raion* centre of Kosa was founded on the banks of the river of the same name in 1623. Settlements continued to spring up in the *volosti*, a few in the 17th century (such as Puksib', [1623], and Bachmanovo [1620]), then more in the 18th century, (Selishye, Chirkovo, Andronovo, Poroshevo and others, mainly in the 1760s and 1770s). In the 19th century the trend continued, with Pidosovo and Demidovo in the 1820s, and Dederui and Shalam in the second half of the century.

By 1890, the population of the pre-Revolutionary *volosti* which were later to make up Kosinskii *raion* (Kosinskaya *volost'*, the village of Krivtsi in Gainskaya *volost'*, and the villages of Chazevo, Pod'yacheva, Karchoi and Pekla'iv in Yuse'evskaya *volost'*) was 5896, and by 1914 it had risen to at least 9123 (data for some of the villages are missing).

[101] Heinapuu, A. (Ed.)(1999) The Endangered Uralic Peoples, a short reference guide. http://www.suri.ee/eup/permyak.html 15.2.1999

In Krasnovisherskii *raion*, not a part of the Komi-Permian area, the picture was similar. There were settlements recorded, in the *volosti* that were later to make up the *raion*, as early as 1579, such as Arefina, Gubdor and Nemzya, and others, such as Bakhari, Morchani, Sipuchi, Vels, Ust-Shugor, Rotegovo and Savino grew up during the next two centuries. In 1890 the population of the *volosti* was 6882, rising to 8095 by 1910[102].

3.2 Pre-Revolutionary Settlement of the North

The image of the Russian North, especially Siberia, which commonly springs to mind is that of a huge penal settlement, a remote place of banishment for Russia's criminals and political dissenters. This reputation is to some degree deserved, since from the time of Ivan the Terrible to the Stalinist 1930s and beyond, millions have been exiled there. The growth of exile went hand in hand with Russia's conquest and consolidation of power over the region, and as early as the 17th century it was already well established as a central feature of the Tsarist penal system. However, exiles and deportees accounted for a very small proportion of the population (just 6% in the 19th century) and of those, just 1% was political exiles.

During the first quarter of the 18th century, the number of exiles diminished as Peter the Great preferred to redirect convict labour into military and civilian projects in European Russia. However, during the second half of the century figures began to increase, for two main reasons. Firstly, Empress Elizabeth's

[102] *Sbornik' Statisticheskii Svedenii po Cherdinskomu uyezdu, Permskoi Gubernii Otdel' Khozyaistvennoi Statistiki.* Perm' 1889

abolition of the death penalty in 1753 resulted in many criminals who would otherwise have been executed being sent to Siberia for life. Secondly, her decree of 1760 granted the serf-owning nobility the right to hand over their insubordinate or unproductive peasants to the state authorities for settlement in Siberia. The primary purpose of the legislation was to colonise and provide labour, but the huge discrepancy between the numbers involved and the supervisory, transport, distribution, settlement and supply networks, ensured disaster. As Wood (1987) writes "The system was chaotic, corrupt and calamitous". The practice of punitive banishment to Siberia for both criminal and political offences continued until 1917, when it was formally abolished by the Provisional Government. But, during the first two decades of Soviet rule, the North continued to absorb exiles.

Although Siberia acquired a reputation as a 'vast, roofless prison', to many people it simultaneously represented a land of escape and freedom from the constraints of serfdom, officialdom and religious persecution in European Russia. Towards the end of the 19th century, the combined effects of the abolition of serfdom, a population explosion and the consequent land shortage in the central provinces, together with the construction of the Trans-Siberian rail link, enabled settlement and development of the region[103].

3.3 After the 1917 Revolution: The Russian North and Soviet Planning

The new Soviet government had a commitment to eliminating

Krivoshchekob', I.Y. (1914) *Slovar' Geograficheskо-Statisticheskii Cherdinskago Uyezda, Permskoi Gubernii. Izdabiye Cherdinskago Uyezdanago Zemstva. Trud'* : Perm'

[103] Wood, 1987, p181-184

disproportions in levels of development between regions of the country, an aim that related to the economic structure of the regions and to a number of social and cultural indices. In pursuing the objective of equalising regional economic development, various strategies were followed, including, in the 1930s and 1940s, the redistribution of all elements of production, including labour, between regions, and at other times, through developing economic specialisation in the regions.

Through central planning, the Soviet Union had at its disposal means not available to planners in the capitalist West; in the USSR, investment resources, and also labour, could be transferred between different regions of the country, and the unified state budget allowed central planners to redistribute income between regions as an aid to development[104]. As Schiffer (1989) writes, the regional economic policy of the USSR advocated the equalisation of economic development between regions, and the location of production in such a way as to eliminate the social and economic differences between rural and urban areas.

In the early years of Soviet power, differences between the developed core of European Russia, and the peripheral regions, such as the North, were striking, highlighting a national economy with significant regional disparities. Policies and programmes of action were put in place to effect change in the distribution of economic activity.

During the Soviet period, the settlement of the North drew upon two policy objectives; the rapid industrialisation of Russia, involving the exploitation of

[104] Pallot & Shaw, 1981, p55-57

natural resources in the North, and the repression or liquidation of entire classes considered to be fundamentally antagonistic to the ideas and methods of Communism.

As part of one of these objectives, in December 1917, Lenin called for a 'purge of the Russian land from all vermin', by which he meant the 'idle rich', 'priests', 'bureaucrats' and 'slovenly and hysterical intellectuals', and in 1918, on his orders, labour camps were opened, the direct descendants of which were utilised during Stalin's Terror, although their nature and function had changed somewhat by then. For much of the 1920s, socialists in prison and isolators had enjoyed the status of 'politicals', and had not been required to do forced labour. The same did not apply to criminals, 'former classes' and 'counterrevolutionary elements' who had to do manual work at least to maintain their camps and prisons.

Conquest (1968) writes that camps seem to have been in existence as early as mid-1918, before the decrees legalising them were passed (in September 1918 and April 1919). The first camp seems to have been at Kholmogori, near Archangel, in 1921. Sixty-five concentration camps were administered by the main Administration of Forced Labour in 1922, and in October of that year this Administration was merged with the Corrective Labour Section of the Commissariat of Justice, and the whole brought under the NKVD (the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) as the Main Administration of Places of Detention. The first great camps were in the Solovetsky Islands in the Far North. In this area, in Tsarist times, the monks of the oldest traditions of isolation had lived, and when the camps were set up, some of the monks were retained to teach the convicts how to operate the

fisheries. In Perm' oblast, the first labour camps were set up in the 1920s, for 'labour deserters' during War Communism.

At the beginning of the Soviet period, the second objective also came into play. Once the Soviet government had established itself firmly and had overcome the more urgent problems it faced, to the point where it had the opportunity to contemplate the whole of its northern territory, it was relatively consistent in its view of the use it expected to make of the North. In words attributed to Stalin by a Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in 1936

> The Arctic and our northern regions have colossal wealth. We must create a Soviet organisation which can in the shortest period include this wealth in the general resources of our socialist structure.

In this, Stalin was following Lenin's ideas. The main emphasis was on the economic exploitation of the North. Since the mid-1930s strategic aims also exerted an influence on the development of the North, but in totalitarian states strategic and economic influences can be treated as different sides of the same coin. For example, secrecy has surrounded certain economic information. Another motive, which was certainly present, was the desire to re-educate the northern peoples in the principles of Marxism-Leninism. But, although strategic and ideological influences have always been of significance in the Russian North, their importance as a factor affecting settlement has not been as great as that of other forms of Soviet policy. As Amundsen (1990) writes, the North had geostrategic significance in World War II, both as a base for naval offensives and for land-based attacks. The North was seen as a protective buffer between East and West, and it played a crucial role in the political and strategic interrelationship between events at sea and on land, especially through the Baltic bases and those on the Barents Sea.

The Soviet administration showed great interest in the North primarily for the practical use that could be made of it. The increasing need for industrial and military strength concentrated attention on the mineral wealth located there. Most other activities, such as transport and agriculture, were regarded as largely complementary to the extractive industries. To implement this policy, the government had to tackle a number of problems, of which the most important were the provision of a labour force, development of building techniques, and the supply of food. Regarding the problem of labour supply, the guiding principle for the Soviet government was that there should be no movement of settlers that was not centrally planned. They devised three approaches to the problem; compulsion, an appeal to young people to go out to remote areas as their contribution to the building of Communism, and a third approach, complementary to the second, of offering incentives[105].

The Soviet settlement of the Russian North was built around the major extractive industries. Before 1917 there were two mining areas in the North, both for gold, in the Yenisey basin and the Lena basin. Both continued to exist, although the importance of the Yenisey goldfields declined, but both were overshadowed by a number of larger and more important mining developments, which grew up at widely separated points. Seen as a whole, these developments represent the most important activity taking place in the Soviet North, and the activity attracting the most settlers.

[105] Armstrong, 1965 p128-153

Extractive industries were developed from the 1920s onwards in Murmansk oblast, Pechenga, the Pechora coalfields, the lower Yenisey, Noril'sk, and the Yakut ASSR, amongst other areas, mining gold, apatite (for fertilisers), nickel, platinum, and other minerals required by the state. *Dal'stroy,* the Chief Administration for Construction in the Far North (*Glavnoye Upravleniye Stoitel'stva Dal'nego Severa*) ran the goldmines in Kolyma, using a huge convict labour force.

The total mining population in the Soviet Union in the 1960s was clearly hundreds of thousands of people, and may have been between half a million and a million.

Whilst extractive industries caused the growth of settlements, none of the mines could have transformed the North to such an extent without an effective transport system, and the development of the transport network itself became a growth pole for population. The biggest installations of the transport network were the seaports. The main western base of the Northern Sea route (the shipping lane along the north coast of Siberia) was at Murmansk, which was also a port of great national significance, being the only major outlet to the sea which never freezes. In addition to the seaports, which must have employed 100,000 in total, there was river transport, and rail and road transport, in which the workforce was smaller. By the 1960s, there were only three short railway lines in the north. The most important was the Murmansk line, running south towards St.Petersburg, which made it possible to exploit the minerals in the centre of the peninsula, and its numerous stations required a large labour force. An extension of the line to Pechenga was opened in 1960, but the whole line only ran for 500km through the north. The other two lines were

shorter; the northern part of the Pechora railway to Vorkuta coal mines, completed in 1942, and its extension to Labytnangi at the mouth of the Ob' completed in about 1950; and the short line from Dudinka to Noril'sk, completed in 1937 and with no connection to the national network. Although there was a large network of roads, larger than that of rail lines, it was still meagre in comparison with the rest of the country[106].

3.4 Forced Labour in the Five Year Plans

By the late 1920s, the two objectives of Soviet policy towards the North; economic development, and the repression of certain groups of the population, were working together. The Soviet State began to seek labour in camps; at a conference of prison officials held in October 1929, the conclusion was that local conditions sometimes presented serious obstacles to the recruitment of labour, and that it was the places of confinement, having at their disposal excess labour in great quantities that could come to the assistance of those economic enterprises which experienced a labour shortage.

The development of a force of very cheap labour, which could be directed to work anywhere, was of the greatest use in implementing the Five-Year Plans in the Soviet Union. When the first Five-Year Plan became law in 1928, it was considered natural and necessary that prison labour should be placed at the service of general industrialisation, but it was not anticipated that it would attain any significant proportions in the overall picture. A decree appeared on March 26th 1928,

[106] ibid.

prescribing 'a greater use of penal labour'. Its intention was to bring about the realisation of a series of economic projects with great savings in expenditures by means of widespread use of labour of individuals sentenced to measures of social protection.[107]

In July of 1928, the Commissariat of Justice ordered the introduction of compulsory labour for all able-bodied prisoners, and in January of the following year, the government let it be known that all persons and institutions failing to comply with these instructions would be punished. A measure was adopted in April 1930 to ensure that all persons sentenced to three years or more must serve their terms in corrective labour camps, which became the basic and prevalent type of places of confinement in the USSR (Dallin & Nicolaevsky, 1948). In 1930, *GosPlan* received instructions 'to incorporate the work performed by those deprived of liberty into the planned economy of the country'. A special department of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, *GULag*, or the Chief Administration of Camps, was established to run the new convict enterprises[108].

The statute on corrective labour camps which governed the later period was adopted on April 7th, 1930. The camps took their later form at a time of great expansion of the network. Estimates of camp population are 30,000 in 1928, over 600,000 in 1930, and nearly 2 million by 1931-32. Labour camps played a very important part in the settlement of the North, and during the 1930s, there was a great deal of expansion in the camp network. The 'Penal Empire', of the vast empty spaces of the North, came under the control of the NKVD (which had superseded the OGPU

[107] Hosking, 1992
[108] Hosking, 1992

in 1934). There were many camps scattered through the Urals, in the Archangel area, and especially in and around Karaganda and on the new railway being built from Turkestan to Siberia. In these areas, the NKVD administered only comparatively small enclaves; its two major colonies were the great stretch of northwest Russia, roughly comprising the area of the current Komi Republic, and the even vaster area of the Far East, centred on the gold fields of Kolyma. Before the NKVD took over, these regions had had a population of a few Russians and a few thousand indigenous inhabitants, but a decade later, the two regions held between 1.25 and 2 million prisoners. The area in the north east of European Russia, administered by the NKVD, was called Pechora, and it ran the notorious Kolyma close for isolation, cold and death. Between Kotlas, the gateway to the region (south west of the Komi Republic), and the Vorkuta coal mining district (in the Komi northeast), lay the single largest concentration of forced labour in Russia, with over one million prisoners[109].

The camp network expanded during the early 1930s, and some of the expansion took place in the area of the North Urals. By 1947 there were camps throughout northwest and northeast Russia, Central European, South European, and East European Russia, the Urals, West Siberia, Central Asia, North Central Siberia, East Siberia, and the Far East. In North East Russia, there were camps in Pechora (the Komi Republic) with headquarters at Ust-Kozhva, the Northern Railroad Camps, in charge of the Kotlas-Vorkuta railway, at Vorkuta, at Ukhta, Ust-Usa and Izhma in the Komi republic, also the Ust-Vym, Vychegda and Vishera Camps, the Usol Camps in Molotov Region (now Perm' region), with headquarters at Solikamsk, just south of Krasnovisherskii *raion*.

[109] Dallin & Nicolaevsky, 1948 p206-216

Corrective labour camps constituted a revival of the old Russian system of penal servitude, but they were only a part of the whole picture. Two milder forms of punishment were reminiscent of the pre-Revolutionary practice of exile, although the Soviet forms were on such proportions that no real parallel could be drawn. "Exile" basically means the assignment of a certain locality for residence to a selected person; usually such a locality is a small town in a distant region. In effect, the ancient system of exile underwent profound change during the first twenty years after 1928, with the result that it became more similar to penal labour. The Soviet courts and the OGPU had used banishment and exile since the early 1920s. "Banishment" left the exiled person with a limited choice to select a place of residence elsewhere in the country other than the place from which they were being sent, whereas exile meant compulsory residence in a specific locality. Before 1930 these measures had been equivalent to true exile, in that they had permitted a certain degree of freedom for the individual within a prescribed area. In January 1930, an attempt was made, through a new law, to introduce greater severity, and to provide that places of deportation be located in distant, unsettled regions. At the same time, another form of exile was becoming prevalent, that of forcible 'resettlement' of large numbers of the population who were considered either inimical or dangerous where they originally lived. Exile of such people became a standard form of forced labour[110]. One example of this process was the 'dekulakisation' of the early 1930s.

In December 1929, Stalin made a speech, which contained an attack on the kulaks;

> Either we go backward, to capitalism, or we go forward, to socialism.... What does that mean? It means that we have passed on from a policy of

[110] ibid.

limiting the exploitative tendencies of kulaks to a policy of *liquidating* the kulaks as a class.

Having decided that there was no certain means of extorting food from the better-off peasants who were best able to produce it, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) decided simply to eliminate them from the villages, and to put their property at the disposal of the new collective farms. The label 'kulak' was applied to anyone who was suspected of resisting the grain deliveries or of being unwilling to join the new collective farms. Usually, the suspected 'kulak' was summoned to the *sel'soviet* and interrogated, after which a requisition team, led by a local 'poor' peasant would visit his house and search it, confiscating food and anything else considered valuable to the collective. Many households drank vodka, sold belongings and slaughtered livestock to prevent them being seized. After requisition, many kulak families were gathered together for deportation. Some were exiled within their own *raioni*, but others were marched to the nearest railway station, loaded onto cattle trucks, and transported thousands of miles, to Siberia, the Urals, or North European Russia. Many were sent direct to labour camps, to join the huge contingent of convicts. It is unclear how many people were 'dekulakised', but estimates put the figure at between 5 and 10 million.[111]

'Dekulakisation' of the early 1930s aimed to 'eradicate' every vestige of the kulak in the Russian village. This group of exiles was termed 'special settlers' or even 'voluntary migrants'. The aim of the resettlement was twofold; to purge the villages of the kulaks and to simultaneously populate the vast empty spaces of Russia. Following the period of dekulakisation and its deportations, whenever the 'socialist

[111] Hosking, 1992

offensive' was intensified, 'settlers' arrived in the North. Members of suspicious nationalities or inhabitants of border areas were moved great distances, and after the outbreak of war in 1939, deportations were stepped up. A minority of the people affected was sent to labour camps; the majority was resettled in remote regions as 'special settlers'. Between 1943 and 1945, four national territorial units were liquidated and part of their populations deported. In general, the areas designated as recipients of resettled people were not prepared for so large and rapid an influx of people, and the deportees had to build their own settlements, or use abandoned slum buildings. Many migrants had to start their new lives in the open, in the sands of Central Asia, or, as in the case of people deported to the area of the north of Perm' oblast, in the northern forests[112].

By the late 1930s and early 1940s, forced labour was playing a large part in the economic development of the USSR. In 1941, it was planned that the NKVD should undertake 14% of construction work, a larger share than any other ministry, and also a large proportion of lumbering and mining[113].

There was also an ethnic dimension to deportations. The Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans were moved from their homes during the 1940s, as a response to the threat from Nazi Germany. One of the areas which received them was the north of Perm' oblast. The major deportations of Volga Germans took place from the Crimea and Black Sea area (initially to the North Caucasus) in August 1941, from the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia in October 1941, and, after a road had been made across the frozen Lake Ladoga, from Leningrad and the surrounding area in March 1942. The deportation decree was published, dated August 28th 1941, and it

[112] Dallin & Nicolaevsky, 1948 p206-216
[113] Armstrong, 1965, p147-150

announced the 'transfer' to Novosibirsk and Omsk provinces, the Altai, Kazakhstan and other neighbouring localities, saying that it was a precautionary measure in view of the fact that none of the Germans had reported on the presence in their midst of tens of thousands of diversionists and spies ready to engage in sabotage at a signal from Germany. The Volga German ASSR and all seventeen German National Districts were abolished. It has been estimated that some 800,000 Soviet Germans were deported from European Russia in 1941-42, 400,000 from the Volga German Republic alone. Over 400,000 Germans were already living in the Asiatic part of the USSR, including those who had been deported during collectivisation and the purges, and those in forced labour camps. The deportations were officially a 'transfer' or 'evacuation'; the Germans were warned, and were allowed to make preparations, but the journey in cattle cars took its toll on the very young, very old, and the sick.

The majority of the deportees were taken to Siberia, and Northern Kazakhstan, and all the Germans, including those already resident in Siberia, were put under the same restrictions. The local living conditions were generally poor and the rations inadequate. After helping with the 1941 harvest, the men were drafted into the labour army and sent to various parts of Siberia, the Urals and Far North, to work on railways, on road construction, in the coalmines and in timber felling.

As for the Germans in occupied territory, when the German Nazi Army took the upper hand, they were evacuated to Poland, and granted German citizenship. Later they fled before the Red Army to Germany proper. The Soviet government did not recognise their German citizenship, and, under an allied agreement that all Soviet citizens should be repatriated, in 1945 250,000 of the estimated 350,000 Soviet

Germans who had reached Germany were transported back to the USSR, mainly to Siberia and the Komi region. There they were put into labour camps or into 'special settlements' like those deported during the war.

The Red Army offensive on the Crimea began on April 8th 1944, and by the 18th, only Sevastopol remained in German hands. On that day, the Crimean Tatars were roused and deported, several thousand miles to the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, Mainly to Uzbekistan. An estimated 200,000-250,000 were moved. Mortality rates were high - the Tatars later claimed that the mortality rates were higher in some deportation areas than others, for example in the Urals, where in some villages up to 100% of the newly arrived Crimean Tatars perished.[114]

The period during which the system of forced labour in the North was at its height appears to have been between 1929 and 1958. The special settlers (*spetsial'nyye pereselentsy*), the people deported to a given locality, and the inhabitants of the corrective labour camps, seem to have constituted the majority of forced labour. After this period, with the death of Stalin in 1953, came a change in policy. The central government still wished to exploit the resources of the North, and to settle it, but by using different means. The settlement of the Russian North became the objective of a series of measures aimed at making the North more attractive to increasingly voluntary migration, whilst at the same time scaling down the labour camp system, or Gulag Archipelago.

During the repressions of the Stalinist system, and the hardships of World War II, a great toll was taken on the Soviet population. A weakened industrial sector and armed forces were intolerable to the leaders of the USSR, and it was

[114] Minority Rights Group, 1980 p8, 19

decided that policy changes were necessary. In the late 1940s it had become apparent that the leaders were concerned about conditions in the labour camps, due to an extent to unrest amongst the *zeki*, and in 1948 the Gulag administration began to improve conditions in the camps, improving food supplies, increasing rations slightly, and introducing more meat and fat into the prison diet. For the first time, the *zeki* began to receive a small wage, and camp shops were opened. The authorities in individual camps were instructed to produce a report whenever a *zek* died, and perhaps as a consequence, the *zeki* began to be issued better clothing, and to be provided with medicine. The *zeki* therefore became better clothed, fed and cared for, and they became healthier as a result. However, there was also a move in 1948 to pick out serious 'political' offenders and isolate them in special strict regime camps, with harsher discipline, and fewer rights than before, and also with the proviso that at the end of their typically 25 year sentences, the *zeki* be detained in permanent exile near the camps rather than be allowed home. In 1948, the first rising about which much is known took place in Vorkuta, in the Komi ASSR, and after the death of Stalin in 1953, there were risings in Noril'sk, another in Vorkuta, Kengir (Kazakhstan) and others. During the late 1950s, streams of people were released from labour camps, under Khrushchev, who was by then in power[115]. The balance between forced labour and voluntary migration in the settlement of the Soviet North was shifting.

In Perm' oblast, there were several labour camps set up in the Stalinist period, many of which were still operational into the 1960s. In total, there were thirteen camps, not all of which were coexistent, one having been set up on the site of an earlier camp, and another having been renamed. In addition, two of the more

[115] Hosking, 1991




Figure 3.1

Map showing the Soviet Labour Camps located in the north of Perm' oblast.

short-lived camps had been created by being detached from larger pre-existing camps.[116] Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the camps. In the 1970s, Brezhnev took the decision to segregate the political prisoners, separating them from the ordinary prisoners, and Perm' oblast became the recipient for these political *zeki*, nationalists and dissidents from Ukraine and Moldova, who were imprisoned in camps near to Chusovoy.

3.5 Voluntary Migration to the North

After 1959, policies intended to influence migration in the USSR could be grouped under three main headings; wage differentials, organised recruitment and moral suasion. Regarding wage differentials, the state used a system of regional coefficients (*raionnye koeffisienty*) to raise wages in the least attractive regions, many of which were in the North[117]. Over a period of fifty years the Soviet Union developed a series of wage and material incentives to attract and retain labour in the harsh environments of Siberia, the Far East, and the European North of the USSR. Higher wage payments were in operation in the Soviet Union, in response to the labour shortages being experienced in the North. The very first compensatory payments had been made following a decree of May 10th 1932, which had introduced the concept of the northern increment (*severnaya nadbavka*). This was an incremental increase in wages, which normally built up over a five-year period, and thus fitted well with the Soviet five-year plans. It was combined with longer periods of annual

[116] *Obshchestvo "Memorial" Gosudarstvennii Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii. (1998) Systema ispravitel'no-trudovikh lagerei v SSSR 1923-60 Spravochnik. Moskva 1998*p184-185, 272-273, 275-276, 291-292, 297-298, 308, 340, 359, 451-452, 456, 491-493, 514.
[117] Grandstaff, 1980

leave entitlement, improved pension rights and privileges in housing. This incentive-led system was a counterbalance to the state-led labour migration of the 1930s. In 1945, a Soviet government decree provided for wage coefficients of between 15 and 100%, increasing progressively in a northern and eastern direction across Siberia and the European North. The highest coefficient was 2.0, that is, 100% addition to basic wages, which occurred in the extreme north-east of Soviet territory and on the islands in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. The effectiveness of such measures is illustrated by events in the 1960s. Khrushchev, the then Soviet premier, visited Vladivostock in October 1959, and remarked that improved living conditions and social amenities in Siberia and the European North ought to be incentive enough to encourage permanent settlement there. A decree effective from March 1960 downgraded the value of the northern increment, and reduced its incremental rate of build-up. The net effect was that a new migrant faced a possible eight-year wait before receiving the full benefit of the new incentives. Losses of population from Siberia during the following years were increased, and in 1967 the northern increments were restored to their former level[118].

The second method of attracting labour to the North was organised recruitment and resettling. The most important organisation involved was *Orgnabor*, the organised recruitment of labour force (*Organizovannoi Nabor Rabochei Sily*). Through the 1930s to the 1950s, *Orgnabor* had channelled rural labour into urban employment, and in the 1950s it recruited labour for construction projects in the remote sections of the country. By the 1960s, *Orgnabor* was recruiting only urban workers for non-seasonal construction and industrial work in the least developed parts of the Soviet Union. Its main function became the direction of labour into the remote,

[118] Sallnow, 1989 p188-207

sparsely settled eastern and northern regions, but it continued to recruit seasonal workers for fishing, peat cutting and lumbering. Whether *Orgnabor*'s activities constituted voluntary or compulsive resettlement is a contested issue. Soviet sources claim that the *Orgnabor* labour redistribution was voluntary, but at the same time they claim that it represented a planned redistribution of labour.

Thirdly, there was moral suasion. This was specifically designed to influence microeconomic decisions to migrate. The principal means was appeals by the Communist party and the state to individuals and groups to migrate to labour-deficient areas, and such appeals were based on the notion of every citizen's obligation to contribute to the development of Communism in the USSR. For example, Komsomol, the Communist youth movement, called for volunteers to work in the Virgin Lands in the 1950s, and about one million young people were sent to Siberia, the North, the Far East and Kazakhstan.

In summary, it can be said that state policy afforded sufficient freedom of conduct to workers between 1959 and 1970 such that their movements may be explained by labour market rationale. State policy in the 1960s sought to motivate workers to migrate to, and to some extent, settle in the North, through the three groups of policies outlined above. The policies fell short of being sufficiently effective, however, because, variously; wage differentials failed to compensate adequately for the additional costs of life at high latitudes, recruitment of workers through *Orgnabor* decreased through the 1960s, and the quality of workers enlisted, in the presence of relatively low real wage differentials, and the absence of coercion, was the subject of complaint. Moral suasion, for its part, was only selectively effective.

From the late 1960s onwards, the ability of the Soviet state to cause population movement diminished, and with it, its ability to effect settlement in the North by coercive means. The Soviet policy of full employment decreased the influence of regional changes of employment structure as a push or pull factor of migration, because a worker did not need to seek employment outside of his or her residential zone. The concept of each person having the right to work where they already lived was powerful. Therefore, in Soviet Russia, the ability to find employment became a constant, and other factors of migration varied and had a greater relative influence over migration than in other countries. The factors with the greatest influence over interregional flows of population than industrial employment included distance, investment levels and the service sector, i.e. the availability of goods and services[119]. To this end, the state continued to increase the standard of living in terms of goods and services available in the Russian North.

However, despite the 1947-1977 30 year policy to move people eastward from European Russia, the most noticeable shift had been to the south, whilst ideally, the population of the North should have been growing relative to the rest of the USSR. By 1990, the demographic situation in the Soviet Union still bore the characteristics the planners had been trying to change. There was still a mismatch between the areas of labour demand and supply, with the Russian North experiencing difficulties in attracting and retaining the labour required to undertake developments envisaged by the state, despite the long-term policies of forced and voluntary in-migration, and various wage incentives. The apparently simple solution of transferring large numbers of people from Central Asia, where rapid growth of the

[119] Mitchneck, 1991 p168-187

population continued, producing a labour surplus, which could not easily be absorbed into the local economy, came up against the unwillingness of non-Slav ethnic groups to move in large numbers to areas like the Russian North, where the physical environment is much less attractive and the social and cultural *milieu* is essentially Russian[120].

To summarise, it can be seen that the changing policy of the Soviet administration has played a pivotal role in the development and settlement of the Russian North. Starting out as a recipient area for forced labour, exiles and convicts, whilst at the same time representing escape from the various pressures of European Russia, the North had a gruesome history of suffering and misery for millions of people. As the political climate changed after the death of Stalin, policy also changed, and as the labour camp structure was partially dismantled, other methods of attracting settlers came to the forefront. Wage increments, relatively high standards of living, and preferential availability of goods and services were among the incentives offered to migrants to the North. However, despite these many and varied policies, at the end of the Soviet period, the problem facing planners was largely the one which their predecessors had faced seventy years ago. The North was underpopulated relative to the activities they had planned to take place there, although, as will be discussed later, it was overpopulated according to the viability of its industries under a market system

[120] Dewdney, 1990

3.6 Soviet Settlement of the North; the north of Perm' oblast

The study area of the north of Perm' oblast has a place in this broad picture. Lying as it does at the southern boundary of the Russian North, it experiences all the hardships associated with remoteness, and harsh climatic conditions, whilst at the same time, not being one of the most highly prized extractive sites, i.e. not the recipient of massive investment, it does not have a Soviet legacy of grand-scale attempts to provide suitable standards of infrastructure and communications.

The study area was affected by the various policies of the Soviet government, which were implemented to try to settle the North. Both Krasnovisherskii and Kosinskii *raioni* were areas designated for the forced resettlement of persons considered inimical to the Communist system. Both were the recipients of forced migrants; Krasnovisherskii primarily ethnic Germans, whilst Kosinskii received deported Russian kulaks, and the study villages of Vaya in Krasnovisherskii *raion* and Solym in Kosinskii experienced such migration. Solym was founded as a settlement for dekulakised peasants from the south; the very oldest people in the village, typically the present-day great-grandparents, were themselves dekulakised. Vaya, although founded before the Revolution, was the destination of many resettled people, amongst them ethnic Germans, some of whom are still living there today.[121]

[121] However, although the north of Perm' oblast was selected as a destination for exiled and imprisoned people, it was not solely an area of receipt of settlement; for example, in the 1930s, most of the Komi-Permyak intellectuals from the Komi-Permyak Autonomous area, which had been set up in 1925, including the authors of Komi-Permian school textbooks, scientists, researchers and pioneers of Komi-Permian national literature, were killed or sent to prison camps.(Heinapuu (Ed.)(1999))

Krasnovisherskii *raion*, as an important timber cutting area, enjoyed preferential treatment from the state in terms of the availability of goods and services, to the extent that people would travel north from the city of Perm' to the town of Krasnovishersk to buy goods which were available in the shops in the north, but not in the city itself[122]. In fact, that policy of incentives may have caused a certain degree of complacency amongst the inhabitants of the *raion*, in that they were so accustomed to the Soviet policy of full employment, and to the good standard of treatment they received from the state, because of the previously high profile of their timber industry, that they are finding the poor economic circumstances of transition especially difficult to deal with.

In terms of labour camps, there was a camp in Krasnovisherskii *raion* during the Stalinist period; *Visheralag* was a forestry camp, set up between 1928 and 1929, and closed on June 26th 1934. At its height, in April of 1931, the camp had a prisoner population of 39,000[123]. (Figure 3.1 shows the location of the camps in the north of Perm' oblast.) There were also camps relatively close by; for example, those already mentioned, located in Perm' oblast, particularly the camps in neighbouring Solikamskii *raion*, and those of the Komi Republic, immediately to the north of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, which constituted the main body of the Pechora camp area, with the highest concentration of prisoners in Soviet Russia. Work on the Kotlas-Vorkuta railway, and in the Vorkuta coalfields to which it led, occupied the *zeki*. It is also reported that the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug was the site of transit camps for Korean and American prisoners of war during the 1950s. There

[122] *pers comm* Sergei Alexandrovich Merkushev, Department of Development and Special Programmes, Perm' Oblast Administration, 23.7.1997

[123] *Obshchestvo "Memorial" Gosudarstvennii Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii.Systema ispravitel'no-trudovikh lagerei v SSSR Moskva 1998.*p184-185

were camps at Gubakha and Kudymkar in the KPAO, in which were held three hundred P.O.W.s, and there was also an interrogation camp specifically for American P.O.W.s.[124] In Krasnovisherskii *raion*, until very recently, the settlement of Vaya was the site of a prison camp, known locally as the 'Zona', which began operation in 1982 and was closed at the request of Vaya's residents in 1990, with considerable loss of employment for the residents themselves, and subsequent lack of service provision, since maintenance of roads, telephone lines and so on was carried out by the *zeki*. Fear of living next to a prison camp (the recently-abandoned ruins of the Zona are easily within sight and walking distance of Vaya) as well as fear of the released *zeki* who, whilst not permitted to live *within* the village, were allowed to make homes on the immediate outskirts of it, are often quoted as reasons for migration from the village. Plates 3.1 and 3.2 show the ruins of the abandoned 'Zona' and those of the former *zek* settlement. 3.3 shows a message to the *zeki*. To this day, the area north of the village of Cherdin, Cherdinskii *raion*, Perm' oblast, is home to exiles, particularly the villages on the banks of the Berezova River.[125]

During the Soviet period there were also timber camps in the Komi republic, at Vychegda, and Ust-Vym. In fact, although the Soviet state initially denied any use of *zek* labour in lumbering[126], there was evidence of such activity in camps to the north of the study area, and the state never denied the use of kulak labour in timber cutting, which took place at least in Kosinskii *raion*, if not in Krasnovisherskii *raion* as well. In a 1931 speech attacking capitalist countries that

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[124] Central Intelligence Agency Information Report Location of Certain Soviet Transit Camps for Prisoners of War from Korea. July 1951-April 1952. http://www.coalitionoffamilies.org/transcmp.html 19/5/1999

[125] pers comm. Pallot, J. 6.7.1999

[126] Pim & Bateman, 1931



Plate 3.1 the ruins of the 'Zona' prison camp, Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997



Plate 3.2 The remains of the houses inhabited by former *zeki* released from Zona, Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*.



Plate 3.3
"Remember, your family is waiting for you!" – message to the *zeki* of Zona, Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997

complained about Soviet forced labour, Kalinin, at the Central Economic Council of the USSR said

> ...they howl at our recent labour laws, stand up for the kulaks, whose labour we are utilising in our timber collections. This employment of the kulaks in timber collections they represent as forced labour, not desiring to notice with what unexampled leniency the Soviet power is treating its class enemies. Capitalist countries physically destroy such enemies. But the Soviet power, having conquered its class enemies, and destroying the kulaks as a class, makes it possible for the kulaks as individuals to work on timber collections and to earn a living by productive labour.

The accounts of dekulakised peasants being resettled in Solym, and other villages in Kosinskii *raion* do not suggest 'unexampled leniency'.

The development and settlement of the north of Perm' oblast continued after the 1917 Revolution. The north of Perm' oblast was part of the Urals Economic Region, and as such it had a role to play in the development of that region, in terms of the importance of the forestry industry and the settlement of the area. In the 1930s in the Urals, major industrial centres were being founded, such as Magnitogorsk, Nizhniye-Tagil', Orsko-Khalilovsk, Bereznikovsk, Sverdlovsk, and the Motovilikhinskii complex in Perm'. The major industrial types were metalworking, machine building, chemical working and forestry. The basic development of the industrial complex was based upon the region's fuel-energy capacity. Through the 1920s – 1940s, timber was a crucial source of energy, and the intensive use of forced labour to cut timber was a response to the energy crisis. Industrial development in the region demanded a considerable expansion of the raw material and energy base. However, the exploitation of deposits of coal and iron ore, concentrated in the north of the Urals Economic Region, was being held back because of a shortage of workers. The opening up of the extensive forest resources was restricted for the same reason.

Every year, temporary workers for the forestry industry arrived not only from the *raioni* of the southern Urals, but also from Nizhegorodskii *krai*, Bashkiria, and Tatar areas, amongst others. However, the organisation of these workers, and the difficulty of the work led to confusion and disruption of production. The special settlers, a cheaper and simpler source of labour, were a solution to the problem. The decision to forcibly transfer industrialisation demanded a considerable influx of workers. It appeared that the mass transfer of special settlers permitted the accomplishment of this grand-scale plan in the shortest possible time. In actuality, even in spring of 1931 a number of economic organisations of the Urals oblast' were provided with a large number of families of special settlers, arriving from within, as well as outside of, the oblast'. Among these organisations were the *lespromkhozi*, the forestry enterprises. The following table shows the number of families of special settlers in various organisations in April 1931.[127]

[127] Yekaterinburg Izdatel'stvo Uralskogo Universiteta (1994) *Sud'ba Raskulachennikh spetspereselentsev na Ural'ye (1930-1936gg) Vipusk 1 bank dannikh po regional'noi istorii Ural v XX vek'ye* Perm State Archive, Fr88, O1, D63, L30 & 31

Table 3.1 Number of families of special settlers in *lespromkhozi* of the Urals oblast, April 1931

Organisation	Number of families
Petropavlovsk *lespromkhoz*	2,088
'Uralplatina', Zaozersko-Ivdel'skii, Kaltimskii Kos'vinskii Mines	1,692
Pashinskii *lespromkhoz*	704
Solikamskii *lespromkhoz*	690
Tavdinskii *lespromkhoz*	1,073
Nikolo-Pavdinskii *lespromkhoz*	2,457
'Uralsvetmet'	480
Total	**9,184**

Source : Perm State Archive Fr-88 O1 D63 L30,31, in Yekaterinburg Izdatel'stvo Uralskogo Universiteta (1994) *Sud'ba Raskulachennikh spetspereselentsev na Ural'ye (1930-1936gg) Vipusk 1 bank dannikh po regional'noi istorii Ural v XX vek'ye*

The special settlers themselves originated from different parts of the Soviet Union. Table 3.2 shows the number of families from each of the areas that supplied special settlers to the Urals.

Table 3.2 The Origins of Special Settler families resettled in the Urals 1930-1931

Origin of Special Settlers	Number of families
Ukraine	32,127
North Caucasus	25,995
Lower Volga	1,878
Middle Volga	663
Central-Chernozem oblast'	1,408
Belorus	9,113
Crimea	2,772
Tatar	7,810
Urals	26,854
Nizhegorodskii *krai*	5,201
Western oblast'	7,308
Ivanovskaya Industrial oblast'	3,655
Moscow oblast'	3,112
Leningrad oblast'	337
Total	128,233

Source : Slavko, T.I. (1995) *Kulatskaya Ssilka na Ural'ye 1930-1936 Izdaniye podgotovleno pri sodeistvii fonda Volkswagen.* p72.

The administration of the Urals oblast' made plans for the special settlements which were to accommodate these immigrants. Some of the major problems to be overcome included the questions of the management of servicing, the utilisation of the special settlers as workers, their living arrangements, provisioning and so on. Management of the settlements required planning for the construction of homes. It was decided that by June of 1931, 70% of the housing was to have been constructed, that a month later, 90%, and by the first of August, all of the building was to have been completed.[128] The cause of this intensive preparation, or, at least, the

[128] Accounts to follow from Kosinskii *raion* and the Visherskii *krai* indicate that the construction was by no means completed before the arrival of the special settlers.

plans for it, was the necessity to utilise the settlers as a labour force as soon after their arrival as possible. However, the local administrations were not in a position to accommodate this enormous mass of people. As a result, the families of special settlers were faced with very poor living conditions, with the most basic of amenities. These circumstances were intensified even further for the settlers by brutality and arbitrary rule on the part of the administrative personnel.[129]

During the construction of villages, the locations assigned were very often found to be inappropriate, and therefore, a number of the special settlements, especially those constructed on swamps, became completely unfit for human habitation. In addition, several villages, in particular those of the forestry collectives, were temporarily closed owing to the lack of a raw material base to provide work for the special settlers, all of which caused severe housing shortages, and limited the capacity for economic utililisation of the settlers. Due to the ineffective implementation of housebuilding plans made at the oblast' level, the houses themselves were built by the special settlers, many of whom, having originated from the more southerly regions of the Soviet Union, were unaccustomed to the severe local climate, and did not have the necessary building materials, or knowledge of how to build suitable houses. The houses they built, of raw, unseasoned timber, using unsuitable construction techniques, were of poor quality; in cold weather they did not keep warmth in, when it rained their roofs leaked, and so on. In Visherskii *krai*, as Krasnovisherskii *raion* was then known, plans to construct houses in advance of the arrival of the special settlers were left unfulfilled almost everywhere. For example, in

[129] Yekaterinburg Izdatel'stvo Uralskogo Universiteta (1994). *Sud'ba Raskulachnennikh spetspereselentsev no Ural'ye (1930-1936gg) Vipusk 1 Bank dannikh po regional'noi istorii Ural v XX vek'ye.*

the *lespromkhozi*, where the provision of housing was significantly better than in other industrial organisations, by September 1931, only 48.4% of the proposed housing had been built, and by the end of the year, midwinter, the figure was still only 51.1%. By March 1932, the total sum of construction in the oblast was 24,300 houses and 77,200 flats, with 16,700 flats in the process of construction – this provision was for almost five hundred thousand special settlers.[130]

Conditions in the villages themselves were extremely unsanitary; because of the lack of basic sanitation, waste material was thrown straight onto the street. In many villages there was no well for water, and inhabitants had to use water from the river or even from the swamps. At the oblast' level, the provision for the special settlers in terms of building materials was more or less adequate. For example, the requirements for glass at the end of 1931 in the *lespromkhozi* and forestry factories were fulfilled at the level of 111%, those for nails at 78%, those for drying oil at 102%. However, the distribution of these materials amongst the organisations was extremely uneven. For example, *'Uraldrevlestrest'*, a forestry enterprise, received only 43% of the glass it needed, but it received more than twice as many nails as it required. The situation regarding another enterprise, *'Uralsevlestrest'* was similar; it only received 64% of the amount of nails it needed, but 30% more glass than was required.[131]

To secure the special settlers' food supply, the economic organisations for which they worked granted every family a plot of land, consisting of 0.1 hectares for a kitchen garden, and not less than 0.5 hectares of hayland. The organisations

[130] ibid.
[131] ibid.

were obliged to assist with the acquisition of working animals on the basis that there should be enough horses for agricultural work, and that between every five families of special settlers there should be one cow. However, in absence of large machinery, it was difficult to work the land, which was mainly forested. Another important factor was that, for a short time, the special settlers, particularly those who came from the southern regions of Russia, carried out farming practices which were unsuitable for the severe climate of the north Urals, attempting to grow crops such as apples, and salad vegetables such as tomatoes and cucumbers.[132]

The extremely difficult living and working conditions endured by the special settlers led to impoverishment, and contributed to a high mortality rate. One of the consequences of this situation was frequent attempts on the part of the special settlers to escape from the villages. Whole families tried to run away, but many were caught and sent back to the special settlements.[133] The table below shows the changes in the number of special settlers in the Urals in 1932-1933.

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[132] ibid. Tomatoes and cucumbers are still grown in the north of Perm' oblast, but they can only be ripened under plastic cloches in a good summer; in the village of Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, tomatoes are usually planted, but very seldom ripen.

[133] *Yekaterinburg Izdatel'stvo Uralskogo Universiteta (1994) Sud'ba Raskulachnennikh spetspereselentsev na Ural'ye (1930-1936gg). Vipusk 1 Bank dannikh po regional'noi istorii: Ural v XX vek'ye.*

Table 3.3 Changes in the Number of Special Settlers in the Urals, 1932-1933

	Year	
	1932	1933
Number present on January 1st	484,380	365,539
Increase:		
Births	6,540	3,894
New settlers	10,107	33,920
Returning from attempted escape	16,922	17,792
Other	1,964	6,171
TOTAL	35,533	61,777
Decrease:		
Deaths	32,645	51,010
Escaped	97,005	55,983
Other	24,724	20,010
TOTAL	154,374	127,003

Source : T.I. Slavko, (1995) *Kulatskaya Ssilka na Uralye 1930-1936 Izdaniye podgotovleno pri sodeistvii fonda Volkswagen* p73.

Under dekulakisation, the destination of kulaks, the 'special settlers', was a number of kulak villages under the administration of commandants. In the Urals, the villages were distributed in 69 *raioni* and 3 *okrugi* (Komi-Permyak, Ostyatsko-Volgul'skii, and Yamal). At the beginning of 1932 there were at least 650 of these villages in the whole of the Urals area, of which the north made up a part. (Appendix 1 shows the number of special settlers in villages of the north of Perm' oblast in late 1931.) The village commandants had the duty of control of the internal routine and management of the special settlements, and the socio-cultural issues and consumer services of the special settlers. The settlers were deprived of the right of free movement outside of the territory of their special settlement.[134]

[134] *Yekaterinburg Izdatel'stvo Uralskogo Universiteta (1994) Sud'ba Raskulachnennikh spetspereselentsev na Ural'ye (1930-1936gg). Vipusk 1 Bank Dannikh po regional'noi istorii: Ural v xx vek'ye.*

All special settlers were divided into five groups according to their capacity to carry out physical labour. Group 1 received those capable of carrying out any labour, Group 2 those who could only do light physical labour, and Group 3, those who were incapable of physical labour, but who could carry out light handicraft work, such as the preparation of mushrooms, berries and so on. Group 4 was for people incapable of any form of work, and Group 5 received children aged less than 16 years.[135]

At the beginning of the period of Soviet collectivisation and dekulakisation, Kosinskii *raion* was brought into the scheme of forced settlement of the North. The *raion* archive in Kosa holds the following account of the first wave of settlement.

> In 1929, the (then) Komi-Permyak National Okrug was designated as one of the areas which was to receive more than three thousand families of kulaks from the western regions of the country. Starting in 1930, a flow of settlers into the area began, with trains carrying 'special settlers' arriving at the stations of Mendele'evo and Grigoryevskaya. The settlers travelled north from the stations on foot, in convoy. The dead and frozen *en route* were buried in the forest, in the snow by the side of the road, and the local residents only collected their bodies for burial in the cemetery in the following spring. The convoy acted in accordance with the policies of the Bolsheviks in the annihilation of the kulaks as a class.[136]

As in many areas selected for the accommodation of dekulakised peasants, the local administration of Kosinskii *raion* was not prepared for such an influx of settlers, and it was unable to provide dwellings. So, the settlers were brought to the designated areas, within the dense forest and amongst the swamps, and ordered to settle around stakes driven into the earth.

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[135] ibid.

By April 1st 1930, within a year of its having been designated as a destination for exiles, in the territory of Gai'inskii, Kosinskii and Kochevskii *raioni* there were 1,700 families of 'special settlers', mainly accommodated in huts, tents, or dugouts. Apart from the absence of housing, and the severe northern winter, there was another serious problem, that of food supply. In their home villages, until they were exiled as kulaks, the special settlers had been able to support themselves through their agriculture, but, having been moved to the north during the winter, they had no supplies of food, no livestock, no means to cultivate the frozen ground. They were starving. In May 1930, the representative of the OGPU announced to the Ural oblast Executive Committee

> ...in the territory of the okrug there are ten thousand people, kulak exiles. They do not have their own supplies of food, and unless supplies are sent to them, in two months time they will have destroyed the local resources.

In the first winter, through cold and hunger, about forty per cent of the exiles perished, mainly children and the elderly. Despite the problems of accommodating and feeding the exiles, all this time they continued to be sent. The local *lespromkhozi* could only provide employment for a third of the able-bodied, and only those with work received a ration.

The summer of 1930 saw the construction of dwellings. Plots were allotted for construction, and the settlers built themselves houses from the allocation of 1.5 cubic metres per person.

By August 25th 1931, the state of special settlements in the Komi-Permyak Okrug was as follows;

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[136] Unnamed fund, held in the Kosinskii *raion* archive, Kosa, containing data from the Komi Permyak Autonomous Okrug State Archive, Fr4, O1, D86, L79, and Fr40, O1, D101, L22

Table 3.4 Population of 'Special Settlements' in the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, August 25, 1931

	Settler Villages	**in which; families**	**Population**	**of which able-bodied**
Gai'inskii	1	146	557	75
Kosinskii	2	77	246	39
Kochevskii	1	437	1533	120
TOTAL	4	660	2336	234

Source : Kosinskii *raion* archive account, containing data from the Komi Permyak Autonomous Okrug State Archive, Fr4, O1, D86, L79, and Fr40, O1, D101, L22

The main occupation of the settlers was forestry, with brigades working in convoy. Life in the villages was not much different from life in the labour camps, of which there were already many in the country. By October 1931 the conditions of the exiles began to become regulated. 'Temporary conditions of rights and duties of the settlers and administrative functions and laws of villages' administration' were consolidated by the then deputy chairman of the OGPU, Yagoda. According to regulations, all administrative functions in special settlements were carried out by the commandant's office of the OGPU, the cost of which was met through a deduction of 15% from the wages of the settlers. For violation of the regulations, the commandant could arrest offenders for 5 days, or impose a fine of five rubles. Acts of civil status were made the responsibility of the local *raion* executive committee. In 1931, 85 people were employed in the commandant's office, to oversee more than 30,000 people who had been exiled to the Okrug, former kulaks, people from Ukraine, and Belarus, and Russian evicted peasants.

These kulaks were accommodated in special settlements (*spetsposelki*), of which by 1933 there were twelve in Gai'inskii *raion*, nine in Kosinskii, and six in Kochevskii *raion*. (By January 17th 1932, in Kosinskii *raion*, there were six special settlements; Sosnovka, with a population of 552, Bad'-Pashnya [117], Loch'-Sai [117], Odan' [607], Buzhdim [240], and Solym, which had a population of 290). By April 1933, in the Gai'inskii settlements, the *lespromkhozi* had built 848 houses, in Kosinskii 371, and in Kochevskii 168. By 1935 the development of the settlements had already run up a cost of 882,000 rubles. Settlers were provided with loans totalling 473,000 rubles, of which half was irretrievable. Therefore, the government invested 250 rubles per household into special settlements in 1931, increasing to 815 rubles in 1935.

In the winter of 1933-34, hunger took one thousand of the inhabitants of the special settlements. The *lespromkhozi* could not provide even one tenth of the food required by the settlers. Unregulated agricultural collectives (artels) in several settlements were weak and in need of assistance. The special settlers were starving, and they were reduced to eating dogs, cats and rats. The children were the first to die, and sometimes parents committed suicide in order to save their children, because Kosinskii *raion* had a children's home which would take in orphans. The Kosinskii children's home existed through the 'Uralzapadles', a forestry enterprise, and it was maintained through a deduction from the wages of the settlers. In 1934 alone, the government deducted 17,000 rubles in this way. The hunger of 1933-34, and the subsequent loss of one thousand of the settlers was the cause of an inquiry by a government commission into the state of the settlements. In accordance with its decision, many of the settlers were transferred to construction sites in Berezniki,

Solikamsk (Solikamskii *raion*) and Krasnovishersk (Krasnovisherskii *raion*). After this transfer of population, there were 1665 families of special settlers remaining in the okrug, of whose members 1,780 people were able-bodied workers. About 600 families were employed in agriculture, 120 in local industry and in handicraft trade, and the rest in forestry. The proportion of able-bodied people to total population was quite poor, for example, in Kosinskii *raion*, in two agricultural settlements of 77 families, only 39 people were able-bodied. Despite these conditions of the workforce, the regime in these settlements was unchanged. The average number of livestock in households was three times lower than the okrug average, explainable mainly by the limitations of the fodder base. On the other hand, many of the unregulated agricultural collectives were much sounder than the local kolkhozi. In part this was due to the unregulated collectives being exempt from state procurement, which, in the second five-year plan, was devastating. A typical settler co-operative was that at Odan', in Kosinskii *raion*, the Odan'skaya Workmen's' Cooperative. It was organised in 1932, and by 1937 it united 55 households with 95 able-bodied workers, feeding 144 people. The cooperative had 260 hectares of land, of which 126 were under tillage, 112 were hayfields, and 22 pasture. The cooperative kept 34 horses, 36 cattle, 13 sheep and 2 pigs, and apart from these livestock, in private plots of the cooperative, there were 52 cattle, a horse, 53 pigs, and 20 sheep. In 1938, all the unregulated collectives were transferred to the status of kolkhozi, and received equal rights to them (with the exception of the freedom to leave the kolkhoz settlements, which in any case was limited).[137]

According to the archive account,

[137] Unnamed fund, held in the Kosinskii *raion* archive, Kosa, containing data from the Komi Permyak Autonomous Okrug State Archive, Fr4, O1, D86, L79, and Fr40, O1, D101, L22

> In these camps (i.e. in all the forced labour settlements), the price of the incredible depravations of a hundred thousand human inhabitants was to compel peasants to subordinate themselves to the new regime, to think the same way and to do just what they were told. Forced labour of settlers was an element of the repression mechanism for the formation of the Stalinist totalitarian system.[138]

From a total of over 6700 by 1914, the resettlement of exiles in Kosinskii *raion* increased its population to at least 10,000 by the mid-1930s, and by 1948 the exile population alone was calculated to be 7319. In 1952, Solym was allocated land by the *lespromkhoz*, for cultivation by the inhabitants of the village. Figure 3.2 shows the quartals of forestry land which were allocated.[139] By 1960 the population of the *raion* had risen to 19,177, of whom 2,093 lived in the *raion* centre of Kosa, with the remaining 17,084 living in outlying settlements. However, whilst the total *raion* population increased, that of the special settlements did not necessarily follow the same trend.

