

Acceptable in the EU? Why some immigration restrictionists support EU mobility

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Abstract

Why do some Europeans support immigration from within the European Union, while rejecting immigration from elsewhere? Acceptance of intra-EU mobility—even by those who wish to restrict immigration more generally—is important for popular support for the EU itself. This paper identifies and attempts to explain the preferences of “EU-only inclusionists”: EU nationals who support relatively high levels of immigration, but only from within the EU. We analyze an underexplored experimental module in the European Social Survey to explore EU inclusionism in relation to other preference profiles. We find that identification with the EU helps explain specific support for EU mobility, while subnational (racial and religious) identities are associated with a preference for European migrants over non-Europeans, but not with specific support for intra-EU movement.

Keywords

European Union, immigration attitudes, migration, mobility, supranational identity

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) requires immigration policy that sharply differentiates between EU and non-EU nationals. Intra-EU mobility is a foundational right for EU nationals, one of the basic, non-negotiable “four freedoms,” alongside free movement of goods, capital, and services. By contrast, member states can and do develop policies to restrict immigration from non-EU countries. The EU even has a distinct nomenclature for each type of movement: “mobility” of EU nationals within EU member states is distinguished

from “migration” by “Third Country Nationals (TCNs)” from outside the EU (Ruhs, 2017a).

However, European publics may not make the same sharp distinction (Geddes and Hadj-Abdou, 2016). The disjuncture between public understandings of immigration and elite rhetoric and policy may pose a significant challenge to the ongoing public support for the EU itself. Anti-immigration public opinion was essential to the Brexit movement (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017), and has created pressure for new restrictions on free movement in other EU states, which the EU has resisted (Ruhs, 2018). This environment makes it an urgent matter for policy-makers and scholars to understand whether EU citizens recognize the fundamental distinction between intra-EU mobility and non-EU migration, and what if anything generates support for this differentiation. However, little research examines EU citizens’ attitudes toward immigration across this fundamental policy dividing line.

This study address this gap in the literature. We focus on understanding what we call Europe-only and EU-only inclusionism: the pattern in which individuals support immigration from within Europe or the EU while opposing immigration from the rest of the world. Thus, we ask: why do some Europeans favor European immigration, while opposing immigration from other parts of the world?

We analyze attitudes of nationals/citizens across 20 countries of the EU and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Our research design distinguishes between support for EU or European inflows, from a general support for immigration or a preference for non-EU/non-European inflows. We then use discrete choice models to analyze the determinants of distinct patterns

of immigration preferences, particularly focusing on support for intra-European migration. Descriptively, we find that Europe-specific inclusionism is relatively rare, highlighting the challenge facing supporters of free movement. Our analysis further shows that support for immigration from Europe can come from supranational identification with the EU, but can also arise from exclusionary versions of more parochial subgroup identities, particularly along religious lines. Our study adds to a growing literature on the role of supranational or cosmopolitan identities (Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Teney et al., 2013) in support for the EU and its policies.

Explaining European or EU inclusionism

Much research addresses the determinants of attitudes toward immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Europeans' attitudes hinge on the extent to which they perceive immigration as a threat, to either concrete or symbolic resources (McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Threat perceptions, in turn, often depend on perceptions of who immigrants are. Public opinion distinguishes among immigrants according to their level of education or job skills (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010), reason for immigrating (Blinder, 2015), and racial, ethnic, national, or religious identities (Bansak et al., 2016; Ford, 2008; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016), all of which may relate to the degree and nature of threats that people perceive from immigration (Azrout and Wojcieszak, 2017).

Despite the political importance of the distinction between intra-EU and non-EU migration, the literature provides little guidance on whether migrants' EU citizenship is one of the dimensions that shape attitudes. We lack up-to-date answers even for simple descriptive questions, such as how many EU citizens prefer intra-EU mobility to non-EU

migration. Prior work suggests that “EU inclusionism” is uncommon: McLaren (2001) finds that most Europeans had the same attitudes toward immigrants from within and from outside the EU, even prior to EU enlargement in 2004; since then, increased economic and cultural heterogeneity would seem to decrease the likelihood that anti-immigration Europeans will make an exception for fellow EU nationals (Ruhs, 2017a).

Even if selective support for European migration remains rare, there are important political and theoretical reasons to attempt to understand the determinants of the Europe-only and EU-only inclusionist patterns of migration preferences. Is EU inclusionism related to supranational forms of political identity, or to parochial forces such as nationalism and cultural chauvinism? Or perhaps EU inclusionism stems from broader economic and political drivers of immigration attitudes and EU support.

Identities

We begin with symbolic or identity-based explanations, investigating two contrasting identities that Europeans may hold. On one hand, identification with the EU itself may generate specific support for intra-EU mobility. On the other hand, support for European migration might reflect a more ethno-cultural vision of European identity, in which European migrants are preferred because they are seen as more similar on other identity dimensions such as race, ethnicity, or religion.

The EU is a locus of a supranational political identity for some citizens (Bruter, 2009; Kentmen-Cin and Erisen, 2017; Risse, 2010). Fligstein et al. (2012) show that European identity and a national identity can and do co-exist within many EU citizens. However, many EU citizens develop strong EU identities; Kuhn (2015) finds that transnational experiences (such as living or studying abroad) increase individual identification with the

EU, but only a small subset of EU nationals ever have these experiences. Likewise, supranational identification with the EU, as opposed to identification with one's member state, is less common among EU nationals without a non-EU immigrant background (Erisen 2017).

Prior work finds political meaning in this variation in EU identification, notably in predicting support for further EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Extending this line of thought, we hypothesize that identification with the EU will also predict EU inclusionist immigration attitudes. Curtis (2014) found indirect evidence of this pattern, inferring from aggregate data on European and non-European migration flows.

Our second set of identity-based hypotheses focuses on more exclusive, subgroup-based identities. Opposition to immigration is associated with negative attitudes toward demographic or cultural out-groups, especially along the lines of race/ethnicity, religion, and language (Creighton et al., 2018). These subgroup identity preferences might also be predictors of a preference for European over non-European immigration, since Europeans may perceive non-Europeans as less similar to themselves along these dimensions. Religion may be especially important; Muslims have been constructed as a threat to Europe and to citizens in many member states, leading to substantial negative sentiment applied specifically to Muslims (Azrout and Wojcieszak, 2017; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008).

We therefore hypothesize that Europeans who value shared ethnocultural characteristics will be more likely to hold Europe inclusionist preferences: accepting European immigration while opposing non-European inflows. Note that this differentiation focuses on Europe as a locus of ethnocultural identities rather than on the EU as a supranational political entity. The European-ness of potential migrants here acts as a proxy

for other characteristics such as whiteness, Christianity, or linguistic or cultural similarity. While both supranational and subnational identities might encourage a preference for Europeans over other immigrants, these two sources of Europe-only inclusionism bear very different normative and political implications.

Resources

Aside from identity-based considerations, citizens may respond to immigration as a potential economic threat. In the labor market theory of immigration attitudes, each individual is more likely to welcome migrants who complement her own role in the labor market while opposing immigration of labor market substitutes (Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Low-skilled “native” workers should oppose the immigration of low-skilled workers but welcome high-skilled workers; high-skilled native workers should hold the opposite set of preferences.

In this theory, skills, not origins, matter; EU citizenship plays no direct role in explaining attitudes. However, EU citizenship may play an important indirect role as a proxy for labor market position. Intra-EU mobility, unlike non-EU migration, can be viewed as a likely route to low-skilled jobs. Because of free movement, EU member states cannot (directly) restrict the arrivals of low-skilled workers from within the EU. Fears of large flows of unskilled workers have long been a part of anti-migration, anti-EU discourse, crystallized in the widely circulated trope of the “Polish plumber,” expected by some to overwhelm domestic labor markets and drive down wages and employment among native workers (Favell, 2008; Spigelman, 2013). By contrast, EU member states limit immigration from outside the EU, including restrictions based on skill and income designed to attract only the highly qualified (Cerna, 2014).

These associations between EU status and immigrants' skill levels, when combined with the labor market theory of immigration attitudes, generate additional hypotheses for EU inclusionism. In the labor market theory, low-skilled EU workers should be more likely to oppose intra-EU migration, whereas high-skilled workers should show greater support (while being less likely to support non-EU migration). This is because the hypothetical Polish plumber is a competitor for low-skilled native-born workers in France or Germany, but a complement (and service provider) for high-skilled native-born workers in those countries. The reverse relationships hold for the high-skilled non-EU immigrant worker coming to fill professional jobs as IT workers, doctors, or researchers, for example.

Alternate economic models of immigration preferences argue that restrictionist attitudes reflect sociotropic concerns about the impact of immigration on the national economy (Gerber et al., 2017; Valentino et al., 2017), or on public finances in particular (Facchini and Mayda, 2009). However, the existing literature does not provide adequate data to distinguish between EU and non-EU migrants' real or perceived impacts on national economies or on national fiscal burdens. Thus, we do not generate hypotheses about European or EU inclusionist attitudes from these theories of economic impacts.

Political engagement

Finally, we develop hypotheses around "cognitive mobilization," a prominent concept in prior literature on support for the EU and its political projects (Hobolt and de Vries, 2016). This theoretical perspective has roots in Zaller's (1992) leading model of public opinion, in which citizens take cues from elites about what political attitudes they should hold. People who know more about politics are more likely to receive, understand, and accept cues from politicians and other elites (Zaller, 1992). Citizens who are most cognitively

engaged in politics follow elite opinion most strongly, gravitating toward consensus on issues where elites agree, and polarizing when elites disagree.

In the EU case, political engagement has traditionally increased support for the EU and for EU integration, long seen as an elite project (Gabel, 1998), possibly because of exposure to political elites’ pro-EU messages (McLaren, 2001). To be sure, elites have become more divided on the EU, with the rise of Eurosceptic parties and shifts in ideology (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Nonetheless, elites remain more supportive of the EU than the general public, while Euroscepticism springs disproportionately from ideological extremes with less attachment to mainstream parties (Elsas et al., 2016).

From this perspective on EU support, we would expect greater “cognitive mobilization” or engagement with politics to predict support for EU-only inclusionist preferences. As noted above, the EU and supporting political elites at the national level draw an extremely sharp distinction between intra-EU mobility and non-EU migration, in both policy and rhetoric. People who pay attention to politics will be more likely to absorb elites’ nuanced, elite-endorsed ranking of potential migration inflows. Less attentive citizens are thus expected to be more likely to miss these nuances, and to react to immigration in broader brush strokes.

Table 1 summarizes the key hypotheses. For each theoretical perspective, we list the factors associated with increased preference for immigration either from the EU specifically, or from Europe but not specifically from the EU. Again, these predictions refer to a *relative preference* for EU or European migrants, rather than general support for immigration.

