

Foreigners and the Making of the Chinese Diplomat



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Abstract

This dissertation marries multiple genres of historical inquiry, and draws upon underappreciated academic insights from Japan, China, and Taiwan to consider two questions. First, how the ‘professional’ Chinese diplomat, fluent in the sociocultural expectations of Western European diplomacy, emerged in the early twentieth century from a country whose various dynasties had, for two millennia, led and participated in an entirely distinct diplomatic culture of its own. And second, how a group of non-Chinese intermediaries working in China’s first modern diplomatic institutions helped nurture this transformation. The story it tells sits at the intersection between Chinese, diplomatic, and transnational history. However, its methodology is decidedly interdisciplinary: it is one of the first studies of modern Chinese diplomatic history to draw upon the ‘New Diplomatic History’, a pioneering approach that moves beyond the field’s traditional focus on the high politics of state-to-state level interactions, to interrogate the overlooked actors, sites, circuitries and processes of diplomatic interaction using insights from sociology, literary theory, and network analysis.

Today, the ‘Chinese diplomat’ has become synonymous with the invective-hurling ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomats that embody the aggressive and normatively out-of-kilter diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China. However, recent scholarship emerging from Japan, China and Taiwan has demonstrated that by the 1910s, Qing China (1644-1912) had cultivated a competent corps of professional diplomats who could perform confidently on the international stage, and who—unlike their ‘Wolf Warrior’ successors—fully embraced Western European diplomacy’s normative prescriptions

for diplomatic conduct and practice. For the Qing, the sociocultural, linguistic, and pragmatic chasms that had to be crossed to achieve this engagement with Western diplomatic culture constituted a remarkable feat of socialisation. From the first century AD until 1895, China had led its own distinct diplomatic culture. In this China-focused international order, ‘tributary’ states such as Korea and Vietnam subscribed ideologically to a hierarchical order in which the primacy of Chinese civilisation and the mandate of the Chinese emperor to rule all sublunary things were given articulation through a variety of rituals and cultural practices. However, in the mid-nineteenth century, foreign encroachment upon China compelled the dynasty to develop a framework for engaging with states on equal terms and according to the normative prescriptions of Western European diplomatic culture.

At its core, this dissertation asks the question of ‘how, by the early twentieth century, did Qing China achieve normative mastery of Western European diplomatic practice and culture, and in the process, produce a corps of professional diplomats whose expertise and experience would feed into and fuel later Chinese diplomacy?’. The pioneering Japanese- and Chinese-language scholarship alluded to above has, to date, only considered this process from the perspectives of Qing diplomats’ receptivity to international law and institutional shifts. However, to be a ‘professional’ diplomat in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was to possess sociocultural fluency in manners and etiquette, to display oratorical and rhetorical distinction in European languages, to dissimulate where appropriate, and to have cultivated the pragmatism to bring these skills to bear, where appropriate, for accessing networks of knowledge and power. Indeed, to be ‘one of them’ was not just about possessing specialist knowledge of international law, but rather about the ability to recognise and perform sociocultural nuances that were either reified as ambassadorial ideals in diplomatic handbooks, or, in many cases, just expected implicitly.

This dissertation interrogates how this metamorphosis was articulated in the everyday tools and circuitry of Qing diplomatic practice, including the art of

negotiation, the crafting of rhetoric in specialised linguistic registers, and the deployment of the press. In doing this, however, this study employs a novel methodological lens. It interrogates the shifting roles of subministerial foreign actors working within Qing China's legations as interpreters, secretaries, counsellors, and legal advisers.

An interrogation of the foreign presence working within China's legations may seem like a bizarre way of addressing the research question outlined above. Why not just look at how China's diplomats themselves were operating? This methodology in fact derives from Qing approaches to diplomatic practice in the period under question. Initially, foreigners were employed in the Qing's legations to perform tasks that the Qing diplomats and their staff themselves could not, or did not want, to do. Indeed, at least initially, any form of profound engagement with 'Western affairs'—of which diplomacy constituted a sub-genre—was anathema to the Confucian scholar-officials who piloted these new overseas institutions in a ministerial capacity. This was indicative of the ideological milieu that the Qing bureaucrats were socialised into: to engage at any level of profundity with a non-Chinese civilisation was to engage in barbarism. What's more, these Qing officials had not arrived at their overseas posts as 'diplomats' replete with training in the morass of implicit customs and practices that undergirded Western European diplomacy; they were learning as they went along. Given such circumstances, the work delegated to and performed by these foreigners, and the evolution of the content of this work, provides a unique space from which we can derive new insights about the nature of the Qing's interaction with Western European diplomatic practice and culture.

This novel methodological approach has proven to be highly effective. Drawing on multilingual archival sources collected in America, Britain, France, Japan, and Taiwan, this study reveals that while these foreigners were first employed by the Qing in the late 1870s to handle cultural explication, interpretation and clerical work, their roles were fundamentally transformed in the 1880s. From this period, they came to exert a leading influence on Qing diplomacy as rhetoricians, orators,

negotiators, press officers, networkers and strategists. I argue that this transformation was indicative of a rapid macro-level transformation in the Qing's engagement with Western European diplomatic practice and culture, in that their use of foreigners in this way demonstrated, among other things, a desire to persuade their diplomatic interlocutors that they were a competent diplomatic entity who ought to be taken seriously.

In the early twentieth century, however, a shift towards the dismantling of this foreign presence and the extent of its involvement in Chinese diplomacy could be observed. This new phase in the evolution of Chinese diplomatic practice, I argue, can broadly be understood as indicative of the emergence of the professional Chinese diplomat. Indeed, having now come to conceive of itself in Western terms as a sovereign nation-state, China identified diplomacy, in the Western sense, as an indispensable component of statecraft that ought to be overseen and run on a day-to-day basis by Chinese actors.

At the same time, this study reveals that the foreigners who worked in the Qing's legations were not mere middlemen. Their craft involved the transposing of complex levels of nuance from one party to the other and the reformatting of Qing views as culturally commensurable ideas that their foreign interlocutors could understand. At times, they even engaged in their own private diplomatic interventions that aimed to bring about a fairer outcome for the Qing. Their work also provided an inadvertent or, at times, deliberate, model for their Qing colleagues on the execution of specific nuances of diplomatic practice. In other words, their significance goes far beyond their utility as a methodological device. They, too, were critical contributors to the Qing diplomatic metamorphosis.

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My academic journey, however, began whilst employed in 2013 at my undergraduate alma mater, Aichi University. Sunayama Yukio encouraged me to

pursue Halliday Macartney as a line of enquiry, and also gifted me with a set of journals written by the Qing diplomats (*chushi riji* 出使日記) from the original ‘From East to West: Chinese Travellers Before 1911’ (*Zou xiang shijie* 走向世界) series that he had purchased while studying at Nanjing University as a student. However, it was under Murata Yūjirō and Kawashima Shin at the University of Tokyo where the project, and my academic training as a Sinologist and East Asianist, began in earnest. Murata-sensei encouraged me to dig deeper into the foreign presence in Qing China’s legations despite pining, as a scholar of China, to explore Chinese historical figures. Murata-sensei’s advice was, in hindsight, highly sagacious. My exploration of these foreigners has revealed much more about China than I had ever imagined. After Murata-sensei moved to Doshisha University, Kawashima-sensei warmly welcomed me into his extensive group of seminar students. His weekly graduate seminars—both the infamous Tuesday ‘KSS’ and the Tuesday afternoon primary-source seminars in which we read documents from the archives of the Zongli Yamen, Waiwubu and Waijiaobu—were instrumental in my training.

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Abbreviations

- ACIMC:** Chen, Xiafei and Han, Rongfang, eds., *Archives of China's Imperial Maritime Customs: Confidential Correspondence between Robert Hart and James Duncan Campbell, 1874-1907*, 4 vols. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1990.
- BYWJB:** Beijing (Beiyang) Government Waijiaobu Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.
- CYS-TZ:** Zhonghua Shuju Bianjibu 中華書局編輯部, ed., *Chouban yiwu shimo (Tongzhi-chao) 籌辦夷務始末 (同治朝)* [The Management of Barbarian Affairs from A to Z (Tongzhi Reign)], 10 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2008.
- FO:** Foreign Office Records, National Archives, Great Britain.
- GXCDHL:** Zhu, Shouming 朱壽命, *Guangxu-chao Donghua lu 光緒朝東華錄* [Records from the Donghua Gate, Guangxu Reign]. Edited by Zhang Jinglu 張靜盧, 10 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2015.
- IOR:** India Office Records, British Library, Great Britain.
- LOC:** Library of Congress, United States of America.
- LOC-G:** Ulysses S. Grant Papers, Library of Congress, United States of America.
- LHZQJ:** Gu, Tinglong 顧廷龍 and Dai, Yi 戴逸, eds. *Li Hongzhang quanji 李鴻章全集* [The Collected Writings of Li Hongzhang], 39 vols. Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2008.
- MAE-CPC:** Correspondance politique (Chine), Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Centre des Archives diplomatiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères, France.
- NARA:** National Archives and Records Administration, United States of America.
- NLS:** Special Collections, National Library of Scotland.
- NPM-Q:** Qing Palace Memorials and Grand Council Archives, National Palace Museum of Taiwan, Taiwan.
- NSW-M:** George E. Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Australia.
- PHS-M:** McCartee Family Papers, Presbyterian Historical Society, United States of America.
- PHS-R:** Rankin Family Papers, Presbyterian Historical Society, United States of America.
- PTSL-R:** Robert E. Speer Manuscript Collection, Princeton Theological Seminary Library, United States of America.
- RSM:** Yokoyama, Manabu 橫山學, ed., *Ryūkyū shozoku mondai kankei shiryō 琉球所屬問題關係資料* [Documents Relating to the Issue of Ryukyu's Jurisdiction], 8 vols. Tokyo: Honpō shoseki, 1980.

- QJWS:** Wang, Yanwei 王彥威 and Wang, Liang 王亮, eds., *Qingji waijiao shiliao* 清季外交史料 [Historical Materials on the Diplomacy of the Late Qing Period], 5 vols. Beijing: Shumu wenxian chubanshe, 1987.
- QSL-TZ:** *Da Qing Muzongyi (Tongzhi) Huangdi shilu* 大清穆宗毅(同治)皇帝實錄 [Veritable Records of Emperor Tongzhi of the Qing], 10 vols. Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964.
- QSL-GX:** *Da Qing Dezongjing (Guangxu) Huangdi shilu* 大清德宗景(光緒)皇帝實錄 [Veritable Records of Emperor Guangxu of the Qing], 8 vols. Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1964.
- WWB:** Waiwubu Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.
- YSKQJ:** Luo, Baoshan 駱寶善 and Liu, Lusheng 劉路生, eds., *Yuan Shikai quanji* 袁世凱全集 [Collected Writings of Yuan Shikai], 36 vols. Zhengzhou: Henan daxue chubanshe, 2013.
- ZMGS-GX:** Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo 中央研究院近代史研究所, ed., *Zhong-Mei guanxi shiliao (Guangxu-chao)* 中美關係史料 (光緒朝) [Historical Documents on Qing-American Relations], 5 vols. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1988.
- ZLYM:** Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

Where documentary collections are used, the volume and page numbers are given immediately after the abbreviation. For instance, take ‘LHZQJ, 32:104’ to mean volume 32, page 104 of *The Collected Writings of Li Hongzhang*.

For any sources which employ the *juan* 卷 system, the letter ‘J’ followed by a number is used to reference the *juan*. For instance, take ‘J4:10’ to mean *juan* 4, page 10.

Conventions

Dates

All dates follow the Gregorian calendar. The exception to this rule can be found in Chinese-language sources in which the Chinese lunisolar calendar is employed. The reign names for Qing emperors have been abbreviated in the following manner:

- TZ: Tongzhi emperor reign (1861-1875)
GX: Guangxu emperor reign (1875-1908)
XT: Xuantong emperor reign (1908-1912)

Dates given in this system take the following format: Reign name + year / month / day. For instance, take ‘GX3/12/1’ to mean the 1st day of the 12th moon of Guangxu Year 3.

Any dates which are followed by (IR) indicate that the date given indicates the date of the emperor’s imperial rescript. Any dates which are followed by (DOR) indicate that the date given is the document’s date of receipt.

Romanisation Conventions

Chinese words and names are romanised according to the Pinyin system excepting names which are more commonly known using another form of romanisation (e.g., Yung Wing rather than Rong Hong). Japanese words are romanised according to the Hepburn system.

Use of East Asian Glyphs

Traditional Chinese characters (*fantizi* 繁體字) are employed uniformly for all terms, titles and literature in the Chinese language, irrespective of whether a title has been published in simplified or traditional Chinese. For Japanese characters, *shinjitai* 新字体 is predominantly employed for all terms, titles and literature in the language, unless one of the above is rendered in *kyū jitai* 旧字体 form.

Introduction

Foreigners and the Making of the Chinese Diplomat

Introduction

At around half-past ten on Sunday October 11, 1896, a twenty-nine-year-old man of Cantonese origin, eager to take up his friend's invitation to join him for Sunday mass, hurried down one of central London's arterial thoroughfares. On his way, he encountered one, and then two other, fellow countrymen who proceeded to invite him into their lodgings to enjoy a smoke and a chat. Despite his eagerness to arrive at his friend's home in time to accompany him to mass, these men were insistent, and a few gentle pushes and entreaties later, he found himself stepping into what he thought to be his new acquaintances' lodgings.¹

This man was Sun Yat-sen 孫中山, torchbearer of revolution who would later come to be known as the 'father' of modern China, and he had just walked into 49 Portland Place, home to the legation of Qing China, whose dynasty he was out to topple. Sun was hustled from room to room until he was eventually moved up to a room on the third floor, complete with barred windows. Before long, a bearded sexagenarian entered the room in a 'bumptious fashion' to proclaim: 'Here is China for you; you are now in China.' There was no turning back; Sun was incarcerated in extraterritorial no man's land.²

¹ Sun Yat-sen, *Kidnapped in London: Being the Story of My Capture by, Detention at, and Release from the Chinese Legation, London* (Bristol: J.W. Arrowsmith, 1897), 32–35.

² Sun, 36–37.

The man who had entered the room and who now commenced to interrogate Sun was Scotsman Sir Halliday Macartney; previously Secretary, but now, in his nineteenth year of tenure, Counsellor to the Qing legation. By this point, Macartney's influence within the legation had accrued to such an extent that he spearheaded Qing negotiations with the British. Indeed, by the time of his retirement in 1905, he had taken 'a leading part in all the important negotiations between Great Britain and China that [had] been carried on in London'. These included 'the [1885] Additional Article to the Chifu Agreement regulating the opium traffic, the Burma Convention of 1886, ... the Tibet Convention of 1890, and the ... [1904] Convention for the importation of Chinese labour into the Transvaal'.³ He was renowned as the mouthpiece of the legation, who gave a 'European dress'⁴ to the Chinese diplomatic establishment, and also as a man who so thoroughly 'identified himself with his rôle as a representative of the Celestial Empire' that he was sometimes 'playfully spoken of as more Chinese than English'.⁵ A portrait of his former patron, Li Hongzhang 李鴻章,⁶ proudly hung on his study wall, and his willingness to go against his better judgement and assist with Sun's ensnarement was perhaps some indication of his thoroughgoing commitment to the dragon flag. There was also some irony to this. Macartney was a putative relative of *the* George Macartney who had met with the Qianlong emperor in 1793,⁷ the story of whom had so enraptured the minds of the Georgians that a reference to him had even found its way into Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park*.⁸ Now, a century later, another contretemps involving a different member of the Macartney family, albeit this time working for the Qing side, would

³ 'Obituary: Sir Halliday Macartney', *The Times*, 9 June 1906.

⁴ Demetrius C. Boulger, *The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney, K.C.M.G.* (London: John Lane, 1908), 361.

⁵ 'Sons of the South - No.23: Sir Halliday Macartney, K.C.M.G.', *The Gallovidian* VI, no. 23 (1904): 134.

⁶ 'Sons of the South'.

⁷ Boulger, *Macartney*, 4-5.

⁸ Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park* (London: Penguin, 2003), 144.

soon become a veritable cause célèbre, capturing the attention of both the British and international public alike.⁹

Various scholarly works have already probed the question of Macartney's culpability in this controversy, but that is not what is of interest to us here.¹⁰ Rather, his involvement invites us to consider the questions of why and how this Scotsman came to play such a pivotal role in this Qing diplomatic institution, of what value were his contributions, and what this position of power he found himself in tells us about the engagement of the Qing dynasty with Western European diplomatic culture and practice itself.

As this dissertation will reveal, Macartney could be seen to epitomise a cosmopolitan class of multicultural 'middlemen' or 'go-betweens' who, across the course of history, plugged gaps of a linguistic, pragmatic and sociocultural nature when divergent universalisms came to interact. They were figures such as the dragomans who brokered diplomatic exchange between the Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe.¹¹ They were also the inadvertent sojourners, missionaries and merchants who, in straddling or crossing the bounds of divergent universalisms, often inadvertently contributed to knowledge of distant regimes, epistemes and technological innovations.¹² In many ways, however, the terms 'middleman' and 'go-between' are overly reductive: their individual agency was heavily implicated in their craft, and they were often 'instrumental in defining, objectifying and maintaining the purported boundaries between cultures, in influencing the power dynamics at play and sometimes exploiting their position for their own benefit.'¹³ Regardless of the judgements we pass on their actions, however, the transactions that they conducted and facilitated contributed to the creation of the globalised world we inhabit today.

⁹ The incident was widely reported on and is retold by Sun in: Sun, *Kidnapped*.

¹⁰ The best of these is: J. Y. Wong, *The Origins of an Heroic Image: Sun Yatsen in London, 1896-1897* (Hong Kong; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

¹¹ E. Natalie Rothman, *The Dragoman Renaissance: Diplomatic Interpreters and the Routes of Orientalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021).

¹² Simon Schaffer et al., eds., *The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770-1820* (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2009); Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance*.

¹³ Schaffer et al., *Brokered World*, xv.

Individuals such as Macartney, who served the Qing dynasty as it learned how to engage with the alien diplomatic culture of the West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were crucial to this engagement, but have been insufficiently examined.

This dissertation argues that prior to the full-fledged penetration of Western European diplomatic culture and its associated practices into the Chinese bureaucratic consciousness,¹⁴ Qing China's ministers, in engaging with the challenge of deciphering the concepts and constructs of Western European diplomacy, equipped their legations and consulates with foreign secretaries, counsellors, consuls and legal advisers for the purposes of performing successfully within the theatre of diplomacy. Their participation endowed the Qing with a more succinct and coherent voice at the negotiation table, in print media, public hearings and events, and in treaty drafts, diplomatic notes and other official correspondence. Their social networks helped in the collating of intelligence and in the private influencing of negotiations. Their cultural capital and rhetorical flare were also mobilised in attempts build cultural commensurability. What's more, in the process of serving the Qing, these individuals were often modelling aspects of diplomatic practice, not only for the serving ministers, but also for the interpreters, counsellors, secretaries and consuls who served alongside them and who later went on to become ministers or diplomatic grandees in the Qing's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waiwubu 外務部) and the Beijing Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waijiaobu 外交部). The involvement of these foreigners thus helped the Qing, in its years of acclimatisation to the norms of Western European diplomacy, to protect and enhance its diplomatic interests, and to defend and promote the rights of its overseas subjects. Cumulatively though, they also contributed to the professionalisation of diplomacy in early modern China.

¹⁴ Designating the form of diplomatic culture which took hold in Europe as 'Western European' is somewhat reductive. Both Byzantine and Ottoman practices exerted their own influence upon the developmental course of diplomacy in Western Europe. I use this phrase here with this proviso in mind. Iver B. Neumann, *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 30–31.

In its interpretation of these foreigners' contributions, this dissertation contends that their involvement was symptomatic neither of a simplistic notion of a 'Western impact/Chinese response', nor of Qing incompetence.¹⁵ Rather, it was representative of the creativity and dynamism born of the fecund soil that was the Qing informal bureaucracy. Practices born of the informal bureaucracy gave ministers the freedom to hire a brain trust of competent foreign staff, to afford them the latitude to act autonomously, and to provide an heuristic to the staff of Qing legations and consulates. For these reasons, this dissertation interprets the position of these foreigners from a Qing-centred perspective, and argues for a rethinking of the notion of a 'foreign expert' or 'Western adviser'.

We should not, however, strip these foreigners of their agency. As this thesis will demonstrate, their own perspectives on diplomatic matters and the worldviews they brought to bear could motivate them to engage, without the permission of the Qing minister they served, in their own private diplomatic interventions. Moreover, their delivery of an heuristic for diplomatic practice was at times deliberate, and at times inadvertent. At times, these actions fell within the ambit of the foreigners' personal 'civilising' missions, as deliberate attempts to demonstrate to the Qing what was becoming of a sovereign state, and what was not. At other times, they were actions

¹⁵ The diplomacy of late Qing and Republican China has often been derided as slapdash, vacuous and incompetent; adjudged a failure purely by the simplistic barometers of governmental decline. In China, the late Qing and Republican periods are often dismissed using the interpretive paradigm of 'the century of humiliation'. While this narrative rightly denounces the turmoil wreaked by imperialist incursions upon the country in the pre-1949 era, it has too often fashioned castles in the sandpits of ahistoricity, strategically ignoring the achievements of past regimes to enhance and legitimise the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, for the Party today, only the post-1949 era has brought the fruits of modernity and progress. However, it would be myopic to identify this problem as a spectre which exclusively haunts the Chinese historical narrative. The Qianlong emperor's refusal to accede to the demands made of him by George Macartney in 1793 to engage in a more profound diplomatic and trading relationship with Britain has continued to influence understandings of the Qing and its diplomacy in the West. The underlying subtext is obvious: they had their chance to recognise the fruits of Western modernity, but they blew it. On these points, see: Stephen R. Halsey, *Quest for Power: European Imperialism and the Making of Chinese Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Henrietta Harrison, 'The Qianlong Emperor's Letter to George III and the Early-Twentieth-Century Origins of Ideas about Traditional China's Foreign Relations', *The American Historical Review* 122, no. 3 (2017): 680–701.

which the Qing minister or his staff had gleaned or proactively identified as effective strategies to adopt for the future. We need to be alert to both sides of the story.

This dissertation also casts these foreigners in the role of a methodological device, as a portal through which to gauge the evolution of late Qing diplomatic practice. When the first ministers were posted abroad, Western European diplomatic culture and practice still largely belonged to an alien episteme. Consequently, the value of embracing its normative prescriptions was not immediately recognised. As a corollary of this, the Qing initially constructed its legations' *raison d'être* upon two pillars: learning about the non-Qing world and purchasing and developing understandings of its military materiel.¹⁶ The tasks initially delegated to the foreigners also reflected this. However, when diplomatic engagement began to be recognised by the ministers as a more pressing matter, their uses for the foreigners shifted. Through an analysis of the ways in which the roles performed by these foreigners fluctuated over time until their eventual elimination from the Chinese diplomatic corps, we are thus provided with a new lens for understanding the penetration of Western European diplomatic practice in the late Qing. What's more, in drawing attention to the Qing position on specific nuances of Western European diplomatic practice, this lens allows us to transcend staid teleological box-ticking narratives of the Qing's stepwise embrace of both international law and the institutional apparatuses of Western European diplomacy. Doing so will not only allow us to assess more precisely how the institutionalisation of Western European diplomatic practice occurred in the Chinese context, but also will shine a light on the process by which the professional Chinese diplomat emerged from an entirely novel angle. In order to succinctly encapsulate this idea of reading qualitative change in Qing attitudes towards Western European diplomatic culture and practice through these foreigners, I appropriate the ecological term 'indicator species'. By this, I mean these foreigners,

¹⁶ Meanwhile, its consulates emphasised the protection of Chinese overseas subjects. The case of the consulates will not be addressed in the current iteration of this study.

and the work they performed, are diagnostic of the changes in Qing assessments of the utility of Western European diplomatic culture and practice.

In arguing the case laid out above, this dissertation is built upon two key premises.

Firstly, in attempting to understand how diplomatic ‘professionalisation’ occurred in the late Qing context, it is crucial that we do not presume that it was a conscious end goal for each individual affiliated with the service, and thereby see it in terms of Whiggish inevitability.¹⁷ While Ma Jianzhong 馬建忠, as a result of his training at Sciences Po in Paris, believed in the pursuit of such an outcome, this was not a belief initially shared by all.¹⁸ And why would it be? Most of the individuals who took up posts at the Qing legations were encountering Western European diplomatic practice for the first time. Furthermore, as will also be expanded upon below, there was a culture in imperial China for high-ranking bureaucrats to outsource work they were unfamiliar with to specialists. Cultivating a will to ‘professionalise’ would require a longer process of socialisation.

Secondly, it is incumbent upon any study which seeks to explore the process by which a ‘professional diplomat’ emerged that it defines what it means by this term. Yet, past scholarship which seeks to probe the emergence of the professional Chinese diplomat has typically not done this. Rather, the implicit criteria centres around whether an individual could deftly conjugate one’s demands according to the grammar of international law, and the extent to which one could move unimpeded in a foreign tongue.¹⁹ While both factors were undeniably important for achieving a

¹⁷ For a rejoinder to diplomatic histories which treat their subject material in this way, see: Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010).

¹⁸ Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司, *Ba Kenchū no Chūgoku kindai* 馬建忠の中国近代 [Chinese Modernity as Seen From the Perspective of Ma Jianzhong] (Kyoto: Kyōto daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai, 2007).

¹⁹ Wang Licheng 王立誠, ‘Waijiaojia de dansheng: Gu Weijun yu jindai Zhongguo waijiaoguan wenhua de bianqian 外交家的誕生：顧維鈞與近代中國外交官文化的變遷 [The Birth of the Diplomat: Wellington Koo and the Shift in Modern China’s Diplomat Culture]’, in *Gu Weijun yu Zhongguo waijiao* 顧維鈞與中國外交 [Wellington Koo and Chinese Diplomacy], ed. Jin Guangyao 金光耀 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2001); Hakoda Keiko 箱田恵子, *Gaikōkan no tanjō: kindai Chūgoku no taigai taisei no henyō to zaigai kōkan* 外交官の誕生——近代中国の対外態勢の変容と在外公館 [The Birth of the Diplomat: Overseas Diplomatic Establishments and their Relation to the Shifts

successful diplomatic performance in the late nineteenth century, this dissertation argues that these are just two of many factors that we ought to consider.

My own definition is premised on the idea that there needed to be a commitment, even if only performative, to what Hedley Bull and Hamish Scott have defined as a ‘diplomatic culture’. Namely, a set of ideas, values, and techniques which function as a common code or sociocultural language around which a diplomatic community operates.²⁰ In the Qing case, a commitment was needed to the diplomatic culture that had emerged within Western Europe and had, by the nineteenth century, begun to spread further afield. Furthermore, my understanding also draws upon the ambassadorial ideals espoused by such handbooks as François de Callières’ *On the Art of Negotiating with Princes*,²¹ first published in the eighteenth century, but—as evinced by comments by Ernest Satow in his *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*—equally important to diplomats and diplomatic practice in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.²² Indeed, operating as a competent member of this diplomatic community required, among other things, the possession of sociocultural fluency in European expectations for manners and etiquette, oratorical and rhetorical distinction in one or more of its languages, the ability to dissimulate where appropriate, and to have cultivated the pragmatism to bring these skills to bear for accessing networks of knowledge and power. To be ‘one of them’ was not just about

in Modern China’s Engagement with the Outside World] (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2012); Li Wenjie 李文杰, *Zhongguo jindai waijiaoguan qunti de xingcheng (1861-1911)* 中國近代外交官群體的形成 (1861-1911) [The Emergence of Modern Chinese Diplomats, 1861-1911] (Beijing: Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2017); Ma Yi 馬一, *Wan Qing zhuwai gongshi qunti yanjiu* 晚清駐外公使群體研究 [Research on the Ministers of Late Qing China’s Legations] (Guangxi: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2019).

²⁰ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 304–5; Hamish Scott, ‘Diplomatic Culture in Old Regime Europe’, in *Cultures of Power in Europe during the Long Eighteenth Century*, ed. Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58–85.

²¹ François de Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy*, ed. H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983). For a pioneering study on ambassadorial handbooks in the post-Westphalian era, see: Heidrun R. I. Kugeler, “Le Parfait Ambassadeur”. The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century Following the Peace of Westphalia’ (D.Phil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006).

²² Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green and co., 1917), x; 127.

possessing specialist knowledge of international law, but rather about the ability to recognise and perform sociocultural nuances that were either reified as ambassadorial ideals in diplomatic handbooks, or, in many cases, just expected implicitly. In many ways, this is a highly essentialised and highly Eurocentric definition of a ‘diplomat’, but to claim that a professional diplomat constituted anything else would be to deny the ideological hegemony that the norms of Western European diplomatic culture came to exert upon the world.

1. The Significance of Qing Legations, Consulates and their Foreign Employees

Prior to its full-blown engagement with the Western European diplomatic paradigm, the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) was an entity which both straddled and sat at the nexus of a variety of different universalisms. Indeed, the means by which the dynasty interacted with areas outside China proper and its northeastern homeland of Manchuria were pluralistic and underpinned by a diversity of protocols and ideologies.²³ Broadly speaking, these areas can be broken down into three categories: tributaries (*shuguo* 屬國 or *shubang* 屬邦), outlying regions (*fanbu* 藩部 or *wai fan* 外藩), and mutual trading states (*hushi* 互市 or *hushi zhuguo* 互市諸國).

‘Tributaries’ (*shuguo* or *shubang*) were states such as Chosŏn Korea, Ryukyu and Vietnam which, generally speaking, subscribed to Confucian norms and, at fixed intervals, would send envoys to China’s imperial capital to present gifts to the emperor. This act was, at least nominally, an articulation of ideological subordination to the primacy of Chinese civilisation and the acceptance of the Chinese emperor as ruler over all sublunary things.²⁴ However, such pageantry belied many of the more pragmatic reasons that lie at the heart of why this diplomatic culture had perdured

²³ By ‘China proper’ I am referring to the eighteen provinces (*zhisheng* 直省), predominantly inhabited by the Han Chinese, which were governed by the Governors-General (*zongdu* 總督) and Provincial Governors (*xunfu* 巡撫), as the ‘arms and legs’ of the Qing emperor.

²⁴ States came to be tributaries both out of their own volition but also through violence and coercion. An example of the latter came with the Manchu invasions of Chosŏn Korea in 1627 and 1636.

for approximately two millennia. The presentation of tribute (*gong* 貢), and the Chinese emperor's reciprocal act of investiture (*cefeng* 冊封), endowed not only the emperor but also the ruler of the tributary state with legitimacy. Furthermore, clear economic incentives were involved: participation enabled a tributary to engage in officially mandated trade with China. Furthermore, a bounty of gifts (*huici* 回賜) was bestowed upon the emissaries and the tributary ruler for their participation in this practice.

The 'outlying regions' (*fanbu* or *waihan*) of Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang were areas which had been conquered by the Qing but had been allowed to continue to engage in their own cultural, religious and legal traditions. While the Qing emperor was accepted (at least nominally) as the Son of Heaven (*Tianzi* 天子) and the legitimate inheritor of Chinese civilisation by the dynasty's tributaries, in these conquered 'outlying regions', the Qing emperor took on a variety of statuses. To the Mongolians, he was a Khan. To the Tibetans, he was the guardian of Tibetan Buddhism. And to the Muslims, he was a patron of Islam, although this status was contested as non-believers were not typically accepted as patrons of the faith.²⁵

Finally, there were the 'mutual trading states' (*hushi* or *hushi zhuguo*), such as Britain and Japan, with which the Qing maintained trading relationships, albeit entirely unmediated by any form of governmental interference.

However, in the nineteenth century, after the Qing's defeat in the first Opium War (1839-1842), the Qing faced the necessity of engaging in a form of interstate relations predicated on the Western European paradigm. As such, the Qing set about developing a variety of new protocols and institutions for diplomatic interaction, often under pressure from their diplomatic interlocutors. The three key innovations were the Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen 總理各國事務衙門 (the Zongli Yamen 總理衙門 or Zongshu 總署 for short), which was an office established in 1861 to deal with the foreign envoys who had come to be stationed in Beijing from that same year; the

²⁵ Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 199.

Superintendency of Trade for the Southern Ports (*Nanyang dachen* 南洋大臣), which was responsible for trade and diplomatic affairs in the treaty ports south of Shanghai; and the Superintendency of Trade for the Northern Ports (*Beiyang dachen* 北洋大臣), which would handle trade and diplomatic affairs in the ports which had been opened north of Shanghai.²⁶

This fledgling ‘diplomatic system’,²⁷ which emerged as a result of these efforts, engaged a number of specialists from outside the confines of the formal bureaucracy, including foreigners. For instance, in the 1860s and 1870s, prior to the Qing’s establishment of permanent diplomatic representation, it engaged erstwhile Western diplomats as envoys for its foreign missions, such as the American Anson Burlingame and the Spaniard Sinibaldo de Mas.²⁸ Its provincial governors—Li Hongzhang in

²⁶ Strictly speaking, neither of the Superintendencies were new posts. Rather, they were evolutions of two posts which had been previously dispatched in the nineteenth century to handle foreign affairs in these localities. The first to be established was the Canton Imperial Commissioner (*Guangdong qinchai dachen* 廣東欽差大臣): the predecessor of the Superintendent of Trade for the Southern Ports. This post was held as an ad-hoc role by the Liangguang Governor-General (*Liangguang zongdu* 兩廣總督). In 1859, the work of the Canton Imperial Commissioner was transferred to Shanghai (*Shanghai qinchai dachen* 上海欽差大臣 or *wukou qinchai dachen* 五口欽差大臣), becoming an ad-hoc role for the Liangjiang Governor-General (*Liangjiang zongdu* 兩江總督) and, in 1862, the post became a dedicated full-time post with the title Superintendent of Trade Affairs (*banli tongshang shiwu dachen* 辦理通商事務大臣). However, in 1866 it was once again made a concurrent role, to be held by the Liangjiang Governor-General. It was colloquially known as the ‘*Nanyang dachen*’, and this, at some unspecified point, became its official title. The predecessor to the Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports was the Superintendent of Trade for the Three Ports (*banli sankou tongshang dachen* 辦理三口通商大臣) which was established as a dedicated full-time post in Tianjin in 1861. From some unidentifiable point, this post came to be known as the ‘*Beiyang dachen*’. In 1870, the post was made a concurrent role of the Zhili Governor-General (*Zhili zongdu* 直隸總督), as an imperial commissionership. For a history, see: Masataka Banno, *China and the West 1858-1861: The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).

²⁷ I use this phrase here purely for reasons of narrative convenience. Such a hermeneutic runs the risk of misrepresenting the Qing’s institutional apparatus for Western European diplomacy as overly monolithic and systematic. For an excellent admonition on the dangers of reading the Western European diplomatic paradigm into the Qing’s initial institutional apparatus for diplomatic affairs, see: Kazumasa Hayamaru, ‘A Critique of Chinese Diplomatic Modernization Narratives: Reinterpreting Shifts in Qing Foreign Affairs Institutions in the Early 1860s from the Qing Perspective’, trans. Thomas P. Barrett, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 22, no. 1 (2022): 1–30.

²⁸ On the Burlingame mission, see: Frederick W. Williams, *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1912); Knight Biggerstaff, ‘The Official Chinese Attitude toward the Burlingame Mission’, *The American Historical Review* 41 (1935); Guoqi Xu, *Chinese and Americans: A Shared History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 25–73. On Sinibaldo de Mas’ mission to Spain to attempt to regain Qing control of Macao, see

particular—often engaged, on an ad-hoc basis, individuals affiliated with institutions existing within the Qing’s informal bureaucracy, or from the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, to oversee or assist in short-term diplomatic missions.²⁹ Robert Hart, the Northern Irish Inspector General of the Customs service, functioned as an informal diplomatic adviser to, and occasional negotiator for, the Zongli Yamen.³⁰ Hart also utilised his own network of Customs staff to achieve diplomatic aims on behalf of the Qing.³¹ This dissertation, however, assesses the hitherto largely ignored foreign presence in the Qing’s legations.

I offer two reasons why this dissertation exclusively addresses the foreign presence in the Qing’s legations. Firstly, past scholarship has to some extent already provided us with a basic understanding of the involvement that foreigners outside the legations had in late Qing diplomacy. However, as noted above, the foreigners who worked within the Qing’s overseas diplomatic operations have yet to be analysed in any depth. Secondly, and more significantly, as Hakoda Keiko has persuasively argued, the Qing’s legations came to be by far the most important institutions in the emergence of professional Chinese diplomatic personnel. According to her findings, up until the establishment of the Waiwubu—the Qing’s first truly ‘Western’ foreign office—in 1901, of sixty-seven ministers who were sent abroad, twenty-five of these

note 2 in: John K. Fairbank, Katherine Frost Bruner, and Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson, eds., *The I. G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868-1907*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 44.

²⁹ Kenneth E. Folsom, *Friends, Guests, and Colleagues: The Mu-Fu System in the Late Ch’ing Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 157; Vera Schmidt, *Aufgabe und Einfluss der europäischen Berater in China: Gustav Detring (1842-1913) im Dienste Li Hung-changs* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1984); Po Chung Yam 布琮任, ‘Qingji Xifang guwen zai Hua de siying: yi Mashi zai Li Hongzhang mufu de shengya wei li 清季西方顧問在華的肆應—以馬士 (H.B. Morse) 在李鴻章幕府的生涯為例 [The Multiple Talents of Western Advisers in the Late Qing: A Case Study of H.B. Morse’s Life in Li Hongzhang’s Mufu]’, *Zhongzheng Lishixue Kan* 11 (2008): 23–48; Ernest P. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China’s Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56–59.

³⁰ Stanley F. Wright, *Hart and the Chinese Customs* (Belfast: Wm. Mullan and Son, 1950); Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司, *Kindai Chūgoku to Kaikan 近代中国と海関 [China and the Maritime Customs Service in Modern Times]* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 1999); Zhang Zhiyong 張志勇, *Hede yu wan Qing Zhong-Ying waijiao 赫德與晚清中英外交 [Robert Hart and Sino-British Diplomacy in the Late Qing]* (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2012).

³¹ Robert R. Campbell, *James Duncan Campbell: A Memoir by His Son* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

had previously served in some capacity in the Qing's overseas diplomatic institutions, be it as interpreters or counsellors.³² In the 1901 to 1906 period, of nineteen ministers, twelve had previously served abroad at a lower ranking level. Furthermore, following the Waiwubu reforms of 1906 to 1907, in the period up to 1911, of twenty ministers, fourteen had previously served abroad at a lower ranking level.³³ This analysis is further reinforced by data she has put forward on the backgrounds of the dignitaries who dominated key diplomatic posts within the Beijing Government. Indeed, Ivan Chen 陳貽范, Hu Weide 胡惟德, Li Sheng-to 李盛鐸, Lu Zhengxiang 陸徵祥, Sun Baoqi 孫寶琦 and Yan Huiqing 顏惠慶, all renowned as exemplary diplomats who worked at a professional standard, had all worked in legation postings during the late Qing era. For these reasons, she considers the Qing's overseas diplomatic institutions as the key incubators of future diplomatic talent for both the late Qing and Republican periods.³⁴ This dissertation seeks to clarify what role in this incubation process, if any, was played by the foreigners who were employed across the Qing's network of legations.

When the Qing legations first began to be established in the West and Japan in the late 1870s, the men elected to serve as its representatives—the *chushi qinchai dachen* 出使欽差大臣, or 'Overseas Imperial Commissioners'—were not, and could not be, professional career diplomats. While some had some basic exposure to 'barbarian affairs' (*yiwu* 夷務) or, as it later came to be known, 'Western affairs' (*yangwu* 洋務), they were members of the cognoscenti who had progressed through the imperial examination system and had undergone a decidedly Confucian education.³⁵ Thus, while they possessed an in-depth knowledge of the classics, and

³² Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 158.

³³ Hakoda, 159.

³⁴ G. R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 5th ed. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 6.

³⁵ According to Hakoda Keiko, the core difference between *yiwu* and *yangwu* was that the former was seen as something to be handled by individuals who were not scholar-officials, such as interpreters (*tongshi* 通事) and merchants, whereas *yangwu* was positioned as a task that needed to be undertaken by the scholar-official class, however grudgingly: Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 165. However, Hayamaru Kazumasa has recently called such interpretations into question, demonstrating how *yangwu* was, at the very least, initially a task associated with 'controlling' foreigners. Hayamaru Kazumasa 早丸一真,

could draft essays and poems, these individuals did not speak the language of the country they were posted to and were, for the most part, encountering and practising diplomacy, in the Western European sense, for the first time. They were thus unprepared to navigate its morass of protocol and implicit methodologies.

This was further reflected in the institutional framework and parameters within which the legations operated. They exhibited an abundance of idiosyncrasies which were not to be found in their Western or Japanese counterparts. Indeed, as was the case in other aspects of Chinese society, many aspects of the legations, and the way they operated, drew on a complex and nuanced body of precedent.

Firstly, the ministers were imperial commissioners (*qinchai dachen* 欽差大臣) appointed by the emperor,³⁶ although they were referred to using the slightly modified appellation of ‘Overseas Imperial Commissioner’ (*chushi qinchai dachen*). To be appointed by the emperor as an imperial commissioner was to be engaged in a temporary, ad-hoc posting (known as a *chai* 差 or *chaishi* 差使)—typically for a period of three years—which was held in addition to one’s permanent, or official post (*que* 缺).³⁷ It was this permanent post, and the ranking carried with it, which constituted an official’s ‘true’ identity within Chinese society. As such, while a convenient hermeneutic, to describe these men as ‘diplomats’ is in fact a misnomer. Indeed, precisely because these were ad-hoc missions, and not a job or career path an official would hold for life, there was no formal system in place to transfer a minister to another diplomatic posting elsewhere at the end of his mission and therefore capitalise on the knowledge he could offer. Another quirk was that, unlike their Western or Japanese counterparts, the ministers would also serve concurrently as

‘Mō hitotsu no yōmu: 19-seiki chūyō ni okeru “yō” no ryōiki tenkai’ もう一つの洋務——19世紀中葉における「洋」の領域展開 [One Other Kind of “Yangwu”: “Yang” and Its Development in the Mid-19th Century] (unpublished manuscript, 29 March 2022).

³⁶ Li Wenjie has demonstrated, however, that the ‘pool’ of names put up for imperial consideration and selection constituted recommendations (*baoju* 保舉) made by important statesmen, past ministers and the Zongli Yamen: Li, *Waijiaoguan*, 227–45.

³⁷ On *chai/chaishi*, see: Kano Naoki 狩野直喜, *Shinchō no seido to bungaku* 清朝の制度と文学 [The Institutions and Literature of Qing China] (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1984), 325–26; 346–37; Li, *Waijiaoguan*, 23.

diplomatic representatives to multiple countries. From 1885 to 1888, one minister was even accredited to as many as six different countries.³⁸

Secondly, as was the case with a domestic imperial commissioner, the overseas imperial commissioners were directly subordinate to the emperor himself. They did not answer to the authority of the Zongli Yamen, but were of equal status to that institution. The Zongli Yamen has often been misconstrued as commensurate with a centralised foreign office,³⁹ a feature which developed in the Western European context after Cardinal Richelieu's concentration of diplomatic responsibility in the French Ministry of External Affairs in 1626.⁴⁰ While policy recommendations were communicated to the ministers by both the Zongli Yamen and Li Hongzhang, a minister could only ever be commanded to do something through edicts drawn up between the emperor and members of the Grand Council (*junjichu* 軍機處), the emperor's advisory body.⁴¹

Thirdly, Li Hongzhang cast an omnipresent shadow over all facets of late Qing diplomacy. Many members or erstwhile members of his private bureaucracy came to serve as ministers or staff in the Qing's overseas institutions.⁴² All ministers, regardless of whether they were drawn from the ranks of his private bureaucracy or not, corresponded privately with Li about diplomatic matters, the latest military technologies and political affairs. What's more, all dispatches sent by the ministers to

³⁸ Weiching W. Yen, 'How China Administrates Her Foreign Affairs', *The American Journal of International Law* 3, no. 3 (1909): 539.

³⁹ Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 6. It also bears noting that the Zongli Yamen was initially only designed as a stopgap measure. As Hayamaru Kazumasa has demonstrated, Qing bureaucrats limited the scope of the institution's functionality, curtailed its scale and authority, and planned for its eventual abolition. See: Hayamaru, 'Modernization Narratives'.

⁴⁰ Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London: Cassell, 1988), 53. However, as G. R. Berridge notes, 'it was only during the eighteenth century that a recognizably modern foreign ministry became the general rule in Europe'. See: Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 6.

⁴¹ A number of Grand Council ministers concurrently served as Zongli Yamen ministers. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Zongli Yamen has been misconstrued as superior to the overseas imperial ministers.

⁴² These linkages are made palpably clear in: Ma Changhua 馬昌華, ed., *Huai-xi renwu liezhuan: wenzhi, Beiyang Haijun, yangyuan* 淮系人物列傳：文職·北洋海軍·洋員 [Biographies of Individuals Belonging to the Huai Faction: Civilian Officials, Officers in the Beiyang Navy and Western Staff] (Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1995).

the court would pass through the Shanghai office of Li's China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, thus giving him access to a plethora of information.

Furthermore, the court's orders for ministers were sent by the Ministry of War (*bingbu* 兵部) to Li in Tianjin for forwarding to the ministers.⁴³ It was for these reasons that he was able to maintain a panoptic gaze over Qing diplomacy for many years until his fall from grace after the climax of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.

Finally, the legations, in terms of their staffing and of the parameters they operated within, were an outgrowth of *mufu* 幕府 practice, a key aspect of the informal bureaucracy that had originated in the offices of local government (*yamen* 衙門), in which a provincial governor privately employed his own personal staff of specialists. As *mufu* practice is significant in other aspects of the core arguments of this dissertation, its specific characteristics will be elaborated upon later.

Despite their lack of training, and the decidedly Chinese dynamics inherent in these new overseas institutions, the ministers had to stand astride a dichotomy of expectations. A successful diplomatic performance by the ministers, in Western terms, hinged upon a variety of factors. They needed to understand the sociocultural conventions of their region of posting in order to navigate interpersonal exchanges and avoid causing offence. They needed to communicate adroitly, in Western terms, with their foreign interlocutors to protect or enhance Chinese diplomatic interests, as perceived in Chinese terms. Their diplomatic notes and treaty drafts needed to be carefully encoded with deft rhetoric, in Western terms, that argued or persuaded their interlocutors of their Chinese priorities. They also needed the knowledge to invoke domestic or international jurisprudential precedents as appropriate. In many ways, they also needed to embody the 'Renaissance man', cultivating not only knowledge of international law and diplomatic protocols but also at least a basic awareness of topics ranging from trade and tariff regulation to the latest play in town.

⁴³ Folsom, *Friends*, 186.

However, a performance could not be adjudged a success purely by the unilateral approval of the Qing's diplomatic interlocutors; they also had to appease their contemporaries back home. Following the emperor's sanctioning of a policy recommendation memorialised by the Zongli Yamen, from late 1877 it became mandatory to regularly submit diaries known as *chushi riji* 出使日記 (lit. diary of an overseas posting), which informed their peers of the conditions of their country of posting.⁴⁴ Accessing accurate and up-to-date information sources was thus essential. What's more, the consequences of failure or of a loss of face, be it at the negotiation table or elsewhere, could be grave. Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾, the first resident minister in London, was impeached for eulogising the West in his own *chushi riji*, *Record of a Mission to the West* (*Shixi jicheng* 使西紀程).⁴⁵ Chonghou 崇厚, the first minister to Russia, was sentenced to death in 1880 for conceding too much in his negotiations with Russia over its occupation of Ili, although this was later commuted at the request of Queen Victoria.⁴⁶ These cases no doubt served as stark reminders to ministers of the punishments which could be imposed for the failure to perform one's job according to expectations emanating from back home. Appeasing both sides was a mammoth task for any professional diplomat, let alone a diplomat who was devoid of training in such matters. The stakes were high.

So, the men who came to staff the Qing's legations were not professional diplomats. Indeed, the very notion of a professional diplomat did not exist in the Qing bureaucratic consciousness at the time.⁴⁷ Consequently, diplomatic engagement through the legations was not seen as a priority, nor was it a core mission in the early years of the legations. Indeed, the core initial missions mandated of the

⁴⁴ Zhang Shouyong 張壽鏞, ed., *Huangchao zhanggu huibian* 皇朝掌故彙編 [Collected Historical Anecdotes about the Qing Dynasty] (Qiushi shushe, 1902), waibian, J18:8. Also see: Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司, Hakoda Keiko 箱田恵子, and Aoyama Harutoshi 青山治世, *Shusshi nikki no jidai: Shinmatsu no Chūgoku to gaikō* 出使日記の時代——清末の中国と外交 [Qing China's Diplomats and Their Diaries: China and Diplomacy in the Late Qing Period] (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2014), 8.

⁴⁵ Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, 36–53.

⁴⁶ Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881* (Clarendon Press, 1965), 87–94.

⁴⁷ Okamoto, *Ba Kenchū*, 58.

overseas institutions were learning about the non-Qing world and the purchasing of modern armaments. To do so, however, required individuals who could not only bridge linguistic and cultural gulfs, but could also navigate interpersonal interactions and know where and how to access the information the ministers needed. Foreigners were thus employed to act in matters which the Qing ministers themselves identified as matters in which they lacked expertise, and to help them engage effectively with the expectations mandated of them by both their diplomatic interlocutors and their home country.

However, ministerial needs would evolve, and so would the work expected of these foreigners. Indeed, the case studies which form the body of this dissertation demonstrate that the functions required of these foreigners by the ministers gradually evolved according to the ministers' progressively deeper engagement with the normative prescriptions of Western European diplomatic practice. What's more, the influence exerted by the foreign presence in the Qing's legations would also begin to wane in the early twentieth century, indicating both an increased self-confidence on the part of the Qing, and a convergence with other countries in constructing a decidedly national diplomatic service.⁴⁸

No definitive source exists which tells us exactly how many foreigners were employed across the Qing's diplomatic institutions. By aggregating data contained across a broad range of sources however, we can nevertheless get a sense of their number. According to my research, from 1877 to 1912, at least twenty-seven men were employed across thirteen legations as permanent or semi-permanent staff, and fifteen as consuls or honorary consuls across thirteen consulates (see Appendix). There were also distinct regional variations in the types of men chosen. For instance, the European legations tended to be staffed by foreigners with some previous experience in China and who spoke Chinese. Meanwhile, the American legation and consulates tended to take on lawyers and legal experts who were sympathetic to the

⁴⁸ Many countries readily employed foreign staff in their diplomatic and consular services. It was only when the rise of 'national' thinking and professionalisation began to occur that these alien elements began to be eliminated. See: Nicolson, *Diplomatic Method*, 34; Black, *Diplomacy*, 160.

sufferings of America-based Chinese communities in the nineteenth century. These were one expression, among others,⁴⁹ of the way in which the Qing saw its overseas diplomatic outposts as serving different purposes in different regions, rather than the unifying purpose of achieving diplomatic breakthroughs in negotiations.

Scholarship on late Qing diplomacy traces a lineage back to H.B. Morse's *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, the first volume of which was published in 1910.⁵⁰ It is surprising then that, despite these foreigners' omnipresence in the activities of the legations and consulates, little research was conducted on them in the twentieth century. Indeed, they were most often relegated to footnotes or fleeting references, with Cheng Wen-hwa, Ho Koon-wan and Wu Baoxiao's works on Halliday Macartney being exceptions.⁵¹

One reason why this foreign presence received sparse attention in the past undoubtedly results from the way in which the Qing's overseas diplomatic institutions were addressed in historiography. Scholars focused their gaze upon on how and why the Qing's legations and consulates came to be established,⁵² but failed

⁴⁹ For instance, as the vast majority of Chinese labourers in America hailed from Canton, Cantonese speakers often came to serve as ministers in Washington. For a breakdown of the regional variations in staffing choices for the Qing's legations and consulates, see: Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 170–79.

⁵⁰ Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 vols (London: Longmans, Green, 1910-1918).

⁵¹ Cheng Wen-hwa 程文華, 'Mageli yu Zhong-Ying waijiao zhi guanxi (1875-1905) 馬格理與中英外交之關係 (一八七五—一九〇五) [Halliday Macartney and Sino-British Diplomatic Relations, 1875-1905]', *Guoli Zhengzhi Daxue Xuebao* 30 (1974): 145–70; Ho Koon-wan 何冠環, 'Shi lun "Hua-yi hezhi" xia zhi Mageli yu Zeng Jize 試論「華夷合治」下之馬格里與曾紀澤 [An Attempt at Discussing Macartney and Zeng Jize under the "Synarchy" Framework]', *Shichao* 3 (1977): 10–27; Wu Baoxiao 吳寶暎, 'Zhongguo zhu-Ying shiguan canzan Mageli qi ren qi shi 中國駐英使館參贊馬格里其人其事 [Halliday Macartney, Counsellor to the Qing Legation in Britain: The Man and His Deeds]', *Qingshi Yanjiu* 11 (1999). Divie McCartee's involvement in diplomacy at the Qing legation in Tokyo has also been discussed briefly in: Watanabe Masao 渡辺正雄, *Zōtei oyatoi Beikokujin kagaku kyōshi* 増訂 お雇い米国人科学教師 [American Teachers of Science in Japan (Enlarged and Revised Edition)] (Tokyo: Hokushensha, 1996), 179–96.

⁵² Knight Biggerstaff, 'The Establishment of Permanent Chinese Diplomatic Missions Abroad', *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 20, no. 1 (1936): 1–41; Yan Heping 嚴和平, *Qingji zhuwai shiguan de jianli* 清季駐外使館的成立 [The Establishment of Overseas Diplomatic Institutions in the Late Qing] (Taipei: Sili dongwu daxue, 1975); Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *China's Entrance Into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Hong-hin Wong Owen, *A New Profile in Sino-Western Diplomacy: The First Chinese Minister to Great Britain* (Kowloon: Chung Hwa Book Co, 1987).

to follow through and analyse how these legations and consulates performed diplomatic and consular functions after their initial establishment. As Okamoto Takashi has pointed out, the dichotomy often drawn between the ‘tribute system’ and ‘treaty system’ is largely to blame.⁵³

Despite receiving a growing level of critique in recent years, problematically, this tribute/treaty dichotomy continues to underpin the interpretive framework applied to late Qing diplomacy. Indeed, scholars have been drawn to identifying a point at which one ‘system’ (a problematic framing in and of itself) was subsumed by the other, resulting in the skating over of the liminal period between the initial adoption of aspects of Western European diplomatic practice by the Qing and its full-fledged absorption. It is testament to this that there is a large number of studies which focus on the inception of the Zongli Yamen, on the superintendents of trade for the Southern and Northern Ports,⁵⁴ and on the establishment of the Qing’s overseas diplomatic institutions. Likewise, the treatment by Immanuel Hsü of the posting of overseas envoys as being commensurate with China’s ‘entrance into the family of nations’ epitomises this trend.⁵⁵ For many scholars, these moments appear to have constituted the proverbial flicking of a switch between the tribute and treaty ‘systems’, with ‘modern’ diplomacy taking hold from there. However, as Banno Masataka has stated, the inception of the Yamen did not ‘signify either the end of China’s resistance or the completion of her adaptation to the modern state system ... It was but one step, though certainly a very important step, in a continuing

⁵³ Okamoto Takashi, ‘Qing China’s Foreign Relations and Their Modern Transformation’, *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 70, no. 1 (2012): 1–5.

⁵⁴ Qian Shifu 錢實甫, *Qingdai de waijiao jiguan* 清代的外交機關 [Diplomatic Institutions in the Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1959); S. M. Mêng, *The Tsungli Yamen: Its Organization and Functions* (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University; distributed by Harvard University Press, 1962); Banno, *China and the West*; Wu Fuhuan 吳福環, *Qingji Zongli Yamen yanjiu* 清季總理衙門研究 [Research on the Zongli Yamen in the Late Qing] (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1995); Ueno Shōkum 上野聖薫, ‘1860 nendai shotō no Chūgoku ni okeru Shanhai Kinsa Daijin kaihen rongi 1860 年代初頭の中国における上海欽差大臣改編論議 [Debates over the Reform of the Shanghai Imperial Commissioner in Early 1860s China]’, *Shichō* 68 (2010); Jennifer M. Rudolph, *Negotiated Power in Late Imperial China: The Zongli Yamen and the Politics of Reform* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

⁵⁵ Hsü, *China’s Entrance*, 118, 186. Also see: Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 11.

process.⁵⁶ Indeed, tribute relations continued to endure after this point, albeit undergoing a continual process of adjustment and realignment.⁵⁷ However, as Hakoda Keiko has pointed out, scholarship on Republican diplomacy sees the existence of ‘professional diplomats’ as a self-evident fact, failing to probe the roots of their emergence.⁵⁸

Okamoto Takashi has argued in relation to two key primary documentary collections that are used for the study of late Qing diplomacy—the *Chouban yiwu shimo* 籌辦夷務始末 (the management of barbarian affairs from A to Z), which covers the reigns of the Daoguang 道光, Xianfeng 咸豐 and Tongzhi 同治 emperors, and the *Qingji waijiao shiliao* 清季外交史料 (historical materials on diplomacy in the late Qing period), which covers the reigns of the Guangxu 光緒 and Xuantong 宣統 emperors—that the way in which they were edited and presented lies at the heart of this binary interpretation of the tribute and treaty ‘systems’. The title of the former carries the implicit assumption that from the Daoguang through to the Tongzhi reigns, diplomatic encounters continued to be filed under the rubric of barbarian

⁵⁶ Banno, *China and the West*, 1.

⁵⁷ Quan Hexiu, likely drawing upon Korean ‘enlightenment party’ intellectual Yu Kil-Chun’s 兪吉濬 theory of *yangjeol chejae* 兩截體制, argued that there was a ‘dual system’ in place in the late Qing that allowed for the coexistence of tributary and treaty ‘systems’: Quan Hexiu 權赫秀, ‘Wan Qing duiwai guanxi zhong de “yige waijiao liangzhong tizhi” xianxiang chuyi 晚清對外關係中的「一個外交兩種體制」現象芻議 [A Study on the “One Diplomacy, Two Systems” Phenomenon in Late Qing Foreign Relations]’, *Zhongguo Bianjiang Shi Di Yanjiu* 19, no. 4 (2009): 70–83. Yuanchong Wang has recently echoed this sentiment in: Yuanchong Wang, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018). In Japan, rather than seeing the coexistence of two ‘systems’, scholars have instead seen the transformation in terms of the gradual reworking of the Qing’s traditional relations according to the logic of treaty relations. See: Motegi Toshio 茂木敏夫, ‘Chūka teikoku no kaitai to kindaiteki saihensei he no michi 中華帝国の解体と近代的再編成への道 [The Dismantlement of the Chinese Empire and Its Path to Modern Reorganisation]’, in *Kōza Higashi Ajia kingendai shi* 講座東アジア近現代史 [Lectures on the Modern and Contemporary History of East Asia], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 2002); Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司, *Zokkoku to jishu no aida: kindai Shin-Kan kankei to Higashi Ajia no meibun* 属国と自主のあいだ——近代清韓関係と東アジアの命運 [Between Dependency and Sovereignty: Sino-Korean Relations in the Late 19th Century and the Fate of the Far East] (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2004); Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司, *Chūgoku no tanjō: Higashi Ajia no kindai gaikō to kokka keisei* 中国の誕生——東アジアの近代外交と国家形成 [The Birth of China: International Relations and the Formation of a Nation in Modern East Asia] (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2017).

⁵⁸ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 4; Kawashima Shin 川島真, *Chūgoku kindai gaikō no keisei* 中国近代外交の形成 [The Development of Modern Diplomacy in China] (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2004).

affairs (*yiwu*). The title, and even the existence of, the latter carries the implicit assumption that the diplomatic encounters of the Guangxu and Xuantong reigns can be seen as a new period in which Western European diplomatic practice had become mainstream.⁵⁹ Based on an analysis of lexical shifts in how the Qing diplomats referred to the notion of Western diplomacy, Okamoto and Kawashima Shin have suggested that rather than seeing the Qing's diplomatic transformation in the binary terms of *yiwu* and *waijiao* (which correspond to the tribute/treaty dichotomy), we should instead see the transition in more nuanced terms as a gradual progression according to the stages of 'barbarian affairs' (*yiwu*), 'Western affairs' (*yangwu* 洋務), 'foreign affairs' (*waiwu* 外務) and 'diplomacy' (*waijiao* 外交).⁶⁰ Similarly, in relation to persisting interpretations of Qing diplomacy, Henrietta Harrison has made a clarion call to scholars to 'remember that the frames we use to interpret Qing history were shaped in the early twentieth century', reflecting the scholarly zeitgeist of that time, and that the choice at that time of what to include and what not to include in primary collections has often affected the way in which archives have subsequently been presented and interpreted.⁶¹ For these reasons, the liminal period of the late 1870s to early 1900s, in which a process of normative diplomatic acclimatisation was occurring within the Qing's legations, has been inadequately addressed.

Indeed, rather than analysing these overseas institutions in the context of this diplomatic transformation, scholars have long opted to interrogate, as objects of intellectual history, the personalities which staffed them in order to understand how their experiences abroad reshaped their *weltanschauung*, their perceptions of the countries they served in, and recently, their views on the ideal Confucian scholar-official.⁶² The ministers and their retinue's diaries, the *chushi riji*, have been mined

⁵⁹ Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司 and Kawashima Shin 川島真, eds., *Chūgoku kindai gaikō no taidō* 中国近代外交の胎動 [Emerging Diplomacy in Late Imperial China] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2009).

⁶⁰ Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 17. Okamoto and Kawashima, eds., *Taidō*, 15.

⁶¹ Harrison, 'Qianlong', 700.

⁶² Sasaki Yō, *Shinmatsu Chūgoku ni okeru Nihonkan to Seiyōkan* 清末中国における日本観と西洋観 [Chinese Views of Japan and the West in the Late Ch'ing Period] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2000); Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河, *Cong Dongfang dao Xifang* 從東方到西方 [From East to West: Chinese

as a resource for these sorts of enquiries, but these very diaries first and foremost served a clerical and administrative purpose, as routine reports sent on a monthly basis to a very specific audience: the Zongli Yamen. They were thus far removed from the forms of journal writing practised as a personal or introspective exercise. Moreover, they were often a *collaborative* effort, with ministers borrowing excerpts from notes penned by subordinates.⁶³ Otherwise, where studies from the perspective of diplomatic history have been conducted, they are either biographical accounts of single ministerial figures or of specific sets of negotiations, which are thus abstracted from the macro-context of the late Qing's diplomatic transformation.⁶⁴

In recent years however, we have finally begun to see a steady rise in scholarship which goes beyond such questions, either to interrogate the specific institutional functions of the Qing's overseas diplomatic institutions or to place them in a grander narrative of diplomatic transformation, or both. Hakoda Keiko's pioneering study has convincingly demonstrated how the Qing's overseas diplomatic institutions were at the forefront of this transformation, serving as inadvertent incubators of professional diplomats for both the late Qing and the Republican governments.⁶⁵ Li Wenjie also has tackled the question of how diplomatic professionalisation occurred in the late Qing by focusing not only on the ministers, counsellors, consuls, translators and attachés which staffed the Qing's legations and consulates, but also on the more recondite personalities who staffed the Zongli Yamen and its successor, the

Travellers Before 1919] (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2002); Teshirogi Yūji 手代木有兒, *Shinmatsu Chūgoku no Seiyō taiken to bunmeikan* 清末中国の西洋体験と文明観 [Late Qing China's Experience of the West and its Perspective on its Civilization] (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2013); Ono Yasunori 小野泰教, *Shinmatsu Chūgoku no shitai-fu-zō no keisei: Kaku Sūtō no mosaku to jissen* 清末中国の士大夫像の形成——郭嵩燾の模索と実践 [The Formation of the Ideal Image of Scholar-Officials in the Late Qing Period: Guo Songtao's Contemplation and Practice] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2018).

⁶³ Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki no jidai*, 5–6.

⁶⁴ Lee En-han 李恩涵, *Zeng Jize de waijiao* 曾紀澤的外交 [The Diplomacy of Zeng Jize] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1966); Hsü, *The Ili Crisis*; Lloyd E. Eastman, *Throne and Mandarins: China's Search For a Policy During the Sino-French Controversy, 1880-1885* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Wang Lianying 王蓮英, *Zhang Yinhan yu wan Qing waijiao* 張蔭桓與晚清外交 [Zhang Yinhan and Late Qing Diplomacy] (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 2011); Liang Biying 梁碧瑩, *Chen Lanbin yu wan Qing waijiao* 陳蘭彬與晚清外交 [Chen Lanbin and Late Qing Diplomacy] (Guangdong: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2011).

⁶⁵ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*.

Waiwubu.⁶⁶ Unlike Hakoda however, Li sees the legations in a less positive light with regards to the role they played in diplomatic professionalisation, seeing them as cesspits of nepotism, attracting individuals of meagre talent who saw the temporary positions (*chai*) in the legations as an easy opportunity to receive personal recommendations (*baoju* 保舉) from the ministers they served that would enhance their official position (*que*) back home.⁶⁷

Elsewhere, Okamoto Takashi, Hakoda Keiko and Aoyama Harutoshi have collaboratively examined the *chushi riji* as an *institutional* feature of the Qing legations, demonstrating that their production was mandated of the legations as an administrative imperative, rather than as an introspective exercise. They have also shown how these journals can be retrospectively used as conduits for understanding the Qing's diplomatic transformation.⁶⁸

Scholarship has also finally begun to emerge in the West. Jenny Huangfu Day has provided us with an insight into how both the writings and activities of the ministers and their staff contributed to the Qing information order, operating as a form of knowledge production about the West.⁶⁹ Furthermore, using the Qing legation in London as a case study, she has also examined how the legations sought to defend and relay Qing interests outside the domestic Chinese context.⁷⁰ Elsewhere, Dai Dongyang has investigated the operations of the Qing Tokyo legation in the period preceding the Sino-Japanese War.⁷¹ On the consulate front, our understanding of their efforts to protect overseas Chinese communities has been greatly enriched by

⁶⁶ Li, *Waijiaoguan*.

⁶⁷ Li, 3–4.

⁶⁸ Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki no jidai*.

⁶⁹ Jenny Huangfu Day, *Qing Travelers to the Far West: Diplomacy and the Information Order in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

⁷⁰ Jenny Huangfu Day, 'Mediating Sovereignty: The Qing Legation in London and Its Diplomatic Representation of China, 1876–1901', *Modern Asian Studies* 55, no. 4 (2021): 1151–84.

⁷¹ Dai Dongyang 戴東陽, *Wan Qing zhu-Ri shituan yu Jiawu zhan qian de Zhong-Ri guanxi (1876-1894)* 晚清駐日使團與甲午戰前的中日關係 (1876-1894) [Late Qing Diplomatic Missions in Japan and Sino-Japanese Relations before the Sino-Japanese War, 1876-1894] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2012).

the work of Yen Ching-Hwang, Sonoda Setsuko, Yucheng Qin and Aoyama Harutoshi.⁷²

Perhaps there is one other reason why little work has been conducted on the foreign figures in the Qing's legations and consulates, which also ties in with a wider problem in traditional diplomatic history: our obsession with the ambassadorial or ministerial figurehead.⁷³ In the late Qing case, the ways in which the 'Burlingame mission' and 'the diplomacy of Zeng Jize 曾紀澤' have been approached by scholars serve as two illustrative examples. As Jenny Huangfu Day has noted, the designation of the Anson Burlingame-led mission to the West in 1868 as the 'Burlingame mission' and the interpretation of 'its significance through the aspirations of the American minister inevitably writes off how its Qing members experienced and interpreted the mission.'⁷⁴ Similarly, whilst constituting one of the cornerstones of scholarship on late Qing diplomacy, Taiwanese scholar Li Enhan's monograph on 'the diplomacy of Zeng Jize' inevitably diverts our attention away from the rest of his entourage, including Halliday Macartney, who were equally crucial to the fuelling of Zeng's diplomatic engine.⁷⁵ In recent years, the so-called 'New Diplomatic History' and its practitioners have tried to move discussion away from interactions held by state representatives or, in the early modern case, representatives of kingdoms, empires, principalities,

⁷² Ching-Hwang Yen, *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch'ing Period (1851-1911)* (Singapore: University Press, National University of Singapore, 1985); Sonoda Setsuko 園田節子, *Nanboku Amerika kamin to kindai Chūgoku: 19 seiki toransunashonaru maigurēshon* 南北アメリカ華民と近代中国——19世紀トランスナショナル・マイグレーション [Overseas Chinese in the Americas and Modern China: Transnational Migration in the Nineteenth Century] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2009); Yucheng Qin, *The Diplomacy of Nationalism: The Six Companies and China's Policy Toward Exclusion* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009); Aoyama Harutoshi 青山治世, *Kindai Chūgoku no zaigai ryōji to Ajia* 近代中国の在外領事とアジア [Late Qing China's Consuls and Asia] (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2014).

⁷³ G. R. Berridge, *Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865-1939), Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in Turkey* (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), xix.

⁷⁴ Day, *Travelers*, 65–66.

⁷⁵ Lee, *Zeng Jize*. See my critique in: Thomas P. Barrett, 'Shinchō zaigai kōkan ni okeru Seiyōjin sutaffu ni kansuru kōsatsu: Shin-Futsu sensō ji no Haridē Makātonī no katsudō wo chūshin ni 清朝在外公館における西洋人スタッフの外交活動に関する考察——清仏戦争時のハリデー・マカートニーの活動を中心に [The Role of Western Staff in Qing China's Legations: Halliday Macartney and the Sino-French War]', *Tōyō Gakuhō* 100, no. 3 (2018): 59–93.

duchies, republics and city states.⁷⁶ As Tracey Sowerby and Joanna Craigwood point out, this new wave of scholarship ‘has also viewed diplomacy as a socio-political process and placed more weight on the importance of individual diplomats’ actions and networks [and] has often defined ‘diplomat’ more broadly than earlier scholarship, incorporating the interpreters, secretaries, and other actors who served below the level of accredited ambassador into our understanding of the diplomatic process.’⁷⁷ Indeed, traditional narratives of diplomatic history long overemphasised the significance of ambassadorial, or ministerial figures, seeing them as the key arbiters of diplomatic action. It was, however, the subambassadorial or subministerial figure who was most intimately involved with the day-to-day diplomatic rigmarole. Reconstructing and analysing the roles of this subaltern class therefore constitutes a crucial task for understanding how diplomacy, regardless of temporal or geographic contingencies, was executed in practical terms.⁷⁸

There are several notable exceptions, however, and their numbers are steadily growing. Banno Masataka, Okamoto Takashi and Paul Bailey have drawn our attention to the forward-thinking writings of Ma Jianzhong on the need for a professional diplomatic service, written during his time as a student at Sciences Po when he concurrently served as a member of staff in the Qing Paris legation.⁷⁹ Zhang Weixiong, Wang Baoping and Ke Ren have demonstrated how members of the Qing legations in Tokyo and Paris, practising a form of ‘cultural diplomacy’, engaged in active exchange with locals and produced tomes on their country of posting for a

⁷⁶ For an overview to the ‘New Diplomatic History’, see: Tracey A. Sowerby, ‘Early Modern Diplomatic History’, *History Compass* 14, no. 9 (2016): 441–56; Houssine Alloul and Michael Auwers, ‘What Is (New in) New Diplomatic History?’ *Journal of Belgian History*, no. XLVIII (2018): 112–22.

⁷⁷ Tracey Amanda Sowerby and Joanna Craigwood, eds., *Cultures of Diplomacy and Literary Writing in the Early Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 9.

