Would-be great powers, status, and stigma: the case of Brazil, 1970-1979

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Abstract

This thesis critically engages the dominant theoretical account of would-be great power status-seeking behaviour in International Relations (IR), namely Larson and Shevchenko's social identity theory (SIT) framework. This critical engagement involves bringing the SIT framework into dialogue with a literature that it has hitherto neglected: the emerging scholarship on stigma in IR. Through this dialogical synthesis, I make two theoretical arguments.

First, I argue that the SIT account of would-be great power status-seeking has theoretically overemphasised the extent to which these states strive for 'positive distinctiveness' because of their 'need for distinctive identities' in their quest for higher status. This overemphasis has overshadowed another crucial drive animating these states' attempts to move up the international pecking order. I contend that this has led to neglect of the other principal motive, which I draw from the literature on stigma, relating to desires by these actors to be seen and accepted as 'normal'. Thus, in contrast to the one-dimensional account offered by the dominant SIT framework, I suggest that would-be great power status-seeking is Janus-faced, animated both by a desire to be positively distinct and by attempts to be seen and accepted as 'normal'. I develop a new conceptual framework to account for this dualistic conception of status.

Second, I attempt to theorise the effects that being stigmatised as 'underdeveloped' has on would-be great powers' quest for higher status. I suggest that being stigmatised as such makes these states extremely wary, bordering on paranoid, of any sort of relationship of political and economic dependence, and that this mindset powerfully shapes their quest for higher standing in world politics. I substantiate these claims using original archival research based on Brazil's near-brush with great power status in the 1970s in the face of underdevelopment.

List of abbreviations

CPDOC	Centre for Research and Documentation of the Contemporary History of Brazil (*Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil*).
FGV	Getúlio Vargas Foundation (*Fundação Getúlio Vargas).*
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding.
MRE	Brazilian Foreign Ministry (*Ministério das Relações Exteriores)*, commonly known as Itamaraty.
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement.
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
NSD	National Security Doctrine.
SIT	Social identity theory.
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organisation.

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Introduction

One of the foremost subjects of debate in the academic discipline of International Relations (IR) over the past two decades has been that of 'would-be great powers'.[1] A significant number of powers have had this label cast upon them, most notably the 'BRICS' (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).[2] States as varied as Turkey,[3] Mexico,[4] and Indonesia,[5] amongst others, have also been occasionally mentioned in the same breath as these other more distinguished would-be great powers in academic and non-academic outlets alike. Much ink has been spilt debating the potential impact these actors might have on international institutions,[6] international aid and development finance,[7] and the normative structure of international society more broadly.[8]

One branch of this broader literature on would-be great power behaviour has come to be concerned with these states' status and their respective status aspirations. It is now well established that these states are 'status seekers',[9] looking to move up the international ladder of stratification and into the great power club. This research agenda has decisively acknowledged that great power status is a distinctly social phenomena requiring recognition and deference from others.[10] In this vein, and contrary to realist scholarship, scholars have

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[1] These actors are often referred to as 'rising powers' but I use the term 'would-be great powers' to identify a type of state with great power aspirations. I elaborate on this preference in Chapter 1. The term 'would-be great powers' comes from Andrew Hurrell, "Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?," *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (2006).

[2] Oliver Stuenkel, *The BRICS and the Future of Global Order*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020); Hurrell, "What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?."

[3] Cemal Burak Tansel, "The Shape of 'Rising Powers' to Come? The Antinomies of Growth and Neoliberal Development in Turkey," *New Political Economy* (2019).

[4] George Friedman, "Mexico has a chance to be the world's 'next great power'," Business Insider, 2016. Available at https://www.businessinsider.com/mexico-could-be-worlds-next-great-power-2016-3?r=US&IR=T.

[5] Evan A. Laksmana, "Indonesia's rising regional and global profile: does size really matter?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* (2011).

[6] Thomas G. Weiss and Adriana Erthal Abdenur, "Introduction: emerging powers and the UN – what kind of development partnership?," *Third World Quarterly* 35, no. 10 (2014).

[7] Michael J. Tierney, "Rising Powers and the Regime for Development Finance," *International Studies Review* 16, no. 3 (2014).

[8] Matthew D. Stephen, "States, Norms and Power: Emerging Powers and Global Order," *Millennium* 42, no. 3 (2014).

[9] Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses to US primacy," *International Security* 34, no. 4 (2010).

[10] Tristen Naylor, *Social Closure and International Society: Status groups from the Family of Civilised Nations to the G20* (London: Routledge, 2018).

argued that there is no 'linear relationship between material power and status'.[11] The historical record supports such an inference, as states with relatively low material capabilities have been granted great power status.[12] France's inclusion in the great power club – despite its relatively low material capabilities – after World War II is the best example of this; France was granted great power status even while other states with significantly more material wherewithal were denied entry to the club.[13] This research has been attentive to status accommodation as a core mechanism to appease status-sensitive would-be great powers in order to ensure their cooperation and collaboration in crucial areas of world politics.[14] Likewise, status denial can lead to conflict.[15] In other words, the question of status recognition and accommodation is a crucial one with huge potential repercussions for our understanding of all aspects of international society.

The puzzle

The most developed theoretical account of managing and accommodating rising and would-be great power status aspirations has come from Larson and Shevchenko's social identity theory (SIT) framework.[16] One of the main theoretical arguments of the SIT-based conceptual framework is that status-seeking would-be great powers have a 'need for distinctive identities' and their status-seeking behaviour therefore consists chiefly of pursuing 'positive distinctiveness' in order to 'maintain [their] distinctive identities'.[17] In more explicit terms, Larson and Shevchenko argue that states 'strive for positive distinctiveness – to be not only different but better'.[18] Most analyses of status in IR – even when critical of SIT – often implicitly or explicitly emulate its theoretical emphasis on states' need to maintain

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[11] Rajesh Basrur and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India: Status and Power* (London: Routledge, 2017), 3.

[12] Gadi Heimann, "What does it take to be a great power? The story of France joining the Big Five," *Review of International Studies* 41, no. 1 (2015).

[13] Ibid.

[14] See, for example, Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers: The role of status concerns," in *Status in World Politics*, ed. T. V. Paul, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers."; T.V. Paul et al., "Status and world order," in *Status in world politics*, ed. T.V. Paul, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); T.V. Paul et al., eds., *Status in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[15] Jonathan Renshon, *Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Michelle Murray, "Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War," *Security Studies* 19, no. 4 (2010); Steven Ward, *Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[16] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers."; Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers."

[17] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 94-95.

[18] Ibid., 68.

distinctive identities and on positive distinctiveness as the principal method and motive for moving up the international ladder of stratification.[19] As a result, these scholars argue, with reference to status recognition and accommodation, that contemporary would-be great powers 'will be more likely to participate in global governance if the United States can find ways to *recognise their distinctive status and identities*'.[20] This SIT-based framework has provided the conceptual groundwork for a huge portion of the status literature in IR,[21] and has emerged as the salient theoretical framework for understanding would-be great power status-seeking more generally.[22] This SIT-inspired framework serves as the central foil of this thesis.

There is another literature developing in IR that has taken a couple of would-be great powers as some of its core cases which this SIT framework has not engaged with,[23] namely the emerging scholarship on stigma. Indeed, there is a strong tension between the core premises of SIT and this literature on stigma in IR.[24] Drawing on Goffman, one of the main claims of this literature on stigma is that some states are seen as 'abnormal' and, as a consequence, a desire to be seen as 'normal' powerfully influences their behaviour. We can see this tension most clearly in the case of Russia. For example, in the post-Cold War era, Larson and Shevchenko are adamant Russia wants to be recognised as a 'great power, not just a "*normal* state"'.[25] In contrast, the literature on stigma and Russia has argued that since the end of the Cold War, Russia has longed to be seen as a 'normal' member of the international community and to cope with its stigma.[26] This is not the only case of a state with great power aspirations trying to simply be recognised as 'normal'. For example, Cooney has argued that Japan's push

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[19] See, for example, Nicola Leveringhaus and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, "Between conformity and innovation: China's and India's quest for status as responsible nuclear powers," *Review of International Studies* 44, no. 3 (2018); Steven Michael Ward, "Lost in Translation: Social Identity Theory and the Study of Status in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 4 (2017); Edward Keene, "Social status, social closure and the idea of Europe as a 'normative power'," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 4 (2013); Marina G. Duque, "Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach," *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2018).

[20] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 66, my emphasis.

[21] Ward, "Lost in Translation," 822.

[22] A small sample of articles drawing directly on SIT's insights include Leveringhaus and de Estrada, "China's and India's quest for status as responsible nuclear powers."; Christina Stolte, *Brazil's Africa Strategy: Role Conception and the Drive for International Status* (New York: Springer, 2015); Emel Parlar Dal, "Status-seeking policies of middle powers in status clubs: the case of Turkey in the G20," *Contemporary Politics* 25, no. 5 (2019).

[23] This is acknowledged in Ward, "Lost in Translation," 832 fn. 27.

[24] Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "Stigma management in international relations: Transgressive identities, norms, and order in international society," *International Organization* 68, no. 1 (2014); Ayşe Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East learned to live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[25] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 79, my emphasis.

[26] Zarakol, *After Defeat*.

for major power status has been powerfully conditioned by 'a quest for normalcy'.[27] This quest stems from Japan's self-identification as a previously abnormal revisionist state which was subsequently willing to intentionally accept some subordination of its own foreign policy during the Cold War. Likewise, in the 1970s, a Brazilian government document posited that ensuring the 'viability of Brazil as a great power' would require the 'entry of Brazil into the developed world'.[28] Here, Brazil, as a developing state, is seemingly not trying to be positively distinct or to maintain its distinctive identity at all, but rather deliberately change and play down one of its main distinguishing characteristics. In line with the literature on stigma, Brazil is trying to overcome its 'abnormal' feature as an underdeveloped state; it is aspiring to become 'normal'. In contrast to SIT, one of the principal claims made by the literature on stigma in IR is that stigmatised states 'seek equal acceptance as "*normal*" states'.[29]

I enter into more precise detail about the literatures on would-be great power status-seeking and stigma in Chapter 1. The puzzle, then, is ascertaining how stigma – hitherto neglected by the dominant account of would-be great power status – might affect, shape, and influence would-be great powers' quest for higher standing in international politics.

Objectives and research questions

This thesis therefore pursues two main objectives. The first is to provide a more comprehensive theoretical account of would-be great power status-seeking behaviour through a synthesis of the SIT-based literature and more recent scholarship on stigma in IR. Conceptually, I am interested in how a consideration of stigma as a factor changes, modifies, and challenges the dominant account of would-be great power status-seeking offered by SIT scholars. I aim to develop a novel and more complete conception of would-be great power status and status-seeking that looks to preserve the valuable insights of the SIT-based conceptual framework while integrating them with the claims of the stigma literature. This is a worthy task given that, as Ward acknowledges,[30] the SIT framework has not had any dialogue with the literature on stigma; nor has the SIT literature considered how standards of abnormality and normality have influenced would-be great power status-seeking despite *prima facie* evidence suggesting these are strong factors shaping these states' behaviour.

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[27] Kevin J. Cooney, *Japan's Foreign Policy Maturation: A Quest for Normalcy* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 186.

[28] Governo do Brasil, "Metas e Bases para Ação de Govêrno," (Brasília: Síntese, 1970), 15.

[29] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 247, my emphasis.

[30] Ward, "Lost in Translation," 832 fn. 27.

Second, I look to move beyond the insight that 'stigma matters' in IR. The aim here is to develop the notion that there are different kinds of stigmas, each of which could potentially inflect and influence the status-seeking of would-be great powers in distinct ways. I theorise one of the most pertinent of these: what I call the 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' stigma, which is a stigma related to a state being labelled or categorised as 'underdeveloped' or 'developing'. The reason this can be considered a type of stigma is because since 1945, 'development' has been the standard of normality that has defined the international system and has thus become one of the main axes of stratification in this system.[31] Being 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' thus implies a certain backwardness and a need to modernise which deviates from this standard of normality. I elaborate on this later in the thesis. Nevertheless, the effects of this stigma are incredibly important to ascertain, because a huge portion of the would-be great powers already mentioned in our discussion fall into this socially-generated category which has been one of the foremost forms of stratification in international society since 1945.[32]

Therefore, the two research questions animating this thesis can be summarised as follows:

1. *How does 'abnormality' (in the form of stigma) influence or shape the status-seeking of would be great powers?*
2. *How does being stigmatised specifically as 'underdeveloped' influence would-be great power status-seeking?*

An initial objection to the inquiry at hand might be to reject 'underdevelopment' as a stigma. Instead, a realist might object that this is just a material weakness, and thus a developing *stigma* adds nothing to our understanding of great power status. The realist would argue that achieving great power status is just a question of alleviating this *material* weakness.

The account developed here is not mutually exclusive with such a criticism, and I am not attempting to dismiss this view outright. I submit, however, that this view misses the deeply social foundations of this supposedly 'material weakness'. Following Zarakol, I understand underdevelopment as a historically contingent and socially-generated category that impacts

[31] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 87-91.

[32] Ibid.

the self-esteem and self-assessment of actors, and not just as a material weakness.[33] Being labelled or cast as underdeveloped or developing, I explain, effectively disqualifies a state from equal treatment precisely because such a label implies a certain backwardness. In other words, this supposedly material weakness creates a sense in these actors themselves that they are socially disqualified from treatment as equals or normal, and this understanding shapes how they go about moving up the international ladder of stratification. In sum, these 'underdeveloped' would-be great powers understand this condition as much in social terms – as a type of social disqualification – as they do in material terms – as a weakness – to the extent that this distinction between the material and the social blurs. Thus, an appreciation of the existence of an 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' stigma better equips us to capture this complexity than does a brute realist analysis.

My argument

The theoretical argument advanced in this thesis is two-pronged, with each prong corresponding to one of the two research questions outlined above.

In response to my first question, I make two contentions. First, what often appears like a would-be great power trying to be positively distinctive can actually just be a case of a would-be great power attempting to distance itself from the very characteristic that makes it abnormal; and second, concerns about stigma powerfully inflect and shape how would-be great powers go about securing recognition for their status aspirations. Indeed, these actors also seek acceptance as 'normals' and not just as positively different. In other words, I am not suggesting that SIT is simply wrong, but rather I am pointing out that SIT-inspired accounts have often been confused and misled by their own framework's theoretical overemphasis on positive distinctiveness and the maintenance of distinctive identities. A consideration of stigma and the two-dimensional nature of would-be great power status-seeking thus allows for new interpretive – and more lucid – insights into the behaviour of these states.

With regards to my second question, I argue that would-be great powers which are stigmatised as 'underdeveloped' are concerned about being cast as a 'abnormal' developing state; in other words, they fear being dismissed as being passive, subordinate, as well as

[33] Ibid.

economically and politically dependent states. These states are therefore paranoid about their development, autonomy, and dependence on external economic markets, and pursue these aims in ways that depart from what one would expect from a pure 'power maximisation' perspective.[34] In contrast, I show that what is as at least as important – if not more so – to these actors is escaping their predicament of being discreditable 'underdeveloped' states. Indeed, these actors see development and autonomy as crucial means through which they are able to avoid the reinforcement and reification of their identities as 'abnormal' underdeveloped states in their quest for higher standing in world politics.

To substantiate these theoretical claims empirically, I draw on original archival research on Brazil's quest for great power status in the 1970s. My reasons for this case selection are outlined in more detail in Chapter 1. This single-case research design follows on from much of the literature on status in IR, which typically uses a single- or small-N to make more general theoretical claims about status-seeking and its associated techniques.[35] I nevertheless pepper this single case with comparisons and contrasts to other 'satellite' cases. I detail my research design and methodology in further depth in Chapter 1. The point for now is that I show that my claims have theoretical generalisability beyond just my main case.

Implications and contributions

The argument developed by this thesis has significant theoretical and policy implications. Most pertinently, understanding the *motives* of status-seeking actors is crucial to processes of recognition and accommodation. If proponents of SIT, as the dominant account for theorising status and status-seeking in IR, contend that comprehending the status-related motives of these actors will allow us to engage in the most effective accommodation strategies,[36] then such motives demand be correctly diagnosed. At the moment, the common wisdom is that would-be great powers 'will be more likely to participate in global governance if the United States can find ways to recognise their *distinctive* status and identities'.[37] This

[34] Ruggie calls this type of position 'neo-utilitarian' and is common to both neorealist and neoliberal institutional perspectives. See John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998).

[35] See, for example, Heimann, "What does it take to be a great power?."; Basrur and Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India*.

[36] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 67.

[37] Ibid., 66, my emphasis.

conclusion depends on the premise that these states have a '*need* for distinctive identities'.[38] However, my main contention in this thesis is that this orthodox view is an overly one-dimensional understanding of these actors' motives. This necessitates a modification and adaptation of the SIT framework, which I offer here. Indeed, recognition and accommodation are not just about recognising these states' distinctiveness, as SIT contends, but also about doing so in ways that are commensurate with these states' stigma and which make them feel more 'normal'. The key implication of this study is a more complete view of the considerations and factors that animate states looking to enter international society's most esteemed club, thus allowing for, on the level of policy, more effective recognition and accommodation strategies.

Alongside these policy implications, I make contributions to a couple of literatures in the academic study of IR. The first contribution is to the literature on the status-seeking behaviours of would-be great powers whose theoretical inferences have hitherto been dominated by the SIT-framework.[39] I make crucial amendments to this framework, maintaining its core insights while also qualifying them in more detail through a consideration of stigma. It is here that I develop the notions of positive and negative status: positive status refers to the dynamics and motives that the SIT framework draws our attention to, pertaining to positive distinctiveness. Negative status, on the other hands, has its roots in the literature on stigma in IR, and refers to the standards of normality and abnormality that dominate international politics. These are not separate concepts *per se*, but are two sides of the same coin designed to draw attention to the two main aspects of would-be great power status considerations. I expand on these dimensions in more detail later on. For now, it suffices to say that these concepts help to move beyond the one-dimensional view of would-be great power status-seeking behaviour offered by SIT, and instead posit a framework that more powerfully captures the Janus-faced nature of these states' quest for higher standing in the international system.

