Whose Peace?
Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding

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Whose Peace? Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding  
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ABSTRACT

Recent years have seen an increasing emphasis on local ownership in UN peacebuilding. Advocates of local ownership assert that it boosts the legitimacy and sustainability of UN peacebuilding by helping to preserve the principles of self-determination and non-imposition of externally-conceived solutions onto post-conflict countries in an activity that can contravene them. However, while the UN perceives local ownership as enabling it to act in accordance with these principles, it also perceives local ownership to imperil the achievement of its operational goals, thus bringing its normative and operational objectives into conflict. This thesis evaluates the UN’s discourse, understandings, and operationalizations of local ownership in peacebuilding. Drawing on examples from the UN peace operation in DR Congo, it shows that despite the UN’s regular invocation of local ownership discourse, it operationalizes ownership in restrictive and selective ways that are intended to protect the achievement of operational goals but that consequently limit self-determination and increase external imposition on the host country. This gap between the rhetoric and reality of ownership suggests that the UN uses local ownership primarily as a discursive tool for legitimation, one intended to reconcile the organization’s normative and operational imperatives. However, because its actions do not match its rhetoric, the UN’s attempts to generate legitimacy through discourse appear to fall flat, particularly in the eyes of local actors. Moreover, because of contradictions in the ways that the UN operationalizes local ownership, it not only deepens the curtailment of self-determination and the degree of external imposition, it also undercuts its ability to realize the very operational goals it is trying to protect. Ultimately, because it is a contradictory and contested concept, local ownership fails to eliminate or ‘fix’ the trade-offs the UN faces in peacebuilding, suggesting that the UN must instead accept them and incorporate them into its goals and expectations.
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance de Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>Alliance pour la Majorité Presidentielle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Armée Nationale Congolaise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMIAP</td>
<td>Détection Militaire des Activités Anti-Patrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIFD</td>
<td>United Kingdom Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces Armées Congolaises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARDC</td>
<td>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Forces Armées Zaïroises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRPI</td>
<td>Forces de Resistance Patriotiques en Ituri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSSS</td>
<td>International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation en Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBSO</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPRD</td>
<td>Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBB</td>
<td>Results-Based Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-G</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD-K/ML</td>
<td>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSRG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAREC</td>
<td><em>Stabilisation et Reconstruction des zones sortant des conflits armées</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td><em>Union pour la Démocratie et Progrès Social</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN ECHA</td>
<td>United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defense Force</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Figure 1. Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1.1. Introduction and Overview

National and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of a peace process. In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation’s core activities, every effort should be made to promote national and local ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors. Effective approaches to national and local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.¹

The above quote, from the 2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, known as the Capstone Doctrine, of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), reflects what has become a near orthodox commitment to local ownership in United Nations peace operations in post-conflict states. Similar rhetoric surrounding local ownership can be found in any number of DPKO guidelines, best practices, and lessons learned documents, as well as in the mandates of current peace operations throughout the world, all of which endorse local ownership as a key principle of peacebuilding.² More specifically, advocates of local ownership of peacebuilding processes assert that it renders peacebuilding more

legitimate and more sustainable by preserving host-country consent; protecting UN impartiality; ensuring that reconstruction efforts are rooted in indigenous structures, culture, and norms; and building local capacity.

Because of these purported benefits, local ownership has emerged as one of the leading principles shaping peacebuilding operations today. It can be viewed as a ‘strategy’ pursued by international actors to generate legitimacy for their activities and to render them sustainable over the longer term. In a 2011 meeting of the Security Council, local ownership was recognized ‘not only as a moral imperative but also as a pragmatic necessity for legitimacy and sustainability.’ The 2009 UN Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict

3 The culmination of this emphasis on ownership within the UN is, perhaps, the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005, which puts local ownership at the center of its doctrine. To be on the agenda of the Commission, a member state must request it, and a compact is then concluded between the Commission and the state. Countries may be referred to the Commission by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, or the Secretary-General, but again, the state’s consent is required. Moreover, the Commission is not an operational body, but one that acts in an advisory capacity for the Security Council and the General Assembly, meaning that leadership of program design, implementation, spending, and evaluation rest with the government of the concerned state. The local ownership approach to peacebuilding is thus codified by the Commission as one the UN must take, and Security Council Resolution 1645, which establishes the Commission, affirms ‘the primary responsibility of national and transitional Governments and authorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict…in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national ownership.’ See United Nations, S/RES/1645 (2005); NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) and International Peace Institute (IPI), ‘Taking Stock and Looking Forward’ (New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation and International Peace Institute, April 2008); International Peace Academy (IPA), ‘Next Steps for the Peacebuilding Commission’ (New York: International Peace Academy, 9 June 2006); and Brandon Hunt, ‘Rocky Road Ahead for Peacebuilding Commission’ (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 24 May 2007).


puts ownership at its heart, also calling it an ‘imperative’ in peacebuilding. The 2011 UN report *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* similarly makes national ownership the first of its four operational recommendations, noting that international interventions should nurture existing national capacities as much as possible, support national institutions ‘from within,’ and bolster the role of women in peacebuilding as a way of making interventions effective and sustainable.

Yet despite the widespread use of the term, local ownership remains remarkably understudied. While scholarly interest is turning more and more towards the role of local actors in peacebuilding, to date academic understandings of ownership have been based primarily on assumptions and normative beliefs held broadly in both the policy and academic communities.

These assumptions and beliefs appear to be sound, justified, and even commonsensical, and it is difficult to argue with the perceived advantages of local ownership in peacebuilding. If international actors ‘do’ everything for local actors—that is, ensure security, build institutions, draft and safeguard legislation, and encourage reconciliation—not only will the peacebuilding process be perceived as externally imposed and hence illegitimate, it is also likely to fail once the UN departs, as national actors will have been unable to build the necessary capacity to continue what the UN has begun. Accordingly, without local involvement, peacekeeping will both lose legitimacy and be less sustainable over the long term.

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1.2. Contradictions in Peacebuilding: Intervention, Imposition, and Self-Determination

The logic behind this thinking about local ownership in peacebuilding relates to a broader conviction that processes of post-conflict transformation and reconstruction cannot be imposed from without and must be indigenous or ‘homegrown’ to be effective. This belief is widely held not only within the UN and the peacebuilding communities, but also more broadly among policymakers, political observers, and academics. For example, in a 2011 New York Times op-ed, Thomas Friedman argued that internal processes of dispute resolution, peacemaking, societal transformation, and revolution throughout the world—most recently the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011—have succeeded precisely because they were internal—that is, they both originated domestically and remained largely domestic processes throughout. Speaking of peacebuilding specifically, Oghogho Edomwonyi argues that it is a process of fundamental social change that must be internally generated and led if it is to be lasting. Similarly, Timothy Donais notes that, ‘[i]n much the same way that genuine reconciliation cannot be imposed by outsiders, no amount of externally-generated policy prescriptions can shift post-conflict societies from a culture of violence to a culture of peace.’ The recently created g7+, a group of fragile and conflict-affected states, has stated that ‘aid delivery, interventions and programs instigated by international actors are often inapplicable, unsustainable and incompatible with our

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in-country national agendas,’ stressing that ‘[e]xternal mandates and ideas can no
longer be imposed on our countries or regions and our peoples.’

Such remarks suggest that successful political, economic, and social change can
only ever be an internal, organic phenomenon. Though some scholars find that UN
peacekeeping is a highly effective tool for securing durable peace, others argue that
war-torn states should in fact be left to rebuild themselves. They advocate a strategy
of ‘autonomous recovery,’ asserting that war is a natural process of societal
transformation and that international intervention, by interrupting natural processes,
can lead to less stable outcomes. Whatever their view of the value of UN

11 g7+, ‘Statement of the g7+ Heads of State to High Level Plenary Meeting of the
high-level-plenary-mee.html. The g7+ was created in 2010, and now comprises 19
fragile and conflict-affected states. In November 2011, at the Fourth High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, the g7+ secured agreement on
principles of engagement in war-torn states that prioritize country ownership.
International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, ‘A New Deal for
Engagement in Fragile States.’ Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness,
12 There is in fact a long history to this view. For example, in his essay ‘A Few Words
on Non-Intervention,’ John Stuart Mill, though giving arguments both for and against
intervention in other societies, generally cautions against it, stating that ‘liberty which
is bestowed upon [a people] by other hands than their own, will have nothing real,
nothing permanent.’ John Stuart Mill, ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention,’ in The
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXI - Essays on Equality, Law, and
Education, edited by John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London:
255&search=%22A+Few+Words+On+Non-Intervention%22&chapter=21666&layout=html#a_809352.
13 Jeremy M. Weinstein, ‘Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in
Comparative Perspective,’ Working Paper 57. Washington, DC: Center for Global
Development, 2005. On the ineffectiveness of international intervention, see also
Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance,’ Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July/August
1999), and Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice:
Implications for Policy,’ in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, edited by
effectiveness of peacekeeping to the consolidation of peace, see Virginia Page Fortna,
peacekeeping, nearly all practitioners and scholars give some degree of credence to the idea that externally-imposed solutions have limited legitimacy and effectiveness in post-conflict situations. Ownership in this light, then, appears to be a logically sound principle to apply to the conduct of peace operations. If peacebuilding, as an activity designed and led by outsiders, has a necessarily limited ability to genuinely build and sustain peace, then including and giving a say to national actors should increase legitimacy and sustainability. As one senior UN peacekeeping official noted,

[T]he benefit [of local ownership in peacekeeping] is that imposing something is both resource-intensive and has a very low margin of success… In general, imposition of something that is fundamentally foreign will always mean that the best you can hope for is a graft, not an alloy. And all grafts eventually collapse, whereas alloys, if done right, end up being stronger… if you’re just bolting something on, then maybe it works for a while, but ultimately it is still inorganic and so it won’t hold as well.14

Not only are there doubts about the efficiency and sustainability of externally-imposed solutions, there is also a normative discomfort with them because they are considered a violation of the principle of self-determination. Belief in this principle is widely and deeply held in the international community. The UN in particular has long been a proponent of self-determination and has linked the concept to international peace and stability, stating in its Charter that one of the organization’s primary purposes is ‘[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.’15 The UN’s promotion of the principle of self-determination intensified through the organization’s active

14 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
participation in and advocacy for decolonization in the 1960s. At that time, the UN General Assembly reaffirmed that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination,’ noting that this right remains inviolable even where political, social, or economic systems are deemed weak or inappropriate.

However, despite the UN’s regular invocation of self-determination, the concept remains ill defined and widely debated and it has both legal and political meanings that continue to evolve to this day. From a legal standpoint, self-determination refers broadly to the right of peoples to determine their own political status, and a distinction is made between internal and external self-determination, where the former involves the rights of peoples within states, such as minority rights and the right to participate in public life, while the latter entails the right of peoples to choose their external international status, for example, remaining in a state, independence, or autonomy. However, there is no standard definition of which

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groups may claim this right, and debate persists about whether it belongs primarily to sub-national groups within a state or if it should be restricted to the colonial peoples who were once living outside of the territory of the colonial power. Others argue instead that the right belongs primarily to the populations of sovereign states in their entirety, and self-determination is thus construed primarily as the broad right of states to determine what type of polity they want to have without interference, domination, or pressure from other states or external actors, rather than specific rights relating to legal status and public participation. In this sense, self-determination is simply the opposite of external or foreign determination of the political status of a country.

Indeed, even in its earlier invocation during decolonization, there was a hesitancy about extending the right of self-determination to ethnic and other minority groups within states, as it was feared that this would lead to the break-up of colonial territories into a multiplicity of small entities, which would in turn ‘threaten’ international order by ‘fragment[ing] existing international society into a far greater number of jurisdictions.’ Even the UN’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which invokes the principle of self-determination as a justification for decolonization, declares in no uncertain terms that ‘[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the

20 Wilde, International Territorial Administration, 246, and Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, 78.
21 Doehring, ‘Self-Determination,’ 64.
22 Doehring, ‘Self-Determination,’ 64, and Jackson, Quasi-States, 152.
24 Jackson, Quasi-States, 42. See also Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, 316, 318.
terrestrial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations.25 In other words, it precludes the right of self-
determination for sub-national groups, and reaffirms that self-determination
principally entails the freedom from foreign rule of the entire population of a
territorially-bounded state.26 This hesitancy to extend the full right of self-
determination to national, ethnic, and other minorities persists to this day, because it
is feared that doing so could ‘empower…domestic disruption, secession or at any rate
norms that could fuel or exacerbate ethnic or racial conflict.’27 Indeed, as Mayall
argues, the international community’s conception of self-determination is based on
territorial considerations rather than social ones, and he asserts that self-determination
‘cannot be invoked—at least not with any hope of securing widespread support—by
dissatisfied minorities within existing states.’28 Accordingly, the adoption of legal
definitions of self-determination has been ‘selective and limited’ and has led to the
growth of more political usages of the term.29

Political meanings of self-determination tend towards the broader, more
general conceptions described above, and since decolonization, the UN has indeed

25 United Nations, A/RES/1514 (XV). General Assembly Resolution 2625 also
reaffirms the primacy of international borders, noting that no action should be taken
that might ‘dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States.’ United Nations, A/RES/2625 (XXV)
(1970), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, 124.
26 This version of self-determination upholds the organization of the international
system as one that is state-based. That the UN would favor such a reaffirmation of
Westphalian principles is hardly surprising, given that it is an organization that is
itself made up of sovereign, territorially-defined states.
27 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, 318. See also Doehring, ‘Self-
Determination,’ 65–66.
28 Mayall, ‘Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the “New World Order,”’ 424.
On this point, see also Freeman, ‘The Right to Self-Determination in International
Politics,’ and Shehadi, Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-Up of States, 8.
29 Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, 317, italics in the original.
moved away from legal definitions of self-determination that emphasize it as an individual or minority right towards definitions that describe a principle or norm that repudiates foreign administration of sovereign states in general—that is, ‘external’ determination—even where those states are deemed to have weak capacities for self-administration.\(^{30}\) Cassese remarks that self-determination has evolved into a general principle that upholds ‘an anti-colonialist standard, …a ban on foreign military occupation and…a standard requiring that racial groups be given full access to government,’\(^{31}\) while Hannum notes that since decolonization, UN practice has affirmed a version of self-determination that implies ‘independence of [a] whole state’s population from foreign intervention or influence,’ regardless of the strength or weakness of that state.\(^{32}\) In this vein, in its 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly asserted that ‘all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development,’ thus affirming the inappropriateness of foreign domination or imposition, but making no direct reference to the particular role of minorities or sub-national groups within states.\(^{33}\)


\(^{31}\) Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, 319.

\(^{32}\) Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 49.

\(^{33}\) United Nations, A/RES/2625 (XXV), 123.
This political conception of self-determination combines the internal and external aspects of legal definitions of self-determination described above. As Ralph Wilde notes, ‘the term “external” self-determination can also be used in the context of freedom from external interference in the exercise of “internal” self-determination.’ In other words, in such political usages, self-determination reaffirms the ability of states to organize themselves internally politically and socially as they see fit, without risking their external sovereign status. Matthew Saul employs a similar political usage of the term, noting that, ‘the aspect of the principle of self-determination that posits that the people of a state as a whole should be free, within the boundaries of the state, to determine, without outside interference, their social, political, economic and cultural infrastructure continues to be central to the preservation of international order.’ This political conception of self-determination, which emphasizes the freedom of a country to determine its own political development and processes without external influence, even where domestic systems and procedures are deemed weak, unfair, or inappropriate, is thus linked closely to the idea of non-imposition discussed above, and it is this political conception of self-determination that I employ throughout this thesis.

The reason the principle of self-determination, thus defined, is complicated by the practice of peacebuilding after civil war is that the UN is present exactly to address political, social, and economic systems that have been deemed weak or inappropriate and that have proven incapable of managing conflicts without recourse.

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to violence. In the process, the UN becomes intimately involved in all kinds of internal political processes that shape the nature and structure of politics and societal relations, processes that normally would not be open to external interference and that together contribute to the country’s degree of self-determination. According to Saul, the principle of self-determination ‘is contravened by the practice of post-conflict reconstruction that is dependent on international actors.’ Moreover, the violation of the principle of self-determination is something that host countries often find particularly disturbing or humiliating and that often leads to resistance and resentment on their part. In this way, the curtailing of self-determination can damage local perceptions of the UN’s legitimacy in post-conflict peace operations.

Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of uneasiness with this circumscription of self-determination among international actors, and ensuring that processes are locally owned is thought to minimize the violation of self-determination entailed by international peacebuilding after war. Indeed, closely related to the idea that externally-imposed solutions will not last and will be viewed as illegitimate and

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36 It is important to note that the UN can in fact intervene in the internal affairs of a member state (under Ch. VII), and member states accept this in signing the Charter and becoming members of the UN. However, this is understood to entail a violation of the right to non-interference (Ch. I, Article 2(7)), not of the right to self-determination, which though related, remain substantively quite different. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations.
37 Saul, ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law,’ 166. Writing of international transitional administration, Zaum echoes this point, noting that in establishing such administrations, ‘the international community compromises one of the fundamental aspects of sovereignty, the norm of self-determination.’ The Sovereignty Paradox, 27.
38 Saul, ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law,’ 166, 175.
inappropriate by local actors, self-determination is deemed critical to keeping peace operations legitimate and sustainable. Michael Barnett defines legitimacy as ‘societal agreement regarding the proper procedures for deciding and pursuing collectively acceptable goals’—a definition that excludes actors external to a particular society and emphasizes the self-determined nature of legitimate governance. Several other scholars reiterate this link between self-determination and legitimacy in relation to peacebuilding specifically. As David Roberts points out, peacebuilding ‘[p]riorities [that] are not designed domestically and do not privilege the institutions locals would favour to deliver their needs’ quickly become ‘delegitimized within.’ Richmond, similarly, notes that ‘self-determination and participation… are key to a social and civil peace’ and that peacebuilding that distances the local and the international through the importation of externally-designed forms of governance at the expense of locally-responsive ones ‘undermines the legitimacy of peacebuilding’—in other words, without ensuring a degree of self-determination within peacebuilding, peacebuilding loses legitimacy. Talentino echoes this sentiment, suggesting that the legitimacy of peacebuilding operations will be undermined if local actors feel that they are being imposed upon by international actors—in other words, if peacebuilding is externally-determined rather than self-determined. Accordingly just as local ownership in peace operations is thought to limit the degree of imposition, it is also thought to preserve a degree of self-determination by ‘ensur[ing] a meaningful

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connection between the reconstruction process and the will of the people,” enablin
g national actors to imagine and realize their own political destiny and thus boosting legiti
macy. As Nina Wilén notes, ‘there remains a strong demand for legitimization of actions that are undertaking inside a state’s territory,’ and local ownership—through its perceived link with self-determination—can fill such a demand.

Self-determination’s link with legitimacy is also thought to endow peacebuilding with increased sustainability. Indeed, it is important to note that legitimacy and sustainability are not separate concepts here. Sustainability may be viewed as corollary to legitimacy in that something that is not deemed legitimate is unlikely to endure, particularly in the context of the social and political upheaval that takes place after conflict. In other words, where positions of authority, institutions, and modes of governance are not fixed, constituents may shift their loyalties rapidly and frequently if they do not feel that the latter are legitimately exercising power. In this sense, sustainability may be viewed partly as a result of or evolution of legitimacy. Indeed, Yannis explicitly links self-determination with both legitimacy and sustainability, noting that ‘respect for the principle of self-determination is a sine qua non for international involvement’ after conflict because it provides the only basis for a legitimate response by the international community and ‘provides a more

44 Many scholars assert that current international transitional administrations after civil conflict are essentially international trusteeship by another name, but that because decolonization reaffirmed and strengthened the principle of self-determination, directly invoking trusteeship is no longer normatively acceptable. For a thorough discussion of this, see Robert H. Jackson, Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 301-307. See also Wilde, ‘Competing Normative Visions of Exit.’
solid basis for sustainable solutions. Lederach and Appleby also link local agency with legitimacy and sustainability, stating that ‘[a] sustainable peace… requires long-term, ongoing activities and operations that may be initiated and supported for a time by outsiders but must eventually become the ordinary practices of the citizens and institutions of the society in question.’ Donais makes a similar point when speaking of local ownership, noting that the link between local ownership and sustainability is a ‘basic reality.’ Preserving a degree of self-determination in the context of international peacebuilding, which, as mentioned, is perceived to violate or reduce self-determination, is thus perceived as a way of maintaining both legitimacy and sustainability. Local ownership, through its association with self-determination, is in turn perceived as a means to do just that.

On a more general note, the apparent clash between the UN’s peacebuilding activities and the principles of self-determination and non-imposition bring to light a broader contradiction facing the UN, that is, situations where the UN’s operational duties and its normative duties conflict. More specifically, peace operations in the wake of civil wars, because they entail intervention, interference, imposition, and the violation of self-determination, may inherently imply a contradiction with some of the most basic organizational principles of the international system, principles that the UN espouses, upholds, and promotes.

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50 As mentioned, self-determination appears in the UN Charter (Ch. I, Article 1(2)) as well as in numerous other resolutions and documents. The principle of non-
In peacebuilding, then, the UN is, in a way, obliged to choose between
remaining aligned with its principles and fulfilling its operational duties. However, as
described, local ownership is thought to enable the UN to reconcile this difference, by
allowing it to continue to act in line with its principles while also allowing it to
engage in effective interventions in post-conflict states. Because of these perceived
links between local ownership and the preservation of self-determination and non-
imposition, local ownership is often spoken about and portrayed in discourse as
something that is normatively desirable. That is, it is considered ‘right’ or
‘appropriate’ and as something that should serve as a principle that guides the way
international peace operations are conducted. Indeed, as the documents cited above
demonstrate, local ownership is considered a moral necessity and intrinsically
‘correct.’

However, as this thesis will show, local ownership, because it is a
contradictory and contested concept and gives rise to its own set of operational
challenges, only enables the UN to paper over that difficulty. More specifically, while
discursively local ownership may seem like an appropriate solution to the violation of
institutional principles entailed by peace operations, in practice, the UN perceives the
excessive devolution of agency and responsibility for peacebuilding to local actors to
put at risk two key operational goals—the overall liberalization of the post-conflict
state and the delivery of demonstrable outputs in the short term—goals that the UN is

intervention also appears in the Charter (Ch. I, Article 2(7)). United Nations, Charter
of the United Nations. On the contradictions between the practice of peacekeeping
and international norms, see Michael Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy,’
51 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change,’ International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 891; Michael
Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organization in
Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); and Roland Paris,
‘Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture,’ European Journal of
International Relations 9, no. 3 (2003).
under pressure to achieve. In other words, local ownership may be able to reconcile
the clash between intervention and self-determination ‘in theory,’ but it does not enable the UN to actually eliminate this underlying tension. As a result, the UN adjusts and limits local ownership in ways that are ultimately detrimental to both its ability to adhere to the principles of self-determination and non-imposition and to its operational effectiveness.

1.3. Research Questions and Findings

This contradiction leaves us with a core empirical puzzle: why does the UN advocate for local ownership based on a set of purported benefits while operationalizing it in a way that obviates the achievement of those exact benefits? Indeed, the perception that local ownership may help to overcome the tension between the UN’s normative and operational obligations in peacebuilding and thus boost its legitimacy and sustainability has informed UN peacebuilding policy to a large extent, but to date, the UN has proclaimed these positive benefits without describing the mechanisms that allegedly produce such effects, specifying the conditions under which this correlation holds, or providing convincing empirical evidence that ownership does indeed boost legitimacy and sustainability by protecting self-determination and minimizing external imposition. Claims that no peacebuilding effort will be sustainable if it is not directed by national actors or that peace and good governance cannot be externally imposed are commonplace, but they are grounded neither in a careful theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between international and national actors in the post-conflict space and their differing perspectives on peacebuilding and ownership nor in an examination of how the UN

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52 Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’ 342.
translates the idea of local ownership into practice. Indeed, because local ownership both as a concept and as a ‘policy’ is thought to be understood and considered to be logically sound, it is rarely questioned, deconstructed, or analyzed and is instead generally taken for granted by international peacebuilders.

Worse, exactly what local ownership is remains unclear, despite its frequent invocation in peacekeeping scholarship and policy discourse. According to Simon Chesterman, local ownership refers ‘in a…vague way to the relationship between stakeholders,’ hazily suggesting the need to include national actors in some way in international peacebuilding activities. When, how, and exactly who should be involved, however, remain underspecified, and the UN offers no coherent definition of ownership, despite its persistent emphasis on it. In addition, neither the UN nor other analysts make reference to local understandings of local ownership, to whether these coincide with UN understandings, and to whether local actors themselves feel a sense of ownership of the peacebuilding process in their country, points that are critical to determining if local ownership indeed functions as the UN portrays it to.

Additionally, though local ownership discourse has been present in peacekeeping for approximately a decade, few multidimensional peace operations have conclusively ‘achieved’ ownership, in the sense of having an implementation process that grants a significant degree of agency to local actors, effects an eventual full transfer of authority to them, or both. Indeed, as mentioned, many UN staff

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admit that local ownership in peacebuilding complicates or even impedes the achievement of the UN’s operational objectives, most importantly the establishment of liberal democratic political systems in the post-conflict country and the more immediate delivery of demonstrable results, such as the disarmament of combatants and collection of weapons, the undertaking of military patrols, the holding of elections, the passing of legislation, and the running of public sensitization campaigns.  

More importantly, despite the heavy emphasis on local ownership in recent peacebuilding discourse, the same period has not been marked by demonstrable changes in the legitimacy levels of UN missions, the long-term sustainability of their efforts, or the efficiency and rapidity with which goals are achieved. In other words, it remains unclear how to operationalize the principle of local ownership for peace operations in a way that will both increase their sustainability and legitimacy and enable the UN to realize its operational goals.

This ‘failure’ of ownership seems to be indicative of a disjuncture between policy theory and actual practice: while local ownership may make sense in theory as described above, it often fails to produce its intended practices and effects. ‘Good’ policies that are theoretically sound can still lead to ‘bad’ outcomes because of...
differences in understanding, contradictory goals and obligations, and problems in implementation, which bridges beliefs, intentions, and effects. In the case of local ownership, for all the logical soundness of the concept in terms of increasing legitimacy and sustainability, it fails to regularly produce these results, suggesting that theories—or assumptions—of how local ownership functions are incomplete. More specifically, local ownership may not ‘work’ as expected because of divergent understandings of what local ownership is, because of how the UN ‘does’ local ownership, because of conflicting organizational imperatives, or because of different perspectives on legitimacy. In other words, as mentioned above, we are faced with a puzzle about why the UN engages in contradictory discursive and operational practices that reduce the purported benefits of local ownership in peacebuilding.

This thesis addresses this question by investigating a concept that is widely cited but remarkably underexplored. It strives to understand the gaps between theory, practice, and effect by mapping the current discourse of ownership, the various understandings of ownership on the part of both UN and national actors, the different ways in which the UN operationalizes the concept, and the divergent expectations of what it should deliver. Throughout this analysis, I draw examples from the UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo (MONUC).

I present four key findings:

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59 MONUC officially ended in June 2010, but the mission continues—essentially unchanged—under the new name of the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation en Congo (MONUSCO).
(1) First, contrary to the rhetoric of local ownership and its emphasis on self-determination and non-imposition, the UN understands local ownership in a limited way that reduces these purported benefits. This restricted understanding of local ownership comes about due to a perception by UN staff that local ownership will inhibit the realization of its operational goals, and it leads to a gap between the discourse and the reality of local ownership. Importantly, the UN’s understandings also stand in sharp contrast to local understandings of local ownership.

(2) Second, as with understandings of local ownership, the UN operationalizes ownership in an ad hoc, restricted, and selective way that inhibits self-determination and thus legitimacy and sustainability, again out of fear that the excessive devolution of responsibility for peacebuilding to local actors will prevent the realization of the UN’s operational goals. This deepens imposition and further curtails self-determination, and widens the gap between rhetoric and reality.

(3) Third, despite the restrictions that the UN puts on local ownership in practice, it continues to invoke the rhetoric of local ownership to qualify its interactions with local actors, suggesting that it values local ownership as a discursive tool that can depict the UN’s actions as in adherence with the principles of self-determination and non-imposition. However, because of the gap between its rhetoric and its practices, these efforts do little to generate perceptions of legitimacy among local actors, suggesting that the UN may be engaging partly in a process of self-legitimation.

(4) Fourth, the UN’s restrictive approach to local ownership in practice together with its discursive use of local ownership, ironically, imperil its ability to both establish liberal democratic polities and deliver concrete outputs, even though its
selective approach is intended precisely to promote the achievement of these goals. Ultimately, this operational failure may also prove deleterious to the UN’s legitimacy.

Taken together, these findings suggest that for the UN, local ownership is perceived of as a means of overcoming the contradiction between its normative and its operational obligations that is inherent in peacebuilding, yet that it may not actually do so in practice. More specifically, I argue that while the UN perceives local ownership as enabling it to act in accordance with its own principles of self-determination and non-imposition, it also perceives local ownership of peacebuilding to put at risk the achievement of two key operational goals—specifically, the liberalization of the post-conflict state and the delivery of concrete and measurable results on the ground in the short term. Accordingly, it shapes and constrains local ownership conceptually and operationally in order to achieve these goals.

This constraining of local ownership, however, brings the UN’s actions into sharp contrast with its own discourse, which depicts local ownership as entailing the broad and open inclusion of national actors in peacebuilding and a relatively high degree of deference to their aspirations and desires, and thus as a means to preserving self-determination and minimizing external imposition. In other words, while the UN’s discourse implies a dedication to normative objectives, the UN’s understanding and behavior may belie a dedication to operational ones. In this way, local ownership appears to be, for the UN, primarily a discursive tool for balancing between operational and normative imperatives.

However, as shall be shown, the UN’s attempts to generate local legitimacy through discourse fail to persuade local actors, as its actions do not match its rhetoric, suggesting that the UN’s discursive efforts appear to be more successful as a tool of self-legitimation than one able to generate perceptions of legitimacy among national
actors. Moreover, because of contradictions in the ways that the UN operationalizes local ownership, it not only deepens the curtailment of self-determination and the degree of external imposition on the host country, it also undercuts its ability to realize the very operational goals it is trying to protect by constraining ownership, thus also limiting the legitimacy it may derive from operational effectiveness.

Ultimately, while local ownership may be theoretically sound at first glance, it is not well understood and is actually a deeply contested concept, one that does not lend itself to easy definition, one that can be translated into practice in many different ways, and one that, at its broadest, is linked to the conflicting operational and normative imperatives that face the UN. Thus while the UN’s rhetoric depicts ownership as something that will render peacebuilding more legitimate and sustainable by promoting self-determination and minimizing external imposition, the UN’s understanding and practices of local ownership necessarily limit the scope of ownership and hence of self-determination while in fact deepening external intrusion into the host country, thus lessening or even cancelling out the expected benefits of ownership in terms of legitimacy and sustainability.

These arguments do not imply that local ownership has no positive value whatsoever, that it cannot foster legitimacy and sustainability, preserve self-determination and mitigate external imposition, or that it should be jettisoned as a principle of UN peacekeeping operations. But because ownership is recommended so pervasively, it merits critical examination in order to determine how the concept is understood, how it is operationalized, how these understandings and practices do or

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60 According to W.B. Gallie, an ‘essentially contested concept’ is one that is appraisive or value-laden, inherently complex, described and valued differently by different users, and changeable in light of changing circumstances. ‘Essentially Contested Concepts,’ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1955-56): 167-98.
do not lead to expected effects, and what they reveal about the motivations of the UN in peacebuilding.

1.4. Conceptual Framework

That actors in the international system face conflicts and trade-offs in their interactions with one another is nothing new or exceptional. UN peacebuilding is no different in this regard. Indeed, much of the scholarship on peace operations has highlighted that peacebuilding is a phenomenon replete with contradictions and tensions. Peacebuilding practitioners are often faced with difficult choices relating to such issues as dependency, duration, and participation. For example, a heavy international presence with relatively coercive means at its disposal may help to achieve rapid results, but is likely to crowd out local political activity and may create dependency on the continued presence of the international community for the maintenance of security. 61 Similarly, the conflict transformation and creation of national capacity for peaceful conflict management to which peacebuilding aspires is a necessarily long-term endeavor, yet the longer international actors remain in a country, the greater the risk of resentment and even hostility towards them on the part of national actors and the greater the degree of foreign imposition on the latter. In addition, the inclusion of so-called spoilers or those who have records of human rights violations or corruption in peacebuilding processes may be critical to securing peace, but may also be detrimental to the cause of justice and thus to the broader legitimacy of the intervening force. 62

As can be seen, many of the contradictions that are regularly highlighted by analysts relate to the relationship between the operational and normative sides of international intervention. More specifically, as mentioned, because intervention after civil war entails deep intrusion into the domestic politics of a country, it often necessitates violating certain key principles of international relations. In the case of UN peacebuilding, these include, most importantly, self-determination, along with non-imposition, which is, as mentioned above, a principle enshrined in the UN’s Charter and one that the organization has a long history of supporting—and one that is thus critical to the UN’s legitimacy.

At the same time, without that degree of intrusion, it is unclear whether the UN or any other external actor can help to bring about meaningful change after conflict. As Saul argues, ‘the level of international involvement that is necessary to make a significant difference is likely to conflict with the principle of self-determination.’ Indeed, some argue that the reason the UN is present in the first place is because local actors were unable to transform conflict and achieve reconciliation on their own, thus implying that a certain degree of violation of self-determination is necessary and even desirable. As Simon Chesterman argues,

‘[peacebuilding] operations have tended to be undertaken precisely because of the malevolence or incapacity of existing governance structures. In such an environment it is, at best, disingenuous to suggest that local “ownership” should be asserted the moment that conflict ceases. If it was appropriate to undermine local ownership with the decision to send thousands of troops into a territory, the cessation of active hostilities does not indicate that the reasons for military intervention have dissipated. At worst, premature restoration of

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63 Saul, ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law,’ 174. See also Recchia, ‘Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction,’ 166.
local control might lead to a return to the governing policies (or lack thereof) that led to intervention in the first place.\textsuperscript{64}

In other words, as described above, without deep intrusion and a certain level of external imposition, the UN will be unable to effectively build peace or deliver any concrete results. While this may help to protect the country’s self-determination and thus the UN’s legitimacy, it may at the same time damage the UN’s legitimacy in another way, as it will be seen as unable to achieve its stated goals, and thus as largely ineffective.

Yet if peacebuilding necessarily involves the curtailment of self-determination in order to be effective and achieve peacebuilding goals, then it also raises difficult questions about how peacebuilding actors like the UN should balance between normative principles and operational duties where they conflict.\textsuperscript{65} Should the UN prioritize the achievement of operational outcomes or the compliance with its stated principles, or is there a way of reconciling the two? Can international actors intervene without curtailing the self-determination of national actors? With which local actors can and should the UN interact to both achieve results and maintain a degree of self-determination for the former? And which of these—the protection of UN principles or the delivery of concrete results—leads to greater dividends in terms of legitimacy for the UN?

Many studies of UN peace operations point out these difficulties of peacebuilding with a view only to issuing policy recommendations that may make

\textsuperscript{64} Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice,’ 7. See also Annika S. Hansen, ‘Local Ownership in Peace Operations,’ in \textit{Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform}, edited by Timothy Donais (Zürich and Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008), 49.

\textsuperscript{65} While normative and operational obligations may not always or necessarily conflict, and in some instances certain principles can even \textit{enhance} operational effectiveness, in the case of international peacebuilding, self-determination and the achievement of stated goals do appear to be, to a certain extent, incompatible.
them easier to overcome or work around in practice. In so doing, they fail to look at the deeper normative and ideological tensions that give rise to these trade-offs. More importantly, these analyses tend to portray them as simply technical problems that can be ‘fixed’ by changing how peacebuilding is done. However, these contradictions and dilemmas are not simply transitory glitches; ultimately, they represent an inherent tension between normative and operational obligations that must be acknowledged and incorporated into policy plans and expectations of outcomes.

Nevertheless, many analyses of peacebuilding portray international organizations or other peacebuilding actors as selecting one of these obligations to prioritize, a view that fits with prevalent theories of the way in which international organizations function. In their seminal work on the latter, Barnett and Finnemore have argued that international organizations, as entities ‘often created to embody, serve, or protect some widely shared set of principles’ often seek to diffuse, strengthen, and protect their principles, norms, and rules. While this normative diffusion may have been intended only as a secondary function of the organization at its founding, over time it can come to be one of its main activities as it becomes a key means to justify the organization’s continued existence and authority. This is, according to many scholars, particularly true of the UN, whose ‘legitimacy and support depend to a significant extent upon its being seen to exemplify and uphold widely held norms.’

68 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World, 33-34. See also Inis Claude, ‘Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the United Nations,’ International Organization 20, no. 3 (Summer 1966).
69 Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping,’ 12.
Barnett and Finnemore argue that the shift in focus from the achievement of concrete results to compliance with and advocacy for rules, principles, and norms constitutes a type of dysfunction. They note that ‘because international organization practices reflect a search for symbolic legitimacy rather than efficiency, international organization behavior might be only remotely connected to the efficient implementation of its goals and more closely coupled to legitimacy criteria that come from the cultural environment.’ In other words, according to this thinking, the UN, as an international organization, might be expected to prioritize adherence to the principles of self-determination and non-imposition above the delivery of concrete results in peacebuilding as a way of ensuring its legitimacy.

Prioritizing such rule-compliance over results also corresponds with ideas-based understandings of the motivations behind the behavior of actors in the international system. More specifically, behavior motivated by ideas and norms as opposed to results and outputs fits with a pattern of action taken according to a ‘logic of appropriateness,’ rather than a ‘logic of expected consequences,’ a dichotomy posited by March and Olsen. A ‘logic of appropriateness’ highlights the importance of ideas and identities, as opposed to material factors and environmental constraints, in explaining the behavior of actors in the international system, and thus can account for the continuation of or increase in a particular type of behavior despite its questionable effectiveness because it is ‘the right thing to do.’ By contrast, action

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70 Barnett and Finnemore call this type of dysfunction ‘the irrationality of rationalization.’ Rules for the World, 39.
71 Ibid., 37.
taken according to a ‘logic of expected consequences’ is driven by preferences, interests, and material factors, and represents the outcome of an iterative negotiation between rational actors with concrete outputs and results as its primary goal. The dysfunction described by Barnett and Finnemore—and action by the UN to remain compliant with its principles regardless of the effects on its ability to deliver results—is therefore often portrayed as action taken according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ as opposed to a ‘logic of consequences.’

However, it should be noted that these two logics are not mutually exclusive and in many ways overlap. Indeed, expectations and interests are both in part social constructs linked closely to perceptions of appropriateness, and, as such, both normative and operational goals may be ‘in the interests’ of an organization as a means of reaffirming its relevance and ensuring its continued legitimacy, and thus a strict dichotomy is overly simplistic, a fact that March and Olsen themselves concede. Accordingly, labeling the variable prioritization of efficiency on the one hand and norm-compliance on the other as ‘dysfunction’ may be misleading or at least overly negative. As Barnett and Finnemore themselves note, international organizations operate in environments characterized by ‘varied and often conflicting functional, normative, and legitimacy imperatives’ and as such it is hardly surprising

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74 March and Olson, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,’ 949-951.
that they attempt to balance between and combine these competing imperatives rather than prioritize one above the other.⁷⁶

As March and Olsen note, according to the ‘logic of appropriateness,’ policy choices are most accurately seen as ‘the application of rules associated with particular identities to particular situations.’⁷⁷ Where an organization appears to be prioritizing the delivery of concrete outputs above normative obligations, then, it may simply be behaving in line with a different side of its identity—one that is operational and that is evaluated according to its ability to produce results, as opposed to one that is normative and that is evaluated according to its compliance with and promotion of particular principles and values. Indeed, the UN may be viewed as having two identities that sometimes conflict: on the one hand, it is an operational actor in international security, one that participates in a concrete and pragmatic way in international conflict management; on the other, it is a normative body that introduces, develops, and promotes norms of international behavior, an institution that takes ethical and moral stands and that helps to set standards for what is right or appropriate and what is wrong or inappropriate in the international system.⁷⁸ For the UN, then, even where it appears to be acting with more material, results-oriented motivations at heart, it may simply be acting in accordance with what it perceives to be appropriate behavior for the operational side of its identity.

Indeed, as shall be shown, in peacebuilding, the UN by no means sacrifices its operational goals to its normative ones, and instead constantly attempts to balance

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⁷⁷ March and Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,’ 951.
⁷⁸ As Lipson notes, ‘[t]he UN is not a purely political organization, but also must produce action.’ ‘Peacekeeping,’ 13.
between these two sets of obligations—specifically, between the desire to demonstrate results, including the liberalization of the post-conflict state and the delivery of tangible outputs in the short term, and the desire to uphold the principles of self-determination and non-imposition—and it uses local ownership precisely for this purpose. That is, because local ownership is seen as a way of maintaining self-determination even in the face of international intervention, it can help to balance between the necessity to intervene and the obligation to protect self-determination. I posit that this is not because the UN wavers between more interest-based and more values-based modes of behavior or between action according to a ‘logic of consequences’ and action according to a ‘logic of appropriateness,’ but because it views both of these sets of obligations as important—just to different sides of its identity. This stands in contrast to much of the literature on international organizations including the UN, which, as mentioned, portrays the latter as eschewing operational success for normative priorities.

In practice, however, the UN’s use of local ownership in its balancing act between appropriate behaviors for its different institutional identities is problematic. As shall be shown, the UN engages in contradictory discursive and operational practices of local ownership that variably emphasize its normative obligations to preserve self-determination and minimize imposition and its operational obligations to fulfill its mandate, and these different practices have serious implications for both its actual ability to uphold these norms and its actual effectiveness. As mentioned

79 Some refer to dynamic as ‘organized hypocrisy,’ a phenomenon originally described by Nils Brunsson, ‘in which organizations respond to conflicting pressures in external environments through contradictory actions and statements.’ Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping,’ 5, and Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy. Similarly, Stephen Krasner posits that organized hypocrisy occurs when there is a conflict between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences, and asserts that ‘rulers must
above, the UN’s discourse of local ownership is clearly an attempt to maintain self-determination and non-imposition, even if just the appearance of them, and as such to generate legitimacy for the UN. By contrast, the UN’s understanding and operationalizations of local ownership appear to prioritize the fulfillment of particular operational goals—the liberalization of the post-conflict state and the delivery of concrete results—which in turn reduce the scope of self-determination and increase the degree of external imposition on the post-conflict state, but may contribute to legitimacy through effectiveness.

Complicating matters even more, the ways in which the UN operationalizes ownership to achieve those operational goals often conflict with one another, and thus even where the UN sidelines its normative obligations for its operational ones, it runs into additional contradictions that render its ability to achieve its objectives questionable. In other words, local ownership may have both very little operational utility to the UN and do little to actually enhance legitimacy.

Ultimately, local ownership in UN peacebuilding enables us to see how the UN attempts to reconcile its many conflicting imperatives. These demonstrate clearly that the UN is pulled in different directions by its different identities as an institution—on the one hand, as a normative actor for which legitimacy is measured in terms of upholding and protecting certain norms in the international system, and on the other hand, as an operational actor for which legitimacy is measured in terms of demonstrable outcomes. As shall be shown, the record of local ownership in helping to actually resolve or overcome these contradictions and challenges is mixed at best, and, as mentioned, it may be more important for the UN to acknowledge that certain honor, perhaps only in talk, certain norms but at the same time act in ways that violate these norms.’ Sovereignty, 66.
contradictions are not ‘fixable’ and must simply be accepted as part of the complex undertaking that is peacebuilding.

1.5. A Note on Terminology

Several terms employed throughout this study require clear definition. First, I use the term peacebuilding to refer to UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations.\(^8\) Strictly speaking these operations are peacekeeping operations and are referred to as such by UN staff, while peacebuilding refers to the activities undertaken by the UN Peacebuilding Commission (see note 3 above). However, I use the word peacebuilding instead of peacekeeping in order to differentiate between ‘traditional’ peacekeeping, which was limited to the interposition of UN blue helmets between combatants to end organized violence usually in interstate war, and ‘multidimensional’ peacekeeping, which entails the deployment of UN troops and civilian staff into a single country after civil war to help establish a stable polity that has a measure of indigenous capacity for nonviolent conflict management and equitable governance. The latter involves a much deeper intrusion into the affairs of the state in question and entails a different set of normative and operational challenges and effects, and thus it is important that it not be confused with ‘traditional’ peacekeeping.\(^9\)

\(^8\) The term peacebuilding was introduced and popularized by then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace*. United Nations, A/47/277-S/24111 (1992), *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeper*.

\(^9\) The different ‘types’ of peace operations are classified differently by different analysts. Doyle and Sambanis distinguish between first, second, and third generation peacekeeping: Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin’s list is even longer, including preventive deployments, traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, assisting transitions, transitional administrations, and peace support operations. However, like Howard, I feel that the most important distinction is between traditional observer missions in interstate wars and broader multidimensional
Second, for expediency, I use the term United Nations (UN) to refer to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its field missions, as it is the main actor in the activities that this thesis examines. The United Nations is, of course, a large and diverse organization, and its many different departments, funds, and agencies represent a plethora of viewpoints and opinions on the matters discussed in this study. Indeed, as can be seen from the diversity of interviewees targeted by this study, it was my specific intention to capture this diversity of perspective. However, as the headquarters and field staff of DPKO are the primary UN actors with which I am concerned, when I use the term UN, I use it to refer to them, unless I specify otherwise.

Finally, I use the term local ownership interchangeably with national ownership. Local ownership is the phrase most commonly found in UN and other peacebuilding discourse as well as academic and policy writings on the subject, and it is therefore the phrase used most often in this thesis. However, by local I do not mean sub-national, I simply mean the opposite of international. UN use of the term likewise does not have any implication of sub-nationality, unless specifically noted. For this reason, I also refer to local and national actors interchangeably, unless otherwise specified.


82 A full list of interviewees is included in Annex I.
1.6. Methodology

This thesis dissects and deconstructs the elements of a little-understood but widely-cited concept in an attempt to increase definitional clarity and understand the gaps between rhetoric, practice, and effects, and my approach to the questions outlined above is qualitative. More specifically, I undertake in-depth qualitative analysis of structured, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews alongside textual analysis of key peacebuilding documents and literature. As mentioned, I undertake this analysis both at the level of the UN more broadly as well as within the case of its peacekeeping mission in DR Congo. My objective is two-fold: first, to explore and unpack the concept and practices of local ownership in peacebuilding, and second, to explain why local ownership has failed to be effectively operationalized by the UN. These two objectives are intertwined. In describing and categorizing understandings and practices of local ownership, an explanation for the UN’s contradictory behavior emerges. While I do not propose a specific causal model, this can be considered a type of ‘constitutive theorizing,’ in which, through description and conceptual analysis, I show how a variety of elements that are overlapping and that exist concurrently can ‘account for’ observed outcomes. In other words, my analysis of patterns of behavior and structural constraints clarifies the causal mechanisms that may explain observable outcomes. Because the institutional identity of the UN is one

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83 ‘Constitutive theorizing,’ as described by Wendt, differs from causal theorizing in the traditional positivist sense where two (or more) variables thought to exist independently of one another are linked in a temporally sequential relationship, and I instead seek to understand the structures, norms, and obligations that constitute and constrain the behavior of the UN. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 83-85. While such analysis implies a degree of causal understanding regarding particular outcomes, it remains primarily an inductive process rather than a deductive one and I do not propose or test causal models about local ownership outcomes, but focus instead on the UN’s contradictory discursive and operational practices that subsequently give rise to those outcomes. Wendt notes that conceptual analysis is particularly well suited to such constitutive theorizing (85).
of the elements that enters into the proposed explanations, I also contribute to the refinement of existing theories of the behavior of international organizations through my analysis.

My analysis takes three main approaches. First, I contextualize the issue of local ownership through a textual analysis of the discourse of ownership in primary and secondary sources. This includes an examination of the origins of the concept in development literature and its adoption into and evolution within peacebuilding, as well as the definitional ambiguity surrounding the concept and the various potential ‘local owners’ in post-conflict situations. Specifically, I examine UN documents on peacekeeping, the mandates of current and past missions, other relevant Security Council resolutions, policy analyses, and academic writing, tracing usage of the term and the conceptual assumptions and operational expectations revealed by those usages. This analysis helps to uncover what the anticipated benefits of local ownership in peacebuilding are, and how ownership is expected to boost legitimacy and sustainability by protecting self-determination and minimizing external imposition is explored in greater depth.

Second, I examine the understandings of local ownership on the part of UN and national actors and the different ways in which the UN operationalizes the concept in the context of its peacebuilding operations through in-depth analysis of qualitative interviews. The analysis and interpretation of this originally-generated data

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enables me to examine how both international and national actors conceive of local ownership, to outline how the UN translates its rhetorical commitment to local ownership into practice, and to evaluate the correlations between the expectations, intentions, and effects of local ownership in peacebuilding. This kind of interpretive method is particularly useful for this kind of study for, as Bevir notes, ‘[p]olitical scientists can understand and explain actions and events only if they properly take into account the intentions, concepts, and ideas constitutive of them.’ In other words, this detailed qualitative analysis enables me to understand the UN’s understandings and operationalizations of local ownership in relation to the broader premises from which it defines its interests, intentions, and values. Most importantly, this approach enables me to uncover areas of contestation and contradiction within local ownership and to clarify why the concept’s logical soundness does not translate into stable or regular practices or effects.

Finally, while this study examines local ownership in UN peacebuilding generally, my analysis is illustrated throughout with examples drawn from the UN.
peacekeeping mission in DR Congo, MONUC. Because the universe of UN peacekeeping operations available for study is small and the subject matter at hand is conceptually complex, a case study approach is highly appropriate for this inquiry, as it allows for the examination of more abstract and contested concepts, which is the primary objective of this research.87

It should be noted that my use of case study analysis is largely heuristic in nature—that is, it is intended to provide illustrations of and support for a broader analysis of the UN,88 and I use it in an inductive sense as a starting point for conceptual analysis and constitutive theorizing, rather than as a means to test particular theories of local ownership. I use a single case study, as the latter is appropriate for exploring a single contested concept and one that has been largely overlooked to date and it is useful in the inductive conceptual analysis that I undertake in this thesis.89 Most importantly, the particular case selected, as shall be discussed below, can be considered a crucial case, one that has informed the UN’s conceptualization and operationalization of local ownership and for which the

87 George and Bennett cite four advantages of case study methods: their ability to help achieve high levels of conceptual clarity, produce new hypotheses, study hypothesized causal mechanisms in individual cases, and account for causal complexity. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 19, 214.

88 Eckstein notes that heuristic case studies—that is, cases aimed at ‘serving to find out’—seek out ‘potentially generalizable relations’ and are thus closely related to more descriptive disciplined-configurative studies, except that they usually have more specific questions and more specific ends (104). They are not usually aimed at explicitly proposing or building new theories, coming instead conceptually prior to theory building, but they can lead to additions and refinements to existing theories. Harry Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science,’ in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 104-108. See also King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 34.

89 See Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 74-75; and John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 39-41.
observations and inferences drawn are therefore likely to apply more generally to the universe of UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{90} As Timothy McKeown notes, case study analysis is ‘often undertaken because the researcher expects that the clarification of causal mechanisms in one case will have implications for understanding causal mechanisms in other cases.’\textsuperscript{91} Indeed, my interviews did not reveal any reason to suggest that MONUC is distinctive as far as the question of local ownership is concerned, and information received in more general interviews largely coincided with that received in interviews specific to MONUC.

Despite the advantages of these methods, this project does face some methodological challenges, including a reduced ability to generalize and the difficulties of observing and measuring abstract concepts. First, the use of qualitative interviews and the analysis of a single case may result in challenges regarding the wider applicability of this research.\textsuperscript{92} However, when analyzing a concept that is largely understudied, the richer, more detailed analysis made possible by qualitative interviews and the use of a single case study is an important ‘first step.’\textsuperscript{93} Until we have a clear understanding of how ownership is understood, how it is used, what its

\textsuperscript{90} Seawright and Gerring assert that representativeness is the key criteria for selecting cases in small-\textit{n} research. Jason Seawright and John Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,’ \textit{Political Research Quarterly} 61 (2008).


\textsuperscript{92} Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science,’ 89-90, and King, Keohane, and Verba, \textit{Designing Social Inquiry}, 20, 104.