⁷⁸ Several recent important studies which have brought these subambassadorial/subministerial figures into view include: Daniel Riches, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture: Brandenburg-Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Christine Vogel and Florian Kühnel, eds., *Zwischen Domestik und Staatsdiener: Botschaftssekretäre in den frühneuzeitlichen Außenbeziehungen* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2021).

⁷⁹ Banno Masataka 坂野正高, *Chūgoku kindaika to Ba Kenchū* 中国近代化と馬建忠 [China’s Modernisation and Ma Jianzhong] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1985); Paul J. Bailey, *Strengthen the Country and Enrich the People: The Reform Writings of Ma Jianzhong (1845-1900)* (Richmond: Curzon, 1998); Okamoto, *Ba Kenchū*.

home audience, and on Chinese topics for foreign audiences.⁸⁰ However, these studies are predominantly interested in the Chinese contingent and their cultural diplomacy or knowledge production activities, and less in topics of a diplomatic nature or indeed the foreign presence.⁸¹

Given that the above studies were conducted by scholars of *Chinese* history, one could argue that their prioritising of *Chinese* personalities is only natural. However, given the overwhelming propensity for the study of the Chinese contingent in the legations and consulates, this dissertation identifies two other reasons which have likely precluded a consideration of the importance of the more ethnically cosmopolitan aspects of the Qing's overseas diplomatic institutions. In the Chinese context, overly simplistic portrayals of foreigners as 'imperialists' which were often used to buttress the 'century of humiliation' narrative, long represented the mainstream intellectual position.⁸² In the West, Paul Cohen's 'China-centred approach' has been exceedingly influential as a corrective to John K. Fairbank's 'impact-response' model that painted China as a passive recipient of Western modernity.⁸³

Cohen's 'China-centred approach' was a breath of fresh air for many scholars and brought a welcome influx of scholarship that focused on internal sources of dynamism

⁸⁰ Zhang Weixiong 張偉雄, *Bunjin gaikōkan no Meiji Nihon: Chūgoku shodai chū-Nichi kōshidan no ibunka taiken* 文人外交官の明治日本——中国初代駐日公使団の異文化体験 [Meiji Japan as Experienced by Scholar-Diplomats: China's First Permanent Mission to Japan and Its Experience of a Foreign Culture] (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 1999); Wang Baoping, *Shindai Chū-Nichi gakujuutsu kōryū no kenkyū* 清代中日学術交流の研究 [Research on Sino-Japanese Academic Exchange in the Qing Period] (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2005); Ke Ren, 'Fin-de-Siècle Diplomat: Chen Jitong (1852-1907) and Cosmopolitan Possibilities in the Late Qing World' (Ph.D. Thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 2014); Ke Ren, 'The Conférencier in the Purple Robe: Chen Jitong and Qing Cultural Diplomacy in Late Nineteenth-Century Paris', *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 12, no. 1 (2018): 1–21.

⁸¹ Thomas P. Barrett, 'D.B. Makkāti to "Ryūkyū shobun" mondai: Shinchō zaigai kōkan ni okeru gaikokujin kan'in no shiteki katsudō to sono igi wo megutte D.B.マッカーティと「琉球処分」問題——清朝在外公館における外国人館員の私的活動とその意義をめぐって [Qing Legation Members as Private Diplomatic Actors: D.B. McCartee's Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Ryukyu Annexation]', *Shigaku Zasshi* 131, no. 2 (2022): 3.

⁸² That is not to say of course that there was no 'imperialistic' aspect to the Western presence. On this point, see: James L. Hevia, *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).

⁸³ Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

and social change in China, rightly recasting China as an active arbiter of its own change and its future trajectory. However, at the same time, the overwhelming influence of Cohen's approach also resulted in a situation in which the study of foreign figures or Sino-Western interactions in Chinese history came to be seen as outmoded or Eurocentric. Such critique, however, conversely engendered what one might loosely define a 'methodological nationalism' of sorts in the field.⁸⁴ While well-intentioned and injecting the field with broader insights on Chinese and Manchu agency, the reluctance to integrate foreign voices into the narrative conversely prevented scholars from investigating the cosmopolitan reality of late Qing institutions. Indeed, to borrow Robert Bickers' words, while much good work 'emerged from the shift to what was termed a 'China-centred' focus, the pendulum swung too far.'⁸⁵

Scholars' growing awareness of the problems examined above appears to have begun to bring the foreigners who served in Qing overseas institutions back into the picture. Daniel McMahon has demonstrated how Halliday Macartney made frequent use of the British press in an attempt to portray and craft an image of the Qing as an 'emerging nation committed to rational international principles'.⁸⁶ Yucheng Qin has made reference to how the Qing turned to a number of American lawyers for assistance in their efforts to protect their overseas subjects in the United States.⁸⁷ Frederick Bee's involvement with the Qing consulate in San Francisco has also been the focus of studies emerging from China and Taiwan.⁸⁸ Li Wenjie's recent

⁸⁴ On this concept, see: Ulrich Beck, 'The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails', *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, no. 7–8 (2007): 286–90.

⁸⁵ Robert A. Bickers, *Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai* (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 13. Hans van de Ven has similarly argued for a re-integration of the foreign element back into Chinese history: Hans van de Ven, 'Globalizing Chinese History', *History Compass* 2, no. 1 (2004); Hans van de Ven, *Breaking with the Past: The Maritime Customs Service and the Global Origins of Modernity in China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 5–7.

⁸⁶ Daniel McMahon, 'China in European Dress: The Qing Legation, Halliday Macartney, and Representation of China in the British Press, 1877-1896', *Fu Jen Historical Journal* 31 (2013): 205.

⁸⁷ Qin, *The Diplomacy of Nationalism*.

⁸⁸ Zhu Weibin 朱衛斌 and Jing Min 敬敏, 'Lun Fuliebi dui Meiguo huaqiao de baohu 論傅列秘對美國華僑的保護 [A Discussion of Frederick Bee's Protection of Overseas Chinese in America]', *Xueshu Yanjiu* 417 (August 2019); Hong Yuru 洪玉儒, *19 Shiji Meiguo pai-Hua yundong yu Qing-Mei waijiao*

monograph has also dedicated a few pages to the functions performed by the foreign contingent in the Qing legations and consulates.⁸⁹ However, these studies remain predominantly biographic or rudimentary in their analysis, and do not place their subjects within a developed purview of diplomatic transformation in the late Qing. Thus, remaining largely unexplored are: the vast range of functions performed by the foreign contingent, the significance of these actions for Qing diplomacy, and how their actions helped to shape a professional Chinese diplomatic service.

2. Rethinking the ‘Foreign Expert’

While research which reinstates the foreign element back into Chinese history ought to be welcomed, problematically, there has been a continued use of the notions of ‘Western adviser’ or ‘foreign expert’ within this scholarship.⁹⁰ These terms are used to signify the broad sweep of foreign employees in Chinese history from the Jesuits who served the Ming through to the Comintern Soviet advisers of the twentieth century. In themselves they are benign, but such framings prevent us from understanding these individuals through the Chinese lens, particularly in the imperial context. This dissertation thus proposes that we employ more nuanced concepts that pertain to the historical realities of the Chinese bureaucracy for the consideration of these individuals’ precise functions.

The notions of ‘Western adviser’ and ‘foreign expert’ are problematic, both on a conceptual level and as genres of academic writing. On a conceptual level: firstly, the concepts themselves promote the positioning of all Western, or foreign, involvement in China within a linear continuum, abstracting each group of individuals from the temporal context in which they were employed, from the means which enabled their

zhong de bairen lingshi: Qing zhu Jiujinshan fu lingshi Fuliebi 19 世紀美國排華運動與清美外交中的白人領事：清駐舊金山副領事傅列秘 [The Nineteenth Century American Chinese Exclusion Movement and a Caucasian Consul at the Heart of Sino-American Diplomacy: Frederick Bee, Vice-Consul to the Qing in San Francisco] (Taipei: Daoxiang, 2020). (Taipei: Daoxiang, 2020).

⁸⁹ Li, *Waijiaoguan*, 280–81, 327, 353–54.

⁹⁰ The classic example is: Jonathan D. Spence, *To Change China: Western Advisers in China, 1620-1960* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

employment, and even dislocating them from their Chinese counterparts. In reality, the only commonality was that they were seen to be bringing some form of ‘modernity’, whether sourced from Europe or Japan, to China.⁹¹ Secondly, this abstraction also lends itself to the risk of seeing the ‘foreign expert’ in universalistic terms, as a generic playing piece that could be deployed in any of the games of modernisation played out in the once ‘benighted’ Japan, Chosŏn Korea, or Siam, whose stereotypical role was to inculcate the grammar of Western modernity.

As genres of academic writing: scholars have typically studied these individuals from one of two specific perspectives: (a) their agency as individual actors, in which scholars have sought to elucidate their individual motivations and the pluralistic identities they possessed, or came to possess through their work in China,⁹² or (b) as agents moving within, or helping to reinforce, a transnational network of foreign empire.⁹³ These studies often recognise the importance of considering Chinese agency, but fail to explore from the Chinese perspective (i) how these actors slotted into China’s own projects of expansion or institution building, or (ii) how their employment was contextualised within the Chinese worldview and/or institutions.⁹⁴

How best then to understand the foreigners who served in the Qing’s legations? This dissertation posits that the employment and application of foreigners serving the Qing in its overseas institutions needs to be contextualised within the Qing’s

⁹¹ The use of non-Western or non-Japanese ‘foreign’, that is, non-Han, talent abounds in Chinese history, but is not typically included within these frameworks. See: Richard J. Smith, ‘The Employment of Foreign Military Talent: Chinese Tradition and Late Qing Practice’, *Journal of Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 15 (1975): 113–38.

⁹² See for example: Spence, *To Change China*; Richard O’Leary, ‘Robert Hart in China: The Significance of His Irish Roots’, *Modern Asian Studies* 40, no. 3 (2006): 583–604.

⁹³ See for example: Catherine Ladds, *Empire Careers: Working for the Chinese Customs Service, 1854–1949* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).

⁹⁴ Earlier work on the late Qing was a lot better at demonstrating the Chinese perspective on foreign employment. Fairbank’s ‘synarchy’ concept, which was clearly derived from the notion of *hua-yi yijia* 華夷一家 (‘Chinese and barbarians together as one family’), helped us to think about the foreign presence in Qing terms (although it has received criticism for not highlighting the imperialist element to the foreign presence). John K. Fairbank, ‘Synarchy Under the Treaties’, in *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, ed. John K. Fairbank (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). Richard Smith, Kenneth Folsom, Vera Schmidt and Ronald Po have also attempted to understand foreign employment in accordance with the Chinese context. See: Smith, ‘Foreign Military Talent’; Folsom, *Friends*; Schmidt, *europäischen Berater*; Po, ‘Xifang Guwen’.

culture of informal bureaucracy.⁹⁵ It further sees these individuals as being best understood as privately employed specialists, known as *muyou* 幕友 or *muliao* 幕僚.⁹⁶

3. The Significance of Informal Bureaucracy to Qing Overseas Institutions

As touched upon above, the Qing's legations and consulates, in terms of their staffing and the parameters they operated within, were an outgrowth of *mufu* practice.

In simple terms, *mufu* practice refers to the delegation of technical tasks to specialists, a practice that was originally incubated within the offices of regional officials—the *yamen*. The need for specialists in the *yamen* context arose due to the emphasis placed upon the need for knowledge of the Confucian classics in order to pass the imperial examination (*keju* 科舉), and thereby attain a post in government. This emphasis engendered a situation in which officials who were newly appointed to a post in the provinces often lacked the technical skills required to tackle the exigencies of daily administrative work, which ran the gamut from taxation and legal matters through to flood control.⁹⁷ Furthermore, this gap in specialist knowledge was

⁹⁵ Foreigners who worked in this capacity were typically referred to as *yangyuan* 洋員 (lit. Western personnel). While it is tempting to translate *yangyuan* as 'Western adviser', I argue that our understanding of this term ought to be anchored in the context of the Qing informal bureaucracy, which I introduce in greater depth in the next section of this chapter. I make this argument because, in the twentieth century, there was a transformation in the extent of foreigners' authority and their latitude for action was greatly curtailed. The foreigner, I argue, became more akin to the foreign worker in the Meiji Japanese context (*oyatoi gaikokujin* 御雇外国人). By that, I mean that foreigners became increasingly subjected to the strictures of bureaucratic hierarchy and did not have the freedom to move as freely as they had in the late Qing when employed in the context of the informal bureaucracy. This change in status of the foreigner may well have been a consequence of the 'Japan impact' of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For a more in-depth discussion, please refer to Chapter 4.

⁹⁶ Yamamoto Hajime has noted that those private specialists who were engaged in Western affairs were typically referred to not as *muyou* but as *muliao* (see: Yamamoto Hajime 山本一, 'Shinmatsu no bakuryō jinji kara miru chihō gyōsei: Chō Shidō no bakuryō wo chūshin ni 清末の幕僚人事からみる地方行政——張之洞の幕僚を中心に [Late Qing Local Administration as Seen from the Muliao Personnel: The Case of Zhang-Zhidong's Muliao]', *Ritsumeikan Bungaku* 667 (2020): 94). This dissertation employs the former due to it being more widely known in the Anglophone context.

⁹⁷ This did not mean that local officials were *unable* to cultivate expertise. Indeed, as William Rowe has demonstrated through his study of Chen Hongmou 陳宏謀 the Confucian 'amateur ideal'

often further compounded by the ‘rule of avoidance’ which dictated that officials must serve in posts which fell outside of their native province. Given China’s vast geographic scale and the immense plurality of local variants in language and customs, the barrier to entry for effective administration by the ‘extra-local official’ could often be enormous. Indeed, as one Japanese scholar has noted, a posting within China could be just as ‘foreign’ an experience as a trip overseas.⁹⁸

Specialists, known as *muyou* (lit. tent friends), were thus employed on a private basis to counteract gaps in expertise and conduct these specialist tasks on their host’s (*muzhu* 幕主) behalf. These individuals typically hailed from one of three backgrounds: (1) those who had yet to obtain an official post, who were out of office, or whose minds were of a more ‘practical bent’; (2) expectant-officials (*houbuguan* 候補官 or *houxuanguan* 候選官)⁹⁹ who had passed through the examination system successfully but who had yet to be awarded a substantial post,¹⁰⁰ or (3) those for whom serving as a *muyou* was a hereditary occupation, such as the so-called ‘Shaoxing masters’ (*Shaoxing shiye* 紹興師爺).¹⁰¹

Due to the importance of the information and advice the *muyou* tendered, the relationship between them and their hosts was devoid of the formalities and constraints of hierarchy.¹⁰² Rather, their relationship was conducted on a level playing field, and they commanded the respect of their host and the other members of his *yamen*. Indeed, within the *yamen* context, the *muyou* were often referred to as *shiye* 師爺, which roughly translates to ‘master’ or ‘teacher’, and their pay packets

popularised by Joseph Levenson requires rethinking. See: William T. Rowe, *Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

⁹⁸ Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司, *Fuhai to kakusa no Chūgoku shi* 腐敗と格差の中国史 (Tokyo: NHK shuppan, 2019), 91–92.

⁹⁹ On the differences between the two, see: Kano, *Seido to bungaku*, 353.

¹⁰⁰ An excellent study on the expectant-official in late Qing China is: Xiao Zongzhi 肖宗志, *Houbu wenguan qunti yu wan Qing zhengzhi* 候補文官群體與晚清政治 [Expectant-Officials and Late Qing Politics] (Sichuan: Bashu shushe, 2007).

¹⁰¹ Folsom, *Friends*, 46–47.

¹⁰² To get a sense of this, see the anecdote in: Youlan Feng, *The Hall of Three Pines: An Account of My Life*, trans. Denis C. Mair (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000), 19. I thank Henrietta Harrison for bringing this example to my attention.

were referred to as ‘payments for a private tutor’ (*shuxiu* 束脩).¹⁰³ This status allowed for the *muyou* to proffer candid advice and to remonstrate with their host when they deemed it necessary. Another clear indication of the status and respect they enjoyed can be found in the data on their annual emolument figures. While this would vary in accordance with their capabilities, their responsibilities and the income of the individual the *muyou* served, the average annual salary for a *muyou* was somewhere in the region of 100-250 taels.¹⁰⁴ However, a taxation or legal *muyou* could, in some cases, receive a salary as high as 2000 taels, which was equivalent to that of a magistrate.¹⁰⁵

In the nineteenth century, this precedent for the outsourcing of specialist work to experts outside the formal bureaucracy flourished to an even greater extent. The backdrop to this was twofold. Firstly, the Taiping Rebellion stretched the dynasty’s military and fiscal capacities to their limits. Secondly, the gradual encroachment of Western powers in the wake of the first Opium War required the Qing to develop new competencies in Western learning and modern technology. To deal with the new challenges presented by these internal and external threats, provincial governors and local officials turned to the *mufu* system.¹⁰⁶ This practice began with Zeng Guofan 曾國藩, and reached its zenith with Li Hongzhang. Compared with previous talent scouting practices, the net was cast wider and foreigners and individuals with ‘irregular route’ (*yitu* 異途) backgrounds in Western learning were welcomed into the ranks of the *mufu*.¹⁰⁷ As time went by, however, these *mufu* gradually evolved into

¹⁰³ Terada Hiroaki 寺田浩明, *Chūgoku hōsei shi* 中国法制史 [China’s Traditional Legal Order] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2018), 158.

¹⁰⁴ Terada, 158.

¹⁰⁵ T’ung-Tsu Ch’ü, *Local Government in China Under the Ch’ing* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 112.

¹⁰⁶ Marianne Bastid-Bruguier, ‘Currents of Social Change’, in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. John K. Fairbank and Denis Twitchett, vol. 11 (Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part 2) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 559–60.

¹⁰⁷ The ‘irregular route’ or ‘miscellaneous route’ (*zatu* 雜途) referred to anyone who had earned a place within the Qing bureaucracy through non-standard means, such as by the purchasing of office (*juan’na* 捐納), military merit (*jungong* 軍功) or personal recommendation (*baoju*). In contrast, the ‘regular route’ (*zhengtū* 正途) referred to anyone who had earned a place in the bureaucracy through

something which far exceeded the scale of what could be recognised as a regular *mufu*. To borrow Jonathan Porter's coinage, these governors' *mufu* transmuted into 'private bureaucracies' which contained much more than just an extended gaggle of host-to-*muyou* relationships.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, these governors established new private armies and a slew of extrabureaucratic institutions known as bureaux (*ju* 局)¹⁰⁹ and offices (*suo* 所) which handled tasks relating to, inter alia, likin collection, modern weapon production, foreign affairs, vaccination, telegraph-based communications, and even cotton spinning.¹¹⁰ As this simple adumbration demonstrates, while informal, or extrabureaucratic in status, the multifarious bureaux and offices helped China deal with the unprecedented exigencies presented by the nineteenth century, in a period when the formal bureaucracy had yet to integrate such components of 'modern' statecraft and industry into its framework.¹¹¹ These new institutions, whilst an outgrowth of the *mufu* system itself, were extraneous to the Qing's circumscribed

more orthodox means. Namely, through earning a place through the imperial examination or through hereditary privilege (*yin* 蔭). For a breakdown, see: Kano, *Seido to bungaku*, 330–41.

¹⁰⁸ Jonathan Porter, *Tsêng Kuo-Fan's Private Bureaucracy* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1972).

¹⁰⁹ To give a sense of the number of bureaux established in a given region, let us turn to the case of Shanghai. While not comprehensive in its purview, the *The Shanghai County Gazetteer, Continued* (*Shanghai-xian xuzhi* 上海縣續志), a gazetteer published in the Republican period, records the establishment of as many as thirty-seven bureaux in the period spanning the Daoguang period (1821–1850) up to Guangxu year 34 (1908). For a more comprehensive overview on bureaux in Shanghai, see: Liang Yuansheng, *Wan Qing Shanghai: yige chengshi de lishi jiyi* 晚清上海——一個城市的歷史記憶 [Shanghai in the Late Qing Period: The Historical Memory of a City] (Hong Kong: Xianggang Zhongwen daxue, 2009), 207–25. The extrabureaucratic bureaux and offices have been largely absent from the English-language narrative on late Qing's handling of the unprecedented circumstances presented by the nineteenth century. Some welcome exceptions to the rule are Yuansheng Liang, *The Shanghai Taotai: Linkage Man in a Changing Society, 1843-90* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 1990); Edward J. M. Rhoads, *Stepping Forth into the World: The Chinese Educational Mission to the United States, 1872-81* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011); Douglas R. Reynolds, *East Meets East: Chinese Discover the Modern World in Japan, 1854-1898* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Association for Asian Studies, Inc, 2014).

¹¹⁰ This is one of the reasons why so much power accrued to the regional governors in the late Qing.

¹¹¹ Their formal integration would have to wait until the 'New Policy' (*xinzheng* 新政) reforms of the 1900s. The Maritime Customs Service has often been seen as the key driver of institutional modernisation in the late Qing. This dissertation sees *mufu* practice, and the bureaux and offices which emerged from it, as constituting just as important a role.

modes of bureaucratic practice.¹¹² The Qing's overseas diplomatic institutions were no exception: they, too, took their cue from *mufu* practice.

There were several key indicators of how this practice was inherited by the Qing's legations and consulates. Firstly, authority was ceded to the minister for the selection of his staff. *Who* the serving minister chose to accompany him during his posting was completely left to his discretion. This paralleled the way in which an official had total say in who was employed in his *mufu* and who staffed his bureaux and offices. In other words, the minister was the ultimate arbiter of his diplomatic *mufu*,¹¹³ although there were notable cases where staffing recommendations were made by Li Hongzhang.¹¹⁴

The second indication of the linkages between *mufu* practice and the legations and consulates could be found in the continuities in personnel. The majority of the individuals who came to serve in these institutions had, in fact, once served in the *mufu* of either Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan, Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 or Yuan Shikai 袁世凱.¹¹⁵ A quick review of some of the individuals who served as minister to Britain serve as a simple demonstration of this fact: Guo Songtao had served as a *muyou* to both Zeng and Li; Liu Ruifen 劉瑞芬 had served both under Li and Zeng; Xue Fucheng 薛福成 had served as a *muyou* to Zeng and Li; and Luo Fenglu 羅豐祿 had

¹¹² Porter, *Private Bureaucracy*; Zhu Dong'an 朱東安, *Zeng Guofan mufu yanjiu* 曾國藩幕府研究 [Research on Zeng Guofan's Mufu] (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1994), 5–10; Iwai Shigeki 岩井茂樹, *Chūgoku kinsei zaisei shi no kenkyū* 中国近世財政史の研究 [Research on Late Imperial China's Financial History] (Kyoto: Kyōto daigaku shuppankai, 2004), 118–58.

¹¹³ Prior to the professionalisation of diplomacy in Western Europe, ambassadors had full control of their own staff appointments. As Harold Nicolson notes, an ambassador's 'secretaries and attachés were chosen from the circle of his own family and friends and were often wholly unfitted to their functions'. Indeed, this was one of the key reasons that in 1712, Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy, 'regretting the amateurishness of the French foreign service, set up a small Political Academy for the training of six young diplomatists who were called 'les Messieurs du Cabinet'.' See: Nicolson, *Diplomatic Method*, 58. This freedom of appointment on the ambassador's part is but a superficial similarity with *mufu* practice however, and it is important that we understand that such aspects of 'convergent evolution' arose as a result of different sociopolitical realities.

¹¹⁴ This very phenomenon is yet further evidence of linkages with *mufu* practice. As T'ung-Tsu Ch'ü notes, while there 'was a law that prohibited a superior official from recommending a [*muyou*] to his subordinate ..., a subordinate official usually found it difficult to refuse such a recommendation.' It was advised that in such cases, 'it was better to accept the secretary, treat him nicely, but not trust him with any important duty.' Ch'ü, *Local Government*, 109.

¹¹⁵ For a clear indication of this, see: Ma, *Zhuwai gongshi*, 47.

been Li's personal secretary and interpreter for years.¹¹⁶ The Qing's overseas diplomatic institutions thus drew from a pool of individuals predominantly affiliated with extrabureaucratic or informal institutions.

The early members of the foreign presence, too, were decidedly *mufu* in their employment origins: Halliday Macartney had served under Li Hongzhang as a *muyou*, founding and managing various modern weapon arsenals. Divie McCartee had previously taught chemistry and physics to Zhang Sigui 張斯桂, vice-minister to the Qing legation in Tokyo.¹¹⁷ David W. Bartlett, Counsellor to the American legation, was a maternal uncle of Yung Wing's 容閱 American wife.¹¹⁸

There were clear signs that the ministers conceived of their retinues in this way. Zhang Yinhuan 張蔭桓, who concurrently served as Qing minister to America, Spain and Peru from 1886 to 1889, repeatedly referred to his staff in terms of a *mufu* in his *chushi riji*, *Diary of Three Continents* (*sanzhou riji* 三洲日記).¹¹⁹ He Ruzhang 何如璋, the first Qing minister in Tokyo, in a scroll sent to McCartee commemorating his service to him upon reaching the end of his term, couched a reference to his employment in terms of his 'inviting [McCartee] into my *mufu*' (*li zhi muzhong* 禮之幕中).¹²⁰ Similarly, critiques of the legations were also couched in terms of *mufu* practice. In 1885, Imperial Censor Xie Zuyuan 謝祖源, in a memorial to the emperor, scathingly described the staff serving in the Qing's legations as *muyou* with no remarkable talent outside the handling of documents.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Folsom, *Friends*, 185; Zhang Fuqiang 張富強, 'Li Hongzhang yu Qingmo qianshi zhuwai 李鴻章與清末遣使駐外 [Li Hongzhang and the Posting of Envoys Overseas in the Late Qing]', *Guangdong Shehui Kexue* 2 (1992); Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 161–91.

¹¹⁷ Divie Bethune McCartee, *A Missionary Pioneer in the Far East: A Memorial of Divie Bethune McCartee*, ed. Robert E. Speer (New York; Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1922), 162.

¹¹⁸ Rhoads, *Stepping Forth*, 81.

¹¹⁹ See, for instance: Zhang Yinhuan 張蔭桓, *Sanzhou riji* 三洲日記 [Diary of Three Continents], Guangxu year 22 block-printed edition, 1896, J3:13, GX13/1/15.

¹²⁰ University of Pennsylvania, Memorabilia Collection, Box 60, 1A:27; Box OS 35, 12:04.

¹²¹ Liu Jinzao 劉錦藻, ed., *Huangchao xu wenxian tongkao* 皇朝續文獻通考 [Comprehensive Survey of Documents from the Qing Dynasty, Continued] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936), J338:10795. Also see: Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 180–81; Day, *Travelers*, 185.

Finally, whilst not an articulation of *mufu* practice per se, there is also evidence which suggests that the Qing legations operated internally, in ideological terms, as a *yamen*, rather than as a Western legation. For instance, Alfred Sao-ke Sze 施肇基, in recounting his time as a student-interpreter under minister Yang Ru 楊儒 at the Qing legation in Washington, states that Yang was a stickler for ‘general *yamen* ceremonial etiquette’.¹²² This is important, for it serves as additional evidence of how the Qing, in embracing Western European diplomatic practice, did not necessarily engage in wholesale mimesis. Rather, it drew upon aspects of its own bureaucratic culture to achieve the normative prescriptions compelled upon it by Western modernity. Indeed, it wasn’t just the culture of *mufu* practice that was enacted transnationally in the nineteenth century, the internal culture of the *yamen* also found application overseas as well.¹²³

Some scholars have suggested that because the Qing’s overseas institutions operated within these parameters, they were inimical to the development of a professional diplomatic staff. These studies instead argue that the incubation of professional diplomats did not begin in earnest until the Waiwubu reforms of 1906 to 1907 which, among other things, eliminated *mufu* practice by affording the Waiwubu, and not the ministers, with unilateral control over staff appointments and by turning the ministerial posts into full-time positions (*shique* 實缺 or *shiguan* 實官), rather than temporary ad-hoc posts held concurrently with another at home in China (*chaishi*).¹²⁴ Three reasons are typically put forward to argue that the *mufu* practice found in the Qing’s overseas diplomatic institutions were inimical to the development of a professional diplomatic service. Firstly, that because staff were compelled to return home with their patron, the minister, no system developed which allowed for

¹²² Shi Zhaoji 施肇基, ‘Shi Zhaoji zaonian huiyilu 施肇基早年回憶錄 [Alfred Sao-Ke Sze’s Recollections of His Early Years]’, in *Shi Zhaoji zaonian huiyilu / Waijiao gongzuo de huiyi* 施肇基早年回憶錄 · 外交工作的回憶 [Alfred Sao-Ke Sze’s Recollections of His Early Years / Recollections of Diplomatic Work], by Shi Zhaoji 施肇基 and Jin Wensi 金問泗 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2016), 18–19.

¹²³ Robert Hart, too, had talked of the Qing legation in London in terms of a *yamen*. See: ACIMC, 1:237, No. 298, Hart to Campbell, Nov. 17, 1876.

¹²⁴ On these reforms see: Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 158.

their experience to be passed on to their successors.¹²⁵ Secondly, that because the minister acted in a nepotistic way by favouring his family and friends for positions, the most suitable candidates for posts did not always necessarily get a billet.¹²⁶ Thirdly, that the legations also became a hotbed for talentless personal recommendation (*baoju*) chasing expectant-officials who had often bought (*juan'na* 捐納) their way into the bureaucracy, as a posting abroad offered the potential for one's post at home to be elevated, through ministerial recommendation, to a higher rank after completion of a three-year post.¹²⁷ In many ways, these criticisms also echo critiques by contemporary onlookers, including the aforementioned Xie Zuyuan, and even Halliday Macartney himself.¹²⁸

This study takes a more sanguine view of the role of *mufu* practice in the Qing's overseas institutions, in line with Hakoda Keiko's analysis.¹²⁹ Taking cues from Guan Xiaohong's study of how *mufu* practice provided a blueprint for the professionalisation of statecraft across the board,¹³⁰ Hakoda has convincingly demonstrated how, while there were indeed a number of problems associated with *mufu* practice in the legations (especially the recommendation chasers issue), it nevertheless allowed the legations to function as a training ground for future diplomatic talent, with many returning to serve again in later years.¹³¹ The statistics put forward earlier in this introduction are testament to this fact.

This dissertation, whilst drawing upon Hakoda's analysis, further argues that *mufu* practice was also important with regard to the foreign presence in these institutions. It argues that *mufu* practice was replicated within the interpersonal relationships between the ministers and their foreign staff, in that specialist tasks that the minister

¹²⁵ For example, see: Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 115.

¹²⁶ Li, *Waijiaoguan*.

¹²⁷ Li.

¹²⁸ FO17/1286, Sir H. Macartney to F. Bertie, Sept. 4, 1896.

¹²⁹ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 162–63.

¹³⁰ Guan Xiaohong 關曉紅, 'Cong mufu dao zhiguan: Qing ji waiguan zhi gaige zhong de muzhi fenke zhishi 從幕府到職官——清季外官制改革中的幕職分科治事 [From Private Secretary to Civil Official: The Function-Based Division of Local Government in the Late Qing Dynasty]', *Lishi yanjiu*, no. 5 (2006): 88–103.

¹³¹ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 161–91.

or his staff were unable to undertake or lacked confidence in executing were delegated to these foreigners, and that they were afforded considerable autonomy in their execution. Li Wenjie, who is critical of the culture of *mufu* practice in the Qing's overseas institutions, has also noted the importance of foreigners to the everyday workings of the legations.¹³² Yet, it was the existence of *mufu* practice which first allowed these foreigners to work there, in the manner that they did. Furthermore, I argue that the positioning of these foreigners as experts in specialist tasks, and their very completion of them, provided both the ministers and their staff—many of whom would later become ministers themselves—with an inadvertent heuristic for how to approach a variety of tasks, running the gamut from treaty wording to the delivery of an oratorical tour de force on the negotiation stage. These individuals thus not only brought much needed skills, they often performed functions which went above and beyond what was expected of them, and inadvertently contributed to the formative stages of the development of China's professional diplomatic service.

That does not, however, mean that we should strip these foreigners of all agency. As we shall see, the functions performed by these individuals were not always predicated upon explicit articulations by the Qing ministers of perceived deficiencies, of areas that needed addressing or jobs that needed doing. Indeed, their engagement benefited the ministers and, by extension, Qing diplomacy in contexts that the ministers initially did not anticipate. This is most apparent in the activities that these foreigners conducted in a private capacity or through unofficial diplomatic channels. Furthermore, it was in this private, unofficial, or semi-official realm that their accumulation of cultural and social capital enabled them to exert considerable influence. However, because these actions were private in nature, they introduce another layer of complexity to our analysis. Whilst they were intended to work for the Qing's benefit, these actions were enacted without consultation with their

¹³² Li, *Waijiaoguan*, 281. Also see: Wang, 'Waijiaojia', 346.

employers. They thus betrayed a sense of ‘knowing what’s best’ for the Qing.¹³³ In this way, then, while the Qing ministers and their Chinese staff were by no means passive recipients of Western European diplomatic practice, the relationship between the ministers and their foreign employees was exceedingly complex: the ministers were using the foreigners for their own ends but, these foreigners, in agreeing to proffer their assistance, were simultaneously signing the Qing up to their own personal ‘civilising’ missions.¹³⁴

Nevertheless, in employing these foreign staff members, we discover an area of institutional ingenuity which runs contrary to portrayals of late Qing diplomacy as slapdash, vacuous and incompetent. The ministers recognised that they *had* to engage with Europe, Japan and the Americas according to alien protocols, through alien languages. They also recognised that they *themselves* lacked the proficiency to do so effectively. They thus turned to the hiring of these men as one key strategy which, as this dissertation argues, redounded to their benefit, not only in ensuring the smooth running of Qing overseas diplomatic activity, but also in the shaping of a professional diplomatic corps.¹³⁵ This dissertation thus joins a growing body of scholarship which recasts Qing actors as a dynamic and creative force,¹³⁶ and argues

¹³³ James Hevia has argued that foreign, particularly British, involvement in China in the nineteenth century constituted an imperial pedagogical project which attempted to inculcate the Qing with the grammar of Western modernity. He contends that this project took two forms, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. The former refers to military intervention, typified by British gunboat diplomacy, and the latter to ‘tutelage’, an ideological assault on the Chinese worldview, typified by European diplomats and the Qing’s foreign advisers’ attempts to ‘teach the Qing elite and the Chinese people in general through various means of coercion and enticement how to function properly in a world dominated militarily and economically by European-based empires’. In some ways, the actions of the foreigners explored in this study coincide with this latter element that Hevia has identified. However, one of the goals of this dissertation is to restore agency to the Qing side by also demonstrating how this ‘tutelage’ was actively utilised by the dynasty to its own benefit. Hevia, *English Lessons*, 13.

¹³⁴ On the ‘exporting’ of civility see: Keith Thomas, *In Pursuit of Civility: Manners and Civilization in Early Modern England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 214–46.

¹³⁵ That did not preclude the possibility that some of these men underwhelmed the ministers in their performance. David W. Bartlett, Secretary to the Qing Legation in Washington was, for example, often lambasted for his ineptitude by Zhang Yinhan 張蔭桓 in his *chushi riji*. See, for example: Zhang, *Sanzhou riji*, J5:8-9, GX13/10/16.

¹³⁶ In the Anglophone context, some key examples include: Benjamin A. Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Odd Arne Westad, *Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750* (London: Bodley Head, 2012); van de Ven, *Breaking with the Past*; Reynolds, *East Meets East*; Halsey, *Quest for Power*.

that the diplomatic knowledge, experience and personnel it cultivated, far from being disregarded when the dynasty collapsed,¹³⁷ fed into and fuelled Republican diplomacy too.¹³⁸

4. Chapter Overview

This dissertation utilises an analysis of the actions of foreign staff members in the Qing's legations, and their deployment by the Qing, as a new metric—an 'indicator species'—through which to consider how the professionalisation and institutionalisation of diplomacy developed in late imperial and early modern China. It thus contributes to our understanding of late imperial and early modern Chinese diplomatic history in two significant ways. First, it elucidates the content, character, and significance of a hitherto overlooked transitional task force of foreign intermediaries that ensured that Qing diplomatic activity in its legations, in the years prior to the development of a fully professionalised staff, could function to a high standard and avoid activities which were inimical to Qing interest. They also helped, often inadvertently, in the shaping and building of a professional diplomatic corps in the late imperial and early modern Chinese context. Secondly, it demonstrates how these foreigners' involvement in the operations of the Qing legations, and the importance this involvement came to possess, was not only due to their own skillsets and contacts, but to the framework that *mufu* practice provided. Rather than being understood purely as a 'foreign expert' then, these individuals' involvement in late Qing diplomacy ought to be understood and contextualised within the practices of the Qing informal bureaucracy, as an interactive process that helped the Qing to bootstrap their way to diplomatic professionalisation.

¹³⁷ As Peter Martin argues, this was the case after the Communist Revolution of 1949 with Zhou Enlai's 周恩來 efforts to build up the Waijiaobu. See: Peter Martin, *China's Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 6, 15, 47. An argument could be made that the Taiwanese diplomatic service is the inheritor to this legacy, however.

¹³⁸ In this sense, it connects to arguments made by Julia Strauss about the long-lasting legacy of state building efforts in China. See: Julia C. Strauss, *Strong Institutions in Weak Politics: State Building in Republican China, 1927-1940* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

Chapter 1 analyses ministerial expectations and goals for Qing legation practice during these institutions' first years of operation. Through the case studies of Halliday Macartney at the Qing legation in London, and Carl Kreyer at the Qing legation in Berlin, the chapter reveals that the Qing ministers' expectations for its foreign staff, and furthermore their mission at large, was of a decidedly non-diplomatic nature at this stage. Rather, the ministers engaged their foreign staff as conduits for learning about the non-Qing world in order to assist the dynasty with the problems it contended with at home. This was indicative of the fact that the Qing had yet to fully see the utility of embracing Western European diplomatic practice.

Chapter 2 analyses the functions performed by Divie McCartee at the Qing Tokyo legation from 1877 to 1880, both in official and private capacities. As was the case at the London and Berlin legations in this period, the Tokyo legation's expectations for legation practice coincided with the emphasis upon learning about the non-Qing world. However, unlike the cases of Macartney and Kreyer at the London and Berlin legations, McCartee was seemingly not involved in such processes. Rather, he was predominantly expected to perform clerical tasks relating to translation, interpretation, and document production. However, the chapter reveals how during the Ryukyu annexation crisis, McCartee, without reference to the legation ministers, undertook a series of private actions through his social networks and the media which were designed to redound to Qing benefit and to return at least a portion of Ryukyu to its status as a Qing tributary. In elucidating McCartee's private interventions, the chapter seeks to argue two points. Firstly, these foreigners, without reference to ministerial authority, and beyond the formal strictures of their role, often engaged in private interventions that held the potential for eliciting meaningful diplomatic change. Secondly, McCartee's decision to take matters into his own hands ought to be seen as symptomatic of the particular modality in which the Qing legations and their ministers were operating in this period, as institutions that were

primarily positioned as centres of learning about the non-Qing world, as opposed to overseas outposts geared towards achieving diplomatic breakthroughs.

Chapter 3 shows how, from the 1880s onwards, Qing ministers began to engage proactively with Western European diplomacy and use it to their advantage. It demonstrates this through an analysis of the evolution of Halliday Macartney's role at the Qing London legation. The chapter advances three separate but interrelated arguments. First, it demonstrates that from Zeng Jize's (1879-1886) tenure onwards, Macartney's role within the London legation was fundamentally transformed so that he increasingly functioned as the legation's (1) lead rhetorician, (2) lead negotiator, and (3) press officer. It was these new characteristics of his work that began to emerge under Zeng's tenure that demonstrated that Zeng and his successors were engaging with the norms, protocols and even ambassadorial ideals of Western European diplomatic culture. Second, I argue that aspects of these new functions that Macartney took on were identified by the Qing ministers as possessing a useful didactic quality for both serving and future diplomatic staff. This was exemplified by how aspects of Macartney's written output—albeit refracted through translation—were chosen to take a place in projects designed for the dissemination of diplomatic knowledge, and by the fact that lower-ranking staff were sent in to witness the negotiations that he chaired for the Qing side. Third, I argue that these new shifts in Macartney's role transformed his social standing within British and wider European society, and that this increased clout also redounded to Qing benefit by creating new means for information collation, diplomatic breakthrough, and for promoting Qing agendas in the press. I therefore suggest that the new roles afforded to him by the ministers worked in combination to produce a fourth, inadvertent shift in the functions he performed: the shift to (4) networker. However, there was a caveat: to hold onto this new status and the privileged access to information that it yielded, Macartney needed to compromise his status, offering information and hints to the British side in return.

Chapter 4 argues that, commensurate with the emergence of what we would today recognise as a professional Chinese diplomatic class in the early twentieth century, there was a corresponding move to curtail the authority of foreign staff to enact, take charge of, or be involved with, key diplomatic actions. I argue that this was a result of two interrelated factors. The first was the emergence of a nation-state consciousness that emphasised that ‘Chinese’ diplomacy ought to be performed by ‘Chinese’ actors, both as a result of pressure from China’s diplomatic interlocutors, who emphasised such norms of practice, and as a result of a broader discourse on the appropriateness of foreign participation in Chinese statecraft. The second factor was the effect of what I term the ‘intellectual labour revolution’ in early twentieth century China, through which formerly ad-hoc or extrabureaucratic posts, including legation and consulate posts, often created and maintained through *mufu* practice, were internalised as full-time dedicated career paths as a result of the New Policies movement and the abolition of the imperial examination system in 1905. This worked to engender an emphasis on valuing and fostering technical expertise which had hitherto not been formally recognised as part of Qing statecraft, and also to remove the societal stigma associated with such work. In the Republican period, this emphasis on technical expertise and professionalism would only grow.

At the same time, I also seek to make a larger argument in this chapter: namely, that the underlying structures of the transaction between foreigner, as *muyou*, and Chinese host, were fundamentally transformed in a sociological sense in this period. There was a desire to impose a clearly defined hierarchy, and the foreign employee, while feeding advice into the decision-making process, was *not* positioned as the individual who was ultimately charged with executing a task. This was a further indication of the emergence of a desire to conduct diplomacy autonomously.

Chapter 1

Discerning the Origins of Foreign Wealth and Power: The Non-Diplomatic Focus of the First Qing Legations

Introduction

This chapter explores the ministerial expectation for foreigners when the first Qing legations were established in the late 1870s, and to what extent, if at all, the ministers embraced the normative expectations of Western European diplomatic culture and practice at this time. However, the structure and purpose of the first Qing legations were heavily anchored to domestic practice and circumstance, and they cannot be understood without first establishing that context here.

Upon receiving orders to proceed to his county post, a newly minted magistrate (*zhixian* 知縣) in Qing China would immediately be confronted by a panoply of problems. Geared towards success in the imperial examination, his education would have emphasised mastery of the Confucian classics and the ability to craft essays and poems. And while in the Tang and Song dynasties, budding scholar-officials had been tested on dynastic law and the crafting of legal judgements, the overarching emphasis in the Ming and Qing periods on the eight-legged essay (*baguwen* 八股文) had meant that new magistrates were usually unprepared for some of the fundamental tasks of office, be they taxation, litigation or otherwise.¹ What's more, the Qing 'rule of avoidance' typically prevented an official from serving on home turf,

¹ Ch'ü, *Local Government*, 93–94.

meaning that a magistrate faced an array of region-specific challenges as well. These challenges were complexified by the idiosyncrasies of local government, and by a lack of familiarity with local customs, dialects and region-specific knowledge. Indeed, although the magistrate was someone who putatively ‘knew (*zhi* 知) the county (*xian* 縣)’, nothing could have been farther from the reality.²

However, the show had to go on. A magistrate’s performance review (*kaoji* 考績) depended on it, and inviting any form of censure from his superiors, be he a governor (*xunfu* 巡撫) or governor-general (*zongdu* 總督), could bring a demotion, or, in extreme cases, an untimely end to a career he had spent so much time working towards.³ To allow for the effective discharge of office, the magistrate and his *yamen* would therefore employ a retinue of individuals, often of local birth, to keep the bureaucratic conveyor belt churning. These consisted of *xuli* 胥吏 (clerks), who mainly performed clerical work, and *muyou* (‘tent friends’, but sometimes translated as ‘private secretaries’), from whom the execution of specialist tasks was expected. These individuals, whilst widely accepted, existed *outside* the confines of the formal bureaucracy, constituting an ancillary and extrabureaucratic class who kept the operations of local governance going. I use the term ‘*mufu* practice’ to denote this reaching outside the confines of the formal bureaucracy for external specialist assistance.

While most widely associated with its role in local governance, the practice of hiring ancillary staff to enable the discharge of a post, or *mufu* practice, could be found in all shapes and forms across the Qing bureaucracy.⁴ And, in the nineteenth

² Bradley W. Reed, *Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 246; Okamoto, *Fuhai to kakusa*, 171–72.

³ Except in the case of service in far-flung regions, only those with the highest level of imperial degree, the *jinshi* degree, could become an official: Kano, *Seido to bungaku*, 331. On the supervision of regional officials by the governors and governor-generals, see: Okamoto, *Fuhai to kakusa*, 106.

⁴ Kano Naoki 狩野直喜, ‘Shinchō chihō seido 清朝地方制度 [Regional Government in the Qing Dynasty]’, in *Dokusho sen’yo* 讀書簞餘 [Collected Notes from My Reading] (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1980), 124; Shiga Shūzō 滋賀秀三, *Shindai Chūgoku no hō to saiban* 清代中国の法と裁判 [Law and Justice in Qing China] (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1984), 13. As noted by Okamoto Takashi, the delegation of tasks to one’s network of trusted contacts was one of the defining features of governance in imperial China: Okamoto, *Fuhai to kakusa*, 112.

century, this ancillary extrabureaucratic substructure, extended to allow for the execution of new types of work. Indeed, *mufu* practice came to provide a multiplicity of services for the private bureaucracies (*mufu*) of regional governors who were tasked with quelling internal rebellion and meeting the normative expectations of the Qing's foreign interlocutors. What's more, from within these *mufu* emerged a slew of new institutional innovations—the extrastatutory bureaux and offices (*ju* and *suo*)—which were established to deal with the novel challenges faced by the dynasty on internal and external fronts, but which again lay outside the parameters of what the formal bureaucracy was equipped to do or to train personnel for. The Qing's legations were one of the institutional innovations of this period, and the extrabureaucratic substructures which underpinned the private bureaucracies, and the bureaux and offices which emerged out of them, could be found underpinning their operations too.

The officials who were appointed by the emperor to serve on ad-hoc missions (*chaishi*), as temporary ministers to the dynasty's legations, similarly turned to *mufu* practice to meet the demands of office, albeit now enacted on a transnational and peripatetic basis. And, as was increasingly the case in many of the new private bureaucracies and extrabureaucratic institutions that were emerging domestically in China, the particular challenges presented by legation work could be met through *mufu* practice,⁵ by employing individuals from non-standard (*yitu*) backgrounds who possessed skillsets which were not cultivated by the formal bureaucracy. This was the context for the employment of foreigners as *muyou* at the legations, the most prominent of whom were 'locals' but who were conversant with Chinese and China.⁶

⁵ For a general overview of the Westerners that Li Hongzhang recruited as *muyou*, see: Folsom, *Friends*, 152–57; Ma, *Huai-xi renwu liezhuan*, 390–433. For specific studies on Li's relationships with Gustav Detring and H.B. Morse, see: Schmidt, *europäischen Berater*; Po, 'Xifang guwen'.

⁶ This phenomenon could be found further afield, too. After Xinjiang's transformation from outlying region (*fanbu*) to province in 1884, in many ways, the interpreters who were employed at the new Han-led *yamen* as frontier mediators played an analogous role to the foreigners in the legations and consulates. On these interpreters, see: Eric Schluessel, *Land of Strangers: The Civilizing Project in Qing Central Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 80–115.

The work expected of the foreigners in the Qing's legations—the focus of this study—was never formally articulated in any of the early imperially-endorsed regulations concerning the dispatch of overseas imperial commissioners. It escaped definition. However, when we contextualise these foreigners' employment against the backdrop of *mufu* practice, we are limited to just one potential reason: to perform tasks that the Qing ministers and their other staff could not achieve alone, but which nevertheless were central to their mission.

Indeed, if the *yamen* of a newly minted magistrate demanded knowledge and skills that could be met through *mufu* practice, then that was even more the case for the newly created foreign legations. The Qing officials who led the legations in an ad-hoc capacity were Confucian scholar-officials who had, at best, expressed some interest in, or had had some past association with, 'Western affairs'.⁷ However, mastery of 'Western learning' continued at the time to be socially detrimental.⁸ An aspiring senior official would typically not, therefore, seek to learn a foreign language or cultivate an in-depth knowledge of some other topic which fell under the umbrella of Western learning. Moreover, in the early years of the legations, most of its ministerial class had never been abroad. This parallels the domestic magistrate, who lacked specialist technical knowledge in some of the key functions associated with his post, not least an understanding of local language variations and regional-specific knowledge—the overlaps are profoundly clear.

Zooming in on the tasks asked of these foreign *muyou* in the legations therefore allows us to identify: (a) what the ministers understood to constitute their mission, since the work the foreigners performed was entirely contingent upon how the ministers perceived their own role, and (b) what the ministers recognised as constituting skill gaps within their retinue. Furthermore, asking these same questions over an extended course of time allows us to identify how the expectations for these foreigners, and therefore what the ministers wanted to achieve, evolved. The outcome

⁷ This would change over time, however.

⁸ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 174–75; Hayamaru, 'Yōmu', 86.

can thus help us to identify how the Qing's engagement with Western European diplomatic culture and practice progressed over time.

This chapter reveals, through an analysis of the two illustrative case studies of Halliday Macartney at the first Qing legation, in London, and Carl Kreyer at the Qing legation in Berlin, that the ministers' expectations for its foreign staff, and therefore their mission at large, was of a decidedly non-diplomatic nature. Specifically, it argues that in this early stage of the legations, the ministers engaged their foreign staff as conduits for learning about the non-Qing world. They extracted information and explanation from them, be it through conversation, interpretation, or translation, but to meet the overriding purposes that they brought with them from China. There was, of course, also a more prosaic bureaucratic workload to be got through. Therefore, unsurprisingly, foreign staff were expected to complete one or both of the following tasks: clerical work, which involved both translation and epistolary output, and interpretation, to facilitate day-to-day interactions.

The missions' objectives and therefore the use of foreigners, were thus of a decidedly non-diplomatic nature, and were intended to be exploratory, protective, and defensive in character. They were more about fending off the outside world than engaging with it through negotiations. It is for this reason that I additionally argue that the establishment of the first legations is more appropriately contextualised, not just in terms of a 'Western impact' which sought to compel the Qing to comply with Western European diplomacy's increasingly universal grammar of interaction and engagement, but rather against the backdrop of the Qing's ongoing domestic Self-Strengthening projects and its efforts to learn more about the non-Qing world because of the threats it posed.

While this dissertation is unique in that it demonstrates this focus through the foreign presence in Qing China's legations, it is not the first study to take note of the

non-diplomatic emphasis in the early years of the legations.⁹ However, it is this dissertation's overarching goal to establish the foreign presence as a viable conduit through which to perceive the qualitative transformation in Qing attitudes and approaches towards Western European diplomatic practice. It is therefore essential that this chapter first clarifies how the foreign presence was initially utilised, and elicits the reasons which underpinned their application in these areas.

1. The Origins of Qing China's Legations

Before introducing the two case studies of Macartney and Kreyer to demonstrate the non-diplomatic focus of the Qing legations in this period, I will first contextualise the circumstances through which these institutions came about, and how a foreign presence came to serve within them.

From the late eighteenth century, permanent diplomatic representation, a practice incubated in the relations between the city states of Renaissance Italy, but adopted by most Western European states by the end of the sixteenth century, began to make its first clarion calls for Eastern participation. An important prelude to this process had likely come with the Ottoman Empire's establishment of its first permanent embassy in Britain in 1793.¹⁰ Hitherto a practice and culture exclusively shared between Christian polities, the Ottoman example demonstrated the potential this shared culture had for penetrating cultures cut from a different cloth. Significantly, it was also in this year that George Macartney made his embassy to China to meet with the Qianlong emperor. Included amongst the demands made of the dynasty was the establishment of mutual permanent diplomatic representation.

While the 1793 Macartney embassy was unsuccessful in convincing the dynasty to embrace such a practice, the Western appetite for the eastward expansion of

⁹ See, for instance: Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 115, 120; Teshirogi, *Seiyō taiken*, 32–33; Li, *Waijiaoguan*, 3.

¹⁰ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 'The Adoption and Use of Permanent Diplomacy', in *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?*, ed. A. Nuri Yurdusev (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 132–34.

permanent diplomatic representation nevertheless grew ever more voracious.¹¹ The breakthrough moment came with the signing the 1858 Treaties of Tientsin, and their eventual ratification through the 1860 Convention of Peking. The former provided the opening the West needed for achieving permission to station its first resident envoys in Beijing, and the latter ensured that it was put into practice.

To borrow Immanuel Hsü's words, the ink had 'hardly dried' on the Convention of Peking before the Western powers and their foreign sympathisers in Qing service were pushing the dynasty to reciprocate by establishing their own resident missions abroad.¹² Article 2 of the Sino-British and Sino-French Treaties of Tientsin provided for this possibility, and the powers were keen to see it realised. Against the backdrop of what came to be called the 'Collaborative Policy'—in which several China-stationed diplomats sought to 'help' the Qing move in the direction of 'progress' in the wake of the Second Opium War—two memorandums were submitted to the Zongli Yamen which urged the Qing to reciprocate. The first of these was 'A Bystander's View' (*juwai pangguan lun* 局外旁觀論), submitted by Robert Hart, Inspector General of the Qing's Imperial Maritime Customs Service, in November 1865.¹³ The second was 'A brief exposition of new ideas' (*xinyi lüelun* 新議略論), penned by Thomas Wade, then Chinese secretary to the British legation in China, but submitted by his superior, British minister Rutherford Alcock, in March 1866.¹⁴ While the Zongli Yamen initially refrained from sharing Hart's suggestions, Wade's memorandum and its forceful tone played a part in triggering an imperially-endorsed call by the Zongli Yamen in late 1867 for the submission of memorandum from eighteen provincial grandees about key issues that the Western powers were

¹¹ Hevia, *English Lessons*. On the reasons why the West hoped to see China reciprocate, see: Black, *Diplomacy*, 153.

¹² Hsü, *China's Entrance*, 153.

¹³ Hsü, 154–55.

¹⁴ Hsü, 156–58.

clamouring to see realised by the Qing.¹⁵ Included among these issues was the establishment of permanent diplomatic representation abroad.¹⁶

The grandees' opinions on permanent diplomatic representation varied. Some favoured it, some opposed it, but most were noncommittal.¹⁷ However, for those that favoured it, its benefit lay in the potential that it provided for learning about the conditions of the non-Qing world. And it is clear why. The Western contingent of the Qing's mutual trading partners (*hushi zhuguo*), once kept out of harm's way through confinement to the Canton factories, had now become full-blown treaty powers, and were occupying ever greater swathes of China proper, not only in its eastern littoral regions, but also in inland areas and, from 1861, prominent locations in the area adjacent to the sacred space occupied by the emperor, which became known as the 'legation quarter'. They were also repeatedly winning wars against the dynasty, which provided the pretexts both for the expansion of their presence and for the extraction of indemnities. Moreover, through the 'imperial archives' of knowledge that they had come to cultivate during their stay in China,¹⁸ these Western powers had also developed a deep understanding of the country's strengths, weaknesses, language, history and culture. However, the Qing knew very little about who these people were, and the conditions of the countries whence they came. Gradually, this knowledge gap had become a cause for concern, and such sentiment was expressed in the Zongli Yamen's memorial of 1867, which sought the opinion of regional grandees on the various issues that the Western powers desired to see China comply with, including that of permanent diplomatic representation. There, it was explained that while the Western powers had thoroughly acquainted themselves with the Qing's areas of weakness and power, the dynasty was decidedly uninformed about the

¹⁵ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 18–19; Hsü, *China's Entrance*, 163–68.

¹⁶ As Immanuel Hsü notes, the court repeatedly deferred to the opinions of provincial authorities because of the immense power they had accrued since the suppression of the Taiping uprising: '[t]he power of the empire now lay in their hands and the central government was powerless to decide policy alone.' Hsü, *China's Entrance*, 152. For a detailed analysis of the responses, see: Li, *Waijiaoguan*, 52–56.

¹⁷ Hsü, *China's Entrance*, 164.

¹⁸ I borrow this idea from: Hevia, *English Lessons*, 128–42.

conditions of these distant countries. The memorial then went on to invoke the recommendation of military strategist Sun Zi 孫子 to ‘know others as oneself’ (*zhi bi zhi ji* 知彼知己) and explained that this principle had not been adhered to in the relationship between the dynasty and its Western interlocutors.¹⁹ While conceding that several difficulties were involved, the Yamen's memorial nevertheless sought to indicate that permanent diplomatic representation could help to redress this balance.

Respondents who looked favourably upon the idea of permanent diplomatic representation likewise stressed the benefits it could bring for information collation and learning. Li Hongzhang averred that permanent diplomatic representation could help the Qing learn the secrets of Western prowess and technological preminence.²⁰ Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 also saw that such an endeavour would allow able men to acquaint themselves with foreign conditions.²¹ From this early stage, there was thus a clear emphasis on the benefits that permanent diplomatic representation could bring for learning about the non-Qing world. This emphasis was also found in the first ad-hoc mission to the West, the Binchun 斌椿 mission of 1866. Its purpose was to make a study the customs and attitudes of Europe,²² culminating in the production of three diaries documenting the continent's customs and machines.²³ Significantly, then, there was initially no consideration of establishing legations for the express purposes of diplomacy, nor of the benefits of embracing the Western European paradigm of diplomatic culture and practice.

Three other ad-hoc missions were dispatched in this period for reasons other than information collation: the Burlingame mission of 1868, the Chong Hou apology

¹⁹ CYS-TZ, 5:2125, No. 1770, Zongli Yamen 6-point circular, TZ6/9/15. See translation in: Hsü, *China's Entrance*, 163–64.

²⁰ CYS-TZ, 6:2260, No. 1850, Li Hongzhang on the Zongli Yamen's 6-point circular, TZ6/12/6. Hsü, 165.

²¹ CYS-TZ, 6:2154–2155, No. 1794, Zuo Zongtang on the Zongli Yamen's 6-point circular, TZ6/10/25. Hsü, 165.

²² CYS-TZ, 5:2125, No. 1770, Zongli Yamen 6-point circular, TZ6/9/15. I borrow the translation from: Hsü, 163–64.

²³ Hsü, 156.

mission of 1870, and the Cuba mission of 1874.²⁴ None of these made permanent diplomatic representation a reality. The decisive steps would instead come in relation to two separate incidents, in 1874 and 1875, one involving Japan and the other Britain. In 1871, the Qing signed its first commercial treaty with Japan, and Articles 4 and 8 provided for the exchange of envoys and consuls respectively. However, as was the case with the Treaty of Tientsin, the Qing had not sought to bring this stipulation to fruition despite Li Hongzhang's previous recommendations.²⁵ In 1874, unbeknown to the Qing, Japan sent a punitive mission to Taiwan to punish the indigenous Taiwanese people who had been responsible for murdering a group of shipwrecked Ryukyuan sailors.²⁶ Having resolved the issue through the mediation of Thomas Wade, which involved the payment of a hefty indemnity of half a million taels, internal debates ensued about whether the Qing should now move to bolster its maritime defence (*haifang* 海防) against the Japanese threat, or instead focus on frontier defence (*saifang* 塞防) in Xinjiang and other parts of its western frontier.²⁷ In these debates, Li explained that, had his advice to establish a permanent mission been heeded three years ago, the Qing, through its ministers in Japan, would have been better positioned to prevent the Taiwan expedition from happening in the first place.²⁸ While the focus of the debates was defence priorities, as exemplified by Li's remarks, they rekindled discussion about the necessity of permanent diplomatic

²⁴ The Burlingame mission was dispatched in an attempt to convince the American and European governments not to be too harsh in the demands they made of China in impending treaty revisions. Meanwhile, the Chong Hou mission of 1870 to France was dispatched as an apology mission for the Tianjin Massacre that had occurred earlier that year. The Cuba mission was dispatched to survey the conditions of Chinese labourers in the country. Biggerstaff, 'The Establishment of Permanent Chinese Diplomatic Missions Abroad', 10–13; Rudolph Ng, 'The Chinese Commission to Cuba (1874): Reexamining International Relations in the Nineteenth Century from a Transcultural Perspective', *Transcultural Studies* 5, no. 2 (2014): 39–62.

²⁵ CYS-TZ, 8:3214, No. 2599, Li Hongzhang memorial, TZ9/12/2.

²⁶ The Qing's response to these events would later be used as a pretext for the Japanese annexation of Ryukyu, explored in the next chapter. On this point specifically, see: Nishizato Kikō 西里喜行, *Shinmatsu Chū-Ryū-Nichi kankeishi no kenkyū* 清末中琉日関係史の研究 [A Study of Relations between China, Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing period] (Kyoto: Kyōto daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai, 2005), 29, 289–96.

²⁷ Hsü, *China's Entrance*, 173–76; Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, 'The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense Vs. Frontier Defense', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 25 (1964): 212–28.

²⁸ Hsü, *China's Entrance*, 173–74.

representation. And, by May 30, 1875, the Qing effectively approved the idea in principle.²⁹

However, the principle was put into practice as a result of the Margary Incident of 1875. In 1874, the British had received permission from the Qing to send a trade expedition from Burma to investigate the mineral resources of Yunnan province. August R. Margary, a serving British consular officer in China, was assigned as an interpreter to the mission. During a preliminary reconnaissance mission on the Burma-Yunnan frontier in early 1875, Margary was murdered by a group of native tribesmen when crossing into Burma. Thomas Wade, by now British minister in China, pounced on this opportunity to exact concessions from the Qing.³⁰ Included amongst the stipulations of the resulting Chefoo Convention of September 1876 was the dispatch of a Qing mission to Britain. While initially not planned to be anything more than an apology mission, the embassy and its minister, Guo Songtao, would establish the first permanent legation in London in January 1877.³¹

2. Building a Foreign Contingent within the Qing Legations

The Qing, Japan,³² Siam,³³ and Chosŏn Korea³⁴ all made use of non-nationals in their first forays into permanent diplomatic representation, be they as ministers or as subministerial staff. This was not without precedent. In fact, it had long been the norm in early modern Western Europe to cast the net as wide as possible and find the optimum candidates to serve as diplomats, regardless of background. The

²⁹ Hsü, 176.

³⁰ Hsü, 177.

³¹ The reasons why the mission was converted are unclear. For a detailed evaluation, see: Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 30–31, 36.

³² Multiple case studies on the Japan case are introduced in: Imai Shōji 今井庄次, *Oyatoi gaikokujin (12): gaikō お雇い外国人 ⑫ 外交 [(Japan's) Foreign Employees (12): Diplomacy]* (Tokyo: Kajima shuppankai, 1975).

³³ See the case of Frederick Verney, English Secretary to the Siam legation in London, in: Chandran Jeshurun, 'The British Foreign Office and the Siamese Malay States, 1890–97', *Modern Asian Studies* 5, no. 2 (1971): 148.

³⁴ See the case of Allen Horrace's involvement in the first Chosŏn embassy to the United States in 1885 in: Wi Jo Kang, *Christ and Caesar in Modern Korea: A History of Christianity and Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 17–26.

benefits of foreigners' participation in diplomatic endeavours were obvious: they brought knowledge of the local language, customs and geography, and were potentially poised to open access to local networks of information and power. However, from the turn of the nineteenth century, this practice was increasingly discouraged due to the emergence of new ideas about the nation-state and the need for national uniformity in crucial offices of state.³⁵ Indeed, non-nationals came to be regarded as untrustworthy.

Nevertheless, these new practitioners of permanent diplomatic representation made extensive use of non-nationals. While this practice was increasingly disavowed in the nineteenth century, such ideas did not begin to have a profound effect on Qing perceptions until the 1900s, when diplomatic professionalisation began to become a stated priority.³⁶ In fact, this once prevailing cosmopolitan attitude of early-modern Western Europe coincided with an attitude that had long prevailed in China. The idea of 'borrowing talent from afar' (*jiecai yiguo* 借材異國) had a long pedigree in Chinese history. Chinese civilisation was, after all, open to everyone, so long as its fundamental tenets were observed and its moral superiority recognised.³⁷ Ethnicity or 'nationality' had therefore not constituted a barrier to entry in the service of a particular dynasty. These cosmopolitan attitudes were just as prevalent during the Qing dynasty and were, in many ways, essential to emphasise given the dynasty's Manchu identity.³⁸

How then did the Qing's first legations come to employ a foreign presence? After Guo Songtao's mission was confirmed, foreign involvement quickly became a talking point. Chen Lanbin 陳蘭彬, who had led the Qing mission to Cuba and who would become the first Qing minister to Washington in 1878, remarked that he thought

³⁵ See Chapter 4 and Black, *Diplomacy*, 160.

³⁶ See Chapter 4.

³⁷ Motegi Toshio 茂木敏夫, 'Fuhēn to tokushū: kingendai Higashi Ajia ni okeru chitsujō kōsō no katarikata (jō) 普遍と特殊——近現代東アジアにおける秩序構想の語り方 (上) [The "Universal" and the "Particular" in East Asia: On Notions of Order in Modern and Contemporary East Asia (Part 1)]', *Tōkyō Joshi Daigaku Kiyō Ronshū* 71, no. 2 (2021): 67–68.

³⁸ Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

that bringing foreigners along was inadvisable as they could sometimes prove to be challenging to control.³⁹ Li Hongzhang, however, saw matters differently, stating in a letter to Guo Songtao that, ‘in going on a long journey to a foreign land, on arrival one will first want to ask of the local taboos to avoid causing offence, and also of the local customs. Taking along one or two locals of the country (*tuzhu* 土著) would, therefore, not be inappropriate’. However, he nevertheless conceded that they ought to be of a ‘docile temperament’,⁴⁰ a recurrent theme in the hiring of Westerners in the nineteenth century.⁴¹ Yung Wing also wrote to Li in this period, recommending that a foreign consul be appointed to serve in San Francisco.⁴²

Robert Hart, who had played a significant role in designing the previous ad-hoc missions and had long advocated for permanent diplomatic representation, was also keen to have his say on the matter. He had hoped to keep the legations within his range of influence, later explaining in a private letter to James Duncan Campbell, head of the Customs’ London office, that he wished to prevent the ‘growth of a class of foreign employés connected with Legations drawn from other than Customs’ sources’.⁴³ He had therefore recommended the appointment of Macpherson, who had served on the Cuba mission under Chen Lanbin, for service at the legation in London.⁴⁴ However, Li Hongzhang blocked this in favour of his own long-serving foreign *muyou*, Halliday Macartney.⁴⁵

³⁹ LHZQJ, 31:491, Li Hongzhang to Guo Songtao, GX2/8/29.

⁴⁰ LHZQJ, 31:491, Li Hongzhang to Guo Songtao, GX2/8/29.

⁴¹ The employment of deferential foreigners who accepted the primacy of Chinese civilisation was a recurring theme during the Qing’s ‘Self-Strengthening’ era. See: Xiang Zhongyin 向中銀, ‘Shilun wan Qing pinyong yangyuan de zhidao sixiang 試論晚清聘用洋員的指導思想 [The Guiding Thought behind the Employment of Foreign Staff in the Late Qing]’, *Anhui Shixue* 1997, no. 1 (1997): 60; Smith, ‘Foreign Military Talent’, 115–17.

⁴² LHZQJ, 31:495, Li Hongzhang to Chen Lanbin, GX2/9/12. In this same letter, Li Hongzhang noted the common practice in China for non-nationals of certain countries to serve as consuls for other countries. This may well have reinforced the Qing view that it was acceptable for foreigners to serve in the aid of other countries’ diplomatic and consular services. See also: John K. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 213.

⁴³ ACIMC, 1:237, No. 299, Hart to Campbell, Nov. 17, 1876.

⁴⁴ Morse, *International Relations*, 2:315.

⁴⁵ LHZQJ, 31:491, Li Hongzhang to Guo Songtao, GX2/8/29; Boulger, *Macartney*, 259–60.

While Hart would eventually manage to place a few of his Customs men in the first Qing legations in London and Berlin, it would instead be the Qing ministers who took primary control over appointments. As explained previously, despite their outward appearance, the legations and consulates were effectively a peripatetic *mufu* under the minister's supervision. They therefore followed the blueprint of other extrabureaucratic institutions that had emerged in the nineteenth century, whose operations were undergirded by *mufu* practice. This approach was also codified in Article 4 of the first iteration of the imperially-endorsed 'regulations for serving overseas in twelve articles' (*chushi zhangcheng shier tiao* 出使章程十二條), which stated that ministers had the power to make their own appointments.⁴⁶ David Bartlett, the first foreigner to serve at the Qing legation in Washington, was recommended by Yung Wing, the vice-minister at the legation. Frederick Bee, the first and only foreigner to serve as Qing Consul in San Francisco, was recommended by Chen Lanbin, despite his earlier concerns about foreign docility. Carl Kreyer, one of the first foreigners to serve at the Qing legation in Berlin, was recommended by Li Fengbao 李鳳苞, the second Qing minister to the country. Divie McCartee, the first foreigner to serve at the Qing legation in Tokyo, was recommended by Zhang Sigui, the vice-minister at the legation. Li Hongzhang would also exert a degree of influence, with, as noted earlier, Halliday Macartney's appointment to the Qing London legation having been on his recommendation rather than Guo's.⁴⁷

Despite the prevailing attitude against foreign participation in resident diplomacy, the receiving states likely elected to exercise tolerance in the Qing case precisely because they recognised the potential this foreign presence brought for guiding further normative acclimatisation to Western European diplomatic culture.⁴⁸ For instance, in the Qing case, the British Foreign Office explained that while it was the rule not to recognise British subjects for service in such capacities, an exception was

⁴⁶ GXCDHL, 1:296, No. 21, GX2/9.

⁴⁷ Boulger, *Macartney*, 259–60. LHZQG, 31:491, Li Hongzhang to Guo Songtao, GX2/8/29.

⁴⁸ Chapter 4 explores how the Qing's diplomatic interlocutors became increasingly intolerant of this practice from the late nineteenth century onwards.

made ‘to meet the special exigencies of the Chinese service’.⁴⁹ In all likelihood, ‘special exigencies’ was a polite veneer for what, in reality, was an Orientalist condescension that considered non-Western peoples as incapable of navigating the morass of normative expectations expected by Western European diplomatic culture.⁵⁰ So, despite the trend away from diplomatic cosmopolitanism in this period, it seems likely that the British and their European and American peers, in light of the ‘special exigencies’ they identified as existing in the case of ‘Oriental missions’, recognised the potential that these men ‘on the inside’ held for civilising and educating from within.⁵¹

While the Western powers may well have identified the foreign presence as an expedient tool for bringing the Qing up to speed with the expectations of Western European diplomatic practice, the Qing nevertheless pursued an agenda which was unfettered by such expectations. Indeed, there was a mismatch of Western perception with Qing reality. This view, as argued by Hakoda Keiko,⁵² has also found reinforcement in secondary scholarship due to Immanuel Hsü’s influential framing of the posting of the envoys as the final stage in China’s entrance into the ‘family of nations’.⁵³ It is also true that if we go fishing for indicators of ‘diplomacy’ we certainly find them: negotiations undeniably formed a part of the work the ministers

⁴⁹ FO17/957, No. 40, Annex 3, Draft of Letter from Earl Granville to the Marquis Tsêng, Aug., 1884.