Table 1. Hypotheses

Expected preference

<i>Category of hypotheses</i>	Pro EU	Pro European
Identity	EU identity (+)	Preference for ethnically and culturally similar immigrants (+)
Resources	High skilled (+) Low skilled (-)	
Cognitive & elite “cues” mobilization	Political awareness & engagement (+)	

Data

The empirical analysis relies on survey microdata from the seventh round of the ESS (2014) and considers nationals/citizens who are resident across 20 EU and EFTA member countries available.

Dependent variables

We construct two distinct dependent variables from 2014 ESS items, one that captures individual-level preferences for European over non-European immigration, and a second that provides leverage on the EU/non-EU distinction. The first dependent variable was created from two items asking how many people should be allowed to immigrate (many, some, few, or none), initially from poorer countries in Europe and then from poorer countries outside Europe. We use answers to these two items to place each respondent in one of four mutually exclusive categories, as follows: Individuals who support the arrival of many or some immigrants from both European and non-European countries are (a) general inclusionists. Those who want few or none to immigrate from both within and

outside Europe are (b) general restrictionists. Meanwhile, others are selective inclusionists, welcoming substantial numbers of immigrants from one geographic area while preferring little or no immigration from the other. Europe inclusionists (c), our group of primary interest, prefer many or some immigrants from poorer European countries and few or no immigrants from poorer non-European countries. Non-Europe inclusionists (d) show the opposite pattern, preferring non-European to European immigrants. Table 2 illustrates the content of the categories and their frequency in the estimation sample. Descriptively, Europe inclusionists comprised only an estimated 9.3% of the population covered by ESS in 2014.

Table 2. Support for Europe-only inclusionism (dependent A)

<i>How many immigrants from?</i>		Outside Europe			
		Many	Some	A few	None
Europe	Many	General Inclusionists 50.2% n = 14,925		Europe inclusionists 9.3% n = 3063	
	Some				
	A few	Non-Europe inclusionists 2.1% n = 656		General restrictionists 38.4% n = 13,606	
	None				

Notes: unweighted sample size and weighted percentages for countries included in sample of nationals. Percentages are weighted to correct for differences in population size across countries and for different probabilities of selection for different groups of the population as recommended (European Social Survey, 2014).¹

This measure might be argued to underestimate Europe inclusionism. The two items are asked consecutively, possibly inducing pressure on respondents to be consistently

pro- or anti-immigration on both. Also, the items do not distinguish between EU and non-EU immigration from within Europe.

To address these limitations, we analyze data from an embedded survey experiment. Each respondent was asked how many of a particular type of immigrant she would like to “allow to come and live here” (many, some, a few, or none). Experimental versions of this question randomly varied the potential immigrant group along two dimensions: job skills (“unskilled laborers” or “professionals”) and place of origin (a European or non-European country). This design eliminates consistency pressure because each respondent was asked about only one of four types of immigration. We can then assess the impact of European immigrant origin on citizens’ preferences experimentally, by comparing aggregate responses to Europe and non-Europe conditions within each skill level.

The experiment revealed significant effects of both skill and origin, as Figure 1 shows. Around 37% of respondents supported allowing many or some unskilled workers from a poorer non-European country. This rose to 45%, a statistically significant increase ($p < 0.001$, two-tailed t-test), for those asked about unskilled workers from a poorer European country. For skilled workers, pro-inclusion stood at 70% for non-European migrants and 73% ($p = 0.001$) for European migrants.




Figure 1. Support for immigration of different origins and skills (dependent B)

Notes: n = 34,453 nationals of the country of residence (~8,500-8,700 per treatment)

In addition to individual level experimental variation, this design involved a country-level non-random source of variation that we use to distinguish between attitudes toward immigration from EU countries and immigration from European countries that are not part of the EU. The experimental survey question asked about immigrants from specific European or non-European countries, rather than from “Europe” in general. Each respondent was asked about immigrants coming from the poorer European or non-European country that provides the largest number of immigrants to that respondent’s country. For example, in Germany, respondents assigned to the “Europe” condition were asked about immigrants from Poland, the non-Europe condition asked about immigrants from Turkey. British and Swedish respondents in the Europe condition were also asked

about immigrants from Poland, while the non-Europe condition asked about immigrants from India or Somalia, respectively. The Online appendix lists the immigrant-sending countries named in each country's survey.

This feature provides some leverage on the role of EU status in generating support for immigrant flows. This is because the Europe treatments specify an EU member state for respondents in some countries and a non-EU European state for respondents in other countries. For example, respondents in Austria were asked about immigrants from Serbia, while those in Poland and Lithuania were asked about arrivals from Belarus.

Explanatory variables

We also test theoretical explanations for Europe- or EU-inclusionist preferences described above. Our first set of explanatory variables relate to the hypothesis that EU inclusionism comes from supranational identification with the EU. EU identification is represented by two ESS questions asking whether the respondent thinks EU unification has gone too far, and trusts the European Parliament (respondents place themselves on a scale from 0 to 10). These are proxies for EU identity rather than direct measures. Nonetheless, these indicators are conceptually and empirically linked to diffuse support for the EU as an institution, as opposed to specific support for policies (Beaudonnet and Di Mauro, 2012). Thus, these measures of identification with (diffuse) support for the EU can be used to predict more specific support for EU policy on issues including immigration.

In addition, we hypothesized that opposition to non-European immigration may also be more likely among respondents who prioritize various forms of national or sub-national identities. Our indicators here assess precisely that tendency, in the context of immigration preferences. We include items on how important respondents think it is for

immigrants to have fluency in the country's official language, a Christian background, white racial identity, and a commitment to the country's way of life, again measured by self-placement on scales from 0 (not important) to 10 (important). We add another binary item that taps into cultural chauvinism at a general level, asking to what extent respondents think some cultures are better than others or whether all cultures are equal. Finally, we take account of national identity with a question asking how close they feel to their country (not at all/not very/close/very close).

Collectively, these items allow us to assess whether preferences for one's in-group translate into a preference for European over non-European migration. Crucially, we expect these variables to connect with Europe-only rather than EU-only inclusionism, reflecting preferences for Europeans on ethno-cultural lines rather than openness to others based on supranational political identification with the EU.

Moving from identities to economic factors, we measure the respondents' occupation with International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) categories, classifying workers as low-skilled (7-9), medium-skilled (4-6), high-skilled (1-3), or in armed forces occupations (0). For retired or unemployed people, we use the previous or most recent occupation. We also include a measure of economic activity: self-reported main activity in the last seven days, in four categories: (a) paid work; (b) education or training; (c) unemployed and actively looking for work; and (d) economically inactive. We control for subjective perceptions of socioeconomic well-being with items in which respondents assess their comfort with their current household income (very comfortable/comfortably coping/difficult to cope/very difficult) and health status (good/fair/bad/very bad). Finally, we include items asking whether it is important that

immigrants (a) have good educational qualifications; and (b) have needed skills (both 0 to 10 scales).

To test the cognitive mobilization hypothesis, we include indicators of interest and engagement in politics. These include self-reported interest in politics (not at all/hardly/quite/very), self-reported turnout in the last national election (yes/no/not eligible), and feelings of closeness to a political party (yes/no). We also include a political participation scale, created by adding responses to seven different items asking whether or not the respondent took part in a given political action in the last 12 months, such as contacting a government official, working in a political party, wearing a campaign badge or sticker, or taking part in a demonstration or boycott. Scores ranged from zero, for taking part in none of these actions, to seven, for taking part in all of them.

In addition, we include education as a consistent correlate of political interest and attention to elite messages. We use a categorical variable based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED): (a) low education if up to lower secondary (0-II); (b) medium education if up to upper second, post-secondary non-tertiary, or short tertiary (III-IV); and (c) high education if Bachelors Degree equivalent or higher (V-VI) (Herrerros and Criado, 2009).

Demographic and other control variables

Our analysis takes into account a series of individual level demographic differences as known correlates of political attitudes rather than for any particular theoretical expectations. These include gender, age, birthplace (in country of interview or naturalized foreign-born), self-reported ethnic minority status, and rural or urban residence. We expect

greater support for EU migration among women, younger people, urban residents, and ethnic minorities (Berg, 2010; Bogard and Sherrod, 2008; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Pichler, 2010). But existing research provides no clear expectations that these variables will independently influence Europe inclusionism.

Analyzing Europe-only inclusionism

Since our first dependent variable includes four discrete, mutually exclusive, unranked categories, we employ maximum likelihood multinomial logit (MLML) regression. This allows us to estimate the effects of predictors on the likelihood that a respondent will be a general inclusionist, general restrictionist, Europe inclusionist, or non-Europe inclusionist. The MLML estimates a logistic regression model for each response category relative to a single reference category, and all within one estimation (Pasek et al., 2009). It yields estimated impacts on the likelihood of holding a particular attitude profile in relation to the chosen reference category (Kwak and Clayton-Matthews, 2002): “general inclusionists” in our case. This choice eliminates the known issues with using consecutive binary logit models to capture differences between multiple outcome categories: (a) comparing a specific outcome category to all other outcomes combined, which complicates the comparison of predictor effect sizes; or (b) comparing each outcome category to the same reference category by excluding two of the other categories in each estimation, which limits the ability to readily compare results across models.

The independent variables were those discussed in the Data section. We account for country differences with the addition of country dummies in the specification, i.e. with fixed country effects.²

In MLML as in logit or probit models, coefficients represent changes in odds ratios. Further, they are linear with respect to odds ratios, but not with respect to actual outcomes (i.e. changes in the probability of the dependent variable taking on a particular value). Therefore, to demonstrate the impacts of our coefficients, we present results by plotting postestimation average marginal effects (AME), which approximate the amount of change in the probability of observing each dependent variable outcome that is associated with each change in the values of a predictor (Hanmer and Kalkan, 2013).

The AME plots thus show the average impact on the actual respondents in the sample. To produce the plots, we generate an individual-level prediction for each person in the sample by holding all independent variables constant at their actual values except for the independent variable whose effects we are plotting. For explanatory variables treated as continuous, the AME shows the predicted change associated with each unit increase in the values of that variable (for example, each step towards the right end of a scale). When the predictor is nominal or binary, the AME shows the change relative to the base category.

Results from the first (multinomial logit) analysis support the identity-based hypotheses, while largely failing to support predictions from the resource-based and cognitive mobilization approaches.

First, we find that proxies for EU identities matter when it comes to demonstrating Europe inclusionist preferences. Figure 2 illustrates this relationship by plotting the change in the likelihood of opting for Europe inclusionism (bottom left panel) across the different levels of support for further EU unification. Each step towards thinking that EU unification has gone too far is associated with an average reduction in the probability of opting for Europe inclusionism of about 0.4 percentage points. The strongest opponents of further EU

unification (respondents at 10 on the scale) are 2 percentage points less likely to be Europe inclusionists than the most positive toward further EU unification (0 on the scale).³ This effect seems small, but looms larger given the rarity of Europe inclusionists, who comprise only about 9% of the weighted sample. A similar but less pronounced effect (marginal effect of 0.2 rather than 0.4) is found for feelings of trust towards the European Parliament (illustrated in the Online appendix). The gradually increasing average marginal effect for support of general restrictions coupled with the almost null effect for non-Europe inclusionism suggests that people opposed to further EU unification move towards generalized restrictions; rather than switching to a preference for non-Europeans.