\textsuperscript{93} See George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences}, 75. On the utility of single case studies, see also Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,’ in \textit{SAGE Qualitative Research Methods}, vol. 3, edited by Paul Atkinson and Sara Delamont (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011), and Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science,’ 92-94. Flyvbjerg notes that often it is possible to generalize from single cases, and adds that ‘formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas the “force of example” is underestimated’ (108).
contradictions are, and what its practical implications are, its incorporation into broader theories of peacebuilding will be relatively ineffective at advancing our comprehension of how peacebuilding functions. Moreover, through my interviews and textual analysis, I have collected hundreds of observations, and thus one case does not imply a small number of observations. In addition, the conceptual analysis and single case study that is undertaken in this thesis can help to shed light on the tensions and contradictions of a concept and thus to open up new questions for future research by enabling me to compare different conceptualizations and operationalizations of ownership in an iterative fashion. In addition, the findings of this study are relevant not only to the study of peacebuilding operations, but to any instance of interaction between the ‘international’ and the ‘national’ where norms and interests conflict. This may include issue-specific areas, such as transitional justice, or more ‘macro-level’ issues such as development assistance, economic investment, and international trade. Moreover, as mentioned, while this study focuses on a particular concept, in so doing, it helps to expose the different motivations behind the UN’s often contradictory behavior, thus contributing to the refinement of existing theories of international organization behavior, which can be subsequently tested in other situations and with other organizations.

Second, the concepts addressed in this project are not amenable to easy measurement. What observable phenomena can be used as evidence of the existence of local ownership, legitimacy, sustainability, or self-determination? In this case, the difficulties of measuring local ownership and its supposed effects are due in part to the lack of clarity surrounding the concept itself and the fact that different actors, as

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95 Flyvbjerg notes that single case studies are useful for generating future questions and hypotheses (though not only that). ‘Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,’ 108-109.
shall be shown, conceive of ownership in different ways. However, these different usages, conceptualizations, and operationalizations of local ownership are exactly the focus of this study and I am therefore more concerned with how the involved actors subjectively understand local ownership, whether they perceive its existence, within what pre-existing ideological or normative frameworks those perceptions exist, and the ways in which it is contested, rather than any objective measurement of it. Additionally, as mentioned, one of the advantages of interpretive qualitative analysis and case studies are their ability to account for abstract and complex phenomena and to situate the behavior of actors within their broader beliefs and link them to their intentions.

In order to capture these subjective understandings, I undertook my research through fieldwork and structured, semi-structured, and unstructured interviews. I conducted 87 interviews between November 2009 and February 2012 in New York, United States; Geneva, Switzerland; Oxford, London, and Maidenhead, United Kingdom; Kinshasa, DR Congo; and by telephone. Interviewees included: UN staff; staff of Permanent Missions to the UN; Congolese political and military officials, civil society actors, and academics; and relevant academics, policy analysts, and journalists. UN interviewees specifically included current and former staff of: MONUC (and MONUSCO) and other peacekeeping missions; the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including civilian, police, and military staff; the Department of Political Affairs (DPA); the Office of the Secretary-General; the Peacebuilding Support Office (part of the Peacebuilding Commission) (PBSO); the

97 See George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 14; Bevir, ‘Introduction: Interpretive Methods’; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, Interpretation and Method; and Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures.
Department of Field Support (DFS); and UN agencies including UNDP, OCHA, and UNICEF. These interviews included individuals based both at UN headquarters and in field locations.98

These interviews can be qualified as elite interviews, though interviewees included both junior and senior UN staff as well as high-level political and military officials and private citizens in Congo.99 While I intentionally sought a diverse array of interviewees in an attempt to determine whether there is a commonality of understanding surrounding ownership, my method of selecting interviewees was not random, nor was it intended to be. As Tansey has argued in relation to process tracing, ‘the goal of process tracing is to obtain information about well defined and specific events and processes, and the most appropriate sampling procedures are thus those that identify the key political actors—those who have had most involvement with the processes of interest.’100 Similarly, the most relevant method for selecting interviewees for the conceptual analysis of a single contested concept that I undertake entails the identification of actors who are most involved with the concept under

98 A full list of interviewees is included in Annex I.
99 On elite interviewing see, Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews,’ PS: Political Science and Politics 35, no. 4 (December 2002); Kenneth Goldstein, ‘Getting in the Door,’ PS: Political Science and Politics 35, no. 4 (December 2002); and Darren G. Lilleker, ‘Interviewing the Political Elite,’ Politics 23, no. 3 (2003). See also Joe Soss, ‘Talking Our Way to Meaningful Explanations: A Practice-Centered View of Interviewing for Interpretive Research,’ in Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn, edited by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2006). My focus on elites was due to the fact that the relations between a UN peacebuilding mission and the host country is largely managed and realized at the elite level. The non-elite and citizens living outside the capital city or in remote areas do have relationships with the UN mission, but these tend to be sporadic interactions as opposed to regular relations. For the purposes of understanding ownership, then, reaching beyond the elite was not necessary for the quality of my data.
100 Oisín Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing,’ PS: Political Science and Politics 40, no. 4 (October 2007): 765. See also King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 115: ‘random selection and assignment have serious limitations in small-n research.’
examination. Random sampling, by contrast, could have resulted in irrelevant information and thus weakened the process of understanding and inference. I therefore targeted as wide a spectrum of individuals as possible, but with the condition that they be involved with UN peace operations to some degree—either cursorily as an observer or intimately as mission staff or host-country liaison—as they are best positioned to provide information on the principles and behavior of the UN and the perceptions and views of national actors.

1.7. Case Selection

While this study focuses on the UN’s peacekeeping practice as a whole, in order to provide more specific illustrations and to capture the national perspective on ownership, I draw examples from the UN peacekeeping mission in DR Congo (MONUC) throughout my analysis. While this operation is still ongoing under the new name of Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation en Congo (MONUSCO), I am concerned with the period when it was known as MONUC from 1999-2010. Of that time, the most relevant phase began with the establishment of the Transitional Government in 2003, as this is when multidimensional peacekeeping activities took off in earnest, and I therefore limit myself primarily to the years 2003-2010.

My criteria for case selection were: (1) that the peace operation take place in a country following civil conflict; (2) that it be a multidimensional peacekeeping operation occurring after the Cold War; and (3) that it be led by the UN. The end of

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101 Given my own previous experience working for MONUC prior to undertaking this research, the selection of this case did contain an element of convenience sampling. Nevertheless, the case of MONUC also satisfies a number of criteria that are key to answering the questions I seek to answer in this thesis, and as mentioned, may also be considered a crucial case for studying the question of local ownership.
the Cold War and the termination of superpower interest in many states around the world allowed either suppressed civil conflicts to resurge or the national dimensions of Cold War proxy wars to take on more salience, and a large number of internal wars either broke out or turned violent after having been dormant for long periods, leading the number of intrastate wars to quickly outstrip the number of interstate wars.\textsuperscript{102} In response, the UN Security Council, likewise freed from the constraints of superpower rivalry, embarked on an active program of peacekeeping and intervention in civil wars, as evidenced by dramatic increases in the numbers of missions authorized (see below).\textsuperscript{103} The UN thus rapidly became the most active peacekeeping organization in the world, regularly authorizing robust missions with Chapter VII mandates enabling them to use force to protect civilian populations.\textsuperscript{104} Additionally, as previously mentioned, not only did the numbers of missions increase, so did the scope of activities undertaken with the shift from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peacekeeping. It is in the context of this type of operation that the concept of local ownership has been introduced to the realm of peacekeeping and it is thus most appropriate to select a case that fits this description.

These criteria limited an already small universe of cases from which to select. The UN has undertaken 67 peacekeeping operations since 1948, of which 52 were


\textsuperscript{104} Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandates enable UN blue helmets to use force to protect civilians in imminent danger of harm, as opposed to Chapter VI mandates, which only authorize the use of force in self-defense or to protect UN assets and installations. United Nations, \textit{Charter of the United Nations}.
authorized since 1989. Of these 52, 20 were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and 29 can be classified as complex missions undertaking multidimensional peacebuilding activities, with the remainder comprising monitoring, observer, or support missions. The inclusion of the latter types of mission in the population would have been inappropriate as they represent a more hands-off interaction between the UN and one or more member states and not the UN’s participation in the physical, political, social, and economic reconstruction of a single country following internal war. They are thus examples of different phenomena and their inclusion might distort inferences drawn about local ownership and peacebuilding after civil conflict.

105 I gathered this information from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ ‘List of Operations’ (see United Nations, ‘List of Operations: 1948-2012,’ Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf.), the websites of individual missions (see United Nations ‘Current Peacekeeping Operations,’ Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml, and United Nations, ‘Past Peacekeeping Operations,’ Department of Peacekeeping Operations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/past.shtml), and the Security Council Resolutions mandating the missions (see United Nations, ‘Security Council,’ http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/). My criterion for calling a mission multidimensional was simply that it undertook activities beyond the security realm to include humanitarian, electoral, political, and other activities. It should be noted that these totals are somewhat misleading, as the total number of peace operations counts advance and follow-on missions that may be better classified as one with the main mission. In addition, the current mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA is not included, as it is technically a Special Political Mission of the Department of Political Affairs, even though it is run by DPKO. Finally, though the UN has participated in the international interventions in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, they were led by other actors, and thus were not included in the group of possible cases for selection. A full list of past and current peace operations for the period 1948-2012 as well as their classification as multidimensional and whether they were authorized under Chapter VII can be found in Annex II. See also Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 5, 348-352, and Anke Hoeffler, Syeda Shahbano Ijaz, and Sarah von Billerbeck, ‘Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding,’ World Development Report 2011 Background Paper (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011), 12-15.
The case of MONUC satisfies all three criteria. As mentioned, the mission was established in 1999 in the context of the second civil war to ravage the country.\textsuperscript{106} It was initiated and led exclusively by the UN and it was not only the largest mission in UN history, with a total of over 22,000 uniformed personnel (troops, military observers, and police) at its peak in 2007,\textsuperscript{107} but it also had one of the broadest mandates, including provision of security and protection of civilians; promotion of human rights; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants; disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign combatants; security sector reform (SSR); electoral assistance; and stabilization. It also included departments specifically dedicated to HIV-AIDS education and awareness and gender equality, and it established the largest UN radio station in history, Radio Okapi.\textsuperscript{108}

Most importantly, because of the nature of the conflict in Congo, structural features of the context, and the mission’s size and scope, the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo can also be considered a crucial case. The conflict in Congo was in fact two wars in quick succession. The First Congo War, 1996-1997, entailed a rebellion supported by Rwanda and Uganda to depose long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and his replacement by Laurent-Desiré Kabila. The Second Congo War (1998-2003) followed just a few months later, pitting externally backed rebel groups against the regime in Kinshasa. A Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement was signed in December 2002 in Pretoria, followed by a Final Act in April 2003, and the war officially ended when the new transitional government took office in July 2003.

\textsuperscript{106} The First Congo War (1996-1997) resulted in the ousting of long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and his replacement by Laurent-Desiré Kabila. The Second Congo War (1998-2003) followed just a few months later, pitting externally backed rebel groups against the regime in Kinshasa. A Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement was signed in December 2002 in Pretoria, followed by a Final Act in April 2003, and the war officially ended when the new transitional government took office in July 2003.


Seko. Sparked by the presence of Hutu génocidaires who had fled to DRC after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, it pitted the Alliance de Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) led by Laurent Desiré Kabila against state forces under Mobutu, which quickly disintegrated in the face of the greater military strength of the rebels. Following Mobutu’s ousting, Kabila took power, but soon broke with his former patrons in Rwanda, dismissing his Rwandan Chief of Staff, James Kabarebe, and expelling all other Rwandan military in Congo as well as many private citizens. This caused particular trepidation among the ethnically-Tutsi Congolese of Rwandan descent—namely the Banyarwanda and the Banyamulenge—of eastern Congo. 109 Rwanda immediately came to the assistance of the latter, which resulted in the formation of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) rebel group, and the beginning of the Second Congo War, which ran from 1998 until 2002. 110 Over the course of the second war, the RCD fragmented into different factions, 111 and several other groups were formed, including the Uganda-supported Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) under Jean-Pierre Bemba, later the main opponent of Joseph Kabila, who took over as president from his father when the latter was assassinated in 2001. In addition, the Second Congo War spawned a number of


110 This tension between the autochtone peoples of Congo and both Congolese of Rwandan descent as well as Rwanda itself has a long history in the region and persists to this day, despite the official cessation of fighting in 2002. As shall be discussed in Chapter 7, these same dynamics have led to continuing tensions in the country and resulted in renewed fighting in 2008 and 2012 in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu.  

111 The main split in the RCD was between the RCD-Goma (RCD-G) and the RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération (RCD-K/ML), but smaller splinter groups broke off from these as well: the RCD-Original, the RCD-National, and the RCD-Populaire. See Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 48-49.
community-level auto-defense groups in the east of the country collectively known as the Mai Mai, who claimed to be defending their territory against armed groups, in particular Rwanda and Rwandan-supported rebels. At its height, the conflict also became significantly internationalized, drawing in seven neighboring African countries. The conflict formally ended with the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement in Sun City, South Africa in December 2002 and its Final Act in April 2003, following a negotiation process known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which brought together the main Congolese parties to the war as well as the political opposition (a coalition of unarmed groups and parties) and civil society (known as the forces vives), including traditional leaders. The agreement established a transitional government known as ‘the 1+4 model,’ which included one president (Joseph Kabila) and four vice-presidents, one each from the RCD-G, the MLC, Kabila’s former government, and the political opposition. Two other agreements—the Pretoria

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112 See Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), 242-243. It should be noted that Mai Mai groups were often unorganized and ill equipped and consequently began making alliances with other armed groups. Later on, therefore, most Mai Mai groups departed significantly from their initial claims to be protecting their communities and became either opportunistic armed groups operating outside of their own territories or weak rag-tag groups of fighters that posed little regular threat.

113 These are Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Chad, Burundi, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (Dan Fahey, ‘Rethinking the Resource Curse: Natural Resources and Polywar in the Ituri District, Democratic Republic of the Congo,’ PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2011, 104). Dan Fahey has argued that that it is inaccurate to classify the Congolese wars as civil conflicts, asserting that ignoring the regional and international dimensions can be misleading; instead he calls Congo’s wars ‘polywar’ where multiple internal wars became interlinked and attracted the involvement of external actors, thus eventually leading to a larger regional conflict. Fahey, ‘Rethinking the Resource Curse,’ 18, 20. Nevertheless, the fighting in Congo’s two wars was always centered in DRC and the reasons the various belligerents became involved related ultimately to questions of the political, economic, and social future of Congo. As such, while the conflict’s international aspects are important and should not be neglected, it is still analytically appropriate to classify the conflict as civil, and most scholars and conflict databases do so. See Fahey, ‘Rethinking the Resource Curse,’ 73, 104.
agreement between Congo and Rwanda and the Luanda Agreement between Congo and Uganda—were signed in July 2002 and September 2002 respectively.\textsuperscript{114}

Peacebuilding following these internecine conflicts has come with a number of challenges. The already numerous factions have continued to fragment and morph, with new rebel movements continuing to appear almost a decade after the formal cessation of hostilities and with state and non-state groups regularly forming new and shifting alliances.\textsuperscript{115} This rapidly changing constellation of stakeholders has meant that even a question as simple as determining who potential local owners are is complicated. In addition, some parts of the country, notably the northeastern district of Ituri and the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, continued and continue to see intermittent fighting after the formal cessation of hostilities, both related and unrelated to the ‘main’ divisions of the war.\textsuperscript{116} These challenges are exacerbated by the presence of large deposits of natural resources, including oil, copper, coltan, cassiterite, gold, diamonds, timber, and other minerals, which garner the interest of

\textsuperscript{114} Autesserre, \textit{The Trouble with the Congo}, 51-53.
\textsuperscript{116} Fighting in Ituri, which peaked in 2003, pitted the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups against one another and was, at its root, largely unrelated to the fighting in the Kivus between Hutu and Tutsi groups, having more to do with local land ownership issues. Nevertheless, the Ituri fighting was complicated by the presence of armed groups participating in the Second Congo War, and the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) and the Uganda-supported \textit{Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani} (RCD-K), which occupied much of the area during the war, played major roles in the fighting. In 2003, the European Union (EU), with Security Council authorization, launched \textit{Operation Artemis} to secure Bunia, the capital of Ituri, and rid it of militias.
neighboring countries and multinational mining companies as well as enable state and non-state actors to sustain their activities. On a practical note, the sheer geographic size of the Congo (approximately the size of Western Europe) together with its weak to non-existent infrastructure has made the logistics of the operation complex and expensive.\textsuperscript{117} Finally, the size of the mission itself has meant that coordination and communication between departments, between civilian and military staff, and with headquarters in New York have been challenging.

These elements, though they render the case of MONUC an extremely complex one, also make it a crucial case, one that is central to understanding the UN’s conceptualization and operationalization of ownership and therefore one from which conclusions can be expected to apply more broadly and therefore one from which we may generate findings and hypotheses that can be tested elsewhere.\textsuperscript{118} The challenges of fragmented and shifting conflict groups, pockets of continuing insecurity, meddlesome neighbors, poor infrastructure, and large deposits of natural resources are challenges that the UN faces in many other countries where it has conducted or currently conducts peace operations. Accordingly, observations from DRC are likely to hold, to a greater or lesser degree, in many other peacekeeping settings. The UN missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola, for example, have faced natural resources issues, while the mission in Darfur has seen the fragmenting and shifting of

\textsuperscript{117} Congo has only 2,794 kilometers of paved roads and approximately 1 fixed line telephone per 1,000 people. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘The World Factbook: Congo, Democratic Republic of,’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. The UN therefore relies on air transportation for the movement of personnel and goods in the country. Air operations regularly account for over 50\% of the mission’s operational budget and over 20\% of its overall budget. For MONUC budget reports, see United Nations, ‘ACABQ Reports.’

\textsuperscript{118} Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research.’
groups and alliances. The fact that MONUC gathers all of these many challenges into one makes it a crucial case and an appropriate one for this study.¹¹⁹

Perhaps more importantly, the suitability of a particular case depends not only on the degree to which a case includes elements in common with other cases, but also the subject matter of the study itself. While an issue such as the use of force, for example, may vary significantly with context, available resources, and the individual personalities involved in a given operation, local ownership is, by contrast, a cross-cutting or ‘meta’ issue that is treated as a general principle of peacebuilding by UN staff, not as one relevant to certain missions and not others—there is thus no reason to expect that UN staff would view it or operationalize it differently in different operations, and it is more likely that they transfer conceptions of it from one context to another.

In addition, MONUC also presents an analytically ‘rich’ case for study and one that is intrinsically important.¹²⁰ As mentioned, it is the largest peacekeeping operation in the world, and one that has garnered widespread international attention and has lasted for over a decade. Because MONUC was the largest mission in UN history, it has had a strong influence on the UN’s peacebuilding practice generally and has been central to defining and redefining the principles according to which peacebuilding is pursued, both within and outside of the UN. Indeed, MONUC was established around the same time that local ownership began to seep into peacebuilding discourse and it embraced the rhetoric of national ownership and

¹¹⁹ Seawright and Gerring argue that in small-n research, purposive case selection is the most appropriate approach as it ‘make[s] an important contribution to the inferential process by enabling researchers to choose the most appropriate cases for a given research strategy.’ ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,’ 295-296.

inclusive approaches. It is thus a case from which the assumptions underpinning UN understandings of ownership and the resulting practices can be gleaned and it therefore provides a rich case for the inductive study of local ownership in peacebuilding. Indeed, because peace operations now constitute one of the UN’s most important activities, with the DPKO budget equaling approximately half of the organization’s total expenditure, critical examination of the assumptions and practices that inform peacekeeping policy is a necessary and important endeavor.\textsuperscript{121} Moreover, on a practical note, the fact that the mission is ongoing means that participating staff are available for interviews, and documents and media reports are easy to access. Such data-rich cases are particularly well suited to qualitative and case study analysis.\textsuperscript{122}

While Congo provides a useful case for examining the meanings and uses of ownership, this study is, as mentioned, not exclusively about Congo. UN interviewees were not requested to restrict their responses to experience in the Congo. To do so would have limited the quality of the information received, as policy makers rarely take decisions without explicit or implicit reference to previous and subsequent experiences. Moreover, particularly when studying UN peace operations, it is highly likely that the line between single cases and the wider universe of cases is blurred, because most UN staff—particularly field staff—tend to ‘circulate’ between missions, serving in several during the course of their careers. Their perspectives thus represent an agglomeration of experiences, of which Congo is just one. Data collected for a


\textsuperscript{122} Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 79.
single case study in the context of the study of UN peacebuilding, then, almost always represents a broader account of the perceptions, understandings, and actions of UN staff, and the views and understandings of UN staff members gathered for this study can therefore be taken as both specific to Congo and more general. This, together with the fact that, as mentioned above, interviewees were asked to respond to questions both with specific reference to Congo as well as more generally helps to support the extension of inferences from the case of MONUC to other UN peace operations.

1.8. Gaps in Current Literature and Contribution to Ongoing Debates

A more in-depth examination of the concept of local ownership is made necessary by the fact that there is a notable paucity of scholarship on the issue, despite its frequent invocation. While development literature has long debated the merits of ‘locally driven’ processes, existing academic work on peacebuilding rarely examines and deconstructs the concept, instead swallowing whole the theoretical assumptions that underlie arguments about its merits. While there has been some increased academic interest in the role of national actors in peace operations, these works tend to be detailed micro-level ethnographic studies that focus entirely on the local, and thus either leave out the international side of the equation or overemphasize the influence of the national, or they tend towards the technical side, offering specific policy prescriptions for program design and implementation.123 This neglect of the normative aspects of ownership and the interplay between theory and practice fits


Those few works that do address ownership specifically omit a number of important issues. First, few scholars have conducted research on \textit{national} perceptions of ownership—what Fortna calls the ‘peacekept’—focusing instead only on the understandings and perspectives of international peacebuilding actors.\footnote{Fortna, \textit{Does Peacekeeping Work}, 10, 175.} This is not surprising, given that the idea of local ownership is itself an international one. Nevertheless, discussions of local ownership that leave out the local are necessarily incomplete. Second, discussions of ownership tend to remain abstract and focus on ownership as portrayed in discourse, with little attention paid to how ownership is translated into practice. Finally, existing studies stop short of examining how the failure by the UN and other international actors to adequately grasp the contested nature of ownership in peacebuilding and its attempts to balance between normative and operational considerations lead to a mismatch between theoretical expectations, actual practices, and effects.

Moreover, treatments of local ownership in relation to peacekeeping are mostly article- or chapter-length works that focus on a particular sub-set of country cases or on one operational issue-area. There are no full-length works on ownership that evaluate understandings of it from a variety of perspectives and that map the different ways in which it is operationalized. Country cases are concentrated on transitional administrations in which international actors assumed some or all sovereign authority, including Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.\footnote{See Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice’; Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?’; and Narten, ‘Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership.’} However, these
cases represent a very special and narrow subset of peace operations, and because, as mentioned, the rhetoric of local ownership has become pervasive throughout peacebuilding, its effects in less far-reaching missions also merit investigation. Issue cases tend to be concentrated on security sector reform (SSR), and often take a practical or prescriptive stance, failing to contextualize the discussion in terms of the normative and other commitments of peacebuilders.\textsuperscript{127}

This thesis thus complements existing work in a number of ways. First, it adds to what is currently only a small body of scholarly work on ownership and the relationship between internal and external actors in post-conflict interventions. Second, it traces the development of the various definitions and usages of local ownership, linking them specifically to UN peace operations and showing how there is a mismatch between assumptions and effects. Third, it maps out the ways in which the concept is translated into practice, and the repercussions of these operationalizations. Fourth, it brings in the national perspective on ownership, which is usually omitted from analyses of ownership. Finally, it examines local ownership in the context of a previously unstudied case, adding new dimensions to the debate surrounding local ownership in theory and practice.

More generally, this thesis contributes to broader debates about different approaches to rebuilding war-torn states, the effectiveness of UN interventions, and the conflicting obligations of the UN. Following the highly intrusive transitional administrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor, which drew strong criticism for their ‘autocratic’ and heavy-handed methods, the international community adopted a ‘light footprint’ approach that put local actors in the lead on peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{128} However, this approach has drawn its own share of criticism, due to the slow pace of progress in consolidating peace.\textsuperscript{129} These various models of peacebuilding differ on the degree of authority that international actors can and should assume when intervening and how and when they should transfer this authority back to local actors. This study, by examining different understandings of local ownership, the different ways it is put into practice in peace operations, and the contradictions and tensions to which it gives rise contributes directly to this debate.

Beyond the debate over peacebuilding paradigms, there exists a broader debate about whether international intervention can ever be effective. As described above, there is a good deal of normative suspicion of the imposition of external structures and norms on national polities, as well as a strong resistance to it by national actors, because it is perceived to violate the right to self-determination. At the same time, many studies conclude that international interventions can go a long way towards helping war-torn states on the road to stability and development and few are

\textsuperscript{128} For criticism of the international transitional administrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor, see Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, ‘The Travails of the European Raj,’ \textit{Journal of Democracy} 14, no. 3 (2003), and Jarat Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor,’ \textit{Survival} 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000).

willing to leave them to their own devices. By addressing the relationship between 
local and international actors in peacebuilding and between the operational and 
normative obligations of peacebuilders, this study adds a new dimension to a larger 
debate in international relations about the effect, if any, of external interventions on 
internal processes, a discussion that, as mentioned, extends ‘upwards’ to development 
assistance, democratization, and globalization and ‘downwards’ to issue-specific areas 
such as transitional justice and security sector reform.\textsuperscript{130}

Finally, this thesis frames its analysis within a broader discussion of the 
conflicting normative and operational objectives of the UN, thus shedding light on the 
motivations of the UN as an actor and the ways in which it seeks to generate 
legitimacy and reaffirm its identity (or identities). Ultimately, by increasing our 
understanding of the various goals of an organization and the different obligations 
behind actual practices, it can help to increase our understanding of not only if and 
how peace operations can be effective and legitimate, but also how international 
organizations function and prioritize goals, thus contributing to the further 
development of existing theories of international organization behavior.

1.9. Chapter Overview

This thesis begins by contextualizing the concept of local ownership. Chapter 
2 traces the evolution of the concept of local ownership from its origins in 
development literature to its introduction into peacebuilding through textual analysis. 
This discursive history examines the various usages of the term—what is being 
owned? who are the owners? when should ownership ‘begin’? This discussion brings

\textsuperscript{130} Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?’, 10-11; Marina Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding 
1002; and Tschirgi, ‘Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited,’ 14-16.
to light two important assumptions on the part of the UN: first, that local ownership can and does enhance legitimacy and sustainability by preserving the host country’s self-determination and minimizing the degree of UN imposition on it, and second, that ownership is something technical and ‘implementable,’ and not something normatively-laden. The chapter then considers each of these assumptions in turn. First, it unpacks ownership’s expected benefits and shows that ownership is thought to increase legitimacy and sustainability in peacebuilding through the building and maintenance of consent and consensus, the preservation of UN impartiality, the privileging of indigenous structures, norms, and values in peacebuilding, and the building of national capacity, largely through the broad inclusion of local actors. Second, it looks more closely at the idea that ownership is technical and consists of a set of particular activities that can ‘create’ ownership and deliver particular effects in peacebuilding. This view, however, neglects the normative bases for understandings of ownership, thus failing to grasp the fact that national and international actors understand ownership very differently and therefore have different expectations of their respective roles in peacebuilding.

Chapter 3 focuses on this latter point, examining how in fact divergent normative beliefs inform understandings of ownership, leading UN and national actors to understand the concept very differently. Specifically, it shows how different conceptualizations of peacebuilding—namely liberal and communitarian peacebuilding—give rise to these different understandings: for the UN, local ownership is a limited concept that entails a process of appropriation by national actors of a liberal vision of post-conflict political order; for national actors, ownership is a broad concept in which national actors imagine, define, and realize their own vision for post-conflict peace and peacebuilding, with only material and technical
assistance from international actors. This discussion raises two important contradictions. First, while the UN’s discourse reveals a belief that local ownership will boost the legitimacy and sustainability of peacebuilding by rendering it more indigenous, its understanding reveals a conviction that indigenous practices are necessarily illiberal and contributed to the outbreak of fighting in the first place, and therefore must be replaced. Second, it shows that while the UN’s discourse of local ownership displays a belief that ownership will also render peacebuilding more legitimate by promoting self-determination, its understanding of local ownership actually restricts self-determination and deepens external intrusion into the host country by limiting it within liberal parameters. Most importantly, this discussion shows how the UN shapes and constrains the version of local ownership present in its discourse in order to preserve the achievement of a key operational goal—in this case the liberalization of the post-conflict state.

Chapters 4 and 5 turn to the issue of how the UN operationalizes ownership. Chapter 4 focuses on the practices of ownership, that is, the concrete activities that the UN undertakes in an effort to create and maintain ownership. The chapter shows that despite the fact that the discourse of local ownership portrays it as something technical and achievable, in practice the UN implements ownership in a half-hearted and ad hoc manner, employing a range of practices that are neither coordinated nor explicitly or exclusively geared towards the creation of ownership among local actors. Most importantly, the chapter shows how the UN undertakes these practices in a restrictive way that limits the amount of substantive agency turned over to local actors because the UN fears that doing so will imperil the achievement of its operational goals—namely, the liberalization of the post-conflict state, already touched upon in Chapter 3, and the delivery of tangible outputs in the short term. Accordingly, as with
understandings, the UN constrains the practices of local ownership in order to promote its operational objectives; in so doing, it further weakens self-determination, and thus legitimacy and sustainability.

Chapter 5 addresses a different aspect of implementation, focusing on the UN’s selection of local owners. It outlines two distinct approaches to the selection of local owners: first, in what I call liberal ownership, the UN interacts with and includes a broad variety of groups in its activities, regardless of their capacity levels, with the condition that they be moderate and liberal. Second, in what I call elite ownership, actors are selected for their existing level of capacity to undertake and maintain peacebuilding and governance, regardless of their liberal credentials. These two approaches to ownership come about in response to the concern, mentioned above, that granting excessive agency to local actors will imperil the UN’s ability to liberalize the post-conflict state on the one hand and deliver concrete outputs on the other. While the criteria for selection differs in each of these approaches and local actors tend to be given more substantive ownership in elite ownership than in liberal ownership, they both remain highly selective approaches to ownership. This selectivity again demonstrates that in practice the UN constrains the broad and inclusive ownership depicted in discourse in order to protect its ability to achieve its operational goals. However, this selective operationalization of local ownership also negatively affects self-determination and deepens the level of UN imposition onto the host country, and thus imperils legitimacy and sustainability further.

Chapter 6 brings together the previous three chapters to address why the UN, despite the fact that it constrains local ownership conceptually and operationally, continues to persistently invoke the discourse of local ownership. The chapter examines how the UN aims to generate legitimacy through discourse both for local
actors and for itself by depicting the intrusive activities of peacebuilding as locally owned. It shows, however, that because of the gap between its rhetoric and its behavior, as well as between the UN’s and local actors’ different understandings of what local ownership should entail, these efforts are unconvincing in the eyes of local actors, for whom legitimacy exists primarily when words and deeds match. At the same time, despite its failure to boost legitimacy in the eyes of local actors, local ownership discourse is employed as a tool for self-legitimation for the UN, enabling it to justify its own actions to itself and thus to reassure itself of its continued legitimacy. However, both of these legitimation efforts, whether successful or not, seek only legitimacy through adherence to institutional principles, with little regard to other sources of legitimacy, including, most importantly, operational effectiveness.

Chapter 7 turns to this latter point, examining how the UN’s restrictive, ad hoc, and selective approach to local ownership conceptually and operationally together with the broad discourse it repeatedly invokes affect its ability to achieve its two operational goals—the liberalization of the host country and the delivery of tangible outputs—despite the fact that that it is precisely the concern for these goals that leads the UN to constrain ownership. The chapter explores several reasons for this. On the one hand, because liberal ownership emphasizes the interaction with liberal but weak actors with little capacity and little influence on major power dynamics, it weakens its own ability to deliver results quickly and efficiently while also minimizing its impact on the nature of the structures and institutions of the state. On the other hand, because elite ownership entails the interaction with more capable actors but ones that often have illiberal tendencies, the UN often entrenches their power and loses leverage over them and thus undercuts its ability to achieve results in the near term while also undercutting its ability to orient them in more democratic
directions. This effect is aggravated by the UN’s discursive emphasis on local ownership, which enables local actors, particularly elites, to justify their resistance to the UN. Ultimately, the UN’s failure to achieve its stated goals also imperils its legitimacy, as it prevents the UN from demonstrating operational effectiveness. The analysis in this and the preceding chapters draws on examples from MONUC.

Throughout the thesis, I underline the contested nature of ownership and show how the assumptions that underlie it fail to fully take into account the contradictions in the concept and its operationalizations. Moreover, I show how the discursive and operational renditions of local ownership differ substantially thanks to the conceptual and operational limits imposed on it by the UN. I highlight that this represents an attempt by the UN to balance between its operational and normative obligations—and more broadly between its operational and normative selves. In practice, this means that ownership does not reliably give rise to its expected effects nor follow the logical path that it does in discourse, and the supposed benefits of local ownership thus do not rest on empirical evidence. Ultimately, expectations of how ownership functions do not necessarily materialize because of contradictions between the discourse of local ownership and how the UN subsequently understands and operationalizes it.

Chapter 8 offers concluding remarks on these findings, while also situating this thesis within broader debates in peacebuilding and international relations. It also offers some suggestions for future research on the issues examined in this thesis.
CHAPTER 2
The Evolution and Discourse of Local Ownership

2.1. Introduction

This chapter traces the evolution of the concept of ownership from its earliest mentions in development in the 1980s to its first appearances in peacebuilding and post-conflict discourse in the 1990s to its near omnipresence in the 2000s. It examines the definitional ambiguity surrounding the term and the lack of clarity about who local owners are on the part of scholars and international practitioners. Importantly, it shows two notable tendencies in usages of the term: first, that international actors strongly associate local ownership with enhanced legitimacy and sustainability in peacebuilding because of its perceived ability to mitigate violations of self-determination and minimize external intrusion; and second, that they usually view local ownership in technocratic terms—that is, local ownership is perceived as a technical solution to problems encountered in the conduct of peace operations, and it can be created and sustained through technical means like capacity building and training. However, because of the tendency to view ownership in technical terms, international actors often fail to take into account the powerful normative beliefs behind ownership and peacebuilding, and therefore to acknowledge that national and international actors may understand ownership and its effects in very different ways. Accordingly, it remains unclear whether the technical activities prescribed by this view of ownership can in fact lead to the normative benefits expected of it. More broadly, the gap between the discourse of ownership and the realization of it may distort ownership’s functioning as expected in post-conflict settings, a matter to which I turn in Chapters 3-5.
2.2. The Origins of the Concept: Local Ownership in Development

Local ownership discourse first emerged in the development context, only becoming salient in peacebuilding later. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) introduced ‘recipient-led approaches’ into its activities as early as the 1980s, and in a 1986 report, the World Bank endorsed recipient-country participation in development activities, stating that, ‘One of the most important services the Bank can provide is to ensure that the process of policy reform is “internalized” in the country as quickly as possible, so that the reform program is designed by the country itself and integrated into its long-term development program.’¹ Like in peacebuilding later, this commitment to local ownership was based upon the belief that it is ‘vital for providing credibility to policies, safeguarding against policy reversals, and ensuring sustainability of benefits’—in short, that it enhances legitimacy and sustainability by rooting development within national structures and culture, ensuring that development is inclusive and participatory, and building the capacity of local actors.²

Despite these early references, it was not until the 1990s that local ownership became widely promoted as a necessary approach to development. In 1995, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stated that ‘[f]or development to succeed, the

² Johnson and Wasty, ‘Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs,’ 1.
people of the countries concerned must be the “owners” of their development policies and programmes.\(^3\) The following year, the DAC again put local ownership at the core of its strategy, stating that ‘[s]ustainable development, based on integrated strategies that incorporate key economic, social, environmental and political elements, must be locally owned.’\(^4\) Such statements reveal a belief that accounting for local circumstances, ensuring the participation of as broad and inclusive a cross-section of society as possible, and incorporating local practices and values into development practice will lead to enhanced legitimacy and sustainability.

This commitment to ownership grew over the course of the decade, culminating in the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework of 1999, which introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) initiative. Under PRSPs, recipient countries help to design and implement their own development programs in accordance with national priorities, aspirations, and capacities, with international actors in a supporting role.\(^5\) This approach has since become deeply ingrained in the international development community, as evidenced by *inter alia* the UN’s Millennium Development Goals,\(^6\) the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of


and the principles and guidelines for most development agencies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). All of these documents tout the importance of local ownership in increasing the sustainability and legitimacy of results, largely through broad-based consultation with beneficiaries, building the capacity of national actors, and taking into account the desires, culture, and capacities of the population. Rubens Ricupero, former Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, summarizes the evolution in development discourse from the provision of technical assistance in the 1960s to technical cooperation in the 1970s to capacity building in the 1980s and 1990s, and asserts that ownership has in recent years become the ‘sine qua non’ for development operations.

The purported effectiveness of local ownership in development was borne out by several empirical studies, further solidifying faith in approaches that put national

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actors in the lead.\textsuperscript{10} According to a study by Johnson and Wasty of adjustment programs, successful outcomes were strongly correlated with a high degree of ownership, defined as government commitment to reform.\textsuperscript{11} Similarly, a 1998 study by Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr found that ownership, defined as ‘the extent to which the proposed measures are perceived as government-designed [as opposed to] donor-imposed,’ had a substantial impact on program implementation in 86\% of cases studied.\textsuperscript{12}

2.2.1. An Elusive Concept: Definitional Ambiguity in Development

However, despite the evidence seemingly validating the ownership approach, debate persists within the development field about whether local ownership is as effective as studies suggest. Determining whether ownership is a primary causal factor explaining success is partly hindered by the fact that development practitioners exhibit a striking lack of coherence on how they define local ownership. Indeed, in spite of their own empirical findings, Johnson and Wasty note that ‘the concept remains conceptually elusive and insufficiently explored.’\textsuperscript{13}

Local ownership in development discourse refers vaguely to the relationship among the various actors and stakeholders in the development process, usually connoting some degree of participation or involvement by some or many beneficiaries. The exact degree of involvement can range from mere buy-in to consultation to participation full leadership, and academics and policy-makers alike

\textsuperscript{10} Tony Killick, with Ramani Gunatilaka and Ana Marr, \textit{Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change} (London: Routledge, 1998), 88-91.
\textsuperscript{11} Johnson and Wasty, ‘Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs,’ 2, 5.
\textsuperscript{12} Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr, \textit{Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change}, 106-107, 125.
\textsuperscript{13} Johnson and Wasty, ‘Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs,’ 2. See also Bossuyt and Laporte, ‘Partnership in the 1990’s,’ 1.
employ this full range of definitions. Brinkerhoff, for one, argues that ‘indigenous leadership is essential for sustainable policy implementation.’\textsuperscript{14} Mosse emphasizes participation, stating that ‘poor people and not outside agencies or governments should determine development needs, decide how they should be met…and should manage the process.’\textsuperscript{15} Johnson and Wasty’s definition of ownership entails initiation of projects by recipient governments, intellectual commitment among policymakers, public support for projects by top leadership, and government efforts at building popular support for projects.\textsuperscript{16}

Development practitioners also use the term incoherently, with many listing local ownership as a core operational principle, but few defining it explicitly. For example, the Paris Declaration calls on recipient countries to ‘[e]xercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies through broad consultative processes,’ ‘[t]ranslate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes,’ and ‘[t]ake the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels.’\textsuperscript{17} The OECD is similarly broad in its usage of the term, at times even employing it in contradictory ways. In its 2001 Poverty Reduction Guidelines, the organization on the one hand recommends that programs be partner-led, relegating itself to a secondary role; on the other hand, it stresses that the organization’s development activities ‘should flow from an analysis of the country’s needs elicited through a dialogue with government and other stakeholders,’ emphasizing broad consultation but not relinquishing decision-making control.\textsuperscript{18} In a

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\item Mosse, ‘Is Good Policy Unimplementable?’, 649.
\item Johnson and Wasty, ‘Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programs,’ 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{17} ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.’
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discussi of PRSPs, Entwistle and Cavassini acknowledge the multiplicity of definitions of ownership that exist, stating that ownership can mean ‘the extent to which a PRS builds on the needs and priorities of an individual country rather than those of its external partners, broad agreement within the country’s executive on country priorities, or broad support for the PRS among the country’s national institutions…and internal partners.’

2.2.2. Who Owns Development?

In addition to ambiguity about what local ownership is, there is a lack of clarity as to who local owners are. National governments are the most obvious partner for international development agencies, and most agencies operate on the basis of agreements signed with recipient governments. Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr attribute poor program outcomes to weak government ownership, suggesting that recipient-country governments are indispensable ‘owners,’ and Entwistle and Cavassini emphasize that strong executive leadership in development processes is essential. Indeed, in a sovereign state, circumventing national governments in the disbursal of large sums of development monies would be unacceptable, and Johnson and Wasty’s indicators of ownership listed above clearly emphasize the key role of national governments.

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21 Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change, 86.
However, this ‘choice’ of owner can lead to a number of challenges. Governments in underdeveloped countries may lack the capacity to develop viable development projects. They may be more concerned with elite political bargaining than implementing projects that respond to the needs of the population. They may be unwilling to consult with a broader constituency, including marginalized groups hit harder by poverty. Indeed, the OECD acknowledges that, ‘[n]ational governments may be assuming increased responsibility for sector programmes, but this does not necessarily mean greater ownership by stakeholders below the national level or outside the public sector.’

Accordingly, consulting widely with civil society and marginalized groups in the design of development programs—if not seeking their direct participation in implementation—has been increasingly advocated, partly because these groups are seen to more legitimately represent the population. Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr acknowledge that ‘ownership in its strongest form requires broadly-based consent,’ and Mosse argues that the active participation of direct beneficiaries, and not just their input, is necessary for success. These arguments imply that it is the breadth of inclusion that will translate into gains in terms of legitimacy and sustainability.

At the same time, excessive decentralization of development assistance is not without risk. While civil society and sub-national political leaders may more legitimately represent the population, partnering with them may undermine the

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26 OECD, ‘The DAC Guidelines,’ 78.
27 Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change, 87.
legitimacy of the central government. This can be particularly perilous as it is the central government that will set macroeconomic policy and through which large aid disbursements will necessarily flow. Worse, if international development agencies interact excessively with sub-national and non-governmental actors, ‘local government can be captured by local élites, regional disparities can be deepened, or central government can “disown” responsibility for the poor.’

Some simply leave the question unanswered. Rather than specify particular partners, the OECD simply exhorts its staff to ‘[n]ever work alone.’ SIDA acknowledges that it partners most frequently with governments, but stresses that if cooperation fails due to diverging interests and priorities, it can terminate the partnership and redirect aid towards others. Who should own development processes then, and what they should own—the way aid is spent, the design of projects, or their implementation—remains unclear.

2.2.3. Operationalizing Ownership in Development

Without a clear definition of local ownership or of who local owners are, it becomes difficult to translate the concept into development policy, leading many agencies to employ the language of ownership without operationalizing it in any coherent way. Development actors employ a range of ‘methods,’ including

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31 OECD, ‘The DAC Guidelines,’ 56.
32 SIDA, ‘Sida at Work,’ 17.
33 Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change, 86; Entwistle and Cavassini, ‘An Operational Approach for Assessing Country
trainings, consultations, joint assessments and projects, and even full devolution of activities where international donors only provide funding and financial and operational oversight. These approaches and activities can actually create and maintain national ownership—that is, a sense on the part of a majority of the population that they have a meaningful level of influence on the development process and that they feel it responds to their needs. Indeed, as early as 1994, Bossuyt and Laporte noted that all development actors claim to practice partnership approaches because they are ‘the politically correct description for most forms of development cooperation,’ but that in reality they are notoriously difficult to implement. In this regard, local ownership may be more of a normative or rhetorical intention, rather than a policy tool that can be evaluated and tested.

At the same time, calls for greater ownership fit uncomfortably with calls for greater donor accountability that also emerged in the 1990s. Development agencies are under constant pressure to deliver results and ‘achieve value for money.’


35 Bossuyt and Laporte, ‘Partnership in the 1990’s,’ 1. In a case study of the failure to implement ownership principles, Mosse notes that, in a participatory rural development project in India, despite the frequent rhetorical reference to local ownership, the needs and desires of the partner organization were never solicited. ‘Is Good Policy Unimplementable?’, 650.

However, devolving project design, implementation, and evaluation to local actors means, in essence, devolving the achievement of results to local actors. Unfortunately, as outlined above, the lack of capacity of national actors, the political interests of governments, and the proliferation of sub-national and non-governmental ‘owners’ means that results may come about slowly or not at all, forcing development agencies to trade efficiency for ownership and return empty-handed to their governments. The OECD acknowledges this contradiction, noting that, ‘[w]orking as partners with such countries in ways that promote country ownership – and yet that ensure aid is effective and has poverty reduction impact – is likely to be problematical.’

Definitional diversity, incoherent operationalization of the concept, and the tension between ownership and effectiveness all complicate assessing whether and how local ownership contributes to development. Indeed, the disjuncture between the concept’s logical soundness and its implementation in practice suggests that theories of how ownership functions are incomplete. The benefits of local ownership relating to sustainability and legitimacy thus remain assumptions, and debates in development about what it is and how to ‘do’ it provide a striking parallel to peacebuilding.

2.3. The Evolution of the Concept: Local Ownership in Peacebuilding

In order to understand how ownership came to be adopted into peacebuilding, it is necessary to view peace operations in historical context, most importantly, to view them in the new global strategic setting that emerged after the Cold War. As noted in Chapter 1, the 1990s represented a new phase in UN peace operations, with the organization taking on an increasing number of peacekeeping missions. Not only was the quantity of interventions increasing, but they were taking place primarily in

intrastate conflicts and were broader in scope than earlier ‘traditional’ operations. The 1990s thus also represented a learning phase for the UN, as it adjusted to the new challenges of peacekeeping in internal conflicts.38

Initially, the ‘new’ peace operations of the 1990s focused on preparing post-conflict countries for elections. After a new government was installed, the UN usually withdrew. The implicit assumption behind this design was that democratic governance was the surest form of conflict prevention in the future, and that democratic governance could be initiated by elections.39 Subsequently, holding free and fair elections as quickly as possible after the signing of a peace agreement became the chosen tool of the UN to set post-conflict countries on the path to democratic governance and, thus, peace. It was presumed that elections would lead to the installation of legitimate governments that could reconcile warring parties, enabling the UN to withdraw.40

However, elections turned out to be a poor proxy for democratization, and thus for conflict transformation, a fact made apparent by the cataclysmic failures of this approach in Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994 where early elections and

39 The assumption that democratic governance and liberalization can prevent conflict recidivism will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.
liberalization exacerbated conflict fault lines and triggered a renewal of violence.\textsuperscript{41} Elections following a peace agreement often legitimize extremist nationalist elements, enabling them to consolidate power and further entrench divisions in society. Even where they do not lead to violence, elections may fail to lead to the installation of legitimate leaders, as the population may have little experience with or regard for ‘Western’ electoral processes and thus not view them as a source of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{42} The UN thus learned that successful elections did not constitute mission success if the country in question returned to war after its withdrawal. Instead, the UN would need to address the underlying sources of conflict and assist in economic reconstruction and institution building. In short, in order to ensure the sustainability of peace, the UN needed to engage in \textit{peacebuilding}, not just \textit{peacekeeping}.

While elections and the establishment of liberal governance structures are still considered important elements of UN peacekeeping operations, the ‘quick and dirty’ approach that focused exclusively on elections has been largely discredited since the 1990s.\textsuperscript{43} As Richard Caplan notes, ‘[t]he emphasis…on \textit{sustainable} peace as an operation’s ultimate objective marks a shift in focus away from singular events or outcomes that in the past, for instance, tended to treat free and fair multiparty elections as the culminating point of international involvement in a conflict.’\textsuperscript{44} As a result, during the 1990s and early 2000s, the mandates of UN missions grew more extensive, with the UN taking on a range of activities within the security, political,

\textsuperscript{41} In Angola, when rebel leader Jonas Savimbi realized that he was losing the elections, he rejected them and returned to arms. In Rwanda, renewed violence leading to genocide broke out even before elections could be held, triggered by plans for democratization and power-sharing, which were meant to pave the way for elections. Paris, \textit{At War’s End}, 68-78, 163-164.
\textsuperscript{42} Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention,’ 292.
\textsuperscript{43} Paris, \textit{At War’s End}, 8, 208.
\textsuperscript{44} Richard Caplan, \textit{International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 212-213, italics in the original.
social, and economic realms aimed at ensuring durable outcomes. As the scope of peacekeeping expanded, the UN’s post-conflict activities came to resemble development more and more—though of course peacekeeping missions retained their military component and operated in conditions of heightened insecurity. Nevertheless, tasks that were formerly considered development tasks began creeping increasingly into the realm of peacekeeping.

However, while these far-reaching missions may have been an improvement on earlier elections-only models, they introduced new challenges, particularly with regards to the self-determination of the host country and the degree of intrusion that they entailed, and accordingly to the legitimacy and sustainability of the UN’s operations. First, the more duties the UN took on in the post-conflict space, the more political authority it usurped from national actors, thus imperiling its legitimacy, as it was unclear on what basis the UN could justify undertaking tasks that normally fall within the purview of sovereign governments. David Harland argues that international administrations suffer from ‘fundamental political illegitimacy’ and Dominik Zaum

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45 Some argue that the expansion of UN peacekeeping mandates reached its apex with the transitional administrations in East Timor and Kosovo, where the UN temporarily assumed full sovereign authority; others argue that these were exceptional missions and must be viewed separately from the overall evolution of peace operations. See Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention,’ 290. For a description of the evolution of peacekeeping within the UN, see Marrack Goulding, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,’ International Affairs 69, no. 3 (July 1993); Bellamy, Williams, and Griffín, Understanding Peacekeeping, 70-92; Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Introduction,’ in New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, edited by Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (New York: United Nations University Press, 2009), 5-10; and Tschirgi, ‘Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited,’ 2-4.

46 In his 1994 Agenda for Development, Boutros Boutros-Ghali linked peace and development directly (though tautologically, he calls development the basis for peace (Para. 3) and peace the basis for development (Para. 16)). United Nations, A/48/935 (1994).

47 These problems were particularly noticeable in international transitional administrations, but existed to a degree in nearly all multidimensional peacekeeping operations.
questions ‘the legitimacy and sustainability of governance institutions that lack local ownership.’ Roland Paris concurs, warning that the local population may not view institutions built by international actors as legitimate. In other words, because these missions took on significant tasks within the realm of domestic political development, they entailed a curtailment of the country’s self-determination. This greater imposition in turn threatened the legitimacy of the mission by appearing to constitute foreign or external domination of a sovereign state. As Saul argues, the increasing level of international involvement that has accompanied the changing nature of peace operations ‘conflict[s] with the principle of self-determination’ and therefore damages their legitimacy.

Second, though more intrusive methods came about in part as a response to the failure to secure sustainable peace through less intrusive approaches, the far-reaching mandates of later missions imperiled sustainability in a different way. If local actors were uninvolved in reconstructing their own countries, it was feared that they would become dependent on international actors to ensure security, economic stability, political development, and rule of law. As Graciana del Castillo argues, ‘sovereign countries need to take responsibility or “ownership” of reconstruction policies as a basis for their sustainability.’ By contrast, where external imposition is deep and dependency develops, sustainability is likely to falter. According to Jens

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49 Roland Paris, ‘Understanding the “coordination problem” in postwar statebuilding,’ in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations, edited by Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (London: Routledge, 2008), 58. Intrusive forms of international intervention may compromise the legitimacy not only of the interveners, but of national authorities as well, as they may be seen to be collaborating with ‘outsiders’ who are imposing their interests on the country.

50 Saul, ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law,’ 169, 174. See also Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?”