Table 3.5 Population of some 'Special Settlements' 1932-1960


	Population 17.01.1932	**Population 30.5.1960**
Sosnovka	522	949
Bad'-Pashnya	117	287
Loch'-Sai	117	611
Odan'	607	223
Buzhdim	240	505
Solym	290	952

Source : Kosinskii *raion* archive account, containing data from the Komi Permyak Autonomous Okrug State Archive, Fr4, O1, D86, L79, and Fr40, O1, D101, L22

[138] Kosinskii *raion* State Archive, Kosa, containing data from the Komi Permyak Autonomous Okrug State Archive, Fr4, O1, D86, L79, and Fr40, O1, D101, L22

[139] *Permskoye Oblastnoye Upravleniye Lesnogo Khozyaistvo (1952) Materiali (Akti, Szemi, Dogovoi, Perepisa) ob o-vod'ye lesnikh ploshadei iz sostava gosudarstvennogo leskhozye Permskoi Oblasti 14 October 1949-1952.* Perm State Archive, Fr-554 O-3 D-82 L-1-1105 (Map redrawn from original).

Figure 3.2 Land transferred from the *lespromkhoz* to the village of Solym, 1952



By 1968 the *raion* population was 17,072, and it continued to decline, falling to 10,900 in 1988, then falling annually by about one hundred, to 10,198 by July 1997[140]. The populations of the six special settlements identified in 1932 also declined through the mid-1990s. For example, Sosnovka's population fell from 299 in 1995[141] to 277 in 1997[142], likewise Loch'-Sai from 307 to 264[143]. Solym remained relatively steady at between 285 and 291[144], but by far the most dramatic decreases in population were experienced by Odan', originally the largest of the special settlements, which had a population of just four in 1997[145], following 'liquidation' in the 1970s, and Bad'-Pashnya, which from a population of 287 in 1960[146] had ceased to exist by 1995[147]. The village of Buzhdim is still inhabited, but *raion* boundary changes since 1960 have placed it in the neighbouring Kochevskii *raion*

From having been an overwhelmingly Komi-Permian region around the time of the Revolution, the ethnic make-up of Kosinskii *raion* had changed by the 1960s, due to inmigration, forced or otherwise, of other nationalities, such as Germans, Ukrainians, and ethnic Russians. By the beginning of 1960 seventeen out of the ninety-two listed settlements were described as Russian rather than Komi-

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[140] Kosinskii *raion* Administration, Department of Statistics *Spisok Naselennikh punktov po Kosinskomu Raionu na 1 yanvarya 1997 goda*
[141] Kosinskii *raion* Administration, Department of Statistics *Spisok Naselennikh punktov po Kosinskomu Raionu na 1 yanvarya 1995 goda*
[142] Kosinskii *raion* Administration, Department of Statistics *Spisok Naselennikh punktov po Kosinskomu Raionu na 1 yanvarya 1997 goda*
[143] ibid. Notes 24 and 25
[144] ibid.
[145] Kosinskii *raion* Administration, Department of Statistics *Spisok Naselennikh punktov po Kosinskomu Raionu na 1 yanvarya 1997 goda*
[146] *Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye, Permskoi Oblasti* (30.5.1960) *Statisticheskii Byulletin' Chislennost' Nalichnogo Naseleniya Sel'skikh Nasellenikh m'est s ukazaniyem chislenno preobladayushchei natsionalnosti.*
[147] Kosinskii *raion* Administration, Department of Statistics *Spisok Naselennikh punktov Kosinskomu Raionu na 1 yanvarya 1995 goda*

Permian[148]. The ethnic composition of the population of Kosinskii *raion* will be discussed further in section 3.7.

The population of the *volosti* which were to make up Krasnovisherskii *raion* (Verkh'-Yazvinskaya, Morchanskaya, and Sipuchinskaya *volosti*, and the villages of Gubdor', Zagar'ye, Savina, Kolinva, Rategova, Ivanovskaya, Yazv' and Nemzya in Gubdorskaya *volost'*) in 1890 was 6,882, and by 1910 this figure had risen to at least 8,095 (data for some of the villages are missing).

The horrific stories of exile to Kosinskii *raion* are not unique to that area. Deportation to 'Visherskii *krai*', as Krasnovisherskii *raion* was then known, was equally disorganised and traumatic. Special settlers destined for Krasnovisherskii *raion* were taken there by water transport, barges pulled behind steamers. However, river conditions, the unreliability of the steamer captains, and the general lack of organisation of the transfers of settlers made the journeys long and gruelling. There are accounts of these 'deliveries' of settlers in the Perm' State Archive.

In the summer of 1932, settlers arrived in Visherskii *krai* from a deportation point in the south of the oblast'. During the months of June and July there were attempts to transport them to their destinations in the remote areas of the *krai*. Many of these attempts were unsuccessful, and resulted in considerable hardship for the settlers.

> In spite of the well-timed notification from higher organs about the arrival of five thousand families of special settlers in Visherskii *krai*..... measures to meet them, transfer them, and distribute them, provide them

[148] *Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye, Permskoi Oblasti* (30.5.1960) *Statisticheskii Byulletin' Chislennost' Nalichnogo naseleniya Sel'skikh Nasellenikh m'est s ukazaniyem chislenno preobladayushei natsionalnosti*

> with rations, and basic sanitary services were not drawn up; in the local areas, no one knew how many settlers were coming, or when they were coming, or into which areas they were to be distributed (for some reason this was kept a secret), and that is why no preparation work whatsoever for the construction of settlements was carried out, because until their arrival, not a single *lespromkhoz* knew where the settlements would be, and yet, in spite of everything, according to the plan of the forestry department, all construction must be completed by August 1st. So, for now, the forest is not being cut, and it is necessary to transport bread and foodstuffs along with the special settlers, without the slightest delay, because delay of delivery leads to hunger, and unpredictable conditions, for which no one wants to be answerable.[149]

Apart from the disorganisation and secrecy that surrounded the transfer of the settlers, and the subsequent lack of preparation for their arrival, there were problems related to their local transportation, and to the conditions in which they were forced to live.

> The deportation party of special settlers, arriving in barges.... (were given)... brief medical examinations, and without the establishment of their ability to work, and without even cutting their hair, the settlers were once again placed on the barges, and taken further, for 2-3 days on deportation rations of 500g of bread, 100g of fish, 80g of kasha and, for children under the age of 12, 100g of sugar. No benefit was forthcoming, so the steamer scattered the occupants of one barge in various places on the banks of the river, without any supervision or accompaniment. The special settlers were left 'homeless'; often they didn't know which *uchastok* they were nearest to, where it was possible to obtain food, or why they had been put ashore from the barge. They made temporary cabins, and they hungrily dispersed along the banks and to local villages, to request alms. In individual cases they committed theft, angering the local population.[150]

Settlers such as these, who had been put ashore by the steamers in places other then their intended destinations (which in any case had made no

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[149] *"O perebrosk'ye spetspereselentsev v Visherskii Krai"*, 29.7.1932 Perm State Archive F4 O9 D218 L150-153, in Yekaterinburg Izdatel'stvo Ural'skogo Universiteta (1994) Bank dannikh po regional'noi istorii: Ural v XX veki. Vipusk 1 Sud'ba Raskulachennikh spetspereselentsev na Ural'ye (1930-1936gg) p152

[150] ibid. p152

preparations to receive them), were often left to sit on the banks of the river for several days, or even weeks.

> In this state, on the banks of the River Vishera, thousands of special settlers sat, and still sit, with nothing to do…., sometimes not receiving rations for 2-3 days. Especially poor is the condition of the children, who make up thirty percent of the total number, of whom a number are still at the breast. The weather is rainy and cold, such that in the cabins it is cold. The half-starved eat grass, and fall ill without medical help. A substantial number of them have died. Apart from this, due to the confusion, some of the special settlers have found themselves in *uchastki* which are not their own. Few settlers have been taken to the remoter *uchastki*, to which they must be delivered as soon as possible in accordance with the plan, but they have set up elsewhere, in confusion.[151]

> A party of 412 people set out for Verkhnyaya Panikha from Kozhinskii deportation transit point, leaving June 20th, and travelled to Ust'-Uls for 9 days, arriving at Ust'-Uls on June 29th, and for more than half a month, they sat on the banks of the river. A party of 340 people set out for *uchastok* 'Dvartstatka', of the Ust'-Uls *lespromkhoz*, on June 22nd, travelled for 13 days to Ust'-Uls, arriving there on July 5th, and also sat on the banks for half a month.[152]

The problems associated with the water transport on the Vishera River in the summer of 1932 are evident in the accounts from the archive.

> When, in the Vishera River, there is high water, all the steamers, 'Chaika', 'Gornyak', 'Bratstvo', 'Nadezhda' and 'Kseniya', cannot travel upstream, because of the fast current. When the water level falls, they also cannot travel, because of the shallow water, and the question arises, of when they can travel. As a rule steamers depart.... several tens of kilometres, and not one reaches the place of destination, and they return back, and scatter the barges (of special settlers) on the banks of the river. Even if this argument can be revealed as unfounded, there is another variant, that of the lack of fuel.[153]

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[151] ibid. p153
[152] ibid. p154
[153] ibid. p155

The problem of fuel was that the steamers had to carry their supply of fuel with them on the long trips to the remote areas of the *krai*. Often the fuel would run out, and the steamers would abandon the barges on the banks of the river, while they went to find more fuel. The blame for the inefficiency of the transportation was placed firmly at the door of the captains of the steamers. This account from the manager of the Ust'-Uls *lespromkhoz*, from the summer of 1932, illustrates the point.

> On June 27th, hearing a steamer siren, I went downstream in a boat, and at Vetryan I met the steamer 'Chaika', which was pulling three barges of special settlers. Because of the lack of fuel, the steamer could not go any further, and there had been discussion and an exit from the predicament had been sought. The steamer 'Bratstvo' had been sent from the scene, carrying a part of the fuel, and the 'Chaika' had continued to Ust'-Uls. I, travelling on the 'Bratstvo', reached Vizhaika, and secured, through Comrade Mitrakhov at Malkhov, forty tonnes of fuel oil for the transfer upstream, but the fuel oil vessel had an inexperienced pilot, who ran the vessel aground, because of which we wasted twenty hours, but when she arrived at the destination, it was found that the fuel oil contained 50% water, and was therefore no use. In general, the water transport in the question of the transfer of special settlers and cargo to the north is manifestly negligent and careless.
>
> In May and June there was deep water, good for vessels to travel to the north, but for some reason 'Chaika'did not work here, but was in the lower reaches, in Perm'. 'Bratstvo' and 'Gornyak' also could have been used for the journey Ust'-Uls to Vels, but this was not done. As a result, Vels and the remote *uchastki* were left without rations; this is not work, this is sabotage[154] (Manager of Ust-Uls *lespromkhoz*)

During one incident when steamers were in collision with logs being rafted on the Vishera, the poor relationship between the steamer captains and the *lespromkhozi* was exposed.

> With a party of 834 people from Kozhinskii deportation point, I left on June 29th in one of three barges pulled by the steamer 'Vishkhimz', which took us to the *uchastok* 'Govorlivoye', and we could go no further because of shallow water. We travelled back, with the steamer 'Gornyak'.

[154] Manager of Ust'-Uls *lespromkhoz*, ibid. p155

> Just one barge went back, and I travelled with it (the others were left behind, and where they are now I don't know). We were taken to 'Akchim', where the steamers 'Chaika' and 'Bratstvo' were, and we just waited for 3 hours, while travelling further was discussed. We left, and we came to 'Melenki', where the movement of the steamer was impeded by logs being rafted on the river[155] (Kudrivshchenko, commandant of the village of Vels)

The logs caused damage to one of the steamers, and when another went to its aid it was also damaged.

> 'Bratstvo' called for help, and 'Chaika' and 'Gornyak' tried to help, but at that moment, 'Gornyak' itself came into danger, and Captain Medvedev of the Chaika, a disenfranchised person, said 'the devil take him, I'm not going there, let it sit there!' 'Bratstvo' fell upon a zinc cable, which cut off its mast, half the cabin room, and the chimneystack. As a result, both (damaged) steamers left, and went upstream for repair, but 'Chaika', without any business to stay, remained in the area for a whole 24 hours. On the next day it went downstream a kilometre to Vetrenka, and brought one barge (of special settlers). To my proposal to organise help for the travelling special settlers, which would have been very realistic, Medvedev answered 'you go to the devil, who you are like. I'm the captain of this steamer, and no one dares give orders to me'. It was evident that he was drunk. Later the steamer left, and I sat with the others until July 4th under open skies. The culprit of this, I think, is the water transport, which is not only negligent, and without management, in all concerns, but also involved in sabotage' (Kudrivshchenko, commendant of the village of Vels)[156]

In Soviet Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the population in 1948 was 18,482, of whom 6,446 lived in the town of Krasnovishersk, and 12,036 in rural settlements[157]. By 1960, the figures had more than doubled, to reach a total of 42,466, of whom 15,136 lived in Krasnovishersk, and 27,330 in rural areas[158]. The total for

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[155] Kudrivshchenko, commandant of the village of Vels, ibid. p155-156
[156] ibid p156
[157] *Gosudarstvennaya Planovaya Komissiya Sovieta Ministrov SSSR, Sektor Naseleniya. Naseleniya Molotovskaya Oblast' 20.3.1948* Perm State Archive
[158] *Tsentral'noye Statisticheskoye Upravleniye pri Soviet'ye Ministrov SSSR. Chislennost' Naseleniya SSSR po perepisi na 15.1.1959 goda po respublikam, krayam, oblastyam, natsionalnim okrugam, raionim, gorodam, posyelkam gorodskogo tipa, raionnim tsentram I krupnim sel'skim naselennim mestam Moskva 1960 p219-223* Perm State Archive F493 O19 D5 L219-223

1968 was 44,302[159]. In 1970, there were fewer people in total living in the *raion*, the figure having fallen to 37,558, and both the urban and rural settlements had shared in the loss of population[160]. During the 1980s, the population of the *raion* stayed fairly constant at around 30-31,000, with lows of 30,400 and 30,500 in 1992 and 1993 respectively, and a high of 31,200 in 1990. Therefore, the period of highest population for both Krasnovisherskii *raion* and Kosinskii *raion* was the 1960s, when Krasnovisherskii reached its maximum of 44,302, and Kosinskii almost 20,000. During the same period, the population of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug was around 230,000, having risen from 171,000 in 1926, and falling to 160,000 at the start of the 1990s. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show more population data for the two *raioni*.

Table 3.6
Population of Krasnovisherskii *raion* 1889-1972

Year	Rural	Urban	Total
1889	-	-	6,882
1910	-	-	8,095
1941	16,300	17,100	33,400
1958	25,782	-	
1960	27,330	15,136	42,466
1967	25,596	-	
1968	29,092	15,702	44,302
1970	22,614	14,944	37,558
1972	20,042	-	-

Source : *Molotovskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya dlya Sluzhebnogo Pol'zovaniya Raioni Molotovskoi Oblasti (Statisticheskii Spravochnik) Chast'1.* Molotov. PSA Fr1133 O1 D141 L218-227. *Molotovskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya Raiona Molotovskoi Oblasti Chast'2* PSA Fr1133 O1 D142 L211

[159] *Itogi Vsyesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959g. Raspredeleniye Naseleniya po polu I vozrastu I chislo lits, sostoyashchikh v brak'ye po Permskoi Oblasti (selskoye naseleniye) na 1.1.1968. g. Perm'* Perm State Archive F463 O19 D15 L270-272

[160] *Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Itogi Vsyesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda Raspredeleniye Naseleniya po Natsional'nosti I chislennost lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietam, gorodam, PGT isel'skim raitsentram Permskoi Oblasti na 15.1.1970. g. Perm'* Perm State Archive F493 O19 D138 L79-80

Orginstruktopskii Otdel Molotovskogo Oblispolkoma Materiali po ukrupneniyu sel'skikh Sovietov Kosinskogo raiona Molotovskoi Oblasti PSA Fr564 O3 D1846 L99-118
Permskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya Sektor Svodnogo Plana Materiali po Proyektomu Planu Mestnogo Khozyaistva Krasnovisherskogo r-n za 1955-56g. PSA Fr1133 O1 D619 L23-28
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Truda Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya i Kulturi. Otcheti po yestyestvennomu i mekhanicheskomu dvizheniya naseleniya Permskoi Oblasti za 1957-59g. PSA Fr493 O11 D22 L146-147
Ts.S.U. pri Sovietye Ministrov SSSR Chislennost' Naseleniya SSSR po perepisi na 15.1.1959 goda po Respublikam, Kraiyam, Oblastyam, Natsional'nim Okrugam, Raionam, Gorodam, Poselkam Gorodskogo Tipa, Raionnim Tsentram I Krupnim Sel'skim Naselennim Mestam PSA Fr493 O19 D5 L219-223
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 PSA Fr493 O19 D8 L7-8
Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Statisticheskii Byulleten' Chislennost' nalichnogo naseleniya sel'skikh nasellenikh mest s ukazaniyam chislenno preoblasdayushchei natsional'nosti 30.5.1960 PSA Fr493 O19 D10 L90-93
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Spiski Naselennikh Punktov Permskoi Oblasti na 1967g PSA Fr493 O11 D818 L117-131 & 302-304
Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1968g.Raspredeleniye Naselenniya po polu I vozrastu I chislo lits, sostoyashchikh v brakye po Permskoi Oblasti (sel'skoye naseleniye na 1.1.1968g) PSA Fr493 O19 D15 L73-79 & 270-272
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya I Kulturi Spisok Sovietov Oblasti Pereschitannikh v granitsam raionov na 1 yanvarya 1968 PSA Fr493 O11 D820 L4 & 14
Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniye 1970 goda. Raspredeleniye naseleniye po natsional'nosti I chislennost lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietam, gorodam, PGT I sel'skim raitsentram Permskoi Oblasti na 15.1.1970 PSA Fr493 O19 D138 L79-80 & 139
Ts.S.U.SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Chislennost' nalichnogo I postoyannogo naseleniya po kazhdomu sel'skomu naselennomu punktu Permskoi Oblasti (predvaritel'niye itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970g) PSA Fr493 O19 D102 L103-108 & 237-241
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Otdel Truda, Kulturi, Naseleniya I Zdravookhraneniya Spiski Sel'skikh Naselennikh Punktov na 1.1.1972 I Chislennost' naseleniya v nikh PSA Fr493 O11 D1256 L172-186 & 321-323
Otdel Zhilishchno-Kommunal'nogo Khozyaistva I bita Ob'edineniya Spisok Lesnikh Poselkov Predpriyatii Vsesoyuznogo Lesopromishlennogo Ob'edineniya Permlesprom po sostoyaniyu na 1.1.1976.

Table 3.7

Population of Kosinskii *raion*, 1889-1972

Year	Total (all *raion* is classified as Rural)
1889	5,896
1910	9,123
1953	16,485
1958	18,625
1960	19,177
1967	15,146
1968	17,072
1970	14,940
1972	13,719

Source : *Molotovskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya dlya Sluzhebnogo Pol'zovaniya Raioni Molotovskoi Oblasti (Statisticheskii Spravochnik) Chast'1.* Molotov. PSA Fr1133 O1 D141 L218-227.
Molotovskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya Raiona Molotovskoi Oblasti Chast'2 PSA Fr1133 O1 D142 L211
Orginstruktopskii Otdel Molotovskogo Oblispolkoma Materiali po ukrupneniyu sel'skikh Sovietov Kosinskogo raiona Molotovskoi Oblasti PSA Fr564 O3 D1846 L99-118
Permskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya Sektor Svodnogo Plana Materiali po Proyektomu Planu Mestnogo Khozyaistva Krasnovisherskogo r-n za 1955-56g. PSA Fr1133 O1 D619 L23-28
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Truda Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya i Kulturi. Otcheti po yestyestvennomu i mekhanicheskomu dvizheniya naseleniya Permskoi Oblasti za 1957-59g. PSA Fr493 O11 D22 L146-147
Ts.S.U. pri Sovietye Ministrov SSSR Chislennost' Naseleniya SSSR po perepisi na 15.1.1959 goda po Respublikam, Kraiyam, Oblastyam, Natsional'nim Okrugam, Raionam, Gorodam, Poselkam Gorodskogo Tipa, Raionnim Tsentram I Krupnim Sel'skim Naselennim Mestam PSA Fr493 O19 D5 L219-223
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 PSA Fr493 O19 D8 L7-8
Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Statisticheskii Byulleten' Chislennost' nalichnogo naseleniya sel'skikh nasellenikh mest s ukazaniyam chislenno preoblasdayushchei natsional'nosti 30.5.1960 PSA Fr493 O19 D10 L90-93
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Spiski Naselennikh Punktov Permskoi Oblasti na 1967g PSA Fr493 O11 D818 L117-131 & 302-304
Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1968g.Raspredeleniye Naselenniya po polu I vozrastu I chislo lits, sostoyashchikh v brakye po Permskoi Oblasti (sel'skoye naseleniye na 1.1.1968g) PSA Fr493 O19 D15 L73-79 & 270-272
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya I Kulturi Spisok Sovietov Oblasti Pereschitannikh v granitsam raionov na 1 yanvarya 1968 PSA Fr493 O11 D820 L4 & 14
Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniye 1970 goda. Raspredeleniye naseleniye po natsional'nosti I chislennost lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietam, gorodam, PGT I sel'skim raitsentram Permskoi Oblasti na 15.1.1970 PSA Fr493 O19 D138 L79-80 & 139
Ts.S.U.SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Chislennost' nalichnogo I postoyannogo naseleniya po kazhdomu sel'skomu naselennomu punktu Permskoi Oblasti (predvaritel'niye itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970g) PSA Fr493 O19 D102 L103-108 & 237-241

Figure 3.3
Number of Settlements in Krasnovisherskii raion, 1580-1998





Figure 3.4
Number of Settlements in Kosinskii raion, 1560-1998



Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Otdel Truda, Kulturi, Naseleniya I Zdravookhraneniya Spiski Sel'skikh Naselennikh Punktov na 1.1.1972 I Chislennost' naseleniya v nikh PSA Fr493 O11 D1256 L172-186 & 321-323
Otdel Zhilishchno-Kommunal'nogo Khozyaistva I bita Ob'edineniya Spisok Lesnikh Poselkov Predpriyatii Vsesoyuznogo Lesopromishlennogo Ob'edineniya Permlesprom po sostoyaniyu na 1.1.1976.

At the same time as the peaks in total population, both *raioni* were experiencing a growth in the number of settlements within their boundaries. Both saw an explosion of new settlements during the three decades between 1930 and 1960; in Kosinskii *raion* the number doubled from around fifty to almost one hundred, and in Krasnovisherskii the increase was more than twofold, from about seventy to nearly one hundred and eighty. In both *raioni*, many of these settlements had been created to house resettled people, but they were also the results of the later Soviet migration policy of developing natural resources through attracting migrant workers. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the increase in the number of settlements in each *raion*[161].

[161] *Molotovskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya dlya Sluzhebnogo Pol'zovaniya Raioni Molotovskoi Oblasti (Statisticheskii Spravochnik) Chast'1.* Molotov. PSA Fr1133 O1 D141 L218-227.
Molotovskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya Raiona Molotovskoi Oblasti Chast'2 PSA Fr1133 O1 D142 L211
Orginstruktopskii Otdel Molotovskogo Oblispolkoma Materiali po ukrupneniyu sel'skikh Sovietov Kosinskogo raiona Molotovskoi Oblasti PSA Fr564 O3 D1846 L99-118
Permskaya Oblastnaya Planovaya Komissiya Sektor Svodnogo Plana Materiali po Proyektomu Planu Mestnogo Khozyaistva Krasnovisherskogo r-n za 1955-56g. PSA Fr1133 O1 D619 L23-28
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Truda Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya i Kulturi. Otcheti po yestyestvennomu i mekhanicheskomu dvizheniya naseleniya Permskoi Oblasti za 1957-59g. PSA Fr493 O11 D22 L146-147
Ts.S.U. pri Sovietye Ministrov SSSR Chislennost' Naseleniya SSSR po perepisi na 15.1.1959 goda po Respublikam, Kraiyam, Oblastyam, Natsional'nim Okrugam, Raionam, Gorodam, Poselkam Gorodskogo Tipa, Raionnim Tsentram I Krupnim Sel'skim Naselennim Mestam PSA Fr493 O19 D5 L219-223
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 PSA Fr493 O19 D8 L7-8
Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Statisticheskii Byulleten' Chislennost' nalichnogo naseleniya sel'skikh nasellenikh mest s ukazaniyam chislenno preoblasdayushchei natsional'nosti 30.5.1960 PSA Fr493 O19 D10 L90-93
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Spiski Naselennikh Punktov Permskoi Oblasti na 1967g PSA Fr493 O11 D818 L117-131 & 302-304
Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1968g.Raspredeleniye Naselenniya po polu I vozrastu I chislo lits, sostoyashchikh v brakye po Permskoi Oblasti (sel'skoye naseleniye na 1.1.1968g) PSA Fr493 O19 D15 L73-79 & 270-272
Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya I Kulturi Spisok Sovietov Oblasti Pereschitannikh v granitsam raionov na 1 yanvarya 1968 PSA Fr493 O11 D820 L4 & 14

An example of the policy of attracting migrant workers comes from the records of the forestry kombinat *'Komipermles'*, which administered forestry in the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*. In 1956, it presented the following data related to the fulfilment of its Plan for increasing its workforce.

Table 3.8 Fulfilment of the Plan to increase the Workforce, *'Komipermles'*, 1955

Oblast' from which workers came	Resettled families		*Orgnabor*		Seasonal Workers	
	Plan	Fact	Plan	Fact	Plan	Fact
Belorusskaya SSR	800	565	1450	499		
Yaroslavskaya	200	196		63		
Molotovskaya (Permskaya)			1250	285		
Balashovskaya			150	254		
Saratovskaya				306		
Gorkovskaya				221		
Kurskaya				172		
Chkalovskaya			200	297		
Penzenskaya			200	193		
Voronezhskaya			300	82		
Litovskaya			200	191	400	2501
Tatarskaya			300	74	2000	1233
Barda					500	332
Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug					3000	2519
TOTAL	1000	761	4050	2658	9500	6585

Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniye 1970 goda. Raspredeleniye naseleniye po natsional'nosti I chislennost lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietam, gorodam, PGT I sel'skim raitsentram Permskoi Oblasti na 15.1.1970 PSA Fr493 O19 D138 L79-80 & 139

Ts.S.U.SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Chislennost' nalichnogo I postoyannogo naseleniya po kazhdomu sel'skomu naselennomu punktu Permskoi Oblasti (predvaritel'niye itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970g) PSA Fr493 O19 D102 L103-108 & 237-241

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Otdel Truda, Kulturi, Naseleniya I Zdravookhraneniya Spiski Sel'skikh Naselennikh Punktov na 1.1.1972 I Chislennost' naseleniya v nikh PSA Fr493 O11 D1256 L172-186 & 321-323

Otdel Zhilishchno-Kommunal'nogo Khozyaistva I bita Ob'edineniya Spisok Lesnikh Poselkov Predpriyatii Vsesoyuznogo Lesopromishlennogo Ob'edineniya Permlesprom po sostoyaniyu na 1.1.1976.

Source : *Ob'yasnitel'naya Zapiska proizvodstvenno-khozyaistvennoi deyatel'nosti kombinata 'Komipermles' za 1955 god. Nachal'nik kombinata 'Komipermles' V. Gladkikh.* Perm State Archive Fr-1336 O1 D23 L135-172

The table above shows the importance of *Orgnabor*, the recruitment organisation which recruited free workers for unskilled work in arduous locations, to the settlement of the region; although most of the labour came from seasonal workers, *Orgnabor* accounted for a total of 2658 new migrants to the area.

Especially in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, many of the new settlements created in the first half of the century were forestry bases, *uchastoks*, which served simply as temporary sites for forestry workers. Many were in existence for fifteen years or less. Whereas the 1930s and the following two decades saw both a numerical and a spatial expansion of settlement in the two *raioni*, a reversal of the trend was experienced in the 1960s and 70s, which is consistent with the change in Soviet migration policy at the time. With the move away from forced resettlement and exile, towards a policy of wage differentials, the failure to compensate adequately for the additional costs of life at high latitudes led to a reduction in the inflow of population to both *raioni*, as in rural Russia as a whole. The constriction of the rural settlement network was aided by Khrushchev's policy of rationalising rural settlements in the 1950s and 60s.

3.7 The ethnic composition of the population of the north of Perm' oblast.

The history of the settlement of the northern part of Perm'oblast, of a combination of forced and voluntary movement, informed by state policy, meant that the population of the area by the late twentieth century was a mixture of people from

various parts of the Soviet Union. For example, Table 3.8 showed the wide range of different oblasts and Republics from which settlers came to join the workforce of *'Komipermles'* in the mid-1950s.

Receiving, as it did, forced migrants from other regions of the USSR (as well as those resettled from Kosinskii *raion* after the winter of 1933-34), by the 1960s, Krasnovisherskii *raion*'s inhabitants originated from a variety of nationality groups. The village of Vaya was chosen as a place in which to resettle kulaks from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus', and it was also a place of settlement for *zeki* released from 'Visheralag' prison camps. By the mid-1930s the first school had been built in Vaya, and by 1965 it had nine classes. In 1958 the main forestry enterprise of Vaya, "Vaiiskii *Lespromkhoz*" was founded, and the inhabitants of the village relied completely upon the employment it provided. In 1944-45 Vaya was also the destination for ethnic Germans and Crimean Tatars, forcibly resettled by Stalin. Current inhabitants of Vaya include two ethnic Germans who had lived in Ukraine, then in Germany, who came to Russia in 1945 and were moved to Vaya. Although, by May 1960, only one of the settlements of Krasnovisherskii *raion* was registered as being non-Russian[162], the *raion* was home to 2009 Germans, divided almost equally between Krasnovishersk and the rural areas[163]. Ten years later, data for nationalities in the *raion* show that there was a large number of nationality minorities represented; the vast majority of the population was ethnic Russian (32,335 out of a total population of 37,558, i.e. 87%), but there were substantial number of Ukrainians (1034, 3%), less Germans, their number having more than halved over the decade, from 2009 to 919 (0.2%), 939 Belorussians, 865 Tatars, and also Udmurts,

[162] Rutcher-Stoyanka, a tiny settlement with only two inhabitants, both of whom were Tatars

Bashkirians, Chuvashis, Komi-Permians, and others. The minority groups tended on the whole to be located within the town of Krasnovishersk, which had been founded during the period of expansion of settlement in the *raion*, but all were well represented in the villages, especially the Germans and Ukrainians.[164] The ethnic composition of the population of Krasnovisherskii *raion* in 1970 is shown in Table 3.9.

In Kosinskii *raion*, in contrast, the majority of the population was Komi-Permyak, with the ethnic Russians the largest minority. Data are shown in Table 3.10. Data for both *raioni* are depicted in Figures 3.5-3.8[165].

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[163] *Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti* (1959) *Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 (posle mashinnoi razrabotki)*, Perms State Archive, Fr493, O19, D8, L7-8

[164] *Ts.S.U. RSFSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti* (1971) *Itogi Perepisi Upravleniye Naseleniya 1970 goda Raspredeleniye Naseleniya po natsionalnosti I chislennost lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietam, gorodam, PGT I sel'skim raitsentram Permskoi Oblasti na 15.1.1970*, Perm State Archive, Fr493, O19, D138, L139

[165] *Ts.S.U. RSFSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permsko Oblasti. Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda raspredeleniye naseleniya po natsional'nosti i chislennost' lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietam, gorodam, PGT i sel'skim raitsentram Permskoi oblasti na 15.1.1970.* PSA Fr493 O19 D138 L 79-80 & 139
http://www.perm.ru/region/admdel/komi/kos.htm 19/03/99
http://www.perm.ru/region/admdel/*raions*/krasnovish.htm 19/03/99. (Data from Gagarskogo, M.D., Stolbova, V.A. & Sharigina, M.D. (1997) Permskaya oblast': otrasli, regioni, goroda. & The Department of Economics, Perm' oblast administration.

Table 3.9

The ethnic composition of the population of Krasnovisherskii *raion*, 1970 and 1997.

	Percentage of the population			
	1970			**1997**
	RURAL	URBAN (town of Krasnovishersk)	TOTAL	TOTAL
Russian	85.8	86.53	86.1	89.4
Ukrainian	2.58	3.02	2.75	2.4
Belorussian	2.74	2.05	2.5	1.7
Bashkirian	0.27	0.12	0.2	0.2
Tatar	2.25	2.4	2.3	1.6
Udmurt	1.04	0.26	0.73	0.4
Chuvashi	0.64	0.15	0.44	-
Komi-Permian	0.27	0.2	0.24	-
German	1.85	3.34	2.45	-
Other	2.56	1.9	2.29	3.7
Total	100	100	100	100

Source : *Ts.S.U. RSFSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permsko Oblasti. Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda raspredeleniye naseleniya po natsional'nosti i chislennost' lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietam, gorodam, PGT i sel'skim raitsentram Permskoi oblasti na 15.1.1970.* PSA Fr493 O19 D138 L 79-80 & 139
http://www.perm.ru/region/admdel/komi/kos.htm 19/03/99
http://www.perm.ru/region/admdel/*raioni*/krasnovish.htm 19/03/99. (Data from Gagarskogo, M.D., Stolbova, V.A. & Sharigina, M.D. (1997) Permskaya oblast': otrasli, regioni, goroda. & The Department of Economics, Perm' oblast administration.

Figure 3.5
The ethnic composition of the population of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1970




Figure 3.6
The ethnic composition of the population of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1997




Figure 3.7
The ethnic composition of the population of the village of Kosa, Kosinskii raion, 1970




Figure 3.8
The ethnic composition of the population of Kosinskii raion, 1997




Table 3.10

The ethnic composition of the population of the village of Kosa, and of Kosinskii *raion*, 1970 and 1997.

	Percentage of the Population	
	1970 (Village of Kosa)	**1997** (Kosinskii *raion*)
Russian	17.22	23
Ukrainian	0.59	-
Belorussian	0.89	-
Ditovtsi	0.15	-
Tatar	0.3	-
Udmurt	0	-
Chuvashi	0	-
Komi-Permyak	80.36	75
German	0.1	-
Other	0.3	2
Total	100	100

Source : *Ts.S.U. RSFSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permsko Oblasti. Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda raspredeleniye naseleniya po natsional'nosti i chislennost' lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietam, gorodam, PGT i sel'skim raitsentram Permskoi oblasti na 15.1.1970.* PSA Fr493 O19 D138 L 79-80 & 139
http://www.perm.ru/region/admdel/komi/kos.htm 19/03/99
http://www.perm.ru/region/admdel/*raions*/krasnovish.htm 19/03/99. (Data from Gagarskogo, M.D., Stolbova, V.A. & Sharigina, M.D. (1997) Permskaya oblast': otrasli, regioni, goroda. & The Department of Economics, Perm' oblast administration

The data above, and in Figures 3.5-3.8 demonstrate that despite the changes in the ethnic composition of the two *raioni*, the situation in the late 1990s is that both show diversity. Krasnovisherskii *raion* still has a significant number of inhabitants who are not ethnic Russians, and Kosinskii *raion*, although still dominated by Komi-Permians, shows an increased number of Russians, and 2% of its population is still from ethnic groups other than those two.

3.8 Summary

To summarise, it can be seen that the study areas of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* in the north of Perm' oblast have historically formed part of the Russian North, both in terms of their nordicity and remoteness (both geographically and economically) and in terms of the way in which they were utilised as part of the Soviet dual policies of banishment and colonisation. Set against the backdrop of the developmental and settlement history of the Russian North, Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* provide an example of areas at the margins of economic development, having had settlement generated within them at the instruction of Moscow rather than through their inherent characteristics and developmental potential. They are themselves qualitatively different from areas located to the south in that they have experienced the kind of Soviet planned development carried out in Siberia and the Far East, but whilst some of those areas still have viable industry and local economies, the north of Perm' oblast is suffering because its major industry, timber, is under severe stress, facing increased costs and falling prices, and the area is not attractive enough to investors to ensure the development of a replacement economic activity. Having expanded population within the two *raioni*, as part of its scheme of ridding the south and west of the country of undesirables, the Soviet State had the deported employed in forestry and other primary industries, which of themselves were not capable of attracting inmigration. The large number of temporary forestry settlements in both *raioni*, but especially Krasnovisherskii, evidences such activity. By acting outside of the market system, not taking into account the real costs of transportation and production, and by offering large financial

incentives to inmigrants, the Soviet state was able to develop the north of Perm' oblast in a way which was to prove to be unrealistic in a market environment.

The problems of the North have continued into the post-Soviet period. A new law "On State Guarantees and Compensation for People Working and Living in Regions of the Far North and Equivalent Regions" went into effect on June 1st 1993, intending to continue the general concept of the wage increment and cost of living bonus for workers at enterprises, institutions and organisations, regardless of their form of ownership[166]. The 'Northern bonus' is also evident in unemployment benefit payments, where, for example, in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, in 1997, the fact that the *raion* was officially described as 'northern' entitled claimants to an extra 20,000 rubles per month[167]. A measure of the continued importance of the northern bonus is the fact the Perm oblast administration states that one of its key policies towards the north of the oblast is to achieve official recognition as 'northern' for as many of its northern *raioni* as possible, in order to boost the subsidies they receive from the federal budget.

The legacy for the North is not simply that it is economically uncompetitive; as Bond (1994) points out, almost every country in the circumpolar North has had to subsidise the development of its far northern regions at some time. Rather the point is that during the post-Soviet transition, when the economic rationale has changed, more people are living in the Russian North than in similar environments anywhere else. A team of scientists led by economist Aleksandr

[166] Bond, 1994, p300
[167] Although the Northern increment was an addition to unemployment benefit, limited financing meant that it was rarely paid.

Granberg concluded that the area was overpopulated in 1993 by some 20%. So, there is a much larger population in the North than justified by any cost-benefit analysis.

The following chapter deals with the other side of the story of the development of the north of Perm' oblast - the history of forestry in the area. Forestry was, and still is, the major economic activity in the north of Perm' oblast, and its history is very closely associated with the movement of people to the area to form a workforce, and the growth of settlements in the region.

Chapter 4 - Developing the Margin – Forestry in the north of Perm' oblast

4.1 The Russian Forestry Sector
4.2 The origins of forestry in Russia and in the north of Perm' oblast
4.3 Kosinskii Leskhoz
4.4 Krasnovisherskii Leskhoz
4.5 Soviet Forestry and Transition
4.6 Post-Soviet Forestry in Krasnovisherski Raion
4.7 Molevoi Splav and Environmental Management
4.8 Problems and Prospects – the importance of the forest

4 Developing the Margin - Forestry in the north of Perm' oblast

4.1 The Russian Forestry Sector
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4.6 Post-Soviet Forestry in Krasnovisherskii raion
4.7 Molevoi Splav and Environmental Management
4.8 Problems and Prospects – the importance of the forest

This chapter will deal with the development of the north of Perm' oblast as a forestry area, from pre-Revolutionary times to the present day, and will examine how changes in the forestry industry have affected the local population. The previous chapter, which related to the settlement of the area, driven largely by the Soviet policy of development of forestry, has already hinted at the importance of this policy, and it forms the background to this description of the *lespromkhozi*, the rafting of logs and the post-Soviet problems of the area.

4.1 The Russian Forestry Sector

Russia has abundant forest resources. With a forested area of 764 million hectares, or 45% of its territory, it is the world's biggest forest holder. Russia's forests make up 22% of the planet's forest. Forest management was, and still is, organised in a hierarchical system from a central level in Moscow, down to regional and municipal levels. During the Soviet period, the central level, *Minleskhoz* and subsequently *Gosleskhoz*, had to co-ordinate its activities with the Council of

Ministers of the Union Republics as well as with the parallel party structure. Although the system in operation in the Russian Federation today differs in significant ways the main parts of the organisational structure of the Federal Forest Service *(Rosleskhoz)* are still the same.

4.2 The origins of forestry in Russia and in the north of Perm' oblast

During the Middle Ages in Europe there was limited awareness of the forests being a limited resource, but in most countries a property rights system developed to protect the forests of the Crown and of the landlords. Peasants were usually obliged to use forests that no one else claimed as their own, and as most of them lived together in villages, different types of property rights systems developed among them. It is commonly held that an enforced property rights system embracing the forests emerged much later in Russia, with peasants, landlords and the Crown alike harvested timber wherever it was most convenient at the time, regardless of who was the formal owner, and that the mix of private and state forest turned into a *de facto* open access system, the only constraint on which seems to have been the technical equipment used for felling and transportation[168]. However, this theory does not take account of regional variations in forest management in pre-Petrine Russia.

Property rights were enforced under Peter the Great. The Tsar wanted to be able to challenge the military powers in Europe, and he needed to strengthen Russia's navy. Forests therefore became a resource of strategic importance for an

[168] Folinenko, 1993, p15

expanding state power. By 1698 he had entrusted the preservation of the forests to the Judicial Board for Public Lands and Funds. There were various laws relating to the cutting of timber; for example, oak was to be cut only if it was needed for ship construction, and offenders faced the death penalty. Logging of other trees was regulated according to the tree diameter, and those not following the rules were fined. Although more than six million hectares of forest disappeared during the reign of Peter the Great, his management system survived into the first decade after the 1917 Revolution. In 1718, he had ordered the governor in Kazan to set up forest inspection, and within a year, all other *gubernias* had followed suit. The Russian Forest Department was created in 1798, with the forests being managed by provincial forest departments, which in turn were divided into forest management units. The Forest Department was under the jurisdiction of the Navy, until 1811, when it was reorganised as the Forest Division in the Department of State Property under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. During the 19th century, the demand for timber began to have an adverse effect on the climate and river systems in central Russia, and it became clear that the open access system was unsustainable. By the end of the 19th century, recommendations concerning felling practices, reforestation and so on were issued, and the first Russian forest tax was imposed in 1898. From then on, logging companies harvesting state forests were either charged to reforest the area cut, or to pay the Crown the estimated cost of reforestation.[169]

The history of commercial forestry in the Urals region began with the production of charcoal under Peter the Great, for use in smelting iron ore and copper. Because of the Tsar's military requirements, the mining of iron nore had increased

[169] Malmlof, T. (1998)

more than that of any other mineral since 1600, and this increase originated almost entirely from the Urals, where the ore was of a high quality, and where there were vast reserves of timber for charcoal (Parker, 1968 : 112). The first areas of forest utilised were those in the immediate vicinity of the factories themselves, or those which lay alongside rivers on which logs could be rafted. For this reason, a number of areas; those around the factories and the nearby rivers, became exhausted. At the end of the 19th century, a time during which the market demand for timber in the area of the Lower Volga was high, intensive timber cutting and transportation began, through the Kama to the Volga. The cutting of timber for the Lower Volga area was driven by the forestry merchants to the south, who bought the timber and processed it themselves. Trees were cut from the areas alongside the riverbanks, their trunks dragged to the river by horses, and then they were rafted on the Kama and the Volga.

A transition to more organised forestry was to follow; before the Revolution the forested area of Perm' region was divided between several categories of proprietor in the following manner.

The State Forestry Department	64.2%
Private owners *(Chasnovladel'cheskiye)*	18.9%
Peasants	7.9%
State Mining Bases	4.6%
Sessional *(posessioniye)*	3.6%

The peasants and mining bases received forest situated in the middle and southern Urals, whereas that of the Forestry Department was located in the north. Officials of the Forestry Department supervised uses of the forest. The forest received by the peasants was far-flung and not of the best quality.

After the Revolution, all forests were nationalised, and formed part of the State Forest Fund. From then on, in accordance with the Forest Code, the forests of Perm' region was divided into those of State (national) and those of local importance. This separation took place in 1926.

Between 1918 and 1923 the forest of state importance was administered by the Guberniya's forest office, and, with the liquidation of the guberniya, by the local forestry offices of the Urals oblast, which was subordinate to the central government's forestry department.

In 1929, the first year of the first Five-Year Plan, all the forest of the Perm' region administered by the *GosLesFond* was transferred to the control of the *NarKomLesa*. Local forestry areas (*lesnichestva*) were liquidated, and in place of them were established *lespromkhozi*, and their administration was immediately given the tasks of forest management, and timber cutting. *Lespromkhozi* had their own local production areas, the *uchastok*, so, for example Dobryanskii *lespromkhoz* had within it three *uchastka*, Kos'vinskii, Dobryanskii and Palazinskii. The majority of the *lespromkhozi* were grouped together under the Trust *'UralZapadLes'* (Western Urals Forest).

In 1936, a water protection zone was organised in the Perm'[170] region, and all of the *lespromkhozi* within the basin of the Kama were reorganised into *leskhozi*. At the same time, a scheme of forest protection and replanting was drawn

[170] During part of the Soviet period, Perm' was known as Molotov. For clarity, the name Perm' will be used throughout.

up at the national level. *Leskhozi* became subordinate to the Perm' Territorial Administration of Forest Protection and Reafforestation, which in turn was subordinate to the State Department of Forest Protection and Reafforestation.

As Barr (1972 : 93) writes, in the post World War II years, the agency responsible for forestry practices in the USSR was changed or reorganised on an average of once every four years, never achieving a management institution with the authority and efficiency of an organisation such as the U.S. Forestry Service.

In 1947 a decree by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (April 4th) replaced the State Department of Forest Protection and Reafforestation with the Ministry for Forestry, and all the forest was handed over to the control of organisations of this Ministry. In the place of the Perm' Territorial Administration of Forest Protection and Reafforestation, the area became part of the Urals Ministry of Forestry.

The State Ministry of Forestry was abolished in 1953, and forests were transferred to the control of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR, with the subordination of the local branch to the Perm' oblast Administration of Agriculture. In turn, the Perm' oblast Administration of Agriculture was subordinate to the State Department of Forest Management and the Efficient Utilisation of Forest of the Ministry of Agriculture of the RSFSR[171].

4.3 Kosinskii Les'khoz

Before the revolution, the forest of Kosinskii *leskhoz* was the private property of Counts Stroganov, Golitsin, and Lazarev (who also owned Vurlamskii, Lologskii and a part of Chazevskii forestry areas). After the Revolution, the forest was transferred to the Kosinskii *leskhoz*, which in 1930 came under the administration of *NarKomLes*, and the forest fund located within the then *lespromkhoz* became part of the Trust '*UralZapadLes*'.

In 1936, Kosinskii *lespromkhoz* was changed into a *leskhoz*[172], and at the time it was made up of five *uchastki*; Vurlamo-Lologskoye (which was later to be sub-divided), Solymskoye, Chazevskoye, Kosinskoye, and Varishano-Churakovskoye. In 1940 the *leskhoz* was taken over by the *GosLesFond,* and its area was fixed at between 461 and 486 hectares. In 1939-1940 there was an inquiry into the forest of Kosinskii *leskhoz*, and a plan for reafforestation was drawn up. At the same time, the *leskhoz* was redivided into six areas; Varishano-Churakovskoye, Vurlamskoye, Kosinskoye, Lologskoye, Solymskoye and Chazevskoye, now called *lesnichestva.*[173]

Figure 4.1 shows Kosinskii *Lespromkhoz* as it stood in 1949.[174]

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[171] *Ministerstvo Lesnogo Khozyaistva Permskoye Oblastnoye Upravleniye Lesnogo Khozyaistva.* (1969) *Dokumental'nikh Materialov Postoyannogo Sroka Khraneniya za 1926-1956-1960g.* Perm State Archive F554 O2 I1

[172] This change meant that the woodcutting activities of the enterprises were functionally separated from wood processing. *Lespromhozi* had carried out both timber cutting and wood processing – *leskhozi*, on the other hand, did not perform wood processing ; instead, they supplied separate wood processing enterprises with raw materials.

[173] ibid.

[174] *Ministerstvo lesnoi I Bumazhnoi Promishlennosti SSSR Glavlesbumproyekt Uralskoye otdeleniv proyektirovaniyu lesozagotovitel'nikh u fabrichno-zavodikukh predpriyatii Tekhnicheskii Proyekt Ziminskogo LZP tresta 'KomiPermLes' na baz'e avtomobil'noi dorogi. (1949) Skhematicheskii Plan Kosinskogo l/khoza Molotovskogo upravleniye l/khozyaistva* Perm State Archive Fr-554 O-3 D-96 L-22 (Map redrawn from original).




Figure 4.1

Kosinskii *Lespromkhoz* in 1949.

4.4 Krasnovisherskii Leskhoz

The history of Krasnovisherskii *leskhoz* is more difficult to trace because archival material is more scarce. It is known that after the Revolution, Krasnovisherskii *leskhoz* was nationalised. Between 1918 and 1929, the *leskhoz* was divided into *uchastki,* Akchimskoye, Zavodskoye, Verkh-Visherskoye, Vostochnoye, Govorlivskoye, and Kutimskoye. Between these two dates the uchastki were independent administrative-economic units, under the jurisdiction of the Perm' Guberniya Forestry Department, and after 1923 they were controlled by the central administration for forestry, *NarKomLes*.

Without doubt, Krasnovisherskii *leskhoz* underwent many alterations, but material detailing these changes, unlike for Kosinskii *raion*, is unavailable[175].

4.5 Soviet Forestry and Transition

As Barr (1988) writes, a response to the poor performance of the forest industries in the USSR often came in the form of ministerial reorganisation. The ministries, which oversaw many of the forest-related branches of the national economy, were unified, disaggregated and then reunified, in an attempt to reduce wastage and increase efficiency, and the changes were also in response to increasing concerns about environmental damage caused by the timber industry, which will be discussed further in section 4.7.

On November 14th 1959, through decree No 1820, the Soviet of Ministers abolished the State Administration of Forest Management and Efficient Utilisation of Forest, and organised the Administration of Forestry and Forest Protection of the RSFSR. On December 18th of the same year, by order of the Administration for forest industry of Perm *Sovnarkhoz*, and Perm Administration of Agriculture, the local Administration of Forestry was abolished.

The responsibility for attracting technology and workers to wood processing enterprises and organisations for the achievement of logging, forest management and forest restoration work was laid upon Perm *Sovnarkhoz*, within which had been organised an independent administration (Administration of Forest Industry of Perm *Sovnarkhoz*), especially to provide labour for forestry. Perm' *Sovnarkhoz* was one of the regional economic councils set up in the mid-1950s, which administered civilian industrial and building enterprises of other than purely local significance[176].