Figure 2. Average marginal effects of EU views on inclusion preferences

Notes: Estimation sample = 26,971 observations; pseudo $R^2 = 0.18$; marginal effect of factor on the probability of expressing each category of dependent A; mean effect with 95% confidence interval (CI); standard errors clustered by country and country fixed effects included alongside complete set of predictors.

The second set of identity-based hypotheses also find support. Here, European inclusionism is predicted by a preference for immigrants who share the receiving nation's most prevalent cultural and ethnic identities. This is supported primarily for religious and national identity. Figure 3 shows the change in the probability of opting for each preference associated with the view that a Christian background is an important condition for immigrants to have. The probability of opting for Europe inclusionism slightly increases for those who think a Christian background is important, while the probability of general restrictionism is reduced. Notably, the same is not the case among those who value being white, speaking the language, or being committed to the country's way of life as important, which better differentiate between general inclusion and general restriction.




Figure 3. Marginal effects on immigration preferences of viewing Christianity as important for immigrants Notes: Estimation sample = 26,971 observations; pseudo $R^2 = 0.18$; marginal effect of factor on the probability of expressing each category of dependent A; mean effect with 95% CI; standard errors clustered by country and country fixed effects included alongside complete set of predictors.

National identity also predicts Europe-only inclusionism: respondents who feel very close to their own country are about 3 percentage points more likely to opt for Europe inclusionism compared to those who reported feeling not at all close. Finally, people who think that some cultures are better than others are about 1.4 percentage points more likely to prefer European only inflows, and 4 percentage points more likely to be general restrictionists. People who view cultures as equal are more likely to be general inclusionists. Thus, the desire for identity-based exclusivity on religious and cultural dimensions predicts both a preference for European immigration and a preference for restricting immigration overall.

Table 3. Marginal effects of variables on inclusion preferences

Predictor	Values	General restrictionists		Europe inclusionists		Non-Europe inclusionists	
		dy/dx	P > z	dy/dx	P > z	dy/dx	P > z
Activity (vs. economically inactive)	In education	-0.058	0.000	0.028	0.025	0.005	0.318
	Unemployed	-0.044	0.003	0.019	0.074	-0.002	0.778
	In paid work	-0.001	0.904	0.000	0.998	0.001	0.711
Occupation (vs. low skill)	Medium skill	-0.018	0.021	-0.002	0.743	-0.004	0.088
	High skill	-0.037	0.000	0.002	0.596	-0.007	0.001
Feeling on current income (vs. very comfortable)	Very difficult	0.075	0.000	-0.016	0.070	0.001	0.805
Subjective health (vs. very good)	Very bad	0.037	0.156	0.011	0.588	0.012	0.269

Notes: Estimation sample = 26,971 observations; pseudo $R^2 = 0.18$; marginal effect of factor on the probability of expressing each category of dependent A; mean effect with 95% CI; standard errors clustered by country and country fixed effects included alongside complete set of predictors.

Unlike the identity-based hypotheses, the resource-based view gains very limited support. As Table 3 shows, people in medium and high skilled occupations are less likely to prefer general restrictions on immigration (relative to low skill occupations). However, the relationship between respondents' skill level and European inclusionism does not follow theoretical expectations. Again, since European inflows are more likely to include low skilled workers, the labor market hypothesis suggests they would be welcomed by high skilled native workers and opposed by low skilled native workers. Attitudes toward non-European migrants, more likely to be highly skilled because of existing immigration restrictions, should show the opposite pattern. However, we find no difference by respondents' occupational skill in the preference for European-only inflows.

Finally, the cognitive mobilization hypothesis does not find support. No measures of engagement or mobilization were significant predictors of the Europe inclusionism. Instead, greater interest and participation in politics were associated with general inclusionism.

Complete results and estimated AME for all predictors are available in the Online appendix. We also show the robustness of these substantive results to various specifications and estimation methods. Most important, we re-estimated the main model using an alternative construction of the dependent variable that captures finer-grained differences in attitudes toward European vs. non-European immigration. The few differences that emerge tend to strengthen our general findings: high levels of job skills become inversely related

with Europe inclusionism, against the expectations of the labor market hypothesis, although being in paid work becomes a positive predictor.

Analyzing support for EU and European migration

For our second dependent variable, we use multilevel modeling to estimate the probability of supporting inclusion of immigrants, with the generic experimental treatment conditions (professional vs. unskilled, European vs. non-European) included as independent variables. Multilevel models are ideal for this situation, with multiple, layered sources of variation in outcomes, and a goal of estimating effects on outcomes at the lowest level of variation (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). We have individuals nested in countries, and we expect sources of variation at both of these levels. Country-level variation comes from differences in the specific immigrant-sending countries named in all four versions of the treatment, as well as any cross-national differences in attitudes toward either EU or non-EU immigrants.

We estimate these effects with a mixed-effects logistic regression model that includes all respondents (level 1) nested within countries (level 2). We use a binary form of the outcome variable, immigration preferences: 0 if the person opted for restriction (none/few), and 1 for inclusion (many/some). We then estimate the probability that an individual in country C will support inclusion of immigrants ($y = 1$), as a function of (a) their individual characteristics; and (b) the treatment they received, as well as including (c) random effects at level 2 for differences between countries and the differential impacts of the treatment at the country level.

Including a random coefficient for each treatment at the country level ensures that the estimated effects of our variables of interest are not confounded by country-level variation in which specific immigrant-sending countries were mentioned in the treatment

wording. This variation was non-random and therefore needs to be controlled for statistically. We specify the covariance in the model as *independent*, since respondents cannot be part of more than one treatment or more than one country sample, simultaneously. This isolates the likelihood of preferring restriction or inclusion of immigrants depending on the treatment, while controlling for other country and individual level differences. The specifications are otherwise identical across all estimations as discussed in the Data section.

We again use AMEs to estimate the impact of independent variables on the predicted probability of inclusionist immigration preferences. Since the treatment design does not vary EU membership experimentally, we use model estimates to derive the impact of receiving a treatment in which the sending countries is within the EU. Recall that half of respondents were asked to evaluate immigrants from a European sending country, but that designated sending country was an EU member only for a subset of receiving countries. Therefore, we estimate average marginal probabilities of supporting inclusion for respondents who were asked to evaluate immigrants from an EU member separately from respondents who received a non-EU sending country. The model already controls for other potential explanatory variables, allowing us to estimate the impact of EU inclusion on immigration preferences, above and beyond other explanatory factors that might increase support for migration from within Europe. We present the most relevant results for our argument below. The Online appendix includes complete results and robustness checks.

Table 4. Predicted probability of preferring inclusion of inflows by treatment and EU/non-EU country mentioned

Treatment fixed effect	Predictive margin	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Skilled from Europe (non-EU)	0.64	0.60	0.68
Skilled from Europe (EU)	0.74	0.70	0.77
Skilled from outside Europe	0.65	0.61	0.70
Unskilled from Europe (non-EU)	0.35	0.30	0.41
Unskilled from Europe (EU)	0.47	0.41	0.52
Unskilled from outside Europe	0.34	0.29	0.39

Notes: Estimation sample = 28,599 observations; full model correctly predicts the outcome in 76% of cases, Pearson residuals larger than +/- 2 in 3.8% of estimation sample (residuals mean = 0.007); values shown represent predicted margins of probability of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; fixed portion of mixed effects logit. For contrast tests in differences between probabilities see the Online appendix.

As Table 4 shows, we find a statistically significant advantage associated with EU status, compared with both non-EU European and non-European inflows. Support for allowing many or some immigrants is predicted at 74% when asked about skilled workers from EU sending countries in Europe and 47% for unskilled workers from the same sending country. The equivalent for those asked about European non-EU countries is estimated at 64% (skilled) and 35% (unskilled).

Tests between mean differences in probability of support suggest that being asked about skilled immigrants from EU countries is associated with a 7% increase in inclusion compared to European but non-EU countries and 8% compared to skilled immigrants from outside Europe. Among those responding to unskilled inflows, EU origin is associated with an 8% increase in support for inclusion compared to non-EU European countries and 12% over unskilled inflows from outside Europe. Although modest in size, the advantage associated with EU origins is statistically significant in both the skilled and unskilled conditions.

Since it became apparent that intra-EU immigration drew more support than non-EU immigration (even from within Europe), our further analysis of the model focuses on accounting for support for this form of migration, both in general and in relation to support for non-EU European inflows. We return to the variables representing our initial hypotheses that support for EU immigration in particular might be explained by (a) identification with the EU; (b) economic responses to a source of low-skilled immigration; or (c) acceptance of elite cues about the acceptability of intra-EU mobility.

Figures 4 to 6 visualize the average probability of support for inclusion of inflows with its associated error range (95% CI) for respondents in the European sending country treatment groups, across the values of a selected predictor. We show probabilities separately for those treated with EU countries and those treated with non-EU European countries. Non-Europe treatments are included in the model but not illustrated in the figures. The first key results are the changes (or lack thereof) in probability of support for EU inflows across the values of a given predictor, which show how that factor affects support for EU mobility in general. We also focus on the disparities in probability between the EU and European non-EU versions of the treatments, to understand whether some factors are associated with people differentiating more or less between EU and non-EU European immigration. A lack of overlap between the intervals of two lines (representing treatments) indicates that the probability of inclusion of those inflows statistically differs for these two treatments at the 95% confidence level.

We find again that proxies for EU identification explain both support for immigration and the tendency to differentiate between immigration flows by geographical origin. As Figure 4 shows, greater opposition to further EU unification is associated with

reduced support for inclusion across skill levels and for both EU and non-EU European sending countries. More important, it is the people who support EU unification (lower end of scale) who are driving the aggregate gap, favoring EU immigration more than non-EU European immigration. This gap disappears among those opposed to further unification, as seen in the narrowing gap between the intervals across the values of the scale.




Figure 4. Predicted support for immigration by skill, origin, and EU views

Notes: Estimation sample = 28,599 observations; full model correctly predicts the outcome in 76% of cases, Pearson residuals larger than +/- 2 in 3.8% of estimation sample (residuals mean = 0.007); estimated probability (margin) of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; mean effect with 95% CI; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression.

Average support for inclusion is estimated at 66% among respondents who were maximally positive to the EU and who were asked about unskilled inflows from EU

countries, but 27% among people maximally opposed to EU unification asked about the same inflows - a drop of 39 percentage points in probability of support. The equivalent gap was roughly 29 percentage points when considering unskilled non-EU inflows from Europe.