51 del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, 230.
Narten, dependency on external assistance in the aftermath of conflict can become structural in that it is self-propagating and resistant to reversal.\textsuperscript{52} Worse, dependency can further imperil legitimacy: as dependency takes hold, peace operations risk becoming indefinite and the restrictions on self-determination prolonged, and over time hostility towards the international community’s presence may increase.\textsuperscript{53} Paris and Sisk warn that ‘[t]his combination of dependency and resistance has the potential to produce pathological patterns reminiscent of colonial societies, which proved to be unsustainable in the past.’\textsuperscript{54}

Gradually, local ownership emerged as a perceived solution to these challenges. The difficulties associated with illegitimacy and dependency were perceived as related to the increased role of the international community in peacebuilding, including its failure to consider national perspectives on peacebuilding, account for and utilize existing national capacities, or build them where they were lacking, and the resultant deleterious effects on self-determination and deepening of external imposition. Accordingly, placing more emphasis on the involvement of local actors, as development practitioners had apparently been doing successfully for years, seemed like an appropriate solution. Indeed, as peacekeeping evolved into peacebuilding and came to resemble development more and more in the types of tasks it was undertaking and goals towards which it worked, it is not

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surprising that development methods should be ‘imported’ into peacebuilding. As early as 1996, Kenneth Bush argued that peacebuilding must be ‘indigenized’ in order to be sustainable, asserting that the focus of interventions should be on building the capacity of national actors.55

That ownership is viewed as a ‘solution’ to peacebuilding challenges highlights the fact that legitimacy and sustainability, as well as ownership, are considered technocratic issues. The lack of legitimacy and sustainability in the eyes of local actors are perceived by the UN to be operational challenges that can be overcome through technical adjustments to the way in which peacebuilding is done rather than any broader rethinking of the international approach to interventions in general. Ownership, in this view, provides exactly such a technical solution: it entails a set of actions that, first, constitute or create ownership and, second, recoup the losses in local legitimacy and sustainability entailed by greater violations of self-determination and greater international intrusion into post-conflict states. As shall be shown below, usages of ownership in peacebuilding discourse confirm both this tendency to view it in technical terms and faith in its ability to ‘fix’ problems encountered on the ground.

However, whether the concept of local ownership can be applied to peace operations in the same way as it is to development practice is questionable. Peacekeeping is by definition international and temporary; development is generally accepted to be a national process and a long-term one. Peacekeeping focuses on the achievement of a particular result—peace and stability—in as short a time as possible; development focuses on processes, which take place on an ongoing basis and with

constantly evolving longer-term goals.\textsuperscript{56} It is hardly surprising then that the definitional complications seen in development are at least as pronounced in peacebuilding. As with development, these include a diversity of usages of the term, a lack of clarity about who ‘local owners’ should be, and confusion about when local ownership should ‘start.’ However, as previously mentioned, two common threads run through these ambiguities: first, the expectation that ownership will render peacebuilding more legitimate and more sustainable in the eyes of local actors by preserving their self-determination and lessening external imposition on them; and second, the tendency of peacebuilding scholars and practitioners to describe ownership in technical terms. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to exploring first the usage of the term in peacebuilding documents and discourse and then local ownership’s presumed benefits in peacebuilding.

\subsection*{2.3.1. An Elusive Concept: Definitional Ambiguity in Peacebuilding}

As in the development field, ownership in peacebuilding literature is everywhere present but usually without explicit definition. According to Simon Chesterman, usages of the term range from responsiveness by international actors at one extreme to full sovereignty, in which local actors may reject international intervention, at the other.\textsuperscript{57} Most often, as in development discourse, it is used to mean varying degrees of national involvement in peacebuilding, ranging from buy-in to consultation to participation to leadership, usages that are implicitly or explicitly

\textsuperscript{56} Though, as described, peacebuilding—as opposed to peacekeeping—is commonly acknowledged to entail a broader set of activities that border on development activities, peace operations are still recognized as temporary institutions, rather than indefinite engagements in particular countries.

\textsuperscript{57} Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice,’ 9-10.
associated with legitimacy and sustainability, and that show a tendency to view local ownership in technical terms, without regard to its normative underpinnings.

Buy-in, in the sense of popular support for international peacebuilding activities, is generally considered a minimum requirement for international interventions. Without the explicit or even tacit support of at least some of the local population, implementation would be impossible. According to Jens Steffek, ‘the legitimacy of international governance hinges upon popular assent to the justifications of its goals, principles and procedures,’ and as Saul notes, local ownership by the population is thought to ‘foster goodwill’ towards the intervention. It is thought that such buy-in or goodwill can be secured through regular communication with the population, usually in the form of targeted public information campaigns designed to explain a mission’s functions, mandate, and goals. It should be noted that buy-in here is conceived of as not just the acceptance of international peacebuilding activities, but rests upon a shared vision of what is ‘right’ for the country—in short, it implies that the interests of national and international actors are coincident and there is no conflict between competing visions of how peace should be built. While the UN may acknowledge a diversity of views among the local population, it is assumed that adequate communication can bring everyone ‘onto the same page,’ and ownership in this sense, then, is intended to generate consensus between the UN and national actors.

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58 Reich, “‘Local Ownership’ in Conflict Transformation Projects,” 16.
60 Saul, ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law,’ 171-172.
about the activities of the mission. Agreement on peacebuilding aims in turn ensures the legitimacy of the international community’s presence and actions by rendering them, in a sense, ‘co-determined’ as opposed to externally imposed. However, buy-in remains a minimalist version of local ownership, in that it defines the role of local actors as a passive one, in which they consent to the international implementation of peacebuilding activities, but do not participate in it themselves.

Other usages of ownership go further, treating ownership as involving an ongoing consultation process with the population in the development of goals and activities. Del Castillo calls for broad participatory processes in determining reconstruction goals, and a 2005 report on UN integrated peace operations recommends the creation of mechanisms to include local actors in planning. The Capstone Doctrine calls for peace operations to be conducted in a consultative and broadly participatory way, and in a 2004 report, Kofi Annan wrote that peacebuilding activities must ‘assist national stakeholders to develop their own reform vision, their own agenda, their own approaches.’ Consultation is thought to render peacebuilding more legitimate and sustainable in three ways. First,

64 del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, 230.
consultation is thought to enable the incorporation of indigenous norms, practices, and culture into peacebuilding by allowing national actors to share both their specialized knowledge and their views on how goals can be best achieved, thus making peacebuilding at least a partly self-determined process. As the Capstone Doctrine declares, ‘[n]ational and local ownership must begin with a strong understanding of the national context.’\textsuperscript{68} Second, as with buy-in, consultation is assumed to help achieve consensus on post-conflict reconstruction activities, aligning the interests and priorities of national and international actors into a unified vision of peacebuilding. Agreement between international and national actors can, in turn, forestall accusations that the international community is imposing its agenda on national actors, once more lending the process greater legitimacy. Finally, consultation, by enabling a plurality of voices beyond the political elite to be heard, is thought to render the peacebuilding enterprise more legitimate as the UN will be perceived as behaving in an impartial and even-handed manner towards all stakeholders, again boosting the degree of self-determination.

While an improvement on mere buy-in, for some, consultation with local actors on mission design and implementation is insufficient to constitute ownership, and these analysts use the term to mean direct participation in the execution of tasks as well as targeted training of national actors in specific areas such as policing, human rights, and gender sensitivity.\textsuperscript{69} Active participation in the implementation of peacebuilding activities and in UN-run trainings is thought to build capacity among local actors, which is seen as a means to ensure the sustainability of efforts beyond the departure of international actors. Robert Orr exhorts the international community

\textsuperscript{68} United Nations, Capstone Doctrine, 39.
to hire local actors to undertake as many activities as possible in order to avoid dependency and generate sustainability, and Roberto Belloni likewise advocates an active local ownership, declaring that local actors should be ‘placed at the center of international engagement, rather than at its receiving end.’ As Michael Barnett argues, ‘if peacebuilders are serious about preparing states for self-governance, then local elites must be included in the reconstruction process.’ The UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit calls for close collaboration with national counterparts in post-conflict institution building and training in order to build capacity in a number of areas, and in his 2001 report No Exit Without Strategy, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote that participatory governance is indispensable for durable peace, explicitly linking national agency to sustainability. Elsewhere, he wrote that peacebuilding activities must ‘be based upon meaningful public participation.’

Participation is also associated with increased legitimacy in local ownership discourse. Katia Papagianni, for one, argues that the post-conflict state gains legitimacy when the statebuilding process is open to broad public participation, and

71 Michael Barnett, ‘Building a Republican Peace,’ 110.
74 Katia Papagianni, ‘Participation and State Legitimation,’ in Building States to Build Peace, edited by Charles Call with Vanessa Wyeth (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 50. Steffek, though not speaking of peacebuilding specifically, also links participation and legitimacy, arguing that it is often assumed that involving those subject to governance ‘actively in the process of governance will make the acts of governance more acceptable to them.’ ‘Legitimation of International Governance,’ 257.
broad participation can again help to generate and solidify consensus between UN and national actors on peacebuilding goals. Direct participation can also help to ensure that local traditions and practices are respected, further boosting legitimacy as well as sustainability by ensuring that capacities are built in a way that complements existing capacities, thus reducing the degree of imposition on the host country.

Still others go even further in their definitions of local ownership, putting leadership of peacebuilding processes squarely in the hands of local actors. Timothy Donais and Bowles and Chopra, for example, define local ownership as domestic control and leadership of the design and implementation of peacebuilding. Narten’s definition includes the ‘assessment, planning and decision-making functions, the practical management and implementation of these functions, and the evaluation and control of all phases of statebuilding programs.’ Neclà Tschirgi states that the host country population ‘must actively be involved in setting the agenda and leading the process,’ and Béatrice Pouligny asserts that ‘implementing bodies should be firmly rooted in the recipient country and represent the interests of ordinary citizens.’ These most expansive visions of ownership posit that when local actors are the primary agents of peacebuilding, it becomes more sustainable. For Hannah Reich, participation alone is insufficient and only full local leadership of peacebuilding can guarantee sustainability. Edomwonyi also advocates a comprehensive version of local ownership on this basis, adding that ‘full’ ownership also enhances legitimacy by making peacebuilding processes internal ones, rather than externally-imposed

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75 Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?’, 3; Bowles and Chopra, ‘Afghanistan,’ 299.
79 Reich, ‘“Local Ownership” in Conflict Transformation Projects,’ 6.
ones. Though UN references to ownership tend to stop short of such expansive definitions, Chesterman notes nevertheless that ‘[e]very UN mission or development programme now stresses the importance of local “ownership.”’

2.3.2. Who Owns Peacebuilding?

The range of conceptions of local ownership is, as in the development field, further confused by the multiplicity of potential ‘local owners,’ including central and local government, ministries and state agencies, security forces, traditional and religious leaders, civil society and NGOs, business and professional groups, and the population at large. Furthermore, in the post-conflict setting, unlike in development, a number of armed non-state actors usually exist who may also claim ownership rights in the peacebuilding phase, further complicating the situation.

Of these potential owners, national governments remain the obvious choice for the international community, and del Castillo argues that they have a ‘rightful claim to manage and coordinate international assistance in the post-conflict transition.’ As in development, circumventing host country governments is usually considered unacceptable and most UN peace operations function on the basis of legal agreements concluded with host-country governments regarding the constitution, scope, and

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80 Edomwonyi, ‘Rwanda,’ 43.
81 Chesterman, ‘Walking Softly in Afghanistan,’ 41.
82 See Narten, ‘Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership,’ 375, and Annika S. Hansen and Sharon Wiharta, ‘The Transition to a Just Order: Establishing Local Ownership After Conflict: Policy Report’ (Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2007), 4-5. Notably, who the corresponding international actors are is also unclear. While for the purposes of this study, the UN has been singled out, it is worth noting that the ‘international community’ is not a monolithic unit and suffers from a similar ambiguity as to who the key actors are or should be. Nevertheless, though neither the local nor the international can be presumed to be a cohesive entity, the division into national and international or internal and external, while perhaps an over-simplification, remains analytically useful as well as commonly employed.
83 del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, 181. See also Pietz and von Carlowitz, ‘Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States.’
rights of the operation. Indeed, for the UN in particular, a focus on national governments is made imperative by the fact that the UN itself is an intergovernmental organization.

However, in post-conflict situations, there may not be a government or even a transitional administration in place when international assistance begins. Even where elections have occurred and a government has been installed, it may remain a polarizing entity that is not truly representative of the population. Indeed, as wars have become increasingly internal, the protagonists of war have also changed, usually involving government forces and one or more extra-governmental or sub-national groups, who are disenfranchised with their government. Post-conflict peacebuilding therefore needs to include programs to reengage them, which means granting ownership not simply to government or national-level actors, but to a much broader cross-section of society. As Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe remark, what they call ‘asocial intervention,’ in which international actors interact only with a small political elite or institutional counterparts in government, works reasonably well in limited operations, but is ‘disastrous when assisting or acting as a governing authority attempting to build capacity for a self-sustaining state.’ Richmond echoes this, arguing that peacebuilding ‘requires an engagement with as broad, representative, and

84 Though missions are mandated by the Security Council, mission-specific Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) are concluded between the UN and the host country, which govern the relationship between the two from a legal standpoint, outlining the rights and responsibilities of each and articulating the host country’s consent to the mission’s presence. SOFAs are usually complemented by a number of issue-specific Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with the government. See United Nations, A/45/594 (1990); United Nations, A/64/633 (2010); and University of Essex, UN Peacekeeping and The Model Status of Forces Agreement, University of Essex, School of Law, United Nations Peacekeeping Law Reform Project, 2011.
85 Freeman, ‘The Right to Self-Determination in International Politics,’ 357.
87 Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention,’ 290.
participatory a representation of everyday life in postconflict zones as possible if it is to be…sustainable.  

Accordingly, as in development, there has been a push for ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding approaches in which international actors engage with civil society and non-governmental actors. Increasingly, the international community has come to value the ability of these latter groups to articulate the population’s interests and promote accountability and thus it claims to include and strengthen it early on in interventions.  

The Capstone Doctrine notes that ownership should take into account ‘impartiality, wide representation, inclusiveness, and gender considerations’ and should ‘not [be] limited to small elite groups.’ Similarly, the New Horizons report notes that public information campaigns and other efforts to generate buy-in among the population must transcend ‘divisions along ethnic, gender and other lines.’ The Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict defines ownership as going beyond the political elite, stressing that ‘[l]ocal and traditional authorities as well as civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a critical role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around a common vision for the country’s future.’ Similarly, a UN report on post-conflict SSR notes that strategies and implementation must be based on national ownership, and that ‘[b]road national consultation lies at the heart of national ownership.’ It goes on to define

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89 Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories, 132.
90 United Nations, Capstone Doctrine, 39.
security sector actors broadly, including both ‘traditional’ security sector actors such as the military, police, corrections, intelligence services, border security, and the judiciary, as well as political institutions, civil society, customary and informal authorities, and private security firms.\textsuperscript{94}

This broad inclusiveness is thought to boost legitimacy by enabling the input of a large array of indigenous actors and minimizing the UN’s imposition on them. As Anna Jarstad has noted, ‘after civil war, it is of particular importance that all interests are represented, in order to render decisions a high degree of legitimacy.’\textsuperscript{95} Including a broad spectrum of owners is also thought to boost legitimacy by preserving the UN’s impartiality—that is, if the UN considers the desires, priorities, and capacities of all actors, then it cannot be accused of having favored any one group above any other, and in this sense, it can also be said to be preserving national self-determination. In addition to being associated with legitimacy, a broad spectrum of owners is identified with sustainability. John Prendergast and Emily Plumb, for example, argue that ‘local civil society organizations, due to their proximity to local-level actors at the end of the implementation chain, can play a key role in ensuring that peace is sustainable.’\textsuperscript{96} For these reasons, the discourse of local ownership emphasizes breadth and inclusion as key to the generation of increased legitimacy and sustainability.

While the push to extend inclusion in peacebuilding beyond national governments to non-governmental civil society groups parallels a similar trend in the

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., para. 14.
\textsuperscript{96} John Prendergast and Emily Plumb, ‘Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding,’ in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 327.
development field, the post-conflict space is, as mentioned, complicated by the presence of illegal or irregular armed groups that may also claim ownership of the peacebuilding process. As discussed in Chapter 1, the conflict in Congo, for example, was marked by a proliferation of armed groups and alliances and hence by a constantly shifting cast of characters during the fighting and the peacemaking stages. Such groups often wield significant power in the aftermath of conflict and may be better positioned to ‘deliver’ segments of the population who view the government with skepticism. Securing their buy-in, at a minimum, may be essential for implementation, as without it, they may seek to derail peacebuilding efforts or portray the process as an illegitimate imposition by ‘outsiders.’

2.3.3. When Does Local Ownership Begin?

In addition to the multiplicity of definitions and owners, local ownership in peacebuilding is further clouded by different perspectives about when local owners should take up ‘possession’ of the process. Many advocate that ownership should begin as early as possible in the peacebuilding process in order to ensure that sufficient capacity is built among local actors before the departure of the UN; however most fail to specify exactly what this means. Orr asserts vaguely that ‘[t]he local population must participate in, and indeed own, the reconstruction process from the start’ and Tschirgi states that capacity building ‘from the earliest stages is vital

97 Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.
for sustainability.99 Chopra and Hohe declare that local participation is crucial ‘from the very beginning,’ but like the others, they do not specify when this is.100

At the same time, many of these authors note that international authority may be necessary in the aftermath of conflict, complicating their calls for early local ownership. Stephen Krasner points out that ‘collapsed and badly governed states will not fix themselves,’ and the international community’s involvement is necessary to stem further violence or its spillover into neighboring countries.101 Likewise, the Capstone Doctrine, for all its emphasis on local ownership, acknowledges that in the short term, the UN may have to initiate peacebuilding activities due to the inability of local actors to do so, with authority only transferred once a legitimate and capable government is in place.102 Annika Hansen concurs, stating that because post-conflict societies tend to be fragmented and local actors tend to lack leadership capacity, ownership may not only be difficult to achieve, but may be a misguided goal: ‘In the context of the initial anarchy, there is a valid argument to be made that the principle of local ownership is only applicable to a very limited degree if at all.’103 Even Chopra and Hohe, who strenuously advocate local participation in peacebuilding,

100 Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention,’ 289.
101 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,’ *International Security* 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 86. As noted in Chapter 1, some scholars disagree with this point, arguing that such states should indeed be left to ‘fix themselves’ and that international intervention may lead to less stable, as well as less legitimate, outcomes. See Weinstein, ‘Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective’; Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’; and Herbst ‘Let Them Fail.’ Others take a middle view. Recchia, for example, argues that international intervention may be necessary in the short term, but as soon as a minimum degree of stability has been achieved, the international community must scale down its involvement. ‘Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction.’ See also Robert O. Keohane, ‘Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty,’ in *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*, edited by J. L. Holzgreve and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
102 United Nations, Capstone Doctrine, 28, 40.
admit that international interventions assume political power in post-conflict states because national governments are ‘fragile, fragmented or altogether collapsed.’\textsuperscript{104}

The need for international rather than national authority after conflict is particularly salient with regards to security, due to the presence, noted above, of regular and irregular armed groups as well as by an abundance of arms and deep mistrust in post-conflict environments. Under these conditions, no former warring group can guarantee the security of other groups or the population at large. These security dilemmas limit the potential for establishing local ownership, as it requires capacity and institution building over the long term.\textsuperscript{105} As Heiner Hänggi points out, ‘[t]ensions between external imposition and local ownership… [will arise] because more often than not physical security will have to be provided by international actors while sufficient local capacity is gradually being built up.’\textsuperscript{106}

While this issue may be most salient in the security sector, the room for local ownership is narrow even in the political, social, and economic realms encompassed by peacebuilding. After conflict, the political sector is often marked by a legitimacy deficit and low levels of governance capacity, due to constantly shifting power alliances, illegal networks, and corruption that take root during conflict. This fragmentation extends to the social sector, in which various groups have become militarized and distrust one another, and may seek redress against those who committed crimes or perpetrated violence against them during the war. The space for promoting local ownership in view of such deep tension and societal fragmentation is

\textsuperscript{104} Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention,’ 290.
\textsuperscript{105} Hansen, ‘Local Ownership in Peace Operations,’ 41.
likely to be limited. Moreover, the absorptive capacity for economic aid is low in the wake of conflict, and thus placing management of aid monies with local actors early on may lead to waste or misuse. As Otwin Marenin points out, ‘[a]lmost by definition, post-conflict societies are not capable of providing the minimal services expected of a state, nor does civil society have sufficient social capital to support reconstruction… International aid is a necessity.’ Chesterman goes even further, arguing that ‘[l]ocal control of political power is rightly seen as the end of a transitional administration, but if an international actor has assumed some or all governmental power then local ownership is surely not the means,’ and he warns that it is naïve to assert that successful peacebuilding requires both UN intervention and local ownership.

Nevertheless, despite recognizing the need for a strong international presence to secure peace initially and achieve specific operational goals as well as the fact that local ownership may imperil those goals, the discourse of local ownership by and large continues to advocate early ownership by local actors, and it remains unclear whether local ownership is the ends or the means of peacebuilding. This paradoxical situation is evident in Hansen’s statement that, ‘[t]he ultimate goal of local ownership ought to be part of the international approach from the very beginning.’

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108 del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States, 235.
2.4. Local Ownership in Peacebuilding: Normative Benefits and Technical Practices

As has been shown throughout the preceding three sections, despite the definitional diversity of local ownership, its many usages—buy-in, consultation, participation, and leadership—have two important elements in common: their perceived association with legitimacy and sustainability in post-conflict settings and their portrayal of ownership as a technical issue. These shall each be considered in turn.

2.4.1. Perceived Benefits

As in development, local ownership in peacebuilding is explicitly or implicitly expected to boost legitimacy and sustainability, both of which are perceived to be imperiled by today’s more intrusive peace operations. More specifically, these benefits to legitimacy and sustainability in peacebuilding are thought to derive from local ownership’s perceived ability to (1) build and maintain host country consensus around and consent to the UN’s presence and activities; (2) preserve UN impartiality; (3) ensure that peacebuilding is rooted in and responsive to indigenous culture, values, and structures; and (4) build national capacity for conflict management and governance. Each of these anticipated benefits is expected to help preserve self-determination and mitigate the degree of external imposition on the host state, and thus enhance legitimacy and sustainability in the eyes of local actors. I examine each of these now in greater detail.
2.4.1.1. Consent

First, if local actors are involved in peacebuilding activities, either passively through buy-in and consultation or actively through participation and leadership, they can be thought of as having implicitly ‘agreed’ to the UN’s intervention and activities. As described above, definitions of local ownership reflect an assumption that ownership can help to build consensus between international and national owners on post-conflict peacebuilding, that it can ensure that their respective visions for the post-conflict political order are aligned. This coincidence of visions and goals between national and international actors is in turn thought to mitigate the violation of self-determination entailed by international intervention and thus buttress the UN’s legitimacy as an intervening force. Indeed, Saul notes that consent contributes to ‘the preservation of the right to self-determination’ in international intervention.

Formal consent has long been a central tenet of UN peacebuilding practice, and the consent requirement in the UN’s earliest peacekeeping missions was in fact intended precisely to forestall accusations that sovereignty and self-determination were being violated—involved states were in effect voluntarily giving up the right to act unilaterally, and were instead entrusting the UN with the management of the conflict, while committing themselves to a political process to resolve the conflict. While these early missions were authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which does require explicit consent by targeted states, today’s interventions after civil wars are usually authorized under Chapter VII, which does not. Nevertheless, in

practice, the UN rarely, if ever, intervenes without consent. More broadly, securing host country consent is considered desirable because operating in a consensual environment is considered more likely to be effective and legitimate, and partnering with national actors can be seen as consent by other means.114

More specifically, local ownership expands the concept of consent in two dimensions: temporally and spatially within the population. First, partnership throughout implementation, as opposed to consent only to the initiation of the intervention, can be seen as constituting continuous consent for the longer-term activities undertaken in peacebuilding. This is particularly important for multidimensional peacebuilding missions, which are longer-term processes than the earlier ‘quick and dirty’ missions. Circumventing national actors in peacebuilding could leave the UN open to accusations of violating the principle of consent, if not initially, then later during the peacebuilding process, particularly after elections have taken place and an internationally-recognized government has been put in place.115 Local ownership during the process, by contrast, could constitute renewed or ongoing consent over time.

Second, local ownership can ensure consent from a broader population than only the government. While the UN’s preferred local partners in interventions have historically been governments, only interacting with government officials can be problematic in a post-civil conflict situation in which they may not be viewed as

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114 Saul, ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law,’ 188.
legitimate. As described above, internal conflicts involve non-state actors and their constituents who need to be convinced that the state supports and represents them. Their consent to the UN’s intervention, then, is arguably as important as that of the government. Local ownership can overcome this obstacle, as it can help to expand the concept of formal consent to entail a broader consensus that encompasses an array of local owners. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the discourse of local ownership stresses that local owners should include as wide a cross-section of society as possible; here this implies that any boost to legitimacy deriving from enhanced consent will be amplified if ownership is as broad and inclusive as possible, rather than restricted to a small number of actors. Chopra and Hohe similarly emphasize the need for incorporating greater breadth into current conceptions of consent, asserting that ‘perhaps the issue of consent should be revisited in a considerably broader sense, socially through the direct participation of local communities in international operations of whatever variety, thus fostering a degree of…legitimacy that has so far been absent.’

2.4.1.2. Impartiality

Second, local ownership is thought to preserve the UN’s impartiality in peacekeeping. Impartiality, like consent, has been a key principle of UN peacekeeping

116 Saul notes that government consent ‘in post-conflict situations is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of the true will of the people,’ and notes that often the government from whom consent is secured is considered legitimate primarily because it is internationally recognized, even if it has minimal claims to popular legitimacy. ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law,’ 185-187.
117 Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention,’ 291.
118 Ibid., 290-291.
since the organization first undertook to intervene in the conflicts of member states.\textsuperscript{119} The UN’s role was conceived of as maintaining an agreed-upon status quo, usually formalized in a ceasefire agreement or peace treaty between warring parties, and not furthering the interests of any one party to the conflict or any interested external state. This was particularly valued during the Cold War, when impartiality was viewed as being able to protect against the predatory designs of great powers that might be engaging in proxy wars through smaller states.\textsuperscript{120}

While peacekeeping has evolved, the principle of impartiality, like the principle of consent, remains central to UN peace operations.\textsuperscript{121} Enabling the input of a broad array of local actors into the peacebuilding process rather than favoring a narrow set of political elites is thought to protect the UN from accusations that it is biased for or against particular parties and thus that it is imposing particular structures or political systems on post-conflict states.\textsuperscript{122} This is particularly important in the immediate aftermath of conflict where former warring factions are jockeying for position and trying to maximize their power in the post-conflict order. If the UN is viewed as ‘playing favorites,’ then it is likely to lose the cooperation of those who feel neglected, left out, or persecuted. This in turn can erode consent, as discussed

\textsuperscript{119} United Nations, Capstone Doctrine. The troika of principles that governed peacekeeping in its earliest stages includes consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense.


\textsuperscript{121} Indeed, though some accuse the UN of not being impartial in conflicts or of being impartial when it should not be, the Capstone Doctrine reiterates the organization’s commitment to the principle (33). See also Vohra, ‘Impartiality in United Nations Peace-Keeping.’

above, and imperil the legitimacy of the mission. Impartiality, then, like consent, is broadened by local ownership to embrace not just national governments, as in traditional peacekeeping, but provincial and local authorities, opposition parties, and civil society. In other words, by interacting with and taking into account the viewpoints of this broad array of groups and actors, more of the host-country population will perceive the UN to be impartial and thus legitimate, and accordingly, the discourse of local ownership emphasizes such breadth and inclusion.

2.4.1.3. Indigenousness

Third, local ownership is also thought to ensure that the reconstruction and peacebuilding activities undertaken by a mission are in line with national culture, history, and norms. By consulting widely with the population, local experiences, expectations, and wishes can be understood and incorporated into UN plans, rendering them more likely to take root and ‘stick.’ Accordingly, countless UN documents and best practices guidelines underline the importance for UN staff of gaining cultural awareness and understanding the local context in which they work. For example, in its *Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, DPKO’s Best Practices Unit urges that all missions ‘take local societal structures and cultural norms into account.’ In other words, because external structures and rules imposed on national contexts where they have no traction and where national actors cannot relate to them will not be durable, this ‘indigenousness’ is presumed to foster sustainability by minimizing imposition.

In addition, by helping to ensure that peacebuilding activities are embedded in local normative structures, local ownership buttresses legitimacy. Because external ideas and practices may be foreign or alien to local actors, giving peacebuilding a degree of indigenousness can make it relevant, appropriate, and acceptable to local actors by preserving a greater degree of self-determination. As Tanja Hohe notes, ‘it is…crucial for the international community to understand local social structures and ideas of political authority and legitimacy’ in order for post-conflict institutions and state bodies to gain legitimacy among the local population.124 Again, the broader the group of local actors with which the UN consults, the better it will be able to tailor its actions to be compatible with national norms, values, and structures, thus further enhancing legitimacy and sustainability.

2.4.1.4. Capacity Building

Finally, local ownership is intended to ensure that peacebuilding is based on broad participation and consultation, which is thought to render peacebuilding more sustainable by helping to build the capacity of national actors. In the eyes of most international actors, post-conflict countries usually suffer from a deficit of conflict management capacity—that is, the tools and mechanisms to peacefully manage societal disputes and collectively take decisions on important matters of state and society are absent. Any capacity that did exist prior to conflict may have been significantly weakened or destroyed during conflict, and it is commonly thought that an international presence is needed precisely because national actors were unable to manage the war-to-peace transition on their own.

124 Hohe, ‘Clash of Paradigms,’ 570.
However, this does not imply that no local capacity exists, and participation by a wide array of state and civil society actors is thought to help ensure that international capacity complements rather than substitutes for national capacity, thus limiting external intrusion to areas where no capacity exists. It is hoped that participation in peacebuilding, either through assisting in the realization of projects or through UN-led trainings, will both build upon existing capacities as well as impart to national actors the necessary skills for future indigenous conflict management, thus making outcomes more sustainable. In addition, it is hoped that participation in institutions of governance during peacebuilding will translate into future participation in political institutions, thus not only leaving the country with a durable conflict management capacity but with the capacity to build and maintain viable and resilient institutions of governance. Again, breadth and inclusiveness are considered important to securing this benefit: the more national actors participate in or are connected with the UN’s peacebuilding efforts, then the greater the dissemination of capacities for conflict management and peacebuilding within the population will be.

2.4.2. A Technical Solution

Clearly, the hopes put into local ownership by international actors are high, and the range of uses of the term as well as the different points of view on who local owners should be and when ownership should ‘begin’ have not deterred international actors from persistently advocating ownership in peacebuilding. This is partly because local ownership is, as mentioned, perceived to deliver specific benefits to the practice of peacebuilding, but also because ownership, as it is currently portrayed in discourse, is viewed as a technical issue, and one that is thus eminently ‘implementable.’

Indeed, the above usages of ownership reveal a view of local ownership as something that can be concretely ‘created’ through the undertaking of a particular set of actions, and, most importantly, that can be created by international actors. There are two elements to this view of ownership. The first is that ownership can help to successfully realize certain effects in peacebuilding and concretely assist in overcoming challenges related to the greater intrusion of the international community entailed by multidimensional peacebuilding operations. The second is that ownership itself is something tangible and implementable: not an abstract theory, but a concrete ‘policy’ or ‘strategy.’ Indeed, most of the discourse discussed above treats local ownership as an instrument that can help achieve greater legitimacy and sustainability by preserving self-determination and lessening imposition and glosses over or fails to mention the confusion surrounding the term and what it means.126 In other words, local ownership is a ‘tool’ for international peacebuilders that helps to ‘fix’ challenges relating to legitimacy and sustainability encountered in peacebuilding.127

In this sense, then, local ownership can be created by undertaking specific actions, such as public information campaigns, consultations and roundtables, trainings, and joint projects, by international peacebuilders with a broad spectrum of local actors, including both political elites and the wider population. These actions, largely through their breadth and inclusion, are presumed to generate and maintain consensus on peacebuilding goals and priorities, maintain the UN’s impartiality and


127 On the tendency to see view peacebuilding as something that can be ‘fixed’ with the use of technical ‘tools’ rather than as something fraught with inherent tensions, see Cedric de Coning, ‘Moving Beyond the Technical: Facing Up to Peacebuilding’s Inherent Contradictions,’ African Security Review, 20, no. 1 (March 2011).
even-handedness towards the host country, embed peacebuilding activities in relevant indigenous traditions and structures, and build the capacity of local actors to take on and continue the activities of peacebuilding beyond the UN’s departure.\textsuperscript{128}

Local ownership is thus, despite its definitional many-sidedness, portrayed as an unequivocally good or useful principle for peacebuilding. Indeed, the UN’s discourse embraces the many usages of local ownership and the full roster of potential owners at once, revealing an uncritical view of the concept and an aversion to advocating it only under certain conditions. The reluctance to qualify ownership in discourse implies that the UN views it as something that it can do, that it ought to do, and that is applicable to all peacebuilding situations.

However, the tendency to view local ownership in this technocratic way leads to a failure to acknowledge both the many normative assumptions that underlie the UN’s particular understanding of local ownership, national points of view on ownership and on how peacebuilding should be conducted, and the aforementioned risks of including local actors with weak capacities and divisive tendencies in peacebuilding. These issues lead to vastly different understandings of what local ownership is or should be in practice. I explore these underlying assumptions and differences between international and national understandings in detail in the next chapter.

\textbf{2.5. Conclusion}

As with development, the actual effects of local ownership in peacebuilding are little known and are, indeed, difficult to observe. Despite the frequent mention of local ownership in peacebuilding discourse, its supposed ability to enhance agreement

\textsuperscript{128} These practices and actors shall be discussed at greater length in Chapters 4-6.
between local and international actors, and its emphasis on self-determination and non-imposition, the relationship between local populations and UN forces and civilian staff is often described as one of contention rather than one of partnership.\textsuperscript{129} Moreover, the discourse of ownership provides little evidence to show conclusively that technical practices such as trainings, consultations, information campaigns, and joint projects create a sense of ownership among national actors, an issue I explore in detail in Chapter 4. Indeed, as can be seen from the discussion in this chapter, national perceptions of ownership are largely left out of the UN’s local ownership discourse. In addition, benefits in terms of legitimacy and sustainability are not easily linked to the increased input and participation of a broad array of national actors.\textsuperscript{130}

As previously mentioned, this may be indicative of a larger gap between policy theory and practice. While local ownership ‘on paper’ appears logically sound, the UN’s failure to definitively show positive effects on legitimacy and sustainability suggests that the depictions of how it works present in discourse may overlook critical elements. More specifically, local ownership may not function as expected because of how the UN understands local ownership, because of how the UN operationalizes local ownership, because of the perceived risks associated with the excessive

\textsuperscript{129}Pietz and von Carlowitz, ‘Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States,’ 6; Reich, ‘“Local Ownership” in Conflict Transformation Projects,’ 3-4; Pouligny, \textit{Peace Operations Seen from Below}; and interview with senior analyst of Congolese politics, Kinshasa, January 2012.

involvement of local actors, or because of different conceptions among UN and national actors of what legitimacy in peacebuilding derives from.

Indeed, while the discourse of local ownership portrays it as something necessarily positive—something that can preserve self-determination and minimize external imposition and thus boost legitimacy and sustainability—and as something eminently implementable, the definitional ambiguities surrounding local ownership as well as the dilemmas relating to who local owners are and when local ownership should begin persist. This may be a reflection of the trepidation, mentioned in Chapter 1, that granting excessive authority to local actors will imperil both the short-term delivery of tangible outputs in peacebuilding as well as the broader goal of liberalizing the post-conflict state. In other words, while local ownership may be a technical fix to deficits of legitimacy and sustainability, it is also perceived as an operational risk to the achievement of peacebuilding goals. Whether local ownership is thus the necessarily ‘good’ policy that it is portrayed to be in discourse is unclear, as shall be shown in the next chapter.

Moreover, as mentioned, because of the technical way in which ownership is portrayed in discourse, the rhetoric of local ownership fails to take into account the normative preconceptions that frame both the UN’s understandings of it—as well as its subsequent operationalizations of it—and national points of view on local ownership. This failure to examine the deeper normative frameworks that shape and delimit UN and national understandings of local ownership mean that the ‘commonsensical’ causal relationships described in discourse may not hold in practice. According to Mosse, this is indicative of a greater gap between ‘policy models of all kinds and the practices they are supposed to generate’—in this case,

whether local ownership is practical or beneficial in practice, even if is good policy ‘in theory.’

In the next chapter, I turn to an examination of these normative underpinnings of ownership, examining how the UN’s understanding of what ownership should be in practice reflects its deeper understanding of peacebuilding. I show how this stands in stark contrast to national views of peacebuilding and ownership and reinforces the perception on the part of the UN that local ownership entails risks to peacebuilding and the achievement of its goals, resulting in a deeply restrictive understanding of local ownership on the part of the UN, which contrasts sharply with the discourse discussed in this chapter. Ultimately, the ideas that inform the UN’s understandings of ownership reveal a preoccupation with the realization of its operational goals—as opposed to its supposed more normative benefits of preserving self-determination and minimizing external imposition touted in discourse—and may thus partly explain why ownership does not deliver in practice what it is expected to in theory.
CHAPTER 3
Understandings of Local Ownership

3.1. Introduction

As described in the previous chapter, much of the current rhetoric of local ownership invoked by international peacebuilders portrays it as something technocratic—that is, ownership is considered an instrument of peacebuilding and implies a set of technical practices. As a technical tool, ownership is expected to deliver a number of benefits to peacebuilding—most notably to render it more legitimate and sustainable by preserving self-determination and mitigating external imposition on the post-conflict state. However, this technical view neglects the powerful normative ideas behind the concept, ideas that define the different ways in which different actors understand it in practice and that define the goals that different actors have in peacebuilding. Indeed, it is through an examination of these normative underpinnings that it becomes clear that international and national actors have two very different understandings of what peacebuilding is for and about, and consequently, of what local ownership in peacebuilding should entail. Most importantly, the normative framework for UN understandings of local ownership reveals how the UN implicitly limits and constrains local ownership conceptually to fit with its operational goals—in this case, the liberalization of the post-conflict state and the establishment of democratic political structures—which it feels will be imperiled by the excessive inclusion of local actors in peacebuilding.

Broadly speaking, international actors understand ownership to mean the adoption by national actors of a vision of post-conflict order that conforms to international standards of liberal democratic governance and human rights, which are thought to be critical ingredients for lasting stability. The main role for national actors is assisting in the implementation and operationalization of that vision, rather than in
the development of the vision in the first place. National actors describe ownership very differently. They generally understand ownership to entail the development and articulation of a post-conflict vision nationally, with international actors only playing an enabling role in implementation consisting primarily of material and financial support, in effect reversing their roles as envisioned by international actors. This version of ownership makes reference to international standards and norms only incidentally, and is instead situated firmly in national norms, culture, history, and aspirations.

These two overarching definitions of ownership reflect a deeper divergence between different understandings of what the peacebuilding project is ultimately for and about. Accordingly, in order to dissect understandings, operationalizations, and implications for peacebuilding of ownership, it is necessary to first examine the deeper beliefs they reflect. Two competing understandings of peacebuilding are relevant here: liberal peacebuilding and indigenous or communitarian peacebuilding.¹ The division between these different understandings should not be exaggerated. National actors sometimes share the views of international actors and vice versa, and, even where disagreement persists, national and international actors often can and do comprehend the thinking of the other. Nevertheless, these two broad conceptions of

peacebuilding do largely divide national actors from international ones, and, ultimately, reveal very different understandings of ownership.

Most importantly, out of these differing understandings of ownership, two critical contradictions emerge. First, while, as mentioned, the UN’s discourse portrays local ownership as able to render peacebuilding more legitimate by promoting self-determination through ongoing consensus building, its particular understanding of ownership in fact restricts self-determination and deepens external imposition in peace operations. Second, while the UN also believes ownership to render peacebuilding more sustainable by ‘indigenizing’ it—that is, making it based upon and responsive to national culture, norms, values, and history—its understanding of ownership entails a belief, implicit or explicit, that indigenous practices and structures are normatively questionable and contributed to the outbreak of conflict in the first place, and therefore must be replaced. Accordingly, any benefits to legitimacy and sustainability assumed to result from ownership’s ability to protect self-determination or render peacebuilding more indigenous appear to be cancelled out by the UN’s own restrictive conceptualization of ownership.

More broadly, the UN’s particular understanding of local ownership implies that its goals may not simply be the preservation of self-determination and the minimization of external imposition, but also the realization of a different, more operational interest, namely the establishment of liberal democratic political structures and practices, which in turn are thought to boost stability and consolidate peace. In other words, the UN shapes, adjusts, and constrains the broad discourse of local ownership that we saw in the previous chapter to fit with this operational objective, because it perceives local ownership as envisioned in discourse to put it at risk.
3.2. Liberal Peacebuilding

As mentioned in Chapter 2, since the end of the Cold War, liberal peacebuilding has come to be the dominant paradigm for the UN’s post-conflict interventions, reflecting a belief that democracy, economic liberalization, human rights, and rule of law are the surest way of making and maintaining peace. Because of their purported peacemaking capabilities, these elements have come to constitute a set of norms and standards that are thought to exist at the global level and therefore it is appropriate and desirable that they should be applied in all contexts, particularly in post-conflict states where they are lacking. According to Richmond, liberal peacebuilding assumes the existence of ‘broad universal norms that enable, legitimate, and provide objectives for [multi-dimensional] interventions.’

While the promotion of democracy and capitalism are not new phenomena, the end of the Cold War led many to believe that liberalism had prevailed over other ideologies of political order and boosted faith in the ability of liberal democracy to create and safeguard peace, stability, and prosperity. To some, this constituted a

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4 Richmond, ‘UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus,’ 90.
natural and inevitable historical evolution, and it was thus natural that liberal thinking should inform the surge in peacebuilding operations that took place at that time.\textsuperscript{5}

The main actors that promote such liberal norms and standards are Western industrialized states in the global North, international organizations, including the UN, and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank.\textsuperscript{6} Such actors view their own peace and prosperity as stemming largely from their adherence to these standards, and their dominance within organizations that engage in peace operations like the UN has enabled them to advocate for a liberal approach to post-conflict operations.\textsuperscript{7} Indeed, the UN, by far the largest actor in post-conflict peace operations, is one of the foremost upholders of the liberal peacebuilding project—it is an organization that supports and promotes these liberal tenets as a way of fulfilling its mandate of maintaining international peace and security around the world and bringing an end to ‘the scourge of war.’\textsuperscript{8} Accordingly, the UN regularly prescribes the installation of democratic institutions, the holding of free and fair elections, the construction of transparent and inclusive judicial systems, economic liberalism, and strict respect for human rights in countries emerging from conflict.\textsuperscript{9} In other words,


\textsuperscript{7} Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?’, 5.


\textsuperscript{9} Importantly, this occurs despite the fact that the UN is not made up solely or even primarily of liberal democracies. Yet it is Western liberal market democracies that dominate the peacekeeping activities of the UN and even those powerful illiberal states that do have an influence on these activities, namely China and Russia, usually choose not to spend their political capital on resisting liberal post-conflict peace operations unless they directly bear upon their interests. Moreover, the two latter
these ‘ingredients’ are considered to constitute a universal ‘recipe’ for successful peacebuilding.

The intellectual underpinnings of this liberal approach to post-conflict peacebuilding lie in democratic peace theory, which holds that democratic states are unlikely to fight one another.10 While this theory is primarily about external relations between states, similar thinking informs theories of internal peace and stability, which has given rise to liberal peace theory, the national variant of democratic peace theory.11 Not only are liberal democratic political and economic systems considered a way of assimilating a country into a global community of peaceful states, they are also considered a way of enfranchising domestic populations, holding leaders accountable, and thus contributing to internal harmony. In other words, installing liberal democratic political and economic systems is seen as a way of preventing future conflict in war-torn states. In this way, liberal peacebuilding is both about creating a state that complies internally with ‘universal’ norms and standards of

countries have to date contributed far less financially to the UN’s peacekeeping operations than the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (in 2011-2012, the latter four countries together contributed over 50% of the assessed peacekeeping budget while Russia and China together contributed under 6%. See United Nations, A/64/220 (2009)). Some predict that the latter two countries will increasingly take an interest in the UN’s peacekeeping operations, but it remains to be seen if and how their increased participation will change the practice of peacekeeping. See Mac Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance*, 7, and Thierry Tardy, ‘Peace Operations: The Fragile Consensus,’ in *SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

10 Democratic peace theory has its earliest origins in the writings of Kant, and in particular his *Perpetual Peace*, in which he argues that world peace is possible when states internally respect the human rights of their citizens as well as those of foreigners and when they are externally organized into a cooperative league of nations, ideas that were subsequently taken up by liberalists like Woodrow Wilson and others. For some of the main arguments on democratic peace theory, see Michael Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), and Michael W. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’ (Parts I and II), *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983) and no. 4 (Autumn 1983).

governance considered key to peace and stability and bringing that state into an economically and politically interdependent union of democracies that do not fight each other.\textsuperscript{12}

This is of course an oversimplification: even the most prosperous and stable democracies have disputes with each other—often over issues such as trade or international law. In addition, many analysts point out that while democracies may enjoy a ‘separate peace’ with one another,\textsuperscript{13} they do go to war against non-liberal or ‘rogue’ states, and these same analysts maintain that belief in democracy’s palliative powers is not based on empirical evidence but instead on ‘hope and assumption.’\textsuperscript{14} Yet even if the conviction that rebuilding a post-conflict state in accordance with ‘global’ norms of democracy and human rights and bringing it into a globalized capitalist economy will prevent a return to war and contribute to international peace and security rests upon unquestioned assumptions, it remains strong among peacebuilding actors, including the UN, and thus shapes its approach to


\textsuperscript{13} Michael W. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics Revisited,’ in \textit{Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge} edited by Charles W. Kegley (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 86.

Indeed, as can be seen in UN documents such as the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi Report), the ultimate goal of peacebuilding is no longer simply to create stability, it is to establish democracy, because doing so is thought to build and reinforce long-lasting peace, as opposed to just temporary stabilization.\(^{16}\) UN peace operations thus represent an ‘attempt to bring war-shattered states into conformity with the international system’s prevailing standards of domestic governance’ as a way of ensuring stability.\(^{17}\) Peacebuilding, in this line of thinking, is linked to global notions of governance, development, and security and not to the local politics, norms, or preferences of countries affected by conflict, and it is a universal concept, not a particularistic or case-specific one.\(^{18}\)

While liberal peacebuilding does generally emphasize that certain standards and principles are global and should therefore be applied universally, it is important to note that there are different forms of the liberal peace and it is not a monolithic concept. Mac Ginty asserts that varieties of liberal peacebuilding range from more ‘persuasive’ forms, as seen in Northern Ireland, to more ‘coercive’ forms, as seen in

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\(^{15}\) While a full discussion of the motivations for this embrace of liberal norms in peacebuilding is outside of the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that for many, the liberal approach to peacebuilding has become a kind of accepted wisdom and is subject to a certain degree of mental inertia. UN staff often take the benefits of liberal peacebuilding as givens because the alternative—the establishment of dictatorships or other forms of repressive governance in post-conflict states by the UN—is inconceivable and unacceptable. As a result they do not subject liberal peacebuilding to any rigorous questioning or demand empirical evidence of its effectiveness, nor is their support for it necessarily based on a deliberate embrace of the theory behind it. However, as mentioned, the important point for this study is that the liberalization of the post-conflict state has come to constitute one of the key objectives of UN peace operations, and, as shall be shown, it has a direct effect on UN understandings of local ownership.


\(^{18}\) Lidén, ‘What is the Ethics of Peacebuilding?’, 2.
Afghanistan. Richmond conceptualizes the various liberal ‘peaces’ as lying along an axis running from hyper-conservative to conservative to orthodox to emancipatory. Nevertheless, there are certain elements common to almost all varieties of liberal peacebuilding, including the main states and organizations promoting liberal peacebuilding mentioned above, the liberal rhetoric they employ, and certain policy prescriptions, that make it the hegemonic form of peacebuilding today.

Most importantly, the post-Cold War liberal underpinnings of this paradigm of peacebuilding justify and legitimate an ever-increasing intrusiveness into the affairs of other states, which conflicts with the discursive emphasis on non-imposition and self-determination. More specifically, in the context of peacebuilding, liberalism rejects relativist approaches to post-conflict reconstruction, instead viewing liberal norms and standards of governance as applying equally to all. In other words, if democracy, rule of law, capitalism, and human rights are universal values and systems that lead to stability and enhance the consolidation of peace in all contexts, it then follows that there is almost a moral obligation and at least a firm justification to...

23 Women’s participation in Afghan politics following the US-led campaign to oust the Taliban in 2001 is a good example of this. While Afghanistan has traditionally been a patriarchal society, the United States, the UN, and other powerful liberal Western actors involved in the war pressed for the adoption of quotas for women in political institutions. As a result, two women were appointed ministers in the interim government and three were appointed to the constitutional Loya Jirga. In addition, once the new Afghan constitution was approved in January 2004, it established a 25% quota for women in the lower house of parliament and a 17% quota in the Senate, again thanks to pressure from Western liberal actors. Afghan women themselves were divided over the issue of quotas, with some considering them unviable and risky. See Mona Lena Krook, ‘Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide,’ *Gender and Politics* 2, no. 3 (2006).
promote them where they are absent, regardless of the implications of this for self-
determination.24

The impetus to rebuild post-conflict states in this liberal democratic image is
made more urgent by the fact that international actors frequently view the absence of
liberal democratic structures and systems as one of the root causes of conflict in the
first place.25 The repression, exclusionary and personalized politics, corruption, unfair
economic policies, and lack of respect for human rights often associated with illiberal
and undemocratic states are viewed as leading directly to the poverty and political
malaise that embolden rebel movements, make states prey for arms trafficking and
criminality, and trigger organized and disorganized violence, ultimately leading to
civil war and state breakdown.26 Indeed, that liberal peacebuilding has become widely

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24 Richmond, ‘Conclusion,’ 355, and Richmond, ‘UN Peace Operations and the
Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus,’ 94. Liberalism itself does not contain any
inherent link to universalism (see Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland, ‘Liberalism,’
of peacebuilding, the central tenets of liberalism that are promoted are considered key
to sustainable peace and therefore applicable everywhere. Many UN documents attest
to this view. For example, In Larger Freedom calls democracy ‘a universal value’
(38). See also Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Democratization, and United Nations,
Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. In this
vein, Rao has argued that the resurgence in liberal cosmopolitan ideas after the end of
the Cold War helped to justify an increasing intrusion into the affairs of Third World
states by powerful Western states and institutions in order to establish liberal political
and economic systems. Rahul Rao, Third World Protest: Between Home and the
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Hurrell calls this dynamic ‘coercive
solidarism,’ in which a select group of powerful states define and promote their
normative agenda as ‘universal.’ ‘Society and Anarchy in the 1990s,’ 31. See also
Right to Democratic Governance,’ American Journal of International Law 86, no. 1
(January 1992).
26 This relates to the ‘greed vs. grievance’ debate about the causes of civil war. Some
argue that it is political disenfranchisement or repression, often based upon ethnicity,
religion, or geography—grievance—that prompts groups to fight, while others assert
that it is material poverty and lack of economic opportunity—greed—that triggers
conflict. See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War,’
Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004); Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The
accepted and largely unquestioned may to an extent be a reflection of the deeply-held belief that autocracy, dictatorship, and other repressive forms of governance lead to conflict. It follows then that indigenous political orders in conflict states should not be allowed to persist and must be replaced by something different, something more conducive to peaceful state-society relations. Liberal democratic political and economic systems, with their supposed track record of success, are a logical choice. The UN’s *Agenda for Democratization* notes that there is an ‘emerging consensus on democracy and its practical importance’ because it ‘contributes to preserving peace and security’ by ‘minimizing the risk that differences or disputes will erupt into armed conflict or confrontation.’

Establishing democratic polities is thus not only a way of boosting the consolidation of peace after civil war, but also a way of minimizing the risk of a return to conflict, presupposed to exist in ‘illiberal’ war-torn states.

However, the problem with this approach, this ‘assumption that democracy is best for all’ is that it fails to take into account contextual specificities and the will of the population of the target countries, and thus the appropriateness of liberal models.

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28 Importantly, the perceived link between repressive or undemocratic domestic governance systems and state breakdown and conflict implies that the latter are the result purely of internal weaknesses, and that internal conflict is rarely or never triggered by international or regional events and issues, which is likely to be an oversimplification. This perception has consequences for the range of solutions that is considered: if the causes of conflict are thought to be internal, then the establishment of liberal political systems within states is an appropriate solution; however, if the causes of conflict lie outside the state in question, or are a combination of internal and external issues, then a solution that focuses entirely on domestic governance is likely to be insufficient. International actors, however, usually frame conflicts in domestic terms—perhaps erroneously—looking for causes—and therefore solutions—that are internal.
for particular societies. In short, the liberal approach to peacebuilding prescribes a one-size-fits-all solution for post-conflict states, which has come under increasing criticism.