The second contribution I make is to the literature on stigma in IR. Until now, contributions to this literature have been few and far between.[40] I build on the insights of this literature by suggesting that there are various types of stigmas, each with potentially different, yet

[38] Ibid., 95, my emphasis.

[39] Ward, "Lost in Translation."

[40] Namely, Zarakol, *After Defeat*; Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management."

generalisable, impacts and effects on would-be great power status-seeking behaviour. I then theorise the effects of one of the most important stigmas for understanding how a number of the contemporary world's would-be great powers go about attaining higher status: the 'developing' or 'underdeveloped' stigma. The reason for examining this individual stigma is that a vast majority of today's would-be great powers fall into the social category of being 'developing' or 'underdeveloped'. We could name a number of states which are known to be would-be great powers and have also been cast as developing in the literature: China,[41] India,[42] Brazil,[43] Indonesia,[44] and South Africa,[45] are prominent examples.

Plan of the thesis

This thesis proceeds in two main chapters, sandwiched between this introduction and some concluding remarks. Chapter 1 provides the theoretical architecture of the thesis. Its main tasks are three-fold. First, it synthesises the SIT framework and studies of stigma in IR to produce more robust theoretical insights about the nature of would-be great power status-seeking, developing the concepts of positive and negative status, before showing the value-added of this type of conceptualisation. Second, it sketches out the nature of the 'developing' stigma and postulates a comparison with the 'defeat' stigma in order to more fully isolate and ascertain its effects. Third and finally, it spells out the methodological underpinnings of the subsequent empirical substantiation of my theoretical claims in Chapter 2. Specifically, it details the nature of: (1) my main case study – Brazil's near-brush with great power status in the 1970s – and the satellite cases I draw upon to add analytical leverage to my account; (2) the thesis' method; and (3) its data collection strategy.

Chapter 2 marshals empirical evidence to substantiate this thesis' main theoretical arguments. This empirical analysis uses the case of Brazil in the 1970s and a range of other mini-cases to give my claims more external validity beyond just my principal case. It operates not through any sort of historical narrative, but rather through vignettes designed to allow for a

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[41] Yong Deng, *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[42] Baldev Raj Nayar and Thazha Varkey Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[43] Stolte, *Brazil's Africa Strategy*.

[44] Laksmana, "Indonesia's rising regional and global profile."

[45] Matthew D. Stephen, "Rising regional powers and international institutions: The foreign policy orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa," *Global Society* 26, no. 3 (2012).

degree of generalisability. This chapter is not meant to be a detailed or comprehensive account of Brazilian foreign relations during this period, but rather an illustration of how the developing stigma affected, shaped, and coloured Brasília's desire for higher standing in international relations.

The concluding chapter recaps the thesis' main arguments and its principal contributions. Finally, I suggest some potentially fruitful avenues for future research on the themes explored throughout this inquiry.

1 Would-be great power status-seeking and stigma

This chapter makes two analytical moves. The first is a synthesis of the SIT-inspired framework – the dominant theoretical literature underpinning would-be great power status-seeking – and the literature on stigma in IR. I argue that through a synthesis of these literatures, it becomes evident that SIT has overemphasised the extent to which status is achieved through states pursuing positive distinctiveness in a bid to maintain a distinctive identity. On the contrary, we find that the status-seeking behaviour of would-be great powers is in fact also powerfully shaped by standards of normality: such states seek to become more 'normal', often at the expense of their 'distinctive identity'. In other words, in contrast to SIT, I contend that would-be great power status-seeking is Janus-faced, as these actors are motivated to be positively distinct but also downplay and cope with the 'stigmatised' aspects of their identities. I conceptualise these aspects in terms of positive and negative status. In contrast to the one-dimensional view proffered by SIT, I contend that both these dynamics are in play as these states look to move up the international ladder of stratification.

Second, I suggest that the literature on stigma in IR has hitherto ignored a crucial type of stigma and its effects that is incredibly salient for understanding contemporary would-be great power behaviour: what I label the 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' stigma. As the name suggests, this is a condition that relates to being stigmatised as underdeveloped or developing. I discuss the nature of this stigma label before discussing precisely how I will ascertain its effects on would-be great power status-seeking behaviour. This sets up an inquiry into the effects of this stigma on would-be great power status-seeking behaviour in the subsequent chapter.

This chapter proceeds in four main steps. First, I briefly document the burgeoning research agenda on status in IR to situate this thesis in a scholarly literature and provide a launchpad for my analysis. Second, I establish the first of my theoretical points. I describe and synthesise both the literatures on status informed by SIT and stigma to show how integrating insights from each can provide more lucid theoretical insights into would-be great power status-seeking. Third, I move to outline what I label the 'developing stigma', which the extant stigma

literature has ignored despite it being crucial to understanding the behaviour of numerous would-be great powers in contemporary international society. Fourth, I discuss the methodological underpinnings of this study including its research design, case selection, method, and data collection.

Status and status-seeking in IR

Research on status in IR is experiencing a vogue. Following a surge of publications in the 1960s and 1970s, this research programme dropped off before undergoing a revival in the past decade or so.[1] The seminal contributions to this recent literature are an edited volume entitled *Status in World Politics*,[2] and Renshon's *Fighting for Status*.[3] This concern with social status in IR has emerged on the back of a reorientation toward the effects of hierarchy in world politics.[4] This analytical attention to hierarchy, as opposed to the traditional disciplinary focus on anarchy, has led to an innovative new research agenda aimed at understanding the role and impact hierarchy has on state behaviour and the international system more generally.[5] Status is only one form of hierarchy, but status has become one of the main currents within this broader analytic agenda.[6] This research attempts to discern how and why social status matters to states, how states seek status, and how status and status concerns affect the behaviour of states.[7] The most developed branch of this literature looks at the role of status concerns as factors for the outbreak of war.[8]

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[1] This story is typically traced back to Johan Galtung, "A structural theory of aggression," *Journal of Peace Research* 1, no. 2 (1964); J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The composition and status ordering of the international system: 1815–1940," *World Politics* 18, no. 2 (1966).

[2] Paul et al., *Status in World Politics*.

[3] Renshon, *Fighting for Status*.

[4] David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); John M. Hobson and J.C. Sharman, "The enduring place of hierarchy in world politics: Tracing the social logics of hierarchy and political change," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 1 (2005); Jack Donnelly, "Sovereign inequalities and hierarchy in anarchy: American power and international society," ibid.12, no. 2 (2006); Janice Bially Mattern and Ayşe Zarakol, "Hierarchies in World Politics," *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (2016); Ayşe Zarakol, ed. *Hierarchies in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[5] Mattern and Zarakol, "Hierarchies in World Politics."

[6] Ibid.

[7] Paul et al., *Status in World Politics*.

[8] Renshon, *Fighting for Status*; Allan Dafoe et al., "Reputation and status as motives for war," *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, no. 1 (2014); Jonathan Renshon, "Status deficits and war," *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (2016); Thomas J. Volgy and Stacey Mayhall, "Status inconsistency and international war: Exploring the effects of systemic change," *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 1 (1995).

Status refers to, following Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth, 'collective beliefs about a given state's ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, socio-political organisation, and diplomatic clout)'.[9] Although material and economic capabilities can generally contribute to and map onto a state's status, this is not always the case.[10] Similarly, there is no single evaluative criteria from which status is derived; it often comes from multiple issue areas or 'social fields'.[11] A number of scholars understand status to manifest in two main ways: as membership in a particular club of actors (the great powers, the 'West', the G-20, the nuclear club, etc), and as an actor's position or rank in such social groups.[12] Paul et al. affirm that 'status is *collective*, *subjective*, and *relative*', and, most importantly, is dependent on the voluntary conferral and deference of other actors.[13] Status is collective insofar as a single state cannot simply confer status upon itself unilaterally. It depends on a collective attribution or belief about a state or group's standing. It is subjective because it depends on the perceptions of others. Similarly, status is relative insofar as a state's standing depends on its position relative to other actors. But this does not necessarily imply that status is a zero-sum game, as a state can move into the great power club without an existing member of that group being evicted.[14] One of the main conclusions of this literature is that status is 'socially scarce in the sense that it cannot be enjoyed by everyone. If everyone has high status, then no one does'.[15]

The extant status literature has fixated on the great power club and the status that surrounds international society's most prestigious social group,[16] although there has also been some

[9] Paul et al., "Status and world order," 7.

[10] Edward Keene, "The naming of powers," *Cooperation and Conflict* 48, no. 2 (2013): 274-75; Carsten-Andreas Schulz, "Accidental Activists: Latin American Status-Seeking at The Hague," *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 3 (2017): 614.

[11] Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon, "Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War," *International Organization* 72, no. 3 (2018).

[12] Naylor, *Social Closure*, Ch. 1; Paul et al., "Status and world order," 7; Dafoe et al., "Reputation and status as motives for war," 374-75.

[13] Paul et al., "Status and world order," 8.

[14] Ibid., 8-9.

[15] Ibid., 9.

[16] Shogo Suzuki, "Seeking 'legitimate' great power status in post-Cold War international Society: China's and Japan's participation in UNPKO," *International Relations* 22, no. 1 (2008); Basrur and Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India*; Iver B. Neumann, "Russia as a great power, 1815–2007," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11, no. 2 (2008); Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers."

effort to understand the status-seeking strategies of small states.[17] There has also been a focus on what Hurrell has called 'would-be great powers', which are 'important second-tier states' with aspirations to be part of the great power club.[18] In mainstream parlance, these states are often referred to as 'rising powers'. Debates about would-be great powers have typically considered the effect of the growing clout of states like China, India, Russia, and Brazil on global governance and the US-led 'liberal international order'.[19] The literature on status has given these debates a new edge, asking if these states could be, or already are, part of the great power club. I prefer the term 'would-be great power' to rising powers because it refers more specifically to the status aspirations of these states. A state can be a rising power without necessarily being a would-be great power, as Hurrell notes.[20] The focus in this thesis is on states which harbour great power aspirations but have not broken into this club, hence my preference for the term would-be great powers.

Entry into the great power club is a distinctly social phenomenon. For example, research has explored how candidates for this status group have been granted entry into the club despite having relatively low and weak material capabilities.[21] One of the main conclusions that this literature has established is that great power standing is a social status conferred onto a state; no amount of military wherewithal guarantees a state such status.[22] Great power status is a distinctly *social* phenomenon, thus requiring recognition and conferral from other states. In other words, for would-be great powers to shake off their 'would-be' status and become a fully-fledged great power, they require 'recognition by others: by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy'.[23]

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[17] Benjamin de Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann, *Small State Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing* (London: Routledge, 2014); William C. Wohlforth et al., "Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking," *Review of International Studies* 44, no. 3 (2018).

[18] Hurrell, "What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?."

[19] For a small selection of these debates see Oliver Stuenkel, *Post-Western world: How emerging powers are remaking global order* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017); Ian Taylor, "'The South Will Rise Again'? New Alliances and Global Governance: The India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum," *Politikon* 36, no. 1 (2009); Charles Grant, *Russia, China and global governance* (Centre for European Reform London, 2012).

[20] Hurrell, "What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?."

[21] Heimann, "What does it take to be a great power?."

[22] Paul et al., "Status and world order," 7.

[23] Hurrell, "What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?," 4.

The subsequent section discusses the literature that has theorised these processes. Specifically, it attempts to synthesise research on SIT and stigma to produce new insights about these developments and the factors that shape them.

Status and stigma in IR: the positive and negative dimensions of status

This section proceeds in three parts. The first begins by describing the SIT-informed framework on the status-seeking behaviour of would-be great powers. Second, it discusses the literature on stigma in IR. Third, it develops a synthesis of these two literatures through the concepts of positive and negative status. The main argument is that the negative dimension of status identified by the stigma literature is useful to draw attention to something theoretically underappreciated by SIT's emphasis on would-be great powers pursuing 'positive distinctiveness' in their quest for higher status. Indeed, this quest is significantly shaped and informed by the negative dimension of status: the stigma of these states. I briefly consider how this helps make better sense of the status-seeking behaviours of would-be great powers.

SIT and would-be great powers

It is now well established that would-be great powers are 'status seekers',[24] holding deep insecurities about their standing in international politics.[25] The most developed and well-established theoretical position in IR for the study of would-be great power status-seeking is the social identity theory (SIT) framework elaborated by Larson and Shevchenko.[26] Ward states that Larson and Shevchenko's work 'has established itself as the conventional wisdom for applications of SIT to the realm of world politics'. He argues that '[n]o theoretical or conceptual framework is more important or influential than Larson and Shevchenko's adaptation of SIT… [for] the study of status in IR'.[27]

Proponents of SIT have outlined a number of strategies that states can use to improve their status, and the conditions under which each strategy is most likely to be employed.[28] These

[24] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers."

[25] Ibid.; Deng, *China's Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations*; David R. Mares and Harold A. Trinkunas, *Aspirational power: Brazil on the long road to global influence* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2016); Basrur and Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India*.

[26] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers."; Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers."

[27] Ward, "Lost in Translation," 822.

[28] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers."

include social mobility, social competition, and social creativity. These authors suggest the main strategy used by rising powers in the post-Cold War era to improve their status is social creativity.[29] Larson and Shevchenko suggest that social mobility—which involves an emulation of the values and practices of members of an elite club—is not a common or useful strategy for would-be great powers. This is because 'a social mobility strategy is not as appealing because it implies a humiliating relationship of tutelage', in addition to meaning these states surrender some of their distinctive identities.[30] Similarly, social competition – a strategy that seeks to 'to equal or surpass the dominant group in the area on which its claims to superior status… [that] often entails geopolitical rivalry' – is not an attractive strategy either, given the material benefits these states have accrued from globalisation.[31] Larson and Shevchenko argue 'that a state is pursuing social creativity [when it promotes] advocacy of new international norms, regimes, institutions, or developmental models. Social creativity emphasizes the state's distinctiveness from the established powers'.[32] They argue that the strategy of social creativity is most commonly observed when the status hierarchy is perceived to be stable and legitimate. Unlike social competition, 'social creativity does not try to upend the status hierarchy, merely to achieve pre-eminence on its own criteria'.[33]

Larson and Shevchenko deduce these strategies, and states' preference for social creativity, from their framework's underlying assumptions. Indeed, their conceptualisation of precisely what drives these actors is derived from their theory's social psychological micro-foundations. Drawing on research that is based on experimental psychology, Larson and Shevchenko argue states '*strive for positive distinctiveness—to be not only different but better*'.[34] For example, they insist that these states 'are motivated to achieve *positive distinctiveness*… because of their *need for distinctive identities*'.[35] For this very reason, these authors argue contemporary would-be great powers 'will be more likely to participate in global governance if the United States can find ways to recognize *their distinctive status and identities*'.[36] This also goes a long way

[29] Ibid.; Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 94.

[30] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers," 39.

[31] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 67, 72; Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers," 43.

[32] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers," 41.

[33] Ibid., 40.

[34] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 68, my emphasis.

[35] Ibid., 67, 95.

[36] Ibid., 66, my emphasis.

to understanding the significant emphasis these authors place on social creativity as a means to pursuing higher status, given it is the strategy most commensurate with the micro-foundational assumptions of their theory.

Subsequent studies of status in IR have interpreted and used the SIT framework in precisely this way, with these accounts amounting to analyses of the different types of social creativity strategies employed by particular states. The theoretical emphasis has been very much on how these states position and set themselves apart from the rest through processes of positive distinctiveness in order to maintain distinctive identities.[37] In this respect, this research on status in IR, even when complementing the SIT framework from insights 'outside' the status literature, has replicated and reproduced Larson and Shevchenko's theoretical emphasis. In sum, the orthodox view of status in IR has become that states and would-be great powers in particular 'are motivated to achieve *positive distinctiveness*… because of their *need for distinctive identities*'.[38]

There is a strand of important research that this literature on would-be great powers has overlooked, however, relating to studies of stigma in IR. This oversight is indeed striking. For example, the two seminal scholarly contributions to the status literature – *Fighting for Status* and *Status in World Politics* – do not make a single reference to or mention the term 'stigma' or any of the works in IR that have theorised stigma and its associated effects.[39] In a critique of SIT, Ward acknowledges this oversight explicitly, but suggests that the literature on stigma might make for fruitful engagement with the burgeoning research on would-be great powers and status going forward.[40] This seems pertinent given that if stigma is a factor that significantly impacts a state's behaviour, especially with respect to its status-seeking strategies, it is important to determine precisely how stigma affects these pursuits. In what follows, I describe the literature on stigma in IR before going onto show how integrating these two literatures helps us push beyond SIT's theoretical overemphasis (rooted in the theory's micro-foundations) on these would-be great powers' desire to achieve positive

[37] For just a small selection of examples of this trend, see Stolte, *Brazil's Africa Strategy*; Dal, "Status-seeking policies of middle powers."; Leveringhaus and de Estrada, "China's and India's quest for status as responsible nuclear powers," 485; Alfred Evans, "Ideological change under Vladimir Putin in the perspective of social identity theory," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 23, no. 4 (2015); Ward makes a similar comment to mine. See Ward, "Lost in Translation," 822.

[38] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 67, 95.

[39] Paul et al., *Status in World Politics*; Renshon, *Fighting for Status*.

[40] Ward, "Lost in Translation," 832 fn. 27.

distinctiveness and maintain their distinctive identities. What the stigma literature shows is that these powers' perceived 'abnormalities' are a key factor shaping precisely how they go about trying to move up the international ladder of stratification, and that this process is not as simple as the SIT framework suggests. Indeed, because of these abnormalities, these states also strive to be seen as *normal*. After a description of the stigma literature in the subsequent subsection, I show how fruitful this integration is for the SIT framework as the dominant theoretical lens for understanding would-be great powers' quest for status in world politics.