⁵⁰ This was also likely the reason why the Foreign Office approved the employment of Stuart Lane at the Japanese legation and Frederick Verney at the Siamese legation, with the third edition of Ernest Satow’s *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* explaining that the British objection to receiving its subjects as members of foreign missions had not ‘applied to the post of secretary to certain Oriental missions ... The Chinese, Japanese and Siamese missions have from time to time employed British subjects in this capacity, and the custom may have extended to some other missions’. Ernest Mason Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 3rd ed. (London; New York: Longmans, Green and co., 1932), 129.

⁵¹ Given that both Halliday Macartney and Stuart Lane became members of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, and also served as members to its ‘Committee for Making Special Report upon the Principles to Govern Intercourse between Christian and Non-Christian peoples’, these hopes may well have not been misplaced. See: Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, *Report of the Sixth Annual Conference Held at Frankfort-on-the-Main, 20-23 August, 1878* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1879), 38, 43.

⁵² Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 11–13, 70.

⁵³ Hsü, *China’s Entrance*, 118, 186.

were involved in from this early stage,⁵⁴ and the ministers even referenced international law from time to time.⁵⁵ However, as we saw above, negotiations and the achievement of diplomatic breakthroughs had not been the original emphasis of early discussions on the establishment of permanent diplomatic representation in Qing circles, nor were such tasks emphasised by the court or the legation staff themselves in these early years. By investing these individuals with the nomenclature of ‘diplomat’, and basing our analysis of them on the *a priori* assumption that they were there to conduct diplomacy due to their acceptance of the inherent value of the practice, we only see the incidents which correspond to this bias, and we fail to see the forest for some of its trees. It also prevents us from conducting a more nuanced analysis of how the Qing came to embrace the Western European paradigm for diplomatic culture and practice over a much more gradual timeframe. And, as I argue below, the fundamental tasks expected of the foreign *muyou* in this period were an explicit articulation of the fact that the execution of ‘diplomacy’ was yet to be the

⁵⁴ Guo handled, for instance, negotiations over the ratification of the Chefoo Convention, and informal negotiations—mediated by Britain—with Sayyid Ya’qūb Khān over the validity of the Ya’qūb Beg regime established in Kasghar.

⁵⁵ In Guo’s private journal, we find several references to international law (for example, see: Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾, *Guo Songtao riji* 郭嵩燾日記 [The Diary of Guo Songtao], ed. Yang Jian 楊堅 and Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河, vol. 3 (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1982), 148, GX3/1/11.). We also find evidence of him referencing international law in his diplomatic notes to the British (see, for instance: FO17/768, Guo Songtao to Lord Derby, Jun. 15, 1877). Guo also sent subordinate Ma Jianzhong to attend the Sixth Annual Conference of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations in August 1878. There, Ma read a speech on Guo’s behalf in which it was stated that as the ‘administrative system of China differs in some points from that of any of the European countries’, China was not ‘in a position to adopt the Law of Nations at once.’ Ma nevertheless stated on Guo’s behalf that he was ‘very desirous of attaining a knowledge of this science, in the hope that it [would] be beneficial to [his] country’ (see: Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations, *Report of the Sixth Annual Conference Held at Frankfort-on-the Main, 20-23 August, 1878*, 40-41). However, as Chapter 3 demonstrates, much of the rhetorical output of the legation was the handiwork of the legation’s foreign staff. It should not therefore be cited as incontrovertible evidence for Guo’s full-blown embrace of international law. Furthermore, even if one concedes that Guo recognised the benefits of international law, we should not construe this as irrefutable evidence that the priority for the Qing legations was diplomacy and that the Qing were already fully cognisant of the vagaries of Western European diplomatic practice. Positive comments about the benefits of international law have too often served more broadly as *the* barometer for Qing receptivity to Western European diplomatic practice. As I argue at the beginning of Chapter 3, such a view is overly simplistic: Western European diplomatic culture and practice constituted a much broader range of social practices. International law was one component among many.

major focus; that would come later. Why else would Ma Jianzhong be so critical of ministers and of the need for a professionalised diplomatic service?⁵⁶

Indeed, initially for the Qing, neither accommodating and embracing the paradigm of Western European diplomatic practice, nor achieving diplomatic breakthroughs, would be an immediate priority. Instead, learning about the non-Qing world and its technological innovations through information collation, translation and other knowledge production activities, and the purchasing of modern weaponry, would constitute the core pillars of early Qing legation activity.⁵⁷

3. Assisting Learning about the Non-Qing World: Halliday Macartney and the Qing London Legation

By the time the Qing came to dispatch the Guo embassy to Britain to establish its first legation in late 1876, the emphasis upon learning about the non-Qing world—as articulated in the early discussions on the benefits of permanent diplomatic representation—had not dissipated in the minds of the court, nor in the minds of the ministers to-be. Tellingly, when Guo and Liu met with the Empress Dowager on October 31, 1876, she explicitly stated to them that after arrival in Britain, they must commit themselves ‘to studying everything you encounter with a great degree of granularity’. To this, Guo replied that he understood such an objective to constitute his ‘most important task’.⁵⁸ This emphasis upon learning was also articulated in one of the very first lines of *A Private Record of my Mission to Britain* (*Yingyao siji* 英軺私記), the diary produced by Liu Xihong 劉錫鴻 and his subministerial colleagues during their stay in Europe.⁵⁹ There, the mission was contextualised as having come about as the result of a Zongli Yamen memorial which

⁵⁶ On Ma Jianzhong’s calls for diplomatic professionalisation at this early stage, see: Okamoto, *Ba Kenchū*, part 1.

⁵⁷ The protection of overseas Chinese would constitute a further pillar which was propped up by the Qing’s consulates. I intend on developing this point in the monograph that arises from this dissertation.

⁵⁸ Guo, *Riji*, 3:60, GX2/9/15.

⁵⁹ On the collaborative nature of Liu Xihong’s diary, see: Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*.

requested that the dynasty ‘follow the example of the Western countries’ and send ambassadors abroad so that it could ‘familiarise itself with the circumstances of other countries’—a clear crystallisation of the missions’ purpose.⁶⁰ Guo Songtao’s subordinate, Li Shuchang 黎庶昌, also noted in a letter how ‘the purpose of the Qing court in dispatching missions was to investigate the conditions of foreign countries’.⁶¹

This early emphasis was clear from the first set of regulations that the Zongli Yamen drew up for the legations too. In Article 5 of the ‘regulations for serving overseas in twelve articles’, which was approved by imperial edict on October 28, 1876, it was stated that after arrival in his country of posting, the minister was, in addition to memorialising about urgent matters at any time, expected to submit reports to the Yamen on ‘day-to-day affairs’ (*xunchang shijian* 尋常事件), which would be fed back on the commissioner’s behalf to the emperor by memorial.⁶² It is not clear whether the Yamen issued a request to the ministers about the format of these reports. However, given (a) the long-standing tradition for submitting diaries to the emperor of imperially-endorsed missions to foreign countries and tributaries (*fengshi riji* 奉使日記 or *xingyao riji* 星輶日記),⁶³ and (b) the precedent set by members of the Binchun, Burlingame and Chong Hou apology missions in submitting journals of their missions to the Zongli Yamen,⁶⁴ it is likely that the practice was an implicit expectation.⁶⁵

However, in late 1877, the Zongli Yamen developed a formalised set of regulations for diary submission. The regulations stated that it was the minister's responsibility

⁶⁰ Liu Xihong 劉錫鴻, *Yingyao siji* 英輶私記 [Private Notes on My Posting to Britain], ed. Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河, *Zou xiang shijie congshu* (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1981).

⁶¹ Li Shuchang 黎庶昌, *Xiyang zazhi* 西洋雜誌 [Miscellaneous Notes on the West], ed. Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河, *Zou xiang shijie congshu* (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1981), 182.

⁶² GXCDHL, 1:296, No. 21, GX2/9.

⁶³ Aoyama Harutoshi 青山治世, ‘Shinmatsu no shusshi nikki to sono gaikōshi kenkyū ni okeru riyō ni kansuru ichikōsatsu 清末の出使日記とその外交史研究における利用に関する一考察 [A Consideration of the Diaries of Late Qing China’s Diplomats and Their Use within Research on Diplomatic History]’, *Gendai Chūgoku Kenkyū* 22 (2008): 40.

⁶⁴ Aoyama, 40–41.

⁶⁵ Even before the formalised regulations for the submission of diaries was formally devised and approved through imperial edict, Guo spoke of the importance of keeping a journal and of submitting it to the Zongli Yamen. QJWS, J12:26-27, Guo Songtao memorial, GX3/10/30.

to record in depth, for submission to the Yamen, the conditions and customs of each country. Doing so would allow the people of China to become thoroughly acquainted with each country's circumstances and would enable them to respond appropriately when confronted with a problem with a foreign power. Keeping quiet about the conditions in other countries, opined the Yamen, would only keep China and the foreign powers eternally distant and would undermine the point of establishing permanent diplomatic representation abroad. As such, the Yamen recommended to the emperor that the ministers in Japan and the West be ordered to record every detail of their day-to-day experiences and—as had been the case thus far—to submit these writings to the Yamen monthly, so that they could be used as a future means of reference.⁶⁶

It is in this context that the legations employed foreigners as *muyou*, to enable the Qing ministers to function in, and learn about, the outside world. Of the available evidence, the most extensive pertains to Halliday Macartney at the Qing legation in London.

Born near Castle Douglas in Kirkcudbrightshire, Scotland in 1833, Macartney owed his employment in the Qing legation in London to his long-term service in China under the patronage of Li Hongzhang in a variety of comparably extrabureaucratic institutions. His path towards engaging with China was typical of many Victorians: he had ridden the wave of empire and had traversed its archipelago of opportunity. After completing his training to be a doctor at Edinburgh University in 1858, Macartney joined the medical department of the British military and was gazetted in September 1858 as third assistant-surgeon in the 99th Regiment, then known as the Lanarkshire Regiment. His first posting was to India, where he served in Calcutta during the Indian Mutiny of 1877-1878. His next posting would take him to China in 1860, serving again as a military surgeon in the Second Opium War.⁶⁷ After the signing of the Peking Convention in October of that year, his regiment was

⁶⁶ Zhang, *Huangchao zhanggu huibian*, waibian, J18:8. On these regulations, see: Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*, 8–9.

⁶⁷ Boulger, *Macartney*, 21–23.

sent to occupy Guangdong, where they were to remain until the indemnity agreed upon in the Convention was paid in full.⁶⁸ During his time there, Macartney began his study of the Chinese language, reaching a level which enabled him to hold some intercourse with Chinese merchants and officials.⁶⁹ During a visit to Shanghai, this language competence allowed him to befriend the Chinese paymaster of Frederick Townsend Ward's Ever Victorious Army (*changshengjun* 常勝軍), a Sino-Western hybrid military force established to tackle the Nian and Taiping uprisings which were then ravaging China. Macartney received an invitation from the paymaster to join the army, and after giving the idea due consideration, in October 1862, he decided to give up his post in the British Army and enlisted.⁷⁰

During his time in the Ever Victorious Army, Macartney began to develop a close relationship with Li Hongzhang. Macartney would go on to join Li's *mufu* as a *muyou*, and under his patronage, went on to serve consecutively as Director (*zongban* 總辦) of three extrabureaucratic bureaux in Songjiang, Suzhou and Jinliang, all established to manufacture Western military technologies (*zhizaoju* 製造局).⁷¹ Macartney earned multiple honours for his work,⁷² including an a third-rank hat-button (*dingdai* 頂戴) in 1864,⁷³ and an honorary Circuit Intendant title (*daoxian* 道銜) in 1866,⁷⁴ and it probably seemed to him that he was edging ever closer to achieving his stated goal of realising a status and influence in China analogous to that of Verbiest, Schaal, or one of the other influential Jesuit missionaries who had served at the Ming and Qing courts.⁷⁵

In January of 1875, however, Macartney's career in Li's service appeared at risk of an abrupt end when two 68-pounder cast iron shell guns, which had been

⁶⁸ Boulger, 34.

⁶⁹ Boulger, 57.

⁷⁰ Boulger, 57–60.

⁷¹ Boulger, 79–146.

⁷² On the awarding of honours of this sort to foreigners, see: Jonathon Chappell, 'Some Corner of a Chinese Field: The Politics of Remembering Foreign Veterans of the Taiping Civil War', *Modern Asian Studies* 52, no. 4 (2018): 1140.

⁷³ QSL-TZ, J115, TZ3/9.

⁷⁴ LHZQJ, 2:513, Li Hongzhang Memorial, TZ5/8/20; Boulger, *Macartney*, 279.

⁷⁵ Boulger, 140.

manufactured under his watch, simultaneously burst when mounted at the Northern and Southern Forts at Dagu, leading to the deaths of five men and seriously wounding several others.⁷⁶ As a result, Macartney stepped down from his position. However, in 1876, his career took an unexpected turn when Li recommended him for the position of Secretary in the upcoming embassy to Britain, which was to be led by Guo Songtao as minister and Liu Xihong as vice-minister.

As would be characteristic of the foreigners who served at the other legations in this period, during his first years at the legation, Macartney primarily served as an interpreter, ministerial chaperone, and as one of the organisation's critical producers of epistolary output in English; the latter being a role he would go on to effectively monopolise from Zeng Jize's tenure onwards.⁷⁷ While these tasks were central to the everyday operations of the legation, it was, as stated above, the task of learning about the non-Qing world which constituted the core of the legation's activities in its first years of operation. Macartney played a central role in facilitating these activities through the provision of a diverse range of information and explanations.

Macartney's involvement in this process began the day the embassy set sail from Shanghai on December 2, 1876. During the journey and at its various ports of call, Macartney began to discuss a wide variety of topics with the ministers and their staff, running the gamut from the financial situation of the British Empire through to nautical practices and shipbuilding conventions. After arriving in Britain, the list of topics proliferated, with Macartney clarifying for Guo and Liu the various alien phenomena they encountered whilst navigating, or whilst en route to, a diverse range of political, religious and cultural spaces. These visits included trips to Buckingham Palace, the Foreign Office, parliament, prisons, schools, factories, theatres and museums. Figure 1 gives a sense of the wide range of topics the ministers discussed with Macartney during their postings.

⁷⁶ Boulger, 239.

⁷⁷ See Chapter 3.

Figure 1: Sample List of Topics Discussed between Macartney and the Members of the London Legation, 1876-1879

Topic	Example
Animal Welfare	GX2/12/22: In explaining to Guo why horses are not whipped on Sundays because it is a day of rest, Macartney tells Guo about an animal welfare organisation in London that advocates against animal cruelty.
Astronomy	GX3/10/18: Macartney informs Guo about Galileo Galilei's findings on heliocentrism and the pushback he faced from the pope and the Catholic Church.
Ceremonial	GX3/1/28: During a visit to Buckingham Palace, Macartney and Guo witness Queen Victoria performing an investiture ceremony. Macartney explains the ceremony to Guo.
Charity	GX3/8/6: Macartney explains to Guo about the British aid and relief efforts in India to help with the famine, and the country's propensity for getting involved in charity work.
Geography	GX2/11/11~13: Macartney tells Guo of the island of Socotra close to the Red Sea, which belongs to England.
Language	GX2/10/4: Macartney explains to Guo the meaning and significance of the term 'Excellency' as a term of address.
Ministerial Comportment	GX3/1/5: Macartney advises Liu not to visit the British friend of an interpreter to the mission, who once was a merchant in Shanghai but who now lives in a village 30 <i>li</i> outside London. Liu had hoped to use it as an opportunity to inspect the British countryside, and investigate agricultural practices, land tax, and the livelihoods of the common person. Macartney explains that the commoner reveres the ministerial class and that it is not proper for a minister to engage with them.
Nautical Practices	GX2/12/2: Macartney talks to Guo about the benefit of lighthouses for guiding ships to their ports and circumventing accidents.
Politics	GX3/9/26: Macartney tells Guo about the different political parties in France.
Religion	GX3/9/23: Macartney explains to Guo about the Jesuits and the other orders of the Catholic Church.
Rules of Warfare	GX2/11/14: Macartney talks to Guo about how captives are not killed, and are treated with courtesy in European warfare.
Science	GX4/10/23: Macartney informs Guo about the 64 chemical elements which made up the periodic table at the time.
Sports	GX3/7/25: Macartney informs Guo of Frederick Cavill's attempt to swim across the English Channel from France to England.
Technology and Innovation	GX3/8/6: Macartney informs Guo about Edinburgh-born Alexander Graham Bell's invention of the telephone.
War	GX3/3/29: Macartney explains to Guo about Russia's decision to go to war with Turkey.

Sources: Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾, *Guo Songtao riji* 郭嵩燾日記 [The Diary of Guo Songtao], ed. Yang Jian 楊堅 and Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河, vol. 3, 4 vols (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1982); Guo Songtao 郭嵩燾, 'Shixi jicheng 使西紀程 [Record of an Envoy's Journey to the West]', in *Guo Songtao riji* 郭嵩燾日記 [The Diary of Guo Songtao], ed. Yang Jian 楊堅 and Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河, vol. 3, 4 vols (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1982); Liu Xihong 劉錫鴻, *Yingyao siji* 英軺私記 [Private Notes on My Posting to Britain], ed. Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河, Zou xiang shijie congshu (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1981).

The examples in Figure 1 are but a few illustrative examples, and do not do full justice to the rich range of topics covered in Macartney's interactions with the

ministers. Furthermore, when we compare Guo Songtao's private journal (later published as *The Diary of Guo Songtao*, or *Guo Songtao riji* 郭嵩燾日記), with that which he submitted to the Zongli Yamen (*Record of a Mission to the West*, or *shixi jicheng* 使西紀程), we discover that only a portion of the interactions Macartney had with the ministers made their way into the latter.⁷⁸ This leads to three points for discussion, two being generally relevant to the production of all *chushi riji*, and one being particular to the case of Guo Songtao's *Record of a Mission to the West*.

The first general point is that the ministers had no obligation to record everything that Macartney shared with them in the diaries earmarked for submission to the Yamen. Indeed, the ministers likely winnowed down the information provided by Macartney according both to their own areas of interest and their understandings of what might be deemed valuable and worthy of further dissemination within the Chinese domestic context. The second general point was that the content needed to be carefully curated and made inoffensive to anti-foreign factions in China. This point is not mere speculation: Japanese scholars have recently demonstrated how there were considerable differences between the journal Guo Songtao compiled for bureaucratic consumption, and that which he kept for his own private reflections.⁷⁹ Self-censorship was therefore likely exercised in the case of Liu's journal too, and probably had implications for what types of information provided by Macartney made their way into the ministers' *chushi riji*. However, as noted in this dissertation's introduction, in the case of Guo, his self-censorship did not go far enough. When the Zongli Yamen published his *Record of a Mission to the West* without his permission in 1877, it was thoroughly condemned in the scholar-official world due to Guo's overly laudatory comments about the West,⁸⁰ and led to his

⁷⁸ The differences between the journals was first pointed out in: Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*.

⁷⁹ Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, 45.

⁸⁰ As noted by Okamoto Takashi, these laudatory comments did not constitute a break in character. Guo had viewed Western civilisation in a positive light even prior to departing for Britain. Such views clashed with Liu Xihong, who was markedly anti-foreign. Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, 52–53.

effective fall from grace.⁸¹ The final point, which is particular to Guo's *Record of a Mission to the West*, was that it only covered the period spanning the embassy's departure from Shanghai on December 2, 1876, until its arrival at Southampton on January 21, 1877. That no further *chushi riji* under Guo's name were published undoubtedly was a result of the censure his first *chushi riji* was subjected to. However, in his personal diary which, again, served as the basis for his official one, we find that Guo continued to make extensive notes about his experiences abroad, many of which were constructed by way of Macartney's influence and information. Although Guo ceased to show his journal to others after the above events,⁸² one can only presume that, despite the widespread censure he was subjected to, he wished to fulfil his promise to the Empress and continued to record his experiences as vividly as possible.

Figure 2: Members of the legation in attendance for the Queen's opening of parliament (February 8, 1877)



Source: *The Illustrated London News*, Feb. 17, 1877, 20.

⁸¹ On the fact that this crisis almost brought an end to the *chushi riji*, see: Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*.

⁸² Li, *Xiyang zazhi*, 182.

Given the way in which the ministers turned to Macartney as an effective dispenser of information and commentary, it is fair to say that his role was endowed with a didactic quality from the start. However, it is unclear to what extent Macartney was cognisant of the ministers' initial focus on learning, and whether he was aware that much of the information he was providing them was being recorded for later bureaucratic consumption in China. Nevertheless, we find clear instances of his seeking to intervene in ministerial interpretations of the West, which, in turn, would influence the narrative being relayed back to China in the *chushi riji*.⁸³ An interesting example could be noted in Macartney's actions prior to the embassy's departure from Shanghai. Initially, the embassy was scheduled to board a steamer operated by Messageries, a French company, but Macartney arranged for their passage to be provided by P&O instead. Macartney's rationale was that because P&O was a British company, the ship would drop anchor at some of the major sites along the British imperial track—Hong Kong, Singapore, Ceylon, Aden, Malta, and Gibraltar—and therefore enable the ministers to experience the full extent of British wealth and power.⁸⁴ These places and their inhabitants therefore became props of sorts, working to foster highly curated images about Britain's imperial 'success story'.

Macartney also made more blatant attempts to either 'educate' the ministers about Western civilisation or to persuade them of China's inadequacies. For instance, the ministers' journals record several lengthy diatribes by Macartney about particular bugbears of his. He had felt passionately about the injustices and asymmetries of the Qing legal system,⁸⁵ and made sure to make his feelings on the subject known.⁸⁶ Macartney also spoke frequently to the ministers about the lack of

⁸³ Their influence on ministerial perceptions has also been noted by Teshirogi Yūji. See: Teshirogi, *Seiyō taiken*, 33–34.

⁸⁴ Boulger, *Macartney*, 265–66.

⁸⁵ A letter of Macartney's to a friend reveals that this had long been a bugbear of his: Boulger, 252–53.

⁸⁶ Some examples included when the ministers had sought to visit some gardens before paying their proper respects to an individual they had a scheduled meeting with (Boulger, 276); when Guo had failed to leave his greeting card with a person (Boulger, 271); and when he had failed to salute another (Boulger, 272).

probity Qing scholar-officials displayed, and their penchant for dissimulation.⁸⁷

Macartney's own diary of the journey to Britain also indicates that he was a stickler for correct etiquette, noting his contempt when Liu had spat into a spittoon during a meal.⁸⁸ To combat further embarrassment, he made efforts to ensure that the ministers upheld the etiquette expected of them, noting several instances in his diary about how he had sought to rectify the ministers' failings in this regard.⁸⁹ He had also prevented a potential diplomatic catastrophe when he discovered that Guo was planning to have one of his staff executed in the legation cellar as punishment for his striking of a boy who had pulled his Manchu queue in Oxford Street.⁹⁰

Such endeavours on Macartney's part should also be understood in connection to his own position in British and wider European society.⁹¹ As his biographer noted, albeit in a somewhat hagiographical timbre, 'the conduct of the work of the Legation was marked by tact, business capacity, and close compliance with the strict code of diplomatic etiquette, and every one knew that this efficiency was wholly due to the ability and vigilance of ... Macartney.'⁹² If the diplomatic community was aware that the invisible hand of Macartney was present in how the ministers conducted themselves in British and European society, the onus was on him and on his reputation to ensure that the ministers' performance tallied with the normative expectations of European etiquette, conduct and diplomatic culture. Any faux pas made by the ministers could also reflect poorly upon him. In this way, his interventions took on a personal significance that extended beyond a desire to see China embrace Western ways.

At the same time, it is also crucial that we recognise that Macartney did not operate an exclusive monopoly over the task of deconstructing and communicating the niceties and nuances of British society, culture, science and much else for the

⁸⁷ Liu, *Yingyao siji*, 106–7, GX3/2/30.

⁸⁸ Boulger, *Macartney*, 267.

⁸⁹ Boulger, 276.

⁹⁰ Boulger, 285–86.

⁹¹ Macartney's self-fashioning is explored in greater depth in Chapter 3.

⁹² Boulger, *Macartney*, 281–82.

ministers. The Chinese members of staff would have had their own thoughts to share with the ministers, and it is important that we recognise their agency, especially given how the creation of the *chushi riji* was a collaborative process between the ministers and their Chinese staff. Robert Hart had also managed to temporarily plant two of his Customs men—James Twinem and Colin Jamieson—in the legation, the former playing an important clerical and translation role in legation work. Walter Hillier, then an interpreter attached to the British legation in Beijing, had also accompanied the embassy on its journey from China,⁹³ and Thomas Wade was often on hand to talk with the ministers during the early stages of the legation's operations.⁹⁴ However, these Chinese-speaking individuals were just one intervening force in ministerial perceptions. In addition to the ministers' own reflections upon the visual, olfactory, audible, and intellectual stimuli they were exposed to as subjective agents in their own right, the knowledge they produced was also undoubtedly affected by interactions with the diplomatic corps,⁹⁵ fellow Britain-based Chinese,⁹⁶ and the other people they encountered. However, it is nevertheless crucial to bear in mind: (a) that the ministers did not speak English, and (b) that owing to Macartney's regular chaperoning of the ministers, he was responsible for a considerable portion of the English to Chinese interpretation. In performing such a role, he thus claimed an incredibly privileged position as it allowed for him to effectively monopolise intelligible information channels when the ministers were interacting with other people.⁹⁷ Indeed, as has been increasingly demonstrated in recent years, interpretation is much more than just the rendering of one language

⁹³ Boulger, 268.

⁹⁴ Guo, *Riji*, 3:passim.

⁹⁵ For instance, on one occasion, Guo asked the Japanese minister for advice on correct diplomatic protocol. Guo, 3:105, GX2/12/27.

⁹⁶ For instance, Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳, who would later become Qing minister in Washington, and who was studying law in England at Lincoln College at the time, met the ministers on multiple occasions. When they met on January 23, 1877, they discussed the nature of the British political system together. Liu, *Yingyao siji*, 49, GX2/12/10.

⁹⁷ In one entry in his journal, Guo lamented how, through Macartney's interpretation, he could only get a sense of what it was that his interlocutor was saying, and not the full picture. This demonstrates the extent to which Macartney and other interpreters monopolised the intelligible information flows for Guo and Liu during their stay: Guo, *Riji*, 3:190–91, GX3/3/11.

into another. It is a form of knowledge production in its own right, with the interpreter making considered decisions about how and in what manner they should convey the words of others.⁹⁸ In discharging the role of interpreter, Macartney thus wielded enormous power over the narrative the ministers fed back to China. A clear expression of the clout Macartney enjoyed can also be found in Guo's diary entry for February 6, 1877. There, Guo stated that when he received a visit from Lord Derby to inform him about his audience with the Queen scheduled for the next day, he was rendered 'powerless to make any enquiries about anything whatsoever' (*yiqie wucong kaojiu* 一切無從考究) due to Macartney's absence at the time.⁹⁹ Such a comment was a testament to the hold Macartney and the rest of the Chinese-speaking foreign presence had over the knowledge production activities of the ministers.

4. Inspecting, Purchasing and Translating Knowledge about Western Ordnance and Military Might: Carl Kreyer and the Qing Berlin Legation

Through the example of Halliday Macartney at the Qing legation in London, we have seen how the Qing's legations were initially established primarily to operate as centres of information collation and knowledge production about the non-Qing world. I will now move to address the case of Carl Kreyer's role at the Qing's Berlin legation.

Established in 1877, the Berlin legation emphasised similar goals to that of its London counterpart. However, the Berlin legation was endowed with a very particular focus: surveying and gathering information about military ordnance. Furthermore, it was also given the task of acting as a purchasing agent for such technology by Li Hongzhang.

The backdrop to the Qing interest in foreign military ordnance followed a similar trajectory to that which had underpinned its interest in learning about the non-Qing

⁹⁸ Two superb recent studies are: Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance*; Henrietta Harrison, *The Perils of Interpreting: The Extraordinary Lives of Two Translators between Qing China and the British Empire* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2021).

⁹⁹ Guo, *Riji*, 3:103, GX2/12/24.

world. In the wake of the Opium Wars, the fear of further foreign encroachment and of the increasing threat posed by internal rebellion loomed large, and the Qing recognised the inefficiencies of the technology it had on hand for staving off these threats. Under the so-called ‘Self-Strengthening Movement’, from the 1860s onwards, regional officials such as Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang began to establish a slew of extrabureaucratic institutions undergirded by *mufu* practice to help the dynasty meet these threats. The most representative of these new extrabureaucratic institutions was the Jiangnan Machine Manufacturing Bureau (*Jiangnan jiqi zhizaoju* 江南機器製造局)—more commonly known as the ‘Jiangnan Arsenal’—which was established in 1865 to manufacture Western guns, cannons, ammunition, gunpowder and ships.¹⁰⁰ In 1869, the Jiangnan Arsenal also established a translation department (*fanyiguan* 翻譯館) under the supervision of Briton John Fryer, which, in the 1870s and 1880s, produced translations of over 200 foreign texts on subjects ranging from the natural sciences and technology, through to history and international law.¹⁰¹ Despite managing to put some of this nascent technology to use in its quelling of the Taipings, the adequacy of Qing military and naval preparedness was called into question when Japan launched its punitive mission to Taiwan in 1874. Completely unprepared to counter such an expedition, it was in this moment that the inadequacies of Qing military and naval preparedness came to light and, much to the chagrin of the Qing, the dynasty was forced to buy off, rather than fight off, the Japanese at a price of half a million taels.¹⁰²

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Taiwan expedition subsequently engendered a debate between key figures in the Qing bureaucracy about whether the Qing ought to prioritise frontier or maritime defence as its immediate focus.

¹⁰⁰ For a balanced overview of the Qing efforts in this regard, see: Elman, *On Their Own Terms*, 355–95.

¹⁰¹ Banno Masataka 坂野正高, *Kindai Chūgoku seiji gaikōshi: Vasuko da Gama kara goshi undō made* 近代中国政治外交史——ヴァスコ・ダ・ガマから五四運動まで [A History of Modern China’s Politics and Diplomacy: From Vasco da Gama to the May Fourth Movement] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1973), 303; Adrian A. Bennett, *John Fryer: The Introduction of Western Science and Technology into Nineteenth-Century China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967).

¹⁰² Hsü, ‘Great Policy Debate’, 213.

Unfortunately for Li Hongzhang, who was a proponent of the latter, the tide of opinion weighed largely in favour of frontier defence, which gave Zuo Zongtang the support and funding he needed to put down the Muslim uprisings in the northwest. The debate nevertheless worked to bolster awareness about the Qing's deficiencies in its naval defences, and allowed for the creation of a small annual four million tael budget, although this sum paled in comparison to that which was directed towards frontier defence.¹⁰³

After Li Fengbao took up office as legation minister in 1878, the Berlin legation would play a crucial role in helping those with access to this budget, however limited it was, to make decisions about which ordnance to invest in, and about how to bolster China's naval and military might.¹⁰⁴ Li Hongzhang explained in a letter to Li Fengbao that he had asked the Zongli Yamen to make it Li Fengbao's mission to investigate the latest in armour-plated ships which might be suitable for Qing naval use.¹⁰⁵ Li Hongzhang additionally sent Xu Jianyin 徐建寅—a scientist who was Director of the Shandong Mechanical Bureau (*Shandong jiqiju* 山東機器局) at the time—to aid Li Fengbao in this task, as his counsellor of legation. Xu was additionally charged with his own mission by Li: to investigate the European factories and their manufacturing practices.¹⁰⁶ These individual tasks, however, would soon blend into one and, alongside the purchasing of warships and other types of ordnance, would become the fundamental *raison d'être* for the Berlin legation.

Much as for the London legation, then, diplomacy was not initially at the core of the Berlin legation's mission. Instead, at the heart of its mission was the provision of

¹⁰³ An annual figure of four million taels in funding was approved for naval use, with only one-fourth of this sum being actually appropriated. Hsü, 227–28.

¹⁰⁴ The first minister had been Liu Xihong, previously vice-minister at the London legation, who was active in the post for just one year. Li Fengbao had initially been sent to Europe in 1877 to co-direct with Prosper Giquel the second delegation of foreign students to Europe from the Foochow Shipyard. Steven A. Leibo, *Transferring Technology to China: Prosper Giquel and the Self-Strengthening Movement* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985), 127–28.

¹⁰⁵ Xu Jianyin 徐建寅, *Ouyou zalu* 歐遊雜錄 [Miscellaneous Recordings from My Time in Europe], ed. He Shouzheng 何守真, *Zou xiang shijie congshu* (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1980), 12, Li Hongzhang to Li Fengbao, GX5/9/4.

¹⁰⁶ Xu, 12, Li Hongzhang to Li Fengbao, GX5/9/4.

the knowhow and materiel needed by the dynasty and its extrabureaucratic efforts in Self-Strengthening. While the reason why the Berlin legation became the Qing's overseas hub for all things technological is not clear, it may well have had something to do with Li Hongzhang's increasing preference in this period for courting the Germans in all things technological.¹⁰⁷ Krupp, for instance, had been one of Li's primary providers of foreign ordnance.¹⁰⁸ Li was also modelling his nascent Beiyang Navy on the German model. There was, therefore, a need to stay informed about the latest information from the country.¹⁰⁹ What's more, the Qing already had a purchasing agent in Britain: James Campbell, head of the London office of the Customs, and Robert Hart's man on the ground. Li, however, was of the opinion that ordnance purchases ought not to be handled by a Westerner.¹¹⁰ The Berlin legation could thus become a counterweight to Hart's influence. Incidentally, the geographic selection of Berlin didn't preclude the legation visiting and collating information from other countries as well. Indeed, it would become a hub for a truly pan-continental effort.

Just as was the case with the London legation, foreign participation played an important role in allowing the Berlin legation to achieve these goals. While Henry Octavius Brown—a Customs man—would be the first foreigner to serve at the Berlin legation under Liu Xihong, its first minister, it would be Carl Traugott Kreyer who

¹⁰⁷ Aleš Skřivan Sr and Aleš Skřivan Jr, 'The Firm Fried. Krupp in the Chinese Market Prior to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95', *German History* 40, no. 3 (2022), 364. Li Hongzhang had also come to be partial to Germany due to the increasing influence exerted upon him by his *muyou*, Gustav Detring: Schmidt, *europäischen Berater*; Hans van de Ven, 'Robert Hart and Gustav Detring during the Boxer Rebellion', *Modern Asian Studies* 40, no. 3 (2006): 650.

¹⁰⁸ Skřivan and Skřivan, 'The Firm Fried'; Sun Lie 孫烈, *Deguo Kelubo yu wan Qing huopao: maoyi yu fangzhi moshi xia de jishu zhuanji* 德國克虜伯與晚清火炮——貿易與仿制模式下的技術轉移 [Krupp and Cannons in the Late Qing: Technological Transfer in the Context of Trade and Imitation] (Jinan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2014).

¹⁰⁹ Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河, 'Yiwei wushi de jishu zhuanjia zougou de daolu: Xu Jianyin chuguo kaocha suoxie "Ouyou zalu" 一位務實的技術專家走過的道路——徐建寅出國考察所寫《歐遊雜錄》 [The Path Walked by a Pragmatic Technological Expert: Xu Jianyin's Investigate Journey Abroad and His 'Miscellaneous Recordings from My Time in Europe']', in *Ouyou zalu* 歐遊雜錄 [Miscellaneous Recordings from My Time in Europe] by Xu Jianyin 徐建寅, ed. He Shouzheng 何守真, Zou xiang shijie congshu (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1980), 9.

¹¹⁰ Xu, *Ouyou Zalu*, 12, Li Hongzhang to Li Fengbao, GX5/9/4.

came to embody the foreign presence at the Berlin legation and its efforts in this regard.

Kreyer was born in Grödel, Saxony in 1839. At fourteen, he ran away to America and briefly made New York his home, before sailing to China. Two years later, in 1863, he made his return to the United States and enrolled at the University of Rochester. There, he studied at the Rochester Theological seminary and served as pastor at a Baptist church in Waterloo, New York State. Apparently, his previous sojourn in China had instilled a thirst to see more of the country, for he set sail for the country again as a missionary of the American Baptist Missionary Union as soon as he completed his studies in 1865. Kreyer served in this role until 1869, after which he was invited by John Fryer to come and work at the Shanghai Institute of Various Languages (*Guangfanyanguan* 廣方言館), located inside the Jiangnan Machine Manufacturing Bureau. In addition to teaching German at the school, he also worked extensively on the translation of Western texts at the translation arm of the arsenal.¹¹¹ As elaborated below, this translation work would become particularly crucial for his involvement with the Berlin legation.

After leaving his job at the bureau in 1874,¹¹² he began work as an interpreter in the *mufu* of Shanghai Circuit Intendant (*Shanghai daotai* 上海道台) Feng Junguang 馮燠光.¹¹³ When Liu Ruifen 劉瑞芬 (later Qing minister to Britain, 1886-90; France, 1887-90; and Russia, 1886-87) took up the post in 1878, Kreyer stayed on. However, in 1879, he was seconded with imperial approval (*zoudiao* 奏調) to the Berlin legation due to a request put in by Li Fengbao, the Berlin legation's new minister.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Takata Tokio 高田時雄, 'Jin Kaili zhuanlüe 金楷理傳略 [A Biography of Karl Kreyer]', in *Riben Dongfangxue* 日本東方學 [Oriental Studies in Japan], ed. Riben Jingdu daxue renwen kexue yanjiusuo 日本京都大學人文科學研究所, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007), 260–76.

¹¹² University of Rochester, *General Catalogue of the University of Rochester, 1850-1911* (Rochester, N.Y.: The University of Rochester, 1911), 27.

¹¹³ When Kreyer joined the Jiangnan Arsenal in 1869, Feng was its director (*zongban*). See: Takata, 'Jin Kaili'.

¹¹⁴ Xu, *Ouyou zalu*, 12, Li Hongzhang to Li Fengbao, GX5/9/4. In addition to working at the Berlin legation, Kreyer would go on to simultaneously hold the position of Counsellor at the Qing legations in Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburg, The Hague, Bruxelles, Stockholm, Rome and Vienna until retiring in 1903. In this period, he served as secretary to the Qing delegates to the First Hague Conference of

Like the foreigners at other legations, Kreyer's translation, interpretation and clerical work for the institution constituted an indispensable component of his work. As was the case with Macartney at the London legation from 1879 onwards,¹¹⁵ Kreyer was to become the Berlin legation's lead rhetorician, overseeing all of its outgoing German-language correspondence.¹¹⁶ He also served as interpreter for the ministers and their staff in their interactions with the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs,¹¹⁷ and on other occasions such as when the ministers were granted audiences with the German Kaiser.¹¹⁸ In terms of his clerical functions, according to Li Fengbao, Kreyer also translated an average of between 4 to 9 English- or German-language letters a day into Chinese.¹¹⁹ Kreyer's absence when abroad on travel also left the legation unable to respond to correspondence in these two languages.¹²⁰

How though did his work pertain to the legation's critical focus of purchasing ordnance and developing understandings about this technology and the knowhow associated with it? His key area of involvement in this regard came with his work at the legation on the translation of texts pertaining, inter alia, to the use and operation of military ordnance and other types of technology, the latest product catalogues from ordnance manufacturers, examples of regulations and contracts used in the navies and armies of the European powers, and guides for the execution of military drills and other exercises.

1899, and also spent time at the University of Berlin studying political economy and the science of finance, 1897-1902. After his retirement in 1903, he served as an adviser (*guwen* 顧問) to the Qing legation in Rome from 1908 to 1910. See: Takata, 'Jin Kaili', 266; 'Noted Career of Dr. Kreyer Is Now Ended', *Post*, Oct. 28, 1914. The latter source can be found within the Central Library of Rochester and Monroe County Historic Scrapbooks Collection. The article is marked as featuring in the '*Post*', but which particular '*Post*' is not made explicit.

¹¹⁵ On this point, see Chapter 3.

¹¹⁶ Xu Jingcheng 許景澄, *Xu Jingcheng ji* 許景澄集 [The Collected Writings of Xu Jingcheng], ed. Zhu Jiaying 朱家英, vol. 1 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 2015), 115, Xu Jingcheng to Zongli Yamen, GX10/10.

¹¹⁷ Xu, 1:165, Xu Jingcheng to Head of the Zongli Yamen, GX16/8.

¹¹⁸ Xu, 1:11, Xu Jingcheng memorial, GX10/12/2 (IR).

¹¹⁹ Zhang Wenyan 張文苑, ed., *Li Fengbao wanglai xinshu* 李鳳苞往來新書 [The Incoming and Outgoing Correspondence of Li Fengbao], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018), 476, Li Fengbao to Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, GX7/9/5. Kreyer's colleague, Chen Jitong 陳季同 was meanwhile responsible for the translation of French correspondence.

¹²⁰ Zhang, 1:476, Li Fengbao to Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, GX7/9/5.

The translation of technical texts of this type had, in fact, constituted Kreyer's key role at the Jiangnan Machine Manufacturing Bureau, with him producing, in collaboration with Chinese staff, translations of at least 36 foreign texts during his time at the bureau. These translations covered such topics as naval manoeuvres, nautical astronomy, coastal defence, artillery, the manufacture of explosives, practical navigation, constitutional law, construction, and the conservation of steam engines and boilers.¹²¹ The vast majority of these collaborative translations had been produced in conjunction with Li Fengbao, the very person who had called for Kreyer to be seconded to the Berlin legation. Indeed, the pair had worked together on a wide range of translation projects at the bureau, the overwhelming majority pertaining to military ordnance, particularly that manufactured by Krupp. As was the case with the other collaborative Sino-Western translation teams at the arsenal, Kreyer would first translate the contents of the source text orally (*kouyi* 口譯). This oral translation would then be finessed into literary Chinese (*bishu* 筆述) by Li.

Shortly after arriving at the legation, Li Fengbao had written to Li Hongzhang about his desire to bring Kreyer to the legation as a dedicated translator of German-language ordnance texts.¹²² Having received, via Li Hongzhang, the permission of Liu Ruifen to bring Kreyer to Germany, Li Fengbao memorialised the Guangxu emperor on the subject, again emphasising his desire to put Kreyer to work translating specialist texts.¹²³ Kreyer set sail for Germany on April 7, 1880,¹²⁴ and after arrival, was put immediately to work in this regard. Whilst hitherto somewhat of a black box, the recently published correspondence of Li Fengbao with the Tianjin Mechanical Bureau (*Tianjin jixieju* 天津機械局) offers us an important insight into

¹²¹ For a list of the texts produced by Kreyer in collaboration with others at the Jiangnan Arsenal, see: Takata, 'Jin Kaili'; Sun, *Kelubo*, 191–92. 'Noted Career of Dr. Kreyer Is Now Ended'.

¹²² Zhang, *Li Fengbao wanglai xinshu*, 2018, 1:136, Li Fengbao to Mechanical Bureau, GX5/8/16.

¹²³ Lu Defu 陸德富 and Tong Linjue 童林珏, eds., *Zhu-De shiguan dang'an chao* 駐德使館檔案鈔 [Copies of the Archival Materials from the Chinese Legation in Germany] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2020), 78, Li Fengbao memorial, GX5/11/10.

¹²⁴ Zhang, *Li Fengbao wanglai xinshu*, 2018, 1:172, Li Fengbao to Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, GX6/2/2.

the translation and knowledge production activities at the Berlin legation, and the central role Kreyer played within them.¹²⁵

Figure 3 draws upon this correspondence to offer a sample list of the wide variety of translation projects Kreyer was involved in at the Berlin legation. Here, I have taken care only to list those ongoing or planned translation projects which explicitly reference Kreyer's involvement. It nevertheless bears noting that, of the translated texts Li Fengbao sent on with his letters to the Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, those which he himself was involved in producing do not list any translation credits; whereas those produced by other collaborative pairs, such as by legation translators Geng Yintai 賡音泰 and Gu Zurong 顧祖榮, do.¹²⁶ Several letters reveal, however, that in the case of these texts in which the translators are not credited, they were produced by Li in conjunction with Kreyer.¹²⁷

Figure 3: Sample List of Translations Produced Collaboratively between Kreyer and the Qing Staff at the Qing Berlin Legation, 1880-1882

Content of ongoing or planned translation	Translators	Date of reference
Book on underwater mines	Carl Kreyer and Xu Jianyin	GX6/6/1
Illustrated manual of gunpowder-related apparatus	Carl Kreyer and Xu Jianyin	GX6/9/18
Naval contract produced by the German Navy	Carl Kreyer and Xu Jianyin (AM), Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao (PM)	GX6/11/9
Price list of Siemens' products	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX6/11/9; GX6/11/16
Test apparatus for gunpowder	Carl Kreyer and Xu Jianyin	GX7/2/25
'Important document'	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/3/9
Manual for equipment which allows for the speed testing of projectiles	Carl Kreyer and Xu Jianyin	GX7/4/2
German regulations for the storage of arms	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/9/5

¹²⁵ See: Zhang Wenyan, ed., *Li Fengbao wanglai xinshu*, 2 vols (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018).

¹²⁶ See translation by Geng and Gu entitled 'German Regulations for Ammunition' (*Deguo qiangzi zhangcheng* 德國槍子章程) in: Zhang Wenyan 張文苑, ed., *Li Fengbao wanglai xinshu* 李鳳苞往來新書 [The Incoming and Outgoing Correspondence of Li Fengbao], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018), 564-86, Li Fengbao to Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, GX8/2/13.

¹²⁷ For instance, the translators of a text on Russian torpedo boats appended to the following letter are not credited: Zhang, 2:523-37, GX8/1/14, Li Fengbao to Tianjin Mechanical Bureau. However, an earlier letter reveals that this text was, in fact, the work of Kreyer and Li Fengbao: Zhang, 2:517, Li Fengbao to Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, GX7/12/15.

Essays on military forts	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/9/5
German regulations for artillery detachments	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/10/4
German manual on military drill exercises	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/10/4
Regulations for the testing of guncotton	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/10/4; GX9/3/20
Illustrated manuals on various torpedo boats	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/10/9
In-depth guide to testing Russian-made torpedo boats	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/12/15; GX8/1/14
Illustrated manuals for planned German warships	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX7/12/15
Text on underwater mines	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX8/2/28
Text on torpedo boats	Carl Kreyer and Li Fengbao	GX8/2/28

Source: Zhang Wenyuan 張文苑, ed., *Li Fengbao wanglai xinshu* 李鳳苞往來新書 [The Incoming and Outgoing Correspondence of Li Fengbao], 2 vols (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018).

While there was a decided focus upon matters of a military nature, the range of translations Kreyer produced in collaboration with his colleagues was nevertheless truly diverse, ranging from illustrated manuals on how to operate certain types of artillery to German manuals on military drills and exercises. Drawing on his long-term experience of orally interpreting similarly specialist texts into Chinese at the Jiangnan Arsenal, Kreyer was central to these endeavours. Indeed, they often couldn't proceed without him.¹²⁸

Li's letters are important as they also demonstrate how these texts made their way back to China for further dissemination in the various arsenals, dockyards and armies, and how their contents were praised for their practical utility.¹²⁹ The Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, at times, even made requests for the sorts of military texts it hoped to see translated in the future.


While most of the texts that Kreyer worked on at the Berlin legation were only ever distributed amongst specialist audiences, some of the materials he translated collaboratively were nevertheless published for wider consumption. The most

¹²⁸ Li Fengbao writes in one letter to the Tianjin Arsenal how he was unable to bring two translations to a speedy completion due to Kreyer having been bedridden for the past two days. Such comments hint at the centrality of his role. Zhang, *Li Fengbao wanglai xinshu*, 2018, 2:609, Li Fengbao to Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, GX8/2/18.

¹²⁹ On these points, see the examples in: Zhang, 2:649, Tianjin Mechanical Bureau to Li Fengbao, GX8/10/19; 752, 755, Tianjin Mechanical Bureau to Li Fengbao, GX9/2/24.

representative of these was a text titled *Diagrams and Charts of Foreign Warships* (*Waiguo shichuan tubiao* 外國師船圖表).¹³⁰ The text started out as a smaller collaborative project between Kreyer and Liu Fuyi 劉孚翊 (Attendant Staff Member at the Qing London Legation, 1876-1877, and then at the Berlin legation, 1877-1880) which brought together information tables on the armoured warships contained in the fleets of various countries, and appears to have been completed sometime in the first year of Kreyer's tenure at the legation, given Liu's untimely death in 1880.¹³¹

Figure 4: Sample pages from *Diagrams and Charts of Foreign Warships*



The text was later rediscovered by Xu Jingcheng 許景澄 (Qing minister to Germany and France, 1884-1887), expanded under his direction to be more

¹³⁰ According to Sun Lie, another text which was produced by Kreyer and Li Fengbao during their time together in Berlin was a text entitled *New Interpretations on Citadels* (*chengbao xinyi* 城堡新義): Sun, *Kelubo*, 193.

¹³¹ Zhang, *Li Fengbao wanglai xinshu*, 2018, 1:343, Li Fengbao to Tianjin Mechanical Bureau, GX6/11/9.

comprehensive in scope, and eventually published under Xu's name in 1896.¹³² Spanning 12 *juan*, the text is a gargantuan compilation of data on the fleets of nineteen countries. Each *juan* covers the fleet of one or more countries, offering information on such items as each ship's length, width, cabin depth, engine horsepower, density of outer armour plating, and year of manufacture (Figure 4, right). Diagrams of each of the ships described were also featured in *juan* 12 (Figure 4, left). According to a later memorial by Qian Xun 錢恂 (Qing minister to Italy, 1908-1909), Kreyer was just as involved in the expanded version, sourcing all the materials to be translated, checking for inconsistencies, and translating and verifying the source texts involved, which spanned more than ten languages.¹³³

In addition to his translation activities, Kreyer also contributed to the Berlin legation's focus on materiel in three other ways. First, Kreyer was involved in the purchasing of much of the materiel the legation ordered on behalf of the dynasty. In 1890, Xu Jingcheng, in a discussion with Max von Brandt, the German minister to China, also noted how one of the key benefits Kreyer brought to the legation was the fact that he had cultivated exceedingly good relations with the various ordnance dealers the Qing had dealings with.¹³⁴ The second point relates directly to his dealings with these individuals. According to a letter later penned by Lü Haihuan 呂海寰 (Qing minister to Germany and Holland, 1898-1901) in 1901, Kreyer played a considerable role in overseeing the manufacturing process of the Zhenyuan 鎮遠 and Dingyuan 定遠 ships, which would become the crown jewels of Li Hongzhang's Beiyang Fleet.¹³⁵ Unfortunately, the evidence provides no insight into exactly how he was involved. The third and final point was Kreyer's chaperoning of legation members to factories, military parades, and ordnance demonstrations. While Li Fengbao had initially sought to bring Kreyer to Germany to assist exclusively with

¹³² While Xu notes Kreyer's involvement in the original text in his preface to the text, he does not assign him any further credit. However, a later memorial by Qian Xun reveals that Kreyer was just as involved in the expanded version of the text. Sun, *Kelubo*, 188.

¹³³ Sun, 188.

¹³⁴ Xu, *Xu Jingcheng ji*, 1:165, Xu Jingcheng to Head of the Zongli Yamen, GX16/8.

¹³⁵ WWB, 02-07-023-11-001, Lü Haihuan to Waiwubu, GX27/8/13.

the translation of specialist texts, Li Hongzhang had recommended in his letter to Li that Kreyer assist Xu Jianyin in his inspection of factories, as it was his first time abroad.¹³⁶ Kreyer accompanied Xu and Li Fengbao, who would come to be just as involved in these visits, on their inspections of military parades,¹³⁷ ordnance demonstrations,¹³⁸ specialist shops,¹³⁹ factories,¹⁴⁰ mines,¹⁴¹ and other exhibitions.¹⁴² In each of the entries of Xu's *chushi riji*, we find accounts of his visits to these places, dissecting what he saw. Kreyer's responsibilities during these visits sadly go undocumented. Nevertheless, he was most likely on hand to interpret the interactions Xu had with the people he encountered, and thereby helped facilitate the unfolding process of technological transfer from Europe to China.

Conclusion

Through an interrogation of the activities of two of the first foreigners to be employed within the Qing's legations, this chapter has sought to: (a) establish and demonstrate the viability of the foreign presence in the legations as an 'indicator species' for perceiving how Western European diplomatic culture and practice penetrated the Qing bureaucratic consciousness in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and (b) to consider what this indicator species tells us about the Qing expectations and perceptions for its legations and staff when it first engaged with the practice of permanent diplomatic representation in the late 1870s and early 1880s.

By moving beyond a frame of reference which couches these individuals in Western conceptual terms as 'Western advisers' or 'foreign experts', and by instead contextualising their employment within the Qing's extrabureaucratic framework of

¹³⁶ Xu, *Ouyou zalu*, 12, Li Hongzhang to Li Fengbao, GX5/9/4.

¹³⁷ Xu, 44, GX5/4/21.

¹³⁸ Xu, 80, GX6/7/13.

¹³⁹ Xu, 44, GX6/4/24.

¹⁴⁰ Xu, 76, GX6/6/10.

¹⁴¹ Xu, 68, GX6/5/18.

¹⁴² Xu, 79, GX6/7/2.

mufu practice, we avoid falling into the trap of an analytical homogenisation which paints all foreign involvement in China, or Asia more broadly, with the same brush. It enables us to realise that these individuals, when positioned as *muyou*, can open a window into understanding the skill and knowledge deficits that the Qing ministers identified, and ergo the contours of what it was the Qing wanted to achieve.

Through the examples of Macartney and Kreyer, this chapter has demonstrated that when the Qing first began to embrace permanent diplomatic representation in the late 1870s, contrary to the opinion of both its contemporaneous foreign interlocutors and secondary literature on the subject, the Qing's purpose for these institutions was not diplomatic engagement. Instead, these institutions, in the first instance, were primarily underpinned by domestic circumstances that emphasised a commitment to learning about the non-Qing world in order to understand and counter threats in the domestic context and to defend it from further encroachment. The early Qing ministers in London drew upon Macartney to help facilitate this process by sourcing a broad range of information and explication on the Western world from him, aiding not only their own understandings but also those back in China through their production of the *chushi riji*. While no doubt sharing many aspects of Macartney's work, the principal function of Carl Kreyer at the Qing legation in Berlin was meanwhile as a conduit for accessing information and explanations on the latest in Western military ordnance, and for assisting with the transmission of this knowledge, through translation, back to China.

This non-diplomatic emphasis reveals a need to anchor our understanding of the Qing embrace of permanent diplomatic representation not only in unilateral terms as a Qing response to a 'Western impact' which called for Qing participation in Western European diplomatic culture, but also within a domestic context in which a need had been identified to learn and broaden understandings of the non-Qing world and its materiel so as to defend the substance and integrity of the Qing world.

At the same time, the abundant evidence of the existence of *mufu* practice within the legations further demonstrates the need for us to locate the origins of the Qing's

first tentative steps into permanent diplomatic representation within its domestic context, with the Qing appropriating tools from its own extrabureaucratic tradition to meet the challenges of locating its first missions abroad which, while superficially appearing to be sites purposed for engagement in diplomacy, were underpinned by a different cultural habitus.

Chapter 2

Foreign Staff and their Private Interventions: Divie McCartee's Private Crusade against the Japanese Annexation of Ryukyu

Introduction

The employment of 'one or two natives ought not to be inexpedient, provided they are of a docile temperament' wrote Li Hongzhang in a letter sent to Guo Songtao, suggesting Halliday Macartney's employment for the soon-to-be incorporated Qing London legation in 1876.¹ However, this idealised docility did not prove to be characteristic of Macartney, nor indeed of many other foreigners appointed to the Qing legations. As introduced in the previous chapter, these appointees often sought to exert agency or to interweave their own personal initiatives into aspects of their work; to put their own stamp on legation work and thereby on the work of the ministers. These private acts were very much fuelled by their own personal agendas and outlooks, built upon the cultural habitus into which they had been socialised. Indeed, in agreeing to work under a Qing minister, each of these foreigners brought their own political and world views, idiosyncratic set of skills, webs of contact, status, and their personal ambitions into play in the legation they served. In a sense, these interventions were also a form of self-fashioning;² a way

¹ LHZQJ, 31:491, Li Hongzhang to Guo Songtao, GX2/8/29. Also see footnote 41 in Chapter 1.

² I expand on this point in Chapter 3.

of articulating the self in an otherwise disembodied collective represented by the ministerial figure.

This chapter explores how this agency could also be enacted outside the formal frameworks or implicit social contracts that these foreigners held with their Qing employers. Specifically, it focuses on the private initiatives of Divie McCartee (1820-1900), Secretary to the Qing legation in Tokyo, during the Ryukyu annexation crisis. I demonstrate that despite being expected to perform a primarily clerical role at the legation, McCartee enacted a series of private initiatives, without reference to the ministers, which were designed to aid the resuscitation of Qing-Ryukyu tributary relations and to combat the annexatory actions of the Japanese Meiji government. What's more, McCartee's decision to take matters into his own hands ought to be seen as symptomatic of the particular modality in which the Qing legations and their ministers were operating in this period. The legations were primarily positioned as centres of learning about the non-Qing world, as opposed to overseas outposts geared towards achieving diplomatic breakthroughs. Meanwhile, its ministers were members of the Confucian scholar-official elite who, in this period were both unfamiliar with Western European diplomatic culture and practice and had yet to see the value of embracing its utility. In this context, McCartee's actions can be seen as symptomatic of this particular developmental phase of the Qing legations and the *raison d'être* they emphasised.

In elucidating McCartee's private interventions, I also seek to argue that these foreigners who served the Qing in its overseas diplomatic outposts could, without reference to ministerial authority, and beyond the formal strictures of their role, engage in private action that held the potential for eliciting meaningful diplomatic change. I therefore avoid the application of a Weberian framework that sees these subministerial actors in 'rational' terms as docile diplomatic cogs, and I instead seek to position them as agents capable of individual diplomatic action.³ In doing so, I

³ For Max Weber, one key characteristic of a modern 'rational' bureaucracy was an administrative staff who were 'subordinate to rigorous and uniform official discipline and supervision'. Max Weber,

demonstrate two things. Firstly, that these foreigners could utilise the imbrication of the public, private and personal arenas they moved between to induce diplomatic change. And secondly, that aspects of their own individuality could often buttress the efficacy of these interventions, whether through their own individual skills, sociability, social connections, multicultural fluency, or status.

This chapter also serves an important methodological purpose. As noted in the introduction, this dissertation utilises the shifting nature of the work performed by foreigners in the Qing's legations as an 'indicator species' through which to assess shifting Qing attitudes towards Western European diplomatic culture and practice. Problematically, however, such a methodology invariably strips these foreign staff of their agency. This chapter seeks to redress this balance by shining a light upon how the agency and private interventions of these subministerial actors could sometimes be at least as important as ministerial actions in effecting substantive diplomatic outcomes.

At the same time, this research breaks new ground in its own right. McCartee's invisible hand and the significance of his interventions in the crisis have hitherto gone undetected by scholars of the Ryukyu annexation. As I argue in my analysis below, his interventions played a major role in the shaping of ex-American president Ulysses S. Grant's mediation of the crisis, upon Japanese policy making and propaganda efforts, and upon the very frontlines of Sino-Japanese negotiations.

1. McCartee's Employment at the Qing Legation in Tokyo

McCartee's tenure at the Qing Tokyo legation began after a colourful three and a half decades in East Asia. In 1844, he began his time in East Asia as a medical missionary nominated by the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in America, and was sent to Ningbo, newly opened to foreign products and

Economy and Society: A New Translation, trans. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2019), 348.

proselytization in the wake of the Opium War.⁴ This was to be the start line of an astonishing career, moving between the multiple masters of Christ, country, Qing China and Meiji Japan, as a medical missionary, consul, interpreter, and educator.

In many ways, McCartee's work as a medical missionary, which brought him to East Asia in the first place, often took a backseat to the adventures offered by other, extraneous opportunities, many of which materialised as a result of the proficiency in Chinese he gained while in Ningbo.⁵ His first consular role, albeit initially unofficial, came in 1845 due to the local circuit intendant's desire to put a representative face to the ever-growing American presence in Ningbo.⁶ His second came in 1862, when he began a three-year tenure as American Vice-Consul to Zhifu. His third came in 1872, when he was called by the American Consul-General to Shanghai, George Seward, to serve as interpreter and U.S. Assessor to the Shanghai Mixed Court. McCartee's time in Shanghai was to be short-lived, however, as an opportunity arose to serve the Qing in a mission to Japan. This opportunity came in July 1872 when the *Maria Luz*, a Peruvian ship making its way from Macao to Peru, was forced to anchor at Yokohama for urgent repairs. On the ship were 232 indentured Chinese labourers, who had been subjected to abject cruelty aboard. After an escapee managed to successfully relay their plight to a neighbouring British ship, the men were freed by the Japanese authorities, triggering a major international tribunal. Shen Bingcheng 沈秉成, the then incumbent Shanghai circuit intendant, sent McCartee as adviser and interpreter to Chen Fuxun 陳福勳, Chinese judge of the Mixed Court, to Japan to help bring the labourers safely home.⁷ On completing the mission, however, McCartee did not return to China. At the invitation of Guido Verbeck, an old friend,

⁴ Ningbo would also be important to his personal life. He met his wife Joanna Knight there, and they adopted several orphans, including Yamei Kin—later renowned as the first Chinese woman to graduate from an American university.

McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 73. Henry W. Rankin, 'Divie Bethune McCartee, M.D., Pioneer Missionary: A Sketch of His Career', *The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal* 33 (1902): 497.

⁵ This proficiency allowed him to compose, edit and translate over forty Christian texts and tracts in the language. For a comprehensive list, see: Watanabe, *Oyatoi Beikokujin*, 452–55.

⁶ The role received American sanction in 1857. PHS-M, RG-177-1-3, Divie McCartee to G. Wiley Wells, Sept 22, 1877.

⁷ PHS-M, RG-177-1-3, O.F. Bradford to D.B. McCartee, Feb. 10, 1873.

he took up a position at the Kaisei Gakkō 開成学校, the predecessor to the University of Tokyo. McCartee spent five years there, delivering lectures in international law, political economy, natural history, and Latin. He even put his horticultural knowledge to use, co-administering the school's Koishikawa gardens alongside famed botanist Itō Keisuke 伊藤圭介. His expertise was also drawn upon in this period for establishing and administering the Tokio Girls' Normal School, the predecessor of Ochanomizu University.⁸

Already, a pattern emerges. McCartee was evidently drawn towards a diversity of short-term roles where his assistance was explicitly requested, or which afforded him the latitude to enact some form of substantive change. Once his role had run its course, his service could be put to use elsewhere. An acquaintance of his, writing about his career posthumously, described his involvement in non-missionary roles as testament to his view that 'Christianity must be not only preached but exemplified in many ways'. Only by doing so could McCartee 'produce a fundamental change in the national life of a people possessing an antique and petrified civilization, culture, and philosophy'.⁹ These 'micro' roles, then, allowed him to play the model Christian, and when taken in toto, served a greater purpose: Christ. That being said, such a view may well have been overly romantic. Indeed, his career moves were often underscored by other, sometimes quite pragmatic reasons: financial incentives, job insecurity, and an insatiable taste for new challenges.¹⁰

⁸ McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 161; 218–21; Tōkyō Kaisei Gakkō, *The Calendar of the Tokio Kaisei-Gakko, or Imperial University of Tokio for the Year 1876* (Tokyo: Tōkyō Kaisei Gakkō, 1876), 3.

⁹ Eli T. Sheppard, 'An American Missionary Statesman: The Life and Work of Dr. Divie Bethune McCartee', *The Missionary Review of the World* 29, no. 1 (1906): 284.

¹⁰ One reason McCartee had, for instance, left his role at the Kaisei Gakkō was due to the 'uncertainty of all government appointments held by foreigners in Japan'. (PHS-M, RG-177-1-3, D.B. McCartee to G. Wiley Wells, Sept. 22, 1877). What's more, the American Consul-General to Shanghai speculated that McCartee left American consular service because the financial terms offered by the Qing Tokyo legation were far better (PHS-M, RG-177-1-3, G. Wiley Wells to John A. Campbell, Nov. 23, 1877). As to McCartee's decision to leave the Tokyo legation at the end of his three-year term, a friend from Tokyo explained that while he gave the immoral behaviour of He Ruzhang sending for a concubine as his reason for stepping down, 'the real cause of his leaving the legation was a love of change that was not unnatural to his lively disposition, and to his long habitual experiences of varying surroundings'. (Benjamin Smith Lyman Papers (MS 190) Special Collections and University Archives,

In April 1877, McCartee resigned from his post at the Kaisei Gakkō and returned to China. In Shanghai, he re-joined the American consular service as interpreter, before being called to simultaneously discharge the functions of Vice-Consul General, Assessor of the United States to the Mixed Court, and head of postal affairs in the Consulate General.¹¹ His tenure was exceedingly brief, however, for in November 1877 he accepted a three-year post as Secretary to the newly constituted Qing legation in Tokyo.¹²

The invitation came from Zhang Sigui, an expectant prefect (*houbu zhifu* 候補知府) who was to be the new legation's vice-minister. McCartee had previously tutored Zhang in chemistry and physics in Ningbo, resulting in a long-term friendship and correspondence. Several years later, Zhang was one of the individuals chosen to pilot this new diplomatic venture, and upon passing through Shanghai, sought out McCartee's assistance. Friendships and social connections thus held real ramifications for appointments in these new institutions which emerged as outgrowths of the Qing informal bureaucracy. At the same time, He Ruzhang, a sub-expositor of the Hanlin Academy (*Hanlin shijiang* 翰林侍講) who had been elected to serve as legation minister, also appears to have recognised that McCartee's past experiences and language competencies could be of benefit.¹³

As was the case with other foreign legation staff in this period, the extant primary evidence indicates that clerical work was at the core of McCartee's role, with him handling translation, interpretation, and the penning of Western-language diplomatic notes for the legation.¹⁴ He also appears to have offered occasional counsel to He

University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, Benjamin S. Lyman to Henry W. Rankin, Apr. 22, 1902). Back in America, McCartee went to work for the Japanese legation in Washington. In 1887 however, he would make his return to East Asia, and from 1889, resumed life as a missionary, living in Japan up until 1899.

¹¹ PHS-M, RG-177-1-3, O.B. Bradford to John A. Campbell, May 21, 1877; D.B. McCartee to G. Wiley Wells, 22 Sept., 1877. McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 161–63.

¹² PHS-M, RG-177-1-3, G. Wiley Wells to John A. Campbell, Nov. 23, 1877. McCartee, 161–63.

¹³ University of Pennsylvania, Memorabilia Collection, Box OS 35, 12:04.

¹⁴ McCartee handled the translation of all English, French and Japanese documents for the legation (McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 163). Initially, interpretation *into* Chinese appears to have not been expected of him. However, He Ruzhang's two interpreters had proved to be so incompetent that He

Ruzhang (McCartee styling himself as ‘Foreign Adviser’ in his autobiography), although the sources are unforthcoming on the particulars.¹⁵ Just as was the case with the European legations, considerable emphasis was placed upon knowledge production at the Tokyo legation, but unlike Macartney, Kreyer and the other foreign staff in Europe, McCartee does not appear to have been immediately involved in such work.¹⁶ Although important to the day-to-day running of the legation, his work appears to have been of a more prosaic nature.

It was perhaps the prosaic nature of his work, coupled with a desire to enact some form of meaningful change during his tenure, that drove McCartee to find outlets that would allow him to do just that. In 1903, Eli Sheppard, an acquaintance of McCartee who had worked as an adviser in international law to the Meiji government from 1876-1880, claimed that McCartee, during his legation tenure, had privately involved himself in multiple diplomatic backchannels concerning the transfer of sovereignty of various ‘other islands’, the question of Chosŏn Korea’s ‘suzerainty’, and the transfer of Sakhalin to Russian control.¹⁷ The reliability of this information is hard to ascertain. What Sheppard meant by ‘other islands’ is not clear. It also was not until *after* McCartee’s tenure had come to an end that Chosŏn envoy Kim Hong-jip 金弘集 visited the legation and was advised to have his country enter into treaty relations with such Western states as America in order to stave off potential foreign incursions. Moreover, Japan’s ceding of Sakhalin to Russia in exchange for the Kuriles—an issue decidedly unrelated to Qing diplomacy—took place in 1875, while McCartee was still at the Kaisei Gakkō.

had McCartee take their place (McCartee, 164; Rankin, ‘Divie Bethune McCartee, M.D., Pioneer Missionary’, 502).

¹⁵ McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 162. University of Pennsylvania, Memorabilia Collection, Box OS 35, 12:04.

¹⁶ While McCartee’s official title varies from source to source, He Ruzhang, on two occasions, refers to him as a ‘translator of Western learning’ (*xixue fanyi* 西學翻譯). This suggests that he may well have been initially employed to assist the legation with its attempts to learn about the non-Qing world. However, the extant sources provide no clarification on this.

¹⁷ PTSL-R, Series II: Correspondence; Box 24, File 24:11, Letters concerning Juana M. McCartee. 1889-1927, E.T. Sheppard to William H. Rankin, Jan. 6, 1903.

What Sheppard *was* right about, however, was McCartee's private interventions in the diplomacy surrounding the Ryukyu crisis. So private were these that traces of his involvement are practically non-existent in the official Qing record. Indeed, much of his working behind-the-scenes to resuscitate Qing-Ryukyu tributary relations would only become known to the Qing *ex post facto*. Nevertheless, it was in this private and largely unofficial capacity that McCartee would make the biggest impact during his tenure in Qing diplomatic service.

2. The Origins of the Ryukyu Crisis

Before delving into the content and implications of McCartee's private interventions in the Ryukyu crisis, it is crucial to first consider the historical significance of the annexation.

In 1609, just nine years after Tokugawa Ieyasu's 徳川家康 reunification of Japan, the Shimazu 島津 clan—the feudal lords of the Satsuma domain 薩摩藩—launched an invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom with Tokugawa consent. As a result of Satsuma's successful conquest, Ryukyu became a vassal of Satsuma and, by extension, of the Tokugawa shogunate. Ryukyu, despite not achieving full unification until 1429, had been a tributary of the Ming (1368-1644) since 1372. The Satsuma invasion, however, did not bring Ryukyu relations with China to an end. Quite the contrary: neither the Ming nor the Qing were ever informed of the invasion. Indeed, following the invasion, Ryukyu, under the advice of the Tokugawa shogunate, began what can only be described as a systematic deception of China. Such a policy was beneficial for both Ryukyu and the shogunate. Conflict with China could be avoided,¹⁸ and both parties could continue to reap the benefits of trading rights and access to information flows

¹⁸ The spectre of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 豊臣秀吉 successive failures in invading the Korean peninsula in the late sixteenth century still loomed large, and the Tokugawa regime recognised that war could threaten the gains it had made in stability after reunification. Avoiding war with China was a *sine qua non* for a perduring Pax Tokugawa. Mark Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 28–29.

brought by Ming, and later Qing investiture of the kingdom.¹⁹ Ryukyu thus subsisted as an autonomous entity, albeit with different interpretations placed upon it. For the Ming and Qing, Ryukyu was a tributary, which, in real terms, meant they would not interfere in its internal or external affairs (paradoxically meaning that Ryukyu was free to establish relations elsewhere so long as it subscribed to the primacy of Chinese civilisation and continued to follow the strictures of tribute practice).²⁰ For Tokugawa Japan, it was a vassal, albeit a clandestine one.

