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Journal article

Extending tournament solutions

Abstract:

An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties—e.g., when there is an odd number of agents with linear preferences—the majority relation is antisymmetric and complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments have a rich mathematical theory and many formal results for majoritarian functions assume that the majority...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s00355-018-1112-x

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
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Grant:
Feodor Lynen research fellowship
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Grant:
Starting Grant 639945 (“ACCORD”
Publisher:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg Publisher's website
Journal:
Social Choice and Welfare Journal website
Volume:
51
Issue:
2
Pages:
193–222
Publication date:
2018-01-16
Acceptance date:
2018-01-05
DOI:
EISSN:
0176-1714
ISSN:
1432-217X
Source identifiers:
819318
Pubs id:
pubs:819318
UUID:
uuid:b684c834-cfdf-42e9-83fb-9196dcd9e9b1
Local pid:
pubs:819318
Deposit date:
2018-01-12

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