Stigma

Drawing on the work of Erving Goffman,[41] IR scholars have increasingly turned toward the role that stigma and stigmatisation have played in shaping state behaviour.[42] Following Goffman, stigma is

> the situation of an individual disqualified from full social acceptance… Those who have dealings with [the stigmatised] fail to accord him the respect and regard which the un-contaminated aspects of his social identify have led them to anticipate extending, and have led him to anticipate receiving; he echoes this denial by finding that some of his own attributes warrant it.[43]

Stigmas are not objective descriptions of individuals, but are always filtered through an ideological prism about acceptable behaviour and characteristics, or what has been called the 'normative framework' in IR.[44] Following Goffman, a stigma is thus a subjective social psychological condition held by an individual – or for our purposes a state – which has internalised a notion of abnormality.[45] Once internalised, a 'stigma becomes the driving force of' an actor's behaviour.[46] In sum, 'the stigmatised individual is caught in a bind. To challenge the stigma only reinforces his association with it; on the other hand, to not challenge it amounts to embracing that association'.[47]

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[41] Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity* (London: Penguin, 1990).

[42] Zarakol, *After Defeat*; Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management."

[43] Goffman, *Stigma*, 9, 19.

[44] Ibid., 12.

[45] It differs from work on emotions, which tends to look at how emotions and emotional displays shape politics. On the other hand, stigma is a social psychological *condition*. See ibid.

[46] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 96; Goffman, *Stigma*.

[47] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 95.

A stigmatised individual, therefore, does not feel stigmatised simply because they possess an attribute that carries a stigma *per se*. Rather, it is the relationship between the normative expectations of a society and the individual's stigmatised characteristic which falls outside the boundaries of 'normal' that produces this feeling.[48] Normality in this case is not a majoritarian notion, however. It is defined in reference to society's dominant groups and the ones who have the power to conflate notions of normality with their own characteristics.[49] As a consequence, any stigmatised attribute is not inherently and objectively a stigma, but rather is because the bearer of a stigma and the society they are in both believe it to be so. Therefore, stigma is deeply *intersubjective*. Stigma operates in social contexts where the stigmatised individual has internalised the particular normative framework that discredits him: he is aware of his failings 'inevitably causing him, if only for moments, to agree that he does indeed fall short of what he really ought to be'.[50] For this very reason, Zarakol argues that stigma is '*as much the internalisation of a particular normative standard that defines one's own attributes as discreditable*, as it is a label of difference imposed from outside'.[51] Thus, stigma is very much a relational concept.[52] For example, it is the norm of heterosexuality that makes homosexuality a stigma, not homosexuality in and of itself.[53] In Zarakol's words, '[f]or one to feel inferiority before another, one must have first accepted and internalised the normative standards that the other is using for evaluation'.[54]

Adler-Nissen argues that '[w]hat makes the concept of stigmatisation analytically powerful is that it refers not only to stereotyping, but also to separation, status loss, and discrimination'.[55] Indeed, studies in IR have used this concept to understand the strategies of stigmatised states to overcome their stigmatised position, but note how these attempts often have the effect of reinforcing the inferiority of the state deemed unworthy of full social acceptance. To quote Zarakol again:

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[48] Goffman, *Stigma*.

[49] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 59.

[50] Goffman, *Stigma*, 18.

[51] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 4, emphasis in original.

[52] Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, "Relations before states: Substance, process and the study of world politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999).

[53] Goffman, *Stigma*, 14.

[54] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 60.

[55] Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management," 146.

> an actor who has internalised the normative standards of the society he is a member of cannot escape stigmatisation even if he isolates himself or rejects those standards as unfair. Once he has internalised these standards, the subsequent choices of isolation or rejection are as much a response to the stigma as embracing the stigma would be.[56]

This internalisation of a particular normative standard manifests itself through 'stigma labels'.[57] These labels are the discursive indicators of the stigma. For example, in IR, calling a state 'underdeveloped' is a label used to draw attention to an abnormal feature of a political community because the normative standard is development.

Integrating these studies of stigma into the framework on the status-seeking behaviours of would-be great powers can provide a better way of understanding the status game played by these states, as Ward implies.[58] The lack of engagement and dialogue between these two literatures is odd because the studies of stigma have made status one of their foremost concerns.[59] But just as the SIT framework has not engaged the stigma literature, there has been no theoretical engagement by these studies of stigma with the SIT framework either. In what follows, I attempt to integrate the insights of the stigma literature to refine the SIT framework, and demonstrate the theoretical payoffs, especially with respect to the status-seeking behaviour of would-be great powers, of doing so.

The synthesis: positive and negative status

I integrate these two literatures together through the concepts of *positive* and *negative* status. This integration is fruitful because both dynamics intuitively affect status-seeking behaviour, something not taken into consideration by the dominant SIT framework. Proponents of SIT take the positive side of the equation into consideration, but do not give equal credence to negative status. The theoretical consequences of this are that SIT has placed too much theoretical weight on the extent to which states pursue distinctiveness, at the expense of appreciating the degree to which stigmatised attributes (negative status) shape would-be great power attempts to achieve higher standing in international politics. Keene has argued 'as is not uncommon in concept formation, the effort to illuminate one phenomenon casts a

[56] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 96.

[57] Ibid., 57.

[58] Ward, "Lost in Translation," 832 fn. 27.

[59] Zarakol, *After Defeat*; Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management."

shadow over another',[60] and this seems to be the case in this instance with SIT. Here I try to correct this overemphasis. Before jumping in I want to remind my reader again that these concepts are designed to capture two sides of the same phenomena: the status-related concerns of would-be great powers. It should also be noted that this dualistic conceptualisation is consciously devised to move beyond the one-dimensional view offered by proponents of SIT.

POSITIVE STATUS. Positive status refers to the dynamics that are dominant in the mainstream literature on status, which is not limited to SIT. The introduction to *Status in World Politics*, for example, likens status to a socially scarce good to be acquired by actors.[61] Ward contends that 'conventional accounts [of status]… view status as a valuable *resource*'.[62] In Larson and Shevchenko's words, this is about achieving a sense of 'positive distinctiveness'.[63] Examples of this could include the type of 'conspicuous consumption' that authors have referred to, like building aircraft carriers or space programs and attempts to enter certain clubs that allow states to positively distinguish between themselves and an inferior group.[64] This sense of positive distinctiveness allows actors to enter clubs and move up the international ladder of stratification more generally, as has been acknowledged by various authors already. Positive status, in this respect, is something that states seek, and it is sought by state action: it manifests itself in positive status-seeking.

The logic here is that states want to stand out in a positive way. This intuitively makes sense: in social settings, one way of achieving higher status in the minds of others is through accomplishing feats or doing things that others have not achieved, or that others are not able to. Of course, this is an important part of achieving higher status in society, but there is another dimension to it which the SIT-inspired framework has overlooked because of its theoretical overemphasis on states' desires to achieve positive distinctiveness and maintain their distinctive identities.

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[60] Edward Keene, "The Standard of 'Civilisation', the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-century International Social Space," *Millennium* 42, no. 3 (2014): 657.

[61] Paul et al., "Status and world order," 9.

[62] Steven Ward, "Status, Stratified Rights, and Accommodation in International Relations," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 5, no. 1 (2019): 160.

[63] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 67.

[64] Paul et al., "Status and world order," 11-12.

NEGATIVE STATUS. Negative status, on the other hand, draws from the literature on stigma in IR. Negative status refers to a condition held by a state about a behaviour, characteristic, or attribute that it sees as abnormal or inferior. The point is that the pursuit of status is not just about acquiring the 'scarce good' that SIT draws attention to (positive status), but also involves coping with the 'abnormal' traits that haunt a state (negative status) which take the form of a stigma. Broadly speaking, this is similar to what Weberians have called 'social dishonour' or 'vulgar' features.[65] Unlike positive status, which is pursued, negative status is something states attempt to cope with or manage. Therefore, negative status management refers to attempts by a state to deal with negative status – stigmatised qualities – such as 'abnormal' characteristics and behaviours. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive categories and likely overlap in many cases. For example, a stigmatised 'developing' state might build a nuclear program to acquire status in the positive sense (entering the nuclear club) but also do it with intentions to eventually shed its 'developing' status and become a 'developed' normal. This might also have the effect of reinforcing its stigma, or re-stigmatising it as a 'rogue state'. With this said, negative stigmas vary from individual-to-individual, as Goffman's work illustrates. The effect that each stigma has on an actor's behaviour is going to differ based on the stigma held by that actor.[66] The point for now is that some states – stigmatised states – face extra burdens in pursuing status in the international system that 'insiders' or 'normals' do not face, something that the debate on would-be great power status-seeking has overlooked.

With this said, negative status is not simply a case of inverting SIT and arguing that states try to get rid of their negative distinctiveness; it is a far more complex dynamic and process. Likewise, it is not clear if SIT's emphasis on positive distinctiveness can be inverted to argue that states attempt to play down or shed their negative distinctiveness because of the framework's core premise that would-be great powers have a '*need* for distinctive identities'.[67] Indeed, trying to get rid of one's negative distinctiveness would likely invalidate the very premise that these actors do have a need for distinctive identities, so this is entirely inconsistent with the confines of the SIT framework.

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[65] Wendy Bottero, *Stratification: Social division and inequality* (London: Routledge, 2004), 40.

[66] Goffman, *Stigma*.

[67] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 95, my emphasis.

This aside, even if it were possible to invert SIT and argue that states just try to 'get rid of' their negative distinctiveness, the process is not so simple because attempts to deal with or shed stigma can often serve to reinforce the inferiority of the stigmatised.[68] For example, if an individual or state tries to remedy their stigma through attempting 'to become "normal" through assimilation, he confirms the definition of himself as not "normal"; if he argues with the "normal" view by pointing out that there are other experiences which that normal view does not account for, he draws attention to his "abnormality"'.[69] The stigmatised thus deal with an existential burden of what seems like perpetual inferiority that colours and motivates their every move. It is not as simple as simply 'getting rid' of the stigma, as this can often serve to only reinforce and concede their inferior position, although this is a strategy that some can pursue depending on the nature of their stigma.[70] It goes without saying that some stigmas are 'reversible' like one's economic position, while others are not, as in the case of someone's ethnicity or sex. Status-seeking is a Janus-faced balancing act that involves dimensions of both positive status-seeking and negative status management.

A simple way to think about the differences between positive and negative status is what sociologists and anthropologists have called *achieved* and *ascribed* status.[71] Achieved status is acquired through one's actions. This strongly resembles what SIT and mainstream studies of status refer to: seeing status as a type of achievement or good to be attained and acquired through means like conspicuous consumption or social creativity strategies. On the other hand, ascribed status is a status assigned to an individual, insofar as it is not earned or chosen.[72] It is typically based on characteristics beyond one's control, like race and sex.[73] While some are seen as immutable or irreversible, others are less so. What these ascribed statuses are depends on the normative framework of the society in which one finds themselves, just as the criteria for achievement depends on the same normative framework. Of course, not all ascribed statuses are viewed negatively (some are viewed positively, in fact). For our purposes though, stigmas are felt by those who fall on the negative side of ascribed

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[68] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 95.

[69] Ibid., 242.

[70] Ibid., 4, 242.

[71] This distinction is typically traced to Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man: An Introduction* (London: Peter Owen, 1965), Ch. 8; See also Irving S Foladare, "A clarification of "ascribed status" and "achieved status"," *The Sociological Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (1969); Bottero, *Stratification*, 48.

[72] Henry L. Tischler, *Cengage advantage books: Introduction to sociology* (Cengage Learning, 2013), 112.

[73] Linton, *The Study of Man*, 116.

status: when they do not have the behaviours or attributes of the 'normal'. Stigmas, while felt individually by stigmatised individuals, appear to be ascribed insofar as the individual internalises this standard. Importantly, negative status draws attention to the fact that often individuals need to deal with or cope with ascribed aspects of their being that are seen as abnormal or discredited, and this shapes how they pursue their achieved or positive status.

Before going on, we must briefly consider the differences between these concepts, the effect that negative status has on the pursuit of status, and the value-added of this conceptualisation through an illustrative example. Imagine the most prestigious social group in a high school: the 'cool group' which is mainly but not exclusively made up of male rugby players. We have two different people seeking entrance into this top group: the first is a female who is a fantastic rugby player; the second is a male who is a rather average hockey player. The female has a sense of positive distinctiveness as a brilliant rugby player and a female one at that, but she is also haunted by the fact that she is a woman and feels condemned to being an 'outsider'. This is perceived to be an abnormal combination and at every opportunity she assures the group she is 'one of the boys'. She knows that this 'abnormal' condition is a barrier or obstacle to her entry into the club, but she tries to distance herself from her sex as much as she can. She tries to be as normal as possible, even though being an incredible female rugby player may be considered a great achievement. Her understanding of moving up the pecking order into the top group means being as normal as she possibly can be, alongside the talent that makes her positively distinct.

At the same time our very average male hockey player begins to pay for private coaching and within a few months is the best hockey player in the school. He is very aware he has no talent for rugby so he decides to pursue this different route. He eventually becomes a fantastic sportsman but he also knows he is not a rugby player. He wishes his talent was rugby and not hockey. He eventually breaks into the group because he is good at sport but, much like our talented female rugby player, he feels inferior to the standard of normality that defines the group: that of being a male rugby player.

In this example, we see standards of normality weighing on the social consciousness of actors looking to move up the pecking order at their school. They often try to distance themselves from their distinctive identities, but positive distinctiveness nevertheless plays a role in pushing them up the ladder of social stratification. They both seek acceptance as normal, not

merely as distinctive. In fact, they often distance themselves from the most distinctive part of their identities in this context. Both positive and negative dynamics are at play here, and the synthesis of the literature that I have carried out allows us to be sensitive to both of these. This is an important corrective to the SIT framework, which only pays due theoretical attention to one of them.

By identifying these two analytically distinct but interacting aspects of status and status-seeking, I reveal that status-seeking by would-be great powers is not just a case of acquiring the 'scarce good' of status through processes of positive distinctiveness. The quest for positive status is powerfully shaped by the negative status, or stigma, that these would-be great powers have. Coping with this abnormality is a crucial part of the status game that SIT has not drawn attention to through its overemphasis on positive *distinctiveness* and states' desires to maintain a distinctive identity.

Therefore, the synthesis of these literatures through negative and positive status has two interrelated important conceptual payoffs that can help produce more precise insights about the status-seeking behaviours of would-be great powers. Firstly, it corrects SIT's overemphasis on would-be great powers having 'a need for *distinctive* identities',[74] by drawing attention to the fact that these states are also powerfully motivated by standards pertaining to being 'normal'. In fact, the SIT framework downplays the role of desires to be normal as a result of this focus on 'distinctive identities', with Larson and Shevcheno arguing that Russia wants to be recognised as a 'great power, not just a "*normal* state"'.[75] Larson and Shevchenko suggest that 'China and Russia will be more likely to participate in global governance if the United States can find ways to recognise their *distinctive* status and identities'.[76] However, scholars like Zarakol have shown that part of Russia's aspirations to higher and great power status in the post-Cold War era has been strongly shaped by an attempt to overcome its stigma.[77] In Zarakol's own words, stigmatised nations 'seek equal acceptance as "normal" states'.[78] This attention to stigma shows that the quest for higher status is shaped by standards of normality as much as they are by a desire to achieve positive

[74] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 95.

[75] Ibid., 79, my emphasis.

[76] Ibid., 66. Emphasis added.

[77] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, Ch. 5.

[78] Ibid., 247.

distinctiveness, something underplayed and overlooked by proponents of SIT. Nevertheless, the integrated focus on negative status management or stigma management is a useful corrective to SIT's theoretical overemphasis on would-be great power's desire to develop a distinctive identity, recognising that they also struggle with aspirations to be seen as normal too. In sum, moving into the upper echelons of international society is about differentiating oneself from those below through positive distinctiveness, as SIT usefully draws attention to. But equally important is coping with the abnormality that prevents a would-be great power from being recognised as 'normal', as studies of stigma point out; something that SIT has theoretically understated. Put simply, there are *two* dynamics at play in a would-be great power's desire for higher standing in world politics. The dynamic that I am drawing attention to, which SIT has underplayed on a theoretical level, is that standards of normality powerfully motivate how would-be great powers attempt to move up the international ladder of stratification too.

Second, this could also mean that apparent attempts at positive distinctiveness are not actually attempts to reaffirm and maintain a distinctive identity at all, but are rather efforts to make oneself 'more normal' by distancing oneself from the very characteristic that makes one abnormal in the first place. The theoretical implication of this is that the pursuit of positive distinctiveness does not necessarily mean states want to 'maintain distinctive identities' at all, as SIT suggests. This is a subtle, but important difference, and can have huge implications for how we understand things like status recognition and accommodation.[79] For example, if our theories of status recognition and accommodation are based on SIT, these theories will inevitably inherit SIT's emphasis on the recognition and maintenance of the *distinctive identities* of would-be great powers.[80] This could lead to malpractices of recognition and accommodation because this framework has misunderstood the motives animating these states. Understanding the motives of the would-be great powers involved is crucial to status recognition and accommodation, so that they can be recognised and accommodated in ways that are congruent with their motives. The focus on negative status brings in a motivating factor that has hitherto flown under the radar.

[79] Duque, "Recognizing International Status."; Ward, "Status, Stratified Rights, and Accommodation in International Relations."

[80] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers."

Stigmas and negative statuses

Until now I have argued that by incorporating insights from studies of stigma into the dominant approach to status in IR, we can understand the motives behind attempts of would-be great powers to gain higher status in more theoretically lucid ways. This section extrapolates from the extant work on stigma in IR and considers what the effect of certain types of stigma are on would-be great powers' quest for higher status in world politics. I show that as it stands, the stigma literature provides useful insights into how, on an abstract level, stigma affects would-be great power behaviour. Nevertheless, it is less attentive to precisely how being stigmatised as *underdeveloped* informs the quest for higher standing. Thus, this section attempts to move beyond the insight that 'stigma matters' to begin to consider different types of stigmas and their potential effects on would-be great power status-seeking. Before diving into this though, I must emphasise that I operate from the premise substantiated in the previous section: that is, negative status, or stigma, has a powerful effect on how states go about moving up the international pecking order and that these states seek acceptance as 'normals' as much as they seek positive distinctiveness.