3.2.1. Critiques of Liberal Peacebuilding

Critiques of liberal peacebuilding can be divided into two broad categories: those that address the effectiveness of liberal peacebuilding and those that question its ideological premises. The first set of criticisms revolves around the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding ‘on the ground.’ Despite the lofty rhetoric surrounding liberal peacebuilding regarding its universal and non-discriminatory nature and its ability to secure enduring peace and prosperity, liberal peacebuilding operations have performed relatively poorly. While of course definitions of success in post-conflict reconstruction vary wildly and few would dispute the fact that international interventions have, in many instances, helped to put a stop to large-scale organized violence and save countless lives, they have nevertheless failed to establish thriving multi-party democracies and market economies in most countries, and thus have

31 Definitions of success can range from a minimal ‘negative peace’—the absence of violence—to a ‘positive peace’ that entails the existence of a degree of indigenous capacity for the maintenance of stability, and implies a certain amount of reconstruction, reconciliation, and justice. See Charles T. Call, ‘Knowing Peace When You See It: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success,’ *Civil Wars* 10, no. 2 (June 2008); Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, 6-8; and Craig Cohen, ‘Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,’ Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 1, United States Institute of Peace, 2006.
failed to meet their own stated objectives.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, while recent international interventions may have reduced the level of violence, whether their explicitly liberal features are the reason for this remains unproven, and there is little empirical evidence showing a causal relationship between the liberal peacebuilding and stability. Further criticisms in this vein point to the high financial cost of liberal peacebuilding, particularly where long-term commitments are necessary to realize liberal goals.\textsuperscript{33}

Responses to these criticisms tend to be problem-solving and solution-oriented in nature.\textsuperscript{34} Rather than question the liberal peacebuilding paradigm itself, these critics argue within its framework, focusing on listing lessons learned and issuing policy recommendations intended to render the operations more effective and boost quantifiable results without straying from the paradigm’s basic ideological tenets.\textsuperscript{35} Common recommendations include the formulation of clear and strong mandates, early intervention, multi-year funding, increasing coordination among peacebuilding actors, better civil-military integration, altering the sequencing of activities, increased use of coercive measures, and, as discussed in Chapter 2, boosting local consultation and participation.\textsuperscript{36} These analyses of peace operations and the resulting policy prescriptions reveal a faith in the liberal peacebuilding project that remains

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Mac Ginty, \textit{International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance}, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Newman, Paris, and Richmond, ‘Introduction,’ 23.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
fundamentally unchanged. That is, the assumption that a liberal approach to rebuilding war-torn states will lead to long-term stability and prosperity is unchallenged and therefore any sub-optimal performance can be attributed to how peacebuilding is done—not what it is doing—and thus ‘fixed’ by technical tinkering. As Roberts points out, this line of thinking suggests that ‘the solution is not to rethink the approach per se but to develop the existing model until it does succeed.’\footnote{Roberts, ‘Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities,’ 66.}

Moreover, as mentioned, confidence in liberal peacebuilding is not evidence-based, and whether these prescriptions can or do result in better outcomes remains unexplored and unverified.

The second group of criticisms, by contrast, does question the premise of liberal peacebuilding, casting doubt on the values and principles it espouses and their appropriateness in different contexts. There are three main strands within this more ‘critical’ school. First, some note that while consolidated market democracies may enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity, transitions to democracy and capitalism are particularly rocky and dangerous. As Paris has described, democracy is an inherently conflictual ideology, one that prizes the expression of difference—albeit peacefully—at least as much as the identification of common interests. Capitalist economic practices, likewise, encourage competition and deregulation. The introduction of such systems into fragile post-conflict countries, where divisions between groups still run deep and have until recently been expressed through violence rather than dialogue, runs the risk of derailing reconciliation and reigniting fighting.\footnote{Paris, \textit{At War’s End}. Sisk also notes that peace and democracy can be conflictual goals and can work against each other: not only can the pursuit of democracy after war imperil peace, but the pursuit of peace can imperil the quality of democracy. ‘Peacebuilding as Democratization,’ 239. See also Nancy Bermeo, ‘What the Democratization Literature Says – or Doesn’t Say – About Post-War...} These critics point to

\footnote{Roberts, ‘Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities,’ 66.}
\footnote{Paris, \textit{At War’s End}. Sisk also notes that peace and democracy can be conflictual goals and can work against each other: not only can the pursuit of democracy after war imperil peace, but the pursuit of peace can imperil the quality of democracy. ‘Peacebuilding as Democratization,’ 239. See also Nancy Bermeo, ‘What the Democratization Literature Says – or Doesn’t Say – About Post-War...}
the high rate of recidivism among conflict countries and note correlations between flare-ups of violence and the activities of liberal peacebuilders, such as elections.

Second, some critics focus on the lack of cultural and context sensitivity built into the liberal peacebuilding model. Liberal peacebuilding, as described above, considers the values and systems it promotes to be universal and therefore to be applicable everywhere. Critics in this vein take issue with the idea that the main pillars of liberal peacebuilding—democratic governance, free market economics, human rights, and the rule of law—represent a set of global structures, values, and norms, arguing that in fact they represent a specifically Western worldview espoused only by advanced industrialized nations. As such, their imposition on post-conflict countries, which are primarily non-Western, constitutes a thinly veiled form of neo-imperialism in which Western states seek to extend and strengthen their political and economic hegemony and project their worldview farther afield. Duffield alleges that

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Democratization,’ *Global Governance* 9, no. 2 (2003), and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, ‘Democratization and War,’ *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995).


40 Paris, *At War’s End*. Note that this position is not irreconcilable with a liberal one. While, taken to its extreme, critics in this vein would reject democracy and economic liberalism in certain conflict societies as inappropriate, some may simply say that democracy and capitalism are appropriate, just not yet. The Special Representative of the Secretary General for UNTAET, Sergio Vieira de Mello, famously asserted that the only workable model for the UN in East Timor was one of ‘benevolent despotism,’ despite the overarching goal of establishing a democratic state. See Sergio Vieira de Mello, ‘How Not To Run a Country: Lessons for the UN from Kosovo and East Timor,’ unpublished paper, June 2000, 4-5, quoted in Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor,’ 35.

Western liberal interventions ‘have a radical mission to transform societies as a whole, including the attitudes and beliefs of the people within them.’

Such critics rue what they see as a total neglect of context specificity, questioning whether democratic systems are viable or appropriate in situations where they have never existed and where social relations have always been established and managed through different means. Though some lessons can be drawn from one situation and applied to others, the liberal neglect of domestic norms, culture, history, and aspirations can be risky as it allows the introduction of particular structures and institutions into situations where they are inappropriate and incongruent, and thus contributes not to peace and stability but to instability and turmoil. In other words, in contrast to liberal peacebuilding proponents who feel that liberal democratic structures are the key to lasting stability, critics of liberal peacebuilding argue instead that locally-embedded and culturally relevant structures are much more likely to result in sustainable peace and stability.

Similarly, in its emphasis of all things ‘global’ and ‘international,’ liberal peacebuilding ignores the very objects of peace operations themselves—the local population in the target country—an omission that can render peacebuilding illegitimate, irrelevant, and ultimately doomed to fail. On this topic, critics are particularly censorious of the tendency of liberal peacebuilders to interact only with the political and military elite in the host country, ignoring the broader population,

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43 On the importance of context to the success of peacebuilding, see Marenin, ‘Understanding Mission Environments.’ See also Saul, ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in International Law,’ 172.
and they suggest that such ‘top-down’ peacebuilding will fail to address the needs of the most vulnerable while further entrenching those already in power. Most of all, these critics condemn advocates of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm for failing to consider that other systems of organizing society based on indigenous structures and values are even possible (or exist already), and they deride the one-size-fits-all mentality of liberal peacebuilding’s proponents.

Finally, still others question the ability of externally-imposed forms of governance—democratic or not—to take root and endure. As discussed in Chapter 1, there is a deep sense among at least some policymakers as well as academics that externally imposed forms of political, economic, and social order will remain superficial and will fail to take root because they do not ‘come from within.’

Similarly to criticisms based on the cultural insensitivity of liberal peacebuilding, these critics argue that because liberal democratic systems are not produced organically by that country’s culture, history, and values, they do not represent the natural evolution of that society and are therefore unlikely to be relevant or to last. Successful and sustainable change within societies, according to this thinking, is an internal evolutionary process that can at best be affected by external interference, but never initiated or led by others. Accordingly, processes of political, economic, and social change after conflict may be better described as state formation than statebuilding, as the latter implies a role for external actors. Englebert and Tull argue that the role of international actors is only to ‘foster’ state formation, but they make

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45 Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention’.
47 Chopra and Hohe, ‘Participatory Intervention, 292.
48 See Herbst, ‘Let Them Fail.’
clear that the process of change itself is and must remain domestic.\textsuperscript{49} While views on the ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of externally-imposed processes range from extremes in which war-torn states should be left to themselves to more moderate positions in which international intervention can actually help countries on the road to reconciliation and stabilization, nearly all practitioners and analysts feel some normative discomfort with the idea that external actors can bring about legitimate and sustainable internal change.\textsuperscript{50}

These three strands of ideological criticism overlap with one another as well as with the more operational critiques, and some analysts blend them together in their questioning of the liberal peacebuilding model. For them, liberal peacebuilding has been in many ways discredited and seeking alternative models of peacebuilding is necessary.\textsuperscript{51} However, while they raise important points about the need for solutions tailored to the circumstances of particular countries as well as the need to recognize that external actors may have limited influence in domestic contexts, few propose credible and realistic alternatives, instead making overarching but not particularly pragmatic or analytically relevant recommendations, such as regular dialogue to reach agreement on objectives and methods. Indeed, their criticisms remain largely abstract, with few analysts acknowledging that for peacebuilding practitioners, including in particular UN staff, peacebuilding remains firmly embedded in a liberal framework that posits that the liberalization of post-conflict states will guarantee continued stability and peace. While, as mentioned, this perception by practitioners may be based on habit (see note 15, above), it has important implications for their willingness

\textsuperscript{51} See Lidén, ‘Building Peace Between Global and Local Politics,’ 617-619.
to accept alternatives. Similarly, critical peacebuilding scholars assume that local actors will be equally willing to compromise with international peacebuilders, which may not be the case, particularly in post-conflict contexts. In this sense, the critical peacebuilding literature requires a more nuanced view of the perceptions of actual peacebuilding actors at both the individual and institutional level as well as of local actors themselves in order to propose realistic alternatives to liberal peacebuilding. Without recognizing the persistence and ubiquity of the liberal peacebuilding mentality among practitioners, both the study of particular approaches, behaviors, and outcomes and the suggestion of new and creative ways of approaching post-conflict states will be restricted. Indeed, as I discuss in the next section, it is liberal peacebuilding that informs UN staff members’ understanding of local ownership, and it is thus imperative to examine local ownership within that framework.

3.3. UN Understandings of Local Ownership

As discussed in Chapter 2, the basis for the persistent calls for local ownership by the UN is that local ownership of peacebuilding is expected to render it more legitimate and more sustainable by preserving self-determination and minimizing external imposition. It is believed that peacebuilding will be more legitimate because it will be participatory and inclusive and will be based on consent and impartiality, and that it will be more sustainable because it will be rooted in national structures and will help to build the capacity of local actors. However, as mentioned, despite the

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52 This is true not only for critical peacebuilding scholars such as Oliver Richmond and David Chandler, but even those scholars who remain in favor of liberal peacebuilding, such as Roland Paris. Paris proposes a framework of ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ in order to address the poor track record of liberal peacebuilding. However, because the liberal peacebuilding paradigm runs so deep among practitioners, it is unlikely that they will publicly accept any model of intervention in which the values associated with liberal peacebuilding are explicitly put on hold or ‘compromised’ in any way. Paris, *At War’s End.*
debates surrounding many aspects of the liberal peace, UN staff still believe deeply in liberal peacebuilding and value its central tenets—democratic governance, rule of law, human rights, and economic liberalism—for their purported ability to build and sustain peace and stability. Accordingly, their acceptance of indigenous values and practices is limited to those that do not contradict the basic framework of liberal peacebuilding.

This conception of peacebuilding implies a very particular version of local ownership. Local ownership within a liberal framework entails a process whereby local actors adopt a UN-designed template for post-conflict political order, one that is embedded in liberal values that are presumed to generate stability and boost the durability of peace and that are thus appropriate for application in all contexts. Local actors do not set the contours of the post-conflict political space themselves; instead, they are expected to embrace wholesale those set out and sanctioned by the international community. This is more accurately termed appropriation than ownership, as it entails a process in which the ‘object’ to be owned is not itself up for discussion but is instead simply transferred to or taken up by another actor.\(^{53}\)

The UN’s liberal vision of post-conflict peacebuilding varies from operation to operation, but several elements appear in the mandates of nearly all current UN operations around the world as well as those of the past ten years. The ubiquity of these ‘core’ elements in UN multi-dimensional peacebuilding operations suggests that they represent the UN’s overarching vision for post-conflict peacebuilding after civil conflict and, as such, they are what national actors are expected to take ownership

\(^{53}\) It is interesting to note that ownership is most commonly translated into French as appropriation, which highlights precisely this idea of transfer and reinforces the notion that ownership entails the taking up by national actors of a pre-determined set of activities or strategy, rather than a process by which they develop that vision themselves prior to implementation.
of. They include: establishing inclusive political and constitutional processes, with a particular emphasis on boosting the participation of women and other marginalized groups in decision-making; promoting human rights and prosecuting violations, as well as reforming the judiciary to ensure transparent and fair processes; protection of civilians in accordance with international humanitarian standards; restructuring security forces to render them less personalized or ethnically- or geographically-polarized, as well as more disciplined and cohesive; supporting the holding of elections in line with international electoral standards for freedom and fairness (this usually includes the presence of international monitors); and promoting the existence of an independent media and vibrant civil society. Most of these existed in the case of MONUC, whose mandates included the protection of civilians, particularly women, children, and marginalized groups; support for democratic institutions and national and local elections; the promotion of political dialogue and good governance; the strengthening of civil society; the mainstreaming of gender considerations into mission activities and Congolese political activity; and the promotion of human rights and persecution of all violations and abuses. These liberal elements existed alongside more ‘traditional’ peacekeeping duties such as the provision of security; monitoring of ceasefires, disarmament, the withdrawal of foreign combatants, and arms embargos; and the protection of UN personnel and assets.

While the situation in any one country will be unique and entail distinctive challenges and while the mandates of missions shift over time as the situation in the

55 For the mandates of current and past UN operations, see United Nations, ‘Current Peacekeeping Operations’ and ‘Past Peacekeeping Operations.’ See also United Nations, Capstone Doctrine, 41 n. 2.
host country evolves, these liberal elements appear to be non-negotiable. For example, while the UN may accept different constitutional processes, it will always demand that they be inclusive and participatory. While the UN may agree that different countries need different types of military structures, they will always demand that they be civilian controlled. 57 While the UN may agree to different forms of judicial process, it will always demand that they meet international standards for transparency, fairness, and promptness. 58 The UN’s insistence on these liberal features is linked to its conviction that such liberal checks and balances constitute the best route to lasting peace and stability.

This is not to say that the UN ignores local context. On the contrary, UN staff are, as mentioned in Chapter 2, keen to acknowledge the need for cultural sensitivity and awareness of local circumstances and they work tirelessly to understand and adapt to local challenges. But it is only a process of adaptation and not one of rethinking overall strategy and goals. This suggests that UN staff view culture and context as technical elements that can be taught, learned, and adjusted to peacebuilding, rather than as resources that should guide and shape their activities, as described above. Context specificity, then, is a ‘problem’ that can be ‘solved’ by enhancing the skills of

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57 According to Decision No. 2007/11 of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, ‘The objective of a United Nations approach to SSR is effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions operating under civilian control within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.’ United Nations, ‘Decision No. 2007/11 of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee,’ quoted in United Nations, Capstone Doctrine, 42 n. 13.

58 According to the Secretary-General’s Report Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Countries, rule of law and justice activities must ‘be consistent with international human rights norms and standards’ and must comply with ‘the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’ United Nations, S/2004/616, Para. 6.
international peacebuilding practitioners. Cultural sensitivity therefore does not entail any rethinking of overall peacebuilding strategy, and any adjustments made for local circumstances are done within the overall framework of liberal peacebuilding. As one senior MONUC staff member noted, ‘When we talk about ownership, we’re talking about a weak actor without capacities, so what is done is conceptualized a priori by the UN.’

Local ownership thus entails the appropriation or taking over by local actors of a set of post-conflict activities and goals determined largely at the international level in accordance with ‘international’ standards and values, with consideration of the particularities of the country in question and the desires of its citizens only coming after the determination of those activities and goals. As Lederach points out, Western peacebuilding practitioners are guided by ‘the basic assumption that the model [they] use in one setting is sufficiently universal to be used with “adjustments” and “sensitivity” in others’ and they ‘take a high view of transferability of conflict resolution skills and processes.’ The depth of belief in liberal assumptions within the UN thus seriously limits the depth of local ownership: local actors are granted ownership of a pre-determined political path, but are not empowered to play a role in determining that path.

For UN staff, however, this restrictive view of ownership is a necessary consequence of what they view as their responsibility to uphold standards of democratic inclusion, liberal governance, and respect for human rights globally in order to bring an end to the war around the world. In other words, the reluctance to allow a broader version of ownership that accepts national ideas is driven primarily by

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60 Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
an unwillingness to part from the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, because the UN believes that liberal peacebuilding is the best way to make and maintain peace and stability in post-conflict countries. The UN believes that leaving the management of peacebuilding practice to local actors may compromise this goal because local actors are assumed to be illiberal and undemocratic and thus to make choices that are not in line with liberal peacebuilding’s key tenets. Accordingly, the UN is not prepared to accept an all-encompassing version of ownership where local actors are given full agency to determine the course of peacebuilding and the methods of implementation, and the UN instead shapes and constrains local ownership conceptually to correspond to its operational goals. More specifically, the UN limits ownership to what fits with its liberal understanding of peacebuilding in order to achieve the successful stabilization of a country through liberalization.

3.4. Communitarian Peacebuilding

While the numerous criticisms of liberal peacebuilding have not fundamentally altered the UN’s views of peacebuilding and hence of local ownership, they have given rise to an increasing interest in and emphasis on communitarian or indigenous forms of peacebuilding, ones that frame national understandings of local ownership. Communitarian peacebuilding takes a ‘bottom-up’ approach in that it is national actors in the country in question who imagine, develop, and operationalize plans for building peace. These models of peacebuilding emphasize that peace must be rooted in national norms, culture, and history, rather than in any supposedly ‘global’ norms of democracy, human rights, or rule of law, in order to be durable. According to Kenneth Bush, communitarian peacebuilding entails a process that enables ‘indigenous actors [to] identify, develop, and employ the resources necessary
to build a peaceful, just, and prosperous society.'

This vision of peacebuilding makes no direct reference to the canon of liberal values—democracy, capitalism, rule of law, and human rights. These elements only find a place here if they are among the desires and aspirations of the indigenous population. This version of peacebuilding then is distinct from liberal peacebuilding in two key ways: first, it is decidedly not universal, but instead places emphasis on the history, culture, and norms particular to a society as the determinants of its political future; second, it grants agency to national actors not to international ones, assigning the latter to a secondary supporting role.

The intellectual foundation of this view of peacebuilding is communitarianism or particularism, which seeks to ‘deflate the universal pretentions of liberal theory’ and holds that definitions of justice, rights, and social order are socially embedded and thus based upon intersubjective understandings derived from interaction within particular communities. Communitarians argue that one’s obligations to members of one’s own community surpass those to human beings more generally, and some in fact posit that, ‘there are no obligations except where there are close, communal relationships.’ From this point of view, then, value systems

63 The idea of communitarianism was introduced by Michael Sandel in his 1982 book Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and the liberal-communitarian debate that has raged among political philosophers can be said to date from that time. According to Chris Brown, ‘The core communitarian position is that the liberal conception of the individual as a pre-social being, entering into relations with other individuals already more or less fully formed, is mistaken – individuals are always ‘embedded selves’ shaped by their social environment.’ Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, 92.
existing at the global level and viable universal solutions to problems of governance and justice are chimeras. While communitarians do not reject the defense of individual rights that liberal peacebuilders advocate, they do reject the supposition of universality of rights and they assert that the latter ignore the fact that individuals are social beings who exist and are embedded in communities. Accordingly, they argue that different cultures and societies may define and prioritize rights differently and that such differences must be accepted rather than ‘universalized’ away. Not only are communitarian theorists critical of the assumptions of universalism of liberal theorists, but they also deride their failure to look beyond dominant Western views in their definitions and analyses, claiming that they base their supposedly ‘universal’ theories on distinctly ‘particular’—that is, Western—ideas, values, and assumptions.

In the realm of peacebuilding, communitarians scoff at undifferentiated templates for remaking post-conflict states into liberal democratic polities, underscoring that legitimate and sustainable solutions ‘must derive from and resonate with the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and places.’


Externally-designed blueprints that are not based on and responsive to local conditions and history mean the imposition of solutions and structures that may be inappropriate in particular contexts and meaningless, ridiculous, or burdensome in the eyes of local actors, and are therefore unlikely to lead to lasting stability. As Otwin Marenin notes, ‘[t]he salience and importance of democratic governance may have no roots in local cultures.’ Indeed, in contrast to advocates of liberal peacebuilding, advocates of communitarian peacebuilding hold that the surest way to make and maintain peace is to root post-conflict structures in indigenous practices and values—whether liberal or illiberal—rather than in any supposedly universal liberal ones.

Moreover, communitarians decry the fact that liberal peacebuilding, with its fixation on particular models of post-conflict governance and order, misses out on a rich reserve of conflict resolution techniques and local knowledge that lie within domestic populations. As Mac Ginty describes,

Many traditional societies developed and maintained sophisticated mechanisms for non-violent dispute resolution and constructed complex conceptions of peace. These versions of peace were far removed from versions of peace introduced by colonial powers or sponsored by elements of the international community in the contemporary era. Having little conception of state sovereignty, modern bureaucracy, written covenants, formal participation structures and linear, sequential notions of time it is unsurprising that traditional societies found, and still find, Western versions of peace alien.

By failing to take advantage of local knowledge and systems, innovative and appropriate tools for building and maintaining peace may be overlooked, and the entire enterprise of peacebuilding weakened. Communitarian peacebuilding,

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71 James Scott calls the detailed, context-specific knowledge of local actors ‘mētis,’ and he posits that it serves as an indispensable complement to the universal, technical
accordingly, attempts to promote the idea that culture and indigenous traditions and values should be resources for peacekeepers to tap into and urges that these, and not any external methods or values, be the primary guides of peacebuilding strategy.\textsuperscript{72} Lederach calls this approach ‘elicitive,’ and he contrasts it with what he calls the ‘prescriptive’ approach: ‘the prescriptive approach [is] based on transferring conflict resolution technology from one setting to another, and the elicitive approach [is] based on building from cultural resources in a given setting.’\textsuperscript{73}

The \textit{gacaca} courts in post-genocide Rwanda are one example communitarians invoke of the positive contribution that indigenous mechanisms can make to peacebuilding. These traditional courts try accused genocide perpetrators openly in the community, with a council of elders presiding over the proceedings. They emphasize dialogue between perpetrators and victims and apology by the former to the latter.\textsuperscript{74} Proponents of communitarian peacebuilding note that these traditional courts enabled Rwanda to deal with a massive backlog of cases after the 1994 genocide that would have taken decades to deal with using Western judicial mechanisms, while also giving the process a level of local legitimacy and relevance that would not have been generated by the use of only Western methods.\textsuperscript{75} Moreover, they point out that by utilizing a mechanism that was rooted in local traditions and


\textsuperscript{73} Lederach, \textit{Preparing for Peace}, 7.


conducted by members of the concerned community, they were able not only to further the cause of justice but also to aid reconciliation and reintegration between former opponents, thus leading to more durable peace.

The Barza inter-communitaire in eastern DRC is another such example. Literally meaning ‘council of elders,’ the Barza was founded in 1998 in North Kivu province and brought together three representatives from each of the province’s nine main ethnic groups. Disputants presented their arguments to the Barza, whose members then discussed the case and attempted to reconcile the parties through informal mechanisms. Independent of the state authorities and ethnically inclusive, the Barza belonged to the tradition of village councils in the area, and this historical relevance as well as its inclusiveness gave the Barza a high degree of legitimacy.

In addition, proponents of communitarian peacebuilding stress that agency must lie with national actors. Decision-making power and control for the entire peacebuilding process, from determining how the post-conflict order should look to implementation, must remain in national, not international hands for legitimate and sustainable peace to take hold. Indeed, many critics of liberal peacebuilding cite a lack of local ownership as part of the reason for its failure and they argue for ‘the right of societies to make their own choices, regardless of the degree to which such choices correspond with emerging international norms.’ Indeed, according to this view, national actors should play a much more prominent role—if not the leading role—in shaping peacebuilding processes. In other words, local actors should fully

76 These are the Hunde, Hutu, Kano, Kumu, Nande, Nyanga, Tembo, Tutsi, and Twa.
78 Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?’, 6.
‘own’ peacebuilding, as their ownership will ensure that external structures that are irrelevant or incompatible with norms and history are not imposed on the country and instead that they are able to determine their own political and social destiny, thus leading to stability and the longer-term consolidation of peace.

3.4.1. Critiques of Communitarian Peacebuilding

As academics and policy-makers have taken an increasing interest in indigenous forms of peacebuilding, it has also been exposed to increasing criticism. There are three main strands of criticism of communitarian peacebuilding. First, while many admit that there are benefits to including indigenous forms of peacemaking and conflict resolution into international efforts, in reality, these methods are little practiced by international peacebuilders and thus little is known about their actual effects. Can international actors legitimately practice them? How can they be incorporated into and combined with international practices? These questions remain largely unanswered, and little empirical evidence exists to show that indigenous peacebuilding is more effective than liberal peacebuilding.\(^79\)

Second, many caution against a tendency to ‘romanticize’ the local (and concurrently ‘demonize’ the international).\(^80\) Indigenous or local approaches to peacebuilding are often considered to be more authentic, natural, and good than international ones.\(^81\) Yet this conception ignores the fact that local actors are as capable of injustice and violence as they are of reconciliation and peace. While local societies may indeed have developed sophisticated non-Western methods of dispute

\(^80\) Lidén, Mac Ginty, and Richmond, ‘Introduction,’ 594.
management and resolution, those local methods failed to prevent the outbreak of conflict that triggered the intervention of the international community in the first place and thus their efficacy and validity can and should be questioned.

Moreover, while local actors may have detailed local knowledge that international actors lack, they may also have partisan agendas and animosity and bias towards particular groups and may thus manipulate their informational advantage for exclusionary purposes. As Mac Ginty points out, ‘[m]any indigenous and traditional approaches to peacemaking, dispute resolution, and reconciliation are conservative and reinforce the position of powerholders. Women, minorities, and the young are often excluded, and an emphasis is placed on conformity and a numbing of activism, criticism, and radical change.’ 82 In addition, conflict will inevitably alter and distort the societal and political landscape, and thus the applicability of indigenous methods must be re-evaluated in this new context—if particular conditions are not present, which may well be the case after the trauma of civil war, these methods may be ineffective, weak, or divisive. 83 Furthermore, there may be multiple views of appropriate indigenous methods and local actors may themselves be divided over the best approach to take, an issue that most discussions of indigenous conflict resolution leave out. Indeed, leaving peacebuilding in the hands of local actors does not mean that they will take it up, and disputes over the appropriate way to address conflicts, reconcile differences, and penalize perpetrators may occur.

In Congo, as mentioned in Chapter 1, civil society was formally included in the peace negotiations in South Africa in 2002, along with the government and rebel groups, in the hope that it could contribute to reconciliation and political stabilization through its detailed local knowledge, cultural awareness, and sub-national representativeness. However, civil society quickly became politicized, as membership in it was viewed as providing access to elite politics and the (material) benefits attached to them. While the strength of this phenomenon varied geographically throughout the country, in some areas, civil society gradually ceased to be an organization intended to represent the population’s views, act as watchdog over the government, and lobby on behalf of marginalized groups to the political establishment, and instead became a politicized entity whose members used their positions as stepping stones to political office. In South Kivu province, for example, two successive presidents of the South Kivu Civil Society, Didace Kaningini and Emmanuel Rugarubura, were appointed to important provincial government posts: Vice Governor of South Kivu and Provincial Minister of the Interior, Decentralization, Customary Affairs, and Security respectively.

Similarly, the Barza inter-communautaire eventually broke down (in 2004), due to the increasing links between Barza members and local politicians. This not only fuelled perceptions that the Barza was being manipulated by and for the latter, but also contributed to increasing tension between North Kivu’s various ethnic groups at

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84 Note that in DR Congo, references to ‘civil society’ usually mean ‘the Civil Society,’ which is an umbrella organization that comprises a majority of national and local NGOs and civil society groups. See societecivile.cd: Le Portail de la société civile en République Démocratique du Congo.’
85 See Belloni, ‘Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transitions.’
86 Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
the time, thus leading many to conclude that the Barza was fuelling conflict as much as or more than it was hindering it.\textsuperscript{88} Advocates of communitarian peacebuilding often fail to account for such problems, instead assuming both that the will for peacebuilding exists uniformly among national actors and that where domestic actors do take up peacebuilding, the indigenous structures they use will continue to function as intended over time without weakening or morphing.

Third, an emphasis on indigenous peacebuilding has the potential to put international peacebuilders into a position where they are forced to violate their own principles. While democracy and economic liberalism may not align with the traditional values and practices of some societies, so too may certain indigenous practices and principles go against those of the international community. For example, Rwanda’s \textit{gacaca} courts, discussed above, were criticized by Amnesty International for not meeting minimum human rights standards regarding trial fairness and presumption of innocence.\textsuperscript{89} Indeed, it can be argued that just as much as it is ‘wrong’ to force democracy onto societies where it is not appropriate or desired, it is ‘wrong’ to force liberal international actors to engage in illiberal activities. At the very least, donors are highly unlikely to be willing to disburse copious amounts of money in support of activities they perceive to be normatively questionable.\textsuperscript{90} This is not to say that indigenous approaches to peacebuilding have no value whatsoever and should \textit{a priori} be omitted from the post-conflict toolkit, but a sober analysis of the

\textsuperscript{88} Clark ‘Ethnicity, Leadership and Conflict Mediation in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,’ and Tull, \textit{The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa}.  
\textsuperscript{90} See, for example, James K. Boyce, ‘Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Constraints,’ \textit{Development and Change} 33, no. 5 (2002), and James K. Boyce and Manual Pastor, Jr., ‘Aid for Peace: Can International Financial Institutions Help Prevent Conflict?’, \textit{World Policy Journal} 15, no. 2 (Summer 1998).
appropriateness of indigenous peacebuilding methods should be undertaken alongside one of the appropriateness of liberal peacebuilding methods.

Most broadly, advocates of communitarian peacebuilding, like critical peacebuilding scholars, fail to adequately acknowledge that international peacebuilding practitioners, particularly in institutions like the UN, still remain committed to liberal peacebuilding, even if they do so out of habit rather than a critical appraisal of its superiority. Accordingly, the communitarian push towards indigenous methods of peacebuilding and conflict management are unlikely to meet with much more than superficial enthusiasm and are more likely to incur skepticism by practitioners. Their actual implementation is even less likely. In other words, communitarian peacebuilding scholarship requires a greater empirical basis in order to propose credible alternatives to liberal peacebuilding.

3.5. Local Understandings of Local Ownership

Despite these debates, just as UN staff remain deeply devoted to liberal peacebuilding’s values and standards in spite of its numerous critics, so do national actors remain committed to a more communitarian version of peacebuilding, which rejects overarching ‘global’ norms in favor of political structures that are embedded in and responsive to local social and political context, history, and traditions, in spite of its critics. And just as liberal peacebuilding frames the UN’s understanding of local ownership, so does communitarian peacebuilding inform local actors’ understanding of ownership, and accordingly they conceive of local ownership very differently than UN staff do.

In local understandings of local ownership, national actors determine their own vision of peacebuilding and post-war order, and they control the process of
realizing that vision, only receiving assistance from the international community in its implementation—assistance that is primarily material, financial, and sometimes technical. Ownership in a communitarian context is thus substantively much broader and deeper than ownership in a liberal context, where it is limited to what the UN and its dominant members and donors will accept, and in a sense, then, it fits much more closely with ownership as depicted in the discourse discussed in Chapter 2. According to communitarian understandings of ownership, national actors should own the entirety of the process of peacebuilding from its earliest stages, and should not simply appropriate something that is externally designed and sanctioned. Local actors determine the type of post-conflict polity they aim to create and, while local actors will no doubt be cognizant of international norms and expectations, how well their vision fits with global liberal norms is not a top consideration. Local actors may choose liberal democratic forms of political organization if that is what they desire, but they may also choose less liberal ones than the UN or powerful Western states would hope for, and the latter must support that choice. In this sense, it is the international that must appropriate the national in communitarian understandings of ownership, as this, rather than the reverse, is considered to be the surest way of achieving stability in the short term and durable peace in the longer term. Indeed, in this conception, ownership is not something that is negotiable at all. Peacebuilding is by definition never in the hands of international actors, nor is it ever ‘on the market’ or ‘up for grabs.’ Unlike UN conceptions, which imply a process of appropriation, national conceptions of ownership are entirely national, with no presumption that any ‘international ownership’ ever exists.

Seen in this light, the UN’s insistence on liberal peacebuilding is an imposition on local actors. While they note that they have no disagreements with the
UN’s principles *per se*, they emphasize that the UN’s importing them into post-conflict states constitutes an imposition because it denies them the right to make their own choices about the future of their country, stressing that because of this, they will not lead to lasting peace. National actors assert that they cannot own what they do not know or understand and what is imposed from without, and thus ownership based on external plans and visions is not ownership at all. They insist, instead, that for genuine ownership to exist, national actors must set the parameters of not only the process and goals of peacebuilding, as described above, but also the role delegated to the UN.91

On the latter, national actors are very clear: the role of the UN is to provide material, financial, and technical assistance to national actors in the realization of their nationally-owned vision for peace.92 National actors claim that while they have the ability to conceive and develop their own ideas for the shape of their polity and the process to get there, what they are lacking are the financial and material resources, and in some cases the technical expertise, to implement those ideas. The UN, by contrast, boasts ample means and technical know-how, and national actors expressed a sense not only of expectation but of entitlement to those financial, material, and technical resources. Specifically, they asserted that UN assistance should consist of *inter alia* the provision of security; the reconstruction of roads and other infrastructure; financing and providing technical input for the conduct of elections; and the undertaking of development projects.93 By taking on these resource-intensive, technically complex projects for which national actors tend to be ill equipped after conflict, international actors free up national actors to focus on political organization,

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91 Interviews with Congolese politicians, academics, and civil society actors, Kinshasa, March 2011.
92 Interviews with Congolese politicians, academics, and civil society actors, Kinshasa, March 2011.
93 Interviews with Congolese politicians, academics, and civil society actors, Kinshasa, March 2011.
the development of political programs, and reconciliation, with a view to establishing a legitimate and sustainable peace. This division of labor in the post-conflict space is, to national actors, the right and equitable one. Ownership is, they claim, something entirely national, and they assert that it is they who must manage their own peacebuilding process and political development—but with UN resources.

Indeed, national actors tend to bristle at any imposition that they feel impinges on their ability to determine their own political path. For example, in DRC, the UN wrote the initial draft constitution for the country during the transition, and included in it a clause requiring a second round of presidential elections if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first round. This was clearly a liberal-minded move to promote democratic development and to keep electoral fraud and misconduct in check not once, but twice. Yet a number of Congolese claimed that they never wanted a second round, that it was contrary to their way of conducting politics, and that they were forced to accept it by the UN and other powerful Western donors.94 The Congolese likewise rue what they see as the UN’s involvement in areas that are beyond its mandate, such as union disputes and International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments.95 They argue that not only are these domestic matters that are irrelevant to the UN, but also that the UN’s way of approaching them and addressing them are different than their own. Nevertheless, they assert that they are often obliged to give

94 Interviews with Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, March 2011. It should be noted that prior to the second post-transition elections in 2011, President Joseph Kabila amended the constitution to remove this clause. This is discussed at greater length in Chapter 7.

95 An arrest warrant was issued for Bosco ‘Terminator’ Ntaganda, chief of staff for the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), a Rwanda-supported armed political militia founded by Laurent Nkunda in 2006, by the International Criminal Court in 2006 (initially under seal, the warrant was unsealed in 2008). The Congolese government, until recently, refused to arrest Ntaganda, claiming that he is essential to the peace process in eastern DRC. Interview with Congolese politician, Kinshasa, March 2011.
in to UN pressure because of their own weakness and lack of resources and thus are
prevented from determining for themselves how to respond to or manage such
situations.  

Indeed, national actors note that their disorganization and financial weakness
after conflict put them ‘at the mercy’ of the UN and its liberal agenda. For UN actors,
as noted, this simply makes it easier to push through a liberal program, which they see
as critical to achieving and maintaining stability after conflict. For national actors, by
contrast, their weakness means that they are unable to counter the imposition of goals
and practices that do not reflect their interests, aspirations, or traditions. As one
Congolese politician noted, ‘MONUC…must take into account the interests of the
population, not just the interests of the West and the international community. It
should not impose its vision without considering the population’s will, aspirations,
cultural values, and social values.’ Some felt that this imposition was so strong that

96 Interviews with Congolese politician, Kinshasa, March 2011. The Comité
Internationale pour l’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT), though not formally
a UN body (its meetings were held at MONUC headquarters and chaired by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)), provides another good
example of the Congolese dislike of intrusive international mechanisms. The CIAT
was a diplomatic body composed of 15 states and international organizations and its
role was to guide and support the transitional government; mediate between parties;
take decisions when there was no consensus; and use its moral authority to denounce
actions counter to the cause of peace. The CIAT took its role seriously, and was
forceful in its actions, recommendations, and denunciations. It was disbanded with the
conclusion of the first elections in 2006, and, while some admitted that it may have
been necessary, nearly all members of the Congolese political elite as well as private
citizens rejoiced at its termination, calling it a clear violation of Congolese
sovereignty accepted only during a period of weakness and transition. See Meike de
Goede and Chris van der Borgh, ‘A Role for Diplomats in Postwar Transitions,’
*frican Security* 1, no. 2 (2008); Célestin Tshimamanda Tukala, ‘La Communauté
internationale et le processus de paix en Afrique centrale. Analyse de cas: Le rôle du
CIAT en RD Congo,’ unpublished paper, prepared for Fondation Paul Ango Ela
workshop, Yaoundé, Cameroon, November 17-19, 2009; and interviews with
Congolese politicians, academics, and civil society actors and with senior
MONUC/MONUSCO officials, Kinshasa, February-March 2011.

97 Interview with Congolese politician, Kinshasa, March 2011.
they characterized the UN as a ‘dictatorship’ and its treatment of national actors as ‘tutelage.’

The latter, of course, are extreme views, and not all Congolese viewed their relationship with MONUC in such hostile terms. Indeed, many acknowledged that the mission contributed significantly to improved security conditions in much of the country and most admitted that the UN is still desperately needed to keep the fragile east of the country from reverting back to full-scale war. Nevertheless, there is a general sense that the UN imposes its vision on the country and that national actors are given very little say in the process of peacebuilding. They argued strenuously that they should be able to determine the laws, institutions, and ideologies that will constitute the Congolese state and that these should fit with their culture and history, while also expressing a strong sense of entitlement to UN resources with which to put in place those elements. They bemoaned the fact that their weakness and disorganization after conflict enabled the UN to impose its liberal ways on them. They stressed that as they grew stronger over the life of the mission, they were more able to resist the UN’s attempts to impose its vision of political organization on them, but they accused the UN of trying to keep them weak and divided in order to be able to maintain its liberal project.

National conceptions of ownership, then, entail a process that is national from start to finish, in which local culture, history, and traditions play crucial roles in shaping how peace is made and how the post-conflict polity is constructed. This further implies that international actors only provide assistance to what is otherwise a wholly national process. This view of local ownership, as mentioned, arguably

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98 Interviews with Congolese politician and academic, Kinshasa, March 2011.
99 Interviews with Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, March 2011.
100 Interviews with Congolese politicians and academics, Kinshasa, March 2011.
coincides to a greater degree with the broad and inclusive version of local ownership that comes through in discourse.

3.6. Hybrid Models of Peacebuilding: A Middle Way?

The tension between communitarian and liberal understandings of peacebuilding—and hence between national and international understandings of local ownership—leaves both analysts and practitioners with important questions about the conduct of post-conflict peacebuilding: which approach should be prioritized? What kinds of compromises can be reached? Can the liberal democratic objectives of interveners and the cultural values of host countries be reconciled? If so, how? Though liberal and communitarian models of peacebuilding may reflect what are mutually exclusive stances in theory, are they wholly incompatible or inconsistent with one another in practice? Indeed, as Kristoffer Lidén points out, ‘[a]n essential puzzle for the ethics of liberal peacebuilding is how to reconcile the liberal premises of the current international peacebuilding consensus with a respect for the cultural integrity of the host-countries.’

Because of these issues, many academics have begun positing hybrid models of peacebuilding that aim to promote local conceptions of peace and development while also incorporating certain liberal international standards. For example, Barnett and Zürcher propose a model of peacebuilding in which the existence of conflicting goals and practices of peacebuilders, state elites, and sub-national elites

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101 See Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 8.
102 Lidén, ‘What is the Ethics of Peacebuilding?’, 10.
most usually results in ‘compromised peacebuilding.’ According to this model, all parties involved in peacebuilding have the ability to resist the will of the others, and peacebuilding thus becomes an iterative process in which goals and practices are negotiated. ‘Compromised peacebuilding’ represents a stable equilibrium outcome in that all parties have sacrificed some of their preferences and interests, but those sacrifices are small enough to prevent defection. Importantly, Barnett and Zürcher’s model suggests that fully liberal peacebuilding has very minimal chances of success, as the international community’s liberal project will always run up against alternative local views, wishes, and practices.¹⁰⁴

Mac Ginty reaches a similar conclusion, positing that hybridity emerges because of, on the one hand, the ability of national actors to resist or subvert the liberal peace as dictated by international interveners and, on the other hand, the inability or unwillingness of international actors to recognize the contradictions and inefficiencies of its liberal approach in practice. Ultimately, he argues, neither side is able to unilaterally impose its will on the other and actual practice is more often than not a hybrid between liberal and communitarian versions of peace.¹⁰⁵

Focusing on the case of Cambodia, Roberts notes that a hybrid polity emerged following the UN’s liberal intervention, one that combined elements of democracy with indigenous political organization and allowed for the persistence of particular non-liberal types of political behavior. Like Barnett and Zürcher, he suggests that this was more accident than intention, a result of the inevitable clash between communitarian and liberal understandings of peace and peacebuilding and the

conflicting goals and interests of national and international actors. He proposes that international actors acknowledge this state of affairs rather than holding rigidly to liberalism and he urges making room for indigenous methods and practices and the pursuit of only those liberal tenets that are most likely to fit with indigenous ones. He recommends, ‘smaller-scale intervention, less ideologically motivated; multiparty elections; external acceptance, not tolerance, of traditional practices that may be at odds with Western expectations and interests; and acceptance and support for indigenous development which may also not be “democratic”.’

Most scholars note that these hybrid forms of peacebuilding come about as on-the-spot compromises rather than as intentional plans to integrate peacebuilding approaches, and they recommend that peacebuilding practitioners make hybridity and integration a more overt objective. Richmond, for one, argues that to achieve what he calls a ‘justpeace,’ negotiation between international and national actors that leads to ‘an outcome that is both locally “authentic” and consistent with the most rigorous international norms pertaining to needs, rights, and institutions’ must occur. In fact, international interveners are not ignorant of the liberal-communitarian divide and they do, at least rhetorically, try to combine the two. UN policy documents, as described in the previous chapter, are replete with references to cultural sensitivity, the importance of local contexts, and the potential benefits of tapping into local knowledge resources. However, these references to local values and culture often neglect or gloss over instances where societies are divided over basic values or where multiple value systems coexist, something that is often the case in war-torn countries.

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107 Richmond, ‘Conclusion,’ 365.
Ultimately, despite the existence of hybrid outcomes on the ground and the lip service paid to different perspectives both nationally and between international and national perspectives, UN staff remain committed to liberal principles and local actors to communitarian ones, and it is these two diverging points of view that inform the different understandings of local ownership of international and local actors.

Indeed, in practice, the ideal-type of negotiation that Richmond describes is unlikely. Some UN staff members did acknowledge that the UN brings specific ideas for how to build peace to all post-conflict situations, and they recognized that local actors may have their own ideas for the post-conflict structure of their state and society, ideas that may clash with the UN’s vision. They asserted that, in such cases, a good-faith negotiation takes place between the UN and national representatives.

However, UN staff went on to qualify these negotiations in strongly circumscribed terms. First, nearly all interviewees emphasized that they can only take place in line with UN principles and in accordance with what the UN is willing to accept. They asserted that ownership cannot be taken to mean blind support or giving national actors a veto over what the UN does. As one senior MONUSCO official noted, ‘the UN cannot abandon its views and principles in working with national actors.’ Second, some expressed a belief that indigenous forms of governance are inadequate to maintain peace and contributed to the outbreak of conflict in the first place, largely because they are undemocratic, nontransparent, highly personalized,

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109 See also Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories*, 130.
110 Interviews with senior DPKO officials, UN agency official, New York, November 2009.
111 Interview with senior MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
and exclusionary—in other words, illiberal.\footnote{Interviews with DPA, DPKO, UN, and PBSO officials, New York, November 2009.} As mentioned earlier, this reveals a conviction on the part of UN staff that national visions of peace and order are usually illiberal and, as the UN believes that liberal principles are critical to stability, such national visions cannot be taken into account in negotiations with national actors over the form of peacebuilding.

Finally, others asserted that when the UN first arrives after conflict, national partners tend to be weak or divided, and thus do not usually present a unified vision for peacebuilding.\footnote{Interview with UN agency official, New York, November 2009.} This means that the UN is largely able to promote its own version of peacebuilding without reference to national wishes. While the UN will often hold consultations to determine national desires and expectations, the disorganization of national actors means that the UN can usually ensure that these discussions nearly always take a liberal starting point.\footnote{The Joint Assessment Mission and Post-Conflict Need Assessments conducted jointly by the UN and the World Bank in Sudan are good examples of this attempt to build a shared vision of post-conflict recovery and development, but some outside observers called these ‘fake negotiations,’ holding that the UN does not really budge from the fundamentals of its liberal vision. Interview with senior peacekeeping analyst, New York, December 2009.} These statements reveal that the UN allows any negotiation that takes place with national actors to occur at the margins only: it is \textit{a priori} framed in liberal terms and is substantively restricted to liberal peacebuilding’s parameters.\footnote{Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2009 and senior DPKO official, New York, January 2012.} In other words, only the logistics but not the politics of liberal peacebuilding are negotiable.

Similarly, local actors allege that their more expansive and indigenous version of ownership rarely exists. The UN is, they claim, unwilling to let go of its liberal democratic agenda, and like UN staff, national actors describe any negotiation or
consultation that takes place over the substance of peacebuilding as highly circumscribed. Most decisions over the shape and conduct of a peacebuilding operation, they claim, are foregone conclusions, and no dialogue of real substance is allowed to take place. They complain that the UN does not often listen to them and that when it does take the time to hear their views, it does not take them into account, only paying lip service to their ideas. They note that it is impossible to own something if one is not privy to the discussions that give rise to it and if it does not respond to one’s needs and wishes. Instead, through consultations and meetings, national actors insist that they are coopted into accepting the decisions of the UN under pressure, but they are clear that this is not ownership, it is imposition.

The aforementioned ‘justpeace,’ and by extension any stable form of hybrid peace, both of which require a genuine negotiation between national and international actors, thus seem unlikely to materialize, and in many ways an unrealistic prescription for peacebuilding. This highlights again that the theoretical discussions about models of peacebuilding remain at least partly divorced from the empirics of of how peacebuilding practitioners understand their work and of how willing they may be to alter their current methods, and as such hybrid models seem unable to posit viable models for how peacebuilding should evolve. Indeed, and most importantly, this discussion shows again that the UN’s approach to local ownership is to implicitly constrain and limit it so that it does not fundamentally contradict its liberal peacebuilding objectives.

\[116\] Interviews with Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, March 2011.
3.7. Implications of UN Understandings of Local Ownership for Self-Determination

As mentioned, one of the underlying reasons for a belief that local ownership is necessary for the legitimacy and sustainability of peacebuilding is that it protects the right to self-determination and mitigates its violation in situations of deep external intrusion into the internal political processes of a society. However, the two very different understandings of local ownership on the part of UN and national actors have strong implications for self-determination in situations of post-conflict peacebuilding. The limited conception of ownership held by UN actors seriously affects the degree of self-determination that can be said to exist in post-conflict countries where there is a UN peace operation. In this understanding of ownership, it is the UN that determines and introduces a plan for post-conflict peace, not local actors. Though in principle a peace agreement will have been signed between conflicting parties that outlines broadly how the post-conflict state will look and what tasks the mission will undertake, in practice, the activities and goals of a UN peace operation are largely decided upon in New York. While room is made for the particularities of each situation—for example, whether a DDR component is necessary—the overall liberal bent of a mission’s mandate remains. In addition, as described, any negotiation that occurs between national and international actors is largely over the form, but not the substance, of the operation.

This limited understanding of ownership, which necessarily restricts the degree of self-determination of national actors, implies that the UN’s goals may not actually be exclusively to protect the norms of self-determination and non-imposition in peacebuilding but something different—in this case, the liberalization of the post-

117 Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
conflict state. In other words, the UN may perceive a trade-off between local ownership and the achievement of its goals: while local ownership as broadly conceived in discourse may help to protect self-determination and minimize imposition, in practice, the UN perceives it to risk the liberalization of the post-conflict state, which in turn is deemed critical to stability and peace and is therefore a key goal of UN peace operations.

Accordingly, the idea that nationals of a particular country should imagine and develop a vision for post-conflict political order themselves—an idea that takes center stage in the discourse of local ownership—is conditional: a national vision can only be accepted as long as it conforms to the liberal tenets such as democracy and respect for human rights that the UN aims to instill in order to maintain both domestic and international peace. As Timothy Donais points out, ‘[s]elf-determination in peacebuilding contexts… is not an unlimited field of possibility, but rather a right balanced by responsibilities to respect and uphold international norms.’¹¹⁸ However, as mentioned, the UN tends to assume that national actors will make illiberal choices after conflict—that they will engage in exclusionary politics, undertake corrupt and opaque economic practices, and ignore or violate human rights. Accordingly, it becomes incumbent upon the UN to push its liberal agenda in order to prevent illiberalism and its perceived association with further conflict. Put another way, post-conflict countries are perhaps assumed not to be ‘ready’ to exercise the right to self-determination, because they may not do so in a way that fits with the UN’s liberal standards and will thus risk a return to war. Indeed, as Chandler argues, today’s international discourse alleges that the main source of the state weakness that

¹¹⁸ Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition?’, 6.
precipitates conflict is ‘that of bad governance and poor institutional choices at the level of elites and societies.’\textsuperscript{119} He goes on,

It is important to note…that these institutional frameworks are often understood to be freely chosen: they are “the parameters that people impose upon themselves”. The autonomy of the state and society is held to pose a deep and underlying problem, in that self-determined decisions create historical path-dependencies whereby institutional problems at both formal and informal levels are reproduced and have deep social and historical roots.\textsuperscript{120}

In other words, international actors view the choices post-conflict countries made before conflict as directly contributing to conflict itself and accordingly believe that if they are left to make choices on their own after conflict, they are likely to choose the same illiberal and undemocratic political, economic, and social structures that they have previously, thus contributing to the perpetuation, rather than the resolution, of conflict.\textsuperscript{121} In this way, self-determination on the part of such societies is perceived as a conflict driver, and is thus a ‘problem’ that the UN must address. For that reason, there is an increasing consensus among international peacebuilders ‘that states and societies…cannot be left to develop their own solutions to social, economic and political questions.’\textsuperscript{122}

By contrast, in communitarian understandings of ownership, self-determination is respected, as local actors do not simply appropriate something that already exists but design and build something themselves according to their own wishes and values. Self-determination here is an open concept, one in which people


\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121} Chandler notes that this represents a massive reversal in thinking within international relations—whereas the autonomy of states used to be the primary organizing principle of the international system, it is now, in many cases, a ‘problem’ to be ‘fixed.’ See \textit{International Statebuilding}, especially 43-64.

have the option to choose any form of government, liberal or illiberal, which cannot be sanctioned or rejected by the broader international community. In contrast to liberal peacebuilding, which holds that liberal state structures are critical to stability, communitarian peacebuilding holds that this fuller self-determination will contribute to the stabilization of the country and the consolidation of peace—and thus to the legitimacy and sustainability of peacebuilding—because it ensures that governance is based on relevant and locally meaningful values and practices. This conception of self-determination fits more closely with accepted legal definitions, as well as those—ironically—put forth by the UN itself, which reject all foreign or alien domination or interference.123

The UN’s more circumscribed version of self-determination, as implied by its limited understanding of ownership, is problematic for three reasons. First, as described in Chapter 1, the UN has repeatedly reaffirmed and promoted the principle of self-determination. Second, and for our purposes more importantly, the UN believes local ownership to in fact promote self-determination, which in turn is expected to boost the mission’s legitimacy. In this regard, then, local ownership introduces an important contradiction: in discourse, the UN portrays local ownership as protecting self-determination and reducing imposition, but the UN’s particular conception of local ownership actually restricts it and instead increases the degree of imposition. Unless national actors happen to believe in exactly the liberal model that the UN espouses, self-determination will be curtailed by the UN’s commitment to working within a liberal framework.