The *leskhozi* were united into four larger units;

Kombinat *'Uralzapadles'* (Kolvinskii, Krasnovisherskii, Cherdinskii, Solikamskii, Bereznikovskii, Chermozskii, Kiz'elovskii, Pashiiskii, Alexandrovskii and Kos'vinskii *lespromkhozi*)

Kombinat 'Komipermles' (Gai'inskii, *Kosinskii*, Yurlinskii, Kudymkarskii)

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[175] ibid.
[176] Nove, 1992, p353

Trust '*Prikamles*' (Dobryanskii, Lis'venskii, Sivinskii. Permsko-Ilyinskii, Permskii, V-Gorodkovskii, Okhanskii, Kungurskii, Kishertskii, Osinskii, Saigatskii, Kuedinskii, Shuch'ye-Ozerskii, Prigorodnii)

Chusovskii *Lespromkhoz* (Chusovskii)

Within these larger units there were fifty-seven *leskhozi* (Appendix 2).

During the 1960s there were various changes to the local level delineation of the *leskhozi*, and in the general administration of forestry in the oblast, and on the basis of a decree of the Perm Administration of Forest Management and Protection, of 19 November 1965 (No 20), the geographical arrangement of *leskhozi* was changed and simplified, so that the fifty-seven *leskhozi* of 1959 were now reduced to thirty (Appendix 3). In the same year, the Soviet Union had implemented a decree which officially had the intention of increasing managerial powers and reducing the control passed down from the centre, but the actual effect was to centralise planning and ministerial powers in Moscow. This decree eliminated the *Sovnarkhozi*, and restored the individual ministries. Most of the ministries were All-Union, hence the centralisation of power in Moscow.

In December 1965, Order No 30 was issued from the Ministry of Forestry, Cellulose-Paper and Wood-Processing Industry. It decreed the renaming of the Perm Association of Forestry and Rafting Enterprises, calling it the 'Perm Association of Forest Industry', or '*PermLesProm*', and name which was to remain until the mid-1990s. *PermLesProm* was the overarching enterprise under which all timbercutting, forestry management, wood-processing papermaking, and all the

subsidiary interests, such as housebuilding and forestry technology colleges in the oblast, were united and administered.

Following the centralising decree of 1965, from 1966 until the fall of the Soviet Union, the USSR State Forestry Committee (*Gosles'khoz*) continually administered most forests. The industrial ministry, however, was not so constant. Before 1968, forest industries were controlled by the Ministry of Forestry, Cellulose-Paper and Wood-Processing Industry, which was then split into two divisions, the Ministry of Timber and Woodworking, and the Ministry of Pulp and Paper. Following years of arguments between the Ministries, and attempts to distribute blame for production shortfalls, the ministries were recombined in 1980 into *Minlesbumprom.*

During the 1970s, there was a period of reorganisation in the administration of the forestry industry, whereby the number of levels of management was reduced from five to three. Below the Ministry there were a number of *obyedineniye*, and under these the enterprises themselves. In some areas a four-tier system of management was maintained, with combines forming a layer of management above the individual enterprise but below the *obyedineniye*. The four-tier system was to be found in areas where combines formed an important management level prior to the reorganisation. Some of the former combines had been put directly under the control of the Ministry, effectively becoming *obyedineniye* in their own right.

As well as the *obyedineniye* and combines, there were also a number of Republic Ministries that came under the control of the central Ministry. Under *Minlesbumprom,* then, there were 25 *obyedineniye* and combines concerned with logging. Within each *obyedineniye* or combine there were a series of 'forest industrial economies', or *lespromkhozi*, over 600 in all. These were the basic planning units in the Soviet logging industry. The number of *lespromkhozi* that came under the control of the higher level of management varied from one part of the country to another, but it usually lay between fifteen and forty. The Five-Year Plans that *Minlesbumprom* was required to fulfil were broken down into one-year plans, which were expressed at the *lespromkhoz* level. Each *lespromkhoz* was allocated an area of forest which was to be logged during the enterprise's operational life.

Under the jurisdiction of each *lespromkhoz* were a number of *lesopunkts*, or 'independent' logging areas. Usually there were between two and four such areas attached to each *lespromkhoz*. Each consisted of an area of forest to be logged, a series of roads, tracks, occasionally railways, depots with the tractors, saws and other equipment required for operations, a repair and maintenance department, a number of landings and a *nizhnii sklad*, or lower landing. The lower landing for each *lesopunkt* acted as a storage depot and sorting yard for the timber logged within its area and as a point of preliminary log breakdown.

Each individual logging area had a number of 'brigades' of about four men, attached to an upper landing, and under the leadership of a brigadier, or foreman. These groups represented the lowest level of planning in common use in Soviet forestry, and each *lespromkhoz* would break down its annual plan into plans for

the various brigades operating in its area. The trees in a brigade'sustainability area were usually felled by chain saw, and once felled, a tree would have been delimbed on the forest floor by means of a chain saw, or taken to the upper landing and delimbed there where conditions were a little easier, although the upper landing was usually no more than an area of level ground cleared for the purpose of delimbing and loading. The timber would usually be dragged ('skidded') along the forest floor by tractor, or by a grapple skidder, to the upper landing. Once the timber reached the upper landing, it would be loaded onto a vehicle to be taken to the lower landing, although usually it would be stockpiled for a while before transportation. Timber would be transferred from the upper to the lower landing by truck. Once at the lower landing, the timber was unloaded, and then processed and stockpiled for further transportation. At the smaller lower landings, such as those in the north of Perm' oblast, relatively few processing procedures would be carried out, other than forming rafts of timber to be floated downstream. In many such cases, the timber would be floated loose, and the lower landing would be little more then the bank of the river. During the winter, work at lower landings such as these would consist of just laying the timber in rafts or loose on the frozen river to await the spring thaw.[177]

The system of breaking down the State Plans sent to the *lespromkhozi* into smaller parts was in evidence before the 1970s. For example, plans for the Vaiiskii *lespromkhoz* in the early 1960s show that each *lesopunkt* was allocated a portion of the total planned output.

[177] Blandon, 1983, p55-70

Table 4.1 Output of Felled Timber for Vaiiskii *Lespromkhoz*, 1963

Lesopunkt	Output in 1962 (thousand m^3)	Planned Output for 1963	Output in 1963	1963 Output as a % of Plan	1963 Output as a % of 1962
Velsovskii	65.1	65	62.8	96.5	96.4
Gor'yevskii	50.2	50.5	44.7	88.6	89
Zolotanskii	58.8	64	59.6	93.1	101.5
Vaiiskii	43.2	48.5	41.5	85.5	96
Sosnovskii	48.7	52	51	98	104

Source : *Vaiiskii Lespromkhoz kombinata 'Uralzapadoles' Zapadno-Ural'skogo Sovnarkhoza (Jan 1964) Ob'yaznitel'naya Zapiska k godavomu otcheti o khozyaistvenno-finansovoi deyatel'nosti Vaiskogo lespromkhoza za 1963 god* Perm State Archive, Fr1074, O1, D299, L98-116

The archive also contains the following account of some of the difficulties faced by the Vaiiskii *lespromkhoz* in fulfilling its Plan for 1963. The *lespromkhoz* had been unable to attain the levels of production required by the Plan, and it offered this by way of an explanation.

> There was a large outlay of labour in preparation and subsidiary work. According to the Plan, 1000 cubic metres of timber requires an outlay of 195 working days, but in fact, the *lespromkhoz* required 218 such days to produce 1000 cubic metres. Over and above the Plan, labour outlay in preparation and subsidiary work was essential. In the spring-summer and autumn, the *lespromkhoz* carries out the 'carting out' of timber. The banks of the Vishera River were fully cleared, and there was no place within three kilometres of a *lesopunkt* where a sufficient area could be felled to provide timber to be carted out without the transfer of additional labour to that place. During this period, small brigades were transferred several times from one place to another. At the end of April and May, brigades were transferred to timber felling areas where it was possible to cart out timber to the banks of the river, and to which it was possible to organise the transferral of people by motor vehicle. At the time of *rasputitsi* (bad roads), the workers travelled on foot. After the *splav*, the brigades were again transferred to the timber cutting areas, to which it was possible to organise transportation by boat. After the level of water in the Vishera River fell, the brigades travelled to new cutting areas on foot. In the autumn, the brigades were transferred in such a manner no fewer than three times.[178]

[178] *Vaiiskii Lespromhoz kombinata 'Uralzapadoles' Zapadno-Uralskogo Sovnarkhoza (Jan 1964) Ob'yaznitel'naya Zapiska k godavomu otcheti o khozyaistvenno-finansovoi deyatel'nosti Vaiskogo lespromkhoza za 1963 god.*. Perm State Archive, Fr1074, O1, D299, L98-116, p5-6

In 1987 the Soviet system of branch administration began to be dismantled. One of the stated goals of *perestroika* was the curtailment of central bureaucracy, and a crucial element of this was the 1987 Law on State Enterprises, which greatly extended the powers of enterprise managers. This was the starting point for a wave of Ministerial reorganisations, beginning in 1988, which transformed entire ministries, or their subunits, into state-owned 'concerns' or 'associations'. Compared to other cases, the transformation of the timber industry was both slower and less successful.[179]

In 1988, *PermLesProm* was made a Territorial Production Complex in conjunction with Order No 72 of *Minlesprom* USSR (16 July). A territorial production complex was a planned aggregate of interconnected units of the sectors of the economy (such as industry, agriculture and construction) located in a relatively compact area (Appendix 4). The status of the enterprise remained unchanged until after the break-up of the Soviet Union, when, in 1992, it became a joint-stock company, under the same name.

By 1991, the crucial step towards corporatisation in Soviet forestry had been taken, with the creation of a 'state corporation' called *Rossiiskie lesopromyshlenniki*. Headed by a former deputy minister, Igor Sankin, this entity retained basic managerial functions, with regard to enterprises in the industry, but it did not outlast the end of the year, and even during its short existence it was undermined by secession. After the demise of the USSR, reform began to affect the forest industry. As in other sectors of the economy, managerial rights were

[179] Lehmbruch, B. (1998) in Carlsson, *et al*, 1998, p33

transferred to the newly created State Property agency. *Rossiiskie lesopromyshlenniki* was abolished as a state corporation, becoming instead the nucleus of a Timber Industry Department (again headed by Sankin), within the new, encompassing Ministry of Industry. The new agency, however, did not last long, as the Ministry itself was liquidated in July 1992, after only nine months of existence. Although other departments regained organisational independence in some form, no successor organisation was formed for the timber industry.

In 1992, it was decided that all firms above a certain level of employment and assets, except for those on the prohibited list (space exploration, health, and education for example), were to be corporatised; in other words, they were to re-register as joint-stock companies with 100% of equity owned by the government, a corporate charter, and a board of directors. This corporatisation significantly reduced the power of central ministries, as firms were governed by their boards of directors rather than by industrial ministers, and ministries lost their legal control over firms[180].

When '*PermLesProm*' became a joint-stock company in 1992, it was one of the vast majority of Russian firms which were converted into open joint-stock companies, rather than closed companies owned by their workers and managers, following the pattern of collective farms. Closed joint-stock companies have many problems; they cannot raise capital, they do not easily accommodate conflicts between the owners, and their managers cannot be removed through external governance mechanisms. As Boycko *et al* (1995) point out, the trouble with running large

[180] Boycko et al, 1995

industrial firms as partnerships of managers and workers is that this organisational form usually does not work. Raising capital and resolving disputes between shareholders become insurmountable problems.

When '*PermLesProm*' was privatised, it set up a scientific-technical association; which had the following tasks:

- Reconstruction and technical re-equipping of production, introduction of new technical equipment and technology, mechanism and automation of production.
- Economy of resources, introduction of resource-conservation technology
- Improvement of the system of management and administration, in market conditions.
- Increase in technical levels and the quality of products.
- Creation of safe working conditions, and fire prevention.
- Development of production of goods for general consumption (consumer goods)
- Scientific-technical creative work, labour and youth
- Protection of local resources
- Social development of enterprise branches, in the spheres of services to the population.

In December 1992, the Russian government created yet another organisation to undertake the more mundane tasks of Russian forestry, the science funding and the research co-ordination. *'Roslesprom'* was to become the nucleus of the later state committee. In the first three years of its existence, acting outside of its

original limits, *Roslesprom* built up some fairly profitable commercial enterprises, and positioned itself at the centre of public-private interaction in the timber industry. However, by the end of the three years, its attempt to remonopolise the industry had failed, and *Roslesprom* was in decline.

In 1994 the joint stock Company '*PermLesProm*' folded, and the constituent parts of the enterprise became independent, and themselves became joint-stock companies. In general, they have faced problems similar to those outlined above; in their attempts to attract sponsors and profit individually, the smaller enterprises have encountered severe financial hardship, and with lack of knowledge of market conditions, they have been poorly equipped to carry out privatisation. Many have become bankrupt, and the social infrastructure they once supported has been transferred to the control of local administrations.[181]

A further complication of the situation is that of the new federal Russian Forest Code. The new Code preserves federal ownership of forests, and it completely replaces the 1993 Basis of Forestry legislation and related forestry regulations that were previously in force. The Code confirms that fact that the Forest Service is striving to become the single owner of the land under the forest fund, and although it contains a provision allowing transfer of a part of the forest fund into the ownership of the regions, the actual procedure for transferring forests into regional ownership is not laid out in detail, and a future struggle over this issue can be expected.[182]

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[181] Unnamed Fund, 1966-1994 Perm' State Archive F1328 O1 L1-18

The loss of the overarching enterprise '*PermLesProm*' has led to fragmentation in forestry enterprises at the local level. The situation in Krasnovisherskii *raion* offers an example.

4.6 Post-Soviet Forestry in Krasnovisherskii raion

In 1993, the forestry sector of Krasnovisherskii *raion* consisted of the following legally registered companies; in wood processing AO (joint-stock company) *'Visherogorsk'*, AO '*Mutikha-les'*, AO *'Vaya-Les'*, the firm *'Forest-Vels'*, AO *'Vishera-Les'*, AO *'Taiga'*, and three *leskhozi*; *Krasnovisherskii*, *Vaiiskii*, and *Visherskii Mezhdukhozyaistvennii*. There was also the timbercutting and rafting company AO *'Ust-Yazvinskii Splavnoi raid'*, and there were two smaller businesses for wood processing, *'Vishera'* and *'Vetlan'*, as well as AO *'Stroitel''*, *'Motov'* and *'Remontno-mechanicheskii zavod'* (machine repair workshop).[183]

The forest complex bound together 19,300 people, inhabitants of sixteen villages, and the town of Krasnovishersk. 5090 worked in the enterprises of the forestry sector. With the arrival of the 'Zona' (the state prison camp) in the forestry villages, more than 600 families of skilled workers left the *raion*. The volume of timber production by the enterprises of the *raion* at that time was 800,000-1,100,000 cubic metres annually. AO *'Visherabumprom'*, the paper factory in Krasnovishersk, processed 400-600 cubic metres of timber each year, and produced

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[182] Taiga News, 20. March 1997. (http://www.sll.fi/TRN/TaigaNews/News20/RussiaLaw.html) October 16th, 1998

[183] AO 'Visherogorsk' was active in the villages of Myasnaya, Visherogorsk, and Malii Shugor; AO '*Mutikha-Les'* in Mutikha; AO '*Vaya-Les'* in Vaya and Vels, *'Forest-Vels'* in Vels; AO *'Vishera-Les'* in Zolotanka and Sipuchi; AO '*Taiga'* in Storozhevaya, Tsepel, Volinka, Romanikha and Severnii

40-43,000 tonnes of paper. The Zona finally closed in 1990. In 1992 there was a sharp fall in the volume of timber produced (in 1991 exports were 496,000 cubic metres, in 1992 474,000). Growth of the prime cost of timber, and in consequence, the cost of paper, meant that the AO '*Visherabumprom*' could not sell more than 4,000 tonnes of paper in 1993, to pay the wood processing workers of the *raion*. Many wood processing companies in turn did not pay their workers between April and June of 1993, which caused a deterioration in work discipline. Firms could not make payments to bank creditors on time.

As a consequence of the financial difficulties of the forestry firms, the *raion* was compelled to make deductions from its budget to support the infrastructure of the forestry villages, which had previously been supported by the enterprises. Schools, clinics, nursery schools, clubs and so on were taken on by the budget of the local administration, which also had to undertake the financial support of the dependants of AO '*Visherabumprom*', such as the bath-house, the sports stadium and the cultural centre in Krasnovishersk.

By summer 1993, the situation in the forestry industry of the *raion* had become aggravated and tense. The output of timber for the first six months of the year was 200,000 tonnes, compared to 300,000 for the same period of the previous year. Problems regarding the possibilities of sale of timber still had to be resolved.

In AO '*Visherabumprom*', the volume of production of paper between January and July 1993 was 8,400 tonnes, compared to 14,600 in the same period of

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Kolchim; and AO 'Ust-Yaz'vinskii Splavnoi Raid in Ust'-Yaz'va, Bakhari, Govorlivoye and Danilov Lug.

the previous year. The volume of log rafting had also fallen by a factor of twenty since the last year of Soviet rule.

By the summer of 1993, practically all the forestry enterprises of the *raion* were insolvent. The sum of debts of the enterprises, in terms of unpaid wages, bank debts, creditor debt and so on, exceeded the value of goods in the warehouses. The main cause of this unsatisfactory situation was seen to be the lack of a market for the sale of goods, both within the *raion* and beyond its boundaries, as well as the low productivity of labour, high cost of products, and irrational use of credit which were also being blamed.

Responses to the situation were being debated in 1993; a governmental programme recommended that AOs *'Vaya-Les'*, *'Mutikha-Les'* and *'Visherabumprom'* should merge into a mixed trading and processing entity, that AO 'Taiga' must finish its evidently incomplete process of becoming a joint-stock company, and that AO *'Visherales'* should merge with the firm *'Orion'*. Recommendations were also made regarding the necessity for forestry enterprises to cooperate with the local administration regarding the infrastructure and amenities of the forestry villages.

In addition to its recommendations, the Federal government also promised cash. It claimed that it would grant AO *'Visherabumprom'* long-term state credit (3-5 years) for reconstruction of the enterprise, and for the development of competitive products, a complete package of 200-250 million rubles annually. It also promised compensation to the enterprises for losses associated with the withdrawal of

the Zona (such as the loss of a buyer of fuelwood), and to take on the maintenance of roads, for which the enterprises had previously been responsible[184].

However, by early 1994, the relations between the *raion* and the Federal government had worsened. The Deputy Head of the Perm oblast Administration, E.S.Sapiro, visited the *raion* in March 1994, to explain the strategy being undertaken by the oblast on behalf of the forestry villages.

> We, workers in the administration of the oblast, are continually putting questions before the government of the Federation, about the necessity for subsidy of the forestry industry from the Federal budget, but without success. The chance of a positive resolution of these problems is almost nil.

Sapiro put forward two main responses to the predicament in which the villages found themselves; to close all the villages which did not have the capacity to support themselves, or to find a foreign investor such as a foreign firm, to throw a lifeline to the inhabitants. The latter was as unlikely as it sounded.

Sapiro also acknowledged another cloud on the horizon for the forestry villages. In 1987, the Soviet of Ministers of the RSFSR had issued a decree "Concerning the closure of rivers and other water bodies of the RSFSR to log rafting" (25.9.1987, No.384), aimed at reducing the environmental damage done to Soviet rivers by the large volumes of logs which were rafted on them annually. According to the decree, the Vishera and its tributaries were to be closed by the end of 1995. Despite the collapse of the USSR, the closure was still to go ahead. In the penultimate year of rafting in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, Sapiro expressed concern for

[184] *Krasnaya Vishera* 22.7.1993

the paper plants downstream of the *raion*, which depended upon rafted timber. He concluded

> We are troubled by the situation regarding the *splav* (rafting). Soon timber rafting will be non-existent, and indeed, in the oblast, giants of industry have stopped working, like Solikamskii, Krasnokamskii and Permskii paper producers. You must prepare for the *splav*, and not lose a minute.[185]

After the final season of rafting on the Vishera, the structure of the forestry industry of the *raion* was in flux, and business ethics were not always constant. The situation of AO '*Visherales*' is an example. '*Visherales*' had become a joint-stock company in the early 1990s, and it was active in the villages of Zolotanka and Sipuchi. In 1993, some of the directors of the company formed the firm 'Orion', and in March 1994 they arranged a trading relationship between 'Orion' and '*Visherales*', and prepared to set up in Mutikha. In July they bought the firm, intending to connect it to a mechanical-repair workshop. However, by January 1995 they were insolvent, with debts exceeding credit by a factor of five. By March 1995, the directors were all asking for their share of 'Orion', and by June they were considering handing the firm over to the *raion* administration. In September 1995, the directors were talking about acquiring technical machinery in preparation for work in the autumn-winter period, the major timbercutting season, in connection with their parent firm, 'Green Branch', of Solikamsk. A.V.Koltsov, the head of 'Green Branch' pleaded for the firms not to accuse each other as he described the situation.

> We have our own interests in the Vishera area, and we are also shareholders in *'Visherales'*. In 1994, we collaborated with the firm 'Orion'. At the basis of our co-operation with AOs *'Visherales'*, *'Taiga'* and *'Stroitel''* was our intention to create a single, powerful forestry enterprise, but alas..... it didn't happen. We co-operated with *'Visherales'*, investing about two million rubles. We have also known for a long time

[185] *Krasnaya Vishera* 1.4.1994

that the firm *'Orion'* acquired 17.6% of the shares of AO *'Visherales'*, and that it possessed a controlling share.[186]

The lack of experience in a competitive market situation is evident in the dealings regarding *'Visherales'*. In October 1995, the firm finally folded.

> With high hopes for a better life we took the decision to become a joint-stock company. At that time, in this hall, there was not enough room for all the shareholders. We all thought that we were the owners of property and the means of production, we had strong, true voices at the meeting, and we were bound to succeed in changing the attitude of people to labour, to making profit. But alas....that did not happen.
>
> (P.F.Syusyusin, General Director of AO *'Visherales'* at the last meeting of the shareholders, 31 October, 1995,[187]

The closure of the Vishera to free floating was as damaging as might have been expected. Syusyusin said

> Because of the withdrawal of the Vishera river from *splav*, and because of the absence of forest cargo vehicles, the continual use of roads, and the lack of capability to replace technical equipment, the lack of spare parts and engine oil, we have hardly produced half as much timber as we did in 1994.

An interview with the Chairman of the Vaya *leskhoz* in March 1996 revealed a tense situation;

> Our volume of production, of course, is paltry. Earlier, when we lived off woodcutting, we produced between 20 and 22,000 cubic metres annually, a third of which was produced in the first quarter of the year. Now, we're just doing the sanitary felling (the felling necessary to preserve the forest's commercial viability, removal of dead and diseased timber, i.e. not felling for profit). It's shameful to speak of a plan. In the four *lesnichestva*, just 1,000 cubic metres are produced per quarter. The machinery is failing, and we haven't got any engine oil. The enterprise has five tractors, a bulldozer, a timber truck, and several cargo vehicles, and we have our own saws. Of course, over the last year, its all been twisted around to generate income. Forestry workers are producing food on their plots, and people are holding out for the enterprise.[188]

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[186] *Krasnaya Vishera* 10.11.1995
[187] ibid.

The inactivity of the *leskhoz* in Vaya was not the village's only economic problem in 1996. V.N.Bogdanov, head of the firm 'Vishera' spoke about their problems.

> In 1994 and 1995 we worked in Vels and in Vaya. Since November 1995 we have been working only in Vaya. Now only one forestry brigade is employed in timbercutting, and the second brigade is sawing the wood, under the lease of AO *'Vaya-Les'*. It would be good if we could have two brigades in Vaya, but we don't have the machinery, and there isn't any engine oil. I would have liked the sawmill to have been working round the clock. In March 1996, AO *'Vaya-Les'* admitted bankruptcy, and it is going to sell off all its machinery. The sawmills are going to be bought, and then there'll be no work at all in Vaya.

V.I. Ivanov, Executive Director of AO *'Vaya-Les'*, and engineer in the Vaya section of AO *'Stroitel''*, described the situation.

> Yes, AO *'Vaya-Les'* is bankrupt. Now we need to gather together all the debts and credits, and determine when and how to sell the property of the enterprise, and to pay off the staff. There are more than thirty of them. The main thing is that I don't know what or how to sell. We have seven tractors, five forestry vehicles, two bulldozers and so on. All of it has been leased to AO *'Stroitel''* since the first of January of this year. They have used the machinery intensively; they had three brigades in Vels, and five in Vaya, and they worked hard. But now AO *'Vaya-Les'* has to sell off the machinery. Who can buy the scraps of *'Vaya-Les'*?[189]

4.7 'Molevoi splav' and environmental management

As discussed earlier, the administration of forestry in the USSR was in a seemingly constant state of change from one organisation or agency to another, in response to moves by Moscow to increase efficiency, reduce wastage, and to try to tackle growing environmental problems associated with the timber industry. The

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[188] *Krasnaya Vishera* 29.4.1996
[189] *Krasnaya Vishera* 29.3.1996

felling of trees can cause soil erosion, destroy wildlife habitats, increase stream sediment, damage fish runs, and alter local microclimatic conditions. Within Soviet forestry, there were additional problems, associated with the ways in which forestry was carried out; loggers could assume that, since the time taken for them to exhaust a given felling area was shorter than the time take for the forest to regenerate, they could abandon the felled area without having to spend time and money on conservation measures, since they themselves would not be harvesting the area again. Logging enterprises did not have permanent responsibility for a given tract of land, so the incentive to carry out rehabilitation work was low (Barr, 1972 : 96)

There were additional problems, such as the considerable felled area left to reseed itself by means of residual seed trees (Barr, 1972 : 97). Regeneration in these areas was often of aspen and birch, rather than the more valuable coniferous trees which had been extracted.

Apart from the problems associated with the felled areas themselves, a major environmental hazard assiciated with forestry was that of the transportation of timber. The term *'molevoi splav'* refers to the free floating of tree trunks from logging areas to downstream processing sites. In the Soviet Union, rafting was a major means of timber transportation; in 1950 over half of all the timber logged by the Ministry of Forestry was dispatched from lower landings by water, and by the 1970s the figure still stood at 37%, with about 60% of that total being loose floated.[190] Water transportation had a great advantage over other methods, in that it was far cheaper. Maintenance of rivers for rafting was forty times cheaper than the maintenance of the

[190] Ibid.

same length of road, and sixty times cheaper than the maintenance of narrow-gauge railways. The cost of transporting timber by river was given as one kopeck per cubic metre kilometre compared with 3.2 for the same unit on an average road in the 1970s.[191] In the north of Perm' oblast, such rafting was the major method of timber transportation from the logging areas of the north to the paper and pulp factories located to the south. For example, the paper plant '*Visherabumprom*' in Krasnovishersk was supplied with logs rafted on the Vishera from Vaya and other timbercutting settlements upstream, and likewise, paper plants such as the one at Solikamsk, and others as far south as the city of Perm' itself, were supplied with wood rafted down the Vishera and Kama Rivers.

Although rafting was crucial to the forestry industry, especially that of the north of Perm' oblast, where there are very few railways and where the roads are largely unmetalled, this method of timber transportation is not without its drawbacks. It was very difficult to prevent some of the timber sinking during the journey, and sunken timber causes environmental problems. Ammonia, phosphate and polyphenols are among the toxic products of timber degradation, and the effect of the release of such chemicals is that the waterway concerned becomes starved of oxygen. In addition, fungal growths on the wood itself occur, and then decompose, further depleting the oxygen supply. The overall consequence is a loss of many biological species leading to an imbalance in the aquatic ecosystem.[192]

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[191] ibid.
[192] Bridges, O. & Bridges, J. (1996 : 114)

In order to understand the response of the Soviet government to this degradation of waterways caused by free rafting, it is necessary to view it as part of the Soviet policy of environmental management of forestry.

In the Soviet Union, forest industries treated the forest resource as a type of 'mining' operation, in which trees were cut down and then the logging brigades moved on to new stands of trees, ever further from the central regions of the country.[193] Towards the end of the Soviet period, a new managment scheme was introduced in an attempt to tie forest management closer to forest utilisation, using *perestroika*-style regulations of economic accountability and profit making. Several major agencies managed the forest resources. *Minlesprom*, the Ministry of Forest Products Industries, recreated in 1988 by the consolidation of the operations of the old Ministry of Pulp, Paper and Woodworking, traditionally oversaw commercial use of wood. Silvicultural activities were also reorganised in 1988, coming under the management of the State Forestry Committee, *Goskomles*.[194]

The change in forest policy in the 1980s, which was illustrated in these management changes, was related to changes in environmental awareness in that decade. Pryde (1991) calls this period the 'Chernobyl Awakening'. He argues that from 1986 to the early 1990s there was a process of the Russian general public becoming environmental activists, spurred on by the fears of nuclear radiation and other issues they saw as affecting them personally. These changes served to complicate the Soviet environmental agenda. The earlier agenda, which emerged in the 1960s, was based on the principles of using natural resources in the most efficient

[193] Pryde, P.R. (1991 :119)
[194] ibid.

manner, with an eye to their conservation, but after the Chernobyl disaster, 'green' issues came more to the forefront of environmental policy.

The Soviet legislation already mentioned in this chapter, that relating to *molevoi splav*, can be seen as part of this change in environmental agenda in the Soviet Union. The legislation was produced in late 1987, a year after Chernobyl, and its primary concern was the protection of Soviet rivers from the environmental damage caused by log rafting. The legislation was carried from the Soviet level to implementation at the Republic level, and a separate document was produced for the Russian Republic.

> Enterprises and organisations of the Ministry of forestry, paper, pulp and woodworking industry of the USSR, during the years of the 11th Five-Year Plan, have transported 4.7 million cubic metres of timber by water. Losses of timber during this period amounted to 900,000 cubic metres.[195]

The Resolution adopted by the RSFSR in September 1987 outlined plans for *molevoi splav* to be outlawed on rivers of the Republic by the end of 1995. On January 31st 1995, the Perm' oblast' Committee for Nature Protection reported on the progress made by the oblast towards closure of the rivers to rafting.

> In the oblast', certain work has been carried out to end *molevoi splav*, and to return rivers to their former status for fishing. In the period 1991-1994, rafting was ended on the rivers *Obva*, *Visherka, Uls, Vels*, and *Yaz'va,* and the extent of the rafting on the river Yaiva was limited. However, colleagues note that, in the work aimed at ending *molevoi splav*, there are serious shortcomings. AO[196] '*Komipermles*', AO '*Ust-Yazvinskii raid*', and other water users have not fully carried out measures to prepare

[195] Resolution of the Soviet of Ministers of the RSFSR, 25.08.1987, No. 384 "Regarding the ending of molevoi splav on rivers and other water bodies of the RSFSR".
[196] Joint-stock company

for the transition from the transportation of timber by rafting to transportation by land.[197]

In response to the circumstances of forestry enterprises in the oblast, the Perm' oblast' Committee for Nature Protection drew up a list of actions to be taken. One of these was directed at the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* Committee for Nature Protection, alongside whom the Perm' oblast' Committee intended to appeal to Moscow.

> We propose that the Perm' oblast and Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* Committees for Nature Protection, in conjunction with waterusers AO *'Komipermles'*, AO *'Verkhnekamskaya splavnaya kontora'* and AO *'Verkhne-Kosinskaya kontora'* should apply to the Russian Government for a prolongation of the time period allowed for rafting on the rivers *Veslyana, Kosa and Lolog.*[198]

On February 8th of the same year, the Committee of the Russian Federation for Water Management *(Roskomvod)* replied to the appeal, which had met with a mixed reception.

> In accordance with the resolution of the Soviet of Ministers of the RSFSR, 25th September 1987, *molevoi splav* on rivers *Veslyana, Lolog* and *Kosa* must be ended by the end of 1995. As was established in 1994, by a commission of the administration of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, the condition of the rivers *Veslyana, Kosa* and *Lolog* is extremely unsatisfactory. Along the banks of these rivers logs are scattered, 70,000 cubic metres in all. The concentration of phenols in the river *Kosa*, for example, exceeds permissible levels by 10-17 times, and those in the *Kama*, downstream of its confluence with the *Veslyana*, exceed the permissible levels by 30 times. Oil products in the *Kosa* exceed allowed levels by 20 times, and in the *Kama* by 50-90 times[199]

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[197] Perm Oblast Committee for Nature Protection, 31.01.1995 'Concerning the work of nature protection and water use with respect to the closure of the rivers of the oblast to rafting'. Committee Chair, V.V. Kazantsev.

[198] ibid.

[199] Committee of the Russian Federation for Water Management (Roskomvod) 08.02.1995, 'Regarding the prolongation of timber rafting on the rivers Veslyana, Kos and Lolog in the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug'. First Deputy Chariman V.I.Makarentsev.

Having considered the appeal, the Committee decided that it could not agree to the request, but it did give consideration to the views of the Russian State Forestry Company, and of the Ministry of Economics.

> The Russian State Forestry Company and the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation hold that it is possible to extend the period of rafting on the stated rivers, since the financial capacity of the forestry enterprises does not permit them to spend 140 million rubles (at 1991 prices) on the construction of a timber lorry road, depots, reloading stations, railway access roads, and on the acquisition of additional timber lorries. To assign resources from the central government is not possible.[200]

Perm' oblast administration's point of view was also taken into account; the oblast requested that rafting on the three rivers should be allowed to continue for another two years, and it also drew attention to the question of the construction of a railway line through the *okrug*, as a method of replacing the rivers as a mode of transport for timber.

> The question of the construction of a railway line, passing through the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* was considerd by the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation in connection with the formulation of a general scheme for the development of railway transport in the period up to the year 2000, and it did not receive a favourable decision from the state experts of this Ministry, because of the high costs of such a construction project.[201]

The net result of the Committee for Water Management's consideration of the request from Perm' was that it recommended that the Russian Government should not allow a prolongation of rafting on the three rivers in question. However, when on February 24th, the final decision was taken on behalf of the government by V. Parfenov, Director of the Department of Nature and Protection of the Environment, he concurred with Perm' oblast and allowed rafting to be prolonged for another two years, making the date of its final cessation 1998.

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[200] ibid
[201] ibid

Despite this respite for three of the north of Perm' oblast's rivers, the vast majority of waterways which had previously been used for log rafting were closed to the *splav* by the end of 1995. Appendix 5 shows the situation in terms of rafting of timber on the rivers of the oblast. The cessation of rafting, as the comments of Syusysin, the general director of AO *'Visherales'* demonstrated, had the effect of increasing the costs of forestry in the north of Perm' oblast, and therefore of reducing its productivity. The ending of *molevoi splav* was a considerable contributing factor in the demise of forestry in the area. Policy alternatives for the timber industry were also mentioned in the debate between the oblast and Moscow regarding the closure of the rivers to rafting, and these will be discussed further in the chapter devoted to policy for the marginal areas.

4.8 *Problems and Prospects – the importance of the forest.*

The data regarding the decline in the forestry industry of the north of Perm' oblast given in Chapter 3 fit into the picture of forestry on the national scale in the Russian Federation. In late September 1996, the following article was published in a Russian national newspaper, detailing the problems facing the industry, and using examples from Perm' oblast and the Komi Republic to illustrate its points.

> For Russian forestry industrialists and exporters, 1996 has been one of the most difficult years of the last ten. According to data from *'Roslesprom'*, in the first 8 months of this year, there was a decline in production in timber cutting, wood processing, and also in cellulose-paper enterprises. Many enterprises were forced to call a halt to production. For example, in August of this year, the Perm' plywood factory ceased production, its profitability having fallen from 50% in September 1995 to just 2.7%. Similarly, AO *Dal'lesprom* has made a loss of 30 billion

> rubles[202] and owes 50 billion in unpaid wages. The Syktyvkar Cellulose-Paper plant's profitability has fallen by 15% between January and August of this year, and that of Solikamskii Cellulose-Paper plant has fallen by 10%. The profitability of the whole forest industrial complex in the last month (August 1996) was 4%, compared to 15.5% at the same time in 1995. Specialists note that by the end of that month, the production of timber in Russia had declined by 38.9% in comparison with the same period of 1995, and that the production of sawed timber had fallen by 37.7%.[203]

On the national scale, on the back of figures such as these, workers have been severely hit by the problems of the forestry sector. In the former Soviet Union, forests provided employment to more than 7% of the country's workforce, and directly affected the lives of around 10 million people, of which some 18% lived in remote logging communities. The impact of transition on these communities has been severe; in the past they relied upon government subsidies to provide transportation, food, and salary premiums for qualified health and education professionals. Their isolation and low population density now raise the cost of providing social services, and with the phasing out of subsidies, many of these remote communities have been left even more isolated from the outside world, and lack basic supplies and services. The inhabitants often find themselves to be in a hopeless situation; on the one hand life in a logging community has become insupportable, but on the other, they are unable to move as their working skills and experiences are of little use elsewhere.

Therefore, the livelihoods of people in forestry areas are highly dependent on the Russian forests. The forestry industry itself is in a poor state, and it is doubtful that it can deliver added value wood products that meet international demands for quality. Harvesting patterns also show that valuable coniferous forests are over-utilised, which means that ecological sustainability is at risk. The workers in the forest

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[202] 1996 prices
[203] *Finansoviye Izvestiya* 19.Sept.1996 pII

sector are the hardest hit by the fall in production; the logging communities are suffering most, but the depression has also caused serious drawbacks to the workers of sawmills and pulp and paper industries. Unemployment, wage arrears, deterioration of the physical and economic infrastructure is the price workers in the forest sectors are paying for the years of transition.[204]

On the part of the workers of the forestry sector of the north of Perm' oblast, there has been drastic change since Soviet times, when forestry was a crucial part of the economy of the oblast, and when its workers enjoyed social infrastructure paid for by their enterprises, secure jobs, and wages paid on time. Since the break-up of the USSR, the situation has changed dramatically. The main forestry enterprise, '*PermLesProm*', which had controlled the smaller forestry concerns in the oblast, folded in 1994, leaving them without a central administration. The Forestry Committee of the oblast Administration, which came into play after the collapse of *PermLesProm*, has no overall control of the enterprises. As the Deputy Chief of the Committee told me

> We have a market system now. There is no planning of forestry in the oblast.[205]

However, she did acknowledge the problems facing the north of the oblast.

> The northern part of the oblast, where our forest resources are concentrated, is a problem area, because there aren't many roads, and in particular there aren't any roads suitable for transporting timber. This territory is very difficult to open up. Timber cutting is weak there. We have poor transport accessibility, high transport prices, and we don't have the technology to produce goods that would be competitive on the world market or in Russia. If *'Visherabumprom'* in Krasnovisherskii *raion* could be re-equipped and restored, that would be something.

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[204] Carlsson, L. & Olsson, M-O, 1998, p10

Despite the fact that the Forestry Committee cannot control the enterprises, now mainly joint-stock companies, it does have projects, and these were outlined by Kolegova.

> We need a business plan. The Russian government has given 1.7 million (new) rubles for the development of an investment project for the forestry complex. Our enterprises cannot develop such a project on their own; there are no competent specialists. They need to employ specialist organisations. Right now, there are lots of consulting firms appearing, which could develop such a project, but only for big money, and the enterprises have no turnover. So, in order to receive credit and to recover economically, the requirements for the enterprises are very tough.

Apart from the development of a business plan on their own behalf, Kolegova explained the alternative policy.

> There is a second exit from this situation; finding partners in the West. If we find partners in the West, then everything would be done for us - the investment project, the business plan, etc. We need to find interested people."

When asked about the likely identity of the Western partners, she went on to say

> I don't know.... when everything is stable in our country, when there are stable taxes, tariffs, laws and so on, when there is confidence, then there will be investors.

To summarise, the forestry in Perm' has gone the way of many other large-scale industrial sectors in Russia, from the Soviet, centrally administered industry under Ministries based in Moscow, through branches in Perm', the Territorial Production Complex *'PermLesProm'* and the local *leskhozi*, all preparing reports which were passed to the next highest level, it has fragmented and weakened under marker forces. As Kolegova pointed out, the individual firms, which separated in order to attract sponsors to themselves, have struggled on their own, and now do not have the means at their disposal to turn their situation around.

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[205] *pers comm* Yevdakia Loginovna Kolegova, Department of Forestry, Perm' Oblast Administration. 19.5.1998

From the perspective of the workers and managers in the local firms, the lack of expertise to deal with the new economic conditions, and perhaps a naive belief that by hard work they could carry on business as usual, the prospects seem bleak. The example of the situation in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, of fragmentation and disorganisation amongst the local firms is typical. The effect on the workers is that they have lost secure employment, steady wages, social amenities, and a certain amount of pride.

The strategy at the oblast level appears to be grounded in the 'business plan' which they hope to draw up with a consulting firm, or with a western partner, if one is forthcoming. At the local level, the enterprises have tried to be successful individually, and having experienced falling profits, followed by losses, and in many cases bankruptcy, it is difficult for them to see a way out of this situation. Under these conditions, workers have become unemployed, and they have begun to look elsewhere for support for their families, mainly to themselves and to their ability to subsist.

Chapter 5 – The Disappearing Village

5.1 Rural depopulation in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia
5.2 Logging Villages and Soviet rural depopulation
5.3 Rationalisation of settlements in the north of Perm' oblast
5.4 Demographic conditions in post-Soviet Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii raioni
5.5 Post-Soviet rural depopulation in the north of Perm' oblast – representations in the newspapers
5.6 Summary

5 The Disappearing Village

5.1 Rural depopulation in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia
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5.4 Demographic conditions in post-Soviet Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii raioni
5.5 Post-Soviet rural depopulation in the north of Perm' oblast –representations in the newspapers
5.6 Summary

This chapter is concerned with rural depopulation as a response to, and also a cause of, marginalisation. Faced with the marginalisation of some rural settlements, one response has been the desertion of the villages, and this trend will be explored through cases described in local, regional and national newspapers.

In previous chapters it has been argued that marginal settlements can be found in the North of Perm' oblast, and the poor economic situation within them, relating to the collapse of the forestry industry in the region, has been described. Faced with these living conditions and economic circumstances, the position in which the inhabitants of the villages find themselves can be understood as a choice between two options; to stay in the villages or to migrate away from them. In many cases, as will be discussed later, people have no choice to make, because of the limitations of their individual situations. Out-migration requires the ability to obtain employment elsewhere, and also the capital to pay for the move and to pay for accommodation; the lack of work, and the delayed wages common in the villages mean that people are rarely able to gather together the means to be able to leave. However, the trend of rural out-migration, leading to rural depopulation, has been evident in the Russian Federation.

This chapter is concerned with out-migration as a response to the socio-economic situation in marginal settlements; an alternative response, remaining in the village and relying on domestic and environmental resources to effect subsistence, will be dealt with in the following chapter.

5.1 Rural depopulation in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia

The rural population of Russia began to decline in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Change in the rural population in European Russia was an integral part of the two processes of urbanisation and colonization, as rural migrants moved to the growing towns and, until World War II, villagers migrated east to Siberia. After the War, eastbound European Russians played a lesser role in the colonization of Siberia[206].

Rural depopulation was also a result of Soviet government policy. The rural population were disadvantaged in comparison with their urban counterparts; rural incomes were smaller, rural people had fewer civil rights (for example, they did not automatically receive an internal passport), and they did not qualify for benefits such as pensions. Rural life was perceived as having a low status. The priority of the rural sector in Soviet planning was low; the lion's share of the resources went to industry and industrial workers, who were seen as the elite. The conceptualisation of rural social problems was itself problematic, with rural and agricultural development being seen as synonymous; agricultural production requirements were always part of plans to improve

[206] Ioffe & Nefedova (1998) p182

rural living standards. Preventing outmigration was simply a way to increase the agricultural labour force and maintain production. The poor standards of living, which were the cause of outmigration, were not themselves seen as a problem.

During the Soviet period, then, rural depopulation was being caused by low standards of living, comparatively few civil rights (it was only in the mid-1970s that rural people received automatic access to passports and pensions), and the poor level of service provision. The majority of people in the rural USSR lived on collective and state farms, whether employed by them or not. In theory, the local administration was responsible for healthcare, education and so on, but in practice, the farm management provided it. Many farms could not provide adequate services, and others afforded them low priority. The result was that the provision of social welfare was arbitrary, and people who did not work on the farms did not necessarily have access to their facilities.

Rural out-migration was viewed as a problem by Soviet and Russian government throughout the post-war period. Khrushchev developed the policy of bringing the 'urban way of life' to the rural areas in an attempt to prevent out-migration to urban centres. His 'agrogorod' proposals would have rehoused the Soviet rural population in medium-sized towns. A scaled-down version of this plan was implemented, through which a progressive concentration of the rural population into 'key settlements' would occur. The logic was that if villages were larger, providing services to them would be cost-effective, and smaller and more remote settlements could die out. This policy of village consolidation involved the classification of all settlements into one of two types; '*perspektivnye*' and '*neperspektivnye*', viable and non-viable. Viable villages were to be expanded, while the non-viable were to be left to die out. The

second category was later subdivided into villages whose populations were to be merged in the immediate future, and those about which a decision was still to be made.

During the thirty years of this policy, the level of effectiveness of the implementation is uncertain. The costs involved in relocating people and providing them with new accommodation in the receiving villages were usually too high for the local authorities. However, there was also a problem of rural 'blight', whereby once a village had been designated '*neperspektivnii*', local administrations and collective farms had a reason to reduce services and support for the villages, whether or not the actual policies of relocation of population, and village closure, were implemented. Despite the limited implementation of the policy itself, therefore, the non-viable designation led to village decline. In the early 1980s, after the policy had been terminated, criticism of it was common. National newspapers such as *Sel'skaya Zhizn'* complained about the abandonment of outlying villages, and the classification of villages as non-viable came to be seen as a major cause of outmigration of young people. In place of the policy of consolidation and selective service provision, *Sel'skaya Zhizn'* began to campaign for a policy to service all Soviet rural settlements, regardless of size or location. Concurrently, measures to promote private housebuilding in rural areas were being introduced, to attract back rural emigrants. However, the measures were *ad hoc*, and no indication of how costs would be met was forthcoming. When Gorbachev came to office, Soviet rural planning had already rejected the consolidation approach, but had not yet developed a coherent alternative policy. Gorbachev's policies aimed to increase agricultural productivity and efficiency, and to effect a social revolution in the Soviet countryside. He wanted to restore peasant tillage and village life, and to guarantee social equality between rural and urban dwellers, with regard to housing conditions,

retail trade, cultural activities, medical care, roads and transport. Gorbachev himself referred to the mistake of thinking of some villages as having no future.

In the national press, during the late 1980s, articles were published detailing the revitalisation of villages declared non-viable decades earlier, under Gorbachev's policy.

> A few years ago only 10-20 pensioners lived here. We built a road, laid an electric cable, built a kindergarten and houses. And what happened? The village quite literally underwent a revival.[207]

An article in *Arenda - arkhimedov rychag*[208] described again the association between improved rural services and the revival of former non-viable villages.

> I look at the young people and I am happy - and they are content with their work ... we now have a regular transport link with Orel. There is a hospital, a club, a bathhouse and canteen. We have taken seven kilometres of water pipeline to the so-called non-viable villages. Villages which for years past have been quiet ring with children's voices, and the most popular means of transport is the pram. We are planning to open a branch of the music school.

Whilst the introduction of rural services was cited as the cause of village growth, the evidence showed that well-serviced villages were losing population as quickly as poorly-serviced ones, and that population was stabilising in villages, regardless of their service provision, near larger towns. The location of rural settlements relative to towns became the principal factor determining their ability to survive, once the traditional network of rural places became unstable and began to degrade. However, policy makers concurred with the belief circulating in the popular press that through the provision of services, the salvation of all Russia's villages was possible.

Another Gorbachev policy was the encouragement of reverse migration, that of urbanites to rural destinations. Central budget funding to each migrant family was made available, and a propaganda campaign to attract in-migrants with initiative, a love of challenge, and a desire to revitalise the Russian village was run. For example, an article in *Nedelya* in April 1989 described two urbanites who moved to a former non-viable Altai village. The hardships and benefits of rural life were detailed, and the article sought to challenge others to take up the gauntlet. In reality, inmigrants faced animosity from village residents, and often found village life unsuitable[209].

By the end of the 1960s, eastward movement decreased, and by the end of the 1980s, only a few Russian regions were attracting migrants, namely Moscow and Leningrad and the South-West Siberian Tyumen oil-fields. Almost all of European Russia and the area south of Siberia suffered rural depopulation.

However, the 1990s have brought change. All of European Russia, except the European North, began to experience rural population growth, while the European and Asian North, and the Far East, began to lose their rural populations. The rapid depopulation of the north is evident in patterns of net migration over the past seven years. For example, two regions located in the far northeast of Russia, bordering on Alaska, lost significant shares of their population; Magadan has lost a third of its population to emigration in the 1990s, while Chukotka has lost nearly half.[210] This landslide migration resulted from the combination of circumstances related to crisis and reform, the removal of budget supports, and of the mark-ups of the 'northern' salaries,

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[207] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* 15, 1989 in Pallot, 199,0 p663-664
[208] Moscow, 1988, in Pallot 1990, p664
[209] Pallot, 1990, p664-668
[210] http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/SO97/byby4.htm 10th February 1999

vanishing personal savings due to inflation, and so on. As Ioffe and Nefedova (1998) write

> One way or another, the introduction of market elements into the economy has revealed that the erstwhile labour-intensive colonization strategy for the areas with harsh natural conditions can no longer be sustained[211].

Since 1991, Yeltsin has taken on board the proposals put forward by Gorbachev, and has encouraged peasant farming, in an attempt to replace collective and state farms, and newspapers have campaigned for a return to the village.

With regard to the Russian North, there is also another potential cause of rural depopulation; federal plans to resettle people away from the Far North to locations further south. For example, an agreement between the Republics of Mari-El and Komi was signed on May 6th 1996, based on the federal programme for the resettlement of inhabitants of the northern areas to Russia's central region. Over 5000 families were to be resettled from Komi by the year 2000, at a cost of 326 billion rubles (1996 prices). So far, there has been no report of these resettlements having taken place, although others have been carried out.[212]

5.2 Logging Villages and Soviet Rural Depopulation

In the 1960s, policies began to be implemented to improve the standards of living in the forestry villages. Whilst these policies were always presented as means of reorganising timbercutting, and indeed were published in the journal *Lesnaya Promishlennost'*, which was primarily concerned with new forestry machinery and

[211] Ioffe & Nefedova, 1998 p182

technology, there was a sense of the importance of the living conditions of the forestry workers, which was carried through in some of the suggestions made for new housing, and for the servicing and layout of the villages themselves. It seems to follow that these measures were introduced at least partly as a response to the problem of rural depopulation, although the connection between the two is never explicitly made.

One such policy was the intention to build 6 million square metres of living space for the workers in the lespromkhozi. The forestry Ministry set out plans for the construction of new homes and villages. It was envisaged that the central part of forestry villages should see a well-equipped building (with running water, sewerage, central heating and electricity). There should also be a club, in which

> ...there will be a hall with a stage, a lobby, a foyer for dancing, a number of rooms for club work, and a library. The stage in the hall is to be expandable, and if necessary may be shrunk to increase the capacity of the hall.[213]

Also in the centre of the village there were to be two-storied houses with flats on both levels, homes for small families, and two-storied houses of a sectional type. On the outskirts of the village it was envisaged that there should be one-storied two-apartment houses, and one-apartment homes for individual construction.

Considered of particular interest within the Plan were the houses with apartments on two levels (plans shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2[214]).

> On the first floor[215] there is the sitting room, and the kitchen with a cellar for the storage of vegetables and for the sanitary junction between bathroom and sewerage. On the second floor there are two or three bedrooms. All the

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[212] SWB 8 May 1996
[213] Verenchikov, *et al* (1967) p25
[214] Verenchikov, *et al* (1967) p25-26
[215] In Russia, 'First' floor is equivalent to the British 'Ground' floor, 'Second' floor to British 'First' floor and so on.

bedrooms are non-interconnecting, and their dimensions and the positioning of their windows allow the free arrangement of furniture.[216]

Settlements seem to have been rationalised in line with the 'viable' and 'non-viable' policy, with guidelines set out for the size and servicing of settlements. For example, there were to be villages of 500, 1000 and 2000-2500 people, with schools for 80, 192 and 320 pupils respectively, and all villages were to have a club, shops and a bakery. Table 5.1 shows the servicing envisaged for the villages of various sizes.

Table 5.1 Amenities planned for forest villages, 1963.