This suggests that EU identity has a dual effect on immigration attitudes: it does some work in support of a particular conception of intra-EU mobility as free movement, while also representing a more positive viewpoint toward European immigration more broadly. This pattern of results is similar for the independent variable measuring trust in the EU parliament as an additional and perhaps more distant proxy for EU identity.

In contrast, the subgroup identity-based predictors of Europe-only inclusionism from the earlier analysis do not predict additional support for EU over non-EU European immigrants, as illustrated in Figure 5. This is consistent with expectations shown in Table 1. Unsurprisingly, respondents who think that whiteness or Christianity are important qualifications for immigrants are less likely to support immigration generally. For people who say that any of these cultural criteria are important, the estimated probability of supporting inclusion is as almost identical for EU and non-EU European inflows (small or no gaps between lines/treatments). This supports our expectations that racial or religious biases do not encourage distinctions between EU and non-EU European migrants. This is largely true of other subgroup identity variables as well; with a possible exception at the low end of the scales for those considering language proficiency and commitment to way of life as unimportant characteristics for migrants.




Figure 5. Predicted support for immigration by views of immigrant identities

Notes: Estimation sample = 28,599 observations; full model correctly predicts the outcome in 76% of cases, Pearson residuals larger than ± 2 in 3.8% of estimation sample (residuals mean = 0.007); estimated probability (margin) of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; mean effect with 95% CI; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression.

Resource-based views again receive limited support. Consistent with the labor market hypothesis, support for unskilled immigrant workers is particularly low among respondents who themselves work low skill occupations; however, the opposite prediction does not hold for skilled respondents' preferences. Respondents in highly skilled occupations exhibit the most positive attitudes towards other skilled inflows, especially from EU countries, rather than being particularly likely to exhibit feelings of competition stemming from labor market displacement or lowered wages.




Figure 6. Preferences for European immigration by skill and EU origin

Notes: Estimation sample = 28,599 observations; full model correctly predicts the outcome in 76% of cases, Pearson residuals larger than +/- 2 in 3.8% of estimation sample (residuals mean = 0.007); estimated probability (margin) of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; mean effect with 95% CI; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression.

Meanwhile, cognitive and elite cue mobilization contributes to higher support for inflows across all wording treatment groups, but not to differentiating EU inflows from others. Having voted in the last national election is not related to immigration preferences across all skills-origin treatments.

Conclusion

Using social survey data across 20 European countries, we have examined the incidence and determinants of Europe and EU inclusionism in Europeans' preferences for immigration flows. We identify occasions where respondents express preference for more immigrants to be allowed from within Europe and/or the EU than from outside, although these represent only about one-in-ten respondents. Further, we examined the determinants of patterns of immigration preferences, testing explanations derived from several prominent theories of immigration attitudes and EU support.

Our descriptive findings alone have important political implications. The political project of the EU depends on broad acceptance of intra-EU mobility, as Brexit illustrates. Yet anti-immigration sentiment is commonplace in immigrant-receiving societies (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014), and this does not seem likely to change. Therefore, broadening support for the EU project requires that some portion of the public who generally feel negatively about immigration will make an exception for fellow EU nationals

Our descriptive results show the weakness of support for such an exception. The vast majority of support for EU mobility comes from people who support immigration from everywhere; less than 10% of ESS respondents support immigration from Europe but not from outside Europe. Similarly, when skills and origins are manipulated experimentally

and respondents are asked about either EU or non-EU European immigrants, we found a relatively modest preference for immigration from EU countries over non-EU European countries, all else equal. These patterns contrast with the normative position entrenched in EU institutions and rhetoric in which EU mobility is decidedly favored over non-EU immigration.

Theoretically, our results highlight the explanatory power of both supranational and subgroup identities, and downplay the role of labor market position and cognitive mobilization, staples of research on immigration attitudes and EU integration, respectively. Identification with the EU has real if limited impact on specific support for intra-EU mobility. On the other hand, a preference for immigrants with shared subgroup identities such as a Christian background, is linked to European inclusionism but not to a specific preference for EU immigrants over other Europeans. Thus, the estimated effects of supranational EU identities and sub-group identification with Europeans' most common religion have partially overlapping and partially diverging effects.

Of course, given the potential for endogeneity in the relationship between EU identity and immigration attitudes, our findings must be acknowledged to demonstrate associations rather than causation. In particular, it has been suggested that, while EU identity might shape immigration attitudes, at the same time immigration attitudes might play a role in determining attitudes toward the EU (Stockemer et al., 2018). We suggest that this reverse causal pathway seems less likely given our descriptive findings showing that relatively few Europeans distinguish between EU and non-EU immigration. However, for those that do make this distinction, we acknowledge that approval of the EU might be

triggered by support for the EU's preferred pattern of immigration restrictions, just as EU identity might boost support for intra-EU migration.

Meanwhile, our non-findings bear emphasis as well. The weakness of the cognitive mobilization theory contrasts with earlier findings, although this may not be surprising given increased elite disagreement on EU issues. Further research might aim to distinguish whether this result reflects a lack of elite influence on disaffected citizens, or, instead, ongoing influence by elites who are more polarized on issues of immigration and Europe. Our results also reaffirm the weakness of objective labor market position as an explanation for attitudes toward immigration, consistent with recent research (Jeannet, 2018) and reviews (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Low skilled workers are not particularly opposed to intra-EU mobility, the largest source of low skilled migrant inflows that they face. We thus provide further reason for economic explanations of immigration attitudes to shift away from the labor market hypothesis and towards theories emphasizing fiscal burdens or sociotropic perceptions of impacts on national economies.

Our tests of these theories indicate limited but real avenues for understanding EU exceptionalism. The only consistent predictors of specific support for intra-EU mobility involve support for or identification with the EU itself. Education and occupational variables are associated with pro-migration attitudes generally, but—against prior expectations generated by existing theories—these variables are not associated with EU-only inclusionism. Thus, increasing specific support for intra-EU mobility depends on generating increased EU identity among those who do not generally support immigration, a difficult task to be sure.

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Notes

1. The regression analyses do not use weighting, since individual and country differences are controlled for within the specification.
2. The more complex alternative, a multilevel multinomial logit model with random country effects, was not necessary, since our focus for this dependent variable is on individual variation, and would have vastly increased the computational requirements for estimation. We instead account for the nesting of respondents within each country sample by clustering standard errors by country.
3. The pseudo R^2 associated with this model is estimated at 0.18. While common in survey attitudes to have low R^2 values, it is indicative of variation in the dependent variable that remains unexplained.

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ONLINE APPENDIX

Acceptable in the EU? Why Some Immigration Restrictionists Support EU Mobility

Scott Blinder & Yvonne Markaki

APPENDIX A

Dependent Variable A (Origin)

Table A1
Sample sizes by country

Country	ESS7 2014	Largest imm. sending country in Europe	Largest imm. sending country outside Europe
Austria	1,671	Serbia	Turkey
Belgium	1,618	Poland	Turkey
Switzerland	1,237	Portugal	Turkey
Czech R	2,128	Ukraine	Vietnam
Germany	2,894	Poland	Turkey
Denmark	1,438	Poland	Turkey
Estonia	1,630	Belarus	Vietnam
Spain	1,818	Romania	Morocco
Finland	2,039	Estonia	Somalia
France	1,820	Portugal	Algeria
UK	2,135	Poland	India
Hungary	1,698	Romania	China
Ireland	2,193	Poland	Nigeria
Lithuania	2,242	Belarus	Turkey
Netherlands	1,856	Poland	Turkey
Norway	1,339	Poland	Somalia
Poland	1,614	Belarus	Vietnam
Portugal	1,234	Ukraine	Brazil
Sweden	1,720	Poland	Somalia
Slovenia	1,209	Bosnia-Herz	China
Total	35,533		

Notes: non-weighted sample, non-nationals excluded; sending countries providing largest number of immigrants follow classifications used in the four experimental questions in ESS7, hence missing for countries excluded in that round.

Table A2

Breakdown of case classification in dependent variable A

Primary classification	How many from Europe	How many from outside	How many from Europe	How many from outside	Difference (non-Europe - Europe)	Alternative classification
General Inclusionists	Many	Many	0	0	0	General inclusion
	Some	Some	1	1	0	General inclusion
	Many	Some	0	1	1	<i>pro Europe</i>
	Some	Many	1	0	-1	<i>pro outside</i>
General restrictionists	A few	A few	2	2	0	General restriction
	None	None	3	3	0	General restriction
	A few	None	2	3	1	<i>pro Europe</i>
	None	A few	3	2	-1	<i>pro outside</i>
Europe inclusionists	Many	A few	0	2	2	Pro Europe
	Many	None	0	3	3	Pro Europe
	Some	A few	1	2	1	Pro Europe
	Some	None	1	3	2	Pro Europe
Non-Europe inclusionists	A few	Many	2	0	-2	Pro outside
	A few	Some	2	1	-1	Pro outside
	None	Many	3	0	-3	Pro outside
	None	Some	3	1	-2	Pro outside

Notes: in the second version of dependent variable A, cases identified as misclassified based on the difference in the preferred level of inflows by origin have been instead assigned to their respective pro-Europe/pro-outside categories.

Table A3

Dependent Variable A (Origin)

<i>How many immigrants from?</i>		Outside Europe				Total
		Many	Some	A few	None	
Europe	Many	3,728	685	141	33	4,587
	Some	199	10,313	2,497	392	13,401
		General Inclusionists		Europe inclusionists		
		Non-Europe inclusionists		General restrictionists		
	A few	31	537	8,025	1,563	10,156
	None	10	78	278	3,740	4,106
Total		3,968	11,613	10,941	5,728	32,250

Notes: unweighted sample breakdown of cases as classified in the construction of the dependent variable, for citizens and countries included

Table A4
Weighted Statistics for Dependent A (as shown in Figure 1)

ESS round and question	Categories of dep A	Percentage
2014 from poorer countries	General inclusionists	50%
	General restrictionists	38%
	Europe inclusionists	9.3%
	Non-Europe inclusionists	2.3%
2002 from poorer countries	General inclusionists	49%
	General restrictionists	42%
	Europe inclusionists	6.7%
	Non-Europe inclusionists	2.4%
2002 from richer countries	General inclusionists	50%
	General restrictionists	38%
	Europe inclusionists	8.2%
	Non-Europe inclusionists	3.4%

Notes: figures correspond to weighted percentages for countries included in sample of nationals. Weighting adjustment incorporates design, post-stratification, and population size weights