Third, and closely related, the UN believes that ownership will boost the sustainability of peacebuilding by making it more indigenous—that is rooted in national structures, practices, norms, and values determined by the population of the country in question. Yet the UN’s understanding of ownership, as described, includes a presumption that national structures must be replaced both because they are illiberal and because they are assumed to be at the root of the problems that triggered conflict to begin with. Accordingly, any benefit assumed to derive from ownership’s ability to make peacebuilding more ‘indigenous’ is similarly cancelled out by its particular ‘liberal’ understanding of ownership and its corollary limited understanding of self-determination.

The UN thus appears to limit its conception of local ownership in such a way that it can continue to pursue its operational goal of liberalizing the post-conflict state. In other words, because local ownership may entail the ‘illiberalization’ of post-conflict countries if that is what local actors choose, the UN constrains local ownership conceptually in order to protect its liberal objectives, which it views as key to the making and sustaining of peace. Local ownership as envisioned in discourse is thus adjusted and molded to fit with the UN’s goals. In other words, ownership in discourse is thought to protect self-determination and increase indigenousness, but the way the UN understands what ownership should be in practice actually circumscribes self-determination and limits it only to what fits with a liberal conception of peacebuilding, because the latter is considered critical to the achievement of the UN’s operational goals.
3.8. Conclusion

The UN advocates local ownership in peacebuilding because it is thought to boost legitimacy and sustainability by preserving the self-determination of the post-conflict state and reducing the degree of external imposition on it. As described in Chapter 2, the discourse of ownership portrays it as something technical and as an approach to peacebuilding that entails a set of specific tasks that can lead to these positive effects. However, as shown in this chapter, this technical view of ownership neglects the normative assumptions that inform understandings of ownership. Specifically, UN staff understand ownership within the framework of liberal peacebuilding and the promotion of ‘universal’ liberal values, which in turn are thought to contribute to peace and stability, while national actors understand ownership within the framework of communitarianism and the indigenous control of peacebuilding, which insist upon the prioritization of local values and structures as a basis for the sustainability of peace. It is thus clear that, first, ownership is not a purely technical set of practices but is instead a deeply contested concept, and second, except in rare circumstances, national and international actors do not have the same views of peacebuilding or of their respective roles within it.

These different broad understandings of peacebuilding by UN and national actors contribute to radically different understandings of ownership. For the former, ownership entails a process of appropriation by national actors of a vision for post-conflict peace and a set of activities designed to achieve it that are liberal in nature. These goals and activities are presumed to be universal and thus appropriate for application everywhere, particularly in post-conflict states where illiberal pre-conflict structures are viewed as causes of the initial conflict in the first place and as potential causes of renewed conflict.
For national actors, however, ownership does not imply their simply adopting a blueprint for peacebuilding laid out by the international community. For them, ownership entails a primarily national process of generating and implementing a program for peace, with the UN’s only role being the provision of material and technical resources for that implementation. Their vision may or may not coincide with international ideals and practices, thus negating the idea that the UN’s liberal peacebuilding project is universal in nature.

These different conceptions of local ownership in peacebuilding have serious implications for self-determination in post-conflict settings where a UN mission is present. While national understandings of ownership imply ‘full’ self-determination, in which external actors are barred from playing a role in the determination of a country’s political future, UN understandings of ownership imply a restricted version of self-determination, in which national actors only appropriate what is otherwise an externally-determined political course.

These different degrees of self-determination in the post-conflict space introduce two important contradictions. First, on the one hand, the UN’s discourse of local ownership in peacebuilding includes an expectation that it will preserve self-determination and lessen the violation of this principle that is implied by international intrusion into internal political processes; on the other hand, the UN’s understanding of ownership necessarily limits self-determination and deepens external imposition. This further suggests that any preservation of self-determination expected to materialize thanks to local ownership is in fact negated by the UN’s own conception of local ownership. In turn, this implies that the UN may be prioritizing the fulfillment of operational goals—here the liberalization of the post-conflict state—
above its more normative goal, described in Chapter 1, of compliance with its institutional norms.

Second, the divergent understandings of ownership and the respective roles of national and UN actors in post-conflict peacebuilding also have implications for the degree of ‘indigenousness’ of peacebuilding. While national understandings suggest that peacebuilding should be entirely indigenous, with agency lying in the hands of national actors and only material input from the UN, UN understandings restrict the room for indigenous practices and goals out of fear that they will be illiberal and thus heighten the risk of conflict recidivism. Again, this reveals a contradiction with regards to ownership in peacebuilding: while the UN advocates ownership partly on the grounds that it will make peacebuilding more indigenous, locally relevant, and thus sustainable, it simultaneously proscribes the allowable degree of indigenousness in order to ensure that liberal structures are established. Again, the fact that the UN’s understanding of ownership restricts the allowable degree of indigenousness suggests that it may be sidelining normative goals in favor of operational ones, because it fears that local ownership of peacebuilding will imperil its ability to achieve them.

These two contradictions, which are revealed by the foregoing examination of differing conceptions of ownership in peacebuilding, suggest that expectations of how local ownership functions as described in the UN’s local ownership rhetoric may not hold in practice. That is, local ownership may not render peacebuilding more legitimate or sustainable because it in fact deepens the violation of self-determination and heightens the external imposition entailed by international peacebuilding operations. Ultimately, this implies that the UN forgoes, or at least limits the scope for, the supposed benefits of legitimacy and sustainability associated with local ownership by constraining the concept to fit with other objectives—namely, the
liberalization of the post-conflict state in line with ‘universal’ liberal standards. As shall be shown in the next two chapters, the UN’s operationalization of local ownership also restricts self-determination and deepens imposition in the interests of achieving operational goals.
CHAPTER 4
Operationalizations of Local Ownership: Practices

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter examined how the UN understands local ownership, and how its understanding differs significantly from that of local actors. More specifically, it showed how UN staff conceive of peacebuilding within a liberal framework and national actors conceive of it within a communitarian framework. Accordingly, the UN’s conception of ownership clearly belies a commitment to liberal tenets, including democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalism, and implies that national ownership must be ownership of those liberal elements. As was shown, this understanding of ownership reveals contradictions between what local ownership in peacebuilding is expected to deliver and what in practice it may deliver because the UN’s limited understanding of local ownership necessarily narrows the scope for self-determination and can deepen external imposition on the host country. Most importantly, it showed that this difference between the rhetoric and reality of local ownership—that is, between what it is thought to achieve and what it can or does achieve—are due at least in part to the fact that the UN constrains ownership conceptually in such a way that it fits with its operational objectives—namely, the liberalization of the post-conflict state.

The next two chapters turn from understandings of local ownership to operationalizations of local ownership. In other words, how does the UN translate its rhetorical commitment to the principle of ownership—however understood—into actual peacebuilding practice? What concrete actions does it take to realize local ownership and to create and maintain a sense of ownership on the part of national actors? Do the ways in which the UN operationalizes local ownership in peacebuilding contribute to enhanced legitimacy and sustainability by protecting self-
determination, as they are expected to? Or are the ways in which the UN operationalizes ownership, like the ways in which it understands it, also circumscribed in order to promote the realization of particular operational goals?

There are two central components to operationalization: practices and actors. In this chapter I address the first of these, examining what specific actions the UN takes to build and maintain ownership on the ground, before I turn to actors in the next chapter. As discussed in Chapter 2, ownership is thought of as a technocratic practice, something that can be concretely ‘achieved’ through particular tasks by international technical experts. This chapter shows, first, how this technocratic approach to ownership results in the UN’s engaging in a variety of activities with no cohesive or comprehensive strategy guiding the overall direction of these efforts. The UN’s operationalization of ownership is thus generally ad hoc and pays little attention to how such practices actually contribute to securing local ownership, preserving self-determination, minimizing imposition, and thus enhancing legitimacy and sustainability.

Second and more importantly, this chapter shows how these practices tend to be circumscribed to varying degrees and thus reveal a reluctance on the part of the UN to actually relinquish ownership of peacebuilding activities to local actors. In other words, the way in which UN staff undertake practices of ownership restricts the actual amount of agency given to local actors and thus the degree of ownership that can be said to be created by these activities, again in contrast to the discourse of local ownership, which advocates broad consultation and direct participation in all phases of peacebuilding. There are two primary reasons for this. First, UN staff believe, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, that excessive involvement by local actors will slow or impede peacebuilding activities and thus imperil the achievement of results; second,
they believe, as discussed in Chapter 3, that local actors are likely to behave in illiberal ways that will jeopardize the UN’s liberal peacebuilding project. In other words, as with understandings of local ownership, the UN implicitly constrains the concept operationally in order to mitigate the perceived risks to two key operational objectives—the establishment of liberal systems and structures of governance and the delivery of concrete results in the short term. However, in so doing, it limits self-determination and heightens its imposition on the host country, and thus limits or even negates the positive effect that local ownership can have on legitimacy and sustainability, in sharp contrast to the discourse of ownership.

4.2. Practices of Local Ownership

Despite its frequent rhetorical invocation of local ownership, the expectations of benefits attached to it, and the general conviction that technical practices will ‘create’ local ownership, the UN has not operationalized the concept in any coherent way. Just as there exists no single definition within the UN or even within DPKO of what local ownership is, there is also no set of concrete guidelines about how UN staff should actualize local ownership in peace operations.¹ As mentioned, countless UN reports, guidelines, and best practices documents tout the importance of local ownership in rendering peacebuilding legitimate and sustainable, but they are remarkably silent on how ownership should be ‘done,’ and nowhere is there a detailed practical guide to making local ownership and its purported benefits a reality. Most efforts to create and maintain local ownership on the ground tend to be ad hoc and incoherent, with different staff employing different methods at different times. Indeed, more and more analyses are beginning to recognize that the weakness or

¹ Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’, 344.
outright failure of efforts to translate rhetoric into action is one of the biggest
problems with local ownership in peacebuilding.²

As discussed in Chapter 2, the discourse of local ownership portrays it in
technocratic terms—that is, local ownership can be concretely realized through the
undertaking of certain tasks by international technical experts. These tasks include
public information campaigns, consultations, meetings, and trainings. These activities
are thought to ‘create’ ownership among local actors by maintaining and extending
consent and preserving impartiality through the inclusion of a broad array of local
actors; rendering peacebuilding more indigenous by raising the level of cultural and
context awareness of UN staff and accounting for national points of view through
consultation and dialogue; and building the capacity of local actors through
participation, consultation, and training.

However, these tasks remain imprecisely defined and do not necessarily imply
a particular sequence of actions, nor are any of them targeted exclusively or explicitly
at building local ownership. Indeed, when asked how they translated their
commitment to local ownership into actual practice, most UN staff members replied
vaguely that they made sure that national actors were somehow ‘involved,’ variously
holding meetings with national actors; training them and building their capacity; and
ensuring that a constant ‘information flow’ to local actors kept them informed and
aware of mission activities.³ In addition, staff did not mention any dedicated attempts
to monitor or evaluate whether these practices actually created ownership—that is,

² Anna K. Jarstad and Louise Olsson, ‘Hybrid Peace Ownership in Afghanistan:
International Perspectives of Who Owns What and When,’ Global Governance 18
(2012), and Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’
³ Interviews with senior DPKO, PBSO, and UN agency officials, New York,
November 2009.
they did not describe any attempts to measure or gauge the perceptions of local actors on their level of ownership following the undertaking of these activities.

Overall, these responses implied neither a coordinated, regular, or progressive effort over time nor any particular heed to whether and how these tasks might actually lead to ownership and thus enhanced legitimacy and sustainability. Meetings with local actors, for example, may imply frank and open dialogues between UN staff and national decision-makers or opinion leaders to jointly decide upon objectives; roundtable discussions with civil society organizations in remote areas to understand local needs and wishes; one-on-one consultations in which UN staff gather information about the security or political situation from national sources; or largely superficial encounters in which UN staff hear the perspectives of local actors but do not subsequently adjust their goals and behavior based on those perspectives. How UN staff can or should respond to national requests, criticisms, or suggestions that arise in such meetings, how often meetings should take place, and how ownership can be progressively nurtured during these exchanges remain unspecified.

Operational flexibility—where a general goal is determined but the means to achieve it are left up to those in charge of implementation—can be useful, as it enables UN staff to take decisions based on specific and evolving circumstances on the ground and gives them the latitude and discretion to adjust practices and limit or expand their use based on their effectiveness at any given point in time. However, where such flexibility exists due to a lack of any dedicated attempt to translate a

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policy goal into policy practice or to a lack of any systematic effort to achieve coordination among different mission actors, it will more likely lead to chaotic, contradictory, half-hearted, or insubstantial efforts on the ground.

As we saw in Chapter 2, such incoherence and diversity of practices afflict local ownership in development, leading to contradictory assessments of whether ownership is indeed central to successful development efforts. The same is true of peacebuilding. The staff of different missions, sections within missions, and locations within missions ‘implement’ local ownership in different ways. For example, staff in the Public Information Division of a mission may focus on radio campaigns designed to raise awareness of the mission’s mandate and activities, with a view to securing buy-in and goodwill through greater understanding.5 Staff in the Political Affairs Division, by contrast, may focus instead on meetings and dialogue with mid- to senior-level political and military actors, in an effort to hear their views, achieve consensus on the goals of the mission, and identify risks to security and political stability.6 The Civil Affairs and Human Rights Divisions are more likely to stay distant from political actors, and engage instead with civil society and underrepresented or vulnerable groups, such as women, youth, particular occupational groups, or members of geographically remote communities, running education and awareness campaigns on humanitarian and social issues.7 While these different

sections of a mission are aware of what others are doing, they rarely coordinate their actions with a view specifically to building ownership, and these efforts thus often take place in parallel rather than in conjunction with one another. Indeed, the Results-Based Budgets (RBBs) for MONUC (see Chapter 1, note 56) measure numbers of meetings with national actors on particular topics but makes no attempt to assess the content of such consultations or their broader effects.\(^8\)

Despite the variability in how staff members attempt to build or maintain ownership, with few exceptions the activities that UN staff described were all circumscribed in some way and thus constituted largely communicative or symbolic activities, with little real agency attached to them. UN staff suggested that local actors could and should somehow be involved in the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of UN activities through, for example, joint assessments, but most stopped short of suggesting there was a leadership role for them in implementation, citing a lack of capacity after war.\(^9\) Moreover, few allowed for local actors to have any major role in the taking of key decisions, usually describing decision-making processes as ones in which local actors were brought ‘on board’ with what the UN wanted and had already, in effect, decided upon.\(^10\) On the military side, UN staff were even more blunt: the UN may consult but primarily to inform, and there is little extensive discussion or joint brainstorming with national counterparts, except occasionally at very senior levels.\(^11\)

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\(^8\) For financial performance reports on MONUC’s RBBs, see United Nations, ‘ACABQ Reports.’


\(^10\) Interviews with senior UN and DPKO officials and staff of Permanent Mission to UN, New York, December 2010.

\(^11\) Interviews with senior DPKO and UN military officials, New York, November 2009 and December 2010. The main exception to this is joint operations involving potential combat, but these tend to be rare in UN peace operations, with most joint
In addition, UN staff emphasized the importance of public information efforts, such as information campaigns describing the UN’s role and activities and sensitizations on particular issues such as women’s rights, but failed to specify how local actors could provide substantive feedback or commentary to the UN, implying that the information flow was often unidirectional and entailed the UN’s describing its goals and activities without reference to the views of national actors. In addition, efforts like sensitizations tend to be singular events, with little ongoing dialogue or follow-up. In Congo, one local academic recalled a visit by the UN’s Radio Okapi to a university in Kinshasa in February 2011 to meet with students and faculty. He noted that this was the first time such a visit had occurred in the nine years since Radio Okapi’s founding and decried the fact that no real debate between students and UN staff was allowed to take place during the session.12

Similarly, the trainings undertaken by UN staff also took place primarily in the form of one-off events rather than as a continuous and progressive activity that might build up capacity over time. For example, the Child Protection Division in MONUC regularly trained Congolese police officers on legal requirements regarding the separation of minors from the police forces and how to address crimes involving minors either as perpetrators or victims. Yet, again, these trainings, as well as those undertaken by other divisions in the mission, usually took place as one-off, issue-specific events, with little regular follow-up. Local actors reiterated this fact with regret, noting that trainings, roundtables, and other interactions with the UN often took place once only and they were rarely given any further training or informed of any channels through which they could ask questions, learn more, or provide

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military operations focusing primarily on patrols and monitoring of the security situation.

12 Interview with Congolese academic, Kinshasa, March 2011.
feedback. The mission also briefly undertook trainings of the integrated brigades of the Congolese military, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), between 2006 and 2008. The training sessions lasted three months and were mostly conducted by the MONUC military, with civilian staff providing trainings on issues such as human rights and civil-military relations. Again, these latter trainings were conducted only once, with no follow-up or refresher training at a later date. Some staff suggested that rigorous on-going training was actually not really something that peacekeepers should undertake, because it falls more under the purview of development actors such as UNDP.

Because of the restricted nature of these activities and the fact that most of them entail either one-way communication efforts or symbolic inclusion in singular events, in many instances, the ownership given to many local actors can at most be characterized as ‘token’ ownership. That is, local actors may be invited to attend meetings or sensitizations or to participate in one-off trainings and workshops organized by the mission, but because there is little coordination within the UN about how to involve local actors, because these interactions are usually only singular events, and because information tends to flow from the UN to local actors but not vice versa, local actors are rarely given any genuine decision-making power or the ability to review or adjust decisions already taken, nor are they usually given any major role in subsequent implementation. Such infrequent, irregular, and ad hoc interactions in which local actors are consulted but not given any real influence suggest that the UN

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13 Interview with Congolese academic, Kinshasa, March 2011.
14 United Nations, S/RES/1756, S/RES/1856, S/RES/1906, and interview with DPKO military official, New York, November 2009. These trainings were undertaken by UN brigades in eastern DRC but were stopped at the end of 2008 in the context of joint operations against the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in the region and, despite plans to renew them later, did not restart.
15 Interviews with DPKO and UN agency officials, New York, November 2009 and December 2010.
may be loath to actually turn over ownership to local actors in the broad way depicted in discourse.

Not surprisingly, local actors expressed a strong feeling that they lacked any ownership of the peacebuilding process. In Congo, nearly all those interviewed said they feel ‘no sense of ownership,’\textsuperscript{16} with only a few citing particular issue- or program-specific exceptions, such as the \textit{Commissions Techniques Conjointes} (Joint Technical Commissions) which were charged with evaluating progress on stabilization activities in the east of the country beginning in 2009.\textsuperscript{17} However, these joint commissions as well as other such structures came only after the mission had been present in Congo for a decade, and thus were viewed by many cynically as ‘too little too late.’ As one civil society actor noted, ‘there is partnership on paper, but is it real partnership? Not really.’\textsuperscript{18} Others expressed the view that the amount of ownership they felt they had had actually decreased over the course of the mission. One politician asserted that while he never got the sense that actions taken by MONUC were intended to give him any ownership, after the elections in 2006, he felt that MONUC dealt with him less and less, and ‘if anything, [he] felt less ownership and interaction with the mission’s goals and activities.’\textsuperscript{19} For local actors, this lack of

\textsuperscript{16} Interviews with Congolese politicians and civil society actors, Kinshasa, March 2011.
\textsuperscript{17} These commissions were originally co-chaired by both government and MONUC officials in each concerned province (North Kivu, South Kivu, parts of Province Orientale (including Ituri District), Maniema, and northern Katanga), but subsequently were chaired only by Congolese government officials, with MONUC playing a smaller supporting and advisory role. These stabilization efforts in eastern DRC will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 5. Interviews with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official and Congolese politician, Kinshasa, March 2011. See also, United Nations Development Programme, ‘Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility for the Democratic Republic of Congo: Terms of Reference,’ 5 November 2009, mdtf.undp.org/document/download/2543.
\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Congolese civil society actor, Kinshasa, March 2011.
\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Congolese politician, London, June 2011.
ownership was closely linked to a sense of being imposed upon by the UN and not being able to make their own political choices.\textsuperscript{20}

Clearly, the ‘token ownership’ engendered by the UN’s practices then not only fails to create a sense of genuine ownership among national actors, but it also fails to reinforce the degree of self-determination that local actors have, and instead magnifies the degree of UN imposition on the country. More specifically, if local actors are only allowed to play a superficial role in activities designed and led by the UN, then peacebuilding will remain a largely UN-determined process. At the same time, given the minimal power of local actors to affect, adjust, or review the practices of the UN, peacebuilding is likely to be perceived as largely imposed from without, rather than based on national aspirations and traditions.

4.3. Perceived Risks of Local Ownership

UN staff maintained that the difficulties in implementing ownership—and hence the restrictive way in which they do so—are due largely to structural and contextual factors. They argued that the scope for ownership in any given situation varied by country and was dependent on societal structure, the existing level of development and education, the degree of unity among local actors, and the level of security. For example, citing Afghanistan, one DPKO staff member noted that because of the tribal structure of society in many areas, consultations had to be undertaken in a specific way that did not necessarily involve all relevant stakeholders, implying that ownership was limited in its reach.\textsuperscript{21} Others noted that higher pre-war levels of socio-economic development and education among the population, as in Kosovo for example, could make consultations and trainings easier to undertake and

\textsuperscript{20} Interviews with Congolese politician and civil society actor, Kinshasa, March 2011.
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
more likely to be successful. By contrast, in a place like Congo, where the country was physically devastated by the war, the levels of development and education are low, and the government is weak and its institutions largely dysfunctional, consultations and trainings were usually more problematic and at higher risk of failure, and thus could not be implemented as widely. Comparing the two, one staff member noted that at least ‘in Kosovo everybody knows how to read,’ whereas in Congo, even such basic levels of capacity could not be taken as given. Still others noted that where national actors are fragmented—not unlikely after civil war—granting them ownership of peacebuilding activities is highly problematic, as doing so may affect power balances between groups or lead to infighting and competition. They maintained, therefore, that the UN needed to err on the side of caution in involving local actors. Others added that in conditions of insecurity and instability, it was often more expedient for the UN to simply implement peacebuilding activities itself. As one MONUC official explained, ‘the objective of a peacekeeping mission is not to develop capacity in the longer term; it is to restore security, open roads, get things going again. And that requires speed and urgency.’

However, despite the fact that UN staff point to what are ostensibly external factors that apparently constrain the scope for ownership, their statements reveal that the reluctance of UN staff to enable local actors to take up ownership of peacebuilding actually comes largely from a perception that doing so may imperil two important operational goals: the efficient delivery of tangible outputs and the

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22 Interviews with senior DPKO and PBC officials, New York, November 2009.
23 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
24 Interview with senior DPKO and DPA officials, New York, November 2009.
25 Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
27 Interview with DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
establishment of liberal state structures in the post-conflict country. This perception in turn derives from two assumptions on the part of UN staff: first, that local actors have weak capacities after conflict and second, that they are often undemocratic and illiberal, as discussed in Chapter 3.

First, as mentioned above, there is a general perception among UN staff that local actors suffer from a lack of capacity—that is, they are ill equipped in terms of skills and knowledge to take on the complex political and social processes of peacebuilding independently.\(^\text{28}\) While there is a general perception that capacity in war-torn states is minimal to begin with, this perception is deepened after conflict, when many UN staff believe that any capacity that did exist will have been weakened or destroyed by conflict.\(^\text{29}\) Accordingly, ownership of peacebuilding cannot be fully granted to local actors because they will be unable to manage the processes adequately and including too many local actors will therefore reduce the UN’s ability to efficiently deliver measurable results, such as the disarmament of combatants, the holding of elections, the building of institutions, the passage of legislation, and the undertaking of military and police patrols.\(^\text{30}\)

Consequently, UN staff tend to restrict the role for local actors to the practices described above—consultations, trainings, and public information campaigns—and exclude them from the actual execution of any peacebuilding activities, at least initially when capacity levels are lowest, to ensure that the delivery of outputs is not imperiled. One senior DPKO official noted that local actors often lack even the basic

\(^{28}\) Interviews with DPKO officials, senior peacekeeping analysts, and staff of Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, November 2009 and December 2010.


capacity necessary to define, articulate, and present coherent and viable ideas for peacebuilding—let alone participate in implementation—arguing that for that reason, it is often incumbent on the UN to present its proposals and plans for peacebuilding as otherwise no action would be taken whatsoever.  

Similarly, others noted that turning implementation over to local actors would likely lead to poor results, if any, as local actors were usually not capable of taking charge of technical operational tasks after conflict, at least in the short term.  

One staff member explained that the UN should aim for ‘national ownership at the strategic level, but at the operation[al] and funding level, [it] must be more cautious because the government doesn’t have the capacity or neutrality to [undertake implementation].’  

One simply declared bluntly that, ‘Here in DRC, we have ownership in mind, but we just do things for [local actors] sometimes because there is a pressure to deliver.’  

In the security realm, UN officials were equally adamant, with one noting that, ‘If you give national actors ownership of security, you are delaying and complicating the achievement of your objectives in the security realm,’ and adding that in contrast to ownership ‘in theory,’ ‘in the field, ownership is not always relevant or useful.’

Second, UN staff tend to be reluctant to turn over agency for peacebuilding to local actors because of a conviction that local actors will not act in accordance with the liberal principles of the UN. As described in Chapter 3, there is a general belief that local actors in war-torn states are illiberal to begin with and that their illiberal practices are partly or even primarily to blame for conflict. This is compounded by a conviction that these local actors will, if given the opportunity, revert to illiberal,

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31 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
32 Interviews with DPKO and UN agency officials, New York, November 2009 and December 2010.
33 Interview with DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
34 Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
35 Interview with senior UN military official, New York, December 2010.
undemocratic, and inhumane practices after conflict that divide rather than unite and weaken rather than strengthen the state and society. Again, this perception of local illiberalism means that UN staff tend to be hesitant about involving local actors in peacebuilding practices and activities and giving them too much responsibility and decision-making power for fear that they will engage in illiberal practices and detract from the UN’s goal of liberalizing the host country in order to establish security and build peace.  

For example, one senior DPKO staff member noted that, while part of the UN’s role is to build the capacity of local actors, doing so ‘doesn’t obviate us of our requirements to ensure to the fullest extent that we can that they live up to codes of conduct and behavior that are considered internationally acceptable,’ implying that their inclusion will be limited where they are deemed to be averse to the UN’s liberal democratic goals. Another noted that, the UN ‘cannot allow ultimate national ownership because the objectives of the mission are fixed by the international community, not the national government or the parties to the conflict.’

Accordingly, the UN’s efforts at consultation, involvement, dialogue, and even training are, as described in Chapter 3, aimed largely at convincing local actors to want and do what the UN wants and wants done, rather than at enabling them to give input that sets the course of peacebuilding and determines and prioritizes the tasks to be undertaken to achieve their goals or play a major role in implementation. As one senior DPKO official noted, ‘We are always pushing these transitional governments to our idea of how they should get their act together, but it’s not necessarily what they want.’ A senior staff member in a permanent mission to the UN

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37 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
38 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
39 Interview with PBSO official, New York, November 2009.
stated that particularly where national actors do not want the same things as the UN, one of the key tasks of the SRSG of a mission is ‘to convince and persuade national actors to get on board with what the UN wants’ and ‘to convince national actors that they also want this, that it is in their interest.’ A senior MONUC official likewise stated that the UN ‘has to make national actors implicated, make them have an interest in appropriating what the UN has started.’ Yet all stopped short of describing a process by which local actors could actually take up the reins of peacebuilding themselves, thus limiting their participation to the symbolic inclusion described above, which itself is heavily restricted. In other words, just as negotiations over the content of peacebuilding are limited as described in Chapter 3, dialogues, consultations, and other practices of local ownership are also limited so that national actors are both unable to fundamentally affect the course of peacebuilding as envisioned within the UN’s liberal peacebuilding framework or to impede its efficiency in producing demonstrable outputs. In other words, as with understandings, the UN shapes, molds, and circumscribes the practices of local ownership so that they do not contradict its operational goals. As one senior UN official asserted, ‘we must remember that the UN can’t just promote local ownership, we have a larger role, and you do not want political elites to have a veto on what you do.’

4.4. Implications of Practices for Self-Determination

As can be seen then, local ownership in practice thus diverges significantly from the discourse of ownership described in Chapter 2 in two ways. First, the technical way in which ownership is portrayed in discourse—as something that can be

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40 Interview with staff of Permanent Mission to UN, New York, December 2010.
41 Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
42 Interview with senior UN official, New York, December 2010.
concretely achieved through particular tasks—is weakened in practice, where UN staff engage in different activities in different locations targeting different local actors. Second, the broad-based consultations, hands-on participation in implementation, and trainings, which are expected to translate into gains in terms of legitimacy and long-term sustainability by prioritizing self-determination and minimizing imposition, are undercut by the heavily restricted nature of practices in the field, which leave local actors with little sense of ownership. More specifically, the circumscribed way in which the UN approaches the tasks intended to create ownership restricts the building of consent, the degree of indigenousness, and the amount of national capacity that is built.43

4.4.1. Consent

First, because the various practices of local ownership, including dialogue, consultation, information sharing, and capacity building, are implemented variably by different actors within a mission, they may achieve different degrees of buy-in and consent among different actors. However, since the UN usually takes its own priorities and goals as a starting point because national actors are presumed to be illiberal and divisive as well as incapable of articulating their own wishes, and it thus rarely gives any meaningful decision-making or decision-reviewing power to local actors, the UN is unlikely to achieve ‘full’ consent in which a majority of local actors genuinely want the same things the UN does, as described above. Indeed, one Congolese civil society official noted that consent only exists with the government, and even there only nominally, but most of the population in Congo simply ‘got used

43 The effect of restricted operationalizations of local ownership on impartiality, the fourth factor thought to contribute to enhanced legitimacy and sustainability, will be discussed in the next chapter on actors.
to [the UN],’ rather than actively consenting to it in any genuine sense.\textsuperscript{44} The UN’s efforts therefore usually achieve varying but generally low levels of consent for its activities, despite its attempts to bring local actors on board with its priorities as described above. In addition, because these interactions often take place, as described, on a singular or infrequent basis, they do not lead to sustained or renewed consent over time, as the discourse of local ownership suggests it will. Accordingly, the practices undertaken by the UN in the name of local ownership reinforce the curtailment of self-determination by restricting the degree to which local actors can agree or disagree with its activities and thus limit the supposed boost to legitimacy entailed by ownership.

\textbf{4.4.2. Indigenousness}

Second, because local actors are perceived to be at least partially illiberal and are thus excluded from determining the substance of peacebuilding, and again because dialogue and consultations take place sporadically, these practices leave little space for national actors to express their ideas and priorities for peacebuilding and the political future of their country, or to gain the capacity to do so if it is lacking. Similarly, as described, public information campaigns usually give more information than they take. Accordingly, the amount of substantive input that national actors actually provide is usually highly restricted and the degree of indigenousness—that is, the degree to which national ideas, wishes, and traditions shape peacebuilding—is thus also necessarily limited. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous chapter, most local actors interviewed for this study did not feel that their views were heard or taken into

\footnote{44 Interview with Congolese civil society actor, Kinshasa, March 2011.}
account. In short, in order to avoid the potentially illiberal influence of national actors on peacebuilding, the UN implements ownership in a way that preserves a preference for internationally-conceived goals and practices. Again, the restrictions put on indigenous participation and input heighten the degree of UN imposition and limit self-determination, and ultimately constrain the benefits of legitimacy and sustainability that are thought to derive from local ownership in peacebuilding.

4.4.3. Capacity Building

Finally, because local actors are believed to have minimal levels of capacity, the UN often undertakes direct execution of peacebuilding tasks, rather than opting for the inclusion of local actors in implementation, which, though perhaps slower, may better build their capacities for the independent management of these tasks. In other words, in the interests of achieving higher levels of measurable results or of achieving results more rapidly, the UN restricts the role for national actors because the latter are perceived as impeding or slowing the implementation of activities and the delivery of concrete outputs. In addition, as with consultation, dialogue, and other practices supposedly geared towards the creation of local ownership, where trainings are undertaken, they are often singular events and rarely form part of a dedicated program to build up particular capacities and skills among particular national actors over time, meaning that not only are local actors excluded from implementation, but also they are not really provided opportunities to gain the skills for implementation that they apparently lack. Again, by taking an approach to ownership in practice in which the UN undertakes tasks directly, rather than focusing on building the

45 Interviews with Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, March 2011.
capacities of local actors, it undercuts the longer-term sustainability of peacebuilding by deepening its level of intrusion and imposition on the post-conflict country.

Taken together, the circumscribed nature of the practices of ownership on the part of the UN are unlikely to contribute to legitimacy and sustainability because they do little to enhance the self-determination of the post-conflict country and instead deepen the UN’s imposition on it. Because the UN’s approach is ad hoc, incoherent, and circumscribed and stops short of enabling a major role for local actors in implementation, its practices are unlikely to translate into significant gains in terms of consent on the part of national actors, the degree of indigenousness of peacebuilding, and the capacity of local actors. As a result, the practices the UN undertakes in the name of ownership, similarly to its understandings, are thus likely to have minimal or even negative effects on self-determination and the degree of external imposition.

4.5. Conclusion

In spite of the broad and inclusive rhetoric of local ownership, which touts its ability to enhance legitimacy and sustainability in peacebuilding by preserving the self-determination of the host country, practices of local ownership by the UN, like its understandings, are highly circumscribed. While UN staff describe this as the necessary result of a variety of structural and contextual challenges in post-conflict countries—including societal structure, initial levels of socio-economic development and education, the fragmentation of local actors, and the degree of security on the ground—their statements suggest that their reluctance to grant a greater degree of ownership to national actors is primarily due to the fact that doing so is perceived to inhibit the achievement of other UN goals—namely, the establishment of liberal
democratic structures of governance and the achievement of more tangible outputs on the ground.

In response, the UN implicitly circumscribes local ownership operationally to minimize these perceived risks. It does this, first, by undertaking a variety of tasks in an ad hoc manner without heed to how they collectively build and sustain national ownership over time. Second, the roles provided for local actors in these tasks involve consultation, dialogue, information-sharing, and training, which are primarily communicative or symbolic acts of inclusion that stop short of allowing any leading role in implementation or of granting any significant degree of decision-making power or the ability to review or alter decisions already taken. This generally restricts the role and influence of national actors in peacebuilding, leaving them with little, if any, real sense of ownership. This restrictive approach to ownership in practice in turn appears to contravene the purported benefits of local ownership in peacebuilding—enhanced legitimacy and sustainability through the preservation of self-determination and the minimization of external imposition—and shows instead how the UN molds and adapts ownership in order to forestall perceived risks to its operational goals.

While this circumscription of the role of national actors in practice may occur implicitly, the UN’s practices of ownership certainly do not show the same dedication to ownership that its words do. Indeed, as with understandings, the UN constrains local ownership operationally in favor of the achievement of operational goals—namely the delivery of concrete results and the liberalization of the post-conflict state. More broadly, the lack of any dedicated methodology for making local ownership a reality and the generally ad hoc and incoherent approach to it suggests that, while the UN invokes the rhetoric of local ownership with frequency and may continue to
believe in local ownership ‘in theory,’ it may be more valuable as a discursive tool than as an actual set of practices for the UN, a question to which I return in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 5
Operationalizations of Local Ownership: Actors

5.1. Introduction

The previous chapter examined one aspect of the UN’s operationalization of ownership, namely the practices that it undertakes in order to create and maintain ownership by local actors in peacebuilding. The chapter demonstrated that, similarly to understandings of ownership, the practices used to operationalize ownership are both restricted largely to communication and symbolic acts of inclusion and implemented in a highly circumscribed way because local ownership is perceived to endanger the realization of two important operational goals: the liberalization of the post-conflict state and the delivery of visible, quantifiable results in the short term. The limitations on how the UN practices ownership in turn limit the scope for enhanced legitimacy and sustainability by restricting self-determination and intensifying external imposition on the host country.

This chapter examines the other core aspect of operationalization: actors. When operationalizing ownership, exactly whom the UN views as viable and legitimate local owners becomes a critical question, as it is they who will be targeted by and involved in the practices undertaken by the UN described in the previous chapter. Accordingly, who local owners are is key to determining how expectations and practices of local ownership do or do not align. Here, I show that the broad and inclusive definition of local owners present in the UN’s ownership discourse is actually made significantly narrower in practice, where the UN selects specific actors with whom to work. This selectivity derives in large part from the two convictions on the part of the UN previously described that first, for all its purported benefits, local ownership is a constraint operationally—that is, it slows or counteracts the delivery of tangible outputs by forcing the UN to work with and turn control over to actors with
little capacity—and second, that it jeopardizes the UN’s liberal peacebuilding
objectives by obliging the UN to work with actors that are potentially illiberal and
undemocratic.

More specifically, I show that the UN employs two different and contradictory
criteria in selecting ‘local owners’ in response to each of these perceived risks: values
and capacity. Selection according to values emphasizes the liberal standards and
principles of local actors in an attempt to counteract the risk to the UN’s liberal goals
entailed by the inclusion of potentially illiberal local actors in peacebuilding.
Selection according to capacity, by contrast, emphasizes efficiency, the delivery of
results, and eventual UN exit, prioritizing actors for their perceived capacity to
contribute to the achievement of concrete targets. In short, these two different
approaches are adopted in order to mitigate the perceived risks of local involvement
to the liberal peacebuilding objectives of the UN and the delivery of outputs described
above.

These bases for selection give rise to two different approaches to ownership,
which I call liberal ownership and elite ownership respectively. Though the two differ
substantially in their selection of local owners, they are similar in that they are both

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1 While I restrict my categorization of selection criteria to two—capacity and
values—Jarstad and Olsson argue that international actors select local owners based
on three criteria: power, legitimacy, and norms and culture. They distinguish between
power, which in their discussion includes capacity, and legitimacy, claiming that the
latter means those actors who have formal recognition or popular support. However,
in most post-conflict societies, those who enjoy recognition or support are likely to be
those with power, thus making this distinction less analytically useful than the
distinction with norms or culture. I also prefer the term capacity to power as selecting
local actors based on power implies that non-state warlords and criminals with
significant political and material resources would be equally ‘eligible’ to take
ownership in the eyes of the UN as similarly powerful state actors. I have found,
however, that the UN has a clear preference in such situations for state actors above
rebel and other non-state leaders, and thus found the term capacity a more useful way
of describing the criterion by which the UN makes selections. This is discussed at
length later in the chapter. Jarstad and Olsson, ‘Hybrid Peace Ownership in
Afghanistan,’ 110-111.
selective rather than inclusive, which stands in stark contrast to the discourse of ownership described in Chapter 2. Indeed, as shown, many of the benefits of local ownership are attributed precisely to the breadth of local owners that is emphasized in discourse, and accordingly, this selectivity has strong implications for ownership’s ability to enhance self-determination and non-imposition and thus actually bolster legitimacy and sustainability. Again, as with understandings and practices, the UN appears to select local actors in such a way that prioritizes the achievement of operational goals above the promotion of the principles of self-determination and non-imposition. This does not imply that the UN does not attempt to achieve greater legitimacy and sustainability for its peace operations, but simply that it fears that local ownership will imperil other important goals. Indeed, the fact that it is the UN, and not local actors themselves, that retains the power to select local owners in the first instance suggests that the UN is reluctant to turn over too much responsibility for peacebuilding to local actors. This again reveals that the reality of local ownership does not match the rhetoric of it, as the latter portrays its main function and benefit as the bolstering of legitimacy and sustainability in peacebuilding by protecting the host country’s self-determination.

Moreover, these two approaches to ownership also tend to contradict one another, with liberal ownership including a much larger group of local actors, but giving them mere ‘token ownership,’ as described in the previous chapter, and elite ownership including a much more exclusive group of local actors, but granting them more substantive ownership of peacebuilding. That these two approaches are, as shall be shown, adopted simultaneously by UN missions suggests that local ownership is usually applied in an uneven and contradictory way that distorts the relationship
between the UN and all local actors, a problem that I discuss at greater length in Chapter 7.

This discussion of owner selection, like that of practices, thus helps to demonstrate further contradictions between expectations, understandings, and operationalizations of local ownership. As with understandings of ownership, the two broad approaches outlined in this chapter—liberal and elite ownership—give rise to contradictions between what ownership is thought to do ‘in theory’ and what it can actually achieve ‘in practice,’ and show that the UN may be prioritizing the realization of its operational goals above the more normative objective of promoting the principles of self-determination and non-imposition.

5.2. The Selection of Local Owners

The ad hoc operationalization of local ownership described in the previous chapter is aggravated by the plethora of potential ‘local owners’ and the UN’s selection among them. As discussed in Chapter 2, the discourse of local ownership in peacebuilding generally advocates that the UN engage with as broad a constituency in the host country as possible—that is, it takes a wide view of local owners. Indeed, many of the purported benefits of ownership are thought to derive from precisely this breadth.

Accordingly, as described in Chapter 2, when discussing ownership, many UN staff members insist that it is critical to engage with as broad a constituency as possible and to reach out to sub-national elites, non-political actors, civil society, and vulnerable and marginalized groups in addition to the central political establishment. As one senior DPKO official noted, local ownership should include ‘all
stakeholders. These staff members argue that it is precisely the broad nature of ownership that results in its benefits of enhanced legitimacy and sustainability in peacebuilding. Furthermore, including a broad array of actors will help to enhance representativeness and democratic governance, thus also contributing to the UN’s liberal peacebuilding project.

However, in practice, the UN tends to operationalize ownership in a much more selective way than such discourse would imply. While there are degrees of inclusion, two overall approaches can be identified: liberal ownership and elite ownership. In the first, a broad array of local actors is included, but they are selected based on their support for the liberal democratic values encapsulated by liberal peacebuilding: democracy, rule of law, human rights, and capitalism. Accordingly, liberal ownership prizes the inclusion of actors from a variety of sectors of society regardless of their level of capacity for peacebuilding and governance, as long as they are normatively aligned with the UN. While this approach would seem to comply with the discursive calls for broad and representative ownership, in practice the UN excludes actors who do not espouse the liberal democratic values that it is trying to promote through peacebuilding for fear that their inclusion will imperil the establishment of liberal state, economic, and societal structures in the host country. This approach is thus actually relatively selective, because despite its emphasis on granting ownership to local actors from different sectors of society, it only considers those with the particular normative perspectives that it holds, which are considered key to the maintenance of peace and security.

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2 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
3 Interviews with senior DPKO, UN, MONUC/MONUSCO, and UN agency officials and staff of Permanent Mission to UN, New York, November 2009 and December 2010, and Kinshasa, February-March 2011.
The second approach entails what I call *elite ownership*, where local owners are chosen based on their capacities rather than their normative orientation. Many UN staff contend that the key local actors who will ultimately need to take on ownership of peacebuilding are political and military elites, particularly at the national level, with a particular emphasis on state officials and elected leaders. According to the logic of elite ownership, the UN must therefore work with the political and military elite, regardless of their liberal credentials, because it is they—much more than any civil society or other non-state actors—who are likely to be the ones who will take up the reins of government once the UN departs. Moreover, it is these elite actors who are also likely to have the greatest existing capacity for governing and management, and who are more likely to be able to implement peacebuilding strategies while the UN is present. By granting ownership to the existing political and military establishment, the UN is then also working with those most likely to be able to ensure that tangible outputs are delivered. By contrast, working with less ‘capable’ actors would imperil this goal. This approach generally results in an even smaller group of local owners than with liberal ownership.

Though these two approaches differ in the breadth of local actors that are considered ‘eligible’ for ownership, both are selective approaches. The main way in which they diverge is in the criteria used for selection, with liberal ownership choosing local owners based on values and norms and elite ownership choosing local owners based on capacities. In other words, the former emphasizes broad inclusion but with a clear preference for liberal actors regardless of their capacity levels, while the latter takes a more restricted view of local actors but with less heed to their liberal credentials and more focus on their present and expected future capacity for governance.
While liberal and elite approaches to ownership arise in response to the perception that the inclusion of local actors may imperil the efficiency of UN peacebuilding and jeopardize the UN’s broader liberal goals respectively, they both, as shall be shown, undercut the purported benefits of local ownership—legitimacy and sustainability—because they infringe upon self-determination and exacerbate the degree to which the UN imposes its preferences upon the host state. Accordingly, as with understandings of ownership, operationalizations of ownership reveal contradictions between the expectations and the reality of local ownership in peacebuilding, and suggest that for the UN, discourse and behavior may not match because of competing institutional objectives. The subsequent sections explore liberal and elite ownership in greater detail, before elaborating on the ways in which they affect self-determination and imposition.

5.2.1. Liberal Ownership

As described in Chapter 2, the discourse of ownership in UN documents and policy papers emphasizes that local ownership should embrace a broad cross-section of society and that without such wide representation, ownership is unlikely to be genuine or result in enhanced legitimacy and sustainability. Staff members also invoke such rhetoric. Regardless of where they are based, their role within a mission or DPKO, or the actions they actually engage in on the ground, nearly all UN staff emphasize the need to capture as wide and representative a cross-section of society as possible, while also avoiding as much as possible local actors associated with repression, violence, corruption, or human rights abuses.⁴ They emphasize in

⁴ Interviews with senior DPKO, UN, MONUC/MONUSCO, and UN agency officials and staff of Permanent Mission to UN, New York, November 2009 and December 2010, and Kinshasa, February-March 2011.
particular the need to interact with sub-national political and military actors at the provincial, municipal, and village level, as well as with non-state actors like civil society groups, women’s and youth groups, refugee associations, and other underrepresented or marginalized groups. These actors are valued because they are perceived, first, to more accurately represent the population, and second and most importantly, because they are thought to be more democratic and less partisan than political elites and to have the ‘common interest’ at heart, rather than particularistic or opaque agendas. As one UN official noted, while ‘there has to be an element of leadership…and the authorities have to take the lead…[peacebuilding] has to be an all-inclusive process.’

This ‘inclusive’ approach to local ownership, which I call liberal ownership, is considered to have a number of characteristics that link it to increased legitimacy and sustainability, as discussed in Chapter 2. Broad inclusion helps to build consensus by bringing multiple national actors and the UN together to delineate a shared vision for peacebuilding and for the future of the country, minimizing the imposition of UN ideas and practices and enabling local actors to help determine their political future. This wide inclusion also helps to safeguard the UN’s impartiality, as it is protected against accusations that it only interacts with and thus favors a narrow group of national actors. Broad inclusion also renders peacebuilding more representative, enabling a variety of actors to provide input into the process, and thus in turn

5 Civil society can, as described in Chapter 3, have less than altruistic motivations, and indeed the perception that they are more democratic may arise from their knowing that saying so can help them secure funding from the international community, on which they are dependent to continue functioning. Nevertheless, what is important here is the fact that the perception persists among the UN and other international actors that civil society groups, precisely because they are not directly involved in national politics, may make more equitable, even-handed, and liberal partners.

6 Interview with PBSO official, New York, November 2009.
rendering it more indigenous and again, less externally imposed. Finally, the participation of actors from different sectors of society, geographic regions, ethnicities, tribes, clans, and religions means that capacity can be built among a greater number of local actors and that they can in turn share their new capacities and skills with a broader constituency covering a greater geographic area.

More importantly, in addition to having what appear to be causal links with enhanced legitimacy and sustainability, liberal ownership also fits well with the UN’s liberal peacebuilding goals. First, its representativeness and inclusiveness are thought to render ownership more democratic. Because it emphasizes broadly participatory processes, this approach to local ownership has what Chesterman calls an ‘implied connection with democracy,’ which fits with the UN’s emphasis on establishing democratic governance in post-conflict states as a buffer against future violence.\(^7\) Second, liberal ownership’s emphasis on marginalizing or persecuting those implicated in war crimes, human rights abuses, or other atrocities aligns with the liberal prioritization of human rights and the rule of law, again in an attempt to boost reconciliation and consolidate peace and security. According to one former Civil Affairs Officer, the UN must engage with those who ‘represent a maximum of citizens and stakeholders,’ and he stressed that therefore ownership must necessarily go beyond national or capital-based organizations. He added however, that these ‘representative’ individuals ‘should not have agendas’ that conflict with those of the UN.\(^8\) This sentiment was echoed by other staff members who noted that the UN must


\(^8\) Interview with PBSO official, New York, November 2009.
avoid interactions with war criminals, particularly where they are being given amnesty or are not being held accountable for their actions.\(^9\)

Such statements reveal that while this approach to ownership advocates a breadth and inclusion in the selection of local owners, it limits that breadth and inclusion to those with who espouse the same liberal norms and values as the UN. As discussed in Chapter 3, UN understandings of ownership \textit{a priori} eliminate the full participation and leadership of local actors because they are suspected of being illiberal and divisive, and in practice, many UN staff in fact do attempt to exclude or sideline those actors whose values do not ‘fit’ with the UN’s liberal democratic priorities. In general, the UN is much more willing, where possible, to turn over control and decision-making power to actors whom it considers moderate and whom it believes will make decisions that are in line with the UN’s liberal peacebuilding standards because these are thought to serve as the best protection against conflict recidivism.\(^10\) Accordingly, liberal ownership is only inclusive insofar as local actors are considered moderate and democratic and it entails a selection process by which the UN attempts to support and foster actors who espouse its liberal democratic values. As Marenin argues, international actors must ‘vet’ local actors for their liberal tendencies and weed out those responsible for violence, and then ‘back them up’ during peacebuilding.\(^11\) By contrast, local actors who deviate significantly from those democratic values, whether with regards to human rights, democratic governance, or

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\(^9\) Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2009.


\(^{11}\) Marenin, ‘Understanding Mission Environments,’ 235-236.
transparent and just economic practices, are unlikely to be embraced in this version of ownership.

In practice, this implies that the UN may actually distance itself from the political elite and major power-holders, as the latter are most likely to have participated in fighting; led rebellions; engaged in corrupt economic deal-making; and ordered, overseen, or condoned atrocities, war crimes, and human rights violations. In other words, liberal ownership, because of its emphasis on democracy, human rights, liberal economic practices, and the rule of law, may entail the UN’s dissociating itself from the government and other powerful stakeholders. The Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict notes that while the state is important, the government at the time may be a transitional body that has been appointed rather than elected, and as such ‘may not be fully representative or recognized by the population.’ It adds that these actors may also have been involved in human rights abuses or atrocities. Ownership must thus necessarily go beyond political elites and perhaps even exclude them, with their lack of popular recognition and possible negative human rights records. In Congo, for example, for many years, MONUC maintained a strict official policy of not interacting with renegade general Laurent Nkunda, who had attacked the eastern city of Bukavu in 2004 and continued to fuel unrest and tension in the east of the country, despite his widespread influence.

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14 Ibid.
15 See also Richmond, ‘Conclusion,’ 362. He notes that, ‘[p]eacebuilding has generally adopted the state as its vehicle, but in many conflicts…the state is the source or root of contention.’
16 This policy subsequently changed, as shall be discussed later in the chapter.
At the same time, this approach to local ownership pays little attention to the technical and political capacities of local actors. Moderate liberal individuals and groups tend to be marginalized during and after conflict, which polarizes actors and foments extremist and divisive rhetoric and behavior. Liberal actors are thus often outside of the major power arenas, existing in civil society or smaller political parties. Consequently, these actors tend to play a smaller role in immediate post-war politics and peacemaking and tend to have little influence on major power politics in post-conflict states. They are also usually less experienced in negotiation, bargaining, rallying segments of the population, decision-making, and management than those more extreme and less moderate political and military actors and have little experience with the technical tasks of peacebuilding such as the organization of elections or the management of DDR programs.