In the nineteenth century, the increasing Western presence in East Asia and the alien epistemes brought in tow instigated an ideological sea change in Ryukyu's status. After anti-shogunate forces succeeded in bringing an end to Tokugawa rule in 1868, the inchoate Meiji state quickly sought to reject the ambiguity and interpretive plurality of East Asia's regional order and the flexibility this order had allowed for Ryukyu to subsist as a dually subordinate polity.²¹ Key Meiji figures were very vocal about the incommensurability of Ryukyu's status with the ideological prescriptions of the new normative order Japan had chosen to embrace. As Japanese statesman Matsuda Michiyuki 松田道之 stated, 'dual subordination stands in contradiction to the logic by which the rest of the world operates' and 'stands to damage the prestige

¹⁹ Ravina, 28; Miki Watanabe, 'The Elements of Concealment in Ryukyuan Diplomacy between Japan and China in Early Modern Times', *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 75 (2017): 92–93. Watanabe notes that while this concealment policy was likely a Satsuma initiative, we must be cognisant of the agency Ryukyu exerted in enacting such a policy. For a more in-depth discussion, see: Watanabe Miki 渡辺美季, *Kinsei Ryūkyū to Chū-Nichi kankei* 近世琉球と中日関係 [Early Modern Ryukyu and Sino-Japanese Relations] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2012), 213–53.

²⁰ This autonomy subsisted so long as a country continued to pay tribute. Failure to do so could result in invasion, as was the case with the Manchu invasions of Chosŏn Korea in the seventeenth century. See: Takashi Okamoto, *Contested Perceptions: Interactions and Relations between China, Korea, and Japan since the Seventeenth Century* (Tokyo: Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2022), 40–51.

²¹ Mitani Hiroshi has demonstrated how Japan's rejection of interpretive plurality in its foreign relations had, in fact, begun in the late Tokugawa. After the rise in anti-shogunate forces posed a threat to the regime, however, this process was put on hold, and would be picked back up by the Meiji government as a key agenda. Mitani Hiroshi 三谷博, *Nihon-shi no naka no 'fuhē': hikaku kara kangaeu 'Meiji Ishin'* 日本史のなかの「普遍」——比較から考える「明治維新」 [Searching for generalities in Japanese history: The Meiji Revolution as seen from a Comparative Perspective] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2020), 197. For an English introduction to the idea of what I translate as 'interpretive plurality' (a key notion advanced by many prominent Japanese scholars) see: Hiroshi Mitani, 'The Transformation of Diplomatic Norms in East Asia during the Nineteenth Century', *Acta Asiatica* 93 (2007): 89–105.

of our status as an independent nation'.²² Similarly, Japanese diplomat Takezoe Shinichirō 竹添進一郎 explained in a memorandum to Li Hongzhang that 'the law of nations may well state that a sovereign can rule two countries, but, just as wives in the West must not take two husbands, a country must not be ruled by two sovereigns.'²³ Japan was now a proponent of clear-cut articulations of sovereign territory; to its advantage, of course.

In many ways, however, the claim to exercise exclusive sovereign control over Ryukyu that Japan was making misrepresented the actual Qing view on Ryukyu.²⁴ While Ryukyu was *subordinate* to the Qing, the Qing never viewed its tributaries as regions over which their 'sovereignty' was exercised, nor in terms of a form of 'territory' which belonged to them.²⁵ These were modern Western notions.

The annexation itself was conducted in three phases over seven years. In 1872, Japan unilaterally abolished the kingdom and established the Ryukyu domain in its place. In 1875, Japan compelled Ryukyu to cut ties with the Qing and prohibited it from dispatching further tributary missions. And finally, on March 27, 1879, Matsuda Michiyuki landed in Naha with approximately 300 troops and 160 policemen to seize Shuri castle, bringing the process to a final close. The Ryukyuan

²² Shimomura Fujio 下村富士男, ed., *Meiji bunka shiryō sōsho* 明治文化資料叢書 [Compendium of Documents on Meiji Culture], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kazama shobō, 1962), 157.

²³ LHZQJ, 32:498, Takezoe Shinichirō to Li Hongzhang, GX5/10/24 (DOR).

²⁴ Ernest Satow perceptively noted this crucial point at the time: FO262/350, Mr. Kennedy to the Marquis of Salisbury, No. 26, Tokio, Feb 13, 1880. For a recent discussion of this point, see: Yamashita Shigekazu 山下重一, "'Japan Gazette' ronzeitsu no Ryūkyū shobun hihan to Inoue Kowashi no hanron 『ジャパングゼット』論説の琉球処分批判と井上毅の反論 [Critique of the Ryukyu Annexation in Articles in the Japan Gazette and Inoue Kowashi's Response]', in *Zoku Ryūkyū/Okinawa shi kenkyū josetsu* 続琉球・沖縄史研究序説 [An Introduction to Research on the History of Ryukyu/Okinawa, Volume 2] (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 2004), 242–43.

²⁵ Scholars' haphazard reading of the Western historical notions of 'sovereignty' and 'suzerainty' into the East Asian past has wrought many misunderstandings. For a discussion, see: Timothy Brook, M. C. van Walt van Praag, and Miek Boltjes, eds., *Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations since Chinggis Khan* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2018); Takashi Okamoto, ed., *A World History of Suzerainty: A Modern History of East and West Asia and Translated Concepts* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2019). However, fearing the loss of Chosŏn Korea in the 1880s, the Qing would soon move to exercise a far more controlling form of relationship over the country in terms which were commensurate with what we would define as a 'vassal state' or a 'suzerain-vassal' relationship in the Western context. On this shift, see: Okamoto, *Zokkoku/jishu*; Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).

king, Shō Tai 尚泰, was relocated to Tokyo and, in April, Nabeshima Naoyoshi 鍋島直彬 was installed as the first governor of Okinawa prefecture.

With this, tensions between the Qing and Japan reached critical heights. For the Qing, what was shocking about Japanese actions was not the loss of Ryukyu as a tributary *per se*, but rather the latent potential that the event held for its other tributary relationships. Indeed, there was a real fear that the loss of one could catalyse a chain reaction. Of particular concern for the Qing was how this event could affect, or even lead to the loss of, the crown jewel of them all: Chosŏn Korea. The key desire for the Qing was thus to see the reinstatement of the Ryukyu Kingdom and its tributary status.

3. McCartney's Private Studies and the Tokyo Legation's Academic Culture

How then did McCartney, in his private capacity, seek to aid the resuscitation of Qing-Ryukyu relations? His private interventions can be understood as constituting three separate phases.

The first of these came with McCartney's private study of the Ryukyu question. McCartney had been closely following Japanese machinations in Ryukyu and foresaw that a crisis was in the offing. Understanding the historical contingencies underscoring the dispute could perhaps enable him to make a difference. To facilitate this, he made regular visits to the bookshops of Tokyo and Yokohama, buying up all maps and books relating to the islands' history, geography, and culture that he could. All in all, he spent a year cultivating a working knowledge of the islands.²⁶

Despite it being an entirely private enterprise, McCartney's project was conducted in full view of ministerial gaze. He Ruzhang seemingly did not recognise the value of his endeavour, joking to McCartney about his studiousness and advising him to 'take

²⁶ McCartney, *Missionary Pioneer*, 164. PHS-R, RG-176-1-22, Henry W. Rankin to Robert E. Speer, Sept. 13, 1902.

life easy'. McCartee responded that he saw himself as a perpetual student, with study coming second nature to him.²⁷

That McCartee could weave this private study into the interstitial pockets of free time that punctuated his official role was undoubtedly a result of the academic culture that existed at the legation.²⁸ As noted in the previous chapter, the key focus of the Qing legations in these early years was learning, through information collation and knowledge production, about the non-Qing world. The Japanese legation was particularly proactive in this regard. He Ruzhang, in his own diary, stated that information collation and the publishing of treatises constituted the fundamental task of the Tokyo legation.²⁹ Legation members collected and mined information from their daily experiences and observations, and from their regular meetings with members of the Japanese literati who were keen to engage in cultural exchange through 'brush communication' (C. *bitan*; J. *hitsudan* 筆談).³⁰ The legation was also provided with generous funding from the Imperial Maritime Customs Service for the procurement of books, newspapers, and other written materials, and for the funding of research as well.³¹ The insights gained were later parsed and reformatted for wider consumption through the various forms of written output produced by the legation. Legation counsellor Huang Zunxian 黃遵憲 was particularly instrumental in this regard, authoring *Treatises on Japan (Ribenguo zhi* 日本國志), a comprehensive survey of Japanese culture, society, geography and more.³²

It seems probable that the presence of such a culture enabled McCartee to weave his private project into the tapestry of his daily schedule without fear of reprimand, and quite possibly even allowed for the exchanging of notes with other legation members on particular topics. And, as will become apparent below, the knowledge

²⁷ McCartee, 164.

²⁸ On this culture, see: Reynolds, *East Meets East*, 103–5; Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*; Wang, *Gakujutsu kōryū*; Zhang, *Bunjin gaikōkan*.

²⁹ He Ruzhang 何如璋, *He Ruzhang ji* 何如璋集 [The Collected Writings of He Ruzhang], ed. Wu Zhenqing 吳振清 and Wu Yuxian 吳裕賢 (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2010), 81.

³⁰ He, 298–374; Zhang, *Bunjin gaikōkan*, passim.

³¹ Wang, *Gakujutsu kōryū*, 559–72; Reynolds, *East Meets East*, 104.

³² Zhang, *Bunjin gaikōkan*, 173–243.

McCartee privately cultivated on Ryukyu's history, geography and culture would find two critical avenues for application after the Japanese moved to annex Ryukyu in March 1879.

4. McCartee and Ulysses Grant's Private Interactions

McCartee's second phase of private action was catalysed by ex-American president Ulysses Grant's involvement in the Ryukyu crisis as a third-party mediator.

After Japan executed the final phase of the annexation in March 1879, its relations with the Qing soured. There was little the Tokyo legation could do to improve things, either. On October 7, 1878, He Ruzhang had sent a sharply worded letter of protest to Terashima Munenori 寺島宗則, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, against the advice of McCartee.³³ For the Japanese side, the content was incendiary. Unless He tendered an apology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not give the legation its ear. With an apology unforthcoming, He was effectively rendered *persona non grata*.³⁴

Just as tensions were mounting, Grant arrived in China in May 1879 as part of his global tour. With the Tokyo legation unable to act, the Zongli Yamen had in the same month begun a series of new correspondence with the Japanese minister to China, Shishido Tamaki 宍戸璣. Grant's arrival thus came at an opportune moment. After meeting with Li Hongzhang in Tianjin, Grant met with Prince Gong, chief of the Zongli Yamen, over several days in early June. Prince Gong officially requested his assistance in mediating the Ryukyu dispute, to which he agreed.

³³ McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 164–65.

³⁴ He Ruzhang sent multiple letters to Terashima, and even met with him in March 1879, but Terashima was unwilling to open up a channel of dialogue without an apology. For a discussion of this chronology, see: Yamashita Shigekazu 山下重一, 'Kaiyaku buntō kōshō to Inoue Kowashi 改約分島交渉と井上毅 [Inoue Kowashi and the 1880 Sino-Japanese Negotiations surrounding Treaty Revision and the Division of the Ryukyu Islands]', in *Ryūkyū/Okinawa shi kenkyū josetsu* 琉球・沖縄史研究序説 [An Introduction to Research on the History of Ryukyu/Okinawa] (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1999), 190–92.

In Japan, Grant formed an intimate link with McCartee that, I argue, considerably affected the course of later negotiations. Their first encounter was at a welcoming event held in Grant's honour at Tokyo's Shinbashi station on July 3, the same day Grant and his entourage had dropped anchor at Yokohama. At Shinbashi, the party were welcomed by a large crowd of dignitaries, including among them Tokyo Governor Kusumoto Masataka 楠本正隆, Governor of Hong Kong John Pope-Hennessy, and members of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, including famed entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiichi 渋沢栄一 and statesman-cum-writer Fukuchi Genichirō 福地源一郎.³⁵ Significantly, McCartee's attendance at this event was conducted *not* in his official capacity as a member of the Qing Tokyo legation, but as chairman of the Committee of American Residents in Tokyo. Indeed, it was not McCartee's official status that brought him into close contact with Grant, but this 'extracurricular' status of his. Before Grant's arrival, Fukuchi Genichirō requested McCartee to correct the English version of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry's welcoming address for Grant and requested that he read this corrected version aloud upon Grant's arrival.³⁶ McCartee obliged.

The day which followed, July 4, was American Independence Day. In the morning, Grant had his first audience with the Meiji emperor, and in the evening attended a lavish independence celebration organised by the Committee of American Residents in Tokyo at Ueno's exclusive Seiyōken restaurant.³⁷ Grant, the guest of honour, was accompanied by his wife and by John Young, *New York Herald* journalist and Grant's unofficial aide during his travels. The soirée was attended by

³⁵ John R. Young, *Around the World with General Grant: A Narrative of the Visit of General U. S. Grant, Ex-President of the United States, to Various Countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa, in 1877, 1878, 1879*, vol. 2 (New York: Subscription Book Department, 1879), 522–23; 'The Arrival of General Grant', *Tokio Times*, 5 July 1879. McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 165; Shibusawa Seien kinen zaidan Ryūmonsha 渋沢青淵記念財団竜門社, ed., *Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō* 澤栄一傳記資料 [Biographical Materials on Shibusawa Eiichi], vol. 25 (Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō kankōkai, 1959), 479.

³⁶ McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 165. For the corrected address read by McCartee, see: Joel T. Headley, *The Travels of General Grant* (Pennsylvania: New World Pub. Co., 1881), 485–86.

³⁷ Gaimushō 外務省, *Nihon gaikō monjo (Meiji jidai)* 日本外交文書 (明治時代) [Japanese Diplomatic Documents (Meiji Period)], vol. 12 (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai rengō kyōkai, 1947), 138; McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 166.

some of the most prominent figures of the American community in Japan, and by several Meiji dignitaries.³⁸ McCartee, who attended the function with his wife, played a central role. As head of the reception committee, he remained at Grant's side for the duration of the evening as his chaperone, introducing him to the two hundred guests in attendance.³⁹ He also presided over the event and delivered a speech before the attendees.⁴⁰

McCartee's presence at these two events may seem of little consequence. The reality was that his attendance as chairman of the Committee of American Residents in Tokyo, and the associated functions he performed in this role, were indicative of the breadth of his network, and of the prestige and status he enjoyed within this hybrid American-Japanese community of elites. McCartee had, throughout his career, cultivated a transnational network of connections, particularly within the overseas American community. He had also come to be highly respected and trusted. He had earned the respect and praise of prominent members of the American diplomatic community, such as Anson Burlingame and John Bingham.⁴¹ What's more, as Counsellor of the Asiatic Society of Japan, McCartee's reputation was well established within academic circles as well.⁴² Given the important functions McCartee discharged at both events, and the time McCartee spent with Grant on July 4, one can infer that he was presented with ample opportunity to interact with and develop a relationship with Grant. It was also highly likely that the informal conversations that took place at these events between McCartee and Grant, and with the people around them, provided Grant with some insight into McCartee's

³⁸ 'General Grant at Tokio', *The Japan Mail*, Jul. 16, 1879; Clara A. Whitney, *Clara's Diary: An American Girl in Meiji Japan*, ed. Tamiko Ichimata and William M. Steele (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979), 251–52; McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 166.

³⁹ See *Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞 article for July 7, 1879, in: Shibusawa Seien kinen zaidan Ryūmonsha, *Denki shiryō*, 25:486. Also see: 'General Grant at Tokio'.

⁴⁰ Whitney, *Clara's Diary*, 251; J. F. Packard, *Grant's Tour around the World* (Philadelphia: William Flint, 1880), 775; Headley, *Grant*, 498.

⁴¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Japan, 1878, Mr. Bingham to Mr. Evarts (Dec. 17, 1877), No. 308. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1865, China, Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward (Mar. 7, 1865), No. 100.

⁴² See the list of members in: Asiatic Society of Japan, ed., *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, vol. 6 (1877-1878) (Yokohama: R. Meiklejohn & Co. Printers, 1878).

reputation, his singular career trajectory, and his knowledge of East Asia and its languages. His American roots no doubt also helped to establish a basic level of trust in Grant's mind.

After these first meetings, Grant confided in McCartee about the Ryukyu question and requested his assistance in devising a solution. Grant's identification of McCartee as a trustworthy confidant was, I argue, likely in no small part due to the factors highlighted above.

When meeting with the Japanese side, Grant made it clear that, as he 'knew nothing about [Ryukyu] except what had been published in the papers', he sought to listen to the cases presented by not only the parties involved, but by third parties as well.⁴³ He Ruzhang, at Li Hongzhang's request,⁴⁴ had McCartee prepare—in an official capacity—a translation which introduced the Qing perspective on the matter, which was sent to Grant on July 11.⁴⁵ The Japanese also had their chance to present a case to Grant in a meeting held in Nikkō on July 22.⁴⁶ However, he was also to hear the case McCartee would present as a private party.

Sometime during or after their first meeting, Grant confided in McCartee that he was not sufficiently acquainted with the history and geography of Ryukyu to act as a mediator or arbitrator.⁴⁷ Given McCartee's year-long study of the Ryukyu question, this admission gave McCartee his first chance to put his hard work to use. Indeed, Grant's admission led to a diplomatic backchannel opening up between Grant and McCartee as two private actors. Despite his 'public' affiliation as secretary to the Qing legation, McCartee kept the content of these interactions entirely private from He and Zhang. His interactions were thus, like his private study of the Ryukyu question, conducted in an entirely private and unofficial capacity.

⁴³ John Y. Simon, ed., *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant*, vol. 29 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 206–7.

⁴⁴ LHZQJ, 32:436, Li Hongzhang to He Ruzhang, GX5/4/25.

⁴⁵ LOC-G, Series 10, Addition III, 1819-1969; Personal and Professional Correspondence, 1840-1885; Ho Juchang to General Grant, July 11, 1879.

⁴⁶ These are laid out in: John R. Young, 'An Eastern War Cloud: The Loochoo Question Between China and Japan', *New York Herald*, Sept. 1, 1879, 4.

⁴⁷ McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 166.

For their next meeting, McCartee took with him a copy of Ijichi Sadaka's 伊地知貞馨 *A History of Okinawa* (*Okinawa shi* 沖縄志),⁴⁸ a gazetteer which had been newly published in 1877, and offered up his first idea for a settlement. McCartee recalls the meeting in his autobiography in the following way.

I took to him a Japanese book, the "Okinawa Shi," ... and told him that both sides seemed unwilling to give way; but that while I deprecated war I could see no way to compromise unless it were by drawing a line at the southern extremity of Okinawa and another at the most northerly of the [Miyako], or Yaeyama Islands, leaving a strait of some sixty miles of sea between them, and that although such a division was unfair, I could see no other way to compromise.⁴⁹

The compromise discussed here accords to what is known in the secondary literature as the 'two-way split'. It suggested that Japan ought to surrender the Miyako and Yaeyama islands to the Qing, while all islands lying to their north (namely the Okinawa and Amami islands) would remain in Japanese hands. The channel in-between the southern islands and Okinawa Island would meanwhile remain neutral territory.


Here was a member of the Qing legation, acting independently, with confidence in his mastery of the histories and geographies of China, Japan, and Ryukyu, to broach a solution which, from his perspective, was the only realistic way of compromising. The precise reasons underscoring his solution are undocumented. However, one possible explanation is that McCartee had learned from his private study of Ryukyu that unlike Okinawa Island, which continued to be treated as a foreign country after

⁴⁸ The function the gazetteer played in this meeting is not clear. McCartee's nephew states in a letter that McCartee had brought to Grant 'the Japanese histories quoted by the Japanese, and pointed out to him the real statements of those histories' (PHS-R, RG-176-1-22, Henry W. Rankin to Robert E. Speer, Sept. 13, 1902). Given McCartee's frequent invocation of the gazetteer in his *Japan Gazette* articles, this is a plausible interpretation. One other possibility is that the included map of the Ryukyu islands, marked up with lines of latitude, were used by McCartee to clarify his proposal.

⁴⁹ McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 166. PHS-M, RG-177-1-5, D.B. McCartee to Henry William Rankin, Sept. 20, 1880. McCartee's autobiography mistakenly renders Miyakojima as 'Mujishoshima'. I have fixed this in the quotation for sake of clarity.

the Satsuma conquest of 1609,⁵⁰ the northernmost Amami islands had, from 1611, come under the direct jurisdiction of the Satsuma domain. As such was the case, it is conceivable that McCartney felt that a solution which gave Japan nothing more than the Amamis would not be acceptable to the Japanese, as it would only assert the *status quo ante*, albeit in a new Western conceptual dress. Japan would thus not have felt like she had ‘gained’ anything from the compromise. However, while McCartney’s solution objectively gave Japan the better deal, with it getting to keep a significant portion of the erstwhile kingdom as constituent sovereign territory, its return of the Miyako and Yaeyama islands conceivably allowed for a restoration of the Ryukyu Kingdom. His solution was therefore not entirely at odds with the Qing position, in that it could allow for Ryukyu’s restoration as a tributary, albeit in a diminutive form.⁵¹

Figure 1: Map depicting McCartney’s two-way split solution



⁵⁰ Ronald P. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 46–47.

⁵¹ Presumably for reasons of realpolitik, it’s clear that throughout these initial deliberations a solution was only ever considered in bilateral terms in which any Ryukyuan position did not figure.

Grant nevertheless apparently responded positively to the idea, with McCartee recalling that it ‘seemed to him to be as reasonable an arrangement as could be devised’.⁵² McCartee’s informal interactions with Grant, at Shinbashi station on July 3, and at the Seiyōken restaurant on July 4, then, thus led to a potential solution to the Ryukyu crisis emerging in the private sphere.

However, McCartee would, before long, go on to offer Grant another proposal. This second idea was mooted in the light of new information McCartee had gleaned from the Qing.

Referring to my note to you of the 12th inst., upon conversing with those who have had better opportunities than I to ascertain the views, with reference to the [Ryukyu] question, held by the Viceroy Li [Hongzhang], and others of the high Chinese officials; I would like to modify what I said, although I took care to state that I had no (sufficient) authority for saying it, —about the willingness of the Chinese Government to give up [Ryukyu] proper to Japan; —and suggest that the islands and the strait lying south of the 26th parallel of North latitude, should be given to China; on account of their connection with or proximity to Formosa;—While the islands and seas to the north of the 29th parallel of north latitude should belong to Japan (and might be called Okinawa ken), as being in close proximity to or connection with Satsuma—and that the islands and seas between the 26th and 29th parallels of north latitude constitute a neutral ground, the (King of [Ryukyu] being reinstated in his sovereignty over so much of his former dominions) under the joint protection of China and Japa[n] (it would I suppose be impossible to add—and of the U.S.A.) each of the protecting powers to have a Resident or Consul or Commissioner, with a staff limited to __ persons to look after the interests of their respective countries.⁵³

Here, McCartee states that he would like to ‘modify’ the suggestions he had previously put forward in a memorandum dated July 12, which he had no authority to broach in the first place (another clear indication of the private nature of his

⁵² McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 166.

⁵³ LOC, John Russell Young Papers, circa 1840-1959, General Correspondence, 1854-1898, Box 12, 1879, July 8-1880, Jan. 1, D.B. McCartee to John Russell Young, July 16, 1879. I retain the underlining from the original text.

activities). This prior memorandum—unfortunately lost—was most likely a written reiteration of the two-way split that McCartee had put forward to Grant in private.⁵⁴ From this new letter, however, we see that McCartee, having now had the opportunity to hear the Qing position, suggests a new proposal that concurs with what the Qing (and as it would unsurprisingly transpire, Ryukyu)⁵⁵ would consider to be an acceptable outcome. Namely, that ‘Okinawa proper’—in other words, Okinawa Island—remained outside the ambit of direct Japanese control. This solution would come to more or less map on to what is known as the ‘three-way split’ in the secondary literature.⁵⁶ The solution enabled Okinawa Island to be looked upon as both a kingdom and a tributary by the Qing, and as a protectorate by the Japanese side.⁵⁷ In many ways, it constituted a ‘modern’ reconfiguration of the interpretive plurality that had hitherto characterised Ryukyu’s dually subordinate status. Indeed, the three-way split enabled Okinawa Island to become a condominium of sorts, in which each side could look upon the region as it deemed appropriate.⁵⁸ It thus held the latent potential for resolving the contradictions

⁵⁴ This interpretation is shared by: Huang Tian 黃天, *Liuqiu chongsheng jiaoti kao: Diaoyudao guishu xunyuan zhi yi* 琉球沖繩交替考——釣魚島歸屬尋源之一 [An Analysis of Ryukyu’s Conversion to Okinawa: One Attempt at Searching for the Origins of the Dispute over the Jurisdiction of the Diaoyu Islands] (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 2014), 268.

⁵⁵ The Ryukyuan aristocrats were vehemently against the idea of a two-way split: Nishizato, *Chū-Ryū-Nichi*, 383–92.


⁵⁶ A later iteration of the solution which was debated gave Japan all the area north of the 27th parallel: ZLYM, 01-34-009-01-004, Li Shuchang to Zongli Yamen, GX16/5/9. See copy of letter titled ‘A copy of a letter from ministers He and Zhang’ (*zhaochao He Zhang liang xingshi laihan* 照抄何張兩星使來函) and dated the sixteenth day of the seventh month (year unspecified) in this document. Nishizato Kikō has demonstrated that the document was originally sent on August 11, 1879. See: Nishizato, 332.

⁵⁷ An analogous situation arose in the Qing’s handling of the colonisation of its other tributaries. For instance, after accepting Vietnam’s colonisation by France, the Qing insisted upon its right to continue to view Vietnam as a tributary. Okamoto, *Chūgoku no tanjō*, 118–209; Thomas P. Barrett, ‘Un Pont Entre Les Mondes: Les Diplomaties de l’ombre de Halliday Macartney Au Temps de La Guerre Franco-Chinoise’, in *D’un Empire, l’autre: Premières Rencontres Entre La France et Le Japon Au XIXe Siècle*, ed. François Lachaud and Martin Nogueira Ramos (Paris: EFEO, 2021), 275–302.

⁵⁸ This joint split idea may well have derived from an idea previously suggested by Guo Songtao. I thank Hakoda Keiko for pointing out this possibility to me. See: Hakoda Keiko 箱田恵子, ‘Ryūkyū shobun wo meguru Ni-Sshin kōshō to chūsai saiban seido 球処分をめぐる日清交渉と仲裁裁判制度 [Arbitration and the Sino-Japanese Negotiations over the Annexation of Ryukyu]’, *Shisō* 77 (2020): 3–4.

engendered by the alternate conceptualisations of order held by the Qing and Japan, and the way they positioned Ryukyu within these alternate conceptualisations.

Figure 2: Map depicting McCartee's three-way split solution



Thus, McCartee presented Grant with two ideas for a potential solution. Firstly, the two-way split. This was a solution which McCartee saw fit, in his private opinion, to be the most apposite means for eliciting a peaceful outcome. And, secondly, the three-way split. This was a solution developed by McCartee that took the Qing's wishes into more significant consideration.

McCartee understood it to be the case that Grant had proposed his two-way split to the Japanese side.⁵⁹ While Grant *did* mention to the Meiji emperor on August 10 that he had heard it suggested that 'a boundary line running between the islands so as to give China a wide channel to the Pacific would be accepted' by the Qing,⁶⁰

⁵⁹ PHS-M, RG-177-1-5, D.B. McCartee to Henry William Rankin, Sept. 20, 1880. McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 166.

⁶⁰ During the meeting, Grant stated that: 'I have heard it suggested, but I have no authority to speak on the subject, that a boundary line running between the islands so as to give China a wide channel

whether or not Grant broached one of McCartee's proposals *directly* to the Japanese side is difficult to ascertain. Suffice to say, the Japanese side did encounter the two-way split *somehow*, and believed that it was this solution that Grant favoured.⁶¹ Grant arguably gave the Japanese side all they needed to reach this conclusion as well. In a letter to Yoshida Kiyonari 吉田清成, Japanese minister to the United States, he stated that 'when the Japanese government approve the Qing's occupation and its absolute right to exercise jurisdiction over the island of Taiwan and the islands that lie due south of Ryukyu, that is to say, the Miyako and Yaeyama islands ... that ought to be more than enough to wholly dispel the Qing's deep-seated grievances'.⁶² This statement formed part of a response to a letter from Yoshida which sought to ascertain whether Grant had expressed his support for the two-way split or three-way split during his time in Japan.⁶³ In preliminary negotiations held between Li Hongzhang and Takezoe Shinichirō in March 1880, Takezoe had broached the idea of compromising by way of a two-way split (and, in return, the Qing affording Japan with the same trading privileges that Western powers enjoyed in China). At the insistence of the Zongli Yamen, Li responded to the Japanese side by stating that it was the Qing's understanding that Grant had supported the three-way split whilst in Japan.⁶⁴

A letter sent by the ministers in Tokyo to the Zongli Yamen and Li Hongzhang on August 11, 1879, lay at the heart of this interpretation, in which they stated that Bingham had informed them that he had discussed the three-way split solution 'in

to the Pacific would be accepted. I have no idea how true it is. I mention it to show that while in the minds of Chinese statesmen there is a feeling of anger, they are open to accommodation.' (Simon, *Grant Papers*, 29:203.)

⁶¹ For a full assessment of the evidence, see: Barrett, 'Makkāti', 12–15.

⁶² RSM, 8:641.

⁶³ Inoue Kaoru had hoped Yoshida could gather enough hard evidence from Grant to undermine the Qing claims of his support for the three-way split. RSM, 8:615.

⁶⁴ Nishizato, *Chū-Ryū-Nichi*, 343–48. This interpretation was quite likely further bolstered by two other sources. The first was information gleaned by Xiang Dehong 向德宏, a Ryukyuan aristocrat then in exile in China, which suggested that Grant had proposed a three-way split to the Meiji emperor. The second was a report published in the *Wanguo Gongbao* 萬國公報 newspaper on October 11, 1879, which indicated that Grant had suggested compromising by way of a three-way split. See: Nishizato, 335; 687–88.

depth' with Grant. What's more, the ministers explained that they had 'previously heard about [the three-way split] from McCartee', which therefore corroborated that the three-way split did indeed constitute 'the will of Grant'.⁶⁵

Ultimately, it proved impossible for the Qing to corroborate that Grant supported the three-way split. Whilst admitting he had his own thoughts about how a solution ought to be reached, Grant himself stated to the Japanese side that he had purposely avoided giving explicit articulation to his own views in letters he had sent to the Qing.⁶⁶ What's more, American minister Bingham, whilst denying making any such overture to He, cryptically stated in a letter to Japanese Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru 井上馨 that while he did not recollect any conversation with He Ruzhang about such a proposition, he may well have mentioned such a solution in passing.⁶⁷

What these various events indicate, however, is that McCartee's solutions were discussed, and most probably debated, in both official and private contexts, although perhaps not mooted by Grant as a solution he endorsed *officially*. Young's report for the *New York Herald* on Grant's meeting with Meiji government representatives at Nikkō tells us that at one point, the conversation took a range that Young did 'not feel at liberty to embrace', as 'propositions and suggestions were made which it would be premature to disclose, and ... would have no value until they were considered and adopted by the Cabinets of Japan and China'.⁶⁸

That the 'propositions and suggestions' discussed here and deemed by Young to be too 'premature to disclose' may well have been one, if not both of, McCartee's solutions, seems highly plausible. Even after the Nikkō meeting, Grant continued to meet privately with such Japanese officials as Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具視, Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重, Itō Hirobumi and Yoshida Kiyonari to discuss Ryukyu.⁶⁹ What's

⁶⁵ ZLYM, 01-34-009-01-004, Li Shuchang to Zongli Yamen, GX16/5/9. See document titled 'A copy of a letter from ministers He and Zhang. For further explanation on this source, see footnote 56.

⁶⁶ RSM, 8:640-641.

⁶⁷ RSM, 8:590-592.

⁶⁸ Young, 'An Eastern War Cloud: The Loochoo Question Between China and Japan', 4.

⁶⁹ Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensankai 井上馨侯伝記編纂会, ed., *Seigai Inoue kōden* 世外井上公傳 [A Biography of Marquis Inoue], vol. 3 (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1968), 408–9.

more, Sheppard, in a letter to McCartee's nephew, explained that, of the Americans in Japan at the time, it was only himself, Grant, and Bingham who were familiar with McCartee's private doings.⁷⁰ In other words, McCartee's solutions came to be known beyond the McCartee-Grant-Young triad. It thus seems highly probable that McCartee's proposals became important talking points across multiple private meetings, and that their provenance had been well and truly obfuscated by the time they reached Japanese ears. Whether or not the Japanese interpretation that the two-way split constituted Grant's *official* opinion was correct, however, is impossible to determine.⁷¹

Significantly, the Japanese would broach the two-way split—an idea they believed, if not to be Grant's own suggestion, at least to receive his support—as a compromise to the Qing in negotiations held in 1880.⁷² Thus, an idea conceived in a private backchannel by a private actor trying to bring a final close to the Ryukyu dispute eventually came to be broached as an *official* proposal by the Japanese side. The private interventions of seemingly peripheral actors such as McCartee more than held the potential to affect diplomacy occurring at the higher rungs of bilateral interaction.

5. McCartee and the Mobilisation of History in the Ryukyu Debate

The third and final phase of McCartee's private intervention in the Ryukyu crisis came with a series of anonymous articles he published in the *Japan Gazette* in late 1879 and early 1880 that sought to undermine Japanese propaganda efforts on Ryukyu. These were drawn up in response to an article published in the *Tokio Times* newspaper that had been drafted by Inoue Kowashi 井上毅, one of the Meiji

⁷⁰ PTSL-R, Series II: Correspondence; Box 24, File 24:11, Letters concerning Juana M. McCartee. 1889-1927, E.T. Sheppard to William H. Rankin, Jan. 6, 1903.

⁷¹ For a full breakdown of the historical evidence, see: Barrett, 'Makkāti'.

⁷² Iwakura Tomomi had also sent a letter to Grant on June 27, 1882, which would further suggest that this was the case. There, Iwakura laments that despite Grant's good offices and 'despite our proposed concessions which were based upon your wise suggestions', China had taken 'backward steps rendering further progress towards ... settlement [of the Ryukyu problem] almost impossible.' Simon, *Grant Papers*, 29:225.

government's key diplomatic rhetoricians and policy advisers on Ryukyu, at the behest of Home Minister Itō Hirobumi. The intention of the article was to influence foreign opinion on the Ryukyu crisis.

As introduced above, one of the key projects that the Meiji government staunchly dedicated itself to in its performance of the sovereign state was the elimination of interpretive plurality in its foreign relations in favour of clear-cut articulations of sovereign territory. The government's determination to present itself in these terms was undoubtedly tied to the experiences of Japan with Western gunboat diplomacy, and the signing of a litany of unequal treaties in the late Tokugawa. However, its staunch fidelity to this new paradigm would cause a panoply of problems, including war, with the polities that still adhered to the long-standing tradition of interpretive plurality in the region, most notably Qing China and Chosŏn Korea.⁷³ The Ryukyu annexation, which sought to extricate Ryukyu from its dual allegiance to Qing China and Japan and embrace the region as a key constituent of Japanese sovereign territory, was another pertinent example of this.

The Meiji government was acutely aware that any actions taken in its foreign policy nevertheless required a solid justification, lest they be called out by the international community that they were now trying to court as sovereign equals. The first clear sign of this came with Japan's attempt to colonise the eastern portion of Taiwan in 1874. The Meiji government hired Gustave Émile Boissonade, a French lawyer, and Charles LeGendre, a former American consul, for the purposes of justifying the colonisation attempt and to ensure that the language and logic Japan employed vis-à-vis the Qing tallied with the normative expectations of international law.⁷⁴

⁷³ This confusion was typified in differing understandings of the content of the Kanhwa Treaty by Japan and Chosŏn. See: Okamoto, *Contested Perceptions*, 76–79.

⁷⁴ Ōkubo Yasuo 大久保泰甫, *Bowasonādo to kokusaihō: Taiwan shuppei jiken no tōshizu* ボワソナードと国際法——台湾出兵事件の透視図 [Gustave Émile Boissonade and International Law: A Perspective View of the Taiwan Expedition] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2016); Robert Eskildsen, *Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia: The Taiwan Expedition and the Birth of Japanese Imperialism* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

In enacting its annexation of Ryukyu, the Meiji government also knew that its actions would require a basis in legitimacy if it were to achieve international support. However, Japan faced one major problem in this regard: in the 1850s, Ryukyu had signed a series of treaties of amity with the United States (1854), France (1855) and the Netherlands (1859). While these were unequal treaties imposed by the threat of force, they nevertheless demonstrated that, from a Western perspective, Ryukyu was a *sovereign* state that was master of its own diplomacy.⁷⁵ That was not all. What further complicated matters for a Japanese justification for annexing Ryukyu to be convincing was that each of the treaties had been penned in Chinese and used the Qing calendar. These facts alone were sufficient ammunition for the refutation of any claim to the intimacy of the Ryukyu-Japan relationship.

Evidence of Japanese concern over international perceptions of its conduct was clearly evinced in Inoue Kowashi's 1879 report, titled 'An Opinion on Ryukyu' (*Ryūkyū iken* 琉球意見).⁷⁶ As noted above, Inoue was one of the Meiji government's key diplomatic rhetoricians and served as the brains behind many of Itō Hirobumi's plans. His opinions and proposals thus held great sway in bureaucratic circles. In his report, Inoue expatiated the weaknesses in the Japanese position, pointing out that if the Ryukyu problem were to be discussed in an international setting, the fact that Ryukyu had, independently of Japan, previously signed treaties of amity with Western powers in the 1850s, could prove to be highly problematic. His report also flagged up the significance of the fact that the treaties were written in Chinese and were dated according to the Qing calendar.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ To reiterate, from the Qing perspective, this was not considered to be contradictory. Tributaries were free to engage in interactions with others so long as they subscribed to the primacy of the Chinese emperor and engaged in tribute practice.

⁷⁶ Inoue Kowashi Denki Hensan Inkaikai 井上毅傳記編纂委員會, ed., *Inoue Kowashi den shiryō hen* 井上毅傳・史料編 [Biography of Inoue Kowashi: Documents], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kokugakuin daigaku toshokan, 1966), 173–80.

⁷⁷ Marco Tinello, *Sekaishi kara mita 'Ryūkyū shobun'* 世界史からみた「琉球処分」 [The Ryukyu Annexation as seen from a Global Historical Perspective] (Ginowan: Gajumaru Shorin, 2017), 283–87.

The Meiji government thus required a means which could allow it to render its actions legitimate in the eyes of international society, particularly its Western counterparts. Eventually, it struck upon the idea of mobilising history to this end.

As I demonstrate below, this strategy was deployed across various contexts: in diplomatic notes sent to the Qing, in memoranda shared with Western third parties, and in English- and Japanese-language newspaper articles. It was in this context that McCartee's private actions would again take on key significance. Indeed, as I argue below, McCartee would come to use his study of the Ryukyu question to push against the Meiji government's historical propaganda campaign in an attempt to engender a resuscitation of Qing-Ryukyu tributary relations.

The Meiji Government's Appeals to History

One of the first indications of the Meiji government's decision to mobilise history to justify the annexation came in the year before Ryukyu's full-blown incorporation into Japan. A letter, sent by Inoue Kowashi to Itō Hirobumi on July 30, 1878, reveals that Itō had instructed Inoue to obtain copies of documents relating to Ryukyu that were in the possession of the former Satsuma domain.⁷⁸ Although the Satsuma conquest of Ryukyu in 1609 could not, at the time, be conceptualised in terms of the incorporation of sovereign territory into the Tokugawa state, these documents could be used by Japan, in its new adherence to the Western conceptualisation of international order, to make this claim retroactively. They thus held crucial value for the Japanese legitimisation effort.⁷⁹ Indeed, as we shall see, these documents would be utilised as justification by the Japanese across various channels.⁸⁰

Preparations for a historical justification were underway from at least summer 1878, and Japan's first active mobilisation of history in a diplomatic context was

⁷⁸ Inoue Kowashi Denki Hensan Inkaikai 井上毅傳記編纂委員會, ed., *Inoue Kowashi den shiryō hen* 井上毅傳・史料編 [Biography of Inoue Kowashi], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kokugakuin daigaku toshokan, 1971), 25.

⁷⁹ Modern researchers have demonstrated how the documents were in fact written long *after* the Satsuma conquest. Yamashita, 'Gazetto', 247–48.

⁸⁰ Also see: Yamashita, 'Kaiyaku buntō', 190.

deployed in July 1879. This came in response to a communication regarding Ryukyu dated May 10, 1879, which Shishido Tamaki received from the Zongli Yamen.⁸¹ On July 16, 1879, Japanese Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori sent a letter to Shishido containing a response and a pamphlet for submission to the Qing side. The pamphlet outlined the Japanese position apropos Ryukyu, and justified the legitimacy of the annexation from the perspectives of geography, linguistics, race, and history.⁸² Three documents relating to the Satsuma conquest of 1609, and Ryukyu's subsequent subjugation, were quoted in full within the pamphlet: the ordinance of Shimazu Iehisa (*hōshō jūgo jō* 法章一五条), the three oaths of King Shō Nei (*Shō Nei seimon* 尚寧誓文) and the three oaths of the Ryukyuan commissioners (*Sanshikan seimon* 三司官誓文). These three documents had likely been collected by Inoue Kowashi in response to Itō Hirobumi's prior request of 1878.

However, that was not the sum of Inoue's involvement. He was the lead strategist on Ryukyu for Japan in this period, drawing up and devising a wide range of policy advice and penning many memoranda and diplomatic communications.⁸³ The pamphlet submitted to the Qing had also been prepared by Inoue, at Itō's request. This fact can be observed from a letter sent by Itō to Inoue on June 11, 1879.⁸⁴ There, Itō requests that Inoue put his all into finishing the pamphlet, and makes vividly clear its significance in the attempt to justify Japanese actions to audiences other than the Qing. According to the letter, Itō had dined with John Pope-Hennessy, Governor of Hong Kong, the night before. Over dinner, the two discussed the Ryukyu question, and Itō had informed Pope-Hennessy that 'whether one looks at the issue from the perspective of topography or the perspective of language and customs, it was plain to see that Ryukyu is a dependency (*zokuchi* 属地) of Japan'.⁸⁵

⁸¹ RSM, 8:270-73.

⁸² RSM, 8:353-63.

⁸³ Yamashita, 'Kaiyaku buntō'; Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensankai, *Seigai Inoue kōden*, 3:415.

⁸⁴ Yamashita, 'Kaiyaku buntō', 196.

⁸⁵ Inoue Kowashi Denki Hensan Iinkai 井上毅傳記編纂委員會, ed., *Inoue Kowashi den shiryō hen* 井上毅傳・史料編 [Biography of Inoue Kowashi: Documents], vol. 5 (Tokyo: Kokugakuin daigaku toshokan, 1975), 13.

Furthermore, Itō boldly declared to Pope-Hennessy that ‘conclusive evidence exists which proves all of these points’. Owing to Pope-Hennessy’s willingness to accept Itō’s claims, Itō concluded that he could use Pope-Hennessy as a conduit through which to promote the Japanese stance on Ryukyu to Thomas Wade, the British Minister to China.⁸⁶ Itō thus asked Inoue to complete the project as soon as possible so he could send copies to Pope-Hennessy and Wade.

However, the British were not the only ones with whom the contents of Inoue’s pamphlet were shared. It was also used to argue the Japanese case to Grant during the Nikkō meeting of July 22, 1879.⁸⁷ Furthermore, a copy was also shared with American minister to Japan, John Bingham, who took a decidedly critical view of the claims.⁸⁸ Inoue’s pamphlet and its accompanying documents relating to the Satsuma conquest had therefore not been put together purely to argue the Japanese case to the Qing. The pamphlet had been carefully designed to help Japan win the support of the wider international community as well.

McCartee’s Private Campaign against Japanese Propaganda Efforts

Inoue Kowashi’s pamphlet, sent to the Qing side on July 16, thus sought to gainsay the legitimacy of the Qing position on Ryukyu through recourse to history. While the pamphlet quoted documents relating to the Satsuma conquest as evidence of Ryukyu’s long-enduring status vis-à-vis Japan, very few of the claims made within the pamphlet cited or were substantiated by hard historical evidence. Itō Hirobumi was acutely aware of this shortcoming, stating in a letter to Inoue dated July 28, that, as he anticipated that a time in which a debate over hard evidence was

⁸⁶ Inoue Kowashi *Denki Hensan Iinkai*, 5:13.

⁸⁷ This is clear when we read Young’s record of the Nikkō talks prepared for the *New York Herald*, in which we find much overlap with that of Inoue’s pamphlet (see: Young, ‘An Eastern War Cloud: The Loochoo Question Between China and Japan’, 3-4). It is also worth noting that a French version of the pamphlet can also be found amongst Inoue’s papers, indicating that a French version may well have also been in circulation. See: Yamashita, ‘Gazetto’, 222.

⁸⁸ NARA, M133, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan, 1855-1906, Roll 40, No 945, Aug. 29, 1879, John A. Bingham to William M. Evarts.

‘inevitable’, he wanted Inoue to compile a ‘more detailed pamphlet’ using the documents Inoue had obtained from Satsuma as a basis.⁸⁹

This letter evidently became the impetus for Inoue’s penning of a new document, entitled ‘A memorandum on why Japan possesses the sovereign right to occupy the Ryukyu islands drafted in response to the Chinese government’s protest’ (*Shina seifu no kōron ni taishite waga Nippon ni Ryukyu tō wo senryō subeki shuken aru no oboegaki* 支那政府ノ抗論に対シテ我日本ニ琉球島ヲ專領スヘキ主權アルノ覚書), which brought additional historical evidence to the table.⁹⁰ The claims made in this new document appear to be an elaboration of Inoue’s previous work, albeit this time furnished with new evidence and divided into eight parts.

On October 11, 1879, an English-language version of this memorandum, reorganised into the five parts of ‘the history of the remotest times’, ‘geographical connection’, ‘language, religion, race, customs, etc.’, ‘modern history’ and historical documents, was published in the *Tokio Times* under the title of ‘Japan and Riu Kiu’.⁹¹ At the time, a debate over the legitimacy of the Ryukyu annexation was being played out transnationally in the newspapers of Japan and China,⁹² and this was not the first instance of the Japanese government’s use of the English-language press to further its political agenda within this debate. The Japanese legation in Beijing had, for instance, hired Briton Frederic Balfour to pen pieces that sought to

⁸⁹ Inoue Kowashi *Denki Hensan Iinkai*, 5:14.

⁹⁰ Yamashita, ‘Kaiyaku buntō’, 196–97. RSM, 8:329–52.

⁹¹ Its publication in the *Tokio Times* was unsurprising, for the newspaper had been established as an English-language propagandist organ of the Meiji government under the auspices of Charles LeGendre who, as noted earlier, was greatly involved in the Japanese attempt to colonise Taiwan in 1874, and Edward House, a Japan-based journalist. Kasahara Hidehiko 笠原英彦, ‘Rujandoru to seifu-kei eiji shinbun ルジャンドルと政府系英字新聞 [LeGendre and Government-Affiliated English-Language Newspapers]’, *Shinbun-gaku Hyōron* 33 (1984): 208–12.

⁹² Shiode Hiroyuki 塩出浩之, ‘1880 nen zengo no Ni-Cchū jānarizumu ronsō: Ryūkyū heigō, Ajia, sōgo imēji 1880 年前後の日中ジャーナリズム論争——琉球併合・アジア・相互イメージ [Debates across Sino-Japanese Journalism around 1880: The Ryukyu Annexation, Asia and Mutual Perceptions]’, in *Tairitsu to kyōzon no rekishi ninshiki: Ni-Cchū kankei 150 nen 対立と共存の歴史認識——日中関係 150 年* [Conflict and Co-Existence in Historical Understanding: 150 Years of Sino-Japanese Relations], ed. Kawashima Shin 川島真 and Liu Jie 劉傑 (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2013).

legitimise Japan's claims to Ryukyu in China's English-language newspapers.⁹³ This *Tokio Times* piece constituted the Meiji government's latest attempt to influence international opinion.⁹⁴ Unfortunately for them, McCartee was one of its readers.

McCartee took a very critical view of the article, perceiving its claims to be 'so garbled' that he felt that his 'relations to the Chinese Government' made it his 'duty to correct them'.⁹⁵ Furthermore, as the statements made by the article had not been transmitted to the Qing 'in the usual diplomatic way', but instead 'published by authority in the *English* language ... in a *foreign* newspaper', and 'urged upon General Grant as true and incontrovertible history', it was quite proper, in the interests of truth, justice, and science, for him to expose the article and its falsehoods.⁹⁶ McCartee was fully aware of what the Meiji government was setting out to achieve by publishing the article in English.

Making full use of his previous private study of the Ryukyu question, McCartee set about penning a series of articles that sought to debunk the historical misinformation promulgated by the Meiji government. Significantly, this endeavour was entirely McCartee's own *private* initiative, and the ministers did not come to learn of the project until after its publication.⁹⁷

⁹³ Yonaha Jun 與那覇潤, *Hon'yaku no seijigaku: kindai Higashi Ajia sekai no keisei to Nichi-Ryū kankei no henyō* 翻訳の政治学——近代東アジア世界の形成と日琉関係の変容 [The Politics of 'Translation': The Transformation of Japan-Ryukyu Relations and the Formation of the Modern East Asian World] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2009), 40–68.

⁹⁴ The use of English-language newspapers would remain a key Japanese propaganda strategy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See: Chin-Sok Chong, *The Korean Problem in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1904-1910: Ernest Thomas Bethell and His Newspapers, the Daehan Maeil Sinbo and the Korea Daily News* (Seoul: Nanam Publications, Co., 1987), 164–65; Peter O'Connor, *The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-1945* (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2010), 30–50.

⁹⁵ McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 166–67. In his autobiography, McCartee makes this statement in reference to how the article misquotes Ijichi Sadaka's *History of Okinawa*. While claims advanced by the article evidently used Ijichi's work as a basis, the article itself did not directly reference the book. On areas in the article which evidently drew upon Ijichi's text, see, for example, the modern history section in McCartee's articles. See: Anonymous, 'Audi Alteram Partem', in *Ryūkyū Studies since 1854: Western Encounter, Part 2*, ed. Patrick Beillevaire (Richmond: Curzon, 2002), 8.

⁹⁶ Anonymous, 'Audi Alteram Partem', 12.

⁹⁷ The reason why McCartee chose to keep his project secret is undocumented, but two interpretations are possible. The first (perhaps obvious) point is that the admission of his status as Qing legation member may well have compromised the force of his arguments. The second is that He Ruzhang himself had evinced a decided lack of interest in McCartee's private study of the question. McCartee thus may well have felt that He would be unenthusiastic about such an initiative.

McCartee's articles appeared anonymously across four issues of the Yokohama-based *Japan Gazette* from November 1879 to January 1880.⁹⁸ While the direct target of the articles was the evidence presented in the *Tokio Times* article, McCartee also took fire at the views of the Japanese side presented in Young's previous article for the *New York Herald*.⁹⁹ McCartee's articles were published under the title of 'Audi Alteram Partem', a Latin phrase meaning 'to hear the other side' but used in legal contexts to mean 'that a decision cannot stand unless the person directly affected by it was given a fair opportunity both to state his case and to know and answer the other side's case'.¹⁰⁰ The sentiment was obvious; this article was to give a voice to the Qing perspective.

McCartee structured his articles in accordance with the *Tokio Times* piece, splitting his counterarguments into five sections. McCartee's key refutations can be summarised in seven points.¹⁰¹ Firstly, the name 'Liuqiu'—the Chinese name for Ryukyu—was older than that of 'Okinawa', the Japanese name for the islands. Secondly, the term 'southern islands' (*nantō* 南島) had never been used by the Japanese to refer to *just* the Ryukyu islands alone. Rather, it had been used as a catchall for all islands that lie south of Kyushu, including Macao and the Philippine island of Luzon. Any reference to the 'southern islands' found in historical texts could therefore not be understood as being coterminous with 'Ryukyu'. Third, as a corollary of the above point, the 'southern islands' spoken of in ancient Japanese texts as having paid tribute to the Japanese emperor were not those of Ryukyu. Fourth, the assertion that the chieftains of Ryukyu were descendants of Minamoto

⁹⁸ The four articles were published on November 26, 1879; December 6; December 20; and January 10, 1880.

⁹⁹ As noted above, this had been a report of Grant's meeting in Nikkō, in which the same evidence used in the *Tokio Times* article had been presented to him as justification for Japanese actions.

¹⁰⁰ Elizabeth A. Martin, ed., *Oxford Dictionary of Law*, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 325–26.

¹⁰¹ For an in-depth analysis of the arguments made in the *Tokio Times* article, McCartee's counterarguments, and Inoue's later counterresponses, see: Yamashita, 'Gazetto'. Yamashita's research, however, does not identify: (a) McCartee as the author of the *Japan Gazette* articles, and (b) that a slightly modified version of Inoue's counterresponses were later published in the *Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shinbun*.

no Tametomo 源為朝, and therefore of Japanese imperial lineage, was nothing more than legend, and the Japanese texts made this proviso perfectly explicit. Fifth, the wide divergences between the languages, religions, cosmogonies, physical characteristics, and customs of the Japanese and Ryukyuan peoples indicate that their ethnographical and ethnological affinities are not as strong as the *Tokio Times* article would suggest. Sixth, the claim that Ryukyu was first made a vassal of Satsuma in 1441 when Ashikaga Yoshinori 足利義教, the then shogun, supposedly conferred the islands upon Shimazu Tadakuni 島津忠国 as a reward for eminent services, was utter hokum. Finally, contrary to what the *Tokio Times* piece suggested, the Japanese had long understood that Ryukyu paid tribute to China. Japan's own books spoke of the kingdom's dual subordination, and the country had even gone to the extent of hiding its influence in Ryukyu. Yet, it was not until 1872 that Japan took umbrage with Ryukyu's dually subordinate status.

While McCartee's articles were by no means flawless,¹⁰² they nevertheless made a highly competent case that fundamentally undermined Japanese claims. As a response, it was particularly notable for its citing of a broad variety of sources that spanned multiple languages and academic traditions. Indeed, his counterarguments drew upon a panoply of Chinese-, Japanese- and European-language books, articles, maps, and dictionaries, exactly referenced across copious footnotes.¹⁰³ Of note was

¹⁰² Yamashita Shigekazu notes that the article's author was naïve in suggesting that the person that the Japanese understood to be Minamoto no Tametomo was perhaps in fact the second son of the last emperor of the Yuan dynasty. Having been expelled from China by the Ming, he had purportedly gone to Ryukyu (Yamashita, 236).

¹⁰³ In July 1879, exiled Ryukyuan aristocrat Xiang Dehong submitted a document to Li Hongzhang which critiqued the validity of claims made in the July 16 memorandum sent by the Japanese to the Qing (See: LHZQJ, 32:459–64, Xiang Dehong to Li Hongzhang, GX5/6/24 (DOR)). In addition, during the tenure of Li Shuchang 黎庶昌, the second Qing minister to Tokyo, Yao Wendong 姚文棟, a renowned geographer in his staff, translated extracts from multiple Japanese texts that put forward questionable claims on Ryukyu and its historical links with Japan. In the margins and afterword, Yao inserted scathing critiques of the translated materials. This was later published in 1883 as *A Small Gazetteer of Ryukyu with a Supplementary Summary* (*Liuqiu xiaozhi bing buyi fu shuolue* 琉球小志並補遺附說略). One finds areas of overlap in these texts with the counterarguments made by McCartee. Given that all three projects were refuting similar arguments and evidence used by the Japanese side, arguably, such an outcome was to be expected. In the case of Yao's text however, given the positive reception to McCartee's articles within and without the Tokyo legation, and the existence of a

his use of Japanese sources to counter claims made by the Japanese side, many of these being sources the Japanese had used themselves. His point about how the ancient Japanese texts themselves explicitly asserted that the theory that the Ryukyuans were descendants of Minamoto no Tametomo was nothing more than legend serves as a good case in point. McCartee also critiqued several cases of garbled translations of the Ordinance of Shimazu Iehisa as given in the article, in one case even offering up a parallel translation to demonstrate just how manipulative Japanese interpretations had been.¹⁰⁴ His caustic noting of the fact that the article had incorrectly rendered ‘Nantō’ as ‘Minamishima’, too,¹⁰⁵ was a small but nevertheless damning indication of ineptitude on the Japanese part.

McCartee’s articles were also remarkable for the fact that they were evidently designed with two audiences in mind. The first was the Qing. The articles gave the Qing perspective—that Ryukyu had long been a dually subordinate polity—an articulate voice, defending it (a) through sources which were linguistically inaccessible to the Qing side, and (b) in accordance with the positivistic standards and expectations of a Western academic audience. This latter point was also highly significant for winning over his second audience: Westerners. The highly empirical presentation, carefully footnoted and corroborated, lent immense credence to the force of his arguments. The footnotes themselves were of highly symbolic value, emphasising that the articles were the voice of reason and truth, and that the author was a credible authority on the topic. They also exuded cool confidence in the strength of the positions put forward: any expert who wished to pore over the sources and verify them for themselves was welcome to (see Figure 3).

McCartee’s articles were also couched in a language that made sense to this Western audience. The Japanese side had, in the first place, couched the debate in terms of who had the stronger sovereign claim to exercising jurisdiction over the

Chinese translation, one cannot rule out the possibility that Yao’s work used McCartee’s articles as a reference.

¹⁰⁴ Anonymous, ‘Audi Alteram Partem’, 11.

¹⁰⁵ Both *nantō* and *minamishima* are plausible readings in Japanese of the characters 南島.

Figure 3: Extract from McCartee's *Japan Gazette* articles (Jan. 10, 1880)

<p>The Japan Gazette.</p> <hr/> <p>YOKOHAMA, JANUARY 10TH, 1880.</p> <hr/> <p>"AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM."</p> <hr/> <p>(Continued from Dec. 20th, 1879.)</p> <p>IV. MODERN HISTORY.</p> <p>"IN the first year of Ka-kitsu (A.D. 1441) these islands were conferred upon Shimadzu Tada Kuni, prince of Satsuma, by Ashikaga Yoshinori, at that time Shō-gun, as a reward for eminent services rendered to the country."</p> <p>This is evidently given upon the authority of the <i>Okinawa-shi</i>, (vol. III fol. 40 <i>et seq.</i>) the author of which persistently, if not always consistently, takes it for granted that all or any of the <i>Minamishima</i>, (<i>Nan-to</i> or <i>Southern Islands</i>) must be identical with Riu Kiu, and who would fain persuade his readers that Riu Kiu had been in ancient times an appanage of Satsuma, and had been left in a state of independency during the period of the civil wars in Japan and the division of the Empire between the Northern and Southern dynasties, A.D. 1335-1385, (and for sixty years thereafter), and that the Shō-gun, Ashikaga Yoshinori, simply resumed his "immemorial rights" over Riu Kiu, and gave it to Satsuma. He quotes the <i>National History</i>,⁷⁴ and the ancient <i>Record of the dependencies of Satsuma</i>.⁷⁵ We have not this last work to refer to; and the <i>Dai Nihon Shi</i> only comes down to A.D. 1412, and we have searched both the <i>Nihon Sei-kiki</i>⁷⁶ and the <i>Koku Shi Riyaku</i>⁷⁷ in vain for any reference to anything of the kind. Moreover, we shall shortly bring Satsuma himself into court, to prove that the theory of the <i>Okinawa-shi</i> is directly opposed to the</p>	<p>In 1604, Ukita Yoshiie who, after the battle at Sekigahara, had fled to Satsuma, requested Yoshii (Shimadzu) Tadatsune to bestow upon him the country of Riu Kiu, stating that he had heard that Riu Kiu had not paid tribute for many years; and promising to subdue it and make it a perpetual appanage. Tadatsune smiled, but made no reply. Yoshiie and his followers then got up a secret expedition against Riu Kiu; but his vessels having been disabled in a gale of wind, he gave up the project, saying with a sigh, than his "destiny was too thin" (i. e. his luck was too poor), for him to succeed.</p> <p>In the same year Shōnei sent an envoy to Satsuma to make complimentary inquiries. The following year Shōnei received investiture from China; that ceremony having been delayed several years on account of the troubled state of things in Japan, and the consequent perilous state of navigation in the seas between China and Japan.</p> <p>In the year 1606 Shimadzu Tadatsune made a request to the Shō-gun that he might be allowed to send an expedition against Riu Kiu, because, although it used to pay tribute to his ancestors, it had not, for a long time, sent envoys or presents, notwithstanding he had repeatedly sent orders to it to do so. It is impossible to reconcile this complaint with what is recorded by the same author but a few pages before, or with Shimadzu's own statement in his subsequent letter to the King of Riu Kiu. It seems simply the story of the wolf and the lamb over again. Having obtained the Shō-gun's permission to conquer Riu Kiu, Shimadzu thereupon sent a letter to the King of Riu Kiu, which we now proceed to give at length.</p>
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<p>74 大日本史. 75 薩藩古記録. 76 日本政記 Enlarged Edition, Pub. A.D. 1876. 77 國史畧 Published A.D. 1876.</p>	<p>78 This has apparently the same title as a work we have previously quoted 琉球事畧 which forms an article, or a part of a thesaurus in 40 volumes entitled 甘爾亭叢書五集. 79 中山國使畧. 80 See <i>Perry's Expedition &c.</i> Vol. II. pp. 222, and 495. 81 See <i>Okinawa Shi</i> Vol. IV. fol. II. verso. Compare also the <i>Annals &c.</i> Vol. VII. fol. 42 verso. and seq.</p>
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islands. The Qing would inevitably be left at a disadvantage if engaging in a debate framed in such a way, because the Qing never viewed its tributaries as regions over which their ‘sovereignty’ was exercised, nor in terms of a form of ‘territory’ which belonged to them. Inoue’s framing was thus anachronistic given the historical reality within which Ryukyu had subsisted until 1875, the year in which Japan had compelled Ryukyu to cease tribute missions to China. McCartee evidently understood, however, that given his audience, and the framing Inoue had applied to the debate, it was important for him to offer counterattacks on a similar plane of logic. For instance, McCartee made references to the fact that if such a thing as the ‘right of discovery’ or ‘right of conquest’ was applicable in the Ryukyu dispute, that right very much fell in China’s favour.¹⁰⁶ He also caustically noted that if the letter purporting to be sent from Tokugawa Ieyasu to the Ryukyuan King as quoted by the *Tokio Times* article was, in fact, genuine, it was a decidedly ‘remarkable letter to be addressed by a suzerain to his vassal’, for the author of the letter ‘addresses the King of [Ryukyu] as his equal and speaks of the “neighbourly” relations existing between himself and the King of [Ryukyu]’.¹⁰⁷ In other words, McCartee was insinuating that such evidence only worked to strengthen the case *against* Japan, as it implied that Ryukyu was a ‘sovereign state’, operating on an equal footing with Japan. He also made China out to be a *suzerain* power, thereby making its position apropos Ryukyu more intelligible to a Western audience unfamiliar with the nuances that distinguished a suzerain-vassal relationship from that of a tributary relationship.¹⁰⁸

McCartee’s articles thus were not merely a *refutation* of Japanese claims; they constituted an academic *tour de force* that sought to convince and persuade the international community of the illegitimacy of the Japanese position. Indeed,

¹⁰⁶ Anonymous, ‘Audi Alteram Partem’, 11.

¹⁰⁷ Anonymous, 9–10.

¹⁰⁸ McCartee, for instance, states that ‘[t]hese and other reasons might have led China, even had she not been “deceived,” to defer the adoption of measures to redress the wrongs inflicted upon her vassal’. Anonymous, 11. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, Macartney engaged in similar endeavours at the Qing London legation.

McCartee recognised, just like the Japanese, that the international community could help to curtail Japanese machinations.

6. The Impact of McCartee's Private Actions

How then, if at all, did McCartee's private interventions enacted in the private sphere affect how the Ryukyu crisis played out on a diplomatic level? We begin with an assessment of the impact of his *Japan Gazette* articles.

After publication, McCartee's articles attracted the attention of several members of the *corps diplomatique*. Famed Japanologist Ernest Satow,¹⁰⁹ then Secretary to the British Legation, took a great interest in McCartee's work, verifying all the references and penning a private analysis. Satow's memorandum made its way to the Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, through John G. Kennedy, the acting British Minister to Japan.¹¹⁰ Bingham, who had already been sceptical of Japanese claims,¹¹¹ also recognised the articles as an important piece of scholarship, forwarding two copies to William M. Evarts, American Secretary of State, introducing them as 'the answer made on behalf of China to the official statement of the claim of Japan to the [Ryukyu] Islands'.¹¹² The Qing, too, took note. After learning that McCartee was responsible for the articles, He Ruzhang had them translated into Chinese for Li Hongzhang. As an expression of gratitude, Li sent McCartee a letter of thanks and had him conferred with the title of 'Honorary Consul General'.¹¹³

It was, however, Itō Hirobumi's response which conveyed just how powerful McCartee's assault on the Japanese claims had been. After reading a translation by

¹⁰⁹ Initially, it was rumoured that famed Japanologist Ernest Satow, then Secretary to the British legation in Tokyo, was the author (see: McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 167; Inoue Kowashi Denki Hensan Inkaï, 5:17). However, this was later dispelled by the January 24, 1880 issue of the *Tokio Times*, which revealed that McCartee was the author.

¹¹⁰ FO262/350, Mr. Kennedy to the Marquis of Salisbury, No. 26, Tokio, Feb. 13, 1880.

¹¹¹ NARA, M133, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan, 1855-1906, Roll 40, No 945, Aug. 29, 1879, John A. Bingham to William M. Evarts.

¹¹² NARA, M133, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan, 1855-1906, Roll 41, No. 1062, Jan. 24, 1880, John A. Bingham to William M. Evarts.

¹¹³ McCartee, *Missionary Pioneer*, 167.

Itō Miyoji 伊東巳代治 of McCartee's first article, Itō sent the following letter to Inoue Kowashi on December 5, 1879.

Itō [Miyoji] sent me a translation of an article that has been published in one of the English-language newspapers relating to Ryukyu which refutes this government's position. Having now read it, I send it on to you. The article cites a variety of miscellaneous books as evidence, and one surmises that a great deal of effort has gone into producing it. ... We should be aware of the fact that the Chinese are likely feeling much relief and encouragement by the support this article provides them with. I would like for you to read through the arguments, and, based on the evidence it provides, clarify just how erudite a production it is. Depending on the situation [we find ourselves in after you review the piece], not responding to a piece like this would be tantamount to allowing a force on the brink of eradication to well up again.¹¹⁴

Itō's words betrayed a distinct sense of trepidation about what McCartee's articles had brought to light. Indeed, for Itō, and by extension, the Meiji government, this series of anonymous articles could not be ignored. Damage control was required, post haste. Inoue set to work penning a response which, after several modifications, was published in four parts in the *Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shinbun*, a Japanese-language newspaper which, much like the *Tokio Times*, was a semi-official organ tied to the government.¹¹⁵

Inoue's responses were a pell-mell of hastily penned refutations that largely failed to respond to the majority of McCartee's most potent claims.¹¹⁶ As Yamashita Shigekazu noted in his analysis of a draft version of Inoue's response, the response 'demonstrated just how inaccurate perceptions about Okinawa's history and its contemporaneous situation were amongst the Meiji government'. What's more, it was 'a hastily written draft' that, in terms of content, 'did not manage to succeed in

¹¹⁴ Inoue Kowashi Denki Hensan Inkaï, 5:17.

¹¹⁵ For the drafts, see: Inoue Kowashi Denki Hensan Inkaï, 5:506–14. The articles themselves were published in the January 28, 29, 31, and February 5 issues of the newspaper.

¹¹⁶ Yamashita, 'Gazetto', 242; 248.

answering *any* of the difficult questions posed by the articles that featured in the *Japan Gazette*.¹¹⁷

McCartee's private interventions also appear to have exerted an influence on the Sino-Japanese negotiations of 1880, although certain aspects are difficult to prove empirically. In 1880, there was renewed hope that the Ryukyu crisis might soon be resolved. From March 26, Takezoe Shinichirō met with Li Hongzhang in Tianjin and engaged in preliminary negotiations. And, from August 18, negotiations over Ryukyu began in earnest in Beijing between Japanese minister Shishido and Zongli Yamen representatives. On both occasions, the influence of McCartee's invisible hand could be observed in Japanese actions in two ways.

The first obvious indication of McCartee's influence came with the Japanese side's proposal to split Ryukyu according to the two-way split solution that McCartee had presented to Grant. The Japanese were willing to make this considerable concession provided that the Qing agreed to modify the 1871 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity, thereby enabling Japan to enjoy the same inland trading rights and most favoured nation status enjoyed by the Western powers in China.

However, this concession was likely no coincidence. Although Grant refused to vocalise explicit support for either the two-way or three-way split, the Japanese government interpreted his comments as indirect support for such a solution despite the conceding of the territory being against its will.¹¹⁸ Japan's decision to follow what it believed to be Grant's advice is unsurprising. For, as we have seen, appeasing Western sentiment was a key strategy for the Japanese throughout the annexation process. Another important point to note is that after having met with Grant at Nikkō, Itō had, by October 1879, begun to entertain the possibility of compromising through a two-way split. Speaking in private to acting British minister Kennedy, Itō stated that 'the southern or western-most islands were small and unimportant, and

¹¹⁷ Yamashita, 253. Italics my emphasis. As noted above, Yamashita is incorrect in stating that Inoue's response was never published in his analysis.

¹¹⁸ Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensankai, *Seigai Inoue kōden*, 3:412.

owing to their vicinity to Formosa might be left to China'.¹¹⁹ What's more, the benefits of achieving a modification of the 1871 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity were not insubstantial in the slightest.

However, it was surely not just these three factors that made this compromise a reality. Abandoning territory in an age of imperialism was not a decision that could have been taken lightly by the Japanese. Such a position came with its own risks.

While impossible to empirically prove beyond all reasonable doubt, McCartee's articles, published in Japan, in a language that the Western powers could directly scrutinise, may well have played a decisive role in finally inducing the Japanese to act in the way they did at the negotiation table. After completing his tenure at the Qing legation in May 1880 and returning to America,¹²⁰ McCartee sent the following letter to his nephew Henry Rankin on November 29, 1880. This letter is of vital significance for considering what influence, if at all, McCartee's private interventions had for Sino-Japanese negotiations on the Ryukyu question.

I learned from the letter from Washington that the [Ryukyu] question had been settled—and in the way that I suggested to General Grant, and which he suggested to the Japanese. At first the Japanese would listen to no proposition re: giving any concession, but after the publication of my letters showing that all their own books acknowledged that [Ryukyu] “belonged to” and “paid tribute to” China as well as to Japan, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs sent commissioners to Peking to propose a compromise “upon the basis proposed by General Grant” as I heard in Japan. This is a cause of thankfulness to me—because it shows (to my mind) that I was able to render the Chinese Government some equivalent for my salary.¹²¹

McCartee's letter seems to suggest that the Japanese—who initially did not entertain any kind of concession—only came to propose his two-way split solution as a way-out *after* the legitimacy of their claims to Ryukyu had come to be fundamentally undermined by the publication of his articles in the *Japan Gazette*. The rationale

¹¹⁹ FO405/26, Mr. Kennedy to the Marquis of Salisbury, No. 187, Oct. 23, 1879.

¹²⁰ *The Japan Weekly Mail*, May 28, 1880.

¹²¹ PHS-M, RG-177-1-5, D.B. McCartee to Henry William Rankin, Nov. 29, 1880.

which undergirded the Japanese decision to propose the two-way split solution as a compromise is undocumented. What's more, this letter could well be seen as expressing McCartee's own confirmation bias. However, there are three reasons why we should take the claims advanced here seriously.