Table A5
Individual Independent Variables

Explanatory factors	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>EU and national identity</i>					
EU unification gone too far	33,220	6.10	2.60	1	11
Distrustful of EU parliament	33,313	7.10	2.50	1	11
Feel close to country	35,332	3.30	0.71	1	4
<i>Shared cultural and ethnic identity</i>					
Religious	35,302	4.30	3.10	0	10
Some cultures better than others	35,533	0.39	0.49	0	1
Important to speak country's official language	35,243	7.00	2.70	0	10
Important to have Christian background	34,884	3.00	3.00	0	10
Important to be white	35,019	1.80	2.70	0	10
Important to be committed to way of life	35,142	7.40	2.50	0	10
<i>Resource competition</i>					
Activity: Paid work	35,417	0.50	0.50	0	1
Activity: Education	35,417	0.10	0.30	0	1
Activity: Unemployed, looking for job	35,417	0.04	0.20	0	1
Activity: Economically inactive	35,417	0.36	0.48	0	1
Occupation: Highly skilled ISCO 1/3	35,533	0.36	0.48	0	1

Occupation: Medium skilled ISCO 4/6	35,533	0.28	0.45	0	1
Occupation: Low skilled ISCO 7/9	35,533	0.27	0.44	0	1
Occupation: Armed forces ISCO 0	35,533	0.00	0.06	0	1
Difficult to cope on present hh income	35,216	1.90	0.78	1	4
Subjective health poor	35,500	2.20	0.91	1	5
Important to have good educational qualifications	35,073	6.40	2.600	0	10
Important to have work skills needed	35,144	6.50	2.7	0	10
<i>Cognitive mobilization</i>					
Education: Up to lower secondary education ISCED 0-II	35,431	0.33	0.47	0	1
Education: Upper second, post-secondary, short tertiary ISCED III-IV	35,431	0.47	0.50	0	1
Education: Bachelors or higher ISCED V-VI	35,431	0.19	0.39	0	1
How interested in politics	35,438	2.50	0.91	1	4
Last national election: did not vote	35,241	0.22	0.42	0	1
Last national election: not eligible to vote	35,241	0.08	0.27	0	1
Last national election: voted	35,241	0.70	0.46	0	1
Feel closer to a particular party than all other parties	34,816	0.51	0.50	0	1
Political action participation scale (7-item cumulative scale)	35,533	1.11	1.42	0	7

Notes: weighted sample statistics

Table A6
Individual Control Variables

Demographics	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female	35,511	0.51	0.5	0	1
Born in country	35,527	0.94	0.24	0	1
Member of ethnic minority	35,129	0.04	0.19	0	1
Age: up to 35	35,533	0.30	0.46	0	1
Age: between 36 and 60	35,533	0.42	0.49	0	1
Age: over 60	35,533	0.28	0.45	0	1
Residence: A big city	35,449	0.17	0.37	0	1
Residence: Suburbs or outskirts of big city	35,449	0.12	0.32	0	1
Residence: Town or small city	35,449	0.34	0.48	0	1
Residence: Country village or farm	35,449	0.37	0.48	0	1

Notes: weighted sample statistics

Table A7

Estimation results from Multinomial Logistic Regression (Equation 1)

	General restrictionists		Europe inclusionists		Non-Europe inclusionists	
	RRR	P	RRR	P	RRR	P
Female	1.018	0.624	1.010	0.805	1.177	0.090
Born in country	0.995	0.967	0.887	0.252	1.032	0.865
Member of ethnic minority	0.926	0.362	0.997	0.985	1.240	0.463
Aged between 36 and 60 yo	0.901	0.068	0.939	0.387	1.096	0.508
Aged over 60 yo	1.000	0.998	1.167	0.098	1.190	0.289
Suburbs or outskirts of big city	1.007	0.894	1.089	0.318	1.130	0.439
Town or small city	0.995	0.902	1.170	0.108	1.177	0.229
Country village	0.980	0.701	1.159	0.121	1.015	0.905
EU unification gone too far	1.193	0.000	1.074	0.000	1.113	0.000
Distrustful of EU parliament	1.051	0.000	1.005	0.670	1.026	0.185
Feels close to country: Not very	0.819	0.176	1.288	0.196	0.944	0.863
Close	0.850	0.419	1.344	0.107	0.581	0.118
Very close	0.982	0.930	1.491	0.027	0.733	0.439
Religious	0.981	0.013	0.992	0.366	1.010	0.376
Some cultures better than others	1.362	0.000	1.385	0.000	1.221	0.019
Important for imm: speak language	1.043	0.001	1.022	0.008	1.006	0.844
Important for imm: Christian	1.032	0.003	1.061	0.000	1.038	0.083
Important for imm: be white	1.183	0.000	1.125	0.000	1.126	0.000
Important for imm: committed to way of life	1.116	0.000	1.081	0.000	1.057	0.014
Activity: In education	0.761	0.002	1.186	0.143	1.129	0.548
Unemployed, looking for job	0.796	0.003	1.102	0.379	0.845	0.558
In paid work	0.995	0.928	0.998	0.981	1.036	0.752
Occupation: Medium skilled ISCO 4/6	0.877	0.004	0.907	0.214	0.786	0.026
Highly skilled ISCO 1/3	0.776	0.000	0.892	0.062	0.610	0.000
Armed forces ISCO 0	0.989	0.962	1.295	0.380	0.780	0.693
not applicable for occupation	0.847	0.058	0.814	0.055	0.948	0.813
Feels on present hh income: Coping	1.183	0.000	1.119	0.023	1.213	0.009
Difficult	1.402	0.000	1.037	0.623	0.991	0.963
Very difficult	1.529	0.000	1.029	0.832	1.308	0.359
Subjective health: Good	1.083	0.022	1.227	0.000	1.046	0.821
Fair	1.089	0.075	1.214	0.011	1.257	0.220
Bad	1.198	0.001	1.149	0.277	1.218	0.243
Very bad	1.362	0.047	1.363	0.239	1.938	0.081
Important for imm: good educational qualifications	1.022	0.106	1.010	0.488	1.075	0.008
Important for imm: skills needed in country	1.117	0.000	1.086	0.000	1.017	0.391
Education: Medium	0.919	0.070	0.850	0.049	0.802	0.012

Degree or higher	0.676	0.000	0.726	0.000	0.537	0.000
How interested in politics: Hardly	0.881	0.009	1.099	0.177	0.783	0.258
Quite	0.760	0.000	0.987	0.909	0.793	0.224
Very	0.691	0.000	0.944	0.635	0.803	0.312
Voted last national election	1.008	0.876	0.999	0.986	1.073	0.652
Not eligible to vote last election	0.854	0.096	1.048	0.792	0.845	0.599
Feel closer to a particular party than all others	0.879	0.000	0.973	0.519	0.922	0.529
Political action participation index	0.889	0.000	0.937	0.000	0.955	0.174
Belgium	0.767	0.000	1.253	0.000	0.721	0.000
Switzerland	0.767	0.000	1.341	0.000	0.741	0.000
Germany	0.602	0.000	1.106	0.000	1.105	0.051
Denmark	2.187	0.000	2.806	0.000	1.158	0.066
Estonia	1.292	0.000	2.273	0.000	0.605	0.000
Spain	1.021	0.605	0.434	0.000	0.712	0.000
Finland	2.514	0.000	2.082	0.000	1.144	0.215
France	0.941	0.005	1.468	0.000	0.462	0.000
UK	0.944	0.097	1.098	0.014	0.359	0.000
Hungary	5.051	0.000	2.586	0.000	1.999	0.000
R of Ireland	1.099	0.002	1.494	0.000	1.034	0.551
Lithuania	0.761	0.001	0.842	0.035	0.443	0.000
Netherlands	1.112	0.000	1.143	0.003	1.656	0.000
Norway	0.602	0.000	0.782	0.000	0.496	0.000
Poland	0.564	0.000	1.135	0.012	0.212	0.000
Portugal	0.661	0.000	1.030	0.580	0.661	0.000
Sweden	0.196	0.000	0.325	0.000	0.637	0.000
Slovenia	0.623	0.000	1.219	0.000	0.663	0.000
Observations	26,971					
Pseudo Rsquared	0.18					
SE adjusted clusters	19					

Notes: RRR corresponds to relative risk ratios

Table A8

**Estimation results from Multinomial Logistic Regression (Equation 1)
- Replication with alternative classification of cases**

	General restrictionists		Pro-Europe inclusionists		Pro outside Europe inclusionists	
	RRR	P	RRR	P	RRR	P
Female	0.919	0.062	0.929	0.108	0.987	0.843
Born in country	1.138	0.124	1.111	0.407	1.127	0.505
Member of ethnic minority	1.085	0.404	1.121	0.179	1.078	0.648
Aged between 36 and 60 yo	1.155	0.018	1.014	0.804	1.097	0.162
Aged over 60 yo	1.404	0.000	1.356	0.003	1.453	0.006
Suburbs or outskirts of big city	1.034	0.689	1.078	0.337	1.062	0.514
Town or small city	1.047	0.501	1.064	0.327	1.039	0.619
Country village	1.122	0.198	1.127	0.198	1.085	0.523
EU unification gone too far	1.130	0.000	1.236	0.000	1.336	0.000
Distrustful of EU parliament	0.985	0.123	1.006	0.687	1.080	0.000
Feels close to country: Not very	1.006	0.978	1.198	0.487	0.678	0.105
Close	1.475	0.046	1.775	0.015	0.640	0.075
Very close	1.469	0.062	2.032	0.003	0.769	0.367
Religious	1.000	0.961	0.990	0.396	0.972	0.064
Some cultures better than others	1.304	0.000	1.648	0.000	1.723	0.000
Important for imm: speak language	1.035	0.001	1.051	0.000	1.078	0.000
Important for imm: Christian	1.039	0.001	1.072	0.000	1.072	0.000
Important for imm: be white	1.083	0.000	1.215	0.000	1.340	0.000
Important for imm: committed to way of life	1.095	0.000	1.161	0.000	1.196	0.000
Activity: In education	1.237	0.091	1.064	0.596	0.988	0.949
Unemployed, looking for job	1.199	0.209	0.973	0.828	1.072	0.663
In paid work	1.240	0.008	1.195	0.023	1.228	0.038
Occupation: Medium skilled ISCO 4/6	1.051	0.493	0.936	0.332	0.888	0.119
Highly skilled ISCO 1/3	0.921	0.307	0.785	0.007	0.633	0.000
Armed forces ISCO 0 not applicable for occupation	1.148	0.736	1.180	0.655	0.990	0.977
	1.048	0.670	0.899	0.300	0.908	0.446