As any attentive reader would already be aware, Zarakol's work has powerfully informed my argument in the previous section and her work remains the foil for this subsection. While the concept of stigma that Zarakol introduced to IR is indeed useful for our purposes here, how she conceptualises some particular instantiations of stigma prove problematic and unhelpful for this inquiry. Her book, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West*, identifies a number of stigmas, but really only considers the theoretical impact of two of these. The first of two main stigmas theorised by her work is, as the name of her book implies, related to being defeated in major war. The second stigma relates to states who feel stigmatised about their position between East and West, like Russia, Turkey, and Japan. The problem with this type of analysis and any attempt to extrapolate from it to the literature on would-be great powers is that these stigmas apply to only a handful of cases. There are very few other would-be great powers who have a defeat stigma, and there are similarly very few others that occupy a similar position to any of these states, having one foot in the East and the other in the West. This is admitted by Zarakol herself, who refers to her three cases as 'those most "fortunate"' of stigmatised states.[81]

[81] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 8-11, 253.

Of course, Zarakol's general theoretical angle is still extremely useful for our purposes here, albeit with slight adaptions and modifications. Along the way, Zarakol points to a handful of other stigmas. For example, she sees three main stigmas operating over time: the first could be called a 'civilisational' stigma relating to the 'uncivilised' and 'backward' values, political systems, and cultural customs a society holds. The second is what I label the 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' stigma, which refers to a society that lacks the necessary industrial and economic progress to be called 'developed'. The third is more contemporary and I will call it the 'good governance' stigma, which has strong links to norms about liberal forms of governance. These are part of her analysis insofar as they provide normative backdrops against which her cases try to curl up to and court the West *after defeat*: Turkey adopts more 'civilised' political processes; Japan uses development to push its case for respect to the West; and Russia (at least in the chronology of Zarakol) accepts norms of good governance. The stigmas are never themselves theorised, but rather play second fiddle to the defeat stigma in every case.

There are many would-be great powers with stigmas, but Zarakol has not explored the effects a very particular type of stigma that the vast majority of contemporary would-be great powers carry: the stigma of being developing or underdeveloped. She herself identifies this stigma, but its effects are never teased out in any detail.[82] Indeed, none of her cases suffer from this condition and as a result she does not explore its distinctive effects. This is quite an oversight given the fact that Zarakol herself admits this has been the dominant conceptual basis of stratification in the international system since at least 1945.[83] As a consequence, identifying the effects of this stigma is an important task for understanding the status-seeking behaviour of contemporary would-be great powers. Indeed, it is arguably the most common stigma that rising and would-be great powers have held since 1945. One can think of many contemporary rising and would-be great powers that could conceivably hold this type of stigma: Brazil, India, China, Indonesia, and South Africa, just to name a few.[84] All these states are often seen as part of the developing world, or Global South. Following Zarakol, we can thus expect the stigma label of being 'developing' or 'underdeveloped' to shape their behaviour.[85]

[82] Ibid., 87-91.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Russia is also occasionally identified as a developing country.

[85] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 95.

To more comprehensively isolate and identify the impact of the developing stigma on would-be great power status-seeking, I consider the clearest stigma developed in Zarakol's work as a point of comparison and contrast: the defeat stigma. Usefully, we can derive both the nature of this defeat stigma and its effect on would-be great powers' search for higher status. First, however, we must turn to the nature of the developing stigma. I chronologically limit this discussion to the post-1945 era for the sake of concision and relevance. Before diving into this exercise, however, we should expect there to be a certain equifinality to stigmas and their effects. That is to say that two or more different stigmas can in certain circumstances produce extremely similar types of behaviour.[86] In other words, in theorising the developing stigma and its effects, it is possible that other stigmas that go unmentioned and untheorised here may have similar impacts on would-be great power status-seeking. For this reason, I contrast the developing stigma with a stigma that intuitively should produce different effects in the form of the defeat stigma.

DEVELOPING STIGMA. This stigma relates to standards of economic development and industrialisation, which have been one of the main components of international society's normative framework since 1945. Indeed, the United Nations saw (and continues to see) 'underdevelopment' as one of the core issues around which its mandate and agenda formed.[87] Being underdeveloped or developing are often used interchangeably with belonging to the 'Third World' or the 'Global South'.

I treat underdevelopment and development not as natural or value-neutral descriptions of a state, but rather as a socially generated category that achieved hegemony post-1945, or what I have already referred to as a stigma label. Nettl and Robertson draw attention to the historically contingent nature of what seems like a deeply naturalised term:

> To a large extent the entire notion of underdevelopment and consequent developmental policies effectively emanated from [the United Nations]; it was also from there that many of today's underdeveloped countries first learned of their underprivileged or atimic [sic] status… Thus, far from regarding the post-war aspirations for economic development as a natural consequence of a given situation, they can be seen as the consequence of externally generated inducements of a rather

[86] Andrew Phillips and J.C. Sharman, *International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 17.

[87] Andre Gunder Frank, "The Underdevelopment Policy of the United Nations in Latin America," *NACLA Newsletter* 3, no. 8 (1969).

> special kind, which were framed and channelled in particular directions for reasons which did not necessarily have very much to do with the felt needs or value systems of the deprived societies. (A clear distinction has here to be drawn between the autonomously generated idea or value of independence-and its obverse, imperialism-and the induced one of underdevelopment or *atimia [sic]*).[88]

In arguing that development became one of the main stigma labels in the period following the Second World War, Zarakol shows that states which were previously castigated for 'civilisational' reasons were recast as 'underdeveloped'.[89] In this spirit, a Brazilian foreign minister was concerned that being underdeveloped could be likened to the concept 'of Rousseau's "happy savage"'.[90] Being cast as developing or underdeveloped implies a duty to develop. Myrdal argues that underdevelopment implies an 'evolutionary imperative' to develop.[91] The term 'underdeveloped' therefore rings of being uncivilised or barbarous.[92] Development has also been seen as a synonym for modernisation, and being underdeveloped could thus be considered synonymous to being pre-modern.[93] By identifying as developing or underdeveloped, an individual or state is conceding two things: first, their inferiority vis-à-vis the developed world; and second, that there is an imperative to develop to shake off this inferiority. There is, as a result, a real sense of backwardness implied by this label.[94] Unlike some stigmas, however, there is a possibility to transcend and escape underdevelopment. A good example of an underdeveloped state becoming developed, despite not being a would-be great power, is Singapore.

Moreover, we should reasonably expect this developing stigma to be imbued with language we would associate with anti-colonialism. This is because almost all 'developing' countries had a formal experience with colonialism.[95] Because of this huge overlap, it is reasonable to

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[88] J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, "Industrialization, Development or Modernization," *The British Journal of Sociology* 17, no. 3 (1966): 276-77.

[89] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 89.

[90] J. A. de Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial: exposição oas Estagiários do Curso Superior de Guerra da Escola Superior de Guerra em 11 de junho de 1971," ed. Escola Superior de Guerra (Brasília: Escola Superior de Guerra, 1971), 45.

[91] Gunnar Myrdal, "Underdevelopment and the evolutionary imperative," *Third World Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (1979).

[92] M. C. Howard and J. E. King, "Capitalism and Underdevelopment," in *A History of Marxian Economics* (London: Macmillan Education UK, 1992).

[93] Nettl and Robertson, "Industrialization, Development or Modernization."

[94] H. Myint, "An Interpretation of Economic Backwardness," *Oxford Economic Papers* 6, no. 2 (1954).

[95] Shiraz Dossa, "Slicing up 'development': Colonialism, political theory, ethics," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 5 (2007).

assume that states who are stigmatised for being developing also attempt not just to develop, but also to be more 'independent' given that being a developing country is often associated with an experience of being colonised.[96] Again, Zarakol briefly alludes to this overlap.[97]

Although it is fairly easy to sketch out why being underdeveloped is a stigmatised attribute, it is less clear what the effects of this stigma might be on would-be great power status-seeking. Given the powerfully normative connotations related to being developed or underdeveloped, there is good reason to think that this will have a considerable effect on would-be great power behaviour. Precisely what that effect is, however, remains unclear. It is nevertheless crucial to understand how this stigma affects the behaviour of would-be great powers looking to move up the international ladder of stratification. I deduce this in part through comparison with the defeat stigma in order to more fully isolate the effects of the developing stigma.

DEFEAT STIGMA. The defeat stigma relates to a feeling of shame after defeat in a major war, and is easily the most clearly theorised stigma in Zarakol's analysis. The defeat stigma is the main stigma theorised in *After Defeat,* but isolating the effect of this stigma through Zarakol could be confounded by the fact that, at least in her analysis, this defeat stigma is interacting with an East-West stigma.[98] For this reason, let us take post-1945 Germany as a prime example of the defeat stigma as Adler-Nissen does,[99] alongside Japan's experience in the same period.

The feeling of shame and repentance produced by its defeat stigma has had a profound effect on German foreign policy in the post-war period. This has been characterised by a shame felt over Nazism and the humiliation which Germany subsequently suffered at the hands of Allied forces in the Second World War. To overcome this and re-establish Germany as a 'normal' in the international system, German international relations since 1945 have been dominated by the search for a common foreign policy with other nations, often in the form of pan-Europeanism.[100] Germany has attempted to exemplify the norms of the liberal

[96] Ted Lewellen, *Dependency and development: an introduction to the Third World* (London: Bergin & Garvey, 1995).

[97] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 87-91.

[98] Ibid., 11-12.

[99] Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management," 156-60.

[100] Ibid.

international order, especially with respect to collective security. This has been done through becoming a staunch promoter of human rights and democracy in the Western world. On top of this, Germany gave up its strong currency during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. Germany searches not for an independent foreign policy *per se*, but a collective, European foreign policy.[101] Adler-Nissen argues that the German approach to its defeat stigma has been not just to live in or recognise the past, but actively deal with it through proving to the world, and to Europe especially, that it exemplifies the norms of international society, as opposed to fighting against them; this is how Germany seeks normality.[102] This stigma also strongly shapes the recognition that Germany seeks. It wants to be seen and recognised as a model international citizen.

Japan's defeat stigma has had a similar effect, although its status-seeking behaviour has been shaped by its cultural stigma too. It has sought to be strongly cooperative with the West and has pursued higher status – in Zarakol's words – by 'exemplifying dominant norms of the international system'.[103] It has used its economic growth as a model for others to follow, and has positioned itself as a bridge to help conciliate the East-West divide. It was also willing to accept its role as a 'second class' power within the Group of 7 because of this stigma, where it was not willing to accept such a status before its defeat.[104]

Post-Cold War Russia is an example that departs from Japan and Germany's post-defeat stigmas. It has not been as repenting, and has displayed some revisionist behaviours undermining core tenets of the liberal international order.[105] However, as Zarakol alludes to, this is likely because its defeat was 'softer'; it was not beaten in an armed conflict.[106] Its stigma has therefore led it to have nostalgia for the more revisionist great power status it had in the past.

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[101] Niklas Helwig, *Europe's New Political Engine: Germany's role in the EU's foreign and security policy* (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016).

[102] Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management," 160.

[103] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 196.

[104] Naylor, *Social Closure*, 126; Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 193.

[105] John J. Mearsheimer, "Bound to fail: The rise and fall of the liberal international order," *International Security* 43, no. 4 (2019).

[106] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 245.

After delineating the broad contours of these two stigmas, the next section describes the methodological underpinnings that this study employs to discern the effects of the developing stigma.

Methodology

I tackle my research puzzle through a single in-depth, qualitative case study of Brazilian foreign policy during the 1970s, when it saw itself as a realistic candidate for great power status. Brazil's candidacy for great power status was recognised both inside and outside the country, with various commentators,[107] Brazilian statesmen,[108] and other states all acknowledging that Brazil could conceivably be a great power in the not too distant future.[109] And while Brazil has long harboured great power ambitions, as many in the status literature have recognised,[110] there was a sense in the 1970s that these objectives were now achievable; great power status 'became a feasible objective of policy: intent and capacity converged'.[111] I briefly return to these themes in the next chapter.

Brazil is a fantastic case to isolate and identify the effects of the developing stigma on would-be great power status-seeking. This is because this was the only identifiable stigma that it carried during this period. For example, Brazil understood itself as geographically part of the Americas but culturally part of the West, and hence did not experience an East-West stigma as Zarakol's examples do.[112] Similarly, unlike Zarakol's cases, it had also not been defeated in any major conflict. Hence, we are able to ascertain the impact of the developing stigma on Brazilian foreign policy more cogently by isolating its effects. Indeed, Brazil's main concern

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[107] See, for example, Riordan Roett, "Brazil ascendant: international relations and geopolitics in the late 20th century," *Journal of International Affairs* (1975); William Perry, *Contemporary Brazilian foreign policy: the international strategy of an emerging power* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), 3.

[108] While these views were latent in the late 1960s, they became pronounced in Brazil from the 1970s onwards. For an official statement of this see Governo do Brasil, "Metas e Bases para Ação de Govêrno."

[109] Kissinger's account of US-Brazil relations in his memoirs make various references to Brazil's quest for great power status. Kissinger gives the impression that he saw these aspirations as both legitimate and achievable. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), Ch. 24.

[110] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers," 48.

[111] Roett, "Brazil ascendant," 141.

[112] Brazil understood itself as part of 'Western civilisation', sharing Christian values with the West. See, for example, Governo do Brasil, "Documentos de Política Externa I," (Brasília: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores do Brasil, 1967), 12, 14; Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, "Introduction: The end of the Cold War in the Third World," in *The End of the Cold War and the Third World: New perspectives on regional conflict*, ed. Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko (New York: Routledge, 2011), 14; Miriam Gomes Saraiva, "O Opção Européia e o Projeto de Brasil Potência Emergente," *Contexto Internacional* 11, no. 1 (1990): 98.

in this period was a desire to be considered part of the *industrialised* or *developed* world.[113] Brazil is also an excellent case for reasons of data collection given there are open and accessible archives that allow us to ascertain precisely how this developing stigma shaped the state's foreign policy thinking at the level of its key policy makers. I elaborate on data collection in more detail below. Nevertheless, for these reasons, Brazil is a brilliant case to probe the questions this thesis is concerned with.

The approach taken here is necessarily qualitative and interpretive to tease out the effects of a stigma on the behaviour of a would-be great power. This means looking at how the understanding an actor holds about an abnormal and stigmatised attribute – namely being 'developing' and/or 'underdeveloped – informs that actor's behaviour, perceptions, and decision-making.[114] I attempt to reconstruct how this stigma informed Brazilian behaviour based on the archival documents that inform this study. The types of subjective and intersubjective qualities that I am interested in, such as the effect of a stigma on status-seeking, require a qualitative and interpretive method like that deployed here.

The ontology of this study follows both the stigma and the status literatures in 'treat[ing] states as individual persons as far as their international actions are concerned'.[115] Such an abstraction means I treat states as intentional and purposive actors. This is common in IR as a discipline, although it is not unproblematic.[116] Future research could go about discerning the logics and pathways of stigma within states and their bureaucracies, but this is not the route taken here. This is nevertheless a useful abstraction for our purposes as the burgeoning literatures on status and stigma have shown, especially when it comes to discerning the effect of stigma on state behaviour.

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[113] This sentiment is best expressed in Silveira, "Esboço de notas emcanmindas ao president eleito João Figueiredo por ministro Silveira", undated (AAS 1978.08.30). See also Saraiva, "O Opção Européia." Silveira to Geisel, MRE, "Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger", 13 February 1976 (AAS 1973.03.26).

[114] This is broadly consistent with a Weberian interpretive approach which attempts to locate the motives informing actors' behaviour. See Mats Ekström, "Causal Explanation of Social Action: The Contribution of Max Weber and of Critical Realism to a Generative View of Causal Explanation in Social Science," *Acta Sociologica* 35, no. 2 (1992).

[115] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 99; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 215-24.

[116] Alexander Wendt, "The state as person in international theory," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2004).

This is first and foremost a theory-building exercise, attempting to try and theorise the types of effect that the developing stigma could have on state policy and action. To add inferential power to my account and to give it more external validity, I make comparisons to states similar to Brazil who seemingly share the 'developing' stigma. These comparisons to other developing would-be great powers – especially India – give my claims a broader and wider applicability. This is consistent with other scholarly analyses of status in IR more generally, which frequently use one case to illustrate a theoretical point before showing that claim's potential applicability to a wider range of cases.[117]

At the same time, I contrast this with the case of Japan and Germany around the same time period. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that Japan and Germany were affected by a different stigma, so this allows us to more ably isolate the effect of Brazil's stigma and show how different stigmas affect the pursuit of status in different ways. Second, Japan and Brazil seek the type of recognition that they want from the same principal audience: the United States. This allows me to show that these states' stigma shaped the different type of recognition they sought from the same principal audience. Therefore, while Brazil is my main case, I also draw small comparisons and contrasts with other states in order to (1) add more leverage to my claims about the distinct effect(s) of the developing stigma specifically and its impact on would-be great power status-seeking, and (2) show that this concept has a wider applicability beyond just Brazil.

Data Collection

My primary data is comprised mainly of archival documents from the Azeredo da Silveira collection. This consists of thousands of unredacted archival documents which are available and open to those affiliated with the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and its Centre for Research and the Documentation of the Contemporary History of Brazil (CPDOC). I spent 3 months at FGV's CPDOC from July to October of 2019.

This archival material contains the secret and personal correspondence of Silveira during his entire career in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty). This correspondence occurred between Itamaraty, the President's offices, other government ministries, Brazilian embassies, as well as other foreign ministries around the world. Of particular interest here are Silveira's

[117] See, for example, de Carvalho and Neumann, *Small State Status Seeking*; Nayar and Paul, *India in the World Order*.

personal documents from his time as Foreign Minister from 1974-1979, under the Geisel government, and his oral history which was published by FGV in 2010.[118] The availability of these unredacted and previously classified documents allows me not just to see and draw inferences from Brazilian behaviour, but rather they allow me to get to the heart of the developing stigma that plagued Brazil's national pathology and discern precisely how this stigma made Brazil 'tick'. On top of this, I also draw on other speeches and documents delivered and created by the Brazilian government and its officials that are publicly available. I am responsible for all translations from Portuguese to English, unless otherwise specified. I have also left all document titles in their original Portuguese form so that my reader can locate them in the case of any future research.