Firstly, we need to consider the original provenance of McCartee's 'letter from Washington'. It was quite likely that either Grant or Young had penned this. The letter had been forwarded to McCartee by Rankin, although the precise reason for this is not clear. According to Eli Sheppard, Grant, Bingham, and himself 'were probably the only Americans who were fully acquainted' with McCartee's private initiatives during his time at the Qing Tokyo legation.¹²² Of these individuals, Grant was most definitely back in America at the time the letter was sent. Sheppard, too, may well have been back in the country as his tenure in Meiji service ended at an unspecified time in 1880.¹²³ However, either Grant or Young was most likely the author. After leaving Japan on September 3, 1879, Grant had remained in frequent contact with Yoshida Kiyonari, the Japanese minister to America, about the Ryukyu crisis until—at the very least—November 16, 1880.¹²⁴ What's more, after Yoshida's return to America, they met in person to discuss its progress. Inoue Kaoru, who replaced Terashima Munenori as Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 1879, had also ordered Yoshida to inform Grant of progress made in the Beijing negotiations on September 30, 1880.¹²⁵ Grant therefore enjoyed privileged access to information coming from negotiation frontlines and thus seems the most likely author. However, as we have seen, Young, too, was privy to McCartee's private work and was a close aide of Grant's during his time in Japan. Therefore, it is conceivable

¹²² PTSL-R, Series II: Correspondence; Box 24, File 24:11, Letters concerning Juana M. McCartee. 1889-1927, E.T. Sheppard to William H. Rankin, Jan. 6, 1903.

¹²³ Sheppard, 'An American Missionary Statesman: The Life and Work of Dr. Divie Bethune McCartee', 284.

¹²⁴ LOC-G, Series 10, Addition III, 1819-1969; Personal and Professional Correspondence, 1840-1885; Yoshida Kiyonari to General Grant, Sept. 19, 1879; Oct., 21, 1879; Jan. 23, 1880; Jun. 26, 1880; Nov. 16, 1880. Kyoto daigaku bungakubu Nihon-shi kenkyūshitsu 京都大学文学部日本史研究室, ed., *Yoshida Kiyonari Kankei Bunsho* 吉田清成関係文書 [Documents Relating to Yoshida Kiyonari], vol. 7 (Kyoto: Shibunkaku shuppan, 2018), 32; 35.

¹²⁵ Kyoto daigaku bungakubu Nihon-shi kenkyūshitsu, 7:138.

that this information was shared with Young by Grant and then later relayed to McCartee.

Secondly, save for Inoue's response in the *Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shinbun*, after the publication of McCartee's articles the Japanese side ceased to cite from historical sources in its diplomatic interactions with the Qing, and, as far as I am aware, ceased to advance historical arguments—whether in private memoranda or newspaper articles—to champion the legitimacy of the annexation to international society.¹²⁶ The reasons for this were patently clear. First, as we saw in the letter Itō Hirobumi sent to Inoue Kowashi on December 5, 1879, McCartee's articles became a source of immense stress for the Japanese. It was for this reason that Itō requested Inoue to pen a response, this being eventually published in the *Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shinbun*. What was curious about this response was not only its lacklustre defence of the Japanese position, but the fact that it was only ever published in Japanese. Given the Meiji government's high level of investment in legitimising the annexation to its Western diplomatic interlocutors, the fact that this crucial response was not published in a foreign language suggests that the government was aware of its inadequacies and chose to publish it only in Japanese to save face vis-à-vis its domestic audience. Publishing a response in English left open the potential for the further undermining of its case in the eyes of the West.

Thirdly, Inoue Kowashi, the rhetorician and brains behind the original memorandum that was later published in the *Tokio Times*, and behind the response to McCartee's articles which was published in the *Tōkyō Nichi Nichi Shinbun*, played a pivotal role in all Japanese diplomatic policymaking on Ryukyu in this period. He had been involved from 1878, gathering historical documents to aid the legitimisation effort and penning policy advice and memoranda to justify the annexation.¹²⁷ Inoue, as the Meiji government's key strategist for Ryukyu policy, had seen the credibility of his historical arguments undermined by the time preliminary negotiations began

¹²⁶ Yamashita, 'Gazetto', 253; 258.

¹²⁷ Yamashita, 'Kaiyaku buntō'; Inoue Kaoru-kō Denki Hensankai, *Seigai Inoue kōden*, 3:415.

between the Qing and Japan in March 1880. This had occurred in the full view of the *corps diplomatique*, a key foreign audience whom the Japanese had wanted onsite. It is hardly coincidental, then, that when Inoue joined Shishido in Beijing for the formal negotiations, he counselled him to stick firmly to proposing the partition of Ryukyu.¹²⁸ This shift in emphasis from complete annexation to a two-way split suggests that Inoue understood that he could no longer sustain historical claims, whether in the negotiations or in the eyes of the foreign powers in whose eyes he sought legitimacy.

Unfortunately for McCartee and his two-way split solution, negotiations between the two sides eventually broke down. While the Qing entertained the idea of a two-way split for a brief period, a final treaty was never ratified.¹²⁹ For the Qing, the reinstatement of the Ryukyu Kingdom as a tributary took absolute precedence.¹³⁰ While a two-way split would indeed allow for the kingdom to be reinstated across the Miyako and Yaeyama islands, many of the Ryukyuan aristocrats who had taken asylum in China vehemently protested such a possibility, seeing a split as tantamount to national destruction.¹³¹ Ryukyuan aristocrat Rin Seikō 林世功 had even committed suicide outside the Zongli Yamen in protest against the proposal.¹³²

Ryukyu's status, however, remained disputed until Japan's decisive victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Thereafter, Ryukyu, or Okinawa, was unequivocally 'Japanese'. The validity of this status, however, remains the subject of fierce debate even today.

Conclusion

During a period of heightened tension between Qing China and Meiji Japan, in which the prospect of war very much remained a possibility,¹³³ McCartee, a foreign

¹²⁸ Yamashita, 'Gazetto', 259.

¹²⁹ Nishizato, *Chū-Ryū-Nichi*, 343–89.

¹³⁰ Okamoto, *Chūgoku no tanjō*, 88–96.

¹³¹ Nishizato, *Chū-Ryū-Nichi*, 383–92.

¹³² Nishizato, 385–87.

¹³³ On this point, see: FO881/4521, No. 16, Sir T. Wade to the Marquis of Salisbury, Jan. 5, 1880.

member of the Qing Tokyo legation, made two key private interventions in the crisis. He submitted two proposals to Grant—one based on his own views and one which took the Qing position into greater account—on how a compromise could be achieved through a split of Ryukyu. He also published a series of articles in the *Japan Gazette*, which sought to undermine the Meiji government's attempts to justify its annexatory actions to international society through largely untenable historical evidence. Both interventions were built upon the foundation of another private initiative—private research into the Ryukyu question—in which McCartee invested not only personal time and effort but also his own private capital.

As interventions, McCartee's actions were made all the more important because of the Qing Tokyo legation's loss of recourse to diplomatic action due to He Ruzhang's incendiary letter. In this sense then, McCartee's interventions have much in common with what Abraham de Wicquefort termed in the seventeenth century to be a 'minister of the second order', albeit acting outside the formal strictures or chain of command of the legation.¹³⁴ Precisely *because* of He Ruzhang's loss of recourse to diplomatic engagement, McCartee's 'diplomatic intrigues', free of the baggage of representative capacity, were all the more crucial as interventions.

These efforts were not altogether unsuccessful, either. McCartee's two-way and three-split solutions went beyond being propositions that only he, Grant and Young were privy to, and were debated and discussed in important circles of the time. What's more, while the precise mechanism by which McCartee's idea reached the Japanese side eludes us, the Meiji government nevertheless broached McCartee's two-way split solution to the Qing when the time came to compromise. This compromise plausibly was teased out, at least in part, by McCartee's other key private intervention in the crisis: the publication of his 'Audi Alteram Partem' articles.

The McCartee case study demonstrates that foreign staff at the Qing legations ought not to be understood as passive diplomatic cogs working only to fuel a larger

¹³⁴ Abraham de Wicquefort, *The Ambassador and His Functions*, trans. J. Digby (London: Bernard Lintott, 1716), 34.

machine or an agenda imposed from above. When circumstances presented the opportunity for private intervention, they acted. When aspects of their individuality could be used—whether personal connections, their membership of other communities and societies, their prestige, status, or even their economic capital—they utilised them.¹³⁵

However, if it was scepticism towards the competence of his employers that underscored McCartee's private interventions in the Ryukyu crisis, he may well have been surprised. The ministers evidently recognised that international law and treaties could be exploited as tools for fighting their corner. Zhang Sigui had previously written a foreword to W.A.P. Martin's Chinese translation of Wheaton's *The Elements of International Law*.¹³⁶ He Ruzhang, in his letter of protest to the Meiji government of October 1878, very explicitly stated that Ryukyu's autonomy was recognised through the treaties it had signed with Holland, America and France in the 1850s. Furthermore, He Ruzhang and Huang Zunxian, in their secret meetings with Kim Hong-jip, would advocate that Chosŏn enter into treaty relations with Western states so as to safeguard itself against foreign incursions.¹³⁷

In this sense, then, the Qing had already begun to understand on a superficial level that international law and the inviolability of treaties held immense power for circumscribing actions, and for reaping benefits. However, this did not represent a full-blown embrace of Western European diplomatic practice and culture. The legation focus remained upon learning, and precisely because of that focus, the

¹³⁵ This means that sabotage or subversion of official business was equally plausible.

¹³⁶ W.A.P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay: Or, China, South and North with Personal Reminiscences* (Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier, 1896), 205.

¹³⁷ During Kim's visit, He ordered Huang to draw up the famous 'A Strategy for Chosŏn' (*Chaoxian celüe* 朝鮮策略) pamphlet which, among other things, encouraged Chosŏn to sign a treaty with the United States as a means to protect itself against foreign incursions. He also drew up the 'on managing Chosŏn's diplomacy' (*zhuchi Chaoxian waijiao yi* 主持朝鮮外交議) pamphlet which made similar policy recommendations to the Qing government, including that the Qing should seek to stop treating Chosŏn as an independent polity (*zizhu* 自主), and instead reconfigure its relationship with the Qing as a *vassal* in the Western international law sense. See: Okamoto, *Contested Perceptions*, 84–88.

ministers had yet to note that this foreign presence in its legations held the potential for critical contributions beyond mere clerical work and knowledge production.

However, the shift would not take long. As the next chapter demonstrates, from the 1880s onwards, the Qing ministers began to actively capitalise on a much wider range of skills possessed by this foreign presence.

Chapter 3

Halliday Macartney and the Transformation of Qing Diplomatic Practice, 1880-1905

Introduction

A new phase in Qing diplomatic practice was ushered in by Zeng Jize's posting to London and Paris in 1879. It began the process of acclimatisation to the normative practices, culture and expectations of Western European diplomatic culture. The new milieu manifested itself in a multitude of ways, but an important milestone was reached with the recognition of the need to engage with international law beyond its mere superficial utility as a discursive tool.¹

The recognition of the utility of international law and its observance by Qing ministers is undeniably important and has been a recurrent theme in revisionist accounts of late Qing diplomacy.² However, as contended in the introduction to this dissertation, receptivity towards international law ought not to be understood as the only indicator of how Qing attitudes towards the utility of Western European diplomatic practice were evolving in this period. Indeed, in many ways, excessive

¹ Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*, 32–33.

² The best examples of this scholarship include: Satō Shinichi 佐藤慎一, *Kindai Chūgoku no chishikijin to bunmei* 近代中国の知識人と文明 [Intellectuals and Civilisation in Modern China] (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1996); Rune Svarverud, *International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China: Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847-1911* (Leiden: Brill, 2007); Lin Xuezhong 林學忠, *Cong wangguo gongfa dao gongfa waijiao: wan Qing guojifa de chuan ru, quanshi yu yingyong* 從萬國公法到公法外交——晚清國際法的傳入、詮釋與應用 [From the Law of Nations to International Law-based Diplomacy: The Propagation, Interpretation and Application of International Law in the Late Qing] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2009); Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*.

emphasis has been placed on Qing receptivity towards the *jus gentium*; an emphasis which has often blinded scholars to the heuristic significance of other indicators. A case in point was the shift that occurred in the focus and formats of the ministers' *chushi riji*, away from being informational 'guidebooks' designed to enlighten their peers about the people, culture, customs, and technology of the non-Qing world, to journals that recorded the minutiae of diplomatic negotiations and day-to-day legation work with explicit didactic intent.³

However, the *chushi riji* are not the only conduit through which we can evaluate the tectonic shifts that were occurring in Qing attitudes towards the utility of Western European diplomatic practice at this time. The foreign presence in the Qing legations is an equally, if not more, valuable conduit through which to trace the contours of this transformation, especially when we understand diplomacy, within a given diplomatic culture, as constituting a body of (often implicit) shared sociocultural practices and expectations. The foreign presence enables us to gain insight into this process precisely because the work the ministers mandated of these individuals, as *muyou*, serves as a direct commentary about what the ministers wished to achieve in *their* work, but were often unable to achieve alone. Implicit shifts which went unarticulated in the ministers' writings are thus thrown into stark relief by an analysis of the shifting nature of the tasks undertaken by these foreigners.

This chapter will elucidate this process through an evaluation of the evolving roles of Halliday Macartney at the Qing legation in London and will advance three separate yet interrelated arguments.⁴ First, as we saw in chapter 1, Macartney's primary role under Guo Songtao was that of interpreter and cultural explicator. Macartney retained these crucial functions throughout his career, but from Zeng's

³ Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*.

⁴ While defining Macartney's place of work as the 'London legation', the Qing minister to Britain was also responsible for legations in other European countries as well. Macartney would, therefore, often travel with him on business to other places. However, as their key place of work was in London, for ease of reading, rather than make constant reference to the peripatetic nature of the minister's *mufu*, I simplify my discussion as being in terms of the London legation.

tenure onwards, Macartney's role within the London legation was fundamentally transformed so that he increasingly functioned as the legation's (1) lead rhetorician, (2) lead negotiator, and (3) press officer.⁵ It was these *new* characteristics of his work that began to emerge under Zeng's tenure that demonstrated that Zeng and his successors were engaging with the norms, protocols and even ambassadorial ideals of Western European diplomatic culture.⁶ Second, I argue that aspects of these new functions that Macartney took on were identified by the Qing ministers as possessing a useful didactic quality for both serving and future diplomatic staff.⁷ This was exemplified by how aspects of Macartney's written output—albeit refracted through translation—were chosen to take a place in projects designed for the dissemination of diplomatic knowledge, and by the fact that lower-ranking staff were sent in to witness the negotiations that he chaired for the Qing side. Third, I argue that these new shifts in Macartney's role transformed his social standing within British and wider European society, and that this increased clout also redounded to Qing benefit by creating new means for information collation, diplomatic breakthrough, and for promoting Qing agendas in the press. I therefore suggest that the new roles afforded

⁵ During his time in China, Macartney would become close friends with Zeng, with the two meeting on an almost daily basis to discuss a wide range of topics. Zeng even entrusted Macartney with treating his mother during her time of illness (see: Lee, *Zeng Jize*, 20). The fact that Zeng and Macartney's relationship began as a personal friendship is a significant point that may have been highly influential in how Macartney's role developed, but I am not aware of further evidence by which this could be explored in any depth.

⁶ Given that Macartney commenced his work in the legation devoid of any diplomatic experience (Boulger, *Macartney*, 280–81), the question of how and why he could perform competently in many of these tasks naturally arises. His day-to-day involvement in legation affairs and interactions with the Foreign Office naturally provided ample learning opportunities. However, it is also clear that he was a benefactor of the increasing commercialisation and proliferation of diplomatic knowledge in the English public sphere (András Kiséry, 'Diplomatic Knowledge on Display: Foreign Affairs in the Early Modern English Public Sphere', in *Cultures of Diplomacy and Literary Writing in the Early Modern World*, ed. Tracey Amanda Sowerby and Joanna Craigwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 146–59). At the time of his death, Macartney's library held Hall's, Vattel's, Martens', Calvo's, and Wheaton's various tomes on international law, a collection of volumes on the proceedings and resulting documentation of the Peace of Nijmegen, and a two-volume text of Sino-British treaties. Such texts undoubtedly served as crucial reference points for his work (NLS, L.C. 1044. (19), Catalogue of antique and modern household furniture also the collection of books which belonged to the late Sir Halliday Macartney.)

⁷ This did not mean that he lost his previous didactic function of dispensing information about the non-Qing world. Rather, the new functions were overlaid on top.

to him by the ministers worked in combination to produce a fourth, inadvertent shift in the functions he performed: the shift to (4) networker. However, there was a caveat: to hold onto this new status and the privileged access to information that it yielded, Macartney needed to compromise his status, offering information and hints to the British side in return.

In addition to considering how these new roles were indicative of the shifts that were occurring in Qing attitudes towards Western European diplomatic practice from the 1880s onwards, I will also explore: (a) how the work Macartney completed in these roles was impactful or meaningful in and of itself, and (b) how the significance of this work connected to a broader agenda that many of the ministers were trying to achieve during their tenures which transcended that of immediate diplomatic breakthroughs. Namely, a desire to present Qing China as an active, competent and rational sovereign state—or suzerain state, in the case of its positionality vis-à-vis its tributaries and its outlying regions (*fanbu*). Through its commitment to the principles underpinning Western European diplomatic culture and practice, China could demonstrate that it was ready to defend and protect its interests, territory, ‘vassals’ (as opposed to its tributaries and outlying regions), and people.⁸

Finally, these shifts also represented the inherent flexibility of *mufu* practice (specifically, how a *muyou*’s role could morph or evolve to fit what the host, in this case the minister, identified as the exigencies of the time), and how it functioned as an important tool for installing new and alien forms of statecraft into the Qing bureaucratic machine as adjunct components that would nevertheless not compromise the value system that undergirded its formal bureaucracy.⁹

Below, I divide my analysis of Macartney, and his instructive significance for understanding the transformation in Qing attitudes towards Western European

⁸ For an article which addresses similar underpinning themes of practice at the Qing London legation, see: Day, ‘Mediating Sovereignty’.

⁹ This was not an isolated instance: back in China, a proliferation of new *muyou* from multifarious ‘irregular route’ (*yitu*) backgrounds were taking on new roles which the formal bureaucracy was unable to handle in isolation. For a definition of the irregular route, see footnote 107 in this dissertation’s introduction.

diplomatic practice, according to the four key shifts outlined above which came to overlay his initial functions as an interpreter and cultural explicator from the 1880s onwards. Namely, his transformation into the legation's lead rhetorician, lead negotiator, press officer, and networker. These four components, in most cases, did not function in isolation. Rather, they were mutually constitutive. In order to tease out their individual significance, however, below I abstract them from this complex reality and assess them as standalone components.

1. Macartney as Lead Rhetorician

The intimate bond between diplomatic practice and practised eloquence in speech and writing in the Western European normative system has been well documented by scholars and practising diplomats alike. As Italian diplomat Gaspare Bragaccia noted in 1626, an ambassador ought to be a 'man of language': a person who could persuade in both speech and writing.¹⁰ Such ideals were also frequently given voice in many of the handbooks on the ideal ambassadorial figure that emerged during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.¹¹ François de Callières, for instance, put immense stock in the refinement of such faculties, stating that it was not enough for a minister 'to think well of an affair', he 'must know likewise how to explain his thoughts distinctly, clearly and intelligibly'.¹²

In the Qing legations, several obstacles stood in the way of the ministers achieving rhetorical finesse in how they expressed themselves to their diplomatic interlocutors. Linguistic competence in English, French and other foreign languages was one such obstacle. Men who could speak a foreign tongue, such as the interpreters (*tongshi* 通事) who had long enabled cross-cultural intercourse between China and the outside, were typically treated with the sort of contempt and scorn reserved for *yamen* clerks

¹⁰ Tracey A. Sowerby and Joanna Craigwood, 'Introduction: Literary and Diplomatic Cultures in the Early Modern World', in *Cultures of Diplomacy and Literary Writing in the Early Modern World*, ed. Tracey Amanda Sowerby and Joanna Craigwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 5.

¹¹ Kugeler, "Le Parfait Ambassadeur", 37.

¹² Callières, *Art of Diplomacy*, 175.

and runners,¹³ and were not to be trusted.¹⁴ This was further compounded by a culture in elite scholar-official circles for avoiding all affairs and work which involved dealing with Westerners in some way (*yangwu*).¹⁵ Typically, the possession of such knowledge—be it of a linguistic or practical nature—and active engagement with it could compromise one’s status within Qing bureaucratic society. It could also be highly dangerous.¹⁶ Such societal stigma, and the risks associated with the cultivation of such knowledge, translated into many ministers being without the capability for cross-cultural communication, let alone the ability to articulate oneself according to the standards laid out by the literature on the perfect ambassador.¹⁷

While each minister did bring with him a number of interpreters and student interpreters who had honed, or were in the process of honing, their aptitude in a foreign tongue, linguistic aptitude did not always equate to the possession of an ability to deftly navigate the sea of diplomatic form, parlance, culture and negotiational flair required for the day-to-day work in the legations. Indeed, many of the interpreters who served in the legations (who had been trained at one of the Tongwenguan schools in Beijing, Shanghai or Guangdong) were ill-prepared for many

¹³ Reed, *Talons and Teeth*.

¹⁴ Even fluent speakers of English deprecated the work of the interpreter. For instance, when Wu Tingfang (who would later become Qing minister to Washington) was asked by Guo Songtao whether or not he would consider becoming an interpreter for the London legation while he was still a student at Lincoln’s Inn in London, Wu stated that ‘he despised the work of the interpreter, and was unwilling to take up such a post’. Liu, *Yingyao siji*, 50. GX2/12/17. For a recent discussion of how interpreters were viewed in China, and the dangers of the role see: Harrison, *Perils*.

¹⁵ As Hayamaru Kazumasa has demonstrated, there were two interrelated reasons for this. First, *yangwu* involved considerable risk: it involved the transfer and of handling money, the browbeating of often brusque foreigners, and compromise. Second, for these reasons, anyone who *wanted* to involve themselves in such work was *necessarily* somebody who did not value honour and integrity. *Yangwu* was thus both hard work, and had implications for one’s social status. Hayamaru, ‘Yōmu’, 86–87.

¹⁶ Harrison, *Perils*.

¹⁷ Zeng Jize was, in this regard, an outlier for his time. He had self-studied English, and his diary reveals that he diligently continued his studies during his time abroad, able to communicate in ‘broken but intelligible English’ (ACIMC, 2:311, No. 1413, Campbell to Hart, Apr. 2, 1886). Despite his interest in learning English, however, Zeng, perhaps under the influence of the social stigma attached to the interpreter, saw developing an understanding of the intricacies of treaties and the day-to-day business of diplomacy as matters which ought to take *precedence* over foreign language acquisition. Indeed, for him, there was ‘no need for the minister to encroach upon the work of the interpreter’. Zeng Jize 曾紀澤, *Zeng Jize riji* 曾紀澤日記 [The Diary of Zeng Jize], ed. Liu Zhihui 劉志惠, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2013), 817. Of Zeng’s successors, the only individual who possessed a solid command of English was Luo Fenglu.

legation tasks. Even where translation from a European language into Chinese was possible for them, this ability was often limited to writing, with oral interpretation often proving too intractable a task.¹⁸

It was for these reasons that, at the Qing legation in London, Macartney came to serve as the key rhetorical interface for the legation and its dealings with the Foreign Office, other branches of government, and wider British society. Below, I will explore the significance of his involvement in the creation of the diplomatic notes, communications and treaties produced by the legation.

Macartney's Diplomatic Notes, Communications, and Treaties

As a member of the Qing bureaucracy, the ability to deftly navigate the ocean of rules, protocols and turns of phrase for memorial writing, official communications, and intrapersonal epistolary exchanges was an exceedingly important component of scholar-official life. A huge range of terms and turns of phrase had to be mastered, and the ability to apply specific usage patterns in accordance with one's positionality vis-à-vis the recipient of one's communication—be it the emperor, a superior, an equal, or a subordinate—was vital.¹⁹ Indeed, precisely because of the complexities involved in imperial 'bureaucratese', it was common practice for Qing officials to hire

¹⁸ For instance, Zhang Deyi 張德彝, who had learned English at the School of Combined Learning and had served as interpreter to several previous overseas missions (and would later become minister in London) was by no means fully up to the task of interpreting. James Campbell explains in one letter to Robert Hart how he 'could not explain was meant by "having to pay the money"', that 'he is very weak in his English!' and that he was unable to 'tell me a hundredth part of what [Guo Songtao] said to him.' ACIMC, 1:288, Campbell to Hart, Jul. 20, 1877. See also: Li, *Waijiaoguan*, 203–4; 280–81.

¹⁹ For an overview of the complexity involved in crafting correspondence in the Qing context, see: John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yü Teng, *Ch'ing Administration: Three Studies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 36–106; Yamagoshi Toshihiro 山腰敏寛, 'Shindai oyobi Minkokuki no kōbunsho no buntai ni tsuite 清代および民国期の公文書の文体について [On the literary form found in the official documents of the Qing and Republican periods]', in *Chūgoku rekishi kōbunsho dokkai jiten* 中国歴史公文書読解辞典 [Dictionary for Reading Official Documents in Chinese History] (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2004), 6–36.

a type of *muyou* called a *shuqi* 書啓 to ghostwrite their correspondence,²⁰ and, in some cases, even a *zhezou shiye* 折奏師爺 to ghostwrite their memorials.²¹

Beyond memorial writing and correspondence, local officials were also responsible for producing other documents which pertained to the processes of litigation and taxation as well. As Terada Hiroaki notes, while it is often hard to discern host from *muyou* in terms of authorial voice in the sources left to historians, it is likely that the vast majority of the specialist documentation required of local officials was also handled by *muyou*, be it he who was responsible for litigation matters (*xingming* 刑名), or he who was responsible for financial affairs (*qianqu* 錢穀).²²

Given the prevalence of such a culture in the *yamen* context, it is unsurprising that the Qing ministers recognised the need for analogous assistance in the crafting of correspondence and other documentation in foreign languages during their postings abroad. Indeed, the use made of Macartney and his peers in this regard can be understood as an extension, or evolution, of this *yamen mufu* culture.²³

It was not particularly surprising that the Qing ministers recognised the need for foreign clerks who could assist them in their epistolary output in a foreign language, but what *was* remarkable was the transformation visited upon Macartney's role in this process after Zeng's arrival in office. Under Zeng, and for the rest of his career at the London legation, Macartney's involvement proliferated in the writing of the

²⁰ Terada, *Chūgoku hōsei shi*, 158; Yang Yujing 楊玉靜, 'Qingdai shuqi muyou tanlüe: yi Pu Songling wei li 清代書啓幕友探略——以蒲松齡為例 [A Study of Clerical Staff in the Qing: A Case Study of Pu Songling]', *Mishu* 2021, no. 5 (2021): 86–92.

²¹ Yamaguchi Hisakazu 山口久和, 'Risshin shusse no kaitei wo akirameta hitobito: Shō Gakusei no "Shōkō shiya" zō wo chūshin ni 立身出世の階梯を諦めた人々——章学誠の“紹興師爺”像を中心に [The Individuals Who Abandoned the Climb to Social Success: A Study of Zhang Xuecheng's Perception of the "Shaoxing Masters"]', *Toshi Bunka Kenkyū* 9 (2007): 88.


²² Terada, *Chūgoku hōsei shi*, 158.

²³ As noted in brief in Chapter 1, in the early years of the London legation, there was a cacophony of authorial voices involved in its epistolary output. Robert Hart worked in close collaboration with his confidant James Campbell, head of the Customs' London office, to diminish Macartney's importance and to ensure that Customs men played a central part in legation affairs. As a result, in addition to Macartney, three of Hart's men had a hand in drafting the correspondence: James Campbell, James Twinem, and Colin Jamieson. Hart's efforts to take control of the London legation ultimately did not prove successful, however. On these plans, see, for instance: ACIMC, 1:237, No. 299, Hart to Campbell, Nov. 17, 1876.

English-language (and often French-language)²⁴ diplomatic notes (*zhaohui* 照會), memorandums, treaties and other forms of informal or private correspondence sent to the British and French foreign offices and other correspondents.

Let us take the main body of correspondence sent between the legation and the British Foreign Office as a case study (Figure 1). Of 515 diplomatic notes sent from the legation to the British Foreign Office from 1877 to 1897, just under 60% of these (296) were unequivocally penned by Macartney. While the vast majority of these were not signed off by Macartney,²⁵ his involvement in their production is evident from his distinctive handwriting, as can be noted from Figure 2.²⁶

Figure 1: Percentage of Diplomatic Notes Handwritten by Macartney, 1877-1897



Note: (i) The casefiles surveyed in Figure 1 are not the sole source of correspondence between the legation and the British Foreign Office. Documents produced by the legation are scattered throughout multiple collections and are often included in topic-specific folders, such as those on the British


²⁴ Macartney officially became First Secretary to the Paris legation in 1891. FO17/1120, Halliday Macartney to Thomas Sanderson, Feb. 24, 1891.

²⁵ This was also the case in the *yamen* context. Terada Hiroaki notes how although it was likely that the vast majority of a *yamen*'s written output was penned by the various *muyou*, their authorial voices were often lost as documents were inevitably signed off by the official in charge. Terada, *Chūgoku Hōsei Shi*, 158.

²⁶ Jenny Huangfu Day has also previously identified this: Day, *Travelers*, 11; Jenny Huangfu Day, 'Qianyan 前言 [Foreword]', in *Wan Qing zhu-Ying shiguan zhaohui dang'an* 晚清駐英使館照會檔案 [Diplomatic Notes from Late Qing China's Legation in Britain], ed. Jenny Huangfu Day, vol. 1, 4 vols (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2020), 1-30; Day, 'Mediating Sovereignty'.

annexation of Burma. (ii) Due to the introduction of the typewriter into legation work from August 22, 1898 onwards (FO17/1355), and to the fact that typewritten documents obscure authorship, I have limited my survey to the pre-1898 period. (iii) All private letters written by Macartney to Foreign Office staff that can be found in the surveyed archives have not been included in my count. (iv) The lack of *any* correspondence in Macartney's hand for 1887 was likely on account of his stays in Scotland to mourn the loss of his father and sister.²⁷

Figure 2: Macartney's Distinctive Handwriting



An example of a letter sent from Macartney to Thomas Sanderson (FO17/1178, Halliday Macartney to Thomas Sanderson, May 30, 1893).

Letter from Zeng Jize to Earl Granville. Evidently written by Macartney, but signed off by Zeng (FO17/939, Zeng Jize to Earl Granville, Nov. 22, 1883).

Images reproduced with permission from The National Archives.

The writings of Xue Fucheng (Qing minister to Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, 1890-1894) help to clarify the precise nature of Macartney's role in the production of the legation's diplomatic notes.²⁸ Macartney would first draft the English-language version in consultation with the minister. This would then be passed on to a Chinese translator for the purposes of producing a Chinese-language

²⁷ *London and China Express*, Dec. 3, 1886, 12; *Times of India*, Jan. 5, 1887, 5.

²⁸ Xue Fucheng 薛福成, *Chushi Ying-Fa-Yi-Bi siguo riji* 出使英法義比四國日記 [Diary of My Posting to the Four Countries of Britain, France, Italy and Belgium] (Beijing: Zhaohua chubanshe, 2017), 157-60, GX16/8/12, GX16/8/13; Xue Fucheng 薛福成, *Chushi gongdu* 出使公牘 [Official Correspondence from My Time Serving Abroad], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhaohua chubanshe, 2019), 6. Also see: Aoyama, 'Shusshi nikki', 49.

equivalent.²⁹ At some unspecified point in this process (albeit likely at the end), the minister would sign the English language version of the note with his signature, as well as stamp the Chinese version with his seal (*guanfang* 關防). These two documents would then be sent on as a pair to the British Foreign Office.³⁰

What, then, of the other correspondence which was not penned in Macartney's distinctive hand? A letter to renowned journalist Wang Kangnian 汪康年, by Wang Daxie 汪大燮 (Qing minister to Britain, 1905-1907), offers important insight into this question.

I heard that when Macartney took leave due to illness one spring, whenever the legation had any official documents that needed writing, they still found themselves having to dispatch someone to Macartney's bedside to request him to dictate the contents of the document. It was only after his dictation that they would then be able to send the document off. Hearing such a story made me particularly worried about the legation's potential to make a fool of itself. Later, after the arrival of the Political Inspection Ministers (*kaozheng dachen* 考政大臣) to Britain, I decided to invite some guests to the legation. The invitation cards had to be sent to Macartney at his home in Scotland for correction.³¹ Only upon receiving his corrections were we then able to send them off.³²

Wang's letter reveals that an absence of Macartney's distinctive penmanship did not necessarily indicate an absence of his authorial voice in the legation's epistolary output. There was, in fact, a dictation culture at the legation, with Macartney orally dictating messages and a clerk transcribing as appropriate. In busy times, Macartney

²⁹ Wu Zonglian's 吳宗濂 *chushi riji* also confirms this process: Wu Zonglian 吳宗濂, *Suiyao biji* 隨軺筆記 [Notes Made While Accompanying the Minister on His Posting Abroad], ed. Shuhe Zhong 鍾叔河, Zeng Deming 曾德明, and Yang Yunhui 楊雲輝, *Zou xiang shijie congshu* (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2016), 115.


³⁰ Prior to Macartney's assumption as lead rhetorician, the drafting process appears to have been a lot messier and very much a case of 'too many cooks'. See: ACIMC, 1:275, No. 348, Campbell to Hart, Jun. 1, 1877.

³¹ Macartney retired from legation work in December 1905. Thereafter, he lived out the rest of his days at his home in Scotland. Boulger, *Macartney*, 485.

³² Shanghai Tushuguan 上海圖書館, ed., *Wang Kangnian shiyou shuzha* 汪康年師友書札 [Wang Kangnian's Letters from Teachers and Friends], vol. 1 (Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2017), 795, No. 153, Wang Daxie to Wang Kangnian, GX32/9/9.

often had one of his sons transcribe his letters for him,³³ and in the later years of his career at the legation, he dictated his responses to letters to his daughter Hallide Jeanne due to his failing eyesight.³⁴ Furthermore, as Figure 3 demonstrates, Macartney's distinctive penmanship can often be found filling in missing words in many of the communications sent to Whitehall, another indication that he had been dictating his letters to a clerk and then checking them before they were dispatched.³⁵ That others also came to play a part in the epistolary output of the legation should therefore not be seen as evidence for the peripheralisation of Macartney's central position within the rhetorical output of the legation.

Figure 3: Examples of Macartney's involvement in letters not in his hand



Sources: FO17/1175, Xue Fucheng to the Earl of Rosebery, Jan. 11, 1893; FO17/1175, Xue Fucheng to the Earl of Rosebery, Jan. 19, 1893; FO17/1175, Halliday Macartney to Thomas Sanderson, Jan. 31, 1893. Images reproduced with permission from The National Archives.

³³ See Macartney's comment on this in a letter to 'Mr. Pau', an ex-colleague of his at the London legation: Boulger, *Macartney*, 455.

³⁴ Boulger, xi. On Hallide's employment, see: FO17/1652, Zhang Deyi to the Marquis of Lansdowne, May 30, 1904.

³⁵ Even Macartney's own letters were often written for him by a clerk. The bottom two images in Figure 3 are an example.

However, diplomatic notes and routine communications were not the only forms of writing in which Macartney took a leading part. Treaty writing was another key development in Macartney's transformation into the legation's lead rhetorician.

The first evidence we have of Macartney's involvement in treaty drafting came during Zeng Jize's time in St. Petersburg, renegotiating the terms of the Livadia Treaty in late 1880 and early 1881.³⁶ As it was the first key piece of diplomacy Zeng was tasked with undertaking, and mindful of the severity with which Chong Hou's misstep had been treated by the Qing bureaucracy, it was imperative that he got things right. During the treaty drafting process, he therefore consulted with Macartney and Frenchman Prosper Giquel,³⁷ another foreigner who had long been in Qing service, who had been temporarily seconded from his role as head of the Qing Educational Mission in Europe in order to assist Zeng in this crucial mission.³⁸ Perhaps due to the attention to detail displayed by Macartney in Russia for his suggestions regarding wording,³⁹ the responsibility placed upon him for the drafting of other treaties after returning to London expanded considerably. Indeed, Macartney came to take responsibility for all of the major draft treaties and conventions which were produced by the legation during his tenure, including multiple draft treaties submitted to the French during the Sino-French War,⁴⁰ a draft convention for the demarcation of the Burma-Yunnan border,⁴¹ and a draft convention concerning the importation of Chinese labour into Transvaal.⁴² As was the case with the legation's diplomatic notes, Macartney would first draft a treaty or convention in English. This

³⁶ For an overview of the negotiations and Zeng's part, see: Hsü, *The Ili Crisis*; Lee, *Zeng Jize*.

³⁷ See, for instance, the entries for GX6/12/29, 30, GX7/1/2, 11 in: Zeng Jize 曾紀澤, *Zeng Jize riji* 曾紀澤日記 [The Diary of Zeng Jize], ed. Liu Zhihui 劉志惠, vol. 3 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2013), 1103-5; 1107.

³⁸ On Giquel's life and career, see: Leibo, *Transferring Technology*.

³⁹ Boulger, *Macartney*, 351-55.

⁴⁰ ACIMC, 2:126-127, No. 1267, Campbell to Hart, Nov. 28, 1884; FO422/2, No. 723, Chinese Proposals for making Terms with France (Communicated by Dr. Macartney to Sir J. Pauncefote), Nov. 23, 1884 (for the Chinese version, see: QJWS, J49:15, Zeng Jize Telegram to Zongli Yamen, GX10/10/10); Boulger, 388-92; MAE-CPC, 67, *Projet de Traité entre la France et la Chine*, Londres, 10 mars 1885, No. 220-226.

⁴¹ IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 24, Meeting, Nov. 7, 1893.

⁴² FO2/899, Draft Agreement under Art V. of Treaty of Peking for Regulating Engagement of Chinese Labourers, Mar. 9, 1904.

would then be translated into Chinese for the minister to peruse. If necessary, as was the case with one of the treaty drafts Macartney produced during the Sino-French War, he would redraft the treaty heads if they did not meet with the minister's approval.⁴³

Of course, even when these drafts had met with the approval of the minister, they were not immutable in their contents, and Macartney, in his role as lead negotiator (explored later), was likewise responsible for discussing and negotiating their contents with the legation's interlocutors, although the minister would often be involved in the final round of negotiations when an exchange of signatures was near. In addition, where suggestions or protests were made by the British side, or indeed when the British side had been responsible for preparing a draft treaty or convention, Macartney would convey these back to the minister.

That Macartney came to play a major role in the legation's written output may seem of minor significance, and perhaps even rather prosaic. But the reality was the opposite. Macartney's 'literary' skillset enabled the legation to proselytize the perspectives, interests and arguments of the Qing side in polished prose that employed a range of considered rhetorical strategies.⁴⁴ In recent years, the interconnectivity between literary writing and diplomatic practice, especially in the early modern European context, has become ever clearer. Timothy Hampton has convincingly shown how early modern diplomats drew upon the sundry tools, devices and topoi of literary writing to craft and shape their communications, negotiations, and modes of self-representation, and used literature as a shared language through which to structure, contextualise and reflect upon their work. Meanwhile,

⁴³ ACIMC, 2:126-127, No. 1267, Campbell to Hart, Nov. 28, 1884.

⁴⁴ A number of reasons can be inferred as to why Macartney was well positioned to assist the ministers in their rhetorical endeavours: he was a native speaker of English; among the lucky few to have been university-educated (Boulger, *Macartney*, 8); was proficient in French, the language of diplomacy (Boulger, 20, 281); and had a demonstrable interest in the written word, encompassing literature, letter writing, poetry, play scripts, philosophy, and history (NLS, L.C. 1044. (19), Catalogue of antique and modern household furniture also the collection of books which belonged to the late Sir Halliday Macartney). That the ministers recognised the value he could add in this regard is a point of great significance that demonstrates how the Qing ministers located the centrality of good writing to success in diplomacy.

playwrights, poets and essayists drew upon the highly semiotically-invested processes of diplomacy, and anecdotes about the trials and tribulations of ambassadors, to explore new frontiers in fiction writing that considered ideas pertaining to self-representation, selfhood, subjectivity, and beyond.⁴⁵

The Qing ministers evidently recognised that careful and considered crafting of diplomatic correspondence was essential. Xue Fucheng, for instance, understood that overly forceful language could anger his discursive opponents and result in a set of negotiations being called off.⁴⁶ Such a perspective stands in sharp contrast to He Ruzhang's stern protest against Japanese actions in Ryukyu, and the Japanese response in 'freezing' him out of any further negotiations, as discussed in the previous chapter. Xue also understood the difficulties attendant upon crafting diplomatic notes in a foreign language due to the convoluted language that was employed.⁴⁷ A good example of this was noted by Ernest Satow in his famous guide to diplomatic practice, in which he explains how even the smallest divergence from the first-person 'I' or 'me'—such as the invocation of the third-person 'Undersigned'—could colour a diplomatic communication with an entirely different tone.⁴⁸ Indeed, effective command of the *mot juste* and the *bon mot* mattered, not only for diplomatic relationships, but for peace, trade, and war as well.

The same point applies to the treaty writing process. As Callières noted, treaties needed to be expressed in clear and precise language so as to circumvent the risk of 'divers interpretation' and furthermore to ensure that they did not 'leave the least room for doubt'. To that end, Callières was of the opinion that a 'minister should be a perfect master of the language in which the treaty is written', should know 'the full extent of the significance that may be given to the terms in which [the treaty] is worded' and ought to be able to 'choose the properest and most expressive words.'⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Timothy Hampton, *Fictions of Embassy: Literature and Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 2009).

⁴⁶ Xue, *Chushi gongdu*, 2019, 1:5.

⁴⁷ Xue, 1:5.

⁴⁸ Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, 1917, 1:69.

⁴⁹ Callières, *Art of Diplomacy*, 155–56.

Such a proclamation may sound contradictory given Macartney's central role in the treaty-writing process. However, investing Macartney with the authority to formulate these specialist documents did not mean that the ministers were inept. Rather, this very act of delegation was, like the other new facets of Macartney's role identified in this chapter, highly indicative of the extent to which the ministers *cared* about and *respected* these processes.

The Qing ministers also recognised that when their interests were at stake, it was essential to prepare convincing arguments which invoked the specialist language of international law. While the Qing had learned to cite international law as a convenient shield from as early as the 1860s,⁵⁰ the imbibing of such a worldview was not fully valued until the 1880s. Xue's tenure was, again, particularly significant in this regard, with his famous 1892 essay, 'On the damage done to China due to her being outside the realm of international law' (*lun Zhongguo zai gongfa wai zhi hai* 論中國在公法外之害) marking a definitive turning point in Qing attitudes towards the inherent value of international law.⁵¹

Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Xue was particularly careful to have Macartney draw up communications invoking such specialist turns of phrase.⁵² Macartney helped the legation to navigate this diplomatic idiolect, and to render its arguments and positions in language which not only conformed to normative standards of formality, but also made these views convincing by appealing to a shared ethical framework of standards for diplomatic intercourse. Furthermore, Macartney also made frequent appeal to the idea that Qing China was an active adherent of the values that underpinned international law, and that as the dynasty proactively fulfilled its duties to Britain and other powers, the same courtesy was due to her from them.⁵³ In many

⁵⁰ Chi-hua Tang, 'China-Europe', in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law*, ed. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, Oxford Handbooks in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 703.

⁵¹ Xue Fucheng 薛福成, *Yong'an Quanji* 庸盒全集 [The Collected Works of Yong'an], vol. 1 (Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1971), 350; Satō, *Chishikijin*, 86–88.

⁵² Xue, *Chushi Ying-Fa-Yi-Bi siguo riji*, 157–58, GX16/8/12.

⁵³ For instance, when arguing on Xue's behalf of the right for the Qing to establish consulates in British territories, Macartney stated 'China has never at any time repudiated the obligations imposed

ways, these proclamations also overlapped with Macartney's own career goal: 'to make China ... conform to the usages of civilised nations, and to get England to treat her with the consideration which she would accord to any other great nation.'⁵⁴

Second, Macartney's involvement enabled the legation's written output to conform with expected conventions for letter and treaty writing. Zeng, for instance, recognised the importance of achieving correct form in his communications, and likewise the difficulty of crafting them appropriately. Zeng made reference to the importance of achieving correct 'diplomatic form' on several occasions, despite the fact that he himself was inadequately familiar with such conventions.⁵⁵

Indeed, the production of diplomatic notes and treaties—much like the sorts of Qing documents referenced above—required mastery not only of a specialised linguistic register,⁵⁶ but also a knowledge of context-specific formalities, and an awareness of how such documents ought to be appropriately structured. As noted by Ernest Satow in his famous guide to diplomatic practice, the typical scaffolding underpinning diplomatic notes was comprised of the following: (1) the title of the person addressed (*l'appel* or *inscription*), such as *Monsieur le Ministre*; (2) reference to the person addressed according to their appropriate title of courtesy (*le traitement*), such as *Majesté*; (3) a complimentary phrase that concludes the letter (*la courtoisie*) that 'may express an assurance of respect, consideration, attachment, [or] gratitude'; (4) the signature (*la souscription*), (5) the time and place of writing (*la date*), typically 'placed at the top of the first page,' or, in more formal instances,

on her by the Law of Nations, and her actions, more particularly within the last fifteen years, have been regulated by a general and always increasing conformity to it. I would, therefore, submit that though as yet she may not, excepting in a limited sense, have thrown her country open to Foreigners and Foreign Commerce, she has still done enough to entitle her to hope that the privilege of making Consular appointments in Her Majesty's dominions will be accorded her in the measure, and under the same circumstances and regulations as that privilege is granted to other friendly nations.'

FO17/1104, Xue Fucheng to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sept. 25, 1890. This document is also significant because Xue discusses in his *chushi riji* how it came to be drawn up under the advice of Macartney. See: Xue, 157–60, GX16/8/12, GX16/8/13.

⁵⁴ Boulger, *Macartney*, 482.

⁵⁵ FO881/4521, No. 266, Mr. Plunkett to Earl Granville, Sept. 22, 1880; ACIMC, 1:868, No. 1082, Campbell to Hart, Jun. 28, 1883.

⁵⁶ Jenny Huangfu Day makes a similar observation in: Day, 'Qianyan', 13.

‘at the end of the letter, opposite to the signature’; (6) the name and official designation of the person addressed (*la réclame*), typically ‘placed at the bottom of the first page on the left’; and (7) the address (*la subscription*).⁵⁷ Treaty writing and the processes surrounding it came with its own set of conventions, too.⁵⁸

Whether making the case against a diplomatic sleight, formulating a key demand in a treaty, or even just writing out a routine communication, hitting the mark with regards to these conventions was important for making the legation’s diplomatic interlocutors take its endeavours seriously, and arguably helped to diminish the degree of ‘alterity’ with which the Qing may have been perceived. Consistency was also important in this regard: a unifying authorial voice, spearheaded by Macartney, could help ensure this.

Third, Macartney’s understanding of European politico-diplomatic institutions and international law enabled him to relay or present the institutional quirks of the Qing bureaucracy and the Qing’s positionality vis-à-vis its tributaries and outlying regions (*fanbu*) in terms which were commensurable with European practices and worldviews.⁵⁹

A case in point was the way in which Macartney sought to present to the legation’s interlocutors the nature of the Qing bureaucracy and its procedures for handling diplomatic events. Analyses of the Zongli Yamen have often misconstrued it as functioning in analogous terms to a Foreign Ministry.⁶⁰ As a consequence of this perception, the Qing ministers who served abroad have often been portrayed as subordinate to the Yamen. As stressed in this dissertation’s introduction, however, the ministers were *imperial commissioners* (*qinchai dachen*) who were subservient to the emperor, and the emperor alone, and were *parallel* in status with the Zongli Yamen. The Yamen could not, therefore, issue orders to a minister, but rather could only tender advice or opinions. Yet, in much of the correspondence drawn up by

⁵⁷ Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, 1917, 1:83–84.

⁵⁸ Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green and co., 1917), 172–288.


⁵⁹ For my assessment of how Macartney came to cultivate such knowledge, see footnote 6.

⁶⁰ On this point, see: Hayamaru, ‘Modernization Narratives’.

Macartney, we find the Yamen and its relationship to the ministers presented in terms which were analogous to the relationship between the British Foreign Office and its diplomats serving overseas. Namely, that the Yamen had ultimate control over a unified foreign policy, and that its ministers were to act out this foreign policy abroad. Take, for instance, the first line in Figure 4. Here Macartney employs, on Zeng Jize's behalf, the phrase 'I have been instructed by the Tsung-li Yamen to...'. While seemingly insignificant, such choice phrases helped to create a sense of an hierarchical linkage between the Yamen and the overseas imperial ministers.⁶¹ While the extent to which the ministers were cognisant of this particular endeavour is hard to discern, this can arguably be understood as a further strategy on Macartney's part which aimed to reduce alterity and present Qing practices as corresponding with Western European ones.

Similar efforts towards achieving commensurability can also be observed in one of the treaty drafts Macartney produced during the Sino-French War. One of the reasons why a Sino-French rapprochement had not been achieved despite multiple

Figure 4: Macartney's presentation of the Zongli Yamen in terms commensurable to the British



Source: FO17/967, Zeng Jize to Earl Granville, Mar. 21, 1884. Image reproduced with permission from The National Archives.

⁶¹ Other turns of phrase included, for instance, 'I have been directed by the Tsung-li Yamên to...'. But, in the Chinese translations of Macartney's diplomatic notes, the parallel nature of the relationship is accurately conveyed. To translate 'instructed' or 'directed', the far more neutral verb *zhu* 囑 ('to entrust') is often employed, and when conveying the sense of having been instructed by the Zongli Yamen to pass on a message, we see the formulaic construction of *zhun...zikai* 准...咨開 ('I have received a letter sent from [an institution or person of equal status] stating that...'). Both the verb *zhun* ('to receive') and the noun *zi* ('letter') were only ever used in conjunction with institutions and people of *equal* status.

negotiation attempts was because of conflicting understandings over the nature of what a tribute relationship actually entailed. Although the Qing had accepted total French control over Vietnam since the signing of the Li-Fournier Convention in 1884, the Qing continued to look upon Vietnam as a tributary, leading to a further breakdown in relations. This was problematic for the French, because they considered a ‘tributary relationship’ as equivalent to the Qing exercising suzerainty over Vietnam. However, a tributary relationship never implied a form of suzerain or sovereign control over a region. Such ideas had only become prominent in the nineteenth century when the nomenclature of ‘suzerainty’, ‘suzerain’, and ‘vassal’—all ideas derived from European feudalism and thus used by Westerners to imply a ‘pre-modern’ form of international relationship—had come to be applied to relationships which were not immediately intelligible in Western European diplomatic practice.⁶² And, it was precisely because the French read the Qing-Vietnam tribute relationship through this prism of ‘suzerainty’ that the two attempts at reconciliation launched by Macartney and Robert Hart in 1884 had each foundered. In a last-ditch attempt at reconciliation, Macartney prepared a further version of his previous treaty draft, and had it submitted to Jules Ferry via a private backchannel. In addition to introducing a number of minor modifications to the treaty heads, the new draft also contained a series of explanatory notes which clarified, in terms that the French would recognise, the specific meanings of each of the articles in his original draft. The overarching points it made were crystal clear. First, that the Qing was willing to cede its ‘suzerainty’ over Vietnam to France. Second, that any mention of ‘tribute’ in the treaty was done ‘with the aim of masking the abandonment of China’s rights over Annam and for sparing certain sensitivities, which might be otherwise aroused’. Qing claims of Vietnam’s ‘tributary’ status—or ‘vassal’ status as the French understood it—were thus purely ‘nominal’, and implied no form of control over Vietnam. In other words, rather than negate the French logic, Macartney *engaged* with French understandings to make the Qing

⁶² For an in-depth analysis of these processes, see: Okamoto, *Suzerainty*.

position more accessible, thereby displaying his fluency in two different conceptual realities.⁶³

The final point I wish to make is that Macartney's diplomatic notes and treaties, in conjunction with their Chinese counterparts, arguably also served a didactic function.⁶⁴ Within the legation context, the gradual accumulation of an archive of communications in Western languages, accompanied by their Chinese translation, allowed it to be drawn upon when Macartney was away on official business with the minister, as a reference point for the *chargé d'affaires* and his subordinate staff. Incoming ministers who were keen to learn the ropes and take an active role in policy decisions also drew upon these materials to assist them in achieving diplomatic goals.⁶⁵ Indeed, the 'old case files' (*jiujuan* 舊卷), served both as a repository of formal phrases and epistolary conventions, and as a database of how one's predecessors had managed prior diplomatic agendas. Their existence could assist with the learning of conventions for specialist writing and with the accompanying process of translation, and they could also strengthen institutional memory in an organisation in which the turnover of ministers and their staff meant that institutional memory was constantly at threat.⁶⁶

⁶³ For a more in-depth analysis, see: Barrett, 'Seiyōjin sutaffu'.

⁶⁴ This study does not mean to diminish the significance of other actors who were involved in the production of the original documents and their translations. The translators who rendered these documents into Chinese, and the opinions of the ministers which fed into the original English-language versions must not be discounted. Macartney was one of several interconnected cogs that spun the wheel of didactic utility.

⁶⁵ See, for instance: Xue, *Chushi Ying-Fa-Yi-Bi siguo riji*, 96, GX16/5/12.

⁶⁶ As noted in this dissertation's introduction, it was the minister who had ultimate authority over staffing choices. Consequently, staff who had served under one minister were typically not retained (*liuren* 留任) by the next, leading to the potential for a failure in institutional memory. The 'old case files' were thus integral to the work of a new minister and his staff. In the case of the London legation, Macartney was a key exception. He was constantly retained at the legation under each successive minister. Arguably, this was not least because of the institutional memory he himself had come to embody. When it was decided that Luo Fenglu, a truly fluent speaker of English, would serve as Gong Zhaoyuan's successor, Macartney attempted to resign due to his fear that he might be dismissed by the new minister. Macartney worried that as it had been his command over the English language which had, in part, enabled him to serve so long in his post, Luo would see no need to retain him during his post. Luo was an individual of 'irregular route' (*yitu*) background with a low official rank, who had not passed the imperial examination. Being dismissed by such an individual would thus have been humiliating for Macartney. However, Luo very much recognised the value of Macartney's work,

Figure 5: Contents pages from Xue's *Official Correspondence from My Time Serving Abroad* which shows a list of 'Western-language diplomatic notes'

出使公牘	目錄	十	傳經樓校本
由	新嘉坡總領事官黃遵憲出巡各島情形由	卷八	
洋文照會	與英外部商設英屬各埠領事		
處護照	與英法外部請給姚文棟游歷印度緬甸越南等		
與英外部	與英外部阻止駐緬英員率兵私越滇邊土司		
與義外部	與義外部請交還中華書院產業		
與英外部	與英外部駁除新金山葛龍巴兩處限制華民新		
例	與英外部請代為保護智利厄瓜多兩國流寓華		
民	與英外部請重定英犯梅生罪名		
	與英外部請轉飭駐緬英員撤兵退出漢董地方		
	與英外部請禁止英兵過野人山境		
	與法外部議裁越南等處華民身稅		
	與英外部預擬滇緬劃界事宜		
	與英外部解明會立坎巨提酋之事		

Macartney's diplomatic notes and treaties—albeit refracted through translation—arguably also served a didactic function outside the immediate context of the London legation, thanks to the endeavours of Xue Fucheng, who sought to disseminate knowledge about Western European diplomatic practice through publication in China.⁶⁷ Xue's *chushi gongdu* 出使公牘 (official correspondence from my time serving abroad) included 53 translated copies of 'Western-language diplomatic notes' (*yangwen zhaohui* 洋文照會) that had been sent to representatives of the British, French, Belgian, Brazilian and Italian governments, with many of them having been initially drafted by Macartney (see Figure 5).⁶⁸ The collection not only offered a look into the sorts of issues the legation had to deal with diplomatically, but also offered a sense of the 'abstruse and convoluted' (*jianse jiequ* 艱澀詰屈) logic and linguistic codes in which the documents had been constructed.⁶⁹

and pleaded for him to stay. Boulger, *Macartney*, 472–73. ACIMC, 3:244–245, No. 2597, Campbell to Hart, May 14, 1897.

⁶⁷ Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*, 177.

⁶⁸ Differences in wording can be noted from the originals, however. Aoyama, 'Shusshi nikki', 48–49.

⁶⁹ Xue, *Chushi gongdu*, 2019, 1:8.

The nature of Macartney's communications was thus vital to the mission of the legation. His ability to navigate the linguistic register involved in the production of such documents, to meet normative expectations of formality and epistolary convention, and to embellish his output in the language of international law helped to give the legation's bureaucratic output what we might call a 'professional' quality. His communications thus functioned to deepen the legation's credibility and to diminish the perceived degree of 'alterity' its interlocutors projected upon it. What's more, aspects of Macartney's written output were also invested with didactic utility thanks to the publication efforts of Xue Fucheng which sought to promote better understandings of Western European diplomatic practice in the Chinese context.

2. Macartney as Lead Negotiator

The Qing ministers' newfound recognition of the utility of Western European diplomatic practice also extended to the negotiation process. As noted by previous scholars, the ministers' *chushi riji* had, in the first years of the legations, mainly been emphasised as a platform for recording information and impressions about the workings of Western civilisation. However, from Zeng's tenure onwards, this emphasis began to give way to a more focused interest on legation work and on the diplomatic agenda *du jour*, including the negotiation process.⁷⁰

In addition to the developing interest in recording and publicising information about the negotiation process itself,⁷¹ this qualitative shift could also be observed in how the ministers made reference, both in their private diaries and in those designed for publication, to specific negotiation techniques,⁷² how international law could be invoked to further an argument,⁷³ and even in their laudatory comments about the

⁷⁰ Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*, 16–34.

⁷¹ The representative example of this newfound interest is: Zeng Jize 曾紀澤, *Jinyao choubi* 金輶籌筆 [Preparatory Plans Written from the Envoy's Golden Carriage] (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1964).

⁷² See Zeng's reference to the use of the interpreter as a means to buy time in negotiations: Zeng, *Riji*, 2013, 2:817.

⁷³ Xue, *Chushi Ying-Fa-Yi-Bi siguo riji*, 157–58, GX16/8/12.

diplomatic tact displayed by others.⁷⁴ This newfound regard for the art of negotiation was a world apart from how the Qing had previously approached the negotiation process in the 1840s and 1850s, in which negotiators displayed a tendency—among other things—to prevaricate and attempt to delay negotiations, to proffer bafflingly vague answers, to be deliberately obscurantist on important questions, and to claim to be without sufficient authority to act.⁷⁵ It was even a world apart from the lack of tact the first minister to Britain and France, Guo Songtao, displayed—acting on diplomatic decisions without sufficient thought, and showing and telling all to his British interlocutors.⁷⁶

However, my argument is that the evolution of Macartney's use by the ministers was even more indicative of how the Qing ministers came to regard the negotiation process. Specifically, I claim that this newfound recognition precipitated two fundamental shifts in the way in which Macartney was deployed in negotiations. The first shift was that the utility of Macartney's advice and expertise was recognised and was actively drawn upon both before and during negotiations, effectively rendering him a strategist. Macartney was, after all, the longest serving member of staff at the London legation, and he was pivotal in all facets of its work. The institutional memory and experience he embodied were therefore second to none, and the ministers were very much cognisant of the value of his expertise. The second shift

⁷⁴ In Zeng Jize's journal, we find evidence of his high regard for the negotiational tact evinced by Benjamin Disraeli during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and at the ensuing Congress of Berlin. See entry for GX5/03/05, in: Zeng, *Riji*, 2013, 2:901.

⁷⁵ For a full survey of the 'behavioural patterns' displayed by Qing negotiators at this time, see: Banno Masataka 坂野正高, 'Gaikō kōshō ni okeru Shinmatsu kan'nin no kōdō yōshiki: 1854-nen no jōyaku kaisei kōshō wo chūshin toshite 外交交渉における清末官人の行動様式——一八五四年の条約改正交渉を中心として [The Behavioural Patterns of Late Qing Officials in Diplomatic Negotiations: A Study Focusing Primarily on the Treaty Revision Negotiations of 1854]', in *Kindai Chūgoku gaikōshi kenkyū* 近代中国外交史研究 [Research on the Diplomatic History of Modern China] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970), 77–96.

⁷⁶ ACIMC, 1:275, No. 348, Campbell to Hart, Jun. 1, 1877; ACIMC, 1:302, No. 380, Hart to Campbell, Sept. 18, 1877. Guo also complained of his inability to get his point across to the British: 'in the two years that I have been here, every time I come to debate an issue with the Foreign Office, I am unable to do more than engage in a simple exchange of a dozen or so words. There is no way for me to make my opinions heard as Foreign Office refuses to accept any form of refutation [of their stance].' Guo, *Riji*, 3:591.

was that Macartney was recognised as possessing the ideal qualities to serve as the legation's lead negotiator.⁷⁷ Below, after offering a brief introduction to the evolution in Macartney's role from backchannel negotiator to lead negotiator, and an introduction to the key negotiations that Macartney undertook during his tenure, I will develop an analysis of precisely what it was that Macartney was able to bring to the negotiation table that made his contributions so valuable to the Qing.⁷⁸

From Backchannel Negotiator to Lead Negotiator

Macartney's entry into the world of negotiations began with the backchannel diplomacy of Zeng Jize. Zeng recognised a great utility in the use of backchannels, with their first employment coming during his time in Russia renegotiating the terms of the Livadia Treaty which, as noted in the introduction, had almost resulted in Chong Hou's execution.⁷⁹ Given the treatment Chong Hou had faced as a result of his 'misconduct', Zeng was exceedingly worried about the prospect of renegotiating the terms of the treaty, likening the task to having to 'stop a flowing river and bringing back waves which had already passed' and 'like searching for food in a

⁷⁷ There were of course moments in the negotiation process in which ministerial presence was mandatory. However, even in such instances, Macartney would interpret for the minister and maintain a prominent voice of his own in the talks. A representative example can be observed in: IOR/L/PS/18/B108, No. 1, Conference at the Foreign Office, Sept. 17, 1895. Meetings which typically necessitated ministerial presence included, for instance, the exchanging of signatures and ratification stages of the negotiation process. However, there were also cases of negotiations in which a Qing minister's continued presence was mandated by his diplomatic interlocutor. One such case was the negotiations between Zeng and the Russians preceding the Treaty of St. Petersburg. In this particular instance, Macartney was unable to attend due to the Russians' desire to keep non-Chinese out of the negotiation process. FO881/4521, Inclosure in No. 180, Mr. Plunkett to the Earl of Dufferin, Aug. 6, 1880; ACIMC, 1:626, No. 805, Campbell to Hart, Apr. 15, 1881.

⁷⁸ Xue, for instance stated that 'Should the need arise to find someone to assist in an important set of negotiations, Macartney would be fully up to the task. Utilising his strength will undoubtedly bring marked results that are clear to anyone.' NPM-Q, 131406, Xue Fucheng to the Guangxu Emperor, GX20/3/21 (IR).

⁷⁹ Although not always successful, evidence of Zeng's recognition of the utility of backchannels abounds in the records of the British Foreign Office. See for instance: FO 422/1, No. 57, Viscount Lyons to Earl Granville, Jan 19, 1883; FO 422/1, No. 102, Earl Granville to Mr. Grosvenor, July 2, 1883. For a recent study, see: Zhang Tianen 張天恩, '1883-nen Shinchō no tai-Futsu gaikō ni okeru uramen kōsaku: yoron sōsa, gikai kōsaku to tai-Futsu seisaku 一八八三年清朝の対仏外交における裏面工作——世論操作、議会工作と対仏政策 [Behind-the-Scenes Manoeuvres in the Qing Dynasty's Diplomatic Relations with France during the Confrontation of 1883: The Manipulation of Public Opinion, Lobbying Activities and Policies toward France]', *Tōyō Gakuhō* 102, no. 4 (2021): 27–56.

tiger's mouth which had already been swallowed'.⁸⁰ Prior to departing for St. Petersburg, Zeng called upon Earl Granville to request that Lord Dufferin, Britain's Russian ambassador, 'might be instructed to afford him his unofficial assistance and advice during his mission to Russia', to which Granville acceded.⁸¹ This formed part of a three-pronged strategy. In London, Zeng had occasion to meet with John W. Foster—the soon to be American ambassador to Russia (and later legal adviser to the Qing legation in Washington)—and request his informal assistance as well.⁸² He also made a similar request to the French.⁸³

Once in Russia, Zeng quickly put Macartney and Giquel to work in making secret communications to, at the very least, the British and French embassies in St. Petersburg.⁸⁴ The historical record demonstrates that Zeng used these channels for three specific reasons: (1) to elicit advice and assistance from the British side about how best to proceed in the negotiations, (2) to understand how his diplomatic actions were viewed by third-parties, and (3) to share information, including treaty drafts, so as to prepare the British for the possibility that they might be requested to mediate the crisis.⁸⁵

While the value of the advice and assistance Zeng received from these various sources, British or otherwise, varied, what is important to note here is the extent to which Zeng sought to capitalise upon such channels as a means to augment the efficacy of his diplomacy and to strengthen his chances of diplomatic success. Even before Macartney's more direct involvement, this was already an important indication

⁸⁰ Zeng Jize 曾紀澤, *Zeng Huimin gong (Jie Gang) yiji* 曾惠敏公 (劫剛) 遺集 [Posthumous Collection of the Writings of Zeng Jize], ed. Chen Yunlong 沈雲龍 (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1968), 523, Zeng Jize to Zongli Yamen, GX6/1/24.

⁸¹ FO881/4521, No. 74, Earl Granville to Sir T. Wade, Jun. 2, 1880.

⁸² John W. Foster, *Diplomatic Memoirs*, vol. 1 (Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909), 155.

⁸³ Henri Cordier, 'Nécrologie: Sir Halliday Macartney', *T'oung Pao*, no. 7 (1906): 405–6.

⁸⁴ Zeng, *Yiji*, 553–54, Zeng Jize to Zongli Yamen, GX6/1/24.

⁸⁵ Zeng, 553–54. FO881/4521, No. 178, The Earl of Dufferin to Earl Granville, Aug. 2, 1880; FO881/4521, Inclosure in No. 180, Mr. Plunkett to the Earl of Dufferin, Aug 6, 1880; FO881/4521, No. 248, Mr. Plunkett to Earl Granville (Telegraphic), Sept. 19, 1880; FO881/4521, No. 254, Mr. Plunkett to Earl Granville, Sept. 21, 1880; FO881/4521, No. 264, Mr. Plunkett to Earl Granville, Sept. 19, 1880.

that Zeng recognised that the negotiation process had to be treated with immense care. Furthermore, his use of Macartney and Giquel in this manner was also indicative of a more considered strategy. During his time in St. Petersburg, for instance, Zeng was clearly aware that if any *official* visits were made by him to the British Embassy and he were to meet with the ambassador, this could impede progress in his negotiations with the Russians as ‘wrong construction would be put upon such a visit’.⁸⁶ Macartney’s and Giquel’s presence, entirely unburdened by any form of representativeness, thus enabled him continued access to these networks.

After the return to Western Europe, Macartney continued to play an important role in the diplomatic backchannels which sought to bring an end to escalating tensions between the Qing and France over Vietnam. However, at the same time, he also began to become more involved with the negotiation process in a more official manner. The precedent was set in February 1883, when it was decided by Zeng that Macartney would represent the Qing side in talks with the British on Article III, section 3 of the Chefoo Agreement which concerned the yet-to-be settled issue of duties to be levied on opium imported into China. Zeng deputed Macartney to attend the preliminary informal conference held at the Foreign Office on March 5, 1883 in order to ‘prepare the way and define the precise range of the discussion.’⁸⁷ Following this preliminary meeting, the key points of contention were discussed by the two sides primarily through the exchange of memorandums, right up until the eventual exchange of signatures on July 18, 1885. Significantly, each of the Qing memorandums was written in Macartney’s trademark hand.⁸⁸ Macartney’s involvement wasn’t limited just to the rhetorical formulation of the Qing position, however. Key strategy for the negotiations had been pre-formulated by Macartney in

⁸⁶ FO881/4521, Inclosure in No. 180, Mr. Plunkett to the Earl of Dufferin, Aug. 6, 1880.

⁸⁷ FO405/27, No. 22, Sir J. Pauncefote to Sir L. Mallet, Feb. 23, 1883; FO405/27, Earl Granville to the Marquis Tsêng, Mar. 1, 1883. FO405/27, No. 31, Memorandum by Mr. Currie, Mar. 5, 1883. For Macartney’s internal memorandum of the meeting see: Boulger, *Macartney*, 410–11.

⁸⁸ FO17/939, Zeng Jize Memorandum, Mar. 12, 1883; FO17/967, Zeng Jize Memorandum, Mar. 21, 1884; FO17/967, Zeng Jize Memorandum, Sept. 27, 1884.

an internal memorandum which served as an *aide-memoire* to Zeng during the negotiations.⁸⁹

The next set of negotiations that Macartney handled, through a mix of in-person encounters and correspondence, was his private interactions with Arthur Meyer, editor of the French *Le Gaulois* newspaper, in which he sought—but ultimately failed—to find a means for Sino-French rapprochement during the war of 1884 and 1885. In an official capacity, however, it was from the latter half of the 1880s that Macartney truly came to shine. From 1886 until his retirement in 1905, Macartney worked on the frontlines of the three key sets of negotiations undertaken by the London legation in this period, all in the capacity of lead negotiator: the London-based portion of the negotiations on Britain's annexation of Burma (January 23 to April 27, 1886), the Burma-Yunnan border demarcation negotiations (September 2, 1892 to March 1, 1894), and the negotiations concerning the importation of Chinese labour into the Transvaal (March 1 to April 15, 1904). However, if we broaden our definition of 'negotiations' to include more routine face-to-face meetings and short-term talks which did not necessarily produce a treaty, the full extent of his involvement becomes clear. Indeed, he visited the British Foreign Office on a frequent, if not daily, basis. In a memorial to the Guangxu emperor, Xue Fucheng revealed that Macartney had played an important part in discussions which

Figure 6: Macartney and Luo Fenglu in discussions with Japanese representatives at the Bank of England at the payment of the final instalment of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki indemnity



Source: *The Graphic*, May 14, 1898.

⁸⁹ Boulger, *Macartney*, 405–8.

concerned the establishment of a Consul-General post in Singapore, the anti-missionary riots of the 1890s, the establishment of a chieftain in Hunza who would be jointly subordinate to Britain and China, and on the return of territory in the Little Pamirs to China.⁹⁰ It was during these more routine visits to the Foreign Office that such discussions occurred. Macartney also represented China at several more minor events and meetings. These included the 1903 talks on the introduction of the gold-exchange standard into China and other silver-using countries, at which he was joined by Ivan Chen 陳貽范, Secretary Interpreter to the Legation,⁹¹ and at the discussions at the Bank of England for the payments of the instalments of the indemnity arising from the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. As Figure 6 demonstrates, at the final session he was accompanied by minister Luo Fenglu 羅豐祿.⁹²

Why, then, did Macartney come to play such a central role in the negotiations the legation was tasked with undertaking from the 1880s onwards? Below, I have identified six reasons why giving Macartney the keys to the door of the negotiation room benefited the Qing position.

First, as argued by many of the great ambassadorial handbooks, to negotiate successfully and effectively required sophisticated oratorical skills.⁹³ Extemporaneous and immediate access to the *bon mot* and *mot juste* were essential, as negotiators needed to be able to deliver, at the drop of a hat, oratorical *tours de force* which were both persuasive and sophisticatedly articulated, and which conveyed a profound sense of conviction. What's more, being able to manipulate the very *impermanence* of orality was crucial to finding success. Indeed, as Filippo de Vivo has identified, this impermanence could give negotiators access to a toolbox of

⁹⁰ NPM-Q, 131406, Xue Fucheng to the Guangxu Emperor, GX20/3/21 (IR).