Villages for long-term activity, in remote raions					
Amenity	Village Population				
	500	1000	1500	2000	2500
School (places)	80	192	192	320	80 + 320
School boarding house (places)	25	52	25 + 52	52 x 2	25 + 2 x 52
Kindergarten & creche (places)	50	90	50 + 90	90 x 2	50 + 90 x 2
Club (places)	100	150	200	200	200
Clinic (beds)	-	-	-	-	-
Field Hospital (beds)	-	-	15	35	35
Shops/Jobs	3/20	5/40	8/60	10/100	10/100
Administration	-	-	-	-	-
Bakery	1	1	1	2	2
Banya (places)	10	20	30	30	30
Market, Petrol station	-	-	-	-	-

Source : *Lesnaya Promishlennost'* 1963. No.7 p23

[216] Verenchikov, et al (1967) p25



1 этаж



2 этаж




Figure 5.1
Ground Plans and diagrams of two-storied two-apartment houses for forestry villages (1967)






Figure 5.2
Ground Plans and diagrams of two-storied two-apartment houses for forestry villages (1967)

The concern for the living conditions was carried through into the appearance of the buildings themselves.

> Particular attention must be paid to the external and internal decoration of the buildings. For this, it is envisaged that enamelled chipboard will be used for decoration.[217]

Two years previously, there had been plans put forward for the organisation of forest villages – two 'new variants' were described in *Lesnaya Promishlennost'*. In both of the plans, the living conditions in the villages were given high priority.

> Variant 1 Regarding the less populated villages in the forest, and the difficulty of equipping them with services and utilities, it is envisaged that all the workers will be settled in one central village, which will be significantly removed from the place of work. Therefore, some of the workers will need to be transported every day by special bus or train.
>
> Variant 2 To build two smaller villages, one in the place of work, and one outside of it. The problem with this variant is the lack of development of the road network in the forest.
>
> Each of these variants has its good and bad points. However, it should be pointed out that good villages are not simply those which are the most economical in terms of running costs, but, and this is the main point, those which are comfortable to live in.[218]

By 1963, there were new plans for the arrangement of villages in timbercutting areas, and also directives for other uses of the forest.

> For the first period of operation (30 years) (there will be) 6 forest villages, arranged around a central village, at a distance of 25-30km from it. The main timbercutters and their families will live in the central village. In the other villages will live workers who are employed in forest restoration, and workers in different secondary trades, and auxiliary production. To this category it is possible to ascribe nut collection (if the nut production zone of the forest is not being cut), collection of berries, mushrooms, and medicinal herbs; haymaking, bee keeping, ski making, pitch production and so on. All of these occupations will employ approximately as many people as timbercutting itself.[219]

These extracts from *Lesnaya Promishlennost'* demonstrate the attention being devoted to the planning of logging villages, particularly in the late 1950s and early

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[217] Verenchikov, et al (1967), p26
[218] *Lesnaya Promishlennost* 1961 no 2 p28

1960s. Although in none of the articles is it explicitly made clear that the measures being proposed for the improvement of living standards in the villages are a response to rural depopulation, this would seem to be the most likely explanantion.

Despite the plans for new amenities and housing detailed in these articles from *Lesnaya Promishlennost'*, during my fieldwork in the north of Perm' oblast. I did not encounter buildings such as two-storey accommodation blocks in any of the villages outside of the raion centres; houses such as that in Plate 6.3 were the norm.

5.3 Rationalisation of settlements in the North

The predominance of small settlements in the rural areas of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii raions was part of a trend in Russia as a whole. Low rural living standards were complicated by the profusion of settlements, many of which were remote from the raion centres, and difficult and expensive to service. Soviet planners therefore aimed to restructure the rural settlement system in order to reduce costs. In the late 1950s, Khrushchev put forward a plan, which would, over a period of several years, liquidate small settlements, and resettle their inhabitants in more sizeable villages.

The aim was to swell the population of rural settlements to a size which would make service provision economically viable. In 1959, a Party plenum approved a motion requiring that every raion be furnished with a long-term development plan, which would be the basis for the restructuring of rural settlements. The main feature was that all rural settlements in a district were classified into one of two categories,

[219] *Lesnaya Promishlennost* 1963 No.4 p22

'viable' (*'perspektivnii'*) or 'non-viable' (*'n'eperspektivnii'*). The former were to grow, the latter to be liquidated. Policy towards the non-viable villages was varied; some were left to die out naturally, while others were to have their populations forcibly resettled by a given date[220].

A document produced by the main forestry enterprise in Perm' oblast, *'PermLesProm'* in 1976 details the fate of many forestry villages. It is concerned with the population of settlements, their distance from the raion centre, their raw material base, and the length of time for which that base could sustain economic activity. There is a judgement passed on the future of each settlement, and a reason for the decision reached. For example, the settlement of Romanikha, in Krasnovisherskii raion, 18km from Krasnovishersk, and with a forest base of 1.2 million square metres which was considered to be capable of supporting economic activity until 1980, was adjudged to be non-viable, and its population was to be moved to Visherogorsk, due to the low living standards in Romanikha. The village of Novii Rodnik, also in Krasnovisherskii raion, is described as having been liquidated already by 1976, and its population resettled in Mutikha, because of the exhaustion of its raw material base. In Kosinskii raion, the villages of Lesnoi, Ust-Kosa, Svetlitsa, and Odan' were designated for liquidation due to lack of material base, and their inhabitants were to be moved to either Novaya Svetlitsa or Kordon by the end of the decade.[221]

Despite the apparent finality of the document regarding the fates of the villages to be liquidated, Romanikha and Odan' still exist, albeit in a precarious position;


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[220] Pallot & Shaw, 1981, p232-240

[221] *Spisok Lesnikh Posyelkov Predpriyatii. Vsesoyuznogo Lesopromishlennogo Ob'edineniya Permlesprom po sostoyaniyu 1.10.1976g.* authorised by *Nachal'nik Otdela Zhilishchno-Kommunal'nogo Khozyaistva I bita ob'edineniya, F.S. Kozlov.*

Figure 5.3

Map of Kosinskii Raion,
showing the settlements present in 1998, and the change in the number of settlements 1960-96.



Scale 1cm = 5km

Since the 1960s, the number of settlements in Kosinskii *raion* has been falling. The following data show the decline in the number of settlements since 1960. The data are presented in the *sel'soviets* of 1960, the centres of which are marked in red on the map.

Kosinskii sel'soviet	1960	14 villages	1996	8 villages
Levichanskii sel'st		11		7
Poroshevskii sel'st		12		7
Puksibskii sel'soviet		9		3
Selishchenskii s/s		4		2
Solymskii sel'soviet		7		4
Sosnovskii s/s		6		2
Chazevskii sel'soviet		1		1
Churakovskii s/s		19		12
Pyatigorskii s/s		7		5
TOTAL		90 villages		59 villages


* signifies that a village is uninhabited

Figure 5.4
Map of Krasnovisherskii Raion
Showing the Settlements present in 1998, and the change in the number of settlements, 1960-96

Since the 1960s, the number of villages in Krasnovisherskii *raion* has been falling; the following data show the decline in the number of villages since 1960. The data are presented in *sel'soviets* of 1960, the centres of which are marked in red on the map (in some cases, the central village no longer exists, so an existing village replaces it, shown in brackets).

	1960		1996	
Antipinskii sel'soviet		31 villages		11 villages
Bichinskii sel'soviet		13		6
Verkh-Yazvinskii sel'soviet		18		3
Kolchinskii sel'soviet (Visherogorsk)		18		8
Morchanskii sel'soviet (Bakhari)		22		4
Severnii Kolchimskii sel'soviet		1		1
Nizhnyaya-Yazvinskii sel'soviet		4		2
Parmskii sel'soviet (Yaborova)		6		1
Sipuchinskii sel'soviet		13		4
Ust'-Ulskii sel'soviet		13		4
Ust'-Yazvinski sel'soviet		9		4
Shugorskii sel'soviet		7		2
Gubdorskii sel'soviet		6		5
TOTAL		153 villages		55 villages

* Signifies that a village is uninhabited



1 P.Bakhari	10 Visherogorsk
2 Bakhari	11 Bichina
3 Parma	12 Nizhnaya Dubrovka
4 Netrunikha*	13 Grushika
5 Talitsa	14 Sheremetyeva*
6 Yepishina	15 Panova
7 Govorlivoye	16 Talavol
8 Dolgoe pleso	17 Antipina
9 Storozhevaya	18 Parshakova

Odan had a population of just four in 1997[222], and although Romanikha was home to 206 people in 1993[223], it was described as a 'non-viable' village by its raion administration in that year. Possibly the non-fulfilment of the planned liquidations stemmed from the review and revision of the rationalisation plans which was ordered by Brezhnev, and which halved the number of 'non-viable' villages and adopted a more flexible approach to those remaining. This policy is discussed further in Chapter 6.


Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show Kosinksii and Krasnovisherskii raions and their settlements in 1998, and the changes in the number of settlements in the *raioni* between 1960 and 1996.

5.4 Demographic conditions in post-Soviet Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii raioni.

The populations of both of the *raioni* exhibit almost all the demographic characteristics of marginal areas, as described by Byron and discussed in Chapter 2. Population density is 2 per square kilometre in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, and 3 in Kosinskii. The total population of both hovers between stasis and decline, and the age structure of both raions is very heavily weighted towards the elderly. Figures 5.6-5.14 show the age structure of the populations of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* in 1968, of Krasnovisherskii in 1990 and 1991, and of Kosinskii *raion* in 1995. An age pyramid's shape varies depending upon whether the population of the area to which it refers is growing, declining, or remaining constant. Depending upon which of the three situations is being experienced, the size of a cohort is smaller or larger than those immediately surrounding it. The age pyramids of Kosinskii *raion* for 1995, and those of Krasnovisherskii *raion* for 1991 exhibit largely the same characteristics of those of Russia as a whole, as described by Heleniak (1996) (Figure

[222] Kosinskii *raion* Administration, Department of Statistics *Spisok naselennikh punktov po Kosinskomu Raionu na 1 yanvarya 1997 goda*
[223] 1993 survey of forestry villages carried out by the Perm' Oblast Administration.

Figure 5.5 Age-Sex Structure of the Population of the Russian Federation, 1996



(Source: Heleniak, 1996 p387)

Figure 5.6
Age Structure of the Population of Kosinskii Raion, 1968




Figure 5.7
Age Structure of the Population of Krasnovisherskii Raion, 1968




Figure 5.8 Age Structure of the Total Population of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1990




Figure 5.9 Age Structure of the Urban Population of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1990




Figure 5.10 Age Structure of the Rural Population of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1990




Figure 5.11 Age Structure of the Total Population of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1991




Figure 5.12 Age Structure of the Urban Population of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1991




Figure 5.13 Age Structure of the Rural Population of Krasnovisherskii raion, 1991





Figure 5.14
Age Structure of the population of Kosinskii Raion, 1995
(all of Kosinskii raion is classified as rural)



5.5). (The population data shown for Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* are the most recent available.) For example, there is a large indentation centred on those aged 60 in 1995 (56 in 1991), reflecting the higher mortality and decreased fertility caused by the famines during the collectivisation of agriculture in the 1930s. The most clearly identifiable distortion is that of the small number of people born during the second World War, who were around 50 years old in 1995 (46 in 1991). These distortions had echo effects on later generations, causing, in turn, the small cohort of the early 1970s, as the World War II cohort passed through their childbearing years. The indentation at ages 20-25 (15-20 in 1991) as a result of World War II is also affecting the number of children being born in the late 1990s, as exhibited by the low number of infants in the pyramids. What is important about the age pyramids as far as marginality is concerned, is the weighting towards older age groups which is evident in the pyramids referring to the 1990s. Although there are no appropriate data for Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the trend, which naturally follows from its pyramids of 1991 and 1990, is very likely to be very similar to that of Kosinskii *raion* in 1995. Comparing these later pyramids with those for both *raioni* for 1968, the dramatic shift from a bottom-heavy to a top-heavy pyramid is clear. The indentations described by Heleniak (1996) have moved up the age brackets, but the major difference is that of the number of children and young people. The populations of both *raioni* in the late 1990s show a tendency towards a high proportion of the population being above working age.

Table 5.2 shows the monthly migration figures for Kosinskii raion for 1994-1996.

Table 5.2 Migration balance of Kosinskii raion, 1994-96

	1994	1995	1996
January	-1	0	+1
February	-19	+3	+1
March	+8	-1	+4
April	+16	-13	+12
May	+8	-1	-1
June	-1	-4	0
July	-11	+9	+7
August	-25	-33	-15
September	-36	-44	-44
October	-7	-25	-22
November	-10	-19	-3
December	+1	+2	0
Net Figures	*-77*	*-126*	*-60*

Source: V.I. Kuznetsova, Director *Kosinskoye Otdela Statistiki, Kosa, Kosinskii raion.*

(Migration data for Kosinskii raion in 1997 show that a round figure of 200 people left the raion in that year[224].) These data show consistent, levels of net outmigration in recent years. The seasonality of the outmigration, which is concentrated in late summer and early autumn, suggests that emigrants may have aims similar to those of a family discussed later, who left their village in order to have their children better educated, and therefore had to leave before the new school year, beginning in September.

[224] *Goskomstat Rossii. Permskii Oblastnoi Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki. Osnoviye Pokazateli razvitiya gorodov i raionov Permskoi oblasti.Perm' 1998.* The data provided in this source consists of figures rounded up or down to the nearest 0.1 thousand people, whereas the data from Kosinskii raion administration was the precise number of persons leaving the raion.

5.5 Post-Soviet Rural Depopulation in the north of Perm' oblast – representations in the newspapers.

Articles in newspapers published in the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, Krasnovisherskii raion, and in the oblast centre of Perm give an indication of the way of life in rural villages. The sources used for this study were the Perm' oblast newspaper, *Zvezda* ('Star'), published since November 1917, the Krasnovisherskii raion newspaper *Krasnaya Vishera* ('Red Vishera', since July 1931), and the two Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug papers, *Parma* (November 1926) and *Parma Novosti*, a newspaper which was founded in the early 1990s. Kosinskii raion does not have its own newspaper.

Over the past few years, changes in rural life in the North of Perm' oblast have been documented in the press. In the early and mid-1990s, especially 1993 and 1994, articles concentrated on the pleasures of *'Leto v derevnye'*, 'Summer in the village', detailing bumper crops of grass, and celebrating the machinery being used to harvest them. A front-page article in *Zvezda* had a photograph of a cheerful man, chewing on a piece of hay, with a sunny hayfield in the background. The following day, the front page was again adorned by a photograph, of another man, standing with his machinery, and the text once again celebrated the bounty of the countryside. In 1994, the portrayal of successful agricultural production in the village continued, with another front-page article listing harvest levels, illustrated by a picture of a huge load of hay being brought in from the fields[225].

In addition, an article from *Zvezda* also in 1994 (13.5.1994) entitled 'This place is beautiful and the people are kind....' portrays life in the village of Serga as idyllic - the pensions are always paid on time, everyone has enough to eat, parents have no fears for the safety of their children, and the community spirit is strong. Whatever the problem, "We all live together - never mind". An interview with an elderly woman sees her comparing the past with the present and finding the present favourable;

> (Interviewer) Was life easier ten years ago?
> (Interviewee) Some things were better. Everything was cheaper, but then, they gave us less money then. Today, you can buy whatever you want. We've just bought seven sacks of flour, and we keep a cow.

A sense of taking comfort in the familiar is evident in the article - when asked why a road name (Kommunisticheskaya) had not been changed, I. Ivantsova replied that it had always been that way, so why change it?

The life of rural pensioners, depicted in a poor light in more recent years, was seen as being fairly good in 1994. Stepan Nikitich Melekhov, a pensioner in Serga, held this conversation with the journalist;

> 'My pension is 66 thousand rubles, and my wife's is 42 thousand. It's paid regularly. Today, pensioners live better than kolkhozniks'
> 'Do you really think so?'
> 'Of course I do! Kolkhozniks work very hard!'

In 1994, the younger generation was depicted as showing no inclination to leave the village, a trend that is central to the descriptions of villages in the late 1990s, when most young people are said to have already left.

> Three lads, Andrei, Vitaly and Igor were going about their business.
> 'Lads, do you like your village?'
> The lads were taken aback by this unexpected question.
> 'Of course!'

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[225] *Zvezda* 2.8.1994

'And what do you like about it?'
'Now, what?.... The people here are good and kind. And the place is beautiful'[226]

By the late 1990s, changes in rural life from the rural idyll to a place of poverty, unhappiness and desertion were being reported in the Komi-Permyak newspapers and *Zvezda*. However, from 1991 onwards, *Krasnaya Vishera* has been portraying rural life in a much poorer light. As early as February 1991, there were articles entitled *'Kak zhit' dal'she?'*, about the prospects for life in rural areas[227] , and this trend continued into the mid-1990s, with 'Problems without solutions'[228] , and 'Vaya-les' and 'Oh, Vaya, Vaya', about the problems of the forestry enterprises in Vaya[229] , and 'Problems of the periphery' about the general problems of the north of the oblast[230] . Throughout the 1990s, *Krasnaya Vishera* was peppered with stories entitled *'Kak zhit' dal'she?'* and *'Vaya/Mutikha dolzhna zhit'* (Vaya/Mutikha must live).

There is a wealth of published material relating to living conditions in rural villages in the mid-to-late 1990s. The overriding images conjured up are those of hardworking, honest people, struck by terrible misfortune or tragedy, often personal illness or loss of family members, enduring the hardships of life in the post-Soviet village, set against the images of the villages themselves facing desertion, malaise and death. For example;

It is possible that life will soon die away in the village of Ivanovka, Ga'inskii raion[231]

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[226] *Zvezda* 13.5.1994
[227] *Krasnaya Vishera* 19.2.1991
[228] *Krasnaya Vishera* 1.3.1994
[229] *Krasnaya Vishera* 8.2.1994 and 7.10.1994
[230] *Krasnaya Vishera* 20.1.1995
[231] *Parma* 19.9.1996

> The young have left, leaving homes and gardens, and the old have gone to another world. Tall grasses and weeds grow on the tracks in the village, which are filled with wearisome silence[232]
>
> Fifteen years ago, Vaya was vigorous, now it vegetates[233]
>
> ...the destiny of the half-ruined village is already determined. The old will go to another world, the young will disperse to different places. And one more village will be wiped from the face of the earth. In a few decades those born here will remember, and will grieve for it.[234]

The low standards of living, namely poor housing, poverty, overcrowding and struggle to feed the family are all related in the press. Personal histories are frequently used to tell the stories in the words of the people experiencing them. For example

> I don't have the strength to live here any longer. Our family is large. My husband and I have five children, and apart from them, my mother lives with us. Before, we lived in a little flat, in the village of Yukse'evo, but there was no barn, so we had nowhere to keep animals. Two years ago we moved to the village of Mitino, to set up a little farm. Now we have our own meat and milk, but no money. I work as a milkmaid in the joint-stock company *'Yukse'evskoye'*, and my husband also works there, at first as a herdsman, then in the metalwork shop and then as a tractor driver. We began to earn less, and then we weren't being paid at all. We haven't been paid for a year. The last time we were paid was December 24th 1994, and then last year, we received between 20,000 and 40,000 rubles on three occasions, to buy a bag of flour, or a kilo of meat or sausage. What can you buy for that money? Our family has one pair of felt boots and one pair of rubber boots. Child benefit is also never paid. Although, it was nice that, at New Year, we could give the children presents, mainly sweets. It's already 4 months since we could buy sugar, although my mother gives us all of her pension. My oldest daughter is 13, and she needs clothes and shoes. But how?[235]

> Eduard, Sergei and Vitaly have just arrived to spend winter with their mother Inna Nikolaievna Buriukova, at 26 Revolution Street, the frost chilling their skin. We (the journalists) visited as the first frost fell on the land. And that was enough to tell us that it's not possible to live here. The floor of the house is rotten, the ceiling leaks, the walls are blackened by damp, and they are overrun with rats. In both summer and winter the stuffy, stagnant smell never leaves the house. When it is frosty, the temperature inside barely reaches 3-5 degrees Celsius. Change has occurred in the Buriukov family, and not for the better. Out of this house, two

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[232] *Parma Novosti* 11.7.1997
[233] *Krasnaya Vishera* 15.7.1997
[234] *Parma* 17.7.1997
[235] *Parma* 31.1.1996

years ago, Inna Nikolaievna's husband began his final journey - he died of brain cancer.[236]

The trend of rural depopulation described in the local press is usually set against the image of the past as golden, happy and prosperous, in comparison with the present, in which the good qualities of village life, such as mutual aid, are falling foul to the pressures of post-soviet life, in one case with the actual fabric of the village being dismantled and sold piece by piece. Descriptions of elderly people left alone in dying villages are the most common.

> The village was once strong, with more than 15 homesteads, and a kolkhoz calf herd, and wide, spacious roads. Today, there are just four houses here, and one of them is empty. The other houses have been pulled down, having rotted and begun to fall down, and what was still valuable was sold as timber to visiting buyers from nearby villages[237]

> ..they (an elderly couple) don't have the strength to chop wood themselves, so they have to hire someone, and pay them - no one will do anything for free anymore.[238]

Rural depopulation is partially explained by changes in the villages, with memories of happier times being contrasted with the present. For example, the author of an article in Parma, 17th July 1997, remembers her happy days in the village of Spasovo,

> I loved the beautiful natural surroundings, buildings deep in green grass, ancient birches. The wise locals knew what they were doing when they chose Spasovo as their home. It is close to the forest, and to extensive meadows and fields. Water comes from under the mountain, and it still flows cold even in hot weather.

and describes the village as it stood in summer 1997

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[236] *Parma* 25.10.1996
[237] *Parma Novosti* 11.7.1997
[238] ibid

Our impressions were very distressing.....it was as if an epidemic had passed through the area. The land was neglected and the forest was already beginning to encroach upon the fields. A gloomy picture appeared before us; some houses had already gone, some had the glass missing from their windows. It's not that long since there were 22 houses in Spasovo - now there are just 8.

The plight of one of its inhabitants, and the conditions in which she lives, is set against the demise of the village.

There is no telephone in the village. The nearest shop is in the village of Muchaki, a few kilometres down the river Yus'va, and the local hospital and administration are in the larger village of Verkh'-Yus'va, ten kilometres away. The only means of transport is a horse, and he is used to travel to hospital, to the nearest shop to buy flour, and to plough the kitchen gardens. In winter, the village is cut off from the outside world.

Maria Nikiforovna Khorosheva is a pensioner. She is 71 and she lives alone. True, her grown-up children and grandchildren often visit her. For ten years she worked on the farm (the Kolkhoz Rodina, now inactive), tended the horses and did the sowing. In a word, she never ceased working. She said

'Life is worthless. I'm often ill. I only just survived the winter. I went to the hospital on the horse. I don't have the strength to cut hay anymore, that's why I got rid of my cow and now I only keep a goat.....Why can't they send a medic, even once a month, to our village? He could examine us and bring medicines. I've got a temperature - it's been going round the village - but there aren't any tablets. If we cried for help, no one could hear us'[239]

Attitudes to rural depopulation and the 'death' of villages are also related. In some places, the inhabitants appear resigned to the end of the village as a settled place, in others they appear determined to fight to keep it alive. And in one case, the possibility of the wholesale relocation of a village is assessed.

Examples of villagers resigned to the death of their village are common;

Soon, no doubt, all that is left of our village will disappear. We will die, and who will be left?[240].

If only some kind of official would come and see what the village is like! But every week we have a funeral[241].

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[239] ibid

[240] Anastasia Grigorievna Ponosovi, of Tarabayevo, Yus'vinskii raion, KPAO, in *Parma Novosti* 11.7.1997

[241] Director of the local school, Ivanovka, Gai'inskii raion, KPAO in *Parma* 19.9.1996

And there are examples of the local administration showing a very pessimistic attitude to the future of some villages. For example

> Rarely does an official come to Okulova Pochinka, a small village 11 kilometres from Bolshoi Usi', the centre of local administration. It's quiet now in Okulova Pochinka. There is no work, and the people drink, and live off the pensions of the elderly. The village club needs repairs, but the local administration closed it, so that there was no need to pay the people who worked there. They also closed the kindergarten, and the school is now held in a barn.
>
> The main administrator of Doyegovskii Sel'soviet, Tatiana Anatolievna Mal'tseva said 'As a village, Tarabayevo is dying'[242].

However, more optimistic attitudes are also represented; for example, the front page article of *Krasnaya Vishera*, the newspaper of Krasnovisherskii raion, on July 15th 1997, was entitled *'Vaya dolzhna zhit''* , 'Vaya must live'. It was an interview with Sergei Arkadievich Filatov, the main administrator of the local sel'soviet. Vaya was depicted as one amongst many forestry villages in the raion which were experiencing outmigration.

> Forest villages, temporary villages, but they survive yet. Myasnaya tumbled down, deserted. Its inhabitants left their homes and their jobs. A few families are left in the village. They rely upon themselves, on their own strength; these people are capable of surviving difficult situations. In Malii Shugor, too, people are providing for themselves. Some people don't want to abandon a familiar place.... But how can the people of Romanikha and Vels' survive without electricity, when work there is meagre, when shops have no branches there, where post comes once a week, and where more than 200 families live where there is no reliable work, and where all is not well with the education of the children (no specialists in the school). There is nowhere else to live.

This has proved to be very much the case in Vaya. 15 years ago, its population exceeded 1200; today it is half that size. 15 years ago, Vaya was vigorous; today it vegetates. The joint-stock company 'Vaya-les' sank over the summer of 1997, and slowly but surely, others gave up their positions in the Vaya area - joint-stock company 'Stroitel', the firm 'Vishera-P', and the Vaya leskhoz are in decline. The firm 'Forest-Vels' is winding down production. There has been a sharp curtailment in the services of the Vaya 'Torgovii Dom' (a shop) and in the raion electrical and postal services, and the raion consumer services. But despite all this, Vaya's people need to survive.

The interview that followed showed Sergei Arkadievich to be a man who fully understood the problems facing the village, and who was at a loss to help solve them

> 'The local budget takes a lot upon itself, but the public purse is empty, and there's too much to be done. Take these houses; every house needs repairs. One has terrible leaks that are thinning the roof, another is simply falling down, and a third has a rotting floor. But we have no planks, no flooring, no tarred roofing paper, no roofing iron or slate. In a word, it's awful'.

But despite his realistic assessment of the situation, the endnote of Sergei Arkadievich's interview is a more positive one than that of other administrators interviewed in newspapers. He says

> 'Is there any escape from this situation? Yes there is. But in order to achieve it, the forestry industry needs to work. And our people have not forgotten how to work. It's a pity that there is no guarantee of a seller's market for timber. Vaya must live, and Zolotanka too'. (Zolotanka is a small village in the Vaya sel'soviet).

In their portrayal of the fate of various villages, the newspapers also published an article about a village whose population was being moved *en masse* to a nearby settlement, and they assessed the possibility of the success of the move. Although the plan is at first described as a "flicker of hope", it is quickly squashed by a description of the conditions of the destination village.

> It is possible that life will soon die away in the village of Ivanovka, Ga'inskii raion. However, there is still a flicker of hope. Last year, eighty people lived in the village, but now it is possible to count the number of inhabitants on the fingers of one hand. The village is organising to move to Serebryanka. Of course, it is a pity that the map of the okrug will show one fewer settlement, but how can people live in the absence of work, communications with the outside world, and other problems that make life in the village unbearable?

The article describes the plans to move the inhabitants of Ivanovka to flats in Serebryanka, but it stresses that

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[242] *Zvezda* 3.11.1995

> ...it would be naive to think that the people of Ivanovka will find paradise in Serebryanka. There will be unemployment, delayed payment of pensions and benefits, because there is no production in Serebryanka, and the state is unable to support its subjects.

And it goes on to describe the problems which will face the new settlers

> In the oldest class of the school there is no teacher. How will the school cope with more pupils when there are already no exercise books, no pencils?... In reality, the problem is that of the general situation; workers in the budget organisations have forgotten the last time that they were paid.

To summarise, the general tone of the newspaper reporting of life in rural villages in the late 1990s is one of pessimism, and resignation to the perceived inevitability of the demise of many villages. Pity is expressed for the people suffering in the villages, but no blame is ever apportioned to those who have left. Where the local administrations have removed services, seemingly with the end of the village in sight, their actions are seen as understandable and inevitable. The contrast employed, between the village as it was in the past, and the village as it is now, serves to heighten the sense of despair.

> In the front garden of a tumbledown peasant house, the wind stirs the green leaves of an old bird cherry tree, as if to talk of the past in Tarabayevo, or maybe just of the past.....[243]

Although the rural way of life is taxing, and local employment prospects limited, out-migration is not being experienced on the scale that might be expected, considering the tone of the newspaper reporting. For example, in the first 6 months of 1997, the whole of Krasnovisherskii raion had a net migration balance of +25, and between January 1993 and July 1997, only 22 people left Vaya. In Kosinskii raion the situation is similar, with a net migration balance of -60 in 1996, -126 in 1995, and -77 in 1994. There are a number of

[243] *Parma Novosti* 11.7.1997

possible reasons for migration figures of this type, but the primary factor is probably that the circumstances of individual families largely determine who can, and who cannot leave. With reference to the circumstances of individual families, leaving is simply not an option for those without savings or an opportunity of work. As discussed earlier, in order to leave, it is necessary to have a place to live elsewhere, such as a flat, and flats are expensive to rent or buy, so either a secure job, or a reserve of capital is necessary to tide a family over until employment can be found. Few families are able to accumulate capital, and rural housing cannot be considered as a reserve of capital because of the lack of demand. A further complication is the registering of residence on the passport, and the associated bureaucratic obstacle of obtaining work. Faced with this situation, few households find themselves in the position of being able to make a decision about whether to stay or leave.

However, rural out-migration should not be seen as a clear-cut process. Although entire families do leave, they do not represent the totality of the migrants. On many occasions, as will be discussed in the household study/family history section to follow in Chapter 6, households can split, or bifurcate, leaving some members in the village while others go elsewhere to find work, or a better education for their children.

It is possible to anticipate that another response to the conditions in the marginal settlements might be the formation of 'shantytowns' on the outskirts of the large towns and cities to which rural inhabitants would like to move if they had the facility to do so. However, in the Russian case, there are a number of possible reasons to explain why this does not appear to be happening. Firstly, the Russian climate is harsh – shantytown accommodation would be unlikely to be able to withstand the Russian winter. Secondly, the level of policing and military presence on the streets of Russian towns and cities is high;

police patrol the pedestrian crossings to ensure that no one crosses unless the crossing light allows, even when there is no traffic on the roads, and there are gangs of soldiers patroling the streets at all hours of day and night. The fact that a 'propiska' is still necessary in order to live in the city of Moscow, that residence permits and job permits must be obtained in all towns and cities, and the constant need to carry the passport, to prove identity, to buy train tickets, for example, means that shantytown dwellers would be unable to maintain legal anonymity, and would be liable for arrest. Also, in terms of food supply, the rural inhabitants would be unwilling to give up their carefully tended personal plot and associated foodstuffs in return for the hope of employment, and the need to buy all of their food. I saw no evidence of temporary housing on either the outskirts of the city of Perm', or near smaller towns such as Krasnovishersk and Vaya.

Although the statistics show that in the past few years out-migration from the two raions being studied has not been on a large scale, the responses from the questionnaire survey carried out as part of this research show that in the minds of people still living in the villages, the depopulation is very evident. Of the inhabitants of Solym, the study village in Kosinskii raion, who were questioned, two were women who had recently married local men and moved to the village, and as such did not know much of the history of the settlement. All the other interviewees said that they knew people who had left, and that those people had either been families displaced to Solym by Stalin, and having living relatives at home in Belarus, Ukraine, or in other areas of Russia, had left as soon as they were liberated, or that they were people who had left later, for other reasons, such as

> ...they left because its really difficult to get around in this area, because the transport is so bad...[244]

[244] *pers comm* Antonina Vladimirovna Tabolina, Solym August 1997

> ...because they weren't getting paid, and the lifestyle's so bad.[245]
> ...they left because their money wasn't being paid, and sometimes they left because they didn't want to have to produce all their own food.[246]

In Vaya, because of its different history, there was a wider range of reasons given for the decision taken by the people who had left, of whom every respondent claimed to have known many. One respondent told me that more than half the population of the settlement had left. Examples of reasons given are

> Zona[247], and because they wanted their children to go to a better school, and also because there isn't any work.[248]
>
> Because of the Zona[249]
>
> Because some people were afraid of the zeks, and because there's no work here.[250]
>
> Because of the distance from hospital. If people are ill they need to live nearer to a hospital.[251]
>
> Because there was no work after the Zona closed[252]
>
> Just fear of the zeks[253]
>
> Because they didn't like the lifestyle, and sometimes people also had a flat somewhere else.[254]

It is clear from the responses from Vaya that the Zona, whether its effect was that of generating fear of the zeks when it was still operational, or unemployment when it closed, was one of the reasons for leaving the village. The effect of the unemployment caused when the Zona closed can be likened to that caused by the collapse of the forestry enterprises in both Vaya and Solym. In general, whatever the

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[245] *pers comm* Svetlana Pavelovna Gardeeva, Solym, August 1997
[246] anon, Solym, August 1997
[247] 'Zona' is the name given to the recently closed prison camp near to Vaya
[248] *pers comm* Freda Yunatovna Bugaichuk, Vaya July 1997
[249] *pers comm* Tatiana Ivanovna Andrukova, Vaya July 1997
[250] *pers comm* Anatoly Ivanovich Ginsmann, Vaya July 1997
[251] *pers comm* Natalia Sergeiovna Perezhodina, Vaya July 1997
[252] *pers comm* Nadezhda Chemishova, Vaya July 1997
[253] *pers comm* Raisa Dmitreevna Koshilya, Vaya July 1997

cause behind the circumstance, the main reasons for leaving the two villages were primarily those of employment and infrastructure, be it the poor schools, the lack of medical care, or the poor transport facilities.

When asked about the plans for their own families, those respondents who said that they did not plan to leave their village gave as reasons

> I have everything I need here, a house, a garden and a job.[255]
>
> Of course, I want to live in town, but I can't afford to. And everything I need is here.[256]
>
> I don't want to stay, but a flat costs more than 20 million rubles, so I'll have to stay.[257]
>
> Will I still be here in five years' time? Yes, I have nowhere else to go.[258]
>
> Yes, because there's nowhere else to go, and you need money to be able to buy a flat. [259]
>
> Yes, because I have nowhere else to go, no flat, nowhere to move to.[260]

And those who were planning to leave were also clear about their reasons

> The whole family will be leaving in a year's time, because I have work in town (Krasnovishersk).[261]
>
> We are all leaving, because there's just no work here.[262]
>
> We are probably going to leave Vaya, because we have a flat in town, and we can go and live there.[263]
>
> ... we are leaving, because the lifestyle here's so bad.[264]

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[254] *pers comm* Marina Mikhailovna Bakhankova, Vaya July 1997
[255] *pers comm* Antonina Vladimirovna Tabolina, Solym, August 1997
[256] *pers comm* Yekaterina Vladimirovna Demeneeva, Solym, August 1997
[257] anon, Solym, August 1997
[258] *pers comm* Yevdakia Ilyanovna Ginsmann, Vaya, July 1997
[259] *pers comm* Anatoly Ivanovich Ginsmann, Vaya, July 1997
[260] *pers comm* Svetlana Gennadyovna Trofimova, Vaya, July 1997
[261] *pers comm* Olga Kashlya, Vaya, July 1997
[262] *pers comm* Nadezhda Chemishova, Vaya, July 1997
[263] *pers comm* Raisa Dmitreevna Koshilya, Vaya, July 1997

5.6 Summary

In the north of Perm' oblast, in line with the trend of rural depopulation in the Russian North as a whole, the demise and disappearance of villages is an ongoing problem.

It would appear that one of the responses to marginalisation in rural areas has been outmigration: rural depopulation. In the north of Perm' oblast, the 'death' of villages is being documented and recorded in the newspapers, which describe the process of out-migration of the skilled, the young, and the able-bodied, and the apparent 'abandonment' of those unable or unwilling to leave. It can be argued that the process of rural depopulation, through which the demographic profile of the villages is changing, is a contributory factor in the marginalisation of those villages. The next chapter will deal in detail with the theory that the exchange networks and communications with useful contacts which a household maintains is crucial to its survival strategies; the more people who leave the village, particularly those who are most likely and able to leave first, such as those who have friends in town, or who have an employable skill, such as teachers, the smaller the social group of the village, and the fewer the opportunities for mutual assistance. As more and more of the people who are able to leave the village do so, the village becomes top-heavy in terms of its demographic profile, the proportion of its population who are of working age decreases, and its ability to sustain itself is reduced. As the newspaper articles point out, once the young people and those with an entrepreneurial leaning have gone, marginalisation appears inevitable.

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[264] *pers comm* Marina Mikhailovna Bakhankova, Vaya, July 1997

However, although many villages are being threatened with complete depopulation and abandonment, while they survive, there are inhabitants within them who have been forced to find alternative survival strategies to out-migration. In many cases, these last few inhabitants are pensioners, who have traditionally relied upon the labour of their children and extended families in achieving subsistence. The following chapter concentrates on the survival strategies employed within villages, and the process by which families who have previously supported themselves within villages using such strategies have decided to change tack and move to the town.

Chapter 6 – Those who stay behind – survival strategies in the villages

6.1 Introduction
6.2 Methodology
6.3 Conditions in the villages
6.4 Effecting subsistence
6.5 The relationship between the forestry enterprises and the inhabitants of the forestry villages
6.6 Stratification and marginalisation within the village
6.7 Individual Households : Family Histories
6.8 Summary

6 Those who stay behind – survival strategies in the villages.

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> *Coping strategies... can be read as ways in which individuals with differential power are able to mobilise existing social, political and economic resources to find a pathway through the maelstrom of transition*[265].

In previous chapters, the definition of marginality has been discussed, as has the history of the study area which has led to the circumstances experienced in the post-Soviet era. However, although the geographical area may be described as marginal, its importance as a means of understanding the changes taking place in the Russian Federation is not. Shanin (1990) writes of 'expolary economies', arguing that all images of political economy carry an assumption of margins, and that the survival of those margins is often considered to be due to social inertia, with the result that the margins' subsumption to the core must result in their eventual demise. However, he also argues that the margins are not being reduced, and that the extent of economic action taking place outside the dominant systems and logics of the political economy has actually been growing. Shanin has developed the term 'expolary economies' to describe these margins, a territory which

'...tends to escape systematic viewing, but is central for the realistic study of the economic and social forms of our time'[266]

6.1 Introduction

The term 'survival strategies' can cover a very wide range of phenomena. For the purposes of this section, the domestic practices employed to effect subsistence will be considered, but on a wider scale, the term can also be seen to encompass the bifurcation of households, and outmigration from rural areas. These strategies are not always mutually exclusive, as will be explained later, but for the purposes of clarity, they will be discussed separately to begin with.

In order to address the issue of household survival strategies, I carried out fieldwork in the north of Perm' oblast in the summer of 1997, concentrating on two villages, Solym, in Kosinskii *raion*, and Vaya, in Krasnovisherskii *raion*. (See Plates 1.1 and 1.2.) In each settlement a questionnaire survey of household budgets and domestic production was carried out. The purpose of this research was to find out about the ways in which the post-Soviet transition is being experienced in marginal areas, through the responses of the inhabitants of the villages to the circumstances in which they find themselves during the transition. Questions were also asked of current residents about the people they knew who had already left, and the reasons they gave for so doing. This research informs the debate within geography regarding the ways in which, even in advanced market economies, small-scale activities, such as family farms and natural economies, can survive where classical economic theory would predict their demise.

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[265] Smith & Pickles, (1998) p8

6.2 Methodology

Rose & Tikhomorov (1993) assert that the growing of food at the domestic level in Russia represents a 'deviation' from the 'Conventional model' of development of food production from self-sufficiency in a 'primitive' society to modern differentiated agriculture, in which the task of food production is undertaken by a small number of farmers, who specialise in producing food to feed the entire population. The deviant possibility they outline is the reversal of trends in a 'stressful' system, in which food shortages force as many people as are able to do so to grow food as part of a complex set of economic relationships. They outline two hypotheses regarding conditions in Russia today, "de-differentiation", whereby a high proportion of households in both urban and rural areas will grow food, and "de-modernisation", in which the majority growing food will do so for consumption rather than for sale in the market. They argue that an immediate consequence of the collapse of the command economy in Russia was to increase rather than decrease stress. The collapse disrupted the 'pseudo-modern' economy of the post-war era and introduced many uncertainties about the value of money, the market price of food, and the ownership of land. Where food supplies are uncertain and/or market prices sometimes beyond the means of those whose wages either have not risen to meet higher costs, or are not being paid at all, a household's capacity to produce food outside officially recognised channels can be critical as a survival strategy. Rose (1986) defines the total welfare of a family as the sum of resources secured in the household, through the market and through non-market allocation by the welfare state. In my research I was interested to find out the extent to which households relied on their own domestic production, and how much on outside sources of support.

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[266] Shanin, 1990 : 94

In order to address these issues, it was necessary to use a household survey. In the literature, household surveys have developed out of the issue of 'food security', which in the 1970s was mostly concerned with national and global food supplies. During the 1980s, the focus shifted to questions of access to food at household and individual levels. The work of Sen (1979) provided a systematic approach to the definition and assessment of vulnerability in terms of food security. However, since the literature developed to deal with famine situations, and chronic food shortages, its applicability to my research was a little limited, and examples of household surveys could not be directly transferred to Russia. Whilst I found that there are shortages of certain types of food at certain times of year in the villages I studied, (such as fresh fruit in early summer) this did not amount to a net food shortage. My research focuses on the origin of food - families may have a limited diet, which was investigated, but they are not starving.

Three types of surveys have been conducted in various countries; the income/expenditure/budget survey, the specialised food consumption survey, and the multi-subject survey. The types of data on food consumption obtained through household surveys vary from one type to another.

Income/expenditure/budget surveys are primarily concerned with providing detailed data on household income and expenditure for investigating the economic behaviour of consumers and for other purposes, such as the construction of cost-of-living indices. In a number of surveys, data on food quantities are also obtained, especially in cases where home-produced food is an important part of food consumption or where the collection of data on quantities is a prerequisite to arriving at expenditure data. Normally, when data on food consumption are collected, the value and quantity of such food items

are noted either by the interviewing method, or by the recording method, and may include food purchased or bartered, food gathered wild (and in some surveys food drawn from household supplies) during the reference period - which is usually a period of 5, 7 or 30 days preceding the day of enquiry. In the case of home produce, the weighing method is also applied. The food consumption data obtained represent the total quantity of food acquired by or available to the household during the reference period. In other words, they refer to the flow of food into households without taking into account wastage or losses of edible food.

The specialised food consumption surveys use a more elaborate definition of consumption than that of the more common budgetary; most attention is focussed on quantities and nutritional values rather than on monetary outlays. Information on food consumption includes not only food consumed in the household but also food eaten outside the home by members of the household. The information on household food consumption is obtained by weighing and measuring food items to be used, before the preparation of each meal, while the information on food consumed outside the household is obtained by interviewing household members. The enumerations are usually carried out for periods of 2, 5 or 7 days. The process calls for careful supervision and close co-operation between supervisor and respondents, and is complicated to undertake.

Multi-subject surveys give emphasis to a broad range of data, combining two or more major topics, such as family characteristics, income, employment, education, housing, nutrition and health. Such surveys have the advantage that different aspects of living can be seen in relation to one another. When the nutritional aspect is included in the multi-subject survey, information on food consumption is obtained. Normally, the value and quantity of food items consumed in the household is recorded. Thus the data on food consumption are similar to those obtained through the income/expenditure/budget survey.

However, in some cases, a section of sample households is selected as a sub-sample from which data on food consumption are obtained by weighing and measuring each food item consumed. In such instances, the data on food consumption obtained are similar to those from the specialised food consumption survey[267].

In terms of the practicalities of data collection through household budget surveys, there are two main methods; namely, the observation of the target population and its environment, and the personal interview aided by a questionnaire. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages, and den Hartog et al (1995) recommend that a combination of the two is utilised; a survey based on a structured questionnaire should be complemented with observation of the community. Observational methods of data collection are techniques for gathering information by watching the behaviour of individuals without direct questioning. This method, much used in social anthropological surveys, may give useful information on the food habits of a community and its members, although such observation may be time-consuming. In order to observe food habits adequately, an extended stay in the community is necessary. Other disadvantages are that only small communities can be observed adequately, and that the collected data can be difficult to analyse. Observational methods should be combined with personal interviews where the interviewer asks questions and records the answers on a questionnaire. This method allows the collection of numerical data, and is comparatively quick. A questionnaire has several limitations, in that not all data can be collected by means of a questionnaire, and that persons interviewed may, for various reasons, withhold information. An advantage of combining the observational technique with the

[267] FAO 1983

questionnaire is that gaps left by the questionnaire can be filled by observation, and the interviewer is more likely to know when and why information is being withheld.

The construction of a questionnaire is a complex process; issues of the wording, ordering, and logical progression of the questions must be addressed, and the questions themselves should not suggest answers. Every additional question increases the time necessary to complete the questionnaire, and may make people less willing to cooperate. The situation becomes more complicated when it is necessary to translate the questionnaire into the local language, as was the case with my research. I found it helpful to keep a detailed notebook during the surveys to record observations made on food and nutrition, and information received from various informants and the population, as an aid to interpreting the survey results.

The most obvious problem associated with the use of these surveys seemed to be that of selecting the most appropriate method of data collection. I needed to know (a) the origins of the food available to a household, (b) the proportion of food originating from each source, and therefore (c) the relative importance of each source of food. Although I was less concerned with the nutritional value of the foods themselves, another aspect of the survey was the availability of various types of imported food, which householders could not produce domestically. The problems connected with the choice of method included those of timescale and emphasis. Since I was studying a location with a highly seasonal climate, where food is stored for consumption over a long period of time, short-term observations and measurements, whilst providing an accurate 'snapshot' of consumption patterns during the particular 2, 5 or 7 days in question, told me little about the relative importance of, for example, home-grown carrots, which are plentiful in late autumn, but

stores of which have generally run out by late spring, and which have to be purchased at high cost if they are to be eaten in summer. Taking into account this seasonality, and the fact that severe malnutrition is not a problem in Russian villages, it seemed unnecessary to carry out a highly accurate nutritional survey, of the sort that can only be sustained for a short period of time.

I decided to carry out a combination of the questionnaire-based interview, and the observation method. I spent three winter months of 1996 in a small study village (Solym, in Kosinskii *raion*), during which time I observed the food habits of the household in which I lived, and of their family and friends, and for one of the three months I was *'khozyaika'*, to the household, a role that involved cooking the meals, during which time I became well-acquainted with the state and contents of a domestic Russian rural food store in late winter, and with the availability and cost of food in the village shops. In addition to this extended period of observation, I also carried out a household survey in late summer. During this period, as well as observation, I carried out a questionnaire-based interview survey, aimed at providing a picture of the consumption patterns of the household over the whole year, the variety and origins of the foods they ate, and the relative importance of these sources.

The questionnaire itself was drawn up with reference to examples of questionnaires in the literature, such as that shown in appendix A of den Hartog et al (1983) (pp89-135). For each household, the name, age, sex, occupation and relation to the respondent of each member was noted. Questions were asked about the number of guests who had stayed in the household over the preceding year, and about the length of time they had stayed, in order to ascertain the number of people supported by the household. With

regard to the capacity for domestic production, respondents were questioned as to the number of different animals they had, and what they were used for, (i.e. cows for milk, calves for meat), the origin of the animals, the amount of time for which they had to be stall-fed, and the source of the hay with which cattle were fed during the winter. The purpose of this last question was to discover whether a household had its own hayfields. In terms of land resources, respondents were questioned about the whereabouts of their private plot, the location of their grazing land, whether they had sufficient land for their needs, how much rent they paid and to whom, and about the implements they used to work the land (to find out if they owned their own plough). They were asked what food crops they grew in their plots, and where the seeds came from. Household representatives were questioned about the household budget; the proportion of household income spent on food, seeds, bills, rent, and so on. Following on from the first question about purchased food, they were asked about the seasonality of purchases, whether there was a season of the year during which they found they had to buy more food than at other times. Questions about the availability of food in the local shops followed, with a section related to temporal changes in availability, and a question about the potential response to the closure of the most local shop, to find out the ultimate importance of retail food. Returning to the idea of domestic production, respondents were asked about the variability of their domestic harvests, to ascertain whether domestic production could be heavily relied upon for subsistence, and they were asked about causes of any variability that existed. In terms of food consumption, respondents were asked about the types and frequencies of food consumption, for example, they were asked whether they consumed potatoes every day, 2-5 times every week, once a week, every two weeks, etc. up to yearly or never. This form of question was asked for every food group (i.e. carbohydrates, fruits, dairy products, vegetables, animal proteins, fats, and luxuries), with many examples from each group. The

aim of this section was to draw up a picture of the dietary habits of the respondents' households, and to see how heavily people relied upon eating foods they produced themselves. In order to discover where foods came from, the same list of foods was taken as the starting point for another section of the questionnaire, in which people were asked to describe the proportion of their provision of each foodstuff originating from a number of sources (e.g. all, almost all, about half, less than half, almost none, or none, from domestic production, purchase, exchange, collection or another source, in which case they were asked to specify the source). Respondents were asked whether their provision had always come from these sources, and if there had been a change, why that had happened (for example, people who formerly bought all their own bread now baked it because prices had risen). When speaking about domestic produce, respondents were asked how long their stores of each crop lasted, how much of the crop was preserved, and about the methods used for preservation e.g. jam-making, salting. Taking these sections together, it was possible to define how reliant a household was upon the crops it produced itself, and how much they found it necessary to purchase. It was also possible to identify households that could afford to buy sweets and fruit for their children, and those that could not. People were asked about the recent history of the village, about people they knew who had left, and reasons they had given for leaving. They were then asked about their own plans for the future, whether they planned to stay or leave, and reasons for this decision.

The choice of respondent was determined mainly by who was willing to be interviewed. Although most people had no objection to giving information about their household, the fact that I carried out my survey during late summer, the haymaking time, meant that many people were very busy. I aimed to interview a number of pensioners, families with middle-aged parents, newly married couples, and so on. Also, since one of

my objectives was to demonstrate the exchange links between households, I often interviewed people one household had told me sold them milk, or in whose hayfields a former respondent had told me they had worked. I also tried to represent socio-economic differences within the villages, interviewing very poor pensioners living alone and dependent upon younger family for labour, and also comparatively affluent people who were employed in private enterprises such as family shops, and in each village I made an effort to speak to households involved in the timber industry, although the reliance locally upon timber meant that little real effort had to be made. I also spoke to people affected by the wage delays in the public sector, such as schoolteachers.

6.3 Conditions in the villages

Living standards in the villages of Krasnovisherskii and Kosinskii *raioni* are comparatively low, in terms of service provision and communications. Rural living conditions are challenging; no running water, no piped gas, unpredictable electricity supply, unmetalled roads, infrequent public transport, limited retail outlets, low standards of telecommunications, falling standards of rural education, and remoteness from other, larger centres of population and services, and effecting subsistence requires hard physical labour. Plates 6.1 and 6.2 show the water supply in Solym, and an example of an abandoned dwelling. Employment opportunities are limited; failure of local industry has caused the employment market to collapse. Since the 1950s, Vaya had been an important timber-cutting settlement, floating logs on the Vishera to timber processing plants downstream, and forestry employed the majority of the population. The remainder worked



Plate 6.1 Water Supply in Solym, Kosinskii *raion*:
One of the village wells, August 1997



Plate 6.2 A vacant house, Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997

for the 'Zona', the Soviet prison camp upstream of Vaya, providing food and other services. The zeks worked to maintain the local roads, power lines and other infrastructure. In the early 1990s, the Zona was closed at the request of the local population, and for ecological reasons, *'molevoi splav'*, the free floating of logs downstream, was outlawed, destroying the timber industry. The timber processing factories are in disrepair, and the industry is in a state of collapse. By July 1997, forestry workers had not received cash payments for 2 years, being paid instead in sugar, flour, and rice.

