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Journal article

Extending tournament solutions

Abstract:

An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties—e.g., when there is an odd number of agents with linear preferences—the majority relation is antisymmetric and complete and can thus conveniently be represented by a tournament. Tournaments have a rich mathematical theory and many formal results for majoritarian functions assume that the majority...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s00355-018-1112-x

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS Division
Department:
Computer Science
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Grant:
Feodor Lynen research fellowship
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Grant:
Advanced Grant 291528 (“RACE”)
Publisher:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg Publisher's website
Journal:
Social Choice and Welfare Journal website
Volume:
51
Issue:
2
Pages:
193–222
Publication date:
2018-01-16
Acceptance date:
2018-01-05
DOI:
EISSN:
0176-1714
ISSN:
1432-217X
Pubs id:
pubs:819318
URN:
uri:b684c834-cfdf-42e9-83fb-9196dcd9e9b1
UUID:
uuid:b684c834-cfdf-42e9-83fb-9196dcd9e9b1
Local pid:
pubs:819318

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