However, under liberal ownership, capacity is not a key criterion for selection, and thus such a lack of capacity and the effects it may have on the UN’s ability to efficiently realize concrete outputs are not necessarily considered an impediment to ownership. Indeed, many staff members noted that while the inclusion of such a broad array of often inexperienced actors made implementation slow and convoluted, it was a ‘necessary evil.' As one senior MONUC staff stated, ‘Ownership is an operational constraint, but a necessary one.' In other words, according to liberal ownership, UN staff should give preference to less experienced actors with the ‘right’ values rather than to those with more capacity and experience but who display illiberal tendencies

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18 Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
and extremist behavior.\textsuperscript{19} In Congo, for example, in the period leading up to and immediately following the 2006 elections, the UN worked to create a forum for civil society actors and organizations in order to enable them to provide unified and constructive input into the peacebuilding and governance processes.\textsuperscript{20} Doing so proved to be a lengthy process of building capacity and resolving inter-group differences, but was considered worthwhile in the interests of supporting moderate liberal voices in Congolese society.

As mentioned, this approach to ownership is not adopted uniformly within UN missions. Considerations of breadth and inclusion and the liberal tendencies of local actors tend to be taken more seriously within particular departments of a mission, in certain geographic areas of a mission, and at certain levels of a mission. Departments such as Civil or Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights perceive the interaction with as broad a cross-section of society as possible as the primary means to secure local ownership and thus bolster legitimacy and sustainability. The staff of these sections are indeed mandated specifically to address grassroots level problems and interact with civil society and the population at its base in order to foster and support moderate actors, and as such it is not surprising that they are stronger advocates of liberal ownership. Similarly, the intended audience of radio and other information campaigns run by the Public Information Division of a mission is usually as broad a cross-section of society as possible. For the staff of these sections, focusing entirely on government or other elite national actors is contrary to representativeness and

\textsuperscript{19} Richmond, ‘Conclusion,’ 363. See also Kristi Samuels, ‘Sustainability and Peace Building: A Key Challenge,’ \textit{Development in Practice} 15, no. 6 (November 2005): 732-733.

\textsuperscript{20} This culminated in the signing of an act of engagement by civil society actors in December 2006 in Kinshasa at the conclusion of a UN-organized and -hosted workshop for civil society organizations. Interview with DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
democracy and thus ownership that targets such actors would, as feared, risk the UN’s liberal agenda.

In addition, in the eyes of these staff members, the ‘local’ in local ownership often means sub-national, extending to the province, state, city, and village level, and they assert that the UN should pay special attention to remote or underdeveloped areas. Staff located in field offices often criticize the national focus of staff based at mission headquarters in the capital city quite openly. Within MONUC, field staff frequently derided their capital city counterparts by saying that, ‘Kinshasa is not the Congo.’ Indeed, the inclusion of sub-national and non-political actors was considered by some to be particularly important in Congo due to the history of secession in parts of the country and as a potential counterweight to the over-centralized system that had characterized the country since the Mobutu era. The inclusion of traditional leaders in the peace negotiations before the transition,

21 Interview with PBSO official, New York, November 2009. See also Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor,’ 30-31.
22 Interview with senior UN official, New York, December 2010.
23 Interviews with DPKO officials, New York, November 2009 and December 2010. Autesserre notes that because the preference for national level politics is so deeply ingrained among international diplomats, the term local ownership often ‘means ownership by the central government, not by people on the ground.’ The Trouble with the Congo, 43, 99.
24 The mineral-rich province of Katanga declared independence in 1960, as did the region of South Kasai. Center-periphery tensions persist to this day in Congo, with the central government exerting an inordinate amount of control over the provinces. In addition, the 2006 constitution of DRC mandates that the country’s current 11 provinces be re-divided into 26 provinces and that 40% of revenues generated in the provinces remain within them. These provisions, which were supposed to be implemented within 36 months of the constitution’s promulgation, have yet to be implemented. Of particular issue is the 40% revenue stipulation. For wealthy provinces like Katanga, this is an important source of income and financial autonomy, but it represents a significant loss—both in terms of finances and political control—for the central government. See Herbert F. Weiss and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, ‘Decentralization and the DRC – An Overview,’ NYU Center on International Cooperation, Issue Paper #1: Decentralization and Governance, 2009, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/archive/congo/docs/Issue%20Paper%20No.%201(EN).pdf.
mentioned in Chapter 1, represents such a deliberate attempt to include non-state actors in peacebuilding. Subsequently, traditional and customary leaders were co-opted into the provincial parliaments, again in an attempt to boost representativeness and extend the peacebuilding process to a greater cross-section of the population.\textsuperscript{25} In this vein, Lederach and Appleby specify that ‘peacebuilding begins and ends with the local’ and Richmond adds that ‘the “local” should be as local as it possibly can be and not merely representative of local elites.’\textsuperscript{26}

Finally, it is more common for junior to mid-level staff of a peacebuilding mission to espouse liberal views of ownership.\textsuperscript{27} In general, senior mission directors deal primarily with senior government or opposition officials, military or rebel commanders, or economic actors. This is partly because it is their task to manage these high-level relationships, but it implies that engaging with a broader, though perhaps less capable, constituency will fall to other members of the mission.

\subsection*{5.2.2. Elite Ownership}

While liberal ownership is selective based on normative criteria, it is paralleled by another, equally selective approach to ownership, but one that selects according to a different criterion. Elite ownership bases its ‘choice’ of owner on capacity—that is, the perceived ability of an actor to take up, manage, and sustain peacebuilding activities, governance, and institution building, particularly once the UN mission departs. It prioritizes the involvement of high-level state officials in peacebuilding, with a secondary role given to key non-state political, military,

\textsuperscript{25} Up to 10\% of the provincial parliaments may be co-opted traditional leaders.
\textsuperscript{26} Richmond, ‘Conclusion,’ 363.
\textsuperscript{27} Autesserre notes that junior staff in MONUC were emphasized the importance of sub-national and micro-level conflict dynamics much more than senior staff did. \textit{The Trouble with the Congo}, 218.
economic, and opinion leaders. Elite ownership also generally maintains a focus on the central level, with sub-national or provincial actors outside the capital city only playing a role when they are considered integral to peace and stability. There are several reasons for the conviction that national-level elites should be the key local owners of peacebuilding.

First, many UN officials argue that these central government and other high-level political, economic, and military actors are key to the sustainability of peacebuilding because it is they who will be the primary national actors who carry the peacebuilding and governance processes forward after the withdrawal of the UN. Accordingly, it is their capacity that must be built, more urgently than that of the civil society, sub-national, and underrepresented groups such as youth, women, and refugee groups that are emphasized by proponents of liberal ownership. Though it recognizes, as mentioned above, that the government of a post-conflict country may not be legitimate, the Secretary-General’s Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict also urges that capacity building ‘be targeted particularly at strengthening national leadership.’ In elite ownership, high-level actors are perceived as more critical to sustainability in the short to medium term than mid- and low-level provincial, municipal, or non-state actors, whose capacities can be built up more gradually over time. As one DPKO official noted, the UN’s primary efforts should go into making sure high-level actors are ‘on board’ with what the UN is doing, and it is then their responsibility—not the UN’s—to make sure that the message trickles down to lower levels.

Second, not only is the future role of elites considered critical to peacebuilding, many UN staff argue that their existing capacity for governance and

29 Interview with DPKO military official, New York, November 2009.
peacebuilding at the time that peacebuilding begins is often far greater than that of other actors. Elite actors are thus thought to be better positioned to take up ownership of peacebuilding earlier on and thus contribute to the realization of concrete outputs such as combatant disarmament, the passing of legislation, and the establishment of institutions. Government officials and other elites in the post-conflict period were often elites and power-holders in the pre-conflict or conflict periods, and as such may be skilled or knowledgeable in mobilization, negotiation, and governance and have experience with political institutions, legislative processes, campaigns, political party management, and military command in ways that sub-national, civil society, or newly-emerged political leaders do not. Even where these skills were not put to particularly democratic use, they at least provide a basis upon which the UN can build.

In Congo, for example, many key members of the post-war political order were high-level political actors prior to or during the war, some beginning their political careers as far back as independence. For example, Léon Kengo Wa Dondo served in the government of President Mobutu as Prime Minister three times and as Foreign Minister once; he was one of Mobutu’s most trusted allies. After the war, he became President of the Senate in 2007. Étienne Tshisekedi was an advisor to Patrice Lumumba, the first post-independence Prime Minister of Congo, before serving in various senior posts in Mobutu’s government during the 1960s and 1970s. Since the end of the wars, Tshisekedi has emerged as a central opposition figure as

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32 These included periods as Minister of the Interior and of Justice and several brief stints as Prime Minister in the 1990s when Mobutu was attempting to introduce reforms to prevent the collapse of his regime.
head of the *Union pour la Démocratie et Progrès Social* (UDPS) party, which he co-founded in 1982. He boycotted the 2006 presidential elections and rejected the results of the 2011 presidential elections, in which he placed second. Antoine Gizenga served as Deputy Prime Minister under Lumumba and briefly as a senator under Mobutu in 1965-66. In the 2006 elections, Gizenga placed third after Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba, and he subsequently signed a coalition agreement with Kabila’s *Alliance pour la Majorité Presidentielle* (AMP) in exchange for his appointment as Prime Minister, a post that he held from 2006-2008.

Vital Kamerhe has also had a political career that has spanned the pre-war, war, and post-war periods. During the first half of the 1990s, he held posts in a number of ministries under Mobutu, and after the latter’s ousting, served in the government of Laurent Desiré Kabila. In 2002, he co-founded Joseph Kabila’s *Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie* (PPRD), and served as the latter’s chief negotiator in the peace process. He subsequently held a number of high-level posts in government, until he had a falling out with the president in 2009, broke with the party, and subsequently ran against Kabila in the 2011 presidential elections. Olivier Kamitatu was Secretary-General of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC, subsequently becoming President of the Transitional Parliament in 2003. He formed his own party in 2006, joined the presidential alliance, and became spokesperson and permanent

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36 Kamerhe served as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Minister of Reconstruction and Planning and Deputy General of the Government in Charge of MONUC Affairs under Laurent Kabila.
37 In 2003, Kamerhe served as Minister of Information and Press and as Government Spokesperson, and in 2004 he became Secretary-General of the PPRD. In 2006, he was elected to parliament and became President of the National Assembly.
secretary of the AMP. He was subsequently named Minister of Planning.39 Bizima Karaha served as Foreign Minister for Laurent Kabila before becoming head of security for the RCD-G during the Second Congo War. Since the end of fighting, he has continued to play a variety of political roles, particularly regarding the ongoing fighting in eastern DRC, and in 2011 he became a member of the African Union (AU) delegation negotiating with then President Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast.40 Such actors, because of their long experience in both national and international politics and negotiations and in spite of the fact that they often behaved in repressive, autocratic, or corrupt ways in previous phases of their careers, are considered by the UN to be more likely to contribute to the delivery of demonstrable results than, for example, relatively inexperienced newly appointed local politicians or civil society actors, and MONUC worked regularly with these individuals. Indeed, several senior MONUC officials named these individuals as ‘good interlocutors’ for the mission, asserting that working with them was more efficient than working with less experienced actors because of their level of technical skills.41

Similarly, high-level military officers who served under pre-war regimes often received training prior to conflict and are thus often considered easier to interact with as well as the most capable of managing the post-war armed forces, even if their roles before and during conflict were repressive, divisive, or brutal. By contrast, recently integrated rebels, even high-ranking commanders, often began fighting at a very young age and never received any formal training, leaving them with little knowledge of political-military interaction, chain-of-command, and military management, let

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39 Ibid., 102-103.
41 Interviews with senior MONUC officials, Geneva, May 2011.
alone SSR or DDR processes. For example, the FARDC, the integrated armed forces founded in 2004 after the end of the Second Congo War, is composed of former members of the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ), Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), MLC, RCD, and Mai Mai. Of these, many from the three latter groups are former rebel combatants with little formal training and knowledge of military strategy or management. By contrast, members of the state armed forces active before the two wars, particularly officers, often benefited from extensive training, including special courses in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. Accordingly the capacity of such officers is almost universally higher than that of former rebels, even if the former never used those capacities for the defense of democracy or human rights.

For example, Major General Gabriel Amisi Kumba (known as ‘Tango Four’) was an officer in the FAZ before joining the AFDL in 1996. During the Second Congo War, he held high-level positions in the RCD-G, and after the cessation of fighting was made Commander of the 5th Military Region in Kasai Oriental, Commander of the 8th Military Region in North Kivu, and finally Chief of Staff of the Army. Similarly, Lieutenant General Didier Etumba was an officer in the FAZ, after having graduated from the Brussels Royal Military Academy and receiving extensive

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42 Exceptions to this include cases where rebellions originate from within the establishment, by, for example, a breakaway group of military officers.
43 After independence in 1960, the Belgian Force Publique, armed forces composed of Congolese soldiers commanded by Belgian officers, was renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise. In 1971, when President Mobutu renamed the country Zaire, the military became known as the Forces Armées Zaïroises. The armed forces were subsequently renamed the Forces Armées Congolaises after Laurent Kabila took power in 1997.
44 Interviews with Congolese academic and senior MONUC/MONUSCO officials, Kinshasa, March 2011.
specialized training in Belgium. He held a number of high-level positions as a member of the AFDL during the First and Second Congo Wars. These posts included Chief of Staff of the Congo’s military intelligence agency, Détection Militaire des Activités Anti-Patrie (DEMIAP), and military advisor at the Lusaka negotiations.

In 2007, he was made Chief of Staff of the Navy before being named Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the highest military post in DRC, in 2008. Again, such actors, with their long military experience and extensive training abroad, make ‘easier’ partners for the UN than rebel commanders with little formal military instruction, and they are perceived as having more of the capacities necessary for helping to deliver tangible outputs and for taking on the maintenance of security and further consolidation of peace after the UN withdraws. As one senior MONUC official noted, ‘ex-FAZ and ex-FAC officers who were trained in military academies in the United States, Europe, China, and not the rebels who have never been educated or trained and cannot read and write,’ make the best partners for the mission.

Fostering the capacity of newer or less experienced political, military, and economic actors to the level requisite to carry forward complex processes of peacebuilding, governance, and security sector management is thus considered to be more difficult and time-consuming than relying on those existing bureaucrats and military officers who have prior experience and training, and thus elite ownership is a way of counteracting the perceived deleterious effect of local ownership on the efficiency of peacebuilding. As mentioned, there is a general perception among UN staff that including actors from civil society, local NGOs, and other smaller or more peripheral groups, actors who have had little or no direct experience with national politics or with the negotiations that led to the cessation of conflict and the

46 These posts included Chief of Staff of the Congo’s military intelligence agency, Détection Militaire des Activités Anti-Patrie (DEMIAP), and military advisor at the Lusaka negotiations.
47 Omasombo and Kennes, Biographies des acteurs de la Transition, 54.
48 Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
deployment of a UN mission, will slow down and complicate the process of achieving results, thus leading many staff to prefer working with ‘the old guard’ of political and military leaders.

Indeed, most UN staff stated openly that ownership in its broadest manifestation is an operational constraint for a mission, alleging that it makes implementation ‘messy,’ time-consuming, and costly for the UN, in spite of its purported benefits in terms of legitimacy and sustainability. And while some called this operational ‘messiness’ a necessity, others explicitly linked the utility of local ownership in peacebuilding with a policy of limiting the number of local owners, noting that if the UN fails to select those with existing capacity, it will fail to make progress towards demonstrating quantifiable results. With reference specifically to Congo, some noted that the UN could not expect small women’s groups or local youth groups to ‘sit at the table as full participants in peacebuilding decisions because they don’t have the capacity, even if they are representative.’ Senior MONUC staff members agreed, with one stating that ‘[the mission] works with civil society only insofar as it can help the mission implement its mandate,’ adding that it rarely did so. Another staff member observed that because the World Bank and the International Development Bank insist on working only with local agencies with little capacity in DRC, they have had ‘zero delivery’ there, and warned against the UN’s taking a similar approach.

The UN’s stabilization plan for eastern DRC, known as the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS), which was introduced in 2008,

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49 Interviews with DPKO officials and staff of Permanent Missions to the UN, New York, November 2009 and December 2010.
50 Interviews with staff of Permanent Mission to the UN, New York, December 2010.
51 Interviews with senior MONUC/MONUSCO officials, Kinshasa, February-March 2011.
52 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
provides a clear example of the sidelining of national actors in the short term in the interests of efficiency. The plan, which was aimed at improving security; supporting political processes and extending state authority; ensuring the safe return, reintegration, and recovery of displaced persons; and combating sexual violence in the turbulent east of the country in order to generate disincentives for further fighting there, was initially drafted almost entirely by senior level MONUC staff based in Kinshasa, with no input from the Congolese political establishment or inhabitants of the areas targeted by the plan, or from the mission’s own field offices, UN agencies, and international NGOs. One staff member explained that this was the case because of the rapidity with which the funds earmarked for stabilization had to be used and, though Congolese government officials were subsequently brought into the planning process, the UN had concerns that an extensive program of consultation with the targeted communities on the planning and design of the stabilization strategy would lead to bickering about where funds should go and what they should be spent on, thus slowing down the mission’s ability to deliver tangible results in a short amount of time. He alleged, in short, that there is ‘a trade-off between the delivery of results and ownership.’

55 Interview with senior DPA official, New York, November 2009. It should be noted that the lack of consultation was condemned by both excluded mission staff as well as the Congolese authorities. In response, the ISSSS was later inscribed within the government’s stabilization program, the Programme de Stabilisation et Reconstruction des zones sortant des conflits armées (STAREC), with ownership progressively turned over to Congolese officials. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the Commissions Techniques Conjointes (Joint Technical Commissions), which were charged with monitoring and evaluation of the stabilization program, were at first co-chaired at both the national and provincial levels by government and MONUC officials, but later the chairing role was taken on by national actors exclusively, with
This emphasis on efficiency and tangible outputs shows how elite ownership, in contrast to liberal ownership, places far less emphasis on the liberal project of the UN. As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, elite actors are considered instrumental to the efficiency of peacebuilding and giving them ownership of the process is considered a practical advantage, regardless of whether or not they have a history of promoting and defending democracy, justice, and human rights. They are valued for their ability to help advance the implementation of the UN’s mandate in a concrete and speedy way, even if their backgrounds conflict with the liberal principles extolled in the mandate. In other words, in prizing capacity over values, elite ownership prioritizes the efficient delivery of results in the short term above the liberalization of the post-conflict state.

An important implication of this approach is that the UN tends to grant elites somewhat more substantive ownership than the mere ‘token ownership’ discussed in the previous chapter. Because elites are considered to have greater existing technical capacities and to therefore be able to contribute more to the realization of concrete outputs, the UN tends to allow them a greater degree of influence over the execution of activities as a means to boost the delivery of results.

At the same time, the trust in existing elites to carry on peacebuilding is by no means complete. The latter are not necessarily considered to have sufficient or appropriate capacities for peacebuilding and governance. Indeed, local elites are often accused of waylaying the progress of peacebuilding and the consolidation of peace due to their weak capacities and lack of motivation, particularly in a country like

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56 See Reno, ‘Bottom-Up Peacebuilding?’, 159.

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56 See Reno, ‘Bottom-Up Peacebuilding?’, 159.
Congo where over a decade of instability and war preceded by several of autocracy, repression, and corruption did little to build up capacity for governance and left nearly all institutions hollowed out and bereft of skilled civil servants. Nevertheless, existing elites are considered to have a relative skill level greater than that of other actors that is valued by proponents of elite ownership, even where these actors were repressive dictators or military commanders and were instrumental in initiating or perpetuating fighting. Consequently, working with them is thought to slow the achievement of peacebuilding goals to a lesser extent than working with other actors. As one senior DPKO official noted, despite the divisive tendencies of such actors and their imperfect capacities, in post-conflict peacebuilding, ‘it may be better to snuggle up to the authorities.’

Furthermore, because war and post-war elites were often also pre-war elites, it is possible that the international community, including the UN, worked with them before and therefore has a pre-existing relationship with them, and it is considered more efficacious to continue working with such actors where possible than to build

58 A similar situation was visible in Iraq. The United States’ policy of summarily removing all members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and barring them from seeking government office following its 2003 invasion of the country, known as de-Baathification, was criticized by many observers and analysts for eliminating all civil servants and bureaucrats with any practical capacities, thus seriously hindering the reestablishment of state services and the functioning of state institutions. Ultimately, in 2004, the U.S. military revoked the policy and dissolved the Supreme National Debaathification Commission originally charged with its implementation, stating that vetted Baathists should be allowed back into their posts in order to buttress reconstruction efforts. See Sharon Otterman, ‘Iraq: De-Baathification,’ Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-debaathification/p7853,’ and Public Broadcasting System, ‘Key Controversies and Missteps of the Postwar Period.’ Frontline, October 17, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/analysis/fuel.html.
working relationships with new interlocutors from scratch. In Congo, for example, Laurent Kabila became president in 1997 after the ousting of Mobutu and remained in that post through the entire Second Congo War until his assassination in 2001.

Accordingly, high-level international and UN officials had already begun to build up a relationship with him by the time MONUC first deployed in 1999. While Laurent Kabila was notoriously difficult to work with in a number of ways, the fact that he had interacted with the international community previously bought him a certain amount of leeway with international actors. This kind of ‘devil we know’ is often preferred by international actors, because they believe the presence of familiar elites to be more conducive to the achievement of peacebuilding tasks than that of new, unknown, and unpredictable actors.

Similarly, the UN in particular and the international community in general are widely accused, both by Congolese citizens, analysts, and politicians as well as external academics and analysts, of having favored Laurent Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, to win the 2006 presidential elections. Many assert that this is because the UN and others had been working with him since he succeeded his father as president in

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60 Laurent Kabila acted as a considerable obstacle to MONUC’s full deployment and activity in the mission’s early days. Despite promises to the contrary, his government persisted in denying the mission freedom of movement throughout the country and it prevaricated on allowing the UN to deploy to government-held, as opposed to rebel-held, areas. It also persistently rejected the appointed neutral facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, despite his acceptance by all the other parties, and failed to attend preparatory meetings for the Dialogue. It also allowed anti-MONUC propaganda to continue on government-controlled media outlets until the SRSG at the time, Kamel Morjane, intervened directly. See United Nations, S/2000/30 (2000), S/2000/330 (2000), S/2000/566 (2000), S/2000/888 (2000), S/2000/1156 (2000). One senior MONUSCO official, who had worked with Laurent Kabila before and during the war, called him ‘impossible.’ Interview, Kinshasa, March 2011. See also Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, 247.

61 Chopra and Hohe note that this tendency to work with existing elites is often ‘rooted in diplomatic habit,’ in which international civil servants are simply habituated to and therefore persist in interacting with institutions or with the elite as opposed to the broader population. ‘Participatory Intervention,’ 290.
2001—in effect for the entirety of the transition period—and thus had built up working relations with him and won a degree of confidence from him that they were loath to give up. For his part, Joseph Kabila, though often characterized as taciturn and ill at ease in the political limelight, was familiar with how international actors functioned, understood their ‘language,’ and knew what their goals were, thus winning him their trust and persuading them that he was key to stability and peacebuilding in DRC.

Because of these considerations of sustainability, capacity, and prior relationships, many UN staff imply that elites should be the key national owners of peacebuilding, and they operationalize ownership to target these actors specifically. While elite ownership does not preclude engagement with other actors, it considers doing so secondary to securing the consent and building the capacity of government officials and other key political, business, and opinion leaders, who are seen as essential to the delivery of concrete outputs in the short term and to the process of building and sustaining peace in a way that sub-national or non-state actors, or even the average citizen, are not.

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62 One Congolese politician accused the French Ambassador at the time of the elections, Georges Serre, of openly stating that Kabila could not be permitted to lose. Interviews with Congolese politicians and civil society actors, Kinshasa, March 2011 and DPKO officials and senior peacekeeping analysts, New York, November 2009 and December 2010.

63 While some UN staff deny such accusations of favoritism, others acknowledge openly that Joseph Kabila was the clear choice for president of not only MONUC but also the leadership of DPKO and the Security Council. Interviews with DPKO officials, New York, December 2010 and January 2012. See also Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 3, 51. In addition, it should be noted that Joseph Kabila is thought to have made an explicit effort to ‘seduc[e] the international community’ by embarking on diplomatic missions to major Western capitals almost immediately after taking office in 2001. Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila, 247.
Moreover, as mentioned, despite frequently acknowledging the important role of particularly powerful rebel commanders and opposition leaders in peacemaking, when it comes to ownership of peacebuilding, UN staff demonstrate a strong preference for government elites. The rationale behind this belief in the primacy of government ownership is the fact that the UN is only present in the host country with the consent of the host government, and that to circumvent the state by granting significant ownership to non-state actors, no matter how powerful, would be a violation of the sovereignty of the host state and may thus potentially result in the withdrawal of formal consent. Ignoring or sidelining state officials or even giving excessive attention to non-state actors where state actors are present is considered, in a sense, a subversion of legitimate state authority, and in an organization that is composed of states, as mentioned in Chapter 2, such behavior is normatively unacceptable, except in extenuating circumstances. As one senior MONUSCO official noted, ‘where there is a legitimate government, of course the primary

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64 Interviews with DPKO and senior UN officials, New York, November 2009 and December 2010. See also Hansen, ‘Local Ownership in Peace Operations,’ and Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.’
65 As mentioned, this is usually true even in cases of deployment under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
66 Despite an increasing acceptance of the fact that sovereignty entails both rights and responsibilities and thus that international intervention is acceptable in cases of extreme abuses of the civilian population, sovereignty and non-interference remain key organizing principles of the global state system. Autesserre notes that because of the norm of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a state, ‘[m]ost international actors [find] the idea of micro-level intervention outrageous.’ The Trouble with the Congo, 217. Indeed, while feasibility and chances for success are important determinants of UN action, UN intervention to address egregious abuses and violations of human rights tend to occur only where there are also strong strategic interests on the part of a permanent member of the Security Council, and accordingly the organization’s ‘default’ remains not to intervene, as can be seen by its failure to become involved in North Korea, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, or Syria beyond the issuing of condemnable Security Council resolutions. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, but there is a large literature on it. See, for example, Jarstad and Olsson, ‘Hybrid Peace Ownership in Afghanistan,’ 115.
relationship [of the mission] will be with that government’—it cannot be otherwise.\textsuperscript{67} A senior UN official similarly stated that if the UN engages too much with non-governmental actors, it will ‘lose [its] capacity to influence the government, ‘\textsuperscript{68} and thus to achieve its operational goals.'\textsuperscript{69} Another senior MONUC official reiterated this conviction, stating that ‘[i]f you take pot shots too often, you risk delegitimizing the government over time, and they are fragile enough as it is.’\textsuperscript{70} Instead, he argued, because the government is key to the delivery of concrete results, it is better to uphold that government than to weaken it and risk the UN’s effectiveness, even where the government’s popular legitimacy levels are low.

One exception to this may be MONUC’s reversal of its long-time official policy of not interacting with renegade General Laurent Nkunda and the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), mentioned above. In January 2008, a peace conference was held in the eastern city of Goma that brought together rebel groups and the government in an attempt to resolve the ongoing conflicts in the east of DRC. At the time, Nkunda’s concurrence with and participation in the peace process was deemed essential to stability in the near term. However, as both the frequency of the UN’s interactions with him and the seniority of the UN staff involved increased, many government officials began accusing MONUC of colluding with Nkunda, forcing the UN to undertake a delicate public relations intervention to calm government fears.\textsuperscript{71} Nevertheless, the UN’s interaction with Nkunda, though

\textsuperscript{67} Interview with senior MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011. Legitimacy in this case may come from a government’s being appointed in a transitional capacity by an internationally-sanctioned or -led peace process or from post-conflict elections deemed free and fair by the international community.
\textsuperscript{68} Interview with senior UN official, New York, December 2010.
\textsuperscript{69} See Reno, ‘Bottom-Up Statebuilding?’, 156.
\textsuperscript{70} Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
\textsuperscript{71} Interviews with Congolese politicians and civil society actors and senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, February and March 2011.
perhaps an affront to government elites, still shows the UN’s willingness to put liberal credentials aside for the sake of results.

As with liberal ownership, elite ownership is not adopted universally within UN missions. Elite ownership is most often practiced by senior UN staff. It is generally the SRSG who deals with the head of state and key opposition leaders and the Force Commander who deals with senior military officials. Similarly, department chiefs in the capital city interact with ministers and other key government officials, and heads of field offices interact with the highest-ranking political actors in their areas of responsibility, much more than they deal with civil society or associations of youth, women, and others. Interacting with the latter, as mentioned, usually taken up by more junior staff. In addition, certain sections within a mission are likely to prioritize engagement with political and military elites. For example, the Political Affairs Department tends to interact with political actors, leaving engagement with civil society or women’s and youth groups to the Civil Affairs, Gender Affairs, or Child Protection sections. A geographic division of labor within most missions is also usually evident, with the most avid proponents of elite ownership usually comprising capital-based UN staff.72

5.3. Implications of Owner Selection for Self-Determination

Because they are often undertaken by different mission staff, these two different approaches to ownership—liberal and elite—are often practiced simultaneously in UN missions. In other words, missions do not explicitly adopt one particular policy of ownership to follow, and often the choices they make regarding local owners remain implicit. Indeed, high-level mission managers are quick to

proclaim the importance of civil society or geographically remote actors—regularly emphasizing, for example, the key role that women can play in peacebuilding—but they do not necessarily engage regularly with those actors themselves. 73 Junior staff, field staff, and staff of sections mandated to work at the grassroots level likewise frequently acknowledge the indispensable role of central governments in setting overall policies, passing legislation, and overseeing the just distribution of resources, but do not necessarily actively work to ensure that such actors own the process of peacebuilding. 74 That different staff interact with different national interlocutors is, to an extent, by design and can lead to a certain level of efficiency. However, in the case of ownership, the difference also exists because of differing views of who local owners should be, views that derive, as mentioned, from the perceived risks of local ownership: the loss of efficiency and the curtailment of democratic development. 75 Moreover, different actors within the mission may be, as mentioned, aware of what their colleagues are doing, but do not necessarily coordinate with them to make the


74 UN documents similarly capture this tension between these two approaches. The Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict report stresses the need to enable national leadership and to enhance government functionality, while also bemoaning the minimal role given to women and civil society in peacebuilding processes. United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85. See also United Nations, A/63/881-S/2009/304.

75 There may also be a bit of a learning process in terms of which national actors UN staff prioritize. For example, a member of the Civil Affairs Section of a UN mission may be mandated to work with marginalized groups at the grassroots level and, over time, may come to value their contribution to peacebuilding more than that of other actors with whom he or she does not work. A discussion of the learning processes of institutional actors in peace operations is outside of the scope of this thesis; however, for our purposes, the key point remains that different staff value the ownership of different national actors.
different approaches to ownership work in tandem or reinforce one another in order to actually build ownership among local actors.

However, though elite and liberal ownership arise in response to different perceived challenges and vary in important ways, with the former resulting in a narrower group of ‘local owners’ than the latter, both are ultimately highly selective approaches to ownership. This selectivity has important implications for the purported benefits of local ownership—that is, enhanced legitimacy and sustainability through the preservation of self-determination and the minimization of external imposition.

As discussed, the discourse of local ownership implies that the inclusion of a broad array of local actors results in widened and deepened consent, heightened perceptions of impartiality, more indigenous processes, and greater capacity building for local actors, which in turn result in more legitimate and sustainable peacebuilding because they enable local actors to determine their political future with minimal interference and imposition by the UN. Because the UN tends to operationalize ownership in a selective rather than inclusive way, however, these benefits are put at risk. The effect of selectivity on consent, impartiality, indigenousness, and capacity building tends to be more acute with elite ownership, as its pool of potential local owners is smaller than that of liberal ownership, but is nevertheless discernable with both approaches to ownership. Most importantly, because of the UN’s selective approach, certain local actors will necessarily be excluded or sidelined, and therefore are unlikely to feel that they have any meaningful ownership of peacebuilding.

5.3.1. Consent

First, selectivity reduces the ‘reach’ of consent. With the liberal approach to ownership, as mentioned, the UN may maintain a certain distance from high-level
government and other non-state officials who have less than perfect records on human rights, political repression, and corruption. As mentioned in Chapter 2, securing the consent of both government officials and those less-than-liberal non-state actors who are essential to peace has long been a key element of UN peacebuilding practice. With liberal ownership, however, the consent of such actors may be missing, which may negatively affect the mission’s legitimacy, and even its ability to remain in the host country.76

The effect of selectivity on consent is even more pronounced with elite ownership. If local ownership can expand consent spatially within the population, as described in Chapter 2, restricting the number of ‘local owners’ with whom the UN works and interacts will necessarily restrict that expansion. With liberal ownership, though particular actors may be excluded, the UN still aims to target a wide cross-section of society and reaches out to actors at all levels and in all sectors, social divisions, and geographic areas. While these actors must fall within certain ideological boundaries, they generally represent a more diverse and varied group of citizens than with elite ownership. In the case of the latter, by contrast, ownership is restricted to those political, military, and economic actors considered essential to maintaining stability and to sustaining peacebuilding and political development after the departure of the UN. This selection of owners, as mentioned, usually places special emphasis on government actors, thus concentrating consent even more. While the consent requirement in peacekeeping is officially only related to the government, as described in Chapter 2, one of the main expected benefits of local ownership is its ability to secure consent from a much larger and more diverse group of local actors.

76 Interviews with senior DPKO, DPA, MONUC/MONUSCO, and UN agency officials and senior peacekeeping analysts, New York, November 2009 and December 2010, and Kinshasa, February and March 2011.
and over a greater period of time, thus rendering the mission more legitimate. Indeed, many members of the Congolese political opposition claimed they felt ‘no ownership whatsoever’ because of what they saw as MONUC’s overt emphasis on interacting with the government, and in particular the executive.\footnote{Interviews with Congolese politicians and civil society actor, Kinshasa, March 2011.} When consent is concentrated in a select group of individuals then, perceptions of legitimacy among other local actors are likely to decline. Put another way, whether actors are excluded for value or capacity reasons, fewer of them are involved in determining the political future of their country, thus reducing the degree of self-determination and, in turn, the legitimacy of peacebuilding.

\subsection*{5.3.2. Impartiality}

Second, impartiality is thought to be safeguarded through the UN’s interaction with a diverse and wide-ranging group of actors. The more local owners the UN interacts with, the harder it is to sustain accusations that the organization favors one group or individual above any others and that it is thus imposing a particular vision, system, or structures onto the host country. In post-conflict societies where competition among groups is fierce and often violent and where local actors are jockeying for position in the post-war political order, the perception of UN impartiality is critical to its legitimacy and indeed its ability to act.\footnote{United Nations, Capstone Doctrine, 33.} However, selective ownership immediately limits the degree of impartiality that can be said to exist, or at least that will be perceived by local actors. If the UN only interacts with a select group of local actors, those who are excluded from the UN’s activities are likely to feel that they have been discriminated against in favor of others, thus
undercutting perceptions of impartiality and any corollary benefits in terms of legitimacy. Perceptions of reduced impartiality in turn reinforce the sense of many local actors that they in fact have no ownership—indeed both government and opposition politicians in Congo expressed the view that the UN was prioritizing the other and therefore that they had less ownership of peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{79}

Again, this effect is greater with elite ownership than liberal ownership, but it exists to a degree with both. While liberal ownership may include a broad cross-section of society, it excludes those who diverge normatively from the UN. The UN thus demonstrates a clear partiality for a certain ‘type’ of local actor. With elite ownership, accusations of partiality are even easier to sustain. Because the UN gives ownership to only a small group of carefully selected actors, and usually gives them a greater degree of substantive ownership, much of the population will feel excluded from the process of planning, executing, and monitoring peacebuilding and reconstruction. Moreover, because the UN tends to focus primarily on governmental—as opposed to non-governmental—elites, members of the opposition, smaller political parties, and former rebel groups are often quick to protest that the UN is biased and ‘plays favorites.’ In Congo, as mentioned, nearly all of the opposition politicians interviewed claimed that they had been to a large extent excluded from the peacebuilding process, and that even if the UN was obliged to work with the elected government, peacebuilding would not be truly legitimate or sustainable without their input as well.\textsuperscript{80} In other words, the UN’s selective approach to local ownership renders peacebuilding less legitimate by excluding some actors from the process of determining the future of their country.

\textsuperscript{79} Interviews with Congolese politicians and civil society actors, Kinshasa, March 2011.
\textsuperscript{80} Interviews with Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, March 2011.
5.3.3. Indigenousness

Third, selective ownership also compromises the indigenousness of peacebuilding. Ownership is thought to render peacebuilding more indigenous by allowing a wide array of citizens from different ethnic, religious, tribal, geographic, and socio-economic backgrounds the opportunity to contribute to the process of peacebuilding and thus ensure that local values, norms, and methods of conflict resolution are incorporated into the UN’s efforts. By limiting the number and type of local actor considered eligible to participate in peacebuilding and determine the political future of the country, the degree of indigenousness is necessarily diminished.

With liberal ownership, as mentioned, because it prioritizes the inclusion of different segments of society and different geographic areas, local owners tend to be a more diverse group than with elite ownership. Accordingly, one may be persuaded that they bring a more ‘accurate’ or nuanced picture of local culture and norms to the table than were only elites allowed to participate. However, with liberal ownership, those who do not share the liberal values of the UN are usually excluded, and along with them, their norms, culture, and conflict management practices, leading to a less representative view of local culture and norms—indeed, one that is hardly representative at all and instead simply mirrors the UN’s values.

With elite ownership, indigenousness is also restricted. Because ownership is granted exclusively or at least primarily to a select group of usually national-level political and military actors, they are unlikely to represent a complete picture of the culture, norms, values, and conflict management practices of the population at large. Where elites are democratically elected and electoral laws ensure some form of representation by population and a degree of geographic parity, this effect may be mitigated. But in the immediate aftermath of conflict, where democratic elections may
not have taken place or where electoral laws often result in winner-takes-all outcomes, elites are unlikely to reflect the indigenous culture and values of the entire country. In addition, because elite ownership usually grants somewhat more substantive ownership to local actors, the ability of elites to promote their views of appropriate governance structures and peacebuilding methods will mean that other views are sidelined to an even greater extent. Accordingly, any boost to self-determination and benefits in terms of legitimacy and sustainability associated with more indigenous peacebuilding are likely to be weakened by elite ownership.

5.3.4. Capacity Building

Fourth, capacity building is also compromised by the UN’s selective way of operationalizing local ownership. As described in Chapter 2, building the capacity of a wide array of local actors is thought to ensure that UN efforts complement rather than substitute for local capacities where they exist and enhance them where they are lacking so that local actors can sustain peacebuilding independently. In addition, it is also thought that capacity building through direct participation in peacebuilding will translate into greater political awareness and future participation in political processes and institution building. However, with liberal ownership, while the UN may organize meetings and consultations for many local actors, it excludes those actors who are illiberal. Similarly, it may hold trainings on political party development, human rights, child protection, or judicial processes, but again it tends to pass over illiberal or extreme actors in favor of moderate ones. In addition, as described in the previous chapter, it rarely holds these trainings on a continual basis that builds up capacity over time. Accordingly, while capacity building may initially touch a large group of local actors, it is unlikely to generate the kind of capacity in the medium to longer term that
will bolster the sustainability of peacebuilding and enable local actors to fully
determine the path of post-conflict political development in their country. Moreover,
as mentioned, the initial level of capacity of marginalized, underrepresented, or
remote groups is frequently so low that the boost from one or two trainings is hardly
likely to bring such actors to a level where they can sustain the continued
consolidation of peace in any substantive way following the departure of the UN.

With elite ownership, capacity building faces the opposite problem. It may be
directed at actors whose initial level of capacity is higher, but it targets far fewer of
them, thus limiting the reach of the capacities that are built. In other words, elite
ownership concentrates capacity in the hands of a few actors, who may not be
representative or who may pay little attention to remote areas and marginalized
groups. More importantly, elite political actors are more likely to have particularistic
or self-interested political agendas, ones that aim to secure their political positions,
wealth, and power or that of particular ethnic, religious, or geographic groups, rather
than to ensure the just distribution of resources or ensure that all voices are
represented. The UN’s focus on them may thus simply better enable them to pursue
those agendas and will therefore appear to many as a way of ensuring that a particular
post-conflict political vision is imposed on the country.

5.4. Conclusion

As has been shown in this chapter, in contrast to the discourse of ownership
explored in Chapter 2, which stresses the inclusion of as broad an array of local actors
as possible, the UN operationalizes ownership in a highly selective way. Different UN
actors use different criteria for making these choices, with some opting for a values-
based selection process and others for a capacity-based process, but both result in
restricted groups of local owners. This selection gives rise to two overall approaches to ownership in practice—liberal and elite ownership—which prioritize the UN’s two operational goals of short-term results and of overall liberalization differently. Liberal ownership selects liberal local actors regardless of their capacity levels in an attempt to promote moderate actors and reduce the perceived risk that most local actors will engage in divisive and illiberal behavior if given the opportunity. Elite ownership, by contrast, selects actors with greater perceived technical skills, regardless of their dedication to liberal values, in an attempt to fend off the problems of efficiency and output delivery that UN staff associate with the excessive involvement of local actors in peacebuilding. As mentioned, because these two approaches to ownership are adopted by different actors within a UN peacebuilding mission, they tend to be undertaken simultaneously, leading to an overall contradictory approach to local ownership in practice, one that prioritizes different actors differently and grants them different degrees of ownership and influence.

However, while they may prioritize the UN’s operational goals differently and result in contradictory practices, both liberal and elite ownership prioritize operational objectives above the more normative goal of promoting self-determination and non-imposition. Because they are selective, both of these approaches to local ownership cut out at least some local actors from the process of peacebuilding, thus limiting the benefits of enhanced consent, impartiality, indigenousness, and capacity building that are proclaimed by the inclusive discourse of ownership. In other words, because the UN operationalizes ownership in ways that are selective—though with varying selection criteria—benefits that derive from breadth and inclusion, including the preservation of self-determination and the minimization of imposition, are inhibited.
More broadly, by retaining the power to select which local actors are entitled to ‘own’ peacebuilding, the UN again reveals a reluctance to relinquish control over peacebuilding. In other words, because those who may participate in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and peace consolidation are ‘chosen’ by the UN, as opposed to their being selected through some sort of domestic process, the UN appears to be unwilling to turn over too great a degree of ownership to local actors.

As the discussion in this chapter and the preceding chapter has shown, theories and expectations of how ownership works are thrown into doubt not only by the ways in which the UN understands ownership, but also by the ways in which it translates ownership into practice. Both understandings and practices of ownership and the selection of local owners by the UN reveal an adjusted and restricted version of the ownership present in discourse, one that suggests that the UN is prioritizing the operational objectives of liberalization and outputs above the normative objective of preserving self-determination. Nevertheless, as described in Chapter 1, the UN’s discursive emphasis on local ownership has only become increasingly ardent and increasingly ubiquitous, suggesting that while the UN’s behavior may belie a dedication to operational objectives, local ownership may still retain discursive value for the UN. I turn to the legitimation function of local ownership discourse in the next chapter.
6.1. Introduction

As has been shown in the preceding three chapters, there is a significant gap between the rhetoric and the reality of local ownership in UN peacebuilding. More specifically, the ways in which the UN understands and operationalizes local ownership in peacebuilding diverge substantially from the discourse of ownership: whereas the latter describes an open and inclusive approach to peacebuilding that prizes the input and participation of all national actors in order to preserve self-determination and minimize external imposition, the former reveal an approach to local ownership that is restrictive, ad hoc, and selective, and thus diminishes any positive effect on enhancing local perceptions of legitimacy and sustainability. As discussed, the reason that UN staff implicitly adopt this restrictive approach to ownership both conceptually and operationally is that they perceive local ownership to imperil two important operational goals: the delivery of demonstrable outputs in the short term and the overall liberalization and democratization of the post-conflict state.

Nevertheless, as mentioned, the UN continues to invoke the broad and inclusive rhetoric of local ownership. As described in Chapter 1, the discourse of local ownership is present in nearly all UN documents and guidelines on peacebuilding, which describe it as something that ought to be done, that is right, and that is a moral imperative.¹ UN staff echo these sentiments, arguing emphatically that local ownership is right and is a necessary principle for peacebuilding.² These statements

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and declarations suggest that local ownership, while being considered a relatively risky *operational* approach to peacebuilding, still retains value as a *discursive* tool for the UN. More specifically, while the UN perceives local ownership in practice as a potential risk to its operational objectives, it remains uncomfortable with the violation of self-determination that peacebuilding entails, and as such it invokes the rhetoric of local ownership as a way of portraying what it is doing in a more favorable normative light.³ In this way, the discourse of local ownership is used to ‘cloak’ what is otherwise a highly intrusive and imposing activity in normatively acceptable terms, thus enabling the UN to overcome the apparent conflict between its operational and normative objectives and, more broadly, between its operational and normative identities—even if, in practice, the UN behaves differently.⁴ In other words, the discourse of local ownership is intended to provide legitimacy for the UN’s peacebuilding efforts.

However if local ownership is a discursive ‘tool’—that is, an instrument used to achieve legitimacy—then it must be deployed in order to achieve one or more particular objectives: for whom or what does the UN seek legitimacy by invoking the rhetoric of local ownership? Who judges the UN’s legitimacy? What kind of legitimacy is implied by these efforts? And are its legitimation efforts successful? In the case of local ownership, there appear to be two levels of legitimation occurring simultaneously: one between the UN and local actors and one internal to the UN. First, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the UN attempts to create or bolster perceptions of the legitimacy of its peacebuilding activities in the eyes of local actors by showing that they are being undertaken with sensitivity to their aspirations and culture, thereby preserving their self-determination and minimizing the imposition of

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³ Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’, 346-347.
⁴ Ibid., 347.
the UN’s interests and preferences on them. I call this *exogenous legitimation*.

Second, the UN engages in a process of self-legitimation in which it seeks to justify its actions to itself by claiming to act in line with its own principles and normative identity, in spite of its operational behavior. To use Rodney Barker’s term, this is a type of *endogenous legitimation*. This form of legitimation is aimed at the UN itself, and does not necessarily affect perceptions of legitimacy in the eyes of local actors, nor is it intended to.

This chapter evaluates the legitimation function of local ownership, examining how the UN invokes the discourse of local ownership to overcome the violation of its own principles inherent within its particular operationalization of ownership. I argue, as mentioned, that the UN undertakes this discursive legitimation with two audiences in mind—local actors and the UN itself. Most broadly, the discursive function of local ownership shows how the UN attempts to balance between its normative and operational objectives—that is, between its normative and operational identities—by attempting to portray its actions as in accordance with institutional principles that it itself espouses and promotes, even where its actual behavior contravenes them.

Importantly, the discursive use of local ownership to portray actions a certain way and thereby generate legitimacy implies a particular type of legitimacy, one that relates to compliance with norms and principles, rather than to operational effectiveness. Indeed, the conviction that local ownership can boost legitimacy and sustainability by ensuring adherence to institutional principles reveals a conceptualization of legitimacy in which the UN’s actual behavior and the outcomes

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it achieves are less relevant than the way in which it behaves.\(^6\) However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the UN’s identity is not purely normative; it is also an operational actor, for whom legitimacy may be measured more in terms of its achievement of its stated concrete objectives. Accordingly, it is unclear whether a discursive emphasis on compliance with principles alone can actually boost the UN’s legitimacy.

Indeed, because of the gap between its rhetoric and its actual behavior, the UN’s legitimation efforts appear to be relatively unsuccessful in the eyes of local actors. More specifically, the UN’s operationalization of local ownership fails to live up to the discourse of local ownership in two ways: the scope of participation and the breadth of participants. Local actors are, as shall be shown, keenly aware of this gap, and remain largely unpersuaded by the UN’s discursive efforts. The legitimation function of local ownership discourse then appears to be primarily meaningful for the UN itself, but does little to boost local perceptions of legitimacy.

This chapter begins with a brief examination of conceptions of legitimacy and legitimation, including a discussion of audiences for legitimacy. I then turn to a more in-depth examination of the two levels of legitimation outlined above, before

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\(^6\) These two different types of legitimacy are often categorized as procedural or process legitimacy and output or substantive legitimacy. The first focuses on the means employed for the achievement of an organization’s stated goals and entails a belief that the way in which it exercises its authority is fair, equitable, and in accordance with accepted norms. In other words, procedural legitimacy stems from adherence to particular principles in the implementation of activities, principles that are generally shared among actors in the legitimacy relationship. The second focuses not on how an entity achieves its stated goals, but if it achieves them. In this conception of legitimacy, the achievement of stated objectives is not something distinct from legitimacy, it is itself a type of legitimacy. On the former, see Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 18-19; Tom R. Tyler ‘Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,’ *Annual Review of Psychology* 57 (2006); and Steffek, ‘The Legitimation of International Governance,’ 256-257. On the latter, see Fritz Wilhelm Scharpf, *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Mark C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,’ *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 580; and Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, 18-19.
discussing how local ownership demonstrates the UN’s continuous balancing act between the different obligations of its operational and normative selves.

6.2. Legitimacy and Legitimation

The literature on legitimacy is vast, and definitions proliferate. Many of these focus on an authority’s right to govern, while others conversely emphasize the duty of the governed to obey. All, however, suggest that the concept requires at least two entities in a hierarchical relationship—that is, one characterized by an imbalance of power between the two entities—and that legitimacy is a public status ascribed based on shared general principles of what is right or good. Coleman notes that legitimacy applies not only to actors but also to actions. Accordingly, legitimacy may be defined as the recognition or perception that an organization or its actions exist or are undertaken in accordance with generally accepted socially embedded beliefs about what is right, proper, and fair.

There are two important elements within this definition that deserve further elucidation. First, because this definition of legitimacy entails the ascription of a status or judgment by one entity to another, it necessarily entails the element of

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audience. Second, because legitimacy is an ascribed or recognized status, it also entails actions to seek or claim that ascription or recognition—that is, legitimation.⁹

First, as an ascribed, relational attribute, legitimacy is dependent on audience: it cannot exist if it is not perceived or judged to exist.¹⁰ Such a judgment is usually given when the expectations of the subordinate party in the hierarchical relationship described above, expectations that are derived from the shared values of the two parties, are met by the dominant party. However, many discussions of legitimacy in practice fail to specify audience.¹¹ Legitimacy is often described as existing, increasing, or decreasing in an almost abstract sense, without being associated with the particular points of view and perceptions of involved actors. Indeed, in the case of local ownership, the discourse simply asserts that ownership can render peacebuilding more legitimate and sustainable, and that particular actions taken on the part of the UN will achieve this outcome, but it does not articulate in whose eyes legitimacy and sustainability will be increased—that is, who will judge legitimacy and sustainability to have been bolstered by the actions of the UN. Accordingly, judgments of whether local ownership in peacebuilding can in fact render the latter more legitimate and sustainable—that is, whether local ownership can deliver in practice what it is presumed to in theory—are left unclear. Perhaps most importantly, even those analyses that do highlight the importance of legitimacy usually fail to take into

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account the scope for self-legitimation—that is, when an actor engages in particular actions in order to reinforce its own perceptions of itself as a certain type of actor.\textsuperscript{12}

The potential audiences for judging the existence of legitimacy and the prospects for sustainability within peacebuilding are many, including the intervener itself, the domestic public(s) of the intervening state(s), the population of the host country, states neighboring the intervening state(s) as well as those neighboring the host country, and the broader international community.\textsuperscript{13} In the case of local ownership, because local ownership addresses the relationship between the UN and national actors in a particular country setting, for our purposes, these two are the most important.\textsuperscript{14}

Second, legitimacy is necessarily intertwined with the act of legitimation. If legitimacy cannot exist without being judged to do so by one entity or claimed to do so by another, then actions to seek it or claim it are then also essential to the existence of legitimacy. Legitimation in this sense is ‘observable human activity,’ as opposed to the attribute of legitimacy itself, which does not exist in concrete terms.\textsuperscript{15} Actors may seek legitimacy and thus engage in practices of legitimation for many reasons. Most

\textsuperscript{12} See, for example, Coleman, \textit{International Organisations and Peace Enforcement}, and Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy.’ The primary exception to this is Rodney Barker’s work on self-legitimation in \textit{Legitimating Identities}.