The conditions in Krasnovisherskii and Kosinskii *raioni* are by no means unusual for the north of Perm oblast. In 1993, the Forestry Department of the oblast Administration in Perm' carried out a survey of all the forestry villages in the oblast which were considered by the administration of the *raion* in which they were situated to be 'non-perspective' (*n'eperspektivnii*). The survey requested information about the populations of the villages, the forestry enterprise which operated within them, about how the infrastructure and services of the villages were run, the villages' prospects for development, and the reasons the *raion* administrations gave for declaring them non-perspective. When the survey replies came back from the *raioni*, the Department of Labour of the oblast administration wrote a report on its findings (18th April 1994);

> The total number of forest settlements in the oblast is 236, with a population of more than 50,000. In 80 settlements with a combined population of 27,000, there either are, or soon will be, problems involving the employment of the population. In most settlements, the percentage of the population (officially) unemployed does not exceed 5% yet, but there are settlements in which it exceeds 50%. The problem of employment of the population of forest settlements exists in conjunction with the exhaustion of the forest base, and by virtue of other economic reasons, such as the difficult financial conditions of forestry enterprises. Unprofitable enterprises, and non-payment by consumers does not allow the maintenance of the necessary

level of social infrastructure, and workers have not received wages for several months[268].

Although the report summarised the situation in the forestry villages as a whole, some of its most extreme examples came from Krasnovisherskii *raion*.

In Krasnovisherskii *raion*, for example, in a number of villages, telephones are absent, as are medical services, and the guarantee of a supply of food products[269].

Even back in 1994, the prognosis for the area was not optimistic;

In a number of cases, the administration cannot offer a solution to the problems of forest settlements, apart from the handing over of local amenities to a higher level of administration.[270]

In the survey itself, the reports from the individual villages were almost uniformly pessimistic about the prospects for the future. There are many examples of the replies to the section of the survey questionnaire entitled 'prognosis for employment', and none of them make heartening reading;

One tractorist is going to work at Kolkhoz 'Zvezda' (Star). In the following year, women will be working at home.

In other words, only one skilled worker had been successful in finding work after having been unemployed, and the employment prospects for women were almost non-existent. (Pervomaiiskii village, Uinskii *raion*)

In 1994 the village dispensary will close, with the loss of 16 jobs. No other changes are foreseen (Vil'va, Gornozavodskii *raion*)

The village has no forestry base, so employment will decrease, especially amongst women. (Storozhevaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*)

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[268] Extracts from a letter to V.I. Rogal'nikov, head of the Forestry Department of Perm' oblast administration, from the Department of Labour of the ablast administration, regarding 'The Employment of the Population, and the social base of the forest villages in Perm' oblast' 18.4.1994
[269] ibid.
[270] ibid.

> Twenty people will lose their jobs when the log rafting ends. But, the village has good haylands for livestock, so for now the population is stable. (Govorlivoye, Krasnovisherskii *raion*)
>
> The collapse of forestry means that the whole village could soon be unemployed. (Myasnaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*)
>
> Enterprises are in difficult financial conditions. Workers have not received wages in 5 months, they are working episodically, and the enterprises may go bankrupt. (Mutikha, Krasnovisherskii *raion*)
>
> The population is falling annually, i.e. from 125 in 1990 to 75 in 1993, and the trend will continue, in the absence of a raw material base, and adequate amenities. (Malii Shugor, Krasnovisherskii *raion*)

Even when the survey revealed some plans for future development of a village, they always included a proviso that investment would be necessary, and given the economic climate in the villages, investment was very unlikely.

The picture of forestry villages in Perm' oblast painted by the 1993 survey is that of settlements in the kind of crisis which was to lead to the conditions described for the study villages in Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*. At the time of the 1993 survey, many of the local amenities, such as schools, clubs and kindergartens, were in the hands of the forestry enterprises, which had already begun to experience difficult financial conditions, and had begun to hand the amenities over to their local administrations. By the time I visited the villages in 1996 and 1997, all amenities were in the hands of the administrations, and the enterprises seemed to be on their last legs.

The 1993 forestry villages survey gives a useful overview of the forestry settlements just four years ago, and provides a comparison with the present day. Unfortunately for the inhabitants of the villages, the conditions in 1993 were generally better than in 1997.

As discussed in the previous chapter, rural out-migration is at present not being experienced at high levels, and people are still enduring the living conditions that, in other circumstances, might force them to leave. The next step must be to ask what strategies are being employed by inhabitants of marginal areas to ensure subsistence under these conditions?

6.4 Effecting subsistence

To quote Van Atta (1993), while the post-Soviet states are making their painful transitions to market conditions, they must eat.

To this end, households of Krasnovisherskii and Kosinskii *raioni* draw upon a wide variety of sources to provide the inputs they require. Food, water, land, firewood, money and labour are all essential, and the household engages in a network of exchange relationships, procurement and production practices, in order to satisfy its requirements. Such a way of life is familiar to Russian people; the fruits of the forest have always been collected and the land has always been cultivated; my question is whether the present circumstances in marginal areas constitute a qualitatively different situation. From the viewpoint of a researcher from an advanced capitalist society, such reliance on the natural economy is unfamiliar, and it forms an interesting academic question.

O'Brien *et al* (1996) have described the system of household production in terms of three contributing factors, human capital, social capital and technological capital, which provide a useful framework for analysis of the survival strategies being employed in the villages studied. 'Human capital' draws on Chayanov's work on peasant households in

Russia, which showed that the availability of labour in the household was strongly connected to the household's capacity to work the land and to produce agricultural products. 'Social capital' is defined as a social infrastructure which can create competitive advantages for individuals, organisations or communities. "Social capital is rooted in specific types of social relationships which provide advantages with respect to accessing information, credit or labour"[271] The Soviet Union, they assert, saw intermediary structures between the individual and the state as potential competitors, and they attempted to destroy traditional types of voluntary associations, informal marketing and trading networks, and other forms of community attachments which exist in rural areas. However the state did not manage to destroy all forms of informal co-operation and networking. Soviet citizens in general, and those living in rural areas in particular, came to develop and maintain informal social support and material helping networks which enabled them to cope with the command economy. The third type of capital, 'Technological capital', encompasses the mechanical equipment used by the household to produce food. Ploughs are an example, as are the boats used in Vaya to transport hay from the meadows across the river.

The exchange relationships in existence in the villages studied have been the subject of debate over the past few decades. There have been two opposing views; on the one hand, it has been argued that the Soviet state succeeded in largely ridding the villages of networks for informal support, and on the other hand other writers hold that the state itself created the need for the same informal networks.

The Soviet state aimed to centralise the production and delivery of goods and services to its population, and virtually all households relied on the state for income

[271] O'Brien, D.J., Patsiorkovski, V.V., Dershem, L., Lylova, O. (1996) p682

(salaries, pensions, childcare), consumer goods, and most services, such as health, education and transport, with the result that a "dependent population", reliant on the state for the majority of its everyday and long-term needs, was created. It was thus argued that such reliance on the state destroyed the significance, if not the total use of, informal networks for social support[272] It has been contested that traditional sources of support were no longer necessary because the state provided services which had previously been provided by family and community[273].

The role of political repression has also been implicated in terms of the cultivation of suspicion and distrust based upon fear of the secret police and informers, meaning that people were apprehensive of trusting family, friends and neighbours. The Soviet Union's form of repression (Feher, Heller and Markus, 1983[274]) resulted in isolated individuals, and little integration into informal networks. When resources and services were needed, they were obtained from formal, bureaucratic state sources rather than from informal ties.

The counter to this argument for isolation and lack of informal networks is based upon the scarcity of goods and services, which was a notable feature of life in the USSR, and which continues to be crucial today. It is held that the scarcity of goods and services actually increased the size and significance of informal networks. Large and extensive networks were, and are, needed to access and obtain necessary goods and services. Thus, the scarcity of goods and services structurally promotes informal networks.[275]

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[272] Anderson, quoted on Wolfe, in Dershem, 1998.
[273] Walder, 1986:13, in Dershem, 1998
[274] in Dershem, 1998
[275] Eisenstadt & Roninger, 1981, Willerton, 1979, Simis, 1982, Sik, 1988, all in Dershem, 1998.

> The more a social system is bureaucratically formalised, regulated, planned, and yet unable to fully satisfy social requirements, the more it tends to create informal mechanisms that escape the control of the system. (Lomnitz, 1988:43)

Such informal mechanisms play an important role in the creation of a social security system based upon mutual support, within the system. The result of the scarcity of goods and services, and of the centralisation of the few goods and services that there are, is a social structure permeated with informal networks of support.[276] I would argue that the theory that the action of the Soviet state served to discourage the development of informal networks in villages such as Solym and Vaya has limited relevance. Through my own research, I found that informal mechanisms have been extremely important, and that they certainly do not seem to have 'sprung up' only after 1991.

The household itself usually consists of a family, usually nuclear, sometimes extended, living together under a single roof and organised as a single unit for budgeting and consumption purposes and for the purposes of providing themselves with food and other domestic arrangements. In the villages of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, households are accommodated in one-storey wooden houses, in their own plot of land, comprising a potato patch, a vegetable garden, and a hayfield. Plate 6.3 shows a typical wooden house. Sometimes households also have access rights to hayfields separate from their kitchen gardens. Located on the household plot are various outbuildings, such as a barn, for keeping livestock, with a hayloft, a wooden *banya*, for washing, a hut for the toilet, and some kind of wooden shelter for firewood (Figure 6.1).

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[276] Morton, 1984, Walder, 1986, Lomnitz, 1988, all in Dershem, 1998.



Plate 6.3 A typical wooden village house, Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, March 1996




Figure 6.1 Land Use Plan of a Household Plot
Solym, Kosinskii *raion*.

Land is the basic essential. From its own land the household obtains the greater part of its subsistence. Land in the villages of Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, and Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, belongs either to the local forestry enterprise, or *les'khoz*, or to the *sel'soviet*, the village soviet. In Vaya, all the land belongs to the *les'khoz*, which ploughs the inhabitants' plots, and collects rental payment (15 rubles per year for hay meadows on the banks of the Vishera River in 1997). In Vaya a nominal land rent of 25 kopecks per year was paid to the *raion* administration in Krasnovishersk. In Solym, the land in the village itself is administered by the Svetlitsa *sel'soviet*, based in the nearby village of Svetlitsa. 5 rubles was paid annually to this *sel'soviet* as land rent. The forest surrounding the village is the responsibility of the local *les'khoz*.

The labour requirements of households are usually fulfilled by their own members, sometimes with the help of the extended family[277], or, more occasionally, waged labour. Shanin (1990) calls this the 'family production unit', with the absence (or limited use) of wage labour, and the increased importance of family centred consumption, the mutual, non-contractual, and long-term support labour relationships. For example, in both Vaya and Solym, incidences of adult children, now married and living separately from their parents' household, helping at haymaking time in return for milk and/or bread from their parents are very common. Households less able to provide for their own subsistence, such as a one-parent family in Vaya, receive more help from the older household; in this case meat, bread and milk were supplied in return for labour at haymaking, and informal gift giving. All members of the household play a part in the collection and cultivation of

[277] The extended family is defined by Laslett (1972) to be a Conjugal Family Unit (CFU) i.e. a married couple, a married couple with offspring, or a widowed person with offspring, with the addition of one or more relatives other than the offspring. If the resident relative is of an earlier generation than that of the CFU, then the extension is said to be upwards. The presence of a grandchild, nephew or niece creates downward extension, and that of a brother, sister or cousin of the couple implies sideways extension. In this definition, the term 'extended family' covers all relatives in habitual contact with a

food. Children participate in the collection of berries and mushrooms, and it is often their job to clean and pick through the berries before preserving. They also help in harvesting crops from the garden, and are often sent on errands to collect milk and bread from other households. Adult labour is deployed in the hayfields, and in the kitchen garden, with women's labour also utilised in the home, where they are responsible for preparing food, and also for making the various preserves which the household stores for winter, as well as laundry and cleaning. Men additionally undertake hunting and fishing trips, being absent sometimes for days at a time, they also take responsibility for the slaughter of animals and the cleaning of the carcasses, and they cut firewood if purchased in full trunks.

Although households provide for a large proportion of their own needs, they still require cash, in order to pay the nominal land rent, to purchase foods and goods they cannot produce themselves, and to purchase vegetable seeds for their gardens. The major sources of cash are wages, pensions and benefits, and revenue from domestic products sold on the local market. (A complication is the fact that under circumstances such as those being experienced in these two *raioni*, vodka is being used as a substitute for cash, a trend pointed out by Ioffe and Nefedova (1997)). Dealing first with money wages, state sector employees receive the most reliable payments, according to local opinion, although this income is still comparatively unreliable; if paid at all, wages are delayed, or paid in kind. For example, in August 1997, teachers in Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, had not been paid for the work carried out between January and June of that year. Payment due for the summer vacation (the remainder of June, and July and August), paid from the Federal rather than the local budget, was received. Therefore, teachers expected to be paid for only 25% of the year, ironically, for the period during which they were actually on holiday.

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person, irrespective of whether they live with him or her. The majority of the extended families in the study area were extended upwards, with the presence of parents of the couple.

> The local budget pays state employees, although here they haven't been paid for six months. The police are paid from the local budget, so they aren't receiving any money; only people paid from the federal budget are getting money.[278] (Valentina Ivanovna Kuznetsova, Kosa, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997)

Other state sector employees, such as those employed by the local *leskhozi*, receive a different form of payment

> Instead of money, people receive flour, and sacks of peas, from the local forestry enterprise, and they also get tickets which they can exchange for wood. They make bread from the flour, rather than buying it from the bakery.[279]

Both village inhabitants and regional administrators generally agree that the major source of cash income into rural areas is state pensions. Of Solym's total population of 287 (July 1997), 102 received a state pension, whether due to old age, orphan status, invalidity or a number of other reasons. The average pension in July 1997 was 312.62 rubles per month. Pensions are more reliable than state sector wages, and as such they form a very important part of households' income, both for the household of the pensioners, and for those nearby. By virtue of their receiving a fairly reliable cash income, pensioners wield a certain degree of power in the villages, being able to make loans to households without any means to obtain money, and they exercise this power at their own discretion, making loans to those most likely to be able to repay. Within extended families, the pension of a grandparent is often the financial 'safety net' for the household.

With regard to unemployment benefit, payments are both smaller and less reliable. For example, in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, officially, 47% of the unemployed qualified for and received the 'minimum payment' of 83.49 rubles per month in summer of 1997, plus the 'Northern' bonus of about 20 rubles, paid because all of Krasnovisherskii

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[278] *pers comm* Valentina Ivanovna Kuznetsova, Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997

raion is considered to be in the North of Russia. Therefore, the minimum monthly payment in the *raion* is around 100 rubles. 38% of the unemployed qualify for the mid-range payment of almost 300 rubles, and 15% for the maximum of 900 rubles, both calculated on the basis of the work carried out by the claimant prior to unemployment. However, all benefit claimants in the *raion*, regardless of status, have been receiving the minimum payment of 100 rubles (the level of payment which should only be received by school-leavers or the long-term unemployed) since October 1996, due to federal budget constraints. The situation in Kosinskii *raion* is similar; the minimum monthly payment there is 100.18 rubles, but since in 1997 nobody had received benefit for almost 12 months, the unemployed have ceased to register their status; although there clearly were unemployed people in Solym, none of them is registered to receive benefit.[280]

Households were also entitled to child benefit of 70 rubles per child per month, which in August 1997 in Kosinskii *raion* had not been received since January of that year[281]. Although the payment itself is therefore unreliable, an important distinction must still be made between those households with children and those without; child benefit is used to pay dues on land, to settle bills and debts (repayment of loans from pensioners is often promised on the receipt of child benefit), and to buy food.

The third major source of currency is revenue from gathered foods or domestic produce sold on the local market. Most households collect wild fruits, nuts, mushrooms and so on as a source of food for themselves, (Plate 6.4) but others rely on the

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[279] pers comm Svetlana Nikolaievna Nikitasenko, Solym, Kosinskii *raion* August 1997
[280] Krasnovisherskii *raion Tsentr Zanyatost' Naseleniya* (1996) *Otchet o deyatel'nosti Tsentra zanyatosti naseleniya Krasnovisherskogo raiona.*, Kosinskii *raion* Administration *Otchet o pabotye Kosinskogo tsentra zanyatosti naseleniya za pervoye polugoda 1997g.* and *pers comm* A.F. Plyasunova, Director *Kosinskogo TsZN* August 1997
[281] *pers comm* Svetlana Nikolaievna Nikitasenko, Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997



Plates 6.4 Wild mushrooms gathered from the forest around Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997

sale of such goods for money. Within villages, the wealthier households are targeted as potential buyers of fresh fish, wild berries and mushrooms, as poorer inhabitants sell 'door-to-door'. In Kosinskii *raion*, where Solym is linked to the *raion* administrative centre, the village of Kosa, by a twice-weekly hour-long bus journey, inhabitants of Solym also travel to the larger settlement to sell berries. Sale of milk (around 2 rubles per litre), sour cream (12 per litre) and cottage cheese (10 per kilogram) makes a cow a potential source of income. Apart from selling foodstuffs, either gathered in the forest, or produced at home, households also sell labour in return for cash, offering work in the hayfields or in the kitchen garden of another household.

Equal in importance with the sources of money are the ways in which it is spent, the goods which are purchased, and the amount of money which is required to satisfy certain obligations. The payments required for renting land are nominal, but there are additional charges levied on rural dwellers. For example, there are the taxes on various forms of transport. Very few households own a car, but those that do had to pay 41 rubles per year in 1997. The tax on a freight vehicle was 601.2 rubles, and that on a motorcycle 5.5. Perhaps more importantly in Vaya, there is also a tax on motor boats, which are frequently used to transport hay from hayfields along the river. Boats without engines are exempted from charges, but those with the least powerful motor cost 25 rubles per year, and those with a motor 2.5 times as powerful incur a fee of 52[282].

Apart from these taxes, the overwhelming type of expenditure of money in both villages was that on food. Every respondent reported that they spent between ninety

[282] *pers comm* Raisa Dmitreevna Koshilya, school director and village record keeper, Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997

and one hundred percent of their cash on food, with any residual going on other essentials. When asked what money was spent on, typical responses were

> "Food. I can't afford to buy anything else at all."[283]
>
> "Food. Anything left over goes on clothes."[284]
>
> "Food, then spending on the animals."[285]
>
> "Just food."[286]
>
> "All of it goes on food"[287]
>
> "Almost all on food. The rest goes to my daughter at college."[288]

Food comes from a range of sources; domestic production, barter, purchase, gift giving, collection, and as payment. Domestic production constitutes by far the most important source of nutrition. The typical household maintains a kitchen garden, in which are cultivated potatoes, carrots, beetroot, cabbages, marrows, peas, garlic, tomatoes, and cucumbers, herbs such as flat-leafed parsley, fennel and horseradish, and soft fruits such as raspberries, and both wild (alpine) and cultivated strawberries. Seeds are purchased either from local markets or by post, or are saved from the previous year's crop.

The agricultural calendar differs between Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, because of the differences in climate between the two areas. The average annual temperature in Krasnovisherskii *raion* is -0.1°C, annual average rainfall is 550-700mm, annual snow cover is 1-2m, and the ground freezes to a depth of between 0.6 and 2m in winter. In Kosinskii *raion*, the average annual temperature is 0.6°C, and annual rainfall is

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[283] *pers comm* Yevdakia Ilyanovna Ginsmann, Vaya, July 1997
[284] *pers comm* Antonina Mikhailovna Sukorukova, Vaya July 1997
[285] *pers comm* Tatiana Ivanovna Andrukova, Vaya July 1997
[286] *pers comm* Antonina Gerasimovna Sarinkina, Solym, August 1997
[287] *pers comm* Natalia Sergeiovna Perezhodina, Vaya, July 1997
[288] *pers comm* Raisa Dmitreevna Koshilya Vaya, July 1997

500-550mm; the climate in general is far less severe[289]. In Kosinskii *raion*, agricultural activity begins in March, when tomato and cabbage seeds are sown into trays indoors. In April and May, little tomato plants are transplanted into cloches in the garden, cucumbers are sown direct into cloches, and carrots, peas and garlic are sown direct into uncovered earth. In late May, little cabbage plants are transplanted into cloches, and marrow seeds are sown into earth enriched with cow manure, which also helps to keep them warm. Potatoes are sown when the first birch leaves appear, usually in May, but in villages close to the Kama River it is necessary to sow them in June because the frozen Kama keeps the soil chilled until late into the spring. Onions and beetroot seeds are sown at about the same time. In late July and early August, cucumbers and tomatoes, and early-sown marrows can be picked, and at the end of August, cucumbers and late marrows are ready. By the end of September carrots and beetroots have been dug and are already in the cellar store, along with the crop of potatoes. In Krasnovisherskii *raion*, where spring comes later and winter sooner, the growing season is shorter; local people complain that tomatoes rarely ripen in the short summer, and the weather can be very unpredictable - snow fell in mid July 1997, to be followed by a week of dry weather and temperatures around 30°C. However, despite the limitations imposed upon agriculture by the local climate, households are able to provide themselves with ample potatoes and root vegetables for the winter; although yields vary from year to year, there is always enough. Plates 6.5 and 6.6 show kitchen gardens in Solym, and plates 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the use of cloches to grow more tender crops in Vaya.

Most households keep some livestock, usually pigs, for meat, sometimes a cow, to provide milk (for processing into sour cream, cottage cheese, butter and hard

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[289] *Ministerstvo Obshchego I Professional'nogo Obrazovaniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii Permskii Gosudarstvenni Universitet* (1997) Permskaya Oblast': Otrasli, Regioni, Goroda., p249-251





Plates 6.5 & 6.6 Kitchen gardens in Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997.





Plates 6.7 & 6.8 Cloches in a kitchen garden,
Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997



Plate 6.9 Domestic cattle left to graze the common land at the roadside Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997.



Plate 6.10 Slaughter of a domestic pig, Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, April 1996



Plate 6.11 Domestic geese allowed to wander freely within the village, Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997.



Plate 6.12 Horses drawing sleds from the hayfields across the frozen lake adjacent to Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, February 1996.



Plate 6.13 Fishing boat at the shore of the frozen lake, Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, February 1996.

Figure 6.2
Production of Potatoes on Household Plots of Krasnovisherskii raion and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1995-1998




Figure 6.3
Production of Vegetables on Household Plots of Krasnovisherskii raion and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1995-1998




Figure 6.4
Production of Milk on Household Plots of Krasnovisherskii raion and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1995-1998




Figure 6.5
Number of Cows on Household Plots of Krasnovisherskii raion on the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1995-1999




Figure 6.6
Number of Cows per 100 Households on Household Plots of Krasnovisherskii raion and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, 1995-1999






Plate 6.14 *Varenia* being made from locally-picked *zemlyaniki* (alpine strawberries) Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997.



Plate 6.15 Wild bilberries cleaned and prepared for *varenia* Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, August 1997

cheeses), and also to produce calves for meat. Goats, sheep, geese, rabbits and, very occasionally, chickens, are also kept. Animals are usually domestic-bred, occasionally purchased from the nearest market, or from neighbours. They require a considerable amount of attention; cows, goats, sheep and sometimes also pigs are allowed to wander freely in the villages, grazing and foraging in the waste land at the side of the roads, and at the edge of the forest, but for about 8 months of the year they must be stall-fed, and hay is required. At all times of year, it is necessary to make a feed for pigs, usually consisting of cheap cereals, bread, potatoes, and household scraps. Most households keep at least two dogs, (for protection against wolves, and also as family pets,) which are fed a similar preparation. Plates 6.9 shows domestic cattle grazing by the roadside, 6.10 shows the slaughter of a domestic pig, both in Solym, and plate 6.11 show domestic geese wandering freely in Vaya. Plates 6.12 and 6.13 show the frozen lake in Solym, and horses being used to pull sleds of hay from the hayfields beyond it to the village.

Statistics produced by the Perm' oblast administration show changes in the levels of production of various types of foodstuffs in household plots over the period 1995-1999. For example, Figures 6.2[290] and 6.3[291] show the data for production of potatoes and vegetables in Krasnovisherskii *raion* and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* (data are not disaggregated for each *raion* of the *okrug*). Figure 6.4[292] shows the production of milk and Figure 6.5[293] shows the number of cows kept by households. Figure 6.6[294] shows the number of cows per one hundred households. These data show that even though the population of Krasnovisherskii *raion* fell by 500 between 1995 and 1998, and that of the

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[290] *Goskomstat RF. Permskii oblastnoi Komitet Gosstatistiki (1999) Lichniye podsobniye Khozyaistva Naseleniya i Krest'yanskiye (Fermerskiye) Khozyaistva Permskoi Oblasti (1995-1998gg) Perm' 1999*, p13

[291] ibid., p14

[292] ibid., p17

[293] ibid., p19

KPAO by 5,200 over the same period (with Kosinskii *raion* losing 400)[295], the production of food on household plots stayed steady or increased. A notable exception in the data is the number of pigs kept, which increased from 14,826 to 15,130 in the KPAO, but fell from 2,723 to 801 in Krasnovisherskii *raion*[296].

Since domestic production is required to feed the members of the household not only at harvest time but also throughout the year, various methods of storage and preservation of seasonal foods are employed. Root vegetables and potatoes are kept in a cellar beneath the house, protected from frost. Cabbage is compressed in wooden boxes before being bottled in salt water. Cucumbers and tomatoes are bottled in a sugar and salt solution with herbs and garlic, and herbs themselves are salted and bottled. Soft fruits are preserved as *varenia*, a kind of jam, or as compote, a form of fruit juice. Plates 6.14 and 6.15 show the preparation of *varenia*. At times of slaughter of animals, meat is preserved by freezing, salting or smoking. Households build a small wooden hut, dig a cellar beneath it, and fill the cellar with ice to keep meat cold throughout the year. Salted and smoked meat is hung in a barn or outbuilding.

Sources of barter, gift giving, and exchange of food are various. "The gift" and "commodity exchange" can be seen as neatly opposing each other in a number of ways; in gift exchange, inalienable objects, of the same kind, pass between people already bound together by social ties whilst in commodity exchange, alienable objects, of different kinds, pass between people acting as free agents. Gift exchange underwrites social relations and is concerned with social reproduction, commodity exchange establishes

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[294] ibid., p19
[295] *Goskomstat Rossii. Permskii oblastnoi Komitet Gosudrstvennoi Statistiki Osnoviye Pokazateli Razvitiya gorodov i raionov Permskoi oblasti Perm' 1998*, p19

relations between things and ensures their reproduction. This counterposition of gift and commodity exchange as a binary pair, as described by Gregory is in contrast with Sahlin's conception of them as being opposite ends of a continuum; from the positive altruism of what he calls 'generalised reciprocity' to the 'unsociable extreme' of 'negative reciprocity', the latter being exemplified by barter, chicanery and haggling[297]. The most common examples of barter are those amongst kin, or extended family, such as when dairy products from a cow kept by one household of an extended family are given in exchange for labour in the hayfields from other households of the family. In this way, a long-term exchange relationship is formed, whereby one "payment" of labour at haymaking time is made in exchange for daily milk, weekly sour cream, and so on. Between non-kin households, the purchase of milk is more likely to take the form of a cash payment for each delivery, but in all cases, the arrangement is made according to the needs and resources of the participating households - as well as cash, the purchasing household might offer the use of its *banya*, or some of the fish caught during the summer months. Market exchange is carried out in village shops and bakeries, where households buy goods they cannot produce themselves, such as flour, rice, cereals and tinned fish and meat, as well as luxuries such as chocolate and fresh fruit. The range of products on sale in the two villages is limited; chicken is the only fresh meat available, and usually only one brand of each product is offered. (Plate 6.16 shows the stock of a shop in Solym). An example of a foodstuff which gives rise to a variety of exchange relationships is that of bread. In both Vaya and Solym there are village bakeries, and some inhabitants continue to purchase bread, both for their own consumption and to feed their animals. However, an increasing number of households are either purchasing flour to bake their own bread, or engaging in barter or exchange relationships with other households, whereby the first household purchases flour

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[296] *Goskomstat RF. Permskii oblastnoi Komitet Gosstatistiki (1999) Lichniye posdobniye Khozyaistva Naseleniya i krest'yanskiye (fermerskiye) khozyaistva Permskoi oblasti. Perm' 1999*, p20

and 'gives' the flour to a second household, which keeps the flour to bake bread for itself, and also bakes for the first household. A further permutation arises when employees of failing enterprises are paid in flour rather than in cash, enabling them to bake bread at home rather than purchase it. Baking bread at home is considered to be more economical; shop bread costs 2 rubles per loaf, whereas the cost of homebaking is estimated at 1.5, and home-baked loaves are bigger. Gift giving is a more kin-based system, in which participants bring gifts of produce from their gardens, such as the first or last crop of strawberries, or home-produced foods with some special significance, such as *blini* (pancakes) during Lent, or sweetened breads at Easter. Purchased 'luxury' foods are also given as gifts, such as chocolate or biscuits to children and grandparents, and fresh fruit to family members who are ill.

Most households in forest villages such as Vaya and Solym also collect wild foods from the forest, mainly berries and mushrooms, and most also fish and hunt. The rights of Soviet citizens to collect the 'fruits of the forest' were clarified on January 1st 1978, in the Fundamental Principles of Forestry Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics. Article 35 stated that 'Citizens shall have the right to freely stay in forests, gather wild fruit, nuts, mushrooms, berries and so forth'. In the same document, the forests were declared 'state ownership, the common property of the whole Soviet people'. This law was updated in 1997, and now states that

> Citizens have the right to enter the territory of the forest fund and the forest without payment, and to collect, strictly for necessity, wild fruits, berries, nuts, mushrooms, and other edible forest resources, medicinal plants and raw materials, to take part in cultural, keep-fit, touristic and sporting activities, and to hunt, according to the legislation of the Russian Federation. (*Lesnoi Kodeks,* 1997 : 44)

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[297] Sahlins, 1972, p200



Plate 6.16 A shop in the village of Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, April 1996

Among the berries collected in accordance with Article 86 are *zemlyanika* (Wild or Alpine strawberries), *malina* (raspberries), *chernika* (bilberries), *golubika* (bog whortleberries), *brusnika* (red bilberries), *moroshka* (cloudberries), *krasnaya* and *chyornaya smorodina* (red- and blackcurrants), *shipovnik* (dogrose hips), *kalina* (berries of the guelder rose, or snowball tree), *ryabina* (rowan berries), and *chernomukha* (bird cherries). Mushroom varieties include *siroyeshka* (Russula), *volnushka* (coral milky cap), *podosinovik* (orange-cap boletus), *podberyozovik* (brown mushroom), *lisichki* (chanterelle), *maslyonok (Boletus luterus), byeli grib* (literally 'white mushroom', *Boletus*), and *rizhik* (saffron milky cap). Berries are preserved with sugar as *varenia*, or as compote, made with boiling water and sugar. Mushrooms are either dried, or bottled salted or marinated. The berry-collecting season begins in late June, with *zemlyanika* and *moroshka,* and extends through the summer, with different berries ripening in succession, *ryabina* being one of the last. At the end of July mushroom collecting begins, and it continues into September.

Fishing is most productive during the months when the rivers and lakes are not frozen, but even when they are, holes are cut in the ice and line fishing is carried out throughout the winter. In Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the proximity of the Vishera to the village of Vaya means that fish is an important source of protein, and also of cash. Most common species found in the Vishera include *khariuz* (grayling or umber), *tai'men'* (salmon-trout), *shchuka* (pike), *nalym* (burbot, or eel pout), and *okun'* (perch). In the more southerly waters of the Kosa River, in Kosinskii *raion*, bream can also be found. Fish from local lakes and rivers is preserved either by drying or salting, to be eaten through the winter, or is sold either to other inhabitants of the village, or in nearby villages, further from the river.

In terms of food consumption, the wide variety of foods described above is not available throughout the year. The highly seasonal climate is reflected in the patterns of food availability. Also, between Solym and Vaya there was considerable variation in the frequency of consumption of various foods. As part of the questionnaire survey, respondents were asked approximately how often they ate a wide range of foods, including domestic produce, and foods they could either only purchase, or only obtain through hunting or fishing. Asking first about average consumption throughout the year, in both villages, as anticipated, potatoes were eaten every day, with carrots, beetroot and onions, the other major vegetable crops, being consumed almost as regularly (either daily, or 2-5 times per week). Likewise bread, milk, butter, and tea. Other staples such as rice, and various types of cereals known collectively as kasha (excluding the specific kasha which is groats) were consumed between once and five times each week. Garden produce which was more difficult to preserve, such as cucumbers and tomatoes, were eaten approximately fortnightly on average across the year, but almost daily in summer, with mushrooms falling into the same category. Every respondent reported eating berries in the form of jam on a daily basis, which is testament to the importance of the forest as the major source of fruit. The major difference between the two villages was in the consumption of fresh fruit of a type that could only be obtained through purchase, such as apples, pears, bananas and oranges. In Vaya, apples were usually eaten monthly (more frequent consumption was only for the children), pears 2-5 times per year if at all, oranges likewise, and bananas almost never. Some families reported never eating any of these fruits. Fruit of this kind is regarded as a luxury, as are products such as cocoa (hot chocolate drinks), very rarely consumed (yearly, or only for celebrations), chocolate, between fortnightly and never, usually never for the families which did not buy fruit. When asked about the consumption of vodka, most people answered that they only drank vodka for celebrations, but the

implication was that the frequency of celebrations requiring vodka was greater than that of those requiring chocolate. Notably, the family which never bought fruit or chocolate was the only one to report consuming vodka every day.

In Solym, although a very similar depiction of consumption of the staple foods applies, there was a difference in the pattern of consumption of fresh fruit. Apples and oranges were more commonly eaten, and sometimes watermelons and even pineapples were brought from the city, or if available, from the neighbouring village of Kosa, where there is a cluster of market stalls. The most likely explanation for the difference in patterns of consumption of 'luxury' items between Solym and Vaya seems to be the difference in proximity to a bigger settlement, or more importantly, the ease of travel between them. Solym is one hour by twice-weekly bus from Kosa, whereas Vaya is 5 hours by once weekly bus from Krasnovishersk, both journeys crossing a river either by means of a temporary bridge, or by virtue of the vehicle being able to drive through the stream (bridges across the Vishera and the Lolog were washed away several years ago and have not yet been rebuilt, which adds to the problems of accessibility for both settlements) Although Krasnovishersk is substantially larger than Kosa (the former is a town, the latter a large village), the difficulty, and therefore the cost of transporting goods from Krasnovishersk to Vaya means that once they arrive in Vaya they are very expensive, and people cannot afford to buy them. This deduction is confirmed by responses from the questionnaires, which saw people giving very similar replies to the question of whether there were foods available in village shops, which they could not afford to buy. Apart from the general complaint that everything is far too expensive, the most frequently mentioned items were fruit, sweets and chocolate, biscuits, and sausages. The same story can be heard from a shopkeeper in Solym, who complained that when he purchased

sausage (kolbasa) for his shop, it was too expensive for local people, and since he didn't have a refrigerator in the store, it sat on the counter until it was rotten. The proximity to the larger settlement is also important for the reason that it is simply easier for the inhabitants of Solym to visit Kosa than it is for those living in Vaya to visit Krasnovishersk. This relates to another section of the questionnaire, where respondents were asked to envisage their response to a situation where there were no shops in their village. With only the exception of the owner of one of the shops, the response in Vaya was that it would be impossible to continue living there. The journey to and from the town to buy food would not be viable partly because of the cost of the journey, and partly because of the inability of families to spend a relatively large amount of money all at once, even if prices were lower in the town. The advantage of village shops was partly that they enabled people to buy just as much as they needed immediately, rather than having to stock up during more infrequent purchases. In Solym the response was the opposite. Without exception, those asked said that the cessation of food sales in Solym would be a slight problem, but that they could just go to Kosa to buy food. There was no question of the future viability of residence in the village based on the hypothetical closure of shops.

Although, as mentioned earlier, the range of foods potentially available is limited by seasonality, the expenditure of cash income on food did not appear to vary accordingly. For example, it is possible to think of autumn as the time of year in which, following the harvest from the kitchen garden, and the collection and preservation of berries and mushrooms, there is ample food in store, as a season not excluded from the slaughter of animals, which is a primarily non-seasonal activity, when there are possibly some of the last of the soft vegetables, such as cucumbers and tomatoes left, and when the river is still unfrozen and available for easy fishing. Under these circumstances, it might

be anticipated that autumn could be a time when it is not necessary to spend heavily on food. However, results from the questionnaire do not bear this out. In fact, there appears to be very little seasonal variation in expenditure on food. A few households claim to spend more in summer, a few say they spend more in winter, but the majority say expenditure in all seasons is the same. A likely reason for this seems to be the nature of the foods that are purchased. The most commonly purchased goods, flour, rice, cereals and tea are all products which cannot be produced at home in this climate, which is also the case for the luxury items such as fruits and chocolate. Apart from these goods, the main purchased food is bread. Families fall into one of two categories, those that bake their own bread, and those that buy (although some bake bread for their own consumption, and buy it to feed their animals. The only example I found of such a household was the Nikitasenkos in Solym, who had more disposable income than any other household in either village). Purchasers tend to remain as such unless put under extreme financial pressure, enough to make them examine the difference in total price between purchasing bread and baking it from purchased flour. The families that buy bread buy it throughout the year - no seasonality was exhibited in this form of purchase. In summary, it can be said that since the foods which are purchased are primarily those required throughout the year, and those which cannot be produced at home, rather than top-ups of foods such as carrots or potatoes, which are home-grown, i.e. shops are there to provide foods which cannot be produced at home, not as a safety mechanism in case domestic production falls short. The non-seasonality of expenditure of money on food can be explained by this circumstance.

In both Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, the major vegetation type is forest, and the main industry of both regions was and is based upon timber cutting. In the domestic economy also, timber is vitally important. Houses are heated by wood-burning

stoves, as is the water for the *banya*, and households without canister gas for cooking also cook on wood stoves. The typical household requires between 10 and 15 cubic metres of firewood each year. It is possible to collect wood from the forest, but only fallen timber, and only with the permission of the *leskhoz*; most purchase it directly from the enterprise. Prices vary both geographically and according to the status of the buyer. For example, in Solym, 'cut' timber (i.e. tree trunks already sawn into manageable lengths) cost 26 rubles per cubic metre to *leskhoz* employees, and 48 to others. Full trunks, to be cut up by the buyer, cost 18 or 35 rubles respectively[298]. Forestry workers often receive a 'ticket' entitling them to a specified amount of timber, in lieu of wages, and households with little money come to arrangements with pensioners and other households, and supplement their purchased timber with gathered wood from where the forest encroaches onto land administered by the *sel'soviet.*

6.5 The relationship between the leskhozi and the inhabitants of the forestry villages.

There is strong case to argue for the relationship between forestry workers and their enterprises being another survival strategy employed by the inhabitants of forestry villages. There are comparisons to be drawn between the situation that has emerged in the Russian agricultural sector since the break-up of the USSR, and that between the forestry enterprises and the inhabitants of the forestry villages.

[298] 1997 prices

Ioffe and Nefedova (1998) write that collective and personal farming in Russia, though separated from one another in the accounts, have never been very far apart in reality. They describe a symbiosis which has evolved whereby collective and state farms used to sell their labourers flour and animal feed, and assign them tractors to plough their subsidiary plots, and whereby stealing from collective and state farms was also common. The large enterprises also resorted to help from personal auxiliary farming when poor milk yields did not allow them to fulfil the state order. Conditions fostered a kind of informal social contract between the personal auxiliary and collective farms, which helped both eke out a living. By the 1980s, argue Ioffe and Nefedova, they had effectively become mutually dependent to the point of being inseparable.

In the Russian agricultural sector, this relationship between the individual and the collective has meant that collective and state farm members are reluctant to upset the status quo; they are unlikely to strike out on their own, independent from the parent farm because of the security and protection from economic uncertainties which the latter offers. Economic difficulties of independent farming, and the social and psychological considerations, such as hostility from neighbours and the withdrawal of access to vital services still provided by the collective farm all play a part in encouraging farmers to remain within the collective and develop their subsidiary plot within, rather than outside of, the framework it provides. The collective and state farms have traditionally provided more than simply employment; they provided shops, village clubs, entertainment, schooling, healthcare and housing, and the land and material resources for people to have subsidiary plots *(lichnoye podsobnoye khozyaistvo)*. Russian agriculture was therefore characterised

by a dualism of large scale mechanised production using collectivised labour resources with small-scale semi-subsistence production on individual members' plots (Pallot, 1997).

A similar symbiosis could be argued to have emerged with the les'khozi and their employees, and this relationship plays an important role in the lives of inhabitants of marginal settlements. Firstly, the inhabitants were, and to a certain extent still are, dependent upon the wages paid to forestry workers, either personally or via a household member. People who did not work directly for the les'khozi were usually employed in the services provided by the les'khozi, such as the kindergarten or club, or in the state school or shops that were there to cater for the other inhabitants, the majority of whom were foresters. Ever since the decline in forestry, and the non-payment of cash wages, *lesniki* (forestry workers) have been paid in flour, dried peas, and in tickets which can be exchanged for fuelwood. Since there is usually very little alternative employment in forestry villages (and since that which exists is mainly state employment, such as teaching, which itself is subject to wage delays), this payment in kind can be a vital part of a household's income. Receiving flour as payment allows a household to bake its own bread, and therefore avoid having to purchase bread in the village bakery.

An important part of the relationship between the collective and state farm workers and the 'host' organisation is the availability of machinery and land, and this is also the case in some forestry villages. In terms of land itself, although the villagers pay rent on their subsidiary plots to the local administration, they lease hay



Plate 6.17 The Vishera River, showing the *baidarka* boats used to transport hay from the riverside meadows to the village of Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997.



Plate 6.18 A shared potato field, ploughed by the *leskhoz* Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997.

meadows from the *leskhoz*; in Vaya in 1997 the charge was 15 rubles per year. (The *baidarka* boats shown in Plate 6.17 are used to transport hay from the fields to the village). Without this hay, it would be impossible to keep livestock such as cows, which are essential for the dairy produce of the village. Although they graze freely during the summer months, cows must be stall-fed for 8 months of the year, which necessitates a substantial supply of hay. The non-availability of fresh milk and dairy products in the village shops means that the *leskhoz* hayland plays a crucial part in the relationship between the personal auxiliary farmers and the enterprise. Another example is that in Vaya, Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the les'khoz ploughs the soil in the subsidiary plots in the village, such as those shown in Plate 6.18, for those inhabitants, the majority of the population of the village, who have no means to plough the land themselves.

Leskhozi are also vital for the provision of firewood in the villages. Sale of fuelwood takes place through the *leskhoz*, such as that in Solym, Kosinskii *raion*, which will deliver the wood to the home of the purchaser if they do not have their own transport. It will also cut the timber to the required size, which is useful to pensioners who cannot chop their own firewood. Since the *leskhoz* has control of the forest around the village, it is necessary to apply to it to collect wood individually, and permission will only be given to collect fallen timber, but the *leskhoz* generally turns a blind eye to people collecting timber from trees which have encroached upon the land administered by the *sel'soviet* (i.e. the village itself; the village is administered by the *sel'soviet*, the surrounding forest by the *leskhoz*). When wood is sold, the *leskhoz* favours its own employees; for example, in 1997 the Solym *leskhoz* sold cut timber to its employees at 26 rubles per cubic metre, and to other customers at 48. Employees

who are not receiving money wages from the *leskhoz* are provided with a ticket, which they exchange for timber.

In the same way as the collective and state farms provide services to the villagers, the *leskhozi* have traditionally been responsible for a considerable proportion of the amenities of their villages. Since the decline of the forestry industry, and the subsequent bankruptcy of a large number of enterprises, an increasing number of these services have been handed over to the control of the local administration, but some still remain in the hands of the *leskhozi*. For example, in 1993, in Bakhari, a forestry village in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the village crèche and boiler house were funded by the local forestry enterprise, the joint-stock company *'Ust-Yazvinskii splavnoi raid'*, and the village bathhouse was funded by the local administration. Similarly, in the settlement of Danilov Lug, also Krasnovisherskii *raion*, two village clubs, the banya, and four boiler houses were funded by the local administration, and the same forestry enterprise as in Bakhari funded the kindergarten, one boiler house, and the 53km of electric cable in the village. However, the inquiry carried out by the Forestry Department of the Perm' oblast administration in 1993 showed that in the vast majority of surveyed settlements, either most of the local amenities had already been taken over by the local administrations, or that there were plans for them to be taken over as soon as possible. Given the difficult financial situation of the local administrations, the upkeep of the amenities is not guaranteed, and the level of services to the population of many settlements has since fallen.

The *leskhozi* are also very important to the inhabitants of the villages for a number of reasons which are not immediately obvious, and which, although they

may appear to be trivial, are actually of very real everyday importance. One of these reasons is that of communication. Bus services to the most remote villages are infrequent, and often the postal service is connected with the public transport; for example, in Solym, the postmistress of the village travels to the *raion* centre of Kosa on the twice weekly bus to collect the village's mail. In other settlements the post is delivered by the post office, but deliveries are seldom more frequent than once weekly. Considering the lack of frequent transport communications between villages, the forestry enterprises are very important. They provide 'informal' transport, allowing people to ride on the top of open trucks rather than wait several days for the next bus, and since the floods of 1993, which washed away several important bridges, forestry machinery is highly valued due to its capacity for being driven through rivers. Large caterpillar trucks and timber carriers help to keep the unmetalled roads passable, by compacting the dirt surface and preventing encroachment by the forest, and the roads themselves are built upon tree trunks laid lengthways on the round as a foundation - the forestry enterprises also laid the roads to begin with. As a general rule, the vehicles employed as local buses are unsuitable for what are effectively off-the-road conditions, and the frequent break-downs at all times of year, and, especially in spring and autumn, the likelihood of being 'bogged down' in deep mud, often result in a rescue by forestry machinery better equipped for the local conditions.

In summary, it can be said that the relationship between the les'khozi and the inhabitants of the forestry villages bears a certain resemblance to that between collective and state farm workers and the farms to which they belong. The *leskhozi* rent out hayland and provide tractors with which to plough the subsidiary plots; since there is no large-scale farming in forestry villages, the inhabitants must provide for

themselves. They also provide firewood, and traditionally they have funded village amenities. Whilst there is perhaps less of a symbiotic relationship in that the les'khozi could never call upon domestic production of timber in order to reach state targets, since the break-up of the USSR, they have received a considerable amount of unpaid labour from the village inhabitants. Another major difference is that *lesniki* could not reasonably be expected to start out minor forestry firms on their own; therefore the debate about private peasant farming and its interaction with the dismantling of the collective and state farm in Russia does not directly inform the understanding of the relationship between forestry firms and village inhabitants. Although there are certainly similarities between the relationships between agricultural workers and collective farms and between *lesniki* and *leskhozi*, I think that the latter is rather more one-sided. However, the summary fact that the inhabitants of the forestry villages still rely heavily upon the *leskhoz*, even in its crippled and bankrupted state, suggests that the les'khozi may be surviving to a certain extent because of their ties to the local community, in a similar way to that which has seen the perpetuation of the collective farms, in the face of encouragement to peasants farmers to break away.

By continuing to work even when they have no real prospect of receiving money wages, *lesniki* may be keeping the forestry enterprises alive. And in the same way as described by Ioffe and Nefedova for the agricultural sector, the services provided by the *leskhozi* (pasture, ploughing) help keep the private plot viable.

6.6 Stratification and Marginalisation within the village.

It has already been stated that few households find themselves in the position of being able to make a decision about whether to remain in their village, or to leave it. There are problems of capital, work, accommodation, the internal passport, and bureaucracy, and it could be argued that informal networks also have a part to play.

In addition to the two opposing views about the informal networks (whether the Soviet system weakened or strengthened them) there is a third. The last view is based on similar assumptions about the scarcity of goods and services and the centralised delivery system, and their combined effect of reinforcing personal networks. However, rather than seeing these two conditions promoting informal support through horizontal relationships, (such as local family and neighbours) this view expects the development of relations based on "target cultivation", i.e. a relationship with a person in a position to benefit oneself (Walder, 1986:180, in Dershem, 1998). Such rationing of restricted or limited goods and services, and the influence of administration on the delivery of them, fosters informal structures known as *blat* in Russian. Access to resources requires a diversified group of network members who have further access to other resources and social circles. One cluster of ties within the network provides broad support, but another cluster of 'instrumental' ties, so-called "targeted relations", provides specialised support. It could be argued that the existence of 'instrumental' members of a network, perhaps those living in a town, could increase the likelihood of a household being able to leave a village.

As Dershem (1998 : 163-198) points out, the maintenance of informal networks which include members who live outside of the village has its costs.

Accessibility reflects the spatial dispersion of a network, and the spatial dispersion is important because of the costs of cultivating and maintaining long-distance ties. Overcoming distance requires certain resources, and researchers such as Fischer (1982:175) and Wellman (1990:207) have found that the more affluent have more spatially dispersed personal ties than those who are less affluent, who tend to have more local ties.

To summarise, it can be argued that stratification within the village on the basis of wealth and of contacts is taking place; the families who do not rely on state wages, or on the forestry industry, are likely to be better off, and, according to Dershem (1998), to have a wider network of contacts. The comparative wealth which has enabled the cultivation and maintenance of 'instrumental' ties, through the ownership of a car and/or a telephone, or the money to pay for public transportation, in conjunction with the financial advantage itself, puts households in a better position than most to be able to leave. An example of such a family is the Nikitasenko family of Solym, Kosinskii *raion*.

6.7 Individual Households : Family Histories

Up to this point, the survival strategies of households in Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* have been discussed in general terms. What now follows is a more detailed description of the circumstances, and responses to them, of a number of individual households.

Until September 1997, Svetlana Nikolaievna and Stepan Valentinovich Nikitasenko lived in Solym, Kosinskii *raion*. Stepan was born in Solym, the eldest of four children, three boys (Anatoly and Ivan) and a girl (Svetlana). Their mother died soon after the birth of Svetlana, and their father's mother, Maria, who had been a kulak transported to Solym during the early 1930s, brought up the children. Maria's husband had been killed in World War II, and she had brought up her own children, and tended a house and garden since he died. She never remarried. As the eldest of the four, Stepan was expected to help support the family, so after school, instead of going away to college, he studied at home, before joining the Red Army. Anatoly also joined the army, and Ivan the Soviet Navy. After military service, Stepan returned home to Solym and married Svetlana Nikolaievna, Anatoly went to live in Yekaterinberg, the city of Sverdlovsk oblast, married, and is now a successful businessman. Ivan returned from the navy missing two fingers from his right hand. He went to work in a bakery in Kosa, and is now married with a young son. The youngest, Svetlana Valentinovna, is currently a student at Perm' University.

Svetlana Nikolaievna was born in Ukraine, to a Komi-Permyak mother, Polya, and a father who abandoned them both soon after her birth. Polya moved back to the *okrug* in the late 1960s, and set up a home with a man called Nikolai. They had no children together, so Svetlana was an only child. After attending school in Solym with Stepan, Svetlana entered Perm' University to read geography. After graduation, she returned to the *okrug*, married Stepan, and began work as a geography teacher in the Solym local school.

The Nikitasenkos have two children, a son Maxim (born 1972) and a daughter Masha (Maria) (born 1975). When the children were small, Stepan was a brigade

leader in the Kosinskii *leskhoz*, and Svetlana worked at the school. After 1991, Stepan set up a business with a friend living in Kosa. They jointly own a shop in Kosa, and one in Solym, both of which employ a shopkeeper, and sell dry and tinned goods, sweets and biscuits, vodka, sausage and occasionally fresh fruit and vegetables. During the mid-to-late-1990s, when state sector employees began to experience severe delays and non-payment of wages, the Nikitasenkos relied upon Stepan's business, whilst Svetlana did not receive wages. Known locally as a *'Kommersant'*, the success of Stepan's business soon made his family the best off in the village. This perceived wealth did not go unnoticed in Solym and in Kosa. The Nikitasenkos are well known in both settlements, and sentiment toward them is not always warm. In Solym, Stepan made an annual gesture of a cash gift to every pensioner on Pensioners' Day, and a gift of sweets or fruit to every pupil on the first day of the school year. The gifts were funded from his own finances, and he was under no obligation to make them. Local sentiment tended to concentrate upon how 'miserly' the gifts were. The family was seen to be 'too wealthy', and constant carping and bitterness amongst neighbours about how everyone should be equal in all things began to make the Nikitasenkos feel ill at ease in Solym. Visits from Anatoly in his American 4x4 did much to fuel the fire. Ill feeling did not originate purely from financial matters. The lifestyle and habits of the family were considered 'urban'. Amongst some people in the village, to be considered 'urban' is an insult. There is a feeling amongst some inhabitants that urban dwellers, who have no need to carry water from a well, who have an inside toilet, and who buy food rather than producing it themselves, are somehow 'soft', and out of touch with the land. The rural subsistence way of life is seen as the only worthy and honourable way to live. Svetlana's liking for travelling to Perm; to visit university friends, and friends from Solym who had already left, Stepan's frequent trips south to collect produce for the shops, and the fact the Nikitasenko children always had books and

pencils for school caused ill-feeling. Svetlana was considered a poor wife and mother for constantly 'abandoning' her family in order to go to the city, for buying clothes, and for not having as many animals as other households had. In summer, her practice of bathing with the children in the lake next to the village caused gossip.