Feels on present hh income: Coping	0.961	0.529	1.117	0.100	1.119	0.058
Difficult	1.032	0.722	1.225	0.011	1.524	0.000
Very difficult	1.009	0.948	1.244	0.212	1.944	0.000
Subjective health:						
Good	1.254	0.000	1.352	0.000	1.143	0.130
Fair	1.236	0.004	1.366	0.000	1.248	0.047
Bad	1.193	0.120	1.330	0.038	1.484	0.005
Very bad	1.107	0.758	1.407	0.366	1.809	0.079
Important for imm:						
good educational qualifications	1.043	0.001	1.050	0.004	1.074	0.005
Important for imm:						
work skills needed in country	1.074	0.000	1.166	0.000	1.140	0.000
Education: Medium	1.211	0.005	1.081	0.231	0.867	0.076
Degree or higher	1.027	0.771	0.768	0.003	0.516	0.000
How interested in politics: Hardly	1.220	0.017	1.180	0.073	0.812	0.061
Quite	1.062	0.463	0.925	0.486	0.627	0.001
Very	0.812	0.039	0.733	0.018	0.611	0.006
Voted last national election	1.101	0.117	1.061	0.456	1.015	0.858
Not eligible to vote last election	0.891	0.494	0.958	0.791	0.705	0.148
Feel closer to a particular party than all others	0.949	0.450	0.891	0.086	0.867	0.051
Political action participation index	0.889	0.000	0.844	0.000	0.850	0.000
Belgium	1.545	0.000	1.249	0.000	1.256	0.000
Switzerland	1.173	0.000	1.047	0.210	0.535	0.000
Germany	0.740	0.000	0.649	0.000	0.550	0.000
Denmark	1.934	0.000	3.514	0.000	2.297	0.000
Estonia	1.110	0.075	1.608	0.000	1.079	0.362
Spain	0.589	0.000	0.526	0.000	0.510	0.000
Finland	1.030	0.607	2.341	0.000	1.343	0.004
France	1.612	0.000	1.445	0.000	1.390	0.000
UK	1.383	0.000	1.217	0.000	1.079	0.125
Hungary	1.142	0.095	4.517	0.000	7.194	0.000
R of Ireland	0.923	0.007	1.091	0.020	1.030	0.535
Lithuania	0.806	0.006	0.609	0.000	0.628	0.000
Netherlands	1.438	0.000	1.391	0.000	1.670	0.000
Norway	1.124	0.048	0.725	0.000	0.372	0.000
Poland	1.095	0.040	0.796	0.000	0.356	0.000
Portugal	1.861	0.000	1.250	0.000	0.924	0.195
Sweden	0.572	0.000	0.180	0.000	0.220	0.000
Slovenia	1.165	0.004	0.875	0.014	0.922	0.222

Observations	26,971
Pseudo Rsquared	0.16
SE adjusted clusters	19

Table A9
Estimated marginal effects of attitudes to EU on preferring inclusion

Predictor	General restrictionists		Europe inclusionists		Non-Europe inclusionists	
	dy/dx	P(z)	dy/dx	P(z)	dy/dx	P(z)
Unification go further	0.021	0.000	0.001	0.211	0.001	0.000
1	0.023	0.000	0.001	0.327	0.001	0.001
2	0.025	0.000	0.000	0.684	0.001	0.004
3	0.027	0.000	0.000	0.651	0.001	0.019
4	0.028	0.000	-0.001	0.152	0.001	0.071
5	0.029	0.000	-0.001	0.029	0.001	0.147
6	0.031	0.000	-0.002	0.000	0.000	0.362
7	0.031	0.000	-0.003	0.000	0.000	0.589
8	0.030	0.000	-0.004	0.000	0.000	0.922
9	0.029	0.000	-0.004	0.000	0.000	0.686
Unification already gone too far	0.027	0.000	-0.004	0.000	0.000	0.545
Complete trust	0.008	0.000	-0.002	0.104	0.000	0.849
1	0.008	0.000	-0.002	0.141	0.000	0.745
2	0.008	0.000	-0.002	0.122	0.000	0.749
3	0.008	0.000	-0.002	0.129	0.000	0.718
4	0.008	0.000	-0.002	0.119	0.000	0.732
5	0.009	0.000	-0.002	0.087	0.000	0.798
6	0.009	0.000	-0.002	0.069	0.000	0.827
7	0.009	0.000	-0.002	0.053	0.000	0.883
8	0.009	0.000	-0.002	0.037	0.000	0.955
9	0.009	0.000	-0.002	0.026	0.000	0.990
No trust at all	0.009	0.000	-0.002	0.018	0.000	0.897

Table A10
Estimated marginal effects of self-identification factors on preferring inclusion

Predictor	General restrictionists		Europe inclusionists		Non-Europe inclusionists	
	dy/dx	P> z	dy/dx	P> z	dy/dx	P> z
Not at all religious	-0.003	0.006	0.000	0.896	0.000	0.067
1	-0.003	0.006	0.000	0.874	0.000	0.076
2	-0.003	0.006	0.000	0.889	0.000	0.076
3	-0.003	0.006	0.000	0.841	0.000	0.077
4	-0.003	0.006	0.000	0.826	0.000	0.074
5	-0.003	0.006	0.000	0.809	0.000	0.077
6	-0.003	0.006	0.000	0.884	0.000	0.091
7	-0.003	0.005	0.000	0.863	0.000	0.090
8	-0.003	0.005	0.000	0.842	0.000	0.087
9	-0.003	0.005	0.000	0.841	0.000	0.092
Very religious	-0.003	0.005	0.000	0.787	0.000	0.085
Feels very close to country (vs not at all)	-0.015	0.674	0.030	0.018	-0.008	0.392
Some cultures better than others (vs all equal)	0.041	0.000	0.014	0.000	0.001	0.737

Table A11
Estimated marginal effects of shared identity factors on preferring inclusion

Predictor	General restrictionists		Europe inclusionists		Non-Europe inclusionists	
	dy/dx	P> z	dy/dx	P> z	dy/dx	P> z
How important being Christian						
Extremely						
unimportant	0.003	0.023	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.280
1	0.004	0.035	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.327
2	0.004	0.046	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.352
3	0.003	0.063	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.393
4	0.003	0.086	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.439

5	0.003	0.135	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.494
6	0.003	0.196	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.545
7	0.002	0.269	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.577
8	0.002	0.391	0.004	0.001	0.000	0.625
9	0.001	0.535	0.004	0.001	0.000	0.665
Extremely important	0.000	0.776	0.004	0.002	0.000	0.703
How important being white						
Extremely unimportant	0.024	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.024
1	0.027	0.000	0.003	0.006	0.001	0.117
2	0.028	0.000	0.003	0.024	0.001	0.230
3	0.028	0.000	0.003	0.080	0.001	0.361
4	0.027	0.000	0.002	0.247	0.000	0.566
5	0.026	0.000	0.001	0.587	0.000	0.809
6	0.025	0.000	0.000	0.927	0.000	0.994
7	0.022	0.000	-0.001	0.676	0.000	0.850
8	0.020	0.000	-0.002	0.291	0.000	0.609
9	0.018	0.000	-0.002	0.116	0.000	0.480
Extremely important	0.014	0.000	-0.002	0.034	0.000	0.313
How important speaking the language						
Extremely unimportant	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.204	0.000	0.868
1	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.346	0.000	0.815
2	0.005	0.001	0.000	0.382	0.000	0.784
3	0.006	0.001	0.000	0.443	0.000	0.748
4	0.006	0.001	0.000	0.612	0.000	0.685
5	0.007	0.001	0.000	0.759	0.000	0.637
6	0.007	0.001	0.000	0.843	0.000	0.602
7	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.916	0.000	0.579
8	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.958	0.000	0.541
9	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.819	0.000	0.496
Extremely important	0.007	0.002	0.000	0.673	0.000	0.447
How important being committed to way of life						
Extremely unimportant	0.009	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.139
1	0.011	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.217
2	0.011	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.241
3	0.012	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.283
4	0.015	0.000	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.445
5	0.016	0.000	0.003	0.006	0.000	0.652
6	0.017	0.000	0.003	0.015	0.000	0.763
7	0.017	0.000	0.002	0.046	0.000	0.940
8	0.017	0.000	0.002	0.126	0.000	0.877
9	0.017	0.000	0.001	0.321	0.000	0.662
Extremely important	0.016	0.000	0.001	0.544	0.000	0.505

Table A12

Estimated marginal effects of resource factors on preferring inclusion

Predictor	General restrictionists		Europe inclusionists		Non-Europe inclusionists	
	dy/dx	P> z	dy/dx	P> z	dy/dx	P> z
How important having good qualifications						
Extremely unimportant	0.002	0.123	0.000	0.881	0.001	0.001
1	0.002	0.126	0.000	0.914	0.001	0.001
2	0.002	0.132	0.000	0.922	0.001	0.001
3	0.003	0.143	0.000	0.998	0.001	0.003
4	0.003	0.153	0.000	0.925	0.001	0.005
5	0.003	0.159	0.000	0.885	0.001	0.008
6	0.003	0.165	0.000	0.850	0.001	0.011
7	0.003	0.171	0.000	0.800	0.001	0.015
8	0.003	0.181	0.000	0.745	0.001	0.020
9	0.003	0.193	0.000	0.677	0.001	0.025
Extremely important	0.003	0.212	0.000	0.646	0.001	0.031
How important having skills needed						
Extremely unimportant	-0.011	0.000	-0.011	0.000	-0.011	0.000
1	-0.014	0.000	-0.014	0.000	-0.014	0.000
2	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000	-0.015	0.000
3	-0.017	0.000	-0.017	0.000	-0.017	0.000
4	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000
5	-0.019	0.000	-0.019	0.000	-0.019	0.000
6	-0.020	0.000	-0.020	0.000	-0.020	0.000
7	-0.020	0.000	-0.020	0.000	-0.020	0.000
8	-0.019	0.000	-0.019	0.000	-0.019	0.000
9	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000	-0.018	0.000
Extremely important	-0.016	0.000	-0.016	0.000	-0.016	0.000

Table A13

Estimated marginal effects of cognitive mobilization factors on preferring inclusion

Predictor	General restrictionists		Europe inclusionists		Non-Europe inclusionists	
	dy/dx	P> z	dy/dx	P> z	dy/dx	P> z
Medium education	-0.006	0.448	-0.010	0.167	-0.004	0.084
High education	-0.053	0.000	-0.010	0.129	-0.008	0.007
Interested in politics (very vs not at all)	-0.063	0.000	0.011	0.188	-0.001	0.796
Voted in latest national election	0.001	0.916	-0.001	0.873	0.001	0.651
Feels closer to a party more than others	-0.022	0.000	0.003	0.250	0.000	0.869
Political action participation index						
0	-0.019	0.000	0.000	0.918	0.000	0.520
1	-0.019	0.000	-0.001	0.659	0.000	0.753
2	-0.018	0.000	-0.001	0.447	0.000	0.872
3	-0.016	0.000	-0.001	0.285	0.000	0.999
4	-0.015	0.000	-0.002	0.166	0.000	0.911
5	-0.013	0.000	-0.002	0.092	0.000	0.802
6	-0.012	0.000	-0.002	0.047	0.000	0.812
7	-0.012	0.000	-0.001	0.143	0.000	0.779

APPENDIX B

Dependent Variable B (Origin – Skill)

Table B1
Summary statistics for dependent variable B

Allow many/some immigrants from poorer cntry	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Treatment: unskilled from European country	8,741	0.46	0.50	0	1
Treatment: skilled from European country	8,638	0.74	0.44	0	1
Treatment: unskilled from non-European country	8,451	0.37	0.48	0	1
Treatment: skilled from non-European country	8,623	0.70	0.46	0	1
Experimental combined (dependent B)	34,453	0.57	0.50	0	1

Notes: Weighted summary statistics; values are % of respondents who chose many/some over few/none in the experimental question (each respondent gets one of the four iterations); EU countries were mentioned in BE DK DE IE NL SE UK ES HU FI FR, while non-EU European countries were mentioned in EE PL LT CZ PT SI AT.