⁹¹ FO17/1614, Zhang Deyi to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Jun. 5, 1903; ACIMC, 3:738, No. 3160, Campbell to Hart, Jun. 12, 1903; United States Commission on International Exchange, *Stability of International Exchange: Report on the Introduction of the Gold-Exchange Standard into China and Other Silver-Using Countries* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), 13; 139; 141.

⁹² 'A Check for £11,008,857', *New York Times*, Mar. 13, 1904.

⁹³ Callières, *Art of Diplomacy*, 175–76.

strategies which were otherwise unavailable in writing.⁹⁴ Orality invested negotiators with the ability, *inter alia*, to hedge or reduce the impact of their statements, to seek out personal sympathy, to assert or simulate empathy, and to feign ‘extemporaneousness’ by making hypothetical suggestions appear as if they were spontaneous initiatives when considerable planning and thought had, in fact, gone into them.⁹⁵ Inevitably, such tools were far more easily accessible to Macartney than to his colleagues. He was, after all, a native speaker who, as identified above, was decidedly in possession of a literary skillset.⁹⁶

With regard to the tools identified by de Vivo, we find evidence of Macartney hedging or playing down the impact of Qing demands,⁹⁷ seeking out personal sympathy,⁹⁸ feigning extemporaneousness,⁹⁹ and also simulating empathy.¹⁰⁰ In analysing the records of Macartney’s utterances in these negotiations, we also find additional strategies at play that would be inappropriate in formal written communications. The most apparent of these are Macartney’s frequent appeals to emotion, particularly with respect to the ideas of probity and reciprocity, the latter of which was a key component of the worldview espoused by international law. For instance, during a meeting held on September 2, 1892 with British Foreign Office and India Office representatives on the demarcation of the Burma-Yunnan boundary,

⁹⁴ Filippo de Vivo, ‘Archives of Speech: Recording Diplomatic Negotiation in Late Medieval and Early Modern Italy’, *European History Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (2016): 529–30.

⁹⁵ de Vivo, 529–30.

⁹⁶ This is, of course, not to rule out the potential for non-native speakers to achieve refinement in such skills, but the reality was that the Qing ministers and their subordinate staff typically did not have access to such talent. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, even when speakers with a deft command of English *were* members of the legation, they lacked training in specialist subjects and negotiational tact at this particular time.

⁹⁷ For instance, during a meeting on the Burma-Yunnan frontier, Macartney asked the British, ‘Is it really worth while to make such difficulties as to the question of the possession of insignificant places of little or no importance?’ IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 15, Meeting, Jul. 31, 1893.

⁹⁸ For instance, in a meeting with British representatives regarding the Burma-Yunnan frontier, Macartney intimated that Xue’s life was potentially at risk if negotiations didn’t go his way. IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 6, Notes of the Conversation at an Unofficial Meeting, Jan. 3, 1893.

⁹⁹ ‘Sir H. Macartney then made a personal suggestion, which he said *had just occurred to him. ...*’. IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 20, Meeting, Oct. 18, 1893.

¹⁰⁰ As Macartney’s invocation of this tool was highly contingent upon what I define as ‘strategic orientalisising’, I deal with it in its own separate point below.

Macartney ‘somewhat theatrically’ asked: ‘And is the Decennial [Tribute] Mission and the withdrawal of the Tibet Mission *the only compensation* to be accorded to China *in return for the great sacrifices she made in 1886 and her benevolent attitude towards Great Britain* on the occasion of the annexation of Upper Burma?’¹⁰¹

Similarly, during a later meeting of representatives on December 29, 1892, Macartney sought to remind his British interlocutors of the ‘benevolent attitude which China had consistently adopted towards Great Britain during the annexation of Upper Burmah [*sic*], and since that date’, and that such ‘friendliness and good-will *deserved some recognition* on the part of England, and it would be a *graceful act* if she were to cede the territory claimed by China’.¹⁰²

Intimating undesirable consequences was another important tool that Macartney frequently invoked. For instance, in one meeting of the Burma-Yunnan border demarcation negotiations, Macartney intimated that if a speedy settlement was not arrived at in relation to the status of territory which lay to the east of the Irrawaddy River, a breakdown in negotiations, or even conflict between the two sides, could occur. Macartney referred to Yao Wendong 姚文棟¹⁰³ who, having been previously in a legation post, now ‘exercised considerable influence in the Chinese official world’ and explained that because the British had previously filed a complaint to the Qing government about Yao’s conduct, he ‘was now employed in fomenting an anti-British agitation’ on the Burma-Yunnan frontier demarcation question and had suggested, with the active support of ‘prominent officials at Peking’, that ‘China should send

¹⁰¹ My italics. IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 1, Meeting, Sept. 2, 1892. The ‘decennial mission’ was a British concession to the Qing that proposed that British Burma continued to send a decennial tribute mission to China, while the ‘Tibet mission’ was a proposed expedition into Tibet by the British that would assess the viability of opening a trade route into the region from Sikkim.

¹⁰² My italics. FO17/1175, Foreign Office to India Office, Jan. 10, 1893.

¹⁰³ After finishing his tenure at the Qing legation in Berlin, Yao planned to travel home via Burma to assess the situation on the frontier. It was arranged that he and his interpreter would be provided with a British escort upon arriving in Burma who would take them to the Chinese frontier. However, Yao did not honour this promise, and never made himself known to the British authorities when he arrived in Burma. This led to the British filing a complaint against his conduct to the Qing. FO881/6259, No. 59, Sir J. Walsham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Feb. 11, 1892.

expeditions into the Kachin hill country'.¹⁰⁴ A speedy settlement, he asserted, could avoid such an outcome.

Similarly, in an aside in a later meeting on October 18, 1893, Macartney averred that, as the incoming minister to Britain, Gong Zhaoyuan 龔照瑗, 'was quite ignorant of trade matters, ... if the discussion of this question was postponed until the arrival of the new Minister, no understanding was likely to be arrived at for a couple of years, whereas the present Minister, who was going to take his seat on the Board of the Yamen, would be in a position to induce his colleagues to ratify any arrangement arrived at by him in London.'¹⁰⁵ A further drawing out of negotiations was precisely what the British didn't want. Macartney played to these concerns.

Second, Macartney, as a Briton, could also appeal to ideas of Qing otherness in his negotiations when forwarding arguments, positions, or demands which he understood to be untenable from the British perspective. I term this phenomenon 'strategic orientalisering'. Many of the moments in which Macartney invokes this strategy appear, on the surface, to be contradictory. Why would he go out of his way to belittle the very people for whom he was seeking to achieve diplomatic breakthroughs? In the light of his array of negotiational skills, this can surely be interpreted as a careful and considered strategy. By strategically denigrating Qing views and ideas, and thereby appealing to ideas of British civilisational superiority, Macartney was crafting an impression of empathy with his British interlocutors. Indeed, by presenting a sense that 'the Qing are a lost cause, but only by humouring their strange logic can you get what *you* want from these negotiations', Macartney was able to soften the blow of demands and positions which he understood to be potentially unreasonable from the British perspective.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 6, Notes of the Conversation at an Unofficial Meeting, Jan. 3, 1893. The British at the time had been involved in putting down revolts in the Kachin territory, which had highly displeased the Qing.

¹⁰⁵ IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 20, Meeting, Oct. 18, 1893.

¹⁰⁶ Many of these strategies likely drew on Macartney's own prejudices, too, of course. The fact they were used strategically, however, is a point of great significance.

A frequent idea that Macartney invoked in this regard was the idea of Qing *amour-propre*, albeit sometimes explained away as Qing ‘vanity’.¹⁰⁷ Ideas pertaining to the Qing obsession with ‘face’ (*timian* 體面) had, by the late nineteenth century, become a popular idea in discussions of the Chinese character and were often cited disparagingly.¹⁰⁸ This idea had, in fact, been something that Macartney had first played with in the treaty draft he submitted to Jules Ferry via a private backchannel in 1885. The Qing desire to continue to view Vietnam as a tributary had been worded using this sort of language,¹⁰⁹ and Macartney, in the accompanying explanatory notes for his treaty, explained that his treaty had been worded in such a way as to avoid offending Qing sensibilities, but that it nevertheless gave the same material advantages to France that had been promised to her by the Li-Fournier Convention of 1884. This strategy carried over to the negotiations for which he was responsible. For instance, when discussing the issue of potentially delimiting the Siam-China frontier with the British, he stated that:

¹⁰⁷ ‘[Macartney] also laid claim to a place called Hanlung Kwan in the neighbourhood of the Shweli river, adding that China attached much importance to her claim on these two parts of the frontier on “sentimental” grounds; in fact, from motives of “vanity.” He intimated that a concession in this respect would facilitate a settlement, but was not prepared to offer any equivalent concession elsewhere.’ IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 5, Meeting, Dec. 29, 1892.

¹⁰⁸ James St. André, ‘How the Chinese Lost “Face”’, *Journal of Pragmatics* 55, no. Sep (2013): 68–71.

¹⁰⁹ In the article that the Qing would use as the justification for continuing to look upon Vietnam as a tributary—Article 4—it was stated that France, in all future treaties signed between itself and Vietnam, would undertake ‘not to insert any expressions which would injure the prestige and dignity (*weiwang timian* 威望體面) of China’. When the French signed the Second Treaty of Huế with the Vietnamese in 1884, in one of the articles it was stated that Vietnam would recognise and accept the protectorate of France. This was deemed as contradicting what the Qing had understood the French to have agreed to in the Li-Fournier Convention. While the Qing had ceded control over Vietnam to France in Article 1 of the Li-Fournier Convention, any terms which implied that *another* country was hierarchically superior to Vietnam other than China was seen as injuring Chinese prestige. Whilst often seen as a silly instance of Sinocentrism, the reality was that it had a lot to do with realpolitik. Just as was the case with the loss of the Ryukyu Kingdom, the Qing was exceedingly concerned that the termination of tributary relations, or even just a perceived termination, could ultimately lead to a knock-on effect on its relationship with Chosŏn Korea, the crown jewel of all of its tributaries. The Qing saw Chosŏn as holding immense significance as a buffer state for its ancestral Manchu home, particularly from the Japanese, and as the ideal instantiation of all its tribute relationships. On this point, see: Okamoto, *Chūgoku no tanjō*; Wang, *Remaking the Chinese Empire*. Even just the removal of one of these states from the list of tributary states that featured in the *Collected Statutes of the Great Qing* (*Da Qing huidian* 大清會典) could be exceedingly damaging for domestic and foreign perceptions of dynastic legitimacy. FO881/5381, No. 176, Sir P. Currie to Mr. Godley, Mar. 20, 1886.

China, though fully aware that Siam was an independent State professed to look upon it as a vassal kingdom, and that this *pretension, ridiculous as it was admitted to be*, even by Chinese officials, would always be stoutly asserted if questioned by a Foreign government. No Chinese official would be found willing to take part in such a delimitation, involving, as it did, a practical repudiation of the Chinese contention that Siam is subject to China. There would be considerable risk that the proposed delimitation, if undertaken at this moment without the consent of China, might be considered as an additional ground of offence. Could not the frontier simply be ascertained without an actual process of delimitation? It would probably not be objected to.¹¹⁰

His crafting of a condescending and disparaging tone played to Western self-perceptions of civilizational superiority, but in the service of Qing interests. And, in this particular instance, he was apparently successful, with the British noting privately that, his ‘announcement appears very important, for it makes it doubtful whether we can carry out our project for defining the Siam-China Frontier without causing further offence to China ...’.¹¹¹ Keeping the Qing on its side was essential for Britain at the time, especially given its value in staving off the Russian threat to British India.¹¹²

Another interesting example from the Burma-Yunnan border demarcation negotiations came when Macartney was attempting to have Britain render the region of Kachin a neutral territory into which there would be equal rights for both British and Qing troops to be sent in punitive columns. He played on ideas of Qing institutional ineptitude to suggest that the Qing would never actually exercise its

¹¹⁰ My italics. IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 6, Notes of the Conversation at an Unofficial Meeting, Jan. 3, 1893.

¹¹¹ IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 6, Notes of the Conversation at an Unofficial Meeting, Jan. 3, 1893.

¹¹² It was precisely for such reasons that the Foreign Office took particular note of Macartney’s warnings, stating to the India Office that ‘in Central Asia [China’s] co-operation is of the greatest value to us; that in the settlement of the Pamir question her cordial friendship is of the first importance; and that any unnecessary action on our part that would alienate her at this moment would be disastrous.’ FO881/6367, No. 4, Foreign Office to India Office, Jan 5, 1893. On the Russian threat, see: Sasaki Yō 佐々木揚, ‘Igirisu Kyokutō seisaku to Ni-Sshin kaisen イギリス極東政策と日清開戦 [Britain’s Far East Policy and the Outbreak of War between Japan and Qing China]’, *Saga Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu Kenkyū Ronshū* 29, no. 1 (1981): 26; Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 127–28.

right to do so anyway. The British, therefore, had nothing to lose by making such a concession.¹¹³ Similar points were also made about the stubborn and benighted nature of specific members of the Qing bureaucracy, with the implication being that appeasing them would be the only way to get what the British needed.¹¹⁴

Another important aspect was the fact that Macartney's central role in all aspects of legation affairs since the early 1880s also enabled him, when engaging in these negotiations, to cite the role-specific knowledge he had accrued over the course of his tenure. During negotiations, this knowledge enabled him, for instance, to apply his intimate understanding of past treaty precedents when arguing on the Qing behalf,¹¹⁵ and to make nuanced arguments about why certain articles in a treaty needed to be worded in a specific way.¹¹⁶ When we contextualise these abilities against the backdrop of the precarious nature of institutional memory at the legation, the

¹¹³ 'He alluded also to the Tonkin precedent to show that the Chinese Government, after disavowing for a long time the acts of marauding bandits, would suddenly throw off the mask and make an attempt to punish or repress them a *casus belli*. On these grounds Sir H. Macartney very earnestly pressed on our consideration the question of neutralising the Kachin territory, adding that, though it would be stipulated that China, equally with Great Britain, should possess the right of sending punitive columns into the tract when necessary, *he thought that, judging from analogy and the well-known characteristics of Chinese administration, it might be anticipated that practically China would never avail herself of this right.*' IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 6, Notes of the Conversation at an Unofficial Meeting, Jan. 3, 1893.

¹¹⁴ For instance, at one point during the Burma-Yunnan border demarcation meetings, Macartney was asked whether Xue Fucheng would agree to the re-insertion of a clause pertaining to the creation of a telegraph line between China and Burma. Macartney, while stating that Xue recognised the utility of the telegraph and would be glad to see it established, he would be unable to agree to the insertion of such a clause because 'he could not safely propose it except under the plea of necessity for communication with a Chinese Customs [post] at Bhamo'. The establishment of a Customs post in the Bhamo region had been one of the key points that Macartney had been consistently arguing for throughout the negotiations. The British, in response, asked whether the need to communicate with the proposed Qing consul in Rangoon would not be reason enough for this extension of the telegraph line in Burma. In response, Macartney relayed that Xue 'felt sure that the head of the Chinese Telegraphic Department, to whom the subject would be referred, would refuse it' and 'explained confidentially that the Chief of the Telegraphs in China was a brother-in-law of [Xue] and a man of very *retrograde tendencies*. The Department was in the hands of a ring of Mandarins who divided the profits among themselves.' The only way to see to them agreeing to it, therefore, would be to agree to the creation of a Customs post at Bhamo. IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 32, Meeting, Feb. 9, 1894.

¹¹⁵ 'With regard to the question of transport, Sir Halliday pointed out that Article V of the Treaty of Peking provided that...'. FO2/899, Engagement of Chinese Labourers, Feb. 24, 1904.

¹¹⁶ 'With regard to the last sentence of this Article, Sir Halliday said that the wording as given in the latest edition of the Convention was not sufficiently precise; it implied that.... This was not the intention of the Chinese Government.' FO2/899, Engagement of Chinese Labourers, Third Meeting of the Committee, Mar. 16, 1904.

significance of his ability to employ such skills takes on even greater levels of significance.

It was also this respect for Macartney's knowledge and expertise that rendered him a key aide in strategy formulation, and which gave him considerable latitude to proffer his own policy recommendations, as we saw above with his *aide-memoire*.¹¹⁷ For instance, Macartney sought to use the two sets of Burma negotiations he was involved in as a way to help the Qing achieve further territorial expansion. When the first set of negotiations began after the British annexation of the country in 1886, the Qing legation pushed for the cession of Bhamo in northern Burma as a concession in compensation for British machinations. It was widely understood that this idea derived from advice Macartney had proffered to Zeng Jize.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, during the Burma-Yunnan border demarcation negotiations, after British troops had made their way into Sadon, Macartney advised Xue to use this event as an opportunity to pursue a policy of claiming that the mountainous region to the north of it (*yeren shandi* 野人山地) was a no-man's land—or *terra nullius*—and therefore to persuade the British into agreeing to a division of land between the two powers.¹¹⁹ With Xue's blessing, Macartney subsequently pushed exceedingly hard for this idea in the negotiations.¹²⁰

The next point is that Macartney's position constituted a textbook case of what Abraham de Wicquefort described in his famous *The Ambassador and His Functions* as a 'minister of the second order'.¹²¹ Precisely because Macartney was *not* the minister, and was therefore not a representative of the Qing emperor, he was entirely

¹¹⁷ In a similar fashion to that of McCartee, Macartney also engaged in his own private study of diplomatic questions. One instance comes with the crisis over Vietnam. Boulger, *Macartney*, 364.

¹¹⁸ FO17/1061, No. 73, Mr. O'Connor to the Earl of Rosebery, Mar. 6, 1886. ACIMC, 2:301, No. 1403, Campbell to Hart, Mar. 12, 1886; 2:317, No. 1420, Hart to Campbell, Apr. 18, 1886. The 'holiday concoction' Hart notes in his no. 1420 is a reference to *Halliday* Macartney.

¹¹⁹ Xue Fucheng 薛福成, *Chushi gongdu* 出使公牘 [Official Correspondence from My Time Serving Abroad], vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhaohua chubanshe, 2019), 717, GX17/12/24. Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 134–42, 147.

¹²⁰ See, for instance: FO881/6259, No. 90, Foreign Office to India Office, Jun. 28, 1892.

¹²¹ Wicquefort, *The Ambassador and His Functions*.

unburdened by any form of representative capacity.¹²² This meant that, as a negotiator, he was free to entertain a variety of strategies, such as those listed above. Zeng himself had learned of the dangers involved in first-hand negotiation by a minister. At one moment during his time negotiating in Russia, the Russians threatened that they would send a fleet to Beijing and have the negotiations carried out there instead. This vague threat apparently terrified Zeng and, in his anxiety to prevent such a catastrophe, he said to the Russians that he was ‘prepared to go so far as to leave the whole territory of Kuldja in the hands of Russia, and to give an undertaking that China would never try to obtain possession of it again, except by diplomatic procedure.’¹²³ The return of Kuldja, otherwise known as Ili, was one of the fundamental tasks entrusted to Zeng.¹²⁴ This slip jeopardised that. Thankfully for him, the Russians were by this point more concerned about teasing out an indemnity from the Qing, rather than the issue of territorial expansion. Sending Macartney in for subsequent negotiations could prevent future crises of this sort, precisely because he was devoid of any representational capacity in the negotiation context. In other words, anything he said or did could be retroactively negated by the minister, and the blame for any perceived lack of action or effort on the Qing part could be apportioned to him, without any serious consequences for the minister.

¹²² The importance of Macartney’s position as a ‘minister of the second order’ was also relevant to the legation’s written output. For instance, as noted above, during the discussions on the additional article for the Chefoo Treaty, Macartney effectively negotiated on Zeng’s behalf through a series of memorandums in Zeng’s name. Within the first of these, we find a clear statement about Macartney’s input into Zeng’s decision-making process: ‘Mr. Macartney has led the Undersigned to believe that the proposition, as above summarized, is rather the solution which Her Majesty’s Government would *prefer* to give to the difficulties which have hitherto stood in the way of their accepting the Chefoo Agreement, than the only satisfactory one which, in their opinion, the question is capable of receiving’. (FO17/939, Zeng Jize Memorandum, Mar. 12, 1883). Invoking Macartney’s name here arguably allowed for a cushioning of Zeng’s position should the British have taken umbrage at it. At the same time, making Macartney’s contributions *visible* helped endow his interactions with the Foreign Office with authority and credibility, and also made clear to the Foreign Office that Macartney was integral to the legation’s decision-making process.

¹²³ FO881/4521, No. 315, Mr. Plunkett to Earl Granville, Oct 25, 1880.

¹²⁴ Russia had occupied Ili from 1871 due to the Muslim uprisings in the region, putting it under temporary protection and promising to eventually return it to the Qing. However, Chong Hou’s treaty had ceded the entirety of the region to Russia and given many other material advantages. Zeng was thus tasked with undoing the damage of the Livadia Treaty, which included getting Ili returned.

For instance, during the negotiations over the Burma-Yunnan frontier, Li Hongzhang reported to the British that Xue had stated to him that the ‘difficulty of coming to an arrangement in London was due to Sir Halliday Macartney’s action’ and that he had been made a ‘tool’ of Macartney. What’s more, Xue was apparently of the opinion that had negotiations with the British been opened in Beijing on the matter, a conclusion might have been more speedily reached.¹²⁵ Yet, despite such claims on Li’s part, Xue had in fact kept the matter entrusted to Macartney, and just one year later, in a memorial sent to the Guangxu emperor eulogising Macartney’s dedication to the Qing cause, his efforts in the issue were recognised as amongst his crowning achievements, with Xue stating that during the negotiations, ‘Macartney demonstrated an unbridled commitment to helping find ways to benefit China’.¹²⁶

In the above case, it was precisely Macartney’s *lack* of representativeness that allowed the Qing to apportion blame to him. On the flip side, however, Macartney’s position as lead negotiator also meant that, should the need arise, his *perceived* representativeness could likewise be invoked as a convenient scapegoat. Sometimes, policy goals for the ministers were circumscribed by imperial edict, which meant that a minister ‘must be able to show very strong reasons why he did not carry out the Imperial behest.’¹²⁷ One wrong turn could be detrimental, even resulting in the loss of life, as was quite nearly the case with Chong Hou. Zeng was reluctant to take on the St. Petersburg treaty negotiations for this reason, and Xue Fucheng, during the negotiation of the Burma-Yunnan frontier, was warned by two friends, one a member of the Board of Censors, that ‘he must be very careful as to any arrangement that he made with regard to the frontier, and particularly as to the country to the east of the Irrawaddy.’¹²⁸ A mistake could spell the end not only of Xue’s social status back in China, but could also result in the severing of his head. Macartney’s assumption of

¹²⁵ FO881/6367, No. 9, Mr. O’Conor to the Earl of Rosebury, Nov. 22, 1892.

¹²⁶ NPM-Q, 131406, Xue Fucheng to the Guangxu Emperor, GX20/3/21 (IR).

¹²⁷ FO881/6648, No. 73, Mr. O’Conor to the Earl of Rosebery, Feb. 2, 1894.

¹²⁸ IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 6, Notes of the Conversation at an Unofficial Meeting, Jan. 3, 1893.

the role of negotiator therefore functioned as an additional buffer to Xue and the other ministers' personal safety, as an unsuccessful outcome could be blamed on him.

On several occasions, however, Macartney's privileged position and the latitude he had been afforded to act in negotiations could come back to bite. The British were often wary of Macartney's position, with the Viceroy of India stating in confidence on one occasion to the Earl of Kimberly, the head of the India Office, that it wasn't clear if Macartney's words actually represented the Zongli Yamen's position during the negotiations he led for the Qing side on the demarcation of the Burma-Yunnan border.¹²⁹ Furthermore, during a meeting in March 1904 on the introduction of Chinese labour into the Transvaal, the British side was quite aghast to discover that Macartney had been acting entirely on his own initiative with regard to a proposal that had been made by the British.¹³⁰ The British reprimanded him for this, with the record stating that the British 'informed Sir Halliday that every proposal on any point of consequence which was made by the British members of the Committee had received the sanction of the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and the Colonies, to whom reports of what had taken place were sent after each meeting, and that he had always been under the impression that the Chinese Minister was being consulted by Sir Halliday in the same manner'.¹³¹ While letting this fact slip was perhaps an act of misjudgement on the part of Macartney, this situation also allows us to confirm the extent of latitude he was granted by the ministers; another key indicator of *mufu* practice.

Another important aspect of Macartney's role in negotiation work was that he could help create knowledge and foster understanding about Qing China's politics, political figures, the nature of its administration, and the nature of its relationships with its tributaries. His deployment of 'strategic orientalisering', arguably helped achieve this too, even if the terms in which the information had been couched was

¹²⁹ FO17/1175, The Viceroy of India to the Earl of Kimberly, Jan. 11, 1893.

¹³⁰ FO2/899, Engagement of Chinese Labourers, Fifth Meeting of the Committee, Mar. 21, 1904. See also accompanying handwritten note by Villiers.

¹³¹ FO2/899, Engagement of Chinese Labourers, Fifth Meeting of the Committee, Mar. 21, 1904.

negative or disparaging. He also worked to create strategically imperfect knowledge about the Qing bureaucracy's systems for handling diplomatic issues. As noted earlier, Macartney often embellished his communications in language which created the image of the Zongli Yamen as a centralised Foreign Ministry with control over the Qing ministers. This was often the case in negotiations, too, where we find Macartney using such language as 'he was instructed by the Minister, acting under the *orders* of the Yamen, ...' and '[t]he Chinese Minister is *instructed* by the Yamen to claim...'.¹³²

Finally, Macartney's involvement in negotiations may well have possessed didactic utility for both serving and future legation staff. When Macartney was negotiating *alone*, the Qing were not learning from him. It was a sign that the legation still relied upon outsourcing, which was one of the key aspects of *mufu* practice. However, from the end of 1892, the legation began to send individuals in with him, the first being an unidentified Chinese clerk in the Burma-Yunnan Frontier negotiations.¹³³ Perhaps most significant, however, was the fact that Ivan Chen was present with Macartney at the Transvaal negotiations and the discussions on the introduction of the gold standard into China.¹³⁴ In the case of the former, Chen even briefly joined in with a discussion about how to render a term into Chinese, and also drew up a piece of correspondence addressed to the British side.¹³⁵ This is significant, for Chen would go on not only to serve as one of Macartney's effective successors at the legation,¹³⁶ but as an important professional diplomat in his own right during the Republican period.

¹³² My italics. IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 2, Meeting, Sept. 8, 1892.

¹³³ See, for instance: IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 5, Meeting, Dec. 29, 1892; IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 7, Meeting, Feb. 17, 1893; IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 13, May 31, 1893; IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 14, Meeting, Jul. 7, 1893.

¹³⁴ FO2/899, *passim*. FO17/1614, Zhang Deyi to the Marquis of Lansdowne, Jun. 5, 1903; ACIMC, 3:738, No. 3160, Campbell to Hart, Jun. 12, 1903; United States Commission on International Exchange, *Gold-Exchange Standard*, 13; 139; 141.

¹³⁵ FO2/89, Engagement of Chinese Labourers, Second Meeting of the Committee, Mar. 11, 1904; FO2/899, No. 56, Ivan Chen to Mr. Pearson, May 5, 1904.

¹³⁶ ACIMC, 3:934, No. 3415, Campbell to Hart, Dec. 29, 1905. The other was John McLeavy Brown, who joined the legation in 1907 after a long service as Inspector General of the Korean Maritime Customs Service.

The significance of the experience he gained through his participation in these negotiations therefore ought not to be underestimated.¹³⁷

Macartney's transformation into the legation's lead negotiator thus brought the legation significant benefits in a period when the importance of diplomacy had come to be fully recognised, but was still beyond the reach of the Qing. The ministers and their staff, while sometimes able to communicate in passable English, lacked training in the oral delivery of language and in the art of successful negotiation. This was problematic as the art of negotiation was so heavily dependent upon oral fluency, command over the *bon mot* and *mot juste*, the effortless application of the tools of orality, and even the ability to convincingly dissimulate through appropriate language choices where necessary. The role that Macartney came to assume, however, demonstrated that the ministers nevertheless recognised these shortcomings and sought to overcome them by deploying him to negotiate on their behalf. The art of diplomacy, and therefore negotiation, now mattered to the ministers, and Macartney's deployment demonstrated this.

The indeterminacy, or in-betweenness, of Macartney's status also became a useful tool for the ministers. Only the minister represented the emperor. Macartney, as Secretary, and later, Counsellor, was therefore *not* representative. His lack of representativeness therefore functioned as a convenient shield for the Qing when he was negotiating with his European diplomatic interlocutors. In other words, if a mistake was made, Macartney's lack of representativeness could be cited to negate it. However, at the same time, precisely because he was, in most cases, the only person negotiating for the Qing, his *perceived* representativeness could likewise be called upon by the ministers if they needed to protect themselves from a potential fall from grace in the Qing bureaucratic context. At the same time, this very in-betweenness was also what enabled Macartney to cultivate cultural commensurability around the

¹³⁷ This point therefore connects with Hakoda Keiko's argument that the Qing legations constituted an important training ground for future ministers. Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 161–91.

Qing's positions and institutional traditions, and what enabled him to employ the tactic of 'strategic orientalisng'.

3. Macartney as Press Officer

In the preceding two sections, we saw how the Qing ministers' deployment of Macartney as the legation's lead rhetorician and negotiator revealed a newfound care and respect for the intricacies of Western European diplomatic practice. Indeed, by the application of Macartney's competencies in these two contexts, the ministers arguably sought to foster a greater sense of credibility around their endeavours, to augment the potency of their arguments, and to diminish the perceived degree of 'alterity' that their interlocutors projected upon them.

The same aspirations also permeated the work that the ministers had Macartney conduct in the capacity of press officer. Systematic news management in the diplomatic context is typically understood to be a product of the post-World War I age, in which 'public diplomacy' came to the fore as a key policy goal.¹³⁸ This view makes sense: the importance of news management or courtship of the press was not something which had been given clear articulation in any of the early modern ambassadorial handbooks, nor in Ernest Satow's twentieth-century guide to diplomatic practice. If anything, virtue lay, instead, in keeping quiet about the delicate task of diplomacy.¹³⁹

That being said, the appetite for information on diplomacy and foreign affairs, at least in the English public sphere, was already flourishing by the late sixteenth century.¹⁴⁰ And, by the nineteenth century, further shifts had emerged. Foreign offices were publishing records of negotiations—'blue books' in the British context, 'yellow books' in the French—in increasing quantities.¹⁴¹ The newspapers, too,

¹³⁸ Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 203.

¹³⁹ 'The New Diplomacy', *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, Feb. 6, 1884.

¹⁴⁰ Kiséry, 'Diplomatic Knowledge'.

¹⁴¹ Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 203.

scrambled to publish nuggets of information which provided a glimpse behind the veiled curtain which was drawn over negotiations.

Zeng Jize evidently perceived the significance of counteracting misinformation and of encouraging knowledge of his and the Qing's diplomacy in the public sphere. His proactive work in this regard arguably came to prefigure the post-World War I move towards systematic news management efforts as noted above, and was perhaps impelled by the ignorance and myths circulating regarding China at the time. For instance, during the height of the Vietnam difficulties, the French cabinet published a series of Sino-French dispatches on the matter which portrayed the actions of the Qing in an 'improper light'.¹⁴² As the *North China Herald* noted in 1884, 'it amounted, in fact, to an *ex parte* statement, calculated to mislead the public, and was a *suppressio veri* which appeared to the Marquis Tsêng to involve a serious *suggestio falsi*.'¹⁴³ In light of this, Zeng made the decision to publish the counter-dispatches in the Parisian press so as to give the European public 'an opportunity of judging the merits of the question'.¹⁴⁴ While this constituted an 'utter disregard for all proper diplomatic reticence' and therefore enraged the French, the *Herald* saw his actions as perfectly just, opining that '[w]hat good or useful end would have been served by permitting a one-sided and therefore false and mischievous impression to prevail, when a little frankness, a simple statement of facts, was all that was necessary to clear the atmosphere?'¹⁴⁵ Such efforts to correct the public record were also considered by the newspaper to be indicative of the emergence of a 'new diplomacy'.¹⁴⁶

How then did Macartney serve these purposes? Under Guo Songtao's tenure, Macartney had privately contributed to accounts of the Guo embassy in *The Graphic* and *The Illustrated London News*.¹⁴⁷ He had also lent his name to Guo's letter which

¹⁴² 'The New Diplomacy'.

¹⁴³ 'The New Diplomacy'.

¹⁴⁴ 'The New Diplomacy'.

¹⁴⁵ 'The New Diplomacy'.

¹⁴⁶ 'The New Diplomacy'. On this point also see: Zhang, 'Uramen kōsaku'.

¹⁴⁷ Boulger, *Macartney*, 282.

was sent in protest to the *Shenbao* 申報 after Guo had come under attack by the newspaper.¹⁴⁸

While drawing up defences of personal character and probity would continue to be a feature of Macartney's role as legation press officer, Zeng's recognition of the significance of counteracting misinformation and of encouraging knowledge about the personae and endeavours of Qing diplomacy shifted Macartney's travails to focus chiefly on diplomacy. Indeed, in the management of information over how the legation's diplomacy was perceived, Macartney's rhetorical prowess was put to use in rebutting false claims made about the ministers and their diplomacy, most usually by having Macartney send in a letter to the editor of a newspaper, in most cases *The Times* (see example in Figure 7). Using these letters as a means to propagate the perspective of the Qing legation, Macartney refuted distortions and fabrications of the ministers' views,¹⁴⁹ defended the Qing's legation-building efforts,¹⁵⁰ and, as was the case under Guo Songtao's tenure, dispelled misinformation about the conduct of the legation and its staff.¹⁵¹

Figure 7: Extract from one of Macartney's letters to *The Times*

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Sir,—In a somewhat facetious article, entitled "Chinese Diplomatic Representation Abroad," which recently appeared in *The Times*, a correspondent, with less than the accuracy which generally characterizes the communications of your correspondents on Chinese matters, makes some remarks to which I would desire your permission to call attention. I do not intend to traverse every remark to which I might possibly take exception, but only to take up a few of the more important of them. A word as to the policy of China as unfolded by "the dignified old gentleman" whom your correspondent depicts as sitting under "a dirty shed in Peking," and returning to each demand of the Foreign Ministers an emphatic *non possumus*, excepting on occasion when, the invitation having been sufficiently pressing, they are said to know full well the road to Canossa. I do not know that amongst people at all acquainted with Chinese matters this would generally be accepted as a correct description either of Chinese policy or of the temple from which it is proclaimed. And I am certain that none of the European Ministers at Peking would recognize it as anything but a leaf torn from a chapter of comparatively ancient Chinese history. No one who knows anything of China will accuse her of disregarding or being reluctant to fulfil her treaty obligations; and if, as your correspondent states, the treaties themselves are so contrived as to be "exercises of ingenuity in delay and avoiding their operation," China, having had so little to do in drafting them, can scarcely be held responsible for their defects. Defects they have, but it is China, and

Source: Halliday Macartney, 'Chinese Diplomatic Representation Abroad', *The Times*, Jul. 1, 1890.

¹⁴⁸ Rudolf G. Wagner, 'The Shenbao in Crisis: The International Environment and the Conflict Between Guo Songtao and the Shenbao', *Late Imperial China* 20, no. 1 (1999): 107–43.

¹⁴⁹ Halliday Macartney, 'Russia and China', *The Times*, Apr. 17, 1880; Halliday Macartney, 'The Marquis Tseng', *The Times*, Aug. 7, 1884, 4; *The Times*, Nov. 28, 1884, 9.

¹⁵⁰ Halliday Macartney, 'Chinese Diplomatic Representation Abroad', *The Times*, Jul. 1, 1890.

¹⁵¹ Halliday Macartney, 'China and Russia', *The Times*, May 18, 1880; Halliday Macartney, 'The British Girls in Peril', *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, Apr. 18, 1898.

However, Zeng and the other Qing ministers also recognised that issuing public rejoinders which invoked Macartney's, or the minister's name, were not always appropriate. When information management was necessary, but it was inappropriate for Macartney or the minister to endorse it publicly, Macartney, with ministerial blessing, turned privately to his contacts in the press to influence the public narrative.¹⁵² This strategy was at its height during the Sino-French War, with two key collaborators being Macartney's friend and biographer Demetrius Charles Boulger,¹⁵³ and M. Blowitz, *The Times*' Paris correspondent.¹⁵⁴

Superficially, the sorts of content which Macartney wrote about and shared with journalists were both unsurprising and perhaps even mundane. However, information management and the careful cultivation of image in the press was extremely important to the legation's diplomatic process, even if its significance had yet to be appreciated more broadly. It mattered because the newspaper was one of the key mediums through which information and impressions were formed outside of the formal channels of negotiation and diplomatic interaction. Newspaper clippings abound in the diplomatic archives of all the powers in this period, demonstrating their relevance to policy making. Furthermore, the verification of information sourced from newspaper pages was *frequently* brought up in the negotiation process. Jaundiced information could not only undermine negotiations and rapprochement efforts, but also edge an already agitated actor closer to war, or help to confirm a pre-existing prejudice. Misleading representations of the legation and its staff could likewise affect credibility during negotiations, and even affect the willingness of the other party to engage. In addition, as public opinion, at least among those with suffrage, was crucial to those in power, well designed information manipulation that

¹⁵² Examples of this abound. See discussion in: ACIMC, 1:847, No. 1062, Campbell to Hart, Apr. 5, 1883; ACIMC, 1:869, No. 1082, Campbell to Hart, Jun. 23, 1883. For the resulting articles, see: 'China and Tonquin', *The Times*, May 1, 1883, 7. *The Times*, May 2, 1883, 9. *The Times*, Jun. 26, 1883, 9.

¹⁵³ 'China and the Capture of Sontay', *The Times*, Dec. 31, 1883, 7; 'France and China (from a Correspondent)', *The Times*, Nov. 17, 1884, 4; 'France and China (from a Correspondent)', *The Times*, Nov. 22, 1884, 10.

¹⁵⁴ Boulger, *Macartney*, 366–67; 'France, China, and Tonquin', *The Times*, Sept. 21, 1883, 3.

induced sympathy, or called out infractions of accepted principles, could impact politicians in representational polities.

One other key characteristic of Macartney's work as a press officer which went beyond the immediate context of information management pertaining to the legation, its staff, and its diplomatic endeavours was his effort, particularly under Zeng, to critically challenge how China was perceived more broadly. In his letters to *The Times*, for instance, Macartney corrected information about members of the Qing bureaucracy,¹⁵⁵ warned about how other countries' conduct could encourage the Qing to pursue a course of war,¹⁵⁶ and also challenged reports about Qing effiteness on the battlefield.¹⁵⁷ No endeavour exemplifies this better than Macartney's work on giving rhetorical form to Zeng Jize's ideas about China's future trajectory in 'China, The Sleep and the Awakening', an article which was published in the January 1887 issue of the *Asiatic Quarterly Review*.

As the title suggests, the article comprised two parts. Part one, the 'Sleep', characterises Europeans' picture of the China of yesteryear; a China which had become intoxicated by the wine of her own greatness, a greatness which was propped up by the splendid achievements of her civilization, the 'fumes of incense brought by many embassies from far-off lands, the inferiority of the subject races that looked up to her', and 'the perfect freedom from the outer din ensured to her by the remoteness of her ample bournes'.¹⁵⁸ But she was now clambering out of this soporific state. Part two, the 'Awakening', averred that the Chinese, in transitioning to this state of lucidity, would, as a 'peaceful people', not seek violent redress for the acts that the Europeans had inflicted upon China and her tributaries, nor would they hunger after the acquisition of further land which was 'so characteristic of some other nations'.¹⁵⁹ That was not all, however. Part two was also a vigorous statement of intent for what was to come now China had awakened. Manchuria, Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan

¹⁵⁵ Halliday Macartney, 'China and the Pamirs', *The Times*, Mar. 14, 1893.

¹⁵⁶ *The Standard*, Nov. 2, 1883, 4.

¹⁵⁷ Halliday Macartney, 'The Korean Sedan', *The Times*, Nov. 8, 1894.

¹⁵⁸ Jize Zeng, 'China, The Sleep and the Awakening', *Asiatic Quarterly Review* 3, no. 1 (1887): 2.

¹⁵⁹ Zeng, 5.

(Xinjiang), would be properly cultivated and colonised to allow for the ‘equable distribution of the population’ (as well as for economic and military purposes).¹⁶⁰ An industrial revolution was also to be unleashed through ‘the establishment of manufactures, the opening of mines, and the introduction of railways’, once her security needs had first been met with her ‘coast defences and the organization and development of her army and navy’.¹⁶¹ Her future foreign policy was also clearly mapped out: she would extend and improve her relations with the treaty powers; ameliorate the condition of her subjects residing abroad; revise the unequal treaties she had been subjected to; and make the relationship between her and her tributaries—so often misunderstood by the Western powers—as unequivocal as possible, exercising a ‘more effective supervision’ over them and accepting a ‘larger responsibility for them than heretofore’.¹⁶²

It is difficult to discern how much of the content in the article was concocted by Macartney, and how much by Zeng. However, on the need to bring greater clarity to the precise nature of the relationship of the tributaries and the outlying regions (*fanbu*) to the Qing, we can find some of its ideas expressed in a letter of Zeng’s to Li Hongzhang.¹⁶³ It therefore seems likely that the core ideas were developed by Zeng, but that Macartney gave them a rhetorical form and flourish in English.¹⁶⁴ Macartney’s involvement was important because, through the use of his ‘literary’ skillset, he was able to embellish Zeng’s arguments in a way which was culturally attuned to the classically educated elite. He developed Napoleon’s putative metaphors in the title into an allegorical personification of China. He employed alliteration (‘that she had been sleeping in the *vacuous vortex* of the storm of forces *wildly whirling* around her’) to make the piece engaging.¹⁶⁵ Biblical references worked

¹⁶⁰ Zeng, 4–5.

¹⁶¹ Zeng, 5–7.

¹⁶² Zeng, 8–9.

¹⁶³ Zeng, *Yiji*, 612–13, Zeng Jize to Li Hongzhang, GX11/7/9.

¹⁶⁴ Macartney nevertheless appears to have cared deeply about this issue, as we can perceive from a letter he later sent to Zeng on the issue: Boulger, *Macartney*, 438.

¹⁶⁵ Zeng, ‘Sleep and Awakening’, 3.

to appeal to the reader's sense of the moral high ground; that is, China's side.¹⁶⁶

Clever literary references, such as to Keats' *Hyperion: A Fragment*, also provided the inspiration for some of the rhetorical flourish in Macartney's prose.¹⁶⁷

The text was also thoroughly anchored in the Victorian zeitgeist and some of the major ideas that characterised the era intellectually. The 'Sleep' exhibited a Gibbonian sense of China's decline and fall, seasoned by Spencer's Social Darwinism, whose coining of 'the survival of the fittest' was an easy justification for the current surge of European colonialism in the 'endless struggle for existence'.¹⁶⁸ He then countered it with an assertion: 'Fortunately, however, there is no reason to believe it is',¹⁶⁹ and then developed an argument, perhaps redolent of Macaulay's Whig history, with its march of progress, or perhaps adopting Spencer's Lamarckian tendencies, to advance a Lamarckian argument about how China was learning to defend and peacefully assert herself among other nations: 'each encounter ... has, in teaching China her weakness, also discovered to her her strength.'¹⁷⁰

These sorts of implicit references, in addition to helping make Zeng's argument compelling and relatable to its Western audience, also gave it a degree of cultural and intellectual cachet that would help convince readers to take its proclamations seriously.

¹⁶⁶ Zeng, 5. The Book of Exodus' 'eye for an eye' was, for instance, invoked to call out the hypocrisy of the West in its failing to mete out sufficient punishment for the vile and xenophobic treatment Chinese immigrants had received in plugging labour shortages in America and elsewhere: 'There is no question of an eye for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth, excepting when the unfortunate offender belongs to the nation of the almond eye'.

¹⁶⁷ Zeng, 2. I owe this insight to Chris Murray's work: 'This did something to rouse China from the Saturnian dreams in which she had been so long indulging...'. As Murray points out, 'the poem recounts the myth in which "Old Saturn lifted up | His faded eyes, and saw his kingdom gone" ... The poem invites association with China where Thea performs a kowtow to the fallen Saturn: "She touch'd her fair large forehead to the ground".' Chris Murray, *China from the Ruins of Athens and Rome: Classics, Sinology, and Romanticism, 1793-1938* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 212–13.

¹⁶⁸ 'There are times in the life of nations when they would appear to have exhausted their forces by the magnitude of the efforts they had made to maintain their position in the endless struggle for existence; and, from this, some have endeavoured to deduce the law that nations, like men, have each of them its infancy, its manhood, decline, and death. Melancholy and discouraging would be this doctrine could it be shown to be founded on any natural or inevitable law.' Zeng, 'Sleep and Awakening', 1.

¹⁶⁹ Zeng, 1.

¹⁷⁰ Zeng, 4.

In helping to proselytise Zeng's statement of intent for how the Qing would approach its tributaries and outlying regions (*fanbu*) going forward, further indications of Macartney's ability to execute adroit acts of cultural commensuration were also on display: 'The *Warden of the Marches* is now abroad, looking to the security of China's outlying provinces—of Corea, Thibet [*sic*] and Chinese Turkestan.'¹⁷¹ The 'Marches' were the regions on either side of the Scottish-English border, delineated by treaty in 1249. Following the English invasion of Scotland in 1296, wardenships were created to lord over these frontier regions, so as to protect them from the threat of invasion.¹⁷² The 'Warden' was a metaphor for the heavier hand that the Qing was now exercising, or was contemplating exercising, over these regions as a result of the lessons it had learned from the annexation of Ryukyu, Vietnam and Burma by the imperial powers.¹⁷³ In the erstwhile *fanbu* of Xinjiang, Xinjiang province (*Xinjiang sheng* 新疆省) was established in 1884, extending the *direct* rule of the emperor there. Its 'Warden' was, therefore, the newly-established Governor of Gansu and Xinjiang (*Gansu-Xinjiang xunfu* 甘肅新疆巡撫). Meanwhile, as a means to protect Chosŏn Korea from imperial encroachment, from the mid-1880s onwards, the Qing effectively rendered Chosŏn (in what we would understand in Western terms) a vassal state under Qing *suzerainty*.¹⁷⁴ Its 'Warden' came with the posting of Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 as Qing Imperial Resident there in 1885. As for Tibet, unequivocal claims to Qing *sovereignty* over the region would have to wait

¹⁷¹ Zeng, 9.

¹⁷² R. R. Reid, 'The Office of Warden of the Marches; Its Origin and Early History', *The English Historical Review* XXXII, no. CXXVIII (1917): 479–96.

¹⁷³ The annexation of Ryukyu, Vietnam and Burma had made the Qing realise that if it wanted to keep its outlying regions (*fanbu*) within its domain, and if it wanted to maintain its erstwhile relationship with Chosŏn Korea, the crown jewel of its tributaries, new forms of relationships with these areas had to be devised. Motegi Toshio famously coined these processes a "modern recalibration" (*'kindai' teki saihen* 「近代」的再編) of the traditional forms of relationships that had existed between the Qing and these regions. Motegi Toshio 茂木敏夫, *Henyō suru kindai Higashi Ajia no kokusai chitsujo* 変容する近代東アジアの国際秩序 [Shifts in International Order in Modern East Asia] (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1997), 44–80. For a full empirical survey of how these 'modern recalibrations' were enacted, see: Okamoto, *Chūgoku no tanjō*.

¹⁷⁴ The best work on the topic is: Okamoto, *Zokkoku/jishu*. For a Western perspective, see: Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade*.

until 1905 when the Qing engaged in negotiations on the region with Britain.¹⁷⁵ At any rate, such a statement served as a warning to those countries which were looking to dislodge these regions from Qing influence, and the implication was that Qing *sovereignty* extended, or would soon extend, to Tibet and Xinjiang, and that Qing *suzerainty* existed in Chosŏn Korea.

The article was, therefore, a coruscating display of the full range of Macartney's literary skillset, culturally attuned to the classically educated elite. It co-opted (the 'Sleep') in order to confound (the 'Awakening') the Victorian hermeneutic of late Qing effete-ness, ineptitude, and self-conceitedness. Macartney's involvement was crucial, providing the embellishment, rhetorical panache and cultural cachet the article needed to make it relatable and impactful in the eyes of the Western reader.

The power of Macartney's rhetoric was also important because China and its people, from the common man through to the diplomat, were subjected to a never-ending barrage of unflattering essentialist portrayals in many broadsheets and magazines of the day. His involvement therefore empowered Zeng's arguments in such a way as to allow them to confound and transcend the prototypical essentialising and orientalisating discourses, thereby helping China to be perceived in more equitable terms.

The final point I wish to note is that, while the Qing ministers' understandings of the value of the press underscored Macartney's press officer role, the British press, and its readers' desire for up-to-date information on China, also came to shape the contours of the role. As a fount of knowledge on China and its diplomatic affairs, Macartney, over time, became the de facto port of call for the press on Chinese matters, particularly when they required reassurance. Consequently, Macartney figured as a reactive agent in these endeavours, as the press would seek *him* out for an interview, particularly from the 1890s onwards. Key examples included interview requests concerning the status of British residents of China during the anti-foreign riots of the 1890s and during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. However, clarification was

¹⁷⁵ Okamoto, *Chūgoku no tanjō*, 335.

also a key reason for the press requesting information from Macartney, with examples ranging from reports on war to the mirth-inducing, such as rumours of an embassy ghost.¹⁷⁶ The shifts in Macartney's role, while most prominently evincing the evolution of Qing attitudes to legation practice, were thus in part also shaped by the requirements and expectations of British society.

To summarise, then: Zeng and his successors' recognition of the significance of counteracting misinformation or encouraging knowledge about Qing diplomacy through the press resulted in Macartney's development into a press officer. This application of Macartney was significant for it was a further indication of the ministers' respect and care for the negotiation process. Misinformation could, after all, have a negative impact on negotiations. At the same time, as evinced by his involvement in developing the rhetorical dress for Zeng's 'China. The Sleep and the Awakening', this function of Macartney's was also developed beyond the immediate context of information management about the legation and its diplomacy, and was used to defend and cultivate more flattering and assertive images of China in the West. However, in time, Macartney's press officer function also came to be shaped by British society and its growing need and appetite for information on China, as evinced by the litany of interview requests Macartney began to receive from the 1890s onwards.

4. Macartney as Networker

The final shift I have identified in Macartney's role was his function as a networker. However, unlike the previous three shifts, I argue that this function was not by ministerial design. Rather, it was an inadvertent consequence of: (a) the three other functions he had taken on from the 1880s onwards, (b) his frequent attendance at non-diplomatic events and other social functions, sometimes in the capacity of Qing representative,¹⁷⁷ (c) his visibility in these roles and at these events, (d) the

¹⁷⁶ 'An Embassy Ghost', *Dundee Evening Telegraph*, Oct. 21, 1903.

¹⁷⁷ Two examples are when Macartney attended a garden party held at Marlborough House with Zeng in July 1884, and when Macartney attended a requiem mass for Alfonso XII of Spain as Qing

prestige, status, and social capital which accrued both as a result of this visibility, and also as a result of the people he associated with in discharging these duties, (e) the additional status and reputation that accrued to him through his marriage to a woman of French aristocratic background and through other forms of self-fashioning, and (f) the longevity of his tenure at the legation which afforded him the opportunity to forge and sustain friendships, cultivate social capital and prestige, and gain trust. Macartney's expanding web of contacts redounded to Qing benefit by creating new means for information collation and diplomatic breakthroughs. However, there was a caveat: in order to hold onto this new status and to the privileged access to information and people that it yielded, Macartney needed, from time to time, to compromise his status, offering information and hints to others in return.

As argued above, one of the key benefits Macartney brought in assuming the role of the legation's lead negotiator for the Qing ministers was that his position, as Counsellor, *lacked* any form of representativeness. However, this did not mean that the Foreign Office, press, and other members of society were unaware of his centrality to legation affairs.¹⁷⁸ Indeed, he permeated them: he interpreted for the ministers, he wrote on behalf of them, he assumed the face of them at negotiations and other events, and he defended the ministers and the dynasty they served in the papers. Macartney was, therefore, a walking diplomatic conundrum: he was both representative yet unrepresentative at the same time.

In assuming these various roles, be it rhetorician, negotiator, press officer, interpreter, or Qing representative at a party, Macartney was encountering a great many people, both in person and through the constant flow of correspondence he produced. Whether he was responding to a letter from a far-off place, visiting the Foreign Office on a routine visit, courting a correspondent's request for an interview

representative in December 1885. *The Morning Post*, Jul. 26, 1884, 3; *Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser*, Dec. 7, 1885, 8.

¹⁷⁸ For instance, during the Transvaal negotiations, the British noted that 'Sir Halliday spoke all the time as if the whole question was being managed by him, which is no doubt the case' and even referred to the 'Chinese Legation' as being nothing more than a nominal designation for Macartney. FO2/901, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, Oct. 6, 1904.

during a crisis, or just attending a social function, Macartney was constantly expanding both his network of contacts and his own profile. His marriage to Jeanne du Sautoy—later known as ‘Lady Macartney’—of French aristocratic background, also connected him to networks further afield in France and Paris.¹⁷⁹ What’s more, unlike his Qing colleagues, who were circumscribed, as per the ‘regulations for serving overseas’ (*chushi zhangcheng* 出使章程), to serving a tenure of three years (although exceptions did occur, as was the case with Zeng), Macartney was a constant presence in contrast to the revolving door of staff arrivals and departures at the legation. Friendships could therefore blossom, and trust could accrue. There often simply wasn’t enough time for the ministers and the staff who accompanied them to achieve this.¹⁸⁰

More formal expressions of the trust and respect placed in Macartney also arguably helped to augment his profile. On the Qing side, he was elevated from Secretary to Counsellor—the second in command to minister—sometime in 1883,¹⁸¹ and received a plethora of other honours for his work.¹⁸² On the British side, he received a Companionship of the Order of St. Michael and St. George (CMG) in May 1881,¹⁸³ and a Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George

¹⁷⁹ Boulger, *Macartney*, 394. This was Macartney’s second marriage. He had previously married in China.

¹⁸⁰ There were, of course, important exceptions. The Qing legation in Tokyo, through ‘brush talk’ (C. *bidan*, J. *hitsudan*) engaged in cross-cultural dialogue with many Japanese intellectuals. Chen Jitong, who was based at the Paris legation, also courted many high-fliers in Parisian society. However, scholars have yet to reveal if any of these friendships and connections had an impact beyond cultural exchange and for the Qing’s diplomatic agendas in the traditional sense. Zhang, *Bunjin gaikōkan*; Ren, ‘Conférencier’.

¹⁸¹ The earliest reference to Macartney as a counsellor (*canzan* 參贊) that I have located is in a memorial penned by Zeng Jize in July 1883. Zeng, *Yiji*, 252, Zeng Jize Memorial, GX9/6/17.

¹⁸² Macartney received an Honorary Consul-General title (*zonglingshi xian* 總領事銜) by 1883 (Zeng, 252, Zeng Jize Memorial, GX9/6/17); had been honoured with the 3rd class of the 2nd grade of the Double Dragon (*shuanglong baoxing* 雙龍寶星) award in 1883 (QSL, J172, GX9/10); the 1st grade of the same class in 1901 (QSL-GX, J172, GX9/10; *The Times*, Sept. 6, 1902); had his ancestors ennobled (*fengdian* 封典) three generations back in 1892 (*The Times*, Dec. 31, 1892, 5); and was awarded the wearing of the peacock’s feather (*hualing* 花翎) in 1897 (QSL-GX, J406, GX23/6).

¹⁸³ Boulger, *Macartney*, 361.

(KCMG) in August 1885.¹⁸⁴ These expressions of gratitude elevated his societal status and were also an indication of how his work was appreciated by both sides.¹⁸⁵

Macartney also evidently worked to highlight his otherness in social settings. He, with ministerial backing, pushed for royal exemption to enable him to accept and to wear his order of the Double Dragon in both 1883 and 1902.¹⁸⁶ In the capacity of Master of Ceremonies, he hosted elaborate receptions at the legation house on Portland Place, which were attended by ‘grand ladies’ and ‘distinguished representatives of rank and fashion’.¹⁸⁷ At more private dinner parties, attended by key movers and shakers in British society,¹⁸⁸ he regaled his guests with stories of his time in China, such as when his friend Charles ‘Chinese’ Gordon kept the severed head of a Taiping commander. He also used these opportunities to show off his handsome Chinese servant, Alli, who, ablaze in ‘gorgeous Chinese apparel, was an ornament to the party’.¹⁸⁹ Such props—both material, or in the case of young Alli, human—arguably constituted a form of self-fashioning that helped make Macartney stand out.

So, Macartney’s burgeoning profile and increased embeddedness in elite social circles, and the trust and friendships he could cultivate because of the longevity of his tenure, enabled him access to a vast range of people and made him a natural point for unofficial contact. How then, might such factors have redounded to Qing benefit?

The first point goes back to his work as a press officer. It was Macartney’s relationships with Boulger and Blowitz which enabled him and Zeng to influence how

¹⁸⁴ FO17/990, Halliday Macartney to the Marquis of Salisbury, Aug. 29, 1885. Boulger, 394.

¹⁸⁵ Boulger, 361.

¹⁸⁶ FO17/957, Zeng Jize to Earl Granville, Jul. 31, 1884. See discussion in accompanying internal memorandum. ACIMC, 3:677, No. 3090, Campbell to Hart, Sept. 26, 1902.

¹⁸⁷ Boulger, *Macartney*, ix.

¹⁸⁸ His dinner parties were attended by many famous politicians, aristocrats, writers, scientists, and painters, including the likes of Lyon Playfair, George Romanes, Anna Swanwick, Thomas Faed, Mary Frances Scott-Siddons, Thomas Wemyss Reid, Joseph Thomson, Henry Saville Clarke, Major Wooley, Lord Houghton. Boulger, viii–ix.

¹⁸⁹ Boulger, viii; James Crichton-Browne, *What the Doctor Thought* (London: Ernest Benn, 1930), 173–74.

information about Qing diplomacy was presented in the press. What's more, Boulger was also the editor of the *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, the journal which had featured Zeng's 'China, The Sleep and the Awakening'.

In the case of the Foreign Office and other departments of the British government, the relationships Macartney cultivated helped him to pull in favours,¹⁹⁰ collate private information,¹⁹¹ hold private and unofficial meetings,¹⁹² and even to make private statements during official visits. In the case of the latter, when the Burma-Yunnan border demarcation negotiations he had been tasked with negotiating weren't going to plan, during a visit to the Foreign Office on February 1, 1893, he expressed in a private capacity his concern about the way in which the issue was developing and urged the British to find a way to compromise as the Qing government often had a tendency to be 'perfectly friendly up to the moment before most serious decisions were announced by the Chinese Representative to the Government concerned'.¹⁹³ This was an unequivocal instance of Macartney's 'intimation of undesirable consequences' strategy. Yet, such appeals were taken seriously precisely because of the positive reputation Macartney had fostered in British society. This is suggested by how Lord Rosebery, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, responded to this appeal of Macartney's:

[Lord Rosebery] thinks it right also, in order to save the responsibility of this Department for future eventualities, to call Lord Kimberley's serious attention to Sir H. Macartney's observations, made privately and in confidence, and not at all in language of irritation or menace. Sir H. Macartney has very great experience of Chinese methods of thought and policy, and, although doubtless desirous of loyally serving the Government by whom he is employed, and obtaining for them advantageous terms, he is

¹⁹⁰ 'I reminded Dr. Macartney that all I had said was purely from myself, but, having now been in intimate official relations with him for about four years, I felt I could not do him better service than by inculcating moderation.' FO422/1, No. 52, Mr. Plunkett to Earl Granville, Aug. 16, 1883.

¹⁹¹ 'According to [information] passed on in private to my counsellor of legation, Macartney, by Peide'er 配德爾, an official in the India Office...' Zeng, *Yiji*, 299, Zeng Jize Memorial, GX11/7/1.

¹⁹² 'Sir Halliday Macartney having requested a private meeting with the British delegates...' IOR/L/PS/18/B65, No. 6, Notes of the Conversation at an Unofficial Meeting, Jan. 3, 1893.

¹⁹³ FO17/1175, Foreign Office to India Office, Feb. 6, 1893.

certainly well disposed also to his own country. ... [I]t seems to Lord Rosebery most desirable that every effort should be made to treat the Chinese Government in a conciliatory spirit, and to endeavour to find the terms of a reasonable compromise.¹⁹⁴

These friendships could also pave the way for diplomatic breakthroughs and progress. At a dinner party held by Zeng at the legation on December 2, 1882, Julian Pauncefote and Macartney entered into private discussions surrounding the resumption of negotiations on the ratification of the Chefoo Convention. Two conflicting interpretations exist regarding who approached whom, but that is immaterial here.¹⁹⁵ In private moments and at informal gatherings Macartney both approached, and was approached by, his associates at the Foreign Office. Tangible outcomes or diplomatic progress often resulted. In this particular case, having received the green light from Macartney for a new attempt at resuming negotiations, Earl Granville reached out to Zeng by letter on January 31, 1883 to suggest a resumption, to which Zeng agreed.¹⁹⁶ Negotiations could thus begin at the dinner table.

Requests for beginning new endeavours to break diplomatic deadlocks could also come from beyond Macartney's immediate network as well. In October 1884, a new set of informal negotiations with an eye to achieving rapprochement in the Sino-French War, began between Macartney and the editor of the *Le Gaulois* newspaper, Arthur Meyer,¹⁹⁷ who had strong links to the Ferry government.¹⁹⁸ In this case, it

¹⁹⁴ FO17/1175, Foreign Office to India Office, Feb. 6, 1893.

¹⁹⁵ ACIMC, 1:799-800, No. 1011, Campbell to Hart, Dec. 8, 1882. Boulger, *Macartney*, 409. Also see reference in: Zeng, *Riji*, 2013, 2:1272, GX8/10/22.

¹⁹⁶ FO17/939, Earl Granville to Zeng Jize, Jan. 31, 1883.

¹⁹⁷ Boulger, *Macartney*, 371-92. Meyer's name and his affiliation is redacted in Boulger's biography, and is only given in Zeng's report to the Zongli Yamen about Macartney's correspondence with him. See: ZLYM, 01-24-015-02-007, Zeng Jize to Zongli Yamen, GX10/12/6.

¹⁹⁸ As to the reasons why Zeng agreed to Macartney engaging with Meyer in the first place, in a report sent by Zeng and received by the Zongli Yamen on January 21, 1885, he explained that in the West, many newspaper editors such as Paul-Armand Challemeil-Lacour (a French statesman) and James Russell Lowell (an American diplomat) were individuals of high social status who had previously served in political or diplomatic roles. As such, he thought it unwise to ignore Meyer's letter. While it is difficult to discern to what extent Zeng and his successors saw the value of Macartney's own social capital, his awareness of such matters is important, for it indicates, in the very

was likely Macartney's unique profile, recently bolstered by his marriage into French aristocracy, that made him the obvious point of contact for Meyer.¹⁹⁹

However, in order for Macartney to hold onto this privileged access to confidential information, private meetings, and other opportunities, he had, at times, to be forthcoming with his own confidential information, and needed to assist his contacts with their own queries and issues. The Foreign Office, for instance, sought from time to time to have Macartney exert influence on the minister on certain points,²⁰⁰ and would also privately sound out with Macartney the viability of their ideas for ways out of a diplomatic deadlock with China.²⁰¹ Macartney, too, proffered confidential information to the Foreign Office without ministerial approval, if concessions of detail might serve the greater good for the Qing.²⁰² It would be unwise to label such acts as a subversion of legation affairs or as an irresponsible shirking of his responsibilities. In making such gestures, Macartney was, after all, risking his relationship with the Qing ministers, the very people who had, in employing him, endowed him with this special status in British high society in the first place.

The new roles which the ministers delegated to Macartney, and the access to people and prestige that these roles brought, thus created the conditions for enabling

least, that the ministers recognised the importance of networking and associating with important figures. See: ZLYM, 01-24-015-02-007, Zeng Jize to Zongli Yamen, GX10/12/6.

¹⁹⁹ Macartney's marriage to Jeanne du Sautoy on August 12, 1884 was taken up by the leading French newspapers of the time, including *Le Matin*, *Le Temps* and Meyer's own paper, *Le Gaulois*. Some of these articles introduced Macartney's decidedly unique career in Qing service, and likely helped elevate his profile within French society. *Le Gaulois*, Aug. 14, 1884; 'Un Grand Mariage: Le Secrétaire de l'ambassade Chinoise a Londres Épouse Une Française', *Le Matin*, Aug. 13, 1884; *Le Temps*, Aug. 14, 1884.

²⁰⁰ The Foreign Office attempted to use Macartney to influence Xue Fucheng to agree to the appointment of British consuls in Xinjiang, for instance. See Foreign Office note attached to: FO17/1104, Halliday Macartney to Thomas Sanderson, Dec., 31, 1890.

²⁰¹ 'I went to see Sir H. Macartney at the Chinese Legation today, and asked him whether he thought the Chinese Govt. were likely to allow an arrangement to be made for the collection of emigrants at Canton for transshipment at Hong Kong on the basis of the Wuchow-Hong Kong arrangements.' FO2/901, Foreign Office to Colonial Office, Oct. 6, 1904.

²⁰² '[Macartney] stated as his private opinion that the Yamen would probably make no serious difficulty in regard to annexation if the existing rights of the Emperor of China in regard to Burmah [*sic*] were recognized. ... I am to request that Sir H. Macartney's observations, which were made in a private conversation, may be treated as strictly confidential.' FO881/5218, No. 140, Sir P. Currie to Mr. Godley, Dec. 9, 1885.

Macartney access to confidential information, new avenues for diplomatic breakthrough, and other opportunities that could redound to the legation and its diplomatic agendas. However, in order to hold onto his access to these people and the opportunities they provided, Macartney needed to reciprocate as well.

At the same time, there was a line he had to walk. His involvement in the capture of Sun Yatsen in 1896, for instance, whilst true to Weber's adage that a bureaucrat must carry out the will of his government as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction,²⁰³ was heavily criticised by international society at the time.²⁰⁴ His relationship with the Foreign Office was also put on the line in 1894 when Baron von Bissing, a correspondent for the German *Kreuz Zeitung* newspaper had misrepresented some of his private words about Lord Rosebery, the then British prime minister.²⁰⁵

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that from Zeng Jize's tenure onwards, the Qing ministers' attitudes towards the utility of Western European diplomatic practice underwent a colossal sea change, and that the precise contours of this sea change are thrown into stark relief when we examine how Macartney's role at the Qing legation in London evolved into being the legation's lead rhetorician, lead negotiator, and press officer. No longer were the initial objectives of knowledge production, the protection of overseas Chinese, and the purchasing of warships and other technologies which were mandated of the legations, enough. Active engagement, and meeting the normative expectations of Western European diplomatic practice and culture were now key targets for ministers, and this was given clear expression through the ways in which the ministers adapted Macartney's role according to their recognition of these normative expectations and ambassadorial ideals. Indeed, the fact that the ministers

²⁰³ Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Routledge Sociology Classics (London: Routledge, 2009), 95.

²⁰⁴ Wong, *Heroic Image*.

²⁰⁵ Boulger, *Macartney*, 457–62.

delegated these tasks to Macartney was not an indication of their ineptitude. This very act of delegation was highly indicative of the extent to which the ministers *cared* about and *respected* the diplomatic process. Gone were the days of disregard for the diplomatic process identified by Banno Masataka in his pioneering survey.²⁰⁶

At the same time, these new functions that the ministers delegated to Macartney also interacted to inadvertently engender an additional role for him: that of networker. Macartney's networker status came about as the result of several interrelated reasons. First, Macartney's performance of the functions of lead rhetorician, lead negotiator, and press officer brought him status and social capital which, in turn, gave him access to a broader range of people and opportunities. These people and opportunities provided new avenues for information collation and for achieving diplomatic breakthroughs. Second, the visibility of Macartney in these roles, combined with the effect of Macartney's marriage to a woman of French aristocratic background, and the effect of his own attempts at self-fashioning, further highlighted his unique status and made him a natural point of call for anything related to Qing diplomacy. Third, Macartney's long tenure at the legation allowed him to cultivate friendships and accrue trust over time. The ministers and their staff simply did not have the time to do this. However, in order to hold on to these links, he, too, had from time to time to be forthcoming with confidential information.

Macartney's role was thus vitally important. He was used not only to foster a sense of legitimacy and professionalism around the legation's diplomatic endeavours, but also to help reduce the degree of alterity with which the legation's endeavours may have been perceived, through a number of rhetorical concoctions and acts of commensurability. Through his burgeoning network, he also came to bring new opportunities for diplomatic breakthrough. Furthermore, his work arguably also served an important didactic function. This was exemplified by how aspects of his written output—albeit refracted through translation—were chosen to take a place in projects designed for the dissemination of diplomatic knowledge, and by the fact that

²⁰⁶ Banno, 'Kōdō yōshiki'.

lower-ranking staff were sent in to witness the negotiations that he chaired for the Qing side.

Macartney's biographer was not incorrect in his assessment that Macartney, 'the silent, reserved man figuring in the entourage of the silk-garbed and peacock-plumed Celestials, ... far from remaining a mere interpreter, would become a political force of no inconsiderable magnitude in the diplomatic world.'²⁰⁷ However, Macartney's ability to do so was *entirely* contingent upon the ministers' own discernment. As T'ung-Tsu Ch'ü noted, the primary criterion in hiring a *muyou* 'was his record of achievement' and his 'competence in performing his duties.'²⁰⁸ That the ministers recognised this was just as much an indication of their own sagacity as of Macartney's talents and industry. And, in recognising this, they achieved one of Callières' most important prescriptions for the perfect ambassador:

But above all, let him choose for his secretary a man of probity, fidelity and judgment, and let him look upon this choice as one of the most important affairs he has to do in preparing himself for his embassy.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷ Boulger, *Macartney*, 281.

²⁰⁸ Ch'ü, *Local Government*, 109.

²⁰⁹ Callières, *Art of Diplomacy*, 135.

Chapter 4

Foreigners and the Emergence of the Professional Chinese Diplomat

Introduction

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a diplomatic darling was born. Known in Western circles as Wellington Koo, this ‘young Chinese cat, Parisian of speech and dress’,¹ dazzled his audience of Great Powers with a polished oration that oozed theatricality and pathos.² Dressed up with the rhetorical flourishes of an unmistakably Wilsonian lexicon that spoke to ideas of national self-determination and territorial integrity,³ the object of Koo’s speech was to convince the Council of Ten that it was time to give Jiaozhou, a German concession since 1898 but under Japanese control since its capture in November 1914, back to China now that the First World War had come to an end. The *Manchester Guardian* reported that Koo’s oration was ‘one of the most moving and impressive events of [the] deliberations’,⁴ and the testimonies of many of the Council corroborated such reports. The French and Canadian prime ministers, Georges Clemenceau and Robert Borden, purportedly broke protocol and publicly applauded Koo’s efforts, and American Secretary of

¹ Georges Clemenceau, *Grandeur and Misery of Victory* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and company, 1930), 150.

² Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002), 333.

³ Bruce A. Elleman, *Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 42.

⁴ ‘China and the League of Nations’, *Manchester Guardian*, Feb. 10, 1919.