In relation to the ontological abstraction of treating the state 'as person',[119] I use these archival documents as a proxy to access the inner social psychological states and motives of the Brazilian state. These often come from one person – Silveira himself – but he was also the most important individual in Brazilian foreign policy during this period. Any effects of stigma are likely to be filtered by him as the head honcho and 'rubber stamper' in the foreign ministry. This is not an unreasonable assumption; the degree of autonomy and independence that Itamaraty has enjoyed compared with other ministries in Brasília during this period is well documented.[120] Following Lake, these assumptions should be judged on the analytical leverage they give us.[121]

Conclusion

This chapter has made two main theoretical points that provide the foundation for the more empirically-orientated nature of the subsequent chapter. First, I corrected the SIT-based conceptual framework's overemphasis on would-be great power status-seeking consisting of positive distinctiveness in an attempt to maintain a distinctive identity. Drawing on the literature on stigma in IR, I suggested that would-be great powers' status-seeking is better described as Janus-faced, being shaped both by attempts to be positively distinct and by efforts to be accepted as 'normal', which can often mean downplaying and distancing

[118] Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, *Azeredo da Silveira: Um Depoimento*, ed. Matias Spektor (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2010).

[119] Wendt, "The state as person in international theory."

[120] Saraiva, "O Opção Européia," 98.

[121] Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, 3-4.

themselves from their distinctive identity in the first place. I developed a theoretical framework around these two points, theorising status in a novel fashion as comprising both positive and negative dimensions.

Second, I argued that we need to establish the effects of what I call the 'developing stigma' – a highly relevant condition faced by a number of contemporary would-be great powers – to more effectively determine the precise effect that being stigmatised as 'developing' or 'underdeveloped' has on would-be great power status-seeking. I described this stigma's historical and social origins, but have yet to detail its precise effects. The next chapter explores empirical evidence using the case of Brazil to ascertain these effects, while also substantiating the theoretical argument developed in the first half of this chapter.

2 The 'developing' stigma: the case of Brazil

This chapter empirically substantiates the two main theoretical claims that this thesis puts forward. The first is that the literature on the status-seeking behaviour of would-be great powers has paid too much analytical attention to these actors' desires for positive distinctiveness, thus overlooking an equally important factor that animates would-be great powers' quest for higher status in world politics. As I have already shown through an integration of this SIT-informed framework and the stigma literature, these states are also powerfully moved by standards of normality and abnormality, or what I call negative status, in their quest for higher standing: these actors seek acceptance as 'normals' and not just as positively different. This chapter adds an empirical layer to this theoretical claim, using the case of Brazil and its great power aspirations during the 1970s. Specifically, I show firstly, what often appears like a state trying to be positively distinctive can actually just be an attempt to distance oneself from the very characteristic that makes one abnormal; and second, negative status concerns inflect positive status-seeking, shaping how a state goes about securing recognition for its status aspirations.

Second, I flesh out the effects of the developing stigma that constituted the negative status component of Brazil's quest for status during this period. I argue that being stigmatised as developing and underdeveloped pushed Brazil to be concerned about any kind of dependence or subordination, be it in political or economic terms to another power or the global economy, because dependence and subordination were seen as reinforcing its identity as an 'abnormal' underdeveloped state. Autonomy from dependence and subordination were the objectives that Brazil relentlessly pursued, in ways that bordered on paranoia; achieving these outcomes was understood as crucial to creating conditions that would allow Brazil to escape its stigmatised condition of underdevelopment. Indeed, these concerns powerfully inflected and shaped Brazil's pursuit of great power status. I draw analogies on this point with India, and contrast this with the effect of the defeat stigma in the cases of Japan and Germany. Another important point of these 'satellite' cases is that they show that while several SIT-inspired accounts of would-be great power status-seeking in IR have considered

the factors of interest here on an empirical level, these have not been theoretically incorporated into our conceptual frameworks.

This chapter unfolds as follows. First, I note how great power status became an aspiration of Brazil in the 1970s. Second, I outline the developing stigma and its effects, alongside examining how this developing stigma coloured Brazil's perception of the international system. Third, I show that Brazil's nuclear program – a typical example of 'positive distinctiveness' in the status literature – was actually primary motivated by a desire to emerge from a position of abnormality and underdevelopment, and thereby be more normal. Fourth, I invoke the developing stigma to elucidate the odd relationship between the US and Brazil during this period. Puzzling in this instance is Brazil's decision to turn down an 'easy' opportunity for recognition in the early 1970s, while also expressing annoyance when the US would come to give Brazil recognition of its 'special status' later in the decade. I suggest that the developing stigma is key to understanding both of these episodes. Fifth, I take Brazilian relations with Europe and the Third World to show how they were animated by the developing stigma and a desire to be seen and accepted as normal.

A brief disclaimer is in order before diving into the analysis. This is not, as previously noted, a comprehensive account of Brazilian foreign policy during the 1970s. On the other hand, it is an analytical exercise that uses episodes from Brazil's quest for great power status to substantiate theoretical claims, while also using that theory to elucidate some puzzling incidents of Brazilian foreign relations during this period.

Great power status as a keystone of Brazilian foreign policy

The economic 'miracle' that Brazil experienced at the end of the 1960s filled the government with a new confidence and pushed great power aspirations to the forefront of its foreign policy efforts.[1] Brazil's ambassador to the US said in the early 1970s that '[w]ith its astonishing progress and development, the country is full of hope and confidence in itself'.[2] From 1967 to 1968 alone, GDP growth jumped from 5% to 11.5%, and peaked at 14% in 1973.[3] The confidence inherited from this so-called 'miracle' saw the aspiration to move up

[1] Peter T. Kilborn, "Brazil's Economic 'Miracle' and its Collapse," *The New York Times*, 26 November 1983.

[2] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 39.

[3] The World Bank, "Brazil: GDP growth (annual %)," The World Bank, 2020. Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.

the international pecking order become one of Brazil's primary objectives. It was 'the period immediately following what has come to be known as the miracle years… during which hopes were high that Brazil would achieve its wished-for great power status'.[4] As Bethell puts it:

> Taking advantage of its success in the economic field – and Brazil's victory in the 1970 World Cup – the military regime encouraged excessive demonstrations of national pride (*ufanismo*) and promoted the idea of Brazilian *grandeza* (greatness) with slogans such as *Brasil Potência* (Brazil Power), *Brasil: o gigante adormecido acordando* (Brazil: the sleeping giant awakens), *Ninguém segura este país* (No one can hold back this country) and *Brasil: Ame-o ou Deixe-o* (Brazil: love it or leave it). And outside Brazil, not least in the United States, there was a growing belief that the country was finally ready to exercise greater influence in the international system.[5]

This pronounced aspiration for great power status can be seen in government documents as well. For example, the very first goal to be achieved by the year 2000 as laid out in the government's 1970 *Goals and Bases for Government Action* (*Metas e Bases para a Ação de Governo),* was the construction of

> a society that is effectively developed, democratic, and sovereign thus assuring the economic, social, and political viability of Brazil as a great power.[6]

In addition to this, references to '*grandeza'* (greatness) were employed by several government officials in this period, especially those in Itamaraty.[7] This quest for higher status was enshrined in the National Security Doctrine (NSD), which the military government adopted in the late 1960s.[8] Entering the club of great powers was arguably the most important and salient of all the tenets of the NSD, as the subtitle of a US Defence Department document

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[4] Anani Dzidzienyo and J. Michael Turner, "African-Brazilian Relations: A Reconsideration," in *Brazil In The International System*, ed. Wayne A. Selcher (London: Routledge, 2019), 201.

[5] Leslie Bethell and Celso Castro, "Politics in Brazil under Military Rule, 1964-1985," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America: Brazil since 1930*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 198.

[6] Governo do Brasil, "Metas e Bases para Ação de Govêrno," 15.

[7] References to higher status can also be found in Silveira to Geisel, "Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger", 13 February 1976 (AAS 1973.03.26) and various speeches delivered by Silveira. For these speeches see AAS 1974.05.27.

[8] Andrew Hurrell, *The Quest for Autonomy: The Evolution of Brazil's Role in the International System* (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2013), 202.

referred to the doctrine as 'a program for major power status'.[9] In a similar vein, Martins described the quest for great power status as '*the central objective* of the national-authoritarian project' of the NSD.[10] Brazil's quest for greatness and great power status should, however, be qualified. It was not an attempt to radically revise the rules of world order. In contrast, Brazil 'did not seek to change the world or to challenge for the sake of challenge, but to improve its place, a desire quite understandable for US policymakers'.[11]

It is worth pausing to consider precisely what Brazil meant by great power status. In sketching a 'global international relations', Hurrell warns that even common concepts like 'security' or 'great power status' might have different meanings for non-Western actors.[12] Throughout the archival documents that make up the empirical backbone of this section, Brazil spells out that its ultimate status desire is to be considered on par with the industrialised states of Western Europe, especially in the eyes of the United States.[13] This is commensurate with scholarship that diagnoses the status hierarchies of this period, which sees these Western industrialised states and Japan as constituting the 'core' of the great power club at this time.[14] Indeed, as will become clear in the forthcoming analysis, and as many scholars have already recognised,[15] it was the recognition of the United States that Brazil cared most about in its quest for great power status. Nevertheless, one thing stood in the way of achieving this status-related objective: great powers are typically advanced industrialised economies, whereas Brazil found itself in a position of underdevelopment.

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[9] Wayne A. Selcher, *The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian government* (Washington: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1977), 3.

[10] Carlos Estevam Martins, "Brazil and the United States from the 1960s to the 1970s," in *Latin America & the United States: The Changing Political Realities*, ed. Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 292, my emphasis.

[11] Robert G. Wesson, *The United States and Brazil: limits of influence* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 59.

[12] Andrew Hurrell, "Towards the global study of international relations," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 59, no. 2 (2016): 4.

[13] Silveira, "Esboço de notas emcanmindas ao president eleito João Figueiredo por ministro Silveira", undated (AAS 1978.08.30).

[14] James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A tale of two worlds: core and periphery in the post-cold war era," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992); Naylor's analysis of the G5 and G7 suggest this too. See Naylor, *Social Closure*.

[15] For a small sample, see Matias Spektor, *Kissinger e o Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009), 10-15; Roett, "Brazil ascendant." This also comes out in a number of documents in Silveira's archive. See Silveira to Geisel, MRE, "Informação para o Senhor President da República: Visita do Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger a Brasília. Aspectos substantivos", 21 April 1975 (AAS1974.03.26); "Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger", 13 February 1976 (AAS 1974.03.26); Silveira, "Esboço de notas emcanmindas ao president eleito João Figueiredo por ministro Silveira", undated (AAS 1978.08.30).

This is something the Brazilian foreign policy machine was aware of.[16] The next section details how Brazil was stigmatised because of this, and that how stigma affected its perception of the possible routes to higher status and of the international system more generally.

The developing stigma in the context of great power aspirations

Even though Brazil wanted to move up the international ladder of stratification into the great power club, it carried a stigma related to its (under)development. There are countless instances of Brazil recognising both its underdevelopment and the fact that 'the economic, social, and political viability of Brazil as a great power' would only be possible if 'Brazil's entry into the developed world' could be facilitated.[17] Similarly, Schneider argues that historically Brazil had 'been barred by… its economic *backwardness*… from any larger international role'.[18] In what follows I outline how and why Brazil held this view, and then describe how it informed Brazilian sensitivities to viable avenues to achieve great power status. I also spell out in more detail throughout this chapter the nature of this stigma and how it impacted Brazil's status-seeking behaviour.

Before diving into the main analysis, how can we know it is the negative dimension of status in the form of the developing stigma specifically, and not just a neorealist desire for more material power, that is animating a would-be great power status-seeking behaviour? This is an important methodological question for the inquiry at hand and a potential objection a hardnosed neorealist might launch at this point. The concept of a developing stigma is better able to capture the behaviour of these actors precisely because the distinction between the purely 'material' neorealist account and a more social analysis is blurred. As I showed in the previous chapter, development is a historically contingent and *socially*-generated category that emerged post-1945.[19] The fact that Brazil – and India, for that matter – understands its material predicament through this prism shows the 'social' underbelly of these concerns. Underdevelopment became as much a social condition to overcome as it was a material weakness; Brazil felt socially discredited because of this stigma label. For example, Brazilian

[16] See, for example, Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger.', 13 February 1976 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[17] Governo do Brasil, "Metas e Bases para Ação de Govêrno," 15.

[18] Ronald Schneider, *Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976), 2.

[19] Nettl and Robertson, "Industrialization, Development or Modernization."; Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 89.

diplomats spoke of underdevelopment not just as a 'category of weak states', but as a condition that designated such countries as 'non-adult' and 'savage'.[20] As a result, it makes no sense to reduce this analysis to a purely 'material' factors given this strong social dimension of the story that pushed Brazil to feel discredited and abnormal. Therefore, following Zarakol, when Brazil uses its stigma label of underdevelopment and the concerns related to it as a reason for action, we can be assured that this is the factor driving its behaviour.[21]

For Brazil, what did it mean to overcome its 'savagery' and 'economic backwardness',[22] and how was this possible? The basic idea was

> to achieve, as quickly as possible, without prejudice to its security, internal social harmony and fidelity to the basic values of the world to which it belongs, levels of economic development that bring it on par with the most advanced countries in the world.[23]

Already in this statement alone we can see attempts to maintain Brazilian identity through maintaining 'the basic values of the world to which it belongs', but also to deal with the condition that Brazil saw as disqualifying it from being accepted as normal. In other words, we see both the positive and negative dynamics of status in action and shaping Brazil's quest for great power status.

Central to this notion of becoming developed was autonomy vis-à-vis other powers in the international system as well as the international economy. Securing autonomy was instrumental to this, as it would provide Brazil protection from ruptures in the international system, be they economic or political. This has been documented in detail by a number of other studies on Brazilian foreign relations during this period, as well as within the Foreign Ministry itself.[24] Silveira saw a close relationship between development and autonomy. In various speeches to military officials, Silveira alluded to this relationship:

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[20] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 41, 45.

[21] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 65.

[22] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 45; Schneider, *Brazil*, 2.

[23] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, "Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger", 13 February 1976 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[24] There are many documents in the Silveira collection and scholarly works that document this. See, for example, Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Segurança Econômica Coletiva para o Desenvolvimento', 5 March 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República:

> should we, when classifying a country as developed or underdeveloped, privilege purely economic (or socio-economic) criteria or should we highlight more the political aspects of development; that is, the capacity of each country to make vital decisions in an autonomous and sovereign way, reducing to a minimum the interference of external factors?[25]

Here we see an effort by Brazil to expand the criteria of development onto grounds that allow it to qualify for this label more easily: from purely economic criteria to 'autonomy'. This attempt to slightly modify the criteria of normality to make these terms more friendly to one's own situation is a classic tactic employed by a stigmatised actor, according to Goffman. Goffman's analysis suggests that trying to change, modify, or expand the criteria of normality to more comfortably fit the social predicament of the stigmatised actor is a strategy of varying success.[26] Nevertheless, it goes to show that negative status dynamics were on the mind of the Brazilians at the time.

Thus, autonomy was conceived of as being a crucial component and precondition of development. Of course, these were luxuries that Brazil did not enjoy as a developing state. It felt that being a primary commodity exporter, being dependent on foreign sources of energy, and not having sufficient technological development meant achieving development and autonomy were made more difficult as Brazil relied on external sources for its own well-being.[27] Autonomy and development went hand-in-hand; autonomy would guarantee Brazil a better chance at achieving development, while development would grant Brazil more autonomy.

Autonomy meant escaping the traditional predicament of large swathes of the developing world, which Brazil saw as condemned to never being able to overcome the position of

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Visita do Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger a Brasília. Aspectos substantivos', 21 April 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26). See also the various speeches Silveira gave in AAS 1974.05.27. For academic works, the most seminal is Andrew Hurrell's scholarship. See, for example, Hurrell, *The Quest for Autonomy*.

[25] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Sivleira, aos Senhores Estagiários da Escola Superior de Guerra. Rio de Janeiro', 19 May 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27) and 'Conferência Pronunciada por sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Sivleira, na Escola Nacional de Informações. Brasília', 24 June 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[26] Goffman, *Stigma*, Ch. 4.

[27] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Visita do Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger a Brasília. Aspectos substantivos', 21 April 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

subordination which had been imposed on them by their history of being under imperial rule.[28] In an unpublished book manuscript, Silveira argued that Brazil was able to transcend this condition:

> Those uncharacteristic states [in the developing world], in their majority, will possibly never overcome their conditions of objects of history. Some countries, however, have the conditions, because of their territorial extension, demographic importance and historical vocation to progress to higher stages of autonomy and self-determination. Such countries will be able to reach the condition of subjects and escape the fatality of being but passive spectators, manipulated in accordance with the Great Alliance [the US and the other Western industrialised states] … Brazil is typical of the category of countries that cannot be turned into satellites.[29]

In other words, on a political level, Brazil was animated by a desire to not be an 'typical' developing country. Behaving as such would only condemn it to sacrificing its autonomy and reinforcing its abnormality as an underdeveloped state. Indeed, Brazil felt embarrassed by this condition of underdevelopment, as its foreign minister likened this predicament to being 'savage' in the early 1970s.[30]

On an economic level, it was motivated by a similar apprehension. Dependence on external markets was seen to hinder Brazil's desire for autonomy and quest for development. 'Breaking dependence' thus became a driver of Brazil's foreign relations in order to transcend its stigmatised condition as a developing state. In Silveira's own words, '[t]here exists a structure of external dependence which inhibits and conditions national forces of industrial development. To industrialise means, in a certain sense, to break that system of dependence'.[31] Indeed, being dependent on Western sources of finance and markets, especially the United States, would curtail Brazilian development ambitions. Such a system of dependence would not allow Brazil the opportunity 'to reach the condition of subjects

[28] Silveira, 'V Conferência de Chefes de Estado ou de Governo dos Paises Não-Alinhados, Colombo.', August 1976 (AAS 1975.00.00). This also comes through in 'Esboço de notas emcanmindas ao president eleito João Figueiredo por ministro Silveira', undated (AAS 1978.08.30).

[29] Silveira, *Um Depoimento*, 10.

[30] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 45.