Table B2
Estimation results from Multilevel Mixed Effects Logistic Regression (Equation 2)

Fixed effects parameters	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	P> z
<i>Skilled from Europe</i>			
Allow skilled immigrants from outside Europe	0.719	0.050	0.000
Allow unskilled immigrants from Europe	0.250	0.023	0.000
Allow unskilled immigrants from outside Europe	0.152	0.016	0.000
Female	0.908	0.028	0.001
Born in country	1.065	0.071	0.343
Member of ethnic minority	1.160	0.094	0.067
Aged between 36 and 60 yo	1.151	0.047	0.001
Aged over 60 yo	1.144	0.063	0.014
Suburbs or outskirts of big city	0.973	0.052	0.606
Town or small city	0.976	0.041	0.554
Country village	0.908	0.038	0.022
EU unification gone too far	0.896	0.006	0.000
Distrustful of EU parliament	0.966	0.006	0.000
Feels close to country: Not very	0.903	0.137	0.500
Close	0.914	0.133	0.537
Very close	0.893	0.130	0.437
Religious	1.010	0.005	0.059
Some cultures better than others	0.789	0.023	0.000
Important for imm: speak language	0.952	0.007	0.000

Important for imm: Christian	0.974	0.006	0.000
Important for imm: be white	0.905	0.006	0.000
Important for imm: committed to way of life	0.931	0.007	0.000
Activity: In education	1.136	0.089	0.104
Unemployed, looking for job	0.970	0.080	0.716
In paid work	0.942	0.041	0.174
Occupation: Medium skilled ISCO 4/6	1.125	0.045	0.004
Highly skilled ISCO 1/3	1.355	0.057	0.000
Armed forces ISCO 0	1.125	0.260	0.611
<i>not applicable for occupation</i>	1.133	0.081	0.080
Feels on present hh income: Coping	0.877	0.030	0.000
Difficult	0.779	0.038	0.000
Very difficult	0.631	0.051	0.000
Subjective health: Good	1.001	0.037	0.968
Fair	0.977	0.044	0.594
Bad	0.835	0.060	0.012
Very bad	0.950	0.135	0.721
Important for imm: good educational qualifications	1.004	0.007	0.554
Important for imm: work skills needed in country	0.925	0.007	0.000
Education: Medium	1.088	0.042	0.028
Degree or higher	1.464	0.076	0.000
How interested in politics: Hardly	1.153	0.052	0.002
Quite	1.409	0.068	0.000
Very	1.627	0.102	0.000
Voted last national election	0.961	0.038	0.310
Not eligible to vote last election	1.158	0.098	0.083
Feel closer to a particular party than all others	1.136	0.036	0.000
Political action participation index	1.079	0.013	0.000
Random effects parameters			
Country sample: Independent variance	Estimate	95% Conf. Interval	
Skilled from Europe (_cons)	0.215	0.027	0.155
Skilled from outside Europe	0.064	0.061	0.273
Unskilled from Europe	0.129	0.088	0.370
Unskilled from outside Europe	0.180	0.111	0.415
LR test vs. logistic regression:	chi2(4) = 1122.99	Prob > chi2 = 0.0000	
Intra-class correlation for level 2:	0.71		
Mixed effects logistic regression summary			
Number of observations	28,599		
Number of groups (countries)	20		
Minimum obs per group	828		
Maximum obs per group	2,587		
Average obs per group	1430		
Wald chi2(47)	3487.54		
Probability > chi2	0.000		

Table B3
Differences in predicted probability of preferring inclusion by origin and skill

Contrasts in predictive margins				
<i>Treatment compared to Skilled from EU</i>	Contrast	Std. Err.	Chi2	P>chi2
Skilled from Europe (non-EU)	-0.07	0.004	346.47	0.00
Unskilled from EU	-0.28	0.019	217.38	0.00
Unskilled from Europe (non-EU)	-0.36	0.018	382.95	0.00
Skilled from outside Europe	-0.08	0.014	33.59	0.00
Unskilled from outside Europe	-0.40	0.020	396.85	0.00
<hr/>				
<i>Treatment compared to Unskilled from EU</i>				
Unskilled from Europe (non-EU)	-0.08	0.003	767.85	0.00
Skilled from Europe (non-EU)	0.21	0.019	123.01	0.00
Unskilled from outside Europe	-0.12	0.026	21.43	0.00
Skilled from outside Europe	0.20	0.022	81.08	0.00
<hr/>				
Joint test			1583.92	0.00

Notes: Estimation sample = 28,985 observations; contrasts in predicted margins of probability of expressing support for allowing many or some immigrants; fixed portion of mixed effects logistic regression as in equation (2).

Model Diagnostics for dependent B

Intra-class correlation in the level 2 of the model, i.e. countries, is particularly low at .07, confirming that latent responses to the outcome variable are not highly correlated within countries (Appendix Table B1). If intraclass correlation were especially high, it would indicate that latent responses of people within the same country sample correlated too highly (i.e. too similar) and the chance of someone preferring restriction or inclusion of inflows is primarily attributable to country of residence. The predicted versus observed classification table suggests reasonable predictive power for our model estimations. Around 68% of respondents who opted for a few or no inflows in their respective question were correctly predicted by the model as preferring restriction. Around 75% of respondents

who chose many or some inflows in their question were correctly predicted by the model as preferring inclusion.

In addition to these diagnostic tests, we also try two alternative estimation methods to ensure our results and conclusions are not particularly sensitive to small changes. We estimate a logistic regression model with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country, in which the treatment is taken into account as an individual fixed effect (Appendix B, Table 4). We also replicate equation 2 by estimating a mixed effects logistic regression where treatment effects are only included in the fixed portion of the equation (Appendix B, Table 5). There are minor differences but our inferences appear robust.

Table B4

Estimation results – Replication with Logistic Regression & Clustered SE			
Parameters	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	P> z
<i>Skilled from Europe</i>			
Allow skilled immigrants from outside Europe	0.717	0.062	0.000
Allow unskilled immigrants from Europe	0.249	0.029	0.000
Allow unskilled immigrants from outside Europe	0.148	0.022	0.000
Female	0.911	0.046	0.065
Born in country	1.063	0.108	0.546
Member of ethnic minority	1.164	0.090	0.049
Aged between 36 and 60 yo	1.154	0.058	0.004
Aged over 60 yo	1.156	0.092	0.067
Suburbs or outskirts of big city	0.976	0.061	0.697
Town or small city	0.980	0.066	0.767
Country village	0.912	0.068	0.217
EU unification gone too far	0.897	0.007	0.000
Distrustful of EU parliament	0.967	0.012	0.006
Feels close to country: Not very	0.896	0.115	0.391
Close	0.909	0.148	0.557
Very close	0.892	0.141	0.467
Religious	1.010	0.007	0.158
Some cultures better than others	0.792	0.032	0.000
Important for imm: speak language	0.953	0.011	0.000
Important for imm: Christian	0.974	0.008	0.002
Important for imm: be white	0.906	0.011	0.000
Important for imm: committed to way of life	0.932	0.015	0.000
Activity: In paid work	1.147	0.084	0.062
In education or training	0.975	0.063	0.690

Unemployed, looking for job	0.951	0.031	0.126
Occupation: Medium skilled ISCO 4/6	1.120	0.045	0.005
Highly skilled ISCO 1/3	1.345	0.078	0.000
Armed forces ISCO 0	1.092	0.238	0.685
<i>not applicable for occupation</i>	1.115	0.096	0.208
Feels on present hh income: Coping	0.887	0.033	0.001
Difficult	0.782	0.046	0.000
Very difficult	0.640	0.060	0.000
Subjective health: Good	1.007	0.042	0.866
Fair	0.984	0.046	0.724
Bad	0.844	0.063	0.022
Very bad	0.937	0.149	0.681
Important for imm: good educational qualifications	1.004	0.009	0.685
Important for imm: work skills needed in country	0.927	0.014	0.000
Education: Medium	1.086	0.052	0.086
Degree or higher	1.466	0.090	0.000
How interested in politics: Hardly	1.167	0.071	0.012
Quite	1.415	0.094	0.000
Very	1.634	0.136	0.000
Voted last national election	0.962	0.035	0.284
Not eligible to vote last election	1.182	0.099	0.046
Feel closer to a particular party than all others	1.133	0.047	0.003
Political action participation index	1.077	0.012	0.000
Belgium	1.141	0.028	0.000
Switzerland	1.674	0.031	0.000
Czech R	0.828	0.023	0.000
Germany	1.942	0.051	0.000
Denmark	0.900	0.031	0.003
Estonia	1.134	0.049	0.004
Spain	0.555	0.018	0.000
Finland	0.532	0.020	0.000
France	2.063	0.037	0.000
UK	1.300	0.055	0.000
Hungary	0.361	0.011	0.000
R of Ireland	0.795	0.019	0.000
Lithuania	1.234	0.039	0.000
Netherlands	0.635	0.018	0.000
Norway	1.331	0.052	0.000
Poland	1.373	0.036	0.000
Portugal	1.455	0.053	0.000
Sweden	1.869	0.075	0.000
Slovenia	1.332	0.034	0.000
Obs	28,599		

Pseudo Rsquared	0.2197
SE adjusted clusters	20

Table B5

Estimation results – Replication with mixed effects logistic and treatment fixed only

Fixed effects parameters	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	P> z
<i>Skilled from Europe</i>			
Allow skilled immigrants from outside Europe	0.717	0.029	0.000
Allow unskilled immigrants from Europe	0.249	0.010	0.000
Allow unskilled immigrants from outside Europe	0.148	0.006	0.000
Female	0.911	0.028	0.002
Born in country	1.060	0.070	0.374
Member of ethnic minority	1.164	0.093	0.058
Aged between 36 and 60 yo	1.154	0.047	0.000
Aged over 60 yo	1.156	0.063	0.008
Suburbs or outskirts of big city	0.978	0.052	0.673
Town or small city	0.981	0.041	0.643
Country village	0.913	0.038	0.029
EU unification gone too far	0.897	0.006	0.000
Distrustful of EU parliament	0.967	0.006	0.000
Feels close to country: Not very	0.898	0.135	0.474
Close	0.910	0.131	0.515
Very close	0.892	0.129	0.428
Religious	1.010	0.005	0.055
Some cultures better than others	0.792	0.023	0.000
Important for imm: speak language	0.954	0.007	0.000
Important for imm: Christian	0.974	0.006	0.000
Important for imm: be white	0.906	0.006	0.000
Important for imm: committed to way of life	0.931	0.007	0.000
Activity: In paid work	1.146	0.089	0.080
In education or training	0.975	0.080	0.755
Unemployed, looking for job	0.951	0.041	0.246
Occupation: Medium skilled ISCO 4/6	1.120	0.045	0.005
Highly skilled ISCO 1/3	1.346	0.056	0.000
Armed forces ISCO 0	1.091	0.250	0.703
<i>not applicable for occupation</i>	1.115	0.079	0.123
Feels on present hh income: Coping	0.885	0.030	0.000
Difficult	0.779	0.038	0.000
Very difficult	0.637	0.051	0.000
Subjective health: Good	1.007	0.037	0.853
Fair	0.984	0.044	0.716
Bad	0.844	0.060	0.018
Very bad	0.938	0.132	0.652
Important for imm: good educational qualifications	1.004	0.007	0.598