State Robert Lansing was similarly impressed by the force of Koo's appeal.⁵ But, for all Koo's best efforts, he had, critically, not been made aware of his government's previous clandestine commitments to Japan which made a return of Jiaozhou an exceedingly tall order. Agreed in September 1918 at talks between the Beijing and Japanese governments, the Beijing Government had tacitly reconfirmed its acceptance of Japan's Twenty-one Demands of 1915, which gave Japan the ability to do what it liked with the former German concession.⁶

Despite the failure that awaited him, Koo's performance at the conference has nevertheless become the stuff of legend,⁷ perhaps elevated in status by Chen Daoming's 陳道明 gripping performance of Koo in the 1999 film *My 1919* (*wo de yijiuyijiu* 我的1919). In China, it has become a David and Goliath moment, in which the 'David'—Koo—confounds the stereotype of Chinese diplomatic ineptitude and sheds the feathers of his 'peacock-plumed Celestial' predecessors.⁸ For many, Koo embodies the arrival of a new China whose diplomats were eminently capable of performing the perfect ambassadorial role. And, it would be these very same Republican diplomats who went on to energetically redefine the terms of China's relationships with foreign powers in a way which was more beneficial to the country, to claw back sovereignty over land in China proper, to earn a place at the League of Nations, and to enter into new relationships and alliances with countries that had previously been beyond its diplomatic reach.⁹

⁵ MacMillan, *Paris 1919*, 334.

⁶ Elleman, *Wilson and China*, 33–50.

⁷ 'Wellington Koo: The Man Who Stood up for China', *China Daily Global*, Jan. 11, 2020, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202001/11/WS5e18ab7ea310cf3e35583d63.html>.

⁸ I borrow this phrase from: Boulger, *Macartney*, 280.

⁹ For a re-evaluation of the diplomatic efforts of China during the Republican era, see: William C. Kirby, 'The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations At Home and Abroad in the Republican Era', *The China Quarterly*, no. 150 (1997): 433–58; Tang Chi-hua 唐啓華, *Beijing Zhengfu yu Guoji Lianmeng: 1919-1928* 北京政府與國際聯盟: 1919-1928 [The Beijing Government and the League of Nations, 1919-1928] (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1998); Strauss, *Strong Institutions*, 152-180; Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 234-332; Tang Chi-hua 唐啓華, *Bei 'feichu bupingdeng tiaoyue' zhebi de Beiyang xiuyue shi (1912-1928)* 被"廢除不平等條約"遮蔽的北洋修約史 (1912-1928) [The Treaty Revision Campaign of the Beijing Government, 1912-1918: Out of the Shadow of the 'Abrogation of Unequal Treaties'] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010); Li-Chiao Chen, 'The Signing of the Sino-Iranian Treaty of 1920', *Iranian Studies* 52, no. 5–6 (2019): 991–1008.

However, the reality was that this new phase of Chinese diplomacy, while by no means flawless, was already in play by the beginning of the twentieth century. Individuals who had spent several years finessing their expertise at one of the legations after an education at one of the Qing language schools or at a foreign institute of education, were now coming to populate the Qing's diplomatic outposts in greater quantity. Individuals such as Wu Tingfang, Lu Zhengxiang, and Yan Huiqing published their ideas in newspapers, journals and magazines,¹⁰ and enchanted audiences with their oratorical displays.¹¹ Indeed, by the time Koo gave his famous oration in Paris, diplomatic China had long since been since awake, and had most certainly long since found her voice.

Yet, although diplomatic China had found her voice by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Qing's legations and consulates continued to employ foreigners. What's more, this situation continued throughout the Republican period right up until the Communist Revolution of 1949. Why was this, and what light can this ongoing foreign presence shed on the specific contours of the process by which the professional Chinese diplomat emerged in the twentieth century?

Despite China, in her various guises, retaining a foreign presence in her legations and consulates right through until the Communist Revolution, this chapter will argue that, commensurate with the emergence of what we would today recognise as a professional Chinese diplomatic class in the early twentieth century, there was a corresponding move to curtail the authority of foreign staff to enact, take charge of, or be involved with, key diplomatic actions. I argue that this was a result of two interrelated factors. First, the emergence of a nation-state consciousness that emphasised that 'Chinese' diplomacy ought to be performed by 'Chinese' actors, both as a result of pressure from China's diplomatic interlocutors, who emphasised such norms of practice, and as a result of a broader discourse on the appropriateness of foreign participation in Chinese statecraft. Second, the effect of what I term the

¹⁰ See, for instance: Yen, 'Foreign Affairs'.

¹¹ Andrew Dickson White, *Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White*, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1905), 554.

‘intellectual labour revolution’ in early twentieth century China, through which formerly ad-hoc or extrabureaucratic posts, including legation and consulate posts, often created and maintained through *mufu* practice, were internalised as full-time dedicated career paths as a result of the New Policies movement and the abolition of the imperial examination system in 1905.¹² This worked to engender an emphasis on valuing and fostering technical expertise which had hitherto not been formally recognised as part of Qing statecraft, and also to remove the societal stigma associated with such work. In the Republican period, this emphasis on technical expertise and professionalism would only grow.¹³

At the same time, I also seek to make a larger argument: namely that the underlying structures of the transaction between foreigner, as *muyou*, and host, were fundamentally transformed in a sociological sense in this period as well. There was a desire to impose a clearly defined hierarchy, and the foreign employee, while feeding advice into the decision-making process, was *not* positioned as the individual who was ultimately charged with executing a task.

As a means of explication, I divide the chapter into four parts. Part 1 will demonstrate how, as a result of foreign pressure and internally-generated discourse on the position of foreigners in Qing statecraft, there was a growing emphasis upon the need to extricate foreigners from China’s legations and consulates by the turn of the twentieth century. Part 2 will demonstrate how, despite the emergence of such an attitude, autonomy in diplomacy was not an immediately realistic goal for the Qing. Indeed, the Qing ministers and their staff, whilst now often fluent in the languages of their posting, still struggled to speak the language of negotiation and

¹² I develop the idea of the ‘intellectual labour revolution’ in more depth in this chapter. The idea draws upon Michael Gibbs Hill’s work, in which he flags up the shifts in ‘mental labour’ that could be perceived in the late Qing and Republican context: Michael Gibbs Hill, *Lin Shu, Inc: Translation and the Making of Modern Chinese Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

¹³ Xiaoqun Xu, *Chinese Professionals and the Republican State: The Rise of Professional Associations in Shanghai, 1912-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Hill, *Lin Shu*; Robert Joseph Culp, Eddy U, and Wen-Hsin Yeh, eds., *Knowledge Acts in Modern China: Ideas, Institutions, and Identities* (Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 2016).

persuasion, or to be able to invoke knowledge of specialist topics in their diplomacy, and thus continued to turn to foreign assistance. Part 3 will demonstrate how the Qing, and its Republican successors, sought to resolve such issues through coming to place a greater degree of emphasis upon achieving diplomatic specialisation from the beginning of the twentieth century. Part 4 will consider how the peripheralisation of the foreign presence was gradually achieved during the final years of the Qing and in the Republican period, both as a consequence of the aforementioned formal emphasis on diplomatic specialism which emerged in the twentieth century, and also as a consequence of the promulgation of a series of laws and regulations which both inadvertently and explicitly worked to circumscribe foreign participation in Chinese state affairs during the Republican era.

1. Emerging Shifts in Attitudes towards the Foreign Presence, 1890-1900

We begin our analysis by discussing the shift in Qing attitudes towards the foreign presence in its legations and consulates. In order to understand this process, however, we must first contextualise how these shifts emerged against the backdrop of a global trend that emphasised the extrication of non-national personnel from diplomatic service.

Cosmopolitan attitudes towards the ethnic or national makeup of diplomatic embassies had long been the norm in early modern Western European diplomatic practice.¹⁴ In this period ambassadors and their staff were often of an exceedingly cosmopolitan character, with some of the great diplomatic theorists working in the service of a foreign sovereign.¹⁵ However, the nineteenth century brought increasingly nationalistic outlooks and a move away from such diplomatic cosmopolitanism. As Jeremy Black noted, this trend reflected both ‘a concern that non-nationals would have divided loyalties’, and ‘a stronger engagement with the idea of diplomacy, like military service, as a representation of the nation-state’. Indeed, it was highly

¹⁴ Nicolson, *Diplomatic Method*, 34; Black, *Diplomacy*, 110–11.

¹⁵ Abraham de Wicquefort and Hugo Grotius—of Dutch origin—had, for instance, both represented foreign courts in the French context.

indicative that the ‘professionalism of diplomacy in the period had a clear cultural and political dimension, with ethnicity being an important element.’¹⁶

The British attempts to dismantle the Levantine dragomanate in its Constantinople embassy and in its provincial consular posts in the region are representative of this process.¹⁷ Like the other European embassies, the British embassy’s dragomanate had long been staffed by Levantine families who were responsible for interpretation, negotiation and information collation at the Ottoman Sublime Porte and Palace.¹⁸ However, owing to concerns over loyalty and other points of dissatisfaction, from 1810 on, the British began to move towards the use of British-born men.¹⁹ As Geoff Berridge has demonstrated, the initial attempts at Anglicisation were paltry at best.²⁰ However, after a scathing attack on the Levantine dragomans was published in *The Times* in 1837, Palmerston renewed efforts to dismantle the non-British presence from the 1840s.²¹ Initial efforts foundered, and continued reliance on Levantine expertise proved essential. However, with the establishment of the Levant Service in 1877, this non-national element gradually, but slowly, gave way to a new cadre of young ‘Englishmen’ who had been specially trained to staff the embassy’s dragomanate and the region’s provincial consular posts.²² Similar debates, fuelled by criticism in the press and other pressure groups, continued into the twentieth century, with Germans working in unsalaried British consular posts becoming a significant target even before the outbreak of the First World War.²³

¹⁶ Black, *Diplomacy*, 160.

¹⁷ On the difficulties of dismantling the Levantine element in British consular service, see: Lucia Patrizio Gunning, *The British Consular Service in the Aegean and the Collection of Antiquities for the British Museum* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 31–58.

¹⁸ G. R. Berridge, ‘Nation, Class, and Diplomacy: The Diminishing of the Dragomanate of the British Embassy in Constantinople, 1810-1914’, in *The Diplomats’ World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815-1914*, ed. Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 407–8.

¹⁹ Berridge, 408–9.

²⁰ Berridge, 409.

²¹ Berridge, 410.

²² Berridge, 414–19.

²³ John McDermott, ‘The British Foreign Office and Its German Consuls Before 1914’, *The Journal of Modern History* 50, no. 1 (1978): 1001–34.

Unsurprisingly, the Qing also encountered such ideas in the nineteenth century. In October 1890, Max von Brandt, the German minister to China, protested to Xu Jingcheng 許景澄 (previously Qing minister to Germany and France, 1884-1887) on behalf of his government about Carl Kreyer's employment as Counsellor to the Qing Berlin legation, expressing his concern about the negative impact his presence could have on Sino-German diplomacy.²⁴ Halliday Macartney's status also proved problematic at times. In 1891, the French expressed their displeasure when he was appointed as Secretary to the Qing Paris legation, owing to his not being a 'Chinaman'.²⁵ Macartney also managed to cause a controversy over his status when he sought, at the British High Court of Justice, to recover a sum he had begrudgingly been forced to pay for the rates and taxes on the property he rented, which he claimed he was exempt from due to his membership of the *corps diplomatique*. The judge ruled in his favour, citing that he had been received 'without reservation or condition of any sort' by the British government as English Secretary to the Qing legation, and was therefore entitled to the privileges enjoyed by the *corps diplomatique*.²⁶ Despite the win, the Foreign Office, under pressure from the Home Office, decided to make a show of the case and publicly announced that in future, any British subjects who were appointed to serve on the diplomatic staff of a foreign embassy or legation should not be entitled to enjoy such privileges.²⁷ Picked up by many key newspapers, this proclamation turned public favour against Macartney.²⁸ Why ought a British subject be exempt, after all?

²⁴ Xu, *Xu Jingcheng ji*, 1:165, Xu Jingcheng to Head of the Zongli Yamen, GX16/8.

²⁵ FO17/1120, Halliday Macartney to Sir Thomas Sanderson, Feb 24, 1891.

²⁶ See *Macartney v. Garbutt and others* (Feb. 18, 24, 1890) in: Arthur P. Stone, ed., *The Law Reports. Cases Determined by the Queen's Bench Division and by the Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions of the High Court of Justice, and by the Court of Appeal on Appeal Therefrom, and by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.*, vol. XXIV (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1890), 368-71.

²⁷ Boulger, *Macartney*, 427-30.

²⁸ Boulger, 427-30. When accepting Macartney's effective successor, John McLeavy Brown, in 1907, the Foreign Office made a point of stipulating that they would accept him but 'they would expect him as an Englishman to pay his rates & taxes and not give them trouble about them as Macartney had done.' NSW-M, ML MSS 312/131, John McLeavy Brown to George Ernest Morrison, Nov. 30, 1907.

Such incidents likely exerted some instructive effect upon Qing understandings of the general trend away from reliance on foreign expertise in the diplomatic context.²⁹ And, by around the turn of the century, there were clear indications that these attitudes, and the wider intellectual pivot toward the nation-state, were beginning to affect the Qing position on foreign expertise more broadly. As noted in Chapter 1, the idea of ‘borrowing talent from afar’ had had a long pedigree in Chinese history, with neither ethnicity nor ‘nationality’ constituting a barrier to entry in the service of a particular dynasty. And, even in the latter half of the nineteenth century, reference to the employment of Westerners was frequently couched in terms which reflected this tradition.³⁰

However, after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, indications that a shift away from this previously open attitude towards Westerners in Qing service began to emerge, and the increasing vigour with which the foreign scramble for Chinese concessions was being unleashed in this period no doubt worked to stir these intellectual embers even further. In 1896, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 criticised the fact that Zhang Zhidong had allowed foreign staff to work within his *mufu*, believing that ‘they denied salaries to Chinese officials’ and served the Manchus.³¹ Such attitudes were also given articulation in popular writings and in vernacular literature. One of the essays featured in Kong Guangde’s 孔廣德 *Writings from Across the Land on Indignation Arising out of Loyalty* (*Putian zhongfen ji* 普天忠憤集), a collection of writings comprising memorials, essays and poems on the Sino-Japanese War and published in 1895, was an essay entitled ‘The Circumstances Surrounding the Defeat of the Beiyang Navy’ (*Beiyang haijun shili qingxing* 北洋海軍失利情形) by an official

²⁹ The case was evidently influential in shaping practice going forward, including articles which featured in the Vienna Convention. See: Eileen Denza, *Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 59, 150, 292, 338.

³⁰ Smith, ‘Foreign Military Talent’. Even Macartney’s employment at the Qing legation in London was dressed up in such terms. See: NPM-Q, 131406, Xue Fucheng to the Guangxu Emperor, GX20/3/21 (IR).

³¹ Seungjoo Yoon, ‘Literati-Journalists of the Chinese Progress in Discord’, in *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China*, ed. Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Zarrow (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 56.

named Zhang Bingquan 張秉銓. The essay called out the Beiyang Fleet's use and mismanagement of unreliable and money-guzzling foreigners, and the implications of their use for the Qing defeat.³² Similar themes were also explored in Li Baoxi's 李寶嘉 *Officialdom Unmasked* (*Guanchang xianxing ji* 官場現形記), a satirical critique of the Qing bureaucracy which was serialised across a variety of publications at the beginning of the twentieth century. Part 58 limns a fictional relationship between a provincial governor and a foreigner in his employ (see Figure 1).³³ It transpires that the foreigner, despite being in possession of all the right credentials, was an overbearing, useless, money guzzling waste of space. Far from redounding to the governor's benefit, the foreigner affected his image in official circles and opened him up to criticism for damaging Chinese prestige.³⁴ Evidently, for these writers, foreigners could no longer be mobilised as pawns for placating the normative expectations that other countries projected upon China (*yi yi zhi yi* 以夷制夷); it was now the Qing state which had become the pawn.

Indications that such thought had begun to permeate the legations and consulates gradually began to become apparent from the beginning of the twentieth century. For instance, when Macartney negotiated the Transvaal Convention on behalf of the

Figure 1: 'His Excellency [the Provincial Governor], suffering under the yoke of his [foreign] adviser'.



Source: Li Baoxi 李寶嘉, *Guanchang Xianxing ji* 官場現形記 [Officialdom Unmasked]

³² Kong Guangde 孔廣德, *Putian zhongfenji* 普天忠憤集 [Writings from Across the Land on Indignation Arising out of Loyalty] (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1975).

³³ Boyuan Li, *Officialdom Unmasked*, trans. T.L. Yang (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), 607–14.

³⁴ Li, 614.

Qing in 1904, the British explicitly stipulated that any Chinese consul appointed to the Transvaal should be a ‘Consul de Carrière’—a career consul—and ‘of Chinese nationality’.³⁵ This was perhaps because they had got wind of the fact that the appointment of a foreigner was already being discussed in Chinese circles.³⁶ However, attitudes on the Qing side had evidently begun to shift by this point, as Macartney responded that ‘the Chinese Government had, in fact, already received several applications from residents in South Africa for the post of Chinese Consul in the Transvaal, but it had been decided not to entertain them’.³⁷ Indeed, it was an individual called Liu Yulin 劉玉麟, who would later go on to serve as Qing minister to Britain, who got the post.³⁸ Similarly, in a letter to the Waiwubu in 1909, Qian Xun 錢恂 (Qing minister to Italy, 1908-1909), made reference to the fact that the reason why the Qing had been careful to avoid establishing foreigners in consular posts was because of its concern over the conferring of authority to a ‘non-Chinese’ (*feibenguoren* 非本國人).³⁹

However, there were instances when the appointment of a foreigner was necessary. The ministers were nevertheless careful to qualify such decisions and assert that the foreigner’s tenure would only be temporary. The implication was that when the minister located an appropriate individual of Chinese background, he would be appointed as the foreigner’s replacement. For example, during the Qing legation in Mexico’s first full year of operation in 1904, despite contradicting the original plans for the legation, it became apparent to Liang Cheng 梁誠 (then Qing minister to America, Mexico, Peru and Cuba) that foreign assistance had become necessary. Liang emphasized in a memorial that it would just be temporary assistance that the foreigner would provide, and that he would avoid drawing up a fixed contract so that

³⁵ FO2/899, Engagement of Chinese Labourers, Second Meeting of the Committee, Mar. 11, 1904.

³⁶ WWB, 02-12-010-02-046, Zhang Deyi to Waiwubu, GX29/10/10; WWB, 02-12-010-02-051, Waiwubu to Zhang Deyi, GX29/10/14.

³⁷ FO2/899, Engagement of Chinese Labourers, Second Meeting of the Committee, Mar. 11, 1904.

³⁸ WWB, 02-12-010-03-002, Zhang Deyi to Waiwubu, GX30/8/18.

³⁹ WWB, 02-12-038-01-006, Qian Xun to Waiwubu, XT1/2/19.

the foreigner could be dismissed at will.⁴⁰ Similarly, when illness left Lei Butong 雷補同 (Qing minister to Austria-Hungary, 1907-1910) without a secretary capable of translating German into Chinese, Lei moved to temporarily plug the gap with a foreigner, stating in a letter to the Waiwubu that the appointment would be terminated when a Chinese replacement was found.⁴¹

Indirect expressions of this trend can be noted elsewhere. For instance, in an English-language article written by Yan Huiqing in 1909 on China's administration of foreign affairs,⁴² Anson Burlingame—despite having been of equal status to that of his peers Zhi Gang 志剛 and Sun Jiagu 孫家谷 on their 1867 mission to America, Europe and Russia, was described by Yan as accompanying the mission as its 'third envoy'.⁴³ Zhi and Sun were meanwhile presented as the embassy's central figures.⁴⁴ Such historical revisionism was an indication that diplomacy was now being identified as a *national* priority that was integral to China's performance of the sovereign state.

Practical considerations also underpinned the turn away from the foreign presence. The Qing had undergone multiple financial crises in the long nineteenth century. The various uprisings, not least that of the Taipings, had devastated provincial coffers, and the slew of indemnities the Qing had to pay affected the dynasty considerably, with those brought by the Sino-Japanese War and the Boxer Uprising being particularly devastating. While new sources of income, including the *lijin* tax, the expanded Customs revenue, and the selling of government posts (*juan'na*), all provided much needed financial lubrication,⁴⁵ the Qing was increasingly forced to

⁴⁰ WWB, 02-12-003-01-023, Liang Cheng Memorial to Guangxu Emperor, GX30/5/21.

⁴¹ WWB, 02-12-033-04-006, Lei Butong to Waiwubu, GX34/2/18.

⁴² At the time, Yan was serving as a counsellor at the Qing legation in Washington whilst simultaneously attending George Washington University to study international law. On Yan's career, see: Weiching W. Yen, *East-West Kaleidoscope, 1877-1946: An Autobiography* (New York: St John's University Press, 1974).

⁴³ Zhi and Sun who had only joined the mission due to Robert Hart convincing the Zongli Yamen for the need to give the mission a 'Chinese character'. Wright, *Hart*, 368. On their parity of status, see: Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*, 73.

⁴⁴ Yen, 'Foreign Affairs', 539. On the status of these individuals, see: Wright, *Hart*, 368.

⁴⁵ Banno, *Kindai Chūgoku seiji gaikōshi*, 42-43.

turn to foreign bond markets and loans to keep the dynasty afloat.⁴⁶ Finding means to economise was therefore an important consideration. The legations and consulates were funded by Qing customs revenues (*yangshui* 洋稅), with 9% of revenue at each Customs House being nominally earmarked for legation and consulate use.⁴⁷ Although expenditure quotas had been set for these overseas institutions, the reality was that actual outgoings did not usually tally with these predetermined amounts.⁴⁸ Indeed, while the Zongli Yamen had made a point of requesting the ministers to find ways to economise in 1897,⁴⁹ the situation did not improve, and the Waiwubu, newly incorporated in 1901 as a condition of the Boxer Protocol,⁵⁰ was growing increasingly concerned about the mismatch between available funding and outgoing expenditure.⁵¹ As the foreign staff had often been remunerated far better than their Qing counterparts, it was unsurprising, then, that the staffing costs associated with maintaining a foreign contingent within the legations and consulates became a source of increasing concern.⁵²

In 1902, the Waiwubu acted. In a memorial, the ministry explained how burgeoning costs meant that it was necessary for it to reformulate its ‘regulations for

⁴⁶ van de Ven, *Breaking with the Past*, 133.

⁴⁷ Initially, 6% of all total revenue at each Customs house had been set aside for hypothecation. This figure was increased to 9% in 1878. As Tsai Chenfeng notes, however, owing to the many crises faced by the Qing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these funds sometimes had to be repurposed for other means as well. Tsai Chenfeng 蔡振豐, *Wan Qing Waiwubu zhi yanjiu* 晚清外務部之研究 [Research on the Waiwubu in Late Qing China] (Taipei: Zhizhi xueshu chubanshe, 2014), 148.

⁴⁸ Tsai, 152.

⁴⁹ Tsai, 152.

⁵⁰ On the creation of the Waiwubu, see: Kawashima Shin 川島真, ‘Gaimu no keisei: Gaimubu no seiritsu katei 外務の形成——外務部の成立過程 [The Formation of “Waiwu”: The Establishment of the Waiwubu]’, in *Chūgoku kindai gaikō no taidō* 中国近代外交の胎動 [Emerging Diplomacy in Late Imperial China], ed. Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司 and Kawashima Shin 川島真 (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 2009), 181–202; Tsai, *Waiwubu*, 71–91.

⁵¹ ZMGS-GX, 5:3104–3105, No. 4581, Waiwubu Memorial to Guangxu Emperor, GX28/2/8.

⁵² For instance, the monthly figure stipulated for second class counsellors given in the expense regulations for serving overseas (*chushi jingfei zhangcheng* 出使經費章程) of 1876 was 400 taels (Peng Nansheng 彭南生, ‘Wan Qing waijiaoguan zhi ji qi fengxin zhidu de xingcheng yu biange 晚清外交官制及其俸薪制度的形成與變革 [The Formation and Transformation of the Diplomatic Service and Its Salary System in the Late Qing]’, *Huazhong Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban)* 36, no. 2 (1997): 100). Halliday Macartney’s monthly salary for the 21st year of Guangxu (1895–1896) was 666 taels. Macartney’s Qing counterpart, Song Yuren 宋育任, likewise a second class counsellor, only received 360 taels. See: Wong, *Heroic Image*, 78.

serving overseas' (*chushi zhangcheng*) in order to cut down on outgoings. The establishment of new 'sub-legations' (*fenguan* 分館), such as those in Central and South America under the jurisdiction of the Qing minister in Washington, and the conversion of erstwhile sub-legations, such as those in Italy and Austria-Hungary, into full-fledged legations, were two key causes of mounting costs.⁵³ However, in the first of the four new regulations, it was also noted that the ministers had been going considerably over their staffing quotas; the implication being that such practice was profligate. And, it was also stated that if any foreigners were employed within a legation, they ought to be counted amongst its attendant members (*suidairen* 隨帶人).⁵⁴ This likely wasn't just to keep staff numbers in line with quotas; attendant members were entitled to a far less substantial pay-packet: 200 taels per month, as per the 1876 regulations.⁵⁵

The ministers appear to have responded to this. For instance, to save on the costs associated with foreign counsellors, Wu Dezhang 吳德璋 (Qing minister to Austria-Hungary, 1902-1904) made a point of avoiding giving his foreign member of staff such a title. Indeed, in 1903, he proclaimed to the Waiwubu that he 'did not dare follow in the footsteps of the legations in Britain or Germany', who had long since moved to give Macartney and Kreyer the prestigious yet costly Counsellor status.⁵⁶ Wu Tingfang, who was particularly keen to implement cost saving measures,⁵⁷ also recommended that his successor move to dismiss John W. Foster, as it would, among other reasons, 'allow the legation to save on several thousand taels in expenses'.⁵⁸ We also find indication that the Waiwubu sought to exert some degree of influence over the issue. In a 1903 memorial about the creation of the Mexican legation, the ministry, citing the relative lack of difficulty involved in the work conducted at the

⁵³ ZMGS-GX, 5:3104, No. 4581, Waiwubu Memorial to Guangxu Emperor, GX28/2/8.

⁵⁴ ZMGS-GX, 5:3105, No. 4581, Waiwubu Memorial to Guangxu Emperor, GX28/2/8.

⁵⁵ Peng, 'Fengxin zhidu', 100.

⁵⁶ WWB, 02-12-031-02-011, Wu Dezhang to Waiwubu, GX29/2/25.

⁵⁷ Tsai, *Waiwubu*, 153.

⁵⁸ In 1903, Foster was on a monthly salary of over 500 kuping taels per month. ZMGS-GX, 5:3373, No. 5069, Wu Tingfang to Waiwubu, GX29/1/5.

Spanish legation, declared that ‘the posting of just a counsellor and one accompanying interpreter ought to suffice’ for the work required of the Mexican legation, and that there was therefore ‘no need to create a post for a foreign member of staff’. It also added that the decision to avoid hiring a foreigner was done with the hope of cutting costs.⁵⁹ As noted above, however, Liang Cheng ultimately concluded that foreign assistance was essential.

It is also in Wu Tingfang’s aforementioned letter that called for Foster’s dismissal that two other emerging attitudes on the foreign presence come into vision. Namely, a growing sense of Qing self-confidence, intermingled with an incipient sense of distrust about where the loyalties of these foreigners lay. In his letter, Wu stated that ‘one supposes that the reason why this legation has hired foreign staff was because the ministers, counsellors, legation staff and interpreters were initially not particularly au fait with the processes of diplomacy. They thus had no choice but to hire foreign talent.’⁶⁰ While recognising Foster’s important assistance to the legation over his long tenure, Wu explained that he had concluded that Foster needed to go when he himself had first become minister. However, owing to Foster not causing any significant issues up to that point, he had exercised magnanimity. In other words, Wu thought he probably could have done without him. Moreover, Wu was confident that the incoming minister, Liang Cheng, was also very much up to the task of flying solo: ‘given that the newly appointed minister Liang is versed in Western languages, there is even less of a need to rely on a Western staff member for assistance’.⁶¹ Besides, if the need for foreign assistance should arise, Liang could just find someone much cheaper from America’s ‘vast pool of shrewd and talented men’ to proffer their assistance when the time was right, opined Wu.⁶²

It was not just a new-found confidence in the skills that he and his colleagues possessed that prompted this missive, however. Wu, while recognising Foster’s

⁵⁹ ZMGS-GX, 5:3731, No. 5602, Waiwubu Memorial to Guangxu Emperor, GX29/9/20.

⁶⁰ ZMGS-GX, 5:3373, No. 5069, Wu Tingfang to Waiwubu, GX29/1/5.

⁶¹ ZMGS-GX, 5:3373, No. 5069, Wu Tingfang to Waiwubu, GX29/1/5.

⁶² ZMGS-GX, 5:3373, No. 5069, Wu Tingfang to Waiwubu, GX29/1/5.

important work for the legation, noted how in recent years he had become a ‘turncoat’ (*daoge xiangxiang* 倒戈相向). During the course of discussions on whether or not Chinese labourers should be allowed to live and work in Hawaii, Foster had apparently not sought to help the labourers, and had even called for banning them from the newly annexed American islands.⁶³ Furthermore, Foster had apparently expressed other ‘discerning views’ in private discussions that had led to his being reprimanded by Wu.⁶⁴ Foster, who had worked exceedingly hard fighting the Qing corner in his service as legation legal adviser, was now seen as a dissenting and untrustworthy voice.⁶⁵

2. Teething Problems, 1900-1907

However, this new national consciousness, bolstered by an increased concern about the financial burden presented by the foreign staff, and even a heightened confidence on the part of some ministers to conduct diplomacy without foreign assistance, did not lead to an immediate expulsion of foreign staff. Indeed, despite the sort of confidence we saw expressed in Wu Tingfang’s letter, the reality was that the Qing was not fully prepared to extricate the foreigners from its legations and consulates. Several factors prevented them from doing so.

The first point that needs to be made is that not everyone was as sanguine as Wu about the prospects of leaving diplomatic matters entirely in the hands of Qing men. In a telegram sent to Wu and forwarded to Wang Kangnian on the proposed establishment of a Qing consulate in Manilla sometime in the 1890s, Huang Zhonghui 黃中慧 (then at the Qing Madrid legation, but later Qing consul to Callao, Peru, 1900-1901), spoke of how Isidore Gordón, a Briton who had long worked at the Qing legation in Spain would, ‘despite not being a man of any great talent, ... be one-

⁶³ On the Hawaii issue, see: Linda Pomerantz-Zhang, *Wu Tingfang (1842-1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern Chinese History* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992), passim.

⁶⁴ ZMGS-GX, 5:3373, No. 5069, Wu Tingfang to Waiwubu, GX29/1/5.

⁶⁵ To get a sense of the important work Foster conducted at the legation, see: Okamoto, Hakoda, and Aoyama, *Shusshi nikki*, 170–73.

hundred times better than any Chinese consul'.⁶⁶ As soon as a Qing counsellor or consul 'begins negotiating with a foreigner, they are reduced to mice or children', continued Huang.⁶⁷ 'Sometimes they don't even say a word, and just listen to what the foreign staff member translates for them, doing nothing but nodding their heads in approval. If they do by chance say something or come up with a plan of action, it is always unbearably sub-standard.'⁶⁸

Wang Daxie often expressed similar sentiments in his letters to Wang Kangnian as well. In one letter, Wang talked of his disappointment with Ivan Chen who, despite having achieved a strong command of English, and having honed his ability to pen diplomatic notes to a near perfect standard, was unreliable in times of diplomatic discord and had come to take a stance of 'the less trouble the better' under the malign influence of some of the previous ministers.⁶⁹ In the letter, Wang juxtaposed what he saw as the ineptitude of himself and his subordinates, predecessors, and colleagues in other legations with that of the foreigner. When he visited the Washington legation, Liang Cheng 'was loathe to put pen to paper', he stated, with the penning of diplomatic correspondence there being effectively divided up between Rong Kui 容揆 (then interpreter at the Washington legation) and Foster, the former taking on 'trivial issues' and the latter being called in to assist with 'issues of import'. On Macartney, too, Wang was full of superlatives: 'I have profound admiration for Macartney's individual conduct. He has been at this legation for thirty years and has been exceedingly earnest in every task he has undertaken. ...

⁶⁶ Shanghai Tushuguan 上海圖書館, ed., *Wang Kangnian shiyou shuzha* 汪康年師友書札 [Wang Kangnian's Letters from Teachers and Friends], vol. 3 (Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2017), 2080–81, Inclosure in No. 12, Huang Zhonghui to Wu Tingfang, Telegram Draft with Notes, GX?/7/20 (DOR). The year in which this telegram draft was sent is unclear, but it is clear from the contents of the letter to which it was attached that Huang was then still employed at the Madrid legation, which he was based at until 1899. See: *Guía oficial de España (1899)* (Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1899), 99.

⁶⁷ Shanghai Tushuguan, *Wang Kangnian shiyou shuzha*, 2017, 3:2080–81, Inclosure in No. 12, Huang Zhonghui to Wu Tingfang, Telegram Draft with Notes, GX?/7/20 (DOR).

⁶⁸ Shanghai Tushuguan, 3:2080–81, Inclosure in No. 12, Huang Zhonghui to Wu Tingfang, Telegram Draft with Notes, GX?/7/20 (DOR).

⁶⁹ The malign influence Wang talks of was a reference to Gong Zhaoyuan, Luo Fenglu and Zhang Deyi. As I note in footnote 109, Wang's view of these individuals likely had a lot to do with their irregular route backgrounds.

That the Chinese, in handling affairs relating to China, are conversely not as devoted to them as that of a Westerner is truly lamentable.’⁷⁰

Wang’s actions spoke to these private proclamations as well. After Macartney’s retirement, on one occasion Wang made the trip all the way up from London to Macartney’s home in Kirkcudbrightshire, Scotland to tease out his assistance over the course of a day.⁷¹ In 1907, he also sought to hire a celebrated lawyer as a private adviser in Macartney’s stead, as so many of the negotiations he had to contend with after Macartney’s retirement ‘pertained to matters of international law and the law.’⁷²

Such self-critique should not be naively cited as evidence for ineptitude, however. The existence of such discussion demonstrated a profound desire on the Qing part to meet and exceed the normative expectations placed upon it by its diplomatic interlocutors. And, as Hakoda Keiko’s pioneering study has revealed, many of the talented individuals who would go on to become Republican China’s most important professional diplomats were already now working or honing their skills within the Qing’s legations and consulates.⁷³ It was precisely because of the profound *care* and *respect* the Qing had come to develop for Western European diplomatic practice that, despite having developed new perspectives on the appropriateness of maintaining a foreign presence in its legations and consulates, the Qing recognised an ongoing need for access to their expertise.

What was this expertise? Gifted speakers of foreign languages were, after all, now beginning to emerge in greater quantities at the legations and consulates, with their oratorical sophistication even earning them praise in diplomatic circles.⁷⁴ As hinted at by the reasons why Wang Daxie sought out a replacement for Macartney, the key

⁷⁰ Shanghai Tushuguan, *Wang Kangnian shiyou shuzha*, 2017, 1:795–96, No. 153, Wang Daxie to Wang Kangnian, GX32/9/9.

⁷¹ Boulger, *Macartney*, x–xi.

⁷² WWB, 02-12-013-01-038, Wang Daxie to Waiwubu, GX32/12/12.

⁷³ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*.

⁷⁴ For instance, American diplomat Andrew White noted that Lu Zhengxiang ‘made the best speech of any foreigner who appeared before the tribunal’ of the First Hague Convention. White, *Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White*, 1:554.

area in which their assistance remained necessary was that of specialist subject matter. This was evinced by how, for instance, John W. Foster was appointed as a co-delegate to the Second Hague Conference with Lu Zhengxiang due to his expertise in international law,⁷⁵ and by how, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, Macartney continued to play a key role in developing rhetorical missives and draft conventions that required specialist knowledge of treaty-writing conventions. As a corollary of this point, this expertise also necessitated these foreigners' ongoing use as negotiators. Even though many gifted foreign language speakers were now serving within the legations and consulates, negotiators needed to be able to both understand and invoke specialist knowledge within the negotiation process in order to tease out the best outcome for China.

The value of this expertise was further enhanced by the longevity of the tenures that many of these foreigners served. As argued in the previous chapter in relation to Macartney, this made the foreigners a key source of institutional memory and gave them the time to cultivate networks of contacts that helped the Qing ministers access important information, the press, and even opportunities for diplomatic breakthrough. Furthermore, the foreigners played an ongoing didactic function in this period. In addition to the case of Macartney explored in the previous chapter, Foster's ongoing involvement as co-negotiator during the negotiations in which China attempted to reclaim the American Canton-Hankow railway concession,⁷⁶ and during the Second Hague Conference, undoubtedly took on a didactic utility for both Liang Cheng and Lu Zhengxiang. Why else would he be there? Yan Huiqing also explained in his autobiography about how he often sought out the counsel of Foster on matters pertaining to international law and diplomatic practice when he was a Counsellor at the Washington legation.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ WWB, 02-21-002-01-005, Wang Daxie to Guangxu Emperor, GX32/3/11. On Chinese participation at the conference, see: Ryan Martínez Mitchell, 'China's Participation in the Second Hague Conference and the Concept of Equal Sovereignty in International Law', *Asian Journal of International Law* 11, no. 2 (2021): 351–71.

⁷⁶ En-han Lee, *China's Quest for Railway Autonomy, 1904-1911: A Study of the Chinese Railway-Rights Recovery Movement* (Singapore: University Press, 1977), 50–84.

⁷⁷ Yen, *Kaleidoscope*, 44.

In addition to specialist subject matter, the foreign presence also provided ongoing assistance with cultures and languages that the Qing had limited experience with. In 1903, Wu Dezhang, in his first full year as the Austria-Hungary legation's first full-time minister, sent a letter to the Waiwubu explaining that he had been told by Count Agenor Maria Gołuchowski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to follow the standard practice for diplomats based in Austria-Hungary of 'intermingling and socialising with the various princes and their wives so as to promote amicable relations'.⁷⁸ However, as it was his first time in the country, Wu explained that all of the courtly protocol he was expected to follow was exceedingly complex and there was much that he did not understand. This was compounded by his 'lack of familiarity with the country and its people'.⁷⁹ Wu thus turned to hiring a foreigner to help assist him 'in every move'.⁸⁰ Furthermore, at the Italian legation, which also received its first dedicated full-time minister in 1902, Xu Jue 許珏 (Qing minister to Italy, 1902-1906) found himself in need of someone who could translate Italian into French. While he had staff who were capable of translating French into Chinese, most of the non-diplomatic correspondence he received was written in Italian. He thus hired a foreigner to translate this correspondence and other materials into French so that they could later be rendered into Chinese.⁸¹

The need for ongoing access to foreign expertise was arguably also wrapped up with the point introduced above about perceived mediocrity, and the consequences of mediocrity for how China was perceived by its diplomatic interlocutors. For the Qing, prestige and outside appearances mattered. In many ways, such attitudes had already been evinced by the types of scholar-official it had initially chosen to serve as its ministers. Up until the Sino-Japanese War, many of the individuals elected to ministerial posts had been the cream of the 'regular route' (*zhengtu*) crop,⁸² touting

⁷⁸ WWB, 02-12-031-02-011, Wu Dezhang to Waiwubu, GX29/2/25.

⁷⁹ WWB, 02-12-031-02-011, Wu Dezhang to Waiwubu, GX29/2/25.

⁸⁰ WWB, 02-12-031-02-011, Wu Dezhang to Waiwubu, GX29/2/25.

⁸¹ WWB, 02-12-036-02-004, Xu Jue to Waiwubu, GX29/1/16.

⁸² On the difference between the 'regular route' and the 'irregular route', see footnote 107 in this dissertation's introduction.

the top *jìnshì* degrees and even the accolade of Hanlin Academician.⁸³ In a letter to Campbell, Hart, too, noted how Wang Fengzao 汪鳳藻 had been selected to serve as Qing minister to Tokyo in 1892 not because of the English-language ability he had cultivated through his training at the School of Combined Learning (Tongwen Guan 同文館), but because he had been a Hanlin Academician.⁸⁴ In many ways, this corresponded to the early modern European practice of choosing aristocrats to serve as ambassadors. The ambassador was, after all, the very embodiment of his sovereign, and he needed to exude such a status through behaviour and bearing. This predilection for regular route elites was also echoed in Xie Zuyuan's scathing critique of the staff in the Qing's diplomatic outposts referenced in this dissertation's introduction. There, he articulated how it was the regular route elites which ought to be in ministerial posts, not those of 'irregular route' (*yitu*) background.⁸⁵ Even after the introduction of the 'modern' Waiwubu in 1901, China and its diplomats continued to be looked down upon as a third-class state,⁸⁶ and many of the Qing's diplomatic staff were deeply affected by this condescension. In the Huang Zhonghui telegram introduced above, Huang contextualised his fears about appointing a Chinese as Qing consul to Manila with the explanation that it was his hope that it would 'prevent the ridicule of foreigners'.⁸⁷ Furthermore, one of the key reasons that Wang Daxie had called for Foster to serve alongside Lu Zhengxiang at the Second Hague Conference was because he was of the opinion that conference delegates should be 'persons of known competency in international law, and the highest moral reputation'.⁸⁸ Indeed, the Qing continued to see foreign participation as helping to

⁸³ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 167. On the social status (*liupin* 流品) of the ministers, see: Ma, *Zhuwai gongshi*, 102.

⁸⁴ ACIMC, 2:902, No. 2052, Hart to Campbell, Jul. 17, 1892.

⁸⁵ Liu, *Wenxian tongkao*, J338:10795.

⁸⁶ Chêng-hsiang Lu, *Ways of Confucius and of Christ* (London: Burns, Oates, 1948), 24.

⁸⁷ Shanghai Tushuguan, *Wang Kangnian shiyou shuzha*, 2017, 3:2079, No. 12, Huang Zhonghui to Wang Kangian, GX?/6/10.

⁸⁸ 'Will Go to the Hague', *Evening Star*, Nov. 10, 1906. See also: WWB, 02-21-002-01-005, Wang Daxie to Guangxu Emperor, GX32/3/11.

endow China with cachet in a period when China continued to be treated as a third-class state.

Prestige, accompanied by a Caucasian face, may well have also been important partly for matters of safety. In Liang Cheng's justification for the need of a foreigner at the Mexico legation, he explained, presumably in relation to checking up on the condition of Chinese labourers scattered across the country, that it would be more appropriate for a non-Chinese to travel in the Mexican interior. Moreover, he explained that the individual had to be someone whose 'moral character and learnedness could be relied upon', and was, societally, at least 'somewhat eminent'.⁸⁹ While not offering an explicit reason as to *why* this was the case, given the rampant Sinophobia at the time—often resulting in physical assault and murder—the choice of a somewhat eminent Caucasian face was arguably not just a means of making the Qing voice credible; it was also a way of sheltering staff from the threat of violence.

Outside the issues of prestige and safety, the issue as to why skill gaps existed in specific areas is a natural question to ask. However, it is also a problematic one. As I have sought to show in this dissertation, the value of embracing Western European diplomatic practice within the Qing context emerged gradually. How ought the Qing have known *how* to cultivate a corps of professional diplomats before it had even begun to arrive at the widespread consensus that diplomacy and diplomats were even necessary? That the Qing lacked a systemised education for the training of professional diplomats was a given and ought not be cited as an instance of ineptitude.

Nevertheless, the question of why an in-depth knowledge of specialist topics did not emerge is an interesting one and is worthy of a brief examination. Of course, the ministers and their staff came from a variety of different backgrounds, with different educations (be they regular route or irregular route) and varying life experiences. Diagnosing the specific contingencies and factors which led to this situation is

⁸⁹ WWB, 02-12-003-01-023, Liang Cheng Memorial to Guangxu Emperor, GX30/5/21.

difficult. Nevertheless, I think we can point to three points as to why such a situation emerged.

The first was that many, albeit not all, of the ministers who worked in the Qing legations had effectively been autodidacts of elite background who had come to their posts due to having some past involvement with ‘Western affairs’ in the domestic Chinese context. As noted by Henrietta Harrison, these sorts of individuals preferred to learn from books rather than from the commoner,⁹⁰ among which the Westerner was invariably included.⁹¹ Their knowledge of diplomatic subjects, including that of international law, was therefore entirely contingent upon what they may have encountered through books available in Chinese translation and without the benefit of practice.⁹²

The second was that when individuals *had* received training at one of the governmental schools designed to prepare interpreters for diplomatic service, that training had largely emphasised language acquisition over other types of Western learning. In this regard, Sun Jia’nai’s 孫家鼐 1896 response to the call for the founding of the Imperial University (*Jingshi daxuetang* 京師大學堂) is particularly instructive.⁹³ As Sun noted there, many of the schools which had been established to teach some facet of Western learning had been ‘constrained by their singular focus on teaching just one skill’. They had therefore achieved little success, and demonstrated a decided ‘lack of understanding regarding the bigger picture (*burning dati* 不明大體)’.⁹⁴ And, in relation to this idea of a singular focus, Sun made another very

⁹⁰ Harrison, *Perils*, 11.

⁹¹ Ono, *Shitai-fu-zō*, 70.

⁹² Such autodidacts and individuals who came to be regarded as ‘experts’ purely due to a smattering of experience with Western affairs, however, began to come under increasing levels of scrutiny in the late nineteenth century, with Liang Qichao being particularly critical about the lack of ‘professional’ training they had received. Yoon, ‘Literati-Journalists’, 57.

⁹³ On Sun’s memorial, see: Timothy B. Weston, ‘The Founding of the Imperial University’, in *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China*, ed. Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Gue Zarrow (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2002), 106–8; Timothy B. Weston, *The Power of Position: Beijing University, Intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898–1929* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 27.

⁹⁴ Beijing Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi 北京大學校史研究室, ed., *Beijing Daxue shiliao* 北京大學史料 [Historical Materials on Beijing University], vol. 1 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1993), 23.

important point on the School of Combined Learning and the Shanghai Institute of Various Languages type of school. ‘These types of schools’, he stated, ‘were excessively particular about [the teaching of] how to read and write foreign languages (*jinjin yu yuyan wenzi* 斤斤於語言文字).’⁹⁵ And they had, he continues, ‘at best, been able to produce nothing more than a few dozen translators’.⁹⁶ As Timothy B. Weston has noted in relation to Sun’s memorial, Sun was implying that ‘educational reform itself required a reorganization of China’s approach to systems of knowledge’. Indeed, ‘[i]t was necessary to unite the various Western disciplines within a single intellectual framework rather than dividing them off from one another into hermetically isolated intellectual subspaces.’⁹⁷

Given the situation faced by many of the legations and consulates at the beginning of the twentieth century, Sun’s assessment appears to be a fair and accurate one. There was a need for staff who possessed not only linguistic prowess, but expert knowledge in international law and other specialist subject matters. While I am not saying that the staff in the legations and consulates had *no* knowledge of specialist subject matter, the ongoing need for foreign assistance demonstrated that more profound understandings had yet to fully materialise. A brief survey of the curriculum on offer at the School of Combined Learning helps to give us a sense about what it was Sun was getting at and how this affected the sorts of individuals who were being fed into the legations and consulates from the school. Students belonged to one of four language departments (English, French, Russian, or German),⁹⁸ and their education revolved mainly around the study of their elected foreign language, Chinese, and mathematics over a five- or eight-year programme of study. International law *was* taught at the school (unlike the other specialist subject

⁹⁵ Beijing Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, 1:23.

⁹⁶ Beijing Daxue Xiaoshi Yanjiushi, 1:23.

⁹⁷ Weston, *Power of Position*, 27.

⁹⁸ Japanese was offered at the school from 1897: Liu Jianyun 劉建雲, *Chūgokujin no Nihongo gakushūshi: Shinmatsu no Tōbun Gakudō* 中国人の日本語学習史——清末の東文学堂 [A History of the Study of the Japanese Language by the Chinese: The Dongwen Xuetang in the Late Qing] (Tokyo: Gakujutsu shuppansha, 2005), 79.

areas, which the staff at the Qing legations and consulates still lacked a mature knowledge of at the beginning of the twentieth century), but it was an elective subject introduced only in the seventh year of the eight-year programme, and in the final year of the five-year programme.⁹⁹ As Lin Xuezhong has demonstrated, of the students enrolled at the school, few chose to study the subject.¹⁰⁰ While some specialists in international law, such as Wang Fengzao, Lian Fang 聯芳, and Qing Chang 慶常 (who would subsequently go on to staff the Qing legations and key figures in the Waiwubu) *did* emerge, it is evident that such specialist knowledge took a back seat to language acquisition.¹⁰¹ The School of Combined Learning did not, as is popularly told, serve as an institution for training *professional* diplomats—it was first and foremost a language school.¹⁰²

The other key issue was that Western learning did not yield upwards social mobility; rather, it often negatively affected it and brought the scorn of others.¹⁰³ Learning from foreigners was regarded as particularly degrading,¹⁰⁴ and the pupils who studied a foreign language at one of the schools noted above were, to borrow Lu Zhengxiang's words, 'regarded as traitors in the making, who, with the aid of these languages, would deliver their country to foreigners.'¹⁰⁵ Many of the students who had come back from the American education mission had been given a cold reception on their return to China,¹⁰⁶ and even Yan Fu 嚴父, who had undertaken the translation of John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, Spencer, Huxley and Montesquieu, had, after returning to China from Britain, been 'treated with disdain by the official class, because he was not much of a scholar in the national language and

⁹⁹ Shin Kawashima, 'China', in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law*, ed. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, Oxford Handbooks in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 463.

¹⁰⁰ This is evinced by the exam data Lin has gathered. In 1878, of 102 students, 9 sat the exam on international law. In 1886, of 100 students, 6 sat it. In 1892, of 103 students, 12 sat it. In 1897, of 107 students, none sat it. Lin, *Wanguo gongfa*, 130.

¹⁰¹ Kawashima, 'China', 464; Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 118.

¹⁰² Wang, 'Waijiaojia', 345.

¹⁰³ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 174–75.

¹⁰⁴ Ono, *Shitaiifu-zō*, 70.

¹⁰⁵ Lu, *Ways*, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Rhoads, *Stepping Forth*, 184.

literature'.¹⁰⁷ As Hayamaru Kazumasa has noted, it was often those individuals who sought to *distance* themselves from Western learning who were conversely sought out to practise it. This was because they were seen to have their priorities in order.¹⁰⁸

3. The Emergence of a Professional Diplomatic Class in China

As noted above, the critique levelled at the abilities of Qing men by individuals such as Huang Zhonghui and Wang Daxie, whilst not representative of every actor working in the service of Qing diplomacy at the time, was indicative of the Qing desire to meet and exceed the normative expectations placed upon it for Western European diplomatic practice. The same was true for why the Qing continued to turn to foreign assistance in the period described above. However, just because there was an ongoing need to bring in foreign assistance, this did not mean that the Qing had yet to take any measures to ameliorate what it identified as its own shortcomings.

The first point that needs to be made is that, even before any of the organisational shifts noted below were enacted in the twentieth century, many of the ministers' staffing choices were contributing to the fostering of a new professional diplomatic class. While the general rule of a three-year post often prevented (but did not preclude, as was the case with Lu Zhengxiang) staffing continuities from one minister to the next at a particular legation, *mufu* practice nevertheless allowed many of the individuals who *had* had legation or consulate experience to return to posts elsewhere. Getting the best possible staff was crucial to the success of a minister's mission.¹⁰⁹ And, as the Chong Hou anecdote—where he was sentenced to

¹⁰⁷ Yen, *Kaleidoscope*, 33. On Yan Fu, see: Benjamin I. Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (London: Harvard University Press, 1964).

¹⁰⁸ Hayamaru, 'Yōmu', 86.

¹⁰⁹ Of course, just as all the foreigners in legation and consulate posts were not necessarily competent (see the example of Bartlett noted in footnote 135 in this dissertation's introduction), not all Qing staff were competent either. The personal recommendation (*baoju*) chasers noted in this dissertation's introduction were a real issue. However, as Hakoda notes, this image has been overblown and has contributed to overly negative portrayals of the legations and consulates in Chinese scholarship (Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 184-185). I also contend that such negative portrayals emerged partly as a form of discrimination, for they were typically levied against irregular route officials by the regular route class.

death for signing a treaty unfavourable to the Qing with Russia—teaches us, success mattered not only societally but existentially as well. This didn't just mean bringing in foreigners, it also meant bringing in staff who had previous experience serving in legation or consulate roles. The two representative examples that Hakoda Keiko points to are that of Liu Shixun 劉式訓 and Lu Zhengxiang.¹¹⁰ Liu had studied at the Shanghai Institute of Various Languages and the School of Combined Learning, and was posted to the Paris legation as a student interpreter in 1894. After that, he remained in Europe working at different legations, being promoted from interpreter to counsellor. And, in 1905, he became Qing minister to France and Spain. Lu, on the other hand, had studied at the Shanghai Institute of Various Languages and School of Combined Learning, and was brought to Russia in 1892 to work under Xu Jingcheng as an interpreter. Receiving re-appointment after re-appointment, he remained in Russia, until he was eventually posted to The Hague as Qing minister to Holland. While this long-term practical experience did not always produce a mature knowledge of specialist subject matter,¹¹¹ nevertheless it arguably helped these individuals to refine their linguistic prowess and to understand the day-to-day procedures of the diplomatic profession.

The same was also true of the ministerial class. While a minister, as an *imperial* commissioned *qinchai dachen*, was ultimately chosen by the emperor, important statesmen, past ministers and the Zongli Yamen had the power to put forward recommendations (*baoju*), and it was often those individuals who had had prior experience whose names were put forward.¹¹² As Hakoda notes, of the 67 ministers posted abroad in the late Qing (1876-1912), 25 had prior experience serving in a legation or consulate. In the Waiwubu period, prior to the reforms of 1906-1907, of 19 ministers, 12 had prior experience. After the reforms, from 1907 to 1911, of 20

An example of this can be found in the Wang Daxie letter introduced above: Shanghai Tushuguan, *Wang Kangnian shiyou shuzha*, 2017, 1:795–96, No. 153, Wang Daxie to Wang Kangnian, GX32/9/9.

¹¹⁰ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 159; 170–79.

¹¹¹ Lu Zhengxiang was for instance profoundly struck by the in-depth knowledge of law displayed by the other delegates at the Second Hague Conference: Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 124.

¹¹² Li, *Waijiaoguan*, 227–45.

ministers, 14 had prior experience.¹¹³ Just as Shiga Shūzō observed in relation to scholar-officials who were appointed to the Board of Punishments (*Xingbu* 刑部), even though legal expertise was not necessarily expected going in, long-term engagement helped foster and promote specialism, and the individuals responsible for submitting the names of ministers to the emperor evidently recognised this.¹¹⁴ These staffing continuities are furthermore one of the reasons why Hakoda points to the legations and consulates as important training grounds for future diplomatic staff.¹¹⁵

One other important point to bear in mind in relation to Hakoda's argument about the legations and consulates' function as a training ground that promoted specialism were the considerable number of students who were brought along to the legations to gain work experience or develop language competence there, often while studying at a nearby university or school.¹¹⁶ And, in the case of the Qing Tokyo legation, a Japanese school (*Dongwen xuetang* 東文學堂) was especially established to train Japanese-language specialists, with some of its graduates going on to become counsellors and consuls in Japan.¹¹⁷ The Zongli Yamen, too, in response to Xie Zuyuan's critique of the legations, noted how students were sent to the legations with the explicit purpose of training.¹¹⁸

The prevailing culture at the legations and consulates thus already set the tenor for the birth of a professional diplomatic class,¹¹⁹ with foreigners plugging the skill gap as the staff gradually deepened and broadened their knowledge of the expectations of the diplomatic profession and other specialist subject matter.

However, several key changes, enacted both in direct and in indirect relation to the

¹¹³ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 158–59.

¹¹⁴ Shiga, *Hō to saiban*, 17. This point therefore complicates the oft-cited 'amateur ideal' popularized by Joseph Levenson about the late imperial Chinese elite. Joseph R. Levenson, 'The Amateur Ideal in Ming and Early Ch'ing Society: Evidence from Painting', in *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy*, vol. 1, 1968, 15–43. Also see critique in: Rowe, *Saving the World*, 3.

¹¹⁵ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 163.

¹¹⁶ Hakoda, 170–79.

¹¹⁷ Hakoda, 177; Wang, *Gakujutsu kōryū*, 371–402.

¹¹⁸ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 181–82.

¹¹⁹ Hakoda, 191.

legations and consulates, helped this prevailing culture to truly flourish in the early twentieth century.

The first of these was the general trend towards the normalisation of previously unorthodox backgrounds and fields of learning. Attitudes towards Western learning had, according to Liang Qichao, begun to shift after the Sino-French War. ‘Up until then’, Liang stated, ‘all of the intelligentsia saw talking about Western learning as a form of shame.’¹²⁰ In the postbellum period, however, Western learning gradually came to be seen as something that ought not to be carried out extrabureaucratically in the bureaux (*ju*), offices (*suo*) or *mufu* of a statesman, but rather as a formally endorsed component of Qing statecraft, and by members of the traditional *regular route* elite. The germination of such attitudes even resulted in calls being made for the implementation of subjects under the Western learning umbrella to be tested within the imperial examination as well. This was a world apart from attitudes which had prevailed previously.¹²¹

After the Qing defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, such attitudes grew with increasing vigour. Under the direction of Kang Youwei 康有為 in 1895, over 1,000 exam candidates rallied together to submit a petition (*gongche shangshu* 公車上書) that protested against the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and called for substantial reform. Following this, came the botched yet hugely significant Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898, led by Kang and disciple Liang Qichao. However, it would be the New Policies (*xinzheng*) movement, catalysed by the defeat of imperial forces in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900-1901, that ultimately brought a programme of truly substantial reform geared towards socio-political change. From 1901, under the banner of these policies, reform was carried out in the realms of government, education and the military, and the dynasty also moved towards adopting constitutionalism. In preparing for this new political modality, reform was ordered at

¹²⁰ Liang Qichao 梁啟超, ‘Wuxu zhengbianji 戊戌政變記 [An Account of the 1898 Coup D’état]’, in *Liang Qichao Quanji* 梁啟超全集 [Collected Works of Liang Qichao], ed. Tang Zhijun 湯志鈞 and Tang Renze 湯仁澤, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2018), 497.

¹²¹ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 180.

both the central and local levels of government (*guan zhi gaige* 官制改革). One important effect of the latter was that, from 1907, the bureaux and offices were excavated from their extrabureaucratic status and incorporated into the formal bureaucracy as official organs of local government, bringing their staff, concomitant practices and institutional memory along with them.¹²² Indeed, *muyou* from across the board were now being formally incorporated into local government as legitimate full-time officials. And, as we shall see below, an analogous process occurred in the diplomatic context as well.

Another key moment came in 1905 with the abolition of the imperial examination, which had hitherto functioned as the key facilitator of upwards social mobility and the achievement of social status within Chinese society. With its abolition, a generation of scholars were effectively left bereft of a vital piece of cultural capital. Moreover, those who had dedicated their youth to preparation for the exam were left in limbo with uncertain futures. Indeed, the archetypical ‘regular route’ official was no longer seen as a *sine qua non* for statecraft. Rather, a new type of intellectual who practised forms of intellectual labour which had once been denounced, was now necessary.¹²³ This had two implications. First, existing and prospective Qing scholar-officials needed to find new avenues not only for achieving upward social mobility and status, but also to sustain themselves and their families.¹²⁴ This meant that

¹²² Guan, ‘Cong mufu dao zhiguan’; Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 195; Li Zhiming 李志茗, *Wan Qing mufu: biandong shehui zhong de feizhengshi zhidu* 晚清幕府——變動社會中的非正式制度 [Late Qing Mufu: Informal Systems in a Changing Society] (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 2018), 43. Scholars have thus argued that these extrabureaucratic organisations which flourished outside of the formal bureaucracy were not only the driving force behind China’s modernisation. They also sat at the nexus of its transformation to a modern nation-state. Indeed, the various bureaux and offices came to serve as a collective of inadvertent incubators of modernity.

¹²³ Bastid-Bruguiere, ‘Currents’, 555.

¹²⁴ As Shinichi Satō notes, many of the people who studied abroad in the post-imperial examination era had initially planned to sit the exam. These students did not just comprise twenty- and thirty-year-olds, but also those in middle and of older age, too (Satō, *Chishikijin*, 23). On some of the options which were available to rural officials, see: Guan Xiaohong 關曉紅, ‘Keju tingfei yu jindai xiangcun shizi: yi Liu Dapeng, Zhu Zhisan riji wei shijiao de bijiao kaocha 科舉停廢與近代鄉村士子——以劉大鵬、朱峙三日記為視角的比較考察 [The abolition of the imperial examination and exam graduates in rural areas in modern times: A comparative analysis using the diaries of Liu Dapeng and Zhu Zhisan]’, in *Qing-mo xinzheng zhidu biange yanjiu* 清末新政制度變革研究 [Research on the Xinzheng Reforms of the Late Qing] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2019), 137–50.

careers in new professions such as diplomacy, and the education required to perform them, now became viable alternatives. Second, a new class of individuals who had emerged from unorthodox irregular route backgrounds, were now presented with new opportunities to take charge of China and its future trajectory.¹²⁵ It was not now a qualification in the imperial examination which held true currency; what came to be valuable was the possession of technical and practical expertise in areas such as Western learning and foreign languages.

It was against this backdrop of monumental societal change that shifts occurred in the diplomatic context as well. The first point to note is that the Waiwubu, China's first 'modern' foreign office, was installed in place of the Zongli Yamen in 1901. The Qing's diplomatic interlocutors had long been dissatisfied with the Zongli Yamen due to its lack of full-time staff and its extrastatutory bureau-esque nature. The negotiations over the Boxer Protocol therefore served as an opportune moment to compel the Qing to introduce a new institution which was more in line with foreign expectations.¹²⁶ By the terms of the protocol, an edict was released on July 24, 1901 which ordered a full-scale reform. This transformed the Zongli Yamen into a regularly constituted ministry which took precedence over the other six ministries of state, and which was staffed on a full-time basis.¹²⁷

However, it was the Waiwubu reforms of 1906-1907 that brought the most important changes in the legation and consulate context.¹²⁸ Firstly, echoing some of the changes which had already taken place centrally in the Waiwubu in 1901, and that which was happening concurrently with the staff at other extrabureaucratic Qing institutions, all ministers were converted from ad-hoc (*chaishi*) posts to full-time dedicated posts (*shiguan/shique*). No longer would a minister be just a 'part-timer' who was on leave from their 'real' post back in China. While the personal recommendation (*baoju*) system had often allowed for this to be the case *informally*,

¹²⁵ On the emergence of this new elite, see: Bastid-Bruguiere, 'Currents', 535-71.

¹²⁶ For a narrative of these negotiations, see: Kawashima, 'Gaimu', 181-202.

¹²⁷ Yen, 'Foreign Affairs', 9; Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 85-86.

¹²⁸ For a detailed history of the significance of these reforms, see: Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 122-23; Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 204-15; Tsai, *Waiwubu*, 177-86.

the introduction of such a measure made retaining individuals with experience a formalised requirement. Future ministers were also required to have some past experience serving in the legation or consular context, and needed to be able to speak a foreign language. Furthermore, if they excelled in their post, they were allowed to stay on and serve a longer tenure at an increased salary. Such measures thus constituted a formal move towards the promotion of diplomatic specialism, with the Waiwubu even explaining that the introduction of such policy would enable individuals to walk the path of specialism in diplomacy (*waijiao yitu* 外交一途) for a lifetime.¹²⁹ The second point of significance was that the power of the minister to choose his staff was taken away from him, with all staffing choices to be henceforth decidedly centrally by the ministry. What's more, 'real' posts (*shique*) would be created for these individuals of subministerial rank, and they would be swapped in and out to work either abroad or centrally at the Waiwubu. However, as the ministry did not have enough officials in its employ to do this immediately, it first needed to compile a database of qualified individuals. As such, the Waiwubu made each of the ministers submit personnel evaluations, in which individuals were assessed on their foreign language ability and understanding of specialist subject matter such as politics, law, commerce, and finance. Those who passed would have their file put on record at the Waiwubu, allowing them to remain in their role, and furthermore earmarking them for future posts elsewhere. Those who didn't pass would be entitled to a trial period, subject to further review.¹³⁰ Whilst such changes thus constituted a negation of *mufu* practice, in which the minister could choose who he brought with him, it nevertheless demonstrated an eye for formally promoting specialism amongst the lower-ranking members of staff and worked to eradicate personal recommendation (*baoju*) chasers from diplomatic service.¹³¹ The reforms also brought the creation of China's first school for training professional diplomats, the Chucaiguan 儲才館. The institution was established as a sort of 'finishing school' for

¹²⁹ GXCDHL, 10:5634-5635, No. 32, GX33/1.

¹³⁰ GXCDHL, 10:5634-5635, No. 32, GX33/1.

¹³¹ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 211–12.

returnee Chinese students from foreign institutions, with an eye to creating diplomatic staff who could serve in the Waiwubu, overseas postings, and regional diplomatic offices, and it achieved moderate success in this regard.¹³² However, its lifespan would be extremely short-lived, closing its doors in 1909 as a result of the choice instead to hire top-ranking graduates of the ‘exam for graduates of a programme of foreign study’ (*yourue biye kaoshi* 遊學畢業考試).¹³³ Nevertheless, the establishment of the school was highly indicative of the emerging emphasis on specialism.

As Hakoda has noted, past scholarship has seen these reforms as the key transitional moment between an unfocused, corruption-rife, and ‘unprofessional’ fledgling diplomatic service, to one which now had its priorities straightened out and which allowed for a professional diplomatic class to emerge.¹³⁴ However, as her study demonstrates, the reality was that these shifts allowed much of the skills and knowledge cultivated in the legations and consulates *prior* to these reforms to flourish, and the professional diplomatic class which emerged was not the result of the mere flick of a switch. Furthermore, many staffing continuities can be noted both before and after these reforms, and also into the Republican era as well.¹³⁵

It is important that we contextualise the significance of these steps that China made towards diplomatic specialisation here. Training for the professional diplomat had only begun in earnest in other countries from around the mid-nineteenth century,¹³⁶ with the fully-fledged diplomatic academy being a decidedly twentieth century phenomenon.¹³⁷ China’s acclimatisation was rapid.

¹³² Hakoda, 210.

¹³³ Hakoda, 210.

¹³⁴ Hakoda, 204, 275–76.

¹³⁵ Hakoda, 195–96, 212–13.

¹³⁶ The earliest academy emerged in France in the eighteenth century: H. M. A. Keens-Soper, ‘The French Political Academy, 1712: A School for Ambassadors’, in *The Art of Diplomacy*, by François de Callières, ed. H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), 189–218.

¹³⁷ Neumann, *At Home with the Diplomats*, 130.

In the Republican period, the emphasis on fostering diplomatic specialisation continued under the endeavours of the Beijing Government's Waijiaobu, the Waiwubu's effective successor.¹³⁸ In addition to retaining the vast majority of its predecessor's staff,¹³⁹ it took several steps of its own. Specific 'modernising' regulations were developed for uniform,¹⁴⁰ working hours,¹⁴¹ and about the precise functions and limits of authority of ministers and consuls.¹⁴² Regulations promulgated at the time also placed an emphasis on the necessity of possessing past experience and foreign language expertise,¹⁴³ with a protocol in 1915 eradicating interpreters from the legation and consular contexts.¹⁴⁴ The implication was that all staff should *already* be proficient. Furthermore, of particular note was the introduction in 1915 of an examination system which evaluated candidates on their Chinese and foreign language abilities, specialist knowledge (constitutional law, international public and private law, and diplomatic history), an elected subject (administrative regulations, criminal law, civil law, commercial law, criminal or civil procedural law, politics, economics, finance and commercial history), and also their ability to complete a practical exercise (such as drafting a diplomatic document in Chinese or a foreign language) either through writing, interview, or a mix of the two.¹⁴⁵ The professional Chinese diplomat was here to stay.

4. The Implications of Reform for the Foreign Presence, 1901-1949

¹³⁸ For an assessment of the endeavors made by the Guangdong Government, see: Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 178–200. As Kawashima Shin notes, many of these efforts followed a very similar structure to that of its rival. Kawashima, 202.

¹³⁹ Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*, 211–13; Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 574, footnote (6). Not all joined the Beijing Government's Waijiaobu, however. Wu Tingfang, for instance, joined the Guangdong Government's Waijiaobu: Kawashima, 179.

¹⁴⁰ BYWJB, 03-12-013-04-001, Waijiaobu to Zhang Yintang, Jan., 1913.

¹⁴¹ Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 129–30.

¹⁴² Kawashima, 133–34.

¹⁴³ Kawashima, 125–26.

¹⁴⁴ Kawashima, 127.

¹⁴⁵ Kawashima, 136–55.

I now move to consider what the implications were for the foreign presence in China's legations and consulates of the emergence of a professional diplomatic class in the twentieth century.

During the Qing era, a total of seven posts in which foreigners worked at the legations and consulates could be observed: counsellor, legal adviser, consul, honorary consul, secretary, interpreter, and attendant staff member. Despite the Waiwubu reforms, which removed the power from the minister to select his staff and, thereby, *mufu* practice, the reality was that several legations continued to maintain a small foreign presence, thus indicating that *mufu* practice remained in play exclusively for the hiring of foreign personnel. Under the Beijing Government, which came to power in 1912, this situation appears to have continued, with a total of four posts—secretary, adviser (*guwen* 顧問), honorary consul, and the slightly abstruse *banshi yangyuan* 辦事洋員 (literally, a Western clerk or office worker)—existing in 1920. However, of these four, only two had existed in the Qing: that of secretary and honorary consul. Furthermore, during the Guomindang rule of China, the foreign presence was reduced to just one post: honorary consul. What did all this mean?

The first point that needs to be made is that the historical record offers no indication that, in the post-1907 period, any of these individuals took a prominent role in the diplomatic affairs of the legation they worked in. Further research may reveal important discoveries, but I have been unable to discover any record which suggests otherwise. Even John McLeavy Brown, who had long served as the Inspector General of the Maritime Customs Service in Korea and had effectively become the 'new Macartney' at the Chinese legation in London, appears to have taken a more peripheral role in legation affairs compared to Macartney during his tenure of 1907 to 1926.¹⁴⁶ While Li Jingfang 李經方 (Qing minister to Britain, 1907-

¹⁴⁶ McLeavy Brown had managed to wangle the post after his long-term friend George Ernest Morrison, during a visit to London in November 1907, convinced the then Qing minister to Britain, Li Jingfang, to take him on. See: NSW-M, ML MSS 312/131, John McLeavy Brown to George Ernest Morrison, Nov. 16, 1907. McLeavy Brown remained in the post until his death in 1926: 'Sir John MacLeavy Brown. Death of Counsellor to the Chinese Legation at 91: A Pathetic End', *North China Herald*, May 15, 1926.

1910) was complimentary about McLeavy Brown's work in the staff performance review he submitted to the Waiwubu in 1910, I have been unable to uncover any evidence which suggests that his role was as prominent as that of his predecessor's during the Qing or Republican periods.¹⁴⁷ The fact that McLeavy Brown was already seventy-two when he took up this post may have had something to do with this. Moreover, given that George Ernest Morrison, the individual who had got McLeavy Brown the post, was adviser to Yuan Shikai, the Beijing Government's first President, this may have also contributed to his retaining of the post in the Republican period. Nevertheless, the historical record is similarly quiet about all of his foreign colleagues who worked in the legation context during the period as well.

The paucity of substantial sources on foreign involvement in legation and consulate affairs in the post-1907 era indicates three things. First, China's diplomats now felt the need to conduct diplomacy predominantly on their own, indicating both an increased self-confidence on their part, and a convergence with other countries in constructing a decidedly national diplomatic service. This likely related both to the nation-state inflected thinking introduced above, to the emergence of a new value system that embraced professional career tracks in what were formerly unorthodox roles, and to the formal drive towards achieving diplomatic professionalism that began with the Waiwubu reforms.