> The attitude of the neighbours is really bad. They are jealous. Because we worked hard, we have things they don't have, and they think we should share it with them ... they say I'm a bad wife because I go to Perm, and because I wear new clothes. (Laughing) ... they think I should be up at the crack of dawn milking cows, and spend all day in the garden, or picking berries.[299]

What seems to be forgotten is that Svetlana and Stepan did not always live this way - when they were first married, they lived in a different house in the village, and Svetlana had a different lifestyle.

> Years ago, we lived in another house, at the other end of the village, a long way from the well. We didn't have a pump like we have now, and I had to carry the water in buckets. We had a cow then, and I got up really early to milk her. When I was pregnant with Maxim, I was working in the hayfield the whole time, even the day he was born. The house only had a little cellar, and there wasn't much room to store things for the winter. The children were only little then, and they couldn't help much around the house. Now Maxim is older, he lights the stove (the heating system for the house), and he feeds the pigs and the dogs. Masha does the washing up. When they were little and I worked at the school, I had to get up and make the breakfast, then go to work, run home and make lunch, go back to work, make dinner, and do all my preparation for school. Stepan might have been at home all day, but he never cooked. He only cooked when it was something he killed, and then he wouldn't let me touch it! It's different now - he understands that I work as well. I had to do all of the work around the house and in the garden. But, you see, now I'm going away to Perm', he'll have to make the jam and compote and preserve the cucumbers. Everyone in the village thinks it's awful that a man should have to do that![300]

In August 1997, the family took the decision to leave the village, or at least to bifurcate. Svetlana was by now director of the village school, with years of teaching experience behind her. She went to Perm' to find a job and a flat. By the beginning of

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[299] *pers comm* Svetlana Nikolaievna Nikitasenko, Solym, August 1997
[300] ibid.

September, she had secured a teaching position in Zakamsk, a suburb of Perm', on the west bank of the Kama, and had found a suitable flat. The family quoted the major reason for leaving the village to be that of the children's' futures. Solym's local school had lost two teachers already during the last six months, one through emigration, and another through illness, and non-specialists were teaching subjects they themselves had only studied to school level. There was no permanent foreign language tuition on offer - the only tuition there had been in the last ten years was a three-month visit by a British graduate student in winter of 1996. Russian universities now demand a foreign language qualification as an entrance requirement, and Stepan and Svetlana were concerned for the education of their children, especially Maxim, who was already some years behind his urban contemporaries in foreign languages. The lack of social amenities and job prospects, very obvious to a family who had lived in Solym when it was twice its current size, and the poor standard of local public transport led them to their decision.

The Nikitasenkos exhibited some characteristics common to many families in Solym, and a few which were almost unique. Like all other households, they had a kitchen garden, and they kept livestock, in their case one or two pigs. The kitchen garden provided for their needs in potatoes, carrots, cabbage, onions and garlic, and also in cucumbers, which they preserved. The pigs provided meat, but the family also purchased fresh meat and sausages, as well as fresh fruit, and as shopkeeper, Stepan could dip into the shop's stocks for his family. For bread, the family relied upon Svetlana's mother. Svetlana and Stepan bought flour, which they gave to Polya, who baked bread for both households. For milk, they relied upon another household, from whom they bought milk straight from the cow, one litre per day. Berries for jam were picked by the family, or bought from neighbours. All the practices of domestic production and exchange are

common to Solym families, but the Nikitasenkos displayed their extra income by being able to buy the fresh fruit and sausages, and by having an electric pump to draw water up into a milk churn in the kitchen, rather than having to carry it from the well, as other families did. The other major differences were the possession of a car, and a van (jointly with the business partner), and a telephone.

Although the family decided to leave Solym, the break was not total. An urban teacher's salary would barely cover the rent on a flat in Zakamsk (despite rumours in Solym that the family were buying a flat outright), so although Svetlana and the children moved to the city, Stepan was to remain in Solym to maintain the business, in order to send money to his family. As Svetlana Nikolaievna said

> Leaving is impossible for families who don't have money or work. We are leaving in September if we can find a flat in Zakamsk. To buy a three-bedroomed flat it costs between 110 and 120 million rubles, and that's just for a normal one, nothing special.

The house in Solym was to become a *'dacha'* for Svetlana and the children, although Stepan continued to live there. The family promised to come home during the school holidays, but did not see their future in Solym. It was not considered inconceivable that Stepan would follow to live permanently in Zakamsk.

The story of the Nikitasenkos demonstrates the importance of the 'instrumental' ties in the personal networks, as mentioned earlier. The family were able to maintain an informal network which included local ties within the village of Solym, in neighbouring villages, and also longer distance ties to Perm', to Sverdlovsk, and to Moscow. The ties were maintained through visits by car, and through telephone calls. And the maintenance of ties in Zakamsk, the suburb of Perm' into which the family intended to

move when they left Solym, was crucial in order to enable Svetlana to stay for free in the area while she looked for a flat and a job.

More recently, there have been changes in the family's circumstances. Maxim and Masha, although originally reluctant to leave Solym, have now become accustomed to life in Zakamsk, and do not want to return. Stepan's shops in Solym and Kosa have been experiencing reduced demand since the crisis of August 1998, and he has been unable to find work in the city. The August crisis has also had a serious effect on the family's finances. On moving to Zakamsk, they began to purchase a flat by installments, but after the crisis, the owner of the flat decided that he no longer wanted to sell, and has offered to return the money already paid for the flat. However, this money has been devalued since August 1998, and so the financial outcome is serious. One option for the family, faced with eviction, was to return to Solym. By October 1999, they had returned, leaving Maxim behind, and the move resulted in the loss of Svetlana's job in Zakamsk. The family had no option but to return to Solym, as a direct consequence of the August 1998 crisis.

Vaya had a similar family to the Nikitasenkos, in terms of their economic situation, within the village. Raisa Dmitreevna Koshilya is the local school director. Her husband is a driver, and her 20-year-old daughter is a student at college, with a baby girl. The family keeps three cows and two calves, and they rent riverside hayfields. They own a tractor, which they use to plough their two kitchen gardens, and they also own the only privately run shop of the three in the village. In addition, they have a flat in Krasnovishersk, to which they intend to move within the next few years. Raisa's sisters and brothers, all born in Vaya, have already left the village. Apart from being able to draw

upon the shop for food, the Koshilya family is also self-sufficient in vegetables, potatoes, meat and milk. In July 1997, general dissatisfaction with life in the village was causing them to consider leaving, and the ownership of the flat made the process easier than that for the Nikitasenkos, although no firm plans had yet been made.

An example of a family at the other end of the economic spectrum is that of the Ginsmanns of Vaya. The family now consists of two households, that of the elderly widowed mother, Yevdakia Ilyanovna, and that of her son, Anatoly Ivanovich. Yevdakia Ilyanovna is a pensioner, living alone in the house in which she raised her four children. In the past, she worked in one of the village shops, which has now closed, and her husband was a forester. She received various Soviet medals for service to the state. Three of her children have left the village

"... because there is no work for specialists in Vaya."[301]

She now lives off her pension, and the products of her kitchen garden, and she buys milk and very occasionally meat. In the past, she used to buy bread, but since 1994 she has been baking it at home, partly for herself, and partly for her son's family. Anatoly is 40 years old, he is married to Lyubov (37) and they have two children, a son Valody (17) and a daughter Irina (16), both of whom were school students at the time of the interview. Anatoly is unemployed, having been laid off when the local timber industry collapsed, and Lyubov works as a secretary in the village administration. They keep a cow, and two calves, and like Anatoly's mother, they have a kitchen garden. The Ginsmann family relies almost totally upon their domestic production, and upon the bread they receive from Yevdakia Ilyanovna. In the past they kept chickens, but the cost of the chicken feed outweighed the savings from having their own eggs, so they no longer keep them. Unlike

[301] *pers comm* Yevdakia Ilyanovna Ginsmann, Vaya, July 1997

most other families in the village, they make full use of the river, catching fish whenever they can, to supplement their domestic production. Anatoly also catches fish in return for the ubiquitous half-litre of vodka, almost a currency in the village. The family collects berries to make into *varenia* for the winter "if we can afford the sugar". The close relationship with the grandmother is a defining feature of the family - Valody and Irina visit Yevdakia Ilyanova to watch her TV (they don't have one of their own), and to collect the bread. Although they want to leave the village, the lack of employment in Vaya for Anatoly means that they can't afford to finance a move, and they do not envisage that their fortunes will change in the near future.

6.8 Summary

It can be seen that while the rural household provides a large proportion of its own subsistence from domestic resources, it also engages in a number of relationships with the state, the local administration, local retailers, and the other households in the village, in order to fulfil subsistence requirements which it cannot satisfy itself. Land is rented at a nominal fee, state sector wages, and pensions and benefits are used to pay these fees, and also to buy goods for the household, and firewood is purchased from the local *les'khoz*. On a more informal level, households engage in barter, whereby foodstuffs, labour and services are exchanged between them in a mutually beneficial arrangement, and at a family level, gift giving strengthens family and friendship bonds.

In the villages of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*, the importance of local environmental resources cannot be overestimated. Apart from providing a source of food for storage for winter, especially as one of the only means of consuming fruit and vegetables during this season, berries and mushrooms and fish are a vital source of money

for the poorer families in the villages. They are able to sell berries gathered free in the forest, either to other families in the village, those who can afford to 'pay' others to do their collecting for them, or by travelling to nearby larger settlements to reach a wider market, or simply by sitting by the roadside waiting for trade from passing cars. In a local economic climate where money income from pensions, and from the few commercial enterprises is the most reliable source of cash, the opportunity provided by sale of common property resources can make a very big difference to a household's ability to subsist.

In summary, it can be said that few inhabitants of villages of Krasnovisherskii and Kosinskii *raioni* find themselves in a position of being able to make grand scale choices about their future, such as choosing where to live, or choosing a school for their children. Migration figures for recent years show a steady trickle out of the rural areas, but the fact that it *is* a trickle shows that despite poor standards of living, most of the inhabitants are staying in the villages and making a living from the land. Lack of opportunities of work, lack of a place to live elsewhere, and lack of capital with which to support themselves are factors which contribute to keeping households rooted in the rural areas. Combined with a sense of insecurity about the future which is widespread in both rural and urban areas, and the economic and social problems arising from federal and local budget constraints (non-payment of benefits, poor services, wage delays and so on), the response of many households to the current situation has been to stay in their village, where they have some assurance of subsistence, and where they are cushioned somewhat from the vagaries of the local economy by their self-sufficiency in many essentials. Even when families do migrate, the break from village life is not always complete - the examples of bifurcated families with dual households show that the idea of rural life as a 'safe haven' in a time of uncertainty does not end at the boundary of the *sel'soviet*.

Having discussed living conditions in the marginal areas in the north of Perm' oblast, and the likely effects of those conditions upon the local population, and having found that outmigration is not being experienced on the levels which might be expected, attention has fallen upon the household survival strategies being employed by the inhabitants to effect subsistence. It could be argued that such marginal regions are experiencing the active creation of conditions of dependence upon a natural economy. Social and economic deprivation is taking place, and whether inhabitants stay or leave, the local administration must devote attention and resources to the problem of marginal areas. On a broader scale, the north of Perm' oblast can be seen to be experiencing a process of creation of marginality, as the emergence of a market economy and the economic problems associated with the collapse of the Soviet system combine to produce spatial inequality.

Earlier in this chapter the question was posed of whether conditions in the settlements of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* in the north of Perm' oblast constitute a different situation from that which can be found all over Russia. As Ioffe and Nefedova write

> In the midst of the total disarray of Russian farming's public sector, galloping inflation, and the scarcity of food in country stores, people survive as they have always done - through personal auxiliary farming.[302]

Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* as they stood in 1996 and 1997 can be taken as examples of the general situation in the forestry villages of Perm' oblast, and especially of those settlements in the north of the oblast. The 1993 survey carried out by Perm' oblast Administration indicated the conditions being experienced all over the north

[302] Ioffe & Nefedova (1997) p177

of the oblast in 1993, and the areas surveyed then have not deviated from the path taken by Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni*.

I would argue that the marginality of these areas, characterised by their harsh physical conditions, the poor standard of services and local infrastructure, and the unemployment caused by the collapse of the artificially supported industries developed during the Soviet period, interacts with the friction of distance and accessibility caused by their geographical location and the infrastructural problems, and their sheer remoteness from economic centres, to make these settlements quantitatively different from villages nearer, or more accessible to, such centres. Therefore, whilst it could be argued that similar processes of reliance upon kitchen gardens, collection of berries and mushrooms, and dependence upon pensions and exchange between households are being carried out in rural areas all over Russia, even within fifty miles of Moscow, I would argue that it is the individuality generated by the remoteness and physical, social, economic and cultural marginality of Kosinskii and Krasnovisherskii *raioni* and areas like them that make peripheral regions of Russia different from those closer to economic and social centres. Taking this one step further, to build upon the work of Stenning (1997), these spatial contingencies, the peculiarities of these *raioni*, are mediating the processes of transformation which are impacting upon these areas, affecting the reconfiguration of centre-periphery relations, population movement, re-defining of identities and so on, such that the post-Soviet transition being experienced here is qualitatively different to that of other areas of Russia. The 'asynchronies' in transition, to concur with Germani (1980) are leading to the occurrence of different regions experiencing very different degrees of transition and development. I would argue that one of the crucial features of transition in these areas is their marginality. Their geographical, climatic, social and cultural

marginalities, and the ways in which some of these marginalities could be accentuated through time must necessarily impact upon, the way in which they experience transition. And, as Shanin writes,

> The significance of the informal, under-monetized, family-rooted, personalised and community-bound characteristics (of expolary economies) makes such social forms particularly recognisable to students of peasant economies and societies. Growing relevance and recognition of these forms of social iving make them increasingly important for a realistic appreciation of the world we live in.[303]

As discussed in Chapter 1, in order to further understanding of the post-Soviet transition, it is necessary to understand the importance of processes and responses in the marginal areas.

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[303] Shanin, 1990 : 85

Chapter 7 – Policy Responses

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7.3 The 1996 Gubernatorial elections in Perm' oblast
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7 Policy Responses

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Having examined the conditions in the two study *raioni*, settlement and development policies carried out within them, and the post-Soviet circumstances of the two areas, in terms of rural outmigration and survival stategies within the villages, the next area of concern is that of local, regional and federal policy. The instability of the Russian Federation in terms of politics and economics since 1991 means that there has been limited coherence in federal policy – or at least, insufficient stability has been achieved to allow the requirements of marginal settlements to achieve a level of priority at the federal level. However, circumstances at smaller spatial scales mean that marginal settlements have been given some consideration.

The instability in government has itself had an effect on marginal settlements, mainly through decentralisation and the federal-regional divide in Russia. This chapter looks at the process of decentralisation in Russia since 1991, and also deals with specific federal, regional and local policies affecting the marginal settlements of the north of Perm' oblast.

The unpredictability and instability of current affairs in Russia, combined with Yeltsin's health and the 2000 elections, mean that the situation is changing daily, and it is difficult to be up to date – however, the August 1998 crisis in the Russian political and economic sphere and its effect on policies towards marginal settlements is used as a backdrop for discussion of more recent developments.

7.1 Regional Autonomy in Russia; Control of the periphery

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the process of functional separation of local government from central government has been taking place.

At the end of 1996, gubernatorial elections brought elected officials to power in over fifty regions of the Russian Federation. Earlier in 1996, the previous governors had demonstrated the power they wielded when they helped Boris Yeltsin win the presidential election against Gennady Zyuganov. Following the elections, the regional governors returned to the regions, while Moscow and Yeltsin tried to assert their power. The newly elected regional elite sought to transform its popular mandate into greater leverage over the federal government, but in 1997, Moscow tried to reassert some of the authority it had relinquished since the break-up in 1991.

However, the relationship is rather more complex than a simple Kremlin versus the regional governors. The Kremlin has a vested interest in using the powerful regional leaders, who collectively constitute the national parliament's Federation Council, to oppose the Communist-led State Duma, the lower chamber.

In the battle, the Federal government had some powerful weapons. The vast majority of the regions of the Russian Federation continue to receive subsidies from the federal budget, so they in turn have an interest in maintaining good relations with the Kremlin in order to guarantee the continued flow of funds. Therefore, the Federation Council voted to approve the 1997 budget on February 12th 1996, despite their objections to the way federal funds within the budget were distributed, to the reliability of the figures being used, and to the criteria for determining allocations, largely because their formal approval increased the likelihood that the regions would receive transfers from the federal government. When, months later, the administration had to admit the inaccuracy of the budget, the regional governors were vindicated.

In March 1997, Yeltsin reorganised his Cabinet, consolidating the executive under the leadership of two new reform-minded first deputy Prime ministers, Anatoli Chubais and Boris Nemtsov. The result was a tightening of the Kremlin's control over federal budget expenditure, and an attempt to reduce the power of natural monopolies, thus increasing the Kremlin's power over the regions. In particular, the appointment of Nemtsov, the former governor of Nizhnii Novgorod, put Yeltsin in favour with the remaining governors who generally supported Nemtsov's promotion. Chubais used his power to restock the federal coffers and to rescind the advantages previously ceded to ethnic republics; for example, he forced Sakha (Yakutia) to contribute a considerable share of its diamond sales to the federal budget, and he revoked Ingushetiya's status as a tax-free zone.

Although Moscow and the new first deputy Prime ministers worked from the top down to control the regions, there were also moves from the bottom up being instigated. The federal government worked to strengthen local governments as a counterbalance to the power of their governors. Since governors and local administrators tend to conflict over the distribution of budgetary funds and property, the federal government played upon this tendency in order to prevent regional leaders from becoming too powerful in their own regions, and thus amassing a powerbase.

For example, the State Duma deputy Sergei Mitrokhin (Yabloko faction) argued in January 1997 that new mechanisms of control should give the president the authority to suspend or terminate regional laws that contradict federal legislation, as well as the right to dissolve regional assemblies that pass such laws and to sack regional executives who disregard court rulings. He believed that the absence of sanctions to discipline federation subjects that violate federal laws, as well as the signing of power-sharing agreements with individual regions, might eventually destroy the federation. Whilst attacking the autonomy of the regional level government, Mitrokhin supported the local and the federal, stating that local self government institutions, whose existence depends to a great extent on the implementation of federal laws, are an important instrument to strengthen the federation. At the time of writing there were no federal regulations pertaining to power relations within the federal subjects, and many regional leaders resist devolving power within their regions to local authorities. Mitrokhin called upon the centre to stop regions from acting in accordance with the principle "take as much freedom as you can" (an alternative translation of Yeltsin's famous statement in 1990, during the 'war of laws' between the RSFSR and the USSR, when he advised republics and

regions of the RSFSR to "take as much sovereignty as you can stomach"). Instead, Mitrokhin argued, the centre must put forward an ideology of balanced federation, which should be based on a balanced division of powers between the centre, the regions and local councils[304].

Whilst Mitrokhin spoke out about measures he thought should be taken, the administration in Moscow was acting. In March 1997, Aleksei Kudrin, the head of the Presidential Main Control Department and also deputy head of the Presidential administration, detailed the steps the administration was taking to tighten control over regional administrations. Anti-corruption investigations had led to the dismissal of governors in Amur, Bryansk and Vologda oblasts, but Kudrin acknowledged that such investigations would be more difficult when faced with elected governors. However, he emphasised the president's right to dismiss anyone, even an elected official, a right that is by no means unchallenged. Kudrin also outlined steps to be taken against governors;

> We are currently developing a mechanism for monitoring the situation in the regions so that we know all about their financial activities, all of a region's sore spots, all of a governor's sensitive points, in general, everything he has done. And then it will be possible to take economic action. After all, every region is very dependent.

This slightly sinister policy is an example of the tactics being considered by Moscow in order to weaken regional government[305]. On September 25th 1997, Yeltsin signed a law on local government financing which made local governments more independent of the regional and federal governments above them, and earlier in the year, on May 29th, he had created a Council on Local Government, which gave him direct access to the country's mayors, bypassing the regional

[304] Russian Regional Report 22.1.1997

governors. Additionally, the administration fought the corner of Izhevsk Mayor Anatoly Saltykov, who was trying to protect his office in the Constitutional Court, after Udmurtiya's parliament, under the chairmanship of Alexandr Volkov, had attempted to arrogate the power to appoint mayors in the republic. The court ruling on January 24th upheld the mayor's case, but Yeltsin had to issue a decree on February 21st in order to force Volkov to accept it. The incident had broad implications for other regions because it defended local government as an independent third level in the overall hierarchy. In February of 1998, the presidential administration announced that it would examine how local governments were being treated in fourteen of the Russian Federation's 89 regions. The fourteen chosen were Adygeya, Kalmykia, Komi, Sakha (Yakutiya), Tyva, Udmurtia, Stavropol, Kamchatka, Novosibirsk, Smolensk, Tula, Ulyanovsk, Koryak Autonomous *Okrug* and St. Petersburg, all of which already had some conflict with Moscow. The Ministry of Justice believed that 51 of Russia's regions violated provisions of the law on local government[306].

Despite this undermining of their power over the levels of administration beneath them, the regional governors were able to assert themselves in other ways. In a Federation Council meeting on July 2nd, they supported the governor of Primorskii Krai, Yevgeni Nazdratenko, against Yeltsin's threats to sack him. Whilst they objected to Nazdratenko's inability to resolve the severe energy crisis facing his region of the Russian Far East, the governors stood firm in their position of opposing Yeltsin's attempts to remove a regional executive who had been elected. The administration withdrew, demonstrating that there were limits to the

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[305] Russian Regional Report 20.3.1997
[306] Russian Regional Report 5.2.1998

Kremlin's ability to rid itself of governors who displeased it. However, just a week later, the administration strengthened the powers of the presidential representatives, giving them the authority to monitor the implementation of federal programs, the way federal money is spent in regions, and the use of federal property. Yeltsin also transferred much of Nazdratenko's power to his newly appointed representative in Vladivostock, Viktor Kondratov, who simultaneously served as head of the regional Federal Security Service.

In addition to this, the Sverdlovsk governor, Eduard Rossel, found a way to keep the local governments in his oblast under control. Elected local leaders of Sverdlovsk's 73 municipal jurisdictions could adopt policies independent of Rossel, and he sought to keep potentially rebellious local leaders in line by creating six administrative districts, ruled by gubernatorial appointees, which would stand above the municipal districts. Yeltsin approved the move. Critics argued that Rossel was trying to usurp the power that rightly belongs to the local leaders, but he defended these charges by arguing that the districts would preserve a unified national system of executive power that would give each citizen the services they deserve, and that the creation of a new layer of bureaucracy would allow the oblast leaders to gain a better sense of what is happening in each part of their territory and to bring government closer to the people. Essentially, Rossel sought to reduce democracy at the local level in the interest of greater co-ordination and efficiency of regional government.

While individual governors tried to extend their control over local administrations, the Federation Council, of which they are all members, acted to defend its collective power. Amendments to the constitution require the approval of

two thirds of the regional legislatures, a proviso that makes changing the basic law extremely difficult. In December 1997, Yeltsin wanted to streamline the process by adding the provision that if the regional legislatures didn't vote on a specific amendment one year after it had been approved at the federal level, then they were considered to have approved it. Federation Council members rejected this proposal as infringing on their rights[307].

On a more general level, as a counterbalance to the anti-regional, pro-local actions of Moscow, the very rise of Nemtsov gave much greater prominence to the regional leadership, and demonstrated that regional leaders could gain access to the highest levels of power. The regions also benefited as the administration signed power-sharing agreements with an additional fourteen regions, bringing the total to forty. Yeltsin described the treaties as a factor to strengthen the federal state, but secretly, they often create frictions between regions when some leaders become convinced that their neighbours are getting a better deal than they are. In one way, at least, they serve to turn the governors against each other; 'divide and conquer' was a policy being employed.

Although it is tempting to see the 'battle' as one between the Federation Council members and the federal administration on one hand, and with their own local leaders on the other, is misleading to view the Council members as a homogeneous mass. One complicating factor was the dual role of ministers, as outlined by Federation Council Chairman Yegor Stroev. He saw himself as playing a key role in the evolving relationship between the central government and the regions.

[307] Russian Regional Report 11.12.1997

On the one hand, along with Yeltsin, the Prime Minister, and Duma Speaker, he was a member of the 'permanent four', formally at the top of Moscow's political pyramid. His formal ranking comes close to reflecting his informal position; in January of 1997, he was ranked 8th most influential politician for 1996 by a Russian newspaper. On the other hand, he was the governor of relatively poor Orel oblast, and served as spokesman for the country's elite. Stroev believed that he was trying to seek the golden mean in the relations between the centre and periphery. He argued that the Federation Council would be able to solve many of the country's problems because as members of the federal legislature, its deputies have to pass laws, while as regional leaders, they must also implement them[308]. Therefore, the role of individual Federation Council members is contradictory (even though as a Council they could refuse to pass laws which they did not wish to enforce), and the individuality of the members themselves leads to divisions within the Council. For example, in December 1997, the Council rejected a bill that would force all power-sharing agreements, including those already signed, to be ratified by the upper house. The presidents of Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan, both of whose republics have treaties that give them numerous powers not shared by other regions, rejected the establishment of such a process. Bryansk Governor Yuri Lodkin said anyone who opposed such a procedure was a "separatist"[309]. The Federation Council is not always a united force.

More recently, the struggle for control over the regions has continued, with a new law to regulate centre-periphery relations. On June 24th 1999, Boris Yeltsin signed the new law "On the principles of dividing power between the Russian Federation government and the regions". The law, which came into effect on July 30th, institutionalises the process of signing power-sharing treaties between the centre

[308] Russian Regional Report 29.1.1997

and the regions, including the procedure of their preparation and the responsibilities of both sides. All aspects of preparing and concluding such agreements must be done openly – in the past some important details of the power-sharing traeties have been kept secret. Whether the new law will end the practice of signing secret treaties, however, remains to be seen.[310]

However, whilst this new law was being drawn up, there was scandal in Russian government; a videotape showing the married Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuri Skuratov, in the company of two prostitutes, appeared at television stations. Boris Yeltsin dismissed Skuratov, but the Federation Council, the upper house of the Duma, voted against the dismissal. On June 9th 1999, members of the upper house voted to appeal to the Constitutional Court to settle the issue, asking the court to decide whether under the Russian Constitution, President Yeltsin had the right to suspend Skuratov from office, pending the outcome of a criminal investigation, without the approval of the Federation Council. Senators had already twice rejected attempts to remove the controversial Prosecutor. The Council's refusal to go along with Yelstin on this and several other crucial votes demonstrated his eroding grip on power as he battled against illnesses that had beset him since the previous autumn.[311] It was only the NATO airstrikes agsinst President Milosevic's Yugoslavia that distracted attention from the Skuratov stand-off.

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[309] Russian Regional Report 11.12.1997

[310] http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/4231 16/7/1999 (Centre for Russian Studies Database)

[311] http://www.smh.com.au/news/9903/22/world/world7.html 16/7/1999 (Sydney Morning Herald)
http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/4233 16/7/1999 (Centre for Russian Studies Database)
http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/779 16/7/1999 (Centre for Russian Studies Database)

7.2 Control in the North Urals.

The interplay between local, regional and federal levels of government is taking place with reference to the autonomous *okrugi* of the Russian Federation. Ten autonomous *okrugi* were created in the 1920s and 1930s in order to grant several indigenous Northern peoples their own official territories. All *okrugi* were subordinate parts of *kraii* and oblasts, which put them at the bottom rung of the ladder of administration. In the early 1990s, as part of the wave of decentralisation, the majority of the *okrugi* declared their independence from the regions to which they were subordinate. The 1993 Federation Treaty and Constitution granted autonomous *okrugi* a status equal to that of the other subjects of the Russian Federation, though at the same time leaving them subordinate to their respective oblasts and *kraii*. Today, autonomous *okrugi* may be divided into three categories according to their economic situation: donors to the federal budget, those that, along with the *kraii* and oblasts they belong to, are budgetary recipients, and *okrug*-recipients that are parts of oblast-donors. The first category consists of Khanti-Mansi, Yamal-Nenets, and Taimyr *okrugi* (the first two belong to Tyumen oblast and the last to Krasnoyarsk krai). These regions are extremely rich in gas, oil and precious stones, while Tyumen and Krasnoyarsk proper are not so well endowed. Four regions, Chukotka, Koryak, Yevenk and Agin Buryat autonomous *okrugi*, belong to the second category, which along with their home oblasts, receive budgetary transfers from the centre. Komi-Permyak autonomous *okrug*, part of Perm' oblast, along with Ust-Orda Buryat, part of Irkutsk oblast, make up the last category, that of recipients in a donor oblast. The Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* has experienced the most negative consequences of administrative separation. Its economy is in a dire state, and it is seeking reintegration, hoping for increased financial support. However, Perm' oblast is itself

already a donor to the federal budget, and it not enthusiastic about the return of the *okrug*, especially because the *okrug* is seeking increased economic aid, while trying to preserve much of its political sovereignty.[312]

North of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* lies the Komi Republic, a region that has been a thorn in the side of the presidential administration. The Komi president, Yuri Spiridonov was returned in the regional elections, and soon set about defying federal law. On February 2nd 1998, he announced that he was not required to obey a Russian Constitutional Court decision overturning a Republican law on local government. His refusal questions a basic tenet of the Russian Federation, that the Constitutional Court's rulings are mandatory for all regions. On January 15th 1998, the court overturned several provisions of the Komi republic's constitution, which limited the rights of local government in the Republic. Spiridonov argued that the power-sharing treaty between his republic and the Kremlin gave the republic the right to determine its political institutions independently. Two days after Spiridonov made his announcement defying Federal law, Boris Yeltsin met with a group of 11 regional leaders, one of whom was Spiridonov, to discuss the issue of centre-periphery relations. Spiridonov proposed renegotiating power-sharing agreements between the federal centre and the regions, and making both sides more accountable for their assigned responsibilities. The proposal was aimed primarily at the Ministry of Finance, responsible for distributing federal money to the regions[313].

[312] Russian Regional Report 15.1.1997.
[313] Russian Regional Report 12.2.1998

7.3 The 1996 Gubernatorial elections in Perm' oblast

In order to understand the political geography of North Perm' oblast, it is first necessary to set the area in the context of the nation-wide elections, and to gain an understanding of the variations in candidate and region which exist in the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation's gubernatorial elections took place in late 1996 and early 1997. Electoral analysts such as McFaul & Petrov (1997) have identified five variables which, they argued, captured the range of candidate types that competed in the elections. Firstly, they identified the 'khozyain' factor. Sitting or past 'khozyainy' made strong candidates. Politically, the term 'khozyain', which means 'boss' or 'master', refers to a person who is able to get things done, whilst paying very little attention to ideological or philosophical debates, and who runs their territory with little regard for democratic procedures because the ends justify the means. In Russia, such people were almost always former CPSU bosses at the regional level, absorbed with the executive functions of the Party and less concerned with ideological tasks. In general, such candidates were incumbents, appointed by Yeltsin, and most were loyal to him, running as candidates for stability. At the opposite end of the spectrum were the newcomers with no governing experience. In several races, entrepreneurs, factory directors or military officials entered the fray. The second category is the Degree of Opposition. These candidates claimed to represent the opposition in society. Sometimes they were communists, sometimes nationalists. The third is the Ideology candidates, represented by the two extremes of liberals and communists. The young liberals were new ideologically-driven politicians, strongly supported by liberal economic reformers in Yeltsin's government.

The traditional communists ran on strong anti-Yeltsin rhetoric and communist ideals. The fourth category is the Executive versus legislative leaders, closely related to the 'khozyain' variable. Most candidates running in the gubernatorial elections made their political careers in either the local executive or soviet. Finally, they identify the Local versus outsider variable, distinguishing candidates by their place of origin.

Having identified the variables in terms of candidates, McFaul & Petrov (1997) turned their attention to the different types of regions called upon to elect. Based on previous voting patterns in the 1995 parliamentary elections and the 1996 presidential elections, they distinguished five region types that influenced the gubernatorial elections in different ways. The first type of region is the 'strong reformist type', which includes regions that have the largest urban populations, with an average of 79% or more of the population living in cities. These are all industrial regions, but they are not necessarily any richer than other regions. These regions voted strongly in favour of reformist parties in 1995 and Boris Yeltsin in 1996. The second type is the 'moderate reformist' region, in which voters supported in equal proportion democrats and centrists on the one hand, and communists and nationalists on the other in the 1995 vote, but then voted strongly for Yeltsin in 1996. These are also industrial regions with high percentage shares of urban population, although the average urban population share is 73%. Thirdly, they identify the 'protest' type. In terms of the rural-urban divide, these regions appear to be fairly similar to the moderate reformist, with on average 71% of the population urban-dwellers. However, some additional factor must be present which contributes to greater discomfort and difficulties than in the more progressive regions. Ethnic conflict, or a longstanding

anti-Moscow sentiment (as in some Siberian regions) are quoted as possible explanations. As a consequence, many of these regions voted for Yeltsin in 1991, Zhirinovsky in 1993, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in 1995, but then split their vote between Yeltsin and Zyuganov in 1996. Third party candidates registered their best support here in the presidential vote. The fourth type of region is the 'conservative'. These regions, the polar opposite of the first, have much lower than average urban population shares (62% on average) and have backed communist candidates in all elections. In Russia, these regions are frequently called the 'Red Belt'. Finally, there are the 'controlled' regions, comprising national republics, oblasts and autonomous *okrugi*. In the national republics, a mix of Soviet and ethnic political culture still predominates, allowing local leaders to control electoral politics. Leaders in most of these regions limit competition, exaggerate turnout and falsify election results to maintain their hold on power. These regions tend to be loyal to the current government in Moscow. The urban share of the population is the smallest among the five region types, only 45% on average. Given the level of control held by local leaders, turnout figures are easily manipulated, and are often quoted at over 70%.

Most gubernatorial elections took place in the autumn of 1996, in a cycle that began in Sverdlovsk in August 1995 and ended in Irkutsk in June 1997. In Perm' oblast, classified as a 'strong reformist' region by McFaul & Petrov (1997), Gennady Igumnov, the incumbent governor, was returned in the elections December 1996. In the first round (December 8th), he received 41.4% of the vote, followed by Sergei Levitan, a former Federation Council member, with 29.7%. Two weeks later,

in the second round of the election, Igumnov took 64.6 % of the vote, compared with Levitan's 30%. Whilst they classify Perm' oblast as 'strong reformist', McFaul & Petrov (1997) designate the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* as a 'controlled' region. In its elections for governor, held on November 17th 1996, Nikolai Poluyanov, the incumbent, was returned with 70% of the vote, followed by A. Fedoseev, a former Federation Council member, with 17% and A. Golubkov with 4%.

7.4 Policy and Regional Budgets

Russian Federation policy is affected by a number of complicating factors. The struggle for power between the regions and the centre is a constant concern, and at the level of individual politicians, there is a concern to maintain their personal seats in government. The current and long-standing economic crisis in Russia also limits the power of the government to implement policies, and there are grounds for arguing that the government listens to those who shout loudest; in other words, that problems are dealt with on the basis of the most vociferous complaints, rather than necessity.

At the regional level, the major problem of implementing policies to deal with the problems of marginal areas is the lack of funds. Perm' oblast is in a particularly difficult position because it is a donor to the state budget, meaning that it contributes more to the federation than it receives back in budgetary transfers. In May 1999 there were thirteen donor regions; Leningrad, Moscow City, Moscow oblast, Lipetsk, Samara, Tatarstan, Sverdlovsk, Bashkortostan, Khanty-Mansi, Yamal-Nenets,

Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and Perm'[314]. In order to understand the difficulties faced by the different regions in gaining funding for regional policy, it is necessary to understand the system of budgetary transfers in the Russian Federation.

Russia's administrative structure has three levels; 21 Republics, formed according to the ethnic principle, and designed to act as 'national homelands'; 6 *kraii*, 49 oblasts, and two 'cities of federal significance' (Moscow and St. Petersburg); one autonomous oblast and 10 autonomous *okrugi*[315].

The system of tax collection inherited from the Soviet period involves the initial collection of most tax revenue by regional administrations, and then the 'sharing upwards' of the revenues according to supposedly standardised region/centre percentage divisions of revenue from particular taxes. This was then followed by various kinds of redistribution of funds from the centre 'back' to the regions.

One fundamental characteristic of Russia's subnational budget is the lack of local autonomy. Local budget outcomes are determined by games of 'tug-of-war' between regions and the centre, without the regions having much autonomy in the determination of their own tax bases and tax rates. They do have some autonomy, however, in the manipulation of the so-called extra-budgetary funds, which have by tradition been outside the control of elected councils, and have been built up in some secrecy by local administrations in collusion with their own local allies in the management *nomenklatura*. The size of these off-budget funds, and therefore the scale of any real local budgetary autonomy is typically unknown to outsiders.


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[314] http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe/4205 16/7/1999. The origin of this list was 'sources inside the Russian Finance Ministry'.

The central government has developed a habit of striking *ad hoc* budget deals with regions. This generates a leap-frogging of claims by various regions against the centre. According to the Ministry of Finance, in 1993 every federal subject had by the end of the year secured a budget deal that differed from the allocation originally set by the centre. A common complaint is that the regions which make the most fuss or which have the most political leverage get the most, to the detriment of equitable treatment across regions. In particular, it was argued in 1993 that the republics within the Russian Federation were using their special status to obtain unduly large net redistributions to themselves, at the expense of a core of net contributors to the federal budget, Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Urals Region, Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, Krasnodar, Tyumen, and Krasnoyarsk[316].

[315] Teague, 1996
[316] Hanson, 1996

STRUCTURE OF THE STATE BUDGET OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION



More recently, the 1999 federal budget, approved on February 16th, promises to change the way in which the distribution of federal funds is carried out. Subsidies for regions are to be calculated in a new way; previously they were determined in accord with incomes from previous years - now they depend on the average income of the population, a method Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov described as more 'just'. Many regions will receive smaller sums than they did in previous years, and in addition to losing the federal subsidies, regional budgets will suffer because the federal government is reducing the tax burden on business.[317]

[317] Russian Regional Report Vol.4 No.8, 4 March 1999, p88

7.5 Local government and local finances

In the Russian Federation, the term 'local government' is used in reference to the thousands of municipal and rural governments throughout the country, and to their subordinate levels, such as municipal wards, towns and villages, and rural settlements. In Russian, the term used is *'mestnoye samoupravleniye'* local self-government, which makes a distinction between state power and that of local government. Theoretically, local government bodies are separate from the organisation of state power, but in practice the distinction is rarely realised.[318]

Political and cultural leaders in Russia have long advocated a strong and effective local government. However, efforts to create it have had little success. Attempts to restructure and reform local government began immediately after the 1990 republic and local elections, when it was decided that the existing system of soviets was incapable of assuming a functional role in government and administration.

The RSFSR drew up new legislation which, although it promised much, failed to make the necessary leap from theory to practice. This left local government a 'vague and malleable' organisation of authority[319]. Although the vagueness mirrored that between Moscow and the regions, its consequences for local government were different. Whereas the regions found themselves able to take advantage of the vagueness and ignore Moscow to a certain extent, local governments were more beholden to the regions. This led to the emergence of regional power as an obstacle to the development of local government.

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[318] Young, 1997

In the years immediately following the break-up of the USSR, local government found itself strongly under the influence of the regional government. The main forms of this influence were material supply, the power to appoint, and financial power. During the Soviet period, the regions controlled the distribution of materials to local enterprises and co-ordinated the delivery of food products to urban areas. After 1991, the breakdown of the central economy did not impact upon these mechanisms and distribution was still conducted by regional administrations, with the result that local officials feared sabotage and restriction of deliveries. In terms of the power regional government had to appoint officials to local government positions, the regional executives exercised considerable influence in the selection of local government personnel at least until the local elections of 1994, when this power weakened in some areas. The most important 'lever' for regional government was the grip they held on local budgets.

After Moscow and the regional governments apportioned revenues from the three main tax sources, each government receiving a portion, the regions then determined the amount of revenue to transfer to local governments, which were consequently left with meagre resources of autonomous revenue, and depended upon the generosity of the regions. Despite their limited sources of revenue, local governments are expected to cover the cost of schools, health clinics, and hospitals, roads, libraries and so on, without the commensurate transfer of resources (Young, 1997).

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[319] Young, 1997:88

During the period of transition, local government in Russia has begun to set policy agendas according to its own perceived social and economic requirements. A new balance is being drawn up between national and local priorities at every level of government. Local governments have little control over the formation of their budgetary revenues and the composition of their budgetary expenditures, thus limiting local independence. Revenue and expenditure plans are still formed and approved at higher levels of government, but there is evidence of growing independence in the areas of local tax and expenditure policies and mounting initiative by local government within the informal budgeting system and within local legislation.

Local government's formal political and economic responsibilities are in the area of supporting and maintaining social and economic infrastructure, as during the Soviet period. The formal areas of authority were carried over into the Russian structure of local government in the post-Soviet period as evidenced by the distribution of state property in 1992;

City and district governments retained property and enterprises involved in the communal economy and the retail system while the oblast, the immediately higher level of government, received property belonging to the productive or industrial sector of the economy. This gave the oblast access to higher tax revenue levels because theoretically the industrial sector would be income-generating. (However, this does not take into account the problems associated with

tax collection during periods of economic shock when production declined or ceased such that little revenue was generated)[320].

Also in 1992, the central government of the Russian Federation transferred responsibility for social protection and price subsidies (previously financed with direct transfers from the federal government) to subnational governments, in an apparent attempt to balance the budget. However, Wallich (1996) argues that the government has not estimated the cost of financing this social protection, or considered whether it can be met with available revenues in each oblast. This new design of the intergovernmental fiscal system, she argues, will influence the differentiation (regional and interpersonal) that emerges in the Russian Federation.

In 1994-95, new laws on local government were enacted, with tax reforms as part of the decentralisation of intragovernmental fiscal relations favouring provincial (oblast) governments, while hardly changing anything for local budgets. The share of local governments own guaranteed income accounted reportedly for 6-8% of total budgetary revenues in recent years. As a share of total federal budgetary income, local tax revenues amounted to only 4.4%, and another 6.5% of total budgetary income in 1994. This was due to some extent to the low efficiency of the local tax collection system, but more to the very small local tax base, and the lack of tax-setting power for local governments, in order to provide enough revenue to cover current costs for local services. The lack of revenue-expenditure balance, argues Kirkow (1997), is particularly evident at the local level.

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[320] Mitchneck, 1997

Local governments remain heavily dependent upon budgetary transfers, subsidies, and soft credits from both higher offices and local enterprises, as in the Soviet period. This is mainly due to the fact that a system of dual subordination of intragovernmental fiscal relations remains in place; Russian authorities have continued to share revenue upward from the local to the regional and then to the national budget. The main taxes (VAT and profits tax), which are collected at the territorial levels, are first shared in fixed percentages with the federal budget, while central authorities redistribute a part of them afterwards, entailing not only a considerable time lag, (and, therefore, under conditions of high inflation, effective devaluation), but is also subject to non-transparent, bargained *ad hoc* deals, and open to local and regional lobbying. Old, dysfunctional practices and structures of the former Soviet fiscal system are still in place, including extrabudgetary funds paralleling acknowledged fiscal flows, the arbitrary granting of preferential treatments (tax exemptions, subsidies), for various industries and territories, tax loopholes and weak legal enforcement[321].

The limited budgetary independence of local governments, which affects the potential for their expenditure, is contributed to by other demographic, economic and legal factors;

(i) high proportion of pensioners, around 25% in small towns, and 45% in rural areas, reducing the economic activity and therefore tax collection.

(ii) economic hardships for local industrial and agricultural enterprises, which often still bear the burden of local social infrastructure.

(iii) the limited tax base on real estate and the lack of legislation on private land ownership.

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[321] Kirkow, 1997

(iv) the control of income of local enterprises by the criminal underworld.

Therefore, argues Kirkow (1997), local taxes are no more than a nuisance, while revenues from profit and income taxes, excise duties and transport and land taxes, which could have a substantial impact on territorial development, are reserved for provincial (oblast) administrations.

The 1994-95 Russian tax legislation included provision for 23 local taxes and duties, the rates of which are normally set in Moscow, but local governments in some cases have the right to define local taxes up to a certain upper limit. Income taxes could be a potentially important local revenue, but corporate and private income taxes are reportedly still not separately identified in local budget bookkeeping, and were estimated to amount together to only 2% of local reseves in recent years[322].

Russia also has revenue-sharing and grant-in-aid programmes. The former is composed of shares of regulated taxes (VAT, profit and income taxes), but there is still a considerable amount of non-transparency and instability, especially at the regional level, where authorities exercise control over these federal funds in an arbitrary way and on an *ad hoc* basis. The latter applies to particular grants and subsidies from the federal budget for the construction of roads and housing in the territories, and equalisation payments for federal mandates such as the increase of wages and welfare allowances, as well as the take-over of housing and social infrastructure by local governments. There are also other forms of fiscal

[322] Kirkow, 1997

redistribution, such as subsidies from the federal and regional budgets to local industries[323].

Kirkow (1997) concludes that local self-government in Russia is still in flux since institutional arrangements remain blurred, no significant tax assignments are provided, and no clear division between federal, regional and local taxes and property has been drawn.

At the federal level, a Federal Fund for the Support of Subjects of the Federation exists, to provide federal support for regions, classified by Lavrov (1996);

'Unsubsidised Regions', adjudged not to be 'in need' or 'in special need', and therefore receiving nothing from the Federal Fund. The share of receipts from the federal budget in total receipts of each of these regions is less than 5%.

The other regions are classified according to the share of receipts from the federal budget in total regional budgetary revenues; in the first class, federal receipts amounted to less than 10% of total revenues; then 10-20%, 20-50%, and more than 50%.

In 1995, Perm' oblast fell into the category of 'slightly subsidised subjects of the Russian Federation', with 53% of the tax revenue raised remaining in the region, while the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* was classified as 'highly subsidised', retaining 77% of taxes raised[324].

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[323] ibid.
[324] McAuley, 1997, p441-443

7.6 Policy Responses at the Federal Level

The view in Moscow appears to be that there is a good level of understanding of the problems of marginal areas, even if the view from the areas themselves is that Moscow is ignorant of their plight. However, in terms of practical action, it seems that the government's capabilities are rather limited, and that there is some disagreement over the best policy to employ.

For example, in May 1995, Vladimir Vladimirovich Goman, from the group *'Vibor Rossii'* spoke to the Duma about a draft bill to be approved by them. The draft concerned the setting up of a government body to oversee the North, and also the creation of a fund and the application of tax incentives in the North.

> I think there is no necessity to illustrate at length what is going on in the far North. The situation is extremely complex, and it is not by chance that the State Duma has already issued three resolutions regarding the problems of the North. Not long ago we took a decision about the socio-economic situation of the small peoples of the North. The situation is extremely critical.(Vladimir Vladimirovich Goman, 23.5.1995)[325]

However, despite Goman's presentation of the draft, there was disagreement.

> What would I like to say in judgement of this draft? In the main there is a simple principle; the creation of a state organ, which will regulate activity of a part of the population of the Russian Federation, and that unequivocally contradicts the Constitution. And, I do not think that this pleases the citizens of the Federation in the *raioni* of the Far North.
>
> I myself am from Murmansk oblast, and I know from long endeavour how to solve the real problems of the Far North. It is exactly *not* this way. This brings expectation, which will never be realised, because the basis of the economic policy of any government is the receipt of maximum profit, and not the maintenance of unprofitable enterprises funded from the government's budget.Vladimir Nikolaievich Manannikov, 23.5.1995)[326]

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[325] Vladimir Vladimirovich Goman, speaking on 23.5.1995 *Federal'niye Sobraniye parlament Rossiskoi Federatsii Gosudartsvennaya Duma. Stenogramma zasedanii Byulleten'. 23.5.1995*

[326] Vladimir Nikolaievich Manannikov, speaking on 23.5.1995, *Federal'niye Sobraniye parlament Rossiskoi Federatsii Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Stenogramma zasedanii Byulleten'. 23.5.1995*

The speaker, Manannikov, had fears for the implications of the draft not only for the people of the North, but for Russia as a whole, and as part of the world economy.

> ...this draft... only secures the situation of Russia as a raw materials appendage to the world economy. We are already observing this. In fact, there are many problems, and the problems of the small peoples of the North are bound up with them. The tendency to align the ruble and the dollar in the near future already means that we cannot export our raw materials onto the world market. (Microphone was switched off).(Vladimir Nikolaievich Manannikov)[327]

Goman countered the objections of Manannikov by listing the support he had for the draft,

> The legislative meeting of the Altai supports it, and the administration of Tyumen oblast, the deputy of the Federation Council, and Spiridonov, President of the Komi Republic support it. In principle, there is the support of the main administration, and the representative organs of power of the Federation. Is it necessary for me to prove this further? (Vladimir Vladimirovich Goman 23.5.1995)[328]

In 1997, the debate was still going on, with speakers in the Duma trying to describe the problems of the North.

> In April snow fell in Moscow – panic, people died. All the TV channels probably talked about it for a week and a half. Snow falls in June in the North, and there are blizzards in June. Whoever goes there on official business knows that it is not business in the suburbs of Moscow. (Boris Grigoryevich Misnik, 22.4.1997)[329]

In 1998, the same problems were in evidence in the North, and the opinion of an observer of Federal policy illuminates the situation.

> There are a number of problems (in marginal areas) connected with the economic crisis, and there is a necessity to remove a large number of citizens from Northern regions, first of all. It's impossible to do this, and there are several reasons why; the government is short of money, and short

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[327] ibid.
[328] V.V. Goman, 23.5.1995, ibid.
[329] Boris Grigoryevich Misnik, speaking on 22.4.1997. *Federan'niye Sobraniye parlament Rossiskoi Federatsii Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Stenogramma zasedanii Byulleten'* 22.4.1997

> of ingenuity as well. Almost nobody is thinking about it - almost all Russian politicians are involved in the fight for their chairs today, and these problems, they are rather expensive... (Nikolai Vladimirovich Petrov 15.6.1998)[330]

The 'Northern' regions mentioned above are part of the Russian Federation's policy towards the Russian North. The periphery of the country is divided into the North and the Far North, terms which refer to the degree of difficulty experienced by people trying to live there. In summer 1998, a new document was put before the Duma, which proposed the amendment of this division, changing the spatial differentiation to three zones, of 'discomfort', 'extreme discomfort', and 'absolute discomfort'. For example, the zone of absolute discomfort included, amongst other areas, the islands in the Arctic Ocean, Pechenga and other parts of Murmansk oblast, and the entire territory of the Nenets Autonomous *Okrug*. The zone of extreme discomfort was to include parts of the Republic of Karelia, and the remainder of Murmansk oblast, and within the boundaries of the zone of discomfort were parts of Archangel'sk oblast, the Komi Republic and Omsk oblast.

Federal policy towards the North falls into a number of categories; that designed to remove people from Northern areas and to help them set up new homes elsewhere, and that intended to help people remaining in Northern areas to maintain and/or improve their standard of living, as well as policies aimed at changing the definition of the North, and therefore altering the areas which qualify for special

[330] *Pers comm* Nikolai Vladimirovich Petrov, Scholar-in -Residence, Carnegie Moscow Centre 15.6.1998

assistance by virtue of their being Northern. There are many examples of all types of policy.

One example of special assistance for Northern people is that of Chukotka Autonomous Area; in September 1996, the head of the administration of the Area in the Russian far North warned that deliveries of supplies were close to breakdown, and that the normal functioning of the area's industry and way of life of its inhabitants was under threat. Alexander Nazarov, who chaired the Federation Council Committee for the North and Ethnic Minorities called for the 1997 draft budget to set aside supplies worth 12,000 billion rubles for the Far North[331]. Another example of the need to supply the Far North is that of Chernomyrdin's pledge, also in September 1996, "not to leave the northerners without food and heating"[332]. An example of a more long-term policy is that entitled *'D'eti Severa'*, or 'Children of the North'. This policy is intended to resolve some of the problems facing children resident in the Russian North, such as those of health, nutrition and education. The opinion in Moscow, as evidenced by a newspaper article, reflects the concern for the welfare of the inhabitants of the North, and shows the conflict between the two major problems, those of the natural resource exploitation which is essential for Russia's economy, and of the poor standards of living in the North.