Important for imm: work skills needed in country	0.927	0.007	0.000
Education: Medium	1.086	0.042	0.032
Degree or higher	1.464	0.075	0.000
How interested in politics: Hardly	1.169	0.053	0.001
Quite	1.417	0.068	0.000
Very	1.638	0.102	0.000
Voted last national election	0.961	0.037	0.301
Not eligible to vote last election	1.181	0.099	0.048
Feel closer to a particular party than all others	1.133	0.035	0.000
Political action participation index	1.078	0.013	0.000
Random effects parameters			
Country sample: Identity variance	Estimate	95% Conf. Interval	
Country random intercept	0.203	0.108	0.384
LR test vs. logistic regression: $\chi^2(01) = 910.81$ Prob $\geq \chi^2 = 0.000$			
Mixed effects logistic regression summary			
Number of observations	28,599		
Number of groups (countries)	20		
Wald χ^2 (47)	4854.8		
Probability > χ^2	0.000		
LR test between main estimation (treatment both fixed and random) and this (treatment fixed only)			
LR χ^2 (3)	212.18		
Prob > χ^2	0.000		

Table B6**Estimated marginal probability of preferring inclusion across attitudes to EU**

	Skilled from Europe (non-EU)	Skilled from Europe (EU)	Unskilled from Europe (non-EU)	Unskilled from Europe (EU)
	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin
EU unification				
Go further	0.78	0.87	0.52	0.66
9	0.77	0.87	0.47	0.63
8	0.75	0.84	0.48	0.60
7	0.70	0.81	0.41	0.58
6	0.68	0.78	0.38	0.51
5	0.66	0.75	0.35	0.47
4	0.60	0.72	0.32	0.41
3	0.57	0.68	0.28	0.38
2	0.57	0.63	0.27	0.34
1	0.53	0.59	0.24	0.29
Already gone too far	0.48	0.55	0.23	0.27
EU Parliament				
Complete trust	0.69	0.77	0.38	0.49
9	0.62	0.83	0.40	0.57
8	0.67	0.81	0.43	0.54
7	0.70	0.81	0.41	0.55
6	0.69	0.79	0.38	0.54
5	0.67	0.76	0.38	0.49
4	0.65	0.73	0.37	0.46
3	0.65	0.71	0.34	0.44
2	0.60	0.68	0.32	0.40
1	0.60	0.65	0.30	0.34
No trust at all	0.56	0.60	0.28	0.32

Table B7**Estimated marginal probability of preferring inclusion across self-identification factors**

	Skilled from Europe (non-EU)	Skilled from Europe (EU)	Unskilled from Europe (non-EU)	Unskilled from Europe (EU)
	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin
Feel close to country: Not close at all	0.64	0.68	0.32	0.47
Not very close	0.67	0.73	0.36	0.47
Close	0.65	0.75	0.37	0.48
Very close	0.63	0.73	0.34	0.46
All cultures are equal	0.68	0.77	0.39	0.50
Some cultures better than others	0.58	0.70	0.30	0.41
Religious: Not at all	0.63	0.74	0.33	0.49
1	0.65	0.75	0.34	0.50
2	0.63	0.75	0.36	0.47
3	0.67	0.75	0.35	0.46
4	0.67	0.72	0.37	0.44
5	0.64	0.73	0.35	0.44
6	0.67	0.74	0.39	0.47
7	0.66	0.74	0.37	0.48
8	0.64	0.74	0.36	0.46
9	0.66	0.74	0.35	0.46
Very religious	0.58	0.72	0.35	0.45

Table B8**Estimated marginal probability of preferring inclusion across shared identity factors**

	Skilled from Europe (non-EU)	Skilled from Europe (EU)	Unskilled from Europe (non-EU)	Unskilled from Europe (EU)
	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin
Important to have Christian background				
Extremely unimportant	0.76	0.81	0.48	0.57
1	0.74	0.77	0.43	0.53
2	0.70	0.77	0.42	0.48
3	0.68	0.72	0.41	0.46
4	0.67	0.71	0.37	0.41
5	0.63	0.66	0.33	0.36
6	0.64	0.65	0.33	0.35
7	0.58	0.63	0.29	0.33
8	0.55	0.58	0.26	0.28
9	0.49	0.57	0.21	0.25
Extremely important	0.44	0.48	0.19	0.19
Important to be white				
Extremely unimportant	0.76	0.81	0.48	0.56
1	0.74	0.74	0.43	0.46
2	0.71	0.73	0.40	0.43
3	0.69	0.69	0.39	0.38
4	0.64	0.66	0.35	0.35
5	0.59	0.59	0.29	0.29
6	0.57	0.58	0.28	0.28
7	0.51	0.55	0.25	0.24
8	0.48	0.47	0.21	0.18
9	0.41	0.40	0.17	0.18
Extremely important	0.35	0.39	0.14	0.14

Important to be committed to way of life				
Extremely unimportant	0.88	0.91	0.64	0.75
1	0.82	0.88	0.57	0.72
2	0.84	0.90	0.60	0.71
3	0.79	0.88	0.58	0.71
4	0.81	0.86	0.45	0.64
5	0.74	0.82	0.44	0.57
6	0.72	0.81	0.41	0.54
7	0.70	0.77	0.39	0.49
8	0.65	0.73	0.35	0.45
9	0.58	0.69	0.29	0.39
Extremely important	0.52	0.62	0.25	0.33
Important to speak country's official language				
Extremely unimportant	0.84	0.90	0.55	0.74
1	0.81	0.90	0.54	0.68
2	0.78	0.87	0.52	0.65
3	0.75	0.85	0.48	0.63
4	0.74	0.81	0.46	0.60
5	0.71	0.78	0.40	0.52
6	0.69	0.77	0.37	0.48
7	0.65	0.74	0.36	0.45
8	0.63	0.70	0.33	0.42
9	0.60	0.67	0.31	0.37
Extremely important	0.53	0.61	0.26	0.31

Table B9
Estimated marginal probability of preferring inclusion across resource factors

	Skilled from Europe (non-EU)	Skilled from Europe (EU)	Unskilled from Europe (non-EU)	Unskilled from Europe (EU)
	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin
Activity: Economically inactive	0.61	0.70	0.31	0.42
Activity: Education	0.73	0.81	0.44	0.55
Activity: Unemployed, looking for job	0.61	0.71	0.35	0.40
Activity: Paid work	0.66	0.76	0.37	0.49
Occupation: Low skilled ISCO 7/9	0.56	0.63	0.28	0.34
Occupation: Medium skilled ISCO 4/6	0.62	0.71	0.33	0.42
Occupation: Highly skilled ISCO 1/3	0.74	0.82	0.44	0.57
Occupation: Armed forces ISCO 0	0.65	0.75	0.43	0.49
Occupation: not applicable	0.66	0.72	0.37	0.44
Subjective health: Very good	0.68	0.78	0.38	0.52
Subjective health: Good	0.67	0.75	0.38	0.47
Subjective health: Fair	0.62	0.70	0.32	0.42
Subjective health: Bad	0.50	0.64	0.25	0.36
Subjective health: Very bad	0.47	0.62	0.24	0.30
Present income: Living comfortably	0.75	0.80	0.44	0.55
Present income: Coping	0.65	0.72	0.36	0.43
Present income: Difficult	0.58	0.65	0.30	0.35
Present income: Very difficult	0.45	0.57	0.23	0.31
Important to have good educational qualifications				
Extremely unimportant	0.77	0.86	0.46	0.67
1	0.74	0.89	0.53	0.62
2	0.76	0.85	0.46	0.60
3	0.70	0.82	0.42	0.57

4	0.67	0.78	0.40	0.53
5	0.66	0.75	0.38	0.48
6	0.66	0.75	0.37	0.48
7	0.65	0.73	0.36	0.44
8	0.62	0.70	0.32	0.40
9	0.60	0.66	0.29	0.36
Extremely important	0.55	0.65	0.29	0.34

Important to have work skills needed				
Extremely unimportant	0.86	0.91	0.62	0.74
1	0.83	0.89	0.62	0.71
2	0.81	0.89	0.52	0.65
3	0.79	0.86	0.53	0.64
4	0.77	0.84	0.45	0.58
5	0.72	0.79	0.44	0.52
6	0.71	0.76	0.40	0.48
7	0.68	0.73	0.37	0.44
8	0.63	0.68	0.33	0.39
9	0.56	0.63	0.28	0.34
Extremely important	0.52	0.58	0.25	0.28

Table B10

Estimated marginal probability of preferring inclusion across cognitive mobilization factors

	Skilled from Europe (non-EU)	Skilled from Europe (EU)	Unskilled from Europe (non-EU)	Unskilled from Europe (EU)
	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin	Probability margin
Education: Up to lower secondary education ISCED 0-II	0.59	0.65	0.32	0.35
Education: Upper second, post-secondary, short tertiary ISCED III-IV	0.62	0.72	0.32	0.44
Education: Bachelors or higher ISCED V-VI	0.78	0.86	0.49	0.64
How interested in politics: Not at all	0.57	0.60	0.28	0.30
How interested in politics: Hardly	0.62	0.70	0.33	0.40
How interested in politics: Quite	0.70	0.78	0.41	0.52
How interested in politics: Very	0.76	0.81	0.48	0.58
Last national election: did not vote	0.59	0.68	0.30	0.39
Last national election: not eligible to vote	0.66	0.75	0.37	0.48
Last national election: voted	0.71	0.79	0.42	0.51
Does not feel closer to a party	0.61	0.70	0.33	0.41
Feels closer to a particular party than all other parties	0.68	0.76	0.39	0.50
Political action participation index				
0	0.61	0.67	0.31	0.38
1	0.69	0.75	0.39	0.46
2	0.72	0.78	0.46	0.51
3	0.75	0.81	0.49	0.58
4	0.81	0.84	0.50	0.60
5	0.86	0.86	0.60	0.70
6	0.79	0.89	0.56	0.65

7	0.80	0.84	0.34	0.76
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