[31] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: II Conferência Geral da UNIDO', 22 January 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

and escape the fatality of being but passive spectators', and would result in it being 'manipulated in accordance with the Great Alliance'.[32]

As we can already see, Brazil was concerned about being seen as an 'abnormal' developing state or a passive spectator who was easily manipulated by the industrialised West; breaking dependence was a crucial way to achieve the autonomy that Brazil strove for. Brazil saw most other developing states in this fashion, as emerging from their recent wars of independence as formally and legally free and autonomous, but at the same time condemned to suffer from underdevelopment and dependence, as a note on the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) discusses.[33] Indeed, Silveira would reiterate that 'we could see in the international structures, as it presented itself – and continues to present itself – a grave conditioning to our sovereignty, which perpetuated situations of unilateral relationships and dependence'.[34] He also admitted that there was a social psychological dimension to this condition, showing that stigma was indeed colouring and shaping Brazil's behaviour, especially as it went about moving up the international pecking order. At the end of his tenure as foreign minister, in a personal note he had written but had then crossed out, he argued that Brazil needed 'to overcome the mental or psychological dependencies' that it held.[35] When it came to the pursuit of great power status, this meant that, in the words of one of Brazil's most important diplomats of the 1970s, 'Brazil cannot accept barriers and obstacles in the pursuit of its full economic development',[36] adding '[t]he international policy of Brazil… has as its objective the removal of any obstacle that could pose a challenge to its economic, technological and scientific development; its cultural heritage and its national identity as a sovereign state; [or] the affirmation and growth of its national power (*Poder Nacional*)'.[37]

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[32] Silveira, *Um Depoimento*, 10.

[33] Silveira, 'V Conferência de Chefes de Estado ou de Governo dos Paises Não-Alinhados, Colombo.', August 1976 (AAS 1975.00.00).

[34] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Sivleira, aos Senhores Estagiários da Escola Superior de Guerra. Rio de Janeiro', 19 May 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27). This theme is also omnipresent in a number of speeches delivered by Silveira and his predecessor. See AAS 1974.05.27 for examples of this.

[35] Silveira, "Esboço de notas emcanmindas ao president eleito João Figueiredo por ministro Silveira", undated (AAS 1978.08.30).

[36] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 47.

[37] Ibid.

The similarities between Brazil and India in this period are striking. Like Brazil, India also felt stigmatised for its underdevelopment in its desire for great power status. India's stigmatisation also emerged from its condition of 'economic *backwardness*'.[38] India's cabinet believed at the time that 'India is not recognised as an equal by the great powers' precisely because:

> Postindependence [sic] economic development policies have not succeeded in turning India into an economically powerful country and have failed to improve the lives of its people in a manner that the industrial and postindustrial [sic] societies of the world would recognise as sufficient… The failure of Indian leaders and their economic policies to transform the Indian economy… [continues] to tarnish India's image and greatly embarrass its leaders and educated class.[39]

India too felt stigmatised and embarrassed because of its underdevelopment, much like Brazil did. Overcoming this stigmatised condition was crucial to being treated 'as an equal by the great powers', and achieving the status it desired.

In the early days of India's pursuit of great power status, its 'primary commitment was to economic development', because '[a]chieving material parity with the nations of the developed world was the only means of securing India's freedom in the long term' and ensuring India was 'recognised as an equal by the great powers'.[40] India was determined to break dependence too, because not pursuing this objective would have the effect of 'reducing it permanently to an object'.[41] According to Nayar and Paul,

> Dependence on the US for economic and food aid, and dependence on the Soviet Union for military equipment, placed India under tremendous pressure, leading to the fear of being turned into a foreign-policy satellite of both superpowers.[42]

Despite using different terminology, the language used suggests that India found itself with a developing stigma as well. Indeed, the developing stigma meant breaking dependence was

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[38] Nayar and Paul, *India in the World Order*, 161, my emphasis.

[39] Paul R. Brass, "India: democratic progress and problems," in *India and the Pakistan: The First Fifty Years*, ed. Selig S. Harrison, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 40.

[40] Basrur and Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India*, 28; Brass, "India," 40.

[41] Nayar and Paul, *India in the World Order*, 158, 64.

[42] Ibid., 164.

perceived as a crucial means to overcome its condition of abnormality and make great power status a viable possibility for these states. This powerfully shaped their behaviour as a result.

As already discussed in the previous chapter, as part of the developing stigma there are indeed undertones relating to developing states' colonial pasts, although such undertones are rarely, if ever, made explicit. In all of my reading of the thousands of documents I combed through in the case of Brazil, only one made mention to Brazil's colonial past in any stigma-like fashion and this reference comes right at the end of the period of inquiry.[43] Complicating this story is the fact that Brazil is a rather unusual post-colonial state in a lot of ways due to the Portuguese crown moving its headquarters to Brazil in the early 19th century, with Portugal effectively being ruled from Rio de Janeiro.[44] After breaking with Portugal, Brazil announced itself as an empire before becoming a republic in 1889.[45] Given this messy story, it seems that any notion of a 'colonial' stigma quickly gets enveloped into the developing stigma after 1945 which Brazil, by inheriting the developing stigma, also internalised. Hence the references to independence and autonomy being an important part of overcoming underdevelopment.[46]

It is possible to see the effect of Brazil's developing stigma in its perception of the international system, especially as it felt that its dependence was tightening and paths toward escaping underdevelopment were becoming narrower. Early in the 1970s, Brazilian diplomats began to speak of 'the freezing of world power' ('O congelamento do poder mundial'),[47] with this perceived freezing and crystallisation seen to be an obstacle to the country's aspirations for higher status. The phrase 'freezing of world power' was used in private between the foreign ministry and Presidential palace in the decade's second administration as well, from 1974 to 1979.[48] Of course, the world order itself was not freezing, but Brazil's stigma and condition as a developing state, alongside its great power

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[43] Silveira, "Esboço de notas emcanmindas ao president eleito João Figueiredo por ministro Silveira", undated (AAS 1978.08.30).

[44] Laurentino Gomes, *1808: The Flight of the Emperor: How a Weak Prince, a Mad Queen, and the British Navy Tricked Napoleon and Changed the New World* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

[45] Darlene J. Sadlier, *Brazil imagined: 1500 to the present* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008), 6.

[46] This is implicit in Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 87-91.

[47] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial."

[48] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: A experiência nuclear da Índia', 21 May 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26).

aspirations, made it feel like it was. Interestingly, it was the obstacles this freezing posed to development, and thus Brazil's aspirations for normality, that caused concern in the Brazilian foreign ministry. Contrary to SIT claims that states want to maintain a distinctive identity,[49] Brazil was very much determined to leave its identity as a 'developing' state behind and become more normal. 'The freezing of world power' became an obstacle to this.

What did Brazilian diplomats mean by this phrase, and how did stigma play into this perception? The power they were referring to was 'not just military power, but also political power, economic power, and technological and scientific power'.[50] Two themes can be highlighted as key tenets of this freezing. The first was *détente's* effect on the Third World's needs for development, especially as there was a perception that the two superpowers cared very little for the ongoing condition of the developing world, which had been shut out of the institutions of *détente*. Brazil spoke of what it called the 'co-presidency' of the superpowers.[51] Foreign Minister Gibson Barbosa put it such: 'this freezing of power does not have as its objective, let us recognise, antagonising those countries that are seeking to break the chains of economic dependence. But the result is practically the same'.[52] It was the feeling of being a developing country (or 'underdevelopment' as they would put it themselves) that the Brazilians feared in the midst of *détente:* 'the problem of underdevelopment has never presented such gloomy and discouraging prospects'.[53] Brazil believed that the two superpowers cared little about what came to be known as the North-South divide, which was defined by conditions of development and underdevelopment, and were far more concerned with the East-West conflict which had security as its main preoccupation. In the words of Silveira, *détente* made the US and Soviet Union 'be able to feel more secure, not just in relation to each other, but jointly, from the rest of the world too'.[54] With the question of development taking a backseat to the high politics of the Cold War, the

[49] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers."

[50] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 40.

[51] Ibid., 41.

[52] Mario Gibson Barbosa in Governo do Brasil, "Documentos de Política Externa IV," (Brasília: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores do Brasil, 1971), 163.

[53] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 43.

[54] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por su Excelência o Senhor Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriors, ante o Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas', 20 September 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

fear of being shut out as an abnormal, underdeveloped country was something Brazil was very conscious of.

Brazil was also deeply critical of the growing discourse of interdependence that was emerging from the United States, arguing that this was not a fair form of commercial arrangement for developing nations, and would only add to their dependence. In Araújo Castro's words,

> we maintain that interdependence presupposes independence, economic emancipation and the sovereign equality of states as an indispensable precondition… First let's be independent. Then let's be – and as quickly as possible – interdependent.[55]

Similar themes were expressed later in the decade behind closed doors by Silveira and the Geisel government. They argued that interdependence would subject Brazil to 'unequal' and 'vertical' arrangements,[56] and although interdependence sounded desirable it was one of the 'instruments of domination par excellence'.[57]

The second and closely related element of the freezing world power was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was called 'the central instrument in the freezing of world power'.[58] Silveira communicated that Brazil 'always defended the idea of a fair and equitable non-proliferation treaty that saw a reduction in the risk of the dissemination of nuclear arms and at the same time stimulated the maximum use of nuclear energy'. However, the NPT that came into being represented 'a condemnation to a situation of inequality'.[59]

The reason for this was that Brazil saw nuclear power as an important resource to overcome its stigma. Speaking in the late 1960s, Brazil's President argued 'nuclear energy plays a dominant role, and is, without doubt, the most powerful resource to be put within the reach of developing countries in order to reduce the distance which separates them from the

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[55] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 46.

[56] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: II Conferência Geral da UNIDO', 12 February 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[57] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por su Excelência o Senhor Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriors, ante o Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas', 20 September 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[58] Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial," 40.

[59] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Conferência Para o Exame do Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares', 30 April 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

industrialised nations'.[60] In 1974, Brazil's inner cabinet looked upon India's successful nuclear test with awe, and this only confirmed that mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle would give them the possibility of 'disturbing "the freezing of world power"',[61] shaking off its developing status, and entering the developed world.[62]

Again, India shared an almost identical perception without using the phrase 'the freezing of world power'. And just like Brazil, India's elite believed 'the country's economic backwardness was not an immutable condition'.[63] But increasingly, India also saw obstacles to overcoming this backwardness and abnormality. With respect to the NPT and Nixon's plans for *détente*, Nayar and Paul argue that

> barring nuclear tests by any state beyond the five powers that had already tested, raised the prospect of a permanent marginalisation of India in international affairs. If successful, the projected regime would have had the consequence of closing the door on India's quest for a major-power role and of reducing it permanently to an object... As the US, with a new Republican administration under Richard Nixon, sought to restructure the world balance of power, India was threatened with greater marginalisation, since the only place envisaged for it in that order was as an object.[64]

In summary, Brazil, and India for that matter, both saw a huge restriction of their paths to higher status in light of their conditions as underdeveloped states, and were deeply aware that they deviated from the standard of normality of 'development'. This provoked fears of social disqualification from equal treatment as 'normals' given the backwardness that economic underdevelopment implied. The trajectory of international relations of the time pushed them to be worried that they would be 'locked in' as abnormal and backward underdevelopment states. It is particularly noteworthy that it was obstacles to *development* that were of particular concern for both of these states, suggesting it was their stigmas relating to their underdevelopment that were crucial in producing this feeling. In response, both states went about achieving status and pursuing normality in ways that were commensurate with their negative status concerns. Thus, achieving development and escaping the effects of their

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[60] Costa e Silva in Governo do Brasil, "Documentos de Política Externa I," 116.

[61] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: A experiência nuclear da Índia', 21 May 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[62] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, "Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Visita do Ministro das Minas e Energia à RFA', 18 November 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[63] Nayar and Paul, *India in the World Order*, 132.

[64] Ibid., 164.

stigma powerfully animated their subsequent pursuits of higher status. The next sections discuss these efforts in greater detail. Important to note at this point though is that a core part of these states' strategies of moving up the pecking order was to ameliorate their 'abnormality' in a bid for equal acceptance as 'normals'. This challenges a core claim of the SIT-informed status framework, which claims would-be great powers strive for 'maintaining distinctive identities' through strategies of 'positive distinctiveness'.[65] I suggest in subsequent parts of this chapter that the literature in fact overplays this and misses a core part of how would-be great powers conceive of moving up the international ladder of stratification. Indeed, coping with their abnormality is an equally important part of this desire to move up the international ladder of stratification, both as a motivation but also as a factor that shapes and inflects how these states go about positive status-seeking too.

The NPT and nuclear program

Brazil's staunch opposition to the NPT appears, on the face of it, odd. Opposing the NPT made Brazil an outsider in international society, being one of only a handful of states to not sign the treaty. Even stranger is that Brazil opposed the treaty despite having no desire to build a nuclear armament. In the most authoritative study on the evolution of Brazil's nuclear intentions, Matias Spektor argues that Brazil was never motivated by a desire to possess a nuclear weapon.[66] He argues the 'lack of interest in a weapon… [was because] Brazil's external security environment – at least from the government's perspective – was fundamentally benign'.[67]

The Silveira collection corroborates this inference too. When India successfully tested its nuclear weapon in 1974, the Brazilians found this scientific achievement admirable and it only reinforced the belief that Brazil had to master the nuclear fuel cycle to escape being categorised as underdeveloped.[68] However, there was no mention of emulating India's experience of developing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Brazil's admiration came from the fact that India's successful nuclear weapons test simply confirmed that nuclear

[65] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 67.

[66] Matias Spektor, "The evolution of Brazil's nuclear intentions," *The Nonproliferation Review* 23, no. 5-6 (2016).

[67] Ibid., 639.

[68] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: A experiência nuclear da Índia', 21 May 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26).

energy was 'an essential part of the process of development'.[69] Other documents related to Brazil's nuclear program in Itamaraty underline this objective too, without mentioning developing nuclear weapons.[70] Why then, would Brazil oppose the NPT?

We get a clear answer from Silveira who outlines Brazil's opposition to nuclear weapons and the NPT in a note to his President:

> Brazil has always defended the idea of a just and equitable non-proliferation treaty that prevents the risk of the dissemination of nuclear arms and, at the same time, *stimulates to the maximum, the use of nuclear energy – in all its forms – for the social and economic process of all peoples. Under those conditions, [Brazil] refuses to sign the NPT because it considers it a condemnation to a situation of inequality*.[71]

In the status literature, nuclear programs are often seen as examples par excellence of the positive dimension of status-seeking.[72] For example, Larson et al. depict entrance into the nuclear club as a clear example of states trying to pursue the positive distinctiveness that the SIT framework directs us to.[73] Brazil's experience suggests a very different story, however. Entering the nuclear club was an important but by no means primary motive for going ahead with its nuclear program in an era of the NPT. On the contrary, a far more salient motivation of pursuing a nuclear program and mastering the nuclear fuel cycle was negative status management, and the desire to move from the developing to the developed world. The NPT placed restrictions on the possibility of mastering the nuclear fuel cycle, and thus also restricted Brazil's ability to mitigate the effects of Brazil's stigma as an underdeveloped state.[74]

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[69] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: A experiência nuclear da Índia', 21 May 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[70] See, for example, Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Cooperação nuclear Brasil-RFA', 29 July 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26); 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Cooperação nuclear. Brasil-RFA.', 15 October 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26); 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Anteprojeto de Acordo entre o Governo da República Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República Federal da Alemanha sobre Cooperação no Setor dos Usos Pacíficos da Energia Nuclear. Comentarios.', 6 March 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[71] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Conferência Para o Exame do Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares', 30 April 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26), my emphasis.

[72] Leveringhaus and de Estrada, "China's and India's quest for status as responsible nuclear powers."

[73] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers," 24; See also T.V. Paul and Mahesh Shankar, "Status accommodation through institutional means: India's rise and the global order," ibid., ed. T. V. Paul, et al.

[74] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Conferência Para o Exame do Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares', 30 April 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

As calls for a non-proliferation treaty gained traction in the late 1960s, Brazil justified its pursuit of nuclear energy through the prism of its negative status concerns. Silveira argued nuclear energy provides the tools to 'reduce the distance between the developed countries and those countries which are still developing'.[75] Mastering the nuclear fuel cycle was a key component of this pursuit,[76] and not doing so would leave Brazil 'totally vulnerable' to the forces of dependence.[77]

Nuclear energy also grew in importance for Brazil in the 1970s because of the increasing uncertainty over the price of oil. The President and Itamaraty were well aware that Brazil was deeply dependent on petroleum exports, and stable prices were a necessity. There were concerns that sudden rises in price could jeopardise Brazil's prospects of achieving development and normality. Thus, nuclear energy was understood as a way to shield Brazil from the shockwave that a jump in oil prices could have caused and hence, mastering the nuclear fuel cycle would allow Brazil to capture more autonomy and reduce its dependence on 'external' sources of energy. Silveira put it thus:

> Brazil cannot give itself the luxury to not think about the economic aspects of the energy question. We are a big country with a large population, *whose necessities of development have to be attended* in opportune time. For reasons that aren't peculiar to us, we suffer an excessive dependence on petroleum. Recent events [the oil crises] showed us the considerable risks of dependence, to an elevated degree, on sources of imported energy… nuclear energy is, moreover, the only option open to the country… we need to think in terms of autonomy.[78]

While not identical, India's nuclear program has been understood in a similar light. Nayar and Paul have argued that India's nuclear program was pursued 'in the context of economic

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[75] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Reunião entre os assessors de Planhejamento de Ministério das Relações Exteriores e do Departamento de Estado Americano.', 21 January 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[76] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Conferência Para o Exame do Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares', 30 April 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[77] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Reunião entre os assessors de Planhejamento de Ministério das Relações Exteriores e do Departamento de Estado Americano.', 21 January 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[78] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Resumo da Troca de Pontos de Vista dentre o Ministro Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira e o Senhor Warren Christopher, no Palácio Itamaraty', 1 March 1977 (AAS 1974.03.26), my emphasis.

backwardness'.[79] Likewise, Basrur and Sullivan de Estrada allude to a similar notion albeit with different language, arguing India's elite thought 'atomic energy could play an important role in the economic development of the nation, providing an additional power source for India's industrialisation'.[80] Of course, the motivations behind India's nuclear intentions also had a strong security dimension to them.[81] Nevertheless, the main point here is that while it may appear that wanting to appear positively distinctive is the main motivation for would-be great powers in their status-seeking behaviour, it also seems that often what are read as attempts to be 'positively distinctive' are actually just efforts by these states to be 'normal' and cope with their stigma. In this respect, negative status is an equally powerful, if not more important, motive shaping the status-seeking behaviour of these states than positive distinctiveness. The nuclear programs of developing states are a core example of this; while often depicted as attempts to secure positive distinctiveness and move into the 'nuclear club', it appears that for developing would-be great powers, nuclear programs are more about trying to mitigate an economic backwardness in an attempt to be more 'normal'. Perhaps more intriguing than this is also that Brazil does not see its movement up the international pecking order solely in terms of being positively distinct and maintaining a distinctive identity, but rather also by becoming more normal and coping with its stigma.