\textsuperscript{13} Coleman, speaking of peace enforcement operations, which differ from peacebuilding operations, lists four potential audiences of legitimacy: domestic public opinion in the intervener’s state, the public within the country of deployment, neighbors of the intervening state, and the international community. \textit{International Organisations and Peace Enforcement}, 24-26.

\textsuperscript{14} As noted in Chapter 1, neither the UN nor national actors can be deemed monolithic, and judgments of legitimacy may vary within them. However, my research did not find that such variations were drastic, and thus micro-level analysis of subdivisions within these two broad groups does not provide significant additional insight.

\textsuperscript{15} Barker, \textit{Legitimating Identities}, 23. Gow and Dandeker describe legitimation as ‘a complex process which refers to the dynamics of the social compact between those in positions of authority and those subject to that authority.’ James Gow and Christopher Dandeker, ‘The Future of Peace-Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success,’ \textit{Armed Forces and Society} 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 173.
analyses, however, focus on the need to justify the exercise of power, noting that power without legitimacy is simply coercion, whereas power with legitimacy is authority.\textsuperscript{16} The legitimation of power generally entails the subjection of power to shared and justifiable rules, as mentioned before, as a way to secure the consent of those subject to its exercise. As Beetham points out, ‘[w]here power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate.’\textsuperscript{17} This amounts to a very instrumental approach to legitimacy—what Suchman calls strategic legitimacy—in which legitimacy is ‘an \textit{operational resource} that organizations extract...from their cultural environments and that they employ in pursuit of their goals,’ here the compliance with institutional principles.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, local ownership is viewed as a ‘solution’ to the normative challenges inherent within peacebuilding, which implies, in turn, that legitimacy and sustainability are also viewed as challenges that can be overcome or technical elements that can be achieved through the instrumental use of local ownership. Wilén echoes this, noting that ‘legitimacy has become...a strategic tool – used when needed to explain or to justify actions that are on the verge of what is acceptable and what is not.’\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{17} Beetham, \textit{The Legitimation of Power}, 3. Beetham argues that power is legitimate when it complies with established rules, the rules are seen as justifiable by both the dominant and subordinate parties in the legitimacy relationship because they are based on shared beliefs, and the subordinate party consents to the power relation. 16.

\textsuperscript{18} Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy,’ 576, italics in the original.

\textsuperscript{19} Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’, 347.
Notably, one of the main ways in which actors seek this kind of instrumental legitimacy is through discourse. As Steffek has argued, the act of ‘giving reasons’ enables actors or institutions to rationally persuade others that they are legitimate, rather than to insist that they accept their legitimacy for abstract reasons.\(^\text{20}\) In this sense, legitimation is largely about acts of communication and representation and symbolic acts, and thus discourse becomes paramount to acts of legitimation by one party and judgments of legitimacy by the other.\(^\text{21}\) In the case of local ownership, invoking the rhetoric of ownership is intended to help the UN persuade local actors, as well as itself, that it is acting in accordance with shared norms of self-determination and non-imposition, which in turn are expected to preserve or generate legitimacy for UN peacebuilding. As Wilén notes, local ownership is a ‘value-adding and legitimizing discursive instrument’ for the UN, but one that is not backed up by much substance.\(^\text{22}\) Indeed, as was shown in Chapter 4, the practices of local ownership that the UN undertakes tend to be largely communicative or symbolic acts that constitute, in most instances, little more than ‘token ownership,’ but that are thought to demonstrate that the UN is acting with the desires and aspirations of the local population in mind. This is particularly notable because it means that actors may perceive themselves as able to gain legitimacy through words or declarations, even where their overall behavior ‘speaks differently.’ As Steffek notes, ‘legitimation


\(^{22}\) Wilén notes that local ownership is a ‘value-adding and legitimizing discursive instrument’ for the UN. ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’, 337, 338, 340.
seems to be created through a process of communication. In other words, actors may consider legitimacy to derive primarily or at least partly from discourse or at best symbolic acts, as opposed to from conduct or operational output.

Importantly, as mentioned, the UN’s use of the discourse of local ownership as a means to generate legitimacy implies a particular conceptualization of legitimacy. If the violation of self-determination entailed by peacebuilding operations is thought to damage legitimacy, then attempting to preserve the latter in order to boost legitimacy suggests that legitimacy is, in the eyes of the UN, perceived to derive from compliance with institutional principles. In other words, the achievement of normative objectives—that is, the continued adherence to norms and principles by the UN—is considered a key source of legitimacy. However, the UN is also, as described, an operational actor, one for which the generation of legitimacy may hinge more upon the achievement of operational outcomes, suggesting that attempts to boost legitimacy through normative compliance may only partly boost the UN’s legitimacy, a point to which I return later.

6.3. Exogenous Legitimation

As mentioned, the UN’s use of local ownership as a legitimation tool entails two processes of legitimation occurring simultaneously. The first of these entails efforts on the part of the UN to bolster perceptions of its legitimacy among local actors in the host country of a peacebuilding mission. This type of legitimation fits well with the common conceptions of legitimacy described above, in which a more powerful actor seeks justification for the exercise of its power over a less powerful

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actor by invoking shared values and ideas of justice and correctness.\textsuperscript{24} In the case of UN peacebuilding, as mentioned, the UN calls upon local ownership as representative of the shared principles of self-determination and non-imposition—that is, it portrays local ownership as a strategy or operational approach to peacebuilding that can preserve self-determination and minimize the degree of external intrusion into and imposition onto a country and therefore can render the UN’s intervention more normatively acceptable. In other words, local ownership as a discursive tool provides rhetoric with which the UN can more acceptably depict actions that are actually deeply intrusive and may deny self-determination.

As one DPKO official noted, ‘peacekeeping missions generate such resentment and frustration in populations… [The UN could] mitigate that a little bit if [it] built local ownership.’\textsuperscript{25} Accordingly, the UN undertakes the practices discussed in Chapter 4, such as public information campaigns, sensitizations, roundtables, and consultations—acts that are largely communication acts or symbolic efforts at the inclusion of local actors—in order to ‘build’ local ownership and portray its activities as aligned with the principles of self-determination and non-imposition. Importantly, many UN officials even acknowledged that it is the discourse of local ownership—rather than the reality of it—that is intended to generate legitimacy in the eyes of local actors. As one DPA official stated, local ownership ‘sounds politically correct,’ and as such is used discursively by the UN to placate the potential concerns of local actors that the UN is imposing its vision and interests upon them through its peacebuilding activities.\textsuperscript{26} Similarly, a senior MONUC official stated that local ownership was

\textsuperscript{24} On the asymmetrical power relationship between national and international actors in peacebuilding, see Hansen, ‘Local Ownership in Peace Operations,’ 42, and Reich, “‘Local Ownership’ in Conflict Transformation Projects.”

\textsuperscript{25} Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2009.

\textsuperscript{26} Interview with senior DPA official, New York, November 2009.
useful because it was important for the mission, and particularly the SRSG, not to be seen by local actors to be running the country on its own, even if, in effect, it is.27 Another senior UN official noted that talking about local ownership is ‘largely about signaling non-imposition.’28 In other words, the appearance of local ownership—achieved through a rhetorical emphasis on it by the mission—could protect the mission against accusations of imposition and neo-imperialism.29

However, as shown throughout this thesis, the UN’s approach to local ownership in practice, as opposed to discourse, actually constrains self-determination and heightens the imposition of UN preferences onto local actors in favor of the achievement of operational goals. More specifically, the actions of the UN fail to match its local ownership discourse in two ways: first, in the scope of participation and second, in the breadth of participants.

First, as discussed in Chapter 3, because the UN understands local ownership within a liberal framework and limits ownership to the appropriation of liberal structures and processes, the UN reduces the sphere of acceptable post-conflict political systems available to local actors, and thus the extent to which they themselves can determine their political future, and deepens the UN’s intrusion into the domestic political processes of the host state. This is exacerbated by the fact, discussed in Chapter 4, that the UN operationalizes local ownership in an ad hoc and restrictive way that minimizes the amount of agency actually turned over to local actors. Second, as shown in Chapter 5, because the UN approaches local ownership in practice in a selective way, in contrast to the inclusive discourse of ownership, even

27 One senior MONUC official noted that the SRSG of MONUC from 2003-2007, Ambassador William Swing, was ‘the most powerful person in Congo at a certain point.’ Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, February 2011.
28 Interview with senior UN official, New York, December 2010.
29 Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
where it does grant greater agency to local actors, it only does so for certain actors, thus heightening imposition by retaining the power to determine who can and who cannot participate in peacebuilding and post-conflict political development.

In these two ways, the UN’s invocation of local ownership in discourse fails to build legitimacy in the eyes of local actors, because its behavior does not match its rhetoric: its approach to the inclusion of local actors is both weak and imbalanced, and thus likely to be viewed as unfair, uneven, and, ultimately, out of sync with the principles of self-determination and non-imposition. In addition, the UN’s approach to local ownership also fails to coincide with local understandings of local ownership, which, as discussed in Chapter 3, put a much greater emphasis on ‘full’ self-determination than do UN ones. In short, the communicative and symbolic acts described previously are insufficient to constitute ownership and hence to boost the legitimacy of UN peacebuilding from the point of view of local actors.

Indeed, as described in Chapter 3, many Congolese expressed the feeling that the UN imposed its vision and preferences on them, despite its stating that it took into account their wishes and desires.\(^\text{30}\) One Congolese politician declared that, while the UN claims that Congo is a sovereign state and should be able to act of its own prerogative, ‘[the UN’s] actions have shown that it still feels that there is a lack of state and no legitimate authority in the country.’\(^\text{31}\) Another noted that the UN’s rhetoric and its actions ‘do not match up,’ calling the UN ‘hypocritical,’ and another described MONUC as ‘theatrical’ but not ‘sincere.’\(^\text{32}\) Another Congolese politician said, ‘we don’t have a problem with [the UN’s] principles, but with its behavior, we

\(^{30}\) Interviews with Congolese politicians, academics, and civil society actors, Kinshasa, March 2011.
\(^{31}\) Interview with Congolese politician, Kinshasa, March 2011.
\(^{32}\) Interviews with Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, March 2011.
do,’ asserting that ‘the UN does not act in accordance with its own principles.’ In other words, because it is not matched by action, the inclusive discourse of local ownership does little to generate legitimacy for UN peacebuilding in the eyes of local actors.

The failure of local ownership to generate legitimacy from the perspective of local actors thus comes about largely because of the gap between the UN’s rhetoric and its actual behavior. While the discourse of local ownership emphasizes that broad inclusion will ensure the self-determination of local actors while minimizing the degree to which the UN imposes its values and objectives on the host country, in practice, because the way the UN operationalizes local ownership is restricted and selective as opposed to broad and inclusive, it fails to ‘undo’ the deleterious effect of peacebuilding on self-determination, and as such to generate legitimacy in the eyes of local actors. In other words, because the UN’s actions do not live up to its promises, the expectations of those subject to it are not met and its sincerity is called into question, thus resulting in, if anything, a loss of legitimacy for the UN. As Wiharta notes, the personnel of peace operations ‘should abide by and try to embody the international norms that they seek to diffuse’ and a failure to do so will almost certainly undermine local perceptions of the UN’s legitimacy. Put differently, the UN must behave in accordance with the ways in which it says it will behave in order to be perceived as legitimate by local actors; if it does not, then the UN is likely to be

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33 Interview with Congolese politician, Kinshasa, March 2011.
34 Again, this ‘inconsistent rhetoric and behavior’ is another example of what many scholars call organized hypocrisy. Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping,’ 8, and Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy, xiii.
35 Sharon Wiharta, ‘The Legitimacy of Peace Operations,’ in SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 106. See also, Tyler, ‘Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,’ 382-383. Others have similarly argued with respect to international transitional administrations that the UN suffers from a lack of local legitimacy for
viewed as illegitimate by local actors. Wilén asserts that, ‘too great a discrepancy between what the UN promises and delivers would be a reason for allegations of illegitimacy,’ but notes that the use of discourse, and particularly the discourse of local ownership, can circumvent this. However, this study has found, as described, that local actors demonstrated a keen awareness of the difference between the UN’s discourse and its behavior, suggesting that efforts to use the discourse of local ownership to portray as locally owned actions that are implemented in a deeply intrusive way that curtails self-determination are unconvincing in the eyes of local actors.

In sum, local ownership does not deliver in practice what the UN’s discourse suggests it will or can—and thus it fails to build legitimacy for peacebuilding in the eyes of local actors. While the UN’s discourse may invoke broadly shared norms of self-determination and non-imposition and may tout local ownership as an operational means to ensuring that its actions remain compliant with and faithful to those principles, in practice, its subsequent actualization of local ownership falls short of these expectations. While the UN appears to believe that ‘talk and decisions [can] compensate for inconsistent action and satisfy demands without [its] actually taking action,’ local actors are cognizant of and sensitive to the discrepancy between talk and action, and it appears that discourse that is not backed up by action does little to generate perceptions of legitimacy among them.

failing to behave in accordance with the values it is attempting to instill—namely for behaving in a dictatorial fashion in order to establish liberal democracies. See Chopra, ‘The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor,’ and Knaus and Martin, ‘Travails of the European Raj.’

36 Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’, 348.
6.4. Endogenous Legitimation

While the UN’s efforts to create legitimacy in the eyes of local actors appear to fall flat, its invocation of local ownership discourse is also geared towards a different audience: the UN itself—in particular the staff of DPKO and its missions.³⁸ By emphasizing local ownership in peacebuilding and its presumed correlation with self-determination and non-imposition, UN staff are also attempting to convince themselves that they are acting in accordance with these principles—not to satisfy the concerns of the target population in the host state of a peacebuilding mission, but to satisfy their own concerns.

More specifically, as described in Chapter 1, the UN as an organization has certain perceptions of its own identity—what is stands for, how it behaves, and what its role in the world is. As mentioned, while the UN’s identity is manifold, two are most relevant to a discussion of peacebuilding operations. First, it is on the one hand an operational actor that participates actively and constructively in the management of conflicts around the world, and second, it is a normative actor that develops, upholds, and promotes norms and principles at the international level. These identities are not only external projections, they are also internal self-perceptions—that is, they define how UN staff see themselves and they help UN staff to gain and maintain a sense of

³⁸ As mentioned in Chapter 1, by the UN, I mean the staff of DPKO and its peacekeeping operations specifically. However, member states of the UN may also be key audiences for endogenous legitimation efforts. Divisions and sections within the UN Secretariat like DPKO may in particular try to ‘impress’ permanent members of the Security Council in order to secure continued support and funding for their work. The objective in such a case would, however, appear to be highly self-interested and would therefore not only have implications for the examination of self-legitimation attempts within the UN broadly defined but also for the study of local ownership, as it would imply an almost entirely instrumental and cosmetic ‘use’ of local ownership in peacebuilding. Other potential member state audiences include members of the Non-Aligned Movement and other sub-committees within the General Assembly. I return to the issue of other sections and branches of the UN in my concluding remarks in Chapter 8.
the worthiness and ‘rightness’ of their role in post-conflict situations. Yet, as described, peacebuilding after civil war usually entails deep intrusion into the domestic political processes of the host state and a curtailing of the latter’s right to self-determination, a principle the UN claims to uphold, which means that the UN is acting in breach of its own stated principles. In other words, its operational and normative identities come into conflict with one another.

As described, there is a fair amount of normative discomfort with this on the part of the UN, and UN staff interviewed for this study displayed a strong desire to convince themselves that they were not behaving in a neo-imperialist or imposing way in their peace operations. Accordingly, the UN’s use of local ownership for legitimation is partly aimed at reassuring itself that it is doing what it can to minimize the violation of its own principles—that is, that what it is doing remains normatively appropriate and acceptable and in line with its own standards, even where its actions may violate them.

According to Barker, this kind of behavior is a form of self-legitimation, in which the perceptions of an actor of his own actions are at least as important as, if not more so than, the perceptions of his actions by others.\textsuperscript{39} He notes that, ‘\textit{[i]n addition to the picture of legitimation frequently presented, as a means whereby subjects…authorise government, or rulers gain the consent of the ruled, legitimation is also an activity carried on by rulers for their own benefit’\textsuperscript{40} in which ‘the rulers themselves are the principal audience.’\textsuperscript{41} He further asserts that self-legitimation is a way for actors to build or reinforce their perceived identities, noting that ‘legitimation is an activity which serves to confirm the identity of the legitimator’—in this case,\textsuperscript{39}\textsuperscript{40}\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39} Barker, \textit{Legitimating Identities}, 14-15.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 51-52.
legitimation serves to reaffirm and revalidate the UN’s normative identity.\textsuperscript{42} He claims that such ‘self-absorbed’ processes of ‘endogenous legitimation’ are a characteristic and constitutive activity of those in power, and that accounts of legitimacy that overlook this aspect of the concept are incomplete.\textsuperscript{43}

In the case of local ownership, the UN invokes the discourse of ownership in order to remain compliant in its own eyes with its own standards of self-determination and non-imposition in the face of an activity that entails the violation of those principles. In other words, by claiming to take efforts to build local ownership in peacebuilding, it can claim to be undertaking peacebuilding in a way that minimizes the violation of key institutional principles and thus to be acting in accordance with the imperatives of its normative identity. And while, as described, the discourse of local ownership is partly intended to portray these activities in a more favorable light to those subject to them, it is also geared towards the UN itself, as a way of reassuring itself of its own continued legitimacy through its compliance with its own principles and its self-perception of its organizational identity as a normative actor in the international system.

Indeed, UN staff, whether at headquarters, in the field, or having held posts in both, all repeatedly stressed that local ownership was ‘the right thing to do.’ One senior MONUC staff noted that the ‘the principle is sound,’ adding that ‘there is no way around ownership and there shouldn’t be,’\textsuperscript{44} and another called it ‘essential.’\textsuperscript{45} Several other senior UN officials similarly noted that ‘the principle is fundamentally

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 112, 34-35.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 14-16, 30. While Barker’s argument is primarily about individual leaders, the process he describes of self-perceptions of legitimacy applies equally well to institutions as actors with power. Indeed, when setting up his argument, he only distinguishes between actors and actions or systems, noting that, it is ‘persons not systems, rulers not regimes, who are legitimated.’ 32.
\textsuperscript{44} Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
\textsuperscript{45} Interview with senior MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
sound’ and many insisted that it is a necessary approach to peacebuilding, declaring that the UN ‘must promote local ownership,’ and that ‘[one] can’t be against ownership.’

More importantly, UN staff explicitly linked their belief that local ownership is normatively appropriate and thus a source of legitimacy for the UN to its supposed ability to preserve the UN’s compliance with its own principles and standards—or at least the appearance of it—in its own eyes. One DPKO official declared that he agrees with the principle of local ownership because one ‘cannot have a continued strong external presence in a country, even if its goals are to help the people of that country.’ In other words, if a UN peacebuilding mission is somehow inherently illegitimate because it forces the UN to violate the principles of self-determination and non-imposition, principles which it itself espouses and promotes, then local ownership can help the UN to retrieve some of the legitimacy lost in its undertaking such a mission. Similarly, another DPKO official noted that without local ownership, peacebuilding would be nothing more than ‘foreign-imposed’ and as such unacceptable not only to the host country population but to UN staff themselves; by portraying the UN’s activities as locally-owned, however, UN staff view their own actions as interveners and peacebuilders as legitimate because they remain aligned with the UN’s normative identity. A senior MONUC official stated that, ‘ownership is a concept that fits with broader UN perceptions of itself, namely self-determination,’ and a senior UN official noted that local ownership ‘is a response to

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48 Interview with DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
49 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
50 Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
the anxiety [on the part of UN staff] that international interventions like peacekeeping operations are neo-colonial,’ and thus contrary to what the UN stands for and how it sees itself.51 Another argued that,

There is a deep-seated political bias in the UN that the UN stands for self-determination rather than externally-imposed, neo-imperial forms of governance. Local ownership fits that view nicely. This is an important part of the UN’s self-perception.52

In other words, the UN invokes the discourse of local ownership in order to reassure itself that it is behaving in line with its stated principles and values—ones that are critical to its identity as a normative and principled actor in international relations—and thus to reassure itself of its own continuing legitimacy and the legitimacy of its peacebuilding efforts.

However, again as mentioned above, that legitimacy can be gained by demonstrating adherence to institutional principles implies a particular type of legitimacy, one in which legitimacy derives from norm compliance, or at least the appearance of it. At the same time, however, as described earlier, the UN is also an operational actor, one whose identity is tied to its ability to deliver results and for whom legitimacy thus derives instead from outputs. Indeed, UN staff expressed concern that the excessive devolution of agency and responsibility for peacebuilding activities to local actors could imperil the achievement of two key operational objectives due to their perceived weakness and potentially illiberal tendencies, and accordingly it constrains local ownership to minimize that risk. As discussed in the previous three chapters, this restrictive approach to local ownership in practice underscores the fact that the UN remains highly cognizant of the importance of

51 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
52 Interview with senior UN official, Oxford, October 2011.
achieving results and fulfilling its mandate. In other words, this approach to local ownership, while it may deepen the UN’s intrusion into the host country and thus its violation of that country’s self-determination, demonstrates that the UN is also attempting to behave in line with the imperatives of its operational identity and suggests that doing so may also be perceived as a key source of legitimacy for the UN.

While this operational sacrifice of principles to results appears to be largely implicit—the UN does not purposefully augment its violation of the host country’s self-determination—its actions and its words thus tell two different stories. While the discourse of local ownership may suggest that compliance with the principles of self-determination and non-imposition are paramount for both the UN’s self-perceptions of its legitimacy as well as the perceptions of local actors, its actions suggest that its ability to fulfill its mandate and demonstrate effectiveness are also viewed, at least internally, as equally key to its legitimacy. Nevertheless, the UN’s persistent discourse of local ownership suggests that it still serves a self-legitimation function for the UN. That is, it helps the UN to justify its intrusion into and imposition onto the host country by depicting it as locally owned, even where more material objectives are being given precedence.

6.5. Conclusion

As has been shown, the discursive value of local ownership for the UN is two-fold. On the one hand, it serves as a way of communicating to local actors that the UN is acting with sensitivity to their aspirations, culture, and traditions, and thus minimizing the affront to their self-determination that is entailed by the presence of a peacebuilding mission, and on the other, it serves as a way for the UN to convince...
itself that it is remaining true to its identity as a normative actor that upholds principles and values at a global level, even though its behavior may suggest that it is acting more in accordance with its operational identity.

While it is not inherent that these two identities should conflict—that is, there is no objective reason why the operational and normative identities and objectives of an actor should contradict one another—in the case of peacebuilding the deep intrusion needed to have any meaningful positive impact on post-conflict peacebuilding and for the UN to fulfill its mandate necessarily implies an infringement on the right of self-determination of the host country, at least where the wishes of local and international actors diverge. Accordingly, the UN faces a situation where it is compelled to sacrifice legitimacy either in terms of compliance with its stated principles or in terms of its ability to effectively fulfill its mandate. As Wilén notes,

[There is] pressure on the UN as an institution to behave and act according to certain international values such as national self-determination… These values are, however, often contradictory and the UN finds itself in a position where it has to uphold contradictory goals and principles at the same time as it needs to be effective in the field.53

The discourse of local ownership is thought to help overcome this difficulty by portraying the UN’s intrusive actions as compliant with the principles of self-determination and non-imposition. This legitimation function of local ownership is targeted at two different audiences—local actors and the UN itself. However, as discussed, the UN’s actions, as opposed to its discourse, show a greater emphasis on the achievement of operational objectives. Because the UN fears that local ownership, construed in discourse as broad, inclusive, and substantive, will complicate, delay, or

53 Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’, 347.
impede the achievement of its operational goals, the UN constrains and restricts local ownership to fit within parameters that it feels will minimize that risk and enable it to better achieve its goals—specifically, it restricts both the breadth of participants and the scope of their participation.

In this sense, then, there is a significant gap between the UN’s rhetoric of local ownership and the reality of it, a gap that is not lost on local actors. Indeed, the local actors interviewed for this study demonstrated a keen awareness of this discrepancy, and they therefore appeared to remain largely unpersuaded by the UN’s discourse. In other words, because the expectations of inclusion and agency contained within the discourse of ownership are not met by the UN’s actions, local actors’ perceptions of the UN’s legitimacy do not appear to be boosted by local ownership. Put another way, because the UN’s actions fail to actually protect self-determination or actually lessen the degree of external imposition, any discourse that claims otherwise holds little sway with local actors. Indeed, local actors suggested that they will only view a UN peacebuilding mission as legitimate if its words are matched by deeds—in this case, if the UN actually grants them ownership, grants it indiscriminately rather than selectively, and allows them to set the overall course for the peacebuilding process in their country. While, as discussed in Chapter 3, their view of what that direction should be may differ from what the UN wants, for local actors, legitimacy will only materialize if their ownership over peacebuilding goes beyond ‘token’ and selective ownership to the much more substantive version of ownership present in ownership discourse.

Most broadly, the gap between the UN’s discourse and its behavior shows how the UN is continually attempting to balance between its normative and operational selves, a balancing act that is fraught with contradictions and challenges.
While the UN attempts to assuage its normative discomfort about the violation of its own principles entailed by peacebuilding by cloaking its efforts in the language of local ownership, the way it subsequently constrains local ownership in practice shows that its discursive actions do not eliminate the trade-offs inherent in peacebuilding, they simply portray them a certain way. Indeed, the fact that local actors are unconvinced by discourse suggests that ultimately, the tension between the UN’s operational and normative imperatives is not a contradiction that can be overcome or ‘fixed’ through particular policy choices; it is an inherent trait of the practice of peacebuilding.

Moreover, for the UN’s operational self, legitimacy may derive from outputs—from the ability to demonstrate the successful fulfillment of its mandate through the delivery of tangible outputs and the liberalization of the post-conflict state. Accordingly, the fact that the UN appears to prioritize its operational objectives above its normative ones does not mean that it is behaving illegitimately, but simply that it may be attempting to secure legitimacy a different way. However, ironically, the combination of the UN’s local ownership discourse and its restrictive approach to ownership in practice also complicates the achievement of these operational objectives. I turn to this issue in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7
Local Ownership: An Operational Obstacle?

7.1. Introduction

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 showed that the way in which the UN understands and operationalizes ownership differs sharply from the discourse of local ownership. In particular, ownership as understood and practiced by the UN, as opposed to the rhetoric that the UN invokes, appears to restrict and inhibit legitimacy and sustainability, at least in the eyes of local actors, rather than boost it, by deepening the violation of self-determination and the degree of imposition entailed by international intervention. This is because the UN constrains, molds, and adjusts local ownership so that it does not imperil two key operational objectives: the delivery of measurable outputs and the liberalization of the post-conflict state.

More specifically, there is an expectation within the UN that local ownership in peacebuilding will compel the UN to turn control and decision-making power over to actors who may not have the capacities to take key decisions and implement technically complex peacebuilding activities and who may continue to prioritize particularistic agendas and divisive, illiberal interests above liberalization and democracy. Accordingly, the UN adapts ownership as portrayed in discourse conceptually and operationally to minimize the perceived risk to those goals. In other words, the form of ownership that it adopts in practice is one that represents an implicit attempt to safeguard its operational goals.

As a result, as discussed in the previous chapter, local ownership appears to be primarily a discursive tool for legitimation for the UN—one that it uses first to generate local perceptions of legitimacy and second to reinforce its self-perceptions of its own legitimacy. More specifically, it uses the broad and inclusive discourse of local ownership to portray its peacebuilding activities as compliant with the principles
of self-determination and non-imposition, and as such in line with its identity as a normative actor in international relations, even where its behavior diverges from them.

However, legitimacy for the UN does not derive solely from compliance with principles, as the discourse of local ownership may imply. It also derives from effectiveness—that is, the achievement of stated operational objectives. As explained, in the context of peacebuilding, the UN has two identities—one normative and one operational—which imply different sets of objectives and different sources of legitimacy. For its operational self, liberalizing the post-conflict state and delivering concrete outputs in line with its mandate are key, and if local ownership is perceived to put those at risk, then curtailing local ownership is a logical step to take. In other words, though the UN constrains and limits local ownership in practice in order to achieve its operational goals—even if doing so appears to compromise its normative goals—doing so may help the UN to achieve legitimacy through effectiveness. As Barnett and Finnemore note, many believe that ‘organizations should be judged by what they accomplish, and if they do not deliver what they promise then their lack of effectiveness injures their legitimacy.’ Speaking of peace operations specifically, Gow and Dandeker as well as Mersiades argue that that performance is one of the most crucial factors affecting the legitimacy of peacekeeping. Accordingly, though it may deleteriously affect the UN’s achievement of its more normative goals—that is,

1 This is often referred to as output or substantive legitimacy. Suchman calls it ‘consequential legitimacy.’ Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy,’ 580; Scharpf, Governing in Europe; and Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, 18-19.
ongoing adherence to the principles of self-determination and non-imposition—the way the UN constricts local ownership is thought to contribute to the achievement of the UN’s operational goals, and thus may help to generate legitimacy based on effectiveness.

However, a closer analysis of local ownership in practice suggests that the way the UN restricts local ownership may actually inhibit the achievement of these two operational objectives—on the one hand by allowing local actors too little agency and on the other by allowing them too much. More specifically, the combination of liberal ownership on the one hand and elite ownership on the other, which variously grant local actors merely ‘token ownership’ or a more substantial degree of influence over the activities of the UN, leaves the UN caught between actors with little capacity and little real influence and those with capacity and influence but often divisive agendas and illiberal tendencies. In practice, because these two approaches are undertaken simultaneously by the UN, this is likely to variably overemphasize and underemphasize the relative power of various actors and distort the relationship between the UN and all local actors, both elites and non-elites, thus leading to real operational difficulties. In other words, though the UN restricts local ownership in practice precisely to promote the achievement of its operational goals, doing so, ironically, may actually have the opposite effect. Importantly, this effect is exacerbated by the UN’s repeated and insistent discursive emphasis on local ownership, which enables local actors to push back against the UN where it restricts their participation in peacebuilding by citing its own discourse.

This chapter explores the operational effects of the UN’s restrictive approach to local ownership, examining first whether local ownership helps or hinders the delivery of concrete results in peacebuilding and second whether it promotes or
inhibits the liberalization of the host country. I show that local ownership, whether in its liberal or elite permutations, actually obstructs, slows, and sometimes even prevents the achievement of these goals. With regards to the delivery of results, in the case of liberal ownership, the UN is often obliged to work with actors with little capacity, resulting in slower processes and fewer outputs in the near term; at the same time, in the case of elite ownership, because the UN concentrates ownership in the hands of a powerful few, it often loses leverage to actors who resist the UN’s involvement in particular issue areas, thus undercutting its ability to achieve results in those areas—an effect that is, ironically, exacerbated by its regular recourse to the discourse of local ownership. With regards to liberalization, liberal ownership often only grants ‘token ownership’ to relatively weak local actors, who are unable to definitively affect the ideological orientation of state institutions; at the same time, elite ownership grants agency to a highly restricted group of actors who often have political agendas that differ from that of the UN, thus often entrenching pre-war and war-time power structures and inhibiting the liberalization of the post-conflict state.

Because both liberal and elite ownership are practiced concurrently by the UN, the overall effect of ownership on both results delivery and liberalization thus tends to be negative, suggesting that local ownership as constrained by the UN in practice actually prevents the achievement of operational goals. Ultimately, because, as mentioned, the UN may derive legitimacy not only from compliance with stated principles but also from the achievement of stated goals, local ownership may inhibit the generation of legitimacy through effectiveness as well as through adherence to stated principles.
7.2. Local Ownership and Outputs

As shown in the previous chapters, both the UN’s understanding and operationalizations of ownership—including both liberal and elite approaches to ownership—are, to varying degrees, inimical to self-determination and deepen the degree of external imposition on the host country entailed by international intervention. This comes about because the UN implicitly constrains ownership in practice in order to prevent it from imperiling the organization’s goals of output delivery and post-conflict liberalization. However, as discussed, liberal and elite ownership differ in their relative emphasis on these two goals. More specifically, liberal ownership emphasizes the liberalization of the host country above the efficient and rapid delivery of outputs, while elite ownership emphasizes the efficient and rapid delivery of outputs with less heed to the liberal nature of the means used to achieve them. This implies, in practice, that ownership may have contradictory or ambivalent effects on a mission’s ability to deliver concrete outputs. This is particularly the case because the UN adopts both liberal and elite approaches to local ownership simultaneously within its missions.

Determining whether the emphasis on local ownership in peacebuilding translates into tangible outputs is not the same thing as measuring mission output in absolute terms. The latter is the result of a number of positive and negative influences, such as available funding, mission strength, donor support, and degree of stability, and establishing causality between UN actions to ‘create’ ownership and mission output is thus fraught with uncertainties. However, what is important here is to analyze whether local ownership can contribute to or instead impedes the delivery of concrete results in general, not whether the level of results achieved by a mission is high or low according to an arbitrary standard or to targets set by the mission. To
examine this question, I examine the UN’s two broad approaches to local ownership—liberal and elite ownership—in turn.

7.2.1. Liberal Ownership and Outputs

As described in Chapter 5, some UN staff blame liberal ownership, because it emphasizes consultation with a broad array of actors with heed only to their liberal credentials but not their technical capacities, for impeding the implementation of specific peacebuilding tasks, such as disarmament, elections, and the passage of legislation. In other words, because local ownership as broadly conceived in its liberal version entails interacting and working with actors that often have little capacity for peacebuilding, have little influence on major power dynamics, and may be located in remote and inaccessible areas outside of the capital, the UN is often forced to forgo the rapid delivery of demonstrable outputs and the completion of particular projects for the sake of lengthy processes of identification of liberal actors, assessment of their capabilities, consultation, capacity building, and coordination. As one senior MONUC official noted, ‘the UN must start by identifying local constituencies and groups that have an interest in strengthening and supporting our agenda,’ but noted that doing so takes a very long time and that such actors may be hard to find after conflict.4 Another senior MONUC official echoed this sentiment, recalling that the insistence on local ownership and in particular on working with moderate actors ‘slowed everything down to no end.’5 Accordingly, in practice, with this version of ownership, because the UN maintains its focus primarily on generating liberal processes and working with moderate actors regardless of their capacity levels, concrete outputs usually come

4 Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
5 Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
about more slowly and less reliably. Put another way, the UN prioritizes its goal of liberalization above its goal of immediate results.

In Congo, for example, in December 2009 (with implementation beginning in earnest in April 2010), MONUC introduced a ‘conditionality policy’ in its relationship with the Congolese military, the FARDC. In short, the policy stated that the mission would no longer provide logistics or other support to those military units whose commanders were responsible for committing human rights violations or abusing the civilian population and that all units would be vetted before support was extended to them. The introduction of this policy coincided with the mission’s conduct of relatively large-scale joint operations with the FARDC to combat the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) in eastern DRC and provided an important caveat to the mandate, which stated that the mission shall support the FARDC. Yet the UN opted to put in place a policy that prevented or at least slowed its achievement of certain mandated security tasks in the interests of promoting its liberal goals—here the defense of human rights. Several UN staff members acknowledged that this policy, while ‘right’ from a liberal point of view, did render the conduct of operations more complicated. As one senior MONUC official noted, ‘the FARDC conditionality policy…made things very difficult,’ first because it obliged the UN to go through a lengthy vetting process before joint action could be

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6 Interview with DPKO military official, New York, November 2009.

7 See United Nations, S/RES/1856, and United Nations, S/RES/1906. The FDLR are comprised of Hutu génocidaires who fled to DRC from Rwanda in 1994 following the genocide and the triumph of Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces under Paul Kagame. While the majority of current FDLR members were very young at the time and are unlikely to have participated in the genocide, they are considered an element of instability in eastern DRC and efforts to repatriate them to Rwanda have long been undertaken. While the 2009 operation, *Kimia II*, represents the first time the UN has used force to dislodge them, Rwanda has repeatedly invaded Congo under the pretext of eliminating them.

8 Interview with DPKO military official, New York, November 2009.
initiated or continued, even though operations and fighting were ongoing, and second because it created resentment among government and military officials, rendering them less disposed to share information and cooperate with mission officials, thus further slowing action and the achievement of security tasks.\(^9\)

Similarly, many local actors—including several government officials—wondered why the UN pledged to play a smaller role in organizing the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections as it did in 2006. UN staff maintain that though the UN provided major technical, logistical, and financial support, the 2006 elections were largely a locally-owned process; its reduced role in the 2011 elections represented an effort to turn even more ownership over to moderate local actors in their efforts to run the elections independently.\(^10\) However, according to many Congolese, the UN should have continued to play a leading role in the organization of the 2011 elections because they lacked the financial, material, and technical resources to effectively organize them themselves.\(^11\) They rued the UN’s ‘stepping back’ in 2011, arguing that its doing so would preemptively reduce the efficiency, timeliness, and fairness of the elections.\(^12\) One Congolese academic noted prior to the elections, for example, that because more of the organization of the elections was being left to Congolese agencies with inadequate technical capacities and logistical resources, there were to be fewer polling stations in 2011 than in 2006, thus making it harder for some citizens to vote.\(^13\) Indeed, these negative predications were largely borne out,

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\(^9\) Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
\(^11\) Interview with Congolese academic, Kinshasa, March 2011.
\(^12\) Interview with Congolese politicians and academics, Kinshasa, March 2011.
\(^13\) Interview with Congolese academic, Kinshasa, March 2011.
with several international observation missions reporting instances of violence as well as irregularities in the carrying out of the elections and the compilation of results.\textsuperscript{14}

It is important to note that the precise way in which the inclusion of local actors imperils the delivery of particular outputs can vary between operations. In Bosnia, for example, in contrast to DRC, the devolution of authority for electoral processes occurred largely without complications, and the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina is now a fully independent Bosnian agency that is thought to be highly effective.\textsuperscript{15} Nevertheless, the possibility that the weak capacities of local actors will hinder the successful fulfillment of mandated tasks is likely to exist in all contexts where they are given agency, and may simply manifest itself in different sectors or programs in different settings.

In general then, the emphasis on including and supporting moderate actors that takes center stage in liberal ownership can impede the delivery of tangible peacebuilding outputs. In other words, because liberal ownership compels the UN to work with local actors with little capacity for the technically complex tasks of peacebuilding, concrete results are imperiled or take longer to materialize, at least in particular issue areas. By contrast, were the UN, with its extensive technical capabilities and significant resources, to take up these tasks unilaterally, results might come about more quickly. In other words, as indeed feared by the UN, local


\textsuperscript{15}Richard Caplan, ‘Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia,’ \textit{International Peacekeeping} 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2005).
ownership in its liberal form, which emphasizes inclusive liberal processes and ultimately the liberalization of the host country above tangible outputs, can be inefficient with regards to demonstrable results because peacebuilding becomes subject to the low capacity levels of national actors. Importantly, this is the case despite the fact that in liberal ownership, local actors are, as noted, often given only ‘token ownership,’ which affords them little real influence over the UN’s activities, methods, strategies, and goals. In other words, even where the UN takes direct action without including local actors, its emphasis on identifying moderates, securing their buy-in, and preserving the appearance of including them delays the delivery of outputs.

7.2.2. Elite Ownership and Outputs

Given the doubt surrounding liberal ownership’s ability to achieve results, it may seem that elite ownership is a better route to fulfilling the UN’s objectives. That is, because elite ownership selects local actors with relatively higher capacity levels and emphasizes the delivery of results above the overall democratization and marketization of the post-conflict state, it may represent a more efficient version of ownership, at least when measured in terms of tangible outputs.

However, though elite ownership is thought to speed the delivery of demonstrable outputs—in fact, it is an approach adopted specifically because it is thought to do so—a closer examination reveals that it can actually endanger this goal by turning over leverage to local elites, an effect that is tied both to the greater amount of agency it gives these actors, as noted in Chapter 5, and, ironically, to its persistent discursive emphasis on local ownership. First, by operationalizing ownership in a way that prioritizes elites, the UN grants agency to actors that it has specifically selected,
thus making it difficult for the UN to deny it to them subsequently. Second, because
the discourse of ownership asserts that peacebuilding must be based on local wishes
and desires and that the power to determine the direction of the country’s political
development should lie with local actors, the UN’s emphasis on ownership enables
the latter to dictate the areas in which they want the UN’s assistance and those in
which they do not by invoking that same discourse. In other words, through the
combination of its discursive emphasis on the primacy of local wishes and its
selective operationalization of ownership, the UN enables local elites to set the terms
for UN involvement and to include or exclude the UN from participation in particular
issue areas.\(^\text{16}\) In so doing, the UN essentially places its ability to deliver outputs into
the hands of a select few local actors and ties the UN to their preferences and
priorities.

In Congo, for example, one of the areas in which MONUC made the least
substantial progress was security sector reform (SSR), in particular with regards to the
military (as opposed to police and judiciary). For the UN as well as the broader
international community, SSR was an area considered critical to the maintenance of
peace and stability and one that therefore figured prominently in the mission’s
mandates.\(^\text{17}\) While many of the delays and problems in implementation resulted from
coordination problems at the international level, most were due to reluctance and
prevarication among national actors.\(^\text{18}\) National elites in Congo repeatedly obstructed

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\(^{16}\) Mac Ginty notes that ‘it is important not to underestimate the agency of local actors’ and that they have the ability to ‘resist, ignore, or adapt’ the actions and goals of the international community. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance*, 84.


\(^{18}\) The coordination problems at the international level derived in part from the plethora of actors involved. For example, for the DDR process, MONUC assumed, for a time, a coordinating role, while the lead implementing agency was UNDP.
international SSR initiatives, regularly preventing the UN from becoming too deeply involved. For example, while the international community drafted many of the initial SSR planning documents, it was not until December 2003, well into the transition, that President Joseph Kabila signed decrees that established the institutional framework for DDR, including an Inter-Ministerial Committee in charge of concepts and policy, a national commission in charge of implementation, CONADER, and a committee in charge of financial management. This was despite continuous pressure exerted by the UN for action to be taken in this area. However, senior MONUC managers reported being blocked at every turn by the highest levels of the Congolese government with regards to the issue of SSR, with one stating that President Kabila made very clear that SSR was a ‘no-go zone’ for the UN and another recalling that any plans that the UN proposed to jumpstart SSR were ‘total non-starters’ with the government.

Many UN staff noted that the ability of local actors to exclude the UN from SSR activities was partly linked to the fact that the UN had repeatedly stressed that it must be a nationally-led process. More specifically, as one senior UN official noted, the discourse of local ownership is ‘a disempowering discourse’ for the UN, one that prevents it from reaching its goals in areas like SSR, because it gives local actors ‘a
powerful discursive weapon’ to wield against the UN, enabling them, in effect, to use
the UN’s own discourse against it and push back against the UN when it wants to take
action.22 One noted with regret that there has been ‘no change’ on SSR in ten years
because of the ability of local elites to resist and waylay the UN’s plans.23

Some UN officials alleged that this recalcitrance derives from the perception
of Congolese elites that SSR is an area too ‘dear’ to sovereignty to be ‘turned over’ to
the international community, with one asserting that ‘Congolese national actors will
never cede ownership of SSR.’24 Others suggested more cynically that a reformed and
integrated military is not in the interests of key Congolese elites. For example, many
high-level military commanders have resisted processes by which their units will be
retrained, integrated into new units, and redeployed (a process known in Congo as
brassage), because they may have political or economic interests (such as illegal
mining) in particular areas and want to keep themselves surrounded by loyal and
 ethnically homogeneous troops who will protect those interests.25 In other words, such
actors prefer to keep the UN’s involvement in security sector activities minimal, and
the UN’s discourse together with its selective practices of ownership enable them to
do so more easily. Similarly, a number of staff asserted that the existence of a strong,
disciplined, and independent military is not in the interests of President Joseph Kabila, who may view such a force as a threat to his power and as increasing the risk of a coup against him. This explains, they argued, his repeated refusals to move forward with plans to integrate the Garde Républicaine—the military unit charged specifically with the protection of the president—into the regular armed forces. One MONUC staff member noted that despite repeated claims by the Minister of Defense that he wanted a strong program of SSR, the combined budget for SSR, homeland security, intelligence, and justice in the 2011 draft budget was approximately 6% of the total national budget. The staff member argued that this constitutes further proof that it is the international community that wants SSR, not the Congolese.

In addition, the loss of leverage resulting from elite ownership has proved not just inimical to the achievement of particular tasks by the UN, but also, at times, to stability itself. Because the UN is unable to direct or oversee the actions of local elites, they can both delay progress on issues central to continued security as well as sideline opposition or rebel actors, who, as mentioned, may revert to belligerent

behavior as a consequence. For example, one mission staff member noted that, ‘SSR might look differently if the UN was involved…but national actors don’t want this. As a direct result, you have a deteriorating security situation.'

Indeed, the repeated prevarication on the part of national actors with regards to SSR led, at least in part, to renewed fighting in parts of the country. In 2004, the lack of progress on army integration erupted into clashes between RCD-G and FARDC troops in South Kivu in eastern DRC. The South Kivu regional commander at the time, General Prosper Nabyolwa, complained that former RCD-G units were not being placed under his command, and suspicions that the latter were smuggling weapons into the region prompted him to order raids against suspected dissidents. These raids led to fighting between troops loyal to Nabyolwa and troops loyal to his RCD-G deputy, Colonel Jules Mutebutsi. Nabyolwa was subsequently replaced by General Mbuza Mabe, but tensions persisted, largely along ethnic lines, and eventually troops loyal to Mutebutsi mutinied. Subsequently, General Laurent Nkunda, who was at the time one of the highest-ranking RCD-G officers, intervened and laid siege to Bukavu, which resulted in civilian deaths, rapes, and looting. The small number of UN troops present at the time proved unable to defend the city against his advance.

Unrest in eastern DRC since 2004 has also been exacerbated by flawed SSR programs. Laurent Nkunda had agreed for his troops from the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple, the rebel group he founded in 2006, to be integrated into the FARDC through a process known as mixage, in which entire units of rebel combatants are adopted wholesale into the FARDC and remain deployed in the

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29 Interview with MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
geographic areas of their rebel activity, rather than dissolved and integrated into existing units that are redeployed elsewhere in the country, as with brassage.\textsuperscript{31} As a result, these units operated in effect under parallel command structures and have continued to pursue their own interests, simply in different uniforms.\textsuperscript{32} In 2008, renewed fighting broke out between CNDP combatants and the FARDC in North Kivu, and the presence of entire army units loyal to Nkunda seriously complicated the situation.\textsuperscript{33}

Regardless of whether Congolese prevarication on SSR was due to sovereign resistance or self-interested calculations, the ability of local elites to foil the SSR plans of the UN shows how elite ownership enables local actors to push back against the UN and thus impede its ability to deliver results, including at times the maintenance of even basic security, first because it grants them a greater level of agency over the peacebuilding process and second because the UN repeatedly emphasizes the importance of their participation and leadership through the discourse of local ownership. One senior MONUC manager called the lack of progress on SSR ‘one of the great failings of the mission,’ a sentiment echoed by most staff both in the mission and at UN headquarters in New York.\textsuperscript{34}

In Congo, this phenomenon was not limited to SSR. One senior MONUC official noted that while the mission had made progress in ‘non-essential’ areas, such as the drafting and adoption of a government policy on sexual violence, the mission

\textsuperscript{32} Prunier, \textit{From Genocide to Continental War}, 323 n. 180.  
\textsuperscript{33} The fighting in 2008 in North Kivu pitted troops loyal to Nkunda and the CNDP against government forces, and came about after a ceasefire agreement brokered the previous January fell apart. Nkunda’s troops were allegedly supported by Rwanda and quickly overpowered weaker and less well-equipped FARDC units. The CNDP came close to taking the provincial capital of Goma before an agreement was reached between the governments of DRC and Rwanda and Nkunda’s arrest in January 2009.  
\textsuperscript{34} Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
had failed to make substantive progress in any of the ‘core’ aspects of its mandate, including SSR, the rule of law, institution building, and fostering democracy. He attributed this largely to the mission’s relying too much on a small number of elites who lack the political will to undertake real action in these areas. In other words, elite ownership, by giving agency to a select group of elites with their own interests and agendas, combined with the UN’s repeated discursive emphasis on the importance of their agency, reduces the leverage of the UN and, as a consequence, its ability to deliver results.

Both liberal and elite ownership, then, appear to be inimical to the delivery of concrete outputs. In the case of the former, the achievement of results is put on hold in the name of identifying moderate actors with whom to interact and working through and around their at times minimal capacities, despite the fact that their actual influence on the peacebuilding process may be limited. In the case of the latter, even though elite ownership is specifically intended to facilitate the realization of demonstrable results by emphasizing the capacities of local partners, the concentration of ownership in the hands of a few, together with the discursive emphasis on the importance of their role in setting the course of peacebuilding, means that the UN loses leverage to them and their interests and thus becomes dependent on them for the achievement of concrete objectives.

7.3. Local Ownership and Liberalization

As with concrete outputs, establishing causality between the liberalization and democratization of post-conflict states and local ownership is difficult, as the former is the result of the interaction of a number of factors, including not only local

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35 Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
ownership, but also the degree of popular support for democracy, the strength of existing institutions, and the prior experience with democratic political participation on the part of the host-country population. Nevertheless, what is important here is whether liberal and elite forms of local ownership contribute to or impede processes of liberalization, not the actual level of liberal democracy that exists in the post-conflict state following UN intervention.

In general, as with outputs, because the UN adopts both liberal and elite approaches to ownership at the same time, the ability of ownership to promote the UN’s liberal objectives is also thrown into doubt. That is, while liberal ownership emphasizes exactly those liberal goals, elite ownership prioritizes efficiency and results, paying far less attention to liberalization and democratization. These two approaches to ownership thus imply contradictory effects with regards to the UN’s liberal peacebuilding agenda. However, though liberal ownership specifically emphasizes the normative orientation of local owners in order to promote the democratization and marketization of the country, because it grants only ‘token ownership’ to local actors and interacts with individuals and groups who usually have little influence on major power dynamics, it fails to make much notable progress in this area. At the same time, elite ownership causes the UN, as described above, to lose leverage to local elites and can also entrench existing power structures, thus making it harder for the UN to push through liberal reforms. Because of these contradictions, local ownership in peacebuilding appears to be relatively inimical to the overall liberalization of the post-conflict state. I examine the relationship of the UN’s goal of post-conflict liberalization with liberal and elite ownership in turn.
7.3.1. Liberal Ownership and Liberalization

Though liberal ownership represents an attempt by the UN to adapt ownership operationally in order to preserve its objective of liberalizing the post-conflict state, it often fails to contribute to this goal because, on the one hand, it is often implemented in a weak way, with local actors being included in an ad hoc and infrequent manner, and on the other, it selects actors that have little influence on high-level political activities in the host country. First, as described in Chapter 4, because the UN undertakes practices of ownership in an often superficial manner that pays little heed to whether its actions actually create ownership, it often only grants local actors ‘token ownership’ in which they are unable to substantively influence the course of peacebuilding. As described, this is particularly the case with liberal ownership, in which the UN does not give away substantive agency or control to local actors, it simply allows them to give input into the process of defining goals and methods, and they are selected largely because they are not expected to disagree with or object to the UN’s liberal goals and objectives. In this way, liberal ownership is a highly passive form of ownership, in which local actors in a sense just ‘rubberstamp’ the UN’s activities, but do not really influence their course or participate in their realization.

Second and more importantly, because the actors selected in liberal ownership often have low levels of capacity for peacebuilding and governance and played marginal roles, if any, in the peacemaking and immediate post-conflict phases, they often have little influence in major power politics. That is, because conflict tends to polarize populations, those with power and influence tend to be galvanizing and controversial figures, rather than moderate conciliatory ones, and thus moderate and liberal actors are often pushed to the sidelines and play minimal roles in the conflict.
as well as the immediate post-war peacemaking phases. These actors are thus at a disadvantage in that they do not always have either the popular backing or the resources to influence high-level political processes. As one senior MONUSCO official noted, civil society and local NGOs in Congo ‘are not strong and they play a small role.’ Accordingly, their support for liberal forms of governance will not usually translate into the construction of liberal institutions or into the passing of legislation that institutionalizes equitable, transparent, and capitalist economic practices and that protects human rights, unless they are given significant support. And while liberal ownership supposedly aims to provide just that support and to foster and assist moderate actors, because it only gives ‘token ownership,’ it does not really increase the influence of such actors in a lasting way. In other words, because these actors are often not major political or military players, existing instead in civil society and marginalized groups and communities, they are often unable to influence the behavior of state officials and legislators and the normative orientation of state institutions and systems. Accordingly, liberal ownership, in spite of its emphasis on exactly the UN’s liberal project, does little to actually liberalize the post-conflict state in a sustainable way.