> It is not surprising that the Federal Programme 'D'eti Severa' has received the highest status. If we want to consolidate the population of the Far North, so as not to lose the future workforce, then we must invest resources in the health of children, and their education. If we want to resolve the problems of the North as quickly and cheaply as possible, then it would be better to resettle the populations of the North in the South, but then who would work at extracting valuable natural resources?[333]

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[331] SWB Weekly Economic Report, 13 September 1996, from ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service) Moscow, in English, 1137gmt 11 Sept. 1996

[332] SWB 25 Sept. 1996 RIA news agency, Moscow, in English, 1702gmt 23 Sept. 1996

[333] *Pravda* 25.4.1998 p1-2.

The total cost of financing supplies to the Far North in 1996 was 4.2 trillion rubles (about $760 million). Of that sum, 3.6 trillion rubles was subsidies compensating the transportation costs to deliver 10 million metric tonnes of oil products and 2 million metric tonnes of food, and the remaining 0.6 trillion rubles was spent on loans to finance the social sphere in the northern regions. However, it is generally accepted that the budgetary funds are often misused and spent on purchases of foreign currency, tobacco, alcohol and automobiles.[334]

An example of an evacuation policy being proposed took place in September 1996, when Alexandr Lebed, the then Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, reported that only one sixth of the necessary stocks of food and fuel had been delivered to the Arctic regions of the Far East, and that Russia may find it necessary to evacuate hundreds of thousands of people.[335]

With regard to policies aimed at changing the North itself, plans to this end were being made in early 1997. It was reported that the Federation Council planned to reduce the number of territories classified as Russia's North so that the regions that needed special state subsidies would continue to receive them, while others would be forced to rely more upon their own resources. At the time, 70% of Russia's territory was eligible for these special benefits, but the country's weak economy prevented the continuation of such budgetary largesse. In their search for objective criteria to decide who should receive additional subsidies, councillors examined the possibility of using such factors as the 'inconvenience of living'. In

[334] Russian Regional Report January 29th, 1997, Internet edition, www.omri.cz
[335] SWB 27 Sept 1996 ITAR-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in Russian, 1212gmt, 26 Sept. 1996

some territories, residents must heat their houses 300 days a year, while in others the climate differs little from that of Moscow where heating is used about 200 days a year.[336]

A similar policy is that allegedly carried out by governmemnt bureaucrats who have tried to give the impression that they have met the Far North's food needs in terms of federal support by sharply reducing what is considered to constitute the minimum amount of food necessary for a person to survive. A person's need for sugar, for example, was reduced from 66 grammes to 30 grammes per day.[337]

However, there is a further approach to marginal areas being taken by the federal government. The margins, particularly those involved in the timber industry, are being used as a political tool. An example is that of the 1996 elections, where there were discrepancies in the policy towards various sectors of the economy, which had an effect on marginal areas. While defence and timber industrial institutions were upgraded, others were downgraded shortly after the elections. However, the upgrading of the timber industry was part of the strategy for winning support during the election campaign. Yeltsin made campaign trips to both Arkhangel'sk and Krasnoyarsk, both major timber-industrial regions, visiting enterprises and dispersing subsidies in the form of cheap loans. This treatment of these marginal regions, withholding governmental support until electoral support was needed, is another example of the federal policy towards marginal areas.

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[336] Russian Regional Report, Internet Edition, February 20, 1997 omrinet@omri.cz
[337] RRR Vol.3 No.44 5. November 1998

Another example of federal policy towards a timber-industrial region is that of its actions regarding the cessation of *molevoi splav* in North Perm' oblast, the free floating of timber from upstream logging sites to downstream processing plants. Resolution No. 384 of the Soviet of Ministers of the RSFSR of 25th September 1987 outlined plans for the permanent banning of rafting on rivers in the Russian Republic, by the end of 1995. Following the collapse of the USSR, the government of the Russian Federation upheld the law, which had been drawn up due to extreme environmental problems of oxygen loss and water pollution of the waterways caused by sunken and rotting timber.

Realising the adverse economic impact closure of the rivers to rafting would have, and the poor economic circumstances of the forestry enterprises within its boundaries, the administrations of Perm' oblast and of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* appealed to the Russian Federation government for a prolongation of the period during which free floating was permitted, for three rivers in the *Okrug*; the Veslyana, Kosa and Lolog. The response from Moscow was mixed; the Ministry of Water Management (*Roskomvod*) cited the extremely high levels of pollution of the rivers as cause for enforcing the resolution, and the Ministry for the Protection of the Environment held a similar point of view, but the Forestry administration in Moscow, along with the Ministry of Economics, appreciated that the forestry enterprises in the area could not afford high costs of building extra roads suitable for timber lorries, nor could they afford new depots along the roads rather than the river banks, or the new lorries themselves. They concurred with the oblast's argument that floating on the three rivers in question should be allowed to continue

for two more years after the passing of the deadline of the end of 1995. However, it was understood in Perm' that after the two extra years had passed, the likelihood that the enterprises would be in better position to carry out such construction was not great, and as a result, the oblast argued that a new railway should be built, through the *okrug*, from Chaikovskaya, through Kudymkar, the administrative centre of the *okrug*, to Syktyvkar, the main city of the Komi Republic to the north of the *okrug*. Moscow's reponse to this thread of the argument was as follows. The Forestry administration in Moscow said that to assign resources for the construction of such a railway from central funds was impossible. The Ministry of Economics considered the construction of the rail line as part of a scheme for the development of railways in Russia as a whole, and decided that the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* railway was not viable. The Ministry of Communication of the Russian Federation reported its finding, that the administration of the *okrug* should

> ...develop a suitable technical-economic base for the construction of a railway line Chaikovskaya-Kudymkar-Syktyvkar, and after examination of the plans for the railway, take a decision about the expediency of its construction.[338]

However, the economic circumstances of the *okrug*, as described in Chapter Three, severely limit the ability of the administration to carry out even the preparative base for the plans for the railway, much less the construction of the railway itself. Federal policy towards this marginal area, whose problems, in terms of the effects of the cessation of timber rafting, are shown to be understood, eventually

[338] Committee of the Russian Federation for Water Management (Roskomvod) 08.02.1995, 'Regarding the prolongation of timber rafting on the rivers Veslyana, Kosa and Lolog in the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*.'

took the form of a two-year extension to rafting, but was no help whatsoever in developing alternative methods of transportation of timber.

Similarly, although the federal government has a number of schemes and programmes, such as 'D'eti Severa', aimed at helping the inhabitants of the Russian North, funding for them is not always reliable. There has been a significant reduction in the financing of federal programmes. In late 1997, there were proposals in place to reduce the financial support for programmes such as those for state support for the numerically small peoples of the North, the programme *'Svoii dom'*; an innovatory programme *'Tekhnoekopolis'*; and state composite programme of socio-economic development of the North. There were also curtailments of state financial support for the resettlement of citizens from the Northern *raioni*. Subsidies for people who have already been resettled from the North were to be excluded from the budget project, and the level of funding for the presidential programme 'Construction of homes for citizens resettled from *raioni* of the Far North and comparable locations' was to be halved.[339]

More recently, during the February 1999 discussion about the 1999 budget, Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov suggested cutting back on benefits for particularly needy groups of the population, such as poor children and veterans. He noted that since laws requiring these benefits had been ignored or only partially fulfilled for the past three or four years, the government was planning to suspend or abolish them.[340]

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[339] *Finansoviye Izvestiya* 16.9.1997 pII.
[340] Russian Regional Report. Vol.4 No.8, 4 March 1999

7.7 Policy Responses at the Regional Level

Policy at the regional level differs somewhat from that at the federal level, in that the regional level administrations are theoretically closer to the problems and are more able to do something practical to assist. In many cases, regional policy takes the form of the implementation of federal law at the regional level. A drawback at the regional level is that of funding policy implementation; the complications associated with the Russian process of budgetary transfer and the federal-regional-local financial system can create problems for regional administrations. For example, in the case of Perm' oblast, the region's status as a donor to the federal budget means that it is not considered to be in need of a great degree of help from the budget. Therefore, the situation within the oblast is effectively assumed to be spatially unvaried, as if there were no disadvantaged localities at all. The attitude towards Perm', according to personnel in the administration, is that because the region is a donor, the federal government is unwilling to give aid, saying that because there are areas which are worse off, Perm' should have a very low priority. An additional problem is that within the oblast itself, the individual *raioni* are classified as donors and recipients in terms of the oblast's internal budget. In the case of Krasnovisherskii *raion*, the presence of diamonds in the *raion* means that the revenue received by the oblast budget places the *raion* in the donor category, even though within the *raion*, the economic advantage gained from the diamonds benefits only one settlement, that in which the diamond miners live, and is not spread amongst other settlements. This means that while the *raion* is nominally 'rich', there are very disadvantaged areas

within it, which find it difficult to receive aid from the oblast because of the status of the *raion*.[341]

An example of regional policy as the implementation of federal policy is that of Perm' oblast administration taking on many of the responsibilities of firms within the oblast which can no longer afford to support them. For example, in 1997, the administration took over a total of 58,352 square metres of living space in Krasnovisherskii *raion*. This undertaking is to continue, with the oblast planning to take on 56,866 square metres from Krasnovisherskii *raion* and 5,267 from Cherdinskii *raion* in 1998, and 50,000 and 93,046 square metres respectively in 1999. Plans for the year 2000 see Cherdinskii *raion* handing over another 44,490 square metres. In each case, the housing is that which was formerly administered and maintained by enterprises in each *raion*, and which can no longer be supported because of the economic circumstances of the enterprises. By 1999 in Krasnovisherskii *raion*, and 2000 in Cherdinskii, the entire housing fund of the enterprises concerned will be in the hands of the administration. The following table details the transferrals of property.

[341] *pers comm* Sergei Alexandrovich Merkushev, Office of Development and Special Programmes, Perm,' oblast Administration, 29.5.1998

Table 7.1 Transferral of the housing fund from enterprises to oblast administration, Perm' oblast, 1997-2000.

Enterprise	Total Housing (square metres)	Transferred in 1997	To be transferred in 1998	To be transferred in 1999	To be transferred in 2000
Krasnovisherskii *raion*					
AO[342] *'Stroitel''*	5,923	-	5,923	-	-
AO *'Ust-Yazvinskii raid'*	23,834	23,834	-	-	-
AO *'Visherabumprom'*	77,017	-	27,017	50,000	-
AO *'Visherales'*	7,027	7,027	-	-	-
AO *'Visheragorsk'*	23,926	-	23,926	-	-
AO *'Vaya-les'*	27,491	27,491	-	-	-
Raion Total	165,218	58,352	56,866	50,000	-
Cherdinskii *raion*					
AO *'Ryabinskii raid'*	5,267	-	5,267	-	-
Cherdinskii LPK	3,276	-	-	-	3,276
Enterprise Sh.320	99,934	-	-	58,720	41,214
Enterprise AM-244/2,4,16	34,326	-	-	34,326	-
Raion Total	142,803	-	5,267	93,046	44,490

Source : Appendix to the Resolution of the Perm' oblast Gubernator, No. 141 23rd April 1998

The regional policy of taking on these responsibilities is required by Presidential decree No 228 of 23.12.1993 'Regarding the state programme of privatisation of state and municipal enterprises', which is re-enforced by the resolution of the oblast gubernator Igumnov, 'Regarding immediate measures for the stabilisation of employment in the forestry sector of the oblast in 1997 and 1998' (No 242, 01.07.1997).

Another example is that of the regional policy of cargo shipment, known as the *'Severnii Zavoz'*. This involves the movement of goods from the southern part of the oblast up the rivers to the north, taking advantage of the high waters. The policy is implemented in spring in Perm' oblast in connection with the resolution of the government of the Russian Federation No. 267, 23.04.1992, which decreed an annual delivery of supplies to areas within the delineation of the North. In the oblast, Krasnovisherskii, Cherdinskii and Ilyinskii *raioni* fall into this category. The delivery is funded, as detailed earlier, by the federal budget and is carried out by the oblast administration. In the current climate of economic crisis, there have been moves at the federal level to change the Spring Shipping, i.e. to allow it to be directed by market forces rather than to keep it within the federal budgetary transfer system, but the moves have been defeated.[343]

Although the regions carry out the policy of shipment of goods to the North, many of the decisions that affect its implementation are taken at the federal level. The *Severnii Zavoz* of autumn 1996 is an example. The finances originally assigned to the shipment amounted to 9.7 trillion rubles, but later the state financial support from the federal budget was fixed at just 3 trillion rubles. Added to these complications at the federal level, there were additional problems in the regions. By October 1st 1996, only 15% of the requirements of aircraft fuel and oil had been delivered to northern airports for the delivery of goods to remote areas, and there were general problems of lack of resources on the part of the providers of goods to be shipped, the absence of necessary financial support for shipments on navigable routes, for icebreaking fleets, and for guarantees of hydrological work to provide information

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[342] 'AO' - joint-stock company

[343] *pers comm* A.S. Puzanov, Project Manager, Institute for Urban Economics Centre for Credit Rating, Moscow. 15.06.1998

about navigability of rivers, all of which served to complicate the work of water transportation. Because of the non-arrival of cargo at the appointed time, the delivery of goods and fuel could not take place in good time for the period of deepest water in small rivers. When the cargo did finally arrive, the transportation workers were compelled to carry out the shipments in icy, shallow water.[344]

Although the *Zavoz* of 1996 did finally go ahead, there are still problems with the shipment of goods to the North. At the federal level, the budgetary support for the shipment, which is crucial to its success, has been decreasing, as shown in the table below. Both its share of the total federal budgetary expenditure, and its actual value in new rubles have been in almost constant decline since 1994.

[344] *Finansoviye Izvestiya* 31.12.1996 p2.

Table 7.2 State Support to the Far Northern Regions

for delivery of products *(Severnii Zavoz)*

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Percentage of total expenditure	1.4	3.3	1.8	0.7	0.7	0.5
Millions of new Rubles	266	6,467	4,380.2	3,000	3,500	2,640

Source : Tabata, S. (1998) Transfers from Federal to Regional Budgets in Russia: A Statistical Analysis. Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 39, No.8 pp447-460

At the oblast level, though, there are also plans drawn up by the oblasts themselves. In the case of Perm', oblast policy towards marginal areas has three main directions. Firstly, there is a plan to redevelop timber production, to keep the paper plants that are still operational fed with raw materials. In conjunction with this use of the forest, the oblast has plans to develop forested areas for other functions, such as tourism, and recreational hunting, berry and mushroom picking, and so on. The major drawback with this plan is the funding; sources of investment capital are hard to find. The administration was hoping, in 1997, to set up special funds using credit guaranteed capital from local banks, but a year later, they were still searching for investors to help redevelop the forestry sector. The second main policy aim is the *Severnii Zavoz*, the shipment of goods to the north. In Perm' this occurs in April and May, when the Kama river is at its highest. Ships travel north up the Kama, and also the Vishera rivers, carrying supplies of necessary resources. The shipping requires a considerable amount of organisation, since it has to take advantage of just two weeks of high water, and therefore resources have to be concentrated into a very short timespan. The third policy directive relates to the federal delimitation of the North. Since the oblast cannot afford to provide all the financial support required by the

marginal areas within it, it turns to the federal budget's northern subsidies. One of the main aims of Perm' oblast administration with regard to its northern *raioni* is to persuade the federal government to classify them as 'Northern', thus entitling them to additional subsidies and state assistance. This is a difficult process, however, since there is no strong political lobby for Perm' oblast in Moscow.[345]

An additional type of regional policy, which has an effect on marginal areas, is that of cooperation between regions. An example of a policy being implemented by three regions together, which could have an influence on the marginal settlements of North Perm' oblast, is that of the Belkomur Railway. Construction of the railway, which is planned to link the city of Perm' with Arkhangelsk through Syktyvkar, capital of the Komi Republic to the north of Perm Oblast, began in November 1998. In December of that year, the results of a six-month study on the Belkomur Line were presented. Foreign specialists examined the railway's demand for cargo transport, technical conditions for building the new sections, and reconstructing existing ones, and prepared a business model for Belkomur. An investor's conference was planned for Spring 1999, with the project's overall cost expected to amount to $2.5 billion. The specialists suggested that potential sources of funding could be company stockholders, foreign governments, and private foreign investors, but it would be likely that foreign states will demand a guarantee for their investment from the Russian Finance Ministry. Private investors, it was argued, would get a different sort of guarantee – permission to develop businesses in the region where the railway is being built, and according to the consultants, this type of investment would be the most desirable since it would stimulate economic activity.

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[345] *Pers comm* Sergei Alexandrovich Merkushev, Department of Development and Special

Under ideal conditions, the consultants calculated, the Belkomur Line could be finished by 2014, but they remain sceptical about the viability of the project. However, the leaders of Komi and Arkhangelsk have prioritized the project, and have spoken of the necessity of completing it soon. They argue that the project's stated completion date is inaccurate, and suggest that the northern part of the railway be built in the next few years. It appears that regardless of what the experts say, the leaders of Komi, Arkhangelsk and Perm intend to continue with the project, and hope that the necessary funds can be found.[346]

At this early stage in the development of the project for the railway, and with no information forthcoming about the proposed route it would take, it is difficult to hypothesise about the effect construction of the Belkomur Line could have on marginal settlements in the North of Perm. If the planned private investment were to go ahead, and if economic activity around the railway were to be stimulated, then there may be a positive effect on nearby villages. However, the timetable put forward by the advisory consultants in December 1998, of a finish date of 2014 under ideal conditions, suggests that such economic activity would be a long time in coming.

Apart from the implementation of federal policy, and inter-regional projects such as the proposed Belkomur Railway, the constituent regions of the Russian Federation also draw up development plans for submission to the federal government. An example of such a plan is that of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, drawn up in 1994. Although the policies proposed originate at the regional level, the problems of financing remain the same.

Programmes, Perm' oblast Administration. 23.7.1997
[346] Russian Regional Report Internet Edition Vol.3 No.51 22 December 1998

7.8 Development Plan of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug 1994

The development plan was drawn up by the administration located in the *okrug* centre of Kudymkar in 1994. The plan detailed the problems facing the *okrug*, and a strategy for dealing with them, and it is an example not only of the kinds of policies being planned for marginal regions, but also of the type of attitude to reform and to the market system prevalent in local level government. A widely held view amongst the inhabitants of the *okrug*, (and, indeed, a view that is mainy accurate,) is that the people in the administration building are the same ones who were there under the Soviet planned-administrative system, and that all that has changed since 1991 is the terms they use; in other words, although the Plan is littered with references to capitalism and market forces, the underlying psychology of the people who have written it actually hasn't changed at all since Soviet times.

The Plan shows a high degree of awareness of the problems facing the *okrug*;

> The economy of the *okrug* is characterised by a low level of development, and by mono-specialisation in forestry industry, with extremely weak development of processing branches. Mono-specialisation, the remoteness of main communication routes, weak development of industrial and social infrastructure, and low standards of living of the population have predetermined extremely poor starting conditions for the transition of the *okrug* to market conditions. Reform activities in the *okrug* for the purpose of the introduction of market conditions, without the necessary consideration of local conditions and peculiarities, brought weak development to the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* in conditions of deep crisis, and delivered its population to the verge of a socio-economic catastrophe.

However, although the problems outlined are primarily economic, the Plan is broader in its expectations for improvement;

> The main objective of socio-economic development of the *okrug* in the foreseeable future is the more complete satisfaction of the material and

spiritual needs of its inhabitants, on the basis of further, dynamic and more complex development of the economy.[347]

> The fate of one of the native populations of Russia need not depend upon market elements with their inexorable rules. It is impossible to tolerate the bankruptcy of the national region as a result of improperly planned reforms. The population and economics of the *okrug* in their present state are in need of substantial support from the federal level, and in the alteration of reform activity, with consideration of regional peculiarities and the principles of social justice. The living standards of the population must be raised, and conditions must be created for the harmonious conservation and development of the identity, and the original culture of the Komi-Permyak people.

Thus, the Plan plays upon the ethnicity of the population of its territory, arguing that the *okrug* must receive assistance because it is a homeland for one of the native peoples of Russia.

The Plan also details the conditions necessary for improvement of it situation;

> It seems that the surmounting of the present crisis may occur through the maintenance of the following conditions;
>
> - Political stability in the country
>
> - Transition to another model of carrying out of reform, maximum consideration of natural, historical, cultural, political and other conditions of Russia and the mentality of her people
>
> - Improvement in the living standards of the people as a priority of the direction of policy reform
>
> - The realisation of well-thought-out regional policies
>
> - Wide support for reform at all levels of the population
>
> - Reconstruction of management of economics, first of all the government sector (as it is done in all civilised countries)

[347] Administration of Perm' oblast, Administration of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, Central Scientific-Research Economic Institute (1994) Federal Programme of the Complex of Socio-Economic Development of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* of Perm' oblast for 1994-95 and until the year 2000 Section 1.2 Fundamental direction of development and the distribution of productive power.

However, the Plan accepts that demanding federal level change as a precondition for its own development is rather unrealistic, and it lists a number of aims at the *okrug* level, including diversification of production, rationalisation of the use of raw materials, a move towards self-sufficiency in food products, reduction in poverty and unemployment, and increases in the efficiency of production. It acknowledges that in the foreseeable future, the basic industry of the *okrug* will continue to be forestry, and that therefore most attention must be focussed on improving the forestry industry. In accordance with this aim, the *okrug* planned to improve the transport network of the territory, in anticipation of the stoppage of log rafting on its rivers. Other aims were the exploration of deposits of oil, and minerals, and more unlikely ideas such as the development of the *okrug* as a recreation area, with 'zones of relaxation', licensed shooting of bear, elk and wolf, and the recreational collection of wild berries.

The realisation of the Plan was divided into two stages, the first, 1994-95, called 'Preparation', was intended to create conditions for the realisation of the main objectives of the whole programme. During the preparation period, the following objectives were outlined; development of industrial building materials and the building industry; increase in hard-surfaced roads by 120-150km; construction of new electricity lines in the north of the *okrug*; completion of water piping in the *raion* centres; increase in the building of housing; construction of 40 new schools, 22 new hospitals and clinics, and 19 new institutes of culture; commencement of the exploration of valuable mineral deposits; preparation for the extraction of oil in the range of 250-300,000 tonnes per year; project work for the construction of railways, and the technical-economic groundwork for the creation of market infrastructure (branches of stock exchange, business centres, brokers' offices etc.).

The second stage of the Plan, 1996-2000 was to see "the maximum possible range of realisation of the programme's objectives", which included; completion of the construction of industrial plants for the production of parquet flooring; increased furniture production; organisation of wood-chemical industry; reconstruction of industry for the production of flax; organisation of leather and fur production; organisation of industrial processing of potatoes for treacle and for semi-processed food products; creation of the capability for processing of mushrooms and berries into high quality products; organisation of the extraction of oil and its partial processing for local needs; construction of mainline gas pipelines to the *okrug* centre of Kudymkar; development of a tourism zone; creation of new production capabilities in mechanical engineering; annual increase in the construction of homes of not less than 20%; services for all ages of the population, through governmental aid, for village economies, the social sphere, and social groups of low income, with the constant reduction of the levels of poverty, and increases in the financing of the spheres of culture, science, education, and the public health services.

However, the sources of funding for these aims and objectives were unsecured at the time of writing of the Plan; the proposed sources are listed below.

Table 7.3 Proposed sources of finance for the Development Plan for the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, 1994-2000

Sources of Finance	**Cost of Project**		**Stage 1 1994-95**		**Stage 2 1996-2000**	
	Billion rubles	%	Billion rubles	%	Billion rubles	%
All sources	**2900.6**	**100**	**257.1**	**100**	**2643.5**	**100**
of which						
FEDERAL BUDGET	**741**	**25.5**	**90**	**35**	**651**	**24.6**
REGIONAL BUDGET	439.1	15.1	55	21.4	384.1	14.5
MINISTERIAL BRANCHES	51.2	1.8	16	6.2	35.2	1.3
EXTRA-BUDGETARY FUND	329.2	11.3	58	22.5	271.2	10.2
ENTERPRISES OF THE REGION	**632**	**21.8**	**14**	**5.4**	**618**	**23.4**
RESOURCES OF THE POPULATION	57.3	2	8	3.1	49.3	1.9
BANK CREDIT	**646.2**	**22.3**	**16**	**6.2**	**630.2**	**23.8**
OTHER eg.SPONSORS	4.6	0.2	0.1	0.04	4.5	0.2
IN ADDITION, CREDIT IN HARD CURRENCY, MILLION $U.S.	11.8 million $US		6.3 million $US		5.5 million $US	

Source : Administration of Perm' oblast, Administration of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, Central Scientific Research Instutute (1994). Federal Programme of the Complex of Socio-Economic Development of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* of Perm' oblast for 1994-95 and until the year 2000. Section 2.8, Organisational-economic mechanism for the realisation of the Programme, p69. Note; all figures relate to 1994 prices.

Thus, it can be seen that the major roles in investment activity were to be played by the federal budget, bank credit, and the enterprises of the region, with a substantial amount of hard currency being relied upon. At the scale of development of specific industries, the sources of finance were to be similar. Table 7.4 shows some examples.

Table 7.4 Proposed Sources of finance for specific industries as part of the Development Plan of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, 1994-2000

Type of Industry	Source of Finance	Amount of finance	Percentage of total
Total of all types	Federal Budget	110,225 million rubles	14.85
	Regional Budget	979 million rubles	0.13
	Enterprises	66,579 million rubles	9.00
	Credit	**564,351 million rubles**	**76.10**
	Total	**742,134 million rubles**	**100.00**
Forestry	Federal budget	19,819 million rubles	11.00
	Regional Budget	979 million rubles	0.54
	Enterprises	14,309 million rubles	8.00
	Credit	**146,284 million rubles**	**80.50**
	Total	**181,391 million rubles**	**100.00**
Light Industry	Federal Budget	1,089 million rubles	29.50
	Credit	**2,938 million rubles**	**70.50**
	Total	**4,027 million rubles**	**100.00**

Source : Administration of Perm' oblast, Administration of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug*, Central Scientific-Research Economic Institute (1994) Federal Programme of the Complex of Socio-Economic Development of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* of Perm' oblast for 1994-95 and until the year 2000. Appendix No.5, p91-93. Note: all figures relate to 1994 prices.

A similar system was proposed for the sectors of agriculture, transport, and services, with a substantial proportion of the necessary financing to be provided through credit.[348]

With regard to the results of the Development Plan, the administration in Kudymkar was unable to provide any information. In 1997, when I obtained a copy of the Plan, the original from which I took a photocopy was the only copy in existence in the administration building, and no follow-up studies had been carried out. It can only be assumed from this, and from the notable absence of new roads,

schools, oil extraction industry and housing that the plan was not successful in obtaining its funding, and has not been carried out.

In 1997, the plans for development of the economy of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* were similar to those described in the plan. In terms of the timber industry, the *okrug* intended to produce pieces to make furniture, and wooden flooring, and also to produce charcoal, to be used in metallurgical and chemical plants. The charcoal absorbs atmospheric pollutants from the discharges of such plants, acting as a filter mechanism. This plan could have aided marginal villages in the north of the *okrug*, but financing, again, was a problem, and the lack of transport infrastructure in the *okrug* complicated the picture, making it necessary to move more and more timber by road, following the closure of the Kama river to free floating in 1994. Apart from the redevelopment of the forestry complex, the administration of the *okrug* planned to open three deposits of oil, in Maikar, Romanschur, and Tukachova, all of which are located in the southern part of the *okrug*, closest to the city of Perm'. There were also plans to develop deposits of gold which are alleged to have been found in Kosinskii *raion*, but no moves to this end have yet been made.[349]

7.9 Policy Responses at the raion Level

In the struggle for power between the regions and the federal government, the *raioni* play an important role. In its attempts to reassert the power it lost after 1991, the federal government is supporting the *raion* against the oblast,

[348] Source; ibid. Appendices 6, 7 & 8, p 102-127 .

attempting to weaken the regional powerbase by undermining it. In Perm' oblast, at the *raion* level, the conflict with the oblast, while not overt, is certainly considered important. Krasnovisherskii *raion*, for example, demonstrates the influence of local, regional and state policy, and the oblast and the *raion* each blame the other for their shortcomings. The oblast administration accuses that *raion* of being lacking in initiative;

> Krasnovisherskii *raion* is not in the worst position. The village of Severnii Kolchim, where the diamond workers live, has very good living conditions, but it is next to Mutikha, which has very poor conditions. It is the fault of the Krasnovisherskii *raion* administration if one settlement is good and another bad, if the profit from the diamonds is not spread out amongst all the settlements. The *raioni* are in a position to decide their own future, and Krasnovisherskii *raion* is in a better position economically than some others, but the local administration has no initiative![350]

Plate 7.1 shows this situation, with an area of poor housing well within sight of a new housing development of a much higher quality.

The *raion* claims that the oblast neither allows it enough power to carry out its own policies, nor gives it enough money. The problems of revenue are not just those involving the oblast, according to the economist of Krasnovisherskii *raion* administration.

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[349] *pers comm* A.N. Dyagilev, Representative of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* at the Perm' oblast Administration, 23.7.1997

[350] *pers comm* Sergei Alexandrovich Merkushev, Department of Development and Special Programmes, Perm' oblast Administration 23.7.1997



Plate 7.1 Foreground : poor quality wooden housing on the outskirts of the town of Krasnovishersk.
Background : wealthier settlement, with brick-built, two-story houses, inhabited by *'Uralalmaz'* diamond workers,
Krasnovisherskii *raion*, July 1997.

> 80% of the *raion*'s tax revenue comes from one enterprise, 'Uralalmaz', the diamond producer - the others are bankrupt, so most of the money in the *raion* comes from one source. Krasnovisherskii *raion* is rich in natural resources - forests, gas, oil, white marble, gold, and diamonds, but most of the money from the natural resources goes to the federal and oblast budgets, which then give back to the *raion* less than they received, less than half, in fact. All of the production of the state enterprises working on natural resources goes to the federal budget. Only the forestry enterprises are joint-stock companies. At the moment, the forest of the *raion* belongs to the *raion*, but the forest statutes now being implemented give the forest to the federal administration. As soon as the paperwork is complete, the forests will belong to Moscow. So, the *raion*, which already has no control over its other natural resources, the gold and the marble and the rest, will have no control over the forests either.[351]

At the sel'soviet level, there is dissatisfaction with the *raion* administration, but there is also understanding of its difficult financial position.

> The administration in Krasnovishersk sends all the money for the buildings in the village, now that the forestry enterprise can't afford to pay for their upkeep, but it's far too little, only 10 million rubles in all.[352]

There is also a degree of confusion and miscommunication between the sel'soviet and the oblast, regarding the 'Zona'. In the past, Vaya was a prison camp base, but in the early 1990s the prison, 'zona', was closed at the request of the inhabitants of the village. The villagers used to bake bread for the prison, and sell firewood to it, and the zeks carried out maintenance on the infrastructure of the village, repairing power lines and boilers, for example. Now that the zona has closed, many people have been left out of work.

> Vaya's opinion is split over whether the zona should return or not. Perm's main administration is already talking with Vaya's residents about whether zona should return, but more people don't want it than do want it, so in the short term future, it probably won't come back[353]

However, at the Perm' administration, this story was not collaborated.

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[351] *pers comm* Nikolai Ivanovich Klementev, Economist, Krasnovisherskii *raion* Administration 16.7.1997

[352] *pers comm* Sergei Arkadyevich Filatov, Main Administrator, Vaya sel'soviet, Krasnovisherskii *raion* 18.7.1997

> The main reason the zona closed was local opinion. Perhaps local opinion is different now from what it was at the time of closure, but it would be extremely difficult to reinstate the zona.[354]

This view is certainly borne out by a visit to the remains of the zona - no effort has been made to maintain the buildings in case of a future return to use as a prison. The hope on the part of some of the villagers of Vaya that the zona, along with the associated benefits, might return, seems to be unfounded.

7.10 Policy Variations at Different Levels of Government

Whilst it is easy to criticise the Development Plan of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous *Okrug* on the grounds of naivety and lack of reliable financing, its approach to the problems at hand is rather different from that of the higher levels of government. In reference to the problem of small and shrinking marginal settlements, and their provision with food and services, the stance of the *okrug* administration was clear.

> The goal of economic reform (in the *okrug*) must be the achievement for all the population of increased.... prosperity, the consolidation of principles of social justice, development of social welfare, expansion of rights and liberties of the people, and humanisation of social relations.[355]
>
> In the *okrug*, the proportion of completely furnished (i.e. with central heating, plumbing, sewerage, a bath or shower, and gas supply) houses is just 5% of the total housing fund. The condition in rural areas of the *okrug* is worse still, with only 5.6% of rural dwellings having plumbing, 1.6% sewerage, 2.5% central heating, and 0.3% hot water supply. In future, for improvement to the situation with regard to housing in the *okrug* there must be delivery of the following top-priority aims; achievement of societal

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[353] ibid.
[354] *pers comm* Sergei Alexandrovich Merkushev Department for Development and Special Programmes, Perm' oblast Administration. 23.7.1997
[355] Source; Komi-Permyak Development Plan Section 2.1 Sub-programme 1: Development of the Social Complex, p19

minimum provisions of housing, and..... fundamental improvement in the degree of comfort of the housing fund in villages... of the *okrug*.[356]

In the *okrug*, medical services must evolve at the fastest rate to villages, where it is necessary to substantially expend the number of close inter-relationships between the working public health institutions of towns and villages. In the future, it will be necessary to create ambulance-clinic aid for the rural population, which would facilitate an increase in the average number of visits to doctors by rural inhabitants. In rural areas, the further development of peripatetic medical services to the population is likewise expedient.[357]

To summarise, despite the acute economic problems described in the Plan, there is no indication of any moves towards allowing the smaller and more marginal villages to die out. The administration is fully committed to improving services such as kindergartens, cultural centres, and medical care to the villages, as well as improvement in village housing, and on numerous occasions, the Plan mentions plans for social justice as an aim; for example;

Methods must be directed toward the creation of conditions in which all social groups may be active, participating in the resolution of questions about the growth of their income and consumption, being closely connected with alterations in the labour activity of the population, and the promotion of efficiency of utilisation of human resources. Social welfare activities must include, alongside work in social production, individual, co-operative, mixed and other sorts of alternative working activities. This provides working activities for all categories of the population, including those who, for many reasons, may not be occupied in social production.

In the future, one of the main problems of the *okrug* in terms of income is the reduction of differentiation of families according to levels of per head average incomes, fundamental to the principles of social justice.[358]

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[356] Source; ibid., p21
[357] Source; ibid., p21
[358] Source; ibid., p24

It can be argued that although the likelihood of the *okrug* administration being able to achieve these aims is probably very low, they are nonetheless its declared objectives, and the concept of the depopulation of marginal areas is simply not acceptable to them.

At the Federal level, however, the situation is rather different. Although, for obvious reasons, the official line will never be that marginal villages are to be left to die out of their own accord, there is a definite undercurrent of this opinion in Moscow.

> The state can be very cruel with respect to its citizens, and if they have no real power to, say, close the railroads (context - the unpaid miners blocking the main east-west railway line in summer 1998), and if they are dispersed, or retired persons, then they are free to survive or to die, but the state isn't taking care of them. It's partly due to objective reasons, and partly due to the fact that the government is very short of money, and they are constantly trying to distribute this money between the most active players, and these guys are not among them.... In the past, there was a policy to develop the remote northern regions, and ineffective enterprises were supported, and the government gave money for retired persons to live on. But now the situation is changing so rapidly, and it's understandable that the developed core of the country will become much smaller than it used to be, and that these northern remote regions will not develop.[359]

In the case of the federal government, there is also the problem of the non-fulfilment of orders. For example, in the Duma in May 1995, Vladimir Vladimirovich Goman was challenged by Tamara Mikhailovna Gudina about a federal law on the governmental guarantees and compensation, the Northern subsidy, which had not been enforced. He answered

> ...the reason for the non-fulfilment of the law on guarantees and compensation is not that of mechanism (mechanism we have, in principle), but of unwillingness, in the absence of responsibility on the part of the government and the Ministry of Finance, in all laws in general, one of which is the law on governmental guarantees. ...we put a question to the Ministry

[359] *pers comm* Nikolai Vladimirovich Petrov, Scholar-in-Residence, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 15.6.1998

> of Finance, asking 'Why has the law on governmental guarantees and compensation not been enforced?' They replied 'There are lots of laws we don't carry out. This is just one of them'.[360]

However, it could also be argued that since the regional governments, despite their high principles, are less able to effect change than they would like to be, that the differences in policy between the different level of government are actually very small, especially considering the fact that even if a law is passed, the system may not be able to enforce it. The net result of policy towards northern marginal areas as a whole is that the subsidies which are allocated to their inhabitants, and the policies of resettlement are prohibitively expensive, and so even though the determination to 'save' the marginal settlements may be stronger at the regional and local levels, on the ground, very little is being done.

To summarise, the debate over policy towards marginal settlements can be condensed into a number of questions.

What can each level of government theoretically achieve? Is there political will to tackle problems? Who has the ability to deliver solutions? And, therefore, who is making the most important decisions regarding life in marginal settlements?

In theory, each level of government, federal, regional and local, has the capacity to effect change. Moscow determines levels of federal funding to the regions, which then redistribute the funds among their *raioni*. But at each level there are complications; lobbying in Moscow means that the most needy are sometimes

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[360] V.V. Goman, speaking on 23.5.1995 *Federal'niye Sobraniye parlament Rossiskoi Federatsii Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Stenogramma zasedanii Byulleten'* 23.5.1995

overlooked in favour of the most vociferous, and in the case of Perm', a donor oblast with very poor *raioni* is still a donor oblast in the eyes of Moscow. Moscow has its federal programmes, but their implementation is never assured, and the financial support it is able to assign to them is limited by fiscal problems. At the oblast level, there are policies, most of which seem to be implementations of federal laws, many relying upon federal funding. *Raioni* find themselves unable to afford policies they might like to be able to implement, such as house repairs and infrastructure improvement, because of insufficient funds from the oblast and a poor local tax base; again, a donor *raion* with poor villages remains a donor.

In terms of political will; from my research it seems that political will is strongest at the lowest level of government, closest to the problem, and with the most to rebel against, especially considering the propensity of rural areas to have a more soviet and communist mindset than the urban areas. Will is also strong at the oblast level, with the regional administration carrying out the necessary policies whenever it can. In Moscow, however, the multiplicity of demands on politicians, and the recent weakening of the centre, along with the instability and uncertainty associated with Yeltsin and the ruble, all combine to ensure that there always seems to be a more pressing problem. The apparent 'withdrawal' of the Russian government from economic governance, revealed in the non-payment of state sector wages, and the erosion of the national state, seems to have led to an increase in the importance of local relations. In addition, it could be argued that as Moscow has sought to integrate into the world economy, it has withdrawn its attention from the local.

7.10.1 The Collapse of the Centre; The August 1998 Crisis

Moscow's withdrawal from the local in terms of regional politics was accelerated by the crisis of 1998, which began in August of that year, and has been closely associated with the decline of Yeltsin and with it the decline of the presidency. Although the presidential administration once monopolised centre-periphery relationships, as discussed earlier, it has given up much of that authority since autumn of 1998. Later that year it remained unclear who would be heading the Main Department of Yeltsin's Presidential Staff, which coordinates the activities of his representatives in the regions and issues concerning local governments. A symptom of the collapse of the centre, this lack of coherence in Moscow underlines the withdrawal of the government from regional affairs.[361]

Earlier in 1998 it was already becoming apparent that the crisis in the Russian Federation could turn the nation into a confederation. Graeme Herd, writing in the Moscow Times in September argued that the centre would become weaker as the handful of donor regions became increasingly reluctant to transfer money to the federal government and recipient regions deperately tried to maintain their current level of funding. Much of the military is now regionalised because it has been forced to rely on regional leaders for necessities. According to one seemingly unlikely scenario hypothesized by Herd, the president would maintain control over foreign affairs and security policy, while the regions would control everything else, even introducing their own currencies[362].

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[361] RRR Vol.4 No.4 (4.2.1999)

An alternative scenario was the total disintegration of the Russian Federation. The national newspaper *Kommersant Daily* considered possible eventualities for the disintegration of the country. Even before the crisis proper, regions had begun to withdraw from the Russian market as a whole. For example, regions such as Leningrad recommended that banks put their money into regional bonds, rather than federal treasury bonds, and those that did did not suffer so heavily in the crisis. Other regions have erected barriers to goods from beyond their borders, and as many as ten regions have defaulted on their debts. Several have created their own monopoly on alcohol production, and Sakha and Kemerovo are setting up their own gold reserves, a move that could let them set up their own central banks. Many regions ceased paying federal taxes, took control of federal shares in local factories, and set up their own financial system, all in violation of federal law.[363] In fact, in November 1998, the Justice Minister, Pavel Krasheninnikov said that one third of the laws adopted by Russian regions violated the Russian Constitution or federal legislation.[364]

By October, Oleg Sysuev, the first deputy chief of staff for the presidential administration in charge of regional relations admitted that the Kremlin had given up its long-time monopoly over regional relations, and would let the government deal with financial requests coming from the regions. By giving up its control over finances, the administration effectively ceded all levers of influence over the regions.[365]

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[362] Graeme Herd is Deputy Director of the Scottish Centre for International Security, University of Aberdeen, 8. September 1998 (RRR Vol.3 No.36 10 Sept.1998)
[363] *Kommersant Daily* 3 September 1998, in RRR Vol. 3 No.36 10 September 1998
[364] *Segodnya* 3 November 1998, in RRR Vol.3 No.44 5 November 1998

At the beginning of 1999, all the problems that had plagued Russia's fragile centre-periphery relations continued. The Russian government owed millions of new rubles in unpaid wages, pensions and other social payments. Different regions adopted different strategies, such as Tatarstan's new budget, and Tver's tax breaks, as the tug-of-war between the centre and the regions continued. Regional governors, strengthened by the economic crisis, called on the centre to redefine budgetary relations, and in response, the federal government moved to allocate a greater proportion of tax revenue to the regions at the expense of the federal purse. Moreover, needier regions would now receive more financial aid while the ones better off would find their subsidies reduced. Governors themselves began to grow stronger, sometimes outside of the law. For example, press reports documented how Yaroslavl authorities have been using public funds to buy favourable coverage from the local media. Local governments also made some gains. In Ulyanovsk, for example, the city administration scored an important victory in a court ruling that prevented the oblast government from giving it unfunded mandates. As the centre has begun to collapse, the power struggle between centre and periphery has taken on a new significance.[366] However, changes in the budgetary arrangements introduced with the 1999 budget have the potential to change the situation.

Recent events such as the Skuratov stand-off, discussed in section 7.1, have undermined the power of the centre, or at least, that of President Yeltsin, even further, and the ongoing periodic sacking and appointing of prime ministers is testament to the instability of the centre. The Federation Council members, who opposed Yeltsin over Skuratov, also approved a cut to Russia's value-added tax

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[365] RRR Vol.3 No 41 15 October 1998
[366] EWI Russian Regional Investor. Vol 1. No.1 14 January 1999

(VAT), a populist move that would greatly reduce the country's already meagre tax revenues and render an agreement with the IMF impossible. Without an IMF loan, Russia will not be able to restructure its debts. This restructuring is critical if Russia does not want to default on its obligations; its entire budget for 1999 is about $US20 billion, and it owes about $US17 billion to lenders. Mr. Yeltsin was expected to veto the tax cut, but the move by the Federation Council shows its willingness to defy him.

7.10.2 Summary

Taking into consideration the effects of the crisis of 1998, and the weakening of the centre in Russian politics, it is very difficult to say who has the ability to deliver solutions to the problems of marginal areas. The Russian system of government and federal budgetary transfer means that the administrations which could possibly have the most impact on local problems, especially in North Perm' oblast', the *raion* and oblast levels, seem to have their hands tied, especially with regard to finance. This is especially true of North Perm' oblast', because of its low priority at the federal level; Perm' is a donor to Moscow, and although, for example, Vaya is a very poor village, Krasnovisherskii *raion* is a net donor to the oblast budget.

I would argue that the most crucial decisions being made about life in marginal villages, such as those in North Perm' oblast', are not being taken in administration buildings by policy makers, but rather by the individual inhabitants of the villages themselves. The survival strategies they are able to employ, be they out-migration or semi-subsistence farming, and the degree of succes of these strategies for each household, I would argue, are the most significant factors influencing life in

marginal settlements. Despite the power vested in Moscow, the regions, and, to a certain extent, the *raioni,* there seem to have been few measures implemented which have benefitted the people of the villages of the north of Perm' oblast in any way other than to provide for their immediate urgent needs, such as the *Severnii Zavoz.* The ability of the people themselves to produce most of the food they need to feed their families, and to utilise the natural resources available to them seem to be more important than measures drawn up elsewhere.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion

8.1 Poverty and Marginality
8.2 'Globalisation' and the marginal settlements
8.3 Summary

8 Conclusion

8.1 Poverty and Marginality
8.2 'Globalisation' and the marginal settlements
8.3 Summary

> *One could envision... a school teacher whose family also kept milk cows, mowed hay, fished in the lake, hunted in the forest, gathered wild berries and gardened in a small greenhouse... This, then, could be the future of the village - a diversified adaptive strategy that is at once ethnic, topophilic, commercial, subsistent, subsidised, neo-traditionalistic, and modern, or even post-industrial*[367].

This diversified adaptive strategy can be seen in the north of Perm' oblast, as the inhabitants of the villages there utilise domestic and environmental resources to effect subsistence. The conditions in the study region owe much to the context of Soviet development policy, and its impact on post-Soviet Russia.

Of central importance to research in the post-Soviet transition is the legacy left by the Soviet State. Spatial contingencies, as Tykkylainen (1995) and Bradshaw, Stenning and Sutherland (1998) have made clear, are crucial to the understanding of the regional impact of transition. In order to address the north of Perm' oblast's situation, this thesis examines the historical context of Soviet economic development and settlement of the area, from pre-Revolutionary times, and the Stroganov landholders, through dekulakisation, and 'special settlers', the rationalisation of settlements, and concurrent developments in the forestry industry, upon which this settlement depended. It traces the expansion of population and industrial activity in the region, and seeks to

draw out the salient features of the region at the time of Soviet collapse. Central to an understanding of the impact of transition on the north of Perm' oblast, then, is an appreciation of the importance of the forestry industry, both as the major employer, and as the provider of amenities and services, ranging from the provision of a social club and a *banya*, to the ploughing of potato fields. Allied to this is the role of the forest as both the lifeblood of the *leskhozi*, and the safety net of the population. Its provision of timber, grazing, berries, nuts and mushrooms form a vital part of the 'basket of goods' of every household.

Equally important is an appreciation of the problems inherent in the location of the north of Perm' oblast, partially hidden under the system of subsidy and increment employed in the Soviet era, but exposed at its demise. Perm' regional administrators such as Kolegova and Dyagilev draw attention to communications problems in the north of the oblast, such as an inadequate network of roads, most of which are effectively seasonal, and unrepaired bridges, all of which act to isolate the area, and increase the costs of transportation, which under the Soviet regime were absorbed by the state.

Perhaps the most obvious legacy of the Soviet system in the study region is the fact the settlements at the centre of this study are there at all. Set up as 'temporary' forestry bases, or as places to house resettled 'kulaks', villages were formed in the north of Perm' oblast between the 1930s and 1960s, at the behest of the state. Of course, no one can know how the settlement history of the area would have taken shape had the

[367] Bychkova Jordan et

1917 Revolution never taken place, but it would seem reasonable to assume that population would have been more sparse than became the case.

An additional legacy is that of nordicity and all that it entailed. The subsidies alluded to above in reference to industrial production also played a very important role in the lives of inhabitants of these villages, who, if not physically transported to the area, were likely to have been lured there by wage increments and the kind of preferential treatment described by Merkushev in the Perm' Administration, such as the wide choice of goods in local shops.

The context for 1991 in the north of Perm' oblast, therefore, could be understood as the following; a remote, forested, marshy area, populated by a mixture of Komi-Permian people and those of various other nationalities, living in planned settlements either at the current behest of the state, or, more usually, as a result of past planning measures, almost entirely dependent on the forestry industry, (which itself had been developed by the state), and accustomed to a high level of state support, and certain perks, in terms of availability of goods in shops and wage increments.

The immediate impact on the region of the collapse of the USSR was negative; the magnitude of the fall in industrial and agricultural production, and the steady growth of both enterprise and administrative debt is documented in Chapter 1. The response of the inhabitants of the area can be understood as a choice between two options; to leave the villages, or to stay and make do. As Chapters 5 and 6 discuss,

various contingencies cloud the distinction between the two, and the different circumstances of different households enable varying degrees of ability to choose freely. The general picture appears to be that those who can leave - the young and skilled, either have already left, or have plans to do so, leaving behind those who, whether by choice or otherwise, eke out a living from the variety of sources listed at the start of the chapter. In fact, one hardly needs to *envision* a school teacher who wakes at dawn to milk cows, who scythes hay, who picks berries and makes *varenia*, who digs potatoes.... one could meet her in any forest village.

Against the backdrop of post-Soviet political wrangling and economic crises, families carry on their business. A consideration of the power and capacity of various levels of government and administration to affect the marginal villages suggests that, particularly in the past year, since the events of August 1998, decisions taken at the village and household level outweigh those made in Moscow.

The findings of this thesis intersect with transition theory in that they provide an example of the divergence of regional and local trajectories of political, social, and economic transformation. In places such as the marginal settlements of the north of Perm' oblast, local realities challenge the unilinearity of neo-liberal theories of transition; the legacy of Soviet rule, manifest in the very existence of the villages themselves, the presence of the forestry industry at the scale to which it was developed pre-1991, and the innumerable social, psychological and cultural effects of state socialism, have created a situation to which the unilinear model applied at the national scale has limited relevance.

Rather than a *transition* to a market system, it could be argued, what is happening is here is a complex reworking of the legacies of the Soviet era. People are using the resources left by the state socialist system to survive; exhibiting multiple transitions, or, arguably, a transition from Communism, but with an unknown endpoint.

The core themes of this thesis are the concepts of transition and marginality; what they mean, their relevance to settlements in the north of Perm' oblast, and their value in interpreting events and responses in the area. Both have been discussed at length; marginality is very difficult to define, used, as it is, to describe land, settlements, people, politics and lifestyles.[368] However, for the purposes of this inquiry, Byron's indicators of marginality (remoteness, primary industry, low population density, static or declining population, low standards of living, and an ageing population) proved most appropriate.[369] In this research, the construct of the Russian North had great relevance, since the study area lies at the southern boundary of the administrative North. In 1998, for the first time, *raioni* in the north of Perm' oblast have been classified as 'aligned' or 'comparable' to the North. Nordicity and marginality proved to be complementary concepts in relation to the study area; the north of Perm' oblast lies at the margin between North and South, just as it lies between what might, in a market-led system, be called the 'viable' and the 'non-viable'; because of its geographical location, the conditions it experiences in terms of climate, natural environment, isolation and so on are not as harsh as those further to the north. This is a central theme; the fact that this area is neither one nor the other makes it interesting. If the boundary between 'core' and

[368] Germani, 1980
[369] Byron (1995)

'periphery' can be thought of as a 'marginal zone', then it could be argued that the north of Perm' oblast presently sits within that zone. However, the zone is not static; during the Soviet period it was not considered to exist at all – all areas were to experience the same levels of economic development under Soviet regional development policy. Development and settlement were produced by the state in areas which, under a market system, might be considered non-profitable. These areas, which include the north of Perm' oblast, have suffered since 1991, but the Far North has suffered worst, and has been the focus of recent Western press attention.