Relations with the hegemon

In the early 1970s, the United States made Brazil a target of its 'devolution' policy.[82] Devolution was a strategy designed by Nixon's White House to more effectively manage US hegemony through developing key partnerships with sizable regional players in order to avoid entangling Washington in another Vietnam-like situation.[83] This involved forging closer ties with these states who had the capacity to contribute to managing global order. Brazil was a target of this, but turned the offer down. Washington was even willing to recognise Brazil's great power status aspirations in exchange for such a partnership. In a document from the State Department, the Americans argued

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[79] Nayar and Paul, *India in the World Order*, 161, my emphasis.

[80] Basrur and Sullivan de Estrada, *Rising India*, 32.

[81] George Perkovich, *India's nuclear bomb: the impact on global proliferation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 3.

[82] Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon doctrine: American foreign policy and the pursuit of stability, 1969-1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[83] Arnold Nachmanoff to Henry Kissinger, 1970 cited in Matias Spektor, "Equivocal Engagement: Kissinger, Silveira and the Politics of U.S.-Brazil Relations (1969-1983)" (University of Oxford, 2007), 68-69.

> The style of our relations with Brazil is perhaps as important as the substance. Brazil is the largest country in Latin America; it thinks of itself as a great power and assumes that it should have a special relationship with the 'other' great power in the Hemisphere. We should be able to play upon this.[84]

Puzzlingly, we now know that Brazil effectively did precisely what the Nixon administration had wanted it to do: orchestrate coups against leftist leaders and develop a network of anti-communist governments in South America.[85] Why then, would Brazil not simply take the status recognition that the United States was offering? Why did Brazil resoundingly reject this opportunity for closer ties and status from the very audience whose recognition it desired?

Before moving on, an interesting contrast can be drawn with Japan, which accepted a subordinate position relative to the West and the United States in order to enter the great power club. In Brazil's case, being a subordinate to the United States would have been an easy avenue to higher status, and perhaps even major power status, as the experience of Japan demonstrates. The best example of this was Japan's acceptance of a 'second-class' position in international society's top grouping in the 1970s: the Group of 7 (G7).[86] Naylor explains that Japan well and truly saw itself of deserving this second-class status at the time.[87] When Japan was excluded from the G7 Guadalupe meeting, the sentiment felt by some in Japan 'was almost a relief that the Japanese Prime Minister was not invited, for Japan did not have a leader of sufficient calibre to join in informal talks with these veteran politicians of the Western world'.[88] Two key objectives of post-war Japanese foreign policy were 'to please the United States', and 'following the United States lead in foreign policy'.[89] Cooney has argued that this followership and subordinate position was motivated by 'a quest for normalcy'.[90] In other words, part of Japan's understanding of how it was to move up the international

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[84] Arnold Nachmanoff to Henry Kissinger, 1970 cited in ibid.

[85] Tanya Harmer, "Brazil's cold war in the southern Cone, 1970–1975," *Cold War History* 12, no. 4 (2012).

[86] Naylor, *Social Closure*, 124.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Shiro Saito, *Japan at the Summit: Its Role in the Western Alliance and in Asian Pacific Cooperation* (London: Routledge, 1990), 62.

[89] Kevin J. Cooney, *Japan's foreign policy since 1945* (London: Routledge, 2015), 36.

[90] Cooney, *A Quest for Normalcy*, 186.

pecking order was to seek acceptance as a 'normal' after its humiliating defeat in the Second World War, and a degree of subordination was seen as the means to do this.[91]

Galtung has recognised that while some thought Japan would search for a more independent foreign policy in the 1970s,[92] the opposite happened: subordination to the United States only intensified.[93] Zarakol attributes this unwillingness to develop a strongly independent foreign policy and inclination to accept some degree of subordination to the stigma Japan felt in the post-war period.[94] 'Exemplifying [the] dominant norms of the international system' was the way that Japan would deal with its stigma as a result of its loss in the Second World War.[95] Cosying up to the West (and especially the United States), even if this meant some type of subordination, was the way that Japan would seek acceptance as normal. In a nutshell, this stigma inflected its quest for membership in international society's top group especially when it came to accepting a subordinated – or second-class – position within it. This was not limited to Japan. Germany (or West Germany at the time) took a similar route to higher status. It searched for major power status through common initiatives within the European Community,[96] often rejecting opportunities to develop a more independent foreign policy and sacrificing some of its own autonomy and strength. The most illustrative instance of this was (and continues to be) its insistence on developing a common security and foreign policy amongst European states.[97] Indeed, Adler-Nissen attributes these German efforts at self-restraint and some degree of subordination to its defeat stigma.[98] This suggests that the defeat stigma of both Germany and Japan pushed them in similar directions in their status-seeking behaviour. For them to enter the club of great powers, they were both willing to sacrifice some of their autonomy in an attempt to be accepted as normal after their defeats in the Second World War.[99]

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[91] Ibid.

[92] Johan Galtung, "Japan and future world politics," *Journal of Peace Research* 10, no. 4 (1973).

[93] Naylor, *Social Closure*, 126, 43.

[94] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 193-95.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Nicholas Wright, *The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in Germany and the UK: Co-Operation, Co-Optation and Competition* (New York: Springer, 2018).

[97] Ibid.

[98] Adler-Nissen, "Stigma Management," 156-60.

[99] Britain can be considered to have followed a similar path to Germany and Japan after it 'lost' the Suez Crisis, accepting a subordinate position to the US. See, for example, Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002).

Brazil's developing stigma, on the other hand, pushed it in a significantly different direction and toward different status-seeking strategies in its relations with the hegemon. In contrast to Japan and Germany, Brazil attempted to move away from, and not closer to, the United States. This meant a resounding rejection of closer ties. The Brazilians believed that closer political relations could have potentially led to a politically and economically dependent relationship with the United States – which was one of the main agents of the freezing of world power – and this would leave Brazil with little manoeuvre in an increasingly crystallised world order.[100] This would leave it condemned to underdevelopment, acting, as Silveira feared, much like a 'satellite'.[101] As a result, Brazil would take a different – one could say scenic – route to get the recognition of the United States. Brazil began to diversify its political and economic ties internationally and intensify extant relations with Europe. Silveira articulated this by saying 'we had to change our policies in Africa and the Middle East, increase our penetration in Asia… and get closer to Europe because we had to minimise the [relative] importance of the United States [for Brazil]'.[102] In minimising this importance, however, the ultimate goal was in the words of President Geisel, to get the recognition of 'the Americans, but to make that link more fruitful, we have to deal with the others'.[103] This seemingly odd manoeuvre makes more sense in light of Brazil's negative status concerns. I also discuss this policy of 'diversification' in more detail in the subsequent section.

Even where one would expect cooperation between the two states to be forthcoming, there were difficulties. When the interests of the US and Brazil seemingly coincided, for example, in attempting to keep the price of oil lower and constant, Brazil decided to shy away from Washington and keep a low profile in forums like the World Conference on Energy. Avoiding a 'militant position' was crucial for Brazil in the negotiations because the Arab states might have retaliated.[104] This low profile and distance from the US was considered wise due to 'the vulnerability of our position, [and] the dependence on external sources of

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[100] See Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger.', 13 February 1976 (AAS 1974.03.26) and Araújo Castro, "O congelamento do poder mundial."

[101] Silveira, *Um Depoimento*, 10.

[102] On the 'European option' see ibid., 261-73.

[103] Geisel cited in Elio Gaspari, *A Ditadura Encurralada* (São Paulo: Companha das Letras, 2004), 282.

[104] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Conferência Mundial de Energia', 9 July 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

petroleum supply, it is not recommended that we run the risk of antagonising the negotiating parties [namely, Arab states]'.[105]

Indeed, Brazil found relations with Washington difficult during this period, even though there was a concerted effort on the latter's part to try to establish closer relations.[106] Washington was also willing to recognise Brazil's status through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 1976.[107] Kissinger outlined in his memoirs that this was an attempt at status accommodation and recognition, as the MoU was about 'giving Brazil a special status'.[108]

Brazil, despite having its positive status recognised through the MoU, was still discontent because the MoU did little to deal with its negative status in the form of its developing stigma. In the lead up to the MoU's signing, Silveira signalled Brazilian desires with express reference to the relationship between Brazil's positive and negative status concerns:

> Strictly speaking, Brazil is considered the type of candidate to the closed club of the most important nations of the West, to which it cannot yet be admitted because it does not meet certain prerequisites considered essential.[109]

Indeed, Brazil did not consider itself sufficiently normal to be granted access to this club. To overcome this, Brazil would attempt to bind the US to an agreement which would ensure

> the recognition of <u>both</u> [*note Silveira's underlining here*] the countries that Brazil has the conditions to, in the near future, become an important part of the most developed countries of the Western world in the defence and formation of ethical, cultural and economic values of that world. In that sense, *it is in the interest of the USA to help Brazil*

[105] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Conferência Mundial de Energia', 9 July 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[106] Spektor, *Kissinger e o Brasil*.

[107] 'Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultations on Matters of Mutual Interest between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the United States of America, Brasília.', 21 February 1976 (AAS 1974.04.16).

[108] Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 743.

[109] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger.', 13 February 1976 (AAS 1974.03.26).

> *accelerate its general development so it can, as quickly as possible, assume that role*… and for this there will be no 'quid pro quo'.[110]

Brazil looked to the United States to provide it with the transfers of technology that it so desperately felt it needed to truly transcend its condition of economic underdevelopment and ensure the 'viability of Brazil as a great power'.[111]

This was made so difficult by various forces in the United States attempting to block Brazilian nuclear deals with West Germany and prevent transfers of technology from the US to Brazil.[112] It was not enough to recognise the 'new status' that Brazil had acquired without also ensuring it was able to overcome its negative status concerns too.[113] Brazil was most disappointed that the United States was prepared to recognise its status aspirations, but was unwilling to help Brazil mitigate its condition of abnormality. Some trade concessions had been made as a result of the MoU, especially in areas sensitive for the Brazilians like textiles and footwear.[114] But overall the tone in Brazil was frustration because it felt the US seemed to have little interest in seeing Brazil escape its conditions of underdevelopment, apart from a handful of trade concessions which, in Brazilian eyes, amounted to very little.[115] In Silveira's words, it felt at the time like 'Washington is forcing its hand and everything indicates it is its purpose to create a situation of growing constraint for the Brazilian government'.[116] There is a stark contrast here between Brazilian wishes for the US to help its Southern neighbour escape its condition of underdevelopment, and the reality of it, which Silveira articulated as

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[110] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger.', 13 February 1976 (AAS 1974.03.26), my emphasis.

[111] Governo do Brasil, "Metas e Bases para Ação de Govêrno," 15.

[112] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Sivleira, aos Senhores Estagiários da Escola Superior de Guerra. Rio de Janeiro', 19 May 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[113] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Sivleira, aos Senhores Estagiários da Escola Superior de Guerra. Rio de Janeiro', 19 May 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27); 'Conferência Pronunciada por su Excelência o Senhor Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriors, ante o Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas', 20 September 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[114] Kissinger to Silveira, 8 May 1976 (AAS 1974.04.23); Kissinger to Silveira, 27 May 1976 (AAS 1974.04.23).

[115] Silveira to Ministro de Estado de Fazenda, Mário H. Simonsen, 4 March 1976 (AAS 1974.04.23); Speech by Silveira in Rio de Janeiro, "Conferência Pronunciada pelo Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira , No Escola de Comandoe Estado-Maior da Aeronática (Ecemar)", 25 October 1976 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[116] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por su Excelência o Senhor Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriors, ante o Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas', 20 September 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

follows: 'if Brazilian development were to be carried out under the wishes of the United States of America, we will be destined to find continuous limitations to our emergence as a nation'.[117]

US-Brazil relations took a turn for the worst with the election of Jimmy Carter at the very end of 1976 who began to criticise Brazil's human rights record as well as its nuclear program.[118] Interestingly, Brazilian officials perceived American criticism as a 'disguised form of dependence', even in the field of human rights. Silveira argued 'Brazil cannot accept any form of dependence, whether it be disguised or in any other form'. [119]

Overall, it is difficult to fully come to terms with the turbulent and puzzling record of US-Brazil relations in the 1970s – even before the election of Carter in 1976 – without considering Brazil's negative status concerns related to the severe stigma it held about its underdevelopment. Silveira, in a speech, alludes to the Americans' incapacity to understand his country's predicament and stigma about its underdevelopment:

> with no other country in the world are our relations as close as the ones we share with the US. We have profound cultural affinities; we have an intense economic relationship; the friendship between the two states is traditional and sincere. Paradoxically, however, it is our relations with the United States of America that are at the front of some of the most constant concerns of our government… The disparities of political and economic power between the US and Brazil are the source of constant reciprocal misunderstandings, aggravated by the feeling, somewhat immature, of moral superiority, something that is still very present in American behaviour.[120]

He continued by criticising the United States for not understanding Brazil's predicament of development:

> Washington did nothing to help developing countries. This situation of political and economic circumstances should bring about a better understanding from the parties

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[117] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por su Excelência o Senhor Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriors, ante o Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas', 20 September 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[118] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Sivleira, aos Senhores Estagiários da Escola Superior de Guerra. Rio de Janeiro', 19 May 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[119] 'Azeredo diz que Brasil não aceita dependência', no date (AAS 1974.04.23).

[120] Speech by Silveira in Rio de Janeiro, "Conferência Pronunciada pelo Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, No Escola de Comandoe Estado-Maior da Aeronática (Ecemar)", 25 October 1976 (AAS 1974.05.27).

> in Washington of our efforts to develop… They [the Americans] developed twisted interpretations, however, as they view these problems as security issues, probably provoked by short term economic interests.[121]

Other countries, like Japan, Britain, and France, Silveira insisted, understood this predicament and these states shared an 'economic friendship with Brazil'. On the contrary, Silveira argued that Brazil's relationship with the United States – given its refusal to budge on questions of transfers of technology and protectionism – resembled 'vassalage'.[122]

To summarise, Brazil wanted to mitigate the condition that disqualified it as a 'normal', and this was perceived as essential to ensure 'the viability of Brazil as a great power'.[123] Washington was seen as a hinderance to this goal of achieving development and Brazil escaping its condition as 'abnormal', despite being willing to recognise Brazil's positive status aspirations. Thus, Brazil's negative status concerns in the form of its developing stigma offer powerful insights into the relationship the Brazilian military dictatorship shared with Washington during this period. Brazil believed Washington was 'locking it in' to a position of abnormality and social disqualification as 'underdeveloped', thus making it difficult to move up the international hierarchy of states. In contrast to the SIT-inspired framework, Brazil was not looking to be positively distinct and maintain its distinctive identity to improve its position on this ladder of stratification, but rather become more 'normal'.

Relations with the rest: Europe and the Third World

As mentioned previously, Brazil's negative status concerns surrounding its stigma pushed it toward a more 'scenic' route to gain recognition from the United States. It engaged in a policy of 'diversification' in the 1970s which saw it hugely expand its relations with other states. This had two purposes: first, gain recognition from Western Europe with the hope of the US following suit;[124] and second, to 'expand, through economic and political means, the

[121] Speech by Silveira in Rio de Janeiro, "Conferência Pronunciada pelo Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, No Escola de Comandoe Estado-Maior da Aeronática (Ecemar)", 25 October 1976 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[122] Speech by Silveira in Rio de Janeiro, "Conferência Pronunciada pelo Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, No Escola de Comandoe Estado-Maior da Aeronática (Ecemar)", 25 October 1976 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[123] Governo do Brasil, "Metas e Bases para Ação de Govêrno," 15.

[124] Geisel cited in Gaspari, *A Ditadura Encurralada*, 282.

degree of autonomy in our external action'.[125] Silveira would say 'we opened up a wide alternative channel of communication with Western Europe: the repercussions to this were very much felt'.[126]

On the first of these, status recognition from the states of Western Europe was forthcoming:

> The establishment of systems of consultation with the Federal Republic of Germany, with Great Britain, with the French Republic and the Italian Republic, came to demonstrate that the leading countries of the Western World in Europe recognised Brazil's new status internationally, something which was expressly mentioned to me by the heads of government of those four countries.[127]

These linkages were designed to get the United States to notice Brazil. Silveira affirmed that 'only through triangulation would our voice be heard by the great powers'.[128] He would go onto state in his oral history that it was through playing the European card that the United States started to 'look for' Brazil, leading eventually to the signing of the MoU in 1976.[129] It was also designed 'to minimise the [relative] importance of the United States [for Brazil]'.[130] Of course, nuclear cooperation with Western European states and especially West Germany was sought out to maximise the options Brazil had in its quest for development. These linkages led to a huge increase in trade too, meaning for the first time since the beginning of the 20th century that Western Europe was Brazil's largest most important trading partner.[131] But this expansion of ties was not limited to Europe. Brazil massively expanded its relations with the Third World as well.

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[125] Silveira, 'Palestra de sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, por ocasião do Seguno Painel de Assuntos Internacionais de Comissão de Relações Exteriores da Câmara dos Deputados. Brasilia.', 27 October 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[126] Silveira, 'Conferência Pronunciada por sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Sivleira, aos Senhores Estagiários da Escola Superior de Guerra. Rio de Janeiro', 19 May 1977 (AAS 1974.05.27).

[127] Silveira to Geisel, "Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger", 13 February 1976 (AAS 1973.03.26)

[128] Silveira cited in Spektor, "Equivocal Engagement," 157.

[129] Silveira, *Um Depoimento*, 144.

[130] On the 'European option' see ibid., 261-73. See also Speech by Silveira in Rio de Janeiro, "Conferência Pronunciada pelo Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, No Escola de Comandoe Estado-Maior da Aeronática (Ecemar)", 25 October 1976 (AAS 74.05.27).