Second, there had been a fundamental change in how foreigners were involved in legation and consulate work. This point has two components to it. Firstly, as a result of the increased recognition of the importance for *Chinese* diplomats to take the helms of Chinese diplomacy, the foreigners who were working in the legations and consulates were likely now conducting more menial tasks, such as clerical work. Secondly, with the coming to power of the Beijing Government in 1912, the Waijiaobu became the central policy-making organ for diplomatic affairs.¹⁴⁸ As a result of this, the ministers became subject to policy from above, marking a break

¹⁴⁷ WWB, 02-12-014-03-045, Li Jingfang to Waiwubu, XT2/10/27.

¹⁴⁸ Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 109, 122.

from previous practice in the Qing dynasty in which the ministers existed on an equal footing with both the Zongli Yamen and Waiwubu. This necessarily eradicated the need for, at the very least, strategy advice from foreign third parties in the legation and consular contexts.

Finally, even if some of these foreigners *were* involved in important work, such as the decision-making process, the underlying structures of that transaction between foreigner and minister was likely predicated on an entirely different sociological dynamic than that which linked the foreign *muyou* to his host in the pre-1907 era. As noted in this dissertation's introduction, two of the key aspects that defined a *muyou* were that he effectively worked on a level playing field with that of his host, and that he often conducted the host's work on his behalf. However, it is my contention that the difference between the dynamic which underpinned the ideal relationship between 'foreign expert' and employee in the post-Qing era was entirely different. There was a desire to impose a clearly defined hierarchy, and the employee, while feeding advice into the decision-making process, was *not* positioned as the individual who was ultimately charged with executing a task. I therefore suggest that we understand that there had been a shift from *muyou* to something which we might identify as similar in status to that of the 'hired foreigner' (*oyatoi gaikokujin* お雇い外国人) in Meiji Japan who, despite being able to tender advice and assistance, was nevertheless subject to the strictures of hierarchy and who did not have a say in the final decision-making process.¹⁴⁹ I therefore suggest that we can understand this process as a transformation from *muyou* to *guwen* (typically rendered in English as 'adviser'). Taken literally, the term *guwen* conveys a sense of a person standing behind the arbiter of an action, to whom said arbiter peers back to (*gu* 顧) and asks a question (*wen* 問), and was originally used to explicate the dynamic which occurred when a

¹⁴⁹ On the limits of authority placed upon Japan's foreign employees, see: Umetani Noboru 梅溪昇, *Oyatoi gaikokujin: Meiji Nihon no wakiyakutachi* お雇い外国人——明治日本の脇役たち [Foreign Employees: Meiji Japan's Supporting Cast] (Tokyo: Kōdansha gakujutsu bunko, 2007), 248–49.

Chinese emperor turned to a subject for advice.¹⁵⁰ The Japanese rendering of the term, *komon*, was commonly used in the Meiji period in the titles of foreign employees and,¹⁵¹ as I demonstrate below, the term also came to prevalence in relation to China's foreign employees in the Republican period.¹⁵² This shift has hitherto been difficult to perceive because most secondary literature has positioned all foreign involvement in China in homogenous terms under the umbrella terms of 'Western adviser' or 'foreign expert'.

The arguments presented above are not pure speculation. There are clear reasons why we can infer them to be the case. First, after the establishment of the Waiwubu in 1901, the employment of foreigners putatively became a task of central government, with the Waiwubu's Bureau of Industrial Matters (*kaogong si* 考工司) taking responsibility for the engagement of Western military officers and other Western personnel.¹⁵³ This was significant as, in the very least, it implied that the central government ought to be responsible for the engagement of foreign staff. In other words, this was a negation of one of the key modes through which foreigners had previously found employment in China: that of *mufu* practice. That this occurred concurrently with other institutional reconfigurations that sought to both eliminate *mufu* practice and absorb the experienced extrabureaucratic personnel it

¹⁵⁰ See entry for *guwen/komon* in: Morohashi Tetsuji 諸橋轍次, *Dai Kan-Wa jiten* 大漢和辞典 [The Great Chinese–Japanese Dictionary], 5th ed., vol. 12 (Tokyo: Taishūkan shoten, 1976), 12905.

¹⁵¹ Gaimushō hyakunenshi hensan iinkai 外務省百年史編纂委員会, ed., *Gaimushō no hyakunen* 外務省の百年 [100 Years of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1979), 1339–40.

¹⁵² While beyond the scope of this present study, given the gargantuan influence Japan had upon China in this period, I think there are grounds to argue that such a shift—both lexically and sociologically—was at least partly informed by the experience of the Qing Reformists and Revolutionaries in Japan. On the 'Japan impact', see: Marius Jansen, 'Japan and the Revolution of 1911', in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. John K. Fairbank and Denis Twitchett, vol. 11 (Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 2) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 339–74; Douglas R. Reynolds, *China, 1898–1912: The Xinzhen Revolution and Japan*, 160 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University, 1993).

¹⁵³ Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 86; Tsai, *Waiwubu*, 116; William L. Tung, *China And Some Phases Of International Law* (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1940), 108.

had produced over the past several decades into new central and local roles seems unlikely to be mere coincidence.¹⁵⁴

By 1910, there were also clear indications that both the media and the Waiwubu itself was beginning to see a need to extricate foreigners from the realm of diplomatic affairs. The Waiwubu had hired Walter Hillier sometime after its inception to assist the ministry with its diplomatic work at a staggering monthly salary of 3,400 taels. However, since being hired, the Englishman had purportedly remained within the British legation and had not devised any strategy whatsoever on the ministry's behalf. After getting wind of this, the Chinese press launched a series of attacks on Hillier for enjoying such a generous salary without having had to lift a finger. Such negative opinions were further compounded when an article was published in the *Shenbao* in July of the same year that scathingly denounced the Waiwubu for its inability to take proper control of its foreign adviser.¹⁵⁵ Perhaps as a result of this criticism, and the ongoing problems the ministry had had with 'taming' its foreign cadre, it stated it would not be replacing Hillier, whose term as diplomatic adviser came to an end in 1910, with another foreigner.¹⁵⁶ Instead, Wu Tingfang was invited to take up the post which, the *Shenbao* noted, would be a far more favourable outcome than having a foreigner in the role.¹⁵⁷

After the Beijing Government came to power in 1912, several further steps were taken which sought to circumscribe, or inadvertently affected, the dynamics of the relationship between foreigner and Chinese employee. These likely had some part in

¹⁵⁴ While accepting the notion that the *muyou* of the late Qing were absorbed into formal governmental structures after the local governmental reforms of 1907, Li Zhiming nevertheless argues that aspects of *mufu* practice remained in play right through until the end of the Republican period. While I accept that this may have been the case in some areas, I am of the view that the evidence presented in this chapter (at least in the case of foreign employees) indicates an effort to move away from such practice and embrace a more 'rational', Weberian form of bureaucratic hierarchy and discipline. Li, *Wan Qing mufu*, 44–50.

¹⁵⁵ 'Pin waijiao guwenguan zhi ganyan 聘外交顧問官之感言 [Some Thoughts on the Hiring of Diplomatic Advisers]', *Shenbao*, Jul. 11, 1910.

¹⁵⁶ 'China's Foreign Adviser', *The North-China Herald*, Jul. 15, 1910; Tsai, *Waiwubu*, 294.

¹⁵⁷ 'Wu xingshi jiangwei Waibu guwen 伍星使將為外部顧問 [Minister Wu to Become Waiwubu Adviser]', *Shenbao*, Aug. 5, 1910; Tsai, *Waiwubu*, 295.

accelerating the trend away from reliance on foreign expertise in China's legations and consulates as well.

The first two points of significance, albeit not *directly* relating to the employment of foreigners was that of the Nationality Law (*guojifa* 國籍法) and the Beijing Government's 1916 'protocols for diplomats and consuls' (*waijiaoguan lingshiguan guan zhi* 外交官領事官官制). The former was first promulgated under the Qing in March 1909 but re-promulgated by the Beijing Government in November 1912 with several new wording choices. Clause 3 of Article 13 explained how the loss of Chinese nationality was not permissible for an individual who worked in a civil or military office.¹⁵⁸ In other words, if a Chinese wished to *revoke* their citizenship and was working in a civil or military post, they first needed to step down from their role. This therefore prevented foreigners from becoming Chinese civil servants or military officers, as it implied that such offices necessitated Chinese nationality.¹⁵⁹ As for the 'protocols for diplomats and consuls', this document included a list of what posts a legation and consulate ought to be comprised of.¹⁶⁰ Foreign staff did not feature anywhere in the regulations, thus indicating a formal expectation that they were not to be employed in such contexts.

The first law promulgated under the Beijing Government which directly targeted foreigners, however, came in 1913, when the cabinet (*guowuyuan* 國務院) developed a set of rules for their employment in the Chinese provinces. The rules sought to achieve a variety of things, but for the purposes of the present study, points one and five are significant. Point one called for the prohibition of employing foreigners in areas other than education, agriculture and forestry, industry and commerce,

¹⁵⁸ 'La Nouvelle Loi Chinoise Sur La Nationalité Du 18 Novembre 1912', *Revue de Droit International Privé* 10 (1914): 246.

¹⁵⁹ Although both authors reference the later 1929 law, I nevertheless owe this insight to: Chen Tiqiang 陳體強, *Zhongguo waijiao xingzheng* 中國外交行政 [China's Administration of Foreign Affairs] (Chongqing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1943), 254; Fan Yang 范揚, *Xingzhengfa zonglun* 行政法總論 [An Overview of Chinese Administrative Law] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1948), 140.

¹⁶⁰ YSKQJ, 34:565-567, No. 34-2084, Order to Promulgate Protocols for Diplomats and Consuls, Mar. 2, 1916. One could technically cite the honorary consul as the exception to this rule, but there was no explicit articulation here that an honorary consul should be a foreigner, although that would largely be the case as explored below.

communications, and currency matters, and point five sought to prohibit foreign *advisers* (significantly, styled as ‘*guwen*’) from being able to vote at meetings.¹⁶¹ Taken together, these two points were the first clear indication that China wanted to circumscribe the level of political involvement and political say the foreigner had. Indeed, this was a clear move designed to dislodge the influence of *mufu* practice.

Another important moment came in 1914, when Yuan Shikai released a presidential order that called for the ‘prudent use of Western personnel’. Yuan called for all provinces to put new foreign staff hires on hold, and that all those foreigners who were already employed must be treated as *nothing more* than *guwen*, or advisers (*liyu guwen zhi diwei* 立於顧問之地位): a clear repudiation of past *mufu* practice. Furthermore, these advisers (again, ‘*guwen*’) were prohibited from intervening in state affairs.¹⁶² This order was the first clear sign that *mufu* practice, through which a foreigner could take on a significant political role on behalf of or in collaboration with his host, and which allowed for relationships often unrestrained by stringent notions of hierarchy, was now being wound down and that the *guwen*, subject to a more stringent form of hierarchy and unable to engage in direct involvement in processes of a political nature, was taking the place of the foreign *muyou*.

Following this, came the ‘Contractual Regulations for the Hiring of Western Personnel’ (*pinyong yangyuan hetong tiaoli* 聘用洋員合同條例), which targeted both institutions inside and outside Beijing, and was promulgated by the Waijiaobu in September 1915.¹⁶³ Of the regulations, Articles 1 and 3 were particularly significant. Article 1 called for foreigners not to be engaged unless absolutely necessary, and Article 3 stated that a foreigner in the employment of China was only ever allowed to express an opinion and was prohibited from interfering in China’s internal

¹⁶¹ Zhou Xue 周雪, ‘Minguo Beijing Zhengfu wairen pinyong yanjiu 民國北京政府外人聘用研究 [Research on the Employment of Foreigners under the Republican Beijing Government]’ (MA Thesis, Hunan Normal University, 2016), 23.

¹⁶² YSKQJ, 25:209, No. 25-564, Order to Use Foreign Staff Prudently, Jan. 31, 1914. Also see: Zhou, 25.

¹⁶³ ‘Waijiaobu dingding pinyong yangyuan zhi tiaoli 外交部訂定聘用洋員之條例 [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Formulates Statutes on the Hiring of Western Staff]’, *Shibao*, Sept. 14, 1915.

affairs.¹⁶⁴ This, again, was further evidence of the desire to curtail political involvement of the foreigner. And, in a draft version of the contract drawn up by Waijiaobu, we find further clarification of the desired dynamic between foreigner and employee:

Article 3: Limits on authority. The appointee shall be subject to the control and direction of (name of official), and other than for those tasks expected of him in his post, if he should have an opinion to express on a matter, he may directly state this to (name of official), who will deliberate upon it. Outside of this, he is prohibited from using the name of (name of post in name of organisation) to intervene in other matters. If he wishes to express his opinion somewhere, he must first receive the permission of (name of organisation or official).¹⁶⁵

Another relevant law also emerged under the Guomindang, who came to power in 1927. A directive from the Examination Yuan (*kaoshiyuan* 考試院) dated November 4, 1932 on the position of foreign civil servants stated that ‘foreigners working within one of China’s state organs in the capacity of a civil servant should be understood to be employed on a part-time or limited basis (*guyong huo pinren xingzhi* 雇用或聘任性質), and were not eligible for promotion’.¹⁶⁶

The final set of regulations which merits note is the ‘Regulations Relating to the Employment of Non-Commissioned Officers by the Diplomatic Missions and Consulates Abroad’ (*zhuwai shilingguan renyong guyuan guize* 駐外使領館任用雇員規則),¹⁶⁷ promulgated by the Guomindang Government’s Waijiaobu in June 1933. Article 3 stated that diplomatic missions were entitled to employ non-commissioned officers, such as clerks, translators and typists, and, interestingly, in Article 10, it was stated that advisers (*guwen*) too might be hired if necessary.¹⁶⁸ To what extent

¹⁶⁴ ‘Pinyong yangyuan zhi tiaoli’; Zhou, ‘Wairen pinyong yanjiu’, 25.

¹⁶⁵ BYWJB, 03-01-027-06-001, Draft Contract for the Employment of Western Personnel (For Regular Use), undated.

¹⁶⁶ Chen, *Waijiao xingzheng*, 254–55; Fan, *Xingzhengfa*, 140.

¹⁶⁷ I borrow William Tung’s translation here. Tung, *Phases*, 102.

¹⁶⁸ Tung, 102. For the original regulations, see the section under the heading given above in: Waijiaobu 外交部, *Waijiaobu faui huibian* 外交部法規匯編 [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’

these provisions enabled the hiring of non-Chinese staff is not clear. Significantly, however, all appointments required Waijiaobu approval.

Writing in 1943 and 1948 respectively, both Chen Tiqiang and Fan Yang were of the view that although there was no direct legal provision in Chinese law concerning whether an official ought to be a Chinese national, it was clear from a legal perspective that Chinese laws contained the principle that foreigners were not allowed to be officials. In demonstrating this, both Chen and Fan referenced the aforementioned Nationality Law, albeit now in a later iteration,¹⁶⁹ and the above 1932 directive, but Fan was slightly more forceful than Chen in his explanations: ‘the right to be an official is a civil right, and cannot be enjoyed by anyone other than a national of the Republic of China. ... An official must offer themselves entirely to the state and be loyal to it. They also must feel a sense of ethical obligation toward it. Such obligations cannot be expected to be fulfilled by foreigners.’¹⁷⁰ Fan did, however, note that as a result of enduring ‘customs’ and past treaty regulations, foreigners nevertheless served as honorary consuls (explored below) and as officials in the Customs service, but that these men were not officials in the formal sense (*bu zuowei guanli* 不作爲官吏) and were not subject to the rules of official service.¹⁷¹

How then did such laws and regulations come to affect the foreign presence in China’s legations, consulates, and embassies, and the *mufu* practice which underscored their application in these contexts? Previously in this chapter, with specific reference to the example of Britain, I explained how Western states had worked to curtail the foreign component of their diplomatic and consular corps, and how the Qing had been exposed to these ideas, both in passing but also as a form of external pressure from its diplomatic interlocutors in the nineteenth century. In the

Compendium of Regulations] (Unknown: Waijiaobu, 1944). Page numbers are given on a section-by-section basis, hence their lack of inclusion here.

¹⁶⁹ The nationality law of 1912 was superseded by a new law promulgated in December 1914, and yet again in February 1929 after the Guomindang came into power (See: Tung, *Phases*, 85-86). By 1929, the clause referenced above pertaining to the inability for individuals in civil and military offices to have their citizenship revoked was now under Clause 3, Article 12 of the law.

¹⁷⁰ Fan, *Xingzhengfa*, 140.

¹⁷¹ Fan, 140.

Western context, it was, however, only in the twentieth century that such ideas were codified as law. In France, several laws were promulgated on November 15, 1920, which dictated that all low-ranking embassy, legation and consular staff must be of French nationality, and that appointments to higher-ranking positions ought to be selected from among these lower-ranking individuals.¹⁷² Furthermore, in America, a law promulgated in 1931 stipulated that all embassy, legation and consular secretaries must be of American nationality.¹⁷³ As Chen Tiquang noted, no analogous laws were promulgated in the Chinese context regarding restrictions on the nationalities of diplomatic staff. However, the rules, ordinances and laws outlined above effectively amounted to the same thing and should be understood to apply to China's legations, consulates, and later embassies in the Republican period.

Mufu practice in the diplomatic context was also likely affected by the shifts outlined above as well. However, in relation to the legation and consulate context specifically, one key moment was in 1914, when the Waijiaobu sought to survey the full extent of the foreign presence in its legations and consulates for the first time.¹⁷⁴ This effectively forced the ministers who did have a non-Chinese in their employ to 'come clean'. The earliest results of such a survey that I have been able to uncover can be found in a 1920 publication in which, outside of the decidedly non-political roles of secretary and honorary consul, *none* of the foreign staff were listed in positions which had been set out in the Beijing Government's 1916 'protocols for diplomats and consuls' document.¹⁷⁵ The other titles we find are that of *banshi yangyuan*—literally, a Western clerk or office worker—and *guwen*, adviser.¹⁷⁶ Even John McLeavy Brown, who had previously been styled 'Counsellor' (the second in

¹⁷² See also: Chen, *Waijiao xingzheng*, 254.

¹⁷³ Chen, 254.

¹⁷⁴ BYWJB, 03-12-013-12-074, Waijiaobu to Washington Legation, Jan. 23, 1914.

¹⁷⁵ YSKQJ, 34:565-567, No. 34-2084, Order to Promulgate Protocols for Diplomats and Consuls, Mar. 2, 1916.

¹⁷⁶ Waijiaobu 外交部, *Zhuwai zhiyuanlu: Zhonghua Minguo jiuinian yiyuefen* 駐外職員錄——中華民國九年一月分 [List of China's Overseas Staff for the 1st Month of Minguo Year 9] (Unknown: Unknown, 1920).

command to a minister) to the Qing London legation, was now, from the official Chinese perspective, a *banshi yangyuan*.¹⁷⁷

Concurrent with, and likely intellectually fuelling, these moves to curtail the influence and level of political involvement of the foreigner in the diplomatic context and beyond was the ever-influential grip of nation-state inflected thinking, which positioned diplomacy and other aspects of statecraft as integral components of China's performance of the sovereign state. As Wellington Koo noted in the preface to Yan Huiqing's autobiography, foreign involvement in this period constituted an encroachment on the 'administrative integrity of China' and removing this presence was necessary for safeguarding China's 'rights of sovereignty and self-respect'.¹⁷⁸ The growing consensus in the Republican era was that key facets of statecraft ought to be conducted by Chinese actors, and such attitudes were afforded unequivocal expression through the attempts to extricate the foreign grip upon other Chinese institutions in the period.¹⁷⁹

At the same time, the normalisation of the diplomat as a profession within Chinese society no doubt also worked to curtail the extent of foreign involvement. The termination of the imperial examination in 1905, coupled with the Waiwubu reforms of 1906 to 1907, worked in tandem to *formally* engender a space in which a professional diplomatic class could emerge, and in which it was socially desirable to become a diplomat. As early as between 1902 and 1911, during the print run of the *Waijiaobao* 外交報,¹⁸⁰ arcane diplomatic topics were featuring in the pages of the journal in ever greater quantity, suggesting not only a normalisation of the diplomat as a professional career choice, but also a growing appetite for the techniques and

¹⁷⁷ The British newspapers nevertheless continued to refer to him as a 'Counsellor', however: 'Sir John MacLeavy Brown. Death of Counsellor to the Chinese Legation at 91: A Pathetic End'.

¹⁷⁸ Yen, *Kaleidoscope*, vii, x.

¹⁷⁹ Chihyun Chang, *Government, Imperialism and Nationalism in China: The Maritime Customs Service and Its Chinese Staff* (London; New York: Routledge, 2013); Robert A. Bickers, *Out of China: How the Chinese Ended the Era of Western Domination* (London: Allen Lane, 2017).

¹⁸⁰ On the *Waijiaobao*, see: Svarverud, *International Law*, 257–59.

knowhow which underpinned this form of intellectual labour among the wider public.¹⁸¹

The one exception to the trend towards the extrication of the foreign presence in China's diplomatic outposts was the growing number of foreigners who served as honorary consuls in the twentieth century, right through until the Communist Revolution of 1949. The first foreigner to be granted this post was that of Stephen W. Nickerson, a lawyer sympathetic to the Chinese plight in America,¹⁸² in the capacity of Qing Honorary Vice-Consul to Boston in July 1902.¹⁸³ This was followed by a slow and steady trickle of appointments, both in the late Qing, and throughout the Republican period, not only in North America but in Europe, South America and Africa as well.¹⁸⁴ The majority of these individuals were merchants, but lawyers (such as Thomas W. Barlow in Philadelphia),¹⁸⁵ ex-Customs men (such as Frederik Schjøth in Christiania),¹⁸⁶ ex-mayors (such as Alderman J. Forster in London)¹⁸⁷ and other individuals of prominent background served in the role as well.

Given the trend away from foreign expertise in the Chinese diplomatic context, such a phenomenon may appear contradictory. However, the reality was that an honorary consular post did not buck such trends. The first point which needs to be made is that the hiring of honorary consuls was effectively a last resort for the

¹⁸¹ Examples included: 'on diplomacy as an academic discipline', 'on how ancient China had bilateral relations (*jiaotong* 交通) but did not have diplomacy (*waijiao* 外交)', and 'on the differences between diplomatic ceremonial (*jiaoji* 交際) and diplomatic negotiations (*jiaoshe* 交涉)'. Guangwen Bianyisuo 廣文編譯所, ed., *Waijiaobao Huibian* 外交報彙編 [Collected Articles from the *Waijiaobao*], vol. 1 (Taipei: Guangwen shuju, 1964), 529, 579–82, 583. On *jiaoji* and *jiaoshe*, see: Satō, *Chishikijin*, 88.

¹⁸² Such views were evident in the articles he wrote: Stephen W. Nickerson, 'Our Chinese Treaties; And Legislation; And Their Enforcement', *The North American Review* 181, no. 586 (1905): 369–78; Stephen W. Nickerson, 'The Dawning of a Wiser Chinese Policy', *The North American Review* 188, no. 637 (1908): 918–27.

¹⁸³ NARA, Notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, 1868–1906, Volume 5, No. 249, Wu Tingfang to John Hay, Jul. 1, 1902.

¹⁸⁴ China's honorary consulships were not exclusively open to foreigners. Overseas Chinese could likewise be appointed to the post, although in the Chinese case, the overwhelming majority of appointments made were to foreigners. As Chen Tiqiang noted, of a total of 32 serving honorary consuls in 1946, just 6 of these were Chinese. Chen, *Waijiao xingzheng*, 164.

¹⁸⁵ 'Chinatown Hears It Has a Consul: Thomas W. Barlow Will Represent Chinese Minister in This City', *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Apr. 12, 1905.

¹⁸⁶ WWB, 02-12-013-02-014, Waiwubu to Li Jingfang, GX33/11/29.

¹⁸⁷ 'A St. Helens Wedding', *Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser*, Jun. 4, 1909.

Republican governments. For instance, Article 12 of the Beijing Government's 1916 'protocols for diplomats and consuls' declared that honorary consuls or honorary vice-consuls were only to be established in areas where there was no existing consul or commercial agent (*tongshang shiwuyuan* 通商事務員).¹⁸⁸ In addition, honorary consuls were not civil servants, were unsalaried, did not enjoy diplomatic privileges, were not subject to promotion, demotion,¹⁸⁹ or transfer, and were not eligible for most rewards and sanctions.¹⁹⁰ Their work was also decidedly unpolitical, with them being responsible for assisting the affairs of Chinese residing overseas, and in developing commercial opportunities for China abroad. Any issues which fell out of this remit required them to involve the minister or consul to whom they answered.¹⁹¹ What's more, the appointment of honorary consuls was a phenomenon that was not unique to China. While different countries took different approaches,¹⁹² their use was nevertheless widespread, and such practice remains the case today.¹⁹³ In many ways then, the proliferation of the Chinese foreign honorary consul in the twentieth century reflected just another convergence with global diplomatic trends.

However, just because the honorary consul's role was divorced from politics, this did not mean that their work was entirely insignificant. Indeed, they provided an important service to the Chinese state *pro bono*. Throughout the twentieth century, Chinese immigrants continued to populate many areas of the world. However, the

¹⁸⁸ YSKQJ, 34:565-567, No. 34-2084, Order to Promulgate Protocols for Diplomats and Consuls, Mar. 2, 1916.

¹⁸⁹ During the Qing, in the case of Stephen W. Nickerson, we do find one example of an Honorary Vice-Consul being upgraded to an Honorary Consul, but such a 'promotion' should be understood as a tokenistic gesture. NARA, Notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, 1868-1906, Volume 6, No. 58, Liang Cheng to Alvey A. Adee, Mar. 30, 1905.

¹⁹⁰ Chen, *Waijiao xingzheng*, 163. Some foreign honorary consuls did, alongside other foreigners who had rendered some sort of service to the Beijing Government, receive Orders of the Golden Grain (*jiahezhang* 嘉禾章), however. Seven foreign honorary consuls received this award in 1914: YSKQJ, 27:88, No. 27-277, Order to Bestow Decorations on Alderman J. Forster et al, Jun. 9, 1914.

¹⁹¹ Chen, 164.

¹⁹² For instance, while Japan only appointed non-nationals and Germany and France appointed more non-nationals as a matter of principle, Britain and America were at the other extreme. They prohibited the appointment of non-nationals altogether. Chen, 254.

¹⁹³ 'A Booming Trade: Foreign Ministries Employ Ever More Amateurs to Do Their Bidding Abroad', *The Economist*, 31 August 2013, <https://www.economist.com/international/2013/08/31/a-booming-trade>.

Qing and subsequent Republican governments often did not have the funds to justify establishing full-blown consulships in certain regions.¹⁹⁴ This was likely the case during the 1920s, when the Beijing Government began to face severe budgetary problems.¹⁹⁵ Hitherto, the government had worked to expand its representative reach considerably, establishing new legations, consulate-generals, and consulates across Europe, Russia, Southeast Asia, and Africa.¹⁹⁶ However, the financial strain placed upon the government as a result of the Boxer indemnity was considerable, and in 1926, all the legations and consulates had been left without payment of funds for over two years and several months, including the salaries of staff, resulting in several having to close or pause their operations.¹⁹⁷ The honorary consuls therefore allowed for the consular affairs of Chinese migrants in more peripheral areas to be attended to in a period of immense domestic and financial instability in China. They also functioned as a source of prestige for the individual in the post, making it a win-win situation for both parties.¹⁹⁸

However, with the coming of the Communist Revolution in 1949 and its clean break with all past diplomatic and consular expertise,¹⁹⁹ the honorary consuls, both non-Chinese and Chinese, had had their day. Indeed, the People's Republic refused to maintain this class of 'bourgeois spies'.²⁰⁰ This made them the last group of foreigners to maintain some form of involvement in China's overseas diplomatic and consular affairs until the mid-1990s, which saw a slow return of non-nationals to the embassies of the People's Republic of China.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁴ Chen, *Waijiao xingzheng*, 163.

¹⁹⁵ Kawashima, *Gaikō*, 111.

¹⁹⁶ Kawashima, 111.

¹⁹⁷ Kawashima, 112.

¹⁹⁸ This is a well-established reason for why individuals would choose to take up an honorary consulship. Interestingly, the Qing were aware of this point as early as 1909, as evinced in a letter sent to the Waiwubu by Qian Xun on the appointment of Leonne Januzzi as Qing Honorary Consul to Naples: WWB, 02-12-038-01-006, Qian Xun to Waiwubu, XT1/2/19.

¹⁹⁹ Martin, *Civilian Army*, 6, 15, 47.

²⁰⁰ Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 144.

²⁰¹ Xiaohong Liu, *Chinese Ambassadors: The Rise of Diplomatic Professionalism since 1949* (Seattle; London: University of Washington Press, 2001), 165.

Conclusion

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, many of the Western powers were already seeking to do away with the cosmopolitanism they had once practised in their selection of diplomatic staff. The Qing were exposed to these attitudes by, at the very latest, the 1890s, and began to recognise the problematic nature of entrusting foreigners to conduct so many aspects of a piece of statecraft which had become inextricably tied up to the performance of the nation-state in the Western imagination. Prompted by such ideology, new-found self-confidence, and the desire to cut costs, the first indications that it was time to part company with the foreign presence were beginning to become clear in the views and practices of Qing ministers and subministerial staff at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, owing to the asymmetries in its staff's grasp of specialist knowledge which extended beyond the realm of linguistic prowess, its concern for how it was perceived in diplomatic negotiations and, to a lesser extent, the safety of its staff in certain regions, the Qing came to recognise that an immediate eradication of foreign assistance was an untenable goal. However, the New Policies of the 1910s worked both in direct and indirect relation to transform this situation. Roles which had once been disparaged came to become socially acceptable and desirable, and a greater emphasis came to be placed upon specialisation, including in diplomacy, across the board. This allowed for many individuals who had once practised technical expertise in extrabureaucratic contexts, be it a *mufu*, bureau (*ju*), office (*suo*), or legation, to be inaugurated into the formal framework of the bureaucracy, and it also encouraged the fostering of a new generation of technocrats who looked very different from the scholar-officials of yesteryear. Furthermore, during the Republican period, in which these technocrats reigned supreme, the emphasis upon fostering and promoting technical expertise continued, and further efforts were made to bring diplomacy and other politically-tinged activities under the control of national actors. Indeed, through the introduction of new laws, regulations and norms of practice, the Republican period fundamentally transformed the sociological dynamic which underpinned how foreign

actors, as *muyou* working in diplomacy, related to their employers. Gone was the horizontal relationship between *muyou* and host which allowed for foreign engagement in, or even execution on behalf of the host, the most sensitive aspects of the diplomatic process. These individuals were now *guwen*, whose involvement was circumscribed to tender nothing more than opinion when it came to the political process.

This chapter therefore demonstrates how the roles played by foreigners in Qing China's legations and consulates retain their instructive utility for us in understanding how China sought to achieve normative mastery of Western European diplomatic practice right through until the end of the Republican period. The foreign presence is diagnostic of changes in how China addressed the challenges posed by the wider world, functioning as does an 'indicator species' in an ecosystem as a simpler way of discerning greater complexities and their trajectory over time. It therefore offers us an alternate window into evolving perspectives not only on diplomacy, but on nationalism, professionalism and statecraft in Qing and Republican China.

Conclusion

This dissertation has utilised the foreign presence in late Qing and Republican China's legations as an 'indicator species' through which to answer two questions. First, how the 'professional' Chinese diplomat, fluent in the sociocultural expectations of Western European diplomacy, emerged in the early twentieth century from a country whose various dynasties had, for two millennia, led and participated in an entirely distinct diplomatic culture of its own. And second, how a group of non-Chinese intermediaries working in China's first modern diplomatic institutions helped nurture this transformation.

The study's key findings serve as a thorough rejoinder to simplistic narratives that promote ideas of Qing ineptitude. As the dissertation reveals, the ministers initially used these foreigners as sources from which to elicit explications, commentary and translations about the ideas, practices and technology of the non-Qing world. But from the 1880s onwards, new emphases came to be placed on using these individuals for meeting and exceeding the normative expectations of Western European diplomatic practice. These new emphases were also diagnostic of a broader agenda that sought to present Qing China as an active, competent and rational sovereign and suzerain state; a state committed to the principles underpinning Western European diplomatic culture and practice, and that was ready to defend and protect its interests, territory, 'vassal states' and people.

However, despite the rapidity with which these new emphases unfolded, the path to normative mastery did not follow a linear trajectory of unbridled Whiggish

progress. There were problems to be overcome along the way. Indeed, despite the Qing coming to recognise the need for its own actors to take control of the execution of diplomacy by the beginning of the twentieth century, diplomatic autonomy was not immediately possible. Indeed, the Qing ministers and their staff, whilst now often fluent in the languages of their posting, still struggled to speak the language of negotiation and persuasion or to be able to invoke knowledge of specialist topics in their diplomacy. They therefore continued to turn to foreign assistance. Nevertheless, a series of institutional changes enacted under the New Policies movement enabled diplomatic specialisation to become a key priority for the dynasty. These changes resulted in the emergence of a decidedly professional diplomatic class that had spent several years training and familiarising itself with the vagaries of diplomatic practice in subministerial roles in the Qing's legations and consulates. Moreover, many of the individuals who came to the fore during this process would go on to work as diplomats during the Republican period, energetically working, among other things, to redefine the terms of China's relationships with the outside world to become more equitable, and to claw back sovereignty over land in China proper.

The foreigners, far from just being indicative of this rapid transformation, were likewise essential contributors to it. They provided expertise in region-specific knowledge, rhetorical finesse, negotiational tact, and other specialist genres of knowledge. They thereby enabled the Qing ministers to achieve their goals both for learning about the non-Qing world and for achieving their newfound expectations for standards of diplomatic practice. The fact that the Qing sought them out to do this was not an indication of ministerial ineptitude. Quite the contrary. The ministers' recognition that they themselves were not always best suited to execute their own standards for diplomatic practice betrayed a profound respect for the diplomatic process and a desire to meet and exceed its normative expectations. What's more, at each stage of the Qing's diplomatic transformation, the ministers also expected these foreigners to serve a didactic purpose. While this began with a desire to have them provide information, explication and commentary about the non-Qing world, the

emergence of a diplomatic emphasis at the legations led to these foreigners being sought out as models of practice for the technical underpinnings of diplomacy, whether written or interpersonal, from the writing of diplomatic notes to etiquette and negotiational tact.

At the same time, these foreigners also brought their own goals and agendas to their work. The example of Divie McCartee in Chapter 2 demonstrates how, precisely because there was a lack of consideration for the diplomatic process in the late 1870s and early 1880s, he sought to utilise his unique skillsets and his access to elite networks to seek a solution to the Ryukyu problem independently of the ministers and their staff. Furthermore, Chapters 1 and 3 demonstrate how Halliday Macartney sought to influence ministerial understandings of the outside world and to use his position at the legation to bolster his status within European society.

Beyond the immediate results of this study, this dissertation also makes important methodological contributions to the fields of late imperial and modern Chinese history, and holds broader significance not only for the historical study of China, but for the study of diplomacy as well.

The first critical contribution this dissertation makes is its demonstration of the central importance of *mufu* practice in China's transformation from empire to nation-state. Modernisation theories typically posited the uptake of aspects of Western modernity as occurring through a form of technological and ideological transfer, in which ideas and materiel made an eastward march to be appropriated in non-Western contexts, either as a form of obsequious mimesis or as a form of compelled development enacted under the yoke of Western encroachment. The 'impact-response' model so often associated with John Fairbank was built upon such premises.¹ Such ideas were rightly critiqued by Paul Cohen in his *Discovering History in China*, which called for analytical realignment of China's encounter with

¹ The textbook most associated with this approach is: Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds., *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

Western modernity in accordance with Chinese agency.² However, the conundrum of how then, from the Qing perspective, forms of ‘Western learning’—once largely disparaged and avoided by the scholar-official class—came to be installed and formally practised by the Qing bureaucracy in the twentieth century went unanswered. Developing the insight and evidence provided by Guan Xiaohong’s and Hakoda Keiko’s studies,³ this dissertation has demonstrated that in the case of the uptake of Western European diplomatic culture and practice, isomorphism did indeed occur, but that the frameworks and goals around which the Qing developed these endeavours, namely *mufu* practice, were decidedly Chinese in origin. Indeed, the Qing ransacked its own bureaucratic toolbox to meet the challenges presented by Western modernity.

As a corollary of this point, it is this dissertation’s contention that many of the other aspects we associate with the emergence of modern China were likely built upon similar foundations of extrabureaucratic practice and personnel. While we know much about the importance of the Maritime Customs Service’s role in this process,⁴ this dissertation demonstrates that it was not the only driving engine of change, and that further consideration of the extrabureaucratic context is required. I am not the first to suggest this. Jonathon Porter first hinted at the importance of *mufu* practice for understanding the emergence of the modern Chinese state in his 1972 study.⁵ Moreover, the aforementioned works of Guan Xiaohong and Hakoda Keiko have provided irrefutable empirical evidence about how the personnel and knowhow of extrabureaucratic institutions were absorbed into formal governmental structures in the early twentieth century. This proposition therefore needs to be tested to see how it holds up in other institutional contexts. It is this author’s hope that this dissertation will serve as a clarion call which encourages other scholars to probe further.

² Cohen, *Discovering History in China*.

³ Guan, ‘Cong mufu dao zhiguan’; Hakoda, *Gaikōkan*.

⁴ On the Customs as a ‘bureaucratic rhizome’, see: van de Ven, *Breaking with the Past*.

⁵ Porter, *Private Bureaucracy*.

However, the core contribution of the dissertation on a methodological front lies in its introduction of the foreigner as an ‘indicator species’ for uncovering the contours of the gargantuan shifts China underwent in its transformation from empire to nation-state. While this is not the first study to situate foreign involvement in nineteenth century Qing China within the context of *mufu* practice, it is the first to reveal that when we situate the foreign presence in late Qing China in closer proximity with autochthonous Qing perspectives and practices, we can reap enormous analytical benefits for understanding evolving Chinese attitudes and perspectives on those technical practices of Western origin which became implicated in its modern state building efforts. Indeed, while this study specifically addresses how China engaged with Western European diplomatic culture and practice, I believe its ‘foreigner as indicator species’ methodology could be employed to great benefit for tracing the emergence and professionalisation of other career tracks of Western origin: be it Western legal practice, engineering, architecture, manufacturing, science, mining, translation, or otherwise.⁶

As noted in this dissertation’s introduction, following Paul Cohen’s call for a China-centred understanding of history,⁷ examinations of the foreign presence in China and of other forms of Western engagement with the country gradually fell out of favour.⁸ Instead, an emphasis upon the agency of Han Chinese and Manchu actors in state practices and state building efforts came to the fore in Anglophone studies of Qing China. This dissertation does not dispute the value of these interventions; the so-called ‘New Qing History’ has, for instance, tremendously benefited our understanding of the realities of the Manchu underpinnings of the Qing state. Moreover, there had previously been an undeniable skew towards studies which sought to understand the ‘Western impact’ on nineteenth century China in some shape or form. New and unprecedented access to sources in China and Taiwan

⁶ Studies of the emergence of the Chinese ‘professional’ have emerged, but they typically do not locate their topics in broader timeframes of transformation. One example is: Xu, *Chinese Professionals*.

⁷ Cohen, *Discovering History in China*.

⁸ Bickers, *Empire Made Me*, 13; van de Ven, ‘Globalizing Chinese History’; van de Ven, *Breaking with the Past*, 5–7.

undoubtedly also encouraged these trends away from the Western engagement with China to flourish even further. However, just as the flowering of studies on the distinct cultures and traditions of the Qing's outlying regions (*fanbu*) have helped to bring greater context and depth to our understanding of the Qing state, so, too, can studies of the foreign presence in the country. It is not a case of 'either-or'. Par Cassel's recent work has, for instance, demonstrated how insights reaped from the New Qing History can help contextualise our understanding of foreign involvement in the treaty ports.⁹ The opposite is also true: an analysis of the foreign presence can also bring greater depth to our understanding of how the Qing met the novel challenges presented by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

This dissertation therefore concurs with Robert Bickers and Hans van de Ven that a deliberate erasure of the foreign presence to pursue an agenda which seeks to promote only Chinese agency is, in fact, hugely detrimental to our understanding of Chinese history.¹⁰ An obvious point is that such analysis allows us to better perceive the 'hard' and 'soft' agendas of foreign imperialist encroachment and the lives and contexts which underpinned these efforts. However, as this dissertation has sought to stress, precisely because the employment of so many foreigners in the extrabureaucratic context of late Qing China was predicated upon *mufu* practice, the foreign presence serves as a profoundly fruitful conduit for teasing out new and important insights into some of the monumental sociocultural shifts and state building efforts that were underway in China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Given the often violent and manipulative character of the Western presence in China in the nineteenth century,¹¹ some might argue that interpreting foreign

⁹ Here, I am specifically referring to Cassel's argument that the Qing acceptance of alternative legal order in the treaty ports ought to be contextualised against the backdrop of the Qing's acceptance of legal pluralism in its outlying regions (*fanbu*). Par K. Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15–29.

¹⁰ Bickers, *Empire Made Me*, 13; van de Ven, 'Globalizing Chinese History'; van de Ven, *Breaking with the Past*, 5–7.

¹¹ Hevia, *English Lessons*.

involvement through the *mufu* lens allows for a veiled apologetics of imperialism, dressed up in a theoretical framework which seeks to legitimise itself through an autochthonous dress. Such a view, however, would betray a very poor grasp of the Qing perspective, and fails to afford the Qing adequate agency to make decisions for itself, and furthermore, to perceive some of the nuances underpinning foreign involvement in Chinese affairs.¹² The Qing were unencumbered by the nationalist perspective that colours our hindsight,¹³ in which the employment of foreigners who had useful skills is seen as some sort of inadequacy or incursion, at least in the affairs of state. This is not to deny that these foreigners brought their own agendas to their work, which could, in some cases, undoubtedly be interpreted as a form of ‘soft’ imperialism that took the ‘export of civility’ as its overriding purpose.¹⁴ Nevertheless, a *muyou* provided the technical expertise and knowledge that his host required due to the host being inadequately positioned to execute such tasks himself, irrespective of ethnic origin.¹⁵ Because so many of the new imperatives of the Qing bureaucracy in the nineteenth century pertained to Western learning, a significant number of foreigners were therefore unsurprisingly implicated in these dyadic host-to-*muyou* relationships.

That is not to deny the fact that individuals of Han background or otherwise were also sought out for their expertise in Western learning.¹⁶ However, one of the key areas of added value reaped by employing the foreigner as an ‘indicator species’ for perceiving China’s modern transformation over their Han counterparts lies in the fact that so many of the tasks associated with ‘Western learning’ ended up becoming either: (a) imperatives for the performance of the modern Chinese state, or (b) desirable or worthy professions because of the abolition of the imperial examination and the ensuing ‘intellectual labour revolution’. In other words, the foreign *muyou* is

¹² On this point, see: Bickers, *Out of China*, 406–7.

¹³ Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Condition’.

¹⁴ Thomas, *Civility*, 214–46.

¹⁵ Hayamaru, ‘Yōmu’.

¹⁶ Take, for instance, the relationship between Li Hongzhang and his *muyou* Ma Jianzhong: Banno, *Ba Kenchū*; Okamoto, *Ba Kenchū*.

a valuable ‘indicator species’ precisely because these tasks ultimately became tasks that the Chinese had to learn to do for *themselves*, or because they came to be socially desirable or viable as a means to achieving upwards social mobility. As attempted in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, tracing the expulsion or peripheralisation of those foreigners who had previously played a central role in conducting these tasks reveals critical insight into when such perceptions and attitudes emerged.

This dissertation’s careful reading of the precise dynamic between the legation ministers and the foreigners who served them has also enabled an important discovery about the evolving sociological dynamic between foreigner and Chinese employer.¹⁷ Two of the key aspects that defined a *muyou* were that he effectively worked on a level playing field with that of his host, and that he often conducted the host’s work on his behalf. However, as argued in Chapter 4, from the advent of the twentieth century, a new ideal for the relationship between foreigner and Chinese employee emerged. This new ideal emphasised a desire to impose a clearly defined hierarchy between employee and foreigner, in which the foreigner, while permitted to feed advice into the decision-making process, was not charged with its execution. While the introduction of such strictures arguably could be seen purely as indicative of a shift towards a more ‘rational’ Weberian form of bureaucratic order,¹⁸ the fact that there was a need to articulate the dynamics of these relationships serves as further evidence of the past precedent of *mufu* practice: why else would there be a need to define the terms of a foreigner’s employment so concretely? This shift has hitherto been difficult to perceive because of the tendency for much of the secondary literature to position foreign involvement in China in homogenous terms under the umbrella terms of ‘Western adviser’ or ‘foreign expert’. It is this author’s hope that such a discovery stimulates more nuanced analysis of foreign involvement in Chinese affairs in the future.

¹⁷ By this, I mean to deliberately exclude those individuals who worked in the ‘imperium in imperio’-esque institutions such as the Customs service.

¹⁸ Weber, *Economy and Society*, 347–48.

Beyond its implications for the study of China, this dissertation holds potential implications for how we approach the study of diplomatic history as well, contributing to a growing body of scholarship, united and committed around the principles which underpin the ‘New Diplomatic History’.

The first key point to make in this regard is that it joins a growing body of work which interrogates the actual *practice* of diplomacy, and the skills and circuitries which underpin the work in this realm.¹⁹ Traditional narratives of diplomatic history typically focused upon either diplomatic personae, particularly that of the ambassador, or took an outcomes-focused approach which often narrated the negotiation process with little regard for the tools being employed in the arenas of interaction. Writing about Qing diplomatic history has been no different.²⁰ What’s more, when scholars have sought to interrogate China’s acclimatisation to Western European diplomatic practice, the typical barometers to be invoked have been either Qing receptivity to international law or institutional shifts, such as the founding of the Waiwubu or the implementation of exams which betrayed a newfound commitment to diplomatic specialisation. As this study has repeatedly stressed, while an understanding of international law became increasingly important in the nineteenth century, it has too often been conflated with the broader embrace of Western diplomacy. However, as Chapter 3 of this dissertation sought to convey, the path to diplomacy involved so much more than just international law. This dissertation therefore seeks to call for future research that makes more considered studies of diplomatic transformation which move beyond such staid barometers.

The next point is that this study’s ‘foreigner as indicator species’ methodology may well serve as a viable approach for diplomatic historians working on other non-

¹⁹ See, for instance: Hillard von Thiessen, ‘Switching Roles in Negotiation: Levels of Diplomatic Communication between Pope Paul V Borghese (1605–1621) and the Ambassadors of Philip III’, in *Paroles de négociateurs: l’entretien dans la pratique diplomatique de la fin du Moyen Âge à la fin du XIXe siècle*, ed. Stefano Andretta (Rome: École française de Rome, 2010), 151–72; Isabella Lazzarini, *Communication and Conflict: Italian Diplomacy in the Early Renaissance, 1350–1520* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); de Vivo, ‘Archives of Speech’.

²⁰ Two examples in the Anglophone context are: V. G. Kiernan, *British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1885* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939); Eastman, *Throne and Mandarins*.

Western cultures. As noted in Chapter 1, Japan, Siam and Chosŏn Korea similarly maintained a cadre of foreign staff in their legations and consulates. An analysis, executed through the analytical lens of the foreign contingents they maintained, could potentially help to elucidate how these various cultures approached the challenge of integrating Western European diplomatic culture and practice into their own bureaucratic traditions. Indeed, as was the case with this dissertation, to what extent these foreign intermediaries helped or enabled this process as a transitional task force can help elucidate otherwise opaque processes and circuitries, and reveal when these states came to perceive Western European diplomatic culture and practice as a state imperative. This dissertation revealed through its analysis of the foreign presence in the Qing's legations that, in the Qing case, this process did not constitute a full-blown mimesis of Western institutions and practices. Instead, the Qing drew upon its own autochthonous extrabureaucratic tradition of *mufu* practice to meet the challenges of normative mastery and acclimatisation. Studies of other countries may reveal other interesting approaches that confound Eurocentric narratives of the uptake of Western European diplomatic culture and practice.²¹

This dissertation also contributes to new scholarship about the significance of subambassadorial or subministerial diplomatic actors. Such individuals constitute a class which, until recently, had long been given short shrift by traditional studies of diplomatic history, with the Qing case being no exception.²² On this front, this study makes important contributions to how we understand the subjective agency of these subministerial actors.

So unwittingly conditioned by the nation-state paradigm as we are, diplomatic historians have often inadvertently interpreted early modern diplomacy through an analytical lens which is moored in understandings of the nineteenth-century

²¹ For a study of this sort, see: Deep K. Datta-Ray, *The Making of Modern Indian Diplomacy: A Critique of Eurocentrism* (London: Hurst & Company, 2015).

²² See my analysis in: Barrett, 'Makkāti', 2–4, 26–29.

European nation-state.²³ This has frequently led historians to perceive the underpinning motivations of diplomatic actors in terms of their unbridled commitment to the nation-state and its cause. Hillard von Thiessen demonstrates that there was a diversity in motivations in the early modern period, and has put forward the concept of normative competition (*Normenkonkurrenz*) to understand how co-existing norms shaped and affected the decisions and actions taken by actors in the early modern European context.²⁴ Von Thiessen specifically identifies that the behaviour and actions taken by early modern ambassadors were not only circumscribed by their sense of duty to the sovereign they served, but also, as individuals of aristocratic background, by the imperatives of the family and patronage networks that they were part of. In other words, in the early modern period the obligations attendant upon one's *public* or *official* role were not the ultimate determinants of how an ambassador would function. Rather, any specific action constituted a careful balancing act that took multiple normative systems into account. Problematically, however, von Thiessen's scholarship only sees this idea as viable for actors working at the ambassadorial level, positing that subordinate diplomatic workers, who bore the brunt of the diurnal diplomatic grind, already exhibited a form of professionalism in the early modern period that evinced a duty to the early modern princely state.²⁵ In contrast, the early modern ambassador resisted the stately grip until the eighteenth century, after which a 'bureaucratic ethos of office' emerged.²⁶ Florian Kühnel has recently disputed this view, convincingly

²³ Hillard von Thiessen and Christian Windler, eds., 'Einleitung', in *Nähe in der Ferne: personale Verflechtung in den Aussenbeziehungen der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 9–13; Riches, *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture*, 17–18.

²⁴ Thiessen, 'Switching Roles in Negotiation'; Hillard von Thiessen, 'Diplomatie vom type ancien. Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus des frühneuzeitlichen Gesandtschaftswesens', in *Akteure der Aussenbeziehungen: Netzwerke und Interkulturalität im historischen Wandel*, ed. Christian Windler and Hillard von Thiessen (Cologne: Böhlau, 2010), 471–504.

²⁵ Florian Kühnel, 'Amt und Person: Botschaftssekretäre und Normenkonkurrenz im frühneuzeitlichen Istanbul', in *Zwischen Domestik und Staatsdiener: Botschaftssekretäre in den frühneuzeitlichen Außenbeziehungen*, ed. Christine Vogel and Florian Kühnel (Cologne: Böhlau, 2021), 169–71.

²⁶ Thiessen, 'Diplomatie vom type ancien', 496, 500; Kühnel, 'Amt und Person', 171.

demonstrating how the normative competition phenomenon was something that affected the actions of early modern subministerial actors just as profoundly.²⁷

This dissertation demonstrates how the normative competition framework holds potential for expansion beyond the temporal and geographic confines of early modern Europe. The foreigners who worked within the Qing's legations can be understood as operating amidst a maelstrom of diverging interests and motivations. McCartee, for instance, had a commitment to serve the ministers, and was also friends with vice-minister Zhang Sigui. Nevertheless, his private actions betray that he also obviously identified a 'higher purpose' in his role which encouraged him to go beyond the ministers and act independently. This could have been motivated by what he understood to be his commitment to getting a fair deal for the Qing. As a Christian and long-serving missionary, the Christian 'ethos' may well have had implications for his actions too.

Similarly, Macartney, too, was affected by multiple competing norms in his work. Like McCartee, he had an obligation to serve the ministers, and had long been friends with Zeng Jize. Yet, we also find evidence of him sharing information with the British side, and of him seeking to use his unique status as Qing servant to enhance his standing within British and European society. He also claimed that his work was underpinned by a desire to see the Qing 'conform to the usages of civilised nations.'²⁸ His work, then, was also galvanised by a decided 'civilising' mission.

At the same time, these case studies also reveal how a dynamic interplay could exist between these competing norms. Indeed, in the case of Macartney, his self-fashioning endeavours and his sharing of information with the British could be seen as constituting facets of his character which were acted out according to the norms of self-gain and patriotism. However, far from 'competing' with the norm that dictated that he had to be loyal to his employer, they often conversely helped bring more opportunities for diplomatic breakthrough for the Qing.

²⁷ Kühnel, 'Amt und Person'.

²⁸ Boulger, *Macartney*, 482.

A further point also needs to be made about the agency the foreigners surveyed in this study exerted in influencing ministerial perceptions. As we saw in Chapter 1, just because Macartney functioned as, at least in Western terms, a ‘subministerial’ actor,²⁹ this did not mean that the ministers were unaffected by Macartney’s own agency as a subjective actor. Indeed, as Guo and Liu’s main interpreter and chaperone, he monopolised a privileged position for influencing not only their understandings of the West, but also the knowledge of it that was recorded in the *chushi riji* and sent back to China. Macartney also sought to make similar interventions in British understandings of China as well for considered purposes. As Chapter 3 argued, Macartney sought to propagate ‘imperfect’ knowledge about the workings of the Qing bureaucracy, particularly the Zongli Yamen, that presented it in commensurable terms with a Western foreign office. Furthermore, his invocation of ‘strategic orientalism’, whilst creating disparaging ‘knowledge’ about the Qing, also served an ulterior motive of seeking to exact concessions from the British. In many ways, then, these individuals performed a similar role to the dragomans recently analysed by E. Natalie Rothman who were central to the creation of Orientalist knowledge production about the Ottoman Empire.³⁰

Diplomatic historian Geoff Berridge has recently made the claim that a ‘counter revolution’ has come to characterise recent global diplomatic practice; a counter revolution in which a return to the pre-nineteenth century practice of hiring non-nationals has begun to remerge.³¹ Tellingly, in a recent memoir, veteran American diplomat William Burns recounts how during his posting in Jordan, the local employees in the consular section demonstrated for him ‘the critical role that foreign service nationals play at American diplomatic posts around the world’, and explains that they were the embassy’s ‘trusted eyes and ears, patient guides, and the one

²⁹ By making this statement I wish to highlight the fact that the relationship between *muyou* and host typically occurred upon a plane of parity.

³⁰ Rothman, *Dragoman Renaissance*.

³¹ G. R. Berridge, ‘The Counter-Revolution in Diplomacy’, in *The Counter-Revolution in Diplomacy, and Other Essays* (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1–15.

thread of continuity of knowledge, expertise, and contacts as officers came and went.³²

This author had the opportunity to make a similar observation when he worked as an intern at the British Embassy in Tokyo in 2012. While the ambassador, counsellors and other important members of staff all played important roles at the embassy in their own right, many lacked advanced competency in the Japanese language, undoubtedly a result of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office since 2020) fears over ‘localitis’. That is, the fear that one’s diplomats might develop a penchant for prioritising the imperatives of the state to which they were accredited, over those of the state they were there to represent.³³ Instead, it was the locally recruited Japanese staff, predominantly female, who bore the brunt of the embassy’s endeavours which required advanced Japanese proficiency, whether the translation of a pamphlet, the crafting of a tweet, or a cold call to a potential Japanese investor in the UK market.

Local hires, while posing obvious risks to governments, can nevertheless play an important function for counteracting the shortage of expertise that is inevitably brought by fears over localitis. They bring the obvious benefit of understandings of the local language, geography, culture and customs. At the same time, the case studies in this dissertation also reveal that their access to local networks and understanding of local contexts can also bring the potential for unexpected diplomatic breakthroughs.

In the era of immense global interconnection, the viability of traditional state-to-state frameworks for diplomacy, and even the embassy itself, have come to be increasingly called into question. However, it is evident that we have also recently entered an era of increasing international polarisation, in which the ravages of war have come to afflict Europe once again. In this new age, in which we are in greater

³² William J. Burns, *The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal* (New York: Random House, 2019), 25.

³³ Diplomats are, therefore, frequently moved around from post to post to prevent against this. Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 10, 117–18.

need of intermediaries of peace and reconciliation than ever, perhaps the local foreign hire may yet come to thrive again.

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Appendix

List of Foreigners Employed in the Service of China's Legations and Consulates, 1876-1949

1. Introduction

What follows is a list of all the foreign staff I have identified as working in legation and consular posts in late Qing and Republican China. Only foreigners working as counsellors, secretaries, interpreters, legal advisors, consuls, honorary consuls, and attendant staff members have been surveyed. Individuals described in ambiguous terms in Chinese as either *yangyuan* 洋員 or *banshi yangyuan* 辦事洋員 are rendered as 'Staff Member'.

2. Foreigners Employed in the Legations and Consulates of Qing China

		Name	Chinese names	Posts	Recommender	Birthplace	Prior role
Austria-Hungary	Vienna Legation	Carl Traugott Kreyer (1839—1914)	金楷理	Counsellor (?—1903)		Germany	Interpreter to Shanghai Circuit Intendant
			祿琦	Attendant Staff Member (1903—?)	Wu Dezhang 吳德章	Austria-Hungary	

	Austria-Hungary Consulate	Alfred Taussig	安福來特道西克, 道西克	Honorary Consul (1909—?)	Lei Butong 雷浦同	Austria-Hungary	Merchant
Belgium	Brussels Legation	Carl Traugott Kreyer (1839—1914)	金楷理	Counsellor (?—1903)		Germany	Interpreter to Shanghai Circuit Intendant
Britain	London Legation	Halliday Macartney (1833—1906)	馬格里, 清臣	Secretary (1876—1883), Counsellor (1883—1905)	Li Hongzhang 李鴻章	Scotland	Director of Jinliang Arsenal
		James Twinem (?—1886)	屠邁倫, 特維難	Staff Member (1877—1879)	Robert Hart		Official in Chinese Customs
		Colin Jamieson	哲美森	Staff Member (1877—?)	Robert Hart		Official in Chinese Customs
			蒙純	Adviser to Wang Daxie (1907—?)	Wang Daxie 汪大燮		Lawyer
	John McLeavy Brown (1835—1926)	柏卓安	Counsellor (1907-1912), Staff Member (1912—1926)	George Ernest Morrison, Li Jingfang 李經方	Northern Ireland	Inspector General of Korean Customs	
London Consulate General	Alderman John Forster	福士達	Honorary Consul-General (1908—?)	Li Jingfang 李經方	Britain	Mayor of St. Helens	
Cuba	Havana Consulate	Richard James Cay	溪理察	Staff Member (1879—?)		Britain	
			溪拉烏	Staff Member (?—1909?)			
France	Paris Legation	Halliday Macartney (1833—1906)	馬格里, 清臣	Secretary (1891—?)	Xue Fucheng 薛福成	Scotland	Director of Jinliang Arsenal
		Carl Traugott Kreyer (1839—1914)	金楷理	Counsellor (?—1903)	Li Fengbao 李鳳苞	Germany	Interpreter to Shanghai Circuit Intendant
			雷洛施	Staff Member			
			阿爾瑪呢	Staff Member (1902—?)	Yu Geng 裕庚		Italian Naval Officer
			杜瓦賚	Staff Member (1902—?)	Yu Geng 裕庚		Commander of the Papal Swiss Guard

	Bordeaux Consulate		柏朗	Honorary Consul (1910—1911)	Liu Shixun 劉式訓		Merchant
			貝爾孟	Honorary Consul (1908—?)	Liu Shixun 劉式訓		Merchant
Germany	Berlin Legation	Henry Octavius Brown	薄郎	Interpreter (1877—1879)	Robert Hart		Official in Chinese Customs
		Carl Traugott Kreyer (1839—1914)	金楷理	Secretary, Counsellor (1880—1903)	Li Fengbao 李鳳苞	Germany	Interpreter to Shanghai Circuit Intendant
		de Scheve		Staff Member (1882—1884?)			
		Otto Franke (1863—1946)	福蘭格, 傅蘭克, 佛朗克	Counsellor (1901—1907)		Germany	Interpreter to German Legation in China
		Basse	巴斯	Interpreter (1903—?)			
		Brocke	柏樂克	Interpreter (1903—?)			
Italy	Rome Legation		畢梯蓬	Secretary (1902?—?)	Xu Jue 許珏	Italy	
		Carl Traugott Kreyer (1839—1914)	金楷理	Counsellor (?—1903), Adviser (1908—1910)		Germany	Interpreter to Shanghai Circuit Intendant
	Rome Consulate		別里尼	Honorary Consul (1908—?)			
	Genoa Consulate	Mackenzie William	馬根齊	Honorary Consul (1911—?)	Wu Zonglian 吳宗濂	Italy	Merchant
	Naples Consulate	Leone Jannuzzi (1878—1959)	雅納威	Honorary Consul (1903—), Honorary General—Consul (1908—?)	Xu Jue 許珏	Italy	Lawyer
Japan	Tokyo Legation	Divie Bethune McCartee (1820—1900)	麥嘉締, 培端, 麥培端	Secretary (1878—1880)	Zhang Sigui 張斯桂, He Ruzhang 何如璋	America	Consular Staff

		Jose Wilde Loureiro (1868—1829)	羅祝謝	Staff Member (1887)		Nagasaki, Japan (Portuguese)	Official in Chinese Customs
Mozambique	Mozambique Consulate		費里士窩傳	Vice-Consul (1905?—1911), Consul (1911—?)	Liu Yulin 劉玉麟	Germany	Merchant
Netherlands	The Hague Legation	Carl Traugott Kreyer (1839—1914)	金楷理	Counsellor (?—1903)	Xu Jingcheng 許景澄	Germany	Interpreter to Shanghai Circuit Intendant
Norway	Christiania Consulate	Frederik Schjøth (1846—1935)	余德	Honorary Consul, Honorary Consul-General (1908—?)	Li Jingfang 李經方	Norway	Official in Chinese Customs
Peru	Lima Legation		德理安	Staff Member (1885—1890?)			
			杜嘉爾	Staff Member (1890—?)			
Russia	St. Petersburg Legation	Carl Traugott Kreyer (1839—1914)	金楷理	Counsellor (?—1903)	Xu Jingcheng 許景澄	Germany	Interpreter to Shanghai Circuit Intendant
Spain	Madrid Legation	Rousett		Interpreter (1881—1882)			
		Félix March (?—1886)	馬治, 麥治	Secretary and Interpreter (1883—1886)		Britain	Correspondent (<i>The Times</i>)
		L.B. March		Secretary and Interpreter (1887—?)			

		Isidore Gordón	科敦	Secretary and Interpreter (1890—1899)		Britain	
Sweden	Stockholm Legation	Carl Traugott Kreyer (1839—1914)	金楷理	Counsellor (?—1903)		Germany	Interpreter to Shanghai Circuit Intendant
United States	Washington Legation	David W. Bartlett (1828—1912)	柏立	Secretary (1878—1890?)	Yung Wing 容闈	America	Correspondent (<i>New York Evening Post</i> and <i>New York Independent</i>)
		John Watson Foster (1836—1917)	科士達, 福士達, 科律師	Legal Adviser (1886—1909?)	Zhang Yinhuang 張蔭桓	America	Diplomat
			梅津司, 梅律師	Legal Adviser (?—?)	Sui Guoyin 崔國因		Lawyer
	Boston Consulate	Stephen Westcott Nickerson	彌格臣	Honorary Vice-Consul (1902—1905), Honorary Consul (1905—?)	Wu Tingfang 伍廷芳	America	Lawyer
	New York Consulate		麥克當	Staff Member (1881—?)		America	
	Philadelphia Consulate	Thomas W. Barlow (1855—1920)		Honorary Consul (1905—?)	Liang Cheng 梁誠	America	Assistant District Attorney to Philadelphia
	San Francisco Consulate	Frederick Alfonso Bee (1826—1892)	傅列秘	Consul (1878—1892)	Yung Wing 容闈, Chen Lanbin 陳蘭彬	America	Lawyer

3. *Foreigners Employed in the Legations and Consulates of the Beijing Government*

		Name	Chinese names	Posts	Recommender	Birthplace	Prior role
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro Legation		呂霍柏	Secretary (1914—)			
	London Legation	John McLeavy Brown (1835—1926)	柏卓安	Counsellor (1907-1912), Staff Member (1912—1926)	George Ernest Morrison, Li Jingfang 李經方	Northern Ireland	Inspector General of Korean Customs
Britain	London Consulate General	Alderman John Forster	福士達	Honorary Consul-General (1908—?)	Li Jingfang 李經方	Britain	Mayor of St. Helens
	Denmark Consulate		郎蒲虛	Honorary Consul (1918—?)		Denmark	
France	Bordeaux Consulate		埃勃里柏脫	Honorary Consul (1917—?)			
	Marseilles Consulate		納蓋來	Honorary Consul (1917—?)			
Italy	Rome Legation		畢梯蓬	Secretary (1900—?)	Xu Jue 許珽	Italy	
	Genoa Consulate	Mackenzie William	馬根齊	Honorary Consul (1911—?)		Italy	Merchant
			低藹黎	Honorary Vice-Consul (1914—?)			
	Milan Consulate	Rossari Augusto	羅薩黎	Honorary Consul (1914—?)			
			蒙低	Honorary Vice-Consul (1914—?)			
	Turin Consulate	Vaccari Alessandro	佛喀黎	Honorary Consul (1914—?)			
Carullo Paolo		喀呂祿	Honorary Vice-Consul (1914—?)				

	Napoli Consulate	Leone Jannuzzi (1878—1959)	雅納威	Honorary Consul (1903—?), Honorary General Consul (1908—?)	Xu Jue 許珏	Italy	Lawyer
			雅納徐	Honorary Vice-Consul (1914—)			
	Rome Consulate		別里尼	Honorary Consul (1908—)			
	Venice Consulate	M. Gorlori	葛勒黎	Honorary Consul (1914—1936)			
		徐鳥爾查	Honorary Vice-Consul (1914—)				
New Zealand	New Zealand Consulate		柏蘭登	Staff Member (1913—1920?)			
Norway	Christiania Consulate	Frederik Schjøth (1846—1935)	余德	Honorary Consul, Honorary Consul-General (1908—?)	Li Jingfang 李經方	Norway	Official in Chinese Customs
		Peter Carl Hansson (1872—1959)	韓森	Honorary Consul (1922—)		Norway	Official in Chinese Customs
		Erik T. Schjøth (1888—1949)	余德	Honorary Consul-General (1936—)		Norway	Official in Chinese Customs
South Africa	South Africa Consulate		白雷	Honorary Consul (1913—1920?)		America	
Spain	Barcelona Consulate		奧泰嘉	Honorary Consul-General (1918—?)			

	Valencia Consulate		培爾那	Honorary Consul-General (1918—?)			
Sweden	Sweden Consulate		史文漢隆	Honorary Consul-General (1918—?)			
United States	New York Consulate		麥克當	Staff Member (1881—1920?)		America	

4. *Foreigners Employed in the Consulates of the Guomindang Government*

		Name	Chinese names	Posts	Recommender	Birthplace	Prior role
Austria	Vienna Consulate	Hans Branaies	柏蘭台	Honorary Consul (1936—?)		Austria	
Belgium	Brussels Consulate	Maurice Picters	馬立師 白德斯	Honorary Consul		Belgium	
Brazil	Pernambuco Consulate	Zeferino Camuce	克蘭	Honorary Consul		Brazil	
		Siquerra Granja	施克拉 甘亞	Honorary Consul		Brazil	
Britain	Birmingham Consulate	Frederick John Long Hickinbotham	郝賡鮑生	Honorary Consul (1939—?)		Britain	
	Sheffield Consulate	F. M. Osborn		Consul?		Britain	
Czechoslovakia	Prague Consulate	Oldrich Busek	卜歇克	Honorary Consul		Czechoslovakia	

Denmark	Copenhagen Consulate	H. O. Lange	蘭克	Honorary Consul-General (1938—?)		France	
Finland	Helsinki Consulate	Helmer Lindell	林題	Honorary Consul		France	
France	Marseilles Consulate	M. Negre	納葛	Honorary Consul (1936—?)		France	
Germany	Cologne Consulate	Richard Berndorff	白連多夫	Honorary Consul-General		Germany	
Italy	Genoa Consulate	Mackenzie William	馬根齊	Honorary Consul (1911—1938?)		Italy	
	Milan Consulate	Rossari Augusto	羅薩黎	Honorary Consul (1914—)		Italy	
	Naples Consulate	Leone Jannuzzi (1878—1959)	雅納威	Honorary Consul (1903—?), Honorary General Consul (1908—?)	Xu Jue 許珏	Italy	Lawyer
	Turin Consulate	Vaccari Alessandro	佛喀黎	Honorary Consul (1914—)			
		Carullo Paolo	喀呂祿	Honorary Vice-Consul 1914—)			
	Venice Consulate	M. Corlori	葛勒黎	Honorary Consul (1914—?)			
Norway	Oslo Consulate	Erik T. Schjøth (1888—1949)	余德	Honorary Consul-General		Norway	Official in Chinese Customs
Peru	Arequipa Consulate	Valdes	凡爾德	Honorary Vice-Consul (1935—?)		Peru	
		Llaguno	易古納	Honorary Consul (1935—?)			
	Cañete Consulate	Cabieses	克比色	Honorary Vice-Consul (1931—?)		Peru	

Casma Consulate	Reyna	銳納	Honorary Vice-Consul (1931—?)		Peru	
Chiclayo Consulate	Piedra	比特拉	Honorary Consul (1935—?)		Peru	
Chimbote Consulate	Rivadenayra	雷瓦登納拉	Honorary Consul		Peru	
Chincha Consulate	S. Duffant	地逢	Honorary Vice-Consul		Peru	
	Songuineti	山磯納第	Honorary Vice-Consul (1940—?)			
Huancayo Consulate	Salazar	撒拉撒	Honorary Consul (1935—?)		Peru	
Ica Consulate	M. Victoria	維多尼亞	Honorary Vice—Consul		Peru	
	Silva	錫爾佛	Honorary Vice-Consul (1935—?)			
Iquitos Consulate	Israel	易斯拉	Honorary Consul (1931—?)		Britain	
Moquegua Consulate	Davila	唐維納	Honorary Consul (1931—?)		Peru	
Mollende Consulate	Valdez	凡爾德	Honorary Vice-Consul		Peru	
Nazca Consulate	Prada	柏拉特	Honorary Consul (1935—?)		Peru	
Pacasmayo Consulate	Santolalla	桑多拉拉	Honorary Consul		Peru	
Paita Consulate	Tassara	特撒拉	Honorary Consul (1931—?)		Peru	
Pisco Consulate	Sasieta	撒西愛德	Honorary Consul (1935—?)		Peru	
San Martín Consulate	Razetto	拉色多	Honorary Vice-Consul (1937—?)		Peru	
Trujillo Consulate	M. Cox	考克司	Honorary Consul		Peru	
	Roberto Parodi	柏考弟	Honorary Consul (1935—?)		Peru	

Spain	Barcelona Consulate	Luis Bigas	畢格思	Honorary Consul			
	Valencia Consulate	S. Antonio	安多尼	Honorary Consul-General		Spain	
Sweden	Stockholm Consulate	Irar Gustaf Hellberg	海伯爾	Honorary Vice-Consul		Sweden	
Switzerland	Luzerne Consulate	Klein	克蘭	Honorary Consul (1940—?)			