For example, [NAME REDACTED] was highly respected and largely regarded as ‘good’ but ineffective. More specifically, it is widely acknowledged that she did not have much influence and was unable to make substantive progress on human rights and women’s issues within the government, because she was considered too transparent and moderate. Similarly, Agnès Kamuanya, interim president of the South Kivu Civil Society in 2007, was known as a moderate, yet struggled during her tenure to have any influence on other powerful members of the organization, who

36 Interview with senior MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
37 Interviews with Congolese civil society actor, Kinshasa, March 2011.
were more interested in enhancing their political positions. The latter remained loyal to the former president, Emmanuel Rugarubura, who, as mentioned in Chapter 3, was appointed as Provincial Minister of the Interior. Hoping that pandering to him might lead to more lucrative and powerful government positions, members of the Civil Society frequently sidelined Kamuanya, organizing meetings and taking decisions without her and leaving her unable to lobby for the needs and rights of local communities or push for transparency and equality in provincial politics. Ultimately, she resigned as interim president of the Civil Society.\footnote{Kamuanya was subsequently returned to her previous post as vice president of the Civil Society, but many speculated that this was only the case because other powerful members wanted to maintain a female face within the organization.}

Moreover, moderate liberal actors like [NAME REDACTED] and Kamuanya whom the UN could support are often in short supply after conflict for exactly the reasons cited above—that is, such actors are often marginalized, excluded from politics, and thus must operate through the weaker channels of civil society. As one senior MONUC official noted, ‘The UN must be strategic in identifying constituencies that also have power’—that is, who are moderate \emph{and} influential and who can support and further the UN’s liberal goals—but noted that such actors were few and far between in the wake of civil war, making it nearly impossible to achieve liberalization through liberal ownership.\footnote{Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.}

\subsection*{7.3.2. Elite Ownership and Liberalization}

While liberal ownership appears unable to effect genuine and lasting democratic reforms because the local actors involved have little influence and power and because the ownership that they are granted is often superficial and largely symbolic, elite ownership suffers from the opposite problem. The elites selected by
the UN as owners in this version of ownership may have greater levels of power and influence and be granted more substantive ownership, but they often do not have liberal convictions or the will to push through democratic reforms. More specifically, first, because elite ownership, as already described, concentrates ownership in the hands of an often illiberal few, the UN loses leverage over those actors and becomes subject to their political desires, which often do not include democratization and capitalism. Second, the concentration of ownership within a small group of elite actors can entrench existing power structures, which are usually undemocratic, thus further imperiling the UN’s liberal project.

As described above, elite ownership often results in the UN’s losing leverage over local elites, because it on the one hand grants them a more substantive degree of influence over the peacebuilding process and on the other invokes a discourse that stresses the importance of their determining the process of peacebuilding, thus making it harder to contradict them when their views diverge from those of the UN.

Congo’s electoral law, discussed in Chapter 3, demonstrates how the UN’s loss of leverage to local elites enabled the latter to frustrate the UN’s liberal peacebuilding project. As described, during the transition, before an elected government had taken office, the UN insisted on the inclusion in the electoral law of a second round of presidential elections where no candidate wins an absolute majority. Following the 2006 elections and the conclusion of the transition phase, the Congolese government, prompted by President Kabila, removed that requirement, making the election for the presidency a single winner-takes-all affair, and hence generally easier to win for the incumbent.40 Because of the discourse of ownership, which insists upon the importance of local leadership on processes such as legislation

and elections, as well as the UN’s prioritization of Congolese elites during the transition, once an elected government was in place, the UN had little bargaining power to contravene such steps. For the mission, however, the 2011 change to the electoral law represented a serious regression on its broader liberal objectives. One staff member noted that with the electoral law, ‘[the mission has] gone ten steps backwards.’

The UN’s loss of leverage to local elites tends to become more acute as local actors become stronger after war. Particularly after elections have been held, a recognized and mandated government has been installed, and the ‘imperative’ to work with the sovereign government becomes more pronounced, the UN is likely to lose a good deal of its bargaining power to the national elite. In Congo, the 2006 elections were indeed such a turning point, with the UN losing a large amount of its influence over local actors and the latter taking a much less compromising stance with the UN. As Autesserre notes, the ‘influence [of the UN] sharply decreased with President Joseph Kabila’s election and inauguration in late 2006.’

Indeed, nowhere was this shift more notable than with President Kabila himself. Following his success in the 2006 elections, senior mission staff reported that he was immediately harder to access and more uncompromising towards the UN. One senior MONUC staff member recalled that, ‘after the elections, Kabila started cutting off people who were very high up;’ other senior staff members told similar stories,

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41 Interview with senior MONUC/MONUSCO official, Kinshasa, March 2011.
43 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 12.
noting that their access was only reinstated at Kabila’s behest. Another recalled that during a Security Council meeting in early 2007, Belgium, a member of the Council at the time, called for the creation of a follow-on mechanism to the CIAT, but that Kabila quickly convened a meeting of the involved ambassadors in Kinshasa and ‘dictated’ that no such mechanism would be permitted.

Many staff attributed this loss of leverage to Kabila after the elections to the amount of agency and control entrusted to him before the elections, and emphasized that it resulted in the frustration of the UN’s liberal peacebuilding project. One senior DPKO official argued that the mission’s excessive focus on Kabila during the transition was ‘a dangerous strategy,’ noting that after the elections, ‘[Kabila] crushed Bemba, bought the provincial parliaments, and weakened parliament, all without much international protest.’ The official explained that the UN could not antagonize the person in whom it had put so much power, particularly in the context of the UN’s frequent discourse on ownership. As a consequence, it lost significant influence with him after his election, which enabled him to push through undemocratic legislation and engage in repressive and dictatorial actions. Another senior MONUC official agreed that the UN’s loss of leverage to Kabila had its roots in its pre-election interaction with him. Because ‘the international community, including the UN, had picked Kabila as the winner even before he won,’ MONUC ‘turned into a houseboy, doing the chores of the Congolese.’ Another agreed, recalling that after the elections, ‘the mission…got accused of having a double standard,’ with Kabila

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46 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
arguing that the UN itself declared him freely and fairly elected and indeed certified that election, but that the organization still didn’t trust him.  

Indeed, most staff admitted that, after the elections, the UN’s influence over Kabila and the political elite in Kinshasa decreased to the point of being minimal. One DPKO official stated that the UN ‘dance[s] to the tune of President Kabila,’  

and a senior UN official noted that situations where the mission consults primarily with the host government, as with elite ownership, risk making the UN ‘an unconditional agent of the central government and the local elite.’ Another senior DPKO official argued that,

The mission is gambling everything on [Kabila]. It is defining consent and political will and ownership as one person—that is a risky strategy. You can’t have just one owner… That is not national ownership, it is just individual ownership.  

On the military side, one senior UN official said that, after the 2006 elections, MONUC became nothing more than a ‘service provider’ for the Congolese government. The UN’s frequent invocation of local ownership discourse, together with the elite ownership approach, can thus easily lead to a loss of leverage for the UN, rendering it less able to promote democratic reforms and the overall liberalization of the host country.

Moreover, as mentioned, because elite ownership concentrates ownership in the hands of existing elites, it can entrench existing power structures, including those that existed before and during the war and which are frequently unequal, undemocratic, repressive, and divisive. Those who have the most capacity and power

48 Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
49 Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2009.
50 Interview with senior UN official, New York, December 2010.
51 Interview with senior DPKO official, New York, December 2010.
52 Interview with senior UN official, New York, December 2010.
are often also those who have the strongest interests in the maintenance of such imbalanced, illiberal, and undemocratic political orders that enable them to retain their power, resources, and benefits. As Krasner has argued, existing elites often ‘are better able to enhance their own power and wealth by making exclusionist ethnic appeals or undermining even the limited legal routinized administrative capacity that might otherwise be available.’ As such, reinforcing the position of such elites, particularly those in government, by giving them the greatest access to the process of determining the future political development of the country may mean preserving the skewed power relations between strong and weak actors and the undemocratic politics that triggered or contributed to fighting or rebellion initially, and thus also inhibiting the liberalization of the state. As one senior MONUC official noted, ‘the risk [of local ownership] is that the UN resurrects old elites.’ Indeed, following his election in 2006, for example, President Kabila was accused of clamping down on opposition parties, most notably his opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC, and of repressing civil society and the press, in particular anyone who criticized the government on its human rights record. Most analysts viewed this as an attempt to solidify his hold on power and called it a ‘dictatorial turn,’ with one senior UN official noting that by 2009, there was serious concern within the UN about ‘the contraction of [democratic] political space as a direct result of efforts by the executive’ in Congo.

This effect is aggravated by the fact that, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the UN exhibits a preference for government actors, as opposed to rebel leaders and opposition leaders, in elite ownership. If elite ownership renews or reinforces pre-conflict and conflict dynamics during peacebuilding by granting excessive or

53 Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty,’ 89.
54 Interview with senior MONUC official, Geneva, May 2011.
exclusive ownership to government actors, it is likely that rebel leaders and opposition actors will be sidelined, and they may opt to return to arms or foment political unrest as a result. Indeed, opposition politicians in Congo pointed out that their exclusion from peacebuilding through what they perceived to be the UN’s preference for government actors contradicted the UN’s purported goal of democratic governance.\textsuperscript{56} That is, because elite ownership may help to reproduce pathological patterns of power relations and repression from before or during the war and may thus trigger the marginalization of non-governmental actors at all levels, it directly contravenes the UN’s goal of a democratic and inclusive polity with a vibrant opposition and civil society. One opposition politician noted that after the 2006 elections, ‘the government thought it had all the power—it no longer had to share it with anyone else. This included not only the 1+4 but also the UN and the international community.’\textsuperscript{57} In other words, the UN’s elite approach to local ownership enabled the government to entrench and solidify its dominance over the opposition, which, together with the UN’s reduced ability to influence the government, seriously impeded the UN’s democratic objectives.

In addition, because elite ownership entrenches existing power dynamics and inhibits the overall democratization of the post-conflict state, it can also inhibit the mission’s fulfillment of its most basic task—the maintenance of stability, which is thought to derive, at least in part, from post-conflict liberalization. In Congo, for example, many of the conflict dynamics that contributed to the Rwandan genocide and to subsequent fighting in eastern Congo persist to this day. The tensions between Tutsi Rwandophone communities and indigenous Congolese populations remains

\textsuperscript{56} Interviews with Congolese politicians, Kinshasa, March 2011, and London, June 2011.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Congolese politician, Kinshasa, March 2011.
strong, and the dominance of the latter in government and their general suspicion of the former has led to the continued political and social marginalization of Tutsis, rather than any major effort at reconciliation. This dynamic, which led to the formation of the RCD-G during the Second Congo War and which was one of its main fault lines, has subsequently contributed to Rwandan support for the CNDP and its offensives in late 2008, as well as to more recent fighting in 2012, which has pitted allegedly Rwandan-supported FARDC mutineers against Congolese forces. Without the resolution of such animosities and movement towards a more inclusive and less ethnically-driven form of governance, repression, autocracy, and divisive politics are likely to persist and liberalization is highly unlikely to take root. Yet elite ownership,

because it displays a preference for government elites, reduces the UN’s leverage over elites, and entrenches rather than softens existing political dynamics, is ill placed to counteract these tendencies.

The ability of elites to resist the UN and to foil its attempts to liberalize the post-conflict state and thus stabilize it relates to a greater tension between building capacity and building will. While the UN may be able to pass on significant technical skills or specialized knowledge, it is up to local actors to decide if, when, and how to employ those skills and knowledge. Local elites may choose to pursue narrow exclusionary interests rather than benefit the population at large. They may even ‘wait out’ the UN, and revert to repressive or even belligerent behavior after its withdrawal. Concentrating ownership in their hands and building their capacity then may simply enable them to pursue their personal or particularistic agendas more efficiently, an effect that is aggravated by the UN’s own discursive emphasis on the primacy of their role in peacebuilding. Ultimately, as Barnett and Zürcher point out, the realization of liberal peacebuilding is unlikely to materialize because of the ability of local actors to push back against the UN. Indeed, as critics of liberal peacebuilding have pointed out, liberal peacebuilding has failed to establish multi-party liberal democracies and capitalist economies in most post-conflict states where it is undertaken, as described in Chapter 3, an effect that is no doubt exacerbated by the tendency to prioritize elites in peacebuilding.

7.4. Conclusion

Previous chapters have shown that local ownership inhibits self-determination and deepens external imposition because the UN molds and constrains it conceptually

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and operationally in order to reduce the perceived risks of local ownership to two operational goals: the delivery of outputs and the overall liberalization of the post-conflict state in line with international norms of democracy and human rights. However, this chapter has shown that the selective ways in which the UN operationalizes local ownership—both liberal and elite ownership—together with its discursive emphasis on the primacy of local actors do little either to help the realization of demonstrable outputs on the ground or to further the UN’s liberal project.

First, with liberal ownership, because the UN engages with actors with low capacities, it undercuts its ability to efficiently and rapidly deliver results; at the same time, because those same actors tend to have little influence among major power brokers, they are also usually unable to institutionalize democratization, a respect for human rights, or the rule of law in any lasting way. In this way, liberal ownership contributes little to either the achievement of concrete outputs or the UN’s attempts to liberalize the host country, despite the fact that it is adopted specifically to promote the latter of these.

Second, with elite ownership, because the UN concentrates ownership in the hands of the few while also invoking rhetoric that reaffirms the importance of their ownership, it tends to lose leverage to them and thus enables them to prevent the UN from participating in or making progress in particular areas. At the same time, this loss of leverage can enable local elites to solidify their positions and thus entrench existing imbalanced power structures, which tend to be illiberal and undemocratic. In this way, elite ownership can both inhibit the realization of tangible outputs in the near term as well as obstruct the UN’s goal of liberalizing the post-conflict state, despite the fact that it is adopted specifically to promote the former of these. In short,
the UN’s restrictive operationalization of local ownership, undertaken in the hope of not risking the delivery of results or the liberalization of the host country, actually does little to achieve either of these tasks, and may even impede them. This effect is exacerbated by the UN’s persistent discursive emphasis on local ownership, which gives local actors the ability to justify resisting or excluding the UN by invoking its own rhetoric.

Moreover, as described, the UN’s efforts to achieve its operational goals may represent an attempt to garner legitimacy from operational effectiveness and from behavior in line with its operational identity, and the curtailing of self-determination implied by the UN’s restrictive practices are justifiable in this light. However, the limited operationalization of local ownership combined with the UN’s expansive discourse, ironically, end up reducing the UN’s ability to achieve those goals—and thus to generate legitimacy from effectiveness. While compliance with stated principles is, as discussed previously, an important source of legitimacy for the UN, so is the achievement of stated operational goals. And while local ownership is rarely the only reason for the UN’s lack of progress on liberalizing the host country or delivering tangible outputs, the UN’s contradictory discursive and operational practices of ownership do appear to have a deleterious effect on the achievement of these two goals.

Importantly, judgments of the operational inefficiency of the UN—and hence of its operational legitimacy—appear to be shared by local actors. As described, many opposition actors in Congo noted that their exclusion or marginalization from politics—which they blame partly on the UN’s emphasis on government actors—directly contravenes the democratization that it so frequently presents as a key goal of peacebuilding. Moreover, as described in Chapter 3, local actors suggest that the role
of the UN should be the provision of financial assistance and the realization of concrete, resource-intensive projects, such as the building of roads and infrastructure. While local and international actors may disagree on which projects should be undertaken and how they should be prioritized, the negative influence of local ownership on delivering concrete outputs means that local actors often consider the UN ineffective—and thus less legitimate. For example, one Congolese politician stated regretfully that, ‘the UN does not build anything for the population.’ A Congolese academic similarly noted that while the UN may build the occasional market or roadway, generally everything it does is ‘provisional, not permanent,’ and therefore does little to boost perceptions of legitimacy based on UN effectiveness in the eyes of local actors.

Together with the ‘failure’ of the discursive function of local ownership described in the previous chapter, the UN thus appears unable to generate either normative legitimacy or operational legitimacy through local ownership. Indeed, because its rhetoric and its actions do not match up, as has been shown throughout this thesis, the UN undercuts its ability to achieve both its normative and its operational objectives. This suggests, again, that the contradictions in peacebuilding between normative and operational imperatives that the UN attempts to overcome through its emphasis on local ownership cannot be eliminated or resolved and must instead be accepted and incorporated into the design and planning of peace operations. In this way, then, the UN’s orthodox commitment to local ownership in discourse appears to be based on assumptions and aspirations rather than on concrete success.

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60 On different perceptions of success in peacebuilding, see Call, ‘Knowing Peace When You See It,’ 191.
61 Interview with Congolese politician, Kinshasa, March 2011.
62 Interview with Congolese academic, Kinshasa, March 2011.
evidence, and needs to be revisited with a stronger acknowledgement of the inherent contradictions and contestedness of peacebuilding.
8.1. Whose Peace?

The title of this thesis asks the question ‘Whose Peace?’, a question that captures the idea that when international intervention takes place after civil war, the peace that is built will necessarily represent a blend of the preferences and goals of the various actors involved—both national and international—akin to the hybrid models of peacebuilding discussed in Chapter 3. However, while those models describe an almost accidental effect that occurs spontaneously on the ground, the question of local ownership represents an explicit acknowledgement on the part of international actors that peacebuilding must belong to someone—that is, peacebuilding cannot exist or take place in the abstract, but rather it must be imagined, designed, undertaken, evaluated, and judged by and for specific actors. Local ownership, specifically, implies that peacebuilding must belong in particular to the people and government of the host country of a UN mission and must be judged successful or otherwise according to their standards. The rationale behind this conviction is that for peacebuilding to be legitimate and sustainable, it must be based on the consent of the host country and rooted in its indigenous culture, history, and norms—in other words, it must not be imposed from without and must enable local actors to determine their own political future.

This stems, as discussed, from a conviction that while international assistance in the aftermath of conflict can go a long way towards stopping violence and helping countries to stabilize, solutions that derive exclusively from external sources are unlikely to endure or to be viewed as legitimate by local actors. This is because externally imposed solutions are perceived to violate the widely-held principle of self-determination, a principle that few countries are comfortable with relinquishing or
with violating. And indeed, the deleterious effects of violating self-determination and imposing solutions in the context of peacebuilding seem commonsensical: if international actors build peace for local actors, that is—design and implement activities to reconstruct the country and consolidate peace—local actors on the one hand will feel alienated from and uninvolved in the structures of governance in their own country and on the other are likely to become dependent on international actors for continued security and stability. Moreover, self-determination is a principle that the international community and in particular the UN has long upheld and promoted—as such, violating it is perceived to damage the UN’s legitimacy as an intervening force. At the same time, without the involvement of the international community, many maintain that peace is unlikely to be built at all. That is, in instances where the international community refrains from intervening, peacebuilding will be left to the groups and actors that went to war with one another in the first place and that were unable to resolve their differences through political or non-violent means—actors that therefore may lack the mutual trust and the capacities for both present and future conflict management.

As described in this thesis, local ownership in peacebuilding has gradually emerged as a perceived solution to this problem. If local actors are able to give input into and participate in the process of peacebuilding, then even where international actors are involved, the violation of self-determination and the degree of imposition is minimized. This, in turn, should allow international peacebuilding actors, like the UN, to recoup at least some of the legitimacy lost by contravening those principles. Accordingly, the discourse of local ownership prescribes the inclusion of a broad array of local actors from all sectors of society and usually from early on in the process; advocates their input, participation, training, and at times leadership in
peacebuilding; and generally describes local ownership in peacebuilding as ‘the right thing to do.’

Yet, in practice, as this thesis has shown, the UN is loath to give up ownership of peacebuilding out of a perception that the devolution of responsibility for peacebuilding to local actors will prevent both the realization of demonstrable results in the short term and the overall liberalization of the post-conflict state, two elements that constitute the key operational objectives of the UN’s peacebuilding efforts. This perceived risk is based on a belief on the part of many UN staff that local actors after conflict suffer from a lack of capacity to take on the complex tasks of peacebuilding in an efficient and timely manner and that they will behave in illiberal ways that prioritize particularistic interests and gains and that will lead to repressive and autocratic political, economic, and social systems, rather than liberal democratic ones that can ensure continued security through the rule of law, a respect for human rights, and a fair distribution of income. In other words, local ownership, however logical it may appear ‘in theory’ is perceived to imperil the fulfillment of the mandate of a UN peacebuilding mission.

Accordingly, as described, what we see in practice is a version of ownership that is constrained conceptually and operationally to fit with the UN’s operational goals and priorities, a version that thus differs substantially from the discourse of local ownership. First, the UN understands local ownership within a liberal peacebuilding framework, an understanding that limits what can be owned to the liberal tenets inscribed within that framework, including democratization, capitalism, rule of law, and the respect for human rights, elements considered by the UN to be the best route to lasting peace and stability. This contrasts sharply both with the UN’s discourse of local ownership and with local understandings of local ownership, which
emphasize that local actors should be able to select a type of governance and societal organization that conforms to their values and history, rather than one that conforms to ‘global’ norms and principles espoused by the UN.

Second, the UN operationalizes local ownership in a way that both restricts the amount of agency turned over to local actors as well as limits the set of local actors enabled to take up agency. While the UN does this in variable ways—on the one hand granting only ‘token ownership’ to moderate liberal actors and on the other granting somewhat more substantive ownership to often illiberal elites—both represent limited versions of ownership that again conflict both with the discourse of local ownership and its emphasis on the broad and substantive inclusion of local actors and with the expectations of local actors themselves, who view the UN’s role as primarily entailing the provision of financial, material, and technical support for a wholly locally-determined and led process of peacebuilding.

As this thesis has shown, these restrictive understandings and practices of local ownership by the UN throw the purported palliative effects of local ownership on the contradictions between international peacebuilding and self-determination into doubt. More specifically, these understandings and operationalizations actually limit the degree of self-determination of local actors even more and exacerbate the degree of UN imposition on the host county, thus exposing a significant gap between the rhetoric and the reality of ownership. And while the UN may still believe that the discourse of local ownership provides a veil of legitimacy to its actions, this discrepancy is not lost on local actors: for them, the failure of the UN to live up to its discourse and give them a ‘genuine’ role in peacebuilding results in reduced perceptions of legitimacy, exactly the opposite effect that local ownership is thought to have by the UN. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 7, the discursive use of local
ownership by the UN combined with the selective ways in which the UN operationalizes it actually undercut the UN’s ability to achieve its operational goals, thus also impairing the UN’s legitimacy from an operational standpoint. In this sense, the political preference for local ownership expressed through the UN’s discourse conflicts with the evidence of how it ‘works’ on the ground presented in this thesis. These deep contradictions and inconsistencies within and between the discourse, understandings, and practices of local ownership thus refocus the question of ‘whose peace’ is being built. Because the UN appears unwilling to cede much more than discursive or nominal ownership to local actors, it appears that peacebuilding, despite the orthodox rhetorical commitment to local ownership, belongs primarily to the UN. Even where some agency is granted to local actors, it is granted to a select few who are chosen by the UN, not by local actors, thus again leaving control over peacebuilding in the hands of the UN and suggesting that it is a restricted and privileged phenomenon, not the broad one implied by ownership discourse. Even where elite ownership enables particular local actors to take up more substantive agency and push back against the UN, ownership usually becomes a source of operational difficulty and contention, rather than a means towards partnership between the UN and local actors and towards the enhancement of legitimacy and sustainability of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding, then, despite the ubiquitous rhetoric of ownership, appears to be only minimally local, and remains instead a largely UN-owned process.

More broadly, the question of ownership reveals how peacebuilding forces the UN to choose between two sets of objectives—normative ones and operational ones—that relate to two different sides of its identity. As mentioned, peacebuilding entails a deep intrusion into the domestic affairs of a state and thus implies that the
UN must violate its own principles of self-determination and non-imposition; yet at the same time, without such deep intrusion, the UN may encounter resistance or weakness on the part of local actors rendering it more difficult to achieve its operational objectives, and thus to successfully build peace in the host country. While the UN’s behavior as described in this thesis suggests that it is privileging the attainment of operational objectives above normative ones, its discursive use of local ownership, and in particular its discursive use of local ownership for self-legitimation, suggests that remaining compliant with institutional principles—or at least appearing to—is also important for the UN. In other words, while operational success—that is, the fulfillment of the mandate through the delivery of concrete outputs and post-conflict liberalization—is a key source of legitimacy for the UN’s operational ‘self,’ norm compliance constitutes a key source of legitimacy for the UN’s normative ‘self.’

As Lipson notes, despite being a political actor judged for its compliance with international norms, the UN is also an operational body in peacekeeping, and thus ‘it is subject to evaluation according to technical criteria of operational effectiveness as well as institutional criteria of legitimacy.’¹

In this sense then, the question of ‘Whose Peace?’ takes on another dimension: is the peace that is built one led by normative or operational considerations? Does local ownership belong to and help to satisfy the UN’s normative identity or the UN’s operational identity? And, perhaps more importantly, is it possible to separate these two identities in peacebuilding? Indeed, as described in this thesis, the clash between the UN’s operational and normative imperatives, while not inherent or unavoidable in general, does appear inevitable in the context of peacebuilding operations, and local ownership thus cannot ‘fix’ or eliminate that contradiction. Instead, this trade-off

¹ Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping,’ 13.
must be taken into account in the planning of peacebuilding, and the expectations of what benefits local ownership can bring to peacebuilding must be adjusted accordingly.

In a sense, the UN faces a choice: if it decides to prioritize its normative objectives by embracing a ‘full’ version of local ownership—the version present in discourse—it must accept the operational consequences of doing so, including the fact that results may come about more slowly and that peacebuilding may not be the liberal democratic enterprise that the UN envisions. If, on the other hand, the UN decides to prioritize its operational objectives and accordingly sideline local actors who are unable to contribute to either the delivery of outputs or the liberalization of the state, then it must accept the normative consequences of doing so and refrain from using a rhetoric that raises expectations of inclusion, participation, and ‘full’ self-determination among local actors. Only if it makes such a choice may the UN close the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of local ownership in peacebuilding.

At the same time, ‘closing the gap’ may not be the best option for the UN. As described, the UN is an organization with two identities in peacebuilding. If it seeks to prioritize one or the other, it is likely to damage its ability to effectively act in the capacity of the other. As Lipson notes, a choice that ‘enhance[s] an organization’s capacity to efficiently produce coordinated action may deprive it of the capacity to function as a political organization’ and the opposite is also true. Ultimately, part of the UN’s role is precisely to ‘reflect inconsistencies,’ and perhaps the gap between rhetoric and reality, however frustrating for local populations, the UN itself, and the fulfillment of peacebuilding mandates, is something we must live with.

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2 Ibid., 22.
3 Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy, 205. Brunsson argues that reforming organizations in a way that prevents them from ‘relf[ect]ing inconsistencies’ actually constitutes a threat to their institutional survival.
8.2. Relation to Broader Debates and Further Research

The above findings are the result of a conceptual analysis. Because of its exploratory and descriptive nature, this thesis both contributes to a number of key debates in international relations and provides a jumping off point for a variety of further research projects, both theoretical and empirical. Indeed, despite its near omnipresence in both policy and scholarly peacebuilding discourse, local ownership remains an understudied phenomenon. The seeming logical soundness of ownership that is depicted in discourse is rarely questioned or accompanied by a detailed empirical investigation of how it functions in practice, nor are local points of view on both what local ownership is and on whether the UN actually manages to ‘create’ it taken into account. In this sense, this thesis fills a lacuna simply by unpacking and dissecting a concept that is widely invoked but about which very little is actually known or understood. This ‘mapping’ of the concept—how it is spoken about, how it is understood, and how it is used—is a critical ‘first step’ towards theory building.\textsuperscript{4} At the same time, through my conceptual analysis, this thesis uncovers new aspects of the UN’s identity, behavior, and motivations, which contribute to the further refinement of existing theories of international organization behavior. I now offer some thoughts on these contributions as well as on possibilities for future research.

8.2.1. Approaches to Peacebuilding

At its broadest, this thesis contributes to discussions about the effect of international interference into domestic political processes. While, as described, some scholars posit that such action will always be futile and that states should be left to recover on their own after conflict, others emphasize the obligation of actors like the

\textsuperscript{4} George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences}, 75.
UN to intervene when international peace and security are at risk, arguing that its doing so can and has helped prevent death and destruction in many countries around the world. Indeed, though the number of interventions undertaken by the UN has leveled off after its post-Cold War surge, it also has not declined significantly, and current practice thus suggests that international intervention during or after civil war is a feature of international political life that is here to stay. Accordingly, if this is the case, how such operations can best be effective—both in terms of stabilizing countries after war and in terms of upholding and furthering international norms and principles—is a key question facing policymakers. In particular, because these two objectives appear to conflict, what approach actors like the UN should take to maximize both, whether they should prioritize one set of objectives over another, or whether they should attempt to sequence them temporally are key points that deserve further clarification.

In this way, the findings of this thesis contribute to policy debates about different approaches to peacebuilding—that is, between more intrusive models of peacebuilding, such as international transitional administrations, to less intrusive models, such as the ‘light footprint’ approach adopted in Afghanistan. While Paris has argued that ‘global culture’ preempts the consideration of more intrusive forms of international intervention such as the missions in Kosovo and East Timor—precisely for the normative reasons put forth in this study—UN staff interviewed for this thesis maintained that given the right constellation of circumstances, such an option would be back on the table. This in turn suggests that where local conditions are deemed so severe as to necessitate international authority, local ownership may not be the

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5 Hoeffler, Ijaz, and von Billerbeck, ‘Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding.’
6 Paris, ‘Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture.’
7 Interviews with senior DPKO and DPA officials, New York, November 2009.
unassailably ‘good’ policy it is currently thought to be. Thus while ‘global culture’ may limit the circumstances under which such intrusive forms of intervention are considered viable options, deeply intrusive missions should not be considered an impossibility. Nevertheless, demonstrating adherence to the principle of self-determination is considered in and of itself an important goal for the UN. Indeed, as this thesis has shown, the greater the degree of imposition on the host country, the greater and more urgent the need to depict peacebuilding as locally owned. In other words, where self-determination is denied, the UN must take additional pains to show that it is limiting that denial to the minimum required for the fulfillment of the mandate. How to design peace operations in such a way that can reconcile these competing objectives or justify the temporary prioritization of one above the other—and to explain these choices to local populations—is thus a critical question facing policymakers at the UN and other organizations.

8.2.2. Institutional Behavior

While questions of mission design, goal prioritization, sequencing, and competing interests must largely be answered by policymakers, on the academic side they relate directly to theories about institutional behavior and as such, the findings of this thesis contribute to the refinement of these theories. As mentioned, the UN, like many other actors in the international system, must balance between different sides of its identity, which in turn imply different goals and objectives. On the one hand, the UN must efficiently deliver on its promises in a tangible way in order to demonstrate its operational effectiveness and utility, and on the other, it must act in accordance with the principles it espouses in order to demonstrate its normative legitimacy and further promote those principles. While there is no inherent reason why these
objectives or identities should conflict, that they do is not uncommon—not only in the practice of peacebuilding, but in any number of undertakings where both ideas and material interests are at stake. While international organizations like the UN are often portrayed as actors that sacrifice efficiency and outputs to the dissemination of norms, as I have argued in this thesis, this is an oversimplification. Both the dissemination of norms and principles and the achievement of operational goals can be ‘in the interests’ of an organization. Similarly, the achievement of both normative and operational objectives can strengthen and reaffirm the identity (or identities) of an organization and thus further shape its ideas, interests, and preferences. Indeed, as described, the achievement of both operational and normative objectives have very real advantages for an organization: while adherence to stated principles can lead to a type of normative or procedural legitimacy, fulfillment of stated objectives can generate output or operational legitimacy. Both, ultimately, are important to the organization’s continued relevance and authority. Sacrificing one or the other will necessarily lead to a loss of legitimacy and relevance in some area, and it is not always clear if the pay-offs from one type of legitimacy can compensate for the loss of the other.

In this sense, then, the UN’s attempt to balance between normative and operational goals as described in this thesis, may provide new insights into how organizations act in general and what their motivations are. Do they prioritize one set of goals above another? Do they instead try to balance between the two, and if so, how? And does the attempt to satisfy both sets of objectives lead to contradictory practices that ultimately undercut the achievement of both, as in the case of local

ownership? As mentioned, this aspect of international organization behavior is key, as most organizations, like the UN, have multiple identities and conflicting obligations. That is, few organizations are purely operational or purely normative, and thus nearly all can be expected to engage in a ‘balancing act’ of the kind that this thesis has described.

In addition, by demonstrating the way in which the UN balances between competing objectives, this thesis also shows that its search for legitimacy—whether normative or operational—is something it does not only for others, but also for itself. That is, it seeks to self-legitimize by convincing itself that it is behaving in line with what is appropriate for its given identities and that it can therefore rest assured of its own legitimacy. This aspect of international organizations—the question of how they view themselves and how they seek to constitute and reaffirm their identities—has been largely neglected. While scholars such as Barker have examined these questions as they relate to rulers and primarily in the abstract, they have not been examined in the context of specific international organizations undertaking specific actions and in particular in the context of multiple institutional identities.\(^\text{11}\) Accordingly, more research may be undertaken to examine both the ways in which multiple identities affect international organization behavior and the way in which international organizations seek to validate and revalidate those different identities. This could be undertaken in the context of other UN activities as well as with regards to other organizations.

\(^{11}\) Barker, *Legitimating Identities*. 

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8.2.3. Interaction of the International and the National

In addition to shedding light on competing imperatives within international organizations, this thesis contributes to debates about the relationship between international and national actors, one that is often marked by different perspectives and conflicting objectives. As described, the UN and national actors have different views not only of what local ownership entails, but also of what peacebuilding after civil war is for and about and of what their respective roles in it should be. How to reconcile these different perspectives while enabling each party to satisfy its objectives and aspirations is a critical question. The nascent but growing literature on hybrid peacebuilding has begun to look at this question, and has described how in practice, the ability of each party to resist or waylay the other has led to hybrid outcomes on the ground.

However, the fact that local ownership in peacebuilding is an approach or ‘policy’ explicitly adopted by the UN and other international actors complicates the models that have been proposed to date. In the latter, each actor is portrayed as pursuing self-interests and of making limited but acceptable concessions to the other involved parties. Local ownership, by contrast, because it is purposefully promoted, at least discursively, by the UN, implies that granting agency to local actors may actually be in the interests of an international actor. Current models of hybrid peacebuilding suggest that the UN’s primary goal is the achievement of a particular operational outcome and that it compromises its control only in so far as necessary to maximize the chances of achieving that goal. However, the discussion of local ownership in this thesis suggests that, because they enable continued adherence to institutional principles, such compromises in control may themselves be viewed as contributing to the achievement of an objective, at least by some actors. Hybrid
models of peacebuilding, while an important contribution to understandings of the often contentious relationship between international and national actors, and one that considers their differing objectives, should be further developed to take into account the fact that the objectives of any single actor may also entail contradictions and conflicts.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the applicability of these discussions extends beyond peacebuilding. Any instance of interaction between the ‘international’ and the ‘national’ writ large will entail conflicting objectives both between these two entities as well as within them. Discussions of local ownership therefore are relevant to macro-level issues such as development and international trade, as well as micro-level issues such as transitional justice, the conduct of elections, and democratization. Except in the unlikely event that these two groups want the exact same thing and are in perfect agreement about how to get there, how to reconcile their often competing interests and aspirations will benefit from the greater study of local ownership.

8.2.4. Additional Case Studies

The findings of this thesis would also be further boosted and refined by the examination of additional case studies. As mentioned, the case of MONUC in DR Congo is a representative and intrinsically important case, and more general interviews with UN staff gave no indication that inferences drawn from it should not apply more broadly. Indeed, as noted, because MONUC was the largest mission ever undertaken by the UN and lasted for over a decade, it has exerted a strong influence on the conceptualization and practice of peacebuilding within the UN generally.

Nevertheless, the analysis of additional case studies would be useful for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned, while local ownership is thought to boost
legitimacy and sustainability in peacebuilding, it is not the only factor that can boost these elements. Legitimacy and sustainability derive from the interaction of a number of factors, including structural conditions within a host country such as the level of political and socio-economic development, the level of security at the time of deployment, and the degree of unity and fragmentation among local actors, and external constraints such as the financial, material, and human resources available to a mission. The examination of other case studies would enable a comparison between different combinations of internal and external conditions and thus shed light on whether local ownership can be more or less effective in different circumstances.

Second, the examination of additional cases could be expanded beyond the criteria used for case selection in this thesis to include traditional peacekeeping operations or international transitional administrations. Indeed, the discourse of local ownership plays a particularly important role in the latter, where the level of intrusion is so deep as to make the desire to portray it as less so even more urgent. For example, in East Timor, though the UN mission was mandated to take over executive powers, it came under increasing fire for taking a ‘top-down’ approach to peacebuilding that allowed little role for local actors beyond a narrow elite, and even they were not provided with the training and support necessary to take on governance responsibilities. It thus introduced a policy of ‘Timorization’ in an attempt to demonstrate sensitivity to these criticisms. Case studies could also be expanded to

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include non-UN peacebuilding operations, including those undertaken by the EU, NATO, or ad hoc coalitions.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, additional cases could provide greater insight into the perspectives of local actors, the area in which the study of local ownership is most deficient. As I have discussed in this thesis, the views of local actors are nearly always omitted from examinations of local ownership, and yet they have important implications for the purported benefits of local ownership. If local ownership is expected to render peacebuilding more legitimate, it is necessary to examine in whose eyes that legitimacy is deemed to exist. As shown, local actors appear unpersuaded by the UN’s attempts to legitimize its actions through the discourse of local ownership and feel a distinct lack of ownership of peacebuilding due to the gap between the UN’s rhetoric and its actions. A greater understanding of the sources of legitimacy as perceived by local actors could add new dimensions to discussions of local ownership and provide additional clarity about why local ownership fails to ‘work’ as expected in peacebuilding. On the policy side, it could provide insight into how to better create and maintain a sense of ownership among local actors, given the fact that they have different ideas than international actors of what local ownership in peacebuilding should entail.

On a related note, while outside of the scope of this thesis, additional case studies would enable both a disaggregation of the ‘local’ and a disaggregation of the UN. First, different sectors of the host country population could be identified based on location, political, ethnic, or religious affiliation, or socio-economic status, and their views on ownership and on whether they actually feel a sense of ownership as a result of actions taken by the UN could be gauged, again adding further depth and maintain security, forcing the UN to re-take responsibility for policing from the Timorese. See Chapter 2, n. 130.
potentially new insights into whether and how local ownership can be beneficial in peacebuilding. Disaggregating the local would also make possible a more nuanced understanding of local ownership that takes into account different ideas among local actors of what the goals of peacebuilding should be, which indigenous methods are best suited to achieving them, and which local actors should be involved in the process.

Similarly, a closer analysis of different branches of the UN could be undertaken, which would enable a more subtle understanding of different perspectives on local ownership within the UN. For example, the perspectives of the staff of different sections of the Secretariat, including DPKO, DPA, and DFS, could be compared and contrasted, as well as the perspectives of UN agency staff, the Security Council, and member states. While the interviewees for this thesis did include members of all of the above, its particular emphasis was not on mapping detailed discrepancies between their views but rather on gauging the overall ‘take’ on local ownership of the UN’s peacekeeping officials.

8.3. Conclusion

This thesis has undertaken a conceptual analysis of local ownership in an attempt to provide greater clarity about what the concept means, how it is understood, how it is translated into practice, and what its effects are. It constitutes an important first step towards building theories of the interaction of international and national actors in a variety of contexts, while also contributing to the refinement of existing theories about various models of peacebuilding and the behavior of international organizations.
I found that there is a significant gap between the rhetoric and the reality of local ownership, one that derives from conflicting objectives on the part of the UN as well as from differing approaches to the operationalization of local ownership. More specifically, this gap derives from the fact that the UN constrains local ownership in order to promote the achievement of operational goals that are perceived to be put at risk by local ownership as depicted in discourse. The UN’s apparent prioritization of operational objectives above normative ones is, as described, not something that is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate,’ it simply represents behavior in line with a particular side of the UN’s institutional identity. And indeed, while the UN’s behavior suggests that it prioritizes operational objectives above normative ones, its continued discursive emphasis on local ownership suggests that the latter are still viewed as important to its legitimacy—both in its eyes and the eyes of local actors.\footnote{Lipson notes that the contradictory behavior of international organizations does not deserve censure as it arises unintentionally in response to conflicting environmental pressures that are outside of the control of the organization. ‘Peacekeeping,’ 9. See also, Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy.}

This thesis has further shown that international and national actors have very different views on local ownership, views that relate to different ideas of what peacebuilding is for and about, as well as differing perspectives on what renders peacebuilding legitimate. This further complicates how local ownership functions, for, despite the UN’s attempts to use the discourse of local ownership to convince local actors of the legitimacy of its actions, they are little persuaded by words that are not backed up by actions.

Finally, this thesis has shown that the UN’s contradictory approaches to local ownership in practice combined with its discursive emphasis on it, ironically, imperil the fulfillment of mandates and the achievement of operational objectives by UN
peace operations. In other words, local ownership, as currently conceived and practiced by the UN, entails a set of contradictions that render its ability to either boost legitimacy in the eyes of local actors or bolster the efficient achievement of a mission’s mandate questionable. Local ownership thus contributes little to the realization of either the normative or operational goals of the UN, and therefore appears to be effective primarily as a tool for self-legitimation. In this sense, then, as previously mentioned, local ownership provides an example of a ‘good’ policy that is logically sound, but that does not translate into its expected outcomes because of differences in understandings, conflicting goals and imperatives, and gaps between discourse and implementation.

This does not imply that the principle of local ownership is faulty, that it entails no positive value for the UN, or that it should be abandoned as a principle of peace operations. But it suggests that it must be evaluated not in the abstract but rather, as in this thesis, in conjunction with evidence from peacebuilding operations and taking into account the perspectives of all of the parties involved in them. Moreover, the UN and others need to acknowledge that the complexities of and tensions between operational and normative obligations are not ones that can necessarily be ‘fixed’ or eliminated, but ones that must be accepted as part of the practice of international peacebuilding and indeed as part of the UN’s broader multifaceted institutional identity.
ANNEX I
List of Interviewees

Interviews were conducted between November 2009 and February 2012 in New York, United States; Oxford, London, and Maidenhead, United Kingdom; Geneva, Switzerland; Kinshasa, DR Congo; and by phone.

Note: Titles given were current at the time of the interview; former titles are included when they are relevant to my research.

United Nations Staff
2. Jonathan Andrews – Senior Partnerships Adviser, Peacebuilding Support Office
3. Alice Arrue – Political Affairs Officer, Asia & Middle East Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; former Political Affairs Officer, MONUC
4. Achi Astain – Deputy Director/Acting Director of Political Affairs Division, MONUC/MONUSCO
5. Claudia Banz – Senior Political Affairs Officer, Africa II Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; former Political Affairs Officer, MONUC
6. Nick Birnback – Chief, Public Affairs Section, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
7. Patrice Chiwota – Senior Program Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office
8. Col. James Cunliffe – Deputy Chief of Staff (Forward), MONUC
9. Álvaro de Soto – former Secretary-General’s Personal Representative for the Central American Peace Process; former Senior Political Adviser to the Secretary-General; former Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, United Nations
10. Spyros Demetriou – Stabilization Team Leader, MONUC
11. Alan Doss – former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MONUC
12. Yves Durieux – Military Liaison Officer, Africa II Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
14. Laure Gnassou – Economic Affairs Officer, MONUC/MONUSCO
15. Jean-Marie Guéhenno – former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
16. David Harland – Director of Civilian Capacities Review, Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations; former Director of Europe and Latin America Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
17. Melanie Hauenstein – Special Assistant to the Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); former Electoral Officer, MONUC and Special Assistant to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-

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General, MONUC/Resident Coordinator-Humanitarian Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative, DR Congo
18. Nicholas Haysom – Director, Political, Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary-General
19. Philip Helminger – Peacebuilding Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office
20. Christina Human – SMART Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; former Political Affairs Officer, MONUC
21. Stephen Jackson – Senior Political Affairs Officer/Great Lakes Team Leader, Africa I Division, Department of Political Affairs; former Senior Political Affairs Officer, MONUC
22. Kevin Kennedy – Principal Officer, Great Lakes Integrated Operational Team, Africa II Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations; former Director, Public Information Division, MONUC
23. Vanessa Kent – former Political Affairs Officer, MONUC
24. Nedialko Kostov – Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; former Special Assistant to the SRSG, MONUC
25. Roderic MacKenna – Special Assistant to the Force Commander, MONUSCO
26. Eyas Mahadeen – Recruitment Officer & SAT Coordinator, Police Division/Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
27. Yannick Martin – Coordination & Response Division, OCHA
28. Erik MboK – Senior Policy Adviser to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Rule of Law, MONUC/MONUSCO
29. Roger Meece – Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MONUSCO; former United States Ambassador to DRC
30. Amin Mohsen – Senior Political Affairs Officer, Africa II Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
31. Ross Mountain – former Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MONUC/Resident Coordinator-Humanitarian Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative, DR Congo
32. Martin Nagler – Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Rule of Law, MONUSCO; former Child Protection Adviser, MONUC
33. Damar Niamji – Finance and Budget Assistant, Field Budget and Finance Division, Department of Field Support
34. Gloria Ntegye – Political Affairs Officer, Africa II Division, Office of Operations, Department for Peacekeeping Operations
35. George Ola-Davies – Director, Public Information Division, MONUC/MONUSCO
36. Vikram Parekh – Planning and Assessment Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office
37. Johan Peleman – Chief, Joint Mission Analysis Center, MONUC/MONUSCO
38. Benoit Pulyser – OCHA
39. Jared Rigg – SSR Program Officer (Civil Administration), Security Sector Reform Unit, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
40. Alain Seckler – Political Affairs Officer, Africa II Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; former Political Affairs Officer, MONUC
41. Aliou Sene – Head of Office, South Kivu, MONUC/MONUSCO/Acting Chief of Staff, MONUSCO
42. Mia Seppo – Crisis and Recovery Adviser, Policy and Strategy Division, Africa, UNDP
43. Kishan Sirohi – Acting Chief of Section, Inspection and Evaluation Division, Office of Internal Oversight Services
44. Richard Snellen – Chief, Civil Affairs Division, MONUC/MONUSCO
45. Nishkala Suntharalingam – Political Affairs Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
46. William Swing – former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MONUC
47. Hannah Taylor – Senior Political Affairs Officers, MONUC/MONUSCO
48. Shin Umezu – Senior Political Affairs Officer, Asia & Middle East Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
49. Wouter Van Winkelborne – Political Affairs Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; former Civil Affairs Officer, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
50. Karin Wermester – Political Affairs Officer, Africa II Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations
51. Wayne Whiteside – Chief of Section, Budget and Performance Reporting Service, Field Budget and Finance Division, Department of Field Support
52. Bettina Woll – Aid Modalities Specialist, UNDP; former Governance Programme Specialist/Political Analyst, UNDP, DRC
53. George Zachariah – Coordination Officer, Partnerships Team, Division of Policy, Evaluation, and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; former Special Assistant to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MONUC/Resident Coordinator-Humanitarian Coordinator/UNDP Resident Representative, DR Congo
54. Anonymous – Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; former Political Affairs Officer, MONUC
55. Anonymous – Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office; former UNICEF, DRC
56. Anonymous – OCHA

Staff of Permanent Missions to United Nations
1. Sofka Brown – Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations
2. Brian Cahalane – First Secretary for Political Affairs, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations
3. Réachbhá FitzGerald, Adviser – Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations

Congolese Political and Civil Society Actors
1. Bertin Banganyigabo Kanyeshuli – National Deputy
2. Marie Madeleine Kalala – Lawyer, National Coordinator, Cause Commune, Member of African Union Committee of Wise Men, Honorary Minister of Human Rights; former Minister of Human Rights
3. Bertin Kanunu Leyan’Simbi M’fumu – Ambassador, Secretary-General of the Minister of Industry
4. Léon Kengo wa Dondo – President of the Senate
5. Raphaël Luhulu Lunghe – Principle Advisor to the President in Charge of Parliament and Democratic Institutions
6. Noel Mbemba – Deputy Delegate-General, General Delegation of the Government in Charge of Relations with MONUC
7. Lambert Mende Omalanga – Minister of Communication and Media
9. Prof. Philemon Muamba Mumbunda – Department of Law and Political Science, Catholic University of Congo
10. Augustin Muwenge – Journalist, Radio Okapi
11. Prof. Arsène Mwaka Bwenge – Centres d’Études Politiques (Center of Political Studies), Faculty of Social, Political, and Administrative Sciences, University of Kinshasa
12. Séraphin N’Gwej – Itinerant Ambassador of the President
15. Maurice Tambwe Lwango – General Delegation of the Government in Charge of Relations with MONUC
16. Prof. Celestin Tshimande Tukala – Centres d’Études Politiques (Center of Political Studies), Faculty of Social, Political, and Administrative Sciences, University of Kinshasa
17. Charly Wenga Bulambo – National Deputy
18. Anonymous – Senior Military Officer, FARDC

**External Analysts and Others**

1. William Durch – Senior Associate, Future of Peace Operations, The Stimson Center
2. Richard Gowan – Associate Director for Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations, Managing Global Order, Center for International Cooperation, New York University
3. Bruce Jones – Director, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
5. Christoph Mikulaschek – Program Officer, International Peace Institute
6. Nader Mousavizadeh – Chief Executive Officer, Oxford Analytica; former Special Assistant to the Secretary-General, United Nations
7. Jenna Slotin, Senior Program Officer, International Peace Institute
ANNEX II
List of UN Peacekeeping Operations
1948 – 2012

This table lists all UN peacekeeping operations undertaken between 1948 and 2012. Beginning with missions deployed in 1989, it sorts them into categories based on whether their mandates were authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the deployment of missions without the consent of the host government and permits UN troops to use force not only in self-defense, and based on whether they were multidimensional or complex in character. My criterion for calling a mission multidimensional or complex was simply that it undertook activities outside of the security realm to include humanitarian, electoral, political, and other activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Chapter VII</th>
<th>Multidimensional/Complex</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>May 1948</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
<td>January 1949</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>India, Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF I</td>
<td>First United Nations Emergency Force</td>
<td>November 1956</td>
<td>June 1967</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
<td>June 1958</td>
<td>December 1958</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Congo</td>
<td>July 1960</td>
<td>June 1964</td>
<td>Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo/Zaire)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>United Nations Yemen Observation Mission</td>
<td>July 1963</td>
<td>September 1964</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>UNICYP</td>
<td>DOMREP</td>
<td>UNIFOM</td>
<td>UNEF II</td>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>India, Pakistan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
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<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Start Date</td>
<td>End Date</td>
<td>Country/Region</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>Iraq, Kuwait</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Morocco (Western Sahara)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
<td>October 1991</td>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
<td>February 1992</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>Croatia, Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina, Macedonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia I</td>
<td>April 1992</td>
<td>March 1993</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
<td>December 1992</td>
<td>December 1994</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda</td>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>September 1994</td>
<td>Rwanda, Uganda</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
<td>August 1993</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>October 1993</td>
<td>March 1996</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (except Res 918 arms embargo)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>June 1994</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>No (except for aircraft)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>December 1994</td>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>July 1996</td>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (except Res 918 arms embargo)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (except Res 918 arms embargo)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
<td>January 1997</td>
<td>May 1997</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>February 1999</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>August 1997</td>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (police mission)</td>
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<td>MIPONUH</td>
<td>United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>March 2000</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (no military)</td>
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<td>UNPSG</td>
<td>UN Civilian Police Support Group</td>
<td>January 1998</td>
<td>October 1998</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>July 1998</td>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Country/Region</td>
<td>Organization/Type</td>
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<td>End</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>September 2003</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>December 2006</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Sudan</td>
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<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UNMIT</td>
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<td>August 2006</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>Central African Republic, Chad</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>July 2010</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
<td>Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNSMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria</td>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>August 2012</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA*</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BINUB*</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi</td>
<td>October 2006</td>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*UNAMA and BINUB are both Special Political Missions run by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and are not included in totals. UNAMA is still run by DPKO; BINUB was run by DPKO until it was replaced by the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) in January 2011, which is run by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

**TOTALS:**
- 67 missions total
- 16 ongoing (as of June 2012)
- 52 missions since 1989
  - Of which:
    - 20 mandated under Chapter VII
    - 29 can be considered multidimensional/complex peacebuilding

**It should be noted that these totals are somewhat misleading, as the total number of peace operations counts advance and follow-on missions that may be better classified as one with the main mission.
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