[131] Speech by Silveira in Rio de Janeiro, "Conferência Pronunciada pelo Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, No Escola de Comandoe Estado-Maior da Aeronática (Ecemar)", 25 October 1976 (AAS 1974.05.27).

Indeed, the interpretation of Brazilian ties with the Third World elaborated upon here goes beyond SIT's narrow focus on would-be great powers using leadership opportunities in the Third World to stake a claim solely to 'positive distinctiveness' in order to 'maintain a distinctive identity' and accrue higher status in the process.[132] Leadership in forums like Bandung and the Third World movement are oft-cited examples of this.[133] In contrast, the analysis here adds a layer of nuance to the insights developed by SIT, suggesting that this type of leadership is not just an attempt to stand out as positively distinct but also a move by these actors to position themselves as 'more normal' than the typically 'abnormal' and 'passive' actors in the Third World itself.

Therefore, leadership and participation in these forums was by no means a simple attempt by Brazil to embrace its identity as a Third World state. Indeed, the Brazilians seemed to hold much, but not all, of the Third World movement in contempt. For example, Brazil maintained mere observer status in the NAM, and in reference to a NAM conference Silveira wrote:

> At every conference, new countries enter the movement, recently emergent from independence wars and burning in their condemnation of those very powers against which they fight; some of those new members, in addition to resentment, bring an ideological conditioning which impedes from maintaining equidistance from the superpowers.[134]

Similarly, Brazil was worried that the influx of new members into the group would lead to a dilution of any calls for a 'reformulation of the normative structures of the international economy' because they were unable to escape the pull of the superpowers.[135] These states, at the beginning of the 1970s, drove Brazil to condemn the movement.[136] A number of documents suggest that while Brazil did see the Third World movement as useful, it

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[132] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers," 36, 50.

[133] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 74.

[134] Silveira, 'V Conferência de Chefes de Estado ou de Governo dos Paises Não-Alinhados, Colombo.', August 1976 (AAS 1975.00.00).

[135] Silveira to Geisel, "Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: II Conferencia Geral de UNIDO", 22 January 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26); 'V Conferência de Chefes de Estado ou de Governo dos Paises Não-Alinhados, Colombo.', August 1976 (AAS 1975.00.00).

[136] Carlos Estevam Martins, "A evolução da política externa brasileira na década 64/74," *Estudos Cebrap* 12 (1975).

nevertheless also held the movement in disdain for its overly 'ideological' attitude toward the reformulation of the economic and political structures of world affairs, and thus took a similar view of the Non-Aligned Movement that much of the developed world had.[137] This type of 'in-group' discrimination is typical behaviour of a stigmatised actor, according to Goffman. He reminds us 'the stigmatized individual exhibits a tendency to stratify his 'own' to the degree to which their stigma is apparent and obtrusive. He can then take up in regard to those who are more evidently stigmatized than himself the attitudes the normals take to him'.[138]

However, as the decade went on the Third World movement was also a natural ally to address developmental concerns, especially given some of these states were going to be able to 'escape the fatality of being but passive spectators, manipulated in accordance with the Great Alliance',[139] especially the petroleum exporting states.[140] Even whilst dependent on petroleum imports, Brazil attempted to broker deals with Arab oil exporters to ensure predictable prices and supply in order to shield itself from the impact of sudden price increases.[141]

Nonetheless, Brazil saw the Third World movement as a means to address its negative status concerns and receive recognition from the Western industrialised states. The calls for a New International Economic Order presented an opportunity for Brazil to kill these two birds with one stone. Brazil wanted to take a leadership role in the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) to make the organisation itself more efficient and responsive. This was meant to 'promote the creation of an Industrial Development Fund that could facilitate concessions to Brazil for more substantial [technological] assistance… to break the system

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137 See, for example, Silveira to Geisel, "Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: II Conferencia Geral de UNIDO", 22 January 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26); 'V Conferência de Chefes de Estado ou de Governo dos Paises Não-Alinhados, Colombo.', August 1976 (AAS 1975.00.00); Informação para o Senhor Presidente da Républica: Visita do Secretário do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos, George P. Schultz.', 26 March 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26); "Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger", 13 February 1976 (AAS 1973.03.26).

138 Goffman, *Stigma*, 130-31.

139 Silveira, *Um Depoimento*, 10.

140 Silveira to Geisel, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Petróleo de política externa. Reunião com o Presidente da PETROBRÁS.', 22 January 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

141 Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República Acordos com Arábia Saudita, Iraque e Coveite. Visita já aceita do Chanceler Sakkaf ao Brasil', 28 May 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26).

of dependence… that inhibits and conditions national efforts at industrial development'.[142] At the same time, this leadership role would ensure

> projection, in a wide forum, of the Brazilian experience and points of view, in order to ensure a responsible leadership role… which does not hesitate, whenever possible, to explore and expand the bands of coincidence with industrialised countries.[143]

In the Third World, both a desire to be positively distinct and a desire to be accepted as a normal were at play. Brazil was desperate to be accepted as a normal by the industrialised West, and in particular, the United States. It was acutely aware of the conditions that disqualified it from the acceptance it sought, and the Third World movement and ties with Europe were central to achieving this.

In particular, it seems that the Third World movement was indeed instrumental in gaining Brazil a sense of positive distinctiveness, but it would be wrong to see this as an attempt to maintain a distinctive identity as a developing state, as proponents of SIT have interpreted other states' attempts to stake leadership claims in the Global South.[144] On the other hand, leadership in the Third World movement also became a means for Brazil to distance itself from the weaker states of the developing world, moving itself away from the perceived abnormality that haunted it. Brazil was deeply concerned about its 'global image… in the foreign press' as a developing state.[145] Of course, the stigma literature suggests that positioning itself as a leader in the Third World may have in fact reinforced Brazil's stigma.[146] This is because, in addition to drawing attention to the fact that Brazil might have been more normal than most of the abnormal developing world, it also highlighted the fact that Brazil was nevertheless an abnormal 'developing' state.[147] Perhaps this is why the Brazilians were so often hesitant to commit wholeheartedly to the Third World cause. For example, sometimes Brazil tried to insist on negotiating directly with the US and the other developed

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[142] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Infomação para o Senhor Presidente da República: II Conferência Geral da UNIDO', 22 January 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[143] Silveira to Geisel, "Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: II Conferencia Geral de UNIDO", 22 January 1975 (AAS 1974.03.26)

[144] Larson and Shevchenko, "Managing rising powers," 36, 50.

[145] Silveira to Geisel, MRE, 'Informação para o Senhor Presidente da República: Sugestões para um programa de trabalho da Assessoria de Imprensa do Itamaraty', 20 April 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26).

[146] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 190.

[147] Ibid.

states when it came to trade concessions, as it had no interest in being thrown in with the rest of the Third World. Instead, it wanted to 'dialogue directly' with the US and the developed world, commensurate with its desire to be treated as a 'normal'.[148] As I have alluded to already, this type of 'in-group' discrimination is a classic tactic employed by these stigmatised actors to try and position themselves as more 'normal'.[149]

Conclusion

This chapter has pursued two main aims. First, I empirically fleshed out the theoretical claims made in the previous chapter: namely, the SIT framework has overemphasised the desire to maintain a distinctive identity and positive distinctiveness at the expense of the negative status dynamics identified by the literature on stigma in IR. To correct this, I provided empirical support for the conceptual framework laid out in Chapter 1 which theorised status in positive and negative terms. The point of this exercise was to preserve the valuable insights of the SIT account, while integrating them into an analytical framework that more accurately reflected the factors driving would-be great powers' quest for higher standing in international politics. These negative status concerns manifest in two ways. First, they can actually be the driver of status-seeking behaviour. For example, it is by becoming more 'normal' one can move up the international ladder of stratification. And second, these negative status dynamics – in the form of stigma – inflect and shape how states go about pursuing and securing recognition for their status aspirations.

The second purpose of this chapter was to ascertain how being stigmatised as 'developing' or 'underdeveloped' shaped would-be great power status-seeking behaviour. Using the case of Brazil, I suggested being stigmatised as developing and underdeveloped pushed Brazil to be concerned about any kind of dependence or subordination, be it in political or economic terms, to another state or the global economy, because these were seen as reinforcing its identity as an 'abnormal' underdeveloped state. Autonomy from dependence and subordination were the objectives that Brazil relentlessly pursued, in ways that bordered on paranoia; indeed, achieving these outcomes was understood as crucial to creating conditions that would allow Brazil to escape its stigmatised condition of underdevelopment, and these

[148] See, for example, Silveira to Geisel, MRE, Informação para o Senhor Presidente da Républica: Visita do Secretário do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos, George P. Schultz.', 26 March 1974 (AAS 1974.03.26); "Subsídios para as conversações com o Secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger", 13 February 1976 (AAS 1973.03.26)

[149] Goffman, *Stigma*, 130-31.

concerns inflected its pursuit of great power status. This was particularly the case in its relations with the US. Here I also contrasted the developing stigma with the defeat stigma, as it proved the best examples to compare and contrast these two types of negative statuses, and more fully isolate the effects of each.

Importantly, these empirical illustrations also substantiated the other theoretical claim of this thesis: that being seen as 'normal' is a crucial factor driving these states' quest for higher status in world politics, and not just maintaining a distinctive identity and being positively distinct. This strongly resembles Weber's claim that in high status groups, 'a specific style of life is expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle'.[150] It is thus a common normality, not difference, that seems to define those at the top of international society. Brazil's experience and attempt to enter the great power club suggests something similar. The theoretical framework substantiated here has reflected both this conceptual claim and the empirical experience of would-be great powers more accurately than the SIT account. The subsequent chapter attempts to summarise these themes and conclusions, before considering some potential avenues for future inquiry.

[150] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 932.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to ask what a consideration of stigma might add to our understanding of would-be great power status-seeking behaviour, in addition to attempting to uncover precisely how being stigmatised as 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' could potentially shape this pursuit of higher standing in international politics. The main theoretical framework put forward by this thesis demands that we conceptualise status in world politics as dualistic: in positive and negative terms. Positive status concerns in this sense relate to the types of dynamics which SIT draws attention to, while the negative dimension of status has its roots in studies of stigma in IR. The value-added of this conceptualisation was demonstrated empirically through the case of Brazil's aspirations for great power status in the 1970s, as both dynamics were in play and both frequently interacted with each other as Brazil looked to move into the great power club. This suggests SIT's insistence that positive distinctiveness is the main strategy used by would-be great powers because these states aspire to maintain a distinctive identity is misplaced and inaccurate. Indeed, this notion of status and status-seeking is overly reductive. In fact, would-be great powers are also deeply conscious that their abnormalities are a serious obstacle to them being accepted as 'normal', and this often leads them to distancing themselves from, or even attempting to overcome, this abnormal identity in the first place.

This conclusion recaps the thesis' main findings as well as its foremost implications and contributions for our understanding of the status-seeking of would-be great powers more generally, before then considering some potentially fruitful avenues for further research based on this thesis' main findings.

A brief recap of the findings

Chapter 1 of the thesis laid the theoretical groundwork for the empirical investigation in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 sought to provide evidence for my proposed two-faced theorisation of would-be great power status and status-seeking, while also fleshing out the nature of the 'underdeveloped' stigma and ascertaining how it influences these actors' quest for higher standing in world politics. I made a number of key findings.

With respect to the first prong of the argument about the effect of negative status (stigmatised abnormal traits, behaviours, and characteristics) on positive status status-seeking, I found: first, what often appears like a state trying to be positively distinctive can actually just be an attempt by that state to distance itself from the very characteristic that makes it abnormal; and second, negative status concerns inflect positive status-seeking, shaping how a state goes about securing recognition for its status aspirations. This necessitates a consideration of negative status and stigma in illuminating would-be great powers' quest for higher standing in global politics given this factor's powerful influence on these states' behaviour. This shows the value-added of my proposed theoretical account, which incorporates these insights while preserving the valuable parts of the SIT-based framework.

Second, I determined the more precise effect of being stigmatised as 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' on the status-seeking behaviour of would-be great powers. I demonstrated empirically that this can often produce a paranoia about being seen or cast as a 'typical' developing state: a passive, dependent spectator in world politics. As a consequence, these underdeveloped would-be great powers are deeply sensitive – above and beyond what one would normally expect – toward any type of political or economic dependence, which is seen to only reinforce the stigma. Rather, the developing stigma pushes would-be great powers to forcefully pursue political and economic autonomy to escape their dependence and underdevelopment. This powerfully shapes these states' pursuit of recognition. As I showed in the case of Brazil, Brazil ended up taking a more 'scenic' route to recognition from the United States in the mid-1970s as it was deeply worried that accepting US recognition – and the closer relationship it would entail – earlier in the decade would reinforce Brazil's stigma and curtail its capacity to become a great power.

Implications and contributions of these findings

The most important policy implication of the conceptualisation of status proffered in this study pertains to status recognition and accommodation. Scholarship on status has established how misrecognition and status denial of would-be great powers' status ambitions have the potential to lead to international conflict and revisionism.[1] But as I argued in the

[1] See, for example, Michelle Murray, *The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Ward, "Status, Stratified Rights, and Accommodation in International Relations."; Reinhard Wolf, "Respect and disrespect in international politics: the significance of status recognition," *International Theory* 3, no. 1 (2011).

introduction, proper and successful processes of recognition and accommodation depend on correctly diagnosing the status ambitions and aspirations of would-be great powers. The dominant and mainstream view of this at the moment – based on the SIT framework – argues that accommodation and recognition of great power aspirants will only take place 'if the United States can find ways to recognise their distinctive status and identities'.[2] My thesis provides a very strong qualification to this view. I have argued that the crucial dimension of status recognition and accommodation is finding novel ways to recognise and accommodate these states in ways that are commensurate with their status aspirations, their positive distinctiveness, *and* their desire to attain 'equal acceptance as "normal" states'.[3] I hope my contribution is a first step on the way to better policy practices of recognition and accommodation.

This thesis has also made two theoretical contributions. The first theoretical contribution is the Janus-faced account of status I proposed to replace the dominant SIT-based framework. The second conceptual contribution is a fleshing out of what the effects of being stigmatised as underdeveloped are on the status-seeking behaviour of would-be great powers. Of course, these are 'first cuts' and the theoretical arguments put forward here remain preliminary and tentative. More research needs to be done to refine both the framework proffered by this study as well as its findings relating to the 'underdeveloped' stigma.

Avenues for future research

In addition to relaxing some of the theoretical and methodological assumptions I made throughout the thesis to provide an account of the interactive pathways and mechanisms of positive and negative statuses within states, I propose three main avenues for further research related to the themes investigated here.

The first, and most intuitive, is an extension of the account established here to the behaviour of Russia and China, the two would-be great powers which have garnered the most attention.[4] One might reasonably suspect that they are unfazed by considerations of stigma:

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[2] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers," 66.

[3] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 247.

[4] Larson and Shevchenko, "Status seekers."; Deborah Welch Larson, "Will China be a New Type of Great Power?," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8, no. 4 (2015); Andrej Krickovic and Yuval Weber, "What can Russia teach us about change? Status-seeking as a catalyst for transformation in international politics," *International Studies Review* 20, no. 2 (2018).

both seem to have veered toward increasingly authoritarian modes of governance in a world that is increasingly defined by the proliferation of liberal democracy. Indeed, these states have been accused of undermining the 'liberal world order' and its foundations through their atrocious human rights records and, more recently, their activities in cyberspace.

From the perspective advanced in this thesis, these behaviours appear to be attacks on the very normative structures that make these states feel stigmatised in the first place. As Zarakol has argued, even when a state fights to reject the normative framework that is largely responsible for such a state's stigmatisation, the stigma is still the primary factor driving its behaviour.[5] In addition to being animated by an attempt to erode the normative structures of the liberal world order, there may also be genuine efforts here to try to reform these very structures to capture a degree of 'normative power'.[6] Keene argues that normative power involves shaping 'the norms by which other states operate… not just by saying and doing things, but in part simply by being different, by embodying a distinctive set of values that others wish to emulate'.[7] Here again we can see a sense of positive distinctiveness popping up in our discussion of status. But this sense of positive distinctiveness appears only as a means to an end; the end goal being to normalise that very distinctiveness as a standard for others to follow. The overall goal is thus to make oneself the very paragon of normality that others strive to mimic. This is entirely commensurate with the claims of this study. Nevertheless, this is only a tentative speculation and more work needs to be done to explore these hypotheses.

The second pathway for future research is the development of a completely new theoretical account of status that builds on the insights crafted here. Such an account could start with the Bourdiean and Weberian position that power is multidimensional, and the social world is subsequently stratified in several different, but overlapping, ways.[8] The foundations of the perspective proffered in this study echo this sentiment, but the thesis itself never went as far as to specify precisely how these intersect or, to use Ruggie's apt phrasing, 'hang together'.[9] Understanding how these axes fit together to provide a fully formed picture of the stratified

[5] Zarakol, *After Defeat*, 95.

[6] Keene, "Social status, social closure and the idea of Europe as a 'normative power'."

[7] Ibid., 940.

[8] Keene, "The Standard of 'Civilisation'."

[9] Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?."

nature of the international social space could prove fruitful indeed. Moreover, historicising the main axes of stratification in the modern international system to understand why it is those axes, and not others, that stratify our world today is another potentially interesting avenue to go down.

The third possible way to expand upon this inquiry would be to develop a typology of stigmas beyond just those developed here and ascertain their effects on status-seeking. This could be confined just to would-be great powers to see how different stigmas affect the status-seeking behaviour of these states in different ways. Of course, one could also analyse and compare the impact which one type of stigma might have on a number of states which occupy different status positions. This would also be a useful extension into the literature on the status-seeking behaviour of small states and middle powers.[10]

Final remarks

This thesis has sought to develop a novel conceptualisation of the factors pushing and pulling would-be great powers in their quest for higher standing in international politics. If it has provoked more questions than it has answers for its readers, it has done its job. The main takeaway however is that while noble in its aims, the orthodox way of understanding would-be great power status and status-seeking needs to be revised. This thesis has provided a first cut at such a revision.

[10] de Carvalho and Neumann, *Small State Status Seeking*.

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