> Norwegians have opened a nationwide campaign to help their neighbours in Russia's impoverished Arctic region by providing food, warm clothing and medicine. More than a million people live on the Kola Peninsula in northwestern Russia.... The economic crisis in Russia has left thousands of Kola residents facing the bitter winter without heat or basic necessities. (New York Times)[370]

> Food Crisis Forces Russia to Swallow Its Pride
> To avert a famine, the Kremlin gets help from Washington (the New York Times International)[371]

> The risk of hunger is among those still dependent on the state for support – pensioners, the armed forces and communities in the Arctic, Siberia and the Far East, which can only be supplied by air or icebreaker in winter.(The Guardian)[372]

> Russia's Far North Near Desperation (The Washington Post)[373]

If the Soviet State pushed the marginal zone beyond the boundary of the nation state, the post-Soviet transition has seen the contraction of the zone, to its current position. The marginal settlements of the north of Perm' oblast can be viewed as the indicators of the zone; they are balanced on the knife-edge of survival or failure; if

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[370] The New York Times, 20.11.1998
[371] Headlines, The New York Times International, 7.11.1998
[372] The Guardian, 7.11.1998
[373] Headline, The Washington Post, 13.11.1998

transition continues to cause decline in the economy of the north of Perm' oblast, the marginal zone may move further south, with consequences for the settlements beyond it. However, should conditions improve, the boundary may retreat to the North, and the settlements in the formerly marginal zone may experience reprieve.

The central point here seems to be one of potential, rooted in both the reality of conditions in the north of Perm' oblast, and in the ways in which the inhabitants of the area view those conditions. Many Russians would say that the processes taking place in the study area can be witnessed elsewhere, within 200 miles of Moscow, in fact, in most rural areas of Russia – personal communication has often thrown up these responses. However, I would argue that the factor which sets the north of Perm' oblast apart is that of potential. Friction of distance, location and geographical marginality are all important – people in other rural areas in Russia may have the opportunity to go elsewhere, to a nearby town or city, and they know that, were investment to become available, their locality, near to such a settlement, may reasonably expect to receive some of it. In the study area, there is no conveniently located town in which to find work, and precious little capital to gather together to move there if work could be found. Also, despite the Soviet experience of investment and state support, people realise that post-Soviet capital investment in their region is highly unlikely. Location may be an old-fashioned concept in a 'globalised' world, but it has relevance here.

Regarding the second main theme, these ideas of diverse regional responses inform debate about transition, contribute to the debate over transitional

trajectories, and to the understanding of how the transition has affected the north of Perm' oblast. The data in Chapter 3 show the downturn in the economy of the area since 1991, and the problems faced in its major industry, forestry. The post-Soviet collapse of the forestry industry may be seen as an indicator of economic marginalisation; the settlements which, as Chapters 3 and 4 describe, were developed as bases for the forestry industry, have suffered from the decline of forestry.

In this marginal zone, transition is being experienced in a way that is shaped by the resources left by the Soviet state, by the natural environment, and by the experiences of the inhabitants of the villages. Although the situation for the villagers is bad, it is not as catastrophic as that experienced even further north. Service provision may be poor, the roads may be impassable, the shops poorly stocked, and the major industry in decline, but the people can get by. There *are* survival strategies that they can employ within the villages to effect subsistence. This situation is in contrast with that in the Arctic, for example;

> (The situation) is critical in the inhospitable Far North, where everything has to be imported. Although rich in minerals, the North is totally dependent on other sources for food.[374]

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the divergent responses to the conditions in the area; rural depopulation and survival strategies within the villages. Levels of outmigration, although significant, are not as high as might be expected, for the reasons discussed (lack of money, employable skills and so on), and most people seem to be relying upon domestic and environmental resources, most notable their personal plots and

the forest, as well as the *lespromkhozi*, for subsistence. It could be argued that within these villages, marginality, particularly with regard to exclusion, is closely allied with poverty.

8.1 Poverty and Marginality

Geographical margins intersect with the production of social marginality in the north of Perm' oblast in that the geographical marginality of the area contributes to the poverty of its inhabitants. Transition in Russia has been accompanied by a sharp decline in output, and by rapid inflation. Structural change has resulted in increased inequality and substantial poverty. However, the definition and measurement of poverty is currently under debate. McAuley (1998) argues that

> On a theoretical level... the concept of poverty embodied in the official poverty line, focussing as it does on a narrowly defined conception of need, is too restrictive. In advanced industrial societies, if not more widely, poverty should be understood not only as implying a lack of resources, but also the consequent enforced exclusion, *iskliuchennost'* from many aspects of social life.
>
> ...Poverty....is associated with limits on a household's ability to consume basic goods, with its ability to acquire medical services and to participate in certain fundamental rituals without getting into debt, and with its inability to indulge its children.
>
> ...whether or not a household is deprived in this sense does not only depend on the current income of it members.[375]

The intersection of geographical margins and the production of social marginality can be seen in the north of Perm' oblast. The location of the

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[374] The Washington Post, 13.11.1998
[375] McAuley (1998) p1-3

inhabitants in villages such as Solym and Vaya, and others, in the north of Perm' oblast, means that they are unable to consume basic goods other than those few available in the poorly-stocked village shops, that medical services are poor, if they exist at all, and that children are rarely indulged. Sprout (1995) has contended that

> The majority of Russians are coping in large part by drawing on a portfolio of economic activities from both the official economy and the unofficial economies.
>
> ... Most striking is the significant proportional growth of 'defensive' households – that is, those which have diversified risk by relying jointly on the official economy and the non-monetised informal economy (which includes growing one's own food, bartering services with family and friends, and queuing).[376]

However, although poverty is evident throughout the Russian Federation, it could be argued that there is still a significant difference between the poverty which can be seen in cities and towns of the Russian Federation, and areas close to them, and that which is apparent in the marginal settlements of the north of Perm' oblast'. Numerous studies have shown that the post-Soviet transition in Russia has witnessed the marginalisation of various groups within society; for example, Hassan and Kyle Peters Jnr. draw attention to the age of lower income households, writing that most are older and not as well educated as the average, thus making them less able to adapt rapidly or ever to the changed circumstances[377]. Varoli describes the plight of pensioners and invalids, the structural poor, who are unable to support themselves, and the young families with children who have greater desires and expectations than their parents, but none of the benefits, such as cheap housing, of the Soviet period[378]. He also details the economic poor, those who cannot support themselves not because they are unable, but because the

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[376] Sprout (1995) p1
[377] Hassan, F.M.A. & R. Kyle Peters Jnr (1996) p643

economy is depressed, such as the hidden unemployed, and state sector workers with unpaid or delayed wages. At the bottom of the social order, he continues, are the homeless, for whom there is little provision or sympathy. Morvant (1996) adds families with many children, single parent families, the sick, refugees and single pensioners to the list of the disadvantaged[379]. Those who write on poverty within Russian society seem to concur on the issue of location. Varoli writes that

> Location is another important determining factor in Russian poverty. Those living in rural areas are the most likely to have abysmal standards of living... most Russians in small towns and villages... live in a squalor that western Europe has not seen since the turn of the century. Few have telephones, let alone modern conveniences such as household appliances and cars. Few roads are paved, and most buildings are badly built and crumbling. An absence of indoor plumbing is not unusual. Such areas usually have high levels of alcoholism, and very low levels of education and culture.

Therefore, it can be seen that while some groups such as pensioners, single parents, the sick and large families may be disadvantaged in Russian society as a whole, regardless of where they live, those members of disadvantaged groups who live not only in rural areas, but in rural areas far removed from the more developed 'core' of the country are at a severe disadvantage. Location in the north of Perm' oblast is an example of such additional marginalisation. The study area's degree of 'nordicity' has already been discussed, in that it is clear that although the north of Perm' oblast lies at the southern boundary of the administrative North, its conditions are not as severe as those of the Far North. However, the process of marginalisation which is taking place in the area is manifest in the poverty of its inhabitants. In fact, many of the interviewees in this

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[378] Varoli, J. (1996) p11
[379] Morvant, P. (1996) p56

study could be better described as 'marginal', rather than 'defensive', according to Sprout's definition

> ...'Marginal' population (the population which relies primarily if not solely on the non-monetised unofficial economy)[380]

The poverty of households in marginal settlements is dependent in part upon their level of income, which, in the forestry villages, is usually very low or even non-existent, if individuals have become unemployed, or if their wages are being delayed or paid in kind. State support in the form of benefits and pensions is also of relatively small monetary value. Their poverty is also, however, dependent upon the conditions in which they live, and the marginalisation of their settlement, in terms of service provision and availability of goods and employment. There is a fundamental difference between this form of poverty and that present in other areas of Russia, where, as Sprout (1995) shows, reliance on farming and kin and friendship networks is also evident. Poverty and marginality combine in that not only is income severely limited, but the ability to consume and to participate is also limited, not only by the level of income, but also by the simple lack of goods to consume or the facility to participate in activities available in areas further to the south, or nearer to the 'core' areas of the country. In short, poverty in towns and cities, which has undoubtedly resulted in reliance on the unofficial economies detailed earlier, is not the same as poverty in Solym and Vaya and comparable marginal settlements. In towns and cities, and in rural areas nearer to them, there are choices and opportunities which do not exist in the marginal settlements. In the absence of such opportunities, in the marginal settlements, increased poverty leads to increased

[380] Sprout (1995) p1

marginality, and in turn, the marginalisation of the villages means fewer opportunities to break out of the cycle of poverty.

8.2 *'Globalisation' and the marginal settlements*

> We live, it is asserted, in a global*ised* world in which nation-states are no longer significant actors or meaningful economic units; in which consumer tastes and cultures are homogenised and satisfied through the provision of standardised global products created by global corporations with no allegiance to place or community. The global is, then, claimed to be the natural order of affairs in today's technologically driven world in which time-space has been compressed, the 'end of geography' has arrived and everywhere is becoming the same.[381]

This process of globalisation is argued to coexist with the process of localisation, as global corporations, global financial movements and global politics play deciding roles in the structuring of daily life, while simultaneously more attention is paid to the local and regional responses and restructuring processes.

> There is, in other words, a double movement of globalisation on the one hand, and devolution, decentralisation or localisation on the other.[382]

The term 'glocalisation' has been coined to describe the coexistence of these restructuring mechanisms, described by Swyngedouw (1992) as

> ...the local/global interplay of contemporary capitalist restructuring processes.... as a single, combined process with two inherently related, albeit contradictory movements and ... a process which involves a de facto recomposition of the articulation of the geographical scales of economic and social life.[383]

Localisation, the rise of the local, is involved with

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[381] Dicken (1998) p3
[382] Swyngedouw (1992) p40

> ...the increased prominence of 'local' politics and the shift of the scale level of decision-making from the nation state down to regions or localities....[384]

'Glocalisation', or at least globalisation and localisation, have some relevance to marginal settlements. It could be argued that localisation is more evident than globalisation in that the scale of decision-making does seem to have shifted from the national scale to the more local, as documented in the previous chapter. It has already been argued that the most significant decisions being taken about marginal settlements are those taken by the inhabitants of the villages themselves. The application of globalisation as a concept is more problematic, however. As discussed earlier, one of the most important indicators of the marginalisation of settlements is the poor quality of communications; roads which are impassable for long periods, damaged telephone lines, very poor reception of radio and television stations, and lack of capital with which to pay for newspapers to be delivered. The 'time-space compression' which is described as an integral part of the process of globalisation does not seem to have had much impact in the north of Perm' oblast. At the time of fieldwork, few households had cars, bus services were infrequent and unreliable, postal services were also infrequent, there was no email connection in the area, and fax machines were very few and far between. Telephone services were sporadic to say the least.[385] The company 'Uralsviazinform', operating telephone, television and radio broadcasting equipment in Perm' oblast, has plans to increase the coverage of its network. The average penetration of telephone

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[383] ibid. p40-41
[384] ibid. p40
[385] An additional problem is that often, new technology, even that designed for the Cyrillic alphabet, such as typewriters, is supplied with an instruction booklet in languages other than Russian. During my time in The north of Perm' oblast, I was called upon several times to read and translate such instruction booklets.

communications in Perm' oblast (excluding the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug) is 43.2%, but it varies by district from 5% in Cherdinskii raion in the north of the oblast, to 83% in the town of Solikamsk. In order to increase penetration, Uralsviazinform have installed new transmitters in Perm', Solikamsk, Berezniki and other large towns. A transmitter is planned for Krasnovishersk, but financing is uncertain; in 1998, over half of the planned investment of US$2million was to be directed towards increasing the number of exchanges in Perm' city, and the other larger towns of the region. With regard to television and radio, as the company states

> At the moment, wireline broadcasting, especially in rural areas, is not a profitable business.

To switch to wireless broadcasting, new transmission stations are necessary, and this development of television and radio broadcasting will require capital expenditures of US$2-3million, the origin of which is unclear.[386]

The influence of global corporations is being felt in terms of the availability of goods produced by Mars, Johnson & Johnson, and Nestle, amongst others, in the local shops (albeit at very high prices), as is the influence of 'global culture' in the form of television series such as 'Santa Barbara', 'Morse', 'Dynasty', and various Latin American ('Tropicana') and French soap operas, dubbed into Russian, carried on the few television stations which broadcast to the north of Perm' Oblast. However, it would be difficult to argue that the inhabitants of the north of Perm' oblast were experiencing globalisation in terms of their communications facilities. In addition, the popular serial 'Santa Barbara' had to be dropped by Radio Television Rossii in December of 1998, when

a batch of 65 episodes built up at the border because RTR had no money to pay the import fees.[387]

However, it could equally be argued that the study region lies beyond the interplay of the global and the local, and that therefore the debate about the influence of globalisation on marginal areas is limited in its relevance.

8.3 Summary

The nature of these conclusions means that they must allow for change; further economic decline may be seen to cause further contraction of the marginal zone towards the centre. A development such as the proposed Belkomur Railway may alter the transition trajectory of the north of Perm' oblast, and villages which today are marginal because of their isolation from the centre may find themselves experiencing development triggered by proximity to this major railway. However, the likelihood of major capital investment into the north of Perm' oblast must be very small. Further observation is necessary. This research appears to be timely, in that some villages are currently being seen to die out - the local press report on villages with only two elderly pensioners remaining - while others appear to be fairly stable. This apparent knife-edge balancing is evidence of a situation of flux - the result which might justifiably have been anticipated - that of the large scale rural depopulation of the north of Perm' oblast, in a similar manner to that which has taken place in regions further to the north, has not happened. However, within the villages themselves there has been stratification, with

[386] http://www.uralsviazinform.ru/annual-r03.html 19/5/1999

some households faring better than others, and tension building where the less affluent feel slighted.

To conclude, I would argue that the case of the north of Perm' oblast is an example of processes of marginalisation. All states have geographical margins, but what makes those seen to emerge in the Russian Federation unique is the fact that they were created by the Soviet policy of developing marginal areas. Since 1991, the margins which were hidden by the command-administrative system and central planning, have begun to emerge. In the long term, the people about whom this thesis is written may be evacuated, they may leave of their own volition, or they may remain as lonely pensioners. The area may be emptied of population, but for now, people remain there, and at least for the moment, they are out of the gaze of the Russian state.

[387] The Guardian, 27.2.1999

Appendices

Appendix 1

Number of Special Settlers in Villages of North Perm, October 20th 1931[388]

Lespromkhoz	No. of families	Persons present in the families				Of whom persons of working age.		
		Men	Women	Children under 14	TOTAL	Men	Women	TOTAL
'Uralzaplestrest'								
Cherdinskii	1,816	2,561	2,329	2,058	6,948	1,776	1,051	2,827
Bondiuskii	1,467	3,650	1,946	1,599	7,195	1,633	1,301	2,934
Solikamskii	711	926	923	940	2,798	538	426	964
Verkh-Yaivenskii	2,086	2,694	2,252	2,387	7,333	1,824	924	2,748
Kolvinskii	2,846	4,086	3,808	4,636	12,530	2,420	1,676	4,096
Kosinskii	1,961	2,801	2,431	2,607	7,839	1,869	1,188	3,057
Gaiinskii	2,598	3,815	3,551	2,695	10,061	2,854	1,597	4,451
Dobryanskii	1,777	2,529	2,058	2,930	7,517	2,077	1,588	3,665
Kaiiskii	554	623	710	185	1,518	494	483	977
Berezni-kovskii	255	422	400	331	1,153	309	151	460
Orlinskii	431	655	578	601	1,834	441	207	648
TOTAL	16,502	24,762	20,986	20,969	66,717	16,235	10,592	26,827

[388] *Yekaterinburg Izdatel'stvo Uralskogo Universiteta (1995) Sud'ba Raskulachnennikh spetspereselentsev na Ural'ye (1930-1936gg) Vipusk 1 Bank dannikh po regional'noi istorii : Ural v XX vek'ye.* p67.

Appendix 2

Lespromkhozi and les'khozi under the Administration of forest industry of Perm Sovnarkhoz after the reorganisation of the forestry industry in conjunction with the decree of the Soviet of Ministers of the RSFSR of 14 October 1959 (with effect from 10 May 1960)[389]

Lespromkhoz or les'khoz	Location	Composition
Kombinat 'KomiPermLes'		
Veslyanskii LPK	Pos. Ust'-Chernaya, Gai'inskii Raion	Veslyanskoye, V-Chernovskoye, Ust'-Chernovskoye lesnichestva, of Gainskii LPK
Berezovskii LPK	pos. Serebryanka Gai'inskii Raion	Berezovskoye, Bad'inskoye les'va, Gai'inskii LPK
Verkhnye-Kamskii LPK	pos. Kerati Gai'inskii Raion	Misovskoye, Tisherskoye les'va, Gai'inskii LPK
Gai'inskii LPK	C. Gai'ini	Shuminskoye, Gai'inskoye les'va Gai'inskii LK, Vulamskoye les'va Kosinskii LK
Pyatigorskii LPK	pos. V-Staritsi Gai'inskii Raion	Pyatigorskoye les'va, Gai'inskii raion
Sei'vinskii LPK	pos. Sei'va Gai'inskii Raion	Verkhnye-Kamskoye les'va Gai'inskii LK
Kosinskii LPK	*c. Kosa Kosinskii Raion*	*Kosinskoye, Solymskoye, Chazovskoye les'va, Kosinskii LK*

[389] *Oblastnoye Upravleniye Lesnogo Khozyaistva Molotovskogo Ispolkom Sovietov Deputatov Trudeshchikhsa Glavnogo Upravleniye Lesov Urala Ministerstva Lesnogo Khozyaistva 1934-60g.* Perm State Archive F554 O1 L4-11

Kochevskii LPK	c. Kochevo Kochevskii Raion	Lologskoye les'va, Kosinskii LK, Kochevskoye les'va, Yurlinskii LK
Varishanskii LPK	pos. Marato Kochevskii Raion	Varishano-Churakovskoye les'va, Kosinskii LK
Verkh-Kosinskii LPK	c. Verkh-Kosa Yurlinskii Raion	V-Kosinskoye les'va, Yurlinskii LK
Velvinskii LPK	pos. Velva Kudymkarskii Raion	Verkh-Velvinskoye, Oshibskoye les'va, Kudymkarskii Lk
Yurlinskii LPK	c. Yurla Yurlinskii Raion	Syuz'vinskoye, Yurlinskoye, Lopanskoye les'va, Yurlinskii LK
Mamkovskii LPK	c. Mamkovo Kudymkarskii Raion	Kuvinskoye, V-In'venskoye les'va, Kudymkarskii LK
Tukachevskii LPK	pos. Tukachevo Yus'vinskii Raion	Timinskoye les'va, Kudymkarskii LK
Kudymkarskii LK	g.Kudymkar Kudymkarskii Raion	Kudymkarskoye, Verkh-Yus'vinskoye, Yus'vinskoye les'va, Kudymkarskii LK
Krokhalevskii LPK	c. Krokhalevo Yus'vinskii Raion	Kuprosskoye les'va, Kudymkarskii LK
Gorodishchenskii LPK	pos.Gorodishchye	Pozhevskoye les'va, Chermozskii LK
Pozhevskii LPK	pos. Pozhva Yus'vinskii Raion	Mai'korskoye les'va, Chermozskii LK
Kombinat 'UralZapadLes'		
Kolvinskii LK	c. Nibor	V-Kolvinskoye, Visherskoye, Korepinskoye, Vizhaiskoye, Berezovskoye, Niborskoye, Niz'vanskoye les'va, Kolvinskii LK
Cherdinskii LK	g. Cherdin'	Pil'venskoye, Bondyuzhskoye,

		Timsherskoye, Cherdinskoye, Kamskoye, Kolvinskoye les'va, Cherdinskii LK
Vaiiskii LPK	*pos. Vaya Krasnovisherskii Raion*	*Kutimskoye, Velsovskoye les'va, Krasnovisherskii LK*
Shugorskii LPK	pos. Malii Shugor Krasnovisherskii Raion	Shugorskoye, Akchimskoye, Govorlinskoye les'va, Krasnovisherskii LK
Krasnovisherskii LPK	g. Krasnovishersk Krasnovisherskii Raion	Krasnovisherskoye, Pesganskoye, N-Yaz'vinskoye, V-Yaz'vinskoye les'va Krasnovisherskii LK & Visherskoye les'va Cherdinskii LK
Solikamskii LK	g. Solikamsk Solikamskii Raion	Solikamskoye, Ul'vinskoye, Moshevskoye, Vil'vinskoye, Parmskoye, Ural'skoye les'va, Solikamskii LK
Verkh-Yazvinskii LPK	station. Yaz'va Sverdlovsk Railways	V-Yazvinskoye les'va, Solikamskii LK, Alexandrovskoye, Yaivenskoye, Tapil'skoye les'va Alexandrovskii LK
Bereznikovskii LPK	g. Berezniki Bereznikovskii Raion	Prigorodnoye, Romanovskoye, Bereznikovskoye les'va Bereznikovskii LK
Shemeinii LPK	pos. Shemeinii Bereznikovskii Raion	V-Kondisskoye, Piskorskoye, Tamanskoye les'va Bereznikovskii LK
Ivakinskii LPK	station Vsyevolodo-Vil'va Sverdlovsk Railways	Bulatovskoye les'va, Kiz'elovskii LK
Kiz'elovskii LK	g. Kiz'el	Kiz'elovskoye, Kospashskoye, Shirokovskoye, Ygleuralskoye

		les'va Kiz'elovskii LK, Melkovskoye, Troitskoye & Lun'evskoye les'va, Alexandrovskii LK
Chermozskii LPK	g. Chermoz Il'yinskii Raion	Chermozskoye, Karginskoye les'va, Chermozskii LK
Kos'vinskii LPK	pos. Chelva Dobryanskii Raion	Peremskoye, Ust'-Kos'vinskoye, Nikylinkoye les'va, Kos'vinskii LK
Vivenskii LPK	g. Gubakha	Milkovskoye les'va Dobryanskii LK, Gubakhinskoye les'va, Kiz'elovskii LK
Nizhnye-Lukhovskii LPK	pos. N.-Lukh Dobryanskii Raion	Nizhnye-Lukhovskoye les'va, Kos'vinskii LK
Taborskii LPK	pos. Vil'va Dobryanskii Raion	Golubyatskoye les'va, Dobryanskii LK, Taborskoye les'va, Kos'vinskii LK
Teplogorskii LPK	Station Teplaya Gora Sverdlovsk Railways	Verkhnye-Us'venskoye, Teplogorskoye les'va, Pashiiskii LK
Pashiiskii LPK	Station Pashnya Chusovskii Raion	Vizhaiskoye & Bassegskoye les'va, Pashiiskii LK, Vil;venskoye les'va, Chusovskii LK
Biserskii LPK	Station Biser Sverdlovsk Railways	Biserskoye les'va, Pashiiskii LK
Chusovskii LPK (immediately subordinate to the Forestry Admin)	g. Chusovoi	Chusovskoye, Koivinskoye, N-Us'vinskoye, Vsyevyatskoye les'va Chusovskii LK; Srednye-Us'vinskoye les'va Kiz'elovskii LK; Kus'ye-Alexandrovskoye les'va,

		Pashiiskii LK
Trust 'PriKamLes'		
Permsko-Ilyinskii LPK	c.Ilyinskoye Ilyinskii Raion	Nerdvinskoye, Rozhd'estvenskoye, Ilyinskoye les'va, P-Ilyinskii LK
Dobryanskii LPK	g. Dobryanka	Visimskoye, Dobraynskoye, Shemetevskoye, Polazinskoye, Kukhtimskoye les'va, Dobraynskii LK
Sivinskii LPK	c. Siva Sivinskii Raion	Fabrichnoye, Sivinskoye, Novo-Mikhsilovskoye, Kis'vinskoye, Sepichevskoye, Vereshchaginskoye, Karagaiskoye les'va, Sivinskii LK
Prigorodnii LK	g. Perm'	Gorodskoye, Verkhnye-Kurinskoye, N-Kurinskoye, Motovilikhinskoye, Permskoye, Levshinskoye, Gaivinskoye les'va, Prigorodnii LK; Kultayevskoye, Nitvenskoye, Krasnokamskoye, Grigor'yevskoye & Yugovskoye les'vs, Permskii LK
Komarikhinskii LPK	Station Komarikhinskaya Sverdlovsk Railways	Komarikhinskoye, Lyadovskoye les'va, Gorodkovskii LK
Vetlyanskii LPK	pos. Vetlyani Chusovskii Raion	Vetlyanskoye les'va, V-Gorodkovskii LK
Troitsii LPK	pos. Ilyicha V-Mullinskii Raion	Troitskoye, Permsko-Cherginskoye les'va, V-

		Gorodkovskii LK
Shumpanskii LPK	pos. Shumpanka Chusovskii Raion	V-Gorodkovskoye les'va Gorodkovskii LK
Kinovskii LPK	Station Kin Sverdlovsk Railways	Kinovskoye, Kumishanskoye les'va, Lis'venskii LK
Lis'venskii LPK	Station Nevidimka Sverdlovsk Railways	Lis'venskoye, Soinskoye les'va, Lis'venskii LK
Asovskii LPK	pos. Lomovka Lis'venskii Raion	Matveyevkoye les'va Lis'venskii LK
Kungurskii LPK	g. Kungur	Kungurskoye, Kalininskoye, Turskoye, Ordinskoye les'va, Kungurskii LK
Bizyarskii LPK	pos. Kukushtan	Anninskoye les'va, Kungurskoye LK, Kukushtanskoye les'va, Permskii LK
Okhanksii LPK	g. Okhansk	Okhanskoye, Ocherskoye, Yugo-Kamskoye, Bol;shye- Sosnovskoye, Rozhdestvenskoye, Andreeveskoye, Chernovskoye les'va, Okhanskii lk
Osinskii LPK	g. Osa	Belyaevskoye, Gorskoye, Chastinskoye, Krilovskoye, Osinskoye les'va, Osinskii LK
Kordonskii LPK	Station Kordon Sverdlovsk Railways	Kishertskoye, Kordonskoye, Suksunskoye, Berezovskoye les'va, Kishertskii LK
Gorodkovskii LPK	pos, Tchaikovskii	Stepanovskoye, Nozhovskoye, Dybrobskoye, Galevskoye, Mikhailovskoye, Chernushinskoye, Fokinskoye les'va, Saigatskii LK

Uinskii LPK	Station Kueda Kazanskii Railway	Kuedinskoye, Chernushinskoye, Bardimskoye, Sarashevskoye, Osh'inskoye, V-Usinskoye les'va, Kuedinskii LK; Uinskoye les'va, Shchuch'ye- Ozerskii LK
Shchuch'ye-Ozerskii LPK	Station Shchuch'ye-Ozero Kazanskii Railways	Chernushinskoye, Ol'khovskoye, Chadskoye, Tyuino-Ozerskoye les'va, Shchuch'ye-Ozerskii LK.

Appendix 3

On the basis of the decree of Perm Administration of forest management and protection of 19 November 1965 (No 20), forestry in Perm was reorganised into the following constituent parts.[390]

1 Veslyanskii LK (pos. Ust'-Chernaya) - detached from Gainskii
V-Chernovskoye, Veslyanskoye, U-Chernovskoye, Berezovskoye, Bad'inskoye les'va
2 Gai'inskii LK (p. Gai'ini) Misovskoye, Timsherskoye, Shuminskoye, Gainskoye, Burlamskoye, Pyatigorskoye, Verkhnye-Kamskoye les'va
3 Cherdinskii LK (g. Cherdin')
Pil'venskoye, Bondyuzhskoye, Timsherskoye, Cherdinskoye, Kamskoye, Kolvinskoye les'va
4 Kolvinskii LK (pos. Nibor)
Niborskoye, Nizvenskoye, Visherskoye, Korepinskoye, Berezovskoye, Vizhaiskoye, V-Kolvinskoye les'va
5 Krasnovisherskii LK (g.Krasnovishersk)
Krasnovisherskoye, Peschanskoye, N-Yazvinskoye, V-Yazvinskoye, Visherskoye, Govorlivskoye, Shugorskoye les'va
6 Vaiiskii LK (pos. Mutikha) - detached from Krasnovisherskii
Akchimskoye, Kutimskoye, Velsovskoye ;les'va
7 Yurlinskii LK (c. Yurla)
Kochevskoye, Lologskoye, V-Kosinskoye, Yurlinskoye, Syuz'vinskoye, Lopanskoye les'va.
8 Kosinskii LK (c. Kosa)
Kosinskoye, Solymskoye, Chazevskoye, Varishano-Churakovskoye les'va
9 Solikamskii LK (g. Solikamsk)
Solikamskoye, Moshevskoye, Vilvenskoye, Parmskoye, Uralskoye, Ul'vinskoye les'va
10 Yaivainskii LK (pos. Yaiva) - formerly Alexandrovskii
V-Yaivinskoye, Yaivinskoye, Alexandrovskoye, Bulatovskoye.
11 Kudymkarskii LK (g. Kudymkar)

Kuvinskoye, V-Invenskoye, Kudymkarskoye, V-Yus'vinskoye, Oshibskoye, V-Velvinskoye.

12 Yus'vinskii LK (c. Yus'va) - detached from Kudymkarskii

Yus'vinskoye, Timenskoye, Pozhvinskoye, Kuprosskoye, Maikorskoye les'va

13 Bereznikovskii LK (g. Berezniki)

V-Kondasskoye, Piskorskoye, Tamanskoye, Prigorodnoye, Romanovskoye, Bereznikovskoye les'va

14 Kiz'elovskii LK (g. Kiz'el)

Kiz'elovskoye, Kospashskoye, Shirokovskoye, Ugleuralskoye, Melkovskoye, Luh'evskoye, Troitskoye, Gubakhinskoye les'va

15 Sivinskii LK (c. Siva)

Fabrichnoye, Sivinskoye, N-Mikhailovskii, Kiz'vinskoye, Sepichevskoye, Vereshchaginskoye, Ukaragaiskoye les'va

16 Ilyinskii LK (c. Ilyinskoye)

Nerdvinskoye, Rozhdestvenskoye, Chermozskoye, Karginskoye, Ilyinskoye les'va.

17 Taborskii LK (pos. Vil'va) - formerly Kos'vinskii)

N-Lukhovskoye, U-Kos'vinskoye, Nikulinskoye, Permskoye, Milkovskoye, Taborskoye, Golubryatskoye les'va.

18 Dobryanskii LK (g. Dobryanka)

Kukhtimskoye, Bisimskoye, Dobryanskoye, Shemetevskoye, Palazninskoye, Vetlyanskoye les'va.

19 Chusovskii LK (g. Chusovoi)

Ust'-Koivinskoye, Vsyevyatskoye, Us-Alexandrovskoye, Srednye-Us'vinskoye, Nizhnye-Us'vinskoye, Chusovskoye, Vil'vinskoye les'va.

20 Vizhaiskii LK (pos. Pashnya)

Vizhaiskoye, Bassegskoye, Teplogorskoye, V-Us'vinskoye, Biserskoye les'va.

21 Okhanskii LK (g. Okhansk)

Okhanskoye, Ocherskoye, Yugo-Kamskoye, Bol'shye-Sosnovskoye, Rozhdestvenskoye, Andreevskoye, Chernovskoye les'va.

22 Permskii LK (g. Perm')

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[390] ibid. L13-20

Gorodskoye, V-Kur'inskoye, N-Kur'inskoye, Motovilikhinskoye, Permskoye, Levshinskoye, Gfaivinskoye, Nitvenskoye, Grigor'evskoye, Krasnokamskoye, Kultayevskoye, Yugovskoye les'va.

23 Komarikhinskii LK (Station Komarikhinskaya) - became Verkhnye-Gorodkovskim

V-Gorodkovskoye, Komapikhinskoye, Lyadovskoye, Troitskoye, P-Cerginskoye les'va.

24 Lis'venskii LK (g. Lis'va)

Lis'venskoye, Soinskoye, Kinovskoye, Kumishanskoye, Matveevskoye, Kopmovishchenskoye les'va.

25 Osinskii LK (g. Osa)

Belyayevckoye, Gorskoye, Chastinskoye, Krilovskoye, Osinskoye les'va.

26 Kungurskii LK (g. Kungur)

Kungurskoye, Kalininskoye, Turskoye, Ordinskoye, Uinskoye, Anninskoye, Kukushtanskoye les'va.

27 Kishertskii LK (c.. Kishert')

Kishertskoye, Kordonskoye, Suksunskoye, Berezovskoye les'va.

28 Tchaikovskii LK (g. Tchaikovskii) - formerly Saigatskii

Stepanovskoye, Nozhovskoye, Dubrovskoye, Galevskoye, Mikhailovskoye, Chernushinskoye, Fokinskoye les'va.

29 Kuedinskii LK (c. Kueda)

Osh'inskoye, B-Usinskoye, Chernushinskoye, Kuedinskoye, Sarashevskoye, Bardimskoye les'va.

30 Oktyabrinskii LK (Shch-Ozero) - formerly Shchuch'ye-Ozerskii

Shchuch'ye-Ozerskoye, Ol'khovskoye, Chadskoye, Tyuino-Ozerskoye les'va.

Appendix 4

Between 1989 and 1994, under the name and within the structure of the TPC 'PermLesProm' were

1 KamLesoSplav (Production Complex)

1.1 Kamskii Rafting Office

1.1.1 U-Urol'skii Raid

1.1.2 U-Yazvinskii Raid

1.1.3 Obvinskii s/k (sovkhoz)

1.1.4 V-Kamskii s/k

1.1.5 Kosinskii s/k

1.1.6 Kerchevskii Raid

1.1.7 Ryabinskii Raid

1.1.8 Tyul'kinskii Raid

1.1.9 Orlinskii Raid

1.1.10 In'venskii KLP (forest production Kombinat)

1.1.11 Chermozskii Raid

1.1.12 Osinskii LPK

Branches

Novoil'inskii Forest-Technology School

V-Gorodkovskii Raid

2 'VolgoLesoSplav' Production Complex

2.1 Kuibishevskii Raid

2.1.1 Saratovskii raid

2.1.2 Astrakhanskii Raid

2.1.3 Volgogradskii Raid

2.1.4 Mezhdurechenskii LPK

2.1.5 N-Kamskii Raid

Branch

Tol'yattinskii Raid

3 'PermLesRemTechnika' Production Complex

3.1 Permskii

3.1.1 Gai'inskii

3.1.2 Dobryanskii

3.1.3 Balatovskii

3.1.4 Kudymkarskii

3.1.5 Kungurskii

3.1.6 Chusovskii

3.1.7 Zakamskii Repair Centres

4 'KomiPermLes' Production Complex

4.1 Kudymkarskii LPK

4.1.1 Velvinskii

4.1.2 Verkhnekosinskii

4.1.3 Yurlinskii

4.1.4 Verishanskii

4.1.5 Kochevskii

4.1.6 Samkovskii

4.1.7 Gorodishchenskii

4.1.8 V-Kamskii LPK

4.1.9 Pyatigorskii

4.1.10 Berezovskii

4.1.11 Veslyanskii

4.1.12 Gai'inskii

4.1.13 Chernovskii

4.1.14 Seivinskii

4.1.15 Kudymkarskii KMTS

4.1.16 Kudymkarskii LTP

Branch

Kudymkarskii KTSh

5 'ChusovLes' Production Complex

5.1 Chusovskoi KLPK

5.1.1 Us'vinskii KLPK

5.1.2 Vizhaiskii

5.1.3 Teplogorskii

5.1.4 Biserskii

5.1.5 Pashiiskii

5.1.6 Verkheyaivinskii

5.1.7 Ivakinskii

5.1.8 Baskovskii

5.1.9 Komarikhinskii

5.1.10 Kormovishchenskii

5.1.11 Kinovskii

5.1.12 Kordonskii

Branch

Chusovskaya LTSh

6 'PermDrev' Production Complex

6.1 Separate apparatus of administration

6.1.1 Permskii DSK

6.1.2 Kombinat 'Krasniy Oktyabr'

6.1.3 Yaivinskii DSK

6.1.4 Dobryanskii DSK

6.1.5 Lyaminskii DSK

6.1.6 Novoil'inskii LPK

6.1.7 Permskii forest factory

7 'PermLes' Production Complex

7.1 Zakamskii LPK

7.1.1 Sh-Ozerskii LPK

7.1.2 Sivinskii KLPK

7.1.3 Bisyarskii LPK

7.1.4 Dobryanskii KLPK

7.1.5 Taborskii LPK

7.1.6 Kungurskoye LTU (Forest Technology College)

7.1.7 Dobryanskii LTSh (Forest Technology School)

8 'PermMebel''

8.1 Bakharevskaya furniture factory

8.1.1 Factory 'Druzhba'

8.1.2 Zakamskaya furniture factory

8.1.3 Kungurskii LMK

8.1.4 V-Kamskaya furniture factory 'Sport'

Branches

Yugovskaya furniture factory

Kukushtanskaya furniture factory

9 Plywood Kombinat

10 PKMTS (Perm Office of Material Technical Supply)

11 PKTB (Project Construction Technical Bureau)

12 PTUS

13 Apparatus for the union

Branches

Solikamskaya KMTS

Kudymkarskoye PKTB

Structure in 1991

Association 'KomiPermLes'

Economic association 'ChusovLes'

Teplogorskii KLPK

Biserskii KLPK

Pashiiskii KMP

Chusovskaya LTSh

Zakamskaya LPK

Bizyarskii LPK

Sivinskii LPK

Shchuch'ye-Ozerskii LPK

Dobryanskii KLPK

Taborskii KLPK

V-Yaivinskii KLPK

Kordonskii KLPK

Kinovskii KLPK

Us'vinskii KLPK

Vizhaiskii LPK

Kormovishchenskii KLPK

Baskovskii KLPK

Ivakinskii KLPK

Komarikhinskii KLPK

Kungurskoye LTU (Forest Technology College)

Dobryanskaya LTSh (Forest Technology School)

Kungurskii Lesotechnikum

KudymkarsKii Lesotechnikum

Krasnokamskii cellulose-paper technikum

Lesokombinat 'Krasniy Oktyabr'

Permskii DSK (Housebuilding Kombinat)

Yaivinskii DSK (Housebuilding kombinat)

Dobryanskii DSK (Housebuilding kombinat)

Novoil'inskii LPK

Permskii Lesozavod

Association 'PermMebel''

Kamskii cellulose-paper kombinat

Permskii cellulose-paper kombinat

Collective enterprise 'Permskii plywood Kombinat'

Leased company 'PKTB Les'

Kudymkarskoye PKTB (project-construction technological bureau)

Permskaya KMTS (office of material-technical supply)

State repair-building firm 'Svyazist'

Association 'PermRemLesTechnika'

TPO 'PermLesTorg'

Administration 'KomiPermLesTorg'

Small enterprises

Co-operative.

Appendix 5

The Closure of Rivers of Perm' Oblast to timber rafting in the 1990s
In accordance with resolution No. 384 of the RSFSR, 25th September 1987

River to be closed to timber rafting	River of which it is a tributary	Date of closure to timber rafting.
Kozd'	Kosa	21.09.1989
Lopan	Kosa	06.07.1987
Ul'vich	Yaiva	27.07.1988
Yum	Kosa	06.07.1988
Syurol	Kosa	06.07.1988
Chusovaya	Kama	1988
Vil'va	Chusovaya	05.10.1988
Kama	Volga	End of 1995
Veslyana	Kama	Period extended until 1998
Visherka	Kolva	End of 1995
Berezovaya	Kolva	End of 1995
Chus	Kama	20.09.1989
Lolog	Kosa	Period extended until 1998
Yanver	Kosa	21.09.1989
Velva	In'va	End of 1995
Obva	Kama	1992
Chan'va	Yaiva	27.07.1988
Kad'	Yaiva	End of 1995
Usolka	Yaiva	11.08.1988
Chikman	Yaiva	1988
Kosa	Kama	Period extended until 1998
Kolva	Vishera	End of 1995
Vishera	Kama	End of 1995
Yaz'va	Vishera	15.09.1990
Yaiva	Kama	End of 1995
Bolshaya Vaya	Vishera	1990
Malii Shugor	Vishera	1990
Akchim	Vishera	1990
Uls	Vishera	30.08.1991
Govorukha	Vishera	19.09.1988
Vels	Vishera	30.08.1991
Pil'va	Kama	End of 1995
Yuzhnaya Kel'tma	Kama	End of 1995
Glukhaya Vil'va	Yav'va	10.10.1988
Chernaya	Veslyana	1987
In'va	Kama	27.09.1990
Kos'va	Kama	Period extended until 2000
Yu. Kondas	Kama	28.08.1988
P. Kondas	Kama	11.10.1989

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Godoviye Otcheti po Mekhanicheskomu dvizheniyu naseleniya za 1950-1957g po g.Perm' i Permskoi Oblasti. Ob'yasneniye k itogam razrabotki materialov mekhanicheskogo dvizheniya naseleniya za 1956g. po g. Molotovu i oblasti. 20.6.1957, Nachal'nik Statupravleniya RSFSR B.T. Kolpakovu. PSA Fr-493 O11 D19 L8-13

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Permskii Sovnarkhoz Upravleniye Lesnoi Promishlennosti (1962) Plan Drevesnoi I Kystarnikovoi Rastitel'nosti chasti Salimskogo Lesnichestva Kosinskogo Lespromkhoza I Prilegayushchikh zemel' drugikh zemlepol'zovatelei I zone zatopleniya Kamsko-vichegodsko-pechorskogo vodnogo soyeineniya Permskoi Oblast' PSA

Permskogo Sovnarkhoza v Kosinskom Leskhoz'ye Permskoi Oblasti (1958) Zapiska po Obosnovanniyu Zakreplenuya lesosir'evoi bazi dlya Kochevskogo lesopromkhoza kombinata 'Komipermles'. PSA R-554 O3 D100

Permskoye Oblastnoye Upravleniye Lesnogo Khozyaistvo Materiali (Akti, Skhemi, Dogovri, Perepiska) ob o-bod'ye lesnikh ploshchadie iz sostavi gosudarstvennogo lesnogo fonda lespromkhozami v Kosinskom leskhoz'ye Permskoi Oblasti 14 Oktyabr 1949 - Aprel' 1952. PSA Fr-554 O3 D32 L1-12

Resheniye Krasnovisherskogo raionnogo Sovieta deputatov trudyashchikhsya Permskoi Oblasti, ot 25 dekabr 1959g. 'O khod'ye vipolneniya resheniya p-i sessii raionnogo Sovieta deputatov trudyashchikhsya "O merakh po ulucheniyu bitovogo obsluzhivaniya naseleniya raiona"'PSA Fr-564 O3 D871 L7-10

Spisok Lesnikh Poselkov Predpriyatii Vsesoyuznogo Lesopromishlennogo Ob'yedineniya Permlesprom po sostoyaniyu 1.10.1976g. (Authorized by Nachal'nik Otdela Zhilishchno-Kommunal'nogo Khozyaistva I bita Ob'yedineniya, F.S. Koslov) PSA Fr-1328 O1 D3016 L1-19

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Itogi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959 (posle mashinnoi razrabotki) PSA Fr-493 O19 D8 L7-8

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Otdel Statistiki Truda, Zarplati, Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya I Kulturi. Perescheti po Permskoi Oblasti yestyestvennogo I mekhanicheskogo dvizheniya naseleniya za 1927-1939g PSA Fr493 O11 D1 L47-49

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Otdel Truda, Kulturi, Naseleniya I Zdravookhraneniya. Spiski Sel'skikh Naselennikh Punktov Kosinskogo raiona na 1.1.1972g I chislennost' naseleniya v nikh PSA Fr-493 O11 D 1256 L321-323

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Otdel Truda, Kulturi, Naseleniya I Zdravookhraneniya. Spiski Sel'skikh Naselennikh Punktov na 1.1.1972g i Chislennost' naseleniya v nikh. PSA Fr-493 O11 D1256 L172-186

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya I Kulturi Spisok Sovietov Permskoi Oblasti Pereschitannikh v granitsakh raionov na 1 yanvarya 1968g. PSA Fr-493 O11 D820 L14

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Truda Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya I Kulturi. Otcheti po yestyestvennomu i mekhanicheskomu dvizheniya naseleniya Permskoi Oblasti za 1957-59g. PSA Fr-493 O11 D22 L146-147

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti Sektor Statistiki Truda, Naseleniya, Zdravookhraneniya i Kulturi. Itogi Godoviye Razrabotok po Mekhanicheskomu Dvizheniyu za 1941, 42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49g. Spisok Gorodov I rabochikh poselkov, vklyuchennikh v razrabotki materiala mekhanicheskogo dvizheniya naseleniya za 1-e polugodiye 1944g. Zam.

Upolnomochennogo Gosplana pri SNK SSSR po Molotovskoi Oblasti - Meshavkin. Nachal'nik Sektora Naseleniya i Zdravookhraneniya - Loz'ye. PSA Fr-493 O11 D5

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Spiski Sel'skikh Naselennikh Ounktov Permskoi Oblast na 1967g. PSA Fr-493 O11 D818 L117-131

Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Spiski Naselennikh Punktov Permskoi Oblasti na 1967g. PSA Fr-493 O11 D818 L302-304

Trest 'Komipermles' 'Glavvostlesa' g. Kudymkar, Molotovskoi Oblasti (1948) Ob'yasnitel'naya Zapiska Glavnogo Bukhaltera k otchetu po Eksploatatsionnoi deyatel'nosti za 1948g. PSA Fr-1074 O1 D83 L116-117

Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Chislennost' Nalichnogo I Postoyannogo naseleniya po kazhdomu sel'skomu naselennomu punktu Permskoi Oblasti (predvaritel'niye itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1970g) Centyabr 1970g. g.Perm' PSA Fr-493 O19 D103 L237-241

Ts.S.U RSFSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1959g. Raspredeleniye Naseleniya po polu I vozrastu I chislo lits, sostoyashchikh v brak'ye po Permskoi Oblasti (sel'skoye naseleniya) na 1.1.1968. g.Perm'. PSA Fr-463 O19 D15 L270-272

Ts.S.U SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Chislennost' Nalichnogo I Postoyannogo Naseleniya po kazhdomu sel'skomu naselennomu punktu Permskoi Oblasti (Krasnovisherskii Raion) (Predvaritel'niye itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1970g). PSA Fr-493 O19 D103 L103-108

Ts.S.U SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Statisticheskii Byulleten' predvaritel'niye itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda. PSA Fr-493 O19 D102 L27

Ts.S.U SSSR Otdel Statistiki naseleniya i zdravookhraneniya. Peredvizheniye naseleniya za 1957 god. RSFSR Permskaya Oblast' PSA Fr-493 O11 D19 L1-2

Ts.S.U SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Statisticheskii Byullenten'. Predvaritel'niye Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi naseleniya 1970goda. Iyun' 1970 g.Perm' PSA Fr-493 O19 D102 L38

Ts.S.U SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye, Permskoi Oblasti. Statisticheskii Byulleten'. Chislennost' Nalichnogo Naseleniya Sel'skikh Naselennikh Mest s Ukazaniyem chislenno preobladayushchei natsional'nosti 30.5.1960. PSA Fr-493 O19 D10 L196-198

Ts.S.U. RSFSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda. Raspredeleniye naseleniya po natsional'nosti I chislennosti lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiya po c.Kosa Kosinskogo raiona Komi-Permyatskogo natsional'nogo okruga Permskoi Oblasti na 15 yanvarya 1970goda. PSA Fr-493 O19 D138 L139

Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniya 1970 goda raspredeleniye naseleniya po natsional'nosti I chislennost lits, imeyushchikh zanyatiye po raionam, gorsovietamn, gorodam, PGT I sel'skim raitsentram, Permskoi Oblasti na 15.1.1970 PSA Fr-493 O19 D138 L79-80

Ts.S.U. SSSR Statisticheskoye Upravleniye Permskoi Oblasti. Statisticheskii Byulleten'. Chislennost' Nalichnogo Naseleniya Sel'skikh Naselennikh Mest s Ukazaniyem Chislenno Preobladayushchem Natsional'nosti 30.5.1960. PSA Fr-493 O19 D10 L90-93

Tsentral'noye Statisticheskoye Upravleniye pri Soviet'ye Ministrov SSSR. Chislennost' naseleniya SSSR po Perepisi na 15.1.1959 goda, po respublikam, krayam, oblastyam, natsional'nim okrugam, raionam, gorodam, poselkam gorodskogo tipa, raionnim tsentram I krupnim sel'skim naselennim mestam. Moskva 1960 PSA Fr-493 O 19 D 5 L219-223

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Ts.S.U Gosplana SSSR Otdel Demografii. Svedeniya o peredvizhenii naseleniya po mestu-otkuda pribili i kuda vibili.

Za g.1943, RSFSR, Molotov. PSA Fr-493 O11 D5 L71
Za g.1944, RSFSR, Molotov. PSA Fr-493 O11 D5 L50
Za g.1945, RSFSR, Molotov. PSA Fr-493 O11 D5 L44
Za g.1946, RSFSR, Molotov. PSA Fr-493 O11 D5 L38
Za g.1947, RSFSR, Molotov. PSA Fr-493 O11 D5 L28
Za g.1948, RSFSR, Molotov. PSA Fr-493 O11 D5 L20
Za g.1949, RSFSR, Molotov. PSA Fr-493 O11 D5 L2-3

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Administratsiya Kosinskogo Raiona Utverzhdennaya chislennost' postoyannogo naseleniya Komi-Permyatskogo avtonomnogo okruga po sostoyaniyu na 1 yanvarya 1990-1997

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Raion Administration, Kosinskii Raion, Nachal'nik V.I. Kuznetsova. Composition of the Population of Kosinskii raion by age, sex and location, 1995.

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Ukaz Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsi O Besplatnom predostavlenii zemel'nikh uchastkov dlya individual'nogo zhilishchnogo stroitel'stva grazhdanam, viyezhayushchim iz raionov Krainego Severa i priravnennikh k nim mestnostei. 2.2.1996 No.135

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Pravitel'stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Postanovleniye O dopolnitel'nikh merakh gosudarstvennoi podderzhki po obespecheniyu zhil'em grazhdan, viyezhayushchikh iz raionov Krainego Severa i priravnennikh k nim mestnostei 17.7.1996 N.872

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Federal'niye Zakon RF Ob otsrochk'ye pogasheniya zadolzhennosti po pereoformlennim v gosudarstvennii vnutrennii dolg Rossiiskoi Federatsii tsentralizirovannim kreditam, nachislennim po nim protsentam otdel'nim organizatsiyam agropromishlennogo kompleksa, a takzhe organizatsiyam, osushchestvlyayushchim zavoz (khraneniye i realizatsiyu) produkstii (tovarov) v raioni Krainego Severa i priravnenniye k nim mestnosti, i viplati protsentov za obsluzhivaniye gosudarstvennogo vnutrennego dolga Rossiiskoi Federatsii po ukazannoi zadolzhennosti. 10 iyun' 1997

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Acknowledgements

This research was funded by a Research Studentship from the Economic and Social Research Council, and the Mortimer May Senior Scholarship at Hertford College, Oxford. Fieldwork was supported by the ESRC, by Oxford University Graduate Studies Board, and by Hertford College.

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr Judith Pallot, and also Alexander Ziryanov, (Dean of the Faculty of Geography), Inna Ilyinikh, (research student), and Raisa Kuznetsova, at Perm' State University; Alexei Novikov at the Centre for Credit Rating in Moscow; Nikolai Petrov at the Moscow Carnegie Centre; V. I. Rogal'nikov (Head of Forestry Department), Yevdakia Kolegova (Department of Forestry), A.N. Dyagilev (Representative of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug) and Sergei Merkushev, at Perm' Oblast Administration; Sergei Filatov (Vaya sel'soviet), Nikolai Klementev (Economist, Krasnovishersk Administration); Olga Ziryanova; Svetlana and Stepan Nikitasenko; Svetlana and Vartan Shahgedanov; Yevdakia Ginsmann; Valentina and Maria Ilyinikh; Viktor, proprietor of *'Dom Sporta'* in Krasnovishersk; John Hobart; and, especially, the people of Solym and Vaya.