Journal article
Extending tournament solutions
- Abstract:
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An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties—e.g., when there is an odd number of agents with linear preferences—the majority relation is antisymmetric and complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments have a rich mathematical theory and many formal results for majoritarian functions assume that the majority...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
-
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(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 431.8KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s00355-018-1112-x
Authors
Funding
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Social Choice and Welfare Journal website
- Volume:
- 51
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 193–222
- Publication date:
- 2018-01-16
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-01-05
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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0176-1714
- ISSN:
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1432-217X
Item Description
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:819318
- UUID:
-
uuid:b684c834-cfdf-42e9-83fb-9196dcd9e9b1
- Local pid:
- pubs:819318
- Source identifiers:
-
819318
- Deposit date:
- 2018-01-12
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2018 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Springer at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1112-x
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